possession” instruction. Moreover, the trial court’s instructions defining “knowingly” and “possession” adequately and accurately explained the level of conscious control over the firearm and the ammunition required under the law. For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury regarding a “temporary innocent possession” defense to the possession of a firearm. B. Conduct of Trial Judge We review a district judge’s conduct during trial for an abuse of discretion as well. See United States v. Verbitskaya, 406 F.3d 1324, 1337 (11th Cir.2005) (citing United States v. Cox, uld not apply to the cases that have been presented to them, based on the facts as developed at trial. See United States v. Williams, 389 F.3d 402, 405 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Paul, 110 F.3d 869, 872 (2d
holding that the defendants possession of the firearm was not so fleeting as to warrant an instruction on temporary innocent possession holding that possession was not so fleeting as to extend the statute beyond its arguable limits holding that trial court acted properly in refusing to give jury instruction on fleeting possession theory recognizing innocent possession defense to a charge of criminal weapons possession holding that to apply the firearm enhancement the firearm need only reflect the context of the defendants possession and the defendants ability to use the firearm to promote the controlled substance offense