for summary judgment, Cadet filed her motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Hence this appeal. If the McClain Agency was an insurance agent for Amstar, as Cadet claims, then the McClain Agency’s acceptance of the premium payments from Cadet after the policy was cancelled can be attributed to Amstar and may estop Amstar from asserting cancellation as a defense. But if, as Amstar argues, the McClain Agency was a broker, which generally acts as an agent for the insured, the McClain Agency’s continued acceptance of the premium payments would not be attributable to Amstar unless it acted in the dual role as a statutory, actual or apparent agent for Amstar for purposes of accepting the premium payments. See Almerico v. RLI Ins. Co., 716 So.2d 774, 776-77 (Fla.1998) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted); see also
holding that a broker may be a statutory agent for an insurance company pursuant to section 626842 florida statutes 1989 or be clothed with actual or apparent authority so that the brokers acts may be binding on the insurance company holding that authority with which the  1983 defendant is clothed may be actual or apparent holding that plaintiff could recover medical fees not actually paid by the insurance company pursuant to an insurance contract holding that insurance broker is generally agent of insured holding that even if an insurance broker is the agent of the insurance company for purposes of soliciting and procuring the policy that would not necessarily make the broker the agent of the insurance company for the purpose of receiving notice of suits and claims