normally may exercise as to relevancy, repetitiveness, and the like. Id. at 714 (emphasis added). The rationale enunciated by the court in Gray for permitting a witness to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege in the jury’s presence was concern that prohibiting an in-court invocation would unfairly prejudice the defendant in the presentation of his defense. Id. at 716. In circumstances where the defense argues that the witness who seeks to invoke the Fifth Amendment is the singularly culpable person and the defendant fails to question the alleged culpable person about the crime in the jury’s presence, the court reasoned in Gray that the jury may wrongly infer that the defendant’s defense is frivolous or insincere. Id. at 714; see also U.S. v. Deutsch, 987 F.2d 878, 884 (2nd Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis supplied); U.S. v. Vandetti, 623
holding that trial court may draw adverse inference from habeas petitioners silence as result of fifth amendment invocation during deposition recognizing danger of unfair prejudice resulting from fifth amendment invocation injurys presence is not so great when the defense rather than the government seeks to draw inferences from a witnesss silence  recognizing that police officers can draw inferences from prior experience holding that juveniles request for parent is invocation of fifth amendment rights recognizing that exercise of trial courts decision regarding witness invocation of fifth amendment in jurys presence requires consideration of defendant being entitled to have his defense fully presented to the jury