making mistakes. Thus, any prejudice against the Defendant was at best minimal and could have been turned to the Defendant’s advantage by his counsel. Even if any prejudice did result, it most certainly did not permeate the entire trial and impact the result as it appears only once in the transcript and never was mentioned later during the trial. See United States v. Beckett, 706 F.2d 519, 520 (5th Cir.1983) (“Prosecutorial misconduct, fortunately occurring only occasionally, mars any trial in which it occurs and gives grounds for appeal. But a conviction should not be set aside if the prosecutor’s conduct, however, wrongful, did not in fact contribute to the guilty verdict and was, therefore, legally harmless.”); see also United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1563-66 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). This ground for a new trial, therefore, is
holding that prosecutors direct comments on a defendants failure to testify were not cured by subsequent inclusion in the jury charge of an instruction regarding the defendants right not to testify holding that trial judges admonition of the jury to disregard prosecutors comments on the defendants failure to testify did not cure the error holding that prosecutors allegedly improper closing arguments regarding burden of proof defendants failure to testify and other allegations did not case serious doubt upon the correctness of the jury verdict or the fairness of the trial holding that the prosecutors comment regarding the defendants failure to call a potential witness did not shift the burden of proof because it did not implicate the defendants fifth amendment right not to testify holding that any potential prejudice regarding burdenshifting is diminished by the prosecutors statement that the burden of proof is the governments and the courts explicit instructions regarding the burden of proof in the jury charge