Cir.2009); United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 302 (4th Cir.2003). Next, Lockamy contends that his prior North Carolina convictions for breaking or entering do not qualify as predicate felony offenses under the Armed Career Criminal Act. This argument is also foreclosed by our precedent. United States v. Mungro, 754 F.3d 267, 272 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 734, 190 L.Ed.2d 458 (2014) (“We therefore conclude that N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1454(a), as interpreted by the North Carolina Supreme Court, sweeps no more broadly than the generic elements of burglary.”); United States v. Kerr, 737 F.3d 33, 38-39 & n. 8 (4th Cir.2013), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 134 S.Ct. 1773, 188 L.Ed.2d 603 (2014) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Lockamy asserts that § 922(g) is
holding that denial of right to allocute was not prejudicial because district court sentenced defendant to low end of guideline range holding that defendant should be resentenced where district court imposed a sentence under an erroneously calculated guidelines range  even where the sentence imposed fell within the correct range holding that court should consider presumptive range for defendant who was sentenced in mitigated range to determine if prior conviction is felony holding that where the guideline range is higher than the statutory maximum sentence the court should depart from the lowest range that could support the statutory maximum recognizing the range of discretion of the trial judge