determine appropriate punishment.” Wike v. State, 698 So.2d 817, 821 (Fla.1997). Thus, we have recognized that a resentencing must proceed “as an entirely new proceeding,” id., and that a “resentencing should proce 1997) (agreeing that because resentenc-ing is a new proceeding, the defendant may challenge the accuracy of prior convictions included on his scoresheet, even though he did not challenge them at the original sentencing). We have also recognized that because a resentencing is a new proceeding, the court is not limited by the evidence originally presented. See Lucas v. State, 841 So.2d 380, 387 (Fla.2003) (“[A] resentenc-ing court is not limited by evidence presented (or not presented) in ... the original ... sentencing phase.”); Mann v. State, 453 So.2d 784, 786 (Fla.1984) (<HOLDING>). Our decision in Mann illustrates this
recognizing that sentencing facts are based on the evidence and testimony presented at sentencing under a preponderance of the evidence standard holding that because resentencing following reversal is a new proceeding the state must introduce evidence that the defendant qualifies for enhanced sentencing even though such evidence was introduced in the previous sentencing hearing recognizing that where a remand directs a new sentencing proceeding both sides may present additional evidence holding that any inherent power to remand to the bia for the consideration of additional evidence should not be exercised where i the basis for the remand is an instruction to consider documentary evidence that was not in the record before the bia and ii the agency regulations set forth procedures to reopen a case before the bia for the taking of additional evidence holding that a defendant has the right both to present evidence to prove that the defendant does not qualify for sentencing under the act and to challenge the states evidence regarding the defendants eligibility for sentencing as a prison releasee reoffender