married could somehow bolster the stability of families headed by one man and one woman.” Perry, 671 F.3d at 1089. In fact, rather than serving the interest of encouraging stable environments for procreation, Section 32 hinders the creation of such environments. See Bishop, 962 F.Supp.2d at 1293-94, 2014 WL 116013, at *31; Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F.Supp.2d 374, 378 (D.Mass. 2010) (concluding that Section 3 of DOMA did nothing to help children of opposite-sex parents but prevented children of same-sex couples from enjoying advantages flowing from a stable family structure); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 963-64. As Plaintiffs De Leon and Dimetman can attest, same-sex couples, although unable to “naturally procreate,” can and do have children. See Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2694 (<HOLDING>); see also Bishop, 962 F.Supp.2d, at 1291-92,
holding that state bans on samesex marriage are unconstitutional recognizing that basis for deportation was aliens misrepresentation about his marriage not the validity of his marriage holding birth mothers samesex partner was a presumed mother    because she received the children into her home and openly held them out as her natural children recognizing that laws prohibiting samesex marriage humiliate tens of thousands of children now being raised by samesex couples holding that a samesex partner could not recover loss of consortium damages under a massachusetts statute for injuries  suffered by her partner even though samesex marriage was unlawful at the time the underlying tort occurred