tortured, beaten, or lingered in pain. Although the trial court here did not explicitly identify heinousness as an aggravating factor, we find this factor relevant in our determination of the appropriateness of Brown’s sentence under Appellate Rule 7(B). Character of the offender The presentence report reflects that the instant offenses are the first for which Brown was charged as an adult. See App. at 64. And although Brown has a lengthy history of juvenile adjudications, the only violent offense appears to be a 2009 battery incident. See id. at 63. Although not reflecting favorably upon Brown’s character, Brown’s offenses do not appear particularly grave and more importantly are not related to his murder convictions. See, e.g., Wooley v. State, 716 N.E.2d 919, 929 n. 4 (Ind.1999) (<HOLDING>). See also Ruiz v. State, 818 N.E.2d 927, 929
recognizing due process concerns inherent in sentencing based on false criminal history holding that evidence of subsequent criminal conduct may be used at sentencing hearing on prior criminal charge and stating that misdeeds occurring up to the time of sentencing whether before the finding of guilty or subsequent are relevant as they go to the defendants history and character  recognizing that the significance of a criminal history in sentencing varies based on the gravity nature and number of prior offenses as they relate to the current offense holding that in the conviction and sentencing for criminal offenses committed in the course of one criminal episode it is the intent of the legislature that there be a separate conviction and sentence for each criminal offense unless one of the offenses is a degree of the other a necessarily included lesser offense subsumed in the other or both offenses are identical holding a court may consider a defendants criminal history even if that history is included in the defendants criminal history category