merely age-eligible—population in order to make the representativeness comparison for the second prong of the prima facie case); Sanders v. Woodford, 373 F.3d 1054, 1069-70 (9th Cir.2004) (following Artero ). How ever, given the overwhelming weight of our own prior case law and (more importantly) that of the Supreme Court, we must adhere to our longstanding authority that the defendant’s prima facie case for a fair-cross section claim may rely on a comparison to total population data or, where available in the record, age-eligible population data. Sanchez-Lopez is the binding precedent of our circuit, which a three-judge panel may not overrule absent intervening Supreme Court or en banc authority (of which we have found none). See Obrey v. Johnson, 400 F.3d 691, 699-701 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); see also H & D Tire & Automotive-Hardware,
recognizing this tension recognizing that different panels of the ninth circuit have applied an abuse of discretion standard and a de novo standard in reviewing district court remand decisions recognizing and resolving tension among ninth circuit cases applying conflicting versions of the harmless error standard in civil cases recognizing that the preponderance of the evidence is the quantum of proof in civil cases recognizing the circuit split and applying the subjective standard as more stringent without deciding which standard applies