for imposing a death sentence.’ ” Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774, 110 S.Ct. 3092, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990) (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980)). If the statutory language is too vague, then the federal court must determine whether the state courts have further defined the vague terms in a constitutionally sufficient manner. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 654, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990) (overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002)). The parties agree that the terms “heinous, atrocious, and cruel” and “manifesting exceptional depravity” are too vague to sufficiently guide the sentencer. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 360, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 420-21, 100 S.Ct. 1759
holding that oklahomas especially heinous atrocious or cruel aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally vague holding that a limit ing instruction which defined the terms heinous atrocious or cruel in equally vague language was not constitutionally sufficient holding that heinous atrocious or cruel is unconstitutionally vague language holding unconstitutionally vague under the reasoning of godfrey an aggravatingcircumstances instruction directing jurors to determine whether the murder was especially heinous atrocious and cruel recognizing that north carolinas heinous atrocious or cruel aggravating circumstance requires a limiting construction