suffered for any set length of time. Although the prosecutor’s statement that the jury needed to find only that the victim suffered mental or physical pain, in isolation, could suggest that a murder can be especially cruel even if the victim is rendered unconscious quickly, the statement’s context clarifies that the prosecutor was referring only to the lack of a particular temporal requirement. Indeed, after making this statement, the prosecutor accurately read the court’s instruction defining cruelty. Taking his statement in context, the prosecutor communicated the correct standard: there is no bright-line rule about the length of time required to establish a victim’s suffering. See id.; cf. State v. Cropper (Cropper II), 223 Ariz. 522, 526 ¶ 12, 527 ¶ 14, 225 P.3d 579, 583-84 (2010) (<HOLDING>). Because the prosecutor did not misstate the
holding that the trial court properly denied a fathers motion for attorney fees where there was no misconduct by the mother holding that where an objection was made and trial courts ruling was treated as conclusive by state and defense counsel there was no need for further objections when evidence was presented to jury holding that when determining prejudice under the objective test relevant considerations include 1 whether the extrinsic evidence was received by the jury and the manner in which it was received 2 whether it was available to the jury for a lengthy period of time 3 whether it was discussed and considered extensively by the jury 4 whether it was introduced before a jury verdict was reached and if so at what point during the deliberations and 5 whether it was reasonably likely to affect the verdict considering the strength of the governments case and whether the governments case outweighed any possible prejudice caused by the extrinsic evidence holding that any vouching by prosecutor was harmless error because the judge informed the jury not to consider the relevant comments there was a great deal of evidence to support the conviction and defendant was not prejudiced holding there was no misconduct when prosecutor argued that period of time required for suffering was a subjective standard defined by what that means to the jury 