it alleged, and the jury convicted him of, a breaking with intent to commit a crime of violence.” The state remedied this omission on resentencing, and the proof — the indictment, the conviction, and the victim’s testimony' — establishes a prior conviction of a violent felony. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Mann, 420 So.2d at 581). We affirmed the death sentence. Id. As we did in Mann regarding evidence establishing an aggravating factor (a case with the ultimate stakes for the defendant), we conclude that because a resentencing is a new proceeding, the State may present additional evidence on remand to prove the defendant qualifies for habitual felony offender sentencing. Our decision furthers the purpose of the habitual felony offender statute. See Richardson, 915 So.2d at 88 (<HOLDING>) (quoting Joyner v. State, 158 Fla. 806, 30
recognizing that the purpose of section 775084 is to protect society from habitual criminals who persist in the commission of crime after having been theretofore convicted and punished for crimes previously committed holding that a statute imposing a one dollar court cost for law enforcement on every person convicted of a crime was not a violation of the separation of powers doctrine because it is reasonable that one convicted of a crime should be made to share in the improvement of agencies that society has had to employ in defense against the very acts for which he has been convicted holding for crimes committed on or after october 1 1988 the sentencing guidelines do not apply to habitual offender sentences recognizing that whitehead was decided before section 775084 was amended so that once the defendant meets the definition of a habitual felony offender the trial court is no longer required to provide written reasons for imposing a sentence in excess of the guidelines recognizing that the amendment to section 775084 superseded whitehead and a habitual offender sentence in excess of the guidelines even in the absence of stated reasons for departure is now valid