nuisance claims are expressly preempted by the ICCTA. .. This Court has not had occasion to address a case dealing specifically with the preemption of nuisance claims by the ICCTA. A state-law action is preempted under the Supremacy Clause of the federal Constitution if the intent of Congress to preempt state law is clear and explicit in the statute. English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990). To determine whether Goldth-waite’s nuisance claims are expressly preempted by the ICCTA, this Court must determine whether Congress specifically stated in the ICCTA that regulation of railroad operations and side tracks is reserved to the federal government. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 77 L.Ed.2d 2d 954, 958 (E.D.Wis.2001)(<HOLDING>); Rushing v. Kansas City S. Ry., 194 F.Supp.2d
holding that the iccta preempted statelaw nuisance claim with regard to railway traffic holding that the iccta preempted statelaw negligence and nuisance claims intended to interfere with railroads operation of switchyard holding that the iccta preempted statelaw tortiousinterference claim holding that the iccta preempted statelaw claims alleging tortious interference and seeking punitive damages holding that the iccta preempted statelaw nuisance claim with respect to operation of side track