that it was implausible that an Orthodox priest would have retaliated against Farcas if she converted his niece was not supported by any corroborating evidence in the record. Thus, none of the IJ’s findings of implausibility provides a legitimate or cogent basis upon which to make an adverse credibility finding. The IJ also erred by giving diminished weight to affidavits introduced into the record by Farcas at her asylum hearing, as the reasons stated by the IJ for doing so are without merit. Wang v. INS, 352 F.3d 1250, 1254 (9th Cir.2003) (“Mere failure to authenticate documents, at least in the absence of evidence undermining their reliability, does not constitute sufficient foundation for an adverse credibility determination”); Zhou v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 860, 866 (9th Cir.2006)(<HOLDING>). Lastly, we hold that the IJ erroneously
holding that it is error for an ij to rely upon the petitioners inability to obtain live testimony from persons living abroad to support an adverse credibility determination holding that in the absence of an adverse credibility determination the court must accept petitioners testimony as true holding that after the real id act the ij must still provide specific examples of a petitioners demean or that would support this basis for an adverse credibility determination holding an ij must to address a petitioners explanation for inconsistencies to rely upon them as the basis for an adverse credibility finding holding when one identified ground for an adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of petitioners claim of persecution the court is bound to accept the ijs adverse credibility determination