to appellant’s victim as a condition of community supervision. -See Tex.Crim. Proc.Code Ann. art. 42.12, §§ ll(a)(20) & (b) (Vernon Supp.2000); Martin v. State, 874 S.W.2d 674, 682 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) ("trial judge’s authority to order restitution requires only: (1) that there be a factual basis in the record to conclude the defendant is liable for the criminal conduct ... and (2) that there be a factual basis to determine the amount of restitution”) (internal citations omitted). Instead, the error cited by the Court of Appeals stemmed from the lack of a factual basis for the amount of restitution imposed. Therefore, the condition fits within the remedy announced in Cartwright rather than that set forth by the Pena Court. Compare Gordon v. State, 707 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). Thus, the relief requested
holding that district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing on defendant as condition of probation joint and several liability with codefendant for restitution of full amount of losses caused by their crime holding trial court was without authority to order appellant to pay restitution for losses caused by offense for which appellant was not criminally responsible and deleting restitution as condition of probation holding that under the restitution provision of the supervised release statute 18 usc  3583 restitution can be ordered only for losses caused by the specific conduct that is the basis for the offense of conviction holding the trial court correctly ordered appellant to pay restitution for the full value of the vehicle holding that restitution is proper for victims losses that are directly caused by appellants conduct for which he was convicted