courts that have considered these issues. The BOP does not exceed its authority by setting a payment schedule for inmates such as Durham. As noted by the Second Circuit, the IFRP “serves a valid penological objective of rehabilitation by facilitating repayment of debts,” and “is fully consistent with the Bureau of Prisons’ authorization, under the direction of the Attorney General, to provide for rehabilitation and reformation.” Johnpoll, 898 F.2d at 851. Nor do we believe, on this record, that the district court violated separation of powers principles by improperly delegating Article III functions to the BOP. Durham has simply not shown any indication that the district court delegated any core judicial functions. Accord Montano-Figueroa v. Crabtree, 162 F.3d 548, 550 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Mujahid v. Crabtree, 999 F.Supp. 1398,
recognizing that the judicial rewriting of a statute would violate the separation of powers doctrine holding ifrp is neither a usurpation of sentencing courts article iii power nor violation of separation of powers doctrine holding rfra is inconsistent with smith and violates the separation of powers doctrine recognizing separation of powers doctrine holding a congressional act which required courts to reopen certain final judgments as an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers doctrine