violate clearly established law, or (b) it was objectively reasonable for the defendant to believe that his action did not violate such law.” Salim v. Proulx, 93 F.3d 86, 89 (2d Cir.1996). Although qualified immunity is a question of law for the Court, if there are factual disputes that bear directly upon whether it was objectively reasonable for an official to believe that he was acting lawfully, these disputes must be resolved by a jury before the legal question can be addressed. See Stephenson v. Doe, 332 F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir.2003). Here, the district court properly granted summary judgment to defendant Anticev on the basis of qualified immunity because it was undisputed that Anticev did not enter or search Bonilla’s apartment. See Thomas v. Ashcroft, 470 F.3d 491, 496 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). The district court also properly granted
holding that to state  1983 claim against defendant plaintiff must allege that defendant was personally involved in or had direct responsibility for incidents that resulted in injury holding that individual liability under  1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation holding that plaintiffs in the absence of a contrary expression from congress  shall have an action under ftca against the united states as well as a bivens action against the individual officials alleged to have infringed their constitutional rights holding that a plaintiff in a bivens action must allege that the individual defendant was personally involved in the constitutional violation holding that defendant is entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff failed to allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right