... in a case ... where the credibility of the witnesses is important.” Arlie Overton v. Hilda Gay Lowe, No. E2007-00843-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 1871946, at *7 (Tenn.Ct.App. June 30, 2009). Indeed, in such cases, the Court of Appeals has opined that “absent strong indications [that the successor judge] still found a way to independently weigh the evidence we should set aside the judgment and order a new trial.” Id. Other jurisdictions that have utilized the thirteenth ju (Ky.1969) (successor judge could rule on criminal defendant’s motion for new trial because the grounds raised “were all matters which could be determined from the record”); Paulson v. Meinke, 352 N.W.2d 191, 193-94 (N.D.1984) (adopting Anderson v. Dewey); Ruggieri v. Beauregard, 110 R.I. 197, 291 A.2d 413, 415 (1972) (<HOLDING>); cf. Hunter v. Union State Bank, 505 N.W.2d
holding that the jury is the judge of the weight and credibility given to witness testimony holding that the applicable rule of procedure vests a successor judge with judicial discretion to review the jury verdict on a motion for new trial on the ground that such verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence where the record clearly discloses that no question of the credibility of the witnesses or the weight to be given to their testimony will require resolution by him holding that the postconviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses holding the resolution of questions regarding credibility and the weight given to testimony is a function of the family court judge who heard the testimony holding that the trial court can and should grant a new trial if the manifest weight of the evidence is contrary to the verdict