in any manner, in a complaint or investigation on behalf of a third person, he has standing to state a claim for retaliation. Id. at 1226-27. In the instant case, there is no question that Lowrey satisfies this standard. 18 . Indeed, we have acknowledged that the anti-retaliation provisions of title VII and the ADEA are nearly identical, and we therefore have construed the provisions consistently. See Holt, 89 F.3d at 1226 n. 1. Likewise, the anti-retaliation provision of title IX is similar to those of title VII and the ADEA and should be accorded a similar 'interpretation. Compare 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e) (title IX) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (title VII) and 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (ADEA). 19 . See Clemes v. Del Norte County Unified Sch. Dist., 843 F.Supp. 583, 587-90 (N.D.Cal.1994) (<HOLDING>); see also Clay v. Board of Trustees, 905
holding that third persons do not have standing to assert title ix claims on behalf of female athletes holding that title vii principles govern retaliation claims arising under title ix and assuming that teachers have standing to raise retaliation claims under title ix based upon complaints raised on behalf of their students holding that retaliation claim was reasonably related to prior sex discrimination claim holding that a claim for retaliation does not lie under title ix holding that a teacher who complained of sex discrimination on behalf of his students had standing to raise an individual retaliation claim under title ix