been intimately involved with the crime lab and its oversight from its inception. Although he was not statutorily authorized to serve as Wilkinson’s supervisor, Luzzi acted in that capacity pursuant to URI’s joint — albeit unauthorized — de facto control over crime-lab employees. And Hilliard was the director of the lab, and thus was Wilkinson’s supervisor when he allegedly uttered his defamatory statements. Thus, even if their statements might have been defamatory in some other context, both Luzzi and Hilliard were entitled to the legal protection afforded to them as Wilkinson’s de facto supervisors by the qualified privilege accorded to those who comment upon the job performance of individuals they supervise. See Swanson v. Speidel Corp., 110 R.I. 385, 338, 293 A.2d 307, 309 (1972) (<HOLDING>). The allegedly defamatory statements related
holding that defendant could not be liable for distributing defamatory statements unless it knew or had reason to know of statements holding that statements in personnel files that would otherwise be defamatory are privileged holding that prosecutors defamatory statements to the press after plaintiff was pardoned were absolutely privileged holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under louisiana law holding plaintiffs must plead alleged defamatory statements with precision