First, as here, judicial review of an administrative event is withheld until the agency instigates a second, independent proceeding. More significantly, the immigration statute is phrased so as to bar review of the agency’s determination of SAW status in an individual action — an event comparable to EPA’s selection of a removal or remedial action, which is the focus of the CERCLA bar. Neither statute mentions the availability of review of a constitutional challenge to the statute itself (as here) or to the agency’s execution of the statute (as in McNary). Insofar as the Immigration and Nationality Act compares to CERCLA, we think that the holding in McNary supports our conclusion here. See also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (<HOLDING>); cf. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 762,
recognizing that this courts construction of a statute becomes as much apart of the statute as the words of the statute itself and that change is a matter that addresses itself to the general assembly not this court holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute holding that the aedpa statute of limitations is not jurisdictional holding that this courts sixyear statute of limitations is jurisdictional holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute not of challenge to statute itself