to ASI’s “employees.” Defendants argue that these references show that this is a suit on behalf of the plan participants. However, the bulk of these references merely provide background information. The only reference that merits discussion is found in the prayer for relief contained in count II of the complaint, which requests “any and all other expenses incurred by ASI and its employees.” This is insufficient to re-characterize the entire complaint as one on behalf of the employees. Such language is not found in the prayers that follow the other counts in ASI’s complaint. Further, ASI has explained that the inclusion of this prayer was inadvertent and has expressly withdrawn the language. See Pl.’s Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Remand at 2 & nc., 178 F.3d 523, 526 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). We are of the view that ASI has sufficient
holding that a public trust that exercised control over the beneficiarys employment did not change the benefit plan into a government plan because the trust did not establish the plan or control it holding that section 406b only governs a defendant service provider who was receiving agreedupon rates directly from a plan if that defendant had discretionary authority or control with respect to the rates agreed to by the plan sponsor holding that an esops purchase of stock at inflated prices with cash already transferred to the esop was an action involving management of assets and was subject to fiduciary standards rejecting the argument that the purchase was only the act of a plan sponsor holding that a plan sponsor was an erisa fiduciary to the extent that it was vested with and exercised discretionary control holding that the court must consider the extent of control exercised by the defendant over the third partys means of infringement