been compensated for its loss in various ways. The district court construed the letter as a “motion for an order determining the amount of [Burress’s] restitution balance” and referred the matter to a magistrate judge. After the parties’ submission of various documents and the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the district court issued an order reducing the restitution owed by $9,650. Burress filed a pro se motion for reconsideration within ten days and filed a timely pro se notice of appeal from the district court’s denial of the motion. On appeal, Burress first attempts to challenge the legality of the district court’s restitution order, contending it violates the rule established in Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 420, 110 S.Ct. 1979, 109 L.Ed.2d 408 (1990) (<HOLDING>), and was not the product of independent
holding that an award of restitution is only for the loss caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction holding that under the restitution provision of the supervised release statute 18 usc  3583 restitution can be ordered only for losses caused by the specific conduct that is the basis for the offense of conviction holding that the victim and witness protection act limits the amount of restitution to the loss caused by the specific conduct forming the basis of the offense of conviction holding that the relevant question in imposing restitution under the mvra is whether the loss is caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction holding that restitution under the victim and witness protection act need not be limited to  the specific amount alleged in the count of mail fraud to which defendant pled