of the corporation’s income. Indeed, our research indicates that, consistent with Metz-Keener, courts in other jurisdictions will only consider a corporation’s retained earnings to be a party’s income if the party has substantial control over a corporation’s earnings or is the sole stockholder. See, e.g., Bleth v. Bleth, 607 N.W.2d 577, 579 (N.D.2000); Mitts v. Mitts, 39 S.W.3d 142, 148 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000). Here, the AAA was created when respondent and the other members of the Siegel-Robert board of directors voted to convert Siegel-Robert into a Subchapter S corporation. Appellant argues that the retained earnings are marital property because they are attributable to respondent’s entrepreneurial efforts during the marriage. See Nardini v. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184, 192 (Minn.1987) (<HOLDING>); White v. White, 521 N.W.2d 874, 878
holding that circuit court erred in failing to consider that marital property in the form of marital earnings was used to pay debt against nonmarital property holding that whether a spouses employment termination benefit is separate or marital property is determined by whether the right to payment accrued during marriage holding that transferring joint property into one partys name for estate planning purposes does not convert marital property into nonmarital property holding that an increase in the value of nonmarital property attributable to the efforts of one or both spouses during marriage is marital property holding that money invested in voluntary investment plan during marriage was marital property because it was property acquired during marriage