to preserve this issue by raising it below, and Defendant counters that his claim is excepted from the preservation requirement insofar as we are required to review de novo whether a sentence constitutes cruel and unusual pu llenged the constitutionality of his sentence in the trial court, we conclude the issue is not preserved for our review. See Rule 12-216(A) NMRA 2001; Burdex, 100 N.M. at 201, 668 P.2d at 317. {32} Were we to reach the issue, we would affirm on the grounds that our opinion in Rueda, 1999-NMCA-033, ¶ 6, 126 N.M. 738, 975 P.2d 351, is controlling and that Defendant has failed to point us to evidence of particular circumstances which would render imposition of the habitual offender enhancement cruel and unusual. Cf. Arrington, 115 N.M. at 561-62, 855 P.2d at 135-36 (<HOLDING>). {33} Nor are we persuaded by Defendant’s
recognizing right to privacy in receipt of health care services to the extent consistent with providing adequate medical care and the safety and good order of the facility holding that evidence of the defendants medical condition and inability of correctional facility to provide necessary care sufficient to support finding that incarceration would be cruel and unusual holding that a state is required to provide medical care to incarcerated individuals recognizing that a patients choice of a health care facility does not render the facility a beneficiary under 502a1b holding evidence insufficient to support finding of implied contract