this belief. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d at 909; Babb, 133 Idaho at 892, 994 P.2d at 635; Fleenor, 133 Idaho at 555, 989 P.2d at 787. In our analysis of a frisk, we look to the facts known to the officer o (concluding that “a number of courts have held, and we agree, that a police officer may lawfully frisk a burglary suspect”); Nelson v. Commonwealth, 24 Va.App. 823, 485 S.E.2d 673, 674-75 (1997) (noting that where burglary is the crime for which the suspect is lawfully detained, it is not unreasonable for the investigating officer to conduct a pat-down search to assure his or her safety as the investigation continues). We note that the logic employed by these jurisdictions is consistent with State v. Burgess, 104 Idaho 559, 561, 661 P.2d 344, 346 (Ct.App.1983) (<HOLDING>). Terry frisks of suspected burglars have been
holding that it is not unreasonable to believe that burglars can be armed and dangerous holding that an officer must be able to point to particular facts from which he reasonably inferred that the individual was armed and dangerous holding that it is not holding that it would be clearly unreasonable to deny a police officer the ability to neutralize the threat of physical harm if he has reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and dangerous holding that it is the use not marketing of firearms that is dangerous