clear absence of all jurisdiction when the judge enters an order at least colorably within the jurisdiction of h[is] court.” Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 771 (3d Cir.2000). Judge Mellon was the presiding judge in the cause of action involving the Funches’ son. The alleged order to reject the Funches’ pleadings cannot be said to be in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction,” even if the order was done out of “malice or corruption of motive.” See id. at 772. Accordingly, Judge Mellon was eligible for judicial immunity for this order. See' id. And because Judge Mellon was judicially immune from suit, the court personnel who carried out his facially valid order are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. See id. at 772-73; Kincaid v. Vail, 969 F.2d 594, 601-02 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the claims against the court personnel
holding that the clerk who refused to accept filing of complaint at the direction of the judge was entitled to quasijudicial immunity holding by a 21 vote that an ohio probate judge was entitled to absolute immunity for filing a criminal complaint holding county clerk sued in official capacity was entitled to the immunity the county enjoyed holding that quasijudicial immunity extends only to officials who perform discretionary functions holding that the relevant time of inquiry is the date of the filing of the complaint