since the Supreme Court decided IBP. The statutory language of the exemptions does not allow for a clean analytical distinction between those activities that are “integral and indispensable” and those that are not. But it is clear to us from the Act’s language and history that the activity in question must be work in the benefit of the employer, and that the security screening mandated by the FAA in this case is not compensable work. We therefore hold that the time appellants spent going through the mandatory security screening is not compensable under the FLSA because that screening is not “integral and indispensable” to a principal activity under IBP, Steiner, or Dunlop. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summa 46, 651 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Vega v. Gasper, 36 F.3d 417 (5th Cir.1994)
holding that when parties voluntarily submit to binding arbitration they generally believe that they are trading their right to appeal an arbitration award for a relatively speedy and inexpensive resolution to their dispute holding that time workers spent traveling on an employers boat to a construction site was not compensable under the act holding that the scope and application of state exemptions are defined by the state courts and that we are bound by their interpretations recognizing the exemptions under the flsa are narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them and their application limited to those establishments plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit  and that the burden of invoking these exemptions rests upon the employer holding that dog handlers commutes are not compensable just because they bring their dogs into work and also noting that the portaltoportal act exemptions properly protect employers from responsibility for commuting time and for relatively trivial nononerous aspects of preliminary preparation maintenance and clean up