July 26, 1994, the ninety (90) day time period began to run. Because, plaintiff filed his complaint on October 26, 1994, ninety-two (92) days after the delivery of the Decision to the attorney, defendant argues that the action should be time barred. The facts of the instant case, however, are distinguishable from those of Irwin. Unlike in Irwin, plaintiff and his attorney were no longer in an attorney-client relationship. Coates’ former attorney did not have the authority to accept correspondence for plaintiff nor act as his representative. Thus, delivery to Coates’ former attorney did not constitute notice to plaintiff, and the ninety day time limitation did not begin to run until Coates receive the Decision himself. See Cumbow v. Vermont American Corp., 586 F.Supp. 873 (W.D.Va.1982) (<HOLDING>). Defendant averred that he received his copy
holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant holding that claimant moving for summary judgment on its claim must conclusively prove all the essential elements of the claim and that claimant has the burden to show that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that claimant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law holding that the delivery of an eeoc decision to the former attorney of a claimant did not constitute notice to the claimant holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner holding claimant suffered permanent total disability where functional disability was only twentyfive or thirty percent claimant was fiftynine years of age claimant had little or no education and the injury kept the claimant from performing physical work