such an inference should be drawn.’” (quoting O’Shea, 185 F.3d at 1102, 1097)); Landrau-Romero v. Banco Popular de P.R., 212 F.3d 607, 614 (1st Cir.2000) (“Alleged conduct that is not explicitly racial iri nature may, in appropriate circumstances, be considered along with more overtly discriminatory conduct in assessing a Title VII harassment claim.”). However, the cases Plaintiff relies on for this proposition involved repeated and pervasive sexual or gender-specific comments, epithets, and/or conduct that “so poisoned the entire body of conduct towards Plaintiff’ that a jury could reasonably - view other facially neutral conduct directed at the plaintiff as sexual or gender-based as well. See O’Shea, 185 F.3d at 1102; see, e.g., EEOC v. PVNF, LLC, 487 F.3d 790, 798-99 (10th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); Chavez, 397 F.3d at 833-36 (finding that
holding that the prosecutors improper remarks referring to the defendants exercise of his constitutional right to a trial by jury was not plain error requiring reversal holding that a supervisors repeated comments to an employee that the supervisor wanted to have sex with the employees fifteenyearold daughter were extremely severe because the comments were significantly more offensive than the typical crass comments we have found to be insufficient to constitute harassment in other cases holding that remarks made by decisionmakers could be viewed as reflecting discriminatory animus holding that right to testify not denied where inter alia defendant made no objection to his attorneys statements that defendant would not testify and made no request to testify holding that where supervisor inter alia frequently made degrading and indisputably genderrelated remarks it was for the jury to determine whether repeated comments referring to plaintiff as a bitch were made because of gender animus