exercises apparent authority over an area, officers may justifiably rely on consent to search); see also United States v. Anderson, 859 F.2d 1171, 1176-77 (3d Cir.1988). The request that initiated the constitutional violation is otherwise constitutionally insignificant. It should be stressed that at no time did Officer Dale ask the defendant for permission to search the trunk. Mr. Wogan was being held in a car a few feet away, and his consent would have obviated the constitutional concerns now implicated. See id. Nevertheless, Officer Dale simply acquiesced to Hill’s request, committing a Fourth Amendment violation in the process. Officer Dale’s altruistic motives do not excuse this infringement. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (<HOLDING>). B. Search Following Consent But the
holding that as long as officers possess a valid warrant the subjective intent of officers is irrelevant holding that under the fourth amendment the motive of the officer when stopping a vehicle for a minor traffic infraction whether subjective or objective is completely irrelevant holding that motive of officers is generally irrelevant to fourth amendment analysis holding that motive is circumstantial evidence of intent recognizing private damage action for fourth amendment violations by federal officers