10 . Defenders accorded the Secretary's interpretation of the statutory phrase "in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range” no deference. 258 F.3d at 1145 n. 11. The court explained that the Secretary had entirely ignored an aspect of the phrase (the use of the disjunctive "or”), and thus there was no interpretation to defer to. See id. Here, we owe the Secretary’s interpretation of the statute deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), because he offers an interpretation of an ambiguous statutory phrase, and offers that interpretation via formal notice and comment rulemaking. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230-31, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001) (<HOLDING>). 11 . Plaintiffs also argue that the Secretary
holding that the postal service was not required to follow notice and comment rulemaking procedures holding that removal proceedings are in the nature of process and defects in the removal procedures are waivable holding that the extradition procedures are a matter of state law holding california postdeprivation recovery procedures satisfy due process despite lack of notice to claimant of recovery procedures holding that although notice and comment procedures are not required to trigger chevron deference such procedures are significant  in pointing to chevron authority