communication-” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (emphasis added). The Act defines ‘“contents’, when used with respect to any wire, oral, or electronic communication, [to] inelude[ ] any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication.” Id. § 2510(8). Although the statutory definition of “contents” is not all-inclusive, we are satisfied that, under the circumstances presented in the case at bar following the deactivation of the voice logger, Bosch never acquired the “contents” of any conversations taking place in the guards’ office. Second, section 2511 proscribes only “intentional[ ]” interceptions. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(l)(a), (b). See Thompson v. Dulaney, 970 F.2d 744, 748 (10th Cir.1992); Malouche v. JH Management Co., 839 F.2d 1024, 1026 (4th Cir.1988) (Powell, J.) (<HOLDING>). The Act thus “re quires that interceptions be
holding that because of its civil nature section 881 does not require the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a criminal violation has occurred holding that section 1983 actions based on violation of the fourth amendment may not rest on violation of state law holding that prior to 1986 amendment when congress replaced with intentionally the word willfully in section 2511 to establish a civil violation of section 2511 a plaintiff had to prove that any violation was intentional or undertaken with reckless disregard holding that because of its civil nature section 881 does not require the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a criminal violation occurred holding that there can be no violation of  1986 without a predicate violation of  1985