States v. Cohen, 99 F.3d 69 (2d Cir.1996); United States v. Hurst, 78 F.3d 482 (10th Cir.1996). Although Bellamy is correct to note that the Sentencing Commission expressed its intent that the Chapter 7 policy statements would only be the first step in a process that would ultimately lead to the promulgation of binding revocation guidelines, see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A, introductory cmt. 3(a) (2002), the Commission has not yet moved beyond this first step. Thus, absent any official action by the Commission, we are left with the policy statements and our law interpreting them. Applying our existing view of Chapter 7 to t f appeals have applied this reasoning in reaching the same conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 323 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Shaw, 180 F.3d 920, 922-23
holding that an error was not harmless when the district court chose the lowest end of the improper sentencing range after stating that even if the court isnt correct the court believes it is necessary to sentence at this very high range holding that no notice is necessary when a court exceeds a range recommended by chapter 7 holding tort action accruing after original chapter 7 petition not part of estate when case converted to chapter 13 and then back to chapter 7 holding that only general rather than specific reasons must be stated when a court strays from the chapter 7 range holding that the district court did not err by failing to specify a final adjusted sentencing range because we apply a presumption of reasonableness only to sentences falling within the initial sentencing range recommended under the guidelines and there is  no intrinsic need to specify an adjusted sentencing range to aid our appellate review