replacing a juror with an alternate. In upholding the constitutionality of the substitution, we noted that “[t]he court questioned the alternate juror[ ] about [his] activities since discharge.” Id. at 176. Furthermore, the alternate had been examined by defense counsel “about his activities after dismissal and the possibility that [he] had formed opinions about guilt or innocence during that time” and was reinstated “only after reaffirming his ability to make a fair decision in the case.” Id. at 178-79. Other circuits faced with this issue have similarly relied on a district court’s questioning of a recalled alternate to insure that the alternate had not yet formed an opinion and was free from any outside influences. See United States v. Quiroz-Cortez, 960 F.2d 418, 420 (5th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Guevara, 823 F.2d 446, 448
holding that although the trial court violated federal rule 47b waiver principles apply in the alternate juror context holding a new trial required when juror is replaced by an alternate during jury deliberations holding that the late substitution of an alternate juror was not prejudicial to defendant because the district court had carefully instructed the alternate not to discuss the case before dismissing her and upon recall the alternate twice affirmed that she had complied with the courts instruction holding that a defendant waives his right to object to a postsubmission substitution of an alternate juror when he voluntarily agreed to the procedure holding that wjhere the defendant knowingly consents to the addition of an alternate juror as was obviously the case here he waives any challenge to that procedure on appeal