court of appeals overlooked Cain's holding that only errors labeled as structural by the Supreme Court are immune from a harm analysis.”); Williams v. State, 273 S.W.3d 200, 225 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) ("The erroneous submission of an unwanted defensive issue has not been labeled by the United States Supreme Court as structural.”). 13 . Gonzales, 994 S.W.2d at 171. 14 . Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(a). See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). 15 . Cain, 947 S.W.2d at 264. See also Gonzales, 994 S.W.2d at 171-72. 16 . 422 U.S. at 865, 95 S.Ct. 2550. 17 . Ruedas v. State, 586 S.W.2d 520, 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (citing Herring and Ex parte Flores, 537 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)). See Ex parte Shivers, 501 S.W.2d 898, 900-01 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (<HOLDING>); Flores, 537 S.W.2d at 459 (holding it to be
holding that mempa v rhay 389 us 128 88 sct 254 19 led2d 336 1967 controlled with respect to texas revocation proceedings that suspended the imposition of sentence and accorded a constitutional right to counsel and further holding that gagnon v scarpelli was inapplicable holding that a right to confrontation exists in parole revocation proceedings holding that there is no constitutional right to representation by counsel at a parole revocation holding that defendants have a right to counsel in criminal proceedings holding the rule requiring that counsel be furnished in proceedings for probation or imposition of deferred sentence as announced in mempa v rhay 389 us 128 88 sct 254 19 led 2d 336 to be retroactive