but plaintiffs have imposed correspondingly greater fees and costs upon defendants. That fact may constitute grounds for reducing plaintiffs’ fee request, but it does not permit the court to deny the fee request altogether. As the Court of Appeals has stated, “[t]o the extent that Chambless’ actions were ‘vexatious[ ] and wasteful[ ],’ he is obviously pe-nalized by not recovering any attorney’s fees for those efforts. This does not affect his right to a reasonable attorney’s fee for his successful claim.” Chambless, 815 F.2d at 872. Nor is plaintiffs’ supplemental application so untimely as to be denied on the ground that it “unfairly surprise[d] or prejudice^] the affected party.” White v. New Hampshire Dep’t of Employment Security, 455 U.S. 445, 102 S.Ct. 1162, 71 L.Ed.2d 325 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Defendants do not claim to have been caught
holding that a fee application under 42 usc  1988 is not governed by the 10day limit imposed on motions to amend judgment under rule 59e frciv p recognizing that rule 59e permits a district court to reconsider and amend a previous order holding that plaintiffs were prevailing parties under 42 usc section 1988 despite dismissal of the appeal as moot and vacation of the district court judgment recognizing absolute immunity to suits under 42 usc  1988 holding that the same standards apply for setting reasonable attorneys fees under the clean air acts fee shifting provision as under 42 usc  1988