paid during the year, and concluded that these should be employed to deem the entire year-end distribution “after taxes,” hence subject to a zero percent rate. As stated above, this was error. See note 5, supra. The wife’s assertion that the husband misstated his rate in both years is unavailing here, as the dismissal of her first complaint for contempt and the finding that 40.3 percent was the correct rate in 2008 remains a ruling in the case. Absent a valid finding that distinguishes the two years, we conclude that this record fails to establish clear disobedience in 2009. We recognize that our cases do not require a clear showing of actual intent to disobey a court order to support a judgment of civil contempt. See O’Connell v. Greenwood, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 147, 150-151 & n.3 (2003) (<HOLDING>). See also United Factory Outlet, Inc. v. Jay’s
holding that a civil contempt defendant has a right to a jury trial when the act of contempt was not committed in the presence of the court and when the incarceration is in part punitive holding that the degree of the loss of use of a body part is a question of fact whether the loss is for all practical intents and purposes is a question of law recognizing civil contempt power under  105a recognizing that the question of the degree of intent that must be shown to support a judgment of civil contempt is unsettled holding that the question of guilty knowledge and especially intent to defraud may be shown by other than direct evidence