to protect quasi-sovereign interests.” (citations and internal quotations marks omitted). Of these three standing capacities, it is clear that a state suing under Title VII can only invoke standing under the doctrine of parens patriae. The other two forms of standing have no relation to employment discrimination. This is clearly the case with 982) (finding white woman who had been deprived of interracial associations in workplace a “person aggrieved” within meaning of Title VII); EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 482 (5th Cir.1980) (finding that the language, design, and purposes of Title VII require that the phrase ‘a person claiming to be aggrieved’ be construed to provide standing coextensive with Article III.); EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439, 451-54 (6th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>); Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466, 469
holding that title vii proscribes racial discrimination against whites upon the same standards as racial discrimination against nonwhites holding that title vii precludes a claim under section 1981 for racial discrimination against a federal employee holding white female employee lacks standing under title vii to allege injury on behalf of black applicants to employment agency who were discriminated against because of race holding that blacks who were not subjected to racial discrimination had standing under title vii to sue over discrimination against other blacks holding that white female had standing under title vii to challenge her employees alleged racial discrimination against blacks