motion to dismiss where plaintiff had alleged that a back problem caused him “severe pain”); Candelaria v. Coughlin, No. 91 Civ. 2978, 1996 WL 88555, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 1996) (Sand, J.) (denying cross-motions for summary judgment because, the parties disputed whether plaintiffs medical claims based on failure to provide proper wheelchair, failure to provide doctor-ordered heating pad, and refusal to treat blood in his urine were “serious” medical conditions); Orr v. Hoke, No. 91 Civ. 1256, 1995 WL 217541, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 1995) (Preska, J.) (rejecting defendants’ argument on summary judgment motion that delay of treatment for a severed finger did not cause plaintiff severe pain); Davidson v. Kalonick, No. 84 Civ. 6985, 1986 WL 3775, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. March 21, 1986) (<HOLDING>). The fact that the plaintiffs surgery was
holding that an assertion of pain sensation alone unaccompanied by any large medical complications does not amount to a serious medical need under the eighth amendment brackets and internal quotation marks omitted holding that plaintiffs allegation that he was denied prescribed pain medication because of a mdoc policy that narcotic pain medications must be given in the infirmary fails to establish an eighth amendment violation holding that deliberate indifference to a serious medical need establishes an eighth amendment violation holding that bruising and soft tissue injury even accompanied by residual pain does not rise to the level of a serious injury holding that plaintiff who alleged he was in pain and discomfort after a bilateral otoplasty sufficiently showed a serious medical need noting that pain though subjective and difficult to measure may well be serious