Thus, a “conviction” cannot be based on conduct that does not violate one of the general criminal laws of this State. Criminal offenses are defined by the General Assembly, State v. Burdin, 924 S.W.2d 82, 87 (Tenn.1996), which has declared that “[c]onduct does not constitute an offense unless it is defined as an offense by statute, municipal ordinance, or rule authorized by and lawfully adopted under a statute,” Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-ll-102(a) (2010). The Legislature’s enactment of other statutes defining certain types of contemptuous conduct as criminal offenses supports our conclusion that contempt findings pursuant to section 29-9-102 should not be viewed as criminal convictions for purposes of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-104; Brown, 914 S.W.2d at 888 (<HOLDING>). Similarly, the Legislature has enacted
holding that the trial court had erred in imposing an obligation to pay child support when clear and convincing evidence established that the husband was not the father of the child holding that an administrative agency is not subject to a contempt proceeding for failure to comply with an order recognizing that the failure to comply with a court order to pay child support is both contemptuous behavior and a criminal offense under tennessee code annotated section 365104a holding that a court may sua sponte dismiss pursuant to rule 41b for failure to comply with a court order holding plaintiffs failure to comply with section 2622 requires dismissal in federal court