is not divested of jurisdiction to hear and resolve the counterclaim. See rule 1.420(a)(2). Here, Tarragon prevailed on its counterclaim in the arbitration proceedings and its motion to confirm the award with the trial court must be treated in exactly the same manner. That is, Tarragon’s motion to confirm the award on its arbitration counterclaim acted as a counterclaim in the claim of lien action once the motion to confirm was filed and served. To ignore the fact that Tarragon’s motion to confirm the award on its counterclaim was pending would be the antithesis of “indulg[ing] every reasonable presumption to uphold [the arbitration] proceedings.” Miele, 656 So.2d at 473; see also Murphey v. Dean Witter & Co., 392 So.2d 286, 286 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (Anstead, J., specially concurring) (<HOLDING>). Second, the parties stipulated to a stay of
recognizing that appellant originally sought enforcement of arbitration award but later voluntarily dismissed her action after appellee filed its counterclaim but explaining that courts generally favor upholding arbitration proceedings which have resulted in an award citing knight v hs equities inc 280 so2d 456 fla 4th dca 1973 holding that arbitration award is binding on the parties holding the appellate court must presume adequate evidence to support the award when appellant sought to vacate the award based on gross mistake with no transcript of the arbitration proceedings holding that judicial enforcement of arbitration award did not constitute state action triggering due process protection holding that an order remanding an arbitration award is not a final appealable order when the order does not also vacate the arbitration award