of Counts II and III without prejudice. This is a legally sufficient ground on which to dismiss these counts and, consequently, there is no need to hypothetically rulé on AmeriCredit’s other arguments for dismissal. Defendant CFC, on the other hand, is in a different position. Although we dismiss Count I (the alleged TILA violation arising from the cash/credit price discrepancy and non-disclosure thereof), we do not dismiss Count IV (the alleged TILA violation arising from deficiencies in the extended warranty disclosure). Because the state law claims arose from the same transaction or occurrence as the remaining federal claim, this court retains supplemental jurisdiction over all counts against CFC. See 28 U.S.C. §. 1367; Graves v. Tru-Link Fence Co., 905 F.Supp. 515 (N.D.Ill.1995) (<HOLDING>). Defendants, however, urge us to consider
holding that the court of federal claims had pendant jurisdiction over a state law contract claim that was part of the same case as a claim over which the court of federal claims had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 usc  1498b holding that the federal district court retained supplemental jurisdiction over claims that the creditor had violated icfa where consumerplaintiff had also alleged federal claims against creditor under tila holding that a district court retained supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs statelaw claims after dismissing the plaintiffs federal claims and did not abuse its discretion by declining to remand the case to state court holding that when all federal claims have been dismissed the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims holding that exercise of jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law claims was proper on the basis of supplemental jurisdiction even though the plaintiffs had erroneously claimed diversity jurisdiction because a legitimate federal question was also presented and the state law claims formed part of the same case or controversy as the federal claim