have been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 682, 105 S.Ct: at 3383 (borrowing the Strickland prejudice standard). The requirement of prejudice, the Court explained, is “[cjonsistent with our overriding concern with the justice of the finding of guilt.” Id. at 678, 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3381, 3383 (quotation marks omitted). The Bagley rule is still in full force and effect. Its requirement that a defendant who has been deprived by the government of an opportunity to impeach a witness against him must prove prejudice in order to obtain relief has been reiterated and applied in many decisions. See, e.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 273-75, 289-96, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 1944-45, 1952-55, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) (<HOLDING>); Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691, 124 S.Ct.
holding that where the record supported the district courts conclusion that statements would not have been suppressed and there had been nothing submitted on appeal to lead to a different conclusion the petitioner had not shown any resulting prejudice from the failure to file a motion to suppress and therefore had not established a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel holding that a defendant deprived of an opportunity to impeach an eyewitness by the governments failure to disclose documents that cast serious doubt on significant portions of her testimony was not entitled to relief because he had not shown that there is a reasonable probability that his conviction or death sentence would have been different had these materials been disclosed holding that even if attorney had secured defense witnesses  2255 relief was not warranted where the evidence against defendant at trial was so overwhelming that no reasonable probability exists that the result of the proceeding would have been different holding that where juror did not disclose that she had an interest in the conviction of the defendant probable prejudice is shown and the conviction must be reversed holding that to succeed on an ineffective assistance claim a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different