v. Starrett, 24 S.W.3d 211, 214 (Mo.Ct.App.2000) (Dowd, J., concurring) (explaining that “life insurance benefits and pensions are often included in property settlements, yet are, by their nature, ongoing and payment may not begin during the ten-year period following judgment”). Here, the trial court’s conclusion Mary Blomdahl should have moved to enforce payment of her ninety percent interest in Russell Blomdahl’s retirement benefits when he had yet to retire and receive any benefits himself reaches a similarly absurd result because it deprives Mary Blomdahl of her interest in the retirement payments before these payments became due. See Jordan v. Jordan, 147 S.W.3d 255, 262 (Tenn.Ct.App.2004) (citing Duhamel v. Duhamel, 188 Misc.2d 754, 756, 729 N.Y.S.2d 601 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2001)) (<HOLDING>); see also In re Weber, 322 Mont. 324, 95 P.3d
holding at least under the facts of the case that the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice action did not begin to run until the plaintiff secured a specific medical diagnosis holding that the statute of limitations for attorney malpractice may begin to run before the plaintiff knows the full extent of his damages holding that the statute of limitations for an attorney malpractice suit did not begin to run until the client had suffered some actual damage holding that a notice of claim period did not begin to run until discovery of the injury holding the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the owning spouse reaches a pay status