the trial court did not depart from the essential requirements of the law in requiring production of the document covered by item (2) because the document is not privileged. The only document covered by item (2) is the employment agreement between Jenney and Airdata. Jenney cannot seriously contend that the employment agreement is protected by the attorney-client privilege be- ■ cause both he and Airdata had copies of the agreement before Jenney retained his former attorney to negotiate the retirement agreement. The fact that Jenney may have given a copy of the employment agreement to the attorney negotiating the retirement agreement does not convert the nonprivileged employment agreement into a privileged document. See Tober v. Sanchez, 417 So.2d 1053, 1055 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (<HOLDING>); cf. Briggs v. Salcines, 392 So.2d 263, 266
holding that a judgment debtors trust fund records are not protected by the attorneyclient privilege because djocuments which are not privileged in the hands of the client cannot be shielded by transferring them to the attorney holding that if documents are privileged in the hands of the client they retain that privilege when given to an attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice holding that trial court properly refused to permit disclosure of privileged communications in part because use of the privileged information was not essential to the defense holding that discussions between management personnel concerning legal advice given by attorney is privileged even when attorney is not physically present holding that a document which is given to an attorney in the course of seeking legal advice is privileged in the hands of the attorney only if it was privileged in the hands of the client