Second Agreement without notice and Court approval. However, once again, the issue presented is not whether creditors would have expected Vision to give them notice of the construction of the Assel Mill. The subject of the Second Agreement was the continued servicing of the Assel Mill. As noted above, repairing equipment is done everyday and creditors expect those expenses to be paid in the ordinary course of business. See, e.g., Harrison, 115 B.R. at 599; Morning Star Ranch Resorts, 64 B.R. at 821-22. Vision argues, however, that the Second Agreement also involved the resolution of claims between Vision and Demag that required notice and approval. Fed. R. Bankr.P. 9019. See, e.g., Peltz v. Gulfcoast Workstation Group (In re Bridge Info. Sys.), 293 B.R. 479, 485 (Bankr.E.D.Mo. 2003) (<HOLDING>); In re Leslie Fay Cos., 168 B.R. 294, 305
holding that an unapproved settlement agreement is binding on the parties even though not yet approved by the court holding that because the alleged settlement was never approved by the court under rule 9019 the settlement agreement was unenforceable holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt holding that a settlement agreement in which the parties failed to agree upon the terms of a release was unenforceable