requirement under D.C. law. Perhaps recognizing that the government interest test clearly favors the application of D.C. law, Paulson & Nace does not argue that the contract is always governed by Virginia law, but rather that Virginia’s notice-to-claimant provision somehow alters the parties’ obligations in this particular case because the underlying lawsuits were filed in Virginia. See Appellants’ Br. 10-11, 16. The firm cites no on-point case law to support this argument. We do not strain to find such authority, because even if Virginia law could be invoked, Virginia courts have made clear that Section 38.2-2226 may not be enforced by the insured — here, Paulson & Nace — against its insurer. See Dan River, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 227 Va. 485, 488-91, 317 S.E.2d 485 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Gross, Civil Action No.
holding despite a reservation of rights that when the insurer provides a defense to its insured the insured has no right to interfere with the insurers control of the defense and a stipulated judgment between the insured and the injured claimant without the consent of the insurer is ineffective to impose liability upon the insurer holding that insured may recover from its insurer any attorney fees incurred in successfully attempting to force the insurer to defend an action against the insured holding that if the insured is only partially compensated by the insurer both the insurer and the insured are real partiesininterest holding that the predecessor statute of va code  3822226 could not be used by insured party against insurer holding that there is an actual controversy between an insurer and the party injured by the insured