had separately appreciated. In this case, the trial court treated the lot and house as a single asset and made no findings regarding the values or amounts of appreciation in the value of the lot or house separately, which is not incongruent with existing precedent. See, e.g., Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C. App. 372, 382, 325 S.E.2d 260, 270, disc. review denied, 313 N.C. 612, 330 S.E.2d 616 (1985) (stating that “the house and land are one asset.”) The trial court applied a “source of funds” theory in valuing the marital and separate portions of the Property. Id. at 382, 325 S.E.2d at 269. We do not believe the trial court erred in applying the “source of funds” theory as its valuation methodology. See Ross I, supra; Stewart v. Stewart, 141 N.C. App. 236, 247, 541 S.E.2d 209, 217 (2000) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). We note that Plaintiff did
holding that a sentencing determination will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion by the district court holding that where there is competent evidence to support the courts findings the admission of incompetent evidence is not prejudicial holding that the trial courts classification of property will not be disturbed as long as there is competent evidence to support that determination holding that a trial courts weighing of mitigating and aggravating factors will not be disturbed absent a showing that the trial court abused its discretion holding that trial courts determination of whether defendant accepted responsibility should not be disturbed unless it is without foundation