S.Ct. 1109. The Court reached this conclusion even while acknowledging that, unlike the situation presented in Garmon, in a major dispute under the RLA there is “no administrative agency equivalent to the NLRB with jurisdiction over railway labor disputes.” Id. at 384 n. 19, 89 S.Ct. 1109. In the years since Jacksonville Terminal and Garmon were decided, this and other circuits have applied their reasoning to major RLA disputes, see, e.g., Bensel v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 387 F.3d at 320-23 (applying Garmon and Jacksonville Terminal to RLA major dispute and affirming dismissal of, inter alia, tortious and malicious interference, fraudulent misrepresentation, and breach of contract claims); to minor RLA disputes, see, e.g., Beers v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 703 F.2d 425, 428-29 (9th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>)-, and to RLA issues, like those presented
holding that act did not bar intentional infliction of emotional distress claim holding that intentional infliction of emotional distress claim brought in context of minor rla dispute was preempted under garmon holding that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was preempted where it arose out of the same conduct as a preempted contract claim holding that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from a claim for emotional distress damages under the employment discrimination statute recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress