court’s interim order and the entirety of its findings of fact and conclusions of law. 1 . See Johnson v. Johnson, 836 P.2d 930, 933 (Alaska 1992); Burrell v. Burrell, 537 P.2d 1, 7 (Alaska 1975). 2 . See Ulsher v. Ulsher, 867 P.2d 819, 821 (Alaska 1994). 3 . See Monette v. Hoff, 958 P.2d 434, 436-37 (Alaska 1998); Vachon v. Pugliese, 931 P.2d 371, 375 (Alaska 1996); J.F.E. v. J.A.S., 930 P.2d 409, 411 (Alaska 1996). 4 . See Lewis v. Lewis, 785 P.2d 550, 552 (Alaska 1990). 5 . See Burrell, 537 P.2d at 7. 6 . See Vachon, 931 P.2d at 375. 7 . See Kowalski v. Kowalski, 806 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Alaska 1991). 8 . See Alaska R. Civ. P. 52(a) (requiring trial courts to make findings in support of their decisions in non-jury cases); see also Duffus v. Duffus, 932 P.2d 777, 779 (Alaska 1997) (<HOLDING>); Bird v. Starkey, 914 P.2d 1246, 1249 (Alaska
holding it improper to independently review the record to find support for a trial courts decision so long as it is unclear whether the trial court considered statutory factors holding that as long as the findings are supported by substantial evidence the board must defer to the hearing committees credibility determinations because they are subsidiary findings of basic facts holding that wjhile trial courts are encouraged to state all findings in their written child custody orders they are not required to do so as long as the basis for their decisions is clear from the record and thus susceptible to review holding that that choices as to selection and arrangement are entitled to copyright protection only so long as they are made independently holding that even though defendants response does not affirmatively state in the document itself that they are competent to testify as to the facts to which they swore does not necessarily doom their testimony  so long as the record taken as a whole demonstrates that their testimony meets the requirements of rule 56