access to the courts and inadequate medical treatment do not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, -, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 2180-82, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (noting that an inmate must demonstrate “actual injury” by showing that the denial of legal resources hindered his efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous claim); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1978-79, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (requiring conscious disregard of a known, serious risk to inmate health or safety to establish a constitutional violation). Nor is Mapp’s claim relating to loss of personal property or his challenge to the disal-lowance of good time credits cognizable under § 1983. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532-33, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3203-04, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-90,
holding that deprivation of property does not violate due process if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy is available and explaining that state tort actions are meaningful postdeprivation remedies holding that if adequate administrative remedies are available it is improper to seek relief in court before those remedies are exhausted holding that when there are no other remedies it is appropriate for the courts to imply one under the state constitution holding the deprivation of the inmates property interest in his mail is not a cognizable constitutional injury given the availability of adequate state postdeprivation remedies under new york law internal quotation marks omitted holding that deprivation of personal property does not violate the constitution if there are adequate state remedies available