arrest was excessive”); Santiago v. City of N.Y., No. 00 CV 7161, 2002 WL 484139, at *3 n. 6 (N.Y.Sup. Feb. 26, 2002) (noting that “irrespective of the existence of probable cause, other causes of action interposed by the plaintiff, such as assault and battery based on the use of excessive force, are not precluded”). If the force used against plaintiff was more than necessary under all the circumstances, then plaintiff is entitled to recover. See Hinton v. City of N.Y., 13 A.D.2d 475, 212 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1st Dep’t 1961) (affirming an award of damages where plaintiff, while being lawfully arrested, was struck by several police officers); Jones v. State, 33 N.Y.2d 275, 352 N.Y.S.2d 169, 307 N.E.2d 236 (N.Y.1973) (generally); see also Pastre v. Weber, 717 F.Supp. 992, 994-995 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (<HOLDING>). The parties here disagree about the degree of
holding that search of car was not incident to arrest where arrestee had exited and locked car before he was approached by officer and then arrested holding that the fourth amendment sets the applicable constitutional limitations on the treatment of an arrestee detained without a warrant up until the time such arrestee is released or found to be legally in custody based upon probable cause for arrest holding that state trooper used excessive force under section 1983 in making arrest where trooper vented anger by striking arrestee on head arms and ribs and by kicking arrestee in groin while he was lying on his stomach holding that where an officer threw an arrestee against a van kneed him in the back pushed his head into the side of a van and searched his groin area in an uncomfortable manner such force was de minimis force holding that a police officers rape of an arrestee was outside the scope of his employment