vacates an award and directs a rehearing is not appealable. Because Struss’ challenge is to a lower court order of the latter type, the order in the instant case is not appealable. Our construction of § 25-2620(a)(5) is comparable to the construction placed on statutes in other states with arbitration statutes similar to those in Nebraska and derived from the Uniform Arbitration Act. See, e.g., Stolhandske v. Stern, 14 S.W.3d 810 (Tex. App. 2000); Prudential Securities, Inc. v. Vondergoltz, 14 S.W.3d 329 (Tex. App. 2000); Kowler Associates v. Ross, 544 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. App. 1996); Dept. of Transp. v. State Employ. Ass’n, 581 A.2d 813 (Me. 1990); Carner v. Freeman, 175 So. 2d 70 (Fla. App. 1965). See, similarly, Airports Com’n v. Airports Police Fed., 443 N.W.2d 519, 523 (Minn. 1989) (<HOLDING>). Notwithstanding the district court’s order
holding that pennsylvanias equivalent of 171098a5 implies that an appeal cannot be taken from an order vacating an arbitration award and directing a rehearing holding that even though appellant was not entitled to appellate review of order vacating award and directing rehearing  as of right  the minnesota constitution gave the minnesota supreme court independent power to review any case holding that an order vacating an arbitration award and directing a rehearing is the functional equivalent of an order granting a new trial holding that order vacating award and ordering rehearing is analogous to order granting new trial holding that an appeal from an order vacating an award while directing a rehearing is an appeal improvidently taken