intoxilyzer machine had been shut down,” consent did not cure refusals); Dep’t of Licensing v. Lax, 888 P.2d 1190, 1193 (Wash. 1995) (adopts bright-line rule). ¶ 17. As the above summary demonstrates, the two lines of cases are not nearly straight; some in the “absolute” jurisdictions are consistent with those in the “flexible” camp, and vice versa. Compare, e.g., Standish, 683 P.2d at 1280 (“flexible” case requiring continuous custody by “arresting officer” and ready availability of testing equipment for later consent to be valid), with Schroeder, 772 P.2d at 1280 (“absolute” case prohibiting later consent after arresting officer had left), and Baker, 714 P.2d at 677 (“absolute” case prohibiting later consent after testing equipment was shut down); see also Baldwin, 849 P.2d at 405 (<HOLDING>). The statute in place in North Carolina most
recognizing rule recognizing this as the general rule recognizing difficulty in artificially categorizing jurisdictions as two separate camps recognizing same recognizing the same determinations although dividing them into four separate inquiries