476 U.S. 355, 368-69, 106 S.Ct. 1890, 1898, 90 L.Ed.2d 369 (1986) (citations omitted). “The critical question in any pre-emption analysis is always whether Congress intended that federal regulation supersede state law.” Id. at 369, 106 S.Ct. at 1899. Congress expressly intended that the FRSA preempt all railroad safety legislation except state law governing an area in which the Secretary of Transportation has not issued a regulation or order and state law more strict than federal regulations when necessary to address local problems. 49 U.S.C. § 20106; see also Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Public Utils. Comm’n of Ohio, 926 F.2d 567, 570 (6th Cir.1991) (explaining the two e 3 L.Ed.2d 649 (1993); see, e.g., City of Covington v. Chesapeake & O. Ry., 708 F.Supp. 806, 808-809 (E.D.Ky.1989) (<HOLDING>); CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Tullahoma, 705
holding city could not enforce through administrative adjudication a city ordinance limiting vehicle weight holding that a jurys finding that a city had delegated its final policymaking authority in the area of law enforcement to a city police chief was supported by the evidence and warranted imposing liability upon the city holding a city liable for personal injuries caused by a driver colliding with a girder in the center of a city street where the city did not give a warning holding that frsa preempted city ordinance regulating the speed of trains within city limits notwithstanding that the city was empowered to regulate speed of trains within its boundaries by kentucky statute holding that city attorneys promise in an oral settlement agreement for city to annex and rezone land was within the legal authority of the city of joliet to accomplish and were not absolutely void acts per se therefore city could be estopped from avoiding enforcement of contract