deportation. See Moniz, 933 A.2d at 697; Tavarez, 826 A.2d at 944; Figueroa, 639 A.2d at 499. “The possibility of deportation is only a collateral consequence [of a plea] because that sanction is controlled by an agency which operates beyond the direct authority of the trial [justice].” Ducally, 809 A.2d at 474 (quoting State v. Desir, 766 A.2d 374, 376 (R.I.2001)). Additionally, and conclusively, applicant should not be heard to contend that she did not receive notice of the immigration consequences. Before she pleaded, she admitted to the trial justice that she read and understood the Spanish language version of the plea form. The Spanish language plea form clearly warns the defendant about possible immigration consequences that can result from the plea. See Figueroa, 639 A.2d at 499 (<HOLDING>). Because neither counsel, nor for that matter
recognizing that the applicant received notice from the plea form even though such notice was not required holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city holding that when counsel was present when a trial date was announced and received written notice of the date even though the client did not receive notice the attorneys knowledge was imputed to the client holding that the juvenile received inadequate notice of a hearing modifying his probation because he received no notice of the hearing or the reasons for it holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner