is determined from consideration of the entire contract. McCann v. Glynn Lumber Co., 199 Ga. 669 (34 SE2d 839) (1945). The testimony of both parties shows they intended to establish an education fund to finance their son’s college education. For example, Armistead testified that he consented to the divorce decree, wanted to pay for his son’s college education when he signed the decree, and knew the decree contained a provision for an education fund. Moreover, his low child support obligation appears to have taken into account his agreement to set aside money for his child’s education. Unlike the trial court, we conclude the provision establishing a fund to use for the child’s “educational purposes” is valid and enforceable. Cf. Robinson v. Robinson, 242 Ga. 698 (251 SE2d 287) (1978) (<HOLDING>); Norrell v. Norrell, 236 Ga. 797 (225 SE2d
recognizing that industrial arts teacher with a nineteenyear clean record at the same high school had a property interest protected by the due process clause in his particular assignment to that same high school holding agreement to pay for education expenses after high school not vague holding that in an agreement where the father agreed to pay reasonable expenses to the extent that such expenses are not provided by any scholarship grant or other assistance for his sons education those expenses did not include loan repayment because it was not one of the forms of enumerated assistance holding that an agreement to pay sons college education expenses was nondischargeable support even though arkansas law does not require payment of such expenses holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid