“[A]n action can ‘affect’ the exercise of powers by an agency without being aimed directly at [the agency].” Hindes v. FDIC, 137 F.3d 148, 160 (3d Cir.1998). In Hindes, the Third Circuit held that the protections afforded to receivers in § 1821(j) extend to third parties. In rejecting the argument that § 1821(j) does not apply to a non-FDIC third party, the court stated, “the statute, by its terms, can preclude relief even against a third party, including the FDIC in its corporate capacity, where the result is such that the relief ‘restraints] or affect[s] the exercise of powers or functions of the [FDIC] as a conservator or a receiver.’ ” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j)). Cf. Telematics Int’l, Inc. v. NEMLC Leasing Corp., 967 F.2d 703, 707 (1st Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). We agree with the reasoning in Hindes and
holding that defendant defrauded fdic when actions diluted value of fdics security interest thereby being likely to frustrate and impair the fdics ability to realize the benefit of the interest holding that section 363f applies only to in rem interests which have attached to the property by way of either the debtors consent to a security interest or the creditors attachment of the property resulting in a lien holding that the doench doctrine protects the fdic even where the fdic does not have an interest in an asset holding that  1821j applied to bar a claim seeking to attach a lien to a certificate of deposit in which the fdic had a security interest because the attachment would ultimately have an effect upon the fdics exercise of its powers as receiver holding that while section 1825b2 does not extinguish an earlier lien or excuse the payment of a tax by the fdic it does deny the ability to use a lien on fdic property as a vehicle for collection of delinquent tax