and (3) if the information is not otherwise discoverable by reasonable care. Id. ¶¶ 12-13 (citing Ducheneaux, 488 N.W.2d at 913 (adopting Restatement (Second) Torts § 551(2)(e))). [¶ 18.] We must first consider whether Les’s intent to open a competing business is a fact basic to the transaction. We have said that the “facts basic to the transaction” analysis is best suited to cases in which the advantage taken of the plaintiffs ignorance is so shocking to the ethical sense of the community and is so extreme and unfair as to amount to a form of swindling, in which the plaintiff is led by appearances into a bargain that is a trap, of whose essence and substance he is unaware. Id. ¶ 13 (quoting Restatement (Second) Torts § 551(2)(e)(emt 1)). See, e.g., Ducheneaux, 488 N.W.2d at 913 (<HOLDING>). [¶ 19.] Les’s failure to disclose his intent
holding that the defendant could not appeal a jury instruction where he did not object to the challenged instruction but in fact requested it and stated he was satisfied with it holding that the requirements under uifsa were not met therefore a south dakota judgment modifying a utah child support order was declared void holding it immaterial that one charged with willfully selling unregistered securities had no actual knowledge that he was violating the law because he was presumed to have and is chargeable with knowledge of the laws under which he was undertaking to do business holding that appellate court could not review the sufficiency of the evidence  based on a particular legal standard because that standard was not submitted to the jury and no party objected to the charge on this ground or requested that the jury be charged using this standard holding that this high standard was satisfied when a rancher did not disclose that the cattle he was selling were infected with a contagious disease that prevented importing them into south dakota