the uncontroverted evidence he chooses not to rely upon, as well as significantly probative evidence he rejects.” Appellant argues that the evidence at issue here is uncontroverted. The government never addresses Clifton or appellant’s argument that the ALJ failed to explain his reasons for rejecting some of Dr. Rawlings’ restrictions, while implicitly adopting others. Rather, the government supplies some reasons that it believes would support the ALJ’s RFC finding. The ALJ did not provide these explanations, however. As appellant correctly points out in her reply brief, this court may not create or adopt post-hoc rationalizations to support the ALJ’s decision that are not apparent from the ALJ’s decision itself. See, e.g., Allen v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1140, 1142, 1145 (10th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); see also Robinson v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d 1078,
holding an employee must be able to perform essential job functions at the time of termination holding that a courts role in reviewing an administrative agency decision is limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agencys findings and conclusions and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law holding that instruction on inference of specific intent to kill did not usurp jurys role as fact finder holding that because parties elected to bring the case to the appellate court in the first instance the appeal could not then be dismissed just to confer jurisdiction upon the district court to determine the issues holding that district courts post hoc effort to salvage the aljs decision would require us to overstep our institutional role and usurp essential functions committed in the first instance to the administrative process