cases could be considered in determining the appellant’s earning capacity for purposes of awarding alimony. Id. at 554-55. In In re Marriage of Zells, 143 Ill.2d 251, 157 Ill.Dec. 480, 572 N.E.2d 944, 945 (1991), the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s conclusion that contingent fees are not marital assets because of their contingent, speculative, and intangible nature. The Illinois court also noted that court-ordered division of contingent fees would violate the Illinois Rules of Professional Con- duet, which prohibit fee-sharing between a lawyer or law firm and a non-lawyer. Id. Like Pennsylvania, however, the Illinois Supreme Court held that contingent-fee eases could be considered in awarding alimony. Id. See also Musser v. Musser, 909 P.2d 37, 40-41 (Okla.1995) (<HOLDING>); In re Marriage of Hershewe, 931 S.W.2d 198,
holding abuse of discretion is the proper standard for reviewing award of attorney fees in patent cases although questions of law may in some cases be relevant holding that pending contingencyfee cases of a law firm constitute future income and not marital assets and although these cases may not be considered in calculating propertydivision alimony they may be considered in establishing support alimony holding that the domesticrelations exception prevented the plaintiff from challenging in federal court the constitutionality of the statecourt judges decision to consider certain assets and property when calculating the plaintiffs husbands income for the purposes of determining alimony payments because the plaintiff ultimately wanted this court to enjoin the state court from using property  to determine the amount of alimony owed holding that property transferred by a spouse to avoid support obligation may be considered on the issue of property distribution as well as alimony holding that final order for alimony may be modified by trial court on showing of substantial change in circumstances of either party