Taylor had not used both terms together; the prosecution conflated two separate remarks from the same conversation. HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. A death sentence is “unique [among criminal sentences] in its ... irrevocability,” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (plurality opinion), which makes it, of course, the “most severe punishment,” Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 16 utional if a defendant’s crimes “cannot be said to have reflected a consciousness materially more depraved than that of any person guilty of murder.” (Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (<HOLDING>). The “underlying principle that the death
holding that the fact that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal holding that the culpability of the average murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction available holding that monetary sanction was not supportable as a compensatory civil contempt sanction because there was no proof of the amount of loss holding that the denial of the motions for summary judgment precludes a sanction on the ground that the claims against them were legally insufficient and that a sanction is generally improper where a successful motion could have avoided any additional legal expenses by defendants emphasis in original holding that parole status alone is insufficient to justify search of a parolee