action is no longer required. Without an explicit recognition that we were modifying the doctrine, we can only interpret the case as creating the same exception to the doctrine for childhood sexual abuse cases that other jurisdictions have created. Finally, as Judge Gross noted below, see Ryan, 841 So.2d at 524 (Gross, J., concurring specially), all of the cases cited in S.A.P. involve plaintiffs who were aware of a cause of action during the limitations period. In S.A.P., we cited several district court cases applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel. 835 So.2d at 1097 n. 11. These were the very same cases we cited in Morsani, see 790 So.2d at 1078 n. 21, also discussed above. We also cited federal cases on the issue. S.A.P., 835 So.2d at 1098 n. 12. Again, these were the same 2002) (<HOLDING>). C. The Statute of Limitations While I agree
recognizing that heamdon only created an exception to the statutory limitations on the delayed discovery doctrine and citing the unique and sinister nature of childhood sexual abuse to hold that heamdon is limited to the specific facts in that case recognizing the rule and the exception but holding facts did not support claim to exception recognizing the need for limited jurisdictional discovery to establish exception to the fsia holding that the delayed discovery doctrine applies in situations involving childhood sexual abuse accompanied by traumatic amnesia holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law