by the general exclusionary rule, which prevents the introduction of collateral bad acts for the sole purpose of suggesting that the defendant is more likely to be guilty of the crime in question. The trial court far exceeded its discretion when it allowed the State to introduce the collateral-act evidence. Finally, we hold that the trial court’s errors cannot be considered harmless error under the circumstances of this case. Rule 45, Ala. RApp. P., provides, in relevant part, that no judgment may be reversed on the ground of the improper admission of evidence unless, after an examination of the entire cause, it appears to the reviewing court that the error has probably injuriously affected substantial rights of the parties. See, e.g., Ex parte Greathouse, 624 So.2d 208, 210 (Ala.1993) (<HOLDING>); Moore v. State, 49 So.3d 228
holding that the relevant dispositive inquiry  is whether it would be clear to a reasonable state official that his conduct was unlawful holding that the proper harmlesserror inquiry asks whether absent the improperly introduced evidence it is clear beyond reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a guilty verdict holding that the trial judge correctly instructed the jury that in resolving whether the crime occurred in tennessee they must be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence introduced on that issue holding that the improper denial of a defendants opportunity to impeach for bias is subject to harmlesserror review in which the reviewing court must determine if the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt holding that when determining prejudice under the objective test relevant considerations include 1 whether the extrinsic evidence was received by the jury and the manner in which it was received 2 whether it was available to the jury for a lengthy period of time 3 whether it was discussed and considered extensively by the jury 4 whether it was introduced before a jury verdict was reached and if so at what point during the deliberations and 5 whether it was reasonably likely to affect the verdict considering the strength of the governments case and whether the governments case outweighed any possible prejudice caused by the extrinsic evidence