of Duncanson tells us otherwise. In Duncanson, a person named Wilson went to Service First, Inc., her insurance agent, to renew her automobile liability policy. Service First undertook to renew the policy, but failed to do so. Wilson was later involved in an automobile collision and was sued by Duncanson. Wilson made a demand upon Service First to defend her against Duncanson’s suit, and Service First refused. We said in Duncanson that Service First was liable to Wilson to the extent of the prior policy, not only for the amounts assessed against Wilson in Duncanson’s action against her, but also was “required to pay a reasonable attorney’s fee for the defense of the suit instituted by Duncanson against Wilson .... ” 157 So.2d at 699. Duncan-son merely holds t So. 241 (1938) (<HOLDING>); City of Miami Beach v. Bretagna, 190 So.2d
holding that request for attorneys fees and damages to attached property in a motion to dissolve a writ of attachment  said to be totally unnecessary to the inquiry of the jurisdiction  constituted a submission by defendant to the exercise of jurisdiction over it personally by the court holding that in order to recover damages including attorneys fees for the damages consequent upon the improper suing out of the writ of attachment the proceedings must be begun  as a proceeding to dissolve the attachment and not as a trial of the case on the merits holding that the obligee may recover attorney fees as an element of damages only up to the limit of the penal amount of the bond holding that the court had appellate jurisdiction to review the merits of the case because only the collateral issue of attorneys fees remained to be decided on remand to the bankruptcy court holding that the defendant was only permitted to recover attorney fees as an item of special damages with respect to the underlying action in which the defendant was sued and was not permitted to recover attorney fees incurred in the malpractice portion of the case as damages