the case to us for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 121 S.Ct. 924, 148 L.Ed.2d 807 (2001). Before us now are the merits of TSSAA’s appeal regarding the constitutionality of the recruiting rule. II. ANALYSIS A. Standard of review We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. See, e.g., Holloway v. Brush, 220 F.3d 767, 772 (6th Cir.2000). Summary judgment is proper when there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute an 58 (6th Cir.1985) (concluding that when a party knowingly, voluntarily, and intentionally signs a jury waiver provision in a civil case, that party has waived its right to a jury trial); International Union v. Dana Corp., 697 F.2d 718, 719 (6th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); Lake James Cmty. Volunteer Fire Dep’t v.
holding that a settlement agreement between dana and the union rendered an appeal moot even though the agreement effectively prevented dana from communicating with its employees regarding a union campaign at one of danas subsidiaries holding that the disappearance by merger of a corporate employer which has entered into a collective bargaining agreement with a union does not automatically terminate all rights of the employees covered by the agreement and that in appropriate circumstances present here the successor employer may be required to arbitrate with the union under the agreement holding that a rico action by union members was properly dismissed where any financial improprieties occurred with union funds and directly injured solely the union recognizing that union members interests are adequately represented by the union holding union members state law claims for defamation against union preempted