Wright fails the substantively-legislative test. The decision did not involve a matter of general policy, applicable to a variety of circumstances, nor to a range of County employees. Quite to the contrary, the decision targeted a particular employee suspected of specific acts of mis- and malfeasance. Urging the opposite conclusion, the Appellants argue that their decision to terminate Wright is analogous to the decision held to be legislative in Bogan. Even a passing review of the Supreme Court’s decision in that case belies the argument, however. In Bogan, the act at issue involved the elimination of the plaintiffs position as part of a larger, city-wide downsizing prompted by declining financial resources. See Bogan, 523 U.S. at 46, 118 S.Ct. 966; see also Aitchison, 708 F.2d at 97 (<HOLDING>). This case, in contrast, involves a decision
holding that borough attorney who was acting in direct assistance of legislative activity was entitled to absolute immunity holding that city council is entitled to absolute legislative immunity from claim under the age discrimination in employment act holding that borough council members who voted to abolish assistant building inspector position on efficiency and economy grounds had absolute immunity from s 1983 claims brought by employee who held the position holding that the considerations underlying absolute prosecutorial immunity at common law dictate the same absolute immunity under  1983 holding that while a witness and prosecutor were protected by absolute immunity for their participation in judicial proceedings they were not entitled to absolute immunity on a  1983 claim that they conspired to present false testimony