First Amendment does not protect conduct that threatens another.” (quotation marks omitted)). 5 . Pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 506-A(l)(A)(l) (2015), "A person is guilty of harassment if, without reasonable cause: [t]he person engages in any course of conduct with the intent to harass, torment or threaten another person” after receiving a statutorily prescribed form of notice not to engage in that conduct. 6 .Cases involving harassing conduct are distinguished from those involving communicative conduct that is undertaken to express a social or political viewpoint, such as burning a flag as a statement or holding a sit-in. See State v. Brown, 207 Ariz. 231, 85 P.3d 109, 113-14 (Ariz.Ct.App.2004). 7 . But see In re Marriage of Suggs, 152 Wash.2d 74, 93 P.3d 161, 162 & n. 1, 165-66 (2004) (<HOLDING>). 8 . In relevant part, the stalking statute
holding that conspiracy requires an agreement to accomplish either an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means holding that a remand unless qualified or limited for a specific purpose is effective for the stated purpose and for consideration of any and all matters that the ij deems appropriate holding that a defendant is in custody and miranda applies even when the purpose of defendants detention is unrelated to the purpose of the interrogation holding that denial of tax exemption for vacant lot held by church for no current purpose or any future exempt purpose did not violate first amendment holding that an order violated the  first amendment as a prior restraint when it restrained a police officers exwife from knowingly and willfully making invalid and unsubstantiated allegations or complaints to third parties which are designed for the purpose of annoying harassing vexing or otherwise harming him and for no lawful purpose