in USSG § 1B1.3 to determine the applicable offense level. United States v. Smith, 232 F.3d 650, 651 (8th Cir.2000); USSG § 1B1.2, comment, (n.2). Medina-Castellanos’ relevant conduct included the February 15, 2004 and May 2, 2004 robberies during which victims were sexually assaulted. Thus, the district court’s determination that sexual assault is the underlying crime for purposes of USSG § 2E1.3 is well-supported. See United States v. Martinez, 136 F.3d 972, 979 (4th Cir.1998) (upholding the district court’s determination under USSG § 2E1.3(a)(2) that the defendant’s base offense level was 32 pursuant to USSG § 2A1.5 because the defendant conspired to commit murder even though the defendant was acquitted of murder); see also United States v. Carrozza, 4 F.3d 70, 74 (1st Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the district court did not err
holding that the district court could constitutionally consider the acquitted conduct in rico sentencing holdingthat in determining base offense level in a rico case district court should not limit its relevant conduct to predicate acts charged against the defendant but instead should consider all conduct reasonably foreseeable to the defendant in furtherance of the rico enterprise holding that judge erred in not explaining to jury that it could consider predicate acts listed in relation to substantive rico count when deciding whether defendants had also conspired to violate rico holding that the nlra preempts a rico claim when the underlying conduct of the plaintiffs rico claim is wrongful only by virtue of the labor laws  holding that predicate acts need not be in furtherance of the enterprise