has the right to confront those who testify against him or her and the right to conduct cross-examination. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51, 107 S.Ct. 989, 998, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987). When a juror communicates objective extrinsic facts regarding the defendant or the alleged crimes to other jurors, the juror becomes an unsworn witness within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause. See United States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 865, 866 (5th Cir.1975); United States ex rel. Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813, 817 (2d Cir.1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906, 91 S.Ct. 1373, 28 L.Ed.2d 646 (1971). That the unsworn testimony comes from a juror rather than a court official does not diminish the scope of a defendant’s rights under the Sixth Amendment. See Lawson v. Borg, 60 F.3d 608, 612 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Jeffries III correctly determined that the
holding that a jurors communication about the defendants reputation for violence deprived the defendant of his rights to confrontation crossexamination and assistance of counsel embodied in the sixth amendment holding that a new york statute allowing judges in a criminal bench trial to deny counsel the opportunity to make a closing argument deprived defendant of his sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees the right to effective assistance of counsel holding that the defendant was deprived of his sixth amendment right to counsel where appointed counsels representation presented a conflict of interest holding that the sixth amendment right to counsel embodies the right to effective assistance of counsel