of applying to later motions the law’s ‘second or successive’ restrictions. Id. at 383,124 S.Ct. at 792. After a review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we conclude that since the record does not indicate that the district court considered the possibility of construing Myrthil’s petition as his first § 2255 motion to vacate, and since Myrthil’s jurisdictional claim can be properly brought under § 2255, the district court should have explored this possibility, along with the issues of the motion’s timeliness, whether equitable tolling applied, and whether the Castro warnings must be given to Myrthil. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) (establishing a one-year statute of limitations for filing a § 2255 motion); Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Castro, 540 U.S. at 382-83, 124 S.Ct. at 792.
holding that equitable tolling is only available when an inmate diligently pursues his claims and demonstrates that the failure to timely file was caused by extraordinary circumstances beyond his control holding in a habeas case that tolling is available when an inmate diligently pursues his claims and demonstrates that the failure to timely file was caused by extraordinary circumstances beyond his control holding that aedpas statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling only when an inmate diligently pursues his claims and demonstrates that the failure to timely file was caused by extraordinary circumstances beyond his control holding equitable tolling available if an inmate diligently pursues his claims and demonstrates that the failure to timely file was caused by extraordinary circumstances beyond his control holding that ejquitable tolling is appropriate when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence