substantial rights. Mares, 402 F.3d at 520. The district court made no comments suggesting it would have imposed a lesser sentence in the absence of mandatory guidelines. See United States v. Bringier, 405 F.3d 310, 317 (5th Cir.2005) (stating the issue as “whether [the defendant] has demonstrated that the sentencing judge would have reached a different result had it sentenced [the defendant] under an advisory scheme rather than a mandatory one”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 264, 163 L.Ed.2d 238 (2005) (No. 05-5535). Therefore, Tovar fails to demonstrate plain error. Tovar contends for the first time on appeal that the statute under which he was convicted, 21 U.S.C. § 841, is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (<HOLDING>). As he concedes, however, this issue is
holding any fact other than a prior conviction that increases the maximum penalty beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt holding that ojther than the fact of a prior conviction any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt holding that any fact other than a prior conviction may not be used to enhance a defendants sentence beyond the statutory maximum unless it is submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt holding that other than the fact of a prior conviction any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt holding that other than fact of prior conviction any fact that increases penalty for crime beyond prescribed statutory minimum must be submitted to jury and proved beyond reasonable doubt