to litigate the issues raised in his habeas corpus application or that his failure to do so before now should be excused. Ex parte Tuan Van Truong, 770 S.W.2d 810, 815 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (Teague, J., dissenting). 2 . A conclusion with which I strongly disagree. See infra Part III. 3 . Because we are not required to write an opinion explaining the reason or reasons we deny relief on applications of habeas corpus, the number of times that we deny relief on the basis that the claim should have been raised on direct appeal may not be apparent to most members of the bench and bar. 4 . We appointed applicant’s first habeas counsel in October 1997. At that time, counsel had been out of law school for just under three years and had been licensed by .Ct. 2765, 106 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (<HOLDING>). 10 . In Coleman, the defendant complained
holding that there is no right to counsel beyond the initial direct appeal and thus no right to counsel in collateral attacks recognizing the right to counsel on appeal recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel holding that there is no federal or colorado constitutional right to postconviction counsel but there is a limited statutory right holding that a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel as a matter of right on direct appeal