the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1141, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986). We examine the totality of the circumstances to see if the waiver choice was uncoerced and the defendant had a “requisite level of comprehension.” Id. As explained above, Walker was not a novice to criminal matters and was well aware of her rights. Furthermore, her relationship with the officers, as well as them statements about possible leniency if she cooperated, do not affect the voluntariness of her waiver. We have previously held that deceptive tactics may not invalidate an otherwise lawful waiver, and they do not invalidate Walker’s waiver. See Soffar v. Cockrell, 300 F.3d 588, 596 (5th Cir.2002) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). There is no other indication that Walker’s
holding outside of the context of title vii or the adea that section 24 fifth preempts state law to the extent but only to the extent that it conflicts holding that once the defendant has submitted to the control of the officer and the process of taking him or her to the police station  has commenced his or her arrest is complete and he or she is in custody for the purposes of the escape statute holding that a failure to inform the defendant of the minimum possible sentence meant that the defendant did not fully understand the consequences of his plea and his rights were therefore automatically substantially affected holding that deceit is only prohibited to the extent that it deprives the suspect of the ability to understand his or her rights and the consequences of abandoning them holding that for a legal malpractice claim to accrue a plaintiff need not know the precise extent of his or her damages or even have suffered all of the damages attributable to his or her attorneys negligence