suits based on public disclosures must show both that he has “direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based,” and that he “has voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing an action.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B). At least two courts have addressed whether an auditor for the Office of the Inspector General can have “direct and independent knowledge.” See United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 913 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 921, 111 S.Ct. 1312, 113 L.Ed.2d 246 (1991) (reasoning that the “fruits of [the auditor’s] effort belong to his employer,” so he could not have “independent knowledge” of the information); United States ex rel. Fine v. MK-Ferguson Co., 861 F.Supp. 1644, 1554 (D.N.M.1994) (<HOLDING>). Only the district court in this case,
holding that where the debtor did not act but merely had knowledge of and benefit from the fraudulent transfer he was not considered to have performed it holding that public meeting did not satisfy public participation requirement because public did not receive adequate notice holding that plaintiffs knowledge was not based upon the public disclosures because plaintiffs knowledge was independent of those disclosures holding work product protection waived for disclosures to independent auditor who did not share common interests with corporation holding that harold fine did not have direct and independent knowledge because he did not personally conduct the audits that led to the public disclosures