incentive for Liberty to terminate coverage or deny the claim. Under such facts, “the potential for self-interested decision-making is evident.” Univ. Hosps. of Cleveland v. Emerson Elec. Co., 202 F.3d 839, 846 n. 4 (6th Cir.2000). “The ‘possible conflict of interest’ inherent in this situation ‘should be taken into account as a factor in determining whether [Liberty’s] decision was arbitrary and capricious.’.” Id. (quoting Davis v. Kentucky Finance Cos. Retirement Plan, 887 F.2d 689, 694 (6th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 905, 110 S.Ct. 1924, 109 L.Ed.2d 288 (1990)); see also Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 489 U.S. 101, 115, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989); Darland, 317 F.3d at 527-528; Whitaker v. Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Co., 121 Fed. Appx. 86, 87 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). While several courts have altered the
holding that a heightened arbitrary and capricious standard of review applied to the decision to deny benefits under the erisa plan holding that a court is to factor an insurers dual role into its review under the arbitrary and capricious standard though the standard remains arbitrary and capri cious holding that under the arbitrary and capricious standard this court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment holding that when applying an arbitrary and capricious standard of review the courts role is to determine whether the plan administrators decision was completely unreasonable holding that the arbitrary and capricious standard performs its usual role of assuring factual support in a case involving a nhtsa decision to rescind a motor vehicle safety standard