provocation must have been adequate; the defendant must not have had time to cool off between the provocation and the slaying; the provocation must have actually impassioned the defendant; and the defendant must not have cooled off before the slaying. State v. Perry, 124 N.J. 128, 159, 590 A.2d 624 (1991); State v. Mauricio, supra, 117 N.J. at 411, 568 A.2d 879. The first two criteria are objective. The latter two are subjective. Ibid. In the present case, the State contends that if the charge was erroneous, the error was harmless because the evidence was insufficient to permit a rational jury reasonably to conclude that the provocation was objectively adequate. See State v. McClain, 248 N.J.Super. 409, 416-17, 591 A.2d 652 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 126 N.J. 341, 598 A.2d 897 (1991) (<HOLDING>). When defendant was arrested, he gave a tape
holding that proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is required by the constitution holding that failure of trial court to instruct jury that state must prove beyond reasonable doubt killing was not committed in heat of passion required reversal of murder conviction even though there was general charge that state was required to prove each element of offenses beyond reasonable doubt holding the state failed to meet its burden of showing the erroneous jury instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where it did not address the issue on appeal holding that one cannot conspire to commit voluntary manslaughter which is a killing in the heat of passion holding that failure to charge jury that state had burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not act in the heat of passion was harmless because the evidence did not support a charge on passionprovocation manslaughter