plaintiffs entirely fail to demonstrate how the central holding of Gray — that government attorneys enjoy absolute immunity from civil suits based on their conduct in initiating and prosecuting child neglect actions — does not apply to their claims against defendant Furse. See id. Furthermore, even if it were the case that defendant Furse had acted in bad faith and fallen under the "spell” of Carolina Lundebye, such behavior would not vitiate the absolute immunity conferred under Gray and Butz. See Gray, 243 F.3d at 575 (noting that "[w]here absolute immunity is deemed appropriate, an official is protected from all suits attacking conduct within the scope of the immunity, even if the official is alleged to have acted in bad faith”); cf. Moore v. Valder, 65 F.3d 189, 194 (D.C.Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). 8 . FIS and Stein Lundebye also argue that
holding that a prosecutors decision whether or not to give defense counsel evidence alleged to be materially exculpatory which was either discovered after the  1983 plaintiffs arrest but before his conviction or while the prosecutor was still functioning as an advocate for the state in posttrial motions and preparations for appeal is clearly part of the presentation of the states case and therefore a prosecutor is absolutely immune from liability for failure to turn over evidence holding that prosecutors are absolutely immune from claims alleging conspiracy to present false testimony but witnesses including police officerwitnesses are not absolutely immune from such claims holding that prosecutors were absolutely immune for withholding exculpatory evidence in violation of a court order because the order was issued in response to a defense motion for any exculpatory evi dence and thus required the prosecutors to make judgments holding that prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for their knowing or inadvertent failure to disclose materially exculpatory evidence recognizing that a judge is not absolutely immune from criminal liability