for appeal established by section 1292(b).” Appellee’s Br. at 45-46. B. As the foregoing discussion indicates, Philip Morris asks us — and the court now agrees — to decide an issue (1) not briefed in the motion leading up to the certified order, (2) not decided in the district court’s opinion accompanying the certified order, (3) not raised by Philip Morris in its request for certification, (4) not discussed in the order granting certification, (5) not raised by Philip Morris in its section 1292(b) petition before this court, and (6) decided in an entirely different order which Philip Morris could at any time have asked the dist the certified order to address other orders made in the case.” Id.; see also United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 677, 107 S.Ct. 3054, 97 L.Ed.2d 550 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Both “[c]om-mentators and courts have
holding that when a court of appeals has jurisdiction on interlocutory appeal the scope of appellate review is not limited to the precise question certified by the district court because the district courts order not the certified question is brought before the court holding that the court of appeals erred in addressing a claim not raised in the certified order though closely related to it holding a new constitutional challenge not raised in district court was not properly before court of appeals holding that appeal of order became moot when order was complied with and court of appeals was notified and that court of appeals erred in issuing advisory opinion on merits of appeal holding that the trial court on remand erred when it adopted a new theory of damages contrary to the order of the court of appeals