turns on the district court’s incorrect view of the role of comparability. See supra. The district court did not, for example, find that the enumerated services New York provides as part of its personal-care services package were denied to the mentally disabled. Instead, appellees’ claim is that New York’s decision not to provide safety monitoring renders the providing of personal-care services ineffective for many who are mentally disabled. At its crux, the claim is that the provision of Medicaid-funded services to one group of disabled persons discriminated against other disabled persons who need different services. Appellees again fail to focus on the particular services provided by appellants. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 303, 105 S.Ct. 712, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985) (<HOLDING>). The ADA requires only that a particular
recognizing right to privacy in receipt of health care services to the extent consistent with providing adequate medical care and the safety and good order of the facility holding that the same standards apply to claims under the ada and under the rehabilitation act holding that medicaid benefits under the rehabilitation act and hence ada are the individual services offered not the amorphous objective of adequate health care  holding the ada and the rehabilitation act applicable holding that exemption under the ada does not preclude liability under the rehabilitation act