be heard is fundamental, and Rapoport has been denied this right. For the above reasons, I dissent. QUINCE, J., concurs. 6 . See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Fredericks, 731 So.2d 1249, 1254 (Fla.1999) ("Accordingly, because Fredericks was made aware of the conduct alleged by the Bar to be unethical and had the opportunity to be heard as to this conduct, there was no violation of due process.”); Florida Bar v. Rubin, 709 So.2d 1361, 1363 (Fla.1998) ("Prior to being found guilty of the charges at issue here, Rubin was afforded appropriate notice and a full opportunity to be heard during the final hearing before the referee. This was sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process.”); see also Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 655, 105 S.Ct. 2265, 85 L.Ed.2d 652 (1985) (<HOLDING>); In re McKay, 280 Ala. 174, 191 So.2d 1, 5
holding that where appellant was put on notice of disciplinary charges against him and was afforded opportunity to respond to boards recommendation demands of due process were satisfied holding that attorney received due process where circuit court afforded attorney notice and opportunity to be heard before suspending him and later disbarring him holding that due process requires notice and an opportunity to respond before imposition of rule 11 sanctions holding that a mother in a child protection proceeding was afforded due process when she had notice of a hearing was represented by counsel and was given the opportunity to rebut evidence holding that lack of notice of charges in disciplinary proceedings violates the due process clause