U.S. 72, 79 n.5, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 2275 n.5, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990); cf. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va. L. Rev. 225, 264 (2000). 279 . It is well-established that a lack of express preemption "does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles.” Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869, 120 S.Ct. 1913, 1919, 146 L.Ed.2d 914 (2000); see also This That & The Other Gift & Tobacco, Inc. v. Cobb Cnty., 285 F.3d 1319, 1323 n.1 (11th Cir. 2002) ("The existence of an express preemption clause, however, neither bars the ordinary working of conflict preemption principles nor by itself precludes a finding of implied preemption.”). With this in mind, I will address only obstacle preemption. Cf. Hillman v. Maretta, 569 U.S. -, -, 133 S.Ct. 1943, 1949, 186 L.Ed.2d 43 (2013) (<HOLDING>). 280 .It is unclear whether Whiting applies
recognizing limits on the erisa preemption clause holding a state law invalid under obstacle preemption without discussing the scope of the federal statutes expresspreemption clause holding that the narrow scope of the savings clause found in the second sentence of subsection a implied a broad scope of preemption for subsection a because the court concluded the second sentence would hardly have seemed necessary if state law were only narrowly preempted holding that the federal due process clause protects a state employee who under state law has a legitimate claim of entitlement to state employment holding invalid on preemption grounds state statute making agreements to arbitrate franchise claims unenforceable