399, 409 (1988); U.S.A. Chamber of Commerce v. State, 89 N.J. 131, 157-158, 445 A.2d 353 (1982); American Fire & Cos. Co. v. New Jersey Dep’t of Ins., 256 N.J.Super. 423, 428, 607 A.2d 196 (App.Div.1992). When legislation impinges upon a fundamental right, or disparately treats a suspect class, it is subject to strict scrutiny, Rinier v. State of New Jersey, 273 N.J.Super. 135, 140, 641 A.2d 276 (App.Div.1994) (citing Drew Assocs. of NJ, LP v. Travisano, 122 N.J. 249, 258, 584 A.2d 807 (1991), certif. denied, 138 N.J. 269, 649 A.2d 1288 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1016, 115 S.Ct. 1358, 131 L.Ed.2d 216 (1995)), thereby requiring that the statute be the least restrictive alternative to accomplish a compelling governmen tal interest. San Antonio Sc . 118, 495 A.2d 1362 (App.Div.1985) (<HOLDING>). The equal protection safeguard “is offended
holding that the right to vote is fundamental holding contribution limits even those that operate as a ban not subject to strict scrutiny holding that a law that merely affects voting without actually denying the right to vote or depriving voters of equal representation is usually not subject to strict scrutiny holding that a fair referendum assuring the equal right to vote under  101a1 includes the right of members to have the vote scheduled at a time when they can exercise their vote and the right to be free from intimidation or fear of reprisal holding that nearly identical kansas statute did not violate equal protection clause when subjected to strict scrutiny