from their conduct....” Johnson v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 38 F.3d 198, 200 (5th Cir.1994), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1361, 131 L.Ed.2d 218 (1995). 8 . See Leffall, 28 F.3d at 531 ("|T]he [state-created danger] cases consistently require a § 1983 plaintiff relying on substantive due process to show that the state actors are guilty of ‘deliberate indifference’ towards the victim of the deprivation."). Even under the rationale of the cases recognizing a state-created danger theory of § 1983 liability, it is not enough to show that the state increased the danger of harm from third persons; the § 1983 plaintiff must also show that the state acted with the requisite culpability in failing to 8 L.Ed.2d 785 (1990); Longoria v. City of Bay City, 779 F.2d 1136, 1138 (5th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). 12 . See also Stewart, 951 F.2d at 684 ("The
holding statute of limitations began to run when plaintiffclient learned attorney negligently drafted contract not later when plaintiff lost on merits defending contract in lawsuit holding that limitations period began to run when flooding occurred not when plaintiffs learned city had been on notice of flooding potential and had fraudulent motive holding that period of limitations on a patients negligence cause of action began to run when the patient knew or had reason to know about the foreign object left in her body holding that limitations began to run when the defendant began wrongfully discharging water containing harmful chemicals on the plaintiffs land and not on the date when the extent of the damages to the land were fully ascertainable holding that the date on which the plaintiff learned of the defendants denial of tenure not the date on which the plaintiff became unemployed was when the statute of limitations began to run