the authority of the Superior Court. See Hicks, 485 U.S. at 632 (“If the relief provided is a fine, it is . . . punitive when it is paid to the court, though a fine that would be payable to the court is also remedial when the defendant can avoid paying the fine simply by performing the affirmative act required by the court’s order.”); see also Roe I, 919 F.2d at 870 (“[I]f the fine is unconditionally payable to the court, the relief is punitive, not remedial, and the contempt proceeding is, by definition, criminal.”). Since the retroactive fine of $105,000 was fixed, unconditional, lacked a sufficient evidentiary basis, and was not made payable to VITA, the Court finds that it was a criminal contempt sanction. See, e.g., United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719, 735 (3d Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>); McDonald’s Corp., 727 F.2d at 87 (noting that
holding that a contempt order labeled by the district court as civil was actually a criminal contempt because the order was retroactive seeking to penalize previous violations and was punitive serving no compensatory purpose holding that 25 surcharge added to fees that otherwise would be compensatory was a criminal contempt sanction even though it was payable to the adverse party and not to the court reversing order for sanctions because court did not follow procedural requirements for criminal contempt holding corporation and its president in criminal contempt because previous order of civil contempt had not been purged holding that mothers failure to appeal prior contempt order precluded her challenge to prior order in appeal from later order entered based upon prior contempt order holding that a civil contempt defendant has a right to a jury trial when the act of contempt was not committed in the presence of the court and when the incarceration is in part punitive