visited the trailer before Dunaway’s trial with a group of people. When asked by this Court whether he could have confused going to the crime scene with looking at pictures of it admitted into evidence, [W.H.] again said he went to the scene, “[W.H.] appeared sure he went to the crime scene. What his testimony left unclear is when. There is nothing in the record indicating the jury went to the crime scéne during the trial. At the evidentiary hearing, [another juror] said she did not recall the jury going to the crime scene. [E.B.] and [another juror] emphatically said the jury did not go to the crime scene. The burden of proving that [W.H.] visited the crime scene during the trial rested entirely on Dunaway and his collateral counsel. See Ex parte Dawson, 710 So.2d 472, 475 (Ala.1997) (<HOLDING>). Because [W.H.’s] testimony was conflicting,
holding a defendant seeking a new trial on the basis of juror misconduct has the initial burden to prove thatajuror or jurors did in fact commit the alleged misconduct holding that two instances of misconduct do not indicate a persistent and widespread pattern of misconduct that amounts to a city custom or policy of overlooking police misconduct holding that discussion among jurors of their agreement to the defendants guilt during trial and before deliberation was not such misconduct as can be shown by the affidavit of a juror holding as procedurally barred an initial postconviction claim alleging juror misconduct holding that the juror misconduct did not have a substantial and injurious affect