prejudgment interest. Although Cavnar was a wrongful death case, Texas courts have extended its application to cases involving economic damages. Under Cavnar, “a prevailing plaintiff may recover prejudgment interest compounded daily (based on a 365-day year) on damages that have accrued by the time of judgment.” Cavnar, 696 S.W.2d at 554 (emphasis omitted). After Cavnar, the Texas legislature enacted reform statutes specifying judgment interest in particular types of cases. Peerless argues that, because the note determined the interest rate, simple interest under article 5069-1.05, § 1 should apply. Section 1, however, defines only the rate; it is silent as to compounding. Therefore, we revert to the common law and Cavnar. Spangler v. Jones, 861 S.W.2d 392, 398 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1993) (<HOLDING>). Apparently, the district court awarded annual
holding that where statute did not apply cavnar remained the law holding that the language of the statute and the courts duty to apply the statute as written requires the court to interpret the statute to apply when the prisoner is sentenced without regard to the institution where the prisoner is incarcerated after the sentencing holding that officers not required to give implied consent warnings where statute did not apply holding that english common law rule of marital exemption did not apply to the new jersey rape statute holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute