with the “express authorization]” of the employer itself before it could be imputed to that employer. Id. Finally, while Le did state that, “it may well be that the General Assembly, by the language ‘deliberate intention of his employer to produce such injury,’ intended something less than the full sweep of common law respondeat superior liability,” id., there is nothing in the Maryland case law to suggest that the legislature intended to protect an employer from suit where, as here, its supervisor acted, as a supervisor, in the normal course of her employment, with the deliberate intent to injure another employee — simply because that supervisor’s action violated the order of an absent, higher-ranking company official. Cf. Hastings v. Mechalske, 336 Md. 663, 650 A.2d 274, 281 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Nor would such a rule be wise. Whether or not
holding with no analysis that any person or organization who may be legally liable therefor applies to a person legally liable for injuries caused by an accident   4 when under the facts of the case the only person to whom the clause could have applied was a tortfeasor holding that the employer remains liable with respect to the duty regardless of the acts or omissions of the person entrusted to perform it holding the same with respect to violations of the fifth amendment holding that the government is liable under the ftca in the same respect as a private person under the law of the place where the act occurred holding that the decision as to the best use of the corpus is not entrusted to the trial court however wise and well intentioned but to the person whose money it was to distribute