standing, a party must have suffered an injury-in-fact, that injury must have been caused by the defendant, and the injury must be redressable by a favorable ruling. Phillips v. DeWine, 841 F.3d 405, 414 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). A sale of the residence (and the eviction that Jahn sought) would constitute such an injury, caused by Jahn’s actions, and is re-dressable by a favorable ruling on the motion to compel abandonment. The eases that Jahn cites in support of his argument to the contrary concern other matters entirely, such as the lack of a debtor’s standing to assert a cause of action that was clearly the property of the estate. See, e.g., In re Jones, 396 B.R. 638, 646-48 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2008) (<HOLDING>). Nor does the debtor have standing to make a
holding that cause of action for malpractice did not arise until the tax deficiency was assessed because prior to assessment the plaintiff had not been injured holding that the internal revenue service could be required to turn over to bankrupt estate tangible property to which debtor retained ownership holding that a prefiling notification letter from the internal revenue service was not a notice of deficiency and therefore the tax court had no jurisdiction over the taxpayers petition holding that the debtor lacked standing to bring a claim against the internal revenue service for the improper assessment of a tax deficiency because the cause of action was the property of the estate and had not been abandoned to the debtor holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate