220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Booker. Jimenez-Cohenete’s challenge, as he acknowledges, is precluded by United States v. Ordaz, 398 F.3d 236 (3d Cir.2005). In Ordaz, we recognized the “tension between the spirit of Blakely and Booker that all facts that increase the sentence should be found by a jury and the Court’s decision in Almendarez-Torres.” Id. at 241. Nonetheless, bound by Almendarez-Torres, we held that a District Court’s determination regarding the fact of a defendant’s prior conviction did not violate the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. See id. Jimenez-Cohenete suggests that the Supreme Court’s decision in Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 25-26, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005) (<HOLDING>), decided two weeks after Ordaz, supports
holding that burglary is violent felony holding that a court can look only to the statutory elements charging documents and jury instructions to determine whether an earlier conviction after trial qualified as a violent felony under the acca holding that court could look only to the statutory definition of a crime the charging document written plea agreement transcript of plea colloquy and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented in determining if prior conviction qualified as a generic burglary for purposes of enhanced sentencing under armed career criminal act holding that in determining whether a prior conviction is a violent felony a court generally must look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense holding that a sentencing court in determining whether a burglary was a violent felony that resulted in an enhanced statutory minimum had to rely on charging documents elements of offenses plea colloquies and express findings by the trial judge and could not look to police reports or complaint applications