for criminal contempt under Rule 42(a), but we disagree that the disputed twenty day increase is a criminal contempt sanction. Appellant points to two facts in support of her argument that the additional twenty days’ imprisonment is a criminal contempt sanction: (1) the district court said that the appellant was becoming “defiant” before announcing the sixty-day sentence and (2) the district court had already announced a sentence of forty days’ imprisonment. We have held that it is necessary to look to the “purpose and character of the sanctions imposed” and not to the name used by the district court when evaluating whether a particular sanction is for criminal contempt. In re Kave, 760 F.2d 343, 351 (1st Cir.1985); see also United States v. Winter, 70 F.3d 655, 660 (1st Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). While these cases deal with the distinction
holding that the characterization of a contempt sanction is a question of law and is not binding on this court holding that a civil contempt defendant has a right to a jury trial when the act of contempt was not committed in the presence of the court and when the incarceration is in part punitive holding that stipulations involving questions of law are not binding on the court holding that arbitration award is binding on the parties holding that claim construction is an issue of law for the court not a question of fact for the jury