there must be “some evidence that the particular circumstances of [the inmate’s] crime — circumstances beyond the minimum elements of his conviction — indicate[ ] exceptional callousness and cruelty with trivial provocation, and thus suggest[ ] [petitioner] remains a danger to public safety.” Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th at 1098, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 417, 104 P.3d at 804-05; In re Montgomery, 156 Cal.App. 4th 930, 946, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 721, 732 (2007). In petitioner’s case, his commitment offenses “do[ ] not rationally indicate that [petitioner] will present an unreasonable public safety risk if released from prison.” In re Weider, 145 Cal.App.4th 570, 589, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 147 (2006); Lee, 143 Cal.App.4th at 1411-12, 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 931; see also Somers v. Schwartz, 2007 WL 2177880, *9 (E.D.Cal.2007) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, this Court “cannot conclude ...
holding that evidence the defendant knew the victim supported a finding that the murder was committed to avoid arrest holding that a state court cannot be said to have unreasonably applied clearly established federal law under  2254d1 when there are no holdings from the supreme court addressing the issue raised by the petitioner holding the state court applied federal law unreasonably in finding the commitment offense of second degree murder stemming from fatal traffic accident while drunk driving was supported by some evidence when there is no evidence that petitioner demonstrated a callous disregard for human suffering when the victim died on impact or shortly thereafter holding that there are no lesser included offenses of second degree felony murder because of the multiple means of committing the offense holding that state court could not have unreasonably applied federal law if no clear supreme court precedent existed