have noted, determining whether a constitutional claim exists is an uncomfortable task where, as here, the answer depends upon a myriad of facts not yet fully developed. See Dirrane v. Brookline Police Dept. (1st Cir. 2002), 315 F.3d 65, 69-70; and Koch v. Town of Brattleboro (2nd Cir. 2002), 287 F.3d 162, 166. In those situations, some courts have resolved this difficulty by proceeding directly to the second stage of the Saucier analysis. See Koch, 287 F.3d at 166 (when convinced that the purported constitutional right violated was not “clearly established,” the court retains discretion to refrain from determining whether, under the first step of the Saucier test, a constitutional right has been violated at all); and Ehrlich v. Town of Glastonbury (2nd Cir. 2003), 348 F.3d 48, 56 (<HOLDING>); see also Santana v. Calderon (1st Cir. 2003),
recognizing that laws and regulations may bear upon the existence of a constitutional interest holding that if the resolution of a statelaw claim depends upon the meaning of a collectivebargaining agreement the application of state law  is preempted and federal laborlaw principles  necessarily uniform throughout the nation  must be  employed to resolve the dispute holding that a statelaw claim is preempted and removable from state court if resolution of the claim depends on an interpretation of the collectivebargaining agreement holding that the saucier test is not mandatory particularly at the pleading stage where facts must first be developed to determine whether a constitutional right was violate recognizing that moving to the second stage of the saucier analysis is appropriate when the existence of a constitutional violation depends upon the resolution of uncertain state law