a judgment in that spouse’s favor. To enable judges to respond adequately to the needs of spouses, the legislature gave broad discretion to judges to award attorney’s fees and did not limit in a strict manner the time in which attorney’s fees could be awarded. The only statutory requirement is that the suit must be pending. Indeed, one of the statutory provisions allows the trial judge discretion to award attorney’s fees and costs “at any time” in a pending suit for divorce. Code § 20-103. O’Loughlin does not hold that the divorce suit is not pending when the mandate has issued and is before the circuit court on remand. It also does not address the authority of the circuit court judge to award attorney’s fees pursuant to Code § 20-103 while the suit is still pending on reman .App.1991) (<HOLDING>). As long as the remand order is still pending,
holding agreement was substantively unconscionable because it prevented arbiter from awarding punitive damages and attorneys fees awards that were intended by the legislature to be awardable holding that attorneys fees incurred in a custody action were nondischargeable under  523a5 holding that fees incurred by debtor were not in the nature of support holding that appellate attorneys fees were incurred during the divorce proceedings and were awardable by the trial judge holding that even though attorneys fees were not properly awardable under rule 68 costs excluding fees were mandatory