See id. at 530 (“It may not have been enough if the government had merely shown ... that the state received less for its money than it should have____ [The defendants were acting in] a scheme to defraud the state.") (emphasis added). Because the facts of Ackal, however, involved the administration of federal funds and federal programs by a state agency, we do not read the opinion as recognizing a section 371 offense arising from acts involving only a state agency. See also United States v. Burgin, 621 F.2d 1352, 1355-57 (5th Cir.) (discussing and approving a “conspiracy to defraud” prosecution for an offense involving federal funds administered by state agency), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1015, 101 S.Ct. 574, 66 L.Ed.2d 474 (1980); United States v. Del Toro, 513 F.2d 656, 663-64 (2d Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 826, 96 S.Ct. 41, 46
holding that in a conspiracy case venue lies where the conspiracy agreement was formed or in any jurisdiction where an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed by any of the conspirators holding that two conspiracies existed where the members of the second conspiracy did not know about the first conspiracy did not benefit from the first conspiracy and were connected with the first conspiracy only through a middleman holding that once a defendant becomes associated with a conspiracy he is responsible for all of the acts of the conspiracy even those which occurred before or after his association with the conspiracy holding that subversion of a federally coordinated program can constitute a conspiracy to defraud the united states even if no federal officials are participants in the conspiracy and federal fund allocation had not yet occurred when the conspiracy was in effect holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges