a conviction for a crime, for challenging the lawfulness of such judgment or the proceedings upon which it is based.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, to construe the legislature’s silence in ORS 161.610 (2001) as somehow authorizing a challenge to the constitutionality of his 1983 sentence would be inconsistent with the legislature’s expressed intent that, in the absence of direct appeal, post-conviction relief is the exclusive remedy for challenging the validity of a constitutionally infirm sentence. Furthermore, the broader historical context of ORS 161.610 (2001) provides that, once final judgment in a criminal case is entered, its validity and regularity are presumed. Capos v. Clatsop County, 144 Or 510, 525, 25 P2d 903 (1933); see also State v. Young, 122 Or 257, 263-64, 257 P 806 (1927) (<HOLDING>). Again, we decline to interpret the
holding that at this stage of the proceedings review is limited to a determination of whether the circuit court afforded due process and whether the court observed the essential requirements of law holding that the appropriate inquiry under aedpa is not whether a federal court believes a state courts determination  was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonablea substantially higher threshold holding that unless a determination by a court in a criminal case is directly attacked it remains the determination of the court whether decided rightly or wrongly recognizing that a lower court cannot change the law of the case as decided by the highest court hearing a case recognizing that the determination is an equitable one