Finley. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. AFFIRMED. HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX, ALMON, and SHORES, JJ., concur. COOK, J., concurs in the result. HOUSTON, KENNEDY, and BUTTS, JJ., dissent. 1 . Finley also argues, separately, that Ms. Patterson should be liable under two additional theories: (1) the traditional premises-owner liability theory; and (2) the affirmative-conduct-of-premises owner theory. Finley, a licensee under the holding of Louisville & N.R.R. v. Griswold, 241 Ala. 104, 106, 1 So.2d 393, 395 (1941), cannot recover under the traditional premises-owner theory because the general rule that a person is not liable for the criminal acts of third parties applies to premises owners like Ms. Patterson. See Moye v. A.G. Gaston Motels, Inc., 499 So.2d 1368 (Ala.1986) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, Finley cannot recover under the
holding police officer who was shot by occupier of premises could not recover from premises owner for injuries the officer should have reasonably expected to sustain while engaged in the line of duty holding there is no duty to third parties on the part of a premises owner who could not have foreseen the criminal acts of third parties holding common carrier liable when passenger injured on premises owned and controlled by a third party holding that a contractor had no duty of care to a third party under a premises liability theory because the contractor was not a landowner or occupier but expressing no opinion as to whether the contractor owed a duty to the third party under general negligence principles because the third partys legal theory was restricted to premises liability holding that premises owner was not liable to invitee who was shot by third party where special circumstances did not exist