factors, including (1) the timeliness of the request, (2) the adequacy of the court’s inquiry into the defendant’s request, and (3)whether the conflict between the defendant and his counsel was so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication and prevented an adequate defense. See id.; United States v. Zillges, 978 F.2d 369, 372 (7th Cir.1992). Even if we find an abuse of discretion, we will uphold the district court’s decision to deny a request for new counsel unless the defendant establishes that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. See Bjorkman, 270 F.3d at 500. As Huston concedes, his request for new counsel was not timely because it was made the morning of trial. Cf. United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d 1499, 1506 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Zillges, 978 F.2d at 372 (one month). Our
holding that defendants assertion of his right to a speedy trial two months before his trial began did not satisfy this barker factor holding that teachers request for four months leave was not a reasonable accommodation holding request made two months before trial timely holding that request for additional leave after employee had already received nine months of leave was unreasonableaccommodation request where employee would remain unable to perform essential function for another six months holding that statement made eight months before employee was dismissed and one made at least ten months before were not too remote from the dismissal and thus properly admitted at trial as evidence of a discriminatory atmosphere where he who made the first statement may have participated in the decision to fire her and the other refused to block her termination