serve to further delay [the Bankj’s right to possession” because the Bank would have to request a continuance to perform “the extensive discovery necessary for defending against the ... counterclaims.” Therefore, in contradiction to the Walkers’ argument on appeal — that the Bank failed to allege or demonstrate that it would have been prejudiced by allowing the counterclaims — the record indicates that the Bank asserted several reasons explaining how it would have been prejudiced by allowing the Walkers to assert and proceed on their counterclaims at such a late stage in the litigation process. In Blackmon, our supreme court noted that under Rule 15, Ala. R. Civ. P., a “trial court can refuse to allow an amendment if allowing it would result in actual preju d [138,] 141 [ (Ala.1992) ] (<HOLDING>).” Id. Although Blackmon involved an amend ed
holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a complaint with prejudice based on the plaintiffs failure to amend the complaint by the deadline imposed by the court holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint holding that the trial court did not exceed its discretion in striking the amended complaint where the plaintiffs had learned of the facts underlying the new allegations six months before they attempted to amend holding that the trial court properly struck the amended complaint when the plaintiff offered no reason to refute the trial courts finding that the new allegations in the amended complaint were based on facts the plaintiff had known since the beginning of the action holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to file a third amended complaint where the plaintiff had already been given opportunities to amend and did not indicate what additional facts he could plead to correct the deficiencies in his complaint