intertwined with the state judgment. This case, as described by Guess, seeks to enjoin the Board from preventing his prescribing homeopathic medicine, and to have § 90-14 declared unconstitutional. This is the same case that the North Carolina courts heard; Guess merely tacks on the First Amendment and Commerce Clause claims to achieve subject matter jurisdiction in the district court. Under these circumstances, if the district court heard this case, it would necessarily have to look to the North Carolina decision against Guess. This consideration of a particular challenge to a state court decision is clearly precluded by Feldman. Artificial attempts to redefine the relief sought are not sufficient to overcome the requirements of Feldman. See Stern v. Nix, 840 F.2d 208 (3d Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Plainly, Guess’ impermissible purpose is to
holding that a plaintiffs reference to himself and all similarly situated future petitioners did not change the essence of his action from a particularized challenge of the state courts decision against him to a general challenge of a statute holding that if a person wishes to challenge a mere procedural violation in the adoption of a regulation or other agency action the challenge must be brought within six years of the decision and that similarly if the person wishes to bring a policybased facial challenge to the governments decision that too must be brought within six years of the decision holding that representation by state officials that they have no present plan to enforce a statute does not divest plaintiffs of standing to challenge the statute because the states position could well change holding that potential class members are similarly situated to the named plaintiffs if they are similarly situated with respect to their job requirements and pay provisions holding that wellfounded fear was established where all of petitioners similarly situated family members were persecuted