1234, 1240 (D.C.Cir.1978); Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 410 (7th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 939, 99 S.Ct. 1289, 59 L.Ed.2d 499 (1979), and are not limited to their common-law meaning. See Broad v. Rockwell International Corp., 614 F.2d 418, 435 (5th Cir.1980). Therefore, courts have not allowed common-law technicalities, which may pose traps for the unwary and opportunities for the unscrupulous, to stand in the way of finding a statutorily cognizable “purchase” or “sale.” The ’34 Act’s vital remedial purposes cannot, however, be permitted to strip the statutory words “purchase or sale” of their core meaning. It is, after all, a statute with express terms that is before us for examination. See Symons v. Chrysler Corp. Loan Guarantee Board, 670 F.2d 238, 241 (D.C.Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). See also Sacks v. Reynolds, Inc., 593 F.2d at
recognizing that we must give meaning to all the words in the claims holding that the principle that remedial statutes are to be liberally construed to effectuate their purpose does not give the judiciary license in interpreting a provision to disregard entirely the plain meaning of words used by congress holding that we must give the words in statutes their plain and ordinary meaning holding that the social security act is remedial and needs to be construed liberally recognizing that the court must give meaning to all the words in the claims