debts of the others. By concluding that Jillian’s is hable to the appellant as a successor-employer, the district court ignored the fact that FPM was only the seller of these assets and had been previously absolved of any responsibility by this same district court and now 3 years after the initial decision, attributes liability to “the Jillian defendants.” Moreover, in using the admittedly separate and broader concepts of successor-employer liability under the Labor Act, the majority belies what actually occurred in the federal cases cited for this proposition. The federal cases establishing successor-employer liability either involved a merger, a purchase or a consolidation of businesses. See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 548, 84 S.Ct. 909, 11 L.Ed.2d 898 (1964) (<HOLDING>); Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S.
holding that the present controversy concerns the plaintiffs rights under state and federal statutes which exist independently of the collective bargaining agreement and do not require interpretation of that agreement holding that where the bargaining unit remains unchanged and a majority of the employees hired by the new employer are represented by a recently certified bargaining agent the successor employer must bargain with the incumbent union holding that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union holding that petitioners remedy under title vii of the civil rights act was in addition to remedies available under the collective bargaining agreement in force between his employer and his union holding that the disappearance by merger of a corporate employer which has entered into a collective bargaining agreement with a union does not automatically terminate all rights of the employees covered by the agreement and that in appropriate circumstances present here the successor employer may be required to arbitrate with the union under the agreement