any sentence within the boundaries of the plea agreement, Mr. Sines could not, at the hearing, attempt to carve out the sentence that he would have liked to receive. Mr. Sines also argues that he is not appealing the sentence imposed, but has merely requested modification of his supervised release pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1. Under the plea agreement, Mr. Sines has agreed to waive his right to appeal the sentence “on any ground” or to contest the sentence in any collateral attack. His attempt to dress his collateral attack in the clothing of a modification of supervised release must fail. Allowing him to challenge the sentence in this manner would gut the effectiveness of most waivers of appeal and waivers of collateral attack. Cf. Behrman, 235 F.3d at 1051 (<HOLDING>). Although we hold that Mr. Sines waived the
holding that the rules of contract law are applicable to plea agreements recognizing collateral attack on void order holding that a judgment as to the title in a prior litigation was not subject to collateral attack holding that a general  constitutionalargument exception to waivers in plea agreements would vitiate most waivers of appeal and all waivers of collateral attack recognizing bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over such a collateral attack