the exceptions to the preservation requirement). Finally, Defendant argues that her BAC results should have been excluded because the test was not performed within three hours of arrest, as required by 7.33.2.15(A)(2) NMAC. We note that this regulation has been superseded by statute. Section 66-8-110(E) (“If the test performed pursuant to the Implied Consent Act is administered more than three hours after the person was driving a vehicle, the test result may be introduced as evidence of the alcohol concentration in the person’s blood or breath at the time of the test and the trier of fact shall determine what weight to give the test result.”). Any time lapse impacts the weight of the evidence, not admissibility. See State v. Bowden, 2010-NMCA-070, ¶¶ 8-12, 148 N.M. 850, 242 P.3d 417 (<HOLDING>). II. Validity of the Search Warrant Next,
holding that where there is a conflict between statutes the more recent statute is controlling and a specific provision prevails over a general provision relating to the same subject matter holding that the judges independent investigation into a factual assertion and revelation of the results of that investigation to counsel deprived defendant of his right to an impartial judge and finder of fact and thus constituted structural error holding that when a statute and a guideline conflict the statute controls recognizing the principle that gives precedence to the terms of the more specific statute where a general statute and a specific statute speak to the same concern holding that where a statute and regulation conflict the statute generally prevails and also explaining that section 668110e permits test results taken more than three hours after the person was driving to be admitted into evidence and gives the fact finder the discretion to give appropriate weight to the results