the policy language at issue as a “choice of law” provision). Our Supreme Court has held “[a] difference of judicial opinion regarding proper construction of policy language is some evidence” that the policy language is ambiguous. Brown v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 326 N.C. 387, 392, 390 S.E.2d 150, 153 (1990) (citations omitted). I believe the language in General Casualty’s policy is ambiguous on the issue; and, accordingly, I would hold that the General Casualty policy does provide coverage for the claims sought in North Carolina by Plaintiffs to the extent that the benefits would be required under Virginia workers’ compensation law. See W&J Rives, Inc. v. Kemper Ins. Group, 92 N.C. App. 313, 316, 374 S.E.2d 430, 433 (1988), disc. review denied, 324 N.C. 342, 378 S.E.2d 809 (1989) (<HOLDING>). I believe that the word “require” in the
holding that an insurance contract should be construed as a reasonable person in the position of the insured would have understood it and that if the language used in the policy is reasonably susceptible to different constructions it must be given the construction most favorable to the insured holding that an exclusionary clause in an insurance contract that lends itself to different interpretations is ambiguous and must be construed in a manner most favorably to the insured holding that contract language is ambiguous where it is in fact reasonably or fairly susceptible to the different constructions being advocated by the parties recognizing that a clause in an insurance policy was susceptible to a construction in favor of the insured but that such a construction would be unreasonable absurd and produce results never intended or contemplated by the parties holding that only if provisions in an insurance contract are open to more than one interpretation should it be construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured