downward departure. We hol , 1222 (6th Cir.1997) (permitting the district court to revisit a defendant’s “entire aggregate sentence” composed of a “single comprehensive sentencing plan” when resentenc-ing pursuant to a successful § 2255 motion to vacate). We note that our holding comports with the practice of the Second Circuit, see Core, 125 F.3d at 75, 77 (ruling that the district court had the discretion to consider a motion for a downward departure on the basis of post-sentence rehabilitation) (“When the trial court undertook to resentence [the defendant] after vacating his § 924(c) conviction, it was required to consider him as he stood before the court at that time.”), and the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit as expressed in an unpublished opinion, see Roberts, 1999 WL 13073, at *6 (<HOLDING>) (“[A]fter vacating a § 924 conviction, a
holding that the district courts denial of a downward departure was an exercise of discretion and therefore not reviewable holding that district court had authority to grant section 5k20 downward departure despite governments opposition holding that the district court may consider evidence of a defendants postsentence rehabilitation and that such evidence may support a downward variance from the federal sentencing guidelines holding that we may not review a district courts refusal to grant a downward departure unless the court mistakenly believed that it lacked the authority to grant such a departure holding that the district court had the discretion to grant a downward departure for postsentence rehabilitation