potential for future changes in parole policy-whether those changes could favor inmates or burden them. Neither does Coddington’s counsel do so in his appellate brief. Nor are we aware of any such duty or for that matter the practicability of imposing such a duty. Whether it is a State’s views on clemency or parole, both policies are a matter of executive-branch grace, the very flexibility of which defies easy cabining or predictability. See Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 276, 118 S.Ct. 1244, 140 L.Ed.2d 387 (1998) (“The Due Process Clause is not violated where ... the clemency and pardon powers are committed, as is our tradition, to the authority of the executive.”); California Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 507-08, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Under these circumstances, the most that an
holding that a change in parole policies without altering the underlying substantive standards does not violate the ex post facto clause holding that parole guidelines are subject to the ex post facto clause holding that the federal parole guidelines at issue were not laws within meaning of ex post facto clause holding that revocation of medical license does not violate the ex post facto clause holding change in ultimate parole decisionmaker from board to governor does not violate ex post facto clause