to that position, as the intended beneficiaiy requirement is a judicially-created limitation and not found anywhere in the statute. Nevertheless, Fobbs — a post-1988 decision — cited approvingly to Wrenn, which expressly held that such a requirement existed. See Fobbs, 29 F.3d at 1447; see also United States v. El Camino Comm. College, 600 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir.1979) (recognizing (in a pre-1988 case) the intended benefi-ciaiy requirement). The Ninth Circuit has not overruled either Fobbs or El Camino on this point and, until it does, the Court is bound by their holdings. The Court will not interpret the intended beneficiaiy requirement in an unnecessarily restrictive manner, however. See NAACP, 599 F.2d at 1252; Alasady, 2003 WL 1565944, at 13, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3841, at *42 (<HOLDING>); Maloney, 1987 WL 26146, at * 1, 1987 U.S.
holding that the term commerce in the faa is to be broadly construed holding that the fcra must be construed broadly in favor of remediation holding that as title vi is a remedial statute the zone of interests to be protected  must be construed broadly recognizing that umuim statute is remedial in nature and should be liberally construed holding that because the proper defendant in a title vi case is an entity rather than an individual plaintiff could not be sued in his individual capacity under title vi