The purpose for which D.C.Code § 22-3202 [i.e., the relevant enhanced sentencing statute] was designed—to deter the increasing number of armed crimes within the District—would not be served by imposing lesser sentences on aiders and abettors of armed principals. Id. at 1128 (emphasis added). See also State v. White, 98 N.J. 122, 484 A.2d 691 (1984) (affirming the imposition of an enhanced sentence where the defendant planned that the robberies be effected by an accomplice with the use of a handgun); State v. Holmes, 451 So.2d 1175 (La.App. 1st Cir.1984) (permitting enhanced sentencing based on imputed possession because, under Louisiana law, co-conspirators are deemed to assent or commend whatever is done to further the common enterprise); Key v. State, 563 S.W.2d 184 (Term.1978) (<HOLDING>). Compare People v. Reed, 185 Cal.Rptr. 169,
recognizing innocent possession defense to a charge of criminal weapons possession holding that the defendants possession of the firearm was not so fleeting as to warrant an instruction on temporary innocent possession holding that possession of a pistol in public requires knowing possession holding that an unarmed participant had joint possession of a firearm through knowledge of possession by his partner holding that in a prosecution for possession of an unregistered firearm evidence of an armed robbery committed with the firearm was admissible