should either not be allowed or it should be restricted to the date the complaint was filed. The record contains no postjudgment motion challenging this issue pursuant to Rule 59(e), SCRCP. Therefore, this issue has not been preserved for our review. Pelican Bldg. Centers v. Dutton, 311 S.C. 56, 427 S.E. (2d) 673 (1993). CONCLUSION We find that the evidence supports the special referee’s conclusion that Glasser was Liberty Life’s agent, that he was clothed with apparent authority, and that his negligence was imputable to Liberty Life. In addition, the evidence supports the special referee’s decision that Liberty Life was liable under contract. Accordingly, the judgment below is Affirmed. Finney, C.J., and Toal, Moore and Waller, JJ., concur. 1 189 S.C. 356, 1 S.E. (2d) 147 (1939) (<HOLDING>). 2 316 S.C. 319, 450 S.E. (2d) 59 (Ct. App.
holding that the insurer is not bound by acts of the agent which are beyond the scope of his authority when the insured has notice of the limitations upon an agents authority or when the circumstances are sufficient to suggest that an inquiry should be made as to such limitations holding that a principal is not hable for the actions of an agent when these actions exceed the agents authority and the thirdparty has knowledge that the agent does not have the authority asserted holding despite a reservation of rights that when the insurer provides a defense to its insured the insured has no right to interfere with the insurers control of the defense and a stipulated judgment between the insured and the injured claimant without the consent of the insurer is ineffective to impose liability upon the insurer holding that the principal is liable for an agents acts committed within the scope of the agents employment holding that when an agent has limited authority and informs the third party of this limitation the principal is not bound by the agents actions that exceed that authority