under 19 U.S.C. § 1520(c)(1) (1982). This Court notes it is clear that Ford’s engines and transmissions were not eligible for “PD” status unless Ford paid duties on the merchandise before the merchandise entered the FTSZ and specifically elected “PD” status for the entries. (See Pl.’s Br. at 8; supra n. 2.) This Court also notes while Ford may have intended to elect “PD” status and to pay the duties as the engines and transmissions were entered into the FTSZ, as Ford itself admits, “for some inexplicable reason,” Ford failed to do so. (Pl.’s Br. at 27.) This Court does not find Ford was mistaken as to the ultimate nature of the merchandise, and so cannot find Ford made a mistake of fact in this case on that basis. See Zaki Corp. v. United States, 960 F.Supp. 350, 362-63 (CIT 1997) (<HOLDING>); Toban Co. v. United States, 960 F.Supp. 326,
holding that even if an insurance broker is the agent of the insurance company for purposes of soliciting and procuring the policy that would not necessarily make the broker the agent of the insurance company for the purpose of receiving notice of suits and claims holding that plaintiffs stated a  349 claim where they alleged that defendants imported counterfeit good with the intent to cause confusion and mistake to deceive customers as to the source and origin of the products holding that insurance broker is generally agent of insured holding that an association of licensed customs brokers has standing to challenge an interim customs regulation allowing consignees to make informal entry of certain low value merchandise holding mistake of fact exists where broker unintentionally and nonnegligently was unaware of the physical nature of the imported merchandise and customs relied on agent to enter good properly