itself show that the explanation for excusing Bradley was a mere pretext for discrimination. The accepted juror may have exhibited traits which the prosecutor reasonably could have believed would have made the individual desirable as a juror. See State v. Collier, 553 So.2d 815, 822 (La.1989). Nor does the fact that the record does not substantiate the prosecutor’s claim that Bradley was related to someone he had prosecuted show that the prosecutor’s assertion of such a relationship was a pretext for discrimination. Finally, the remaining reasons given by the prosecutor, i.e., that Bradley was very inattentive and that she could not make eye contact with him, clearly constitute race-neutral reasons. See State v. Durham, 94-1036, p. 16 (La.App. 5th Cir. 4/16/96); 673 So.2d 1103, 1113. (<HOLDING>); State v. Willis, 552 So.2d 39, 42 (La.App. 3d
recognizing familiarity with governing law as reason to grant motion to transfer recognizing a veniremans failure to make eye contact with the prosecutor as a racially neutral reason recognizing a veniremans inattentiveness as a racially neutral reason holding that a failure to adequately train will only result in  1983 liability where that failure amounts to a deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact recognizing that the drafters of  1981 were not concerned with practices that were facially neutral