of record was competent, credible, and probative, and the Board was under no obligation to provide an explanation for its rejection of favorable evidence. Cf. Caluza, 7 Vet.App. at 506. The parties do not dispute that the correct facts were before the Board at the time of the November 1983 decision. Rather, the appellant argues that, because “all of the evidence of record supported his position, there is only one permissible view of the evidence, and thus no weighing or reweighing of the evidence.” Appellant’s Br. at 6 (citing Joyce v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 36, 43 (2005)). Accordingly, he argues that “[t]he Board thus denied service connection ... under 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a), incorrectly applying the law to the facts of the case.” Id.; see Crippen v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 412, 422 (1996) (<HOLDING>). The appellant’s argument, however, improperly
holding that because the carrier contested the compensability of the claim and took the position that there was no evidence that the accident arose out of and in the course and scope of hernandezs employment there was no conclusion on the merits holding that on a motion for summary judgment the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiffs position will be insufficient and there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff holding that appellate courts determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction based on a review of all of the evidence admitted at trial holding that no interest is paid on benefits awarded based on a finding of cue recognizing that cue may be based on a showing that there was no evidence before the adjudicator that could have supported a denial of the claim on the merits that is that all of the evidence militated in support of the claim