that he recalled translating between Peters and appellant, he did not specifically remember translating that appellant stated that he had been driving the car. However, viewing Andrade as an agent or mere language conduit of appellant, and attributing the translated statement directly to appellant, whether Andrade remembers the specific substance of the translation at trial is not determinative of the statement’s admissibility. See Tex.R. Evid. 801(e)(2)(C),(D). Moreover, such discrepancy goes to the weight, not the admissibility of the translated statement. See Stoker v. State, 788 S.W.2d 1, 10 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (stating any discrepancy in testimony goes only to weight of evidence and not its admissibility); see also State v. Patino, 177 Wis.2d 348, 502 N.W.2d 601, 610 (1993) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that the trial court did not
holding that in employees age discrimination suit against former employer supervisors statement to employee was not hearsay even though the statement was offered for its truth because the statement was an admission by a party opponent holding appellate argument that statement violated rule 404b was improper because it was the defendant who elicited the statement at trial holding that discrepancy between declarants testimony at preliminary hearing compared to his translated statement offered at trial went to weight not admissibility of statement holding that the victims prior videotaped testimony from a preliminary hearing was admissible as testimony at trial where the victim was unavailable to testify holding no injury to ashley shown by statement to widow of murder victim that was not in evidence because trial court gave sua sponte instruction to jury to disregard statement and statement did not contradict ashleys testimony