fee, nor is a fee charged for a number of people in any one vehicle”; and (2) “[t]he fee is strictly a parking fee for the automobile to enter.” Id. at 523. The Georgia Court of Appeals has also examined this issue. In Majeske v. Jekyll Island State Park Auth., 209 Ga.App. 118, 433 S.E.2d 304 (1993), the court held that a per-vehicle fee, not based on the number of occupants, and not charged to individuals entering by means other than motorized vehicle, was not a “charge” sufficient to remove the Authority from the protection of Georgia’s Recreational Property Act. The court also determined that a re-entry fee did not transform what was strictly a parking fee into a “charge” for admission. Id. at 305-06; cf. Hogue v. Stone Mountain Mem’l Ass’n, 183 Ga.App. 378, 358 S.E.2d 852 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, in Garreans v. City of Omaha, 216
holding that a charge for the use of a public wharf was a user fee rather than a tax for constitutional purposes holding that allowing moderate use of the resources on the property was not inconsistent with exclusive use holding that whether the public invitee may have some commercial purpose in mind was irrelevant to recreational immunity instead by opening up the lands for recreational use without a fee the landowner brought itself under the protection of the immunity statute holding that the amendment was a use regulation which was in effect a condition on the use of property in the affected zone holding an initial four dollar fee allowing reentry during the course of the patrons stay permitted the use of a vehicle in the park and did not constitute a charge for the recreational use of the park