prepared, as of the April 8th trial date. With respect to the issue of delay, three days before trial commenced, on April 5, 1991, Sarasua advised the court that his client wished to substitute counsel. Mack only formally moved to substitute counsel on April 8, 1991. Petitioner plausibly argues that he did not make this eleventh hour request for a continuance to delay trial but because he did not have the financial resources to hire a private attorney until this late date. While Petitioner’s argument is compelling, his decision to substitute counsel was dilatory in that it could and should have been made long before the day of trial. It cannot be said that Petitioner was denied ample opportunity to secure counsel of his choice. See United States v. Sexton, 473 F.2d 512 (5th Cir.1973) (<HOLDING>). Even if the Court accepts Petitioner’s
holding that denial of request for continuance to allow retained counsel to prepare for trial did not deny defendant effective assistance of counsel when defendant had waited more than two months to retain an attorney courtappointed counsel appeared competent and defendants motion failed to state when retained counsel would be ready recognizing a defendants right to dismiss retained counsel in favor of appointed counsel recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel holding the state courts denial of a motion to substitute retained counsel for appointed counsel to be an unreasonable application of gonzalezlopez because it was not justified by undue delay and the trial court wrongly assumed without questioning the defendant that she could not afford to pay retained counsel holding that in determining whether there exists a valid waiver of the right to counsel in the criminal setting the court may consider a defendants lack of good faith in working with appointed counsel including an unreasonable refusal to cooperate with counsel or an unreasonable request for substitution of appointed counsel and the timeliness of defendants request for new counsel particularly when a defendant makes an untimely request for new counsel  under circumstances which are likely to result in a continuance