possession of a firearm by a violent career criminal when it should have been reduced to felon in possession of a firearm. Third, Jones also correctly argues that the trial court erroneously imposed a three-year mandatory minimum sentence for the use of a firearm without a jury finding that he actually possessed the firearm. Section 775.087(2)(a)(1), Florida Statutes (2003), enhances the sentence of a defendant who “actually possessed” a firearm during the commission of the crime. We remand for the trial court to strike the mandatory minimum provision imposed on count five because the jury verdict form does not reflect that Jones was in actual, rather than constructive, possession of the firearm as required for the enhancement. See Bundrage v. State, 814 So.2d 1133 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (<HOLDING>). Finally, we agree that the trial court
holding that to enhance a sentence because of the defendants use of a firearm the jury must find the defendant guilty of a crime involving a firearm or otherwise specifically find that a firearm was used holding that defendant was not entitled to partially suspended sentence as a previously convicted felon holding that dual convictions of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of ammunition by a convicted felon violated double jeopardy holding the defendant was a convicted felon within the purview of the federal statute prohibiting the receiving and possession of firearms by a convicted felon where the defendants prior conviction was based on an idaho state probated sentence holding that the trial court was not entitled to impose a threeyear mandatory minimum sentence on a defendant convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon where the jury verdict did not specifically find actual possession