Second, he argues that the court erred in concluding that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his prompt presentment right by executing the “Commissioner’s Waivers.” The motion court did in fact list the factors that it considered in determining whether the appellant’s third written statement and his oral statement were given voluntarily, and so the appellant’s first argument lacks merit. We agree with the appellant’s second argument, however, that the motion court erred in finding that the appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his prompt presentment right. “[A] defendant may specifically waive his right to prompt presentment, provided such waiver is knowingly and intelligently made.” Johnson, supra, 282 Md. at 332, 384 A.2d 709. See also Logan, supra, 289 Md. at 470, 425 A.2d 632 (<HOLDING>). In Williams, supra, the Court explained the
recognizing requirement of knowing intelligent waiver recognizing that courts will enforce waiver of appeal rights when waiver is knowing and voluntary holding that knowing intelligent and voluntary waiver standard set out in johnson v zerbst 304 us 458 58 sct 1019 82 led 1461 1938 is the one to be met for an effective waiver of the requirement of a prompt initial appearance holding a waiver of a substantial constitutional right must be a voluntary knowing and intelligent act holding that record did not show voluntary or intelligent waiver