of relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). 32 . See also Avakian v. Chulengarian, 328 Ill.App.3d 147, 262 Ill.Dec. 663, 766 N.E.2d 283, 294 (2002); Tucker v. St. James Hosp., 279 Ill.App.3d 696, 216 Ill.Dec. 332, 665 N.E.2d 392, 396 (1996). 33 . This conclusion also is consistent with the few of our sister circuits that have addressed this precise issue. See, e.g., Liggon-Redding v. Estate of Sugarman, 659 F.3d 258, 261-65 (3d Cir.2011) (finding no conflict between Rule 8 or Rule 11 and a Pennsylvania statute requiring a “certificate of merit” to be filed in professional malpractice claims); Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 158-61 (3d Cir.2000) (finding no conflict between Rule 8 or Rule 9 and a similar New Jersey law); cf. Littlepaige v. United States, 528 F. App'x 289, 292-93 (4th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). 34 . R.40 at 2 (citation omitted). 35 . R.49
holding that discovery rule applied to wrongful death action predicated on medical malpractice holding amendment to statute of limitations was a procedural amendment to be applied retroactively in a medical malpractice case holding expert testimony is generally required to establish proximate cause in medical malpractice cases holding the provisions of a comprehensive medical malpractice act unconstitutional holding that a north carolina rule requiring an expert certification in a medical malpractice case applied in a federal tort claims act case sounding in medical malpractice brought in federal court