of credit as a payment device depends upon its independence from the transaction of which it is a part.” Sun Marine Terminals, 797 S.W.2d at 10. We hold that the district court abused her discretion in enjoining Synergy from presenting the letter of credit. Acceleration Clause The district court also temporarily enjoined Synergy from “directly or indirectly attempting to declare [Lone Star] to be in default of its payment obligations under the ... lease.” Lone Star argues that the district court did not abuse her discretion in so enjoining Synergy because Lone Star established a probable right of recovery on its allegation that the lease’s acceleration clause is an unenforceable penalty. See Walling, 863 S.W.2d at 58 (citing Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 424 S.W.2d 216, 218 (Tex.1968)) (<HOLDING>); Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 24
holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting such a temporary injunction holding that trial court may grant temporary injunction if applicant demonstrates probable right to recover damages and probable injury in time before trial holding in part that the trial court abused its discretion in granting a temporary injunction in the absence of a showing that the plaintiff did not have an adequate remedy at law holding that when a trial court determines that the amount of damages awarded by a jury is excessive the court may either suggest remittitur or grant a new trial on the issue of damages holding that the trial court may not grant summary judgment on a ground not raised in the motion