him of the charges, or reject this explanation as not credible and find him guilty. Because so much hinged on the jury’s view of Vaghari’s credibility, the prosecution was justified in emphasizing credibility issues in its arguments to the jury. Nor is the number of references to “lies” or “lying,” standing alone, proof of prose-cutorial misconduct. This is especially true here, where the government gave a three and one-half hour opening summation and an hour-long rebuttal. In the context of this marathon argument, the government’s remarks about Vaghari’s credibility were neither pervasive nor ov erly repetitious, and the sheer number of times the word “lies” was mentioned cannot be viewed as indicative of improper argument. See United States v. Rude, 88 F.3d 1538, 1548 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, these repeated references to “lies”
holding that isolated statements of judge viewed in the context of a fourteenday trial did not support a claim of bias holding prosecutors statement that defendants testimony was outandout lies not improper because not excessive or inflammatory holding that the court does not have jurisdiction over an action contesting the denial of a protest filed more than ninety days after notice of liquidation holding that a prosecutors use of the words lie lies or lied over 90 times when referring to the defendants in its closing argument was within the boundaries of proper  summations holding that prosecutors use of the words lie lies or lied more than ninety times was not improper when viewed in the context of the monthlong trial