sound and vital canon ... that statutes passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes ... are to be liberally construed, doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians.” Bryan, 426 U.S. at 391, 392 (citations omitted). Thus, any statutory ambiguity as to whether the State can enforce a warrant against the Tribe should be read to protect Indian sovereignty. Reading the plain language of the statute and applying long-established canons of construction relevant to Indian law cases, the United States Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have interpreted Public Law 280 to extend jurisdiction to individual Indians and not to Indian tribes. See Id. at 389, 96 S.Ct. 2102 (interpreting Public Law 280 and observing that “the 1, 211-12, 98 S.Ct. 1011, 55 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Defendants assert that because tribes are no
holding that an indian tribes exercise of criminal jurisdiction over nonindians is inconsistent with the domesticdependent status of the tribes and that tribes may not assume such jurisdiction without congressional authorization holding that federal legislation with respect to indian tribes  is not based upon impermissible racial classifications and noting that article i  8 of the constitution gives congress the power to regulate commerce  with the indian tribes recognizing the inherent power of indian tribes  to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all indians holding that indian tribes could only exercise criminal jurisdiction over tribal members and not other indians holding that indian tribes lack tribal jurisdiction over crimes committed by nonmember indians within the tribes reservation