Clause is thus most naturally read to concern whether the property is used by the public or the government, not whether the purpose of the taking is legitimately public. II Early American eminent domain practice largely bears out this understanding of the Public Use Clause. This practice concerns state limits on eminent domain power, not the Fifth Amendment, since it was not until the late 19th century that the Federal Government began to use the power of eminent domain, and since the Takings Clause did not even arguably limit state power until after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Note, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 Yale L. J. 599, 599-600, and nn. 3-4 (1949); Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, 250-251 (1833) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, several early state
holding the act inapplicable to the united states in its role as employer holding that temporary deprivations of use are compensable under the takings clause recognizing that the supremacy clause does not of its own force create rights holding confrontation clause inapplicable at sentencing holding the takings clause inapplicable to the states of its own force