to dismiss de novo. See Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 232-33 (3d Cir.2004). The District Court held that, pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, it lacked appellate authority over the decision of the state court that Appellant sought relief from. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (only United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review decisions of state courts); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust, 263 U.S. 413, 416, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). Because Appellant was essentially asking the District Court to invalidate the state court’s consent order, the Court held that his complaint was barred by Rooker-Feldman. See id.; see also E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1091 (3d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). To the extent that the District Court held
holding that the court had an adequate record to grant the defendants motion for summary judgment because the relevant evidence would have been in plaintiffs possession holding that to grant appellant relief would require an inferior federal court to determine that the state courts judgment was erroneous and would foreclose implementation of that judgment holding that after removal of diversity case to federal court the federal court may grant summary judgment notwithstanding earlier denial of summary judgment motion by state court holding that rookerfeldman doctrine barred plaintiffs claim because alleged legal injuries arose from the state courts purportedly erroneous judgment and the relief sought would require the district court to determine that the state courts decision was wrong and thus void holding that courts must look to the state that rendered the judgment to determine whether the courts of that state would afford the judgment preclusive effect