Lefrak in the Allman negligence action. However, the holding of Stoney Run and the specifics of the Allman action suggest the opposite conclusion — that the way in which lead paint harmed Ashley Allman is not included in the pollution exclusion. The holding of the Second Circuit in Stoney Run— that the ordinary person could read the words of that policy as the argot of environmental law that applies to environmental pollution only, and that carbon monoxide poisoning in an apartment is not covered by that exclusion — supports the conclusion that the pollution exclusion may not apply in this case. Stoney Run, 47 F.3d at 37; Rapid-American, 80 N.Y.2d at 654, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 973, 609 N.E.2d at 513; see also Weaver v. Royal Ins. Co. of America, 140 N.H. 780, 674 A.2d 975, 977-78 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Sullins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 340 Md. 503,
holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release holding that court must determine intent of parties by reference to language of release turning to extrinsic evidence only when it determines as a matter of law that terms are ambiguous recognizing that probation officers are mandated to enforce a sentencing courts terms and conditions of supervised release holding that discharge dispersal release and escape are terms of art of environmental law holding that release discharges only persons named in or sufficiently described by terms of release