with the passage of the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-3598 (1994), Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title VI, § 60026,108 Stat. 1982. In pertinent part, § 3005 reads: Whoever is indicted for treason or other capital crime shall be allowed to make his full defense by counsel; and the court before which the defendant is to be tried, or a judge thereof, shall promptly, upon the defendant’s request assign 2 such counsel, of whom at least 1 shall be learned in the law applicable to capital cases.... 18 U.S.C. § 3005 (2000). On its face, the statute is clear that two attorneys must be appointed to represent a defendant promptly upon the defendant’s request after the defendant is indicted for a capital crime. See In re Sterling-Suarez, 306 F.3d 1170, 1173 (1st Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). The question we address in this case is
holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty holding that the judicial determination of fugitive status must be made only after the probationer has been found and brought before the court regardless of whether this occurs before or after the date on which probation was originally to have expired holding that the statutory requirement applies promptly after indictment not only after the attorney general has made a determination to seek the death penalty holding that the confrontation clause applies through the finding of guilt but not to sentencing even when that sentence is the death penalty holding that the decision to seek the death penalty is made by a separate branch of the government and is therefore not a cognizable federal issue