Id. (internal emphasis, quotation marks, and citation omitted). It is not sufficient for a defendant to allege merely that severance would have improved his chances for acquittal. See id. Vas’ argument on appeal falls far short of showing the required prejudice. He argues generally that “[h]earing about the alleged wide-ranging lawlessness involved in the execution of both the real estate scheme and the separate and different campaign scheme, likely led the jury to brand the defendants as individuals with entrenched criminal propensities....” Appellant’s Br. at 56-57. Contrary to this argument, however, most if not all of the evidence related to the straw-donor count would have been admissible to show Vas’ motive with respect to the property-flip scheme. See Eufrasio, 935 F.2d at 569 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the District Court gave a careful
holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for severance where the allegedly prejudicial evidence would have been admissible in separate trials holding that even in separate trial other crimes evidence would not have been admissible and identification testimony would have been admissible holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence where the evidence would serve only to impeach  testimony holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to amend complaint because the proposed amendment would have been futile