to fair warning, Rogers v. Tennessee, 582 U.S. 451, 457-59, 121 S.Ct. 1693, 149 L.Ed.2d 697 (2001), such concerns are not present in the civil context. In the civil context, the “law applicable to a particular case does not turn on “whethe or Express, 181 F.3d 799, 806 (7th Cir.1999) (stating that “when a question of retroactivity is involved” the party claiming a due process violation must show that the provision in question is arbitrary and irrational). As discussed earlier, the Wisconsin Supreme Court explained in great detail in Collins why it adopted the risk contribution doctrine and in Thomas why it applied it in the lead paint context. Nothing about the court’s reasoning is arbitrary and irrational. See generally United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 174 (4th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Nor does application of the risk contribution
holding change of law from apportionment of liability to sole liability of current insurer affected substantive rights of parties and could not be given retroactive effect holding that the act is not retroactive holding that the act is retroactive holding that retroactive liability under comprehensive environmental response compensation and liability act of 1980 which allocates to the defendant the burden of disproving causation comports with due process holding no liability existed under the circumstances