In order to exhaust his claim based on the mandatory minimum, Wardell needed to “properly raisef ]” it in the state courts. Judd, 250 F.3d at 1313 (emphasis added). He did not do so when he made his claim based on the 85% rule. This case is indistinguishable from Kelley v. Secretary for Department of Corrections, where we ruled that a habeas petitioner had not exhausted the claim for ineffective assistance of counsel that he attempted to raise on federal habeas where he had not mentioned the same ineffectiveness theory in his Florida Rule 3.850 motion. 377 F.3d 1317, 1350 (11th Cir. 2004). This was true even though there was some testimony on that theory at his Rule 3.850 hearing. Id.; see also Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S.Ct. 1056, 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 380 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Because Warden’s claim is now clearly
holding that a petitioner does not fairly present his claim where the claim has been presented for the first and only time in a procedural context in which its merits will not ordinarily be considered holding that this court will not address the merits of an issue presented for the first time in a reply brief holding where a claim is presented for the first and only time in a procedural context in which the merits are not likely to be considered unless there are special and important reasons the petition is not exhausted holding that a claim not raised before the trial court will not be considered for the first time on appeal holding that ordinarily courts are not obligated to review evidence presented for the first time on appeal