as may be necessary to ensure that they do so. (Affidavit of Bernard H. Oxman, ¶ 21). However, that UNCLOS constitutes customary international law does not end the inquiry for us. An individual defendant is afforded standing to assert rights under an international treaty only if the treaty is self-executing, see infra, and we do not believe that under the law in this Circuit customary international law can be regarded as self-executing. A “violation of international common law, which obviously could not be self-executing in the sense that a treaty might be, would not affect the legality or constitutionality of the Coast Guard’s actions and would not affect the court’s jurisdiction.” U.S. v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1090 (5th Cir.1980), citing U.S. v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). While the Defendant does attempt to
holding that the fourteenth amendment which makes persons bom in the united states and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the united states and requires that representatives be apportioned among the states based on population excluding indians not taxed did not make an indian a citizen of the united states holding inter alia that a united states court retains jurisdiction over persons arrested on a foreign ship beyond the us navigable waters when said arrest violates a treaty to which the united states and the foreign country are parties holding that foreign states are not persons entitled to rights under the due process clause holding that the commandant of the united states disciplinary barracks and the united states are identical parties holding that the land under navigable waters was not granted by the constitution to the united states but was reserved to the states respectively and that new states have the same rights jurisdiction and sovereignty over the soil under navigable water as the original states