case could be deemed stolen only from Ms. Della Sala’s accusation. But this is to say that an inference that an officer might logically draw from the nature of a stolen object is entitled to greater weight than the testimony of the victim of the crime — a premise that itself is contrary to established precedent. Where, as here, a citizen informant is the victim of the crime in question, her report is entitled to great weight in the probable cause determination. See, e.g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). Indeed, as this court has recently pointed out, a crime victim’s accusation standing alone can establish probable cause. Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 370 (6th Cir.1999); see also United States v. Maryland, 479 F.2d 566, 569 (5th Cir.1973) (<HOLDING>). From these shaky ramparts, the majority
holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law holding that information given to law enforcement authorities by the victim of the crime immediately after its occurrence was clearly sufficient to supply probable cause for appellants arrest holding that the government was to be treated as a private person and a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the agents exceeded their ability to arrest because while a law enforcement officer may arrest a person without a warrant  given probable cause  a private person may only arrest someone for a crime  committed  in his presence holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same