because the complaint seeks only an injunction against future enforcement of the helmet law. Any past injury suffered by the plaintiffs does not give them standing to enjoin future enforcement of the helmet law. Insofar as the complaint seeks an injunction against future enforcement of the helmet law based on the possible vague application of the law to the individual plaintiffs, such a claim is not ripe for review. Where there are insufficient facts to determine the vagueness of a law as applied, the issue is not ripe for adjudication. See Freedom to Travel Campaign v. Newcomb, 82 F.3d 1431, 1441 (9th Cir.1996) (concluding that vagueness of one provision of a regulation was not ripe for review due to insufficient facts); Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025, 1033 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>), cert. granted, — U.S. —, 116 S.Ct. 2521, 135
holding that the act violates neither separation of powers nor principles of due process by allowing a victim veto that precludes application of the act as well as holding that the act is not void for vagueness and does not constitute a form of cruel or unusual punishment holding that the statute of limitations in a criminal case is a nonjurisdictional affirmative defense that is waived if not raised in the trial court holding as brady violation prosecutions failure to disclose to defense that prosecution had agreed not to prosecute key witness in exchange for his testimony at trial holding that in an action for malicious prosecution the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages not only for his unlawful arrest and imprisonment but also for expenses of his defense holding that the vagueness of brady handgun act not ripe for adjudication in suit for injunction but could be raised as a defense in the case of an unlikely criminal prosecution of law enforcement agents