for energy will be met with least-cost service. Edison maintains that the City’s interpretation of section 8—402 is contrary to two basic rules of statutory construction: (1) a specific statutory provision controls over a more general provision (Maxwell v. Hobart Corp. (1991), 216 Ill. App. 3d 108, 111, 576 N.E.2d 268; see also Governor’s Office of Consumer Services v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n (1991), 220 Ill. App. 3d 68, 580 N.E.2d 920 (GOCS)); and (2) no statutory provision should be interpreted so as to render another provision meaningless. In re Application of County Collector (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 64, 72, 547 N.E.2d 107. First, the City seeks to impose a statutory duty through section 1—102, even though that section is merely prefatory in nature. (See GOCS, 220 Ill. App. 3d at 74 (<HOLDING>).) Thus, the requirements of section 8—402
holding that substantive review is adequate holding that court may not impose procedural requirements on agency decisionmaking that go beyond those of the administrative procedure act holding that section 1102 of the act does not impose any substantive requirements holding that the requirements of explanation and consideration of alternatives do not impose additional procedural requirements upon an agency in contravention of vermont yankee holding that section 636b1c  does not require any review at all  of any issue that is not the subject of an objection