would have a restrictive effect on county powers rather than a liberal one — that is, it would be restrictive on the successor governing body. Again, we find the statutory requirement to liberally construe the powers of a county, as long as consistent with our Constitution and general laws, to be compatible with Newman’s policy of prohibiting local governing bodies from binding their successors as to governmental functions unless clearly authorized by enabling legislation. Cunningham argues in the alternative that the payment of severance under his employment contract would be a proprietary function rather than a governmental function, and, hence, the 2008 Council was permitted to bind the 2009 Council as to payment of his severance. See Cowart I, 319 S.C. at 132, 459 S.E.2d at 880 (<HOLDING>). Again, the appointment of a public officer is
holding that where a city enters contract in excess of its statutory power the mere fact that the municipality has received the benefits of the contract which has been performed by the other party does not make the municipality liable either on the theory of ratification estoppel or implied contract in order to do justice to the other party by paying the reasonable value of the property or services holding that if the contract involves the exercise of the municipal corporations business or proprietary powers it is binding on successor bodies if at the time the contract was entered into it was fair and reasonable and necessary or advantageous to the municipality holding that the law in effect at the time a contract is made is as much a part of the contract as if incorporated therein holding that even though certain corporate formalities had not been complied with in the execution of the subject contract the corporation had knowledge of the existence of the contract and treated it as a valid and binding contract and thus ratified the contract by accepting the benefits thereunder holding entering into a contract with a minnesota resident can justify the exercise of specific jurisdiction but only where the dispute involves the contract