matter jurisdiction. It follows that we have jurisdiction to hear Biogen’s appeal pursuant to § 141. Ill We now turn to the merits of Biogen’s appeal of the Board’s judgment against Fiers in the '939 interference. The Board’s judgment was based on Fiers’ failure to meet his burden in responding to the July 16, 2013, order to show cause why Fiers should not be estopped from continuing with the interference, given that he had lost two prior interferences. Interference estoppel “by judgment” applies where “a losing party in a previous interference between the same parties” tries to patent a claim “not patent-ably distinct from the counts in issue in that [prior] interference.” Woods v. Tsuchiya, 754 F.2d 1571, 1579 (Fed.Cir.1985); see also In re Deckler, 977 F.2d 1449, 1452 (Fed.Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); MPEP § 2308.03 (9th ed. March 2014)
holding that a losing priority judgment in an interference proceeding bars the loser from obtaining a patent containing claims that are patentably indistinguishable from the claims corresponding to the lost count holding that the public harm requirement applies to fraudulent inducement claims because the fraud claims arise from related contract claims holding rookerfeldman also bars federal claims raised in state court as well as claims that are inextricably intertwined with the statecourt judgment holding that the court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute holding that in order to understand patent claims a court can take instruction from the other claims the specification and the prosecution history