(“[a]lthough due process requires schools and colleges to base their suspension and dismissal decisions on substantial evidence, the standard of review ■on appeal is whether there is some evidence to support the decision of the school or college disciplinary board.”). Although Marshall’s argument that more process was potentially warranted in his case is compelling, particularly with regard to the seemingly deficient eviden-tiary standard applied by the Defendants at the hearing, his arguments do not find support under either Indiana or Seventh Circuit law. The Court is bound by what the law is and not by what Marshall believes the law ought to be. Notably, Marshall solely cites out-of-Circuit cases and secondary sources to support each o 238-39, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (<HOLDING>). Because Marshall only alleged his due process
holding that the court evaluating a claim of qualified immunity must first determine whether the plaintiff states a claim of a constitutional violation at all and then must determine whether the claimed right was clearly established before proceeding to the qualified immunity question holding the record did not contain enough facts to determine whether the statute was constitutional as applied to the particular facts and circumstances of the case holding that the saucier test is not mandatory particularly at the pleading stage where facts must first be developed to determine whether a constitutional right was violate recognizing that moving to the second stage of the saucier analysis is appropriate when the existence of a constitutional violation depends upon the resolution of uncertain state law holding officers conduct must violate a constitutional right