of personnel actions will not defeat the employer’s summary judgment motions.”) Stadmeyer’s occasional comments to To-massi regarding retirement and whether she could keep up with the workload are comparable to, if not less offensive than, comments that have been held previously to be stray remarks. For example, a plant manager’s statements that the work force “was older, had been around too long, made too much money and enjoyed too many benefits” and that the company needed “new young people” was not enough to overcome the employer’s articulation of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employee’s discharge. Woroski v. Nashua Corp., 31 F.3d 105, 110 (2d Cir.1994); See also, Spence v. Maryland Casualty, 803 F.Supp. 649 (S.D.N.Y.1992), aff'd. 995 F.2d 1147 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Seltzer, 356 F.Supp.2d at 298 (finding
holding over recognizing that enhancement requires control over a participant in the scheme not only control over the scheme itself holding over the hill to be stray remark holding that the superior court had no jurisdiction over the division of marital property when the district court had properly invoked jurisdiction over the property holding that a consent order purporting to exert jurisdiction over nonestate property cannot be utilized to support a finding of subject matter jurisdiction over claims that otherwise could not be heard in bankruptcy court