Finally, because the sentences are not reclassified or “enhanced,” nothing prevented the court below from “stacking” them. See § 775.021(4), Fla. Stat. (1983) (“Whoever, in the course of one criminal transaction or episode, commits separate criminal offenses, upon conviction and adjudication of guilt, shall be sentenced separately for each criminal offense; and the sentencing judge may order the sentences to be served concurrently or consecutively.”). Indeed, even had they been enhanced, only the minimum mandatory portions of the sentences could not be. “stacked.” See Palmer v. State, 438 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla.1983) (prohibiting the stacking of minimum mandatory sentences). For these reasons, we affirm the order on appeal. 1 . See Harris v. State, 766 So.2d 403, 404 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>); § 775.087(1), Fla. Stat. (1983) (providing
holding that iowa burglary is not categorical burglary as the elements of iowa burglary law are broader than those of generic burglary holding that armed robbery cannot be enhanced under section 7750871 florida statutes 1981 because under the robbery statute it is already an enhanced charge due to the use or display of a weapon holding that the police have an automatic right to conduct a protective search of a burglary suspect because burglary is a crime for which an offender would likely be armed holding that the defendants sentence for armed burglary in violation of section 810022b was improperly enhanced pursuant to section 775087 because the use of a weapon or a firearm is an essential element of armed burglary holding that when defendant was guilty of burglary but the only evidence that he was armed was from his own statement existence of the firearm went only to the degree of the offense and was not as an element of proof