in Associated General Contractors v. Smith, 74 F.3d 926 (9th Cir.1996), that a needs requirement for state registration of an apprenticeship program is preempted by ERISA. Smith, however, relied substantially on our overturned decision in Dillingham Construction N.A., Inc. v. County of Sonoma, 57 F.3d 712 (9th Cir.1995), rev’d, 519 U.S. 316, 117 S.Ct. 832, 136 L.Ed.2d 791. See Smith, 74 F.3d at 929-30. Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in reversing our decision in Dillingham, substantially altered the ERISA preemption analysis for apprenticeship plans. Consequently, we cannot rely on Smith, but instead must apply the ERISA preemption analysis developed by the Supreme Court in Dillingham to the Oregon needs requirement. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). I. “REFER TO” Dillingham held, first, that
holding that a three judge panel is free to reexamine the holding of a prior panel when the supreme court has undercut the theory or reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable holding that a three judge panel is not bound by prior circuit precedent if an intervening decision of a higher authority undercuts the theory or reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable holding that where the relevant court of last resort has undercut the theory or reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable then a threejudge panel of this court and district courts should consider themselves bound by the intervening higher authority and reject the prior opinion of this court as having been effectively overruled holding that when intervening supreme court case law is clearly irreconcilable with a prior circuit decision a panel of this court is bound by the later and controlling authority and should reject the prior circuit opinion holding a threejudge panel may not reexamine normally controlling circuit precedent in the face of an intervening united states supreme court decision unless the reasoning or theory of our prior circuit authority is clearly irreconcilable with the reasoning or theory of intervening higher authority