substance of the evidence is apparent from the context in which the question was asked.’ ” State v. Glass, 2000 ND 212, ¶ 8, 620 N.W.2d 146 (quoting State v. Jensen, 2000 ND 28, ¶ 17, 606 N.W.2d 507 (citing N.D.R.Ev. 103)). The substance of the evidence is not demonstrated when Lemons’ counsel stated only that J.R. would provide “credible exculpatory evidence.” The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lemons’ motion for a continuance. See Erban, 429 N.W.2d at 413 (concluding no abuse of discretion when trial court denied a continuance when a subpoenaed witness could not be located and the defendant failed to advise the court of the expected content of the witness’s testimony if called at trial); see also Flattum-Riemers v. Peters-Riemers, 2001 ND 121, ¶ 15, 630 N.W.2d 71 (<HOLDING>). C [¶ 15] Even though Lemons failed to
holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing plaintiffs expert witness to testify when it also allowed defendants expert witness who disputed the methodology used by plaintiffs expert to testify recognizing that the burden on summary judgment shifts to the nonmoving party once the moving party has met its initial responsibility of showing the absence of a triable issue of fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case holding no abuse of discretion when the moving party failed to make an offer of proof by showing what the witness would testify to if present holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining expert witness was qualified to testify holding that there was no abuse of discretion in allowing a defendants surprise fact witness to testify because the plaintiff did not request a continuance