the officers contemplated whether to cite him. Such a conclusion is inescapable given the purposes underlying a citation. The latter not only informs the accused of the charge levied against him and the time and place at wMch he must appear to answer that charge, Tex. Transp.Code Ann. § 543.003 (Vernon Pamph.1996), but also serves to secure his release once the accused signs the citation. Id. at 543.005. Logically, one cannot, nor need not, secure Ms release unless he is in the throes of restraint. And, in issuing the citation, the officer terminates the restraint. See id. (stating that the officer “shall then promptly release the person from custody” once the written promise to appear is executed); Sedani v. State, 848 S.W.2d 314, 317-18 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>). Issuing the citation also terminates the
holding that once probable cause is established officer is not required to investigate further holding that although the investigation of the traffic offense that served as the basis for the stop was complete when the officer issued the citation the officers continued detention of the appellant thereafter for a canine search was lawful because during the investigation of the traffic offense the officer had developed a reasonable suspicion that the appellant had committed a drugrelated offense holding that an officer  may detain a person in order to determine identity and circumstance when that officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot holding that the defendant could appeal the district courts order granting a new trial because his right not to be subjected to a second trial for the same offense could not be remedied once the second trial has taken place holding that the officer may not further detain or rearrest the individual once the citation has issued unless a second offense is spied