L.Ed.2d 203 (1993).. In Herrera, the Court explained that “the threshold showing for such an assumed right would necessarily be extraordinarily high,” and found that the petitioner’s evidence was “far short of that which would have to be made in order to trigger the sort of constitutional claim which we have assumed, arguendo, to exist.” Id. at 417, 418-19, 113 S.Ct. 853. Whether a freestanding actual innocence claim is cognizable remains an open question. McQuiggin v. Perkins, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 1931, 185 L.Ed.2d 1019 (2013) (“We have not resolved whether a prisoner may be entitled to habeas relief based on a freestanding claim of actual innocence.”); District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 71, 129 S.Ct. 2308, 174 L.Ed.2d 38 (2009) (<HOLDING>); House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 554-55, 126
holding that a right to be released when a joint tortfeasor has been released is a vested right holding right to testify was federal constitutional right recognizing that the court has assumed arguendo that there is a federal constitutional right to be released upon proof of actual innocence but also noting the difficult questions such a right would pose and the high standard any claimant would have to meet recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights holding that there is no federal or colorado constitutional right to postconviction counsel but there is a limited statutory right