Cir.1997) (“The text of § 1986 requires the existence of a § 1985 conspiracy.”), which in turn requires an allegation of four elements: (1) a conspiracy involving two or more persons; (2) for the purpose of depriving, directly or indirectly, a person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) which causes injury to a person or property, or a deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. See Hilliard v. Ferguson, 30 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir.1994). Defendants contend that Ms. Rhyce cannot allege the first element because, under the single entity doctrine, the individual defendants, as employees of the Fire District, cannot be considered individuals sep arate from the Fire District. See id. at 653 (<HOLDING>); Benningfield v. City of Houston, 157 F.3d
holding that petitioners status as school board members does not permit them to step into the shoes of the school board and invoke its right to appeal holding that a school board and its employees constitute a single entity incapable of conspiring with itself for purposes of  19853 holding that the findings of fact conclusions of law and decision signed by the school board president constituted the decision of the board holding that a county ordinance imposing an impact fee on new residential construction to be used for new school facilities did not constitute an unauthorized delegation of power from the county to the school board because the fundamental policy decisions were made by the county and the discretion of the school board was sufficiently limited holding that the supreme court of pennsylvania is a state entity for purposes of the eleventh amendment