citing United States v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 712, 714-15 (5th Cir. 2007)). 33 . Id. at 481 (citing Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005)). 34 . Id. 35 . — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1405, 1414, 188 L.Ed.2d 426 (2014) (‘‘[T]he parties do not contest that [the Tennessee statute under which the defendant was previously convicted] is a 'divisible statute'..., We may accordingly apply the modified categorical approach, consulting the indictment to which Castleman pleaded guilty in order to determine whether his conviction did entail the elements necessary to constitute the generic federal offense.”). 36 . Id. 37 . - U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2276, 2281, 186 L.Ed.2d 438 (2013). 38 . See Mathis v. United States, — U.S. ---, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 2251, 195 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016) (<HOLDING>) (citing United States v. Mathis, 786 F.3d 1068
recognizing that independent analysis is  the only means by which the defendant can defend against expert testimony by the state  holding that a prior conviction is not a predicate offense under the sentencing guidelines if the statute that provides the basis for the prior conviction sweeps more broadly than the generic crime described in the guidelines holding that a conviction under a texas robbery statute qualifies as generic robbery be cause its elements substantially correspond to the basic elements of the generic offense in that they both involve theft and immediate danger to a person holding that if a crime is broadly defined the court can look beyond the elements of the crime recognizing a circuit split over whether accas general ralethat a defendants crime of conviction can count as a predicate only if its elements match those of a generic  offensegives way when a statute happens to list various means by which a defendant can satisfy an element