have probable cause to believe the defendant was under the influence of alcoholic beverages before requiring the defendant to submit to the blood draw as required by section 316.1933(l)(a). As the record reflects that the law enforcement officer did not require the defendant to submit to the blood test, but rather the law enforcement officer obtained the blood sample after the defendant voluntarily consented to the blood draw, we find that this argument lacks merit. See State v. Geiss, 70 So.3d 642, 648 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (noting that “blood test results obtained by actual consent, independent of the implied consent statute [section 316.1932], are admissible”); see also State v. Murray, 51 So.3d 593, 595-96 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011); Kujawa v. State, 405 So.2d 251, 252 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (<HOLDING>). However, even if the defendant had not
holding that independent of the implied consent law the fourth amendment requires an arrestees consent to be voluntary to justify a warrantless blood draw holding that failure to require proper preservation of blood samples rendered a prior version of rule 8102 inadequate and inconsistent with the purpose of the implied consent law as it relates to ensuring the reliability of test results as such the state was not entitled to the presumptions of impairment associated with the implied consent statutory scheme holding that the implied consent warning given to the defendant was not misleading or coercive because the validity of the implied consent notice is not contingent upon other administrative aspects of ocga  405671 holding that the implied consent law allows law enforcement officers to obtain blood in circumstances in which a warrant or actual consent may otherwise be required holding that the implied consent statutes are irrelevant when the defendant gives actual consent to a blood or breath test