had opportunity for cross-examination, and. (3) opposing party suffered no prejudice). Further, the Second Circuit has cited Garcia v. Woman’s Hosp., 97 F.3d 810, 814 (5th Cir.1996) (“Among the factors the trial court should examine in deciding whether to allow a reopening are the importance and probative value of the evidence, the reason for the moving party’s failure to introduce the evidence earlier, and the possibility of prejudice to the non-moving party”) with approval. See Matthew Bender & Co., 158 F.3d at 679. District courts in this circuit seem to consider similar factors in determining whether to reopen the evidentiary record before judgment has been made in actions heard without a jury. See Shred-It USA, Inc. v. Mobile Data Shred, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d 604, 607 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (<HOLDING>); John v. Sotheby’s, Inc., 858 F.Supp. 1283,
holding that defense counsels failure to object to testimony did not warrant a new trial because there was no prejudice from admission of the testimony holding that there was no prejudice when evidence complained of would have been admissible against defendant in separate trial holding that when appraising a partys motion to reopen the record posttrial the court must consider 1 whether or not the moving partys failure to submit evidence was the result of its own lack of diligence 2 the extent to which reopening the record might prejudice the nonmovant and 3 where the interests of justice lie holding that posttrial discovery of asserted newly discovered evidence did not satisfy the requirement that the evidence must be such as with reasonable diligence could not have been discovered and produced at trial holding posttrial submissions inadmissible where there was no compelling reason why the trial record should be reopened the failure to introduce the posttrial submission at trial reflected lack of due diligence and admission of evidence would have caused undue prejudice