evidence” that the prosecutor did not dismiss Juror 016 on the basis of her demeanor. In light of the evidence in the record, the appellate court’s determination that the prosecutor dismissed Juror 016 because of her demeanor was an unreasonable determination of the facts. Because this determination provided the basis for the appellate court’s conclusion that the trial court had not clearly erred in accepting the prosecutor’s justification as race-neutral, this determination also was objectively unreasonable. See Johnson, 3 F.3d at 1331 (“When there is reason to believe that there is a racial motivation for the challenge,” we are not “bound to accept at face value a list of neutral reasons that are either unsupported in the record or refuted by it.”); Lewis, 321 F.3d at 833-34 (<HOLDING>). C. The state court of appeal held that
holding that an employees attempt to prove actual discrimination requires more substantial evidence than a prima facie case because evidence of pretext and discrimination is viewed in light of the employers justification holding that where justification for strike was not corroborated by the record and the prosecutor was not credible the proffered justification could not support state courts conclusion that petitioner had failed to prove purposeful discrimination holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record holding that the states agebased justification for exercising a strike was pretextual in that case but noting that a jurors age can be a relevant consideration when evaluating the genuineness of a proffered justification holding that the plaintiffs complaint failed to state a claim for purposeful and unlawful discrimination