pre-removal “right” to apply for a 212(c) waiver, since such a right would only vest at the commencement of removal proceedings. More directly, Appel argues that under the analysis outlined in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994), and followed in I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001), the application of the IIRIRA’s 212(c) prohibition is impermissible. It is not. Appel was convicted by jury of the crimes leading to his removal proceedings. As this Court had determined before St. Cyr, and has reiterated thereafter, petitioners in Appel’s position are not entitled to relief from the application of the AED-PA/IIRIRA prohibitions on § 212(c) waivers. See Magana-Pizano v. INS, 200 F.3d 603, 614 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Herrera-Blanco, 232 F.3d
recognizing that aliens whose proceedings are commenced with a notice to appear on or after april 1 1997 are subject to removal proceedings under iirira while aliens whose proceedings were commenced with an order to show cause before april 1 1997 were subject to deportation proceedings under prior law holding that we have jurisdiction to review an aliens legal eligibility for relief under former ina  212c holding that aliens who pleaded not guilty and elected a jury trial  are barred from seeking  212c relief holding that bars on 212c relief do not apply to aliens entering preaedpa nolo contendere or guilty pleas in reliance on 212c availability but that those bars do apply to aliens convicted through other means prior to the enactment of aedpa and whose proceedings commenced postaedpa holding that the relevant date is not when petitioner filed for  212c relief