him because they constitute party admissions under Rule 801(d)(2)(A) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Schering Corp. v. Pfizer Inc., 189 F.3d 218, 239 (2d Cir.1999). Mayor Bronko argues, however, that the probate clerks’ testimony is not admissible against him because it does not fall within any of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. Ms. Ciaceiarella responds that the testimo ny is admissible against Mayor Bronko under the co-conspirator exception, the excited utterance exception, the agent exception, and the residual hearsay exception. Mayor Bronko does not seem to dispute that if Ms. Ciacciarella’s version of events is true, a reasonable jury could decide that she has satisfied the state action requirement. See Tancredi v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 316 F.3d 308, 312 (2d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Brentwood Academy v. Tenn. Secondary
holding that government actor must intentionally abuse his or her power as a state official to harm state employee in order to sustain substantive due process violation holding that while the fourteenth amendment is directed against state action and not private action the state action requirement is met in a civil action where state law is applied whether by statute or common law holding that theterm discretionary does not apply to the phrase exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of plan assets holding that state action is present when the state exercises coercive power over is entwined in the management or control of or provides significant encouragement either overt or covert to a private actor holding that a state agency created under state law was a state actor