of removal). 18 . Cf. Baeta, 273 F.3d at 1264 ("Under the circumstances presented, transfer of the portion of the habeas petition [that could have been raised on direct review] to this Court is appropriate.” (emphasis added)). 19 . Under the FFOA, a successfully completed deferred adjudication could not be considered “a. conviction for the purpose of a disqualification or a disability imposed by "law upon conviction of a crime, or for any other purpose.” 18 U.S.C. § 3607(b). 20 . In Moosa, we found that the first prong of § 1101(a)(48) was met because Texas law states that a judge may enter a deferred adjudication “after receiving a plea of guilty or plea of nolo contendere, hearing the evidence, and finding that it substantiates the defendant's guilt.” Moosa, 171 F.3d at 1 (1971) (<HOLDING>). 25 . See, e.g., Harper, 509 U.S. at 97, 113
holding that a decision to limit a new rule of criminal constitutional law to prospective application can be based on a balancing of the purpose of the new rule the reliance placed on the previous view of the law and the effect on the administration of justice of a retrospective application holding that in context of patent claim at issue if means only if holding that in the federal noncriminal law context a judicial decision can be applied nonretroactively if it established a new principle of law if such a limitation will avoid substantial inequitable results and if retrospective application will not retard the purpose and effect of the new rule holding that simmons announced a new rule and retrospective application of the rule was barred by teague holding that if the contract can be given a definite and certain meaning or interpretation the contract is not ambiguous and will be construed by the court as a matter of law