to state law does not violate the Bankruptcy Clause); e law. “In the absence of a controlling federal rule, we generally assume that Congress has ‘left the determination of property rights in assets of a bankrupt’s estate to state law,’ since such ‘property interests are created and defined by state law.’ ” Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 329, 113 S.Ct. 2106, 2110, 124 L.Ed.2d 228 (1993) (quoting Butner v. U.S., 440 U.S. 48, 54-55, 99 S.Ct. 914, 918, 59 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979)). The definition of “debtor’s principal residence” in 11 U.S.C. § 101(13A)(B) includes manufactured and mobile homes, but is silent as to whether manufactured and mobile homes are real or personal property. Therefore, we look to the applicable state law to determine whether the debtors’ propert 2008)
holding that the definition of debtors principal residence in 11 usc  10113aa protects holder of secured claim in a mobile home that is debtors principal residence from modification under 11 usc  1322b holding that the antimodification provision of 11 usc  1322b is applicable to a mobile home irrespective of whether the home is attached to the real property on which it sits holding that because the definition of debtors principal residence in 11 usc  10113a includes incidental property a secured interest in incidental property cannot be modified under 11 usc  1322b holding that a lien on the debtors mobile home which was the debt ors principal residence as defined by 11 usc  10113aa was not subject to modi fication under 11 usc  1322b holding that the addition of a definition of debtors principal residence in 11 usc  10113aa did not change the scope of the 11 usc  1322b antimodification provision and  1322b remains applicable only to real property