double jeopardy issue. But even in the unlikely event that our supreme court intended Rule 27(d) to supersede the double jeopardy clause, and to abrogate the constitutional protections that normally attend the mid-trial dismissal of a jury in a criminal case, we could not lawfully enforce that supposed intention. As the Supreme Court of the Territory of New Mexico noted almost a century ago, "It is ... not within the power of the Legislature to take away from the citizens the constitutional guarantee of immunity from [a] second jeopardy." United States v. Awrandt, 15 NM. 292, 107 P. 1064, 1067 (1910). This same principle limits the actions of our supreme court when it acts in its legislative capacity, promulgating rules of procedure. See Etheredge v. Bradley, 502 P.2d 146 (Alaska 1972) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, in the absence of clear legislative
holding the argument that the state and federal constitutions required appointed counsel in adoption proceeding was not preserved holding that the former alaska civil rule governing prejudgement attachments violated the due process clauses of both the state and the federal constitutions holding that lsacc art 160 prior to its amendment in 1979 was unconstitutional as a violation of the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions holding that the due process and equal protection clauses do not trigger tucker act jurisdiction in the courts holding that philadelphias procedures for adjudicating parking violations satisfy the due process requirements of both the united states and the pennsylvania constitutions