of constitutional error, there has been an advancement in DNA technology that could demonstrate a viable claim of actual innocence, and the habeas petitioner faces execution, the Court acted within its discretion in finding that good cause was shown to make limited processes of discovery available to Cherrix. See Bracy, 520 U.S. at 909, 117 S.Ct. 1793 (stating that it is the duty of the court to provide the necessary facilities and procedures for an adequate inquiry); compare Jenkins, 1992 WL 32342, at *1 (finding that the habeas petitioner had shown good cause to use discovery devices of the Federal Rules because the DNA fingerprinting tests petitioner sought to utilize were unavailable at the time of his trial); Gaitan-Campanioni v. Thornburgh, 111 F.Supp. 1355, 1356 (E.D.Tex.1991) (<HOLDING>). Petitioners argue that Cherrix should not be
holding that while as a general matter discovery should be freely permitted  j jurisdictional discovery is justified only if the plaintiff reasonably demonstrates that it can supplement its jurisdictional allegations through discovery holding that district court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion to extend discovery where no effort was made to explain why the requested discovery could not have taken place within the original discovery period holding that although discovery is permitted in habeas cases only by leave of court court should nor hesitate to allow discovery where it will help illuminate issues underlying applicants claim holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law recognizing trial courts decision on discovery issues implies a finding that requested discovery was not reasonably available