A. The Limited Scope of the Second Trial Was Mandated by the Superior Court Opinion Interlake’s chief complaint, the one that generated so much pretrial appellate activity, is that I did not permit re-litigation of the product liability claim on which Rice prevailed in the first trial. It argues that to the extent that the Superior Court opinion addressed Interlake’s right to present evidence on its “defenses,” it remanded for a complete new trial on all issues, and that I improperly limited the scope of the proceedings to damages and to the cross-claims. Interlake contends that extant authority holds that limited re-trials are disfavored; Rice argues that this is not so. See e.g, Quinbyv. Plumsteadville Family Practice Inc., 589 Pa. 183, 210-11, 907 A.2d 1061, 1077-78 (2006) (<HOLDING>); McNeil v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas
holding that superior court erred in granting judgment nov and remanding for a new trial generally holding that trial court may grant judgment nov on grounds other than that presented in motion for judgment nov so long as the party receiving such relief did file motion holding that superior courts erred in granting judgment nov on a wrongful death claim and remanding for new trial on that claim and on damages holding that superior court erred in reversing trial courts order granting new trial and remanding for a new trial limited to apportionment of damages holding that trial court erred by granting a directed verdict on statute of limitations defense and remanding for a new trial on the statute of limitations only