a label and not an “identifying statement.” However, courts have held that similar titles in the captions of complaints were sufficient to trigger the identification mechanism in Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(h). See, e.g., Teal, 933 F.2d at 345. Moreover, Panek’s argument that his jury trial right was preserved by Concordia’s subsequent jury trial demand in its answer to the counterclaim is unavailing here. While in a nonadmiralty case any party may assert a demand for a jury trial and both parties must consent to the withdrawal of the demand, in an admiralty case, a 9(h) election for admiralty cannot be undone by the opposing party’s jury demand. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(h); Craig v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 19 F.3d 472, 476-77 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 875, 115 S.Ct. 203, 130 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Cateora v. British Atl. Assurance, Ltd., 282
holding that defendant is entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff failed to allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right holding that when plaintiff sought arbitration and neither the award nor the arbitration agreement mentioned interest the plaintiff was not entitled to preaward interest holding respondent refused to arbitrate where it neither opposed nor responded to petitioners arbitration demand letter holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right structural error occurred holding that plaintiff was not entitled to rely on a defendants jurydemand where the defendant had neither a constitutional nor a statutory right to make such a demand