claim in the event this Court denies review, this claim will be addressed at this time in the interests of judicial economy. (See Defs.' Mem. of Law in Opp'n to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ.J.; Falleck Reply Aff. ¶¶ 3^1.) 7 . In support of this notion, Schwartz has attached numerous redacted copies of the Charges and Specifications and/or Disposition Sheets for the years 1988-1990. Upon review, it is evident that the attached exhibits do not include offenses which included repeated reckless driving histories augmented by civilian fatalities. In addition, Schwartz's papers neither elucidate how these documents relate to his case nor do they shed light on the nature of the penalties meted out by the NYPD. See Pl.’s Exs. C-S; 1-68. 8 . See, e.g., Dáñese v. Knox, 827 F.Supp. 185, 196 (S.D.N.Y.1993)
holding that the negotiability of disciplinary review procedures mandated in njsa 3413a53 does not apply to the division of state police because negotiability of such procedures would infringe unacceptably on one of the most important managerial prerogatives of the superintendent of state police holding that on a review of the sufficiency of the evidence the court determines whether any rational trier of fact could have found all the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt holding that subject to its enabling legislation and pursuant to its police power a borough has the authority to enact laws that it perceives necessary to protect the public health safety and general welfare so long as the goal sought to be achieved is legitimate and the means used to achieve that goal are reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive holding the port authoritys disciplinary procedures have a rational relationship to any one of a number of legitimate goals including the maintenance of a prepared uniformed police force  necessary to completely secure and protect the port authority premises holding that where the conviction was final the disciplinary commission was not authorized to assume the roles of both an accusatory tribunal and the ultimate determiner of guilt and that the separation of responsibility between the disciplinary board and the disciplinary commission provides constitutional due process