supra, required them to go there. Then the district court disassociated itself from the case in pieces, first issuing its dismissal judgment on April 26, 1984, next — eight days later — filing a memorandum explaining the dismissal, thereafter entertaining the Commission's motion to clarify ten days after that, and finally issuing a decision on the motion more than six weeks after its initial judgment. The district court's continuing association with the case understandably left the plaintiffs uncertain as to the precise point at which the decision became final. In similar circumstances, the Ninth Circuit sensibly explained why it refused to dismiss an appeal as untimely. See Pierre v. Jordan, 333 F.2d 951, 955 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 974, 85 S.Ct. 664, 13 L.Ed.2d 565 (1964) (<HOLDING>). 4 . It is ironic that the only court with
holding that the sixth circuits clear statement in workman that a finding of regarded as disability obviates the obligation to reasonably accommodate is binding precedent and upholding jurys finding that defendant was not liable for failing to accommodate a regarded as disabled employee holding that notice of appeal was not effectively taken where appeal was filed simultaneously with timely motion for reconsideration because when timely motion for reconsideration is filed a notice of appeal filed prior to disposition of the motion to reconsider has no effect holding that the plaintiff was entitled to conclude that the district court regarded the motion as timely this being the case unique circumstances exist requiring that her motion be regarded as  effectively terminating the running of the time for appeal holding that under the circumstances of that case an argument made for the first time in a motion for rehearing was waived holding that pleadings cannot be regarded as summary judgment evidence