corpus. In other words, because B.H.M. was not a party to the original suit affecting the parent-child relationship, his suit must be considered an original suit. Thus, J.P.K. suggests, much as the petitioners did in V.L.K., that application of the parental presumption, i.e., whether the suit is original or a modification, depends upon the identity of the parties. In V.L.K., the supreme court rejected this argument, holding that a determination on the applicability of the parental presumption, i.e., whether a suit is original or a modification, does not depend upon the parties’ identities, but the circumstances and the relief is sought. See V.L.K, 24 S.W.3d at 342-43 (recognizing that Legislature did not impose different burdens on parents versus nonparents, 829, 833 (Tex.1980) (<HOLDING>). First, it is undisputed there was a prior
holding where party fails to challenge specificity of pleading it waives right to claim that pleading fails to meet legal requirements holding that pleading rules are substantive recognizing that the federal pleading standard is a less stringent standard than the delaware pleading standard recognizing by citing several cases that diametric opposing lines of case law authority exist with one line suggesting that information need not allege each element of offense charged because notice pleading is sufficient distinguishing pleading elements from pleading facts holding that courts look to substance of plea for relief to determine nature of pleading not merely title of pleading