that an anti-sodomy statute violated the due-process rights of consenting, homosexual adults. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003). After Romer and Lawrence, federal courts began to conclude that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation that is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest violates the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Johnson, 385 F.3d at 532; Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 456 (7th Cir.1996); Pratt, 803 F.Supp.2d at 153 n. 12; Massey, 256 F.Supp.2d at 1095; Park v. Trs. of Purdue Univ., No. 4:09-CV-087-JVB, 2011 WL 1361409, at *7 (N.D.Ind. Apr. 11, 2011); Praylor, 2005 WL 1528690, at *3; cf. Milligan-Hitt v. Bd. of Trs. of Sheridan Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 523 F.3d 1219, 1233-34 (10th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). The Court concludes that in 2009, when Devlin
holding that a plaintiff had not established a prima facie case of race discrimination because she failed to show valid comparators and presented no other circumstantial evidence of discrimination holding discrimination based on pregnancy was not sex discrimination holding unconstitutionality of sexualorientation discrimination not clearly established before lawrence in june 2003 holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record holding that in a discrimination case plaintiff must prove that firing was a result of intentional discrimination