bargaining agreement. Vernon specifically acknowledges that he was a probationary employee at the time of his removal and in his appeal to the Board, disavowed having any claim under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-353 (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 4301 et seq.) or any claim under the Whistle-blower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12,103 Stat. 16. The Board has jurisdiction over appeals from certain agency personnel decisions pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7701(a), which provides that “an e risdiction to reach the merits of any of Vernon’s claims, including both the claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the claims based on collective bargaining agreements. See Pervez v. Dep’t of the Navy, 193 F.3d 1371 (Fed.Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). The only other way that the Board may
holding that a schoolteacher elected by the school board was an employee not an official and therefore entitled to benefits under the workers compensation act holding that an employer did not regard an employee with an impaired ankle as disabled where it encouraged her to work in a position that required walking holding that a prima facie cases was established where the plaintiff offered evidence showing that 1 the majority of her responsibilities were not eliminated but transferred to an employee outside of the protected class and 2 the employee was not offered to remain in her position holding that the petitioner was not entitled to the protections of 5 usc  7511a1 and 7513 because under  7511a1a the temporary status of his position in the competitive service prevented him from qualifying as an employee holding that as an individual with a probationary position in the competitive service the petitioner was not an employee and therefore the board had no jurisdiction at all over her appeal