how long the cross-examination continued beyond the initial twenty-two-minute limitation; it shows only that the limit was reached after twenty transcript pages of testimony and that testimony continued for thirteen more pages. See HOV Tr. at 32, 52, 65. Stanfield argues that even though the announced limit was ultimately exceeded, the court’s exhortations to defense counsel to “finish up,” id. at 56, 63, caused counsel to be “pressured and distracted,” Appellant Br. at 17, and amounted to a denial of Stanfield’s right to confront the witness against him. A probationer facing revocation is entitled to “an opportunity to ... question any adverse witness.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.1(b)(2)(C); see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488-89, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2603-04, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (<HOLDING>); Gagnon v. Scarpelli 411 U.S. 778, 782, 93
holding that revocation of parole does not create collateral consequences sufficient to extend standing beyond expiration of sentence and rejecting as moot a challenge to an allegedly erroneous parole revocation holding that there is no constitutional right to representation by counsel at a parole revocation recognizing right of allocution in probation revocation proceedings holding that a right to confrontation exists in parole revocation proceedings holding that probation revocation proceedings are clearly not criminal proceedings