misapprehension, particularly when it knew that WSI sought dismissal of all Weaver Cooke’s claims. By remaining si lent, Weaver Cooke implicitly agreed WSI’s expansion joint work was not an issue and waived any argument to the contrary. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that “grounds alleged in the complaint but not relied upon in summary judgment are deemed abandoned” and holding that where summary judgment movant asserted that non-movant’s claims were based on oral agreements and in response non-movant did not suggest to the contrary, non-movant could not later argue on appeal a different basis for the claims); Alston v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, Civil Action No. TDC-13-1230, 2016 WL 5231708, at *9 (D. Md. Sept. 21, 2016) (<HOLDING>); Njema v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 124
holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment holding that a plaintiff who pled in her complaint that her law firm actively misled her in support of her request for application of the discovery rule had sufficiently pled the application of the doctrine holding that summary judgment was appropriate where plaintiffs admissions in her deposition undermined her claims holding that specific statutory provisions take priority over general statutory provisions holding that in connection with crossmotions for summary judgment the substance of the plaintiffs motion and her silence in response to the defendants characterization of her claims as being based on violations of specified statutory provisions established abandonment of claims based on other statutory provisions set forth in her complaint