a result of Torgerson, which abrogated a litany of decisions suggesting summary judgment should be granted sparingly in discrimination cases. Because this Court has cited these cases for different legal principles that remain good law, it has not indicated such abrogation. 6 . The statute applies only if (1) the plaintiff has been employed “for at least 1,250 hours of service with [his] employer during the previous 12-month period” and (2) the employer has at least 50 employees within 75 miles of the plaintiff's worksite. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A)-(B). DRHC does not dispute these conditions are satisfied here. 7 . In any event, for the reasons set forth below, the claim would fail even if viewed as a "retaliation” claim. See Brown v. City of Jacksonville, 711 F.3d 883, 891 (8th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). 8 . To be sure, some older Eighth Circuit
recognizing similar analysis applies to discrimination and retaliation claims recognizing first amendment retaliation right holding that the mcdonnell douglas burdenshifting framework applies to retaliation claims in the same manner as to discrimination claims holding that burdenshifting analysis applies to handicap discrimination as well holding that discrimination and retaliation claims are considered distinct types of claims that must be raised independently if the retaliation occurred prior to the filing of the administrative charge