concedes this, noting that a “factual finding” interpretation of these figures, including the “zero-release” figures, is the less likely of the two possibilities— the other being that the figures were intended only as decisionmaking devices. Id. at 481. 59 . Looking to the future, and commanded by Congress to make policy, a rule-making agency necessarily deals less with “evidentiary” disputes than with normative conflicts, projections from imperfect data, experiments and simulations, educated predictions, differing assessments of possible risks, and the like. The process is quasi -legislative in character. Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722, 735 (D.C.Cir.1974). Accord, Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C.Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941, 96 S.Ct. 2662, 49 L.Ed.2d 394 (1976) (<HOLDING>). 60 .The original S-3 rulemaking record on
holding that when there are no genuine issues of material fact summary judgment is appropriate holding that disputed issues of fact cannot be resolved based on affidavits and must be decided based on evidentiary hearings the only admissible procedure for resolving such issues holding that agency may promulgate rules based on qualitative appraisal of risk when scientific knowledge provides no answer to crucial issues of fact recognizing under fre 702 that there is no clear line dividing testimony based on scientific knowledge from testimony based on technical or other specialized knowledge holding that a single flexible test for reliability applies to all expert testimony holding that daubert applies not only to testimony based on scientific knowledge but also to testimony based on technical and other specialized knowledge