convert a public-forum park into a nonpublic forum. There is no evidence in the record that the beaches have ever been used as a public forum, or that there has ever been a lapse in the application of the restrictive covenant to the beaches. Moreover, were we to hold that IVGID could not exclude persons from the beaches as required by the restrictive covenant, we would be removing “one of the essential sticks in the bundle of property rights” belonging to the prior owner of the 1968 property; namely, the right to exclude others. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980). Of course, there are some limitations on property owners’ ability to enforce that right. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948) (<HOLDING>). However, the general public does not
holding that restrictive covenants in franchise agreements are enforceable to protect the basic product which the franchisor has to sell namely the franchise itself   holding that state courts may not enforce racially restrictive covenants holding that the united states may bring suit against a state to enforce compliance with federal law holding that the restrictive covenants at issue are unenforceable as a matter of public policy holding that courts cannot imply covenants which are inconsistent with express provisions