2680, 2742 (2005); Pub.L. No. 109-163, § 1405(e)(1), 119 Stat. 3136, 3477 (2006); Pub.L. No. 109-366, § 7(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 2635 (2006); Pub.L. No. 110-181, § 1063(f), 122 Stat. 3, 323 (2008). That statutory jurisdictional bar erected by Congress in those amendments, currently found in 18 U.S.C. § 2241(e), is different from the judge-made jurisdictional bar against unexhausted § 2241 petitions set forth in Gonzalez. The latter bar, which has no statutory home, is the only one at issue in the present case. 4 . That Thaler dealt with a different section of the habeas corpus statute and Reed Elsevier dealt with a different statute altogether does not undermine our conclusion that those two decisions abrogated Gonzalez. See United States v. Sneed, 600 F.3d 1326, 1332 (11th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Lopez, 562 F.3d 1309, 1312
holding that the changes in sentencing law imposed by united states v booker  us  125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 did not render waiver of appeal involuntary and unknowing holding that united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 did not alter the standard of review for the interpretation and application of the guidelines holding that one of our prior panel precedents about when criminal filing deadlines are jurisdictional was abrogated by bowles v russell 551 us 205 127 sct 2360 168 led2d 96 2007 even though bowles dealt with civil filing deadlines holding that a conviction for florida armed robbery is a crime of violence under the armed career criminal act holding that one of our prior panel precedents involving the armed career criminal act was undermined to the point of abrogation by shepard v united states 544 us 13 125 sct 1254 161 led2d 205 2005 even though shepard dealt with a different provision of that act