provides that a government “employee shall not be considered as acting within the course and scope of his employment ... if the employee’s conduct constituted fraud, malice, libel, slander, defamation or any criminal offense other than traffic violations.” Similarly, Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-46-7(2) (Rev.2012) excludes fraudulent, malicious, defamatory, and (non-traffic) criminal conduct from the scope of employment. ¶ 43. We find the circuit court erred when it found all of Clyde’s actions that “flowed from” his role as county supervisor fall under the MTCA. Instead, the court should have looked to section 11-46-5(2) to determine if the Bradleys’ allegations were based on conduct within Clyde’s scope of employment with the county. See McGehee, 708 So.2d at 81 (¶ 11) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 44. The Bradleys alleged Clyde was acting
holding plaintiffs suit sounded in defamation because regardless of what the suit is labeled the thing done to cause any damage to plaintiff eventually stems from and grew out of the defamation holding that because the plaintiff alleged defamation an act excluded from sections 114652 and 114672 the plaintiff did not have to provide the public employee presuit notice holding that the plaintiff did not establish a waiver where the defendants answer had put the plaintiff on notice of an arbitration defense holding that public meeting did not satisfy public participation requirement because public did not receive adequate notice holding that a plaintiff must comply with the notice of claim requirements in order to maintain an action against a government employee even if the plaintiff claims that the employee acted with fraud or malice