sentence. Id. Cooper’s 300-month variant sentence is reasonable. On remand, the district court heard counsel’s argument regarding the weight that should be afforded the § 3553(a) factors, allowed Cooper an opportunity to allocute, allowed Cooper’s stepmother to speak on his behalf, and thoroughly considered the § 3553(a) factors before imposing Cooper’s sentence. We find that the district court adequately explained its rationale for imposing the variant sentence, that the sentence was “selected pursuant to a reasoned process in accordance with law,” and that the reasons relied upon by the district court are plausible and justify the sentence imposed. See United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473-76 (4th Cir.2007); see also United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Although Cooper argues that “[t]he goal of
recognizing that the district court must place on the record an individualized assessment based on the particular facts of the case before it and that the individualized assessment  must provide a rationale tailored to the particular ease at hand and be adequate to permit meaningful appellate review holding that the decision of the appellate court establishes the law of the case and it must be followed by the trial court on remand holding that suspicion must be individualized holding that district court must conduct individualized assessment based on particular facts of each case holding that while the gsr is a valuable starting point the sentencing judge must make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented