665, 666 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); Wilson v. State, 947 So.2d 1225, 1226-27 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). Accordingly, we must determine whether the commencement of Wilson’s trial in this instance should be regarded as a crucial stage of the proceedings requiring the renewal of the offer of assistance of counsel under rule 3.111(d)(5). II. Discussion The beginning of the “trial” in the context of rule 3.111(d)(5) may not be the actual start of trial, but the start of the trial stage. See McCarthy v. State, 731 So.2d 778, 780 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (concluding a pretrial hearing was the “commencement of the trial stage of the proceedings, since it addressed McCarthy’s ability to competently handle the mechanics of the trial process on his own”); Lamb v. State, 535 So.2d 698, 699 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (<HOLDING>). The trial stage does not necessarily commence
holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to continue trial three months where although trial was complex and records were voluminous court had already granted two prior continuances and continuance of three weeks was sufficient to prepare for trial holding that the defendant was entitled to a pretrial evidentiary hearing on his claim of immunity based on selfdefense holding a pretrial hearing on the waiver of counsel conducted three weeks before trial was the start of the trial stage where there were no changes between the pretrial hearing and the trial holding the rule was not applicable in a pretrial venue hearing holding that even if it could be considered retrospective hearing conducted by trial court on second day of trial was consistent with due process given the lack of a lapse in time the fact that the psychologist who testified at the hearing had interviewed petitioner and prepared a report five weeks before trial and the trial courts direct observation and question of petitioner just before the trial