of the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See Talley, 431 F.3d at 786. Accordingly, we affirm Selgjekaj’s conviction and sentence. AFFIRMED. 1 . We are unpersuaded by Selgjekaj’s additional argument, that the district court constructively amended the indictment when it instructed the jury concerning a scrivener's error in Count 17 of the indictment. Because neither the state in which the offense conduct took place nor the state represented on the counterfeit cigarette stamps are essential elements of the charged offense, see 18 U.S.C. § 2342(a), the original indictment put Selgjekaj on notice of the crime charged, and the change did not provide a broader basis for conviction, we discern no constructive amendment here. Cf. United States v. Castro, 89 F.3d 1443, 1452-53 (11th Cir. 1996) (<HOLDING>). 2 . The PSI also recommended a 2-level
recognizing that a constructive amendment to an indictment occurs when either the government the court or both broadens the possible bases for conviction beyond those presented by the grand jury holding that an allegation as to the time of the offense is not an essential element of the offense charged in the indictment and within reasonable time limits proof of any date before the return of the indictment and within the statute of limitations is sufficient holding that it was not error plain or otherwise for a judge to rely on an unsubstantiated summary of a state indictment contained in the psr to determine that the prior offense was a crime of violence even though the defendant had not admitted that the summary of the indictment was correct holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense holding that constructive amendments alter or expand the essential elements of the offense contained in the indictment such that the possible bases for conviction go beyond what is contained in the indictment