who had failed the Arizona bar exam filed suit against the members of the Committee on Examinations and Admissions alleging that the manner in which they graded the exam violated the Sherman Act. Although the individual members of the Committee were the named defendants, the Court concluded that the suit was barred by Parker’s state-action exception because the “Arizona Supreme Court necessarily delegated the administration of the admissions process to the Committee ... and retained the sole authority to determine who should be admitted to the practice of law in Arizona.” .Id. at 573, 104 S.Ct. 1989. Accordingly, the conduct being “challenge[d] was in reality that of the Arizona Supreme Court.” Id.; cf. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790, 95 S.Ct. 2004, 44 L.Ed.2d 572 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Here, Mothershed alleges that Arizona Supreme
holding that a minimum fee schedule enforced by the virginia state bar did not fall within the parker exception because the fee schedule was not mandated by the virginia supreme court and thus it could not fairly be said that the state of virginia through its supreme court rules required the anticompetitive activities holding that the plan for erecting a chinese wall within a commonwealths attorneys office does not eliminate any potential imputed conflicts arising under rules of the supreme court of virginia pt 6  ii dr 5105 recognizing that  the virginia supreme court has consistently applied the one year statute of limitation  to defamation actions  holding that the doctrine of legislative immunity did not bar prospective  injunctive relief against the chief justice of the virginia supreme court insofar as he was acting to enforce rather than legislate disciplinary rules holding that the court had the power to enforce a 12 million judgment recommended by a special master and adopted by the court in favor of virginia and against west virginia