are mandated in the clemency process and that Johnston has been provided with the clemency proceedings to which he is entitled. Further, we decline to depart from the Court’s precedent, based on the doctrine of separation of powers, in which we have held that it is not our prerogative to second-guess the executive on matters of clemency in capital cases. Johnston has not provided any reason for the Court to depart from its precedents or to hold that an additional clemency proceeding is required before a death warrant is signed. Because these same claims have been raised and ruled on in the Court’s prior precedents, and Johnston has provided no reason for the Court to depart from those precedents, relief is denied. Claim of Mental Illness as a Bar to 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) (<HOLDING>), Johnston argues that it similarly constitutes
holding the death penalty unconstitutional for mentally retarded defendants recognizing that within the world community the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved holding that the execution of mentally retarded criminals violates the eighth amendment holding that mentally retarded capital murderers are constitutionally ineligible for death penalty holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants