for Respondent 9, n. 3. The South Carolina Supreme Court shrugged off the possibility of further administrative and trial proceedings, however, preferring to dispose of Lucas’s takings claim on the merits. Cf., e. g., San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U. S. 621, 631-632 (1981). This unusual disposition does not preclude Lucas from applying for a permit under the 1990 amendment for future construction, and challenging, on takings grounds, any denial. But it does preclude, both practically and legally, any takings claim with respect to Lucas’s past deprivation, i. e., for his having been denied construction rights during the period before the 1990 amendment. See generally First Englisk Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U. S. 304 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Without even so much as commenting upon the
holding that taxes are not takings unless the government tries to achieve through special taxes what the takings clause of the fifth amendment forbids if done directly holding that temporary deprivations of use are compensable under the takings clause holding that rights in a government benefits program were not vested property for purposes of the takings clause of the fifth amendment recognizing that takings cases are based on the proper exercise of statutory and regulatory authority holding the takings clause inapplicable to the states of its own force