tangential effect upon [future] ultimate decisions.” Dollis, 77 F.3d at 781-82; see also Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 708 (5th Cir.1997) (discussing the genesis of this rule). Therefore, we have repeatedly held that an employment action that limits an employee’s future opportunities for promotion, but does not itself affect the employee’s job duties, compensation, or benefits, does not qualify as an adverse employment action. Banks, 320 F.3d at 575; accord Walker v. Thompson, 214 F.3d 615, 629 (5th Cir.2000) (stating that an employer’s decision to remove the employee’s major account from her after she filed a complaint with the EEOC did not qualify as an adverse employment action, even though the employee’s chances of advancement were decreased); Dollis, 77 F.3d at 782 (<HOLDING>). Our review of the summary judgment record
recognizing retaliation involving promotion as adverse employment actions under the first amendment holding that employers refusals either to consider whether the plaintiff deserved a promotion or to provide the employee with training opportunities thereby decreasing future promotion opportunities were not ultimate employment decisions holding that 15 vsa  751b8 permits the court to consider a spouses possible future inheritance in determining opportunities of each spouse to acquire capital assets and income in the future recognizing exception to application requirement when employer does not notify employees of available promotion and does not provide formal mechanism for expressing interest in promotion holding that plaintiffs evidence of statistical disparities in hiring promotion and compensation was sufficient to support claim of intentional discrimination where the employment decisions were based on completely subjective criteria