stating that “a Bivens remedy is available for Plaintiffs’ ... Fourth Amendment unreasonable and punitive [ ] search[ ] claims.” 789 F.3d at 237. The court reasoned that “the Fourth Amendment is at the core of the Bivens jurisprudence, as Bivens itself concerned a Fourth Amendment claim ... for the defendants’ use of unreasonable force without probable cause, resulting in the plaintiffs unlawful arrest.” Id. The p rcuit law— that the Bivens issue was not directly raised before this Court in Martinez-Aguero — is unpersuasive. As this Court has stated, “[wjhen confronting decisions of prior panels ... we are bound by 'not only the result but also those portions of the opinion necessary to that result....’” Gochicoa v. Johnson, 238 F.3d 278, 286 n. 11 (5th Cir 28-29 (D.Conn.2010)
holding that the remedy in a prison conditions case must remedy actual injuries that have been identified by the court and suffered by the plaintiffs holding that the csra precludes even those bivens claims for which the act prescribes no alternative remedy because it found no inadvertence by congress in omitting the remedy recognizing the civil service reform act as a special factor precluding a bivens remedy holding the privacy act to constitute a special factor precluding a bivens remedy recognizing a bivens remedy for undocumented immigrants who were subjects of a raid by federal immigration officials reasoning that if a bivens remedy were precluded the present plaintiffs would have no forum in which to seek a remedy for the defendants alleged constitutional violations