id.; Li v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 913, 916 (9th Cir.2007). The United States may defend against an application for fees by showing that its position throughout the litigation was “substantially justified.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The parties do not dispute that an award would be just or that the application for fees was timely; however, they disagree about whether Wagner is a “prevailing party” and whether the government’s position was “substantially justified.” A. Prevailing Party To be a “prevailing party” under the EAJA, a party must establish that a federal court’s actions resulted in a “material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties” and that the alteration was “judicially sanctioned.” Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604-05, 121 S.Ct. 1835; see Perez-Arellano, 279 F.3d at 794 (<HOLDING>). 1. Material Alteration of the Legal
holding that payment of eaja fees directly to the attorney also is consistent with the broad purpose for enacting the eaja  if the commissioners narrow position was adopted there would be a substantial risk that counsel for a successful plaintiff might not be paid which would have a chilling effect on the willingness of attorneys to represent indigent claimants in social security cases thus thwarting the primary purpose the eaja was enacted holding that the buckhannon rule governs an application for fees under the eaja holding that the eaja application satisfied the eaja content requirements because it contained among other things an itemized statement of the fees sought  supported by an affidavit from the appellants counsel holding that buckhannon applies to the attorneys fees provision of the idea holding that under the eaja a litigant did not incur fees when his former employer agreed to pay his legal fees and expenses