no requirement that a sentencing judge impose the PRS or announce it, at sentencing or otherwise.” Scott v. Fischer, 616 F.3d 100, 103 (2d Cir.2010) (footnotes omitted). 2 . Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not challenge the imposition of PRS, merely the means by which is it was imposed, and that, consequently, Heck does not apply. (Defs.’ Reply Mem. of Law in Further Supp. of their Mot. to Dismiss the Compl. ("Defs.’ Reply Mem.”) 11.) First, as discussed above, this is an incorrect characterization of the Complaint. Second, even accepting Defendants’ characterization of the Complaint, the very case cited by the Defendants supports a conelusion that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are timely. See Rodriguez v. Fischer, No. 08-CV-4662, 2010 WL 438421, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2010) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Before Earley, New York state courts had
holding that a complaint filed within three years of an accident complied with the michigan court rules and was not barred by the statute of limitations even though service was made more than three years after the accident holding that for purposes of longarm jurisdiction because plaintiff was employed in new york the original event causing his injury occurred in new york holding that new york statute of limitations for  1983 actions was three years holding that where the issue of sanctions was not before the court of appeals when the appeal was filed the district court retained jurisdiction holding that a plaintiff challenging the administrative imposition of a period of postrelease supervision could not have been aware of his injury until april 29 2008 when the new york court of appeals proscribed the practice and that as the complaint in that case was filed less than three 3 years later it was not timebarred