white, use their cell phones to make calls and texts. (Id. at ¶¶ 177-78). Finally, Rivas was docked time for arriving to work late. (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶¶ 79, 82, 83.) However, these actions are not sufficient to sustain a hostile work environment claim under § 1981 or the NYCHRL. Moreover, Rivas does not dispute that she has arrived late to work, and her performance evaluations demonstrate that she struggled with this aspect of her employment from the get go. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 60, 71; Rivas Aff. Exs. 6-7, 10-11). Thus, it is hard to conclude that the actions Rivas complains of amount to unfair scrutiny by Speranza, rather than a consequence of Rivas’s work and attendance problems that needed improvement. See Leung v. N.Y. Univ., No. 08CV5150 (GBD), 2010 WL 1372541, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted). Speranza
recognizing hostile work environment discrimination in ada context holding that unfair scrutiny was not sufficiently severe to result in a finding that an objectively hostile or abusive work environment existed holding that a viable hostile work environment claim requires an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive holding single incident of sexual harassment was neither sufficiently pervasive nor severe to constitute a hostile work environment recognizing a hostile work environment claim under section 1983