immigration detainer because that status will cause him to be ineligible for desirable prison programs that might otherwise be available. However, the district court was aware of Arroyo’s status as a Colombian national, was not required to discuss each § 3553(a) factor, and was within its discretion to assign weight to each factor. See Amedeo, 487 F.3d at 832; Talley, 431 F.3d at 786. As for Arroyo’s argument that his sentences are unreasonably disparate when compared to other “boat cases,” the statistics that Arroyo points to and the circumstances of these unrelated cases are not part of this record. We therefore cannot determine whether the circumstances of those cases bear relation to the circumstances of this case. See United States v. Campbell, 491 F.3d 1306, 1317 (11th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, we will not substitute our judgment
holding that plaintiffs were injured by defendants collection and publication of highly sensitive personal information including credit card numbers social security numbers financial account numbers and information regarding plaintiffs personal issues including sexuality mental illness alcoholism incest rape and domestic violence holding that imposition of lengthy sentences did not show prejudice where sentences were warranted by facts shown in the evidence holding that amendment 706 did not have the effect of lowering the applicable guideline range where the defendants received statutory mandatory minimum sentences and thus the defendants were not eligible for relief under  3582 holding that the statistics cited by campbell regarding other defendants sentences were merely bare numbers without context and thus were unpersuasive holding that the operative provision in determining the defendants applicable sentencing range is the statutory minimum  not the crack cocaine guideline and that the defendants were still subject to the mandatory minimum upon which their substantial assistance departures  and thus them ultimate sentences  were based