focused their attention on the word “corruptly” as the key to what may or may not lawfully be done in the situation presented here. Section 1512(b) punishes not just “corruptly persuading]” another, but “knowingly . . . corruptly persuading]” another. (Emphasis added.) The Government suggests that “knowingly” does not modify “corruptly per suades,” but that is not how the statute most naturally reads. It provides the mens rea — “knowingly”—and then a list of acts — “uses intimidation or physical force, threatens, or corruptly persuades.” We have recognized with regard to similar statutory language that the mens rea at least applies to the acts that immediately follow, if not to other elements down the statutory chain. See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U. S. 64, 68 (1994) (<HOLDING>); see also Liparota v. United States, 471 U. S.
holding that the term knowingly under  2252a applies to both the nature of the material and the age of the children depicted recognizing that the most natural grammatical reading of 18 u s c  2252a1 and 2 suggests that the term knowingly modifies only the surrounding verbs transports ships receives distributes or reproduces holding that the offense defined by sections 2201a1 and b2b has three parts two of which include culpable mental states and that intentionally knowingly or recklessly in the third part modifies impeding the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of the person holding that unless otherwise directed by the statute the term knowingly merely requires proof of knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense holding that to determine whether a statement was voluntary the court must consider the totality of all the surrounding circumstances  both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation and decide  whether a defendants will was overborne by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession