and human rights abuses in Montenegro.” Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen based on their failure to establish changed circumstances in Montenegro. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (c)(3)(h). Finally, although the BIA erred in finding that Smail Perasevic’s affidavit was “unsworn,” we decline to remand on that basis. See Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 275-76 (2d Cir.2006) (declining to remand because the Court could “predict with confidence” that the BIA would reach the same conclusion absent the error). Because that affidavit concerned the same claim that the IJ had previously found not credible, the BIA was under no obligation to afford it any probative weight. See Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 143, 147-48 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for
holding that an adverse credibility determination is sufficient to deny asylum holding when one identified ground for an adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of petitioners claim of persecution the court is bound to accept the ijs adverse credibility determination holding that the agency may properly conclude that a prior adverse credibility determination undermines the authenticity of documentary evidence filed in support of a motion to reopen holding that an adverse credibility determination may be dispositive where the applicant does not produce any corroborating evidence holding that because petitioner made no effort to demonstrate that the affidavits and additional documentary evidence she submitted in support of her motion to reopen met the requirements under 8 cfr  10032c1 the bia was not obligated to consider them