to the purposes for which it was conferred by the Constitution.”). Thus in Raftdain II we held that a “waiver by a foreign state [of sovereign immunity], rendering it a party to an action, is broad enough to sustain the court’s jurisdiction through proceedings to aid collection of a money judgment rendered in the case, including discovery pertaining to the judgment debtor’s assets.” 281 F.3d at 53-54; Walters v. Indus. & Commercial Bank of China, Ltd., 651 F.3d 280, 297 (2d Cir.2011); see also FG Hemisphere Assocs., LLC v. Democratic Republic of Congo, 637 F.3d 373, 380 (D.C.Cir.2011) (upholding contempt sanctions against foreign sovereign for failing to comply with general asset discovery order); Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1477-78 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Whether a particular sovereign asset is
holding that the district court must find a total failure to respond to the discovery requested holding that district court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion to extend discovery where no effort was made to explain why the requested discovery could not have taken place within the original discovery period holding that an instrumentality of a foreign nation must respond to discovery about its worldwide assets and that it could not use the fsia to conceal its assets from the district court recognizing the need for limited jurisdictional discovery to establish exception to the fsia holding that a pro se party must be advised of consequences of failing to respond to a dispositive motion including an explanation that the failure to respond  may result in the district court granting the motion and dismissing the case