at 374; Stephens, 610 S.E.2d at 144. In short, some cases (which could be distinguished) suggest that Smith’s statement to Officer Hammock could support a terroristic threats charge and some cases (which could be distinguished) suggest that it could not. A reasonable officer could come to either conclusion. As a result, even if Detective Israel was wrong to conclude that Smith’s statement demonstrated intent to communicate under Georgia’s ter-roristic threats statute, his error was a reasonable mistake of law. And a reasonable mistake of law does not destroy probable cause. Cahaly v. Larosa, 796 F.3d 399, 408 (4th Cir. 2015) (“[Officers may have probable cause based on reasonable mistakes of law.”). Cf. Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 530, 536-540, 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014) (<HOLDING>). As a result, Smith’s alleged statements would
holding this framework applies whether the traffic stop is based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion holding that a traffic stop is valid under the fourth amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring holding that an officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop even when his suspicion that a law has been violated is based on a reasonable mistake of law holding that a police officer may stop a driver where the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion regarding the commission of a civil traffic violation holding that an officers reasonable mistake of law can give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a traffic stop under the fourth amendment