and we do not attempt to define the spectrum of what may or may not constitute a new rule for retroactivity purposes.”). Hence, the concurrence’s sweeping list of four categories of cases that "delineate[s] when a new rule is established” is not helpful. 35 . For this proposition, the concurrence relies upon Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 102 S.Ct. 2579, where the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that as far as federal retroactivity jurisprudence is concerned, a new principle of law is announced when a case "disapproves a practice [that it] arguably has sanctioned in prior cases.” Id. at 551, 102 S.Ct. 2579. However, this class of cases disavowed previous decisions that expressly sanctioned the practices involved. See Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 673, 93 S.Ct. 2926, 37 L.Ed.2d 873 (1973) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 731, 86
holding that the burden is on the party seeking to exercise jurisdiction by clearly alleging facts sufficient to establish jurisdiction holding that a reviewing court has an obligation to satisfy itself of the jurisdiction of the court below holding that the court long and consistently had recognized that military status in itself was sufficient for the exercise of courtmartial jurisdiction a view that was later disavowed by the court holding that the district courts order refusing to exercise jurisdiction and remanding to the magistrate court for trial was sufficiently final for purposes of appeal and then determining that the remand was in error holding the military judge did not abuse his discretion in dismissing charges with prejudice for violation of speedy trial courtmartial rule and recognizing that the military judge assessed the prejudice that would result from remedies short of dismissal