docket for nine years without entry of a final judgment. On these facts, due diligence is not demonstrated. MacGregor, 941 S.W.2d at 75-76; Rotello, 671 S.W.2d at 509. Consequently, Bazan has not shown and error is not apparent on the face of the record- before us. See Lynda’s Boutique, 134 S.W.3d at 848. C. Direct Appeal On still another ground, I would hold that Bazan has not demonstrated he is entitled to a restricted appeal. See Tex. R.App. P. 26.1, 30; Lynda’s Boutique, 134 S.W.3d at 848. Ten days after the complained-of dismissal order, Bazan filed a pro se letter requesting the trial court enter a final written order. I would construe the letter as a post-trial motion to modify. Home Owners Funding Corp. v. Scheppler, 815 S.W.2d 884, 887 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1991, no writ) (<HOLDING>). If granted, the requested motion would have
recognizing that we construe pro se complaints liberally holding that we construe the rules liberally and look only to the effect if the instruments request was granted holding that courts must construe pro se filings liberally recognizing courts special duty to construe liberally a pro se plaintiffs pleadings holding that courts should liberally construe the requirements of rule 3