employment, and independent living.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added). A request for a service dog to be permitted to escort a disabled student at school as an “independent life tool” is hence not entirely beyond the bounds of the IDEA’S educational scheme. Finally, we reject appellants’ argument that their § 1983 discrimination claim is not subject to the exhaustion rule. The language of Section 1415(Z) of the IDEA is sufficiently broad and encompasses complaints asserted under any federal statute, as long as they seek relief available under the IDEA. In Hope, we affirmed the dismissal of all of plaintiffs’ claims, including their § 1983 cause of action, for want of subject matter jurisdiction due to non-exhaustion. Hope, 69 F.3d at 688; see also Hope, 872 F.Supp. at 19-20 (<HOLDING>). In Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748 (2d
holding that collateral estoppel applies to  1983 claims holding that excessive force claims are not subject to exhaustion requirement recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different holding that exhaustion requirement applies to excessive force claims holding that the ideas exhaustion requirement applies to claims asserted under  1983