that the two-level increase is a misapplication of the Guidelines because § 2B1.1(b)(12)(A) applies only when it is the fraudulent offense itself that carries the risk of death or serious bodily injury. Rizzo contends that the increase was applied based on his attempt to elude apprehension and did not relate to his theft of mail offense. Rizzo argues that trial counsel’s failure to make these objections fell below objective standards of practice and that prejudice resulted. Rizzo’s argument that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the application of both § 3C1.2 and § 2Bl.l(b)(12)(A) has no merit because the enhancements were based on two separate instances of flight, one on July 25, and one on August 10. See United States v. Gillyard, 261 F.3d 506, 509-12 (5th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). The Government concedes that §
holding that there was no prejudice when evidence complained of would have been admissible against defendant in separate trial holding that there was no legal separation where there was no evidence  that the orders at issue mandated or acknowledged separate existences recognizing that separate ratings can be assigned for separate periods of time based on facts found holding that there was no double counting in applying  3c12 and  3a12b because they were based on separate acts holding that the defendants sentences were properly enhanced under  3a12b because they assaulted an officer employed by the mississippi bureau of narcotics and during the assault made statements including they are the police lets kill them