contractual rights that could be protected by the Due Process Clause. Matsuda, 378 F.Supp.2d at 1258. Because we have already concluded that the district court’s application of the reserved powers doctrine was in error, we remand to the district court to reconsider the Lessees’ due process claim once it has determined whether the Lessees had any contractual rights that could give rise to a protected property interest. We express no opinion as to whether any property interests potentially arising from the Lessees’ contracts could meet the “exceedingly high” burden our Due Process jurisprudence imposes. Furthermore, we express no opinion as to whether our decision in Amnendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir.1996) (en banc), precludes the Lessees from 2, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, because we conclude that the
recognizing  1983 substantive due process claim holding that the court of federal claims had jurisdiction to decide an alleged due process violation related to his claim for damages under a moneymandating statute recognizing that an officers forcible rape of a woman violates her substantive due process rights holding that mere neglect for prisoners safety does not amount to a substantive due process violation implying that intent to do harm would be an abuse of government power and amount to a substantive due process violation recognizing a plaintiffs  1988 claim predicated on an alleged violation of his substantive due process rights