been reasonably equivalent to the $248,896.88 in transfers to Ms. Buchanan. See Gray v. Snyder, 704 F.2d 709, 711-12 (4th Cir.1983). According to 11 U.S.C. § 548, “ ‘value’ means property, or satisfaction or securing of a present or antecedent if the transfer satisfies a “claim” the transferee-creditor has against the debtor. The bankruptcy code defines “claim” as: “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliqui-dated, fixed, contingent, matured, unma-tured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). Congress intended that this be the “broadest possible definition.” H.R.Rep. No. 595, at 309; S.Rep. No. 989, at 21; see also Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 279, 105 S.Ct. 705, 707-08, 83 L.Ed.2d 649 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Ms. Buchanan contends she had a claim against
holding that a broad statutory definition of a term that was inconsistent with the terms plain meaning did not affect the terms definition in other contexts recognizing that congress desired a broad definition of a claim  recognizing broad scope of the reorganization estate recognizing that congress has the power to completely divest the courts of their sentencing discretion and that congress granted broad authority to the sentencing commission guided by specific goals and principles holding that congress use of requirement evinced an intent for broad preemption of state tort laws