of the statute. Of course their interpretations differ. That is why they are in court. See Bank of America NT & SA v. 203 North LaSalle Street P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 461, 119 S.Ct. 1411, 143 L.Ed.2d 607 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“A mere disagreement among litigants over the meaning of a statute does not prove ambiguity; it usually means that one of the litigants is simply wrong.”). Whether a statute is ambiguous is a pure question of law to be determined by the courts, however, not by the parties or by an administrative agency. See Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 369, 115 S.Ct. 2172, 132 L.Ed.2d 314 (1995) (finding that interpretation of statutory terms is a question of law and is therefore the court’s duty); Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 446, 107 S.Ct. 1207 (<HOLDING>). Second, it is not unheard of for a court to
holding that matters of statutory construction are questions of law for the court to decide rather than issues of fact holding that pure questions of law that are discernible from the record are subject to de novo review holding that district courts retain jurisdiction after iirira to decide habeas corpus challenges involving pure questions of law recognizing rule of statutory construction that statutes must be read as a whole and sections which are part of the same general statutory scheme must be construed together and each given effect if it can be done by any reasonable construction holding that courts must decide pure questions of statutory construction