sentence wherein he argued that he should be subjected to registration for only ten years because the underlying offense had occurred on September 18, 1999, prior to the effective date of the lengthier registration requirements under Megan’s Law II. The trial court denied the motion, and on appeal, the Superior Court affirmed, holding that the defendant was subject to the lifetime registration requirement under Megan’s Law II. Fleming, supra at 1240-41. More specifically, the Fleming court determined that because the registration requirements of Megan’s Law II do not serve to punish an offender but rather are designed to help ensure the safety of the public, the application of the lifetime registration provision of Megan’s Law II was not, as the defendant had argued, an 2d 1174 (1994) (<HOLDING>)). The Superior Court further opined that in
holding that possession of a drivers license is irrelevant to the offense of failing to present a license which is completed by failing to present the license when requested to do so by an officer holding unconstitutional a statute which provided for drivers license suspension for persons under 19 after conviction of any alcoholrelated offense holding that age disclosed on a drivers license constituted an admission where the party swore to the truth of the statements made in the license application holding that a guilty plea to underage drinking could not be withdrawn based on fact defendant was unaware that his drivers license would be suspended because of his conviction as the license suspension was a civil consequence of the conviction holding insufficient officers advisement that defendants license may be suspended if he refused to submit to breath test when statute mandates that license will be suspended for refusal of chemical test