could be sued in any county in which it had an agency); see also Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem. Code ANN. § 15.001 historical note (Vernon Supp.1996) (Act of May 8, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 138, § 11, 1995 Tex.Gen.Laws 978, 981-82 provides that suits commenced before September 1, 1995, are governed by former law). The plaintiffs’ response to the motion to transfer venue did not comply with Rule 87: neither an affidavit setting forth venue facts nor any duly proved attachments accompanied the response. Tex.R.Civ.P. 87 3(a). Conversely, Bleeker’s motion to transfer venue properly set forth all the facts necessary to show that Williamson County was a permissible venue for the litigation. See id. 2(a), 3(a). But see Watson v. City of Odessa, 893 S.W.2d 197, 199 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1995, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). The hearing on the motion to transfer venue
holding that motion to transfer also must show either that county where action is pending is improper or that venue is mandatory in another county holding that where the murder and robbery occurred in one county but the plan was hatched in another county and the body was subsequently returned to that other county both counties had jurisdiction to try the appellant holding that venue was improper in the county of death because no other event occurred there holding that if a modification petition is filed in a county where venue is appropriate it is improper to transfer the venue to another county merely because venue also would have been proper in the other county however once an enforcement proceeding is undertaken in an appropriate venue venue is improper in a different county over a subsequently filed petition to modify the decree which was the subject of the enforcement proceedings holding that tr 76a required that the trial court grant the motion for change of venue from laporte county where laporte county was a party to the action despite the fact that it was also a preferred venue