8 without an apartment would be tantamount to no relief at all. Similarly, a change in NYCHA’s Section 8 termination policies and practices would mean little to plaintiffs who have already lost their apartments. Preliminary injunctive relief thus is essential to aid this Court’s ability to decide the claims and accord the appropriate relief. Id. at 256. Central to the court’s rationale was that the NYCHA was not, and could not become, a party to the state court eviction proceedings, which were between the private landlords and the plaintiffs. Thus, if the eviction proceedings were not enjoined, the court would be “unable to accord meaningful relief to the parties”. Id.; see also Lattimore v. Northwest Coop. Homes Ass’n, No. 90-CV-49, 1990 WL 10521534, at *4 (D.D.C. March 26, 1990) (<HOLDING>); cf. Caulder v. Durham Hous. Auth., 433 F.2d
holding that a notice of appeal filed in an adversary proceeding could not appeal the main proceeding holding that the longer appeal period from a judgment controlled over the shorter appeal period in a certiorari proceeding when the two proceedings were consolidated in the district court and the certiorari proceeding was not an independent proceeding holding that the court was not barred from enjoining the eviction proceeding based on the second exception to the antiinjunction act because the plaintiff could not raise her claims as a defense in the eviction proceeding holding that misleading testimony regarding the purpose of a proceeding did not warrant inquiry into the result of the proceeding holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding