already provided for backpay. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 253, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994); Provencher, 145 F.3d at 11; Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344, 1352 (7th Cir.1995). Thus, under the scheme established under Title VII, the court awards backpay, and the jury awards other compensatory damages. The fact that the statute separates these factfinding responsibilities does not suggest that Congress abolished the general requirement that some form of compensatory damages be awarded before punitive damages be awarded. Indeed, backpay awards are compensatory in nature and are, in fact, “the most obvious economic damages in a wrongful discharge case.” Hennessy, 69 F.3d at 1352; see also Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 253, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (<HOLDING>). In this case, Corti was not awarded
holding that punitive damages do not need to be proportional to compensatory damages recognizing that implicit in language of  9 allowing civil action for damages or injunctive relief or both was a plain legislative intent to afford victims of discrimination the legal remedy of compensatory damages holding that recovery is limited to actual compensatory damages recognizing that backpay is a makewhole remedy that resembles compensatory damages in some respects holding that when compensatory damages are nominal a much higher ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages can be contemplated