fact regarding whether defendants’ proffered explanation is mere pre text for discrimination, see Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 154 (D.C.Cir.1993); Sage v. Broadcasting Publ’ns, Inc., 997 F.Supp. 49, 53 (D.D.C.1998); McCain v. CCA of Tenn., Inc., 254 F.Supp.2d 115, 119 (D.D.C.2003), plaintiff has alleged facts which, if believed, could be reasonably used by a jury to find intentional discrimination against plaintiff in her termination. Porter allegedly required plaintiff “to accomplish ten customer service training sessions, whereas her white male counterparts [Bello and Stickler] were expected to conduct only three to five.” (Pl.’s Stmt. Fact. ¶ 124.) She further alleges that Porter “transferred [plaintiffs] responsibility for evaluation and measurement to Mr. Bello, an (D.P.R.1992) (<HOLDING>); Walker v. Sec’y of the Treasury, 713 F.Supp.
holding that the plaintiff will be entitled to recovery if he convinces the trier of fact that puerto ricans discriminated against him because he was born  puerto rican holding that each plaintiff is liable for fees if he would have been entitled to his fees if he had prevailed holding in a title vii case but relying on  1981 cases that the issue is not the plaintiffs physical characteristics but whether he was discriminated against by other africanamericans because he was born black holding that a timely filed extrajudicial claim did not toll the statute of limitations for a suit in the puerto rico courts because it did hot pursue identical claims holding that a suspect must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law that he has the right to the presence of an attorney and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires