exhibits were crack cocaine and expressly referred to the government’s Exhibit No. 2 as “an awful big piece of crack cocaine ... a pretty big chunk.” We hold the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the substances seized from appellant’s automobile were crack cocaine or cocaine base. DISPARITY IN SENTENCING—DUE PROCESS Guidelines § 2D1.1(a)(3) uses a 100 to 1 ratio for powder cocaine to crack cocaine or cocaine base, that is, 100 grams of powder cocaine is the equivalent of 1 gram of crack cocaine or cocaine base. Appellant argues the sentencing guidelines’ distinction between powder cocaine and crack cocaine or cocaine base is not supported by a rational basis and thus violates due process, citing State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 888-91 (Minn.1991) (banc) (<HOLDING>). This court has upheld the constitutional
holding distinction between penalties for crimes involving crack cocaine and powder cocaine lacked rational basis and thus violated equal protection clause of state constitution holding that district court did not err in determining that cocaine base was crack cocaine based on chemical analysis identifying cocaine base together with competent lay testimony bridging the evidentiary gap between cocaine base and crack cocaine and refusing to require showing of smokeability ie water solubility or melting point for purposes of establishing crack cocaine under the guidelines since smokeability distinguishes cocaine base from powder cocaine not from crack holding that the guidelines stiffer penalties for cocaine base do not violate equal protection holding that sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine is constitutional holding that there is a rational basis for the distinction