ALJ Krappa concluded that Plaintiff could perform jobs that are “simple and repetitive” but does not explain how she arrived at that conclusion. (R. 18.) The ALJ stated that Plaintiffs impairments “have been described in various terms: depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder,” but did not consider the effects and limitations of each mental illness separately. (R. 20.) She also failed to address Plaintiffs GAF assessment of 50, which indicates serious symptoms or difficulty in social and occupational functioning. (R. 257.) Overall, the reference that Plaintiff can perform simple and repetitive tasks does not “specifically convey” her mental limitations and “greater specificity is required.” See Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 122 (3d Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>). Because the ALJ did not clearly evaluate all
holding employees inability to do repetitive work with hands and arms extended at or above shoulder levels was not sufficient proof that she was substantially limited in major life activity of performing manual tasks holding that where male teacher asked female teacher out for a drink asked her to perform tasks she perceived as secretarial and struck her in a fight purported harassment was not genderbased and was not sufficiently severe or pervasive holding that the finding that plaintiff could perform simple repetitive one twostep tasks was not sufficiently descriptive to encompass her limitation recognizing that where a plaintiff failed to perform because of the defendants breach the plaintiff could recover damages caused by the defendants breach holding that the word interfere in the regulation could not p 7 fairly be interpreted to encompass the respondents failure to unlock her door and her remonstrances on constitutional grounds