restitutionary provisions of the Victim and Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663-3664. This proposition presents a pure question of statutory interpretation and, as such, invites de novo review. See, e.g., Gifford, 17 F.3d at 472; Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 750, 757 (1st Cir.1992). A. Conceptualizing the Problem. This ease falls into a grey area that separates two established legal principles. On one hand, although once problematic, see infra p. 35, it is by now settled that a government entity (local, state, or federal) may be a “victim” for purposes of the VWPA (and may be awarded restitution) when it has passively suffered harm resulting directly fro h Cir.1993) (similar) (dictum); United States v. Salcedo-Lopez, 907 F.2d 97, 98 (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Finley, 783 F.Supp. 1123,
holding that money used by undercover government agent to purchase false identification documents is not recoverable under the vwpa holding that attorneys fees and costs spent by an insurance company to defend against civil suit filed by defendant are not recoverable under the vwpa holding that drug buy money advanced by the government is not recoverable under the vwpa holding attorneys fees not generally recoverable unless party prevails under cause of action for which attorneys fees are recoverable and damages are recovered holding punitive damages not recoverable under 2715