is so vague that persons “ ‘of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.’ ” United States v. Mena, 863 F.2d 1522, 1527 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 110, 107 L.Ed.2d 72 (1989) (quoting Connelly v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926)). In Papichristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162, 92 S.Ct. 839, 843, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972), the Supreme Court stated that “greater leeway is allowed” in the field of regulatory statutes governing business activities. More importantly, we find the definition of consultation no more vague than other ordinances upheld by the Supreme Court. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 501, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1194, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Nat’l Dairy Products Corp.,
holding constitutional ordinance requiring licensing for the sale of products designed or marketed for use with illegal drugs holding firearms large sums of cash  and uncharged quantities of illegal drugs are admissible to show a defendant is involved in the distribution of illegal drugs holding that the commercial use requirement of section 1125c is virtually synonymous with the in connection with the sale offering for sale distribution or advertising of goods and services requirement of the lanham act holding that the new jersey real estate licensing act is applicable to the sale of a company through a stock sale holding that failure to comply with rule requiring notice of sheriffs sale requires voiding of sale