but on significantly more favorable terms, [citation omitted] In the alternative, if the plaintiff presents direct evidence that the lender intentionally targeted her for unfair loans on the basis of sex and marital status, the plaintiff need not also show that the lender makes loans on more favorable terms to others. Id. at 886-87. As discussed above, plaintiffs have not alleged that they were treat ed any worse than similarly situated home buyers of other ethnic backgrounds, and therefore cannot meet the fourth element of a “reverse redlining” claim. A concluso-ry allegation that defendants discriminated against Plaintiffs because they are “minority buyers” is insufficient to state a cause of action under the FHA. See U.S. v. Weisz, 914 F.Supp. 1050, 1053 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (<HOLDING>) Accordingly, plaintiffs’ FHA claims are
holding that the standard for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as the standard for a motion to dismiss holding that plaintiffs allegations that defendant engaged in coercive business practices without justification entirely out of malice and without normal economic selfinterest were conclusory and thus insufficient to state a claim holding that when there was no surprise and no prejudice defendant was entitled to rely on defense of accord and satisfaction in its summary judgment motion even though it was not included in the pleadings holding that plaintiffs allegation that defendant engaged in conduct that coerced intimidated threatened and interfered with neighboring residents enjoyment of their dwelling because of their religion in violation of the fha was entirely conclusory characterization of defendant residents intent that was not binding on court for purposes of defendants motion for judgment on pleadings holding that plaintiffs allegation that defendant had exclusive knowledge as the manufacturer did not support claim that defendant was aware of a defect