of Richards’s affidavit, given on some unspecified day in March of 2001, concerning the “C-store picker” position states the following: I could perform the C-store picker responsibilities with or without accommodations. Currently, I am on and off my feet frequently. There is no reason why I could not now walk a cart down the aisle and pull products. Furthermore, if Farner-Bocken would accommodate me by allowing me to use a motorized cart that it uses in [the] “case pick” department, I could [do] my job. Plaintiffs LR 56.1(e) Appendix Resisting Defendant’s Motion For Summary Judgment at 6 (Exhibit 2, Richards’s Affidavit, ¶24) (emphasis added). Although Richards “acknowledges” her prior deposition testimony, Richards’s affidavit appears to be inc Supp. 672, 684-686 (N.D.Iowa 1995) (<HOLDING>); Kunzman v. Enron Corp., 902 F.Supp. 882,
holding that the court may disregard an affidavit submitted solely for the purpose of opposing a motion for summary judgment when that affidavit is directly contradicted by deposition testimony and the nonmovant does not explain the discrepancies holding that waterhouse cannot generate a genuine issue of material fact by making statements in an affidavit that directly contradict his sworn deposition testimony given in the case holding that physicians affidavit created genuine issue of material fact even though it directly contradicted his prior deposition testimony where physician offered a plausible explanation for the change in his testimony holding that facts alleged in an employees affidavit were insufficient to raise an issue of fact for the purposes of defeating a summary judgment where the affidavit contradicted the employees earlier deposition statements holding that the affidavit of an expert proffered in opposition to summary judgment motion was assertedly in conflict with the experts prior deposition testimony but the court found that the affidavit could generate genuine issues of material fact because the expert explained the basis for his apparently changed opinion