an agreement to arbitrate employment discrimination claims. Benefits Communication Corp. v. Klieforth, 642 A.2d 1299, 1304 (D.C.1994). The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has consistently said, however, that it would adopt in DCHRA cases federal civil rights precedents “when appropriate,” not indiscriminately. Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, 715 A.2d 873, 889 n. 31 (D.C.1998) (quoting Klie-forth, 642 A.2d at 1301); see also Arthur Young & Co. v. Sutherland, 631 A.2d 354, 371-72 (D.C.1993) (permitting, given the text of the DCHRA and its legislative history, punitive damages awards despite their unavailability under Title VII, and noting that “Title VII is not the only source of the DCHRA”). And in Wallace, the court hel l, 355 F.Supp.2d 223, 227-228 (D.D.C.2005) (<HOLDING>). This result was unremarkable since the DCHRA,
holding that a supervisor was not similarly situated to another supervisor with the same title where the former could not perform the latters duties holding plaintiffs supervisor subject to suit holding individual defendants subject to suit holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city holding that the plaintiffs claims arose from a certain contract because the subject matter of the plaintiffs suit was intertwined with requirements referred to in the contract