” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Commotir-Law Claims Finally, Comley attempts to repackage her discrimination claims under various common-law labels, some sounding in law and others in equity. Chapter 151B is a comprehensive remedial statute, and thus precludes replication of discrimination claims in the form of common-law actions. See id. § 9 (exclusivity provision). The purpose of this provision is “to subject all discrimination claims to some administrative scrutiny.” Charland v. Muzi Motors, Inc., 417 Mass. 580, 585, 631 N.E.2d 555 (1994). Claims against the individually name defendants Chapter 151B, unlike its cognate federal statutes, provides for. individual personal liability. Beaupre v. Cliff Smith & Assocs., 50 Mass.App.Ct. 480, 491, 738 N.E.2d 753 (2000) (<HOLDING>). While Comley has adduced sufficient facts to
holding it was not a surprise or unfair to the defendant for the state to pursue a theory of aiding and abetting at trial when the charging document did not refer to aiding and abetting recognizing aiding and abetting conversion recognizing both aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duties and aiding and abetting conversion recognizing aiding and abetting trespass holding that individual harasser could be found liable for aiding and abetting his corporate entity which was the vehicle through which the plaintiff was dismissed for refusing his sexual advances