Faretta and McKaskle. In my view, that issue should be reached, if required, after the relevant facts are fully determined. I cannot join the majority, in part, because it insists on elaborating on such issues prematurely. See Majority Opinion at 741 (“Frantz’s exclusion resulted in a complete silencing of Frantz’s voice on the matters.”) (emphasis added). If the majority is suggesting that Frantz could not use Lamb at the bench conference, then that position misinterprets the permissible role of a standby counsel, who may handle any duties delegated by a self-representing defendant. Instead, the defendant is representing himself or herself when he or she delegates a task to a standby counsel and assents to being assisted to that extent. We should keep in mind that b th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384,
holding that trial court abused its discretion in summarily denying defendants request to have standby counsel conduct his closing argument holding that trial court erred in denying defendants request to allow standby counsel to conduct voir dire where there was no indication that the trial court considered the koehler factors or that granting the request would have disrupted or delayed the trial holding that the district court did not err by refusing to allow the defendant to absent himself from the trial at which his identification would be an integral issue recognizing where standby counsel was initially restricted to procedural matters only and selfrepresenting defendant suddenly decided to absent himself from court room at the outset of trial that standby counsels role could be extended to include a substantive discussion of the implications of waiving his right to be present at his own trial holding that defendants constitutional right to be present at all stages of his trial does not arise before the trial begins