Warehouse appears to have misread Tamar rac. Although the Tamarac court stated that one of the three issues raised by the city was whether Tamarac “possessed a sufficient property interest in its existing liquor licenses to require procedural due process rights prior to any refusal to renew the licenses,” 310 N.W.2d at 477, the court failed to reach that issue because it decided the ease on other grounds. Thus the Tamarac court did not even consider whether there is a property interest in a liquor license. Moreover, in Hymanson v. City of St. Paul, the Minnesota Supreme Court expressly stated that “[u]n-der Minnesota law, there is no property right in a liquor license.” 329 N.W.2d 324, 326 n. 1 (Minn.1983); see also Paron v. City of Shakopee, 226 Minn. 222, 32 N.W.2d 603, 607-08 (1948) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, our independent research has
holding that bond and miller did not apply because the plaintiff was appointed to the city council by the mayor rather than elected by the public holding a recidivist may be justifiably punished more severely than a firsttime offender holding that city council had discretion to approve applications for liquor licenses and that liquor license holder was no more entitled to renewal than firsttime applicant holding that city is not liable for inaccessible restaurants and liquor stores it licenses holding that an employment contract between an outgoing city council and the city manager was void on public policy grounds because it attempted to take away the governmental or legislative power of the incoming council to appoint and remove public officers