(2005), by failing to meet the standard of care for performing third trimester abortions as set forth in sections 390.0111 and 797.03. Based on these findings, the ALJ recommended suspension of Dr. Pender-graft’s medical license and imposition of other penalties. The Board approved and accepted the recommended order, including the recommended penalties. On appeal, Dr. Pendergraft argues that the violation of sections 456.072(l)(k) and 458.331(l)(g) cannot serve as the basis for any disciplinary action by the Board because he has not been convicted of violating sections 390.0111 and 797.03. We disagree. The Board disciplined Dr. Pender-graft for “failing to perform any statutory or legal obligation” placed upon him as a licensed physician pursuant to sec 30, 190 So. 59, 61-62 (1939) (<HOLDING>). It is the stated intent or purpose of both
holding that a prior acquittal does not preclude the admission of evidence of a defendants other alleged crimes in a prosecution for the bank robbery on the basis of collateral estoppel principles because    the prior acquittal did not determine an ultimate issue in the present case holding that a criminal defendant is entitled to know the charges against him and to be tried solely upon the charges against him internal quotation marks and citation omitted recognizing that acquittal in criminal court on identical charges as those forming basis for medical boards complaint does not bar inquiry into physicians actions for purposes of depriving him of right to practice medicine holding that the dismissal of criminal charges for evidentiary insufficiency is an acquittal for purposes of the double jeopardy clause holding that there is no need for a formal motion for a judgment of acquittal in a bench trial because the plea of not guilty asks the court for a judgment of acquittal