hearing. On appeal, the court held that the resentencing did not violate the defendants' double jeopardy rights because a ”[d]efendant is charged with knowledge that his sentence, if illegally imposed, is subject to correction under Fed.R. Crim.P. 35(a) ... [and] [u]nder such circumstances ... has no expectation of finality in the sentence he receives.” 769 F.2d at 257. The distinction between Crawford and the case before us is that the illegality in Crawford affected the entire sentence, including its severity; because the court denied the government its right to allocution, the court decided the appropriate punishment on the basis of incomplete information. Thus, the defendant could have no expectation of finality in the severity of his sentence. See also McClain, 676 F.2d at 918 (<HOLDING>). In this case, the defect in the sentence is
holding that the double jeopardy clause did not bar resentencing on counts that were affirmed on appeal when a sentence of imprisonment on another count was vacated holding that an apprendi error was harmless where the defendant received a concurrent sentence on another count longer than the statutory maximum applicable to the count affected by the error holding that a criminal defendant convicted by a jury on one count cannot attack that conviction because it was inconsistent with the jurys verdict of acquittal on another count citations omitted holding that double jeopardy does not prohibit resentencing on unchallenged count after appeal of defendant on another count and vacatur of entire sentence but explicitly noting that what we have said  in no way is addressed to a situation involving concurrent or noninterlocking sentences holding that in some circumstances a sentence on one count may be increased after the sentence on a similar or related count has been vacated on appeal