the two counselled second offense shoplifting charges, Appellant had to have admitted to an earlier conviction for first offense shoplifting. Moreover, the State notes that Appellant has never sought to challenge the constitutionality of any of her plea agreements based either on an assertion of lack of coun sel or lack of a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel. To be properly charged with third offense shoplifting requires only that the accused have been previously convicted of two shoplifting offenses within the preceding seven-year period. See W.Va.Code § 61-3A-3(e) (1992). There is no requirement that one of the two prior convictions be for first offense shoplifting, only that there be two prior convictions. See State v. Barker, 179 W.Va. 194, 199, 366 S.E.2d 642, 647 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Since Appellant was convicted twice for
recognizing that two prior first offense dui convictions were sufficient predicate for third offense dui conviction holding that a conviction and sentence for a predicate offense that is entered after the commission of the current offense does not qualify as a prior felony within the meaning of the sexual predator statute holding that a charge of first offense dui is constitutionally petty and no right to jury trial attaches holding that dui is not such an offense recognizing that dui manslaughter and vehicular homicide are two separate crimes neither being a lesser included offense of the other but holding that a single death cannot support convictions for both crimes