further his master’s business, that his actions were, “at least for a time, authorized by his employer, related to the service for which he was employed, and motivated to an extent by [his employer’s] interests,” and that, therefore, his wrongful acts fell within the scope of his employment and [the employer] should be accountable. Conversely, a jury might find that [the employee’s] acts were so “divorced in time, place and purpose” from his employment duties as to preclude the imposition of liability on his employer. The nature of the acts were, at the very least, sufficiently associated with [the employee’s] authorized duties to escape dismissal on summary judgment. Id. at 250 (internal citations omitted); see also, e.g., Walgreen Co. v. Hinehy, 21 N.E.3d 99, 107 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (<HOLDING>). Here, when Officer Rogers sexually assaulted
holding that it is well established that whether an employees actions were within the scope of employment is a question of fact and even if some of the actions were unauthorized the question of whether the actions were within the scope of employment is for the jury holding that the actions were not actions of public and general applicability but were actions directed principally and primarily at plaintiffs holding that the question of whether an employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment or while performing duties related to the conduct of the employers business for purposes of insurance coverage were questions of fact that precluded summary judgment particularly since there was a question regarding the employees intent in performing the act in question recognizing that employment actions can be adverse even if such actions are subsequently withdrawn holding it is a question of fact