sanctions under either Bankruptcy Rule 9011 “or under its inherent power.” Scott was provided additional notice at the hearing on the motion to remand, held nearly two months prior to the hearing on the sanctions motion. The bankruptcy court expressed its serious suspicions of Scott’s conduct, noting that the “timing of [the notice of removal] is very difficult to ignore;” the circumstances of the removal caused “red lights” to go on; and the court got the “impression ... there’s something else going on and it’s not something that’s a good thing.” NIAP’s filings and the court’s comments provided Scott adequate notice that his notice of removal was alleged to be sanctionable and his actions alleged to be conducted in bad faith. See In re DeVille, 361 F.3d 539, 549-50 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Scott had ample opportunity to
holding that trial court erred by imposing sanctions against attorney without notice and hearing but error was cured by attorneys subsequent challenge to sanctions holding that the bankruptcy court has the inherent power to award sanctions for badfaith conduct in a bankruptcy court proceeding holding that adequate notice was given where the court expressed its suspicions of the disputed conduct prior to imposing sanctions even though the court failed to specify in advance that its inherent power would be the basis for the sanctions holding that due process rights were not violated by the district court failing to expressly articulate that it was imposing sanctions pursuant to its inherent power recognizing the federal courts ability to impose inherent power sanctions on parties