(8th Cir.1995) (following Murphy’s reasoning and holding that the federal holder in due course and D’Oench doctrines have been preempted). We disagree with the analysis of the D.C. and the Eighth Circuits and hold that the federal common law D’Oench doctrine has not been preempted by statute. Our analysis of the preemption issue begins with a discussion of the effect of federal statutes on the federal common law, in light of the role that the federal common law plays in our system. In Swift v. Tyso 31, 1333-34, 3 L.Ed.2d 1454 (1959) (creating a federal common-law privilege that protects federal officers from libel and defamation suits arising out of statements made in the course of duty); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366, 63 S.Ct. 573, 575, 87 L.Ed. 838 (1943) (<HOLDING>). Courts often examine the policies expressed
holding that the federal habeas courts task is to determine if the state courts decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the supreme court of the united states holding that ejxcept in matters governed by the federal constitution or by acts of congress the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state holding that the rights and duties of the united states on commercial paper which it issues are governed by federal law and that in the absence of an applicable act of congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to their own standards holding that congress did not authorize the states to enforce federal law where it gave states regulatory control through enforcement of their own laws holding that states may enforce their own laws for disabled children and are not limited to the minimum standards of the federal law