that because state law would have a ins regardless of whether the plaintiff describes his claim using the term “malicious prosecution”; what matters is whether the claim “in 'essence” complains of conduct that amounts to malicious prosecution under state law. Brooks v. City of Chicago, 564 F.3d 830, 833 (7th Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf Runnion, 786 F.3d at 517-18 (rejecting an argument that the compla dy, J., concurring) (noting, before applying the Parratt-Hudson doctrine to a claim by a plaintiff who had not been convicted, that “[t]he -State must, of course, comply with the constitutional requirements of due process before it convicts and sentences a person who has violated the law”); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (<HOLDING>); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79
holding the prosecutor is required to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury holding that a conviction violated due process because the prosecutor knowingly allowed a government witness to commit perjury holding prosecutor has affirmative duty to disclose material exculpatory evidence holding the government has an affirmative duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to a criminal defendant holding that a conviction violated due process because the prosecutor knowingly refused to disclose crucial exculpatory evidence to the defendant