written instructions or policies with no limitation as to subject matter.” (Emphasis in original.) Choice asserts that “instruction” can only be construed to “relate to specific tasks [that] are issued by employers from time to time throughout the course of an employee’s employment,” Accordingly, under Choice’s construction of the provision, Choice could terminate Feeley for failing to follow any instruction given for any task at any time during his employment, without restriction. Choice’s interpretation of this one ground for termination—out of nine grounds—would convert Feeley’s employment status to at-will. See id. (requiring limitations to termination to be specific and not general); Curtis v. Ziff Energy Grp., Ltd., 12 S.W.3d 114, 118 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Such a construction would be in contradiction
holding requirement in contract to provide notice for termination but not limiting reasons for termination constitutes atwill employment relationship holding that a clause limiting arbitration to employment termination extends to a defamatory comment made after such termination about employees service holding that the conflicting explanations given by defendants agents for the plaintiffs termination were also sufficient to raise a reasonable inference that defendants proffered reasons for the termination were pretextual the inconsistent testimony  regarding the motivating reasons for plaintiffs termination cast doubts on the asserted nondiscriminatory legitimate reasons and may alone  be sufficient to preclude summary judgment on plaintiffs claim holding that termination is an adverse employment action holding that the plaintiffs express atwill agreement precluded the existence of an implied contract requiring good cause for termination