delay in this case so as to warrant reversal of his conviction. See United States v. Hudson, 46 MJ 226 (1997); United States v. Jenkins, 38 MJ 287 (CMA 1993). The court below and I both agree that the post-trial delay in this case did not legally prejudice appellant as required by our case law for appellate relief. See United States v. Gray, 22 USCMA 443, 445, 47 CMR 484, 486 (1973); United States v. Timmons, 22 USCMA 226, 227, 46 CMR 226, 227 (1973). Appellant, however, argues that this Court’s decisions requiring a showing of legal prejudice for reversal do not bind the Court of Criminal Appeals or preclude it from granting a lesser form of sentence relief (confinement reduction) based on a simple showing of unreasonable post-trial delay. But see United States v. Timmons, supra (<HOLDING>). He cites the “unique” sentence approval
holding miranda error prejudicial in part because the defense presented testimony it otherwise would not have due to the improperly admitted statements holding that erroneous admission of improper and prejudicial evidence did not require reversal because the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty against the defendant even without the prejudicial testimony holding that a trial witnesss testimony as to the credibility of another witness was prejudicial error holding posttrial delay standing alone without prejudicial error in the trial proceedings will not require relief on otherwise proper findings and sentences holding the exclusion of cumulative evidence was not prejudicial error