be treated as any other ordinary lease agreement are weak and insufficient to demonstrate a substantial ground for dispute. First, this would not be a traditional lease in the sense that Dunkin’ Donuts is not a traditional landlord. Sections 365(d)(3) and (4) apply only to “true” or “bona fide” leases. Liona Corp., N.V. v. PCH Assocs. (In re PCH Assocs.), 804 F.2d 193, 198 (2d Cir.1986). However, Dunkin’ is a franchisor that owns and leases certain premises for the sole purpose of advancing its franchise business. Dunkin’ Donuts is in the business of franchising and thus its leasing is only a tool to accomplish and further the goals of that business. See Principe v. McDonald’s Corp., 631 F.2d 303, 309 (4th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970, 101 S.Ct. 2047, 68 L.Ed.2d 349 (1981) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the operative document is reasonably
holding under kansas law that a plumber who was injured while inspecting the leased premises in order to prepare an estimate for plumbing work had not entered the premises for the purpose for which they were leased and thus could not rely on the public use exception recognizing a landlords duty for injuries sustained on leased premises where the landlord is aware that the premises are leased with intent to admit the public holding that mcdonalds franchisees could be required to operate only on premises leased to them by the parent company and this was not an illegal tying arrangement because the challenged aggregation is an essential ingredient of the franchised systems formula for success making the franchise and the premises lease a single product holding that the defendant who owned the premises could discharge its duty by either warning the plaintiff or making the premises reasonably safe holding that the public use exception was not applicable because the injury to the tenants employee occurred in an area of the leased premises that was not open to the public but was used only by employees