the current case does not involve a trespass or nuisance claim, but instead involves an MCPA deceptive practice claim. There has been no intrusion by way of trespass or nuisance onto appellant’s property, justifying the application of the continuing harm doctrine. Here, appellee’s actions of sending numerous e-mails did not delay the accrual of appellant’s MCPA action to a further date. Further, appellee did not have a continuous and ongoing duty or relationship with appellant, as in Litz, that would excuse appellant from having brought suit within three years from December 1, 2012. See id. at 649, 76 A.3d 1076. In addition, unlike Litz, it is clear on the face of the complaint that appellant’s MCPA claim was barred by the statute of limitations. See Litz, 434 Md. at 649, 76 A.3d 1076 (<HOLDING>). There is no reason that appellant should be
holding that the amended complaint could not relate back to the original complaint in which all claims were barred by the statute of limitations holding that plaintiffs amended complaint was not barred by the applicable statute of limitations where the amendment merely expanded on plaintiffs negligence theories and stating that in a tort action an amendment may vary the statement of the original complaint as to the manner in which the plaintiff was injured or as to the manner of the defendants breach of duty holding that district court improperly dismissed pro se prisoners civil rights complaint by sua sponte raising statute of limitations defense that was neither patently clear from the face of the complaint nor rooted in adequately developed facts holding it was unclear from face of litzs complaint that her allegation of negligence was barred by the applicable statute of limitations holding that where plaintiffs claims are timely on the face of the allegations of the complaint a court should strike the affirmative defense of statute of limitations