within this exception by asserting that the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s decision regarding extreme and unusual hardship violated their Fifth Amendment Due Process rights. Specifically, they argue the BIA did not adequately address as a hardship factor the potential harm that could befall Tashfia if she had to travel to Bangladesh. In support of this, Petitioners contend that the IJ’s decision primarily mentioned facts relating to economic hardship, while the BIA made only “cursory” mention of Petitioners’ fear for Tashfia’s safety. This, they contend, amounts to the application of an incorrect legal standard and a violation of their due process rights. As the government correctly argues in opposition, this claim comprises nothing more than a challenge to the cor rectness of Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); Parvez, 506 F.3d at 97 (allegation that the
holding allegation that the agency failed to fully evaluate an aspect of petitioners claim to be another way of saying that the agency got the facts wrong holding that the court must find that the agency entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency or the decision is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise holding that an agency acts arbitrarily and capriciously if it entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem or offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency holding deference to agency methodology appropriate unless agency failed to address an essential factor holding that an agency acts arbitrarily and capriciously if it entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem