about Garci-as prescription were not intended to incriminate but to exonerate Garcia from criminal activity. The officers secured the consent to search to find the prescription which would preclude charges from being brought. Thus, neither the questioning of Garcia nor the obtaining of the consent to search constituted interrogation requiring Miranda warnings. In all other respects, we affirm the trial courts rulings, including its determination that the consent to search was otherwise voluntarily given and that the search did not exceed the scope of the consent. Affirmed. STONE and FARMER, JJ., concur. 1 . Everett, 893 So.2d at 1286-87: We note that most courts that have considered this issue have held similarly. See, e.g., United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568
holding that a suspects request for counsel to advise him on whether he should consent to a police search pursuant to the indiana constitution did not invoke his miranda right to counsel during a subsequent custodial interrogation holding that because consent is not a statement and a request for consent is not an interrogation giving consent to search is a neutral fact which has no tendency to show that the suspect is guilty of any crime holding that a consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of miranda  holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of  1983 holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation