influence the selection of issues — is the sort of event to which [amended § 2255] would ‘attach new legal consequences.’ ” Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 866 (7th Cir.1996) (en banc), cert. granted in part, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 726, 136 L.Ed.2d 643 (1997). Accordingly, because § 2255 movants must be afforded both notice as well as a reasonable opportunity to secure review of important legal interests, this Court holds that petitioners have one year within which to file a motion to vacate from the later of the effective date of the Act, the date upon which conviction becomes final, the date upon which a novel (and retroactive) rule of law is announced by the Supreme Court, or the date upon which other grounds for relief become or should have been known. See Simmonds, 111 F.3d at 746 (<HOLDING>); Lindh, 96 F.3d at 866 (“reliance interests
holding that prisoners whose convictions became final on or before april 24 1996 must file their  2255 motions before april 24 1997 holding that the oneyear statute of limitations under the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act aedpa begins to run on the date a prisoner dismisses his direct appeal because his conviction is then final holding that  2254 petitions of prisoners whose convictions became final before the passage of the aedpa are timely if filed within one year from the aedpas effective date holding that the oneyear statute of limitations for filing a habeas petition under the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act of 1996 is not jurisdictional holding that  2255s one year limitations period is also a reasonable time for prisoners to bring  2255 motions whose convictions became final before the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act took effect