held that presentment of a letter of credit may not be enjoined unless there is evidence of fraud by the beneficiary. Philipp Bros., 787 S.W.2d at 40. To justify enjoining the presentment of a letter of credit, the fraud must be extreme. A trial court may enjoin presentment only if “the wrong doing of the beneficiary has so vitiated the entire transaction that the legitimate purposes of the independence of the issuer’s obligation would no longer be served.” Id. (quoting GATX Leasing Corp. v. DBM Drilling Corp., 657 S.W.2d 178, 182 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1983, no writ)); SRS Prods., 994 S.W.2d at 384-85 (wrongdoing must be “egregious, intentional, and unscrupulous”). But see Goldome Credit Corp. v. University Square Apartments, 828 S.W.2d 505, 509 (Tex.App. — Amarillo 1992, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Lone Star argues that the acceleration clause
holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation holding that corporation and sole owner of corporation were separate legal entities and corporation was not party to contract signed by owner in individual capacity holding that presentment of documents signed by officer of corporation when corporation did not exist posed risk of double payment on debt thereby constituting fraud which vitiated transaction holding that individuals assumption of the role of president of the corporation and her authority to sign documents on behalf of the corporation demonstrate that she had the requisite control over the corporation for purposes of finding individual liability under section 5a holding that nonofficer nonemployee who was in reality a de facto officer or employee of corporation and who had significant control over disbursements made by the corporation was responsible person for purposes of  6672 liability where he had failed to insure payment of trust fund taxes of corporation while continuing payment of other corporate creditors