in question must be one not readily identifiable without use of the trademark; (2) only so much of the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or service; and (3) the user must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder. Downing, 265 F.3d at 994. The doctrine of nominative fair use applies only when the mark is “the only word reasonably available to describe a particular thing.” Abdul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d at 412. “Because it does not implicate the source-identification function that is the purpose of the trademark ... such use is fair because it does not imply sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.” Id.; see Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1155 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Where a celebrity’s name is used in a
holding that no fiduciary duty existed between the plaintiff and defendant because there was no evidence that the parties agreed that defendant would be acting primarily for the benefit of the plaintiffs holding that there was no confusion regarding endorsement where the plaintiffs mark was not so closely associated with the plaintiff that any mention would suggest sponsorship or endorsement holding that where evidence showed plaintiffs supervisor considered transferring plaintiff the day before she was served with plaintiffs lawsuit there was no causal connection showing that the transfer was retaliatory holding that standing at inception of the suit was not established where the note attached to the complaint was not made payable to the plaintiff and contained no endorsement even though the original note endorsed in blank was introduced at trial holding that even without explicit disclaimer no endorsement or sponsorship was suggested when there was no evidence in the record that rights holders were associated with the alleged infringers