hearing and the trial court again reiterated that the motion for leave was denied. We disagree with Summersett’s premise that the trial court allowed the motion to dismiss to be filed so that it could be overruled by operation of law. First, the foregoing colloquy indicates that the trial court retracted his original statement that he would “rule that it is dismissed by operation of law,” thus the record does not show an express ruling that the motion to dismiss was denied by operation of law and it certainly does not invoke the right to appeal embodied in section 27.008 as suggested by Summersett. Second, even if we were to conclude otherwise, we are not bound by a trial court’s conclusion on an issue of law. See BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex.2002) (<HOLDING>). A trial court’s denial of a mo tion for leave
holding that where both the appellate and trial courts are reviewing the paper record  there is no reason for the appellate courts to defer to the trial courts finding holding that appellate courts may review trial courts legal conclusions to determine their correctness holding that trial courts determination of facts has a presumption of correctness but trial courts legal conclusions are subject to de novo review holding that on review of a motion to suppress the appellate court is to give deference to a trial courts factual findings but legal conclusions are reviewed de novo holding appellate courts must consider the trial courts jury charge as a whole