counties was limited, and that its efforts in these five counties cannot establish common evidence of impact in the entire eighteen county DMA. What Dr. Teece considers “unlikely,” Dr. Singer considers to be the common evidence of antitrust impact, namely that RCN was stymied in its efforts by Corn-east’s predatory behavior. In reaching our conclusion on the common impact of clustering on overbuilding, however, we place no reliance on Dr. Singer’s opinions regarding Comcast’s lobbying activities. Comcast argues that Singer’s theory is at odds with the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 81 S.Ct. 523, 5 L.Ed.2d 464 (1961); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 85 S.Ct. 1585, 14 L.Ed.2d 626 (1965) (<HOLDING>). For purposes of class certification, we must
holding that an individual is immune from antitrust liability for exercising first amendment right to petition the government holding that a railroad owned and operated by the federal government was immune from antitrust action under the governmental immunity doctrine which protects the federal government its agencies and instrumentalities from the reaches of antitrust law holding that the government is immune from liability for its choice of traffic protection devices holding that a railroad operated and owned by the federal government was immune from antitrust liability recognizing that a judge is not absolutely immune from criminal liability