statute. Common law actions based on such an injury are barred by the exclusivity provision of this statute. See Mass.Gen.L. ch. 152, § 15 (co-employees); Mendes v. Tin Kee NG., 400 Mass. 131, 132, 507 N.E.2d 1048 (1987); Mass.Gen.L. ch. 152, § 23 (employers). The exclusivity bar applies even where the allegedly injurious actions occur in the course of termination. Bertrand v. Quincy Market Cold Storage & Warehouse Company, 728 F.2d 568 (1st Cir.1984). In Bertrand, the court held that as “the employer’s conduct substantially took place while the plaintiff was an employee, and it explicitly concerned his employment, the plaintiff suffered ‘a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment.’ ” Id. at 572, citing Mass.Gen.L. ch. 152, § 26. It i , 500 N.E.2d 812 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Claims of negligent infliction of emotional
holding that a single incident of yelling at plaintiff and refusing to assign him to quality control is not the kind of extreme and outrageous conduct the indiana supreme court had in mind when it adopted the tort holding that where the complaint alleged that the employer gave the plaintiff a poor performance review increased his sales goals by 42 and pressured him to take early retirement the conduct was not extreme and outrageous holding that defendantemployers failure to follow mandatory personnel policies governing performance evaluations and its discipline and removal of plaintiff from his position without cause did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct holding employer discipline and written and verbal criticism of employees job performance not extreme and outrageous holding that assistant principals allegedly defective investigation did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct