test results became so critical to the defense and were so thoroughly discussed that they surely attributed to the verdict. While the jury could have reached the same verdict without the laboratory test results, that evidence surely influenced the verdict in some way. We therefore conclude that the error in admitting this evidence was not harmless and that appellant is entitled to a new trial. II. Given our decision to grant appellant a new trial, we need not discuss in detail the remaining issues raised by appellant. We nevertheless mention the sentencing issue to give some guidance to the district court on retrial. At sentencing, appellant concedes that the district court followed the procedure endorsed by the supreme court in State v. Chauvin, 723 N.W.2d 20, 27 (Minn.2006) (<HOLDING>). Appellant merely challenges the instructions
holding that the district court possessed the inherent judicial authority to empanel a resentencing jury on remand from  reversal of the respondents enhanced sentence and because the district court erred by failing to recognize that it possessed this inherent judicial authority boehl reversed and remanded for the district courts discretionary determination of whether to exercise that authority holding that district courts have inherent judicial authority to impanel sentencing jury for purposes of departing from presumptive sentence recognizing district courts inherent authority to dismiss with prejudice for abuse of judicial process holding that outside of rule 35 there exists no inherent authority for a district court to modify a sentence holding that courts have inherent authority in special circumstances to stay adjudication