apparent. See United States v. Brown, 402 F.3d 133, 138-39 (2d Cir. 2005) (vacating condition where it was “seemingly unrelated to [Defendant’s] offense and circumstances”). As mentioned earlier, the nature of these employment restrictions mean that, as a practical matter, he may never be employable. Another condition prohibits Jenkins from incurring new credit charges or opening additional lines of credit without approval of a probation officer. Nothing in the record suggests these restrictions on Jenkins’s use of credit cards are “reasonably necessary,” 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(5), to protect the public or to deter Jenkins from continuing to engage in the conduct for which he was convicted — possession of child pornography. Cf. United States v. Peppe, 80 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 1996) (<HOLDING>). This is especially true when the use of
holding that retaliation claim was reasonably related to prior sex discrimination claim holding that the mere passive extension of credit does not constitute any form of reliance holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or holding that a bar on incurring debt without prior approval was reasonably related to defendants offense which involved the extortionate extension of credit holding that where there were two possible grounds to revoke defendants probation and only one ground was relied on to revoke his probation defendant was not entitled to jailtime credit when he was later convicted on the offense that constituted the other ground it did not matter that the authorities learned about the ground for revocation while investigating the offense for which he was convicted sjection 558031 requires only that custody be related to the offense on which credit is sought because his custody was not related to the convicted offense he did not get any credit