law, it does not supersede the defendant’s causal responsibility in criminal law. We therefore find no error in the trial court’s instructions on the subject of seat belt usage or in its denial of defendant’s motion for new trial. Ill Our holding does not foreclose a trial judge with sentencing discretion from considering in mitigation that a victim’s injuries would have been less severe, had the victim worn a seat belt or otherwise acted with reasonable care. See A.R.S. § 13-702(E) (1992); cf. State v. Currie, 150 Ariz. 59, 60, 721 P.2d 1186, 1187 (App.1986) (serious nature of victim’s injury properly used as aggravating factor in sentencing). In this case, however, as previously noted, the trial judge lacked sentencing discretion. He was statutorily obliged, on 2d 257, 265 (1987) (<HOLDING>). We need not engage in fundamental error
holding that release status must be proven by clear and convincing evidence through reliable documentary evidence holding that fraud on the court must be supported by clear unequivocal and convincing evidence holding that a bad faith claim must be met through the clear and convincing evidence standard holding that reliance must be proven by some evidence holding that whether adverse possession was proven by clear and convincing evidence is a factual determination made by the chancellor