the signing of the Hillwood Agreement.” Courson testified that these allegations are, in fact, absolutely false. See Plaintiff MSJ App. 12. Interestingly, this theory was completely abandoned by Tenant-Base and not even addressed as a genuine issue of material fact in its Partial MSJ or in its Response to the Plaintiff's MSJ. 18 . See, e.g., GWTP Inv., L.P. v. SES Americom, Inc., 497 F.3d 478, 483 (5th Cir.2007) (reversing district court’s judgment that plaintiffs fraud claim “was just a repackaged contract claim,” holding that defendant’s misrepresentations made after the parties entered into an unenforceable oral agreement were actionable in fraud); Nat’l Ctr. for Policy Analysis v. Fiscal Assocs., Inc., No. CIV. A. 3:97CV2660L, 2002 WL 433038, at *5-6 (N.D.Tex. Mar. 15, 2002) (<HOLDING>); Bray Int’l, Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l,
holding that summary judgment on chapter 93a claim is appropriate when summary judgment is granted on fraud claim and chapter 93a claim is solely based on the underlying claim for common law fraud holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid the securities fraud exception by pleading mail fraud or wire fraud if the conduct giving rise to those offenses also amounts to securities fraud recognizing fraud claim based on defendants postcontract promises of performance holding that allegations of intent or concealment that merely relate to defendants performance of contractual obligations do not state a claim for fraud under new york law holding that where a merger clause is included in the written contract alleged collateral promises will not be enforced through fraud because under fraud the reliance must be reasonable