behavior beyond simple assault alone for the purposes of § 111. Chestaro does not describe the proper construction of simple assault for the purposes of § 113. Moreover, it is best read as necessarily implying that the broad category of simple assault in both §§ 111 and 113 subsumes both common-law assault and common-law battery. Finally, we note that our conclusion is in accord with the decisions of several of our sister Circuits interpreting simple assault, as used in § 113(a)(5), to encompass completed common-law battery which, as noted above, does not require a specific intent to injure. See United States v. Lewellyn, 481 F.3d 695, 697-99 (9th Cir.2007) (concluding that simple assault includes spitting on another); United States v. Whitefeather, 275 F.3d 741, 742-43 (8th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Bayes, 210 F.3d 64, 68-69
holding that failure to give lesserincluded charge of simple assault as lesserincluded offense of aggravated assault on police officer was reversible error holding that punching another person is a statutory assault holding simple assault is a lesser included offense of recklessly endangering another person holding that expenses includes costs holding that simple assault includes urinating on another