discretion to revisit Judge Johnson’s order, but this is not to say that district courts should take lightly reconsideration of the orders of their colleagues. As the D.C. Circuit has stated, “[i]nconsis-tency is the antithesis of the rule of law. For judges, the most basic principle of jurisprudence is that we must act alike in all ease of like nature.” LaShaum v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1393 (D.C.Cir.1996) (noting that the law of the case doctrine helps implement this principle). Thus, although Judge Johnson’s order is not “subject to” the law of the case doctrine, Langevine, 106 F.3d at 1020, nothing prevents the court from applying the rationales of that doctrine to guide a Rule 54(b) decision. Virgin Atlantic Airways v. National Mediation Board, 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); c†. Lan-gevine, 106 F.3d at 1023-24 (quoting
holding that even if rule 54b allows parties to request district courts to revisit earlier rulings the moving party must do so within the strictures of the law of the case doctrine holding that a court may deny leave to amend when the moving party had the opportunity to amend earlier but waited after judgment to do so recognizing that the burden on summary judgment shifts to the nonmoving party once the moving party has met its initial responsibility of showing the absence of a triable issue of fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case holding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the commonwealth resulted from a mistaken view of the law by earlier courts recognizing that an appellant seeking to establish that the district court abused its discretion must do so by a discussion of facts arguments and rulings that appear in the record