of late notice.”). This rule creates an exception to the general tenet of contract law that “one seeking to escape the obligation to perform under a contract must demonstrate material breach or prejudice.” Unigard, 584 N.Y.S.2d 290, 594 N.E.2d at 573. New York courts have never applied this exception outside of the insurance context, however. See, e.g., Unigard, 584 N.Y.S.2d 290, 594 N.E.2d at 573 (referring to the no-prejudice rule as a “limited” exception for insurance contracts); Am. Home, 661 N.Y.S.2d 584, 684 N.E.2d at 16-17; Rekemeyer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 4 N.Y.3d 468, 796 N.Y.S.2d 13, 828 N.E.2d 970, 975 (2005). Federal courts have split on whether to extend this rule to indemnitors, compare Ballard v. Parkstone Energy, LLC, 664 F.Supp.2d 325, 330-31 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (<HOLDING>); EMI Catalogue P’ship v. CBS/ Fox Co., No. 86
holding that plaintiff stated a claim for breach of contract when it alleged the government failed to purchase insurance for plaintiff as agreed by contract holding that appellant waived its claim that its opponent had waived the protections of the noerrpennington doctrine by failing to assert the opponents waiver holding that the parties purchase agreement did not require a showing of prejudice for plaintiff to assert that defendant waived its claim for indemnification holding that where purchaser had taken possession and paid part of the purchase price the statute of frauds did not bar enforcement of a purchase agreement holding that plaintiff lacked standing to assert rico claim for mail fraud based on misrepresentations made to third parties