here, it is universally recognized that such agreements are typically interpreted using ordinary contract principles. See Kilroy, 27 F.3d at 684 (quoting United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011, 1022 (D.C.Cir.1992)) (“addressing a grant of ‘retrogressive use immunity’ in the context of a plea agreement and stating “a plea agreement is a form of contract.”); see also United States v. Conway, 81 F.3d 15, 17 (1st Cir.1996); United States v. Aleman, 286 F.3d 86, 89-90 (2d Cir.2002) (“[w]e interpret [immunity] agreements according to principles of contract law ... ”); United States v. Cantu, 185 F.3d 298, 302 (5th Cir.1999) (“we interpret [non-prosecution] agreements in accordance with general principles of contract law.”); United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645, 663 (7th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); McFarlane, 309 F.3d at 514 (“an immunity
holding that immunity agreements are analogous to plea agreements and are enforced under principles of contract law within the constitutional safeguards of due process recognizing that immunity agreements like plea bargains are interepreted as ordinary contracts   holding that agreements other than fullfledged collective bargaining agreements may be contracts within the meaning of  301 holding that the rules of contract law are applicable to plea agreements holding that at will contracts of employment are subject to tortious interference with contracts claims