at 110. “They instance situations where the legislative and executive branches of government agree on wh 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir.1994) Estate II”) (describing the “prohibition against summary execution” as a “similarly universal, definable, and obligatory” norm); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F.Supp. 162, 184 (D.Mass.1995) (finding summary execution to be a violation of international law). b. Torture As with Plaintiffs’ claims for extrajudicial killings, the Court holds that the existence of the TVPA is strong evidence that the prohibition against torture is a binding customary international law norm. See In re Agent Orange, at 110; Saravia, 348 F.Supp.2d at 1154. Thus, the Court holds that there is a customary international law norm against torture. See also Doe I, 395 F.3d at 945 (<HOLDING>); Estate II, 25 F.3d at 1475 (recognizing the
holding that violation of state law was not a per se constitutional violation holding that section 1983 actions based on violation of the fourth amendment may not rest on violation of state law holding that a violation of a rightofway statute is negligence as a matter of law holding that agents violation of irs regulations did not mandate exclusion of evidence obtained as a result of violation recognizing torture as a jus cogens violation and thus as a violation of the law of nations