persuaded. Only the District Court’s erroneous dismissal of the § 1981 claims enabled that court to re solve issues common to both claims, issues that otherwise would have been resolved by a jury. But for that erroneous ruling, this case would be indistinguishable from Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen. It would be anomalous to hold that a district court may not deprive a litigant of his right to a jury trial by resolving an equitable claim before a jury hears a legal claim raising common issues, but that a court may accomplish the same result by erroneously dismissing the legal claim. Such a holding would be particularly unfair here because Lytle was required to join his legal and equitable claims to avoid the bar of res judicata. See Harnett v. Billman, 800 F. 2d 1308, 1315 (CA4 1986) (<HOLDING>). Our conclusion is consistent with this
holding that res judicata barred conspiracy claim against defendant even though defendant had not been a party to the prior action because the civil conspiracy claim should have been adjudicated in a prior action and defendant as an alleged participant in the conspiracy would have been indispensable party to that adjudication holding that a civil claim is barred by collateral estoppel even though the prior adjudication was in criminal proceedings and the parties are not the same because the matters were actually litigated and decided in the prior trial holding that the doctrine of res judicata is applicable to defenses that could have been raised in a prior action holding that prior adjudication barred a claim that arose out of the same transactions and that could have been raised in prior suit holding that a prior suit and a subsequent suit between the same parties did not involve the same claim because the evidence necessary to sustain the subsequent suit was insufficient to entitle the plaintiff to relief in the prior suit