for the purposes of a § 1985 claim. See United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 837, 103 S.Ct. 3352, 3360, 77 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1983) (stating that “we find no convincing support in the legislative history for the proposition that [§ 1985(3) ] was intended to reach conspiracies motivated by bias towards others on account of their economic views, status, or activities”); see also Trautz v. Weisman, 819 F.Supp. 282, 290-91 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (noting that “courts have held that protection under § 1985(3) extends to the ‘discrete and insular’ minorities who receive special protection under the equal protection clause because of inherent personal characteristics”); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1291, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973) (<HOLDING>); cf. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323, 100
holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection holding that the cap does not violate equal protection holding that at least where wealth is concerned the equal protection clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages holding that the state law violated equal protection principles holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause