on a discount rate as large as 16%. It is therefore safe to say that the entire 1980 award was included within the 1983 award, and that therefore interest on the $400,000 attributable to the 1980 award should run from 1980. C. The final issue is what rate of interest to apply. The first judgment was entered more than two years before the effective date of the 1982 amendment to § 1961. Courts have disagreed over whether to apply the federal method of determining interest to judgments entered before October 1, 1982. A majority of circuits have concluded that the amended statute should apply only to judgments entered after its effective date. See Campbell v. United States, 809 F.2d 563, 569 (9th Cir.1987) (collecting cases). But see R.W.T. v. Dalton, 712 F.2d 1225, 1234-35 (8th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1009, 104 S.Ct. 527,
holding that the trial court erred in denying as untimely a postjudgment motion to intervene filed promptly after judgment and noting that this holding was consistent with several decisions of the federal courts permitting postjudgment intervention for the purpose of appeal holding that the fcia rate should apply to a march 30 1982 judgment against a private party for the entire postjudgment period holding as a mutter of law that divorce actions are civil actions within the meaning of the postjudgment interest statute and that the wife was entitled to postjudgment interest under the statute with respect to unpaid spousal support payments ordered under a divorce judgment holding that the amended statute should apply to a preeffective date judgment for the entire postjudgment period holding that plaintiff was entitled to postjudgment interest from date of original verdict and not just from the date on which the supreme court reversed the trial courts entry of a directed verdict noting we cannot see any good reason why plaintiff should lose his postjudgment interest because defendant was able to convince the trial court to make an erroneous ruling 