of this appeal, we must first decide if we have jurisdiction. Our jurisdiction is limited to “final decisions of the district courts,” and the decision before us is arguably interlocutory. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The District Court relied upon In re Consolidated Rail Corp. 631 F.2d 1122 (3d Cir.1980), and Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Marshall, 610 F.2d 1128 (3d Cir.1979), in treating Wedgewood’s motion to quash as a “nondispositive” motion. It could therefore be ruled upon by a Magistrate Judge. Ordinarily, in order for us to have jurisdiction over the District Court’s refusal to quash a subpoena, the subpoenaed party must refuse to comply with the subpoena and suffer the sanction of a contempt citation. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 326-28, 60 S.Ct. 540, 84 L.Ed. 783 (1940) (<HOLDING>). The subpoenaed party may then challenge the
holding that a denial of an order to quash a subpoena not directed to a movant was a final order if the movant had no further opportunity to challenge the subpoena holding that denial of motion to vacate discovery order and to quash subpoena issued pursuant to 28 usc  1782 constitutes final appealable decision holding that a denial of a motion to quash a grand jury subpoena is not final and therefore not appealable holding that overruling of motion to quash does not affect substantial right and is therefore not final appealable order holding that an order denying a motion to vacate a  1782 order and denying a motion to quash the subpoena was immediately appealable