commentary to section 4A1.2 defines “prior sentence” as “a sentence imposed pri- or to sentencing on the instant offense, other than a sentence for conduct that is part of the instant offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, comment. (n.l). Here, Appellant’s state court sentence was imposed in April of 1993, prior to his August 30, 1993, sentencing on the instant offense. Whether his conduct in selling cocaine qualifies as conduct that was part of the instant offense presents an issue of first impression in this circuit. Other circuit courts of appeal that have considered the issue have decided the appropriate inquiry is whether the “prior sentence” and the instant offense involve conduct that is severable into two distinct offenses. See, e.g., U.S. v. Beddow, 957 F.2d 1330, 1338-39 (6th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); U.S. v. Banashefski, 928 F.2d 349 (10th
recognizing money laundering as a predicate act under rico recognizing that deadly weapon finding may be made even when weapon used is unknown holding that venue did not he in virginia for money laundering that occurred in florida de spite the fact that the money was embezzled in virginia holding that defendants state conviction for carrying a concealed weapon was not part of the instant federal money laundering offense even though the concealed weapon was found at the time of defendants arrest for attempting to carry out money laundering scheme holding that rule 3702d12 does not apply to convictions for possession of firearm and carrying concealed weapon when unrelated to commission of any additional substantive offenses