for any “civil action arising under an Act of Congress enacted after the date of the enactment of this section.” 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a). Meanwhile, Congress in 1991 amended § 1981 to remove a bar on claims alleging discriminatory conduct that took place after an employment contract was formed. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); see Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 372-73, 124 S.Ct. 1836, 158 L.Ed.2d 645 (2004) (explaining that § 1981(b) was added in response to Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989)). In 2004, the Supreme Court in Jones held that the amendment to § 1981 in turn triggered 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a), and applied a four year statute of limitations to claims arising under § 1981. Jones, 541 U.S. at 374, 382, 124 S.Ct. 1836 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs claims plainly allege
recognizing cause of action holding that any action that was made possible by a post1990 enactment carries a fouryear statute of limitations even if not a wholly new cause of action holding that the uccs fouryear statute of limitations provision which barred an action by the plaintiff did not bar a thirdparty contribution and indemnity claim holding that new uniform fouryear statute of limitations in 28 usc  1658 only applies to lawsuits made possible by post1990 enactments recognizing the cause of action