a specific date and when the contingency fees in question are still unresolved. However, neither case speaks to the dissolution of a partnership, which, under the UPA, is not bound to a specific date in the determination of value. The UPA specifically contemplates a winding up period during which the contingency fees can be resolved and become susceptible to valuation. Instantly, the contingency fees were resolved by the time of trial and thus could be valued. Therefore, Lamparski and Beasley do not apply to the current situation, and the trial court in Solo should not have relied upon those cases. Turning next to the authorities relied upon by the trial court in granting the new trial in the instant case, we examine In re Labrum & Doak, LLP, 227 p.2d 208, 820 P.2d 1248, 1251 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Hurwitz v. Padden, 581 N.W.2d 359, 361
holding that an attorney was entitled to a quantum meruit recovery even though his oral contingency fee agreement with the client violated the ind rules of professional conduct which require a contingency fee agreement to be in writing holding that law firm was liable for restitution of contingency fee but not of other noncontingent fees following vacatur of judgment holding contingency fee cases commenced prior to dissolution are assets of the firm holding that contingency fee contracts are voidable where attorneys fail to comply with disciplinary rules holding that a law firm could intervene in a former clients action to protect its interest in its contingency fee