Defendant's conspiracy conviction, a second recidivist information was filed against him based upon the felonies set forth in the first recidivist information. Defendant ultimately entered into a plea agreement under which he agreed to acknowledge his three prior felony convictions and also waived the recidivist trial, as provided for in W.Va.Code § 61-11-19 (1943) (Repl.Vol.2005). He was given a second life recidivist sentence, which was ordered to run consecutively to the first. Defendant later challenged the second life recidivist sentence in a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which he filed with this Court on or about July 3, 1991. Defendant's request for habeas relief was denied in Gibson v. Legursky, 187 W.Va. 51, 415 S.E.2d 457 (1992). See Id., at syl. pt. 2, 415 S.E.2d 457 (<HOLDING>) 14 . On August 21, 2000, Defendant, by
holding that  djouble jeopardy principles are not offended merely because earlier convictions used to establish a recidivist conviction are subsequently utilized to prove a second recidivist conviction  holding that a defendants denial of a conviction may be contradicted by introducing public records which prove such a conviction holding that where a conviction is reversed after trial the double jeopardy clause does not bar a government appeal that if successful would only reinstate the conviction and would not subject defendant to a second trial holding that the proper procedure to prove prior convictions is to offer a certified copy of the conviction holding that rule 35a can be used to challenge sentences that are not authorized by the judgment of conviction