[sex offenders] is confidential.” RCW 4.24.550(9). ¶24 The John Does argue that “public disclosure” refers to producing documents or information in response to a PRA request. By including this language, they argue, the legislature made RCW 4.24.550 the exclusive mechanism for obtaining sex offender records. This is too far a stretch. At the time Zink made her request, the statute did not mention the PRA or a public records request. While this court tries to harmonize the language of statutes, the same term used in different statutory schemes without definition may carry different meanings “ ‘according to the context in which it is used.’ ” Graham v. State Bar Ass’n, 86 Wn.2d 624, 626, 548 P.2d 310 (1976) (quoting State ex rel. Tattersall v. Yelle, 52 Wn.2d 856, 863, 329 P.2d 841 (1958) (<HOLDING>)). Here, the context is that of a state agency
holding that a state agency created under state law was a state actor holding that the state police is a state agency holding that a statute calling the bar association an agency of the state did not use agency in the same sense as in a separate unrelated statute regarding audits of state agen cies holding that in light of a worksharing agreement between the state agency and the eeoc a charge of discrimination filed with the state agency was properly filed with the eeoc on the same date holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state