incapacitation; (3) whether the person committed an offense involving driving under the influence of alcohol, controlled substances or drugs; and (4) whether the tests, if any, were administered in accordance with the provisions of this article and article five of this chapter. W.Va.Code § 17C-5A-2(f) (emphasis added). 6 . The distinction between a judicially-created exclusionary rule and a statutorily-created one must not be overlooked. In Chase v. Neth, 269 Neb. 882, 697 N.W.2d 675 (2005), the Supreme Court of Nebraska dealt with such distinction, explaining that "the statutes in effect at the time of Chase’s arrest do not require the State to establish the validity of the arrest, that requirement having been specifically removed from the statutes by the 2003 amendments.” Id. at 684 (<HOLDING>); see also People v. Krueger, 208 Ill.App.3d
holding that exclusionary rule does apply to civil forfeiture proceedings holding that exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture proceedings holding that probation and parole revocation hearings are not criminal proceedings such that the state exclusionary rule applies but noting that police misconduct which shocks the conscience may lead to invocation of the exclusionary rule holding that the exclusionary rule generally does not apply to immigration proceedings holding judicial exclusionary rule inapplicable to administrative license revocation proceedings but acknowledging application of statutory exclusionary rules where applicable