for employers looking to trick prospective § 216(b) opt-in plaintiffs into signing damaging statements. Perhaps HL-A means to fall back on the distinction, recognized in Morgan and Cameron-Grant (and in this Court’s December 9 Order), between Rule 23 and § 216(b) proceedings. But so what? To say that Rule 23 class actions and § 216(b) actions are different is not to conclude that employers may resort with impunity to dishonest, misleading and abusive tactics to obtain declarations from their employees in § 216(b) actions, with courts being powerless to remedy the situation. And many cases have expressly recognized district courts’ discretion to regulate such communications in the § 216(b) context. See, e.g., Kerce v. West Telemarketing Corp., 575 F.Supp.2d 1354, 1366 (S.D.Ga.2008) (<HOLDING>); Maddox v. Knowledge Learning Corp., 499
holding that entry of settlement decree without notice to putative class members violated the due process rights of the class members holding that putative class members are not parties to an action prior to class certification holding that tolling applies to a subsequent class action when the prior denial of class certification was based solely on rule 23 deficiencies of the putative representative holding that even if the offer of judgment was undisputed the case could not be dismissed in light of plaintiffs pending motion for conditional certification including authorization to issue optin notice to putative class members  and the fact that one additional plaintiff had already joined the action recognizing that in appropriate circumstances the court may limit the parties communications with putative class members prior to decision on conditional certification question in a  216b action