purpose to serve the [employer],” even if it is forbidden by the employer. Restatement §§ 228(l)(e), 230. For example, when a salesperson lies to a customer to make a sale, the tortious conduct is within the scope of employment because it benefits the employer by increasing sales, even though it may violate the employer’s policies. See Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 70, at 505-506. As Courts of Appeals have recognized, a supervisor acting out of gender-based animus or a desire to fulfill sexual urges may not be actuated by a purpose to serve the employer. See, e. g., Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F. 3d 1437, 1444 (CA10 1997), vacated on other grounds, post, p. 947; Torres v. Pisano, 116 F. 3d 625, 634, n. 10 (CA2 1997). But see Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F. 2d, at 184-185 (<HOLDING>). The harassing supervisor often acts for
holding that the doctrine of respondeat superior in maryland allows an employer to be held vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of its employee when that employee was acting within the scope of the employment relationship citations omitted holding harassing supervisor acted within scope of employment but employer was not liable because of its quick and effective remediation holding unconstitutional a workers compensation statute which granted immunity from suits by coemployees to employees who acted within the scope of their employment holding that both agent and principal will be liable when the agent acts within the scope of his employment but for his own purposes holding that the principal is liable for an agents acts committed within the scope of the agents employment