(1966)[,] and its progeny.” Zektaw v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 127, 135, 677 S.E.2d 49, 53 (2009). “[T]he United States Supreme Court [has] established that ‘[i]f the individual states ... he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present,’ ” Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 278 Va. 118, 123, 677 S.E.2d 45, 48 (2009) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474, 86 S.Ct. at 1628), or until “the suspect reinitiates the interrogation,” Commonwealth v. Hilliard, 270 Va. 42, 49, 613 S.E.2d 579, 584 (2005) (citing Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2355, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981)). See generally Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104, 96 S.Ct. 321, 326, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Determining whether a suspect actually
holding police should scrupulously honor a request for counsel emphasis added holding that a suspect must unambiguously request counsel holding that in determining whether there exists a valid waiver of the right to counsel in the criminal setting the court may consider a defendants lack of good faith in working with appointed counsel including an unreasonable refusal to cooperate with counsel or an unreasonable request for substitution of appointed counsel and the timeliness of defendants request for new counsel particularly when a defendant makes an untimely request for new counsel  under circumstances which are likely to result in a continuance holding that a suspects request for counsel to advise him on whether he should consent to a police search pursuant to the indiana constitution did not invoke his miranda right to counsel during a subsequent custodial interrogation holding that a request for counsel made to foreign authorities is insufficient to trigger edwards rule even if army cid agents were aware of specialist colemans prior request for counsel made to german police