is a critical difference between being the intended beneficiary of an estate and being the intended beneficiary of a contract between a lawyer and his client.’ ” 349 Md. at 754, 709 A.2d at 1276 (quoting Copenhaver v. Rogers, 238 Va. 361, 384 S.E.2d 593, 596 (1989)). A number of jurisdictions, some of which do not ordinarily subscribe to the strict privity theory, have decided the same issue before this Court and have held, as a matter of law, that beneficiaries under a will do not have standing to sue the personal representative’s attorney. See, e.g., Goldberg, 266 Cal.Rptr. at 489 (applying the balancing of factors test); Hopkins v. Akins, 637 A.2d 424, 428-29 (D.C.1993)(applying the strict privity rule); Neal v. Baker, 194 Ill.App.3d 485, 141 Ill.Dec. 517, 519, 551 N.E.2d 704, 706(<HOLDING>), appeal denied, 132 Ill.2d 546, 144 IlLDec.
holding that plaintiff could not prevail as a thirdparty beneficiary where contract was not valid holding that the governments cooperation with a thirdparty is not sufficient to establish a thirdparty beneficiary relationship recognizing common law cause of action as thirdparty beneficiary holding employer thirdparty beneficiary could compel arbitration holding that the thirdparty beneficiary theory did not apply