State police. In these circumstances, the defendant’s rights were not violated. See Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952) (“[njothing in the Constitution . . . requires a court to permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was brought to trial against his will”); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). See also United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 662-666 (1992). As for the purportedly “egregious” conduct of the Massachusetts State police, the record shows that the defendant was unrestrained until he attempted to flee in the Trinidad airport. There is no showing of the type of force or coercion that would require a court to divest itself of jurisdiction. See, e.g., United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 275-276 (2d Cir. 1974) (<HOLDING>). The motion judge correctly denied the
holding that the state department country report constituted substantial evidence to support the agencys finding of changed country conditions in guatemala holding that the bia abused its discretion when it denied petitioners motion to reopen by failing to consider evidence of country conditions holding that there is a presumption that new evidence discovered by criminal defendant after trial is over would not change outcome of trial holding that for purposes of claim 4 another country means a country other than the first and second country explicitly rejecting tpllcs proposed construction holding that criminal process would be abused by trial of italian citizen allegedly brought to this country after being tortured