mother originally attested four times under oath that she did not know the identity of the child’s father. Later, she based her conclusion that R.M. is the father solely on the child’s appearance. The mother also concedes that it is possible that some other man is the father. In January of 2010, the child’s mother first disclosed to both R.M. and the Probate Court that R.M. was the child’s father. Almost immediately, R.M. acknowledged his paternity. At that point, the Probate Court immediately should have ordered R.M. to participate in paternity testing. See 18-A M.R.S. § l-302(b) (2011) (“The [Probate] Court has full power to ... take all other action necessary and proper to administer justice in the matters which come before it.”); Estate of Kingsbury, 2008 ME 79, ¶ 9, 946 A.2d 389 (<HOLDING>). [¶ 12] In its very first incarnation, the
holding that production of documents without seeking a protective order waives the right to such an order unless there is a showing of good cause for the delay holding a written order is required for an appeal from a convicting courts ruling on a postconviction motion for dna testing holding that 18a mrs  l302b provides the court with authority to order dna testing when there exists good cause or sufficient reason recognizing that an order for dna testing could cause irreparable harm because the test is intrusive and any error in improperly ordering genetic testing cannot be remedied on appeal after the testing is done and the results are released recognizing that history of domestic violence provides good cause for declarants absence