court “shall impose” the presumptive term “unless the preponderance of aggravating or mitigating factors, as set forth in [N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1] a and b., weighs in favor of a higher or lower term” within the statutory range. N.J.S.A 2C:44 — 1(f)(1). Thus, in considering the applicability of the thirteen aggravating and thirteen mitigating factors in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-l(a) and (b), the presumptive term is the pivot point for moving a sentence up or down within the statutory range. State v. Kromphold, 162 N.J. 345, 352, 744 A.2d 640 (2000) (“The Code confers on a sentencing court the limited power to depart from the presumptive terms in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1f(1) if it finds a preponderance of aggravating or mitigating factors.”); see also State v. Dalziel, 182 N.J. 494, 503, 867 A.2d 1167 (2005) (<HOLDING>). “If the mitigating and aggravating factors
holding that trial judges do not have discretion to reject a mitigating factor altogether despite evidence in the record holding that a trial court must not preclude the jury from considering any aspect of the defendants character or circumstances as a mitigating factor holding that trial court retains wide discretion to apply or reject mitigating and aggravating factors as well as to interpret meaning of individual factors and its determination must be upheld absent abuse of discretion holding that it was appropriate for the trial court to find that lack of a prior criminal record was not a mitigating factor in light of the violent nature of the crime committed holding that counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to pursue a particular mitigating factor where despite a reasonable investigation by counsel counsel was not put on notice of any such mitigating evidence