124, 125 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (claim for economic loss); Flax v. McNew, 896 S.W.2d 839, 841 (Tex. App.—Waco 1995, no writ) (claim for economic loss, emotional distress, and other elements of damages). 5 . The IIED claim was Hardin's only claim against Devall. 6 . Through an election of remedies, LeBlanc elected to recover against Devall the conversion damages and abandon the IIED damages. 7 . See supra at n.6. 8 . OGA filed a motion for judgment n.o.v. on other grounds. The trial court could grant it judgment n.o.v. on the "wrongful pregnancy” issue to the extent the law supported such an outcome even without OGA moving on that basis. See McDade v. Tex. Commerce Bank, Nat'l Ass’n, 822 S.W.2d 713, 717-18 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). 9 . See City of Houston v. Petroleum Traders
holding that superior court erred in granting judgment nov and remanding for a new trial generally holding that the trial court may not grant summary judgment on a ground not raised in the motion holding that superior courts erred in granting judgment nov on a wrongful death claim and remanding for new trial on that claim and on damages holding that trial court may grant judgment nov on grounds other than that presented in motion for judgment nov so long as the party receiving such relief did file motion holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion