Allen v. Ohio Dept of Job & Family Servs., 697 F.Supp.2d 854, 894 (S.D.Ohio 2010); Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 582 (6th Cir.2000). Thus, the question before the Court is whether Ofc. Schmidt could reasonably believe that sexual discrimination against his wife, who was not an employee of the Cheverly Police De- partment, could constitute an employment discrimination claim under Title VII. Although a retaliation claim may lie in the case of “third-party retaliation,” the cases that have allowed such claims involved cases where both the person filing the discrimination complaint and the person adversely affected were employees or former employees of the same company. See, e.g., Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 178, 131 S.Ct. 863, 178 L.Ed.2d 694 (2011) (<HOLDING>). By contrast, in Reece v. Pocatello/Chubbuck
holding that proof that an employer fired an employee three months after the employee filed a charge of discrimination sufficed to state a prima facie case of causation holding plaintiff did not exhaust his retaliation claim where his eeoc charge made no mention of retaliation holding that plaintiff who filed administrative charge for racial harassment and discrimination could add claim for retaliation because some of the same facts supported both types of claims holding that student plaintiffs could bring retaliation claims where they were allegedly retaliated against for complaints made by their parents on their behalf and noting that ollier allowed the same and that thompson allowed a retaliation claim by a plaintiff who was fired because his fiancee who was also his coworker engaged in protected activity and firing him was intended to harp her holding that an employee who was terminated after his fiancee filed a charge of discrimination had standing to sue employer for retaliation where his fiancee was employed by the same company