of his sister’s experience during the May 2001 detention. Specifically, Suntharalinkam’s asylum application stated that a bribe paid by his mother secured “our” release, whereas he testified at the hearing that his sister was released the day after they were first detained. The IJ asked Suntharalinkam to explain why he used the word “our” in his declaration, but Suntharalinkam’s response was “indiscernible” according to the hearing transcript. Because this detail does not affect or enhance the merits of Suntharalinkam’s claim, and because it was probably the result of a translation difficulty, we hold that an adverse credibility finding cannot be based on this purported inconsistency, which, again, may not have been one at all. See Zahedi v. INS, 222 F.3d 1157, 1167-68 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Eighth, the IJ noted that during
holding when one identified ground for an adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of petitioners claim of persecution the court is bound to accept the ijs adverse credibility determination holding that substantial evidence supported an adverse credibility finding where the petitioners two asylum applications differed significantly regarding past persecution holding that ijs adverse credibility was not supported by substantial evidence where there were significant communication and translation problems  during the asylum hearing and the discrepancies at issue were not crucial to petitioners claim holding that in light of an applicants omission of various relevant facts from his asylum application substantial evidence supported the ijs adverse credibility determination holding that minor discrepancies that do not involve the heart of the asylum claim are not an adequate basis for an adverse credibility finding