to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has established a genuine issue of fact as to whether Trooper . Nolan used excessive force in removing her from her car and handcuffing her. See Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 123-24 (2d Cir.2004) (noting that the Second Circuit has found that “allegations that police yanked arrestee out of a ear, threw her against it, and pinned her arm behind her back were sufficient to withstand summary judgment” (citing Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 923-24 (2d Cir.1987))). According to Plaintiff, she was sitting peacefully in her car, attempting to make a "telephone call, when Trooper Nolan approached her. Trooper Nolan grabbed her, dragged her from her vehicle, pushed her to the ground, and, with the assista WL 4592785, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011) (<HOLDING>); Hamilton v. City of New York, No. 07-CV-3633,
holding that officers knocking the plaintiff to the ground rolling him over and pinning him with their knees on his neck back and legs so he could be handcuffed did not constitute excessive force and noting that the plaintiffs offer to return to custody after his escape attempt did not eliminate the need for force holding that tightening handcuffs  to their maximum for apparently gratuitous reasons along with kneeing the plaintiff in his back could be excessive force holding that purposely tripping the plaintiff while he was being escorted in handcuffs  causing him to fall to the floor and cut his face could be excessive force holding that under the totality of the circumstances plaintiffs claim that his handcuffs were tightened along with related physical force was enough to create a question of fact for the jury holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim