and counter-intuitive action in ordering Green back into the truck — where he would have access to the very weapon that allegedly serves as the basis for Abrego’s concerns about his own safety — result in our conclusion that he did not possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant him in believing that Green was dangerous and had in his truck a weapon that he could gain immediate control of. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1049, 103 S.Ct. at 3480; State v. Thirty Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Dollars and no/100, 136 S.W.3d 392, 402-03 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2004, pet. denied); Horton, 16 S.W.3d at 853-54; cf. Ramsey v. State, 806 S.W.2d 954, 958 (Tex.App.-Austin 1991, pet. ref d) (<HOLDING>); cf also Tasby v. State, 111 S.W.3d 178
holding that plaintiffs who were in the car during car accident could recover for emotional damages because they were within zone of danger holding that officer had specific and articulable facts warranting reasonable belief that defendant posed danger if he were permitted to reenter his car because defendant had tried to hide shaving kit from officer and that officer acted reasonably in taking preventive measures to ensure there were no weapons within defendants grasp before allowing him to return to car holding officer may search vehicle for weapons if officer has reasonable belief based on articulable facts that officer or another may be in danger holding that a police officer may order an individual out of his car and frisk him for weapons if there is a reasonable belief that the individual is armed and dangerous holding warrants check on passenger before officer inquired as to registered owner of suspected stolen car was unreasonable because officer had not formed reasonable articulable suspicion that defendant was engaged in any criminal activity