passage of time between each group of offenses supports the district court’s determination that three distinct plans to acquire illegal firearms occurred. Wessells additionally argues that the court’s grouping was not based on the nature of the interest invaded as required by Section 3D1.2. He claims that the purposes of the GCA and NFA are so similar that violations of either act implicate substantially the same harm. As we have noted, the district court did group the GCA and NFA offenses together within each of the three separate courses of conduct. At least one appellate court has found, however, that violations of these Acts represent harms sufficiently dissimilar that they need not be grouped together under Section 3D1.2. See United States v. Pope, 871 F.2d 506, 510 (5th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). We cannot say as a matter of law that the
holding that the application of the enhancement for using a firearm in connection with another felony offense is proper only if there is a clear connection between the firearm that was used in the other offense and the one that was used in the offense of conviction holding that the thrust of a section 922g1 offense differs widely from an unregistered firearm offense that has nothing to do with the prior criminal record of the offender holding that a prior conviction ie one for which the civil right to possess a firearm has not been restored is an element of a 922g1 violation holding that period of proscription for firearm ownership under section 922g1 was indefinite holding that in a prosecution for possession of an unregistered firearm evidence of an armed robbery committed with the firearm was admissible