that Judge Coffey’s culpability is abated to some degree by the existence of personal and emotional problems. The JCC also observed that “as a member of the [JCC] for a number of years, Judge Coffey should have been more aware of what would constitute misconduct under the Code.” As noted by Judge Coffey, the suggestion that misconduct committed by a former JCC member is automatically more severe “is an unfair criticism, in that all judges should be held to the same high standard.” See Sup. Ct. R. 38 (applying the commands of the Code to all “judges”). We agree that there is no basis for subjecting a former member of the JCC to a heightened standard, absent, some showing that her position made her aware that her misconduct was offensive to the Code. Cf. Fleischman, 933 P.2d at 569 (<HOLDING>). However, despite Judge Coffey’s assertions to
recognizing that the trial judge must be given a wide range of discretion in determining whether a mistrial should be declared holding that a violation of a witness separation order did not warrant reversal because the jury was completely informed of the conversation between the witnesses  and was given adequate information by which it could judge the reliability and credibility of the revised testimony holding that consideration may be given to whether a judge was informed of the impropriety of her actions holding that the jury is the judge of the weight and credibility given to witness testimony holding that an instruction given after the jury informed the judge that it was unable to reach a verdict and the judge told the jury it had to reach a decision was improper after relying on other cases involving the exercise of supervisory powers and not relying on constitutional grounds