was on his mind. In contrast to cases in which a declarant confesses to law enforcement but additionally implicates his accomplice in the crime, this case involves statements the declarant (Clarke) made in confidential exchanges with a long-time friend — a friend he had no reason to conclude would reveal those statements to law enforcement. Moreover, in his' statements to Wright, Clarke did not minimize his role in the robbery; the most plausible conclusion to draw from the content of the statements is that Clarke and Franklin each played substantial roles in the commission of the offense. As we recently reiterated, the admission into evidence of statements such as these does not offend the confrontation clause. Gibson, 409 F.3d at 338. Compare Lilly, 527 U.S. at 131, 119 S.Ct. 1887 (<HOLDING>) and Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541, 106
holding that statement to police made thirtysix hours after a different statement to police was not part of one confession and not admissible under the rule of completeness holding that a statement inculpating the declarant and his alleged accomplices is not trustworthy when made as part of a custodial confession to law enforcement agents holding that testimonial evidence is admissible only if the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the declarant holding that rule of completeness did not apply where statements made at the scene and the statement made at the police station were  distinct and not part of one confession holding that an inculpatory statement by a declarant was not reliable when he viewed the defendant like an older brother providing a motivation to lie the statement was made only to defense investigators and not to prosecutors the declarant was not under oath had not been read his miranda rights and was not represented by counsel and the declarant ultimately recanted his admission