manufacturers to install lap/shoulder belts and air bags and described federal safety standards as “minimum standards.” Appellants’ App. at 311, 585. We conclude that a letter from a single NHTSA administrator, written nine years before the version of FMVSS 208 at issue here, is not indicative of NHTSA’s regulatory scheme as that scheme is set forth in Geier and various regulations. We hold that the Rolands’ common law tort action is pre-empted on the narrow grounds that it conflicts with the deliberate and comprehensive regulatory scheme set forth in FMVSS 208. We do not join the above-cited courts in finding pre-emption based upon the broader grounds that any regulation which affords a choice to a manufacturer pre-empts the state action. See generally Rogers, 737 N.E.2d 1158 (<HOLDING>). II. The Rolands’ contend that the trial court
holding that state law product liability action was not preempted when manufacturer exercised a choice under fmvss 213 holding the state law claims were not preempted holding that under new york law a manufacturer is not obligated to design a product that is impossible to abuse holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law holding that common law misrepresentation claims were not preempted because they did not conflict with a fmvss