with his inconsistent testimony at the first trial. In order to bootstrap an allegation of prejudice stemming from Arzoo-manian’s testimony, Gary argues that his second trial was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. This suggestion that double jeopardy prohibits a second trial because of the unknowing presentation of purportedly perjured testimony by a prosecutor is wholly unsupported by ease law. Indeed, courts have held that prosecutorial misconduct must rise to an egregious level for double jeopardy to bar a retrial. A defendant cannot be retried only “where the misconduct of the prosecutor is undertaken ... to prevent an acquittal that [he] believed at the time was likely to occur in the absence of his misconduct.” United States v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912, 916 (2d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2414, 124
holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met recognizing that the federal pleading standard is a less stringent standard than the delaware pleading standard holding that even if the standard for waiver is clear the standard was not met holding that the jeopardy clause bars retrial when the prosecution failed to supply sufficient evidence to merit conviction holding that fact that conviction has been overturned at defendants behest removes double jeopardy bar to increased sentence after retrial