the parties not before the court, who have a direct stake in the litigation, are either unlikely or unable to assert their rights. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 1370, 113 L.Ed.2d 411, 425 (1991). Even if we assume the expiration of the narrow window of time to assert a single-subject challenge meets this test, standing to bring actions on behalf of third parties still requires the litigant to establish a personal injury or stake in the application of the challenged statute. Id. at 410-11, 111 S.Ct. at 1370-71, 113 L.Ed.2d at 425 (providing that to establish third-party standing, litigant must have suffered an “injury in fact” so as to give the litigant a sufficient concrete interest in the outcome of the dispute); ICLU v. Critelli, 244 N.W.2d 564, 567 (Iowa 1976) (<HOLDING>). This critical element is not eliminated in
holding the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment extends the right to jury trial to defendants in serious criminal cases in state courts holding iowa civil liberties union and lawyers lacked standing to maintain action to challenge a supervisory order of the court pertaining to the trial of criminal cases  only defendants in the criminal cases had standing holding that 60day time limit for notice of appeal in civil cases not 10day limit in criminal cases applies to  2255 proceedings holding that the workproduct doctrine applies in criminal cases because its role in assuring the proper functioning of the criminal justice system is even more vital than its role in civil cases holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue