until October 1978, fifteen months after the agreement, the court reasoned that the City and the Authority could not have been aware of Appellants’ claim for a de facto taking at the time the agreement was finalized. More importantly, the City may have had any number of reasons for settling the Clara Thomas claim and, therefore, that subsequent settlement cannot necessarily be construed as evidence of the parties’ intent at the time the agreement was signed. Finally, I believe that the majority disregarded the governmental status of the contracting parties, which requires a stricter analysis of third-party beneficiary status. See Clifton v. Suburban Cable TV Co., Inc., 434 Pa.Super. 139, 144, 642 A.2d 512, 515 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1173, 115 S.Ct. 1152, 130 L.Ed.2d 1110 (1995) (<HOLDING>) Accordingly, I would affirm. President Judge
holding that in order for a plaintiff to file suit against the government on a contract claim in the court of federal claims a plaintiff must have either direct privity or thirdparty beneficiary status holding that courts considering government contracts must take a more narrow view of thirdparty beneficiary status  and apply a more stringent test to determine whether a third party qualifies for beneficiary status holding that the thirdparty beneficiary theory did not apply holding decrees identification of person by name was sufficiently specific for purposes of thirdparty beneficiary status recognizing common law cause of action as thirdparty beneficiary