agency must “expressly parse or refute on the record each individual argument or piece of evidence offered by the petitioner”); see also Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 337 n. 17 (2d Cir.2006) (presuming that the agency “has taken into account all of the evidence before [it], unless the record compellingly suggests otherwise”). Indeed, while the BIA noted that Zheng submitted letters from her physician and the WuHang town family planning office, it reasonably gave those documents limited weight because they were unauthenticated photocopies. See id. at 342 (finding that the weight afforded to the applicant’s evidence in immigration proceedings lies largely within the discretion of the agency); see Matter of H-L-H & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 209, 214 & n. 5 (BIA 2010) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, contrary to Zheng’s argument
holding that an officer was not entitled to qualified immunity from suit when a minimal further investigation would have exonerated the suspect holding that even if the prison disciplinary committee failed to follow a state administrative regulation requiring the committee to convene within eight calendar days after commission of prison offense or its discovery the noncompliance did not of itself violate due process holding that the fact that the members of the grievance committee and the disciplinary counsel are appointed by the supreme court is not enough by itself to establish a per se violation of due process holding that unsigned unauthenticated documents from a street resident committee and villager committee that fail to identify the authors are entitled to minimal weight holding that prison disciplinary hearing committee members are entitled to qualified immunity