In Taylor, the Supreme Court was interpreting the “three-strikes” provision of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which includes “burglary” in its enumerated list of violent felonies. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Here, we must interpret the Sentencing Guidelines, where the enumerated felony is the more specific “burglary of a dwelling,” not “burglary.” Although we have consistently applied Taylor*s methodology to the Sen- tenting Guidelines, see, e.g., United States v. Perez-Vargas, 414 F.3d 1282, 1284 (10th Cir.2005), Taylor does not claim to provide a generic definition of “burglary of a dwelling.” Our analysis must be attuned to the particular statute or guideline in question. Cf. Nijhawan v. Holder, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 2294, 2300, 174 L.Ed.2d 22 (2009) (<HOLDING>). Our case law does not establish the meaning
holding that a conviction under  22039 qualifies as an aggravated felony under the categorical approach holding that the categorical approach applies to the identical definition of crime of violence in 18 usc  16 holding that taylors categorical approach does not apply to an immigration statutes provision establishing that an alien may be deported if convicted of an aggravated felony including an offense defined as one involving fraud or deceit despite the similarities to 18 usc  924e holding for the purposes of 18 usc  924e that being a felon in possession of a firearm is not a violent felony as defined in 18 usc  924e2b holding that we need not remand to the bia so that it may apply the categorical approach