intended to grant the Planning Commission injunctive powers, it would have done so by expressly providing the Planning Commission such power. See generally id. The legislature’s intent is apparent. By omitting any reference authorizing the authority or lead agency, such as the Planning Commission, to order injunctive relief on its own, the CZMA makes clear that the power to enjoin is solely granted to the circuit court. See HRS §§ 206A-33 and 205A-6(c). Accordingly, the provisions of the CZMA undoubtedly affirm that injunc-tive authority rests with the circuit court. 2. By ordering Morgan to conduct a sand replenishment program, the Planning Commission improperly attempted to mandate injunctive relief. An injunction is an extraordinary remedy. Castle v. Kapena, 5 Haw. 27 (1884) (<HOLDING>); see also Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968,
holding that the relevant inquiry when assessing irreparable injury is whether there is an adequate remedy in the absence of an injunction holding that an accounting is an extraordinary remedy holding that an injunction is an extraordinary remedy holding in review of a downward departure that an extraordinary reduction must be supported by extraordinary circumstances holding that once a plaintiff has met its burden in showing that an injunction is necessary no delay in the issuance of that injunction is appropriate absent extraordinary considerations here there are no extraordinary circumstances or considerations only the relatively standard posttrial motions