with Plaintiff. See Dkt. No. 22 at ¶¶ 27-32,110,120-21. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged facts that plausibly suggest that Defendant may be held liable for the conduct of its predecessor, i.e., AMSA. As such, the Court denies Defendant’s motion to dismiss this claim. Moreover, the Court agrees with Defendant that, in the circumstances presented in this case, “successor liability” is not a separate cause of action but merely a theory for imposing liability on a defendant based on the predecessor’s conduct. Although the Court was unable to find New York or Second Circuit case law reaching such a holding, other courts have agreed with this finding. See Automotive Indus. Pension Trust Fund v. Ali, No. C-11-5216, 2012 WL 2911432, *8 (N.D.Cal. July 16, 2012) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted); Tindall v. H & S Homes,
recognizing cercla successor liability holding that erisa does not preempt the plaintiffs claim that the erisa plan administrator is liable for medical malpractice where the plaintiff premised the claim solely on state law and did not invoke the erisa plan holding that  successor liability is not a tort it is an equitable tool used to transfer liability from a predecessor to a successor  quotation omitted holding that in the context of erisa successor liability is not an independent cause of action but simply a theory for imposing liability based on a predecessors erisa violation recognizing cause of action for equitable estoppel under erisa