establish pretext so as to make summary judgment improper. In this case, while the indirect evidence and direct evidence are independently sufficient to allow the Chuangs to proceed to trial, it is the cumulative evidence to which a court ultimately looks. 1. Indirect Evidence It is not quite accurate to say that at this point the burden of production shifts back to the Chuangs. As the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, a disparate treatment plaintiff can survive summary judgment without producing any evidence of discrimination beyond that constituting his prima facie case, if that evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding the truth of the employer’s proffered reasons. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., — .U.S. -, -, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2108, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (<HOLDING>); see also St. Mary’s Honor Center, 509 U.S. at
holding that in a discrimination case plaintiff must prove that firing was a result of intentional discrimination holding that the factfinder may infer discrimination from the falsity of the employers explanation holding that if factfinder rejects employers proffered nondiseriminatory reasons as unbelievable it may infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination without additional proof of discrimination holding that a finding of pretextuality allows a juror to reject a defendants proffered reasons for a challenged employment action and thus permits the ultimate inference of discrimination holding in the discrimination context that a plaintiff may challenge incidents which occurred outside the statute of limitations period if the various acts of discrimination constitute a continuing pattern of discrimination