depending on the person to whom it is applied. That is, as applied to the official who is legislatively empowered, it does not prevent a ruling that the individual has final policy-making authority; as applied to a subordinate to whom that policymaker delegates her authority, however, it precludes a ruling that the subordinate has final authority- This interpretation, however, avoids reading Praprotnik as internally contradictory, a far more unusual result. Moreover, this understanding is better able to comply with the policy underlying municipal liability which seeks to hold the muniei-pality accountable for the conduct of those whose acts may fairly be said to be those of the municipality. Brown, 520 U.S. at 403-4 10th Cir.1989) rev’d on other grounds 928 F.2d 920(10th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). When a subordinate has only delegated
holding that under praprotnik city manager had final policymaking authority regarding personnel decision despite city charters command that all personnel decisions be made according to merit and fitness holding that a city manager was the final policymaker for purposes of section 1983 liability because of provisions in the norfolk city code requiring that all orders rules and regulations applicable to the entire police department must be approved by the city manager other than some police standard operating procedures holding that a jurys finding that a city had delegated its final policymaking authority in the area of law enforcement to a city police chief was supported by the evidence and warranted imposing liability upon the city holding that director of the police department is not a final policymaking official because his decisions are constrained by the county manager the board and administrative order and polices holding that under praprotnik a town charters directive that city managers personnel decisions be based on merit and fitness did not preclude city managers final policymaking authority where no other town officials were empowered to enforce that provision