his predecessor had made in the order of May 16, 2000. In other words, even if we prescind from the above-summarized “final judgment” rule, completely adequate notice was provided to Mr. Friedrich. Greensleeves’ intention to appeal the ruling encompassed in the May 16, 2000 order is clear. See MCI Telecommunications Corp., 71 F.3d at 1092 (exercising appellate jurisdiction over orders not specified in the notice of appeal when a connection exists between the specified and unspecified order). This intent is especially clear when viewed in light of Greensleeves’ earlier attempt to appeal the May 16, 2000 order, which was dismissed by this Court as premature because partial final judgment had not been entered. See Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 125, 126 (5th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). Finally, we note that there is virtual
holding premature notice of appeal was treated as entered on date of entry of final judgment holding that there was appellate jurisdiction under principle that a premature notice of appeal from a nonfinal order may ripen into a valid notice of appeal if a final judgment has been entered by the time the appeal is heard and the appellee suffers no prejudice holding that notice of appeal from final judgment brought forward the entire case including earlier interlocutory orders that were not independently appealable holding that the appellate court should have construed the notice of appeal from the denial of a motion to vacate the judgment as an attempt to appeal from the underlying judgment holding that a notice of appeal that referred only to the final judgment was sufficient to support review of earlier orders including an order involved in an unsuccessful attempt to take a premature appeal