753, 105 S.Ct. 1611, 84 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 93 S.Ct. 2000, 36 L.Ed.2d 900 (1973); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). I. Grand Jury Subpoena of Fingerprints and Hair Samples. To the extent the subpoenas issued in this case seek to compel the production of fingerprint samples, they plainly do not implicate respondents’ Fourth Amendment rights. Obtaining physical evidence from someone can implicate Fourth Amendment concerns at two different levels: the initial “ ‘seizure Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”). See also Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969) (<HOLDING>); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 632 F.Supp. at
holding that analysis of seizures under the fourth amendment applies only to an initial seizure and subsequent conditions of detention are properly examined under the fourteenth amendment holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation holding that the initial seizure of the defendant was unlawful but noting with regard to the second step in the fourth amendment analysis that fingerprinting involves none of the probing into an individuals private life and thoughts that marks an interrogation or search holding that knockandannounce principle is an element of the fourth amendment reasonableness inquiry because we have little doubt that the framers of the fourth amendment thought that the method of an officers entry into a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search and seizure holding that the fourth amendment and the exclusionary rules are not implicated by a private search