that have not yet been accessed by their intended recipient. See, e.g., In re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F.Supp.2d 497, 512 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (“Hit appears that [section 2510(17)(A)] is specifically targeted at communications temporarily stored by electronic communications services incident to their transmission — for example, when an email service stores a message until the addressee downloads it.”); United States v. Weaver, 636 F.Supp.2d 769, 771 (C.D.Ill.2009) ("Because the emails here have been opened, they are not in temporary, intermediate storage incidental to electronic transmission.”). Here, as noted above, Broome testified that she never accessed any of Husband's unopened emails. 4 . See, e.g., Hilderman v. Enea TekSci, Inc., 551 F.Supp.2d 1183, 1204-05 (S.D.Cal.2008) (<HOLDING>); In re DoubleClick, 154 F.Supp.2d at 511-13
holding that subsection b did not apply because the communications at issue were not being stored by an electronic communication service holding that emails stored by employee on hard drive of companyissued laptop were not in electronic storage as contemplated by the sca holding that promises of a future business relationship not contemplated by the sales contract would not be barred by the doctrine holding that the only statements not disclosed were the probation officers recommendations which did not constitute factual information as contemplated by the statute holding that email messages stored on a computer but not yet read were in electronic storage