as part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The Eleventh Circuit has held that this section mandates exhaustion of a prisoner’s administrative remedies and that courts no longer have discretion to waive the exhaustion 1999) (same); Johnson v. Garraghty, 57 F.Supp.2d 321 (E.D.Va.1999) (same); Beeson v. Fishkill Correctional Facility, 28 F.Supp.2d 884 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (same); Moore v. Smith, 18 F.Supp.2d 1360 (N.D.Ga.1998) (same); with Wright v. Dee, 54 F.Supp.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (<HOLDING>); White v. Fauver, 19 F.Supp.2d 305
holding that excessive force claims are to be treated under the fourth amendment recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different holding that excessive force claims are not subject to exhaustion requirement holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim holding exhaustion requirement inapplicable when requiring exhaustion would be futile