others similarly situated, and (2) “that such differential treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person.” Cine SK8, Inc. v. Town of Henrietta, 507 F.3d 778, 790 (2d Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). In 2008 (after Judge Robinson’s opinion in this case), the Supreme Court held that “the class-of-one theory of equal protection does not apply in the public employment context.” Engquist v. Or. Dept. of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 598, 128 S.Ct. 2146, 170 L.Ed.2d 975 (2008). Here, where plaintiff was a public employee challenging employment decisions, Engquist controls. See, e.g., Appel v. Spiridon, 531 F.3d 138, 139-40 (2d Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>) While some courts within this Circuit have
holding that in light of engquist the equal protection clause does not apply to a public employee asserting a violation of the clause based on a class of one theory of liability holding that the dominos decision only pertained to the contract clause of the statute and that a plaintiff asserting an equal benefits clause claim need not rely on a contractual relationship holding that neither the due process clause nor the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment require the appointment of counsel on a petition for discretionary review to a state supreme court holding that discrimination based on religion is subjected to strict scrutiny whether a claim arises under the establishment clause the free exercise clause of equal protection clause holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause