to the crime, while at the same time avoiding criminal liability herself. Her last-minute change of heart, after she had both pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of endangering a child and disavowed any responsibility for Jordan’s death for two and a half years, further supports this view. This appears to be a “justice-subverting ploy” that provides the justification for requiring indicia of truthfulness. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 301 n.'21, 98 S.Ct. 1038 (discussing a scenario where person A is a defendant, person B tells persons C and D that he committed the crime and then goes into hiding, persons C and D testify at A’s trial, and then person B — who did not commit the crime — returns from hiding and has several witnesses to corroborate his innocence); Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 290 (<HOLDING>); Bracero, 528 A.2d at 941 (noting that “it is
holding that statement that declarant saw defendant outside was admissible under rule 8081 because the statement explained an event or condition holding that testimonial evidence is admissible only if the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the declarant holding in a criminal case that a statement by an unavailable declarant was not admissible as a declaration against his penal interest and was not admissible under rule 804b5 either holding that an inculpatory statement by a declarant was not reliable when he viewed the defendant like an older brother providing a motivation to lie the statement was made only to defense investigators and not to prosecutors the declarant was not under oath had not been read his miranda rights and was not represented by counsel and the declarant ultimately recanted his admission holding that the admission of testimonial statements against a defendant is unconstitutional when the declarant does not appear at trial unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for crossexamination