with a supervisor about one month before he was fired, but the ALJ inexplicably found that fatigue breaks were never mentioned during that conversation. Given CPC’s concession that Carter mentioned fatigue breaks to his supervisors when questioned about his delays, we conclude that the ALJ’s finding that Carter never told his supervisors that his delays were caused by such breaks is not supported by substantial evidence. Furthermore, because the ALJ’s finding that Carter’s delays were not truly caused by fatigue breaks rested on this factual error, we also conclude that finding is not supported by substantial evidence. We further conclude that the ALJ’s flawed factual analysis, adopted by the ARB, prejudiced Carter. See Sea “B” Mining Co. v. Addison, 831 F.3d 244, 253 (4th Cir. 2016) (<HOLDING>). The evidence overlooked by the ALJ and the
recognizing that we generally apply harmless error rule to administrative adjudications holding that violation of rule 16 in that case was not harmless error recognizing that the insurance code governs procedures for administrative adjudications recognizing that where the error involved defies analysis by harmless error standards or the data is insufficient to conduct a meaningful harmless error analysis then the error will not be proven harmless beyond a reasonable doubt holding exclusion was harmless error