to the Estate,” but “[i]f Segal proves that there are monies owed, and that the monies at issue constitute post-petition wages, then the Estate is no worse off as a result”). Segal’s argument that the Trustee abandoned any interest he may have had in the monies owed under the Consulting Agreement is therefore without merit. Finally, Segal argues the Bankruptcy Court improperly reopened the bankruptcy case and expanded the scope of the District Court’s referral by allowing the Trustee to litigate this adversary proceeding. This Court disagrees. Under 11 U.S.C. § 350(b), a bankruptcy court may reopen a case — on motion of a party or on its own motion — “to administer assets, to accord relief to the debtor, or for other cause.” See Donaldson v. Bernstein, 104 F.3d 547, 552 (3d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Here, the Bankruptcy Court had cause to
holding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioners motion to dismiss under 11 usc  707a holding a bankruptcy court is empowered to reopen a bankruptcy case on its own motion under 11 usc  105a holding that a motion to enforce bankruptcy sale order is a core proceeding and citing 11 usc  105a as the section which gives the bankruptcy court the power and the jurisdiction to enforce its valid orders  holding that bankruptcy court has discretionary power pursuant to 11 usc  105a to order preconfirmation plan payments in a chapter 12 proceeding holding that claims under 11 usc  362h must be brought in the bankruptcy court rather than in the district court which only has appellate jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases