the trial court here was without authority to grant attorney fees pursuant to OCGA § 13-6-11 on summary judgment, and we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to that extent. Decided June 12, 2013 Jeremy E. Citron, for appellants. Waldon, Adelman, Castilla, Hiestand & Prout, Jonathan M. Adelman, for appellees. Because we agree that a binding agreement was reached but hold that the trial court lacked authority to award OCGA § 13-6-11 attorney fees at summary judgment, we affirm in part and reverse in part. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. Andrews, P. J., and McMillian, J., concur. 1 See OCGA § 44-14-473 (c) (l)-(2) (providing requirements for healthcare-provider lien affidavits to validate a release of a cause of action, which affid 730 SE2d 518) (2012) (<HOLDING>); Penn v. Muktar, 309 Ga. App. 849, 850-51 (711
holding that purported acceptance was a counteroffer when response required additional act of resolving all liens holding that although sellers acknowledgment was not valid acceptance of buyers offer under  22071 buyers subsequent acceptance of and payment for goods along with buyers objection to a particular term within counteroffer constituted assent to remaining terms of counteroffer holding that purported acceptance was a counteroffer when it conditioned settlement upon satisfaction of liens holding that purported acceptance letter was a counteroffer when it conditioned settlement upon additional act of resolving medical liens that were not mentioned in offer holding that purported acceptance was a counteroffer when proposed release contained terms that directly contradicted the demand and letter required execution and return of the release before draft of policy limits could be removed from trust