his sentence while on parole and whatever expectation of privacy he may have had while on parole had been waived. At the hearing on the suppression motion, Officer Tripp testified he conducted the search based only on the agreement. He testified there had been no complaints involving Baldón at the motel. Peterson, the parole officer, agreed the search was “completely based on [the] agreement and nothing more.” The district court denied Baldoris motion to suppress. It found Baldón consented to the search by signing the parole agreement and that the consent made the search reasonable. It also found Baldón waived any claim of privacy. Baldón then waived his right to a trial by a jury, and the court found him guilty of the charges. Following the imposition 734, 968 P.2d 445, 448 (1998) (<HOLDING>); People v. McCullough, 6 P.3d 774, 781
holding that a parole condition which restricted a parolees access to the internet unless he had prior approval of his parole officer was reasonably related to reintegrating the parolee into his community and protecting the general public and did not violate parolees first amendment rights holding suspicionless searches of parolees cannot be justified by consent if prospective parolee does not have freedom to accept or reject parole holding the parolees signature on parole agreement is not to be taken as an unrestricted consent to any and all searches whatsoever or as a blanket waiver of all constitutional rights to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures holding parole officer could extract consent from parolees sister prior to parolees release holding that consensual suspicionless searches of government employees personal belongings in the workplace were searches even though refusal to consent carried no criminal penalty and the searches were not for law enforcement purposes