position was not substantially justified. Furthermore, the legal effect flowing from the facts was the subject of real dispute, as we describe below. As for whether the ensuing litigation was substantially justified, Schock argues that the weakness of the FDIC’s position was established by the fact that she was clearly entitled to (although she was denied) summary judgment, twice, on her contract claim. The district court erred, Schock says, in denying her motions for summary judgment in light of the “unanimous rule” of state agency law that death of the principal terminates apparent authority or because the undisputed facts demonstrate that the bank had actual or constructive notice of Miller’s death. See, e.g., In re Estate of Kelly, 130 N.H. 773, 547 A.2d 284, 288 (1988) (<HOLDING>); accord Gallup v. Barton, 313 Mass. 379, 47
holding that attorneys acts within scope of his authority are binding on client recognizing general rule that attorneys apparent authority terminates at death of client recognizing this as the general rule holding that an attorneys filing a notice of appearance on behalf of his or her client constitute a waiver of service of process by the client recognizing general rule