inapplicable to her. The State’s argument, however, was recently rejected by this Court in Clark v. State, 166 So.3d 147, 151 (Ala.Crim.App.2014) (“Although Clark committed his offense well before October 1, 2013, he was not sentenced until October 11, 2013, and, according to the expressed intent of the legislature, was required to be sentenced under the presumptive sentencing standards.”.). 5 . Under the presumptive standards a “non-prison” disposition includes probation, community corrections, county jail/work release, a reverse split, or a split sentence with a suspended split. ’ See Presumptive and Voluntary Sentencing Standards Manual 23. 6 . On remand, the circuit court may not impose a sentence length, greater than 30 months. See generally Ex parte Tice, 475 So.2d 590 (Ala.1984)
holding that an express waiver of the right to appeal the sentence was invalid because the trial court had failed properly to advise the defendant and that the defendant therefore did not waive his right to appeal the legality of his sentence holding that defendant cannot successfully challenge legal sentence or attack underlying conviction through motion for sentence reconsideration holding that a judge who imposes a more severe sentence after the original sentence is successfully attacked must affirmatively state objective reasons for the harsher sentence to ensure that vindictiveness against the defendant plays no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial holding that a court may not impose a harsher sentence on a defendant who successfully challenges his sentence on appeal holding that the presumption of vindictiveness only applies when the new sentence is actually harsher than that imposed prior to the successful appeal