parent corporation apparently owned the trust. On that basis, the court concluded that the employer, which also administered the plan, “would feel duty bound to conserve its corporate parents’ funds.” Id. at 1324. In contrast to the situation in Brown, here LTD benefits are paid out of Lumbermens’ assets so that payments to Wangenstein would not have any direct impact on KNS’s operating funds. Even where the party making the benefits determination is the wholly-owned subsidiary of the insurance company responsible for paying the claims, the heightened arbitrary and capricious standard would not apply unless “the plan-payout funding source retains ultimate control over the pay-out decision.” Williams, 373 F.3d at 1136; Buce v. Allianz Life Ins. Co., 247 F.3d 1133, 1141 (11th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Here, not only is there no allegation that
holding that a heightened arbitrary and capricious standard of review applied to the decision to deny benefits under the erisa plan holding that arbitrary and capricious standard applies to section 1132a1b denial ofbenefits claims if the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan holding that when applying an arbitrary and capricious standard of review the courts role is to determine whether the plan administrators decision was completely unreasonable holding that the heightened arbitrary and capricious standard applies where a plan administrator despite delegating its claim processing duties to a third party exercises the ultimate authority to determine for itself whether payments should be made out of its own assets holding that where a company pays plan beneficiaries from its own assets its perpetual conflict with its profitmaking role as a business must shape  the application of the arbitrary and capricious standard