of appellant’s rights to access the Marketplace District has been adversely affected by the trespass ordinance. They therefore do not have standing under McCullen. Where individuals received no-trespass orders and were prevented from attending a speech by Ms. Baird on Church Street, it would be for those individuals to seek relief, not Ms. Baird. ¶ 15. Appellants’ argument is therefore similar to those in cases where plaintiffs have unsuccessfully attempted to assert third-party standing on behalf of others. See Bischoff v. Bletz, 2008 VT 16, ¶ 16, 183 Vt. 235, 949 A.2d 420 (finding that plaintiffs’ contract with defendants did not give them standing to challenge third party’s contract with defendants); see also State v. Karov, 170 Vt. 650, 652, 756 A.2d 1236, 1238-39 (2000) (mem.) (<HOLDING>). Like the federal courts, we generally do not
holding that if defendant moved for or consented to mistrial retrial of defendant was not barred on double jeopardy grounds holding that defendant did not have standing to raise facial challenge to validity of aggravated assault statutes for their risk of creating double jeopardy grounds because he himself was not charged in way that created double jeopardy holding that  2241 was the proper statute for the petitioners pretrial double jeopardy challenge holding that double jeopardy clause did not apply to forfeiture proceeding before the court holding that a delinquency proceeding places a juvenile in jeopardy for purposes of the double jeopardy clause