11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2) (providing that administrative expenses shall be allowed for “compensation and reimbursement awarded under section 330(a) of this title”); id. § 503(a) (“An entity may timely file a request for payment of an administrative expense .... ”). Additionally, we conclude that to interpret § 726(a) as urged by the Trustee (and followed by the minority view) would produce results at odds with Congress’s intention in drafting the legislation. The district court determined that it would “not be satisfied with a plain-meaning-of-the- language construction that yields an inequitable result, until it is convinced no equitable construction of that same language is possible.” Reed II, 312 B.R. at 838 (citing Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60, 51 S.Ct. 49, 75 L.Ed. 156 (1930) (<HOLDING>)). To preclude recovery of all interest on a
holding that the scope and application of state exemptions are defined by the state courts and that we are bound by their interpretations holding that federal courts are bound by state interpretations of state law recognizing that although early interpretations of the act were narrow subsequent interpretations demonstrate that the act reaches a wide variety of deceptive commercial practices holding that interpretations of a statute which produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available holding that courts should avoid interpretations of statutes which would produce absurd results