him or is exposed to the risk of double jeopardy.’ ” United States v. Hamilton, 992 F.2d 1126, 1130 (10th Cir.1993) (quoting Hunter v. New Mexico, 916 F.2d 595, 599 (10th Cir.1990)). Neither situation is applicable here. First, Mr. Ciocchetti received adequate notice that the veracity of the Merrill Lynch account statement was at issue — it was listed in the Indictment under another charge, and Mr. Ciocchetti defended against it at trial. See United States v. Boston, 718 F.2d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir.1983) (“We ... believe that Boston had ample notice from the indictment of the acts for which he was to be tried. The convictions were not based on facts outside the scope of the indictment [as a whole] .... ” (citation omitted)); United States v. Tomasetta, 429 F.2d 978, 979 (1st Cir.1970) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Winters, 210 F.3d
holding appellate courts must consider the trial courts jury charge as a whole recognizing that the question is whether the indictment as a whole conveys sufficient information to properly identify the conduct relied upon by the grand jury in preferring the charge emphasis added holding that whether a jury charge comments on weight of evidence is determined by looking at the jury charge as a whole not isolated statements holding that the trial court erred in denying the defendants motion in arrest of judgment when the indictment lacked a material element and it was not apparent that the grand jury based the indictment on facts that satisfy this element of the crime and that the only permissible cure was to send the matter back to the grand jury holding that in determining whether constructive indictment occurred court must look at the allegedly erroneous instruction in context of the charge as a whole