requirements under UFTA, Gulf and Security nevertheless contend that as a matter of law and of public policy the statute of limitations should not have commenced in this action until they obtained the default judgment against Clark in August of 1997 in California. ¶24 As far as the law is concerned, Gulf and Security vigorously argue under the mistaken assumption that a creditor may not assert an UFTA claim until after the underlying judgment is entered. This persistent assumption represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the law under UFTA. ¶25 Gulf and Security base their theory on our decision in Murphy v. Atkinson (1993), 262 Mont. 164, 864 P.2d 273, as well as a recent appellate court decision from California, Cortez v. Vogt (Cal.Ct.App. 1997), 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 853-54 (<HOLDING>). In Murphy, we determined that a cause of
holding that the twoyear time limitation of rule 3850 does not commence until the sentence becomes final holding that statements and charges by municipality may not be amended in light of legislative purpose of shielding police and similar employees from harassment holding that in view of legislative statements of policy and purpose of the ufta as a cumulative and additional remedy limitation period did not commence until debtorcreditor relationship existed after judgment was made final holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence holding that statements made in the course of negotiation were not contracts and such statements were merged into the final written agreement