interpret our murder statute to establish whether a drug delivery crime can form the predicate basis for felony murder if the victim is not linked directly to the drug distributor. At this time, we still save that question for another day. However, it is without legitimate debate that, in Rhode Island, drug-distribution crimes can form the predicate felony for a felony murder charge. See § 11-23-1 (“Every murder * * * committed during the course of the perpetration, or attempted perpetration, of felony manufacture, sale, delivery, or other distribution of a controlled substance otherwise prohibited by the provisions of chapter 28 of title 21 * * * is murder in the first degree.”). As such, Torres’s indictment is valid on its face. See State v. Concannon, 457 A.2d 1850, 1355 (R.I.1983) (<HOLDING>). It is this posture that makes Torres’s
holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a charge on the lesserincluded offense when the evidence showed either the commission of the completed offense as charged or the commission of no offense such that the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser offense holding that we will not grant relief unless the indictment is so obviously defective as not to charge the offense alleged by any reasonable construction holding that an allegation as to the time of the offense is not an essential element of the offense charged in the indictment and within reasonable time limits proof of any date before the return of the indictment and within the statute of limitations is sufficient holding that under the particular facts alleged in the indictment vehicular homicide was a lesser offense included in the murder charge holding that where the date of the offense is not an element of the charge  a variance between the indictment date and the proof at trial is not fatal so long as the acts charged were committed within the statute of limitations period and prior to the return date of the indictment