district court’s satisfaction that “the testimony given by a material witness is false”) (citation omitted). According to the district court, “[a]t most, the record discloses that the witness alleged to have committed perjury has a different recollection from the witness now adduced by [Relators], and there simply is no way to determine which witness has a better memory or remembers the events in question more accurately.” We agree with the district court’s conclusion that Farrell’s declaration does not establish that Esposito’s testimony was false, but rather, at most, suggests that her recollection of the events was different than Farrell’s. A mere discrepancy in the testimony of two witnesses does not establish perjury. See United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 312, 327 (D.C.Cir.1974) (<HOLDING>). Because this discrepancy is the basis for
holding that expert testimony should not be admitted as to a matter that is obviously within the common knowledge of jurors because such testimony almost by definition can be of no assistance holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial holding that the fact that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal holding that the fact that two witnesses gave different testimony is obviously insufficient to establish that either is a perjurer holding that selfinterested witnesses can be reliable when they provide detailed testimony that is corroborated by other witnesses or facts