same reasons that the Defendants are liable under § 1692e(5) of the FDCPA in the Fifth Circuit, they are liable under § 392.301(a)(8). The Defendants are liable under Texas statutory law for filing an improper lawsuit in California to collect on the Baker Debt. “[B]oth the case law and statutes demonstrate that a fair debt collection can be premised on flawed legal proceedings because both federal and state law prohibits fraudulent, deceptive or misleading representations, including those made in judicial or governmental proceedings.” Gibson v. Grupo de Ariel, LLC, 2006 WL 42369, *4, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 539, at *14 (N.D.Tex. Jan. 9, 2006); Eads v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 538 F.Supp.2d 981, 987 n. 7 (W.D.Tex.2008) (citing Gibson and Goldman v. Cohen, 445 F.3d 152, 155 (2d Cir.2006) “(<HOLDING>)”). Thus, as stated in the Memorandum of
holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of  1983 holding that an initial communication within the meaning of the fdcpa includes the initiation of a lawsuit holding that pleadings are initial communication under fdcpa holding that where the violation of the fdcpa was the filing of a lawsuit the statule of limitations begins to run on the date of filing holding that rawlings  a codefendant in the present action  is not a debt collector within the meaning of the fdcpa