its own cross-elasticity analysis to demonstrate the district court’s approach is wrong. It merely asserts the court’s definition was inadequately supported and thus cannot stand. But this issue was for Buccaneer to resolve in the first instance, and the district court’s independent foray into market definition does not absolve Buccaneer of that burden. See Campfield, 532 F.3d at 1118. And the cases Buccaneer relies upon, in which this court reversed trial courts’ market definitions as inadequately supported by interchangeability and cross-elasticity principles, do not suggest otherwise. See Telecor, 305 F.3d at 1131-32; Westman Comm’n Co. v. Hobart Int’l, Inc., 796 F.2d 1216, 1221 (10th Cir. 1986). In fact, Telecor squarely cuts against Buccaneer’s position. See 305 F.3d at 1131-32 (<HOLDING>). Finally, even if we could infer from the
holding that the burden is on the plaintiff to allege facts sufficient to establish jurisdiction holding summary judgment appropriate where plaintiff failed to establish product identification holding district court erred in granting summary judgment for plaintiff as to scope of relevant product market because plaintiff had not alleged sufficient facts to satisfy its burden of showing products were interchangeable holding that district court did not err in summarily granting defendants motion for summary judgment pursuant to local rule where pro se plaintiff failed to respond to motion after district court had warned plaintiff that it would deem his failure to respond a consent to granting of motion holding plaintiff to his burden of persuasion on appeal of summary judgment