2074, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976)); see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 547 n. 13, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) (noting that “the failure to allege that the reasons for the dismissal were published dooms” plaintiffs liberty interest claim); Dickeson v. Quarberg, 844 F.2d 1435, 1440 (10th Cir.1988) (“A liberty interest is not violated when one is discharged without public disclosure of the reasons for the discharge.”). Thus, speculative rumors circulating in the community as a result of defendants’ failure to publish do not establish a deprivation of a liberty interest. While the injury to reputation asserted by the plaintiff may be actionable under state tort law , it falls far short of a constitutional violation. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 697-99, 96 S.Ct. 1155 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
holding that a defamation claim is a personal injury tort claim holding that merely declining to rehire a person did not constitute defamation for deprivation of liberty interest purposes absent any charges against the good name or reputation of that person holding that harassment or discrimination does not rise to the level of persecution under the ina unless it is accompanied by physical punishment infliction of harm or significant deprivation of liberty holding that defamation standing alone is not sufficient to establish a claim for deprivation of a liberty interest citations omitted holding that conduct actionable as state claim for defamation does not rise to level of liberty deprivation simply because government officials are involved