statements on the Wallach tape had “no basis,” the complaint is utterly devoid of allegations indicating either a specific agree ment by these defendants to participate in the affairs of the enterprise or an agreement to the commission of two specific predicate acts. Finally, Ms. Goren’s amended complaint cannot be saved by its many conclusory and vague allegations concerning the collective conduct of the “defendants.” It is well established that a complaint may be dismissed if it contains only conclusory, vague and general allegations of a conspiracy. See Schiffels, 978 F.2d at 352; Otto v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 814 F.2d 1127, 1136 (7th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1026, 108 S.Ct. 2004, 100 L.Ed.2d 235 (1988); see also Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 366 (3d Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Instead, in order to state a viable RICO
holding that a conspiracy claim must contain supportive factual allegations describing the general composition of the conspiracy some or all of its broad objectives and the defendants general role in the conspiracy holding that two conspiracies existed where the members of the second conspiracy did not know about the first conspiracy did not benefit from the first conspiracy and were connected with the first conspiracy only through a middleman holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges holding that in a conspiracy case venue lies where the conspiracy agreement was formed or in any jurisdiction where an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed by any of the conspirators holding that once a defendant becomes associated with a conspiracy he is responsible for all of the acts of the conspiracy even those which occurred before or after his association with the conspiracy