of the presentment requirement were somehow in doubt — the Statement revealed that notice of the claim had already been provided, and the silence of the government agency is sufficient compliance with the statute. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 4. Moreover, the factual predicate for the plaintiffs’ claims did not change at all. See Ruiz-Rosa v. Rullan, 485 F.3d 150, 154 (1st Cir.2007) (explaining that fair notice is provided where a complaint explains “who did what to whom, when, where, and why” (citations omitted)); Morales-Vallellanes v. Potter, 339 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir.2003) (indicating that a complaint may “sufficiently raise[] a claim even if it points to no legal theory or ... the wrong legal theory” (citation omitted)); DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 310 n. 6 (1st Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Thus, because the amended complaints did not
holding that the government need not prove actual notice to the prisoner holding that a complaint need not clearly articulate the precise legal theories to provide fair notice holding that statutory language alone even in the total absence of case law can be sufficient to provide fair notice holding that group pleading did not render complaint infirm where complaint provided fair notice of claims holding that covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not require lender to provide notice concerning loans to individual who expressly waived notice in contract