are “arbitrary, in bad faith, or unconscionable” are “unfair or deceptive” in violation of § 3(a) of that statute. Bernardi’s, 432 Mass, at 435, 735 N.E.2d at 355 (“[Section] 4(1) does not proscribe a particular act or practice, but rather is more general in scope.”). Having declared that what is “arbitrary, in bad faith, or unconscionable” is “unfair or deceptive” is not, however, very enlightening. Perhaps recognizing the difficulty in applying the catch-all provision to the facts of this case, Coady has abandoned reliance on § 4(1) in its final submission to this Court. For that reason, and because there is no evidence of unconscionable conduct or bad faith, this Court declines to address § 4(1) more specifically. Cf. Bernardi’s, 432 Mass. at 427, 434-36, 735 N.E.2d at 350, 355-56 (<HOLDING>); Richard Lundgren, 45 Mass.App.Ct. at 417, 699
holding that normal presumption of ownership in favor of holder of motor vehicle certificate of title may be rebutted despite language of minnstat  168a10 subd 5 providing that the transfer of a motor vehicle is not effective until titling requirements are complied with holding that a motor vehicle dealer may not seek relief from a prospective new dealership in its relevant market area under  41 because it would nullify the more particular requirements of  431 holding that the statutory definition of motor vehicle is not controlling holding that a motor vehicle dealer did not have standing to sue a manufacturer for allegedly unreasonably withholding consent to transfer dealership franchise because the statute the dealer relied on for relief was not intended to provide protection against the loss of an opportunity to acquire an additional franchise holding that the sensible and popular understanding of what a motor vehicle accident entails necessarily involves the motor vehicle being operated as a motor vehicle 