Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure § 5311, at 261 (1980). 6 A trial court’s decision to admit evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Doe v. Gonzaga Univ., 99 Wn. App. 338, 362, 992 P.2d 545 (2000). 7 Whether a witness’s testimony remains consistent after settling is an important factor in determining whether settlement evidence should be admitted to show bias. See, e.g., Lee v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 566 So. 2d 1052, 1056-57 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (where a witness injured in the same accident as the plaintiff offered consistent testimony before and after settling with defendant, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit evidence of the settlement to show bias); London v. Stewart, 221 Neb. 265, 376 N.W.2d 553, 556-57 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Anderson v. Alfa-Laval Agric., Inc., 209 Wis.
holding that admittance of prioracts evidence was not unfairly prejudicial after observing that in an effort to ensure that the testimony was not unfairly prejudicial the trial justice carefully excluded the testimony because of its remoteness and its potential to be cumulative holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive holding that the challenged evidence the government introduced in rebuttal was substantive evidence and not  relevant for impeachment purposes because it was not offered to show that the witness was not a credible person but to show that she was not at the defendants home during the relevant time making her testimony that she did not see any drugrelated activity while at the defendants home irrelevant holding that settlement evidence offered to show bias was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial where the witnesss testimony before and after plaintiff settled with her husband a defendant was inconsistent but the change was the opposite of what would result from bias holding that a trial witnesss testimony as to the credibility of another witness was prejudicial error