is not an adjunct to the district court and therefore does not have statutory powers under 28 U.S.C. § 451 to enter a final judgment in this case. The Court disagrees with Debtor’s contention that a bankruptcy judge lacks the constitutional power to enter a final judgment in this adversary proceeding. The Supreme Court held in the Stem case that the bankruptcy court lacked constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on a state law counterclaim based on tortious interference, but that it had the statutory authority to do so under § 157(b)(2)(C). Further, a turnover proceeding like this one is a paradigmatic exercise of the Court’s in rem jurisdiction, very different from the scenarios considered in Stern. See, e.g., In re Pali Holdings, Inc., 488 B.R. 841 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2013) (<HOLDING>). A turnover action is expressly listed in 28
holding that bankruptcy court could constitutionally exercise its in rem jurisdiction to issue final judgment for turnover of amount owing on promissory note holding that where prior state court had in rem jurisdiction district court could maintain in personam jurisdiction and simply deny requests for conflicting in rem relief because district court is fully capable of preventing inappropriate conversion of the suit to a proceeding truly in rem holding that a bank is required to notify the maker of a promissory note by some affirmative act upon exercise of its option to accelerate the maturity date of the note holding that a party cannot waive in rem jurisdiction under florida law and a court proceeding pursuant to in rem jurisdiction must actually possess in rem jurisdiction over the property that is the subject of the matter holding that when the basis of the earlier suit was that the plaintiff had had defaulted on a promissory note and the claim in the instant action is whether that promissory note was valid the transaction test is met