Id. “Sections 1 and 2 of the Act of March 2,1931 are now part of our present statutory scheme as 18 U.S.C. § 401, which condemns obstructive acts in the court’s presence, and 18 U.S.C. § 1503, which prohibits contemptuous conduct away from the court, respectively.” United States v. Essex, 407 F.2d 214, 217 (6th Cir.1969). The somewhat sketchy legislative history of § 1503 suggests that a prime focus of the current version § 1503 and of prior iterations was to refine the judicial power to address contempts of court. However, nothing in the legislative history demonstrates that its broad language was not intended to cover allegedly “corrupt” conduct in civil litigation that impedes the “due administration of justice.” See Brogan v. United States, — U.S. at —, 118 S.Ct. at 808-09 (<HOLDING>). In other words, contrary to defendants’
holding that simple denial of guilt came within broad language of statute prohibiting making of false statement we cannot imagine how it could be true that falsely denying guilt in a government investigation does not pervert a governmental function holding that testimony given by a defendant in support of a motion to suppress cannot be admitted as evidence of his guilt at trial holding that a showing of actual prejudice was required where the defendant claimed that counsel was ineffective for conceding guilt at the guilt phase of a capital trial holding that the states transfer statute did not violate the apprendi rule because the transfer hearing determines not the minors guilt but the forum in which his guilt may be adjudicated holding that defendant could be charged for making false statements to treasury officials under the tax evasion statute or the statute prohibiting false statements to government officials