in involuntary protective custody were similar to those in administrative protective custody and disciplinary segregation. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486, 115 S.Ct. at 2301 (inmate’s confinement “did not exceed similar, but totally discretionary, confinement in either duration or degree”). In sum, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that Arce’s confinement did not “present a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of [Arce’s] ... sentence.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485, 115 S.Ct. at 2301; Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 708. (3d Cir.1997) (fifteen months of administrative segregation not atypical when “inmates in a myriad of circumstances [would] find themselves exposed to the [same], conditions to which [the inmate] was subjected”); Mackey v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, —— U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 136, 139
holding that a state statutory framework and the punitive nature of segregation created a liberty interest holding that the inmate had no cognizable due process claim because he had no liberty interest in being free from disciplinary segregation holding that 12 days of prehearing confinement in the shu did not implicate a statecreated liberty interest holding that 117 days in administrative segregation due to lack of bed space did not implicate a statecreated liberty interest holding that placement in disciplinary segregation does not implicate a liberty interest because it falls within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a sentence