and quiet that Congress intended to protect,” id. at 326, the Court finds that she has failed to establish that the injury she complains of “falls within the zone of interests sought to be protected by the statutory provision whose violation forms the legal basis for [her] complaint,” Davis by Davis, 121 F.3d at 98 n. 8 (internal quotations and emphasis omitted). See, e.g., Maiden Creek Assocs., L.P. v. United States DOT, 123 F.Supp.3d 638, 649 (E.D.Pa.2015) (noting that courts have held that plaintiffs “whose sole motivation ... was their own economic self-interest and welfare” were not within the zone of interests to be protected by the National Environmental Policy Act) (internal quotations omitted); Cellco P’ship, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64407, at *17, 23, 2012 WL 1638066, at *8 (<HOLDING>); cf. Anderson, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51368, at
holding that a district court may not disregard the fccs final orders simply because congress did not specifically grant the fcc express authority to regulate a specific subsection of the tcpa holding no coverage for tcpa claims under similar policy exclusion where violations of the tcpa were not explicitly excluded by name but rather were excluded because the exclusion applied to violations of any statute  that  addresses  the sending transmitting or communicating of any material or information   holding that the plaintiffs did not fall within the zone of interests protected by the tcpa because they attempted to use the statute in a way not intended or contemplated by congress and because their damages are not of the vexatious and intrusive nuisance nature sought to be redressed by congress in enacting the tcpa holding that the plaintiff did not have standing because it was not able to demonstrate how its economic interests fell within the zone of interests protected by the nhpa holding the defendant does not possess statutory standing to attack the subpoena  because he has not demonstrated that he was within the zone of interests intended to be protected by  876a