proceeding under 21 U.S.C. § 848, as opposed to the civil forfeiture proceeding at issue in this case. See Oberlin, 718 F.2d at 896. Furthermore, Oberlin recognized this distinction, noting that the defendant’s criminal conviction and the criminal forfeiture were intended as a penalty, and thus abated. Id. Potter also argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977), eliminates the distinction between in rem and in personam proceedings such that those labels can no longer be the basis for distinguishing civil and criminal forfeiture proceedings. Thus, she contends, Shaffer calls into question the validity of Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 676-79, 94 S.Ct. 2080, 2088-90, 40 L.Ed.2d 452 (1974) (<HOLDING>). Shaffer is distinguishable from
holding that 18month delay in filing forfeiture action did not violate due process holding recoupment statute unconstitutional because it did not provide for a hearing prior to entry of judgment holding that the defendants property interest requires a preseizure hearing holding a puerto rican forfeiture statute modeled after  881a which did not provide for preseizure notice and hearing did not deny appellant due process recognizing due process right to notice and informal hearing in school disciplinary process