bag with the other) was the “longest” ten seconds of her life. To the extent the jurors interpreted this idiom to necessarily imply fright, they had the discretion to ignore Callahan’s testimony to the contrary. It is altogether possible, therefore, that the jurors dismissed Callahan’s claim about not being “frightened” as an after-the-fact exaggeration by a “very outspoken individual”— a boast of sorts, offered from the point of view of courtroom hindsight. See generally Montague v. Commonwealth, 40 Va.App. 430, 436, 579 S.E.2d 667, 669 (2003) (noting that a factfinder need not decide between rejecting or accepting a witness’s testimony in full, but may find it credible in part and incredible in part); see also Barrett v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 102, 107, 341 S.E.2d 190, 193 (1986) (<HOLDING>). We cannot discern, of course, which scenario
holding that the defendants unconstitutionally obtained statements to the police telling them that narcotics were located in the hood of his truck did not render the narcotics inadmissible because the police were trained to look under the hoods of vehicles when searching for drugs and therefore would have found them even had the defendant not directed them to look under the hood holding that where petitioners did not simply challenge the validity of their orders of removal but had questioned whether the statute grants the ins authority to remove them to a country that cannot accept them the court of appeals retains jurisdiction recognizing that jurors should be protected from being harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict holding that assumption of jurisdiction by the state court would infringe upon the right of reservation indians to make their own laws and be governed by them recognizing that jurors have the right to reject that part of the evidence believed by them to be untrue and to accept that found by them to be true