Law No. 111-203, § 1400(c); 124 Stat. 1376, 2136. Thus, the appropriate period for response was, at the relevant time, 60 days. 7 . As above, Dodd-Frank made changes to RESPA, including increasing this amount to $2,000. Dodd-Frank, Pub. Law No. 111-203, § 1463; 124 Stat. 1376, 2184. However, § 1400(c) of Dodd-Frank delayed the effective date of Title XIV of the Act and with it, this $1,000 to $2,000 change. Dodd-Frank, Pub. Law No. 111-203, § 1400(c); 124 Stat. 1376, 2136. Thus, the appropriate figure is $1,000. 8 . See, e.g., Merriweather v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 11-15515, 2012 WL 4378568, *3, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137303, *8 (E.D.Mich. Sept. 25, 2012) and Wienert v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 08-cv-14482, 2009 WL 3190420, *7-8, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89881, *22-25 (E.D.Mich. Sept. 29, 2009) (<HOLDING>); see also Eichholz v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA.,
holding where there is no duty to defend there is no duty to indemnify holding that statutes dealing with same subject matter should be construed with reference to each other as parts of one system holding that if there is only one construction that will permit all parts of the deed to be given effect it should be followed holding that only one trier of fact should be used for the trial of what is essentially one lawsuit to settle one claim split conceptually into separate parts because of historical developments holding that there is no duty to comply with all three parts of  2605e2 rather a servicer should choose one response option  but not stating or implying that the choice is one of complete discretion