claims because they asserted or reasserted a federal basis for relief from his underlying conviction. In his brief, Mr. Haley focuses solely on the court’s ruling as to timeliness and not its determination that the claims were second or successive. Mindful of the deference we afford pro se pleadings,, see Van Deelen v. Johnson, 497 F.3d 1151, 1153 n. 1 (10th Cir.2007), we have carefully examined both motions and conclude they either in substance or effect assert or reassert a federal basis for relief from Mr. Haley’s underlying conviction. Reasonable jurists could not debate the correctness of the district court’s decision that the Rule 60(b) motions were subject to authorization under § 2255(h). See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 532 & n. 4, 125 S.Ct. 2641, 162 L.Ed.2d 480 (2005) (<HOLDING>). Because reasonable jurists could not debate
holding that a rule 60b motion that presents grounds entitling a petitioner to habeas corpus relief or seeks to add a new ground for relief requires authorization holding that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law holding that district court must resolve all claims for relief premised on alleged constitutional violations which are raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus whether habeas relief is granted or denied holding that rule 60b bars sua sponte relief holding attorneys failure to object does not warrant rule 60b relief