State’s modified definition “could have easily affected the jury’s verdict.” But there was substantial evidence that Orsag was intoxicated. Orsag’s fiancé testified that Orsag drank that night, he smelled of alcohol, he pulled over to the wrong side of the road, he exhibited signs of intoxication on all of the field-sobriety tests, and he refused a breath test. Therefore, the evidence is sufficient for the jury to find Orsag was intoxicated, whether it considered either the State’s interpretation of the definition or the definition contained in the charge. Finally, Orsag argues that, by allowing the State to misstate the law, “the only reasonable conclusion the jury could draw was that the prosecutor was stating proper law.” See Kincaid v. State, 534 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex.Crim.App.1976) (<HOLDING>). But the trial court instructed the jury to
holding that trial courts failure to sustain objection to prosecutors misstatement of parole law to appellants detriment was harmful error and noting that jury assessed maximum penalty allowed holding trial courts error in overruling objection to prosecutors misstatement of law of intoxication that differed from definition in charge was harmless when there was evidence supporting the jurys verdict and it was presumed the jury followed the instructions in the charge holding that the prejudice prong of strickland was not met in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the prosecutors misstatement of law where the trial court properly instructed the jury holding that any prejudice resulting from a misstatement of the law by the prosecutor was cured by trial courts proper instruction on applicable law holding that any error in the prosecutors misstatement of the gjrand jjurys function was cured when the judge in effect granted the objection and allowed the attorney to correctly articulate the grand jurys function