that a stipulation “waives the requirement that the government produce evidence (other than the stipulation itself) to establish the facts stipulated to beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 678 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Clark, 993 F.2d 402, 406 (4th Cir.1993)). Arguably, the italicized phrase contemplates a formal reading to the jury of all necessary stipulations. But that issue was not before the court. The stipulation was read aloud in Muse (and in the case it cited for support), see id. at 678; the actual issue was the propriety of a jury instruction. See id. at 677. Therefore, while' the Muse court accurately described normal trial practice to include the reading of stipulations, it had no occasion to consider the situation before us today. See Hardin, 139 F.3d at 817 (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Jackson, 124 F.3d
holding that references to reading stipulations in muse are dicta holding that everything after denial of jurisdiction is dicta pure and simple recognizing such limitations in dicta recognizing that alternative holdings are not dicta recognizing that a reading of the oregon criminal statute indicates that the acts prohibited are those which are performed upon the mother rather than any action taken by her