404 A.2d 573 (Me. 1979) (concluding new juvenile code retained beneficent and rehabilitative purposes of prior code); State v. Lawley, 91 Wash. 2d 654, 591 P.2d 772 (1979) (three dissenting justices concluded changes in system shifted focus from offender to offense and so policy arguments in McKeiver were not controlling); State v. Schaaf, 109 Wash. 2d 1, 10, 12-13, 743 P.2d 240 (1987) (noting rehabilitation was still purpose of juvenile code and differences continued to distinguish juvenile proceedings, which were not criminal proceedings, with one justice dissenting because juvenile code was punitive like criminal system). We are also mindful that many of the state courts that have addressed this issue in one form or another have declined to extend the constitutional 83 (1974) (<HOLDING>); In re R.Y., 189 N.W.2d 644, 651-53, 655 (N.D.
holding a 15yearold juvenile sentenced to an adult facility is not entitled to jury trial dissent reasoned state is required to give child same constitutional rights given to criminals if it is going to treat child like a criminal holding that statute allowing for transfer of juvenile to adult criminal court does not implicate apprendi because the judges transfer determination does not subject the juvenile to enhanced punishment it subjects the juvenile to the adult criminal justice system holding juveniles do not have constitutional right to a jury trial but striking down statute that allowed juveniles to receive adult sentence without a jury trial three justices dissented reasoning juveniles should be entitled to a juiy trial under all cases because changes to juvenile justice code treated juveniles like criminals holding an unborn child is not a child for purposes of criminal prosecution of mistreatment of a child recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights