court. See Taylor, 173 F.3d at 540-41. The Sixth Circuit rejected the prisoner’s claim that this treatment violated the IAD because it found that the prisoner had been in a “local facility” awaiting a transfer to a “correctional facility.” Id. at 541. The court reasoned that the local facility did not offer rehabilitative programs that would have been interrupted by the prisoner’s temporary transfer. Id. The Taylor court also held that even if a “term of imprisonment” co 4 (1989) (“The very programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation whose obstruction the IAD was intended to prevent are not present in jails. Permitting prisoners sentenced to jails to invoke the IAD’s Article 111(a) provisions, therefore, would be meaningless.”). But see Bozeman, 533 U.S. at 153, 121 S.Ct. 2079 (<HOLDING>); Nelms, 532 S.W.2d at 927 (holding that
holding that the statute is mandatory holding that the language of the iad is mandatory and absolute holding that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional holding that the language of the statute is mandatory and the commission must act within 180 days holding that a states use of the word shall is mandatory language