on July 3, 2001. As no adversary proceedings were filed pursuant to any of these sections, and such actions would now be time-barred, the Debtor’s prepetition debts, including Lowe and Flynn’s prepetition claims, were, in fact, discharged pursuant to the Discharge Order. Therefore, the Debtor’s request to be allowed to obtain a discharge regarding these claims is moot— he has already been granted a discharge as to these claims pursuant to the Discharge Order entered on July 3, 2001. Any action such as reopening the Debt- or’s bankruptcy case or amending his schedules to include Lowe and Flynn’s claims is not necessary and would have no effect on his discharge, the discharge injunction, or the Knox County Circuit Court Lawsuit. See, e.g., Judd v. Wolfe, 78 F.3d 110, 113 (3d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); In re Cheely, 280 B.R. 763, 766
holding that although the plan cannot discharge the debt  the claimant may otherwise subject the debt to the provisions of a confirmed plan holding that a prepetition equitable distribution right to equalization relief constitutes a discharged prepetition claim and distinguishing while agreeing with in re marriage of seligman 14 calapp4th 300 18 calrptr2d 209 214215 1993 wherein it was held that a prepetition equitable distribution right to in kind relief does not constitute a prepetition claim holding that the preponderance of the evidence standard applies to  523 claims holding that every prepetition debt is discharged subject to the provisions of  523 holding that reporting of historically accurate debt may violate the fcra when the reporting did not include that the debt was discharged in bankruptcy or that the debt was in dispute