we need not reach Ote-ro’s claims under Shepard because we will reverse on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, grant the writ, and remand the cause for re-sentencing. We do not reach constitutional issues unnecessarily. See Santana Products, Inc. v. Bobrick Washroom Equipment, Inc., 401 F.3d 123, 130-31 (3d Cir.2005) (citing Spicer v. Hilton, 618 F.2d 232, 239 (3d Cir.1980)). 2 . Otero also contests whether an 8-level enhancement for a prior aggravated felony under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) would be appropriate in this case. If the basis of that enhancement was his prior conviction for simple assault, he is correct. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) app. note 2 (defining “aggravated felony” by reference to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)); Popal v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 249 (3d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). This, however, also calls into question the
holding that a second state court conviction for simple possession of narcotics is an aggravated felony as defined in 8 usc  1101a43 holding that a conviction for simple assault under pennsylvania law does not qualify under 18 usc  16b by way of 11 usc  1101a43 as an aggravated felony holding that kidnaping by deception under ohio law is a violent felony as a matter of law under 18 usc  924e2bii holding that conduct designated as a felony under state law but as only a misdemeanor under the controlled substances act does not qualify as an aggravated felony holding that sexual assault of a child qualified as crime of violence under 18 usc  16