statute, including § 18.1-215, the statute under which Silver was charged. Although not directly raised by Silver, the Court further notes that application of the recent complaint hearsay exception to § 18.1-215 does not raise an ex post facto concern. On brief, Silver indirectly presents an ex post facto argument, claiming that § 18.1-215 of the Code of Virginia is not one of the exceptions delineated in § 19.2-268.2. (Memo. Opp. Mot. in Limine 2-4.) The applicability of the relevant hearsay exception is a mere procedural change that “does ‘not increase the punishment nor change the ingredients of the offense or the ultimate facts necessary to establish guilt’.” Pilcher v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 158, 163, 583 S.E.2d 70, 72 (2003) (quoting Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 590 (1884)) (<HOLDING>); see also Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 51 Va.
holding that application of the rape shield law to a case in which the underlying events occurred prior to the enactment of the rape shield law was not a violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws holding that the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws applies only to penal statutes which disadvantage the offender affected by them holding that the rape shield statute affects the use of character evidence to impeach witnesses  and is therefore procedural in nature holding that the retroactive application of a statute authorizing the assessment of a cost to a defendant who committed the felony pri or to the statutes enactment did not violate ex post facto laws holding that a rape shield statute was not ex post facto when it barred evidence of a prior sexual relationship that was admissible before enactment of the statute