of 1990, as amended (ADAAA).” We agree with the Dyer court’s line of reasoning: “As disability discrimination claims encompass both kinds of cases, it is reasonable to conclude that [Vasquez’s] charge alleging disability discrimination can be expected to encompass the various statutory means by which [Vasquez] might establish such a claim, including the assertion that she was regarded as having an impairment.” Dyer, 532 F.Supp.2d at 935-36. The vast majority of district courts addressing this or substantially similar issues have reached the same conclusion, holding that the scope of an EEOC charge alleging disability discrimination extends to “regarded as” claims in addition to actual disability claims. See, e.g., Pellack v. Thorek Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 9 F.Supp.2d 984, 989 (N.D.Ill.1998)(<HOLDING>); see also Anderson v. Foster Group, 521
holding disability discrimination claim barred holding that retaliation claim was reasonably related to prior sex discrimination claim holding that regarded as claim is reasonably related to claim of discrimination on the basis of disability alleged in eeoc charge holding that an original eeoc charge is sufficient to support  a civil suit under the act for any discrimination  developed in the course of a reasonable investigation of that charge provided such discrimination was included in the reasonable cause determination of the eeoc holding that retaliation arising out of first eeoc filing was reasonably related to that filing obviating the need for a second eeoc charge