proximity between these remarks and the ensuing disciplinary action by Shaw severely undermines the reasonableness of any inference that there existed a causal relationship between the remarks and the subsequent decisionmaking by Shaw. See Ayala-Gerena v. Bristol Myers-Squibb Co., 95 F.3d 86, 97 (1st Cir.1996). Second, the comments made by Houston did not unambiguously display an age-based animus. Instead, Houston simply observed a fact of life: since Vesprini was “not going to be [with Shaw] much longer,” the time had come for Vesprini (i) to “step back and let the young stallions run the [day-to-day] business,” and (ii) to mentor Scott Mahan and Michael Vesprini as the next generation of Shaw executives. See, e.g., Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 511-12 (4th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted); see also EEOC v. Tex.
holding that the statement made two years prior to adverse employment action that there comes a time when we all have to make way for younger people did not create an inference of age discrimination given that it was stated as a  truism with no disparaging overtones holding that adea plaintiff had failed to make a prima facie case of age discrimination when he was replaced by someone only two years younger and within the protected age group and there was no other evidence of age discriminatory motive holding that a statement of fact relating to the plaintiffs age was not direct evidence of age discrimination because the relevance of the comment is provided by inference holding that references to the need to attract newer younger people or young blood were insufficient evidence of age bias because they were isolated and merely reflected a truism of business life holding that the fourth prong of a prima facie age discrimination case was satisfied where plaintiff was replaced by two individuals  one who was four years younger than plaintiff and the other who was ten years younger