not apply under either constitution. Id. at 166, 716 A.2d at 16. The defendant in LaCourse was tried for perjury. During the cou . Ct. App. 1998) (stating that policies underlying privilege against self-incrimination support conclusion that Virginia’s constitution prohibits the state from using a defendant’s pre-arrest silence as part of its case in chief); State v. Easter, 922 P.2d 1285, 1291-92, 1293 (Wash. 1996) (en banc) (reasoning that weight of authority and purpose of privilege support holding that Fifth Amendment bars the state from making substantive use of pre-arrest silence); State v. Fencl, 325 N.W.2d 703, 710 (Wis. 1982) (‘We hold that the protections of the Fifth Amendment do extend to pre-Miranda, prearrest silence.”); Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 390 (Wyo. 1995) (<HOLDING>). This view is not universal, however. See
holding that the government can use prearrest silence for impeachment purposes against a defendant because no government action induced the silence holding that federal constitution does not permit state to use prearrest silence to imply guilt and characterizing the states argument to the contrary as nothing short of incredible holding that substantive use of prearrest silence is contrary to fifth amendment holding that state constitution prohibits substantive use of prearrest silence holding that impeachment by use of prearrest silence does not violate fifth or fourteenth amendments