and no provision in the document suggests that it is final or intended to be immediately implemented. As such, unlike the September agreement between Yae-kle and Andrews, the document here does not satisfy the exception made for final, written, fully executed agreements provided for in section 18-22-802(2.5). It therefore remains protected as confidential under section 307 of the Dispute Resolution Act. Absent that document, we are left with a slim record on which to perform a common law contract analysis. There is nothing to suggest the terms of any agreement; rather there are only Chotvacs's actions in removing the fence (in accordance with the inadmissible document) and Lish's prompt objection to those actions. Cf. Mestas v. Martini, 113 Colo. 108, 117, 155 P.2d 161, 164-65 (1944) (<HOLDING>). No other admissible evidence supports
holding that if the contract can be given a definite and certain meaning or interpretation the contract is not ambiguous and will be construed by the court as a matter of law holding that to establish an exception to the statute of frauds it must first be shown that an agreement to convey was actually reached that an oral contract must be established by clear and convincing evidence and that the chapter 7 trustee failed to establish that there was any parol contract for conveyance of property from debtors parents to the debtor holding that in order for a contract to be enforced it is necessary that all the essential terms of the contract must first be established by competent evidence and shown to be definite certain clear and unambiguous holding that where the language of the contract is unambiguous and conveys a definite meaning the court may decide the meaning of the contract as a matter of law recognizing that an implied contract must result from a meeting of the minds of the parties in mutual assent to the terms and must be based upon a sufficient consideration free from fraud or undue influence not against public policy and sufficiently definite to be enforced