judgment are to be terminated.”). 6 . Synopsis, H.B. 277, 139th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 1998). 7 . 1A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 23:38 (7th ed.). 8 . Our interpretation of the saving statute does not open the door to limitless prosecutions for repealed crimes. For! most crimes the statute of limitations will close the door on future prosecutions. See 11 Del. C. § 205. 9 . Synopsis, H.B. 277, 139th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 1998). 10 .See Dorsey v. United States, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2321, 2331, 183 L.Ed.2d 250 (2012) ("Case law ... makes clear that penalties are 'incurred' under the older statute when an offender becomes subject to them, i.e., commits the underlying conduct that makes the offender liable.”); United States v. Reisinger, 128 U.S. 398, 402, 9 S.Ct. 99, 32 L.Ed. 480 (1888) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Jackson, 468 F.2d 1388, 1389
recognizing that the burden to establish a valid waiver of a constitutional right is upon the prosecution holding based upon language in related statutes now repealed that actual knowledge of declaration of habitual offender status and direction not to drive was required for conviction for driving after having been so declared holding statute that extended statute of limitations for certain criminal sexual conduct could not be applied retroactively to a prosecution commenced after the limitations statute in effect at the time of the alleged offense had expired holding that because petitioners proceedings commenced after the enactment of iirira petitioner was statutorily ineligible for suspension of deportation holding that prosecution for repealed statute that commenced after statutes repeal was valid by operation of  109