attempt to resolve it). While the record does not reveal the bankruptcy court’s reasons for denying relief from the injunction, the district court’s opinion affords some guidance. In upholding the bankruptcy court’s refusal to relax the injunction, that court cited the substantial delay in the liquidation of BRMC that this litigation already had caused and concluded that, in all events, any proceeding brought by the churches in the probate court likely would be a waste of time. BRMC III, 2004 WL 1778881, at *5-*6 & n. 12. Although the matter is far from clear, we assume, for argument’s sake, that the probate court retains the authority, even at this late date, to modify its decree confirming Ms. Krauss’s estate plan. Cf. O’Brien v. Dwight, 363 Mass. 256, 294 N.E.2d 363, 380-81 (1973) (<HOLDING>). Even so, the mere fact that relief which is
holding that probate courts have the continuing power to revoke or modify their decrees but suggesting that such action would only be appropriate in limited circumstances holding that the power to terminate a contract atwill subsumes the power to modify its terms recognizing district courts power to admit evidence for a limited purpose holding that the recognition power is not limited to a determination of the government to be recognized but rather includes the power to take actions without which the power of recognition might be thwarted holding that consent decrees and orders should be construed as contracts