United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948, 981 (9th Cir.2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 965, 124 S.Ct. 1729, 158 L.Ed.2d 411 (2004). Wilson first argues that La Mott’s testimony did not relay an admissible coeonspirator statement because the government did not prove that La Mott was part of the conspiracy. An otherwise hearsay statement is admissible if it was made by a coconspirator of the defendant during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E); United States v. Kearns, 61 F.3d 1422, 1425 (9th Cir.1995). While the declarant must be a member of the conspiracy, the witness testifying at trial need not be a member of the conspiracy in order for a coconspirator’s statement to be admissible. See United States v. Williams, 989 F.2d 1061, 1067-69 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Garcia, 16 F.3d 341
holding that statements by coconspirators to nonmembers of the conspiracy introduced through the testimony of nonmembers were admissible under rule 801d2e holding that admission of statements obtained in violation of miranda was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the substance of the statements was introduced through other untainted testimony holding that post arrest statements made by coconspirator to law enforcement officer were not admissible under rule 801d2e but admission of testimony was harmless because officers testimony was cumulative holding that statements by a cooperating coconspirator to known authorities made after the commencement of cooperation are not admissible under rule 801d2e because such statements are not made in furtherance of the conspiracy holding a trial court should not allow a jury to hear outofcourt coconspirator declarations before holding a hearing outside the jurys presence to determine whether such statements are admissible under federal rule of evidence 801d2e