the interests of motor common carriers merely using the public highway at a crossing for deliveries, i.e., the City of Chester example). Local governments and the Commonwealth obvi ously share the requisite sort of interest, as they are by nature concerned with the public safety of their residents. We also believe that the Commission’s implicit decision that railroad companies possessing a right-of-way through a crossing — albeit they may not actually own facilities local to the crossing — also are concerned is consistent with this overarching purpose. Notably, Norfolk necessarily acknowledges partial jurisdiction and power, on the Commission’s part, relative to the allocation of costs to the company for the protection of its own operations at crossing sites. See Brief of Norfolk at 14 (<HOLDING>). The difficulty with Norfolk’s conception of
recognizing strong preference that children live in their own homes with their own families recognizing the not insignificant costs involved in both establishing and operating as an llc recognizing that the puc does have limited costallocation authority relative to a mere operating railroad pertaining to costs in connection with their own operations at the crossing but not for the crossing itself holding that states may enforce their own laws for disabled children and are not limited to the minimum standards of the federal law holding that the bankruptcy court properly disallowed fees when the bank could not demonstrate actual costs and expenses beyond its normal operating costs attributable to the debtors loan