activity and the adverse action are not completely unrelated.’ ” Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 978 n. 52 (11th Cir.2008) (quoting Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1457 (11th Cir.1998)). The plaintiff may satisfy the burden of causation by showing close temporal proximity between his protected activity and the adverse employment action. Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir.2007). In the absence of other evidence tending to show causation, temporal proximity must be “very close.” Id. (citation omitted). A three-to-four-month period between the protected activity and the adverse employment action is “not enough” to show “very close” temporal proximity. Id.; see Higdon v. Jackson, 893 F.3d 1211, 1220-21 (11th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). The plaintiff must also provide evidence of
holding that a three month interval between protected activity and adverse act is too long standing alone to establish an inference of retaliation holding that absent other evidence a thirteenmonth interval between an eeo charge and alleged retaliatory termination was too long to establish a causal link holding that a temporal link between protected activity and an adverse employment action may in some cases be sufficient to create an inference of retaliation holding that a temporal proximity of one month between the plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to establish a causal connection holding that a threeyear gap between the protected activity and the adverse employment action was insufficient to support an inference of causation