Carlson’s policy with NAFCO covers its Y2K expenses. There is no legal relationship between Carlson and the reinsurers, and there is no case or controversy. Contrary to Carlson’s assertions, this Court cannot extend its subject matter jurisdiction to cases not involving a case or controversy by virtue of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act. In the alternative, Carlson argues that, if the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act does not grant this Court broader jurisdiction, the Court should apply the Minnesota Declaratory Judgment Act. Carlson acknowledges that declaratory judgment acts are procedural rules and, thus, in a diversity case the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act should apply. See Shelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671, 70 S.Ct. 876, 94 L.Ed. 1194 (1950) (<HOLDING>). Carlson instead contends that the “outcome
recognizing that the declaratory judgment act is procedural in nature and not an extension of federal court jurisdiction recognizing that the declaratory judgment act is only procedural and does not create substantive rights internal quotation marks and citations omitted holding that the declaratory judgment act is remedial only and the party seeking declaratory relief must have an underlying cause of action holding that where the question to be resolved in the declaratory judgment action will be decided in a pending action it is inappropriate to grant a declaratory judgment holding that the declaratory judgment act is a procedural device