effective only if the insurer established, by a preponderance of affirmative evidence that such lack of cooperation or notice has resulted in actual prejudice to the insurer. 7 . Maryland is not alone in holding that the duty to defend does not arise until the insurer is notified of the litigation and the insured tenders the defense, i.e., surrenders control. See, e.g., Eastman v. United States, 257 F.Supp. 315, 319 (S.D.Ind.1966); Gribaldo, Jacobs, Jones & Assocs. v. Agrippina Versicherunges, A.G., 3 Cal.3d 434, 91 Cal.Rptr. 6, 476 P.2d 406 (1970). Several courts have stated that, because there is no duty to defend prior to notice of the suit, the insurer is not liable for pre-notice attorneys’ fees. See Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Chicago Ins. Co., 782 F.Supp. 71, 73 (N.D.Ill.1991) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 994 F.2d 1254 (1993); SL Indus., Inc.
holding that insurer is not required to pay cost of defending action it was never afforded an opportunity to defend holding that the hawaii supreme court would likely apply equitable principles of quasicontract restitution and unjust enrichment to allow an insurer to be reimbursed for the cost of defending a lawsuit it was determined postsettlement not to have had a duty to defend holding that a claim against an insurer for vexatious refusal to pay cannot be maintained where the court finds that the insurer has no duty to defend under the policy holding that insurer had a continuing duty to defend holding on summary judgment before the question of the insurers obligation to indemnify was decided that the insurer was liable for the costs of the insured in defending the declaratory judgment action because it breached its duty to defend