on the date of discharge. (e)(1) A member of the ... Air Force ... who is discharged under other than honorable conditions forfeits all accrued leave to his credit at the time of his discharge. (Emphasis added.) 9 . Because Williams' claims do not directly constitute a collateral attack on his court-martial, the court need not undertake the analysis suggested in Matias v. United States, 923 F.2d 821 (Fed.Cir.1990), which indicates that a plaintiff can pursue in this court a limited collateral attack of a court-martial conviction on constitutional grounds if the action is otherwise within this court's jurisdiction. See Matias, 923 F.2d at 822-23 (citing Bowling v. United States, 713 F.2d 1558, 1560 (Fed.Cir.1983), and Gearinger v. United States, 188 Ct.Cl. 512, 412 F.2d 862, 864 (1969) (<HOLDING>)); see also Ragard v. United States, 439 F.3d
holding in pertinent part that this court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal holding that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the petitioners collateral attack under  1331 holding that the appellate court had jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal on a restraining order and the district court retained jurisdiction to proceed with the trial recognizing the court of claims jurisdiction to hear collateral attacks on courtmartial convictions holding that an effective notice of appeal must be filed for this court to have jurisdiction to hear the case