667. 16 .' The petitioners also attempt to evade the precepts of Collins by emphasizing their status as civil service employees, rather than at-will employees. See W. Va. Dep't of Env'l Prot. v. Falquero, 228 W.Va. 773, 724 S.E.2d 744 (2012). Although the petitioners are correct in .their assertion that firefighters are civil service employees, they exaggerate the implications of that distinction. While the firefighters' status as civil servants entitles them to certain protections, such as the right to continued employment absent a showing a good cause for termination, their status as civil service employees does not entitle them to benefits of a perceived contractual obligation where no such obligation exists. See, e.g., Coday v. City of Springfield, 939 F.2d 666, 668 (8th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); see also W. Central Mo. Reg'l Lodge No. 50 v.
holding even in context of employee manual that policy which included agreement to provide annual salary increase of five percent did not constitute contract between city and employees and distinction between atwill employees and public employees was not dispositive in this context holding city could not enforce through administrative adjudication a city ordinance limiting vehicle weight holding that the notice requirements of section 101101 do not apply to employees because they are not governmental units holding that provisions protecting classified service employees from administrative demotion or discipline did not preclude reclassification of employees and warning against misinterpretation of scope of protections afforded to employees where protections apply only to administrative actions such as the promotion or discipline of employees they do not limit or preclude the city councils legislative authority to make necessary policy and budget decisions they do not somehow override the express authority for the city councils actions  and thus they do not create a constitutionallyprotected property interest that prohibits the city council from passing the ordinance at issue in this case holding that disclosure of grandjury testimony of city employees was proper because they cannot be expected to have any personal privacy interest in their duties as city employees