very well could have been the difference betw 5 (C.D.Cal.2006) ("Crawford v. Washington’s protections apply to any proof of any aggravating factor during the penalty phase of a capital proceeding under the FDPA.”); Russeau v. State, 171 S.W.3d 871, 880 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (reversing a death sentence under Crawford because the trial court admitted testimonial hearsay at the punishment phase), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 2982, 165 L.Ed.2d 990 (2006), and cert. denied, - U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 2982, 165 L.Ed.2d 989 (2006); State v. Bell, 359 N.C. 1, 603 S.E.2d 93, 115-16 (2004) (applying Crawford to hold that the introduction of testimonial hearsay at the sentencing phase of a capital trial violated the Confrontation Clause); and Rodriguez v. State, 753 So.2d 29, 43-44 (Fla.2000) (<HOLDING>) with Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 398 (7th
holding that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule where the defendant was able to confront and crossexamine the witness who claimed that the statements at issue were made holding that the sixth amendment confrontation clause was not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under a georgia statute permitting an exception for statements by coconspirators where there was sufficient indicia of reliability supporting the truth of the statements holding that any confrontation right is found in the fourteenth amendments due process clause not the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment holding that the sixth amendment right of confrontation applies to all three phases of the capital trial and that the admission of  hearsay statements of codefendants in the penalty phase violated the confrontation clause holding that the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial hearsay