carafes into coffee decanters through a regular and orderly process and that this decanter remained in the Cory packaging until shortly before the acci dent. Id.; see also V. Mueller & Co. v. Corley, 570 S.W.2d 140, 143 (1978) (finding that plaintiff successfully traced the defect to the manufacturer through evidence that the product was stored in the manufacturer’s sealed container and appeared to be in good condition when it was removed); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 792 (Tex.1967) (“When it is shown that the product involved comes in a sealed container, it is inferable that the product reached the consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it was sold.”); Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinsky 82 Nev. 439, 420 P.2d 855, 858 (1966) (<HOLDING>); Kroger Co. v. Bowman, 411 S.W.2d 339, 342
holding that a plaintiff need not prove that there was no reasonable opportunity for tampering but only introduce evidence suggesting that the defect existed while in the defendants control which would be sufficient for a jury to find an absence of tampering holding that on a motion for summary judgment the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiffs position will be insufficient and there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff holding that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that an oral agreement existed and that it was not modified holding that at the summary judgment stage there must be sufficient evidence on which the jury could find for the plaintiff holding that absent a defendants stipulation the state must first introduce evidence sufficient to allow the jury to find that the charged act occurred before the trial court can admit uncharged misconduct evidence to prove intent