Seminatore, we find these references incidental to the propositions of law for which these cases stand. In reaching this conclusion, we take into consideration that the word “pending” is used once in the Seminatore opinion and, although “pending” is used four times in the Wilke opinion, it is not used at all in the court’s discussion of legal expenses under R.C. 305.14. Notably, neither case involved the reliance on assurances of reimbursement that we must consider here. {¶ 50} It is inconsistent for respondents to stand in the way of proper procedural performance under R.C. 305.14(A) while arguing that relators’ writ of mandamus must fail because the particulars of R.C. 305.14(A) were not followed. See Barrett v. Picker Internatl., Inc. (1990), 68 Ohio App.3d 820, 826, 589 N.E.2d 1372 (<HOLDING>). {¶ 51} Thus, in conclusion, we hold that
holding that plaintiffs status as thirdparty beneficiaries cannot be used as both a sword to reap the benefits    and a shield to protect them holding that shareholders lack standing to sue as thirdparty beneficiaries to allegedly breached contract unless the contract indicates the intent to benefit them directly independently of their shareholder status holding that a firearm could be used both to protect the defendants spouse and to facilitate the defendants drug trafficking crimes holding that beneficiaries of a trust that signed an agreement with the fhlbb were not in privity or have thirdparty beneficiary status because the government did not make any promises expressly intended to benefit them recognizing noncontracting parties rights as thirdparty beneficiaries of an insurance contract