precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. McKEOWN, Circuit Judge, dissenting: Although the majority selectively summarizes the facts, under the applicable standard, we are permitted to override the Immigration Judge’s factual findings only if “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4). Here, there is little evidence of a government actor, and no substantial evidence that the government could not or did not control those threatening Kaburu. A reasonable factfinder could fairly and easily have found the claimed threats and acts were related to Kaburu’s performance of her government job, and not because of her political beliefs or on account of another protected ground. See Chanco v. INS, 82 F.3d 298, 302-303 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). The police responded to Kaburu’s reports of
holding that dangers arising from police work do not support a claim of persecution on account of a protected ground holding that evidence that  is consistent with acts of private violence  or that merely shows that a person has been the victim of criminal activity does not constitute evidence of persecution based on a statutorily protected ground holding that to qualify for asylum the fear of future persecution must be based on reasonably specific information showing a real threat to individual persecution not mere assertions of fear of possible persecution or speculative conclusions quoting mapouya 487 f3d at 412 holding that persecution based on being a current member of the military national police force or us embassy guard does not qualify as persecution on a protected ground holding that absent a pattern of persecution linked to the applicant persecution of family members is insufficient to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution