PacifiCorp also asserts that the “Commission’s adoption of a fictitious capital structure in [the Pinal Order] is based on findings that are erroneous and entirely lacking in evidentiary support.’’ Br. of Appellant at 40. To the extent that PacifiCorp asserts that the Commission’s order lacks substantial evidence, we do not address the argument because PacifiCorp fails to assign error to the Commission’s findings or offer arguments demonstrating which findings it takes issue with. RAP 10.3(a), (g), (h). 31 PacifiCorp also argues that Gorman offered inconsistent testimony during cross-examination. To the extent that PacifiCorp is arguin on’s findings are prima facie correct). 33 See also Gen. Tel. Co. of Nw., Inc. v. Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 109 Idaho 942, 712 P.2d 643, 645-46 (1986) (<HOLDING>). The utility argued that the commission erred
holding that the utilities commission has the discretion to use a hypothetical capital structure in setting customer rates particularly where the utility is a whollyowned subsidiary of a holding company holding that the texas legislature limited jurisdiction to the public utilities commission for disputes about rates operations and services of an electric utility by stating that the commission has exclusive original jurisdiction over these issues citing tex utilcode  32001 west 2007 holding commission cannot authorize utility to increase rates based solely on return on stock and warning of potential danger of tying rates to one factor over which the utility exercises total control  without regard for the interests of the consumer holding the idaho utilities commissions use of a hypothetical capital structure is within its power to protect ratepayers holding that the plaintiff utility company deserved a remedy for confiscatory rates