a defendant—with a societal interest in accurate fact-finding, which may require consideration of out-of-court statements.” [Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 97 L. Ed. 2d 144 (1987)]. We have accordingly interpreted the Confrontation Clause in a manner sensitive to its purposes and sensitive to the necessities of trial and the adversary process .... Thus, though we reaffirm the importance of face-to-face confrontation with witnesses appearing at trial, we cannot say that such confrontation is an indispensable element of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to confront one’s accusers. Craig, 497 U.S. at 849-50. In Craig the Court retreated from its earlier statements in Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016-17, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 101 L. Ed. 2d 857 (1988) (<HOLDING>), and returned to the reasoning of Roberts, 448
holding that in reviewing confrontation clause challenge appellate courts must first determine whether the confrontation clause is implicated holding that when deciding whether the admission of a declarants outofcourt statements violates the confrontation clause courts should independently review whether the governments proffered guarantees of trustworthiness satisfy the demands of the clause holding that the confrontation clause does not apply to the sentencing hearing holding that the confrontation clause guarantees the defendant a physical facetoface meeting with the witnesses appearing before the trier of fact holding that any confrontation right is found in the fourteenth amendments due process clause not the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment