604 F.2d 326, 334-36 (5th Cir.1979) (no agreement to import munitions without a license where parties “just discussed how [they] could possibly do it”); Steinberg, 525 F.2d at 1134 (no conspiracy where defendant’s statements regarding agreement were “equivocal”). There need not be a specific agreement as to price, quantity, and time, place and manner of delivery. See United States v. Sharif, 817 F.2d 1375, 1378 (9th Cir.1987). But there must be an agreement to commit some offense. No such agreement exists if the parties to the alleged conspiracy raise objections and impose unaccepted preconditions on their agreement. See Sharif, 817 F.2d at 1378; United States v. Jones, 765 F.2d 996, 1002 (11th Cir.1985); see also United States v. Podolsky, 798 F.2d 177, 178 (7th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Iennaco imposed the unaccepted precondition
holding that unaccepted precondition to agreement would have defeated conspiracy but upholding conspiracy conviction based on district courts finding that agreement existed although performance was subject to certain conditions holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges holding that evidence tending to show knowing participation in the conspiracy is sufficient to sustain conspiracy conviction holding that two conspiracies existed where the members of the second conspiracy did not know about the first conspiracy did not benefit from the first conspiracy and were connected with the first conspiracy only through a middleman holding that in a conspiracy case venue lies where the conspiracy agreement was formed or in any jurisdiction where an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed by any of the conspirators