16 of the Indiana Constitution, which provides in pertinent part that “[a]ll penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense.” Punishment for contempt is generally within the sound discretion of the trial court. Hopping v. State, 637 N.E.2d 1294, 1298 (Ind.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1017, 115 S.Ct. 578, 130 L.Ed.2d 493. We have previously noted that Ind.Code 34-4-7-6, which limited punishment to a fine of $500.00 and/or imprisonment of no more than three months, has been repealed. See Contempt of Steelman, 648 N.E.2d 366, 369 (Ind.Ct.App.1995); Matter of Craig, 552 N.E.2d 53, 56 (Ind.Ct.App.1990). Now, in the absence of the statute, the power to punish contempt is limited by reasonableness. Id. (citing Green v. U.S., 356 U.S. 165, 78 S.Ct. 632, 645, 2 L.Ed.2d 672 (1958) (<HOLDING>)). Our supreme court has held that a sentence
holding that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion by stating that it did not have the ability to present the transcript to the jury holding a party must timely present his legal theories to the trial court so as to give the trial court an opportunity to rule properly holding that trial court was required to give full effect to supreme courts judgment and that by failing to do so the trial court abused its discretion holding that a reviewing court has the power to reject the findings and conclusions of the trial court where the findings are not supported by the evidence holding that the lack of statutory limitations does not give the trial court unbridled discretion as the trial court has a special duty to exercise such an extraordinary power with the utmost sense of responsibility and circumspection