in § 1325(a)(5)(C) does not speak to satisfaction of a claim”). The debtors therefore ask us to read the valuation applicable to the retention option under § 1325(a)(5)(B) into the subparagraph governing surrender, § 1325(a)(5)(C). But we will not read language from one statutory section into another; if Congress intended to provide for full satisfaction of a 910 car claim upon surrender, it would have done so expressly. See Russello v. Uni hat § 506(a) determines the meaning of the phrase “allowed secured claim” in that section. In the absence of express language linking the meaning of “allowed secured claim” in § 1325(a)(5) to § 506(a), the most natural reading of the phrase is that it describes a claim that is both “allowed” under the Bankruptcy Code and “secured” by a lien. Cf. id. (<HOLDING>). Thus, the phrase “allowed secured claim” in §
holding that if claim is not an allowed secured claim pursuant to section 506a by its terms section 1325a5b is inapplicable holding that if  506 does not apply to an allowed claim such claim cannot become a secured claim holding that the words allowed secured claim in  506d refer to a claim that is secured by a lien and allowed under  502 holding that the meaning of allowed secured claim in  506a does not determine the meaning of allowed secured claim in  506d holding that section 506d does not permit the strip down of a partially secured lien