held that the residual clause in the ACCA is unconstitutionally vague, his enhanced sentence under the U.S.S.G. (by analogy) violates his right to due process set forth in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The holding in Johnson is inapplicable to Yates because his sentence was not based on the residual clause of the ACCA; Yates’s sentence was enhanced under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 and § 4B1.2(a)(2). The residual clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B 1.2(a)(2) defines a “crime of violence” in the same manner that the ACCA defines the term, but this Court has recently held that the provisions of the U.S.S.G. are not subject to the same due process challenge as the ACCA. See United States v. Stevens, No. 6:06-CR-85-DCR; 6:15-CV-226-DCR; 2015 WL 9306593, at *2 (E.D.Ky., Dec. 21, 2015) (<HOLDING>); Fletcher v. Quintana, No. 5:15-CV-286-DCR,
holding a defendant could not receive an enhanced sentenced under the residual clause of  4b12a2 following johnson holding that to prove a johnson claim the movant must show thatmore likely than notit was use of the residual clause that led to the sentencing courts enhancement of his sentence holding that a claim under booker does not fit within the savings clause of 28 usc  2255 holding that apprendi did not affect enhanced sentence under  924e holding that johnson did not support the defendants collateral challenge under 28 usc  2255 to his sentence enhanced under the residual clause of the ussg