to doubt the veracity of Nyama’s story. Nothing in Nyama’s appeal persuades us that the IJ’s skepticism was unfounded. Nyama does not attempt to unravel the mystery of the four corresponding applications, or otherwise explain why his story is to be believed. Instead, Nyama contests the admissibility of the three other applications, the IJ’s credibility determination, and the IJ’s demand that Nyama obtain additional corroborating evidence. First, Nyama argues that the other applications should not have been admitted because they were hearsay. This is incorrect. The reports were offered not to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but instead to impeach the credibility of Nyama’s asylum narrative. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(c); Foster v. Gen. Motors Corp., 20 F.3d 838, 839 (8th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Even if they were hearsay, however, the
holding that agents testimony as to witnesss identification was not hearsay holding that statements offered to establish defendants state of mind in making an employment decision and  not offered for the truth of the matter asserted are not hearsay holding that some of the testimony is not being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted and there fore is not hearsay holding that a text message constituted hearsay insofar as it was offered to prove the truth of the statement asserted holding that the admission of a report was not hearsay because it was not offered to prove its truth but to impeach the veracity of the witnesss direct testimony