a possible maximum sentence of 40 years, and likely removal from the United States, factors providing him with a strong motive to flee before trial; (3) although Blanco appears not to have steady lawful employment, at times relevant to the charged conspiracy, he was driving an expensive sports car registered in his name, a circumstance raising questions as to financial resources; and (4) Blanco’s criminal history reveals repeated failures to appear in court, resulting in the issuance of four bench warrants. On this record, the district court acted well within its discretion in ordering bail based on the risk of flight. We need not, therefore, consider whether a risk of danger to the community also supported detention. See generally United States v. Leon, 766 F.2d 77, 81 (2d Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). Nor did Blanco’s sleep apnea compel release
holding that the legislature did not intend the basis for a continuous protective order be limited to the four enumerated findings but also to include a finding of a history of domestic violence recognizing  1951 includes fear of economic harm holding that to come under the act the harm must be caused by a failure of something a worker is using to support himself holding that a threat to harm another person is a crime of violence recognizing that statutory concern is not limited to acts of violence but also includes the harm to society caused by narcotics trafficking