breach ed his contract. These practices alone do not amount to a violation of the “unlawful” prong of § 17200; Shroyer must also allege that New Cingular engaged in a business practice “forbidden by law, be it civil or criminal, federal, state, or municipal, statutory, regulatory, or court-made.” Saunders v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.App.4th 832, 838-39, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 438 (Cal.Ct.App.1994). In other words, a common law violation such as breach of contract is insufficient. See Allied Grape Growers v. Bronco Wine Co., 203 Cal.App.3d 432, 450-54, 249 Cal.Rptr. 872 (Cal.Ct.App.1988) (finding a § 17200 violation only after finding three violations of the California Food and Agriculture Code); see also Nat’l Rural Telecomms. Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 319 F.Supp.2d 1059, 1074-75 (C.D.Cal.2003) (<HOLDING>). Because Shroyer does not go beyond alleging a
holding that irrespective of the common law support we will not recognize an immunity available at common law if  1983s history or purpose counsel against applying it in  1983 actions recognizing that commission is not bound by statutory or common law rules of evidence holding that a violation of federal regulations cannot support a wrongful discharge claim under kentucky law holding that a violation of common law can support a  17200 claim provided that the conduct is also unlawful unfair or fraudulent holding that the statutes abrogated the common law