Cir.2003) (applying the state-created danger theory where decedent shot himself during a police standoff). As both these suicide cases demonstrate, however, we do not strictly require third-party violence as a precondition to invoking the state-created danger theory, but rather only pri 009) (recognizing that without an underlying constitutional violation, a § 1983 claim for failure to supervise "necessarily fails”); see also Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 922-23 (10th Cir.2001) (relying on Sutton to uphold a claim for failure to supervise against a child welfare supervisor as part of a complaint that also adequately alleged an underlying constitutional violation against subordinate social workers based on danger creation); cf. Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082, 1092 (10th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). We believe Sutton recognized the requirement
holding that a municipality may not be held liable under section 1983 under a theory of respondeat superi or but may be liable for policies or customs that violate an employees constitutional rights holding a sheriff could not be liable for implementing county policies where no underlying violation of decedents rights had occurred holding supervisory liability existed where sheriff failed to establish policies regarding accurate identification of suspects and where sheriff knew of prior instances of mistaken identity holding that a city may not be held liable under  1983 where there was no underlying constitutional violation by any of its officers holding that where no underlying constitutional violation occurred the city cannot be liable under monell