produce nonsensical results.”).) The trouble with Devcon’s approach is that, instead of asking whether the contractual language is clear and then applying the exclusion’s unambiguous meaning, it looks at the effects of the exclusion and concludes that the language must be unclear because it produces, in Devcon’s view, bad results. That is an unduly intrusive way to evaluate the relationship between two sophisticated commercial entities bargaining at arm’s length. See Moessner, 121 F.3d at 905 (recognizing that, as a general matter, “sophisticated insureds may exercise more bargaining power vis-a-vis the insurers, and therefore be in less need of protection from the courts than other insureds”); see also Canal Ins. Co. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 435 F.3d 431, 440 (3d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 264
holding that the policy language expected or intended by an insured person is unambiguous and requires a subjective intent on behalf of the insured holding when insured has failed to show circumstances attributable to the insurer that fostered coverage expectations or that an ordinary layperson would misunderstand the exclusion summary judgment against the insured is appropriate holding as unambiguous under iowa law the insurance policys exclusion of coverage to any obligation of the insured to indemnify another because of damages arising out of  a bodily injury to any employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of his employment by the insured holding that under pennsylvania law the reasonable expectations of an insured may overcome unambiguous policy language only when the insured is a noncommercial entity holding that regardless of the subjective belief of the insured the record established a basis to believe that the insured had committed an act that could give rise to a claim under the policy