‘that a young black male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun,’ without more, was insufficient to justify a Terry stop”)). Mitchell claims that the description in this case was equally vague, and that we must therefore conclude that it could not give rise to a Terry stop. However, as discussed, the “stop” in this case did not occur until the officers frisked Mitchell, and at that point the officers had a reasonable and articulable suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances, including most notably the fact that Mitchell said he had a gun. Thus, the seizure was not based merely on an anonymous tip with some descriptive information of a sub ject’s readily observable location and appearance. See J.L., 529 U.S. at 272, 120 S.Ct. 1375 (<HOLDING>); cf. United States v. Cohen, 481 F.3d 896 (6th
holding that michigan law provides no substantive right to parole holding that the predecessor to local rule 561b3 provides the only acceptable means of  presenting additional facts to the district court holding that the jones act provides an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction holding that the statute was ambiguous because it provides no definition of the term violation and provides no specific direction as to the proper unit of prosecution holding that an anonymous tip does not establish sufficient indicia of reliability simply because it provides an accurate description of a subjects readily observable location and appearance because such a tip provides no predictive information and therefore leaves the police without means to test the informants knowledge or credibility