take longer than fifteen minutes to do so. The trial court stated it had a “bad docket” and “under the circumstances [would] just order that the temporary order remain in force and effect.” The court then allowed appellant to “make an exception,” at which point appellant offered Mason’s testimony. We conclude that because no evidence was adduced at the hearing on irreparable injury or on probable recovery, the trial court erred in granting the temporary injunction. See In re Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n, 85 S.W.3d 201, 204 (Tex.2002) (orig.proceeding) (noting temporary injunctions require more stringent proof requirements than temporary restraining orders that can issue on sworn pleadings); Markel v. World Flight, Inc., 938 S.W.2d 74, 79 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION We reverse the trial court’s order
holding that temporaryinjunction orders simple recitation of conclusory statement that plaintiff will suffer an irreparable injury for which it has no other adequate legal remedy does not satisfy rule 683s requirement that a temporary injunction order specify reasons why plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law holding that discovery of financial information was not in and of itself the type of irreparable harm necessary for certiorari review holding that likelihood of irreparable harm must be based on evidence in the record not unsupported and conclusory statements regarding harm the plaintiff might suffer holding that pleadings alone will not support entry of a temporary injunction where record contains absolutely no testimony or any type of evidence to prove imminent or irreparable harm holding that even a temporary deprivation of first amendment rights constitutes irreparable harm