be added to the composition to pass the microbiological test, depending on the amount of the other ingredients (e.g., pro-pofol and oil) that are present in the composition.” (Def. Mem. at 22.) Plaintiffs counter that the proper construction of “an amount of edetate” is “at least an amount of edetate which is sufficient in and of itself to meet the microbiological test recited in the claim phrase, regardless of the presence of other components in the composition, up to no more than 0.1% by weight of edetate.” (Goldberg Decl. Ex. P. at 5.) Mayne’s proposed definition encompasses the scenario of no edetate in the claimed composition. (Def. Mem. at 21.) Reading an express limitation out of the claim is contrary to case law. See Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1105 (Fed.Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Texas Instruments Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
holding that a court cannot construe claims to read an express limitation out of the claim or render it meaningless holding that the argument that an additional limitation be read into claims 1 3 and 4 was only correct with respect to claim 1 and thus only claim 1 was invalid holding that courts are without power to construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend modify or limit its express terms holding that a contracts indemnification clause which did not contain an express limitation to thirdparty claims should be read in conjunction with a separate contract clause that stated that a partys liability for thirdparty claims should be limited to indemnification holding courts must give effect to every provision and word in a statute and avoid any interpretation that may render statutory terms meaningless or superfluous