railroad for trail use, as well as the trail operator’s consent to railbanking. See 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(d)(1). If a trail use agreement cannot be reached, railbanking is not separately permitted. Rather, without a trail use agreement, the railroad line will be abandoned, the federal government will lose its jurisdiction over the right-of-way, and the property will revert to the underlying fee owners. Jenkins, 102 Fed.Cl. at 615. Moreover, as discussed in Jenkins, 102 Fed.Cl. at 617, Federal Circuit precedent has also made clear that the government’s taking liability extends to the foreseeable consequences of the actions that arose from issuance of the NITU, and that the government cannot escape liability by claiming that it is not the trail operator. See Preseault II, 100 F.3d at 1551 (<HOLDING>); Toews v. United States, 376 F.3d 1371,
holding the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the actions of the federal government holding that the county government not the federal government was liable for the taking of an air easement over plaintiffs property even though the airport was funded in part by a federal grant based on compliance with federal regulations holding that when the government acts to enforce public rights the mere fact that the government has no pecuniary interest in the controversy is not sufficient to exclude it from the courts holding that when the federal government puts into play a series of events which result in a taking of private property the fact that the government acts through an  agent does not absolve it from the responsibility and the consequences of its actions holding the federal government responsible for the immediately foreseeable consequences of its actions