may be convicted even if the principal is not charged, is acquitted, or is not yet prosecuted. See Massey, 267 S.C. at 444, 229 S.E.2d at 338 (noting “the conviction of the principal is no longer a condition precedent to the conviction of an accessory”). An exception to these modern notions of criminal liability applies to an accessory after the fact. While an accessory before the fact may be treated like a principal upon proper proof, an accessory after the fact is not generally treated like a principal of the crime. See S.C.Code Ann. § 16-1-55 (2003) (outlining lower classifications of punishment for persons convicted of the offense of accessory after the fact to a felony as compared to punishment for the principal felon); State v. Good, 315 S.C. 135, 139, 432 S.E.2d 463, 466 (1993) (<HOLDING>); State v. Fuller, 346 S.C. 477, 481, 552
holding that there was no abuse of discretion for denying the motion to change venue because although there had been some publicity surrounding the murder an independent review of the record demonstrates that there was no difficulty in seating the jury holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed firstdegree murder holding that where there is no essential conflict as to the facts and the evidence the trial court was correct in refusing to submit the theory of strict liability to the jury holding that there could be no risk of spillover evidence where there was significant proof that both defendants participated in all the transactions holding there was no error in refusing to charge accessory after the fact because there is no exclusionary situation which eliminates one defendant or the other from having participated in the murder as a principal