decision, when the parties agreed to transition Z.S. back to public school with a plan approved by all parties and supported with a transition plan from CCCD. Contrary to Carmel’s assertions, the IHO decision declaring the 2007-2008 IEP inadequate effected a material change between the parties in connection with the subsequent negotiations. Our Court recognizes a distinction between claims for tuition reimbursement pursuant to the pendency provision and claims for tuition reimbursement pursuant to an administrative determination that a school district has failed to provide a FAPE. See Mackey ex rel. Thomas M. v. Bd. of Educ. for Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 158, 160-61, supplemented sub nom. Mackey v. Bd. of Educ. for Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 112 Fed.Appx. 89 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Carmel claims that the IHO decision did not
holding that either a fouryear or a twoyear limitations period applies to claims under the idea in ohio for tuition reimbursement either way the claims were timebarred recognizing application of sovereign immunity to school districts holding that the unilateral placement of a student by the parents in an unapproved school is not by itself a bar to tuition reimbursement but public schools may not place students in unapproved schools holding that though the school districts plan was adequate the parents were still entitled to tuition reimbursement under the pendency provision holding that court may order reimbursement of private school expenses incurred by parents of handicapped child in successful challenge to iep brought under eha predecessor to idea stating that it is beyond cavil that appropriate relief would include a prospective injunction directing the school official to develop and implement at public expense an iep placing the child in a private school and affirming reimbursement award against petitioner local school district 