matter by asserting that his claims in Miller II “arose and have been continuing to arise out of the same occurrences or transactions and series of occurrences or transactions adversely affecting and interfering with his rights in Nueces County, Texas, during the time period from September 24, 1993 [when Windsor filed the Windsor suit] through the present.” Thus, Miller’s claims in Miller II have the same factual basis as the claims raised in the Windsor suit. Such claims were accordingly required to be asserted as compulsory counterclaims. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 97(a); Getty Oil Co., 845 S.W.2d at 800. Miller is barred by res judicata from relitigating this same subject matter in Miller II. See, e.g., Soto v. Phillips, 836 S.W.2d 266, 268 n. 1 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1992, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). The trial court correctly granted Windsor a
holding that a party may pursue what would be a compulsory counterclaim in a separate lawsuit but that party runs the risk of losing in the initial lawsuit and being bound by that result holding that an injured former employees lawsuit was not barred by res judicata where he never authorized the union to represent his interest in a previous lawsuit over the same benefits recognizing that where first suit is filed in response to notice of a planned lawsuit by the plaintiffs adversary that lawsuit may be dismissed holding res judicata barred plaintiffs derivative suit because of a final judgment in a prior derivative lawsuit holding first lawsuit and allegations in second lawsuit part of same transaction for res judicata purposes even though different theory of recovery and harm alleged in second lawsuit