to any language from Danforth or Walsh to that effect. Chief Justice CASTILLE, concurring. I join the Majority Opinion, with the exception of (1) the Majority’s apparent approval of the Superior Court’s decisions in Danforth and Walsh subject to an inaccurate disclaimer that “neither of these decisions put into place per se rules or mandated explicit warnings” regarding a suspect’s knowledge of the criminal investigative purpose of a search, see Maj. Op. at 232-35, 77 A.3d at 571-72; and (2) the Majority’s sugges tion, on multiple occasions, that a defendant’s knowledge of the possible use of blood test results in a subsequent criminal prosecution against him is a required, rather than merely a relevant, factor in an assessment of voluntary consent. See id. at 236-38, 77 A.3d at 573-74 (<HOLDING>); id. at 237 n. 12, 77 A.3d at 573-74 n. 12
holding consent to blood draw involuntary when among other circumstances it was given after officer informed arrestee that south dakota law provides that drivers automatically consent to blood draws holding that the dissipation of alcohol from a persons blood stream constitutes a sufficient exigency to justify a warrantless blood draw holding that on the basis of the totality of the evidence when viewed objectively we conclude that a reasonable persons consent to this blood draw would have contemplated the potentiality of the results being used for criminal investigative or prosecutorial purposes thus officer agostino validly obtained from appellee his consent for the blood alcohol test holding that independent of the implied consent law the fourth amendment requires an arrestees consent to be voluntary to justify a warrantless blood draw holding that the implied consent statutes are irrelevant when the defendant gives actual consent to a blood or breath test