577, 95 S.Ct. at 1860, 1862. By contrast, the administrative decision in this case concerns the possibility that certain kinds of cars are defective and unsafe. This possibility, in turn, depends on an evaluation of “technical” evidence about the cars which the agency’s own regulations prescribe. See 49 C.F.R. § 552.6. Of course, the reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for the agency’s but it certainly is possible for the court to review the administrative decision for factual support without an impermissible substitution of judgment, in the same way we review agency factual determinations under § 706(2)(A) thousands of times every year. Cf. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, 463 U.S. 29, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the concerns about identifiable
holding that a heightened arbitrary and capricious standard of review applied to the decision to deny benefits under the erisa plan holding that a court is to factor an insurers dual role into its review under the arbitrary and capricious standard though the standard remains arbitrary and capri cious holding that a reversal of the plan administrators decision is in order under the most deferential arbitrary and capricious standard when no reasonable grounds exist to support the decision holding that when applying an arbitrary and capricious standard of review the courts role is to determine whether the plan administrators decision was completely unreasonable holding that the arbitrary and capricious standard performs its usual role of assuring factual support in a case involving a nhtsa decision to rescind a motor vehicle safety standard