United States v. Love, 178 F.3d 1297, 1999 WL 115523, at *6-8 (6th Cir. Feb. 8,1999) (finding no violation when the first three of the four Barker factors weighed in favor of the defendant, but the defendant had not shown any prejudice from the delay). The state court, in short, reasonably applied Barker in Brown’s case. V. For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. COLE, Circuit Judge, dissenting. Because the state court’s adjudication of Brown’s federal speedy trial claim was contrary to clearly established federal law and de novo review of his claim demonstrates that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated, I respectfully dissent. I. Standard of Review Brown presented to the Ohio Court of Appeals a speedy trial claim, based upon violations of both the O 06) (<HOLDING>). But whether the state court adjudicated
holding that federal courts presiding over causes of action created by state law should apply state substantive law but federal procedural law holding that federal courts should apply state substantive law holding that deference is owed to state agencys interpretation of state law holding that when presented with petitioners claim based upon state and federal law and the state court confined its analysis  to state law aedpa deference does not apply holding federal courts are bound by state court determinations of state law