to factor equitable considerations into its decision on remand. IV. CONCLUSION We REVERSE the order imposing a constructive trust and REMAND for further proceedings to establish the amount of the statutory allowances and share. 1 . For additional background concerning Riddell and Lillie and the administration of this estate, refer to Riddell v. Edwards, 32 P.3d 4 (Alaska 2001) ("Riddell I") and Riddell v. Edwards, Mem. Op. & J. No. 1050 (Alaska, October 10, 2001) ("Riddell II"). 2 . Riddell I, 32 P.3d at 5, 10. 3 . Riddell II, Mem. Op. & J. No. 1050 at 1. 4 . The superior court cited Coleman v. Coleman, 85 Or. 99, 166 P. 47 (1917). 5 . Patey v. Peaslee, 99 N.H. 335, 111 A.2d 194, 198 (1955) (barring heirs from annulling marriage); Patey v. Peaslee, 101 N.H. 26, 131 A.2d 433, 435 (1957) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Internal footnote omitted citing Patey,
holding plans suit against law firm for constructive trust was a suit for appropriate equitable relief holding that under california law a constructive trust may be sought only by the equitable owner of the trust res not by a creditor of the equitable owner holding that a constructive trust is appropriate in the case where transfer of the options would not be profitable possible or convenient recognizing constructive trust as appropriate equitable remedy holding that the statute of limitations cannot bar appellants claim that a constructive trust should be imposed  because a constructive trust is an equitable remedy and therefore not subject to the statute