(allowing testimony of an informant whose receipt of a reward was made contingent upon the “final results” of his undercover work); United States v. Jett, 491 F.2d 1078, 1081 (1st Cir.1974) (stating that payment of an informant based on the value of services rendered is a permissible contingent arrangement); Heard v. United States, 414 F.2d 884, 886-87 (5th Cir.1969) (approving admission of the testimony of an informant who was a convicted felon and had been paid for results rather than information); Williams v. State, 463 So.2d 1064,1069 (Miss.1985) (acknowledging some merit in the Glosson result, but nevertheless concluding that “we would be remiss in our duties were we to bar the testimony of contingency fee informants”); State v. Salenos, 112 N.M. 268, 814 P.2d 136 (N.M.App.1991) (<HOLDING>). See generally Annotation, Contingent Fee
holding that the bias streamlining procedure does not violate an aliens due process rights holding that negligent inaction by a jail officer does not violate due process holding that a contingency fee agreement with a confidential informant does not violate due process holding that the defendant bears the burden of proof and that such a disposition does not violate the due process clause holding that doctrine does not violate due process