2.330(g). The denial of a motion to disqualify by a successor judge will only be reversed if the record clearly refutes the successor judge’s decision to deny the motion. Kokal v. State, 901 So.2d 766, 774 (Fla. 2005). Irrespective of the timeliness of Pasha’s motion under rule 2.330(e), the record does not. clearly refute the trial court’s decision—as a successor judge—to deny Pasha’s motion for. disqualification under Kokal. First, although the trial court initially began a hearing without Pasha in attendance on September 21, 2012, the record from the hearing reflects that the trial court, the State, and standby counsel simply engaged in .administrative discussions until the trial court called Pasha into the courtroom. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Carlon, 820 So.2d 891, 896 (Fla. 2002) (<HOLDING>). At no point during Pasha’s absence from the
holding that communications to the police are conditionally privileged holding that easements using terms telephone telegraph and communications could properly be utilized for both internal communications and for thirdparty voice and data communications recognizing that a partys lack of response to a motion or argument therein is grounds for the district court to assume opposition to the motion is waived and grant the motion holding that judges ex parte communications with juries can be harmless under state law as well recognizing that ex parte communications regarding strictly administrative matters are not sufficient to grant a motion to disqualify a judge