filed a motion in the district court that he styled as a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion. In the motion, Zeedyk sought relief from the district court’s denial of his § 2254 claim that the evidence was insufficient to support the deadly-weapon finding. Zeedyk moves for a COA to appeal the district court’s denial of the purported Rule 60(b) motion. Because Zeedyk’s Rule 60(b) motion challenged the district court’s determination that the deadly-weapon claim in his § 2254 application failed on the merits, the Rule 60(b) motion constituted an unauthorized second or successive § 2254 application. See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 532 & n.4, 125 S.Ct. 2641, 162 L.Ed.2d 480 (2005); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487, 500, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the district court lacked jurisdiction
holding that federal prisoners challenging determination of their future parole eligibility date must bring their suit under habeas corpus theory holding that recent cases have established that habeas corpus relief is not limited to immediate release from illegal custody but that the writ is available as well to attack future confinement and obtain future releases holding that a writ of habeas corpus is a state prisoners sole federal remedy for challenging the duration of his imprisonment in order to obtain a speedier release in the future holding that managing conservator while in texas to seek return of child by writ of habeas corpus may not be served with civil process and is subject to jurisdiction of court in which habeas corpus is pending and only for purpose of prosecuting writ of habeas corpus holding that the district court mischaracterized a state prisoners  1983 claim as a petition for writ of habeas corpus because the prisoner did not attack his conviction challenge the fact or length of his confinement or seek immediate release from prison