doctrine does not preclude Hawkins from asserting that his judgment debt is dischargeable. The New Jersey state court proceeding dealt exclusively with the issue of whether plaintiff-creditor suffered injuries due to defen dant-debtor’s actions. The issue of whether Hawkins’ actions during the altercation constituted willful and malicious acts as defined by Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code was “ ‘unknown, unarisen, or unaccrued at the time of the original action.’ ” Id. Hawkins voluntarily filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection months subsequent to the entry of the default judgment against him. Thus, the state court neither had reason to deal with the dischargeability of the debt at issue, nor did it have jurisdiction to do so. See Brown, 442 U.S. at 127, 99 S.Ct. 2205 (<HOLDING>). Given these findings, the Court must deny
holding that the bankruptcy courts as compared to state courts have exclusive jurisdiction to determine issues of dischargeability under the bankruptcy code holding that the bankruptcy code endows the bankruptcy trustee with the exclusive right to sue on behalf of the estate holding that bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction to control disposition of chapter 13 debtors property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate unless the property is related to the bankruptcy proceedings of the code holding that the eleventh amendment does not bar a bankruptcy court from issuing a money judgment against a state under the bankruptcy code holding that pursuant to federal statute and the courts inherent equitable powers a bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to issue a separate money judgment after determining the amount and dischargeability of a claim