We agree with this assessment. Because a crime of violence necessarily contemplates a victim, we reject Drapeau’s contention that making a bomb is a victimless crime. We now turn to the question of whether the district court clearly erred in its finding that Officer Sazue was a “victim” of making the firebombs. Because the Sentencing Guidelines do not define the term “victim,” we look to the term’s plain and ordinary meaning in interpreting the Guidelines. See Un .2d 390 (1997); United States v. McCaleb, 908 F.2d 176, 179 (7th Cir.1990) (“Nothing in the ... guidelines requires that the victim be harmed or made aware of the threat.”). It is enough that the intended victim of the crime was a government official. Cf. United States v. Duran, 891 F.Supp. 629, 633 (D.D.C.1995) (<HOLDING>). As found by the district court, Drapeau and
holding that the erroneous admission of a hearsay statement that identified the defendant as the shooter was harmless where the defendant never contested that he shot the gun but claimed only that he shot in selfdefense holding that attempted felony murder was abolished holding that there is no crime of attempted felony murder in florida holding that a 3a12a enhancement was appropriate for attempted murder of the president although the defendant mistakenly shot at a lookalike holding that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to argue based on the first districts decision in montgomery that the standard attempted manslaughterbyact instruction was fundamentally erroneous where betts was charged with attempted firstdegree premeditated murder and convicted of the necessary lesserincluded offense of attempted seconddegree murder