(Colo.1996), held: Knowing misappropriation [for which the lawyer is almost invariably disbarred] "consists simply of a lawyer taking a client' conversion, barring significant factors in mitigation. See People v. Coyne, 913 P.2d 12, 14 (Colo.1996), citing People v. Young, 864 P.2d 563, 564 (Colo.1993). Jar-amillo's knowing conversion, standing alone, would warrant disbarment. See ABA Ston dards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991 & Supp.1992) ("ABA Standards") § 4.11 (stating that disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly converts client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client); In re Cleland, 2 P.8d 700 (Colo.2000)(attorney disbarred for, among other rule violations, knowingly misappropriating client funds); In re Thompson, 991 P.2d 820 (Colo.1999)(<HOLDING>); People v. Townshend, 933 P.2d 1327
holding that disbarment was the appropriate sanction for an attorneys repeated material misrepresentations holding that disbarment was the appropriate sanction where an attorney misappropriated funds from his real estate partners holding that a law firm receiving funds for a client was not an initial transferee because the firms role with respect to the received money was to accept the funds in settlement of its clients case deposit the money in trust keep as fees only what the the clients agreed to and pay the rest to the bank on behalf of the clients in satisfaction of their loan holding that disbarment is the presumptively appropriate sanction under both the florida standards for imposing lawyer sanctions and case law when a lawyer misappropriates trust funds holding that disbarment is the presumptive sanction for misappropriating approximately 15000 in funds he had received from clients