would have it, transmission of such notice would be all that is required to exercise the right of rescission. The problem with this argument is that, in a significant number of instances, the remedial economy of the remedy would be jeopardized. See Kull, supra, at 577. Specifically, it is self-evident that when a borrower who has provided notice to a creditor decides later — at some unknown, and perhaps distant, point in the future— to effectuate the rescission right through judicial process, the underlying circumstances in no small number of cases are likely to have changed significantly. Just to provide one example: new actors may have come onto the field post-transaction and obtained some interest in the loan or the underlying property. Cf. Beach, 523 U.S. at 418-19, 118 S.Ct. 1408 (<HOLDING>). And, as a consequence of this reality,
recognizing that tilas statute of repose acts to limit the clouding of a propertys title holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute holding that statute of repose acts as an outer limit or ceiling within which all suits must be brought holding that the 3year limit is a period of repose holding that provision has the characteristics of a statute of repose