claim that, because Towers breached, plaintiff is unable to satisfy the second element of his breach of contract claim, namely, Towers’ performance. The Court disagrees. The same analysis applies when considering whether Towers performed on the contract and whether Towers’ failure to collect constitutes a material breach. See Hadden v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 34 N.Y.2d 88, 96, 356 N.Y.S.2d 249, 312 N.E.2d 445 (1974) (“[I]t is not every breach of a constructive obligation which will excuse the other party from rendering its performance under the contract.... If the party in default has substantially performed, the other party’s performance is not excused.”); F. Garofalo Elec. Co., Inc. v. New York University, 300 A.D.2d 186, 188-89, 754 N.Y.S.2d 227 (1st Dep't 2002) (<HOLDING>); Anderson Clayton & Co. v. Alanthus Corp., 457
holding that one method of computing damages for a breach of contract is the contract price less the reasonable cost of completion holding that for a suit to be brought in the venue in which the contract was to be performed the contract must expressly state where the performance of the contract was to occur holding that jurys verdict for the defendant in a breach of contract action did not establish the absence of breach because the jury was instructed that it could find for the defendant if it concluded that the defendant had not breached the contract or if the defendant proved an affirmative defense holding that if plaintiff substantially performed its contractual obligations then it would be entitled to the payment due under the contract less the cost of any correction of defects in its performance even if it breached the contract holding that a construction contractor is entitled to recover profits upon breach of a partially performed contract but not the same amount as if the contract were completed because that amount must be reduced by the cost of completion