contractor, and further, that it appears that the Gass Court, similarly to the Joseph Court, based its reliance on the Restatements on 1 V.I.C. § 4. See supra at n.15. 20 Kosick v. Bar-Sela, 49 V.I. 3, 6 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2007). While it appears the Supreme Court has not explicitly conducted a Banks analysis to adopt the common law elements of negligence, those have been implicitly adopted in many of its decisions. See, e.g., Brady v. Cintron, 55 V.I. 802, 823 (V.I. 2011). Further, the essential elements of negligence are so widely accepted and fundamental to the practice of law in the United States and the Virgin Islands, that requiring a Banks analysis in this instance would yield the same result. 21 See, e.g., Smith v. Lucky Stores, 61 Cal. App. 3d 826, 828, 132 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1976) (<HOLDING>). 22 See generally 23 A.L.R. 984 (originally
recognizing that restatement second of torts   416 to 429 are often overlapping recognizing that restatement second of torts  323 and 324a correctly state pennsylvania law recognizing kansas courts adoption of restatement second of torts  909 1977 recognizing restatement second of torts  428 but also discussing the inherently dangerous activities standard recognizing tentative draft of restatement second of torts  652e