court the Secretary’s decision to the contrary. The regulatory regime is completely a creation of the Labor Department’s regulations, and under the Administrative Procedure Act, it is only statutes, not agency regulations, that can preclude otherwise available judicial review. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1); Gladysz, 595 F.Supp. at 53-54. In light of the presumption of judicial review, see McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 496, 111 S.Ct. 888, 112 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1991); Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670, 106 S.Ct. 2133, 90 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986), we cannot conclude (despite our suspicions) that Congress intended to preclude the alien from challenging labor certification denials without the alien’s employer. See Block, 467 U.S. at 351, 104 S.Ct. 2450 (<HOLDING>). The district court held that appellants
holding that judicial review is available over the determination of whether extreme hardship exists though no jurisdiction exists to review the ultimate decision of whether to grant a waiver under  1186ac4a holding that where congressional intent is clear a court must give effect to such intent holding that because here the statutes in issue provide for judicial review via citizen suit provisions yet do not set forth a standard for that review judicial review is limited to apa review on the administrative record holding that iiriras permanent rules lack the clear statement of the congressional intent necessary to eliminate habeas review holding that where substantial doubt about congressional intent exists the general presumption favoring judicial review is controlling