65 (2000); Stanl custody determinations that arise in dependency proceedings, other courts have recognized a preference for placing the child with a fit parent, where the child was removed from the home based on the conduct of the other parent. See, e.g., In re D.S., 52 A.3d 887 (D.C. 2012) (recognizing a parental preference in neglect proceedings in the absence of evidence that the parent is unfit or that granting custody to that parent would be detrimental to the children’s best interest); In Interest of M.M.L., 900 P.2d 813 (Kan. 1995) (recognizing that a parent’s fundamental right to the care of his or her child may not be disturbed absent a finding of parental unfitness or substantial endangerment to the child’s welfare); Matter of Cheryl K., 484 N.Y.S.2d 476 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1985) (<HOLDING>). This preference is rooted in these
holding that when the child was removed from the home because of the fathers actions the mother who had never been adjudicated an unfit parent had a superior right to custody as against third parties holding that the mclendon standard applied where an agreement between the parties granted the parties joint legal custody of the child with physical custody to the mother and the agreement had been adopted by the trial court holding unconstitutional a statute providing for children to be declared dependent and removed from their unwed fathers custody based on the presumption that unwed fathers are unfit parents holding custody and guardianship of child whose natural parent is adjudicated unfit mandatorily vests with social services holding that although the father did not have physical custody of his children at the time they were removed the children were nonetheless effectively removed from both their parents when they were removed from the physical custody of the mother and placed in another home pursuant to the dispositional decree