it merely requires them to consider each officer’s actions. 4 . Contrary to Plaintiffs’ contention, this argument is not waived. The officers have consistently urged the district court to consider their claims for qualified immunity individually. The district court’s opinion illustrates as much because it expressly denies the officers’ request to be considered separately. See Meadours, 2005 WL 1923596, at *6. 5 . Of course, if we were able to conclude that the officers' actions were objectively reasonable even under existing law and the facts alleged by the Plaintiffs, the dispute would not be material and they would be entitled to qualified immunity. See Kinney, 367 F.3d at 357. We cannot find that here. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) (<HOLDING>). We also note that Meadours was not a criminal
holding that an officer may use deadly force when a fleeing suspect threatens the officer with a weapon holding the use of deadly force is constitutionally permissible only if the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm either to the officer or to others holding that an officer cannot use deadly force unless a suspect poses an imminent threat of serious physical harm recognizing that deadly force is only justified where a suspect poses an immediate threat holding officers decision to use deadly force to stop truck driver was not objectively unreasonable because officer believed driver posed an imminent threat of serious physical harm to the officers in the pursuit as well as other innocent motorists