allege.” (Docket No. 113 at 3.) The Thorndikes have moved to exclude the second sled test and to preclude any testimony by Dr. Guenther with respect to the second sled test. They contend that the test is not a fair reproduction of the accident event and, therefore, is neither “relevant nor scientifically reliable.” (Docket No. 114 at 21.) In order for the second sled test to be of assistance to the fact finder, it should be designed in a manner that takes into account the known facts about the actual collision event. See, e.g., Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., 104 F.3d 472, 479 (1st Cir.1997) (excluding plaintiff expert’s theory where it depended on factual assumptions belied by the plaintiffs own testimony); Habecker v. Clark Equipment Co., 36 F.3d 278, 290 (3d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1003, 115 S.Ct. 1313,
holding that probable cause was clearly present justifying the taking of a blood sample without the defendants consent when it was established that the defendant was involved in an automobile accident and the police noticed liquor on his breath at the scene of the accident and at the hospital holding that a simulation of an accident did not meet the fit requirement because the conditions of the simulation were far different from those existing at the time of the accident holding that where the dispositive issue in an administrative proceeding was whether an accident occurred as the plaintiff alleged it did collateral estoppel did not bar litigation of whether the accident was workrelated because that issue had not yet been litigated holding that an insureds personal belief that he was not liable for an accident provided no basis for submitting the question of the reasonableness of his delay in notification to a jury when the insured knew the day after the accident that it had been claimed that the cable he had installed had caused the accident holding that the plaintiffs location on the supply barge at the time of the accident did not alter his status