claim for excessive force against Defendants Vega and Gibson. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion is denied as to this cause of L 5877550, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2011) (reaffirming that verbal harassment by a corrections officer fails to establish an Eighth Amendment violation), adopted by 2011 WL 5877548 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2011). Along these lines, “[i]ntentional spitting has not been deemed to be a constitutional violation, at least in the prison setting.” Faccio v. Eggleston, No. 10-CV-783, 2011 WL 3666588, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2011); see also Tafari v. McCarthy, 714 F.Supp.2d 317, 348 (N.D.N.Y.2010) (finding that a corrections officer who spat chewing tobacco in the face of a prisoner did not violate the Eighth Amendment); Greene v. Mazzuca, 485 F.Supp.2d 447, 451 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (<HOLDING>). Courts in the Second Circuit have routinely
holding that nothing so amorphous as overall conditions can rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment when no specific deprivation of a single human need exists holding that yelling spitting at and threatening an inmate do not rise to the level at which prevailing doctrine sets the constitutional bar to establish cruel and unusual punishment holding that officers patting pretrial detainee on the buttocks does not rise to the level of punishment to constitute a constitutional violation holding thirty days in disciplinary segregation does not rise to the level of punishment invoking the due process clause holding state constitutional guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment is more extensive than federal constitutional standard