regarding an appropriate prison term for the crime of first-degree murder. Finally, we find that the penalty of life imprisonment is not grossly disproportionate to the crime of first-degree murder. If, as Justice Kennedy’s opinion noted, “the crime of felony murder without specific intent to kill ... [is] a crime for which no sentence of imprisonment would be disproportionate,” [Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) ] [ ] then the sentence of life imprisonment for the specific intent crime of first-degree murder cannot be disproportionate. Accordingly, we hold that Mr. Phillips’ sentence does not violate the proportionality principle mandated by the Eighth Amendment. See also People v. Launsburry, 217 Mich.App. 358, 551 N.W.2d 460, 463-64 (1996) (<HOLDING>); State v. Massey, 60 Wash. App. 131, 803 P.2d
holding that what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is a question of law holding cruel and unusual punishment complaint not preserved holding that the imposition of a true life sentence on a minor convicted of felony murder was cruel and unusual based on the specific circumstances surrounding the offense holding prison officials ultimately violated the plaintiffs right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment holding life in prison without the possibility of parole was not cruel and unusual punishment for juvenile convicted of murder