the Board’s conclusion that a conviction under Ind.Code § 35-2-4-9(b) is an aggravated felony. Gaiskov contends that a conviction under the Indiana statute cannot be considered sexual abuse of a minor because the prohibited conduct includes touching that is too minor to constitute sexual abuse. Specifically, he argues that the Indiana statute does not fit within the definition for “sexual abuse of a minor” because it does not require the touching of specific sexual body parts. We find this argument unconvincing. First, as our decision in Gattem illustrates, touching, let alone the touching of sexual body parts, is not required for a crime to be classified as “sexual abuse of a minor.” See Gattem, 412 F.3d at 760-61; see also Bahar v. Ashcroft, 264 F.3d 1309, 1310-13 (11th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Second, Ind.Code § 35-42-4-9(b) does not
holding that taking indecent liberties with a child under 16 for sexual gratification constitutes sexual abuse of a minor even without physical contact holding that the new york misdemeanor offense of sexual abuse of a minor constitutes an aggravated felony under ina  101a43asexual abuse of a minor holding that the state felony offense of taking indecent liberties with a child categorically constituted a crime of violence for purposes of the career offender sentencing guidelines holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse holding that taking indecent liberties with a child is not a lesser included offense of statutory rape given the differing age elements