actually occurs prior to an incident is not conclusive on the question of whether the defendant knew or should have known that the condition created an unreasonable risk of harm. See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Scamardo, 673 S.W.2d 371, 373 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ). When there is evidence of notice to a property owner or operator of a prior similar occurrence — here, evidence of Marshall’s knowledge of a near fall attributable to the same condition — such evidence is probative as to the question of notice. See Klorer, 717 S.W.2d at 760. We conclude that the record contained more than a scintilla of evidence that Sabine and Northwest had notice of the alleged defect. See Tex. S. Univ. v. Gilford, 277 S.W.3d 65, 70-71 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>); see also Klorer v. Block, 717 S.W.2d 754, 760
holding that evidence of prior complaints raised fact question regarding defendants actual knowledge holding it is a question of fact holding that estoppel was a question of fact holding that actual apportionment of damages is a question of fact holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact