circumstances proved must be “consistent with [the] conclusion [of guilt] and inconsistent with any other rational conclusion.” We noted that such language is not a “mandatory” instruction in circumstantial evidence cases. Id. Moreover, we explained that tests for sufficiency of the evidence are conceptually distinct from jury instructions and “not every sufficiency of the evidence test should be read to the jury.” Id. We have followed Turnipseed in two relevant cases. See, e.g., State v. Stein, 776 N.W.2d 709, 723 (Minn.2010) (“Although we eventually abandoned the special jury instruction, State v. Turnipseed, 297 N.W.2d 308, 313 (Minn.1980), we retained the traditional rational hypothesis review standard.”) (Meyer, J., concurring); State v. Jones, 516 N.W.2d 545, 548 n. 4 (Minn.1994) (<HOLDING>). Recently we discussed the circumstantial
holding that trial court did not err holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to give the defendants tendered instruction regarding the voluntariness of his confession holding that turnipseed controlled and that the district court did not err in failing to give a rational hypothesis jury instruction regarding circumstantial evidence holding that trial court did not err in failing to sua sponte provide instruction regarding extraneous offenses during guiltinnocence recognizing that in circumstantial evidence cases a judgment of acquittal is appropriate if the state fails to present evidence from which the jury can exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt