of reasonable doubt. While, in a post-trial analysis of the questions posed by the State during voir dire and argued in closing argument, we agree with Appellant that these examples are not appropriate hypotheticals regarding reasonable doubt, under the facts of this case, we find no manifest injustice to Appellant and deny Point III. The instructions given to the jury required each juror to be firmly convinced of Appellant’s guilt before that jury could act on that conclusion and find Appellant guilty. Generally, when the jury is provided with the correct trial court instructions giving the definition of reasonable doubt it cures any harm from an erroneous statement of reasonable doubt by the prosecutor. See State v. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d 511, 537-38 (Mo. banc 2003) (<HOLDING>); State v. Williams, 97 S.W.3d 462, 471 (Mo.
holding that excluding expert testimony was harmless and did not affect the jury verdict because the subject matter of the testimony was only one factor and by no means a determinative one holding that court may place some limits on voir dire examination holding that no manifest injustice resulted although the prosecutor did misstate the law at one point because the correct standard of proof was restated multiple other times during voir dire and in argument and the jury was properly instructed holding that trial court properly prohibited an argument at closing that was not based on facts in the record and could have effect of confusing the jury holding on habeas review that counsels failure to object to improper argument at trial did not prejudice petitioner where other evidence supported a guilty verdict and the jury was told closing argument was not evidence