may recover for time spent on unsuccessful motions so long as it succeeds in the overall claim. See North Am. Corp. v. Allen, 636 S.W.2d 797, 800 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 1982, no writ). In light of this careful consideration of the attorneys’ fees by the district court, the first portion of this claim fails. Rollins’ second complaint requests that the attorneys’ fee award be remanded to the district court because DPS’s attorney did not segregate the hours spent pursuing DPS’s breach of contract claims from the hours spent defending against Rollins’ counterclaims. Rollins claims that attorneys’ fees cannot be recovered under Texas law for defending against contract claims. See Ventana, 879 F.Supp. at 678; Aetna Cas. & Sur. v. Wild, 944 S.W.2d 37, 41 (Tex.App.Amarillo 1997, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). However, Texas law explicitly recognizes that
holding that unsegregated attorneys fees must be remanded holding trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to physicians in absence of any evidence of attorneys fees holding that inextricably intertwined exception did not apply that trial court erred by not requiring segregation and that case should be remanded to trial court for determination of the amount of the segregated attorneys fees holding that where plaintiff sought recovery of fees against multiple defendants evidence of unsegregated fees was more than a scintilla of evidence to support fee award what a reasonable attorneys fee would be for the entire case indicates what the segregated amount  should be recognizing that a school district must be a prevailing party in order to be entitled to attorneys fees under the idea