fees does not allow attorney’s fees to be recovered against a municipal utility district. Tex.Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 38.001 (Vernon 1986). We agree. This issue has been decided in the District’s favor by the Austin Court of Appeals in Lake LBJ Municipal Utility District v. Coulson, 839 S.W.2d 880 (Tex.App.—Austin 1992, no writ) (interpreting former TexRev. Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 2226, since repealed). The Austin Court in Coulson held, in effect, that a municipal utility district was neither an individual nor a corporation such that a person could recover attorney’s fees against it, thus disagreeing with the opinion of the Beaumont Court of Appeals in Wickersham Ford, Inc. v. Orange County. Id. at 890-94; Wickersham Ford, 701 S.W.2d 344, 348-49 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1985, no writ) (<HOLDING>). We agree with the Austin Court that the term
holding that county defendant was a person within meaning of fca for purposes of suit by private plaintiff holding that a police department is not a person within the meaning of section 1983 holding that orange county is a person within meaning of former texrevcivstatann art 2226 holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of  1983 holding that a state was embraced within the meaning of the word person  where the word person was defined as meaning and including a partnership association company or corporation as well as a natural person