there effectively told the grandmother she had no right to resist the search by claiming to have a warrant, while the DPS officer here correctly informed Valenzuela that Arizona law required hi “instinct with coercion” whether or not he actually possessed a valid warrant. See. id. at 549, 88 S.Ct. 1788 (“A search conducted in reliance upon a warrant cannot later be justified on the basis of consent if it turns out that the warrant was invalid.”); see also Lo-Ji Sales, 442 U.S. at 329, 99 S.Ct. 2319 (citing Bumper and holding that after a business’s agent was arrested and made aware of “the presumed authority” of a search warrant, his compliance with officers’ requests could not be considered free and voluntary consent to a search); State v. Medicine, 865 N.W.2d 492, 498 ¶ 13 (S.D.2015) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, whether the officer here
holding that in deciding whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity it is not only the evidence of clearly established law that is for the court but also whether a reasonable officer could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful in light of the information the officer had holding that a public officer has no discretion or authority to misinterpret the law holding that qualified immunity applies only if an officer had arguable probable cause to arrest holding that bumper applies whether an officer honestly represents authority or fabricates it holding that an officer or employee of the tennessee valley authority was not an officer or employee acting under the authority of the united states or any department or any officer of the government thereof within the meaning of a criminal statute first enacted in 1884