but before its effective date. Bishop argues that defendants therefore had notice that their conduct was unlawful discrimination at the time that it occurred, and may be held liable for it in a suit brought after the effective date of the ADA. In sum, this argument states that the date of enactment governs when conduct became unlawful, while the effective date only governs when an injured party may bring suit to enforce the provisions of the ADA. A careful reading of Landgraf and Rivers, however, counsels against accepting Bishop’s arguments. First, while these opinions did in fact address cases pending at the time of enactment of the ADA, they both speak in terms of the law effective at the time the allegedly discriminatory conduct occurred. See Landgraf — U.S. at-, 114 S.Ct. at 1508 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added); Rivers, — U.S. at-, 114
recognizing that aedpa would not apply to a habeas petition that was pending at the time of its enactment recognizing that new law did not apply to claims that accrued prior to enactment holding that aedpa amendments to  2254 apply only to such cases as were filed after the statutes enactment holding that the fair sentencing act does not apply retroactively to defendants whose criminal conduct occurred before its enactment even if those defendants were sentenced after its enactment holding that section 1981a does not apply to cases arising before its enactment