post billboards, and otherwise advertise their athletic programs, TSSAA’s limited regulation of recruiting conduct poses no significant First Amendment concerns. B Brentwood made a voluntary decision to join TSSAA and to abide by its antirecruiting rule. See Brentwood, 531 U. S., at 291 (“No school is forced to join”); cf. Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U. S. 555, 575 (1984). Just as the government’s interest in running an effective workplace can in some circumstances outweigh employee speech rights, see Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138 (1983), so too can an athletic league’s interest in enforcing its rules sometimes warrant curtailing the speech of its voluntary participants. See Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U. S. 563, 568 (1968) (<HOLDING>); see also Board of Comm’rs, Wabaunsee Cty. v.
holding if an employee does not speak as a citizen on a matter of public concern the employee has no first amendment cause of action based on his or her employers reaction to the speech holding that no liberty interest was implicated where the public reason for employees dismissal was that their services did not meet the expectations of the public employer recognizing the states interests in regulating the speech of its employees and stating that the problem is arriving at a balance between the interests of the employee as a citizen in commenting on matters of public concern and the interest of the state as an employer in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees  quoting pickering 391 us at 568 88 sct 1731 holding that the scope of a government employees first amendment rights depends on the balance between the interests of the employee as a citizen in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the state as an employer in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees recognizing a public employees first amendment right to address matters of legitimate public concern