and (4) the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination. United States v. Fulford, 980 F.2d 1110, 1114 (7th Cir.1992), citing United States v. Lewis, 954 F.2d 1386, 1391 (7th Cir.1992). Foster challenges only the second element of this test, which was undoubtedly satisfied here. Foster clearly implied in his opening statement that Anderson would lie about Foster’s involvement in the robbery in order to curry favor with the government. By implying that Anderson’s plea agreement gave him an incentive to lie, Foster opened the door to the admission of Anderson’s prior consistent statements on direct examination, before Foster had an opportunity to challenge Anderson’s credibility on cross-examination. See United States v. Cherry, 938 F.2d 748, 756 (7th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); United States v. LeBlanc, 612 F.2d 1012, 1017
holding that trial courts perjury admonishment to defense witness did not violate defendants due process rights because it had no effect on trial testimony record revealed that testimony was consistent with previous recorded statement given to defense counsel holding that a witnesss prior inconsistent statement to an officer could be used to impeach her holding witnesss prior consistent statement admissible where defense counsel implied in his opening statement that witness should not be believed because of the favorable consideration he received from the government in his plea bargaining agreement holding witnesss prior consistent statement admissible in part because defense counsel implied during opening statement that witness had fabricated her testimony holding that trial counsel was not ineffective when he failed to introduce defendants prior consistent statement statement was not admissible because it was made after defendant had been arrested clearly not a time when the effect of the statement could not have been foreseen