not interpret the “weak results” because they were below the required threshold level of intensity and, thus, uninterpretable and unreliable. On cross-examination, Staples said that because she could not determine whether the DNA the lab tested was from a mixed sample, she did not take this possibility into account when she conducted her statistical analysis. Rather, she said that because there was “no indication above the controls of a mixture in this particular case,” the DNA sample was treated as a single source. The defendant objected to the admissibility of the DNA evidence. He argue affirming trial court’s admission of expert testimony where expert used likelihood ratios to explain DNA results from a known mixed sample); People v. Coy, 620 N.W.2d 888, 895 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (<HOLDING>). In this case, however, there was insufficient
holding a dna match is virtually meaningless without a statistical probability expressing the frequency with which it could occur holding that there was no ineffective assistance for failing to hire a dna expert because the defenses theory was that the defendants dna was planted so the dna evidence would not seem to be an issue holding that admission of evidence that defendants dna profile was consistent with dna profiles from mixed blood samples was plain error warranting reversal because no testimony was provided to explain the statistical significance of a potential match holding that the erroneous admission of dna evidence is never harmless holding that frye test for admissibility was satisfied because expert used likelihood ratios to explain results of dna tests conducted on known mixed samples