more than one reasonable interpretation. In re B.C., 176 Ill. 2d 536, 543 (1997). In ascertaining legislative intent, it is proper to compare statutes that concern the same subject matter and to consider statutes on related subjects. See Anderson v. City of Park Ridge, 396 Ill. 235, 244 (1947). A. Credit Against Commitment for Time Spent in Predisposition Detention On the first issue, section 5 — 815(f) of the Act requires that an habitual juvenile offender be committed to the DOC until age 21. 705 ILCS 405/5 — 815(f) (West 2000). Commitment as an habitual juvenile offender is considered a determinate commitment and good-conduct credit for habitual juvenile offenders is determined according to the procedures applicable to adult p , and In re C.L.P., 332 Ill. App. 3d 640 (2d Dist. 2002) (<HOLDING>). The appellate court in this case relied on
holding juveniles do not have constitutional right to a jury trial but striking down statute that allowed juveniles to receive adult sentence without a jury trial three justices dissented reasoning juveniles should be entitled to a juiy trial under all cases because changes to juvenile justice code treated juveniles like criminals holding that juveniles sentenced to indeterminate terms are not entitled to predisposition credit holding that when a defendant is sentenced to a term that does not exceed the statutory maximum allowed for an indeterminate amount of the drug involved the jurys determination of drug quantity is practically irrelevant holding that a credit issuing bank did not breach a credit agreement when it unilaterally modified the terms holding that juveniles are not entitled to jury trials