of those rights.” Id. The Dancas contend that their state law' claims do not “relate to” an ERISA qualified plan because PHCS stepped beyond the scope of ordinary utilization review and participated in actual medical treatment decisions. As such, citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 324A (1965), the Dancas argue, those agents assumed a duty of care to manage and control plaintiffs healthcare. It is unimportant, for purposes of ERISA preemption, that decisions of agents of PHCS affected actual treatment decisions (i.e, the appropriate place of hospitalization) because state law claims for negligent treatment decisions made in the course of utilization review are also preempted by § 514(a). See, e.g., Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1489 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d
holding that erisa does not preempt the plaintiffs claim that the erisa plan administrator is liable for medical malpractice where the plaintiff premised the claim solely on state law and did not invoke the erisa plan holding that a plaintiff in an erisa denial of benefits case bears the burden of proving her entitlement to contractual benefits holding that tort law claim for injuries allegedly sustained because of negligently improper denial of coverage did not arise under act holding plaintiff cannot transform a claim for denial of benefits under erisa into a state law claim by alleging that utilization review agent negligently determined that physical therapy to rehabilitate a knee was not necessary holding that the state law contract claim alleged the same conduct as in the erisa claim and was therefore preempted