can only be interpreted as an implied finding that the board’s decision was motivated by the death threats rather than by White’s exercise of protected activity. Indeed, the examiner did not make any finding that White’s complaints about the athletic equipment and evaluation were at all factors in the board’s decision. Therefore, it would seem that White did not even satisfy his burden of proving that his exercise of protected activity was a substantial factor in the board’s decision to terminate him. Our review of the record indicates that the Commission’s conclusion that there was no violation of White’s first amendment rights is not in error. See Hillis v. Stephen F. Austin State University, 665 F.2d 547, 552 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 2906, 73 L.Ed.2d 1315 (1982) (<HOLDING>). White offered no evidence that he had
holding that pretext is subject to the clearly erroneous standard holding that the finding of intent to discriminate is a factual determination subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review holding that appellate review in a first amendment case of a lower courts finding concerning the motivation behind a decision to terminate a faculty member is governed by the clearly erroneous standard holding that a finding of accommodation is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard of review instead of under a de novo standard holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record