hasten her demise, we conclude that the conduct falls within the ambit of comment “f ’ of section 46. Further, comment “e” explains that the unequal position of the parties in a relationship, where one asserts and has the power to affect the interests of the other, may also supply the heightened degree of outrageousness required for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46 cmt. e. Liberty Mutual was in such a position in relation to Steadman. Finally, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true, Liberty Mutual’s delay was wholly unjustified because the issue of Steadman’s entitlement to the lung transplant had been litigated, and the JCC had ordered Liberty Mutual to authorize the transplant. See Harris, 510 So.2d at 989 (<HOLDING>). Compare Metropolitan, 467 So.2d at 279
recognizing validity of cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress holding that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from a claim for emotional distress damages under the employment discrimination statute holding that the insured sufficiently alleged a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress where the insurer rejected the insureds claim for disability payments without any justification and where coverage had been previously determined to exist holding that act did not bar intentional infliction of emotional distress claim recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress