the obligation to ensure that the INS had an address at which he could be reached throughout the proceedings. This obligation necessarily included a duty to correct the address listed on the Notice to Appear, particularly since the Notice to Appear informed him that all future mailings would be sent to the address listed on the form. As this and other courts have noted in various contexts, including immigration cases, one’s signature on a form or contract establishes a strong presumption that “[o]ne who accepts a written contract , is conclusively presumed to know its contents and to assent to them.” Haskins v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 230 F.3d 231, 239 (6th Cir.2000) (quoting 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 224 (1991)); see also, Hanna v. Gonzales, 128 Fed.Appx. 478, 480 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289, 1301
holding that the state courts determination that the petitioner could not show prejudice because he did not allege that the witness was available to testify was a reasonable application of federal law to the facts of the case holding that reading the indictment as a whole we have no doubt that the defendant was fully aware of the charges against him holding that because the petitioner signed under oath his adjustmentofstatus application the law charges him with knowledge of the applications substance despite his assertion that he was never actually aware of its contents holding that the plaintiff had a right of privacy in the contents of a settlement agreement that stated that the plaintiff had sued his employer for failing to hire him because he was a single gay male and because his employer suspected that he had aids holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment