of the particular words, “an act.” The legislature expressly used the article, “an,” when referring to the requisite act or acts causing serious injury. “ itively singular or plural, looking to the language of the statute does not resolve the ambiguity inherent in section 708.4(1) regarding the proper unit of prosecution. Adding to the confusion is the inconsistency in the language of the criminal code. Other criminal provisions expressly refer to “a series of acts” or “serious injury” caused “in the course” of the crime as the unit of prosecution. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 709.2 (“A person commits sexual abuse in the first degree when in the course of committing sexual abuse the person causes another serious injury.” (Emphasis added.)); State v. Carter, 602 N.W.2d 818, 822 (Iowa 1999) (<HOLDING>). Thus, if the legislature in er applying the
holding that the offense of sexual battery requires the state prove the victims lack of consent regardless of the victims age and charge the jury on the same holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse recognizing that the defendants act of slitting the victims throat was part of a continuous series of acts involving sexual abuse which fell into the statutes reference to in the course of holding trial court was proper in admitting a doctors testimony that a delay between the occurrence of an incident of child sexual abuse and the childs revelation of the incident was the usual pattern of conduct for victims of child sexual abuse holding that although there were six occurrences under the general liability policy there was only one sexual abuse occurrence where sexual abuse occurrence was defined as a single act or multiple continuous sporadic or related acts of sexual molestation or abuse caused by one perpetrator