does not establish privity. Nor is privity found when the litigated question might affect a person’s liability as a judicial precedent in a subsequent action. 330 S.C. at 317, 498 S.E.2d at 687 (citations omitted). Due process concerns prohibit estopping litigants who never had a chance to present their evidence and arguments on a claim, despite one or more existing adjudications of the identical issue which stand squarely against their position. Richburg, 290 S.C. at 434-35, 351 S.E.2d at 166. Even where all the elements for collateral estoppel are met, it will not be rigidly or mechanically applied, and the application of the doctrine may be precluded where unfairness or injustice results, or public policy requires it. State v. Bacote, 331 S.C. 328, 331, 503 S.E.2d 161, 163 (1998) (<HOLDING>). The circuit court found Cannon and Heider, as
holding that a civil claim is barred by collateral estoppel even though the prior adjudication was in criminal proceedings and the parties are not the same because the matters were actually litigated and decided in the prior trial holding that state law controls whether issues decided in a prior state court action are entitled to preclusive effect and setting forth the elements of collateral estoppel under washington law holding that collateral estoppel is not available to a criminal defendant for a judgment of acquittal following a civil traffic hearing recognizing that nypd disciplinary hearings can have preclusive effect but ultimately holding that collateral estoppel did not apply due to issues specific to the administrative proceedings in that case holding that in a subsequent criminal action for driving under the influence collateral estoppel did not apply to issues decided at a prior administrative hearing held pursuant to implied consent statute