regulations by asserting that the contract contained implied affirmative duties that would impact lending operations, which a state statute or regulation could not directly accomplish pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 560.2. Instead, plaintiffs allege breach of specific, explicit contractual obligations that prohibited collection of the Disputed Fees. As a straightforward breach of contract claim, it is not preempted under HOLA and its implementing regulations. See, e.g., Baldanzi v. WFC Holdings Corp., No. 07-CV-9551 (LTS), 2008 WL 4924987, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2008) (finding breach of contract claim not preempted by HOLA where claim only sought to “enforce the terms of contracts into which Defendant entered”); see also Mincey v. World Savings Bank, FSB, 614 F.Supp.2d 610, 646 (D.S.C.2008) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the Court concludes that
holding that a cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the time of the breach recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract holding breach of contract claim not preempted as a straightforward breach of contract action as it alleged violation of specific covenant holding breach of contract claim not preempted under hola holding that trial court erred by dismissing breach of contract claim because appellee made promises to perform specific acts in contract the breach of which would give rise to a breach of contract action