into these facts at all. Neither could defense counsel have relied on the fact that Dr. Emery did not find a need for neurological examinations because, as discussed above, they failed to give him the information necessary to form an opinion in this regard. In sum, defense counsel’s failure to insist on neuropsychological testing did not stem from an informed decision made after reasonable investigation, as required by the Constitution, but was the product of neglect. See Seidel v. Merkle, 146 F.3d 750, 756 (9th Cir.1998) (finding ineffective assistance where defense counsel “failed to conduct even the minimal investigation that would have enabled him to come to an informed decision” regarding his client’s mental health defenses); cf. Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Pizzuto not only has shown that his counsel’s
holding that defense counsel opened the door to the states rebuttal remarks when defense counsel raised the issue in his closing argument holding that defense counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for presenting a diminished capacity defense as opposed to a defense of legal insanity holding that the decision whether to seek a mistrial is a tactical decision entrusted to defense counsel binding the defendant even when the defendant expressed a contrary wish to his lawyer holding that defense counsel gathered sufficient evidence to make a reasonable tactical decision not to conduct further investigations into his clients mental health when psychiatric experts interviewed the defendant for more than twenty hours and informed defense counsel that they could not find any basis for a mental defense holding that defense counsels decision not to call defendant to the stand despite defendants repeatedly expressed desire to testify on his own behalf was not ineffective assistance of counsel but was a reasonable tactical decision by counsel not to subject defendant to all of the risk attendant on crossexamination