to prosecute caused a delay of significant duration; (2) whether there was notice to plaintiff that further delay would result in dismissal; (3) likely prejudice to defendant because of further delay; (4) a balance between court calendar congestion against plaintiffs right to an opportunity for a day in court; and (5) the efficacy of lesser sanctions. Id. at 254. “No one factor is dispositive, and ultimately we must review the dismissal in light of the record as a whole.” Id. In ruling on Appellant’s motions to reopen and for reargument, as well as in the underlying dismissal, the district court did not adequately address these factors or sufficiently explain its reasoning to enable us to review the district court’s reasoning. See Martens v. Thomann, 273 F.3d 159, 180 (2d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted). The record
holding that the district court is not required to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the  3553a factors or to discuss each of the  3553a factors holding that evidence not submitted to the district court cannot be part of the record on appeal holding that appellate court will not remand a case to the district court for a violation of rule 50 if the district courts rationale is apparent from the record holding that nothing in booker or elsewhere requires the district court to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the  3553a factors or to discuss each of the  3553a factors holding that although the district court was not required to discuss each of the factors on the record a decision to dismiss stands a better chance on appeal if the appellate court has the benefit of the district courts reasoning