judges, the trial management techniques needed to control these lawyers may seem harsh, even abusive. A rigorous standard that restricts sanctions to instances of clearly abusive behavior will reduce the likelihood that councils will sanction appropriate behavior out of inexperience. And quite apart from the problem of inexperience, even judges can act unfairly — indeed vindictively — towards colleagues. A rigorous standard will reduce, though of course it cannot eliminate, the possibility that judicial discipline will be used to sanction unpopular judges engaged in appropriate behavior. Third, judicial discipline, like civil liability for judicial acts, can chill the proper exercise of judicial discretion. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967) (<HOLDING>); cf. Williams v. United States, 156 F.3d 86,
holding that imposing civil liability for acts committed to judicial discretion would contribute not to principled and fearless decisionmaking but to intimidation holding that judges have immunity from suit for judicial acts recognizing judicial immunity for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction holding that in the context of erisa successor liability is not an independent cause of action but simply a theory for imposing liability based on a predecessors erisa violation holding that the ban on judicial review of actions committed to agency discretion by law is jurisdictional