granted Medicaid-recipients an individually enforceable right to choose their medical provider, reasoning that the phrase “any individual eligible for medical assistance” evinced “the kind of individually focused terminology that unambiguously confers an individual entitlement under the law.” Harris, 442 F.3d at 461 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). We noted that “the mandate [ ] does not contain the kind of vagueness that would push the limits of judicial enforcement.” Id. at 462. And we explained that “the ‘must ... provide’ language of the provision confirms that the statute is ‘couched in mandatory, rather than precatory, terms.’ ” Id. (omission in original) (quoting Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341, 117 S.Ct. 1353); see also Barry v. Lyon, 834 F.3d 706, 717 (6th Cir. 2016) (<HOLDING>). By contrast, in Gonzaga University the
holding that the statutory right to counsel at a civil commitment hearing implicitly includes the right to the effective assistance of that counsel recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees the right to effective assistance of counsel holding that section 1396aa8 which requires that state medicaid plans provide that medical assistance shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals supports a section 1983 claim holding that the federal supplemental nutrition assistance program  mandating that assistance under this program shall be furnished to all eligible households 7 usc  2014acreated a privately enforceable statutory right