contribution exists only in favor of a tort-feasor who has paid more than his pro rata share of the common liability_” (emphasis supplied). Utica is not a tort-fea-sor. The specific language of N.C.G.S. § 1B-I(b) controls over the more general provision of N.C.G.S.- § 20-279.21(b)(4). Utilities Comm. v. Electric Membership Corp., 3 N.C. App. 309, 314, 164 S.E.2d 889, 892 (1969). Thus, while N.C.G.S. § 1B-I(b) prohibits a claim of contribution by Utica, N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4) allows Utica to assert a direct claim that could have been asserted by its insured, Mr. Johnson. In short, Utica’s right to pursue a claim against Zimmerman cannot be defeated by Zimmerman’s action of executing a release in favor of the Hudsons. See Blauvelt v. Landing, 68 N.C. App. 779, 315 S.E.2d 524 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Because Utica may assert all claims that the
holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release holding that release discharges only those tortfeasors specifically named in the release agreement holding that a release between two parties cannot bind a thirdparty who was a stranger to the release holding that release discharges only persons named in or sufficiently described by terms of release holding that a release of unknown claims has no effect in the absence of evidence apart from the words of the release