the Jones Act, not the seafarer’s agreement. As initial matter, we note that the arbitration clause, by its terms, is not limited to “disputes arising out of or in connection with [the seafarer’s] agreement.” It also requires arbitration of “any and all disputes arising out of ... Seafarer’s service on the vessel.” Montero maintains that this language is not broad enough to encompass his suit, which he alleges arose out “the shoreside doctor’s negligence.” We reject that argument. Montero’s complaint raised four claims, two of which alleged Jones Act negligence, one of which alleged unseaworthiness, and one of which asserted a cause of action for maintenance and cure. But for Montero’s service on the vessel, none of those claims would have been viable. See Doe, 657 F.3d at 1220-21 (<HOLDING>); see also O’Boyle v. United States, 993 F.2d
holding that claims arising under the age discrimination in employment act may be subject to arbitration holding that the status exception extends to termination proceedings because the tjermination of parental rights is nothing more than a determination of the legal status between the natural parent and the child holding that claims arising under the jones act and allegations of unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure are dependent on the plaintiffs status as a seaman employed by the cruise line and the rights that she derives from that employment status holding that although samesex partner may have been able to prove her status as a de facto parent such status was not sufficient to establish parental rights to custody and visitation over the objection of the biological mother holding that filing an answer  does not invoke the status as a defendant in plaintiffs lawsuit