concurrence's third case addressed whether a party lacked a justiciable interest in the relief sought and thus lacked constitutional standing, a separate issue I address in footnote 6 below. See In re John G. & Marie Stella Kenedy Mem’l Found., 315 S.W.3d 519, 522-23 (Tex.2010) (citing DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299, 304 (Tex.2008) (discussing constitutional standing)). And the concurrence’s fourth case is consistent with Kazi: although it held that a step-grandfather lacked standing under the Family Code to sue for access to a child, the court did not characterize his failure to meet the statutory prerequisites as a jurisdictional defect. See In re Derzapf, 219 S.W.3d 327, 331-33 (Tex.2007) (orig. proceeding). Further, un .App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). 6 . I note that neither defendants nor my
holding that district court had subjectmatter jurisdiction and yet that judgment void for lack of jurisdiction to render the particular judgment holding that standing is component of subjectmatter jurisdiction and subjectmatter jurisdiction is essential to courts authority to hear case holding that party may not appeal summary judgment in favor of opponent when grounds opposing summary judgment asserted on appeal were not raised before trial court holding that when the district court improperly purported to transfer to the circuit court an action over which the circuit court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction the circuit court was without jurisdiction to enter its judgment which was void and dismissing the appeal from that void judgment holding that voidness of summary judgment in defamation case could be asserted for first time on appeal only if trial court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction to render judgment and concluding court had jurisdiction