Cir.1998) (finding deficient performance where appellate counsel “fail[ed] to raise a well-established, straightforward, and obvious ... claim”); Claudio v. Scully, 982 F.2d 798, 805 (2d Cir.1992) (noting that a court may find deficient performance where “[n]o reasonably competent attorney [w]ould have missed the ... claim” and appellate counsel’s “decision not to raise the claim cannot be viewed reasonably as a strategic decision.”) Under the second prong, which requires a petitioner “[t]o establish prejudice in the appellate context, a petitioner must demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability that his claim would have been successful before the state’s highest court.” Mayo, 13 F.3d at 534 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see also Clark, 214 F.3d at 321 (<HOLDING>); Abdurrahman v. Henderson, 897 F.2d 71, 74 (2d
holding that for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to be established a defendant must show that but for counsels error the outcome of his proceedings would have been different holding that the outcome of the case could have been different if the trial court had imposed the appropriate burden holding that to establish stricklandpierce prejudice in the appellate representation context the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the direct appeal proceeding would have been different but for counsels deficient performance holding that to show prejudice in a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors the result of the proceeding would have been different holding that a petitioner must show  that the outcome of his appeal would have been different had counsel raised the issue