care described in Dr. Helge’s report with James’s resulting injury. However, after describing that injury in his report, Dr. Rushing states specifically that the injury was “a result of improper amphetamine prescription and improper supervision.” [Emphasis added.] To fulfill the requirements of section 74.351(i) by supplementing Dr. Helge’s report as to Dr. Davisson, Dr. Rushing was not required to mention Dr. Helge’s exact description of the standard of care applicable to Dr. Davisson, especially when, as here, that standard of care is accurately described as a failure to properly supervise or monitor, which is precisely the conduct that Dr. Rushing implicates as causing James’s injuries. See Packard v. Guerra, 252 S.W.3d 511, 526-27 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>); Perez v. Salinas, No. 13-08-00192-CV, 2008 WL
holding that we must first determine our jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits of the appeal holding that court was within its discretion to refuse to consider reports that did not meet the supreme courts standards for admitting reports into evidence recognizing that we have consistently held that a party who wishes to introduce evidence of past false reports of sexual assault bears the threshold burden of establishing the falsity of the past reports holding that we must review multiple reports in the aggregate to determine if they are adequate as to liability and causation holding that if no material issues of fact are in dispute and an appeal presents only a question of law we apply de novo review