violations can provide a basis for establishing negligence per se. Second, even when a statutory provision does specify a standard of care, a plaintiff must still prove the additional elements of duty, proximate causation, and injury to establish liability. Where a statutory provision does not define a standard of care but merely imposes an administrative requirement, such as the requirement to obtain a license or to file a report to support a regulatory scheme, violation of such requirement will not support a negligence per se claim. Even if the regulatory scheme as a whole is designed to protect the public or to promote safety, the licensing duty itself is not a standard of care, but an administrative requirement. See Ridge v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 117 F.3d 126, 131 (4th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); see also Duncan v. Hixon, 223 Va. 373, 288
holding that violation of city ordinance does not constitute negligence per se holding that although violation of rules of professional conduct does not constitute negligence per se such violations may be relevant and admissible in assessing the legal duty of an attorney in a malpractice action and whether that duty was breached holding that federal regulations making a pilot responsible for operation of his aircraft and requiring him upon request to submit a written report to the government whenever he deviates from an aviation rule in an emergency provide for general standards of conduct but do not impose a particular duty and thus their violation was not negligence per se in virginia holding that violation of state law was not a per se constitutional violation holding violation of the rules of professional conduct does not create a legal duty on the part of the lawyer nor constitute negligence per se although it may be used as some evidence of negligence