1679, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968). “While States have broad power to regulate economic activity,” N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 913, 102 S.Ct. at 3425, they can prohibit only certain forms of intimidation and coercion in connection with labor disputes. See Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 104-05, 60 S.Ct. at 745. If it is assumed, arguendo, that the Texas statute seeks to regulate “fighting words,” nevertheless, it must be shown to be precisely and narrowly drawn, so as not to cover protected speech. A carefully drafted statute prohibits only speech that is not protected by the First Amendment; and a statute is deemed unconstitutionally overbroad, if it restricts protected as well as unprotected speech. See Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 94 S.Ct. 970, 39 L.Ed.2d 214 (1973) (<HOLDING>); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 92 S.Ct.
holding unconstitutional an ordinance prohibiting opprobious language holding ordinance restricting availability of abortion unconstitutional holding that a plaintiff had standing to attack an entire ordinance including portions of the ordinance not applied to the plaintiff holding an ordinance was unconstitutionally vague for prohibiting conduct entirely dependent upon whether or not a policeman is annoyed holding that  1324 preempted a local ordinance prohibiting renting housing to illegal aliens