assets-are all of its creditors. 24 . S.I. Acquisition, 817 F.2d at 1152. 25 . H.R.Rep. No. 595, 2nd Sess., at 340 (1977), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, at 6297. We note that even though the automatic stay provision does not apply in this case, the injunctive relief that must be requested by the Curators embodies the same policy concerns. 26 . We do not imply that a creditor can never assert an individual claim against the debtor. Indeed, we intend just the opposite. Courts and commentators alike recognize differences between a "personal” claim — one in which an individual creditor has been harmed — and a "general” claim — one in which the creditors collectively have been harmed. 27 . But see Ellenberg v. Walliagha (In re Mattress N More), 231 B.R. 104, 109-10 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1998) (<HOLDING>). 28 . In re E.F. Hutton Southwest Properties
holding that a chapter 7 trustee was the only person with authority to bring  a cause of action after the appointment of a trustee holding that the trustee of a nominee trust functions more as an agent than as a true trustee recognizing authority of chapter 13 trustee to recover overpayment but not finding refund appropriate where error was attributable to trustee holding that because  544b1 provides only the power of avoidance it does not confer authority on the trustee to pursue state law damage claims but that the trustee could pursue such claims under  544a1 or 2 if the claims could have been asserted by the debtor corporation recognizing that from a policy perspective a trustee should be able to pursue general alter ego claims as a representative of the estate but concluding that no statutory basis under the code exists for the trustee to do so