entrapment.” Here also, this decision charts a different course from almost all of the circuits and deviates from the course previously set by our decisions. This circuit, along with every other circuit except the Second, has steadfastly held that there is no defense of private entrapment. See United States v. Mahkimetas, 991 F.2d 379, 386 (7th Cir.1993); United States v. Jones, 950 F.2d 1309, 1315 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1700, 118 L.Ed.2d 410 (1992); United States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263, 1269 (7th Cir.1986). Even the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Valencia, 645 F.2d 1158, 1168-69 & n. 10 (2d Cir.1980), has been placed in doubt by the subsequent caselaw of that circuit. See United States v. Pilarinos, 864 F.2d 253, 256 (2d Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Toner, 728 F.2d 115, 126-27
holding that firstdegree murder is one crime although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways holding no derivative entrapment where middleman was induced by a government agent to commit crime responding to pressure takes it upon himself to induce another to participate in crime recognizing that entrapment is a statutory defense rooted in the notion that congress could not have intended to criminally punish those who commit elements of crime but are induced by the government to commit the acts and that outrageous conduct defense is rooted in constitutional law holding that an employer who caused his agent to commit a crime in another county was deemed to have been personally present where the crime occurred holding an inducement to commit a crime by a private party who has no government involvement does not establish an entrapment defense