circumstances, under Section 13A-5-52 of the' Code of Alabama (1975), existed.' The jury, by its guilt-phase verdict, and the trial court, by its sentence, rejected Lopez’s testimony that Dunaway suffered from a severe mental disease or defect at the time he murdered James Patterson. Therefore, Dunaway’s contention that the trial court ‘made a determination’ he is mentally retarded is without merit. Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R.Crim. P. “Based on evidence from Dunaway’s trial and evidence presented at his evi-dentiary hearing, this Court finds that Dunaway is not mentally retarded. A review of' Dunaway’s trial testimony shows he was clear and articulate on the stand, even during a vigorous cross-examination by the prosecutor. See Clisby v. State of Alabama, 26 F.3d 1054, 1056 (11th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Dunaway admitted he made up an alibi because
holding that dishys trial testimony gave the judge an opportunity to gauge roughly dishys intelligence holding that a defendant was not entitled to a relief under section 2255 when he asserted that the sentencing judge who was not the trial judge was influenced by the sentence imposed by the trial judge on a codefendant holding that a trial judge has discretion to exclude evidence of pending charges and that where the defendant was given a full opportunity outside the presence of the jury to develop a foundation for bias but failed to do so the trial judge did not abuse its discretion holding that it was error for the trial judge to answer a jurys question without giving defendants counsel an opportunity to be heard before the trial judge responded holding that identical error did not prejudice defendant because by giving the instruction the judge merely gave the jury the opportunity to overturn his own ruling