factual issue of discrimination vel non for clear error. See Merwine v. Bd. of Trustees for State Institutions of Higher Learning, 754 F.2d 631, 636 (5th Cir.1985). We agree with the district court that Wallace’s salary was based on the workings of the classified and unclassified civil service system, as well as the operation of the LSU employee system, which the district court accurately described at trial as “Byzantine.” Wallace fails to show that any disparity in pay was based on his race, and his claim is supported by only his own subjective belief. See Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 427 (5th Cir.2000) (rejecting plaintiffs reliance on subjective belief regarding discriminatory intent); Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 26 F.3d 1277, 1297-98 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). We conclude there is no clear error in the
holding that more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the race classification is required to make a prima facie race discrimination case holding that mere presence at the crime scene without more is insufficient to prove accomplice liability holding that the test for good faith is the actual belief of the party and not the reasonableness of that belief holding that an employee may establish that the legitimate reason for an employment decision offered by an employer is pretextual by showing by a preponderance of the evidence either that the discrim inatory reason was the true reason motivating the employers conduct or that the profferred legitimate reason was false holding that plaintiffs mere collective belief was insufficient to prove that race was the true reason for disparate treatment