any failure to disclose Mr. Burke was harmless, that he is competent to testify as to Target’s reasons for settling the underlying lawsuit based on his personal knowledge, and that Target need not offer “de novo proof’ of facts establishing its potential liability to show that it settled in reasonable anticipation of liability. Target is correct that it need not offer “de novo proof’ of its potential liability. Still, U.S. Gypsum — the leading Illinois case on this issue, and the authority on which Target primarily relies — plainly contemplated that some evidence from the underlying case (as opposed to ex post statements by counsel) would be offered to support the insured’s argument that it settled in reasonable anticipation of liability. See id., 205 Ill.Dec. 619, 643 N.E.2d at 1245 (<HOLDING>) (Emphasis added). Indeed, neither Gypsum nor
holding exclusion inapplicable because under the facts alleged in the underlying suit the insured could receive personal profits and be legally entitled to retain them and distinguishing cases where there was sufficient evidence in the underlying complaint to show the profits received were illegal or undeserved within the meaning of the exclusion holding that a judgment for attorneys fees may be rendered in the nature of child support regardless of whether the underlying action is one of enforcement or modification holding that although the specific underlying felony is an essential element of felonymurder the government is not required to include the elements of the underlying felony or state the specific means by which it alleges the defendant committed the underlying felony holding that the insured may offer testimony evidence or depositions obtained or adduced in the underlying cases  because whether gypsums anticipation of liability was reasonable would naturally turn on the quality and quantity of proof which gypsum would expect to be offered against it in the underlying action holding that in granting summary judgment the trial courts disregard of the plaintiffs proffered expert testimony was not erroneous because that testimony would go not to the question of whether defendants decision took safety into account but rather would go to the question of the quality of the decision