class actions and medical malpractice claims, made applicable to pending causes of action. See id. The majority of House Bill 4 did not apply to pending cases, but applied only to those cases filed after its general effective date — September 1, 2003. Id. § 23.02(d), 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws at 899. Even if one accepts the dissent’s view that the Statute is remedial in the sense that it merely deprives Satterfield of a remedy for her accrued and pending claims against Crown Cork, the Statute would still be unconstitutional because it applies retroactively and fails to provide Satterfield, and other potential claimants, a reasonable time to bring suit after the enactment of the new law and preserve their vested rights. See Baker Hughes, Inc. v. Keco R. & D., Inc., 12 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex.1999) (<HOLDING>); Mellinger, 3 S.W. at 254-55 (same); see also
holding that habeas petitions challenging judgments of conviction that became final before the effective date of the aedpa are not time barred if filed within one year from aedpas effective date april 241996 holding retroactive application of the act to prosecution that was pending before the effective date of the act was precluded because the act is prospective holding that guidelines did not become effective until adopted by the legislature on july 1 1984 and those who committed their offenses before the effective date must affirmatively elect to be sentenced under the guidelines holding that procedural or remedial statutes may not be applied to pending suits at the time they become effective if doing so would destroy or impair rights that vested before the statutes effective date holding that the commission on remand can set the effective date of a rate to be the effective date of the original commission activity