He also argues that they were deliberately elicited by the jail officials in violation of his Fifth Amendment Miranda rights and his Sixth Amendment Massiah rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199,12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964). The trial judge’s finding that the statements were voluntary was not clearly and manifestly wrong. See State usion of the statements because he had previously asserted his right to counsel. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). But Miranda only applies to custodial interrogation. Jackson and Compton did not attempt to elicit an incriminating response from Kemp. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Compton only asked Kemp why he was in
holding that the defendant must demonstrate that the police and their informant took some action beyond merely listening that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks holding that an interrogation occurs when there is express questioning or any words or actions on the part of the police other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect holding that a comment made by one police officer to another in the presence of the accused expressing concern that handicapped children might come across a shotgun is not a statement designed to elicit an incriminating response holding that a defendants response to a question about his address was not protected by miranda notwithstanding the fact that pohce made use of the statement because it was not intended to elicit incriminating statements holding that defendant must demonstrate that the police and their informant took some action beyond merely listening that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks