263, 292, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999). To the extent Brown asserts a violation of California law in this regard, we cannot consider that aspect of this claim. See Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780, 110 S.Ct. 3092, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990) (“[FJederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.”). Finally, Brown contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to evidence suggesting that Brown had a pri- or criminal record. But the evidence to which Brown contends trial counsel should have objected does not support such an inference, and so we cannot say that counsel was deficient in this regard. Thus the California Court of Appeal did not unrea sonably reject this claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (<HOLDING>). We construe Brown’s briefing of uncertified
holding by implication that where a claimant fails to return to the secretary a formal claim application within one year of the submission of his informal claim his informal claim is not a cognizable claim for effective date purposes holding that if  506 does not apply to an allowed claim such claim cannot become a secured claim holding that courts need not reach both prongs of an ineffectiveassistance claim if the claim fails on one of them holding that if the state court addresses both the procedural default and the merits of a federal claim in the alternative a federal court should apply the state procedural bar and decline to reach the merits of the claim holding that trial court properly found that claim was timebarred when the gravamen of claim for breach of fiduciary duties was an alleged failure to correctly read an ultrasound and reach proper diagnosis and accordingly the claim amounted to a claim of negligence that went to the propriety of the defendants medical skill and judgment