because it perceives its original judgment to be incorrect.” Weeks v. Jones, 100 F.3d 124, 128-29 (11th Cir. 1996) (quotation omitted). Indeed, “errors that affect substantial rights of the parties are outside the scope of Rule 60(a),” and “may be corrected under Rule 60(b) if brought to the attention of the district court within the one year time limit.” Warner v. City of Bay St. Louis, 526 F.2d 1211, 1212 (5th Cir. 1976) (footnote omitted). The district court’s correction here was not the sort contemplated by Rule 60(a). The court's material change to its sanctions order, which made liable ■ a party excluded from the award entered some two-and-a-half years earlier, is the type of correction that must be sought under Rule 60(b) within a year from the date the order is entered. See id. (<HOLDING>). We come to that conclusion for a number of
holding that the proper rate for prejudgment interest is the rate fixed by the parties in a contract holding that rule 60a did not authorize the district court to change the rate of interest in its initial order holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding prejudgment interest at the colorado statutory rate of 8 percent holding that where a partys motion seeking an amended judgment to include an award of prejudgment interest did not invoke a specific federal rule of civil procedure the district court correctly construed it as a motion under rule 60a since the amended judgment did not affect substantive rights but merely corrected a judicial oversight namely the district courts failure to include the monetary award in the original judgment holding that rule 60a is the proper vehicle for correcting a judgment in order to provide for an award of prejudgment interest where among other things governing law would make the interest award automatic or the district court clearly intended to make the interest award in its prior order