of her benefits. Hence, this Court holds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies and does not fit under the futility exception. Therefore, Plaintiff is barred from seeking legal recourse in this Court. III. Contractual Limitations Period Assuming arguendo that Plaintiff somehow can clear the exhaustion hurdle, her claim is nonetheless time-barred. An ERISA cause of action for benefits accrues, and the statute of limitations or contractual limitations period begins to run, when a benefit claim has been made and formally denied. Stevens v. Employer-Teamsters Joint Council No. 84 Pension Fund, 979 F.2d 444, 451 (6th Cir.1992). This is true even when the policy suggests otherwise, de Coninck v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 747 F.Supp. 627, 633 (D.Kan.1990) (<HOLDING>). The limitations period began to run on April
holding that a reasonable contractedfor limitations period that is not contrary to public policy is generally enforceable holding that accrual date begins to run on the date the employee is notified unambiguously of the adverse employment action holding that the plain meaning of the uim policy language was clear and not contrary to public policy holding erisas accrual date for limitations period controlled despite contrary language in policy holding that limitations period on employment discrimination claim triggered on date of discharge not on date of discovery of discriminatory intent