at 94) (explaining that he did not believe, prior to the July 1, 2008 meeting, that Plaintiff would be terminated but that, prior to the meeting, he “didn’t know about two others — about two major factors: the 2007 payments and the financial statement”). In light of the affidavits and the admitted actions taken by Plaintiff without approval of the TCPFA as a whole, the Court finds no genuine question of fact as to whether (1) Miller’s recusal, or (2) any further evidentiary hearings would have prevented Plaintiffs termination. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that he would been terminated anyway. See Cifarelli v. Village of Babylon, 894 F.Supp. 614, 622 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (finding as a matter of law that “a pre-termination hearing would not have staved off’ the plaintiffs termination) (<HOLDING>).” V. § 1983 Liberty Interest Claim In his
holding therefore that although defendants failure to provide plaintiff with sufficient notice of termination and a pretermination hearing violated his right to procedural due process defendants motion for summary judgment should be granted insofar as it seeks to bar plaintiff from recovering more than a nominal amount holding that plaintiff who provides evidence of acts more severe than a lack of due care may withstand summary judgment motion on a failure to protect claim holding that plaintiffs due process rights were violated when the trial court granted a summary judgment motion eight days after it was filed without providing the plaintiff with a sufficient opportunity to be heard holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that motion for summary judgment was not opposed holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that a motion for summary judgment was not opposed