491 U.S. at 688, 109 S.Ct. at 2696, 105 L.Ed.2d at 589. Similarly, “[r]elianee on a single source, in the absence of a high degree of awareness of probable falsity, does not constitute actual malice.” Woods v. Evansville Press Co., 791 F.2d 480, 488 (7th Cir.1986); accord N.Y. Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567, 576 (5th Cir.1966). Nor does a “shoddy” investigation constitute actual malice. See Dodds v. Am. Broad. Co., 145 F.3d 1053, 1062-63 (9th Cir.1998); see also Faigin v, Kelly, 978 F.Supp. 420, 429 (D.N.H.1997) (“[FJailure to follow journalistic standards and lack of investigation may establish irresponsibility or even possibly gross irresponsibility, but not reckless disregard of truth.”). Indeed, sources of information need not be completely neutral. See Dodds, 145 F.3d at 1062 (<HOLDING>). Mullin and the Iowa Democratic Party
holding that a reporters deeply religious source who expressed skepticism about a judges reliance on a crystal ball to decide cases was not so biased as to render her statements unreliable holding that jurors who expressed residual doubt about the defendants right to silence should have been dismissed for cause holding that where a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is grounded in the claim that counsel failed to strike a biased juror a defendant must show that the juror was actually biased against him holding that it did not violate the defendants right to remain silent when the prosecutor questioned her about inconsistencies between her pretrial statements to authorities and her defense at trial holding that the failure to strike potentially biased juror was not iac where decision was based on trial strategy