the IDEA’S attorney’s fees provision. We have, however, applied Buckhannon to a number of other attorney’s fees statutes. See, e.g., Kasza v. Whitman, 325 F.3d 1178, 1180 (9th Cir.2003) (applying Buckhannon to the fee-shifting provision of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e)); Perez-Arellano v. Smith, 279 F.3d 791, 793-94 (9th Cir.2002) (applying Buckhannon to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)); Bennett, 259 F.3d at 1100-01 (applying Buckhannon to the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988). Moreover, all of the other circuits to confront the issue have held that Buckhannon applies to the attorney’s fees provision of the IDEA. See T.D. v. LaGrange Sch. Dist. No. 102, 349 F.3d 469, 471 (7th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); John T. v. Del. County Intermediate Unit, 318
recognizing that a school district must be a prevailing party in order to be entitled to attorneys fees under the idea holding that buckhannon applies to the attorneys fees provision of the idea holding that the buckhannon rule governs an application for fees under the eaja holding that the invocation of the stayput provision of the idea does not entitle the party to attorneys fees holding that the legislative history of the idea indicates that this attorneys fees provision should be interpreted in accordance with hensley v eckerhart