even when faced with a second motion to dismiss, Ms. Moseley neither timely responded nor sought an opportunity to cure the alleged deficiencies in her amended complaint. Thus, although the district court could have disposed of this case more efficiently by ruling on the second motion to dismiss before, for example, ordering and setting a date for mediation, Ms. Moseley’s failure to pursue her own rights by timely responding to Carnival’s second motion to dismiss forecloses any conclusion that she was prejudiced by the court’s docket management. For this same reason, we conclude the district court’s decision to dismiss Ms. Moseley’s claim with prejudice did not amount to an abuse of discretion. See Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th Cir.2002) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). III. For the reasons set forth above, we
holding that dismissal with leave to amend should be granted even if no request to amend was made holding the district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff who is represented by counsel never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court holding that denial of leave to amend was appropriate because the plaintiff sought to amend his complaint two years after filing his complaint  on the eve of trial when discovery was complete holding that when a district court expressly grants leave to amend it is plain that the order is not final holding that dismissal with leave to amend is not a final order