there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding. Finally we turn to the two remaining nonstatutory aggravating factors — future dangerousness and other criminal acts— challenged by Holder. He asserts that each factor is independently at odds with the FDPA and the Constitution, and that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of either factor. Holder also argues that, taken together, the factors are duplicative and therefore impermissi-bly skewed the jury’s decision to impose a death sentence. We begin with the future dangerousness nonstatutory aggravating factor. First, there is little danger of duplication with the statutory aggravating factors because on in Simmons v. South Carolina is misplaced. See 512 U.S. 154, 178, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994) (<HOLDING>) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
holding that when a state asserts future dangerousness as grounds for imposing a death sentence due process requires that a defendant be entitled to inform the jury that he is parole ineligible holding that juveniles are constitutionally ineligible for death penalty holding that where the capital defendants future dangerousness is at issue and state law prohibits the defendants release on parole due process requires that the sentencing jury be informed that the defendant is parole ineligible holding that the trial court violated the defendants due process rights by relying on conduct of which he had actually been acquitted when imposing a sentence holding that a state may consider and rely upon a defendants future dangerousness in its decision to seek a death sentence