because the Master Association was created before the effective date of chapter 720, the definition of “member” set forth in the Declaration controls over the statutory definition. This argument, however, lacks merit because application of the statutory definition of “member” does not impair any of Rosenberg’s contract rights under the Declaration; rather, it expanded his rights by giving him standing to sue the Master Association for alleged violations of chapter 720. See Lawnwood Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Seeger, 959 So.2d 1222, 1224 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (stating that a legislative act impairs a contract when the contract “is made worse or is diminished in quantity, value, excellence or strength.”); But cf. Coral Lakes Cmty. Ass’n v. Busey Bank, N.A., 30 So.3d 579, 583-84 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (<HOLDING>). We further conclude that Rosenberg is
holding broker not a party to a purchase contract and therefore not liable for attorneys fees even though provision providing for payment of the brokers commission was contained in the contract holding that section 7203085 which makes purchasers at foreclosure liable for unpaid assessments could not apply because section was enacted after declaration providing that successors in title were not liable for assessments went into effect and application of the statute would thus impair vested contract rights holding that the government was liable for partial breach of contract holding title company liable for bad faith holding the government liable to plaintiffs for breach of contract