240. 48 . Id. (citations omitted). 49 . Id. 50 . Id. at 229, 78 S.Ct. 240. 51 . Id. 52 . Id.; see also id. at 229-30, 78 S.Ct. 240 ("Where a person did not know of the duty to register and where there was no proof of the probability of such knowledge, he may not be convicted consistently with due process. Were it otherwise, the evil would be as great as it is when the law is written in print too fine to read or in a language foreign to the community.”). 53 . McNeely v. United States, 874 A.2d 371, 384 (D.C.2005). In other cases, the Court has avoided due process problems by construing statutes prohibiting "willful” activity to require knowledge of the technical or esoteric legal duty at issue. See, e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 149, 114 S.Ct. 655, 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201,
holding that a criminal violation of  5324a3 may be established without proof that the defendant knew that structuring was unlawful holding that to establish that a defendant willfully violated the antislructuring law the government must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful and stating that specific intent to commit the crimes  might be negated by eg proof that defendant relied in good faith on advice of counsel internal quotation marks omitted holding that the government must show only that a defendant had knowledge of the reporting requirements and acted to avoid them holding that in a prosecution for willfully violating federal law against structuring financial transactions to evade bank reporting requirements the government must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful holding that to violate a specific intent statute the defendant must act with the purpose of violating the law