will decree reformation of a written instrument if it is conclusively shown that the words of the writing do not correctly express the meaning that the parties agreed upon.”). 10 . See, e.g., Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Fred S. Post, Jr., Co., 747 S.W.2d 777, 781 (Tenn.1988); Lebo v. Green, 221 Tenn. at 314, 426 S.W.2d at 494; Dickens v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 170 Tenn. at 414, 95 S.W.2d at 914; Greer v. J.T. Fargason Grocer Co., 168 Tenn. at 244-45, 77 S.W.2d at 443-44; Barnes v. Barnes, 157 Tenn. 332, 338, 8 S.W.2d 481, 482 (1928). 11 . See 27 Williston on Contracts § 70:21, at 260 ("If the parties reach agreement as to only part of a prospective bargain, ... reformation is still an appropriate remedy."); Cerberus Int’l, Ltd. v. Apollo Mgmt., L.P., 794 A.2d 1141, 1152 (Del.2002) (<HOLDING>). 12 . The prior agreement need not rise to the
holding that a defendant who is seeking to excuse a procedurally defaulted claim of structural error need not establish actual prejudice and so the court need not require petitioner to prove that his counsels failure to object to the trial closure was actually prejudicial holding that citys policy need not be unconstitutional per se but need only cause a constitutional violation holding that the fact of prior convictions under  924e need not be charged in an indictment and proven to a jury and also that the government need not charge in an indictment and prove to a jury that a defendants prior conviction constitutes a violent felony under  924e holding that the government need not prove actual notice to the prisoner holding that the party seeking reformation must prove a specific prior understanding that differed materially from the written agreement and that this understanding need only be complete as to the issue involved and need not constitute a complete contract in an of itself