Mario,” (Id. ¶ 15); and "negligently mismanaged the transference phenomenon by attempting to have sex with Mario on the way to Denver," (Id. ¶ 16), make it clear to the Court that Plaintiff's counsel is merely attempting to fit the intentional abuse and manipulation of an essentially helpless young man in Bullis' charge into the constraints of the FTCA by placing the word "negligent” before each description of Bullis' intentional acts. While the Court is deeply disturbed by the allegations of abuse by Bullis, it cannot countenance an overly broad reading of the FTCA which would extend the waiver of immunity beyond that which Congress intended. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-18, 100 S.Ct. 352, 356-57, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979); United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. at 814
holding all exceptions to discharge under  523a must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence holding that an employer did not regard the plaintiff as disabled holding due regard must be given to the exceptions to the ftca holding that intent of parties to choice of law must be given effect holding that prejudice is not an element to be considered in regard to the failure to give mandated statutory notice