long ago concluded that evidence obtained as the product of an unreasonable search is not admissible in a criminal proceeding. Florida has long recognized the so-called ‘exclusionary rule’ regarding the inadmissibility of such evidence.” (citing Thurman v. State, 116 Fla. 426, 156 So. 484 (1934); Jackson v. State, 87 Fla. 262, 99 So. 548 (1924); Chacon v. State, 102 So.2d 578 (Fla.1958))). Extractions of bodily fluids, as occurred in this case, implicate essentially the same principles ap hat the consent was “not the .result of duress or coercion, express or implied.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248, 93 S.Ct. 2041. Voluntariness is a question of fac d when the police demand entry onto private premises. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948) (<HOLDING>). Further, consent has been determined to be
holding that because consent is not a statement and a request for consent is not an interrogation giving consent to search is a neutral fact which has no tendency to show that the suspect is guilty of any crime holding that persons knowledge of his right to refuse a consent to search is a factor but not a necessary prerequisite to demonstrating a voluntary consent holding there is no consent as a matter of law where the consent was given under coercion holding that the state must prove consent was voluntary not simply a submission to authority holding that when entry is demanded under color of office and consent is given in submission to authority rather than as an understanding and intentional waiver of a constitutional right consent is not voluntary