in a resurgence of the land claims and ethnic violence of the early 1990s. Mbaye, therefore, has failed to demonstrate that the new evidence is material and would alter the outcome of her case, and we hold that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in so finding. In addition to being a prerequisite for her motion to reopen, presentation of previously unavailable, material evidence is also necessary for Mbaye to overcome the bar to successive applications contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(2)(e). See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) (permitting a successive petition “if the alien demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Attorney General ... the existence of changed circumstances which materially affect the applicant’s eligibility for asylum.”); Zhang v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 851, 859 (6th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Mbaye filed her motion to reopen and intent
holding that because the ij denied an asylum application as untimely we lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction to review the final order of removal as it pertained to the asylum claim recognizing that an order denying a motion to modify a family court order where the motion is based on changed factual or legal circumstances is appealable as a special order after final judgment holding that the requirement that an alien appeal a removal order within 30 days is jurisdictional holding that an alien may apply for asylum successively based on any material changed conditions for 90 days after a final order of removal but not thereafter holding that the exhaustion requirement of  1252d1 applies only to an alien  challenging a final order of removal and not to  any person 