Ann. §§ 56-5-930 and -1020 apparently vest such authority for selecting and installing crossing warning devices solely in the Highway Department. However, the court does not agree that these provisions were intended to relieve railroads of their common-law duty to provide safe passage across their rails. See, e.g., Graham v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 250 F.Supp. 566, 571 (D.S.C.1966) (“Where a railroad crosses a public highway a motorist using the highway has a right to use the crossing just as much as the railroad has a right to use it; and it is the common law duty of the railroad to give such signals and to take such actions as are reasonably sufficient to protect travellers using the crossing.”); cf. Doremus v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 242 S.C. 123, 130 S.E.2d 370, 375 (1963) (<HOLDING>). Because railroads are the entities most
holding that an employer through its employees did not breach an independent duty to power company not to come in contact with power companys transmission lines because such a duty is a general duty not an independent one holding that an insurer has a duty to conduct an investigation reasonably appropriate under the circumstances holding that railroad company has commonlaw duty independent of statute to give such signals as may be reasonably sufficient in view of the situation and surroundings to put individuals using the highway on their guard holding that duty existed as a matter of public policy independent of the restatement holding that no independent commonlaw duty exists on the part of an employer to preserve evidence for an employees potential civil action against third parties