for purposes of coverage since the damage caused by the drywall was “unexpected” and “unanticipated” and not the result of any intentional act. However, the court may look outside the policy for the definition of a policy term only where the policy itself does not provide a definition, see Corban v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 20 So.3d 601, 609 (Miss.2009) (“court’s role is to render fair reading and interpretation of policy by examining its express language and applying “ordinary and popular meaning” to any undefined terms”); and plaintiffs’ insinuation to the contrary is plainly unfounded. As Shelter notes, Mississippi law requires that policy terms and definitions be enforced as written. See Noxubee County School Dist. v. United Nat’l Ins. Co., 883 So.2d 1159, 1166 (Miss.2004) (<HOLDING>) (citing United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v.
holding that it was proper for court to rely on affidavits of defendants representatives in negotiations because their personal knowledge and competence to testify are reasonably inferred from their positions and the nature of their participation in the matters to which they swore holding that while trial courts are encouraged to state all findings in their written orders they are not required to do so as long as the basis for their decisions is clear from the record and thus susceptible to review holding that because plaintiffs would be able to file their case in colombia  plaintiffs concerns as to their safety are more appropriately considered in the private interest factors analysis holding that arbitration clauses as contractual agreements must be enforced to their terms holding that ijnsurance policies are contracts and as such they are to be enforced according to their provisions and ijnsurance companies must be able to rely on their statements of coverage exclusions disclaimers definitions and other provisions in order to receive the benefit of their bargain