cost"). Because the statutory scheme allows the imposition of a surcharge if Simonis is sentenced in the future for a crime covered by § 973.046(lr) or for a crime covered by § 973.046(lg) when additional costs relating to his DNA specimen are actually incurred in that case (within the proper exercise of the circuit court's discretion), it is unreasonable to construe those provisions to allow an imposition of the surcharge now on the theory that such costs might be incurred in the future. ¶ 18. We recognize that, for various purposes during the course of a sentencing, a circuit court typically has the difficult obligation of attempting to predict whether a defendant appears likely to commit crimes in the future. See State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶ 23, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the problem here is not that the
holding that the interpretation of statutory language should be consistent with the legislatures purpose and intent recognizing that the sentence imposed should be consistent with the protection of the public recognizing that determination of appropriate sentence to be imposed should ordinarily be determined by the trial court on remand rather than at the appellate level recognizing constitutional right to be present when sentence is imposed recognizing that if a guidelines error did not affect the district courts selection of the sentence imposed the sentence should be affirmed