(or seven, which carries the same base offense level of 32, see USSG § 2D1.1(c)(4) (base offense level 32 applies to quantities of at least five but less than fifteen kilograms of cocaine)). But perhaps he is hable for only the one kilogram that was exchanged. Accordingly, as required by § 2255, the District Court should hold “a prompt hearing” to “determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law” on whether there is a reasonable probability that, had he received effective assistance of counsel at his original sentencing, Smack would have established that he was entitled to a shorter sentence. The reasonable probability of any decrease in Smack’s sentence would establish prejudice. See Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 121 S.Ct. 696, 148 L.Ed.2d 604 (2001) (<HOLDING>). The remedy, in turn, would be to resentence
holding that any reduction in sentence constitutes substantial prejudice for purposes of strickland analysis holding that a permanent change in income constitutes a substantial change in circumstances justifying a reduction of alimony holding that it is error to engraft onto the prejudice branch of the strickland test a requirement that any increase in a sentence must meet a standard of significance holding that in defining the reasonable probability language in strickland with more precision substantial possibility describes the prejudice standard in strickland holding petitioner demonstrates actual and substantial prejudice by proving a claim under strickland