(“[GJuided by the fundamental principle of equality before the law, . . . when a judge acts in violation of V.R.E. 605, we require no further showing of prejudice toward the injured party and will reverse the court’s tainted ruling.”). The majority cites two cases from other jurisdictions to support this rule of per se prejudice. See Barker, 420 N.W.2d at 699; State v. McCrary, 2004 SD 18, ¶ 32, 676 N.W.2d 116. But other courts have reached the opposite conclusion and chosen to apply a harmless-error analysis that requires prejudice before a reversal will be granted. See, e.g., Nickl, 427 F.3d at 1293 (“If a violation of Rule 605 has occurred, it is then necessary to consider whether the violation was prejudicial or harmless.”); Elmore v. State, 682 S.W.2d 758, 762 (Ark. Ct. App. 1985) (<HOLDING>). The approach of these courts is consistent
holding that where appellant moved to recuse trial judge from deciding the motion for new trial the judge of the administrative district was required to designate a judge to hear the recusal motion holding that district judges failure to recuse was harmless error where the underlying question was patently clear and so there was no need to vacate the district courts decision and to remand to another district court judge to make the same clear determination holding that a trial witnesss testimony as to the credibility of another witness was prejudicial error holding that while it was error for the regular judge to disqualify himself for only the habitual phase of the trial the error was harmless holding it was clearly error where trial judge failed to recuse himself when it became clear he would be a witness in the case and emphasizing the need for trial judges to diligently avoid all appearances of impropriety but concluding that error was not prejudicial and therefore denying new trial