78 (quoting Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 583, 86 S.Ct. 1698); see also Liteky, 510 U.S. at 554, 114 S.Ct. 1147 (predispositions developed during proceedings are rarely sufficient); Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., 888 F.2d 1287,1301 (D.C.Cir.1988) (“It is well settled that a motion for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 144 or § 455 must be based upon prejudice from an extra-judicial source.”). Klayman’s conclusory allegations and statements of opinion that the Court “has demonstrated an extra-judicial bias and prejudice” against him are wholly insufficient on this point. See Hanrahan, 248 F.Supp. at 474 (the affidavit “must state facts as opposed to conclusions” and must do so with “particularity”); cf. Karim-Panahi v. U.S. Congress, 105 Fed. Appx. 270, 274-75 (D.C.Cir.2004) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, while his dissatisfaction with
holding that summary judgment is appropriate where the nonmovant rests merely upon conclusory allegations improbable inferences and unsupported speculation holding that recusal is not required on the basis of unsupported irrational or highly tenuous speculation holding a military judge need not recuse himself solely on the basis of prior judicial exposure   holding that allegations against nondiverse defendants must be factual not conclusory because conclusory allegations do not state a claim holding that under section 455 a judge should not recuse himself based upon conclusory unsupported or tenuous allegations