is to be judged by the trier of fact.”) Schledwitz v. United States, 169 F.3d 1003, 1015 (6th Cir. 1999) ("Bias is always relevant in assessing a witness’s credibilityi”). See also Tenth Circuit Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction Committee of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 1.08 (2011, rev. 2015) (listing numerous factors for the jury to consider when assessing credibility). 22 . Smith, 156 F.3d at 1053 ("[J]urors using common sense and their faculties of observation can judge the credibility of an eyewitness identification, especially since deficiencies or inconsistencies in an eyewitness's testimony can be brought out with skillful cross-examination.”); McEwen v. City of Norman, Okl., 926 F.2d 1539, 1546 (10th Cir. 1991) (<HOLDING>); Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Heitchew, 146 F.2d
recognizing a common knowledge exception holding that jurors do not need expert testimony on matters of common knowledge holding that expert testimony should not be admitted as to a matter that is obviously within the common knowledge of jurors because such testimony almost by definition can be of no assistance holding that expert testimony should be excluded when jury is equally competent to form an opinion about ultimate fact issue or experts testimony is within jurys common knowledge recognizing common knowledge exception