process claim, also on the basis of Smith, and held that Durr’s Eighth Amendment challenge failed because the state has discretion to allow appellate review, so long as its system is consistent with due process and equal protection, and Ohio’s option of a discretionary appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court met that requirement. The district court rejected Durr’s ex post facto and retroactiv 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (affirming state courts’ dismissal of a prisoner’s § 1983 damages suit against prosecutors and police investigator based on an allegedly unlawful investigation leading to his arrest while state-court conviction was pending because a favorable judgment would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-92, 125
holding that state prisoners challenges to the constitutionality of prison disciplinary proceedings that led to the deprivation of goodtime credits fell within the core of habeas holding that inmates serving life terms were not entitled to goodtime credits because state statute expressly foreclosed the granting of goodtime credits to such inmates holding that habeas was the sole vehicle for an inmates constitutional challenge to procedures employed by state officials to deprive him of goodtime credits holding that a prisoner who challenged prison procedures used to deny him goodtime credits and not actual denial of those credits stated a cognizable claim under  1983 holding that depriving inmates of statecreated right to goodtime credits in prison disciplinary proceedings requires due process