of “business trust,” but we find those cases unpersuasive: they either do not explain their reasoning, or merely cite to the case of Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 99 S.Ct. 914, 59 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979), as if that case provided the last word. See Loux v. Gabelhart (In re Carriage, House, Inc.), 146 B.R. 352, 355-56 (D.Vt.1992) (“We know from Butner ... to look to State law to ascertain property rights (or, in other words, to determine what sort of ‘entity,’ if any, would be created under state law based on the facts).”); In re Mohan Kutty Trust, 134 B.R. 987, 989 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1991) (finding that the trust was not a business trust under either the state’s definition or the federal case law definitions); In re Heritage N. Dunlap Trust, 120 B.R. 252, 254 (Bankr.D.Mass.1990) (<HOLDING>); In re Village Green Realty Trust, 113 B.R.
holding that we construe the rules liberally and look only to the effect if the instruments request was granted holding the court may look to state law for guidance where federal law is not fully developed holding that sjince the code does not define what constitutes a business trust we look to state law and citing butner without comment holding that property is an inherently state lawrelated term and that courts should look to state law when applying rico holding same and citing cases