indicates that he told Gregory that the document to be faxed was a copy of the bylaws, but it does not establish that Gregory in fact knew they were bylaws. And, while Gregory herself referred to the documents as bylaws, it is possible that this reference only indicates the state of her knowledge at the time she testified. Gregory’s reference to bylaws does not prove that she knew the documents were bylaws at the time she faxed them, and does not demonstrate that the ALJ’s credibility determination was irrational or patently erroneous. In addition to Smith’s comments about Krueger, the timing of the discharge itself supports an inference that Krueger was dismissed because of his union-related activities. See NLRB v. O’Hare-Midway Limousine Serv., 924 F.2d 692, 697 (7th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). At the time Krueger was discharged, Jet Star
holding that evidence of a cursory investigation can give rise to an inference of an unlawful motive holding that the timing of a discharge may indicate the existence of an unlawful motive holding that the existence of probable cause vitiated the need for an inquiry into an underlying motive for the arrest holding that liability for the tort of wrongful discharge based on refusal to commit an unlawful act can extend to the corporate officers who authorized or directed the discharge holding that one of the essential elements of an abuse of process claim is the existence of an ulterior motive