adequate basis for granting it. First, Ferguson argues that, in considering the sufficiency of the evidence against him, the Court should discount the testimony of Richard Napier as unreliable. Since the Court reserved decision on Ferguson’s motion until after the jury’s verdict, however, the Court may not make its own credibility assessments of the government’s witnesses. Autuori, 212 F.3d at 118 (“Where there is conflicting testimony at trial, we defer to the jury’s resolution of the witnesses’ credibility.”) (citation omitted). Ferguson argued Napier’s credibility to the jury; post-verdict, the Court cannot revisit the jury’s credibility determination absent extraordinary circumstances that are inapplicable here. Id.; see United States v. Sanchez, 969 F.2d 1409, 1414 (2d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Second, Ferguson argues that no rational jury
holding that the bia rule is unreasonable in this context holding in context of rule 33 motion that wjhere testimony is patently incredible or defies physical realities it may be rejected by the court despite the jurys evaluation holding that where a court considering a rule 12b6 motion relies on matters outside the pleading the motion must be treated as a rule 56 motion for summary judgment holding that it may not holding rule of lenity in the penal context to be a rule of last resort