defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless. Id. at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. Pullin argues that the district court’s giving the jury an improper dynamite instruction violated his unwaived constitutional rights. Pullin further argues that the court’s failure to inform the jury on the consequences of a deadlocked jury misled the jury, possibly leading it to believe that it must continue deliberations until a unanimous verdict was reached. The state counters that Pullin has failed to demonstrate that the district court’s colloquy 0, 47 S.Ct. 135, 135-36, 71 L.Ed. 345, 346 (1926) (<HOLDING>). While stating that it was mindful that the
holding that the judges inquiry into the jurys numerical division was improper due to the potential dangers of jury polling by relying on the courts supervisory powers holding that the court must consider the adequacy of the inquiry into the conflict the extent of the conflict and the timeliness of the motion holding that where the meaning of the jurys verdict was not clear in light of the trial courts jury instructions the court of appeals erred in directing entry of judgment for respondent the case should have been remanded to the trial judge who was in the best position to pass upon the question of a new trial in light of the evidence his charge to the jury and the jurys verdict holding that the courts inquiry into the reasonableness of the governments proposed corrective action was proper holding that the separationofpowers principle imposes significant limits on the district courts use of its supervisory powers to exclude governments evidence