conspicuously fails to provide any authority to support [the] contention” that Brooks recognizes two separate and distinct constitutional rights is misplaced. [Response at 4.] The Supreme Court clearly divided the Brooks decision into two sections: (1) the right to remain silent; and (2) the right to due process. Since then, the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that Brooks protects a criminal defendant’s right to remain silent and his right to “make independent decisions about how to conduct the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (some citations omitted) (citing Brooks, 406 U.S. at 612-13, 92 S.Ct. at 1895, 32 L.Ed.2d 358); see also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659, n. 25, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Panza, 612 F.2d 432, 439
recognizing that brooks protects against denial of counsel at a critical stage of his trial holding that sentencing is a critical stage of criminal proceedings and the offer of counsel must be renewed at each critical stage where the defendant appears without counsel holding that posttrial motion for new trial is critical stage requiring counsel or valid waiver holding that the filing of a motion for a new trial is a critical stage of the prosecution and that an indigent defendant is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel at that stage holding postindictment lineup is critical stage of trial at which defendant is entitled to presence of counsel