negligence claims are preempted because they rely on the same facts, including the same harm, as their Title VII claims. In making this argument, defendant relies largely on Geise v. Phoenix Co. of Chicago, Inc., 159 Ill.2d 507, 203 Ill.Dec. 454, 639 N.E.2d 1273 (1994). This opinion has been “the source of the confusion” as to whether the preemption inquiry focuses on factual similarities. Spahn v. Int’l Quality & Productivity Ctr., 211 F.Supp.2d 1072, 1076 (N.D.Ill.2002). The Illinois Supreme Court, however, clarified in Maksimovic that the inquiry “focuses on legal duties, not facts.” Id. Because plaintiffs’ negligence claims rely on independent torts, the factual overlap between their sexual harassment and negligence claims is not dispositive. See French, 2010 WL 4684016, at *2 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, defendant’s motion to dismiss is
recognizing that it is not dispositive that the facts alleged in the ihra claim may be duplicative of facts alleged for the negligent retention claim holding that although the express warranty claim was not federally preempted the plaintiff had not alleged sufficient facts for the claim to survive dismissal under rule 8 where the pjlaintiff alleged no facts demonstrating that defendants made any affirmations specifically to plaintiff or her physician so as to form the basis of the bargain recognizing as viable actions in tort negligent hiring and negligent retention holding that because plaintiffs claims were presented as a single claim based on the same facts and based on the same alleged damages multiple awards would be duplicative holding that government may prove facts outside the overt acts alleged in the indictment