expressly authorized her daughter to sign the agreement. Under these circumstances, while the prior conduct of Doris Alexander may have authorized Carol Alexander to sign certain medical forms for her, “there is no evidence that [Doris Alexander], prior to or at her admission to the nursing home, gave [her daughter] express authority to enter into the [arbitration] agreement on her behalf.” McKean, supra at 509 (1) (a). See also Ashburn Health Care Center v. Poole, 286 Ga. App. 24, 26-27 (648 SE2d 430) (2007) (where no power of attorney, nursing home failed to establish that husband had actual authority to sign arbitration agreement on behalf of his wife upon her admission to nursing home); Hogsett v. Parkwood Nursing & Rehab. Center, 997 FSupp.2d 1318, 1324 (I) (B) (2) (N.D. Ga. 2014) (<HOLDING>). (b) Implied authority. We note that “Georgia
holding that a person signing an arbitration agreement using power of attorney is not a party to that agreement merely by virtue of having signed it holding that the plain language of a healthcare power of attorney did not give daughter the right to sign away her mothers right to a jury trial holding mother qualified as thirdparty beneficiary to daughter and soninlaws agreement incident to divorce because it provided for repayment to mother of a specific amount of money from the proceeds of the sale of the couples home holding that trial court properly terminated fathers obligation to support his seventeenyearold daughter who refused to live with father but instead chose to reside in her own apartment after her mother moved out of state where daughter offered no justifiable reason for not living with her father daughter only contended that her stepmother was too neat for her and that she wanted to live closer to her friends holding that daughter had no express authority to sign arbitration agreement for mother where no power of attorney and daughter did not discuss signing the agreement with her mother