of fraud on the court. In this regard, the district court recognized that under binding Tenth Circuit precedent “[ijntent to defraud is an absolute prerequisite to a finding of fraud on the court.” Weese v. Schukman, 98 F.3d 542, 553 (10th Cir.1996). The district court then proceeded to set out at length its reasoning for concluding that McVeigh had not demonstrated a reasonable probability that given additional time he could present a viable claim of fraud on the court. Second, McVeigh is simply wrong in trying to compartmentalize the questions of fraud on the court and Brady materiality. If the evidence in question was not material, a fundamental requirement for fraud on the court would be absent. See United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 47, 118 S.Ct. 1862, 141 L.Ed.2d 32 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the fact that only non-material
holding that motion filed under fedrcivp 60b properly construed as successive  2255 motion holding that a motion to vacate a judgment under fedrcivp 60b is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court   citations omitted holding that while a district court lacks jurisdiction to deny a 60b motion while an appeal is pending it can certify that it will grant a 60b motion if the court of appeals remands the case for that purpose holding without extended discussion that even if the district court should have construed the petitioners motion under 18 usc  3582c2 as a rule 60b motion the court would nonetheless have had to recharacterize the rule 60b motion as an sshp holding that fedrcivp 60b motion premised on fraud on the court is available only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice