v. United States, 394 U.S. at 467, 89 S.Ct. at 1171, “[I]n addition to directing the judge to inquire into the defendant’s understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of his plea, Rule 11 also requires the judge to satisfy himself that there is a factual basis for the plea.” To construe the plea as an admission not only of the charge but also of the alleged overt act, when the judge had not had the opportunity to satisfy himself that there was a factual basis for the latter, would be inconsistent with Rule 11. We are aware that decisions in other circuits have on occasion treated guilty pleas as admitting factual allegations in the indictment not essential to the government’s proof of the offense. Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365
holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges holding that in a conspiracy case venue lies where the conspiracy agreement was formed or in any jurisdiction where an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed by any of the conspirators holding that plea to multidefendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment holding that once a defendant becomes associated with a conspiracy he is responsible for all of the acts of the conspiracy even those which occurred before or after his association with the conspiracy holding that two conspiracies existed where the members of the second conspiracy did not know about the first conspiracy did not benefit from the first conspiracy and were connected with the first conspiracy only through a middleman