to prevent that harm.” Horton v. Flenory, 889 F.2d 454, 457 (3d Cir.1989); see also Morrow, 719 F.3d at 166 (stating, as “a general matter, ... a State’s failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause”) (quotingDeShaney). Relying on the above-cited case law and the facts in this matter, this Court finds that Defendant has no constitutional obligation to prevent private student-on-student or trespasser-on-student violence. However, our anal t has repeatedly held that publicly-funded schools, such as Defendant, do not have a special relationship with their students that would create “a constitutional duty to protect students from private actors.” Morrow, 719 F.3d at 170; see also D.R., 972 F.2d at 1369-72 (<HOLDING>); Brown v. School District of Philadelphia, 456
holding that no special relationship existed between the school and student holding that no special relationship exists between state and school children despite compulsory attendance laws holding special relationship existed between caregiver and developmentally disabled individual holding that a school had no duty to protect pedestrian from student recognizing the existence of the special relationship