that all three confer discretion and make application a condition of eligibility. Plaintiff takes no position on whether the 1965 or 1973 plan applies but argues that the 1995 plan does not apply because it was enacted after Pickard’s right to benefits vested. I conclude that the 1965 plan controls. Plans or plan amendments that take effect after an employee has terminated employment generally do not affect the employee’s right to benefits. Pratt v. Petroleum Prod. Mgmt, Inc. Employee Sav. Plan & Trust, 920 F.2d 651, 661 (10th Cir.1990) (stating that an employee is entitled to benefits in accordance with the terms of the plan as of the date of termination from employment); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Associates’ Health & Welfare Plan v. Wells, 213 F.3d 398, 403 (7th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Pickard terminated employment in 1966, at
holding pension benefits rolled into ira were received by plan participant for purposes of ltd benefit offset because administrator had discretionary authority to review plan holding that plan amendment which took effect after benefits were received was inapplicable holding that claims were preempted where the factual basis of the complaint was the denial of reimbursement of plan benefits holding that erisa permits suits to recover benefits only against the plan as an entity and thus the beneficiary had erred by suing her exhusbands employer and plan administrator when proper party would have been the benefits plan itself holding that when a plan fiduciary initially determines that a covered employee is eligible for benefits and later determines that the employee is not  eligible for those benefits by virtue of additional medical information received the plan fiduciary is not required to obtain proof that a substantial change in the ltd recipients medical condition occurred after the initial determination of eligibility and noting that a contrary holding would basically prohibit a plan fiduciary from ever terminating benefits if it later discovered evidence that the erisa plaintiff was not disabled at the time of the initial grant of benefits and that such a rule would have a chilling effect on the prompt ness of granting initial benefits in the first place