” Anderson v. Cagle’s, Inc., 488 F.3d at 953 (citing White v. Osmose, Inc., 204 F.Supp.2d 1309, 1314 (M.D.Ala.2002)). Decertification is proper if “the action relates to specific circumstances personal to the plaintiff rather than any generally applicable policy or practice.” Mahoney, 2011 WL 4458513, at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Burt v. Manville Sales Corp., 116 F.R.D. 276, 277 (D.Colo.1987)). In fact, “the more material distinctions revealed by the evidence, the more likely the district court is to decertify the collective action.” Anderson v. Cagle’s, Inc., 488 F.3d at 953. Nevertheless, the Court is mindful that the FLSA is a remedial statute, and should be construed broadly. See, e.g., Reich v. Circle C. Investments, Inc., 998 F.2d 324, 329 (5th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Prickett v. DeKalb Cnty., 349 F.3d 1294, 1296
recognizing market and societal costs resulting from wrongdoing and avoidance of unjust enrichment as remedial purposes recognizing the remedial purposes of the wvccpa and the liberal construction we have historically afforded this act recognizing repayment of damages to society as remedial recognizing flsas remedial purposes recognizing that cjonsistent with the remedial purposes of the ada a charge of employment discrimination must be construed with the utmost liberality 