transfers. Posman’s response provided additional documentation regarding the transfers and requested that the court deny Bankers Trust’s motion to dismiss. The court noted that Civil Procedure Rule 8 only required “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See id. at 4. Although significant factual detail is not required, the claim must “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” See id. (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). The court also noted that other courts have held that merely quoting statutory language is insufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See, e.g., Kubick v. FDIC (In re Kubick), 171 B.R. 658, 660 (9th Cir. BAP 1994) (<HOLDING>). In Posman, I found that the following
holding that district court did not abuse its discretion by entering default judgment without first holding evidentiary hearing where there was no uncertainty about the amounts at issue the pleadings contained specific dollar figures and the court requested and received affidavits in support of the default judgment holding that trial court must make entry of default prior to entry of default judgment and court may not make entry of default when there is no default in law or in fact holding that internal procedural safeguards could and should have been established to prevent the loss of a complaint by the postal service and the consequent entry of default judgment holding that the trial court was without authority to set aside entry of default on motion to set aside default judgment holding that entry of a default judgment was inappropriate where complaint merely recited statutory language and contained no facts