beyond its borders. In re Ginther, 282 B.R. 16, 19 (Bankr.D.Kan.2002); In re Peters, 91 B.R. 401, 403 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1988). Both Illinois and Michigan statutes are without extraterritorial effect absent clear legislative intent. See Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 216 Ill.2d 100, 296 Ill.Dec. 448, 835 N.E.2d 801, 852 (2005); Sexton v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 413 Mich. 406, 320 N.W.2d 843, 854-55 (1982). Various bankruptcy courts have prohibited debtors from applying the exemption laws of their domicile state to property located beyond that state’s boundaries. See, e.g., In re Sipka, 149 B.R. 181, 182-83 (D.Kan.1992); Ginther, 282 B.R. at 19-20; In re Peters, 91 B.R. 401, 413 (Bankr.W.D.Tex. 1988). But see Arrol v. Broach (In re Arrol), 170 F.3d 934, 936-37 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); In re Stratton, 269 B.R. 716, 718-19 (Bankr.
holding that the general rule is that temporary absence from the premises will not itself cause an abandonment of the homestead but to retain the homestead exemption one leaving the homestead must in good faith intend to return albeit the intent to return need not be at any particular time in the future holding that california law permitted the application of a homestead exemption to property located outside the state holding that the general homestead exemption may not be invoked to defeat claims against the holder for taxes and assessments against the homestead property holding that a wife could claim a homestead exemption even though she only had a beneficiary interest in the property held in trust holding that homestead exemption was unavailable even though claimants were  living on the land and claiming it as homestead with the permission or acquiescence of the owner for they could have no homestead right or interest in land to which they had no title