does not logically support the inference that his decision to direct Collins to fire plaintiff was racially motivated. The evidence showed that Garr believed coworker reports of sexual harassment, warned plaintiff verbally and in writing, and fired him upon determining that McCauley’s complaint was credible. Moreover, there was no evidence that defendant had labeled plaintiff as a troublemaker because of his complaints, or that there was any connection between those complaints and his discharge. Thus, even if the allegations of sexual harassment were false, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that it was his race, and not the allegations of sexual harassment, that motivated defendant’s decision to discharge him. See Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 939 F2d 1466, 1470-71 (11th Cir 1991) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff’s subjective perception that he was
holding that a plaintiff has not demonstrated that the employers reason for terminating him was pretextual if the employer reasonably believed the complaint of sexual harassment lodged against the plaintiff and acted on it in good faith holding that where the employer fired the plaintiff upon a good faith belief that he sexually harassed coworkers the plaintiff could not prove pretext by challenging the harassment allegations holding that a plaintiff may rely on the same evidence to prove both pretext and discrimination holding that the test for good faith is the actual belief of the party and not the reasonableness of that belief holding that plaintiff failed to establish pretext where plaintiff was terminated after the employer conducted an investigation into a subordinates allegations of misconduct on the part of the plaintiff and believed the allegations to be true even though plaintiff presented evidence in the lawsuit that the allegations may have been false