coherent and consistent, the inquiry is over.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). In a different context, the Supreme Court has recognized that “dealing with” is a “broad term.” See N.L.R.B. v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 211, 79 S.Ct. 1015, 1020-21, 3 L.Ed.2d 1175 (1959) (concluding that “dealing with” as used in 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) is a “broad term” and is not synonymous to “bargaining with”). The dictionary definition of “dealing with” is “to be concerned.” Webster’s II New Riverside University Dictionary 350 (1984). Given the breadth of the language used by Congress, we conclude that Menendez’s construction of § 410(b)(2) is overly narrow and that the plain meaning of “dealing with” includes 18 U.S.C. § 641. See United States v. Estus, 544 F.2d 934, 935-36 (8th Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>). Our conclusion that the scope of § 410(b)(2)
holding that a statute which made it illegal for a person to knowingly use  any false writing or document did not involve a continuing offense because it contemplated a single act quoting 18 usc  1001 holding that the defendant could be prosecuted for making false claims against the government under either the false claims statute 18 usc  287 or the mail and wire fraud statutes 18 usc  1341 1343 holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001 holding that good faith is a defense to the willful filing of false statements under 18 usc  1001 holding that 18 usc  1001 which criminalizes making false statements to a united states agency is specifically made applicable to the postal service by 39 usc  410b2