applies to the actions of the Assembly Speaker challenged here. Simply put, the Speaker is not a state administrative officer within the meaning of Rule 2:2- 3(a)(2). In contrast, we have assumed jurisdiction of appeals from a Governor’s executive order, as the Governor is the State’s chief executive or administrative officer. See, e.g., Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Christie, 413 N.J.Super. 229, 251, 994 A.2d 545 (App.Div. 2010) (stating that appeals challenging the Governor’s executive order “were properly filed with this court as a challenge to a final administrative decision or order, pursuant to Rule 2:2 — 3(a)(2)”); Perth Amboy Bd. of Educ. v. Christie, 413 N.J.Super. 590, 597 n. 5, 997 A.2d 262 (App.Div.2010) (same); Bullet Hole, supra, 335 N.J.Super. at 571-72, 763 A.2d 295 (<HOLDING>); Dalton v. Kean, 213 N.J.Super. 572, 574-76,
holding that the state police is a state agency holding retroactive application of the act to prosecution that was pending before the effective date of the act was precluded because the act is prospective holding that a real estate brokers allegations of an oral contract with prospective purchasers stated a cause of action holding that state law causes of action arising from improper processing of a claim for benefits are preempted holding that the governors designation of the state police as point of contact for processing brady act background checks of prospective gun purchasers was appealable to the appellate division