in the record that could have led a reasonable person to believe that any of the plaintiffs had the specific intent to further the PFLP’s unlawful aims.” The government does not contest this finding. Accordingly, for the purposes of the First Amendment analysis, we assume that the Plaintiffs did not possess specific intent. The government now tries to evade the specific intent standard we articulated in American-Arab I. Relying on the new evidence of fundraising activity, the government contends that a more relaxed First Amendment inquiry is appropriate. Because activity, rather than mere association, is at issue, the government maintains that the case should be analyzed under the standard set forth in United States v. O’Brien, 391- U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968) (<HOLDING>). Yet in Americarir-Arab I we already
holding that government has more latitude in restricting expressive conduct than in curtailing pure speech holding that participating in community service is not expressive conduct holding that the video games at issue are expressive and qualify as speech for purposes of the first amendment holding that more than notice to a defendant is required recognizing that code is speech