subsidies. But on the undisputed facts in the record before us, we are unable to conclude that OGS was 'aiding the transmission of a government message by denying WD’s Lunch Program applications. > For these reasons, we conclude that defendants’ actions were not OGS’s “government speech.” The government speech doctrine therefore offers defendants’ no refuge from the First Amendment’s prohibition of viewpoint discrimination. 2. Government contractor speech Defendants also argue that OGS’s actions should be seen as conditions placed on a prospective government contractor’s speech—that is, WD’s speech—and thus are subject to, and satisfy, the balancing of interests described by Board of County Commissioners, Wabaunsee County v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 116 S.Ct. 2342, 135 L.Ed.2d 843 (1996) (<HOLDING>); We reject this argument as well. Defendants
recognizing that the strong presumption against protective orders necessitates a balancing of interests recognizing the states interests in regulating the speech of its employees and stating that the problem is arriving at a balance between the interests of the employee as a citizen in commenting on matters of public concern and the interest of the state as an employer in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees  quoting pickering 391 us at 568 88 sct 1731 holding that financial disincentives on speech burden first amendment rights for purposes of the pickering balance holding that in performing the pickering balancing test the district court was proper in first assessing the value from the first amendment perspective of the employees speech holding that first amendment requires factintensive and deferential balancing of governments interests against government contractors speech interests in line with the standard applied to government employees under pickering v board of education 391 us 563 88 sct 1731 20 led2d 811 1968