intoxicant or drug of whatsoever nature, or any combination of such drugs, to a degree which impairs his ability to drive or operate any motor vehicle, engine or train safely, or (iv) while such person is under the combined influence of alcohol and any drug or drugs to a degree which impairs his ability to drive or operate any motor vehicle, engine or train safely. 3 . In 2003, the General Assembly amended Code §§ 18.2-268.6 and 18.2-268.7. See 2003 Va. Acts, chs. 933, 936. The amendments took effect after Cutright’s conviction, and thus, have no bearing on this case. 4 . In making this observation, we do not consider the results of Cut-right’s preliminaty breath test. See Code § 18.2-267(E). 5 . See also Brooks v. Newport News, 224 Va. 311, 316, 295 S.E.2d 801, 804 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Thurston v. Lynchburg, 15 Va.App. 475, 483,
holding that the proper standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence holding that the fourth amendment requires some minimal level of objective justification for making a terry stop which is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence recognizing that the result of a breath analysis is but auxiliary proof which may tend to corroborate evidence of the objective symptoms of intoxication recognizing that the preponderance of the evidence is the quantum of proof in civil cases recognizing an intermediate level of scrutiny in which the governmental objective must be important and the challenged law must be substantially related to that objective