| ^possibility that there may be a complete failure of payment — that the subcontractor is to bear the risk of the owner’s nonpayment. Nor, contrary to RCI’s suggestion, does the Subcontract contain “unless and until” language. If the Subcontract did contain “unless and until,” “condition precedent,” or similar conditional language, RCI’s argument might be persuasive. In sum, the Subcontract contains no language that would qualify it as a “pay-if- paid” clause; it is a classic “pay-when-paid” provision. Indeed, as Tymeless points out, the language in the Subcontract is indistinguishable from the language in the J.A. Jones subcontract in Southern States. We thus find the trial court erred in construing the language in the Subcontract as a “pay-if-paid” clause. Southern States, supra, (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s
holding that instructions are sufficient which substantially follow the language of the statute or use equivalent language holding when ordinance language is clear courts must give language its plain meaning holding that essentially equivalent is unconstitutionally vague holding equivalent language is a paywhenpaid clause holding that language authorizing an agent to act in my name place and stead in any way which i myself could do is not functional equivalent of language in neill