residence used for drug distribution), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 993, 110 S.Ct. 543, 107 L.Ed.2d 540 (1989); Dunn, supra, 846 F.2d at 762-63 (sustaining trial court’s admission of expert testimony explaining that vials, wax-paper bags, I-beam scales, measuring spoons, and m L.Ed.2d 614 (1982); United States v. Maher, 645 F.2d 780, 783-84 (9th Cir.1981) (upholding admission of expert testimony comparing defendant’s activities to those of persons conducting counter-surveillance while transporting drugs). A number of state courts have applied similar reasoning in concluding that expert testimony concerning the modus operandi of drug dealers would be likely to enhance the jury’s ability to understand the evidence adduced. See, e.g., State v. Salazar, 27 Ariz.App. 620, 557 P.2d 552, 557 (1976) (<HOLDING>); State v. Vilalastra, 207 Conn. 35, 540 A.2d
holding admissible expert testimony concerning countersurveillance techniques commonly used by narcotics dealers specifically including practice of using vehicle to observe in advance area where distribution was intended to occur holding admissible police officers testimony that firearms are commonly used in drug trafficking holding that using the opinions of an expert that were not testified to during trial which were irrelevant and solely used to destroy the credibility of the expert was not admissible holding admissible expertwitness testimony that drug dealers commonly register cars and apartments in names of female friends to conceal narcotics activities holding admissible police officers expert testimony that narcotics dealers often use intermediary in making delivery to buyer under mistaken assumption that intermediary would insulate dealers from criminal liability