the subject and leave no room for the inference that the question sought to be raised can be the subject of controversy.” Hagans, 415 U.S. at 537, 94 S.Ct. at 1379. The claim must be “so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of [the Supreme Court] or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy within the jurisdiction of the District Court, whatever may be the ultimate resolution of the federal issues on the merits.” Id., 415 U.S. at 543, 94 S.Ct. at 1382 (quoting Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666-67, 94 S.Ct. 772, 777, 39 L.Ed.2d 73 (1974)). This test does not require the claim, in order to be substantial, to be supported by evidence. See also Seals v. Quarterly County Court, 562 F.2d 390 (6th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). The District Court, in effect, confused the
holding that the language of the arbitration clause   any controversy or claim arising out of     was broad enough to encompass the plaintiffs claim alleging fraud in the inducement of the contract holding that a statelaw claim is preempted and removable from state court if resolution of the claim depends on an interpretation of the collectivebargaining agreement holding that a failure to make out a hostile work environment claim effectively disposes of the constructive discharge claim as well holding that if a claim is substantial enough to support jurisdiction over a pendent claim and resolution of the pendent claim completely disposes of the controversy fees should be awarded regardless of what the record now reveals about the validity of the constitutional claim holding estoppel claim could not lie in tort where the facts that support the claim could not support a claim for fraud or misrepresentation