religious speech because it would require courts “to inquire into the significance of words and practices to different religious faiths” and “[s]uch inquiries would tend inevitably to entangle the State with religion in a manner forbidden by our eases”). Third, the Borough asserts that the plaintiffs cannot state a free exercise claim because the eruv is an “optional” religious practice. For reasons similar to those counseling against requiring the plaintiffs to demonstrate a substantial burden on their religious practice, we cannot accept the Borough’s contention that courts presented with free exercise claims should, as a threshold matter, determine whether the religious practices at issue a , the Lukumi Court would have considered whether 84-88, 64 S.Ct. 882, 88 L.Ed. 1148 (1944) (<HOLDING>). Finally, if the First Amendment shielded only
holding that further inquiry into falsity of defendants prior testimony in a rape case is barred holding that courts can inquire into the sincerity but not the truth or falsity of religious beliefs holding that the defendants offer of the affiants sworn testimony to establish falsity of the warrant affidavit did not amount to a substantial preliminary showing of falsity under franks holding that a district court need not inquire into the veracity of a classified affidavit unless the information it provides is insufficient or contradicted by the record or there is evidence of bad faith on behalf of the agency holding that religious exercise is any exercise of religion whether or not compelled by or central to a system of religious belief and that the use building or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered  religious exercise