during the limitations period. Seale, 13 F.3d at 854; Dawson, 4 F.3d at 1309-13. The FDIC must prove that the majority of directors were “active participants in wrongdoing or fraud.” Dawson, 4 F.3d at 1312. Dawson declined to define what level of culpability rises to the level of active participation in wrongdoing or fraud. Id. at 1313 n. 4. Seale, however, seems to have clarified the matter somewhat. As the Court reads Seale, in order to prove that a director was an “active participant in wrongdoing or fraud” as called for by Dawson, the FDIC must be prepared to show that the director: (1) was guilty of gross negligence, (2) was guilty of a breach of fiduciary duty, or (3) intentionally engaged in wrongful conduct. See Seale, 13 F.3d at 854-55; contra Acton, 844 F.Supp. at 317 (<HOLDING>). Intentionally engaging in wrongful conduct
holding that even  gross negligence does not of itself justify an inference of intent to deceive holding that dawson proscribes gross negligence holding that negligence does not violate the due process clause but reserving the question whether gross negligence does holding that cjulpable negligence is negligence of a gross and flagrant character which evinces a reckless disregard for the safety of others holding that ordinary negligence and gross negligence are not separate causes of action