112 S.Ct. at 2037, that general rule has no bearing in this case. First of all, the doctrine of reading statutes in pari materia only makes sense when the word or phrase being interpreted has acquired special, non-literal significance as a legal term of art. See Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 307-09, 112 S.Ct. 711, 716, 116 L.Ed.2d 731 (1992) (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263-65, 72 S.Ct. 240, 250, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952)). Appellants fail to identify any word or phrase in § 2713 which has become a legal term of art. If Appellants are suggesting that all claims presentation provisions should be interpreted consistent with CERCLA’s, then their argument flies in the face of clear precedent to the contrary. See Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 28-31, 110 S.Ct. at 310-11 (<HOLDING>); National Envtl. Foundation v. ABC Rail Corp.,
holding that clean water acts notice provision is a condition precedent to all claims holding that rcras notice provision is a condition precedent to all claims holding that a condition was precedent to performance because the contract language did not explicitly state that it was precedent to formation holding that compliance with analogous notice provision of the resource conservation and recovery act rcra was a mandatory condition precedent to suit holding that parol evidence is admissible to establish a condition precedent to the existence of a contract