innocently or negligently. Therefore, we hold that the D’Oench doctrine applies even when the customer is completely innocent of any bad faith, recklessness, or negligence. In regard to section 1823(e), Young points out that the statutory language prohibits claims based on agreements that tend “to diminish or defeat the interest of the [FDIC] in any asset” that the FDIC acquires as receiver of a failed depository institution. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(e)(1) (emphasis added). Young claims that since the confirmed letter of credit relates to a liability of the bank, rather than to a specific asset, section 1823(e) does not bar his claim. Several cases in other circuit courts of appeal support Young’s contention. See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. v. FDIC, 32 F.3d 592 (D.C.Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); John v. Resolution Trust Corp., 39 F.3d 773,
holding that section 1823e is narrower than the doench doctrine and that section 1823e applies only to cases involving a specific asset holding that the commonlaw doench doctrine applies to bar suit even when the rtc does not acquire a specific asset whose value is affected by the alleged secret agreement holding that claims that do not diminish or defeat the fdics interest in any specific asset are nevertheless doench barred in light of the established purpose of the doench  doctrine to protect the fdics reliance on the banks records holding that regardless of whether a specific asset is involved doench applies to claims or defenses that relate to ordinary banking transactions holding that  1823e applies only when the fdics interest in a specific asset would be impaired by the alleged secret agreement