guarantee of due process.” 135 S.Ct. at 2563. Petitioner’s sole claim is that his sentence is in contravention of Descamps because his prior conviction for possession of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver in violation of section 893.13(1)(a)(1) of the Florida Statutes does not constitute a felony drug offense under 21 U.S.C. § 851 or a controlled substance offense. (Doc. 3 at 4; Doc. 8 at 3). Petitioner qualified as a career offender based inter alia on his prior convictions for sale or delivery of cocaine, delivery of cocaine, and possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver under Florida law. (Criminal Case Doc. 90 at 14-15). None of these predicate offenses apply based on the residual clause. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 775 F.3d 1262, 1268 (11th Cir.2014) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, Petitioner is not entitled to
holding that a conviction under fla stat  893131 is a serious drug offense holding that possession of listed chemical with intent to manufacture controlled substance is controlled substance offense holding that mens rea required for possession of a controlled substance is knowledge that defendant possessed a controlled substance holding that the defendants prior drug conviction for simple possession did not constitute a controlled substance offense because the plain language of  4b12b requires that the prior conviction involve possession with intent to distribute holding that section 893131 of the florida statutes is  a controlled substance offense under ussg  4b12b