has filed a motion for ifp with his complaint. Such a result would run counter to the rationale for establishing a limitations period in the first place, and could be especially harmful in the context of employment litigation, where damages for back pay could mount while the defendant remained unaware of the plaintiffs complaint. In order to avoid this result, the Court holds that once an ifp motion is denied, the statute of limitations will start to run again, and the plaintiff will be required to pay the filing fee within the remaining limitations period or within a reasonable time, whichever is later. See Jarrett v. U.S. Sprint Communications Co., 22 F.3d 256, 259 (10th Cir. 1994); cf. American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 561, 94 S.Ct. 756, 38 L.Ed.2d 713 (1974) (<HOLDING>). Some district courts have adopted a local
recognizing that american pipe established that commencement of a class action tolls the applicable statute of limitations as to all members of the class holding that a class action tolls the statute of limitations only for subsequent individual actions not for subsequent class actions holding that the institution of plaintiffs suit tolls or suspends the running of the statute of limitations governing a compulsory counterclaim holding that the filing of a class action by a class representative without standing tolls the period of limitations with regard to all asserted members of the class and that the amendment of the complaint by the addition of a class member with standing relates back to the original complaint holding that the filing of a complaint in a class action suit suspends the statute of limitations but a denial of class certification reactivates the statute of limitations for potential plaintiffs