allege the facts constituting an offense did not affect the trial court’s jurisdiction. See Hatch v. State, 924 P.2d 284, 294 (Okla.Crim.App.1996) (citing Bruner v. State, 612 P.2d 1375, 1380 (Okla.Crim.App. 1980); Holloway v. State, 602 P.2d 218, 220 (Okla.Crim.App.1979)). Rather, an Information was sufficient so long as it did not mislead the defendant and did not expose him to the possibility of later being put in jeopardy a second time for the same offense. See, e.g., Doyle v. State, 785 P.2d 317, 326 (Okla.Crim.App.1989); Jefferson v. State, 675 P.2d 443, 445 (Okla.Crim.App. 1984); Nealy v. State, 636 P.2d 378, 380 (Okla.Crim.App.1981). See generally Miller v. State, 827 P.2d 875, 880-83 (Okla. Crim.App.1992) (Lumpkin, Vice-Presiding J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (<HOLDING>), majority opinion overruled by Parker v.
recognizing that the federal pleading standard is a less stringent standard than the delaware pleading standard holding that courts look to substance of plea for relief to determine nature of pleading not merely title of pleading recognizing by citing several cases that diametric opposing lines of case law authority exist with one line suggesting that information need not allege each element of offense charged because notice pleading is sufficient distinguishing pleading elements from pleading facts holding that pleading rules are substantive holding that a court may not apply a heightened pleading standard more stringent than the usual pleading requirements of rule 8 in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under  1983