to plead guilty to firearms violations under a Pinkerton theory of liability, and his disagreements with four attorneys. The district court was alert to such issues. Indeed, it specifically found that Vasquez’s difficulty dealing with counsel was a function of his personality, not his competency. It further found his plea decision to reflect not incompetency but a strong, if mistaken, belief that he was less responsible for the loss of life in the robbery because he was “separat[ed] from the more violent ends of the[] conspiracies,” App’x 1733. Thus, neither Vasquez’s plea decision nor his relations with counsel manifest the district court’s abuse of discretion in not sua sponte ordering a new competency hearing. Compare, e.g., United States v. Kerr, 752 F.3d 206, 217 (2d Cir. 2014) (<HOLDING>), with United States v. Auen, 846 F.2d 872,
holding the district court did not abuse its discretion by coneluding the plea would not adequately represent the defendants criminal conduct recognizing defendants right under utah constitution to control his defense and represent himself holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling based only on affidavits holding that district court did not abuse discretion in declining to order new competency hearing based on defendants obstinate belligerent and obsessive behavior obsession with his own theories of defense distrust of his attorneys or desire to represent himself at trial holding that trial court erred in denying appointment of counsel where court had no information concerning petitioners education or ability to represent himself petitioner presented no expert testimony concerning competency of defense furnished by trial counsel petitioner did not call alibi witness to testify at hearing and effective crossexamination may have revealed that counsels own problems with federal government interfered with his representation of petitioner