argument, as the district court noted, is baffling given that he grounded his age discrimination claim on allegations that Matsushita treated Underwood and Stookesbury preferentially. Moreover, the very cases Wagner cites for the elements of a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, Hein v. All American Plywood Co., Inc. and Braithwaite v. Timken Co., require plaintiffs to provide comparative evidence of disparate treatment. Hein, 232 F.3d at 489; Braithwaite v. Timken Co., 258 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir.2001). Citing Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, Wagner also contends that the district court improperly considered Matsushita’s nondiscriminatory reason for Wagner’s termination in evaluating the fourth element of a prima facie case of age discrimination. 206 F.3d 651 (6th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). But this court’s cases often incorporate an
holding that a plaintiff who could not demonstrate every element of the mcdonnell douglas test could nonetheless demonstrate a prima facie case holding that federal government employee successfully established prima facie case of retaliation under mcdonnell douglas but failed to prove employers proffered reason was pretextual holding that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she was unable to present evidence that she was qualified for the position holding that a title vii plaintiff need not plead the elements of a mcdonnell douglas prima facie case to survive a motion to dismiss holding that the district court fundamentally misapplied the mcdonnell douglas test when it considered defendantemployers nondiscriminatory reason in assessing whether plaintiffemployee showed that she was qualified for her position under the third element of a prima facie ease