business is a disputed question of fact which cannot be resolved on summary judgment. State Auto disputes Appellants’ arguments and also posits in the alternative that, even if Kraus was an “insured” at the time he committed the acts in question, Appellants’ false imprisonment claims were subsumed by their sexual assault claims. As discussed below, we conclude that the district court correctly found that the determination of whether Kraus was an “insured” under the policy is a question of law where the pertinent facts are undisputed, that the policy is not ambiguous, and that Kraus’s acts fall within the Criminal-Acts Exclusion. Because we affirm the district court on those grounds, we do not reach State Auto’s alternative argument in support 2d 349, 633 N.W.2d 707 (Wis.Ct.App.2001) (<HOLDING>); Michelet v. Scheuring Sec. Servs. Inc., 680
holding the question of whether insurance companys requests were reasonable under policy language was a fact question holding that the question of whether an employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment or while performing duties related to the conduct of the employers business for purposes of insurance coverage were questions of fact that precluded summary judgment particularly since there was a question regarding the employees intent in performing the act in question holding that issues of fact precluded summary judgment on the question of whether an employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment for purposes of insurance coverage when the employee was simply sitting in his vehicle in his employers parking lot waiting for the business to open at the time the accident occurred holding that it is well established that whether an employees actions were within the scope of employment is a question of fact and even if some of the actions were unauthorized the question of whether the actions were within the scope of employment is for the jury holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact