termination of Spry’s benefits. We review the district court’s decision de novo, utilizing the same standard applicable to the district court’s review. See id. at 359; Evans v. Eaton Corp. Long Term Disability Plan, 514 F.3d 315, 321 (4th Cir.2008). We conclude that the decision to terminate Spry’s benefits was within the Administrator’s discretion. Clearly, the evidence before the Administrator was conflicting on the question of whether objective evidence demonstrated that Spry was unable to work. Resolving this conflict was the Administrator’s responsibility, and there was nothing inherently unreasonable in the decision not to adopt the opinions of Spry’s primary care physicians. See Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 831-34, 123 S.Ct. 1965, 155 L.Ed.2d 1034 (2003) (<HOLDING>). However, the district court provided several
holding that erisa does not require plan administrators to give special deference to treating physicians opinions holding that plan administrators may credit reliable evidence that conflicts with a treating physicians evaluation but may not arbitrarily refuse to credit a claimants reliable evidence including the opinions of a treating physician holding that unlike the social security disability program erisa does not require plan administrators to give special deference to the opinions of treating physicians and noting that there are critical differences between the two programs that nothing in erisa requires employers to establish employee benefit plans and that erisa does not mandate what kind of benefits employers must provide if they choose to have such a plan quotations omitted holding that courts have no warrant to require administrators automatically to accord special weight to the opinions of a claimants physician holding that nontreating physicians opinions are entitled to little weight when contradictory to treating physicians opinions and will not constitute substantial evidence standing alone