in an individual Hobbs Act case need only be ‘potential’ ”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 732, 163 L.Ed.2d 568 (2005); United States v. Re, 401 F.3d 828, 835 (7th Cir.2005) (“Moreover, the impact on commerce need not be actual; given that the Hobbs Act criminalizes attempts as well as completed crimes, it is enough that the conduct (here, the conspiracy to extort) had the potential to impact commerce.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 1652, — L.Ed.2d - (2006); United States v. Rivera Rangel, 396 F.3d 476, 482 (1st Cir.2005) (“The government need only show a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on interstate commerce in order to bring extortion within the reach of the Hobbs Act.” (internal quotation omitted)); United States v. Perrotta, 313 F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Toles, 297 F.3d 959, 969
recognizing it is the law in our circuit that if the defendants conduct produces any interference with or effect upon interstate commerce whether slight subtle or even potential it is sufficient to uphold a prosecution under the hobbs act internal quotation omitted holding the limitations to congresss commerce clause authority recognized in lopez have no effect on the establishment of the interstate commerce element of the hobbs act holding that the district court properly denied defendants motion to dismiss based upon a lack of jurisdiction when defendant challenged the interstate commerce element of the hobbs act holding that an effect on commerce is sufficient even though the effect is not immediate or direct or significant but instead is postponed indirect and slight holding that the government can satisfy the hobbs act interstate commerce requirement by showing that the robbery resulted in the closure of a business engaged in interstate commerce