created by the alleged misstatements.’ As the Court of Appeals has noted, ‘[t]he truth on the market defense is intensely fact-specific and is rarely an appropriate basis for dismissing a § 10(b) complaint for failure to plead materiality.’ Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier Inc., 2005 WL 2148919, *6 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (citations omitted). To be sure, there has been some debate regarding the applicability of the fraud-on- the-market presumption to analyst cases, albeit in a different context, namely, class certification pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23. See, e.g., Hevesi v. Citigroup Inc., 366 F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir.2004) (granting petition for interlocutory appeal to review this “novel question”); Fogarazzo v. Lehman Bros. Inc., 232 F.R.D. 176, 185 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (<HOLDING>); DeMarco v. Lehman Bros. Inc., 222 F.R.D. 243,
holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact holding that estoppel was a question of fact holding that it is not holding that plaintiffs need not offer evidence that analyst reports actually distorted market price because it is a question of fact holding it is a question of fact