“sworn affidavits or other competent evidence” suggesting that defendant does business within Delaware. Time Share Vacation Club, 735 F.2d at 67 n. 9. Plaintiffs attempts to rely upon defendant’s two letters to Techno as a means of demonstrating personal jurisdiction under 10 Del. C. § 3104(e)(l-3) are equally unpersuasive. While defendant may have hoped to secure Techno’s business in Nevada, defendant’s letters were isolated solicitations, mailed from outside of Delaware, that did not result in any business either in Delaware or Nevada. In interpreting Delaware’s long-arm statute, this court has consistently held that solicitations do not normally rise to the level of transacting business. See Thorn EMI North America, Inc. v. Micron Technology, Inc., 821 F.Supp. 272, 274 (D.Del.1993) (<HOLDING>); Applied Biosystems, Inc. v. Cruachem, Ltd.,
holding plaintiffs allegation that defendants committed torts in texas was sufficient to bring defendants under the longarm statute holding that television station was not subject to personal jurisdiction in  new york under that states longarm statute since libel claim did not arise from defendants delivery of mail orders to new york holding that under delawares longarm statute the act of mailing for purposes of subsection c3 is complete when the material is mailed even if the mailed material causes tortious injury within delaware holding that under delawares longarm statute mere solicitation does not arise to transacting business holding that defendants issuance of letters of credit to plaintiffs could not serve as the basis for transacting business under new mexicos longarm statute because the record makes it clear that it was plaintiffs not defendant fibc who initiated the transaction at issue in this case