participatory democracy and the centrality attributed to the right to vote in our legal and political culture, I am compelled to conclude that the deprivation of the franchise is an “affirmative disability or restraint” of the gravest sort. Yet the majority concludes otherwise. In support of its holding that felon disenfranchisement does not constitute criminal punishment, the majority concludes that Article 120 does not impose “any affir sical sanction, the deprivation of citizenship, to constitute a sanction “essentially penal in character.” The majority also argues that disenfranchisement during incarceration is not an affirmative disability because it is “not as enduring as permanent occupational debarment.” See Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 18 S.Ct. 573, 42 L.Ed. 1002 (1898) (<HOLDING>). But revoking a license to practice a
holding that use of the guidelines in effect at time of sentencing does not violate ex post facto clause after booker holding retroactive application of idra would violate the ex post facto clause holding that revocation of medical license does not violate the ex post facto clause holding that parole guidelines are subject to the ex post facto clause holding that the ex post facto clause  has no application to deportation