v Martin, 367 Mass 404; 326 NE2d 12 (1975) (necessary means "wise in the light of facts known at the time rendered”); and Group Hospitalization, Inc v Levin, 305 A2d 248 (DC App, 1973) ("necessary” means "reasonably calculated to shorten and relieve an ordeal of agonizing pain and thereby effectuate the most rapid recovery possible”). Reference to McLaughlin v Connecticut General Life Ins Co, 565 F Supp 434 (ND Cal, 1983), illustrates that Free’s list of definitions was not exhaustive. McLaughlin cites, inter alia, Fassio v Montana Physician’s Service, 170 Mont 320; 553 P2d 998 (1976) (finding that the language "necessary services” requires only that services be prescribed and performed by a licensed physician), and Aetna Life Ins Co v Sanders, 127 Ga App 352; 193 SE2d 173 (1972) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, McLaughlin provides a new
holding that the language necessary to the treatment should be construed to accord great weight to a physicians recommendation holding  362h should be construed more broadly than its literal language and should be read in conjunction with all of  362 holding that if a document is facially clear it will be construed according to its language holding that railroad immunity act should be strictly construed holding that criminal statutes of limitation should be construed in favor of the accused