exposing himself to a specific sentence under the plea agreement, petitioner foreclosed the possibility of challenging the same. The government further relies in Bernard, supra, in which the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1)(C) allows “parties to agree on a specific sentence, or that particular provisions of the guidelines apply or do not apply [and].., clearly contemplates agreements on sentences that could not be reached by directly applying the Guidelines.” Thus, “once a plea agreement with a sentencing stipulation is reached between the parties and accepted by the Court, it must be enforced at sentencing.” Id., citing United States v. Goodall, 236 F.3d 700, 705 (D.C.Cir.2001). See also, United States v. Moure-Ortiz, 184 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals summarized
holding that prebooker plea agreements remain binding after booker holding that the rules of contract law are applicable to plea agreements holding that immunity agreements are analogous to plea agreements and are enforced under principles of contract law within the constitutional safeguards of due process holding that plea agreements executed pursuant to fedrcrimp 11c1c are binding on the district court holding that state prosecutors agreements with defendant not binding on federal prosecutors