punishment for violation; specifically, a Class A misdemeanor. Id. These provisions relate clearly and directly to regulation of a sexually-oriented enterprise. See State v. Garcia, 823 S.W.2d 793, 798-99 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1992, pet. ref d); Schope v. State, 647 S.W.2d 675, 678-79 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, pet. ref d). Therefore, we conclude the language of the ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague, it gives clear definition as to what types of establishments and employees are subject to its terms, and it provides guidance to both law enforcement and the general public concerning what type of conduct is prohibited and how the ordinance will be enforced. See Carmaco, 203 S.W.3d at 600; Haddad v. State, 9 S.W.3d 454, 457-58 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we overrule appellant’s three
holding  3631 not vague or overbroad holding the ordinance as applied to entertainers performing at a sexuallyoriented business is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad holding that attorney disciplinary rule was unconstitutionally vague as applied holding  241 not vague or overbroad holding factor b is not unconstitutionally vague