a valid license, from Georgia or another jurisdiction, at the time he was stopped, to rebut the presumption created by OCGA § 40-5-29 (b) and prevent the State from proving the no-valid-license element of the violation. That is because, as a matter of constitutional due process, statutory presumptions cannot be conclusive on the factfinder or shift the burden of proof to the defendant in criminal cases. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S. 510, 521-524 (99 SC 2450, 61 LE2d 39) (1979); Napier v. State, 276 Ga. 769, 771 (583 SE2d 825) (2003). 9 By contrast, it is not unusual for the punishment imposed for a crime to reflect the offender’s subsequent conduct; indeed, that is the basis for paroling sentences. See also Pepper v. United States,_U. S._,_(131 SC 1229, 1236, 179 LE2d 196) (2011) (<HOLDING>). Nor are amnesty programs and pardons unusual,
recognizing that a trial court can set aside verdict holding that resentencing should consider all sentencing arguments and remanding for court to consider defendants argument for downward departure based on postconviction rehabilitation holding that the trial court was without authority to set aside entry of default on motion to set aside default judgment holding that when a defendants sentence has been set aside on appeal a trial court at resentencing may consider evidence of the defendants postsentencing rehabilitation holding district courts may consider rehabilitation when deciding whether to impose a more lenient sentence at a defendants resentencing