Hughes v. Stottlemyre, 454 F.3d 791, 799-800 (8th Cir.2006), and Hudson, 227 F.3d at 1051); see also Hughes v. Stottlemyre, No. 04-4053, 2006 WL 3498325, at *1 (W.D.Mo. Dec. 4, 2006) (concluding on remand that McDonnell Douglas paradigm applies). Although the prima facie case requirement under McDonnell Douglas is “not onerous” and should not be “conflated with the ultimate issue of discrimination,” Rodgers v. U.S. Bank, 417 F.3d 845, 852 (8th Cir.2005), the majority treats it for purposes of summary judgment as sufficient to prove conclusively that the employer acted with retaliatory motive — regardless of the employer’s proffered legitimate non-retaliatory reasons for the promotion decisions. Ante, at 656-58; but cf. Sprenger v. Fed. Home Loan Bank, 253 F.3d 1106, 1111 (8th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). After finding a prima facie case, the
holding that a plaintiff may rely on the same evidence to prove both pretext and discrimination holding to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination a plaintiff must show he 1 holding that a plaintiff had not established a prima facie case of race discrimination because she failed to show valid comparators and presented no other circumstantial evidence of discrimination holding that in a discrimination case plaintiff must prove that firing was a result of intentional discrimination holding that an employees attempt to prove actual discrimination requires more substantial evidence than a prima facie case because evidence of pretext and discrimination is viewed in light of the employers justification