when a statute changes only procedural, not substantive, law. “Procedural statutes enacted subsequent to the initiation of a suit which do not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or contractual rights apply not only to future actions, but also to accrued and pending actions as well.” Pilcher v. Department of Social Servs., 663 P.2d 450, 455 (Utah 1983) (quoting Department of Social Servs. v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998, 1000 (Utah 1982)); accord Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 792 (Utah 1990); Washington Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Sherwood Assocs., 795 P.2d 665, 667 (Utah App.1990). Since section 59-1-610 does not enlarge, eliminate or destroy either of the parties’ rights, we apply it in the present case. See Pilcher, 663 P.2d at 455-56; see also State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1267 (Utah 1993) (<HOLDING>). As to the statute at issue in the case at
holding that the standard of review for an award of statutory damages is even more deferential than an abuse of discretion standard holding that standard of review is a matter of procedural rather than substantive law holding that trial courts ruling admitting dna evidence is subject to de novo review and is reviewed as a matter of law rather than by an abuseofdiscretion standard holding that substantive review is adequate recognizing abuse of discretion rather than de novo standard of review