order of the court by the contumacious party, a failure to award attorney’s fees serves to diminish the force of the decree if the entitled party is not in a position to obtain counsel. Furthermore, where the party responsible for compliance with the previous decree forces new litigation to be filed in order to gain the party’s compliance, an award of attorney’s fees is appropriate. (Internal citations and quotation marks omitted). See also Holloway v. Holloway, 865 So.2d 382, 383 (¶ 3) (Miss.Ct.App.2003) (finding no abuse of discretion where the chancellor did not specifically hold the husband in contempt but still awarded the wife some of her attorney’s fees incurred in the prosecution of her contempt motion); Russell v. Russell, 724 So.2d 1061, 1066 (¶ 24) (Miss.Ct.App.1998) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 30. As the record reflects, although the
recognizing that a school district must be a prevailing party in order to be entitled to attorneys fees under the idea holding in modification suit in which no enforcement was ordered that trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering father to pay mothers attorneys fees as child support under the necessaries rule recognizing that under a limited exception attorneys fees may be recovered by a party who gains enforcement of a previous support order even when no contempt is ordered holding that attorneys fees under adea may not be recovered against a defendant who was not an employer of the plaintiff holding attorneys fees not generally recoverable unless party prevails under cause of action for which attorneys fees are recoverable and damages are recovered