until he received the order in March 2001. While in ordinary circumstances he likely would be faulted for not exercising due diligence to determine the disposition of his motions during the two year period contemplated by the rule, petitioner had no reason to make such an inquiry in this case because he believed that in accordance with the April 1999 order, he had been permitted to withdraw his motions to vacate sentence. Accordingly, we conclude that Snell has pled an adequate basis for avoiding the two year time limitation imposed by the rule. We further conclude that he otherwise timely sought relief to the extent his petition seeking belated appeal was filed within two years of his discovery of the existence of September 1998 order. Cf. Adams v. State, 543 So.2d 1244 (Fla.1989)(<HOLDING>). In response to our order to show cause why a
holding that a rule 3850 motion based upon new facts or a significant change in the law must be filed within two years of the time such facts become known or such change is announced holding that a showing of a change in circumstances that is or is likely to be beneficial to the child may also warrant a change in custody holding that a subsequent petition may be filed upon a showing of a change in circumstances holding that a change of venue has no affect on the applicable state law and that change of venue is but a change of courtrooms holding that a change in the law of sentencing does not constitute a new factor