found in Torres’s home and car. The inference that Torres used these telephones is reasonably based on the record. See id. at 462 (noting that a prosecutor may “ask the jury to draw inferences from the evidence that the prosecutor believes in good faith might be true” (quoting United States v. Blueford, 312 F.3d 962, 968 (9th Cir.2002))). Second, even if the prosecutor elicited incorrect testimony that Torres was the registered owner of the car he drove to the January 21 drug deal and misstated during closing arguments that Torres “shows up to all these drug deals driving cars registered in his name, using phones subscribed in his name,” those errors do not require reversal because Torres has not established prejudice. See United States v. Smith, 962 F.2d 923, 935 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). 3. The record contained sufficient evidence
holding that even if a trial court errs in a ruling on the admissibility of evidence we will reverse only if the error is inconsistent with substantial justice and that the error was harmless holding that we may reverse a conviction under plain error only if the prosecutors improper conduct so affected the jurys ability to consider the totality of the evidence fairly that it tainted the verdict and deprived the defendant of a fair trial recognizing that even if the prosecutor engaged in improper conduct we must reexamine the improper remark in light of the entire record to determine whether the remark deprived the defendant of a fair trial holding that even if a defendant is able to show that there was a plain error that affected his substantial rights a court of appeals is not required to reverse a conviction unless it finds that the error seriously affected the fairness integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings holding that the prosecutors request that the jury send a message to the community was improper in the guilt phase of the trial but was not so flagrantly improper as to constitute plain error