{22} A “specific-intent crime” is defined as one for which a statute expressly requires proof of “ ‘intent to do a further act or achieve a further consequence.’ ” State v. Bender, 91 N.M. 670, 671, 579 P.2d 796, 797 (1978) (quoting People v. Hood, 1 Cal.3d 444, 82 Cal.Rptr. 618, 626, 462 P.2d 370, 378 (1969)). A general intent crime, however, requires only a “conscious wrongdoing,” or “the purposeful doing of an act that the law declares to be a crime.” Ibn Omar-Muhammad, 102 N.M. at 278, 694 P.2d at 926. New Mexico courts have long followed the same common law specific-general intent approach, allowing voluntary intoxication as a consideration only for specific-intent crimes, including premeditated first-degree murder. See, e.g., State v. Campos, 122 N.M. 148, 921 P.2d 1266 (1996) (<HOLDING>); State v. Tapia, 81 N.M. 274, 275-76, 466 P.2d
holding that under the crimes code conspiracy and the completed substantive offense are separate crimes holding that the government may not be permitted to introduce other crimes evidence in its case in chief to prove intent unless the defense disputes intent during opening statements holding intoxication is only a defense to specific intent crimes and not general intent crimes holding that diminished capacity is a defense only to specific intent crimes holding that under florida precedent trial court erred in excluding expert testimony on intoxication as voluntary intoxication was a valid defense to a specific intent crime and expert testimony is relevant to a disputed voluntary intoxication defense