physician-patient privilege statute is highly speculative, see Snyker v. Snyker, 245 Minn. 405, 408, 72 N.W.2d 357, 359 (1955), the policies of Schmerber and Oevering are simply inappo-site to the question of medical privilege. 3 . Where exceptions to a statutory privilege are concerned, the court “prefer[s] * * ⅜ to defer a policy determination * * ⅝ to the legislature.” Gianakos, 644 N.W.2d at 420. This court has ultimate authority over eviden-tiary questions including privileges under the Minnesota Constitution, State v. Erickson, 589 N.W.2d 481, 485 (Minn.1999), but generally defers to statutory evidentiary rules as a matter of comity. See State v. Lanam, 459 N.W.2d 656, 658 (Minn.1990). 4 . See, e.g., Indep. Petrochemical v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 117 F.R.D. 292, 295 (D.D.C.1987) (<HOLDING>); Anas v. Blecker, 141 F.R.D. 530
holding that the law of michigan rather than the forum applied to manufacturers claim of attorneyclient privilege in a products liability suit because the communication took place in michigan and therefore michigan had most significant relationship to communication recognizing that not all correspondence between a lawyer and a client are privileged depending on whether the two have a personal relationship separate and apart from the lawyerclient relationship holding an attorney who carries on representation of an existing case after a law firm dissolves does so on the firms behalf and any income derived from the case belongs to the dissolved firm holding that the right to control the means by which the work is accomplished is clearly the most significant test of the employment relationship and observing that many of the other factors enumerated in the restatement second are merely evidentiary indicia of the right to control holding that letters from insureds attorney to accounting firm not privileged under the law of the state with the most significant relationship to the communication and compelling production