the new procedures do not allegedly disadvantage Navajos “in the same fundamental way” as the old procedures, see id. at 662, 113 S.Ct. 2297, and it cannot be said “that the challenged conduct continues,” see id. at 662 n.3, 113 S.Ct. 2297. This is not an instance where the same allegedly harmful practice is simply being repackaged with superficial changes and reinstated under another name. The County’s conduct “has been ‘sufficiently altered so as to present a substantially different controversy from the one that existed when suit was filed.’ ” Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 815 F.3d 105, 109 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing Ne. Fla. Chapter, 508 U.S. at 671, 113 S.Ct. 2297 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)); Kan. Judicial Review v. Stout, 562 F.3d 1240, 1246-47 (10th Cir. 2009) (<HOLDING>). All told, there are significant factual and
recognizing that old chief was based entirely on the federal rules of evidence rather than the constitution holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to the differential between their new and old wages holding that old rules under teague constitute clearly established federal law under aedpa holding that a change between old and new rules was fundamental to a degree that impacts our jurisdiction over the plaintiffs challenges to the old rules holding inference is warranted when a 67 year old is replaced by a 59 year old