test. Savage, supra, 120 N.J. at 631, 577 A.2d 455. Notwith standing the unique nature of a defendant’s testimony, we continue to believe that the Strickland/Fritz test, see supra at 251-52, 736 A.2d at 478-79, applies to the issue before us. Several federal courts likewise have required defendants to prove that they have been prejudiced by defense counsel’s failure to inform them of the right to testify. See, e.g., United States v. Tavares, 100 F.3d 995 (D.C.Cir.1996) (rejecting rule under which defense counsel’s performance resulting in denial of defendant’s right to testify constitutes prejudice per se); Ortega v. O’Leary, 843 F.2d 258, 262 (7th Cir.1988) (applying harmless-error analysis to denial of right to testify); Campos v. United States, 930 F.Supp. 787 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (<HOLDING>). Counsel’s failure to inform defendant of his
holding that the appropriate vehicle for claims alleging that defense counsel violated a defendants right to testify is a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record holding that analyzing denial of right to testify as claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is soundest approach holding no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim for failure to raise as basis for appeal of conviction ineffective assistance of trial counsel where basis for the latter claim was inadequate recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel