testified that petitioner admitted to engaging in consensual sex with the victim on the night in question. Given the strength of this evidence, the Kansas Court of Appeals found that “it is difficult to believe that the testimony of three or four transient people, some of whom had criminal records, to the effect that Payne was drinking and smoking marijuana with them at the time of the crime would be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors.” Petitioner has failed to proffer clear and convincing evidence to contradict these factual findings. As such, the court cannot find that the state appellate court unreasonably applied the prejudice prong of the Strickland framework to the facts of this case. See United States v. Nelson, 984 F.Supp. 1368, 1872 (D.Kan.1997) (<HOLDING>). While the alibi witnesses might have
holding that to establish prejudice there must be a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different holding that upon remand if the trial court determined that the testimony in a newly discovered evidence claim was reliable the trial court must review that new evidence as well as brady claims that were previously rejected in a prior postconviction motion because the evidence was equally accessible to the defense and there was no reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different had the evidence been disclosed holding that party asserting plain error must show a reasonable probability that but for the error claimed the result of the proceeding would have been different holding that even if attorney had secured defense witnesses  2255 relief was not warranted where the evidence against defendant at trial was so overwhelming that no reasonable probability exists that the result of the proceeding would have been different holding that there is no brady violation unless a reasonable probability exists that the disclosed evidence would have altered the result of trial