of which they are a part. See Fulfillment Services Inc. v. United Parcel against an insurer, see Brandt v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.3d 813, 210 Cal. Rptr. 211, 693 P.2d 796 (Cal.1985) (“When an insurer’s tortious conduct reasonably compels the insured to retain an attorney to obtain the benefits due under a policy, it follows that the insurer should be liable in a tort action for that expense. The attorney’s fees are an economic loss — damages — proximately caused by the tort. These fees must be distinguished from recovery of attorney’s fees qua attorney’s fees, such as those attributable to the bringing of the bad faith action itself.”) (internal citations omitted); and abuse of process suits, see, e.g., Technical Computer Servs., Inc. v. Buckley, 844 P.2d 1249 (Colo.Ct.App.1992) (<HOLDING>). What is less clear is whether Congress
holding that the defendant was only permitted to recover attorney fees as an item of special damages with respect to the underlying action in which the defendant was sued and was not permitted to recover attorney fees incurred in the malpractice portion of the case as damages holding the same for malicious prosecution holding that insured may recover legal fees incurred in defending itself in a declaratory judgment action brought by insurer but not for those incurred in prosecuting cross claims and counterclaims against insurers holding that section 1983 claims alleging due process violations stemming from malicious prosecution are unavailable when a state malicious prosecution action exists recognizing the general rule that a claimant in a malicious prosecution or abuse of process action can recover attorney fees incurred in defending against the prior wrongful litigation but cannot recover attorney fees incurred in bringing the malicious prosecution or abuse of process action itself and applying the same rule where the abuse of process claim is brought as a counterclaim to wrongful litigation rather than as a later separate action