§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) (ii). Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that the evidence Liu submitted in support of his motion to reopen was not material to his claim that he feared persecution if returned to China on account of his “Falun Gong identity,” as the evidence did not establish that Liu was in fact a practitioner of Falun Gong. See INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988) (recognizing that a movant’s failure to produce material evidence is an independent basis for the denial of a motion to reopen). Indeed, as the BIA found, neither the affidavit or photographs purportedly depicting his parti t the record did not demonstrate Liu’s prima facie eligibility for relief. See Abudu, 485 U.S. at 104, 108 S.Ct. 904 (<HOLDING>). Indeed, as the BIA found, Liu failed to
holding that the bia may deny a motion to reopen on the ground that the movant has not established prima facie eligibility for the underlying relief sought holding that a movants failure to establish a prima facie case for the underlying substantive relief is a proper ground for the bia to deny a motion to reopen recognizing that in an untimely motion to reopen based on changed country conditions the movant must submit previously unavailable evidence demonstrating his prima facie eligibility for relief recognizing that failure to offer new previously unavailable evidence establishing a prima facie case for the underlying relief sought is a proper ground on which the bia may deny a motion to reopen recognizing that failure to offer evidence establishing a prima facie case for the underlying substantive relief sought is a proper ground for denying a motion to reopen