by an all-inclusive definition of “integral and indispensable.” In IBP, the Supreme Court addressed whether the time spent waiting to don protective clothing on the employer’s premises before engaging in productive labor was compensable under the Portal-to-Portal Act. IBP, 546 U.S. at 24, 126 S.Ct. at 518. The Court held, in part, that the time workers spent waiting to don protective gear necessary for productive labor was not itself “integral and indispensable” to a “principal activity.” IBP, 546 U.S. at 42, 126 S.Ct. at 528. This circuit has not interpreted the Portal-to-Portal Act in a published opini ding that the four hours workers spent traveling on their employer’s bus each day was not compensable under the Act); and Ralph v. Tidewater Constr. Corp., 361 F.2d 806 (4th Cir.1966) (<HOLDING>). 4 . The district court specifically ruled
holding that time workers spent traveling on an employers boat to a construction site was not compensable under the act holding costs of providing power during construction delay were direct damages because contract provision specified that owner would provide electricity to construction site holding that the plaintiff could not recover fees for time spent on unsuccessful motions holding that one of the employers many construction sites constituted an establishment holding that the workers compensation act is to be liberally construed and reasonable doubts as to construction are to be resolved in favor of coverage