to be erroneous. The District, however, fails to cite any cases in support of its claim that the award of medical benefits was speculative. Arkansas law is well settled that we will not consider the merits of an argument when an appellant fails to cite any convincing legal authority in support of that argument, and it is otherwise not apparent without further research that the argument is well taken. Smith-Blair, Inc. v. Jones, 77 Ark.App. 273, 72 S.W.3d 560 (2002); Matthews v. Jefferson Hosp. Assoc., 341 Ark. 5, 14 S.W.3d 482 (2000). |nMoreover, the Commission’s decision was based on Dr. Young’s statement that he felt it appropriate to see Wilson in the future if Wilson continued to have pain that interfered with his daily activities. See Patchell, 86 Ark.App. 230, 184 S.W.3d 31 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm on this issue as well.
holding that claimant is entitled to ongoing medical treatment if such is geared toward management of the claimants injury holding ec is not responsible for medical treatment required independently by the subsequent noncompensable injury when the removal of a hindrance to recovery from the compensable injury is merely an incidental effect of such treatment holding that a claimant establishes a prima facie case for compensable medical treatment where a qualified physician indicates treatment was necessary for a workrelated condition holding that a tortfeasor is required to pay the expenses of over treatment or unnecessary medical treatment unless such treatment was incurred by the victim in bad faith  holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant