request that the court place a limiting instruction in the charge concerning the extraneous offense. Again, as with the two previous points, we find that the defense attorney’s decision not to do so could have been plausible trial strategy. It is possible that he did not ask for the instruction because Amanda’s death was relevant to his defensive position that other factors, besides Appellant’s intoxication, caused victim’s death. We note that Appellant’s trial attorney did request and receive an instruction on concurrent causation. There’s also the very strong possibility that trial counsel reasonably believed that since the evidence of the extraneous offense had come in without objection, his request for a limiting instruction would have been overruled. See Molinar, 910 S.W.2d at 579 (<HOLDING>). We overrule point of error five. In his sixth
holding that the defendant could not show deficient performance if the evidence the defendant claims counsel should have sought to exclude was admissible holding that counsel could have reasonably determined that the trial court would not sustain a rule 403 objection therefore counsels failure to object to this evidence was not deficient performance holding that failure to object to properly admitted evidence was not deficient performance by trial counsel holding that district courts decision that trial counsels failure to object to crawford material was based on a reasonable trial strategy and did not constitute deficient performance under washingtons  first prong was not debatable holding that it was not deficient for counsel to fail to object to a standard instruction that had not been invalidated by this court