in the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and Miranda and focus solely on judicial interpretation of "custodial interrogation” as used in Miranda. We limit our analysis accordingly. See Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 520, 526 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) ("The warnings provided in Section 2(a) are virtually identical to the Miranda warnings” and "are required only when there is custodial interrogation” as construed in Miranda.). 9 . We refer to the Innis test as the "should-have-known test.” 10 . See also Jones v. State, 795 S.W.2d 171, 172 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) ("[W]e hold the police questioning incident to the videotaped sobriety test was 'activity normally attendant to arrest and custody’ of a DWI suspect, not 'interrogation.' ”); McGinty v. State, 723 S.W.2d 719, 722 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) (<HOLDING>). 11 . Four justices concurred on other grounds
holding that custodial interrogation by police must not occur prior to suspect being informed of his or her right to counsel and against selfincrimination holding that miranda does not apply to statements of the defendant which are voluntary and unsolicited and not the product of custodial interrogation holding that a refusal to sign an implied consent form is not a refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test for purposes of section 1547 holding that denial of an independent chemical test after defendant refused to submit to a policeadministered test did not violate due process holding that refusal to submit to breathalyzer test did not result from custodial interrogation