probation is not part of a criminal prosecution, and thus the full panoply of due process protections accorded a defendant in such a proceeding do not apply to a revocation proceeding, the loss of freedom embodied in the revocation of probation constitutes a deprivation of a defendant’s liberty.”). The Rhoad court further explained that we should consider the totality of the circumstances when deciding whether a revocation-hearing waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Id. Other circuits have taken a similar approach and have refused to require formal procedures like those that Rule 11 requires in connection with guilty pleas. See United States v. Hodges, 460 F.3d 646, 651-52 (5th Cir.2006); United States v. Gibbs, 228 Fed.Appx. 639, 639 (9th Cir.2006) (unpublished memorandum) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Farrell, 393 F.3d 498, 500
holding that record did not show voluntary or intelligent waiver holding that once the defendant raises the issue of intelligent and voluntary waiver with respect to prior guilty pleas the burden is on the state to establish a valid waiver recognizing requirement of knowing intelligent waiver holding that under the sixth amendment a criminal defendant may waive his right to counsel if that waiver is knowing intelligent and voluntary holding a waiver of a substantial constitutional right must be a voluntary knowing and intelligent act