step in a series of interconnected transactions, but rather a separate financing transaction undertaken at Arco’s request as part of a settlement between the parties approximately eighteen months after the alleged fraud is purported to have been underway. (AC ¶¶ 94-97; Ex. 22 [Letter Agreement].) Arco failed to include Earls Eight in its initial complaint and has itself alleged that the sale of the Earls Eight Notes constitutes an independent violation under 10b-5. (FAC ¶ 16.) Earls Eight cannot therefore be viewed as “essential” to the alleged scheme. The distinctions between this case and Arnold bar equitable tolling of the repose period as applicable to CRAFT. See Lampf, Pleva, Lip-kind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 363, 111 S.Ct. 2773, 115 L.Ed.2d 321 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Arco’s FAC also contends that the repose
holding that because purpose of tolling statute is to remedy problem of locating a nonresident defendant before expiration of statute of limitations tolling statute does not apply to adverse possession action because of statutory scheme allowing for service by publication on parties outside state in such actions holding that equitable tolling principles apply to suits against the united states in the same manner as they apply to private parties holding that statute was one of repose because it embodies the most distinctive characteristic of a statute of repose the barring of the right to bring an action rather than the remedy prescribed holding tolling principles do not apply because the purpose of the statute of repose is clearly to serve as a cutoff holding that provision has the characteristics of a statute of repose