the present case is whether Al-Amin has a liberty interest in freedom from confinement in administrative segregation. For reasons we will discuss, we conclude that he does have a not liberty interest under the par ticular facts of this case. That conclusion makes it unnecessary for us to determine whether GSP’s procedures for confining Al-Amin to administrative segregation and for keeping him confined there provided Al-Amin with due process. A liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment may arise from the Due Process Clause itself, or state law may create a liberty interest. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995). The Supreme Court has given us some examples of cases in the prison context where the Due Process Clause ir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Although Al-Amin has been confined in
holding claims raised for first time on appeal will not be considered absent exceptional circumstances holding that absent extraordinary circumstances a failure to comply with the statute requires a dismissal with prejudice holding in review of a downward departure that an extraordinary reduction must be supported by extraordinary circumstances holding that an allegation that a prisoner was kept in administrative segregation to punish him for filing civil rights complaints stated a retaliation claim holding that absent extraordinary circumstances administrative segregation as such being an incident to the ordinary life of a prisoner will never be a ground for a constitutional claim