704(a); see also United States v. Wantuch, 525 F.3d 505, 513 (7th Cir.2008). But this rule “does not lower the bars so as to admit all opinions.” Fed.R.Evid. 704 advisory committee’s note. The evidence must be otherwise admissible as lay testimony under Rule 701, United States v. Baskes, 649 F.2d 471, 478-79 (7th Cir.1980), or expert testimony under Rule 702, United States v. Scavo, 593 F.2d 837, 844 (8th Cir.1979). Most importantly for our purposes, the testimony must be helpful to the trier of fact under either rule. Fed.R.Evid. 704 advisory committee’s note; see also Fed.R.Evid. 701(b), 702. We have held repeatedly that lay testimony offering a legal conclusion is inadmissible because it is not helpful to the jury, as required by Rule 701(b). See, e.g., Wantuch, 525 F.3d at 514 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Espino, 32 F.3d 253, 257
holding that the timing of the alleged actions of the prosecutor supported the courts conclusion that the prosecutors actions were associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process instead of the investigatory phase because the conduct occurred one month before plaintiffs trial and more than five years after the grand jury indicted plaintiff holding that the question of whether the defendant knew his actions were legal demanded a conclusion as to the legality of the defendants conduct which is unhelpful to the jury under rule 701 holding that the relevant question in imposing restitution under the mvra is whether the loss is caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction holding that it is well established that whether an employees actions were within the scope of employment is a question of fact and even if some of the actions were unauthorized the question of whether the actions were within the scope of employment is for the jury holding that it is error to conduct most of the jury selection process in the absence of the defendant