engage in any conduct subsequent to speaking with Cohen that could be construed as a waiver of the privilege: once Cohen advised him to invoke the Fifth Amendment, Fornes apparently stopped telling others about the murder. The fact that Fornes has died does not alter the privileged nature of the conversation, as the privilege survives his death. Nonetheless, under the authority of Chambers v. Mississippi, I conclude that Fornes’s statements to Cohen are admissible. As the Supreme Court held in Chambers, even if the evidence would otherwise be inadmissible under the state’s rules of evidence, a defendant in a criminal case may nonetheless be entitled to introduce the evidence if its exclusion would render his trial fundamentally unfair. See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302-03, 93 S.Ct. 1038 (<HOLDING>); see also Priest v. Hennessy, 51 N.Y.2d 62,
holding declarations against penal interest admissible where certain conditions are met holding that victims statements were hearsay admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule and constitutionally permissible under ohio v roberts citations omitted holding that only selfinculpatory aspects of hearsay statement but not other parts of statement are admissible under exception for statements against penal interest holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process even though statements were not admissible under mississippi law which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay holding that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule where the defendant was able to confront and crossexamine the witness who claimed that the statements at issue were made