within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment,” Sullivan, 508 U. S., at 280, certainly altered the understanding of the significance of such an error. Insofar as the majority means to suggest that a rule may be sufficiently “new” that it does not apply retroactively but not “new enough” to qualify for the watershed exception, I note only that the cases establishing this exception suggest no such requirement. Rather than focus on the “degree of newness” of a new rule, these decisions. emphasize that watershed rules are those that form part of the fundamental requirements of due process. See Teague, 489 U. S., at 311-312 (plurality opinion); Mackey, 401 U. S., at 693-694 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part); cf. O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U. S. 151, 167 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U. S. 383, 396 (1994)
holding that our standard of review for decisions of the health care authority board  predecessor to the division  is very narrow and that we will not disturb the boards statutory interpretations absent a compelling indication of error internal quotation marks and citations omitted holding that beneficiary of general support trust has a legal right to compel distribution of funds internal quotation marks omitted holding that narrow right of rebuttal established by simmons v south carolina 512 u s 154 1994 has hardly altered our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding internal quotation marks omitted emphasis in original recognizing that the declaratory judgment act is only procedural and does not create substantive rights internal quotation marks and citations omitted holding that the test of competency is whether he the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding  and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him internal quotation marks omitted