in the statute refers directly to the common law D’Oench doctrine. The only language in the statute even relevant to the issue presented by Mo-torcity — the range of oral agreements with respect to which the FDIC will be protected — is found in § 1823(e)(1), and its language was merely carried over intact from prior law. As in Texas, our conclusion is supported by the evident purpose of FIRREA — to enhance the FDIC’s ability, to address the problems created by the increasing number of financial institutions in default. As in Texas, Motorc (“Section 1823(e) requires an identifiable ‘asset’ which is acquired by the bank and then transferred to the regulatory agency, and to which the unenforceable agreements must relate.”); Murphy v. FDIC, 38 F.3d 1490, 1500 (9th Cir.1994) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); Thigpen v. Sparks, 983 F.2d 644, 648-49 (5th
holding that a party providing a letter of credit fails at its peril to include in the letter language restricting honor and payment of the credit holding that  1823e does not apply to a claim relating to a letter of credit a letter of credit is a liability not an asset holding that documents did not substantially comply where copies of letter of credit and promissory note were submitted and letter of credit required originals holding that section 1823e applies only to assets and does not apply to claims regarding letters of credit because letters of credit are liabilities rather than assets holding that plaintiff had standing where the beneficiary of a letter of credit had assigned to plaintiff its cause of action for wrongful dishonor of the letter of credit