claim, we hold that we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s determination that Shao failed to file an asylum application within one year of arrival in this country, see Xiao Ji Chen v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 434 F.3d 144, 154-55 (2d Cir.2006); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3), including the BIA’s determination that Shao’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel faded to constitute exceptional circumstances for late filing, see id.; see also Ismailov v. Reno, 263 F.3d 851, 854-55 (8th Cir.2001). As to Shao’s withholding of removal claim, we agree with the government that it was error for the IJ to equate the burden of proof required for asylum with the burden of proof required for withholding of removal. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Carranza-Hernandez v. INS, 12 F.3d 4, 7 (2d
holding that the asylum standard for past persecution or wellfounded fear of future persecution is lower than the clear probability standard to show eligibility for withholding of removal holding that the clear probability standard applies in withholding of deportation actions holding that the standard for withholding of removal is a showing that it is more likely than not that a petitioner will face persecution upon her return holding that the clear probability standard for withholding of removal is higher than the standard for asylum which requires only a reasonable possibility of persecution holding that the standard for withholding of removal is more demanding than the standard for asylum