timely. She claims that equitable tolling applies because of the Debtor’s fraud and concealment of the facts that form the basis of the Trustee’s cause of action. The Debtor contends that as a matter of law equitable tolling does not apply to extend the time period in § 727(e)(1). The doctrine of equitable tolling was defined by the Supreme Court in Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 66 S.Ct. 582, 90 L.Ed. 743 (1946), as follows: [T]his Court long ago adopted as its own the old chancery rule that where a plaintiff has been injured by fraud and “remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered, though there be no special circumstances os), 24 B.R. 688 (Bankr.D.R.I.1982) (<HOLDING>); In re Schneider, 37 B.R. 115, 119
holding that the 120day filing period is subject to equitable tolling and addressing circumstances warranting equitable tolling holding  727d1 complaint was untimely and noting the one year period for filing runs from discharge rather than discovery of the fraud but not addressing expressly equitable tolling recognizing that equitable tolling doctrines may toll the time period for filing holding that plaintiffs lack of knowledge of the bankruptcy case doesnt affect the deadline in  727e1 for filing a  727d1 complaint but not expressly discussing equitable tolling holding that oneyear period runs from the discovery of the transfer