protected groups but were guilty of similar safety infractions were not terminated. There was thus ample evidence in the record for the trial court to determine that the reason for the dismissal was race or age-based animus and not a valid business judgment. Furthermore, Smith presented direct evidence of age-based animus — Smith was called “old man,” and the foreman had indicated that he was happily anticipating Smith’s retirement. FDC contends that “old man” is simply a term of respect, an argument we find wholly unconvincing; in the trial court’s discretion, it could easily be determined that such statements evinced age-based animus and evidence of discriminatory intent. See Scofield v. Bolts & Bolts Retail Stores, 21 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1478, 1480, 1979 WL 291 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (<HOLDING>). We find adequate evidence to support the
holding that a plaintiff could not show that she engaged in protected activity because she did not present evidence that she informed her employer that her complaints were based on race or age discrimination holding that the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of age discrimination based upon a showing that she was a member of the protected group she was qualified and capable of doing her job she was discharged and that her manager called her old woman thus evincing agebased animus sufficient to demonstrate discriminatory intent holding that a plaintiff in a discrimination case need not demonstrate that she was replaced by a person outside her protected class in order to carry her burden of establishing a prima facie case holding that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she was unable to present evidence that she was qualified for the position holding that to make out the fourth element of a prima facie case of sex discrimination plaintiff must prove that males remained in similar positions and similarly for age discrimination that she was otherwise discharged because of her age