follow in substituting the commission for its predecessor agency in pending court cases involving the former commission. In construing provisions of the act, we have previously permitted the commission to substitute itself for the former commission as the party defendant. See Celona v. Rhode Island Ethics Commission, 544 A.2d 582, 583 n. 1 (R.I.1988) (acknowledging the substitution of the commission for the former commission during the pendency of the litigation). Indeed, any other interpretation would contravene the clear intent of §§ 4 and 6 of the act and would not promote the policies and obvious purposes behind the establishment of the commission as a successor entity to the former commission. See, e.g., Kirby v. Planning Board of Review of Middletown, 634 A.2d 285, 290 (R.I.1993) (<HOLDING>); see also In re Advisory to the Governor
recognizing that the court will not interpret a legislative enactment literally when to do so would provide a result at odds with its legislative intent and that in this instance the court must interpret the enactment consistent with its policy or obvious purpose holding that illegal state regulation can be accomplished either by an award of damages or by legislative enactment recognizing that the zoning code of a homerule city is a legislative enactment recognizing that aedpa would not apply to a habeas petition that was pending at the time of its enactment holding that the fair sentencing act does not apply retroactively to defendants whose criminal conduct occurred before its enactment even if those defendants were sentenced after its enactment