as a matter of serious criminal concern, but not as something new and different. The majority’s implicit assumption that terrorism is different, and must be treated differently, thus flies in the face of the congressionally sanctioned structure of sentencing that applies to terrorism as well as all other kinds of federal criminal offenses. Our courts are well equipped to treat each offense and offender individually, and we should not create special sentencing rules and procedures for terrorists. In presiding over the many terrorism-related cases on their dockets, courts have treated other issues in terrorism cases in ways that do not differ appreciably from more broadly applicable doctrines. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2079, 2083, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) (<HOLDING>); Jewel v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 673 F.3d 902,
holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit holding that ordinary qualified immunity standard protects officials in a suit alleging an unconstitutional use of the material witness statute for detaining terrorism suspects holding officials are entitled to qualified immunity for reasonable mistakes of law holding that summary judgment for defendant officials on the basis of qualified immunity was improper given officials indefinite refusal to treat plaintiffs cavity