terms of the trust hereinafter described concerning the other one-half (50%) of the options to purchase shares as a result of owning the “fair value” options. Randall purchased all of the stock options in November 1998, so he acquired them while he and Ginger were married. Also, none of the stock options were awarded for work done outside of the parties’ marriage. Randall was given the opportunity to purchase the stock options because of his management position with his company. The stock option plan recites that management employees were given this opportunity in order to motivate them to exert their best efforts on behalf of the company. However, because Randall bought the stock options in 1998, they were not something that would be awarded in the fu Tex.App.-El Paso 1992, no writ) (<HOLDING>); In re Marriage of Joiner, 755 S.W.2d 496, 498
holding that stock plan to which employer and employee spouse both made contributions and whose value was dependent on length of employee spouses employment was a deferred compensation retirement plan holding that stock options that could be purchased but not sold without company consent during marriage were community property even though value of options was dependent upon employee spouses postdivorce employment holding that an extended earnings plan was not an employee pension benefit plan because the payment of benefits was not contingent upon retirement or the employee attaining a certain age holding that a debtors interest in an erisaqualified employercontrolled stock bonus and profit sharing retirement trust was excluded from the debtors estate pursuant to 11 usc  541c2 and applicable state spendthrift trust law where the plan involved no active participation by the employee where the plan included a statutorily required antialienation provision and where the plan precluded borrowing and withdrawals by the debtor except on the debtors death termination of employment disability retirement or termination of the plan holding that where employee gave notice to employer of injury and employer told employee that nothing could be done for him through workmans compensation employer had breached statute and was liable for medical treatment which was reasonable and necessary to restore employee to maximum usefulness