is admittedly singular. State v. Kidd, 562 N.W.2d 764, 765 (Iowa 1997). Because “an” is a variant of the article “a,” it can also be construed as singular and not collective. Id. at 765-66 (finding the statute referring to possession of “an offensive weapon” created three separate chargeable offenses, not one all-inclusive charge, because the defendant possessed three sawed-off shotguns). What the court failed to consider in Kidd, however, is a fundamental principle of statutory construction memorialized in the Code itself: “Unless otherwise specifically provided by law the singular includes the plural, and the plural includes the singular.” Iowa Code § 4.1(17). We have previously applied this rule when construing criminal statutes. See State v. Prybil, 211 N.W.2d 308, 312 (Iowa 1973) (<HOLDING>). Thus, because under this rule “an” is not
holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a charge on the lesserincluded offense when the evidence showed either the commission of the completed offense as charged or the commission of no offense such that the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser offense holding that discharge of a police officer for the choice to enter into a relationship with the wife of his superior officer on the force was rational holding the statute governing the offense of receiving corrupt influence makes it equally illegal for a public officer to enter a series of wrongful transactions as to accept a single gratuity based on the statutory language referring to any gift commission discount bonus or gratuity holding that the language of the statute is mandatory and the commission must act within 180 days holding that the statute creating the maryland human relations commission did not grant the commission power to make monetary awards for compensatory or other damages particularly in the absence of any statutory guidelines or limitations