statements of non-party witnesses, the courts applied Federal Rule of Evidence 613 to bar extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statements after the witnesses admitted making the statements. In contrast, Whitaker’s prior statement was admissible against him as substantive evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A) as the statement of a party opponent. See Bondie v. Bic Corp., 947 F.2d 1531, 1534 (6th Cir.1991). At the time of trial, Rule 613 expressly provided that “[t]his provision does not apply to admissions of a party-opponent as defined in rule 801(d)(2).” Fed.R.Evid. 613(b). Thus, the reliance by the defense on Rule 613, Rush, Greer, and Sisto is faulty. See United States v. Kenny, 645 F.2d 1323, 1340 (9 rwriters, Inc., 282 Fed. Appx. 406, 411-12 (6th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). The defense further contends that Chapman did
holding letter from specialist to treating physician fell within business entry exception to the hearsay rule holding that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule where the defendant was able to confront and crossexamine the witness who claimed that the statements at issue were made holding that the admission of evidence under an exception to the hearsay rule is reviewed for abuse of discretion holding transcript of witness interview taken by insurance agent fell within rule 8036 but no other hearsay exception applied to allow admission of the statements within the transcript as substantive evidence holding that even if the trial court erred in excluding a letter from evidence that fell within an exception to the hearsay rule the error was harmless where admission of the letter would not have had a substantial effect on a partys rights