“the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). In making this inquiry, a court is not concerned with the issue of whether the substance of the confession is true. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544, 81 S.Ct. 735, 5 L.Ed.2d 760 (1961) (expressly disapproving of judging the admissibility of a confession under the United States Constitution by utilizing a standard which considers the probable truth or falsity of the confession and instead emphasizing that the question of admissibility is “a question to be answered with complete disregard of whether or not [the defendant] in fact spoke the truth.”); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 377, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Bracey, 501 Pa. 356, 365, 461
holding state must prove voluntariness of confession beyond a reasonable doubt holding that question of whether a confession was coerced was not to be resolved by considering the truth or falsity of the confession holding that under elstad the first question that must be answered when determining whether a subsequent confession is tainted by an earlier confession is whether the initial confession was obtained in violation of the defendants fifth amendment rights  ie whether it was involuntary  or whether the confession was voluntary but obtained in technical violation of miranda  holding the determination of the voluntariness of a confession is a determination uninfluenced by the truth or falsity of the confession holding that trial judges determination of the admissibility of a confession is based on whether the confession was voluntarily given