articulated in Ex parte Cranman and Ex parte Butts sandwiched between the terms “willfully, maliciously,” and “in bad faith.” Cf. King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221, 112 S.Ct. 570, 116 L.Ed.2d 578 (1991) (quoting NLRB v. Federbush Co. 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir.1941)) (“ ‘Words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have only a communal existence; and not only does the meaning of each interpenetrate the other, but all in their aggregate take their purport from the setting in which they are used.... ’ ”). Our conclusion in this regard also is consistent with the manner in which our appellate courts have applied the principles of immunity to state agents both before and after Ex parte Cranman and Ex parte Butts. Compare, e.g., Byrd v. Lamar, 846 So.2d 334 (Ala.2002) (<HOLDING>); Tuscaloosa County v. Henderson, 699 So.2d
holding as to the admissibility of prior bad acts that allegedly took place fourteen and twelve years before the acts alleged in that case that the lapse of time between the defendants sexual acts    goes to the weight of the evidence not to its admissibility holding that an offer of proof under the sexual innocence inference theory must show that the prior acts clearly occurred and that the acts closely resembled those of the present case holding that the acts of a corporate officer done in his or her official capacity are acts of the corporation holding that acts of promissory fraud  which require proof that the defendants intended not to perform promised acts  were not protected by stateagent immunity holding deceptive acts which were not disclosed to the investing public are too remote to satisfy the requirement of reliance because a plaintiff cannot rely on acts of which it is unaware