Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 314, 126 S.Ct. 1735, 164 L.Ed.2d 480 (2006) (“Jurisdiction is determined ‘by the law of the court’s creation and cannot be defeated by the extraterritorial operation of a [state] statute ..., even though it created the right of action.’ ” (internal citation omitted)); Davet v. City of Cleveland, 456 F.3d 549, 554 (6th Cir.2006) (applying similar analysis to federal supplemental jurisdiction). For these reasons, the court will deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count II against the Town and the School Committee. Count II against the individual school officials members, Fournier, Rathbone, and Van Amburgh will be dismissed. E. Counts III and IV: 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must allege that a defendant, .2d 695, 713 (E.D.Pa.2007) (<HOLDING>). Defendant Van Amburgh argues that these
holding that a seventeenyearold student lacked the capacity to consent to engage in sexual conduct with a teacher and consequently her allegations of a seeminglyconsensual sexual relationship with the teacher were sufficient to state a  1983 claim based on a violation of substantive due process recognizing  1983 substantive due process claim holding that a teachers consensual sexual relationship with a fifteenyearold student constituted a violation of the students substantive due process rights holding that sexual molestation of students by teacher is presumed to result in physical injury holding that similar allegations were insufficient to state a due process claim