the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Id. at 9-10, 112 S.Ct. 995. It is this latter caveat that, in our view, is key in this case. Assuming, for purposes of argument, that Duke’s action of locking the door to Cooler 4 while plaintiffs were inside can be considered a use of “force” within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment, we conclude that the evidence presented by Coon would not allow a jury to reasonably find that he experienced anything more than the minimum level of discomfort described in Hudson. In short, subjecting a typically-clothed inmate to a temperature of 39 degrees for approximately 20 minutes simply does not constitute the malicious and sadistic application of force. See Sow v. .Fortville Police Dep% 636 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); Miller v. Sanilac Cnty., 606 F.3d 240, 251
holding that excessive force claims are not subject to exhaustion requirement holding that a police officers rape of an arrestee was outside the scope of his employment holding that police officer did not subject arrestee to excessive force by requiring him to stay outside in cold temperatures during an investigation that lasted more than an hour holding that deputies use of a police dog is subject to excessive force analysis holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force