has and is engaged in the business involved, that is, the manufacture, sale and distribution of the Equal product. The injury alleged, therefore, can not be characterized as arising out of a consumer transaction. Thus, I conclude that Merisant lacks standing to pursue its claim under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, and summary judgment is denied as to Count VIII. See M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1493 n. 21 (11th Cir.1990) (“The Florida DTPA applies to consumer transactions, defined in part as transactions in which the consumer ‘has not been previously engaged.’ ”). See also Big Tomato v. Tasty Concepts, Inc. 972 F.Supp. 662, 663 (S.D.Fla.1997). But see Laboratorios Roldan v. Tex Intern., Inc., 902 F.Supp. 1555, 1570 (S.D.Fla.1995) (<HOLDING>). IV. Conclusion In sum, Merisant’s motion for
holding that possession of a sawed off shotgun is a crime of violence holding that violation of state law was not a per se constitutional violation holding violation of right to testify could not be harmless holding that palming off could constitute violation of flastat  501201 holding that violation of city ordinance does not constitute negligence per se