[M]ere presence in another’s apartment, without more, would not suffice to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy. More than mere presence, however, is arguably shown in this case. Id. at 27, 537 A.2d at 619-20 (citations omitted). The Court in Ricks went on to find that, whereas appellants had standing to challenge the search, the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 27-28, 537 A.2d at 620. In State v. Sampson, 362 Md. 438, 765 A.2d 629 (2001), Judge Wilner, speaking for this Court, adopted the refined two-prong test articulated in California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 39, 1 10th Cir.1986) (finding that squatter had no standing to challenge search of cave where he had been staying for eight months); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 546 Pa. 65, 683 A.2d 253, 259 (1996) (<HOLDING>); State v. Linton, 356 N.J.Super. 255, 812 A.2d
holding that squatter had no standing to challenge search of abandoned apartment which he had occupied solely for the business of packing for distribution for narcotics holding that squatter had no standing to challenge search of abandoned apartment because hardly more than a fugitive presence would not be one that could be accepted by society holding that defendant staying in abandoned house had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the house despite having a key to the house and the ability to let people in and out of it holding that squatter had no reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore no fourth amendment standing to challenge search of abandoned structure holding that squatter had no standing to challenge search of abandoned house where he was staying