deferential standard. However, there is more. Liberty’s dealings with Plaintiff, particularly during the period before Plaintiff retained counsel, were inconsistent. Plaintiff was preliminarily approved for benefits, and then denied, first because of the pre-existing condition exclusion, then because of a failure to provide “objective medical” evidence of disability, and finally because of the pre-existing condition exclusion. Plaintiff correctly points out that the policy includes no requirement that Plaintiff present objective medical evidence to support her claim. See Canseco v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California, 93 F.3d 600, 608-9 (9th Cir.1996) (implied additional plan terms are disfavored); Duncan v. Continental Cas. Co., 1997 WL 88374, *4 (N.D.Cal.1997) (<HOLDING>). In deciding Plaintiffs appeal, Liberty relied
holding that an insurance company could not deny a claim for longterm disability benefits based on a lack of objective medical evidence when the original policy did not refer to the objective medical evidence standard and never defined that term holding that plan administrator could appropriately require objective medical evidence supporting disability claim where such a requirement is not contradicted by any provision of the administrators own policy holding that it was wrong for an administrator to require a claimant suffering from fibromyalgia and chronic fatigue syndrome to submit objective medical evidence in support of her claim for benefits when the plan did not require such evidence holding that plan administrator cannot exclude a claim for lack of objective medical evidence unless the objective medical evidence standard was made clear plain and conspicuous enough in the policy to negate layman sic plaintiffs objectively reasonable expectations of coverage  holding that the corroborating evidence need not be medical evidence if the appellant explains why medical evidence is not available