(suggesting, without citing supporting legal authority, that there is a "distinction between a religious practice which is a positive expression of belief and a religious commandment which the believer may not violate at peril of his soul” in the context of prisoners' free exercise claims). 33 . In 1990, a divided panel of our Court suggested in dictum — in a case that did not involve a Free Exercise Clause claim, and without citing Widmar — that public schools have "a compelling interest in maintaining the appearance of religious neutrality” in their classrooms, and that this interest, even if not required by the Establishment Clause, might outweigh public employees' free exercise right to wear religious garb. United States v. Board of Education, 911 F.2d 882, 889 (3d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). The opinions cited in support of this
holding that the timely filing of an eeoc charge pursuant to  706 of title vii 42 usc  2000e5 did not toll the statute of limitations for an action brought on the same facts under 42 usc  1981 holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 holding that the doctrine of qualified immunity does not protect a government official who is sued in an official capacity under title vii because title vii does not impose personal liability holding that title vii does not require public schools to allow teachers to wear religious garb as this would impose an undue hardship on the schools under 42 usc  2000ej holding that plaintiffs claims under 42 usc  1981 are also governed by the special venue provision of title vii