therefore is not owed Chevron deference. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”); see also Wilderness Soc’y v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051, 1061 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc) (“If, under these canons, or other traditional means of determining Congress’s intentions, we are able to determine that Congress spoke clearly ..., then we may not defer to the[agency’s] contrary interpretation.”). Moreover, the Secretary’s regulation conflicts with NAGPRA’s plain language and so is invalid for that reason. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 481, 121 S.Ct. 903, 149 L.Ed.2d 1 (2001) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
holding that chevron deference is due only when the agency acts pursuant to delegated authority and the agency action has the force of law holding that chevron deference is due only to a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency holding that agency interpretation which is reasonable is entitled to deference holding that under a due weight deference standard a more reasonable interpretation overcomes an agency interpretation holding that chevron deference is due only when the agency acts pursuant to delegated authority