premise. Landgraf holds that: When a ease implicates a federal statute enacted after the events in suit, the court’s first task is to determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach. If Congress has done so, of course, there is no need to resort to judicial default rules. When, however, the statute contains no such express command, the court must determine whether the new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed. If the statute would operate retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). However, neither of these decisions addressed
holding new statute applicable only prospectively holding the general rule is that in the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary a law affecting substantive rights liabilities and duties is presumed to apply prospectively holding that state statutes are exempt from the implied limitations of the commerce clause only when the congressional direction to do so has been unmistakably clear holding that there is no clear congressional intent that firreas statutes of limitations 12 usc  1821e12a  apply only prospectively holding that where congressional intent is clear a court must give effect to such intent