in this case was objectively unreasonable. The evidence in this case is a far cry from being “too powerful to conclude anything but [the petitioner’s factual claim],” Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 265, 125 S.Ct. 2317, nor is the state court’s finding close to “clearly erroneous,” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 529, 123 S.Ct. 2527. Our conclusion that the state court’s factual determination was not unreasonable is bolstered by the apparent disagreement among our sister circuits on the extent to which § 2254(d)’s deference is conditioned, if at all, on the state court’s fact-finding procedures, and whether procedures like those used in Alabama’s courts in this case result in factual determinations that satisfy § 2254(d)(2)’s standard. Compare Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158, 1168-70 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>), and Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1001 (9th
holding that review under  2254d1 is limited to the record before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits rejecting the petitioners claim that the federal habeas court could consider evidence introduced in an evidentiary hearing holding that probable cause hearing under wis stat  980092 was not intended to be an evidentiary hearing but rather a review of the paper record with argument allowed by counsel holding that the state courts rejection of the petitioners ineffective assistance of counsel claim was an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence before the state court holding that credibility determinations are for the jury holding that a state courts rejection of petitioners habeas claim was unreasonable under  2254d2 where the court made credibility determinations on the basis of a paper record without an evidentiary hearing