any evidence indicating that the State did not strike white jurors who were victims of crime, which would have created an inference that the State was engaging in a possible discriminatory motive in striking these four black jurors. In Moss v. State, 834 So.2d 135, 142-43 (Ala.Crim.App.2002), this Court stated: “While it is true the striking of one person for a racial reason is a violation of the principles of Batson, and grounds for reversal, see Williams v. State, 548 So.2d 501, 507 (Ala.Crim.App.1988), it is equally true that ‘Merely showing that the challenged party struck one or more members of a particular race is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case.’ Edwards [v. State], 628 So.2d [1021,] 1024 [ (Ala.Crim.App.1993) ]. See also Ex parte Trawick, 698 So.2d 162 (Ala.1997) (<HOLDING>). “ ‘A defendant fails to establish a pri-ma
holding that without more the mere fact that the prosecutor used a high number of strikes to remove women from the venire is insufficient to establish a prima facie case holding that the strike of one hispanic veniremember was insufficient to make out a prima facie case of discrimination where the challenging party failed to show any pattern or any other evidence to the trial court which would raise an inference that the prosecutor used peremptory strikes to remove that veniremember on account of her race holding that the prosecutors use of four of his five peremptory strikes to remove blacks was sufficient to establish a prima facie case holding that a prima facie case of discrimination is not established merely by the number of peremptory strikes against blacks in cases where the percentage of blacks on the empaneled jury is higher than the percentage of the venire pool holding that when the prosecutor articulates reasons for strikes and the trial court makes a ruling on discriminatory intent the question of whether a prima facie case was made is moot