we observed that “in determining entitlement to federal relief for due process violations, a relevant consideration is the adequacy of ‘existing state remedies.’ ” Montañez-Allman, No. 13-2384 (quoting Acevedo-Feliciano, 447 F.3d at 124). We explained that this is particularly true where, as here, the relief sought implicates comity concerns, but is not “necessary to prevent great and irreparable injury.” Id. (quoting Mass. State Grange v. Benton, 272 U.S. 525, 527-29, 47 S.Ct. 189, 71 L.Ed. 387 (1926) (Holmes, J.)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Rosario-Torres, 889 F.2d at 323 (urging caution “[i]n shaping equitable remedies, [where] comity concerns can loom large”); cf. R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-01, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941) (<HOLDING>). Relying on such comity considerations and the
holding that federal courts must exercise a wise discretion in administering equitable relief to avoid   needless friction with state policies citations and internal quotation marks omitted holding that compliance with rule 3 is both a mandatory and jurisdictional prerequisite to appeal internal quotation marks omitted recognizing that the declaratory judgment act is only procedural and does not create substantive rights internal quotation marks and citations omitted holding that issues not argued specifically and distinctly in a partys opening brief are waived internal quotation marks and citations omitted holding that an appeal is not moot so long as the appellate court can fashion relief that is both effective and equitable internal quotation marks omitted alteration in original