is not so weak, nor is the contrary evidence so overwhelming, that the finding should be set aside and a new trial ordered. See Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 635; Cain, 709 S.W.2d at 176. We overrule the potions Wise Electric’s first and second issues challenging the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s findings of fact 36 through 41, 53, 55 through 58, 63, and 64. Because AHC met its bürden of establishing that no post-fire market existé for any of its smoke-damaged inventory, the general rule for measuring negligently-inflicted damages to personal property — that being the difference between its market value immediately after the injury at the place where the damage occurred — does not apply here. See Pasadena State Bank, 149 Tex. at 50, 228 S.W.2d at 128 (<HOLDING>); Int’l-Great N. R.R. Co., 46 S.W.2d at 670
holding that damage to building and personal property as a result of fire negligently caused by defendant was to be measured by reasonable cash market value of the property at the time it was destroyed by the fire or if it was not totally destroyed by the diminution in its fair market value before and after the fire recognizing that the personal property destroyed might not have a market value triggering variations in the way in which the method of determining damages may be stated to achieve proper compensation for the injury inflicted as a proximate result of the wrongful act complained of holding that the measure of damages of converted property is the market value at the time of conversion recognizing the conduct giving rise to punitive damages must be a proximate cause of the harm inflicted holding that the injury was inflicted by the defendant when it occurred as a result of the defendants combative conduct