that of the client. Until judgment, or in this case settlement, the attorney has the right to recover fees for services rendered, but not to obtain a share of the income produced by the client’s claim. See Covington v. Rhodes, 38 N.C.App. 61, 64, 247 S.E.2d 305, 308 (1978). The attorney does not, as Mrs. Young suggests, own the claim itself. Accordingly, we join the majority of those circuits to have addressed this issue and decline to adopt the Cotnam exception. See Coady v. Commissioner, 213 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir.2000); Alexander v. IRS, 72 F.3d 938 (1st Cir.1995); Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451 (Fed.Cir.1995); O’Brien v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 707, 1962 WL 1147 (1962), aff'd 319 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.1963). See also Bagley v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 396, 418-19, 1995 WL 730447 (1995) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 121 F.3d 393 (8th Cir.1997). Rather,
holding that aln attorney who is employed under a contingent fee contract and discharged pri or to the occurrence of the contingency is limited to quantum meruit recovery for the reasonable value of the services rendered to the client and may not recover the full amount of the agreed contingent fee holding that the entirety of litigation settlement proceeds was taxable income to client not net after payment of attorney fees holding that where a successor attorney fails to inform the client of the clients duty to pay the predecessor attorney the successor assumes the obligation to pay the first lawyers fee out of his or her contingent fee holding provision in attorneys fee contract requiring client that terminated contract to immediately pay attorney fee equal to present value of attorneys interest in case was inconsistent with public policy and unconscionable holding without mentioning cotnam that settlement portion paid to attorneys pursuant to contingent fee was income to client