information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole.” Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. The State introduced no physical evidence of a sexual assault, nor did anyone other than the complainant witness the sexual assault. T.N., however, testified at trial, and his statements are consistent with R.N.’s testimony as the outcry -witness. The jury found T.N.’s testimony to be credible. Moreover, the range of punishment in this case was 5 to 99 years or life. Although the prosecutor discussed the extraneous offenses during closing argument, he did not seek the maximum punishment available. The jury assessed punishment at eight years’ confinement, far below the maximum, and only three years above the minimum. See Jones v. State, 111 S.W.3d 600, 609-10 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, pet. ref’d) (<HOLDING>); Tabor v. State, 88 S.W.3d 783, 788-89
holding that trial courts failure to give reasonabledoubt instruction sua sponte during punishment phase for extraneous offenses offered during punishment was harmless error in part because the jury assessed punishment far below maximum available despite states plea for maximum holding that a criminal offense carrying a maximum punishment in excess of 500 requires trial to a jury holding that trial court did not err in failing to sua sponte provide instruction regarding extraneous offenses during guiltinnocence holding that trial courts failure sua sponte to give reasonabledoubt in struction during punishment phase about pen packets offered during punishment was harmless error because sentence imposed was well within punishment range and prosecutor had asked for greater sentence holding that article 3707 section 3 of the code of criminal procedure requires the trial court to give a defendant opportunity to present evidence regarding punishment after it has found the particular defendant guilty and before punishment is assessed