that stands for the proposition that a state statutory provision prohibiting class-action suits results in a failure to meet Rule 23(a) or (b) certification requirements. Rather, the cases that the appellants do cite suggest that such a provision is fatal not to Rule 23’s certification requirements, but rather to Rule 23 more generally under the Rules Enabling Act. See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins, Co., 559 U.S. 393, 130 S.Ct. 1431, 176 L.Ed.2.d 311 (2010) (controlling op.) (discussing a conflict between a New York rule prohibiting class-action suits and Rule 23 solely with regards to the Rules Enabling Act); Williams v. King Bee Delivery, LLC, No. 5:15-CV-306-JMH, 199 F.Supp.3d 1175, 2016 WL 4184026, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104001 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 8, 2016) (<HOLDING>); Anderson v. GCA Servs. Grp. of N.C., Inc.,
holding that in the rule 23 class action context named plaintiff may appeal a denial of class certification even if his or her individual claims had been satisfied through the entry of judgment holding that federal court sitting in diversity should apply fed r crv p 4 rather than conflicting state rule because federal rule was consistent with rules enabling act holding that tolling applies to a subsequent class action when the prior denial of class certification was based solely on rule 23 deficiencies of the putative representative holding that krs  3373852 prevents class certification under rule 23 in federal court because of the rules enabling act holding that rules allowing multiple claims to be litigated together  including rule 23  are categorically valid under the rules enabling act