of the President because he cannot remove the commissioners and whether the ex officio members are present during the Commission’s deliberations — have some impact (even though the extent of which may be impossible to measure) on how the Commission decides matters before it. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 n. 5, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 3188 n. 5, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986) (“ ‘[I]t is the Comptroller General’s presumed desire to avoid removal by pleasing Congress, which creates the here-and-now subservience to another branch that raises separation-of-powers problems.’”) (quoting Synar v. United States, 626 F.Supp. 1374, 1392 (D.D.C.1986)); Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, -, 111 S.Ct. 2298, 2312, 115 L.Ed.2d 236 (1991) (<HOLDING>). We cannot assume, however, that the
recognizing absolute immunity for attorneys and board members of the texas medical board holding that a mayor although the executive officer may still have legislative functions recognizing absolute immunity for board members and the director of the mississippi state board of nursing holding that a trustee is not granted veto power over a debtors personal decisions at least with respect to prepetition expenditures holding unconstitutional a board of review comprised of members of congress with veto power over certain  executive functions even though the statutory scheme might prove to be innocuous