sentence and renders it superfluous. While it is indisputable that the relationship between the two sentences is awkward, reading the last sentence broadly does not necessarily render the first sentence null. Considered in light of § 9613(f)(l)’s purpose, which was to codify (and hence supplant) the federal common law contribution suit implied from § 9607(a), see supra, the last sentence can logically be understood as a clarification of how the new statutory contribution suits fit into the court-interpreted CERCLA scheme. See Aviall, 312 F.3d at 685, 687 (noting that the final sentence was necessary “to eliminate the uncertainty in case law prior to [§ 9613(f)(l)’s] enactment as to whether contribution was available under CERCLA at all”); see also Pneumo Abex Corp., 142 F.3d at 776 (<HOLDING>). Finally, Nick’s argues that the term
holding that the government was not responsible for delay from withdrawal of guilty plea holding that when a plaintiff files suit alleging that multiple tortfeasors are responsible for the plaintiffs injury any settlements are to be credited against the amount for which the liable parties as a whole are found responsible but for which only the nonsettling defendant remains in court holding that  9613f1 is the exclusive vehicle for responsible parties to obtain contribution from other responsible parties holding that defendant was responsible for the delay from the withdrawal of his guilty plea holding plaintiff responsible for attorney error