the fact that its analysis of whether the Ingram’s job performance justified the pay differential leads to the question of Merrill Lynch’s intent even though the EPA is a strict liability statute. The Settlement states that Merrill Lynch can rebut Class-wide statistical evidence of discrimination “with evidence related to the individual Claimant’s case.” (R. 112, Settlement ¶ 7.11(8)(e).) In addition, some appellate courts consider whether the employee’s actual job performance justified the pay differential, rather than only considering whether a job-wide wage disparity between male and female employees was due to a bona fide job evaluation system. See, e.g., Ryduchowski, 203 F.3d at 144, Ambrose v. Summit Polymers, Inc., No. 05-1048, 2006 WL 797939, at *5-6 (6th Cir. Mar.24, 2006) (<HOLDING>). Ingram herself raises the issue of Merrill
holding plaintiffs burden was to show that the misconduct for which she was discharged was nearly identical to that engaged in by a male employee whom her employer retained internal quotation omitted holding that a plaintiff can show that she is qualified by presenting credible evidence that she continued to possess the objective qualifications she held when she was hired holding that a plaintiff could not proceed on her procedural due process claim brought under  1983 because she did not show that she had exhausted her state law remedies or alleged that those remedies were inadequate holding that because the plaintiffs skills had deteriorated during the period she claims she was paid less than a male employee who performed equal work the plaintiff was not entitled to proceed further under the epa holding that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she was unable to present evidence that she was qualified for the position