confinement in Close Management violates his rights to due process. Specifically, he argues that he has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in returning to the general prison population. The state responds that he was given a constitutionally adequate hearing when he was committed to administrative confinement prior to his transfer to CM; that his CM status has been reviewed on a periodic basis; and that he has been afforded the opportunity to express his views regarding his CM status. We believe petitioner’s procedural due process rights and his substantive due process rights were violated. 1. Procedural Process Generally, a prisoner has a protected liberty interest in remaining in the general population. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (<HOLDING>); See Parker v. Cook, 642 F.2d 865, 867-68 (5th
holding that placement in disciplinary segregation does not implicate a liberty interest because it falls within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a sentence holding that the plaintiffs disciplinary segregated confinement for thirty days did not present the type of atypical significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest holding that placing a prisoner in disciplinary confinement clearly effects liberty interest holding that an inmates mandamus petition challenging a disciplinary report imposing 15 days disciplinary confinement was a collateral criminal proceeding because the disciplinary confinement limited petitioners ability to earn gain time recognizing a liberty interest in reasonably safe conditions of confinement