define the range of penalties for crimes.”), overruled on other grounds by Zimmennan v. State, 860 S.W.2d 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). By extension, we conclude that the prosecutor acts within his authority when he recommends a sentence of life without parole in a capital trial. The Board has no jurisdic tion during the sentencing phase of a criminal trial, nor does it have the authority to prescribe whether an offender should be statutorily eligible for parole based on the nature of the crime committed. We therefore reject appellant’s contention that the prosecutor’s election amounts to a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. See Wilson v. State, 348 S.W.3d 32, 42-44 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. filed); cf. O’Bryan v. State, 591 S.W.2d 464, 476 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (<HOLDING>), superseded on other grounds by statute,
holding that the trial court properly refused defendants instruction because it invaded the province of the jury holding that no mental health expert is competent to express an opinion about whether a particular set of facts constitutes a mitigating circumstance because that would invade the province of the judge and jury holding that where the capital defendants future dangerousness is at issue and state law prohibits the defendants release on parole due process requires that the sentencing jury be informed that the defendant is parole ineligible holding that a jury does not invade the province of the board when it determines the probability of a capital defendants future dangerousness holding that the court is limited in amending a verdict after discharge of the jury and cannot invade the province of the jury