should apply a four-factor test to determine whether the delay between the initiation of criminal proceedings and the beginning of trial violates a defendant’s right to a speedy trial: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the cause of the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) the presence or absence of prejudice resulting from the delay. Id. A two-year delay between indictment and trial weighs against the government. Id. at 1336-37. A delay attributable to negligence is weighted less heavily than a deliberate delay, but still counts against the government. United States v. Dennard, 722 F.2d 1510, 1513 (11th Cir.1984). When the investigation was not performed diligently, however, it weighs heavily against the government. Ingram, 446 F.3d at 1339-40 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, as the delay between indictment and
holding that the defendant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that the improper juror contact occurred and only if the contact is established must the government demonstrate absence of prejudice holding that a defendant was properly required to demonstrate prejudice where only two of the first three barker factors weighed heavily against the government holding that when determining whether a delay in prosecution violates a defendants right to a speedy trial courts must consider the length of the delay the reason for the delay whether the defendant asserted his rights and the resulting prejudice to the defendant holding that a twoyear delay weighed heavily against the government when the arresting officer knew where the defendant lived and worked and made only weak efforts to contact the defendant holding that a sixyear delay caused by negligence weighed heavily against the government