protection. Under Wilson and Chevron, we recognize that the Attorney General through the BOP, determines presentence credit, and not the courts. We review solely the constitutional consequences or effect of placing defendants prior to adjudication of guilt and sentencing and postsentence convicts serving their sentences in a halfway house under identical conditions and giving only the post-sentence convicts sentence credit. Because neither a suspect nor a quasi-suspect class is involved, we review this governmental decision for a rational basis. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 44-42, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254-55, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985); see United States v. Woods, 888 F.2d 653, 656 (10th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1006, 110 S.Ct. 1301, 108 L.Ed.2d 478 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Under this review standard, Dawson prevails
holding that a rational basis analysis is applicable to equal protection claims of presentence defendants residing in a halfway house holding that because lawrence declined to address equal protection it did not disturb philips equal protection ruling under the rational basis standard of review holding that a presentence defendant is not similarly situated with a postsentence convict and denial of sentence credit does not violate equal protection holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection holding that there is a rational basis for the distinction