to principles and interpretations of federal Title VII cases when construing the MHRA. See e.g., Continental Can Co. v. State by Wilson, 297 N.W.2d 241, 246 (Minn.1980) (Title VII cases and principles are instructive and have been applied to the MHRA) (citing Danz v. Jones, 263 N.W.2d 395, 398-99 (Minn.1978)). “Title VII affords employees the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.” Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 65, 106 S.Ct. at 2405. Several federal courts of appeal, federal district courts, and at least one state court have held that an employee has a cause of action against his or her employer when a non-employee sexually harasses the employee. See e.g., Folkerson v. Circus Circus Enters., Inc., 107 F.3d 754, 756 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Trent v. Valley Electric Ass’n, 41 F.3d 524,
holding employee had cause of action against her employers when nonemployee harassed her and employers failed to take corrective action holding employer could be hable for sexual harassment of employees by nonemployees including employers customers holding that where the employer fired the plaintiff upon a good faith belief that he sexually harassed coworkers the plaintiff could not prove pretext by challenging the harassment allegations holding employer may be hable for sexual harassment of employee by independent contractor holding employer may be hable when its employee is sexually harassed by employers patrons and employer either ratifies or acquiesces in harassment by not taking immediate andor corrective action