on the officer’s compliance with another portion of OCGA § 40-5-67.1 which is not part of the implied consent notice, specifically subsection (f), which requires the officer to follow proper administrative procedures in order to trigger the suspension. We upheld the sufficiency of the implied consent notice and affirmed the denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress, finding that a license suspension “is a true and legitimate consequence of refusing to submit to . . . the test[,]” and that “[t]here is no unlawful coercion where the officer merely informs the arrestee of the permissible range of sanctions that the [S] tate may ultimately be authorized to impose.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. See also Singleterry v. State, 227 Ga. App. 155, 156 (3) (489 SE2d 42) (1997) (<HOLDING>). Here, the statute clearly authorizes a
holding that the trial judge rather than the jury makes the determination of whether the defendant violated the implied consent law holding there is no consent as a matter of law where the consent was given under coercion holding that officers not required to give implied consent warnings where statute did not apply holding that the implied consent statutes are irrelevant when the defendant gives actual consent to a blood or breath test holding that the implied consent warning given to the defendant was not misleading or coercive because the validity of the implied consent notice is not contingent upon other administrative aspects of ocga  405671