Polk County convictions in 1974 and 1975, appellant failed to allege all of the factors required under Beach to shift the burden to the state to show either that counsel was required or that the right to counsel was validly waived. As to the December 19, 1974 conviction, appellant made no assertion that the DUI conviction was punishable by more than six months of imprisonment, nor did he claim that he was actually imprisoned. Moreover, the statute at the time did not provide for more than six months imprisonment. See § 316.028(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1973) (providing that a first DUI conviction shall be punished by imprisonment of not more than six months or by a fine of not less than $25 or more than $500, or by both a fine and imprisonment); Hlad v. State, 585 So.2d 928, 930 (Fla.1991) (<HOLDING>). In addition, appellant made no allegation
holding that an asylum applicant had not suffered past persecution where she claimed to have been beaten and to have suffered some bodily injuries but she was not detained imprisoned tortured or sexually assaulted in any way holding that the defendant was not guilty of felony dui because the state was unable to prove that the defendant had three prior dui convictions but remanding the case to the circuit court for resentencing without reference to any potential jurisdictional problem holding that a prior nonarizona conviction to be used as a prior felony conviction under the statute must both be for an offense that would constitute a felony in arizona and be classified as a felony in the other jurisdiction holding that prior dui conviction could be used to enhance an offense to felony even though defendant did not have appointed counsel where defendant could not have been imprisoned for more than six months and was not in fact imprisoned holding that defendants knew and understood consequences of their dui pleas even though trial court did not inform them of bill under debate by legislature that could enhance future similar convictions to felony level