supra, 372 U.S. at 66, 83 S.Ct. 631, and difficulty in locating that line leads to self-censorship, a particularly subtle and most insidious form of the malady. Vance, 587 F.2d at 165-66 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). The court agrees with Millennium’s assertion that the license revocation procedure at issue here brings it within the ambit of Vance. As in Vance, the City proposes to prevent a business operator’s full exercise of First Amendment freedoms going forward, on the basis of past instances in which expression offered by the business has crossed the line from lawful to unlawful. Plaintiffs’ and Intervenors’ Brief in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction (“PI Motion”) at 11; see also Gayety Theatres, Inc. v. City of Miami, 719 F.2d 1550, 1552 (11th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). The City argues that Vance does not apply to
holding that a city could not use past conduct to enjoin future protected speech holding that speech about financial assistance and handling racial discrimination does not qualify as protected speech holding that protected speech cannot serve as the basis for a violation of city ordinances at issue holding that when protected speech is inextricable from unprotected speech the court will treat the entire message as protected holding that after the district court determined that the plaintiffs speech was protected the court was required to inform the jury of its ruling that knapps speech was constitutionally protected