times as long as that generally sufficient to trigger judicial review.” 505 U.S. at 658, 112 S.Ct. 2686. We have regularly rejected Sixth Amendment claims based on multi-year delays causing greater prejudice than the delay in this case. Cf. Flowers v. Warden, Connecticut Corr. Inst., Somers, 853 F.2d 131, 133 (2d Cir.1988) (“[W]e note first that the 17-month delay here, while lengthy, is nevertheless considerably shorter than those in other cases where we have found no speedy trial violation.” (citing numerous cases)). Unquestionably, the ten-month delay attributable to the government here cannot sustain a Sixth Amendment claim absent “some additional compelling circumstance, such as bad faith by the prosecution or actual prejudice.” United States v. Jones, 91 F.3d 5, 9 (2d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). The district court erred by weighing the
holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply laches where the only prejudice shown by the government was attributable to its own delay rather than to that of the movant holding that dismissal was not required where entire 13month delay attributable to state was reasonably explained holding that dismissal of indictment was abuse of discretion when delay attributable to the government was twelve months holding that dismissal was required where overall length of prosecution was 16 months state was responsible for 13 months of delay and six months of that delay was due to simple neglect holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that a tenmonth delay in filing a dismissal motion was reasonable