not send his letter in August 1981, but instead sent it after his benefits were discontinued on December 22, 1981 as the circumstances suggest. The request to “not stop my compensation as I need the income” is a clear disagreement with a determination discontinuing compensation. Since the regulations do not require a notice of disagreement to be couched in specific language, Mr. Morrison’s objection to the halt of his compensation satisfies the requirement of a notice of disagreement under the regulations. § 19.113; see Collaro v. West, 136 F.3d 1304, 1309 (Fed.Cir.1998) (concluding that the veteran raised constitutional and statutory issues even though the VA only resolved factual issues in response to a vague notice of disagreement); Comer v. Peake, 552 F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed.Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). In my view, Comer controls this case. In that
holding that identification of appellant in notice of appeal is a jurisdictional requirement and that the failure to name a party in a notice to appeal constitutes a failure of that party to appeal recognizing that the ada is interpreted in a manner similar to title vii holding that an appeal is perfected when the appeal bond is filed holding that the va is obligated to read appeal filings in a liberal manner holding that ordinarily courts are not obligated to review evidence presented for the first time on appeal