The focus of this' Six Amendment inquiry is on the adversarial process, not the defendant’s relationship with a particular lawyer. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n. 21, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984)); United States v. Hughey, 147 F.3d 423, 431 (5th Cir.1998); Rodgers, 755 F.2d at 540 n. 4. As the Supreme Court has explained: [Wjhile the right to select and be represented by one’s preferred attorney is comprehended by the Sixth Amendment, the essential aim of the Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692 (1988); see also Hughey, 147 F.3d at 432 (<HOLDING>); cf. United States v. Messino, 181 F.3d 826,
holding that a 75day delay justified the denial of a motion to withdraw holding that the presumption of prejudice must extend as well to the denial of counsel on appeal when the granting of an attorneys motion to withdraw had left the petitioner entirely without the assistance of counsel on appeal holding that the district courts denial of a motion to continue based on defense counsels scheduling conflict was not arbitrary holding that the district courts denial of motion to continue even though it required counsel to withdraw due to a scheduling conflict protected the adversarial process and the defendants substantial rights holding that denial of motion for summary judgment is interlocutory even though trial judge had stated that there was no just reason for delay because denial of motion for summary judgment was not a final determination of defendants rights and the appeal did not affect defendants substantial rights