not to stand on its own, but to be part and parcel of their equal protection claim. Specifically, the First Amendment is relevant to determining whether the CEP burdens the exercise of plaintiffs’ fundamental constitutional rights. See Libertarian Party of Indiana v. Packard, 741 F.2d 981, 984 n. 2 (7th Cir.1984) (discussing the interplay between the First and Fourteenth Amendments with respect to a similar claim); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92-93, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (initially rejecting plaintiff's First Amendment claim somewhat summarily before addressing plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim). 11 .Indeed, the two constitutional theories often overlap. See Harrah Independent School Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194, 197, 99 S.Ct. 1062, 59 L.Ed.2d 248 (1979) (<HOLDING>); see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120,
holding that due process and equal protection clauses of fourteenth amendment are not confined to protection of citizens rather they apply to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction holding that the due process and equal protection clauses do not trigger tucker act jurisdiction in the courts holding that the equal protection and due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments do not provide a sufficient basis for jurisdiction because they do not mandate payment of money by the government holding that the supreme courts decisions construing the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment do not form a checkerboard of bright lines between black squares and red squares holding that neither the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment nor article i  2 of the constitution guarantee against errors in the administration of an election