however, that because Gruntal’s claims and his counterclaims were determined by the bankruptcy court in the context of a section 502(b) hearing, the bankruptcy court’s authority is limited simply to determining the viability of any claims against his estate and does not extend to the entry of a money judgment. Porges’ argument reduces to the contention that a bankruptcy court reviewing an adversary proceeding possesses sufficient jurisdiction to determine liability on a contested claim but do F.2d 1398 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827, 94 S.Ct. 46, 38 L.Ed.2d 61 (1973); accord In re Baudoin, 981 F.2d 736, 742 (5th Cir.1993) (noting that order allowing proof of claim constitutes final judgment); Sure-Snap Corp. v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 948 F.2d 869, 870 (2d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Porges argues that the entry of judgment in
holding that the lender liability claims of the debtor are precluded by res judicata holding that claims raised in later litigation were barred because they could have been fully litigated in chapter 11 reorganization process holding that debtor whose plan of reorganization had been confirmed by bankruptcy court could not later bring lender liability claims against creditors where those claims could have been raised in bankruptcy proceeding holding that stockholders cannot participate in a plan of reorganization unless creditors claims have been satisfied in full holding that debtors failure to disclose claims against creditors in bankruptcy proceeding judicial estopped him from later prosecuting claims