defect in the jury instruction constitutes ‘plain error,’ the appellate court must examine the entire record and determine if the instructional error had a probable impact on the jury’s finding of guilt.” State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 661, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378-79 (1983). It is well established that where an indictment charging a defendant with conspiracy names specific individuals with whom the defendant is alleged to have conspired and the evidence at trial shows the defendant may have conspired with persons other than those named in the indictment, it is error for the trial court to instruct the jury that it may find the defendant guilty of conspiracy based upon an agreement with persons not named in the indictment. See State v. Mickey, 207 N.C. 608, 610-11, 178 S.E. 220, 221-22 (1935) (<HOLDING>); State v. Minter, 111 N.C. App. 40, 42-43, 432
holding that evidence was sufficient for jury to find that the defendant participated in the conspiracy even though he did not have a relationship with all of his fellow coconspirators holding the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that it may find the defendant guilty of conspiracy if the jury found the defendant agreed with at least one other person where the indictment charged the defendant with conspiring with a single named individual and the evidence tended to show the defendant may have conspired with a number of persons not just the named coconspirator to commit an unlawful act holding the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it may find the defendant guilty if the jury found the defendant had conspired with the two coconspirators named in the indictment or both of them or others where evidence tended to show a conspiracy between the defendant and some person other than the named coconspirators holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to accept the defendants guilty pleas to two counts of the indictment and stating that even if the trial court erred the error had not prejudiced the defendant because he was found guilty by the jury of the charges to which he intended to plead and the evidence of the other crimes would have been admissible in the trial for the first degree murder charge holding that the district court correctly instructed the jury that there had to be a substantial similarity between the indictment and the proof in order to find the defendant guilty