the trier of fact believes that the presumed fact has been overcome by whatever degree of persuasion is required by the substantive law of the case.” Rebuttable presumptions which shift the burden of proof are “expressions of social policy,” rather than mere procedural devices employed “to facilitate the determination of the particular action.” [This type of] presumption shifts the burden of proof, ensuring that the issue of negligence goes to the jury. This interpretation appears to best implement public policy that adequate operative notes be kept. Id. at 600-601 (quoting Caldwell v. Division of Retirement, 372 So.2d 438, 440 (Fla.1979)). Applying these observations to the present case, we hold that the trial court should have adopted a rebuttable presumption that Providen 1982) (<HOLDING>). 2. Shifting the burden of proof makes it
holding that the trial courts definition of normal use was harmless error holding that unless an erroneous instruction was unlikely to have changed the result of the trial a reviewing court cannot say that giving the instruction was harmless error holding that any error in trial courts comparative negligence instruction was harmless where the jury found that both defendants were not negligent holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error holding exclusion was harmless error