that the 2000 decision of the California Board of Prison Terms (“the Board”) to deny him parole and to set his next parole hearing two years later violated his due process rights. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the Board’s decision was supported by “some evidence.” See Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985). Accordingly, the California Superior Court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Williams further contends that his due process rights were violated because the Board’s decision violated his plea agreement. We reject this contention because the record contains no evidence of the terms of that agreement. Cf. Buckley v. Terhune, 441 F.3d 688, 699 (9th Cir.2006) (en banc) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2094, 167
holding that a federal habeas court may grant specific performance of a plea agreement in the face of evidence that the state has breached the terms of such an agreement holding federal court is not bound by terms of plea agreement between defendant and state authorities holding specific performance of plea agreement proper remedy where defendant testified against all of his coconspirators and where court later unilaterally breached original plea agreement by imposing a ninety day term of incarceration in addition to sentence of probation that had been earlier agreed to without first providing1 defendant with opportunity to withdraw plea on the record holding that district courts failure to hold evidentiary hearing to ascertain whether defendant breached plea agreement was harmless when it was clear defendant breached agreement holding that if a plea agreement is breached the district court may either grant specific performance or allow the defendant to withdraw the plea