We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 949 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm. The district court properly dismissed Hucul’s action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because Hucul’s action constituted a forbidden “de facto” appeal of prior state court orders. See Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777-78, 781 (9th Cir. 2012) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives federal district courts of jurisdiction to hear direct and “de facto” appeals from state courts, including a federal complaint that is “frame[d] ... as a constitutional challenge to the state court[’s] decision[]” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 616 (9th Cir. 2007) (<HOLDING>). Contrary to Hucul’s contention, the extrinsic
holding that rookerfeldman doctrine bars federal determination of claim where the district court must hold that the state court was wrong in order to find in favor of the plaintiff holding that a plaintiffs federal action seeking to vacate a state court judgment was a de facto appeal and thus barred under the rookerfeldman doctrine holding that to grant appellant relief would require an inferior federal court to determine that the state courts judgment was erroneous and would foreclose implementation of that judgment holding that the federal claims which arose from state court criminal contempt proceedings were inextricably intertwined with the state court action and thus the federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims pursuant to the rookerfeldman doctrine holding that rookerfeldman doctrine barred plaintiffs claim because alleged legal injuries arose from the state courts purportedly erroneous judgment and the relief sought would require the district court to determine that the state courts decision was wrong and thus void