and, therefore, it is unconstitutional, or, at the very least, subject to an "open courts” challenge. This argument fails for two separate reasons. First, as parents of a deceased child, the More-nos have no constitutional right to recover exemplary damages under art. 16, § 26. See Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470, 475 (Tex.1984) (Supreme Court has consistently held that class of beneficiaries listed in art. 16, § 26 does not include parents of deceased child). Indeed, even if this court (or the legislature) wanted to broaden the class of persons entitled to recover exemplary damages to include parents of deceased children, we would be without authority to do so. Id.; see also Scoggins v. Southwestern Electric Service Co., 434 S.W.2d 376 (Tex.Civ. App. — Tyler 1968, writ refd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). Second, the question of whether § 16.003(b)
holding that regardless of dischargeability of exemplary damages under section 523a6 punitive damages flowing from the same course of fraudulent conduct necessitating an award of compensatory damages are not dischargeable in bankruptcy under section 523a2a holding the eighth amendment inapplicable to an award of exemplary damages holding the plaintiffs action was one for wrongful death and not survival where damages listed in complaint were identical to damages listed in the wrongful death act holding that provision in wrongful death act that allowed parents to recover exemplary damages was invalid under art 16  26 since legislature could not enlarge on exemplary damages holding plaintiff could not recover prejudgment interest on exemplary damages because suit was filed on april 161987 and thus governed by cavnar and not article 5069105