as whether the date of that injury ought be tolled until he learned of the discriminatory animus that made his demotion wrongful. As a general principle, section 1983 claims accrue “when the plaintiff knows, or has reason to know, of th rto Rico, we dismissed the identical theory proffered by Bou when we rejected the appellant’s contention that “his cause of action existed in what amounts to a state of suspended animation until he became aware of the racial and political motives behind the adverse employment decision.” 27 F.3d at 749-750. Following this clear precedent, the statute of limitations period for Bou’s claim began to accrue at the first discrete act of discrimination. See id.; cf. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2162, 2164, 167 L.Ed.2d 982 (2007) (<HOLDING>). There is simply no support for Bou’s argument
holding that the limitations period begins to run at the time that the parties first enter into the franchise agreement holding that a claim for discrimination in private employment is not preempted by title vii holding that the limitations period for a title vii claim for pay discrimination begins with the first discrete act holding statute of limitations for discriminatory pay practices begins when initial pay decision was made holding that same standard applies to equal pay act and title vii wage discrimination claims