terms of a pretrial agreement. Indeed, we need look no further than the FY14 NDAA which presages the Article 60 changes with the section heading: “Elimination of Unlimited Command Prerogative and Discretion; Imposition of Additional Limitations.” Given Congress’ clear desire to limit CA discretion in granting post-trial sentencing relief, we are unable, as the government urges, to read this agreement so broadly as to permit the CA to grant relief that was not specifically contained within the pretrial agreement. C. The disapproval of the discharge was a nullity We find that the portion of the CA’s action purporting to disapprove the bad-conduct discharge, having no basis or justification in law, was a nullity. See United States v. Tarniewicz, 70 M.J. 543, 544 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2011) (<HOLDING>). Rather than unnecessarily ordering a new CA’s
holding that to the extent a cas action directed a punitive discharge executed after final judgment in violation of article 71 umcj was ultra vires and thus a nullity holding that the judgment was entered without jurisdiction and was therefore a nullity holding that the trial court in entering judgment affirming an earlier judgment for an award of attorney fees after having discovered that it mistakenly entered the earlier judgment before the expiration of time for the filing of objections had the inherent power under orcp 71 cs modification authority to change the effective date of the judgment without vacating or setting aside the judgment holding that filing of an answer up to the time of signing of judgment renders the judgment an absolute nullity holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence