BAP ruled that the debtors were not entitled to discharge because “prepayment does not ‘complete’ [a] plan for purposes of §§ 1328(a) or 1329.” Id. at 545. Rather, it held, “[t]he ‘applicable commitment period’ in § 1325(b) is a temporal requirement ... [and] the statutory concept of ‘completion’ of payments includes the completion of the requisite period of time.” Id. at 546. The BAP reached that conclusion even though that case, like this one, involved debtors who had no projected disposable income and for whom § 1325(b)(1)(B) accordingly would permit monthly payments of $0 to unsecured creditors. Id. at 540. Because the text of § 1325(b) is ambiguous, we also look to legislative history in construing its temporal requirement. See Wilson v. Comm’r, 705 F.3d 980, 987-88 (9th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). Congress amended § 1325(b), adding the
holding that we may consult legislative history as an aid to the interpretation of ambiguous text recognizing longstanding precedents that permit resort to legislative history only when necessary to interpret ambiguous statutory text holding that unless a statute is ambiguous on the point at issue a court should not resort to legislative history in interpreting it recognizing that courts may look beyond the statutory text to determine legislative intent only when the statute is ambiguous holding that even where there are  contrary indications in the statutes legislative history we do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear