each and every element required to establish the offense.”); United States v. Arriaga-Segura, 743 F.2d 1434, 1436 n. 2 (9th Cir.1984) (“A guilty plea constitutes an admission of all facts necessary for conviction.”); United States v. Burke, 694 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir.1982) (“A guilty plea does, however, constitute an admission of all facts necessary for conviction____”). United States v. Mathews, 833 F.2d 161 (9th Cir.1987), on which the government relies, is not inconsistent; there the court held that the defendant’s plea to the indictment charging federal kidnapping constituted an admission of the essential jurisdictional fact that the kidnapping crossed state lines. Id. at 163-64. The inference to be 0 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d
holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing holding that a defendant must have knowledge of the likely consequences of entering the guilty plea in order for a plea to be voluntary and knowing holding that jurys failure to find the defendant guilty of possession of marijuana could not be reconciled with a verdict of guilty of possession of marijuana with intent to purchase holding evidence of marijuana plants on premises defendant owned with his wife insufficient where marijuana plants were grown in an uncultivated area and there was a total absence of evidence of the defendants involvement holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea