procedures and requirements pertaining to nondiscriminatory employment practices.” Brief Amicus Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Council In Support of the Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 2. The EEAC has on many occasions prior to this one participated in cases as amicus in several federal appellate courts, and in the Supreme Court, advocating the interests of employers on various issues. 9 . This issue has been considered by other courts of appeals as well. See, e.g., Talley v. United States Postal Serv., 720 F.2d 505 (8th Cir.1983) (deciding that disparate impact theory is inapplicable), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 952, 104 S.Ct. 2155, 80 L.Ed.2d 541 (1984); Pope v. City of Hickory, 679 F.2d 20 (4th Cir.1982) (same); cf. AFSCME v. State of Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>), reh’g denied, 813 F.2d 1034 (9th Cir.1987);
holding that there is no disparate impact claim under the adea holding that a plaintiff must demonstrate that it is the application of a specific or particular employment practice that has created the disparate impact under attack holding that in title vii disparate impact case an employer may rebut prima facie case of disparate impact by demonstrating that the employment policy at issue is related to the employees job performance and justified by business necessity holding that disparate impact analysis is inapplicable to suit challenging hiring practice that based employee compensation on market rates rather than comparable worth despite demonstrable disparate result and concluding that that analysis is confined to cases that challenge specific clearly delineated employment practice at a single point in the job selection process holding that disparate impact analysis may be applied to subjective employment practices in employment discrimination actions