F.2d 257, 259 (11th Cir.1981)). “[I]n order to amount to reversible error, a judge’s remarks must demonstrate such pervasive bias and unfairness that they prejudice one of the parties in the case.” United States v. Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 750 n. 6 (11th Cir.2002). Appellant argues that the district court judge made several negative remarks about defense counsel which resulted in prejudice to his client. Appellant argues that the “pervasively demeaning treatment” of defense counsel and the trial judge’s refusal to give a curative instruction to the jury warrant a new trial. (Appellant’s Br. at 17.) We disagree and conclude, instead, that the district court did not abuse its discretion and that a new trial is unnecessary. It is apparent from the record that on sever 0th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). The Second Circuit has held that the defense
holding that possession was not so fleeting as to extend the statute beyond its arguable limits holding that trial court acted properly in refusing to give jury instruction on fleeting possession theory holding that the defendants possession of the firearm was not so fleeting as to warrant an instruction on temporary innocent possession holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to give the defendants tendered instruction regarding the voluntariness of his confession holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give a mere inspection instruction in a firearm possession case