this court has repeatedly defined the parameters within which that power can be exercised. See Crochiere, 273 Wis. 2d 57, ¶ 12. As explained supra, § 973.195(lr)(b) sets forth a limited number of bases upon which an inmate may file a petition for sentence adjustment. Two of these grounds are not legitimate bases upon which a circuit court may modify a sentence based on our common law "new factor" jurisprudence, and the final ground in § 973.195(1r)(b) is much broader than the traditional common-law test to determine whether a new factor is present. Compare § 973.195(lr)(b)l.-5. with Crochiere, 273 Wis. 2d 57, ¶¶ 14-17 (describing the test for a "new factor" and collecting cases concluding "new factors" were not present) and State v. Hegwood, 113 Wis. 2d 544, 548, 335 N.W.2d 339 (1983) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 43. Thus, if § 973.195 were construed as
holding that a change in the law of sentencing does not constitute a new factor holding that change in state substantive case law does not constitute the removal of an impediment holding that a change in personal circumstances in the united states does not constitute a change in country conditions and therefore does not establish an exception to the filing deadline for motions to reopen holding defendants perceived demotion from change of duties does not constitute constructive discharge as a matter of law holding that a change of venue has no affect on the applicable state law and that change of venue is but a change of courtrooms