performed, a reasonable attorney would have engaged in similar time expenditures”). This Court is persuaded that attorneys’ fees and costs relating to this Court’s previous attorneys’ fees decision are not duplicative of the first appeal, and therefore shall be awarded. Moreover, the Town and Village brought the first appeal and Coe’s counsel argued the case despite the lack of appellate jurisdiction. Coe, 328 Fed.Appx. 743. Accordingly, this Court shall award Coe attorneys’ fees and costs relating to the oral argument for the second appeal. Due to Coe’s unsuccessful second appeal at the Second Circuit, the amount of time that this Court finds reasonable for attorneys’ fees will be reduced by fifty percent. See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Carroll v. Blinken, 105 F.3d 79, 81 (2d
holding that in determining the reasonableness of attorneys fees under federal fee shifting statutes courts may not enhance the fee award above the lodestar amount to compensate attorneys for assuming the risk of receiving no payment for their services if the lawsuit failed holding that the quantity of relief obtained as compared to what the plaintiff sought to achieve are key elements in determining the degree of success holding that the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained recognizing discretion of district court in determining a fee award holding that status as a prevailing party does not by itself entitle a plaintiff to attorneys fees rather the most critical factor in determining a fee awards reasonableness is the degree of success obtained emphasis added