is presumed when a violation of a separation of witnesses order occurs, but the presumption can be overcome if the non movant can show that there was no prejudice. Stafford v. State, 736 N.E.2d 326, 381 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (relying on Hernandes v. State, 716 N.E.2d 948, 955 (Ind.1999) (Boehm, J., dissenting), reh'g denied ), reh'g denied, trams. denied. Here, Ray's counsel cross-examined Dr. Burrows. Further, Ray's counsel questioned Dr. Burrows on how she learned that Blake had received a sternum rub. Thus, Ray was not placed in grave peril because the jury was informed of the conversation between Dr. Burrows and the prosecutor and was given adequate information to judge the credibility of Dr. Burrows. See, eg., Hightower v. State, 260 Ind. 481, 486, 296 N.E.2d 654, 657 (Ind. 1973) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 916, 94 S.Ct. 1412, 39
holding that the postconviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses holding that because the line of questioning was not relevant to the credibility of the witness and sought information about which the witness had no knowledge it was not a constitutional violation to sustain the objection holding that the jury is the judge of the weight and credibility given to witness testimony holding the excluded testimony was relevant to whether a signature was that of a deceased party and since a statement regarding the issue was the only testimony that could be given by the witness no offer to prove was necessary because the substance of the evidence was apparent from the context of the question asked holding that a violation of a witness separation order did not warrant reversal because the jury was completely informed of the conversation between the witnesses  and was given adequate information by which it could judge the reliability and credibility of the revised testimony