when describing this last requirement of state-created danger liability. See Rivas, 365 F.3d at 197 (noting that the state-created danger test asks “whether the state actor used his or her authority to create an opportunity, which otherwise would not have existed, for the specific harm to occur,” and that, “[w]ere it not for [the state’s] acts,” no harm would have occurred); Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1209 (observing that the jury could conclude that the officers’ conduct was the “but for ’ cause of the injury, and that their conduct “greatly increased” the likelihood of harm). We noted in Kaucher v. County of Bucks that, “[t]here must be a direct causal relationship between the affirmative act of the state and plaintiffs harm.” 455 F.3d 418, 432 (3d Cir.2006) (citing Smith, 318 F.3d at 510 (<HOLDING>)). Ye’s allegations, which must be taken as
holding a plaintiff failed to show an actual injury to challenge an epa rule when the plaintiff alleged he would not have purchased a piece of property or would have paid  less because the plaintiffs allegations showed only that the property was worth less to him not that the property was in fact worth less holding the fourth element asks if but for the defendants actions the plaintiff would have been in a less harmful position holding that defendant must show reasonable probability that but for counsels errors the sentence would have been significantly less harsh holding that a back pay award should make injured parties whole by placing them in the position that they would have been but for the discrimination holding that regardless of insurers good faith denial of coverage plaintiff is entitled to recover interest to put it in position it would have been in if coverage had not been denied