when he has attained a position of safety from the immediate threat.’” Reese, 272 N.W.2d at 866 (quoting People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal.App.3d 823, 831-32, 118 Cal.Rptr. 110, 115 (1974)). Thus, we implicitly recognized that escapees have a continuing duty to turn themselves in after escaping. See id. at 870 (McCormick, J., dissenting) (observing that the majority’s definition of the necessity defense “makes unauthorized failure to retur Crim.App.1996) (same). Turning now to the absence-from-custody offense, we find no material distinction between it and the crime of escape for purposes of the continuing offense statute. Indeed, we have treated absence from custody under section 719.4(3) as a L.Ed.2d 497 (1990); see also Woolsey v. State, 111 Nev. 1440, 906 P.2d 723, 726 (1995) (<HOLDING>). This rationale is subject to some doubt in
holding that failure to appear when released on bond was a continuing offense holding that dismissal for failure to appear at a deposition is on the merits holding that the defendants oral promise to appear was insufficient to amount to a required appearance within the meaning of the failure to appear statute holding that failure to appear for sentencing is a continuing offense because a convicted criminal has a continuing obligation to face sentencing and presents an ongoing threat to the integrity and authority of the court so long as he has not appeared holding that failure to appear is also a continuing offense