the language of § 109(g)(2) is mandatory — i.e., a court must dismiss a bankruptcy petition if the debtor was a debtor in another bankruptcy case within the preceding 180 days and the debtor requested and obtained a voluntary dismissal of the case following the filing of a request for relief from the automatic stay provided by § 362. E.g., In re Bigalk, 813 F.2d 189, 190 (8th Cir.1987); In re Tooke, 133 B.R. 661, 663 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1991); In re Denson, 56 B.R. 543, 546 (Bankr.N.D.Ala.1986); In re Keziah, 46 B.R. 551, 554 (Bankr.W.D.N.C.1985). A second line of cases appears to suggest that, although § 109(g)(2) is mandatory, § 109(g)(2) applies only if the motion for relief from stay was pending at the time of the voluntary dismissal. E.g., In re Milton, 82 B.R. 637 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.1988) (<HOLDING>); In re Jones, 99 B.R. 412 (Bankr.E.D.Ark.1989)
holding that  109g2 does not apply when there was no unresolved motion pending at the time when the debtor sought dismissal holding that  109g2 is discretionary and does not apply if mechanical application would lead to unwarranted results holding that 42 usc  1997e does not apply to claims pending at the time of passage of the plra holding that section 101 of the act does not apply retroactively to eases not pending on appeal at the time the act became effective recognizing that aedpa would not apply to a habeas petition that was pending at the time of its enactment