this may be the case, the fact that Plaintiff Berrios knew about his rights under COBRA does not relieve Defendants from their obligations under the statute. Neither a plaintiffs actual knowledge of his rights under COBRA nor his prior COBRA-related job responsibilities, dispenses with a plan administrator’s obligation to give the employee the notifications enumerated in 29 U.S.C. Section 1166(a). Rodríguez v. Int'l College of Bus. & Tech., Inc., 364 F.Supp.2d 40, 46 (D.P.R.2005); Torres-Negrón v. Ramallo Bros. Printing, 203 F.Supp.2d 120, 124-25 (D.P.R.2002) (stating that even where the former employee’s duties during employment included the distribution of COBRA notices, the plan administrator must provide COBRA notice); see Mlsna v. Unitel Communs., 41 F.3d 1124, 1129 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Nonetheless, on the record before the Court
holding that plan language giving plan administrator power to determine which employees are eligible to participate in the plan and providing all parties dealing with the plan an interpretation of plan provisions on request indicates deferential standard of review of trustee eligibility decisions holding that an employees claim against plan administrator for denied benefits is preempted holding that plan administrator of an erisa health plan did not have to anticipate the confusion of a plan participant holding an employees knowledge of his cobra rights does not relieve the plan administrator of its notification duties holding that because no plan document granted discretion to the plan administrator and because the fiduciaries had not expressly delegated their discretionary authority to the plan administrator the district court properly employed the de novo standard of review