is reestablished.” (Emphasis added.) The Comment to Subsection (b), of that statute states: “Subsection (b) is intended to insure that any immunity provisions provided in the act or by common law will prevail over the liability provisions. It is anticipated that the Courts will realistically interpret both the statutory and common law immunities in order to effectuate their intended scope.” We have repeatedly emphasized that “immunity is the dominant theme of the Act” and that where immunity applies, liability does not attach. Weiss v. New Jersey Transit, 128 N.J. 376, 382-83, 608 A.2d 254 (1992); see Pico v. State, 116 N.J. 55, 560 A.2d 1193 (1989); Rochinsky v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 110 N.J. ); Aebi v. Monmouth County Highway Dep’t, 148 N.J.Super. 430, 434, 372 A.2d 1130 (1977) (<HOLDING>). In applying N.J.S.A. 59:4-5, our unifying
holding officer had a reasonable basis to stop a motorist for crossing the fog line and that failure to have regard for the width and use of the street by swerving off the side of the road or crossing the marker lines constitutes probable cause for a traffic stop holding a county and a road district had standing to sue state highway commission and county tax collector based on their interest in and control over the public roads of the county holding that a failure to warn was not a policy judgment holding county immune under njsa 5945 for failure to warn motorists that the width of the road way was being suddenly reduced to the width of the bridge holding that a bia road was a tribal road by considering the nature of the rightofway at issue and finding that although the tribe had relinquished certain gatekeeping rights by allowing public use of the road and collaborating with the bia in maintaining it the tribe had maintained other significant gatekeeping rights because the rightofway was not granted to the state and the road did not form any part of the states highway system