question at issue,” we must, second, determine whether VA’s regulation is “based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. “[I]n a Chevron step-one analysis, we employ traditional tools of statutory construction and examine ‘the statute’s text, structure, and legislative history, and apply the relevant canons of interpretation.’” Heino v. Shinseki, 683 F.3d 1372, 1377-78 (Fed.Cir.2012). Beginning with the statute’s text, a term as general as the word “award” in section 5112 does not have a single plain meaning. See Black’s Law Dictionary 950 (9th ed. 2009) [hereinafter Black’s] (defining “award” as “[t]he decision or determination rendered by arbitrators or commissioners, or other private or extrajudicial deciders, upon a controversy submi 268 (2015) (<HOLDING>). The legislative history of Public Law 87-825,
holding that a phrase should be interpreted consistent with the context of the statute in which it is contained holding that the phrase or ganic diseases of the nervous system contained in 38 usc  11013 was ambiguous because the statute did not define the phrase recognizing that where the marks share a word or phrase but are otherwise different the plaintiff is not pmmitted to claim a right to all variant of the phrase in a specific market holding that the possibility of a mistaken understanding of the phrase preponderance of the evidence on the part of the jury is too remote to constitute plain error when counsel gave the jury an accurate explanation of the legal meaning of the phrase in his closing argument and that meaning is consistent with the common understanding of the words in the phrase holding phrase based upon or attributable to is not ambiguous and rejecting secondary suit construction