real property of the debt- or’s estate. Because the parcel to be sold includes part of the Signal Hill B property which is not a part of the debtor’s estate nor part of the McMahons’ estate, neither trustee is authorized to sell the property. The court finds no distinction between this case and others in which a trustee has sought court approval to sell real property owned by a partnership and not by the individual partner that had filed bankruptcy. See In re Manning, 831 F.2d at 206-07; In re Funneman, 155 B.R. 197, 198-99 (Bankr.S.D.Ill.1993). Both courts consistently reasoned that the real property in question was not property of the estate and therefore was not subject to sale by the chapter 7 trustee under § 363(f). In re Manning, 831 F.2d at 207; In re Funneman, 155 B.R. at 200 (<HOLDING>); see also Rodeck v. Olszewski (In re
holding that this court lacked jurisdiction under  46110 for lack of finality and that the district court also lacked jurisdiction because the orders were not final and thus not ripe for review holding not only that trustee lacked authorization under  363f but also that bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to approve a sale of nonestate property holding that a consent order purporting to exert jurisdiction over nonestate property cannot be utilized to support a finding of subject matter jurisdiction over claims that otherwise could not be heard in bankruptcy court holding that an award of sanctions under rule 11 survives despite a later determination that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction holding that creditor lacked appellate standing to appeal order of bankruptcy court absent permission of bankruptcy court