the charges. Id. The court distinguished this situation from that in which the prosecution and the accused entered into a compromise agreement, which would preclude a malicious prosecution claim. Id. at 58-59, 533 A.2d 974. 6 . In support of its argument that plaintiff's § 1983 claim accrued on March 26, 1993, Newark relies on Smith v. Wambaugh, 887 F.Supp. 752 (M.D.Pa.1995), aff'd, Smith v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108 (3d Cir.1996). Neither opinion supports a finding that plaintiff's § 1983 claim accrued when the Appellate Division reversed the conviction and remanded for a retrial. To the contrary, these cases support plaintiff's argument that her § 1983 claim accrued when the criminal charges against her were dismissed. 7 . See also Girdler v. Dale, 859 F.Supp. 1279, 1282, n. 3 (D.Ariz.1994) (<HOLDING>). 8 . For example, a reversal by a state's
holding that  1983 claims accrued when all charges were dismissed rather than a previous date on which the conviction was vacated on the theory that the charges remained pending until the dismissal holding that the cause of action accrued on the date of sale holding that the final termination of the criminal proceedings occurred when criminal charges  were dismissed with prejudice rather than when the accused was released from prison pending a retrial holding that the speedy trial clock for state charges did not begin to run when the defendant was taken into custody by federal authorities on federal charges but rather when he was indicted for the state charges holding that a plaintiffs  1983 claim accrued on the date of the alleged illegal search and seizure