the hardship resulting from innocent ignorance.” Id. at 385, 68 S.Ct. at 3.... “The ‘presumption’ that everyone knows the law is simply a more colorful way of stating the principle that ignorance of the law is irrelevant.” 21 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure § 5124, at 588 (1977) (footnote omitted). In the case at hand, appellant, even though he may have been ignorant of the abandonment provisions of 38 C.F.R. § 3.158(a), is necessarily charged with knowledge of the regulation. Morris, 1 Vet.App. at 265. It is clear, based on Morris, that Ms. Jernigan’s due process argument based on lack of notice must also fail. Moreover, as discussed above, there is no evidence that Ms. Jernigan relied on VA’s allegedly misleading notice to her detriment. See Day, 23 F.3d at 1066 (<HOLDING>); Gilbert, 45 F.3d at 1394 (“[A] plaintiff must
holding that an administrator was not in substantial compliance with  1133 where the initial denial notice omitted one of the grounds later relied on for the denial of benefits holding that a notice that misled claimants by equating a new application with an appeal of the initial determination violated due process holding that although the denial notice that claimants received failed to satisfy the requirements of due process the only claimants who could have been injured by the inadequacy are those who detrimentally relied on the inadequate denial notice holding that technical inadequacy in the notice of appeal did not deprive the court of jurisdiction holding that the juvenile received inadequate notice of a hearing modifying his probation because he received no notice of the hearing or the reasons for it