which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tor-tious, or criminal does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby."). 14 . Although we have cited § 302B several times in dicta, this court has never invoked that section as a source of liability. See Bryson v. Banner Health Sys., 89 P.3d 800, 805 n. 11 (Alaska 2004) (quoting almost identical language in Prosser and Keeton on Torts for the proposition that a special relationship may yield a duty to protect another from a third party); Joseph v. State, 26 P.3d 459, 471 n. 67 (Alaska 2001) (citing § 302B for the proposition that "a reasonably foreseeable occurrence cannot be an intervening/superseding cause if the actor has a duty to prevent that occurrence"); Wil 011) (<HOLDING>); Kim v. Budget Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 143
holding that a prior conviction for abusive sexual contact under 18 usc  2244a3 was a per se crime of violence within the meaning of the application notes and declining to consider application of the residual clause holding that defendants constitutionally protected privacy interest began at the door to his room not at the door to the rooming house holding that violence was not the foreseeable result of opening the door to an abusive and upset exhusband while a new boyfriend was over holding that opening the door in response to a police demand and then failing to object when officers entered was not voluntary consent holding that arrest by the back door of defendants house was unlawful