40-41 (1st Cir.1999). Accordingly, we deny the petition for review in No. 04-1134. Additionally, we uphold the immigration judge’s finding that the state court’s grant of probation before judgment constituted a “conviction” within the meaning of the federal immigration laws. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2000); Yanez-Popp v. INS, 998 F.2d 231, 234-37 (4th Cir.1993). Finally, to the extent that Ameh claims that the Board’s use of the summary affirmance procedure as set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4) (2004) violated his rights under the Due Process Clause, we find that this claim is squarely foreclosed by our recent decision in Blanco de Belbruno v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 272 (4th Cir.2004). We do not separately review whether the Board appropriately streamlined this case. See id. at 281 (<HOLDING>). We therefore deny the petition for review in
holding that the critical date for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 237a1h is the date of the immigration judges decision holding that a board affirmance of an ro decision subsumes that decision holding that a reviewing court is not to substitute its decision for that of the board holding that the remedy when the board improperly affirms a case under its summary affirmance procedures for example by allowing a nonharmless error to slip through is judicial review of the immigration judges decision holding that where a statute provides a procedure for judicial review of a bid protest a party may not circumvent the established procedures and was obligated either to pursue its right to judicial review or to file its declaratory judgment action in compliance with the procedures for administrative appeal set out in the statute