accepts service must be shown to have been authorized to bind his principal by the acceptance of process.” Schwarz v. Thomas, 222 F.2d 305, 308 (D.C.Cir.1955); see also 4A Wright & Miller § 1097 at 85-86 (“[D]efendant’s attorney probably will not be deemed an agent appointed to receive process absent a factual basis for believing that an appointment of this type has taken place.”). Thus, an attorney is not authorized to receive service of process solely by reason of the attorney’s status as counsel. Durbin Paper Stock Co. v. Hossain, 97 F.R.D. 639, 639 (S.D.Fla.1982) (citing Ransom, v. Brennan, 437 F.2d 513, 518 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904, 91 S.Ct. 2205, 29 L.Ed.2d 680 (1971)); see also Stone v. Bank of Commerce, 174 U.S. 412, 421, 19 S.Ct. 747, 750-51, 43 L.Ed. 1028 (1899) (<HOLDING>). If agency is to be implied, “ ‘it must be
holding that a clerical employee was not an agent authorized to accept service of process for the corporation holding attorney cannot accept service of process which commences the action without any authority to do so from his principal holding that an attempted service on the partys counsel was insufficient without proof of the counsels actual authority to receive service holding that service is not avoided by service on a partys attorney as service on an attorney is ineffective unless he has been authorized to accept such service holding that while a purported agent must possess actual authority to accept service of process such authority may be implied rather than express