be given to an operator/lessee after the cessation of production; rather, the 60 day period to begin reworking or drilling operations runs from the cessation of production. Despite this statutory language, 43 C.F.R. § 3107.2-2 purports to commence the 60 day period for reworking or drilling operations only after notice: “The 60 day period commences upon receipt of notification from the authorized officer that the lease is not capable of production in paying quantities.” 43 C.F.R. § 3107.2-2. The IBLA’s solution to the apparent contradiction between the statutory language and the regulatory language, which it applied in this case, has been to ignore the regulatory language. See Merit Productions, et al., 144 I.B.L.A. 156, 160-67 (Dep’t Interior May 29, 1998) (Burski, A.J., concurring) (<HOLDING>). Nonetheless, the agency has not changed the
holding that instructions are sufficient which substantially follow the language of the statute or use equivalent language recognizing contradiction declaring the regulatory language a nullity and reeommending adjudication solely on the statutory language holding when ordinance language is clear courts must give language its plain meaning holding that an adjudication on summary judgment is an adjudication on the merits holding that when language is exactly the same in two statutory provisions the meaning of that language is also identical