that she reasonably believed occurred. There is no evidence that she engaged in any protected activity. In fact, Hoosier admits she did not complain to anyone about discrimination. Without more, Hoosier’s claims that she engaged in protected activity and suffered an adverse employment action is deficient, and there are no disputed issues of material fact sufficient to defeat Greenwood’s motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, Greenwood is entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to Hoosier’s retaliation claims. IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons set (7th Cir.2009) (“An isolated or ‘stray remark’ is typically insufficient to create an inference of discrimination.... ”); Kir-ley v. Bd. of Ed. of Maine Township High School, 2013 WL 6730885, *8 (N.D.Ill.Dec. 13, 2013) (<HOLDING>); Hogg v. Fraser Shipyards, Inc., 407 F.Supp.2d
recognizing that the seventh circuit consistently has held that isolated comments that are no more than stray remarks in the work place are insufficient to establish that a particular decision was motivated by discriminatory animus holding that an isolated comment is not direct evidence of discrimination even if a plaintiff interpreted it as motivated by a discriminatory animus holding that isolated remarks are insufficient to prove discriminatory intent holding that comments which were considered by personnel board in normal course of considering employment action were relevant to establish discriminatory intent and were not just stray remarks holding that stray comments without more cannot establish a case of employment discrimination but if other indicia of discrimination are properly presented the remarks can no longer be deemed stray and the jury has a right to conclude that they bear a more ominous significance