the light most favorable to the non-moving party). We reject this argument. First and foremost, Capital One is not a party to this action. If Bentrud has a complaint with the manner in which Capital One changed (i.e. reduced) the interest rate, he can raise that issue in arbitration. The district court’s inquiry, and ours on appeal, concerns the representations and collection efforts of Bowman Heintz, the party alleged by Bentrud to have committed the FDCPA violations. Based on the record before us, Bentrud has not raised a triable issue that Bowman Heintz either misrepresented the interest rate or attempted to collect an amount not authorized by the agreement with Capital One. Because Bentrud failed to carry his burden, see Hess v. Kanoski Bresney, 784 F.3d 1154, 1159 (7th Cir.2015) (<HOLDING>), his second FDCPA claim, theorized under §
holding that the plaintiffs have the burden of proof and persuasion as to the existence of standing recognizing that the burden of persuasion for a showing of prejudice was on the defendant holding without discussing the plaintiffs burden of persuasion that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment holding plaintiff to his burden of persuasion on appeal of summary judgment holding that plaintiff bears burden of production as well as persuasion