Cir. 2014) (affirming the district court’s grant of a motion to strike class allegations, where the arbitration agreement did not mention class arbitration); Reed Elsevier, Inc. ex rel. LexisNexis Div. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 2013) (“The principal reason to conclude that this arbitration clause does not authorize classwide arbitration is that the clause nowhere mentions it.”); Reed v. Fla. Metro. Univ., Inc., 681 F.3d 630, 643-44 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding that silence in an agreement does not “constitute! ] consent to class arbitration” (internal quotation marks omitted)), abrogated on other grounds by Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2064, 186 L.Ed.2d 113 (2013); Dominium Austin Partners, L.L.C. v. Emerson, 248 F.3d 720, 728-29 (8th Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>); Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 275
holding that the court has no independent authority to compel arbitration of a class claim holding that the federal arbitration act requires enforcement of class action waivers in arbitration clauses even when massachusetts law provides for a substantive right to bring a class proceeding holding that the district court did not err by compelling individual rather than class arbitration because the relevant agreements were silent as to class arbitration holding that an order compelling arbitration in an independent proceeding is appealable as a final order because in that context the order compelling arbitration resolves the sole issue before the court holding the doddfrank act prohibition on arbitration agreements did not invalidate all arbitration agreements because njothing in the statutes context suggests that congress sought to bar arbitration of every claim if the arbitration agreement in question did not exempt doddfrank claims