to decide the § 8371 bad faith claim.... ”). But Nealy directly conflicts with, and therefore is preempted by, the FAA. The FAA prevents state law from undermining parties’ contracts to arbitrate. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 58-59, 63-64, 115 S.Ct. 1212, 131 L.Ed.2d 76 (1995) (upholding arbitration of a punitive damages claim under a contractual arbitration provision, notwithstanding New York state law allowing only courts — but not arbitrators — to award punitive damages); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16, 104 S.Ct. 852, 79 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984) (“Congress [through the FAA] intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements.”); cf. Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287 (3d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). IV. Conclusion In this context, we hold that
holding that pennsylvania law applied as the parties did not argue choice of law issue and implied that pennsylvania law applied by focusing their arguments on same holding that  4 does not empower court to rewrite venue provisions of arbitration clause or to order arbitration within district absent contractual provision so indicating holding that the best way to harmonize a choice of law clause and an arbitration clause is to apply the substantive case law of the named state to the entire agreement including the arbitration clause holding that a choiceoflaw clause without more did not evidence contractual intent to opt into pennsylvania law governing arbitration standards holding that a contracts choiceoflaw provision did not determine the scope of an arbitration clause