by applicable direct authority as to leave no doubt in the mind of a reasonable officer that his conduct, if challenged on constitutional grounds, would be found wanting.” See Lattany, 845 F.Supp. at 266, see also K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 851 (7th Cir.1990) 10 . In its holding concerning the application of qualified immunity, the Court discusses the applicability of Cochran's status as a constructive or de-facto guard. 11 . See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941) ("[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken under color of state law”) (internal quotation omitted). 12 . See Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905 (10th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). 13 . See Wilson v. Meeks, 52 F.3d 1547, 1552
holding that the federal habeas courts task is to determine if the state courts decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the supreme court of the united states holding that clearly established law is construed as supreme court or tenth circuit decisions on point or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts holding that the sixth circuit erred in finding that the state courts jury instructions were contrary to clearly established federal law holding that where the supreme court has expressly left an open question circuit precedent is immaterial and there is no clearly established law for the state court to have unreasonably applied holding that the sixth circuit erred by following its own precedent rather than that of the supreme court in determining what is clearly established federal law