of Strickland prejudice. 47 . See, e.g., Washington Reply Br. at 7. 48 . While we assume without deciding that Washington could have prevailed on this theory, we note that a “caution” or “lack of total commitment” defense is difficult to successfully mount given the broad liability for drug-conspiracy charges. See United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 425 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) ("To prove a conspiracy, the government must show: (1) a shared unity of purpose; (2) an intent to achieve a common illegal goal; and (3) an agreement to work toward that goal.”); see also Smith v. United States, 568 U.S. 106, 133 S.Ct. 714, 719, 184 L.Ed.2d 570 (2013) (explaining withdrawal from a conspiracy); United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S, 10, 17, 115 S.Ct. 382, 130 L.Ed.2d 225 (1994) (<HOLDING>). 49 .The government notes that no additional
holding that proof of overt act is not required to support admission of evidence of statement of coconspirator during course of conspiracy holding that proof of an overt act is not required in a  846 conspiracy holding that the elements of a drug conspiracy under 21 usc  846 do include an overt act requirement recognizing requirement that defendant conspired to commit an overt act in state in furtherance of the conspiracy holding that an 18 usc  1956h conspiracy does not require proof of an overt act