testimony did not provide the sole and crucial link in the State’s case against Defendant. There is some authority that where the juvenile is the only witness on whose testimony the State depends for the conviction of the defendant, juvenile records should be admitted. Jones v. State, 249 Ind. 621, 627, 232 N.E.2d 587, 590 (1968) (Jackson, J. concurring). Here, however, Moody was not the State’s only identification witness. Nicole Phipps was the State’s principal identification witness because she provided eyewitness testimony to the murder. Second, in Davis, the witness had provided deceptive testimony by denying that law enforcement officials had ever questioned him. This testimony went unchallenged due to the trial court’s exclusion of the juvenile record. Id. a 34, 1037 (Ind.1986) (<HOLDING>); cf. Terrell v. State, 507 N.E.2d 633, 635
holding that a trial witnesss testimony as to the credibility of another witness was prejudicial error holding that although the trial court improperly permitted reference to the witnesss juvenile adjudication based on theft for impeachment purposes there was no prejudicial effect requiring reversal holding that juvenile adjudications may not be used for impeachment purposes because the disposition of a juvenile does not constitute a criminal conviction holding that a juvenile adjudication may be used as a prior conviction for apprendi purposes holding that there is no prejudice where the racial reference was for purposes of identification