cause to search, (2) a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, and (3) reasonable procedures). 8 . 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908. 9 . See, e.g., People v. Ritchie, 130 Cal.App.3d 455, 181 Cal.Rptr. 773, 774 (1982) (noting in dicta that. the dissipation of blood alcohol evidence over time is a "special factor" that "triggers ... warrantless intrusion into the body"); State v. Entrekin, 98 Hawai'i 221, 47 P.3d 336, 348 (2002) (stating that exigent circumstances were "clearly present" because alcohol dissipates from bloodstream); State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 775 P.2d 1210, 1212 (1989) (stating that dissipation of alcohol in blood creates an "inherent exigency which justifies [a] warrantless search"); DeVaney v. State, 259 Ind. 483, 288 N.E.2d 732, 735 (1972) (<HOLDING>); State v. Baker, 502 A.2d 489, 493 (Me.1985)
holding that rough handling under the exigent circumstances present was not excessive force holding that once the scene was secure exigent circumstances no longer existed and the police were required to obtain a search warrant recognizing exigent circumstance exception to warrant requirement holding that exigent circumstances were created by dissipation of bloodalcohol content in time needed to obtain a warrant holding that exigent circumstances were present because evidence of bloodalcohol content could disappear during the time necessary to obtain a warrant