basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant, or to some comparable judicial record of this information.” 125 S.Ct. at 1263. In light of Shepard, we conclude that the prior-conviction exception extends to “facts regarding prior convictions” that are contained in conclusive judicial records. Because a defendant’s sentence to probation or supervision can be found in the judicial record, we conclude that a trial court may properly consider this fact without violating the defendant’s Blakely rights. Therefore, the trial court did not err in considering the fact that Huber committed the instant offense while under supervision for a prior offense. We note that several courts have come to the same or a similar conclusion. See United States v. Corchado, 427 F.3d 815, 820 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Fagans, 406 F.3d 138, 142
holding that judge could rely on presentenee report to determine that defendant was on probation at the time of the offense but declining to base this holding the theory that probation is derivative of criminal history holding that a defendant was not entitled to a relief under section 2255 when he asserted that the sentencing judge who was not the trial judge was influenced by the sentence imposed by the trial judge on a codefendant holding the state must prove that at the time of the homicide the defendant was engaged in the commission of the felony holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a charge on the lesserincluded offense when the evidence showed either the commission of the completed offense as charged or the commission of no offense such that the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser offense holding that the priorconviction exception to blakely permits a sentencing judge to enhance a defendants sentence based on the fact that the defendant was on probation and under supervision at the time of the commission of the offense