mitigating evidence relating to that conduct. Moreover, that right was not satisfied because "both Becldey and defense counsel had an opportunity to speak at the ... sentencing hearing.” See infra ¶ 39. Neither Beckley nor his counsel was competent to provide a psychological evaluation, and without that type of evaluation we can only speculate whether the trial court’s ultimate sentence would have been different. Further, the dissent’s assertion that our decision here will discourage trial courts from ordering presentence reports in the future is untenable. A defendant’s statutory right to present mitigation evidence is not dependent upon a trial court’s decision to order a presentence report. 7 . This case is distinguishable from State v. Jensen, 1998 SD 52, V 57, 579 N.W.2d at 623 (<HOLDING>) and State v. Iron Necklace, 430 N.W.2d 66,
holding that consideration of pending or dismissed charges during sentencing results in a denial of the defendants due process rights holding that preadjudication detention of a juvenile such as that at issue here is not a denial of due process of law holding decision denying expert witness testimony during sentencing concerning impact of prison term on juvenile offender was not a denial of due process holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony holding due process required an opportunity for crossexamination when the decision depended on the credibility of individual witness testimony