are conditioned on compliance with the court’s order, whereas an unconditional penalty is considered criminal contempt because it is solely and exclusively punitive in nature. Id. In the present case, the contempt imposed was criminal because the function of the sanctions imposed was to punish Jackson for disobedience of the trial court’s order. Namely, the trial court sought to punish Jackson because she violated the order prohibiting her from accumulating junk, clutter, and debris on her property. Furthermore, the punishment imposed, the ninety days imprisonment, was unconditional in that Jackson did not have an opportunity to purge herself of the sanctions if she complied with the court order. Thus, the trial court viewed the sanctions as criminal rather than civil. See id. (<HOLDING>). The distinction between civil and criminal
holding that a contempt order labeled by the district court as civil was actually a criminal contempt because the order was retroactive seeking to penalize previous violations and was punitive serving no compensatory purpose holding discretion of district court for sentencing is explicitly limited in this case by the statute which provides that life imprisonment may be imposed only if death results from the defendants actions and if the jury directs the imposition of the sentence holding a sentence of imprisonment is considered punitive and therefore criminal contempt if it is limited to a definite period holding that a civil contempt defendant has a right to a jury trial when the act of contempt was not committed in the presence of the court and when the incarceration is in part punitive holding a sentence is not limited to period of incarceration