subsequent changes in the zoning laws “prohibiting or limiting [a particular] use, the owner must (1) obtain a permit or occupancy certificate where required by applicable ordinance and (2) must proceed under that permit or certificate to exercise it on the land involved so that the neighborhood may be advised that the land is being devoted to that use”) (quoting Richmond Corp. v. Bd. of County Commr’s, 254 Md. 244, 255-56, 255 A.2d 398, 404 (1969)). Although we have not adopted previously the doctrine of zoning estoppel, the principles of equitable estoppel have been considered and applied by both Maryland appellate courts in claims brought against local governments in land use contexts. See Permanent Fin. Corp. v. Montgomery County, 308 Md. 239, 251-53, 518 A.2d 123, 129-130 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Bd. of County Comm’rs v. East Prince
holding that an intervening change in statutory interpretation did not amount to a change in controlling law under the mandate rule where plaintiffs attempted on remand to rely on a different but related statute which could have been but was not previously raised and the interpretation of which had not changed holding that stare decisis required the court to adhere to a prior statutory interpretation despite the agencys subsequent interpretation of the statute contrary to the settled law holding erisa plan interpretation is simply one of contract interpretation holding an administrative interpretation cannot change the meaning of a statute or control the courts interpretation of it holding that where a contractor relied on montgomery countys prior reasonable and debatable interpretation of the statutory phrase nonhabitable structures and constructed its building based on that interpretation and with a valid permit it would be inequitable for the county board of appeals to apply a changed interpretation to require removal of the buildings fourth floor