in McLean. We unanimously agree that the sua sponte order of the trial judge now before us was a departure from the essential requirements of law. 2 . Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959), codified as explained in, Kulling v. State, 827 So.2d 311, 314 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). CANADY, Judge, concurring. I fully concur with the conclusion and the analysis set forth in the majority opinion. I write separately for the sole purpose of expressing my view that fingerprint-type similarity should not be required for the admission of similar fact evidence concerning modus operandi that is relevant to corroborate a victim’s testimony that an offense occurred and not to establish the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator. See Shapiro v. State, 696 So.2d 1321, 1324 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (<HOLDING>). I agree that in the case under review the
holding that similar fact evidence regarding prior act of sexual misconduct by defendant was properly admitted to show the defendants common scheme plan or design to sexually exploit his patients and that such evidence is relevant even if it is not uniquely similar holding that a defendant must show that the victim had previously been exposed to a sexual act and that the prior sexual act was sufficiently similar to the present sexual act to give the victim the experience and ability to contrive or imagine the molestation charge holding that error if any in excluding portion of defendants statement to police was harmless because similar evidence was admitted through the testimony of another witness holding in similar bus bid rigging trial that evidence of another conspiracy was properly admitted to show defendants knowledge and  general intent recognizing that the common scheme or plan exception is generally applied in cases involving sexual crimes where evidence of acts prior and subsequent to the act charged in the indictment is held admissible as tending to show continued illicit intercourse between the same parties