defendant to trust the advice of his counsel in weighing the immigration consequences of his decision. Petitioner’s counsel advised him that he would “in all likelihood, receive a sentence of only one to three years’ imprisonment.” (Id.) The fact that this turned out to be true, buttresses the court’s conclusion that it was reasonable for Petitioner to rely on his counsel’s advice in making his immigration decisions. Second, and more importantly, however, case law before IIRIRA held that even an alien who received a sentence longer than five years might have maintained eligibility for § 212(c) relief, provided that the alien had not served five years of his sentence at the time of his removal hearing. See Matter of Ramirez-Somera, 1992 WL 301623, 20 I. & N. Dec. 564, 566 (BIA 1992) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the fact that Petitioner could have
holding that sentences of five years in prison followed by ten years probation were illegal sentences that exceeded the statutory maximum of five years for a thirddegree felony holding that magistrate judge had jurisdiction to dismiss prison inmates action under 42 usc  1983 as frivolous without consent of defendants because defendants had not been served yet and therefore were not parties holding that a potential prison sentence of up to five years was clearly serious holding the same where the term conviction refers to a defendant who has been found guilty of a listed offense but has not yet been sentenced holding that an immigrant defendant is eligible for  212c relief despite having been sentenced to a fifteen year prison term because he had not yet served five years of the sentence