the failure to prepare a memo is deemed a cover-up). And an employer’s investigation of an anonymous or disputed act of discrimination can be deemed to prolong and amplify the victim’s humiliation, or the failure to investigate may be deemed a cover-up. Keeping these considerations in mind, we see that the majority of incidents cited by Alfano are sex-neutral on their face. Facially neutral incidents may be included, of course, among the “totality of the circumstances” that courts consider in any hostile work environment claim, so long as a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that they were, in fact, based on sex. But this requires some circumstantial or other basis for inferring that incidents sex-neutral on their face were in fact discriminatory. Compare Howley, 217 F.3d at 155-56 (<HOLDING>), and Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d
holding that factfinder could reasonably infer that facially sexneutral incidents were sexbased where the perpetrator had previously made sexually derogatory statements holding that a witness could testify about statements made to him by a police department investigator because the statements were an admission by partyopponent and were thus not excluded by the hearsay rule holding that statements made in the course of negotiation were not contracts and such statements were merged into the final written agreement holding a social worker treating the child was permitted to testify to statements the child made about the abuse including the victims identification of the perpetrator because the statements were necessary to the treatment of ensuring the continued safety of the child holding that the litigation privilege did not preclude a malicious prosecution claim where the accusatorial statements that led to the plaintiffs arrest were made before the charges against him were filed and were not made during and were unrelated to the judicial proceeding