has admitted in this and prior proceedings that he committed intentional torts against Ms. Lewis, and, therefore, cannot deny an intent to injure. Such an admission, regardless of its characterization, is not sufficient to show the intent required by section 523(a)(6) because such intent may be present in some, but not all intentional torts. For example, under Virginia law, conduct that is intentional or reckless is all that is required to establish the intent requirement of intentional infliction of emotional distress (an intentional tort). Almy v. Grisham, 273 Va. 68, 639 S.E.2d 182, 189 (2007). Yet, intentional or reckless conduct is not sufficient to establish the intent required under section 523(a)(6). See Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61, 118 S.Ct. 974, 140 L.Ed.2d 90 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Even if the Court were to consider the
holding that  523a6 requires the actor to intend the injury not just the act that leads to the injury holding that the word willful in a6 modifies the word injury indicating that nondischargeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury holding that there must be proof of both a willful act and malicious injury to establish nondischargeability under section 523a6 holding that a mere deliberate or intentional act that causes injury is not sufficient to establish willfulness in the context of 11 usc  523a6 holding that the debtors knowing act of failing to obtain workers compensation insurance so that the employer owed an employee a debt after the employee suffered a workplace injury was not the sort of willful and malicious injury required for nondischargeability under  523a6 because it cannot not be said that the employer intended for the employee to suffer a fall or that there was an unbroken chain of events leading from the employers intentional act to the employees physical injury