to § 2680(e), claims “arising out of an act or omission of any employee of the Government in administering the provisions of [The Trading with the Enemy Act]” are excepted from the waiver of sovereign immunity. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(e) (1988). In a brief and well-reasoned opinion, the D.C. Circuit has read this exception to prevent efforts by plaintiffs to use the Federal Tort Claims Act to circumvent the provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act. Gubbins v. United States, 192 F.2d 411 (D.C.Cir.1951) (rejecting a defamation claim based on the plaintiff being placed on a list of persons pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act that blocked them from engaging in certain transactions); see also Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666, 674-76, 80 S.Ct. 1288, 1294-95, 4 L.Ed.2d 1478 (1960) (<HOLDING>). The reasoning of Gubbins is applicable here
holding that judicial review of final agency action under the administrative procedure act  provides the proper procedure to challenge the sufficiency of an eis holding that judicial review of decisions of military correction boards is review of the administrative record conducted under the administrative procedure act holding that the trading with the enemy acts provisions for judicial review are exclusive of any other remedy and rejecting arguments that judicial review of actions taken under the trading with the enemy act is available via the administrative procedure act holding that because here the statutes in issue provide for judicial review via citizen suit provisions yet do not set forth a standard for that review judicial review is limited to apa review on the administrative record holding that there was adequate opportunity when state court judicial review of an administrative proceeding was available