intent to violate the order.”). As noted above, this Court has departed somewhat from that common formulation and has described criminal contempt as “[la] the willful [2a] disobedience toward, or [lb] open [2b] disrespect for,. [3] the rules or orders of a court.” Poindexter, 389 S.W.3d at 117. Although broader, perhaps, than the version limited to willful violations of reasonably specific court orders, we agree with the Cabinet and the dissenting Court of Appeals judge that our version of the contempt elements is likewise limited, as the Supreme Court said, to the “violation of] specific duties ... arising directly from the parties’ participation in judicial proceedings,” not to a party’s duties generally under the substantive law. Cf. Commonwealth v. Nicely, 326 S.W.3d 441 (Ky.2010) (<HOLDING>); Jones v. United States, 560 A.2d 513
holding that standard for revocation of probation is preponderance of the evidence holding that a probationers challenge to a condition of his probation was moot in light of the supreme courts reversal of the underlying conviction and the probationers apparent completion of probation  holding that probationers substantive violation can be the basis of probation revocation but should not be punished as a contempt holding probation revocation is not a stage of a criminal prosecution holding that revocation of probation is merely an extension of a sentencing proceeding