the [legislative] discretion granted under the statute.” Massey, 145 N.C. App. at 355, 550 S.E.2d at 845. In both Massey and Summers, we upheld the City of Charlotte’s conditional use re-zoning as a legislative act, but we noted that the relevant ordinances did not require any quasi-judicial process. See Summers, 149 N.C. App. at 516-17, 562 S.E.2d at 24 (affirming the city’s conditional use re-zoning in a single, legislative procedure) ; Massey, 145 N.C. App. at 352-53, 550 S.E.2d at 844 (noting that the city followed the procedural requirements set forth in its ordinance and rejecting the trial court’s conclusion that the absence of a quasi-judicial element invalidated the re-zoning decision) . See also Chrismon v. Guilford County, 322 N.C. 611, 638-39, 370 S.E.2d 579, 594-95 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, in Knight v. Town of Knightdale,
holding that where a zoning board had no authority under state law to take certain actions with respect to a protected property interest a trier of fact could conclude that there was no rational basis for the towns zoning boards actions and that as a result the zoning board violated appellants rights to substantive due process holding that the board validly exercised its legislative discretion in this matter only after a lengthy deliberation completely consistent with both the procedure called for by the relevant zoning ordinance and the rules prohibiting illegal contract zoning holding that because the board of aldermen only decided whether to grant a variance under the zoning ordinance the superior court erred by determining the question of the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance which was never raised or considered by the board of aldermen recognizing that zoning and rezoning are legislative matters holding that the city was not estopped from enforcing a zoning ordinance when a zoning department employee mistakenly stamped the plaintiffs application for a license to operate a laundromat to indicate compliance with the ordinance