a cause of action for injury to real property accrues when the injury is committed. See Houston Water-Works Co. v. Kennedy, 70 Tex. 233, 8 S.W. 36, 37 (1888). The right to sue is a personal right that belongs to the person who owns the property at the time of the injury, and the right to sue does not pass to a subsequent purchaser of the property unless there is an express assignment of the cause of action. Abbott v. City of Princeton, 721 S.W.2d 872, 875 (Tex.App.Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.). “Accordingly, a mere subsequent purchaser [of the property] cannot recover for an injury committed before his purchase.” Lay v. Aetna Ins. Co., 599 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Vann v. Bowie Sewerage Co., 127 Tex. 97, 90 S.W.2d 561, 562-63 (Tex.1936) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, under Texas common law, absent a
holding that the deed and not the historical description of the land determines what land constitutes the forfeitable property holding that if respondents suit is one for permanent damages to the land the measure of damages is the decreased value of the land holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue a permanent nuisance action for injury to property because none of the plaintiffs were the owners of the land when the cause of action accrued with the first injury holding that the owner of the land could not bring a 93a action against a prior owner of the land who was not the seller because there was no business connection between the two parties holding that a cause of action for damages to property resulting from a permanent nuisance accrues to the owner of the land at the time the injury begins to affect the land and mere transfer of the land by deed does not transfer the claim for damages