the defendants’ alternate ground for affirmance, that § 31-48d does not create a private right of action for a violation of that statute, implicates the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, and therefore may be raised at any time during the proceedings. See, e.g., Coldwell Banker Manning Realty, Inc. v. Cush-man & Wakefield of Connecticut, Inc., 293 Conn. 582, 610, 980 A.2d 819 (2009) (addressing alternate ground to affirm even though not raised at trial because it implicated court’s subject matter jurisdiction); see also MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. Boata, 283 Conn. 381, 390, 926 A.2d 1035 (2007) (“a claim that a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear a case . . . may be raised at any time”); cf. Neiman v. Yale University, 270 Conn. 244, 253, 851 A.2d 1165 (2004) (<HOLDING>). We agree with the defendants on the merits of
holding that trial court properly granted motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff had failed to exhaust remedies available through exclusive grievance procedure holding that plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies by failing to include issue in case brief holding a decision denying a motion to dismiss an action for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction is not appealable holding that a retired teacher did not fail to exhaust administrative remedies because he was not subject to the grievance procedure in the collectivebargaining agreement holding that the remedies are exclusive