(affirming district court's judgment that plaintiff’s § 1985(3) claims were barred by the intracor-porate conspiracy doctrine and reaffirming the circuit’s extension of the doctrine from the context of antitrust litigation to allegations of conspiracy under the Civil Rights Act); Buschi v. Kirven, 775 F.2d 1240, 1252-53 (4th Cir.1985) (affirming the applicability of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to bar plaintiffs' § 1985(3) claims); Cross v. General Motors Corp., 111 F.2d 1152, 1156-57 (8th Cir.1983) (affirming district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s § 1985(3) claim as barred by the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine where the corporate agents’ acts "arguably were within the scope of employment”); Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 530 F.2d 66, 71-72 (2d Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>). A minority of circuits have, however, refused
holding plaintiffs  19853 claim alleging a conspiracy among a corporation and its directors to discriminate against her on the basis of sex was barred by the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges recognizing that although civil conspiracy is a separate actionable tort a conspiracy claim is barred where the underlying tort is barred by the applicable statute of limitations holding that two conspiracies existed where the members of the second conspiracy did not know about the first conspiracy did not benefit from the first conspiracy and were connected with the first conspiracy only through a middleman holding that plaintiffs civil conspiracy claim was barred by section 343909c