omitted). In Dustman, the Texas Supreme Court ordered the contemner discharged in view of his established inability to pay the ar-rearage due in child support payments ordered in his divorce judgment. Numerous other Texas cases have both permitted and imposed certain restrictions on imprisonment as a civil sanction in domestic relations cases. See, e.g., Ex parte Preston, 162 Tex. 379, 347 S.W.2d 938, 942 (1961) (quoting Decker v. Decker, 52 Wash.2d 456, 326 P.2d 332, 333 (1958), for the proposition that “[problems of domestic relations involving alimony, support payments, property settlements, together with court orders in connection therewith, do not normally fall into the debtor-creditor category.”); Ex parte Jackson, 590 S.W.2d 775, 776 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1979, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Were we to find that the Texas law exemption
holding that final judgment ordering 4000 in monthly alimony created presumption in subsequent proceedings that husband had ability to pay that amount holding that the ordering of a rehearing caused the judgment to not be final and appealable holding trial court erred in ordering that in event wife failed to pay equalization judgment to husband court clerk could automatically enter judgment against wife and order sale of stock in closelyheld family business holding that a divorce judgment ordering a husband to pay 5000 in past community debts could not be enforced by a contempt judgment because it concerned money to be earned in the future holding that circuit court that had no jurisdiction to modify georgia custody determination could not enter valid contempt judgment against husband for violating void modification judgment