under Rule 56(c), without analyzing or discussing the issue in depth. 3 . Even in cases in which the nonmoving party properly objects before the lower court, some federal courts have refused to find reversible error in a court’s consideration of a motion for summary judgment within the ten-day notice period if the nonmoving party is unable to show that he or she was prejudiced by the court’s action. 10A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2719 (3d ed. 1998) ("if the motion is served less than ten days before the hearing but no prejudice appears to have occurred, proceeding with the summary judgment motion still may be proper"). See Oberg v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 11 F.3d 679, 684 (7th Cir.1993); Dillard v. Blackburn, 780 F.2d 509, 515-16 (5th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); Hoopes v. Equifax, Inc., 611 F.2d 134, 135-36
holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner holding that the ten day notice provided for in rule 56c is not required in habeas cases where the petitioner never claims the benefit of notice never claims to have been disadvantaged by the lack of notice and where the court is satisfied that he has not been so disadvantaged holding that the fraud claims against the defendant should not have been dismissed as the complaint provided him with fair notice of the claims made against her holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city holding that the defendant did not require advance notice where he could not show how he was prejudiced by late notice or how he could have been helped by additional notice