per day that a PRP does not comply with a UAO). GE analogizes the imposition of fines under a UAO to a judgment for money damages — it may take a court order to enforce the judgment, but payment is due from the date of the judgment. See PI. Opp. at 24-25. GE contends that the UAO need not be self-executing to constitute a deprivation, citing the Supreme Court’s decision Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. 264, 298-301, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982). In Hodel, an administrative order issued by the Secretary of Interior requiring the immediate cessation of mining operations was found to constitute a deprivation of property even though judicial intervention was required to collect penalties. See also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972) (<HOLDING>). GE’s arguments fall short of establishing
holding pennsylvania replevin statute unconstitutional holding that a statute must not be given the one of two reasonable interpretations which will render it unconstitutional holding the contract was not authorized by law holding that although authorization was initially given for property exercise of that control continued to be authorized only because the defendant deceived the rightful owner of the property into believing that a legitimate use was being made of the property holding replevin statute unconstitutional although it merely authorized the seizure of property which occurred only after the order was given to the sheriff