... shall exist within the United States,” U.S. Const, amend. XIII, § 1, and empowers Congress to enforce its provisions, see U.S. Const, amend. XIII, § 2. The Supreme Court has interpreted this grant of power broadly, finding that Congress can affirmatively enforce the ban on slavery and involuntary servitude, and enact legislation to erase “all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.” Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20, 3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835 (1883). Moreover, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968), the Supreme Court opened the door to the inclusion of private acts of racial discrimination within the “badges and incidents of slavery” language as stated in the Civil Rights Cases. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 413, 88 S.Ct. 2186 (<HOLDING>). Although the Thirteenth Amendment was
holding that 42 usc  1982 a provision of the civil rights act of 1866 which allows victims of racial discrimination to sue private defendants was a valid exercise of congress thirteenth amendment authority holding official immunity is available in claims of discrimination if plaintiff fails to establish his treatment by defendants was so at variance with what would reasonably be anticipated absent racial discrimination that racial discrimination is the probable explanation holding that civil rights claims under 42 usc  1981 and 1982 are personal injury tort claims holding that the retaliation provision of title vii is an adequate exercise of congress authority under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment holding that 18 usc  245 a statute passed on the same day as 42 usc  3631 and for similar purposes constituted a valid enactment under congress thirteenth amendment authority as applied to racially motivated interference with federallyprotected rights