and B & G were to pay fringe benefit contributions, interest, liquidated damages, fees and costs. The settlement sums were for amounts then owed under the CBAs—-the bonded obligation—and nothing more. (B & G Settlement Agreement, Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 20, ¶ 1, Doc. 45-9; Brown Settlement Agreement, Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 21, ¶ 1, Doc. 45-9.) The Plaintiffs even agreed to waive liquidated damages if Brown and B & G complied with the settlement agreements, which would have decreased IFIC’s surety liability. (B & G Settlement Agreement, ¶ 2; Brown Settlement Agreement, ¶ 2.) Therefore, the settlement agreements did not substantially increase IFIC’s liability and discharge is not warranted. Cf. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Penn Paving, Inc., 557 Pa. 439, 734 A.2d 833, 839 (1999) (<HOLDING>). IFIC analogizes this case to R.P. Richards,
holding that an increase in sellers costs by 522 resulting in the sellers loss of approximately 267 million failed to con stitute commercial impracticability holding that proceeds means profits only when imposing a money laundering count leads to a radical increase in the statutory maximum sentence and only when nothing in the legislative history suggests that congress intended such an increase holding that an unconsented increase in an indemnity obligation from 150000 to 5 million was a material modification sufficient to discharge indemnitors liability holding that in pleading scienter arguing that the motive for defrauding investors was to increase the companys profits or to increase officer compensation is not sufficient holding that failure to report a change in federal taxable income as required by state law excepted state tax liability from discharge