the steroid manufacturing process for the broader conspiracy, including by transferring steroids into vials and labeling them. There was also evidence that Karimi carried manufacturing equipment into his apartment, that such equipment was stored at Karimi’s apartment, and that steroids were taken to the post office directly from Karimi’s apartment. Thus, the district court was entitled to find that all of the drugs that were manufactured and distributed while Karimi was involved in the conspiracy were within the scope of, in furtherance of, and reasonably foreseeable in connection with the criminal activity Karimi jointly undertook with his co-conspirators. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) & app. n.3(D); United States v. Godson, 763 F.3d 1189, 1220 (9th Cir. 2014) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Newland, 116 F.3d
holding that evidence was insufficient to prove a conspiracy where the evidence did not show that individuals who sold drugs to the defendant knew that the drugs were meant to be resold holding that the district courts error in calculating the amount of drugs at issue was harmless because the error had no impact on the defendants sentence holding that the sentencing court erred in failing to make a factual determination as to the amount of drugs attributable to the defendant after his participation in the charged conspiracy holding no error as to relevant conduct where there were detailed factual recitations connecting the defendant to the drugs at issue and establishing that they were part of the conspiracy holding that uncharged amounts of drugs may be included as relevant conduct even if the defendant never actually possessed or distributed the drugs