§§ 1981 and 1982. These are the first two sections of the Civil Rights Act, as now codified. The plain purpose of these statutes is to provide for equality of rights as between persons of different races. The complaint under review does not allege that appellant was deprived of any right which, under similar circumstances, would have been accorded a person of a different race. It follows that no cause of action is stated under these sections. 239 F.2d at 230; see also Olivares v. Martin, 555 F.2d 1192, 1196 (5th Cir. 1977). This observation that section 1981 is intended to provide equality between “different races,” like the Supreme Court’s dicta, provides little guidance in resolution of the issue presently before me. Thus the Agnew Court, as in the Su d 1157 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334
holding by implication that plaintiff a brownskinned person of east indian descent had stated a proper claim under section 1981 holding that private racial discrimination and harassment of a kenyan citizen of indian descent does not establish persecution holding that plaintiff who alleged discrimination on the basis of his mexicanamerican descent had stated a valid claim under section 1981 holding that plaintiff is entitled to assert claim of retaliatory transfer under  1981 holding that american indian plaintiffs had appropriately pled a claim under section 1981