an explosive in terms of its primary or common purpose, we hold that the Government need not show that a device is actually able to explode to prove that a defendant knowingly possessed an explosive under § 842(i)(l); it need only prove that the defendant knew he possessed dynamite or other chemical compound, mixture, or device that was primarily designed to function by explosion. Finally, Mr. Markey argues that because he believed in good faith that the dynamite could not explode, he should be exonerated. This contention appears to be one of ignorance of the law — “I thought the law applied differently than it does.” See United States v. Capps, 77 F.3d 350, 353 (10th Cir.1996). This type of argument is “easily rejected.” See United States v. Reed, 114 F.3d 1053, 1057 (10th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, evidence concerning Mr. Markey’s
holding that a claim is not moot where there is a viable damages claim holding that a good faith belief that a firearm is inoperable is not a viable defense to 18 usc  922g holding that good faith is a defense to the willful filing of false statements under 18 usc  1001 holding for the purposes of 18 usc  924e that being a felon in possession of a firearm is not a violent felony as defined in 18 usc  924e2b holding that the test for good faith is the actual belief of the party and not the reasonableness of that belief