considered as a whole does not compel a contrary conclusion. See Zhang v. U.S. INS, 386 F.3d 66, 67 (2d Cir.2004) (affirming denial of asylum under the substantial evidence standard where the IJ found that the asylum applicant had submitted “ ‘few [corroborating] documents’ ” and had “ ‘not presented consistent, detailed or credible testimony1 to support his claim of persecution”). With respect to Sultan’s complaint that the IJ erred (1) by denying Sultan relief under the Convention Against Torture and (2) by excluding certain evidence that Sultan did not timely submit, Sultan failed to raise these claims in his appeal before the BIA. Consequently, we are without jurisdiction to consider them. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Cervantes-Ascencio v. U.S. INS, 326 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). ^ £ * * * % Having considered all of
holding that a courts authority to require exhaustion of administrative remedies in actions brought under the apa is limited when neither the statute nor agency rules specifically mandate exhaustion as a prerequisite to judicial review holding the bia did not abuse its discretion in finding petitioner did not satisfy the procedural requirements for his motion in part because petitioner failed to submit a completed application for relief holding that exhaustion of issues is jurisdictional holding that the petitioner could demonstrate its constitutional standing for the first time on judicial review of an order of the land use board of appeals because the need to do so first arose when the petitioner sought to invoke the courts jurisdiction on judicial review recognizing that  1252d1s exhaustion requirements require a petitioner to raise issues to the bia in order to preserve them for judicial review