considerable amount of pain and suffering on a victim.”) with (Tr. 1/26/82, at 150) (defining torture as either a murder that is “especially atrocious, heinous, or cruel manifesting exceptional depravity” or one that involves the “intention to inflict pain, suffering, or both pain and suffering.”). As pain was the crux of Pursell’s defense, the trial court’s failure to instruct on this point had serious ramifications. See supra at 335-37, 394-95. Again, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s failure to explore this difference was objectively unreasonable. Finally, the Court’s conclusion was devoid of reasoning. The Court dismissed Pursell’s claim in two conclusive sentences. It never cited Godfrey, a case that clearly governed Pursell’s claim. See Stringer, 503 U.S. at 227-29, 112 S.Ct. 1130 (<HOLDING>). It never acknowledged that the “especially
holding that the unconstitutionality of the especially heinous atrocious or cruel instruction was compelled by godfrey holding that issue of inadequate jury instruction was waived because the instruction given was the one expressly requested by defense counsel holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given holding prosecutors misstated the law as applied to oklahomas heinous atrocious or cruel aggravating circumstances and additionally encouraged the jurors to decide the question on the basis or sympathy for the victims holding that defendant was not entitled to entrapment instruction when there was insufficient evidence to support such an instruction