with his client. Id. Strickland also establishes the proper prejudice inquiry in a situation like this in which there has been a denial of counsel “altogether” at a critical stage: that is, “prejudice is presumed.” Id. at 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Thus, here, as in Wiggins, the “ ‘clearly established’ precedent of Strickland ” governs. See Wiggins, 123 S.Ct. at 2536. Moreover, again as in Wiggins, a Supreme Court habeas case (here, Flores-Ortega) issued shortly after the relevant state court decision illustrates the proper application of Strickland to the particular facts of the case. Indeed, the Supreme Court made it even clearer in Flores-Ortega than it did in Williams that it was simply applying Strickland to the facts before it. See Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 477, 120 S.Ct. 1029 (<HOLDING>); 528 U.S. at 478, 120 S.Ct. 1029 (rejecting a
recognizing that roe v floresortega clarified the application of the strickland standard to a claim that an attorney was constitutionally deficient for failing to file a notice of appeal holding that the strickland test applies to claims  that counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal recognizing that strickland applies to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims holding strickland two prong test applies to ineffective assistance claims throughout trial including punishment holding that pennsylvanias test for ineffective assistance of counsel is not contrary to strickland