that his claim of failure to accommodate is not precluded by the RLA in his reply brief, after Southwest argued in its brief that Carmona had waived this argument. As we do not generally consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief, we hold that Carmona has waived his right to appeal the district court’s dismissal of his failure-to-accommodate claim. See, e.g., United States v. Prince, 868 F.2d 1379, 1386 (5th Cir.1989). 6 . Norris, 512 U.S. at 252-53, 114 S.Ct. 2239. 7 . Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 406 U.S. 320, 322, 92 S.Ct. 1562, 32 L.Ed.2d 95 (1972) ("Thus, the notion that the grievance and arbitration procedures provided for minor disputes in the Railway Labor Act are optional, to be availed of as the employee or the carrier 8, 1115 (8th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); cf. Brown, 254 F.3d at 667-68 (“It remains
holding that union members suit based on contract that was independent of a collective bargaining agreement was not preempted and not removable holding section 301 preempted plaintiffs claim for tortious interference with contract because that claim would require interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement holding that plaintiffs ada claim is not preempted by rla because plaintiff seeks to enforce a federal statutory right not a contractual right embodied by the collective bargaining agreement holding that plaintiffs retaliatory discharge claim was not completely preempted and noting that state court on remand would have to apply federal law to remaining issues requiring interpretation of collective bargaining agreement holding that an employee does not forfeit his title vii right of action if he first seeks relief under an arbitration clause in his collective bargaining agreement