court’s prison sentence.” Crace, 207 F.3d at 836. The facts of the present case support the conclusion that the district court considered and rejected the § 3583(d) option. Johnson’s counsel made the § 3583(d) argument at the hearing shortly before the district court revoked Johnson’s supervised release. Thus, it would be difficult to conclude that the district court was not aware of the option. The district court’s conclusion that an intensive drug-treatment program in prison was “[t]he only solution ... to help” Johnson with his crack addiction, Hr’g Tr. at 15, suggests that the district court concluded that the in-patient program urged by defense counsel would not address Johnson’s addiction problem adequately. See also United States v. McClellan, 164 F.3d 308, 310 (6th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Washington, 147 F.3d 490,
holding that appellate court may infer that district court considered sentencing guidelines policy statements despite district courts failure to make explicit reference to them holding that the district court should not have considered a  2255 petition based on an alleged misapplication of the sentencing guidelines holding that failure to permit intervention was harmless where the appellate court considered the defendants claim  as if the district court had al lowed them to intervene holding that a court of appeals may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a district court sentence that reflects a proper application of the sentencing guidelines holding that a court of appeals may presume reasonable a district courts proper application of the sentencing guidelines