inter alia, that the jury could believe or disregard Dr. Fitzgerald’s testimony as it could for any witness. Simmons’ jury-usurpation contention overlooks Dr. Fitzgerald’s related testimony: “I never give testimony as to whether or not a rape did or did not occur”. Simmons also does not mention the district court’s instructing the jury it could discredit any witness’ testimony. Even viewed in isolation, however, Dr. Fitzgerald’s testimony did not impermissibly intrude upon the jury’s determination of Robinson’s credibility. Mental-health experts are permitted to testify that “symptoms and recollections appear[] genuine and that [the expert believes she or] he ha[s] not been ‘duped’” by a fabricated account. Skidmore v. Precision Printing & Pkg., Inc., 188 F.3d 606, 618 (5th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). As in Skidmore, Dr. Fitzgerald stated
holding district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting psychiatrists testimony that plaintiff suffered posttraumatic stress disorder and that he did not think the plaintiff had lied to him or fabricated her psychiatric symptoms holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a transcript of a recording even though defense counsel did not stipulate to its accuracy holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting gangrelated evidence holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of a witness that was not highly probative