various classes of railroad tracks side analyzing the audible warning devices regulation, the principles governing preemption are similar. The regulation at issue clearly prescribes minimum decibel levels for trains which are designed to alert drivers and the public that the train is advancing through an intersection. The fact that the regulation sets a minimum level but does not specify maximum levels does not alter the applicability of the preemption provision in the FRSA. The regulation at issue, 49 C.F.R. § 229.129, clearly “covers” the subject matter of plaintiffs negligence claims since the regulation deals specifically with the “sound-producing capacity” of audible warning devices. See Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Public Utility Comm. of Oregon, 9 F.3d 807, 813 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). In setting the minimum level, the FRA
holding that cause of action for injury to corporations property or for impairment or destruction of its business is vested in corporation as distinguished from its shareholders holding that police officers sued in their official capacity are not liable for a violation of a privacy interest where the police department did not have a policy of deliberately failing to train its officers with respect to the confidentiality of records holding that shareholders claim is derivative if the alleged injury affects the shareholder indirectly in his or her capacity as a shareholder and describing the inquiry as whether the gravamen of the pleadings alleges injury to the plaintiff upon an individual claim as distinguished from an injury which directly affects the shareholders as a whole holding that members of the city council in their official capacity are not immune from a section 1983 suit against the municipality for deprivation of liberty interest in reputation without due process holding that section 229 regulates the soundproducing capacity of train whistles as distinguished from their use