be lost.” Stokes, therefore, was on notice that the 90-day period commenced upon her receipt of the Determination. See St. Louis v. Tex. Worker’s Comp. Comm’n, 65 F.3d 43, 47 (5th Cir.1995) (noting that one criteria to consider regarding equitable tolling is whether the EEOC provided adequate notice of the complainant’s right to sue) (citing Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984)). Moreover, her unsworn affidavit provides no information regarding the details of her conversation with the EEOC investigator or whether Stokes questioned the investigator regarding the unequivocal language of the Determination. The evidence is insufficient to meet Stokes’s burden, and equitable tolling does not apply. Cf. Ramirez, 312 F.3d at 184-85 (<HOLDING>); see also Conaway v. Control Data Corp., 955
holding that based on the little information plaintiff provided the court could not conclude that the eeoc affirmatively misled him holding that a misnomer does not render a summary judgment void provided the intention to sue the correct defendant is evident from the pleadings and process such that the defendant could not have been misled holding that the pjlaintiff was not seeking the enforcement of a final eeoc order because he specifically requested more relief than the eeoc awarded holding that where law firm had reason to believe that the information provided to it by the company was materially different from the truth firm could not escape liability merely by stating that its opinion was based solely on information provided to it holding that an original eeoc charge is sufficient to support  a civil suit under the act for any discrimination  developed in the course of a reasonable investigation of that charge provided such discrimination was included in the reasonable cause determination of the eeoc