against self-incrimination may conflict with a defendant’s right to compel that same individual to be a witness in his behalf under the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 170, 267 S.E.2d at 731. One way that this conflict may be resolved, as we discussed in Haverty, is through a grant of immunity. This need for a grant of immunity arises by virtue of the fact “that the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process for a criminal defendant include[s] not only the right to subpoena the witness, but also to have him testify.” Id. at 171, 267 S.E.2d privilege outside the jury’s presence adhere to this practice as a means of preventing the jury from drawing any improper inferences from the witness’ decision to exercise his constitutional privilege. See Bowles v. U.S., 439 F.2d 536, 541 (C.A.D.C.1970) (<HOLDING>); U.S. v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1211 (1st
recognizing that exercise of trial courts decision regarding witness invocation of fifth amendment in jurys presence requires consideration of defendant being entitled to have his defense fully presented to the jury recognizing danger of unfair prejudice resulting from fifth amendment invocation injurys presence is not so great when the defense rather than the government seeks to draw inferences from a witnesss silence  recognizing that policy reasons undergirding assertion of fifth amendment privilege outside jurys presence apply even if privilege is invalid recognizing privilege recognizing concerns that invocation of fifth anendment in jurys presence will have a disproportionate impact on their deliberations and identifying principle that guilt may not be inferred from exercise of privilege as underpinning of rule that jury should not draw inferences from witness decision to exercise constitutional privilege against selfin crimination