appeals specifically stated: “We think that such an offer [of cooperation] evidences a consciousness of guilt and is relevant to prove the charge against Levy.” Levy, 578 F.2d at 900. There is no reason why the prosecutor could not argue an inference properly drawn from relevant and admissible evidence. The law gives a prosecutor wide latitude in argument and he may comment on facts and legitimate inferences that may be drawn therefrom. People v. Williams, 192 Ill. 2d 548, 573 (2000). Neither the testimony elicited, nor the prosecutor’s comment thereon, violated Rule 402(f). We find no error, much less plain error. We therefore hold that the issue is procedurally defaulted and that no basis exists to excuse the default under our case law. See People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (1995) (<HOLDING>). We turn now to the post -Miranda silence
recognizing that when plain error is lacking the procedural default must be honored holding that an error is plain only if it is clear under current law when there is no binding precedent on point an instruction typically will not be plain error holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error recognizing plain or fundamental error holding that trial court must make entry of default prior to entry of default judgment and court may not make entry of default when there is no default in law or in fact