Id. at 315-16. The question, then, is whether the remedy of reversal, employed in Akins and Bentley, is still viable in the face of the scope of review set forth in Russell and its progeny that we review only BVA decisions and do not perform a full review of the underlying decision(s). We hold that the remedy of reversal is, in fact, still viable today. Since Russell, the Court at least twice has reversed a BVA decision denying a CUE claim when there was no basis whatsoever in the record for a contrary result. Ternus v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 370, 377 (1994) (reversing BVA decision and holding that CUE existed in RO decision that had reduced veteran’s benefits where Court found that “[i]t is clear” that CUE existed therein (citing Olson, infra)); Olson v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 430 (1993) (<HOLDING>). To be sure, in other cases, where the effect
holding vcaa inapplicable to claim that ro decision contained cue holding that prior ro decision that had not become final was not subject to cue collateral attack holding that cue existed in ro decision that had reduced veterans benefits where court found that it is evident that cue existed therein holding that each allegation of cue is separate and must be specifically considered by the board before the veterans court has jurisdiction holding that cue motion is not claim for benefits and that vcaa definition of claimant cannot encompass person seeking revision of final decision based on cue