in custody requests the presence of a lawyer before further interrogation.”). In this case, the interrogation video reveals Detectives Neal and Richardson did precisely what the law forbids. After Thomas requested counsel, the detectives not only continued discussing Thomas’s case, but they also pressed on her the possible “benefits of cooperation” as well the penalties of disobedience. See Gomez, 927 F.2d at 1539. In doing so, Detectives Neal and Richardson unmistakably violated Edwards’s “rigid prophylactic rule.” See Towne v. Dugger, 899 F.2d 1104, 1106 (11th Cir.1990), abrogated on other grounds by Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994); see also Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 92-96, 105 S.Ct. 490, 491-93, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). The Government claims Thomas’s statements
holding that a defendant need not be advised of the right to terminate questioning at any time holding police violated edwards when they continued questioning a defendant after his initial invocation of the right to counsel even though he responded to the subsequent questioning holding that a suspects invocation of the right to remain silent must be unequivocal to require that police questioning cease holding that any time is insufficient to warn accused of right to counsel during questioning holding that the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under miranda on whether his right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored  and upholding officers attempts to resume questioning after defendant invoked right to remain silent because defendant was readvised of his rights sufficient time elapsed between the original invocation and the requestioning and the questioning involved a different crime