and that the additional clause “without demand or notice” means, simply, that the holder may exercise such option without giving to the maker any notice of such intention and without demand for the payment of the unpaid balance which would thus be accelerated. As [defendant] argues, this of course does not mean that the holder can exercise the option by some secret mental process on [his or] her part not evidenced by some form of affirmative action, such as by bringing suit thereon, or say, by entering the entire unpaid balance as immediately due and payable upon [his or] her books of account. It is imperative that some act, signifying an intention to accelerate must appear[.] Id. (emphases added); see also Fletcher v. Public Fin. Co. of Alabama, 429 So.2d 1039, 1040 (Ala.Civ.App.1981) (<HOLDING>), rev’d on other grounds, Ex Parte Fletcher,
holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or holding that a bank is required to notify the maker of a promissory note by some affirmative act upon exercise of its option to accelerate the maturity date of the note holding that the holder of the note must act in a manner that effectively provides notice that the holder has exercised his option holding that the option to accelerate a promissory note does not operate automatically but some act is required to effect such acceleration holding that the words without notice or demand in an optional acceleration clause do not negate the requirement that the holder affirmatively elect to accelerate the debt because the option is not selfexecuting it is mandatory that some definitive action be made on the part of the lender citation omitted