In support of his contention, defendant refers to the legislative history of Title III, which cites to United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 396, 54 S.Ct. 223, 226, 78 L.Ed. 381, 386 (1933), and which states ráther laconically that “[aj violation of [§ 2511] must be willful to be criminal.” S.Rep. No. 90-1097, at 93, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2181. The citation in the federal legislative history to Murdock, however, is not particularly helpful because, rather than providing a definition for “willfully,” Murdock simply provides a list of possible meanings for this word before concluding that “[a]id in arriving at the meaning of the word ‘willfully’ may be afforded by the context in which it is used.” Murdock, 290 U.S. at 395, 398, 54 S.Ct. at 226, 226, 78 L.Ed. at 385, 387 (<HOLDING>); see also State v. Contreras, 105 R.I. 523,
holding that a bad faith claim is a tort holding that bad faith includes lack of good faith in investigating the facts of a complaint holding that without a demonstration of bad faith on the part of the attorney in question sanctions pursuant to this statute are inappropriate holding that in the context of the criminal tax statute in question willfully meant prompted by bad faith or evil intent holding that trial courts have the power to sanction parties for bad faith abuse of the judicial process not covered by rule or statute