officers did not know the precise “use” to which Hobbs’s confession would put at the time they solicited it is of little consequence. See Stoot, 582 F.3d at 927 (“The question ... is not whether a reasonable officer could have discerned the precise meaning of ‘use’ in a criminal case under Chavez, but rather whether the officer obtained the allegedly coerced statements so that they could later be used against the suspect in a criminal case.”). In May 2005, “a reasonable public official interrogating a criminal suspect would have recognized that coercing a confession by abusive language and physical contact, along with coaching the suspect as to the details of the confession, clearly violates the suspect’s constitutional right against self-incrimination.” Hill, 2009 WL 174994, at *8 (<HOLDING>); see also Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F.3d 648,
holding that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity where the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that speech was public concern holding that officers were entitled to qualified immunity where defendant officers could have reasonably believed that they were given sufficient third party consent to search holding that prosecutors who soon after arrest of suspect allegedly directed police to coerce confession from suspect were not entitled to absolute immunity because interrogation is ordinarily a police activity holding that police officers were not entitled to qualified immunity where they used threats and physical violence against the plaintiff in march 1992 to coerce a confession that was later used to convict him of murder holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity