who congregate each night at this particular dance hall are not members of any organized association; they are patrons of the same business establishment. Most are strangers to one another, and the dance hall admits all who are willing to pay the admission fee. There is no suggestion that these patrons “take positions on public questions” or perform any of the other similar activities described in [cases addressing expressive association]. Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 24-25, 109 S.Ct. 1591. Here, the plaintiffs contend that they were engaging in both the recreational viewing of a sports event, and the expression of their views on the importance of baseball, and the virtue of their home team. (See James Decl. ¶¶ 3, 6-7; C. Gibbs Decl. ¶¶ 4, 7-8.) In Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, o 1993) (<HOLDING>). The plaintiffs have not submitted evidence to
holding that government has more latitude in restricting expressive conduct than in curtailing pure speech holding that religious exercise is any exercise of religion whether or not compelled by or central to a system of religious belief and that the use building or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered  religious exercise holding that students action wearing black armbands was expressive conduct entitled to first amendment protection holding that unfurling religious banner in stands at world series game constituted expressive conduct holding that participating in community service is not expressive conduct