to “better ... provide for its disabled students”). The IDEA recognizes that states “shall determine whether [private] schools and facilities meet the standards that apply to State educational agencies and local educational agencies and that children so served have all the rights the children would have if served by such agencies.” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(B)(ii). The IDEA, in effect, “expressly incorporates State educational standards.” Schimmel by Schimmel v. Spillane, 819 F.2d 477, 484 (4th Cir.1987). “Because unapproved private schools do not meet the State educational standards,” the IDEA “does not require [a state’s] school systems to place and fund handicapped children in unapproved private schools.” Id.; see also Antkowiak by Antkowiak v. Ambach, 838 F.2d 635, 640 (2d Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the statute’s goal of protecting
holding district court lacked authority to order placement at a school not approved by the state holding that a students private school tuition should be reimbursed where parent did not unilaterally place student in private school because the school district tacitly consented to the private school attendance before proposing a different placement holding that while a magistrate lacked the authority to enter an order granting a motion to correct error and thus that the order was defective for failing to contain the judges signature or another indication it was approved or adopted by the trial court the city waived any challenge to the validity of the order by failing to make a timely objection and observing that the indiana supreme court has long held that defects in the authority of a court officer as opposed to the jurisdiction of the trial court itself to enter a final order will be waived if not raised through a timely objection and more recently this court has applied the same principle to civil proceedings and clarified that any objection to the authority of an adjudicative officer must be raised at the first instance the irregularity occurs or at least within such time as the tribunal is able to remedy the defect holding that exhaustion was not required because the plaintiff had moved outside the school district and the administrative officer consequently lacked the authority to grant relief holding that this court lacked preliminary authority to review the district courts jurisdiction because there was no immediately appealable order before the court