temporari ly totally disabled. The JCC awarded her TTD benefits “from July 3, 2014 and continuing so long as she remains entitled to same, and subject to the limitations set forth in Section 440.093(3),” which, the JCC ruled, “should be construed as a cumulative period limiting the total number of months of benefits such benefits are payable after an injured worker reaches physical MMI, and not a consecutive month period.” There is no question that the TTD award here is subject to section 440.093(3); the statute applies here because Claimant received impairment benefits. See W.G. Roe & Sons v. Razo-Guevara, 999 So.2d 708 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). But we find error in the JCC’s interpretation of the statute. See, e.g., Lombardi v. S. Wine & Spirits, 890 So.2d 1128, 1129 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (<HOLDING>). In contrast to the JCC’s understanding, we
recognizing that the application of statutory criteria to facts as found by the district court is subject to de novo review recognizing de novo standard of review holding statutory interpretation is subject to de novo review recognizing that the standard of review for issues of statutory interpretation and construction is de novo holding that we review a district courts interpretation of a statute de novo