contemplated in Blakely. The admissions to which the Court alluded were facts the defendant admits in a guilty plea. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 304, 124 S.Ct. 2531; cf. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005) (noting that in determining the nature of the defendant’s prior conviction for sentence-enhancing purposes, the sentencer is "generally limited to examining the statutory definition [of the crime], charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented ”) (emphasis added). Courts have included a defendant’s testimony at sentencing and stipulations at trial in this category. See, e.g., United States v. Collier, 413 F.3d 858, 860-61 (8th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Champion, 234 F.3d 106, 110
holding that the fact of a prior conviction for sentencing purposes need not be proved to a jury or admitted by defendant to satisfy the sixth amendment holding that if sentence does not exceed maximum authorized by facts admitted by defendant or found by jury there is no sixth amendment violation holding no sixth amendment violation occurred because the defendant chose to testify at sentencing and admitted the facts upon which the court imposed sentence holding that there is no sixth amendment error when the sentence does not exceed the maximum authorized by facts the defendant admitted holding that there is no sixth amendment right to jury sentencing