Nonetheless, every circuit court save one addressing the issue has held that plaintiffs’ inability to proceed on a class or collective basis in arbitration does not prevent them from vindicating their substantive rights under the FLSA. See Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013) (“There is no inconsistency between either the FLSA text or its legislative history and the conclusion that arbitration agreements containing class waivers are enforceable in cases involving the FLSA.”); Carter v. Countrywide Credit Industries, Inc., 362 F.3d 294, 298 (5th Cir.2004) (citing Gilmer and rejecting plaintiffs’ claim that their inability to proceed collectively deprives them of substantive rights available under the FLSA); Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496 (4th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Horenstein v. Mortgage Market, Inc., 9
holding that tila does not create a nonwaivable right to sue as a class holding that putative class members are not parties to an action prior to class certification holding that even where there are  contrary indications in the statutes legislative history we do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear holding that where there is no suggestion in the text legislative history or purpose of the flsa that congress intended to confer a nonwaivable right to a class action a plaintiffs inability to bring a class action cannot by itself suffice to defeat the strong congressional preference for an arbitral forum holding that the right of all putative members of a proposed class in an action filed pursuant to kansass class action rule of civil procedure to file a separate action is preserved pending the determination of whether the initial case shall be maintained as a class action