station, see Borlawsky Dep. at 51-52, the kicking was not so arbitrary or purposeless so as to lead to an inference of an intent to punish the plaintiff. See Ellis, 887 F.Supp. at 329. The use of handcuffs for an arrestee is obviously justifiable, see Gold v. City of Miami 121 F.3d 1442, 1446 (11th Cir.1997); Foster v. Metropolitan Airports Comm’n, 914 F.2d 1076, 1082 (8th Cir.1990) and any failure to comply with a state statute or a police department order does not make out a constitutional violation. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 543, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (noting that draft recommendation of Federal Corrections regarding conditions of confinement are not determinative of requirements of the Constitution); Soares v. Connecticut, 8 F.3d 917, 922 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly summary judgment shall be entered
holding that department of environmental protection handcuffing policy has no bearing on whether officers violated constitutional rights holding that district court had no jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs claims that his constitutional rights were violated in state divorce proceeding holding that in excessive force cases the threshold question for the court is whether the officers conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right holding that an employee has no right of action against an employer for wrongful discharge where no clear mandate of public policy is violated thereby holding that the threshold inquiry assuming as true the facts alleged by the injured party is whether the officers conduct violated a constitutional right