make the actual promotion decision. The trial court specifically found that “plaintiff has failed to allege direct personal involvement—or establish direct personal involvement on the part of Mr. Lysinger.” IX R. at 2043. Based on this finding, the court granted judgment as a matter of law to Mr. Lysinger on plaintiffs § 1981 failure to promote claim. The issue of Sprint’s liability under Title VII is coextensive with Mr. Crowder’s liability under § 1981. First, there is nothing to distinguish the Title VII and the § 1981 claims; they are based on the same facts. “‘The elements of each cause of action have been construed as identical, and a jury verdict on the issue of liability ... under § 1981 is normally conclusive on the issue of liability in a parallel action under Ti t Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Ms. Heno argues that there are several ways
holding that there was no basis for liability of government agency once individual decision maker was released by jury verdict holding no individual liability under the adea holding that there is no individual liability under title vii holding that note marked in rem gave maker no liability at all beyond property itself and that creditor was unable to maintain any action against maker to reach any of makers other assets holding that there is no individual liability under law 44