participation in Wilshire. Albrecht argues he did not know that the June 4 agreement would serve as a release with regard to his counterclaim against Lund. Nonetheless, the express terms of the June 4 agreement acknowledged that Lund was an “owner of record” of Wil-shire, that Albrecht “disclaims any interest” in Wilshire, that Wilshire belongs to Lund, and that Albrecht would make no claim against Lund with respect to Wil-shire. The objective language of the June 4 agreement, not Albrecht’s undisclosed subjective intention regarding the June 4 agreement, is what is legally binding upon the parties. See Brae Transp., Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 790 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir.1986) (applying California law); Edwards v. Comstock Ins. Co., 205 Cal.App.3d 1164, 252 Cal.Rptr. 807, 809 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we hold that the district court
holding that releasors submitted declaration in opposition to summary judgment as to his undisclosed intent was inadmissible to contradict the release holding that grant of judgment was premature where plaintiff submitted properly supported rule 56f request for further discovery in opposition to defendants motion for summary judgment holding that arguments not raised in opposition to a motion for summary judgment are waived holding that claims raised for the first time in an opposition to a motion for summary judgment are not properly before a court holding that defendants failed to raise triable issue of material fact where they did not establish that the type size of the copy they submitted in opposition to summary judgment motion was identical to that of the original contract