the above-listed cases and two additional cases not listed in his motion to correct illegal sentences, case numbers 89-4346 and 89-12881. Pursuant to the negotiated plea, Merrell was sentenced to forty-year sentences on each first degree felony punishable by life imprisonment and each life felony, fifteen years on each second degree felony, and five years on the sole third degree felony. The sentence imposed on each count and each case was ordered to run concurrent with the other sentences imposed. Merrell claims that the habitual offender designations imposed for the life felonies were error. While we agree that in 1990, when the sentences were imposed in the instant cases, a habitual offender sentence was not authorized for life felonies, see Lamont v. State, 610 So.2d 435 (Fla.1992) (<HOLDING>), the forty-year sentences imposed in the
holding that under the 1991 version of the habitual offender statute defendant could not receive habitual offender sentence for life felony holding that a defendant sentenced as an habitual offender who later successfully challenges one of his predicate offenses may have his habitual offender status and sentencing enhancement vacated through postconviction relief or a motion to correct erroneous sentence holding that the habitual offender act as it existed in 1989 did not apply to those who were convicted of life felonies holding that defendants habitual traffic violator conviction could also serve as a predicate felony conviction under the general habitual offender statute holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in not allowing defendant to present evidence of his subjective belief regarding his status as habitual offender because his belief was irrelevant to offense of driving as habitual offender