trait or propensity. In this case, Armstrong offered no evidence to support her assertions about Mandy. Additionally, as a matter of common law, Armstrong failed to offer any evidence to support her assertion that the Macks had or should have had knowledge of any behavior by Mandy that would have formed the basis for them to have had any concerns, or to have given any warnings, that she was of a vicious or mischievous nature. Thus, they failed to allege an essential element of a common-law negligence in a dog-bite claim. See Pattermann, 173 Wis. 2d at 148, 496 N.W.2d at 615. Although we have located no cases exactly on point, we do note that our conclusion is consistent with the conclusions reached in several similar cases. See Tschida v. Berdusco, 462 N.W.2d 410 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (<HOLDING>); Wilcoxen v. Paige, 528 N.E.2d 1104, 1106
recognizing that legal owner and keeperowner both could be liable under minnesota dogbite statute but dismissing strictliability claim of veterinarians employee because there was no negligence by the legal owner holding that the owner of the land could not bring a 93a action against a prior owner of the land who was not the seller because there was no business connection between the two parties recognizing the general rule that a property owner is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor holding that the indemnity plaintiffs liability was due only because of its legal duty as the property owner and not because of any active or independent negligence holding that the burden of proving lack of negligence is on the owner