with the second manufacturing count. The State responds that the two counts relate to two separate crimes and the merger argument must, accordingly, fail. We agree with the State. Although both the first and second counts charged Dittmer with crimes that included the date of December 20, 1999, the assistant county attorney explained that the conspiracy to manufacture charge stemmed from a different act with different people at a different time than did the manufacturing charge. Dittmer did not contest this explanation and the district court accepted it, stating “they are two separate and distinct offenses.” Under these circumstances, we conclude the merger argument is inapplicable. See State v. Walker, 610 N.W.2d 524, 526-27 (Iowa 2000). Cf. State v. Maghee, 573 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 1997) (<HOLDING>). III. Disposition We vacate the judgment and
holding that there was sufficient evidence of intent to sell or deliver where the defendant was in possession of one large cocaine rock and eight smaller rocks holding that trial court may arrest judgment on conviction for possession with intent to deliver and enter judgment of guilt on simple possession holding that the manner a controlled substance is packaged may be considered in establishing intent to sell and deliver holding that trial court could properly determine that evidence of a gun was relevant to the charge of possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine because as a practical matter firearms are frequently involved for protection in the illegal drug trade holding defendant could only be sentenced to a single offense under section 1244011 not both conspiracy with intent to deliver and possession with intent to deliver