verdict and holding that costs should be awarded when final judgment, including jury award and prejudgment interest, amounted to more than rejected offer). Thus, we conclude that the prejudgment interest included in the final judgment should be considered in comparing it to Defendants’ offer of judgment under Rule 1-068. {45} Moreover, because the prejudgment interest awarded in this case was in the nature of damages to compensate Gilmore for the loss of use and earning power of the funds retained by the Duderstadts, see Colucci, 117 N.M. at 377, 872 P.2d at 350, it constitutes a portion of Gilmore’s recovery of damages and should be considered in evaluating whether Gilmore’s recovery was more favorable than the offer of judgment. See Davis v. Chism, 513 P.2d 475, 480-81 (Alaska 1973) (<HOLDING>). {46} Thus, based on the plain language of
holding that when compensatory damages are nominal a much higher ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages can be contemplated recognizing that prejudgment interest was an element of damages in a civil theft ease holding that prejudgment interest is based on the amount of the judgment not the total amount of damages awarded by the jury because nonsettling defendants have no control over settlement negotiations and should not be forced to pay prejudgment interest on settling defendants parts of a damages award holding that prejudgment interest is in the nature of compensatory damages and therefore should be included in judgment finally obtained holding that prejudgment interest should not be added to damages awarded for misrepresentation because the amount of damages were not liquidated or ascertainable before the verdict