Allegiant does not defend its position that removal was proper based on diversity jurisdiction. 8 . 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). 9 . Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). 10 . Gaus v. Miles, 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). 11 . Id. 12 . Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331). 13 . Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987) (internal citation omitted). 14 . Wayne v. sistent with the Ninth Circuit’s summary of these cases in Gilstrap v. United Air Lines, Inc., 709 F.3d 995, 1006 (9th Cir. 2013). 33 . Id. at 722. 34 . Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8-9, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 156 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003) (<HOLDING>). 35 . Martin, 555 F.3d at 808; 49 U.S.C. §
holding that removal is proper based on complete preemption only when congress intended the federal cause of action to be exclusive holding removal and preemption are distinct concepts erisa preemption does not allow removal unless complete preemption exists holding that there was no federal question removal jurisdiction under the complete preemption exception to the wellpleaded complaint rule holding that dismissal is proper for a derivative cause of action but not for a direct cause of action holding that tension in supreme court cases can be resolved by reading complete preemption as a term of art  a description of the specific situation in which a federal law not only preempts a state law to some degree but also substitutes a federal cause of action for the state cause of action thereby manifesting congresss intent to permit removal