(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As applied to Susi’s case, this due process protection extends not only to his exercise of the right to appeal, but also the right to go to trial. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978) (“[P]unish[ing] a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort.”); United States v. Olivares, 292 F.3d 196, 198 (4th Cir.2002) (“Due process requires that vindictiveness play no role in resentencing the defendant.”). No presumption of vindictiveness applies to Susi’s sentencing because his sentence after remand (160 months) was less than his original sentence (180 months). See United States v. Kincaid, 964 F.2d 325, 328 (4th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Although Susi broadly asserts that the
holding that intervening conduct may be used to rebut the presumption of vindictiveness holding that a court may not impose a harsher sentence on a defendant who successfully challenges his sentence on appeal holding that the presumption of vindictiveness only applies when the new sentence is actually harsher than that imposed prior to the successful appeal holding that the imposition of a harsher sentence after trial than what had been offered by the state pretrial does not create a presumption of vindictiveness holding that a judge who imposes a more severe sentence after the original sentence is successfully attacked must affirmatively state objective reasons for the harsher sentence to ensure that vindictiveness against the defendant plays no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial