parent is absolutely bound to provide reasonably for [the child's] maintenance and education, and [the parent] may be sued for necessaries furnished, and schooling given to a child, under just and reasonable circumstances”). 4 . Our dissenting colleagues rely upon the absence of any express statement of this authority in Chapter 156, sometimes referring to this absence as the “silence” of Chapter 156. See post at pp. 720-21. Though the Legislature could have stated this authority expressly in Chapter 156, its failure to do so is not disposi-tive. The Legislature stated in section 156.401 that trial courts may modify a child-support order under circumstances such as those presented in the case under review. Se 02-00091-CV, 2003 WL 21705248, at *8 (Tex.App.-Austin Jul. 24, 2003, no pet.) (<HOLDING>) (mem. op.). Our Legislature has provided that
holding fees mandatory under predecessor statute of  38001 holding defendant could not recover attorneys fees under predecessor to statute 38001 when defendant did not present contract claim holding that trial courts may not use section 38004 to take judicial notice of reasonableness of attorneys fees awarded under statute other than section 38001 holding that attorneys fees for quantummeruit claim may be recovered under texas civil practice and remedies code section 38001 because this claim falls within general statutory language even though statute does not specifically refer to quantummeruit claims holding award of attorneys fees to party prevailing on contract claim is mandatory under section 38001 if there is proof of the reasonableness of the fees