organ of the male, which is necessary to constitute rape, need be only slight; it is not necessary that the vagina shall be entered . . ., but an entering of the anterior of the organ, known as the vulva or labia, is sufficient.’ [Cits.]” Payne v. State, 231 Ga. 755 (1) (204 SE2d 128) (1974). While the definition of criminal sexual assault under 720 ILCS 5/12-13 (a) (1), previously cited as Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 38, par. 12-13 (a) (1), does not contain the element of non-consent, the “against her will” element of Georgia’s rape statute was supplied here by evidence that the victim was under 14 years old, which was the legal age of consent in this State at the time the assault occurred. See Drake v. State, 239 Ga. 232, 233 (236 SE2d 748) (1977), superseded by statute on other grounds (<HOLDING>). Accord Owens v. State, 178 Ga. App. 750 (3)
holding that the defendants consent to allow the officer to search her purse by way of holding it open for the officer was for consent to a limited view of the purses interior not to surrender possession  for an unrestricted search and thus the officer exceeded the scope of the defendants consent recognizing that consent is an exception to the warrant requirement and that voluntariness of consent depends on the totality of the circumstances holding there is no consent as a matter of law where the consent was given under coercion holding that against her will in the rape statute means without her consent and that the fact that the victim was under the age of consent was sufficient to establish that element holding that mistake as to the age of the victim is no defense to statutory rape