be overcome. The Director Defendants counter that Delaware state courts frequently dismiss duty of care claims based on a DGCL § 102(b)(7) exculpatory defense at the motion to dismiss stage of a suit. See, e.g., Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1094 (Del.2001). Yet, those Delaware courts were interpreting Delaware state procedural rules. The Director Defendants incorrectly assume that Delaware’s procedural rules concerning a motion to dismiss are equivalent to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As the Third Circuit stated, “Delaware cases are legion requiring specific allegations of fact to support a plaintiffs demand for relief under Chancery Rule 8.” Tower Air, 416 F.3d at 236; see also Notinger v. Costa. (In re Robotic Vision Systems, Inc.), 374 B.R. 36, 44 (Bankr.D.N.H.2007) (<HOLDING>). Relying on Delaware state court decisions,
holding that if a state case explicitly states that the state standard is more favorable to the defendant than the federal standard the federal claim is considered adjudicated below when the state standard is applied recognizing that the federal pleading standard is a less stringent standard than the delaware pleading standard holding the pslra standard for pleading scienter is more stringent than the second circuits standard prior to the act and that motive and opportunity is not an independent basis to show defendants had scienter holding that a court may not apply a heightened pleading standard more stringent than the usual pleading requirements of rule 8 in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under  1983 holding that state courts must apply the federal pleading standard in fela cases