the court deems appropriate in the circumstances (“such other equitable or remedial relief as the court might deem appropriate”). In contrast, the anti-alienation provision speaks only in the most general terms. Consequently, under Guidry’s reasoning, the more specific language of section 409(a) serves as a better indicator of congressional intent than the general language of section 206(d)(1). Thus, section 409(a) should “not be controlled or nullified” by the anti-alienation provision. See also Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States ex rel. Calvin Tompkins Co., 322 U.S. 102, 64 S.Ct. 890, 88 L.Ed. 1163 (1944) (applying rule that when a specific and general provision conflict, the specific terms and language prevail); Gallenstein v. United States, 975 F.2d 286, 290 (6th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Markair, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 744
holding that bribery must be given its ordinary meaning at the time of the enactment of the relevant statute holding that when two statutes are in conflict the more recent and specific statute should prevail so as to repeal the earlier general statute recognizing the principle that gives precedence to the terms of the more specific statute where a general statute and a specific statute speak to the same concern holding that when construing a general enactment and a more particular enactment within the same statute and when the plain language of the two subsections cannot be otherwise reconciled the more specific subsection should be given effect recognizing that where the statutory language is not ambiguous  the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute must be given effect