intent to promote or aid the commission of an offense, such person agrees with one or more persons that at least one of them or another person will engage in conduct constituting the offense and one of the parties commits an overt act in furtherance of the offense, except that an overt act shall not be required if the object of the conspiracy was to commit any felony upon the person of another.” A.R.S. § 13-1003. At the time of Petitioner’s trial in 2001, first degree murder, as defined in A.R.S. § 13-1105, was considered a “specific intent” crime which required the specific intent to kill another person. See State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 32, 906 P.2d 542, 565 (1995); State v. Fisher, 176 Ariz. 69, 79, 859 P.2d 179, 189 (1993); State v. Cook, 170 Ariz, 40, .W.2d 787, 788-89 (Mich.1992) (<HOLDING>). It is “universally recognized” that “an
holding that conditional intent sufficient to satisfy specific intent mens rea in federal car jacking statute holding that conditional intent sufficient to satisfy specific intent mens rea for solicitation to commit murder offense holding that a mens rea of unlawfully in the indictment was sufficient because the indictment referenced the applicable statute which required a reckless mens rea holding that where both firstdegree and felony murder were possible bases for a murder conviction a jury instruction that suggested the jury could rely on felony murder as the predicate offense for a conviction for conspiracy to commit murder was improper because under arizona law a conviction for conspiracy to commit firstdegree murder requires a specific intent to kill holding that conditional intent sufficient to satisfy specific intent mens rea in federal carjacking statute