not to exceed two (2) stories in height, or tri-level single[-]family dwelling and a private garage not to exceed one (1) story in height for not more than three (3) cars. (Emphasis added.) ¶ 13 Neither party to this action requested that t a contract between the property owners as a whole and each individual property owner and that the interpretation of the Restrictions presents a question of law, we review the trial court’s interpretation of the Restrictions de novo. Tezak, 177 Ariz. at 448, 868 P.2d at 1081. The Hortons took possession of Lot 1 with both actual and constructive knowledge of the Restrictions, and are therefore entitled to enforce the contractual obligations contained therein. See O’Malley v. Cent. Methodist Church, 67 Ariz. 245, 250-51, 194 P.2d 444, 448 (1948) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 15 By dismissing the Hortons’ complaint and
recognizing that commonplan restrictive covenants are enforceable by any grantee as against any other upon the theory that there is a mutuality of covenant and consideration which binds each and gives to each the appropriate remedy quoting korn v campbell 192 ny 490 85 ne 687 689 1908 holding that a contract need not have mutuality of obligation as long as it is supported by consideration holding that where covenant contained in each deed and contract to purchase lot in development provided that purchaser covenanted to pay developer and its successors 20 each year for general maintenance that covenant remained in force until stated date and that it should be automatically renewed for each tenyear period thereafter unless owners of at least twothirds of lots agreed in writing to change or abrogate it covenant was not invalid on theory that it imposed perpetual obligation incapable of abrogation holding that state courts may not enforce racially restrictive covenants holding that the restrictive covenants at issue are unenforceable as a matter of public policy