these doctors. See Appellants’ Brief at 38-44 (citing, inter alia, Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 79 S.Ct. 1400, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 77 S.Ct. 752, 1 L.Ed.2d 796 (1957); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 35 S.Ct. 240, 59 L.Ed. 441 (1914); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 28 S.Ct. 277, 52 L.Ed. 436 (1907)). This argument is patently frivolous. The Supreme Court decisions upon which appellants rely have either been expressly overruled, see, e.g., Lincoln Federal Labor Union No. 19,129 v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 533-37, 69 S.Ct. 251, 255-57, 93 L.Ed. 212 (1949) (expressly rejecting the Adair-Coppage interpretation of the Due Process Clause), or are clearly inapposite, see Greene, 360 U.S. at 508, 79 S.Ct. at 1419 (<HOLDING>); Schware, 353 U.S. at 239-47, 77 S.Ct. at
holding prior statement subject to crossexamination when made does not violate confrontation clause holding that the failure to attach a custody order was not reversible error because there was no showing of prejudice where the respondents were aware of the childs placement the petition noted that custody of the child was given by prior orders the respondent admitted that the child was in the legal custody of the buncombe county department of social services and the respondents were present at pretermination hearings in which custody was granted to petitioner and hearings in which visitation options were discussed and determined holding that the constitutional right to crossexamination must be satisfied first before the court can exercise its discretion in limiting the scope or extent of crossexamination holding that in the absence of explicit authorization from either the president or congress the respondents were not empowered to deprive petitioner of his job in a proceeding in which he was not afforded the safeguards of confrontation and crossexamination holding that the admission of prior testimony that had been subjected to crossexamination violated the confrontation clause because the state did not prove that the witness was unavailable