Third, the injury must not be due to the contributory negligence of plaintiff.” Savina v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 247 Kan. 105, 795 P.2d 915, 933 (1990). It is the second element that fails here. “In medical malpractice cases, the doctrine only applies when a layman could find, as a matter of common knowledge, that the patient’s condition was such that would ordinarily not have occurred if due care had been exercised.” Butler ex rel. Commerce Bank, N.A. v. HCA Health Servs. of Kan., Inc., 27 Kan.App.2d 403, 6 P.3d 871, 887 (1999). As we have already stated, however, the “common knowledge” exception does not apply to the facts of this case. Expert testimony is required to prove Mrs. Esposito’s case, and none is available. For this reason, res ipsa loquitur is unavailable as well. See id. (<HOLDING>). In her appellate briefing, Mrs. Esposito also
holding res ipsa loquitur inapplicable in case where both liability and causation had to be established by expert witnesses holding that while a foundation for an inference of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be based on the testimony of an expert witness the experts testimony must establish that the occurrence indicates the probability of negligence holding that permitting jury to find malpractice from blood draw without expert testimony by applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur instead of eliciting expert testimony as to the standard of care to be reversible error holding the expert witnesses were protected by witness immunity to ensure expert objectivity holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial