law in a number of jurisdictions that “the running of a statute of repose creates a vested right not to be sued.” Wenke v. Gehl, Co., 274 Wis.2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 405, 425 (2004). See also Mills v. Wong, 155 S.W.3d 916, 920 (Tenn.2005) (“The running of the statute of repose ... has a substantive effect.”); Nolan v. Paramount Homes, Inc., 135 N.C.App. 73, 518 S.E.2d 789, 792 (1999) (“If plaintiff fails to file within the prescribed period, the statute gives defendant a vested right not to be sued.”). In light of these authorities it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to find that the substantive right for a statute of repose only begins when the limitation period has run. See Doe A. v. Diocese of Dallas, 234 Ill.2d 393, 334 Ill.Dec. 649, 917 N.E.2d 475, 485 (2009) (<HOLDING>). Because the limitation period had not run
holding that because a claim was never raised in the district court this court would not consider it for the first time on appeal holding that because the repose period in question was eliminated before it expired it never operated to insulate defendants from liability and never vested defendants with any substantive rights holding the assignment invalid because the assignee never used the mark and never acquired any of the assignors tangible assets or goodwill holding it is a question of fact recognizing that a broad definition of stolen is consistent with the guidelines purposes and finding that the enhancement was properly applied where a defendant found a gun that was lost or mislaid by its owner who never authorized anyone to take the gun never sold it and never gave it away as a gift