in 1984: Abandoning the Pursuit of Fairness and Consistency,” 69 Cornell L.Rev. 1129, 1214-16 (1984). The cases from Zant through Barefoot to Pulley, then, have in fact if not in doctrine vanquished the requirement of consistency that lies at the core of Furman and Gregg, and thus mark a departure from the principle underlying those cases that death sentences require heightened procedural scrutiny because death is different in kind from any other form of punishment. This retreat unifies the cases decided since Barefoot. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2061, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984), the Court held that “[f]or purposes of describing counsel’s duties ... Florida’s capital sentencing proceeding need not be distinguished from an ord 88 L.Ed.2d 704 (1986) (<HOLDING>); id. at-, 106 S.Ct. at 705, 88 L.Ed.2d at 727
holding that under federal rule of appellate procedure 52b plain error in a jury charge may be considered by an appellate court although it was not brought to the attention of the trial court holding that where both the appellate and trial courts are reviewing the paper record  there is no reason for the appellate courts to defer to the trial courts finding holding trial court failed to make a finding of fact but rather made a finding of the ultimate question of law  that the defendants plea was not knowingly and intelligently made holding that the finding of intent to murder required under enmund does not have to be made by the trial factfinder but can be made by federal appellate court after reviewing trial and appellate proceeding holding the issue of recusal of the trial judge to be preserved for appellate review must be raised in the trial court