from the class if the member so requests”). 36. Plaintiffs observe that after receiving-class notice in the ordinary case, a would-be class member cannot refuse to opt out and later object to class certification. Plaintiffs argue that through declining to opt out, the class member has in essence consented to the propriety of class certification. Courts have held, for example, that a decision not to opt out of a class should foreclose attacks on whether the class has adequate representation. See, e.g., Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc., 606 F.2d 354, 357-58 (2d Cir.1979) (observing that right to opt-out of the proposed settlement protects class members’ interests from alleged inadequate representation); see also Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. Power Co., 8 F.3d 1370, 1378 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1220, 114 S.Ct. 2707,
holding that conflicts of constitutional magnitude can arise from cases of successive representation holding that the failure to optout precluded challenge to adequate representation based upon purported conflicts of interest between subclasses holding that there is a qualified first amendment right of access to proceedings and documents relating to disqualification of a judge in a criminal case and to conflicts of interest between attorneys in a criminal case holding that pslra barred rico claims based on pension fund scheme involving failure to disclose conflicts of interest and commission arrangements holding where challenge was waived that appellate review is precluded