law restricting its jurisdiction. Where a court is authorized by statute to entertain jurisdiction in a particular case only, and it undertakes to exercise the power and jurisdiction conferred in a case to which the statute has no application, in so doing it will not acquire jurisdiction and its judgment will be a nullity and subject to collateral attack. Chickamauga Trust Co. v. Lonas, 139 Tenn. 228, 201 S.W. 777, 778-79 (1918). With this distinction in mind, the Receiver cites a number of Tennessee cases suggesting that although Surety Bank may attack the Chancery Court’s subject matter jurisdiction to appoint a receiver, it may not collaterally attack the scope of the receiver’s authority. See, e.g., Slaughter v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 125 Tenn. 292, 143 S.W. 603, 605 (1911)(<HOLDING>); Roberison v. Davis, 169 Tenn. 659, 90 S.W.2d
holding that while a magistrate lacked the authority to enter an order granting a motion to correct error and thus that the order was defective for failing to contain the judges signature or another indication it was approved or adopted by the trial court the city waived any challenge to the validity of the order by failing to make a timely objection and observing that the indiana supreme court has long held that defects in the authority of a court officer as opposed to the jurisdiction of the trial court itself to enter a final order will be waived if not raised through a timely objection and more recently this court has applied the same principle to civil proceedings and clarified that any objection to the authority of an adjudicative officer must be raised at the first instance the irregularity occurs or at least within such time as the tribunal is able to remedy the defect holding that a void decree has no legal effect holding that the scope of the receivers authority prescribed in the order of his appointment cannot be questioned in another tribunal unless the order or decree was void holding that void order must exceed courts authority to act and not be merely erroneous holding that an order granted simultaneously with a recusal order is void unless the trial judges written order  was but a reduction of an earlier adverse oral ruling made prior to the recusal