does not affect any right of a creditor to offset....” This language has been interpreted to mean that a creditor’s right to setoff a mutual, pre-petition debt survives even the discharge of the debtor, because it would “be unfair to deny a creditor the right to recover an established obligation while requiring the creditor to fully satisfy a debt to a debtor.” In re Davidovich, 901 F.2d 1533, 1539 (10th Cir.1990) (quoting In re G.S. Omni Corp., 835 F.2d 1317, 1318 (10th Cir.1987)); see also In re Service Decorating Co., 105 B.R. 859, 862-63 (N.D.Ill.1989); In re Morgan, 77 B.R. 81, 85 (Bankr.S.D.Miss.1987); In re Ford, 35 B.R. 277, 279-80 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1983); In re Slaw Constr. Corp., 17 B.R. 744, 748 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1982). Contra In re Johnson, 13 B.R. 185, 188-89 (Bankr.M.D.Tenn.1981) (<HOLDING>). Buckenmaier relies upon numerous cases that
holding that creditors cannot allow postpetition funds to be automatically applied to a prepetition indebtedness absent some positive indication that debtors indeed intend to voluntarily assume their prepetition debts holding that an attempted setoff in response to a debtors postpetition lawsuit was enjoined by  524a2 notwithstanding that acts giving rise to action occurred prepetition holding that a postpetition claim under section 1305 is a liability that arises postpetition and relates only to postpetition activity holding disputed claim for misappropriation of funds is noncontingent and liquidated because all events giving rise to liability occurred prepetition and the amount of the debt can be calculated holding that legal malpractice claim against chapter 7 debtor arose prepetition when the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred and therefore was subject to the debtors discharge