in having the government act against them only through lawfully appointed agents.” Andrade, 729 F.2d at 1497. It “assumes that an individual suffers no judicially cognizable injury when he is the subject of adverse governmental action that is legitimate in all respects save that the official taking the action lacks lawful title to office.” Kathryn A. Clokey, Note, The De Facto Officer Doctrine: The Case for Continued Application, 85 Colum. L.Rev. 1121, 1122 (1985) [hereinafter Clokey]; see also Hussey v. Smith, 99 U.S. (9 Otto) 20, 24, 25 L.Ed. 314, 315 (1878) (“The acts of [de facto] officers are held to be valid because the public good requires it. The principle wrongs no one.”). But see Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182-83, 115 S.Ct. 2031, 2035, 132 L.Ed.2d 136, 143 (1995) (<HOLDING>). The doctrine “applies where a qualified
holding that a hearing officer acting in a judicial capacity was entitled to claim judicial immunity and could not be compelled to give testimony about his mental process in deciding a case holding that determination of timely filing of complaint under ftca was independent of the merits of plaintiffs ftca claim holding an individual who makes a timely challenge to a judicial officer based on the appointments clause is entitled to a determination of the merits of his claim holding that an administrator that has control over and makes the ultimate determination regarding the merits of an insureds claim must act in good faith in processing the insureds claims holding that there is no probable cause when an officer makes a stop based on a mistake of law