does not apply to issues which do not turn on the employer’s motivation in making the challenged employment decision.” Colin v. Guilford County Bd. of Educ., 2010 WL 3911426 at *6 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 5, 2010). Colin cited decisions of the Third, Tenth, Seventh, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits that did not apply McKennon to review of an employment discrimination plaintiffs prima facie case. Id. (citing McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 621 (3d Cir.1996), abrogated on other grounds, Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 119 S.Ct. 1597, 143 L.Ed.2d 966 (1999) (finding the after-acquired evidence an affirmative defense “that becomes meaningful once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination”); Anaeme v. Diagnostek, Inc., 164 F.3d 1275 (10th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Gilty v. Village of Oak Park, 919 F.2d 1247,
holding that mckennons discussion on afteracquired evidence did not apply to a title vii failuretohire action and the evidence to which plaintiff objected was nonetheless admissible to show that plaintiffs prima facie case was not supported by a preponderance of the evidence holding that the afteracquired evidence rule announced in mckennon applies to cases in which the afteracquired evidence concerns the employees misrepresentations in a job application or resume holding the plaintiff satisfies the burden of a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence holding that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because there was no evidence that the decisionmaker knew of the plaintiffs protected conduct holding that in title vii disparate treatment case in order for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case the plaintiff must proffer evidence among other things that she performed her job according to her employers legitimate expectations if the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case the presumption shifts the burden to the employer to produce a legitimate nondiseriminatory reason for its actions