the use of estoppel to prevent the government from denying the benefit of PL-110 status if all of the elements can be proved. The district court did not err in concluding that it had jurisdiction to entertain the estoppel claim. We therefore conclude that the Does are not barred by the Tucker Act from proceeding on their constitutional, statutory or regulatory claims or their estoppel claim in the district court, so long as those claims are not based on the alleged contract, or any contract, between the CIA and the Does. Those claims that we have identified as being based on contract are not within the jurisdiction of the district court and must be dismissed. The district court may proceed with the remaining claims. See North Side Lumber Co. v. Block, 753 F.2d 1482, 1486 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). Ill Resolution of this case also requires us
holding that a breach of settlement claim should have been brought in the court of federal claims pursuant to the tucker act holding that the tucker act does not provide independent jurisdiction over claims for injunctive relief in contractual dispute cases holding that in the context of the federal tort claims act claims dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds are not dismissed for lack of jurisdiction but for the existence of a defense holding that contractual claim must be dismissed under the tucker act but other claims could go forward on remand holding that the claims court has no jurisdiction under the tucker act over claims to social security benefits