F.Supp.2d at 1287-91. However, because the statute is ambiguous, 19 U.S.C. § 1623(a) could easily be interpreted as merely granting Customs broad authority to require some form of security from an importer — security which had been provided here — rather than contemplating additional security. Here Customs appears to have adopted the more restrictive interpretation. See, e.g., Sioux Honey Ass’n v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., — CIT-, 700 F.Supp.2d 1330, 1347 (2010) (discussing how 19 U.S.C. § 1623(a) should be read in conjunction with 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2)(B)(iii)) (affd in part, vacated in part on other grounds 672 F.3d 1041, cert. denied, — U.S.-, 133 S.Ct. 126, 184 L.Ed.2d 28 (2012)); see also Chevron USA v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) (<HOLDING>). The National Fisheries court ultimately
holding that the evidence must be sufficient to support the agencys findings of fact and that the agencys inferences from those facts must be reasonable holding that an agencys reasonable reading of an ambiguous statute must be affirmed holding that when a court is asked to construe an ambiguous statute it must defer to the interpretation set out in a regulation promulgated by the agency charged with administering the statute so long as the agencys interpretation is reasonable holding that where statute is ambiguous deference is appropriately accorded to agencys interpretation holding that a court must defer to an agencys reasonable interpretation of a statute even if the court might have preferred another