of a proceeding.” Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242, 110 S.Ct. 2822, 111 L.Ed.2d 193 (1990) (internal quotations omitted)(emphasis original). Apprendi is not of this • magnitude because it is not clear that a jury would reach a substantially different conclusion than would a judge on drug quantity, and the elements of a possessory drug offense that are most difficult to prove, such as intent to distribute, have always needed to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See e.g., Goode, 39 Fed. Appx. at 158; Sanders, 247 F.3d at 149. Supreme Court precedent suggests that Apprendi does not satisfy the watershed exception. First, in Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495, 110 S.Ct. 1257, 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990), the Court cited Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (<HOLDING>) as an example of the type of new
holding that a parents statutory right to counsel in termination proceedings guarantees the right to effective counsel holding no right to counsel for capital defendants in state habeas proceedings recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel holding that defendants have a right to counsel in criminal proceedings holding that a defendant does not have the right to be represented by counsel in postconviction proceedings which are civil proceedings