a criminal trial is sometimes treated as evidence tending to prove that the defendant committed th .Super. 293, 299-300, 391 A.2d 923 (App.Div.1978) (same) and Hyland v. Kehayas, 157 N.J.Super. 258, 263-265, 384 A.2d 902 (App.Div. 1978) (same). 2 Furthermore, the Appellate Division's opinion reversing the criminal conviction of Guastella’s co-defendant, Wasyluk, raised a serious question about the merits of the judgment against Guastella. Consequently, even if Guastella had survived long enough for a judgment of conviction to have been entered on the verdict against him, once Wasyluk’s judgment had been reversed, the trial court should not have accepted Guastella’s conviction as nce Co., 215 N.J.Super. 278, 282, 521 A.2d 912 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 152, 526 A.2d 211 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Kahlaid,
holding that a principal is bound by a contract entered into by the principals agent on her behalf if the agent had authority to bind the principal holding that arson committed by a dominant fiftypercent stockholder was attributable to the corporation holding that in an arson case there must be other proof that the offense was committed to corroborate a confession by the defendant holding that a corporation could be served by delivering a copy of the subpoena to an officer or managing or general agent of the corporation and that the agent could be an individual a partnership or another corporation holding that arson committed by stockholder who was the principal managing agent precluded recovery by the corporation