relief adverse to the rights of the mother. Characterizing Hewitt as a petitioner is consistent with Walker’s liberal construction of the mandatory transfer provision. See id. (condemning severe limitations “without good reason”). Thus, Hewitt was properly before the trial court as a petitioner. Section 155.204 of the Family Code does not distinguish between petitioners and counter-petitioners. Instead, “[a] motion to transfer by a petitioner or movant is timely if it is made at the time the initial pleadings are filed.” Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 155.204(a) (Vernon Supp.1996). The italicized portion refers to the first pleading filed by that petitioner. See Walker, 729 S.W.2d at 123; cf. Garza v. Texas Dep’t of Human Servs., 757 S.W.2d 44, 47-48 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1988, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). Because Hewitt joined the suit as a
holding that a respondent cannot avoid the initial pleading element by obtaining a dismissal and filing her own suit holding an inmate must exhaust all available administrative remedies before filing suit and if exhaustion was not completed at the time of filing dismissal is mandatory holding that the initial filing of a suit later voluntarily dismissed is not the effective date of a second suit because a voluntary dismissal does not toll or affect in any way the continuous running of the applicable statutory time period holding that an employees private arbitration agreement with her employer precluded her from filing suit against the employer under the adea holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid dismissal under rcfc 12b6 by asserting a new claim