with Eckloff. Like Sonmez’s “sole purpose” instruction, this instruction was properly refused because it is an incorrect statement of law. See McFadden, 753 F.3d at 443-44. As noted by some of our sister circuits, the text of Section 1325(c) does not provide any support for such a requirement. See United States v. Ortiz-Mendez, 634 F.3d 837, 840 (5th Cir.2011) (rejecting similar argument and noting that the defendant “asks us to read into the statute an element [of the statute] that is absent”); see also United States v. Darif, 446 F.3d 701, 709-10 (7th Cir.2006) (rejecting proposed “intent to establish a life” jury instruction as “not supported by the language of [Section 1325(c) ] defining the marriage fraud offense”); United States v. Islam, 418 F.3d 1125, 1128-30 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). In the absence of such a statutory
holding that it was improper for the trial court to instruct the jury that it could not consider the states failure to videotape the defendant holding that the failure to properly instruct the jury on the burden of proof required a new trial holding that the failure to instruct on a definition or to amplify an element is not a failure to instruct on an essential element holding that the district court correctly declined to instruct the jury that the government was required to prove as an element of the offense that the defendant did not intend to establish a life with his wife holding that district court did not err in holding that it was unnecessary to instruct the jury that intent to produce anticompetitive effects is an element of the offense of which defendants were convicted