possession may be proven if the defendant merely had ‘dominion over the premises where the firearm is located.’ ”) (citation omitted). In this context, we have asked and answered the following question: [H]ow incriminating does the evidence have to be to support a finding of constructive possession? Though it would be unreasonable, and perhaps impossible, to expect a crystal clear path forward in such fact-intensive inquiries, our prior cases demonstrate at least one common thread: When the defendant is found in close proximity to a firearm at the time of the arrest, the inference of dominion and control is particularly strong, and thus the incriminating evidence needed to corroborate the conviction is less. See, e.g., United States v. Black, 525 F.2d 668, 669 (6th Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>). Of course, this means the opposite should
holding a consent voluntary when a defendant who had been warned of his rights and knew police were investigating murders turned his gun over to a policeman who suggested that he could sell the gun for the defendant holding that evidence was sufficient to prove defendant constructively possessed the gun where although defendant denied ownership of the gun it was found near a knife of which defendant claimed ownership and where defendant was aware of the presence of the gun holding sufficient connection or nexus existed between the defendant and a gun in a case of nonexclusive possession because the gun was found under the defendants seat was visible and retrievable by defendant and a magazine of ammunition was hidden in the seat cover holding direct testimony tying a defendant to a gun was not required when the gun was found in the defendants truck and when the defendant had both ammunition for the gun and a rack in which it could have been kept holding that the statement i have a gun is a threat of death