“B.” The alternative routes that one may consider in reaching a destination have become confusing to trial judges through dicta and examples used in different appellate cases. That confusion, I believe, led the trial judge in the case before us to exclude the Williams rule evidence out of an abundance of caution. The State correctly sought appellate redress and this panel fully agrees that the evidence is relevant and admissible and should be allowed at trial with the standard cautionary jury instructions as stated in our recent o court had no basis for concluding that the similar acts evidence which the State sought to introduce did not meet the fingerprint-type similarity test articulated by this court in Kulling. See also Farrill v. State, 759 So.2d 696, 698 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>). But I believe that the strict test set forth
holding that sexual assault was not foreseeable because plaintiff produced no evidence of similar criminal acts on or near defendants premises holding that evidence of other allegations of torture was inadmissible in part because it was not similar to the allegations made by defendant holding that sexual orientation and sexual identity are immutable holding in case where identity was not at issue that evidence of collateral offenses of sexual batteries on children outside the intrafamilial or custodial context was inadmissible because the collateral acts were not strikingly similar to the charged crimes and did not possess unique characteristics to distinguish them from other similar sexual batteries on children holding evidence of other crimes inadmissible when identity is not at issue