and did not appear to Surkin to be impaired or unable to understand the conversation. The District Court did not err in finding that Kelly had the capacity to enter into the settlement. See Sobel v. Sobel, 435 Pa. 80, 254 A.2d 649, 651 (1969) (explaining that a person’s mental capacity is best determined by his spoken words and his conduct, as well as the testimony of persons who observed such conduct on that date). Kelly further argues that he did not authorize Surkin to convey the settlement offer to Boeing. As the District Court found, the testimony at the eviden-tiary hearing clearly showed that Kelly expressly authorized Surkin to convey a settlement offer of $225,000 to Boeing and that Boeing accepted. See Covington v. Cont’l Gen. Tire, Inc., 381 F.3d 216, 221 (3d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Kelly’s subsequent refusal to execute the
holding that the governments attorney had the implicit authority to bind the government although the contracting officer had the express authority holding that ambiguous agreement between attorney and client must be construed in the clients favor holding attorney must have express authority to settle a clients claims holding an attorney violated his duty of candor to the tribunal by changing his clients interrogatory answers without the clients knowledge holding that a suspended attorney should not be permitted to have contact with clients