regard, it parallels the statutes mandating the licen-sure of general building- contractors, which statutes, as our supreme court stated in Cooper v. Johnston, 283 Ala. 565, 567, 219 So.2d 392, 394 (1969), were primarily enacted “to protect the public against incompetent contractors.” Because the Act was intended for the benefit of the public, our caselaw requires that it be construed most favorably to the public. See State Ins. Dep’t v. Howell, 614 So.2d 1053, 1056 (Ala.Civ. 14, 17, 9 Cal.Rptr. 447, 449-50 (1960) (house described as a person’s “home” in a will includes not only structure and the land upon which it is situated, but also any garage or outbuildings which make up a residence); In re Niesen’s Estate, 46 Ohio Op. 164, 166-67, 103 N.E.2d 24, 27 (Hamilton Co. Prob. Ct.1951) (<HOLDING>). Clearly, then, the term “residence” is not
holding that home includes adjacent garage and noting that at common law dwelling house included the privy barn stable cow house and dairy house if they are part of the same parcel although they are not under the same roof or contiguous to it holding that rooming house residents had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the front hallway of the house they shared which was not obviously a rooming house open to the general public holding that the evidence was sufficient to preclude inference where he tried to enter the house drunk and was staying at the neighboring house holding that defendant staying in abandoned house had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the house despite having a key to the house and the ability to let people in and out of it holding that an unoccupied house is afforded the same protection under section 8100112 as an occupied house