quotation marks and citations omitted); accord Tur v. FAA, 104 F.3d 290, 292 (9th Cir.1997). The purpose of this restriction is to prevent litigants from using a damages claim as a collateral attack on a pending FAA order, see Crist, 138 F.3d at 804, and to allow courts to identify and dismiss damages claims that are actually “thinly disguised attempts] at an end-run around the jurisdictional limitation imposed by [§ 46110].” Mace, 34 F.3d at 860. The collateral attack doctrine prevents plaintiffs from crafting constitutional tort claims either as a means of “relit-igatfing] the merits of the previous administrative proceedings,” Tur, 104 F.3d at 292, or as a way of evading entirely established administrative procedures. See Green v. Brantley, 981 F.2d 514, 517, 521 (11th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). But a damages claim is not “inextricably
holding that this court does not have jurisdiction over plain tiffs claims because the court may review neither criminal matters nor the decisions of district courts holding that district court had supplemental jurisdiction over claims challenging administrative decision once case was properly removed based on original jurisdiction arising from constitutional claims holding that this court does not have jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims because the court may review neither criminal matters nor the decisions of district courts holding that district court had no jurisdiction over bivens claims challenging an faa order where neither plaintiff nor his attorney  pursued the matter through any appeal to the faa administrator or otherwise holding that district court had jurisdiction over claims that the faa violated due process by spoiling evidence during the pendency of the plaintiffs hearings before the faa