121 L.Ed.2d 513 (1992), in which the Court held that ERISA preempted a state statute that applied only to employers who provided health insurance coverage, and Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139, 111 S.Ct. 478, 112 L.Ed.2d 474 (1990), in which the Court held that ERISA preempted a common-law cause of action premised on the existence of an ERISA plan). 32 . Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 325-28, 117 S.Ct. 832 (refusing to hold that a state statute pertaining to approved apprenticeship programs “referred to” ERISA plans because not all such programs were ERISA plans); see also Corporation Health Ins. v. Tx. Dep’t of Ins., 215 F.3d 526, 535 (5th Cir.2000), op. modified, 314 F.3d 784 (5th Cir.2002). 33 . See La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 40:2010; cf. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 829, 108 S.Ct. 2182 (<HOLDING>). 34 . Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 325, 117 S.Ct.
holding that a georgia garnishment statute that solely applied to erisa employee benefit plans was preempted holding that federal common law of erisa preempts state law in the interpretation of erisa benefit plans holding florida exemption statute for employee benefit plans was not preempted by erisa due to savings clause recognizing that it was beyond dispute that a state statute that required all insured benefit plans to submit to an extra layer of review for certain benefit denials had a substantial effect on erisa plans holding that a state law requiring benefit plans to include minimum benefits related to erisa plans