acts of savings and loans associations of their basic state common-law-type remedies.”). As OTS has instructed, “[fjederal thrifts are presumed to interact with their borrowers in a truthful manner,” and so laws which generally impose obligations of truthfulness “should have no measureable impact on lending operations.” Opinion of OTS Chief Counsel, P-96-14, Dec. 24, 1996, available at 1996 WL 767462, at *6 (concluding that Indiana Deceptive Act and Practices statute not preempted by HOLA and implementing regulations). Consequently, because plaintiffs’ fraud and unjust enrichment causes of action are not state laws which impose specific substantive standards which more than incidentally affect lending operations, these claims are not preempted. See Baldanzi, 2008 WL 4924987, at *3 (<HOLDING>); see also Cassese MTD Opinion, at 34-35
holding that erisa does not permit a plaintiff to assert an independent federal common law cause of action such as unjust enrichment to enforce the terms of an erisa plan thus to the extent plaintiffs third cause of action for unjust enrichment is brought pursuant to a federal common law right it must be dismissed holding that the plaintiffs claims for unjust enrichment were not barred by the availability of relief under the public works bonding act mcl 129201 et seq because a plaintiff enjoyed the right at common law to recover in quantum meruit from a defendant who had been unjustly enriched holding that where a prior agreement fixed the salary of the plaintiff plaintiff could not seek to recover for his services on a theory of unjust enrichment holding common law claim for unjust enrichment not preempted plaintiffs claims in the instant case asserted under generally applicable common law principles and statutes seek only to  test defendants conduct of its business by the same standards applied to other business enterprises and to recover gains allegedly obtained unjustly  they do not seek to impose any limitations on the defendants exercise of its national banking power and thus invoke laws that would only affect that power incidentally if at all recognizing that new mexico has adopted the common law unless otherwise abrogated by specific statutory provisions and that the power of a trial court to change venue on its own motion if necessary to assure the defendant a fair trial is part of that common law