of whether the images on the site constituted child pornography, the receipt shows Shiver’s familiarity with making commercial transactions for pornographic images on the Internet. The government also presented evidence specifically showing that the image of one child in particular had been produced in North Carolina. That the latter image ended up on Shiver’s computer in Florida strongly suggests that it traveled in interstate commerce. We likewise reject Shiver’s contention that the government’s evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that he “knowingly possessed” the images of child pornography on his computer. Although we have interpreted the meaning of “knowing possession” in other contexts, see, e.g., United States v. Glover, 431 F.3d 744, 748 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>) (quotation omitted), we have not yet had
holding that the phrase possession or custody in  5225b requires actual and not merely constructive possession holding in a similar factual situation that the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction because it had no actual or constructive possession of the letters of credit involved recognizing theory of constructive possession holding that constructive possession need not be exclusive but may be shared by others holding that k no wing possession can be demonstrated by proof of either actual or constructive possession