that: (1) the person, compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated, and (2) the selective treatment was motivated by an intention to discriminate on the basis of impermissible considerations, such as race or religion, to punish or inhibit the exercise of constitutional rights, or by a malicious or bad faith intent to injure the person. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608-09 [105 S.Ct. 1524, 1531-32, 84 L.Ed.2d 547] (1985); LeClair v. Saunders, 627 F.2d 606, 609-10 (2d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 [101 S.Ct. 1418, 67 L.Ed.2d 383] (1981). 960 F.2d at 10-11. The FSK court further held that the plaintiffs’ allegations did not “allege discriminatory treatment based on ... an impermissible factor.” Id.; see also Yapalter v. Bates, 494 F.Supp. 1349 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Here, Plaintiffs only have alleged a
holding that where hospital used balance billing that since the hospital had already received payments from the patient and his health insurer and had agreed to accept that amount as payment in full for its services there was no longer any amount owing to the hospital and thus it could not assert a statutory hospital lien for the difference between its charges and the amount received in light of the negotiated network agreements holding that it was permissible to distinguish between hospital and clinic providers of psychiatric services and private psychiatrists holding that due process entitled indigent defendant to psychiatrist to present insanity defense and crossexamine state psychiatrists because of the tremendous reliance jurors place on psychiatric testimony where there is often no single accurate psychiatric conclusion on legal insanity holding that a private physician contracting with a county psychiatric hospital was liable as a state actor but was not entitled to qualified immunity holding that a company providing administrative purchasing and financial services to a hospital was not a hospital and thus could not be held directly liable under emtala