to refrain from speaking “applies ... equally to statements of fact the speaker would rather avoid,” Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 573, 115 S.Ct. 2338, 132 L.Ed.2d 487 (1995). The compelled speech at issue here raises particularly troubling First Amendment concerns. At bottom, the disclaimer portrays abortion as one among a menu of morally equivalent choices. While that may be the City’s view, it is not the Center’s. The message conveyed is antithetical to the very moral, religious, and ideological reasons the Center exists. Its avowed mission is to “provid[e] alternatives to abortion.” J.A. 360. Its “pro-life Christian beliefs permeate all that the Center does.” J.A. 354. Its staff and volunteers are trained “in encoura 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931) (<HOLDING>). But over time, adjunct First Amendment rights
holding that a state may not exercise a prior restraint on publishing a newspaper holding that unlawful restraint could not even be an included offense holding that prior restraint analysis applies to commercial speech but that the general health claim regulation 21 cfr  10114 was sufficiently welldefined to survive prior restraint analysis recognizing that courts should exercise judicial restraint in a facial challenge holding that a regulation was not a prior restraint because it did not authorize suppression of speech in advance of its expression