indifferent to his mental health needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1044 (9th Cir.1989), and we affirm. The district court properly granted summary judgment on the claims against Associate Warden Kirkland because Smith failed to raise a triable issue as to whether Kirkland knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Smith’s health, as required by Fanner v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). Nothing in the record could have given Kirkland such knowledge. Various medical reports and Smith’s own statements at the classification committee hearings indicated that Smith did not have mental health needs. Cf. Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 408 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). At most, Smith presented a difference of
holding that court abused its discretion in failing to recruit counsel where the case presents complicated medical matters involves varying recommended courses of treatment by numerous physicians and required discovery into what constitutes reasonable carefor medical professionals recognizing that prison officials should defer to medical professionals on medical matters holding that state medical director of prison medical services corporation was not final policymaker holding that an aljs own medical analysis which is contrary to medical evidence is invalid recognizing that even when a prisoner files suit under section 1983 alleging medical malpractice against prison medical officials medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner