The court ultimately concluded, however, that the danger Mendoza posed to the community — evidenced by the fact that, despite his relatively young age (twenty-five), Mendoza had a history of using aliases, two convictions for driving while impaired, and a prior conviction for assault with a deadly weapon — trumped any leniency that these factors might otherwise support. Thus, the court opined that an upward variance was necessary to protect the public from any further crime Mendoza may commit. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C). We thus conclude the district court’s well-reasoned explanation amply justified the extent of the variance it imposed. Because there was no abuse of discretion in the district court’s reasoning in this case, we will defer to it. See Diosdado-Star, 630 F.3d at 366-67 (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d
holding sentencing courts decision to impose a sentence six years longer than advisory guidelines range was reasonable because district court employed  3553based reasoning to justify the variance holding sentence within properly calculated advisory guidelines range is presumptively reasonable holding a sentence within the advisory guidelines range is presumptively reasonable holding that district courts decision to exceed the advisory sentencing range in chapter 7 of the sentencing guidelines ussg  7b14 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion holding booker error is avoided when district court calculates proper guidelines sentencing range treats guidelines as advisory and imposes reasonable sentence