of crimen falsi crimes is different from reputation evidence. However, Appellant fails to differentiate the two methods. Contrary to Appellant’s position, it has long been the law of this Commonwealth that a witness’s credibility may be attacked by showing her bad reputation for truth and veracity. Commonwealth v. Fowler, 434 Pa.Super. 148, 150, 642 A.2d 517, 518 (1994), allocatur denied, 539 Pa. 688, 653 A.2d 1227 (1994) (citing Commonwealth v. Payne, 205 Pa. 101, 104, 54 A. 489, 491 (1903)). In Butler, the court stated, “[a defendant’s] previous record is admissible for [impeaching credibility] just the same as testimony of prior reputation for veracity is evidence for the jury’s consideration.” 405 Pa. at 47, 173 A.2d at 474. See also Fowler, 434 Pa.Super. 148, 642 A.2d 517 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Packel & Poulin, supra, § 608.1. Based on our
holding that the admission of a report was not hearsay because it was not offered to prove its truth but to impeach the veracity of the witnesss direct testimony recognizing that a defendants good reputation for truth and veracity may be introduced when he was impeached by evidence of bad reputation for truth and veracity holding that the veracity of an agencys affidavit need not be questioned if no bad faith or contradictory evidence is found holding testimony that would violate the confrontation clause if introduced for the truth may nonetheless be admissible if offered for the limited purpose of impeachment holding that a district court need not inquire into the veracity of a classified affidavit unless the information it provides is insufficient or contradicted by the record or there is evidence of bad faith on behalf of the agency