court’s decision granting a request for injunctive relief in an action claiming violation of the Eighth Amendment). Although the decisions plaintiff relies on contain broad language which “seem to apply a blanket rule regarding irreparable harm where substantive constitutional rights are concerned, other courts have found that the mere allegation of a constitutional infringement in and of itself does not constitute irreparable harm. Rather district courts must consider the nature of the constitutional injury before making such a conclusion.” Pinckney v. Board of Education of the Westbury Union Free School Dist., 920 F.Supp. 393, 400 (E.D.N.Y.1996) (citing cases). See also Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72-73 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 848, 110 S.Ct. 144, 107 L.Ed.2d 102 (1989) (<HOLDING>); New Alliance Party v. Dinkins, 743 F.Supp.
holding that a movant for a preliminary injunction must first demonstrate that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the requested relief holding that the threat of irreparable harm must be immediate holding that even a temporary deprivation of first amendment rights constitutes irreparable harm holding that a party who can show a significant risk of irreparable harm has demonstrated that the harm is not speculative recognizing that not all constitutional harms are synonymous with irreparable harm and that mere assertion of a first amendment right does not automatically require a finding of irreparable harm rather the movant must show a chilling effect on protected activity