a portion of the original district court decision. Id. at 640. But our holding only affirmed the small portion of the decision that found that an exception in the ordinance was preempted by the FCLAA. The relief sought by Federation was far broader than that which we upheld. It sought not the elimination of merely this exception, but rather the elimination of the entire ordinance. In fact, our holding that the generic advertising exception was preempted actually did not provide Federation any relief at all; rather, it further limited Federation’s ability to advertise. Therefore, the fact that we affirmed this portion of the original district court decision certainly does not make Federation a prevailing party. See generally Cady v. City of Chicago, 43 F.3d 326, 329 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Federation also tries to characterize itself
holding that even under the catalyst theory a plaintiff is not a prevailing party unless he obtains the relief sought or at least relief that is directly beneficial to him holding that a defendant is the prevailing party within the meaning of statutory provisions awarding attorneys fees to the prevailing party even when the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the action holding a party seeking mandamus must serve the party against whom relief is sought holding that exhaustion is required even where the relief sought is not available in the administrative process holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees