effect on the trial court because the arbitrator’s decision was not confirmed pursuant to HRS § 658-8 (1993) and, therefore, was not a final judgment according to HRS § 658-12 (1998). 1 disagree. Barretto relies upon Oppenheimer v. AIG Hawai'i Ins. Co., 77 Hawai'i 88, 881 P.2d 1234 (1994), in which this court held that HRS § 658-12 allows direct appeals from orders confirming, modifying, or correcting an arbitration award. Id. at 92, 881 P.2d at 1238. However, appealability and finality are related but distinguishable concepts. See generally Labayog v. Labayog, 83 Hawai'i 412, 422, 927 P.2d 420, 430 (App.), cert. dismissed, 83 Hawai'i 545, 928 P.2d 39 (1996). Appellate jurisdiction and collateral estoppel implicate different policy concerns. For purp 629 P.2d 1116, 1123-24 (1981) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, to determine whether the
holding that the plaintiffs due process claims were completely barred by res judicata because the underlying factual predicate for each of these claims  is substantially identical to the allegations presented in state court holding that the plaintiffs claims were barred by res judicata when the federal courts judgment was finalized by denial of his petition for certiorari holding that when claims regarding the employment relationship arise after the plaintiffs first case is initiated the second case is not barred by res judicata holding that collateral attacks on bankruptcy courts jurisdiction are barred by res judicata holding that res judicata did not apply where a trial courts order was not a final judgment