transfer, or permanent impairment. Still-son v. Peterson & Hede Co., 454 N.W.2d 430, 433 (Minn.1990) (wage loss); Flint v. Am. Can Co., 426 N.W.2d 190, 191 (Minn. 1988) (functional impairment); Moes v. City of St. Paul, 402 N.W.2d 520, 527 (Minn.1987) (job transfer); see also Minn. Stat. § 176.66, subd. 1 (2000) (“The disablement of an employee resulting from an occupational disease shall be regarded as a personal injury within the meaning of the workers’ compensation law.”). Moreover, because damage is an essential element of an employee’s tort claim against a third party, the absence of a physical manifestation of illness will result in dismissal of the employee’s tort action for failure to state a claim. Dalton v. Dow Chem. Co., 280 Minn. 147, 152-53, 158 N.W.2d 580, 583-84 (1968) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the employee does not have an
holding the twoyear statute of limitations under iowa code section 8526 does not begin to run until the employee discovers or should discover in the exercise of diligence the nature seriousness and probable compensable character of the injury or disease holding the discovery rule does not require an expert opinion of causation but instead limitations begin to run when the employee discovers the nature seriousness and probable compensable character of the injury or disease recognizing hearing loss from onthejob noise as an occupational disease holding that interest does not begin to accrue until the date of judgment not the date of verdict holding that the employees thirdparty tort claim stemming from the employees occupational disease does not accrue and the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the occupational disease begins to manifest itself