claim for failure to abide by these strictures. In addressing that assertion, we note that the specificity requirement extends only to the particulars of the allegedly misleading statement itself. See Educadores Puertorriqueños en Acción v. Hernández, 367 F.3d 61, 66 (1st Cir.2004). The other elements of fraud, such as intent and knowledge, may be averred in general terms. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). After careful perscrutation, we deem this line of defense unavailing. The Larkin and Prentiss letters are unarguably specific as to speaker, content, context, and time. These statements are sufficient to shield the fraudulent misrepresentation count from dismissal at the pleading stage. See, e.g., Powers, 926 F.2d at 111; see also Philippe v. Shape, Inc., 688 F.Supp. 783, 786-87 (D.Me.1988) (<HOLDING>). We note, however, that the complaint
holding that a complaint satisfied rule 9b because it identified the misrepresentations at issue the specific dates on which they were made and the specific persons responsible for making them holding that a plaintiff satisfied rule 9b by pleading which machines were the subject of alleged fraudulent transactions and the nature and subject of the alleged misrepresentations holding that if the alleged misrepresentations are material a plaintiff is entitled to recovery whether or not the misrepresentations caused the alleged damage holding that rule 9b applies to fca holding that documents affixed to complaint that contained alleged misrepresentations satisfied rule 9b