the trial court should consider the particular facts of the case, balancing the need to ensure ethical conduct on the part of lawyers against the litigant’s right to freely chosen counsel.”). We next consider the circumstances in which Martin’s original lawyers were expected to be necessary witnesses. This Court has stated: [Tjhere is “conflict inherent in counsel’s dual role as advocate and witness,” and for an attorney to act as both witness and advocate is a circumstance to be avoided. Rather, “[t]he practice of trial attorneys testifying is not approved by the courts except where made necessary by the circumstances of the case.” McLaughlin v. Payne, 295 Ga. 609, 611 (761 SE2d 289) (2014) (citations omitted). See also Mobley v. State, 265 Ga. 292, 299 (18) (b) (455 SE2d 61) (1995) (<HOLDING>); Castell v. Kemp, 254 Ga. 556, 557 (331 SE2d
holding that when counsel also serve as witnesses they are forced into ethical conflicts their credibility is improperly placed in issue and advocacy roles are impaired holding that credibility determinations are for the jury holding that outofcourt statements by witnesses that are testimonial in nature are barred under the confrontation clause unless witnesses are unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to crossexamine them recognizing that the argument that the nature of the witnesses testimony and their relationship to each other in this case itself creates an issue of fact as to its credibility is not legally sound holding trial court is sole and exclusive judge of witnesses credibility