this ease controls and cites case law to support their position. However, the authority cited by defendants is distinguishable from the facts of this case. In the cases cited by defendants, the charters provided “in no uncertain terms” that the employee serves at the pleasure of the City and therefore is an “at will” employee, removable at any time, for any purpose, and without any procedural due process protections. See Harrington, 677 F.Supp. at 1499-1500 (finding that city charter provision stating that “the Mayor shall appoint a Chief of Police ... the Chief of Police shall be subject to removal by the Mayor” provided that the Chief of Police serves at the pleasure of the Mayor and is removable at will); Haynes v. City of Sisters, No. 97-6195-TC, slip op. at 7 (D.Or. Oct. 23, 1998) (<HOLDING>) ; Meyers v. City of Gold Hill, No. 94-3007-CO,
holding the chief of police was an atwill employee because the parties agreed that the chief of police was an appointed officer and the citys charter stated that officers shall be appointed and may be removed by the mayor with consent of the council holding that chief of police was entitled to immunity for demoting police officer pending appeal of hearing officers decision to contrary because although statute made hearing officers decision final and binding statute nowhere addressed enforceability of decision pending appeal thus chief of polices action was discretionary holding chief of police an executive officer because a member of the executive branch and an officer holding that statements made only to supervisor and chief by police officer were matters of public concern holding that a bankruptcy trustee is an officer of the court appointed by the court directed by the court and paid by the court but is in no sense an agent or employee or officer of the united states