deference, and “ ‘should not disturb [that interpretation] unless it appears from the statute or the legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned.’ ” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845, 104 S.Ct. at 2783 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383, 81 S.Ct. 1554, 1560, 6 L.Ed.2d 908 (1961)); Akindenovo, 61 F.3d at 284-85. Thus, the court will defer to the agency’s interpretation if it is “rational and consistent with the statute.” NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, AFL-CIO, 484 U.S. 112, 123, 108 S.Ct. 413, 421, 98 L.Ed.2d 429 (1987); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44, 104 S.Ct. at 2781-82 (describing the review as a determination of whether the agency’s interpretation is “reasonable”); Akindenovo, 61 F.3d at 284-85 (<HOLDING>); Arkansas AFL-CIO v. FCC, 11 F.3d 1430,
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