of ordinary care of the risk or hazard about which he failed to warn. Moreover, there will be no liability unless [the] manufacturer failed to take the precautions that a reasonable person would take in presenting the product to the public. Although this ground of recovery is sometimes referred to as strict liability, it is really nothing more than a ground of negligence liability described as the sale of a product in a defective condition.... W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 99, at 697 (5th ed. 1984) (footnote omitted). We have embraced this view, see Fane v. Zimmer, Inc., 927 F.2d 124, 130 (2d Cir.1991), and, more importantly, so has Vermont. See Ostrowski v. Hydra-Tool Corp., 144 Vt. 305, 308, 479 A.2d 126, 1 s, Inc., 679 F.2d 1204, 1205-06 (5th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). The first and second prongs are easily
holding that causation is an essential element in failure to warn claim holding that a failure to warn was not a policy judgment holding that the failure to instruct on a definition or to amplify an element is not a failure to instruct on an essential element holding that loss causation is a necessary element of a rule 10b5 claim holding that failure to instruct on an essential element was harmless error because the element was so clearly established