421; see also Annot., 48 A.L.R. 3d 430, 479, sec. 12(b) (1973).) Harm done to the good will of a business has been recognized as a proper element of consequential damages in actions sounding in contract (Stott v. Johnston (1951), 36 Cal. 2d 864, 871, 229 P.2d 348, 352), and in tort (see Lowrey v. Dingmann (1957), 251 Minn. 124, 128, 86 N.W.2d 499, 502). When a business is sold, its good will can be transferred along with its other assets. (See Mohawk Maintenance Co. v. Kessler (1981), 52 N.Y.2d 276, 283, 419 N.E.2d 324, 328-29.) It follows that, in some circumstances, the good will of a business can be appropriated to another’s use, and a wrongful appropriation of that property right is actionable. Cf. Mohawk Maintenance Co. v. Kessler (1981), 52 N.Y.2d 276, 284-85, 419 N.E.2d 324, 329 (<HOLDING>). Accord, Ranft v. Reimers (1902), 200 Ill.
holding that the seller of a business implicitly transferred a property right in the firms good will to the buyer and that the seller could not then impair that right by actively soliciting the customers of his former business holding that a seller could enforce an arbitration provision against a buyer even though only the buyer had signed the provision holding that broker who represents seller cannot represent buyer in purchase of property from seller without sellers knowledge and consent holding that breach occurred when seller told buyer that seller would do no more to rectify alleged warranty violation holding that a person who obtains drugs from a seller is not an accomplice of the seller