conducting joint trials in conspiracy cases, which offsets to some extent the government’s level of culpability. While the government arguably may be responsible under Barker for the delay in this case, we cannot find that that responsibility weighs heavily against the government. There is absolutely no evidence of bad faith by the government. The reasons for delay in this case were, at worst, neutral reasons. In addition, the government’s actions were taken in pursuit of a valid and important judicial policy favoring joint trials. Given these facts, we conclude that even if the government is ultimately responsible for the delay under Barker, the reasons for delay do not weigh heavily against the government and do not excuse a showing of actual prejudice. See Mitchell, 769 F.2d at 1547 (<HOLDING>). 2. Prejudice Appellant concedes that he
holding that a twoyear delay weighed heavily against the government when the arresting officer knew where the defendant lived and worked and made only weak efforts to contact the defendant holding the government must demonstrate the defendant knew of the characteristics of the firearm that required it to be registered holding suppression not required where the government mailed the required notice 34 days after the 90day statutory period because defendant had access to the recorded calls and transcripts and failed to demonstrate actual prejudice holding that a sixyear delay caused by negligence weighed heavily against the government holding that a defendant was properly required to demonstrate prejudice where only two of the first three barker factors weighed heavily against the government