capacity. The proposal thus could not be deemed to be made by Rebeca Ipox in her capacity as co-personal representative, much less made on behalf of the other co-personal representative. But even if the proposal had been made by Rebeca Ipox in her capacity as a personal representative, it would have been ineffective. Section 733.615(1) provides that “the concurrence of all joint personal representatives appointed ... is required on all acts connected with the administration and distribution of the estate.” Section 733.615 provides that “multiple representatives must act in concert, and have no authority to act independently, regardless of the circumstances.” Messina v. Scionti, 406 So.2d 529, 532 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). See also Costello v. Davis, 890 So.2d 1179 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (<HOLDING>); Pearce v. Foster, 454 So.2d 721 (Fla. 4th DCA
holding that plaintiffs personal injury action against other driver in auto accident was not precluded by arbitration award between insurance carriers regarding damage to plaintiffs car because plaintiff did not participate in or control arbitration was not a party to arbitration agreement did not adopt agreement or attempt to benefit from agreement holding that the defendant companys action in sending a representative to ohio to negotiate a resolution of a prior dispute did not confer personal jurisdiction holding that one copersonal representative did not bind the other copersonal representative to a contingent fee agreement with counsel because the other copersonal representative did not join in the agreement holding that parties to an arbitration agreement need not equally bind each other with respect to an arbitration agreement if they have provided each other with consideration beyond the promise to arbitrate holding that personal representative may amend personal injury suit to state wrongful death claim following plaintiffs death