amount as liquidated damages.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(c). Mion argues that'the FLSA’s waiver provision should not be read into the FMLA, and that § 2617(a)(4) is the FMLA’s exclu sive limitation on an employee’s right of action. That section provides, in relevant part, that the employee’s right of action terminates when the DOL files a complaint pursuant to § 2617(b) or (d). 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(4). Mion argues that her right of action has not terminated because the DOL has not filed a complaint in this case. However, the plain language of § 2617(a)(4) does not indicate that its limitations are exclusive. Moreover, the FLSA contains a paralle ed employer correspondence, and supplied WH-58 release forms, see Cuevas v. Monroe Street City Club, 752 F.Supp. 1405, 1416 (N.D.Ill.1990) (mem.op.) (<HOLDING>) In this case, the parties agree that the DOL
holding that the flsa preempted plaintiffs fraud claim holding that the flsa does not preempt a state law contractual claim that seeks to recover wages for time that is compensable under the contract but not under the flsa holding that the flsa does not preempt state law contract provisions that are more generous than the flsa demands holding under flsa holding that punitive damages are not allowed under the flsa