2000 UT 53, 1 9, 4 P.3d 783. We look no further if the plain language of the statute is unambiguous on its face. See id. 148 Section 41-6-80 explains the duty a vehicle operator has with respect to pedestrians and in particular pedestrians who fall into the category of "any child or any obviously confused, incapacitated, or intoxicated person." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-80. The last sentence states, "This section supersedes any conflicting provision of this chapter or of a local ordinance." Id. The Gorostietas argue that this last sentence indicates that the vehicle operator's duty supersedes or sets aside the duty of a child pedestrian and the jury was therefore misled in finding that Dalinda was 35% at fault for her injuries. T 49 The Gorostietas misinterpret the plain meaning 10 (1999) (<HOLDING>); Phelps v. MacIntyre, 397 Mass. 459, 491 NE.2d
holding that statute does not eliminate plaintiffs burden to prove reasonableness and necessity of past medical expenses holding that statute provides medical bill is admissible to prove amount fairness and reasonableness of charges holding that statute provides medical bills are admissible as evidence of necessary fair and reasonable charges holding that although plaintiff was liable for medical services rendered he was not bound by the amount of the charges listed in the admission contract as he was entitled to question the reasonableness of the charges holding that statute allows admissibility of evidence by affidavit to prove reasonableness and necessity of medical expenses