disciplin ary segregation were isolated from other inmates and only permitted approximately 50 minutes a day to exercise and shower. The Court nevertheless held that “[t]he regime to which [the inmate] was subjected ... was within the range of confinement to be normally expected for one serving an indeterminate term of 30 years to life.” Id. at 487, 115 S.Ct. at 2302. Even assuming that the additional deprivations of communal religious services and out-of-cell exercise for 15 days caused the level of Arce’s hardship to exceed the hardship at issue in Sandin, any difference is significantly offset by the relative brevity of Aree’s segregation which was 12 days shorter than the 30 day segregation in Sandin. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486, 115 S.Ct. at 2301; see also Frazier, 81 F.3d at 317 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the 15 day duration without
recognizing a liberty interest in reasonably safe conditions of confinement holding that placement in disciplinary segregation does not implicate a liberty interest because it falls within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a sentence holding that 12 days of prehearing confinement in the shu did not implicate a statecreated liberty interest holding that 117 days in administrative segregation due to lack of bed space did not implicate a statecreated liberty interest holding that punitive conditions of pretrial confinement implicate due process