340 S.C. 1, 10, 530 S.E.2d 132, 136 (S.C.Ct.App.2000). See also State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Compupay, Inc., 654 So.2d 944, 947 (Fla. Dist.Ct.App.1995) (“It can be reasoned that an act of discrimination or harassment, like an act of sexual abuse, has but one end: to harm the victim.”); Commercial Union Ins. Companies v. Sky, Inc., 810 F.Supp. 249, 253 (W.D.Ark.1992) (observing that “it strains the imagination to speculate how a pattern of sexual overtures and touching can be ‘accidental’ ”); Sena v. Travelers Ins. Co., 801 F.Supp. 471, 476 (D.N.M.1992) (finding that “the insured’s intent to harm can be inferred as a matter of law in cases involving sexual misconduct”); see also Old Republic Ins. Co. v., Comprehensive Health Care Assocs., Inc., 786 F.Supp. 629, 632-33 (N.D.Tex.1992) (<HOLDING>); Greenman v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 173
holding that an insurer had no duty to defend in the absence of any cause of action amounting to a potentially covered offense under the  insurance policy holding that the insurer had no duty to defend the insured because the allegations of the initial complaint did not allege facts which would bring the case within the coverage of the title insurance policy holding an insurer had no duty to defend a complaint alleging various causes of action arising out of alleged sexual harassment because intentional acts are not occurrences as the term is commonly defined in insurance policies holding that insurer had a continuing duty to defend holding that liability insurer had duty to defend insured against complaint that alleged intentional tort and negligence in the alternative even when policy excluded coverage for intentional torts