nowhere in his motion to remand and accompanying brief does he raise any argument for remand based on section 1445(c). Nor does he cite section 1445(c), as required by this court’s local rules. See L.R. 7.2(a)(4) (requiring all briefs to “refer to all statutes, rules and authorities relied upon”) and L.R. 7.3(b) (requiring that all motions “shall state with particularity the grounds therefor” and “cite any statute or rule of procedure relied upon”). Rather, his entire motion rested on the argument that Cemex failed to meet the federal jurisdictional amount in controversy requirement. (See Docs. 7 & 8.) A party cannot claim that just because it moved to remand a case it may later argue every possible reason for doing so. See Denman v. Snapper Div., 131 F.3d 546, 548 (5th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Lunsford’s reference to REDA in setting forth
holding that denial of remand was proper where plaintiff failed to raise the proper objection holding venue proper where proper when the action was commenced holding that plaintiff had no authority or statutory right for actions proper course was to report actions to proper legal authority holding the denial of a proper question is always reversible error holding failure to raise issue of improper measure of damages in trial court waived review of complaints that proper measure of damages was not submitted to jury and that plaintiff failed to present evidence on the proper measure