that Watts survived Booker, and we decline to reconsider our position. See United States v. Horne, 474 F.3d 1004, 1006 (7th Cir.2007); United States v. Price, 418 F.3d 771, 788 & n. 7 (7th Cir.2005). Watts acknowledged that there is some disagreement among circuit courts about whether a sentence, like this one, that is based almost entirely on acquitted conduct, violates due process when the district court applies a preponderance of the evidence standard rather than requiring clear and convincing evidence. Compare, e.g., United States v. Hopper, 177 F.3d 824, 833 (9th Cir.1999) (requiring clear and convincing proof where the use of acquitted conduct results in a seven-level adjustment to the defendant’s Guide lines range), with United States v. Ward, 190 F.3d 483, 492 (6th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, the disagreement— which Watts
holding that a district court may find acquitted conduct by a preponderance of the evidence holding that a district court may not impose a sentencing enhancement based on conduct of which the jury acquitted the defendant holding that district court may treat acquitted conduct as relevant conduct at sentencing holding that criminal conduct of which defendant is acquitted may be used as sentencing factor if proved by preponderance of the evidence holding that the district court was permitted to find conduct that had been acquitted by the jury when determining the defendants sentence