foreclosure.” Tex.R. Crv. P. 735.3. Indeed, a Rule 736 order allowing a foreclosure to proceed “is without prejudice and has no res judicata, collateral estoppel, estoppel by judgment, or other effect in any other judicial, proceeding.” Tex.R. Civ, P. 736.9. Thus, a lender may abandon acceleration even after receiving a non-judicial foreclosure order under Rule 736. See Biedryck v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 01-14-00017-CV, 2015 WL 2228447, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 12, 2015, no pet.) (describing Rule 736 as “merely providing] a procedural device to obtain authorization to proceed with the remedy of foreclosure”); see also Snowden v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., No. H-14-2963, 2015 WL 5123436, at *3 (S.D.Tex. Aug. 31, 2015) (citing Biedryck, 2015 WL 2228447, at *5) (<HOLDING>). Under the rule established in Boren, the Bank
holding that a failure to comply with the foreclosure statutes invalidates a foreclosure sale holding that the existence of an acceleration clause need never be disclosed holding that after a judgment entry grants a decree of foreclosure and order of sale the foreclosure action cannot be dismissed as the judgment is final holding that a lender may abandon acceleration even after obtaining a rule 736 order allowing foreclosure holding that a debtor may cure a default after acceleration but expressing no limit on the right