attracting ■ a strong candidate and raising money to support that candidate. Tidal Tr. IV, at 54:9-59:18. All of these chilling effects on speech and association — difficulty convincing voters to participate in the political process and vote, attracting strong candidates, raising money to support such candidates, and influencing elected officials — represent cognizable, and recognized, burdens on First Amendment rights. See, e.g., Anderson, 460 U.S. at 792, 103 S.Ct. 1564 (finding that plaintiff was injured by election law that made “[v]olunteers ... more difficult to recruit and retain, media publicity and campaign contributions ... more difficult to secure, and voters ... less interested in the campaign”); Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Blackwell, 462 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>); Benisek v. Lamone, 266 F.Supp.3d 799, 834 (D.
holding that primary election ballot filing fee violated fourteenth amendment and noting that the primary election may be more crucial than the general election in certain parts of texas recognizing that electoral restrictions that affect a political partys ability to perform its primary functions  organizing and developing recruiting supporters choosing a candidate and voting for that candidate in a general election  can constitute severe first amendment burdens holding that ny elec l  2126 unconstitutionally burdens  first amendment rights as applied to a party supporting a crossendorsed candidate running in another partys primary holding that the governor did not have to obtain the consent of the senate for the appointment of a candidate when the first candidate had been rejected by the senate the senate was not in session at the time that the second candidate was appointed and because the legislature which created and therefore controlled the office did not require by statute that the governor seek the senates approval in those circumstances holding candidate for house of representatives had standing to challenge election regulation exempting opponents of selffinancing candidates from certain campaigncontribution limits where plaintiff candidate had declared his candidacy and was demonstrably a selffinancing candidate whose opponents would imminently receive expanded access to campaign funding