for cause-promoting speech, the Department does not advance any compelling governmental interest supporting this content-based distinction, nor does it adequately explain how the distinction is narrowly tailored to serve this interest. Therefore, the Access Policy’s preference for speech that “promotes a cause” is likely to be found unconstitutional. This is not to foreclose completely the notion of some kind of preference for cause-promoting speech over disinterested speech in the Capitol. Certainly, First Amendment jurisprudence recognizes the fundamental importance of political speech to our system of government. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571-72, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) (<HOLDING>). With the exception of commercial speech,
holding that a public employees internal memoranda raising concerns about public corruption are protected first amendment speech because they addressed a matter of public concern holding that if the speech in question does not address a matter of public concern there is no first amendment violation holding that issues of prison security public safety and official corruption are matters of public concern recognizing that in certain matters the community has no legitimate concern recognizing a public employees first amendment right to address matters of legitimate public concern