state court remedies with regard to a particular post-conviction application. See Bennett v. Artuz, 199 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir.1999). “[A] state-court petition is ‘pending from the time it is first filed until finally disposed of and further appellate review is unavailable under the particular state’s procedures.” Bennett v. Artuz, 199 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir.1999), aff'd by 531 U.S. 4, 121 S.Ct. 361, 148 L.Ed.2d 213 (2000). A pro se litigant is accorded “some degree of latitude” in meeting filing requirements. Brown v. Superintendent, 1998 U.S. Disk LEXIS 1936, No. 97 Civ. 3303, 1998 WL 75686, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.23, 1998). But “[it] has long been recognized that ignorance does not excuse lack of compliance with the law.” Velasquez v. United States, 4 F.Supp.2d 331, 334-35 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (<HOLDING>); see also Brown, 1998 WL 75686 at *4
holding no court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely pcra petition holding that bureau of prisons failure to notify prisoners regarding aedpas time limitation did not warrant acceptance of untimely petition holding that plaintiffs failure to notify attorney of receipt of right to sue letter and failure to confirm that the attorney had received the letter did not warrant the application of equitable tolling holding that untimely petition for postconviction petition divests trial court of jurisdiction holding that the untimely petition in that case tolled the aedpa statute of limitations