courts have nevertheless permitted the EEOC to maintain a suit for injunctive relief. See, e.g., EEOC v. Massey Yardley Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 117 F.3d 1244, 1253 (11th Cir.1997) (noting that “there would be little point in [the EEOC] having the independent power to sue if it could not obtain relief beyond that fashioned for the individual claimant”); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 10 F.3d 1286, 1291-92 (7th Cir.1993); Goodyear Aerospace, 813 F.2d at 1542-45. Conversely, however, in these same contexts some of the same courts have recognized that a charging party’s actions that impede his own right to sue can also circumscribe the contours of the EEOC’s suit in its own name to the extent that it acts on behalf of the charging party. See, e.g., Goodyear Aerospace, 813 F.2d at 1543 (<HOLDING>); EEOC v. U.S. Steel Corp., 921 F.2d 489, 496
holding that a plaintiff who pled in her complaint that her law firm actively misled her in support of her request for application of the discovery rule had sufficiently pled the application of the doctrine holding that the fact that the plaintiff did not avail herself of the opportunity to litigate her discrimination claims before the civil service commission and on administrative review in the state courts did not insulate her claims in federal court from the effects of res judicata holding that in connection with crossmotions for summary judgment the substance of the plaintiffs motion and her silence in response to the defendants characterization of her claims as being based on violations of specified statutory provisions established abandonment of claims based on other statutory provisions set forth in her complaint holding that summary judgment was appropriate where plaintiffs admissions in her deposition undermined her claims holding that the charging partys acceptance of a personal settlement of her claims rendered moot the eeocs claims for backpay on her behalf