charge so that its deliberations on percentages of negligence will not be had in a vacuum, or possibly based on a mistaken notion of how a statute operates.” 82 N.J. at 345, 413 A.2d 322. We emphasized that “a jury informed of the legal effects of its findings ... is better able to fulfill its fact finding function.” Id. at 345-46, 413 A.2d 322. See also State v. Mejia, 141 N.J. 475, 485, 662 A.2d 308 (1995) (“As we have repeatedly stated, trial courts ... must inform juries of the effect of their findings.”) (citations omitted); Campo v. Tama, 133 N.J. 123, 140, 627 A.2d 135 (1993) (“We have always emphasized that juries must understand the import of their findings.”) (O’Hem, J., dissenting); Chavanne v. Clover Financial Corp., 206 N.J.Super. 72, 80-81, 501 A.2d 1024 (App.Div.1985) (<HOLDING>); Dimogerondakis v. Dimogerondakis, 197
holding that although trial courts oral opinion may be used as a reference in the interpretation of its written findings of fact it is not a finding of fact holding that ultimate outcome charge should be used to inform a jury of fact that its award will be subject to courts control until child reaches age of maturity holding that claims arising under the age discrimination in employment act may be subject to arbitration recognizing duty of parent to control conduct of child holding that the issue of proximate causation involves application of law to fact which should be left to the fact finder subject to limited review