is the one required to shoulder these fees. See id. That is all too clear in a case like this, in which Ms. Mantiply has appealed each and every adverse order to the district court and then to this Court time and again. Having determined that Section 362(k)(l)’s award of attorneys’ fees apply to prosecuting damages actions, we have no trouble concluding that defending that judgment on appeal is also within the statute’s fee-shifting authorization. This Court has held many times that fee-shifting statutes—which Section 362(k) undoubtedly is—entitle parties not only to fees in the court of first instance, but also to appellate fees incurred in defending the judgment. See In re Rosenberg, 779 F.3d at 1265; Thompson v. Pharmacy Corp. of Am., Inc., 334 F.3d 1242, 1245 (11th Cir. 2003) (<HOLDING>); Finch v. City of Vernon, 877 F.2d 1497, 1508
holding that under 42 usc  1988 which allows the award of attorneys fees in a civil rights action under  1983 a prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily recover an attorneys fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust  quoting srep no 941011 p 4 1976 holding that an attorney may recover fees for time spent litigating the award of a 11 usc   1988 fee holding that plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys fees for time spent litigating the fees issue on appeal under title viis attorneys fee provision holding that a contingentfee agreement should not act as a ceiling on the award of attorney fees under 42 usc  1988 holding that the plaintiff could not recover fees for time spent on unsuccessful motions