plead a strong inference of the required state of mind “by identifying circumstances that indicate conscious behavior on the part of the defendant, though the strength of the circumstantial allegations must be correspondingly greater.” Tuchman v. DSC Communications Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1068 (5th Cir.1994). Conscious behavior is a “more stringent standard.” Lovelace v. Software Spectrum Inc., 78 F.3d 1015, 1019 n. 3 (5th Cir.1996). “Conscious behavior, of course, means conscious misbehavior.” Coates II, 55 F.Supp.2d at 635; see Maldonado v. Dominguez, 137 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.1998) (concluding that conscious misbehavior requires strong inference that defendant knew statement or omission was false or misleading); In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1418 (3d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Scienter can also be pleaded based on strong
holding that admission of hearsay was harmless where strong circumstantial evidence established the same facts holding that the totality and magnitude of that defendants accounting violations constituted strong circumstantial evidence of reckless or conscious behavior holding a plaintiff must plead sufficient factual allegations to establish that a plausible contract exists but need not plead every detail of the contract holding that motive is circumstantial evidence of intent holding that plaintiff must plead strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior