which is found by the court to be necessary for the preparation of the party’s case, and reasonable attorney fees....” Id. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The omission of “costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a)” from sub-paragraph (d)(1)(B), which sets the 30-day time limit, indicates that the 30-day limit applies only to an application for attorney’s fees and expenses. The statute does not provide a similar time limit for an application for costs, thus the 14-day time limit in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39 applies and bars Haselwander’s application for costs. EAJA defines a “party” for purposes of the Act as “an individual whose n 007) (same). Appellant is a “prevailing party” in this case. See, e.g., Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 298-302, 118 S.Ct. 2625, 125 L.Ed.2d 239 (1993) (<HOLDING>). He is therefore eligible for attorney’s fees.
holding that even under the catalyst theory a plaintiff is not a prevailing party unless he obtains the relief sought or at least relief that is directly beneficial to him holding that a party has mental capacity if she appreciated the effect of what she was doing and understood the nature and consequences of her acts and the business she was transacting holding that the prevailing party inquiry does not turn on the magnitude of the relief obtained holding that exhaustion is required even where the relief sought is not available in the administrative process holding that a petitioner who obtains reversal of an administrative order denying benefits is a prevailing party even if she has not yet successfully obtained the relief she sought from the agency