judges to concentrate on trying cases, and its assurance that magistrates' adjudicatory jurisdiction had been circumscribed in the interests of policy as well as constitutional constraints, confirms this inference.” (footnotes omitted)); Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 937, 111 S.Ct. 2661, 115 L.Ed.2d 808 (1991) (distinguishing Gomez on the basis of consent and holding that when a defendant consents, the magistrate has jurisdiction to perform jury selection in a felony trial, finding no Article III structural protections implicated where the district court maintains "total control and jurisdiction” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). See generally Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 61-65, 52 S.Ct. 285, 76 L.Ed. 598 (1932) (approving statutory regime that Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Puryear v. Ede’s Ltd., 731 F.2d 1153 (5th
holding that a postconsent reference order signed by the district judge was required to vest authority in a magistrate judge for disposition of a summary judgment motion holding that a district court judge to whom a case had been reassigned could grant the defendants motion for summary judgment after the previous judge had denied the motion holding that only a district judge in the charging district and not a magistrate judge in that district may review the release order of a magistrate judge in the arresting district holding that where appellant moved to recuse trial judge from deciding the motion for new trial the judge of the administrative district was required to designate a judge to hear the recusal motion holding that the judge cannot consider factual statements of counsel in a motion for summary judgment