basis in which defendants are considered. I question whether that concern for individuality exists under a system which not only admits expert testimony deduced without examining the subject but also, as in this case, accepts the possibility that jurors will allow that evidence, rather than factors more personal to a defendant’s crime and character, to effectively condemn that individual to death. 1 . As the Court of Criminal Appeals admitted, "the State’s case at [Flores’] punishment [hearing], to some extent, rested upon Dr. Griffith's testimony.” Flores v. State, 871 S.W.2d 83, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983) (allowing the use of psychological testimony on a defendant’s alleged "future dangerousness”); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 108 S.Ct.
holding that the trier of fact must be allowed to consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence recognizing that texas courts have adopted the aamr definition of mental retardation providing that mental retardation must manifest before age of 18 years holding that the sentencing structure allowed the jury to give mitigating effect to petitioners prison record holding that the key under pewy i  is that the jury be able to consider and give effect to a defendants mitigating evidence in imposing sentence holding that the sentencing procedure was inadequate in failing to allow jury to give mitigating effect to defendants mental retardation and abusive background