§ 12-562(B). Nevertheless, “claims involving lack of consent, i.e., the doctor’s failure to operate within the limits of the patient’s consent, may be brought as battery actions.” Duncan v. Scottsdale Med. Imaging, Ltd., 205 Ariz. 306, 310, ¶ 13, 70 P.3d 435, 439 (2003). For consent to be effective, it must be “to the particular conduct, or substantially the same conduct.” Id. at 311, ¶ 16, 70 P.3d at 440 (citing Restatement § 892A(2)(b)). As our supreme court further observed in Duncan: The terms and reasonable implications of the consent given determine the scope of the particular conduct covered. Restatement § 892A cmt. d. The “scope” of consent is an issue for the trier of fact to determine. Id.; see also Cathemer v. Hunter, 27 Ariz.App. [780,] 785, 558 P.2d [975,] 980 [ (1976) ] (<HOLDING>). “[A]nything greater or different than the
holding that when a physician allegedly ignored the instructions of a patient and operated on the tip of the patients nose causing a turned up nose the patients general consent to rhinoplasty was not conclusive proof the patient had consented to the additional work and an action for battery could be brought holding that an operation without the patients consent sounds in battery holding that a patient who endures an operation without his consent may base his action on a tortious battery holding that a psychiatrist had no duty to detain a patient who killed himself and injured his wife because the patient was outside of the scope of the facilitys range of observation and control even when the psychiatrist agreed to treat the patient the patient had suicidal tendencies and the psychologist took the patient into custody but then later permitted him to leave holding a jury question existed as to whether a patient consented to an operation and whether the operation received was substantially similar to the operation to which the patient consented so as to be within the scope of the consent