in two pre-2007 “hand-to-hand sale arrests.” (Nesser Deck Ex. A at 14-15). As the Government later conceded, one of these arrests did not involve crack cocaine, and the Court struck the other arrest from admission at trial because the evidence tying Ortiz to the sale was so weak. Ortiz now moves for dismissal of the Indictment based on Special Agent Kolvek’s “incorrect and conclusory testimony.” The motion is denied. Even assuming the testimony was inaccurate, “[i]t is well settled that a guilty verdict at trial ‘remedies any possible defects in the grand jury indictment.’ ” United States v. Lombardozzi, 491 F.3d 61, 80 (2d Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Eltayib, 88 F.3d 157, 173 (2d Cir.1996)); United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 73, 106 S.Ct. 938, 89 L.Ed.2d 50 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Ortiz responds to this line of cases by
holding that district court could not decide after jury returned verdict to treat jury verdict as advisory on issue not triable of right by jury but which was tried by consent of parties to nonadvisory jury holding that a jury verdict of guilty constitutes a conviction for purposes of the federal firearms statute and therefore the defendant was convicted of a felony during the interval between the jurys return of its guilty verdict and his scheduled sentencing holding that right was available in grand jury proceedings holding the trial court erred in ordering the transcription of grand jury proceedings so that it could intervene in the operations of the grand jury holding that the societal costs of retrial after a jury verdict of guilty are far too substantial to justify setting aside the verdict simply because of an error in the earlier grand jury proceedings