reiterating the well-established standard of review in zoning cases, opined: The ordinance ... and all similar laws and regulations, must find their justification in some aspect of the police power, asserted for the public welfare.... ... [I]t must be said before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. 272 U.S. at 387-95, 47 S.Ct. at 118-21 (emphasis added). See also Brend v. Confederated Tribes and Bans of Yakima Indian Nations, 492 U.S. 408, 109 S.Ct. 2994, 106 L.Ed.2d 343 (1989); Midnight Sessions Ltd. v. City of Philadelphia, 945 F.2d 667, 676 (3d Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. ——, 112 S.Ct. 1668, 118 L.Ed.2d 389 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Elias v. Town of Brookhaven, 783 F.Supp. 758,
holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property holding that a cause of action for damages to property resulting from a permanent nuisance accrues to the owner of the land at the time the injury begins to affect the land and mere transfer of the land by deed does not transfer the claim for damages holding that a declaratoryjudgment action against the state that would affect property in which the state had an interest was barred by  14 holding that  10113aa does not alter the requirement that the property in question be real property in order for the antimodification provision to apply holding that in instances in which a state reasonably concludefs that the health safety morals or general welfare would be promoted by prohibiting particular contemplated uses of land does not require compensation until the adverse affect on the real property interests reaches a certain magnitude