and began questioning the two men. The fact that the detectives in this ease requested that Peterkin answer questions apart from Durovic, and separated them by about ten feet, does not convert an otherwise voluntary encounter into a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The first moment at which Peterkin may have been seized was when Detective Lascik took Peterkin’s identification back to the van to run a background cheek. By that time, however, Peterkin and Durovic had already given the detectives conflicting stories, including whether they knew each other. This inconsistency, together with the detectives’ earlier observations of their unusual behavior, was enough to create reasonable suspicion to support a Terry stop. See United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 458-59 (3d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Brown, 345 F.3d 574, 578
holding an officer may order a passenger to get out of a car during a traffic stop and may frisk a passenger for weapons if the officer reasonably suspects the passenger is armed and dangerous holding that after receiving conflicting stories from a driver and passenger the officer had reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the terry stop and conduct background checks on them both holding that receiving conflicting stories from the driver and passenger of a stopped car about their travel gave the officer reasonable suspicion to extend the terry stop holding that it was impermissible for an officer to question a driver about matters unrelated to the traffic stop after the officer had fulfilled the purpose of the stop by issuing a written warning to the driver holding that a police officer may stop a driver where the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion regarding the commission of a civil traffic violation