evidence she could have presented that would have bolstered her case. The record reveals that the circuit court based its factual findings entirely on Harris’s testimony. Under those circumstances, “ ‘it is clear that consolidation did not detrimentally affect [Harris].’ ” Martin, 975 So.2d at 991-92 (quoting 11A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2950 (2d ed.1995)). Hence, I agree that the judgment should not be reversed on the basis that the cir cuit court Consolidated the injunction hearing with a trial on the merits of some of Harris’s claims. Harris also argues that the judgment should be reversed because, as a matter of law, she did not abandon the premises. See Bowdoin Square, LLC v. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc., 873 So.2d 1091, 1100 (Ala.2003) (<HOLDING>). I note, however, that the circuit court found
holding that wjhen a wrongful demand or notice to quit or vacate leased premises is made by a lessor or landlord and is followed by immediate surrender of possession by the lessee or tenant a constructive eviction has been accomplished holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant despite retaining keys because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property recognizing a landlords duty for injuries sustained on leased premises where the landlord is aware that the premises are leased with intent to admit the public holding under kansas law that a plumber who was injured while inspecting the leased premises in order to prepare an estimate for plumbing work had not entered the premises for the purpose for which they were leased and thus could not rely on the public use exception holding that abandonment requires that tenant vacate the leased premises