as such findings “simply do not exist in a fibromyalgia ease.” (PI. Mem., pg. 15.) Indeed, as Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit explained in Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 307 (7th Cir.1996), “[fibromyalgia’s] cause or causes are unknown, there is no cure, and, of greatest importance to disability law, its symptoms are entirely subjective. There are no laboratory tests for the presence or severity of fibromyalgia.” Id. Thus, any focus by the Defendant or by ALJ Cohen on the absence of objective evidence is misplaced, because “its absence is no more indicative that the patient’s fibromyalgia is not disabling than the absence of headache is an indication that a patient’s prostate cancer is not advanced.” Id., see also Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>) (citing Lisa v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health &
recognizing disagreement among district courts in the second circuit as to whether the standard for vicarious liability is the same under title vii and the nyhrl but interpreting second circuit law including quinn to indicate that nyhrl claims should be analyzed under the framework of title vii holding that the terms second circuit and third circuit do not require entirely separate and distinct circuits with each requiring a specific structural requirement holding that certificate is required to appeal denial of rule 60b motion challenging denial of habeas application and stating that eight circuit courts including eighth circuit are in accord on this issue holding that when the district court improperly purported to transfer to the circuit court an action over which the circuit court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction the circuit court was without jurisdiction to enter its judgment which was void and dismissing the appeal from that void judgment holding that a growing number of courts including the second circuit have recognized that fibromyalgia is a disabling impairment and that there are no objective tests which can conclusively confirm the disease 