held that a prisoners liberty interest is implicated only when government action “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293. It was the First Circuit’s view that transfer to more restrictive conditions did not impose an “atypical” hardship: the conditions were “no different from those ordinarily experienced by large numbers of other inmates serving their sentences in customary fashion.” Id. at 1160; see also Lyle v. Sivley, 805 F.Supp. 755, 760 (D.Ariz.1992) (finding that notwithstanding the dictates of § 8624(c), an inmate had no constitutional liberty interest in transfer to a less restrictive environment) (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (<HOLDING>)). A prisoner cannot level a due process
holding that a prisoner has no constitutionallybased liberty interest in a particular prison classification  because an inmate is not entitled to a particular degree of liberty in prison recognizing the individuals interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters holding that the inmate had no cognizable due process claim because he had no liberty interest in being free from disciplinary segregation holding that vdocs interstate transfer regulations are routine and create no liberty interest in any transfer holding that an inmate had no liberty interest in avoiding transfer to a more restrictive facility