Moreover, it is analytically easy for a judge to separate what is appropriate to consider at each step of the Zolin analysis. At step one, the judge may consider only evidence other than the potentially privileged material itself. At step two, the judge must also consider the content of the material. There is no reason to believe this analytical framework cannot be applied properly just because the judge got a sneak peek at step-two evidence. In sum, although it was error for the district court not to follow Zolin’s two-step process, de la Jara, 973 F.2d at 749, the error was harmless because the district court properly reconsidered its decision under the correct standard as soon as the error was brought to its attention. See United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1503 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). It makes no difference that in Chen the
holding that while it was error for the regular judge to disqualify himself for only the habitual phase of the trial the error was harmless holding that disclosure of grand jury materials to parole commission was harmless error holding that the governments error in submitting potentially privileged material with an ex parte application for zolin crimefraud determination was harmless because the district judge explicitly disregarded the allegedly privileged materials holding that the governments failure to argue harmless error results in a waiver of the argument holding that the district courts error in exercising jurisdiction was harmless error because the court properly applied the relevant state law to the undisputed material facts and came up with the right answer