testify that he was “pretty seared” because Daughter could have gotten hurt, it does not appear that Petitioner offered testimony in this regard as to Martin. As discussed above, the witnesses’ testimony indicated that the officers grabbed Petitioner, focusing their attention on him and no one else. At the settling of Jury Instruction No. 65, Loy, Petitioner’s counsel, herself stated, tion on every defense or theory of defense having any support in the evidence,” State v. Cabrera, 90 Hawai'i 359, 370, 978 P.2d 797, 808 (1999) (citation omitted), based on the evidence discussed above, there was no rational basis on which the jury could conclude that Petitioner was justified in using force for the protection of others. See State v. Kupihea, 98 Hawai'i 196, 206, 46 P.3d 498, 508 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, viewing the evidence as a
holding that courts of appeal should only correct a forfeited error at the trial level in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result holding that a trial court errs by failing to limit the definitions of the culpable mental states as they relate to the conduct elements involved in the particular offense holding that trial court was not required to include all statutory definitions in its instructions but rather should refer only to those definitions having a rational basis in the evidence adduced at trial and not otherwise excludable holding that in absence of reporters record or compliance with rule 346c appellate court would presume evidence adduced at trial supported trial courts judgment holding that the trial judges misconduct at trial did not prejudice the defendant in light of the courts curative instructions