and in a section that sets out the contours of a federal claim for damages “arising out of’ the hijacking and the crashing of the planes used in the attacks, some courts initially interpreted the provision to provide jurisdiction only in actions brought by direct victims of the attacks or their survivors. See, e.g., Combined Ins. Co. of Am. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, No. 01 Civ. 10023(RO), 2002 WL 31056851, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2002), aff'd on other grounds, 75 Fed.Appx. 799 (2d Cir. 2003); Goodrich Corp. v. Winterthur Int’l Am. Ins. Co., No. 5:02 Civ. 367, 2002 WL 31833646, at *4 (N.D.Ohio June 17, 2002). The Second Circuit has not read Section 408 in general, or Section 408(b)(3) in particular, so narrowly. See In re WTC Disaster Site, 414 F.3d at 375-80 (<HOLDING>). However, this Circuit has rejected also the
holding that causes of action of workers claiming respiratory injury arose under the air transportation safety and system stabilization act before september 29 2001 and under new york state law thereafter holding that claims brought under section 10b of the securities exchange act and rico claims were arbitrable holding that section 408 of air safety act extended to claims brought by workers for respiratory injuries suffered during rescue and cleanup efforts at the wtc after attacks holding that the limitation act does not apply to claims brought under the oil pollution act holding that the limitation act does not apply to claims brought under the clean water act