requirement is not a sanction traditionally regarded as punishment. Defendant next contends that the registration requirement implicates an affirmative disability or restraint on defendant’s liberty, both because it requires defendant to undertake the affirmative action of registering and because it subjects defendant to “police scrutiny, control, and monitoring” and limits his “liberty and expectation of privacy.” We disagree. The demands of complying with the registration requirement — the additional expenditure of time and energy, and any concomitant limitation on a registrant’s freedom of action — are minimal. Any “burden” associated with compliance is so incremental that it does not approach the level of punishment. See State v. Burke, 109 Or App 7, 11, 818 P2d 511 (1991) (<HOLDING>); see also Hudson, 522 US 93 at 104 (exclusion
holding that retroactive application of mvra does not violate the ex post facto clause because restitution is not a criminal punishment holding that the supreme courts ex post facto precedents do not clearly establish that amended section 29336 violates the ex post facto clause holding retroactive application of idra would violate the ex post facto clause holding that state work release regulation was not an ex post facto law holding that the fact that a retroactive law may have a deleterious effect on an individual does not mean that it is ex post facto punishment