program, cannot be viewed as a temporary measure for preserving the status quo.”). Consequently, that type of agency action normally requires notice and an opportunity for comment. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d at 818. In NRDC v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179 (2d Cir.2004), a case that neither side cited, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit provides a possible answer to why a suspension or delayed implementation of a rule normally constitutes a substantive rulemaking requiring notice and an opportunity for comment: because “altering the effective date of a duly promulgated standard could be, in substance, tantamount to an amendment or rescission of the [rule.]” NRDC v. Abraham, 355 F.3d at 194; see also Public Citizen v. Steed, 733 F.2d at 98 (<HOLDING>) (internal quotations and citation omitted);
holding that agencys suspension of rule was a paradigm of a revocation constituting a 180 degree reversal of the agencys former views as to the proper course holding that judicial review of an administrative agencys decision is limited solely to whether given the relevant standard and facts the agencys decision was arbitrary illegal capricious or unreasonable recognizing a state agencys powers are limited to 1 recognizing of course the suspension of the imposition of sentence and the grant of probation holding that the evidence must be sufficient to support the agencys findings of fact and that the agencys inferences from those facts must be reasonable