it is not within the statute’s proMbitive provisions.” Id. at 665. Like McGraw, Cerasam cannot allege that defendants charged any fee or generated any revenue through the pre-release screeMng. Any ultimate profit motive was clearly secondary to the creative and editorial purposes of the screemng. Thus, the proposed § 51 claim would fail as a matter of law. In light of the futility of an amendment to add such a claim, the motion to amend is demed with respect to tMs claim as well. Finally, to the extent plaintiff purports to assert a claim that the film portrays him m a “false light,” that claim must be dismissed. New York • does not recognize any such false light claim. See, e.g., Howell v. New York Post Co., Inc., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350, 354, 612 N.E.2d 699 (Ct. App.1993) (<HOLDING>); Freeman v. Johnston, 192 A.D.2d 250, 601
holding that while an individual has a right to possess obscene material in the privacy of his home there is no corresponding privacy right to purchase such material holding that constitutional right of privacy does not apply to medical records holding that even where the underlying complaint made no mention of the right of privacy a violation of privacy  is implicit in a tcpa faxad claim recognizing a constitutional right of privacy in mental health records holding that new york law has no common law right of privacy embracmg such claims as false light as any such privacy right is purely statutory