federal and state proceedings who apparently did not communicate in advance of Hopkins' testimony in the first trial. In addition, when Gary's counsel interviewed Hopkins to solicit information upon which his testimony in the first trial was based, she asked permission only of the attorney representing Hopkins on the federal charges. 4 . There is no evidence in the record that the defendant proposed this particular solution to the trial judge. 5 . We also note that if Gary had opted to testify as to whether he possessed a gun at the time of his arrest, he would not have been permitted to take the Fifth Amendment with respect to the breaking and entering offenses which immediately preceded. See Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 155-57, 78 S.Ct. 622, 626-28, 2 L.Ed.2d 589 (1958) (<HOLDING>). 6 . The trial court arrived at the same
holding that fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination is a purely personal one that cannot be utilized by or on behalf of any organization such as a corporation holding that waiver of privilege against selfincrimination is proceeding specific holding that defendants exercise of right to testify in own behalf waives his fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination holding that juveniles request to call parent is assertion of fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination recognizing commonlaw privilege against selfincrimination