“matter of fact” without providing any clear basis for its opinions other than these cursory descriptions. Further, the prosecutor stated variously “I felt her responses lined up in a way that would make her not a helpful witness for the State.... [H]er responses to me seemed matter of fact and I felt like her responses would not make her a good juror for the State.... I don’t recall what it was [about Ms. Thornton], there was something that I immediately decided that I would make her one of my strikes.” These explanations all fall short of being reasonably clear and specific. It is not enough for the prosecutor simply to describe a nondiscriminatory motive without tying it to something specific about the juror herself. See United States v. Horsley, 864 F.2d 1543, 1546 (11th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). . ¶ 27 If the prosecutor cites demean- or as
holding that africanamerican plaintiffs claims that defendants should have known that placing him in a jail with a large population of white inmates put him at risk of being attacked were without merit because the plaintiff had not alleged any specific facts which would show that he was in danger of being assaulted by the other inmates holding prosecutors explanation that he struck juror because i just got a feeling about him obviously fell short of being reasonably clear and specific holding that plaintiff stated iied claim where officer allegedly hurled racial epithets at him and struck him without provocation holding that the defendant was placed in official detention when two police officers approached him and told him that he was under arrest as the defendant could not reasonably have believed that he was free to leave holding that allegations fell short of title vii liability where male plaintiff claimed that male coworker stood behind him and bumped into him while he mopped peeped at him in restroom and asked him to dance at christmas party