might have been more curious or concerned about the activity at Kidder.”); Shields, 25 F.3d at 1129; Manufacturer’s Life Ins., 2000 WL 709006, at *4. While “[a]n egregious refusal to see the obvious, or to investigate the doubtful, may in some cases give rise to an inference of ... recklessness,” Chill, 101 F.3d at 269 (emphasis added, quotation mark and citation omitted), merely calling a misrepresentation obvious does not make it so. See Feasby v. Industri-Matematik Int’l Corp., No. 99 Civ. 8761, 2000 WL 977673, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2000). To sufficiently plead scienter, something more than simply the bare incantation that a misrepresentation was obvious or that the defendant ignored information available to it is required. See S.E.C. v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732, 741 (2d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Rather, plaintiffs must offer particularized
holding that the sixth amendment confrontation clause was not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under a georgia statute permitting an exception for statements by coconspirators where there was sufficient indicia of reliability supporting the truth of the statements holding that various law enforcement personnel and judges were victims of the crime of making false statements to a government agency for purposes of  3a12a where the defendant made false statements about the officials to the irs causing the irs to investigate the officials certainly had the effect of making these individuals the defendants victims holding analysts statements insufficient to satisfy particularity requirements because plaintiffs failed to identify with specificity the statements made by a particular defendant or describe how those statements were false or misleading holding that pleading standard for recklessness was met where the corporate officer included false statements in sec filings despite the obviously evasive and suspicious statements made to him by the corporate officials upon whom he was relying and despite outside counsels recommendation that these statements not be included holding that defendant could be charged for making false statements to treasury officials under the tax evasion statute or the statute prohibiting false statements to government officials