of the Dent property and they could not be held to have released those constituents simply because, unbeknownst to them and beyond any means of their control, the substances were leaching onto their property from their release point on the Koppers property by subsurface migration. Strict liability could not, therefore, be imposed upon them for the release of those constituents under any of the relevant “liable person” provisions of § 107(a)(l)-(4). See United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265, 1280 (3d Cir.1993) (recognizing that upon proof that a hazardous substance found on a site could not be “fairly attributable” to a party sued under § 107(a), that party’s properly “apportioned share would be zero”); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 270 (3d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); cf. Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons
holding that a party may not raise a new claim in its response to a dispositive motion holding that potentially liable party could avoid all liability by proving its released hazardous substances did not contribute to response costs holding that investigatory costs are considered costs of response under cercla holding that arranger liability claim requires proof that defendant arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances owned or possessed by defendant holding that a municipal sewer system that leaked hazardous waste could rely on a thirdparty defense to avoid liability under cercla