except to give her moral support.” Nor is there even an allegation that Defendants questioned Elsensohn regarding his wife’s case. Similarly, § 2615(b)(3) does not apply because Elsensohn does not allege that he was discriminated against as a result of testimony he gave or was a shkill Corr. Facility, 122 F.Supp.2d 335, 346-47 (N.D.N.Y.2000) (same); E.E.O.C. v. Nalbandian Sales, Inc., 36 F.Supp.2d 1206, 1213 (E.D.Cal. 1998) (same); Murphy v. Cadillac Rubber & Plastics, Inc., 946 F.Supp. 1108, 1118 (W.D.N.Y.1996) (same); Mandia v. ARCO Chem. Co., 618 F.Supp. 1248, 1250 (W.D.Pa.1985) (same). Of course, other courts have refused to broaden the protections of anti-retaliation statutes through judicial interpretation. See Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 568-69 (3d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813,
holding ifrp is neither a usurpation of sentencing courts article iii power nor violation of separation of powers doctrine recognizing that the judicial rewriting of a statute would violate the separation of powers doctrine recognizing separation of powers doctrine holding that the act violates neither separation of powers nor principles of due process by allowing a victim veto that precludes application of the act as well as holding that the act is not void for vagueness and does not constitute a form of cruel or unusual punishment holding that neither the americans with disabilities act nor the adea permits a thirdparty retaliation action even though a literal reading of the statute was at odds with the policies animating the antiretaliation sections because the preference for plainmeaning interpretations protects the separation of powers and rightly assumes that congress intends what it says