that requiring a new “wiretap order in every district where [the government] thought a target could make calls ... seems unworkable”); United States v. Henley, 766 F.3d 893, 911-12 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2065, 191 L.Ed.2d 968 (2015); United States v. Luong, 471 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The most reasonable interpretation of the statutory definition of interception is that an interception occurs where the tapped phone is located and where law enforcement officers first overhear the call.”); United States v. Jackson, 207 F.3d 910, 914 (7th Cir. 2000), vacated on other grounds, 531 U.S. 953, 121 S.Ct. 376, 148 L.Ed.2d 290 (2000); United States v. Denman, 100 F.3d 399, 403 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Tavarez, 40 F.3d 1136, 1138 (10th Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130, 136
holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute holding that the statute qualifies as an exemption 3 statute holding that the oklahoma statute like the california statute did not qualify as an enumerated offense because it lacked the elements of substantial interference with the victims liberty and risk of bodily injury holding that the oklahoma wiretap statute like the federal statute authorizes wiretaps within the territorial jurisdiction where the contents were first heard holding that the language of the statute and the courts duty to apply the statute as written requires the court to interpret the statute to apply when the prisoner is sentenced without regard to the institution where the prisoner is incarcerated after the sentencing