§ 32:3 (4th ed.) (“The plain, common or normal meaning of language will be given to the words of a contract unless the circumstances show that in a particular case a special meaning should be attached to them.”). Because the original 1984 dealer agreements were in force in 1998 when the Maryland Act’s good cause provision became law, the Act effected a change in law that impaired an existing contractual relationship — it limited a contractual right to terminate the dealer agreements. And, we conclude that this impairment was substantial. A provision granting the right to terminate a contract without cause is a material provision of that contract. See Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 423 F.2d 563, 568 (1st Cir.1970), rev’d on other grounds 400 U.S. 41, 91 S.Ct. 156, 27 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970) (<HOLDING>). The Maryland Act impairs the contractual
holding that a public employee who can be discharged only for cause is entitled to at least some informal due process before he can be terminated holding that a law converting a contractual relationship terminable by either party without cause into one which can be terminated only under certain conditions was a change of great magnitude that violated the contracts clause holding that the statute describes but one offense which can be committed by either or both of two methods holding that party was an agent under the plain terms of his contracts holding that independent contractors whose contracts were terminated following a change in administration were not protected by the first amendment