whether any legal duty independent of ERISA is implicated by defendants’ actions, it also seems clear that “the alleged liability is derived from or dependent upon the existence and administration of [Hartford’s] ERISA-regulated benefit plan,” and thus that plaintiffs quantum meruit claim is “not entirely independent of the federally regulated contract itself, and [is] therefore preempted.” Davila, 542 U.S. at 210, 124 S.Ct. 2488; Radcliff, 377 F.Supp.2d at 563-64 (quoting Davila, 542 U.S. at 213, 124 S.Ct. 2488). Plaintiffs characterization of Count 6 as just using Hartford’s severance plan benefits as a measure of her damages is circular — the amount of those benefits is not an accurate measure of damages for her claims unless she was in fact e 2d 258, 260 (D.Conn.2005) (Eginton, J.) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, plaintiffs quantum meruit claim,
holding widows claim that deceased husbands former employer and its life insurance carrier were negligent in their handling of husbands conversion of benefits was preempted by erisa finding the liability of the defendants is dependent upon the existence of the erisa plan and the interpretation of rights conferred by it holding that it was appellants burden to prove that her husbands death occurred in the scope of employment and that she was eligible for widows benefits holding that erisa does not preempt the plaintiffs claim that the erisa plan administrator is liable for medical malpractice where the plaintiff premised the claim solely on state law and did not invoke the erisa plan holding that the former husbands property from a noninterspousal gift may not be distributed under section 610751 although use of the former husbands separate property may be awarded to the former wife to satisfy the former husbands child support obligation holding that the plaintiffs causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an erisa plan