theory of standing”, id. at 498, suggesting I attempted to sneak this analysis under the door, the majority goes far astray in two ways. First, my panel opinion .does cite “authority” — by analogizing to Rule 15(b). 473 F.3d at 195. Second, my panel opinion candidly admits no “precedent [had been located] for this implied-admission concept”. Id. (emphasis added). Surely, the majority recognizes courts must sometimes decide issues of first impression. Concomitantly,- standing must, of course, be viewed in context. E.g., Littlefield, 268 F.3d at 294 n. 31. Moreover, as reflected in my panel opinion, 473 F.3d at 194, standing is more relaxed for Establishment Clause claims, especially concerning schools. E.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 583, 112 S.Ct. 2649, 120 L.Ed.2d 467 (1992) (<HOLDING>). For the majority to state that, in Lee, “the
holding that standing does not exist where the court would have to accept a number of very speculative inferences and assumptions in any endeavor to connect the alleged injury with the challenged conduct  holding plaintiff had standing to challenge future clergypresence and prayers at a highschool graduation based on stipulated facts and assumptions concerning the offering and content of the prayers from an earlier middleschool graduation holding that plaintiff had standing to challenge a portrait of jesus in the hallway of his high school even after graduation as plaintiff still visited the school and will confront the portrait whenever he is in the hall  plaintiff claimed that  he continued to suffer actual injury holding that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged injuryinfact based on impact to sites that the plaintiff had visited in the past and planned to revisit each year in the future holding that passengers lacked any reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore had no standing to challenge the search of the vehicle