award less than the maximum statutory limit when the FDCPA violation was not occasioned by a “repeated pattern of intentional abuse or where the violation was technical.” Gonzalez, 2013 WL 4851709, at *1 (internal quotation omitted). In view of the record in the instant case, the Court finds that Plaintiff has achieved success on her claims under the FDCPA, as well as on her recovery under GBL § 349. See Rodriguez v. Pressler and Pressler, L.L.P., No. 06 Civ. 5103, 2009 WL 689056, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2009) (declining to adopt Magistrate Judge’s recommendation reducing fee by 50% since counsel achieved “the maximum possible monetary relief available under the statute”); see also Dowling v. Kucker Kraus & Bruh, LLP, No. 99 Civ. 11958, 2005 WL 1337442, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 6, 2005) (<HOLDING>). Finally, the Court notes that Defendant
holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment holding that equitable relief is not available to an individual under this section of the fdcpa holding that a per diem physician could be adequately compared to per diem attorneys in an organization with a limited number of per diem physicians holding that the maximum statutory damages available to plaintiffs under the fdcpa is limited to 100000 per plaintiff per proceeding holding that a maximum vertical price maintenance scheme is not per se illegal