stated: “I think — I know I will.” T.140. The comments that followed this exchange do not negate the fact that Juror No. 9’s assurance, taken in context and as a whole, was unequivocal. As to Juror No. 13, the trial court secured a definite statement that she would keep an open mind until the end of the trial. See T.141-42. After reviewing the voir dire of these jurors, the Court cannot say that the state trial court’s conclusion regarding their ability to be impartial is without “fair support” in the record. See Patton, 467 U.S. at Ground III: Harsh and excessive sentence A petitioner’s assertion that a sentencing judge abused his discretion in sentencing is generally not a federal claim subject to review by a habeas court. See Fielding v. LeFevre, 548 F.2d 1102, 1109 (2d Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>) (citing Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741,
holding claim is cognizable holding that petitioner raised no cognizable federal claim by seeking to prove that state judge abused his sentencing discretion by disregarding psychiatric reports holding claim is not cognizable recognizing that sentencing judges have the discretion to reject any sentencing guideline but no judge is required to do so holding that a claim seeking dna testing is cognizable under section 1983