is expressly intended to benefit “all” individuals eligible for Medicaid assistance, a group that, the parties do not dispute, includes Doe. See § 1396a(a)(8). Second, the provision is not so “vague and amorphous” that the judiciary cannot competently enforce it: the provision is clear that the standard for informing applicants of their eligibility for Medicaid services is “reasonable promptness” and the relevant federal and state regulations and manuals define reasonable promptness as forty-five days or ninety days, depending on the applicant. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 435.911; South Carolina Medicaid Manual, cited at J.A. 242; United States Department of Health & Human Services Center for Medicaid and State Operations, Olmstead Update No: 4, at J.A. 290. Third, the provision use 2002) (<HOLDING>); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 714
holding that there is an exhaustion requirement in  1983 suits asserting violations of the medicaid act holding that the medicaid statute did not create an enforceable cause of action against a private health care facility holding that  1396aa8 is enforceable by medicaid recipients under  1983 holding that section 1396aa8 which requires that state medicaid plans provide that medical assistance shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals supports a section 1983 claim holding that medicaid recipients do have enforceable rights under  1396aa23