to read the provision to apply to either pre-loss or post-loss rights and duties, or both. In short, the provision is ambiguous. Because the provision is ambiguous, we construe it against its drafter and conclude that it prohibits only the assignment of pre-loss rights and duties. Our conclusion is consistent with what appears to be the majority rule. See, e.g., Conrad Brothers, 640 NW2d at 236-38 (citing cases); Insurance, 44 Am Jur 2d 102 § 801 (2003) (“In the absence of an express provision to the contrary, provisions relating to the consent of the insurer to an assignment do not relate to assignments after loss or to assignments as collateral security.” (Footnotes omitted.)). But see High-Tech-Enterprises, Inc. v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 430 Pa Super 605, 635 A2d 639 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, nothing in the policy affects
holding that insurance company could sue in insureds name following assignment of insureds interest against tortfeasor holding automobile exclusion in general liability policy did not apply because plaintiffs claim of negligent supervision and training was a separate and distinct theory of recovery from the use of an automobile holding that a similar exclusion denies coverage for property damage to the particular part of the real property that is the subject of the insureds work at the time of the damage if the damage arises out of those operations holding insureds failure to comply with notice provision in insurance policy resulted in no coverage for a newly acquired car holding that assignment of insureds rights to coverage for property damage under automobile insurance policy to automobile repairer was invalid because of antiassignment provision