aid recipients with regard to their religion. Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the educational crisis precipitating the Cleveland program distinguishes this case from Zel-man. Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized that the purpose of the Cleveland program was to “assist poor children in failed schools.” 536 U.S. at 655, 122 S.Ct. at 2469. In contrast, Defendants have not argued that Arizona schools are failing or even that the Tuition Tax Credit will primarily benefit the poor. However, Plaintiffs’ objections are irrelevant to the constitutional analysis, which only asks whether the program has a valid secular purpose, seeking neither to advance nor inhibit religion. 536 U.S. at 648-649, 122 S.Ct. at 2465; cf. Am. Jewish Cong. v. Corp. for Nat’l. & Cmty. Serv., 399 F.3d 351 (D.C.Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>), rev’g 323 F.Supp.2d 44 (D.D.C.2004).
holding that use of borrowed funds constituted a preference because the funds constituted hard cash available for distribution to creditors holding that discretionary distribution of government funds to americorps recipients is permissible under the establishment clause which only requires that government distribute funds neutrally with respect to religion holding that an order to disgorge funds was final even though the order did not distribute the funds holding that the segregation of funds was not a prerequisite to the establishment of a statutory trust under the internal revenue code holding that defendant violated section 4b when she misappropriated pool participant funds by soliciting funds for trading and then trading only a small percentage of those funds while disbursing the rest of the funds to investors herself and her family