of her role”). Plaintiffs key ' argument, though, is that her speech at the October 29, 2014 EMC meeting was of a fundamentally different character than her other expressions, and that it was that event that led Mixner to terminate her three weeks later. Id. at 31. We agree with Mixner that if two years indeed passed between Plaintiffs speech and Mixner’s decision not to reappoint her, Plaintiff cannot show temporal proximity. See Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 512 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that “we have held that such an inference [of causation] could be drawn where two days passed between the protected activity and the alleged retaliation, but not where 19 months had elapsed”) (internal citations omitted); Scrip v. Seneca, 651 Fed.Appx. 107, 111-12 (3d Cir. 2016) (<HOLDING>). But, we consider Plaintiffs contention that
holding that a 17 month time period between the employees protected speech and his termination could not support an inference of causation holding that a two month period might be enough  to prove the causation prong holding that a lengthy delay of approximately a year between plaintiffs reports and her termination does not support an inference she was fired because of the protected activity holding that adverse employment activity that occurred 10 months and 17 months after protected activity was insufficient on its own to create a reasonable inference of causation holding that a threeyear gap between the protected activity and the adverse employment action was insufficient to support an inference of causation