that “there was a chance of me getting out and starting a new life”; and (2) the deal that Florida offered Ashley gave him complete immunity from prosecution on the burglary and murder charges in exchange for his testimony against Mills. We hold that this cross-examination exposed Ashley’s prior inconsistent statements and bargain with Florida to the extent that the jury could judge his credibility and Mills could argue effectively that Ashley’s testimony was not credible. Mills’s lawyer engaged in sufficient cross-examination, and the trial judge neither abused his discretion nor violated the Confrontation Clause in limiting the cross-examination to that which the attorney-client privilege did not protect. See, e.g., United States v. Perez-Tosta, 36 F.3d 1552, 1563 (11th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Taylor, 17 F.3d 333, 340
holding that criminal defendants are entitled to obtain for impeachment purposes statements made by government witnesses to government agents that relate to the subject matter of the witnesses direct testimony holding that defendants absence from and defense counsels restriction to written questions in hearing on competency of child complainant did not violate confrontation clause holding that sentencing court did not violate defendants due process rights when it reasonably refused to recall a witness for crossexamination holding that despite district courts restriction on crossexamination of government witness concerning the sentencing benefits he would earn through testifying for the government it did not violate defendants confrontation rights because of defense counsels effective impeachment of the government witnesses credibility and sentence reduction holding that the district court did not err in instructing the jury not to draw any adverse inferences from the governments failure to call a witness because the witness did not have a relationship with the government such that one would expect him to give testimony in favor of the government