is certainly appropriate given the determination that the order was a nonfinal order based on the trial court’s failure to determine the amount of compensation due the employee. Similarly, in this case, we must conclude that, in spite of the attempted Rule 54(b) certification, the trial court’s failure to determine benefits due after it had determined Hester’s injury to be com-pensable rendered the order insufficiently final to support an appeal. Therefore, the appeal is due to be dismissed. Further, we note that § 25-5-88, Ala. Code 1975, provides that a final judgment in a workers’ compensation case “shall contain a statement of the law and facts and conclusions as determined by [the trial] judge.” See also Johnson v. Harbison-Walker Refractories Co., 847 So.2d 377 (Ala.Civ.App.2002)(<HOLDING>). The trial court’s order in this case contains
holding that a trial courts judgment must comply with the statutory requirement that the judgment contain written findings of fact and conclusions of law holding that appellate deadlines are not extended by request for findings of fact and conclusions of law following summary judgment because they have no place in a summary judgment proceeding holding that findings of fact and legal conclusions are neither necessary nor proper in summary judgment proceeding holding that the trial courts oral expression in open court of its future intention to render a judgment was not itself a judgment but rather the trial courts written findings of fact and conclusions of law were its judgment holding that motion accepting judgment but requesting findings of fact and conclusions of law was not directed against the judgment