integrity of the prosecution, “charg[ing it] with ‘reprehensible’ conduct in purportedly attempting to cast a false light on [the defendant’s] activities.” 470 U.S. at 4, 105 S.Ct. at 1041, 84 L.Ed.2d at 6. The Court held that defense counsel’s conduct was sufficient to invoke the “invited response” doctrine because “[d]efense counsel ... must not be permitted to make unfounded and inflammatory attacks on the opposing advocate.” Young, 470 U.S. at 9, 105 S.Ct. at 1043, 84 L.Ed.2d at 8; see also United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 33 n. 5, 108 S.Ct. 864, 869 n. 5, 99 L.Ed.2d 23, 32 n. 5 (1988) (opining that, under Young, a prosecutor’s reference to a criminal defendant’s failure to testify may be contextually proper); United States v. Nickens, 955 F.2d 112, 121-22 (1 st Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). This Court has not yet had the opportunity to
holding that defense counsels argument that the prosecution was trying to railroad his client was sufficient to invoke the invited response doctrine holding that defense counsel had invited prosecutors comments on parole law holding prosecutors argument that defense counsels goal was to keep evidence from the jury was improper holding improper counsels argument that plaintiff was entitled to something for manner in which defense was conducted holding that no exception to the invited error doctrine has ever been adopted by this circuit