obstruction of justice crimes, courts have defined the specific intent element broadly. See Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 207, 13 S.Ct. 542, 37 L.Ed. 419 (1893) (indicating that the intent to take a wrongful act that will have the "natural and probable consequence” of obstructing justice is an “evil intent” to obstruct justice); see also United States v. Hopper, 177 F.3d 824, 830-31 (9th Cir.1999) (indicating that the elements of an obstruction-of-justice offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1505 are satisfied where the defendants had acted to prevent collection of their tax debt, and knew that “the natural and probable effect” of their actions would be to interfere with IRS proceedings (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Gallimore, 491 F.3d 871, 876 (8th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Because we have interpreted § 3146 as
holding that conspiracy to commit a particular substantive offense cannot exist without at least the degree of criminal intent necessary for the substantive offense itself internal quotation marks omitted holding that defendant bears burden of showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 18 usc  3553a  2006  factors internal quotation marks omitted recognizing that to be in violation of 18 usc  115a1b the defendant must act with the intent to retaliate against a government employee on account of the performance of his or her official duties  holding that the second part of 18 usc  115a1b requires that a threat be made with the intent to retaliate against the judge after the judge has acted holding that the only intent necessary to convict a defendant under 18 usc  1513b for retaliating against a witness victim or informant was an intent to retaliate internal quotation marks omitted