another corporation as its instrumentality has formed it or is using it to perpetrate a fraud or other injustice or for some other improper purpose. See, e.g., Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Svcs., Inc. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328 F.3d 1122, 1134-35 (9th Cir.2003) (“To satisfy the alter ego exception to the general rule that a subsidiary and the parent are separate entities [for purposes of personal jurisdiction], the plaintiff must make out a prima facie case (1) that there is such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities [of the two entities] no longer exist and (2) that failure to disregard [their separate identities] would result in fraud or injustice.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 926-28 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); United Elec. Workers v. 163 Pleasant St.
holding that parent is liable for acts of subsidiary under agency theory only if parent dominates subsidiary parent of whollyowned subsidiary that had seats on board took part in financing and approved major policy decisions was not liable because parent did not have daytoday control holding that a subsidiary is not an alter ego of its parent even when the corporations are closely tied through stock ownership shared officers financing arrangements and the like recognizing separate corporate identity of parent despite evidence that parent consolidated its profits and losses with that of its whollyowned subsidiary in presenting parents financial reports to shareholders that subsidiary was considered a division of parent and that subsidiary accounted for 60 of parents and subsidiarys combined operations recognizing separate corporate identity of parent despite evidence that parent was alterego of its subsidiary and was being sued for acts of its subsidiary holding that a parents ownership of subsidiary and facts that the same people served as directors of both companies and that a parent was involved in macromanagement and finances of subsidiary did not satisfy first prong of alter ego test and thus the court did not need to reach second prong dealing with equities