involved in the incident, which was for his own lustful gratification. Moreover, while “the definition of sexual penetration announced in Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-97 encompasses any penetration, the Court holds the parameters of the definition of sexual penetration are logically confined to activities which are the product of sexual behavior or libidinal gratification.” Frei v. State, 934 So.2d 318, 325(¶ 18) (Miss.Ct.App.2006)(quoting Roberson v. State, 501 So.2d 398, 400 (Miss.1987)). ¶ 11. This Court and the Mississippi Supreme Court have interpreted Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-97 (Rev.2006) to include common sense applications where the accused attempts to engage in semantics regarding the literal reading of the statute. See Frei, 934 So.2d at 325(¶ 18) (<HOLDING>); see also Hennington v. State, 702 So.2d 403,
holding that medical report was not material for brady purposes where report at best showed lack of vaginal penetration of sexual abuse victim penetration was not necessary for conviction of sexual abuse of a minor under iowa law holding that a jury instruction listing additional modes of sexual penetration than those listed in the information did not impermissibly amend the charge of sexual assault becausein part the added modes of sexual penetration did not change the applicable statute sentence or level of offense holding that the clergy sexual conduct statute requires general intent and does not impose strict liability because the act of sexual penetration must be intentional holding that penetration of anus and penetration of sexual organ although found in same subsection of section 22021a1b are separate offenses holding that mississippi code annotated section 97395 was not overbroad despite the fact that innocent penetrations can occur during the course of parental activities or clinical duties and the meaning of sexual penetration is legitimately confined to those activities which are done for sexual gratification