complied with Policy Directive 04.05.112, which established restraint procedures for handling disruptive prisoners. Summary judgment for the defendants on Kennedy’s Fourteenth Amendment claim was proper for a reason other than the reason stated by the district court. See Allen v. Diebold, Inc., 33 F.3d 674, 676 (6th Cir.1994). With respect to Kennedy’s claim that he was unconstitutionally placed in soft, hard and “top of bed” restraints, these allegations were insufficient to defeat the motion for summary judgment. Kennedy failed to show that placement in such restraints imposed “atypical and significant hardship” so as to warrant further investigation as to whether his due process rights were violated. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (<HOLDING>); Mujahid v. Meyer, 59 F.3d 931, 932 (9th
holding that 30day disciplinary confinement did not present the type of atypical significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest and further stating that the chance that a finding of misconduct will alter the balance in consideration of parole is simply too attenuated to invoke the procedural guarantees of the due process clause holding that 30day segregated confinement in hawaii penitentiary did not present such atypical hardship so as to create liberty interest holding that the plaintiffs disciplinary segregated confinement for thirty days did not present the type of atypical significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest holding that a statecreated liberty interest in ones classification may exist where classification imposes atypical and significant hardship recognizing a liberty interest in reasonably safe conditions of confinement