“erred in deciding only the voluntariness of [his] Miranda waiver, without determining whether [it] was knowing and intelligent.” Andrews argues that the district court should have made an express finding as to the knowing and intelligent nature of his Miranda waiver. Plainly a defendant’s motion to suppress should not be denied on the basis of a Miranda waiver, absent a finding by the district court that the waiver was knowing and intelligent. However, such a finding may be inferred by an appellate court, given adequate support in the record. Several other circuits have inferred that the district court made factual findings reflecting a valid waiver, even though such findings were not expressly stated in the record. See United States v. Whitworth, 856 F.2d 1268, 1278 (9th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1084, 109 S.Ct. 1541,
holding that the prior conviction was valid for calculation of the defendants criminal history because his waiver of the right to counsel was valid recognizing that we can consider trial evidence in reviewing the denial of a pretrial suppression motion holding that the fifth amendment did not require the suppression of the physical fruits of a miranda violation where the statement was voluntary holding that waiver of miranda rights was valid where  finding  that the defendant initiated the conversation  was  implicit in the district judges denial of the suppression motion  holding that in determining the voluntariness of a waiver of miranda rights a court must evaluate the totality of the circumstances