that typically accompanies an adjudication of insanity — a stigma that often surpasses that accompanying a criminal conviction’ ” — can be deemed rational. Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Law § 4.5(a) n. 16 (2d ed.1986) (quoting Note, 65 Minn. L.Rev. 927, 945-46 (1981)). Furthermore, this court has already recognized a competent defendant’s right to exert control over his or her defense. See Wood, 648 P.2d at 91; see also United States v. Marble, 940 F.2d 1543,1548 (D.C.Cir.1991) (finding that court should respect competent defendant’s decision not to raise mental illness defense). Therefore, Woodland should not be required to display a heightened level of competency to waive his right to a particular defense. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993) (<HOLDING>). The trial court correctly concluded that
holding that the standard for determining competency to plead guilty is whether the defendant has a rational understanding of the proceedings holding that the state does not have to prove a defendants competency to stand trial holding competency standard for pleading guilty or waiving right to counsel is same as competency standard for standing trial and disapproving contrary holding of masthers holding that competency standard for stand ing trial is same as standard for determining competency to waive right to counsel recognizing that a defense attorneys opinion on the clients competency or incompetency is an important but not dispositive factor for trial court to consider in its competency determination