not carried the initial burden of establishing either proper cause or a change of circumstances, the trial court is not authorized by statute to revisit an otherwise valid prior custody decision and engage in a reconsideration of the statutory best interest factors. ’ [Emphasis added.]” These initial steps to changing custody — finding a “change of circumstance or proper cause” and not changing an “established custodial environment” without clear and convincing evidence — are intended to “erect a barrier against removal of a child from an established custodial environment and to minimize unwarranted and disruptive changes of custody orders.” Heid v AAASulewski (After Remand), 209 Mich App 587, 593; 532 NW2d 205 (1995). See also Foskett v Foskett, 247 Mich App 1, 6; 634 NW2d 363 (2001) (<HOLDING>). The movant, of course, has the burden of
recognizing the compelling need to give a measure of finality to custody decrees in order to ensure a more stable environment for the child holding that the failure to attach a custody order was not reversible error because there was no showing of prejudice where there was no indication that the respondent was unaware of the placement or custody of the children at any time the motion to terminate stated that dss was given legal custody of the minor children and the record included a copy of an order in effect when the motion was filed that awarded dss custody of the children recognizing the legislatures intent in enacting the child custody act was to prevent the removal of children from established custodial environments  except in the most compelling cases  quoting braver v baker 411 mich 567 577 309 nw2d 532 1981 holding that the uccja applied to a california child custody order granting temporary custody of two children to their father holding that in cases of ambiguity we may resort to subsequent amendments in order to glean the legislatures intent