age of eighteen. Id. at 576-77, 125 S.Ct. 1183. Appellant ignores the largest and most evident distinguishing factor of the Roper opinion. As the State points out, “death is different.” See also United States v. Feemster, 483 F.3d 583, 588 (8th Cir.2007); vacated on other grounds, - U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 880, 169 L.Ed.2d 718 (2008) (noting that life imprisonment for a juvenile is not cruel and unusual while acknowledging that the Eighth Amendment applies to death penalty cases with “special force”) (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 568, 125 S.Ct. 1183); United States v. Salahuddin, 509 F.3d 858 (7th Cir.2007) (limiting the holding of Roper to death penalty cases and upholding the imposition of a life sentence on a juvenile); Culpepper v. McDonough, 2007 WL 2050970, *4-5 (M.D.Fla. July 13, 2007) (<HOLDING>); Douma v. Workman, 2007 WL 2331883, *3
holding that the imposition of a life sentence on a juvenile does not violate the holding of roper holding unconstitutional defendants sentence of death based upon the holding in roper supra and remanding for the montgomery circuit court to set aside the defendants death sentence and to sentence him to the only other sentence available  life in the penitentiary without the possibility of parole holding that after roper juvenile convictions can qualify as predicate offenses for sentence enhancement purposes holding that roper did not support a similar postconviction claim and noting that roper contained obiter dictum to the effect that life imprisonment without the possibility of parole remains a permissible sentence for such offenders holding that graham which prohibited the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide does not apply to a lengthy termofyears sentence that might constitute a de facto life sentence