preemption under § 514, which is merely “a federal defense that cannot provide the basis for removal jurisdiction,” Felix, 387 F.3d at 1158; and complete preemption under § 502(a), which can support removal. Id. at 1156. The complete preemption doctrine asserted by Wellmark is an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule. See Felix, 387 F.3d at 1154. A completely preempted claim “becomes a federal claim and can be the basis for removal jurisdiction.” Coldesina v. Estate of Simper, 407 F.3d 1126, 1137 (10th Cir.2005). “[A] state law claim is only ‘completely preempted’ under Taylor if it can be recharacterized as a claim under [federal law].” See Felix v. Lucent Tech., Inc., 387 F.3d 1146, 1156 (10th Cir.2004); accord Schmeling [v. NOR-DAM ], 97 F.3d [1336] at 1342 [(10th Cir.1996) ] (<HOLDING>). Turgeau v. Administrative Review Bd., 446
recognizing cause of action holding that where congress does not establish a statute of limitations applicable to a federal cause of action a void which is commonplace in federal statutory law  this court has repeatedly borrowed the state law of limitations governing an analogous cause of action holding that tension in supreme court cases can be resolved by reading complete preemption as a term of art  a description of the specific situation in which a federal law not only preempts a state law to some degree but also substitutes a federal cause of action for the state cause of action thereby manifesting congresss intent to permit removal holding that removal is proper based on complete preemption only when congress intended the federal cause of action to be exclusive recognizing the cause of action