amongst the first twenty positions, and would almost certainly have been questioned during jury selection. The African-American venire members were in positions 2, 4, 20, 82, and 98. Before any questioning of the venire panel, the prosecution requested a jury shuffle. This procedure results in a random reshuffling of the panel members’ positions. See Tex.Code Crim. PROC. art. 35.11. After the jury shuffle, the African-American venire members were in positions 64, 68, 76, 87, and 90. Blan-ton’s trial counsel raised no objection at the time of the shuffle. Later, when the prosecution exercised a peremptory strike of African-American ve-nire member Michelle Johnson, Blanton’s trial counsel objected based on Batson v. Kentucky. See 476 U.S. 79, 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) (<HOLDING>). The prosecutor responded with a race-neutral
holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause holding that the equal protection clause forbids prosecutors from challenging potential jurors solely on account of their race recognizing that potential jurors as well as litigants have a right based in the equal protection clause to nondiscriminatory jury selection procedures holding that a criminal defendant can bring a third party challenge to the peremptory striking of jurors based on race whether or not he is of the same race as the jurors who are struck holding that plaintiff stated viable equal  protection clause claim where officer humiliated and harassed the plaintiff on basis of race prior to and during a lawful arrest