13 Vet.App. 314, 326 (2000) (en banc) (describing "the VA pro[ Claimant nonadversarial claims adjudication process”); Littke v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 90, 91-92 (1990). 4 .Cf. Scarborough v. Principi, 536 U.S. 920, 122 S.Ct. 2584, 153 L.Ed.2d 774 (2002) (granting petition for writ of certiorari and remanding in light of Edelman, infra), vacating 273 F.3d 1087, 1092 (Fed.Cir.2001) (concluding, in attorney-fee context, that, after expiration of 30-day period for filing Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) application pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B), appellant could not amend EAJA application to include statutorily-required allegation that Secretary's position was not substantially justified); Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 535 U.S. 106, 112-115, 122 S.Ct. 1145, 152 L.Ed.2d 188 (2002) (<HOLDING>). 5 . See generally Austin v. Brown, 6 Vet.App.
holding that when a court is asked to construe an ambiguous statute it must defer to the interpretation set out in a regulation promulgated by the agency charged with administering the statute so long as the agencys interpretation is reasonable holding that the charge was timely when filed within the statute of limitations period even though served after the period holding that where statute did not indicate whether discrimination charge must be verified  under oath or affirmation  when filed statute was open to interpretation and sustaining agencys conclusion that verification could be filed after timely charge was submitted because that interpretation was reasonable holding an administrative interpretation cannot change the meaning of a statute or control the courts interpretation of it holding that a charge not taken under oath or affirmation is not a valid charge