of driving on 12 additional days per month, and a 60-mile increase in a daily commute are not “objectively intolerable” changes in the terms and conditions of employment, what makes the 120-mile transfer in the present case an adverse employment action? See Darnell, 731 F.Supp. at 1313; Policastro, 297 F.3d at 538. And if the transfer had been to a location, say, 40 miles away, would the change in Keeton’s employment status still be “materially adverse”? Kocsis, 97 F.3d at 885; see Sanchez, 164 F.3d at 532 (finding no adverse employment action despite a potential 35-minute increase in commuting time); Spring, 865 F.2d at 885 (finding no adverse employment action where increased travel time to work was the only negative consequence of an employee’s transfer); Nelson, 2 Fed.Appx. at 433 (<HOLDING>). When, in other words, would a reasonable
holding that a 60mile increase in commuting distance did not constitute an adverse employment action where the employee retained the same job title salary and benefits holding that a job transfer was not an adverse employment action because the plaintiff enjoyed the same  rate of pay and benefits and her duties were not materially modified holding that a transfer of job duties can constitute an adverse employment action holding that removal of job responsibility did not constitute an adverse employment action because there was no change in the plaintiffs job position grade pay or benefits holding that change in employment assignment that inter alia increased onthejob commuting time was not an adverse employment action