sexual assault victims.” Id. at 1026. Conversely, in People v. Spicola, the New York Court of Appeals recently held “the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he allowed the expert to testify about CSAAS [Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome] to rehabilitate the boy’s credibility.” 16 N.Y.3d 441, 922 N.Y.S.2d 846, 947 N.E.2d 620, 635 (2011). Significantly, here, the State offered the challenged expert testimony in its case in chief against Dudley, not in rebuttal. Spi-cola is therefore distinguishable. But, the observation of the Spicola dissent (concluding that allowing an expert to connect general characteristics to a specific complainant is equivalent to bolstering the victim’s credibility and is therefore inadmissible); State v. Foret, 628 So.2d 1116, 1130 (La.1993) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. La-Caprucia, 41 Mass.App.Ct.
holding trial court was proper in admitting a doctors testimony that a delay between the occurrence of an incident of child sexual abuse and the childs revelation of the incident was the usual pattern of conduct for victims of child sexual abuse holding that an expert testifying to child sexual abuse symptoms must limit the testimony to general characteristics that cannot directly concern the particular victims holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse holding that the testimony of an expert witness is admissible when the witness outlines the general characteristics of sexually abused children and then states that the victims symptoms are consistent with those characteristics holding that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing expert testimony that directly linked the characteristics of sexually abused children to the complainants in this case