130. This alternative definition, when viewed in the charge as a whole, properly informed the jury of the prosecution’s burden. Id. at 43, 524 A.2d 130. Here, immediately following the offending clause, the trial court provided an alternative definition of reasonable doubt: “a doubt which arises from a fair and rational consideration of the evidence or perhaps the lack of evidence, it means a doubt as would cause a man of ordinary prudence to pause or hesitate when called upon to act in the most important aspects of life.” This clause more accurately describes the State’s burden. It leads us to believe that the offending language was unlikely to have lessened the State’s burden of proof in the eyes of the jury. See Victor, supra, 511 U.S. at-, 114 S.Ct. at 1249-50, 127 L. Ed.2d at 599 (<HOLDING>). Defendant next alleges error in the part of
holding that charge defining reasonable doubt as a doubt for which you can conscientiously express a reason was neither confusing nor inaccurate holding that harmless beyond a reasonable doubt analysis not applicable in habeas cases holding that beyond reasonable doubt standard not required in termination cases holding potential prejudice caused by equating reasonable doubt with a substantial doubt mitigated by providing an alternate definition of reasonable doubt as a doubt that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act holding that proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is required by the constitution