But the wisdom of requiring graphic images that depict the health risks of using tobacco products is amply supported by the evidence that the current textual warnings do not effectively convey these risks. More to the point, the required warnings need not be a reasonably tailored solution that materially advances the stated interest; they need only be reasonably related to the government’s interest in preventing consumer deception. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651, 105 S.Ct. 2265. The dissent errs by using the wrong test: it evaluates the warnings under Central Hudson, relying on cases that analyze laws restricting commercial speech rather than laws requiring disclosures. (See Dissent at 529) (citing Thompson v. Western States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 122 S.Ct. 1497, 152 L.Ed.2d 563 (2002) (<HOLDING>); BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. Farris,
holding that an ordinance exempting certain signs from a general sign ban was an unconstitutional contentbased restriction on speech holding that a law prohibiting advertising and promoting particular compounded drugs was an unconstitutional restriction of commercial speech under the central hudson test holding unconstitutional an ordinance prohibiting opprobious language recognizing that noncommercial speech is accorded greater protection under the first amendment than is commercial speech and striking down ordinance that imposed a greater restriction on political than on commercial billboards holding that restriction on government employee speech was unconstitutionally vague