by ‘harmless-error’ standards.” III We next consider whether a juvenile court has the power to grant probation to a child after a nonjury trial when the basis for the adjudication of delinquency is murder. We agree with the court of appeals that the juvenile court does have the power to grant probation. The Family Code provides that “the court or jury may, in addition to any order required or authorized under Section 54.041 or 54.042 of this code, place the child on probation on such reasonable and lawful terms as the court may determine.” The Family Code does not limit a juvenile court’s authority to grant probation. There appears to be some uncertainty, however, about whether section 3g of article 42.12 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure applies in pp.—Waco 1980, no writ) (<HOLDING>); In re D.L.E., 531 S.W.2d 196, 197
holding that in admitting evidence the failure of the trial court to give a limiting instruction sua sponte is not reversible error holding that failure to explain allegations and possible consequences was fundamental error that required reversal even though the juvenile had not raised this in his brief holding that when none of the required explanations were given that was fundamental error requiring reversal holding that failure to explain allegations and possible consequences mandated reversal holding that explanations of allegations and possible consequences of the proceeding were mandatory and that failure to give these explanations was reversible error