The benefits to Curry are thus impossible to ascertain, and the court abused its discretion in awarding Curry attorney’s fees based on benefits under section 73.092(1). Instead, the court should have based its attorney’s fee award on section 73.092(2). See Dep’t of Transp. v. Smithbilt Indus., Inc., 715 So.2d 963, 966-67 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). Section 73.092(2) provides factors for an attorney’s fee consideration “[i]n assessing attorney’s fees incurred in defeating an order of taking, or for apportionment, or other supplemental proceedings, when not otherwise provided for.” A plain language reading of that subsection suggests that it would be inapplicable in this case because the underlying action was not a “supplemental proceeding.” See also LaBelle Phoenix Corp., 696 So.2d at 948 (<HOLDING>). However, in Smithbilt, this court suggested
holding that the appellate court properly determined that generally under principles of inverse condemnation a property owner may seek compensation in an eminent domain proceeding for pretaking damages caused by the condemnor holding that an order was not final where the order stated that the court would end the cause after a final accounting was reviewed and approved but did not say that the cause was ended reasoning that this language indicates that the trial court considered that the cause was still open holding before huffman was decided that younger abstention was inapplicable to an eminent domain proceeding holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence holding that an eminent domain action that ended with a stipulated final judgment was not a supplemental proceeding