further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; [and] (3) the kinds of sentences available.... 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); see also United States v. Mosqueda-Estevez, 485 F.3d 1009, 1012 (8th Cir.2007) (laying out the three-step procedure that district courts should follow when sentencing a defendant). We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Jenners to 96 months’ imprisonment. Here, when examining Jenners’s criminal history, the district court was permitted to consider that under the plea agreement, 24 of the 25 counts in the indictment were dismissed. See United States v. Yahnke, 395 F.3d 823, 826 (8th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Considering these 24 uncharged offenses along
holding that a refusal to make false statements that no misconduct occurred is a very different circumstance  than an affirmative statement of misconduct recognizing that a court is not limited in what it may consider in determining whether parental rights should be terminated recognizing that the court sanctions more harshly for cumulative misconduct than for isolated misconduct holding that two instances of misconduct do not indicate a persistent and widespread pattern of misconduct that amounts to a city custom or policy of overlooking police misconduct recognizing that the district court is not limited to only convictions when deciding whether to depart it may consider uncharged misconduct provided that there is sufficient proof of the misconduct