by default, unless, the insurance company undertakes the burden of obtaining a separate, comprehensible, and written disclaimer of stacking. Under this rationale those who want stacked coverage pay for it, and those who don’t want it don’t pay for it. ¶ 31. It is clear that such a rule would not cut down on the statutory minimum under this Court’s holding in Garriga, because, if stacked coverage is treated as extra U.M. coverage, the insured has the right to contract for stacked coverage above the $10,000 minimum. Additionally, the concern voiced by the majority that all insurance contracts will be written to exclude stacking becomes irrelevant because, under Garriga, the carrier must provide the insured with the extra stacked coverage if she so desires it. Garri-ga, 636 So.2d at 663 (<HOLDING>). ¶32. This rule would have the effect of
holding that loss of quiet enjoyment is not a sufficient plus holding that even if the minimum mandatory exceeds the statutory maximum the court must impose the minimum mandatory holding that the minimum under the statute is 10000 plus whatever additional coverage the insured desires to purchase holding that a district court commits reversible error when it sentences a defendant to less than the statutory minimum where no exception to the mandatory minimum applies holding that sentencing court had discretion under sentencing statute noting that the legislature has demonstrated its ability to use restrictive language when it desires to do so