satisfy the requirements of Due Process. See, Rule 7(c)(1), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (stating that an Indictment “shall be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged”). Id. The Government disagrees with the Defendant’s contention that the Indictment is unconstitutionally vague, and argues that the Defendant’s conduct satisfies the elements of Section 2250(a)(2)(A), since he is a sex offender by reason of a conviction under Federal law, as defined by SORNA, see, Complaint, Docket No. 1, Affidavit of Moran, at ¶ 7, and that that allegation, alone, provides the Defendant with adequate notice of the crime with which he is being charged. See, United States v. Templeton, 2007 WL 445481 at *3 (W.D.Okla., February 7, 2007)(<HOLDING>). In the alternative, the Government argues
holding that an indictment was sufficient where it failed to specify which subsection of sorna defendants conviction allegedly meets holding that an indictment under  922g1 was not required to allege a substantial effect on interstate commerce an indictment which tracked the statutory language was sufficient holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense holding that evidence of an eighteenyearold conviction was admissible to show intent because that conviction involved exactly the same crime as was charged in the indictment holding that an indictment which cites the pertinent statute and uses its language will be sufficient to support a conviction