375 F.3d 1341 (Fed.Cir.2004). Since, as we explain below, sufficient evidence supports the jury’s verdict, we need not consider whether the District’s failure to move for judgment as a matter of law at the close of its own case (as opposed to at the close of Smith’s case) further limits our review “to considering whether the verdict is so unsupported by the evidence that allowing it to stand would constitute a manifest miscarriage of justice,” Fredrick, 254 F.3d at 162. The District presents two fact-based challenges to the jury’s verdict. First, it argues that the jury could not have reasonably concluded that the District had a deliberately indifferent policy or custom under Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Second, it claims that even had such a policy
holding that discrimination against a municipal employee could trigger municipal liability under  1983 through official policy or custom holding that county liability under  1983 cannot rest on a theory of respondeat superior holding that conditionsofconfinement claims must be brought in 42 usc  1983 civil rights complaint rather than in habeas petition recognizing respondeat superior liability holding that municipal liability for purposes of claims brought under 42 usc  1983 must stem from an unconstitutional policy or custom rather than simply from respondeat superior