is terminated due to her fault, at least until the employee regains employment. Subsection (E) applies in this case, Tyson’s argues, because when she was fired Williams had been employed for less than 100 weeks following the work injury. [¶ 7] In construing section 214(1)(E), “we first examine the plain meaning of the statutory language, ‘and we construe that language to avoid absurd, illogical or inconsistent results.’ ” Temm v. S.D. Warren Co., 2005 ME 118, ¶ 8, 887 A.2d 39, 41 (quoting Jordan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 651 A.2d 358, 360 (Me.1994)). “If the statutory language is ambiguous, we then look beyond the plain meaning and examine other indicia of legislative intent, including legislative history.” Temm, 2005 ME 118, ¶8, 887 A.2d at 41. [¶ 8] The statute does not ex .1992) (<HOLDING>); Cousins v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 599 A.2d
holding that the injunction did not constitute a claim recognizing general enforceability of plan provisions reducing benefits by amount of any social security benefits holding failure of reemployment drug test did not constitute grounds for reducing employees benefits holding 18 pacsa  7508 effectuates the legislative purpose of reducing drug crimes holding pursuant to former title 39 that termination for fault did not constitute grounds for discontinuing benefits