factors. Id. Here, we find that the district court ignored a material factor deserving significant weight — indeed the central thesis of appellant’s argument. That is, the plaintiffs position as Advocate for Persons with Disabilities was abolished in 2013 when Law 75 explicitly repealed Reorganization Plan 1 of 2011 and Law 78 created the Office of Ombudsman for Persons with Disabilities. As such, we further find that the court erred in finding that Diaz had demonstrated a l 6) (same) (citing Abt v. United States, 146 Ct.Cl. 205, 210 (1959)), aff'd, 818 F.2d 876 (Fed.Cir.1987). Repeal is an act unquestionably within the ken of the Puerto Rico Legislature and thus is fatal to Diaz’s legal position. See Higginbotham v. Baton Rouge, 306 U.S. 535, 538, 59 S.Ct. 705, 83 L.Ed. 968 (1939) (<HOLDING>); see also Bastían v. Kennedy, 829 F.2d 1, 2
recognizing that the legislature can create statutory exceptions to atwill employment holding that the legislature may create or expand privileges by statute holding that state legislature may at pleasure create or abolish public offices holding that the colorado constitution reserves no authority in the state legislature to change add to or diminish the qualifications for constitutionally created offices recognizing that the state courts have the power to abolish the tort of alienation of affections