assumed the existence of a uniform body of substantive maritime law applicable throughout the county.”). Indeed, courts have observed repeatedly that maritime law is federal law. See e.g. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A v. Calhoun, — U.S. -, - n. 8, 116 S.Ct. 619, 626 n. 8, 133 L.Ed.2d 578 (1996) (referring to “[t]he federal cast of admiralty law”); Tullier v. Halliburton Geophysical Svcs., Inc. et al., 81 F.3d 552, 553 n. 1 (5th Cir.1996) (referring to “federal maritime law”); Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 59 F.3d 1496, 1513 (5th Cir.1995) (referring to need for uniformity within “federal admiralty law’). Moreover, since the enactment of Rule 4(k)(2), several district courts have recognized its applicability to admiralty cases. See e.g. United Trading Co., 1996 WL 374154, at *3-*4 (<HOLDING>); Nissho Iwai Corp. v. M/V Star Sapphire et
holding that claims arising under admiralty law do fall within rule 4k2 rubric and criticizing district court in world tanker for its narrow reading of rule 4k2 holding that rule 4k2 does apply to admiralty cases holding that claims arising under the sixth amendment fall outside the jurisdiction of the court of federal claims holding that a party need not make a specific reference to rule 9h to fall under admiralty jurisdiction holding that courts apply substantive admiralty law to claims that sound in admiralty regardless of whether the complaint invokes diversity or admiralty jurisdiction