defend only because the underlying complaint specifically alleged conduct that was covered by the policy. See Fuisz, 61 F.3d at 244-45 (finding that a complaint alleging that the defendant had failed to verify the accuracy of his statements could be read to allege unintentional conduct not barred by the policy’s exclusion for intentional harms). But here, the underlying complaints present no allegations of abuse resulting from the activities of a CACI employee who was in Iraq for only a short time. Therefore, CACI’s protestation finds no grounding in the language of the complaints, and it cannot sustain its burden of proof. In sum, the potentiality rule does not require us to abandon the rule of reason. See Ellett Bros., Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 275 F.3d 384, 388 (4th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). For while we construe ambiguities in coverage
holding that plaintiffs who sought injunctive relief under 42 usc  1983 could get same relief in a state court mandamus action holding that a complaint that sought injunctive relief as well as such further relief as the court deems just did not present a factual allegation supporting a claim for damages holding that lack of subject matter jurisdiction precluded court from awarding injunctive relief as well as damages holding that a court may award injunctive relief against a state officer holding that even if indirect purchasers are barred from seeking damages relief they may still obtain injunctive relief