of even a brief detention may be such as to foreclose a finding of voluntary consent” is also instructive. Id. at 90 (footnote omitted) (quoting United States v. Worley, 193 F.3d 380, 387 (6th Cir.1999)). Even seemingly innocuous circumstances such as a brief stop in an airport “make it easy for implicit threats or subtle coercion to exert tremendous pressure on an individual to acquiesce to the officer’s wishes. In such a situation it would be easy to misinterpret acquiescence to an officer’s demands as consent; acquiescence cannot, of course, substitute for free consent.” Id. (quoting United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 596 (5th Cir.1982)). We have similarly recognized the potential for coercion even in brief roadside stops. See State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767, 782-83 (Iowa 2011) (<HOLDING>). In other words, coercion can easily find its
holding that defendants consent to search his person while on board an interstate bus was voluntary even though the police did not tell the defendant of his right to refuse consent holding that a detained defendants consent to search his car was voluntary even though the police did not tell him he was free to leave holding officers request for consent in the squad car without informing pals he was free to leave or warning him regarding his right to refuse consent was coercive holding under state constitution that validity of consent search requires knowledge of right to refuse consent holding that persons knowledge of his right to refuse a consent to search is a factor but not a necessary prerequisite to demonstrating a voluntary consent