Dr. Fulero’s testimony transgressed Fed. R.Evid. 403, which provides that: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by r. 1996) (applying a deferential standard to conclude that “the district court properly recognized the very real danger that the proffered expert testimony could either confuse the jury or cause it to substitute the expert’s credibility assessment for its own”); United States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042, 1052 (7th Cir.1992) (“the district court’s decision to exclude Dr. Loftus’ testimony was a proper exercise of its discretion, whether under Rule 702 or Rule 403.”); but cf. United States v. Gallardo, 497 F.3d 727, 733 (7th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, in United States v. Rincon, 28
holding that where the record reveals no conflict in the evidence or impeachment of any witness the reviewing court may find the award was not based upon disbelief of the testimony of the witnesses holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting testimony to only one witness where additional witnesses would have provided the same testimony holding any error in admitting testimony of expert witness was harmless because it was cumulative of same testimony given by six other expert witnesses who testified at trial holding that expert testimony on effect of drug abuse on witness memory would intrude upon the jurys role in assessing witness credibility only because the defendant had not put forth any evidence to show that the witnesses actually used drugs and that thus there was no factual link between the experts testimony and the specific witnesses