Protection Law (“UTPCPL”) because plaintiffs have no evidence of malfeasance but only nonfeasance, and the law requires that a plaintiff establish malfeasance to prove liability. Defendants also argue that plaintiffs cannot claim that they had a reasonable expectation of insurance coverage because they knew that the policy that had purchased did not provide such coverage. Under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL”), 73 Penn. Stat. §§ 201-1, et seq., “[i]t is well established that an insurer’s refusal to pay benefits to an insured is nonfeasance, and not actionable under the CPL.” Klinger v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 895 F.Supp. 709, 717 (M.D.Pa.1995); see also Horowitz v. Federal Kemper Life Assurance Co., 57 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the plaintiffs would not have a claim
holding that in pennsylvania only malfeasance the improper performance of a contractual obligation raises a cause of action under the unfair trade practices and consumer protection law citation omitted and an insurers mere refusal to pay a claim which constitutes nonfeasance the failure to perform a contractual duty is not actionable holding that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction under the rookerfeldman doctrine to hear a rescission claim brought under the pennsylvania unfair trade practices and consumer protection law after entry of a judgment in a state court mortgage foreclosure action because rescinding the loan would negate the state court judgment holding unfair trade practices and consumer protection law applicable to residential leases holding that a cause of action exists under the connecticut unfair trade practices act for violations of the cuipa holding that an insurers violation of covenant of good faith and fair dealing was actionable under the consumer protection act