negligence placed the plaintiff....” Brown v. Philadelphia Coll, of Osteopathic Med., 449 Pa.Super. 667, 674 A.2d 1130, 1135-36 (1996). Russell’s actions were intentional, not negligent. The impact rule, which depends upon the negligence of a defendant, is therefore inapposite to this case. 7 . Because DiSalvio’s federal cause of action survives Russell's Motion to Dismiss, the Court retains supplemental jurisdiction over DiSalvio’s remaining state law claims. 9 . Unlike the School District Defendants, Russell has not argued that this tort is unavailable to plaintiffs in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 10 . The Court similarly rejects Russell’s argument that DiSalvio cannot recover punitive damages from him under her § 1983 claim. See Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491, 1497 (3d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). 11 . DiSalvio suggests that Magill should
holding that punitive damages may be awarded for egregious violations of the lmrda holding that punitive damages may be imposed against employer for tortious conduct of employee holding that punitive damages may be awarded under  1983 when the defendants conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others holding that a supervisor with no personal involvement may be liable for the constitutional violation of a subordinate for culpable action or inaction in the training supervision or control of his subordinates acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation  or reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others holding that since the complaint set out a deliberate indifference claim it follows logically that reckless or callous indifference has been noticed