for New Trial A. Attorney Coercion In her second point of error, Viki asserts the trial court erred by denying her motion for new trial because her attorney coerced her into agreeing to the stipulation that awarded Andy the seven lots. In support of her motion for a new trial, Viki filed an affidavit in which she asserted that her former attorney coerced her to agree to the stipulation by telling her that, if she refused, the trial judge would have told her to accept, anyway. Even if we accept Viki’s evidence, however, her claim would still fail. To invalidate an agreement based on undue influence or duress, the coercion must come from the opposing party to the agreement, not the claimant’s attorney. See Kosowska v. Khan, 929 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1996, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we overrule Viki’s second point
holding that speech must be a threat or coercion to be actionable holding that whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary or was the product of duress or coercion express or implied is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances holding that the crime of knowingly and willfully threatening the president required only that the threat be made under circumstances where a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom it is addressed as a serious threat and not be the result of mistake duress or coercion holding that duress or coercion would invalidate a contract if the coercion comes from the opposing party not the claimants attorney holding that the question whether the defendants consent to accompany the agents was in fact voluntary or was the product of duress or coercion express or implied is to be determined by the totality of all the circumstances