that an “administrative decision” as defined under 3 — 101 should be equated with the term “final order,” we would nonetheless conclude that no “final order” was entered in this case. 735 ILCS 5/3 — 101 (West 1996). As we pointed out earlier, when the chief legal counsel sustained the default, she essentially entered a finding of liability against Pinkerton for its failure to appear. We conclude that a determination of liability by default without a determination of damages does not meet the statutory definition of an administrative decision “which affects the legal rights, duties or privileges of parties and which terminates the proceedings before the administrative agency.” 735 ILCS 5/3 — 101 (West 1996); see also Skrypek v. Mazzocchi, 227 Ill. App. 3d 1, 7, 590 N.E.2d 990 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Stotlar, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 728 (holding
holding that the trial court was without authority to set aside entry of default on motion to set aside default judgment holding that a default judgment becomes a final order after damages are set thereby fixing the rights of the parties holding that district courts order granting motion for default judgment was erroneous  because a default judgment cannot be entered until the amount of damages has been ascertained  holding an order of default was not final where it resolved only the question of liability and the case was continued for proof on the issue of damages holding that where the district court dismisses a complaint and provides a stated period within which the plaintiff may amend the order of dismissal  becomes final upon the expiration of the time allowed for amendment the time for appeal is measured from the date on which the district court order of dismissal becomes final