substantive evidence. Judge Friedman, however, believed that it went too far to characterize a meeting solely for purposes of deliberation and decision as a hearing. In this regard, she distinguished the decisions relied on by the common pleas court as involving the presentation of oral argument, which was forbidden at the October 22 meeting in this case. See Wistuk, 887 A.2d at 350 (Friedman, J., dissenting) (“Because the Board’s October 22, 2003, meeting clearly was not scheduled for the equivalent purpose of the oral arguments allowed in Hogan and Gaster, I believe the trial court’s reliance on those cases is misplaced.”). In support of her conclusion, Judge Friedman referenced South Lebanon Township Zoning Hearing Board v. Weber, 140 Pa.Cmwlth. 177, 180-81, 592 A.2d 127, 129 (1991) (<HOLDING>), and Quality Food Markets, Inc. v. Zoning
holding that a mere writ does not serve as notice to a health care provider that a claim might qualify for section 715 coverage for purposes of section 715s requirement of notice to the department see supra note 2 holding that the defendants evidence did not qualify as newly discovered evidence holding that a meeting to announce deliberations did not qualify as a hearing for purposes of section 9089 holding that an entity may qualify as a state agency for some purposes while being classified as a local agency for other purposes holding states are not persons for the purposes of section 1983