or a salvor’s name,” in order for Tielsch’s uncle to have arranged for the car to be destroyed. Appellant’s Brief, at 77-78. Tielsch also notes that Francis Tielsch had been contacted by police investigators two times before the prosecutor made his final argument and had informed the police that he had not made a claim, nor had any claim been filed through his agency, for the Corvette. See id., at 77. In addition, Tielsch contends that the veteran prosecutor “knew or should have known that he could not utilize the loose leaf papers from a detective’s file.... ” Reply Brief, at 1 (emphasis added). ¶ 13 The record simply does not support Tielsch’s contention that the Commonwealth acted intentionally in describing Exhibit 31 to prejudice Tielsch. See Smith, 532 Pa. at 186, 615 A.2d at 325 (<HOLDING>). Although the prosecutor was mistaken in his
holding that the state constitutional double jeopardy clause may bar retrial when the prosecutor subjectively believes that an acquittal was likely when he intentionally committed misconduct and the court determines from an objective perspective that the misconduct actually deprived the defendant of the reasonable prospect of an acquittal holding that the double jeopardy clause bars retrial when the commonwealth intentionally undertakes to prejudice the defendant to the point of the denial of a fair trial holding that where the evidence offered by the state and admitted by the trial court  whether erroneously or not  would have been sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict the double jeopardy clause does not preclude retrial holding the double jeopardy clause applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment holding that the jeopardy clause bars retrial when the prosecution failed to supply sufficient evidence to merit conviction