(Colo.2005). Third, the trial court confused the jury by providing the entire statutory definition of "prostitution by a child." None of these arguments was preserved below. 174 We decline to address defendant's unpreserved constitutional arguments for the same reasons given in Part III, supra. Because providing the statutory definition of "prostitution by a child" was appropriate and Madden does not require a different result, we discern no error in the trial court's instruction. 1. Standard of Review 175 When a defendant does not make a specific objection to tendered jury instructions, review is for plain error. People v. Garcia, 28 P.3d 340, 345 (Colo.2001). Plain error occurs only where an error is so "obvious and substantial" that it "undermined the fundament 69 P.2d 54, 62 (1962) (<HOLDING>), with Crawford, 191 Colo. at 507-08, 558 P.2d
holding that any potential prejudice regarding burdenshifting is diminished by the prosecutors statement that the burden of proof is the governments and the courts explicit instructions regarding the burden of proof in the jury charge holding that defendant must establish the application of the limitationexclusion to the plaintiffs claim where defendant did not contest the plaintiffs assertion that defendant bore the burden of proof in this case because the limitation on benefits for mental and nervous conditions is a coverage exclusion and the plan documents contained no express provision regarding burden of proof holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant holding that additional instructions were necessary when the statutory definition of the charged offense by itself suggested that the defendant bore the burden of proof holding that when congress is silent on the issue of the burden of proof applicable to a common law affirmative defense that does not negate an element of the offense we presume congress intended the defendant to bear the burden of proof of the defense by a preponderance of the evidence