Scanes in 2006 was improper, the testimony was brief and isolated, and the government immediately asked follow-up questions intended to clarify Scanes had an outstanding warrant for a suspended driver’s license. Scanes has cited no authority suggesting this incident rose to the level of substantial prejudice to entitle him to a mistrial. See Ettinger, 344 F.3d at 1161. While Scanes asserts the government, in its closing argument, was required to stress the limited purpose of his prior conviction, he fails to cite any authority for this proposition. The district judge’s limiting instructions and admonitions that the arguments of counsel were not evidence and were not binding on the jury served to mitigate any possible prejudice resulting from its admission. See Zapata, 139 F.3d at 1358 (<HOLDING>). Scanes has not argued on appeal that the
recognizing district courts power to admit evidence for a limited purpose recognizing the district judge diminished the prejudicial impact of the extrinsic evidence by properly instructing the jury for what limited purpose the extrinsic evidence was to be used holding that the district court committed plain error by admitting evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment where the error did affect a substantial right of the defendants and the admission of evidence which should have been excluded did have a prejudicial impact on the jury holding that when determining prejudice under the objective test relevant considerations include 1 whether the extrinsic evidence was received by the jury and the manner in which it was received 2 whether it was available to the jury for a lengthy period of time 3 whether it was discussed and considered extensively by the jury 4 whether it was introduced before a jury verdict was reached and if so at what point during the deliberations and 5 whether it was reasonably likely to affect the verdict considering the strength of the governments case and whether the governments case outweighed any possible prejudice caused by the extrinsic evidence holding that the district court properly declined to consider extrinsic evidence where the plea agreement was unambiguous