on its own. However, the law requires the district judge to do no such thing. See Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 674, 100 S.Ct. 2406. Despite Pinkston’s suggestion that we should do otherwise, Judge Miller is a most knowledgeable, experienced and well-respected Article III judge and, without strong evidence to the contrary, we will take him at his word when he informs us that he has conducted a de novo review and considered the plaintiffs objections in compliance with § 636(b)(1). See United States v. Severson, 49 F.3d 268, 273 (7th Cir.1995); United States v. Rodriguez, 888 F.2d 519, 521-22 (7th Cir.1989); see also Stokes v. Singletary, 952 F.2d 1567, 1576 (11th Cir.1992); United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 618 (9th Cir.1989); cf. Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47-48 (4th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Tortora, 30 F.3d 334, 337
holding that the lack of evidence that the magistrate judge examined the trial transcript in its sufficiencyoftheevidence analysis left the court no alternative but to reverse the denial of habeas relief and remand for review of the transcript holding that a courts failure to provide a defendant with any portion of a habeas transcript was error holding that the failure to object to the magistrate judges report releases the court from its duty to independently review the motion holding that under current eleventh circuit rule the failure to object limits the scope of our appellate review to plain error review of the magistrate judges factual findings  however failure to object to the magistrate judges legal conclusions does not preclude the party from challenging those conclusions on appeal holding that failure to review the evidence presented to the magistrate and failure even to have a transcript filed with the district court  was reversible error