who were sentenced for offenses which occurred after the effective date of the 2002 amendment to the SRA. Varga, 151 Wn.2d at 187. Our task was to determine whether, following the 2002 amendment to the SRA, it was proper for the sentencing judges to include convictions which would have washed out based upon prior statutes and court opinions. Id. We interpreted the 2002 amendment to the SRA as a clear expression from the legislature within the statute itself to redefine “criminal history” to be applied prospectively rather than retrospectively. Id. at 191, 193. In Varga, we stated, “[h]ere endment does not apply retroactively to revive defendant’s 1975 offense that washed out under former version of the SRA); see In re Pers. Restraint of Williams, 111 Wn.2d 353, 361, 759 P.2d 436 (1988) (<HOLDING>); cf. State v. Dunaway, 109 Wn.2d 207, 216, 743
holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the courts decision during which time congress could have repealed the provision holding 1986 sra amendment to wash out provision which took effect after defendants sentencing not applicable holding the sixth amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment holding to the same effect holding that plan amendment which took effect after benefits were received was inapplicable