35-38). These intervening events greatly undermine the inference of retaliation. See, e.g., Johnson v. Auburn Univ., 403 F.Supp.2d 1101, 1114 (M.D.Ala,2005), aff'd, 193 Fed.Appx. 955 (11th Cir.2006). Considering the totality of the circumstances, including the nine month period between Winston’s EEO complaint and his suspension, as well as his intervening promotion, positive review, and various discretionary awards, Winston has failed to present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find a causal link between his protected act and the adverse employment action. Likewise, as discussed supra, no reasonable jury could find that Smithsonian’s proffered reasons for the seven-day suspension were pretextual. See Laurent v. Bureau of Rehab., Inc., 544 F.Supp.2d 17, 23 n. 5 (D.D.C.2008) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Count II must be dismissed. D.
holding that to establish a causal connection plaintiff must show that the individual who took adverse action against him knew of the employees protected activity holding that the plaintiff demonstrated pretext in part by establishing a causal connection holding that five weeks between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to establish a causal connection holding that plaintiff cannot establish pretext because she is unable to show any causal connection her complaints and the adverse action holding that the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact regarding her retaliation claim because she failed to offer any evidence of a causal relationship between her involvement in protected activity and the adverse employment action