defendants to discover the virtues of introspection and remorse when facing the threat of punishment. See United States v. DeBeir, 186 F.3d 561, 572-73 (4th Cir.1999) (affirming district court’s ruling that evidence of “extreme remorse” is not atypical and does not justify downward departure); United States v. Brewer, 899 F.2d 503, 509 (6th Cir.1990) (ruling that remorse and prompt payment of restitution are not enough to take case out of the “heartland”). Moreover, Bogdan’s claim of remorse is undermined by the presentence report which indicates that he had not paid any restitution despite being employed. Regrettably, the “heartland” of cases under the Guidelines encompasses immense and heart-wrenching hardships. See, e.g., United States v. Dyce, 91 F.3d 1462, 1467-68 (D.C.Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). To find that Bogdan’s circumstances are
holding that the trial court did not err in finding that a trust relationship existed between a foster mother and foster child where it found that the child immediately became attached to the foster mother and was confiding in her when she made statements admitted under the hearsay exception holding that taking care of three young children one of whom suffered from a serious medical condition and being needed at work were purely personal circumstances not exceptional reasons for release holding that the district court erred when it departed based on the defendants status as a single mother with three children under the age of four one of whom was being breastfed and where incarceration would require placing the children in foster care holding evidence insufficient to terminate mothers parental rights under section c because mother made arrangements for adequate support of children evidence showed mother left children with father who maintained steady employment and adequately supported children mother knew that father would provide adequate support and mother left children pursuant to agreed divorce decree holding care custody and control of children is a fundamental right