it was in violation of the bankruptcy stay and, therefore, the justice court was without jurisdiction to enter it. Judgments — even final ones — that are void for jurisdictional defects are subject to collateral attack. Middleton v. Murff, 689 S.W.2d 212, 213 (Tex.1985); Nguyen v. Intertex, Inc., 93 S.W.3d 288, 294-95 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.); Zarate v. Sun Operating, Ltd., 40 S.W.3d 617, 620-21 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. denied). But the ability to collaterally attack a judgment is limited by the long-standing and well-settled rule that we must presume the validity of the judgment under attack and, thus, extrinsic evidence may not be used to establish a lack of jurisdiction. See In re A.G.G., 267 S.W.3d 165, 169 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2008, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>); Toles v. Toles, 113 S.W.3d 899, 914
holding that trial court had jurisdiction to consider custody dispute before a divorce or separation action had commenced holding that extrinsic evidence of applicability of automatic stay could not be considered because divorce decree on its face recited that trial court had jurisdiction of matter and no evidence in record of divorce proceeding affirmatively showed that automatic stay deprived trial court of jurisdiction holding that district court had no jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs claims that his constitutional rights were violated in state divorce proceeding holding that the jurisdiction of the divorce court with regard to support and maintenance is statutorily determined unless otherwise provided by agreement incorporated into the divorce decree holding that the trial judge had the power to incorporate a settlement agreement in a decree following the entry of a decree of divorce