its initial order and then expressly declined to rule on the motion. It concluded that, because there was “no order granting or denying that motion,” the appellants would “have nothing to appeal.” We disagree. A litigant claiming official immunity is .entitled to a judgment on whether the defense is appropriate at each step of the litigation, including both the motion to dismiss stage, and the summary judgment stage. By way of analogy to qualified immunity cases, if the district court had denied the motion to dismiss on absolute immunity grounds and this court affirmed, a motion for summary judgment on immunity grounds could nonetheless be brought, and appeal taken again if the district court denied that motion. See, e.g., Marks v. Clarke, 102 F.3d 1012, 1017 n. 8 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Of course, in this case the district court
holding that the rule announced in bailey v united states 516 us 137 116 sct 501 133 led2d 472 1995 applies retroactively on collateral review holding court lacked jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeal of denial of motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity by defendants who were not public officials holding that an interlocutory appeal lies from a denial of summary judgment on a qualified immunity claim holding that the supreme courts interpretation of 18 usc  924c1 in bailey v united states 516 us 137 116 sct 501 133 led2d 472 1995 has retroactive application to cases on collateral review recognizing that in behrens v pelletier 516 us 299 116 sct 834 133 led2d 773 1996 the supreme court held that a defendant may appeal both the district courts denial of a motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity and a subsequent denial of summary judgment on the basis of such immunity