that the officers utilized improper physical tactics. Instead, he claims that they used a combination of threats and promises, which had the cumulative effect of overbearing his will. Whether a confession was voluntary depends upon “the totality of all the surrounding circumstances — both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.” Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). The Supreme Court has held that the combination of threats and promises may rise to the level sufficient to overbear an interviewee’s will, rendering any confession the product of impermissible coercion. Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534, 83 S.Ct. 917, 9 L.Ed.2d 922 (1963); see also Ledbetter v. Edwards, 35 F.3d 1062, 1070 (6th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). However, as a plurality of the Supreme Court
holding that threats to inflict financial or personal harm are not true threats where no ones personal safety is threatened holding that the defendants purchase of a firearm and ammunition on the same day that he made a threat demonstrates that his threats are more than mere puffery and evidences an intent to carry out the threats holding that expansion of the ada to encompass threats to self is untenable because the ada mentions only threats to others recognizing that in the face of a powerful combination of threats and promises even a defendant who is completely innocent might well confess recognizing that section 103 sets forth the standard and so synergism of a known combination is not required