addressing compatibility— is a separate “matter” for purposes of Rule I.11(a). They argue that when Mr. Cassell worked for the BZA, he was only involved with the LESA scoring stage; and that he is therefore free to represent Thom Hill before the BZA in connection with other aspects of Thorn Hill’s CUP application (for example, compatibility). However, neither common sense nor applicable legal authority support the contention that each stage in the consideration of a conditional use permit application is a separate and discrete “matter.” Nor do they support the contention that the BZA may not bar its former lawyer from aiding an applicant in connection with an application about which the lawyer once advised the BZA. In a similar case, In re Sofaer, 728 A.2d 625, 647 (D.C.Ct.App.1999) (<HOLDING>), the D.C. Court of Appeals quoted approvingly
holding that a former state department lawyer was disqualified from representing libya in connection with the lockerbie airplane bombing when the lawyer had worked on issues related to the bombing at the state department holding that under separation of powers the legislative department makes the laws the executive department carries the laws into effect and the judicial department interprets and declares the laws holding that because the department of revenue is subordinate to the board of tax review in the decision making process the department is not an adversely affected or aggrieved party having standing to petition for judicial review of the boards order reversing a decision of the department holding that the company administering a selfinsurance program for the department of transportation was an agent for the department and was therefore immune from suit holding that a state department of transportation employee was subject to patronage dismissal where his duties included serving as a liaison between the director of the department and the general public and other government officials including representing the department at meetings and conferences