with the government’s discovery violation. Lastly, appellant argues the military judge could not properly determine whether a mistrial was appropriate because he was also the finder of fact and had already announced findings. Appellant essentially argues the military judge was unable to make a proper, objective determination regarding the motion for mistrial because he was also the subjective fact-finder. We find no merit in this assertion. It is hardly unusual for legal issues to arise after findings are made, including ones for which mistrial may be a permissible remedy. Both the military judge’s roles of fact-finder and judicial arbiter of whether mistrial was appropriate are actions done in an official capacity. See United States v. Soriano, 20 M.J. 337, 340 (C.M.A.1985) (<HOLDING>). As detailed above, we find the military judge
holding that where appellant moved to recuse trial judge from deciding the motion for new trial the judge of the administrative district was required to designate a judge to hear the recusal motion holding that under section 455 a judge should not recuse himself based upon conclusory unsupported or tenuous allegations holding that the fact that the judge received adverse publicity for granting postconviction relief in another case did not require the judge to recuse herself holding that counsel was not ineffective for not filing a motion to recuse the judge who presided at trial when the judge had also prosecuted a prior case that was used to enhance the current case holding a military judge need not recuse himself solely on the basis of prior judicial exposure  