various policymaking county officials who “combined to create an official County policy of illegal retaliation against plaintiffs based on racial motivations.” See Plaintiffs’ Opposing Memorandum, pg. 21. In plaintiffs view, evidence of this retaliatory policy is established primarily by initially awarding the GPP contract to another vendor (although plaintiffs were ultimately awarded the contract), ordering minuscule amounts of the product, and a derogatory statement made by Rodriguez, an individual who is not even a party to this case. These incidents, however, fail to constitute a custom or policy of retaliation “so permanent and well settled ... with the force of law.” See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, supra. See e.g., Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439, 443 (5th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, plaintiffs fail to present any
holding that two separate incidents of rape were perpetrated against the same victim where an appreciable period of time elapsed between the incidents and intervening events occurred during the interim holding that a dozen racial incidents over a two and one half year period were too few to constitute a custom with the force of law holding that five alleged incidents in four years were too few too separate in time and too mild  to create an abusive working environment holding that two incidents of alleged excessive force are insufficient to show policy or custom holding that only two overtly racial comments and one arguably racial remark over the course of the plaintiffs eight years of employment did not constitute pervasive conduct