sentence vacated, 864 F.2d 992 (3d Cir.1988), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 2442, 104 L.Ed.2d 998 (1989), and United States v. Ortega Lopez, 684 F.Supp. 1506 (C.D.Cal.1988) (en banc), rejected by United States v. Brady, 895 F.2d 538, 540-42 (9th Cir.1990). The lawyer chose instead to confine himself to the two issues addressed above. Given our recent decisions rejecting the due process argument, United States v. Allen, 873 F.2d 963, 966 (6th Cir.1989); United States v. Jacobs, 877 F.2d 460, 462 (6th Cir.1989), it is clear that the course urged by Mr. Perry would have been unavailing. Tactical choices of this sort are properly left to the sound professional judgment of counsel in any event. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 3312, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Mr. Perry’s other arguments for replacement
holding that an indigent defendant does not lose his anders rights because counsel is able to identify relatively minor sentencing issues holding that defendants right to be present does not extend to bench conferences on legal and scheduling issues in which defense counsel participated and to which defendant could not have made a meaningful contribution holding that the right to have counsel present means the right to have counsel physically present during the interrogation not merely the right to consult an attorney by telephone holding that an indigent defendant cannot have a fair trial without being provided counsel holding that an indigent defendant does not have a constitutional right to press issues even if nonfrivolous which counsel in his professional judgment decides not to present