Unless specified otherwise throughout this opinion, we will generally discuss the appeal in terms of the total relief awarded by the district court rather than by referencing the various awards of relief. 2 . This case was decided prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981, and is binding precedent under Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981). 3 . The fact that plaintiffs request for attorneys' fees remained outstanding is irrelevant to the issue as to whether a final judgment had been entered. See Taylor v. Texgas Corp., 831 F.2d 255, 258 (11th Cir.1987) (awards of attorneys’ fees in ADEA cases are collateral to decision on the merits). See generally Budinich v. Becton Dickinson and Co., 486 U.S. 196, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 1721, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988) (<HOLDING>). 4 . We similarly reject as frivolous the
holding that order denying motion to dismiss a bankruptcy petition is final under 28 usc  1291 holding that a decision on the merits is a final decision for purposes of filing an appeal pursuant to 28 usc  1291 whether or not there remains for adjudication a request for attorneys fees attributable to the case holding that summary judgment order that does not dispose of all claims between parties does not confer appellate jurisdiction because it is not a final decision under 28 usc  1291 recognizing the general rule that once all claims against all parties have been dismissed a prior order will become final for purposes of appeal under 28 usc  1291 holding that existence of outstanding claims for attorneys fees do not affect determination whether district court entered a final decision for purposes of 28 usc  1291