872, 884 (7th Cir.1994) (citing Pierce, 487 U.S. at 570-71, 108 S.Ct. 2541 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Appellant’s additional claim that the district court abused its discretion by denying EAJA fees in relation to the ALJ’s vocational analysis is an attempt to relitigate the underlying merits of her disability adjudication that we need not consider. For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the decision of the district court denying Huber’s application for fees under the EAJA and REMAND for the district court to determine the appropriate amount of fees to award to Huber. 1 . Because the remand Huber obtained was under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), her application for fees was timely. See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 298 & 300-01, 113 S.Ct. 2625, 125 L.Ed.2d 239 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 102, 111
holding a district court remanding a case pursuant to sentence four of  405g must order judgment in the case and may not retain jurisdiction over the ad ministrative proceedings on remand holding that a remand due to an intervening court decision did not render the appellant a prevailing party for eaja purposes holding that 42 usc  405g limits the district courts discretion to remand for reconsideration in light of new evidence holding that a sentence four remand under 42 usc  405g is a final appealable decision and that a party who wins a remand under sentence four is a prevailing party for purposes of the eaja holding that a plaintiff who wins any measure of damages is a prevailing party for the purposes of feeshifting statutes