See, e.g., Jerry Harmon Motors v. First Nat. Bank, 440 N.W.2d 704 (N.D. 1989) (affirming pretrial change of venue when evidence was presented that significant proportion of small community either had deposits or loans with the bank who was a party or had purchased or repaired an automobile at the car dealer who was the other party). Generally, courts have concluded that more accurate information will be obtained by attempting to impanel a jury. Corbetta Const. Co., Etc. v. Lake Cty. Public Bldg., 381 N.E.2d 758, 768 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (affirming denial of venue change when trial court excused for cause potential jurors affected by the publicity and movant did not exhaust its peremptory challenges); Burns v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 857 N.E.2d 621, 641-42 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (<HOLDING>); Little v. Kobos by and through Kobos, 877
holding that the extent to which parties may examine prospective jurors on voir dire lies within the trial judges discretion holding that absence of defendants from part of voir dire discussing trial publicity with prospective jurors was error under rule 43 holding that venue change was properly denied when trial court allowed extensive voir dire and all but one of the prospective jurors who recalled reading the relevant news articles was excused for cause and the last was not challenged for cause by movant holding that the jurors failure to remember particular facts inquired about on voir dire and the jurors misunderstanding of voir dire questions do not constitute probable prejudice holding that the defendant must renew a motion for a change of venue after voir dire to preserve the issue for appeal