cites Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 60-61, 108 S.Ct. 376, 98 L.Ed.2d 306 (1987), which held that citizen suits under the Clean Water Act must be based on conduct that is ongoing or intermittent, not “wholly past.” However, Gwaltney left unresolved whether discharges are considered “ongoing” where, as here, the conduct that caused the violation has ceased, but the effects of the violation remain. The lower courts have split on this issue: Some courts, interpreting the [Clean Water Act] and Gwaltney expansively, have held that the continuing migration of pollutants from past discharges is sufficient to establish jurisdiction under Section 505(a)(1). See Umatilla Waterquality Protective Ass’n v. Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., 962 F.Supp. 1312, 1322 (D.Or.1997) (<HOLDING>); Werlein v. United States, 746 F.Supp. 887,
holding that to achieve goals of cwa epa is required to establish and enforce technologybased limitations on individual discharges into the countrys navigable waters from point sources holding that the land under navigable waters was not granted by the constitution to the united states but was reserved to the states respectively and that new states have the same rights jurisdiction and sovereignty over the soil under navigable water as the original states holding a discharge of pollutants is ongoing if the pollutants continue to reach navigable waters even if the discharger is no longer adding pollutants to the point source itself holding that wetlands adjacent to navigable waters are included in the term territorial waters holding that a worker injured on actual navigable waters in the course of employment is covered under the lhwca