Defendant asserts that the application of this standard to the case at hand indicates that the district judge should have recused himself, primarily in light of the critical importance of credibility determinations throughout the proceedings. {19} As a practical matter, we acknowledge that the expression of personal opinion about the credibility of a complaining witness and the guilt of a defendant gives rise to question whether the judge could put such opinions out of his or her mind in order to ensure that the defendant received a fair trial on remand. However, authorities establish a presumption that judges will be able to set aside previously-expressed opinions and preside in a fair and impartial manner on remand. See, e.g., United States v. Howard, 218 F.3d 556, 566 (6th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Nelson, 718 F.2d 315, 321
holding that the fact that the judge on remand had presided over the defendants first trial and had expressed the opinion that the victims testimony was highly credible did not support recusal for bias holding the issue of recusal of the trial judge to be preserved for appellate review must be raised in the trial court holding that party who had sought disqualification of the judge who heard his cause only from the assignment judge and not the judge himself could not appropriately raise recusal issue on appeal holding that the fact that a judge had ruled against the defendant is not a basis for finding the judge prejudiced holding that counsel was not ineffective for not filing a motion to recuse the judge who presided at trial when the judge had also prosecuted a prior case that was used to enhance the current case