IFP status was denied. The policy of leniency afforded pro se prisoner litigants because of their lack of ability to control the processing of their petitions supports this conclusion. Therefore, we hold that a pro se prisoner’s habeas petition is filed, for purposes of determining the applicability of the AEDPA, when he delivers the papers to prison authorities for mailing. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s dismissal of the habeas corpus petition and REMAND for further proceedings. 1 . Spotville dated his petition as June 30, 1995, and it was stamped as received by the Clerk of Court on July 25, 1995. 2 . This court’s disposition of leniency toward pro se litigants has been tempered in certain circumstances, however. See Saahir v. Collins, 956 F.2d 115, 119 (5th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); but see May v. Collins, 948 F.2d 162, 166 n.
holding that pro se pleadings from defendants who are represented by counsel in the pending criminal proceedings are unauthorized holding that trial court erred in considering pro se motion for new trial filed when defendant was represented by counsel holding there should be no distinction between pro se petitioners and those represented by counsel for abuse of writ purposes holding that a defendant proceeding pro se is bound by same rules as party represented by counsel and a court cannot allow pro se litigant lower standard of performance holding defendants pro se motion to reduce sentence was not properly before the trial court when defendant was represented by counsel since defendant may not proceed both by counsel and pro se