666 was intended to merely encompass conduct that touched only those funds creating the basis for jurisdiction. The case law does not tell us otherwise. While we have failed to uncover direct authority on this issue, we think the void is due to the fact that in the usual circumstance, the funds serving as the jurisdictional basis are generally the same as the funds to which a connection with the offense conduct is sought. Courts have no occasion to differentiate between the funds providing jurisdiction and the funds to which the conduct is connected. See, e.g., Zwick, 199 F.3d at 684 (finding no connection between bribes for access permits and funds for snow removal and steam bank erosion without specifying which funds provided the jurisdictional basis); Santopietro, 166 F.3d at 93 (<HOLDING>); United States v. McCormack, 31 F.Supp.2d 176
holding that participation in federal programs and receipt of federal funds under such programs fall far short of manifesting a clear intent  to waive immunity holding that ncaa was not an indirect recipient of federal funds even though it received dues from schools that received federal funds holding the requisite connection was met with proof that the city received federal funds for housing and urban development programs and the corrupt payments at issue concerned real estate transactions also without specifying which federal grant provided the jurisdictional basis holding that a college received federal funds where the funds were granted to its students as financial aid rather than directly to the college because the language of the section does not distinguish between direct and indirect receipt of federal funds holding that  666 does not require any connection between the misconduct and federal funds