itself has commissioned or created.” Id. at 422, 126 S.Ct. 1951. The Garcetti Court explicitly declined to advance a framework for defining when an employee speaks pursuant to his official duties, explaining that “[t]he proper inquiry is a practical one.” Id. at 424, 126 S.Ct. 1951. This reflects “the enormous variety of fact situations” in which a public employee claims First Amendment protection. Id. at 418, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. 1731). This Court has given contours to Garcetti ’s practical inquiry for defining the scope of an employee’s duties. We declined to extend First Amendment protection to speech where public employees were required to take the speech “up the chain of command,” Foraker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231, 241-43 (3d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>), abrogated on other grounds by Borough of
recognizing a presumption of regularity that undergirds the official acts of public officers causing courts to presume that they have properly discharged their official duties holding that statements at issue were protected expressions of opinion because they lacked specificity and precision and the factual implications concerning such statements were unclear holding that municipal police officers are immune from personal liability for decisions acts or omissions that are 1 made within the scope of their official duties while in the course of their employment 2 discretionary rather than ministerial and 3 not made in a wanton or reckless manner holding that police officers statements concerning hazardous conditions at a firing range were made within their official duties since they were obligated to report that type of information up the chain of command holding that witness statements in police report inadmissible