“waiver of Miranda rights and ... postwaiver invocation of those rights”: Regarding initial waiver of those rights, the United States Supreme Court has stated that “a heavy burden” rests on law enforcement officers “to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived” his Miranda rights.... However, once a suspect has clearly, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights, Davis places the requirement of clarity with respect to postwaiver invocation of those rights on the suspect. Id. (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. 1602). Since Leyva, every state appellate court to consider the pre-waiver and post-waiver distinction, with only one exception, has applied its reasoning or similar rationale. See State v. Collins, 937 So.2d 86, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (<HOLDING>); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 856, 869 (Alaska
holding that defendant was denied counsel even though his lawyer asked another defendants lawyer to take notes or whatever in the defendants lawyers temporary absence holding that there was no interrogation where the police asked only routine booking questions that did not relate even tangentially to criminal activity moreover there is no evidence that the defendant was particularly susceptible to these questions or that police somehow used the questions to elicit an incriminating response from the defendant holding that davis did not apply where the defendants questions regarding a lawyer were asked before she signed the waiverofrights form holding that subject matter questions may be but are not necessarily decided before questions of personal jurisdiction holding that even where a client was more sophisticated in business matters than the lawyer himself the lawyer should have assumed the client was relying on the lawyer for the legal aspects of the loan from the client to the lawyer to the same extent that the client would rely on the lawyer for advice were the client making the loan to a third person