some of the anti-trust laws,” the court still concluded that the coupon program at issue could not violate § 202(a) “absent some predatory intent or some likelihood of competitive injury.” Armour, 402 F.2d at 717; see also IBP, Inc. v. Glickman, 187 F.3d 974, 977 (8th Cir.1999) (concluding that the challenged conduct did not “potentially suppress or reduce competition sufficient to be proscribed by the [PSA]”); Parchman v. USDA, 852 F.2d 858, 864 (6th Cir.1988) (“[The PSA] does not require that the Secretary prove actual injury before a practice may be found unfair. The Secretary need only establish the likelihood that an arrangement will result in competitive injury to establish a violation.” (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)); DeJong, 618 F.2d at 1337 (<HOLDING>). In a more recent case, based on facts similar
holding that the municipality may be held liable for the illegal or unconstitutional actions of its final policymakers as they engage in the setting of goals and the determination of how those goals will be achieved holding that unfair practices under  202 are not confined to those where competitive injury has already resulted but includes those where there is a reasonable likelihood that the purpose will be achieved and that the result will be an undue restraint of competition holding that as in an action alleging infringement of a mark likelihood of confusion is the essence of an unfair competition claim holding that actual reliance is not required to establish injury under nc gen stat  5863151 2001 which governs the unfair methods of competition and unfair and deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance holding that conviction will not be reversed unless there is a reasonable likelihood that but for attorneys errors the result of the proceeding would have been different