no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (emphasis added). The exclusive rights in the copyrighted work granted by the Act are reproduction; preparation of derivative works; distribution by sale, rental, lease or lending; public performance, in the case of motion pictures or audiovisual works; and public display of individual images from motion pictures or audiovisual works. 17 U.S.C. § 106. State laws, whether statutory or common law, are subject to express preemption under Copyright Act § 301 only if they create rights that are “equivalent” to the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a); see also Ehat v. Tanner, 780 F.2d 876, 878 (10th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); 1 Melville B. Nimmer and David Nimmer, Nimmer
recognizing that the copyright act was amended in 1976 to include computer programs in the definition of protectable literary works holding that conversion and unjust enrichment claims were preempted by the copyright act since they were not qualitatively different from a copyright claim because they contained no extra element beyond those necessary to show copyright infringement holding that while the computer program at issue was within the subject matter of copyright the right sought under state law pursuant to a license was not equivalent to the exclusive rights under copyright as such copyright preemption did not apply holding that because literary works including compilations and derivative works are within the subject matter of copyright state common law that purported to protect a work for which plaintiffs copyright action was unsuccessful was preempted holding that the copyright act distinguishes between employees and independent contractors for copyright possession