the delay outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. A district court is “required to set out its reasons for granting an ‘ends of justice’ continuance” to provide a record for appellate review, otherwise “the time is not excludible.” United States v. Brooks, 697 F.2d 517, 520 (3d Cir.1982). Additionally, once a district court grants a continuance we have “strongly urged” district courts “not to wait and rely on counsel to inform them when defendants are ready to go to trial.” United States v. Lattany, 982 F.2d 866, 883 (3d Cir.1992). Here, the district court ruled that this was a complex case because of the number of defendants, and the fact that the indictment contained fifty separate charges. See United States v. Fields, 39 F.3d 439, 444 (3d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Although Gutierrez attempts to refute that
holding that speedy trial act requires that an ends of justice continuance be specifically limited in time holding that fivemonth openended continuance based on ends of justice did not violate speedy trial act holding that where the case is technically not closed and the ends of justice may best be served by the admission of crucial evidence it is an abuse of the trial courts discretion to deny the introduction of such evidence holding that an ends of justice continuance may be appropriate where the case is unusual or complex holding that an ends of justice continuance is proper when a case is complex and involves multiple codefendants and multiple overt acts occurring in multiple states and in which the complexity outweighs the interests of individual defendants