“an important but relatively narrow function.” Cordi-Allen v. Conlon, 494 F.3d 245, 255 (1st Cir.2007). Properly focused, they vindicate the basic equal protection principle of “uniform treatment of persons standing in the same relation to the governmental action questioned or challenged.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 [84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506] (1964). But they should not transform every ordinary misstep by a local official into a violation of the federal Constitution. See Cordi-Allen, 494 F.3d at 255; see also Olech, 528 U.S. at 565 [120 S.Ct. 1073] (Breyer, J., concurring). Further, certain government actions are ill-suited to judicial oversight under the class-of-one formula. See Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agrie., 553 U.S. 591, 602 [128 S.Ct. 2146, 170 L.Ed.2d 975] (2008) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, there may be considerable merit
holding the classofone doctrine inapplicable to government employment decisions and explaining that a significant consideration in olech and its forebears was the existence of a clear standard against which departures even for a single plaintiff could be readily assessed holding that on a motion for summary judgment the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiffs position will be insufficient and there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff holding that the nature and circumstances of the charged offenses and the weight of the evidence against the defendant of  3142g1 and 2 are best assessed in the charging district holding that even if the standard for waiver is clear the standard was not met holding that the unwarranted hardship standard was less restrictive than the constitutional taking standard and meant the denial of the reasonable and significant use of the property