See Tow v. Pagano, 312 S.W.3d 751, 757 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.); Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. Ryder Scott Co., 212 S.W.3d 522, 530 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). It is clear from the case law that Raytheon’s challenge is to Boccard's standing, not to its capacity. Although capacity must be raised by verified denial, standing can be raised at any time. See Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 849 (Tex.2005). We also note that the issue of whether Boccard could assert the alter ego claim was adjudicated prior to trial in a motion for summary judgment proceeding in Boccard’s favor. At that point, there was no longer a need for a verified denial. See Basic Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Dynex Commercial, Inc., 348 S.W.3d 894, 899 (Tex.2011) (<HOLDING>). 7 . It is noteworthy that, in Trenwick
holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment holding that if there is any issue of fact which remains upon a motion for summary judgment the motion must be denied holding that a verified complaint is treated as an affidavit for summary judgment purposes and considered in determining whether material issues of fact exist holding that where parties did not respond to an issue in summary judgment motion parties relinquished any claim on the issue and conceded that summary judgment should be entered against them holding that there was no longer any reason for a verified pleading regarding capacity after issue had been adjudicated in summary judgment proceeding