under rule 609(d) — or under a hybrid of rules 609(d) and 404(b)— the evidence of Rogers’s prior distribution of crack. Rule 609(d) governs only the admissibility of evidence introduced for impeachment of a witness. Evidence not introduced to attack a witness’s credibility falls outside the rule’s scope. Here, the government questioned Rogers about the circumstances that surrounded his prior crack dealing in order to rebut his defenses of mistake and lack of intent and lack of knowledge. Neither rule 404(b) nor rule 609(d) required the evidence’s exclusion. The language of the two rules is plain, see, e.g., Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 687, 108 S.Ct. at 1500, and we decline Rogers’s invitation to conflate them. See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 867 F.2d 1110, 1115 (8th Cir. 1989) (<HOLDING>). Rogers argues further that the district court
recognizing distinction between tolling and estoppel recognizing distinction between rules 404b and 609d recognizing this distinction recognizing distinction between two types of waiver recognizing distinction between smith and mcdonnell