should be steered by “familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations[.]” Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270, 114 S.Ct. 1483. We first observe that, as explained in Section III.B., infra, Baldwin’s claims expired on March 24, 2008, more than six months before the VBIA was enacted on October 10, 2008. Thus, applying § 4327(b) retroactively would attach a new legal consequence to the expiration of Baldwin’s claim; that is, Baldwin’s claims against the City would be allowed to proceed rather than be barred. In this vein, other cases have held that applying a new statute of limitations to pre-enactment claims would have a retroactive effect by unfairly barring or reviving a claimant’s suit. See, e.g., Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Chenault v. United States Postal Serv., 37
holding that the aedpa applies to those habeas corpus petitions filed after its effective date of april 24 1996 holding that in general aedpa applies only to habeas petitions filed after the statutes effective date of april 24 1996 and noting that aedpas special procedures for 28 usc  2254 petitions in capital cases apply also to petitions pending on april 24 1996 holding that petitioners whose convictions became final before the enactment of aedpa had a oneyear grace period after aedpas effective date to file their federal habeas petitions holding that prisoners whose convictions became final on or before april 24 1996 must file their  2255 motions before april 24 1997 holding that applying 28 usc  2244d1which was enacted on april 24 1996 and created a oneyear statute of limitations for habeas petitions filed by prisoners held pursuant to state court judgmentsto convictions that became final before that effective date would impermissibly attach new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment internal quotation marks omitted