address seria-tim. The initial motion to dismiss, filed only by defendant Pereira on October 11, 2005 (docket entry 7), seeks dismissal of the complaint on diverse grounds. Pereira first avers that the complaint is time barred under Puerto Rico’s one-year statute of limitations. That claim is patently spurious, since the previous action filed by plaintiff in federal court on September 16, 2003, Civil No. 03-2001(JP), was not the object of a disciplinary dismissal, as defendant represents, but rather voluntarily dismissed by plaintiff through a motion filed on March 31, 2004. Plaintiff, thus, had one year since the filing of the motion for voluntary dismissal to re-file his action, which he timely did on March 31, 2005. See Garcia Aponte v. E.L.A., 135 D.P.R. 37, 1994 WL 909243 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Pereira next argues that all claims for
holding that the period of limitations starts to run anew on the date the notice of dismissal is filed in the court holding that the statute of limitations begins to run on the date the alleged malpractice is discovered holding the sixyear limitations period begins to run upon date that payment is made recognizing that revival causes the statute of limitations clock to run anew holding that the limitations period for  1983 actions arising in ohio is the twoyear period found in ohio rev code  230510 and that the limitations period starts to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action 