or other relief, for alleged failure to enforce the HQS. This regulation evinces an intent by HUD not to have the regulations in Part 982 confer any enforceable federal rights. Part 982, however, is inapplicable to this case; it applies to Section 8 housing, not public housing units. See 24 C.F.R. Part 982 (“Section 8 Tenant Based Assistance: Housing Choice Voucher Program”). Plaintiffs argue that under the doctrine of expresso unius est exclusio alterius, the fact that HUD has not adopted a similar regulation with respect to the public housing program suggests that HUD interprets the statutes and regulations governing public housing units as creating enforceable federal rights. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics, 507 U.S. 163, 168, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Part 982 also does not assist plaintiffs.
recognizing that the federal pleading standard is a less stringent standard than the delaware pleading standard holding that the fact that federal rule of civil procedure 9b requires a heightened pleading standard for some claims but not for a section 1983 claim against a municipality means that the rules do not require a heightened pleading standard for such a claim holding that heightened pleading standards of fed rcivp 9b apply to fraud elements of rico claim holding that heightened pleading standards do not apply to defamation actions holding that a court may not apply a heightened pleading standard more stringent than the usual pleading requirements of rule 8 in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under  1983