to the prior litigation. Review in this court under the APA thus does not disturb the finality of the prior judgment. It does, however, vindicate the authority of the circuits to rule on statutory meaning independently of each other. C. The Statutory Question This case involves the construction of a statutory term implemented by a government agency with authority to administer the statute. At issue is the meaning of the word “reimbursements” in § 9704(b)(2)(A) of the Coal Act. In reviewing an agency’s statutory interpretation under the APA’s “not in accordance with law” standard, we adhere to the familiar two-step test of Chevron, provided that the conditions for such review are met. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 2170-71, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001) (<HOLDING>). Under Chevron, “if the intent of Congress is
holding that a longstanding agency interpretation was no longer entitled to chevron deference given that the agency had changed its position on the issue holding that agency action is final  and thus has legal effect  only if taken by officials possessing properly delegated authority holding that administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for chevron deference when it appears that congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority holding that chevron deference is due only to a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency holding that chevron deference is due only when the agency acts pursuant to delegated authority and the agency action has the force of law