of this grant of summary judgment. 3 . Although before this court Amundsen contends that she did not weave prior to the traffic stop, on an interlocutory appeal, we must accept the undisputed facts as outlined by the district court. See Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1154 (10th Cir.2008). Were we reviewing the appeal of a final order on summary judgment, we would review the facts de novo. See Bradford v. Wiggins, 516 F.3d 1189, 1194 (10th Cir.2008). 4 . We recognize that most cases addressing potential Fourth Amendment violations arising from traffic stops for suspicion of driving under the influence will involve additional indicia of intoxication beyond the suspect’s driving pattern. See, e.g., State ex rel. Verburg v. Jones, 211 Ariz. 413, 121 P.3d 1283, 1286 (Ariz.Ct.App.2005) (<HOLDING>); Dixon v. State, 103 Nev. 272, 737 P.2d 1162,
holding that reasonable suspicion justified the field sobriety tests because the driver drove erratically had bloodshot and wateiy eyes slurred speech and had trouble exiting the vehicle holding that officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct a vehicle stop where official license and registration records reflected that the vehicle was registered to a driver with a revoked license holding only reasonable suspicion is required to conduct a field sobriety test holding that reasonable suspicion justified the field sobriety tests where the driver weaved across lanes stumbled out of the vehicle swayed while standing and admitted to drinking three beers holding that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle solely because the vehicle drove onto a lot after hours and then left in a hurry