to the 1983 process, about which no claim of discrimination has been lodged with this Court, plaintiffs are barred from challenging this examination process. See Gilty v. City of Oak Park, F.E.P. Cas. (BNA) 1388, 1394, 1989 WL 84398 (N.D.Ill. July 18, 1989) (defendant who implemented promotional process agreed upon by plaintiff as part of settlement of prior litigation has articulated legitimate business reason for using same). This argument, though not without some illusory appeal, is entitled to little weight for the following reasons. First, it ignores the fact that, with the exception of the Bridgeport Guardians, many of the plaintiffs in this action were not parties to the November 3, 1982 consent decree. Cf Martin v. Wilks, — U.S. —, 109 S.Ct. 2180, 104 L.Ed.2d 835 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Second, the consent decree specifically does
holding that a judgment as to the title in a prior litigation was not subject to collateral attack holding that an attempt to set aside a divorce decree constituted an impermissible collateral attack holding that nonparties to a consent decree resolving a title vii case may fully challenge beyond the narrow grounds normally available for such a collateral attack employment decisions taken pursuant to it recognizing bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over such a collateral attack recognizing that a limit on the governments ability to enter a consent decree would make it substantially more difficult to settle title vii litigation