1053, 1058 (Ind.1998)). And the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to effective assistance of counsel during his first appeal as of right. Taylor v. State, 840 N.E.2d 324, 337 (Ind.2006) (citing Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985)). Here, it is undisputed that, despite our clear order directing that new appellate counsel be appointed for Allen, no such appointment was made. As a result, Allen’s appeal was not effectively prosecuted and was ultimately dismissed. We therefore agree with the post-conviction court, Allen, and the State that Allen was denied his right to the assistance of counsel during his direct appeal. See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (<HOLDING>); Castellanos v. United States, 26 F.3d 717,
holding that when counsels deficient performance deprives a defendant of an appeal he would have oth erwise taken the defendant has made out a successful claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel holding that for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to be established a defendant must show that but for counsels error the outcome of his proceedings would have been different holding that ineffective assistance of counsel occurs when there is deficient performance and prejudice which is a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record holding that to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel a defendant must demonstrate that counsel was constitutionally deficient and as a result defendant was prejudiced