persuasive effect. However, Rodriguez is correct that the motion to strike is not authorized under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure as USSA used it here: to summarily dismiss Rodriguez’s substantive claims without an opportunity to replead. See, e.g., Fort Bend County v. Wilson, 825 S.W.2d 251, 252-53 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ); Centennial Ins. Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Cos., 803 S.W.2d 479, 482-83 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ); Susanoil, Inc. v. Cont’l Oil Co., 516 S.W.2d 260, 263-64 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1973, no writ). Moreover, as in Centennial, we find that Rodriguez has not waived this issue because the trial court’s use of the unauthorized procedural mechanism was the type of error that cannot be waived. See Centennial, 803 S.W.2d at 482 (<HOLDING>). As this court explained in Centennial,
holding dismissal for failure to comply with rule 8 was dismissal of entire action which was appealable final order holding that complaint that appellee used an unauthorized procedure to obtain dismissal of appellants claims was not waived because the trial court lacked authority to enter the order of dismissal holding that plaintiffs were entitled to vacate final order of dismissal as void when they did not receive the motion for dismissal or notice of the hearing on the order until after the dismissal was entered holding that a district courts order of dismissal with prejudice was a nullity because the court lacked jurisdiction holding that a review committee of the kansas board for discipline of attorneys had the authority to dismiss a complaint against an attorney with or without prejudice and when dismissal was ordered without specifying the nature of the dismissal the dismissal was without prejudice to the filing of later proceedings on the same matter