tribunals as sources of customary international law. But see In re Apartheid, 346 F.Supp.2d at 549-50 (finding that these tribunals are not binding sources of international law). In Sosa, the Supreme Court held that the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights did not establish the existence of binding customary international law because the Declaration did “not of its own force impose obligations as a matter of international law.” 124 S.Ct. at 2767. The Sosa Court also held that the U.N. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was not a source of binding international law because, even though it was ratified, it was done so “on the express understanding that it was not self-executing” and did not create any enforceable obligations. Id.See also Flores, 343 F.3d at 162 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis in original). The Nuremberg trials
holding that claims are related if they involve a common core of facts or they are based on related legal theories holding that treaties which are entitled conventions or covenants are proper evidence of customary international law because and insofar as they create legal obligations  holding that restrictive covenants are not favored by the law and should be strictly construed as they are an interference with an owners free and full enjoyment of his property holding that that choices as to selection and arrangement are entitled to copyright protection only so long as they are made independently holding that arguments that are not raised or that are not accompanied by factual and legal support are deemed waived