and the public interest.” All Stainless, Inc. v. Colby, 364 Mass. 773, 308 N.E.2d 481, 485 (1974) (citations omitted). “If the covenant is too broad in time, in space or in any other respect, it will be enforced only to the extent that is reasonable and to the extent that it is severable for the purposes of enforcement.” Id. (citations omitted); see Cedric G. Chase Photographic Labs., Inc. v. Hennessey, 327 Mass. 137, 97 N.E.2d 397, 398 (1951); see also Fla. Stat. § 542.335(l)(j). Whether a non-compete covenant is reasonable or overbroad is a question of fact, not of law. See MDS (Canada), Inc. v. Rad Source Technologies, Inc., 822 F.Supp.2d 1263, 1313 (S.D.Fla.2011); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Girardeau, 301 So.2d 38, 40 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), cert. denied, 317 So.2d 75 (Fla.1975) (<HOLDING>); Sarasota Beverage Co. v. Johnson, 551 So.2d
recognizing that what is a reasonable area is a factual matter to be determined in each noncompete case holding that state property tax liens are not entitled to the states statutory interest rate as a matter of law rather the appropriate rate of interest is determined by the equities of each case recognizing that a contract is to be construed to give reasonable effect to each of its provisions holding that what is a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech recognizing that in certain circumstances inquiry notice may be determined as a matter of law