but be bolstered by his status as a seasoned prosecutor and the newly appointed United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois. By this comment, Lassar did not merely suggest to the jury what he thought they might find when examining the evidence, a type of comment that we have approved although it steps close to the line of impermissible argument. See Whitaker, 127 F.3d at 606-07. He introduced a comparison that invited the jury to rely on his experience as a prosecutor while preventing any real response from the defense. Where there are two reasonable interpretations of a prosecutor’s conduct—one proper and one improper—we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in finding it to be improper. See United States v. Cheska, 202 F.3d 947, 950 (7th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). Here, the trial court’s
holding that discretion is abused only when no reasonable person could agree with the trial courts assessment holding that trial court was required to give full effect to supreme courts judgment and that by failing to do so the trial court abused its discretion holding trial court abused its discretion when it struck the appellants intervention holding that appellate court could not determine whether trial court abused its discretion in denying relators motion to compel the other party to produce documents because it could only speculate whether there was evidence to support the trial courts denial holding that abuse of discretion in denying a 60b motion is established only when no reasonable person could agree with the district court and there is no abuse of discretion if a reasonable person could disagree as to the propriety of the courts action