proscription against searches and seizures; (2) it contains a vague enforcement standard which is susceptible to arbitrary enforcement; or (3) it fails to give fair and adequate notice of the type of conduct prohibited. We will address each issue separately. 2. Fourth Amendment The statute, in essence, requires a person to provide reliable identification when requested by a police officer who has a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity under the standard of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Whether such a requirement violates the fourth amendment’s proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures was specifically left open by the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 53 n.3, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2641, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Because Terry approved a more substantial
holding that a person could not be required to furnish identification if not reasonably suspected of any criminal conduct holding that a statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived of to justify it holding that in a fifth amendment challenge pjrovided that conduct is of a sort widely known among the lay public to be criminal  a person is not entitled to clear notice that the conduct violates a particular criminal statute it is enough that he knows that what he is about to do is probably or certainly criminal holding that the victims negligence is not a defense to criminal conduct holding that criminal conduct on premises was not foreseeable