Johnston argues that under Missouri law testimony about these incidents should not have been admitted into evidence, and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the wrongful admission of this unconvicted crimes evidence. Again, the claim is governed by Strickland. We reiterate that, in habeas corpus proceedings, it is not within our province “to reexamine state-court determinations on s 3 L.Ed.2d 91 (1999). Because the evidence about which Johnston complains was not objectionable under Missouri law, it was not unreasonable for the Missouri Supreme Court to conclude that Johnston suffered no Strickland prejudice from his counsel’s decision not to object to that evidence. Johnston is not entitled to habeas relief on this ground. Compare Kinder, 272 F.3d at 553-54 (<HOLDING>). C. Johnston’s third allegation of ineffective
holding that it was not deficient for counsel to fail to object to a standard instruction that had not been invalidated by this court holding that district courts decision that trial counsels failure to object to crawford material was based on a reasonable trial strategy and did not constitute deficient performance under washingtons  first prong was not debatable holding that failure to object to admissible evidence was not ineffective assistance of counsel holding that counsel could have reasonably determined that the trial court would not sustain a rule 403 objection therefore counsels failure to object to this evidence was not deficient performance holding that failure to object to properly admitted evidence was not deficient performance by trial counsel