did not have enough information to opine on whether A.Q.W. should be placed with Dolores. Dolores testified she first became aware appellant was the child’s father about thirty days before the termination hearing when appellant told her. She said appellant wants to be a father to A.Q.W., and both she and appellant want A.Q.W. placed with her if appellant’s parental rights were terminated. She said appellant was upset when he thought he might lose his parental rights if he was sent to prison. She said her son is not a “bad person.” She did not agree his parental rights should be terminated because he has not had a chance to be a father, she thought he would be a very good father, and “[h]e wants this child.” Appellan ding same); In re 91 S.W.3d 18, 25 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Here, appellant was not confirmed as A.Q.W.’s
holding the icwa beyond a reasonable doubt standard applies only to a special verdict question here special verdict question 7 relating to whether the return of custody of the child to the parent is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child holding that departments preparation of several service plans designed to help a parent regain custody of her child and parents failure to complete requirements of the service plans constituted reasonable efforts on the states part to return the child to the mother under the first element of section 1610011n holding that fundamental error occurred in the prosecution of a mother for aggravated manslaughter of her child when the prosecutor commented on the fact that the mother had contemplated having an abortion during the course of her pregnancy with the child holding that an order ceasing reunification efforts and awarding foster parents guardianship was supported where the child was being harmed by the lack of permanency the mother had not made progress toward reunification despite reasonable efforts from dss and the mother had failed to remedy the risks associated with returning the child to her home holding that the domicile of the child follows that of the parent with lawful custody