is raised in a 60-1507 motion, as here. This view holds some support in Kansas law. Kansas case law ... plainly holds that constitutional challenges to presumptive sentences under the KSGA cannot be reviewed on direct appeal and must be raised in post-conviction proceedings under K.S.A. § 60-1507. Id. at 7-8 (citing State v. Lewis, 27 Kan.App.2d 134, 140-42, 998 P.2d 1141 (Kan.Ct.App.) (“[Because the issue is not one that could have been presented on direct appeal, it necessarily is one whose only chance of review is by collateral attack, i.e., a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.”)), rev. denied, 269 Kan. 938 (Kan.2000). Hopper v. Cline, 2011 WL 6372960, *3 (D.Kan.2011). See State v. Mitchell, 45 Kan.App.2d 592, 605, 252 P.3d 586 (2011); State v. Lewis, 27 Kan.App.2d 134, 998 P.2d 1141 (2000) (<HOLDING>). And here, the KCOA addressed this claim on
holding cruel and unusual punishment complaint not preserved holding the constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment may be waived holding that the claim of not being able to interview jurors was procedurally barred because the claim should and could have been raised on direct appeal holding defendants claim that the presumptive sentence was cruel and unusual punishment was statutorily barred from being considered on direct appeal but could be raised in a postsentence collateral attack holding that a cruel and unusual punishment claim is not jurisdictional and therefore may not be raised for the first time on appeal