preempted by FIFRA; if anything, it suggests a contrary conclusion. Plaintiffs claim in this case, though arguably more akin to the Cipollone plaintiffs’ second theory of fraudulent misrepresentation, is subject to a preemption provision under FIFRA which differs in scope from that under consideration in Cipollone. Unlike § 5(b) of the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, which limits the preemptive force of that Act to state laws “based on smoking and health,” FIFRA § 136v(b) broadly preempts “any requirements” that arise under state law, suggesting that Congress did intend, via FIFRA, to proscribe the regulation of deceptive advertising. Plaintiffs fraud claim is thus preempted. See Graves v. Metrex Research Corp., No. CV91 505710, 1995 WL 416292, at *6 (Conn.Super.Ct.1995) (<HOLDING>); Trinity Mountain Seed Co. v. MSD Agvet, 844
holding that misrepresentation was essential to plaintiffs claim holding that if the alleged misrepresentations are material a plaintiff is entitled to recovery whether or not the misrepresentations caused the alleged damage holding misrepresentation claim to be preempted holding plaintiffs misrepresentation claim preempted where the only alleged misrepresentations shown by plaintiff were those contained in their labeling or safety data sheet holding because plaintiff had not alleged defendant made a misrepresentation or that the alleged defect posed a safety risk the district court  properly dismissed plaintiffs  fraudulent concealment claim