that liability attaches to all transactions in a hazardous substance.’ ” Id. at 360 (quoting Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685 F.Supp. 651 (N.D.Ill.), aff'd, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir.1988)). Liability only attaches to parties that have “taken an affirmative act to dispose of a hazardous substance ... as opposed to convey a useful substance for a useful purpose.” Prudential Ins. Co. v. United States Gypsum, 711 F.Supp. 1244, 1253 (D.N.J.1989). Thus, it has been held that no arrangement for disposal of hazardous wastes has taken place where there has been a conveyance of a “useful, albeit dangerous product, to serve a particular, intended purpose.” Id. at 1255, quoted in Kelley, 739 F.Supp. at 358; cf. United States v. A & F Materials Co., 582 F.Supp. 842 (S.D.Ill.1984) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the district court determined
holding that subsequent to a judicial sale the report of the sale must be made to and ratified by the court before a deed for the property is given by the trustee to the purchaser holding that a person who obtains drugs from a seller is not an accomplice of the seller holding that the circuit courts statutory power in a divorce suit did not inherently extend to the disposal of the personal property of a party holding that the seller of a caustic solution could be a responsible party under cercla if the motivation for the sale was the disposal of the solution holding unenforceable certain financing arrangements under a contract for the sale of property upon which the seller is liable for taxes if the sale was consummated with intent to avoid such tax or in fraud of the internal revenue laws