Appellant contends that the supplemental jury charge was unduly coercive because it gave the jurors the impression that deliberations could last indefinitely. We must review the instructions to a jury not “ ‘in artificial isolation, but ... in the context of the overall charge.’ ” United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 674, 95 S.Ct. 1903, 44 L.Ed.2d 489 (1975) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47, 94 S.Ct be coercive if it contained language urging the jurors to re-examine their own view but not to “surrender [their] honest conviction as to the weight or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of [their] fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.” Fioravanti, 412 F.2d at 420 n. 32; see also United States v. Alper, 449 F.2d 1223, 1234 (3d Cir.1971) (<HOLDING>); cf. also Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v.
holding that allen charge given by court was coercive and required a new trial holding that it is not holding that a supplemental jury charge was not unduly coercive because although it suggested jurors reexamine their views it told them not to surrender their honest convictions holding second modified allen charge coercive per se unless jury requests it holding that a statement that the jurors were not required to reach a verdict but should try to do so was not coercive