and joint stock companies as well as individuals, unless restricted by the context to an individual as distinguished from a corporate entity or specifically restricted to 1 or some of the above enumerated synonyms and, when used to designate the owner of property which may be the subject of an offense, includes this State, the United States, any other State of the United States as defined infra and any foreign country or government lawfully owning or possessing property within this State. The Woodbridge defendants argue that because N.J.S.A. 1:1-2 also has separate definitions for “municipalities” and “municipal corporations,” the term “person” should not be read to include municipalities. See Leonard v. State Highway Dep't 29 N.J.Super. 188, 196, 102 A.2d 97 (App.Div.1954) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs counter by citing Hartman v. City
holding that a state was embraced within the meaning of the word person  where the word person was defined as meaning and including a partnership association company or corporation as well as a natural person holding that person as defined in njsa 112 does not include the state based on the fact that 1 the definition of person indicates that such term includes the state when it is used to designate the owner of property which may be the subject of an offense and 2 state and municipality are separately defined in njsa 112 holding that the scope and application of state exemptions are defined by the state courts and that we are bound by their interpretations holding that when a term is defined in the statute it need not be further alleged in the indictment holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance