at 790 (noting that “[a]n unrevealed risk that should have been made known must materialize, for otherwise the omission, however unpardonable, is legally without consequence”). These principles apply in informed consent cases that involve the prescription of drugs. Hence, the test of proximate cause in such cases requires that the plaintiff establish a causal relation between the prescribed drug about which she was inadequately warned and the harm that materialized. See, e.g., Niemiera v. Schneider, 114 N.J. 550, 554, 555 A.2d 1112 (1989) (stating in failure-to-warn medical malpractice ease involving administration of vaccine, “fundamental underlying question” is whether vaccine “was the cause of’ plaintiffs brain damage); Eppel v. Fredericks, 203 A.D.2d 152, 610 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1994) (<HOLDING>). That test of medical causation is applicable
holding to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination a plaintiff must show he 1 holding that in order to prevail on a malicious prosecution claim under  1983 a plaintiff must establish among other things the absence of probable cause for the initiation of the proceedings against her holding that in order to establish prima facie case for failure to procure informed consent plaintiff must establish among other things that prescribed drug about which she received inadequate warning was proximate cause of her injury holding that in title vii disparate treatment case in order for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case the plaintiff must proffer evidence among other things that she performed her job according to her employers legitimate expectations if the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case the presumption shifts the burden to the employer to produce a legitimate nondiseriminatory reason for its actions holding that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she was unable to present evidence that she was qualified for the position