"so inextricably intertwined ... that [the] right to counsel for the pending charge cannot ... constitutionally be isolated from [the] right for [the] uncharged offense.” Petr’s Mem. at 6 (citing United States v. Hines, 963 F.2d 255 (9th Cir.1992)). This narrow exception does not apply to this case, which involves two completely separate and unrelated offenses, one minor, one serious, committed at different times in different places, with only the same defendant in common between them. See Hines, 963 F.2d at 257-58 (declining to apply exception to general rule that the Sixth Amendment is offense-specific, because "[although [the uncharged offense involved] the same offense, the place, time, and persons were all different”); United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 743-44 (5th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Whatever the precise contours of this
holding that mere possession of a dangerous weapon is insufficient to support a charge of robbery with a dangerous weapon holding unlawful possession of any unregistered firearm involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another will occur holding that armed robbery suspect was entitled to bail hearing even though armed robbery was considered capital offense under mississippi law because maximum sentence was life imprisonment holding that in a prosecution for possession of an unregistered firearm evidence of an armed robbery committed with the firearm was admissible holding that exception did not apply to uncharged federal offense of unlawful possession of unregistered firearm even though defendant already had pending state charge of armed robbery involving the same weapon