1998 ME 198, ¶ 10, 716 A.2d 212, 217. The availability of the qualified immunity defense is a question of law. See id. at ¶ 13, 716 A.2d at 217. Pursuant to the death-knell exception to the final judgment rule, we will hear a government official’s interlocutory appeal from an order denying a motion for summary judgment in which a claim of immunity is raised. See id. (citing J.R.M., Inc. v. City of Portland, 669 A.2d 159, 160 & n. 1 (Me.1995)). A court ruling on a motion for summary judgment may consider only the portions of the record referred to, and the material facts set forth, in the Rule 7(d) statements. See Prescott v. State Tax Assessor, 1998 ME 250, ¶ 5, 721 A.2d 169, 172 (citations omitted). III. DISCUSSION [¶ 16] Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Every person who, Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); Pierce v. Engle, 726 F.Supp. 1231, 1237
holding that a suspension with pay does not violate any recognized property interest holding that a twoday suspension with pay does not deprive plaintiff of measurable property interest holding that suspension with pay was not adverse employment action holding that a suspension with pay does not invade any recognized property interest holding that a school principals suspension with pay did not implicate a constitutionally protected property interest