ability to be gainfully employed, relying solely on the fact that he had previously worked. Moreover, Averbeck attempts to shift the burden of proof to Burkley. Since Averbeck is the party alleging voluntary underemployment, she shoulders the burden of proof. Andrews, 867 So.2d at 478 n. 2. Further, the court must consider disability. Averbeck notes that the VA determined Burkley to be partially disabled, not totally disabled. However, section 61.30(2)(b) does not require total disability; incapacity denotes a lack of physical or mental disabilities. Black’s Law Dictionary at 474, 764 (7th ed.1999) spouse is relevant, but does not absolve the court from having to find the ability to work based on sufficient evidence. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 737 So.2d 641, 643-645 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>). While receipt of dis ability benefits does
holding that court abused discretion in denying alimony where highest salary ever earned by wife was small fraction of husbands current salary holding that determination of causation in permanent disability hearing not barred by estoppel because wlhether an industrial accident caused temporary total disability or permanent partial disability are two distinct questions holding that it was appellants burden to prove that her husbands death occurred in the scope of employment and that she was eligible for widows benefits holding that debtors situation did not have a certainty of hopelessness because his only disability was from a back injury which he attributed a 20 disability rating and a significant problem for the debtor was his negative attitude toward obtaining employment holding that husbands psychological disability from vietnam was outweighed by two decades of merchant marine employment in which he eventually earned over 100000 annually