misconduct “that has affected the grand jury’s charging decision and is brought to the attention of the trial court before the commencement of trial”). The defendant suggests that Benjamin should not be applied retroactively to bar her claim. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07, 92 S.Ct. 349, 355, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971) (setting forth a three-part test for determining whether a judicial decision should be applied retroactively). We sympathize with the defendant’s belief that retroactive application of Benjamin to preclude any appeal would “pro duce substantial inequitable results.” Id. at 107, 92 S.Ct. at 355 (quoting Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706, 89 S.Ct. 1897, 1900, 23 L.Ed.2d 647 (1968)); cf. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1339-40 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 107 S.Ct. 928, 93
holding that a shortened statute of limitations should not be applied retroactively as to bar otherwise valid civil claims holding that annulment of the automatic stay can be retroactively applied to validate proceedings that otherwise would be void holding amendment to statute of limitations was a procedural amendment to be applied retroactively in a medical malpractice case holding statute that extended statute of limitations for certain criminal sexual conduct could not be applied retroactively to a prosecution commenced after the limitations statute in effect at the time of the alleged offense had expired holding generally that new rules of law should not be applied retroactively in habeas corpus cases