S.W.2d at 271. Relying on her senses other than vision, Jane was able to say that the surface from which she licked the peanut butter did not feel like a finger, a spoon, or any other kind of utensil. Although Jane testified that she did not see appellant’s sexual organ and, although she could not describe it (other than distinguishing it from the objects identified above), she concluded appellant had her lick peanut butter off his sexual organ and the evidence is sufficient for the jury to have determined Jane was correct in her assessment. See Villalon, 791 S.W.2d 130, 134 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (noting that child-complainants are not expected to testify with the same clarity and ability as is expected of adults); Meeks v. State, 897 S.W.2d 950, 955 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1995, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). First, we note that Jane was consistent in
holding that circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to support a cocaine conspiracy conviction holding that direct and circumstantial evidence are to be given the same weight when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence holding that complainants failure to make incourt identification of defendant went to the weight and credibility of the witnesses and concluding circumstantial evidence was sufficient to uphold defendants conviction holding that the postconviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses holding when the defendant timely objected to an incourt identification by an eyewitness the trial judge should have directed the government to provide an outofcourt lineup or other protective procedure to avoid an impermissibly suggestive incourt identification