25-34. Second, the Government has admitted that it made a mistake in failing to invoke FOIA Exemptions 7(C), 7(D), and 7(F) in the district court, acknowledging that it “did not fulfill its responsibility under FOIA in a timely fashion.” Appellees’ Br. at 12-13. The Government’s behavior in this case, moreover, is far more consistent with simple human error than with the kind of tactical maneuvering we disapproved in Maydak. To begin with, at the time this litigation commenced, Maydak had not yet been decided, and under then-governing law, the Government might quite plausibly have believed that it could rely solely on Exemption 7(A) without reviewing its voluminous investigative file on August to determine whether other exemptions might apply. See Senate of Puerto Rico, 823 F.2d at 581 (<HOLDING>). Indeed, Maydak was not decided until well
holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its ruling whether to proceed with a declaratory judgment action holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in changing the surname of the child where the court made factual findings that the name change would be in the best interest of the child holding that the district courts decision whether to remand for further proceedings or payment of benefits is discretionary and is subject to review for abuse of discretion holding that the decision whether to apply the exhaustion requirement in an erisa case is committed to the district courts sound discretion but that the district court abused its discretion by not dismissing the suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the government to invoke other foia exemptions after its initial reliance on 7a collapsed and leaving open the question of whether the conclusion of lawenforcement proceedings constitutes a substantial change in the factual context of the case sufficient to invoke an appellate courts section 2106 discretion to remand