L.Ed.2d 346 (1976) (commercial speech “does ‘no more than propose a commercial transaction’ ”), quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376, 385, 93 S.Ct. 2553, 2558-59, 37 L.Ed.2d 669 (1973); Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 109 S.Ct. 3028, 3031, 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (commercial speech “propose[s] a commercial transaction”). We f he three-year period for personal injury actions set forth in § 1-52(5) is the North Carolina limitations period applicable to § 1983 actions. Mallas v. Kolak, 721 F.Supp. 748 (M.D.N.C.1989); Reagan v. Hampton, 700 F.Supp. 850 (M.D.N.C.1988); Reed v. United Transp. Union, 633 F.Supp. 1516, 1525 (W.D.N.C.1986); see also Keller v. Prince George’s County, 827 F.2d 952, 955 n. 2, 965 (4th Cir. 1987) (<HOLDING>). 3 . In Esposito, this Court concluded that a
holding that if state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions the general or residual statute for personal injury actions should be used for 1983 actions recognizing that wilson v garcia requires all  1983 actions to be characterized as personal injury tort actions for statute of limitations purposes holding that a twoyear statute of limitations period applies to all  1983 actions brought in pennsylvania holding that new york statute of limitations for  1983 actions was three years recognizing those actions for monetary relief that we have characterized as equitable such as actions for disgorgement of improper profits