instruction on terroristic threats was sufficient. We agree. Although the charge of terroristic threats is not meant to encompass verbal threats expressing transitory anger without intent to terrorize, there is no authority for Dick’s contention that failure to include that language in a jury instruction is reversible error. See State v. Jones, 451 N.W.2d 55, 63 (Minn.App.1990), review denied (Minn. Feb. 21, 1990). The district court properly instructed the jury on the elements of ter-roristic threats, including instructions on the meaning of “intent” and “reckless disregard” and permitted Dick’s counsel to argue transitory anger. The court did not abuse its discretion by denying the proposed instruction on transitory anger. See State v. Lavastida, 366 N.W.2d 677, 680 (Minn.App.1985) (<HOLDING>). IV. Sentencing Dick agrees that the Minnesota
holding that instructions for terroristic threats were proper even though the court failed to instruct on transitory anger holding that when three distinct threats were made  2a61b2 was properly applied even though there were only two mailings holding that the district courts failure to instruct the jury as to the proper standard of proof constituted plain error holding that the failure to instruct on a definition or to amplify an element is not a failure to instruct on an essential element holding that the court properly refused to instruct on an issue for which no evidence was offered