this case bears no resemblance to the facts in Waller, where the trial court closed an entire seven-day suppression hearing in order to prevent publication of 2 h hours of wiretap evidence. Here, in contrast, the courtroom closure was partial: the trial court closed the courtroom during the testimony of only two witnesses, and the transcript of their testimony was publically available. See Campbell v. Sabourin, 37 F.Supp.2d 601, 604 (E.D.N.Y.1999) (presence of jury and public availability of transcript attenuates “the specter of the ‘secret trial’” that motivated ratification of the Public Trial Clause). Thus, the closure here was no broader than necessary to protect the state’s interest in the safety of the undercover officers. See Jones v. Stinson, 94 F.Supp.2d 370, 395 (E.D.N.Y.) (<HOLDING>), rev’d on other grounds, 229 F.3d 112 (2d
holding that closure was narrowly tailored where courtroom was closed only during testimony of two undercover officers and transcript was not sealed holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive holding that closure was limited not only because it lasted only for the testimony of one witness  but also because there was no limitation at all on the right of the public or the press to examine the transcript of the officers testimony holding that no closure occurred when judge did not allow anyone to enter or leave courtroom during jury instructions holding that issuance of commercial fishing permit for closed waters to one individual was not regulation and was not abuse of discretion