tax liability is strictly contingent on Bronsdon’s finan re Archibald), 280 B.R. 222, 229 (Bankr.S.D.Ind.2002) (stating, in 2002, that “[t]he tax implications of a discharge under the ICRP are speculative at best given that the ICRP is approximately eight years old”). But see, e.g., In re Durrani, 311 B.R. 496, 508 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.2004)(“However, that discharge of indebtedness, unlike a discharge in bankruptcy, results in income that [debtor] would have to recognize fo eration of the ICRP is an important component of the undue hardship analysis. See State Univ. New York-Student Loan Serv. Ctr. v. Menezes, 352 B.R. 8, 15, 17 (D.Mass.2006). The mere availability of the ICRP does not mandate a conclusion that undue hardship is absent. See In re Lee, 352 B.R. 91, 95-96 (8th Cir. BAP 2006)(<HOLDING>); Jones v. Bank One Texas, 376 B.R. 130, 142
holding that no one factor is determinative and the weakness of  one factor may be overborne by the strength of the others holding that the areas propensity toward criminal activity is one factor to be considered in determining the existence of reasonable suspicion holding that edwards protection only extends to interrogation and that denial of counsel is only one factor to be considered in determining whether  consent was voluntarily given but it is not a decisive fact holding that no one factor is determinative and the weakness of one factor may be overborne by the strength of the others holding that the availability of the icrp is but one factor to be considered in determining undue hardship but it is not determinative