vehicle being operated by Scott, the excluded person. It is significant there is no limiting language in the first sentence of the exclusion that would indicate an intent that the exclusion does not apply to claims brought under the UM/UIM coverage. To the contrary, the exclusion encompasses “any claim.” We have previously held that the use of the word “any” in a statute “means all or every.” State v. Bishop, 257 Iowa 336, 341, 132 N.W.2d 455, 458 (1965); accord Lopez v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 890 P.2d 192, 195 (Colo.Ct.App.1994) (interpreting word “any” in named driver exclusion to “mean[ ] ‘every,’ ‘all,’ ‘the whole of,’ and ‘without limit’ ” (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 97 (1986)); State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kiehne, 97 N.M. 3d 1228, 1234 (Alaska 2007) (<HOLDING>); O’Brien v. Dorrough, 928 P.2d 322, 325-26 &
holding automobile exclusion in general liability policy did not apply because plaintiffs claim of negligent supervision and training was a separate and distinct theory of recovery from the use of an automobile holding nearly identical exclusion of  any claim  unambiguously operates to bar recovery of uim benefits under policy when driver is excluded holding nearly identical policy language plainly indicates that any claim arising from the excluded drivers operation of the automobile is not covered including negligent entrustment claim against the named insured holding claim for injuries arising out of use of truck and not from negligent supervision excluded from coverage by auto exclusion in commercial general liability policy no claim that language in policy was ambiguous or unclear holding nearly identical named driver exclusion was plain and unambiguous and excluded claim brought under um coverage