its inability to agree, the law must afford defendant the benefit of the final non-unanimous verdict that might have been returned absent the coercion. Having erroneously been deprived of a substantial opportunity to receive a jury verdict resulting in imprisonment rather than death, the defendant may not be subject to another capital sentencing proceeding. We recognize that any reversible error in a capital case may be said in some sense to have deprived a defendant of the opportunity to receive a jury verdict resulting in imprisonment, and that nevertheless the usual and proper remedy for such errors is reversal of the death sentence and a retrial of the sentencing proceeding in which the defendant may again face the death penalty. See State v. Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. at 67 (<HOLDING>). But a Czachor error is critically different
holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty holding that defendant may be subject to death penalty on resentencing holding that if a trial court has rejected death as a possible sentence double jeopardy bars the state from seeking the death penalty at resentencing even where rejection of the death sentence was based on a legal error holding that resentencing is required