that is, the employee need not prove that her activity was the sole basis for the employer’s action, but the employee must prove that “but for” the activity he or she would not have been fired. Jackson v. City of Killeen, 654 F.2d 1181, 1185, 1186 (5th Cir. 1981) (articulating the “but for” test for pretext); Pittman v. Hattiesburg Municipal Separate School District, 644 F.2d 1071, 1076 (5th Cir. 1981) (“(to show pretext, need only show race was a “but for” cause, not sole basis, for employment action); Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 555 F.2d 1251, 1257 (5th Cir. 1977)”). See Sherkow v. State of Wisconsin Department of Public Safety, 630 F.2d 498 (7th Cir. 1980) (pretext to be determined according to “but for” standard). Cf., NLRB v. Wright Line, Inc., 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir., 1981) (<HOLDING>). Compare, Williams v. Boostin, 663 F.2d 109
holding that a district court may have jurisdiction over action taken by the national labor relations board despite an express statutory finality provision when the agency has acted in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the national labor relations act holding that in a mixed motive retaliation case the but for test applies to pretext but further holding that the burden shifts after employee has shown pretext under the but for test to the employer to show that absent retaliation the plaintiff would have lost his job anyway holding that the national labor relations act does not unconstitutionally abridge the freedom of the press in that it does not interfere with the right to discharge any employee for any proper cause holding ports authority was not an employer subject to the jurisdiction of the national labor relations board holding that the but for test applied in a mixed motive case under the national labor relations act