399, 405-06, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988). 25 . Section 301 of the L.M.R.A. provides exclusive federal jurisdiction over "suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees." 29 U.S.C. § 185; see Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 23, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983). Section 301 also "authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these collective-bargaining agreements and includes within that federal law specific performance of promises to arbitrate grievances under collective bargaining agreements." Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1975). 26 .See also Baker v. Farmers’ Electronic Coop. Inc., 34 F.3d 274, 284-85 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). 27 . Article V of the Agreement, in pertinent
holding that  301 preempts state claims against nonsignatories where interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement is required for resolution holding section 301 preempted plaintiffs claim for tortious interference with contract because that claim would require interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement holding that in cases involving claims against fellow employees where the question of section 301 preemption has arisen courts have governed their determinations on the preemption by the necessity of referring to a collective bargaining agreement for resolution of the claim rather than by the individual status of the defendant holding that the statute of limitations applicable to a section 301 suit was the same as that which applies to suits against an employer for breach of the collective bargaining agreement holding that if the state law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement the claim is independent for  301 preemption purposes