limited a plaintiffs recovery under the copyright laws to those infringements that have occurred within three years of suit, even where earlier acts of infringement are held to be time-barred, those cases are inappo-site as well. In many cases courts have taken pains to articulate the limitations rule in terms of counting back three years precisely because earlier infringement claims would be time-barred given the actual accrual dates of those claims. While the Second Circuit has not endorsed a “continuing violation” approach to copyright infringement, the argument goes, nothing should prevent a plaintiff from recovering damages for discrete acts of infringement occurring during the three-year limitations period immediately prior to suit. See Yunnan Design, 1999 WL 1075942, at *7 (<HOLDING>); Galet v. Carolace Embroidery Co., No. 97 Civ.
holding that defendants failure to seek advice of counsel goes to the second component of the seagate test  what defendant knew or should have known with respect to the likelihood of infringement holding that an infringement on the defendants fundamental due process right in the form of a comment on the defendants silence by the prosecution did not rise to level of plain error holding defendants counterclaims barred by statute of limitations and did not relate back to date plaintiff filed action holding that notwithstanding defendants claim that plaintiff should have known of any alleged infringement by 1995 at the latest four years before plaintiff brought  its suit infringement claims in connection with items offered for sale in defendants 19992000 catalog would not be barred by statute of limitations holding that constitutional claim that paternity suit should not be barred by statute of limitations is waived by failing to raise the issue before the trial court