in an action begun within the prescribed period of limitation and such judgment be afterward arrested or reversed on error or appeal, the plaintiff may begin a new action within one year after such reversal or arrest. Minn.Stat. § 541.18 (1990). This statute, virtually unchanged since its enactment in 1851, is rarely utilized and is not interpreted by any appellate court. Furthermore, no legislative history is available. We start, of course, with the plain language of the statute. Gale v. Commissioner of Taxation, 228 Minn. 345, 37 N.W.2d 711, 714-15 (1949). Indeed, simply because the statute is quite old does not release us from our obligation to give the statute its plain meaning. See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 191-92, 104 S.Ct. 584, 590-91, 78 L.Ed.2d 401 (1984) (<HOLDING>); see also Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (“Every law
holding that absent unusual circumstances this court must apply the plain meaning of a statute holding that an appellate court must give a statute its clear and plain meaning when the statute is unambiguous recognizing that where the statutory language is not ambiguous  the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute must be given effect holding that thirtytwoyearold statute must still be given its plain meaning holding that a statute should where possible be construed according to its plain meaning and as a whole giving meaning to all its parts