with the District Court that Mejia’s § 2241 petition amounts to a second or successive challenge to his conviction, and that Mejia has failed to show that § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention. In contrast to the petitioner in In re Dorsainvil, Mejia does not rely on an intervening change in the law to argue that his conduct is noncriminal. In addition, Mejia is not a petitioner who “had no earlier opportunity” to challenge his conviction: he was aware of, and could have raised, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in his first § 2255 motion, but failed to do so. Id. That he failed to do so does not render the remedy afforded by § 2255 inadequate or ineffective. See Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, Mejia cannot rely on § 2241
holding that it is the inefficacy of the remedy not the personal inability to use it that is determinative under  2255 holding that it is not holding that it is the use not marketing of firearms that is dangerous holding for  2241 purposes that  2255 is inadequate or ineffective only if the remedy itself is infirm not because of the movants failure to use it or to prevail under it holding that the availability of the icrp is but one factor to be considered in determining undue hardship but it is not determinative