it has not done so here. Under the express terms of the Statute, Satterfield has no available remedy against Crown Cork. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. §§ 149.001-.006. Texas courts have recognized that a cure for retroactivity is to allow statutes to operate prospectively or for the Legislature to provide a grace period when enacting statutes affecting vested rights. See, e.g., Likes, 962 S.W.2d at 502 (upholding retroactive application of new immunity defense when the Legislature afforded a reasonable time to file accrued causes of action); Texas Water Rights Comm’n, 464 S.W.2d at 649 (permittee afforded a reasonable time after enactment of statute to preserve their rights, thus providing a “reasonable remedy” after fair opportunity to protect rights); Middleton, 185 S.W. at 560 (<HOLDING>). In Middleton, the Texas Supreme Court upheld
holding that the fair sentencing act does not apply retroactively to defendants whose criminal conduct occurred before its enactment even if those defendants were sentenced after its enactment recognizing that new law did not apply to claims that accrued prior to enactment holding that the damages and jury trial provisions of the 1991 act apply to conduct occurring prior to the date of enactment recognizing that aedpa would not apply to a habeas petition that was pending at the time of its enactment holding that the payments accrued