assistance by failing to present evidence that was favorable to the defense, failing to properly cross-examine the main prosecution witnesses, and failing to demonstrate the prejudice the defense suffered due to the People’s failure to provide a specific time and date in its demand for a notice of alibi. In denying Alexander’s petition, the Superior Court held that Alexander’s “arguments are blatant attempts to re-litigate issues that were already raised and resolved on [direct] appeal” before this Court. 2015 V.I. LEXIS 9, at *9. Although the Superior Court did not expressly state it, this reasoning was essentially a holding that Alexander’s petition was procedurally barred because it was already raised and addressed on direct appeal by this Court. See Blyden, 64 V.I. at 377 (<HOLDING>). This was error. This Court did not address
holding that a similar claim in a rule 32 petition was procedurally barred because it was raised at trial and because it was raised on direct appeal holding that a caldwell claim is procedurally barred if it is not raised on direct appeal holding that a habeas claim is procedurally barred where it was already raised on direct appeal and decided on the merits by this court holding that the claim of not being able to interview jurors was procedurally barred because the claim should and could have been raised on direct appeal holding that the caldwell claim is procedurally barred because it could have been raised on direct appeal but was not