of MAJ Stone and CPT Seifert, and the wounding of fourteen other military officers. Therefore, it was not unreasonable for trial defense counsel to forego trying to convince the court-martial panel to the contrary, and to instead focus squarely on trying to persuade the panel members that Appellant’s acts were not premeditated. Accordingly, concessions such as the ones made by trial defense counsel that Appellant “threw those grenades” and “shot and killed Captain Seifert” were not unreasonable because they did not concede Appellant’s guilt to capital murder. Indeed, this type of approach is a well-recognized defense strategy in capital cases. See Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190-91, 125 S.Ct. 551, 160 L.Ed.2d 565 (2004); Lingar v. Bowersox, 176 F.3d 453, 458-59 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we conclude that trial defense
holding that concession of elements of seconddegree murder to challenge defendants mens rea for a capitalmurder conviction was not constitutionally deficient where overwhelming evidence pointed to defendant as perpetrator holding that an indictment that omitted the mens rea element was sufficient because it cited the applicable statutes which informed the defendant of the elements of the charged offenses holding that it was not error to allow the penalty phase jury to hear evidence that the defendants previous conviction of seconddegree murder was obtained pursuant to an indictment for firstdegree murder holding that a mens rea of unlawfully in the indictment was sufficient because the indictment referenced the applicable statute which required a reckless mens rea holding that conditional intent sufficient to satisfy specific intent mens rea for solicitation to commit murder offense