a child's educational performance.” See 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(c)(9) (2005); see also Cal.Code Regs, tit. 5, § 3030(f) (2005) (providing pupil is entitled to special education where pupil has "chronic and acute health problem[]” that "adversely affects a pupil’s educational performance”). 8 . The district court reasoned: A contrary finding would effectively negate and render superfluous the statutory and regulatory provisions that a "disorder in a basic psychological process” qualifies as a "specific learning disability” only if, as a result of such disorder, a "severe discrepancy” exists between the child’s intellectual ability and academic achievement. See Cal. Educ.Code § 56337 (2005); Cal.Code Regs, tit. 5, § 3030(j) (2005); see also Hart v. McLucas, 535 F.2d 516, 519 (9th Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>). If a "specific learning disability” were
holding that it is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy spacious as well as clean wellbalanced as well as carefully patrolled holding courts must give effect to every provision and word in a statute and avoid any interpretation that may render statutory terms meaningless or superfluous holding that courts should avoid constructions that would render statutory text superfluous holding in the construction of administrative regulations as well as statutes it is presumed that every phrase serves a legitimate purpose and therefore constructions which render regulatory provisions superfluous are to be avoided holding that statutes should not be interpreted so as to render any of its provisions nugatory