that “shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to society in general”— conduct that “is per se morally reprehensible and intrinsically wrong----” Maghsoudi, 181 F.3d. at 14. We have found moral turpitude in crimes involving some aggravating factor like “serious physical injury." See, e.g., Nguyen v. Reno, 211 F.3d 692, 695 (1st Cir.2000). And although we have not explicitly said so before, we now endorse the BIA’s uncontroversial position that a reckless state of mind can under some circumstances be sufficient to support a finding of moral turpitude. The BIA has consistently held that to be the rule. See, e.g., Matter of Franklin, 20 I. & N. Dec. 867, 870 (B.I.A.1994) (<HOLDING>); Matter of Wojtkow, 18 I. & N. Dec. 111,
holding that missouris reckless conduct statute establishes a crime involving moral turpitude holding that robbery under california law categorically qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude and noting precedent in this and other circuits that theft crimes are crimes involving moral turpitude holding that the bia did not act unreasonably in concluding new yorks first degree reckless endangerment statute is a crime involving moral turpitude holding that assault with a deadly weapon was not a crime involving moral turpitude holding that involuntary manslaughter defined either as reckless or negligent was not a crime of moral turpitude because itwas based on unintentional conduct in contrast to those crimes involving some form of evil intent it is not an offense that is mala in se and thus does not fall within the definition of crimes involving moral turpitude