when the life sentence he received for this offense amounted to “cruel and unusual punishment” within the meaning of the United States and Georgia Constitutions. To begin with, we note that Pepe-Frazier has waived any direct constitutional challenge to his sentence by failing to raise such a challenge at the first opportunity (i.e., the sentencing hearing), which is what gives rise to his current assertion that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to make such a challenge. OCGA § 16-6-4 provides that, except in limited circumstances not applicable in this case, “a person convicted of the offense of aggravated child molestation shall be punished by imprisonment for life or by a split sentence that is a term of imprisonment for not less than 25 year 1 SE2d 485) (2008) (<HOLDING>); Humphrey v. Wilson, 282 Ga. 520, 528-30 (3)
holding that a life sentence pursuant to  841 blaiii was not a cruel and unusual punishment holding that an effective life sentence of fortyfive years for seconddegree forgery was excessive and that a life sentence was cruel and unusual in violation of the eighth amendment holding that the imposition of a true life sentence on a minor convicted of felony murder was cruel and unusual based on the specific circumstances surrounding the offense holding that the imposition of a true life sentence on two fourteenyearold offenders for committing the crime of rape was violative of the eighth amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment holding that the imposition of a life sentence for failure to register as a sex offender constituted cruel and unusual punishment because the sentence was so harsh in comparison to the crime