change in law. See Parrado’s Reply at 7. He seeks to rely on the authority of Salas v. United States, which holds that a defendant may argue that his plea was not knowing or voluntary when an intervening change in law occurs. 139 F.3d 322, 324-25 (2d Cir.1998). The facts stipulated in the plea agreement, however, are binding, and the petitioner is only allowed to contest whether the stipulated facts constitute a crime in light of the change in law. See id. Because Apprendi and Jones dictate that the quantity of narcotics is an element to be decided by the jury, and because Parrado’s guilty plea is the equivalent of a jury decision on quantity, the change in law has no affect on the instant situation. See Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 38, 116 S.Ct. 356, 133 L.Ed.2d 271 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Further, Parrado’s guilty plea was knowingly
holding that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge holding that entering a guilty plea is an admission of guilt and a waiver of the right to jury trial holding that a defendant must have knowledge of the likely consequences of entering the guilty plea in order for a plea to be voluntary and knowing holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to withdraw guilty plea filed three weeks after entering the plea holding that the trial courts erroneous admission of an experts opinion that the defendant was guilty was harmless where the prosecution produced overwhelming evidence of guilt