v. Kennedy, 669 S.W.2d 309, 313 (Tex.1984) (articulating this principle); Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex.1988) (applying principle in attorney- client context); Dernick Res., Inc. v. Wilstein, 312 S.W.3d 864, 877 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (“A fiduciary relationship imposes a duty on the fiduciary to render full and fair disclosure of facts material to the relationship giving rise to the duty.”). The self-dealing side profits bring into question the fairness of the transactions and Whittington’s ability to act as a trustworthy agent for the Investor Partnerships and the limited partners. They are plainly “material facts” that must be disclosed. See, e.g., Manheim Auto. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Hurst (In re Hurst), 337 B.R. 125, 131-32 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.2005) (<HOLDING>); see also Gunn Dep., 40-43 (explaining why
holding that whether attorney complied with fiduciary duty to disclose all material information was question of fact holding that sellers failure to disclose possibility that tenant corporation might go into default not actionable because was predictive insight and therefore was nondisclosure of opinion rather than of fact holding that filing of litigation against the same defendant put a plaintiff on inquiry notice of the probability of fraud with another transaction involving the defendant where the complaints in both lawsuits involved similar allegations that defendant failed to disclose its inadequate loss reserves and did not sufficiently monitor its operations holding that because the bank had no duty to report defendants structured transactions these transactions did not constitute material facts within the meaning of 18 usc  1001 consequently defendant may not be held criminally liable under 18 usc  2b for causing the bank to fail to disclose a material fact holding that failure to disclose that the defendant was involved on both the sellers and buyers side of transactions constitutes a concealment of a material fact sufficient to support a charge of fraud