any supervised released violations that occurred before the expiration of the supervised release term. The majority, moreover, imports into § 3583(i) something that is simply not there — an additional power automatically to further delay revocation proceedings until the defendant is in federal custody. The absence of any statutory basis for such post-term authority is particularly significant, in my view, because the statutory provisions governing supervised release do adjust in another respect for periods of incarceration on charges other than those giving rise to the term of supervised release in question. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) (suspending the running of a term of supervised release while the defendant is imprisoned); cf. United States v. Morales-Alejo, 193 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Had Congress intended, as the majority
holding that uncounseled conviction could not be considered by court in sentencing defendant after subsequent conviction recognizing that  1983 action does not accrue until conviction or sentence has been invalidated holding that apprendi does not apply retroactively holding that  3624e does not apply until after conviction holding that a private right of action does not arise until 180 days after a charge has been filed