not have retroactive application. On the issue of initiation post-invocation, the Harris Court emphasized the Stumes holding: “Edwards established a new test for when that waiver would be acceptable once the suspect had invoked his right to counsel: the suspect had to initiate subsequent communication.” Harris, 19 M.J. at 337 (quoting Stumes, 465 U.S. at 646, 104 S.Ct. 1338). Since Harris, the CAAF and its predecessor court have interpreted the applicability of the Edwards rule to fit military practice; however, clarity vis-a-vis initiation has remained consistent. Within the context of what constitutes “initiation,” our superior court has consistently expressed the test as one focused on an accused-initiated communication. See e.g. Coleman, 26 M.J. 451, 452 (C.M.A.1988) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Delarosa, 67 M.J. 318, 320
holding that under the fifth amendment once an accused person in custody has expressed his or her desire to deal with the police only through counsel that person is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available  unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police holding that edwards precludes further interrogation unless he the accused himself initiates further communications holding that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further policeinitiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights an accused  having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police holding that an accused who has invoked the right to counsel is not subject to further interrogation unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police holding that subsequent to an invocation of counsel the edwards per se rule does not apply if an accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police