claims of which a signing party has actual knowledge or that he could have discovered upon reasonable inquiry.” Fair v. Int’l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 905 F.2d 1114, 1116 (7th Cir.1990) (quotations omitted); see also Wagner v. NutraSweet Co., 95 F.3d 527, 533 (7th Cir.1996). Neither party disputes that Hampton was aware of the alleged wrongful acts prior to the date she signed the Waiver. Her claims fall within the Waivers’s scope unless Hampton presents a persuasive reason for construing the Waiver to exclude them. Hampton’s primary assertion is that the Waiver did not release her Title VII claims because they did not “arise” until after she received her EEOC right-to-sue letter allowing her to file suit in federal court. Hampton is incorrect. See, e.g., Pierce I, 65 F.3d at 567-68 (<HOLDING>). The natural meaning of the term “arise” in
holding that a plaintiff who has filed a charge with the eeoc is foreclosed from pursuing a state civil action under  411202 because filing a charge with the eeoc is equivalent to the election of an administrative remedy under  411205 holding that in light of a worksharing agreement between the state agency and the eeoc a charge of discrimination filed with the state agency was properly filed with the eeoc on the same date holding that a general release covered plaintiffs claim even though he had already filed an eeoc charge holding that failure of eeoc to transmit charge to phrc within limitations period was subject to equitable tolling where plaintiff requested crossfiling in the cover letter attached to the eeoc charge on the first page of the charge itself and on an official form used by the eeoc for requests for dualfiling holding that where the writings on file were insufficient to constitute an effective charge a charge had not been effectively filed despite the fact that the eeoc had assigned the case a charge number