his judgment and sentences for aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, aggravated fleeing to elude, possession of cannabis with intent to sell or deliver, and felon in possession of a firearm. He raises six points on appeal. We find no merit to his arguments with the exception of those raised in point'six regarding issues Jones preserved in his motion to correct sentencing errors filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2). First, Jones correctly argues that the habitual felony offender sentencing statute e rida Statutes (2003), should also be stricken because the trial court did not make a finding on the record of Jones’s ability to pay before imposing the fine. See Gonzalez v. State, 939 So.2d 224 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>). Jones also challenges the $65 cost imposed
holding that court not required to find ability to pay before imposing criminal fine holding that where the language of the statute required the imposition of both confinement of which a portion could not be suspended and a fine the court had the ability to impose a fine and then suspend it holding that the statute in effect at that time ie section 7750832b florida statutes 2003 required the court to conduct an inquiry into the defendants ability to pay the fine before imposing it recognizing that because a district courts determination of the appropriate fine involves factual issues including the defendants ability to pay the fine imposedthe district courts calculation of the fine is entitled to deference and can be reversed on appeal only for clear error holding that competent substantial evidence did not support the trial courts conclusory finding that husband had the present ability to pay and noting that the presumption of section 61145a florida statutes is rebuttable