clearly established federal law. As the magistrate judge properly concluded, by prosecuting Dewald for the allegedly unlawful use of a candidate’s name and the conversion of other committees’ donor lists, “the Michigan Attorney General intruded into territory directly covered by the FECA and its regulations.” Dewald, 2012 WL 3206021, at *16-17 (citing various statutory and regulatory provisions governing the precise conduct at is sue in Dewald’s prosecutions, including 2 U.S.C. §§ 432(b)(4), 441d(a)(3), and 438(a)(4) as well as 11 C.F.R. §§ 102.14(a), 110.11, and 104.15). Where, as here, Congress expressly preempts state regulation in a particular domain, prosecutions under state law are prohibited. See Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Harris, — U.S.—, 132 S.Ct. 965, 970, 181 L.Ed.2d 950 (2012) (<HOLDING>); see also Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S.
holding that the preemption provision of the act does not apply to a fraud prosecution because there is no conflict with state insurance regulation holding that erisa preempts a plaintiffs claims for violation of the state insurance code and consumer protection act holding that fehbas complete preemption provision closely resembles erisas express preemption provision and precedent interpreting the erisa provision thus provides authority for cases involving the fehba provision recognizing limits on the erisa preemption clause holding that express preemption clause in the federal meat inspection act preempts california penal code provision on the slaughter of hogs