to this instruction. However, the court later stated that it had allowed the aforementioned question ounsel argued in his closing argument the very point which he contends he was denied the opportunity to make — that Elliott’s willingness to take a lie detector test demonstrated a lack of consciousness of guilt. The Commonwealth argues that the PCRA court’s denial of relief on this ineffectiveness claim is correct because the underlying claim of trial court error is meritless. First, it argues that this Court has already ruled that testimony regarding a defendant’s purported willingness to undergo a polygraph examination is inadmissible for the same reasons that a defendant’s refusal to take such test is inadmissible. Commonwealth v. Saunders, 386 Pa. 149, 125 A.2d 442, 445-46 (1956) (<HOLDING>). The Commonwealth further submits that
holding that an error is plain if it is clear or obvious holding that because a polygraph test is not judicially acceptable it is obvious that neither a professed willingness nor a refusal to submit to such a test should be admitted because a defendants willingness is merely a selfserving act or declaration which obviously could be made without any possible risk holding that expert testimony should not be admitted as to a matter that is obviously within the common knowledge of jurors because such testimony almost by definition can be of no assistance holding that it is not holding that when counsel denied the petitioner the right to appeal neither the strickland prejudice prong nor the harmlesserror test is appropriate