excised the language offensive to Cunningham from HRS § 706-662, see supra note 2, and inserted it into HRS § 706-661, see supra note 1. However, for the reasons discussed infra in section II.D.l, we do not believe, in light of Cunningham, that sections 23 and 24 of Act 230 would survive scrutiny in the federal courts. 17 . Any aggravating fact that HRS § 706-662 requires the sentencing court to find as a precondition to an extended prison term is now constitutionally infirm if not exempt under Cunningham, such as prior or concurrent convictions or a fact admitted by the defendant. 549 U.S. at -, 127 S.Ct. at 860; see also supra note 15. This court recognized the constitutional infirmities contained in HRS § 706-662(5) and (6) in Tafoya, 91 Hawai'i at 271-72, 982 P.2d at 900-01 (<HOLDING>) and in Kaua, 102 Hawai'i at 13, 72 P.3d at 485
holding that a proper review of the sufficiency of the evidence under the due process clause gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony to weigh the evidence and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts holding that when an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction the relevant question is whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt holding that when reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a state criminal conviction the relevant question under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt holding that the facts pertaining to the victims special status and the defendants knowledge of that status were intrinsic to the crime and hence that the sixth amendment required that the facts be found by the trier of fact holding that the issue of defendants actual knowledge should not be resolved on summary judgment but should be left to the trier of fact