pre-trial release on April 12, 1985. Although this appeal has received expedited review, a decision has not yet been rendered by the Second Circuit. Thus a total of only fifty-six (56) non-excludable days have elapsed since Leon was arrested and detained (assuming that the filing of Elba Rodriguez’s omnibus motion stopped the clock as to all the co-defendants). DISCUSSION Leon’s first argument is based upon the interpretation of Section 3164(b) itself, which provides that, “[t]he periods of delay enumerated in Section 3161(h) are excluded in computing the time limitations specified in this section.” Leon argues that this sent C.Cir.1976) and United States v. Mejias, 417 F.Supp. 579 (S.D.N.Y.1976), aff'd. on other grounds, sub nom., United States v. Martinez, 538 F.2d 921 (2d Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>). According to the House Report accompanying
holding generally that new rules of law should not be applied retroactively in habeas corpus cases holding that a court examining if a law should be applied retroactively should consider whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment holding that the first amendment definition should be applied by analogy in the franks setting holding that factor 10 should not be applied when the victim is the only one at risk holding that the exclusions should be applied