dis proportionate to the harm inflicted upon government and society by the offense. Payment of restitution in no way alters the status of the property as ill-gotten gains. Restitution operates to make the victim of the crime whole, not to confer legal ownership on the offender of the stolen property. Taylor, 582 F.3d at 566 (quoting United States v. Emerson, 128 F.3d 557, 567 (7th Cir.1997), alterations omitted). Thus, ordering forfeiture in addition to restitution is not an unfair double recovery. In this case, both forfeiture and restitution were mandatory. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 982(a)(2), 3663A(a)(l) (“[T]he court shall order, in addition to ... any other penalty authorized by law, that the defendant make restitution to the victim of the offense .... ”); see also Taylor, 582 F.3d at 566 (<HOLDING>). Nothing in the statutory scheme permitted the
holding that the language of the statute is mandatory and the commission must act within 180 days holding that where defendant objected in the district court only to the loss calculation and not specifically to the calculation of restitution the issue of restitution was not properly presented  to the district court holding that by ordering both restitution and forfeiture the district court properly adhered to the mandatory language found within the statutory schemes holding that the language of the iad is mandatory and absolute holding that when no statutory exception applies  the district court lacks the authority to impose a sentence less than the statutory mandatory minimum