that Plaintiffs interests in the speech outweigh the employers interests in workplace efficiency because the speech concerned public officials in the performance of their official duties. As such, Plaintiff has satisfied the first element of a prima facie retaliation claim. The second element of a retaliation claim requires Plaintiff to demonstrate that each defendant took adverse action against him. Here, while Plaintiff has borne this burden with respect to Morawski and the BPW he has failed to make the necessary showing as to Esparaza. Plaintiff alleges that a variety of actions were adverse. The Court need not address each of these assertions since it is convinced that the March 15, 1996 termination was serious enough to qualify as an adverse action. See Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 394 (<HOLDING>); Mattox v. City of Forest Park, 183 F.3d 515,
holding that an action is considered adverse if it is capable of deterring a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct holding that termination is an adverse employment action holding that an unrealized risk of future adverse action even if formalized is too ephemeral to constitute an adverse employment action holding that if status is not a fundamental right and that  1915g is rationally related to the legitimate end of deterring frivolous lawsuits holding that it is not