as an “animal”). We will not, however, reverse a sentence on the basis of improper prose-cutorial statements unless those statements are prejudicial enough to deprive a defendant of his constitutional rights to a fair penalty phase hearing. At the outset, we reject Allen’s contention that in a capital case there is greater protection under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause for a fair penalty phase hearing than there is for a fair trial. In determining whether Allen has received a fair penalty phase hearing, we therefore adopt the same standard set out by the Supreme Court and this court in determining whether a defendant has received a fair trial under the Constitution despite improper prosecutorial comments during trial. See, e.g., Darden, 477 U.S. at 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464 (<HOLDING>); Cannon, 88 F.3d at 1502 (outlining a
holding that the relevant question is whether the prosecutors comments so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process holding that when reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a state criminal conviction the relevant question under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt holding that the trial courts order violated due process because it was unclear whether or not the defendant was required to appear on the date in question holding that plain error is the appropriate standard of review when a defendant objects to a prosecutors comments at trial does not move for a mistrial and then on appeal argues that the comments deprived him of a fair trial holding that trial judges admonition of the jury to disregard prosecutors comments on the defendants failure to testify did not cure the error