made the statement is in fact “a party or an agent” of defendants. It is undisputed that the speakers, though some are unidentified by name or specific title, were all executives or “key” stakeholders of defendant hospitals. The statements were made in the scope of their employment relationship and during the existence of the joint venture. They acted within the scope of them, employment in stating their views on the state of their, operations and integration of those operations at the request of .Premier’s CEO. Thus, the sources of the statements are identified sufficiently to establish that they were made by agents of defendants acting within the scope of and during the existence of their employment relationship. See Ryder v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 128 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). The crucial question is whether there is
holding that while trial courts are encouraged to state all findings in their written orders they are not required to do so as long as the basis for their decisions is clear from the record and thus susceptible to review holding that rico claims were personal and plaintiffs were therefore entitled to sue on their own because their injuries were distinct from the injuries to creditors in general resulting from the diversion of corporate assets holding in a similar situation that statements from unidentified ex ecutives were admissible because evidence established that though their precise identity was unknown they were all westinghouse executives who had authority to make personnel decisions and thus were actfing within the scope of their employment in stating their views on the state of their workforce holding that certain veniremen had been improperly excluded because they acknowledged that their views of the death penalty might affect their deliberations but only to the extent that they would view their task with greater gravity holding that a contractors employees were not within the scope and course of their employment when they deviated from their work to shoot at squirrels