mandated.”); United States v. Hooker, 418 F.Supp. 476, 479 (M.D.Pa.1976), aff'd mem., 547 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 950, 97 S.Ct. 1591, 51 L.Ed.2d 799 (1977) (District Court stating that “[a] bail reduction hearing is not a ‘critical stage’ of the proceedings where the defense on the merits would be impaired without the assistance of counsel.”); Padgett v. State, 590 P.2d 432, 436 (Alaska 1979) (“The setting of bail is ... not an adversary confrontation wherein ‘potential substantial prejudice’ to ‘the defendant’s basic right to a fair trial’ inheres, but rather is limited to the issue of interim confinement.”) (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1932, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 1157 (1967)); Ex parte Stewart, 853 So.2d 901, 904 (Ala.2002) (<HOLDING>) In Coleman v. Alabama, supra, the United
holding in the context of an initial appearance at which bail was set that the fact that the court may determine or evaluate the conditions for release does not create an adversarial proceeding or a critical stage  holding that sentencing is a critical stage of criminal proceedings and the offer of counsel must be renewed at each critical stage where the defendant appears without counsel recognizing structural error where counsel was  prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding holding that the filing of a motion for a new trial is a critical stage of the prosecution and that an indigent defendant is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel at that stage holding that a valid waiver of counsel at an early stage of the proceeding does not continue in effect through a subsequent stage