to AR.S. § 12-341.01(A), the trial court lacks discretion to deny a fee award required by the terms of the parties’ contract. Chase Bank of Ariz. v. Acosta, 179 Ariz. 563, 575, 880 P.2d 1109, 1121 (App.1994). Consequently, the trial court erred by refusing to award fees to Sourant unless his breaches prevented him from reaping the benefit of the fee provisions, or he was not the prevailing party. We address each issue in turn. ¶ 33 We reject Murphy Farrell’s contention that Sourant’s breaches excused enforcement of the fee provisions against it. We agree with Murphy Farrell that an uneured material breach of contract relieves the non-breaching party from the duty to perform and can discharge that party from the contract. Zancanaro v. Cross, 85 Ariz. 394, 400, 339 P.2d 746, 750 (1959) (<HOLDING>); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 242, emt.
holding unchallenged jury finding that defendants subsequentlyoccurring breach was not excused by plaintiffs prior material breach required defendant to pay plaintiff per the terms of the agreement holding that after jury findings of dual breach unchallenged finding that defendants breach was not excused based on prior material breach of plaintiff constituted implicit finding that there was no material breach by plaintiff holding that victim of a minor or partial breach must continue own performance but victim of a material or total breach is excused from further performance holding that the government was liable for partial breach of contract holding that a partial failure of consideration can support a claim for breach of contract