not overcome by violence or prevented by fear, retain his possession of it.” Id. at 272. The circumstances in Lake are sufficiently similar to those here so that Lake controls. Therefore, the third element is satisfied. The fourth element is not in dispute, and is clearly controlled by United States v. Applewhaite, 195 F.3d 679, 685 (3d Cir. 1999), where we held that the threatened or actual force at issue must be employed in furtherance of the taking of the car. The evidence here clearly establishes that it was. The fifth and final element is easily satisfied by the circumstances under which the car was stolen — the defendants insisted Tredway give them her keys in the course of a robbery and assault. See Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 8, 143 L. Ed. 2d 1, 119 S. Ct. 966 (1999) (<HOLDING>) We agree with the government. The record
holding that where congressional intent is clear a court must give effect to such intent holding that intent to carjack requires that defendant possessed intent to seriously harm or kill driver if necessary to steal car holding that accident does not include intentional act if insured acted with intent to harm and noting that intentional acts exclusion applies if insured acted with specific intent to harm holding that the evidence was insufficient to show intent to steal if the evidence showed only possession of the materials as a normal incident of employment holding that the relevant intent is not the intent to return ultimately but the intent to return to the united states within a relatively short period