The Texas stalking offense for which Rodriguez was convicted is not a force offense within the meaning of § 2L1.2. The use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force is not a required element of the statute under a plain reading of the text. See Tex. Penal Code § 42.072. The statute criminalizes behavior that another person fears is threatening bodily injury. Id. But as this Court has consistently held, one can cause bodily injury without the use or attempted use of physical force. See Andino-Ortega, 608 F.3d at 311 (concluding that the offense injury to a child “can be committed by intentional act without the use of physical force by putting poison or another harmful substance in a child’s food or drink”); United States v. Villegas-Hernandez, 468 F.3d 874, 882 (5th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Calderon-Pena, 383 F.3d at 260 (stressing
holding that a texas assault statute requiring that the defendant intentionally knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another  may be violated by the defendant so causing such injury by means other than the actual attempted or threatened use of physical force against the person of another and hence does not have such use of force as an element alteration in original holding that  2241a1 requires actual use of force meaning use of such physical force as is sufficient to overcome restrain or injure a person holding that the decision of a police officer to preserve public safety and order through use of commands backed by threat of force or actual use of physical force is a matter of discretion holding that where the states definition of robbery has on its face the element of use or threatened use of physical force a robbery conviction is properly used as a predicate under acca holding force to be an element of pre1994 amendment  111 which may be satisfied by proof of force or threat of force