outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144,
holding that although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged brady material a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material holding that an appellants due process rights were not violated when he did not receive brady material before his transfer hearing because he will be able to make effective use of any brady material at trial holding defendant owes a duty to disclose where the defendant alone has knowledge of material facts which are not accessible to the plaintiff holding prosecutor has affirmative duty to disclose material exculpatory evidence holding state has affirmative duty to disclose favorable and material evidence to defense