(citing Ass’n. of Wash. Pub. Hosp. Dists. v. Philip Morris Inc., 241 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir.2001)). See also Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro v. Lerner, 31 F.3d 924, 928 (9th Cir.1994) ("These three policy concerns guide a court’s evaluation of the directness of the injury" (citation omitted)). Analyzing these factors, the Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff cannot recover under RICO for injuries caused to a third party. See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268-69, 112 S.Ct. 1311 ("[A] plaintiff who complained of harm flowing merely from the misfortunes visited upon a third person by the defendant’s acts was generally said to stand at too remote a distance to recover" (citations omitted)). The Ninth Circuit has applied this principle in several cases. See, e.g., Oki Semiconductor, 298 F.3d at 774 (<HOLDING>); Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
holding defendants plea to indictment alleging 8000 theft was not an admission to the theft amount holding that treble damages awarded under the civil theft statute are remedial not punitive holding that theft victims were not directly injured by a money launderers subsequent activities because only after the theft occurred and the semiconductors were sold could tran launder the proceeds holding that defendants auto theft conviction could serve to support his conviction for auto theft as a class c felony and as a prior unrelated felony conviction under the habitual offender statute holding treble damages under the civil theft statute are punitive