have been taken to actuate the assaults. Plaintiff would have no claims. See Hoot v. United States, 790 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir.1986) (noting “[a]bsent the assault and battery perpetrated on Hoot by Frith, there would be no claim” and holding .that the negligence claim against the United States “ ‘arose out of the assault and battery and no amount of ‘semantics’ can change it”). In Count I, the Plaintiff alleges that Bullis’ conduct, including his sexual assaults, his “mismanagement of the transference phenomenon,” and his inappropriate .use of alcohol and drugs, constituted a breach of Bullis’ professional duty which caused Plaintiffs injuries and for wh ambit of the FTCA and are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Wine v. United States, 705 F.2d 366, 367 (10th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, Defendant’s motion to dismiss will
holding that 28 usc  2680h bars suits against the government in all eases where the intentional tort was committed by a government employee holding in a federal prisoners habeas case under 28 usc  2255 that the district court may raise the question of procedural default even if that defense was waived by the government holding where two offduty airmen committed rape assaults and murders attempt to establish liability on a negligence basis is  merely an effort to circumvent the retention of immunity provided in 28 usc  2680h holding that section 2680h specifically bars an action against the united states for misrepresentation holding in any case in which the employee has intentionally injured another the tort asserted against the government regardless of whether it is called negligence is indeed an intentional tort attributable to the government