court’s sentencing decision is immaterial. Mosley, 505 F.3d at 810-11; Van Horn, 976 F.2d at 1184; Brunelle, 864 F.2d at 65; McCray, 849 F.2d at 305. We have not yet decided the appropriate remedy for the defendant’s breach of a plea agreement. Other circuits have come to differing conclusions on this question. Compare United States v. Williams, 510 F.3d 416, 427-28 (3d Cir. 2007) (applying same remedy to defendant’s breach as to government’s breach and remanding to a different judge for resentencing), United States v. Bowe, 257 F.3d 336, 346 (4th Cir. 2001) (remanding to district court to determine whether appropriate remedy for defendant’s breach was specific performance, withdrawal of plea, or other equitable relief), and United States v. Alexander, 869 F.2d 91, 94-95 (2d Cir. 1989) (<HOLDING>), with United States v. Bradstreet, 207 F.3d
holding that prosecution is generally entitled to specific performance or withdrawal of plea following defendants breach but because the government waived its right to withdrawal of plea only the possibility of specific performance remained holding that defendant was responsible for the delay from the withdrawal of his guilty plea holding defendants refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court which had reviewed presentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate was not entitled to specific performance of original plea holding that if a plea agreement is breached the district court may either grant specific performance or allow the defendant to withdraw the plea holding that the government was not responsible for delay from withdrawal of guilty plea