tolling of the [EEOC] filing is inappropriate ... notwithstanding the plaintiffs allegations that she was given incorrect information by both an EEOC employee and her own counsel.” See Crossman v. Crosson, 905 F.Supp. 90, 95 n. 3 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also South v. Saab Cars USA Inc., 28 F.3d 9, 12 (2d Cir.1994) (“[L]ack of due d ]” delay as grounds alone for applying the equitable tolling doctrine. (PI. Mem. 10.) No principle of law supports the proposition that the applicability of equitable tolling is measured by time alone. Rather, the relevant inquiry centers of the factual circumstances leading to the delay; equitable tolling does not excuse ordinary neglect. See Johnson v. Al Tech Specialties Steel Corp., 731 F.2d 143, 147 (2d Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted); Toolan v. Bd. of Educ. of
holding that the charge was timely when filed within the statute of limitations period even though served after the period holding the 90 day period begins to run the date the eeoc right to sue letter is delivered to plaintiffs counsel holding that in computing time to determine whether an act was performed within a specified period of time under the statute of limitations the first day is excluded and the last day of the period is included holding in the context of the 90day period during which a plaintiff must bring suit after receiving a right to sue letter that in the absence of a recognized equitable consideration the court cannot extend the limitations period by even one day holding that the limitations period for  1983 actions arising in ohio is the twoyear period found in ohio rev code  230510 and that the limitations period starts to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action 