that she was in a committed relationship with B.O.C.’s sister and had no interest in a relationship with a male. The trial court specifically found in the Final Judgment of Paternity that it was the intent of the parties “that [B.O.C.] would provide the donor sperm with which [A.A.B.] became pregnant and that the child would be raised by [A.A.B.] and [B.O.C.’s] sister as the child’s Parents.” In a factually similar Texas case, In re H.C.S., 219 S.W.3d 33 (2006), a mother challenged the standing of a sperm donor to pursue a proceeding to establish the paternity of a child conceived through artificial insemination. The mother and her same-sex partner had asked the partner’s brother to act as a sperm donor so that the couple could have a child together. The parties did not pu d 523 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Because B.O.C. was a sperm donor he
holding that a trial courts judgment must comply with the statutory requirement that the judgment contain written findings of fact and conclusions of law holding that failure to comply with statutory prerequisite deprived the courts of subjectmatter jurisdiction holding that the signature requirement was an indispensable condition precedent and the failure to comply with it deprived the town of jurisdiction to annex holding that the failure to comply with the statutory requirement of physician involvement prevented the mother from claiming that the sperm donor was not a legal parent under the donor nonpaternity statute holding that absent extraordinary circumstances a failure to comply with the statute requires a dismissal with prejudice