because they appear to stem from the confusion arising from applying Supreme Court pronouncements of the 1920s and 1930s in modern cases. Earlier this century, the Supreme Court had yet to develop the varying degrees of scrutiny ubiquitously applied in the modern era. The recognition of a constitutional right did not necessarily result in a clear specification of the particular degree of scrutiny to be applied. In fact, the Court not only explicitly recognized "fundamental rights of the individual which [Meyer, supra; Bartels v Iowa, 262 US 404; 43 S Ct 628; 67 L Ed 1047 (1923); Pierce, supra] declared,” Farrington, n 6 supra at 299 (emphasis added), but at the same time articulated a reasonableness standard. Id. at 298. See also Pierce, supra at 534 and Meyer, supra at 399-401 (<HOLDING>). Adding to the confusion was the Court’s
holding parental rights are constitutionally protected fundamental interest recognizing a presumption of reasonableness recognizing fundamental parental rights while utilizing a reasonableness standard recognizing this substantial interest in context of termination of parental rights holding that the clear and convincing standard provides appropriate due process in cases involving parental rights