considering its substance, allegations and evident purpose, see Hoover v. Gregory, 835 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied), for these purposes, we hold that her request for jury trial was presented to the trial court. Craig further contends the trial court did not rule on Jackie’s request as required by Rule 33.1(a)(2). However, Craig overlooks the provision of 33.1(a)(2)(A) which provides that a ruling may be either expressed or implicit. As above noted, the request for jury trial was presented in Jackie’s response on file at the time of the hearing. Accordingly, the court’s announcement at the close of the hearing and rendition of the order constituted an implicit adverse ruling of Jackie’s request for a jury trial. See In Re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d 163, 165 (Tex.2003) (<HOLDING>). We have not overlooked Craig’s argument that
holding that the defendant was denied due process because the procedural rule was not followed in any respect by the trial court holding that where the trial court implicitly denied the defendants motion to suppress but neither expressly denied the motion nor explained its ruling claim of error could not be reviewed holding that by proceeding to trial without issuing the requested bench warrant it was clear the trial court implicitly denied the request holding jury trial waiver valid despite defendants argument that district court failed to clearly distinguish between jury trial bench trial and the use of stipulated facts holding that the district court acted within its discretion when it denied plaintiffs request for counsel