and it must relate to material information. Mere silence in the absence of a duty to speak, however, cannot suffice to prove fraudulent concealment. Sevin v. Kelshaw, 417 Pa.Super. 1, 611 A.2d 1232, 1236 (1992)(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 550 (1977)) (citations omitted and emphasis supplied). In a case involving alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, concealment of a material fact from the Government, the First Circuit noted that “in prosecuting a § 1001 concealment violation, it is incumbent upon the government to prove that the defendant had a legal duty to disclose the material facts at the time he was alleged to have concealed them.” United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676, 683 (1st Cir.1985)(emphasis added); see United States v. Gimbel, 830 F.2d 621, 626 (7th Cir.1987)(<HOLDING>). The Government, in its cryptic response
holding that good faith is a defense to the willful filing of false statements under 18 usc  1001 holding a bank officer who informed a third party that it would be safe to extend 8000 credit to bank customer although customer did not have an open account at the bank could be held liable for the material misrepresentation holding that under certain conditions a bank assumes a duty to disclose facts material to a transaction holding that because the bank had no duty to report defendants structured transactions these transactions did not constitute material facts within the meaning of 18 usc  1001 consequently defendant may not be held criminally liable under 18 usc  2b for causing the bank to fail to disclose a material fact holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001