reason reject such testimony. In these eases the testimony of the interested party was either in the nature of opinion evidence or there was some other evidence before the court which cast suspicion or created doubt concerning the testimony of the interested party. See also Ratley v. Indus. Comm’n, 74 Ariz. 347, 349-50, 248 P.2d 997, 998 (1952) (“[T]he trier of the facts is the judge of the witness’ credibility and is not required to accept the uncontradieted evidence of an interested party, but there are exceptions. The trier of the facts may not arbitrarily reject such uncontradicted evidence when nothing intrinsic in the evidence itself or extrinsic in the circumstances casts suspicion thereon.”); Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 152 Ariz. 1, 4, 730 P.2d 178, 181 (App.1985) (<HOLDING>); Hunter v. Indus. Comm’n, 130 Ariz. 59, 61,
holding that in the absence of contradictory testimony a reasonable person would not be justified in rejecting the witnesss unimpeached testimony holding that agents testimony as to witnesss identification was not hearsay holding that a trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion to exclude testimony of a witness for an alleged sequestration violation where no impermissible harmonization of testimony could be inferred from the witnesss reading of the newspaper in the absence of any evidence that this testimony was based on what he read holding that arresting officers testimony at suppression hearing supported finding of probable cause to arrest defendant for dwi despite contradictory testimony of defendant and his passenger and despite minor inconsistencies in officers testimony holding contradictory testimony does not invalidate a verdict