not required to set forth an hour-by-hour analysis of the fee request. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Mancuso, 825 F.2d 559, 562 (1st Cir.1987); In re ‘Agent Orange’ Product Liability Litigation, 818 F.2d 226, 237-38 (2d Cir.1987) (‘no item-by-item accounting of the hours disallowed is necessary or desirable’); Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy Inc., 776 F.2d 646, 657-58 (7th Cir.1985).” Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1397-1399 (9th Cir.1992). Rather, “the district court has the authority to make across-the-board percentage cuts either in the number of hours claimed or in the final lodestar figure as a practical means of trimming the fat from a fee application.” Id., 987 F.2d at 1398 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Kirsch v. Fleet St., Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 173 (2d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>) (internal citations omitted); Mares v. Credit
holding that the court has discretion to double check the reasonableness of the percentage fee through a lodestar calculation recognizing that because it is unrealistic to expect a trial judge to evaluate and rule on every entry in an application a specific percentage cut is a practical means of trimming fat from a fee application recognizing court discretion in determining reasonable fee under rule 11 holding that the court has discretion simply to deduct a reasonable percentage of the number of hours claimed as a practical means of trimming fat from a fee application  holding that district court had discretion to decline to deduct unemployment insurance benefits from damages award