overruling Bryant would create a conflict among the circuits, seven of which have held that escapes are inherently risky and thus always constitute a crime of violence under § 4B1.2. United States v. Luster, 305 F.3d 199, 202 (3d Cir.2002), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1773, 155 L.Ed.2d 528 (2003); United States v. Turner, 285 F.3d 909, 915-16 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 895, 123 S.Ct. 180, 154 L.Ed.2d 163 (2002); United States v. Gay, 251 F.3d 950, 954 (11th Cir.2001); United States v. Nation, 243 F.3d 467, 472 (8th Cir.2001); United States v. Ruiz, 180 F.3d 675, 677 n. 7 (5th Cir.1999); United States v. Harris, 165 F.3d 1062, 1068 (6th Cir.1999); United States v. Dickerson, 77 F.3d 774, 777 (4th Cir.1996); see also United States v. Jackson, 301 F.3d 59, 63 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 2629, 156
holding that crimes subject to a minimum sentence of 15 years under 18 usc  924e1 are properly characterized as class a felonies under 18 usc  3559 holding that for purposes of 18 usc  924e involuntary manslaughter in ohio is a violent felony the definition of which is identical for all relevant purposes to the definition of crime of violence in  4b12a holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001 holding for the purposes of 18 usc  924e that being a felon in possession of a firearm is not a violent felony as defined in 18 usc  924e2b holding that escapes are categorically risky in the context of 18 usc  924e