would not simply reverse course again after this litigation regarding Appellants’ eligibility for ADHC. See Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 316 (4th Cir. 2013). We disagree. Assuming that when this suit was initiated Appellants had standing to challenge their service coordinator’s initial decision that they were no longer eligible to receive ADHC, the claims regarding their eligibility became moot once Appellants obtained a reversal of the decision through the ad ministrative appeal process without ever having their ADHC discontinued. The reversals were “not ... voluntary cessation[s] within the meaning of that doctrine, but w[ere] instead the result of [Appellants’] successful administrative appeal[s].” Oregon Nat. Res. Council, Inc. v. Grossarth, 979 F.2d 1377, 1379 (9th Cir. 1992) (<HOLDING>). Cf. ACLU of Mass. v. U.S. Conference of
holding that the fact that the sale may not be fully consummated does not prevent a determination that the appeal is moot because section 363m does not require the purchaser to take irreversible steps consummating the sale before the absence of a stay will render an appeal moot holding that action challenging united states forest services approval of a timber sale became moot when challenged sale was halted as a result of an administrative appeal recognizing that it is an unusual challenge to a sale that does not distort the validity of the sale and that the exception likely has meaning only when collateral issues are challenged holding that an appeal challenging a bankruptcy court order lifting the automatic stay became moot when the underlying bankruptcy case was dismissed holding that an appeal challenging a bankruptcy court order approving a foreclosure sale became moot upon dismissal of the underlying bankruptcy case