requirements for stating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Simply stated, the fact that Oliveras ultimately did not get the chance to go before an IJ cannot be attributed solely to any ineffective assistance by Attorney Luff. Given that a mechanism existed under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A) to cure the harm caused by Attorney Luffs incompetence and secure another opportunity to state her case against deportation, which Oliver-as failed to take advantage of, it cannot be said that Oliveras’ immigration proceedings were rendered “fundamentally unfair” on account of the ineffective assistance she received. Hence, Oliveras’ due process rights were not violated, and the BIA acted 'within its discretion in declining to grant her relief. See Guerrero-Santana, 499 F.3d at 93 (<HOLDING>). 3. Equitable Tolling Finally, Oliveras
holding that a petitioners failure to address the bias denial of a motion to reopen in the argument portion of his opening brief on appeal waived the issue holding that it was an abuse of discretion for the bia to fail to consider the merits of a petitioners claim holding that the petitioners failure to raise his ineffective assistance of counsel claim before the bia deprived the district court of jurisdiction to hear the issue holding that the merits of petitioners ineffective assistance claim were immaterial as counsels shortcomings could not account for petitioners failure to timely file his second motion to reopen holding that criminal defense counsels failure to file notice of appeal when requested to do so is per se ineffective assistance