41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-19, 10 L.Ed. 865 (1842), the Supreme Court held that, in the absence of a state statutory or constitutional provision, federal courts sitting in diversity should not apply a state court’s common law decisions. Rather, federal courts should fashion their own federal common law rules by consulting “the general principles and doctrines of ... jurisprudence.” Id. at 19. Almost a century later, in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80, 58 S.Ct. 817, 822-23, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), the Supreme Court expressly overruled Swift, holding unconstitutional the federal common law regime created by that decision. Writing for the Court, Justice Brandéis flatly declared: “There is no federal general common 440 U.S. 715, 726-27, 99 S.Ct. 1448, 1457, 59 L.Ed.2d 711 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593, 597, 79 S.Ct.
holding that participation in federal programs and receipt of federal funds under such programs fall far short of manifesting a clear intent  to waive immunity holding that the priority of liens stemming from federal lending programs is a matter of federal common law holding that apportionment of cercla liability is  a matter of federal common law holding that a national rule is not needed to determine the priority of liens arising from federal lending programs holding that a federal court may resort to state law analogies for the development of a federal common law of privileges in instances where the federal rule is unsettled