of law. C. The Appropriate Remedy There remains the issue of whether vacating the consent decree is the proper course of action, or whether modifying it in some other way is more appropriate at this time. In Rufo, 502 U.S. at 391, 112 S.Ct. 748, the Court held that “[a] proposed modification should not strive to rewrite a consent decree so that it conforms to the constitutional floor.” Instead, “[o]nce a court has determined that changed circumstances warrant a modification in a consent decree, the focus should be on whether the proposed modification is tailored to resolve the problems created by the change in circumstances.” Id. The court should “do no more” because “a consent decree is a final judgment;” however, “[w]ithin these constra 53, 81 S.Ct. 368, 5 L.Ed.2d 349 (1961) (<HOLDING>); Evans v. City of Chicago, 10 F.3d 474, 475
holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because there was no  consent decree left to be terminated holding that a consent decree should be vacated under rule 60b in light of amendments to the railway labor act holding that where the action was filed as a class action and a consent decree was entered into entry of the consent decree was sufficient certification of the action as a class action under rule 23 holding that defenses under rule 60b may be waived holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because the challenged provisions of the decree had expired