CIT at —, 123 F.Supp.2d at 1371. Under the second interpretation, tied to the slightly more flexible “impede” or “avert” definition of “prevent,” an agreement would have to effectively counteract — without necessarily eliminating — price suppression. Id. The Court finds that Commerce’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable because it is in accord with the interpretation tied to the latter definition of “prevent,” and because, contrary to U.S. Steel’s suggestions, this interpretation creates a reviewable standard. How much price suppression is “significant” may be determined on a case-by-case basis. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947); see also Fabrique De Fer De Charleroi S.A. v. United States, slip op. 01-82, at 21 (CIT July 3, 2001) (<HOLDING>). And any conclusion that an agreement prevents
holding that reinstatement in an age discrimination case lies within the discretion of the trial court after careful consideration of the particular facts of the case holding that the appropriate postpetition interest rate must be determined by examining the equities involved in a particular case holding defendant failed to rebut statutory presumption where evidence was not particular to the facts and circumstances of the case holding that a special relationship may arise from the factual circumstances of a particular case holding that commerce may reach a determination after examining the particular circumstances of the case without formally promulgating an allinclusive standard