on a procedural defect. The statute does not say “if plaintiff makes a motion to remand based on a procedural defect within thirty days, the court must grant the motion.” The plain language of the statute makes this conclusion untenable. However, this court wishes to stress that it is not saying a court may not order a remand based on a procedural defect. It is quite clear that procedural defects may be the basis of a remand order. See Huffman, 194 F.3d at 1077-79; Cornwall, 654 F.2d at 686-87; see also Freebird, Inc. v. Merit Energy Co., 597 F.Supp.2d 1245, 1249-50 (D.Kan.2009) (remanding for failure to allege the requisite amount in controversy under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) and the Class Action fairness Act); Marshall v. Skydive America South, 903 F.Supp. 1067, 1070-71 (E.D.Tex.1995) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, just because a court may order
holding that a failure to specify codefendants consent in notice of removal was a procedural defect not amenable after the thirtyday time for amendment had passed holding that any defect in removal procedure must be cured within the 30day removal period or it is fatal to the removal and defendants failure to attach exhibits to the notice of removal within that time required remand holding that the circuit judge did not have the authority to extend the thirtyday time limit for filing a notice of appeal holding that the laterserved defendants  had thirty days from the date of service on them to file a notice of removal with the unanimous consent of their codefendants even though the firstserved codefendants did not file a notice of removal within thirty days of service holding that remand was necessary where all defendants did not officially and unambiguously consent to removal notice within the mandatory thirtyday statutory time period