during examination of witness who was in fear of his personal safety after being threatened). While the closure in these cases was limited to the duration of the witness’s testimony, it was proper in this case for the court to exclude St. Clair from the entire trial because more than one witness complained of intimidation. Indeed, protecting the participants in a trial is an integral part of protecting the integrity of the trial itself. Cf. United States v. Jackson, 513 F.2d 456, 459 (D.C.Cir.1975) (stating one purpose of statute criminalizing witness intimidation is “the protection of participants in federal judicial proceedings, and thereby the protection of the public interest in the due administration of justice”); Broadbent v. United States, 149 F.2d 580, 581 (10th Cir.1945) (<HOLDING>). St. Clair’s exclusion did not undermine the
holding that courts of appeal should only correct a forfeited error at the trial level in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result holding that courts may only review claims for fundamental miscarriage of justice holding that failure to consider an improper jury instruction would constitute a miscarriage of justice holding that sealing an indictment for the security of witnesses and to protect against witness tampering was proper recognizing statute prohibiting witness intimidation was designed to protect witnesses in federal courts and to prevent a miscarriage of justice by corrupt methods