and medical reports. However, on direct appeal, we held: "Even assuming the statement [was] improperly admitted, reversal is not required.... Douglas was not harmed by its admission." Id. at 13. Douglas cannot demonstrate he was prejudiced by counsel's alleged error. Finally, Douglas claims his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately prove ineffective assistance of trial counsel. However, Douglas did not submit his direct appeal record of proceedings to the post-conviction court. Accordingly, neither we nor the post-conviction court can determine that Douglas was prejudiced by trial counsel's actions. Consequently, we cannot say the post-convietion court's denial of Douglas' petition was contrary to law. See Tapia v. State, 753 N.E.2d 581, 587-88 (Ind.2001) (<HOLDING>). 7. Delay in Hearing Post-Comviction Petition
holding that a plaintiff cannot be denied a new trial for failing to establish sufficient proof to meet a standard which at the time of trial did not exist holding petitioners failure to present any witnesses or submit the trial record into evidence at hearing led to conclusion that petitioner did not meet his burden of proof for postconviction relief holding that where movant alleged the names of uncalled witnesses and them anticipated testimony which would have been relevant mitigation evidence in the penalty phase but did not allege that trial counsel knew of the witnesses or that the witnesses were available to testify at trial the movant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his postconviction relief motion because he did not allege facts sufficient to satisfy the standard applicable to his claim holding that the district court properly denied petitioners request for an evidentiary hearing on equitable tolling where the petitioner filed several petitions for postconviction relief containing the same arguments presented in his federal habeas petition recognizing that even where a party has the burden of proof at trial that party need not produce proof supporting his claim in response to a motion for summary judgment unless the movant has first presented evidence that would negate an element of the nonmovants claim or indicates that the nonmovant will be unable to meet his burden at trial it is never enough simply to state that the nonmoving party cannot meet its burden at trial