was approved by the family court; nevertheless, paragraph seventeen originated as “a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration” within the meaning of the statute. The family court’s approval and merger of the agreement into an order does not insulate the arbitration provision from compliance with section 15-48-10(a). Given the strict construction of section 15-48-10 mandated by the supreme court, we conclude the arbitration clause contained in paragraph seventeen of the agreement had to comply with section 15-48-10(a) to be enforceable. See Ebert v. Ebert, 320 S.C. 331, 338, 465 S.E.2d 121, 125 (Ct.App. 1995) (contract principles should be applied to a separation agreement approved by the family court); Bogan v. Bogan, 298 S.C. 139, 142, 378 S.E.2d 606, 608 (Ct.App.1989) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, it was error for the family
holding that the government was bound by an agreement it treated as binding although it preceded the formal plea agreement holding that an unapproved settlement agreement is binding on the parties even though not yet approved by the court holding that even though an agreement was approved by the family court it retained its character as an agreement for purposes of legal analysis holding that where the parties fail to reach an agreement as to the character nature or type of release to be used an essential element of the agreement is not established holding that plaintiff was not the prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorneys fees even where the court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of a settlement agreement because there was insufficient judicial sanctioning of the alteration of the parties legal relationship