return of the items seized there. The District Court agreed that “the venue defect could have been cured by a transfer to the proper venue for the claims related to items 6, 7, and 8.” The District Court also noted that “dismissal effectively destroyed [Rodriguez’s] ability to refile the motion in the proper venue because, by that point, the six-year statute of limitations had run.” Therefore, citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1(a)(3), the District Court certified that it would grant Rodriguez’s motion for reconsideration and “issue an order transferring the portion of his claims relating to items 6, 7, and 8 to the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, if the Court of Appeals remands for those purposes.” Venen v. Sweet, 758 F.2d 117, 123 (3d Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). The Government has agreed that such a remand
holding district courts decision to deny a rule 60b motion is a separately appealable decision requiring a new notice of appeal holding without extended discussion that even if the district court should have construed the petitioners motion under 18 usc  3582c2 as a rule 60b motion the court would nonetheless have had to recharacterize the rule 60b motion as an sshp holding that a lower court cannot grant a rule 60b motion after an appeal has been filed unless the appellate court grants a limited remand upon the trial court entering a memorandum indicating its inclination to grant the rule 60b motion holding that motion for reconsideration would be construed not as a rule 60b motion but rather as an unauthorized successive motion under  2255 which the district court may have been without jurisdiction to consider holding that while a district court lacks jurisdiction to deny a 60b motion while an appeal is pending it can certify that it will grant a 60b motion if the court of appeals remands the case for that purpose