and unless evidence can be produced which will support the conclusion that it was then defective, the burden is not sustained.” (Emphasis added.) This does not speak to the burden of proof with respect to any substantial change after the allegedly defective product leaves the seller’s hands. The Restatement (Second) provides little guidance on what constitutes “substantial change,” see id. § 402 cmt. p, much less the burden of proof on the question. 23 . Ford asserts that the "vast majority of jurisdictions" place the burden of negating substantial change exclusively on the plaintiff. In most of the cases Ford cites, however, it was undisputed that some change had occurred in the product. See, e.g., Glassey v. Continental Ins. Co., 176 Wis.2d 587, 500 N.W.2d 295, 300-301 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Rients v. International Harvester Co., 346
holding that the replacement of the cap of the subject spray tank constituted a substantial change holding that the combination of the statutory cap and a high threshold for culpability for punitive damages in a title vii case confined a punitive damages award within the cap to a level tolerated by due process holding that the termination of the fee cap did not affect litigation in progress when the fee cap was in effect holding down the locking cap holding that the findings of reviewing physicians constituted substantial evidence in support of the secretarys decision to deny benefits