confinement for 60 days, and reduction to E-l. Production of Defense Sentencing Witness The appellant contends the military judge erred in failing to order the government to produce his father as a sentencing witness. He argues, as he did at trial, that a live witness is more compelling than a “piece of paper” and thus the military judge’s ruling was an abuse of discretion. We do not agree. R.C.M. 1001(e) sets forth the rights of an accused to present witnesses during pre-sentence proceedings. The rule provides that there shall be “greater latitude” in presentencing proceedings than on the merits to receive information by means other than the personal appearance of witnesses. R.C.M. 1001(e)(1). See generally Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949) (<HOLDING>); Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c). The military judge is
holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial recognizing that the constitution permits some imprecision in the apportionment of income to a particular state holding that the constitution permits the sentencing authority to consider evidence from sources other than live witnesses holding that the sentencing judge could consider the defendants subsequent arrest even though the charges were dismissed during sentencing holding that the idaho constitution provides no greater protection from double jeopardy than does the federal constitution