liquidated the subject property and realized the profits therefrom, the receiver had no remaining interest in the property. Id. at 518. The Pyramid court disagreed, finding that the plain language of the statute reflected Congress’s intent to prohibit any interference, direct or indirect, with the functions of the receiver. Id. And, like Dittmer’s lawsuit, the Pyramid court found that the plaintiffs suit would have the effect of rescinding the transfer of property from the receiver to the purchasing company, a move that “would undoubtedly ‘restrain or affect’ the [receiver] in the performance of its statutory duties.” Id. at 519. Other lower courts are in accord with the reasoning of Hindes and Pyramid. See, e.g., Hoxeng v. Topeka Broadcomm, Inc., 911 F.Supp. 1323, 1334-35 (D.Kan.1996) (<HOLDING>); Furgatch v. Resolution Trust Corp., No.
holding that a tax sale did not violate  1825b2 where under texas law the fdics interest was not devalued or extinguished since it had not been made a party to the suit holding that the outcome of the case could have been different if the trial court had imposed the appropriate burden holding that a litigant may not claim standing to assert the rights of a third party holding that the fdics agent could assert  1821  to bar a claim for specific performance even when the fdic was not and could not have been a party to the case holding that evidence necessary to the governments rebuttal of a defendants case could not be excluded under rule 403 but could have been if it was introduced only to bolster the prosecutions case