of the charges, [the] defendants have no constitutional right to a jury trial in traffic cases, as they would in a true criminal prosecution, and cannot reasonably be expected to defend with the same vigor.” Id. at 671; cf. Briggeman v. Albert, 322 Md. 133, 586 A.2d 15, 18 (1991) (considering whether to admit a traffic violation in a subsequent criminal proceeding, noting that “it is common experience that people plead guilty to traffic charges for reasons of expediency even though they may believe themselves innocent”). In the Traffic Tribunal, there is a lesser level of formality with which cases are both tried and defended, which is one reason of many convincing us that applying collateral estoppel to the present situation would be inequitable. See Walker, 768 P.2d at 672-73 (<HOLDING>). We are careful to stress, however, that we
holding that collateral estoppel is not available to a criminal defendant for a judgment of acquittal following a civil traffic hearing holding that there is no need for a formal motion for a judgment of acquittal in a bench trial because the plea of not guilty asks the court for a judgment of acquittal holding that a criminal acquittal does not have collateral estoppel effect on a later civil forfeiture proceeding based on the same conduct holding that a fact established by a criminal judgment was to be given conclusive effect under collateral estoppel doctrine holding that a prior acquittal does not preclude the admission of evidence of a defendants other alleged crimes in a prosecution for the bank robbery on the basis of collateral estoppel principles because    the prior acquittal did not determine an ultimate issue in the present case