operandi exception because Government sought to admit it only for that purpose). To be admissible, "other acts” evidence offered to prove modus operandi must be so similar to the charged offense "that they evince a signature quality-marking the extraneous act as the handiwork of the accused.” United States v. Sanchez, 988 F.2d 1384, 1393-94 (5th Cir.1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). As Joshua’s prior possession is not so similar to the charged offense as to constitute modus operandi evidence, the evidence is inadmissible to establish identity. The intent exception is also unavailing. While we have allowed extrinsic evidence of intent in drug possession or conspiracy cases where criminal intent was disputed, see e.g., United States v. Broussard, 80 F.3d 1025, 1040 (5th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>), here because intent is not contested the
holding similar evidence sufficient to sustain a jury verdict of possession with intent to distribute cocaine holding no unfair prejudice from admission of conviction for possession of 50 to 200 pounds of marijuana with intent to distribute as evidence of intent to distribute cocaine holding that evidence of a 10yearold drug conviction was properly admitted to show intent in a prosecution for possession with intent to distribute holding that a prior conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine is admissible under rule 609 holding that an inference of intent to distribute was not warranted from the possession of one ounce of cocaine