to recuse himself just because his “prior conduct . . . indicates a view that would favor one party or the other. If that were the law, no judge could sit on a case after rendering a decision in a similar case.” Id. ¶ 23. {66} Las Cruces Professional Fire Fighters also analyzed administrative bias in general and adopted the analysis of Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, who, in his treatise, compiled a list of five basic types of bias. Id. ¶ 24 (describing framework laid out in 3 Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 19:1, at 371-72 (2d ed. 1980)). Most importantly, we adopted Professor Davis’s position that an official’s “[ajdvance knowledge of adjudicative facts ... is not alone a disqualification for findi Control Comm’n, 2006-NMCA-115, ¶ 50, 140 N.M. 464, 143 P.3d 502 (<HOLDING>). {68} In the instant case, both the hearing
recognizing familiarity with governing law as reason to grant motion to transfer holding that we consider an agencys expertise or special knowledge when  application of the regulation is primarily factual and necessarily requires application of the agencys technical knowledge and expertise to the facts presented citation omitted internal quotation marks omitted holding that familiarity with facts is insufficient to constitute bias stating that it is impractical to require commissioners to sit with an entirely clean slate and that cjommissioners are appointed because of their knowledge and expertise holding that evidence of the defendants personal cocaine use was relevant to their knowledge regarding the charge of conspiring to import marijuana because it demonstrated their familiarity with illegal drugs holding that agencys construction of statute it was charged with enforcing was entitled to deference because it was reasonable in line with the statutes meaning and related to its expertise