Thus, the Board’s action, far from being arbitrary or capricious so as to run afoul of the standard espoused by our supreme court in Lambert, supra, falls squarely within the authority of a school board to terminate the employment of a tenured teacher for conduct within the scope of § 16-24C-6(a). We conclude that the decision of the Board to terminate the employment of the teacher was proper. We do so notwithstanding the contrary conclusion of the hearing officer, who in our view improperly limited his inquiry in the order reversing the Board’s decision solely to whether the conduct demonstrated in the eyidentia-ry record before the Board amounted to a violation of the conflict-of-interest provisions contained in § 5.6 of the Board’s policy manual. Cfi Cahalane, 117 So.3d at 371 (<HOLDING>). The order under review is, therefore,
holding that under the facts of that case the action primarily involved a custody dispute and therefore that the trial court erred in determining the case by applying the dependency statute holding that a second judgment controls over an earlier judgment entered in the same case holding that the same hearing officer as in this case erred in substituting his judgment for that of the pertinent school board in that case holding in termination of parental rights case that trial court erred in taking judicial notice of evidence before him in guardianship hearing in same case holding the same in a breachofcontract case