case; rather, we are bound by our prior case law requiring consideration of imputed income where a parent has become voluntarily unemployed. See Clinchfield Coal Co. v. Reed, 40 Va.App. 69, 73, 577 S.E.2d 538, 540 (2003) (“The decision of one panel [of our Court] 'becomes a predicate for application of the doctrine of stare decisis’ and cannot be overruled except by the Court of Appeals sitting en banc or by the Virginia Supreme Court.” (quoting Johnson v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 425, 430, 478 S.E.2d 539, 541 (1996))). 3 . The rationale behind this principle is that a parent should not be permitted "to shift to his wife and children the consequences of his wrongdoing.” Layman, 25 Va.App. at 368, 488 S.E.2d at 659; see also Hammers v. Hammers, 216 Va. 30, 31, 216 S.E.2d 20, 21 (1975) (<HOLDING>). 4 . We recognize that in L.C.S., 19 Va.App.
holding that parents may not voluntarily terminate their rights in a child to avoid child support payments or contract away a child support obligation holding that in order to obtain a reduction in child support payments a parent must show that his lack of ability to pay is not due to his own voluntaiy act recognizing that fathers parental rights were terminated based upon his incarceration and his behavior while in prison his history of substance abuse and the fact that his child support payments are in arrears holding that where payments are made on past due support they must first be applied to  current child support installments due then to accrued and outstanding interest on  delinquent child support obligations and finally to the principal amount due on unpaid child support holding that husbands knowledge of his obligation of support and his subsequent election to enter employment that would substantially reduce his income and make it impossible to meet his obligations would not justify reduction in support