of PWID marijuana within proximity of a school. Significantly, plea counsel stated at the plea proceeding that Husband was originally “charged with everything,” but she “was able to get the solicitor who had the case at the time to dismiss all of his cases.” A review of the plea proceeding also reveals that plea counsel argued for leniency on behalf of Husband by comparing his more limited involvement in the crimes to that of Petitioner. We believe plea counsel’s approach essentially pitted Husband against Petitioner, which was clearly detrimental to Petitioner’s interests. In light of the foregoing, we find Petitioner established that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected her plea coun sel’s performance. See Thomas v. State, 346 S.C. 140, 143-45, 551 S.E.2d 254, 256 (2001) (<HOLDING>); see also Staggs v. State, 372 S.C. 549,
holding that absent an actionable injury to one spouse the other spouse cannot recover for loss of consortium holding that plaintiffs motion to amend her complaint to add her husband as a defendant did not relate back because her failure to sue her husband was not due to misnomer or mistake involving the identity of the proper party but because the law at the time of the complaint did not allow one spouse to sue another in tort holding petitioner in pcr proceeding demonstrated actual conflict of interest that affected her counsels performance given counsel jointly represented petitioner and her husband in a case where solicitor offered a plea  bargain that would allow the charge against one spouse to be dismissed if the other spouse would plead guilty to the entire amount of cocaine holding that an adverse action taken solely against a spouse in retaliation for conduct of the other spouse should be analyzed as a claimed violation of a first amendment right of intimate association holding that knowledge of prohibited activities is not necessarily the same as fraudulent intent and that the code does not allow attribution of intent from spouse to spouse