the degree “ ‘that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence.’ ” Id. (quoting Snyder, 291 U.S. at 108, 54 S.Ct. 330). There is no constitutional right to be present “when presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow.” Cohen v. Senkowsky 290 F.3d 485, 489 (2d Cir.2002) (citations and quotation marks omitted). With respect to the in camera hearings relating to the location of the undercover officer’s gun, petitioner has not explained how his exclusion from the hearing precluded a meaningful opportunity for cross-examination of the undercover officer. It was never alleged that the under cover officer used her gun during the sting and defendant had a full opportunity to cross-examine her on the sting itself at trial. Cf. Stincer, 482 U.S. at 739-44, 107 S.Ct. 2658 (<HOLDING>). Similarly, petitioner has failed to explain
holding that the confrontation clause bars admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless the witness was unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity for crossexamination holding that statute allowing videotaped testimony of child witnesses at trial violated state constitutional right of confrontation but not sixth amendment right holding confrontation right not violated by exclusion of defendant from competency hearing of child witnesses where defendant had opportunity for full and effective crossexamination at trial holding that due process guarantees were not violated where a defendant was excluded from a witness competency hearing and noting that the hearing did not concern the witnesses substantive testimony holding that defendants absence from and defense counsels restriction to written questions in hearing on competency of child complainant did not violate confrontation clause