any official misconduct on the part of Chief Brady because no such intimidation, coercion, or improper “suppression” of evidence for Wade’s benefit ever took place. Appellants therefore have failed to conclusively establish that the gist of the Article was not more damaging to Wade’s reputation in the mind of the average reader than the truth. Furthermore, even if appellants had established a right to summary judgment on the basis of substantial truth, because the underlying facts regarding the alleged intimidation, coercion, and “suppression” of evidence are disputed, a material issue of fact exists on the issue of substantive truth precluding summary judgment. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(c); see also Cram Roofing Co., Inc. v. Parker, 131 S.W.3d 84, 90 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that appellants did not meet
holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case holding that whether the gerrymandering at issue was the product of impermissible racial motivation was a disputed fact and that it was error in this case for the district court to resolve the disputed fact of motivation at the summary judgment stage holding that jurisdiction exists for determining if disputed facts are material holding in regard to substantial truth defense that ojbviously if the underlying facts regarding the gist of the statement are disputed then a fact issue arises holding that trial courts resolution of disputed facts are conclusive on appeal when supported by substantial evidence