a formal written demand do not warrant a finding of “good cause.” Upon receipt of Kubik’s May 21, 1987 letter, appellant’s counsel still had until June 29, 1987 — thirty-eight days — to effect service of process or to seek a good cause extension prior to the expiration of the time limit. He did neither. He showed no diligence in formally demanding the information and providing its relevance in accordance with 28 C.F.R. § 16.22(d). See Powell v. Starwalt, 866 F.2d 964, 965 (7th Cir.1989) (observing that Rule 4(j) “defines diligence in prosecution”). The failure of appellant’s counsel to act until September does not rest upon the necessary “good cause” for purposes of extending the time requirement of Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(j). See Floyd v. United States, 900 F.2d 1045, 1047 (7th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>) (footnote omitted); see also Braxton ¶. United
holding that good cause means at a minimum excusable neglect holding that a failure to corroborate ones testimony with supporting evidence cannot form the sole basis for an adverse credibility determination holding that simple attorney neglect without the presence of substantial extenuating factors such as sudden illness or natural disaster cannot constitute the sole basis for a good cause determination holding that a conflict of interest created by an administrators dual status as claims reviewer and claims payor does not per se constitute good cause to consider evidence outside of the administrative record but that such a conflict of interest in combination with other factors such as insufficient procedures for initial or appellate review or the failure of an insurer to include a claimed reason for denying benefits in its notices to a claimant may constitute good cause for expanding the record upon review holding plaintiffs counsels illness constitutes good cause