interest rule. Indeed, the public interest rule and the statute are expressions of the same concern, that the value of public interests effected through use restrictions be taken into account in valuation. In its briefing, the department has asserted that the decision of the Supreme Court in Bayridge II was in error in concluding that ORS 308.205(2)(d) applied to restrictions other than zoning restrictions. This court does not accept the department’s invitation to call into question the opinion in Bayridge II. The public interest analysis of this opinion does not depend on the Bayridge II discussion of ORS 308.205(2)(d). Further, this court has indicated that voluntary restrictions on land use are similar to or the same as other zoning restrictions. See Willamette Factors, 8 OTR at 406 (<HOLDING>). 13 For ease of reference, this approach will
holding that where the citys conveyance of a segregated golf course to private parties included a reversionary clause which provided that the city could retake the property if it were no longer used for a golf course the city had complete present control over the golf course and state action existed under the fourteenth amendment holding that even in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time place or manner of protected speech provided the restrictions are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information holding that open space restrictions agreed to by a golf course developer were properly treated as zoning restrictions and serve to reduce value under public interest rule discussed in tualatin development 256 or 323 473 p2d 660 1970 holding restrictions embodied in content neutral statute must be narrowly tailored to serve significant government interest while leaving open sufficient alternative channels of communication holding that a quick look analysis was inappropriate for restrictions imposed by professional association of dentists on member advertising where the likelihood of noncompetitive effects of restrictions were not obvious and restrictions could plausibly be thought to have procompetitive effect on competition