definition of the crime.” Id. Thus, we will not look at the underlying facts of Payne’s prior conviction for larceny from the person. A number of courts confronted with larceny-from-the-person statutes of different states have held them to be crimes that “involve[ ] conduct posing a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” John, 936 F.2d at 767. See, e.g., United States v. Hawkins, 69 F.3d 11 (5th Cir.1995) (interpreting Texas law), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1163, 116 S.Ct. 1053, 134 L.Ed.2d 198 (1996); United States v. De Jesus, 984 F.2d 21 (1st Cir.1993) (interpreting Massachusetts law); United States v. Franklin, 1996 WL 428413, 91 F.3d 144 (6th Cir. July 30, 1996) (unpublished opinion) (interpreting Tennessee law). But see United States v. Lee, 22 F.3d 736 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). The elements of the offense in each one of
holding that theft from the person is not a crime of violence holding that a threat to harm another person is a crime of violence holding that theft from the person of another under wisconsin law is not a crime of violence as a matter of law and can only qualify as such if there are sufficient facts in the indictment to indicate that a serious threat of violence occurred holding that an escape from custody under minnesota law is a crime of violence holding that battery under wyoming law did not necessarily qualify as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence