— namely, a store receipt in her pocket indicating that an individual made a purchase from Green Hills Market at 6:01 p.m. on the day of the fire. The scope of an arresting officer’s obligation to consider exculpatory evidence is guided by two competing principles. On the one hand, “[o]nce a police officer has a reasonable basis for believing there is probable cause, he is not required to explore and eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of innocence before making an arrest.” Curley v. Vill. of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Yet, on the other hand, an “officer may not disregard plainly exculpatory evidence.” Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 395 (2d Cir.2006); see, e.g., Russo v. City of Bridgeport, 479 F.3d 196, 208 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). We do not consider the issue of whether the
holding that parole boards do not have to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment holding that the prosecution must disclose to the defense all exculpatory evidence known to the state or in its possession holding that failure to request continuance waives complaint that state withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of brady holding that record must show that evidence is exculpatory for defendant to establish brady violation holding that a fourth amendment violation could occur when incarceration was due to the polices failure to perform the simple task of checking exculpatory evidence in their possession