J., concurring). Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun observed in his concurring opinion that: ... [i]t is not hard to imagine inflictions of psychological harm — without corresponding physical harm — that might prove to be cruel and unusual punishment. ... [T]he Eighth Amendment prohibits the unnecessary and wanton infliction of “pain,” rather than “injury.” ... “Pain” in its ordinary meaning surely includes a notion of psychological harm. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 16, 112 S.Ct. 995, quoted in Chandler, 145 F.3d at 1360. The court noted in Chandler that the Eighth Circuit has held open the possibility that verbal threats “could violate the Eighth Amendment if the resulting harm were sufficiently severe.” 145 F.3d at 1360-1361, citing Freitas v. Ault, 109 F.3d 1335, 1338 (8th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>), and citing Watson v. Jones, 980 F.2d 1165
recognizing the possibility of a  1983 action for physical and psychological harm from sexual harassment but declining to find that welcome and voluntary sexual interactions could constitute an eighth amendment violation holding that sexual assault coercion and harassment certainly may violate contemporary standards of decency and cause physical and psychological harm holding that an employer must remedy situation of sexual harassment holding that sexual harassment need not take the form of sexual advances or other explicitly sexual conduct in order to be actionable under title vii holding that sexual harassment is a personal injury tort