proscribed conduct, and they do indicate that it is their intention to engage in such conduct. Thus, O’Shea is inapplicable. Laird is also not directly on point. There, the plaintiffs challenged an Army civilian surveillance system on first amendment grounds. “The plaintiffs, however, were not targets of the surveillance, thus any chilling effect resulted merely from their knowledge of the surveillance activities.” Olagues v. Russoniello, 797 F.2d 1511, 1518 (9th Cir.1986) (en banc). In this case, by contrast, the chilling effect upon the sanctuary workers plainly results from more than mere knowledge of the prosecutions. Rather, plaintiffs claim to be actual targets of the harboring prosecutions because they are engaging in the very conduct that is being prosecuted. Cf. id. at 1518-19 (<HOLDING>). The court agrees with the defendants that the
holding that an organization whose members are injured may represent those members even where the organization itself cannot show injury holding that an organization whose members were potential targets of future prosecutions had standing to seek injunctive relief holding that a class of juveniles had standing to seek injunctive relief in federal court against future interrogations by a police squad because of the strong likelihood that the challenged interrogation methods would be used again holding that a party that was neither a purchaser nor a seller of the securities involved lacked standing to seek injunctive relief under the federal counterpart to  8617 holding an organization had standing because some of its individual members did