yet failed to enter the cell to check on Bell’s status. But the records reveal that Wellington was concerned enough to get the nurse to also observe Bell. Both Wellington and the nurse concluded that Bell was sleeping and that they should not enter the cell. This turned out to be a wrong conclusion. Whether checking on Bell earlier would have saved his life is not clear. This was an unfortunate situation. Appellants may have established negligence, but the facts do not demonstrate that Wellington’s conduct was such as to deprive him of qualified immunity under the test set forth above. See Jacobs, 228 F.3d at 395 (“[A]n officer’s acts must constitute at least more than a mere ‘oversight.’ ”) (citation omitted); Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 645 (5th Cir.1996) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). It should be noted that prior to Bell, no
holding that states inadvertent or negligent destruction of evidence did not violate defendants due process rights holding that the defendant bears the burden of proof and that such a disposition does not violate the due process clause holding that doctrine does not violate due process holding that negligent inaction by a jail officer does not violate due process holding that the act does not violate separation of powers is not void for vagueness and does not violate principles of due process by allowing a victim veto precluding application of the act