of reasonableness, as measured by prevailing professional norms. Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc). We need not “address both components of the inquiry if [Capshaw] makes an insufficient s y in these Sprint Nextel records. Regardless of any subjective expectation (about which we have no evidence), it was unreasonable for Capshaw to assume that information about his cell phone calls could not be made available to the government by the third-party telephone company. See id. at 744, 99 S.Ct. at 2582. (“When he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and ‘exposed’ that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business.”); see also Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 843 (11th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). At Capshaw’s trial, the cell phone records
holding that a customer has no reasonable expectation of privacy in dialed telephone numbers which were conveyed to the telephone company holding that telephone users have no expectation of privacy in dialed telephone numbers because they voluntarily expose such information to the service provider recognizing record supported determination that defendant lacked expectation of privacy in house holding that defendants lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in common area of residential building holding that defendant lacked reasonable expectation of privacy in phone and fax numbers dialed