Generally, a judge is not required to be recused based solely on his prior rulings, remarks, or actions. Gaal v. State, 332 S.W.3d 448, 454 (Tex.Crim.App.2011). A judge’s bias or partiality may be grounds for a recusal motion only if the conduct shows a “ ‘deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.’ ” Id. (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1150, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994)). Counsel is not required to file futile motions. Mooney v. State, 817 S.W.2d 693, 698 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Hollis v. State, 219 S.W.3d 446, 456 (Tex.App.-Austin 2007, no pet.). Nor is counsel’s failure to file a pretrial motion categorically deemed ineffective assistance of counsel. Madden v. State, 911 S.W.2d 236, 241 (Tex.App.-Waco 1995, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>). A record that is silent as to defense
holding that counsel was not ineffective for not filing a motion to recuse the judge who presided at trial when the judge had also prosecuted a prior case that was used to enhance the current case holding that the fact that the judge received adverse publicity for granting postconviction relief in another case did not require the judge to recuse herself holding that trial judge did not err in refusing to transfer to another judge defendants motion for substitution of judge for cause where defendants motion was not made in good faith holding that where appellant moved to recuse trial judge from deciding the motion for new trial the judge of the administrative district was required to designate a judge to hear the recusal motion holding that a defendant was not entitled to a relief under section 2255 when he asserted that the sentencing judge who was not the trial judge was influenced by the sentence imposed by the trial judge on a codefendant