a compensation claim to a conclusion on the merits, may file an action against an employer for that workplace injury under these circumstances if the employer’s conduct is to the level of intentional conduct substantially certain to result in injury for which workers’ compensation immunity is not available. Jones, 932 So.2d at 1105 (emphasis added). Vallejos improperly relies on Jones because Jones dealt with waiving the right to pursue an action under an intentional tort theory. All Jones means for Vallejos is that he can still pursue a civil action based upon an exception to the exclusivity of the workers’ compensation statute because none of those claims were litigated in the workers’ compensation case. See Petro Stopping Ctrs., L.P. v. Gall, 23 So.3d 849, 852 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (<HOLDING>); Vasquez, 962 So.2d at 413-14 (emphasis added)
holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt holding that gall waived her right to sue for an intentional tort because her mediated settlement was a conclusion on the merits due to the fact that the settlement agreement provided that petro accepted gall as permanently and totally disabled holding that because the alleged settlement was never approved by the court under rule 9019 the settlement agreement was unenforceable holding that trial court did not err by refusing to enforce mediated settlement agreement that contained an illegal provision