in entering a probation order, which included a special condition that he pay for drug and alcohol testing, when the condition was not orally pronounced at sentencing. The trial court granted the motion sixty-four days after the motion was filed. However, because the order was issued outside of the sixty-day time limit for rule 3.800(b) motions, the trial court’s order is a nullity and the appellant’s motion is deemed denied. See Byrd v. State, 840 So.2d 436 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Robinson v. State, 850 So.2d 658 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.800(b)(l)(B)(2003). Nonetheless, by filing a rule 3.800(b) motion, the appellant preserved this issue for consideration on direct appeal. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.140(e)(2)(2003); see also In re Anders Briefs, 581 So.2d 149, 152 (Fla.1991) (<HOLDING>). The condition imposed upon the appellant,
holding that an indigent defendant does not lose his anders rights because counsel is able to identify relatively minor sentencing issues holding that an indigent litigants right to appointed counsel has been recognized to exist only where she may be deprived of her physical liberty that the constitution does not require the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in every parentalstatus termination proceeding and that the decision whether due process calls for the appointment of counsel is to be answered in the first instance by the trial court subject to appellate review holding that an indigent defendant cannot have a fair trial without being provided counsel holding that the appropriate remedy for a trial courts refusal to consider an indigent defendants request for new counsel is to remand for a hearing holding that an indigent defendant does not have a constitutional right to press issues even if nonfrivolous which counsel in his professional judgment decides not to present