lie, after lie, after lie.” This comment alone is not sufficiently prejudicial to entitle the defendants to a new trial. Therefore, we must determine whether counsel’s other references to defense witnesses’ veracity constituted gross improprieties entitling defendants to a new trial because of the court’s failure to correct them ex mero motu. In North Carolina, “[i]t is improper for a lawyer to assert his opinion that a witness is lying.” State v. Locklear, 294 N.C. 210, 217, 241 S.E.2d 65, 70 (1978). However, the mere fact that counsel makes such an argument does not automatically establish that the argument is grossly improper so as to require a new trial when the trial court does not intervene ex mero motu. See State v. Solomon, 340 N.C. 212, 218-20, 456 S.E.2d 778, 782-84 (1995) (<HOLDING>); State v. Noell, 284 N.C. 670, 696, 202 S.E.2d
holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in disallowing recross where the prosecutor did not raise any new matters during redirect holding that various expressions of personal belief by the prosecutor in closing argument were improper warrant ing admonishment by the trial court holding that prosecutors statements regarding his opinion as to the truthfulness of a defense witness considering the evidence against the defendant did not reach the level of the grossly improper statements which would require the trial court to correct them ex mero motu holding a trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to require disclosure of an informants name holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to intervene ex mero motu to prevent closing argument by the prosecutor that the defendant lied during his testimony