the fair market value of assets” at the time immediately before the discharge of the debt. 26 U.S.C. § 108(d)(3); see Merkel v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 192 F.3d 844 n. 3 (9th Cir.1999) (applying definition). The overall effect of these provisions is that, at the end of the 25-year period, a participant in the ICRP will experience a taxable event only to the extent that, after the discharge, her assets exceed her liabilities. See 26 U.S.C. § 108(a)(1)(B), (a)(3), (d)(3); Toberman v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 294 F.3d 985, 988 (8th Cir.2002)(quoting Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 310 n. 11, 103 S.Ct. 1826, 75 L.Ed.2d 863 (1983)). Accordingly, it was legal error for the Bankruptcy Court to hold that “participation in the program would result in a tax liability,” because .Tex.2007)(<HOLDING>). There are possible circumstances in which
holding that seeking out loan consolidation options such as the icrp is an important component of the good faith inquiry under the brunner test holding that a debtors ability to make reduced payments under the icrp is relevant to the inquiry of whether the debtors reasonable future financial resources will cover payment of the debt while still allowing a minimal standard of living holding that while the creditor has the initial burden to produce some evidence of lack of good faith the ultimate burden is on the debtor to prove his good faith holding when applying the brunner test that while not a per se indication of a lack of good faith debtors decision not to take advantage of the icrp is probative of her intent to repay the loans holding lack of prejudice to the defendant is not good cause