Board and defendant Justice Cappy provided that his attorney could accompany him. Complaint ¶¶ 36-37, 39, 43, 47-49, 51, Exhibits I, M, O. Plaintiff also alleges that defendants sought to chill his allegedly protected speech by informing him that he had no authorization to retain counsel. Complaint ¶ 38, Exhibit J. Defendants attempt to characterize all of this speech as simply complaints about a matter of personal concern, specifically the extent of plaintiffs administrative powers as President Judge. It is true that usually when a public employee complains solely about a reduction in his or her responsibilities, such a complaint is not on a matter of public concern and so is not protected by the First Amendment. See, e.g., Marquez v. Turnock, 765 F.Supp. 1376, 1385 (C.D.Ill.1991) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 967 F.2d 1175 (7th Cir.1992). But in
holding in part that complaints focused on individual compensation do not involve a matter of public concern holding that the complaints of a public employee about a reorganization plan were on a matter of public concern even though the employee was primarily motivated by the adverse effect of the plan on himself holding that private complaints by public employee that his responsibilities were being lessened and his recommendations were not being followed were at least for the most part not on a matter of public concern holding that the absence of a motivating desire to address a matter of public concern was not dispositive as to whether the speech addressed a matter of public concern holding that the plaintiffs speech was not a matter of public concern because it did not bring to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust on the part of the defendant and others