by sufferance of the State for a considerable period of time. And although no tenancy under property concepts was thereby created, we think that this long acquiescence by the government has given rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of the [squatters], at least with respect to the interior of the building itself. Id. at 640. In addition to those courts which have invoked policy grounds to deny standing to “squatters,” other courts have merely questioned whether a squatter could have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises searched. See Amezquita v. Hernandez-Colon, 518 F.2d 8, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1975) (stating that squatters on public land could not avail themselves of Fourth Amendment protection); State v. Gilmore, 324 Mont. 488, 104 P.3d 1051, 1055 (2004) (<HOLDING>); State v. Cruz, 15 Kan.App.2d 476, 809 P.2d
holding that trespasser did not have expectation of privacy in bedroom where he did not pay rent and had been asked to leave holding that a lessee of a home could not consent to a search of a bedroom that was used exclusively by a temporary gratuitous guest because the guest had an expectation of privacy in the bedroom holding that a landlords acceptance of rent turned a trespasser to a tenant at sufferance holding that defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in statements made to companion while seated in police car holding that a defendants sister could consent to a search of only the common areas of their shared house and her own bedroom and explicitly stating that the sister could not consent to search the defendants bedroom because the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her own bedroom