to any ruling on the motion to compel medical treatment, which it would have had a right to do if it continued to dispute compensability. See Publix, supra. It is well settled that “ ‘[a] party may not predicate an argument for reversal on “invited error,” that is, “error into which he has led or lulled” ’ ” the pertinent adjudicative body. Wood v. State Pers. Bd., 705 So.2d 413, 422 (Ala.Civ.App.1997) (quoting Atkins v. Lee, 603 So.2d 937, 945 (Ala.1992), quoting in turn Dixie Highivay Express, Inc. v. Southern Ry., 286 Ala. 646, 651, 244 So.2d 591, 595 (1971)). Moreover, this court will not issue a writ of mandamus to compel a trial court to perform an act that the trial court was never requested to perform. See Wood v. City of Birmingham, 247 Ala. 15, 19, 22 So.2d 331, 334 (1945) (<HOLDING>). Finally, “[t]his Court cannot put a trial
holding that our court will not consider an issue of whether a defendant has standing to seek suppression of evidence if the issue was not raised in the lower court holding that when there was no attempt in a motion to set aside that part of a decree that was final mandamus would not issue to review the action of the lower court in rendering its final decree since mandamus will not issue to compel the court to do anything that it has not been asked to do holding that an attempt to set aside a divorce decree constituted an impermissible collateral attack holding when the state statute did not abrogate the common law rule the only available damage remedy in a mandamus action was one for making a false return and damages for the delay in doing the thing the mandamus sought to command could not be sought in the mandamus action holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because there was no  consent decree left to be terminated