Id.; Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802-03, 93 S.Ct. 1817; Johnson, 931 F.2d at 207. If this is done, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the allegedly legitimate reason is merely a pretext for discrimination. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804, 93 S.Ct. 1817. However, “a reason cannot be proved to be a ‘pretext for discrimination’ unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (citation omitted); see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 146, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (<HOLDING>). In the summary judgment context, St. Mary’s
holding that the objective truth or falsity of reports concerning a witness were not subject to further proof because such truth or falsity was a collateral matter holding that the factfinder may infer discrimination from the falsity of the employers explanation holding that a plaintiff can establish pretext only by showing that her employers explanation is a he holding that if factfinder rejects employers proffered nondiseriminatory reasons as unbelievable it may infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination without additional proof of discrimination recognizing that jury may infer from the evidence that defendants money came from drug sales