the fact that the plaintiffs’ evidence “admits of alternative interpretations,” because “it is the province of the jury to determine how much weight to accord” that evidence); cf. Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 468, 112 S.Ct. 2072 (“Matsushita ... did not introduce a special burden on plaintiffs facing summary judgment in antitrust cases.”). The Defendants suggest that the evidence is susceptible to an inference of independent action, and that fact alone should secure them summary judgment in their favor. This Court, however, finds that the Plaintiffs present sufficient evidence to show “that the inference of conspiracy is reasonable” in light of the Defendants’ competing inference of independent action. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588, 106 S.Ct. 1348; see also Publ’n Paper, 690 F.3d at 63 (<HOLDING>). This Court addresses the evidence defeating
holding that a reasonable inference need not be the sole possible inference recognizing that a vital fact may not be established by piling inference upon inference holding that adverse inference rule is permissive holding that the nonmovant need not be given the benefit of every inference but only of every reasonable inference recognizing that to uphold the government contentions would require the court to pile inference upon inference