non-discriminatory reason for its employment decision.” McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. In contrast to Plaintiffs showing as to a pri-ma facie case, he is unable to establish that GEL’s stated reason was “merely pretex-tual” and carry his “ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimination.” Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 164, citing, St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 506-11, 113 S.Ct. 2742. At the outset, the undersigned notes that it is undisputed that the Plaintiff was discharged, along with Bob West and 24 other GEL C & I sales employees, as part of a division-wide RIF effecting 4% of all GEL employees. Economic hardship resulting in layoffs can be, as a matter of law, a legitimate, non-pretextual reason for reductions-in-force. Accord Rowe, 233 F.3d at 830 (<HOLDING>); and Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30
holding that where contract does not authorize employers selective discharge of union officials discharge violates section 8a3 holding employers rif was valid nonpretextual reason for discharge holding that an employee may establish that the legitimate reason for an employment decision offered by an employer is pretextual by showing by a preponderance of the evidence either that the discrim inatory reason was the true reason motivating the employers conduct or that the profferred legitimate reason was false holding that employers report to state employment agency providing a reason for termination that was different than employers proffered reason did not create a genuine and material issue of fact as to pretext particularly when evidence showed the inaccurate reporting benefitted employee holding that an atwill employee may have a cause of action for wrongful discharge when the reason for a discharge was the employees exercise of a right conferred by a wellestablished legislative enactment