the officers’ actions were justified at their inception, and second, whether their actions were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the officers’ initial interference.” Id. A court must be flexible in this analysis because, “while an officer’s actions must bear some relation to the purpose of the original stop, he may shift his focus and increase the scope of his investigation by degrees if his suspicions mount during the course of the detention.” Chhien, 266 F.3d at 6. Moreover, “there is no talismanic time beyond which any stop initially justified on the basis of Terry becomes an unreasonable seizure under the [F]ourth [A]mendment.” United States v. McCarthy, 77 F.3d 522, 530 (1st Cir.1996) (citations omitted). Therefore, “[t]he reasonableness i Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). In these circumstances, the fact that Sugar
holding that defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a locked vehicle owned and operated by a third party but parked on defendant homeowners driveway where the evidence seized was the subject of the unlawful enterprise in which defendant participated holding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth holding that defendant had legitimate expectation of privacy in contents of locked safe stored in his apartment but owned by third party holding that defendant was seized where the officer told defendant that she knew that he was on probation defendant admitted to the officer that he had given her a false name and defendant was asked for consent to search a backpack because a reasonable inference was that defendant was the subject of a continuing investigation and his or her freedom of movement had been significantly restricted by the officers show of authority holding defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in blood sample drawn by hospital