basis of the qualified immunity defense. Id. The plaintiff then filed a motion for attorney’s fees, which the district court denied. Id. at 759, 100 S.Ct. at 1990. The court of appeals reversed on the ground that its earlier pronouncement that plaintiff's due process rights had been violated constituted a form of judicial relief. Id. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the only relief afforded plaintiff was "the moral satisfaction of knowing that a federal court concluded that his rights had been violated.” Id. at 762, 100 S.Ct. at 1991. It found that plaintiff had not prevailed and added, "[a]ny other result strains both the statutory language and common sense.” Id. at 763, 100 S.Ct. at 1992. 6 . But see Palmer v. City of Chicago, 806 F.2d 1316, 1320 (7th Cir.1986) (Posner, J.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1049, 107 S.Ct. 2180,
holding merely that the evidence was sufficient to support the award of attorneys fees holding that a preliminary injunction reversed on appeal does not support an award of attorneys fees holding that a district court may award attorneys fees while the merits are on appeal holding that an award of attorneys fees under supreme court rule 38 precursor to rule 222 did not preempt an award of attorneys fees to which one is otherwise entitled and thus appellant could seek an award of attorneys fees pursuant to section 1577300 which permits an award of fees for a party prevailing in an action against a state agency holding prayer for general relief does not support award of attorneys fees