suit notice provision, the Hallstrom court noted that several other environmental statutes contained very similar provisions, all modeled on the notice provision of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604. 493 U.S. at 23, 110 S.Ct. 304. Acknowledging the need for uniform interpretation, the Court “granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the Courts of Appeals regarding the correct interpretation of the notice provisionfs].” Id. at 25 and n. 2, 110 S.Ct. 304 (citing Garcia v. Cecos Int'l, Inc., 761 F.2d 76 (1st Cir.1985) (construing the notice provision in RCRA as a mandatory prerequisite for suit); Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681 (7th Cir.1975) (construing the notice provision of the Clean Air Act as mandatory); Proffitt v. Bristol Commissioners, 754 F.2d 504 (3rd Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); Pymatuning Water Shed Citizens for Hygienic
holding that more than notice to a defendant is required holding that notice provisions of rcra and cwa were satisfied where proper parties had notice in fact of the alleged violations more than 60 days before suit was filed holding that notice provision of cwa was satisfied where district court stayed the proceedings for 60 days in order to cure the procedural default holding that tenant had received more than 30 days to correct violations of the lease when the notice was served on february 27 and the complaint was filed on april 4 holding 57 days notice before deadline to file a complaint under  523 was sufficient notice when creditor had actual notice of filing