must allege “that the [defendant] agreed, either by words or action or conduct, to undertake any form of actual contractual commitment to the plaintiff.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) D’Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of Directors of Notre Dame High School, 202 Conn. 206, 211-12 n.2, 520 A.2d 217 (1987). The defendants move to strike the third count of the revised complaint on the ground that the action is barred by the six year statute of limitations, claiming that the last alleged acts or omissions committed by any defendant were in 1991. The plaintiff, however, has alleged that she was disfellowshipped from Watchtower in March, 1996. It is the plaintiffs claim that during the term of her membership, Watchtower agreed that in exchang c Diocesan Corp., 10 F. Sup. 2d 138 (D. Conn. 1998) (<HOLDING>). “It is now well established that state
holding that claim of breach of fiduciary duty can be resolved under connecticut law holding that breach of fiduciary duty claim was preempted by fehba holding that plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial on claim of breach of fiduciary duty where underlying claim was a common law negligence action holding that a plaintiff seeking individual relief under erisa  502a3 under a breach of fiduciary duty theory did not have a cause of action when the alleged breach of fiduciary duty was a failure to distribute benefits in accordance with the plan holding that missouri law applied to the plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claim because it is corporate law that defines the contours of that duty