135 S.Ct. 1318, 1324, 191 L.Ed.2d 253 (2015) clarified liability for statements of opinion under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933. It maintained that "a sincere statement of pure opinion is not an 'untrue statement of material fact,' regardless whether an investor can ultimately prove the belief wrong.” Id. at 1327. But, if a statement "omits material facts about the issuer's inquiry into or knowledge concerning a statement of opinion, and if those facts conflict with what a reasonable investor would take from the statement itself,” than the omission creates liability. Id. at 1329. Although addressing claims under section 11 of the Securities Act, Omnicare's analysis may also bear on claims dealing with opinions brought under section 10(b). See City of Omaha, 679 F.3d at 67-68
holding that claims brought under section 10b of the securities exchange act and rico claims were arbitrable holding that claims under  10b of the securities exchange act of 1934 were arbitrable under a predispute arbitration agreement holding that claims under the securities act of 1934 and the rico statutes are arbitrable holding that the same reasoning regarding opinions that is used under sections 11 and 12 of the securities act of 1933 applies to claims under sections 10b and 20a of the 1934 act as these claims all share a material misstatement or omission element holding that claims under the securities act of 1933 are arbitrable