Davis asserts that habeas relief is appropriate in this case because his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was denied at the trial level. The attorney’s failure to object to the jury instructions on sympathy, executive clemency, and voluntary manslaughter did not prejudice Davis’s defense because (1) the instructions were not manifestly improper, (2) he has not alleged any facts that likely would have mitigated the jury’s sentencing decision, and (3) he could not argue voluntary manslaughter without undermining his general theory of the case (i.e., that he “passed out in his trailer from drinking and, when he awoke, ... found [the victim] lying in the pickup”). See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117, 1133 (9th
holding that a defendant alleging ineffective assistance must demonstrate that their counsels performance both fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and prejudiced the defense recognizing that defendant must show 1 that counsels performance was deficient and 2 that counsels errors prejudiced the defense holding that ineffective assistance of counsel constitutes cause for procedural default only if counsels performance was constitutionally ineffective recognizing that in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel a movant must show that he was prejudiced by his counsels performance holding that to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel a defendant must demonstrate that counsel was constitutionally deficient and as a result defendant was prejudiced