range of documents” such as “grand jury transcripts” and certain "warrant materials” that “traditionally [have] been kept secret for important policy reasons.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178. No party asserts this third standard is relevant here. 8 . This case differs slightly from Phillips, in which a nonparty sought access to court records previously filed under seal. Phillips, 307 F.3d at 1209. Here no third party seeks access to previously sealed documents, but this is a distinction without a difference. It is undisputed that a "strong presumption of access to judicial records applies fully to dispos-itive pleadings.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179. Accordingly, whether a third party has sought access is immaterial when a party moves to seal documents already filed with the court. See id. (<HOLDING>). 9 . "Relevant factors” include the "public
holding that it was appropriate to seal banking records when congress clearly mandated the privacy of those records holding simply that  compelling reasons must be shown to seal judicial records attached to a dispositive motion holding that the end of a conspiracy must be affirmatively shown holding that the materials attached to the motion for summary judgment must be admissible and usable at trial holding that special damages must be shown to be reasonable and necessarily resulting from accident