countries but noting that the right generally remains less expansive than the Fifth Amendment right in the United States). There is no reason to think the drafters of the Vienna Convention had these uniquely American rights in mind, especially given the fact that even the United States Supreme Court did not require Fifth and Sixth Amendment post-arrest warnings until it decided Miranda in 1966, three years after the treaty was drafted. Judge Thomas’s dissent discusses the longer history of the exclusionary rule for an involuntary confession, but that is not the issue we must decide. Although appellant contends that the exclusionary rule is the usual and, in this instance, only effective way to enforc (4th Cir.1995) (same); United States v. Thompson, 936 F.2d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Benevento, 836 F.2d 60, 69
holding that agents violation of irs regulations did not mandate exclusion of evidence obtained as a result of violation holding a statutory violation insufficient to justify imposition of the exclusionary rule absent an underlying constitutional violation or right or evidence that congress intended exclusion as a remedy holding that because code  19260 a procedural statute did not expressly provide a right of suppression of evidence a violation of that provision did not require application of the exclusionary rule in the absence of a constitutional violation holding that exclusionary rule only requires exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights and that exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of statutory rights is not necessarily required holding that violation of state law was not a per se constitutional violation