Under Iowa R.Civ.P. 88(d), promulgated long after McKeown, a jurisdictional defense is not waived simply because it was omitted in a pre-answer motion to dismiss. The federal rule, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3), is to the same effect. Under this rule, either the court or any party may raise an issue of subject-matter jurisdiction at any time, and the Eleventh Amendment is regarded, at least for this purpose, as going to subject-matter jurisdiction. See Raper v. State of Iowa, 940 F.Supp. 1421, 1426 (S.D.Iowa 1996), aff'd, 115 F.3d 623 (8th Cir.1997). In general, “a state official may waive the state’s immunity only where specifically authorized to do so by that state’s constitution, statutes, or decisions.” Santee Sioux Tribe of Nebraska v. State of Nebraska, 121 F.3d 427, 431 (8th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). See State v. Sorensen, 436 N.W.2d 358, 364
holding that a county is not an arm of the state for purposes of the eleventh amendment holding attorney general could not contract on behalf of the state to employ an assistant attorney beyond the attorney generals own term holding that for public policy reasons the mere filing of a bar complaint by a defendant against his attorney does not mandate removal of the attorney holding that there was no waiver where attorney general appeared in federal court answered a complaint responded to discovery and later moved to amend its answer to the complaint in order to raise states eleventh amendment immunity holding that the conduct of an assistant attorney general of nebraska in answering a complaint and filing a counterclaim did not amount to waiver of the eleventh amendment