assertion of the right to a timely appeal; and 4) the prejudice occasioned by the delay. See Simmons, 898 F.2d at 868 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-33, 92 S.Ct. at 2191-93). While the projected delay in this ease is not as extreme as some of the previous cases in which appellate delay has given rise to a due process violation, see, e.g., Cody, 936 F.2d at 719 (nine to ten years); Simmons, 898 F.2d at 867 (six years), it is within the period of time considered by the courts to be indicative of a violation of due process. See, e.g., Burkett v. Fulcomer, 951 F.2d 1431, 1445-46 (3d Cir.1991) (eighteen-month delay between sentencing and appellate decision constituted due process violation), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 3055, 120 L.Ed.2d 921 (1992); see also Harris, 15 F.3d at 1561 (<HOLDING>); Coe v. Thurman, 922 F.2d 528, 531 (9th
holding twoyear delay created rebuttable presumption of due process violation and citing cases in which delays of seventeento eighteenmonths either gave rise to or warranted inquiry into possible due process violation holding that in similar factual situation no due process violation occurred holding that mere neglect for prisoners safety does not amount to a substantive due process violation implying that intent to do harm would be an abuse of government power and amount to a substantive due process violation holding habeas petition was not second or successive where first petition did not attack conviction but alleged due process violation due to delay in adjudication of direct appeal in state court holding that state postconviction delays do not give rise to independent due process claims that are cognizable under  2254