short, the plaintiffs made a compelling showing of need for the information in question and the surrounding circumstances did not make apparent the likelihood that disclosure would lead to serious injury. As indicated above, under such conditions, a judge is required to examine carefully a claim of privilege to satisfy himself of its legitimacy. The question then becomes: does such judicial scrutiny require the judge to insist that the government make as complete as possible a public defense of its claims? Unfortunately, this is one of those procedural issues to which the case law provides no clear solution. Only three decided cases bear on the matter. The two that are directly relevant are flatly inconsistent with one another. Compare Kinoy v. Mitchell, 67 F.R.D. 1, 8 (S.D.N.Y.1975) (<HOLDING>), with Jabara v. Kelley, 75 F.R.D. at 488
holding that it is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself holding that the decision of the appellate court establishes the law of the case and it must be followed by the trial court on remand holding that an award of arbitration cannot be set aside for mere errors of judgment either as to the law or the facts if the award is within the scope of the submission and the arbitrators are not guilty  of the acts of misconduct set forth in the statute the award operates as a final and conclusive judgment and  however disappointing it may be  the parties must abide by it holding that the person claiming the privilege must set forth with enough particularity to enable the court to make an informed decision the nature of the material withheld and of the threat to the national security should it be revealed holding that a fraudulent transfer complaint need only set forth the facts with sufficient particularity to apprise the defendant fairly of the charges made against him