tort itself, not the "parties” in the legal sense of the word. 4 . Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 255, 93 S.Ct. 493, 498, 34 L.Ed.2d 454, 1973 A.M.C. 1 (1972). 5 . 485 F.2d 520, 525, 1973 A.M.C. 2478 (5th Cir.1973), cert. denied, Chicot Land Co. v. Kelly, 416 U.S. 969, 94 S.Ct. 1991, 40 L.Ed.2d 558 (1974). 6 . Kelly, 485 F.2d at 524. 7 . See n. 3, supra. 8 . 409 U.S. at 261, 93 S.Ct. at 501, 34 L.Ed.2d at 463. 9 . 409 U.S. at 268, 93 S.Ct. at 504, 34 L.Ed.2d at 467. 10 . 409 U.S. at 274, 93 S.Ct. at 507, 34 L.Ed.2d at 471. 11 . This fortuity has led to the development of often subtle nuances in the determination of whether a particular claim, or part of a claim, may be characterized as maritime. Compare Smith v. Pan Air Corp., 684 F.2d 1102 (5th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>) with Barger v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc.,
holding that admiralty jurisdiction extends to maritime insurance contracts holding the loss of a helicopter in the gulf of mexico within the admiralty jurisdiction holding that a complaint that asserts both admiralty jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction is not an adequate 9h designation to trigger admiralty procedures holding that courts apply substantive admiralty law to claims that sound in admiralty regardless of whether the complaint invokes diversity or admiralty jurisdiction holding maritime claims did not lie for death of a helicopter pilot killed while transporting oil field workers to platforms in the gulf of mexico