Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the fee award, stating: The specific, uncomplicated language of [our AR.S. § 12-1510] clearly reflects the legislative intent that attorneys’ fees are not to be awarded for work performed in arbitration proceedings, unless the parties specifically agree to and provide for such fees in the arbitration agreement. There are important policy considerations supporting this determination not to allow attorneys’ fees in arbitration proceedings, unless provi ttorney’s fees for the arbitration proceedings when the arbitration panel itself cannot award such fees would render meaningless the provision of A.R.S. § 12-1510 which expressly excludes the award of “counsel fees.” See Pima County v. Maya Constr. Co., 158 Ariz. 151, 156, 761 P.2d 1055, 1060 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Such a ruling would also rewrite the
holding that statutes must be read so as to give effect to all statutory language holding that where two statutes seemingly conflict they should be interpreted to give effect to both holding that statutes should not be interpreted so as to render any of its provisions nugatory holding that we must give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of a statutes language holding that contracts should be interpreted to give effect to all provisions