437 U.S. 463, 468, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978). The Government contests only the first element, arguing the order in this case does not “conclusively determine the disputed question” because the district court is “monitoring the case” and at any time “may lift the stay” should it decide the military commission proceeding is “unlikely to begin in a timely fashion.” Even a collateral order that is technically subject to modification, however, “conclusively determine^] the disputed question [if] there is no basis to suppose that the District Judge contemplated any reconsideration of his decision.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12-13, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983); see also Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1103 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); In re Gen. Motors Corp., 594 F.2d 1106, 1118
holding appellants failure to plead affirmative defense of modification precluded trial court from considering evidence of oral modification at summary judgment hearing holding that insurance guarantee association stay statute did not suspend limitation period because action was not pending when stay was entered holding that denial of petition for modification of maintenance was proper when the parties agreement prohibited modification of maintenance holding that there is no impermissible modification of the note because the very terms of the note allow for prepayment without a penalty holding a stay although theoretically subject to modification was a reviewable collateral order because the district court did not impose a time limit on the stay or note circumstances that might result in its modification