320 F.3d at 1028 (internal quotation marks omitted). I. Quasi-Judicial Immunity for Parole Officers The Supreme Court has reserved deciding whether members of state parole boards have absolute quasi-judicial immunity for their official actions. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 n. 11, 100 S.Ct. 553, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980). We have held, however, that parole board members are entitled to absolute immunity when they perform “quasi-judicial” functions. Anderson, 714 F.2d at 909-10. Thus, parole board officials of the BPT are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for decisions “to grant, deny, or revoke parole” because these tasks are “functionally comparable” to tasks performed by judges. Sellars, 641 F.2d at 1303; Bermudez v. Duenas, 936 F.2d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Absolute immunity has also been extended to
holding that the members of the dc parole board were entitled to absolute immunity against the claim that they violated the parolees constitutional rights when they failed to provide him with a timely parole revocation hearing holding a parole rule equivalent to a statute holding sellars immunity encompasses actions taken when processing parole applications holding that parole is not a right in pennsylvania holding that the public policy considerations supporting public officials immunity required that the immunity be applied to bar contribution actions as well as direct actions