look alike.... [i]f you put them in the same costume.” H. reported to Hayat’s investigator essentially the same comment by Cote, “that when they dress alike they all look the same.” B. also stated more generally that “[tjhroughout the deliberation process, Mr. Cote made other inappropriate racial comments,” but, aside from the “look alike” remark, did not say what any of them were. Generally, the Federal Rules of Evidence forbid courts from inquiring into what went on during jury deliberations. See Fed.R.Evid. 606(b). We have not decided, as some courts have, whether Rule 606(b) prevents us from considering evidence that a juror’s racial bias was expressed during deliberations. See Henley, 238 F.3d at 1120-21; compare, e.g., United, States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 84, 87 (1st Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>), with United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230,
holding that rule 606b precludes any inquiry into the validity of the verdict based on juror testimony regarding racial or ethnic comments made during the course of deliberations but that the rule against juror impeachment cannot be applied so inflexibly as to bar juror testimony in those rare and grave cases where claims of racial or ethnic bias during jury deliberations implicate a defendants right to due process and an impartial jury internal quotation marks omitted holding that rule 606b precludes a party seeking a new trial from using one jurors affidavit of what another juror said in deliberations to demonstrate the other jurors dishonesty during voir dire holding that juror interviews were not permissible where the alleged jury misconduct of premature deliberations constituted internal influence holding a new trial required when juror is replaced by an alternate during jury deliberations holding that the district courts dismissal of a juror after five weeks of deliberations violated the defendants right to a unanimous jury because the record evidence suggested the juror found the evidence insufficient for a conviction