injury on which the action is based.” Id.; Rodríguez-García v. Municipality of Caguas, 354 F.3d 91, 96-97 (1st Cir.2004); Rodriguez Narvaez v. Nazario, 895 F.2d 38, 41 n. 5 (1st Cir.1990). A claimant is deemed to “know” or “learn” of a discriminatory act at the time of the act itself and not at the point that the harmful consequences are felt. See Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8, 102 S.Ct. 28, 70 L.Ed.2d 6 (1981); Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980). In the employment discrimination context, this circuit has rejected the contention that claims do not accrue until the plaintiff knows of both the injury and the discriminatory animus. Morris v. Gov’t Dev. Bank of P.R., 27 F.3d 746, 749-50 (1st Cir.1994); cf. Vistamar, Inc., 430 F.3d at 66 (<HOLDING>). In Morris v. Government Development Bank of
holding that the statute of limitations period for a section 1983 claim seeking to redress an unlawful taking of property began to accrue on the date of the wrongful appropriation holding limitations period began to accrue upon discovery of the herniated disc and not from the date of the accident holding that when the representations and warranties were made on the date of closing the statute of limitations began to run on that date even though the contract imposed cure and repurchase obligations on the defendant holding that the date on which the plaintiff learned of the defendants denial of tenure not the date on which the plaintiff became unemployed was when the statute of limitations began to run holding that interest does not begin to accrue until the date of judgment not the date of verdict