liable under the Act and that this evidence conclusively proves the amount of the Insureds’ damages under the Unauthorized Insurance Claims. Therefore, even if the Insureds had challenged the trial court’s denial of the JNOV motion, they waived this issue by failing to brief it. See Tex.R.App. P. 38.1(h); Halim v. Ramchandani, 203 S.W.3d 482, 487 n. 7 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.). Third, for the Insureds to be entitled to a new trial based on the jury’s failure to answer the questions 10-12 because the jury followed the instructions in these questions, the Insureds would have to have objected to the instructions in questions 10-12 that caused the jury not to answer these questions. See Little Rock Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Dunn, 148 Tex. 197, 222 S.W.2d 985, 989-90 (1949) (<HOLDING>), modified on other grounds by Bradford v.
holding appellant could not complain of jurys failure to answer question because the charge instructed the jury not to do so based on its answer to a prior question and because appellant did not object to this instruction holding appellant could not obtain a new trial so that jury could answer liability question because the charge instructed the jury not to answer the question based on its answer to a prior question and because appellant did not object to this instruction holding that party that failed to object to instruction that jury not answer a question based on its answer to the prior question waived that partys right to have the jury make findings as to the subsequent question holding failure to object to conditioning instructions waived error arising from the jurys failure to answer question holding failure to object to conditioning instructions waived error arising from the jurys failure to answer question when answer could not be implied and that lack of objection waived right to new trial to have jury answer questions