scope of the waiver. We note that some other circuits analyze appeal waivers under a three-part analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1327 (10th Cir.2004); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 891-92 (8th Cir.2003). These circuits consider the validity and scope of the waiver, and also whether enforcement of the waiver will result in a miscarriage of justice. Although we have not used the term miscarriage of justice in analyzing appeal waivers, the concept seems to be subsumed within our analysis of the scope of the waiver. 11 . On the merits, we affirmed the defendants' sentences. Although a defendant certainly can waive the right to counsel at a sentencing proceeding, see generally Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (<HOLDING>), we did not base our decision on that
holding that petitioner cannot reserve the right to seek a public defender while choosing to proceed pro se holding no presumption of acquiescence because defendant was never allowed to proceed pro se holding that a defendant has a right to proceed pro se at trial holding defendants pro se motion to reduce sentence was not properly before the trial court when defendant was represented by counsel since defendant may not proceed both by counsel and pro se holding that a rule 121 colloquy is required only in response to a timely and unequivocal invocation of the right to proceed pro se