§ 1291. The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) did not err in rejecting Williamson’s testimony. If a claimant presents objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment and there is no evidence of malingering, “ ‘the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.’ ” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir.2007) (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir.1996)). Although not every reason given by the ALJ met this standard, it was nonetheless proper for the ALJ to discount Williamson’s testimony based on Dr. Eckstein’s observation that there was reason to suspect that Williamson exaggerated her symptoms. See Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Nor did the ALJ err in affording less than
holding when one identified ground for an adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of petitioners claim of persecution the court is bound to accept the ijs adverse credibility determination holding that an adverse credibility determination must be supported by a true inconsistency holding evidence of virtually identical offense was relevant to show intent among other things in trial of charged offense holding that a credibility determination based on among other things a tendency to exaggerate was supported by substantial evidence holding that an aljs decision to discount a subjective claim of drowsiness was supported by substantial evidence where the alj noted among other things that the claimant did not appear drowsy at the hearing