of his convictions were for minor offenses, such as multiple trespasses. But the district court concluded that these offenses showed repeat criminal activity and “a person who has no respect for the law and thinks that he can do whatever he wants to do.” It was within the district court’s “wide discretion” and “substantial latitude” to determine the weight of each factor in sentencing Griffin-Cooke. See United States v. Salazar-Aleman, 741 F.3d 878, 881 (8th Cir.2013). The district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Griffin-Cooke five months above the Guidelines range. This court, finding the variance not substantively unreasonable, need not address Griffin-Cooke’s objections to the upward departure. See, e.g., United States v. Grandon, 714 F.3d 1093, 1098 (8th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Timberlake, 679 F.3d 1008,
holding that an upward variance or departure in the sentence imposed on a career offender based on  3553a factors including criminal history was substantively and procedurally reasonable holding that district courts error was not harmless because the court relied on an improper factor in imposing an upward departure holding district court did not impermissibly engage in triple or quadruplecounting when it relied on prior convictions to determine that the sixteenlevel enhancement applied in calculating the criminal history category in departing upward and in varying upward holding harmless any error in departing upward under ussg  4a13 where district court alternatively imposed reasonable sentence as an upward variance holding that the district court violated fedrcrimp 32 by departing upward in sentence without notice and the psr identified no grounds for departure