reasons, we choose not to apply the fourth “factor” here, a decision that, happily, keeps us as true as possible to our prior circuit practice. B. The government pitched its argument against appealability of the unsealing order solely on the contention that the order did not satisfy the fourth “factor.” It conceded (insofar as one can “concede” a jurisdictional issue) that the “other” three Cohen appealability factors were met. Obviously, the government’s position takes on significance in light of our conclusion that the fourth “factor” is not applicable. But, irrespective of whether we would agree with the government’s assessment of the three factors, our decision in James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d at 237, compels the conclusion that the order in question here is a collateral order. See id. (<HOLDING>). In James, the subject of the district court’s
holding that a district court order denying anonymity to the parties is a collateral order holding that a bankruptcy court order denying a trustees claim to immunity was final and appealable under the collateral order doctrine holding the collateral order exception does not apply to a pretrial order denying class certification because the order is subject to revision prior to a decision on the merits holding that states may take advantage of the collateral order doctrine to appeal district court orders denying claims of eleventh amendment immunity holding that pursuant to the collateral order doctrine and 28 usc  1291 a state may appeal from a district court order denying it eleventh amendment immunity