this case was perfected on appeal, resolved, in UCFAA’s favor, some of the arguments raised by the Planchers in opposition to UCFAA's claim of entitlement to limited sovereign immunity. 104 So.3d at 359. The supreme court specifically rejected the argument that the lack of a statutory declaration precludes a corporation from being considered a state agency or subdivision pursuant to section 768.28(2), finding that a corporation formed by the Jacksonville Transit Authority was entitled to sovereign immunity as "a state agenc[y] or subdivision! ] under section 768.28(2) because it primarily acts as an instrumentality of JTA,” despite the lack of a statute specifically authorizing its formation. Id. at 368-69; see also Mingo v. ARA Health Servs., Inc., 638 So.2d 85, 86 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (<HOLDING>). 7 .Pursuant to section 1004.28(l)(a), Florida
holding a state agency as an arm of the state cannot constitute a person under  1983 because it is a sovereign entity holding that a lack of a waiver of sovereign immunity deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction holding that in the absence of a statute providing immunity the defense of sovereign immunity is not available to a municipal corporation in an action for damages alleged to be caused by the tortious conduct of the municipality recognizing that in certain circumstances inquiry notice may be determined as a matter of law recognizing that while the lack of an express statute granting sovereign immunity precludes such immunity as a matter of law the entity in question could still be determined to be acting as an agency of the state under the facts and circumstances of a particular relationship