and Kisseloff on his case. The Court now proceeds to the MBTA’s argument that Martino’s total award of attorney’s fees should be reduced to reflect what it characterizes as his “limited success at trial,” in that Martino requested $380,000 from the jury and received only $50,000. Def.’s Mot. at 7-10. Under Hensley, when a plaintiff has achieved “only limited success, the district court should award only that amount of fees that is reasonable in relation to the results obtained.” 461 U.S. at 440, 103 S.Ct. 1933. This does not mean, however, that a plaintiffs award of attorney’s fees cannot exceed his actual recovery; on the contrary, in City of Riverside v. Rivera, the Supreme Court expressly rejected that proposition. 477 U.S. 561, 564-581, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986) (<HOLDING>). The First Circuit has explained that a
holding that an attorneys fees award is not appealable until the amount of the award is set holding trial court had no authority to award attorneys fees when arbitrator had stated he would not award attorneys fees holding that an award of attorneys fees under supreme court rule 38 precursor to rule 222 did not preempt an award of attorneys fees to which one is otherwise entitled and thus appellant could seek an award of attorneys fees pursuant to section 1577300 which permits an award of fees for a party prevailing in an action against a state agency holding that the amount of damages a plaintiff recovers is only one of many factors that a court should consider in calculating an award of attorneys fees id at 574 106 sct 2686 and upholding an award of attorneys fees for 24545625 for plaintiffs who had received a jury award of 33350 holding merely that the evidence was sufficient to support the award of attorneys fees