is an issue of contract interpretation, particularly well-suited for summary judgment. See Gov. Sys. Advisors, Inc. v. United States, 847 F.2d 811, 812 n. 1 (Fed.Cir.1988) (citing P.J. Maffei Bldg. Wrecking Corp. v. United States, 732 F.2d 913, 916 (Fed.Cir.1984)). Neither party addresses that issue of contract interpretation directly, but defendant necessarily assumes that pay “in lieu of notice” may satisfy a requirement of “notice.” This assumption is reasonably implicit in defendant’s argument because, without it, defendant’s request for summary judgment based on pay in lieu of notice makes no sense. And there is authority to support defendant’s implicit assumption. Farias v. Bexar County Bd. of Trustees for Mental Health Mental Retardation Servs., 925 F.2d 866, 877 (5th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 866, 112 S.Ct. 193,
holding that a difference between 384 days prepreference average number of days to payment and 547 days preference average number of days to payment did not make the payments out of the ordinary course of business holding that 120 days notice was satisfied by 30 days work plus 90 days pay holding that landlord was not liable where dog injured child nine days after landlordtenant relationship was established and where the lease called for 30 days notice before it could be terminated holding that a difference between approximately 54 days prepreference average days to payment and approximately 67 days preference average days to payment did not make the payments out of the ordinary course of business holding that delays of 115 days and 101 days were both substantial