(when the new offense was committed) by showing that a motion for new trial or a notice of appeal had been filed. By contrast, in Jordan and the present case, whether the defendant took such action was not ascertainable at the time of judgment in the subsequent case because the defendant could still take such action in the future. Consequently, in the latter situation, the prior conviction must be deemed non-final because of the possibility that the court’s judgment could be retroactively vitiated by the mere filing of a motion for new trial or notice of appeal. Accordingly, th ess otherwise indicated, all references to Articles refer to the Code of Criminal Procedure. 6 . Milburn, 2005 WL 1412055, at *1, 2005 Tex.App. LEXIS 4679, at *2-3. 7 . 36 S.W.3d 871, 877 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) (<HOLDING>). 8 . Baker v. State, 520 S.W.2d 782, 783
holding that in determining whether a prior conviction is a violent felony a court generally must look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense holding that a prior nonarizona conviction to be used as a prior felony conviction under the statute must both be for an offense that would constitute a felony in arizona and be classified as a felony in the other jurisdiction holding that because appellant did not become a party by intervention before judgment was rendered appellant may not extend the time to appeal by filing a motion for new trial holding that if appellant preserves legal sufficiency complaint in motion for new trial new trial is all the relief appellate court can give because that is all the relief appellant requested in trial court holding that a prior conviction is not final and cannot be used to deny appellant community supervision in the primary offense if appellant still has time to file a motion for new trial in the prior conviction case