compensation value owed to a railroad whose easement is subsequently crossed by a public road right of way obtained by condemnation. It does not constitute a holding defining “railroad purposes.” The plaintiffs thus also rely on III. Cent. R.R. v. Wathen, 17 Ill.App. 582 (1885), wherein a private grant was held not to extend to non-railroad uses. However, that grant included specific language restricting the easement it granted to “depot grounds and railroad uses only.” That language is missing from the deed under examination here. The plaintiffs’ own precedents support the alternative proposition that a private conveyance may grant a railroad a greater estate than that associated with just railroad operations. See Hodges v. Western Union Tel. Co., 133 N.C. 225, 233, 45 S.E. 572 (1903) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the court will examine the language of
recognizing that an easement may entitle the easement owner to do acts which were not for the easement would constitute a nuisance holding that the court must determine rights in condemnation ujnless  there is found in the deed of the plaintiffs granting the easement to the railroad company language indicating a purpose or operating to pass a larger or more extended right or easement than that which would have been acquired by judgment in condemnation proceedings   holding that permanent easement arising from condemnation of pipeline easement reduced property value by 20 holding that in condemnation proceedings the landowner has the burden of establishing the value of the property holding that an easement agreement and an unrecorded easement plan created an easement