a fair trial” because the argument “rest[ed] almost entirely upon the quantum of publicity which the events received,” without any evidence of “constitutional unfairness”). Rather, “[t]he nature of the publicity and whether it is the sort that could be laid aside by jurors, rather than its volume, is the crucial factor to be considered.” Brofford v. Marshall, 751 F.2d 845, 851 (6th Cir.1985) (citing Murphy, 421 U.S. at 794, 95 S.Ct. 2031). In addition to the volume and content of the pretrial publicity, two other factors are relevant in determining whether prejudice is presumed. First, the court should consider the amount of time which has elapsed between the peak pretrial publicity and the actual trial. Murphy, 421 U.S. at 803, 95 S.Ct. 2031; see also Lehder-Rivas, 955 F.2d at 1524 (<HOLDING>). Although noting that “[i]t would be fruitless
holding that courts evaluation of the existence of presumptive prejudice should include consideration of the time lapse between peak publicity and the trial holding that the applicable rate is that in existence at the time of judgment holding that even if it could be considered retrospective hearing conducted by trial court on second day of trial was consistent with due process given the lack of a lapse in time the fact that the psychologist who testified at the hearing had interviewed petitioner and prepared a report five weeks before trial and the trial courts direct observation and question of petitioner just before the trial holding that the most important consideration should be the existence of an antagonistic economic interest holding that where the law is unsettled at the time of trial but settled by the time of appeal the plainness of the error should be judged by the law at the time of appeal