IV & XIV; Fla. Const, art. 1, § 12. The demand for a speedy trial sounds in the constitutional right to a “speedy and public trial.” U.S. Const, amend. VI & XIV; Fla. Const, art. 1, § 16(a). A person does not ordinarily abandon the right to seek suppression of evidence unlawfully seized merely by demanding a speedy trial. Indeed, the Florida Supreme Court has made clear that a speedy trial demand can be compatible with a pending motion to suppress. State v. Embry, 322 So.2d 515, 518 (Fla.1975) (“[T]he mere filing of a motion to suppress is not tantamount to a finding of law that the speedy trial deman-der does not have a bona fide desire to obtain trial, that he is not prepared and will not be prepared for trial.”); see also Williams v. State, 548 So.2d 898, 899 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (<HOLDING>). Nor are we persuaded by the trial court’s
holding that aggressiveness with which defendant asserted his speedy trial right was lacking because he merely filed one demand for speedy trial and opposed his original counsels withdrawal holding that the trial court erred by granting the defendants motion to dismiss holding that trial court erred in considering pro se motion for new trial filed when defendant was represented by counsel holding a trial court erred in determining that a motion to suppress was waived by a speedy trial demand holding that like most rights speedy trial can be waived