Ann. §§ 127.001-.007. As such, the insurance company contended that the agreement was unenforceable and not an insured contract because it did not assume any liability. Swift Energy Co., 206 F.3d at 492-93. We first noted that, when an insurer seeks to deny coverage, the terms of an insurance policy should be construed broadly in favor of coverage. Id. Based on that principle and the lack of relevant precedent, we held that the agreement was an insured contract within the context of interpreting the policy because Mid-Continent had intended to assume Swift’s tort liability. Id. at 493. The indemnity provision therefore qualified as an insured contract, and Swift qualified as an additional insured. Id.; see also LeBlanc v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 193 F.3d 873, 875 (5th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Travelers Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Pac. Emp’rs Ins.
holding that an indemnitee must be proven to be free of negligence in order to receive indemnity either under a general indemnity agreement or under implied indemnity holding that an indemnity provision need not be valid and enforceable to trigger obligations under the contract so long as the parties agreed to indemnity holding that reinsurance is a mere contract of indemnity holding that indemnification provision did not expressly state the party was seeking indemnity for its own negligence so as to satisfy express negligence test holding that a party that settled but failed to immediately notify a third party of indemnity claims did not waive indemnity claims