1020, 119 S.Ct. 1257, 143 L.Ed.2d 353 (1999); United States v. Von Foelkel, 136 F.3d 339, 341 (2d Cir.1998) (upholding § 2262(a)(1) as it falls within Lopez’s first category); United States v. Wright, 128 F.3d 1274, 1276 (8th Cir.1997)(upholding § 2262(a)(1) as it “falls within Congress’s authority to ‘keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses.’ ”) (quoting Caminetti [v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491, 37 S.Ct. 192, 61 L.Ed. 442 (1917) ]), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1053, 118 S.Ct. 1376, 140 L.Ed.2d 524 (1998); United States v. Gluzman, 953 F.Supp. 84, 89 (S.D.N.Y.1997)(upholding § 2261(a)(1) as it falls within Lopez’s first category), aff'd, 154 F.3d 49 (2d Cir.1998). Id. at 571-72. See also United States v. Henry, 429 F.3d 603, 619 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Based upon the foregoing, this Court
holding that double jeopardy precludes dual convictions for felon in possession of a firearm and felon in possession of separate ammunition because section 790231 florida statutes prohibits possession of  any firearm ammunition or electric weapon or device emphasis in original holding that dual convictions of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of ammunition by a convicted felon violated double jeopardy holding that commerce clause authorizes congress to punish any particular criminal action even without proof of a relation to interstate commerce when the activity is part of a class of activities determined by congress to affect interstate commerce holding that the defendants stipulation that the gun had moved in interstate commerce was sufficient evidence to support his conviction under 18 usc  922g1 holding that conviction for possession of ammunition by a convicted felon in violation of 18 usc  922g is valid under the commerce clause as long as the ammunition had previously moved in interstate commerce even though the possession did not have a substantial affect on same