the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). See also, United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 204-05, 103 S.Ct. 2309, 2313-14, 76 L.Ed.2d 515 (1983) (discussing the expansive reach of § 541). Notwithstanding this broadly inclusive definition, the debtor may seek to exempt property from the bankruptcy estate by means of 11 U.S.C. § 522 or some other valid nonbankruptcy law exemption. See Tignor v. Parkinson, 729 F.2d 977, 980 (4th Cir.1984). Although property that ultimately becomes exempt will not be available for distribution to creditors, it is nonetheless property of the bankruptcy estate at the outset of the case. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b). Consequently, these debtors’ pre-petition causes of action for personal injuries are property of their estates. See, e.g., Tignor, 729 F.2d at 981 (<HOLDING>); Sierra Switchboard Co., v. Westinghouse
holding that funds held in escrow are property of the estate only to the extent of the debtors independent right to that property holding that where the policy names only the directors or officers as insured the proceeds are not property of the estate holding that whether an action would have a conceivable effect on the bankrupt estate is determined at the time a lawsuit is filed holding that the debtors claims for injuries to the person whether unliquidated as when the petition was filed or settled as occurred during the proceeding are thus property of the bankrupt estate as of the commencement of the ease holding that the mortgaging or conveying of exempt property to a creditor is not against the public policy of the state of michigan and that that the bankrupt had the power to convey to a creditor his existing exemptions resulting in the exempt property not being property of the debtor or the debtors bankruptcy estate