race to see which forum can resolve the same issues first.” San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. at 567, 103 S.Ct. 3201. That concern militates against recognizing waiver-by-removal here. Finally, we note that our holding does not leave plaintiffs like Bodi without a forum for redress. Defendants conceded at oral argument that, like the State of Georgia in Lapides, the Tribe would likely have been amenable to Bodi’s suit in its own court system—here, Shingle Springs Tribal Court. Cf. Shingle Springs Tribal Court Ordinance, art. II, ch. 4, § 1(b) (2013) (setting forth the Tribe’s express waiver of sovereign immunity in tribal court for various purposes, including labor relations); William Wood, It Wasn’t an Accident: The Tribal Sovereign Immunity Story, 62 Am. U. L. Rev. 1587, 1666 (2013) (<HOLDING>); Catherine T. Struve, Tribal Immunity and
holding that indian tribes lack tribal jurisdiction over crimes committed by nonmember indians within the tribes reservation holding that indian tribes could only exercise criminal jurisdiction over tribal members and not other indians recognizing that many though not all indian tribes make tribal court remedies available for claims against their governments holding that an indian tribes claims of possessory rights were not political questions holding that a tribes waiver did not constitute a consent to suit in state court on negligence claims against it but instead specified that tribal court was the exclusive forum for the resolution of such claims