458 U.S. at 186 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3034; see also Lillbask, 397 F.3d at 85 (citation omitted). The second factor requires that “a reasonable expectation of repetition” must be “more than a theoretical possibility.” B.J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. State Educ. Dep’t/Univ. of the State of N.Y., 815 F.Supp.2d 601, 612 (W.D.N.Y.2011) (quotation omitted). “Mere speculation that the parties will be involved in a dispute over the same issues does not rise to the level of a reasonable expectation or demonstrated probability of recurrence.” Dennin v. Conn. Interscholastic Athletic Conference, Inc., 94 F.3d 96, 101 (2d Cir.1996). The fact that a plaintiff has repeatedly challenged each IEP developed does not establish the requisite “reasonable expectation” of repetition. See B.J.S., 815 F.Supp.2d at 613 (<HOLDING>). The court in B.J.S. found that the plaintiffs
recognizing presumption holding that the presumption that a plaintiff will continue to challenge an iep year after year regardless of what is recommended by the cse does not create a reasonable expectation of recurrence recognizing that courts will indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver of the constitutional right to trial by a jury holding that guidelines create a rebuttable presumption recognizing that a temporary use of property does not automatically create an expectation of privacy in that property