argue that a finding of willfulness is not required. The court will overrule the defendants’ objections to the magistrate judge’s order. First, here the government did produce the required agents’ statements, albeit late, and neither Rule 26.2(e) nor the Jencks Act was meant to cover situations, such as this one, where a party does, ultimately, produce required statements. As stated, Rule 26.2(e) applies where a party “disobeys an order to produce or deliver a statement,” while § 3500(d) of the Jencks Act applies, “[i]f the United States elects not to comply with an order of the court ... to deliver to the defendant any such statement.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 26.2(e) (emphasis added); 18 U.S.C. § 3500(d) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Dupuy, 760 F.2d 1492, 1497 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Heath, 580 F.2d 1011, 1019
holding that reversal for late disclosure of a states witness requires trial prejudice and defendants claim that he turned down an attractive plea offer because he thought the state could not prove its case without the witness does not demonstrate prejudice holding that testimonial hearsay statements of a witness who does not appear at trial are inadmissible under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment unless the witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the witness holding that accused has right to crossexamine witness on issue of a witness potential bias that stemmed from the fact that the witness had instituted a civil action for damages against the defendant arising from the crime charged holding that the district court did not err in instructing the jury not to draw any adverse inferences from the governments failure to call a witness because the witness did not have a relationship with the government such that one would expect him to give testimony in favor of the government holding that the governments late disclosure of a statement by a government witness did not require reversal under the jencks act where the defendants were allowed a second chance to crossexamine the witness