of explosives.’ ” Id. (quoting Sykes, 131 S.Ct. at 2277). Scudder’s child molestation convictions are for intentional crimes, see Ind.Code § 35-42-4-9(e) (1981); Lechner v. State, 715 N.E.2d 1285, 1287 (Ind.App.1999), and they are “similar in risk” to the crimes listed in the ACCA’s residual clause. See Sykes, 131 S.Ct. at 2276. In United States v. Mincks, we held that statutory sexual offenses “categorically ... present a serious potential risk of physical injury to another because ‘this type of contact between parties of differing physical and emotional maturity carries a substantial risk that physical force ... may be used in the course of committing the offense.’ ” 409 F.3d 898, 900 (8th Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. Alas-Castro, 184 F.3d 812, 813 (8th Cir.1999) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>)). The same is true for Scudder’s offenses.
holding that sexual assault of a child qualified as crime of violence under 18 usc  16 holding that the categorical approach applies to the identical definition of crime of violence in 18 usc  16 holding that bank robbery by force and violence or intimidation under 18 usc  2113a is a crime of violence holding that a court must only look to the statutory definition not the underlying circumstances of the crime to determine whether a given offense is by its nature a crime of violence for purposes of 18 usc  16 holding dui causing serious bodily injury is not a crime of violence under 18 usc  16