the same way and explained that the relevant mental distinction between intentional discrimination and “reckless disregard” for federally protected rights is essentially the same as the well-known difference between a “knowing” and a “willful” violation of a criminal law. See 469 U. S., at 126-127. While a criminal defendant, like an employer, need not have knowledge of the law to act “knowingly” or intentionally, he must know that his acts violate the law or must “careless[ly] disregard whether or not one has the right so to act” in order to act “willfully.” United States v. Murdock, 290 U. S. 389, 395 (1933), quoted in Thurston, 469 U. S., at 127. We have interpreted the word “willfully” the same way in the civil context. See McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U. S. 128, 133 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Construing §1981a(b)(1) to impose a purely
holding that the knowledge required by  14202 of the mcdca refers to actual knowledge or reckless disregard as to the falsity of the information or the existence of the right holding that the plain language of the fair labor standards acts willful liquidated damages standard requires that the employer either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the statute without regard to the outrageousness of the conduct at issue holding that the government did not have to prove that the defendant knew that his acts violated the clean water act but merely that he was aware of the conduct that resulted in the permits violation holding that the language of the statute and the courts duty to apply the statute as written requires the court to interpret the statute to apply when the prisoner is sentenced without regard to the institution where the prisoner is incarcerated after the sentencing holding the employees complaints must give adequate notice to the employer that the employee is complaining of conduct prohibited by title vii