parties raised the issue of attorney’s fees prior to the issuance of the March 12 order by expressly including a request for attorney’s fees and costs in their prayers for relief. The trial court bifurcated the underlying hearing on the merits and informed the parties that it would hear arguments relating to attorney’s fees after reaching a ruling on the merits. Thus, in its order denying the motion to vacate, the court indicated that the parties “may” present their arguments for attorney’s fees and costs at a later date. Because the March 12 order does not “dispose” of the issue of attorney’s fees — “relief contemplated” by both parties prior to issuance of the order — the order is not a final order for purposes of Rule 1:1. See Estate of Hackler, 44 Va.App. at 61, 602 S.E.2d at 431 (<HOLDING>). And, because the March 12 order was not a
holding that an order by the trial court remanding the cause to the agency to impose a sanction other than the one imposed by the agency was not a final and appealable order because it did not terminate the litigation between the parties on the merits holding that because trial courts order did not dispose of the defendants counterclaim that order was not a final judgment that would support an appeal holding that res judicata did not apply where a trial courts order was not a final judgment holding that an order to show cause was deficient when it merely stated that the defendant had violated a prior court order and did not include the facts that purportedly constituted the criminal contempt holding that an order was not final where the order stated that the court would end the cause after a final accounting was reviewed and approved but did not say that the cause was ended reasoning that this language indicates that the trial court considered that the cause was still open