rights to a child’s sibling. See §§ 32A-4-2(C)(4), -22(C)(2). The enactment of the aggravated circumstances provisions was a response to the federally recognized problem in abuse and neglect cases of a tendency to “err on the side of protecting the rights of parents. . . . [The result of which was that] too many children are subjected to long spells of foster care or are returned to families that ive intent that the aggravated circumstances finding is to be delayed pending appeal of an earlier termination. We are not persuaded. The Legislature could have limited the definition of aggravated circumstances to those situations in which an appellant has exhausted her rights to appeal, but it did not. See State v. Office of Pub. Defender ex rel. Muqqddin, 2012-NMSC-029, ¶ 47, 285 P.3d 622 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, considering that the primary
holding that when the legislature enacts a statute it is presumed that the legislature is aware of existing statutes holding that the legislature can define separate offenses within the same statutory subsection even if the acts are in close temporal proximity recognizing that the legislature can create statutory exceptions to atwill employment holding that a statutory right is a creature of the legislature and does not exist where the legislature has not acted recognizing that the legislature is free to define statutory elements as it wishes