are governed-by the Strickland standard, which declared that “legal representation violates the Sixth Amendment if it (1) falls ‘below an objective standard of reasonableness,’ as indicated by ‘prevailing professional norms,’- and (2) the defendant suffers prejudice as a result.” Chaidez v. United States, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1103, 1107, 185 L.Ed.2d 149 (2013) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). The test is applied to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at any stage of the litigation. See Hill v. Lock-hart, 474 U.S. 52, 57, 106 S.Ct 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). In Strickland, the Supreme Court found that the district court had properly declined to issue a writ of habeas corpus. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 701, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (<HOLDING>). Counsel, it explained, had not made an
holding that designation is neither a sentence nor a punishment holding trial counsels performance at sentencing where defendant received death sentence after initial guilty plea was neither unreasonable nor prejudicial recognizing that defendant must show 1 that counsels performance was deficient and 2 that counsels errors prejudiced the defense holding that counsels assistance was not ineffective even though counsel used the wrong version of the federal sentencing guidelines because counsels performance was based upon a reasonable decision to offer a guilty plea in exchange for a lighter sentence holding where neither defense counsel nor the trial court explained to the defendant that intent to cause death was an element of seconddegree murder and there was no factual statement or admission implying intent the plea was involuntary