fact and we conclude that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Alves v. Hometown Newspapers, Inc., 857 A.2d 743, 750 (R.I.2004). Although we recognize that there are situations in which the viability of a particular statute of limitations defense will present a factual issue that must be resolved by the trier of fact, it is also true that there are many situations in which the question can be resolved in accordance with Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. See Morris v. Government Development Bank of Puerto Rico, 27 F.3d 746, 748 (1st Cir.1994) (“In an appropriate case, [Fed.R.Civ.P.] 56 can be employed to determine the applicability of a statutory time bar to a particular set of facts.”); Maughan v. SW Servicing, Inc., 758 F.2d 1381, 1387 (10th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); see also Bader v. Alpine Ski Shop, Inc., 505
holding that the issue of defendants actual knowledge should not be resolved on summary judgment but should be left to the trier of fact holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that motion for summary judgment was not opposed holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if there is a genuine dispute about a material fact holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that a motion for summary judgment was not opposed recognizing that summary judgment should not be granted when there is a viable issue of fact about the beginning of the limitations period but also stating that cases involving statute of limitations defenses frequently lend themselves to summary disposition