increased risk of extinction, 81 Fed. Reg. at 17,401. The definition of “significant” applied by the Service in the final rule on the petition to list the African coelacanth may very well be a reasonable interpretation of the ESA’s statutory language, but it is not the definition set forth in the Final SPR Policy. The Court recognizes that the Service has broad discretion to interpret the SPR language of the ESA. See Defenders of Wildlife, 258 F.3d at 1145. In light of this broad discretion, the majority of Plaintiffs’ arguments against the Service’s SPR interpretation are unavailing. The SPR interpretation set forth in the Final SPR Policy does not violate the plain language of the ESA merely because it fails to define “significant” as synonymous with “important.” See id. at 1141 (<HOLDING>). The Final SPR Policy is not unreasonable
holding that such statutory language is quite plain and gives general legislative consent for a district to be sued in the courts of texas in the same manner as other defendants holding that we must give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of a statutes language recognizing that the esa uses language in a manner in some tensionwith ordinary usage recognizing that where the statutory language is not ambiguous  the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute must be given effect holding that probation orders need not include every possible restriction so long as a reasonable person is put on notice of what conduct will subject him or her to revocation and that ajlthough the conditions should be clearly set out and must mean what they say every detail need not be spelled out and the language should be interpreted in its common ordinary usage