109 A. 707, 709 (R.I.1920) (“The memorandum is not the agreement on which the complainant brings suit. It is only a memorandum of the agreement.”). Because the agreement between the parties was ambiguous, the interpretation of that agreement is a question of fact which cannot be decided by this Court at the summary judgment stage. See ADP Marshall, 710 F.Supp.2d at 212. BJ’s also contends that, because Cappalli was a BJ’s member, she was bound by BJ’s rules of membership, including those contained in the P & C’s, regardless of her knowledge of those rules. The cases cited by BJ’s in support of this argument, however, all involve associations very different from the one at issue in the present case. See Post v. Belmont Country Club, Inc., 60 Mass.App.Ct. 645, 805 N.E.2d 63, 67 (2004) (<HOLDING>); Miller v. Supreme Tent of Knights of
holding there was no rule 404b violation where the evidence was admitted to show knowledge and knowledge was an element of the crime charged holding that a member of a golf club was charged with knowledge of an indemnity clause in the clubs membership handbook holding that police district attorney and judge are charged with knowledge of law particularly when dealing with constitutional rights holding that copperweld did not apply to the nfl and its member clubs and finding the clubs to be separate entities capable of conspiring together under  1 holding that the knowledge requisite to knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as distinguished from knowledge of the law