judge’s (“IJ”) denial of her application for asylum and withholding of deportation. Because the transitional rules apply, Kalaw v. INS, 133 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir.1997), this Court has jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a). We review claims of due process violations in immigration proceedings de novo, Lopez-Urenda v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 788, 791 (9th Cir.2003), and review adverse credibility determinations for substantial evidence, Gui v. INS, 280 F.3d 1217, 1225 (9th Cir. 2002). We deny the petition for review. Taking Petitioner’s testimony as true, we hold that substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that the one vague threat made to Petitioner while she was detained for two hours did not establish past persecution. See Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Substantial evidence in the record also
holding that general crime conditions are not a stated ground for a wellfounded fear of future persecution holding that absent past persecution an alien can demonstrate eligibility for asylum based on a wellfounded fear of future persecution by demonstrating that he or she subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable recognizing that the governments inability to control the source of persecution may support a finding of a wellfounded fear holding that threats standing alone  constitute past persecution in only a small category of cases and only when the threats are so menacing as to cause significant actual suffering or harm  recognizing that although threats may serve as the basis for a wellfounded fear of future persecution tjhreats themselves are sometimes hollow and while uniformly unpleasant often do not effect significant actual suffering or harm