and vicarious liability, erroneously used a general verdict form rather than one posing specific interrogatories, and improperly admitted certain evidence. We have considered and rejected these arguments, which are either too insubstantial for extended discussion or are waived because the club omitted them from its opening brief and raised them only in its reply brief. See, e.g., World Wide Minerals, Ltd. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 296 F.3d 1154, 1160 (D.C.Cir.2002). 4 . We also reject the club's argument that Bates' testimony did not meet the standard of admissibility announced in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150, 152, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) (<HOLDING>). 5 . In its reply brief, the Zei Club changed
recognizing that an expert may rely on an article because it is the expert who determines based on study and experience whether the article is reliable holding that in some cases the relevant reliability concerns may focus upon personal knowledge or experience and that the trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding  how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable holding experts experience knowledge and training is considered in determining reliability holding that the judge and jury may rely upon common knowledge and experience without proof holding that psychologists testimony on the reliability of eyewitness testimony was both relevant and reliable and thus should have been admitted