for purposes of Trial Rule 4.1 where defendant had temporarily gone to stay with relatives at time of service); Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that evidence supported finding that defendant's father' sonably calculated to inform, the mere fact that the defendant has knowledge of the action will not grant the court personal jurisdiction. Barrow v. Pennington, 700 N.E.2d 477, 478-79 (Ind.Ct.App.1998); see also Overhauser v. Fowler, 549 N.E.2d 71, 73 (Ind.Ct.App.1990) (‘"actual knowledge of the suit does not satisfy due process or give the court in personam jurisdiction.’ ”) (quoting Glennar Mercury-Lincoln, Inc. v. Riley, 167 Ind.App. 144, 152, 338 N.E.2d 670, 675 (1975)); but cf. Reed Sign Serv., Inc. v. Reid, 755 N.E.2d 690, 696-97 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (<HOLDING>), trans. denied (2002); Kendall v. Primmer, 662
holding that the appellate court had jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal on a restraining order and the district court retained jurisdiction to proceed with the trial holding that where defendant received temporary restraining order and had actual knowledge of hearing technical failure to include summons with tro did not deprive trial court of personal jurisdiction holding temporary restraining order void because court waived bond holding temporary restraining order void for lack of requirement of separate bond holding that failure to include right to appeal in statute indicated legislature did not intend to permit appeal from denial of temporary restraining order