within the Act’s exception for petitions “based solely on grounds arising after such sixtieth day” that allows a party to file a petition for review “within sixty days after such grounds arise.” Id. North Carolina contends that our January 4, 2013, decision in NRDC v. EPA, 706 F.3d 428, 435-37 (D.C.Cir.2013), constituted after-arising grounds under section 7607(b). But North Carolina brought its petition more than ten months after we issued NRDC — well outside of the sixty-day window for petitions that the after-arising grounds exception provides. Even assuming, without deciding, that NRDC constituted after-arising grounds, North Carolina’s petition is thus still untimely. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b); see also Am. Rd. & Transp. Builders Ass’n v. EPA, 588 F.3d 1109, 1113-14 (D.C.Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). The State explains that it did not bring its
holding that petitioner was dili gent for equitable tolling purposes where petitioner filed state petition two months after conviction was final and filed federal petition seven days after discovering state had denied petition on the merits holding that a fiduciary corporation was a purchaser within the meaning of  12a2 and was entitled to bring suit on its own behalf or on behalf of its clients holding that a petitioner may amend a habeas petition rather than filing a second or successive petition when the first petition has not yet reached a final decision holding that a petitioner invoking the afterarising grounds exception must bring its petition within sixty days of when its afterarising claim ripens holding that the sentencing disposition which commits the juvenile to a residential program for sixty days followed by sixty days of community control exceeds the maximum sentence permitted by statute for a seconddegree misdemeanor