Marable when we explained that, “by the nature of the crime, the precise bounds of a single conspiracy seldom will be clear from the indictment.” Marable, 578 F.2d at 153. However, if the “judged on its face” language of Menna is read to restrict a defendant to his indictment for proof of a double jeopardy claim once he has pled guilty to the crime he is challenging, we will necessarily be requiring an indictment to serve a purpose for which it is, admittedly, frequently inadequate. We might be less concerned about this result if it did not have constitutional, as well as practical, implications. As it is, however, we simply cannot, on the strength of thi the government could “separate a single, ongoing conspiracy into discrete conspiracies by simply dividing the time frame”); Winship (<HOLDING>). Through the years, we have seen this freedom
holding in the absence of alj findings supported by specific weighing of the evidence we cannot assess whether relevant evidence adequately supports the aljs conclusion and thus the aljs unexplained conclusion was beyond meaningful review holding in the absence of alj findings supported by specific weighing of the evidence we cannot assess whether relevant evidence adequately supports the aljs conclusion recognizing that the government carved out a portion of a larger conspiracy and alleged it as a separate conspiracy recognizing that we cannot rest a conclusion of separate conspiracy personnel on the governments decision of who to charge in specific indictments holding that plea to multidefendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment