the service of process here under consideration if it were held retroactive, and the Court considers that question separately, infra. First we address our attention to the effect to be given our construction of § 24-113.1(b) by reason of the intervening amendment. It is obvious that the legislature had in its contemplation situations just like the one posed by the cases for decision today when it enacted § 24-113.1 (c). The question raised by the amendment is this: Did the Georgia legislature feel that § 24-113.1 (b) did not cover out-of-state negligence causing an in-state injury, and because of that feeling enact § 24-113.1 (c) to fill the “gap”, or was it simply confirming in more explicit terms the correctness of this Court’s rea 7 Ga. 294, 13 S.E. 493, 14 L.R.A. 721 (1891) (<HOLDING>). We accepted the test in Pritchard as stating
holding that the act is retroactive recognizing that the application of a retroactive amendment is discretionary holding that retroactive application of amended guidelines provision is not plain error holding that the act is not retroactive holding retroactive application