working on behalf of the defendant’s attorney. Yet, the text clearly states that “the victim must be clearly informed by the defendant’s attorney,” not “the defense” or “other agents of the defendant.” As the Supreme Court has stated on several occasions, different words used in the same statute generally mean different things. See, e.g., Dept. of Transportation v. Stallcup, 341 Or 93, 101, 138 P3d 9 (2006) (use of different terms in real estate appraisal statute suggests that each was intended to have different meaning); State v. Glaspey, 337 Or 558, 564-65, 100 P3d 730 (2004) (use of different terms in assault statute — “victim” in one provision and victim’s “child” in the other — means that one is not the same as the other); State v. Keeney, 323 Or 309, 316, 918 P2d 419 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Here, the different words are not only in the
holding that when the legislature enacts a statute it is presumed that the legislature is aware of existing statutes recognizing that the legislature would not generally use a different meaning for the same word in a legislative provision unless a different purpose was intended holding that the plaintiffs had relied on illinois law because they could have filed in a different forum having a different statute of limitations holding that the legislature intends different meanings when it uses different terms in a statute holding that an arbitrator was not bound by an earlier award involving a different contract and different union