of jury selection. Wiley v. Puckett, 969 F.2d 86 (5th Cir.1992); Wilkerson v. Collins, 950 F.2d 1054 (1992); Jones v. Butler, 864 F.2d 348, 369 (5th Cir.1988). This rule is based on the fact that a trial judge must make a credibility determination, giving consideration to all of the surrounding circumstances. The Fifth Circuit has expressed concern that the passage of time undermines such a determination. Wilkerson, 950 F.2d at 1063. Thus, if a defendant fails to object at the time of jury-selection, the state may later object to a court’s consideration of a Batson claim by asserting what is known as the procedural default defense. This defense has typically been negated by a showing of certain extenuating circumstances. See, e.g., Tasco v. Butler, 835 F.2d 1120, 1122 (5th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). The Fifth Circuit has explained that
holding that the federal habeas corpus court could reach the merits of a due process claim even though there was no contemporaneous objection in state court trial where the state habeas corpus court reached the merits rather than rely on the procedural default defense holding that aedpa limits a federal habeas court to the record before the state court where a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by the state court holding that if the state court addresses both the procedural default and the merits of a federal claim in the alternative a federal court should apply the state procedural bar and decline to reach the merits of the claim recognizing that the district court did not reach the merits holding that managing conservator while in texas to seek return of child by writ of habeas corpus may not be served with civil process and is subject to jurisdiction of court in which habeas corpus is pending and only for purpose of prosecuting writ of habeas corpus