30 days after the judgment or order appealed from is entered, fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). The test for when the period, under which an appeal must be taken or a petition for certiorari filed, begins to run anew is “whether the lower court, in its second order, has disturbed or revised legal rights and obligations which, by its prior judgment, had been plainly and properly settled with finality.” Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 344 U.S. 206, 211-12, 73 S.Ct. 245, 97 L.Ed. 245 (1952). We find that the district court did not, by its Rule 70 order, disturb, revise or alter the legal rights or obligations plainly and properly settled in its final judgment. As a result, the time to take an appeal of the underlying judgment in this case does not run anew. See id. (<HOLDING>). We find, therefore, that Baldwin will not be
holding that supreme court need not consider issue not raised in petition for certiorari holding that the applicable rate is that in existence at the time of judgment holding that the solicitor generals ratification of an unauthorized petition for certiorari could not cure a failure to meet the mandatory and jurisdictional 90day deadline to file a petition holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to alteramend judgment where the plaintiff raised the choice of law issue for the first time after the entry of summary judgment holding that the judgment at issue did not meet the test for whether the time to file a petition for certiorari ran anew as the judgment at issue simply reiterated without change everything which had been decided previously