of Rule 16a6-(a), and has no bearing on whether an option not presently exercisable due to an implied condition precedent falls within the exemption. 5 . Our holding has indirect support in the case law interpreting the meaning of “sale” for purposes of § 16(b) of the Act. See, e.g., Colan v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 812 F.2d 357, 368 (7th Cir.) (describing a secret agreement guaranteeing an investor corporation the right to sell its shares at the time of a delayed merger as akin to a “formal option agreement,” and holding that there was no "sale" at the time of the posited agreement where significant conditions precedent to the merger had not yet been satisfied), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820, 108 S.Ct. 79, 98 L.Ed.2d 42 (1987); Portnoy v. Revlon, Inc., 650 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir.1981)
holding that neither a letter of intent nor a merger agreement constituted a contract to sell shares within the meaning of  16b where the agreement did not irrevocably bind the party to exchange its stock because there existed unfulfilled conditions precedent that could have blocked the merger holding that a claim for breach of a provision in a merger agreement arises from the purchase or sale of the debtors securities holding that court had no supplemental jurisdiction over claim by shareholder for breach of merger agreement that was the subject of the dispute between the merger partners over which the district court had subject matter jurisdiction holding that plaims for breach of a merger agreement arise from the purchase or sale of debtors securities holding that in the context of a rule 10b5 claim when the merger was approved and the exchange of securities occurred the owner of stock had in effect purchased a new security and paid for it by turning in his old one