of willfulness may arise from attempts to conceal income or assets, failure to keep books or records, and conducting business largely on cash basis); United States v. Turano, 802 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir.1986) (inference of willfulness from tax protest activities); United States v. Shivers, 788 F.2d 1046, 1048 (5th Cir.1986) (inference of willfulness from disregard of notices informing of duty to file); United States v. Ostendorff, 371 F.2d 729, 731 (4th Cir.1967) (allowing inference of willfulness from pattern of failure to file). We find that, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational juror could have found Kotmair guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Glasser, 315 U.S. at 80, 62 S.Ct. 457; United States v. Saunders, 886 F.2d 56, 60 (4th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Kotmair next argues that the district court
holding that it is function of trial court to judge witnesses credibility and to weigh conflicting evidence holding that in resolving sufficiency of evidence appeals court does not weigh evidence or review credibility of witnesses holding that on a motion for summary judgment it is settled that a trial court is not permitted to weigh material conflicting evidence or pass upon the credibility of the witnesses holding that a successor judge may consider a motion for new trial in a case tried to the court where she is not required to weigh conflicting evidence or pass upon the credibility of witnesses but can resolve such issues  upon evidence which is not materially in conflict holding that appellate courts determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction based on a review of all of the evidence admitted at trial