domains and adequately articulated a sufficient evidentiary basis for his decision. We reject Jaramillo’s argument that the ALJ committed reversible error by not giving controlling weight to Mesa’s treating physician’s opinion that he had an “extreme limitation in the area of concentration, persistence, or pace.” A-28. As noted by the ALJ, the opinions of the treating physician and the State Agency Psychological Consultant differed. As we held in Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 115 n. 5 (3d Cir.1983), a referee may reject the conclusions of the treating physician if he “weights] [those conclusions] against the other relevant evidence and explainfs] why certain evidence has been accepted and why other evidence has been rejected.” See also Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 41 (3d Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). The ALJ has adequately done so in the present
holding that the alj must make findings setting forth specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in order to reject the contradicted opinion of a treating physician holding that where a treating physicians opinion is contradicted by a consulting physician the alj must explain on the record the reasons for rejecting the opinion of the treating physician holding that remand was not required and that the aljs failure to mention treating physicians opinion was harmless error because the alj adopted the treating physicians recommendations holding that the alj erred by failing to mention the contrary opinion of a treating physician holding that an alj may discount a treating physicians opinion where the physician has offered inconsistent opinions