at the time that Rhodes committed the offense, Count I of the indictment erroneously charged her with a felony for violating that section. To correct this error, the Government dismissed Count I and (with Rhodes’ consent) filed a direct information charging her with a misdemeanor for violating that section. In this opinion we refer to the direct information and Count I of the indictment collectively as “Count I.” 2 . After the court denied Rhodes’ motion to strike Browe for cause, Rhodes used her last peremptory challenge to remove Browe from the venire. Thus, Rhodes contends that the district court’s error was prejudicial because it impaired her statutory right to exercise ten peremptory challenges. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 24(b); United States v. Martin, 749 F.2d 1514, 1518 (11th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). 3 . In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d
holding that a defendants exercise of peremptory challenges  is not denied or impaired when the defendant chooses to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause holding that batson applies to a prosecutors use of peremptory challenges regardless of whether the stricken juror is of the same race as the defendant holding use of peremptory strike against gay juror failed heightened scrutiny holding that trial judges determination  that the prosecutors use of peremptory challenges to strike all four africanamerican venirepersons for lack of education and business experience was not pretextual  was not clearly erroneous holding that trial courts erroneous refusal to strike juror for cause impaired defendants statutory right to his allotted number of peremptory challenges