changes are “ “within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose,’ ” id. (quoting Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 2538, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976)). Instead, the Due Process Clause protects against restraints or conditions of confinement that “exceed[ ] the sentence in . an unexpected manner.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, 115 S.Ct. at 2300; see id. at 479 n. 4, 115 S.Ct. at 2297 n. 4 (observing that proscribed conditions of confinement must be “qualitatively different from the punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of crime, and [have] stigmatizing consequences.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 1264, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980) (<HOLDING>); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22,
holding that we may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence within the guidelines range holding that involuntary commitment to a mental hospital is not within the range of conditions of confinement to which a prison sentence subjects an individual holding that imposition of a sentence within the properly calculated range is not reviewable holding that mentally retarded individuals who are involuntarily committed to a state institution have a constitutional right to reasonably safe conditions of confinement under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment because pjersons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish holding that prison conditions are those aspects of prison life affecting the entire prison population