to discuss appellate waivers, and we only considered the absence of such a discussion to the extent that it illuminated whether the waiver was knowing and voluntary. See, e.g., United States v. Atterberry, 144 F.3d 1299, 1300 (10th Cir.1998). Nevertheless, prior to the enactment of Rule 11(b)(1)(N), we employed an error analysis when a district court failed to give other warnings that were then required by Rule 11. See, e.g., United States v. Vaughn, 7 F.3d 1533, 1535-36 (10th Cir.1993) (employing error analysis to review a district court’s omission of the instructions required by Rule 11(e)(2)). In light of the clear text of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) and the Supreme Court’s decision in Vonn, we see no reason why we should treat Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors any differently. Vonn, 122 S.Ct. at 1054 (<HOLDING>). Thus, we conduct an error review when a
holding that claims of rule 32h notice error are reviewed for plain error in the absence of an objection holding that the district courts failure to give a required warning now embodied at rule 11b1 is reviewed under harmless error if objection was made in the district court or under plain error if no objection was made holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error holding that sentencing error is harmless if the error did not affect the district courts selection of the sentence imposed holding that to preserve an alleged error in the admission of evidence a timely objection must be made to the introduction of the evidence specific grounds for the objection should be stated and a ruling on the objection must be made by the trial court