(“In this instance, Cook’s filing of the petition 39 days after the Quitman County Democratic Executive Committee conducted the hearing on September 4, 2003 was not “forthwith” as required by the statute”) (emphasis added). ¶22. In Pearson, this Court deemed “forthwith” a petition filed thirteen days, nine working days, after the committee decision. 541 So.2d at 450. The committee never reached a decision in this case. Parker filed his petition for judicial review on June 22, 2005, fifteen days, eleven working days, after the last committee meeting on June 7, 2005, in which the contest was scheduled to be addressed. Filing within eleven working days is not a significant departure from the nine working days this Court found to be “forthwith” in Pearson. But see Turner, 193 So. at at 632 (<HOLDING>). In this case, the “forthwith” requirement is
holding that the filing of a petition twentysix days after the final executive committee action was stretching forthwith too far holding that california supreme courts denial of habeas petition becomes final thirty days after filing holding that utility customers mailing of a petition did not constitute the filing of the petition as filing was not effectuated until the petition was received by the clerk holding that the time limit for filing a petition for review of a final order of deportation is jurisdictional holding that petitioner was dili gent for equitable tolling purposes where petitioner filed state petition two months after conviction was final and filed federal petition seven days after discovering state had denied petition on the merits