The Smith court rationalized that the case was “practically ‘on all fours’ ” with Meeks because the 1997 Amendments imposed a mandatory time assessment of 15 months. Id. at 589. It argued that the “previously non-existent ‘mandatory minimum’ penalty removes discretion and is thus, ... subject to ex post facto rejection.” Id. at 590. Consequentially, the Smith court found the guidelines unconstitutional. Even if Smith were the only state court precedent, rather than a solitary departure from the prevailing au 1997 Amendments as being procedural, rather than affecting matters of substance and therefore as not violative of the Ex Post Facto Clause because they are not laws within the meaning of the Clause. See Miller, 482 U.S. at 430, 107 S.Ct. 2446; see also DiNapoli, 764 F.2d at 146 (<HOLDING>); Shepard v. Taylor, 556 F.2d 648, 654 (2d
holding that parole guidelines are subject to the ex post facto clause holding that use of the guidelines in effect at time of sentencing does not violate ex post facto clause after booker holding that work release and security classification regulations were not ex post facto laws holding that the ex post facto clause  has no application to deportation holding that the federal parole guidelines at issue were not laws within meaning of ex post facto clause