to arbitrate is not as broad and expansive as defendants contend. Although I recognize that generally agreements to arbitrate should be broadly construed to effectuate the purpose behind the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq., nevertheless, the parties can only be compelled to arbitrate a dispute if in fact they agreed to do so. The necessary inquiry then is whether in fact the parties before the court agreed to arbitrate the dispute contained in this lawsuit. See Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, 489 U.S. 468, 478, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 103 L.Ed.2d 488 (1989) (“the FAA does not require parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so”); State of N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 90 F.3d 58, 62 (2d. Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); see also Oldroyd v. Elmira Savings Bank,
holding that claim was not subject to mandatory arbi tration because the parties specifically excluded it from the general arbitration clause holding that whether in federal or state court a challenge to the validity of the contract as a whole and not specifically to the arbitration clause within it must go to the arbitrator and not the court holding that because a valid arbitration clause existed the parties had to arbitrate all disputes when the subject matter of the dispute has a reasonable relationship to the subject matter of the contract holding that a mandatory arbitration clause does not preclude litigating a federal statutory claim holding that the analogy to arbi tration agreement is not persuasive in part because the principal feature of an arbitration agreement is that the contracting parties agree they will not submit their controversy to a court of law in the first instance