Relying on subsection (a)(2)(i) of Section 9543’s PCRA eligibility requirements, Appellee argues that a Batson claim is not a constitutional violation that “so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.” Id. Instead, he maintains that the injury against which Batson protects is the equal protection right of venirepersons not to be discriminated against, which is unrelated to the reliability of the verdict rendered. Appellee concludes that because the PCRA does not afford him a remedy on his Batson claim, he is entitled to state habeas corpus relief. We decline Appellee’s invitation to construe a Batson claim as falling outside the statutory framework of the PCRA. Initially, we note that both the PCRA 1242 (1999) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Lantzy, supra, (holding that
holding that to the extent defendants claim is one of ineffective assistance of counsel it is not cognizable on direct appeal and rule 2915 is the exclusive procedure by which a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be advanced holding that the appropriate vehicle for claims alleging that defense counsel violated a defendants right to testify is a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel holding that counsels failure to investigate the defendants personal and psychiatric history constituted ineffective assistance during the penalty phase but not during the guilt phase holding that claim alleging counsels ineffectiveness during the plea bargaining process is cognizable under the pcra holding that claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel during penalty phase of capital case is cognizable under the pcra