a payment to an officer or employee” violates the statute "is often a matter of ascertaining the intent of both the payor and the payee” (emphasis added)). 8 . Accord OGE Memorandum to Designated Agency Ethics Officials Regarding 18 U.S.C. § 209 Guidance (July 1, 2002), 2002 WL 32100961, at *9 (reaffirming that "an intent to compensate for Government services cannot be inferred from a bona fide award for public service” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 9 . See, e.g., Nat’l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. Taylor, 582 F.3d 1, 28 (D.C.Cir.2009) (stating that, because the Lobbying Disclosure Act requires the government to prove the defendant acted "knowingly and corruptly,” "good faith mistakes will [not] result in criminal liability”); United States v. DeFries, 129 F.3d 1293, 1310 (D.C.Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d
holding the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that defendant claiming selfdefense had no duty to retreat holding that a receiver is not liable for loss resulting from his good faith reliance on the advice of counsel holding that plaintiffs who received fraudulent tax advice and acted in reliance on the advice though only alleging a future risk of being assessed penalties for acting on the advice had alleged an injuiyinfact holding that the district court erred in failing to instruct that good faith reliance on counsels advice is a defense to the fraudulent intent required for embezzlement under 29 usc  501c holding that transferees intent is only relevant for the purposes of a good faith defense and is not part of the trustees prima facie case to recover fraudulent transfers pursuant to 11 usc  548