Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 2088, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). Although the question has not been answered yet by the Second Circuit, the few courts that have addressed the issue, applying the four-part Cort test, have concluded that no private right of action should be implied under the FCPA. See Citicorp Int’l Trading Co. v. Western Oil & Refining Co., 771 F.Supp. 600, 606-07 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“[N]o private right of action exists under the FCPA”); Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1027-30 (6th Cir.1990) (“[N]one of the Cort factors supports ... private right of action theory_”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1086, 111 S.Ct. 961, 112 L.Ed.2d 1048 (1991); McLean v. International Harvester Co., 817 F.2d 1214, 1219 (5th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Applying the four-part Cort test below, we
recognizing private right of action recognizing that legislative history is not used to create ambiguity where statutory language is clear holding that neither the language of the statute nor its legislative history suggests that appointment is permissible only in some limited set of circumstances holding that the legislative history under the act indicates that liquidated damages are intended to be punitive in nature holding that neither the language nor the legislative history of the fcpa indicates the congressional intent to create a private right of action