that the Court has rejected the notion that the agency must “expressly parse or refute on the record each individual argument or piece of evidence offered by the petitioner”); see also Xiao Ji Chen, 471 F.3d at 336 n. 17 (presuming that the agency “has taken into account all of the evidence before [it], unless the record compellingly suggests otherwise”). Moreover, the agency did not err in declining to afford any evidentiary weight to a copy of a letter from Lu’s village committee because that letter lacked any indicia of authenticity. See Xiao Ji Chen, 471 F.3d at 342 (finding that the weight afforded to the applicant’s evidence in immigration proceedings lies largely within the discretion of the agency); see Matter of H-L-H & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 209, 214 & n. 5 (B.I.A.2010) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, substantial evidence supports
holding that the the statement of the purpose of the law in question in the committee report is not conclusive and reiterating that the question is whether the law is reasonably calculated to achieve a legitimate police power purpose holding that the court has the discretion to bar a defendant from introducing documents that would have served no purpose other than to repeat the testimony given by the witness holding that prison disciplinary hearing committee members are entitled to qualified immunity holding that unsigned unauthenticated documents from a street resident committee and villager committee that fail to identify the authors are entitled to minimal weight especially when the documents were allegedly obtained from the authorities specifically for the purpose of the hearing on the applicants behalf holding that the fact that the members of the grievance committee and the disciplinary counsel are appointed by the supreme court is not enough by itself to establish a per se violation of due process