of judgment); Fed.R.CivJP. 62(a) (requiring prevailing parties to wait until ten days after the date on which a judgment is entered before they may execute on a judgment); Fed.R.App.P. 4 (requiring that a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days after the date on which a judgment is entered). The Advisory Committee Notes on Rule 58 bolster this conclusion. Those notes state that the rule is designed to eliminate uncertainties about precisely when a court rendered a judgment. Such uncertainties had arisen in contexts analogous to the one in the instant case, where courts wrote opinions or memoranda “con 2d 940, 942 (5th Cir.1987) (discussing the Advisory Committee’s concern with eliminating uncertainties); Duffer v. American Home Assurance Co., 512 F.2d 793, 799 (5th Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>). See generally 11 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R.
holding that a trial courts judgment must comply with the statutory requirement that the judgment contain written findings of fact and conclusions of law holding that the trial courts oral expression in open court of its future intention to render a judgment was not itself a judgment but rather the trial courts written findings of fact and conclusions of law were its judgment holding that although trial courts oral opinion may be used as a reference in the interpretation of its written findings of fact it is not a finding of fact holding that the trial courts oral pronouncement must conform to the written judgment holding that motion accepting judgment but requesting findings of fact and conclusions of law was not directed against the judgment