must be compelling proof that the refusal to deal was motivated by anticompetitive purposes, or will produce an anticompetitive effect. See, e.q., Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 133 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946, 99 S.Ct. 340, 58 L.Ed. 2d 338 (1978) (“[Something more than an agreement between [a manufacturer and a distributor] must be shown. The agreement becomes violative of Section 1 of the Sherman Act only if it is anticompetitive in purpose and effect — in sum, it must be tested by the rule of reason.”) (emphasis in original); Westman Comm’n Co. v. Hobart Int’l, Inc., 796 F.2d 1216, 1223 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 108 S.Ct. 1728, 100 L.Ed.2d 192 (1988); cf. Local Beauty Supply, Inc. v. Lamaur, Inc., 787 F.2d 1197, 1200 (7th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, regardless whether a combination
holding that to be preempted as a per se illegal hybrid restraint a regulation must involve a delegation of market power to private parties that is per se illegal because otherwise the hybrid restraint could not be attacked as facially invalid holding that the per se rule does not apply to a vertical agreement between a buyer and supplier and noting that precedent limits the per se rule in the boycott context to cases involving horizontal agreements among direct competitors holding that otherwise lawful nonprice mechanism agreements between a manufacturer and a distributor may be rendered per se unlaw ful if imposed as part of an illegal scheme to fix prices holding that a maximum vertical price maintenance scheme is not per se illegal holding such agreements to be per se illegal