by law, and, in doing so, indicated he considered defendant’s accountability in the murder in aggravation. Evidence of other criminal conduct is admissible at sentencing, even though a defendant has previously been acquitted of that conduct. See People v. Jackson, 149 Ill. 2d 540, 549-50, 599 N.E.2d 926, 930 (1992) (noting in dicta a majority of jurisdictions permit introduction of evidence of other criminal conduct at sentencing regardless of defendant’s acquittal of that conduct); In re Nau, 153 Ill. 2d 406, 426, 607 N.E.2d 134, 143-44 (1992) (evidence of criminal conduct admissible at subsequent civil commitment hearing despite previous acquittal of the criminal charge, following Jackson); see also United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 136 L. Ed. 2d 554, 117 S. Ct. 633 (1997) (<HOLDING>); but see People v. Damnitz, 269 Ill. App. 3d
holding that the district court could constitutionally consider the acquitted conduct in rico sentencing holding sentencing courts may consider evidence of conduct or charges of which a defendant was acquitted holding that a district court may not impose a sentencing enhancement based on conduct of which the jury acquitted the defendant holding that criminal conduct of which defendant is acquitted may be used as sentencing factor if proved by preponderance of the evidence holding that a sentencing court may consider acquitted conduct or uncharged criminal conduct