Biology, Inc., 425 F.Supp. 318 (D.Mass.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222 (1 Cir. 1976). For the opposing view, see, e. g., Nottelson v. A. O. Smith Corp., 397 F.Supp. 928 (E.D.Wis.1975); Troy v. Shell Oil Co., 378 F.Supp. 1042 (E.D.Mich.1974), appeal dismissed as moot, 519 F.2d 403 (6 Cir. 1975); Collins v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 376 F.Supp. 979 (E.D.Okl.1974). Other courts have blurred the distinction between jurisdiction and the availability of preliminary relief, and appear to hold that jurisdiction may be available only in cases where relief on the merits is appropriate, see Berg v. Richmond Unified School District, 528 F.2d 1208, 1211 (9 Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 429 U.S. 1071, 97 S.Ct. 806, 50 L.Ed.2d 788 (1977); Jerome v. Viviano Food Co., Inc., 489 F.2d 965, 966 (6 Cir. 1974) (<HOLDING>); Donald v. Ray, 377 F.Supp. 986, 987
holding that district court has no jurisdiction to take further action where there was no remand order holding no irreparable harm and thus no jurisdiction where no existing employeeemployer relationship holding that the threat of irreparable harm must be immediate recognizing that only void judgments are subject to collateral attack and that a judgment is void only when court had no jurisdiction of the parties or property no jurisdiction of the subject matter no jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment or no capacity to act holding that no seizure occurred where officers boarded bus and began questioning passengers gave passengers no reason to believe that they required an answer and tjhere was no application of force no intimidating movement no overwhelming show of force no brandishing of weapons no blocking of exits no threat no command not even an authoritative tone of voice