statement at the beginning of this exchange, “I guess the only thing I can do is probably stop talking and get a lawyer,” put Munck “on notice that [the defendant might wish to remain silent and might be seeking a lawyer,” but that it did not constitute “a completely unequivocal invocation” of those rights. The defendant contends that this was error because his statement “adequately conveyed to Munck that [he] wanted to stop talking and consult with a lawyer.” We disagree. An expression of doubt or uncertainty cannot be considered unequivocal. See State v. Gasteazoro-Paniagua, 294 P.3d 857, 860-62 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013). Here, the defendant never explicitly stated that he no longer wished to speak with Munck or that he wished to have an attorney present. Cf. Grant-Chase, 140 N.H. at 267 (<HOLDING>); State v. Nash, 119 N.H. 728, 731 (1979)
holding that defendant adequately indicated to officers that she sought assistance of counsel when she stated that she wanted to call her lawyer and officer testified that request was unambiguous holding that trial court was not required to conclude that wife was disabled for alimony purposes where she testified about her disability and offered documentation of her social security disability benefits but where she produced no medical testimony and where other evidence indicated that she was otherwise active and did not stay in bed all day as she claimed holding that a plaintiff can show that she is qualified by presenting credible evidence that she continued to possess the objective qualifications she held when she was hired holding that a plaintiff could not show that she engaged in protected activity because she did not present evidence that she informed her employer that her complaints were based on race or age discrimination holding appellant produced no evidence that when she made her complaints to management she ever mentioned that she felt she was being treated unfairly due to her race or sex