28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 2. Further, although the appellate court identified the three-step inquiry for identifying purposeful discrimination under Batson, it unreasonably applied Bat-son’s third prong in determining that the trial court had fulfilled its duty to determine whether Collins had established purposeful discrimination. See Andrade, 123 S.Ct. at 1174 (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)). It is well-established that “once the prosecutor offers a race-neutral basis for his exercise of peremptory challenges, the trial court then has the duty to determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination.” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 363, 111 S.Ct. 1859 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); id. at 359, 111 S.Ct. 1859 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added); Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106
holding that the burden of proving lack of negligence is on the owner holding that the burden of proving that the employee did not make reasonable efforts is on the defendant holding that the trial court must determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination holding that the defendant bears the burden of proving outside contact with the jury holding that the government must satisfy its burden of proving contract damages