by a state or a state agency into a constitutional case.” Id. at 10. This principle is well-established in other circuits as well. These cases appear to rest on either of two distinct propositions. In the first category, some cases have held that not all contract rights constitute property protected by the Constitution. See, e.g., Linan-Faye Constr. Co. v. Hous. Auth, of Camden, 49 F.3d 915, 931— 32 (3d Cir. 1995); Unger, 928 F.2d at 1399; Yatvin, 840 F.2d at 417. Other cases recognize that contract rights can be property for constitutional purposes, and are protected against government actions taken in the government’s sovereign capacity, for example, by a statute eliminating certain contractual rights. See, e.g., Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (<HOLDING>). A second category of cases holds that even if
holding that the physical occupation caused by the mandatory installation of cable television equipment was a compensable taking holding cause of action accrues when some compensable damage occurs holding that the enactment of elihpa and lihprha which eliminated some contractual rights in the circumstances of that case effected a compensable taking holding covenant in an employment agreement executed some 12 years after the initial taking of employment was not incident to the taking of employment holding that a cause of action for an unconstitutional taking accrues at the time the taking occurs