direction of Officer Rankin and thus, he was a state agent. III. Norman, holds that an informant does not have a legitimate right to claim a privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment once the informant acquires the status of a state agent. If Norman espouses a rule that an informant acting as a state agent cannot assert a legitimate right against self-incrimination, then the facts of the instant ease would compel us to conclude that Dal Bosco’s claim of privilege under the Fifth Amendment was spurious. However, we should be reluctant to accept a broad limitation of an informant’s right against self-incrimination solely because the informant is a state agent. Such a rule ignores precedent that a claim against self-incrimination is a personal individual right and (<HOLDING>). The foregoing cases demonstrate settled case
holding that congress may impose its will on the states as long as it is acting within the powers granted by the constitution holding that a district court has discretion to caution a witness about selfincrimination so long as the court does not actively encourage the witness not to testify or badgerf a witness into remaining silent holding that an undercover agent is not an accomplice as long as the agent does not bring about the crime but merely obtains evidence to be used against those engaged in crime holding that police may approach citizen and ask that he roll down the window as long as the officers do not detain the citizen or create the impression that the citizen may not leave holding that a private citizen acting as undercover agent is not an accomplice witness so long as he does not bring about the crime