negates this implication. Under the 1852 election code, elections were all in person and by ballot. 1 R.S. 1852, ch. 31, §§ 5, 16-19, at 261, 262. No provision existed requiring the County Sheriff or the State Prison Warden to transport convicted prisoners to their respective precincts so that they might vote. In short, Snyder has not pointed to any historical evidence suggesting that convicted prisoners in Indiana were permitted to vote around the time the Constitution was ratified, and the applicable statutes of the time provide no mechanism by which such persons could have voted. Moreover, we perceive no state constitutional requirement that the General Assembly extend the absentee ballot to convicted prisoners. Cf. Griffin v. Roupas, 385 F.3d 1128 (7th Cir.2004) (Posner, J.) (<HOLDING>). In sum, the General Assembly may exercise its
holding that federal constitution does not permit state to use prearrest silence to imply guilt and characterizing the states argument to the contrary as nothing short of incredible holding that under the federal constitution the states retained unlimited authority in matters of taxation except where trumped by for instance the commerce clause recognizing that oath taken to honor state constitution makes it the justices duty to apply the state constitution when it does not conflict with the federal constitution holding that the federal constitution does not require states to permit unlimited absentee voting holding that current statute meets due process requirements and that federal constitution does not require a particular standard of proof