end. As for the remaining privileges raised by the DOJ (the required reports privilege and the official information privilege), we will not address the merits thereof, since any privilege was waived by both the untimeliness of the DOJ’s motion as well as its partial disclosure of the information requested by Plaintiff through the subpoena. As stated above, a motion to quash must be timely filed in order for the Court to consider it. See, Fed.R.CivP. 45(c) (3) (A) (iii). The term timely is not defined in the rule, and therefore, is subject to interpretation. Some courts have concluded that it should be interpreted as requiring the movant to file the motion during the 14 days period following service of the subpoena. See, In re Ecam Publications, Inc., 131 B.R. 556 (Bkrtcy.S.D.N.Y.1991)(<HOLDING>). Other courts, however, have found it
holding that taxpayer who is the target but not the recipient of an administrative subpoena pursuant to 26 usc  7602 may challenge the subpoena holding that the term timely should be read in conjunction with 45c2b that requires a party subject to a subpoena to object to a subpoena duces tecum within 14 days of service of the subpoena holding motion to enforce subpoena filed in district court where plaintiff served subpoena was nondispositive because resolution thereof would not dispose of complaint pending in other district court holding that while a grand jury subpoena for the production of books and papers may implicate the fourth amendment when presented with a challenge to such a subpoena a court need only determine whether the request is far too sweeping in its terms to be regarded as reasonable holding that a denial of an order to quash a subpoena not directed to a movant was a final order if the movant had no further opportunity to challenge the subpoena