required the government to prove predisposition consistent with Jacobson. That the instructions given were reconcilable with Jacobson in this manner reaffirms the Supreme Court’s observation that Jacobson does not constitute “an innovation in entrapment law,” — U.S. at - n. 2, 112 S.Ct. at 1541 n. 2, and supports a finding that the district court’s instructions did not result in plain error. Second, Williams has made only a minimal showing of inducement. He argues that Richardson’s generosity left him with a sense of obligation to him that induced him to sell crack. We have rejected claims of entrapment based on similarly implausible theories of inducement. See United States v. Citro, 842 F.2d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 866, 109 S.Ct. 170, 102 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Third, contrary to Williams’ argument on
holding that the juvenile defendants who voluntarily left their homes in the middle of night to ride to the police department in patrol cars and who were told they were not under arrest were not in custody holding that defendants who were treated to expensive dinners and offered money were not adequately induced to show that they were not predisposed holding that defendants were not in control and therefore were not supervisors and not subject to liability under  1983 holding that the plaintiffs were not entitled to present testimony that they were induced to enter an automobile lease by promises that they could disregard terms of the lease holding exhibits deemed admitted into evidence where they were treated below without objection as if they were admitted