to breach of the architectural agreement; the judgment debtor was solely NZA. The circuit court essentially used a proceeding supplementary to judgment to enter an additional judgment against a party not previously subject to a judgment on the claim at issue. MCR 2.621 and [MCL 600.6104] do not provide any authority for such a ruling in the context of piercing the corporate veil. [Id. at 303-304.] Particularly important to this case, the Green I Court declined to answer “the questions whether plaintiffs are legally entitled to file a new and separate action against Ziegelman, outside [MCL 600.6104], under a corporate veil piercing theory and whether res judicata or the compulsory joinder rule, MCR 2.203, would bar such an action.” Id. at 305. See also Green II, 310 Mich App at 438 (<HOLDING>). Consequently, the Green I Court did not
holding that issue of whether dismissal was with or without prejudice becomes ripe only when new action is filed and issue is raised the court in the new action should decide the issue holding that a court should decide whether an arbitration agreement survived a corporate merger and bound the resulting corporation recognizing that the green i court did not decide whether an independent action could be filed to pierce the corporate veil holding that it is not the courts role to decide whether an experts opinion is correct holding that a court should decide whether the arbitration contract bound parties who did not sign the agreement