erroneous statutory citations in an indictment do not constitute grounds for reversing a conviction, as long as the defendant was on fair notice of the charges against him. See, e.g., United States v. Stein, 233 F.3d 6, 23-24 (1st Cir.2000); United States v. Van West, 455 F.2d 958, 959 (1st Cir.1972). We perceive no substantive difference between charging a defendant with a section 371 conspiracy to violate section 1203 and charging a defendant under the nascent conspiracy provision of section 1203, as amended. This congruence is solid proof that the appellants were in no way prejudiced in their ability to mount a defense by the government’s erroneous citation to the amended (and inapplicable) version of section 1203. See, e.g., United States v. Eirby, 262 F.3d 31, 38 (1st Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); see also Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(c)(3). The short of
holding that a district courts refusal to strike jurors for cause should only be reversed if the defendant demonstrates actual prejudice holding that the violation of a rule of procedure prescribed by this court does not call for a reversal of a conviction unless the record discloses that noncompliance with rule resulted in prejudice or harm to the defendant holding that miscitation or omission of a statutory provision is not a basis for reversal unless the defendant demonstrates prejudice holding that prosecutorial error does not warrant reversal unless substantial prejudice results holding that omission was not plain error