claim, when the final disposition of the proceeding involves the merits and indicates the accused’s innocence.” However, in Smith-Hunter, the Court of Appeals described this language from MacFawn as dicta and “rejected] the notion — as contrary to the common law and our longstanding precedents — that ... [a] plaintiff must demonstrate innocence in order to satisfy the favorable termination prong of the malicious prosecution action.” 95 N.Y.2d at 198-99, 712 N.Y.S.2d 488, 784 N.E.2d 750. The court read MacFawn narrowly to “stand only for the proposition that dispositions inconsistent with innocence ... cannot be viewed as favorable to the accused.” Id. at 199, 712 N.Y.S.2d 438, 734 N.E.2d 750; see also Cantalino v. Danner, 96 N.Y.2d 391, 392, 729 N.Y.S.2d 405, 754 N.E.2d 164 (2001) (<HOLDING>). If the law were as Trigg argues, it would
holding that pretrial diversion agreement in which accused must acknowledge responsibility for offense conduct does not terminate the criminal action in favor of the criminal defendant for purposes of bringing a malicious prosecution claim holding that for the purposes of a malicious prosecution action a favorable termination must be one indicating that the accused is innocenta disposition that does not indicate the plaintiffs innocence is not considered a favorable termination  holding that a dismissal in the interest of justice was a favorable termination for the purposes of a malicious prosecution action where the courts reasons for dismissing the criminal charges were not inconsistent with the innocence of the accused holding that only malicious prosecution requires a favorable termination of the criminal proceedings and that claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and abuse of process accrue on the date of arrest holding the same for malicious prosecution