regarding prior inconsistent statements with a directive to the jury that it was the sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses, stating: “You are the sole judges of the facts and credibility of the witnesses and of the weight which you will give the testimony of each witness. After making your own judgment, give the testimony of each witness such weight, if any, as you think it deserves.” This instruction explicitly informed the jury that it was entitled to give a witness’s testimony no weight at all, if it so chose. Accordingly, the trial justice, though not using the precise words proffered by defendant, adequately instructed the jury about its authority to discredit the testimony of a witness who had been impeached by a prior inconsistent statement. See Adefusika, 989 A.2d at 477 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, “[w]e perceive neither error nor
holding that the trial court correctly instructed the jury that the defendant had to establish by evidence that outweighed the evidence against him that he lacked the capacity to form specific intent holding that jury trial in civil cases is not so fundamental to the american system of justice as to be required of state courts by due process holding that although the trial justice did not adopt the specific language that defendant requested be used in instructing the jury    the trial justice adequately and accurately instructed the jury as to that element of the charge holding that the trial court reversibly erred when it altered an essential element of the crime charged and broadened the language of the indictment by instructing the jury on the general definition of enterprise for rico conspiracy holding that the trial court committed fundamental error in not instructing the jury on the knowledge element of the offense of resisting an officer without violence when that element was in dispute at trial