even assuming that they did. See United States v. Rodriguez, 43 F.3d 117, 122 (5th Cir.1995) (assuming for the sake of argument that a Doyle violation occurred where the “prosecutor’s questions were sufficiently broad as to be construed as commentary on [the defendant’s] failure to come forward with his alibi (1) prior to arrest, (2) immediately after arrest and Miranda warnings ..., and (3) during the time period prior to trial but following his arrest”); cf. United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427, 440 (3d Cir.1996) (assuming arguendo that the prosecutor’s questions violated Doyle and proceeding to harmless-error analysis). B. We hold that any Doyle violation here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (<HOLDING>); Balter, 91 F.3d at 440 (“The Supreme Court
holding that a constitutional error is harmless where it can be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained holding that before an error can be held harmless the reviewing court must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the defendants conviction holding that in order to conclude that federal constitutional error is harmless court must find that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt holding that the harmless error test places a burden on the state to prove that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or alternatively stated that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction holding that error is considered harmless if it is established beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or alternatively stated that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction