that the Diocese was fully insured. But Gallagher cannot. The record plainly indicates that both Gallagher and the Diocese consented to the plan (with the dollar changes) and that there was a certain object to the plan (i.e., the provision of full insurance coverage above the loss fund). Therefore, the Diocese and Gallagher had a valid contract, and Gallagher expressly warranted a specific result. Accordingly, the Diocese’s claims against Gallagher, at least with regard to the first year of the plan, are contractual and thus timely filed. Next, Gallagher contends in the alternative that, even if it expressly warranted that the Diocese would be fully insured for ication, silence, or inaction. See, e.g., W.R. Aldrich & Co. v. Spalitta, 285 So.2d 835, 836-37 (La.Ct.App.1973) (<HOLDING>). A modification will, however, not be effected
holding consent was given involuntarily when a reasonable person would not have felt they had the choice to withhold consent to search holding consent invalid where defendant threatened by officer that everyone in the house would go to jail if he did not sign consent form holding that to preserve an alleged error in the admission of evidence a timely objection must be made to the introduction of the evidence specific grounds for the objection should be stated and a ruling on the objection must be made by the trial court holding that although person who hired an excavating company did not expressly consent to a modification in the cost of the contract he did consent by implication when he asked for location of excavation to be changed was advised that the eost would be greater and made no objection holding that a defendants consent is not rendered involuntary by the fact that he was in custody and was not advised of his constitutional rights before the officers requested his consent to search or by the fact that he was eighteen years old chemically messed up and tired