obligations. Specifically, we stated that inmates received “virtually all the benefit of their § 1983 money judgment when the proceeds were applied to satisfy their restitution debt.” Id. at 661. We find appellees’ attempts to distinguish Beeks to be unpersuasive. Regardless of factual and procedural differences between the cases, the general principle that an inmate whose money is taken and applied toward his court-ordered restitution debt does not suffer from a total deprivation of that money is applicable to both cases. When an inmate leaves prison, he leaves with his restitution debts. Any payment of those debts while the inmate is incarcerated will work to his ultimate benefit. Other courts have followed a similar logic. Cf. Campbell v. Miller, 787 F.2d 217, 222 (7th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1019, 107 S.Ct. 673,
holding that defendants collection of money from plaintiffs account to satisfy restitution order demonstrated only a concerted effort to apply plaintiffs funds to the payment of the criminal judgment entered against him not a conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights holding that prisoners notice of appeal is deemed filed on date he delivered it to prison officials for mailing to court holding constitutional prison officials decision to impound a prisoners account pending his compliance with a restitution order and characterizing the prisoners complaint as a restriction on his freedom to use his funds in a particular way rather than a total deprivation of the money holding that prisoners notice of appeal deemed filed on date he delivered it to prison officials for mailing to court holding that prisoners petition challenging additional two years on prisoners original sentence as a result of the decision of the prison disciplinary board is not subject to section 2244d1