to connect his marijuana plants to the drug-running conspiracy, along with the fact that the evidence is, according to Stanley, highly prejudicial, renders that evidence irrelevant and inadmissible. Bound by this court’s holding in United States v. Kaufman, we disagree. See 858 F.2d 994, 1005 (5th Cir.1988), reh’g denied, 874 F.2d 242 (1989). In Kaufman, where the defendant challenged admission of his prior conviction for possession of marijuana, the court held that the conviction was admissible to show intent for importing marijuana. Id. (“Kissell’s earlier conviction for possession of marijuana was certainly similar enough to the charge of importing marijuana in the instant case to shed light on [his] intent.”); see United States v. Haynes, 881 F.2d 586, 589-90 (8th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Brookins, 919 F.2d
holding that plea to multidefendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment holding that evidence of defendants prior operation of weed houses showed involvement in cocaine conspiracy holding that simple possession of cocaine is not lesser included offense of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute holding that circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to support a cocaine conspiracy conviction holding that the statute of limitations did not commence  despite the filing of a prior complaint against another physician  until the defendants deposition made the plaintiff aware of the defendants involvement in the decedents death where the plaintiff failed to discover the defendants involvement because of the defendants misstatement concealment or fraud