physical or mental inability to perform the required duties or for any other good and just cause, provided, that any such cancellation may be effected only in accordance with the New Mexico Statutes and any applicable rules and regulations of the State and Local Boards of Education. The terms of Harrell’s contract thus implicitly provided that it could be canceled in accordance with the applicable New Mexico statute, Section 22-10-17.1, which requires that any appeal from the local board’s decision be submitted to final and binding arbitration. When Harrell agreed to the terms of the contract, he arguably agreed to the arbitration procedure contained in the statute. See, e.g., Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 728 F.2d 577, 580 (2d Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). We hold, however, that Harrell’s putative
recognizing that in reviewing ruling on motion to compel arbitration we first determine whether party seeking arbitration established existence of arbitration agreement holding that the plaintiff was required to arbitrate his claim which accrued before he became bound by the arbitration rules of the new york stock exchange because he was fully aware of the existing claim at the time he became a member of the exchange and became bound by its arbitration rules holding membership in new york stock exchange with concomitant obligation to be bound by arbitration provisions of its constitution and rules sufficient to constitute consent to arbitration of covered disputes whether or not arbitration provisions are specifically incorporated in contract holding that that plaintiffs claims which accrued before he became bound by the arbitration rules of the pacific stock exchange were not arbitrable because the record contained little if any evidence to show that the plaintiff knew of the existing controversy when he became bound by the arbitration rules holding that an arbitration in accordance with aaa rules is a binding arbitration