442 (2004) (“Ring announced a new procedural rule that does not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review.”); McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1258 (11th Cir.2001) (“Therefore, like these other circuits, we hold that the new constitutional rule of criminal procedure announced in Apprendi does not apply retroactively on collateral review.”). Nevertheless, Mr. Howell contends that he should be able to rely on Apprendi and Ring because Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), expanded and clarified Apprendi and the Supreme Court has yet to decide whether Blakely is retroactive. Unfortunately for Mr. Howell, his Blakely argument is now foreclosed by our precedent. See Varela v. United States, 400 F.3d 864, 866-68 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Mr. Howell is not entitled to relief on
holding that united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 did nothing to alter the rule that judges cannot depart below a statutorily provided minimum sentence except upon the governments motion on the basis of substantial assistance holding that the changes in sentencing law imposed by united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 did not render waiver of appeal involuntary and unknowing holding that blakely and united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 are not retroactive on collateral review holding that waiver of right to appeal in plea agreement entered into before united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 was not invalidated by change in law effected by that case and that booker error fell within scope of waiver holding that waiver of right to appeal sentence in plea agreement accepted before decision in united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 was not invalidated by change in law