F.Supp.2d 231, 239 (E.D.N.Y.1999) (quoting Broadway & 67th St. Corp. v. City of New York, 100 A.D.2d 478, 475 N.Y.S.2d 1, 6 (1st Dep’t 1984)) (alteration in original); see also ESI, 995 F.Supp. at 435 (“Pleading special damages requires ‘a particularized statement of the reasonable, identifiable and measurable’ loss.”) (quoting Gray v. Grove Mfg. Co., 971 F.Supp. 78, 81 (E.D.N.Y.1997)). Plaintiff has not only failed to itemize her losses, see Procter & Gamble Co. v. Quality King Distribs., Inc., 974 F.Supp. 190, 198 (E.D.N.Y.1997); Gray, 971 F.Supp. at 81, her prayer for relief does not even specify a “round sum,” see PI, Inc. v. Ogle, No. 95 Civ. 1723, 1997 WL 37941, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 1997); see also Matherson v. Marchello, 100 A.D.2d 233, 473 N.Y.S.2d 998,1001 (2d Dep’t 1984) (<HOLDING>). In fact, in response to Chapman’s
holding that even  round figures or a general allegation of a dollar amount as special damages do not suffice holding that a liquidated damages amount set by contract is enforceable where the amount bears a reasonable relation to the damages actually sustained holding that a defaulting party admits only to the liability of his or her portion of the damages and therefore what must be determined after the entry of default is the dollar amount of the damages suffered by the injured party and the portion of those damages to be awarded against the defaulting party based upon the extent of its percentage of negligence holding damages do not constitute other equitable relief holding as a general rule that a bank and its customers do not have a special or confidential relationship