Moyer, 370 Pa. 35, 87 A.2d 246 (1952), and McCandless v. Burn, 377 Pa. 18, 104 A.2d 123 (1954). However, in Pennsylvania, there is an important difference in the rule of interpretation as applied to restrictive covenants on the use of land. It is this. Land use restrictions are not favored in the law, are strictly construed, and nothing will be deemed a violation of such a restriction that is not in plain disregard of its express words: Jones v. Park Lane For Convalescents, 384 Pa. 268, 120 A.2d 535 (1956); Sandyford Pk. C. Assn. v. Lunnemann, 396 Pa. 537, 152 A.2d 898 (1959); Siciliano v. Misler, 399 Pa. 406, 160 A.2d 422 (1960); and, Witt v. Steinwehr Dev. Corp., 400 Pa. 609, 162 A.2d 191 (1960). Id. at 544, 220 A.2d at 2-3. See Hoffman v. Gould, 714 A.2d 1071, 1073 (Pa.Super.1998) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). Additionally, we note that
holding that restrictive covenants are not favored by the law and should be strictly construed as they are an interference with an owners free and full enjoyment of his property holding that only if provisions in an insurance contract are open to more than one interpretation should it be construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured holding pcra time limits are jurisdictional in nature and must be strictly construed holding dormancy statutes should be strictly construed holding that railroad immunity act should be strictly construed