(1st Cir.1993) (a monitoring device consisting of " 'alligator clips attached to a microphone cable at one end’ and an ‘interface connecting [a] microphone cable to a VCR and a video camera' on the other * * * is precisely the type of intercepting device Congress intended to regulate heavily when it enacted Title III”); Torres, 751 F.2d at 885 ("[T]he soundtrack of a videotape, no less than a free-standing tape recording, is within the scope of Title III.”); United States v. Haimowitz, 725 F.2d 1561, 1581-82 (11th Cir.1984) (assuming that the audio component of a video recorder is subject to Title III); Audenreid v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 97 F.Supp.2d 660, 663 (E.D.Pa.2000) (since "the evidence produced by the parties clearly demonstrates that the video camera which had ir.1977) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Cheely, 814 F.Supp. 1430,
holding recordings properly authenticated where law enforcement agents who participated in the taped conversations testified that according to their memories the audio and video tapes contained accurate recordings of the conversations that occurred holding that when the district court improperly purported to transfer to the circuit court an action over which the circuit court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction the circuit court was without jurisdiction to enter its judgment which was void and dismissing the appeal from that void judgment holding that the exclusionary rule should not be applied to searches which relied on fifth circuit law that was subsequently overturned holding that the appellants claim that the circuit court erred in failing to make specific findings of fact as to all claims in the appellants rule 32 petition was not preserved for review because the appellant did not first present the claim to the circuit court holding that the fact that appellee here taped the conversations which he permissibly overheard we find as the fifth circuit did in simpson v simpson 490 f2d 803 809 5th cir 1974 to be a distinction without a difference