receiving party must return, sequester, or destroy the specified information it received. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(B). Second, the receiving party must not use or disclose the information until the court or parties resolve the claim of privilege. Id. The court finds that plaintiff complied with both responsibilities. Here, plaintiff asserts that the mutual protective order that the parties entered during Mr. Murphy's deposition amounts to a sequestration and, thus, complies with Rule 26(b)(5)(B). The court agrees. Although the parties did not cite any authority that explains the term "sequester,” the court’s research has identified two cases discussing the term under Rule 26(b)(5)(B). See, e.g., Coburn Grp., LLC v. Whitecap Advisors, LLC, 640 F.Supp.2d 1032, 1040-41 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (<HOLDING>); Thermoset Corp. v. Bldg. Materials Corp. of
holding it was reasonable for an attorney to refuse to return an inadvertently produced email but agree instead to quarantine the email while the parties formed their positions about the privilege dispute and briefed the issue for the court holding in the context of an attorney malpractice suit an insurance company is not vicariously liable for the acts of the attorney it selects to defend the insured while the insurer selected the attorney to defend the insureds and controlled the ultimate decision to settle or defend under the policy there is nothing in the record to indicate the insurer had any control over the details of the litigation as it was being conducted by the the attorney holding that an appellate court has discretion to consider an issue not argued by the parties holding that jurys original verdict of guilty without intent and recommend mere was an acquittal such that after it was presented to an officer of the court and the court the trial had ended  and the trial court was without authority to return the jury to its room for any further action holding that an issue is preserved for appeal where the issue was sufficiently raised for the court to rule on it  