service, program or activity is a public entity. Civic Ass’n of the Deaf of New York City v. Giuliani, 915 F.Supp. 622, 634 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (internal citations omitted). NY-CHA does not dispute, that it is a “public entity” within the meaning'of the statute. Because the standards for discrimination against the disabled are interpreted similarly in the Rehabilitation Act, ADA, and FHAA, Plaintiffs’ Disability Rights Statutes claims can be analyzed together. See Toyota Motor Manuf., Ky. Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 193-94, 122 S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002); Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc., 51 F.3d 328, 334 (2d Cir.1995) (noting that Congress relied on Rehabilitation Act standards in drafting the FHAA); Lincoln Cercpac v. Health and Hosp. Corp., 977 F.Supp. 274, 279-80 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (<HOLDING>); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 12133 (West 1995)
holding that secrecy is essential to establishing a violation of massachusetts wiretap act holding that neither the ada nor the rehabilitation act applies to prison employment holding that the requirements for establishing a rehabilitation act violation are similar to those for establishing an ada violation holding that the same standards apply to claims under the ada and under the rehabilitation act holding the ada and the rehabilitation act applicable