(a), (b), (c), (d), or (e) of this section. 7 U.S.C. § 192. At issue in this case is only what constitutes an “unfair” practice within the meaning of § 202(a). The District Court held that an “unfair” practice is one that “injures or is likely to injure competition.” The Growers contend that this interpretation of the statute is belied by the United States Department of Agriculture’s (“USDA”) interpretation, as well as the statute’s plain language and purpose. We first address the Growers’ suggestion that we must defer to the USDA’s reasonable interpretation of the statute because the agency is authorized to make rules and regulations necessary to carry out the PSA. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) (<HOLDING>). To that end, the Growers claim that the USDA
holding that administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for chevron deference when it appears that congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority holding that chevron deference is due only when the agency acts pursuant to delegated authority and the agency action has the force of law holding that court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency holding that chevron deference is due only to a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency holding that when congress has implicitly delegated legislative authority to an agency a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency