performance of the employee’s duties; (3) whether the act occurred on the employer’s premises; and (4) whether it occurred during the hours of employment. Id. at 996-97. La Day’s claim meets the third and fourth factors; the alleged tortious conduct occurred on Catalyst’s premises during working hours. It undeniably fails the first two prongs, however. Craft’s harassment of La Day was certainly not “primarily employment rooted” and was not “reasonably incidental to the performance of [Craft’s] duties.” Id. Meeting the third and fourth prongs is not in and of itself sufficient to sustain a claim of vicarious liability. So, we affirm summary judgment on this issue. For the reasons we have explained, the summary judgment is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in pa pp.2d 833, 846 (E.D.Va.2002) (<HOLDING>); Merritt v. Del. Riv. Port Auth., 1999 WL
holding that the court must assume on summary judgment that the nondecisionmakerharasser relayed the plaintiffs complaints about sexual harassment to the decisionmaker even though both the harasser and the decisionmaker denied this fact the harasser was present at the meeting in which it was decided that plaintiff would be terminated he had an incentive to pass on this information and his credibility was in question as to other matters holding that a party must at least have a subjective belief that litigation was a real possibility and that belief must have been objectively reasonable holding that the trial court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of defendant and denied plaintiffs motion for summary judgment where plaintiff failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that defendant breached its duty to act in good faith holding that the test for good faith is the actual belief of the party and not the reasonableness of that belief holding that summary judgment was justified in a case where the plaintiffs sole proof of the harassers homosexuality was the victims subjective belief that the harasser was gay and where numerous coworkers denied this claim