in Regulating Hyper-Intrusive Searches, 55 Rutgers L.Rev. 547 (2003) [hereinafter Simmons, Can Winston Save Us ] (describing these searches as qualitatively different than ordinary searches, and thus requiring higher constitutional standards). These searches are all so invasive of privacy or dignity that courts have held that the government must show more than the standard requirement of probable cause in order to obtain a warrant. Id. at 550, 560 (“[W]hen a search technique is extraordinarily intrusive, the reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment could impose extra limitations ....”); see, e.g., Richards, 520 U.S. at 394, 117 S.Ct. 1416 (stating a higher-than-probable cause standard for no-knock warrants); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759, 105 S.Ct. 1611, 84 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 883
holding that a compelled surgical intrusion into an individuals body for evidence implicates expectations of privacy and security of such magnitude that the intrusion may be unreasonable even if likely to produce evidence of a crime holding that to justify a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence 1 the evidence must have been discovered after trial 2 the failure to discover this evidence must not be attributable to a lack of due diligence on the part of the movant 3 the evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching 4 the evidence must be material and 5 the evidence must be likely to produce an acquittal if a new trial is granted holding that ijnadmissible evidence may be material if the evidence would have led to admissible evidence holding that defense counsel may call attention to the states failure to produce evidence recognizing the right of a defendant to comment upon the failure of the state to produce evidence