But this ‘fresh start’ policy is only available to the ‘honest but unfortunate debtor.’ ” Kane, 755 F.3d at 1292 (citation omitted). To this end, Congress enacted several exceptions to the general rule of discharge. Id. One of those exceptions is contained in § 523(a)(6), which excepts from discharge any debt “for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity.” 11U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). This Court has explained that a debtor commits a “willful” injury when “he or she commits an intentional act the purpose of which is to cause injury or which is substantially certain to cause injury.” Kane, 755 F.3d at 1293 (quoting Jennings, 670 F.3d at 1334); see also Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61-62, 118 S.Ct. 974, 977, 140 L.Ed.2d 90 (1998) (<HOLDING>). We have determined that “mali cious” means
holding that a mere deliberate or intentional act that causes injury is not sufficient to establish willfulness in the context of 11 usc  523a6 holding section 107a17bs plain language does not require that the actor actually intend death or serious bodily injury an object is a deadly weapon if the actor intends a use of the object in which it would be capable of causing death or serious bodily injury holding that the debtors knowing act of failing to obtain workers compensation insurance so that the employer owed an employee a debt after the employee suffered a workplace injury was not the sort of willful and malicious injury required for nondischargeability under  523a6 because it cannot not be said that the employer intended for the employee to suffer a fall or that there was an unbroken chain of events leading from the employers intentional act to the employees physical injury holding that the word willful in a6 modifies the word injury indicating that nondischargeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury holding that  523a6 requires the actor to intend the injury not just the act that leads to the injury