in which they waived their rights to appeal,' except in the event that they were sentenced outside the advisory guidelines range, which they were not. While they claim the prosecution violated the plea agreement by not recommending an acceptance of responsibility reduction, or recommending that Odeh be sentenced at the low end of the advisory guidelines range, they agreed to allow the district court to resolve the question of whether a breach occurred by agreeing to the appeal waiver. However, as in Hicks and Hare, the defendants never presented that argument to the district court. And their waiver of appeal bars them from having this court consider the question on appeal. Hicks, 129 F.3d at 381; Hare, 269 F.3d at 862; see also United States v. Whitlow, 287 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>). Odeh and Hussein believe that United States
holding appeal waiver in conditional guilty plea agreement precluded defendant from asserting new argument on appeal in support of suppression motion holding that a plea agreement with a waiver of direct appeal rights does not include a waiver of collateral remedies because the government could have included a waiver of collateral rights in the plea agreement and chose not to do so holding that the united states breach of the plea agreement releases the defendant from the appeal waiver holding that a waiver of appellate rights precluded a defendant from arguing on appeal that the prosecution violated the plea agreement and explaining wjaiver of appeal means that the final decision concerning whether there was a breach of the plea agreement will be made by one article iii judge rather than three article iii judges   holding that a waiver of right to appeal contained in a plea agreement is enforceable