v. Texas, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1631, 123 L.Ed.2d 245 (1993) reaffirmed its position that “interest,” at common law, does not include processing fees or penalty charges. In Texas, the Court examined the Debt Collection Act of 1982, 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3701 et seq., and found that: The common law rule requiring parties owing debts to the Federal Government to pay prejudgment interest where the underlying claim is a contractual obligation to pay money differs from the prejudgment interest liability imposed by [the] Debt Collections Act ... in that under the common law ... processing fees and penalty charges are not imposed [as interest]. Id. — U.S. at ---, 113 S.Ct. at 1635-36 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See United States v. Childs, 266 U.S. 304, 45 S.Ct. 110, 69 L.Ed. 299 (1924) (<HOLDING>). The logic behind this continuing federal
holding that a states use of the word shall is mandatory language holding that purpose of the amendment was to clarify the definition of the word maintain holding that the word void is not sufficient holding that the word interest is to be understood in its ordinary senseto hold that congress intended to use the word in the sense of a penalty is contrary to all rules of interpretation and invokes a special definition of the word interest that is unwarranted citations omitted holding the word individuals is not the equivalent of the dictionary acts use of the word persons