States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (internal citations omitted). A court “read[s] an [indictment] as a whole” and “construefs] the allegations in a practical sense, with all necessary implications.” Barker, 985 F.2d at 1125 (internal citations omitted). II. Section 922(k) is a Valid Exercise of Congress’s Authority Under the Commerce Clause Defendant Colon-Quiles argues that section 922(k) is an invalid exercise of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause because the activity that it prohibits does not have a substantial effect upon interstate commerce. Section 922(k) reads, in part, as follows: “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person ... to possess or receive any firearm which has had the importer’s or manufacturer’s s 1904, 146 L.Ed.2d 902 (2000) (<HOLDING>); and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
holding that a determination of whether the defendants actions constituted a taking under the louisiana constitution does not implicate any issues of federal law and thus does not provides a basis for a federal district court to exercise federal subject matter jurisdiction holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute holding under the circumstances that a criminal proceeding does not qualify as an alternate remedy under the federal fca holding that application of federal arson statute to a private home would federalize a typically state crime and thereby significantly change  the federalstate balance in the prosecution of crimes holding that arson of an owneroccupied residence not used for any commercial purpose does not qualify as property used in commerce and is not subject to federal prosecution under federal arson statute