special act, and thus conflict with it, the special act will be considered as an exception to the general statute, whether it was passed before or after such general enactment. State v. Ibn Omar-Muhammad, 102 N.M. 274, 277, 694 P.2d 922, 925 (1985) (quoting State v. Lujan, 76 N.M. 111, 117, 412 P.2d 405, 408 (1966) (in turn quoting Blevins, 40 N.M. at 368, 60 P.2d at 209)). 27. Other jurisdictions have held that the enactment of a comprehensive motor vehicle code shows a legislative intent to preempt the field. In State v. Davidson, the Supreme Court of Idaho held that with the passage of the motor vehicle code, the legislature “intended to cover the whole field and subject matter of the operation of motor vehicles, including definitions of the several offenses growing out 215 (1960) (<HOLDING>). 28. In addition to the case law from this
holding that vehicular homicide involving criminal negligence is not a crime of violence under begay holding that the older more general manslaughter statute is preempted by the vehicular homicide statute holding that under the particular facts alleged in the indictment vehicular homicide was a lesser offense included in the murder charge holding that the state must prove criminal negligence for its homicide by vehicle statute even though the statute specifically states that any traffic violation is sufficient holding that dwi manslaughter and vehicular homicide are different forms of the same offense