Respondent appeals. I. Amendment of Petition Respondent argues the trial court erred in finding and concluding that grounds existed to terminate respondent’s parental r S.E.2d 917 (1991) (reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the petitioner on the issue of whether the respondent had abused his daughter, because the termination procedures set out in the juvenile code required an adjudication hearing on this issue and did not authorize a summary procedure based on N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56); see also In re D.S.C., 168 N.C. App. 168, 173, 607 S.E.2d 43, 47 (2005) (our case law has “declined to judicially impute procedural rights to parties which are not otherwise authorized by the termination statute”); In re Peirce, 53 N.C. App. 373, 281 S.E.2d 198 (1981) (<HOLDING>). The Rules of Civil Procedure will, however,
recognizing that the department is required to present clear and convincing evidence to support termination of a parents parental rights recognizing this substantial interest in context of termination of parental rights holding that foster parents have standing to intervene to seek termination of parental rights recognizing that termination of parental rights can be accomplished only by resort to chapters 63 adoption and 39 termination of parental rights and any attempt by a parent to contract away the childs right to support is void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy holding that a respondent in a termination of parental rights proceeding may not file a counterclaim