Ontiveros shot the victim with the intent to cause serious physical injury. If the jury concluded that Ontiveros intended or knew that his conduct would merely cause serious physical injury rather than death, then he did not plan to achieve a result which, if accomplished, would constitute the offense of second-degree murder. Because Ontiveros may have been convicted for a non- s satisfied if the person acts intentionally. A.R.S. § 13-202(C) (2001). 2 . Although the intent to do an act may be inferred from the circumstances of the doing of the act itself, State v. Rodriguez, 114 Ariz. 331, 333, 560 P.2d 1238, 1240 (1977), we may not presume that Ontiveros intended the ordinary consequences of his act. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 522-23, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979) (<HOLDING>). 3 . See also State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz.
holding that jury instruction stating the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts violates due process holding that lack of notice of charges in disciplinary proceedings violates the due process clause holding a judgment in the absence of notice violates due process rights holding that the knowing use of false testimony to obtain a conviction violates due process holding that a conflict of interest on the part of the prosecution violates the due process clause of the virginia constitution