We find that the language of section 261.106 of the Texas Family Code unambiguously provides statutory immunity for certain persons who assist in the investigation of a report of alleged child abuse or neglect or who participate in a judicial proceeding arising from a report, petition or investigation of child abuse; however, we find no intent in the unambiguous language of this statute to abolish common-law derived judicial immunity. See Tex. Fam Code § 261.106. We conclude that the statutory privilege granted by section 261.106 serves a different purpose than derived judicial immunity and that the Legislature, by enacting this statute, did not intend to abolish derived judicial immunity. See Laub v. Pesikoff, 979 S.W.2d 686, 690 n. 2. (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we overrule Barbara’s seventh
holding that section 261106 of the texas family code does not abolish or modify the absolute commonlaw judicialcommunications privilege because the statute serves different purposes holding that texas legislature has no police power to violate article i section 16 of the texas constitution because section 29 emphatically and unambiguously excepts this power from the powers of the government of the state of texas holding same for family code section 105001a5 holding that troxel opinion did not affect issue of grandparent standing because texas family code standing statute does not overrule parental presumption holding that section 21013 of the texas property code is a mandatory venue statute and is enforceable by mandamus