without proof that Defendants would have disciplined him in any event, especially in light of Livesay’s admission that he could not recall the DAO ever disciplining another individual for some of the same conduct on which Eng’s suspensions were based. See Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d at 978 (noting that “a reasonable fact finder could find from the inconsistent application of [city] policy that the defendants’ motivation for enforcing the policy ... was retaliation for [the plaintiffs] constitutionally protected speech”). Moreover, (1) the proximity in time between Eng’s comments regarding the COPs and both Livesay’s letter regarding administrative leave and Matsumoto’s letter (bearing Livesay’s name) regarding the first suspension (see Allen v. Iranon, 283 F.3d at 1078 (<HOLDING>)); and (2) Sowders’ indication after
holding the closeness in time between the plaintiffs complaint and the defendants demand for his resignation or firing supports an inference of retaliatory motive holding that a threeyear gap between the protected activity and the adverse employment action was insufficient to support an inference of causation recognizing that protected conduct closely followed by adverse action may justify an inference of retaliatory motive holding that evidence of a cursory investigation can give rise to an inference of an unlawful motive holding that an elevenmonth gap in time is within the range that has been found to support an inference of retaliatory motive