can receive an attorney’s fee award under Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 11 is one of first impression in this jurisdiction. Other jurisdictions have, however, dealt with this issue in the context of Fbd.R.Civ.P. 11 or its equivalent and have ruled that a pro se attorney litigant is not entitled to receive attorney’s fees for a violation of the rule. We agree. Although not identical to Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 11, Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 also allows for sanctions when a “pleading, written motion, and other paper” signed by an attorney is “presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation,” or presents legal arguments not “warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument fo .3d 475, 198 P.3d 560, 563-65 (2009) (<HOLDING>); Beasley v. Peters, 870 S.W.2d 191, 196
holding attorneys fees not available to pro se attorney litigant in a federal freedom of information act action holding that california rule modeled almost word for word on rule 11 of the federal rules of civil procedure does not allow a pro se attorney litigant to recover sanctions in the form of an award of attorneys fees holding that a pro se litigant who is an attorney is not entitled to fees under  1988 holding that successful rico defendants may receive attorneys fees under federal rule of civil procedure 11 holding that under rule 13 of the texas rules of civil procedure which precludes bringing a groundless suit for purposes of harassment a pro se attorney litigant is not entitled to attorneys fees because an attorneyclient relationship was the predicate for that particular sanction