not err in considering only whether there was a change in country conditions with regard to the Chinese government’s treatment of pro-democracy activists in general. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir.2008) (noting that aliens who have been ordered removed are not permitted “to. disregard [those] orders and remain in the United States long enough to change their personal circumstances (e.g., by having children or practicing a persecuted religion) and initiate new proceedings via a new asylum application”). Therefore, because substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Lin failed to establish changed country conditions, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii); see also Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>), the BIA did not abuse its discretion by
holding that when bia considers relevant evidence of country conditions in evaluating motion to reopen this court reviews bias factual findings under substantial evidence standard holding that the bia abused its discretion when it denied petitioners motion to reopen by failing to consider evidence of country conditions holding that in determining whether evidence accompanying a motion to reopen demonstrates a material change in country conditions that would justify reopening we compare the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below holding that bia did not abuse its discretion by declining to consider an unauthenticated document submitted with a motion to reopen to show changed country conditions holding that in evaluating evidence of changed country conditions the bia compares the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below