to the rule, ‘it may generally be said that any delay of eight months or longer is presumptively prejudicial.’ ”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 2 Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 18.2 (1984)); State v. Dixon, 969 S.W.2d 252, 256 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (“[A] delay of eight months or longer should be considered presumptively prejudicial.”); City of Billings v. Bruce, 1998 MT 186, 290 Mont. 148, 965 P.2d 866, 877 (establishing 200 days as length of delay necessary to trigger further analysis), overruled in part by Ariegwe, 2007 MT 204; Pierce v. State, 921 S.W.2d 291, 294 (Tex. App. 1996) (“Most delays of eight months or longer are considered presumptively unreasonable and prejudicial.”). But see United States v. Lugo, 170 F.3d 996, 1002 (10th Cir. 1999) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Derose, 74 F.3d 1177, 1185
recognizing possession of cocaine as a lesserincluded offense of possession of cocaine with intent to sell holding no presumptive prejudice for approximately 7month delay on charges of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and reentry of deported alien holding that simple possession of cocaine is not lesser included offense of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute holding similar evidence sufficient to sustain a jury verdict of possession with intent to distribute cocaine holding no unfair prejudice from admission of conviction for possession of 50 to 200 pounds of marijuana with intent to distribute as evidence of intent to distribute cocaine