of funds and announcement of an intention to draw funds, it expands the scope of conduct that violates the Dealership Act. To determine whether the Amendment adversely affects AHM’s substantive rights, we compare AHM’s rights under the Dealership Act before and after the Amendment became effective. If the application of the Amendment creates a new disability in respect to past transactions, the Amendment affects substantive rights and may not be applied retrospectively. See Lessard v. City of Manchester Fire Dep’t, 118 N.H. 43, 47 (1978) (an amendment should not be applied retrospectively “so as to create a new obligation, impose a new duty or attach a new disability in respect to past transactions” (quotation omitted)); see also Martin v. Pat’s Peak, 158 N.H. 735, 737, 742-43 (2009) (<HOLDING>). Resolving this issue requires us to interpret
holding that new rule applied purely prospectively primarily because of reliance factor holding that where a legislative amendment changed the exemption provisions of a tax statute defining those eligible for certain exemptions and refunds the amendment could only be applied to tax years after its effective date even where the legislature expressly stated the amendment should have retroactive effect and looked to the law in place during the taxable events to determine if the taxpayer was eligible for a refund holding that bradley governs whether a statute is to be applied prospectively or retroactively holding that a statute which affects a matter still in litigation when the statute becomes effective will be applied by a reviewing court even though the statute was not then law when the decision appealed from was handed down unless the legislature expresses a contrary intent holding that even when legislature only sought to clarify a statutory ambiguity by defining a term the amendment applied prospectively because the clarified intent was not clearly expressed in original version of the statute