is “contingent on future events that may not occur as anticipated.” See id. at 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325. Consequently, the Lanham Act question is not ripe for consideration by the district court or this Court. Appellants conceded as much at oral argument. Because the Lanham Act question is not ripe for consideration, the case should have been dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction without consideration of the merits of the claims. See Sample, 406 F.3d at 312 (noting that ripeness is an essential component of federal subject matter jurisdiction). Because the Lanham Act forms the sole basis for supplemental jurisdiction over Appellants’ state law claims, those claims, too, should have been dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See Womble v. Bhangu, 864 F.2d 1212, 1213 (5th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). We conclude, therefore, that the
holding that the federal district courts dismissal of the plaintiffs federal claims deprived the court of its jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims arising from the same incident holding that the district court was not divested of subject matter jurisdiction upon the dismissal of the plaintiffs federal claims holding that the united states court of federal claims lacks jurisdiction over claims sounding in tort including fraud holding that state law claims cannot pend from a federal one over which the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction holding that the federal claims which arose from state court criminal contempt proceedings were inextricably intertwined with the state court action and thus the federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims pursuant to the rookerfeldman doctrine