not a legislator and therefore not entitled to assert legislative immunity. (Pls.Mem. in Opp’n at 24.) Presumably plaintiffs are analogizing the dictum of Forrester that state executive officials are not entitled to absolute immunity for their official acts to the same extent as the President of the United States. See 484 U.S. at 226, 108 S.Ct. at 543-44. However, the Municipal defendants do not assert Zwim’s immunity as an executive, but only with respect to his participation in approving legislated Board resolutions. (Mun. Defs.Mem. of Law at 21.) Although defendant Zwirn is chief executive of the Town, he has legislative responsibilities in his dual capacity as a Town Board member. N.Y.Town Law §§ 60, 63 (McKinney 1987); see also Aitchison v. Raffiani, 708 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); Orange, 830 F.Supp. at 706 (county executive
holding chief of police an executive officer because a member of the executive branch and an officer recognizing that the fellow officer rule functions to include officers outside the common investigation holding that although jury found officer not to have had probable cause for arrest officer was entitled to immunity because law was not clearly established as to circumstances in which officer found himself holding that in extraordinary circumstances where a police officer neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard qualified immunity may still be available holding that a mayor although the executive officer may still have legislative functions