the district court’s ruling are considered abandoned on appeal and not reviewable by this Court). Pending for review is the district court’s disposition of Hopson’s disparate treatment claims regarding the above five employment actions, brought pursuant to Title VII and Michigan’s EUiott-Larsen Civil Rights Act. A. Direct Evidencé of Discrimination Under both Title VII and Michigan law, a plaintiff may set forth a prima facie case of employment discrimination by presenting direct evidence of the defendant’s discriminatory intent. Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir.2000) (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989) (plurality opinion)); Harrison v. Olde Fin. Corp., 225 Mich.App. 601, 572 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Mich.Ct.App.1997) (<HOLDING>). “[DJirect evidence is that evidence which, if
holding that title vii of the civil rights act of 1964 provides the exclusive remedy for claims of employment discrimination by federal agencies holding that when the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination federal law provides appropriate guidance for analyzing claims brought under the michigan civil rights act holding that when the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination price waterhouse applies rather than mcdonnell douglas holding that title vii provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment holding the court may look to state law for guidance where federal law is not fully developed