3, would be unnecessary if Arrowood’s insureds are not liable to the Ellis Parties in Case 2. R.. 141-1 at -10 — 11., Therefore, a trial on Case 2 would promote judicial economy. Id. It is true that “whether resolution of a single issue would likely be dispositive of an entire claim is highly relevant in determining the efficacy of bifurcation.” In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 695 F.2d 207, 216 (6th Cir.1982). But as the Court repeatedly stated, the issue pf Arrowood’s insureds’ liability to the Ellis Parties is resolved. Obviously, relitigating a settled issue is not an efficient use of judicial resources. And a jury verdict on Case 2 may not automatically make liability “reasonably clear” under the UCSPA. See, e.g., Lee v. Medical Protective, 904 F.Supp.2d 648, 656 (E.D.Ky.2012) (<HOLDING>). And even if liability in Case 2 were
holding that despite a jury verdict against the insured hospital for medical malpractice liability was not beyond dispute holding that the ada does not create a remedy for medical malpractice holding that the hospital was fraudulently joined because hospitals are not sellers of medical devices and therefore there was no basis in illinois law to support the plaintiffs claims for strict liability and breach of implied warranty against the hospital recognizing that even when a prisoner files suit under section 1983 alleging medical malpractice against prison medical officials medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner holding that a defendant in a medical malpractice case who acquiesced to a general verdict form despite several theories of breach could not then challenge the verdict on the basis that jurors may have relied on a theory not supported by sufficient evidence