not need to decide whether a conviction could be supported only by evidence that a rational person in Jodrey’s position would have felt fear. Stinson’s analysis of the evidence rests upon the flawed argument that direct evidence of Jodrey’s fear was required for a rational factfinder to conclude that Jodrey was put in fear because of Stinson’s actions. A factfinder, however, is entitled to “draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence.” State v. Child, 1999 ME 198, ¶ 5, 743 A.2d 230, 232. Circumstantial evidence is not, as a matter of law, inherently inferior evidence; factual findings may be supported by reasonable inferences drawn from all the circumstances even if those inferences are contradicted by parts of the direct evidence. See State v. Hagan, 527 A.2d 1308, 1309 (Me.1987) (<HOLDING>). The jury was instructed that they could
holding that refusal to consent to search cannot support a finding of reasonable suspicion holding refusal to sign hospital waiver of liability form is not a refusal under section 1547 holding that the defendants due process rights were violated by refusal to allow him to contact counsel after he was given misleading information on consequences of refusal to take bloodalcohol test holding that a refusal to sign an implied consent form is not a refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test for purposes of section 1547 holding that victims can be in fear despite their refusal to admit to anything smacking of cowardice