racketeering income.”). Although a few circuits have adopted a more liberal approach, the Second Circuit has consistently distinguished between injuries alleged to be caused by racketeering activity, and injuries alleged to be caused by investment of racketeering funds. See Gregory P. Joseph, Civil RICO: A Definitive Guide, § 7 (3d ed. 2010). Under the Second Circuit’s rule, injuries caused by the racketeering activity itself may not form the basis for a Subsection 1962(a) claim. See Discon, Inc. v. NYNEX Corp., 93 F.3d 1055, 1063 (2d Cir.1996), vacated in part on other grounds by, 525 U.S. 128, 119 S.Ct. 493, 142 L.Ed.2d 510 (1998); Ouaknine, 897 F.2d at 82-83 (2d Cir.1990); Blue Cross and Blue Shield of New Jersey, Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 113 F.Supp.2d 345, 383-84 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, neither can a plaintiff state a
holding that to state a  1962a claim plaintiff must allege that the defendants received income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity and invested it in the acquisition of any interest in or the establishment or operation of a rico enterprise holding that a plaintiffs claim of injury stemming from alleged procedural harm is insufficient to ground standing where the harm is uncoupled from any injury in fact or tied only to an undifferentiated injury common to all members of the public holding that a shareholder lacks standing to bring a suit based on loss in value to his or her shares as this injury derives from and thus is not distinct from the injury to the corporation holding that to state a subsection 1962a claim plaintiffs must allege a use or investment injury that is distinct from any injury resulting from the racketeering predicate acts themselves holding under maryland law that a breach of fiduciary duty claim alleging loss in share value shareholder must allege an injury distinct from an injury to the corporation