were for traffic offenses. He contends that the court in sentencing him to the maximum sentence available only looked at the number of his past crimes, not their nature. He argues that the court in sentencing him should have examined the actual fraud that occurred in the case as opposed to basing its sentence on the potential fraud alleged by the government. Furthermore, Perkins asserts that the district court should have determined the need for the sentence imposed, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), as well as the kinds of sentences available pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(3). We review sentences imposed under the post-Booker advisory Guideline scheme for reasonableness. United States v. Winingear, 422 F.3d 1241, 1244 (11th Cir.2005); Booker, 543 U.S. at 260-63, 125 S.Ct. at 765-66 (<HOLDING>). Following the Booker decision, we have held
holding that sentence is reasonable when the district court properly addresses sentencing factors of  3553a recognizing that many of the  3553a factors are already incorporated into any guidelines determination and the  3553a factors can themselves overlap holding that nothing in booker or elsewhere requires the district court to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the  3553a factors or to discuss each of the  3553a factors holding that appellate court review sentences for unreasonableness in light of the  3553a factors holding that the district court is not required to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the  3553a factors or to discuss each of the  3553a factors