from acting on applications submitted by individuals pursuant to § 925(c). The parties have not suggested that the ATF has access to any funds other than those affected by the relevant spending limitation, nor are we aware of any such funds. Thus, while the annual appropriations statutes speak in terms of the ATF’s ability to spend appropriated funds, their effect on the agency is obvious: It may neither grant nor deny applications falling within the scope of the funding restriction. We therefore conclude that Congress’s intent to suspend the ATF’s ability to act on applications submitted by individuals pursuant to § 925(c) is “clear and manifest.” Tennessee Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 189, 98 S.Ct. 2279 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Dickerson, 310 U.S. at 561, 60 S.Ct. 1034 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Wiggins, 50 F.Supp.2d 512,
holding that the plaintiffs did not fall within the zone of interests protected by the tcpa because they attempted to use the statute in a way not intended or contemplated by congress and because their damages are not of the vexatious and intrusive nuisance nature sought to be redressed by congress in enacting the tcpa holding that money appropriated by congress for entitlements under other sections of the impact aid act were not available appropriations for a program that provided aid to school districts financially burdened by federal ownership of real property holding that title ii of the ada was a valid use of congress power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment holding that congress suspended operation of statute by restricting use of appropriated funds holding that where counterclaim arises out of same transaction alleged in plaintiffs complaint is not barred by a running of the statute of limitations thereafter rather statute of limitations is suspended until counterclaim is filed