168 Vt. at 485, 726 A.2d at 25. ¶ 54. The broad public benefit that underlies all of the statutory exemptions, however, is different from the distinctly public character that we require of property in order to specifically qualify as a “public” use. As we explained in American Museum, the public-use exemption exists “ ‘for the performance of service essentially public in nature . . . and, in so doing, assumes a share of the public burden.’ ” 151 Vt. at 109, 557 A.2d at 904 (quoting English Language Ctr., Inc. v. Town of Wallingford, 132 Vt. 327, 329-30, 318 A.2d 180, 182 (1974)) (emphasis added). We have suggested that a similar public character must inhere in certain “charitable” uses in order to qualify for the statutory exemption. See MacDonough-Webster, 2003 VT 70, ¶ 16 (<HOLDING>). ¶ 55. To expect, however, that a church or
holding that a fraternal lodge which did not benefit an indefinite segment of the public at large could not qualify for the charitableuse exemption of  462 holding that an issue is a matter of substantial public importance where it involves the use of property in a large subdivision and involves the rights of a large number of people holding that the tennessee statute providing an exemption for a life insurance policy made for the benefit of the insureds spouse andor children or dependent relatives allows for the exemption of the cash surrender values of such policies holding that no public policy stated where employee and not public at large would benefit from employees whistleblowing actions recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public