with the same deficiency — the court should strike his pleading or, depending on the circumstances, dismiss his case and consider the imposition of monetary sanctions.”). We are not, however, convinced that the instant case was one with respect to which a dismissal with prejudice was appropriate under the circumstances. Moreover, a complaint — so long as it is minimally sufficient to put a defendant on notice of the claims against him — will not fail for mere surplusage. See United States ex rel. Garst v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir.2003) (“Surplusage can and should be ignored. Instead of insisting that the parties perfect their pleadings, a judge should bypass the dross and get on with the case.”); Davis v. Ruby Foods, Inc., 269 F.3d 818, 820 (7th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). We have recognized that “[pleading facts not
holding it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude testimony holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion holding that it is an abuse of discretion  to dismiss a complaint merely because of the presence of superfluous matter holding it was not an abuse of discretion to deny funds