that complaint with a challenge to the punishment he was assessed. While the record is clear that Wright had three years to comply with the condition of community supervision that required him to submit to sex offender treatment and that the three years had not expired at the time that the State proceeded to adjudication on the underlying of fense, the former version of article 42.12, section 5(b) provides no statutory vehicle that would allow Wright to challenge what he claims to be a due process violation. See id. And because the Legislature did not make its changes to article 42.12, section 5(b) retroactive, we are constrained by former article 42.12, section 5(b) to hold that Wr 104, at *1 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth Mar.17, 2005, pet. ref d) (mem. op.) (not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we must overrule Wright’s sole
holding that defendants objection to personal jurisdiction was forfeited where defendant did not object before he entered his plea holding that appellant forfeited his complaint regarding his sentence because he did not object at trial holding that a defendant forfeited his confrontation clause claim by failing to properly preserve it at trial holding appellant waived his challenge to statute as vague as applied because he did not specifically object at trial holding complaint that sentence violated equal protection was waived because of failure to object at trial