promise to sell [him] Unit 7S,” which he considers “a unique property.” In addition, he contends that what “had been a refundable deposit on another unit in Boston is now non-refundable.” This is reportedly because he “has stopped looking at other properties in Boston and the opportunity to purchase many of these potential properties likely no longer exists.” The Rule 56 materials submitted to this court do not support these contentions. As mentioned in the background supra, Trinity Place has confirmed, in response to a subpoena, that Albrecht has already entered into a P&S agreement with them. It cannot be said, therefore, that Albrecht has suffered the harms he complains of. These facts are simply not sufficient to support an estoppel. Compare Levin v. Rose, 302 Mass. 378, 382 (1939) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). Facts Alleged by Albrecht
holding that even wisconsin which has one of the broadest coverages of the economic loss doctrine would not apply it to bar an action for the rescission of a contract holding that the statute of frauds is not a bar where the denial of relief to one who has been misled to his harm would cause an unjust and unconscientious injury and loss holding that loss of customers and resulting injury to goodwill can constitute irreparable harm that is not compensable by an award of money damages holding that the plain language of this section requires the denial of relief for a petitioner who has finished serving his sentence holding that a plaintiffs claim of injury stemming from alleged procedural harm is insufficient to ground standing where the harm is uncoupled from any injury in fact or tied only to an undifferentiated injury common to all members of the public