21, 2001. The district court stated that it was sentencing Nelson under the “Large Habitual Criminal Statute.’ ’ While that statement lacks clarity, the sentences imposed are consistent with NRS 207.012 for count 2 and NRS 207.010(1)(a) for counts 1 and 3, as the State had noticed the habitual criminal allegations in the amended information. Accordingly, we conclude that t 73, 775 (2004). 3 State v. Colosimo, 122 Nev. 950, 954, 142 P.3d 352, 355 (2006); Williams v. State, 118 Nev. 536, 546, 50 P.3d 1116, 1122 (2002). 4 Colosimo, 122 Nev. at 95 Y. 1957) (determining that a prohibition against driving at speeds that endanger life, limb, or property is meaningless because a motor vehicle driven at any speed creates such a risk), with State v. Thurston, 293 A.2d 770, 771-72 (N.H. 1972) (<HOLDING>), State v. Joas, 168 A.2d 27, 31 (N.J. 1961)
recognizing that although it is impossible for some crimes to be defined with mathematical preciseness a crime may be properly defined by the wellknown terms reckless and endanger holding that if a crime is broadly defined the court can look beyond the elements of the crime holding that involuntary manslaughter defined either as reckless or negligent was not a crime of moral turpitude because itwas based on unintentional conduct in contrast to those crimes involving some form of evil intent it is not an offense that is mala in se and thus does not fall within the definition of crimes involving moral turpitude holding that the determination whether a crime is a necessarily included lesser offense of another crime is made by examining the elements of the crimes that must be proved in order to sustain a conviction holding that because the general assembly did not expressly include conspiracy among those offenses defined as crimes of violence we conclude that one convicted of conspiracy may not be sentenced pursuant to  1611309la