by a transfer to another position, as opposed to modification of her existing job duties. 30 . It is not obvious to us that a "modification of an existing position" theory would result in CBA interpretation, and Boeing has not cited to us any provision of the CBA that would need to be interpreted if Humble pursues that theory. See Miller v. AT & T Network Sys., 850 F.2d 543, 549 (9th Cir.1988) (explaining that under Oregon law, expert opinions and not CBA provisions on job assignments govern whether a disabled employee can satisfactorily perform a job). In the absence of briefing and discussion, we need not resolve whether Washington law on this point is the same as Oregon's. 31 . 66 F.3d at 1526-27. 32 . Id. at 1527. 33 . Id.; see also Miller, 850 F.2d at 548-49 (9th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). 34 . Cramer, 255 F.3d at 690-91 (citing
holding that erisa preemption is an affirmative defense where erisas preemptive effect would result only in a change of the applicable law and would not subject the claim to exclusive federal jurisdiction holding that the need to reference the cbas local assignment and transfer provisions would be minimal under oregon disability discrimination law and did not result in preemption of that claim holding plaintiff did not have standing to challenge the validity of an assignment from mers to bac because she was not a party to the assignment and the assignment did not affect her underlying obligation to make timely payments holding that west virginia disability discrimination law is not mechanically tied to federal disability discrimination jurisprudence holding disability discrimination claim barred