to have prevailed in 1997, when this Court suspended numerous provisions of prior medical malpractice reform legislation as intruding on the Court’s exclusive powers under Section 10(c). See, e.g., 40 P.S. § 1301.813-A (Dilatory or frivolous motions, claims and defenses) (suspended). However, the Court’s efforts to define the limits of exclusivity of its procedural rulemaking powers solely in terms of the nebulous line between substance and procedure have yielded a number of facially implausible holdings. See, e.g., Laudenberger v. Port Auth. of Allegheny County, 496 Pa. 52, 66-67, 436 A.2d 147, 155 (1981) (treating the promulgation of a rule awarding monetary damages for delay in civil cases as procedural rulemaking); Commonwealth v. Morris, 565 Pa. 1, 30, 771 A.2d 721, 738 (2001) (<HOLDING>). In the face of such decisions, one jurist has
holding that the carrying out of an execution after the first execution attempt had failed did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment holding that when a prisoners deliberate indifference claim is covered by the eighth amendment the substantive due process claims are duplicative and thus the substantive due process claims should be dismissed holding that execution of a defendant who commits a capital crime while under the age of eighteen is prohibited by the eighth amendment holding that substantive review is adequate holding that a stay of a capital prisoners execution is substantive