He points to a lack of complaints about his behavior while in pre-trial custody and contends the court incorrectly acquiesced to jail policy rather than considering the circumstances unique to his case. ¶ 29 Although a defendant generally has the right to be free from restraints in the courtroom, the court may order their use if, in the court’s discretion, the restraints are needed for courtroom security and safety. State v. Cruz, 218 Ariz. 149, 168 ¶¶ 118— 19, 181 P.3d 196, 215 (2008). But the court “must have grounds for ordering restraints and should not simply defer to the prosecutor’s request, a sheriffs department’s policy, or security personnel’s preference for the use of restraints.” Id. ¶ 119; cf. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 633, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953 (2005) (<HOLDING>). The type of restraints used should be
holding that the penalty is applicable holding that the sixth amendment right of confrontation applies to all three phases of the capital trial and that the admission of  hearsay statements of codefendants in the penalty phase violated the confrontation clause recognizing the unique and irrevocable nature of the death penalty and    the consequently overarching need for reliability in the imposition of such a penalty holding a state may use visible restraints in the guilt or penalty phases only if a special need for them exists holding that the confrontation clause applies through the finding of guilt but not to sentencing even when that sentence is the death penalty