living with Mother and Children, and, thus, no new parent-child relationship or family unit would be created. While Father concedes that the Superior Court opined in J.M. that cohabitation is not the sine qua non of a new family unit, he notes, consistent with the dissent below, that the Superior Court in that case held only that mother and grandfather were permitted to show cause under Section 2901, but that it remanded to the orphans’ court to make the ultimate determination as to whether cause was shown. Father suggests that, rather than relying upon J.M., the Superior Court should have instead considered L.J.B. (remanding for hearing regarding stepmother’s intention to adopt where stepmother and the child’s father were separated) and Adoption of J.D.S., 763 A.2d 867 (Pa.Super.2000) (<HOLDING>), when interpreting the term “family unit,” as,
holding that proposed adoption by stepparent who was separated from the childs mother was not valid and that as a result termination of the fathers parental rights was inappropriate holding that statute that imposed different requirements to establish parental rights on father than on mother did not violate fathers right to equal protection under the law holding evidence that mother allowed child to remain in home in which there was violent conduct as evidenced by fathers physical abuse of mother during her pregnancy was legally sufficient to support termination recognizing that termination of parental rights can be accomplished only by resort to chapters 63 adoption and 39 termination of parental rights and any attempt by a parent to contract away the childs right to support is void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy holding that termination of fathers parental rights should be reversed since it was done to facilitate childs adoption and would prejudice rights of child and mother to receive support from father