too, sir. Court: Well, you don’t want him to represent you? I’m going to order that he represent you anyway. 3 Contrary to appellant’s argument, Johnson, in our view, provides a more useful analogy to the case at bar than Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). In Johnson, the Supreme Court referred to the applicable positive law that established a right to counsel — the Sixth Amendment — and acknowledged that there was a corresponding right to waive the assistance of counsel in federal court. Similarly, in the case at bar we are called upon to determine whether under the applicable positive law that establishes a right to counsel — Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-316 — a party has a corresponding right to waive that right in an Arkansas court. Th County, North Carolina, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (<HOLDING>), which are relied upon by appellant, offers
holding that when counsel is constitutionally mandated under weeks and graham section 9240519 does not prohibit or preclude appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in seeking collateral review holding on equal protection grounds that meaningful first appeal requires appointment of counsel for indigent defendants holding that an indigent party has the right to courtappointed counsel in a private child custody proceeding in which the other parent is represented by counsel provided by a public agency holding that the constitution does not require the appointment of two attorneys for indigent capital defendants holding that an indigent litigants right to appointed counsel has been recognized to exist only where she may be deprived of her physical liberty that the constitution does not require the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in every parentalstatus termination proceeding and that the decision whether due process calls for the appointment of counsel is to be answered in the first instance by the trial court subject to appellate review