driver” in Andersen and the fact that the Supreme Court affirmed our opinion in Moore, which expressly rejected the approach adopted in the dissenting opinion upon which our dissenting colleague in this case relies, we are unable to conclude that existing precedent leaves open the possibility of holding that the “physical contact” requirement of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-279.21 has been satisfied as long as another vehicle is “implicated” or “involved” in the harm that the insured sustained. Thus, we simply do not believe that the prior decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court permit the adoption of the approach espoused by our dissenting colleague and the dissenting judge in Moore. Finally, our dissenting colleague contends that McNeil, 84 N.C. App. at 442, 352 S.E.2d at 917 (<HOLDING>), and Geico Ins. Co. v. Larson, 542 F. Supp. 2d
holding that collision between loading ramp that detached from trailer and insureds vehicle was not actual physical contact with a motor vehicle holding that the term strike as used in a contractual definition of hitandrun coverage required physical contact between the hitandrun vehicle and the insured vehicle holding attempt to apprehend hitandrun driver was directly and reasonably related to the operation and use of the insured vehicle holding that collision between the claimants vehicle and a steel pipe dropped from an exiting truck was not actual physical contact with a motor vehicle holding that the physical contact needed to support a direct claim against an uninsured motorist carrier pursuant to nc gen stat  2027921 existed where the physical contact arose between the hitandrun vehicle and plaintiffs vehicle through intermediate vehicles involved in an unbroken chain collision which involved the hitandrun vehicle