Therefore, in conducting our review, we also focus on the legal significance of the conduct that the district court classified as race-based. At least through that restricted lens, as the district court suggested, the pervasiveness question is arguably a close one. Cf. Herrera, 474 F.3d at 681, 683 (where plaintiffs supervisor, inter alia, repeatedly referred to him when speaking with other co-workers as “the fucking Mexican,” concluding that the evidence of pervasiveness was sufficient, but “presented] a close question”); cf. also Al-Kazaz v. Unitherm Food Sys., Inc., 594 F. App’x 460, 463 (10th Cir.2014) (collecting cases from other circuits where plaintiffs were “continually subjected to offensive comments”); Mos-by-Grant v. City of Hagerstown, 630 F.3d 326, 336 (4th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). But the pervasiveness inquiry “is not
holding that the pervasiveness element was satisfied in a case involving copious evidence of sexbased hostility holding evidence of repayment was irrelevant in case involving title misrepresentations to obtain loans holding that in a case involving misrepresentations in violation of securities and exchange commission rule 10b5 under the circumstances of this case involving primarily a failure to disclose positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery holding that evidence of similar incidents is probative as to notice element in premises liability case holding that even though some of employees duties appeared to satisfy the directly related element the element was not satisfied where those duties were not part of his primary duty