§ 212(c) relief then waived his right to administrative appeal of his deportation order. See id. at 64. As a result of this waiver, Copeland was caught between a procedural rock and a hard place in pursuing judicial review via habeas. On the one hand, if Copeland filed a habeas petition asserting his right to § 212(c) consideration, he faced a likely administrative exhaustion challenge. See id. at 69; see also Theodoropoulos v. INS, 358 F.3d 162, 171 (2d Cir.2004). On the other hand, if he tried to cure his exhaustion failure by filing a motion to reopen his administrative proceedings, he could (and did) find himself deported before he could avail himself of habeas review. See United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d at 69-70; see also Swaby v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 156, 160 n. 8 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). The court recognized that Copeland might have
holding that second and third state habeas petitions that were dismissed as impermissible successive petitions were properly filed holding that federal courts have statutory habeas jurisdiction over petitions filed by guantanamo detainees holding that so long as the petitioner is subject to a final order of deportation an alien is deemed to be in custody1 for purposes of the ina recognizing that habeas petitions filed by aliens subject to ina  106 may be mooted by deportation holding that under permanent rules of hrira the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction over claims of aliens ordered deported for crimes listed in ina and holding that district courts retain habeas jurisdiction over deportation orders of criminal aliens