given the recent history of political upheaval in Congo. Review of this question is limited by § 101(e) of the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub.L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4), which provides that “no court shall reverse a determination made by a trier of fact with respect to the availability of corroborating evidence ... unless the court finds ... that a reasonable trier of fact is compelled to conclude that such corroborating evidence is unavailable.”) Id. § 101(e). This provision applies in Ikama-Obambi’s case. See id. § 101(h); Orejuela v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 666, 671 (7th C ama-Obambi was not credible because she lacked certain substantiating evidence, an implicit finding is not enough to justify an IJ’s demand for corroboration. See Soumahoro, 415 F.3d at 736 (<HOLDING>). Here, the IJ did question Ikama-Obambi’s
holding an ijs credibility findings are entitled to deference if supported by specific cogent reasons holding that explicit credibility finding must be more than passing remark of disbelief and must be supported by specific cogent reasons holding that an ijs credibility determinations enjoy highly deferential review when supported by specific cogent reasons that bear a legitimate nexus to the findings holding that substantial evidence supports an adverse credibility finding if it is supported by specific cogent reasons holding that a factual finding must be supported by more than mere surmise or suspicion