only willfully and intentionally sold timber, which did not belong to him, but also had no intention of paying his former wife and co-owner in indivisión for her share of the timber he took. Unquestionably, he acted in blatant disregard of his former wife’s ownership interest for his own gain. His conduct, therefore, constitutes the very activity the Legislature sought to curtail through the enactment of its punitive “timber piracy” provisions, and it simply defies logic and the explicit intent of the Legislature to find those provisions inapplicable to the situation herein. Significantly, the Legislature created this specific statute to govern timber piracy, and it is well established specific provisions prevail over more general provisions. Kennedy v. Kennedy, 699 So.2d 351 (La.1996)(<HOLDING>). It further follows that, given the clear
holding that motion to dismiss cannot be treated as summary judgment holding that general release must name  or specifically describe parties to be discharged holding statute specifically directed to timberland  must be treated as an exception to the general codal rules recognizing fundamental error as an exception to the general rule of preservation holding that release must specifically name or otherwise specifically identify the persons to be discharged