notice to the insurer of the nature of the specific wrongful act, the consequences which have resulted or may result from the wrongful act, and the circumstances by which the insured first became aware thereof. There can be little good faith disagreement that the so-called “notice”— stating only “[t]his is just for notice purposes as this has been discontinued and there are no allegations” (UF No. 11)— inadequately complies with the policy’s requirements of notice of Wrongful Act(s) Granted, the Summons with Notice alleged breach of contract or fiduciary duty, but provided no information regarding the particular acts which led to the lawsuit being filed, the people who committed the acts and when the underlying acts occurred. See F.D.I.C. v. Caplan, 838 F.Supp. 1125, 1130 (W.D.La.1993) (<HOLDING>); see also McCullough v. Fid. and Deposit Co.,
holding that insured informing insurer that it had received a cease and desist order was insufficient notice because it did not detail the particular subsidiary involved the particular agents officers or directors involved the time period during which the events occurred the identity of potential claimants and the specific unsound practices made the basis of the order holding that the proper focus when determining the starting point of the limitations period  is upon the time of the discriminatory acts not upon the time at which the consequences of the acts became most painful  holding as to the admissibility of prior bad acts that allegedly took place fourteen and twelve years before the acts alleged in that case that the lapse of time between the defendants sexual acts    goes to the weight of the evidence not to its admissibility holding notice insufficient because it merely recited the language of the policys notice provision and provided no information regarding the types of practices alleged to constitute wrongful acts the agents officers or directors alleged to be involved in wrongdoing or the time period during which the allegedly wrongful acts took place holding that an individual could recover for acts occurring outside the statutory time period if at least one act occurred within the time period and the acts were part of the same hostile work environment