in a suspect verdict or a trial that was fundamentally unfair or unreliable. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369, 372, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993). Given the strong case against Medearis and the uphill climb he faced, by virtue of his own pre- and post-incident conduct, there is no reasonable probability that the letter, if the same had been admitted and used to impeach Whiting, would have created a reasonable doubt with respect to his guilt and changed the outcome of the case. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-96, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Medearis, 380 F.3d at 1058-60. Counsel and the trial court’s handling of the letter did not so upset the adversarial balance between the defense and prosecution to warrant a new trial. See Odem v. Hopkins, 382 F.3d 846, 851-52 (8th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Bear Stops v. United States, 339 F.3d 777,
holding that even if the error complained of was structural and affected substantial rights the fourth prong of olano was not met because of the overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted evidence of petitioners guilt holding improperly admitted evidence was harmless error given the overwhelming evidence of guilt holding that prejudice was not shown where there was overwhelming evidence of guilt holding the error harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt holding stricklands prejudice prong was not met because of overwhelming evidence of guilt