it from other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause.”) Crawford did not spell out a comprehensive list of “testimonial” statements but noted that they include (1) “ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent,” such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony made without cross-examination, and “similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially”; (2) extrajudicial statements contained in formalized testimonial materials; and (3) “statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.” 541 U.S. at 51-52, 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (<HOLDING>); see Davis, 547 U.S. at 827-28, 126 S.Ct. 2266
holding that a statement given after miranda warnings have been administered may be inadmissable when police have elicited a previous unwarned statement during a custodial interrogation holding recording of eyewitnesss inculpatory statement made in custodial interrogation testimonial in nature holding that whether a statement made in response to interrogation is testimonial depends on whether the objective purpose of the interrogation was to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution or to meet an ongoing emergency holding that refusal to submit to breathalyzer test did not result from custodial interrogation holding that an officers hearsay statement was not cumulative to the eyewitnesss testimony where the officers statement provided the only evidence of a possible motive for the shooting and where the officers statement was based on his own observations not the eyewitnesss observations