defendant on the disparate treatment claim in Count I. However, because of the temporal remoteness between the plaintiffs last request for an accommodation in October 2004 and her termination in October 2005, Count III will be dismissed. Compare Woodruff v. Peters, 482 F.3d 521, 529 (D.C.Cir.2007) (finding that “a reasonable finder of fact could infer causation” where “less than a month” elapsed between protected activity and adverse employment action), with Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273-74, 121 S.Ct. 1508, 149 L.Ed.2d 509 (2001) (finding that 20-month period between employer’s knowledge of plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action “suggests, by itself, no causality at all”), Coons v. Sec’y of the Treasury, 383 F.3d 879, 887-88 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>), and Richmond v. ONEOK, Inc., 120 F.3d 205,
holding the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case that the defendants failure to promote him was discriminatory where the plaintiff failed to that show he was qualified for the relevant position holding that a prima facie case of retaliation requires a causal link between the employees protected activity and the employers adverse employment action holding that where a request for an accommodation was made one year prior to demotion the distant time sequence was inadequate to show a causal link and plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case of retaliation holding that a plaintiff bringing a retaliation claim under title vii must establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing that she engaged in a protected activity that she was subjected to an adverse employment action by her employer and that there was a causal link between the two holding that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because there was no evidence that the decisionmaker knew of the plaintiffs protected conduct