but has nonetheless achieved the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant’s conduct. We hold that it does not. Id. at 600,121 S.Ct. 1835. The Court also noted that Congress “has authorized the award of attorney’s fees to the ‘prevailing party’ in numerous statutes in addition to those at issue, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, 89 Stat. 402, 42 U.S.C. § 19731(e), and the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2641, 42 U.S.C § 1988,” and stated that “we have interpreted these fee-shifting provisions consistently .... ” Id. at 602-603, n. 4, 121 S.Ct. 1835. This statement echoed the Court’s previous statement in a case a 67 (7th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). That being said, the First Circuit has not
holding that buckhannon applies to the attorneys fees provision of the idea holding that the plaintiffs state commonlaw tort claims were preempted by the national motor vehicle safety act 15 usc 1381 et seq holding buckhannon applicable to the freedom of information act 5 usc  552 et seq which provides attorneys fees for complainants who have substantially prevailed holding buckhannon applicable to the fair credit reporting act 15 usc  1681 et seq which authorizes attorneys fees for prevailing parties holding buckhannon applicable to the equal access to justice act 28 usc  2412 et seq which authorizes attorneys fees for prevailing parties