of the offense”). 14 . 544 U.S. 13, 16, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 1257, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005); see also Gomez-Leon, 545 F.3d at 784. 15 . Snellenberger, 548 F.3d at 701. 16 . 520 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 433, 172 L.Ed.2d 314 (2008); Gomez-Leon, 545 F.3d at 784. 17 . See United States v. Espinoza-Cano, 456 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir.2006) (quoting Shepard, 544 U.S. at 25, 125 S.Ct. at 1262). 18 . 414 F.3d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir.2005) ("Although police reports and complaint applications, standing alone, may not be used to enhance a sentence following a criminal conviction, ... the contents of these documents may be considered if specifically incorporated into the guilty plea or admitted by a defendant.”). 19 .See, e.g., Almazan-Becerra, 537 F.3d at 1098-1100 (<HOLDING>); Espinoza-Cano, 456 F.3d at 1132 (district
holding that based on the facts presented by the state and the defendants stipulation to the existence of a factual basis for his plea the court properly determined a factual basis for the plea existed holding that district court abused discretion in denying motion to withdraw plea based on intervening supreme court decision that may have rendered factual basis of plea insufficient holding that district court properly considered a police report that the defendant had stipulated contained a factual basis for his plea holding that because the court could not consider police reports it could not rely on an attorneys argument based on the police report as the basis for determining the statutory basis for a conviction holding that right to challenge factual basis is waived by guilty plea