a writ to sequester a debtor’s property). Whether the Due Process Clause requires pre-de-privation process depends on the “the importance of, and harm.to, the private interest, the likelihood of interim error, and the governmental interest in a delay.” David, 538 U.S. at 716, 123 S.Ct. 1895. Two lines of precedent applying these principles are relevant here. The first, sometimes called the Par liver, 510 U.S. 266, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994), applied' the Parrattr-Hudson doctrine to a suit similar to this one. The plaintiff had been charged with a crime without probable cause; after the charge was dismissed, he brought suit under § 1983 against the police detective who arrested him and caused him to be charged. Citing Parratt, Justice Kennedy r 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959) (<HOLDING>). Cases like Whitlock and Fields, which allow
holding that the perjury by a key government witness irrespective of whether the government knew of the perjury at the time of trial infected the trial proceedings and required reversal holding that the defendants due process rights were violated when the trial judge singled out the only defense witness and indicated to that witness that he expected the witness to he and would personally ensure that the witness was prosecuted for perjury and thereby effectively drove that witness off the stand holding that a conviction violated due process because the prosecutor knowingly allowed a government witness to commit perjury recognizing that motion for relief from judgment may be properly filed pursuant to rule 1540b3 where party induced witness to commit perjury holding that a conviction violated due process because the prosecutor knowingly refused to disclose crucial exculpatory evidence to the defendant