a “broad and practical definition of ‘interrogation.’ ” E.g., Glover v. State, 677 So.2d 374 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Applying Innis, we conclude that the trooper’s statement to Origi was the “functional equivalent” of interrogation. First, unlike Innis, this case does not involve the police equivalent of a water cooler conversation, where one officer makes a comment to another in the suspect’s presence. Rather, the comment here was directed at the suspect himself (i.e., “That’s a lot of drug’s you had”). That fact distinguishes this case from those polic DCA 1995) (“The tactic of ‘[confronting the accused with incriminating evidence [against him] is a common and traditional method of prompting a recalcitrant suspect to confess.’ ”); Lornitis v. State, 394 So.2d 455 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (<HOLDING>). Third, Origi was not merely in custody; the
holding tip to be sufficiently reliable where the officer confirmed an informants description of the suspects appearance and location though the officer did not personally witness any criminal behavior holding that use of deadly force was justified against a suspect when officer forced to make a splitsecond decision relied on his reasonable belief that another officer had seen a gun in the suspects hands even though the suspects hands were handcuffed in front of him and the defendant officer never saw a weapon holding that defendant who was a passenger in a car had joint constructive possession of drugs found next to the defendants luggage in truck of car even where she disclaimed ownership of the drugs holding the same where an officer instructed two suspects to identify their personal belongings in the cargo area of a truck where the officer had also found bails of drugs holding that although jury found officer not to have had probable cause for arrest officer was entitled to immunity because law was not clearly established as to circumstances in which officer found himself