the jury to hear Grindle’s version of the events without his being subjected to cross-examination by the State. In this context, the court’s exclusion of a single statement from the recorded interview was in no way prejudicial to his defense and did not violate his right to due process. See M.R. Evid. 412(b)(1)(C); see also Drewry, 2008 ME 76, ¶¶ 27-28, 946 A.2d 981. [¶ 13] We are also unpersuaded by Grin-dle’s contention that the statement was admissible pursuant to Rule 412(b). Grin-dle sought to introduce his own hearsay opinion of the victim’s sexual predisposition whereas the rule permits, in limited circumstances, evidence only of specific instances of an alleged victim’s sexual behavior. See M.R. Evid. 412(b)(1)(A)-(B); cf. State v. Arnold, 421 A.2d 932, 937-38 (Me. 1980) (<HOLDING>). The court did not abuse its discretion in
holding that opinion testimony was inadmissible to prove a persons character or character trait when maine rule of evidence 405 permitted only evidence of reputation or specific instances of conduct holding that evidence of other crimes though generally inadmissible to show character is admissible to show for instance proof of motive or plan recognizing that under the proper application of rule 608b extrinsic evidence of specific instances of bad conduct is made inadmissible when offered to prove a witnesss character for untruthfulness holding counsel was not ineffective for making tactical decision to present character evidence in favor of the defendant which opened the door to states presentation of evidence of defendants bad character especially when limiting instruction mitigated any potential prejudice holding impeachment evidence was not merely cumulative where the withheld evidence was of a different character than evidence already known to the defense