a defendant from both irrelevant information and overly prejudicial information, the relaxed evidentiary standard also works to a defendant’s advantage in helping to prove mitigating factors and to disprove aggravating factors. Allen’s reliance on California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 542-43, 107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed.2d 934 (1987), which used the term “evidence” rather than “information” in its opinion, is misplaced because the distinction between evidence and information was not at issue. We therefore reject Allen’s facial challenge to the FDPA’s relaxed evidentiary standard during sentencing. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 204, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (“We think it desirable for the jury to have as much information before it as possible when it makes the sentencing decision.”); Jones, 132 F.3d at 242 (<HOLDING>). c. Appellate Review Allen claims that the
holding the eighth amendment requires that sentencing procedures in capital cases be evaluated under a heightened standard of reliability recognizing that the federal rules of evidence do not apply to sentencing hearings holding that the right applies at capital sentencing in particular holding that the fdpas relaxed evidentiary standard does not impair the reliability or relevance of information at capital sentencing hearings but helps to accomplish the individualized sentencing required by the constitution holding that the right to crossexamine adverse witnesses applies to capital sentencing hearings