Simply put, a causal connection between the Mr. Black’s DDOT disciplinary proceedings and his whistleblowing complaint is temporally impossible because Mr. Black did not make a formal whistleblow-ing complaint until months after his DDOT disciplinary proceedings started. Thus, Mr. Black has failed to state a plausible retaliation claim under the Whistleblower Protection Act. V. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the District’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 1 . Mr. Black concedes that his defamation claim fails because he did not comply with D.C. Code § 12-309 prior to filing this lawsuit. Pl.’s Mem. Opp. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss ("Pl.’s Mem. Opp."), Docket No. 15 at 20. See, e.g. Clark v. Flach, 604 F.Supp.2d 1, 7 (D.D.C.2009) (<HOLDING>). 2 . On February 12, 2013, Mr. Black filed a
holding that a defendant is in custody and miranda applies even when the purpose of defendants detention is unrelated to the purpose of the interrogation holding that the purpose of  12309 is to allow the district to conduct a prompt investigation of the injured persons claim holding that police officers have a duty to conduct an investigation into the basis of the witness report holding that after a reasonable investigation an insurer must promptly settle a claim for the value or within the range assigned to the claim as a result of its investigation holding that the irs has a law enforcement purpose in the context of a criminal tax investigation