imposed different burdens when suit is original versus modification). Thus, when there is any subsequent custody proceeding after an original determination of conservatorship, as here, the proceeding is a modification and the parental presumption does not apply, regardless of the parties involved. In re P.D.M., 117 S.W.3d at 457-58 (citing V.L.K, 24 S.W.3d at 342-43). Although B.H.M. styled his pleadings as an original petition, and we have determined he has standing to file an original petition pursuant to section 102.003(a)(9), which governs standing in original suits, this does not determine the nature of the suit. See, e.g., In re C.A.M.M., 243 S.W.3d at 217 (describing action to modify custody order after managing conservator’s death as suit to modify); P.D.M., 117 S.W.3d at 456 (<HOLDING>); see also State Bar of Tex. v. Heard, 603
holding that chapter 153s statutory presumption that a childs best interest is served by awarding custody to the parent in original custody proceedings does not apply in chapter 156 modification proceedings in the absence of a similar provision in chapter 156 holding court cannot change custody without showing that change is in best interests of child holding provisions of chapter 156 of texas family code governing modifications clearly apply to suits that attempt to effect change in custody after entry of initial custody order holding fact that the parties failed to communicate and had continuing hostility does not constitute a material change in custody to warrant modification of custody holding that temporary order amounted to order modifying custody of children because language changed custody for an indefinite period