similar requirements, are “crimes of violence.” Although neither section contains a requirement that physical force be employed, see State v. Rivera, 260 Conn. at 490, 798 A.2d 958, the Connecticut Supreme Court has treated a conviction for risk of injury under § 53-21(2), arising out of the sexual assault of child victims as violent in nature. In Rivera, the defendant had been charged with risk of injury to a minor and second degree sexual assault based upon his sexual assault of two of his young relatives. Noting that neither the sexual assault statute nor the risk of injury statute contains an element of physical violence, the Court held that, nevertheless, the defendant’s crime was violent in nature. Id. at 492, 798 United States v. Rodriguez, 979 F.2d 138, 140-41 (8th Cir.1992)(<HOLDING>); Ramsey v. INS, 55 F.3d 580, 583 (11th
holding that a conviction for sexual assault of a child under nebrevstat  28320011 was a crime of violence because this type of contact between parties of differing physical and emotional maturity carries a substantial risk that physical force may be used in the course of committing the offense holding that because the crime of rape involved a nonconsensual act there was a substantial risk that physical force may be used in committing the offense holding that under iowa code  7098 the offense of lascivious acts with a child was a crime of violence because it involved a substantial risk that physical force would be used against the child victim in the course of committing the offense holding that a conviction for a lascivious act with a child in violation of iowa code  7098 was a crime of violence holding that the florida offense of attempted lewd assault on a child under the age of sixteen is a crime of violence even though the offense might be accomplished without use of physical force