a threat to life or freedom.’” Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir.2003) (quoting Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir.1993)). The incidents of which Petitioner complains simply do not rise to this level. As a child Tjandra witnessed the burning of a church and the destruction of his father’s business. As an adult he lived with the fear that soccer hooligans would hurt his family. Tjandra, however, was never harmed. While we are troubled by the actions of Muslim extremists in Indonesia, this Court does not recognize “isolated incidents that do not result in serious injury” as persecution. Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 615 (3d Cir.2005). Accordingly, we determine that Tjandra has not been the victim of persecution. See Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 536 (3d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). We also determine that Tjandra failed to show
holding that isolated criminal acts by unknown assailants resulting in theft of personal property and minor injury were not sufficiently severe to constitute persecution holding that two isolated criminal acts perpetrated by unknown assailants against ethnic chinese indonesians which resulted only in the theft of some personal property and a minor injury is not sufficiently severe to be considered persecution holding that petitioner an ethnic chinese christian from indonesia did not establish a wellfounded fear of future persecution in indonesia because she failed to demonstrate that she would be individually targeted for persecution and country reports indicate that religious discrimination and harassment of ethnic chinese have declined in previous years holding that isolated physical violence and unfulfilled threats perpetrated by serbian citizens against an ethnic albanian in kosovo constituted harassment not persecution holding that two isolated criminal acts perpetrated by unknown assailants  are not sufficiently severe to be considered persecution