(en banc) (further quotation omitted). This seizure implicates a passenger’s Fourth Amendment interests to the same degree as the driver’s. Erwin, 875 F.2d at 270 (“[W]e reject any notion that a vehicular stop detains for Fourth Amendment purposes only the driver simply because the passenger may be free to depart.”). We assess the reasonableness of a routine traffic stop under the principles laid out for investigative detentions in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), considering “ “whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.’ ” Holt, 264 F.3d at 1220 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868); see also id. at 1230 (<HOLDING>). We must examine “both the length of the
holding that an officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop even when his suspicion that a law has been violated is based on a reasonable mistake of law holding that a traffic stop is valid under the fourth amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring holding that a traffic stop is reasonable under the fourth amendment when police have probable cause to believe a traffic infraction has occurred holding this framework applies whether the traffic stop is based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion holding that a conclusion that reasonable suspicion supported the stop of a vehicle was subsumed within the trial courts ruling that the officer had probable cause for the stop