affected the teacher-student re lationship. We note that, at the time of the Board’s action, the term “unprofessional conduct” was neither defined by statute nor by our jurisprudence. In deciding whether Winters’ conduct constituted unprofessional conduct, we “may substitute our judgment for agency conclusions regarding the legal effect of its factual findings.” Sanders v. Novick, 151 Ariz. 606, 608, 729 P.2d 960, 962 (App.1986). ¶ 15 With partial rebanee on Welch v. Board of Education of Chandler Unified School District No. 80 of Maricopa County, 136 Ariz. 552, 667 P.2d 746 (App.1983), Winters submits that his off-campus conduct for which he is being disciplined must bear a reasonable relationship to his fitness as a teacher. We agree. See Welch, 136 Ariz. at 555, 667 P.2d at 749 (<HOLDING>). ¶ 16 Although Winters would like us to limit
holding that constitutional questions will not be decided if case can be decided on other grounds holding that before a duty can be imposed there must be a relationship between the parties and the harm must have been foreseeable holding that wrongful or improper purpose must be shown for jurisdictional purposes holding that special damages must be shown to be reasonable and necessarily resulting from accident holding that whether actual harm to students or school must be shown or whether inference of unfitness to teach can be inferred from the conduct will be decided on a casebycase basis