remains available.” See also Barrett et al. v. Union Bridge Co., 117 Or 220, 224, 243 P 93 (1926) (same); Deupree v. ODOT, 173 Or App 623, 629, 22 P3d 773 (2001) (“Where access to private property is retained through another public road, even though that access may be less satisfactory, the loss of direct highway access is not compensable.”); Curran v. ODOT, 151 Or App 781, 784-85, 785 n 3, 951 P2d 183 (1997) (“Generally, any act by the state that affects the use of a highway for legitimate ‘highway’ purposes does not result in a taking of access rights to the highway that is compensable under Article I, section 18, even if that action interferes with the abutting property owner’s access to the highway from the property.”); Gruner v. Lane County, 96 Or App 694, 697, 773 P2d 815 (1989) (<HOLDING>). As those cases make clear, no compensation is
holding that city may by ordinance require abutting landowner to repair sidewalk but that the abutting landowner is not liable in an action in tort for injuries holding that regulatory restrictions on abutting landowners right of ingress and egress are not compensable when landowner has adequate alternative means to access property holding that judge had power to limit ingress and egress of persons during counsels final arguments because it was a reasonable limitation to prevent disturbance holding in an inverse condemnation case that the abutting landowners right of direct access was subservient to the city of portlands proper exercise of its governmental powers for purposes of public safety and convenience and that the elimination of access from the landowners property to the affected street did not constitute a taking holding that appellant landowner who complained of a sewer pipe being laid offshore his property had the incorporeal right to free ingress and egress to abutting navigable waters