with SA KS after his invocation of counsel. That communication “evinced a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation.” Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045-46, 103 S.Ct. 2830. Assuming arguendo that the 15-20 minute interval between KS’s request for consent and the appellee’s subsequent unilateral change-of-heart is insufficient to make it legally distinct from Hutchins for purposes of Edwards, we find that the military judge’s interpretation of Hutchins as a per se expansion' of Edwards is flawed for several reasons. First, such an expansion, per se barring SA KS’s request for consent to search— a non-interrogative event — conflicts with subsequent Supreme Court eases interpreting the Edwards rule. See, e.g., Montejo, 556 U.S. at 795, 129 S.Ct. 2079 (<HOLDING>). Second, taken to its logical conclusion,
holding that the clear language of the iccpr manifests that its provisions are to govern the relationship between an individual and his state holding that the mirandcbedwards regime  does not govern  noninterrogative types of interactions between the defendant and the state  holding defense applicable to both types of claims holding that plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum recognizing distinction between two types of waiver