indorsers, and other persons conditionally liable also receive benefits from payment of the debt. If called on to pay, guarantors and the like would have been creditors; the “benefit” to them is that extinguishing the primary debt means that they receive a larger percentage of their claim than they would have had they paid and been converted to general creditors of the bankrupt. Cases under the 1898 Act routinely held that unless a person escapes an obligation to pay and so reaps a larger portion of his claim than do other creditors, he has not received a statutory “benefit”. E.g., Mayes v. Palmer, 208 F. 97 (8th Cir.1913); Walker v. Wilkinson, 296 F. 850 (5th Cir.1924); Mansfield Lumber Co. v. Sternberg, 38 F.2d 614 (8th Cir.1930). See also Bonded Financial, 838 F.2d at 895-96 (<HOLDING>). The Liquidator has not identified, and we
holding that subparagraphs a and b are mutually exclusive and thus any travel between work and home even if it is also for a dual purpose must be analyzed exclusively under paragraph a holding that transferee and beneficiary are mutually exclusive categories holding trial court is sole and exclusive judge of witnesses credibility holding that the remedies are exclusive recognizing that  1983 and  2254 proceedings are mutually exclusive so that if a claim can be properly raised in one of those proceedings it cannot be raised in the other type of proceeding