taken a different view of the applicable law does not mean that the [defendants] did not adequately represent their interests in the litigation.” 530 F.2d at 505, quoting United States v. Board of School Comm’rs, 466 F.2d 573, 575 (7th Cir.1972). Thus, we stand by this court’s previous statement that “it seems unlikely that anyone could be better situated to defend than the governmental department involved and its officers.” Id. As to the Task Force’s claim to intervene permissively under Rule 24(b), we agree with the Task Force that the district court failed to exercise its discretion in the sense that, at least on the record before this court, it did not address the request presented. Cf. McKay v. Heyison, 614 F.2d 899, 907-08 (3d Cir.19 v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 630 (9th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913, 103 S.Ct. 1891,
holding that a motion to intervene was permitted even though the intervenor filed her motion eighteen days before trial where the intervenor herself could have brought an independent action to seek the same relief as she was within the twoyear statute of limitations commencing on the date of her automobile accident holding that the district courts denial of a petition to intervene was harmless error because the merits of the appellants claim were eventually considered on appeal holding that the improper denial of motion to intervene did not require a new trial where proposed intervenor was permitted to participate in the argument on the appeal from the order granting summary judgment and its contentions were duly considered holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment holding that notice indicating appeal was from judgment on date of jury verdict was insufficient to preserve appeal from earlier order granting summary judgment