the applicant’s probable right will be endangered if the writ does not issue.” Transp. Co. v. Robertson Transps., Inc., 152 Tex. 551, 556, 261 S.W.2d 549, 553 (1953); see also State v. Cook United, Inc., 464 S.W.2d 105, 106 (Tex.1971) (explaining that under Rule 683 “it is necessary to give the reasons why injury will be suffered if the interlocutory relief is not ordered”). And, when setting forth its reasons, the trial court must set forth specific reasons, and not merely make conclusory statements. Kotz v. Imperial Capital Bank, 319 S.W.3d 54, 56 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2010, no pet.); see Tex.R. Civ. P. 683 (requiring the court’s order granting injunctive relief to “be specific in terms”); Indep. Capital Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Collins, 261 S.W.3d 792, 795-96 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); Auto-Nation, Inc. v. Hatfield, 186 S.W.3d
holding that injunction order simply setting out elements necessary for relief and failing to identify the injury from denial of the injunction was conclusory and void holding that the injunction did not constitute a claim holding that the failure of the applicant to file a bond before the issuance of the temporary injunction renders the injunction void ab initio holding that court lacked jurisdiction on appeal from injunction because the order was simply an interpretation of an earlier order holding preliminary injunction improper where it exceeded the relief sought and granted the same relief which would have been given in a final order of permanent injunction