the filing of his third state habeas petition in the California Supreme Court. Under AEDPA, the one-year limitations period is tolled for “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review ... is pending,” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), provided that the petition is timely filed under state law. Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 193, 126 S.Ct. 846, 163 L.Ed.2d 684 (2006). Under California law, a petition is timely as long as it is filed within a reasonable length of time, which requires that a petitioner justify any substantial delay in filing. Velasquez v. Kirkland, 639 F.3d 964, 966-67 (9th Cir.2011). Byrnes’ petition was not timely. First, the delay of 141 days was substantial. See Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); see also Velasquez, 639 F.3d at 966-69.
holding that a difference between approximately 54 days prepreference average days to payment and approximately 67 days preference average days to payment did not make the payments out of the ordinary course of business holding that a difference between 384 days prepreference average number of days to payment and 547 days preference average number of days to payment did not make the payments out of the ordinary course of business holding that delays of 115 days and 101 days were both substantial holding that a trial date 101 days after an initial arraignment but only 55 days after a second arraignment was not an unreasonable delay under  3161h7 holding that 120 days notice was satisfied by 30 days work plus 90 days pay