as levied by the government, with debts which are “obligations ... founded upon contract, express or implied”). Under recent caselaw, however, not all statutorily-created assessments have automatically been deemed involuntary. See Lorber, 675 F.2d at 1066-67 (Voluntariness does not depend on the debtor’s motivation, but on the “inherent characteristics of the charges”.); In re Belozer Farms, Inc., 199 B.R. 720, 724 (9th Cir. BAP 1996) (noting that the contractual-versus-statutory distinction has not been followed by all courts and concluding that “the simple fact that an assessment is authorized by statute does not require a finding that it is ‘involuntary'”); In re S.N.A. Nut Co., 188 B.R. 392, 395 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1995) (citing In re Jenny Lynn Mining, 780 F.2d 585 (6th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>), as examples of “courts under the [Bankruptcy]
holding that  charges should be given more precise content by taxes and fees  holding that plaintiff explained why statements were fraudulent where the complaint alleged that defendants statements requested port fees and customs taxes  but no such fees or taxes were due holding petitioner could not deduct real estate taxes imposed on property he did not own because these taxes were not imposed on him holding that permit fees imposed by statute were not taxes holding that permit fee assessments required by statute are not taxes under the code