2000, for the FDA certification numbers she was told that they 'would be provided. A reasonable jury could conclude that Biotronix 2000’s delay in providing the numbers did not amount to a red flag making it unreasonable for Safety Technologies to rely, without investigation, on Biotronix 2000 to communicate the fact that FDA certification was rescinded. Even if a jury concluded that such reliance, without investigation, would be unreasonable, Linda King testified that Safety Technologies attempted to verify FDA certification on its own, but was unsuccessful. The evidence suggested that without the appropriate in a fraud case where a plaintiffs damages are not fixed and certain until judgment is entered. See, e.g., Total Petroleum, Inc. v. Davis, 822 F.2d 734, 738 (8th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); Nelson v. Hench, 428 F.Supp. 411, 421
holding that prejudgment interest should not be added to damages awarded for misrepresentation because the amount of damages were not liquidated or ascertainable before the verdict holding that where the amount of damages was the primary issue in dispute the plaintiffs claim for damages was not liquidated until the date the jury returned its verdict and the plaintiffs are not entitled to prejudgment interest under ksa  16 201 holding that prejudgment interest is based on the amount of the judgment not the total amount of damages awarded by the jury because nonsettling defendants have no control over settlement negotiations and should not be forced to pay prejudgment interest on settling defendants parts of a damages award holding that prejudgment interest was not appropriate because the plaintiffs damages were not readily ascertainable because at the time the cause of action arose a fact question remained for the court to determine when the fraud terminated recognizing general rule that prejudgment interest may be awarded in claims for liquidated amounts