determined by the arbitrators, see Daiei, Inc. v. United States Shoe Corp., 755 F.Supp. 299, 303 (D.Haw.1991), the district court did not err. Nor did the district court err in finding that the Panel did not act with manifest disregard of the law when it applied Hawaii law rather than abiding by the contractual choice-of-law provision. Although parties are generally entitled to select the law which applies to contractual claims, we have expressly determined that tort claims are not governed by a contractual choice-of-law provision. See Sutter Home Winery, Inc. v. Vintage Selections, Ltd., 971 F.2d 401, 407-08 (9th Cir.1992) (tort claims are not governed by contractual choice-of-law provisions); Consol. Data Terminals v. Applied Digital Data Sys., 708 F.2d 385, 390 n. 3 (9th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Here, the Panel awarded damages to IEL based
holding that under texas choice of law principles contractual choice of law provisions are generally upheld holding that punitive damages could not be granted because punitive damages are a matter of substantive law and substantive state law  must yield to federal limitations holding that new york law did not preclude an arbitrators award of punitive damages despite a new york choice of law provision because there was no indication in the contract that the parties intended to limit their remedies in arbitration holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law holding that tort law and the law of punitive damages are not controlled by the contract choice of law provision