mandatory rather than precatory terms: it states that plans “must” provide for assistance that “shall” be delivered with reasonable promptness. See § 1396a(a)(8). Finally, the Medicaid Act does not explicitly forbid recourse to § 1983. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 521, 110 S.Ct. 2510. Nor does the Act impliedly forbid such recourse: although the Act provides that states should adopt a fair hearing process, the Act does not contain a “comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under § 1983.” Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341, 117 S.Ct. 1353 (emphases added). The statute merely req 2510. We note that three circuits have engaged in similar analysis of § 1396a(a)(8) and reached the same conclusion. See Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 183 (3rd Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Bryson v. Shimway, 308 F.3d 79, 88-89 (1st
holding that  1396aa8 is enforceable by medicaid recipients under  1983 holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 holding that an analysis based upon gonzaga blessing and other cases compels the conclusion that the provisions invoked by plaintiffs 42 usc  1396aa8 1396aa10 and 1396da15  unambiguously confer rights vindicable under  1983 holding that person in 42 usc  1983 does not include states holding that the state law of collateral estoppel applies in civil rights actions brought under 42 usc  1983