Co. v. Broeckelman, 957 S.W.2d 461, 465 (Mo.Ct.App.1997), citing Rice v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 946 S.W.2d 40, 42 (Mo.Ct.App.1997). However, “where language in an insurance contract is unequivocal, it is to be given its plain meaning notwithstanding the fact that it appears in a restrictive provision of a policy.” Harrison v. MFA Mutual Insurance Co., 607 S.W.2d 137, 142 (Mo.1980) (en banc); see, e.g., Hartford Casualty Insurance Co. v. Budget Rent-A-Car of Missouri, Inc., 864 S.W.2d 5, 6 (Mo.Ct.App.1993) (auto exclusion in commercial general liability policy found unambiguous); Shelter Mutual Insurance Co. v. Politte, 663 S.W.2d 777, 779 (Mo.Ct.App.1983) (auto exclusion in homeowner’s insurance policy); cf. Northland Insurance Cos. v. Russo, 929 S.W.2d 930, 934 (Mo.Ct.App.1996) (<HOLDING>); American States Insurance Co. v. Porterfield,
holding that a professional liability policy provided primary coverage over a general liability policy for acts committed by a pastor during counseling sessions holding claim for injuries arising out of use of truck and not from negligent supervision excluded from coverage by auto exclusion in commercial general liability policy no claim that language in policy was ambiguous or unclear holding identical exclusion was consistent with public policy of cost containment and consumer choice evidenced by statutory scheme that tied uim coverage to liability coverage and authorized named driver exclusions holding that there was no coverage because there was no occurrence within the meaning of the policy because defective workmanship does not constitute an accident or an occurrence under a commercial general liability policy holding two exclusions in commercial general liability policy were ambiguous because coverage provided in one section was taken away in another section