noted that “Plaintiff [Liddy] and similarly situated voters would be prejudiced if an ineligible candidate were to remain on the ballot because of a delay in finding out about the lack of eligibility.” Although the appellant prevailed on the dispositive motions, the Circuit Court ultimately ruled in favor of Gansler and his continued candidacy for the office of the Attorney General. The appellant, pursuant to § 12-203(a) of the Election Law Article, in response, noted an appeal to this Court and to the Court of Special Appeals , 468, 150 A.2d 433, 435 (1959) (noting that, although it is essential to raise the defense of laches in the pleadings, “equity may decline relief for a stale claim after the facts are fully developed”); Warburton v. Davis, 123 Md. 225, 231, 91 A. 163, 165 (1914) (<HOLDING>), citing Syester v. Brewer, 27 Md. 288, 319
recognizing that a court in a proper case and on its own motion may refuse to grant relief to a complainant who on the final hearing appears to have been guilty of laches although the defense was not interposed by the defendant holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply laches where the only prejudice shown by the government was attributable to its own delay rather than to that of the movant holding that the trial court may not grant summary judgment on a ground not raised in the motion holding that a motion to continue a hearing on a postjudgment motion was ineffective to extend the period for the trial court to rule on the motion absent the express consent of the parties holding the master shall consider the following factors in deciding whether to grant relief from an entry of default 1 the timing of the motion for relief 2 whether the defendant has a meritorious defense and 3 the degree of prejudice to the plaintiff if relief is granted