of the CLAM Sale were treated as distributions to Richard and Todd. The effect of these transactions was to transfer money from one Kitchin-controlled entity to pay the debts of another Kitchin-con-trolled entity resulting in harm to the Trust. On this basis, this Court finds that Richard exercised sufficient control over Kitchin LLC to satisfy the first prong of the Ashley test. Having established control, this Court also finds that the totality of the circumstances warrants piercing the corporate veil. Looking to the substance of the CLAM Sale and the CAP Payments, this Court recognizes that both Richard and Todd treated the debts of Chester Auto Parts and Kitchin LLC as indistinguishable. See Cureton v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 198 F.3d 107, 127 fn. 5 (3d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Neither Richard nor Chester Auto Parts
holding that alter ego is shown from the total dealings of the corporation recognizing that the corporate entity is disregarded to prevent fraud or an injustice not to inflict an obligation on an innocent corporation and that the fraud or inequity sought to be eliminated must be that of the party against whom the alter ego doctrine is invoked holding jurisdiction over an individual may not usually be predicated on jurisdiction over a corporation unless the corporation is the alter ego of the individual or when the individual perpetrates a fraud holding an alter ego action could be brought by the debtor corporation under texas law recognizing that pursuant to the traditional application of the alter ego doctrine corporate form may be disregarded when the corporation is the mere instrumentality or business conduit of another corporation or person