in nature, but is instead best understood as a prudential prerequisite to filing a clai “was discharged because of [her] age.” Slone included a slightly more detailed explanation: “I was informed that I was terminated for violation of the Health Information Privacy Act. I believe that I was discharged because of my age, 53, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).” We find this question to be a close one. Because administrative exhaustion does not raise a jurisdictional question under the ADEA, however, we may decline to decide the issue if reaching the merits of Allen’s and Slone’s disparate-impact claim provides a clearer basis for the disposition of the case. See State of Ohio ex rel. Celebrezze v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 868 F.2d 810, 813 (6th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). As discussed below, we conclude that the
holding that the supreme court has final appellate review of agency decisions holding that the court of appeals lacks the authority to overrule decisions of the supreme court of north carolina and has a responsibility to follow those decisions until otherwise ordered by the supreme court holding that this court does not have jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims because the court may review neither criminal matters nor the decisions of district courts holding that because the merits of the plaintiffs underlying claims were sufficiently clear this court did not need to interpret the scope of a supreme court case discussing the reviewability of agency decisions holding that this court need not address the merits of an argument raised for the first time on appeal