accepting or rejecting the stated purpose of the bond. To hold otherwise — that a bond’s purpose is not a part of the “question” that must go before the voters — makes this constitutional guarantee illusory. Under the District’s interpretation, a school district could present a bond measure under stated purposes that voters would surely receive favorably, and then, once the election has concluded, change the purposes for which the bond proceeds may be spent to one the voters may not have received favorably had those purposes been presented to them. Such an interpretation would allow a school district to accomplish a purpose in direct violation of an essential condition upon which voter approval was obtained. Cf. Peery v. City of Los Angeles, 187 Cal. 753, 769, 203 P. 992 (1922) (<HOLDING>). Because Section 34 takes away the voters’
holding that the proper rate for prejudgment interest is the rate fixed by the parties in a contract holding that rule 60a did not authorize the district court to change the rate of interest in its initial order recognizing that taxpayers are not entitled to interest on cash bonds recognizing that no bond or a nominal bond may be appropriate in cases involving the public interest holding that a city could not sell bonds below par value effectively raising the interest rate because that would change the terms of the bond measure that voters approved