in Arizona. Since these arguments were addressed, at least in part, in the federal court proceeding, the appellee contends that their consideration is foreclosed by the doctrine of res judicata. In a similar case, however, Division One of this court has stated: “In Arizona, however, neither the doctrine of res judicata nor full faith and credit flowing from recognition of a judgment by a sister state is available to bar the court which originally issued the judgment from subsequently modifying or reversing that judgment in accordance with the established laws and procedure of that original jurisdiction.” Tarnoff v. Jones, 17 Ariz.App. 240, 244, 497 P.2d 60, 64 (1972). See Also Porter v. Porter, 101 Ariz. 131, 416 P.2d 564 (1966); Rule 60(d), Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S. (<HOLDING>). We therefore reject the appellee’s res
recognizing use of ancillary jurisdiction in subsequent proceedings for the exercise of the courts inherent power to enforce its judgments holding that courts review judgments not statements in opinions recognizing that judgments of arizona courts on foreign judgments will not be conclusive in the jurisdiction of origin holding that judgments rendered by courts not having authority to enter such are not subject to collateral attack because judges entering those judgments were de facto officers recognizing that our courts will normally not enforce foreign tax judgments