indicating that the decision to demote and reassign Harmon to one of their Fairfax, Virginia locations was based not on his polygraph test results but instead on the company’s belief that Harmon’s refusal to provide additional information demonstrated a need for increased supervision for a period of 30 to 60 days. See Day Dep. at 71-73; Brar Dep. at 54-61. Defendant’s evidence further indicates that CB Squared executives offered Harmon the option of working at a closer location in Garrisonville, Virginia after he complained that the commute to Fairfax in the mornings was prohibitively long. Brar Dep. at 61-63. Such attempts to accommodate Plaintiffs needs could be construed by the trier of fact as inconsistent with an intent to force Plaintiff to resign. See Holsey, 743 F.2d at 209 (<HOLDING>). In his account of the October 16th meeting,
holding that fraud may be inferred from circumstantial evidence holding intent may be inferred from all facts and circumstances holding that employers intent may be inferred through circumstantial evidence holding that motive is circumstantial evidence of intent holding that an agreement may be inferred entirely from circumstantial evidence