no support to Plaintiffs’ contention that this right to engage in a romantic relationship disconnected from familial relationships is “necessarily implicit” in those privacy rights protected by the Constitution. Plaintiffs’ additional citations similarly fail to convince the Court that Plaintiffs’ asserted right should be recognized as a right at all, let alone a fundamental one. Plaintiffs cite cases from the Sixth and Seventh circuits finding that the Constitution protects some non-marital romantic relationships. See Christensen v. County of Boone, II, 483 F.3d 454, 463-65 (7th Cir.2007) (finding, in light of Lawrence, a protected intimate association where an unmarried couple had developed a long-tern relationship); Anderson v. City of LaVergne, 371 F.3d 879, 882 (6th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). However, as Isenbart noted when acknowledging
holding that the plaintiffs entered into an intimate association where the individuals lived together at some point were romantically and sexually involved and anderson was monogamous in the relationship holding that cooperation agreement defendant entered into with the government did not include defendants testifying at trial where there was no meeting of the minds as to that point recognizing the same point holding that agreement had been reached where the plaintiff had proposed terms for providing his services to the defendant and the parties then entered into a business relationship  despite defendants claim it never agreed to the plaintiffs proposed salary terms for that relationship holding that where a statutes definition of intimate relationship was silent on whether a sexual relationship was required and some of the examples included in the definition implied a sexual relationship but some did not it was ambiguous and the court was required to look beyond its text to resolve that ambiguity