date of sentencing. See United States v. Labeille-Soto, 163 F.3d 93, 99 (2d Cir.1998) (“If the defendant has completed his state prison term before the federal sentence is imposed, § 5G1.3 does not apply, and his federal prison term cannot be imposed concurrently.”). While not technically incarcerated at the time of his sentencing, Scott nonetheless argues that his term of term of imprisonment was not “discharged” because New York law defines parole as a part of the sentence of imprisonment. See New York Penal Law § 70.40(l)(a) (“Release on parole shall be in the discretion of the state board of parole, and such person shall continue service of his or her sentence or sentences while on parole, in accordance with and subject to the provisions of the executive law and the c Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Ramirez, 252 F.3d 516, 519
holding the iad was not applicable to a prisoner who had been sentenced but was incarcerated in a local jail or holding facility while awaiting transfer to the assigned penal institution holding that because the defendant was not imprisoned  incarcerated in a penal institution  when he was sentenced  he was not subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment and could not invoke  5g13 holding that the concurrent sentencing requirement of  5g13b  is only triggered when there is an undischarged term of imprisonment at the time of sentencing holding that   3584a allows the district judge to specify the sequence of service of terms of imprisonment only when sentences are imposed at the same time or the other sentence is an undischarged term of imprisonment to which the defendant is already subject  holding that a term of imprisonment begins at the time a prisoner is sentenced