within seven days after sentencing, or (2) upon a substantial assistance motion filed by the government. Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(a), (b). A plain reading of the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1) supports the conclusion that the district court correctly found that none of the provisions of § 3582(c) or Rule 35 applied, and therefore, that it did not have the authority to modify Lockhart’s sentence. Here, the record establishes that neither the Director of the Bureau of Prisons nor the government filed a motion for a sentence reduction, and Lockhart’s motion was not filed within seven days of sentencing. Therefore, the district court was powerless to modify Lockhart’s sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1), and we affirm. See United States v. Diaz-Clark, 292 F.3d 1310, 1319 (11th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). The district court also properly found that
recognizing district courts inherent authority to dismiss with prejudice for abuse of judicial process holding that outside of rule 35 there exists no inherent authority for a district court to modify a sentence holding that the district court possessed the inherent judicial authority to empanel a resentencing jury on remand from  reversal of the respondents enhanced sentence and because the district court erred by failing to recognize that it possessed this inherent judicial authority boehl reversed and remanded for the district courts discretionary determination of whether to exercise that authority holding the court has the inherent authority to enter an order of confidentiality holding the court had no jurisdiction to modify a validly imposed sentence on prisoners own motion