124. The Supreme Court recognized t rly required the husband to comply with the terms of the agreement. Nothing in Code § 20-107 as it existed in 1976 precluded the incorporation of the agreement or the enforcement of its provisions. IV. The husband next contends that the wife’s motion to show cause must fail because it referenced only the April 26, 1976 decree of divorce, which preceded the signing of the agreement on July 8, 1976. We find no merit in this argument. The divorce decree reserved for future determination the issues of support and maintenance. Those issues were settled by the parties’ agreement, which was “approved, ratified, affirmed and incorporated” as the court’s decree by order dated July 9, 1976. See Rogers v. Damron, 23 Va.App. 708, 713, 479 S.E.2d 540, 542 (1997) (<HOLDING>). Although the husband did not raise this issue
holding a motion to revise an enrolled divorce decree because of a discrepancy between the separation agreement and the decree filed more than 5 years after entry of the enrolled decree was properly denied holding that the trial judge had the power to incorporate a settlement agreement in a decree following the entry of a decree of divorce holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because the challenged provisions of the decree had expired holding that the trial court had authority to enforce a marital property settlement agreement that had not been incorporated into the parties final divorce decree recognizing a divorce decree which incorporates a property settlement agreement is a final and conclusive adjudication  