discrediting. The sexual activity took place in an unlocked barracks room and two other service members were present during at least a portion of the sexual encounter. Moreover, one of the room’s windows was left open throughout the encounter and Cpl H video recorded the conduct through the open window. See Marcum, 60 M. J. at 207 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974)) (“The fundamental necessity for obedience and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline, may render permissible within the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it.”). The appellant’s argument that this was a wholly private exchange without aggravating factors is untenable. We find that the same factor C.A.A.F.2013) (summary disposition) (<HOLDING>). In sum, the appellant falls far short of
holding lawrence does not invalidate charges of criminally prohibited sexual activity with minors holding section 2680h barred direct liability claim premised on servicemembers sexual assault and murder of civilian holding that the illinois statutory definitions of sexual penetration and sexual conduct cover clearly distinct conduct and that therefore the statute was not unconstitutionally vague holding that conduct charged under article 120k ucmj was not plainly private when the sexual activity occurred while in the presence of two additional servicemembers in the unlocked barracks room of two other servicemembers who were reasonably likely to unintentionally observe the sexual activity and therefore the failure of the military judge to raise a lawrence issue sua sponte was not plain error holding that sexual harassment need not take the form of sexual advances or other explicitly sexual conduct in order to be actionable under title vii