and protective orders are issues within the sound discretion of the motion or trial judge,” Hanover Ins. Co. v. Sutton, 46 Mass.App.Ct. 153, 159 (1999), as is “the admission of evidence, particularly expert testimony.” Beaupre v. Cliff Smith & Assocs., 50 Mass.App.Ct. 480, 485 (2000). “Where good cause is shown, the Court ‘may make any order which justice requires to protect a party . . . from undue burden or expense.’ ” Stanley Realty Holdings v. Watertown Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 18 Mass. L. Rptr. 468 (Mass.Super.Ct. 2004), quoting Mass.R.Civ.P. 26(c). For good cause to exist, the party seeking protection bears the burden of showing specific prejudice or harm will result if no protective order is granted. See Beckman Indus., v. International Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (<HOLDING>); see also San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 187
holding that when the appellate record consists largely of unsubstantiated allegations without affidavits from defense counsel or the defendant it is not adequately developed holding that broad allegations of harm unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning do not satisfy the rule 26c test holding that plaintiffs who alleged a subjective chill of their first amendment rights failed to establish specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm holding that a defendants mere allegations of taint or his unsubstantiated suspicions do not necessitate inquiry by the court holding a broad claim with no factual support was insufficient to satisfy rule 9b