might grant the accused a right to introduce evidence of the complainant child’s sexual contact with a third party if the sexual conduct in question was not only unusual but also strikingly similar to the alleged contact with the accused. Francis A. Gilligan, Edward J. Imwinkel-ried & Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Theory of “Unconscious Transference”: The Latest Threat to the Shield Laws Protecting the Privacy of Victims of Sex Offenses, 38 B.C. L.Rev. 107, 140-141 (1996) (footnotes omitted). The cases following the compromise approach place the burden on the defendant to show that the prior sexual act occurred and that the prior sexual act was sufficiently similar to the present sexual act to give the victim the knowledge to imagine the molestation charge. See Pulizzano, 456 N.W.2d at 333 (<HOLDING>); State v. Oliver, 158 Ariz. 22, 760 P.2d 1071,
holding as to the admissibility of prior bad acts that allegedly took place fourteen and twelve years before the acts alleged in that case that the lapse of time between the defendants sexual acts    goes to the weight of the evidence not to its admissibility holding that the striking similarity between the acts alleged in the indictment and the prior incidents rendered incidents that occurred fifteen years prior to the acts alleged in the indictment relevant and admissible under rule 404b holding that moores prior convictions were not admissible to show motive because there was no showing that the acts underlying the prior convictions had a logical tendency to lead to an inference that moore because he committed these prior acts  was motivated to commit the nowcharged crime holding that an offer of proof under the sexual innocence inference theory must show that the prior acts clearly occurred and that the acts closely resembled those of the present case holding admission of prior bad acts of child abuse was reversible error when the defendant did not have exclusive control over the children during the period when the prior bad acts occurred