It is only if we infer that Schmitz’s reference to Wallace’s ab sences is code language for Wallace’s pregnancies that it relates to Wallace’s protected class. If we were to make this inference and countenance this general statement as evidence of discriminatory intent, we would find in effect that any employer’s remark observing that an employee has taken leave constitutes such evidence. We decline to do so for, as the Seventh Circuit has stated, “[t]he [Pregnancy Discrimination Act] requires the employer to ignore an employee’s pregnancy, but ... not her absence from work, unless the employer overlooks the comparable absences of non-pregnant employees.” Marshall v. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 157 F.3d 520, 526 (7th Cir.1998) (quoting Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores, 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir.1994)) (<HOLDING>). Next, Gaskin overheard Schmitz state that
holding that the supervisors failure to give employee new assignments once she announced that she was pregnant and that her maternity leave would occur during the two months prior to the employers busiest time did not constitute evidence of discrimination holding that an employee who did not present evidence that she could have returned to work prior to the expiration of her fmla leave allowance was not entitled to additional leave merely because her employer had not properly provided her with notice that the leave was designated as fmla leave holding that discharging an employee because she was on maternity leave would violate that poli cy holding that an employer was justified in demoting plaintiff after she returned from maternity leave because plaintiff could not rebut the employers evidence that she was having performance problems before she went on leave and that additional performance problems were discovered while she was on leave holding that a plaintiff could not show that she engaged in protected activity because she did not present evidence that she informed her employer that her complaints were based on race or age discrimination