The parole officer testified that his job was to supervise convicted felons and that Mr. Prieto was one of his supervisees. And during her testimony, Ms. Prieto stated twice that her son was a convicted felon. This testimony did not violate Old Chief or Rule 404(b)(1). Old Chief does not preclude reference to the fact that the defendant has a prior felony conviction; instead, it precludes any discussion of the nature and substance of the felony: “In dealing with the specific problem raised by § 922(g)(1) and its prior-conviction element, there can be no question that evidence of the name or nature of the prior offense generally carries a risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant.” 519 U.S. at 185, 117 S.Ct. 644; see also United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1472 (10th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). However, there was no Old Chief violation
holding that a prior nonarizona conviction to be used as a prior felony conviction under the statute must both be for an offense that would constitute a felony in arizona and be classified as a felony in the other jurisdiction holding that for sentencing purposes the government does not need to allege a defendants prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact is not an element of the present crime holding that to avoid the risk of unfair prejudice the parties should make use of a redacted record stipulation affidavit or other similar technique whereby the jury is informed only of the fact of a prior felony conviction but not the nature or substance of the conviction holding that in determining whether a prior conviction is a violent felony a court generally must look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense holding that where defendant stipulates to prior felony conviction evidence of the nature of the prior crime is irrelevant and should be excluded