purposes of the EAJA, and whether the Government’s position was “substantially justified” is uncontested. The primary issue in this case is whether Murkeldove and the Vinning Plaintiffs incurred fees as contemplated by the EAJA. Here, the parties entered into contingency-fee agreements with their attorneys for the payment of an EAJA award. Thus, as a threshold matter, we must determine whether contingency-fee agreements are allowed under the EAJA. The Commissioner and Plaintiffs agree that Plaintiffs have incurred fees, and our analysis in United States v. Claro, 579 F.3d 452 (5th Cir.2009), supports this determination. The plaintiff in Claro sought attorney’s fees and expenses pursuant to the Hyde Amendment, which incorporates the requirements articulated in section 2412 4th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Phillips v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 924 F.2d
holding parties agreement provided clear contractual justification for the award of costs and expenses including attorneys fees to the prevailing party holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees holding that under the eaja a prevailing party with an unconditional right to be indemnified for his legal expenses by a solvent third party had not incurred attorneys fees recognizing that a school district must be a prevailing party in order to be entitled to attorneys fees under the idea holding that under the eaja a litigant did not incur fees when his former employer agreed to pay his legal fees and expenses