must be ‘testimonial’ to be excludable under the Confrontation Clause.” United States v. Udeozor, 515 F.3d 260, 268 (4th Cir.2008) (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006)). After reviewing the warrants of deportation in this case, we find that they are nontestimonial and are therefore not subject to the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. See United States v. Burgos, 539 F.3d 641, 645 (7th Cir.2008) (collecting cases). We further find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the warrants pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 803(8)(B). Rule 803(8)(B) creates an exception to the hearsay rule for public records and reports setting forth “matters observed pursuant to a duty imposed by law as to w 4 F.3d 42, 43 (11th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we conclude that the district
holding that the admission of routinely and mechanically kept ins records such as a warrant of deportation does not violate rule 8038b recognizing detention during deportation proceedings as a constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process holding that admission of business records does not violate the confrontation clause under roberts holding that admission in evidence of certified copies of docket sheets of defendants prior convictions did not violate defendants sixth amendment right to confrontation because such records are not testimonial holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to civil deportation hearings where ins must only prove identity and alienage