Potter’s license if the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that she was in actual physical control of her car or had been driving while intoxicated. A.R.S. § 28-1321(A), (K). In Love, the supreme court clarified that “even where a defendant is determined to have relinquished actual physical control, if it can be shown that such person drove while intoxicated to reach the place where he or she was found, the evidence will support a judgment of guilt.” 182 Ariz. at 327-28, 897 P.2d at 629-30. Thus, the safe harbor does not immunize an impaired driver from prosecution for DUI if the state can prove that the person had driven while intoxicated before surrendering control of his or her vehicle. Id.; State ex rel. O’Neill v. Brown, 182 Ariz. 525, 527, 898 P.2d 474, 476 (1995) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 18 Potter told Officer Stant that she had
holding that dui conviction merges with aggravat ed assault by vehicle while dui conviction holding that corpus delicti of dwi is that someone drove or operated motor vehicle in public place while intoxicated holding that to be convicted under dwi statute a person must be driving or in actual physical control of the vehicle but motion of the vehicle is not necessary holding state can obtain dui conviction by proving circumstantially that defendant drove while intoxicated to place where he relinquished actual physical control of vehicle holding that the state had the burden of proving the defendants two prior convictions in order to obtain the felony dui conviction