It is true that, in the fraud context we have placed a great deal of weight on the requirement of an evil intent. But even in this context, we have not held that' if a statute requires evil intent, it necessarily involves moral turpitude. We have held only that without an evil intent, a statute does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. See Hirsch v. INS, 308 F.2d 562, 567 (9th Cir.1962) (“A crime that does not necessarily involve evil intent,', such as an intent to defraud, is not necessarily a crime involving moral turpitude.”) To state the proposition positively, we have held that in the fraud context an evil intent is necessary, but not sufficient, for a crime inevitably to involve moral turpitude. Cf. Gonzalez-Alvarado [v. INS ], 39 F.3d [245,] 246 [(9th Cir.1994) ] (<HOLDING>)- Id. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
holding that involuntary manslaughter defined either as reckless or negligent was not a crime of moral turpitude because itwas based on unintentional conduct in contrast to those crimes involving some form of evil intent it is not an offense that is mala in se and thus does not fall within the definition of crimes involving moral turpitude holding that missouris reckless conduct statute establishes a crime involving moral turpitude holding that assault with a deadly weapon was not a crime involving moral turpitude holding that new yorks reckless conduct statute establishes a crime involving moral turpitude holding that a crime involving the willful commission of a base or depraved act is a crime involv ing moral turpitude whether or not the statute requires proof of evil intent