reasons for regulating the export of thermal imaging cameras. The evidence regarding the control reasons was relevant to whether the cameras in Defendant’s possession at the time of his arrest fell within the export-control regulations. The district court erred, however, by allowing prejudicial testimony relating to potentially dangerous applications of the technology. In addition to having little or no probative value, this testimony was highly prejudicial and did not show anything about what Defendant or the intended recipients planned to do with the technology. Nonetheless, because Defendant failed to object, we review only for plain error, United States v. Morris, 827 F.2d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir.1987), and find none. See United States v. Bracy, 67 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). 6. The district court permissibly excluded
holding that the trial court did not plainly err by allowing improper character evidence because tjhere was plenty of other evidence connecting the defendants to the crime holding that trial court did not err holding that the nature or character test set forth in code  192231 applies to both indictments and warrants and that since the amendment at issue in the case did not change the nature or character of the offense charged  the trial court did not err in allowing the trial to proceed on the amended warrant holding that the trial court did not exceed its discretion under rule 403 by allowing evidence that provided background for the crime charged holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment