breach occurs after the date of judicial demand. In support it cites Miller v. Louisiana Gas Service Co., 95-874 (La.App. 5 Cir. 6/25/96), 680 So.2d 52; and City of New Orleans v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 517 So.2d 145 (La.App. 4th Cir.1987). Continental further contends that the trial court’s award of interest on the 2005 settlements from the date of the July 2003 judicial demand is, in essence, a penalty award and thus is inconsistent with the compensatory purpose of prejudgment interest. See Trans-Global Alloy Ltd: v. First Nat’l Bank of Jefferson Parish, 583 So.2d 443 (La.1991). We agree. The interest on these settlement awards should not begin to accrue until the date Tate & Lyle paid these amounts, giving rise to an indemnity obligation on Continental’s part. See Miller, supra (<HOLDING>); see also United, 517 So.2d at 165 (holding
holding the claim of constructive discharge does not accrue until an employee resigns holding that right to payment does not accrue until condition precedent has been fulfilled holding that because an indemnitor is not liable until the indemnitee actually makes payment interest does not accrue until the payment is made holding that interest does not begin to accrue until the date of judgment not the date of verdict holding that the term reverse payment is not limited to a cash payment