witness, he was precise in his answers, and he jousted with the defense attorney during the course of his examination. The Attorney General went on to testify: “We expect that persons are going to come in and tell the truth.... That just plain didn’t happen in the Sanders case. Mr. Storeh was a person who lied about his credibility, and it was a serious risk to the judicial system.” In sum, Storeh perjured himself multiple times at Maxwell’s trial and employed a signature method to “book” fellow inmates. Furthermore, Storeh had a chronic pattern of dishonesty that both predated and followed Maxwell’s trial. The evidence of Storch’s later lies under oath does not establish the nature of his testimony at Maxwell’s trial, but it remains relevant. It demonstrates a willingness to com 2003) (<HOLDING>); Bradley v. Duncan, 315 F.3d 1091, 1094 (9th
holding that the state courts rejection of the petitioners ineffective assistance of counsel claim was an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence before the state court holding that the state courts decision to uphold the parole boards denial of parole was an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence holding that the postconviction court erred in finding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim proeedurally barred because the courts opinion did not comment specifically on the ineffective counsel argument and the overall holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jurys verdict could not be viewed as an adjudication on the merits of the ineffective assistance claim holding that the petitioners failure to raise his ineffective assistance of counsel claim before the bia deprived the district court of jurisdiction to hear the issue holding that a state courts rejection of petitioners habeas claim was unreasonable under  2254d2 where the court made credibility determinations on the basis of a paper record without an evidentiary hearing