of a statute). Nevertheless, we hold that Congress intended that the CSRA would operate to the exclusion of all other statutory remedies' for claims arising out of the federal employment relationship. Because “Congress clearly intended the CSRA to be the exclusive remedy for federal employees,” the comprehensive grievance procedures of the CSRA implicitly repealed all other then-existing statutory rights of federal employees regarding personnel decisions. Pinar v. Dole, 747 F.2d 899, 913 (4th Cir.1984); see Petrini v. Howard, 918 F.2d 1482, 1484-85 (10th Cir.1990) (per curiam) (explaining that the CSRA preempted state law challenges to federal personnel decisions because the CSRA “was intended to provide the exclusive procedure for challenging” such decisions); Spagnola, 809 F.2d at 30 (<HOLDING>). Hall maintains that her claim should not be
holding that federal employee was precluded from bringing  19851 claim because the csra is the exclusive remedy for aggrieved federal employees advancing nonconstitutional claims holding that plaintiffs claims were precluded by csra because actions complained of arose from federal employment relationship even though many of the alleged violations occurred after the employment relationship was terminated recognizing that the csra did not explicitly limit federal court jurisdiction to enjoin unconstitutional personnel actions by federal agencies holding that plaintiffs were not released from the exclusive remedial framework of the csra when their claims arose from their federal employment even though the csra provided plaintiffs with no remedy holding that title vii provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment