at 304. Thus, supervisory prison officials such as Defendants Banks and Jackson may be held liable for a Section 1983 violation only if they either were personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or if there is a “sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Thompkins, 828 F.2d at 304. The court concludes that Defendants Banks and Jackson were not personally involved in denying Plaintiff medical care. These Defendants are neither nurses, doctors, or other health aides; rather, they hold supervisory positions and were not personally involved in Plaintiffs medical treatment. Accordingly, they cannot be liable for the alleged denial of medical treatment. See, e.g., Camberos v. Branstad, 73 F.3d 174, 176 (8th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 111 (2d
holding that state medical director of prison medical services corporation was not final policymaker holding that because the warden and medical treatment director lacked medical expertise they cannot be liable for the medical staffs diagnostic decision not to refer plaintiff to a doctor to treat his shoulder injury holding that conduct by the plaintiff contributing to his illness or medical condition and furnishing the occasion for medical treatment is not a defense to medical malpractice where a doctor negligently treated a man who had attempted to commit suicide holding that statements in medical records given for the primary purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment are nontestimonial holding that whether to order an xray or additional diagnostic treatment is a matter for medical judgment