and United States v. Missouri Pacific R. Co. (1929) 278 U.S. 269, 278, 49 S.Ct. 133, [136] 73 L.Ed. 322 (setting forth the standard formulation of the “plain meaning rule”), it is now settled that available extrinsic interpretive aids may not be disregarded even though the statutory language appears to have a “plain meaning” which does not lead to an absurd result. See, e.g., U. S. v. Amer. Trucking Ass’ns (1940) 310 U.S. 534, 543-44, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 1064, 84 L.Ed. 1345: When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available there certainly can be no “rule of law” which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on “superficial examination.” Accord, Train v. Colorado Pub. Int. Research Group (1976) 426 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 1938, 48 L.Ed.2d 434 (<HOLDING>) and McMann v. United Air Lines, Inc. (4th
holding that court of appeals erred in relying on the plain meaning of a statute when the legislative history clearly indicated another meaning holding that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous no need exists for the court to examine the legislative histo ry and the court must give effect to the plain meaning of the statute holding that absent unusual circumstances this court must apply the plain meaning of a statute holding that an appellate court must give a statute its clear and plain meaning when the statute is unambiguous holding that the meaning of a notwithstandingotherlaw proviso was straightforward in reinforcing the plain meaning of the legislative prescription to which it was attached