omitted). “We review an award of sanctions under § 1927 only for abuse of discretion.” Id. But “[wjhere the exercise of that discretion depended on the resolution of a purely legal issue, [ ] we approach such a question de novo.” Id. III. A. Jurisdiction Under a heading titled “The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction To Consider a Motion For Sanctions,” Aplt. Opening Br. at 17, Mr. Dickson makes several arguments. First, he argues that “Section 1927 targets the vexatious and unreasonable multiplication of proceedings. Sanctions under this section are levied to compensate the victims of dilatory practices.” Id. According to Mr. Dickson, he was not dilatory and not subject to sanctions. While it is correct that reach of § 1927 includes dilatory practices, see Hamilton, 519 F.3d at 1206 (<HOLDING>), Mr. Dickson has not cited any authority that
holding that in the absence of demonstrated prejudice remand is unnecessary recognizing that the colorado river doctrine is necessary to ensure judicial economy and deter abusive reactive litigation holding amendment to statute of limitations was a procedural amendment to be applied retroactively in a medical malpractice case recognizing that purpose of a 1980 amendment to the statute was to deter unnecessary delays in litigation holding that the purpose of section 1927 is to deter unnecessary delays in litigation