an instruction “sufficient to overcome any prejudicial effect” arising from prosecutorial statements that were unsupported by the evidence. See United States v. Herrera, 54 F.3d 348, 356 (7th Cir.1995); see also United States v. Jean, 25 F.3d 588, 597-98 (7th Cir.1994) (noting that similar instruction, given in response to defense counsel’s objection to allegedly improper closing argument, limited the impact of the remark). Accordingly, we find no plain error. b. Mr. Anderson alternatively submits that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the prosecutor’s argument. We cannot accept this contention because we cannot conclude that Mr. Anderson was prejudiced. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (<HOLDING>). In United States v. Van Wyhe, 965 F.2d 528
holding that to establish prejudice there must be a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different holding that to succeed on an ineffective assistance claim a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different holding that in order to show prejudice defendant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different holding that conviction will not be reversed unless there is a reasonable likelihood that but for attorneys errors the result of the proceeding would have been different holding that to establish prejudice sufficient to warrant finding of ineffective assistance the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different