of whether Kinkus committed disorderly conduct. See Bentley v. Grange Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 119 Ohio App.3d 93, 694 N.E.2d 526, 530 (1997) (providing that under Ohio law, collateral estoppel applies to facts that: “(1) [were] actually and directly litigated in the prior action, (2) [were] passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, and (3) when the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party in privity with a party to the prior action”). Thus, Kinkus cannot contest the accuracy of Popp’s police report which served as the basis for Prosecutor Thomas’s decision to bring the disorderly conduct charge. Since Popp supplied only truthful information to Prosecutor Thomas, he cannot be subject to a malicious prosecution claim. See McKinley, 404 F.3d at 444 (<HOLDING>); Darrah v. City of Oak Park, 255 F.3d 301, 312
holding that a prosecutors threat to bring more serious charges to induce a plea bargain no more than openly presented the defendant with the unpleasant alternatives of forgoing trial or facing charges on which he was plainly subject to prosecution holding that the defendant could not be liable for malicious prosecution where the plaintiff presented no evidence suggesting that defendants conspired with influenced or even participated in the prosecutors decision to bring charges against him holding that a police officer cannot be held liable for malicious prosecution when he did not make the decision to prosecute the plaintiff holding the same for malicious prosecution holding that action could not form the basis of a malicious prosecution claim where criminal information was dismissed as insufficient to support the charges without prejudice and the prosecutors did not amend or refile