alleges that she, Rutledge, and Knapp generally performed similar jobs, and that the fact that her supervisors provided various explanations to her of why she could not be promoted demonstrates that those explanations are pretext. See EEOC v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 243 F.3d 846, 852-53 (4th Cir.2001) (“Indeed, the fact that Sears has offered different justifications at different times for its failure to hire Santana is, in and of itself, probative of pretext.”). Neither of these allegations creates a genuine issue of material fact concerning pretext. It is undisputed that Rutledge and Knapp had different job titles than Baldwin, and Baldwin offers no evidence other than her unsupported allegation to permit a conclusion that their duties were nonetheless similar. See Evans, 80 F.3d at 960 (<HOLDING>). Absent proof that their duties were the same,
holding that temporal proximity is insufficient in and of itself to establish that the employers nondiscriminatory reason for discharging an employee was in fact pretextual holding that a plaintiffemployees unsubstantiated allegations and bald assertions are insufficient to rebut the employers nondiscriminatory justification for an employment decision recognizing that even a personal grudge can constitute a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse employment decision holding that unsubstantiated assertions are not competent summary judgment evidence recognizing that an employers decision to eliminate a position is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating a position or employee