“custom or practice can be inferred from evidence of repeated constitutional violations for which the errant municipal officers were not discharged or reprimanded” (internal quotations marks and ellipsis omitted)); Henry v. Cty. of Shasta, 132 F.3d 512, 519 (9th Cir.1997) (“When a county continues to turn a blind eye to severe violations of inmates’ constitutional rights — despite having received notice of such violations— a rational fact finder may properly infer the existence of a previous policy or custom of deliberate indifference”), as amended by 137 F.3d 1372, 1372 (9th Cir.1998) (order). Lastly, the district court gave an adequate limiting instruction explaining that the evidence was admitted only for a limited purpose, and what that purpose was. See Velazquez, 793 F.3d at 1028 (<HOLDING>); see also Dubria v. Smith, 224 F.3d 995, 1002
holding that the probative value of contested evidence far outweighed any danger of unfair prejudice where any potential unfair prejudice was cured by a limiting jury instruction holding that an attorneys failure to sign a subpoena can be cured holding that any prejudice resulting from a misstatement of the law by the prosecutor was cured by trial courts proper instruction on applicable law holding that potential prejudice can be cured by an appropriate iimiting instruction holding almost any improper argument may be cured by an instruction to disregard