410.025(d), 410.169, 413.055(a); 28 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 126.7(a), (c)(3), 133.306(b). Here, SORM agreed that Lawton’s injury was compensable. When it later disputed the extent of that injury, it was governed by the deadline applicable to such disputes, not the sixty-day deadline governing compensability. A carrier has up to forty-five days from the date it receives a complete medical bill to dispute whether that treatment was necessary. See 28 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 124.3(e); 133.240(a). That is the time frame applicable here. “[T]he [Division] could have easily formulated exceptions in the language of a general rule.” Rodriguez, 997 S.W.2d at 255. Because the Division has not done so, the court of appeals’ reliance on an appeals panel decision to the contrary was improper. Id. at 254-55 (<HOLDING>). To the extent some cases have held
holding that deference is owed to an agencys interpretation of its own categorical exclusion regulations so long as that interpretation is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation holding that a secretarys interpretation of a departments regulation is controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation holding interpretation may not be inconsistent with regulation holding that courts should defer to agencys interpretation of its own regulations if not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation holding that while courts defer to the divisions interpretation of its own regulation they cannot do so if that interpretation is  plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation  quoting public util commn of tex v gulf states util co 809 sw2d 201 207 tex1991