823. The Court further explained: “However, so far as said cases rule, even though dicta, that a railroad corporation may not, upon a valuable consideration, by agreement and purchase and by a deed in fee, take the fee in land so purchased, they are overruled.” 43 S.W.2d at 823 (emphasis added). Coates, therefore, does not “recognize” the existence of the rule that plaintiffs discern in the original Chouteau decision. Rather, Coates makes plain that the law was never to that effect. Instead, a railroad could obtain fee title via deed so long as there was no language limiting the interest conveyed and upon a showing of valuable consideration. 43 5. W.2d at 823 (finding that series of deeds dated between 1868 and 1876 conveyed fee title to railroads); see also Hubbert, 58 Fed. Cl. at 616 (<HOLDING>); Bayless v. Gonz, 684 S.W.2d 512, 513
holding that deeds dated 1884 conveyed fee title to railroad because granted for valuable consideration and without limiting language holding that attorneys fee statute using shall language is not discretionary holding transfer of capital accounts from a limited partnership to a llc was valuable consideration for purposes of imposing state real estate transfer fee because the members received new rights and privileges holding transfer of legal title to property as a capital contribution to llc was in exchange for valuable consideration and constituted a sale of the property holding that where a contract for legal services fails to expressly provide for the amount of the fee a reasonable fee is implied