individualized hearing should be examined under a “special justifications” approach. However, this Court concludes that Magistrate Judge Martin misinterpreted the reasoning of those cases, and declines to adopt his Report and Recommendation in this regard. The Court will therefore conduct its own due process analysis, and explain its reluctance to adopt the rationale of Magistrate Judge Martin. The question of whether the petitioner’s asserted liberty interest is a fundamental right is crucial for purposes of substantive due process analysis. See Reno, 507 U.S. at 302, 113 S.Ct. 1439. If the liberty interest of the petitioner is fundamental, then applying strict scrutiny, the Court mus 2012272, — U.S. -, — S.Ct. -, — L.Ed.2d - (2003); Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d 299, 310 (3rd Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Parra v. Perryman, 172 F.3d 954, 958 (7th
holding that the right to vote is fundamental holding that the right to drive is not a fundamental right holding right to be fundamental recognizing that a criminal defendants right to a fair trial is fundamental recognizing a fundamental right to marry