social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.’ ” Id. at 382-83, 112 S.Ct. at 2542-43 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572, 62 S.Ct. 766, 769, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942)). Thus, First Amendment protection “does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations,” thereby allowing government to regulate obscenity, defamation, “fighting words,” id. at 383, 112 S.Ct. at 2543 (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572, 62 S.Ct. at 769), and threats of violence. See id. at 383, 388, 112 S.Ct. at 2546 (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707, 89 S.Ct. 1399, 1401, 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969)); see also In re: Steven S., 25 Cal.App.4th 598, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 644, 647 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Florida v. T.B.D., 656 So.2d 479, 480-81
holding that the first amendment does not protect true threats against the president holding that although the father did not have physical custody of his children at the time they were removed the children were nonetheless effectively removed from both their parents when they were removed from the physical custody of the mother and placed in another home pursuant to the dispositional decree holding that threats to inflict financial or personal harm are not true threats where no ones personal safety is threatened holding that threats and fighting words are removed  from the scope of the first amendment holding that the defendants purchase of a firearm and ammunition on the same day that he made a threat demonstrates that his threats are more than mere puffery and evidences an intent to carry out the threats