Roscitis cannot recover anything above that amount from ICSOP. This frustrates the Legislature’s purpose in passing § 27-2-2.4, which was to “give an aggrieved and injured party the right to proceed directly against an insurer in those circumstances in which the tortfeasor has sought protection under the applicable provisions of the United States Bankruptcy Code.” D'Amico v. Johnston Partners, 866 A.2d 1222, 1229 (R.I.2005). ICSOP counters, however, by noting that the Rhode Island Legislature limited recovery under § 27-7-2.4 to “insurance coverage available for the tort complained of’ (emphasis added). Thus, ICSOP argues, it was clearly not the Legislature’s intent to expand the scope of coverage available under an insurance policy. Cf. Barber v. Canela, 570 A.2d 670, 671 (R.I. 1990) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). Yet IC-SOP contends that
holding that a related direct action statute ri gen laws  2772 is designed only to provide a remedy to the injured party and not to enlarge the liability of the insurer beyond the limits stated in the policy holding that an injured third party does not have the right to bring a direct action against a tortfeasors liability insurer holding that when an insurer files suit to cancel a policy the entire liability of the insurer both on the policy and under the statute is put in issue holding that an insurer which insures a tortfeasor under a liability policy has no obligation of good faith and fair dealing to an injured third party even where the injured third party also carries a separate policy with the insurer holding assignable to injured party insureds claim against insurer for judgment in excess of policy limits