appellant continued to perform services as appellee’s independent sales agent in the territory designated in said modified agreement until such time as he received appellee’s termination letter dated May 27,1997. Analysis Based on the summary judgment evidence in the record, we reject appellee’s first argument. ' Appellee’s letter dated October 29, 1996, is only one of a series of writings relating to the parties’ agency transaction. In considering the legal ef- feet of these -writings, we must read them in conjunction with one another and in the light of all the surrounding circumstances. Smart v. Tower Land and Inv. Co., 597 S.W.2d 333, 337 (Tex.1980); Central Power & Light Co. v. Del Mar Conservation Dist., 594 S.W.2d 782, 789-90 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1980, writ refd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). After considering the three letters together
holding that by statute an assault is established by proving a menacing threat which may or may not be accomplished by a specific intent to injure holding that when a contract is signed by one party but not the other the manifestation of consent by the nonsigning party is sufficient to bind that party holding that in order for a contract to be enforced it is necessary that all the essential terms of the contract must first be established by competent evidence and shown to be definite certain clear and unambiguous holding that lack of consent may be established by adequate circumstantial evidence holding that validity of contract may be established by one or more writings signed by party to be charged