vio lence and her credibility. It additionally found the district court had no authority to order the State to secure and produce the patient waiver of a witness, but failed to further address the procedure for the production of the records. We granted further review. II. Standard of Review. Ordinarily, we review discovery orders for an abuse of discretion. State v. Schuler, 774 N.W.2d 294, 297 (Iowa 2009). However, to the extent the issues in this case involve constitutional claims, our review is de novo. State v. Reyes, 744 N.W.2d 95, 99 (Iowa 2008). Because the issues in this case rest on constitutional claims involving Cashen’s due process right to present a defense, our review is de novo. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56, 107 S.Ct. 989, 1001, 94 L.Ed.2d 40, 57 (1987) (<HOLDING>). III. Analysis. A. The State’s Claims. In
holding that trial court properly refused to permit disclosure of privileged communications in part because use of the privileged information was not essential to the defense holding that when a state obtains an order to remove a child from his home and takes the child into protective custody it is exercising affirmative state power over the child to the extent that it has a due process obligation to assume responsibility to provide for the childs basic needs holding that educational records are not privileged under ferpa holding a due process analysis applies in determining whether to disclose a child protective service agencys privileged records for purposes of a defendant presenting a defense holding that the denial of due process in a particular case is subject to harmless error analysis