1 (1986), this evidence is not the sort that is cognizable on collateral review. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 347, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992) (“[T]he ‘actual innocence’ requirement must focus on those elements that render a defendant eligible for the death penalty, and not on additional mitigating evidence that was prevented from being introduced as a result of a claimed constitutional error.”). This is especially true given that the evidence did not exist at the time of White’s sentencing, so there is no argument that it would have been included but for some constitutional defect. Finally, this evidence would not satisfy the elevated Schlup standard, even if it were to be admissible. See, e.g., Hughes v. State, 897 S.W.2d 285, 294 & n. 13 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, White has not made a substantial
holding that 21 years of crimefree violencefree behavior twelve years of good behavior in prison and other meaningful productive activities were not sufficient to outweigh the states evidence in support of the death penalty holding that the good behavior requirement of a suspended sentence defined the period of suspension holding that sentences of five years in prison followed by ten years probation were illegal sentences that exceeded the statutory maximum of five years for a thirddegree felony holding that the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate retaliation for activities that occurred two years prior to the termination holding sentence of thirtyfive years in prison with ten years probation for seconddegree murder is within the statutory maximum under 1997 statutes