injury both occurred prior to 1973); Mansfield v. GAF Corp., 5 Mass. App. Ct. 551, 556 (1977) (same). Federal courts applying Massachusetts law have placed similar emphasis on the date of injury rather than on the transaction date. See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Labs, 551 F. Supp. 245, 246 (D. Mass. 1982); McCormack v. Abbott Labs, 617 F. Supp. 1521, 1524 (D. Mass. 1985). In In re Massachusetts Asbestos Cases, 639 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D. Mass. 1985), the court expressly held that “the defense of lack of privity is not available against any plaintiff whose first manifestation of physical symptoms attributable to an asbestos-related disease occurred after December 16, 1973.” See Eagle-Pitcher Indus., Inc., v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1028 (1982) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, although Thayer’s
holding that for purposes of determining coverage under insurance policy disease results    when it becomes reasonably capable of medical diagnosis holding that the plaintiffs asserted legal basis for coverage is irrelevant to the determination of whether the insurance policy provides coverage and instead looking to the facts underlying the claim for coverage holding that insurers failure to deny existence of insurance coverage under policy at issue was to admit that coverage existed holding that new yorks public policy does not bar insurance coverage for disparate impact employment discrimination but noting that the state of new york insurance department has stated that it is against public policy to provide insurance coverage for intentional acts of discrimination holding that in order for claim to be within scope of coverage of title insurance policy it must be specifically provided for