concurring, joined by Thomas, J.) (such a disparity “illustrates how a criminal law like this may effectively displace a policy choice made by the State” and, for this reason, courts “should interpret narrowly federal criminal laws that overlap with state authority unless congressional intention to assert its jurisdiction is plain”). The Federal Government’s policy choice to authorize a 5-20 year sentence for this crime effectively displaces the State’s policy choice to authorize a 3-15 year sentence for the same crime, and that is true whether the State opts not to prosecute Latón in the future or exercises its discretion to prosecute him under state law as well (and potentially create an 8-35 year sentence). See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 93, 106 S.Ct. 433, 88 L.Ed.2d 387 (1985) (<HOLDING>). The Federal Government’s own prior guidance
holding that double jeopardy does not bar the prosecutions appeal of a trial courts ruling which overturns a jurys guilty verdict holding that a double jeopardy violation does not result from prosecutions by different sovereigns arising from the same act holding that the government may appeal a postverdict ruling without violating double jeopardy where the appeal does not result in a new trial holding the first question for purposes of a double jeopardy analysis is whether congress expressed its intent concerning multiple convictions at a single trial for different statutory violations arising from the same act or transaction holding that double jeopardy clause does not prohibit imposition of death sentence in alabama despite life sentence in georgia in murdertrial arising from same homicide