730 A.2d at 150. We also have said that “[t]o be permanently disfigured” for the cognate crime of malicious disfigurement “means that the person is appreciably less attractive or that a part of his [or her] body is to some appreciable degree less useful or functional than it was before the injury.” Perkins, 446 A.2d at 26. Plainly, it is difficult to be precise about the degree of seriousness required, but we think it fair to conclude that only more severe and extensive bruising than J.G. sustained should be treated as disfigurements for purposes of the crime of aggravated assault; to do otherwise likely would be to trivialize the statute and to disregard the “high threshold of injury” it erects. Jenkins, 877 A.2d at 1069; cf. Stroman v. United States, 878 A.2d 1241, 1246 (D.C.2005) (<HOLDING>). Even assuming, though, that J.G.’s bruises
holding that a defendant may not be convicted of multiple offenses under  922g on the basis that he belonged to more than one prohibited class or that he simultaneously possessed more than one firearm holding in a prosecution for attempted possession of a prohibited weapon that a cut on the forehead requiring fifteen stitches though more than a mere bruise was not shown to be a protracted and obvious disfigurement holding that something more than a mere error of law is required to constitute misconduct holding that probable cause is something more than mere suspicion holding that persecution is an extreme concept requiring more than mere harassment