on the desks of one or more Sprint employees. I R. at 29G. Although the court did not allow this document to go to the jury, it allowed counsel to discuss it with witnesses as a “one page racially defamatory document.” IV R. at 745-46. Shrouding this document in mystery by continually referring to it as a racially defamatory document while simultaneously refusing to admit it in evidence could only serve to heighten the jury’s view of the document’s importance. On remand, the court should require Ms. Heno to lay a sufficient foundation for establishing a causal nexus between Sprint, particularly through Mr. Crowder, and this document. Given the highly prejudicial nature of the document, such a foundation should be substantial. See Robinson v. Runyon, 149 F.3d 507, 511 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). If such a foundation' is laid, and the
holding that courts should look at the notice afforded by a document rather than a litigants motivation in filing to determine whether a document constitutes a notice of appeal holding that an order dismissing the case did not satisfy rule 58s separate document requirement because the order was never entered as a separate document holding that in connection with a motion to dismiss the court may consider a document not attached to the pleadings where the plaintiffs claim depends on the contents of a document the defendant attaches the document to its motion to dismiss and the parties do not dispute the authenticity of the document even though the plaintiff does not explicitly allege the contents of that document in the complaint holding that an unsworn memorandum is a pleading and not an evidentiary document therefore it had no evidentiary value and should not have been admitted as an exhibit holding that nigger employment application should have been admitted based on evidence that document was widely circulated throughout office on several occasions and supervisors were seen reading the document and laughing