2395, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991) (linking clear statement rule with constitutional avoidance canon). The Court in Will derived this “clear statement” rule from the Eleventh Amendment cases requiring an explicit textual intent to abrogate a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity, but noted its applicability in a range of contexts in which Congress alters the federal-state balance of power. See Will, 491 U.S. at 65, 109 S.Ct. 2304. In Gregory, the Court applied this “plain statement” principle where Congress’ imposition of liability under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act would “upset the usual constitutional balance” by interfering with the states’ fundamental role in defining the qualifications of their state judges. Id. at 460-61, 111 S.Ct. 2395; see id. at 464-67, 111 S.Ct. 2395 (<HOLDING>). It cannot seriously 'be disputed that if
holding that in an earlier version of 11 u s c  106 congress had failed to make sufficiently clear its intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity holding that state judges are absolutely immune from  1983 liability except when acting in the clear absence of all jurisdiction holding that congress did not make a sufficiently clear statement in the adea that state judges are within the acts coverage holding that a public corporation in that case a commission created to provide information about the tva is an entity separate from the state and its acts are not acts of the state  within the meaning of the state constitutions prohibition against the state creating new debts holding that judges have immunity from suit for judicial acts