the characterization of the 1992 conviction as an “aggravated felony.” He sought a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to former INA § 212(c) for the first, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1996), and cancellation of removal under INA § 240A(a) for the second. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). The IJ held that even if Heredia was eligible for relief under former § 212(c), his 1992 conviction precluded him from seeking relief under current § 240A(a). See Rodriguez-Munoz v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 245, 248 (3d Cir.2005). On appeal, the BIA noted that the statute under which Heredia was convicted in 1992 applies to any transfer of a controlled substance, whether payment is involved or not. See N.Y. Penal Law § 220.00(1); see also People v. Starling, 85 N.Y.2d 509, 626 N.Y.S.2d 729, 650 N.E.2d 387, 390 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Because the BIA did not have Heredia’s record
holding that in the absence of a statutory definition a term should be accorded its ordinary meaning holding that a judgment for attorneys fees may be rendered in the nature of child support regardless of whether the underlying action is one of enforcement or modification holding that a broad statutory definition of a term that was inconsistent with the terms plain meaning did not affect the terms definition in other contexts holding that purpose of the amendment was to clarify the definition of the word maintain holding that the statutory definition of the term sell conspicuously excludes any requirement that the transfer be commercial in nature or conducted for a particular type of benefit or underlying purpose