all other appeals. In fact, we require the defendant to raise a new claim for the first time on appeal. When an appellant has not raised this new claim on appeal, he is subject to the waiver provision of the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b). These considerations prompt us to revisit the continued validity of Hubbard. However, the mere fact that our current process to review ineffectiveness claims does not square with the rules of appellate procedure employed in most cases cannot conclude our discussion of this matter, since these rules of appellate procedure existed at the time we announced the Hubbard rule. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Piper, 458 Pa. 307, 328 A.2d 845 (1974); Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114 (1974). Thus, we will also c , 950 (3d Cir.1986)(<HOLDING>). However, as a general rule, the federal
recognizing a narrow exception to the gener al rule where an objection has been properly made at trial or where the record clearly shows actual conflict of interest   recognizing conflict recognizing the conflict recognizing an exception to the conflict rule where the conflict arose after the award of the contract holding the existence of a possible conflict required remand for a determination of whether an actual conflict of interest existed and holding a new trial would be required if an actual conflict existed