St. Michael’s, 880 F.2d at 597. Given the above, we readily conclude that a “missing witness” instruction would have been improper under the circumstances of this case. Simply stated, there is no basis for concluding that the government’s decision not to reveal the identity of its confidential informant was the result of any consideration other than its concern for the informant’s safety and anonymity, so a contrary inference would not have been justified. Moreover, where, as here, a defendant’s right to a fair trial is not jeopardized by the government’s refusal to disclose its informant’s identity, the exercise of that prerogative can never give rise to a negative inference suggesting that the informant’s testimony would have been unfavorable. Cf. St. Michael’s, 880 F.2d at 598 (<HOLDING>). We note that here counsel was permitted,
holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness holding that the defendants due process rights were violated when the trial judge singled out the only defense witness and indicated to that witness that he expected the witness to he and would personally ensure that the witness was prosecuted for perjury and thereby effectively drove that witness off the stand holding that requiring a missing witness instruction each time the prosecution decides not to immunize a witness would constitute a substantial judicial encroachment upon prosecutorial discretion holding rule applicable to witness holding that death of potential alibi witness did not cause actual prejudice because defendant failed to relate the substance of the testimony of the missing witness in sufficient detail and to show witness testimony not available from other sources