1983). But the FTCA provides only damage actions. Thus there is a broad world to which the military-specific language of the Privacy Act can apply, while Feres leaves the FTCA’s similar language with little or no role. More generally, we have understood Feres to create the equivalent of a “clear statement” rule. In finding it applicable to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), we said: ... Feres itself represents a refusal to read statutes with their ordinary sweep. The unique setting of the military led the Feres Court to resist bringing the armed services within the coverage of a remedial statute in the absence of an express Congressional command. Bois v. Marsh, 801 F.2d 462, 469 n. 13 (D.C.Cir.1986) (emphasis added); see also Coffman v. State of Michigan, 120 F.3d 57, 59 (6th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Roper v. Department of Army, 832 F.2d 247,
holding that ada and rehabilitation act do not apply to the military absent a clear direction from congress emphasis added holding the ada and the rehabilitation act applicable holding that neither the ada nor the rehabilitation act applies to prison employment holding that exemption under the ada does not preclude liability under the rehabilitation act holding that the same standards apply to claims under the ada and under the rehabilitation act