charge. Even if Ke-kacs’ testimony was as unworthy of belief as the prosecutor tried to demonstrate, that does not in any way lead to the conclusion that Berkowitz was involved in encouraging the witness to testify as he did. In order for improper prosecuto-rial comments to require reversal and remand, the comments must deprive the defendant of a fair trial. See, e.g., Perry v. State, 718 So.2d 1258, 1260 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Cooper, 712 So.2d at 1217. Following the Criminal Appeals Reform Act, the burden of demonstrating prejudice is upon the defendant/appellant. See Barnes v. State, 743 So.2d 1105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), reh’g denied, 743 So.2d at 1109 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). We believe that Berkowitz has carried that burden. See Doherty v. State, 726 So.2d 837, 838 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)(<HOLDING>). Since neither of the K-Mart employees
holding that where the appellant has failed to demonstrate error the court is not required to search the record for an error holding that harmless error test is satisfied when there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction holding that error is considered harmless if it is established beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or alternatively stated that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction holding that where appellant challenges a nonconstitutional error the criminal appeals reform act requires that he demonstrate that there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict holding that a nonconstitutional error is harmless where an appellate court has a fair assurance that the error did not substantially affect the verdict