803(3). A statement that the declarant is afraid or testimony demonstrating that the declarant was afraid when he made the statement qualifies under Rule 803(3). See, e.g., Martinez v. State, 17 S.W.3d 677, 688 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (allowing declarant’s statement that she was afraid of man with same first name as appellant); Williams v. State, 798 S.W.2d 368, 371 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1990, no pet.) (admitting testimony describing declarant’s disturbed emotional state because it demonstrated her fear of defendant when she said defendant was going to kill her and her children). In contrast, a statement from which the de-clarant’s fear can only be reached by inference is an inadmissible statement of belief. See, e.g., Dorsey v. State, 24 S.W.3d 921, 928 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 2000, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); Barnum v. State, 7 S.W.3d 782, 790-91
holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment holding that a teachers complaint to school authorities that her principal had instructed her to make improper changes in her own students grades was unprotected because it was made pursuant to her official duties holding that declarants statement that if anything strange happened to her like car crash it meant that defendant had killed her is one of belief holding that a plaintiff who pled in her complaint that her law firm actively misled her in support of her request for application of the discovery rule had sufficiently pled the application of the doctrine