falls into the latter category: that of an employee with a non-limiting impairment incorrectly regarded as having an impairment that limited him in at least one major life activity. Specifically, Macfarlan claims that once he was cleared to work fulltime, Ivy Hill incorrectly regarded him, because of his lifting restrictions, as impaired in a manner that substantially limited him in the major life activity of “working.” A “temporary non-chronic impairment of short duration is not a disability covered by the [Acts].” Rinehimer, supra, 292 F.3d at 380. Macfarlan’s temporary lifting limitations, which were removed only four months after first imposed, are the very definition of such a non-chronic impairment. Accord Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dept., 158 F.3d 635, 646 (2nd Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Because Macfarlan’s lifting restriction was
holding that an issue is abandoned when not raised in an appellate brief holding that an impairment lasting seven months was too brief in duration to qualify as an adaqualifying disability holding an argument made in plaintiffs reply brief but not in their opening brief waived holding an appellate brief may serve as a notice of appeal holding that episodic multiple sclerosis is categorized as an impairment  that will consistently meet the definition of disability and a ministroke is categorized as an impairment that may be disabling for some individuals but not for others