or obligations” conferred by the agreement. She testified that while she did not recall specifically anything DKW explained to her about the agreement, DKW advised her to sign it and she did in fact sign it on DKW’s advice. Based on this testimony, the court of appeals concluded that a jury could infer “that DKW had represented to [the Delps] that the [agreement] protected their interests.” 948 S.W.2d at 496. Assuming that a representation, as that term is used in the DTPA, could be inferred from DKW’s advice to sign the agreement, a general representation that the agreement would protect the Delps’ interests is too vague under the facts of this case to support DTPA liability. See State Farm County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Moran, 809 S.W.2d 613, 621 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied) (<HOLDING>); Employers Cas. Co. v. Fambro, 694 S.W.2d 449,
holding general claims by an insurer of the adequacy or sufficiency of coverage  are not generally actionable under the dtpa holding that when the insurer takes the position that the policy does not cover the complaint the insurer must 1 defend the suit under a reservation of rights or 2 seek a declaratory judgment that there is no coverage if the insurer fails to take either of these actions it will be estopped from later raising policy defenses to coverage holding that if an insurer denies coverage based on an assertion that the underlying claim is excluded from coverage there is a presumption that the insurer did not suffer prejudice because prompt notice would have merely resulted in an earlier denial of coverage holding that claims actionable only by virtue of the nlra are preempted holding that when the insured brings an action for a declaration of coverage and prevails absent a bad faith denial of coverage by the insurer attorneys fees incurred by the insured in the prosecution of that action are not incurred at the request of the insurer