circumstances. Additionally, the evidence clearly showed that the officers were engaged in conduct that qualifies for immunity and that the officers were not the proximate cause of .Mines’s injuries. Mines did not refute this evidence, nor did she proffer any evidence indicating that additional discovery would challenge the officers’ immunity defense. Therefore, the trial court erred in denying Officer Clifton and Officer Davis’s summary-judgAient motion based on immunity. Likewise, the materials before us demonstrate that Homewood is entitled to- immunity. Section 6-5-338(b), Ala. Code 1975, provides that the immunity enjoyed by peace officers extends to “governmental units or agencies authorize^ to appoint peace officers.” See also Ex parte City of Gadsden, 781 So.2d 936 (Ala. 2000)(<HOLDING>). Accordingly, because Officer Clifton and
holding that in the absence of a statute providing immunity the defense of sovereign immunity is not available to a municipal corporation in an action for damages alleged to be caused by the tortious conduct of the municipality holding that an officer applying for a warrant without probable cause may be entitled to qualified immunity but is not entitled to absolute immunity holding officers engaged in search entitled to immunity holding that because the officers decision to pursue the suspect was a discretionary act entitled to immunity the plain language of  65338b ala code 1975 extended that immunity to the municipality that employed thei officer recognizing that defendants employed by a municipality can invoke qualified immunity