the bankruptcy court construed his Motion as a request under §§ 503(b)(2) and 503(b)(1)(A). On appeal, Jones has not mentioned § 503(b)(4) or argued that the bankruptcy court erroneously construed his Motion, except to state that the bankruptcy court failed to consider his request under § 330(a)(1). Manning highlighted that Jones’s appellate brief “appears to substitute § 503(b)(1)(A) for 503(b)(4),” which Manning attributes to Jones realizing that "§ 503(b)(4) simply is not applicable to the present case.” (Appellee’s Second Br. 7, ECF No. 10). Without expressing any opinion on the soundness of Manning’s statement, the Court does not consider any claim under § 503(b)(4) because Jones has waived this point. LaBella Winnetka, Inc. v. Vill. of Winnetka, 628 F.3d 937, 943 (7th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). 7 . The Court notes that page 19 of Jones's
holding that appellant waived issue by failing to raise it in opening brief holding that failure to include an issue in statement of issues did not bar the appellant from raising the issue in its opening brief holding that a partys failure to raise an issue in the opening brief waived the issue even though the party raised the issue in his reply brief holding that argument not raised in opening brief is waived holding that appellant waived the issue on appeal by not raising it in its opening brief even though the lower courts decision was based on that point