“right-of-way” is self-evident and was wholly unnecessary given the fact that the trial court did read the right-of-way traffic statute to the jury. Our review of the instructions, taken as a whole, leads us to conclude that the lower court adequately charged the jury in this case and that the jurors were not misled. We therefore cannot find the court’s failure to specifically define right-of-way in this case to be reversible error. See Tolivert v. Estate of Scherer, 715 So.2d 358, 358-59 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (stating that “[i]f the instructions given contain a sufficient statement of the law concerning the points in controversy, then there is no reversible error in failing to give the requested instructions.”); CSX Transp., Inc. v. Whittler, 584 So.2d 579, 586 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (<HOLDING>). Finally, as to the appellant’s remaining
holding that the ninth circuit erred because the state appellate courts conclusion that one incorrect statement in jury instructions did not render the instructions likely to mislead the jury was not unreasonable holding that although the instruction at issue could have been worded more specifically the jury instructions as a whole did not mislead the jury as to the law holding that if jury instructions viewed as a whole fairly state the applicable law to the jury the failure to give particular instructions will not be error holding that the law presumes that the jury will follow the courts instructions holding that the jury instructions taken as a whole sufficiently informed the jury of the states burden of proving that the defendant specifically intended to kill the victim