of the distinction between loss occurring from repairable vehicles and totally destroyed vehicles is based upon the realization “that the economic loss to the owner who is deprived of a vehicle because it has been totally demolished is the same as the loss to the owner who is deprived of a vehicle during the period required for repair.” Damages in Tort, supra § 37.54[1], at 169; see also New York Cent., 218 N.E.2d at 376 (“We fail to see any valid reason for the distinction between repairable and irreparable damage which would justify loss of use for the former and not the latter.... Have not both property owners lost the same thing, i.e., the use of such property?”); Remedies, supra §. 5.11, at 385. We agree with this reasoning and, therefore, adopt the ru 259 S.W. 711 (1924) (<HOLDING>); Menard v. Prejean, 374 So.2d 1275
holding that plaintiffs who were in the car during car accident could recover for emotional damages because they were within zone of danger holding that a plaintiff who did not replace a destroyed tractortrailer due to lack of funds and failure to find a suitable replacement could recover for loss of use of the vehicle limited to a reasonable time holding plaintiff who did not purchase an available replacement because of financial inability could nonetheless recover for loss of use of a totally destroyed car holding that the driver of a car who had permission to use the car had standing to challenge its search holding that where the owner of a tractor knew immediately after the accident that the tractor was a total loss damages for loss of use were not recoverable beyond a reasonable time limited to 30 days notwithstanding the owners financial inability to replace the property for eight months