motion to suppress, finding that his claims failed as a matter of law, without an evidentiary hearing, finding that such a hearing would only serve as “unnecessary delay.” (R. 45 at 210). In its order, the district court determined that, even if Ray was told at his home “that his child’s mother would be arrested if he did not cooperate,” his confession at the police station took place after he was Mirandized. (Id. at 209). Further, the trial court found that it was “equally plausible that Ray confessed at the station, after being Mirandized, because he knew he had been caught after drugs and firearms were seized from his home during the search,” as opposed to confessing because of any alleged coercion. (Id. at 209-10) (citing United States v. Hunter, 332 Fed.Appx. 285 (6th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>)). The district court did not consider Seibert
holding that the district courts finding that an allegedly coercive threat did not specifically motivate the defendants confession where 1 there was no evidence that the threat was repeated at the police station 2 defendant offered no admissible evidence that the threat was the crucial factor motivating his confession and 3 he confessed immediately after the officer threatened to administer a gun residue test as opposed to confessing immediately after the allegedly coercive threat was made thus the gunresidue test was just as plausible a motivating factor for the confession as was the threat holding that i have a gun give me money may imply threat to use gun but was not an express threat of death holding after long discussion of the various opinions in black that that case established that a defendant can be constitutionally convicted of making a true threat only if the defendant intended the recipient of the threat to feel threatened holding that threat occurring 36 days before possession of firearm not present threat holding that the statement i have a gun is a threat of death