explained in a case involving the shooting of a fleeing motorist, “the law ... has been vague on whether the potential risk to unknown third parties is sufficient to justify the use of force nearly certain to cause death.” Cordova, 569 F.3d at 1193 (emphasis added). Because no one “has identified a single case predating the conduct at issue that prohibits [ramming a car] in a materially similar context,” and because I believe that these cases demonstrate that Davis’s actions “at best fell in the hazy border between excessive and acceptable force,” the Plaintiff has failed to show that Davis’s conduct was prohibited by clearly-established law. Lyons v. City of Xenia, 417 F.3d 565, 579 (6th Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Cordova, 569 F.3d at 1193 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). Accordingly, I respectfully
holding that where police officers had stopped a vehicle because they suspected that the motorist was intoxicated irrespective of whether the deputies were justified in detaining the motorist after he showed no signs of intoxication and even if they had not after approaching the motorist observed conditions raising a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot they were entitled to ask the motorist for permission to search his vehicle holding that a fleeing motorist was not seized for fourth amendment purposes until the law enforcement officers were successful in stopping the motorist at a roadblock holding term third party did not include an uninsured motorist carrier holding that police officers are entitled to conduct an investigatory stop of a motorist if they have reasonable suspicion that the motorist has committed a traffic violation holding that because the law in this area is unclear an officer who shot a fleeing motorist was not unreasonable in believing that a potential threat to third parties would justify shooting the motorist