high speed, as Kluge did, “his vehicle has the potential to become a deadly or dangerous weapon.” Kendrick, 423 F.3d at 809. As the Fifth Circuit has noted, the risk of injury to others associated with police pursuits of fleeing suspects “appear[s] to be at least ‘roughly similar’ to that associated with arson,” one of the example crimes in § 4B1.2(a)(2). Harrimon, 568 F.3d at 537 (quoting Begay, 553 U.S. at 143, 128 S.Ct. 1581). Finally, unlike the Minnesota statute at issue in Tyler, Iowa’s fleeing statute only applies to those who “exceed[] the speed limit by twenty-five miles per hour or more.” Iowa Code § 321.279(3); see Tyler, 580 F.3d at 725 (“Neither high speed nor reckless driving is a statutory element of [Minnesota’s fleeing statute].”); see also Harrison, 558 F.3d at 1294 (<HOLDING>). Thus, we hold that eluding under section
holding that floridas fleeing crime does not involve a high level of risk of physical harm to others because neither high speed nor reckless driving is a statutory element holding that this court does not have jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims because the court may review neither criminal matters nor the decisions of district courts holding that the high level of similarity between the charged crime and prior bad acts necessary to prove common scheme or plan does not require evidence of common features to show a unique method of committing the crime holding that designation is neither a sentence nor a punishment holding that harassment or discrimination does not rise to the level of persecution under the ina unless it is accompanied by physical punishment infliction of harm or significant deprivation of liberty