in Overtown near her house where she would give small quantities of cocaine and heroin to small children, to sell on the street for her. Leonard and Lenard Brown, who at that time were still in their early teens, allegedly helped Gibson pack cocaine, cook it into crack, and sell cocaine and heroin on the street along with other children. The defense raised a 404(b) objection at trial. This evidence of Gibson’s drug sales before any of the charged conduct in the indictment is “extrinsic” evidence whose admission is regulated by Rule 404(b). Under that Rule, this evidence was probative of Gibson’s intent on the Count 17 charge of knowingly maintaining a place for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, and using drugs. United States v. Cardenas, 895 F.2d 1338, 1342 (11th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks and citations
holding that extrinsic offense evidence was admissible to prove intent where the prosecutor stated that she anticipated the defendant would deny his intent to be involved in the charged offense and defense counsel did not even mention that he would refrain from contesting the intent issue holding that the government may not be permitted to introduce other crimes evidence in its case in chief to prove intent unless the defense disputes intent during opening statements holding that when defendants plead not guilty the government is required to prove all elements of charged offenses including intent holding that when a defendant charged with conspiracy enters a not guilty plea he makes intent a material issue in the case and imposes a substantial burden on the government thus the government may introduce extrinsic offenses which qualify under 404b to prove defendants state of mind unless defendant takes affirmative steps to remove the issue of intent from the case holding that the rule 404b evidence admitted to prove intent was clearly relevant because intent was at issue in the trial