offense that results in the commission of an offense by another person in another county, or who commits the crime of hindering prosecution of the principal offense, may be tried in either county.” 4 Although venue is not an element of the offense, it is a material allegation that the state must prove to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Cervantes, 319 Or 121, 123, 873 P2d 316 (1994); State v. McMillan A113456, 199 Or App 408, 412, 111 P3d 1154 (2005). 5 The state also argues that Curry County was a proper venue for defendant’s trial because he intended to hinder Everts’s prosecution there. However, neither actual prosecution of the underlying offender nor successful hindrance of prosecution is an element of ORS 162.325. Cf. State v. Roper, 286 Or 621, 595 P2d 1247 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, we reject the state’s argument
holding the crime of conspiracy is committed or not before the substantive crime begins holding that two conspiracies existed where the members of the second conspiracy did not know about the first conspiracy did not benefit from the first conspiracy and were connected with the first conspiracy only through a middleman holding that where an agreement constituting criminal conspiracy was made in clackamas county it was irrelevant to the venue issue that the object of the conspiracy  robberywas intended to be committed in multnomah county because actual commission of the object crime is not an element of conspiracy holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges holding that in a conspiracy case venue lies where the conspiracy agreement was formed or in any jurisdiction where an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed by any of the conspirators