of constitutional finality that attend an acquittal.” Id. at 729, 118 S.Ct. 2246 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 134, 101 S.Ct. 426, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980)). Like the United States Supreme Court, we find that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude granting the State a second opportunity to demonstrate that Collins meets the criteria for habitualization. A second attempt to prove the criteria for an enhanced sentence does not equate to “a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal.” Lippman, 633 So.2d at 1064 (quoting Pearce, 395 U.S. at 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072). We have held in other contexts that a resentencing following a reversal on a sentencing issue does not implicate double jeopardy concerns. See Trotter, 825 So.2d at 368 (<HOLDING>); Harris v. State, 645 So.2d 386, 388
holding that double jeopardy clause did not apply to forfeiture proceeding before the court holding that imposition of a habitual offender sentence on remand after the trial courts pronouncement of a nonhabitual sentence in the original proceeding does not violate double jeopardy holding that double jeopardy principles are not violated where the trial court did not impose a multiplier at the original sentencing but imposed a multiplier on remand holding that in a new sentencing proceeding after the original sentence has been vacated by the appellate court the trial court is not precluded from applying a drugtrafficking multiplier that it did not use in formulating the original sentence holding that double jeopardy protections did not prevent the state from presenting evidence of youthschool sentencing enhancement when the original sentence was overturned on appeal