Thus, we conclude that there is a nexus between the no contact order and Howe’s crimes. We also note that Howe is mistaken in his belief that M. is not an individual to be protected as a result of his crimes because he did not attempt to find her and “was focused on just the adults.” Appellant’s Brief at 9. While M. may not have been physically injured or directly physically attacked during the altercation in February 2005, there is little doubt that a child is a protected individual when her parents engage in a physical altercation involving a firearm, her grandmother is shot, and her father is incarcerated as a result of his crimes. M. is a person eligible for protection within the meaning of Ind.Code § 35-38-2-2.3. See Hines v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1275, 1284 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) (<HOLDING>), trans. denied. [13] We cannot say the terms
holding that the trial court had discretion to prohibit defendant from residing within one mile of the victim given the statutory authority to prohibit direct or indirect contact with an individual holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the state to introduce direct evidence of the controlling nature of defendants relationship with the victim holding that a prosecutors questions eliciting testimony from a victim as to issue of virginity prior to the assault did not violate colorados rape shield statute because that statute does not specifically prohibit a victim from testifying as to a lack of prior sexual activity id at 1020 holding that denial of amendment is within discretion of trial court holding that rule 37 does not prohibit a lawyer who will testify at trial from acting as counsel in pretrial discovery