detrimental). Next, Green challenges trial counsel’s dereliction in not objecting to segments of the District Attorney’s (“DA”) closing argument. While the court agrees that several of the DA’s arguments, discussed in Claim XIX, were likely improper, trial counsel’s conduct does not rise to the level of ineffective assistance. Even if Green can satisfy Strickland’s performance prong on this issue, he has not fulfilled the second component requiring a reasonable probability that the error was prejudicial to the outcome. (See discussion infra Part III.B.9.) Green further contests trial counsel’s failure to object to statements that allegedly tended to diminish the jury’s sense of responsibility in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985) (<HOLDING>) Specifically, Green refers to comments by the
holding that a jury cannot be led to believe that they do not possess responsibility for deciding the appropriateness of the death penalty holding it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendants death rests elsewhere holding that defendant may be subject to death penalty on resentencing holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants