Reid’s affidavit because it is “conclusory” and because Reid provides no foundation for how he calculated the principal amounts due on the Notes. As the district court noted, Reid’s statements are based on his personal knowledge. See Fed.R.CivP. 56(c)(4) (“An affidavit or declaration ... must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.”). As an account manager at RBC Reid is responsible for monitoring and collecting the Atas-ca Oaks and Lake Houston Notes. Therefore, Reid is competent to testify on the amounts due on the Notes, and his affidavit satisfies the requirements of Rule 56(c)(4). See, e.g., United States v. Lawrence, 276 F.3d 193, 196-97 (5th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse
holding that a nonhearsay response to an interrogatory that is based on personal knowledge may be considered as evidence on summary judgment holding that attorneys affidavit was not competent evidence of his clients agreement or communications with the defendants because it was not based on personal knowledge holding that the affidavit in question did not satisfy the burden of the party moving for summary judgment where affiants eonclusory statement failed to indicate personal knowledge of the circumstances in question and personal knowledge could not be reasonably inferred from the contents of the affidavit holding that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court at the summary judgment stage to consider information from an affidavit based on inadmissible hearsay rather than the affiants personal knowledge holding that a loan analysts affidavit based on personal knowledge of certain loan records is admissible summary judgment evidence