prima facie case of discrimination, contrary to the directions of Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). 8 . We note that there are seemingly unanswered questions about what is a “subsidiary fact” and what is an “ultimate fact” in a Title VII case. See, e.g., Bickel v. Burkhart, 632 F.2d 1251, 1255 n. 5 (5th Cir. 1980) (where the court comments that “[t]here is some uncertainty as to the proper scope of appellate review of a trial court’s resolution of ... [the] causation issue [in a retaliation case],” citing Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 628 F.2d 488, 491 (5th Cir. 1980)). Whether other questions of fact are subject to the clearly erroneous standard is also uncertain. See, Merriweather v. Hercules, 631 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1980) (<HOLDING>). Compare, Ramirez v. Sloss, 615 F.2d 163 (5th
holding that the clearly erroneous standard of review applies to  3bllc determinations holding that pretext is subject to the clearly erroneous standard holding that the finding of intent to discriminate is a factual determination subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review holding that even though the court does not usually apply the clearly erroneous standard to mixed questions of fact and law this standard is properly applied to the materiality issue holding that a finding of accommodation is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard of review instead of under a de novo standard