M., 503 U.S. 347, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 118 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992). The intended effect of the statutory language is at best uncertain because the reference to “any such grounds applied in [Suter ], but not applied in prior Supreme Court decisions” is open to interpretation. However, “the fairest reading of Section 1320a-2 [and 1320a-10] is that Congress was concerned ... that a court should not eviscerate an otherwise enforceable right merely because it appears in a statute mandating that participating states include a particular provision in their state plans.” Messier v. Southbury Training School, 916 F.Supp. 133, 144-45 (D.Conn.1996); see also Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1002-03 (11th Cir.1997). But see LaShawn A. v. Barry, 69 F.3d 556, 568-70 (D.C.Cir.1995), vacated by 87 F.3d 1389 (1996) (<HOLDING>). In light of sections 1320a-2 and 1320a-10,
holding that because buter did not use an approach different from past cases  1320a2  1320a10 are without any effect recognizing that the legislature would not generally use a different meaning for the same word in a legislative provision unless a different purpose was intended holding that an arbitrator was not bound by an earlier award involving a different contract and different union holding that a district court cannot use the psrs factual statements when applying the modified categorical approach holding that the categorical approach applies to  924c