to “an action [that] is timely commenced and is terminated in any other manner than ... a failure to obtain personal jurisdiction over [a] defendant”); see also Harrison v. Lutheran Med. Ctr., 468 Fed.Appx. 33, 36 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that “§ 205(a) does not allow tolling based on a prior suit that was terminated due to a failure to obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Midwest Mem’l Grp., L.L.G. v. Int’l Fund Serve. (Ir.) Ltd., No. 10-CV-8660, 2011 . WL 4916407, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2011) (noting that § 205(a)’s “tolling provisions are not applicable where a prior action against the same defendant ha[d] been ter-, minated for lack of personal jurisdiction”); Jacquez v. Campouerde, 309 A.D.2d 903, 766 N.Y.S.2d 89, 89 (2003) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the savings statute applies
holding that because a court previously dismissed an action against the defendant for lack of personal jurisdiction the plaintiff was not entitled to invoke the sixmonth extension contained in  205a to recommence his terminated action holding that when a plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its action and subsequently brought the same action against the same defendant the defendant had the right to remove despite having participated in the earlier trial for over one year in state court holding that where an action was commenced less than 60 days after a notice of claim was served on the port authority the action must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction holding a decision denying a motion to dismiss an action for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction is not appealable holding that the proper ground for dismissal of a  1983 action in which the plaintiff has failed to establish state action is lack of jurisdiction