2052. B. Prejudice The prejudice prong requires Mr. Mooneyham to demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for the counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366. A “‘reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. That requires a ‘substantial,’ not just ‘conceivable,’ likelihood of a different result.’ ” Heard v. Addison, 728 F.3d 1170, 1176 (10th Cir.2013) (quoting Cullen v. Pinholster, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1403, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011)). Mr. Mooneyham asserted in the district court that he would have rejected the plea offer “but for counsel’s error.” R. vol. 1, at 267. This assertion is inadequate under the circumstances. See Heard, 728 F.3d at 1184 (<HOLDING>) (quoting Miller v. Champion, 262 F.3d 1066,
holding that to satisfy the prejudice prong a petitioner must establish that but for counsels errors there is a reasonable probabil ity the result of the proceeding would have been different holding in the context of a plea that the strickland prejudice prong requires a defendant to demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial holding that a  mere allegation that the petitioner would have insisted on trial but for his counsels errors  is ultimately insufficient to justify relief holding that the defendant could not prove prejudice from alleged ineffective assistance because he has never claimed that but for counsels errors he would have pleaded not guilty and insisted upon going to trial holding that to show prejudice in a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors the result of the proceeding would have been different