shall not be allowed after affirmance in the appellate court, except as provided in Rule 41.” The exception in Miss. R.App. Peoc. 41, governing the stay of the mandate and release pending an application for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, was inapplicable to Champluvier’s case. Thus, Champluvier was not entitled to obtain bail after her conviction was affirmed under either Rule 39(a) or Rule 41. Further, the appeals court denied her petition for release pending her petition for discretionary review to the Mississippi Supreme Court. Champluvier has not shown that Sheriff Riley wrongfully arrested and incarcerated her in violation of her rights under Mississippi state law or the United States Constitution. See Young v. Hubbard, 673 F.2d 132, 134 (5th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). Contrary to Champluvier’s argument, the
holding that there is no constitutional right to appeal a criminal conviction holding that it is well settled that there is no constitutional right to an appeal holding that it may not holding that there is no absolute federal constitutional right to bail pending appeal however once a state makes provisions for such bail it may not deny it arbitrarily or unreasonably holding that the lack of any ongoing appeal of weeks conviction renders moot the question of bail pending direct appeal