and hiring. H.R.Rep. No. 40(1), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 92 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 630 (emphasis added). The fact that the Committee listed “discharge” along with “retaliation” shows that Congress intended to make not only retaliatory discharge but also retaliation in general actionable under § 1981. In particular, the Committee Report indicates that Congress clearly intended § 1981(b) to encompass retaliation against an employee for filing EEOC charges: In cutting back the scope of the rights to “make” and “enforce” contracts[,] Patterson also has been interpreted to eliminate retaliation claims that the courts had previously recognized under section 1981. See, e.g., Overby v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 884 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 5 WL 311911, at *5 (E.D.La. May 18, 1995) (<HOLDING>); Adams v. City of Chicago, 865 F.Supp. 445,
holding that a claim of retaliation for filing eeoc charges is cognizable under  1981 holding claim is not cognizable holding claim is cognizable holding that retaliation claims are not cognizable under 42 usc  1981 holding that plaintiffs claim of reduction in work hours in retaliation for her filing of eeoc charge states a cause of action under  1981