where the contact was between the trial court judge and the jury, occurred with the knowledge of counsel and the defendant, and the contents of the communication were recorded and divulged to counsel and the defendant, it is hard to categorize this communication as “extrajudicial. ” Cf. Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 119-20, 104 S.Ct. 453, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983) (employing a harmless error analysis, not a Remmer analysis, in evaluating whether ex parte, unrecorded, communication between trial judge and a juror was prejudicial). As the jurors learned of the threat via the court and not from á third-party, it is also questionable as to whether the communication could be classified as exposing the jury to “extraneous information.” see United States v. Tran, 122 F.3d 670, 673 (8th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Rodriquez, 116 F.3d 1225,
holding that extraneous information which is unrelated to the case being tried is not prejudicial holding that rule 606b does not violate the sixth amendment holding that the only statements not disclosed were the probation officers recommendations which did not constitute factual information as contemplated by the statute holding that information disclosed to jurors as a result of their presence at trial ie that the defendant did not testify did not constitute extraneous prejudicial information within the meaning of the rule 606b exception holding that one jurors exposure to extraneous information concerning prior criminal acts of the defendant which she did not disclose to the other jurors before they rendered a verdict did not merit a new trial