a Department official when she communicated with the Wheelhouse board. The burden then shifted to Dahly to demonstrate the possible existence of any triable issue that Powell’s conduct violated Dahly’s clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. See Stephens v. Geoghegan, 702 So.2d 517, 526 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (describing the two-step analysis of a qualified immunity defense). Dahly failed to establish the existence of any constitutionally guaranteed right that Powell’s conduct may have violated. In count nine, Dahly contended that his sudden termination violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process right to some form of pre-termination notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542-47, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) (<HOLDING>). A public employee may establish the existence
holding that the elevation of a federal employee who could not be removed without cause to a temporary promotion that could be terminated at any time at the discretion of the agency did not confer a property interest protected by the due process clause in the elevated position holding that a public employee who can be discharged only for cause is entitled to at least some informal due process before he can be terminated holding that plaintiff state employees contract right to be discharged only for cause was not protected by due process clause because it did not rise to level of fundamental right holding that an atwill employee can be discharged for any reason or no reason unless employee is discharged for reasons that contravene a clear mandate of public policy holding that a tenured teacher who can be dismissed only for good cause has a legitimate claim of entitlement to his or her position and may not be deprived of it without due process of law