of employment. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 20C (1935). The court rejected the employees’ argu ment, holding that the dispute was not a “labor dispute,” within the meaning of the Massachusetts Act: The bill is merely one for specific performance of covenants restraining trade or competition, inserted in contracts for personal service, covenants of a character that have long been held enforceable in this Commonwealth .... where the contract for personal service is not itself invalid, the interest to be protected is consonant with public policy, and the restraint is limited reasonably in time and space. The judge had authority to issue an injunction---- 313 Mass. at 143, 46 N.E.2d 550 (citations omitted). Cf. Mengel v. Justices of Superior Court, 313 Mass. 238, 246-47, 47 N.E.2d 3 (1943) (<HOLDING>). The holdings in Cascade Laundry and Saltman
holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of  1983 holding that a controversy that is a labor dispute within the meaning of the massachusetts act is not taken outside the scope of that act merely because it also involves breaches of an employment contract holding that the title of an act is not an index but is merely a label holding that the complaint stated a claim under the flsa where it alleged that parties were an employer and employees within meaning of act and that the defendantemployers operation constitutes an enterprise engaged in commerce  within the meaning of  the act holding that it is well established that whether an employees actions were within the scope of employment is a question of fact and even if some of the actions were unauthorized the question of whether the actions were within the scope of employment is for the jury