attention of the panel. However, Defendant has now obtained and presented evidence that, assuming authenticity, shows he was indeed sentenced on the same date for both of his prior drug trafficking convictions. Based on this new evidence, and in light of defense counsel’s failure to assist Defendant in litigating this issue on direct appeal, we will depart from our general rule against considering on habeas an issue that was disposed of on direct appeal. Cf. United States v. Alvarez, 142 F.3d 1243, 1247 (10th Cir.1998) (noting that we will depart from the law-of-the-case doctrine “when the evidence in a subsequent trial is substantially different” or “when the decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice”); Johnson v. Champion, 288 F.3d 1215, 1226 (10th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). The government further argues Defendant’s
holding that a prisoners failure to pursue an appeal in state court is a procedural bar to federal habeas relief unless the petitioner shows both cause for failing to bring the state claim  and actual prejudice from the failure to consider his federal claims holding that it would be inappropriate to predict whether state law would foreclose state postconviction review of the petitioners habeas claim where the state permitted second or successive state petitions when the procedural bar would result in fundamental injustice holding it would be manifestly unjust to adhere to a clearly erroneous finding that imposed an unnecessary procedural hurdle on a state habeas petitioner holding that a petitioner should be permitted to seek habeas review in state court even if there were doubt that the states substantive law would permit a habeas petition holding that a state procedural default will not bar consideration of a federal claim on habeas review unless the last state court rendering a judgment clearly and expressly stated that its judgment rested on a state procedural bar