without power to modify child support arrearages directly, it should be equally unable to do so by restricting execution on those judgments. See Smith v. Smith, 797 S.W.2d 798, 800-801 (Mo.App. 1990) (“A party in whose favor a judgment has been rendered may have an execution. ... Husband, in his petition to quash [the writ of execution], in effect sought to relitigate the division of property made by the trial court. As the trial court determined, this was an improper ‘collateral attack upon the judgment.’ ”). The superior court was not permitted to consider Demers’s good faith in reducing his arrearages to judgment; restricting CSED’s ability to execute the judgment based upon Demers’s good faith is accordingly impermissible. See Hooks v. Hooks, 13 Kan.App.2d 105, 762 P.2d 846 (1988) (<HOLDING>). CSED submitted the required documentation of
holding trial court lacked authority to impose electronic monitoring condition and deleting the provision as a condition of applicants deferred adjudication probation holding that the district court lacked authority to enforce a foreign judgment where the plaintiff filed only an affidavit describing the foreign judgment and not a certified copy of the judgment itself in the first instance holding that in the absence of statutory authority trial court lacked discretion to condition execution of childsupport judgment upon regular payments towards the arrearages holding that a foreign judgment for alimony and child support arrearages was not subject to attack in wyoming except on grounds that would permit attack upon any other money judgment such as want of jurisdiction in the court entering the judgment or lack of service so as to vest jurisdiction over the defendant holding that the trial court lacked authority to renew spousal support payments pursuant to a motion that was filed after the expiration of time during which spousal support was required to be paid under the original judgment