drug traffickers” enabling their crimes; we described that as “a fully developed argument”); Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d at 1149 (prosecutor repeatedly argued that a conviction “is gonna make you comfortable knowing there’s not convicted felons on the street with loaded handguns”; we described that as an “entire line of argument, made even more indefensible by its repetition”); Mendiola, 976 F.2d at 486-87 (prosecutor argued “[t]hat gun is still out there. If you say not guilty, he walks out right out the door, right behind you”; we described that as “a far cry from a few unwise comments”). Here, the prosecutor’s “no more” mantra impliedly invited the jury to consider community safety, but did not expressly urge them to do so. Cf. United States v. de Cruz, 82 F.3d 856, 862 (9th Cir. 1996) (<HOLDING>). In addition, the vast majority of the
holding that a sentencing court may consider acquitted conduct or uncharged criminal conduct holding that a district court may depart upward based upon based criminal conduct when such conduct is not included in the computation of criminal history category holding that prosecutors statement that crime shouldnt go on was simply a way of saying that defendant had engaged in criminal conduct and should not be permitted to continue that criminal conduct holding that the victims negligence is not a defense to criminal conduct holding that criminal conduct on premises was not foreseeable