choice by its maker.” Lowe v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 670, 678, 239 S.E.2d 112, 117 (1977) (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225, 93 S.Ct. at 2047). “Consent can be invalidated only upon a showing that one’s ‘will [was] overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired.’ ” Elliott v. Commonwealth, 61 Va.App. 48, 57, 733 S.E.2d 146, 151 (2012) (quoting United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 828, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976)). The Commonwealth must prove voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence based on “the totality of all the circumstances.” Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 327, 356 S.E.2d 157, 164 (1987) (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S.Ct. at 2048); see Sellers v. Commonwealth, 41 Va.App. 268, 272, 584 S.E.2d 452, 455 (2003) (<HOLDING>). The factors relevant to applying the
holding that the evidence raised the issue of voluntariness of consent even though the officers comments were in response to an inquiry by the suspect recognizing that the ultimate question of the voluntariness of consent is one of law recognizing that consent is an exception to the warrant requirement and that voluntariness of consent depends on the totality of the circumstances holding that the question of whether police had a reasonable basis for finding that a third party had authority to consent to search is a question of law holding that because of the factbound nature of the inquiry determination of voluntariness of consent to search is reviewed for clear error