license agreements. This fact was first conveyed to Kustom by Norwood’s attorney’s letter of November 3, 2009, which also claimed to terminate the license agreement. But the successor Norwood stands in the shoes of the Old Norwood, and is therefore estopped from attempting to piggyback on Old Norwood’s 2008 notice, given Kustom’s curative efforts and Old Norwood’s ensuing silence and continued commerce with Kustom. Norwood was required to provide new notice and an opportunity to cure whatever breaches it may have alleged prior to terminating. Although the Court previously found in this entry that Kustom committed the first material breach, that breach did not discharge Norwood from its contractual obligations to Kustom. See Frazier v. Mellowitz, 804 N.E.2d 796, 804 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, regardless of Kustom’s breach,
holding that as a matter of law nonbreaching party was bound by the contract despite other partys material breach because nonbreaching party continued to demand performance under the contract following the material breach holding that an uncured material breach does not discharge the nonbreaching party unless the material failure to perform cannot be cured holding plaintiff not required to perform its residual contract obligations after defendants material breach holding that nonbreaching party must decide whether to rescind the contract or seek to enforce it when the material breach occurred rather than waiting until after trial and before judgment to decide and stating that nonbreaching party waived its right to rescind the contract based on the other partys material breach by 1 treating the contract as still in effect following the material breach and 2 by filing suit to enforce the contract holding only a material breach discharges contractors duty to perform