granted bankruptcy courts exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a debt is dischargeable based on the bankruptcy courts’ expertise); Schwager v. Fallas (In re Schwager), 121 F.3d 177, 181 (5th Cir.1997) (noting same). Second, KSU argues that it did not waive immunity by merely agreeing to perform certain functions before the bankruptcy court because those obligations only require it to appear and move for a dismissal under the Eleventh Amendment. This is not a reasonable interpretation of the obligations to which KSU assented by entering into the agreement with the DOE because, as explained above, 34 C.F.R. § 674.49 contemplates a number of specific obligations by w d.2d 670 (1998). But cf. Wyoming Dep’t of Transp. v. Straight (In re Straight), 143 F.3d 1387, 1392 (10th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 119 S.Ct. 446, 142
holding that the language of 11 usc section 727d is unequivocal holding that chapter 13 debtor lacked standing under 11 usc  548 but finding limited authority for the debtor to avoid a transfer under 11 usc  522h holding that a state is immune by virtue of 11 usc  106c from money damages for violating the automatic stay provision of 11 usc  362a holding that 11 usc  106b is unaffected by seminole tube holding that a confirmed chapter 13 plan is binding on all parties under 11 usc  1327a however the plan may be modified pursuant to 11 usc  1329