cross-examination of cooperating witness Banks, the restriction was limited to the details of one telephone conversation. Such a limitation on cross-examination is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Larson, 495 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir.2007) (en banc) (“A challenge to a trial court’s restrictions on the manner or scope of cross-examination on nonconstitutional grounds is thus reviewed for abuse of discretion.”). In light of the extensive evidence of Banks’ questionable character that the defense was allowed to produce, the limitation was not an abuse of discretion. Moreover, even if the limitation were error, it was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence against Taylor. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (<HOLDING>). 3. The district court’s statement that the
holding that confrontation clause issues are subject to harmless error analysis holding that the harmlesserror rule of chapman v california  applies to the failure of a trial judge to submit an element of the offense to the jury holding that the improper denial of a defendants opportunity to impeach for bias is subject to harmlesserror review in which the reviewing court must determine if the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt holding that the constitutionally improper denial of a defendants opportunity to impeach a witness for bias like other confrontation clause errors is subject to chapman harmlesserror analysis holding confrontation clause violations subject to harmless error analysis