which requires the district court to consider “the need for the sentence imposed ... to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.” Id. § 3553(a)(2)(C). Thus, when a district court considers § 3553(a)(2)(B), it should focus on whether a sentence will provide general deterrence. See United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d 1227, 1240 (11th Cir. 2006) (explaining that § 3553(a)(2)(B) speaks to general deterrence while § 3553(a)(2)(C) speaks to specific deterrence). General deterrence is effective in the context of white collar crime such as Edwards’s bank fraud and bankruptcy fraud. “Defendants in white collar crimes often calculate the financial gain and risk of loss, and white collar crime therefore can be affected and reduced with serious punishment.” Martin, 455 F.3d at 1240 (<HOLDING>). White collar crime, especially bank fraud,
holding that a sentence of five years probation was unreasonably lenient where the defendant played a key role in an accounting fraud scheme that caused over 1 billion in losses to a companys shareholders and the guidelines range was seventyeight to ninetyseven months imprisonment holding that substantial downward variance was substantively unreasonable holding that a sentence of seven days imprisonment was substantively unreasonable where the defendant participated in a securities fraud conspiracy that caused more than 1 billion in losses holding that general losses must be sufficiently disaggregated from losses caused by the initial abuser when determining those losses caused by the continuing traffic of the images holding that a sentence of twelve months imprisonment was unreasonably lenient where the defendant engaged in wire fraud and caused 90000 in losses and the guidelines range was sixtythree to seventyeight months imprisonment