that the withholding of the grievance forms, if established, would have rendered the grievance process permanently unavailable to Spada under the regulations then in effect. Therefore, we will vacate the Magistrate Judge’s dismissal of Spa-da’s complaint and remand for further proceedings. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) prohibits an inmate from bringing a civil rights suit alleging specific acts of unconstitutional conduct by prison offi cials “until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “Proper exhaustion of administrative remedies is necessary” to satisfy the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006); see also Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 230 (3d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Dr. Martinez contends that the Magistrate
holding that plras exhaustion requirement is an affirmative defense that can be waived or forfeited by defendants holding that the plras exhaustion requirement applies to the grievance procedures set forth in an inmate handbook holding that the plras exhaustion requirement contains a procedural default component recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different holding in addition that  1997eas exhaustion requirement includes a procedural default component