of an accused in a second trial when the accused has already been convicted or acquitted of that crime, and it forbids punishing an accused more than once for the same offense in a single prosecution. See U.S. Const. amend. V; Gonzales, 304 S.W.3d at 845; Bigon v. State, 252 S.W.3d 360, 369-70 (Tex.Crim.App.2008); see also Harris, 359 S.W.3d at 629. This is a multiple-punishments case. The relevant inquiry in a multiple-punishments double-jeopardy case is always whether the Legislature intended to permit multiple punishments. Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368, 103 S.Ct. 673. However, because two subsections of a single statute are at issue in this case, we must first “ascertain whether [the] alleged conduct violates two distinct statutory provisions within one statute.” Vick, 991 S.W.2d at 832 (<HOLDING>); Gonzales, 304 S.W.3d at 847-48 (holding that
holding unlawful restraint an included offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault so conviction on the former was vacated holding that multiple prosecutions for aggravated sexual assault based on different statutory subsections are permissible because the legislature defined the allowable unit of prosecution as each completed act holding that aggravated assault was not a lesser included offense in prosecution for armed burglary attempted robbery and use of a firearm in the com mission of a felony because the allegation in the information that the accused carried a firearm was insufficient to charge the elements of aggravated assault holding that no apprendi violation shown when trial court cumulated sentences for aggravated sexual assault and indecency with a child when appellant did not dispute that sentence for each count was within statutory range holding in a multiplepunishment case that aggravated sexual assault focuses on prohibited conduct