(“We are of the view that those actions having an intimate bearing on the duties normally assigned to the office of employment, even though'usurped or misused, must be considered as falling within the meaning of the term ‘scope of employment.’ ”). The second and third criteria, however, are not satisfied. As to the second, Moussa acted outside the time and place limits of his employment with the City. When-the altercation broke out, Moussa was off-duty and well outside the Chicago Police Depart- merit’s jurisdiction—the DuPage County courthouse is more than 20 miles outside the Chicago- city limits—attending to a family matter on his personal time. The fact that Moussa was off-duty cuts against Anderson, see Rivera v. City of Chicago, 2005 WL 2739180, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2005) (<HOLDING>), although off-duty status standing alone is
holding that officers decision regarding route and speed to travel in responding to allpoints bulletin was discretionary holding that an officers conduct fell outside time and space limits where he was offduty on the date in question and not responding to an emergency holding that an offduty officers assertion to bystanders that he was on the job  at the scene of a car accident did not place him within the scope of employment holding as a matter of law that an offduty government agent was not acting within the scope of his employment when he was driving home intoxicated after completing his tour of duty because on no basis would the court conclude that drinking and driving after work hours fell within the scope of the dea agents employment   holding that an allegation as to the time of the offense is not an essential element of the offense charged in the indictment and within reasonable time limits proof of any date before the return of the indictment and within the statute of limitations is sufficient