the Bank. A party who has entered into an agreement to arbitrate must insist on this right, lest it be waived. “Under this circuit’s precedent, a party waives its right to arbitrate if it (1) substantially invokes the judicial process and (2) thereby causes detriment or prejudice to the other party.” Al Rushaid v. Nat’l Oilwell Varco, Inc., 757 F.3d 416, 421 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). While waiver should not be inferred lightly, we conclude that Giusti’s conduct in this case clears the waiver threshold. After the Receiver sued Giusti in 2011, Giusti participated in discovery and other pre-trial litigation. Giusti ultimately moved to compel arbitration in 2014, and continued to litigate while that motion was pending. See In re Mirant Corp., 613 F.3d at 589-91 (<HOLDING>). One- of the primary justifications for
holding that a party substantially invoked the judicial process by inter alia submitting three motions to dismiss before moving to compel arbitration holding that statements in motions and briefs are not evidence to be considered in ruling on a motion to compel arbitration holding party did not waive right to arbitrate despite moving to dismiss and moving for summary judgment on opponents claim holding inter alia that common law claims were preempted holding that once the party seeking to compel arbitration establishes the existence of an arbitration agreement and that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement the trial court must compel arbitration