therefore, it has the capacity to screen out disabled employees and therefore the possibility of violating the ADA’s requirement of an individualized assessment of an employee’s capabilities. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.7 (“It is unlawful for a covered entity to use standards, criteria, or methods of administration, which are not job-related and consistent with business necessity, and: (a) That have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability”); Weigel v. Target Stores, 122 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir.1997) (stating that the determination of whether one qualifies as a qualified individual with a disability “necessarily involves an individualized assessment of the individual and the relevant position”); see also Heise v. Genuine Parts Co., 900 F.Supp. 1137, 1154 & n. 10 (D.Minn.1995) (<HOLDING>); Hutchinson v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 883
holding that a must be cured or 100 healed policy is a per se violation of the ada because the policy does not allow a casebycase assessment of an individuals ability to perform essential functions of the individuals job with or without accommodation holding that ada may obligate employer to reassign disabled employee who can no longer even with reasonable accommodation perform the essential functions of her job holding that plaintiff lacking standing to challenge employers policy that an employee had to be 100 healed before being permitted to return to work where plaintiff could not gain any relief from the per se violation of the ada because the plaintiff was not a qualified individual with a disability holding that employee who frequently missed work was not a qualified individual able to perform the essential functions of her job either with or without a reasonable accommodation as required to support disability discrimination and reasonable accommodation claims under the rehabilitation act holding an employee must be able to perform essential job functions at the time of termination