statement cannot be interpreted as “true threats.” Throughout Plaintiffs briefing, he argues that he obviously was not seriously threatening his fellow students in his communications with Carly Moore. (Response, p. 9). Plaintiff notes that Moore responded with encouragement and laughter, which indicated the comedic nature of their discourse and also the non-threatened response of the listener. (Id.) For example, Moore suggested that Plaintiff should shoot all of the black women because “[t]he death of a black person cracks me up.” (Id.) Plaintiff also claims that his statements could not be considered threats because they were conditional and equivocal. Whether or not a reasonable person would believe the statements were a true threat is a question of law. See Doe, 306 F.3d at 626 (<HOLDING>). In Doe, there was no question that the four
holding that the narrowing of the use of parnar claims only applies absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary and citing to hrs  37869 as an example of such legislative intent holding that in a 18 usc  922g1 prosecution ussg  5k21 upward departure was warranted because the defendant should have foreseen the possibility of serious harm as a result of his actions even though the defendant harbored no intent to harm and was not directly responsible for the death holding that even if the trial court erred in excluding a letter from evidence that fell within an exception to the hearsay rule the error was harmless where admission of the letter would not have had a substantial effect on a partys rights holding a reasonable recipient would have perceived the letter as a serious expression of an intent to harm holding the wifes testimony that husbands release would cause psychological harm to other family members was insufficient to support commitment courts finding that husband would cause serious bodily harm to another person