but held that the lower court should have abstained. The debtor appealed that decision. The First Circuit reversed. Central to the decision making of the Court was its view that unlike the pre-petition claim in Marathon, post-petition contracts do not involve rights “independent of” or “antecedent to” the filing of the bankruptcy petition. In those circumstances, the First Circuit had no difficulty placing the action within the definitional provisions contained in § 157(b). Writing for the panel, Judge Breyer reasoned that “[t]he action of a debtor-in-possession to collect a post-petition debt arising from the sale of the estate’s assets, unlike a suit to recover a pre-petition debt, falls ver a post-petition account receivable to be core); In re Franklin Computer, Corp., supra, (<HOLDING>); In re All American of Ashburn, Inc., 49 B.R.
holding that debt from debtor to bank in the form of chargebacks to the debtors account for credit card transaction rescissions was prepetition debt even though customers rescinded transactions postpetition and the bank therefore chargedback postpetition because a customers right to rescind and thereby the banks right to chargeback accrued at the time the customer made a purchase even though such customer exercised his right to rescind postpetition holding an action to recover a postpetition account receivable to be core holding plaintiff could not recover on nuisance action to recover for alleged damage to property he does not own or rent holding an action for postpetition breach of an agreement to purchase property to be a core proceeding holding that a postpetition claim under section 1305 is a liability that arises postpetition and relates only to postpetition activity