and need not consider whether the Second Avoidance Motion is also barred by the doctrine of laches, which “is an equitable defense that a creditor may raise to bar the requested relief of a debtor upon a showing that the debtor was guilty of unreasonable delay which prejudiced the creditor.” Male, 362 B.R. at 242 (citing Saucier v. Quantum Varde Asset Fund, LLC (In re Saucier), 353 B.R. 383, 386 (Bankr.D.Conn.2006); Webb v. Boroughs (In re Webb), 48 B.R. 454, 458 (Bankr. E.D.Va.1985)). Without ruling on this issue, the court notes that exemption rights are liberally construed in favor of debtors, and “[pjassage of time in itself does not constitute prejudice.” Id. (quoting In re Bianucci, 4 F.3d 526, 528 (7th Cir.1993)); see also Matter of Baskins, 14 B.R. 110, 111 (Bankr.E.D.N.C.1981) (<HOLDING>); In re Tarrant, 19 B.R. 360, 364
holding that the definition of debtors principal residence in 11 usc  10113aa does not operate to extend the antimodification provision of 11 usc  1322b to structures that are not real property holding in a case where a chapter 11 trustee was appointed after a period during which the debt or had operated as debtor in possession that a chapter 11 trustee has two years from the date of his appointment not from the commencement of the chapter 11 case to bring avoidance actions holding debtors are entitled to establish and recover their compensatory damages under 11 usc  105a for violations of the discharge injunction holding that the definition of debtors principal residence in 11 usc  10113aa protects holder of secured claim in a mobile home that is debtors principal residence from modification under 11 usc  1322b holding that debtors are not barred from bringing an avoidance action under 11 usc  522f after their discharge has been granted