only when there is no evidence to support it or we reach a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made ...." Kalwits, 822 N.E.2d at 282 (emphasis in original). There clearly is evidence in the record here that a fiduciary or confidential relationship existed between Morfin and Martinez, and that Morfin was the superi- or or dominant partner. The remainder of Morfin's argument is unclear. He contends, in part, that there is no evidence that he exercised undue influence upon Martinez and forced him to name Morfin as beneficiary of the life insurance and pension proceeds. This is beside the point. The trial court expressly found no evidence of undue influence in this case. Such is not required for a finding of constructive fraud, however. Cf. Strong, 771 N.E.2d at 1146 (<HOLDING>). Morfin also asserts, "The mere violation of
holding that the statute requires actual intent to hinder delay or defraud creditors or the trustee constructive intent to defraud does not suffice holding that a finding of specific intent to defraud necessarily excludes a finding of good faith holding that although there was evidence the defendant transferred or caused to be transferred more money to the debtor than the debtor transferred to the defendant there was legally sufficient evidence to support the jurys finding of actual fraud under section 24005a1 and b because the badges of fraud showed the debtors intent to hinder delay or defraud creditors holding that  2314 does not require specific intent to defraud a certain person a general intent to defraud any person who might fall victim to the schemers plan is sufficient holding that actual intent to defraud is not necessary to finding of constructive fraud