of this evidence in his closing argument, Kelly’s remedy was to object before the trial court that the prosecutor had misstated the facts. Cf. State v. Weeks, 634 A.2d 1275, 1276 & n.1 (Me.1993). Kelly made no such objection. The trial court’s decision to admit the statistical evidence was within its broad discretion. IV. [¶ 25] Finally, Kelly contends the court erred when it denied his motion for a new trial. Kelly based the motion in part on what he terms as the State’s prejudicial failure to disclose Bean’s knowledge that the defendant had worn t m.App.1989); see also State v. Gaines, 260 Kan. 752, 926 P.2d 641, 649 (1996) (expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification is never admissible). But see People v. McDonald, 37 Cal.3d 351, 208 Cal.Rptr. 236, 690 P.2d 709, 726 (1984) (<HOLDING>). 9 . We ultimately upheld the guilty verdict,
holding that instructions on crossracial identification required prospectively unless parties agree there was no crossracial identification holding that testimony regarding outofcourt identification was inadmissible where the state failed to ask the witnesses about the identification during its direct examination holding court abused its discretion when it excluded psychologists testimony regarding host of identification issues among which was crossracial identification recognizing a trend in recent years to allow such testimony and collecting cases in which such testimony was allowed in cases involving crossracial identification identification after a long delay identification after observation under stress and psychological phenomena as the feedback factor and unconscious transference holding that trial court erred when it admitted outofcourt identification of defendant when the witness who made the identification was never asked about defendants identity at trial