ten days after they are entered, and an injunction is enforceable immediately upon entry). There was no material violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1451(f). Neither Ariel’s Rule 60 motion for relief from the judgment, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c)(2); Smith v. Stone, 308 F.2d 15, 17 (9th Cir.1962), nor his appeal from the denial of that motion, see United States v. $2,490.00 in U.S. Currency, 825 F.2d 1419, 1420 (9th Cir.1987), stayed the district court’s judgment. The BIA did not err in affirming the IJ’s finding that Ariel was removable. The IJ correctly held that the district court order collaterally estopped Ariel from relitigating in his removal proceedings the issue of whether he obtained admission by misrepresenting his marital status. See Belayneh v. INS, 213 F.3d 488, 492 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). The district court actually and necessarily
holding that removal proceedings are in the nature of process and defects in the removal procedures are waivable holding that nonmutual issue preclusion should not apply against the state government holding res judicata ie claim preclusion doctrine applies to consent judgments holding that the doctrine of res judicata applies to deportation proceedings holding that the doctrine of issue preclusion applies in removal proceedings