diligence on the parties to satisfy the conditions and implement the terms of the contract. Gilmore contends that the trial court erred by directing a verdict which prevented the jury from considering whether the Duderstadts breached these express covenants by increasing the rent and interfering with his ability to make the 10% net profit during the trial period. Although the trial court instructed the jury on the duty of good faith and fair dealing, the jury was allowed to consider the issue only in connection with Gilmore’s breach of contract claim for the bonus. We hold it was error for the trial court to so limit Gilmore’s claim of breach of contract to the amount of the bonus. See Clark Leasing Corp. v. White Sands Forest Prods., Inc., 87 N.M. 451, 456, 535 P.2d 1077, 1082 (1975) (<HOLDING>). {24} “Whether express or not, every contract
recognizing that in exceptional cases the inference may be so strong as to require a directed verdict for plaintiff holding that a posttrial motion is not required after a grant of a directed verdict holding that the trial court erred in granting the school boards posttrial motion for directed verdict because although the school board timely moved for a directed verdict during trial it did not serve its motion for directed verdict until the eleventh day after the verdict holding that directed verdict does not violate seventh amendment recognizing that motions for directed verdicts are not normally directed to bits and pieces of an action