conclusion, Bama points to case law from the District of Columbia Circuit which holds that a director’s status as “responsibly connected” can be rebutted if he shows that he had only a nominal role in the operations of the business. See, e.g., Minotto v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 711 F.2d 406, 408 (D.C.Cir.1983). The circuits have split, however, on whether the statutory definition of “responsibly connected,” as it existed prior to the 1996 amendment, was a per se rule or a rebuttable presumption. Compare, e.g., Veg-Mix, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 832 F.2d 601, 611 (D.C.Cir.1987) (allowing a person to prove that he was not at fault or in control of those at fault to avoid the employment bar provision) with Pupillo v. United States, 755 F.2d 638, 643-44 (8th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). We need not reach the issue here, however,
holding that the statutory definition of responsibly connected provided a per se rule holding that the trial courts inclusion of per se definition of intoxication did not expand the allegations against the defendant and was not error holding expert testimony is not required as a per se rule  in bad faith actions holding such agreements to be per se illegal holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment