against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment") (emphasis added) and cases decided thereunder. See, e.g., King v. Chrysler Corp., 812 F.Supp. 151, 153 (E.D.Mo.1993) (rejecting need for employee-employer relationship between plaintiff and defendant under § 2000e-2); Pardazi v. Cullman Medical Ctr., 838 F.2d 1155, 1156 (11th Cir.1988) (defendant's interference with plaintiff’s employment relationship with third party suffices under § 2000e-2). But, as King now apparently concedes, § 2000e-2 is inapplicable to cases against the federal government, and the plain terms of § 2000e-16, which govern here, require a plaintiff to be an employee of the defendant agency. See, e.g., Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 829 (D.C.Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). 8 . As noted, the text may not always support
holding that glc 152 15 provides that the only party immune from suit under the statute is the direct employer a special employer is not immune because the special employer is not liable for the payment of workers compensation and there was no agreement between the direct employer and the special employer that the special employer would be liable for the payment of such compensation holding that under the fmla an employer includes both individuals and public agencies and therefore also includes individuals in public agencies holding honest services statute covers only bribery and kickback schemes holding that plaintiffs claims were precluded by csra because actions complained of arose from federal employment relationship even though many of the alleged violations occurred after the employment relationship was terminated holding that  2000e16 covers only those individuals in a direct employment relationship with a government employer