vote. In the absence of any corporate action by the board respecting his salary, I am unable to construe the election of Mr. Zell to act in the role of chief executive officer as automatically carrying with it any salary entitlement in the non-bankruptcy context. Nothing in the Code would override the requirement of corporate approval of his salary or otherwise enlarge his rights beyond that authorized by the board. Thus, under any plausible interpretation of Section 327, as it applies to the present case, Zell is ineligible for compensation and the Debtor’s second contention, therefore, is overruled. III. Mr. Zell cannot be compensated under Section 503 absent employment under Section 327. Finally, Mr. Zell contends that 11 U.S.C. Sections 503(a) 96 B.R. 884 (Bankr.E.D.Wis.1989) (<HOLDING>). Courts reaching a different result regarding
holding that property manager not a professional when management authority had not been delegated to it holding that chevron deference is due only when the agency acts pursuant to delegated authority holding that an agent acting outside his delegated authority is not protected by the discretionary function exception holding that property manager held to be a professional when granted broad autonomy and unfettered discretion holding that determination as to whether an official has been delegated final policymaking authority is a question of law for the court not one of fact for the juiy