for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, this included no determination whatever regarding the copyright claims but simply a determination that, in the absence of any surviving federal claim against the Record Companies and the absence of any party requesting that the Court exercise supplemental jurisdiction, the Court would not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the surviving pendant claims against the Record Companies. Moreover, the stipulation cannot plausibly be considered a consent decree, because the Court did not retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the agreement. See, e.g., Sonii v. General Electric, No. 95 C 5370, 2003 WL 21541039 (N.D.Ill. June 11, 2003), at *5-6; see also Roberson v. Giuliani, No. 99 Civ 10900, 2002 WL 253950 at *3-6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2002), (<HOLDING>). As noted above, plaintiffs have also claimed
holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees holding that plaintiff was not the prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorneys fees even where the court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of a settlement agreement because there was insufficient judicial sanctioning of the alteration of the parties legal relationship holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal because it was filed before the final order awarding attorneys fees holding parties agreement provided clear contractual justification for the award of costs and expenses including attorneys fees to the prevailing party holding that a defendant is the prevailing party within the meaning of statutory provisions awarding attorneys fees to the prevailing party even when the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the action