issue. The legislature, identifying a state interest in preventing domestic abuse and in protecting family and household members against physical harm, has instituted an expedited judicial process to promote that interest. We have concluded that there is a rational basis in treating domestic abuse situations differently from harassment cases. On the other hand, we have recognized that while HRS § 586-5.5 impinges upon a defendant’s fundamental freedom of movement, that freedom is not unduly infringed or curtailed. Accordingly, HRS § 586-5.5 does not constitute a significant deprivation of a defendant’s freedom of movement, requiring that he or she be afforded the greater protection of a clear and convincing standard of proof. Cf. Addington, 441 U.S. 418, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (<HOLDING>); Thompson v. Yuen, 63 Haw. 186, 623 P.2d 881
holding that civil commitment for any purpose constitutes significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection holding that for an initial civil commitment the state has the burden of proof holding that due process encompasses the right to counsel in a civil contempt proceeding holding that clear and convincing standard is required by due process in a civil proceeding brought under state law to commit an individual involuntarily for an indefinite period to a state mental hospital because civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection holding that in a proceeding to terminate parental rights the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof violates the due process clause and that due process requires at least a clear and convincing evidence standard