mention a licensing requirement. See 31 C.F.R. § 560.206. Rather, it prohibits transactions “[ejxcept as otherwise authorized pursuant to this part.” Id. These authorizations include licenses as well as other exemptions. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 560.210 (“Exempt transactions”). Accordingly, we conclude that “willfulness” under IEEPA requires the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with knowledge “that his conduct was unlawful,” Bryan, 524 U.S. at 186, 118 S.Ct. 1939, but not that the defendant was aware of a specific licensing requirement. In so holding, we join those of our sister circuits to have considered and rejected analogous challenges under IEEPA. See United States v. Homa Int'l Trading Corp., 387 F.3d 144, 147 & n. 2 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Dien Duc Huynh, 246 F.3d
holding that the district court correctly declined to instruct the jury that the government was required to prove as an element of the offense that the defendant did not intend to establish a life with his wife holding that to support a conviction for willful violation of ieepa and the itr the government was not required to prove thatdefendant knew he was not a depository institution entitled to avail itself of an expressed exception to the embargo because the law does not require such a negative finding by the jury to establish willfulness holding that the government did not have to prove that the defendant knew that his acts violated the clean water act but merely that he was aware of the conduct that resulted in the permits violation holding that apprendi does not require the government to prove that defendant knew type and amount of controlled substance holding that while the government was required to prove that the defendants phone call crossed a state line  the government did not need to prove that the defendant knew of the interstate nexus