(Thompson. J.) (“The court must carefully weigh several competing interests, including the interest in finality, the interest in conservation of judicial resources, the interest in adjudication on the merits, and the interest that justice be done.”) (citations omitted). It was now time that this case went to trial. To be sure, state immunity (state-agent immunity and discretionary-function immunity) is not abrogated for negligent or wanton behavior. Ex parte Randall, 971 So.2d 652, 664 (Ala.2007) (“[P]oor judgment or wanton misconduct, an aggravated form of negligence, does not rise to the level of willfulness and maliciousness necessary to put the State agent beyond the immunity recognized in [earlier case law].”) (citing Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So.2d 1046, 1057 (Ala.2003) (<HOLDING>)); Hinson v. Holt, 776 So.2d 804, 811
holding that a state agent was entitled to immunity notwithstanding the fact that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to return a verdict for malicious prosecution because malice for purposes of malicious prosecution can be based upon a lack of probable cause but such malice in law is not enough to satisfy the ex parte cranman exception for acts committed willfully maliciously fraudulently in bad faith beyond his or her authority or under a mistaken interpretation of the law holding that a bad faith claim is a tort holding that for a defendant to recoup attorneys fees under  706k of title vii a court must find that the plaintiff litigated his or her claim beyond the point where it became frivolous unreasonable or groundless or where plaintiff acted in bad faith holding that stateagent immunity is not abrogated for negligent and wanton behavior instead immunity is withheld only upon a showing that the state agent acted willfully maliciously fraudulently in bad faith or beyond his or her authority holding that awarding fees under  35a is inappro priate absent an explicit finding  that the losing party acted willfully or in bad faith