typically are made in the presence and on the advice of counsel. ¶ 12 In short, the danger that a defendant will be convicted based on coerced or otherwise unfairly elicited and untrustworthy admissions is not the same in the change-of-plea context as it is in the extrajudicial context. And, assuming a defendant’s plea is somehow infirm, he or she is not without means of obtaining redress; the defendant may seek to set aside the conviction entered pursuant to the guilty plea. See Kercheval, 274 U.S. at 224, 47 S.Ct. at 583 (defendant is bound by plea, “[b]ut, on timely application, the court will vacate a plea of guilty shown to have been unfairly obtained or given through ignorance, fear or inadvertence”); see also State v. Ysea, 191 Ariz. 372, ¶¶ 23-24, 956 P.2d 499, 506 (1998) (<HOLDING>); State v. Anderson, 147 Ariz. 346, 351-52, 710
recognizing untimeliness under ariz rcrim p 324a as a basis for dismissal of an arizona petition for postconviction relief distinct from preclusion under rule 322a recognizing a defendant may seek postconviction relief pursuant to rule 32 ariz rcrim p on ground that trial counsel had been ineffective by inducing defendant to enter guilty plea recognizing that rule 32 is a postconviction remedy holding that appellate courts may not on appeal from the dismissal of a rule 32 petition consider claims not raised in the rule 32 petition holding that a petition to correct sentence was properly considered as a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to rule 371 because it challenged a judgment entered on a plea of guilty on grounds cognizable under the rule