intends to assault someone. Feola may leave room for argument, however, as to what mental state is required in connection with the first two elements. Here the defendant focuses on the “forcibly” element of § 111(a)(1), contending that its inclusion requires a showing of “intent, deliberation, and voluntariness.” Even to show general intent, however, “the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly, consciously, and voluntarily committed an act which the law makes a crime.” Kleinbart, 27 F.3d at 592 (emphasis added). What sets general intent apart from specific intent is that “general intent may be inferred from the doing of the act.” Id. In contrast, specific intent requires a showing of “bad purpose.” Id. at 592, n. 4. See also Gonyea, 140 F.3d at 653 (<HOLDING>). The question with which we are left is this:
holding that in interpreting a contract the actual purpose and intent of the parties must be derived holding that specific statutes create exceptions to general statutes therefore if a provision of a specific statute is inconsistent with one in a general statute on the same subject the specific statute controls holding that a court must first determine whether the intent of congress is clear or instead the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue holding defendant must act with specific intent to cause death of another in order to be convicted of attempted murder holding that to violate a specific intent statute the defendant must act with the purpose of violating the law