on the disparate impact theory without proof that the questioned policy or practice has had a disproportionate impact on the employer’s workforce. This conclusion should be as obvious as it is tautological: there can be no disparate impact unless there is [an ultimate] disparate impact.” Where, under a facially neutral employment process, there has been no adverse effect on the group — and certainly there has been none here — Title VII has not been infringed. I — I HH The Court’s position is no stronger in case authority than it is in logic. None of the cases relied upon by the Court controls the outcome of this case. Indeed, the disparate- impact cases do not even support the propositions for which they are cited. For example, the Court cites Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 321 (1977) (<HOLDING>), and observes that “[although we noted in
holding that purported calculation error in mandatory minimum was harmless because challenged sentence was 60 months longer than presumed minimum and was imposed according to guidelines without reference to statutory minimum holding that even if the minimum mandatory exceeds the statutory maximum the court must impose the minimum mandatory holding that a district court commits reversible error when it sentences a defendant to less than the statutory minimum where no exception to the mandatory minimum applies holding that where the statutory mandatory minimum sentence is higher than the upper end of the guideline range the court departs from the statutory level ie the lowest offense level that could support the statutory minimum holding impermissible minimum statutory height and weight requirements for correctional counselors