of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching for Its Proper Limits, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1331, 1366 (1989) (stating that “[a]t its core, the defense of duress requires us to determine what conduct we, a society of individual members of the human race, may legitimately expect of our fellow threatened humans”). Indeed, the MPC, in developing the defense, determined that duress had to be treated differently and kept exceptional because of the moral implications inherent in excusing a defendant who “rationally and intentionally” chooses to commit an unlawful act that may actually include harming an innocent third party. Laura K. Dore, Downward Adjustment and the Slippery Slope: The Use of Duress in Defense of Battered Offenders, 56 Ohio St. L.J. 665, 747-48 and 747 n. 339 (1995) (<HOLDING>); see also Dressier, supra, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev.
recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act but refusing to extend policy beyond claims where the parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct   holding that firstdegree murder is one crime although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways recognizing that entrapment is a statutory defense rooted in the notion that congress could not have intended to criminally punish those who commit elements of crime but are induced by the government to commit the acts and that outrageous conduct defense is rooted in constitutional law recognizing public policy considerations that undergirded determination to limit the defense to the most serious types of pressures to commit crime holding that the decision not to remove materials during canal construction was based not on policy judgments but on technical scientific engineering considerations and thus is not susceptible to policy considerations