to underin-sure their interests. Therefore, we conclude that Owen did not demonstrate any special circumstances on which a court could hold that State Farm was obligated to explain to her its internal practices and procedures. As a matter of law, State Farm owed Owen no duty of disclosure. Finding that the basic element of fraudulent suppression did not exist, we need not consider the remaining elements of Owen’s claim or address the damages issues that State Farm presents. We therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment for the plaintiff Owen and render a judgment for the defendant State Farm. REVERSED AND JUDGMENT RENDERED. MADDOX, HOUSTON, SEE, and LYONS, JJ., concur. SHORES, J., concurs in the result. ALMON, J., dissents. 1 . See Van Arsdale & Co. v. Howard, 5 Ala. 596 (1843) (<HOLDING>); Juzan v. Toulmin, 9 Ala. 662 (1846) (the
holding that it was not harmless error for court to submit to a jury whether defendants conduct was unfair under the ucl holding that under ohio law fraud claim failed because there was no evidence of reliance recognizing the fundamental principle of contract law and florida law that an obligation is illusory when it appears on its face to be so insubstantial as to impose no obligation at all holding that failure to submit an element of the offense to the jury is subject to harmless error analysis holding it was error to submit a fraud claim to the jury partly because there was no principle of law establishing an obligation of disclosure