with [Harrison] participated in the alleged beating.” Id. Nothing more is required for summary judgment to be denied. On this record, Plaintiffs are also entitled to argue that deputies who were present had a duty to intervene to prevent the use of excessive force against Harrison, even if not all of them integrally participated in the application of force. “[P]olice officers have a duty to intercede when their fellow officers violate the constitutional rights of a suspect or other citizen.” United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1447 n. 25 (9th Cir.1994), rev’d on other grounds, 518 U.S. 81, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996). “[0]fficers can be held liable for failing to intercede only if they had an opportunity to intercede.” Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Liability for failure to intervene may extend
holding that officers were not entitled to qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage where there was a triable dispute as to whether they were reasonable in shooting a suspect who was not facing or pointing his gun at them holding officers did not have a realistic opportunity to intervene because they were not present at the time of the shooting holding that an officer did not employ excessive force in shooting a suspect who turned out to be unarmed because at the time of the shooting the officer had a reasonable belief that the suspect posed a threat and was armed holding that a defendant did not waive his right to be present at an ex parte encounter between the judge and juror because he was not present at the time of the communication and therefore had no opportunity to object when the error was committed holding that evidence of recklessness by one officer in events leading up to shooting was immaterial in evaluating objective reasonableness of shooting officers decision to use deadly force in the situation he faced at time of shooting