conduct was criminal; there was no lawful conduct that was made unlawful by a retroactive reinterpretation of a statute. See id. at 355, 84 S.Ct. 1697 (civil rights protesters who lawfully entered restaurant were convicted under trespassing statute after court reinterpreted statute to add an additional element, making protesters’ conduct unlawful after the fact). Additionally, the admission of victim impact evidence here is unlike other cases where the Supreme Court and this court have held that a due process violation occurred. The admission of victim impact evidence did not change the requirements for imposing the death penalty or prevent Gentry from arguing the fundamental elements of his defense. See Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 121-28, 111 S.Ct. 1723, 114 L.Ed.2d 173 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358-62, 97
holding that the defendant is not entitled to be sentenced by the judge who took his plea when the judge made no promise to sentence him holding that the defendants due process rights to notice were violated when a judge imposed a capital sentence even though the state took the position that it would not seek the death penalty holding that due process rights were not violated when alien claimed a lack of actual notice but his attorney received notice holding that the confrontation clause applies through the finding of guilt but not to sentencing even when that sentence is the death penalty holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law but conviction was later reversed neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty