and NMSA 1978, Section 31-21-15(B) (1989). It then argues that the district court’s order is not sufficiently final because Defendant is awaiting a new hearing consistent with the order of remand, and the outcome of the State’s motion to revoke probation has yet to be determined. We are unpersuaded that the district court’s order is not final. {13} “Ordinarily, an order remanding a case for further proceedings in a lower c CA-056, ¶ 6, 137 N.M. 442, 112 P.3d 303 (recognizing an exception to the general rule that an order of remand is not sufficiently final for purposes of appeal pursuant to the doctrine of practical finality “if the party opposing remand would be unable to have the propriety of the remand heard at a later date”); Apodaca, 1997-NMCA-051, ¶ 16, 123 N.M. 372, 940 P.2d 478 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, because finality depends upon the
holding that superior court erred in reversing trial courts order granting new trial and remanding for a new trial limited to apportionment of damages holding that the point on appeal and the objection in the trial court must be the same in order for it to be preserved for appeal holding that evidence in first trial concerning firearms in which defendant was acquitted of drug and rico conspiracies could be used in second trial on firearms offenses because evidence was collateral to elements of offenses in second trial holding that the defendant could appeal the district courts order granting a new trial because his right not to be subjected to a second trial for the same offense could not be remedied once the second trial has taken place holding double jeopardy does not bar second trial after granting of new trial for reason other than insufficiency of evidence