from prudential limitations on standing. For the reasons that follow, I conclude that Congress has demonstrated no such intent and that the language of Title III therefore erects a prudential barrier preventing ERC from establishing organizational standing. Federal courts are in agreement that the language of Titles I and II of the ADA, which grant a remedy to “any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability,” signifies a “congressional intention to define standing to bring a private action ... as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution,” thereby eliminating prudential standing limitations. Innovative Health Sys., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 37, 47 (2d Cir.1997); see also A Helping Hand, LLC v. Balt. Cnty., 515 F.3d 356, 363 (4th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); AvalonBay, 2009 WL 1153397, at *7, 2009 U.S.
holding that prudential limitations on standing do not apply to title ii ada claims holding that title ii does not apply to the states holding that georgias statute of limitations for personal injury actions should be applied to discrimination claims brought under the rehabilitation act and title ii of the ada holding that title ii of the ada was a valid use of congress power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment holding that title ii of the ada is not applicable to the federal government