facts underlying the charges for which the defendant had been acquitted were an “integral and natural part of an account of the [defendant’s] crimef.]” The same cannot be said for the facts at issue here, which relate to a seizure that occurred on an entirely different occasion. For that reason, we do not find either Agee or Solomon directly relevant to the present controversy. As a result, we will first examine the challenged evidence in light of the principles traditionally employed in evaluating challenges to evidence admitted pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b), which focus on the similarity between the prior incident and the incident that underlies the current charges against the defendant. See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 348, 107 L. Ed. 2d 708, 717 (1990) (<HOLDING>). To be sure, the events of 10 February 2005
holding that collateral estoppel component of tire double jeopardy clause did not preclude government from introducing defendants prior acquittal at trial because government was presented with lower standard of proof in the later case holding that the estoppel doctrine did not apply because unlike the situation in ashe v swenson the prior acquittal did not determine an ultimate issue in the present case holding that a prior acquittal does not preclude the admission of evidence of a defendants other alleged crimes in a prosecution for the bank robbery on the basis of collateral estoppel principles because    the prior acquittal did not determine an ultimate issue in the present case holding that a criminal acquittal does not have collateral estoppel effect on a later civil forfeiture proceeding based on the same conduct holding that there is no need for a formal motion for a judgment of acquittal in a bench trial because the plea of not guilty asks the court for a judgment of acquittal