voluntary dismissal will not entitle him to toll the statute of limitations. See Wood v. Elling Corp., 20 Cal.3d 353, 359, 142 Cal.Rptr. 696, 572 P.2d 755 (1977); Thomas v. Gilliland, 95 Cal.App.4th 427, 433, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 520 (2002). Thus, Johnson’s voluntary dismissal of his state court action is not an event to which equitable tolling applies. V Based on the foregoing, the district court’s dismissal of Johnson’s claims against the defendants under § 1981 and under California Civil Code §§51 and 51.5 for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and the district court’s dismissal of Johnson’s FEHA claims for failure to comply with the statute of limitations are AFFIRMED. 1 . Also named as defendants in thi Cal.3d 72, 81, 219 Cal. Rptr. 150, 707 P.2d 212 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Jackson v. Superior Court, 30 Cal.App.4th
holding that female children excluded from membership in the boys club could bring claims against the organization holding that a class of all high school female athletes could not be certified  even if the alleged conduct of the defendant school system was discriminatory  when some female athletes did not share the same goals or interests as the named female plaintiffs because those unnamed female athletes were satisfied with andor benefitted from the alleged discriminatory treatment holding that debtor whose plan of reorganization had been confirmed by bankruptcy court could not later bring lender liability claims against creditors where those claims could have been raised in bankruptcy proceeding holding that costsplitting provision in pep boys arbitration agreement is severable from the rest of the agreement holding that evidence established a municipal custom within the police department of a code of silence regarding sexual harassment of female officers and of retaliation against female officers who complained about same