contends that the application of the primary-jurisdiction doctrine to Plaintiffs’ RICO claims would require the dismissal of those claims, such a contention is incorrect. (Cassens Br. at 20-21.) The principal issue underlying the application of that doctrine is simply whether a federal court should postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction in deference to an administrative agency; it does not divest the Court of its subject-matter jurisdiction. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 353, 83 S.Ct. 1715, 10 L.Ed.2d 915(1963). 2 . At least one federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction has applied the primary-jurisdiction doctrine in favor of a state administrative agency. See Northwinds Abatement, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 69 F.3d 1304, 1311 (5th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). It is unclear, however, whether that federal
holding that the parties choiceoflaw agreement as relating to workers compensation was appropriately avoided where it offended state public policy as reflected in express provisions of the pennsylvania workers compensation act holding that the trial courts authority to initiate workers compensation benefits before the final adjudication was not divested by the legislature and was consistent with the stated purpose of the workers compensation act holding the retaliation claim did arise under states workers compensation laws holding that because maryland law expressly creates right to file workers compensation claim action exists for wrongful discharge for termination based solely on the filing of a workers compensation claim holding that under the doctrine the district court should have stayed the diversityjurisdiction case pending the state workers compensation commissions final decision on whether the defendant properly paid certain workers compensation claims