available only to that party; or (2) has such a relationship with one party as to effectively make him unavailable to the opposing party, regardless of actual physical availability. Tavarez, 626 F.3d at 905 (citing United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 926 (7th Cir.1976)). The latter prong is also referred to as “pragmatic unavailability.” See United States v. Christ, 513 F.3d 762, 773 (7th Cir.2008); Yumich v. Cotter, 452 F.2d 59, 64 (7th Cir.1971) (finding that the employment by the city of uncalled police officers who witnessed an altercation between officers and the plaintiff, as well as the officers’ “strong personal interest in the success of the city’s defense of their conduct ...” rendered them pragmatically unavailable to the plaintiff); see also Mahone, 537 F.2d at 926-27 (<HOLDING>). In this case, Garibay was unquestionably
holding that the state could not under any circumstances be charged for the delay during the period the defendant was held after his arrest for and until his conviction on felony charges in another jurisdiction holding that the same hearing officer as in this case erred in substituting his judgment for that of the pertinent school board in that case holding that an officer who was involved in the arrest initiating case was pragmatically unavailable to the plaintiff because of his association with the united states in building its case as well as his interest in seeing his police work vindicated by a conviction of the defendant holding that where the court records in the present case and the records in a previous conviction reflected the same name and date of birth as well as a signature and the defendant did not object that he was not the same person as had been previously convicted the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction holding that there was reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant based on his presence in an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking and his flight upon seeing police officers