an employment decision is admissible as direct evidence in a mixed-motive case. This is probably because these circuits have a very strict view of what qualifies as direct evidence in a mixed-motive case. In the Tenth Circuit, for example, a comment by a formal decision-maker that the plaintiff was an "incompetent n_[racial slur]” was not direct evidence because the factfinder "would have to infer that the bias reflected in the statement[ ] was the reason behind the adverse employment decision.” Shorter v. ICG Holdings, Inc., 188 F.3d 1204, 1207 (10th Cir.1999). The Fifth Circuit has taken a similarly strict view of direct evidence. See Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1218 (5th Cir.1995). But see Brown v. East Mississippi Elec. Power Ass'n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). As we have explained earlier, see supra note
holding that the use of racial slurs and menacing remarks constitute severe conduct holding that racial discrimination is a personal injury tort holding that a supervisors routine use of racial slurs constitutes direct evidence that racial animus was a motivating factor in the contested disciplinary decisions holding that racial discrimination is not a personal injury tort holding that use of racial slurs by managers responsible for the decision regarding a plaintiffs termination constitutes direct evidence