to conversion because the court determined that “exemptions must be determined as of the date of filing.” Id. The court explained, ‘“to hold that the conversion date controls exemption eligibility would be tantamount to assuming that conversion creates a new filing date, an assumption that the statutory words preclude.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Williamson, 804 F.2d 1355, 1359 (5th Cir.1986)). See In re Walter, 45 F.3d 1023, 1028 (6th Cir.1995); In re Magallanes, 96 B.R. 253, 255 (9th Cir. BAP 1988); see also In re Heater, 189 B.R. 629, 636 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1995); In re Michael, 183 B.R. 230, 233 (Bankr.D.Mont.1995); In re Schoonover, 147 B.R. 430 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1992) (each holding that the date of the original petition controls exemptions); and In re Marcus, 1 F.3d 1050, 1052 (10th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Given that the statutory directive is clear
holding that the relevant time of inquiry is the date of the filing of the complaint holding that abstention was inappropriate in part because six months elapsed between filing of the federal case and filing of the state case holding that filing of an administrative complaint did not meet the requirement that the employee seek counseling prior to filing holding that where law not facts changed between filing and conversion law in effect on date of filing controls holding that where the violation of the fdcpa was the filing of a lawsuit the statule of limitations begins to run on the date of filing