v. Kline, 845 F.2d 1300, 1307 (5th Cir.1988); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1071 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1994) (enbanc). 4 . Gowesky, 321 F.3d at 508 ("The EEOC regulations make plain that an inability to perform one particular job, as opposed to a broad range of jobs, does not constitute an impairment that substantially limits one’s ability to work.”) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)); Sherrod, 132 F.3d at 1120 (5th Cir.1998) (“Evidence of disqualification from a single position or narrow range of jobs will not support a finding that an individual is substantially limited from the major life activity of working.”) (citing Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 727 (5th Cir.1995)). 5 . See Bridges, 92 F.3d at 334 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B)). 6 . See, e.g., id. (<HOLDING>). Collins correctly notes that we have
recognizing a settlement prevented a municipal referendum as it was not a legislative action holding that the federal officer removal statute is not narrow or limited  holding that a limitation that prevented one from becoming a firefighter or even a firefighter and associated municipal paramedic or emt backup firefighter only affects a narrow range of jobs  recognizing that prior to the death of a police officer or firefighter there is limited vesting of survivor benefits under the plan holding that this courts power to correct an error prevented appeal from becoming moot because of the fulfillment of the judgment obligation appealed from