requires consideration of whether withholding adjudication of the Electrocution Causes of Action at this time will impose any meaningful hardship on the parties. “The prototypical case of hardship comes from the claimant who faces a choice between immediately complying with a burdensome law or ‘riskpng] serious criminal and civil penalties.’ ” Warshak, 532 F.3d at 526 (quoting Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 153, 87 S.Ct. 1507). This prototypical hardship is not present in this litigation. The CPEA does not force the Inmates to make any choice. In fact, as already discussed, the CPEA provides for carrying out executions by electrocution if, and only if, one of two statutory contingencies a 2012 WL 113655, at *1-2 (Tenn. Ct.App. Jan. 11, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 11, 2012) (<HOLDING>). The Inmates nevertheless argue that
holding that defendant truthfully stated on firearm purchase form that he had no felony convictions given the fact that adjudication of guilt was deferred and sentence suspended on his prior offense of felony receipt of a stolen car holding that defendants prior felony convictions in georgia state court for drugrelated conspiracy and simple possession qualified as predicate prior felony drug offenses for  841b1a because under the plain language of the statute  felony drug offense includes any criminal conduct relating to narcotics including simple possession which a state has proscribed as a felony holding that reversal of conviction for felony murder was required where jury failed to find the defendant guilty of the underlying felony as essential element of the felony murder offense holding that the plaintiffs action was ripe where the plaintiff who had received a pardon for three felony drug convictions in georgia and had his firearm rights expressly restored by the pardon asked the court to determine whether a tennessee criminal statute prohibiting anyone convicted of a felony drug offense from possessing a firearm applied to him in light of a tennessee attorney generals opinion stating that the criminal statute applied to pardoned felony drug offenders holding that drug felony under state law can constitute an aggravated felony for federal sentencing guidelines purposes even if the same conduct would not constitute a felony under federal law