than during a trial, Burke’s right to confront the witnesses against him physically was not implicated. Unlike in cases where the defendant is present only via video-conferencing, Burke was in the courtroom, physically facing the witnesses, and it was only the judge who was remote. The other constitutional foundation of the right of defendant to be present is the Fifth Amendment Due Process clause, and the Supreme Court has held that this clause guarantees “that a defendant be allowed to be present ‘to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence[.]’ ” Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 108, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934)); see also id. at 745-46, 107 S.Ct. 2658 (<HOLDING>); Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. 1482
holding that no hearing was required where there were written reports supporting defendants competency holding that the due process rights of an unadmitted alien barred from entry on security grounds were not violated when he was excluded from the united states without a hearing holding confrontation right not violated by exclusion of defendant from competency hearing of child witnesses where defendant had opportunity for full and effective crossexamination at trial holding that due process requires a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case holding that due process guarantees were not violated where a defendant was excluded from a witness competency hearing and noting that the hearing did not concern the witnesses substantive testimony