A little blood trail coming down the side of [Bagwell’s] face. Now how did he get that? How did [Bagwell] get that? How did he get this right here? How did he get this cut? One way he could have gotten this cut, ladies and gentlemen, one way is if when he ran out, ran through the glass in a hurry, see the arc on this glass? He could have cut his eye when he was running out. When [Armstrong] startled them when they came back. Although the DNA test results indicating Bagwell’s blood was not found on the pieces of glass do not exonerate Bagwell or preclude the possibility of his guilt, we believe the jury more likely than not would have reached a different verdict had this evidence been presented at trial. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S.Ct. 770, 792, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) (<HOLDING>). The evidence would have rebutted the State’s
holding that the prejudice prong in strickland was not satisfied because counsels failure to raise an evidentiary issue would not have altered the result of the proceedings because the erroneous admission of the evidence would have constituted harmless error recognizing strickland prejudice does not require a showing that counsels actions more likely than not altered the outcome but the difference between stricklands prejudice standard and a moreprobablethannot standard is slight and matters only in the rarest case  holding that in defining the reasonable probability language in strickland with more precision substantial possibility describes the prejudice standard in strickland holding stricklands prejudice prong was not met because appellate counsels failure to raise an evidentiary issue would not have altered the result of the proceedings because the erroneous admission of evidence would have constituted harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt holding that an assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice