suspicion of criminal activity, so long as the officers refrain from the type of intimidating behavior that would lead a reasonable person to believe that the person was not free to leave.”). McKinnon argues that, even crediting Gish’s version of events, the encounter was non-consensual, pointing to Gish’s motive to be proactive and “involved in things before they happen” and to Gish’s failure to elicit any information from him before the patdown. But neither Gish’s motive nor Gish’s decision not to ask any questions before requesting a patdown search bears on the pertinent inquiry here, which is whether a reasonable person would have believed that he could not leave the consensual encounter. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Peters, 194 F.3d 692, 697
holding that in determining whether a seizure has occurred a court must consider if in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was not free to leave recognizing that a person has been seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment only if in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave holding that a person is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave holding that an individuals liberty is restrained only if in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave holding that the defendant was placed in official detention when two police officers approached him and told him that he was under arrest as the defendant could not reasonably have believed that he was free to leave