In fact, the trial court found that Hunter was not free to leave because Officer Keller’s car was blocking him in, preventing his exit onto Road 2499. The record contains no evidence of repetitive questioning, lengthy questioning, or the use of physical punishment to force consent. Deferring, as we must, to the trial court’s credibility determinations and to the historical facts impliedly found by the trial court when it granted Hunter’s motion to suppress, we cannot hold that the trial court abused its discretion by concluding either that Hunter’s consent was not voluntary or, as is more probable, by concluding that the State simply failed to meet its burden of establishing the volun-tariness of Hunter’s consent by clear and convincing evidence. Accord Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 333 (<HOLDING>); Reyes-Perez v. State, 45 S.W.3d 312, 315-19
holding that consent was freely and voluntarily given despite officers advisement that the police could get a search warrant if consent was not given holding consent was given involuntarily when a reasonable person would not have felt they had the choice to withhold consent to search holding search not to violate fourth amendment where officers belief that apparent landlord had the power to consent and that he had not revoked that consent was reasonable emphasis added holding there is no consent as a matter of law where the consent was given under coercion holding consent invalid when given under coercive circumstances in which police misrepresented that they had a warrant to search the home