days from the filing date (and making public) of the ... indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). But the Act also contains “a long and detailed list of periods of delay that are excluded in computing the time within which the trial must start.” Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 497, 126 S.Ct. 1976, 164 L.Ed.2d 749 (2006). Thus, any period of delay resulting from other proceedings involving the defendant, including delay resulting from a pretrial motion, is excludable from the seventy-day period of the Speedy Trial Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D); United States v. Tinklenberg, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 2007, 2010-16, 179 L.Ed.2d 1080 (2011) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, a “reasonable period of delay”
holding that trial courts limited findings were insufficient to allow determination of whether trial court abused its discretion in denying defendants motion to dismiss his indictment on constitutional speedy trial grounds holding that the speedy trial provision is tolled when a defendants pretrial motion is pending holding a trial court erred in determining that a motion to suppress was waived by a speedy trial demand holding that whether a pretrial motion actually caused or is expected to cause delay of trial is irrelevant to the speedy trial act holding subsection h1d stops the speedy trial act clock upon filing of a pretrial motion regardless of whether the motion has any impact on the trial setting