and counsel should review the verdict prior to its publication to contend that the trial court in this case committed reversible error by not reviewing the verdict with counsel prior to returning the jury for further deliberations. Assuming that the trial court should have shown the first verdict to counsel, this assumed error does not demand a reversal as ultimately the defense has no right to insist that the court accept a return of ambiguous verdicts or to insist on a particular instruction. Consequently, Appellant has failed to show that he has sustained any legal prejudice because the trial court at all times had the discretion to return the jury to the jury room for additional deliberations to clarify their verdict.” (citations omitted)). 35 See Frost, 328 Ga. App. at 341 (1) (<HOLDING>), reversed on other grounds by State v. Frost,
holding that trial court erred in granting plea in bar as to murder when prior to receipt and publication of fact that jury could not reach a verdict on murder count jury had indicated in notes to the trial court that it had acquitted defendant of murder and holding that there was no verdict until it was received and published in open court holding that a criminal defendant convicted by a jury on one count cannot attack that conviction because it was inconsistent with the jurys verdict of acquittal on another count citations omitted holding that trial court erred in insisting upon a mistrial as to all counts when jury had indicated that it was only hung as to one count and noting that the trial court erred because it could easily have followed the less drastic alternative of accepting the jurys verdict on the decided counts and declaring a mistrial only on the undecided count such that there was no manifest necessity to grant a mistrial punctuation omitted holding that defendant could not complain on appeal that the severed trial of two counts was tried to the same jury on the same day when he moved to sever the counts and then agreed to incorporating evidence from the trial of one count into the trial of the other count holding that when there was no manifest necessity for aborting a trial rather than using other less drastic remedies to cure problems in the absence of defendants motion for a mistrial the granting of a mistrial is an abuse of discretion