is the only entity with the capacity to impose or implement SEQRA, and the Villages have only attempted to ensure such action through a lawsuit. Cf. Westchester Day Sch., 386 F.3d at 189 (equating “implementation of a land use regulation” with “regulation or rejection” of actions by a zoning board). This interpretation is borne out in what actually happened in the Chestnut Ridge Action: Defendants did not prevail, and as such, the lawsuit had no bearing on the actions that Ramapo took in implementing SEQRA. It is also consistent with the plain meaning of RLUIPA; Congress made no mention of “enforcing,” or “litigation relating to,” land use regulations in RLUIPA, even though it could have easily done so. Cf. Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F.Supp.2d 250, 255 (W.D.N.Y.2005) (<HOLDING>). The Court therefore agrees with Defendants
holding that the exclusionary rule generally does not apply to immigration proceedings holding that rluipa does not apply to eminent domain proceedings because congress made no mention of it and the concept is hardly  arcane or littleknown holding that the right of privacy does not attach to matters already within the public domain holding that because the farr act does not expressly mention habeas corpus or 28 usc  2241 it does not eliminate habeas jurisdiction holding that it is not