always amount to specific intent. “[W]illful is a word of many meanings, its construction often being influenced by its context. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101, 65 S. Ct. 1031, 89 L. Ed. 1495 (1943).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Flanagan, 240 Conn. 157, 182, 690 A.2d 865, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 865, 118 S. Ct. 172, 139 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1997). This court has construed the term to require less than specific intent to violate the law. See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d
holding evidence of intent to arouse or gratify sexual desire is relevant where it is an element of the crime charged holding that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the physical endangerment portion of the statute when the defendant was charged only with the risk of injury to a child by doing an act likely to impair the morals of a child under the age of sixteen holding that where defendant charged with wilfully or unlawfully committing certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child contrary to general statutes  5321    specific intent is not an element of the crime defined holding that specific statutes create exceptions to general statutes therefore if a provision of a specific statute is inconsistent with one in a general statute on the same subject the specific statute controls holding that a defendant more likely committed multiple acts if the defendants conduct in committing the lesser crime caused the victim to suffer an additional risk of harm beyond that inherent in the ultimate crime