Keble v. Hickeringill and Carrington v. Taylor). Indeed, Lord Coleridge, although of the opinion that the cause was bad, nonetheless recognized that novel factual circumstances would not foreclose the possibility that a case could still be recognized at law. Lumley, 2 El. & Bl. at 250-51, 118 E.R. at 762 (Coleridge, J., dissenting) (“I am aware that with respect to an action on the case the argument primae impressionis is sometimes of no weight.”). This canvas of ancient authorities persuades us that Rhode Island’s courts, if presented with a similar case in 1843, would have recognized, as did Lumley v. Gye, that the allegations of tortious and malicious interference with contract as pled in this complaint stated an action on the case cognizable at law. Cf. Bendick, 558 A.2d at 944 (<HOLDING>). Thus, because the parties’ rights and
holding that an action concerning the application of the omitted spouse statute was an action at law holding that rhode island courts in 1843 would have allowed an action to establish and collect an administrative penalty as an action for debt triable to a jury at common law holding that an action for the negligence of an architect in the performance of professional services is an action for breach of contract holding that a  1983 claim is an independent original action rather than a review proceeding even when it challenges an administrative action holding a shareholders derivative action even where the only relief allowed is a recovery of damages is nevertheless a suit in equity and not an action at law