(citing Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26, 125 S.Ct. 1254). The court then compares the elements of the crime of conviction with those of the generic offense. Descamps, 133 S.Ct. at 2281. During oral argument, the question was raised as to whether W. Va. Code § 61 — 3— 11(a) is divisible because it states alternative locational elements. See W. Va. Code § 61 — 3— 11(a) (criminalizing entry into a "dwelling house, or an outhouse” (emphasis added)). Neither party briefed this issue, and the district court did not address it below. Moreover, there are no Shepard documents in the record pertinent to Defendant’s West Virginia burglary convictions. We therefore need not and do not reach the question of divisibility to resolve this appeal. See United States v. McLeod, 808 F.3d 972, 977 (4th Cir. 2015) (<HOLDING>). Nor do we express any view as to whether W.
holding that application of the modified categorical approach did not establish a covered conviction where the judgment of conviction did not contain the factual basis for the crime holding that virginia burglary statute comes within definition of generic burglary holding that a conviction under a divisible statute could not qualify as acca burglary pursuant to the modified categorical approach when there were no shepard documents to show that the crime of conviction was generic burglary holding modified categorical approach unavailable where the statute of conviction was missing an element of the generic definition holding that iowa burglary is not categorical burglary as the elements of iowa burglary law are broader than those of generic burglary