administrative claim specifically included a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and was based on the same underlying conduct that supported their amended complaint. Because we conclude plaintiffs’ administrative claim provided the government with sufficient notice of their intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the district court did not lack jurisdiction under § 2675(a) of the FTCA. B. Misrepresentation Exception The second issue on appeal involves the FTCA’s intentional torts exception. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). If a claim against the government falls within an exception to the FTCA, the cause of action must be dismissed for want of federal subject matter jurisdiction. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 31, 73 S.Ct. 956, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953) (<HOLDING>), partially overruled on other grounds by
holding that where discretionary function exception of  2680a applied district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over cause of action holding that there was no federal subject matter jurisdiction under the private cause of action provision of the act holding that the discretionary function exception may apply in the absence of a conscious decision  recognizing a discretionary function exception to that waiver holding that a federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that effectively sought review of an indiana state courts decision