requirement of deference to the Secretary’s interpretation disappears when the Secretary’s interpretation is inconsistent with clear Congressional intent. Hall v. Secretary, Health, Educ. and Welfare, 600 F.2d 556, 561 (6th Cir.1979). “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the [Secretary], must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. at 2781. If this court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, finds that “Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.” Id. at 843 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. at 2781 n. 9; See e.g., Miller v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 733 F.2d 399, 403 (6th Cir.1984) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Appellant correctly argues that this court’s
holding that absent unusual circumstances this court must apply the plain meaning of a statute recognizing that plain meaning does not control where context shows that the parties have assigned an unusual meaning to a term holding that thirtytwoyearold statute must still be given its plain meaning holding that an appellate court must give a statute its clear and plain meaning when the statute is unambiguous holding that court of appeals erred in relying on the plain meaning of a statute when the legislative history clearly indicated another meaning