insulate Defendants from potential liability for past breaches of their fiduciary duties. 2. Limitation of the Class to Polaroid Stockholders Defendants also contend that Plaintiffs are not suing on behalf of the Plan “as a whole” and that their claims are accordingly barred by Russell. In particular, Defendants argue that because Plaintiffs sue only on behalf of those Plan participants whose accounts were invested in Polaroid stock, any benefits would not accrue to the Plan as a whole, but rather to those individuals who owned Polaroid stock during the Class Period. Although the Second Circuit has not yet spoken to this issue, Defendants’ argument runs against the prevailing grain of authority. See, e.g., In re Schering-Plough Corp. ERISA Litig., 420 F.3d 231, 234-35 (3d Cir. 2005) (<HOLDING>); Kuper v. Iovenko, 66 F.3d 1447, 1453 (6th
holding that professionals who advised the plan were not fiduciaries because they had no decision making authority over the plan or plan assets also noting that the power to act for the plan is essential to status as a fiduciary holding that where plaintiffs alleged that the plan suffered significant losses and requested that fiduciaries make good to the plan the losses to the plan they need not seek to recover for all plan participants allegedly injured by the fiduciary breach recognizing that plan participants should be able to access information about the plan administrators fiduciary duties from the plan administrators counsel holding that a subclass of plan participants could sue where the remedy sought by plaintiffs would benefit the plan as a whole and  cure any harm that the plan suffered holding that plan participants cannot establish standing to seek money damages where the plan has substantial surplus assets or the plan sponsor is financially capable of making up any losses suffered by the plan citing harley 284 f3d at 906