suspicion” in the instant case for the first time from a cold record on appeal. Tacitly conceding its inability to distinguish Dortch from the present case, the majority tries to circumvent it by arguing that Dortch was overruled by Brigham, 382 F.3d 500. But this argument lacks persuasive merit. Rather than overruling Dortch, Brigham distinguishes and builds upon Dortch, as has been observed by a host of other circuit precedents citing to and applying Dortch following Brigham. See United States v. Cavitt, 550 F.3d 430, 436 (5th Cir.2008) (citing as binding precedent Dortch’s analysis that the facts in Dortch do not establish reasonable suspicion); United States v. Khanalizadeh, 493 F.3d 479, 483 (5th Cir.2007) (same); United States v. Jenson, 462 F.3d 399, 404-05 & n. 5 (5th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). In fact, Brigham positively cites Dortch at
holding reasonable suspicion is based on totality of circumstances holding that the reasonableness inquiry is based upon the totality of the circumstances in determining whether or not a search was reasonable holding that the trial court properly considered an objectors claim that the applicant exhibited an intent to hoard as part of the totality of the circumstances in its reasonable diligence determination holding that the government lacked reasonable suspicion based on the facts of that case in part because we have previously found detentions unreasonable based on the totality of the circumstances when the driver exhibited signs of nervousness citing dortch 199 f3d at 199200 recognizing that district courts finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause based on the totality of the circumstances is ordinarily accorded deference