established’ constitutional rights.” Noyola, 846 F.2d at 1025. After weighing James and Mellen’s interests, we conclude that this is not one of those rare cases where a public employer violated a clearly established constitutional right. We recognize that James’s interest in running for office is significant because “[political speech regarding a public election lies at the core of matters of public concern protected by the First Amendment.” Wiggins v. Lowndes County, 363 F.3d 387, 390 (5th Cir.2004). James argues that there is no public interest to weigh against his individual interest in running for office because the ability of the district attorney’s office to provide services was not in any way affected by his candidacy. See Vojvodich v. Lopez, 48 F.3d 879, 885-86 (5th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). We disagree. Mellen has presented evidence
holding that termination is an adverse employment action holding that reduction in workload is an adverse employment action holding that conduct causing public humiliation was not an actionable adverse employment action because public perceptions were not a term or condition of employment of the plaintiffs employment holding that an adverse employment action is unconstitutional unless the public employer shows a disruption in its ability to provide services holding that denial of a bonus was not an adverse employment action