recent developments in the law have undermined the Ninth Circuit’s rationale for characterizing conciliation as jurisdictional. The Supreme Court “has implicitly rejected the notion that Congress’ preference for conciliation, while important, is a sufficient basis in of itself for concluding that Congress intended the requirement to be jurisdictional.” E.E.O.C. v. Alia Corp., 842 F.Supp.2d 1243, 1252, 2012 WL 393510, at *6 (E.D.Cal. February 6, 2012); see Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 130 S.Ct. 1237, 1248 n. 9, 176 L.Ed.2d 18 (2010) (“We do not agree that a condition should be ranked as jurisdictional merely because it promotes important congressional objectives.”); see also Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 504, 515-516, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has made clear that a
holding requirement nonjurisdictional and remanding for a possible eeoc waiver of that requirement recognizing that most other courts apply title vii principles to title ix cases but refusing to apply title viis knew or should have known standard to a title ix claim holding that there is no individual liability under title vii holding that title viis numerosity requirement is nonjurisdictional even though it serves the important policy goal of sparing very small businesses from title vii liability because the statutory provision containing the requirement does not speak in jurisdictional terms or in any way refer to the jurisdiction of district courts holding that title viis provision limiting its application to businesses with fifteen or more employees was not jurisdictional on the basis that when congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character