crime.” Id. It is clear that Seesing understood the “carry” component, as he admitted having the weapon on his person. See United States v. Lopez, 100 F.3d 98, 101 (9th Cir.1996) (“[I]n order to convict a defendant under section 924(c) for ‘carrying’ a firearm ‘the defendant must have transported the firearm on or about his or her person.’ ” (quoting United States v. Hernandez, 80 F.3d 1253, 1258 (9th Cir.1996))). As for the second component, the district court erred in failing to state an element of the crime. As noted, the court asked Seesing, “[D]id you carry or use a firearm during drug trafficking?” The court left out the requirement that the use or carrying must be during “and in relation to” the drug trafficking. See United States v. Mendoza, 11 F.3d 126, 128-29 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the requirements of Rule
holding that the us supreme courts interpretation of 18 usc  924c in an earlier case was not an expression of a new rule because the court merely interpreted a substantive criminal statute using rules of statutory construction holding that second or subsequent in 18 usc  924c convey different meanings holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001 holding for the purposes of 18 usc  924e that being a felon in possession of a firearm is not a violent felony as defined in 18 usc  924e2b holding that in relation to is an element of 18 usc  924c