.in the Mejias’ car would not create probable cause to believe they were aware of the package’s contents. b. Probable cause at the time criminal proceedings were commenced against the Mejias. The determination of whether a particular defendant had probable cause must be made on the basis of the information possessed by, or reasonably available to, that defendant. See 59 N.Y. Jur.2d False Imprisonment & Malicious Prosecution § 71 (1987). In this case, there is no evidence that at the time criminal proceedings were commenced, any Airborne employee was aware of the seizure of the additional portfolios from the Mejias’ office. Moreover, even if the police defendants’ knowledge of the additional portfolios can be imputed to Airborne, cf. Davis v. Little, 851 F.2d 605, 607 (2d Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>), that additional evidence would still not be
recognizing that an arrest based on probable cause cannot be the basis of a claim for false arrestimprisonment holding that hearsay may be relied on to show probable cause when substantial basis exists for crediting it holding that probable cause may be determined on basis of collective knowledge of police holding that the police officers had probable cause to make a warrantless entry holding that a determination of probable cause does not bar a state law malicious prosecution claim where the claim is based on the police officers supplying false information to establish probable cause