fair dealing claim. As an initial matter, we note that the parties dispute whether this issue was properly preserved for appeal. Assuming without deciding that the issue was preserved, we find unpersuasive PH’s contention that it was a “prevailing party” below. Courts, both in Massachusetts and elsewhere, have uniformly required that a party succeed on a significant issue in order to be entitled to attorneys’ fees. See, e.g., Handy v. Penal Insts. Comm’r of Boston, 412 Mass. 759, 592 N.E.2d 1303, 1307 (1992) (requiring that party in civil rights case “succeed[] on a significant issue” to be entitled to attorneys’ fees); Fedele v. School Comm. of Westwood, 412 Mass. 110, 587 N.E.2d 757, 761 (1992) (same). See also Farrar v. Hobby, — U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 566, 569, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Texas State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep.
holding that when plaintiff has proven injury but has failed to prove the amount of damages the plaintiff is only entitled to nominal damages holding that district court erred in awarding attorneys fees in civil rights action where plaintiff only recovered 1 in nominal damages holding that when a civil rights plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief the only reasonable attorneys fee is usually no fee at all citation omitted holding that the fee applicant bears the burden of showing that  an adjustment is necessary to the determination of a reasonable fee  holding that petitioner had failed to exhaust alternative remedies for review of his fee agreement because the ssa notified petitioner he could obtain his fee by filing a fee petition