to the daily business conducted by an attorney, in order to warrant substantial discipline. See, e.g., In re Brown, 674 So.2d 243, 246 (La.1996) (“Conviction of a crime may warrant disbarment, even though the crime was not directly connected with the practice of law.”). With respect to the harshness of the discipline imposed upon Hoare, we agree that a suspension of one or two years, rather than disbarment, appears to be a more typical sanction imposed in disciplinary cases involving an alcohol-related vehicular homicide. See, e.g., Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Michaels, 38 Ohio St.3d 248, 527 N.E.2d 299 (1988) (eighteen-month suspension); Jones, 759 S.W.2d at 63 (two-year suspension); Matter of Disciplinary Proceeding Against Curran, 115 Wash.2d 747, 801 P.2d 962 (1990) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); Matter of Howard, 143 N.J. 526, 673 A.2d 800
holding that consecutive sentences imposed on multiplieitous counts  two counts of conspiracy for one drug smuggling enterprise  violated double jeopardy clause holding that severance was not required when a defendant was charged with five counts of forcible rape two counts of felonious restraint three counts of kidnapping two counts of armed criminal action two counts of forcible sodomy one count of second degree assault one count of first degree robbery and one count of stealing holding that issues underlying all counts were sufficiently intertwined that the separate appeal of the summary judgment counts would complicate the trial of the remaining counts holding that twoyear delay was not reasonable holding that presumptive sanction for two counts of vehicular homicide is twoyear suspension