to restore a sense of fairness to lost-chance cases. A purely prospective application of Scafidi would clearly frustrate that purpose. VI Also at issue is whether the trial court erred in refusing to give the jury an ultimate outcome charge. See Roman v. Mitchell, 82 N.J. 336, 413 A.2d 322 (1980). Defendant does not contest the proposition that in cases governed by Scafidi an ultimate outcome charge is generally appropriate. Instead, he asserts that any error in not giving the charge was harmless. We disagree. The primary justification for giving a jury an ultimate outcome charge is that it informs the jury about the impact of its decision. In Roman, supra, we stated “that a jury in a comparative negligence situation should be given an ultimate out . 518, 485 A.2d 338 (Law Div.1984) (<HOLDING>). In Scafidi, we acknowledged that the jury’s
holding that jury not required to award noneconomic damages merely because it has awarded economic damages holding that where the courts instructions caused a jury to consider erroneous criterion of liability plaintiff was prejudiced and new trial was warranted holding that the seventh amendment does require that the jury also be allowed to determine the amount of any punitive damages awarded holding that when a plaintiff files suit alleging that multiple tortfeasors are responsible for the plaintiffs injury any settlements are to be credited against the amount for which the liable parties as a whole are found responsible but for which only the nonsettling defendant remains in court holding that ultimate outcome charge which would inform jury that any damages awarded to plaintiff in personal injury action would be molded to reflect only that percentage of liability which jury attributes to nonsettling defendant was warranted