that had contracted •with a potential creditor to make automated fraud-alert calls. Plaintiff responds that these decisions are distinguishable because plaintiff provided her cell phone number to Stompeez, not Quality. But Frausto, Baird, and Greene all stand for the proposition that a third-p.arty contractor performing services for the entity to which a plaintiff provided her cell phone number stands in the shoes of that entity in a consent analysis. See, e.g., Baird, 995 F.Supp.2d at 1106 (“No reasonable consumer could believe that consenting to be contacted by an airline company about a scheduled flight requires that all communications be made by direct employees of the airline, but never by any contractors performing services for the airline.”); Frausto, 2011 WL 3704249, at *2 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs second argument regarding consent
holding that the name under which a debt collector is licensed to do business is the debt collectors true name for purposes of the fdcpa holding that the defendant debt collector was the equivalent of the party to whom the plaintiff had provided her cell phone number for purposes of the tcpa holding that the act extends to claims by individuals against whom a debt collector has made purposeful targeted and directed attempts to collect a debt alleged to be owed by the plaintiffs holding that the notice requirement applies only to the first debt collector that communicates with the consumer holding that where the defendant obtained a nondefaulted debt under the mistaken belief that the debt was in default and where the defendants subsequent collection activities were based on that mistaken belief the defendant was a debt collector for purposes of the fdcpa