to the effective date of the Act, it could have done so.... Since it did not, and since there is nothing ambiguous in the statute’s language concerning its reach or applicability, there is no need to conduct the Landgraf retroactivity analysis. Id. at 61-62 (footnote omitted); see also United States v. One “Piper” Aztec “F” De Luxe Model 250 23 Aircraft Bearing Serial No. 27-7651057, 321 F.3d 355, 359 (3d Cir.2003) (“[The] CAFRA applies to ‘any forfeiture proceeding commenced on or after [August 23, 2000].’ The plain language is clear: the commencement of a forfeiture proceeding can mean only the point when the government first files a complaint for forfeiture in rem under 18 U.S.C. § 981(b)(2).... No other interpretation is sensible.”); $80,180.00 in U.S. Currency, 303 F.3d at 1185-86 (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted); cf. United States v. Real
holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant holding that the cafras heightened burden of proof was not applicable to a civil forfeiture action in which the complaint had been filed on november 9 1999 congress manifested a clear intent to apply the cafras heightened burden of proof only to judicial forfeiture proceedings in which the governments complaint was filed on or after august 23 2000because congressional intent is clear we need not resort to judicial default rules to determine the retroactive scope of the legislation holding that when congress is silent on the issue of the burden of proof applicable to a common law affirmative defense that does not negate an element of the offense we presume congress intended the defendant to bear the burden of proof of the defense by a preponderance of the evidence holding that the cafras heightened burden of proof standard was applicable to a civil forfeiture action that was pending at the time of cfras enactment holding that section 523a2c shifts the burden of production and not the burden of proof on the issue of intent only