Thompson have interpreted Thompson’s, three-part test. See Larson v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 328 N.W.2d 343 (Iowa.Ct.App.1982) (evidence that employee’s supervisor knew of danger associated with post-hole digger machine’s unshielded “power take-off shaft,” that he was familiar with the reasons underlying subsequent Occupational Safely and Health Administration regulations requiring guards to shield the shafts, that he knew that his order requiring weight to be placed on post-hole digger arm required worker to work in close proximity to the unshielded shaft, and that injury was probable whenever working near unshielded moving parts sustained finding that supervisor was guilty of wanton neglect and thus could be held liable to injured worker); Taylor v. Peck, 382 N.W.2d 123 (Iowa 1986) (<HOLDING>); Justus v. Anderson, 400 N.W.2d 66
holding that a defendant owed no duty to a plaintiff with regard to the safekeeping of evidence because there was no promise by the defendant or its employees to inspect or safeguard the evidence for the plaintiffs benefit and destruction of physical evidence was not criminal because destruction was innocent and designed to ensure the safety of the defendants employees holding that although there was evidence of discrimination based on race there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of constructive discharge holding that the court properly refused to instruct on an issue for which no evidence was offered holding that there was insufficient evidence of wanton neglect by coemployee toward claimant to impose liability on coemployee where there had been no previous accidents on particular punch press no safety inspections to alert employee of danger or malfunction concerning activation of machine and no evidence that coemployee knew that safety mechanism was partially dismantled and coemployee did not instruct claimant to put her hand into die to cheek loose pin holding that the trial court properly failed to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication and manslaughter where there was no evidence that the appellant was intoxicated at the time of the offense although there was evidence that the appellant had been drinking beer on the day of the offense where there was no evidence concerning the quantity of beer he had consumed