order specifically states it was entered into to resolve a disputed claim and constitutes no admission on the part of Walgreen. The stipulation and consent order was therefore “motivated by a desire for peace rather than from a concession of the merits of the claim,” and for that reason the document was irrelevant. 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 508, at 588-89 (1994) (explaining that one of the underlying principles excluding settlements and offers of settlement is that “the evidence is irrelevant as being motivated by a desire for peace rather than from a concession of the merits of the claim” (emphasis added)); see Miller v. Component Homes, Inc., 356 N.W.2d 213, 215-16 (Iowa 1984); see also Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1246-47 (3d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Kramas v. Security Gas & Oil, Inc., 672 F.2d
holding evidence of defendants prior drug use and heroin addiction admissible to establish defendants motive to commit robbery holding that a defendants antitrust liability depends on the overall effects of a defendants conduct in the relevant market holding extrinsic evidence of defendants motive to possess gun inadmissible where defendant did not contest the issue of motive holding trial court improperly instructed jury in trial for possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute that evidence of defendants similar acts of possession was admissible to show motive where motive was not element of crime charged and defendant did not contest motive holding that evidence of five prior antitrust actions brought against the defendants was irrelevant on issue of defendants motive to conspire and noting that simply because the defendants were named in past antitrust cases involving similar allegations does not make it more probable that the defendants had a motive to carry out their conspiracy