we next consider whether Panek in fact made the requisite 9(h) “identifying statement” in his counterclaim, thereby waiving his right to a jury trial. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Virgilio, 574 F.Supp. 48, 51 (S.D.Cal.1983) (“By invoking 9(h) the plaintiff may preclude a right to a jury trial which might otherwise exist.”). We conclude that he did, although the election could have been more artfully made. While the preferred technique is to invoke expressly Rule 9(h), Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 5 Federal Practice and Procedure § 1313 at 719 (1990), the words “In Admiralty” in the caption with no accompanying demand for a jury trial, were sufficient to constitute a 9(h) election for admiralty procedures. See, e.g., Teal v. Eagle Fleet, Inc., 933 F.2d 341, 345 (5th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). One important factor in determining whether a
holding that under rule 38e there is no right to a trial by jury if plaintiff chooses to identify his claim as admiralty or maritime as permitted by rule 9h holding that courts apply substantive admiralty law to claims that sound in admiralty regardless of whether the complaint invokes diversity or admiralty jurisdiction holding that a complaint that asserts both admiralty jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction is not an adequate 9h designation to trigger admiralty procedures holding that rule 4k2 does apply to admiralty cases holding that a party need not make a specific reference to rule 9h to fall under admiralty jurisdiction