was both foreseeable and certain. See American Capital II, 59 Fed. Cl. at 575-76; American Capital III, 63 Fed. Cl. at 712-13. The Government argues that “the Court appears to have adopted an approach that equates the causation requirement with the foreseeability requirement.” 2/25/05 Gov’t Mot. to Reconsider at 19 (citing American Capital III, 63 Fed.Cl. at 712) (quoting Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin On Contracts §§ 1006, 1007 at 60-61 (interim ed. 2002) (“Our only test of ‘causation,’ ... is foreseeability!.]”)). The Government thus concludes that “to the extent the Court in the present case collapsed the causation analysis into its foreseeability analysis, that approach is incompatible with CalFed.” 2/25/05 Gov’t Mot. to Reconsider at 20. The Gove 3 F.3d 1426, 1429 (8th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Crocker v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 826
holding that officers directors and employees of a corporation may become personally liable under  1981 holding that where plaintiff reata failed to demonstrate waiver of citys immunity from liability under tort claims act plaintiffs claims were properly dismissed and plaintiff was not entitled to replead holding officer personally liable because he agreed to personally guarantee payment on an account holding that where an express contract was in place between plaintiff and defendant that governed the compensation sought by plaintiff plaintiff may not recover under a theory of unjust enrichment holding that professional corporation was not necessary party where plaintiff asserts claims that accrue to plaintiff personally