effects of an earlier discrimination or on a completed act of discrimination.” Martinez, 1998 WL 342043 at *2, citing United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977); Lightfoot v. Union Carbide Corp., 110 F.3d 898, 907-08 (2d Cir.1997) (“[a] continuing violation is not established merely because an employee continues to feel the effects of a discriminatory act”); Blesedell, 708 F.Supp. at 1414; Shelford v. New York State Teachers Retirement System, 889 F.Supp. 81, 85 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (“the mere continuation of a discriminatory act’s effect, however painful those effects may be, is not sufficient to rescue a stale claim concerning a violation that occurred prior to the limitations period.”); Malarkey v. Texaco, Inc., 559 F.Supp. 117, 120 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 704 F.2d 674 (2d Cir.1983). As
holding that the dispositive question in the first step of saucier  whether those facts establish a constitutional violation  is a pure question of law recognizing the motives of the officer as a critical factor in determining whether a particular instance of excessive force rises to the level of a constitutional violation recognizing that whether a duty exists is a question of law for the courts recognizing that the critical question is whether any present violation exists holding that the question whether a cause of action exists is not a question of jurisdiction and therefore may be assumed without being decided