meaning” of the term “fail” as “deficient, inadequate, or unsuccessful.” That is, in the state’s view, the jury would not understand the probative value of the term, or the underlying assertion, to be based on science because the term “fail” does not necessarily have a scientific meaning. We disagree. A jury’s understanding of whether testimony is scientific is not based exclusively on whether the expert witness uses scientific-sounding jargon or words that are susceptible to only scientific meanings. Juries are capable of recognizing scientific substance when they hear it. Sampson, 167 Or App at 496-97 (explaining the scientific principles underlying DRE evidence and noting that “it is clear that DRE draws its authority from scientific principles”); see also O'Key, 321 Or at 296-97 (<HOLDING>); Branch, 243 Or App at 315 (the jury will
holding that the special relationship exception does not apply to the relationship between a student and a school holding that to show a causal connection the plaintiff must demonstrate a relationship between the misconduct and the plaintiffs injury holding that hgn evidence is scientific and therefore must satisfy the pertinent delaware rules of evidence governing the admission of such evidence holding that hgntest evidence is scientific because such evidence purports to draw its convincing force from the scientific proposition that there is a causal relationship between consumption of alcohol and the type of nystagmus measured by the hgn test and that relationship is not within the realm of common knowledge of the average person holding that lay testimony is competent if it is limited to matters that the witness has actually observed and is within the realm of the witnesss personal knowledge