state administrative review process was sufficient to evidence Congress’ intent that exhaustion of those remedies should be required before permitting a § 1983 claim. See id. at 967-68. The Alacare court emphasized that § 1983 was designed to be “an alternate, supplemental avenue for relief to persons who almost always have an additional available remedy at state law.” Id. at 967 (emphasis in original). The Alacare court also reasoned that to hold that the mere existence of a state remedial scheme is sufficient to support an exhaustion requirement would eviscerate the general rule established in Patsy and would dramatically narrow the scope of relief available under § 1983. See id. at 968; see also Greenwald v. Axelrod (In re: Greenwald), 48 B.R. 263, 270-71 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (<HOLDING>); but see Arden House, Inc. v. Heintz, 612
holding no exhaustion requirement in  1983 suit alleging violations of the medicaid act holding that there is an exhaustion requirement in  1983 suits asserting violations of the medicaid act holding that the ideas exhaustion requirement applies to claims asserted under  1983 recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different holding exhaustion requirement inapplicable when requiring exhaustion would be futile