statute that stated, [n]othing in this article shall constitute a waiver of the immunity of the state from any action. The exercise of authority provided in this article shall not constitute the provision of liability insurance protection under Article I, Section II, Paragraph IX of the Constitution. OCGA § 45-9-5. This language is almost identical to OCGA § 36-85-20, the statute at issue here. In Price we examined OCGA § 45-9-5 and concluded that the expressed legislative intent must give way to the mandate of the constitution. Id. at n. 2. In Price we rejected out of hand the assertion that the program of self-insurance did not constitute liability insurance within the meaning of the constitution. See also Martin v. Dept. of Public Safety, 257 Ga. 300 (357 SE2d 569) (1987) (<HOLDING>). We recently rejected a similar argument in
holding that selfinsurance program covering employees waived the sovereign immunity of the department of public safety in spite of language contained in ocga  4595 holding that sovereign immunity barred a wrongful death claim against the board and stating that the only question is whether the boards sovereign immunity protection was waived emphasis added holding that a claim that sovereign immunity has been waived is itself waived if not argued on appeal holding that the legislature has in clear and unambiguous language waived sovereign immunity against elected public officials and governmental entities defined by the act to be employers holding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred a claim for money damages against the librarian of congress in his official capacity because immunity had not been waived and the exceptions to immunity did not apply