however, seek review of the Court of Appeals’ decision, nor did she present a brief in response to the State’s petition for review. We, therefore, have limited our decision to the issue raised in the State’s petition. 2 The dissent alleges that “[m]ost commentators also agree failure to obtain the consent of present cohabitants renders the search itself illegal (and not legal as to some and illegal as to others).” Dissent at 690. This assertion is arguable. See United States v. Donlin, 982 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir. 1992) (“Valid consent may be given by a defendant or a third party with ‘common authority’ over the premises. Third party consent remains valid even when the defendant specifically objects to it.”) (citation omitted); United States v. Childs, 944 F.2d 491, 495 (9th Cir. 1991) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added); United States v. Hendrix,
holding residence means legal residence for will probate holding the valid consent of a person with common authority will justify the search of a residence even if the cooccupant is physically present holding that reasoning which would justify the arrest by the search and at the same time justify the search by the arrest  will not do holding that it was unreasonable to believe that womans boyfriend had authority to consent to the search of her purse even though he had authority to consent to the search of the car in which it was kept holding that consent searches do not require probable cause to justify the search of a home