has suffered prejudice from juror misconduct. See Rodriguez, 125 F.3d at 744. We therefore “place great weight on the nature of the extraneous information that has been introduced into deliberations.” Id. (citing Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1490 (9th Cir.1997)). See Thompson, 74 F.3d at 1574(juror misconduct occurs when a juror introduces into the jury’s deliberation a matter which was not in evidence or in the instructions). The potential for prejudice is heightened when a juror interjects into the deliberations “objective extrinsic facts” regarding the accused because that •juror becomes an unsworn witness who is not subject to either confrontation or cross-examination. Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d at 1490. See United States v. Navarro-Garcia, 926 F.2d 818, 821-22(9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). While jurors may bring their life experiences
holding that where the common knowledge or experience of laymen jurors is extensive enough to recognize or infer medical negligence from the circumstances then an expert witness is not necessary holding that testimony of ins official who had personal exposure to countys recordkeeping practices was sufficient to support a finding of personal knowledge especially given the defenses failure to further explore the nexus between the witnesss experience and purported personal knowledge on crossexamination citing davis 792 f2d at 130405 holding that the failure of an affidavit to be made on personal knowledge or specify how the affiant had personal knowledge of the facts asserted is a defect in substance and need not be objected to at trial to be a ground for reversal holding that a jurors personal knowledge or experience constitutes extrinsic evidence where the juror interjects his or her past personal experiences into deliberations in the absence of any record evidence on a given fact holding that attorneys affidavit was not competent evidence of his clients agreement or communications with the defendants because it was not based on personal knowledge