that the phrase “at the will of’ is a “modern” construct that had an entirely different meaning in 1917 does not withstand historical scrutiny. As explained below, the “at will” language had precisely the same legal éffect then as it does now — across the nation and in Vermont in particular. Thus, its accepted and conventional meaning must be harmonized with the rest of the statute — not read out of it — to serve a more plausible legislative purpose, one in which the “for cause” ick, 1 A. 496, 501 (N.J. 1885) (noting that the “power of removal” of police officers “may exist in some cities at the will of some municipal officer or body of officers” while in others the removal is only “for cause” (emphasis added)); People ex rel. Wheeler v. Cooper, 57 How. Pr. 416,_(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1879) (<HOLDING>); Smith v. Bryan, 40 S.E. 652, 653-54 (Va.
holding that mayors power  to remove is for cause after an opportunity to be heard and observing that not allowing a hearing would render the safeguard  a hollow device and a sham because a removal could actually be made at the will of the removing power emphasis added holding that an essential component of procedural fairness is an opportunity to be heard holding that the  district court did not give the plaintiffs an adequate opportunity to be heard where it failed to conduct an in limine hearing and denied oral argument on the evidentiary issues holding that under state law the police commissioners are not authorized to remove police officers at will but for good and sufficient cause and after due hearing emphasis added holding that the judge must allow the attorneys the opportunity to be heard on an initial 3850 motion in a capital case for the purpose of determining whether an evidentiary hearing is required and to hear legal argument relating to the motion