the liberty of a person.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1871 n. 10,104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). The question of the reasonableness of Armstrong’s conduct has not been fully briefed by the parties, because of the defendants’ sole reliance upon immunity in their motion for summary judgment, and we therefore pretermit further consideration of this issue. However, while the conduct alleged in Ms. Newton’s affidavit may amount to an assault, or to a violation of her constitutional rights, it does not follow that the same conduct necessarily constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct sufficient to support an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Surrency v. Harbison, 489 So.2d 1097, 1104-06 (Ala.1986) (<HOLDING>). Our supreme court has often emphasized that
holding that an assault claim was for a jury to decide while affirming the direction of a verdict on an outrage claim holding that any error in directing verdict for defendant on plaintiffs claim for conspiracy to defraud was harmless given that jury ultimately rejected underlying fraud claim holding courts attempt to recognize actual jury verdict was improper in wake of landgraf but affirming judgment on basis of courts own findings of fact and conclusions of law holding the defendants claim that he was denied the right to testify was appropriate for direct review when the record was adequately developed to permit full consideration of the defendants claim the pertinent facts were undisputed a pcr hearing was not necessary to resolve a factual dispute and would not aid in the application of the law and the defendants claim was presented not as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim but rather as an error committed by the trial court in excluding the defendants testimony which was not an appropriate basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim holding that district court could not decide after jury returned verdict to treat jury verdict as advisory on issue not triable of right by jury but which was tried by consent of parties to nonadvisory jury