days. Such circumstances are precisely the type that the speedy trial right aims to prevent. The right to a speedy trial is “not primarily intended to prevent prejudice to the defense caused by passage of time; that interest is protected primarily by the Due Process Clause and by statutes of limitations. The speedy trial guarantee is designed to minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial, to reduce the lesser, but nevertheless substantial, impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while released on bail, and to shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges.” MacDonald, 456 U.S. at 8, 102 S.Ct. 1497. The nineteen months Brown spent in pretrial incarceration constitutes actual prejudice. See Redd, 809 F.2d at 1272 (<HOLDING>). In concluding otherwise, the majority defers
holding that an assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice holding that a tenmonth incarceration was oppressive and constituted prejudice holding that a tenmonth delay did not bar the motion where there was no demonstration of prejudice and because disqualification is in the public interest where there is an ethical violation holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that a tenmonth delay in filing a dismissal motion was reasonable holding that a plaintiffs voluntary dismissal of his claims with prejudice constituted a final order that was appealable