425.17(d)(1). Thus, Dr. Yamanaka’s statements do not constitute unprotected commercial speech. Id. Second, Mebo has not shown a probability of prevailing on its UCL claims. See id. § 425.16(b)(1). It cannot establish a legally and factually sufficient prima facie UCL claim because Mebo cannot establish statutory standing, Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 17204, which requires economic injury caused by the unfair business practice, see Kwikset Corp. v. Super. Ct. (Benson), 51 Cal.4th 310, 322, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 741, 246 P.3d 877 (2011). Mebo also has not pleaded sufficient facts to survive Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)’s particularity requirement. See Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 317 F.3d 1097, 1106-08, 1110 (9th Cir.2003); see also Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). ■ 3.Because the district court’s grant of Dr.
holding that a plaintiff satisfied rule 9b by pleading which machines were the subject of alleged fraudulent transactions and the nature and subject of the alleged misrepresentations holding that heightened pleading standards of fed rcivp 9b apply to fraud elements of rico claim holding that the fact that federal rule of civil procedure 9b requires a heightened pleading standard for some claims but not for a section 1983 claim against a municipality means that the rules do not require a heightened pleading standard for such a claim holding that rule 9b applies to fca holding that californias ucl claims are subject to rule 9b pleading standards