to Mr. Flanders’s adversary case, the state-court proceedings had become final for Rooker-Feldman purposes even though the action was remanded on an unrelated matter of state law. Mr. Flanders does not question the finality of the state-court proceedings, and we agree with the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that there was sufficient finality for Rooker-Feldman purposes. See Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1032 n.2 (10th Cir. 2006) (defining finality to include when the state courts have finally resolved all federal questions and only state-law or factual questions remain). 5 . Some courts have found an exception to Rooker-Feldman when a state court wrongly construes a bankruptcy court’s discharge order. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Herr (In re Hamilton), 540 F.3d 367, 373-75 (6th Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>); Pavelich v. McCormick, Barstow, Sheppard,
holding that an action taken in violation of the automatic stay is void ab initio holding that the tucker act confers jurisdiction to hear claims for alleged breach of contract and that jurisdiction is not lost if the court later determines on the merits that the alleged contract is in fact void ab initio or invalid holding that a state court judgment that modifies a discharge in bankruptcy is void ab initio and the rookerfeldman doctrine would not bar federal court jurisdiction holding rookerfeldman doctrine deprived district court of jurisdiction to review decision of west virginia state bar holding that the rookerfeldman doctrine is broad enough to bar all federal claims that were or should have been central to the state court decision