fees, an award of reasonable fees is mandatory, as long as there is proof of reasonable fees ... and the plaintiff has been awarded damages.” Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 302 F.3d 448, 462 (5th Cir.2002), citing Tex. Civ. Peac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 38.001(8) (Vernon 2002). Accord Coffel v. Stryker Corp., 284 F.3d 625, 640 (5th Cir.2002) (“[t]he award of reasonable attorneys’ fees is mandatory under § 38.001 if the plaintiff prevails in his or her breach of contract claim and recovers damages”). The only discretion the Fifth Circuit permits is discretion to determine the amount of the attorney’s fees award. See id. The availability of a section 38.001 award is not conditioned on a contractual provision for attorney’s fees. See, e.g., Holland v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 1 S.W.3d 91, 95 (Tex. 1999) (<HOLDING>); Golden v. Murphy, 611 S.W.2d 914, 915
holding award of attorneys fees to party prevailing on contract claim is mandatory under section 38001 if there is proof of the reasonableness of the fees holding that prevailing party to contract dispute may recover attorneys fees either pursuant to contract or pursuant to statute holding that prevailing party was entitled to attorneys fees under an option contract which had expired prior to litigation because the parties were litigating their performance under the terms of the contract holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees holding defendant waived request for fees pursuant to contract provision by only generally referring to fees in the answer and not citing the contract