a person can establish standing “without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy.” 504 U.S. 555, 573 n. 7, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). As an initial matter, in the very next footnote the Court dismissed any notion that the “special” nature of procedural rights disregard ed any causation requirement, see 504 U.S. at 573 n. 8, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (“If we understand [the dissent] correctly, it means that the Government’s violation of a certain (undescribed) class of procedural duty satisfies the concrete-injury requirement by itself, without any showing that the procedural violation endangers a concrete interest of the plaintiff.... We cannot agree.”), and thus plaintiffs’ failure to establish causation remains fatal. See Ctr. for Law, 396 F.3d at 1157 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit has rejected
holding that a plaintiffs claim of injury stemming from alleged procedural harm is insufficient to ground standing where the harm is uncoupled from any injury in fact or tied only to an undifferentiated injury common to all members of the public holding that to have standing a plaintiff must establish an injury in fact a casual connection between the injury and that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision holding that because fact of injury was a distinct question from quantum of injury common proof could establish classwide injury even though amount of damage to each plaintiff was uncertain holding that use of tangible property must be proximate cause of injury and that property does not cause injury if it does no more than furnish the condition that makes the injury possible holding that allegation of procedural injury does not affect the issues of injury in fact or causation