— U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 1817, 137 L. Ed.2d 1026 (1997); United States v. Nash, 44 M.J. 456, 457-58 (1996). However, that is not the situation the military judge faced in the appellant’s case. Rather, the appellant wanted to introduce his willingness to take the test and the unwillingness of the NCIS to give it to him. His intent was to undermine the credibility of the second sworn out-of-court statement he gave to NCIS. The military judge also determined that evidence concerning the appellant’s offer to take a polygraph and that it was not given was inadmissible under Military Rule of Evidence 403. See United States v. Berg, 44 M. J. 79, 80 (1996)(per curiam). He gave solid reasons for ruling as he did. Record at 198-203. See United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392, 399-400 (C.M.A.1993) (<HOLDING>). He then properly instructed the members that,
holding the military judge did not abuse his discretion in dismissing charges with prejudice for violation of speedy trial courtmartial rule and recognizing that the military judge assessed the prejudice that would result from remedies short of dismissal holding that a military judge did not abuse his discretion in dismissing charges with prejudice to remedy unlawful command influence holding that the military judge has considerable discretion to exclude relevant evidence under military rule of evidence 403 holding that the trial court was within its discretion to exclude because the record showed considerable confusion on the part of the juror holding rule 403 does not exclude all prejudicial evidence the rule focuses only on the danger of unfair prejudice