postconviction relief representation. The Public Defender’s Office was not free to exercise discretion without being granted the authority to act in behalf of the defendant. Similarly, in State ex rel. Smith v. Brummer and in Green v. State, counsel had been appointed and was representing his client. The issue was whether in representing his client, appointed counsel could also seek relief in federal court. Mann cites to no case, nor were we able to find a case, wherein the Public Defender’s Office was permitted to represent a defendant who was not under sentence of death in a collateral postconviction relief proceeding without being appointed to do so. In fact, the Second District Court of Appeal has recently held to the contrary. See Perry v. State, 869 So.2d 41 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)(<HOLDING>). In summary, an indigent criminal defendant
holding that the defendant waived the right to dismissal under  3162a2 when he did not file a motion to dismiss before trial holding defendants pro se motion to reduce sentence was not properly before the trial court when defendant was represented by counsel since defendant may not proceed both by counsel and pro se holding that petitioner cannot reserve the right to seek a public defender while choosing to proceed pro se holding that the public defender was not authorized to file a motion collaterally attacking the defendants sentence and affirming the trial courts dismissal of perrys rule 3800a motion filed by the public defender without prejudice to perrys right to file such a motion pro se holding that a motion filed as a rule 59e was not a motion to alter or amend the judgment and did not toll the time to file an appeal because the motion for costs was wholly collateral to thejudgment on the merits