country conditions to except it from the time and number limitations. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C). Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that she did not establish changed country conditions. See Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008). As the BIA noted, Guan’s adoption of Falun Gong constituted a change in her personal circumstances, not a change in conditions in China. See Li Yong Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 129, 130-31 (2d Cir.2005); Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143, 151-56 (2d Cir.2008). Contrary to Guan’s argument, the record does not compel the conclusion that the BIA ignored her evidence of conditions in China because the BIA expressly noted that she had presented reports and articles concerning country conditions. See Shao, 546 F.3d at 169 (<HOLDING>); Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471
holding that the weight afforded to an applicants evidence in immigration proceedings lies largely within the discretion of the agency internal quotation marks omitted recognizing that the court has rejected the notion that the agency must expressly parse or refute on the record each individual argument or piece of evidence offered by the petitioner internal quotation marks omitted holding that a foreign entity without property or presence in this country has no constitutional rights under the due process clause or otherwise internal quotation marks omitted holding the eeoc is not required to provide documentation of individual attempts to conciliate on behalf of each potential claimant internal quotation marks omitted recognizing that the court has never held that a petitioner is limited to the exact contours of his or her argument to the agency