that “[i]t is the purpose of this legislation to assist the cities, counties and states in the solution of the discarded materials problem,” id. at 11, 6249. Below, the district court concluded that these isolated bits of legislative history and the broadly worded statutory language upon which they rely “do not come close to expressing an ‘unmistakably clear’ intent on the part of Congress to exempt state laws relating to solid waste from the limitations of the dormant Commerce Clause.” (J.A. 10). We fully agree with this conclusion. The fragments of statutory language and legislative history cited by the Defendants fall far short of the demanding standard that congressional intent be unmistakably clear. See In re: Southeast Arkansas Landfill, Inc., 981 F.2d 372, 377 (8th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). G. The Defendants’ next to last attempt at
holding the meaning of commerce element in a different federal statute the hobbs act to be a question of law recognizing the two different types of conspiracies under the federal statute holding that a tortfeasor is required to pay the expenses of over treatment or unnecessary medical treatment unless such treatment was incurred by the victim in bad faith  recognizing that consent decrees have a dual character that of contract and that of judicial decree subjecting them to different treatment for different purposes holding that nothing in rcra or any other federal statute comes close to authorizing different treatment of outofstate waste