have not even made that showing with regard to the specific items that are the subject of Kobe’s claims. Kobe’s future prospects with regard to the ACD seem especially uncertain. DHHS denied his request for the ACD his doctor ordered, and while the USC Program, apparently at Rich/Lex’s request, has now voluntarily allowed Kobe to use a satisfactory ACD, there is no indication that DHHS has ever altered its decision that Kobe is not legally entitled to such a device. If, after this ease is completed, the USC Program requests return of the ACD or if Kobe needs it adjusted, repaired, or replaced, he could well be met with the same sort of allegedly improper delays and denials that he claims repeatedly occurred before he decided to press his claims in court. Cf. Pashby, 709 F.3d at 316 (<HOLDING>). And Kobe certainly has reason to be concerned
holding that offset for social security retirement benefits does not include federal disability benefits and stating that there was no legislative intent to embody the entire subchapter of the social security act dealing with both disability benefits and old age benefits holding that disability benefits are not retirementtype benefits holding that retirement benefits are accrued benefits under erisa holding that state agencys voluntary reinstatement of benefits after agency had previously announced that recipients no longer met the eligibility requirements for those benefits did not moot suit challenging the termination of the benefits when agency remained free to reassess the recipients needs and cancel their benefits at any time holding that when a plan fiduciary initially determines that a covered employee is eligible for benefits and later determines that the employee is not  eligible for those benefits by virtue of additional medical information received the plan fiduciary is not required to obtain proof that a substantial change in the ltd recipients medical condition occurred after the initial determination of eligibility and noting that a contrary holding would basically prohibit a plan fiduciary from ever terminating benefits if it later discovered evidence that the erisa plaintiff was not disabled at the time of the initial grant of benefits and that such a rule would have a chilling effect on the prompt ness of granting initial benefits in the first place