belief must be true, Fields’s focus on the fact he transferred firearms solely to an undercover officer is unpersuasive.”); see United States v. Asante, 782 F.3d 639, 644 (11th Cir.2015) (for purposes of § 2K2.1(b)(5), a court looks to the circumstances as “known to the defendant”). It bears repeating that the government was only required to establish that Pawlak had “reason to believe” that the recipient’s possession would be unlawful, if the facts were as Pawlak (5th Cir.2010) (vacating the sentence in light of the government’s concession that there was no evidence that the individuals receiving the firearms “had a relevant criminal conviction or [were] under a criminal justice sentence at the time of the offense”). But see United States v. Pepper, 747 F.3d 520, 525 (8th Cir.2014) (<HOLDING>). Instead, I believe that the stronger argument
holding that the government failed to prove the defendants actions fell under the unlawful possession prong bjecause the government failed to present any evidence that the defendant knew that his conduct would result in a firearm being transferred to an individual falling under the narrow guidelines definition of an individual in unlawful possession holding that both the unlawful possession and unlawful use prongs were met and noting that the firearm transferred to the individual was not registered making the individuals possession of it necessarily unlawful holding that because original interception was not unlawful subsequent use by prosecutor could not be found unlawful holding that the defendants actions fell under the unlawful possession prong where the defendant transferred at least one firearm to a known felon holding that the doctrine may only be predicated on continuing unlawful acts and not on the continuing effects of earlier unlawful conduct