and gaming facility owned and operated for-profit by a Native American tribe, because the commercial enterprise was not part of the tribe’s governmental function. 166 F.3d at 1128-30. The Miccosukee court relied on the two principles. First, the proposition that a general statute, like the ADA, is applicable to all persons including Native Americans and their property; and, second “that tribe-run business enterprises acting in interstate commerce do not fall under the self-governance exception to the rule that general statutes apply to Indian tribes.” Id. at 1129 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Federal Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 116, 80 S.Ct. 543, 4 L.Ed.2d 584 (1960)); Cf. EEOC v. Karuk Tribe Housing Authority, 260 F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, the Northern District of
holding that the tribes housing authority was exempt from the adea a general statute because the tribal entity was not just a business but also functioned as an arm of tribal government by providing housing to tribe members holding that acoma tribal law was the law of the place because the tribal court could have jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claim holding that a casino that functioned as an arm of the tribe enjoyed tribal immunity holding that the fifth amendment did not apply to tribal government holding that a tribal housing authority established by tribal council pursuant to its powers of selfgovernment was a tribal agency rather than a separate corporate entity created by the tribe