not actionable as a tortious misrepresentation of facts. Thus, a claim of equitable estoppel lies in tort, whereas a claim of promissory estoppel lies in contract. Id. at 716 (citations omitted). Thus, DeLo-zier’s claim was contractual and was not barred by the CGIA. Id. As Berg and DeLozier illustrate, a claim that is supported by allegations of misrepresentation or fraud is likely a claim that could lie in tort. See Berg, 919 P.2d at 259; DeLozier, 917 P.2d at 716-17; see also Patzer v. City of Loveland, 80 P.3d 908, 912 (Colo.App.2003) (explaining that a claim that is based not on a promised performance in the future, but rather on an alleged misrepresentation of facts is fundamentally a tort claim barred by the CGIA); Lehman v. City of Louisville, 857 P.2d 455, 457 (Colo.App.1992) (<HOLDING>). In sum, these eases apply our general rule
holding that a ttca claim based on an officers allegedly negligent use of his service weapon was a claim for intentional tort not negligence holding that when the essence of the claim is either negligent or intentional misrepresentation the claim could lie in tort holding negligent misrepresentation sufficient holding estoppel claim could not lie in tort where the facts that support the claim could not support a claim for fraud or misrepresentation holding that although the form of relief alone does not govern the categorization of a claim as a tort or other type of action a trial court must consider the nature of the relief sought to determine whether a particular claim lies in tort or could lie in tort