the state. That notwithstanding clause was included in ORS 115.008 in response to our decision in Payne. In Payne, we held that ORS 12.250 exempted the state from the 30-day limitation period set out in ORS 115.145(1). We based that holding on our earlier decision in City of Medford v. Budge-McHugh Supply Co., 91 Or App 213, 754 P2d 607, rev den, 306 Or 661 (1988), in which we held that ORS 12.250 was applicable outside of ORS chapter 12, despite the “in this chapter” language. Specifically, we applied the exemption in ORS 12.250 to claims brought under ORS 30.905. In doing so, we rejected the argument that “ORS 12.250 applies only to limitations in chapter 12.” Budge-McHugh Supply Co., 91 Or App at 218-19. However, the Supreme Court rejected that reasoning in Shasta, 329 Or at 158-59 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, even without ORS 115.008, we
holding that ors 30905 did not make ors 12250 applicable to claims brought under that statute because ors 12250 applies only to limitations contained in ors chapter 12 holding that even though  24 only refers to actions in state court it applies to state claims brought in federal court holding that a twoyear statute of limitations applies to negligence claims under texas law recognizing that basis for challenging administrative rule under ors 1834004b holding that a twoyear statute of limitations period applies to all  1983 actions brought in pennsylvania