to expert testimony, however, because its admission, at worst, amounted to harmless error. Fed.R.Evid. 103(a) (“Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected ... ”). The quantity of drugs Jania claimed Venson dropped was a minor issue, and therefore the error in admitting Jania’s testimony would not have had “a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the determination of [the] jury.” Cerabio LLC v. Wright Med. Tech., Inc., 410 F.3d 981, 994 (7th Cir.2005). Venson also does not argue that he was deprived of an opportunity to adequately cross-examine Jania, and “he questions neither the accuracy of the statements offered nor the qualifications of [Jania] to make them.” Oriedo, 498 F.3d at 604 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the Court declines to grant a
holding that lay opinion testimony is not admissible when the jury can readily draw the necessary inferences and conclusions without the aid of the opinion holding that disclosure of grand jury materials to parole commission was harmless error holding that lay witness opinion as to guilt of defendant inadmissible holding that error in classifying agents testimony as lay opinion and failing to subject it to the disclosure requirements was harmless holding that lay opinion testimony on the technical subject of asbestos in the workplace was inadmissible when the witness failed to demonstrate sufficient personal experience or technical knowledge to qualify him to offer an opinion