348, 353, 15 P3d 29 (2000) (citing Springfield Education Assn. v. School Dist., 290 Or 217, 223, 621 P2d 547 (1980)). In this case, the disputed term is not exact, nor is it delegative in nature. It “embod[ies] a complete expression of legislative meaning” but is “open to various interpretations.” See Coast Security Mortgage Corp., 331 Or at 354. Therefore, it is an inexact term, and we review the agency’s interpretation of it as a matter of law, Springfield Education Assn., 290 Or at 227, in accordance with the interpretive principles of PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993). Coast Security Mortgage Corp., 331 Or at 354; see also Broadway Deluxe Cab v. Natl. Council on Comp. Ins., 133 Or App 324, 329-30, 891 P2d 1326, rev den, 321 Or 246 (1995) (<HOLDING>). We begin with the statute’s text and context,
holding that no person can commence or maintain an action in a court of record as agent for another unless he is a regularly licensed attorney holding that maintain for purposes of ors 65602714 1993referring to a person who maintains equipmentis an inexact term holding state is person for purposes of judicial recusal statute holding that county of delaware was not a person for purposes of fca liability holding that the person who travels as an agent of person defrauded is a victim