it has not had occasion to define the contours of an agency’s authority to use administrative subpoenas post-indictment. In its motion, the government suggests such authority is virtually unbounded, relying upon an out-of-circuit decision for the’ proposition that § 876, “unlike the grand jury system, ... may ... be used to discover evidence related to the charges in the original indict ment.” Gov’t’s Mot. at 5 (quoting Phibbs, 999 F.2d at 1077). While only the Sixth Circuit has explicitly concluded that § 876 contemplates no limit on post-indictment collection of evidence in aid of ongoing litigation, decisions of a number of other courts, cited by the government, lend further support for its position. See, e.g., United States v. Harrington, 761 F.2d 1482, 1485 (11th Cir. 1985) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hossbach, 518 F.Supp. 759,
holding that an insurer has a duty to conduct an investigation reasonably appropriate under the circumstances holding the dea may issue subpoenas under section 876 in an ongoing investigation so long as they are not to run against the targeted individual even after an indictment has been returned recognizing qualified privilege for government files relating to an ongoing criminal investigation holding that an accused may not complain if the statute of limitations is extended so long as the period of time originally provided therein had not run at the time of such extension because an accused does not acquire any vested right in a statute of limitations until it has operated to bar the prosecution of the offense with which he has been charged holding that a court may amend an indictment so long as the scope of the remaining charges is narrower than before