N.E.2d at 1343. Similarly, we find that the injury sustained by the purchasers in the instant case was temporary and that the reasonable cost of repair is the fair and adequate measure of damages. See id. The evidence, by Krysevig’s testimony, indicated that it would cost $86,248 to bring the campground in compliance with the National Electric Code and to essentially cure the defect. By deciding to reduce the purchase price of the campground by the amount of Krysevig’s estimate, the trial court inherently concluded that Krysevig’s estimate was reasonable. Because the judgment is supported by evidence from the record, we cannot say that the trial court’s decision is clearly erroneous. See DeHaan, 572 N.E.2d at 1320; cf. Coffey v. Wininger, 156 Ind.App. 233, 296 N.E.2d 154, 162 (1973) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we hold that the trial court
holding that congress has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence when it had before it evidence including some memory surveys holding that there was no evidence or inferences to be drawn from the evidence to support the damage award holding merely that the evidence was sufficient to support the award of attorneys fees holding that in reviewing sufficiency of evidence in juvenile adjudication the appellate court considers the evidence most favorable to the judgment and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom and affirms if those inferences constitute substantial evidence holding that reasonable inferences cannot be drawn from conjecture or speculative evidence