an employer from intentionally treating someone differently based on his or her age. It would be a stretch to read the phrase “because of such individual’s age” to prohibit incidental and unintentional discrimination that resulted because of employment decisions which were made for reasons other than age. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 611-13, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 1707, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993) (“The ADEA requires the employer to ignore an employee’s age ...; it does not specify further characteristics that an employer must also ignore.”). Admittedly, in Griggs, the Supreme Court construed language in Title VII that was nearly identical to that found in Section 623(a) of the ADEA to create a disparate impact theory of discrimination. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431, 91 S.Ct. at 853 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, we generally interpret the ADEA
holding that discriminatory employment practices are cognizable under title ix holding that dogs are effects holding that title vii proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in operation holding that employment practices which are neutral in form but which result in discriminatory effects are prohibited unless justified by business necessity holding that the csras exclusive and comprehensive remedial scheme precludes review under the apa of disputes that concern not only employment practices specifically prohibited under the csra but also employment practices that are so insignificant as not even to bear mention in the csra