suggested in dicta that checkpoints to inspect driver’s licences and vehicle registration might be constitutional. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). 9 . 531 U.S. 32, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000). 10 . See id. at 47-48, 121 S.Ct. 447. 11 . See id. at 46, 121 S.Ct. 447. 12 . Id. at 41, 121 S.Ct. 447. 13 . Id. at 44, 121 S.Ct. 447. 14 . Id. at 41, 121 S.Ct. 447. Thus, the Court struck down the use of checkpoints whose primaty purpose was drug interdiction, but emphasized that its holding in Martinez-Fuerte was not affected. See id. at 47, 121 S.Ct. 447. 15 . We note that the checkpoint at Marfa is an immigration checkpoint, rather than a border checkpoint. See United States v. Jackson, 825 F.2d 853, 860 (5th Cir.1987) (en banc) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
holding that stops for brief questioning about immigration status at the border rou tinely conducted at permanent checkpoints are consistent with the fourth amendment and need not be authorized by warrant holding that a checkpoint is the functional equivalent of the border only when the government has proven to a reasonable certainty that the traffic passing through the checkpoint is international in character a border checkpoint stops no more than a negligible number of domestic travelers holding that there was no actual prejudice where the defendant has the functional equivalent of the notice required holding that comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions associated with ordinary traffic stops explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that terry stops are subject to the dictates of miranda  holding that reasonable suspicion standard applies to routine traffic stops