based on a statutory interpretation that was inconsistent with an intervening decision of the Supreme Court). As the Second Circuit’s traditional understanding of Wilko and § 10 — that Wilko endorsed manifest disregard and that § 10’s grounds are not exclusive — is inconsistent with the basis for the holding in Hall Street, the Court finds that the manifest disregard of the law standard is no longer good law. Even assuming arguendo that “manifest disregard” remains a viable doctrine, “the reach of [this] doctrine is ‘severely limited.’ ” Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 202 (2d Cir.1998) (citations omitted). In fact, even a court convinced that an arbitrator incorrectly applied the law is not free to vacate the award. See Wallace v. Buttar, 378 F.3d 182, 190 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Rather, vacatur for manifest disregard of the
holding that an order remanding an arbitration award is not a final appealable order when the order does not also vacate the arbitration award holding that arbitration award is binding on the parties holding the appellate court must presume adequate evidence to support the award when appellant sought to vacate the award based on gross mistake with no transcript of the arbitration proceedings holding that because the federal arbitration act provides that requests for relief should be made by motion rather than by filing a complaint the rules of notice pleading provided for in fedrcivp 8 do not apply to a proceeding to vacate an arbitration award holding that a federal court cannot vacate an arbitral award merely because it is convinced that the arbitration panel made the wrong call on the law