no time remained in the limitations period when Banks filed his original petition, dismissal without prejudice would not benefit Banks. A recent Supreme Court case has clarified how district courts should treat unexhausted habeas claims. Under its guidance, we remand this matter to the district court. After Duncan, this court and sister circuits concluded that the statute-of-limitations concerns resulting from the enactment of AEDPA required a modification of Lundy’s rule: district courts confronted with a mixed petition containing potentially meritorious, unexhausted claims, should stay the petition and hold it in abeyance pending prompt exhaustion of state remedies, rather than dismissing the petition without prejudice. See Griffin v. Rogers, 308 F.3d 647, 652 & n. 1 (6th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Duncan, 533 U.S. at 182-183, 121 S.Ct. 2120
holding that a district court faced with a mixed petition should dismiss only the unexhausted claims in the habeas petition and stay further proceedings on the remaining portion until the petitioner has exhausted hisher remedies in state court holding that a district court faced with a mixed petition should stay the unexhausted claims pending exhaustion rather than dismiss them without prejudice for the same purpose it is preferable to stay proceedings pending exhaustion holding that insurance guarantee association stay statute did not suspend limitation period because action was not pending when stay was entered holding that such a stay is appropriate where in the absence of a stay the continuation of the proceedings in the trial court disrupts the arbitration proceedings and can render them ineffective holding that it was an abuse of discretion for a district court not to stay an exhausted petition pending exhaustion of a newly discovered claim