contends the district court both improperly deferred to the interpretation in the Rooker letter and Rooker declaration and misconstrued the statute. This court agrees with both of these contentions and thus concludes that the district court erroneously determined the term “education records” within FERPA does not encompass the grades at issue here. The district court erred in granting deference to the Rooker letter and declaration for two reasons. First, as discussed infra, the meaning of the terms “education records” and “maintain” are clear from the statute itself, and a court can only defer to an agency’s interpretation if a statute is deemed ambiguous. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-4, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Second, even if the relevant statutory
holding that a court must defer to an agencys reasonable interpretation of a statute even if the court might have preferred another holding that deference is owed to an agencys interpretation of its own categorical exclusion regulations so long as that interpretation is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation holding that a reviewing court must defer to an agencys interpretation of an operable statute as long as that interpretation is consistent with legislative intent and is supported by substantial competent evidence holding that when a court is asked to construe an ambiguous statute it must defer to the interpretation set out in a regulation promulgated by the agency charged with administering the statute so long as the agencys interpretation is reasonable holding that where multiple agencies are charged with administering a statute a single agencys interpretation is generally not entitled to chevron deference but concluding that there would be no comparable concern if all three agencies charged with administering the statute in question pressed the same interpretation before this court