not “otherwise qualified” for admission to either the Camelot or Riverside facility. Neither facility offered subacute care. By plaintiffs own admission, this is the type of care she required. The form of that admission is the application for and receipt of Medicaid reimbursement for sub-acute care. Plaintiff attempts to avoid this central fact by arguing that while she was eligible for Medicaid subacute care payments, she did not require that level of care. Plaintiffs position is unpersuasive. “Plaintiff in the case sub judice cannot speak out of both sides of her mouth with equal vigor and credibility before this court.” Reigel v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of N.C., 859 F.Supp. 963, 970 (E.D.N.C.1994). See also August v. Offices Unlimited, Inc., 981 F.2d 576, 581-82 (1st Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). At the same time plaintiff maintains that any
holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment holding that employee who frequently missed work was not a qualified individual able to perform the essential functions of her job either with or without a reasonable accommodation as required to support disability discrimination and reasonable accommodation claims under the rehabilitation act holding that the fact that the insurance agents perform functions that are an essential part of the companys normal operations is a decisive factor holding an employee must be able to perform essential job functions at the time of termination holding that statements plaintiff made to obtain disability insurance were binding admissions that he could not perform the essential functions of his job