had a right to the SALU in the first instance. Rather, the issue is whether the City, which had already granted Hillside the SALU, had the authority to revoke that valuable property interest and whether Defendants deprived Plaintiffs of a property interest without procedural due process. It is apparent that the City Planning Commission lacked the authority to revoke Hillside’s Special Approval Land Use once it was granted. Under Michigan law, absent a specific grant of authority in either the Sterling Heights Zoning Ordinance or the enabling state statute which gives the City the right to create “Special Land Uses,” the Planning Commission is powerless to revoke a previously approved Special Land Use. See McVeigh v. City of Battle Creek, 350 Mich. 214, 86 N.W.2d 279, 280 (1957) (<HOLDING>); Kethman v. Oceola Twp., 88 Mich.App. 94, 276
holding that parole boards do not have to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment recognizing the inherent power of the courts to issue warrants holding that zoning boards of appeal do not have the inherent power to grant a rehearing holding that federal courts have inherent power to investigate whether a judgment was obtained by fraud recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals