in the district court’s determination that there was no inequitable conduct based on the record before us. Bartell has provided no direct evidence that Allen withheld information about the Red Rider with intent to deceive the PTO. Instead, Bartell argues that Allen was “at least grossly negligent” in withholding the Red Rider from the PTO, and that, on the basis of Argus Chemical Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., 759 F.2d 10, 14-15, 225 USPQ 1100, 1103 (Fed.Cir.1985), Allen’s intent to deceive is shown by this gross negligence. However, even if Allen’s conduct amounted to gross negligence, this alone would not be sufficient to show the requisite intent. Kingsdovm Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876, 9 USPQ2d 1384, 1392 (Fed.Cir.1988) (en banc in relevant part) (<HOLDING>). Bartell argues, in essence, that the Red
holding that amendment made as of right under mpep weighs against an inference of intent to deceive holding that a finding that particular conduct amounts to gross negligence does not of itself justify an inference of intent to deceive recognizing that a jury is permitted to infer an intent to deceive from circumstantial evidence holding that negligence does not violate the due process clause but reserving the question whether gross negligence does holding that ordinary negligence and gross negligence are not separate causes of action