The conduct charged in Counts Eight and Ten would probably also be admissible on the other counts to show the scope of the scheme. Theriault’s conclusory assertion that a jury could “infer criminal conduct” from one group of counts to the other falls far short of showing the kind of pervasive prejudice needed to sever counts due to evidentiary spillover. To prevail on a motion to sever based on a need to testify (apparently Count Eight, the false loan application), a defendant must make “a convincing showing that he has both important testimony to give concerning one count and strong need to refrain from testifying on the other.” Richardson, 515 F.3d at 81 (quoting United States v. Alosa, 14 F.3d 693, 695 (1st Cir.1994)); see also United States v. Jordan, 112 F.3d 14, 16 (1st Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>) (quoting United States v. Gray, 958 F.2d 9, 14
holding that under the sliding scale approach a petitioner had made a sufficiently strong showing of likely success on the merits where he presented a case which raises serious legal questions or has a reasonable probability or fair prospect of success holding that success on a motion to sever requires a strong showing of prejudice recognizing that the burden of persuasion for a showing of prejudice was on the defendant holding that an assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice holding that injunctive relief may be warranted where there is a particularly strong likelihood of success on the merits even if there is a relatively slight showing of irreparable injury