doubt. We need not reach the merits of this argument because the error, if any, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The element of intent was never a live issue in the case. In this respect, the Bee-man case is distinguishable. There, intent was a principal issue. The defense in Bee-man contended that “although he acted in ways which in fact aided the criminal enterprise, he did not act with the intent of encouraging or facilitating the planning or commission of the offense.” 199 Cal.Rptr. at 69, 674 P.2d at 1327. The court concluded that “where the defense centered on the very element as to which the jury was inadequately instructed ..., we cannot find the error harmless.” Id.; see People v. Caldwell, 36 Cal.3d 210, 224, 203 Cal.Rptr. 433, 441-42, 681 P.2d 274, 282-83 (1984) (<HOLDING>). In the case before us, appellant’s defense
holding that unless an erroneous instruction was unlikely to have changed the result of the trial a reviewing court cannot say that giving the instruction was harmless error holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error holding that a typographical error on the jury verdict form was harmless error because the trial court polled the jurors after the mistake was discovered to make sure that they understood the verdict that they had entered holding that a beeman error was harmless because the challenged instruction could not have affected the jury deliberation and verdict holding that the defendant could not appeal a jury instruction where he did not object to the challenged instruction but in fact requested it and stated he was satisfied with it