that M.E.’s commitment was justified both on the basis of his dangerousness and because he was gravely disabled. See Ind.Code § 12-26-7-5 (2007) (providing that a trial court may enter an order of regular commitment upon a finding that the individual for whom commitment is sought is mentally ill and either dangerous or gravely disabled). Thus, even assuming that M.E.’s argument is sufficient to establish that the trial court’s conclusion regarding M.E.’s dangerousness was tainted by his pretrial detention, he has not directed our attention to any evidence suggesting that the trial court’s conclusion that M.E. is gravely disabled was so tainted. For all of these reasons, M.E. has not established fundamental error. See In re Commitment of Tedesco, 421 N.E.2d 726, 730 (Ind.Ct.App.1981) (<HOLDING>). M.E. has not challenged the sufficiency of
holding that committees fourteenday prehearing detention without a probable cause hearing violated due process but reversal was not warranted because there was no evidence that the regular commitment hearing was tainted by the prehearing detention holding that a district court grievance committees reliance on a state courts findings without holding an independent hearing did not violate the attorneys due process rights holding that pretrial detention resulting from legal process unsupported by probable cause violates the fourth amendment holding that due process guarantees were not violated where a defendant was excluded from a witness competency hearing and noting that the hearing did not concern the witnesses substantive testimony holding that detention of approximately eight months violated due process