We recognize that prior to Smoot, which was decided after the trial of this case, the circuit courts and the litigants had no Virginia case precedents on this point. Nevertheless, the evidence in this case fails to establish that the husband considered his interest in the partnership to be composed of discrete, segregated shares. To the contrary, the evidence suggests that all the husband’s funds were commingled and considered to be an integral part of his ownership interest. In Smoot, the Supreme Court of Virginia cited an Illinois case which applied the doctrine of transmutation to support the proposition that commingled marital and separate property must be classified as marital property. Id:, see In re Marriage of Smith, 86 Ill. 2d 518, 531-32, 427 N.E.2d 1239, 1245-46 (1981)(<HOLDING>). We conclude from our reading of Smoot that
holding that the trial court erred in finding that marital property was the former wifes separate property based on a nonseparation agreement in which the former husband purported to relinquish any interest in the marital property holding that furniture and furnishings for marital residence purchased with separate funds were transmuted into marital property because they were acquired and treated as communal property holding that assets acquired subsequent to separation are not considered marital property absent evidence that spouse used marital property to obtain them holding that separate property may become marital property if spouse donates it to marital unit with intent at time of donation that property become marital holding that separate property valued at 45000 was transmuted to marital property when improved by 3800 of marital property