even if the trial court and counsel were not aware of, and did not consider, the less drastic alternative). The State faults appellant for not stating that he would waive the juror’s disqualification, and thus, “it cannot be said that proceeding with either of the disqualified jurors was an available option.” However, a challenge to a juror based on a non-absolute disqualification, such as county residence, is a forfeitable right, not a waivable right. See Webb v. State, 232 S.W.3d 109, 112 & n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (noting that although many cases suggest “a challenge for cause is waived if not used, it is more accurate to say that the right is forfeited by failure to request the challenge” (citing Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993))); Mayo, 4 S.W.3d at 11-12 (<HOLDING>). Thus, all appellant had to do to forfeit a
holding that a challenge for cause based on county residence is waived if not made the legislature did not intend for a defendant to waive the countyresidence requirement only by knowingly accepting a disqualified juror holding that the defendant waived the right to challenge a suppression ruling on appeal holding there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the defendant did not intend to perform when the promise was made holding that trial courts denial of motion for new trial based on juror misconduct was justified where there was no evidence presented at hearing on motion that juror had knowingly concealed relevant litigation experience during voir dire and identity of juror as county court litigant was not demonstrated holding that a court must allow the defendant to ask in voir dire whether a potential juror would automatically impose the death penalty and suggesting that such a juror should be disqualified for cause