Electric that “installation” triggers coverage). Therefore, the court concluded that all of the defendant’s policies in effect from the time of the municipality’s discharge until the date of remediation were triggered. In New Castle County, supra, the court held that the “injurious process” encapsulated by the continuous trigger doctrine included a municipality’s initial discharge into a landfill and the gradual leaching of contaminants into surrounding property. 725 F.Supp. at 812 (noting that the “process that led to this property damage began as early as the first half of 1969” and referring to testimony indicating that “there had been a slight deterioration of the wells at Tybouts by July, 1969”). See also Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., supra, 662 F.Supp. at 76 (<HOLDING>); United Technologies Corp. v. Liberty Mutual
holding several defendant insurers liable where policyholders allegedly exposed the sites to pollutants during policy periods holding that the language of  9133 applies only to insurers and not to the insurers employees holding that an insurance policy cannot be transferred to a third person without the insurers consent holding insurer on risk during period of alleged exposure liable for policyholders defense in proportion that period on risk bears to total period of alleged exposure policyholder must bear prorata share of costs for uninsured periods holding that the employer was not the insurers agent