of whether evidence of a conviction for a third degree sexual offense is admissible for impeachment under Rule 5-609, the intermediate appellate court opined that the conviction was not relevant to credibility and thus inadmissible for impeachment purposes: As shown by an examination of section 3-307 of the Criminal Law Article, there are numerous ways that the State can convict a person under that section. The offense can be committed by various assaultive acts (see Section 3-307(a)(1)), but the offense can also be committed by nonassaultive means. See § § 3-307(a)(2), (3), (4), and (5). “[A]cts of violence generally have little, if any, bearing on honesty and veracity.” Prout, 311 Md. at 364, 535 A.2d 445. See also Fulp [v. State], 130 Md.App. [157] at 167[, 745 A.2d 438 (2000)] (<HOLDING>) Likewise, the non-assaultive ways that a
holding that an infamous crime under the arkansas constitution is a crime involving elements of deceit and dishonesty holding that larceny being a felony is an infamous crime holding that the crime of assault with intent to murder was neither an infamous crime nor a crime relevant to the witnesss credibility 130 mdapp at 167 745 a2d 438 holding that counsel did not admit the defendant was guilty of a crime when counsel noted that if the evidence established the commission of any crime that crime was voluntary manslaughter not murder holding that conviction of dueling was not an infamous crime under former state constitutional provision disenfranchising persons convicted of an infamous crime but concluding that the right to hold public office was separate from the right of suffrage