was arrested for committing a felony or committing a nonfelony crime in which a firearm was used or displayed. f 17 A prosecutor may not use the fruits of an illegal search as evidence against a defendant at trial. State v. Marks, 114 Wn.2d 724, 730-31, 790 P.2d 138 (1990); State v. Maddox, 116 Wn. App. 796, 806, 67 P.3d 1135 (2003), aff’d, 152 Wn.2d 499, 98 P.3d 1199 (2004). And without the evidence obtained in the illegal search, the prosecution could not have proved that Nusbaum possessed or controlled the guns at the time of his arrest. See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 696, 85 S. Ct. 1246, 14 L. Ed. 2d 170 (1965) (the exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture hearings); cf. Barlindal v. City of Bonney Lake, 84 Wn. App. 135, 141-42, 925 P.2d 1289 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Because the officers seized the weapons
holding admissible police officers testimony that firearms are commonly used in drug trafficking holding that a city which brought an action for forfeiture of firearms recovered from a drug suspects residence was collaterally estopped from introducing evidence of drug possession thus it could not prove the firearms were used in drug transactions and could not forfeit them holding prior drug deals admissible to prove knowledge of the drug trade recognizing firearms as common tools of the drug trade holding that evidence in first trial concerning firearms in which defendant was acquitted of drug and rico conspiracies could be used in second trial on firearms offenses because evidence was collateral to elements of offenses in second trial