denied); United States v. Ricks, 882 F.2d 885 (4th Cir.1989) (same), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1047, 110 S.Ct. 846, 107 L.Ed.2d 841 (1990). In cases where a defendant has complained about a definition that was given, although we have spoken of “this circuit’s rule against elaborating on the meaning of ‘reasonable doubt’ ...” (Woods, 812 F.2d at 1487), we usually examine the instructions as a whole to see whether the reasonable doubt instruction was prejudicially misleading or confusing. See, e.g., United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1060 (4th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1081, 106 S.Ct. 848, 88 L.Ed.2d 890 (1986). And although we have sometimes found error in such situations, we have not reversed on this ground alone. See United States v. Moss, 756 F.2d 329, 333 (4th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); Murphy v. Holland, 776 F.2d 470, 475-78 (4th
holding that the trial courts definition of normal use was harmless error holding that alien was conditional paroled where inter alia he was issued a form entitled order of release on recognizance which  declared that in accordance with section 236 of the ina  you are being released on your own recognizance provided you comply with certain conditions  holding that the giving of an erroneous reasonable doubt instruction can never be harmless error holding that a finding of fraud may be reversed only for clear error but that the finding must be judged in view of the clear and convincing burden of proof holding the unsolicited giving of the following definition to be harmless error proof of such a convincing character that you would be willing to rely upon it without hesitation in your most important affairs of your own sic