Passariello “asked first,” Penny-Mac’s request was denied. This “race to the podium” analysis does not reflect the proper exercise of a court’s discretion. The record below manifestly supported PennyMac’s requested relief from the technical admissions. In light of that record, and in the absence of any showing of prejudice to Labeau and Passariello, the trial court abused its discretion in fading to grant relief. See Donaldson, 165 So.3d at 42. See also Ruiz v. De Varona, 785 So.2d 508, 509 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (finding “dismissal based solely on the failure to timely answer a request for admissions would be inappropriate when the pleadings make clear the opposing party’s position and the existence of disputed facts”); Sher v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 557 So.2d 638, 639 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (<HOLDING>) CONCLUSION We do not countenance PennyMac’s
holding that a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment precluded default judgment holding that disputed issues of fact precluded entry of summary judgment since the record was replete with evidence contradicting the admissions created by shers failure to file a timely response holding that the function of the trial court on a motion for summary judgment is to determine whether issues of fact exist and not to decide the merits of the issues themselves holding because trial court fully considered plaintiffs response to summary judgment motion failure to render summary judgment without notice or hearing harmless thus trial court was not required to vacate the summary judgment and then reinstate it to accomplish the same end holding that when there are no genuine issues of material fact summary judgment is appropriate