motor-driven vehicle and the plaintiffs injuries. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d at 543; LeLeaux v. Hamshire-Fannett Indep. Sch. Dist., 835 S.W.2d 49, 51 (Tex.1992). “This nexus requires more than mere involvement of property” and has been described as a “direct nexus.” Put another way, “ ‘the [vehicle]’s use must have actually caused the injury.’ ” Whitley, 104 S.W.3d at 543 (quoting White, 46 S.W.3d at 869) (emphasis added). “Thus, as with the condition or use of property, the operation or use of a motor vehicle ‘does not cause injury if it does no more than furnish the c at child’s death arose from use of motor vehicle when bus driver honked horn to signal child to walk across street, where she was hit by oncoming vehicle); Hitchcock v. Garvin, 738 S.W.2d 34, 37 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987, no writ) (<HOLDING>). 2. TTCA’s Property Waiver For the TTCA’s
holding that a plaintiff can show that she is qualified by presenting credible evidence that she continued to possess the objective qualifications she held when she was hired holding that childs injuries incurred when she was struck by oncoming vehicle arose from schoolbus drivers failure to activate required warning signals to protect child as she debarked bus holding that defendant adequately indicated to officers that she sought assistance of counsel when she stated that she wanted to call her lawyer and officer testified that request was unambiguous holding appellant produced no evidence that when she made her complaints to management she ever mentioned that she felt she was being treated unfairly due to her race or sex holding that the district court did not err in failing to address the defendant personally to determine whether she understood the rights she was waiving by admitting that she violated the conditions of her probation