from ordinary permit delays. They contend that a permit applicant need only comply with certain specific requirements in order to receive one and can expect to develop at the end of the process, whereas there is nothing the landowner subject to a moratorium can do but wait, with no guarantee that a permit will, be, granted at the end of the process. Setting aside the obvious problem with basing the distinction on a course of events we can only know after the fact — in the context of a facial challenge — petitioners’ argument breaks down under close examination because there is no guarantee that a permit will be gran .D.Mo.1991) (following Riverside Bayview and holding takings claims unripe absent denial of a pertnit); Lakewood Assoc. v. United States, 45 Fed.Cl. 320, 332 (1999) (<HOLDING>); see also Moore v. United States, 943 F.Supp.
holding that the trial court erred in permitting a lawyer to offer his opinions concerning securities law and the application of that law to the contract in dispute holding that an agency is not required to undertake a search that is so broad as to be unduly burdensome holding that privatization is necessary to protect the members of the plaintiff class from cruel and unusual punishment through constitutionally unacceptable health care services that the remedy extends no further than is necessary to correct the violation of the federal rights of members of the plaintiff class that such relief is narrowly drawn and that there is no less intrusive means to correct the violation of plaintiffs federal rights holding by texas supreme court that takings claim failed as a matter of law because the state took possession of the property in question under a contract with the plaintiff and therefore with the plaintiffs permission and consent holding that application for and denial of a permit is necessary to a ripe takings claim absent futility or a showing that the permitting procedure is so burdensome as to effectively deprive the plaintiff of his property rights