defense, Contour Spa, 692 F.3d at 1207, and we cannot either. Also problematic is the race to the courthouse that Bodi’s position on tribal waiver-by-removal would likely inspire. There are reasons why a tribe may prefer to litigate in federal court. “[T]ribal immunity ‘is a matter of federal law,’” Bay Mills, 134 S.Ct. at 2031 (quoting Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 756, 118 S.Ct. 1700), and, as such, tribes may wish to avail themselves, when possible, of the “experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers on [such] federal issues,” Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312, 125 S.Ct. 2363, 162 L.Ed.2d 257 (2005) (discussing removability of claims “impli-cat[ing] significant federal issues”); see Contour Spa, 692 F.3d at 1207 (<HOLDING>). In addition, state courts have long been at
holding the americans with disabilities act not to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity and declaring congress abrogates tribal immunity only where the definitive language of the statute itself states an intent either to abolish indian tribes common law immunity or to subject tribes to suit under the act holding that tribes voluntary participation in administrative proceedings is not the express and unequivocal waiver of tribal immunity that we require in this circuit holding that acoma tribal law was the law of the place because the tribal court could have jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claim recognizing that tribes have an interest in a uniform body of federal law in the area of tribal immunity recognizing the uncertain state of federal law in this area