knowledge of the rule or order, supports our adoption of the majority rule. “[Wjhere the legislature includes particular language in one section of the statute but omits it in another section of the same act, it is presumed that the legislature acted purposefully in including or excluding that particular subject.” State v. Hawk, 170 S.W.3d 547, 551 (Tenn.2005) (quoting Bryant v. Genco Stamping & Mfg. Co., 33 S.W.3d 761, 765 (Tenn.2000)). By stating that the level of punishment for violations of the rules and regulations promulgated under the 1980 Securities Act is subject to a heightened knowledge requirement, the legislature sent a clear signal that such a requirement does not exist for violations of the Act itself. See, e.g., United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.1972) (<HOLDING>). Our adoption of the majority rule is also
holding no violation of the travel act holding that the knowledge requisite to knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as distinguished from knowledge of the law holding that knowledge of the patent is required for willful infringement holding knowledge of the bankruptcy petition and action taken thereafter was sufficient to find a willful violation of the stay holding that the last sentence of 15 usc  78ffa which matches the second independent clause of section 409a of the 1956 uniform securities act makes it clear that the statute contemplates a willful violation by one who has no knowledge of the violated rule or regulation footnote omitted