and far-reaching prohibition against discrimination of many kinds.” Id. Although we have noted that the Council did not intend the DCHRA to prohibit every discriminatory practice, see, e.g., Evans v. United States, 682 A.2d 644, 648 (D.C.1996); Dean, 653 A.2d at 319, it nevertheless follows that standing under the DCHRA should be accorded a broad enough construction to make a remedy available from those forms of discrimination which the statute does reach. We traverse no new epistemological territory when we recognize that discrimination not only inflicts an injury on the individual who is targeted for discrimination but also exacts a social and economic toll from others. See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211, 93 S.Ct. 364, 34 L.Ed.2d 415 (1972) (<HOLDING>); Cf. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300,
holding that age discrimination is not a personal injury tort holding that racial discrimination is not a personal injury tort recognizing that discrimination causes injury to the whole community holding that for requisite causal connection to exist the vehicle must be the instrumentality which caused the injury not merely a contribution which causes a condition which in turn causes the injury holding that racial discrimination is a personal injury tort