2005 that service was not executed due to a faulty address. Using a different address for Cornell Abraxas, Cain sought another summons on November 14, 2005. The summons, issued in January 2006, was successfully executed in February 2006. Cornell Abraxas filed a timely motion to dismiss, claiming that the Complaint was time-barred and that Cain failed to effect timely service of process under Rule 4(m). The District Court agreed as to Cain’s failure to serve process and dismissed the complaint without prejudice on that ground. This timely appeal followed. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The dismissal without prejudice was a final decision because Cain would be time-barred from re-filing his complaint. See Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 207 (3d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). We review the District Court’s order for
holding that denial of a postconviction motion without prejudice and with leave to amend is not a final appealable order holding appeal from an order dismissing action without prejudice was properly before this court holding that a bankruptcy court order denying a trustees claim to immunity was final and appealable under the collateral order doctrine holding that an order dismissing a claim without prejudice is a final appealable order if the statute of limitations for that claim has expired holding that an order dismissing a complaint without prejudice is a final appealable order only if no amendment to the complaint could cure the defects in the  case internal quotation marks omitted