Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 261, 130 S.Ct. 2869, 177 L.Ed.2d 535 (2010)). “[Notwithstanding th[is] presumption against extraterritoriality, a statute will be construed to apply extraterrito-rially if Congress gives a ‘clear indication’ of that intention.” United States v. Ballestas, 795 F.3d 138, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255, 130 S.Ct. 2869). “[I]ri examining [a] statute for congressional intention . of extraterritorial application,, [a court] should consider both contextual and textual evidence.” Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d at 1345. The defendants argue.that “[n]either the plain language of the statute, nor any legislative history suggests—directly, indirectly, or otherwise—a Congressional intent to create criminal liabili 219 (D. N.M. 2008) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F.Supp.2d 189,
holding that  924c applies extraterritorially because the predicate crime of violence  violation of the torture act is one that may be prosecuted in a court of the united states  holding that  924c applied to bombings of united states embassies in east africa because the predicate charges under 18 usc  844f1 3 apply extraterritorially holding that  924c applies extraterritorially where the underlying substantive criminal statutes apply extraterritorially holding that  924c applies extraterritorially where the predicate acts include crimes on the high seas holding that  924c applies extraterritorially in a bombing plot where the charges were predicated on 18 usc  844i which the court held to apply extraterritorially