we first noted that the State presented no evidence to show that the defendant gave his brother-in-law explicit or implicit consent to enter or use the defendant’s bedroom. Id. at 316. Furthermore, we noted that the State presented no evidence that the brother-in-law ever entered the defendant’s bedroom, with or without the defendant’s consent. Id. We therefore held that once the officers received notice that the defendant lived in the bedroom, the officers were obligated to investigate further to determine if the brother-in-law truly-had authority to consent to a search of the bedroom. Id. at 317. Because the officers did not investigate further, we reversed the judgment of the trial court. Id. at 318; see also Riordan v. State, 905 S.W.2d 765, 772 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); Reynolds v. State, 781 S.W.2d 351, 355
holding that the defendants mother validly consented to a search of a motor home parked in the driveway of her house when the motor home was connected by an electrical cord to her house the mother was observed entering the motor home repeatedly and the mother apparently had supervisory authority over two teenage girls who were inside the motor home because it was reasonable to conclude that the mother had common authority over the motor home sufficient to give valid consent holding that babysitter living in home connected via ramp to defendants home had no authority to consent to search of defendants home holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendants home was invalid because contraband was picked up by defendant rather than being delivered to his home and affidavit failed to provide facts establishing a nexus between contraband and defendants home holding that child residents had no actual or apparent authority to consent to search of mothers home holding that consent searches do not require probable cause to justify the search of a home