courts the discretionary authority to address important issues that they find it appropriate to decide. Indeed, the inflexible cross-appeal rule that the Court adopts may disserve the interest in judicial efficiency in some cases. For example, correcting an error that prejudiced a nonappealing defendant on direct review might obviate the need for a collateral attack. Cf. Granberry v. Greer, 481 U. S. 129, 134 (1987) (allowing the Court of Appeals to address the merits of an unexhausted habeas corpus petition if “the interests of comity and federalism will be better served by addressing the merits forthwith [than] by requiring a series of additional state and district court proceedings before reviewing the merits of the petitioner’s claim”); Munaf v. Geren, 553 U. S. 674, 691 (2008) (<HOLDING>). Because the reviewing court is in the best
holding that the pendency of a petitioners federal habeas corpus petition does not divest a trial court of jurisdiction to address a pcra petition holding that a petition for review is an adequate substitute for habeas corpus holding that the federal habeas corpus court could reach the merits of a due process claim even though there was no contemporaneous objection in state court trial where the state habeas corpus court reached the merits rather than rely on the procedural default defense recognizing occasions    when it is appropriate to proceed further and address the merits of a habeas corpus petition rather than reverse and remand on threshold matters holding that section 236e does not strip the court of jurisdiction to consider the merits of petitioners habeas corpus petition