Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121, 83 L. Ed. 2d 523, 533 (1985) (stating that “the McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination”); Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1142 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that plaintiffs must present “ ‘direct evidence that decisionmakers placed substantial negative reliance on an illegitimate criterion’ ” in order “[t]o earn a mixed-motive instruction”) (citation omitted), overruled in part by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 156 L. Ed. 2d 84 (2003); Eaton, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9545 at *24-25 (applying the McDonnell Douglas proof scheme to a whistleblower claim in the absence of direct evidence of retaliation); Miko v. Comm’n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 220 Conn. 192, 204, 596 A.2d 396, 403 (1991) (<HOLDING>). “Direct evidence” has been defined as
holding that without a link to the challenged decision stray remarks did not constitute indirect evidence of discrimination sufficient to satisfy the final prong of the mcdonnell douglas framework holding that the facts of the ease fall under the mcdonnell douglas standard which does not require direct proof of discrimination for the plaintiff to make a submissible case holding that when the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination price waterhouse applies rather than mcdonnell douglas holding that a title vii plaintiff need not plead the elements of a mcdonnell douglas prima facie case to survive a motion to dismiss holding because the plaintiffs erisa claim is based on alleged circumstantial evidence  the eighth circuit analyzed the claim under the mcdonnell douglas framework