a claim necessarily occurred before that time. Because Colvin did not file suit until August 2003, its breach of contract claim is barred by the Tucker Act’s six year statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2501. The trial court dismissed Colvin’s claim on the merits; we affirm the dismissal, but do so for lack of jurisdiction. See John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 457 F.3d 1345, 1354 (Fed.Cir.2006). Finally, Colvin seeks compensation under 43 U.S.C. § 1752(g) for the value of improvements made to the grazing area. However, even if such a claim may properly be raised here, it did not request a determination by the Secretary of the value of its improvements as required by the statute. Cf. Julius Goldman’s Egg City v. United States, 214 Ct.Cl. 345, 556 F.2d 1096, 1099 (Ct.Cl.1977) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, its claim is not ripe for failure
holding that in its review of the irs exercise of discretion the court is limited to a review of the administrative record holding that where the statute in question required that the measure of fair market value shall be as determined by the secretary  the court cannot substitute its own discretion for properly exercised administrative discretion holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion holding that the court abused its discretion where the delay cannot not reasonably be attributed to the plaintiff alone holding that while a court may direct that discretion be exercised it may not specify how that discretion is to be exercised nor require the performance of a particular discretionary act