marks and citations omitted); see also Eastern Enters, v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 118 S.Ct. 2131, 141 L.Ed.2d 451 (1998); Greenbrier, 193 F.3d at 1356-57. For purposes of this appeal we accept, but do not decide, that B & G’s vending machine contracts may constitute “property.” See Greenbrier, 193 F.3d at 1357. Even if B & G’s contracts are property rights and were affected by the government’s actions, we conclude that a taking did not occur. We agree with the government that California did not act as an agent of the United States by enacting the section 22960 vending machine restrictions and that the United States is therefore not responsible for that law’s interference with B & G’s vending machine contracts as a matter of law. “Agency is th Ct.Cl. 593, 372 F.2d 505, 507 (1967) (<HOLDING>). Like the grants in Griggs and D.R. Smalley,
holding that the county government not the federal government was liable for the taking of an air easement over plaintiffs property even though the airport was funded in part by a federal grant based on compliance with federal regulations holding that the federal government was liable for a taking of property where city of burlington acted under federal authority holding that the federal government was liable for a taking of property where california officials acting under the authority of a federal order occupied land holding that the conditional grant of federal funds to ohio for highway projects did not make the federal government liable for ohios acts or omissions holding that ohio high school athletic association was not a recipient of federal funds because it did not receive direct federal assistance and it did not receive money from local schools who were recipients of federal assistance