extensively. On voir dire, Timmons and Allen testified that the State had not offered and that they did not expect leniency in exchange for their testimony. They denied any expectation of leniency in return for their testimony and there was no basis for any expectation of leniency. The trial judge ruled Ebb’s proposed cross-examination inadmissible. On the other hand, the judge allowed Ebb to cross-examine House-Bowman about his pending charges because he had some subjective expectation of leniency. Applying the principles of Watkins to the instant case, we conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in precluding the Petitioner from cross-examining the witnesses about their pending charges before the jury. See Gutierrez v. State, 681 S.W.2d 698, 705-07 (Tex.Ct.App.1984) (<HOLDING>); State v. Grace, 648 So.2d 1306, 1307-09
holding that the trial judge retains the discretion to exclude dna evidence if errors in the laboratory procedures render it so unreliable that it would not be helpful to the trier of fact but that trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting that evidence holding that a trial judge has discretion to exclude evidence of pending charges and that where the defendant was given a full opportunity outside the presence of the jury to develop a foundation for bias but failed to do so the trial judge did not abuse its discretion holding it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude testimony recognizing the range of discretion of the trial judge holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the appellants motion for change of judge where the appellant failed to demonstrate actual bias