inquiry here is whether the trial court abused its discretion in not entering more detailed findings supporting its decision to deny Tibbs’s “reverse transfer” petition. Effectively, Tibbs contends the trial court misinterpreted the law as not requiring detailed findings and that we should remand for the entry of such findings. We disagree. As a matter of statutory interpretation, we will not ordinarily read requirements into clear and unambiguous statutes that are not there. Mitchell v. State, 813 N.E.2d 422, 429 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. The “reverse transfer” statute contains no requirement that the trial court enter findings. If the legislature had wanted to require such findings, it knows how to do so. See Lucas v. McDonald, 954 N.E.2d 996, 998-99 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (<HOLDING>). In fact, there is an express statutory
holding that a reviewing court will only presume that the trial court made implicit factual findings when such findings were necessary to its ultimate conclusion holding trial court did not err by failing to consider amended petition filed after hearing without leave of court holding trial court did not err in failing to enter findings in support of its denial of petition to be removed from lifetime sex offender registry because statute only required such findings if a petition was approved holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case holding that trial court did not err