("A comparative analysis of jurors struck and those remaining is a well-established tool for exploring the possibility that facially race-neutral reasons are a pretext for discrimination.”). The record reveals, however, that Jurors 016 and 006 had very different backgrounds and thus did not possess "comparable characteristics” for purposes of the cross-racial analysis discussed in Turner. Juror 006, like Juror 016 was single, but, in contrast to Juror 016, Juror 006 had never been employed and, significantly, had an uncle who was a recovered alcoholic. This evidence is inconsistent with the prosecutor’s assertion that there was a white juror with comparable characteristics who was dismissed for being single with no children. Compare Burks v. Borg, 27 F.3d 1424, 1429 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>) with Turner, 121 F.3d at 1251-52 (perceiving
holding that an appellate court cannot consider an issue that was not preserved for appellate review holding that counsel may treat minorily and nonminority jurors differently when there are subjective differences between them although that party cannot insulate an explanation from appellate review simply by couching it in vague and subjective terms holding that there is no due process right to appellate review holding that the  exceptional and extremely unusual hardship determination is a subjective discretionary judgment that has been carved out of our appellate jurisdiction holding that mere fact that trial court may decide discretionary matter differently from appellate court does not demonstrate abuse of discretion