states in which we have made zero or very few sales. In addition, there are many local jurisdictions in which we have never made a sale.”). Preliminary injunction hearings are ill-suited for such fine tailoring. More fundamentally, we are not convinced by the government’s premise: that Gordon may challenge the PACT Act only “as applied” against his sales into jurisdictions with which he lacks minimum contacts. The government points out that a court may find a statute to be invalid on its face only if a plaintiff has shown that the Act has no “plainly legitimate sweep.” Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Repub. Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (<HOLDING>). The government argues that any facial
holding that a jury verdict will be sustained on any reasonable theory based on the evidence holding that facial challenges will be sustained only if no set of circumstances exist under which the act would be valid holding that courts should exercise judicial restraint and decide asapplied challenges before facial challenges holding that on appeal a summary judgment ruling will be upheld if it can be sustained on any grounds even if the trial court gave an incorrect reason for its ruling holding that equitable tolling under  2255 would be allowed if at all only for extraordinary circumstances