to invoke his right to remain silent. Doody argues that Caratachea waived his right by testifying under oath at Doody’s juvenile transfer hearing. We disagree. A waiver of the fifth amendment privilege affects only the particular proceed ing in which the waiver occurs. Nelson v. Hannah, 122 Ariz. 296, 297, 594 P.2d 550, 551 (App.1979) (citing Ottomano v. United States, 468 F.2d 269 (1st Cir.1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1128, 93 S.Ct. 948, 35 L.Ed.2d 260 (1973)). Caratachea’s waiver of his fifth amendment right at the juvenile transfer hearing, a proceeding separate from the trial, did not constitute a waiver of his right to refuse to testify at trial. See United States v. Licavoli, 604 F.2d 613, 623 (9th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935, 100 S.Ct. 2151, 64 L.Ed.2d 787 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Juvenile transfer hearings, like grand jury
recognizing commonlaw privilege against selfincrimination holding that a witness may invoke the privilege against selfincrimination at trial despite testifying previously before a grand jury in the same case holding that waiver of privilege against selfincrimination is proceeding specific holding that the drug tax violated the privilege against selfincrimination holding that miranda warnings were not required for suspect testifying at inquest when suspects lawyer had previously advised him of his privilege against selfincrimination