it represents a reasonable practical accommodation of the interests of the state and the defendant in the criminal justice process.”). In the Confrontation Clause context, however, the Supreme Court has recognized that the risk of prejudice stemming from the introduction of a co-defendant’s confession is so high that, in some circumstances, even a limiting instruction cannot cure the constitutional problem. See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136, 88 S.Ct. 1620 (“[Tjhere are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.”); see also Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 196, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) (<HOLDING>). It is only when a co-defendant’s statement
holding new trial should not have been granted because jury was properly instructed holding that similartransaction evidence against codefendant did not require severance given that trial court instructed jury that such evidence only pertained to codefendant holding that claims regarding the sufficiency of the evidence before the state grand jury may not be raised on habeas where a properly instructed petit jury heard all relevant evidence and convicted holding that a properly instructed jury may not consider the redacted confession of a codefendant which obviously referred directly to someone often obviously the defendant holding that where jury has been properly instructed counsel is not ineffective for failing to object to an instruction