See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96. The court finds that any disability that Plaintiff suffered during the ninety-day period from July 19 to October 17, 1994, was not severe enough to prevent him from managing his affairs or to prevent him from understanding his legal rights and acting upon them. Courts generally apply equitable tolling for a mental disability only , when the Plaintiff has a severe disability that precludes his ability to reason and function in society. Compare Miller v. Runyon, 77 F.3d 189, 191-92 (7th Cir.) (stating that because plaintiff could work, attend his affairs, and attend college classes, he would not receive the benefit of equitable tolling), cert, denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 316, 136 L.Ed.2d 231 (1996) with Nunnally v. MacCausland, 996 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). In Nunnally, for example, the plaintiff
holding that counsel cannot raise his or her own ineffectiveness holding that a teachers complaint to school authorities that her principal had instructed her to make improper changes in her own students grades was unprotected because it was made pursuant to her official duties holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment holding that allegations that employees supervisors yelled at her told her she was a poor manager and gave her poor evaluations chastised her in front of customers and once required her to work with an injured back were insufficient to state title vii claim holding that material question existed as to whether plaintiffs paranoid schizophrenia causing hallucinations and massive disorganization rendered her incapable of rationally cooperating with counsel or pursuing her claim on her own