when they really mean that no violation has occurred. In particular, the antitrust injury element of standing demands that the plaintiffs alleged injury result from the threat to competition that underlies the alleged violation. A court seeing no threat to competition in a rule-of-reason case may then deny that the plaintiff has suffered antitrust injury and dismiss the suit for lack of standing. Such a ruling would be erroneous, for the absence of any threat to competition means that no violation has occurred and that even suit by the government— which enjoys automatic standing — must be dismissed. Id. at 306 (quoting Levine v. Central Fla. Med. Affiliates, Inc., 72 F.3d 1538, 1545 (11th Cir.1996)); accord Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 184 F.3d 268, 275 n. 2 (3rd Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Because the defendants’ analysis too narrowly
holding district court erred by incorporating issue of anticompetitive market effect into its standing analysis confusing antitrust injury with an element of a claim under section 1 of the sherman act and stating district courts approach may have been result of the similar antitrust injury label applied to injury component of antitrust standing analysis and to marketplace harm element under section 1 holding that an antitrust injury is an injury that is attributable to an anticompetitive aspect of the practice under scrutiny holding that a plaintiff must show antitrust injury in order to bring an antitrust lawsuit holding that an antitrust injury is a necessary element of a  2 claim holding that there must be a causal connection between the alleged antitrust violation and the antitrust injury for there to be antitrust standing