plaintiffs] to the scene, where they were injured by a third party. Id. at 122. The Supreme Court’s analysis in Bell v. Campbell remains viable, and was recently applied in IHS Cedars Treatment Center of Desoto, Texas, Inc. v. Mason, where the Supreme Court held that a patient’s early discharge from a hospital was not the cause in fact of injuries the patient sustained in an automobile accident occurring approximately twenty-eight hours after discharge. 143 S.W.3d 794, 799, 800, 802 (Tex.2004). Here, the circumstances surrounding the children’s deaths were too remotely connected with TXU’s disconnection of electricity to constitute the cause in fact of the deaths. See Union Pump, 898 S.W.2d at 775; Riojas v. Lone Star Gas Co., 637 S.W.2d 956, 959(Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref d) (<HOLDING>). TXU’s disconnection of electricity was not a
holding defendants act of disconnecting gas service for nonpayment was not proximate cause of plaintiffs carbon monoxide poisoning holding that failure to warn of a gas leak could not have been a proximate cause of the accident if the gas company already knew of the leak holding that a physicians negligence need only be a proximate cause not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury holding that the termination of electric service by a public utility for nonpayment of bills was not state action holding that negligence must be the proximate cause of injury