basis for jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law claim and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over that claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (a district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim ... if ... the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”); see also Beal v. City of N.Y., 1994 WL 163954, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 1994); Cornett v. Bank of Cal. Int’l, 1993 WL 254983, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 1993). Because this court has dismissed all of plaintiffs federal claims, and in the interest of judicial economy, this court hereby dismisses plaintiffs state law claim for lack of jurisdiction. Id.; cf. Dunton v. County of Suffolk, 729 F.2d 903, 911 (2d Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION In sum, for the reasons stated
holding that the federal claims which arose from state court criminal contempt proceedings were inextricably intertwined with the state court action and thus the federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims pursuant to the rookerfeldman doctrine holding that where federal claims were patently meritless and insubstantial district court did not have jurisdiction to retain state claims holding that federal district court retains substantial discretion when deciding whether to retain jurisdiction over pendent state claims after the linchpin federal claims are dismissed holding that federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over  1983 claims holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction and remanding the matter to state court