use the spring-hinged door closers, and her future plans (as stated at the time the complaint was filed) are much more specific than the vague invocations that troubled the Supreme Court in Lujan: much of her extended family lives in the area and the Overland Park Courtyard Marriott is close to them. Furthermore, Scherr’s discussion of her cousin’s then-upcoming wedding is sufficient to support a plausible inference that Scherr would have liked to return to the hotel but for its continued use of the spring hinges. Given Scherr’s past travel history and her affirmative de sire to stay at the hotel but for the alleged violations, on these facts, Scherr has standing to sue the Overland Park Courtyard Marriott. See D’Lil v. Best W. Enci-na Lodge & Suites, 538 F.3d 1031, 1037 (9th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Scherr’s standing to sue the Overland Park
holding that a plaintiff established standing when she demonstrated her intent to return to a city and to stay at the hotel she was suing if it were to be made accessible holding that a plaintiff can show that she is qualified by presenting credible evidence that she continued to possess the objective qualifications she held when she was hired holding that the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of age discrimination based upon a showing that she was a member of the protected group she was qualified and capable of doing her job she was discharged and that her manager called her old woman thus evincing agebased animus sufficient to demonstrate discriminatory intent holding appellant produced no evidence that when she made her complaints to management she ever mentioned that she felt she was being treated unfairly due to her race or sex holding that a plaintiff could not show that she engaged in protected activity because she did not present evidence that she informed her employer that her complaints were based on race or age discrimination