“industry wide safety standards,” and the manufacturer relied on the safety standards. 101 Wn. App. at 857-62. No duty can exist under the rescue doctrine without this privity of reliance. ¶14 In sum, a public entity has a duty under the rescue doctrine when an injured party reasonably relies, or is in privity with a third party that reasonably relies, on its promise to aid or warn. See, e.g., Bratton v. Welp, 145 Wn.2d 572, 576-77, 39 P.3d 959 (2002); Babcock v. Mason County Fire Dist. No. 6, 144 Wn.2d 774, 778, 30 P.3d 1261 (2001) (finding no duty to aid because reliance was unreasonable); Beal v. City of Seattle, 134 Wn.2d 769, 785, 954 P.2d 237 (1998) (analyzing duty to aid under “special relationship” doctrine); Honcoop v. State, 111 Wn.2d 182, 192-93, 759 P.2d 1188 (1988) (<HOLDING>). But the Osborns relied on neither Mason
holding the voluntary assumption of a duty will give rise to liability if the performance is not done with reasonable care holding that no duty to warn exists when hazards are known through general knowledge holding that such a duty exists holding duty to warn exists only if public entity makes assurances that could give rise to justifiable reliance holding trade association voluntarily assumed the duty to warn because manufacturers relied upon assurances