and sentences from the third remand. The district court denied that petition, and we affirmed. See Smith v. Coleman, 453 Fed.Appx. 625 (6th Cir.2011). 2 . Respondent’s argument that this petition should be reviewed under AEDPA's deferential standard because even though it was filed prior to a state court judgment, it was not considered until after a judgment had been rendered, is unavailing. What determines our standard of review is the nature of the claims raised and "the time [the petitioner] filed his petition,” Stow v. Murashige, 389 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir.2004) (alteration omitted), not the "present status of the case pending against him,” Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 224 (5th Cir.1987); see also Jacobs v. McCaughtry, 251 F.3d 596, 597 (7th Cir.2001) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). But see Jackson v. Coalter, 337 F.3d 74 (1st
holding   2241 is the proper avenue by which to challenge pretrial detention holding that a  2241 petitioners claim was not cognizable under  2241 and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction holding that defendant did not have standing to raise facial challenge to validity of aggravated assault statutes for their risk of creating double jeopardy grounds because he himself was not charged in way that created double jeopardy holding that  2241 was the proper statute for the petitioners pretrial double jeopardy challenge holding that a delinquency proceeding places a juvenile in jeopardy for purposes of the double jeopardy clause