without merit under Delaware law. First, as noted above, the fact that Chase had superior bargaining power cannot establish unconscionability unless the contract contains oppressive, one-sided terms. The arbitration provisions in the CMAs were not one-sided, but bilateral: were Chase to bring claims against Stinger, Stinger could compel arbitration. Second, Stinger cites no legal authority for his argument that a “lack of meaningful choice” renders an arbitration agreement unconscionable. Moreover, Stinger did have a choice—he could have pp.2d 1017, 1025 (N.D.Cal.2007) (“Credit card agreements containing arbitration clauses are not unconscionable in either California or Delaware when they bind both parties equally.”); Marsh v. First USA Bank, N.A., 103 F.Supp.2d 909, 920 (N.D.Tex.2000) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, the arbitration agreement between
holding arbitration clause in credit card agreement unconscionable holding arbitration provision of automobile installment sales agreement unconscionable holding fee splitting provision of arbitration agreement unconscionable under california law holding that a credit card arbitration provision presented in a takeitorleaveitmanner was not unconscionable holding that an arbitration provision in a credit card cardholder agreement was not unconscionable