run afoul of the purposes of statutes of limitations, it does not necessarily follow that equitable estoppel bars Dammann’s defense that the claims are time barred. Application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel relates to Dammann’s actions rather than IFF’s; in order for the doctrine to apply, Dammann must have tricked IFF into forgoing a timely filing of the claims or have led IFF to believe that its claims were properly and timely filed. As the Supreme Court of New Jersey recently explained, With regard to procedural and substantive statutes of limitations, our case law reveals that the doctrine of equitable tolling of limitations periods has been applied only in narrowly-defined circumstances. See, e.g., Price v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 182 N.J. 519, 525-27, 867 A.2d 1181 (2005) (<HOLDING>); Freeman v. State, 347 N.J.Super. 11, 31, 788
holding that the 120day filing period is subject to equitable tolling and addressing circumstances warranting equitable tolling holding that the petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling where he filed his habeas petition more than two months late holding that equitable tolling applied where insurance company statements and conduct lulled plaintiff and his attorney into believing that plaintiffs uninsured motorist claim was properly filed holding that petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling where former counsel actively deceived petitioner over several months into believing he was diligently pursuing petitioners legal remedies when in fact he was not recognizing equitable tolling in the title vii context where the plaintiff has been deceived lulled into inaction actively misled or has in some extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his or her rights quotations and citations omitted