to admit the officers was a solicitation to speak with the defendant, presumably inside the apartment. See Robbins, 364 F.2d at 47. Thus, even though the defendant remained silent, his conduct corresponded with and answered the question posed. See id. However, as discussed above, Det. Swierk did not seek permission to enter Antone’s apartment, or, as in Robbins, ask generally whether they could talk. Rather, while still outside, Det. Swierk specifically asked whether Antone would go somewhere else (the police station) and talk. Ignoring Antone’s statement for the moment, his conduct alone (without some evidence of trickery on Antone’s part) could not have implied an answer to a question he was not asked. Compare Commonwealth v. Rogers, 444 Mass. 234, 827 N.E.2d 669, 673-75 (2005) (<HOLDING>), and United States v. Shaibu, 920 F.2d 1423,
recognizing difference in elements between offense of actual entry and attempted entry holding that the police officers had probable cause to make a warrantless entry holding that in every warrantless entry into private residence state has burden to demonstrate that exigencies of situation made entry imperative holding that the related independent source rule could potentially apply on remand despite illegal police entry into a warehouse containing marijuana where police had legitimately gained probable cause prior to entry and separately obtained a warrant for entry if the search pursuant to warrant was in fact a genuinely independent source of the information and tangible evidence holding in an impliedconsent case that a warrantless police entry was unlawful in part because the police did not request entry