the judgment of a state court.”). The district court began by observing that § 2244(d)(l)’s one-year statute of limitation runs from the “date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” § 2244(d)(1)(A). Here, the OCCA denied Mr. Grant’s direct appeal on January 9, 1997. Though Mr. Grant did not seek certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, that option remained open to him until April 8, 1997. See Sup.Ct. R. 13(1) (establishing a ninety-day window during which a state court defendant may seek certiorari from a judgment in the state court of last result). Thus, Mr. Grant’s conviction became final, for purposes of § 2244(d)(1), on April 9, 1997. See Locke v. Saffle, 237 F.3d 1269, 1273 (10th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted). Given that
holding that even a remand by the supreme court for reconsideration in light of an intervening court opinion does not require the court to consider an argument raised for the first time in a petition for certiorari holding that supreme court need not consider issue not raised in petition for certiorari holding that a state court criminal judgment is final for purposes of collateral attack in federal court at the conclusion of review in the united states supreme court or when the time for seeking certiorari review expires recognizing that where a state prisoner declines to pursue certiorari in the united states supreme court that petitioners conviction is not final  until  after the time for filing a petition for certiorari with the supreme court has passed holding it is settled that the supreme court may consider questions raised on the first appeal after which the court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari as well as those that were before the court of appeals upon the second appeal after which the court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari internal quotation marks omitted