it leaves unclear, without reference to defendant’s 1983 gun minimum sentence or more information about the 1991 conviction, whether defendant was sentenced in 1991 to 10 years under ORS 161.610(4)(a) for a first use or threatened use of a “machine gun, short-barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun, or * * * silencer” or whether defendantwas sentenced to 10 years under ORS 161.610(4)(b) for a second use or threatened use of another kind of firearm. See ORS 161.610(1) (defining “firearm”). 4 As the sentencing court stated, in reference to defendant’s 1983 conviction, “the denial of the right to jury trial is as fundamental as the denial of the right to counsel, and, therefore, can be collaterally attacked.” See Custis v. United States, 511 US 485, 114 S Ct 1732, 128 L Ed 2d 517 (1994) (<HOLDING>). As stated below, my resolution of this appeal
holding that where the record shows defendant was represented by counsel and the conviction is valid on its face the defendant is precluded from attempting to undermine the validity of that conviction by collateral attack holding that the defendants prior conviction was not obtained in violation of his right to counsel because he had the opportunity for appointed counsel at public expense holding that a prior conviction obtained in violation of a defendants constitutional rights cannot be used as the underlying conviction in a prosecution under colorados felon with a gun statute holding that defendants have a federal constitutional right to make a collateral attack on a prior conviction only when that conviction was obtained without the assistance of counsel holding that there is no constitutional right to appeal a criminal conviction