victim’s undisputed injuries, this court held that the statute required proof that the bodily injury was a foreseeable, rather than intentional, result of the rights-viólating conduct. Woodlee, 136 F.3d at 1405. At no point did this court even consider the possibility that the statute might not require proof of foreseeability at all, i.e., that the statute, imposed strict liability .on a defendant for bodily .injury resulting from his conduct. Because there is no logical distinction between the statutory language at issue in Woodlee and the language of § 841(b)(1)(E) that we are now tasked with interpreting, I believe that we are bound by Woodlee to interpret § 841(b)(1)(E) as incorporating a proximate cause requirement. See United States v. Ensminger, 174 F.3d 1143, (10th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). To conclude otherwise creates an
holding that in the absence of an intervening supreme court decision only the en banc court may overrule a decision by a threejudge panel holding that a panel may not reconsider issues decided earlier in the same case by the en banc court holding that one panel of this court is bound by the precedent of an earlier panel absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision of the supreme court holding that only intervening law from the supreme court or this court sitting en banc can overrule a prior panel decision holding that we are bound by prior panel opinions until they are overruled or abrogated by the supreme court or this court sitting en banc