and thereby rendered his knowledge and intent irrelevant. We have previously rejected this argument and do so again here. See id.; see also United States v. Oaks, 606 F.3d 530, 539 (8th Cir. 2010). “Knowing possession of a firearm is an element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and [Graham] placed his knowledge of the firearm’s presence at the scene on his person at issue by pleading not guilty to the crime and requiring the government to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Oaks, 606 F.3d at 539. When, as here, a defendant pleads not guilty to a felon-in-possession charge, he places his knowledge and intent at issue even when the government proceeds solely on an actual-possession theory. See Williams, 796 F.3d at 959; United States v. Halk, 634 F.3d 482, 486-88 (8th Cir. 2011) (<HOLDING>). Graham’s 2009 firearm-related arrest was thus
holding that to apply the firearm enhancement the firearm need only reflect the context of the defendants possession and the defendants ability to use the firearm to promote the controlled substance offense holding prior drug convictions relevant to show that defendant had knowledge and intent necessary to possess drugs at issue in case holding that the government was required to prove that the defendant lacked a license to possess a firearm but not that the defendant possessed the firearm for any duration of time holding that previous firearm possessions were relevant to show defendants knowledge and intent to possess a firearm where police saw defendant holding and discarding a gun holding that to enhance a sentence because of the defendants use of a firearm the jury must find the defendant guilty of a crime involving a firearm or otherwise specifically find that a firearm was used