on the right is nonetheless subject to review 'under a "reasonable exercise of police power" test. 874 P.2d at 329. {19 In the second mstance, we would note: ~ ' e Not all restrictions on fundamental rights are analyzed unider a strict seru-tiny standard of review. See, e.g., Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1256 (D.C.Cir.2011) ("The [Supreme] Court has not said, however, and it does not logically follow, that strict scrutiny is called for whenever a fundamental right is at stake."); State v. Cole, 264 Wis.2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328, 336 (2008) ("This court has previously recognized that it need not apply strict serutiny every time a governmental burden upon fundamental rights is implicated."); see also Denver Publ'g Co. v. City of Awrora, 896 P.2d 306, 311 (Colo.1995) (<HOLDING>); Watso v. Colo. Dep't of Social Servs., 841
holding that procedural errors at sentencing  are routinely subject to harmlessness review  quoting puckett v united states 556 us 129 141 129 sct 1423 173 led2d 266 2009 holding that regulations that are unrelated to the content of speech are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny quoting turner broad sys inc v fed commcn commn 512 us 622 642 114 sct 2445 129 led2d 497 1994 plurality opinion holding that the rule announced in simmons v south carolina 512 us 154 114 sct 2187 129 led2d 133 1994 doesnt apply retroactively on collateral review holding that although contempt and sanctions are not identical the principles the supreme court articulated for cases of contempt in international union united mine workers of america v bagwell 512 us 821 114 sct 2552 129 led2d 642 1994 guide our determination of what procedural protections are necessary in imposing sanctions under a courts inherent powers recognizing that references to and descriptions of the jurys verdict as advisory as a recommendation and of the judge as the final sentencing authority are permissible under romano v oklahoma 512 us 1 114 sct 2004 129 led2d 1 1994