issued a published decision construing any of the provisions of subdivision (d). The board has been called upon to apply that subdivision in a number of differing fact situations, none involving the definition of “predecessor in interest.” (See Van Asselt v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 41 Cal. Comp. Cases 1.) In P. Lorillard Co. v. Peper (E.D. Mo.) 65 F. 597, 598 (affd. 86 F. 956; cert, den., 171 U.S. 690 [43 L.Ed. 1179, 19 S.Ct. 886]), it was observed that, in common acceptation, “predecessor” means “ ‘one who goes before or precedes another in a given state, position, or office,’ and does not necessarily express any relation of legal privity” and that who is a “predecessor” is a question of law and fact. (See Balkins v. County of Los Angeles, 81 Cal.App.2d 42, 48 [183 P.2d 137] (<HOLDING>).) In Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951) a
holding that even if a particular privacy interest is minor nondisclosure remains justified where  the public interest in disclosure is virtually nonexistent holding that it is not holding that prejudgment interest may include compound interest holding that the owner of an equitable interest in property in the form of a land contract can grant a mortgage on that interest under ohio law holding that a predecessor in interest is not a privy