of law, which on appeal is reviewed de novo. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Beecher, 2011 OK CIV APP 1, ¶¶ 7-8, 256 P.3d 1008, 1011. 7 . Muskogee cannot avoid constitutional restrictions on the power of eminent domain by merely labeling the proposed parking facility as a public utility. The purpose and use behind the exercise of eminent domain-here the purpose and use of the parking facility-must be analyzed to discern if it passes constitutional muster. See, e.g., City & County of San Francisco v. Ross, 44 Cal.2d 52, 279 P.2d 529, 533 (1955) (rejecting the argument that the provision of off-street parking facilities at a reasonable rate regardless of ownership and primary purpose of operation ipso facto serves a public purpose); Shizas v. City of Detroit, 333 Mich. 44, 52 N.W.2d 589 (1952) (<HOLDING>); Reel v. City of Freeport, 61 Ill.App.2d 448,
holding the bia did not abuse its discretion in finding petitioner did not satisfy the procedural requirements for his motion in part because petitioner failed to submit a completed application for relief holding that care of the grounds was part of the business of the hospital holding that no consideration existed for part of the settlement holding that a challenge to part b determinations in an order involving both part a and part b must begin in district court holding statute providing for condemnation of property to be used in part for offstreet parking facilities and in part for rental for private business void for failure to satisfy the public purpose test