417, 105 S.Ct. 2078. Nevertheless, given the strong potential for an accomplice’s confession that implicates the defendant to unfairly infect the trial if considered as substantive evidence of guilt, and given the lack of otherwise overwhelming evidence of guilt, we have serious concerns that the verdict was substantially influenced by the constitutional error. It is only natural that a juror, upon hearing the out-of-court statements from two admitted participants in the robbery saying that Adamson was involved, would consider those statements in assessing guilt, unless instructed otherwise. Cf. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135-36, 88 S.Ct. 1620 (describing “extrajudicial statements of a codefendant” as “devastating to the defendant”); see also Vazquez v. Wilson, 550 F.3d 270, 280 (3d Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we hold that the error was not
holding that an inculpatory statement by a declarant was not reliable when he viewed the defendant like an older brother providing a motivation to lie the statement was made only to defense investigators and not to prosecutors the declarant was not under oath had not been read his miranda rights and was not represented by counsel and the declarant ultimately recanted his admission recognizing the chance that the jury will credit a nontestifying codefendants incriminating statement and conclude that the statement pointed to the objecting defendant as the offender even though he could not crossexamine the declarant holding that testimonial evidence is admissible only if the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the declarant holding that the introduction of a jointly tried nontestifying codefendants statement violates the sixth amendment confrontation clause if the statement contains incriminating evidence concerning a defendant holding that a prior inconsistent statement was admissible and the defendant failed to ask for a limiting instruction that the jury could not use the statement as substantive evidence