need not exhaust the procedures set forth in 20 U.S.C. § 1415 where resort to the administrative process would be either futile or inadequate.” Id. at 1303; see also Honig, 484 U.S. at 327, 108 S.Ct. 592; Kerr Ctr. Parents Ass’n v. Charles, 897 F.2d 1463, 1470 (9th Cir.1990). Here, the Porters exhausted California’s due process procedure regarding their initial complaint, receiving a SEHO order in their favor. Neither they nor the MBUSD appealed that order to a court of competent jurisdiction. Accordingly, the order was final and binding under the IDEA and state law. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(l)(A); Cal. Educ.Code § 56505(g), (i). There is no dispute that the IDEA required the implementation of the final decision of the SEHO. See Robinson v. Pinderhughes, 810 F.2d 1270, 1274 (4th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); see also Jeremy H. v. Mount Lebanon Sch.
holding that this court will not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative fact finder who heard the testimony and was in a position to evaluate the credibility of witnesses because evidence is weighed by the administrative agency and not by the courts holding that ideas procedural requirements can only be fairly construed to contemplate that once a final favorable administrative decision has been gained by a plaintiff the state will carry out that decision although it may have opposed the position of the plaintiff in the administrative proceedings holding that for the administrative position of the government to be substantially justified it must have a reasonable basis both in law and fact holding that to have standing a plaintiff must establish an injury in fact a casual connection between the injury and that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision holding that in order to establish standing a plaintiff must show 1 it has suffered an injury in fact  2 the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and 3 it is likely as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision