is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.” Id. The actual length of delay necessary to warrant an application of the other factors in the balancing test is not defined by the Constitution, but must be considered in light of the circumstances of the particular case. Id. at 530-31, 92 S.Ct. at 2191-92. A delay of less than one year will rarely qualify as “presumptively prejudicial” for purposes of triggering the Barker inquiry. See Doggett v. United States, — U.S. -, - n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 2691 n. 1, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992). The legally relevant delay in this case was only ninety-two days, a period insufficient to presume prejudice. See United States v. Vanella, 619 F.2d 384, 386 (5th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). Under Barker, we need not even consider the
holding that a relatively brief delay of less than one hundred days certainly does not rise to the level of presumptive prejudice holding thirty days in disciplinary segregation does not rise to the level of punishment invoking the due process clause holding that a limited financial hardship exception to the schools uniform policy does not rise to the level of a system of individualized exemptions  holding any improper delegation did not rise to level of plain error holding that apprendi does not apply where the defendant was sentenced to less than the statutory maximum