claims implicates New Hampshire’s duties and responsibilities under the Reinsurance Agreement. We therefore cannot conclude with positive assurance that Magellan’s non-breach of contract claims do not require— or at a minimum, touch upon in some way-the interpretation of the Reinsurance Agreement. See, e.g., In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 754-56 (Tex.2001) (compelling arbitration of tort claims related to financing contract); Jack B. Anglin Co., 842 S.W.2d at 271 (“Although the City’s misrepresentation claims are grounded in legal theory distinct from its contract claim, they are factually intertwined, and thus are subject to the arbitration provision of the contract.”); HouScape, Inc. v. Lloyd, 945 S.W.2d 202, 205-06 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, orig. proceeding) (<HOLDING>). We hold that Magellan’s fraud, breach of
holding that tort claims were arbitrable because they arose out of and were related to contract holding that antitrust claims arising out of an international commercial transaction were arbitrable despite the fact that they were not specifically mentioned in the arbitration clause holding that employees claims against firm were not subject to mandatory arbitration because they did not arise out of business activities of either employee or firm but instead arose out of divorce agreement holding that claims brought under section 10b of the securities exchange act and rico claims were arbitrable holding that a settlement agreement is an arbitrable subject when the underlying dispute is arbitrable