580, 589, 605 A.2d 1106 (1991), aff'd. o.b., 127 N.J. 394, 605 A.2d 1073 (1992). “The purpose of the principle is to effectuate current policy.” Kruvant v. Mayor & Council of Cedar Grove, 82 N.J. 435, 440, 414 A.2d 9 (1980). A municipality may change its land-use ordinances after an application has been filed, even “in direct response to the application.” Burcam Corp. v. Planning Bd., 168 N.J.Super. 508, 521, 403 A.2d 921 (1979). However, the time-of-decision rule is not automatic. See Lake Shore, supra, 255 N.J.Super. at 589, 605 A.2d 1106. A court must balance the municipality’s zoning interest against the developer’s degree of reliance on the old statute and its entitlements of right. Id. at 590-91, 605 A.2d 1106. See also Phillips v. Curiale, 128 N.J. 608, 617, 608 A.2d 895 (1992) (<HOLDING>). In this case, resolution of the
holding that retroactive application of statute turns on legislative intent and whether retroactivity works either unconstitutional interference with vested rights or manifest injustice holding retroactive application holding no retroactive application recognizing a general principle that retroactive application of rules is permitted absent any manifest injustice holding that retroactive application of amendments will not result in manifest injustice