the evidence of Robertson’s alleged prior threat to his ex-wife as Williams rule evidence, the State cannot rely on the law of impeachment to introduce the same evidence through the back door by asking an impermissible question regarding an alleged prior crime. Finally, we address whether the admission of this collateral-crime evidence constitutes reversible error. This Court has held that the erroneous admission of irrelevant collateral crimes evidence “is presumed harmful error because of the danger that a jury will take the bad character or propensity to crime thus demon strated as evidence of guilt of the crime charged.” Castro v. State, 547 So.2d 111, 115 (Fla.1989) (quoting Straight v. State, 397 So.2d 903, 908 (Fla.1981)); accord Czubak v. State, 570 So.2d 925, 928 (Fla.1990) (<HOLDING>). In this case, given the highly inflammatory
holding that a district court may not rely on a charging document without first establishing that the crime charged was the same crime for which the defendant was convicted holding that counsel did not admit the defendant was guilty of a crime when counsel noted that if the evidence established the commission of any crime that crime was voluntary manslaughter not murder holding that where court informed jurors that the defendant had escaped from custody the trial judge acted within his judicial capacity and did not testify  holding collateral crime evidence that defendant was an escaped convict was presumptively harmful holding it is fundamental error to convict a defendant of crime not charged and which is not a lesser included offense of the charged crime