United States v. Marine, 84 F.Supp. 785, 787 (D.Del.1949) (new trial warranted when juror and prosecution witness ate lunch together during the trial, even when it was uncertain that the two had discussed the case); Miles v. State, 261 Ala. 670, 675, 75 So.2d 479, 484 (Ala.1954) (defendant was entitled to a new trial “free from probability of injury” after three police officers who were witnesses for the prosecution accompanied the jury to and from lunch during the trial, even though there had been no discussion of the case); Kelley v. State, 555 N.E.2d 140, 142 (Ind.1990) (error in failing to grant motion for mistrial after it was discovered that a witness for the prosecution had sat with three of the six jurors during a lunch recess); Romo v. State, 500 P.2d 678, 680 (Wyo.1972) (<HOLDING>). As these cases recognize, however, when an
holding that double jeopardy barred the second prosecution when one of the jurors in the first trial became disabled and the trial court declared a mistrial instead of proceeding with eleven jurors holding that the trial court should have granted the defendants motion for mistrial after it was revealed that a police officer who also was a prosecution witness had sat with several jurors during a lunch break even though the witness testified that he did not discuss the business of the case with the jurors holding that the trial courts admonition of a witness even though detailed and strongly stated did not coerce the witness because the court did not threaten or badger the witness and the court provided the witness with her own counsel to ensure that the decision was voluntary holding prior testimony was admissible where the witness who first testified during a suppression hearing was murdered after he testified where the defendant was represented by counsel who had extensively crossexamined the witness holding that the trial court had properly granted prices motion for new trial because while the state properly introduced identification testimony from a police officer who was not a witness to the offense it improperly elicited testimony that the witness was in fact a police officer who knew the defendant from working in his neighborhood