that he was under criminal information for a felony. His only possible defense to this charge was that some intervening event — in this case, a plea offer — caused Bowling to believe that he was no longer under a felony information, and that this mistaken belief was reasonable under the circumstances. The government contends that the testimony from the prosecutor about whether he made a plea offer was irrelevant, or, if relevant, it was not necessary to obtain this testimony from him as only Bowling could testify about what he knew when filled out the form. We disagree. The county prosecutor’s testimony presents a possible defense and thus is clearly relevant. See Fed.R.Evid. 401; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Bowling does not have to testify and should
holding that the standard of proof for dischargeability actions is the preponderance of the evidence standard holding that the standard of review under rule 60 is abuse of discretion holding that if a state case explicitly states that the state standard is more favorable to the defendant than the federal standard the federal claim is considered adjudicated below when the state standard is applied holding that even if the standard for waiver is clear the standard was not met holding that the basic standard of relevance under rule 401 is a liberal one