(“The Supreme Court [in Taylor ] rejected the trustee’s argument that § 522(Z) requires debtors to file claims for exemptions in good faith.”). A trustee must therefore object timely to a facially invalid exemption claim — one that is objectionable based on “(1) the description of the exempted, property; (2) the Code provisions governing the claimed exemptions; [or] (3) the amount listed in the column titled value of claimed exemption.” In re Messina, 687 F.3d 74, 80 (3d Cir.2012) (internal citations omitted); see Schwab, 560 U.S. at 785, 130 S.Ct. 2652; Massey v. Pappalardo (In re Massey), 465 B.R. 720, 726 (1st Cir. BAP 2012). If the trustee does not object in time, an invalid exemption claim will stand. See Bone v. Taco Bell of Am., LLC, 956 F.Supp.2d 872, 878 (W.D.Tenn.2013) (<HOLDING>); Trumble v. Burke (In re Miller), 04-3365,
holding despite contrary authority that husband debtor with a mere possessoiy interest was not entitled to claim a homestead exemption and stating it is a fundamental tenet of the law of exemptions that the debtor must have an ownership interest in the property before an exemption may be claimed a long line of illinois cases has required that a debtor have title or some ownership interest in property in order to claim a homestead exemption other courts deciding the issue under the federal exemption scheme have held that the key word is interest and that an interest in real property up to a specified amount implies a monetary interest more than just one spouses right to reside with the other recognizing cause of action holding a debtors claim for loss of consortium to be entitled to an exemption under the oklahoma exemption statute and collecting other bankruptcy decisions recognizing a debtor spouses loss of consortium as the basis for allowing an exemption under federal and various state exemption statutes recognizing the cause of action holding that a chapter 7 debtor who claimed an invalid exemption in a cause of action had standing to pursue that litigation because the cause of action was excluded from the bankruptcy estate after no party in interest objected timely to the exemption