[his] plea for equitable tolling ... must fail.”). Thus, the circuit court correctly determined that Clemons’s claim was untimely under Rule 32.2(c), Ala. R.Crim. P. For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court did not err by summarily dismissing Clemons’s claim because it was procedurally barred. See Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R.Crim. P. (authorizing a circuit court to summarily dismiss a claim that is procedurally barred). III. Clemons also argues that he is entitled to relief under the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005). Clemons’s claim that he is entitled to relief under Rompilla is not properly before this Court because it was not raised in Clemons’s Rule 32 petition. See Ex parte Clemons, 55 So.3d at 351 (<HOLDING>); Ex parte Linnell, 484 So.2d 455, 457
holding that appellate courts may not on appeal from the dismissal of a rule 32 petition consider claims not raise in the rule 32 petition recognizing that rule 32 is a postconviction remedy holding that because the petitioner had already filed a rule 371 petition he was barred from submitting a subsequent petition under that rule and his petition was subject to dismissal on that basis regardless of the label he placed on it holding that where the petitioner alleges that he failed to receive notice of the dismissal of his rule 32 ala rcrim p petition in time to effect a timely appeal therefrom and the events about which the petitioner complains all occurred before june 1 2005 the effective date of the amendment to rule 32 providing a different remedy for obtaining an outoftime appeal from the dismissal of a rule 32 petition a petition for a writ of mandamus is the only appropriate remedy holding that a similar claim in a rule 32 petition was procedurally barred because it was raised at trial and because it was raised on direct appeal