and Davis has not established that his conviction was the product of “a deliberate and especially egregious error ..., or one that ... combined with a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct ] might so infect the integrity of a proceeding as to warrant the grant of habeas relief.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638, n. 9. .2002) (same). We reject Davis’s contention that his attorney’s failure to contest the government’s references to his nickname, “Punchy,” amounted to a denial of effective assistance because these references “were not prejudicial in view of the fact that they were brief and isolated and in light of the substantial evidence of guilt adduced by the government.” United States v. Mitchell, 328 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir.2003); see also Fields v. Woodford, 309 F.3d 1095, 1108 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Davis contends that his trial counsel should
holding that to show prejudice in a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors the result of the proceeding would have been different holding that defendant must show reasonable probability that but for counsels errors the sentence would have been significantly less harsh holding that a habeas petitioner must show that counsels errors  actually prejudiced him recognizing that in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel a movant must show that he was prejudiced by his counsels performance recognizing that defendant must show 1 that counsels performance was deficient and 2 that counsels errors prejudiced the defense