for terminating him was pretextual; in fact, he does not even appear to challenge Bolivar’s allegations regarding his performance. This alone would be reason enough to dismiss the discrimination claim because a plaintiff is required to rebut each nondiscriminatory reason articulated by his employer to carry his burden of demonstrating pretext. See id. With respect to Bolivar’s claim that he improperly accused his superiors of racism, McKinney denies ever making such statements. However, regardless of whether McKinney made the alleged accusations, the relevant issue is whether Bolivar believed in good faith that such accusations were made and whether McKinney was truly terminated based on that good faith belief. See Waggoner v. City of Garland, 987 F.2d 1160, 1165-66 (5th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Even assuming that McKinney’s supervisors
holding that an employee may establish that the legitimate reason for an employment decision offered by an employer is pretextual by showing by a preponderance of the evidence either that the discrim inatory reason was the true reason motivating the employers conduct or that the profferred legitimate reason was false holding that if a direct supervisor who had the responsibility to stop harassment knew of and failed to act against it the plaintiff has no further obligation to bring it to the employers attention holding that a plaintiff has not demonstrated that the employers reason for terminating him was pretextual if the employer reasonably believed the complaint of sexual harassment lodged against the plaintiff and acted on it in good faith holding that where the employer fired the plaintiff upon a good faith belief that he sexually harassed coworkers the plaintiff could not prove pretext by challenging the harassment allegations holding that the plaintiff must establish that a supervisors harassment was within the scope of his employment and that the employer failed to respond adequately and effectively when it learned of the harassment