61. Immediately upon the officers’ entry, Mr. Miles stepped forward. Id. at 17. One officer saw a gun in plain view and asked to whom it belonged; Mr. Miles admitted that the gun was his. Id. at 17-18. A grand jury returned a two-count indictment against Mr. Miles. I R., Doc. 1. When his motion to suppress the gun and certain incriminating statements was denied, I R., Doc. 32, Mr. Miles entered a conditional plea of guilty to Count I of the indictment — possessing a firearm after conviction of a felony. I R., Doc. 36. This appeal followed. Discus Yvette Sugura consented to the search of her apartment, Aplee. Br. at 15-23, and that the search was supported by exigent circumstances. Id. at 12-15; see also Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 216, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981) (<HOLDING>). Because we hold that Ms. Sugura’s consent was
holding that in the absence of consent or exigent circumstances a law enforcement officer must procure a search warrant before searehing for the subject of an arrest warrant in the home of a third party holding that an arrest warrant can authorize entry into a dwelling only where the officials executing the warrant have reasonable or probable cause to believe the person named in the warrant is within holding that in die absence of exigent circumstances the mere existence of probable cause does not justify a nonconsensual entry by police into a home without an arrest or search warrant holding that absent consent or exigent circumstances law enforcement officers cannot legally search for the subject of an arrest warrant in the home of a third party without first obtaining a search warrant holding that arrest warrant does not authorize search of thirdparty dwelling in which arrestee does not reside in the absence of consent or exigent circumstances