relation to nonpunitive ends. See id. at 473, 97 S.Ct. at 2805; Consol. Edison Co., 292 F.3d at 354. Other aspects of a challenged statute also bear on the bill of attainder analysis. For example, the inclusion of protective measures designed to safeguard the rights of the burdened individual or class weighs against a finding that a statute is a bill of attainder. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 477, 97 S.Ct. at 2807. Moreover, the selectivity or scope of a statute may indicate punitiveness where the differential treatment of the affected party or parties cannot be explained “without resort to inferences of punitive purpose.” BellSouth I, 144 F.3d at 67; see also Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 192 F.3d 1050, 1067 (D.C.Cir.1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 816, 121 S.Ct. 53, 148 L.Ed.2d 21 (2000) (<HOLDING>); BellSouth II, 162 F.3d at 690. Finally, the
holding that the district court did not err by compelling individual rather than class arbitration because the relevant agreements were silent as to class arbitration holding that where material misrepresentations are made to class members an inference of reliance arises to the entire class holding that the breadth of a challenged statute indicated that congress was aiming not to punish appellants but rather to regulate an entire class holding that putative class members are not parties to an action prior to class certification holding that the filing of a complaint in a class action suit suspends the statute of limitations but a denial of class certification reactivates the statute of limitations for potential plaintiffs