at the time of filing its interloeutory appeal, moved to admit the ap-pellee’s sworn statement (PE 13 for identification), both parties entered into a stipulation of fact following the appellee’s initial unsuccessful motion to suppress. In the? stipulation, the appellee admitted to oral and vaginal sex with KL. PE 19. We have no doubt that the appellee would not have entered into this stipulation had he prevailed on his suppression motion in the first instance. Thus, the certification by the trial counsel and the decision of the Judge Advocate General’s representative to perfect this appeal are sufficient to invoke jurisdiction as effectively as the certification of a United States Attorney under the Criminal Appeals Act. See United States v. Scholz, 19 M.J. 837, 841 (N.M.C.M.R.1984) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we conclude we have jurisdiction
holding that evidence of the scope of a particular claim can be found on review of other claims holding that an administrator need not address each piece of evidence holding same as to the filing of a notice of an interlocutory appeal recognizing that the scope of issues in interlocutory appeals is limited holding that in an interlocutory appeal it is beyond the scope of this court to speculate as to what weight or importance a particular piece of evidence might have at trial