Knox v. Taylor, 992 S.W.2d 40, 50 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.). Defamation is acti vided into two categories: general and special. Peshak v. Greer, 13 S.W.3d 421, 427 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.). General damages include mental anguish and injury to a person’s reputation that naturally flow from the libel. Id. “Once injury to reputation is established, a person defamed may recover general damages without proof of other injury.” Leyendecker, 683 S.W.2d at 374; Knox, 992 S.W.2d at 60 (“In the recovery on a claim of defamation per se, the law presumes actual damages and no independent proof of damages to reputation or of mental anguish is required.”); Marathon Oil Co. v. Salazar, 682 S.W.2d 624, 630 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref d n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>); Bellefonte Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Brown,
holding that in a slanderous or libelous per se context actual damages need not ever be proved holding that words that are libelous per se are so obviously hurtful to person aggrieved by them that they require no proof of their injurious character to make them actionable holding that pro se petitioners need not raise issues in ins terms but may raise them as they may have understood them holding that a jury could find an intent to discriminate from evidence of use of code words such as all of you and one of them the words themselves are only relevant for what they reveal  the intent of the speaker recognizing that slander per se is actionable without a showing of actual or special damages