the diamond could be sold and the sale proceeds used for the wife’s attorney’s, fees and costs, and that the trial court would defer on the wife’s motion for temporary fees and costs. When the trial court ultimately “charged” the wife with the proceeds used for her attorney’s fees and costs, it implicitly found that the wife was not entitled to temporary attorney’s fees and costs. It may be that-the use of the sale proceeds by the wife should have beeii treated as temporary support, but there were never any findings regarding the wife’s entitlement to. temporary fees and costs. The wife acknowledges in her reply brief that the trial court did not make the findings necessary to support a temporary attorney’s fees order. See Duncan v. Duncan, 642 So.2d 1167, 1168-69 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the
holding that although we typically review award or denial of attorneys fees and costs for an abuse of discretion where district court denies attorneys fees and costs based upon legal determination that a party is not a prevailing party we review the determination de novo recognizing that an award of temporary attorneys fees and costs is based on an assessment of need and ability to pay as well as the reasonableness of the fees and costs holding that an award of attorneys fees under supreme court rule 38 precursor to rule 222 did not preempt an award of attorneys fees to which one is otherwise entitled and thus appellant could seek an award of attorneys fees pursuant to section 1577300 which permits an award of fees for a party prevailing in an action against a state agency holding that lexis fees are not taxable as costs but reserving ruling on whether such fees are recoverable as attorneys fees holding that the costs of computerized research should be characterized not as taxable costs but as attorneys fees