not a judicial determination of the rights of the parties and does not purport to represent the judgment of the court, but merely records the preexisting agreement of the parties ... Hentschel v. Smith, 278 Minn. 86, 86-87, 153 N.W.2d 199, 201 (Minn. 1967). Further, “parties to a consent judgment” generally intend merely to put an end to the litigation at hand, but do not intend the judgment to have binding effect as to the issues raised in collateral, perhaps unforeseen, litigation which may arise in the future ... [but] “a contrary result is appropriate in those exceptional situations in which the parties have manifested their intention that the consent judgment is to have collateral estoppel effect.” Id. (Emphasis added). 58 . In re Miller, 307 Fed.Appx. 785 (5th Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>); In re Vollbracht, 276 Fed.Appx. 360 (5th
holding that the party challenging the dischargeability of a debt bears the burden of proving the debt nondischargeable by a preponderance of the evidence holding nondischargeable postpetition interest on debt that was determined to be nondischargeable under section 523a2 as obtained by fraud holding that the cox bankruptcy court struck a balance too harshly against a creditor when it found that credit card debt could not be found nondischargeable under section 523a2a holding intent to preclude can be found by language contained with the stipulated judgment indicating the debt is nondischargeable in bankruptcy holding the intent of parties can be inferred from sufficient details contained within the consent judgment indicating the parties understood the consent judgment operated as a final adjudication of the factual issues