the hallmarks of traditional legislation.” Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54-56, 118 S.Ct. 966. Such traditional legislation includes “policymaking decisions] implicating budgetary priories ... and the services the [government] provides to its constituents.” Id. Legislative immunity applies to acts within the “legislative sphere” even w sparse record, the Court cannot state as a matter of law that Defendants are entitled to legislative immunity. See Phillips v. Town of Brookhaven, 216 A.D.2d 374, 375, 628 N.Y.S.2d 723 (2d Dep’t 1995) (stating that “[i]t cannot be determined on the instant record that the individual defendants were acting exclusively in a legislative capacity, which is required for immunity to attach”); see also Moxley v. Town of Walkersville, 601 F.Supp.2d 648, 662 (D.Md.2009) (<HOLDING>). This ruling does not prevent Defendants from
holding that the burden is on the defendants to establish the existence of absolute legislative immunity holding that legislative immunity does not depend on motivation for legislative action even if the motive was to impinge on plaintiffs free speech rights holding that the doctrine of legislative immunity is not uniquely asserted on motions to dismiss recognizing the authority of the district court to dismiss an action pursuant to  1915d based on the doctrine of qualified immunity holding that the federal government does not waive its immunity where there is no private counterpart even when uniquely governmental functions are involved