of administrative exhaustion precludes T & C’s claims. T & C, on the other hand, contends that the bankruptcy court had a separate and distinct basis for exercising jurisdiction because T & C’s counterclaims related to property of the estate, see 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), and were within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, see 28 U.S.C. § 157(b). As the BAP noted, the courts have divided on this question. Some have held that the exhaustion requirements of statutes such as the FTCA and the Medicare Act bar bankruptcy court review. See, e.g., In re St. Mary Hosp., 123 B.R. 14, 16-18 (E.D.Pa.1991); In re Berger, 16 B.R. 236, 237-38 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1981). Other courts have held that bankruptcy jurisdiction is not precluded. See, e.g., Ashbrook v. Block, 917 F.2d 918, 921-23 (6th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); In re Shelby County Healthcare Servs., 80
holding that section 106a mandates an automatic waiver of sovereign immunity and thereby impliedly repeals the ftcas exhaustion requirement holding that the ftcas exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional holding attempted statutory waiver of sovereign immunity under  106a unconstitutional and listing similar cases recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different holding that waiver of federal tort claims act sovereign immunity is conditioned upon strict compliance with exhaustion requirement