that the states have demonstrated for the testimony of Mr. Davey does not outweigh “the possible effect [of disclosure] upon the functioning of future grand juries,” Douglas Oil, supra, 441 U.S. at 222, 99 S.Ct. at 1674, in, for example, discouraging witnesses from appearing voluntarily before a grand jury or from being entirely forthcoming in their testimony. A consideration of “the public interest, if any, served by disclosure to a governmental body,” Illinois v. Abbott & Associates, Inc., supra, 460 U.S. at 567-568 n. 15, 103 S.Ct. at 1361-62 n. 15, does not require a different result where, as here, the states may be able to obtain the same or substantially similar information from readily available alternative sources. See United States v. Moten, 582 F.2d 654, 663 (2d Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>); Cuisinarts, supra, 516 F.Supp. at 1021
holding that disclosure of grand jury materials to parole commission was harmless error holding that even when the information is crucial to a litigants case reporters should be compelled to disclose their sources only after the litigant has shown that he has exhausted every reasonable alternative source of information holding that where witness refused to take the oath and testify his grand jury testimony should not have been admitted because he was not subject to cross examination before the grand jury holding that the right of access to government information or sources of information within the governments control is not mandated by the first or fourteenth amendments holding that a partys need for grand jury materials varies in proportion to the degree of access he has to other sources of the information he seeks