so doing may also evaluate its probable impact on a new trial in light of all the facts and circumstances shown at the original trial of the case." Id. While the evidence may have been impeaching as to Brasher, the evidence does not "destroy[ ] or obliterate[ ] the testimony upon which [the] conviction was obtained." State v. McCraney, 719 N.E.2d 1187, 1190 (Ind.1999) (quoting Wilson v. State, 677 N.E.2d 586, 588 (Ind.Ct.App.1997)). As the State points out, Jackson and Belcher's testimony was sufficient to support Morgan's convictions even if Brasher's testimony was "totally disregarded by the jury." Appellee's Brief at 23. We conclude that the alleged "newly discovered evidence" would not likely have produced a different result in a new trial. See, e.g., Thompson, 796 N.E.2d at 840 (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Morgan's
holding that posttrial discovery of asserted newly discovered evidence did not satisfy the requirement that the evidence must be such as with reasonable diligence could not have been discovered and produced at trial holding seventh state petition for postconviction relief which was based on newly discovered evidence but rejected by the state courts because the evidence was not newly discovered was properly filed holding that in order to qualify as newly discovered evidence the evidence must have been in existence and hidden at the time of judgment holding that the defendants evidence did not qualify as newly discovered evidence holding that unavailable evidence may constitute newly discovered evidence if the failure to learn of the evidence did not result from the defendants lack of due diligence