See Leaffer v. Zarlengo, 44 P.3d 1072, 1078 n. 6 (Colo.2002). These principles teach that words or provisions should not be added to a rule, see People v. Cross, 127 P.3d 71, 73 (Colo.2006), and that the inclusion of certain terms in a rule implies the exclusion of others, see Zab, Inc. v. Berenergy Corp., 136 P.3d 252, 261 (Colo.2006) (Eid, J., concurring). Applying these principles, we hold that costs and fees cannot be assessed when the court imposes punitive sanctions against a contemnor, because C.R.C.P. 107(d)(1) does not expressly authorize their assessment. We find the rule’s silence dispositive in light of the language in C.R.C.P. 107(d)(2) permitting the assessment of costs and fees when a remedial sanction is imposed. See In re Lopez, 109 P.3d 1021 (Colo.App.2004) (<HOLDING>); Eichhorn v. Kelley, 56 P.3d 124
recognizing that an award of temporary attorneys fees and costs is based on an assessment of need and ability to pay as well as the reasonableness of the fees and costs holding that costs and fees cannot be assessed when a court imposes punitive sanctions holding that the board cannot be liable for punitive damages citations omitted holding attorney fees not allowable as costs holding that the district court did not err by including in the amount awarded the costs and fees borne by defendantsappellees in bringing the motion for sanctions