parameters. (emphasis added). In other words, the court had the option to either impose the punishment it originally assessed before granting appellant probation, Guzman v. State, 923 S.W.2d 792, 799 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1996, no pet.), or reduce the punishment originally assessed. From the foregoing, we make several observations. First, appellant’s punishment was previously determined and assessed under section 3(a). Indeed, had punishment not been assessed, the court’s authority to simply reimpose punishment following revocation, as allowed by section 23(a), would make little sense. Second, since punishment was already assessed, it follows that appellant already had the opportunity to present evidence on the matter. See Borders v. State, 846 S.W.2d 834,835-36 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (<HOLDING>). To the extent that the appellant had the
holding that the trial judges failure to admonish the appellant regarding the range of punishment was harmless because the record was replete with statements by the parties concerning the punishment range and because there was nothing in the record to indicate that the appellant was unaware of the range of punishment holding that civil settlements have no bearing on decisions of criminal punishment and imposition of a restitution order is a form of punishment and part of a criminal sentence holding that article 3707 section 3 of the code of criminal procedure requires the trial court to give a defendant opportunity to present evidence regarding punishment after it has found the particular defendant guilty and before punishment is assessed holding that trial courts failure to give reasonabledoubt instruction sua sponte during punishment phase for extraneous offenses offered during punishment was harmless error in part because the jury assessed punishment far below maximum available despite states plea for maximum holding that defendant has right to trial by jury before conviction of contempt punishable by severe punishment