that the continuance was at Mr. McIntosh’s request. But the only reason noted in the record for the continuance involved the State’s need to interview witnesses. 2 Accord, United States v. Koller, 956 F.2d 1408, 1414 (7th Cir. 1992) (8-month delay presumptively prejudicial on drug charges); State v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 56, 803 P.2d 557, 560 (Ct. App. 1990) (approximately 8-month delay on forgery claim); State v. Olmsted, 1998 MT 301, 292 Mont. 66, 968 P.2d 1154, 1162 (256-day delay for burglary and drug possession), overruled in part by State v. Ariegwe, 2007 MT 204, 338 Mont. 442, 167 P.3d 815; Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Tex. App. 1997) (814 month delay on delivery of cocaine charge); see also United States ex rel. Fitzgerald v. Jordan, 747 F.2d 1120, 1127 (7th Cir. 1984) (<HOLDING>); Smith v. State, 550 So. 2d 406, 408 (Miss.
holding that delay resulting from prior incompetence to stand trial does not violate speedy trial guarantee holding that dismissal was required where overall length of prosecution was 16 months state was responsible for 13 months of delay and six months of that delay was due to simple neglect holding that a 19month delay between indictment and trial did not violate the constitutional right to a speedy trial holding that a delay of 8 months is enough to provoke a speedy trial inquiry holding that whether a pretrial motion actually caused or is expected to cause delay of trial is irrelevant to the speedy trial act