at the administrative hearing “to show his compliance with the implied consent law.” Id. at 429. We have continued to apply this holding in later cases under varying factual scenarios. See Reed v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 540 N.W.2d 50, 51 (Iowa 1995) (affirming revocation on the basis that licensee failed to meet his burden of proof “to show compliance with the implied consent law and the peace officer’s failure to satisfy the procedural requirements” when licensee argued arresting officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe licensee was operating while intoxicated); Gaskey v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 537 N.W.2d 695, 697-98 (Iowa 1995) (same); Peterson v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 508 N.W.2d 689, 691-92 (Iowa 1993) (same); Mary v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 382 N.W.2d 128, 132 (Iowa 1986) (<HOLDING>). In Gaskey, we succinctly stated that “a
holding that the implied consent statutes are irrelevant when the defendant gives actual consent to a blood or breath test holding search not to violate fourth amendment where officers belief that apparent landlord had the power to consent and that he had not revoked that consent was reasonable emphasis added holding that the implied consent law allows law enforcement officers to obtain blood in circumstances in which a warrant or actual consent may otherwise be required holding that the consent of the driver was invalid when the officer knew that the passenger was the owner of the automobile holding driver has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he had complied with the implied consent law and that the peace officers had not satisfied the procedural requirements thereof where licensee claimed his consent to blood test was invalid and that he was incapable of consenting