error in the convictions and affirmed the judgment of the district court. Because the defendants in Davila did not expressly challenge their convictions under § 242 on appeal, the majority dismisses the importance of that ease to the discussion presently before us. The defendant in Contreras also did not dispute the fact that a sexual assault perpetrated under color of law fell within the proscriptions of the due process clause. Presumably, therefore, the majority would also dismiss the precedential value of that ease for the same reasons advanced in its discussion of Davila. Despite the majority’s casual treatment of prosecutions for sexual assaults under § 242, however, these eases provide further support for the proposition that court decisions had already recognized an ) (<HOLDING>); Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59, 62 (9th
recognizing that not all criminal assaults will constitute violations of a constitutional right but that the right to be free from intrusions into bodily security that shock the conscience is unmistakably established in our constitutional decisions as an attribute of the ordered liberty that is the concern of substantive due process recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights holding that there is no substantive due process right under the fourteenth amendment to be free from malicious prosecution holding that there is no constitutional right to appeal a criminal conviction recognizing right to be free from unjustified intrusions on personal security