agreement and its fears as to the possible outcome of arbitration could not be introduced in the face of conflicting duties under Title VII. To the extent the district court’s ruling reflects the idea that Title VII always trumps the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, that ruling is erroneous as a matter of law. While it is true that employers cannot use collective bargaining agreements to contract around anti-discrimination laws like Title VII, see Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 79, 97 S.Ct. 2264, 53 L.Ed.2d 113 (1977) (“[A] collective-bargaining contract ... may [not] be employed to violate the statute.”), that principle is not app nding that evidence of Ameritech’s collective bargaining agreement was irrelevant as a , 1051 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Because the district court based its decision
holding that a collectivelybargained seniority system was not trumped by the duty to reasonably accommodate the disabled under the americans with disabilities act holding that when an employer takes steps to accommodate an employees restrictions it is not thereby conceding that the employee is disabled under the ada or that it regards the employee as disabled holding that an employee whose disability is related to his ability to perform the duties of his position is not disabled under the act and therefore an employer has no duty to accommodate holding that unjustified segregation constitutes discrimination prohibited by the americans with disabilities act holding that despite garrett congress abrogated state sovereign immunity under title ii of americans with disabilities act