Moreover, defendants convicted of conspiracy to commit murder in California are “punishable in the same manner and to the same extent as” defendants convicted of murder. CaLPenal Code § 182(a); see also id. (“[I]n the case of conspiracy to commit murder, ... the punishment shall be that prescribed for murder in the first degree.”). Thus, the state of California clearly considers the culpability of individuals who conspire to commit murder on a par with that of individuals who actually carry out the deed themselves. Given the close relationship between these two offenses, Governor Davis’s review of parole decisions involving a person convicted of conspiracy to commit murder was not clearly outside the scope of his jurisdiction. See Crooks v. Maynard, 913 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Although Governor Davis’s review of Miller’s
holding that a judge did not act in clear absence of all jurisdiction where he had colorable authority to take the action in question holding that the question of whether police had a reasonable basis for finding that a third party had authority to consent to search is a question of law holding that a judge who misinterpreted a statute and erroneously exercised jurisdiction did not act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction holding that similar argument did not raise a colorable question of law for purposes of jurisdiction holding appeal improper where trial judge did not rule upon question