a person from using a corporation for criminal purposes, the person and the victim, or the person and the tool, are different entities, not the same. Id. at 2090 (citations omitted). See also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 185, 113 S.Ct. 1163, 122 L.Ed.2d 525 (1993) (stating that liability “depends on showing that the defendants conducted or participated in the conduct of the ‘enterprise’s affairs,’ not just their own affairs.”) (emphasis in original). A plaintiff may not circumvent this “distinctness” requirement “by alleging a RICO enterprise that consists merely of a corporate defendant associated with its own employees or agents carrying on the regular affairs of the defendant .... ” Riverwoods Chappaqua Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 30 F.3d 339, 344 (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). However, a corporate entity may be held
holding that the activities of two loan officers acting within the scope of their authority could not subject them to rico liability for conducting the affairs of the alleged enterprisebank holding that for immunity an official must first prove that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred  holding that police officers were not entitled to immunity under the itca law enforcement immunity provision where the officers violated their statutory duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all individuals while acting within the scope of their employment holding that under section 1962c distinctiveness is satisfied and rico applies when a corporate employee unlawfully conducts the affairs of the corporation of which he is the sole owner  whether he conducts those affairs within the scope or beyond the scope of corporate authority holding that the court has an affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting within the scope of its jurisdictional authority