excuse jury questions submitted in questions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5—whether Bartush’s subsequently-occurring breach was excused on the grounds of a prior material breach or on other applicable grounds. See Mustang Pipeline Co., 134 S.W.3d at 199; Texas Pattern Jury Charges: Business PJC 101.2; see also Cont’l Dredging, Inc., 120 S.W.3d at 394. And the jury determined that it was not. Because by virtue of its “no” answer to question 4, the jury found that Cimco’s failure to comply was not material and because by virtue of its no answers to questions 4 and 5, the jury found that Bartush’s failure to comply was not excused, the jury’s answer to question 3—finding that Cimco breached first—was rendered immaterial. See, e.g., Spencer v. Eagle Star Ins. Co. of Am., 876 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex. 1994) (<HOLDING>). The jury’s verdict, viewed as a whole, was
holding that the disputed issue with respect to the state law bar was properly submitted to the jury holding that trial court did not commit reversible error when it submitted admissibility of evidence question to jury because the trial court had independently decided the question holding that solicitors statement during closing that defense witnesses have lied was merely a question which was submitted to the jury for its determination when it made its findings and returned its verdict holding that a jury question is immaterial when it was properly submitted but has been rendered immaterial by other findings holding it is a question of fact