with whom Justice Breyer joins, dissenting. Although I agree with nearly all of what Justice Ginsburg has written in her concurrence — a concurrence that raises serious concerns that the Court totally ignores — I dissent for the following reasons. The mere fact that a false denial fits within the unqualified language of 18 U. S. C. § 1001 is not, in my opinion, a suffic 1932) (“We are unable to conclude that it was the intention of the Congress in enacting [a Prohibition Act] statute that its processes of detection and enforcement should be abused by the instigation by government officials of an act on the part of persons otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its commission and to punish them”); United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, 631 (1818) (opinion of Marshall, C. J.) (<HOLDING>). Although the text of § 1001, read literally,
holding that although words any person or persons in maritime robbery statute are broad enough to comprehend every human being    general words must not only be limited to cases within the jurisdiction of the state but also to those objects to which the legislature intended to apply them recognizing that the court must give meaning to all the words in the claims holding that a jury could find an intent to discriminate from evidence of use of code words such as all of you and one of them the words themselves are only relevant for what they reveal  the intent of the speaker recognizing that we must give meaning to all the words in the claims holding that if the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous a court must derive legislative intent from the words used without involving rules of construction or speculating as to what the legislature intended