a workmen’s compensation claim previously announced in Sventko, supra. Delke, 460 N.W.2d at 327; see also Phillips, 531 N.W.2d at 148 (“In enacting § 301(11) of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, the Legislature codified Sventko."). In this sense, the common law right to be free from retaliatory discharge does not arise under Michigan’s worker’s compensation statute, but is merely reflected in it. See Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1092 (5th Cir.1991) (“[WJhether a state has codified a statute as part of its workers’ compensation chapter does not determine whether a claim filed under that statute is one ‘arising under the workers’ [sic] compensation laws’, for the purpose of section 1445(c).”); cf. Patin v. Allied Signal, Inc., 77 F.3d 782, 789 (5th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). ii. Whether a retaliation claim necessarily
holding that ruttiger precludes claims for breach of contract breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing insurance code and dtpa violations and negligence because all claims arise out of the carriers handling of the workers compensation claim holding that where the conduct forming the basis of the plaintiffs breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing claim is the same conduct forming the basis for the breach of contract claim the claims merge and there is no separate cause of action for breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing holding that claims for the breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing against workers compensation insurance carrier did not  arise under the state workers compensation statutes but are at most related to those statutes and thus do not come within the ambit of the nonremovability provision of  1445c good faith and fair dealing claims were created by texas common law not by the compensation statute recognizing workers compensation insurance carrier owes employee duty of good faith and fair dealing in processing compensation claims holding that the duty of good faith and fair dealing is a contractual duty