because it is not narrowly drawn to accomplish those ends. The problem is that the ordinance recites those interests only at the highest order of abstraction, without ever explaining how they are served by the sign code’s regulations generally, much less by its content-based exemptions from those regulations. In Dimmitt, we noted that even if the government’s interest in aesthetics and traffic safety could be sufficient justification for content-based regulation of signs, those interests “clearly áre not served by the distinction between government and other types of flags; therefore, the regulation is not ‘narrowly drawn’ to achieve its asserted end.” Dimmitt, 985 F.2d at 1570 (emphasis added) (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct. 948); see also, e.g., Gilleo, 986 F.2d at 1184 (<HOLDING>). The same is true here — the. sign code
holding that an ordinance was not narrowly drawn since it was not the least restrictive alternative available holding that the plaintiffs due process challenge to a city ordinance was barred because it was inextricably intertwined with a statecourt ruling that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the ordinance holding that a plaintiff had standing to attack an entire ordinance including portions of the ordinance not applied to the plaintiff holding that it was an abuse of discretion to admit the record when an admission was available holding that because zoning restrictions are in derogation of property rights where a term in a zoning ordinance is undefined an ambiguity in that term must be construed in favor of the property owner and the least restrictive use of the land