(1874), the equitable tolling doctrine provides that “where a plaintiff has been injured by fraud and ‘remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered, though there be no special circumstances or efforts on the part of the party committing the fraud to conceal it from the knowledge of the other party.’ ” Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396-397 66 S.Ct. 582, 585, 90 L.Ed. 743 (1946), quoting from Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. at 348. “This equitable doctrine is read into every federal statute of limitation.” Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. at 396-397, 66 S.Ct. at 585. One court has held that equitable tolling does not apply to § 727(e)(2). See Johnson, 187 B.R. at 986-989 (<HOLDING>). The Court based its holdings on two grounds,
holding that provision has the characteristics of a statute of repose holding that statute of repose was not subject to toiling provision applicable to statute of limitations because among other reasons it would ignore fundamental distinctions between ordinary statutes of limitations and statutes of repose holding that a statute of repose sets absolute parameters of any action holding that statute was one of repose because it embodies the most distinctive characteristic of a statute of repose the barring of the right to bring an action rather than the remedy prescribed holding that  727e is a statute of repose and an essential prerequisite to the proceeding