the corporate veil. Other than to state that a separate cause of action is required to pursue the remedy of piercing the corporate veil, and we have rejected that argument, defendants have pointed to no law that prohibits plaintiffs from filing this second suit against Persha and seeking to pierce Kasper’s corporate veil. Certainly Persha was not off-limits to a new lawsuit, as the first case against her was dismissed without prejudice. See Mable Cleary Trust v Edward-Marlah Muzyl Trust, 262 Mich App 485, 509-510; 686 NW2d 770 (2004), overruled in part on other grounds by Titan Ins Co v Hyten, 491 Mich 547, 555 n 4 (2012). And as we noted earlier, actions to enforce judgments are specifically permitted by the common law. See Netting Co v Touscany, 247 Mich 279, 282; 225 NW 556 (1929) (<HOLDING>), and Union Guardian Trust Co, 308 Mich at 172.
recognizing a commonlaw action to recover on a personal judgment recognizing that when a cause of action is reduced to a judgment the cause of action is merged into the judgment and thereafter only an action on the judgment exists recognizing cause of action recognizing the cause of action recognizing discharge in retaliation for pursuing rights under iowa workers compensation laws violates public policy and gives rise to commonlaw cause  of action