prohibition within the meaning of § 1441. The authority on this point is currently divided, and of the only two circuit courts to squarely consider the question, one prohibited removal and one allowed it. Compare Johnson v. Butler Bros., 162 F.2d 87, 88-90 (8th Cir.1947) (prohibiting removal) with Cosme Nieves v. Deshler, 786 F.2d 445, 450-51 (1st Cir.1986) (allowing removal). See also Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir.1988) (discussing removability generally, and stating that the FLSA is an example of a statute that allows cases to be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction and “contain[s] no limitation on removal, express or otherwise, to bar removal as required under § 1441(a)”); Baldwin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 667 F.2d 458, 460- 61 (5th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). In Johnson, which was decided over fifty
holding under flsa holding that punitive damages are not allowed under the flsa holding that adea actions which are enforced under the flsa are removable but recognizing the split of authority on the removability of flsa actions and reserving ruling on that question holding that the flsa does not preempt a state law contractual claim that seeks to recover wages for time that is compensable under the contract but not under the flsa holding that the flsa does not preempt state law contract provisions that are more generous than the flsa demands