facility. Certainly, the same cannot be said for snowboarding. This Court’s conclusion that the Statute applies to snowboarding makes particularly good sense given the growing popularity of the sport. Nowadays, ski areas are more often dominated by snow boarders; if they could sue for collisions occurring on the ski trails, insurance costs to ski operators would increase substantially, in direct derogation of the legislature’s intent. In those states with statutes similar to the Statute here, courts have reached the same conclusion as this Court and held that the two sports should be regarded as the same when it comes to protecting the ski operator from lawsuits arising from collision on the slopes. See e.g. Cecere v. Loon Mountain Recreation Corp., 923 A.2d 198, 203 (N.H. 2007) (<HOLDING>); Shukaski v. Indian Head Mountain Resort, 166
holding that a police department is not a person within the meaning of section 1983 holding that a person using a snowboard is a skier within the meaning of the new hampshire statute holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of  1983 holding that a state was embraced within the meaning of the word person  where the word person was defined as meaning and including a partnership association company or corporation as well as a natural person holding that unless the law enforcement officers show of authority succeeds in restraining a person the person has not been seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment