may be proceeded against for the same offense by another indictment or information. Id. at 443-44, 330 A.2d at 173 (citations omitted); see also Hooper v. State, 293 Md. 162, 169 n. 3, 443 A.2d 86, 90 n. 3 (1982) (“[I]f jeopardy had attached at the trial, the nol pros on appeal will ordinarily operate as an acquittal of the underlying charges because of double jeopardy principles.”); Ward, 290 Md. at 91, 427 A.2d at 1017 (“[A] nolle prosequi, without the defendant’s consent and after jeopardy attaches, ‘amounts to an acquittal’ of the underlying offense.”); Friend v. State, 175 Md. 352, 356, 2 A.2d 430 (1938) (“The nolle prosequi entered without the consent of the accused ... placed this defendant in double jeopardy.”); cf. Bynum v. State, 277 Md. 703, 709, 357 A.2d 339, 342 (1976) (<HOLDING>). C. Nolle Prosequi as Dismissal The State
holding that although double jeopardy prohibited subsequent prosecution for offenses charged in counts dismissed by a nolle prosequi entered without the consent of the accused after jeopardy has attached it had no application in the context of the same prosecution which continues on other counts holding that issues underlying all counts were sufficiently intertwined that the separate appeal of the summary judgment counts would complicate the trial of the remaining counts holding that consecutive sentences imposed on multiplieitous counts  two counts of conspiracy for one drug smuggling enterprise  violated double jeopardy clause holding that the trial courts dismissal of the charges after jeopardy had attached based on the prosecution witnesses failure to appear was not an acquittal and therefore double jeopardy did not prevent the court from reconsidering its decision and reinstating the charges holding that a prosecution for the same offense was barred by double jeopardy where a mistrial was declared without manifest necessity