extend to the right to possess and retain a particular job or to perform particular services .... Rather, the property interest is more generally in continued employment, and no deprivation exists so long as the employee receives ‘payment of the full compensation due under the contract.’” (emphasis added)). Pratt’s argument must, therefore, fail because he had no property interest in the right to possess or retain particular job duties. See Gilbert v. Ho-mar, 520 U.S. 924, 928, 117 S.Ct. 1807, 138 L.Ed.2d 120 (1997) (finding “[t]he protections of the Due Process Clause apply to government deprivation of those prerequisites of government employment in which the employee has a constitutionally protected ‘property’ interest.”); see also hollar v. Baker, 196 F.3d 603, 607 (5th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). [¶ 21] With respect to the second question of
holding that the scope and application of state exemptions are defined by the state courts and that we are bound by their interpretations recognizing that state agencies which are independent of the state are citizens of the state holding the constitution does not create property interests they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law holding that in limine hearings are encouraged when courts are concerned with the factual rather than legal dimensions of the evidence holding that the federal rules of civil procedure apply in diversity eases where they are on point unless they both directly conflict with state law and are invalid under the constitution or the rules enabling act