¶51 L&A’s reasoning is deeply flawed and should be soundly rejected by this court. First, L&A erred in reasoning that “default” must mean a material breach justifying termination rather than the failure to fulfill a contractual obligation. The subcontract itself defines “default,” and the meaning of “default” must also be read in light of the purpose of the bond, which is to guarantee the “prompt and faithful” performance of the subcontract. Obviously, a subcontract has not been promptly and faithfully performed when the principal has breached its contractual obligations, whether the breach is serious enough to justify termination or not. “[I]t is axiomatic that the very purpose of a performance bond is ‘to assure completion of the contract.’ ” U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 369 F.3d at 67 (<HOLDING>) (quoting Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371
holding that cleanup costs incurred pursuant to a consent decree were not incurred voluntarily and must be sought through a  113f contribution action holding that a surety has standing to sue for a progress payment released by the government after notification by the surety of unpaid subcontractors holding that there is no privity of contract between the government and a surety since the government is not a party to the agreement between the surety and the contractor the government never undertakes an obligation to the surety holding that bankruptcy court could not enter judgment for 7402564 under  107a for incurred costs when such costs had not been incurred holding that a surety must pay all the costs of completion not simply those incurred after a declaration of default