no evidence of flagrant bad faith or callous disregard for the rules, nothing to justify a presumption that [plaintiffs] case lacks merit, and nothing to suggest [defendant] was unable to prepare for trial without the admissions. See id. at 918; cf. Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 843 (Tex.2004) (affirming dismissal based on destruction of tapes at heart of case). Further, Sandra offered to pay for any expenses Darrin incurred because her responses were late. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 215.4. We hold under the facts presented'here that the trial court should have granted a new trial and allowed the deemed admissions to be withdrawn upon learning that the summary judgment was solely because Sandra’s responses were two days late. See Spohn Hosp. [v. Mayer], 104 S.W.3d [878,] 883 [Tex.2003)] (<HOLDING>). Id. at 443. In Marino v. King, the supreme
holding that it is improper to ask a witness to comment on the credibility of another witness holding that testimonial hearsay statements of a witness who does not appear at trial are inadmissible under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment unless the witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the witness holding that witness statements in police report inadmissible holding lateproduction of witness statements insufficient to justify deeming facts on merits holding that parole status alone is insufficient to justify search of a parolee