herself, you may consider such false statement as circumstantial evidence from which consciousness of guilt may be inferred” — was proper, see, e.g., United States v. Glenn, 312 F.3d 58, 69 (2d Cir. 2002), and was not, as Guevara contends, “an extensive negative instruction.” Guevara’s third argument is that the district court improperly attributed to her 300, as opposed to 100, grams of heroin with respect to the September 2, 1999 transaction, which she brokered. There is no dispute that the deal for the sale and purchase of 300 grams of heroin brokered by Guevara was not consummated for this amount solely as a result of the government’s unilateral decision to purchase a reduced quantity, that is 100 grams, of heroin. Because Guevara intended to and was capable of brokering a ir.1994) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Alaga, 995 F.2d 380, 383 (2d
holding that the quantity of drugs involved in an offense does not support a downward departure because the legislature intended the quantity of drugs to be a determining factor in varying penalties holding that the quantity of drugs negotiated was properly attributed to the broker even though the seller ultimately could not supply the requested amount holding that a person who obtains drugs from a seller is not an accomplice of the seller holding that it was up to the jury to decide whether the broker and seller understood the property to be sold where the listing agreement erroneously indicated a property description was attached but the seller testified the broker knew what property was to be sold holding that the quantity of drugs may not be used to support a departure