of minority voters instead of a larger number of “influence districts” that would increase the likelihood of electing more of the group’s candidates of choice. See, e.g., Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 154, 113 S.Ct. 1149, 1155, 122 L.Ed.2d 500, 511 (1993). But the Cingles test—which is the current standard for Section 2 claims—suggests that a claim based on dilution of minority influence could not survive, because the first prong requires that a minority group be large enough to constitute a majority in a district. The Supreme Court recognized as much in Voinovich, supra, noting that if it were to assume that influence claims are actionable, “the first Cingles precondition ... would have to be modified or eliminated.” 507 U.S. at 158, 113 S.Ct. at 1157, 122 L.Ed.2d at 514 (<HOLDING>). The Court has left that question for another
holding that courts need not reach both prongs of an ineffectiveassistance claim if the claim fails on one of them holding that the government need not prove actual notice to the prisoner holding that court need not reach question of influencedilution claim because complainant failed to prove gingless third requirement white bloc voting holding that this court does not decide whether a petitioner must demonstrate that a trial court would have accepted the plea offer to prove prejudice because assuming such a requirement exists petitioner met the requirement holding that the question of whether police had a reasonable basis for finding that a third party had authority to consent to search is a question of law