to hear this appeal only if such jurisdiction is provided by the collateral order doctrine. In Cohen, the Court stated that 28 U.S.C. § 1291 does not “permit appeals, even from fully consummated decisions, where they are but steps towards final judgment in which they will merge.” Id. at 546, 69 S.Ct. at 1225. “The purpose is to combine in one review all stages of the proceeding that effectively may be reviewed and corrected if and when final judgment results.” Id. The collateral order doctrine carves out a “narrow exception to the normal application of the final judgment rule,” Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 798, 109 S.Ct. 1494, 1498, 103 L.Ed.2d 879 (1989), limited to orders that (1) c calf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 113 S.Ct. 684, 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993) (<HOLDING>); and Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 63 S.Ct.
holding that the mitchell rationale applies to claims of eleventh amendment immunity made by states and state entities holding that  1983 does not override a states eleventh amendment immunity holding that state did not waive eleventh amendment immunity by removing case to federal court holding that  1983 does not override states eleventh amendment immunity holding that the eleventh amendment applies in  1981 litigation