Co., 196 S.W.3d 774, 782-83 (Tex.2006) (orig.proceeding) (recognizing strong presumption favoring arbitration); Prudential Sec., Inc. v. Marshall, 909 S.W.2d 896, 898 (Tex.1995) (orig.proceeding) (same); Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Tex.1992) (orig.proceeding) (same). These statutes — titled arbitration acts— eability of arbitration clauses are inapplicable because they conflict with the Brady knowing and voluntary standard adopted by the supreme court in In re Prudential. Compare Brady, 397 U.S. at 746, 90 S.Ct. at 1469 n. 6 (emphasizing that to be voluntary a jury trial waiver must be “done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences”) with In re Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 987 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex.1999) (orig.proceeding) (<HOLDING>), abrogated in part on other grounds by In re
holding that once the party seeking to compel arbitration establishes the existence of an arbitration agreement and that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement the trial court must compel arbitration holding trial court must decide whether to compel arbitration of personal injury claim of party who was not signatory to arbitration agreement holding that trial court properly denied motion to compel arbitration of claims for fraud and unfair and deceptive trade practices because arbitration clause in agreement only applied to indemnification claims and there were no other arbitration clauses in agreement holding that a party attempting to compel arbitration must first establish that the dispute in question falls within the scope of a valid arbitration agreement recognizing that in reviewing ruling on motion to compel arbitration we first determine whether party seeking arbitration established existence of arbitration agreement