breach of obligation. Likewise, it is entirely possible that a division order might be executed under such circumstances as to constitute a contractual modification of the relations previously prevailing between operator and royalty owner. But this should appear clearly. No court ought to infer an intent to enter into such a contractual-modification without cogent evidence thereof.” See also: 3A Summers, Oil and Gas,. Section 590 at pp. 137-142 (1958); Bounds, “Division Orders”, Southwestern Legal Foundation, Fifth Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Law 91 (1954); Manual of Oil & Gas Terms, verbo “Division order”, p. 66-(1957); Comment, Royalty Division Orders, 23 La.L.Rev. 571 (1963). Also: White v. Hodges, 201 La. 1, 9 So.2d 433; Brown v. Sugar Creek Syndicate, 195 La. 865, 197 So. 583 (<HOLDING>); Brown Land & Royalty Co. v. Green, CA 5, 198
holding that appellate courts may not on appeal from the dismissal of a rule 32 petition consider claims not raise in the rule 32 petition holding clarified in gulf refining co v goode 212 la 502 32 so 2d 904 at 907 recognizing that rule 32 is a postconviction remedy holding that an appellant cannot raise an issue on appeal from the denial of a rule 32 petition which was not raised in the rule 32 petition holding that appellate courts may not on appeal from the dismissal of a rule 32 petition consider claims not raised in the rule 32 petition