the Cabinet, and Yowell and Codell in their official capacities. Ordinarily, a federal appellate court does not have jurisdiction to review a decision of a state court. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923). However, in cases involving removal, the district court is instructed to “take[ ] up the case where the State court left it off.” Duncan v. Gegan, 101 U.S. 810, 812, 25 L.Ed. 875 (1879). Further, although “[a]ny orders or rulings issued by the state court prior to removal are not conclusive in the federal action after removal ... it is well-settled that they do remain binding on the parties until formall S. 459, 464, 65 S.Ct. 347, 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945) (<HOLDING>); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441,
holding that a damages suit against a state officer in his official capacity was barred because it was functionally a suit against the state holding that when the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state the state is the real substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal defendants holding suits against state officials for monetary damages impermissible where the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state rather than against the officer in his individual capacity holding suits against state officials for prospective injunctive relief are permissible because they are in effect suits against the officials in their individual capacities holding that suits which seek no recovery from state funds but rather allege that recovery is sought under and up to the limits of the states liability insurance coverage fall outside the traditional constitutional bar to suits against the state