is no dispute that Lin’s second motion to reopen, filed in 2012, was untimely and number-barred because her removal order became final in 2003. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B)(i). Lin contends that the Chinese government’s awareness of her religious activities in the United States, and changed conditions for Christians in China, constitute a material change in country conditions excusing her motion from the applicable time and number limitations. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). We do not reach that issue, however, because we hold that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lin’s motion based on her failure to demonstrate her prima facie eligibility for the underlying substantive relief. See Jian Hui Shoo v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168 (2d Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Contrary to Lin’s assertions, the BIA did not
holding that to establish a violation of due process an alien must show that she was denied a full and fair opportunity to present her claims internal quotation marks omitted recognizing that an aliens ability to secure reopening depends on a demonstration of prima facie eligibility for relief which means she must show a realistic chance that she will be able to obtain such relief internal quotation marks omitted holding that the act of slamming  is objectively sufficiently serious to state a claim for relief under the eighth amendment alterations and some internal quotation marks omitted recognizing that to survive dismissal a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter accepted as true to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face internal quotation marks omitted holding that remand is not required where there is no realistic possibility that absent the errors the ij or bia would have reached a different conclusion internal quotation marks omitted