containing the information required for registration under [the SORP]”). Underpinning this argument is McCraw’s interpretation of the SORP to include C.I.’s criminal case as a “reportable conviction” that requires registration as a sex offender regardless of C.I.’s successful completion of deferred adjudication. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.001(5)(a). However, because we have determined that C.I.’s 1986 case was dismissed without a conviction and that he therefore had no duty to register under the SORP, we find that DPS’s reporting of C.I.’s case as a conviction and McCraw’s actions seeking to compel C.I. to register were ultra vires acts, for which sovereign immunity does not apply to deprive the trial court of jurisdiction. See In re Smith, 333 S.W.3d 582, 585 (Tex. 2011) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we find that C.I. has pleaded
holding that if an officer smells the odor of marijuana in circumstances where the officer can localize its source to a person the officer has probable cause to believe that the person has committed or is committing the crime of possession of marijuana and thus has authority to arrest him without a warrant in a public place holding police officer is a public official holding that an officer or employee of the tennessee valley authority was not an officer or employee acting under the authority of the united states or any department or any officer of the government thereof within the meaning of a criminal statute first enacted in 1884 holding that no court has the authority to substitute a different sentence for that which is required by law holding that a public officer has no discretion or authority to misinterpret the law