that equitable tolling is available under § 2000e-16(c), see 498 U.S. at 93-96, 111 S.Ct. 463, and the governing EEOC regulations now .embody that rule, see 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). The notion that the Bell court “might” have reached a different result with this predicate, however, does not provide sufficient basis for this Court to disregard otherwise binding circuit precedent. Rather, “[i]f a precedent of’ an appellate court “has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions,” the lower court “should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to [the appellate court] the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Torres, 115 F.3d
holding that the court of appeals erred in declining to apply supreme court precedent even though the reasoning of that precedent had been eroded by subsequent decisions holding that the sixth circuit erred by following its own precedent rather than that of the supreme court in determining what is clearly established federal law holding that the court of appeals lacks the authority to overrule decisions of the supreme court of north carolina and has a responsibility to follow those decisions until otherwise ordered by the supreme court holding that a condition was precedent to performance because the contract language did not explicitly state that it was precedent to formation holding that even though petition for allowance of appeal was pending before the pennsylvania supreme court decision remained binding precedent as long as the decision had not been overturned by our supreme court