past and admission by defendant that there was nothing to be done). Construing Brown’s claims of Scarberry’s prior knowledge and repetition of the incidents liberally, we conclude that he has alleged sufficient deliberate indifference to require a response from Scar-berry. However, Brown’s complaint does not substantively mention Defendant R. Brock, Food Services Manager, and does not allege any prior knowledge on his behalf, aside from the fact that he is in a management position in food services at the prison and that he responded to certain grievances. As the principles of re-spondeat superior do not apply in § 1983 cases, Brown’s allegations are insufficient to state a claim against Brock. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we dismiss No. 15-6685, affirm
holding that immunity is not waived for injury or death caused by negligent supervision holding that defendant in  1983 action may not be sued solely for injury caused by his employee or agent holding that an ohio municipal court could not be sued under  1983 because it was not a person as  1983 uses that term holding that an injury is not within the scope of employment after the employee has left work unless the injury was caused by the employers negligence holding that a defendant can only be sued in his official capacity under  1983 if he acted pursuant to an official policy or custom in causing the constitutional injury