been tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subject to peer review; (3) the known or potential rate of error; and (4) the degree of acceptance in the relevant scientific community.” Id. 4 The citation in an attached footnote recognized that there may be no definitive boundary between “scientific” evidence and evidence based on “technical or other specialized knowledge”: “See also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 US 579, ---, 113 S Ct 2786, 2800, 125 L Ed 2d 469, 487 (1993) (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that there is no clear demarcation between scientific, technical, and specialized knowledge).” O’Key, 321 Or at 320 n 5. 5 Cf. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 US 137, 148, 119 S Ct 1167, 143 L Ed 2d 238 (1999) (<HOLDING>). 6 Despite the Supreme Court’s suggestion in
recognizing under fre 702 that there is no clear line dividing testimony based on scientific knowledge from testimony based on technical or other specialized knowledge holding that a single flexible test for reliability applies to all expert testimony holding that fre 702 applies to all offers of expert witness testimony requiring that the trial court determine the reliability and relevance of the offered submissions holding that daubert does not create a new framework for analyzing proffered expert testimony based upon technical or other specialized knowledge  holding historical cellsite analysis testimony about how cell phones and towers connect clearly based on scientific technical or specialized knowledge within the scope of rule 702 quoting fed r evid 701c holding that daubert applies not only to testimony based on scientific knowledge but also to testimony based on technical and other specialized knowledge