counsel was deficient in failing to utilize Music since she could have testified that appellant was “very intoxicated,” he “banged into walls” and “couldn’t really talk,” and that his condition may have been due to “more than alcohol.” Appellant argues that this evidence clearly could have been used to undermine finding the CCP aggravator, and could have supported finding intoxication, which the State’s experts found unsupported by the evidence. However, this Court rejected this claim in Jennings II, 583 So.2d at 318-19. The Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of relief because evidence of appellant’s intoxication on the night in question “was well known [at trial], but was abandoned in favor of the identity defense.” Id. at 322; see Engle v. Dugger, 576 So.2d 696, 700 (Fla.1991) (<HOLDING>). As to the sentencing phase, this Court
holding that martinez did not apply to ineffective assistance of counsel subclaims that were not defaulted by postconviction counsel holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel holding that tactical decisions of trial counsel do not justify postconviction relief and that the existence of an additional defense theory does not mean counsel was ineffective holding that the appropriate vehicle for claims alleging that defense counsel violated a defendants right to testify is a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel holding that res judicata does not bar a defendant from raising a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for the first time in a postcollateral proceeding if the defendant was represented by the same counsel at trial and on direct appeal or if an actual conflict of interest enjoined appellate counsel from raising a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal