members of the limited purposes for which they could use this evidence. Item (9) is a different story. The appellant showed SSgt Smith and A1C Kublitz a “cracker.” We can find no purpose for the admission of this evidence other than to show that the accused was a druggie. Although the military judge abused his discretion in admitting this evidence, we are convinced it was harmless. Article 59(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 859(a). After the military judge “ruled” on the motion in limine, the appellant pled guilty to using marijuana on the camping trip. His counsel asked the military judge to prohibit the prosecution from producing evidence of this offense before the court members during findings on the fraudulent enlistment and LSD offenses. See United States v. Cousins, 35 M.J. 70 (C.M.A.1992) (<HOLDING>). The military judge declined to do so. The
holding the use of a drug that carries a higher sentence rather than another drug does not amount to sentencing factor manipulation holding that drug use is not probative of character for truthfulness holding prior drug deals admissible to prove knowledge of the drug trade holding prior use of one type of drug is not relevant to establish use of another type of drug on a different occasion holding evidence of prior drug use admissible to show motive and the nature of the defendants relationship with coconspirators