it does not mention any investigation or specify any infraction that was allegedly committed by the manager. (Pl.’s Ex. 19.) The other source is Roun-tree’s own testimony, which fails to provide any detail about any charges against the white manager, but instead it focuses on the family considerations that purportedly informed the decision to allow the man to remain closer to Richmond. (Pl.’s Ex. 18 at 065, Def.’s Ex. 33 at 175-76.) Reading the record in Rountree’s favor, all he has shown is that another man with family concerns was detailed closer to home. Without evidence about the reasons for the detail or the nature of the alleged infractions, plaintiff has not carried his burden of showing that the other manager was in fact similarly situated. See George, 407 F.3d at 415-16 (<HOLDING>). As to Newbill’s purported treatment of black
holding that the court had an adequate record to grant the defendants motion for summary judgment because the relevant evidence would have been in plaintiffs possession holding that the trial court may not grant summary judgment on a ground not raised in the motion holding that trial court may not grant summary judgment by default  when the movants summary judgment proof is legally insufficient holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if there is a genuine dispute about a material fact holding that where record evidence specified the comparative alleged infractions of the relevant individuals but where the accuracy of those allegations was in genuine dispute a court may not grant summary judgment