challenges de novo. Soadjede v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 830, 831 (5th Cir.2003). First, Reyes-Gomez claims that, if removed to the Dominican Republic, he is likely to be injured or killed; and that this would violate his right to substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment. In support, he relies on the state-created danger doctrine, which has never explicitly been adopted by this court. Scanlan v. Tex. A&M Univ., 343 F.3d 533, 537 (5th Cir.2003). Under this doctrine, due process is violated when state actors: (1) “use[ ] their authority to create a dangerous environment for the plaintiff’; and (2) “act[] with deliberate n the light of INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001). That decision, however, did not overrule Cortez. Id. at 324, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (<HOLDING>). Further, post-Sf. Cyr, numerous courts have
holding that under permanent rules of hrira the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction over claims of aliens ordered deported for crimes listed in ina and holding that district courts retain habeas jurisdiction over deportation orders of criminal aliens holding in the context of a non  212c iirira retroactivity challenge that if reliance were required we would insist at most upon objectively reasonable reliance and not subjective reliance holding that the presumption against retroactivity applies far beyond the confines of the criminal law and the  mere statement that deportation is not punishment for past crimes did not preclude its considering an aliens reasonable reliance on the continued availability of discretionary relief holding that reasonable reliance is not an element of the defense holding that the failure to notify aliens counsel of an order to appear for deportation violated the aliens statutory right to counsel