ownership interests in, and servicing rights to, mortgage loans as they change hands through the life of a loan.”). 2 . The Trustees are not currently seeking summary judgment against the Grantors. 3 . The Court derives its authority to issue this memorandum opinion from 28 U.S.C. § 132(c), under which the judicial power of the Court may be exercised by a single judge, "[ejxcept as otherwise provided by law, or rule or order of court....” 28 U.S.C. § 132(c). See also Rhiel v. OhioHealth Corp. (In re Hu , 490 (Bankr. N.D.Ohio 1993) ("[Section 544(a)(3)] is directed towards secret or nondisclosed claims which were in place prior to the bankruptcy filing — not to postpetition transfers.”). 7 . See, e.g., Rieser v. Hayslip (In re Canyon Sys. Corp.), 343 B.R. 615, 657 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 2006) (<HOLDING>). 8 . In Belisle, the issue was whether a
recognizing that from a policy perspective a trustee should be able to pursue general alter ego claims as a representative of the estate but concluding that no statutory basis under the code exists for the trustee to do so holding that a trustee had no standing to pursue claims of fraud against the debtors accountant because under connecticut law those claims belonged to investors holding that because  544b1 provides only the power of avoidance it does not confer authority on the trustee to pursue state law damage claims but that the trustee could pursue such claims under  544a1 or 2 if the claims could have been asserted by the debtor corporation holding that a chapter 7 trustee was the only person with authority to bring  a cause of action after the appointment of a trustee holding that trustees statement in a previously filed brief that trustee could bring claims accruing on or after september 20 1987 was a judicial admission by the trustee that statute of limitations precluded all claims arising before that date