a new contract resting partly in writing and partly in parol, the reason for the rule being that, when such an alteration is made, part of the contract has to be proven by parol evidence, and the contract is thus exposed to all the evils which the statute was intended to remedy. Robertson v. Melton, 131 Tex. 325, 115 S.W.2d 624, 626-27 (1938). In this case, the parties had a contract clearly required to be in writing, a forty-year lease for an interest in property. Tex.Bus. & Com.Code § 26.01(b)(5) (applying the writing requirement to a lease of real estate for a term longer than one year). Moreover, the purported modification, a one-sixth reduction in the amount of rent to be paid, materially affects the value of the contract. See Parrish v. Haynes, 62 F.2d 105, 106-07 (5th Cir.1932) (<HOLDING>). Thus, such a modification would have to have
recognizing circumstances that justify enforcement of a promise unenforceable under the statute of frauds holding appellants deposition testimony that he believed his oral contract would exist for another eight to ten years was unenforceable pursuant to statute of frauds holding that a parol modification of a lease having two years to run reducing the amount of rent was unenforceable under the statute of frauds holding that the statute of frauds bars a breach of contract claim based on an oral agreement to enter a future employment contract that would need to meet the statute of frauds holding lessor entitled to full months rent when rent due on first of month and lease rejected on second