that there are "four categories of cases that delineate when a new rule is established" could be read as enumerating an exhaustive list of categories, concurrence at 285, 361 P.3d at 1188, it is overly restrictive. The inquiry into whether a rule is new or preexisting is not accurately conducted by classifying a wide variety of cases in which this issue may arise under inflexibly delineated categories; oftentimes, a rule promulgated by a case is best characterized as existing on a spectrum, one end of which constitutes rules that are clearly preexisting and the other end composed of clearly new rules. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (“It is admittedly often difficult to determine when a case announces a new Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966) (<HOLDING>). In stark contrast, Ruggiero and Kekue-wa were
holding that a consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of miranda  holding that a failure to warn was not a policy judgment holding that even though the state trial court rendered its judgments in the defendants prior cases on the same day with their sentences to run concurrently the district court did not clearly err in finding that those prior cases were not consolidated for sentencing due to cases separate indictments and judgments and the absence of a consolidation order recognizing that the courts previous cases approved of incustody interrogation even though there was a failure to warn accused persons of their rights or the failure to grant them access to outside assistance cases that miranda later rendered nonbinding holding that although not essential to the outcomes of two previous cases the court of appeals should have followed the texas supreme courts statements in those cases