proceed on an ad hoc basis in setting fees and reimbursing claims, no more specificity in the language of Rule 134.1 is required to give Vista adequate notice of how fee disputes will be resolved on a case-by-case basis. See id.; Patient Advocates, 136 S.W.3d at 656-57. Similarly, when the complaint is viewed in terms of constitutional vagueness, the challenged language here is comparable to language that has been upheld by courts as providing fair notice in the context of case-by-ease adjudication. Language that requires fee guidelines to be “designed to ensure the quality of medical care” and “designed to achieve effective cost control” is similar to language that courts have held passes constitutional muster under a vagueness challenge. See, e.g., Pennington, 606 S.W.2d at 689-90 (<HOLDING>); TXU Generation Co., 165 S.W.3d at 841-43
holding that actual reliance is not required to establish injury under nc gen stat  5863151 2001 which governs the unfair methods of competition and unfair and deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance holding that a mortgage or modification of a mortgage is not a good or a service under the dtpa holding that msurers allegedly deceptive acts or practices did not cause any injury independent of the denial of policy benefits holding notice insufficient because it merely recited the language of the policys notice provision and provided no information regarding the types of practices alleged to constitute wrongful acts the agents officers or directors alleged to be involved in wrongdoing or the time period during which the allegedly wrongful acts took place holding that language in dtpa generally prohibiting false misleading or deceptive acts or practices and providing a nonexhaustive list of such acts provided adequate notice to survive vagueness challenge explaining the boundaries of illegality under the dtpa must remain flexible because it is impossible to list all methods by which a consumer my be misled or deceived