41(e) provides a remedy for alleged victims of unlawful warrantless seizures of property. Paka was seized as part of a criminal investigation into suspected animal cruelty and, as such, the Hegartys could have requested a V.R.Cr.P. 41(e) hearing to contest the warrantless seizure and to obtain a judicial determination of whether they were entitled to possession of the horse pending the conclusion of the prosecutorial process. See V.R.Cr.P. 41(e). This remedy was available to the Hegartys at any time during the twelve-day criminal investigation, and the fact that no criminal charges were filed did not preclude them from filing a Rule 41(e) motion and thereby obtaining the due process they insist they were denied. See State v. Kornell, 169 Vt. 637, 638, 741 A.2d 290, 291 (1999) (mem.) (<HOLDING>). ¶21. Here, where the circumstances required
holding that a district court has jurisdiction to entertain a rule 41e motion for the return of property before a criminal prosecution has begun believing such a motion to be in effect a civil action holding that rule 41e motion for return of seized property is treated as a civil equitable proceeding when criminal proceedings against moving party are not yet pending holding that a district court has jurisdiction to consider  a rule 41e motion  filed after criminal proceedings had been completed holding federal rule of civil procedure 11 motion in abeyance pending resolution of a bankruptcy proceeding holding that rule 4as timing requirements apply to an appeal from an order granting or denying a criminal defendants motion for the return of property under fedrcrimp 41e