yet by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, “ ‘the underlying principle is that when a promise of immunity induces a defendant to ... cooperate with the government to his [or her] detriment, due process requires that the prosecutor’s promise be fulfilled.’ ”) (quoting United States v. Fuzer, 18 F.3d 517, 521 (7th Cir.1994)). With these standards in mind, the court turns to consideration of the merits of defendant Kozak’s motion to dismiss. B. The Existence Of A Cooperation Agreement In This Case Applying basic contract principles to the alleged cooperation agreement in this case, in order to dismiss the indictment, the court must find that an agreement existed between the government and Kozak, that Kozak has substantially performed her part of the agreement, and that Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); cf. United States v. Barnes, 83 F.3d 934, 938
holding that there can be no plea agreement without a meeting of the minds holding that where the plea agreement required the government to inform the sentencing court of all defendants cooperation the issue  is not whether the prosecutor enthusiastically disclosed his cooperation but whether the prosecutor disclosed all cooperation holding that plaintiff may be entitled to prevailing party status where the mediation agreement entered into by the parties was read into the record before a hearing officer holding that cooperation agreement defendant entered into with the government did not include defendants testifying at trial where there was no meeting of the minds as to that point holding that defendant was not entitled to specific performance of alleged cooperation agreement entered into with fbi agent who allegedly promised defendant he would not be prosecuted if he cooperated in making a statement where there was no evidence establishing that agent was authorized to make promises to obtain defendants cooperation