of Torts § 64(a) was adopted here, Plaintiff would still be entitled to judgment as a matter of law pursuant to the undisputed facts in this case because the higher burden is met under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 428. The Court leaves this difficult question to the discretion of the Supreme Court, but highlights that the Second and Third Restatement provisions regarding a contractor’s nondelegable duties must be analyzed as a collective scheme which attempts to consolidate the application of these many nuanced and overlapping common law principles. 56 Black’s Law Dictionary, Instrumentality (9th ed. 2009) (“A thing used to achieve an end or purpose.”). 57 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 428 cmt. a (emphasis added). 58 See Reith, 22 Ill. App. 3d 337, 317 N.E.2d 369, 373 (1974) (<HOLDING>); See Williamson 265 S.W.2d 354. 59 Plaintiff’s
holding that insurance company operating under a reservation of rights had the right and the duty to control the defense until such time as it was determined that it had no liability insurance coverage recognizing the debtorinpossessions duty to file records and operating reports holding highlow settlement agreement between estate and company was not a mary carter agreement and it was not erroneous to have allowed the company to participate in the trial or by failing to disclose the agreement to the jury holding that a customer has no reasonable expectation of privacy in dialed telephone numbers which were conveyed to the telephone company recognizing a telephone company operating under a franchise agreement as holding a nondelegable duty to the public