constitutional amendment and the tort claims act, we hold that the Georgia Ports Authority is a state “department or agency” that is entitled to the defense of sovereign immunity under Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX of the Georgia Constitution. Because the state has waived its immunity by enacting the Georgia Tort Claims Act, the Georgia Ports Authority may be liable for the torts of state officers and employees while acting within the scope of their official duties or employment. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Sears and Carley, JJ., who dissent. 1 OCGA §§ 50-21-20 to 50-21-37 (1994). 2 Miller v. Ga. Ports Auth., 217 Ga. App. 876 (460 SE2d 100) (1995). 3 Ga. Const., Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX (Supp. 1995). 4 See Scarlett v. Ga. Ports Auth., 223 Ga. 417 (156 SE2d 77) (1967) (<HOLDING>); Intl. Longshoremen’s Assn. v. Ga. Ports
holding that party timely objected to appointment of special master and did not waive its right to object when it objected to appointment several days before it participated in proceedings before special master holding that because the special master saw the witnesses and heard the testimony he has broad discretion in determining credibility holding that courts have inherent authority in special circumstances to stay adjudication holding that ports authority was not a condemning body as defined in the special master act holding that reviewing court should accord deference to special masters decision and may not substitute its own judgment for that of the special master