what ever [sic] terms you apply to guess work or subconscious feelings give rise to some thoughtful, some articulable, reasonable reflection on an evaluation of the evidence or lack of evidence in the case. Memorandum of Law, Statement of Facts, attached to Petition (Docket # 1) (quoting T.723). Turning first to the trial court’s alleged direction that a juror should be able to “articulate” his or her “reasonable doubt,” this statement is a variation on New York’s pattern jury instructions, which define reasonable doubt in part as “a doubt for which some reason can be given.” Vargas, 86 F.3d at 1277 (quoting 1 Criminal Jury Instructions (New York) § 3.07, at 92 (1983) and citing People v. Malloy, 55 N.Y.2d 296, 300, 303, 449 N.Y.S.2d 168, 170, 171, 434 N.E.2d 237, 238-39, 239-40 (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 847, 103 S.Ct. 104, 74
holding that proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is required by the constitution holding that charge defining reasonable doubt as a doubt for which you can conscientiously express a reason was neither confusing nor inaccurate holding potential prejudice caused by equating reasonable doubt with a substantial doubt mitigated by providing an alternate definition of reasonable doubt as a doubt that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act holding that the giving of an erroneous reasonable doubt instruction can never be harmless error holding that beyond reasonable doubt standard not required in termination cases