raising his claims on direct appeal and that this factor cannot be fairly attributable to [his] own conduct.” Lynn, 365 F.3d at 1235. Rose contends that the district court committed Faretta error by permitting him to proceed pro se at sentencing, and that error should serve as cause. But, if there was error at sentencing, it cannot overcome the procedural-default bar, which prevents § 2255 mov-ants from raising claims they failed to assert on direct appeal. See McKay, 657 F.3d at 1196 (“Under the procedural default rule, a defendant generally must advance an available challenge to a criminal conviction or sentence on direct appeal or else the defendant is barred from presenting that claim in a § 2255 proceeding.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); see also Lynn, 365 F.3d at 1235 (<HOLDING>). And in any event, the record makes clear that
holding that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim alleged to be cause for the procedural default of other claims is itself an independent claim subject to the procedural requirements of exhaustion holding that defendant must have clearly objected at trial to the matter he is raising on appeal holding that the plaintiff was precluded from raising the issue for the first time on appeal holding that to show cause to overcome procedural default a defendant must demonstrate that something prevented him from raising his claims on direct appeal emphasis added holding claims must be raised on direct appeal or waived