use at a time other than the time about which the witness is testifying are not permitted.” Commonwealth v. Koehler, 558 Pa. 334, 737 A.2d 225, 239-40 (1999) (citations omitted); accord Commonwealth v. Rizzuto, 566 Pa. 40, 777 A.2d 1069, 1081 (2001). ¶ 8 Further, the mere fact that Cesar was under the influence of drugs or alcohol on December 7, 2001 does not, without other evidence, tend to establish or demonstrate that Cesar had a motive to fabricate his testimony at trial. Guilford did not present any other evidence at trial to demonstrate the version of the events that he sets forth in his appellate brief. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in precluding this testimony. See Commonwealth v. French, 396 Pa.Super. 436, 578 A.2d 1292, 1300 (1990) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 9 Guilford also contends that the trial
holding that statements made to the police during a field investigation should be analyzed on a casebycase basis and establishing an eightfactor test that includes consideration of the purpose of both the declarant and the officer holding that the trial court had properly granted prices motion for new trial because while the state properly introduced identification testimony from a police officer who was not a witness to the offense it improperly elicited testimony that the witness was in fact a police officer who knew the defendant from working in his neighborhood holding that the trial court did not err in precluding crossexamination of police officer as to statements made during an internal police investigation because the purpose for which such testimony was sought was pure speculation which has no support in the record holding that trial court did not err holding that the trial court did not err in charging the jury that the defendant was in the custody of the victim officer when he shot and killed the officer due to the undisputed evidence presented at trial including the defendants pretrial statement to police admitting that fact