prosecution inconsistent with the statutory safeguards for ensuring TCEQ discretion, essentially advocating for a rewrite of the Ordinance “to the extent rgy Hous. Elec., LLC, 324 S.W.3d 95, 102-03 (Tex.2010) (explaining that prior case law, which relied on the agency’s own sever-ability rule, had invalidated a Public Utility Commission rule only as to the timing portion of the rule, not the interest rate portion of the rule). Never have we altered an ordinance’s applicability or reconstructed a city’s authority under an ordinance in order to eliminate patent inconsistency. To the contrary, we have made clear that “an ordinance which conflicts or is inconsistent with state legislation is impermissible.” City of Brookside Vill., 633 S.W.2d at 796; see City of Beaumont, 291 S.W. at 206 (<HOLDING>). We cannot invalidate the enforcement
holding that court may not sever clause from initial ordinance and submit remainder of ordinance to voters holding that whether pleadings fail to state a cause of action may not be resolved by summary judgment holding that an ordinance essentially and directly repugnant to state law must fail holding that a plaintiff had standing to attack an entire ordinance including portions of the ordinance not applied to the plaintiff holding city ordinance preempted by state law because ordinance prohibited act specifically allowed under state law