v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir.2003) ("[W]e review only issues which are argued specifically and distinctly in a party’s opening brief.”) (citation omitted). 3 . Thirty days from January 2, 2003, the date the district court faxed the district court’s order to Ford’s attorney, was February 1, 2003, a Saturday. February 3, the date Ford filed the notice of appeal, was a Monday. 4 . No comparable provisions existed prior to these amendments. 6 . There is no dispute that the ruling granting summary judgment is one of the rulings for which a separate document is required under Rule 58. 7 .Prior to the amendments to Rule 58, the lack of a separate document resulted in the appeal period never beginning to run at all. See, e.g., Corrigan v. Bargala, 140 F.3d 815, 819 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly,’ if the 2001 version of the
holding that where oral loan was silent as to the time of repayment the statute of limitations began to run at the time the contract was made holding the trial court was without authority to dismiss an appeal on the ground that the amount of the judgment required the appellant to file an application for discretionary review holding that the limitations period begins to run at the time that the parties first enter into the franchise agreement holding that because the district courts order failed to comply with rule 58 appellants notice of appeal cannot be considered late holding that the time to file an appeal never began to run because the clerk failed to enter a separate judgment as required by rule 58