extent Therrien’s actions contributed to these errors. Therefore, we must reverse and remand the Paragraph 7 portion of the liability determination to allow the court to make the appropriate factual findings. See Crawford v. Johnson, 489 S.E.2d 552, 555 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding summary judgment on claim for contribution or indemnity against attorney to the extent that plaintiffs liability was based on his own fraud and willful conversion, but remanding on other parts of claim that may have been caused by attorney's actions); see also Carr v. Peerless Ins. Co., 168 Vt. 465, 476, 724 A.2d 454, 461 (1998) (“Summary judgment is inappropriate if there is a disputed issue of material fact.”); Berlin Dev. Assocs. v. Dep’t of Soc. Welfare, 142 Vt. 107, 112, 453 A.2d 397, 400-01 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Further, although liability under Paragraph 9
recognizing propriety of granting partial summary judgment pursuant to vrcp 56d as method for dealing with complex litigation holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment holding that the plaintiff had standing to pursue its takings claim while granting plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment that the government was liable for partial breach of contract holding that a denial of a motion for partial summary judgment is interlocutory and subject to revision at discretion of the court holding that the court lacked appellate jurisdiction over a partial summary judgment on liability in a qualified immunity case