Whitman never expressly told Khan or Motey that he would rather not know the story behind a suspicious tip. But a defendant’s “purposeful contrivance” to avoid knowledge, Svoboda, 347 F.3d at 480, may not manifest in an affirmative act because “the very nature of conscious avoidance makes it unlikely that the record will contain directly incriminating statements.” United States v. Kozeny, 667 F.3d 122, 134 (2d Cir.2011). For that reason, “[i]t is not uncommon for a finding of conscious avoidance to be supported primarily by circumstantial evidence.” Id. Whitman responded to warning signs about the nature of Khan and Mote/s tips not with skepticism but with advice on how better to play fast and loose. A reasonable jury could thus infer that WL 1943342 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2013) (<HOLDING>). But that question is not at issue in this
holding that employer breached fiduciary duty to disclose that it was considering allowing employees to participate in benefit plan holding that a debtor need not have received a benefit from the fraudulent activity in order for  523a2a to prevent a discharge holding that remote tippee need only know that tipper breached a fiduciary duty and not have specific knowledge that tipper received a personal benefit recognizing that on the part of a fiduciary there is a duty to make a full disclosure of any and all material facts within his knowledge and of which he knows or should know that the other person is ignorant holding record supported jury finding that fiduciary relationship existed between bishop diocese and plaintiff and that such duty was breached