constituted a security. Chapman argues that Hines "told the jury that the transaction at issue would constitute a security" by testifying that promissory notes and "notes that are issued for investment purposes and are not collateralized" are seeu-rities. 120 Hines testified that there are "two different forms" of securities-those that are explicitly enumerated in the Utah Code as a security, see Utah Code Ann. § 61-I-13(1)(ee) (LexisNexis 2011), and those "that need an explanation in which elements ar determining that a witness's testimony should have been excluded where the witness connected his opinion testimony "to the requirements of Utah law" and answered "a specific question" on the verdict form (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)), and Stringham, 957 P.2d at 607 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse
holding that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to pose a hypothetical seenario to an expert witness consisting of the exact actions of which the defendant was accused in order to ask the expert to give an opinion as to whether the  actions were illegal emphasis omitted recognizing that the expert was particularly qualified to give his opinion holding that it is well established that whether an employees actions were within the scope of employment is a question of fact and even if some of the actions were unauthorized the question of whether the actions were within the scope of employment is for the jury holding that an expert that had provided consulting services to the defendant relating to the litigation was not precluded from serving as an expert for the plaintiff holding that using the opinions of an expert that were not testified to during trial which were irrelevant and solely used to destroy the credibility of the expert was not admissible