officers. He instead argued that the facts supported a conclusion that the State’s witnesses were being truthful. This is not misconduct. See State v. Fiallo-Lopez, 78 Wn. App. 717, 731, 899 P.2d 1294 (1995). E. Expression of Personal Opinion ¶19 Jackson also alleges that the prosecutor committed misconduct by stating, “I think maybe [Greene] might have ulterior motives.” RP (Mar. 13, 2008) at 41. Jackson did not object to this statement. And the prosecutor made this statement in the context of recounting evidence and reasonable inferences from the evidence that could support the jury’s conclusion that Greene was not credible. As such, it is not flagrant and ill-intentioned misconduct that no jury instruction could cure. See State v. Hoffman, 116 Wn.2d 51, 94-95, 804 P.2d 577 (1991) (<HOLDING>). ¶20 We note, however, that it is highly
recognizing that prosecutors must have reasonable latitude to fashion closing arguments and thus can argue reasonable inferences based on the evidence including that one of the two sides is lying holding that defense counsels estimate that compensable damages were 6900070000 and concession that i think hes been significantly injured i think he has injury now i think it may need treatment we dont know for sure were not judicial admissions holding that an attorneys arguments are not evidence holding do you think i need a lawyer to be ambiguous holding that prosecutors phrasing argument in terms of i think or i think the evidence shows to which trial counsel did not object is not prosecutorial misconduct if the arguments are based on evidence or reasonable inferences