for them. See MCL 552.13(1) (granting the trial court authority to order one spouse to pay the other spouse’s attorney fees in order “to enable the adverse party to carry on or defend the action.”); see also MCR 3.206(C). Although the trial court correctly noted that there were precedents that indicate that a trial court can order a party to directly pay fees to an attorney, those precedents do not alter the fact that the payment is invariably for the benefit of the client or the client’s estate. See DePew v DePew, 373 Mich 162; 128 NW2d 533 (1964) (noting that the trial court had jurisdiction to order the husband to pay his wife’s attorney fees even after the parties’ reconciled and dismissed the complaint), and Stackhouse v Stackhouse, 193 Mich App 437, 439-445; 484 NW2d 723 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, even if the trial court had
holding because an award of attorney fees is discretionary court may consider attorney fees in relation to the underlying equities in the case recognizing that an appeal filed within 30 days of the entry of an order awarding attorney fees was timely filed as to the issue of attorney fees holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider an award of sanctions entered against attorney because the notice of appeal did not provide that attorney was appealing in his own name holding that the death of a dependent spouse does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to order the surviving spouse to pay the dependent spouses attorney fees and that the attorney may request the fees in his own name holding that a trial court commits plain error by imposing courtappointed attorney fees where the record is silent as to the defendants ability to pay the fees ordered