cases holding particular sanctions to constitute non-punitive regulatory measures have served far clearer and more substantial societal interests than the attenuated justifications provided for felon disenfranchisement. For example, in Hendricks, the state civil commitment law held to be non-punitive was intended to protect the public from dangerous mentally ill persons “likely to engage in ‘predatory acts of sexual violence.’ ” 521 U.S. at 350, 117 S.Ct. 2072. Similarly, Alaska’s sexual offender registration requirement, held to be non-punitive in Smith, had the express purpose of “protecting the public from sex offenders” who “pose a high risk of reoffending.” 538 U.S. at 93, 123 S.Ct. 1140; see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (<HOLDING>). On the other hand, the provision being
holding that the prison litigation reform act requires a prior showing of physical injury that need not be significant but must be more than de minimis  holding that preventative detention under bail reform act justified by the need to prevent danger to the community was regulatory and preventative rather than punitive holding that a prisoners claim was saved by his request for nominal and punitive damages even though he could not recover compensatory damages under the prison litigation reform act holding that the bankruptcy reform act of 1978 publ no 95598 92 stat 2549 precluded dismissal of cases pending before enactment of the reform act in order to refile under the act holding that a defendants propensity to commit crime generally even if the resulting harm would be not solely physical may constitute sufficient risk of danger to come within contemplation of the bail reform act