Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1205 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying New York law to hold that the “exclusionary effect of policy language . . . controls” and that the insurer had the burden to prove that the harm was expected or intended despite the policy definition of “occurrence” as an accident resulting in harm “neither expected nor intended”); Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 750 F. Supp. 1340, 1350 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (assigning burden of proof regarding “neither expected nor intended” clause in definition of occurrence to the insurer, noting that “[t]his interpretation is supported by case law and the general rule . . . that an insurer must prove the applicability of an exclusion to coverage”); Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 712 A.2d 1116, 1126 (N.J. 1998) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we find no error in the trial
holding that defendant must establish the application of the limitationexclusion to the plaintiffs claim where defendant did not contest the plaintiffs assertion that defendant bore the burden of proof in this case because the limitation on benefits for mental and nervous conditions is a coverage exclusion and the plan documents contained no express provision regarding burden of proof holding that the plaintiffs have the burden of proof and persuasion as to the existence of standing holding that the unexpectedly and unintentionally definition of occurrence should be treated as an exclusion for purposes of assigning the burden of proof to the insurer holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant recognizing that the burden of proof is an essential element of the claim itself and that one who asserts a claim has the burden of proof that normally comes with it