(“[T]he rule ... that a plaintiff bringing a retaliation claim need not have personally engaged in statutorily protected activity if his or her spouse or significant other, who works for the same employer has done so[,] is neither supported by the plain language of Title VII nor necessary to protect third parties, such as spouses or significant others, from retaliation.”); Holt v. JTM Indus., Inc., 89 F.3d 1224, 1226-27 (5th Cir.1996) (concluding, in an ADEA case, that “the language that Congress has employed in [the ADEA] will better protect employees against retaliation than we could by trying to define the types of relationships that should render automatic standing under [the ADEA].”); EEOC and Mickle v. Bojangles Restaurants, Inc., 284 F.Supp.2d 320, 325-30 (M.D.N.C.2003) (<HOLDING>). The Court does find persuasive Gonzalez ’s
holding that a plaintiff can prove illegal retaliation under   1981 in the same manner as he establishes retaliation under title vii holding that the retaliation provision of title vii is an adequate exercise of congress authority under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment holding that title vii retaliation claims must be proved according to traditional principles of butfor causation which requires proof that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer holding that the court finds more persuasive the decisions of the circuit courts which reject reading a thirdparty retaliation cause of action into title vii but ultimately finding that the participation prong of title vii is potentially broad enough to encompass retaliation against third parties in the circumstances alleged in the instant case holding that title vii retaliation claims require proof that the desire to retaliate was the butfor cause of the challenged employment action