(quoting Combs v. Combs, 787 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Ky. 1990)). More importantly, I am not prepared to conclude that the sharing of household expenses, in addition to the existence of a long-term relationship, can never constitute changed circumstances. Indeed, in a cohabitation case (not a “roommate” case), it is difficult to conceive of a situation where a court could find changed circumstances in the absence of such economic factors. ¶ 45. While the majority states that it adopts “the majority rule for cohabitation situations,” ante, ¶ 18 (citing Smith v. Mangum, 747 P.2d 609, 611 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987)), the majority rule does not foreclose a trial court from considering evidence of shared expenses in determining whether changed circumstances exist. See Mangum, 747 P.2d at 612 (<HOLDING>). To the contrary, the cases cited by the
holding that although cohabitation is not in itself the de facto equivalent of marriage that would warrant modification of spousal maintenance all evidence relating to the economic nature of the relationship between wife and cohabitant would be relevant and admissible to show that wifes support needs have changed holding that even in separate trial other crimes evidence would not have been admissible and identification testimony would have been admissible holding that the trial court lacked authority to renew spousal support payments pursuant to a motion that was filed after the expiration of time during which spousal support was required to be paid under the original judgment holding that the trial court was without authority to modify a spousal support obligation when the modification proceeding was initiated ten years after the obligation to pay spousal support under the dissolution judgment had been terminated by order holding that denial of petition for modification of maintenance was proper when the parties agreement prohibited modification of maintenance