analysis.” This standard is not defined by bright lines and rigid boundaries. Instead, the standard allows a magistrate judge to review the facts and circumstances as a whole and make a common sense determination of whether “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” The magistrate judge’s decision in this regard is one we review with great deference. Grossman, 400 F.3d at 217 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)) (other internal quotation marks omitted). As part of such a common sense determination, we observed in Grossman, “it is reasonable to suspect that a drug dealer stores drugs in a home to which he owns a key.” Id. at 218; see also Servance, 394 F.3d at 230 (<HOLDING>). In light of our precedent, the district court
holding that evidence was admissible under the good faith exception where the affidavit contained a detailed description of the nature of the offense the premises to be searched the items for which they were searching and the transaction which led the informant to believe that the drugs would be in this apartment holding that on clear error review appellate court cannot secondguess the trial courts choice between permissible competing inferences internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted recognizing that the nexus between the place to be searched and the items to be seized may be established by the nature of the item and the normal inferences of where one would likely keep such evidence internal quotation marks omitted holding that due process is violated if evidence of prior bad acts goes only to character and there are no permissible inferences the jury may draw from it internal quotation marks omitted holding that a warrant lacking a description of items to be seized was not facially invalid and finding in the alternative that even if the warrant were found to be deficient the seized evidence was admissible under the good faith exception