further proper impeachment about the time interval between the first and second Miranda warnings. B. Under the third prong of plain error review, we inquire whether error affected a defendant’s substantial rights. “[T]he defendant must demonstrate that the error affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” Broussard, 669 F.3d at 553. Here, the government’s closing and rebuttal arguments used Andav-erde-Tiñoco’s silence to attack his duress defense, the only issue at trial, which resulted initially in a deadlocked jury. See United States v. Harp, 536 F.2d 601, 602-03 (5th Cir.1976) (“Because the prosecutor’s comments struck at the jugular of their story, those remarks cannot be classified as harmless.”); see also United States v. Johnson, 558 F.2d 1225, 1230 (5th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Meneses-Davila, 580 F.2d
holding that defendants who do not object to jury instructions at trial are subject to a plain error standard of review on appeal holding that the courts review is conducted under the plain error standard holding that an accused must unambiguously invoke the right to remain silent holding same under plain error review and finding it likely that defendants expressed desire to remain silent tipped the scales for the jury holding that evidence of a defendants invocation of the right to remain silent ordinarily is not admissible at the defendants criminal trial