we conclude that the claim for unfair representation did not abate. This is an issue of first impression in Minnesota. The United States Supreme Court has stated that the “closest state-law analogy” for breach of the duty of fair representation is legal malpractice. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 167, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2292, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983). Minnesota has reached the question of whether a legal malpractice claim is an “injury to the person”; it is not. Johnson v. Taylor, 435 N.W.2d 127, 129 (MinnApp. 1989), review denied (Minn. Apr. 19, 1989). Thus, we conclude the unfair representation claim did not abate. On the other hand, the assault claim and emotional distress claims are considered “injury to the person” claims. Cf. Thompson, 319 N.W.2d at 407 (<HOLDING>); see also Dean v. Shirer, 547 F.2d 227, 229-30
holding that liability insurer had duty to defend insured against complaint that alleged intentional tort and negligence in the alternative even when policy excluded coverage for intentional torts holding that new yorks threeyear residual statute of limitations for personal injury claims not embraced by specific statutes rather than oneyear statute of limitations for intentional torts governed  1983 action holding that personal injury exception should be construed narrowly so as not to include torts without physical injury holding prior statute that abated only intentional torts but allowed personal injury claims based on negligence to survive unconstitutional holding that a negligence claim is not a personal injury tort claim