365, not sold under section 363, pursuant to the Sale Order. Bechtel argues, therefore, that its right of setoff under those Contracts cannot be affected by section 363 and must be determined under section 365. Contrary to Bechtel’s assertions, executory contract rights are a form of “property” that is salable “free and clear” of interests under section 363(f). In re Rickel Home Ctrs., Inc., 209 F.3d 291, 302 (3d Cir.2000) (concluding that assignment of leases and executory contracts are subject to sale under section 363, and particularly section 363(m), because “[b]oth exec-utory contracts and unexpired leases ... are included in the definition of ‘property of the estate’ contained in section 541.”); Krebs Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Valley Motors, Inc., 141 F.3d 490, 498 (3d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). In addition to complying with section 363,
holding that provision in prepetition agreement which precluded sale of assets by debtor was not a bar to a sale under section 363 because prepetition agreements purporting to in terfere with a debtors rights under the bankruptcy code are not enforceable holding that because  363 sale was subject to court approval debtor was not bound to perform until then and could withdraw the application to approve and abandon the contract holding that a judgment lien attaches to a vendors interest in an executory land contract holding that section 363 governs the sales of executory contracts here section 365 provides some limitations and conditions to assignments none of which negates the applicability of section 363 to the sale at auction of an executory contract holding that sale under section 363 eliminates unexercised setoff rights but not recoupment defense