the first prong. The Court will deny the relief sought because the petition fails on the first prong — the petitioner has not, for the following reasons, demonstrated an indisputable right to the creation of such an overpayment. A writ must be denied as to this element of the extraordinary relief sought because we hold that the Secretary is already obliged, if the statutory and regulatory requirements are met, to pay attorney fees in an appropriate amount directly to the attorney without regard to any recoupment of any overpayment to the veteran. We note at this point that we make no determination as to whether the attorney would be entitled to the full 20% (or any portion thereof) of the past-due benefits total awarded for all three claims. See Mason Fee Agreement, 13 Vet.App. at 86 (<HOLDING>). a. Interpretation of statutory provision: The
holding because an award of attorney fees is discretionary court may consider attorney fees in relation to the underlying equities in the case holding that where attorney successfully represents a va claimant before this court  the secretary is obligated under certain circumstances to pay directly to the attorney 20 of the pastdue benefits awarded on the basis of the claim or application for benefits underlying the issues successfully appealed to this court holding that issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised for the first time before this court holding that direct payment of attorney fees for representation before the court is to be made on the basis of the claim or application for benefits underlying the issues successfully appealed to this court holding that a district court may not authorize an attorney to charge fees for representation in court when the commissioner has already authorized that attorney to charge fees for representation in administrative proceedings and declining to reach the secretarys contention that  406b does not allow a court to authorize attorneys fees unless it renders a judgment on the merits favorable to the claimant