Appellant’s claim of self-defense. In my view, the prosecutor’s statement here directly undermined Appellant’s sole defense by attributing the use of the racially inflammatory word “niggas” to Appellant and by telling the jury that Appellant referred to the deceased’s family as “niggas,” when neither of these facts are in the record or inferable from the record. To me, the prosecutor’s statement during final closing argument—the very last words the jury heard before retiring to deliberate— was of such significance that it resulted in the denial of Appellant’s right to a fair trial, and thus, deprived Appellant of due process. See Greer, 483 U.S. at 765, 107 S.Ct. at 3109; Burwell, 245 F.2d at 163; see also Coleman v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 118 Fed.Appx. 949, 951-52 (6th Cir. 2004) (<HOLDING>); see also Elizondo v. State, 487 S.W.3d 185,
holding prosecutors reference in closing argument to defendants prior conviction constituted an introduction of evidence so extremely unfair as to violate fundamental conceptions of justice and thus a deprivation of defendants right to due process holding that the introduction of driving records without a witness did not violate a defendants right to confrontation holding that jury trial in civil cases is not so fundamental to the american system of justice as to be required of state courts by due process holding that the prosecutors indirect reference to a defendants prior conviction was improper holding right to be fundamental