harmed by the duplicity of Count II of the indictment. C. Remedy Having found the threat of prejudice to the defendant due to the duplicity of Count II of the indictment, the next question is whether the entire judgment must be vacated. Duplicity does not necessarily require dismissal of an indictment. See United States v. Goodman, 285 F.2d 378 (5th Cir.1960) (“The entire count should not be dismissed when a less drastic ruling will suffice.”); 1A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Mill tates, 395 U.S. 6, 53 n. 116, 89 S.Ct. 1532, 23 L.Ed.2d 57 (1969), or by a jury instruction that ensures that the jury is unanimous as to the conduct underlying the conviction, see, e.g., Murray, 618 F.2d at 898; cf. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 664-65, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977) (<HOLDING>). Where, as here, a defendant has already been
holding that guilty verdict rendered on duplicitous indictment did not preclude on double jeopardy grounds the court of appeals from ordering a retrial based on evidentiary error courts instruction to jury that it had to unanimously find all elements of both crimes charged in count eliminated possibility that jury had acquitted defendant of one of those crimes holding that when the jury acquitted the defendant on the greater offense but deadlocked on the lesserincluded offenses double jeopardy did not bar retrial of the lessers holding that when jury acquitted defendant on greater offense but deadlocked on lesserincluded offenses double jeopardy did not bar retrial of the lesers holding that if defendant moved for or consented to mistrial retrial of defendant was not barred on double jeopardy grounds holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted