I respectfully dissent. By ignoring the heart of appellant’s complaint, the majority makes an easy case for themselves. Rather than squarely reaching all issues raised by appellant, the majority couches appellant’s challenge to Judge Hughes’ competency to hear appellant’s motion for new trial only in terms of the trial judge having knowledge of relevant facts. While appellant makes this challenge, he also asserts that he was denied due process because Judge Hughes testified at a hearing over which she presided denied him the right to an impartial hearing. I believe that the potential for partiality inherent in Judge Hughes’ conduct runs afoul of the structural due process protections of the Constitution. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 135, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955). (<HOLDING>). Judge Hughes’ conduct, therefore, impacts
holding that treatment as a child is not a constitutional right but a right granted by the legislature and statute met basic due process requirements recognizing that the preservation requirement applies even to issues of due process when there has been a clear opportunity to present the argument on appeal to the lower tribunal holding basic elements of due process are notice and a right to be heard holding that an alien is entitled to the fifth amendment guarantee of due process which is satisfied by a full and fair hearing holding that a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process