the restitution at the rate of [$50.00] per month.” However, despite Yamamoto’s full compliance with these conditions, the sentencing court in 1992 revoked his probation on the grounds that Yamamoto had inexcusably failed to comply with a substantial condition of his probation, ie., had failed to pay the entire $118,000.00 in restitution during his five-year term of probation. In revoking Yamamoto’s probation, the sentencing court in the instant case erroneously assumed that the order to pay $118,-000.00 in restitution was a condition of his probation. In actuality, the restitution order was an authorized free-standing sanction imposed in combination with Yamamoto’s sentence of probation. See HRS § 706-605(1)(d) (1993); State v. Gaylord, 78 Hawai'i 127, 154, 890 P.2d 1167, 1194 (1995) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks, internal brackets,
recognizing that the stated purposes of a contempt sanction alone cannot be determinative holding that the suspension or revocation of a drivers license is not a sanction which once imposed precludes the application of criminal sanctions recognizing that an order of restitution  is available as a freestanding sanction to be imposed alone or in combination with other sanctions holding that where no discovery order was violated sanctions could not imposed pursuant to rule 37 but nevertheless upholding the sanction order under the courts inherent power holding that equitable restitution is available but that legal restitution is not