-, 115 S.Ct. 1359, 131 L.Ed.2d 216 (1995), the methodology employed by the majority gives panels of this court license to issue what in essence are advisory opinions on significant constitutional questions which, because they are Teague-barred, are not even cognizable on federal habeas. Here, for example, our circuit is henceforth bound by the majority’s interpretation of Simmons — an interpretation with which, this time, I happen to agree — when the scope of that decision is not even properly before the court. I would decide the question we are required by Caspari and Gray to decide, namely whether Simmons announced a new rule of constitutional law, and hold that Simmons is a new rule and thus unavailable to petitioner under Teague. Cf. Stewart v. Lane, 60 F.3d 296, 301 (7th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). It is implausible that a reasonable jurist,
holding that identical language in montana postconviction relief statute bars application of laches holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence holding that conviction based on plea of nolo contendere bars subsequent  1983 claim because even though such a plea does not involve admission of guilt it does communicate acceptance of conviction and sentence holding that teague bars application of simmons to a conviction final in 1985 holding that 405k cannot support a rule 60b motion for relief from a final civil judgment and stating that the principle of retroactive application of controlling decisions applies only to application in other civil cases which are not yet final at the time the controlling decision is issued