a person on bail or after he has deposited money in escrow). This argument overlooks the fact that this statutory provision obviously applies to instances where the person attached under the writ wishes to pay his child support obligation (i.e., the “bail”) so as to avoid sitting in jail awaiting for a court appear-anee. After a court appearance, a person sitting in jail would either be serving a sentence for contempt, or subject to release by the payment of a court ordered amount of child support arrearage. Furthermore, while Indiana Code § 34-4-9-2.1(b)(2) required the writ of attachment to state the amount of Johnson’s bail or escrow, no amount appears on the writ, and thus, the writ was apparently invalid under Indiana law. See Leshore v. Indiana, 739 N.E.2d 1075, 1078-79 (2000)(<HOLDING>). Therefore, the upshot of all this is that
holding that a plaintiff cannot rely on factual events that take place subsequent to a banks closure to support its claimed ownership of escrow funds holding that the burden is on the plaintiff holding that an in dictment valid on its face is not subject to challenge on the ground that the grand jury acted on the basis of inadequate or incompetent evidence holding that a writ that failed to fix an amount of bail or escrow was invalid on its face meaning that the sheriff had no jurisdiction to detain the plaintiff based on that writ holding that a bank is entitled to rely on its deposit agreement when responding to a writ of garnishment