is substantially the same as a claim for false arrest under New York law.” Weyant v. Okst, 101 845, 852 (2d Cir.1996). Therefore, the elements of a cause of action for false arrest under both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New York law are: “ ‘(1) the defendant intended to confine [the plaintiff], (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.’ ” Singer, 63 F.3d at 118 (quoting Broughton, 37 N.Y.2d at 456, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 93, 335 N.E.2d 310). Where, as here, an arrest is made without a warrant, the existence of probable cause is an affirmative defense that must proved by the defendant. See Broughton, 37 N.Y.2d at 458, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 95, 335 N.E.2d 310; see also Weyant, 101 F.3d at 852 (<HOLDING>). Probable cause, or reasonable cause as it is
holding that the existence of probable cause is a complete defense to a  1983 claim alleging false arrest holding that probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest holding that existence of probable cause to arrest constitutes justification and is a complete defense to an action for false arrest  quoting bernard v united states 25 f3d 98 102 2d cir 1994 holding that the existence of probable cause for an arrest is a complete defense to a first amendment retaliation claim under the doctrine of qualified immunity holding that there is no  1983 cause of action for false arrest unless the arresting officer lacked probable cause