it to sue purely as a representative of its members — in other words, to act as a “private attorney general.” See National Ass’n of Realtors, 894 F.2d at 940-41. Therefore, because NAS-FA is suing only on behalf of its members, and not to adjudicate any of its own rights, NASFA’s members are the real parties in interest to this controversy, and it is their citizenship that should control for diversity jurisdiction purposes. This conclusion accords with the “well settled” general principle, in this circuit and elsewhere, that divers upp. 267, 270-71 (D.Md. 1995) (finding that corporate franchisees who had property interests at stake were not nominal or formal parties who could be ignored for diversity purposes); Workman v. Nat’l Supaflu Sys., Inc., 676 F.Supp. 690, 693 (D.S.C.1987) (<HOLDING>). But cf. Turnamics, Inc., v. Advanced
holding that although the question of diversity jurisdiction is distinct from that of immunity the analysis of citizenship determinations for eleventh amendment immunity and diversity jurisdiction are the same holding that for diversity purposes the citizenship of a llc is determined by the citizenship of all of its members holding that corporation that may be liable under state law was not a nominal party and thus its citizenship in same state as plaintiff destroyed diversity jurisdiction holding that lawyer who acted as mere depository for funds was nominal party whose citizenship should not be considered for diversity purposes holding that defective allegations of citizenship may be amended to establish diversity jurisdiction