in this opinion, we remand to the district court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED. 1 . While there is evidence in the record that Gaston knew about the extra zippered closure prior to visitation hours, we construe the evidence in favor of the plaintiff in light of the current summary judgment context of this case. 2 . On remand, the district court should consider exactly what level of indifference, if any, the defendant supervisors showed. In the context of a procedural due process claim, to which this claim is closely akin, a negligent oversight may not in and of itself render a defendant liable under § 1983. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328, 334 n. 3, 106 S.Ct. 662, 663, 666 n. 3, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986) (<HOLDING>). 3 . The district court did not reach the
holding that negligence does not violate the due process clause but reserving the question whether gross negligence does holding that this lack of any reasonable expectation of continued employment suffices to establish the lack of property in the constitutional sense and hence the lack of a viable due process claim holding temporary suspension pursuant to credible allegation of fraud does not trigger due process protections holding that mere negligence does not implicate the right to due process holding that negligence in the context of a tort claim relating to bodily injuries allegedly sustained by an inmate because of lack of maintenance of a prison stairway does not constitute a violation of constitutional due process but reserving the question of whether recklessness or gross negligence is sufficient to trigger the protections of constitutional due process