therapist-patient relationship that Mt. Hood had authorized, Mt. Hood must bear the burden of that risk as a result of the nature of its business. Therefore, according to plaintiff, Mt. Hood is vicariously liable for injuries caused by Dyer’s relationship with plaintiff, even if Dyer acted outside the scope of his authority. Plaintiff overlooks the fact that the jury rejected her claim that Mt. Hood was directly negligent because of its alleged failure to perform its obligations as a treatment provider. Moreover, although the Restatement sections are helpful to our analysis, they are not controlling. In Oregon, plaintiff must allege and prove the Chesterman requirements. G.L., 306 Or at 60; see also Lourim v. Swensen, 147 Or App 425, 437-38, 936 P2d 1011, rev allowed 326 Or 133 (1997) (<HOLDING>). In this case, plaintiff failed to present any
holding that chesterman is the only test to determine whether an employer is liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior holding that municipality may not be held liable under  1983 upon theory of respondeat superior holding that a municipality cannot be liable on a respondeat superior theory holding governmental entity liable for malicious harassment of its employee under doctrine of respondeat superior recognizing respondeat superior liability