points. It is undisputed that Chief Quijas was the sole decision maker with respect to Dunn’s termination, and Dunn has not come forward with any evidence that Chief Quijas was motivated by racial bias. Instead, Dunn asserts that Lieutenant Nunn, the officer who conducted the criminal investigation into Dunn’s conduct, was racially biased and that Chief Quijas’s decision was based on Nunn’s investigation. The court recognizes that “there are situations in which the forbidden motive of a subordinate employee can be imputed to an employer because under the circumstances of the case, the employer simply acted as the ‘cat’s paw of the subordinate.” Willis v. Marion County Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir. 997). See, e.g., Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Here, however, Dunn has failed to raise a
holding that city managers single unconstitutional action was sufficient for the imposition of municipal liability holding districtwide class certification not appropriate where the claims were based on oral conversations in which store managers allegedly deviated from company policy holding that if the review committee was unaware of district managers agebased animus and acted as the conduit of the managers prejudice  his cats paw  then innocence of the members would not spare the company from liability holding that under praprotnik a town charters directive that city managers personnel decisions be based on merit and fitness did not preclude city managers final policymaking authority where no other town officials were empowered to enforce that provision holding that affidavits from 25 of the potential class did not support the plaintiffs assertion of widespread violations resulting from a common policy or plan where allegation was that individual managers required employees to work offtheclock