and the day that she had contacted the Union about a grievance, which was May 10 or May 11.” (Horst Dec. ¶ 8.) 15 . The principles governing summary judgment are well-established and are the lens through which the record must be viewed. In essence, summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P. Put differently, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law where, “the n px. 527, 530-31 (7th Cir.2001) (affirming that employee's request to his union representative for "help” with respect to his termination "was not specific enough to trigger the union's duty to file a grievance.”). 17 . See Murman v. Renold Power Transmission Corp., 632 F.Supp. 853, 854 (M.D.Pa.1985) (<HOLDING>); Flanigan v. Local 671, Intern. Brotherhood of
holding that a union may breach its duty of fair representation by rejecting an employees interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement if the unions interpretation is itself arbitrary or unreasonable holding that where an employee has never requested the union to file a grievance the employee can hardly argue a breach of the duty of fair representation on the unions part holding that where employee cannot establish unions breach of duty of fair representation in failing to process grievance he must abide the outcome of the contractual remedies holding that employee did not invoke grievance procedure where he never mentioned the word grievance to the union and where he never asked the union to take any action on his behalf holding that in the grievance representation context an employee must prove that the unions acts tainted the grievance procedure such that the outcome was more than likely affected by the unions breach internal citation and quotation omitted