a capital-murder conviction and that, to the extent the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that it could consider Cameron’s testimony for purposes of establishing intent, that error was harmless. We disagree. In R.C.W. I and R.C.W. II, R.C.W.’s general intent was established by the acts of sexual abuse themselves perpetrated upon his daughter. Therefore, the trial court’s instruction allowing the jury to consider the additional evidence of intent was harmless. However, in this case intent was a central issue to be determined because, in order to prove capital murder, the State was required to prove that Towles had the specific intent to kill Geon-tae, a child under 14 years of age. § 13A-5 — 40(a)(15), Ala.Code 1975. See Ziegler v. State, 886 So.2d 127, 140 (Ala.Crim.App.2003)(<HOLDING>). Intent has been defined as “the ripened
holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts holding that under the accomplice liability doctrine a nontriggerman accomplice may be convicted of double murder a capital offense under  13a540a10 alacode 1975 only if he had the particularized intent that both victims be killed holding that alabama appellate courts have repeatedly held that to be convicted of a capital offense and sentenced to death a defendant must have had a particularized intent to kill holding defendant must act with specific intent to cause death of another in order to be convicted of attempted murder holding that a defendant must have notice that the trial court might sentence him to death