long as the government is attempting to help its citizens, Guerrero cannot establish that a public official or other person acting in an official capacity would acquiesce in his torture at the hands of the cartel. We have recognized, however, that the “awareness” prong of acquiescence can be met by a showing that some elements of the government are in a collusive relationship with the torturers—even if the government generally opposes the groups. See, e.g., Pieschacon-Villegas v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 303, 312 (3d Cir. 2011) (remanding to determine, inter alia, whether petitioner could establish acquiescence despite evidence that the Colombian government had made efforts to demobilize the FARC and AUC and control corruption); Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 351 (3d Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>); Silva-Rengifo, 473 F.3d at 69-70 (rejecting
holding that a parent company would at the very least have to have been deliberately blind to its subsidiarys fraud in order to have the requisite scienter recognizing as a general matter that official immunity would protect official decisions to investigate suspected fraud in the administration of government contracts holding that fraud may be inferred from circumstantial evidence holding that such circumstantial evidence may be used to prove discrimination holding that two government representatives each telling the petitioner that there was nothing they could do to protect her from the farc may be circumstantial evidence that the colombian government was willfully blind to such treatment and that to pursue official assistance would have been futile