here — that Church remained in denial and untreated four years into his prison term— was insufficient to overcome the Pearce presumption. Church's state of being in denial and untreated did not constitute a new factor, only a continuation of the same situation that existed at the time of the original sentencing. ¶ 60. In sum, we conclude that resentencing on convictions that remain intact after one or more counts in a multi-count case is vacated is not always required. Where, as here, the vacated count did not affect the overall dispositional structure of the original sentence, resentencing on the remaining counts is unnecessary. We also conclude that the increased sentence imposed upon Church was presumptively vindictive under Pearce, and was not supported by objective new factors in (<HOLDING>). 4 The scope and applicability of the rule
recognizing that a trial court has the authority before accepting a verdict and before discharging a jury to send the jury back to correct a mistake in its verdict but concluding that jury had been discharged because jury was allowed to return to court on following day and was allowed to deliberate same issue it previously had decided holding that no presumption of vindictiveness arose when a second jury on retrial following a successful appeal imposed a higher sentence than a prior jury because a second jury was unlikely to have a personal stake in the prior conviction or to be sensitive to the institutional interests that might occasion higher sentences holding that although court should inform jury about defendants prior sentences the court should instruct the jury that it should not consider prior sentences in its decision to impose a life or death sentence because they are not statutory aggravating or mitigating factors holding that almendareztorres rejected the argument that the fact of a prior conviction must be found by a jury holding that where a statute provides for an enhanced penalty based on a defendants prior conviction the fact of conviction is a sentencing factor to be determined by the court rather than a jury