See, e.g., Sipayung v. González, 491 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir.2007). The BIA found accordingly here, and there is nothing on this record that would “compel” a contrary result. Instead of a “pattern or practice” of persecution approach, Sugiarto relies on the disfavored group theory, arguing that she need only show a “comparatively low” level of individualized risk because Christians of Chinese ethnicity are a “disfavored group” in Indonesia. It is relevant in this context that country conditions evidence on the record, namely, State Department Human Rights Reports, do indicate some degree of continuing violence against Christians perpetrated by terrorist groups in Indonesia, even if a pattern or practice is not established. See, e.g., Budiono v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 44, 49 (1st Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). But as previously discussed, the IJ and BIA
recognizing an individuals privacy interest in not having his or her identity revealed in the context of a criminal or national security investigation recognizing that ij should look at an individuals claim in the context of country condition reports holding that in context of patent claim at issue if means only if holding that in determining whether constructive indictment occurred court must look at the allegedly erroneous instruction in context of the charge as a whole holding that when determining the adequacy of a jury charge an appellate court should look to the record and the closing arguments to place the words of the judge in context