that he was “forced” to agree to the TOS as a “condition of continued employment,” it is clear that he had to agree to the TOS before becoming a Lyft driver. See Barrasso, 2016 WL 1449567, at *6 (granting motion to compel arbitration over unconscionability challenge, in part because "[employee] agreed to the [defendant’s] arbitration procedures at the outset of his employment relationship. This was an entirely voluntary act—even if economically motivated—and there was no 'gross disparity’ in consideration exchanged by the parties”). 16 . It is also unclear what alternative method Lyft could have reasonably employed in order to propose the agreement to Bekele. For example, Lyft might have mailed the agreement to him, and required that he mail it back with a 3, 1153 (N.D.Cal.2015) (<HOLDING>). 19 . Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, which
holding we may consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal when the issue presented is purely one of law and  depends on the factual record developed below holding that a prior administrative decision actually decided ultimate factual issues that are essential to plaintiffs present claims and that issue preclusion therefore bars the relitigation of those issues holding that trial court must make findings of fact on all material factual issues that involve ultimate issues in divorce and must make findings that characterize and value each asset or liability on which disputed evidence was presented holding that factual pleadings on this issue are weak but sufficient holding that uber drivers are presumptive employees but that the ultimate issue of classification depends on disputed factual issues