that charged in the indictment can constitute reversible error, a reversal is not mandated [when], as here, the charge as a whole limits the jury’s consideration to the specific manner of committing the crime alleged in the indictment. And indeed, in the case sub judice, the trial court instructed the jury that the State had the burden of proving every material allegation in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt, further instructed that the jury could only find the defendant guilty if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the offenses “as described in the indictment,” and sent the indictment out with the jury during its deliberations. Accordingly, these instructions, when considered in their entirety, cured any potential error pertaining t (4) (143 SE2d 730) (1965)
holding that the state felony offense of taking indecent liberties with a child categorically constituted a crime of violence for purposes of the career offender sentencing guidelines holding that statute making it a crime to take immoral improper or indecent liberties with a child or to commit lewd or lascivious act upon the body or any part or member thereof of such child does not violate due process because it fails to define the quoted language holding that a conviction for a lascivious act with a child in violation of iowa code  7098 was a crime of violence holding that the defendant did not need to have physically touched the victim in order to be convicted of taking indecent liberties with a child in violation of ncgs  142021a2 holding that taking indecent liberties with a child is not a lesser included offense of statutory rape given the differing age elements