negotiations.” Obviously that could be achieved without a statement, by means of a telephone call. Counsel for plaintiffs in their brief before us urge that the statement “is nothing more that [sic ] a fair and reasonable attempt by counsel to estimate, at a given point and time, an approximate value of the case.” Considered study of this explication, including that in Perdomo, convinces us that the requirement of the Rule has no real purpose that could not be as adequately served without the Rule. On the other hand if the statement is limiting, then the Rule does serve a purpose. As between two constructions, one of which appears to be superfluous or lack purpose, we will choose the one that does not. See Hackensack Bd. of Education v. Hackensack, 63 N.J.Super. 560, 569 (App.Div.1960) (<HOLDING>). We realize that such a determination is
recognizing courts must interpret statutes to give effect to all language used rendering no portion meaningless or superfluous holding that legislative language must not if reasonably avoidable be found to be inoperative superfluous or meaningless holding courts must give effect to every provision and word in a statute and avoid any interpretation that may render statutory terms meaningless or superfluous holding that postdeprivation remedy must be meaningless or nonexistent to be inadequate holding that legislative consent to suit must be by clear and unambiguous language in either a statute or by other express legislative permission