may be described either as a bequest or as a distribution. Since the parties' rights are the same in either event, we refer throughout to Ms. Krauss as the testator and to the gift as a bequest 5 . Here, the authorities are divided and are thus of little help. 6 . Of course, a testator might leave a bequest for the specific purpose of enabling a charita- . ble organization, whether or not solvent, to pay its debts. That sort of bequest is beyond the scope of this opinion. 7 . Our emphasis on the testator’s intent is buttressed by our- knowledge that, under Massachusetts law, a testator could expressly include a provision in her will precluding a bankrupt charity from taking thereunder. See Springfield Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Friele, 304 Mass. 224, 23 N.E.2d 138, 141 (1939) (<HOLDING>). 8 . In the case of charities, a named
holding that a testator is generally entitled to place such conditions and limitations on a bequest as she sees fit holding a bequest to foreign school district not deductible for estate tax purposes holding that the district court did not err in failing to address the defendant personally to determine whether she understood the rights she was waiving by admitting that she violated the conditions of her probation holding that a plaintiff can show that she is qualified by presenting credible evidence that she continued to possess the objective qualifications she held when she was hired holding that even where rule in question admits of two interpreta tions agency is entitled to interpret its rule as it sees fit