377 F.3d at 682 (“[W]hen the IJ does not believe the applicant or does not know what to believe, the applicant’s failure to corroborate his testimony can be fatal.”). But if an IJ believes the applicant’s testimony, corroboration “is not required.” Zheng v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 804, 810 (7th Cir.2005) (emphasis in original); see also Dong v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 573, 579 (7th Cir.2005); Uwase v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir.2003). To ensure that IJs have the freedom to require supporting evidence, yet do not inappropriately demand it, we require that, before denying a claim for lack of corroboration, an IJ must: (1) make an explicit credibility finding; (2) explain why it is reasonable to have expected additional corroboration; and (3) explain why the petitioner’s reason ir.2005) (<HOLDING>); but see Hussain v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 622,
holding that ij failed to make explicit credibility finding when he described applicants testimony as general and meager making his demand for corroborating evidence improper holding that an ij failed to make explicit credibility flnd ing when he described applicants testimony as general and meager making his demand for corroborating evidence improper holding that an ij failed to make explicit credibility finding when he made passing remark that he disbelieved applicants testimony holding that an ij failed to make explicit credibility finding when he remarked that applicants testimony was vague and confusing as well as exaggerated holding that an ij made an explicit credibility when the ij found testimony not credible based on several enumerated inconsistencies