indicating a desire to appeal. It was then that counsel was appointed, but failed to file anything with the Superior Court. Accordingly, we hold that Appellant has made sufficient allegations that counsel abandoned him for purposes of his first PCRA appeal by failing to file an appellate brief and that Appellant’s relief under subsection (b)(l)(ii) is not controlled by the Gamboa-Taylor line of case law. Thus, as discussed previously, Appellant has made sufficient allegations to invoke subsection (b)(l)(ii). Appellant alleges that he did not receive the review to which he was entitled through no fault of his own. On appeal, Appellant was assigned counsel who could not raise the ineffectiveness claims he wanted to pursue. See Commonwealth v. Appel, 689 A.2d 891 (Pa.1997) (<HOLDING>). Such an infirmity was compounded when counsel
holding that ineffectiveness of postconviction counsel could establish cause to reopen judgment but ineffectiveness of postconviction appellate counsel could not holding ineffectiveness cannot be raised for first time on appeal holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel holding that it would be improper for original trial counsel to raise the issue of his own alleged ineffectiveness in a posttrial habeas corpus case holding that counsel cannot raise his or her own ineffectiveness