codefendant that implicates the accused is introduced into evidence at their joint trial ... even if the jury is instructed to consider the confession only as evidence against the codefendant.” United States v. Cope, 312 F.3d 757, 780-81 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 137, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968)). Because it is premised on the Confrontation Clause, the Bruton rule, like the Confrontation Clause itself, does not apply to nontestimonial statements. See United States v. Pugh, 273 Fed.Appx. 449, 455 (6th Cir.2008) (“[T]he statement at issue ... is nontestimonial in nature, and therefore, does not implicate the Confrontation Clause as analyzed under Bruton or otherwise.”); see also United States v. Vargas, 570 F.3d 1004, 1009 (8th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Pike, 292 Fed.Appx. 108, 112
holding that bruton does not apply to nontestimonial codefendant statements holding that voluntary statements to police initiated by witness are not interrogation and therefore are nontestimonial holding statements by coconspirator nontestimonial and thus admissible holding rule 16 does not apply to oral statements other than statements of the defendant holding that driving records were nontestimonial