reviewed the record and find that the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence. The inconsistencies and implausibilities in the petitioner’s testimony relied on by the IJ bore a “legitimate nexus,” Secaida-Rosales, 331 F.3d at 307, to Kruja’s claim because they concerned (1) her story of past persecution, (2) her explanation of how she became aware that someone was inclined to persecute her, and (3) her past political activities which she relied on as one motivation for the persecution. The background materials were not such as to require a finding that simply on the basis of her status as a young woman, any subjective fear of persecution held by Kruja was reasonable. Cf. Al-Harbi v. INS, 242 F.3d 882, 891-93 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, Kruja did not present
recognizing that the governments inability to control the source of persecution may support a finding of a wellfounded fear holding that wellfounded fear was established where all of petitioners similarly situated family members were persecuted holding it improper to deny cat relief based on adverse credibility finding where objective documentary evidence establishes likelihood of torture holding that iraqi petitioner who failed to establish past persecution nonetheless had a wellfounded fear of future persecution because evidence of country conditions supported the conclusion that the iraqi government would persecute as traitors any evacuees who returned to iraq holding objectively wellfounded fear established notwithstanding adverse credibility finding by documentary evidence of very high likelihood of execution if returned to iraq