F.3d at 660, 663. Applying these principles to this case, we observe that, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1952, an ITAR crime of violence that does not result in death carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment for a term of twenty years, while an ITAR crime of violence that results in death is punishable by a sentence up to and including a term of imprisonment for life. See 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3)(B). Thus, the death of a victim of an ITAR crime is a fact that may result in a sentence above the otherwise applicable statutory maximum. We hold, therefore, that the death of a victim of an ITAR crime is an element of the offense that must be charged in the indictment and proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt before a sentence above twenty years may be imposed. Cf. Thomas, 274 F.3d at 663 (<HOLDING>). Because the deaths of Kovach and Gould were
holding that statutory maximum is twenty years when drug quantity is not charged as element of offense and found by jury beyond a reasonable doubt holding that postapprendi drug quantity is an element of the offense to be proven to jury holding lopez was inapplicable to the language prior conviction for a felony drug offense in 21 usc  841b1a because felony drug offense was defined in 21 usc  80244 as an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the united states or of a state holding that when the indictment charges that a certain minimum quantity of drugs is involved in the offense proof of that quantity is a fourth element of the offense holding that drug quantity is an element of an offense under 21 usc  841