in the text or legislative history of OPA remotely approaching the type of extraordinarily clear evidence needed to justify departing from the plain meaning of a statute’s text, we turn to Appellants’ remaining argument. 3. The CERCLA Analogy. Appellants devoted a considerable amount of time and space in their briefs and at oral argument to the proposition that OPA’s similarity with the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (West Supp.1994), requires us to interpret OPA’s claims provision consistently with CERCLA’s provision, which limits the presentation requirement to claims asserted against CERCLA’s Fund. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9612(a). See, e.g., United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 841 (4th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Appellants’ argument is without merit. The
holding that sovereign immunity also applies to cross claims and third party claims holding that cerclas claims presentation provision only applies to claims asserted against the fund holding that the public harm requirement applies to fraudulent inducement claims because the fraud claims arise from related contract claims holding that the ideas exhaustion requirement applies to claims asserted under  1983 holding that claims including constitutional claims must be asserted in trial court to be raised on appeal