of any party nor affect the jurisdiction of circuit and district courts or venue of actions therein.” We find no inconsistency in the operation of §§ 6-3-5 and 6-3-7 that would require us to refer to procedural rules. Section 6-3-5 is specifically related to insurance companies. This specific statute would apply exclusively to these cases if it conflicted with § 6-3-7, the general corporate venue statute. See Crawford v. Sprin-gle, 631 So.2d 880 (Ala.1993) (where statutes in pari materia are general and specific, the more specific statute controls the more general statute). This Court finds no conflict between § 6-3-5 and § 6-3-7; accordingly, these corporate venue statutes should be read in pari materia. Cf. Ex parte New England Mutual Life Insurance Co., 663 So.2d 952 (Ala.1995) (<HOLDING>); Opinion of the Justices No. 599 So.2d 1166
holding that  635 does not exclusively govern contract actions against an insurance corporation and that  637 does not exclusively govern personal injury actions against an insurance corporation holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation holding that corporation and sole owner of corporation were separate legal entities and corporation was not party to contract signed by owner in individual capacity holding that legal injury occurred for purposes of negligence action against insurance agent when insurance company rejected the claim holding that the trust fund and denuding theories of recovery were considered to belong to the debtor corporation because each action was created for the benefit of the corporation ie to vindicate injury to the corporation caused by improper actions by control persons