her clients’ interests”); Conroy, 845 N.W.2d at 65 (collecting cases and finding a rule 32:3.2 violation when the attorney failed to cure defaults in six appeals); Do-lezal, 796 N.W.2d at 914 (finding a rule 32:3.2 violation when the attorney failed to follow through with or dismiss appeals and disregarded default notices). Although Weiland failed to comply with our appellate procedures in an effort to protect Pierce’s interests, the comments to the rule disclaim such motivation as a. legitimate interest of a client. See Iowa R. Profl Conduct 32:3.2 cmt. [1] (“Realizing financial or other benefit from otherwise improper delay in litigation is not a legitimate interest of the client.”); accord 2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., The Law of Lawyering § 31.03, at 31-4 to -5 (4th ed.2015) (<HOLDING>). Expediting an appeal by meeting deadlines,
recognizing that a clients interest in delay itself is not entitled to weight in assessing the propriety of a lawyers tactics on behalf of the client holding that a district court is entitled to give more weight to the seriousness of the offense than to other factors holding that in determining the propriety of summary judgment credibility determinations may not be made  recognizing that fundamental consideration in assessing the propriety of a prosecutors motion to dismiss is whether the motion is made in good faith holding that the plaintiffs counsel were not entitled to compensation for a seventeenmonth delay in the payment of approximately 11500 in attorneys fees in one matter and a fourteenmonth delay in the payment of approximately 8000 in fees in another matter because the delay itself was not very long and the amount of fees not very high