is no allegation or any evidence to support an allegation that the delay caused by the continuance prejudiced appellant’s defense. Finally, we cannot conclude that the sheer duration of the delay was unreasonable under § 3161(h)(7). Nearly half of the days during the continuance would have been excluded anyway under § 3161(h)(1)(F) due to motions filed by appellant. As for the remainder, many days would have been excluded from appellant’s speedy trial clock due to the extensive motion practice of appellant’s codefendants prior to trial. The periods of excludable delay that this court has held are reasonable convinces us that the actual, additional delay caused by the continuance was not unreasonable under § 3161(h)(7). See United States v. Tobin, 840 F.2d 867, 869-70 (11th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Darby, 744 F.2d at 1519 (holding forty-two
holding delay of 51 days to be unreasonable holding a four month delay to be reasonable under  3161h7 holding that eight months and ten days of delay was not an unreasonable period of delay to attribute to a codefendant under  3161h7 holding that the district court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend after a delay of eight months holding that a trial date 101 days after an initial arraignment but only 55 days after a second arraignment was not an unreasonable delay under  3161h7