of the Mendozar-Marbinez analysis weighs in favor of deeming Article 120 a punitive sanction is bolstered by examining what has been found to constitute a “legitimate non-punitive purpose” in prior Mendoza-Marbinez cases, and what has not. That examination reveals that th ed before us bears a far greater resemblance to the one at issue in Mendozar-Marbinez itself. In Mendoza-Martinez, where “there was no reference to the societal good that would be wrought by the legislation,” the Supreme Court concluded that “the obvious inference” was that “Congress was concerned solely with inflicting effective retribution upon this class of draft evaders and, no doubt, on others similarly situated.” Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 182, 83 S.Ct. 554; see also Trop, 356 U.S. at 97-98, 78 S.Ct. 590 (<HOLDING>). Finding no legitimate non-penal interest
holding that undocumented aliens cannot be treated as a suspect class holding that a former spouse is a proportionate owner of the other spouses future military retirement pay and is thus entitled to onehalf of the percentage of such pay representing the number of military marriage years relative to the total length of military service holding that there is no basis under texas law to conduct a pretrial evidentiary hearing to determine the as applied constitutionality of a state penal law or state criminal procedural statute and that such a challenge must await trial holding that motion to dismiss cannot be treated as summary judgment holding that statute stripping military deserters of citizenship rights cannot rationally be treated other than as a penal law