that “individualized determinations,” as are contemplated by the holding in Dolan v. City of Tigard,, 512 U.S. 374, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994) for dedications or exactions of private land, are a part of the reasonableness test. See Matthews, 95 N.J. at 322, 471 A.2d 355 (noting and following the holding in Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47 (1972) which did not rely “on the legal theory of dedication .... Instead, the Court depend ed upon the public trust doctrine, impliedly holding that full enjoyment of the foreshore necessitated some use of the upper sand, so that the latter came under the umbrella of the public trust.”) (emphasis added). See also Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 78 N.J. 174, 179-80, 393 A.2d 571 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the reasonableness factors to be
holding that the borough of deals dedication of a portion of a beach for use by its residents only was immaterial given the public trust doctrines requirement that the public be afforded the right to enjoy all dry sand beaches owned by a municipality holding that public use of a beach was presumed to have originated by permission and to have continued as a license until some act  of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege holding that in order to exercise its rights under the public trust doctrine the public must be given both access to and use of privatelyowned dry sand areas as reasonably necessary holding that because public use of a beach was permissive the public was a licensee and as such could be excluded from the whole area at any time by the title owner holding the effect of a commonlaw dedication is to create only such an estate or right in the public as is necessary to enable it to enjoy the uses for which the dedication is made and to reserve the fee to the dedicator