§ 101.106(f) and Phillips v. Dafonte, 187 5.W.3d 669, 675 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.)). The movant employee bears the burden of proving that the suit could have been brought under the TTCA against a governmental unit. See id. General medical malpractice claims are not encompassed by the TTCA’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity. Id. However, Dr. Wang was never required to make any such showing and the trial court never ruled that he had done so because Kamel voluntarily amended his pleadings removing Dr. Wang as a defendant and adding UTHSCH. Thus, Ka-mel’s case is distinguishable from one in which the employee must satisfy the burden of proving both prongs under 101.106(f). See Hintz v. Lally, 305 S.W.3d 761, 767 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). After Kamel amended his pleadings adding
holding that the court had an adequate record to grant the defendants motion for summary judgment because the relevant evidence would have been in plaintiffs possession holding that a plaintiffs voluntary dismissal of a complaint does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to entertain a motion for sanctions under rule 11 holding that a summary judgment motion must stand or fall on the grounds expressly presented in the motion holding plaintiffs voluntary dismissal of doctor distinguishes case from circumstances in which trial court is presented with motion under 101106f and must address the could have been brought under this chapter clause in course of deciding whether to grant or deny motion holding district court had no authority to require plaintiffs to obtain courts permission to dismiss defendant who had not served answer or motion for summary judgment as plaintiffs had absolute right to dismissal without prejudice and thus court could not sanction plaintiffs for filing notice of voluntary dismissal rather than motion