may order that interest awarded by this section be fully or partially waived. 14 M.R.S. § 1602-B(5). [¶ 12] The prejudgment interest statute entitles the prevailing party “to interest as a matter of right,” Avery v. Kennebec Millwork, Inc., 2004 ME 147, ¶ 8, 861 A.2d 634, 636 (discussing 14 M.R.S. § 1602-B in light of its predecessor statute, section 1602) (quotation marks omitted), which right is “defeasible only when the prevailing party obtains a continuance of longer than thirty days or when the nonprevailing party petitions and shows good cause that it should be waived altogether,” Sawyer v. Walker, 572 A.2d 498, 499 (Me.1990) (discussing the predecessor statute to section 1602-B). [¶ 13] A divorce proceeding is a civil action. Raymond v. Raymond, 480 A.2d 718, 723-25 (Me.1984) (<HOLDING>). [¶ 14] Raymond explicitly addressed
holding that a debt for attorney fees incurred by an exspouse in a postjudgment divorce contempt proceeding was nondischargeable holding that wife was entitled to prejudgment interest on alimony and child support arrearages from the date those payments were due holding as a mutter of law that divorce actions are civil actions within the meaning of the postjudgment interest statute and that the wife was entitled to postjudgment interest under the statute with respect to unpaid spousal support payments ordered under a divorce judgment holding habeas proceedings are not civil actions for purposes of  1915 holding that because divorce proceedings are civil actions resulting in an order for judgment postjudgment interest was due under the statute on withheld alimony payments