view, while the amendment permits the modification of paternity judgments when there has been blood or genetic testing and it excludes the named father, it does not address the named father’s entitlement to such testing and, consequently, it does not restrict the consideration of the best interest of the child before any post-paternity blood or genetic testing is ordered. Thus, whether, after paternity has been determined, there will be, or should be, a blood test ordered is not a question directed to § 5-1029, but to the trial judge, to be decided in light of the relevant circumstances, including, therefore, the best interests of the child. The cases sub judice are exactly the type of cases in which our case law dictates, and the General Assembly envisioned, that the bes 8, 905 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Sider v. Sider, 334 Md. 512, 527, 639 A.2d
holding that the trial court must specifically consider whether it would be in the best interest of the child for the case to proceed before a putative father may be permitted to seek blood tests in an attempt to rebut the presumption of paternity holding that the best interest of the child was the proper standard to apply in determining whether blood tests should be conducted holding that the best interest of the child is the paramount concern in determining whether to order blood tests to determine paternity holding that the trial court erred by not considering whether ordering blood tests to disestablish paternity was in the best interest of the child holding that although a putative father had standing to bring a paternity action the action could not proceed and the blood tests could not be ordered unless the trial court determined that the paternity action would serve the best interest of the child