this provision, an infamous crime is one in which “its underlying facts establish a felony, a crimen falsi offense, or a like offense involving the charge of falsehood that affects the public administration of justice.” Commonwealth ex rel. Baldwin v. Richard, 561 Pa. 489, 751 A.2d 647, 653 (2000) (footnote omitted); see Commonwealth v. Shaver, 3 Watts & Serg. 338, 342 (Pa.1842) (articulating original definition); see also Commonwealth ex rel. Corbett v. Griffin, 596 Pa. 549, 946 A.2d 668, 674-75 (2008) (all felonies are infamous crimes). At least one other court has interpreted infamous crime, as used in a criminal disenfranchisement provision of a state constitution, to include treason, felony, and crimen falsi offenses. See Barker v. People, 20 Johns. 457, 460-61 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1823) (<HOLDING>). We decline to follow this approach, primarily
holding that manslaughter was an infamous crime under a divorce statute because it was a felony holding that larceny being a felony is an infamous crime holding that an infamous crime under the arkansas constitution is a crime involving elements of deceit and dishonesty holding without discussion of montgomery that a defendant can only be impeached by evidence of a conviction of a prior felony or infamous crime holding that conviction of dueling was not an infamous crime under former state constitutional provision disenfranchising persons convicted of an infamous crime but concluding that the right to hold public office was separate from the right of suffrage