proceeding”). Here, the only evidence that th .Crim.App.2000) (stating, in motion to suppress context, “[T]he judge may believe or disbelieve all or any part of a witness’s testimony, even if that testimony is not controverted”). Appellant’s and Sanchez’s after-the-fact, out-of-court averrals about appellant’s ability to understand the proceedings and waivers he signed were untimely factual statements in appellant’s self-interest. Even though the State did not offer affidavits to controvert appellant’s and Sanchez’s affidavits, it was within the trial court’s discretion to disbelieve the assertions contained in those affidavits that appellant does not read or speak English. See Charles, 146 S.W.3d at 210; Shanklin, 190 S.W.3d at 167; see also Phuong Anh Thi Le, 300 S.W.3d at 327 (<HOLDING>). The trial court, and not this Court, is in
holding that the court should make factual findings from the record evidence as if it were conducting a trial on the record holding that in reviewing trial courts ruling on habeas corpus petition reviewing court must defer to all of trial courts implied factual findings supported by record recognizing that the bia must defer to the factual findings of the ij unless they are clearly erroneous holding that as long as the findings are supported by substantial evidence the board must defer to the hearing committees credibility determinations because they are subsidiary findings of basic facts holding that appellate court must defer to all implied factual findings supported by record