a First Amendment retaliation claim, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of DPS on that claim. C. Procedural Due Process Harris next argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for DPS on Harris’s claim that DPS violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by placing him on paid leave without affording him due process of law. As “the Supreme Court stated in [Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 544-55, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) ],” however, “the suspension of [even] a tenured public employee with pay ... avoid[s] due process problems entirely.” Jackson v. City of Columbus, 194 F.3d 737, 749 (6th Cir.1999), abrogated on other grounds by Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A, 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the evidence establishes that
holding the right to assistance of counsel as announced in gideon v wainwright 372 us 335 83 sct 792 9 led2d 799 to be retroactive holding that plaintiffs alleging discriminatory treatment are not required to plead facts establishing a prima facie case under mcdonnell douglas corp v green 411 us 792 93 sct 1817 36 led2d 668 1973 because its burdenshifting framework does not apply in every discrimination case holding that a plaintiff who could not demonstrate every element of the mcdonnell douglas test could nonetheless demonstrate a prima facie case holding that the burdenshifting test established by mcdonnell douglas v green 411 us 792 93 sct 1817 36 led2d 668 1973 does not apply at the pleading stage holding that a plaintiff in a discrimination case need not demonstrate that she was replaced by a person outside her protected class in order to carry her burden of establishing a prima facie case under mcdonnell douglas corp v green 411 us 792 93 sct 1817 36 led2d 668 1973 