his qualitative spiritual experience.” Id. at 1212. Such decisions make clear that inmates do not forfeit their free exercise rights when the burden on their religious practice results from discipline imposed for violating prison rules. Of course, McEachin does not allege that his free exercise rights were infringed in the course of legitimate disciplinary measures. He claims that he was disciplined for failing to obey an order expressly given to him by a corrections officer who knew that completion of the task would require plaintiff to abandon religious prayers in which he was then engaged. Precedent' suggests that inmates have a right not to be disciplined for refusing to perform tasks that violate then-religious beliefs. See, e.g., Hayes v. Long, 72 F.3d 70 (8th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). B. Appointment of Counsel Given that McEachin
holding that we are not at liberty to rewrite a contract and reversing a trial courts grant of summary judgment where the court erred in interpreting the contract holding that issue of material fact as to neutrality in application of prison regulation required reversal of district courts grant of summary judgment recognizing the general rule which permits judicial notice of a courts prior cases to support a motion for summary judgment but reversing because in his order the trial judge made no specific reference to the basis for his grant of summary judgment holding that a district court may not grant summary judgment without giving plaintiff an opportunity to submit materials admissible in a summary judgment proceeding or allowing a hearing on defendants motion holding that muslim plaintiff had a clearly established right to refuse to handle pork while performing kitchen duties and reversing the district courts grant of summary judgment to prison official defendants who disciplined the plaintiff for declining to help prepare pork chops