functional capacity to perform certain work in the national economy, and is therefore not disabled under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i) & 423(d). With respect to Talavera’s obesity, several of Talavera’s treating and examining physicians — all of whom were aware of her obesity — concluded that her weight only imposed mild limitations on her functional abilities. Moreover, the ALJ expressly referred in her decision to the Vocational Expert’s testimony that “claimant’s weight would not interfere with [certain] low stress jobs.” Id. at *12 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, it is evident that the ALJ did adequately consider Talavera’s obesity. See Dumas v. Schweiker, 712 F.2d 1545, 1553-54 (2d Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Talavera’s contention that the ALJ erred in
holding that vocational experts testimony that there were jobs claimant could perform constituted substantial evidence holding that an alj cannot discredit lay testimony solely because it is not supported by medical evidence in the record holding that an alj is entitled to rely on vocational experts testimony that is based on assumptions that are supported by evidence in the record holding that the alj did not consider the vocational experts testimony on crossexamination and failed to articulate a basis for rejecting this evidence which was a basis for remand holding it is error for an alj to fail to consider factors relevant to the pain analysis which are supported by the record