and facing certain deportation.” St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 325, 121 S.Ct. 2271. The latest possible moment that either of these consequences — i.e., certain deportation or possible deportation — can attach is at the time of conviction. The instant before the jury returns its verdict, the defendant is subject to no immigration consequence; the instant after, he is subject to an immigration consequence. Which consequence a defendant ultimately suffers depends on whether statutes passed after his conviction apply to him. Therefore, application of a “new” law to the past event of conviction results in a different consequence than would otherwise apply — the precise concern of Landgraf. It is true that, because conviction is humer, 520 U.S. 939, 948-49, 117 S.Ct. 1871, 138 L.Ed.2d 135 (1997) (<HOLDING>). In each of these cases the Supreme Court
holding that dismissal is proper for a derivative cause of action but not for a direct cause of action holding statute that expanded cause of action and thus increased liability had retroactive effect holding that the elements of a cause of action were not subject matter jurisdictional simply because the statute that created the cause of action provided that district courts shall have jurisdiction of such actions recognizing the cause of action recognizing cause of action