Court has held: "[Pjolice officers entering a dwelling must knock on the door and announce their identity and purpose before attempting forcible entry.” Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 387, 117 S.Ct. 1416, 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997) (emphasis added). The district court relied on United States v. Filce, 82 F.3d 1315 (5th Cir.1996), overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Brown, 161 F.3d 256 (5th Cir.1998). As the majority correctly points out, however, Fike interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 3109, which (at least as construed in Fike) requires an actual "breaking] open any outer or inner door or window.” The "attempting” language in Richards mandates a different result in the instant case. 5 . See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341, 60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Section 3109 reads in relevant part: The
holding that a defendant generally may not challenge an enhanced sentence through a section 2254 petition on the ground that the prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained holding that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable where evidence has been obtained by means sufficiently separate from the illegal activity to be free of any taint holding that evidence obtained pursuant to an unlawful stop should have been suppressed because there were no intervening events that purged the illegal taint holding that the reading of miranda warnings and the signing of a waiver of fourth and fifth amendment rights are not sufficient intervening factors sufficient to dissipate the taint of an unlawful entry into a home recognizing that unconstitutionally obtained evidence can become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint