was first discussed in Varney v. Secretary of Health and Human Services (Varney II), 859 F.2d 1396, 1398-99, 1401 (9 h Cir.2003) (discussing the Circuit’s conflicting case law and holding that the doctrine is not mandatory because the court has “some flexibility in applying the crediting as true theory” (internal quotation marks omitted)). It is not necessary for us to resolve the conflict at this time, however, because, unlike Varney II or Lester, here there are outstanding issues that must be resolved before a proper disability determination can be made. See Varney II at 859 F.2d 1401 (declining to address whether the credit-as-true rule should be adopted in cases where a remand for further proceedings is required before a disability determination can be made); Lester, 81 F.3d at 834 (<HOLDING>). This Court has recognized that there are
holding that because the court credited defense testimony over prosecution testimony and there was a reasonable basis in the record for the trial court finding that an agreement existed between the defense and the prosecution the decision could not be disturbed on appeal holding that assumption of the defendants guilt is within the courts discretion but is not mandatory holding that the statute is mandatory holding that when an alj improperly rejects a claimants testimony regarding his limitations and the claimant would be disabled if his testimony were credited the testimony must be credited as a matter of law holding that the creditastrue rule is mandatory but only where the claimant would be disabled if his testimony were credited