vitiates their voluntariness.”) (citing California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125-26 n. 3, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983) (per curiam) and McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970)). Put differently, a defendant’s waiver may be knowing and intelligent even if the defendant is not fully aware of the tactical and strategic implications of his decision to proceed with the interrogation. As already noted, a waiver may be knowing and voluntary, even if unwise or imprudent. A contrary conclusion would lead to the unwarranted result that only counseled waivers would be effective. Yet, neither Miranda nor its progeny impose this kind of restriction on valid waivers. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424-26, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Nguyen next argues that even assuming
holding that district courts findings were not clearly erroneous where there was  sufficient evidence  that the defendants waiver of his rights was knowing and intelligent holding that a defendants waiver of the right to testify must be knowing informed and intelligent holding that defendants waiver was knowing and intelligent even when police withheld information from defendant that his attorney sought to consult with him holding that under the sixth amendment a criminal defendant may waive his right to counsel if that waiver is knowing intelligent and voluntary recognizing requirement of knowing intelligent waiver