for failing to provide a patient with proper instructions. In all of these scenarios, a court might hold a doctor liable for actions which involve speech and, given such state action, presumably infringe the doctor’s First Amendment rights. With this in mind, we proceed to evaluate the Act’s constitutionality. C. We find that the Act is a valid regulation of professional conduct that has only an incidental effect on physicians’ speech. As such, the Act does not facially violate the First Amendment. To define the standards of good medical practice and provide for administrative enforcement of those standards is well within the State’s long-established authority to regulate the professions. See generally Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 449, 74 S.Ct. 650, 654, 98 L.Ed. 829 (1954) (<HOLDING>); Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs,
holding that states were permitted to regulate intrastate airfares holding  902 authorized department of health to regulate hospitals managerial practices holding that states may regulate all professions concerned with health recognizing that the states have a cognizableinterest in whether congress may direct or otherwise motivate the states to regulate in a particular field or a particular way recognizing that it serves no discernible public purpose to draw distinctions between clinical social work and other mental health professions with regard to the need for confidentiality