entered judgments requires that old injunctions remain in effect when the old law on which they were based has changed. Id. at 1166-67. Sweeton is particularly relevant to the case at hand. In that case, the Sixth Circuit faced challenges to a consent decree mandating parole procedures which the Supreme Court had determined — ten years earlier- — -not to implicate federal due process interests. Id. at 1164. Finding that the “decisional law has changed so that the enjoined behavior, which once might have been a violation of federal law, is no longer a matter of federal law at all,” the Sixth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to vacate the consent decree and to dissolve the injunctions imposed by it. Id.; see also Evans v. City of Chicago, 10 F.3d 474, 475 (7th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Shakman, 426 F.3d at 934 (“Institutional
holding that kentucky does not recognize any inherent right to local government holding that a district court cannot require a unit of state or local government to abide by a consent decree that does not serve any federal interest holding that consent decree could not preclude plaintiffs from bringing claims that could not have been brought at time consent decree was filed and to which they were legally and procedurally entitled holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because the challenged provisions of the decree had expired holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because there was no  consent decree left to be terminated