not temporary par tial disability, it is difficult to see why the result in Wilkins’s case should be any different. Wilkins argues, based on an unreported decision of a Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel, that a failure to incorporate the average weekly wage concept into the temporary partial disability calculation would undermine workers’ compensation policy. She notes that the calculation of an employee’s average weekly wage includes such compensation as overtime, bonuses, and commissions. See P & L Const. Co. v. Lankford, 559 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tenn. 1978) (stating that the earnings of an employee under this definition “include anything received by him under the terms of his employment contract from which he realizes economic gain”). But see Pollard, 886 S.W.2d at 760 (<HOLDING>). The law includes this non-wage income in the
holding that the scope of the average weekly wage definition is not unlimited and concluding that it excludes fringe benefits holding that in determining plaintiffs average weekly wage pursuant to nc gen stat  9725 the commission had no authority to combine his earnings from the employment in which he was injured with those from any other employment holding that the flsa does not prohibit changes in wage rates it prohibits the payment of overtime at less than one and onehalf times the regular wage rate holding that it is not holding that the definition of average weekly wages and the range of alternatives set forth in the five methods of computing such wages as specified in the first two paragraphs of ncgs  9725 do not allow the inclusion of wages or income earned in employment or work other than that in which the employee was injured