L.Ed.2d 231 (2009); United States v. Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d 357, 366-67 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 130 S.Ct. 192, 175 L.Ed.2d 120 (2009); see also § 2L1.2, cmt. n. 6 (a conviction that triggers the 16-level enhancement may be assigned criminal history points). Nor is a sentence resulting from the 16-level enhancement under Section 2L1.2 unreasonable because illegal reentry arguably is akin to a trespass offense. See United States v. Aguirre-Villa, 460 F.3d 681, 683 (5th Cir.2006). Finally, a sentence calculated under Section 2L1.2 is not unreasonable simply because the alien entered the country to find work, lived in the United States for most of his life, and reentered to be with his family. See, e.g., United States v. Gomez-Herrera, 523 F.3d 554, 565-66 (5th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). The district court reasonably concluded that
holding base of operations requirement fulfilled where defendant kept its largest office in new york was 95 owned by a us domiciliary who had lived in the united states for twentyfive years and derived its entire income from shipping cargo to or from the united states holding that fiveyearold child was not required to visit in prison the father who was convicted of murder holding that a guidelines sentence was reasonable although the defendant lived in the united states from infancy until age 51 and reentered to visit his father before he died holding an individual not of full age who misrepresents his or her age cannot invoke the defense of infancy to void a contract holding that the defendants sentence was within the guidelines range and therefore presumptively reasonable