contended that any reasonable peace officer, or citizen, for that matter, would believe that mild profanity while peacefully advocating a political position could constitute a criminal act. The facts in this case could lead a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the circumstance of Leonard’s arrest for disturbing the peace were devoid of any indicia of disruption or contention. See Mich. Comp. Laws. § 750.170. We therefore hold that no reasonable officer would find that probable cause exists to arrest a recognized speaker at a chaired public assembly based solely on the content of his speech (albeit vigorous or blasphemous) unless and until the speaker is determined to be out of order by the individual chairing the assembly. See Jones v. Heyman, 888 F.2d 1328, 1329 (11th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Any peace officer in attendance can
holding that even though a visitor may be an invitee when she first enters the premises her status may change to licensee while she is there if the use to which she puts the property is not within the scope of the invitation holding that a sentencing court may determine the nature of a prior conviction without violating the sixth amendment holding that the chair of city commission meeting may without violating the first amendment have a speaker removed when she becomes disorderly by speaking offtopic holding that corporate president who called and participated in shareholders meeting to elect directors was estopped from questioning the legality of the meeting and election of directors who later removed him holding that a plaintiff can show that she is qualified by presenting credible evidence that she continued to possess the objective qualifications she held when she was hired