503 F.3d at 717-719 (concluding that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of age discrimination but holding that defendant’s decision to replace the plaintiff with someone twenty-eight years younger was insufficient to persuade jury that the plaintiff was discriminated against). The approximately thirty-seven year age difference between Dunn and Brittany is significant enough to satisfy the fourth element of Dunn’s prima facie case. See Riley v. Lance, Inc., 518 F.3d 996, 1000 (8th Cir.2008) (“As to part four of the prima facie case, Lance does not dispute Riley’s contention that he was replaced with a substantially younger person. That fact alone gives rise to the necessary inference of age discrimination.”); Keathley v. Ameritech Corp., 187 F.3d 915, 920-21 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) abrogated on other grounds by Torgerson, 643
holding that age discrimination claim was subject to compulsory arbitration holding that age discrimination is not a personal injury tort holding that fourteenyear age difference is sufficient to infer discrimination holding age discrimination claim barred holding that a statement of fact relating to the plaintiffs age was not direct evidence of age discrimination because the relevance of the comment is provided by inference