that it “undeniably involved an issue the BIA had not considered.” Id. at 1183. By contrast, in Fernandez-Ruiz, the BIA had considered whether the petitioner’s state conviction constituted a crime of domestic violence— it had simply conducted this inquiry under the categorical, rather than modified categorical, approach. Id. at 1134-35. We did not consider remanding the case for the government to supplement the record of the petitioner’s conviction because the government did not ask that we do so. Id. at 1135. This case, however, is ripe for remand. Our remand does not ask the BIA to consider whether evidence currently on the record is sufficient to demonstrate that Mrs. Kawashima’s conviction is an “aggravated felony.” Cf. Ruiz-Vidal v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Instead, we remand to the BIA so that it may
holding that courts may consider a plea agreement and other documents contained in the record of conviction when applying the modified categorical approach holding that the categorical approach applies to  924c holding that we need not remand to the bia so that it may apply the categorical approach holding that the categorical approach applies to the identical definition of crime of violence in 18 usc  16 recognizing that a court may not apply the modified categorical approach if the statute proscribes only conduct that involves moral turpitude internal quotation marks omitted