the FDIC acquires the failed bank, the FDIC has acquired no asset and therefore may not invoke § 1823(e)). In light of our holding that the federal common law D’Oench doctrine has not been preempted, we need not decide whether §§ 1821(d)(9)(A) or 1823(e)(1) are limited to claims that impair the FDIC’s interest in a specific asset. See Brookside Assocs. v. Rifkin, 49 F.3d 490, 495 (9th Cir.1995) (declining to address the extent to which § 1823(e) is limited by a specific asset requirement because the common law D’Oench doctrine is not so limited). Instead, we reaffirm the principle that the common law D’Oench doctrine is not limited to claims relating to a specific asset of the bank that has been acquired by the FDIC. RTC v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 594-95, 597 (11th Cir.) (en bane) (<HOLDING>), cert, denied sub nom. Jones v. RTC, — U.S. -,
holding that section 1823e is narrower than the doench doctrine and that section 1823e applies only to cases involving a specific asset holding that the commonlaw doench doctrine applies to bar suit even when the rtc does not acquire a specific asset whose value is affected by the alleged secret agreement holding that the doench doctrine protects the fdic even where the fdic does not have an interest in an asset holding that claims that do not diminish or defeat the fdics interest in any specific asset are nevertheless doench barred in light of the established purpose of the doench  doctrine to protect the fdics reliance on the banks records holding that regardless of whether a specific asset is involved doench applies to claims or defenses that relate to ordinary banking transactions