But a district court is not “required to consider ... an argument that a guideline is unworthy of application in any case because it was promulgated without adequate deliberation.” Id. at 367-68 (emphasis in original). Under the presumption of reasonableness that we give to a district court’s within-Guidelines sentence, “we will not second-guess [a district court’s] decision! ] ... simply because the particular Guideline is not empirically-based.” Janosko, 355 Fed. Appx. at 895 (quoting United States v. Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d 357, 367 (5th Cir.2009)). The district court here explicitly considered the § 3553(a) factors when sen r.2008) (treating multiple convictions as a single offense for purposes of § 5G1.3(b)); and United States v. Kimble, 107 F.3d 712, 714-15 (9th Cir.1997)
holding that prior felony drug convictions that fall within the conspiracy period may be used to enhance the defendants sentence if the conspiracy continued after his earlier convictions were final holding that due to statute defendant cannot collaterally attack prior convictions used to enhance sentence unless in violation of the right to counsel holding that  5g13c applied where defendants undischarged sentence resulted from multiple convictions only one of which was used to enhance his instant sentence holding that where defendants seek to challenge predicate convictions used to enhance current sentence proper avenue for relief is through pcr proceeding holding amended language gives district courts discretion to permit collateral attack on prior convictions used to enhance sentence