functioning of the judicial system. Id. at 707, 94 S.Ct. at 3107, 41 L.Ed.2d at 1063; Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 447, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 2782, 53 L.Ed.2d 867, 893-94 (1977). Although we have recognized that the principle of separation of powers is implicit in the Alaska Constitution, Brad-ner v. Hammond, 553 P.2d 1, 5 n. 7 (Alaska 1976), we have never addressed an executive privilege claim. However, other state courts have held that a governor, in the discharge of official duties, is entitled to an executive privilege analogous to the President’s. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Verdow, 414 A.2d at 921-24; Nero v. Hyland, 76 N.J. 213, 386 A.2d 846, 853 (1978); cf. State, ex rel. Attorney General v. First Judicial District Court, 96 N.M. 254, 629 P.2d 330, 334 (1981) (<HOLDING>). We agree with this view and conclude that the
holding that under separation of powers the legislative department makes the laws the executive department carries the laws into effect and the judicial department interprets and declares the laws holding that the qui tam provisions do not usurp the executive litigating function because the statute gives the executive branch substantial control over the litigation recognizing as a matter of law executive privilege for governor recognizing dhs as one of the states twentyfour executive administrative agencies holding that state attorney general as member of executive department may assert claim of executive privilege