was that he traveled to Mississippi — not to have sex with minors — but to masturbate in a public park. His intent, then, was a material issue. The government introduced the computer evidence and accompanying testimony to demonstrate he had a sexual interest in young children, as circumstantial evidence of his intent to commit the crimes charged. “To establish relevance under the first prong where testimony is offered as proof of intent, it must be determined that the extrinsic offense requires the same intent as the charged offense.... ” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). Evidence that South possessed child pornography nine months prior is relevant to determine the purpose of his multiple trips to Mississippi. See United States v. Mooney, 303 Fed.Appx. 737, 742-43 (11th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). The second and third prongs of the test are
holding district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting images and videos of child pornography because the stipulation was not an adequate substitute for the evidence offered holding that private possession of child pornography is not protected by the first amendment holding admission of videos containing child pornography was probative of intent to sexually assault a child holding that the admission of child pornography and chat logs found on the defendants computer was not an abuse of discretion in a  2241c case holding that it was an abuse of discretion to admit the record when an admission was available