only applies to a prisoner who is serving “a term of imprisonment” and contains two significant limits. First, the prisoner’s trial must be commenced, subject to some tolling principles, in the receiving state within 120 days of his or her arrival in the receiving state. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-31-101, art. IV(c). Second, the prisoner’s trial must be conducted in the receiving state before the prisoner is returned to the “original place of imprisonment.” TenmCode Ann. § 40-31-101, art. IV(e). If the trial is not commenced within 120 days of the prisoner’s arrival or if the prisoner is returned or “shuttled” back to the original place of imprisonment before trial, the trial court is required to dismiss the charges with prejudice. Id. Whether Defendant is entitled to relief under App.1995) (<HOLDING>); State v. Black, 989 N.E.2d 151, 156 (Ohio
holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute holding that the language of the statute and the courts duty to apply the statute as written requires the court to interpret the statute to apply when the prisoner is sentenced without regard to the institution where the prisoner is incarcerated after the sentencing holding the iad was not applicable to a prisoner who had been sentenced but was incarcerated in a local jail or holding facility while awaiting transfer to the assigned penal institution holding that when a statute is patterned after a similar provision in another states statute it is proper to resort to judicial constructions placed on the statute by the courts of the state whose statute provided the model in determining the proper construction   holding that a pro se prisoner complaint is deemed filed as of the date the prisoner gives the complaint to prison officials to be forwarded to the court