because each death sentence remains supported by at least one remaining statutory aggravating circumstance. See Tate v. State, 287 Ga. 364, 368 (7) (695 SE2d 591) (2010) (citing Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862 (103 SCt 2733, 77 LE2d 235) (1983)); Lance, 275 Ga. at 23 (25). 15. Martin argues that the trial court’s sentencing phase jury instructions on mitigating circumstances were improper in several ways. This matter has been waived for ordinary appellate purposes, because Martin requested these jury instructions, which were drawn from the pattern jury charges. See OCGA § 17-8-58 (applicable to trials occurring on or after July 1, 2007, and providing for “plain error” review where a jury charge was not objected to at trial); Pena v. State, 297 Ga. 418, 424 (6) (a) (774 SE2d 652) (2015) (<HOLDING>). However, pretermitting the question of the
holding trial courts error in overruling objection to prosecutors misstatement of law of intoxication that differed from definition in charge was harmless when there was evidence supporting the jurys verdict and it was presumed the jury followed the instructions in the charge holding that the defendants motion in limine which sought to exclude the evidence to which the defendant later made a general objection at trial adequately provided the context for determining the specific ground of objection holding that trial court did not err in refusing to give charge because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his requested charge was tailored to the evidence holding that the plain error review provided for in ocga  17858 is waived where the defendant requested the charge in question and made no objection to the charge at trial holding that a noticebased objection to a motion to amend an indictment to charge the defendant as a habitual offender is waived if the defendant fails to make a specific and contemporaneous objection