murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide. -U.S. at-, 132 S.Ct. at 2048, 182 L.Ed.2d at 941. 12 . In fact, some of the Amici in Blueford sought adoption of a per se rule requiring trial judges to take partial verdicts wherever any unanimity exists as a prerequisite to a finding of manifest necessity as to the remaining counts — in effect, requiring even states that do not permit partial verdicts in certain circumstances to accept them. See, e.g., Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Blueford v. Arkansas, - U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2044, 182 L.Ed.2d 937 (2012). 13 . The majority of jurisdictions accepting partial verdicts are in accord with this interpretation. See, e.g., Wallace v. Havener, 552 F.2d 721, 723 (6th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>); Daniels v. Burt, 895 F.Supp. 180, 184
holding that the trial court plainly erred in failing to provide a specific unanimity instruction to the jury holding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in declining to instruct the jury regarding a partial verdict where the judges examination of the tentative verdict sheets revealed no indication of jury unanimity holding that the trial judge abused his discretion in not accepting partial verdicts as to counts on which the jury indicated unanimity recognizing the range of discretion of the trial judge holding that trial judge should have granted new trial rather than judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the judge could not know in what order the jury reached its inconsistent verdicts