intelligence and ordinary experience.” Ibid. See, e.g., Magner v. Beth Israel Hosp., 120 N.J.Super. 529, 534, 295 A.2d 363 (App.Div.1972) (finding that a jury could conclude from “common experience” that defendant doctor was negligent when plaintiff suffered bums while unconscious during surgery), certif. denied, 62 N.J. 199, 299 A.2d 733 (1973); Tramutola v. Bortone, 118 N.J.Super. 503, 512-13, 288 A.2d 863 (App.Div.1972) (ruling that a jury was competent to resolve issue of defendant physician’s negligence, without expert testimony, where x-rays obviously showed needle in plaintiff’s chest but defendant had failed to inform the plaintiff of the needle), rev’d in part on other grounds, 63 N.J. 9, 304 A.2d 197 (1973); Steinke v. Bell, 32 N.J.Super. 67, 70, 107 A.2d 825 (App.Div.1954) (<HOLDING>). See also Becker v. Eisenstodt, 60 N.J.Super.
holding that with regard to intervening causes except when reasonable minds could not differ the question should be left for the jury to determine whether the intervening act and the resultant injury were such that the author of the original wrong could reasonably have expected them to occur as a result of his own negligent act recognizing a common knowledge exception recognizing common knowledge exception holding that in order to determine whether disqualification of plaintiffs attorney is appropriate because of a previous attorneyclient relationship he had with the defendant the court must determine whether confidential information was passed from client to attorney holding that laypersons could determine through their common knowledge whether defendant dentist was negligent when he extracted the wrong tooth