under the substantial evidence standard, which we will find where an IJ’s finding “is supported by ‘reasonable, substantial, and probative’ evidence in the record when considered as a whole.” Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 307 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d 279, 287 (2d Cir.2000)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Jin Hui Gao v. United States Att’y Gen., 400 F.3d 963, 964 (2d Cir.2005) (per curiam). The IJ found that Ebid was not credible because he knowingly submitted a forged doctor’s letter regarding a critical incident at the heart of his asylum claim— that he was arrested in May 1999 and detained and tortured for five days — and did not admit that it was fraudulent until confronted with the result of the government 5 F.3d 151, 157-58 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); cf. Lin v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 127, 132 (2d
holding an ij must to address a petitioners explanation for inconsistencies to rely upon them as the basis for an adverse credibility finding holding that in the absence of an adverse credibility determination the court must accept petitioners testimony as true holding that after the real id act the ij must still provide specific examples of a petitioners demean or that would support this basis for an adverse credibility determination holding when one identified ground for an adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of petitioners claim of persecution the court is bound to accept the ijs adverse credibility determination holding that absent a satisfactory explanation a report indicating that petitioners birth certificate was forged impeached her general credibility and observing that the ij could have rested the adverse credibility determination on this fact alone