corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court dismissed Young’s petition as untimely under the one-year limitation period imposed by the Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); see also Waldrip v. Hall, 548 F.3d 729, 734 (9th Cir.2008). We affirm. Young is not entitled to statutory or equitable tolling of the one-year limitation period. To obtain tolling, Young must adequately justify the delay between the denial of his first state habeas petition on September 2, 2004, and the subsequent filing of his second and third state habeas petitions on February 2, 2005. See § 2244(d)(2) (providing tolling during the pendency of a properly filed state habeas petition); Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 192-93, 126 S.Ct. 846, 163 L.Ed.2d 684 (2006) (<HOLDING>); see also Waldrip, 548 F.3d at 734. Young
holding that california supreme courts denial of habeas petition becomes final thirty days after filing holding that defendant abandoned his motion by failing to pursue it within a reasonable time after it was filed recognizing that federal habeas statutes require petitioner to be in custody when petition filed holding that a habeas petitioner must be in custody under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his petition is filed holding that a california habeas petition is timely if filed within a reasonable time