Stephens had was a right to receive payments under a covenant not to compete. Therefore, the description contained in the security agreement, clearly referring to tangible property, did not describe or identify the collateral at issue here, intangible property. Orix cites numerous cases from other jurisdictions for the proposition that the phrase “all personal property” is a sufficient description under § 9.110. We have reviewed all of those cases and find that they are distinguishable. Six of the cases cited by Orix are inapplicable because in none of them do the courts hold that super generic descriptions (which were clearly descriptions of some kind of tangible property) were sufficient to cover intangible property. See Donald v. Madison Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1973) (<HOLDING>); In re Legal Data Systems, Inc., 135 B.R. 199
holding description all tangible personal property now owned by the debtor or which may hereafter be acquired sufficient to cover equipment holding description all personal property sufficient to cover equipment holding that description all inventory accounts machinery equipment finished products and products being manufactured also everything connected with said business in any way sufficient to cover trailers holding description all of the goods then owned or to be owned in the future sufficient to cover equipment and vehicles holding that experienced contractor familiar with business practices is merchant with respect to buying certain equipment despite lack of special knowledge of that equipment