unit, and is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss.” Section 523(a)(7) creates an exception to discharge for both criminal and civil penalties. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 110 S.Ct. 2126, 109 L.Ed.2d 588 (1990); see also United States Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev. v. Cost Control Mktg. & Sales Mgmt. of Virginia, Inc., 64 F.3d 920 (4th Cir.1995) (finding a civil judgment for disgorgement of profits under the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act nondis-chargeable); United States v. WRW Corp., 986 F.2d 138 (6th Cir.1993) (concluding civil penalties imposed for violations of safety standards under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act were excepted from discharge); Forney v. Hoseley (In re Hoseley), 96.1 I.B.C.R. 37 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1996) (<HOLDING>). Here, Debtor does not dispute that the awards
holding that filing of request for lump sum settlement constituted institution of a proceeding under the texas workmans compensation act holding that plaintiff could recover damages under both the lanham act and the copyright act because the profits awarded under the federal trademark statute constitute compensation rather than a penalty while statutory damages are awarded under the copyright act are designed to serve a variety of purposes other than compensation including deterrence and punishment holding that portion of civil judg ment awarded under the idaho workmans compensation act was nondischargeable holding that liquidated damages under fair labor standards act constitutes compensation for the retention of a workmans pay which might result in damages too obscure and difficult of proof for estimate other than by liquidated damages holding that treble damages awarded under the civil theft statute are remedial not punitive