of section 726.110(1) contrasts markedly with the text of statutory sections in which the legislature has created separate provisions governing both limitations and repose. For example, the statute applicable to securitie structured similarly. See, e.g., §§ 95.031(2)(a), .11(3)(j) (actions founded on fraud), .11(4)(b) (medical malpractice). Unlike these statutes, section 726.110( s a legal shortcoming in the plaintiffs case — the period of limitations — and precludes the defendant from f a statute of repose, which absolutely extinguishes a right of action, to allow the doctrine of equitable estoppel to resurrect that extinguished right. Although we are aware of no Florida case deciding whether a statute of repose forecloses resort to the doctrine of 253, 255 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the text of section 726.110(1) does
holding that equitable doctrine of contra non valentem did not apply to medical malpractice statute of repose providing sevenyear time limit even where the cause of action was not discovered due to fraud or concealment holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute holding that statute was one of repose because it embodies the most distinctive characteristic of a statute of repose the barring of the right to bring an action rather than the remedy prescribed holding that the 3year limit is a period of repose holding that the statute of limitations begins to run on the date the alleged malpractice is discovered