. In Doe v. Alaska Superior Court we required the state on remand to identify specific documents and to explain why they fell within the scope of the executive privilege because the state had objected to disclosing an entire file, not just specific documents within the file. See Doe, 721 P.2d at 626. Contrary to Gwich'in's reading of Doe, this requirement does not place a "heavy" burden upon the state to detail why the documents should not be furnished. Gwich'in also relies on Capital Information Group, but that case discussed the state's "burden" at the balancing-of-interests stage, not the level of detail required when the agency makes its written determination. See Capital Info. Group, 923 P.2d at 36 (quoting Weaver & Jones, supra note 21, at 31 W.Va. 563, 482 S.E.2d 180, 192 (1996) (<HOLDING>); see also Doe, 721 P.2d at 624-25 (discussing
holding that there is no statutory deliberative process privilege in arizona and declining to create such a privilege under the common law holding that deliberative process privilege protects written advice opinions and recommendations to public body from outside consultants obtained during public bodys decistonmaking process holding that emails among prosecutors relating to decision not to prosecute were covered by the deliberative process privilege holding that internal emails about how to present an agency decision to the public were covered by the deliberative process privilege recognizing application of federal deliberative process privilege to internal state communications