care ... to reasonably assure itself that its immediate vendee and distributor was so informed as to be able and likely to transmit ... knowledge of [the product’s] dangers.”); In re Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litigation, 971 F.2d 831, 838 (2d Cir.1992) (stating that “[t]he sophisticated intermediary doctrine protects a manufacturer from liability only if the chain of distribution is such that the duty to warn ultimate users should fall on an intermediary in that chain, rather than on the manufacturer”); Smith v. Walter C. Best, Inc., 927 F.2d 736, 741 (3rd Cir. 1990) (weighing totality of factors is required to determine reasonableness of reliance on a third party as a conduit of necessary product information); Stuckey v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 874 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); Hunnings v. Texaco, Inc., 29 F.3d 1480 (11th
holding that arizona rule of civil procedure 52a requires the court to find only the ultimate facts not the evidentiary facts upon which the ultimate facts are based holding that the defendant pharmacist had undertaken a duty to accurately warn of a drugs side effects with respect to the warning actually given but not a duty to warn of all possible side effects of the medication holding that there is no necessity to warn a consumer already aware through common knowledge or learning of a specific hazard holding that the staffing agency which forwarded a background check conducted by another entity to the ultimate employer was liable under  1681bb3 because its decision to furnish the report to the ultimate employer was an adverse action holding that a suppliers duty to warn an ultimate consumer can be discharged by a warning given to an intermediary but focus is on whether the intermediarys knowledge was sufficient to protect the ultimate consumer