of the indictment, and when the juror reiterated her position, the judge continued polling the rest of the jury as to all counts. When the whole jury had been polled, the judge returned to the first juror and asked her about the disputed count once again, and this time the juror responded that she found the defendant guilty. We reversed, holding that “the inevitable effect was to pressure the first juror to conform her vote to that of the majority.” 349 A.2d at 466. Acknowledging these precedents, the government nevertheless cites several other cases in which this court has given the trial judge some discretion to continue polling after a dissent in certain situations. See Artis v. United States, 505 A.2d 52, 58 (D.C.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 964, 107 S.Ct. 464, 93 L.Ed.2d 409 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. United States, 470 A.2d 756, 760
holding that when first indictment was filed within the thirtyday period there is no speedy trial act violation when a subsequent indictment repeating one charge from the initial indictment and adding other counts is filed outside the thirtyday window holding that it was not error plain or otherwise for a judge to rely on an unsubstantiated summary of a state indictment contained in the psr to determine that the prior offense was a crime of violence even though the defendant had not admitted that the summary of the indictment was correct holding that it was not error to continue polling on counts not subject to dissent when there was a multicount indictment holding that it was not reversible error to continue polling the remaining jurors on all counts when the disputed count was later dismissed holding that issues underlying all counts were sufficiently intertwined that the separate appeal of the summary judgment counts would complicate the trial of the remaining counts