provide for the event of the merger or resignation of a corporate trustee, but fail to make any provision for the appointment of a successor to an individual trustee if it was intended that there could in fact be an individual trustee. This inconsistency becomes more apparent when consideration is given to the provision in Article V that “[i]n all cases, the successor in trust shall have all the powers, privileges and discretion herein given unto said The International Trust Company. (Emphasis added).” These powers include the right to appoint a successor. However, as explained above, an individual trustee would not have the power to appoint his or her successor, and thus would not have “all the powers” of the Trust Company. See Durst v. United States, 559 F.2d 910,912-13 (3rd Cir.) (<HOLDING>). Other provisions cited by the plaintiff
holding that it was proper for the medical examiner to estimate the victims time of death based on the results of her investigators lividity test as it was standard procedure for her to rely on tests performed by members of her office holding victim waived physicianpatient privilege by authorizing her doctor to release her medical records to the department of criminal investigation because the information contained in her medical records was no longer confidential between herself and her physician holding that a district court had sufficient reason to reject the plaintiffs belated attempt to amend her complaint fifteen months after the commencement of her action and nine months after the initial amendment to her complaint holding that after examining the trust instrument as a whole interpreting it to permit the settlor to appoint herself as trustee would lead to inconsistencies in the successorship provision by requiring her to take action after her death holding that it did not violate the defendants right to remain silent when the prosecutor questioned her about inconsistencies between her pretrial statements to authorities and her defense at trial