presented in this case. We pass finally to consideration of the remaining subsection of Rule 60(b) which provides for the correction of a judgment “for any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” Fed.R. Civ.P. 60(b)(6). We have held that Rule 60(b)(6) should apply “only in exceptional or extraordinary circumstances which are not addressed by the first five numbered clauses of the Rule.” Hopper v. Euclid Manor Nursing Home, Inc., 867 F.2d 291, 294 (6th Cir.1989) (citing Pierce v. United Mine Workers, 770 F.2d 449, 451 (6th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1104, 106 S.Ct. 890, 88 L.Ed.2d 925 (1986)); see also Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 199, 71 S.Ct. 209, 212, 95 L.Ed. 207 (1950); United States v. Karahalias, 205 F.2d 331, 333 (2d Cir.1953) (<HOLDING>). Courts, however, must apply subsection (b)(6)
recognizing that debilitating illness which precludes all participation in the litigation may constitute compelling reason for relief under rule 60b6 holding that the availability of the icrp is but one factor to be considered in determining undue hardship but it is not determinative holding that a grant of equitable relief requires diligence by the claimant holding that rule 60b6 may be used to grant relief in case of extreme and undue hardship holding that relief under rule 60b6 is not available unless the other clauses 1 through 5 are inapplicable