reenter the O’Neills’ home without a warrant, the district court relied on the consent-once-removed doctrine. This doctrine allows government agents to enter a suspect’s premises to arrest the suspect without a warrant if [undercover agents]: 1) entered at the express invitation of someone with authority to consent; 2) at that point established the existence of probable cause to effectuate an arrest or search; and 3) immediately summoned help from other officers. United States v. Yoon, 398 F.3d 802, 806 (6th Cir.2005) (emphasis added) (applying the doctrine to the sale of illegal drugs). The O’Neills argue that this doctrine does not apply in the present case, where the undercover officers left the premises and then attempted to make a second entry. This court has previous ir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Akinsanya and Diaz, however, do not stand for
holding that initial consent was not withdrawn where the undercover officer momentarily stepped out to obtain help from other officers located in the room across the hall in making the arrest holding that the defendants unlawful arrest in his hotel room rendered his subsequent consent to the search of his room invalid even though he signed a consent form allowing the search after his arrest because the government  completely failed to address whether there was a break in the causal relationship between the unlawful arrest and the subsequent search holding that defendants consent was involuntary where defendant consented to search following a warrantless entry and officers explained that absent consent the officers would obtain a warrant holding exigent circumstances demonstrated because officers knew defendant stored drugs in room across from the bathroom making destruction particularly easy holding that the implied consent law allows law enforcement officers to obtain blood in circumstances in which a warrant or actual consent may otherwise be required