juror who had in fact been contacted did just that. We therefore conclude that the district court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an adequate evidentiary hearing into the allegations of extraneous influences on the jury pursuant to the holding in Remmer. It is true that the defendants did not expressly request a Remmer hearing below. The district court, however, was fully aware of the nature of Shabazz’s claims, and Corrado and Tocco plainly stated their objections to the district court’s three-question proposal in their motions for a mistrial and for a new trial. Given these circumstances and the serious nature of the claims of jury misconduct, it was the district court’s duty to order a hearing sua sponte. See United States v. Davis, 177 F.3d 552, 556-57 (6th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Rigsby, 45 F.3d at 124-25 (“When there is a
holding that district court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an adequate evidentiary hearing into the allegations of extraneous influences on the jury pursuant to the holding in remmer  and remanding for a hearing at which the defendant should be accorded the opportunity to question the jurors individually and under qath holding that the emergence of a credible claim of extraneous influence on a jury imposed a duty on the district court to conduct a remmer hearing despite the fact that the defendants had not expressly requested such a hearing below holding that allegations of influence by an unnamed person outside the jury required the holding of an evidentiary hearing to determine extrinsic influence recognizing a remmer presumption but noting that sometimes the circumstances are such that the remmer presumption does not even apply holding trial court did not err in failing to conduct a hearing on motion for reinstatement when appellants failed to call to the trial courts attention the need for a hearing