Cf. City of Midwest City v. House of Realty, Inc., 198 P.3d 886, 891 n. 6 (Okla.2008) (“All public bodies shall give notice in writing by December 15 of each calendar year of the schedule showing the date, time and place of the regularly scheduled meetings of such public bodies for the following calendar year____In addition ..., all public bodies shall, at least twenty-four (24) hours prior to such meetings, display public notice of said meeting, setting forth thereon the date, time, place and agenda for said meeting ...; provided, however, the posting of an agenda shall not preclude a public body from considering at its regularly scheduled meeting any new business.” (quoting Okla. Stat. tit. 25, § 311 (2001)); cf. Grapski v. City of Alachua, 31 So.3d 193, 199 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2010) (<HOLDING>)) Nor is there any restriction contained in
holding that the removal of a public speaker by the mayor at a city commission meeting was not a first amendment violation and thus permissible because to deny the presiding officer the authority to regulate irrelevant debate and disruptive behavior at a public meeting  would cause such meetings to drag on interminably and deny others the opportunity to voice their opinions holding texas open meeting act prohibiting governmental body from conducting closed meetings during which public business or public policy over which the governmental body has supervision or control is discussed to be contentneutral because closed meetings 1 prevent transparency 2 encourage fraud and corruption and 3 foster mistrust in government holding that public meeting did not satisfy public participation requirement because public did not receive adequate notice holding while florida courts have recognized that notice of public meetings is mandatory the preparation of an agenda that reflects every issue that may come up at a properly noticed meeting is not and notice need not be given of every potential deviation from a previously announced agenda the public has the right to attend open meetings but no authority to interfere with the decisionmaking process holding that public meetings held after implementation of final remedial action were not meaningful and that the only public meetings held before remedial action were not meaningful because they did not discuss selection of remedy