Harper argues that the filing of his amended complaint, without the Title VII claim, deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction over his remaining state law claims because the amendment “related back” to the filing date of his first complaint, thereby depriving the court of original federal question jurisdiction (and thus supplemental jurisdiction) from the inception of the case. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) (providing that “[a]n amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading” under certain circumstances). Harper’s argument is wrong as a matter of law. The existence of subject matter jurisdiction is determined by examining the complaint as it existed at the time of removal. See Long v. Bando Mfg. of Am., Inc., 201 F.3d 754, 758 (6th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>) (citing In re Carter, 618 F.2d 1093, 1101 (5th
holding that when the district court disposed of the adea claims the pendent claims became subject to dismissal for want of subject matter jurisdiction holding that the federal district courts dismissal of the plaintiffs federal claims deprived the court of its jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims arising from the same incident holding subject matter jurisdiction divested because federal cause of action had been dismissed without prejudice holding that notice of appeal of district court opinion denying arbitration stay divested district court of jurisdiction to continue proceedings until the appeal was complete holding that the district court was not divested of subject matter jurisdiction upon the dismissal of the plaintiffs federal claims