or other entity ... in any man ner, including ... any denial ... [of] staff privileges ... because such health care institution, or person, association, or corporation ... declines to participate in a health care service which violates the health care institution's conscience.” (emphasis added)). 7 . The Second Circuit has held that this statutory provision does not imply a private right of action. See Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 626 F.3d 695, 698-99 (2d Cir.2010). However, if the hospitals are indeed entities covered under 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c), JWHO would likely have a remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of its statutory right to be free from discrimination in seeking admitting privileges. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980) (<HOLDING>); Banks v. Dallas Hous. Auth., 271 F.3d 605,
holding that plaintiffs social security numbers are not relevant to determining liability for unpaid wages in a suit under the flsa and state law holding no exhaustion requirement in  1983 suit alleging violations of the medicaid act holding that title ivd of the social security act did not support a right enforceable pursuant to  1983 in part because the statute mandated substantial compliance with federal regulations holding that 1983 authorizes suits to redress violations by state officials of rights created by federal statutes as well as the federal constitution holding that because  1983 by its plain text broadly encompasses violations of federal statutory  as well as constitutional law plaintiffs could bring suit for violation of social security act