public sale of assets pledged to secure the loan. No further judicial labor was required, so we conclude that the summary judgment was a final order disposing of the initial loan default action. Because an appeal of a nonfinal order was pending at the time, the trial court violated the express language of rule 9.130(f) by entering final judgment without having jurisdiction to do so. The summary judgment is thus null and void. See Bemben v. Chock, 938 So.2d 565, 566 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (“The final summary judgment is a nullity because the trial court entered it during the pendency of the Sell ers’ interlocutory appeal of an order denying their motion to dissolve the Buyers’ lis pendens. See Fla. R.P. 9.130(f)”); McKenna v. Camino Real Vill. Ass’n, 8 So.3d 1172, 1174 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (<HOLDING>). A void judgment is “[a] judgment that has no
recognizing that nonfinal orders may be revised at any time before a final judgment is entered holding that after final judgment was entered and defendant did not file a direct appeal the proceedings were no longer pending under rule 12b2 holding that the judgment was entered without jurisdiction and was therefore a nullity holding that there was appellate jurisdiction under principle that a premature notice of appeal from a nonfinal order may ripen into a valid notice of appeal if a final judgment has been entered by the time the appeal is heard and the appellee suffers no prejudice holding that the final judgment was entered without jurisdiction while a nonfinal appeal was still pending