Justice. The parties’ 1975 consent divorce decree required William M. Armistead, the husband, to pay $25 per week in child support and establish an educational fund in the wife’s name “for the benefit of and use for [their son’s] educational purposes.” After the son turned 18, Deborah Fields moved for contempt for Armistead’s failure to pay any amount into the educational fund. The trial court denied the motion, holding the provision was void for indefiniteness and vagueness. We reverse. A contract between a husband and wife in a divorce case is subject to the usual rules for construction of contracts. Brown v. Farkas, 195 Ga. 653 (25 SE2d 411) (1943). The cardinal rule of construction is to ascertain the intention of the parties, w (1976) (<HOLDING>). Armistead’s obligation to make payments to
holding requirement to pay tuition for the children as they reach college age not vague holding agreement to pay for education expenses after high school not vague holding factor b is not unconstitutionally vague holding that although parents have a fundamental right to the care and custody of their children they have no fundamental right to allocate support to their children as they see fit holding that a tuition waiver is not the same as income for child support purposes