she endured when faced with the prospect of losing her position. (Id. at 68.) But such harm is not the kind of material harm that the DCHRA demands, but rather the sort of vague, subjective harm that this Circuit has repeatedly rejected as insufficient. See Stewart v. Evans, 275 F.3d 1126, 1135 (D.C.Cir.2002) (no adverse employment action where no change in position, grade, pay, or benefits); Forkkio, 306 F.3d at 1130-31 (“Purely subjective injuries ... are not adverse employment actions.”). In sum, then, the effect of Reed’s demotion (if it can be called that) was simply never felt. It was an hypothetical employment action, not an actual one, and thus does not satisfy the requirements of the prima facie case. See Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1267 (11th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Reed’s allegations about the ERT fail for a
holding that mere reprimand even if it does not result in actual dismissal can constitute adverse employment action holding that when an employee suffers an injury from an unexplained fall while the employee is on the job and performing the duties of his employment that injury is eligible for compensation under the workers compensation act holding that where an employee was transferred to a new job site over 120 miles away that transfer while not per se an adverse employment action was an appropriate factor for the jury to consider in determining whether an adverse employment action occurred holding that the decision to reprimand or transfer an employee if rescinded before the employee suffers a tangible harm is not an adverse employment action holding that termination is an adverse employment action