into the shoes of the prior mortgagee. See Lamb Excavation, Inc. [v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 208 Ariz. 478, 481], 95 P.3d [542,] 545 [ (Ariz.Ct.App.2004) ]. Critics of the majority view contend it fosters willful ignorance by encouraging prospective mortgagees to forgo conducting title searches so that they might later claim lack of actual knowledge. See Houston, [119 Nev. at 488,] 78 P.3d at 73. “Unlike the majority view, a minority of jurisdictions hold that either actual or constructive knowledge of an intervening lien bars equitable subrogation. See Kuhn v. Nat’l Bank of Holton, 74 Kan. 456, 87 P. 551, 552-53 (1906). This approach has been criticized as obviating the doctrine completely. See Capitol Nat’l Bank [v. Holmes], 43 Colo. [154,] 160, 95 P. [314,] 316 [ (1908) ] (<HOLDING>); see also Kim [v. Lee, 145 Wash.2d 79, 98], 31
recognizing the longstanding rule that insurers may not apply equitable subrogation against their insureds holding that the statute of limitations cannot bar appellants claim that a constructive trust should be imposed  because a constructive trust is an equitable remedy and therefore not subject to the statute recognizing equitable subrogation recognizing constructive trust as appropriate equitable remedy recognizing that because a debt must always be recorded in order to attach as a lien constructive notice will always preclude equitable subrogation except when  unnecessary and unimportant