action must be ‘unusually suggestive’ of retaliatory motive before a causal link will be inferred.” 126 F.3d at 503 (citing Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1302). The Court in Krouse cited Jalil as an example of a case where the timing of the retaliatory action (two days after the employee filed an EEOC complaint) was unusually suggestive. See Krouse, 126 F.3d at 503 (citing Jalil, 873 F.2d at 708). PLC discharged Farrell approximately three to four weeks after she rejected DeLong’s advance. A temporal proximity of three to four weeks may support an inference of retaliation. However, more than temporal proximity alone is required to establish a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. See Bowles v. City of Camden, 993 F.Supp. 255, 264 (D.N.J.1998) (<HOLDING>). Relying on the Third Circuit’s recent holding
holding that to show a causal connection the plaintiff must demonstrate a relationship between the misconduct and the plaintiffs injury holding that a temporal proximity of one month between the plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to establish a causal connection holding that temporal proximity between the alleged retaliators knowledge of a protected activity and an adverse employment action may be sufficient to establish causal connection or retaliatory motive in some cases holding that in addition to temporal proximity plaintiff must show further evidence supporting a causal connection holding that a close temporal proximity between a public employees speech and a defendants actions suggested a causal relationship