of the APD. We affirm on the merits, but vacate in part the order awarding attorney’s fees. I Carleton maintains that his substantive due process rights were violated when he suffered psychological harm from being relegated to Division Chief in Bixel. However, this was neither alleged in Carleton’s pleadings nor raised in any form in district court, so we decline to consider it. In any event, the argument lacks authority in support. Carleton also posits that Fukai’s treatment amounted to a stigma that prevents him from performing legal management positions. This fails because Carle-ton was not denied the right to engage in his chosen profession, the practice of law, which is the relevant universe — not legal management. See Nunez v. City of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 867, 873 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, Carleton still holds a legal position
holding there is no protected liberty interest in maintaining the foster family relationship holding that the plaintiff owner of a restaurantbar stated a cause of action for deprivation of a liberty interest by alleging that the defendant city engaged in a campaign of harassment that infringed on the plaintiffs constitutional right to pursue an occupation holding that harassment and delay in plaintiffs attempt to obtain a barbers license constitutes a due process violation of the plaintiffs liberty interest in the pursuit of that occupation holding that there was no liberty interest for the typical foster parents in question holding that while there is a centuriesold concept of liberty of occupation  there is no similar notion of liberty of position or rank within an occupation