to earn contingent commissions, a broker’s duty of loyalty requires it to inform the insured that it is receiving such contingent commissions. Marsh counters that if the broker had such a duty, the legislature would have said so in section 375.116, and its silence on this subject should be taken as a rejection of any such disclosure requirement. Section 375.116 does not purport to replace the common law in regard to broker commissions or to set out all of a broker’s duties to an insured. Its silence on this or other issues regarding brokers is just that — silence. Nothing in the language of section 375.116 or any other cited statute suggests that the legislature intended to address the issue of disclosure. See Overcast v. Billings Mut. Ins. Co., 11 S.W.3d 62, 69-70 (Mo. banc 2000) (<HOLDING>). Whether Marsh had a duty to disclose these
holding to read words and concepts into our statutes that the general assembly did not write shows disrespect both for the general assembly and the common law which the legislature has the power expressly to displace recognizing that this courts construction of a statute becomes as much apart of the statute as the words of the statute itself and that change is a matter that addresses itself to the general assembly not this court holding that the general assembly intended to provide the tax collecting authorities with alternative methods for collecting taxes holding that the general assembly intended to preserve the common law requirement of recklessness in  involuntary manslaughter because only then is the legislative scheme of sanctions commensurate to culpability carried forward recognizing the power of the general assembly to enact statutes bearing on the introduction of evidence