courts will not apply it to parties falling outside those limitations, even if the parties stipulate that the law should apply.” Gravquick A/S, 323 F.3d at 1223. The Ninth Circuit in Gravquick, consistent with the Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh circuits, held that a specific territorial limitation on the application of a state law must be given effect even where the parties contractually agree that the state law must apply. Id.; see Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc. v. E. Auto Distrib., Inc., 892 F.2d 355, 358 (4th Cir.1989) (refusing to apply New York law to out-of-state franchisee’s contractual dispute where the franchisee did not conduct business in New York, despite existence of New York choice-of-law clause); Cromeens, Holloman, Sibert, Inc. v. AB Volvo, 349 F.3d 376, 386 (7th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Bimel-Walroth Co. v. Raytheon Co., 796 F.2d
holding that under illinois law interpreting the meaning of a contract is a question of law determined by the court holding that geographic limitation in illinois franchise law prevents its application to dispute with outofstate franchisor notwithstanding express illinois choiceoflaw clause holding there was no personal jurisdiction over nonresident guarantor of equipment lease although payments were made to illinois bank the guaranty was accepted in illinois and it provided that it would be gov erned by illinois law holding that illinois wage law did not apply to nonresident employee who worked outside the state even though eim ployers primary place of business was in illinois holding that the united states was a statutory loaning employer under illinois law