those rights is a compelling state interest. See, e.g., Eu, 489 U.S. 214, 109 S.Ct. 1013, 103 L.Ed.2d 271. In this case, the current scheme is not narrowly tailored to achieve that end because there exist several less onerous means by which a state may secure the party’s right to guide its own association in this fashion. First of all, New York State could allow parties to associate with their favored candidates by permitting parties to finance those candidates, directly and indirectly, at the nominating stage — a practice that is illegal under the current statutory scheme. See N.Y. Elec. L. § 2-126 (providing that par ties may not expend funds “in aid of the designation or nomination of any person”); but see Avella v. Bait, 83 A.D.3d 77, 820 N.Y.S.2d 332, 333 (3d Dep’t 2006) (<HOLDING>); Kermani v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, No.
holding that attorney disciplinary rule was unconstitutionally vague as applied holding that ny elec l  2126 unconstitutionally burdens  first amendment rights as applied to a party supporting a crossendorsed candidate running in another partys primary holding that provision requiring candidate to be a resident and qualified elector unconstitutionally adds additional qualifications holding that a tax on ink and paper burdens rights protected by the first amendment recognizing that electoral restrictions that affect a political partys ability to perform its primary functions  organizing and developing recruiting supporters choosing a candidate and voting for that candidate in a general election  can constitute severe first amendment burdens