Order of Police, and thus preclude us from applying strict scrutiny even though the Borougl~ has discriminated against conduct motivated by Orthodox Jewish beliefs. First, the Borough insists that, because the utility poles are on its land, this case is governed by Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 108 S.Ct. 1319, 99 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988), which held that the Free Exercise Clause did not prevent the federal government from implementing a decision, based on religion-neutral criteria, to construct a road and allow timber harvesting on 17,000 acres of national forest land traditionally used by Native Americans for religious practices. Id. at 447-53, 108 S.Ct. 1319; see also Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-701, 708, 106 S.Ct. 2147, 90 L.Ed.2d 735 (1986) (<HOLDING>). According to the Borough, the controlling
holding states may make nondiscriminatory religious practice exemptions but that such exemptions are not constitutionally required holding that religious exercise is any exercise of religion whether or not compelled by or central to a system of religious belief and that the use building or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered  religious exercise holding that a law that treats religious and nonreligious organizations differently offends the principles of the free exercise clause because it is not neutral or generally applicable holding that free exercise clause did not require government to grant religious exemption from generally applicable religionneutral statutory requirement that welfare recipients furnish their social security numbers where no individualized exemptions were allowed holding that religionneutral law that is generally applicable does not violate free exercise clause despite incidental effect on religious practice