discriminatory motive.” Gagliardi, 18 F.3d at 194 (citing Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102). Here, plaintiffs state that they were discriminated against because they belonged to a class of “developers” or “commercial landowners.” This will not suffice. For this reason as well, plaintiffs’ section 1985 claim must be dismissed. Because plaintiffs do not state a claim for conspiracy under section 1985, we hold that the Town employees are protected by qualified immunity, and therefore dismiss this claim as to them. See Brown v. City of Oneonta, 106 F.3d 1125, 1133 (2d Cir.1997) (determining that qualified immunity shielded defendants, upon concluding that plaintiffs’ failed to state claim under section 1985(3)). See also Southard v. Texas Bd. of Criminal Justice, 114 F.3d 539, 556 & n. 30 (<HOLDING>). IV. Section 1986 Claim A viable section 1985
holding that plaintiff had failed to state a claim for relief under section 1983 holding that a claim under the equal protection section of section 19853 requires proof of classbased animus holding that a denial of a claim of qualified immunity is an appealable final decision holding that defendant officers were entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law where they relied upon consent of property owner to perform search holding that defendant had qualified immunity under section 19853 claim where underlying claim failed as a matter of law