of which are local and some out of State.” Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 585-86, 117 S.Ct. 1590, 137 L.Ed.2d 852 (1997). Thus, as the Court stated, “[f]or purposes of Commerce Clause analysis, any categorical distinction between the activities of profit-making enterprises and not-for-profit entities is ... wholly illusory.” Id. at 586, 117 S.Ct. 1590. Similarly, government institutions not only can affect interstate commerce but also can be direct participants in interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has noted on several occasions the impact that certain federal, state, and local government institutions can have on interstate commerce. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 537, 547-48, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Governments in general, and individual
holding that commerce clause authorizes congress to punish any particular criminal action even without proof of a relation to interstate commerce when the activity is part of a class of activities determined by congress to affect interstate commerce holding that the inability to proceed as a class does not deprive plaintiffs of substantive rights under the fair labor standards act flsa holding claims based on the fair labor standards act subject to arbitration holding that a religious foundation is an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the fair labor standards act holding that application of fair labor standards act flsa to transportation employees employed by local government does not contravene the commerce clause because labor conditions of those employees affect interstate commerce