hospitals. 13 . Even assuming for the moment that decedent was in state custody at the time of his death, the complaint’s failure to allege private violence — a failure about which we will have more to say subsequently — would render the special relationship exception inapposite. In that case, the questions simply would be those posed by the complaint's first claim for relief, namely, whether Defendants exhibited deliberate indifference to decedent’s serious medi cal needs and whether that indifference caused a constitutional deprivation. See, e.g., DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198-199 n. 5, 109 S.Ct. 998 (suggesting deliberate indifference is necessary to establish a substantive due process violation in a custodial setting); Sawyer v. County of Creek, 908 F.2d 663, 666 (10th Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by Leatherman v.
holding that a sentence of incarceration would constitute deliberate indifference to defendants medical needs holding that in order to state a violation of the eighth amendment an inmate must demonstrate that prison officials showed deliberate indifference to serious medical needs recognizing a state doctor may violate a detainees right to substantive due process by exhibiting deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs holding that the eighth amendment protects prisoners only from deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs holding that pretrial detainees possess a constitutional right against deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs because the due process rights of a pretrial detainee are at least as great as the eighth amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner