with “unclean hands” and is not entitled to rely on the doctrine of equitable estoppel to force Romero into arbitration. The trial court’s order is affirmed. Dissenting opinion by: SARAH B. DUNCAN, Justice. SARAH B. DUNCAN, Justice, dissenting. It is undisputed that the Agreement expressly referred to Wood/Menna & Company as a party, the Agreement was signed by Jay Menna of behalf of Wood/Menna & Company; and, at the time the agreement was signed, the only entity authorized to do business and doing business as Wood/Menna & Company was ANCO Insurance Services of Houston, Inc. Under these circumstances, ANCO Insurance Services, Inc. is entitled to invoke the Agreement’s arbitration clause. Cf., e.g., Carlin v. 3V Inc., 928 S.W.2d 291, 294-97 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Disk] 1996, no writ) (<HOLDING>). The majority avoids this result in reliance
holding that appellee was bound by the arbitration clause contained in an agreement signed by its assignor when all of appellees claims arose out of and were directly related to the agreement holding that trial court properly denied motion to compel arbitration of claims for fraud and unfair and deceptive trade practices because arbitration clause in agreement only applied to indemnification claims and there were no other arbitration clauses in agreement holding that a person signing an arbitration agreement using power of attorney is not a party to that agreement merely by virtue of having signed it holding that a clause covering any controversy or claim  related directly or indirectly to this agreement was a broad arbitration clause holding that tort claims were arbitrable because they arose out of and were related to contract