in some respect. To me, such an approach invites municipal officials to substitute rank speculation and conjectural claptrap for genuine engineering expertise and constitutes an open invitation for local planners to engage in incompetent fear-mongering about perceived or imagined development risks, no matter how unfounded, unlikely, or controllable such risks may be. Such an open-textured standard for upholding the denial of subdivision applications will all too easily be converted into an impermeable cloak to cover confiscatory regulatory takings, official pandering to neighbors’ antidevelopment biases, political shenanigans, and other such local governmental capriciousness of the sort that we recently condemned in L.A. Ray Realty v. Town Council of Cumberland, 698 A.2d 202 (R.I.1997) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the mere fact that the municipality
holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 holding that person in 42 usc  1983 does not include states holding that 42 usc  1983 does not provide a remedy for flsa violations holding that the petitioner property owners had established 42 usc  1983 substantive and procedural dueprocess violations against town officials who arbitrarily denied the plaintiffs request for subdivision approval holding that plaintiffs had claim under 42 usc  1983 against state where state had created an intermediate care facility but placed plaintiffs on waiting list