circumstances presented, we hold that the statements in the 2002 report do not provide adequate support for petitioners’ asylum claims. Finally, petitioners argue that the BIA denied them due process by taking administrative notice of the 2003 State Department report without affording them an opportunity to rebut the inferences drawn from that report. In Yang v. McElroy, 277 F.3d 158, 163 n. 4 (2d Cir.2002), we held that “[i]t is well-settled that the BIA may take administrative notice of current events bearing on an [asylum] applicant’s well-founded fear of persecution” but did not address whether due process requires that the BIA provide petitioners with an opportunity to rebut inferences drawn from a country report. Compare Gutierrez-Rogue v. INS, 954 F.2d 769, 773 (D.C.Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>) and Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588, 597 (7th
holding that the bia violated the fifth amendments due process clause in taking notice of the change of government without providing the petitioners an opportunity to rebut the noticed facts holding that the due process clause of the fifth amendment requires that petitioners be allowed an opportunity to rebut officially noticed facts particularly when  those facts are crucial to  the outcome of the administrative proceeding holding that bia denials of motions to reopen or reconsider are reviewed for abuse of discretion holding such service satisfies due process holding that availability of motions to reopen satisfies the due process requirement that petitioners be allowed to rebut facts of which the bia takes administrative notice