this standard is in “doubt post-Booker.” Lackard’s suggestion to the contrary, however, the Guidelines are still to be considered in determining an appropriate sentence. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 49, 128 S.Ct. 586 (“As a matter of administration and to secure nationwide consistency, the Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial benchmark.”). In addition, because the district court specifically addressed several § 3553(a) factors before imposing Lackard’s sentence and explicitly tied them to Lackard’s case, we find that Lackard has failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness afforded his within-Guidelines sentence. See United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir omitted); United States v. Chemical Found., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15, 47 S.Ct. 1, 71 L.Ed. 131 (1926) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we refuse Lackard’s request to
holding that to dispel the presumption that a prosecutor has not violated equal protection a criminal defendant must present clear evidence to the contrary holding the prosecutor is required to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury holding that absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary a defendant is bound by his representations made during a plea colloquy holding that plaintiff must present such evidence holding that a conviction violated due process because the prosecutor knowingly refused to disclose crucial exculpatory evidence to the defendant