“ill-suited” for evaluating the effectiveness of counsel in advising of deportation, and held that “ad vice regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” Id. at 1481-82. While Youngs refers to Padilla as representing a “trend away from the distinction between direct and collateral consequences,” Appellant Br. at 22, Padilla’s holding was limited to the requirement of counsel to advise of deportation pursuant to their Sixth Amendment responsibilities. These Sixth Amendment responsibilities of counsel to advise of the advantages and disadvantages of a guilty plea are greater than the responsibilities of a court under the Fifth Amendment. See Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 50-51, 116 S.Ct. 356, 133 L.Ed.2d 271 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the Padilla Court’s unwillingness to
holding that due process requires that defendant be fully aware of direct consequences of guilty plea holding that courts mention of a guilty plea and acceptance of responsibility to defense counsel was not reversible error holding that counsel not the court bears the responsibility of advising a defendant of the consequences of a guilty plea apart from the small class of rights enumerated in rule 11 holding that the defendants guilty plea was valid where the district court carefully questioned the defendant about whether he understood the consequences of his guilty plea holding that a defendant must have knowledge of the likely consequences of entering the guilty plea in order for a plea to be voluntary and knowing