combined in a single agency. Our own research indicates that Mr. Long’s argument is without merit. We previously addressed the combination of investigatory, enforcement, and adjudicative functions in the context of school disciplinary proceedings in Heyne v. Metro. Nashville Board of Public Education, 380 S.W.3d 715, 735 (Tenn.2012), and found that the merging of these functions comports with due process. As we explained: Due process does not require all the structural safeguards in administrative and civil ad t, 297 Mont. 493, 995 P.2d 923, 928 (2000) (rejecting claim that Montana’s attorney disciplinary system violated due process principles because investigatory and enforcement authority were combined in one agency). But see Tweedy v. Okla. Bar Ass’n, 624 P.2d 1049, 1054-55 (1981) (<HOLDING>). In Tennessee’s attorney disciplinary system,
holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to review state disciplinary proceedings against attorney holding that the oklahoma supreme court under due process principles could not order the reinvestigation of an attorney disciplinary grievance but also noting that the board of governors of the state bar could review the matter holding that taxpayer could not have presented substantive due process claim to the board of assessment review because of the limited jurisdiction of that board holding that due process requires that the findings and actions of a disciplinary prison board be supported by some evidence in the record holding that the fact that the members of the grievance committee and the disciplinary counsel are appointed by the supreme court is not enough by itself to establish a per se violation of due process