to commit himself to such an alternative to a federal sentence. 2 . Defendant also raises two additional arguments: (1) that the district court improperly based its sentence on the defendant’s refusal to waive his constitutional and statutory rights to oppose his deportation; and (2) that the district court failed to appreciate the scope of its authority to consider, as a mitigating circumstance upon which to base a departure, defendant's vulnerability and susceptibility to abuse in prison due to his physical condition. Both arguments lack merit. As to the first argument, the conditioning of a downward departure on the surrender of a statutory right to a deportation hearing would not have offended due process. See United States v. Galvez-Falconi, 174 F.3d 255, 260 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). See generally United States v.
recognizing that a defendant may appeal a district courts refusal to depart downward if the sentence was imposed in violation of law because the district court misconstrued its authority to depart holding that district court had authority to grant section 5k20 downward departure despite governments opposition holding that the district court was not required to state affirmatively on the record that it knew it possessed the authority to depart downward holding that a circuit court has no jurisdiction to review a district courts discretionary decision not to depart downward from the guidelines but would have jurisdiction if the district court based its decision on the belief that it did not have the authority to depart holding that where a defendant malees a showing that the act of consenting to deportation carries unusual assistance to the administration of justice district court has authority under ussg  5k20 to depart downward in absence of the governments consent