that the sentencing judge could have considered appellant’s statement only for the purposes of lowering her sentence. There is no support for such a proposition. If the judge had the authority to adjust appellant’s sentence downward, he had the authority to adjust it upward. 5 . The district court warned appellant that she was becoming "defiant” part way through her second statement. Appellant then continued to sp 91, 1094 (11th Cir.2000) (same); United States v. González, 163 F.3d 255, 263-64 (5th Cir.1998) (same); United States v. Abreu-Cabrera, 64 F.3d 67, 73-74 (2d Cir.1995) (same); United States v. Layman, 116 F.3d 105, 108-09 (4th Cir.1994) (same); United States v. Townsend, 33 F.3d 1230, 1231 (10th Cir.1994) (same); with United States v. Clay, 37 F.3d 338, 340 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). This circuit has not decided this issue, but
holding that timely filing of rule 35c predecessor to rule 35a  motion renders otherwise final order of district court nonfinal until disposition of that motion holding that once a sentence is imposed it is a valid final judgment until it is reversed or vacated holding that oral imposition of sentence begins seven day clock for rule 35c holding that a sentence is not imposed until judgment enters for purposes of rule 35c recognizing that a criminal prosecution is not complete until a sentence has been imposed