there is a factual dispute as to whether a defendant "possessed” a gun within the meaning of § 2D1.1(b)(1), Fed. R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(D) requires the district court to either make a specific finding or indic cific findings under Fed. R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(D) where defendant objected to § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement for possession of a firearm that he claimed "belonged to his roommate,” and district court failed to make any findings on this point). 9 . Diana Buchanan also argues that the district court abused its discretion in sentencing her to the maximum possible sentence under the guidelines "in light of the unusual and tragic circumstances of Mrs. Buchanan’s background,” or, in the alternative, that the district court should have departed from the guidelines in sentencing her. th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 529, 130
holding that the eighth amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence but forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime holding that the guidelines stiffer penalties for cocaine base do not violate equal protection holding that a life sentence without parole for possession of 650 grams of cocaine base did not violate the eighth amendment holding that district court did not err in determining that cocaine base was crack cocaine based on chemical analysis identifying cocaine base together with competent lay testimony bridging the evidentiary gap between cocaine base and crack cocaine and refusing to require showing of smokeability ie water solubility or melting point for purposes of establishing crack cocaine under the guidelines since smokeability distinguishes cocaine base from powder cocaine not from crack holding that stiffer penalties for cocaine base transactions are not grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense and therefore do not violate eighth amendment