Michael and the Human Resources Department that she would not go to work in the garage to pass out registration forms because she was feeling ill and was concerned that the fumes in the garage would make her feel worse. This evidence satisfies the statutory test for good cause for leaving the job. § 443.101(l)(a)l., Fla. Stat. (2010); Humble v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 963 So.2d 956 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); Vajda v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 610 So.2d 645 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). We conclude that the Viera has presented competent substantial evidence that she left her job for good cause within the meaning of the unemployment compensation statute and is not disqualified from receiving benefits. See Vajda; see also Salinas v. Eastern Aero Marine, 908 So.2d 1169, 1171 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (<HOLDING>); Delaughter v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals, 847
holding that claimants refusal to comply with supervisors order to perform production work did not constitute misconduct that would preclude award of unemployment compensation benefits as claimant had previously suffered from allergies from chemicals used in manufacturing department holding that isolated incident in which claimant raised voice at his supervisor in private office but in front of two other employees and possibly used profanity did not constitute misconduct sufficient to deny unemployment compensation benefits holding that the consideration of the fact that claimant collected unemployment benefits while he was allegedly disabled was not a ground for reversal where there was other medical and vocational evidence supporting denial of benefits and claimants receipt of unemployment benefits was not decisive factor in denial of benefits holding that district court had discretion to decline to deduct unemployment insurance benefits from damages award holding that an isolated incident in which an employee used profanity in a telephone conversation with her supervisor did not constitute misconduct sufficient to cut off unemployment benefits