1038, 118 S.Ct. 1347, 140 L.Ed.2d 496 (1998); Groome Resources, 234 F.3d at 217; Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 468 (7th Cir.1999); St. Croix Waterway Ass’n v. Meyer, 178 F.3d 515, 520 (8th Cir.1999); Kildea v. Electro-Wire Prods., Inc., 144 F.3d 400, 407 (6th Cir.1998); see also Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 613, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971) (striking down a city ordinance barring “conduct ... annoying to persons passing by” on vagueness grounds because, inter alia, the ordinance “did not indicate upon whose sensitivity a violation [would] depend — the sensitivity of the judge or jury, the sensitivity of the arresting officer, or the sensitivity of a hypothetical reasonable man”). But see Belle Maer Harbor v. Charter Twp. of Harrison, 170 F.3d 553 (6th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, “it is well established that
holding that a jurys finding that a city had delegated its final policymaking authority in the area of law enforcement to a city police chief was supported by the evidence and warranted imposing liability upon the city holding factor b is not unconstitutionally vague holding the phrase open and gross lewdness unconstitutionally vague holding unconstitutionally vague a city ordinance imposing criminal sanctions because its use of the term reasonable to guide law enforcement discretion was not amenable to a limiting interpretation in the unique and everchanging context of open water restrictions holding city could not enforce through administrative adjudication a city ordinance limiting vehicle weight