375 N.E.2d 1192 (1978). Two of Gunther’s theories are easily eliminated. First, a plaintiff is a member of a protected class if she asserts “a claim based on sex discrimination as a pregnant woman.” White v. University of Mass., 410 Mass. 553, 557, 574 N.E.2d 356 (1991). There is no allegation that Gunther’s termination was motivated by animus toward her pregnancy because at the time of her discharge she was not pregnant and had been working for over eight months in a managerial position with equivalent salary. Second, to the extent that Gunther is claiming she was discriminated against as a single mother, she can not prevail. Parenthood is not listed as a protected class in the statute. See G.L. c. 151B, § 4; cf. Upton v. JWP Businessland, 425 Mass. 756, 758-59, 682 N.E.2d 1357 (1997) (<HOLDING>). With respect to the claim of pure gender
recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy recognizing public policy exception to atwill doctrine holding that it was not a violation of public policy for the defendant to discharge the plaintiff an atwill employee because she was a single mother unwilling to work newly imposed long hours holding that an employee could maintain a claim for constructive discharge in violation of virginias public policy exception to the employment atwill doctrine holding that an atwill employee may not recover for discriminatory discharge under section 1981 because the atwill relationship was not sufficiently contractual under tennessee law