perceptions of the officers, but not blind deference; these perceptions must be reasonable under an objective standard.” United States v. Woodrum, 202 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.2000) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699-700, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)). B. The Initial Stop Sugar and Stark challenge Crivello’s initial stop of the RY based on Crivello’s claim that the right rear double wheels of the RV crossed over into the right shoulder three times. Crivello asserts that he had probable cause to stop the RY for a violation of Mo.Rev.Stat. § 304.015.5. The text of that statute reads, in relevant part, “[w]henever any roadway has been divided into three or more clearly marked lanes for traffic ... [a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practic (9th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Perez, 700 F.2d 1232, 1236
holding that defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a locked vehicle owned and operated by a third party but parked on defendant homeowners driveway where the evidence seized was the subject of the unlawful enterprise in which defendant participated holding that defendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building holding that the driver of a ear owned by his wife who had given him permission to use it had a legitimate expectation of privacy under the fourth amendment holding bank clients had no legitimate expectation of privacy in banking information revealed to a third party holding that defendant had legitimate expectation of privacy in contents of locked safe stored in his apartment but owned by third party