536 (3) (313 SE2d 748) (1984) (“Whether an act is performed in a ‘public place’ is a jury question.” (citation omitted)); see also United States v. Floyd, 281 F3d 1346, 1349 (III) (A) (2002) (public intoxication); Martin v. State, 291 Ga. App. 363, 366 (1) (b) (662 SE2d 185) (2008) (same); Ridley v. State, 176 Ga. App. 669, 670 (337 SE2d 382) (1985) (same). Cf. People v. Giacinti, 44 Ill. App. 3d 699, 702 (358 NE2d 934) (Ill. App. 3d 1974) (noting, in context of public-indecency statute that used a similar definition for “public place,” that “when imprisoned, the prisoner is deprived of his private life” and “[h]is entire existence becomes public, open to the view of other prisoners, as well as prison officials”). Compare Favors v. State, 104 Ga. App. 854, 855 (123 SE2d 207) (1961) (<HOLDING>). But see Tooke v. State, 4 Ga. App. 495,
holding that significant involvement of government agency charged with protecting public environmental interest satisfies public participation requirement in certain circumstances holding that the doorway of the home is a public place for purposes of the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment holding in case concerning public intoxication that the yard of a county jail may become a public place under certain circumstances and whether the yard of a certain jail is a place of public gathering or assembly in a given instance is for the jury holding section 625 only requires a showing that the conduct was done in a place that is open to the public or where the public has a right to be recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public