of a substantial change in circumstance stems from Appellant’s relocation to St. Johns County. Indeed, the trial court cited the portion of Dr. Bloomfield’s report finding that the first time-sharing plan approved by the trial court “was no longer working since [Appellant] moved to St. John’s [sic] County” and that it would not work unless the parties agreed to move closer. Our review of the record indicates that all of Appel-lee’s alleged problems with Appellant’s continued custody of the children began after he moved. “A desire to relocate alone, as a matter of law, is not a substantial change in circumstances sufficient to warrant modification of custody.” Segarra v. Segarra, 947 So.2d 543, 547 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2006); see also Ogilvie v. Ogilvie, 954 So.2d 698, 701 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (<HOLDING>); Sotomayor v. Sotomayor, 891 So.2d 559, 561
holding that the mere fact that a petitioner took voluntary trips back to his home country standing alone does not suggest either any fundamental change in circumstances or the possibility of internal relocation holding that a permanent change in income constitutes a substantial change in circumstances justifying a reduction of alimony holding relocation alone even if to another state was not a substantial change in circumstances holding remarriage of exspouse and loss of income not to be a substantial change in circumstances holding that a custodial parents move to a foreign state without more is not a substantial change of circumstances that would support a modification of custody