or will not affect, sentencing.” Fed. R.Crim.P. 32(c)(1) (1999). But on December 1, 2002, amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure replaced Rule 32(c)(1) with Rule 32(i)(3). See United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 666 (6th Cir.2003). Clark’s sentencing hearing was held in April of 2003, so the applicable provision is Rule 32(i)(3), not Rule 32(c)(1). The purpose of the new rule was to make clear that controverted matters at sentencing only require a ruling if the disputed matter will affect the eventual sentence. Darwich 337 F.3d at 666. Even before Rule 32 was amended, however, this court required a defendant to expressly call controverted matters to the court’s attention before Rule 32(c)(1) would apply. See United States v. Hurst, 228 F.3d 751, 760-61 (6th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Rule 32 affords the parties several
holding that the courts factfinding duty under rule 32c1 was not triggered because the defendant failed to object to the sen tence enhancement recommended in his psr holding remand not required where district court relied on federal psr that incorporated facts from state psr not objected to by defendant to determine prior conviction was controlled substance offense for purposes of career offender sentence enhancement under guidelines holding that the district courts reliance on the psr to characterize the defendants prior offense for enhancement purposes was error holding that where defendant failed to object to facts in psi relating to prior conviction the failure to object constituted an admission holding that defendant adopted facts found in the psr by not objecting