provided for only limited review of Part B decisions. It allowed the equivalent of § 405(g) review for “eligibility” determinations. See 42 U. S. C. § 1395ff(b)(l)(B) (1982 ed.). It required private insurance carriers (administering the Part B program) to provide a “fair hearing” for disputes about Part B “amount determinations.” § 1395u(b)(3)(C). But that was all. Michigan Academy first discussed the statute’s total silence about review of “challenges mounted against the method by which . . . amounts are to be determined.” 476 U. S., at 675. It held that this silence meant that, although review was not available under § 405(g), the silence did not itself foreclose other forms of review, say, review in a court action brought under § 1331. See id., at 674-678. Cf. Erika, supra, at 208 (<HOLDING>). The Court then asked whether § 405(h) barred
holding prejudgment interest is to be determined on the entire amount of compensatory damages and then reduced by the amount of interest which would have accrued at present value on the settlement amount determined before trial holding insufficiently definite bonus agreement that did not establish amount or method for determining amount of payment holding that court of appeals erred by rendering judgment for full amount of attorneys fees sought after reversing 0 fee award because jury awarded less in damages than amount sought and therefore uncontroverted attorney testimony on amount of attorneys fees did not establish amount of reasonable and necessary fees as a matter of law holding that when trial court orders restitution at sentencing pursuant to statute the defendant is entitled to notice of the amount claimed and the opportunity to dispute the amount holding that the medicare part b statutes explicit reference to carrier hearings for amount disputes does foreclose all further agency or court review of amount determinations