phone with someone identifying himself as petitioner, that he informed this person of the report of abuse that had been made, and then left his phone number so he could be reached, but despite these efforts the detective “never received a call back from anybody.” Trial Tr. Vol. III at 45-48. In both instances defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial on the basis that petitioner’s exercise of his constitutional right to remain silent was improperly, if indirectly, commented upon. The trial court denied the objection, but cautioned that “this comes very close” to an “impingefment] of [petitioner’s] right to assert his fifth amendment privilege” and directed the prosecutor “to be very explicit that you’re commenting [instead] on what the 7, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (<HOLDING>), to a pre-arrest, pre-Miranda context in
holding that it is improper for prosecutor to comment on accuseds postarrest silence holding fifth amendment prohibits comment on accuseds testimonial silence holding that the fifth amendment in its direct application to the federal government and in its bearing on the states by reason of the fourteenth amendment forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accuseds silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt holding fifth amendment prohibits comment on accuseds silence during police custodial interrogation holding that the fifth amendment  forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accuseds silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt