find no more than that the Wagners were negligent in erecting the chain, which as Carter recognizes, precludes any recovery by the Doehrings because the decedent was no more than a trespasser. We concur in our reasoning in Carter and we find as a matter of law that the Wagners’ erection of the chain was neither willful nor wanton. Even if we were to assume arguendo that young Doehring were not a trespasser, but was an invitee, and therefore the standard upon which to base a holding against the Wagners would be simple negligence, we would have found, as a matter of law, that the action of Doehring in driving a motorcycle at a high speed, at night, without a helmet and without headlights, was clearly contributorily negligent. See Reiser v. Abramson, 264 Md. 372, 378, 286 A.2d 91 (1972) (<HOLDING>); see also Robertson v. Shell Oil Company, 34
holding that in order to find contributory negligence as a matter of law there must be some prominent and decisive act which directly contributed to the accident and which was of such a character as to leave no room for difference of opinion thereon by reasonable minds holding that defendants bear the burden of proving contributory negligence by a preponderance of the evidence holding that a customer was not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law even though she knew the oil was on the floor before her slip and fall holding where reasonable difference of opinion as to whether the defendants act was the or a proximate cause of the injury the matter is for the jury to decide holding in a civil context when reasonable minds cannot differ on the issue of intervening cause the matter can be decided as one of law