unless there is a ‘special relationship’ between the emergency personnel — police officers, firefighters, and EMTs — and an individual.” Woods v. District of Columbia, 63 A.3d 551, 559 (D.C.2013) (Oberly, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Allison Gas Turbine Div. of Gen. Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia, 642 A.2d 841, 843 (D.C. 1994)); Hines, supra, 580 A.2d at 136 (“[Ajbsent some ‘special relationship’ between the government and the individual, the District’s duty is to provide public services to the public at large[,]” not to any individual who emerges to seek services); id. at 139-40 (agreeing that “responses to calls for emergency assistance are simply not actionable under the public duty doctrine”); Wanzer v. District of Columbia, 580 A.2d 127, 129 & 132 (D.C. 1990) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. District of Columbia, 580 A.2d
holding that patdown did not end the officers reasonable suspicion of the defendant and that to have sent him on his way without brief further questioning would have been unreasonable inept police work holding in case where claim was that the decedent would have survived his stroke if an ambulance had been sent when first summoned that the public duty doctrine barred a suit alleging negligent and inept failure to dispatch an ambulance holding that the special duty doctrine as an exception to the public duty doctrine was a concept distinct from immunity and did not serve to resurrect an otherwise immune claim holding that refund suit for tax imposed in violation of export clause filed beyond applicable period of limitations was barred where claimant had failed to first present timely administrative claim to internal revenue service even though there was little  if any  reason to believe that claim would have been granted holding that public duty doctrine barred suit against district for failure of ambulance service to respond promptly to calls for help