in Griffin in one or the other of the following respects: It either prohibits inviting the jury to do what the jury is perfectly entitled to do; or it requires the jury to do what is practically impossible. [Id. at 68, 120 S.Ct at 1124, 146 L.Ed.2d at 55 (footnoteq omitted).] Ultimately, the Court concluded that a prosecutor may accuse a defendant of tailoring based on trial presence because such com- merits are “appropriate” and “sometimes essential [ ] to the central function of the trial, which is to discover the truth.” Id. at 73, 120 S.Ct. at 1127, 146 L.Ed.2d at 59. Our appellate case law has, for decades, conformed to the Portuondo approach and permitted the kind of accusations allowed in that case. See State v. Buscham, 360 N.J.Super. 346, 366, 823 A.2d 71 (App.Div.2003) (<HOLDING>). In State v. Robinson, 157 N.J.Super. 118,
holding prosecutors reference to defendant being only witness in courtroom during testimony as tailoring opportunity not plain error holding that a trial judges decision to close the courtroom during the testimony of a witness without making the requisite casespecific findings of fact was reversible error holding that prosecutors reference to the fact that not one white witness has produced contradictory evidence was plain error holding that prosecutors reference to code of silence among witnesses to shooting not plain error where argument finds support in record holding that prosecutors reference to cooperation agreements with government witnesses was not plain error