it was relying on the reasons given by the government in its motion to dismiss. The instant appeal ensued, and, once again, the judgment of the district court must be vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. Generally, after a defendant has been convicted, the defendant “is presumed to have a right to [the] return” of any property that has been seized from him or her. United States v. Chambers, 192 F.3d 374, 377 (3d Cir.1999); United States v. Potes Ramirez, 260 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir. 2001). In a case where, as here, the government has not forfeited the property in question, a motion under Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(g) — formerly Rule 41(e) — -is the proper basis for a request for the return of such property. See, e.g., United States v. Sims, 376 F.3d 705, 708 (7th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Chambers, 192 F.3d at 376 (holding, in a case
holding that property owner still has relief in the form of the return of his property though condemnation was complete and a highway was constructed across the property holding where the commonwealth is not in possession of property in question petition for return of property is moot holding that the court lacked jurisdiction over claims sounding in tort when the government seized and failed to return plaintiffs property or in the alternative that his property was lost as a result of the governments theft holding petition for writ of mandate seeking return of property does not toll the statute of limitations holding that unless the seized property has been forfeited rule 41g is the proper remedy for seeking the return of such property