persecution. But this, too, begs the question under the regulations, which is whether living, working, and applying for some type of refugee or asylum status amounts to a formal offer of resettlement such that the burden of showing that he was not in fact resettled shifted to Maharaj. Thus, we must decide what role, if any, the Cheo presumption plays in a case where there is evidence that an alien lived in a third country for four years, was permitted to work, and had an application for some kind of residence status pending. This leads us, in turn, to consider anew how best to interpret the firm resettlement regulation, and to clarify the construct under which we analyze whether the mandatory bar a ernment bears the initial burden of showing firm resettlement); Abdille, 242 F.3d at 491 (<HOLDING>); Mussie, 172 F.3d at 332 (holding that “[o]nce
holding that section 523a2c shifts the burden of production and not the burden of proof on the issue of intent only holding that appellant bears burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence holding that the government bears the initial burden of producing evidence that a third country offered the applicant some type of permanent resettlement or evidence a third country officially sanctioned the aliens indefinite presence holding employer satisfied its burden of production holding that under the regulations the ins bears the initial burden of producing evidence that indicates that the firm resettlement bar applies and should the ins satisfy this threshold burden of production both the burden of production and the risk of nonpersuasion then shift to the applicant to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she had not firmly resettled in another country