type of CTA. However, the CEA does not impose fiduciary duties on impersonal advisors. The leading authority for the proposition that the CEA imposes fiduciary obligations on all CTAs is Savage v. CFTC, 548 F.2d 192, 197 (7th Cir.1977). However, Savage cannot be read so broadly; the party in that case offered personalized advice, id. at 194, and so would be considered a fiduciary under the common law. Nothing in § 6o indicates an intent on the part of Congress to impose fidudary duties on impersonal advisors. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a), which contains language similar to 7 U.S.C. § 6o, does not impose fiduciary duties. See Trussed v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F.Supp. 757, 762 (D.Colo.1964); see also SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 631 (7th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, § 206 of the IAA, 15 U.S.C. §
holding that trustees fiduciary duty exists independent of any clause in trust agreement holding that a plaintiff seeking individual relief under erisa  502a3 under a breach of fiduciary duty theory did not have a cause of action when the alleged breach of fiduciary duty was a failure to distribute benefits in accordance with the plan holding that breach of fiduciary duty claim was preempted by fehba holding that whether attorney complied with fiduciary duty to disclose all material information was question of fact holding that a breach of a fiduciary duty connected with trading on material nonpublic information is necessary for a violation  17a indicating that  17a does not impose any independent fiduciary duties by its own language