probation revocation hearings, Scarpelli and Byington are less definitive than the State represents because due process principles may require counsel in some circumstances. In Scarpelli, the Supreme Court held that “[although the presence and participation of counsel will probably be both undesirable and constitutionally unnecessary in most revocation hearings, there will remain certain eases in which fundamental fairness — the touchstone of due process — will require that the State provide at its expense counsel for indigent probationers or parolees.” 411 U.S. at 790, 93 S.Ct. 1756. ¶ 8 In Byington, we explained that “[t]he assistance of counsel at a probation revocation hearing is constitutionally guaranteed only in certain circumstances.” 936 P.2d at 1115; see also id. at 1114-17 (<HOLDING>). Quoting Scarpelli, we noted that counsel
holding that probation is not a sentence holding defendant cannot establish prejudice merely by alleging court held probation revocation hearing after defendants period of probation expired holding that a defendant was not constitutionally entitled to counsel at a probation revocation hearing when he admitted to violating the terms of his probation and refused the district courts offer to appoint counsel holding that the right to counsel in probation revocation proceedings is not absolute where the defendant has been convicted of or has admitted to committing a crime holding that where defendant admitted to two violations of probation and was sentenced therefor court could not enter second order of revocation and resentence defendant on third charge of violation of probation which was pending at time defendants probation was first revoked