on appellants to sign the addendum, and the conspicuousness of the provision. Although appellants were not represented by counsel as the Secchis in Prudential were, nor did they negotiate the contract over six months as the Secchis in Prudential did, the record shows that appellants were not precluded from doing so and could have done so if they wanted. And the other facts of this case are similar enough to those in Prudential that I believe it is controlling here. Based on the foregoing undisputed facts, I believe that the jury waiver here, and the circumstances under which it was signed, are substantially similar to the waiver and circumstances in Prudential. See Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 134; see also Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 203 S.W.3d at 316; Wells Fargo, 115 S.W.3d at 609-10 (<HOLDING>). Thus, I would conclude that Bank of America
holding that jury waiver stating that it was made knowingly and voluntarily raised presumption of same and that burden was on party challenging enforceability of jury waiver to present evidence overcoming presumption recognizing initial burden of presenting prima facie evidence that jury waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made is on party seeking to enforce provision holding defendant was not entitled to jury instructions on lesserincluded offenses because his request did not constitute a waiver of the statute of limitations on those offenses such a waiver must be knowingly intelligently and voluntarily made holding prelitigation waiver of jury trial must be made knowingly and voluntarily and courts will indulge in every reasonable presumption against a waiver of that right recognizing presumption