the arbitrator’s decision on the common law grounds that it was arbitrary and capricious and the decision was contrary to public policy because it diminished Macias’s rights under Texas law. The Supreme Court held in Hall Street that the grounds found in Section 10 are the exclusive grounds for vacating an arbitration award under the FAA. Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 586, 128 S.Ct. at 1404. The cases relied on by Macias in support of her common law grounds pre-date Hall Street. See Bro 08-00243-CV, 2009 WL 3109875, at *2, (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] September 17, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (complaint that arbitration award violates public policy is not viable ground for vacating an award under the FAA); see also Citigroup Global Markets., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 350 (5th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we conclude that the common law
holding that hall street restricts the grounds for vacatur to those set forth in section 10 of the faa holding that plea in bar may be based only on grounds set forth in statute holding that arbitrary and capricious ground for vacatur recognized along with the four grounds for vacatur specified in chapter 1 of the faa could not be used to vacate award under the convention holding that common law grounds such as manifest disregard of law and gross mistake were not valid grounds for vacatur of arbitration award as hall street forecloses any common law grounds for vacatur holding section 10 of faa is procedural and does not preempt state common law