costs as elements of loss from the nonprevailing party. Based on these clear, representations of legislative intent from the words utilized, as well as the particular facts of these cases, I conclude that the phrase “any loss” includes the elements of attorney’s fees and costs as provided by statute and included as part of the judgment against a dealer. In Hubbel’s case and the Herberts’ case, the motor vehicle dealers violated at least one of the conditions set forth in section 320.27(10) and, correspondingly, one of the provisions set forth in the surety bonds issued by Aetna became applicable. Specifically, as established by the trial court’s entry of a judgment against the motor vehicle dealer in Hubbel’s case, see, e.g., Ellish v. Richard, 622 So.2d 1154, 1155 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (<HOLDING>), the dealer failed to refund a deposit to
holding that no actual substantial controversy exists between plaintiff and tortfeasor against whom default judgment has been entered in a subsequent coverage action recognizing that the party against whom a default judgment is entered admits all wellpleaded factual allegations as true recognizing the courts obligation to assume all factual allegations to be true and to draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor holding that a default judgment was not void because the bankruptcy court that entered the judgment had proper jurisdiction over the party seeking relief holding that where the defendant was in default the district court correctly accepted the fact allegations of the complaint as true