(“A single invidiously discriminatory governmental act is not immunized by the absence of such discrimination in the making of other comparable decisions.” (internal "quotation marks omitted)); see also, e.g,, Rice v. White, 660 F.3d 242, 256 (6th Cir.2011) (“[Tjhe trial judge erroneously believed ... that Batson violations may be ‘cured’ by reference to the ultimate racial composition of the [petit jury.]”); Strickland v. State, 980 So.2d 908, 915 (Miss.2008) (“The Batson doctrine is not concerned with racial, gender, or ethnic balance on petit juries. ... Rather, it is concerned exclusively with discriminatory intent on the part of the lawyer against whose use of his peremptory strikes the objection is interposed.”); cf. United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 207-08 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). As a result, courts cannot bless any jury
holding that it was impermissible for the trial court to balance the number of africanamerican and jewish jurors in a raciallycharged case holding that the trial court should have granted the defendants motion for mistrial after it was revealed that a police officer who also was a prosecution witness had sat with several jurors during a lunch break even though the witness testified that he did not discuss the business of the case with the jurors holding that defendants batson claim was strongly discounted by the fact that three africanamerican jurors were sworn in holding that double jeopardy barred the second prosecution when one of the jurors in the first trial became disabled and the trial court declared a mistrial instead of proceeding with eleven jurors holding that trial court abused its discretion in failing to make a proper inquiry of jurors andor failing to strike jurors for cause after jurors explicitly expressed bias