of the other six persons was outweighed by the prejudicial effect of the repetition of the inflammatory aspects of the State’s case. Id. at 540. In a later case, our supreme court reversed a child molesting conviction because the victim’s mother, caseworker, and psychologist all testified before the victim testified about the victim’s hearsay statements to them. Modesitt v. State, 578 N.E.2d 649 (Ind.1991). The supreme court held “as did the Court of Appeals in Stone v. State (1989), Ind.App., 536 N.E.2d 534, that we could not say that the drumbeat repetition of the victim’s original story prior to calling the victim to testify did not unduly prejudice the jury which convicted [the defendant].” Id. at 651-52. Under Modesitt, hearsay statements by a victim are admissible p.1996) (<HOLDING>), summarily affirmed by 682 N.E.2d 1289, 1292
holding that the lead detectives testimony that it is not unusual for victims or witnesses of crimes to be reluctant to cooperate with police did not improperly vouch for the truthfulness of victims testimony holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive holding harmless the improper admission of a social workers hearsay testimony concerning a childs report of sexual abuse where the credibility of the childs testimony was supported by other witnesses holding that the improper admission of hearsay testimony from two witnesses whose testimony was brief and consistent with the victims testimony did not constitute drumbeat repetition of the victims statements holding that the improper admission of hearsay testimony of two witnesses that confirmed but did not elaborate upon the victims testimony would have had only minor impact on the jury because there was little to undermine the victims credibility