120 S.Ct. at 1640. “[I]t is now well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited.” Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170, 46 S.Ct. 68, 69, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925). As the Supreme Court of Virginia has noted, the “rape shield” law was adopted to “limit or prohibit the admission of general reputation evidence as to the prior unchastity of the complaining witness, but ... [to] permit the introduction of evidence of specific acts of sexual conduct between the complaining witness and third persons in carefully limited circumstances.” Winfield, 225 Va. at 218, 301 S.E.2d at 19. Indeed, the Court furthe 77, 480-81 (1979) (<HOLDING>). We further note that in response to Pilcher’s
holding that the rape shield statute affects the use of character evidence to impeach witnesses  and is therefore procedural in nature recognizing that the declaratory judgment act is procedural in nature and not an extension of federal court jurisdiction holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial holding that a rape shield statute was not ex post facto when it barred evidence of a prior sexual relationship that was admissible before enactment of the statute holding that application of the rape shield law to a case in which the underlying events occurred prior to the enactment of the rape shield law was not a violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws