of law, it would not be in the public interest to dismiss the disciplinary proceedings for no reason other than the Bar’s failure to prosecute them with the proper dispatch.” In re Weinstein, 254 Or. 392, 459 P.2d 548, 549 (1969), quoted in Engerman, 289 Md. at 346, 424 A.2d at 370. This is not to say that delay is irrelevant. If an attorney’s ability to present a defense is substantially impaired, and an attorney can show actual prejudice to the defense, there might be a due process violation. See, e.g., In the Matter of Carson, 252 Kan. 399, 845 P.2d 47, 55 (1993) (noting an attorney discipline proceeding may be dismissed because of delay, but only if the delay is prejudicial to the defense and respondent convincingly establishes prejudice); In re Morrell, 684 A.2d 361 (D.C.1996) (<HOLDING>) (quoting In re Williams, 513 A.2d at 797).
holding that lack of notice of charges in disciplinary proceedings violates the due process clause holding that when determining whether a delay in prosecution violates a defendants right to a speedy trial courts must consider the length of the delay the reason for the delay whether the defendant asserted his rights and the resulting prejudice to the defendant holding that the preindictment delay was a due process violation because actual prejudice was shown and the state had shown absolutely no need for any investigative delay holding that if delay in the prosecution of disciplinary charges substantially impaired the attorneys ability to defend against the charges  the constitution might compel a different analysis a delay coupled with actual prejudice could result in a due process violation  holding that a defendant must not only show actual prejudice as opposed to mere speculative prejudice  but also  any actual prejudice was substantial  that he was meaningfully impaired in his ability to defend against the states charges to such an extent that the disposition of the criminal proceeding was likely affected