exceptions to the FTCA. Id; see 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (describing a “law enforcement officer” as “any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.”). The U.S. Supreme Court has specifically held that intentional misconduct by BOP officers gives rise to a cause of action under § 2680(h). Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980). Because the phrase “law enforcement officer” appears in neighboring subsections (c) and (h), the phrase should be construed similarly in cases arising under both exceptions. See U.S. West Comm. v. Hamilton, 224 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir.2000) (citing Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 244, 93 S.Ct. 477, 34 L.Ed.2d 446 (1972) (<HOLDING>)). We are also persuaded by the fact that BOP
holding that the words and provisions of a statute must be construed in a harmonious way holding that there is no reason why the words in one section in a code should have any different meaning ascribed to them than nearly identical words appearing in other sections of the same code id at 288 holding that two statutes relating to the same subject matter could be given simultaneous effect without conflict and in pari materia holding that words in different sections of the same statute should be similarly construed under the canon of in pari materia recognizing that the doctrine of in pari materia requires that statutes relating to the same subject be construed together to harmonize the statutes and give effect to legislative intent