(9th Cir.1991) (noting in dicta that a defendant’s “ ‘inability to retain money that it should never have received in the first place’ is not the kind of detrimental reliance that justifies estoppel against the government”) (quoting Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 61, 104 S.Ct. 2218, 81 L.Ed.2d 42 (1984)). While we acknowledge that the treble damage provision of the civil FCA produces a harsher result than mere recovery of the expended funds, we note that these damages and other remedies are authorized by Congress. In addition, the fact that the unavailability of estoppel permits the government to recover treble damages does not justify departure from the longstanding and widely-accepted principle disfavoring government estoppel. See Merrill, 332 U.S. at 386, 68 S.Ct. 1 (<HOLDING>). Finally, from a practical perspective, we
holding that use of borrowed funds constituted a preference because the funds constituted hard cash available for distribution to creditors holding that fraudulent oral misrepresentation of the level of benefits does not provide the basis for a nonpreempted claim even though erisa may also provide no remedy recognizing that not even the temptations of a hard case will provide a basis for ordering recovery of funds that would be expended contrary to law holding that the avoidance powers provide for recovery only if the recovery is for the benefit of the estate holding that an order to disgorge funds was final even though the order did not distribute the funds