not have acquired any executory obligations towards Brunson because his employment was terminable at will misses the point. Brunson is not suing to enforce an ex-ecutory obligation but to recover compensation for services which he has already fully performed, allegedly in reliance on promises made to him in advance of such performance. Compare Alston v. Brown Transport Corp., 182 Ga. App. 632 (356 SE2d 517) (1987); Murphine v. Hosp. Auth. of Floyd County, 151 Ga. App. 722 (261 SE2d 457) (1979). Brunson would not have been required to give the company “additional” consideration over and above the performance of his job as a sales representative in order to accept the offer created by these alleged promises. Compare Management Search v. Morgan, 136 Ga. App. 651 (222 SE2d 154) (1975) (<HOLDING>). Similarly misplaced is C. B. A.’s reliance on
holding that under the mwa the question of whether an employee was an independent contractor or an employee was a question of statutory interpretation holding that an employers promise to pay a bonus to an employee was not enforceable where the employee was already obligated under a written contract to perform the services in question holding that employee may claim contract created based on employer promise of severance pay to employee holding that under texas law a contract may be terminable at will and without cause but an employer cannot promise to pay employee a certain wage and then unilaterally decide to pay employee less for work she has already performed holding that res judicata properly barred claims based on an employers decision to terminate an employee because the termination was not a fresh act of discrimination rather it was the same decision not to allow the employee to return to work that the employee had challenged previously