First, the trial court’s evidentiary ruling to exclude a police report summarizing Roscoe Buffington’s statement did not violate Shandola’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to compulsory process and due process. The statement had little, if any, probative value and was not material to Shandola’s defense at trial. See Miller v. Stagner, 757 F.2d 988, 994 (9th Cir.), amended, 768 F.2d 1090 (9th Cir.1985) (“In weighing the importance of evidence offered by a defendant against the state’s interest in exclusion, the court should consider [among other factors] the probative value of the evidence on the central issue ... and whether it constitutes a major part of the attempted defense.”); United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Second, the trial court’s exclusion of a
holding that suppression of evidence by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the defendant upon request violates the defendants right to due process where the evidence is material holding that section 1983 action requires a showing of defendants personal participation in alleged constitutional violation holding that partys failure to specify how his presence would have been of assistance at the hearing precluded the requisite showing of harm holding state has affirmative duty to disclose favorable and material evidence to defense holding that a violation of a defendants constitutional right to compulsory process requires at a minimum some plausible showing of how the excluded testimony would have been both material and favorable to his defense