dismissed by the district court as alleging only one cognizable federal cause of action, that is, for arrest without probable cause. We also hold that the defendants sufficiently pleaded qualified immunity with respect to count one. 8 . The insufficiency of counts two and three, which were dismissed for reasons other than qualified immunity, is not before us under the collateral order doctrine which permits us to consider the immunity issue. See Schmelz v. Monroe County, 954 F.2d 1540, 1542-43 (11th Cir.1992). Nor does this case present us with an opportunity to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction to pass on the propriety of the district court's disposition with respect to these counts. See Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, —U.S. —, —, 115 S.Ct. 1203, 1211-12, 131 L.Ed.2d 60 (1995) (<HOLDING>). The district court's dismissal of these two
holding that pendent jurisdiction allows review of an unappealable order if it is inextricably intertwined with an appealable one  recognizing the rulings in cook and weinberg and holding that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review an order that was not a preliminary ruling upon which the appealed order was predicated holding that an appellate court may not exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction to review a nonfinal district court order where the merits of the nonfinal order are not inextricably intertwined with the properly appealed collateral order or where review of the former is not necessary to ensure meaningful review of the latter holding that certiorari petition is appropriate to review nonfinal pretrial evidentiary order in criminal case holding that an order requiring an employercarrier to provide an ime is a nonfinal order for purposes of invoking appellate jurisdiction