that a remand is necessary to give Kilpper an additional opportunity to assert his defenses with sufficient specificity to meet the requirements of Civil Rule 77(c)(2). If Kilpper offers defenses on remand that entitle him to a hearing under Rule 77(e)(2), the court should grant his request for a hearing. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we REMAND this case for further proceedings. 1 . We use a pseudonym for the name of the child. 2 . AS 25.27.120 authorized CSED to claim reimbursement from Kilpper. 3 . Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1284 n. 6 (Alaska 1979). 4 . Id. 5 . Arnett v. Baskous, 856 P.2d 790, 791 n. 1 (Alaska 1993). 6 . See Sea Lion Corp. v. Air Logistics of Alaska, Inc., 787 P.2d 109, 115 (Alaska 1990). 7 . See Ferguson v. State, CSED, 977 P.2d 95, 98-103 (Alaska 1999) (<HOLDING>); State, CSED v. Wetherelt, 931 P.2d 383, 388
holding that reasonable reliance upon the old rule is an important factor supporting prospective application of the new rule holding that injunctive relief was unwarranted when the jurys award already included prospective relief holding that the eleventh amendment precludes an award of injunctive or declaratory relief that is not prospective in nature holding that eleventh amendment does not bar federal suit against state official for prospective injunctive relief holding that rule 60b5 offers only prospective relief