the FAA, i.e., transportation workers’ employment contracts, are entirely unenforceable even where state law provides otherwise. This conclusion flouts the principle that “questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983); see also Desiderio v. Nat’l Ass’n of Securities Dealers, Inc., 191 F.3d 198, 204 (2d Cir.1999). Moreover, it departs from clear authority upholding the arbitrability of Title VII and New York Human Rights Law claims. Desiderio, 191 F.3d at 206 (enforcing arbitration clause regarding Title VII claims); Schuetz v. CS First Boston Corp., No. 96 Civ. 5557(DC), 1997 WL 452392, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8,1997) (<HOLDING>); Fletcher v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 81 N.Y.2d
holding that unfair competition claims are arbitrable recognizing disagreement among district courts in the second circuit as to whether the standard for vicarious liability is the same under title vii and the nyhrl but interpreting second circuit law including quinn to indicate that nyhrl claims should be analyzed under the framework of title vii holding that title vii and nyhrl claims are arbitrable holding that a settlement agreement is an arbitrable subject when the underlying dispute is arbitrable holding claims based on title vii subject to arbitration