The district court instructed the jury on the specific intent required for a conviction for filing false tax returns by stating: The word “willfully,” as used in this statute, means a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty. In other words, the defendant must have acted voluntarily and intentionally and with the specific intent to do something he knew the law prohibited, that is to say, with intent either to disobey or to disregard the law. Negligent conduct is not sufficient to constitute willfulness. The jury’s conclusion that Tarwater acted willfully would necessarily negate any possibility of “good faith” in filing false tax returns. Id. (internal citations omitted); see also United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 13, 97 S.Ct. 22, 50 L.Ed.2d 12 (1976) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Carter’s claim fails because the jury’s
holding good faith jury instruction unnecessary when court gave adequate specific intent instruction holding that a jury instruction compromised the appellants goodfaith argument because it did not make clear that a goodfaith belief by the appellants that they were complying with the tax laws whether or not objectively reasonable negates the specific intent element holding in a tax fraud case that a goodfaith instruction was unnecessary because the trial judge adequately instructed the jury on willfulness holding that various aspects of the trial adequately directed the jurys attention to the identification evidence and made defendants requested instruction unnecessary holding new trial should not have been granted because jury was properly instructed