in Becker, this court stated that a six-year time span between drug offenses is too great to be relevant. 230 F.3d at 1232. We do not view that statement as a per se temporal rule, however, as the court in that case went on to assess other factors bearing on relevance: the probative value and the similarity of the offenses. See id. at 1232-33; see also United States v. Burse, 150 F. App’x 829, 831 (10th Cir.2005) (unpublished) (affirming the use of an eight-year old drug conviction, and noting that Becker “relied heavily on a fact-specific analysis of the relevance of the prior crimes”). Indeed, other Courts of Appeal routinely uphold the admission of prior drug convictions older than the ones in this case. See, e.g., United States v. Gaddy, 532 F.3d 783, 789 (8th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Matthews, 431 F.3d 1296,
holding that only one offense should have been charged when four separate packages of the same drug were found holding that prior drug convictions that were four ten and eleven years old were not so remote from the charged drug offenses as to render them inadmissible holding that eight years between prior convictions and the beginning of the charged conspiracy was not too remote holding two prior convictions more than ten years old admissible where disorderlypersons offenses bridged the gap holding that prior distribution and possession convictions that were eight and ten years before the charged conduct occurred were not too remote