official immunity existed only in the cramped sense used by the court of appeals, its qualified promise against personal civil liability to public officers would be hollow indeed. The purpose of the doctrine of official immunity is to protect public officers from civil liability for conduct that would otherwise be actionable. Ministerial acts are those: [ w]here the law prescribes and defines the duties to be performed with such precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the exercise of discreti .App.—Dallas 1992, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (explaining that officers were not entitled to immunity because “their actions in the pursuit did not involve matters within their discret L.Ed.2d 483 (1988); Vasquez v. Hernandez, 844 S.W.2d 802, 804-05 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1992, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (<HOLDING>); Wyse, 733 S.W.2d at 227 (describing
holding that officers positioning himself next to his patrol car with gun drawn and then firing was a discretionary use of deadly force holding that deadly force was unreasonable where the suspect possessed a gun but was not pointing it at the officers and was not facing the officers when they shot holding that instruction on use of deadly force was required where appellant was aware of the decedents violent history decedent had a gun in his car and appellant used force only after decedent had made an attempt to approach his car holding that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure holding that injury of plaintiff  who was detained in negligently parked patrol car that along with another patrol car was struck by thirdparty vehicle  did not arise out of use or operation of patrol car within meaning of ttcas motorvehicle waiver rather patrol car merely furnished condition that made injury possible