also 146 Cong. Rec. S1753-02, *81761 (Mar. 27, 2000) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (explaining that legislation “provides a statutory basis for a judge to disallow a civil forfeiture claim by a fugitive, while leaving judges discretion to allow such a claim in the interests of justice,” and noting that Degen “left open the possibility that Congress could establish such [a] doctrine by statute”). The three lettered subparts of the statute’s fifth requirement indicate that the statutory disentitlement power conferred by Congress is not limited, as Ms. Collazos urges, to common-law fugitives. Certain ly, subpart A targets traditional common-law fugitives, specifically, persons who allegedly committed crimes while in the United States and who, upon learning that their arrest wa 3 (2d Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>). But the statute is by no means limited to
holding that government may not prefer those who believe in no religion over those who do believe holding there is no meaningful distinction between due course and due process recognizing distinction between tolling and estoppel holding there should be no distinction between pro se petitioners and those represented by counsel for abuse of writ purposes holding that no meaningful distinction exists between those who leave their native country and those who already outside decline to return