any approval, assignment, or consent with respect to such transfer.” Id. § 1821(d)(2)(G)(i)(II). But none of these broad powers encompasses the right to reclassify deposits without authorization, where to do so has the effect of zeroing out a depositor’s funds, as occurred here. Indeed, such an action would be antithetical to the FDIC’s “basic mission [which] is to protect insured depositors.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FDIC, 32 F.3d 592, 595 (D.C.Cir.1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, a general allegation of statutory authority cannot suffice here; rather, the Court must look to each provision to see whether it affords FDIC-R the authority it claims. Cf. Nashville Lodging, 59 F.3d at 242 (citing O’Melveny & Myers, 512 U.S. at 85, 87, 114 S.Ct. 2048) (<HOLDING>). In short, FDIC-R cannot cite to any specific
holding that in cases of a false conflict of law a court may apply the law of the forum state holding that in diversity cases federal courts are to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law holding that where a conflict between state and federal law is alleged it must be reasonable to conclude that congress would have intended to preclude the state law in question since it would make little sense to preempt state law in order to serve the purposes underlying federal legislation if congress itself would not require or admit of preemption of state authority holding that a revision of the fdi act does not displace preexisting state law except where there is an explicit federal statutory provision or in those few and restricted cases where there is a significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law  holding that the application of an element of a state law tort is preempted if in holding a defendant hable for the conduct  there would be conflict with federal patent law