action pursuant to section 1653(2)(B) “should be considered with at least the same level of scrutiny as that required for a petition under the Grandparents Visitation Act,” that is, by demonstrating, on a prima facie basis, their standing as de facto parents, or according to some other extraordinary circumstance. Davis, 2008 ME 125, ¶ 12, 15, 17, 953 A.2d 1166; see Katon v. Brandi M., 2011 ME 131, ¶¶ 2-3, 32 A.3d 1047 (upholding the dismissal of a grandparent visitation petition when the contact alleged was “typical for a grandparent and not extraordinary”); Philbrook, 2008 ME 152, ¶¶2-5, 16-22, 26, 957 A.2d 74 (concluding-that the “loving and helpful grandparents” with whom the children had lived periodically did not establish standing); Robichaud, 2003 ME 54, ¶¶ 6-11, 820 A.2d 1212 (<HOLDING>). [¶ 17] Of course, one predicate to all of
holding that the trial court had discretion to prohibit defendant from residing within one mile of the victim given the statutory authority to prohibit direct or indirect contact with an individual holding that the defendant bears the burden of proving outside contact with the jury holding that a pattern of intermittent contact in the form of occasional visits  lasting from one day to one week over three and onehalf years intermixed with several periods of daily contact  typified the contact that one would anticipate from a connected extended family and was not extraordinary enough to establish a compelling state interest holding no abuse of discretion where judge had personal relationship with government witnesses but had not had contact with them for over ten years holding that the defendant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that the improper juror contact occurred and only if the contact is established must the government demonstrate absence of prejudice