to tell the State she had recognized Forde. Because there was no state action involved in Gina’s pretrial identification of Forde, there was no due process concern, and the trial court was not required to hold a Dessureault hearing. ¶32 Forde attempts to avoid Perry and Williams by arguing that because the Dessu-reault hearing was held, the court was required to comply with due process. She cites cases concerning “state-created” rights, which require due process once invoked. See Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 463, 101 S.Ct. 2460, 69 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981) (“A state-created right can, in some circumstances, beget yet other rights to procedures essential to the realization of the parent right.”); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-58, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (<HOLDING>). But the Dessureault hearing was not a
holding that state prisoners challenges to the constitutionality of prison disciplinary proceedings that led to the deprivation of goodtime credits fell within the core of habeas holding that a prisoner cannot be deprived of a protected liberty interest in goodtime credits without procedural due process holding that state prisoners challenges to revocation of their goodtime credits through disciplinary proceedings could be brought as a  1983 action because inmates sought only a declaration that the disciplinary proceedings were invalid and thus attacked only wrong procedures and not wrong result holding that depriving inmates of statecreated right to goodtime credits in prison disciplinary proceedings requires due process holding that inmates serving life terms were not entitled to goodtime credits because state statute expressly foreclosed the granting of goodtime credits to such inmates