this distinction, Justice Stevens emphasized that the rale in that case “expressly and unambiguously applie[d] not only to claims based on New York law but also to claims based on federal law or the law of any other State.” Id. at 432, 130 S.Ct. 1431. Here, the prohibition on class-action litigation only applies to claims brought under the Kentucky Wage and Hour Act, and it appears within the same statutory provision that creates the private cause of action. KRS § 337.385(2). Thus, as three district courts have concluded, we assume without deciding that the Kentucky statute’s purported prohibition against class-action litigation is substantive for the purposes of the Rules Enabling Act. See Williams, 199 F.Supp.3d at-, 2016 WL 4184026, at *6-7, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104001, at *19-22 (<HOLDING>); Green, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171647, at
holding that in the rule 23 class action context named plaintiff may appeal a denial of class certification even if his or her individual claims had been satisfied through the entry of judgment holding that rules allowing multiple claims to be litigated together  including rule 23  are categorically valid under the rules enabling act holding that tolling applies to a subsequent class action when the prior denial of class certification was based solely on rule 23 deficiencies of the putative representative holding that federal court sitting in diversity should apply fed r crv p 4 rather than conflicting state rule because federal rule was consistent with rules enabling act holding that krs  3373852 prevents class certification under rule 23 in federal court because of the rules enabling act