period under Section 1446(b).”). But see Davis v. Time Ins. Co., 698 F.Supp. 1317, 1321-22 (S.D.Miss.1988) (“[Tjhis Court perceives no difference between a situation where an amended complaint adds a new federal question and one where a recent United States Supreme Court decision.invigorates a pleading with federal character.”); Smith v. Burroughs Corp., 670 F.Supp. 740, 741 (E.D.Mich.1987) (stating that the “statute on its face indicates that it covers virtually any situation in which an action not initially removable later becomes removable”). Similarly, most courts agree that a change in statutory law regarding removability is not “other paper” for purposes of restarting the clock under § 1446(b). See, e.g., Coman v. Int’l Playtex, Inc., 713 F.Supp. 1324, 1326-27 (N.D.Cal.1989) (<HOLDING>); Phillips v. Allstate Ins. Co., 702 F.Supp.
holding court cannot change custody without showing that change is in best interests of child holding that because there was complete diversity when the action commenced diversity jurisdiction was not defeated by the addition of a nondiverse plaintiff which was not indispensable holding that a federal court in diversity jurisdiction must apply state substantive law holding that statutory change in diversity requirements is not other paper holding that a showing of a change in circumstances that is or is likely to be beneficial to the child may also warrant a change in custody