acts are more appropriately discussed within our analysis of the doctrine of qualified public official immunity. 18 . Our critique of the analysis performed by the Court of Special Appeals in Rice and Tucker is limited to the court's endorsement of an incorrect test for determining the application of absolute judicial immunity; it does not reach other aspects of those opinions. 19 . In this regard, the position of a eourl-appointed trustee is similar to that of a court-appointed master. We stated in State v. Wiegmann, 350 Md. 585, 714 A.2d 841 (1998), that "[a] master is not a judicial officer, and the Maryland Constitution does not vest a master with any judicial powers.” Wiegmann, 350 Md. at 593, 714 A.2d at 845 (citing In re Anderson, 272 Md. 85, 106, 321 A.2d 516, 527 (1974) (<HOLDING>)). We observed in In re Marcus 405 Md. 221, 950
holding that a reviewing court has the power to reject the findings and conclusions of the trial court where the findings are not supported by the evidence holding that a masters findings do not become binding until approved by a judge of the court to which he reports holding corporate officer liable as aider and abettor in filing of false reports even though reports were not authorized or approved of by officers holding that an unapproved settlement agreement is binding on the parties even though not yet approved by the court holding that findings by the trial judge are considered binding on appeal when supported by adequate substantial and credible evidence