a purchase money loan, meaning they obtained it to acquire their property on Corey Drive. However, the purchase money loan does not form the basis of the Millers’ complaint; rather, the Millers’ DTPA claim against BAC is based entirely on their attempted modification of that loan. Such modification is akin to refinancing in that it is not sought for the acquisition of a good or service, but rather to finance an existing loan on previously acquired property. See Ayers v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, 787 F.Supp.2d 451, 455 (E.D.Tex.2011) (“[A] modification of an existing loan ... is analogous to refinancing services. Refinancing is simply an extension of credit that does not qualify Plaintiff as a consumer.” (citations omitted)); Fix v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 242 S.W.3d 147, 160 (Tex.App.2007) (<HOLDING>). As in Ayers, “[h]ere, the alleged loan
holding that plaintiffs  lack standing because the court cannot issue the requested writ of mandamus and thus cannot redress the alleged injury holding that an implied warranty to perform services in a good and workmanlike manner is an action available under the dtpa and is subject to the twoyear limitations provided by the dtpa holding that the refinance cannot qualify as a good or service under the dtpa because the plaintiffs had already purchased their house and thus the refinance merely extended credit citation omitted holding that service was proper where a copy of the summons and complaint was left with the defendants wife at the defendants maryland house in which the defendant had lived before moving ahead of his family to arizona where he had purchased a house intending never to return to maryland and to move his family to arizona noting that the service was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of service at the defendants dwelling house or usual place of abode where the service succeeded in actually apprising him of the lawsuit holding statute of limitations for dtpa action including claim for breach of express or implied warranty under the dtpa is two years