with a deadly weapon, finding that a firearm, is by definition, a deadly weapon which fires projectiles likely to cause death or great bodily harm); Mitchell v. State, 698 So.2d 555, 558 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (noting that “[bjecause the definition of ‘firearm’ does not involve proof that the gun is loaded or operable, a defendant’s use of a firearm during a crime can be established even if the gun is not recovered and introduced into evidence”); Miller, 613 So.2d at 531 (concluding that the trial court did not err in refusing to give a jury instruction on the justifiable use of non-deadly force, because a firearm is, by definition, a deadly weapon which fires projectiles likely to cause death or great bodily harm) (emphasis added); M.R.R. v. State, 411 So.2d 983, 984 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (<HOLDING>); Bass v. State, 232 So.2d 25, 27 (Fla. 1st DCA
holding if the language of a deed or other written instrument is clear and unambiguous the intention of the parties is gathered from the instrument it is what the grant or said and not what he intended to say holding that recording of an instrument provided constructive notice to subsequent purchasers not to those with an interest antecedent to the making of the instrument holding that an unloaded gun used in the commission of an aggravated assault is a deadly weapon holding that for purposes of the aggravated assault statute if the instrument used is a firearm as defined by section 7900016 then that instrument is a deadly weapon as a matter of law  regardless of whether it is loaded or capable of being fired and holding that for purposes of the aggravated assault statute if the instrument is not a firearm then courts are to apply an objective test and look to the nature and actual use of the instrument and not to the subjective fear of the victim or intent of the perpetrator in determining whether the instrument is a deadly weapon holding that intent is a separate element and evidence relating to intent is irrelevant to determining whether an object is a criminal instrument