evidence precisely because a jury may properly infer therefrom that the defendant believes himself to be guilty of the charged crime, which constitutes some evidence that he is, in fact, guilty. See 1 Leonard B. Sand, et ah, Modern Federal Jury Instructions: Criminal, Instructions 6-9 (flight), 6-11 (false exculpatory statements) (2002). So in this case, in which other evidence plainly established that Cassese had placed the charged DPRC stock purchases, a rational jury could reasonably infer from his effort to undo those trades that he believed that he was guilty of the charged Rule 14e-3(a) crime, that is, that he believed that, at the time he placed the trades, he did so in willful violation of federal securities laws. See United States v. Gordon, 987 F.2d 902, 906-07 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Perez, 387 F.3d
holding that intent and knowledge can be proved by circumstantial evidence holding that employers intent may be inferred through circumstantial evidence holding criminal acts designed to reduce the likelihood of conviction including threats against witnesses are admissible under rule 404b as showing consciousness of guilt recognizing that circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to demonstrate a defendants guilt holding that defendants knowledge of and intent to participate in a criminal conspiracy may be established through circumstantial evidence including acts that exhibit a consciousness of guilt