of documents, it can only issue a protective order if the moving party satisfies an even more demanding standard of good cause than that applicable under the common law presumption of access: When “the more stringent First Amendment framework applies, continued sealing of the documents may be justified only with specific, on-the-record findings that sealing is necessary to preserve higher values and only if the sealing order is narrowly tailored to achieve that aim.” Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 124. In this case, the Court has already determined that the unfiled documents and the documents submitted in connection with NASD’s motion to dismiss are not judicial documents. There is thus no First Amendment presumption of access with respect to these documents. Cf. Hartford Courant, 380 F.3d at 93 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). The documents submitted with
recognizing common law right of access to judicial documents recognizing first amendment retaliation right holding that there is a qualified first amendment right of access to proceedings and documents relating to disqualification of a judge in a criminal case and to conflicts of interest between attorneys in a criminal case holding that there is no first amendment or common law right of access to documents which played no role in a judicial decision recognizing that first amendment provides qualified right of access to judicial documents