that, after a district court grants a motion for relief under § 2255, it may exercise its discretion to entertain during resentencing a motion for downward departure due to post-sentence rehabilitation. Much as a district court conducts de novo resentencing after a general remand, see, e.g., Jennings, 83 F.3d at 151, so too may it choose to broaden the scope of resentencing after it chooses to grant relief pursuant to § 2255. See United States v. Jones, 114 F.3d 896, 897 (9th Cir.1997) (permitting, during resentencing pursuant to § 2255, the re-imposition of a fine on the basis of information developed after sentencing) (“[T]he statute gives district judges wide berth in choosing the proper scope of post-2255 proceedings.”); United States v. Moore, 83 F.3d 1231, 1234-35 (10th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Pasquarille v. United States, 130 F.3d
holding that the constitutional right to crossexamination must be satisfied first before the court can exercise its discretion in limiting the scope or extent of crossexamination holding that in considering dismissal of an appeal the court should exercise discretion to determine whether dismissal is appropriate in the circumstances presented by the case holding that to grant a writ of mandamus a court in the exercise of its discretion must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances holding that upon vacating a sentence pursuant to  2255 a district court must exercise its discretion to determine the appropriate scope of resentencing proceedings holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion