drugs. Although Nicole was a potentially .untrustworthy informant, “extensive corroboration may overcome the doubt inherent in relying on an informant without a track record,” United States v. Glover, 755 F.3d 811, 818 (7th Cir. 2014), and Raisbeck was able to confirm several aspects of her story. Before the meeting, Raisbeck had confirmed that Nicole was right about Miller’s nickname, physical appearance, phone number, history of dealing drugs in the Bloomington area, and recent arrival in town by train. By itself Nicole’s proven familiarity with Miller might not have pro vided probable cause, but her knowledge gave Raisbeck a reasonable basis to think that she could prove to be a reliable informant. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 326, 331, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244, 103
holding that in a fifth amendment challenge pjrovided that conduct is of a sort widely known among the lay public to be criminal  a person is not entitled to clear notice that the conduct violates a particular criminal statute it is enough that he knows that what he is about to do is probably or certainly criminal recognizing that when an informant is shown to be right about some things he is probably right about other facts that he has alleged including the claim that the object of the tip is engaged in criminal activity recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel recognizing that an officer must have a reasonable articulable suspicion that the person has been is or is about to be engaged in criminal activity to frisk an individual for weapons and must have probable cause to conduct a further seizure recognizing investigatory stop must be justified by objective manifestation that person stopped is or is about to be engaged in criminal activity