the generic, contemporary meaning of “aggravated assault.” Ultimately, we need not decide which party’s interpretation is correct. C. The District Court Did Not Plainly Err Even assuming the court erred in treating Kentucky’s second-degree assault offense as matching the generic “aggravated assault” offense, the error was not plain. Satisfying the second prong of plain error review requires showing that the district court’s error was “clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute.” Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135, 129 S.Ct. 1423. We are reluctant to find plain error when no binding precedent contradicts the district court’s holding. See United States v. Garcia-Gonzalez, 714 F.3d 306, 318 (5th Cir. 2013); see also United States v. Gonzalez, 792 F.3d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 2015) (<HOLDING>). If a party’s theory of the case requires
holding that arbitration award is binding on the parties recognizing that issues are functionally the same if one action is dispositive of the other recognizing that although federal precedent was not binding it was persuasive authority recognizing that lack of binding authority is often dispositive in the plainerror context holding that a motion for rule 11 sanctions is dispositive