the considerable added expense incurred as a result of Austin’s abuses. Although both goals are important, the primary rationale for the imposition of sanctions on Austin is to deter him from engaging in future abuse. See Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 393, 110 S.Ct. at 2454; accord White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 683 (10th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1069, 111 S.Ct. 788, 112 L.Ed.2d 850 (1991). Despite the requirement that trial courts be precise in issuing sanction orders, the court has “wide discretion” in determining an appropriate amount of sanctions to impose on a party. In re Mark Indus., 751 F.2d 1219, 1224 (Fed.Cir.1984) (permitting trial court discretion in imposing remedial sanctions); see also Kirk Capital Corp. v. Bailey, 16 F.3d 1485, 1490 (8th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). To establish the appropriate amount of
holding that a motion for rule 11 sanctions is dispositive holding that an award of sanctions under rule 11 survives despite a later determination that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction holding that a rule 11 sanctions award need only be appropriate thereby according broad discretion to the trial court holding that trial court abused its discretion by denying a motion for rule 11 sanctions without adequate explanation holding that courts of appeals should review all aspects of the district courts rule 11 determination for abuse of discretion and noting that the district court has broad discretion to impose rule 11 sanctions