to the plaintiff, the temporal proximity between the official’s act and the injury, and the clear traceability of the injury to the official’s conduct. The facts here are markedly different: the plaintiffs have alleged that Wojcik and Savage violated Pauluk’s constitutional rights by moving him into a municipal building where he was exposed to toxic mold over the course of several years — along with countless other employees, including the defendants. Wojcik and Savage’s decision to reassign Pauluk more closely resembles the cases in which this court has declined to find a cognizable due process violation due to the unforeseeable nature of the' plaintiffs’ injuries and the fact that the danger facing the plaintiff existed independent of state action. See, e.g., Patel, 648 F.3d at 976 (<HOLDING>); Huffman v. County of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d
holding that a seventeenyearold student lacked the capacity to consent to engage in sexual conduct with a teacher and consequently her allegations of a seeminglyconsensual sexual relationship with the teacher were sufficient to state a  1983 claim based on a violation of substantive due process holding that a teacher could not sue as a representative of her students under unruh holding no rational fact finder could conclude that a teacher acted with deliberate indifference to her students wellbeing because the teacher did not know there was any immediate danger in allowing the plaintiff to briefly use the nextdoor bathroom alone holding that sexual molestation of students by teacher is presumed to result in physical injury holding that a school acted impermissibly when a public school teacher was not rehired because allegedly he had relayed to a radio station the substance of a memorandum relating to teacher dress and appearance