burden of proving the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. I would hold that it is error for a trial court to charge the jury that an alleged victim’s testimony needs no corroboration. Although section 16-3-657 contains current and correct law, it is not a proper subject of a jury charge. Section 16-3-657 prevents courts, either on a dispositive motion at the trial level or on appellate review, from finding a lack of sufficient evidence to support a conviction because the alleged victim’s testimony is uncorroborated. See James Cranston Gray, Jr., Criminal Law—Rape Reform in South Carolina, 30 S.C. L.Rev. 45, 55-60 (1979) (discussing the no-corroboration rule as governing judicial review of the sufficiency of the evidence); cf. Ludy v. State, 784 N.E.2d 459, 468 (Ind.2003) (<HOLDING>). Charging this rule does not assist the jury
holding that reviewing court may consider trial evidence in reviewing denial of motion to suppress holding that the nocorroboration rule is a legal standard for a court reviewing a conviction holding that a chancellor reviewing the decision of a state agency properly reversed and rendered where once the legal standard to be applied properly had been established remanding the case would be futile given st dominics admission that it could not meet that legal standard holding that when the state court uses the wrong legal standard the rule of deference does not apply holding that a reviewing court is not to substitute its decision for that of the board