at 415, 111 S.Ct. 1364. But see Keel, 162 F.3d at 271 (“While the defendant need not be a member of the same race as the excused jurors in order to raise a Batson challenge, that Keel and the jurors are of different races eliminates the argument that the jurors sympathize with the defendant because they share the same race.” (internal citation omitted)). In order to meet the third prong of a prima facie case, a showing of facts and circumstances raising an inference of discrimination is required, and raw data alone is often not enough. See Allen v. Lee, 366 F.3d 319, 330 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Though statistics are not utterly bereft of analytical value, they are, at best, manipulate and untrustworthy absent a holistic view of the circumstances to which they apply”); Keel, 162 F.3d at 271 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 881
holding racebased use of peremptory strikes against jurors unconstitutional holding that while batson claim was waived derivative claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the batson claim is cognizable under the pcra holding that peremptory strikes did not violate batson when given these jurors opposition to or hesitation toward imposing the death penalty it is clear that the prosecutor acted well within constitutional bounds in excusing them holding that it was not iac to decline to use peremptory strike on a potential juror whose statements hinted at possible bias against defendant where counsel strategically used peremptory strikes against jurors who might have been more likely to convict holding that there was no batson claim even when the prosecution used nearly seventy percent 70 of its peremptory strikes to remove potential african american jurors