proviso would be surplusage. In this regard, the Authority explains that the Statutory Construction Act already prioritizes specific statutory provisions (such as a conferral of the power to prescribe taxicab regulations under Section 5722) over more general ones (i.e., any other statutes concerning the power to adopt regulations). Moreover, according the Authority, there simply are no statutory provisions conflicting with the Commonwealth Court’s interpretation of Section 5722, thus rendering the notwithstanding-other-law term devoid of meaning and impossible to execute, again, were the court’s understanding of Section 508 to prevail. See 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1921(a), 1922(1), (2). The Authority references City of Philadelphia v. Clement & Muller, Inc., 552 Pa. 317, 715 A.2d 397 (1998) (<HOLDING>), as an example of a decision in which this
holding that plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive recognizing that plain meaning does not control where context shows that the parties have assigned an unusual meaning to a term holding that court of appeals erred in relying on the plain meaning of a statute when the legislative history clearly indicated another meaning holding that a statute should where possible be construed according to its plain meaning and as a whole giving meaning to all its parts holding that the meaning of a notwithstandingotherlaw proviso was straightforward in reinforcing the plain meaning of the legislative prescription to which it was attached