U.S.C. § 1342(b); see also Cal. Water Code § 13370(c) (providing that the state act "authorize[s] the state to implement the provisions of [the federal Act]”); 40 C.F.R. § 122.28(a) (authorizing the use of general permits in lieu of individualized NPDES permits). 3 . We review de novo the district court's order of dismissal. NRDC, Inc. v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 651 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir.2011). We also review de novo questions of law, including the interpretation of a statute. Miranda v. Anchondo, 684 F.3d 844, 849 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, —■ U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 256, 184 L.Ed.2d 137 (2012). 4 . Other courts, construing § 1365(b)(1)(B), have reached the same conclusion. See Friends of Milwaukee's Rivers v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 382 F.3d 743, 754-55 (7th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Chesapeake Bay Found, v. Am. Recovery Co.,
holding that the clear and unambiguous language of  1365b1b and its uniform interpretation by the courts require the conclusion that the statute did not bar a citizen suit that was filed several hours before a government enforcement action holding that an appellate court must give a statute its clear and plain meaning when the statute is unambiguous holding that the interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law holding that legislative consent to suit must be by clear and unambiguous language in either a statute or by other express legislative permission holding that when the contract language is unambiguous we take these words to represent the parties intent and the plain meaning of this language governs its interpretation