the position in question is filled (and by logical extension when the promotion is de facto denied). Egelston v. State University College at Genesco, 535 F.2d 752, 755 (2nd Cir. 1976); Gates v. Georgia-Pacific Corporation, 492 F.2d 292, 294-295 (9th Cir. 1974). Here, however, it is evident that plaintiff did not apply for the newly created position, nor did she even make her interest in that position known to her superiors until almost a year and a half had elapsed from the time the position was filled. That fact alone casts extreme doubt on plaintiff’s ability to make out a prima facie case. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Wright v. Stone Container Corporation, 386 F.Supp. 890, 894 (E.D.Mo.1974), aff’d 524 F.2d 1058 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff contends that the delay in filing
holding fourpart individual job applicant test for establishing prima facie title vii case the same for promotion cases holding that because plaintiff did not apply for a job he could not be rejected in a title vii case holding that there is no individual liability under title vii holding that in title vii disparate treatment case in order for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case the plaintiff must proffer evidence among other things that she performed her job according to her employers legitimate expectations if the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case the presumption shifts the burden to the employer to produce a legitimate nondiseriminatory reason for its actions recognizing that a plaintiffs burden in establishing a prima facie case is not onerous