paradigm” and finding that Section 2113(a) bank robbery “by force and violence, or by intimidation” qualifies as a crime of violence under Section 924(c)(3(A)). Wade has therefore failed to demonstrate a “realistic probability” that the accidental use of force would meet the elements of Hobbs Act robbery. See Gonzales, 549 U.S. at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815. Wade’s argument is particularly unpersuasive given that the Ninth Circuit has already determined that the federal bank robbery statute to which Wade refers, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) qualifies as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(1), which uses a definition of “crime of violence” that is nearly identical to the “crime of violence” definition provided in Section 924(c)(3)(A). See United States v. Selfa, 918 F.2d 749, 751 (9th Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>). IV. CONCLUSION Wade’s claim is procedurally
holding that kidnapping is a crime of violence which necessarily involves the threatened use of physical force under 18 usc  924 holding that robbery is a crime of violence for purposes of habitualoffender sentencing holding that bank robbery by force and violence or intimidation under 18 usc  2113a is a crime of violence holding that a bank robbery conviction under  2113a by force and violence or by intimidation qualifies as a crime of violence under the  924c3a useofforce clause holding that sexual assault of a child qualified as crime of violence under 18 usc  16