in court.” Crooker, 763 F.2d at 17. Awarding fees to Mr. Demarest would not further the statutory purpose. The statute attempts to enable meritorious litigation to take place, not to reward individuals who obtain legal redress. While Mr. Demarest’s pro se efforts have been successful, see Demarest v. Manspeaker, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 599, 112 L.Ed.2d 608 (1991), they do not entitle him to compensation. As we said in Turman v. Tuttle, 711 F.2d 148, 149 (10th Cir.1983), the policy supporting fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is “not to compensate pro se litigants but to enable litigants with valid claims to present their claims without having to bear the burden of the costs.” The Supreme Court endorsed this view of § 1988 in Kay v. Ehrler, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1435, 1437, 113 L.Ed.2d 486 (1991) (<HOLDING>). We see no reason to hold differently in the
holding a pro per litigant to the same standard as an attorney holding attorneys fees not available to pro se attorney litigant in a federal freedom of information act action holding a court can restrict future pro se pleadings if it first provides a pro se litigant notice and an opportunity to respond holding that a pro se litigant who is an attorney is not entitled to fees under  1988 holding that a pro se attorney is ineligible for attorneys fees under 42 usc  1988 despite handling his professional responsibilities  in a competent manner