permissible exercises of her First Amendment freedom of speech and freedom to petition the government for a redress of grievances. We reach a different conclusion. In general, Colorado’s ban on the unauthorized practice of law does not implicate the First Amendment because it is directed at conduct, not speech. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978) (suggesting that the government’s regulation of the practice of law is a regulation of conduct, not speech); S. Christian Leadership Conference v. Sup.Ct. of La., 252 F.3d 781, 789 (5th Cir.2001) (finding that state prohibition on unlicensed students practicing law in state courts did not regulate speech); Drew v. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm., 970 S.W.2d 152, 155 (Tex.App.1998) (<HOLDING>); Fla. Bar v. Furman, 376 So.2d 378, 379
holding that ban on unauthorized practice of law did not implicate the first amendment holding that a law did not violate the first amendment because it did not burden the exchange of ideas and noting most laws restricting a states initiative process would not implicate the first amendment holding that under the supremacy clause a state court could not enforce a prohibition on the unauthorized practice of law against an individual who was permitted to practice law under the rules of a federal court located in the states jurisdiction holding that the unauthorized practice of law constitutes violation of code holding out admission to practice law when not admitted to practice