conveyed property as a” World War I memorial and that “[i]f the Secretary determines that the conveyed property is no longer being maintained as a war memorial, the property shall revert to the ownership of the United States.” In effect, the government has tightly restricted the VFW’s use of the subject property for one purpose and, more importantly, has reserved the right to reassert ownership and repossess the subject property any time the Secretary of the Interior makes the discretionary determination that the VFW is not adequately maintaining the Latin cross as a World War I memorial. Such a reversionary clause defeats Defendants’ contention that the government has given up control over the subject property. See Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320, 322-23 (5th Cir.1962) (<HOLDING>); see also Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 8
holding that the city had standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute allowing certain communities within the same county as the city to incorporate as towns without the citys consent holding that a city may be held liable on account of the unconstitutional conduct of city officials only if the citys policy or custom played a part in the violation holding that open space restrictions agreed to by a golf course developer were properly treated as zoning restrictions and serve to reduce value under public interest rule discussed in tualatin development 256 or 323 473 p2d 660 1970 holding that where the citys conveyance of a segregated golf course to private parties included a reversionary clause which provided that the city could retake the property if it were no longer used for a golf course the city had complete present control over the golf course and state action existed under the fourteenth amendment holding that citys enforcement of the entire state penal code would not constitute a city policy because the city was required to follow state law