in another, that may be precisely what the Legislature intended,” and “we must honor that difference.”); cf. Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.034 (“In order to preserve the legislature’s interest in managing state fiscal matters through the appropriations process, a statute shall not be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity unless the waiver is effected by clear and unambiguous language.... Statutory prerequisites to a suit, including the provision of notice, are jurisdictional requirements in all suits against a governmental entity.”). 3. Other Cases Construing Statutory Use of “Must” This construction of the Act’s procedural requirements is also consistent with this Court’s precedent in analogous situations. See, e.g., Jose Carreras, M.D., P.A. v. Marroquin, 339 S.W.3d 68, 72 (Tex.2011) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem Code §
recognizing that the applicant received notice from the plea form even though such notice was not required holding that health care liability claimants failure to include authorization form with notice precluded claimants from availing themselves of statutory tolling provision because statute provided that notice must be accompanied by the authorization form holding recoupment statute itself served as a form of notice holding claim that negligent supervision caused assault was health care liability claim because it was inseparable from the health care and nursing services provided holding that an obligation imposed by statute cannot form the basis for a statutory employer relationship