meaning); cf. Shames v. Coontz, 882 F.Supp. 1173, 1174 (D.Mass.1995) (Lasker, J.) (deciding that plaintiffs will likely prevail on secondary significance claim where mark was used for 16 years with “apparent considerable success” and “broad ... and pervasive” advertising) (emphasis added). Advertising of a mark can be probative of secondary meaning. See Boston Beer, 9 F.3d at 182. “[W]hile secondary me BS, 1998 WL 428092, at *8 (D.Mass. May 26, 1998) (Alexander, M.J.) (suggesting that evidence of trademark advertising is relevant to determining secondary meaning only insofar as it indicates that the public associates an advertised mark with a particular source) (citing Aro-matique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 872 (8th Cir.1994)); Stratus Computers, 1987 WL 7748 at *3-4, (<HOLDING>). Here, Lyons does not offer adequate evidence
holding that a failure to mark 13 of products is certainly not adequate marking holding that mark had not acquired secondary meaning even with advertisements costing 4400000 over five years because it did not lead consumers to associate plaintiffs mark with its products holding that inconsistent advertising of an alleged protected trademark for five years did not establish secondary meaning holding limited use of a mark did not constitute prior use in commerce sufficient to establish rights in the mark holding plaintiff failed to establish selfrealization acquired secondary meaning because members of the american hinduyoga community believed the mark was a spiritual state of mind and did not automatically associate a selfrealization product with plaintiff