is concluded. We do not find this contention persuasive, as it ignores the availability of preliminary injunctive relief. Arielle had the option to seek preliminary injunctive relief below, but did not do so. Two recent cases from our Circuit, relied on to a significant extent by the Rosenfelds, illustrate the availability of such relief in the context of racial discrimination claims. See Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.Sd 123, 133-34 (4th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1019, 120 S.Ct. 1420, 146 L.Ed.2d 812 (2000) (granting preliminary and final injunctive relief on appeal in a racial discrimination case against MCPS); Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 708 (4th Cir.1999), cert. dismissed, 529 U.S. 1050, 120 S.Ct. 1552, 146 L.Ed.2d 364 (2000) (<HOLDING>). Nor does Arielle’s contention that
recognizing the availability and appropriateness of preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against school board on racial discrimination claim but vacating the district courts injunction as overbroad holding that a party may obtain relief from a district courts permanent injunction pursuant to rule 60b5 holding that title vii proscribe racial discrimination in private employment against whites on the same terms as racial discrimination against nonwhites holding that title vii proscribes racial discrimination against whites upon the same standards as racial discrimination against nonwhites holding preliminary injunction improper where it exceeded the relief sought and granted the same relief which would have been given in a final order of permanent injunction