issue until a final RO or BVA decision has been rendered in that matter, or the appeal has been withdrawn by the claimant. See Hamilton, 4 Vet.App. at 531-32, aff'd, 39 F.3d 1581-85. Just as the Court’s jurisdiction is dependent on a jurisdiction-conferring NOD, the Board’s jurisdiction, too, derives from a claimant’s NOD. See Marsh v. West, 11 Vet.App. 468 (1998) (“untimely NOD deprives [BVA] of jurisdiction”); Garlejo v. Brown, 10 Vet.App. 229, 232 (1997) (Board did not err in refusing to adjudicate matter as to which no NOD was filed). When the Board has jurisdiction over a particular matter, that jurisdiction is “mandatory”. In the Matter of Fee Agreement of Cox, 10 Vet.App. 361, 374 (1997), vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. Cox v. West, 149 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed.Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); see also Suttmann, Soloman, and EF, all supra
holding expressly that this court properly held that such decision by secretary is mandatory holding that this time requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional holding that this courts review is limited to the bia decision and the portions of the ijs decision that it expressly adopted holding that decision of this court unless or until overturned by this court en banc the  federal circuit or the supreme court is a decision of the court on the date it is issued any rulings interpretations or conclusions of law contained in such a decision are authoritative and binding as of the date the decision is issued and are to be considered and when applicable are to be followed by va agencies of original jurisdiction the board and the secretary in adjudicating and resolving claims holding that the statute is mandatory