that of Pacour-ek in that she alleges that Hewlett-Packard discriminated against her because it knew that she was planning to become pregnant and probably would become so in the near future. This court agrees with Pacourek that the purpose of the PDA is best served by extending its coverage to women who are trying to become pregnant. As noted above, the Supreme Court has equated discrimination on the basis of pregnancy with discrimination based on sex. Newport News, supra, 462 U.S. at 684, 103 S.Ct. at 2631. Further, it has recognized that a woman’s ability to become pregnant may subject her to disparate treatment. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of Am., UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 197, 111 S.Ct. 1196, 1202, 113 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991) (<HOLDING>). The legislative history of the PDA supports
holding that title vii does not prescribe an employers determination of preferred or required job requirements holding that a title vii plaintiff could not hold coworkers liable in their individual capacities under title vii holding that because plaintiff did not apply for a job he could not be rejected in a title vii case recognizing title vii claim by subclass of african american women holding that employers fetal protection policy violates title vii because fjertile men but not fertile women are given a choice as to whether they wish to risk their reproductive health for a particular job