serious risk of harm. Cf. Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 481 (6th Cir.2010) (“Even if we assume, without deciding, that [plaintiff] faced an objectively serious risk of harm, [defendant] was not deliberately indifferent to that risk.”). Defendant Christopher Flewelling There is no dispute that Flewelling knew Meier’s BAC was 0.31, a BAC that Flewelling described in his deposition testimony as “pretty high.” (R. 47, Ex. E, C. Flewelling Dep. at 35.) He also knew that Meier was incapable of passing sobriety tests and that his speech was slurred. However, Meier’s intoxication by itself— even at the extreme level indicated by the BAC—was insufficient to put Flewelling on notice that Meier needed medical attention. Cf. Schack v. City of Taylor, 177 Fed.Appx. 469, 472 (6th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). This is especially true because other signs
holding that doctrine does not violate due process holding the defendant lacked any expectation of privacy in his cell so the jailer had the right to inspect anything in his cell holding that doctrine does not violate right of confrontation holding that the district court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing where the defendant stated a colorable claim that the government violated his constitutional right to counsel by placing him in a cell with a known informant who may have been acting as a government agent holding that placing a highly intoxicated man who exhibited no other signs of alcoholrelated ailment in a holding cell does not violate contemporary standards of decency