was not the motivating factor for his termination. A jury instruction error "is not harmless if it could have ‘reasonably ... affected the outcome of the trial' or if the jury 'quite possibly’ relied on an erroneous instruction.” Avaya Inc., RP v. Telecom Labs, Inc., 838 F.3d 354, 396 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Hill v. Reederei F. Laeisz G.M.B.H., Rostock, 435 F.3d 404, 411 (3d Cir. 2006), and Hirst v. Inverness Hotel Corp., 544 F.3d 221, 228 (3d Cir. 2008)). Here, the difference between "but-for” and "mixed-motive” instruction goes to the central issue before jury; Why was Egan fired? There is no question that a significant change relating to this critical issue could have reasonably affected the outcome of the trial. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 588 F.3d 614, 617 (8th Cir. 2009) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Arguably, the District Court could have
recognizing that the burden of persuasion for a showing of prejudice was on the defendant recognizing that in such close circumstances where the error involves the central issue in the case it is the better policy to require a new trial under the correct instruction holding the sandstrom error in that case was clearly not harmless on the facts and therefore declining to address the question of whether an erroneous charge that shifts a burden of persuasion to the defendant on an essential element of the offense can ever be harmless holding that the improper use of a mixedmotive instruction in a butfor case shifted the burden of persuasion on a central issue in the case and therefore the error cannot be harmless holding unconstitutional a mandatory rebuttable presumption that shifted to the defendant a burden of persuasion on the issue of intent