agree that Santana-Illan’s two prior state drug convictions were both simple possession crimes. They also agree that simple possession of illegal drugs is punishable as a misdemeanor under the CSA, not as a felony. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a); Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 54 n. 4, 127 S.Ct. 625, 166 L.Ed.2d 462 (2006); Martinez-Macias, 472 F.3d at 1218. But this general rule has exceptions, one of which is at the core of this appeal. As the Supreme Court noted in Lopez v. Gonzales, the crime of recidivist possession is a felony under the CSA and, thus, a drug trafficking h Cir.2008) (same), and Berhe v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 74, 85-86 (1st Cir.2006) (same), and Steele v. Blackman, 236 F.3d 130, 137-38 (3d Cir.2001) (same), with United States v. Cepeda-Rios, 530 F.3d 333, 335-36 (5th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>), and United States v. Pacheco-Diaz, 513 F.3d
holding that defendants prior felony convictions in georgia state court for drugrelated conspiracy and simple possession qualified as predicate prior felony drug offenses for  841b1a because under the plain language of the statute  felony drug offense includes any criminal conduct relating to narcotics including simple possession which a state has proscribed as a felony holding that a conviction under  22039 qualifies as an aggravated felony under the categorical approach holding second simple possession conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony regardless of whether it was actually prosecuted as recidivist possession holding that a second state court conviction for simple possession of narcotics is an aggravated felony as defined in 8 usc  1101a43 holding that a conviction under  22039 for attempted sale of cocaine qualifies as an aggravated felony