expect a sheriffs department to be familiar with its own policies on these matters. See id. The injunction at issue here is analogous to that in Thomas, as it simply directs Schedler to maintain in force and effect his policies, procedures, and directives for implementation of the NVRA with respect to coordination of the NVRA. That is, the injunction refers generally to the defendant’s policies without defining what those policies are or how they can be identified. See id. Schedler vigorously contests the suggestion that he can be expected to know what “policies, procedures, and directives, as revised,” the injunction references, and the fact that the referenced policies are Schedler’s own does not suffice to satisfy Rule 65(d). See id.; see also U.S. Steel Corp., 519 F.2d at 1246-47 (<HOLDING>). An injunction should not contain broad
holding that extrinsic evidence of the parties course of conduct may be considered where the contract language is ambiguous holding that injunction violated rule 65d in spite of incorporating the parties own contract language holding that the parties choice to require arbitration for disputes which arise under a contract when the standard language was arising out of or relating to demonstrated that the parties intended the agreement to be narrow holding that parties can stipulate that they were both parties to a contract and thus the real parties in interest even when one party did not sign the contract holding that when the contract language is unambiguous we take these words to represent the parties intent and the plain meaning of this language governs its interpretation