adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Id. at 1170 (quoting, Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979) (original emphasis)). Based on the evidence before it, the court rejected the plaintiffs attempt to assert a classification based on sex and held that “the proper classification, if there was one at all, was the group of persons with whom [the defendant] had or sought to have a romantic affair.” Id. at 1172. Other courts have similarly rejected attempts to label sex-neutral harassment or discrimination as “sex discrimination” or “sexual harassment” merely because it followed the break up of a consensual relationship between a man and a woman. See, e.g., Keppler v. Hinsdale Township High School, 715 F.Supp. 862, 869 (N.D.Ill.1989) (<HOLDING>). This court finds the rational of Succar,
recognizing that the duty arises not from the terms of the insurance contract but from an obligation imposed in law as a result of the special relationship holding that the doctrine of respondeat superior in maryland allows an employer to be held vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of its employee when that employee was acting within the scope of the employment relationship citations omitted holding that a sexual assault on a female employee was of a personal nature and not directed against the employee as part of the employment relationship holding that an employer does not necessarily regard an employee as disabled simply by finding the employee to be incapable of satisfying the singular demands of a particular job holding that in a quid pro quo case when an employer penalizes an employee after the termination of a consensual relationship the employee has to show that the penalty was a result of the employees refusal to give in to demands for additional sexual relations and not simply the result of anger over the failure of the past relationship