preliminary hearing, he was permitted to function as such in a role as limited by the Rule. Consequently, since the Rule provides that Officer Miller was permitted to function as a Commonwealth representative for purposes of questioning witnesses, and if needed, make recommendations to the issuing authority, it would be absurd to conclude Officer Miller was not a “party” for purposes of requesting a continuance. Accordingly, the trial court properly rejected Appellant’s claim. See Commonwealth v. McCoy, 599 Pa. 599, 962 A.2d 1160, 1168 (2009) (“When there is an interpretation available that gives effect to all of the statute’s phrases and does not lead to an absurd result, that interpretation must prevail.”); Lower Merion Twp. v. Schenk, 247 Pa.Super. 494, 372 A.2d 934 (1977) {en banc) (<HOLDING>). Finally, with regard to his Rule 600 claim,
holding the rules of criminal procedure are intended by our supreme court to possess a similar dignity as that accorded to statutes which are entitled to presumption that the legislature did not intend a result that is absurd recognizing that to avoid absurd results the court has a duty to interpret the rules of criminal procedure with logic and common sense recognizing that in adopting rules which are substantially similar to the federal rules of criminal procedure this court has traditionally given great weight to relevant precedent from federal courts particularly the supreme court of the united states holding that teague applies only to procedural rules and not to decisions of the supreme court deciding the meaning of criminal statutes recognizing the legal concept that when interpreting a statute it is presumed that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result