could rationally find them unworthy of credence and hence infer that the employer did not act for the asserted nondiscriminatory reasons.” Id. at 1196 (quotation omitted). Because Mr. Williams “bear[s] the burden of proof at trial [on the issue of pretext], he must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts so as to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case in order to survive summary judgment.” Cardoso v. Calbone, 490 F.3d 1194, 1197 (10th Cir.2007) (quotation omitted). In his opening brief, Mr. Williams mentions several theories in support of his argument that the decision to terminate his employment was a pretext for discrimination. Some of these theories are recognized as a means to prove pretext. See Crowe, 649 F.3d at 1197 (<HOLDING>). The problem with this reasoning is that Mr.
holding that absent a rational reason for disparate treatment similarlysituated taxpayers should be treated in a similar fashion holding that to assert a viable equal protection claim plaintiffs must first make a threshold showing that they were differently treated from others who were similarly situated to them holding that proof that the employer acted in bad faith by using a pretext to discharge its employee is only one possible way of demonstrating that the employers stated reason was not a legitimate one holding that a plaintiff can establish pretext only by showing that her employers explanation is a he recognizing that one way to prove pretext is by showing that similarlysituated employees were treated differently