trial counsel was manifestly incorrect that Appellant could do so-this is not a dispositive ruling subject to reservation. During the plea colloquy, the court confirmed, “you are reserving your right to appeal the [cjourt’s pretrial ruling.” Consequently, counsel included a clause in a binding agreement, Appellant signed an agreement with that clause, and the trial court confirmed the clause’s existence and accepted the agreement which included it. The clause, however, was patently erroneous. Plea bargains are contracts and are subject to the rules of contract law. Kingry v. State, 28 So.3d 173, 174 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). Appellant was thus entitled to rely upon the written agreement, his counsel, and the court’s confirmation. See Carlisle v. State, 687 So.2d 929, 930 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (<HOLDING>); see also State v. Cowart, 761 So.2d 1100,
holding that because appellant did not become a party by intervention before judgment was rendered appellant may not extend the time to appeal by filing a motion for new trial holding that an appellant is not permitted to rely on invited error on appeal holding no jurisdiction where appellant argued report was no report because it failed to mention appellant in any substantive way but trial court found report was merely deficient on element of causation as to appellant and granted extension holding record insufficient to support inference appellant knew consequences of his plea when record is silent about whether appellant was actually informed that a guilty plea could result in his deportation holding trial court reversibly erred in not permitting appellant to withdraw his plea where court erroneously stated appellant could appeal motion was in fact not dispositive and appellant was entitled to rely on the courts statement