from the past discrimination. But of course, if an employer engages in a series of acts each of which is intentionally discriminatory, then a fresh violation takes place when each act is committed. Id. at 628, 127 S.Ct. 2162, citing National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002). In response to Ledbetter, Congress passed the Fair Pay Act in order to overturn and reverse its effects. See, Pub.L. No. 111-2, 125 Stat. 5 (2009); see also, Johnson v. District of Columbia, 632 F.Supp.2d 20, 21 (D.D.C.2009) (“Through the Fair Pay Act, Congress intended to reverse the effect of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ledbetter * * *.”); Mays v. Central States Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 2009 WL 2163177 at *2 (D.Kan., July 1, 2009) (<HOLDING>). For our purposes, the Fair Pay Act changed
holding that mandatory language such as will pay or shall pay creates the necessary moneymandate for tucker act purposes holding statute of limitations for discriminatory pay practices begins when initial pay decision was made recognizing that the fair pay act overturned the ledbetter decision holding that the defendants could not be held in contempt for failure to pay more than the fee cap amount because the court cannot order the djefendants to violate an act of congress to pay the total award holding that a panel of the court of appeals is bound by a prior decision of another panel of the same court addressing the same question but in a different case unless overturned by an intervening decision from a higher court