& Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237, 61 S.Ct. 179, 85 L.Ed. 139 (1940). The court proceeds by considering statutory construction and legislative history in order to predict which lower court decision the California Supreme Court would uphold. The modern definition of trespass unambiguously includes the negligent spread of fire, Kelly, 179 Cal.App.4th at 460, 102 Cal.Rptr.3d 32 (citing Elton v. Anheuser-Busch Beverage Group, Inc., 50 Cal.App.4th 1301, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 303 (1996)), but the relevant definition for purposes of statutory interpretation is the definition of statutory language at the time of the statute’s enactment. See, e.g., BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84, 91, 127 S.Ct. 638, 166 L.Ed.2d 494 (2006); Perrin v. U.S., 444 U.S. 37, 41-42, 100 S.Ct. 311, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Smiley v. Citibank, 11 Cal.4th 138, 152, 44
holding that  unless otherwise defined words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary contemporary common meaning  at the time congress enacted a statute and reviewing dictionaries from the era of the statutes enactment to assist in determining its meaning citation omitted holding that an undefined statutory term should be given its natural ordinary meaning recognizing that where the statutory language is not ambiguous  the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute must be given effect holding that statutory words must be given their ordinary contemporary meaning holding that bribery must be given its ordinary meaning at the time of the enactment of the relevant statute