in a copyright action. Additionally, defendants note that they did not discover the full extent of defendants’ infringement until March 2010, shortly before filing this action. The record reflects that plaintiffs did not unreasonably delay the commencement of this action, and that to the contrary, they sought an efficient out-of-court resolution of this matter. Ultimately, once they were convinced that defendants would not cease their infringing conduct absent injunctive relief, and once the scope of defendants’ infringing conduct became clear, they promptly brought this action and filed the instant motion. Thus, plaintiffs did not waive any right to preliminary injunctive relief on account of delay. See Eve of Milady v. Impression Bridal, Inc., 957 F.Supp. 484, 490-91 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (<HOLDING>). As it is clear from this record that
holding that intangible injuries such as damage to advertising efforts and goodwill can be irreparable harm for purpose of a preliminary injunction holding that the threat of irreparable harm must be immediate holding that a party who can show a significant risk of irreparable harm has demonstrated that the harm is not speculative holding that monetary damages do not generally constitute irreparable harm holding that efforts to resolve matter without litigation did not suggest absence of irreparable harm