others at least in certain circumstances allowed the plaintiff to recover for the full two-year backpay period specified in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(l), e.g., Goodwin, 275 F.3d at 1011 (misreading Ashley as agreeing with this result), Anderson, 180 F.3d at 335-37. The Second Circuit never addressed the issue in the context of Title VII, but pr e-Morgan decisions under other statutes suggest it would have adopted the majority position. See Connolly v. McCall, 254 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir.2001) (relying on Bazemore in holding in a § 1983 case that "application of a discrimina-toiy policy” within the limitations period preserves a claim against that policy, even if the policy was instituted outside the limitations period); Pollis v. New School for Social Research, 132 F.3d 115, 119 (2d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Kim v. Dial Serv. Int’l, Inc., 159 F.3d 1347
holding that to establish a prima facie equal pay act claim the plaintiff must show that the jobs being compared are substantially equal holding that equal pay act claims reaccrue with the receipt of each challenged paycheck holding that the mere allegation that a female professor was paid less than a male colleague for equal work stated a claim under the equal pay act holding that judges comments to jury during equal pay act trial were harmless error holding that same standard applies to equal pay act and title vii wage discrimination claims