appropriate sentence outside the guideline range if a departure is warranted. We also reject Appellants’ contention that consideration of conduct from dismissed counts would severely undermine the plea bargaining process and threaten the proportionality in sentencing that the guidelines seek to foster. Reality does not bear out their argument. There is little difference between utilizing uncharged, dismissed, or even acquitted conduct as a basis for departure and employing it as relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 to determine the base offense level or adjustments to it. And, the propriety of using uncharged, dismissed, and acquitted conduct for these purposes is well settled. See, e.g., United States v. Watts, — U.S. -, -, 117 S.Ct. 633, 636-38, 136 L.Ed.2d 554 (1997) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Carroll, 3 F.3d 98, 102 n.
holding that when a court miscalculates the guideline range yet imposes a sentence that falls within a properly calculated guideline range the sentence enjoys a presumption of reasonableness holding that a sentence within the properly calculated guideline range is presumptively reasonable holding that consideration by a sentencing court of acquitted conduct was appropriate in establishing the applicable guideline range or in determining the sentence to impose within the guideline range holding that sentences within the guideline range are presumptively reasonable holding that conduct contained in dismissed counts may be considered by a district court in determining whether to depart from the applicable guideline range