deciding whether appellant was intoxicated. See Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 8; Speer, 890 S.W.2d at 90. The record reflects that, although Officer Green agreed that he did not know whether “it was him being normal or him being intoxicated,” because he had no prior contact with appellant, the officer refused to go so far as to agree that appellant could have been either “intoxicated” or “normal.” No law, however, requires that an officer have prior contact with a defendant. Prior knowledge of the defendant’s normal state is not a prerequisite to testimony by an officer that he believed that the defendant was intoxicated. See Railsback v. State, 95 S.W.3d 473, 484 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd); see also Massie v. State, 744 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1988, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>). Finally, the question whether station-house
holding that where a patient is in possession of his faculties and in such physical health as to be able to consult about his condition and where no emergency exists making it impracticable to confer with him his consent is a prerequisite to a surgical operation by his physician holding that the question presented is whether he adduced sufficient evidence from which a factfinder reasonably could conclude that the nature and severity of his injury significantly restricted his ability to walk as compared with an average person in the general population holding that where the appellant remained at the scene rendered aid and gave his name to the police the evidence was insufficient to convict him under section 3742 even though the appellant initially lied about his involvement in the accident holding that if evidence exists that appellant could not use his faculties on the occasion in question in the manner in which the normal nonintoxicated person would be able to use his faculties the evidence is sufficient to convict  holding that the amendment was a use regulation which was in effect a condition on the use of property in the affected zone