with the requirement(s) mandated by Congress and explained to Zakiya in the Ross decision.”) If we accept the BOP’s reading of the statue, we effectively must find that Congress delegated to the BOP, an executive branch agency, the authority to extend a defendant’s sentence beyond that ordered by an Article III court. Such a proposition would contravene basic tenets of separation of powers and result in an unconstitutional delegation of judicial power to the executive branch. A. It is well established that “the judicial power” is vested solely in Article III courts, see U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 1, with very limited exceptions. Numerous courts have confirmed that imposing a sentencing is part of the judicial power. See Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 37 S.Ct. 72, 61 L.Ed. 129 (1916) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 806, 808-9
holding that it is not an appellate courts function to make findings of fact holding the antiinjunction act inapplicable unless tribunal is performing a state judicial function recognizing in a dictum judicial function exception but holding that receiving from defendant false name and consent form to proceed thereunder is within courts administrative function holding that imposition of punishment is a judicial function holding that civil settlements have no bearing on decisions of criminal punishment and imposition of a restitution order is a form of punishment and part of a criminal sentence