L.Ed.2d 1 (1995) — i.e., that “[disclosure of the polygraph results ... could have had no direct effect on the outcome of trial,” given that state law precluded its admission, “even for impeachment purposes” — has generated a lack of clarity in some circuits on the issue of when nondisclosure of inadmissible evidence gives rise to a Brady violation. See, e.g., Felder v. Johnson, 180 F.3d 206, 212 (5th Cir.1999) (observing that ”[t]he Fifth Circuit has not clearly specified how to deal with Brady claims about inadmissible evidence — a matter of some confusion in federal courts” and noting the varied interpretations of the Supreme Court’s decision in Wood v. Bartholomew, supra); Paradis v. Arave, 240 F.3d 1169, 1179 (9th Cir.2001); but see U.S. v. Veras, 51 F.3d 1365, 1375 (7th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). It is not necessary for the court to address
holding that even in separate trial other crimes evidence would not have been admissible and identification testimony would have been admissible holding admissible certain evidence which would not have been obtained but for violations of constitutional requirements holding that such information is not material under securities law holding that the information contained in the police files with regard to other possible suspects was not brady material holding that information of other conduct by the investigating police officer was not material under brady because the information would not have been admissible under fedrevid 608b as it would have been extrinsic evidence impeaching the witness on collateral matters