driving privileges for the fixed period of time specified under this section.” I.C. § 9-30-5-10(a). Thus, the trial court’s only duty is to review the evidence before recommending the suspension. See id. We find that the trial court had sufficient opportunity to weigh the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing before it made a recommendation. Just as the evidence of Dixon’s four previous substance related offenses supported the four year sentence enhancement, we find that the same evidence also supports the recommendation of the maximum five-year suspension. Furthermore, because a license to drive is a privilege and not a right, a subsequent hearing, in addition to a full sentencing hearing, is not required by due process. Mitchell v. State, 659 N.E.2d 112, 116 (Ind.1995) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we find that the trial court did
holding that driving privileges are not a fundamental right and a statute requiring a license suspension after a conviction for possession of cocaine did not violate substantive due process holding right to be fundamental holding that doctrine does not violate due process holding that a twoyear suspension of visitation privileges did not violate either the first amendments right to freedom of association holding that plaintiff state employees contractual right to promotion was not protected by constitutional guarantee of substantive due process because right was not fundamental