issuing state was illegible. Significantly, the statute does not restrict its operation solely to Virginia license plates, but requires that “every license plate” be “clearly legible.” Va.Code 46.2-716. Thus, the condition of the license plate provided DeCoster with an objectively reasonable basis for the traffic stop, and the fact that the traffic stop was a pretext for further investigation is irrelevant and does nothing to impair the stop’s constitutionality. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769. Similarly unpersuasive is defendant’s second argument, that Va.Code 46.2-716 violates the negative commerce clause, and therefore cannot serve as the basis for a traffic stop. In support, defendant cites Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627, 98 S.Ct. 2531, 57 L.Ed.2d 475 (1978) (<HOLDING>), and the more recent case of Granholm v.
holding that a new mexico statute that criminalized dissemination of materials that are harmful to minors violated the commerce clause because the nature of the internet made it impossible for the statute to reach purely intrastate conduct and the benefits to be achieved were limited holding that a new jersey statute prohibiting the importation of waste materials into the state violated the negative commerce clause recognizing israel had no interest in denying its citizens the substantive advantages of new jersey defamation law in new jersey residents claims for defamation published in new jersey holding that the statute as applied violates the commerce clause holding that an arkansas statute discriminated against interstate commerce by banning the importation of most outofstate waste even though a small amount of outofstate waste was allowed into arkansas under the statute