have a cause of action but a remedy by which he can reduce his right to damages to judgment.” 285 N.C. at 319, 204 S.E.2d at 833. The court concluded: It is manifest ... that despite the contractual relation between plaintiff insured and defendant insurer, this action is actually one for the tort allegedly committed by the uninsured motorist. Any defense available to the uninsured tortfeasor should be available to the insurer.” 285 N.C. at 319, 204 S.E.2d at 834. I do not find the reasoning of Brown persuasive. First, Alabama courts have never accepted the proposition that, in order to recover UM benefits, the insured must have not only a right but also an enforceable remedy against the uninsured motorist. See, e.g., Walker v. GuideOne Specialty Mut. Ins. Co., 834 So.2d 769 (Ala.2002) (<HOLDING>). Second, our decisions have never held that a
holding a personal profit exclusion applicable to an insured corporation where the purpose of the exclusion was to exclude coverage when the insured received profits to which the insured was not legally entitled holding that the uncorroborated testimony of the insured can establish that he is legally entitled to recover from the driver of a phantom vehicle holding that uncorroborated testimony of one witness is sufficient by itself to sustain a conviction holding that uncorroborated accomplice testimony may provide the exclusive basis for a criminal conviction holding that the uncorroborated testimony of an informant may be sufficient to sustain a conviction