intended to violate the statute. A. Sturm’s first claim is that Congress did not intend the Hobbs Act to apply to actions based on a creditor’s fear of nonre-payment. He supports this claim by pointing to the absence of any mention of such actions in both the statute’s legislative history and in cases interpreting the statute. He argues that extending the statute to include such actions would interfere with state sovereignty and squander federal judicial resources. We find Sturm’s arguments unpersuasive. The statute provides a precise definition of extortion, and there is persuasive evidence that Congress intended “to make punishable all conduct falling within the reach of the statutory language.” United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 377, 98 S.Ct. 1112, 1116, 55 L.Ed. 2d 349 (1978) (<HOLDING>). The purpose of the statute was “to prevent
holding that proof of racketeering was not a separate prerequisite to criminal liability under the hobbs act recognizing that injury is a prerequisite to liability holding the meaning of commerce element in a different federal statute the hobbs act to be a question of law holding that impossibility is not a defense to attempts or conspiracy under the hobbs act holding no liability under false claims act unless certification prerequisite to payment