section 2615(a)(1) provides a clearer statutory basis for § 825.220(c)'s prohibition on discrimination and retaliation”). Since we are examining only the DOL’s interpretation of the interference provision of § 2615(a)(1), we need not address § 2615(a)(2)’s prohibition of retaliation for "opposing any practice made unlawful” by the FMLA. 4 . While Defendants pointed to a few of our cases as authority that direct evidence is required for mixed-motive instructions in FMLA retaliation claims even after Desert Palace, we have not held as much because that issue was never outcome-determinative until this case. See Ross v. Gilhuly, 755 F.3d 185, 193 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting that the plaintiff did "not argue that his retaliation claims are mixed-motive claims”); Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 302 (<HOLDING>); Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364
holding that a plaintiff who could not demonstrate every element of the mcdonnell douglas test could nonetheless demonstrate a prima facie case holding that the facts of the ease fall under the mcdonnell douglas standard which does not require direct proof of discrimination for the plaintiff to make a submissible case holding that whether the case could proceed under a mixedmotive instruction was not relevant because the case could proceed under the more taxing mcdonnell douglas standard holding that the improper use of a mixedmotive instruction in a butfor case shifted the burden of persuasion on a central issue in the case and therefore the error cannot be harmless holding that a garnishment proceeding could not proceed because the underlying judgment was null and void