right to cross-examine, and to offer evidence of his own” where the sentencing proceeding effectively adds a new charge requiring additional fact-finding and leading to additional punishment, explicitly declined to overrule Williams. See Specht, 386 U.S. at 608, 87 S.Ct. 1209. Although a stronger argument can be made that the death-eligibility phase of a capital sentencing proceeding is similar to a proceeding qualifying for enhanced due process protections under Specht, there is a constitutionally significant distinction between statutory aggravating factors necessary to establish death-eligibility and nonstatutory aggravating factors that may be considered only after a defendant has been determined to be death eligible. See United States v. Bourgeois, 423 F.3d 501, 507 (5th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>) (relying on Jones v. United States, 527 U.S.
holding imposition of the death penalty proportionate where the trial court found two aggravating circumstances ccp and contemporaneous murder two statutory mitigating factors and a number of nonstatutory mitigating factors holding that failure to charge nonstatutory aggravating factors in indictment is not constitutional error because under the fdpa only statutory factors expose a criminal defendant to the death penalty holding that if the imposition of the death penalty depends on the existence of aggravating factors a jury must find those factors beyond a reasonable doubt holding that the fifth amendment does not require the government to charge nonstatutory aggravating factors in the indictment because the finding of a nonstatutory aggravated alone will not support imposition of the death penalty holding that the grand jury need not find nonstatutory aggravating factors