“If the defendant does not object to a defect, error, or irregularity of form or substance in an indictment ... [before trial], ... he may not raise the objection on appeal.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.14(b) (Vernon 2005). Article 1.14(b) is designed to prevent a defendant from lying “behind the log” and attacking an otherwise constitutionally valid indictment for the first time on appeal — it does not relieve the State of its burden to prove that a defendant is a habitual offender. Compare Teal v. State, 230 S.W.3d 172, 175-78 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (discussing legislative-reform package designed to prevent conviction reversals based on the “fine technical distinctions between defects of form and those of substance”) with Jordan v. State, 256 S.W.3d 286, 291-92 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the court of criminal appeals has
holding that defendants habitual traffic violator conviction could also serve as a predicate felony conviction under the general habitual offender statute holding that states burden under habitual offender statute is an issue of sufficiency of evidence and cannot be categorized as trial error holding that under the 1991 version of the habitual offender statute defendant could not receive habitual offender sentence for life felony holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in not allowing defendant to present evidence of his subjective belief regarding his status as habitual offender because his belief was irrelevant to offense of driving as habitual offender holding that under habitual felony offender statute a sentence includes the sanction of probation