basis for the difference in treatment.” See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000); Neilson v. D’Angelis, 409 F.3d 100, 105 (2d Cir.2005). Tatta’s equal protection claim fails for at least three reasons. First, The evidence offered by Tatta to support this claim consists entirely of inadmissible hearsay information concerning Wooley’s medical condition and treatment. See Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 11-13. Under Rule 56(e), the party opposing a motion for summary judgment must raise a material question of fact through affidavits “made” on personal knowledge.” A statement, as here, asserting the existence of facts not personally known to the declarant may not be considered. See Patterson v. County of Oneida, N.Y., 375 F.3d 206, 219 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Because Tatta’s hearsay assertions regarding
holding that hearsay in affidavit which would be inadmissible in evidence at trial could not be considered on motion for summary judgment holding that a court may not consider hearsay contained in an affidavit when ruling on a summary judgment motion holding that hearsay evidence may be considered on summary judgment if the same evidence would be admissible in another form at trial holding that statements in affidavits based solely on hearsay are inadmissible as summary judgment evidence holding that hearsay statement did not constitute competent evidence and thus could not be considered in opposition to motion for summary judgment