the pollution was not “sudden or accidental” as a matter of law, despite the fact that it may have been unintended. This Court agrees with the analysis of Judge Hodges in Industrial Indemnity. Additionally, the doctrines of intra-court comity and stare decisis mandate that this Court rule in a similar fashion. As the Court in United States v. Anaya, 509 F.Supp. 289, 293 (S.D.Fla.1980) held: [Ijmplicit in our desire for uniformity is our disinclination to depart from the doctrine of intra-court comity. The well-recognized doctrine establishes a general rule that, absent unusual or exceptional circumstances, judges of coordinate jurisdictions should follow brethren judges’ rulings (citations omitted). Further, the doctrine of stare decisis mandates that like , 905 F.2d 954 (6th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); EAD Metallurgical, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
holding that a three and onehalf month temporal proximity is insufficient to create a jury issue on causation holding that there must be a temporal connection between the dates of the alleged offense and the evidence pointing to another perpetrator holding that circumstantial evidence may support temporal link between defendants intoxication and his driving holding that intervening misconduct can sever the temporal proximity connection between the protected conduct and the adverse employment holding that the phrase sudden and accidental has a temporal component and does not describe continuous and ongoing pollution events