must be used. The court may look to certain documents — rather than just the statute itself — to determine which elements of the statute Brown ran afoul of when he was convicted. Once that is determined, the categorical approach is used to determine if the crime of conviction is a “violent felony” under the ACCA. Mathis v. United States, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 2249, 195 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016). Under the categorical approach, “we focus on the nature of the offense rather than on the circumstances of the particular crime. Consequently, only the minimum criminal conduct necessary for conviction under a particular statute is relevant.” United States v. Acosta, 470 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Barrow, 230 F.Supp.3d 116, 121, 2017 WL 519305, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (<HOLDING>) (alteration omitted). According to his
holding that a prior conviction is not a predicate offense under the sentencing guidelines if the statute that provides the basis for the prior conviction sweeps more broadly than the generic crime described in the guidelines holding that for sentencing purposes the government does not need to allege a defendants prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact is not an element of the present crime holding that a conviction and sentence for a predicate offense that is entered after the commission of the current offense does not qualify as a prior felony within the meaning of the sexual predator statute holding that in determining whether a prior conviction is a violent felony a court generally must look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense holding that where a statute provides for an enhanced penalty based on a defendants prior conviction the fact of conviction is a sentencing factor to be determined by the court rather than a jury