airline records—corroborated Fleurancois’s testimony, we conclude that the agents’ statement that Cummings’s testimony was “inconsistent” with records, was at most ambiguous. Moreover, even if the government overstated the probative value of the evidence of perjury, there is no indication that the agents affirmatively attempted to deceive Cummings. To the contrary, the record suggests that any overstatement more likely resulted from the government’s confusing the airline records of Fleurancois’s flight with those of Williams’s flight. Absent some evidence that the government affirmatively attempted to mislead Cummings, we are not persuaded that the agents acted in bad faith, or that their tactics were unduly coercive. Cf. United States v. Mast, 735 F.2d 745, 750 (2d Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Finally, even if we were inclined to disagree
holding that the sixth amendment generally permits interrogation of a represented person only 1 if it was the defendant and not the government who initiated the interrogation and 2 if the defendant voluntarily waived his right to counsel holding that custodial interrogation by police must not occur prior to suspect being informed of his or her right to counsel and against selfincrimination holding that a condition of supervised release that requires a defendant to report to his probation officer upon reentry to the united states does not violate the defendants fifth amendment right against selfincrimination holding that government conduct during noncustodial interrogation did not violate defendants right against compelled selfincrimination where agents had not affirmatively attempted to mislead the defendant recognizing commonlaw privilege against selfincrimination