complaint and correctly concluded that McWeay’s pleading still failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We summarily affirm the dis trict court’s dismissal of McWeay’s complaint based on the well-reasoned report and recommendation of the magistrate judge. V. McWeay argues that the district court’s dismissal order and order granting in part and denying in part her motion for relief from the judgment violate her constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and a trial by jury. These contentions are meritless. The district court’s compliance with and reliance upon the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not violate McWeay’s or any litigant’s constitutional rights. See, e.g., Garvie v. City of Ft. Walton Beach, Fla., 366 F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). VI. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the
holding that dismissal pursuant to federal rule of civil procedure 56 did not violate the seventh amendment holding that seventh amendment right to jury trial not violated by courts dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to rule 12b6 because as a matter of law complaint faded to present an issue for trial holding that the district of columbias antislapp law could not be applied in federal court in a diversity case because it conflicted with federal rules of civil procedure 12 and 56 holding that seventh amendment right to jury trial not violated by courts dismissal for lack of jurisdiction holding that directed verdict does not violate seventh amendment