of detective agencies engaged to guard the property of their employer’s clients, security guards have not been granted police powers by statute and therefore are not state agents in any traditional sense for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. See Huger, supra, 285 Md. at 353, 402 A.2d 880; Leach v. Penn-Mar Merchants Ass’n, 18 Md.App. 603, 610, 308 A.2d 446, cert, denied, 269 Md. 761 (1973). Without governmental powers, security guards are acting as private citizens when protecting property, and their private status is not altered because their interest in protecting property coincides with the public’s interest in preventing crime generally. The Attorney General of Maryland has also recognized that licensed security guards are not state agents. See 50 Op. Att’y Gen. 309 (1965) (<HOLDING>). See Stevenson v. State, 287 Md. 504, 413 A.2d
holding that employer could be subject to contribution claim based on the intentional tort exception to workers compensation immunity when there was evidence that employer had removed safety guards from printing presses had been warned of the dangers but refused to reinstall the guards disregarding safety notices about the machinery and had instructed employees to engage in dangerous practices holding that an employees private arbitration agreement with her employer precluded her from filing suit against the employer under the adea holding that since security guards act upon the authorization of their employer that authorization can be no broader than that which the employer possesses namely the authority of a private citizen holding that oncall security guard was covered under insurance policy requiring him to be on the business of the employer where among other factors the employer benefitted from the arrangement by reducing the number of guards who had actually to be on duty holding that glc 152 15 provides that the only party immune from suit under the statute is the direct employer a special employer is not immune because the special employer is not liable for the payment of workers compensation and there was no agreement between the direct employer and the special employer that the special employer would be liable for the payment of such compensation