marks omitted). ¶16 Applying that definition here, we conclude that, under all of the circumstances presented, the City had a reasonable suspicion that LaMont had consumed alcohol. As noted, Supervisor and Attorney both observed that LaMont smelled like alcohol, that his eyes were bloodshot and his face puffy, that his speech was slow, and that he appeared agitated. These circumstances, taken together, have been held to constitute reasonable articulable suspicion in the criminal context. See, e.g., State v. Perkins, 2009 UT App 390, ¶ 14, 222 P.3d 1198 (concluding that officers had reasonable suspicion where the defendant exhibited “red eyes and slurred speech, was slow to respond ... and stumbled upon leaving the vehicle”); see also State v. Morris, 2011 UT 40, ¶ 27, 259 P.3d 116 (<HOLDING>). We draw a similar conclusion here. ¶17
holding that the court of appeals properly concluded that the odor of marijuana emanating from defendants vehicle constituted probable cause to search the vehicle holding that the smell of alcohol emanating from the defendants vehicle was enough to generate reasonable suspicion holding that the smell of marijuana gave the police probable cause to search the vehicle holding that a smell associated with pcp was enough to establish probable cause holding that alcohol odor provided probable cause to search vehicle for open container and smell of burnt marijuana justified search of entire vehicle for drugs