“beyond the control of the Seller.” This type of clause is not an opt-out provision; it is limited in scope. See Gen. Injectables & Vaccines, Inc. v. Gates, 527 F.3d 1375, 1377 (Fed.Cir.2008) (delays caused by subcontractors are within the builder’s control and therefore not excused by “beyond the seller’s control” force majeure clauses); Hutton Contracting Co. v. City of Coffeyville, 487 F.3d 772, 779 (10th Cir.2007) (same); Stand Energy Corp. v. Cinergy Servs., Inc., 144 Ohio App.3d 410, 760 N.E.2d 453, 457 (2001) (“Mistaken assumptions about future events or worsening economic conditions, however, do not qualify as a force majeure.”). The clause does not make the two-year duty illusory. See Johnson Enters, of Jacksonville Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 162 F.3d 1290, 1311 (11th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Port Largo Club, Inc. v. Warren, 476 So.2d
holding it was error to submit a fraud claim to the jury partly because there was no principle of law establishing an obligation of disclosure recognizing that a contractual provision renders an obligation illusory when it allows a party to breach with impunity recognizing the basic principle of contract law that the obligation of good faith is an implied condition in every contract recognizing the fundamental principle of contract law and florida law that an obligation is illusory when it appears on its face to be so insubstantial as to impose no obligation at all holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation