findings, unless they “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding” (reasonable decision). 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (emphasis added). In that regard, those findings are “presumed to be correct”; as noted, in district court, Gutierrez had “the burden of rfebutting [that] presumption ... by clear and convincing evidence”. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The first four claims for which a COA is requested are: (1) whether the state-habeas and district courts erred in construing Gutierrez’ due-process claim (regarding the prosecution’s alleged failure to produce information about a juror’s prior offense) as one arising under Brady v. Maryland, 873 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (<HOLDING>); (2) whether Gutierrez was denied a fair and
holding that the prosecutions suppression of evidence material to guilt or punishment violates due process regardless of the prosecutions good or bad faith holding prosecutions suppression of favorable material evidence violates due process holding that suppression by government of evidence favorable to accused upon request violates due process when evidence is material to guilt holding that suppression of evidence by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the defendant upon request violates the defendants right to due process where the evidence is material holding that suppression by prosecutor of evidence favorable to an accused violates due process where evidence is material to either guilt or punishment