court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the officer because the plaintiff’s injury occurred entirely though the officer’s inadvertence. Id. at 8. During the years since Dodd and Troublefield, courts have consistently held that plaintiffs cannot predicate excessive force claims on accidental police shootings. See, e.g., Pollino v. City of Phila., No. Civ. A. 03-6288, 2005 WL 372105, at *7 (E.D.Pa. Feb.15, 2005) (citing Dodd and Troublefield while reiterating that accidental discharge of a firearm cannot support an excessive force claim); Owl v. Robertson, 79 F.Supp.2d 1104, 1114 (D.Neb.2000) (relying on Dodd to hold that “if [a] shooting [is] truly accidental, then there [is] no violation of ... Fourth Amendment rights”); Clark v. Buchko, 936 F.Supp. 212, 219-220 (D.N.J.1996) (<HOLDING>). An excessive force claim may proceed to
holding that excessive force claims are to be treated under the fourth amendment holding that evidence of recklessness by one officer in events leading up to shooting was immaterial in evaluating objective reasonableness of shooting officers decision to use deadly force in the situation he faced at time of shooting holding that an insurance company had to indemnify defendant driver pursuant to policy because shooting that caused accident was determined to be accidental holding that fourth amendment claims for accidental shooting are inappropriate if the officer  lacked intent to seize the victim  by firing the gun  holding that fourth amendment claims are not cognizable on habeas review because the fourth amendment exclusionary rule does not relate to the accuracy of the factfinding process