were convicted of conspiring to use, carry, or possess a firearm in furtherance of, inter alia, a conspiracy to violate the Neutrality Act and a conspiracy to provide services to the Taliban. 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c),(o); J.A. 3223. Both Count Five and Count Eleven, in other words, ■ expressly allow one conspiracy to serve as the predicate for another conspiracy. Nothing about this statutory framework is unconstitutional, improper, or even unusual. Courts have recognized that one conspiracy can serve as the predicate for another conspiracy when the “[overarching] conspiracy and the predicate conspiracy are distinct offenses with entirely different objectives.” United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1135 (3rd Cir.1990); see also United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 918 (2nd Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208,
holding that two conspiracies existed where the members of the second conspiracy did not know about the first conspiracy did not benefit from the first conspiracy and were connected with the first conspiracy only through a middleman holding that congress intended to allow multiple punishments for rico conspiracies and conspiracies to commit the underlying predicate offense even though the offenses were the same under the blockburger test holding that conspiracies can serve as predicate acts for a rico conspiracy holding that judge erred in not explaining to jury that it could consider predicate acts listed in relation to substantive rico count when deciding whether defendants had also conspired to violate rico recognizing money laundering as a predicate act under rico