is entertained, his failure to object to the drug weights for which he was held responsible renders any Collins error harmless. See United States v. Brown, 202 F.3d 691, 700-01 (4th Cir.2000) (“[I]f the element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, the harmless error inquiry ends, and we must find the error harmless.”). Moreover, we find that even if we were to vacate Williams’ sentence on his conspiracy charge, Williams would still be subject to a 360-month sentence for his cocaine distribution conviction. Thus, even if the Collins claim was properly before this court and found to be meritorious, it would still afford Williams no relief as the district court’s sentence on remand would have been the same. See United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 231 (4th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>) (internal citations and quotation marks
recognizing that where the error involved defies analysis by harmless error standards or the data is insufficient to conduct a meaningful harmless error analysis then the error will not be proven harmless beyond a reasonable doubt holding that unless an erroneous instruction was unlikely to have changed the result of the trial a reviewing court cannot say that giving the instruction was harmless error holding that a nonconstitutional error is harmless where an appellate court has a fair assurance that the error did not substantially affect the verdict recognizing that an error will be deemed harmless if a reviewing court is able to say with fair assurance after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error holding that before an error can be held harmless the reviewing court must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the defendants conviction