430, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). Thus, unless the appellant can demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched, his mere possessory interest in the searched government quarters will not establish a Fourth Amendment violation. See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 91-92, 100 S.Ct. at 2552-2553; United States v. Quinn, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 1623, 89 L.Ed.2d 803 (1986) (per curiam decision dismissing writ of certiorari as improvidently granted); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105-106, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 2561-2562, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980); United States v. Miller, 13 M.J. 75, 77 (C.M.A.1982) (person seeking to suppress search evidence bears burden of proving he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in area being searched); cf. United States v. Harris, 5 M.J. at 46-47 (<HOLDING>). The test for determining whether appellant
holding that society recognizes a reasonable expectation of privacy holding defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in blood sample drawn by hospital recognizing that actual standing by virtue of a reasonable expectation of privacy may be established in certain circumstances by a proprietory interest in premises seized holding that passengers lacked any reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore had no standing to challenge the search of the vehicle recognizing that in certain circumstances inquiry notice may be determined as a matter of law