trucking under the FAAAA). Both provisions were enacted “[t]o ensure that the states would not undo federal deregulation with regulation of their own.” In re Air Cargo Shipping Serv. Antitrust Litig., 2008 WL 5958061, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2008). Congress was “[c]oncerned that state regulation impeded the free flow of trade, traffic and transportation of interstate commerce [and] resolved to displace certain aspects of the State regulatory process.” Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 1769, 1780, 185 L.Ed.2d 909 (2013) (internal quotes omitted). Based on the language and purpose of the ADA and FAAAA’s preemption provisions, both have been interpreted broadly. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Dilts v. Penske, 769 F.3d 637, 643 (9th
holding removal and preemption are distinct concepts erisa preemption does not allow removal unless complete preemption exists holding that erisa preemption is an affirmative defense where erisas preemptive effect would result only in a change of the applicable law and would not subject the claim to exclusive federal jurisdiction holding that courts have given section 453 a narrow preemptive effect in light of its legislative history and rejecting an argument based on conflict preemption holding that the ada preemption clause expresses a broad preemptive purpose recognizing limits on the erisa preemption clause