the United States. He is physically present in the United States only because he was paroled into the country by the INS. Parole does not constitute an entry. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(13)(A)-(B), 1182(d)(5)(A). Borrero refers us to cases supporting the proposition that even aliens unlawfully present in the United States are guaranteed due process of law. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238, 16 S.Ct. 977, 41 L.Ed. 140 (1896). Those cases may support extending certain constitutional protections to inadmissible aliens accused of crimes, but they do not call into question the power of the government to detain an alien who is stopped at the border. See Sierra v. INS, 258 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Hoyte-Mesa v. Ashcroft, 272 F.3d 989, 991
holding that there was no legal right to court review of parole board decision because there is no legal right to release on parole holding that an inadmissible alien is legally considered to be detained at the border and thus has no due process interest in release on parole holding that notice to an alien at the most recent address provided by the alien is legally sufficient holding that where the capital defendants future dangerousness is at issue and state law prohibits the defendants release on parole due process requires that the sentencing jury be informed that the defendant is parole ineligible holding that any reliance by the parole board on inadmissible hearsay did not violate due process