into two distinct inquiries because each question is intertwined with and dependent upon the other. Clause 2 of Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2002), states that “all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces,” though not specifically criminalized by another UCMJ Article, “shall be taken cognizance of by a ... court-martial ... and shall be punished at the discretion of that court.” Thus, in contrast to most criminal statutes that speak in terms of prohibited acts, clause 2 of Article 134 speaks in general terms of acts which create a prohibited effect. Nonetheless, Article 134 is not void for vagueness under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the question in this case is whether
holding that an insurance contract should be construed as a reasonable person in the position of the insured would have understood it and that if the language used in the policy is reasonably susceptible to different constructions it must be given the construction most favorable to the insured holding that contract language is ambiguous where it is in fact reasonably or fairly susceptible to the different constructions being advocated by the parties recognizing that the reasonableness of an agencys interpretation turns in part on the constructions fit with the statutory language holding that consideration for a contract as a whole covers the arbitration clause holding judicial constructions of article 134 have narrowed the reach of its broad language and supplied examples of the conduct it covers