trial period. Cf. Gibbs v. Whelan, 56 N.M. 38, 41-42, 239 P.2d 727, 730 (1952) (“A party to a contract cannot take advantage of his own act or omission to escape liability thereon.”); Highlands Plaza, Inc. v. Viking Inv. Corp., 72 Wash.2d 865, 435 P.2d 669, 677 (1967) (noting that upon anticipatory breach, tender of performance by other party is not necessary for breach of contract recovery, and plaintiffs defective tender of performance was of no consequence). Thus, we hold that the trial court erred in ruling, as a matter of law, that Gilmore’s failure to submit timely written notice of his intent to exercise the option was not excused by the Duderstadts’ prior act of increasing the rent during the trial period. See Ledbetter v. Webb, 103 N.M. 597, 602-03, 711 P.2d 874, 879-80 (1985) (<HOLDING>). 4. Breach of Express and Implied Covenants of
holding appellate courts cannot reverse judgment  on grounds not raised on appeal holding it is axiomatic that an appellate court cannot reverse a trial courts judgment absent properly assigned error recognizing appellate court may not reverse a summary judgment on a basis not raised by the appellant on appeal holding an appellate court cannot reverse a trial courts judgment absent properly assigned error recognizing that appellate court may reverse trial courts judgment when it is based on an erroneous conclusion of law