Chapter IX,” is fulfilled. S.Rep. No. 95-989, at 110. As a final effort, the defendants resort to the presumption against preemption. See Antilles Cement Corp. v. Fortuño, 670 F.3d 310, 323 (1st Cir.2012). But “preemption is not a matter of semantics.” Wos v. E.M.A., ex rel. Johnson, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1391, 1398, 185 L.Ed.2d 471 (2013). Puerto Rico “may not evade the preemptive force of federal law by resorting to a creative statutory interpretation or description at odds with the statute’s intended operation and effect.” Id. This is particularly true where, as here, the presumption is weak, if present at all. See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108, 120 S.Ct. 1135, 146 L.Ed.2d 69 (2000) (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977)) (<HOLDING>); Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S.
recognizing a presumption against retroactive legislation recognizing presumption holding that a common law presumption of death is triggered after an absence of seven years recognizing that presumption of prejudice was triggered by jurors unauthorized contact with intern holding that the presumption is weaker if triggered at all where there is not a tradition of state legislation