is material because the Seventh Circuit has recognized only two situations in which the denial of costs under Rule 54(d) might be warranted (the first involves misconduct of the party seeking costs and the second involves a pragmatic exercise of discretion to deny or reduce a costs order if the losing party is indigent) (Mother & Father v. Cassidy, 338 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir.2003); Rivera, 469 F.3d at 634-35)), while district courts appear to enjoy broader discretion under § 1132(g)(1). See Nichol, 889 F.2d at 121 (stating that declining “to award attorneys’ fees and costs to ERISA defendants, even prevailing defendants, would rarely constitute an abuse of discretion”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Jackman Fin. Corp. v. Humana Ins. Co., 641 F.3d 860, 866 (7th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); Hess v. Reg-Ellen Mach. Tool Corp., 367
recognizing presumption recognizing that  1132g1 creates a presumption in favor of awarding costs and fees to the prevailing party but characterizing that presumption as modest and rebuttable holding that guidelines create a rebuttable presumption holding that child support formula creates a rebuttable presumption and an inequitable result rebuts the presumption holding that in case of a short term marriage a presumption against awarding permanent alimony arises but such presumption is rebuttable