guarantee to a statutory right, "it is for the legislature, not the courts, to prescribe" the scope of the right. Schmidt, 63 Wis. 2d at 89; see Harvot, 320 Wis. 2d 1, ¶ 50; In re Ogg's Estate, 262 Wis. 181, 186, 54 N.W.2d 175 (1952); Relyea v. Tomahawk Paper & Pulp Co., 102 Wis. 301, 304, 78 N.W. 412 (1899) ("[M]ere statutory rights may be conferred upon such conditions as in the wisdom of the legislature may seem best, and the conditions may be changed from time to time, even as to existing rights, or such rights may be taken away entirely, at the legislative will."). Therefore, we recognize statutory rights only where the legislature has, through the legislative process, specifically acted to create them. In re Fidelity Assurance Ass'n, 247 Wis. 619, 624, 20 N.W.2d 638 (1945) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 17. When interpreting statutory rights, we
holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language holding that a statutory right is a creature of the legislature and does not exist where the legislature has not acted holding that in order for there to be state debt in the constitutional sense one legislature in effect must obligate a future legislature to appropriate funds to discharge the debt created by the first legislature holding that whether the legislature has complied with article iii section 61 of the texas constitution which states that the legislature shall provide suitable laws for the administration of workers compensation insurance for municipalities is a political question committed to the legislature holding that when the legislature enacts a statute it is presumed that the legislature is aware of existing statutes