disability or restraint, physical or otherwise.” To the extent the majority suggests that a restraint need be “physical” in order to resemble a punitive sanction, such a requirement simply does not exist. Rather, Smith discusses physical restraints as only one kind of possible restraint a criminal law might impose. Smith, 538 U.S. at 100, 123 S.Ct. 1140. In fact, our society regularly punishes wrongdoers without actually imposing physical restraints on them, most commonly, with criminal fines. And Supreme Court decisions tasked with applying the Mendoza-Martinez factors to ascertain the penal or regulatory nature of a particular sanction have regularly found non-physical sanctions to be affirmative disabilities or restraints. See, e.g., Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 774, 114 S.Ct. 1937 (<HOLDING>). In fact, Mendoza-Martinez itself held a
holding that operates as a charge of debtors in personam tax liability not debtors in rem tax liability holding a tax on illegal drugs to be a punitive measure in part because it allowed for sanctions by restraint of debtors property holding that property seized by a creditor prior to debtors bankruptcy was property of the estate even though creditor  the irs  held a secured interest  a tax lien  in the property holding that in some rcases there is an adequate remedy at law for an attack on an illegal or unconstitutional tax through the tax appeal board holding that punitive damages are not allowed under the flsa