would be required if there were no allegation of a conspiracy.” Ibid. Further, Justice Stevens chides us for citing cases in which the court allowed recovery. But in two of these cases the court explicitly grounded its decision on the fact that the plaintiff had identified an actionable independent tort on which the conspiracy claim could be based. See Cohen v. Bowdoin, 288 A. 2d 106, 110 (Me. 1972) (“[I]f [the plaintiff’s conspiracy claim] is to be upheld as stating a claim upon which relief can be granted, it must be on the ground that the complaint sufficiently alleges the actual commission of the separate and independent tort of defamation against the plaintiff”); Middlesex Concrete Products & Excavating Corp. v. Carteret Indus. Assn., 37 N. J. 507, 516, 181 A. 2d 774, 779 (1962) (<HOLDING>). In short, we think that there is ample
recognizing that although civil conspiracy is a separate actionable tort a conspiracy claim is barred where the underlying tort is barred by the applicable statute of limitations holding that an actionable  20a claim must be preceded by an actionable primary violation under  10b holding that the plaintiffs stated a claim for conspiracy because they alleged an actionable tort holding that economic loss rule precluded the plaintiffs tort claims because they only alleged injuries to the subject of the contract itself holding defendants were properly joined because they are alleged to have participated in the underlying conspiracy