less room for advancement.” Id. at 613 (quoting Sharp v. City of Hous., 164 F.3d 923, 933 (5th Cir.1999)); Pegram, 361 F.3d at 283 (“[A]n employment transfer may qualify as an adverse employment action if the change makes the job objectively worse.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare Sys., LLC, 277 F.3d 757, 770 (5th Cir.2001) (“A job transfer that includes a shift change that involves changes in duties or compensation or can be objectively characterized as a demotion may be an ‘adverse employment action’.... ”); see, e.g., Sharp, 164 F.3d at 933 (“The jury could have viewed transferring from the elite Mounted Patrol to a teaching post at the Police Academy to be, objectively, a demotion.”); Forsyth v. City of Doll., 91 F.3d 769, 774 (5th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Click v. Copeland, 970 F.2d 106, 110 (5th
recognizing as demotions the reassignment of two police officers from the intelligence unit to night patrol because the intelligence unit positions were more prestigious had better work ing hours and were more interesting than night patrol and few officers voluntarilytransferred from the intelligence unit to night patrol and other officers had been so transferred as punishment holding that injury of plaintiff  who was detained in negligently parked patrol car that along with another patrol car was struck by thirdparty vehicle  did not arise out of use or operation of patrol car within meaning of ttcas motorvehicle waiver rather patrol car merely furnished condition that made injury possible holding that officers had reasonable suspicion to stop suspect seen driving late at night only a short distance from the area in which a crime had been committed holding that defendant violated  148a1 when he refused officers repeated requests to step away from the patrol car holding that the juvenile defendants who voluntarily left their homes in the middle of night to ride to the police department in patrol cars and who were told they were not under arrest were not in custody