court that there was no evidence presented at trial of any connection between Mizen’s decision to terminate Ms. Willis for receiving three written reprimands and Ms. Willis’ filing of a charge of discrimination. Cf. Hiatt, 26 F.3d at 769 (noting that, at trial, plaintiff bears the burden of proving that prohibited animosity played a causal role in his termination). There was also no evidence presented at trial that Mizen harbored a race-based animus toward Ms. Willis. B. As the district court recognized, there can be situations in which the forbidden motive of a subordinate employee can be imputed to the employer because, under the circumstances of the case, the employer simply acted as the “cat’s paw” of the subordinate. See Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Orneases have noted that this situation may
holding that city managers single unconstitutional action was sufficient for the imposition of municipal liability holding districtwide class certification not appropriate where the claims were based on oral conversations in which store managers allegedly deviated from company policy holding that under praprotnik a town charters directive that city managers personnel decisions be based on merit and fitness did not preclude city managers final policymaking authority where no other town officials were empowered to enforce that provision holding that affidavits from 25 of the potential class did not support the plaintiffs assertion of widespread violations resulting from a common policy or plan where allegation was that individual managers required employees to work offtheclock holding that if review committee that was unaware of district managers agebased animus acted as the conduit of managers prejudicehis cats pawthe innocence of its members would not spare the company from liability