long recognized that the writ is available to those who suffer such a curtailment of liberty as to render them “in custody” for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c). See, Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 239-40, 83 S.Ct. 373, 9 L.Ed.2d 285 (1963); Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1182 (9th Cir.1998); and Williams v. INS, 795 F.2d 738, 744 n. 3 (9th Cir.1986). In Williams, 795 F.2d at 744, the Ninth Circuit made clear that the Supreme Court’s expansion of “custody” in the criminal context applies to habeas petitions in the immigration context. In the present case, neither party seems to contend this point. What is in contention is whether Petitioner — who is subject to removal orders and the government’s Intensive Supervised Appearance Program (‘ISAP’) — h Cir. Aug. 11, 2000) (<HOLDING>) Aguilera v. Kirkpatrick, 241 F.3d 1286, 1291
holding a final deportation order places an alien constructively in custody1 because of the specialized meaning those words have in the context of an immigrationrelated habeas petition holding that the time limit for filing a petition for review of a final order of deportation is jurisdictional holding that a collateral challenge to the use of a deportation proceeding as an element of a criminal offense must be permitted where the deportation proceeding effectively eliminates the right of the alien to obtain judicial review but declining to enumerate which procedural errors are so fundamental that they may functionally deprive the alien of judicial review holding that habeas review is  for any alien held in custody pursuant to an order of deportation holding that so long as the petitioner is subject to a final order of deportation an alien is deemed to be in custody1 for purposes of the ina