239 (533 SE2d 129) (2000). 7 Young, 274 Ga. at 848; see also Kaminer v. Canas, 282 Ga. 830, 838 (4) (653 SE2d 691) (2007) (“We find OCGA § 9-3-71 (a) to be an extremely harsh limitation in application because it has the effect, in many cases,... of cutting off rights before there is any knowledge of injury. Nonetheless, the legislature has the power, within constitutional limitations, to make such provisions.” (punctuation omitted)). 8 OCGA § 9-3-71 (a). 9 OCGA § 9-11-8 (a) (1) (A). 10 McCord v. Lee, 286 Ga. 179, 180 (684 SE2d 658) (2009). 11 Beamon v. Mahadevan, 329 Ga. App. 685, 687 (1) (766 SE2d 98) (2014) (punctuation omitted) (quoting McCord, 286 Ga. at 180). 12 Id. (punctuation omitted) (quoting McCord, 286 Ga. at 180). 13 Kaminer, 282 Ga. at 832 (1); see also id. at 831-32 (1) (<HOLDING>); Frankel v. Clark, 213 Ga. App. 222, 223 (444
holding that the burden rests upon the party seeking benefits to prove the injury sustained was the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment and the rule of liberal construction is not a substitute for the claimants burden of establishing his claim by a preponderance of the evidence holding that in cases of misdiagnosis the injury begins immediately upon the misdiagnosis due to pain suffering or economic loss sustained by the patient from the time of the misdiagnosis until the medical problem is properly diagnosed and treated and that tjhe misdiagnosis itself is the injury and not the subsequent discovery of the proper diagnosis punctuation omitted holding at least under the facts of the case that the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice action did not begin to run until the plaintiff secured a specific medical diagnosis holding that under the ada discovery of the original act of discrimination not future confirmation of the injury or determination that the injury is unlawful is when the statute of limitations begins to run holding that the basis of liability is negligence and not injury