(1) refusing to allow Pratt to perform the duties of his previous position and (2) using a pretext to suspend him from the position to which he had been ordered reinstated. [¶20] Pratt’s contention that the Board failed to reinstate him to the identical duties he held prior to his wrongful termination is unavailing. First, Pratt offers no authority to support his proposition that he has a property right in these specific job duties. Indeed, the jurisdictions that have had the opportunity to consider this issue have expressly held that there is no property right in particular job duties. See Annapolis v. Rowe, 123 Md.App. 267, 717 A.2d 976, 987 (1998) (citing Royster v. Bd. of Trustees, 774 F.2d 618, 621 (4th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1121, 106 S.Ct. 1638, 90 L.Ed.2d 184 (1986) (<HOLDING>)); Huang v. Bd. of Governors, 902 F.2d 1134,
holding that even though certain corporate formalities had not been complied with in the execution of the subject contract the corporation had knowledge of the existence of the contract and treated it as a valid and binding contract and thus ratified the contract by accepting the benefits thereunder holding that any constitutionally protected property interest employee had as a result of his employment contract has been satisfied by payment of full compensation  including salary and benefits  due under the contract holding that sovereign immunity does not protect the state from claims for statutory employment benefits that constitute a protected property interest holding that suspended employee had no constitutionally protected property interest in actually performing job due process rights are not implicated so long as employee continues to receive salary and benefits holding that under article i section 9 a person has no constitutionally protected privacy interest in abandoned property