may not, under the guise of interpretation, be modified, revised, amended or rewritten.” Syl. Pt. 1, Consumer Advocate Div’n v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 182 W.Va. 152, 386 S.E.2d 650 (1989). As Syncor argues, the purpose of regulations is to give effect to the governing statute; such regulations cannot be used to alter or narrow the statute’s application. See Boley v. Miller, 187 W.Va. 242, 246, 418 S.E.2d 352, 356 (1992) (recognizing that agency’s statutory interpretation is inapplicable where such interpretation “‘is unduly restricted and in conflict with the legislative intent’ ”) (quoting Syl. Pt. 5, in part, Hodge v. Ginsberg, 172 W.Va. 17, 303 S.E.2d 245 (1983)); see also Syl. Pt. 4, Security Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. First W.Va. Bancorp, Inc., 166 W.Va. 775, 277 S.E.2d 613 (1981) (<HOLDING>). It is axiomatic that: “Where the language of
holding that the state board of administration is charged with investing and reinvesting funds of the state retirement system and is clearly an agency as defined by section 1190112 florida statutes holding that legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute holding that ijnterpretations of statutes by bodies charged with their administration are given great weight unless clearly erroneous holding that the district courts denial of a reduction for acceptance of responsibility is a factual question and should be accorded great deference and should not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous recognizing that the bia must defer to the factual findings of the ij unless they are clearly erroneous