apparently finds the extension of time for payment (majority at 88) was prejudicial to the rights of the judgment creditor. But quite to the contrary, an extension of time to repay a loan is generally presumed beneficial to junior lienors, not prejudicial. See, e.g., Crutchfield v. Johnson & Latimer, 243 Ala. 73, 8 So. 2d 412, 414 (1942); Lennar N.E. Partners v. Buice, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1576, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 435, 439 (1996) (citing Resolution Trust Corp. v. BVS Dev., Inc., 42 F.3d 1206, 1215 (9th Cir. 1994)); Eurovest Ltd. v. 13290 Biscayne Island Terrace Corp., 559 So. 2d 1198, 1198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Larson Cement Stone Co. v. Redlim Realty Co., 179 Neb. 134, 137 N.W.2d 241, 245 (1965). But see Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Smith, 277 S.C. 162, 284 S.E.2d 770, 772 (1981) (<HOLDING>). Instead of a note amortized over 15 years
holding that although alabama state law would give a mortgagee who erroneously recorded a release of a mortgage an equitable right to have the mortgage retroactively reinstated reinstatement would have resulted in relating back the perfection of the mortgage to the original recording date in violation of treas reg  3016323hla2 holding that a mortgage transfer does not take effect until the mortgagee gives value in exchange for the mortgage holding that a bank holding a chattel mortgage on an automobile damaged in a collision had an equitable lien in insurance proceeds because the mortgage required mortgagor to insure the vehicle and name mortgagee as a loss payee holding that in a case in which an omitted junior mortgagee foreclosed its mortgage the junior mortgagee had the absolute right to redeem from the senior mortgagee who had purchased the property at a sale following foreclosure of the senior mortgage holding extension of senior mortgage resulted in loss of priority because intervening mortgagee had agreed to be subordinated on the assumption the senior mortgage would be fully satisfied on the initial due date