a matter of law). “The denial will be harmless only if ‘no reasonable jury could have found for the losing party, and the trial court could have granted a directed verdict for the prevailing party.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). If this case were the typical erroneous denial of jury demand case, then we would agree that the standard of review would be whether the evidence was sufficient to submit the case to the jury or whether the issues could have been disposed of on summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law. See id.; Security Mutual Casualty Co. v. Affiliated FM Insurance Co., 471 F.2d 238, 245 (8th Cir.1972) (applying directed verdict or JNOV test of sufficiency of evidence to submit case to jury); Shelter Mutual Insurance Co. v. Parrish, 659 S.W.2d 315, 317-20 (Mo.Ct.App.1983) (<HOLDING>). However, as discussed above, this is not such
holding that mere speculation is insufficient to support a jury verdict holding denial of jury trial was harmless because evidence was insufficient to create issue of fact for submission to jury and insurer would have been entitled to directed verdict recognizing that a trial court has the authority before accepting a verdict and before discharging a jury to send the jury back to correct a mistake in its verdict but concluding that jury had been discharged because jury was allowed to return to court on following day and was allowed to deliberate same issue it previously had decided holding that party did not waive right to trial by jury by requesting directed verdict holding that district court could not decide after jury returned verdict to treat jury verdict as advisory on issue not triable of right by jury but which was tried by consent of parties to nonadvisory jury