agreed not to introduce the testimony of DeFoy, a jailhouse informant who claimed that Pursell admitted to the killing. Today, Pursell claims that Krahe’s testimony violated his rights under the Fifth Amendment, and that his defense counsel was ineffective when he abandoned the motion for a mistrial. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the merits of the ineffectiveness claim, and I will apply AEDPA’s deferential standard of review to that claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In all other respects, my review is de novo. There is little question that Krahe’s statement about Pursell’s prior record violated the Fifth Amendment. Indeed, any statements made by Pursell after he invoked his rights to counsel and silence were inadmissible under Miranda. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-75, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (<HOLDING>); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101
holding that once miranda warnings have been given if the individual indicates in any manner  that he wishes to remain silent the interrogation must cease any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion subtle or otherwise holding that the interrogation must cease once the suspect invokes his miranda right to counsel holding that if a suspect indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning holding that a statement given after miranda warnings have been administered may be inadmissable when police have elicited a previous unwarned statement during a custodial interrogation holding state did not impermissibly comment on defendants right to remain silent when it crossexamined him on the inconsistency of his testimony with the prior statement he made to the arresting officer after being given the miranda warnings