sharply curtails restrictions on electoral speech and. the right to vote because, in our republican form of democracy, elected representatives in power have a strong incentive to enact legislation or policies that preserve their position, at the expense of public interest. As Justice Scalia explained, “[t]he first instinct of power is the retention of power, and, under a Constitution that requires periodic elections, that is best achieved by the suppression of election-time speech.” McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 263, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Casting a vote and associating with a political party are among the most fundamental forms of “election-time speech.” See Williams, 393 U.S. at 30, 89 S.Ct. 5 (<HOLDING>); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555, 84 S.Ct. 1362
holding that the determination of the boundaries of a political subdivision of the state is a political question solely within the power prerogative and discretion of the legislature and not subject to judicial review holding that persecution was on account of political opinion because petitioners prosecutorial investigation into acts of political corruption was by its very nature political recognizing the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs and the right of qualified voters regardless of their political persuasion to cast their votes effectively holding that njeither the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is absolute and congress may prohibit federal employees from participating in political activities in view of its interest in maintaining a nonpartisan work force recognizing even federal constitutional right of association does not apply to the right of one individual to associate with another