conferred upon it as necessarily incident to the exercise” of the adjudicatory power expressly granted. Id. Courts in other jurisdictions considering this issue have held that the board has the inherent or implied power to set aside settlement agreements that it has approved when the agreement is procured by either the employee’s or the employer’s fraud. See Beese v. First Nat’l Stores, 52 N.J. 196, 244 A.2d 689, 691 (1968) (noting that the Worker’s Compensation Bureau possesses the inherent power, apart from a recently enacted statute providing the Board with express power to reopen awards “for good cause shown” within one year of its judgment, to reopen judgments for fraud, mistake, inadvertence or other equitable grounds); Estelle v. Board of Educ., 14 N.J. 256, 102 A.2d 44 (1954) (<HOLDING>); Hyman v. Essex County Carpet Cleaning Co.,
holding dqrrespective of the absence of express statutory authority and a one year limitation imposed upon such a reopening in certain circumstances  it is abundantly clear that the division has the inherent power comparable to that possessed by the courts  to reopen judgments for fraud mistake inadvertence or other equitable ground  citation omitted emphasis omitted holding that federal courts have inherent power to investigate whether a judgment was obtained by fraud recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals holding that the workmens compensation division has that power inherent in all tribunals to reopen judgments in instances of fraud recognizing use of ancillary jurisdiction in subsequent proceedings for the exercise of the courts inherent power to enforce its judgments