on Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 98 S.Ct. 866, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978), for two propositions: (1) “[w]hen construing a new law that amends or changes an old law, the Court must presume that Congress knew how the previous laws were applied and that any changes in the language of the new law were intended”; and (2) “when Congress ‘re-enacts a statute without change,’ it is presumed that Congress was aware of the interpretations and applications of the law and intended not to disturb it.” M. Fortunoff of Westbury Corp., 260 F.Supp.2d at 528 (citing Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 581, 98 S.Ct. 866). Reasoning from these principles, the district court decided that in changing “motor common carrier” in § 10927(a)(3) to “motor carrier” in § 13 .S. 110, 131, 134-35, 98 S.Ct. 965, 55 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978) (<HOLDING>); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 16, 68
holding that congress incorporation of jury provisions of the fair labor standards act into the age discrimination in employment act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions holding that when congress included provisions of compulsory testimony act of 1893 in the emergency price control act of 1942 it necessarily adopted settled judicial construction of the 1893 act holding erisa plan interpretation is simply one of contract interpretation holding an administrative interpretation cannot change the meaning of a statute or control the courts interpretation of it holding when congress reenacted the voting rights act it necessarily adopted justice departments longstanding interpretation of acts requirements