a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim and that the claim must be dismissed. Plaintiff clarifies in response, however, that the violation of David’s due process rights that is being asserted arises from his over-detention in the Macomb County Jail. {See ECF No. 32 at Pg ID 693.) In reply, the Macomb County Defendants argue that Plaintiff f te has “a liberty interest in being released at the end of his term of imprisonment.” Schultz v. Egan, 103 Fed.Appx. 437, 440 (2d Cir.2004); Davis v. Hall, 375 F.3d 703, 712-13 (8th Cir.2004). This liberty interest is most often attributed to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 51 (brackets and additional citations omitted); see also McNeil v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245, 246, 92 S.Ct. 2083, 32 L.Ed.2d 719 (1972) (<HOLDING>). The District Court for the District of
holding that an attempt by a prosecuting attorney to serve two masters violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment holding a judgment in the absence of notice violates due process rights holding that there is no substantive due process right under the fourteenth amendment to be free from malicious prosecution holding that continued incarceration after the lawful basis for custody expires violates due process under the fourteenth amendment holding that states procedure providing for jury evaluation of voluntariness of a defendants confession violates fourteenth amendment due process