or Isabel was entitled to land from MPLC. Antonio’s estate and Isabel each separately assert entitlement to the property interest at issue. The question as to who is entitled to the land is, however, the subject of a related dispute which is not before us. For purposes of the appeal before us, we shall treat the interests of Antonio’s estate and Isabel as being identical, i.e., both agree with the trial court’s decision that the government is obligated to convey additional land to whomever is found to be Antonio’s successor. We shall, therefore, refer to both Isabel and Antonio’s estate collectively as “Cabrera.” 4 See 1 CMC § 3102(a). 5 Cf. Barr Rubber Prods. Co. v. Sun Rubber Co., 425 F.2d 1114, 1126-27 n.23 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878, 91 S. Ct. 118, 27 L. Ed. 2d 115 (1970) (<HOLDING>), 6 Our statement of this issue combines two
holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a fed r civ p 60b motion where movants reiterated arguments raised previously and did not present any basis to vacate the challenged order holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to amend complaint because the proposed amendment would have been futile holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for severance where the allegedly prejudicial evidence would have been admissible in separate trials holding that district court did not abuse its discretion by denying as untimely made a motion to join a party under fed r civ p 20 and noting that court likewise would not have erred if motion had been made under fed r civ p 19