record was closed. Appellees’ responses characterized the October 22, 2003, meeting as a hearing and indicated that Appellant did agree on the record to its scheduling as such. The common pleas court denied relief after oral argument on a limited evidentia-ry record consisting of the transcripts of the September 30 and October 22 Board proceedings, adopting Appellees’ position that the October 22 meeting constituted a hearing. In this regard, the common pleas court relied on Hogan, Lepore & Hogan v. Pequea Township Zoning Board, 162 Pa.Cmwlth. 282, 638 A.2d 464 (1994), as support for the proposition that the concept of a hearing, for purposes of Section 908, is not limited to a proceeding in which a zoning hearing board receives substantive evidence. See id. at 289-90, 638 A.2d at 468 (<HOLDING>); see also Gaster v. Township of Nether
holding that appearance at the scheduled hearing demonstrates actual notice of the hearing holding that although the record of a zoning hearing was closed to further substantive evidence a later board meeting at which counsel offered oral argument constituted the final hearing for purposes of section 9089 holding that probable cause hearing under wis stat  980092 was not intended to be an evidentiary hearing but rather a review of the paper record with argument allowed by counsel holding that argument raised at oral argument that was not included in brief is waived holding that dissolution of a tro after the plaintiff failed to carry its burden at the preliminary injunction hearing constituted a final decisions on the merits for purposes of the bond