or (3) “being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (emphasis added). The crux of Kaplan’s ADA claim is that the Cit 6th Cir.1999) (same); Newberry v. E. Texas State Univ., 161 F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir.1998) (same); Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 148 n. 12 (3d Cir.1998) (en banc) (declining to rule on this issue but noting that the argument that employers are not required to provide reasonable accommodation for perceived disabilities has “considerable force”). But see Katz v. City Metal Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir.1996) (allowing “regarded as” plaintiff to proceed, concluding that whether plaintiff could have performed his job with reasonable accommodation was an issue for the jury) ; Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F.Supp.2d 151, 163 (E.D.N.Y.2002) (<HOLDING>). Though the weight of circuit authority
recognizing that no federal circuit has addressed the issue holding that the tenth circuit if faced with this issue would follow those circuit court of appeals  that have permitted the use of class action waivers in arbitration agreements holding that district court has no jurisdiction to decide unauthorized second or successive  2255 claims recognizing that the second circuit court of appeals has yet to decide the issue but concluding that employers have a duty to accommodate in regarded as cases holding that the court of appeals has jurisdiction to decide its jurisdiction under the transitional rules of the iirira