to and from Atasca and Bowman by requesting information from that time period in its interrogatory. Further, the dates of insolvency were established by El Paso’s partial motion for summary judgment. Legally, El Paso’s complaint about the time period would shift the burden to Bowman to prove an element of El Paso's claim. Rather, it is El Paso's burden to prove that Atasca did not receive reasonably equivalent value. See In re Pace, 456 B.R. at 270; see also Mladenka, 130 S.W.3d at 405. Perhaps El Paso will disprove Bowman's self-serving testimony with additional financial records, or a fact finder may disbelieve him and find actual fraud. See Phillips v. B.R. Brick and Masonry, Inc., No. 01-09-00311-CV, 2010 WL 3564820, at *5-6 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 10, 2010) (mem. op.) (<HOLDING>). But with the summary judgment evidence
holding that although there was evidence the defendant transferred or caused to be transferred more money to the debtor than the debtor transferred to the defendant there was legally sufficient evidence to support the jurys finding of actual fraud under section 24005a1 and b because the badges of fraud showed the debtors intent to hinder delay or defraud creditors holding that debtors depositing of funds into spouses separate account did not establish actual intent to hinder delay or defraud creditors for purposes of denial of discharge under chapter 7 holding that actual intent to defraud is not necessary to finding of constructive fraud holding that the statute requires actual intent to hinder delay or defraud creditors or the trustee constructive intent to defraud does not suffice holding that debtor cannot take advantage of  522f after debtor has transferred his exempt property