the entire controversy doctrine does not prevent reinstitution of its earlier claims and therefore should not bar its malpractice claim against these defendants. Plaintiff cites to Woodward-Clyde, supra, 105 N.J. at 464, 523 A.2d 131, for the proposition that the entire controversy doctrine does not bar a plaintiff from reinstituting a claim previously dismissed without prejudice. See also Mason v. Nabisco Brands, Inc., 233 N.J.Super. 263, 267, 558 A.2d 851 (App.Div.1989) (“[t]ypically, ‘without prejudice’ means that there has been no adjudication on the merits of the claim and that a subsequent complaint alleging the same cause of action will not be barred simply by reason of its prior dismissal”); Malhame v. Borough of Demarest, 174 N.J.Super. 28, 30, 415 A.2d 358 (App.Div.1980) (<HOLDING>). We conclude, however, that plaintiffs
holding that a dismissal of a complaint on the defendants motion is the same as a nonsuit holding borough could not appeal dismissal of complaint without prejudice because  dismissal without prejudice is comparable to a nonsuit under the former practice of lavf  holding that a review committee of the kansas board for discipline of attorneys had the authority to dismiss a complaint against an attorney with or without prejudice and when dismissal was ordered without specifying the nature of the dismissal the dismissal was without prejudice to the filing of later proceedings on the same matter holding that dismissal of a complaint for insufficient jurisdictional allegations should be without prejudice to amend holding that dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim should generally be without prejudice but if the plaintiff has been given an opportunity amend his complaint and fails to do so the dismissal may be with prejudice