342 F.Supp.2d at 350-53, a ruling they do not challenge. 4 . The partial dissent argues that in amending § 1960(b)(1)(A) in 2001,' Congress nullified only the federal specific intent requirement, leaving intact any applicable state specific intent requirement. Even if this was Congress’ intent, the statutory language simply does not allow such a distinction. 5 . We agree with the Talebnejads that § 1960(b)(1)(A) is not a strict liability offense. This fact does not help them, however. A strict liability or "public welfare” offense is one in which no mens rea is attached to a factual element of a crime, such that a defendant cannot escape criminal liability on the basis of a mistake of fact. See, e.g., United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 607, 609, 91 S.Ct. 1112, 28 L.Ed.2d 356 (1971) (<HOLDING>). As explained in the text, however, §
holding that in a prosecution for possession of an unregistered firearm evidence of an armed robbery committed with the firearm was admissible holding possession of an unregistered firearm is presumptive evidence of unlawful violent intentions and therefore involves the substantial risk of violence necessary to label the possession a crime of violence holding that a conviction for possession of an unregistered hand grenade did not require knowledge that the hand grenade was unregistered characterizing the statute as a regulatory measure in the interest of the public safety which may well be premised on the theory that one would hardly be surprised to learn that possession of hand grenades is not an innocent act holding that a defendants conviction for two possession of marijuana counts could not be supported by his possession of two marijuana cigarettes dropped from his hand and again for his possession of several packets of marijuana found in a nearby jacket during the same search holding unlawful possession of any unregistered firearm involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another will occur