to an appeal was prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel would “risk[ ] expiration of a substantial part and possibly all of the one-year limitations period ..., unless the time devoted to taking the steps required to obtain an appealable judgment were deemed to toll the one-year period.” 332 F.3d at 65. This risk is only greater in light of the issuance of our decision in Fuller, given the potential that defendants may seek the Fuller remedy at a time when a habeas petition would be timely, only to have a panel hold after expiration of the AEDPA limitations period that Moreno-Rivera forecloses such relief. Though it may not be the case that a Fuller remedy is worth pursuing in light of more recent jurisprudence, compare Urinyi v. United States, 607 F.3d 318, 321 (2d Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>), with Fuller, 332 F.3d at 65 (expressing
holding premagwood that where a first  2255 motion was granted so movant could file a direct appeal the second  2255 motion was not a successive motion under aedpa holding that a  2255 petition seeking only reinstatement of the right to a direct appeal does not render any later petition a second or successive petition under the aedpa holding habeas petition was not second or successive where first petition did not attack conviction but alleged due process violation due to delay in adjudication of direct appeal in state court holding that a petitioner may amend a habeas petition rather than filing a second or successive petition when the first petition has not yet reached a final decision holding a petition unexhausted because the petition provides no citation of any case that might have alerted the court to the alleged federal nature of the claim and the petition does not contain a factual description supporting the claim citations omitted