law. We note that the district court, in granting Tomlin’s habeas petition, took the view that the KCOA did not address the real constitutional issue underlying Tomlin’s ineffectiveness claim, which the court identified as “whether there was a manifest necessity for a mistrial on the charge of rape.” Tomlin, 516 F.Supp.2d at 1231. The KCOA had concluded that, because there was not a unanimous agreement on all charges, but rather only a partial verdict not recognized under Kansas law, no verdict was possible. And because there was no verdict, the jury was essentially deadlocked and there was a manifest necessity for a mistrial, with the result that a later retrial was not barred by double jeopardy. See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 459, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 35 L.Ed.2d 425 (1973) (<HOLDING>); cf. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 642, 123
holding the double jeopardy clause applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment holding that a prosecution for the same offense was barred by double jeopardy where a mistrial was declared without manifest necessity holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted holding that if defendant moved for or consented to mistrial retrial of defendant was not barred on double jeopardy grounds holding that since the mistrial met the manifest necessity requirement of our cases  the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment  did not bar retrial under a valid indictment