it asks the court to adjudicate rival claims to the property, and (2) when acting under color of title, the State does not have the requisite intent to “take” the property of another. Because the Porrettos bring a trespass to try title action against the State, not a takings claim, they must first obtain legislative consent, which they did not do. See State v. Lain, 162 Tex. 549, 349 S.W.2d 579, 582 (1961). Thus, the trial court properly granted the defendants’ plea to the jurisdiction on the Porrettos’ inverse condemnation claims. Accordingly, I would overrule issue one. Because I believe that the GLO is entitled to immunity, I would also hold that it is immune from the Porrettos’ breach of contract claim. See Tex. A & M Univ.— Kingsville v. Lawson, 87 S.W.3d 518, 521 (Tex.2002) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, I would also overrule issue
recognizing that under texas law governmental immunity embraces two principles immunity from liability and immunity from suit holding that if governmental entity agrees to settle lawsuit from which it is not immune it cannot claim immunity from suit for breach of settlement agreement holding state immune from suit involving a federal question holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit