substantially outweighed by the dangers listed in Rule 403. Rule 404(c)(l)(C)-(D); State v. Aguilar, 209 Ariz. 40, 49 ¶ 30, 97 P.3d 865, 874 (2004). Benson argues the trial court erred by making this finding because the attack on Yolanda was dissimilar to and remote in time from the other crimes. See Rule 404(e)(l)(C)(i)-(ii) (listing dissimilarity and remoteness as factors to consider). ¶ 14 The trial court did not abuse its discretion. Although the attack on Yolanda differed in some ways from the attacks on the other victims (for example, it involved a second assailant and the use of a chemical to render her unconscious), the attacks did not have to precisely align for the evidence to be cross-admissible. See State v. Lehr (Lehr III), 227 Ariz. 140, 147 ¶ 21, 254 P.3d 379, 386 (2011) (<HOLDING>); see also Rule 404 emt. to 1997 amendment
holding that the fact of a prior conviction for sentencing purposes need not be proved to a jury or admitted by defendant to satisfy the sixth amendment recognizing that jurors have the right to reject that part of the evidence believed by them to be untrue and to accept that found by them to be true holding death sentence need not be pending in order for this court to engage in review of issues on appeal holding that ajets need not be perfectly similar in order for evidence of them to be admitted under rule 404 holding that the 1979 policy interpretation need not be approved by the president in order to become effective as it is not a rule regulation or order