not avail himself of subsection (e)’s avenue for substantive review of the Comptroller’s redetermination of eligibility — a determination that the Comptroller has no duty to make absent an application to cure. This case is readily distinguishable from those instances when a statute’s context dictated that we not construe the term “must” to create a condition precedent. See, e.g., Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d at 492 (although Texas Seed Arbitration Act made arbitration a condition precedent to filing suit, the context of the statute demonstrated that failure to file arbitration “within the time necessary to permit effective inspection of the plants under field conditions” did not bar suit) (applying Tex. Agric. Code §§ 64.002, 64.006(a)); City of DeSoto v. White, 288 S.W.3d 389, 395-96 (Tex.2009) (<HOLDING>); see also Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.016 (providing
holding hearing examiner exceeded his jurisdiction by reforming indefinite suspension to temporary suspension of 92 days in excess of 15day statutory period for temporary suspensions holding that police chiefs suspension letter omitting statutorily required information about process for appeal of suspension did not deprive hearing examiner of jurisdiction over suspended officers appeal and require reinstatement of officer holding that the good behavior requirement of a suspended sentence defined the period of suspension holding the state did not meet its burden of proving defendant operated a motor vehicle while suspended where the only evidence of actual notice of suspension was that dot mailed defendant the notice of suspension holding that technical inadequacy in the notice of appeal did not deprive the court of jurisdiction