of forced termination,' or that 'the employer's conduct ... [was] motivated by a desire to avoid subjecting its actions to the scrutiny of a termination-related hearing.’ ” 804 F.2d 327, 333 (5th Cir.1986) (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Fowler, 799 F.2d at 981); see also Holden v. Knight, 155 Fed.Appx. 735, 739 (5th Cir.2005) (unpublished) (explaining that we "ha[ve] made clear that a plaintiff may make out a cognizable claim when he alleges particular facts showing that he found himself between the Scylla of voluntary resignation and the Charybdis of forced termination” without discussing the need to show a motive to avoid pre-termination procedures (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); but see Rutland v. Pepper, 404 F.3d 921, 922-23 (5th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). While our rule of orderliness requires us to
holding that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she was unable to present evidence that she was qualified for the position holding that because the plaintiff did not allege facts indicating what specific medical information she provided to dps she failed to state a constitutional claim holding that defendant interfered with plaintiffs right when the employer forced her to choose between resignation and working without leave holding that a plaintiff could not show that she engaged in protected activity because she did not present evidence that she informed her employer that her complaints were based on race or age discrimination holding that plaintiff failed to establish a constructive discharge claim because she did not assert that her employer was motivated by a desire to avoid pretermination procedures without considering whether plaintiff could alternatively allege only that she was forced to choose between resignation and termination