his trial on unrelated bank robbery charges. The Supreme Court disagreed and declined to extend “the collateral estoppel component of the Double Jeopardy Clause to exclude in all circumstances ... relevant and probative evidence that is otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence simply because it relates to alleged criminal conduct for which a defendant has been acquitted." Dowling, 493 U.S. at 348, 110 S.Ct. at 672. Based on the Court's holding in Dowling, we conclude that Gornto no longer constitutes good law to the extent it holds that the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars the government from introducing the underlying evidence of acquitted substantive counts in the retrial of the mistried conspiracy count. See United States v. Machado, 804 F.2d 1537, 1543 (11th Cir.1986)
holding that in the absence of an intervening supreme court decision only the en banc court may overrule a decision by a threejudge panel holding that one panel of this court is bound by the precedent of an earlier panel absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision of the supreme court recognizing that a later en banc court may overrule an earlier en banc opinion holding that only intervening law from the supreme court or this court sitting en banc can overrule a prior panel decision holding that we are bound by prior panel opinions until they are overruled or abrogated by the supreme court or this court sitting en banc