omitted). 27 . Id. at 1261 (Bryner, C.J., concurring). 28 . Id. at 1256. 29 . Id. 30 . Id. 31 . Id. 32 . Id. at 1256-57. 33 . Id. at 1257. 34 . Id. 35 . Id. at 1261 (Bryner, C.J., concurring). 36 . 599 P.2d 727 (Alaska 1979). 37 . Id. at 738. 38 . Id. at 730. 39 . Id. at 739. See also Newhall, 843 P.2d at 1260 & n. 4 ("'It is possible that in deciding [Reevesl] the supreme court was influenced by the fact that a 'balloon could be one of those rare single-purpose containers which by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance. ") (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 750-51, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1548, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring)). 40 . 809 P.2d 421, 423 (Alaska App.1991) (<HOLDING>). MANNHEIMER, Judge, concurring. I agree with
holding that the search of a balloon was justified under the plain view exception where the contraband nature of the balloon  was immediately apparent to the officer who seized it holding that even if an officers stop of a defendant who was on foot was unlawful the search of a parked car was justified by a different officer observing a gun magazine in plain view in the car holding that the incriminating nature of an item was immediately apparent where the police officers had probable cause to believe that it contained evidence of a crime holding that the criminality of a knotted opaque party balloon found in plain view during a traffic stop was immediately apparent because the officer had probable cause to believe that the balloon contained an illegal substance holding that the fourth amendment permits seizure of property in plain view where 1 the officer has a lawful right to access the object itself and 2 the propertys incriminating character is immediately apparent