the majority claims, relying on the “punitive damages” principle, “that reckless conduct is capable of being deterred.” See majority opinion at 8, 919 P.2d at 270. However, because workers’ compensation is a no-fault system, it is not designed to “punish the wrongdoer.” The majority fails to recognize that deterrence and no-fault are concepts that are at the opposite ends of the spectrum. Thus, the majority’s premise that the deterrence concept supports lawsuits between co-employees is simply wrong. Rather, “punishing the wrongdoer” is accomplished within the internal disciplinary procedures of the employer. In this sense, an employer’s disciplinary function plays a vital role in workers’ compensation. Cf Wharton v. Hawaiian Electric Co., Inc., 80 Hawai'i 120, 906 P.2d 127 (1995) (<HOLDING>). In addition, because our workers’
holding that the trial courts authority to initiate workers compensation benefits before the final adjudication was not divested by the legislature and was consistent with the stated purpose of the workers compensation act holding that because maryland law expressly creates right to file workers compensation claim action exists for wrongful discharge for termination based solely on the filing of a workers compensation claim holding that employees stress injury solely due to disciplinary proceedings was not compensable under workers compensation holding that an employees visit to the office solely to retrieve medical documents for a workers compensation claim was not an activity implied into the contract of employment holding that provisions of section 40115102 are applicable to the determination of the status of truck drivers as employees or independent contractors under the workers compensation act and discussing legislative history indicating intent to apply these provisions both to workers compensation and unemployment compensation matters