Homes, Inc., 518 So.2d 922, 923 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (excessive rain); Camacho Enters., Inc. v. Better Constr., Inc., 343 So.2d 1296, 1297 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (heart attack). The court then concluded that the force majeure clause rendered Paradigm’s obligation illusory under the Disclosure Act because the clause excuses delays that would “not qualify under Florida’s impossibility of performance principles.” Neither the district court nor the Steins have explained why the standard of legal impossibility should be the measure of obligation under the § 1702(a)(2) exemption — why any force majeure clause that extends beyond legal impossibility renders a contract non-exempt. This force majeure clause covers events that may or may not happen, but whether they do , 1333 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (<HOLDING>). Nor does the clause make the two-year duty
recognizing the fundamental principle of contract law and florida law that an obligation is illusory when it appears on its face to be so insubstantial as to impose no obligation at all holding party in breach could not maintain suit for breach of contract holding that there must be a tort distinguishable from or independent of the breach of contract in order for a party to bring a valid claim in tort based on a breach in a contractual relationship holding government could be liable for breach of a contractual obligation to purchase insurance for plaintiff recognizing that a contractual provision renders an obligation illusory when it allows a party to breach with impunity