at-will status must be express and specific. In fact, the majority turns Broim on its head in concluding that “[bjecause appellee did not have the express contractual right to terminate the agent agreement unilaterally, before the expiration of the one-year term, [Gaede’s] part performance would constitute sufficient consideration to establish mutuality of obligation.” The majority’s analysis assumes the very fact it insists a jury should determine — the parties’ intent to enter into a one-year contract. Moreover, a one-year sales agency contract does not exist here because Gaede failed to establish at least one material term — the commencement date of any one-year appointment. See Rios v. Tex. Commerce Bancshares, Inc., 930 S.W.2d 809, 815 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). Notably, Gaede concedes the length of his
holding even in context of employee manual that policy which included agreement to provide annual salary increase of five percent did not constitute contract between city and employees and distinction between atwill employees and public employees was not dispositive in this context holding that an order that did not specify a date or command the contemnor to act immediately was not definite and specific holding that noncompliance with terms of agreement did not terminate agreement failure to comply with date requirement in termination procedure rendered termination ineffective and letter between nonparty and party could not terminate agreement holding that failure to list a beginning date of a pay period on a pay stub was not a violation of section 226a6 when the employer provided an electronic wage statement that did include the beginning date of the pay period holding that letter stating an annual salary did not embody the terms of any agreement between the parties as it did not specify a beginning date duration of time and did not require acceptance signatures