created by the state pursuant to Ohio Rev.Code § 306.32 which empowers counties, municipal corporations and townships to create transit authorities. A companion statute, Ohio Rev.Code § 306.31 delegates state authority to GCRTA through its declaration that “[a] regional transit authority so created is a political subdivision of the state.” While state law declarations of an entity’s public purpose are not controlling, when considered along with GCRTA’s operations and administration, such a declaration weighs heavily in favor of finding that GCRTA is a “political subdivision” within the meaning of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2). See Natural Gas, 402 U.S. at 602, 604, 91 S.Ct. at 1749; see also Crilly v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 529 F.2d 1355, 1363 (3rd Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>). GCRTA satisfies the second prong of the
holding that a tennessee public utility district was not an employer under  1522 because it was a political subdivision of tennessee recognizing that a board of elections is not a political subdivision and its members are not county officers holding that septa created directly by an act of the pennsylvania legislature is a political subdivision within the meaning of 29 usc  1522 holding that the complaint stated a claim under the flsa where it alleged that parties were an employer and employees within meaning of act and that the defendantemployers operation constitutes an enterprise engaged in commerce  within the meaning of  the act holding that the determination of the boundaries of a political subdivision of the state is a political question solely within the power prerogative and discretion of the legislature and not subject to judicial review