in fact, consumers will not necessarily get less tar” due to “such behavior as compensatory smoking.” Ibid. This history shows that, contrary to petitioners’ suggestion, the FTC has no longstanding policy authorizing collateral representations based on Cambridge Filter Method test results. Rather, the FTC has endeavored to inform consumers of the comparative tar and nicotine content of different cigarette brands and has in some instances prevented misleading representations of Cambridge Filter Method test results. The FTC’s failure to require petitioners to correct their allegedly misleading use of “light” descriptors is not evidence to the contrary; agency nonenforcement of a fed eral statute is not the same as a policy of approval. Cf. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U. S. 51 (2002) (<HOLDING>). More telling are the FTC’s recent statements
holding that private security guards unsolicited call to police did not establish agency holding that erisa does not preempt professional malpractice claims holding that the safety act and fmvss 208 did not expressly or impliedly preempt a tort claim based on the manufacturers failure to install lap belts holding that the safety act and fmvss 108 did not impliedly preempt commonlaw conspicuity tort based on inadequate lighting and reflectors on truck trailer holding that the coast guards decision not to regulate propeller guards did not impliedly preempt petitioners tort claims