people who are not government officials (“and other person acting under color of law”) are “government,” and thus proper defendants under RFRA, indicates that individual capacity suits must be permitted because no one who is not a government official has an “official capacity” in which to be sued. Moreover, Congress knows how to specify that a statutory provision applies to government officials only in their “official capacity” when it wants to, and has not done so here. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), which provides, in part, “[a] civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity ... may ... be brought in any judicial district,” and Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 100 S.Ct. 774, 63 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980) (<HOLDING>). The court also reads RFRA to allow for
holding that since damage claims in an article 78 proceeding may only be asserted against individuals in their official capacities the plaintiff could not have recovered damages against the education officials in their individual capacities and therefore cannot be barred by res judicata  holding that an action brought against the state officials in their official capacities was not properly removed to federal court because the district court lacked jurisdiction holding that such claims however cannot be brought directly against the state or a state agency but only against state officials in their official capacities holding based in part on this statutory language that  1391e is not applicable to actions for money damages brought against federal officials in their individual capacities holding suits against state officials for prospective injunctive relief are permissible because they are in effect suits against the officials in their individual capacities