that a surety may consent in advance to conduct which would otherwise discharge him, Regan v. United States Small Business Admin., 926 F.2d 1078, 1082 (11th Cir.1991) (applying Georgia law), but Amwest argues that the common usage of the word “modify” means something different from “release” and that the contract should be interpreted according to its plain meaning. The district court agreed with Amwest, finding that modification means “a change, alteration or amendment that ‘introduces new elements into the details, or cancels some of them, but leaves the general purpose and effect of the subject matter intact.’ ” (Order at 10 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 905 (5th ed. 1979)). Cf. Delta Diversified, Inc. v. Citizens & Southern Nat’l Bank, 171 Ga.App. 625, 320 S.E.2d 767, 772 (1984) (<HOLDING>). In response, Hardaway points to other
holding that surety consented to subordination of collateral in advance where contract expressly provided that modification or release of principals obligations would not discharge surety recognizing that the gjovernment as obligee owes no equitable duty to a surety  unless the surety notifies the government that the principal has defaulted under the bond  notice by the surety is essential before any governmental duty exists holding that obligee can recover from surety attorneys fees that are provided for in obligees subcontract so long as the total recovery against the surety does not exceed the penal amount of the bond holding that there is no privity of contract between the government and a surety since the government is not a party to the agreement between the surety and the contractor the government never undertakes an obligation to the surety holding that a surety has standing to sue for a progress payment released by the government after notification by the surety of unpaid subcontractors