to arbitration the question of whether the successor has somehow assumed any of the obligations of the old bargaining agreement.”), with Stardyne, Inc. v. NLRB, 41 F.3d 141, 145 n. 3 (3d Cir.1994) (stating that a "successor [is] not bound by its predecessor’s collective bargaining agreement”), NLRB v. Rockwood Energy and Mineral Corp., 942 F.2d 169, 174 (3d Cir.1991) ("[A] successor is not bound by the substantive terms of its predecessor's labor agreement.”), and United Steelworkers of Am. v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 828 F.2d 1001, 1010 (3d Cir.1987) ("[A] successor employer is not automatically re quired to adopt its predecessor’s collectively bargained agreements, see NLRB v. Burns.”). 4 . Compare Stotter Div. of Graduate Plastics Co. v. District 65, 991 F.2d 997, 1001 (2nd Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>), and Boeing Co. v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists
holding that a successor corporation had a duty to arbitrate the extent of its obligations under its predecessors cba because there was substantial continuity in the business enterprise holding that the operation of a competitive business enterprise which was expected to provide a financial return that would be of benefit to the municipal corporation was proprietary holding that the employer had a protectible interest in its good will where the employee had direct contact with its customers and much of the employers business was repeat business holding  substantial continuity is untenable as a basis for successor liability under cercla holding that in the context of erisa successor liability is not an independent cause of action but simply a theory for imposing liability based on a predecessors erisa violation