counsel and have new court-appointed counsel. Id. at 35-36. The appellate court found knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel and also found that his choice was voluntary. Id. A clear choice between two alternative courses of action, however, does not always permit a defendant to make a voluntary decision. The Wilks court emphasized that ”[i]f a choice presented to a [defendant] is constitutionally offensive, then the choice cannot be voluntary.” Id. at 36. 87 . Cf. Birdwell, 10 S.W.3d at 78 (noting that assuming delay based on a defendant’s proceeding pro se "could effectively insulate denials of self-representation from meaningful appellate review”). 88 . See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 820, 95 S.Ct. at 2533-34. 89 . See In re Arnett, 804 F.2d 1200, 1203 (11th Cir. 1986) (<HOLDING>); Spencer v. Ault, 941 F.Supp. 832, 852 (N.D.
holding that under the sixth amendment a criminal defendant may waive his right to counsel if that waiver is knowing intelligent and voluntary holding a waiver of a substantial constitutional right must be a voluntary knowing and intelligent act holding that the constitutional right to a sixmember jury may be waived by a knowing and intelligent waiver recognizing requirement of knowing intelligent waiver holding that a defendants waiver of the right to testify must be knowing informed and intelligent