the Government charged Acosta with criminal activity in both the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, and because the “jurors by their verdict rejected that there was any criminal conduct within” the Southern District of New York, the Court “must accept the jurors findings” in concluding that venue does not properly lie within this District. (Id. at 9.) The Court disagrees. As a threshold matter, Acosta waived any challenge to venue by not raising a specific objection to venue until after the jury returned its verdict. This approach is implicit in Second Circuit case law, which requires that a defendant’s objection to venue must be specifically articulated by the close of evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Lester, No. 96-1519, 1997 WL 321809, at *2 (2d Cir. June 13, 1997) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Mancebo-Santiago, No.
holding that if a modification petition is filed in a county where venue is appropriate it is improper to transfer the venue to another county merely because venue also would have been proper in the other county however once an enforcement proceeding is undertaken in an appropriate venue venue is improper in a different county over a subsequently filed petition to modify the decree which was the subject of the enforcement proceedings holding that the failure to object to a trial courts instruction constitutes waiver holding that the failure of three defendants to object to venue did not waive a fourth defendants objection and therefore affirming the trial courts decision to transfer venue holding that under the second circuits longstanding doctrine a defendants failure to specifically object to venue at the close of evidence constitutes a waiver of objection to venue holding that the failure to object to an instruction constitutes a waiver of error