458 U.S. 419, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982), or a regulation that completely deprives an owner of all economically beneficial use of his or her property, see Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992). Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538, 548, 125 S.Ct. 2074. The third category of takings is gov- . erned by the standard set forth in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978), and the fourth category is governed by the standard set forth in Nollan and Dolan. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538-39, 548, 125 S.Ct. 2074. Because Highlands relies solely on the Nollan and Dolan standard in its initial brief, we do not address the other theories of taking. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548, 125 S.Ct. 2074 (<HOLDING>). 2 . In arguing that the exactions in this
holding that because the property owner argued only a theory of taking that was no longer a valid theory property owner did not demonstrate his entitlement to relief holding that the pretrial order did not adequately disclose a theory because it did not give notice of that theory holding that property owner still has relief in the form of the return of his property though condemnation was complete and a highway was constructed across the property holding that the current property owner may not assert a public nuisance claim against the former owner holding that because property was no longer property of the estate the court could not order turnover