their counterproposal during that period. Preclusion did not depend upon public notice of the counter-proposal. Nor would notice have helped Crawford, since the Joint Parties did not file their counterproposal until the last day of the period (as the rule permitted), after which it was too late for Crawford to take effective action—even if he had received notice of the counterproposal. The notice that truly mattered in this case was the Quanah NPRM, which the FCC filed on August 18, 2000. As discussed above, that notice apprised Crawford that the only way he could reliably protect himself was to file his Mason proposal within the initial comment period that followed the NPRM. It was Crawford’s failure to act during that period that doomed his proposal. Cf. Kittyhawk, 7 F.C.C.2d ¶ 4 (<HOLDING>). Crawford’s position is not improved by the
holding that a cause of action accrues when the claimant knew or reasonably should have known of the wrong holding that the district court erred because it applied the enhancement without taking into account whether the defendant knew or should have known possession would be unlawful holding that a request is sufficiently clear if the administrator knew or should have known that plan information was requested holding that because the commissions interpretation of the cutoff rule has remained constant since its inception the applicant knew or should have known that an intervening proposal filed on the last possible day could act to deny him consolidation holding that the statute of limitations begins to run under federal law when plaintiffs knew or should have known of the injury which forms the basis of their claims