offense” render the warrant general. A warrant must be read as a whole, see, e.g., Tracey, 597 F.3d at 154, and a supporting affidavit likewise “is to be read in its entirety and in a common sense, nontechnical manner,” United States v. Miknevich, 638 F.3d 178, 182 (3d Cir.2011); see also United States v. Johnson, 690 F.2d 60, 64 (3d Cir.1982) (“When a warrant is accompanied by an affidavit that is incorporated by reference, the affidavit may be used in construing the scope of the warrant.”). Accordingly, “such evidence of a criminal offense” refers not to any criminal offense, but to the criminal offense of unlawful contact with a minor defined throughout the remainder of the warrant and affidavit. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480-81, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976) (<HOLDING>). Karrer contends that the warrant failed to
holding that the phrase together with other fruits instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this time unknown did not render a warrant general where context made clear that the reference was to false pretenses crime holding that the inclusion of the phrase together with other fruits instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this time unknown did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was clear from the context that the term crime in the warrants referred only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of one specific real estate lot holding that counsel did not admit the defendant was guilty of a crime when counsel noted that if the evidence established the commission of any crime that crime was voluntary manslaughter not murder holding the crime of conspiracy is committed or not before the substantive crime begins holding prosecutor has discretion to charge defendant under general crime even though more specific crime exists