as a matter of law and any depreciation of the remainder of the subject property due to such condition should not be included in your consideration of damages to the remainder. In response, INP argues that the court of appeals correctly held that INP’s evi- denee was about unsafe access to the remainder property and the cost to cure. It argues that these damages are compensa-ble, and, as a result, the trial court did not err in admitting this evidence. We conclude that, as a matter of law, the trial court erred by finding a material and substantial impairment of access to INP’s remainder property. After the condemnation, reasonable access to INP’s property remained even though one of the five driveways to the property was closed for safety reasons. See Heal, 917 S.W.2d at 10 (<HOLDING>). However, as the court of appeals correctly
recognizing a right of access to civil proceedings holding that landowner was entitled to compensation because the condemnation destroyed all reasonable access to remainder property holding that where by virtue of state action access is limited but remains reasonable there is no such denial of access as entitles the landowner to compensation recognizing no right to damages if landowner retains reasonable access to property after a condemnation holding that in condemnation proceedings the landowner has the burden of establishing the value of the property