story.” Id. The Court then admonished greater pre-termination procedural rights “would intrude to an unwarranted extent on the government’s interest in quickly removing an unsatisfactory employee.” Id.; see also Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 2080, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976) (noting a federal court “is not the appropriate forum in which to review the multitude of personnel decisions that are made daily by public agencies”). Here, Schwartz’s due process rights were fully accorded. Schwartz was provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard: he was afforded a full evidentiary hearing, represented by counsel, cross-examined hostile witnesses, and presented evidence on his own behalf. Cf. Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 545, 79 S.Ct. 968, 975, 3 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1959) (<HOLDING>). Schwartz contends Commissioner Koshetz’s
holding us department of interior violated its own termination proceeding regulations when it denied employee the right to crossexamine adverse witnesses and failed to provide a specific statement of charges at disciplinary hearing holding that a student has a right to counsel in a university disciplinary hearing where there is a pending criminal charge for the same incident but noting that the attorneys role at the disciplinary hearing is limited to safeguarding the students rights at the criminal proceeding and not to affecting the outcome of the disciplinary hearing holding an inmate has a due process right to 1 advance written notice of the disciplinary charges 2an opportunity to call witness and present evidence and 3 a written statement of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action holding that the right to crossexamine adverse witnesses applies to capital sentencing hearings holding that a prison disciplinary committee violated inmates rights to procedural due process by refusing to call their witnesses even though the disciplinary hearing took place in the aftermath of a riot and the resulting disciplinary caseload was ex tremely heavy