A.2d 691 (1977), aff'd, Del.Supr., 386 A.2d 670 (1978)). On several occasions, this Court has discussed the causal nexus between an injury and an automobile accident which is required to trigger coverage under § 2118(a)(2)(e). “While a causal connection between use of the vehicle and the injury is required, there is no requirement to show that the injury was proximately caused by the use of the automobile. Rather, the showing must be that the injury occurred by virtue of the inherent nature of using the motor vehicle.” Dickerson v. Continental Casualty Co., Del.Super., C.A. No. 82C-MR-8, Poppiti, J. (Sept. 1, 1983) (citing Hutchins v. Mills, Fla.Dist.Ct.App., 363 So.2d 818, 821 (1978), cert. denied, Fla.Supr., 368 So.2d 1368, No. 88C-DE-191, 1989 WL 158511, Taylor, J. (Nov. 2, 1989) (<HOLDING>); Sczubelek v. Maahs, Del.Super., C.A. No.
holding that the sensible and popular understanding of what a motor vehicle accident entails necessarily involves the motor vehicle being operated as a motor vehicle  holding that plaintiff who slipped on ice while approaching her car lacked the necessary nexus with the yehicle and therefore was not an occupier of a motor vehicle holding that the statutory definition of motor vehicle is not controlling holding that plaintiff who slipped and fell on ice while securing cars on his employers motor vehicle carrier preparing to travel was very close to the vehicle and engaged in a task related to the vehicle and therefore was an occupier of a motor vehicle holding automobile exeeption did not apply to warrantless search of vehicle where vehicle was not readily mobile because the vehicle was legally parked in parking lot occupants of vehicle were seated on a bench in the playground near the parking lot police officers surrounded the vehicle and the driver of the vehicle was handcuffed for safety purposes