Rule 60(b)”). We have said repeatedly that Rule 60(b) is not a substitute for an appeal or a timely motion under Rule 59(e), and cannot serve to resurrect arguments that were available before the time for filing an appeal expired. See, e.g., Tango Music, LLC v. DeadQuick Music, Inc., 348 F.3d 244, 247 (7th Cir.2003); Bell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 214 F.3d 798, 801 (7th Cir.2000). Eyiowuawi does not dispute that he learned about the dismissal shortly after the decision was announced, but he did not act promptly to seek our review of that ruling. We cannot review it now, and Eyiowuawi offers no other basis for disagreeing with the district court’s exercise of discretion in denying his Rule 60(b) motion. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Al Salvi for Senate Comm., 205 F.3d 1015 (7th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Dickerson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ford Heights,
holding dismissal for failure to comply with rule 8 was dismissal of entire action which was appealable final order recognizing that a district courts dismissal of an independent action under rule 60b is reviewed for abuse of discretion holding district courts dismissal following explicit and reasonable warning was not an abuse of discretion recognizing that propriety of dismissal without warning for failure to prosecute although abuse of discretion and grounds for appeal was not basis for overturning denial of motion under rule 60b to set aside dismissal holding that the trial courts denial of a motion to set aside the verdict for insufficient evidence is reviewable only for abuse of discretion