claim was clearly insufficient to state a claim for breach of § 9.4. The supposed “clarification” in his brief in opposition to judgment on the pleadings, which in fact presented an entirely new legal theory, did not cure the defective complaint. See Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 202-03 (3d Cir.2007). Jang’s proffer that he “would be prepared to amend” his complaint, App. at 559, does not change the analysis, because it cannot be construed as a motion for leave to amend. See Ranke v. Sanofi-Synthelabo Inc., 436 F.3d 197, 206 (3d Cir.2006). The District Court thus did not abuse its discretion in declining to address the § 9.4 claim, nor in dismissing the complaint with prejudice. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). 2. Denial of Jang’s Motion for
recognizing that although leave to amend generally should be freely granted that decision is left to the district courts discretion and as in the present case not only was there no abuse of discretion it appears that appellants never properly requested an opportunity to amend in the district court holding that in noncivil rights cases district courts have no obligation to offer leave to amend before dismissing a complaint unless the plaintiff properly requests it recognizing several reasons to deny leave to amend a complaint recognizing that one of those conditions for a district judge to grant leave to amend the complaint may properly be that claims contained in the original complaint but not included in the amended complaint be considered dismissed with prejudice  holding the district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff who is represented by counsel never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court