of action or the form of relief chosen by the claimant except as provided otherwise in this section.” In contrast, the CGIA was not intended to apply to actions grounded in contract. Berg v. State Bd. of Agric., 919 P.2d 254, 258 (Colo.1996). Because Robinson’s claims here are framed in the pleadings as contractual and quasi-contractual, rather than tort claims, the issue before us is whether these claims “lie in tort or could lie in tort” and are thus ba t must examine the source from which the allegedly breached duty arises). Although the nature of the relief requested is not dispositive on the question of whether a claim lies in tort, the relief requested informs our understanding of the nature of the injury and the duty allegedly breached. See generally Conners, 993 P.2d at 1170-76 (<HOLDING>). We assess the nature of the injury and the
holding that a negligence claim is not a personal injury tort claim holding that there must be a tort distinguishable from or independent of the breach of contract in order for a party to bring a valid claim in tort based on a breach in a contractual relationship holding that when the essence of the claim is either negligent or intentional misrepresentation the claim could lie in tort holding that although the form of relief alone does not govern the categorization of a claim as a tort or other type of action a trial court must consider the nature of the relief sought to determine whether a particular claim lies in tort or could lie in tort holding estoppel claim could not lie in tort where the facts that support the claim could not support a claim for fraud or misrepresentation