of the application of the § 3.306(b)(1) “usual effects” clause the RO would have erred in “rely[ing] on the finding that one disorder (hyperthyroidism) preexisted service in order to deny service connection for another separate disorder, hypothyroidism, and implicitly conclud[ing] that it too preexisted service.” R. at 25. This Court cannot controvert findings made by the Board that are not adverse to the appellant. See 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(4) (as amended by the Veterans Benefits Act of 2002 Pub.L. No. 107-330, § 401, 116 Stat. 2820, 2832 (Dec. 6, 2002) (providing for Court to reverse or set aside only findings of fact “adverse to the claimant”)); Roberson v. Principi, 17 Vet.App. 135, 138 (2003) (per curiam order); see also Nolen v. Gober, 222 F.3d 1356, 1360-1361 (Fed.Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, we hold that the conceded RO error
recognizing that only a claimant is entitled to the secretarys assistance in the development of the facts pertinent to the claim the benefit of the doubt and the determination whether the claim is well grounded holding that claim construction is a matter of law for the court to determine holding that once secretary determined that claim was well grounded it was improper for this court to reconsider matter holding that because a claim was never raised in the district court this court would not consider it for the first time on appeal holding that even if an agreement that title would pass once financing was obtained the most a creditor could claim was a security interest once the good was delivered