and tortious activities into Virginia. In this regard, AAMG points to DNX’s acceptance of $2,400 worth of jewelry from a donor in Virginia in December, 2003. According to Caswell’s affidavit, however, the content of which AAMG does not contest, the jewelry donor contacted DNX. (Caswell Aff. ¶ 10.) Even when coupled with the harmful effects in Virginia of DNX’s alleged conduct, the one-time unilateral act of a single third-party contacting DNX, even if that contact was facilitated by DNX’s website or other national advertising, is simply “too attenuated and insubstantial to provide a constitutionally sufficient basis” for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over DNX. See ESAB, 126 F.3d at 626; see also Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Based on the record before the court and
holding that california courts assertion of personal jurisdiction over floridabased reporters did not violate due process when allegedly defamatory article that was the basis of the suit focused on the california activities of california residents recognizing a hypothetical situation where california law left a party free to sue on a claim in maryland even after the claim was precluded in california because the california statute of limitations had expired holding that the ninth circuit is bound by the california supreme courts interpretation of california law recognizing that california has a valid interest in protecting a california company from copyright infringement holding that personal jurisdiction in california was appropriate over nonresident journalist where harmful effects of allegedly defamatory article would be exclusively felt in california and california was the state of newspapers greatest circulation