on September 30,1999. She claims that the District Court should have instructed the jury that the statute of limitations did not bar her claim to the extent it is based on this attack. Therefore, she argues, the jury could have properly been left to determine whether the earlier attacks levied against here were a part of a continuing course of violations. We ordinarily evaluate jury instructions under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Fischbach and Moore, Inc., 750 F.2d 1183, 1195 (3d Cir.1984). A district court necessarily abuses its discretion, however, if its instruction “misstates the proper legal standard.” As such, we exercise plenary review over a jury instruction challenged on that basis. Hopp v. City of Pittsburgh, 194 F,3d 434, 440 (3d Cir. 194 (3d Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). Federal law governs the accrual of a § 1983
holding kansas law provides twoyear statute of limitations for  1983 actions measured from date cause of action arose holding that a twoyear statute of limitations applies to negligence claims under texas law holding that a compulsory counterclaim was barred by pennsylvanias twoyear statute of limitations notwithstanding that the plaintiff filed his complaint late in the twoyear limitations period holding that a twoyear statute of limitations period applies to all  1983 actions brought in pennsylvania holding that kentuckys one year statute of limitations period applies to  1983 actions