of Rule 803(3). Harmon, ¶ 32. This case deals with the “highly contentious” distribution of Helen’s estate, and Helen’s alleged statements are “out-of-court statements made by the testator regarding his or her testamentary intentions.” Harmon, ¶ 37. As such, Helen’s statements to her attorneys do not contain “comparable circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.” M. R. Evid. 804(b)(5); see Harmon, ¶ 37. The verbal act doctrine does not apply here because the issue is not whether Helen discussed her dispositional intentions with her attorneys—“the existence of statements”—but rather what she told them—“the truth of the matters asserted within [the statements].” Morrow, 236 Mont. at 399, 770 P.2d at 862; see also In re Estate of Mead, 2014 MT 264, ¶¶ 23-24, 376 Mont. 386, 336 P.3d 362 (<HOLDING>). The District Court therefore did not abuse
holding that where plaintiff had possession of a stock certificate and the signature on the certificates was admitted plaintiff was entitled to recover on it unless the other party established a  defect going to the validity of the security ucc 81053c holding that a party failed to meet this burden when he presented no corroborating evidence by the persons who could have given testimony regarding the execution of the deed such as the person signing as witness to his signature and the notary public who subscribed as having notarized his signature or a handwriting expert in support of the contention that his signature to the deed was forged holding that when the possibility is real that an outofcourt statement which implies the existence of the ultimate fact in issue was made with assertive intent it is essential that the statement be treated as hearsay if a direct declaration of that fact would be so treated holding the excluded testimony was relevant to whether a signature was that of a deceased party and since a statement regarding the issue was the only testimony that could be given by the witness no offer to prove was necessary because the substance of the evidence was apparent from the context of the question asked holding that the verbal act doctrine applied to the testators outofcourt statement acknowledging his signature on the will because the existence of that statement was material to determining the validity of the witnesss signature