Dev. Corp. v. City of Chesterfield, 963 F.2d 1102, 1104 (8th Cir.1992) (noting that substantive due process claims should be limited to “truly irrational” governmental action). Therefore, we conclude that the officers are entitled to summary judgment on appellees’ due process claim. III. The second incident occurring on September 21, 1996, involves appellants Offi cer Stanley and Sergeant Aldrich. These appellants contend that the district court should have granted them qualified immunity on appellees’ Fourth Amendment and due process claims. A. Fourth Amendment As stated above, the relevant inquiry in a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim is whether the officers had probable cause to arrest appellees. See Baker, 443 U.S. at 142, 99 S.Ct. at 2693-94; Hannah, 795 F.2d at 1389 (<HOLDING>). Appellees claim that Officer Stanley and
holding  1983 action lies for warrantless arrest without probable cause recognizing the defense of good faith and probable cause in  1983 case involving unconstitutional warrantless arrest holding that there is no  1983 cause of action for false arrest unless the arresting officer lacked probable cause holding that in a  1983 action issue of probable cause is for the jury holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment