first motion to remand, Harper amended his complaint to eliminate the Title VII claim, leaving only the state law claims. Defendants argue that, even after Harper dismissed his Title VII claim, th reason for his termination — theft of a co-worker’s cell phone — was a pretext for retaliation for exercising his rights under the anti-discrimination laws and in contravention of Michigan’s public policy against retaliation for exercising worker’s compensation rights. At most, the terms of the CBA were relevant background for Harper’s termination. For these reasons, Harper’s state law claims for retaliation, which were independent of the CBA, were not pre-empted by § 301 of the LMRA. See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 407, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Smolarek v. Chrysler Corp., 879 F.2d 1326,
recognizing retaliatory discharge tort implied by the workers compensation act holding that plaintiffs retaliatory discharge claim under michigan law was not preempted because the statelaw tort of retaliatory discharge creates rights independent of those established by the collective bargaining agreement further holding that discrimination claim was not preempted even though the employer was likely to rely on provisions of the cba in its defense holding that the factual questions underly ing the tort of retaliatory discharge for filing a workers compensation claim including whether the employer had a nonretaliatory reason for the discharge would not required a court to interpret any term of a collectivebargaining agreement and would not turn on the meaning of any provision of a collectivebargaining agreement recognizing the tort of retaliatory discharge holding that employee must prove that the sole reason for their discharge was their filing of a workers compensation claim to prevail on a claim of wrongful discharge under marylands workers compensation act