v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) — the method urged by defendants here in their papers. See id. However, the plaintiff may also establish discrimination directly, in which case the McDonnell Douglas framework is inapplicable. Id. at 550 (citing Greene v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 554, 557-58, 560 (10th Cir.1996)). To prevail using this direct method, a plaintiff must introduce direct or circumstantial evidence that the alleged retaliatory motive “actually relate[s] to the question of discrimination in the particular employment decision, not to the mere existence of other, potentially unrelated, forms of discrimination in the workplace.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted); see also Thomas v. Denny’s, Inc., 111 F.3d 1506, 1512 (10th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Here, both Ms. O’Tool and Mr. Pepper have
holding that when plaintiffs allege classwide racially discriminatory treatment in violation of title vii proof of discriminatory motive is essential although the burden may be met in some situations by presentation of statistical evidence that permits an inference of racial discrimination holding that evidence which suggests but does not prove a discriminatory motive is circumstantial evidence by definition holding that remarks made by decisionmakers could be viewed as reflecting discriminatory animus holding that a causal connection may be established indirectly with circumstantial evidence for example by showing that the protected activity was followed by discriminatory treatment or through evidence of disparate treatment of employees who engaged in similar conduct or directly through evidence of retaliatory animus holding that plaintiff may prove discriminatory motive by presenting evidence of conduct or statements by persons involved in the decisionmaking process that may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged retaliatory attitude 