involving intimate relationships or furthering another right under the constitution', such as free speech.” 406 Fed.Appx. at 259 (citing City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 24, 109 S.Ct. 1591). In that case, the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court’s jury instructions, which stated that the plaintiff “had to show that the [defendant’s] restriction on association intruded on another constitutional right.” 406 Fed.Appx. at 259-60. Even accepting the Complaint’s allegations as true and viewing those allegations in the light most favorable to A.M., A.M. fails to state a plausible expressive-association claim. See Mink v. Knox, 613 F.3d at 1000. A.M. alleges that her transfer to the Homestead House “deprived [her] of her First Amendment right to associate with persons .Ct. 3244 (<HOLDING>). In this sense, A.M.’s claim resembles that of
holding that the right to associate with others as a military company is not a privilege of citizens of the united states recognizing the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs and the right of qualified voters regardless of their political persuasion to cast their votes effectively recognizing a right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political social economic educational religious and cultural ends holding that njeither the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is absolute and congress may prohibit federal employees from participating in political activities in view of its interest in maintaining a nonpartisan work force recognizing even federal constitutional right of association does not apply to the right of one individual to associate with another