of Columbia Circuit identified three factors to be considered in evaluating whether a “law or regulation imposes a substantial, as opposed to inconsequential burden on the litigant’s religious practice,” id. at 1320:(1) whether “the litigant’s beliefs [are] sincere and the practices at issue [are] of a religious nature,” (2) whether “[t]he challenged rule ... burden[s] a central tenet or important practice of the litigant’s reli gion,” and (3) “whether the litigants’ beliefs find any support in the religion to which they subscribe, or whether the litigants are merely relying on a self-serving view of religious practice.” Id. at 1320-21. The court ruled that a religious practice did not have to be mandated by a religion to be significant to the observance of that faith. Id. at 1319 (<HOLDING>). We recently reached the same conclusion,
holding that the court of appeals has jurisdiction over murder cases under the constitution even if thornton directs such cases to be transferred to the supreme court holding that this time requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional holding that no federal court other than the supreme court may entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify a judgment of a state court holding that because a requirement that a religious practice be mandatory to warrant first amendment protection finds no warrant in the cases of the supreme court or of this court catholic prisoners could raise free exercise challenge to rule barring them from consuming small amounts of wine during communion holding that a requirement that a religious practice be mandatory to warrant first amendment protection finds no support in the cases of the supreme court or of this court