696 S.W.2d at 553-54. Cavnar does not allow recovery of prejudgment interest on exemplary damages. See id. at 555-56. Although Cavnar involved a personal injury action, its reasoning and holding have been applied to all types of suits, including DTPA actions. See McCann v. Brown, 725 S.W.2d 822, 825-26 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1987, no writ); Quintero v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 709 S.W.2d 225, 230-31 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1985, writ refd n.r.e.). Thus, Cavnar prejudgment interest applies to this case unless article 5069-1.05 governs this issue. In 1987, the Texas Legislature amended article 5069-1.05 to add a section dealing with prejudgment interest. See Tex.Rev.Civ. StatAnn. art. 5069-1.05, § 6 (Vernon Supp.1993). This section codified, modified, and overt pp.—Austin 1990, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Appellee agrees that article 5069-1.05 is
holding that prejudgment interest should accrue 30 days after fee petition was filed holding that prejudgment interest in suit filed before september 2 1987 not governed by article 5069105 section 6 holding that section 1602 of the mliia which became effective september 1 1995 requires that judgments include prejudgment interest holding plaintiff could not recover prejudgment interest on exemplary damages because suit was filed on april 161987 and thus governed by cavnar and not article 5069105 holding that prejudgment interest may include compound interest