Because supplemental jurisdiction alone does not permit a federal court to exercise jurisdiction, id. at 1565, we first consider whether the district court had original jurisdiction over any of the Kinseys’ claims. In doing so, we liberally construe the Kinseys’ pro se amended complaint. See Powell v. Lennon, 914 F.2d 1459, 1463 (11th Cir.1990). With regard to the Kinseys’ claims against Gould, to the extent that they assert a claim under the Sixth Amendment, such a claim is insubstantial and frivolous because “[t]he Sixth Amendment applies only to criminal proceedings.” Barbour v. Haley, 471 F.3d 1222, 1231 (11th Cir.2006), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 127 S.Ct. 2996, 168 L.Ed.2d 707 (2007). To the extent that the Kinseys assert a Fifth, Fourteenth, or First Amendment acces (11th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the Kinseys cannot rely upon any of the
holding that the first grable requirement was met where the plaintiff in order to prevail on his legal malpractice claim had to show that he would have prevailed on his claim under federal patent law holding professional malpractice claim not contractual holding that a claim of legal malpractice under alabama law did not present a federal question holding that plaintiffs could not sue attorneys for legal malpractice so long as underlying medical malpractice action out of which legal malpractice claim arose was still pending on appeal holding that legal malpractice claims are not assignable