occurs when the prosecutor, while arguing, either: (1) places the prestige of the government behind the witness by making explicit personal assurances of the witness’s credibility; or (2) implicitly vouches by implying that the witness’s credibility is supported by evidence outside the record. De La Cruz Suarez, 601 F.3d at 1218. Improper vouching does not exist where a prosecutor “simply [makes] explicit an inference that the jury could have drawn from the evi dence.” United States v. Epps, 613 F.3d 1093, 1101 (11th Cir.2010) (quotation omitted), cert. denied - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1526, 179 L.Ed.2d 344 (2011). Even where vouching occurs, it only warrants reversal if it prejudicially affects the substantial rights of the defendant. Cargill v. Turpin, 120 F.3d 1366, 1379 (11th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Finally, with respect to Cummings’s assertion
holding that a defendant bears the burden of objecting to an allegedly improper closing argument at the time the improper argument is made holding that a district court can cure the effect of an improper prosecutorial comment with a jury instruction recognizing that the defenses response argument at closing can ameliorate the improper prosecutorial comments holding that alleged prosecutorial misconduct must be evaluated in light of the prosecutors argument and the entire record and if a review of the record convinces the court that the jury would have convicted defendant even if it were not exposed to the alleged improper prosecutorial comments then no actual prejudice occurred recognizing that a lawyers comments during closing argument may explain away the alleged prejudicial effect of the opposing parties closing argument comments