934, 937 (Tex.1972). The requisites of promissory estoppel in Texas are (1) a promise, (2) foreseeability of reliance thereon by the promisor, and (3) substantial reliance by the promisee to his detriment. English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex.1983). For the same reasons Appellants lack standing to assert a breach of contract cause of action, they likewise lack standing to assert a promissory estoppel cause of action. The summary judgment evidence conclusively establishes that Vantage did not make any promise to Appellants; Appellants do not dispute this, but claim only that Vantage made a promise to SFWA. In short, Appellants are not “promisees” who can assert the independent claim of promissory estoppel against Vantage. See, e.g., Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93, 97 (Tex.1965) (<HOLDING>); see also O’Connor’s Texas Causes of Action
holding that proof that a promise was not kept alone is insufficient to make out a claim of promissory fraud since there is no proof that the defendants made the promise never intending to keep it holding that an admission from the promisor that he lacked intent to form a contract by his promise could provide clear and convincing evidence sufficient to support a jury verdict in favor of a plaintiff on a promissory fraud claim holding evidence legally sufficient under sections d and e holding evidence legally sufficient recognizing promissory estop pel theory may be invoked when promisee obtains promise from promisor that is less than a legally sufficient contract