simplify, and, where necessary, strengthen the existing veterans’ employment and reemployment rights provisions.” H.R.Rep. No. 103— 65(1), at 18 (1993) (emphasis added), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2449, 2451; see also S.Rep. No. 103-158, at 33 (1993) (noting that USERRA “would restructure, clarify, and improve ” the VRRA (emphasis added)). Among other improvements, if an employer engaged in willful discrimination, USERRA permitted a plaintiff to seek liquidated damages, a form of relief unavailable under the VRRA. See USER-RA sec. 2, § 4324(c)(1)(A)(iii). With that new provision, Congress converted what had been an equitable claim into a legal one, which brought along the corresponding right to a jury trial. See Maher v. City of Chi., 463 F.Supp.2d 837, 844 (N.D.Ill.2006) (<HOLDING>); cf. Calderon v. Witvoet, 999 F.2d 1101, 1109
holding that punitive damages are not allowed under the flsa holding that because liquidated damages under the adea are punitive in nature a jurys award of state punitive damages and adea liquidated damages constitutes a double recovery and therefore reducing the total recovery by the amount of the liquidated damages award holding that the legislative history under the act indicates that liquidated damages are intended to be punitive in nature holding that liquidated damages under the adea are intended to punish and deter while contrasting them to the legislative purpose of liquidated damages under the fsla holding that liquidated damages under userra are punitive and therefore subject to trial by jury