good cause for its decisions. Title VII is not a vehicle for second-guessing business decisions. The employer may take adverse action against an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or no reason at all, so long as its action is not for a discriminatory reason. Price argues that the trial court’s instruction elevates the burden on the plaintiff to establish liability. We hold that the trial court did not commit reversible error by giving the above jury instructions. The trial court’s instruction regarding the binding effect of the EEOC’s findings was not an abuse of discretion. The instruction correctly stated the law regarding the probative value of an EEOC determination. See McClure v. Mexia Indep. Sch. Dist., 750 F.2d 396, 400 (5th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). We have held that the trial court has
holding because defendant does not argue in his brief that these findings of fact are not supported by    evidence in the record this court is bound by the trial courts findings of fact holding that issues of discriminatory intent and actual motivation are questions of fact for the trier of fact holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case holding that although trial courts oral opinion may be used as a reference in the interpretation of its written findings of fact it is not a finding of fact holding that circuit precedent that eeoc determinations and findings of fact although not binding on the trier of fact are admissible as evidence in civil proceedings as probative of a claim of employment discrimination applies in jury trials