groups on the basis such groups have not been.shown to share unique attitudes, ideas, or experiences, and therefore, do not constitute a “distinctive group.” E.g., State v. Puente, 69 Ohio St.2d 136, 431 N.E.2d 987, 989 (1982) (considering exemption of doctors, dentists, and lawyers from jury service); Boyd, 867 S.W.2d at 336 (considering systematic exclusion of doctors, lawyers, and the clergy); cf. Commonwealth v. Matthews, 406 Mass. 380, 548 N.E.2d 843, 848 (1990) (considering exclusion of “suburban parents” and “caretakers of adolescent children”). Other courts have skipped the distinctive-group analysis and have simply held the government had a legitimate reason to exclude the occupational group under consideration. E.g., United States v. Terry, 60 F.3d 1541, 1544 (11th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 737, 133
holding that a defendant need not be a member of the excluded group in order to assert a sixth amendment faircrosssection claim holding that fire departments are analogous to police departments in this respect holding routine exclusion of members of fire and police departments did not violate the faircrosssection requirement because it is good for the community that these workers not be interrupted in their work holding that the right of privacy does not extend to sexual behavior that is not purely private that compromises a police officers performance and that threatens to undermine a police departments internal morale and community reputation holding that a defendant may object to the exclusion of members of the defendants own race