courts’ exercise of discretion in denying such a waiver. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)® therefore deprives us of jurisdiction over the inadmissibility-waiver issue. In the end, our review is limited to one legal question: whether Idy’s reckless conduct convictions constitute crimes involving moral turpitude. III. STANDARD OF REVIEW Where, as here, the BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s ruling, and discussed some of the bases for the IJ’s opinion, we review both the BIA’s and IJ’s opinions. Zheng v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir.2007). The BIA’s legal conclusions receive de novo review, but we give “appropriate deference to the agency’s interpretation of the underlying s have agreed that the BIA’s interpretation is reasonable. See, e.g., Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 90 (3d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Franklin v. INS, 72 F.3d 571, 573 (8th
holding that the bia did not act unreasonably in concluding new yorks first degree reckless endangerment statute is a crime involving moral turpitude holding that new yorks reckless conduct statute establishes a crime involving moral turpitude holding that assault with a deadly weapon was not a crime involving moral turpitude holding that missouris reckless conduct statute establishes a crime involving moral turpitude holding that illinoiss reckless conduct statute establishes a crime involving moral turpitude