the conduct of the professional association. However, OGA fails to explain how this distinction applies to this case other than to distinguish this case from Dale. Further, OGA did not argue below that the doctors were not acting in the course and scope of their employment. Therefore, we express no opinion on this argument. 3 . We note, however, that in certain cases involving complex interrelationships between corporations, professional associations, or other types of entities, a report prepared by an expert in corporate law may be helpful to the medical experts and the court, and may be considered as a "good cause” exception to the general rules concerning expert reports under Chapter 74. See Packard v. Guerra, 252 S.W.3d 511, 528-533 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). But this is not such a case. Further, we note
holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by sequestering a criminal defendants fingerprint expert holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion when considering the reactive nature of the federal claim holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining expert witness was qualified to testify holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering expert report prepared by nonphysician corporate lawyer to connect the dots among the business relationships of defendant entities and doctors acting in their corporate capacities