stated reasons: (1) the Bexar County Parties were not parties in the trial court, (2) the Bexar County Parties have no standing to appeal, (3) the doctrine of virtual representation does not apply, and (4) the commitment order lacks finality. These arguments lack merit. Even if the doctrine of virtual representation does not apply, courts have held that nonparties have a right to appeal from a judgment if they clearly have an interest in that judgment and if they are bound by the judgment. See The Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829, 843 (Tex.2000) (stating that a person whose interest is prejudiced by an error in a judgment has standing to appeal the judgment and citing Jemigcm case with approval); Jernigan v. Jernigan, 677 S.W.2d 137, 139-40 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1984, no writ) (<HOLDING>); Department of Children and Families v.
holding that the supreme courts proper scope of review of a trial courts decision in a trial de novo of an assessment matter is whether the decision of the trial court was clearly erroneous holding that where both the appellate and trial courts are reviewing the paper record  there is no reason for the appellate courts to defer to the trial courts finding holding nonparties had right to appeal trial courts judgment that bound the nonparties and affected an interest of the nonparties that appeared in the trial courts record recognizing an appellate court may affirm a trial courts decision that reached the right result regardless of the trial courts reasoning holding that third party seeking to be reimbursed for costs incurred in responding to discovery request had standing to appeal because its interests were directly represented by its own counsel in the trial court it was effectively bound by the trial courts final order of dismissal the other party would have had the right to appeal the trial courts ruling if it had granted the request for reimbursement and the third party had no other legal remedy to contest the trial courts denial of its request