constitutional authorization, to include power of decisional finality within present constitutional terms. The differentiation is between adjunct fact finding and plenary judicial responsibility.’" Id. (quoting Foster v. Foster, 768 P.2d 1038, 1042 (Wyo.1989) (Urbigkit, J., specially concurring)). Similarly, the Indiana Supreme Court has stated that the state legislature is forbidden to vest commissioners with judicial duties that, under the Indiana constitution, only judges are allowed to exercise. Smith, 417 N.E.2d at 1121-23. "'A master commissioner is not a court, and judicial duties which courts only can exercise, can not be conferred upon him.’” Id. at 1121 (quoting Shoultz v. McPheeters, 79 Ind. 373, 376 (1881)); see also Rivera v. State, 601 N.E.2d 445, 446 (Ind.Ct.App. 1992) (<HOLDING>). HOWE, Justice, concurring: I concur. I write
holding that a commissioner acts as an instrumentality to inform and assist the court only the court has authority to make final orders or judgments holding that court of appeals statutory jurisdiction over final orders of removal extends to reinstatement orders holding that order could be appealed because ajlthough the district court did not make an express finding there is no doubt that the district court intended its orders to be final judgments for purposes of appeal recognizing that orders denying motions to reopen are treated as final orders of removal holding that while a magistrate lacked the authority to enter an order granting a motion to correct error and thus that the order was defective for failing to contain the judges signature or another indication it was approved or adopted by the trial court the city waived any challenge to the validity of the order by failing to make a timely objection and observing that the indiana supreme court has long held that defects in the authority of a court officer as opposed to the jurisdiction of the trial court itself to enter a final order will be waived if not raised through a timely objection and more recently this court has applied the same principle to civil proceedings and clarified that any objection to the authority of an adjudicative officer must be raised at the first instance the irregularity occurs or at least within such time as the tribunal is able to remedy the defect