typically regarded as an act that initiates an investigatory stop. See Brooks v. State, 745 So.2d 1113, 1113-14 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). We emphasize that an officer’s use of a spotlight is not the same as the use of emergency lights. See State v. Wimbush, 668 So.2d 280 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (reversing suppression where officers pulled alongside parked car and illuminated inte rior of car with a spotlight, seeing cocaine on driver’s and passenger’s faces; initial encounter held consensual, not stop). Likewise, we do not decide today whether a consénsual encounter ends when an officer turns emergency lights on for a second or two at night to signal a citizen that the approaching person is a police officer and not^i robber. Cf. State v. Baldonado, 115 N.M. 106, 847 P.2d 751, 755 (Ct.App.1992) (<HOLDING>). Finally, we do not decide today whether an
holding that reasonable suspicion is required to prolong a traffic stop after the purpose for which the investigatory stop was instituted has been accomplished holding that a conclusion that reasonable suspicion supported the stop of a vehicle was subsumed within the trial courts ruling that the officer had probable cause for the stop holding that circumstances created reasonable suspicion for investigatory stop holding that flight from police can help establish reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop holding manner in which officers approach a car after activating emergency lights determines whether stop is seizure requiring reasonable suspicion trial courts should find stop if manner was accusatory but no stop if manner was deferential and officers ask if occupants need help