Cir.2005). Gloria and Terry do not defend their actions on the basis that they were responding to an emergency, with no time to reflect, but on the basis that even if their conduct fell short of regulatory requirements, it did not come close to shocking the conscience. Plaintiffs’ evidence did not show the defendants acted even with deliberate indifference. Though other circuits have varied in their formulations of when “deliberate indifference” rises to conscience-shocking conduct in the foster care context, state officials must have been at least aware of known or likely injuries or abuse and have chosen to ignore the danger to the child. See Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 810 (3d Cir.2000) (listing cases); see also Waubanascum v. Shawano County, 416 F.3d 658, 666-67 (7th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Even when the evidence is viewed in the light
holding that a state had no affirmative duty to a child placed voluntarily by his parents into foster care since he was in the custody of his foster parents who were not state actors rather than in the states custody holding that a child has a  1983 action against the state while in foster care where the state is deliberately indifferent to the likelihood that a foster home is unsafe yet places the child there or allows the child to remain there holding foster parents not liable for willful act of their foster child holding that plaintiffs must present evidence that the state actor knows or suspects that the  foster parents with whom a child is placed are likely to abuse the child to show deliberate indifference holding that in order to support a termination of parental rights based on prospective abuse it is necessary to show that the behavior of the parent was beyond the parents control likely to continue and placed the child at risk and citing as an example the parents mental illness