frequency of parole reconsideration hearings for certain violent offenders from every year to every three years did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. 514 U.S. at 508. In support of this holding, the Supreme Court noted that the question was one of degree that could not be reduced to a “single formula” and concluded that, under California’s parole structure, the amendment did not alter the statutory standards for determining either the initial date for parole eligibility or an inmate’s suitability for parole. Id. at 507. Instead, the amendment merely altered the method to be followed in fixing a parole release date, “[rjather than changing the sentencing range applicable to covered crimes.” Id. at 507-08; cf. Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 544, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2084 (2013) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 22. Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court
holding that parole guidelines are subject to the ex post facto clause holding that district court did not violate ex post facto clause in sentencing defendant above guidelines maximum where district court assumed guidelines to be advisory prebooker holding that retroactive application of advisory sentencing guidelines violated ex post facto clause because guidelines created sufficient risk of increased sentencing range holding that the application of the guidelines in effect at sentencing rather than at the time of defendants conduct does not violate the ex post facto clause even if the current guidelines suggest a harsher sentence because the guidelines are only advisory not binding holding that use of the guidelines in effect at time of sentencing does not violate ex post facto clause after booker