with retailers using its market power. Without such a provision, Caremark was free to negotiate with retailers to pay less than the amount Carpenters would later reimburse it, allowing Caremark to pocket the difference. This, of course, is the very conduct that Carpenters alleges was a breach of fiduciary duty. Given that this scheme was the very deal for which Carpenters bargained at arms’ length, Caremark owed no fiduciary duty in this regard. Schulist v. Blue Cross of Iowa, 717 F.2d 1127, 1131—32 (7th Cir.1983) (parties bargaining at arm’s length prior to entering into contract owe no fiduciary duties for pre-con-tract activities). See also Pharmaceutical Care Mgmt. Assoc. v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 301 (1st Cir.2005), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 2360, 165 L.Ed.2d 280 (2006) (<HOLDING>). This is not to say that the “commercially
holding that the puc does not have the authority to regulate or control the management decisions of a utility absent a finding that the management decision would adversely affect the public holding that pharmaceutical benefit management companies are generally not erisa fiduciaries because they lack discretionary authority or control in the management of the plan but rather engage in ministerial duties holding that theterm discretionary does not apply to the phrase exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of plan assets holding that a partner in and accounting firm who brought an action under the age discrimination in employment act adea and the employee retirement income security act erisa was considered an employee because he was subject to the control of a management committee which acted in secrecy and had no bona fide ownership interest fiduciary relationship voting right or management control holding that professionals who advised the plan were not fiduciaries because they had no decision making authority over the plan or plan assets also noting that the power to act for the plan is essential to status as a fiduciary