that dismiss an indictment for failure to adequately plead an enterprise. See United States v. Marchese, 1991 WL 60338, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.ll, 1991) (concluding that civil RICO cases cited by defendant were not only nonbinding authority from other circuits but also inapposite because they addressed motions to dismiss complaints rather than indictments). 3 . Segal is correct to point out that the Seventh Circuit "does not look favorably on many instances of mail and wire fraud to form a pattern.” Hartz v. Friedman, 919 F.2d 469, 473 (7th Cir.1990). In cases, however, where the Seventh Circuit has held that several acts of mail or wire fraud do not form a pattern, other factors of the continuity analysis were also lacking. See e.g., Lipin Enters. Inc. v. Lee, 803 F.2d 322 (7th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). The Government, in contrast, alleges that the
holding twelve acts designed to defraud only one victim on one occasion insufficient to allege pattern holding that a nineyear scheme by two defendants to defraud a single plaintiff of various real estate holdings constituted a rico pattern holding that factor 10 should not be applied when the victim is the only one at risk holding a defendant may not be convicted of more than one count of dissemination of matter harmful to minors based on one occurrence even if there was more than one victim holding that  2314 does not require specific intent to defraud a certain person a general intent to defraud any person who might fall victim to the schemers plan is sufficient