here. In essence, plaintiffs, as they did with Raines, have stitched together a patchwork quilt of evidence that they allege presents a disputed issue of material fact as to Howard’s scienter. I disagree. Plaintiffs’ cited evidence simply does not rise to an inference of scienter. Although scienter is generally a question of fact for a jury, see, e.g., SEC v. Pace, 173 F.Supp.2d 30, 33 (D.D.C.2001) (“In the ordinary securities fraud case, scienter is a genuine issue of material fact.”); see also Wechsler v. Steinberg, 733 F.2d 1054, 1058-59 (2d Cir.1984) (“Issues of motive and intent are usually inappropriate for disposition on summary judgment.”), summary judgment is appropriate if plaintiffs present no concrete evidence of scienter, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (<HOLDING>); see also In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig.,
holding that summary judgment is unwarranted if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party holding that a grant of summary judgment in favor of one party creates a final judgment allowing appellate review of denial of opposing partys summary judgment motion holding the plaintiff could not defeat a summary judgment motion without offering any significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint recognizing that resolving defendants state of mind may be appropriate on summary judgment and that plaintiff may not defeat a defendants properly supported motion for summary judgment  without offering any concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his favor holding that a district court may not grant summary judgment without giving plaintiff an opportunity to submit materials admissible in a summary judgment proceeding or allowing a hearing on defendants motion