that he or she possesses all the constitutional and statutory requirements of the office for which the candidate has filed. Subsection (2) clearly requires the petition to be sworn to by the candidate and not less than two registered voters. Subsection (3) requires, by its plain language, the candidate to swear that he meets the requirements for the office. We do not believe the statute should be interpreted as requiring the registered voters to also swear that the candidate meets the requirements of the office. Such interpretation is inconsistent with the language of subsection (3) and does not reflect a liberal interpretation in favor of allowing the candidate (Waterman) to continue on the ballot under these circumstances. See Heleringer v. Brown, Ky., 104 S.W.3d 397 (2003) (<HOLDING>). Rather, we interpret subsection (2) as merely
holding that courts should liberally construe the requirements of rule 3 holding that coas should be construed liberally recognizing the rule of statutory interpretation that laws are to be liberally construed so as to reach a substantially correct result and the court should to every reasonable extent interpret such provisions as directory rather than mandatory holding that statutes should not be interpreted so as to render any of its provisions nugatory holding that election laws should be liberally interpreted so as to allow the candidate to stand for election