decision so as to lead to a conclusion that the Board’s decision was based on personal animus rather than merit. [¶ 44] The Board’s sanction is authorized by law, and on this record and under our deferential standard of review, we hold the Board did not abuse its discretion in deciding to revoke Dr. Hsu’s license. We therefore conclude the district court erred in reversing the Board’s order revoking Dr. Hsu’s license. Because we sustain the Board’s sanction, we conclude Dr. Hsu has not demonstrated a clear legal right to the ALJ’s recommended sanction, and we further conclude the district court abused its discretion in issuing a writ of mandamus compelling the Board to adopt the ALJ’s recommended sanction for monitoring. See Eichhorn v. Waldo Twnshp, 2006 ND 214, ¶ 19, 723 N.W.2d 112 (<HOLDING>). [¶ 45] We therefore reverse the part of the
holding that to grant a writ of mandamus a court in the exercise of its discretion must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances holding when the state statute did not abrogate the common law rule the only available damage remedy in a mandamus action was one for making a false return and damages for the delay in doing the thing the mandamus sought to command could not be sought in the mandamus action recognizing that the issuance of a writ of mandamus is itself generally a matter of discretion recognizing petitioner for writ of mandamus must demonstrate clear legal right to the act sought to be compelled and no other plain speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary cause of law and stating mandamus may not be issued to compel an officials discretionary acts holding that a court may grant a writ of mandamus if 1 the petitioner demonstrates that he lacks an adequate alternative 2 the petitioner demonstrates a clear and indisputable right to the writ and 3 the court is convinced that issuing the writ is warranted