of said contracts. It was quite apparent that Hurst knew the payment affidavits were false and misrepresented. Appellants objected to the second statement — the statement that Young allegedly made to Doolan — on the basis of hearsay. See Tex.R. Evid. 801(d). Appellants objected to the other statements arguing that they were “unsupported conclusory statements” and, thus, not proper summary judgment evidence. Appellants’ hearsay objection should have been sustained. Appellees do not identify any evidence in the record showing that Young’s alleged statement falls within a hearsay exception. Therefore, we will not consider this statement in our review. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(f); Einhorn v. LaChance, 823 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (op. on reh’g) (<HOLDING>); Lopez v. Hink, 757 S.W.2d 449, 451
holding that hearsay in affidavit which would be inadmissible in evidence at trial could not be considered on motion for summary judgment holding that affidavits that are conclusory and based on hearsay can not be used to oppose motion for summary judgment holding that statements in affidavits based solely on hearsay are inadmissible as summary judgment evidence holding affidavits based on conclusory allegations insufficient at summary judgment holding that a district court may not consider either hearsay evidence in affidavits or unsworn documents in a summary judgment proceeding