the incompletely redacted Meadows at Kyle II contracts — and Whittington’s specific denial in response to that question. Duncan asked, and more to the point, Whittington lied, precisely because the fact was material. Whittington’s only argument of any substance on this element is that the fiduciary relationship arose so late — at or after each closing — that his fiduciary duty could not have been breached by any failure to disclose. It is true that Texas law teaches that a fiduciary duty must exist before it can be breached. “[T]he trust giving rise to the fiduciary relationship must exist prior to the act creating the debt, i.e. the debtor must have been a trustee' prior to his or her wrongdoing.” Cardwell, 2011 WL 6338813, at *8; Willis v. Donnelly, 199 S.W.3d 262, 276-77 (Tex.2006) (<HOLDING>); Meyer v. Cathey, 167 S.W.3d 327, 331
holding that a breach of duties that a fiduciary contractually assumes beyond those duties imposed by law is considered to arise out of contract holding that there could be no claim for breach when allegedly wrongful actions occurred before the alleged fiduciary attained the position that triggered the duties holding there was no evidence to support the existence of any alleged fiduciary duty holding that first amendment barred adults breach of fiduciary duty claim against pastor for actions that occurred when parishioner was a minor holding that causes of actions against directors of corporations for breach of fiduciary duty are contract actions