supporting evidence.’ ” Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir.2004) (quoting Cordero-Trejo v. INS, 40 F.3d 482, 491 (1st Cir.1994)). Here, the agency reasonably determined that Alvarez-Elvira did not produce evidence showing a nexus between the political opinion. Alvarez-Elvira’s testimony about the threat she received, who made the threat, and what motivated the threat (other than a desire for information on how the assassinated mayor ran his office) was vague and undetailed. A single threat from unidentified individuals, for unknown reasons, is insufficient to establish an objective fear of future persecution on the protected ground of political belief. See Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d at 178; Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Alvarez-Elvira testified that she
holding that to constitute persecution the harm must rise above mere harassment holding that harm must be sufficiently severe rising above mere harassment to constitute persecution holding that to constitute persecution the harm must be sufficiently severe rising above mere harassment holding that persecution is an extreme concept requiring more than mere harassment holding that to constitute persecution harm must be more than harassment