of product in a defined period of time. When the contract is read in its entirety, the obligations of each party are described in detail. There is nothing in the language used by the parties, which describes each party’s various obligations, that indicates a party’s negligence would excuse nonperformance of a specific obligation. Moreover, an agreement excusing a party’s performance due to that party’s negligence defeats the purpose of having an agreement requiring specific performance within a specified period of time. Wells’ interpretation of the force maj-eure clause is inconsistent with the absence of any discussions between the parties indicating the common understanding of a force-majeure clause was not intended by the parties and with the purpose of a pr 06, 908 (Iowa 1977) (<HOLDING>). VI. Disposition. We remand the case to the
holding that trial court impliedly ruled on motion for continuance by granting motion for summary judgment when appellant filed motion for continuance two days before summary judgment hearing holding that a trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment holding that only motions filed under 12b6 can be converted to a summary judgment motion holding summary judgment may only be entered for one who has filed a motion asking that relief and only after notice and hearing on that motion holding that an appellate court should not undertake to review whether a plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted when the only motion filed and the only motion on appeal was the trial courts grant of summary judgment