Truth be told, the principles are now the same for cases involving relief from a default. There is not a single case since the adoption of rule 1.500 holding that an order vacating a default after final judgment would be affirmed even though it would have been reversed if the issue had reached the appellate court before the final judgment had been entered. Moreover there is no reason for such a double standard of review. If a trial judge has grossly abused judicial discretion in vacating a default before judgment, surely the effects of that abuse would persist into the entry of a consequent final judgment. I also disagree with the two-tiered standard of review that this court has recently added to review on this subject. See George v. Radcliffe, 753 So.2d 573 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>). We explained our rationale thus: “That
holding that orders remanding an action to a federal agency are generally not considered final appealable orders holding that remand orders are also appealable orders under 28 usc  1291 holding that court of appeals statutory jurisdiction over final orders of removal extends to reinstatement orders holding that there are two standards in review of orders on motions to vacate defaults simple abuse of discretion for orders denying relief and gross abuse of discretion for orders granting relief recognizing that orders denying motions to reopen are treated as final orders of removal