or § 107 of CERCLA. Id. at 167, 125 S.Ct. 577. Although Aviall also sought a ruling on whether it could, in the alternative, bring an action for cost recovery under § 107(a), the Court declined to decide the question. Id. at 168, 125 S.Ct. 577. The effect of Aviall, then, has been to clearly foreclose contribution actions under §113 where there has been no underlying civil action. But, because the Court refused to resolve whether § 107 is a viable avenue for recovery actions by PRPs, see id. at 170, 125 S.Ct. 577, and further, because the Court refused to decide what exactly could constitute a “civil action,” for purposes of § 113 contribution actions, the decision has, not surprisingly, provoked a number of divergent lower court decisions. Compare Atl. Research, 459 F.3d at 834-836 (<HOLDING>), with DuPont, 460 F.3d at 543 (finding that §
holding that where none of the events for accrual of a  113f1 contribution claim can arise because a prp has incurred response costs based on its agreement to remediate in accordance with a state agencys administrative order the relevant period of limitations and accrual is provided in  113g2 the court found that under such circumstances the contribution action becomes the initial action for cost recovery under cercla  107 thus bringing such action within  113g2 applicable to initial actions for recovery of the costs referred to in  107 holding that an action by plaintiffs who had a legal obligation to conduct cleanup pursuant to a  106 order and then sought costs for cleanup from other prps was the quintessential action for contribution recognizing a right to contribution holding that dismissal is proper for a derivative cause of action but not for a direct cause of action holding that  107 continues to offer a distinct cause of action for direct recovery and additionally an implied right to contribution for prps