S.Ct. 27, 138 L.Ed.2d 1057 (1997). “Other variables may come into play depending on the particular facts presented.” Id. As the nature of the factors makes clear, the “ ‘likelihood of confusion’ standard is predominantly factual in nature.” Id. Defendants argue no consumer would reasonably believe that the Franklin Mint’s advertisements and products derived from or were authorized by Princess Diana, her Estate or the Fund. Similar arguments have met with mixed success in other celebri ty endorsement cases. In Wendt, the Ninth Circuit held that where a jury could reasonably conclude that most factors weigh in a plaintiffs favor, summary judgment on the issue of likelihood of confusion was inappropriate. Id.; see also Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 413 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). On the other hand, likelihood of confusion
holding that lanham act claim was not prohibited due to fact that author had not registered copyright holding that the statute of limitations for all of plaintiffs eleven causes of action including those brought under lanham act  43a 15 usc  1125a and lanham act  43c 15 usc  1125c is four years holding lanham act claim based on gms use of plaintiffs former name lew aleindor should go to jury holding that  157d required withdrawing reference where bankruptcy court faced lanham act claim partly involving the issue of secondary meaning because interpreting lanham act provisions to a given set of facts is generally neither simple nor straightforward holding that continued use of trademark after termination of franchise for nonpayment of royalties constitutes lanham act violation