that the district judge grant the prison officers’ motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to paragraphs one through four of Count III; this the district court did by minute order dated August 3, 1999. However, the district court never acted on the recommendation that it construe the screening order as another report and recommendation, nor did it ever enter an order dismissing any counts of the complaint, which it was required to do since the magistrate judge lacks power to enter a dispositive order. See 28 U.S.C. § 636. This would ordinarily mean that there is not a final judgment for us to review since there are still claims pending before the district court, and thus, that we would lack appellate jurisdiction. See Chacon v. Babcock, 640 F.2d 221, 222 (9th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). In this case, however, it is clear from the
recognizing the general rule that once all claims against all parties have been dismissed a prior order will become final for purposes of appeal under 28 usc  1291 holding that summary judgment order that does not dispose of all claims between parties does not confer appellate jurisdiction because it is not a final decision under 28 usc  1291 holding summary judgment order was not a final judgment because it did not dispose of the defendants claim for attorneys fees holding that order denying motion to dismiss a bankruptcy petition is final under 28 usc  1291 holding that an order is not a final appealable order when it does not dispose of the complaints against all of the defendants