even if he had preserved it, we do not believe that Barker’s motion was untimely. Barker could not file her motion until the litigation had commenced, and once it had commenced, she did not delay in bringing the matter to the trial court’s attention. Barker filed her original answer forty-five, days after Hendricks filed his original petition, and nine days after that, she moved to disqualify Proctor. The motion was filed well in advance of discovery, and it cannot be characterized as a dilatory trial tactic. See EPIC Holdings, 985 S.W.2d at 52-53 (concluding that the delay in filing the motion to disqualify was not prejudicial because “almost no discovery” had been conducted at the time of filing); Spears v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 797 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that Barker’s motion was timely
holding that a year delay in filing a motion to disqualify did not bar the motion where there was no evidence that the motion was inspired by dilatory tactics holding that delay is waived when the defendant makes dilatory pleadings and motions holding that courts must adhere to an exacting standard when considering motions to disqualify so as to discourage their use as a dilatory trial tactic holding courts must adhere to legislative intent when interpreting a statute holding that an accused cannot sustain a speedytrial claim when delay results from his    making dilatory pleadings or motions failing to object when a continuance is granted the government   