10: Pimental’s Chapter 93A claim hinges upon her breach of contract and negligence claims; she alleges that Wachovia’s “unfair or deceptive” practices were its “premature and erroneous disbursal of construction loan funds ....” Compl. ¶ 33. Wachovia’s duties to Pimental are defined by the terms of the loan contract, which expressly commit the inspection of the property and the decision to disburse funds to the discretion of Wachovia without imposing a duty upon it to protect Pimental’s interests. Since Pimental has failed to allege sustainable breach of contract or negligence claims, and the Chapter 93A claim is based upon the previous two claims, there is no basis for finding Wachovia liable under Chapter 93A. See Egan v. Athol Mem. Hosp., 971 F.Supp. 37, 47 (D.Mass.1997) (Gorton, J.) (<HOLDING>). ■ A practice may be a violation of
holding that summary judgment on chapter 93a claim is appropriate when summary judgment is granted on fraud claim and chapter 93a claim is solely based on the underlying claim for common law fraud holding that inaccuracies did not give rise to a violation of chapter 93a where there was no deliberate misrepresentation of underlying facts and no indication that the insurance company did not believe its conclusions to be true at the time holding that an abutter could not bring a 93a claim because there was no business relationship with the defendant holding that the city of springfield was potentially liable under chapter 93a holding that where there was no evidence of the claimed underlying violation and where there were no unique arguments related to the chapter 93a claim defendant was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs chapter 93a claim