on his complaints, that the trial court did not prevent appellant from introducing evidence at the hearing, and that appellant did not object to the termination of the hearing or request permission to introduce additional evidence. Further, although the trial court stated it had reasons for its decision and was acting based on information in appellant’s probation file, appellant did not request a statement of reasons. Therefore, appellant did not preserve error as to the trial court’s alleged failure to give appellant a hearing or a statement of reasons. See Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 886-87 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (stating that even constitutional complaints may be waived by failure to timely assert them in the trial court); Rogers v. State, 640 S.W.2d 248, 264 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) (<HOLDING>); McDonald v. State, 608 S.W.2d 192, 194 n. 9
holding that party can waive procedural due process rights under ordinary preservationoferror rules holding that liberty interests that are protected by procedural due process are generally limited to freedom from restraint holding rules of appellate procedure are obviously procedural in nature holding that new rules of criminal procedural are generally not retroactive holding in second opinion on rehearing that procedural due process complaints are subject to waiver under ordinary preservationoferror rules