issued the citation in 1998. The jury found that substantial interference did not occur until June 12, 1998, a date that corresponds with the postal worker’s testimony, the TCEQ citation, and the plaintiffs’ accounts. Some evidence supports this finding. The Company argues that there would be no statute of limitations for permanent nuisance if a claim could be “revived” by evidence that conditions worsened. But we are dealing here with gradations. On one end of the scale, a nuisance can be established by a physical fact that is beyond dispute. If the nuisance consists of hazardous chemicals in the ground, the nuisance begins when the landowner knows or should have known that the chemicals were there. See Tenn. Gas Transmission Co. v. Fromme, 153 Tex. 352, 269 S.W.2d 336, 338 (1954) (<HOLDING>). The result does not necessarily vary with the
holding that when the representations and warranties were made on the date of closing the statute of limitations began to run on that date even though the contract imposed cure and repurchase obligations on the defendant holding that the date on which the plaintiff learned of the defendants denial of tenure not the date on which the plaintiff became unemployed was when the statute of limitations began to run holding that  2401a statute of limitations on procedural challenge began to run at the latest on the date the challenged regulation was amended recognizing that the statute of limitations for a survival action began to run on the date of the decedents injury as though he was bringing his own lawsuit holding that limitations began to run when the defendant began wrongfully discharging water containing harmful chemicals on the plaintiffs land and not on the date when the extent of the damages to the land were fully ascertainable