if (1) the statement was testimonial and (2) the de-clarant is unavailable and the defendant lacked a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Howard v. State, 853 N.E.2d 461, 465 (Ind.2006). The Court emphasized that if testimonial evidence is at issue, then “the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Id. (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. at 1374). C.S. was found competent to testify, was made available for cross-examination, and did in fact testify at trial. Because C.S. testified and was cross examined, the rule announced in Crawford is simply not appli cable here. Surber’s Sixth Amendment confrontation rights were not violated. See, e.g., Agilera v. State, 862 N.E.2d 298, 306 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) (<HOLDING>), trans. denied. II. The next issue is whether
holding that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule where the defendant was able to confront and crossexamine the witness who claimed that the statements at issue were made holding that the defendants sixth amendment confrontation clause rights were not violated by the admission of the child victims statements to her mother grandmother a detective and a forensic investigator holding that the sixth amendment right of confrontation applies to all three phases of the capital trial and that the admission of  hearsay statements of codefendants in the penalty phase violated the confrontation clause holding that the sixth amendment confrontation clause was not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under a georgia statute permitting an exception for statements by coconspirators where there was sufficient indicia of reliability supporting the truth of the statements holding that any confrontation right is found in the fourteenth amendments due process clause not the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment