it had specifically authorized the government to perform. This conclusion is in accord with those of other courts that have addressed the issue. See, e.g., United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir.1987) (noting that “[n]o practice is more ingrained in our criminal justice system than the practice of the government calling a witness who is an accessory to the crime to which the defendant is charged and having that witness testify under a plea bargain that promises him a reduced sentence”); United States v. Crumpton, 23 F.Supp.2d 1218, 1219, 1998 WL 764804 (D.Colo.1998) (stating that “[ajgreements which offer an inducement to a witness to testify are within the authority granted by Congress”); United States v. Laureano, 1998 WL 696006, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.7, 1998) (<HOLDING>); United States v. White, 27 F.Supp.2d 646,
holding prosecutions failure to disclose promise of leniency to witness provided in exchange for that witnesss testimony violated due process holding that  201 does not sweep so broadly as to prevent prosecutors from offering leniency to an individual in exchange for truthful testimony holding that agreements which afford cooperating accomplices leniency in exchange for testimony do not violate  201c2 holding that the fact that a prosecutor afforded favorable treatment to a government witness standing alone does not establish the existence of an underlying promise of leniency in exchange for testimony holding that a remote tippee must know that original exchange was given in exchange for benefit