sufficient to show that Boyd conspired with an unknown drug supplier in New Orleans. We are not persuaded. The evidence was clearly sufficient to show that Boyd was a drug dealer and that he distributed crack as charged in the indictment, but it 'did not show that he was engaged in a conspiratorial agreement to violate the drug laws. None of the three women who testified against Boyd indicated that she worked for Boyd or solicited drug sales on his behalf, or otherwise acted in concert with Boyd to achieve a common purpose beyond their desire to purchase drugs from him. See United States v. Cardenas, 9 F.3d 1139, 1157 (5th Cir.1993) (“An agreement to violate narcotics laws may be inferred from ‘concert of action.’ ”); see also United States v. Mitchell, 484 F.3d 762, 769 (5th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). The only motive apparent from the testimony
holding that the quantity of drugs that the defendant had originally agreed to sell to undercover agents was attributable to him notwithstanding the fact that at the agents request he ultimately agreed to complete the deal for a lesser amount holding that agreement as to form and content did not constitute agreed judgment holding that plaintiff stated a claim for breach of contract when it alleged the government failed to purchase insurance for plaintiff as agreed by contract holding that coconspirators concert of action allowed jury to infer an agreement where defendants agreed to purchase crack cocaine together for distribution agreed to travel together and agreed to have another coconspirator conduct the transaction on behalf of all of them holding that there was no evidence that parties actually agreed to modify stock purchase agreement and thus contract was effective as originally written