a year prior to the case being called for trial. No evidence was presented that Wilson’s counsel suffered harm by the court’s refusal to grant the continuance. In light of the action taken by the trial court and the lack of prejudice shown by Wilson, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Wilson’s motion for continuance. We therefore overrule Wilson’s fifth point of error. Admissibility of Wilson’s Statements Evidence supporting Wilson’s conviction included his inconsistent statements, both oral and written, made while he was at the police station. Wilson claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress these statements because they were obtained in violation of Jackson v. Denno. 378 U.S. 368, 376, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964) (<HOLDING>). The trial court’s ruling on a motion to
holding that question of whether a confession was coerced was not to be resolved by considering the truth or falsity of the confession holding that trial judges determination of the admissibility of a confession is based on whether the confession was voluntarily given holding that under elstad the first question that must be answered when determining whether a subsequent confession is tainted by an earlier confession is whether the initial confession was obtained in violation of the defendants fifth amendment rights  ie whether it was involuntary  or whether the confession was voluntary but obtained in technical violation of miranda  holding that admissibility of a confession is governed by determining from the totality of the circumstances whether or not it was made voluntarily holding the determination of the voluntariness of a confession is a determination uninfluenced by the truth or falsity of the confession