between the federal and state standards (an assumption which, in light of Dartt, appears quite reasonable). B Liberty asserts that, because the jury found only pretext, not pretext plus, it could not have acted with the evil motive or intent that the federal standard for exemplary damages requires. This assertion is not unlike Liberty’s due process argument, see supra Part III(B), and suffers the same fate. A jury need not find some special sort of malign purpose in order to exact punitive damages in a disparate treatment case because the “intent” that is necessary to under-gird an award of punitive damages in such a ease is the same “intent” that is required' for a finding of discrimination in the first place. See Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 832 F.2d 194, 205 (1st Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). The Rowlett panel specifically rejected an
recognizing that the state of mind necessary to trigger liability for the wrong is at least as culpable as that required to make punitive damages applicable holding that in order to submit a claim for punitive damages to a jury in a product liability action a plaintiff is required to produce evidence of actual knowledge holding a court may not award punitive damages holding that a hearing on a motion to amend to allege punitive damages is not necessary recognizing the financial position of the defendant as a factor in assessing a punitive damages award