that ‘[w]here there is coercion, there cannot be consent.’ ” United States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819, 828 (11th Cir.1996) (citation omitted) (quoting Bumper, 391 U.S. at 550, 88 S.Ct. 1788, and citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991)). In essence, the inquiry is whether the consent was “the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225, 93 S.Ct. 2041. The voluntariness of consent has been addressed by the courts in a variety of contexts. For example, it has been held that knowledge of a right to refuse a search is not a prerequisite of a voluntary consent to search. Id. at 234, 93 S.Ct. 2041; see also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40, 117
holding that warrantless search of defendants vehicle was legal because defendants consent was voluntary even through he was in police custody at the time of giving consent holding that defendants consent to search his person while on board an interstate bus was voluntary even though the police did not tell the defendant of his right to refuse consent holding that a detained defendants consent to search his car was voluntary even though the police did not tell him he was free to leave holding that persons knowledge of his right to refuse a consent to search is a factor but not a necessary prerequisite to demonstrating a voluntary consent holding under state constitution that validity of consent search requires knowledge of right to refuse consent