had the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) “he asked his attorney to appeal within the time allowed for giving notice of an appeal”; (2) “the attorney failed to perfect the appeal”; and (3) “such failure was through no fault of [Conwill’s].” Dickey v. State, 662 So.2d 1106, 1108 (Miss.1995) (emphasis added and citation omitted). The time allowed Conwill for giving notice of an appeal of his burglary conviction was within thirty days of the imposition of his sentence, which occurred on June 25, 2008. See M.R.A.P. 4(a), (e). Before the sentencing order was entered, Conwill announced to the judge that he was not going to pursue an appeal, based on the plea bargain for his aggravated-assault charge. Cf. Andrews v. State, 923 So.2d 239, 240 (¶ 5) (Miss.Ct.App.2006) (<HOLDING>). And consistent with this announcement, no
holding defendant who voluntarily dismissed his appeal of one conviction based on plea agreement for separate charges was not entitled to outoftime appeal holding that issues were not waived on subsequent appeal when initial appeal was dismissed holding that a defendant who is allowed to withdraw his plea must either withdraw his plea to all charges or to none when his plea to all charges was part of an agreement with the state holding that a defendant who has successfully challenged his plea in one ease should be allowed to withdraw his plea in a second case when both cases were part of one negotiated settlement of his charges holding that where a criminal defendant has voluntarily and knowingly entered into a plea agreement in which he or she waives the right to appeal the defendant is not entitled to resentencing in light of booker 