whether a statute is permissibly retroactive may depend on whether the statute, if it applies to past conduct, upsets vested substantive rights, liabilities or duties that arose before the statute’s enactment. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483. This inquiry is guided by “familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations.” See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270, 114 S.Ct. 1483. Then-Chief Judge Hamilton, addressing the 2007 Amendment, explained, with reference to Dieter, that “the 2007[A]mendment did not change the ‘calculus’ for any party or upset any reliance interests.” See Boston v. The Huntington Nat’l Bank, No. 1:09-cv-0679-DFH-JMS, 2009 WL 2563473, at *5 (S.D.Ind. Aug. 17, 2009) (citing DeHart v. Anderson, 178 Ind.App. 581, 383 N.E.2d 431 (1978) (<HOLDING>)); see also O’Laughlin v. Barton, 582 N.E.2d
recognizing the tide of the majority of case law holding that a statute that lowered the age of majority to 18 did not have retroactive effect on the plaintiffs lawsuit when the applicable statute of limitations was shortened because it was tied to the age of majority recognizing distinction made by majority recognizing the majority rule holding that a statement of fact relating to the plaintiffs age was not direct evidence of age discrimination because the relevance of the comment is provided by inference