opinion lets G & G get away with the latter, by substituting the normal causation prong of standing analysis for the more intimate causal relationship required by the state action doctrine. Were it permissible to thus turn a pumpkin into a carriage, the Court should have allowed the Sullivan plaintiffs to bring their “facial challenge,” on the theory that, while the private insurers in that case were not state actors, the state bureau’s authorization of their withholding created a “causal link” sufficient to support standing. In addition to ignoring Sullivan’s state action holding, the majority fails to apply the other teaching of the case-that before finding a deprivation, we must carefully identify the nature of the property interest at stake. See Sullivan, 119 S.Ct. at 989-90 (<HOLDING>). The opinion reinstated today asserts that G &
holding that a statutory entitlement to payment for reasonable and necessary medical treatment cannot give rise to a property interest until the payments in question have been proven to be reasonable and necessary holding that an officers reasonable mistake of law can give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a traffic stop under the fourth amendment holding that statute provides medical bills are admissible as evidence of necessary fair and reasonable charges holding that medical expenses must be proven to be both reasonable and necessary holding that jury should decide whether plaintiffs testimony proved reasonable and necessary medical expenses