to them; also the writing or document embodying such decision.”). Title 38, U.S.Code, does not define the word universally to cover all sections contained within the title, and section 5112 does not define it for purposes of that section. As illustrated by section 5111(d), which defines “award” for the purpose of that section only, the definition of “award” may refer to different types of awards, such as “an original or reopened award” or “an increased award.” 38 U.S.C. § 5111(d); see also, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 1117(h)(2)(A) (specifying “the original award of compensation or service connection” (emphasis added)). Thus, the plain meaning of the term “award” in sections 5112(b)(9) and (10) is ambiguous and does not, standing alone, reveal congressional intent. See Heino, 683 F.3d at 1378 (<HOLDING>); see also Fountain v. Shinseki, 27 Vet.App.
recognizing that the term including is somewhat ambiguous holding that the plain meaning of the term the cost referred to in section 1722aa2 of title 38 uscode was ambiguous recognizing that plain meaning does not control where context shows that the parties have assigned an unusual meaning to a term holding exclusion was not ambiguous recognizing that where the statutory language is not ambiguous  the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute must be given effect