such as the one presented in this case, are questions of law and our review is de novo. Hadley, 224 Ill. 2d at 370; Taddeo, 216 Ill. 2d at 595; Jarvis v. South Oak Dodge, Inc., 201 Ill. 2d 81, 86 (2002). We will therefore apply a de novo standard of review to the construction of the word “truck” in the case sub judice. II. Exemption Under Section 212.1 of the Act On appeal plaintiff argues, inter alia, that the Board erred in finding that Calambas did not drive a “truck” or maintain a separate business identity. The Board argues, among other things, that neither its interpretation of the word “truck” nor its findings that plaintiff failed to meet its burden under section 212.1 of the Act were clearly erroneous. See Quad Cities Open, Inc. v. City of Silvis, 208 Ill. 2d 498, 507 (2004) (<HOLDING>); Streeterville Corp. v. Department of Revenue,
holding that when interpreting tax exemption statutes we strictly construe the statute in favor of taxation and against exemption holding act qualifies as exemption statute under exemption 3 holding one who claims tax exemption has burden of showing entitlement to exemption holding a debtors claim for loss of consortium to be entitled to an exemption under the oklahoma exemption statute and collecting other bankruptcy decisions recognizing a debtor spouses loss of consortium as the basis for allowing an exemption under federal and various state exemption statutes holding that the statute qualifies as an exemption 3 statute