sentence and remanded for resentencing before a different judge. Id. Although some courts have interpreted our reversal in Seays to be because the attempted murder charge arose subsequent to the offense for which the defendant was being sentenced, our court has had different views on the basis for the reversal. In a recent case, we interpreted the reversal of the sentence in Seays as the result of the trial judge’s consideration of subsequent arrests. See Peters, 128 So.3d at 845 (citing Seays for its reversal of a sentence where the judge considered subsequent arrests). However, in an earlier case, we construed the reversal of the sentence as being based upon the defendant’s later acquittal of the attempted murder charge. See Whitehead v. State, 21 So.3d 157, 160 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (<HOLDING>). We reiterated in Whitehead that a court can
holding that a trial courts consideration of a new pending charge at a sentencing hearing for the purpose of determining a pattern of conduct and defendants character was not improper absent a showing that the trial judge used the pending charge in determining defendants sentence recognizing district courts discretion to consider pending state charge in determining sentence holding that the trial court was authorized to consider pending charges against the defendant and distinguishing seays because the defendant in seays had been acquitted of the pending charge holding evidence of pending charges against a witness is inadmissible for impeachment purposes holding sentencing courts may consider evidence of conduct or charges of which a defendant was acquitted