pursuant to zoning ordinances. See Heery, 61 N.C. App. at 613, 300 S.E.2d at 870. In Heery, we held that because there was no finding of fact in the trial court’s order, and petitioners did not allege any special damages, petitioners were not an aggrieved party and thus lacked standing. In contrast, the Neighborhood alleged special damages in their original motion to intervene and particularized the special damages in their amended motion. Petitioner emphasizes that the City found there was no evidence of diminished property values; however, the court, not the City, determines standing. The superior court found the Neighborhood to be aggrieved, such a finding is supported by the Neighborhood’s pleading, and therefore we affirm. See Piney Mountain, 63 N.C. App. at 247, 304 S.E.2d at 253 (<HOLDING>). Affirmed. Judges GREENE and HORTON
holding that where one plaintiff has standing we need not consider whether the other individual and corporate plaintiffs have standing to maintain the suit holding that when a corporate petitioner has no property interest but represents individuals who live in the affected area and who potentially will suffer injury    such petitioner has standing holding a party has no standing to appeal unless he or she is an aggrieved party an individual who is not a parent in the eyes of the law has no legal interest in the child and therefore has no standing to appeal holding that an evicted plaintiff has no legal interest in property and therefore has no standing to bring a cercla claim holding that franchisor not only has valid interest in protecting good will it has developed but it also has an interest in being able to place a new franchisee at or near the same location where its goodwill has been created