relief must be filed before the statute of limitations has run); State ex rel. Egeland v. City Council of Cut Bank, 245 Mont. 484, 803 P.2d 609 (1990) (counterclaim or cross claim for affirmative relief does not relate back to the commencement of the plaintiff’s action); Ho v. Rubin, 333 N.J. Super. 599, 756 A.2d 643 (1999) (claim for defamation is not a claim for “recoupment” and therefore must be asserted as counterclaim or cross claim before the statute of limitation expires); Bednar v. Bednar, 455 Pa. Super. 487, 688 A.2d 1200 (1997) (a counterclaim or cross claim seeking affirmative relief must be brought before the statute of limitations expires; the statute is not tolled by the commencement of the plaintiff’s action); Brown v. Hipshire, 553 S.W.2d 570, 571-72 (Tenn. 1977) (<HOLDING>); Hawkeye Sec. Ins. Co. v. Apodaca, 524 P.2d
holding that under the law of the district of columbia the filing of a complaint does not toll the statute of limitations on a counterclaim holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in considering merits of state law counterclaim that formed part of the same case as federal counterclaim even though court had dismissed federal counterclaim quoting 28 usc  1367a holding that where counterclaim arises out of same transaction alleged in plaintiffs complaint is not barred by a running of the statute of limitations thereafter rather statute of limitations is suspended until counterclaim is filed recognizing that defendant could raise recoupment defense against state but not independent cause of action or counterclaim holding that a cross claim or counterclaim for affirmative relief must be filed before the statute of limitations expires because a claim is not stripped of its character as an independent action by acquiring the label counterclaim