of the third-party’s breach of the contract without justification, actual breach of the contract, and damages resulting therefrom.” Lama Holding Co. v. Smith Barney Inc., 88 N.Y.2d 413, 646 N.Y.S.2d 76, 668 N.E.2d 1370, 1375 (1996) (citations omitted). Here, the first and fourth elements of Plaintiffs claim — existence of a valid contract and breach — require interpretation of the parties’ CBA. Indeed, there is no way to adjudicate breach of contract absent interpretation of the underlying contract. See Baylis v. Marriott Corp., 906 F.2d 874, 877 (2d Cir.1990) (“Under traditional principles of New York law, a party may not recover for tortious inducement of breach of a contract without proving that the underlying contract has been breached.” 747 F.Supp. 162, 172 (E.D.N.Y.1990) (<HOLDING>). Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs
holding section 301 preempted plaintiffs claim for tortious interference with contract because that claim would require interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement holding plaintiffs state law claims of inter alia tortious interference with contract are preempted by section 301 of lmra holding that lmra preempted plaintiffs state law claims against employer for sexual harassment slander tortious interference with economic relations conspiracy and intentional infliction of emotional distress holding inter alia that common law claims were preempted holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law