participation of a guardian ad litem, who would promote their best interests pursuant to the standards set out in 19 M.R.S.A. § 752(5) (Supp.1995), even if the guardian ad litem’s recommendation were inconsistent with the children’s own preferences. Miller, 677 A.2d at 69-70. [¶40] Our discussion in Miller does not support Pearson’s claim. First, Miller did not hold that children of divorcing parents have the constitutional right to participate as a party-would. See id. at 70; see also Levy, Maine Family Law § 6.3[6] at 6-34 (8th ed. 2013). Second, even if such a right exists, it is fulfilled by the court’s overarching best interest analysis, in which the children’s preference is one of many factors, none of which is dispositive. See 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3)(C); Knight, 680 A.2d at 1038 (<HOLDING>); Levy, Maine Family Law § 6.3[2] at 6-12 to
recognizing policy and ruling that person who failed to file counterclaim when childs paternity was being determined in earlier litigation should not be allowed to bring later suit to establish that he was childs natural father as this would not be in the childs best interests holding that a childs preference regarding parental contact is not determinative of the best interest analysis and that a court must assess a childs best interest in light of all statutory factors holding that it was error to base a tpr decision solely on the childs best interest holding that when information which potentially undermines the best interest of the child as well as the interest sought to be protected by the legitimation statutes and the policy of this state it must first be tested in light of the best interest of the child standard recognizing that a trial court must make a finding that the timesharing schedule is in the childs best interests