under the circumstances, Petitioner had no “realistic possibility” of being paroled in ten years. Tr. (Evid. Hearing Dec. 10, 2003) at 8. Magistrate Judge Scheer concluded that trial counsel’s faulty parole-eligibility advice constituted an unprofessional error satisfying the first part of the Strickland test. While this conclusion is open to debate, cf. United States v. Stephens, 906 F.2d 251, 253-54 (6th Cir.1990) (“the mere fact that an attorney incorrectly estimates the sentence a defendant is likely to receive is not a fair and just reason to allow withdrawal of a plea agreement.” (internal quotations omitted)); United States v. Nimocks, No. 99-5296, 2000 WL 1679469, at *5 (6th Cir. Nov.2, 2000) (following Stephens ); cf. also Nagi v. United States, 90 F.3d 130, 135 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>), no one has objected to this conclusion; thus,
holding that ineffective assistance of counsel constitutes cause for procedural default only if counsels performance was constitutionally ineffective recognizing that in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel a movant must show that he was prejudiced by his counsels performance holding counsels failure to object to victim impact testimony and evidence was not ineffective assistance of counsel when the trial record was silent as to counsels strategy holding trial counsels performance at sentencing where defendant received death sentence after initial guilty plea was neither unreasonable nor prejudicial holding that counsels assistance was not ineffective even though counsel used the wrong version of the federal sentencing guidelines because counsels performance was based upon a reasonable decision to offer a guilty plea in exchange for a lighter sentence