causation of an injury and the defendant’s use of force.” Villegas-Hernandez, 468 F.3d at 880 (quoting United States v. Vargas-Duran, 356 F.3d 598, 606 (5th Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted)). As in Villegas, a defendant could violate § 422, for example, by threatening either to poison another or to guide someone intentionally into dangerous traffic, neither of which involve “force”, as that term is defined by our court. See id. at 879. Therefore, because “it is possible under [California] law for the State to obtain a conviction under ... the terroristic threats statute without proof of the threatened use of physical force against another person, this is not an element of the offense”. United States v. Naranjo-Hernandez, 133 Fed.Appx. 96, 98 (5th Cir.2005) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the COV enhancement was applied
holding that dismissal of prior action in louisiana federal court on the grounds of the statute of limitations bar subsequent action filed in minnesota federal district court holding that under minnesota law an insurance policy or provision not filed with the commissioner of insurance is unenforceable holding  522f3 inapplicable under minnesota exemption law holding without discussion that a banks lobbying activities designed to obtain the passage of a minnesota statute were not state action holding minnesota terroristicthreats statute not a cov