trial. Rather, § 4241(d) provides that the Attorney General “shall hospitalize the defendant ... as is necessary” to determine whether the defendant’s condition will improve. Ferro’s argument simply is not supported by the language of the statute. Moreover, several other circuits have considered whether § 4241(d) requires commitment to the Attorney General upon an initial finding of incompetency, and in all cases, the courts have concluded that the statute is mandatory. See United States v. Filippi, 211 F.3d 649, 651 (1st Cir.2000) (stating that the statute establishes a general rule of commitment without a “case-by-case choice by the district court as to whether to incarcerate once the incompetency finding has been made”); United States v. Donofno, 896 F.2d 1301, 1302 (11th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Shawar, 865 F.2d 856, 860
holding that the language of the statute is mandatory and the commission must act within 180 days holding that the term shall is mandatory for purposes of statutory construction when the statute is unambiguous holding that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional holding that the statute is mandatory holding that application note 6 is not mandatory