of the late charge specified in the contract, but rather that the charge should be deemed unenforceable because “it was grossly disproportionate to any damages that may be sustained by the late payment of any cable bill.” Id. at *1. Wells Fargo contends that, as in Hall and Sanchez, there is no dispute in the instant case that the Loan Agreement contained an enforceable obligation that Sundance pay a prepayment premium and that the parties simply disagree as to the calculation of that prepayment. Sundance, however, cites a series of cases for the proposition that Section 725.04 clearly applies to claims to recover overpayments that were unenforceable based on the parties’ contract. See, e.g., Sensormatic Sec. Corp. v. Sensormatic Electronics Corp., 249 F.Supp.2d 703, 710-12 (D.Md.2003) (<HOLDING>); Saglio v. Chrysler First Commercial Corp.,
holding that a clause making payment by the owner an express condition precedent to payment by the general contractor to the subcontractor was enforceable holding that a paywhenpaid clause does not preclude a subcontractors recovery under the miller act payment bond because the federal legislation conditions payment of the subcontractor not on payment by the government to the contractor but rather on the passage of time from completion of the work or provision of materials holding that it was not essential to an action by a supplier on a payment bond under the miller act that a demand be made on the general contractor for payment  although there was evidence in the case from which it could be found that the materialman looked to the general contractor for payment  since the statute does not require a demand for payment but merely requires written notice of the claim holding that the term reverse payment is not limited to a cash payment holding that section 72504 barred application of voluntary payment defense to payment of excessive commissions