employment. 42 U.S.C. § 233(a). Thus, Congress has expressly made the FTCA an inmate’s sole remedy for injuries received by Public Health Service Officers acting within the scope of their employment. See Lewis v. Sauvey, 708 F.Supp. 167, 169 (E.D.Mich.1989). Two Sixth Circuit panels that have directly addressed this issue did not permit prisoners to pursue a Bivens actions against prison doctors for acts or omissions made while performing their official tasks, holding that the FTCA provides “the exclusive remedy in a civil suit that is brought against a Public Health Service Officer if the civil suit involved subject matter that is covered by the FTCA.” Beverly v. Gluch, No. 89-1915, 1990 WL 67888 *1 (6th Cir.1990); see also Walls v. Holland, No. 98-6506, 1999 WL 993765 (6th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Both Movants have filed declarations with the
holding that the ftca offers the exclusive remedy for personal injuries resulting from the performance of medical and related functions by a commissioned public health service officer acting within the scope of her office holding that a right of action for personal injuries resulting from negligence cannot be assigned absent statutory law holding that the employee was acting within the course of her employment when she died while returning from the workrelated session because her death occurred on a public highway which was brought within the scope of her employment by her employers requirement that she attend training at the state police academy holding that the position of  alltime health officer for a county was not an office within the meaning of section 1467 of the code of 1907 holding that the remedy in a prison conditions case must remedy actual injuries that have been identified by the court and suffered by the plaintiffs