schedule to the defendant’s probation officer, provided that the court first establishes the amount of restitution.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). This argument is therefore without merit. D. Term of incarceration and ability to pay restitution Against the advice of his attorney, Clark also argues that the district court erred in imposing a sentence at the top of the sentencing guideline range rather than from the middle or bottom of the range, and that the district court erred in failing to consider his limited financial means in ordering him to pay restitution from his earnings during incarceration. Clark’s attorney raised both of these issues in the form of a no-merit brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967) (<HOLDING>). With respect to Clark’s argument that the
holding an appellate brief may serve as a notice of appeal holding that the presumption of prejudice must extend as well to the denial of counsel on appeal when the granting of an attorneys motion to withdraw had left the petitioner entirely without the assistance of counsel on appeal recognizing the right to counsel on appeal holding that if courtappointed appellate counsel wishes to withdraw on the ground that an appeal is wholly frivolous counsel must include with the withdrawal motion a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal holding that appellate counsel is not required to raise meritless issues on appeal