matter, even if this count were dismissed, Plaintiffs would simply refile with a new caption, putting the case right back where it started. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 8(f) (district courts are to construe pleadings so “as to do substantial justice”); Dopp v. HTP, Corp., 947 F.2d 506, 513 (1st Cir.1991) (“Pleadings are liberally to be construed, and for the purposes of determining what relief a claimant has sought, complaints ought not to be read grudgingly or with a hypertechnical eye.”); Torres Ramirez v. Bermudez Garcia, 898 F.2d 224, 226-27 (1st Cir.1990) (“It is not fatal to a complaint that a legal theory has been mischaracterized or that the precise language invoking jurisdiction has not been used.”); Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Universal Ins. Co., 838 F.2d 612, 622 (1st Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Janke Constr. Co., Inc. v. Vulcan Materials
recognizing authority stating that a plaintiff in a cercla action is allowed to plead alternative theories even if it cannot ultimately seek duplicate recovery holding a complaint sufficiently raises a claim even if it points to no legal theory or even if it points to the wrong legal theory as a basis for that claim holding that the failure to draw the district courts attention to an applicable legal theory waives pursuit of that theory in this court holding that instructing the jury on a legal duty theory when appellant had no legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense was error holding that the failure to plead a particular legal theory when the plaintiff pled two related legal theories was not a bar to recovery