(“It is possible to object to the presence of the Prayer Mural without having to find its goals of academic achievement and good sportsmanship offensive.”). Nor is the Court persuaded that Doe 5 gave up her right to file suit because she waited until 2012 to raise an objection about the monument, even though she was aware of its presence for some time before that. See Freethought Soc. of Greater Philadelphia v. Chester Cnty., 334 F.3d 247, 255 n. 3 (3d Cir.2003) (“[W]e do not believe that the defendants have demonstrated that Flynn waived her right to bring this action (or that the statute of limitations has expired) because she noticed the plaque in the 1960s but did not bring an action until 2001.”); Tearpock-Martini v. Borough of Shickshinny, 756 F.3d 232, 238 (3d Cir.2014) (<HOLDING>). Finally, inasmuch as Doe 5 is a member of the
recognizing that the court had to first consider whether the object in question can be defined as religious for establishment clause purposes holding that establishment of christmas day as legal public holiday did not violate establishment clause holding that there is no statute of limitations for establishment clause challenges to stillexisting religious displays holding that rluipa violates establishment clause holding no violation of federal establishment clause