of the State that Carman failed to exhaust his claim. Second, because we conclude that Carman exhausted his claim, we address whether the decision of the state court involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. A. Carman Exhausted His Claim for Purposes of Federal Review. Carman properly presented his Pate argument to the Florida courts. Before trial, defense counsel expressed reservations about Carman’s ability to “assist in his defense,” and after the trial court found that Carman was competent to proceed, defense counsel moved, unsuccessfully, for a continuance. Carman was not required, as the State argues, to request that the trial court conduct a competence hearing. See Wright v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 278 F.3d 1245, 1249, 1253 (11th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). It is not as though defense counsel failed to
recognizing that although the petitioner never requested that the trial court conduct a hearing on  whether he was mentally competent to stand trial his mental incompetency procedural due process claim  was timely raised on direct appeal and rejected on the merits without discussion by the fourth district court of appeal holding that where the fourth amendment question was raised at trial but not preserved on direct appeal in the state court the defendants failure to raise the issue on appeal in the state courts did not suffice to avoid stone holding that issues not raised before the trial court cannot be raised on appeal holding that because a claim was never raised in the district court this court would not consider it for the first time on appeal holding that since district court of appeal properly found that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on a 3850 motion during the pendency of a direct appeal the district court of appeal should have vacated the order rather than affirming on the merits