based on whether KSU had the authority to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 467, 65 S.Ct. 347. We easily resolve this question by examining the enabling legislation, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 76-723. Nothing in the statute itself makes entering into a contract waiving immunity an ultra vires act. Indeed the contrary is true-this legislation explicitly gives KSU, as a state educational institution, expansive, unlimited authority to contract with the DOE so that KSU may participate in student financial assistance programs. Further, unlike in other Kansas statutes, there is no provision in § 76-723 disclaiming a waiver or prohibiting consent to waive. See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 75-6116(g) ( ement Co. (In re Estate of Fernandez), 123 F.3d 241, 244-46 (5th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), amended by 130 F.3d 1138 (5th Cir.1997); cf.
holding that the alien tort statute itself is not a waiver of sovereign immunity holding that the united states is liable for interest only in the event of a clear statutory waiver of sovereign immunity holding that the waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear and unequivocal holding attempted statutory waiver of sovereign immunity under  106a unconstitutional and listing similar cases holding that section 106a mandates an automatic waiver of sovereign immunity and thereby impliedly repeals the ftcas exhaustion requirement