the father’s death, and that his estate remains liable for such support. Appellant argues that if the legislature has seen fit to so provide by statute so far as illegitimate children are concerned, this Court should adopt the same philosophy so far as legitimate children are concerned. This argument, though grounded in reason, is not an argument to be presented to this court but would properly be the subject for legislation. As recognized by the appellant the law as found by the trial court is well established in Indiana. We hold the trial court did not err in finding that the responsibility for support of the minor child ceased upon the death of the parent. Id. at 197, 273 N.E.2d at 543; see also Estate of Brummett by Brummett v. Brummett, 472 N.E.2d 616, 617 n. 1 (Ind. Ct.App.1984) (<HOLDING>). Soon after McKamey, the legislature enacted a
holding that the evidence did not support a finding that the parents intentionally abandoned their child holding that in order to support a termination of parental rights based on prospective abuse it is necessary to show that the behavior of the parent was beyond the parents control likely to continue and placed the child at risk and citing as an example the parents mental illness holding that parents may not voluntarily terminate their rights in a child to avoid child support payments or contract away a child support obligation holding that custodial parents death does not terminate noncustodial parents child support obligations set forth in dissolution decree recognizing that at common law a parents liability to support his child terminated at the parents death the terms of the support order could not be enforced against his estate unless provisions allowing for such enforcement were included in the order