Kodak Co., 98 F.Supp.2d 141, 147 (D.Mass.2000) (internal quotations omitted)); see also Arruda v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 310 F.3d 13, 18-19 (1st Cir.2002). 123 . See id. at 46-47 (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1298, at 625-26 (2d ed.1990)). 124 . Karvelas, 360 F.3d at 228. 125 . See Cal. Gov't Code §§ 12651(a)(1) & (2); Del.Code Ann. tit. 6, §§ 1201(a)(1) & (2); D.C.Code §§ 2-308-14(a)(1) & (2); Fla. Stat. §§ 68.082(2)(a) & (b); Haw.Rev.Stat. §§ 661-21(a)(1) & (2); 740 Ill. Comp. Stat.175/3(a)(1) & (2); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, §§ 5B(1) & (2); Nev.Rev.Stat. §§ 357.040(1)(a) & (b); Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 71-5-182(a)(1)(A) & (B); Tex. Hum. Res.Code Ann. § 36.002; Va.Code Ann. §§ 8.01-216.3(A)(1) & (2). 126 . Cf. Karvelas, 360 F.3d at 227-28 (<HOLDING>). 127 .Id. at 232. 128 . See id. at 225
holding that heightened pleading standards do not apply to defamation actions holding that the federal false claims act is an antifraud statute to which rule 9bs heightened pleading requirements apply holding that the group pleading doctrine survives the pslra as to rule 9bs particularity requirements but does not apply to the pslras scienter requirements holding that rule 9bs heightened pleading requirement applies to allegations of mail and wire fraud used as predicate acts for a rico claim holding that a court may not apply a heightened pleading standard more stringent than the usual pleading requirements of rule 8 in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under  1983