jury to find Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). See also OCGA § 16-2-20 (parties to a crime); Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 33 (673 SE2d 223) (2009) (“ ‘It was for the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence.’ ” (citation omitted)). 2. The pattern jury instruction for felony murder says in part: “A person (also) commits the crime of murder when, in the commission of a felony, that person causes the death of another human being (with or without malice).” Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases, § 2.10.20 (parentheticals in original). The commentary on t 27) (1982) (<HOLDING>). 3. In instructing the jury on the form of its
holding that although appellant filed a proposed jury charge appellant did not preserve error because trial court did not endorse proposed charge and appellant did not call trial courts attention to the portions of the proposed charge that were complained about on appeal holding that courts erroneous disjunctive charge on one of several indictments against the appellant was harmful error under almanza standard because the erroneous charge made it possible for the jury to return a nonunanimous verdict holding that an erroneous charge on sanity was harmless because it was beneficial to appellant holding that the erroneous admission of dna evidence is never harmless holding the sandstrom error in that case was clearly not harmless on the facts and therefore declining to address the question of whether an erroneous charge that shifts a burden of persuasion to the defendant on an essential element of the offense can ever be harmless