sentences, keeping such persons imprisoned for the duration of their sentences deprives them of liberty absent legal authorization and thus without due process of law. The principle embodied in Greenholtz and Allen is therefore sound: Laws requiring parole of prisoners under certain specified circumstances give rise to a constitutionally protected liberty interest. In determining whether the appellees have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole, the key question is therefore whether the District of Columbia parole regulations require the Board to grant parole under certain circumstances. The D.C. Court of Appeals has recently made clear that it interprets the regulations as not ever requiring the Board to release a prisoner on parole. See McRae, 667 A.2d at 1360-61 (<HOLDING>). Because we are bound by D.C. Court of Appeals
holding that there was no legal right to court review of parole board decision because there is no legal right to release on parole holding that it is well settled that the pennsylvania board of probation and parole has exclusive authority to determine parole when the offender is sentenced to a maximum term of imprisonment of two or more years holding that parole is not a right in pennsylvania holding that the parole regulations numerical system is not a rigid formula  because the board is not required to either grant or deny parole based upon the score attained holding the board is not required to either grant or deny parole based upon the score attained and it may ignore the results of the scoring system and either grant or deny parole in the individual case so long as it specifies the reasons in writing