benefits as a common denominator. I therefore dissent. 1 .This is the only evidence in the record about Bruce's involvement with tribal authorities. Bruce (quite properly) does not rely on anything else. While the majority disclaims reliance on two arrests reported in the Presen-tence ■ Investigation Re al.1958) (finding no doubt that petitioner is an Indian subject to the Major Crimes Act as he is an' Indian by blood and enrolled as a member of the Mono tribe), aff'd sub nom. Dickson v. Carmen, 270 F.2d 809 (9th Cir.1959); see also Halbert v. United States, 283 U.S. 753, 762-63, 51 S.Ct. 615, 75 L.Ed. 1389 (1931) (noting the general rule that the right of individual Indians to share in tribal property depends on tribal membership); Vezina v. United States, 245 F. 411 (8th Cir.1917) (<HOLDING>). 5 . As we observed in United States v.
holding that under the oregon constitution when a person consents to have their blood drawn and tested for specified substances the scope of that consent limits the scope of the states power to test the blood without a warrant holding that person who was by blood of the fond du lac band of the chippewas of lake superior who moved to the reservation was recognized enrolled and secured allotments upon the reservation were members holding that an appeal was not equitably moot because the person who was issued the money was a party and was aware when the payment was made that the award would be appealed holding that a person who cut and removed timber pursuant to the direction of the person in possession of the property but without the written consent of the company holding legal title to the land could be held liable under the gtccs recognizing serious harm results when members of the legal profession engage in criminal acts which give rise to a lack of confidence by members of the public in those who are officers of the court