unsound mind the right to commence an action “after the removal of such disability.” The statute is silent, however, as to the effect of a representative commencing an action before the disability is removed. That is the issue we must now decide. This Court has not addressed this issue based on the current statutory language found in Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-1-106. However, in Thompson v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T. Pac. Ry. Co., 109 Tenn. 268, 70 S.W. 612, 613-14 (1902), this Court held, under an earlier version of this statute, that a married woman’s cause of action was not barred by the applicable statute of limitations even when her husband was capable of bringing a suit on her behalf within the limitations period but did not do so until after the limitations peri 6 (Ind.1990) (<HOLDING>); Newby’s Adm’r v. Warren’s Adm’r, 277 Ky. 338,
holding that the appointment of a guardian for a mentally incompetent or nonage person does not have the effect of commencing the running of the period of limitations tolled by virtue of the disability holding that appointment of guardian does not operate to start statute of limitations running in cases where title to cause of action is in person belonging to class of disabled persons encompassed within tolling provision holding that appointment of guardian over incompetent adult does not remove legal disability so as to halt tolling and commence running of statute of limitations holding that appointment of a conservator does not remove a mentally disabled persons legal disability so as to start the statute of limitations running holding that washingtons statute tolls the statute of limitations for a legally incompetent person notwithstanding the appointment of a guardian this is so because the right to the tolling statute vests in the incompetent person not in the guardian from this premise it follows that the guardians subsequent actions on the incompetent persons behalf should have no additional effect upon the statute of limitations unless they result in res judicata