of status, positing that we need not address this question because the BIA, in the alternative, considered and denied Petitioner’s second application on the merits. However, because we must ensure that we review the correct BIA opinion, which turns on which adjustment application the IJ had jurisdiction to adjudicate, see Cadapan v. Att’y Gen., 749 F.3d 157, 159 (3d Cir. 2014), we i pause to clarify the IJ's jurisdiction. We have held that when the BIA does not expressly retain jurisdiction over a petitioner’s case and issues a remand order unlimited in scope and purpose, an IJ has jurisdiction to consider any matters pertinent to that case under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and its implementing regulations. Johnson v. Ashcroft, 286 F.3d 696, 702-03 (3d Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Matter of Patel, 16 I. & N. Dec. 600,
holding that in exercising its discretion in choosing the appropriate sanction the trial court is not limited to considering only the specific violation committed but is entitled to consider other matters which have occurred during the litigation holding that a remand unless qualified or limited for a specific purpose is effective for the stated purpose and for consideration of any and all matters that the ij deems appropriate holding that unless remand from the bia is qualified or limited to a specific purpose an ij may consider any and all matters he  deems appropriate in the exercise of his administrative discretion or which are brought to his attention in compliance with the appropriate regulations holding that where issues were not considered by the bia remand is appropriate holding that any inherent power to remand to the bia for the consideration of additional evidence should not be exercised where i the basis for the remand is an instruction to consider documentary evidence that was not in the record before the bia and ii the agency regulations set forth procedures to reopen a case before the bia for the taking of additional evidence