11(c)(2)(A). Moreover, “[b]ecause Rule 11 sanctions should be imposed with caution,” Knipe v. Skinner, 19 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir.1994) (citing Rodick v. City of Schenectady, 1 F.3d 1341, 1351 (2d Cir.1993)), the district court is afforded discretion in determining whether to impose sanctions for sanctionable conduct. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 11(c). In exercising this discretion, courts should “bear in mind that sanctions are not intended to ‘ehill an attorney’s creative, imaginative or enthusiastic advocacy on his client’s behalf.’ ” Magnotta v. Berry, No. 91 CV 0531, 1996 WL 11238, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5,1996) (quoting Kraemer Export Corp. v. Peg Perego U.S.A., Inc., No. 93 CV 0198, 1994 WL 86357, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.17, 1994)). But cf, Levine v. F.D.I.C., 2 F.3d 476, 479 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Here, certain aspects of defendants’ motion
holding the record did not contain enough facts to determine whether the statute was constitutional as applied to the particular facts and circumstances of the case holding because an award of attorney fees is discretionary court may consider attorney fees in relation to the underlying equities in the case holding that the creativity of an attorney may not transcend the facts of a given case holding that an order imposing sanctions against an attorney for one of the parties in a pending case is final and therefore immediately appealable by the attorney holding that the issue of waiver requires an analysis of the specific facts in each case