court did not err in concluding that the Darnalls had failed to present clear and convincing evidence indicating that the road had been abandoned by nonuse for a period of 20 years and, therefore, that the road was a public road. II. The Darnalls’ second argument is that the trial court erred by dismissing Tanner, by making no express ruling with respect to Lauderdale County, and by failing to sufficiently describe the road. With regard to the Darnalls’ arguments regarding Tanner and Lauderdale County, we note that the Darnalls did not file a cross-claim against either of those parties. Accordingly, we conclude that the Darnalls have no standing to challenge the trial court’s action or inaction with regard to those parties. See Otts v. Gray, 287 Ala. 685, 691, 255 So.2d 26, 31 (1971) (<HOLDING>). In support of their argument that the court
holding that erisa preempts derivatively asserted thirdparty claims recognizing common law cause of action as thirdparty beneficiary holding that a thirdparty providers claim against insurer for promissory estoppel was not preempted by erisa because the thirdparty provider was not bound by the terms of the erisa plan holding that the governments cooperation with a thirdparty is not sufficient to establish a thirdparty beneficiary relationship holding that a plaintiff who had asserted no claim against a thirdparty defendant lacked standing to complain of the courts action with regard to the thirdparty defendant