(-TWC) within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act. Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §§ 21.201-21.202 (West 2015); Specialty Retailers, 933 S.W.2d at 492-93 (explaining 180-day period commences on date alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, not when plaintiff feels effect of decision). , We frame the issue regarding a failure to comply with Chapter 21’s administrative exhaustion requirement as a defense to liability, rather than ajurisdictional bar, mindful that the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Prairie View A & M University v. Chatha raises questions about whether the failure to satisfy Chapter 21⅛ administrative exhaustion requirement implicates trial court jurisdiction in a suit between private parties. See 381 S.W.3d 500, 510-11 (Tex.2012); compare Schroeder, 813 S.W.2d at 488 (<HOLDING>) with Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428,
recognizing private right of action holding that the 180day filing deadline applicable to motions to reopen from removal orders filed in absentia is not jurisdictional holding that failure to comply with the 180day deadline for filing a charge is a jurisdictional bar even in suits between privateparties because texas commission on human rights act does not provide an unconditional private right of action holding the failure to comply with the act does not bar defendant from raising a constitutional challenge to jury selection procedures holding that the 180day filing deadline is jurisdictional and mandatory