the appeals, insofar as they pertain to the father’s second postjudgment motion, are properly before this court. On appeal, the father asserts that the probate court erred in not holding a hearing on his second postjudgment motion. We note that “[tjhere is no ... procedural requirement that a hearing be held on a Rule 60(b) motion, even if one is requested by the movant; indeed, no such hearing need be held if the motion is clearly without substance and frivolous.” Summers v. Summers, 89 So.3d 141, 143 (Ala.Civ.App.2011) (citing Waldron v. Fikes, 378 So.2d 1138, 1139 (Ala.Civ.App.1979)); see also Snooky Hairrell Volkswagen, Inc. v. Speer, 689 So.2d 51, 53 (Ala.1997), Bradford v. Bradford, 628 So.2d 732, 734 (Ala.Civ.App.1993), and Ex parte Oden, 617 So.2d 1020, 1028 (Ala.1992) (<HOLDING>). Based on the record, the probate court did
recognizing that the burden on summary judgment shifts to the nonmoving party once the moving party has met its initial responsibility of showing the absence of a triable issue of fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case holding that a party may not use a rule 60b motion as an occasion to relitigate its case holding that a coa is required to appeal the denial of a rule 60b motion from a judgment in a  2254 proceeding holding that a party might be entitled to a hearing on a rule 60b motion when the party presents evidence of extraordinary circumstances to support a reversal of the judgment holding that a grant of a tr 60b motion requires notice to the opposing party and a hearing