4, the date on which Peoples filed his request for a continuance. Given the uncertainty over when the tran scripts would finally be ready (and, more generally, over Peoples’ need for additional time to prepare for trial), the district court lacked sufficient information on November 8 to set a specific trial date. Thus, it was perfectly reasonable for the district court to grant an open-ended continuance that extended until the first available trial date after the transcripts were ready. In addition, the continuance only lasted about five months, and the trial itself occurred just two-and-a-half months after the court reporter completed and filed the transcripts the defendants had requested. Such a relatively short period of time is not unreasonable. See, e.g., Twitty, 107 F.3d at 1489 (<HOLDING>); Lattany, 982 F.2d at 874-76 (ruling that
holding that speedy trial act requires that an ends of justice continuance be specifically limited in time holding that fivemonth openended continuance based on ends of justice did not violate speedy trial act holding that an ends of justice continuance may be appropriate where the case is unusual or complex holding that a 19month delay between indictment and trial did not violate the constitutional right to a speedy trial holding that where a defendant acquiesces in a continuance that time is excluded from the speedy trial calculation