alone is not sufficient to establish an improper motive. Respondents assert, however, that Pace’s reliance on AFSCME, Council 31 is misplaced because in the instant case, the Board did not rely on temporal proximity alone in finding that Pace had an improper motive for firing Panikowski. Instead, respondents contend, the Board found that Pace manufactured reasons for discharging Panikowski and treated her differently than other bus operators, and that these are grounds for inferring an improper motive by an employer. See York Products, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 881 F.2d 542, 545 (8th Cir. 1989) (“[b]oth implausible explanations and false or shifting reasons support a finding of illegal motivation”); Pollard v. Rea Magnet Wire Co., 824 F.2d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1987) (<HOLDING>). For support, respondent cites Temp-Masters,
holding that in title vii disparate treatment case in order for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case the plaintiff must proffer evidence among other things that she performed her job according to her employers legitimate expectations if the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case the presumption shifts the burden to the employer to produce a legitimate nondiseriminatory reason for its actions holding that in a title vii case alleging racial discrimination if the employer is trying to hide its real reason that effort  coupled with the evidence making up the employees prima facie case  may convince the trier of fact that the real reason needed to be hidden and therefore probably was discriminatory holding to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination a plaintiff must show he 1 holding that a plaintiff s prima facie case combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employers asserted justification is false may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated emphasis added recognizing that whether the employee uses the mcdonnell douglas framework or other evidence to create a prima facie case when the employer offers a legitimate nondiseriminatory reason for its adverse action the question is whether a rational trier of fact could conclude that the employers action was taken for impermissibly discriminatory reasons