to property” and thereby be eligible for revival under the Revival Act, such a claim must not be an action for either personal injury or breach of a contract. Because the warranty claim asserted by Chase is not an action for personal injuries, the crucial question is whether it is a breach of contract action within the meaning of § 25-b. New York courts have interpreted claims for breach of warranty as breach of contract actions within the meaning of GCL § 25-b. Therefore, New York courts would find that a breach of warranty action is not an action for injury to property and would not be revived by the Toxic Tort Revival Act. In Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953), the New York Court of A . 182, 183, 22 N.Y.S.2d 238, 239 (N.Y.City Ct.Kings Co. 1940) (<HOLDING>); see also Great American Indemnity Co. v. Lapp
holding that this courts sixyear statute of limitations is jurisdictional holding that violation of accountants duties mandated by statute did not create a cause of action based on breach of implied contract for employee holding that sixyear contract statute of limitations did not apply reasoning that an action to recover damages for personal injuries based on breach of warranty is only nominally based on contract holding that the sixyear statute of limitations on a written contract is applicable to a cause of action based on a um policy recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract