does not make forbearance the “default,” and it does not put the onus on the Commission to prove that the prerequisites for forbearance are not satisfied. Rather, section 10(c) “simply means” that the Commission must attend promptly to forbearance petitions, and the burden is on the petitioner to show that a regulatory obligation is not needed and that forbearance is consonant with the public interest. Id. ble one. See Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 57, 126 S.Ct. 528, 163 L.Ed.2d 387 (2005) (concluding that, where a statute was silent on the burden of persuasion and “[a]bsent some reason to believe that Congress intended otherwise,” the burden “lies where it usually falls, upon the party seeking relief’); see also Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 756 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>), superseded by statute on other grounds, 8
holding that in the absence of an express statutory allocation of the burden of proof the board of immigration appealss placement of the burden on the alien was reasonable under chevron holding that section 523a2c shifts the burden of production and not the burden of proof on the issue of intent only holding that traditional allocation of burden of proof to the party challenging the decisions applies to decisions under the tca holding that the burden is on the plaintiff holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant