that Kinoshita is inconsistent with federal policy favoring arbitration”). But see Tracer Research Corp. v. National Environmental Services Co., 42 F.3d 1292, 1295 (9th Cir.1994) (equating “arising out of’ with “arising under” and adhering to the logic of Kinoshita and its progeny). The Fourth Circuit has similarly refused to take the restrictive approach of the Kinoshita line of cases. In Peoples Security, the court construed an arbitration clause containing the following language: Any question, charge, complaint or grievance believed to constitute a breach or violation shall be immediately communicated between counsel and the party alleged to be in breach of the agreement shall have five days to respond, Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 744 F.2d 409, 410 n. 1, 413 (5th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). At least one court has speculated that
holding that a clause requiring arbitration if any dispute arises by the parties hereto as to the rights or liabilities incident to this agreement is broad enough to cover claims alleged under texas statutes governing insurance and deceptive trade practices holding that trial court properly denied motion to compel arbitration of claims for fraud and unfair and deceptive trade practices because arbitration clause in agreement only applied to indemnification claims and there were no other arbitration clauses in agreement holding consumer claims under the texas deceptive trade practices act nonassignable holding that a clause requiring arbitration wjhenever any question or dispute shall arise or occur under this agreementcontract was sufficiently broad to cover a claim of fraudulent inducement holding that the clause any dispute that shall arise between the parties  with reference to the interpretation of this agreement or their rights with respect to any transaction involved was broad