the trial judge to which the defendant assented.” Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005); United States v. Murillo-Lopez, 444 F.3d 337, 340 (5th Cir.2006). Flores-Vasquez contends that because the statute of conviction includes “stealthy snatching,” it does not categorically qualify as a crime of violence. The D.C. Circuit has held that the D.C. robbery statute does not categorically qualify as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). See In re Sealed Case, 548 F.3d 1085, 1089 (D.C.Cir.2008). However, the Government cites our discussion of a Texas statute (which did not explicitly include “stealthy snatching”) as supporting its argument that the D.C. robbery statute qualifies as generic robbery. Santiesteban-Hernandez, 469 F.3d at 381 (<HOLDING>). We need not resolve any tension among prior
holding that a conviction under a texas robbery statute qualifies as generic robbery be cause its elements substantially correspond to the basic elements of the generic offense in that they both involve theft and immediate danger to a person holding in part that robbery as a class b felony is not necessarily a lesserincluded offense of robbery as a class a felony holding conviction for robbery under alabama statute a crime of violence both because the statute involved physical force and because robbery was one of the enumerated offenses in comment note 1 to ussg  4b12 holding that where the states definition of robbery has on its face the element of use or threatened use of physical force a robbery conviction is properly used as a predicate under acca holding insufficient the plaintiffs generic allegations