from my knee to my hip. He was kicking me and telling me to get up off that floor, stop your faking, you know, stop the dramatics, you know. Q. When you say he was kicking you, what do you mean, how was he kicking you? A. You want me to demonstrate? Q. Well, I mean was he like winding up and kicking you or was he just nudging you with his foot? A. No, he was kicking me, you know, kicking me. Q. And was this while you were unconscious? A. Yes. Q. How did you know he was kicking you if you were unconscious? A. Well, becaus onstitutional use of excessive force, but the encounter the plaintiff describes in her deposition, while perhaps unprofessional as she describes it, does not meet the constitutional standard to make out a substantive due process violation. See Ellis, 887 F.Supp. at 329 (<HOLDING>). Because the incident was isolated and in an
holding thirty days in disciplinary segregation does not rise to the level of punishment invoking the due process clause holding that pretrial detainees possess a constitutional right against deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs because the due process rights of a pretrial detainee are at least as great as the eighth amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner holding that the due process clause protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment holding that officers were entitled to rely on the judicial officers finding of probable cause in issuing the search warrant unless they knowingly made false statements to obtain the warrant and that a challenge to the adequacy of the officers investigation does not rise to level of clearly established constitutional violation holding that officers patting pretrial detainee on the buttocks does not rise to the level of punishment to constitute a constitutional violation