the Wulf court’s reasoning. We similarly reject the other cases cited by the IRS which find section 109(e) to be jurisdictional. Most of these cases provide a very cursory analysis of the section 109(e) issue. Moreover, those that more substantively address the issue are unpersuasive. Two such opinions, for example, contain internal inconsistencies. See In re Glazier, 69 B.R. 666 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Okla.1987); In re Kelsey, 6 B.R. 114 (Bkrtcy. S.D.Tex.1980). These courts concluded that they lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the debtor, yet indicated they would entertain a motion to convert the case to another chapter. Such a proposition violates well established notions of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Republic Trust & Sav., 59 B.R. 606, 610 n. 1 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Okl.1986) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, because of the unpersuasiveness of
recognizing that if a debtor did not satisfy section 109e and if it was jurisdictional the court could not convert debtors case because it would have no authority whatever over debtor holding creditor does not have to prove it investigated debtors creditworthiness if debtor does not claim the card was preapproved and debtor was insolvent at the time holding debtor could cure after the debtor had previously made payments to the bank holding that bankruptcy court was not required to provide debtor with a hearing before dismissing debtors chapter 13 case where debtor received notice that his case was going to be dismissed if he missed another payment holding debtor could include property because the bank accepted payments directly from the debtor and had previously allowed the debtor to cure default