Looming Limitations requirement and the Inability Allegation). Because the Beaumont case is contrary to this court’s precedent, the majority errs in following it. In reaching its conclusion, the majority relies heavily on the Code Construction Act. The majority never says whether it believes the statute to be ambiguous but nonetheless reviews the legislative history. Because the statute is unambiguous, there is no sound reason to consider legislative history and many compelling reasons not to do so. And, even if the legislative history did support the majority’s interpretation, it would not be right to give effect to the legislative history if doing so would contradict the unambiguous language of the statute. See Fleming Foods of Texas, Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278, 283-84 (Tex.1999) (<HOLDING>); St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 952 S.W.2d at 505
holding that court of appeals erred in relying on the plain meaning of a statute when the legislative history clearly indicated another meaning holding that even where there are  contrary indications in the statutes legislative history we do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear holding that legislative consent to suit must be by clear and unambiguous language in either a statute or by other express legislative permission holding that although section 311023 of the texas government code states that courts may consider the legislative history of unambiguous statutes the legislative history of a statute cannot be used to alter the unambiguous meaning of a statute except for the rare instance in which it is used to show a typographical error holding that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous no need exists for the court to examine the legislative histo ry and the court must give effect to the plain meaning of the statute