to allege that any defense existed), Marine Midland Trust Co. of So. N.Y. v. State Nat’l Bank of Bethesda, 268 Md. 503, 511-12, 302 A.2d 609 (1973) (affirming trial court’s refusal to vacate default judgment under former Maryland default judgment rule because party could not show fraud, mistake, or irregularity). Similarly, the Fourth Circuit had adopted a liberal view of discretionary relief from default judgments, particularly when the attorney, and not the party, is responsible for the error. See Augusta Fiberglass Coatings v. Fodor Contracting, 843 F.2d 808, 811 (4th Cir.1988) (“When the party is blameless and the attorney is at fault, the former interests control and a default judgment should ordinarily be set aside.”), United States v. Moradi, 673 F.2d 725, 728 (4th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). While Fourth Circuit law is not controlling
holding that a default judgment was not void because the bankruptcy court that entered the judgment had proper jurisdiction over the party seeking relief holding that when a constitutional right is vested in a party and there is a doubt as to whether that right has been waived the doubt should be resolved in the defendants favor holding that any doubt as to the propriety of granting relief must be resolved in favor of the party when the party is not responsible for the error that caused the default judgment holding that the workers compensation act is to be liberally construed in the employees favor and any doubt in its construction is thus resolved in favor of the employee holding that reversible error was committed when the court could not determine that the instruction given by the trial justice was sufficient to remove the taint of the statement and such doubt was to be resolved in favor of the defendant