however, that in some cases two medical opinions can be consistent even if there are some differences in medical findings. See, e.g., Parker v. Harris, 626 F.2d 225, 233 (2d Cir.1980) (concluding that a non-treating physician’s opinion was consistent with a treating physician’s opinion, despite some difference in medical findings, because both doctors found major functional limitations). Thus, it is important for the ALJ to explain why this particular difference in medical findings is substantial, particularly because Ellington stated his condition varied from day to day. Second, the fact that Segal did not recommend Ellington for surgery is not necessarily evidence that Segal disagreed with Handago regarding Ellington’s disability. See, e.g., Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 134-135 (<HOLDING>). Finally, that the claimant admits to taking
holding that a physicians conservative medical treatment for a particular condition tends to negate a claim of disability holding that no medical advisor was necessary when the evidence did not indicate that the claimant was disabled before his dli holding that opting for conservative treatment instead of surgery is not substantial evidence that the claimant was not disabled holding that a history of conservative medical treatment undermines allegations of disabling symptoms holding that plaintiff established for purposes of summary judgment a material question as to whether he was disabled because of hernia surgery