than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.” FedEx argues it is entitled to summary judgment on the overtime claims of 24 of the 25 Plaintiffs asserting such claims. First, FedEx argues that the ten Plaintiffs with overtime claims who stopped working for FedEx before January 1, 2007 are exempt from the MMWL. Before January 1, 2007, the MMWL excluded from its definition of “employee” any “individuals employed by an employer” subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). See, e.g., Mo. Ann. Stat. § 290.500, Historical and Statutory Notes, 2006 Amendment (West 2012) (providing that “individuals employed by an employer covered by 29 U.S.C. § 203” were not subject to the state statute); Doyel v. McDonald’s Corp., 2009 WL 350627, at *2 (E.D.Mo. Feb. 10, 2009) (<HOLDING>). FedEx contends it is an “employer” within the
holding that employees may not contract away their flsa rights holding that claims arising from a june 2007 loan were governed by the preamendment statute holding that the statute plainly exempted  all employees who were covered by the flsa before january 1 2007 holding under flsa holding that maintenance workers in a building that did produce goods for interstate commerce were covered under the flsa