is akin to the private interests in Mitchell and Fuentes. In those cases, a creditor alleged an interest in the delinquent debtor’s property and wished to freeze that property before the parties’ rights could be adjudicated. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 601-02, 94 S.Ct. 1895, 1897, 40 L.Ed.2d 406 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 69-70, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 1988-89, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972). The only difference here is that the Government, rather than a private creditor, asserts the interest. In both Mitchell and Fuentes, the Court noted that, even though the status of the property was contested, the defendant retained an interest, and due process therefore required a prompt hearing on the propriety of the deprivation. Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 606-07, 94 S.Ct. at 1899-1900 (<HOLDING>); Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 81-82, 92 S.Ct. at
holding that to grant a writ of mandamus a court in the exercise of its discretion must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances recognizing that the issuance of a writ of mandamus is itself generally a matter of discretion holding that a statute entitling the defendant to an immediate hearing following issuance of a writ of sequestration effected a constitutional accommodation of the conflicting interests of the parties holding review of district court order imposing sanctions is by application for issuance of a writ of certiorari holding that an execution may not run against the property of a political subdivision of the state and thus the only procedure available to a judgment creditor is the issuance of a writ of mandamus