faith in bringing its suit. Professional Baseball Leagues’ argument is as follows: (1) when the plaintiff is the prevailing party, he or she can only get attorney fees when it is proven that the defendant has engaged in acts of infringement in bad faith, see Takecare Corp. v. Takecare of Oklahoma, Inc., 889 F.2d 955, 957 (10th Cir.1989) (stating, in the context of a prevailing plaintiffs claim for attorney fees, that “[r]unning through the case law, which has developed around a § 1117(a) award of attorney fees, is the implicit recognition that some degree of bad faith fuels the infringement at issue”); (2) the standard for awarding attorney fees should be the same for a prevailing defendant, see Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534, 114 S.Ct. 1023, 1033, 127 L.Ed.2d 455 (1994) (<HOLDING>). We agree with Professional Baseball Leagues’
holding that a defendant is the prevailing party within the meaning of statutory provisions awarding attorneys fees to the prevailing party even when the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the action holding that prevailing party has no standing to appeal recognizing that a school district must be a prevailing party in order to be entitled to attorneys fees under the idea holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees holding that prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants seeking attorney fees are to be treated alike