the United States Employees’ Compensation Commission to make initial fact-finding, but requiring substantial oversight by Article III judges, who must decide "fundamental or jurisdictional facts” de novo). 5 . Supreme Court's precedent, see, e.g. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 & n. 5, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 26 L.Ed.2d 437 (1970), instructs that persons accused of petty offenses, not considered "crimes” at common law, have no due process right to be tried by a jury of their peers. On that point, I concur. 6 . Well-developed non-delegation caselaw has been applied to the distinctive Article III role of our federal magistracy over half a dozen times by the Supreme Court, see, e.g., supra note 4, as well as by our court. See, e.g., United States v. Johnston, 258 F.3d 361 (5th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Hill v. City of Seven Points, 230 F.3d 167
holding that district courts delegation of voir dire to magistrate judge is inconsistent with 28 usc  636b3 where defendant does not consent holding that absent a timely postjudgment motion the trial court has no jurisdiction to alter amend or vacate a final judgment holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence holding that only a district judge in the charging district and not a magistrate judge in that district may review the release order of a magistrate judge in the arresting district holding that a consensual delegation of the final judgment in a federal prison ers motion to vacate conviction or sentence to a magistrate judge violated the constitution