that placed a forty-five day time limit on the administrator’s decision to grant or deny a license. See Redner, 29 F.3d at 1500. In the event the administrator exceeded the forty-five day time limit, the ordinance stated that “the applicant may be permitted to begin operating the establishment for which a license is sought," unless and until the County Administrator notifies the applicant of a denial of the application.” See id. at 1500-01 (citation omitted). We held that the ordinance was unconstitutional on its face because its use of the word “may” rather than “shall” allowed the individuals responsible for enforcing the ordinance to suppress the protected expression for an indefinite time period prior to any action on their part or any judicial determination. See id. at 1501 (<HOLDING>). In Lady J. Lingerie, we examined the
holding that a plaintiff had standing to attack an entire ordinance including portions of the ordinance not applied to the plaintiff holding that a party may not invoke the capable of repetition yet evading review exception where its failure to obtain prompt relief has prevented judicial review holding also that the ordinance failed to provide for prompt judicial review holding that because here the statutes in issue provide for judicial review via citizen suit provisions yet do not set forth a standard for that review judicial review is limited to apa review on the administrative record holding that the llupa does not provide for judicial review of a request to change a comprehensive zoning plan