Right to Sue from the EEOC. 42 U.S.G. § 2000e-5(f)(l); Norris v. Florida Dept. of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 730 F.2d 682 (11th Cir.1984). The Plaintiff has the burden to prove that she adhered to this requirement. Martinez v. U.S. Sugar Corp., 880 F.Supp. 773, 777 (M.D.Fla.1995), aff'd 77 F.3d 497 (11th Cir.1996). Notice to the attorney who is formally representing the claimant before the EEOC constitutes notice to the claimant and commences the running of the 90 days allowed for the filing a Title VII or ADEA action. Decker v. Anheuser-Busch, 632 F.2d 1221, 1223 (5th Cir.1980), vacated and remanded for additional fact findings en banc, 670 F.2d 506 (5th Cir.1982) on remand, 558 F.Supp. 445 (M.D.Fla.1983); Ringgold v. National Maintenance Corp., 796 F.2d 769, 770 (5th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); Josiah-Faeduwor v. Communications Satellite
holding the 90 day period begins to run the date the eeoc right to sue letter is delivered to plaintiffs counsel holding that the 90 day period set out in rule 591 begins to run from the date of filing rather than the date set for hearing of the posttrial motion holding the sixyear limitations period begins to run upon date that payment is made holding that the statute of limitations period begins to run when the allegedly discriminatory pension plan is applied to the plaintiffs and leaving determination of the actual date the statute begins to run on each claim to the district court holding that limitation period begins to run at the time of the breach