does not emphasize the need for honesty. See id. at 290, 523 S.E.2d at 671. Finally, as in Hinnant, the child’s statements lack inherent reliability because of the nature of Rockwell-Flick’s leading questions. See id. Indeed, almost none of the child’s statements about the defendant were spontaneous, but rather responded to direct questions such as whether anyone had ever touched or kissed her. Second, although the child testified, unlike the minor child in Hinnant, we cannot treat Rockwell-Flick’s testimony as corroborative testimony since the trial court explicitly ruled that it was substantive evidence. Consistent with that ruling, the trial court did not limit the jury’s consideration of her testimony as corroborative. See State v. Quarg, 334 N.C. 92, 101-02, 431 S.E.2d 1, 5 (1993) (<HOLDING>). In this case, there was no physical evidence
holding that trial court is not required to give limiting instruction when defendant did not object at first opportunity because evidence admitted for all purposes recognizing that upon request the trial court may provide a limiting instruction to the jury holding that failure to give a limiting instruction for 404b evidence is not plain error holding that a trial court errs when it fails to give a limiting instruction properly requested by a party holding that failure to give a properly requested chicone instruction cannot be harmless error