authorizes the court to remand the case to the Superior Court. See Lapoint v. Mid-Atl. Settlement Servs., Inc., 256 F.Supp.2d 1, 3 (D.D.C.2003) (remanding the case based on the absence of unanimous consent); accord Williams, 984 F.Supp. at 29. It is, however, equally clear that “[a] procedural defect in removal ... does not affect the federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction and therefore may be waived.” Koehnen v. Herald Fire Ins. Co., 89 F.3d 525, 528 (8th Cir.1996); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (requiring remand in the absence of subject matter jurisdiction). Indeed, “[a] party that engages in affirmative activity in federal court typically waives the right to seek a remand.” Koehnen, 89 F.3d at 528; see also Lanier v. Am. Bd. of Endodontics, 843 F.2d 901, 905 (6th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Riggs v. Plaid Pantries, Inc., 233 F.Supp.2d
holding that denial of leave to amend was appropriate because the plaintiff sought to amend his complaint two years after filing his complaint  on the eve of trial when discovery was complete holding that the plaintiffs second complaint did not relate back to her first complaint because her second complaint was not an amendment to her first complaint but rather a separate filing holding that the plaintiff waived her right to object to procedural defects in the removal proceedings by filing requests for discovery entering into stipulations and seeking to amend her complaint holding that a plaintiff elected to stand on her complaint by repeatedly asserting the validity of her averments and by failing to seek leave to amend following dismissal holding that a plaintiff who pled in her complaint that her law firm actively misled her in support of her request for application of the discovery rule had sufficiently pled the application of the doctrine