While polling the jury, the trial court must not engage in either coercive or intimidating conduct, such as requiring jurors’ acquiescence to the verdict or extensive in-court interrogation of a dissenting juror. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 273 A.2d 842, 844-45 (D.C.1971) (stating that trial judge’s repeated efforts to obtain unanimous verdict upon jury polling, including extended questioning of dissenting juror, may have had coercive effect upon dissenting juror); Brutton v. State, 632 So.2d 1080, 1083 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1994) (stating that court’s interrogation of dissenting juror in front of jury created impression that juror lacked right to change vote and led to intimidating situation causing juror to capitulate to verdict); State v. Ware, 498 N.W.2d 454, 459 (Minn.1993) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 14 Heaps argues that a trial court has no
holding that a statement that the jurors were not required to reach a verdict but should try to do so was not coercive holding that an allen charge was not inherently coercive even though jury was split 111 because the judge did not know the identity of the holdout juror holding that under the circumstances the deception was so unfair as to be coercive holding that though judge did not question juror individually note from juror to judge requesting private meeting to ask legal question did not suggest juror would not base verdict on evidence holding that repeated questioning of juror about assent to verdict could be coercive or intimidating