very fact that an alternative deadline is tied to the schedule for collection of the tax verifies this reading of “tax year.” {¶ 18} Finally, our construction of “tax year” is borne out by the BTA’s consistent application of this deadline for filing valuation complaints; in both of the following BTA cases, the BTA found that jurisdiction did not exist, based upon the “tax year” constituting the year when the value was determined — what Toledo calls the “assessment year” as opposed to the “collection year.” See Strongsville Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision (Apr. 8, 1994), B.T.A. Nos. 1993-K-1088 and 1993-K-1089 (complaint filed in March 1992 found to be untimely to contest value as assessed for 1990); Bill v. Ottawa Cty. Bd. of Revision (Nov. 5, 2004), B.T.A. No. 2004-A-920 (<HOLDING>). {¶ 19} For the foregoing reasons, we hold
holding that a complaint contesting a propertys valuation for tax years 19881994 would have had to have been filed by march 31 of the year following the tax year in question ie march 31 1989 through march 31 1995 holding refund of discriminatory tax required because predeprivation remedy not clearly available for tax years at issue holding that determination of a tax refund for a particular tax year creates a single claim under rule 54b because the total tax liability for each taxable year constitutes a single unified cause of action regardless of the variety of contested issues and points that may bear on the final computation quoting finley v united states 612 f2d 166 170 5th cir 1980 but determination of a single issue for a single tax year was not resolution of a unified cause of action holding that state legislature should determine whether to cure discriminatory tax by enforcing tax as to all or forgiving tax in its entirety holding that agency could not claim confidentiality for tax returns that had been exhibits in tax court and were therefore public records