adverse as viewed by a reasonable person in the circumstances.” Id. The only alleged discrimination about which Howard complained was Krzastek’s message threatening that Howard’s job was in jeopardy. An allegation such as this falls well short of an adverse action. Nowhere in the record is there any indication that the message resulted in a “serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” Id. at 1239. In fact, nothing suggests, nor does Howard argue, that at the time Krzastek left his message, he had taken any action — including termination, demotion, or even a reprimand — that could have seriously affected Howard’s employment. Howard’s belief thus was not objectively reasonable. Cf. Akins v. Fulton County, 420 F.3d 1293, 1301-02 (11th Cir. 2005) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, his retaliation claim fails as
holding that a change in job duties was not an adverse employment action where the new job duties did not constitute qualitatively inferior work requiring any less skill or knowledge holding in the context of a first amendment retaliation claim that adverse employment actions may include negative evaluation letters holding that removal of job responsibility did not constitute an adverse employment action because there was no change in the plaintiffs job position grade pay or benefits holding that a transfer of job duties can constitute an adverse employment action holding in first amendment retaliation case that unwarranted reprimands a negative work evaluation threat of job loss through dissolution of the plaintiffs division threat of suspension without pay removal of job duties and exclusion from meetings did not constitute adverse employment action either singly or when considered in the aggregate