phrase “any trial” as encompassing all trials, including those unrelated to motor vehicle operation. The phrase is already as expansive as possible. Adding the modifier “civil or criminal,” as the Legislature did in the crash report provision, would serve only to emphasize — or perhaps even restrict — the provision’s scope. In fact, the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles has argued that the modifier “civil or criminal” renders the crash report provision inapplicable to administrative proceedings, such as license suspension hearings, that are neither civil nor criminal. This case does not require us to address that argument, which the district courts have consistently rejected. See Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Corbin, 527 So.2d 868, 872 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (<HOLDING>); see also Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor
holding that exclusionary rule does not extend to proceedings other than criminal trials holding that a defendant does not have the right to be represented by counsel in postconviction proceedings which are civil proceedings holding that to narrowly interpret the accident report privilege as being applicable only in criminal and civil trials in the literal sense of these terms but not in administrative proceedings would be to substantially diminish its effectiveness holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to proceedings other than criminal trials holding that by its terms rule 50 applies only to jury trials