criteria set forth in the statute are satisfied.). It, therefore, is especially unlikely the statute as representing an attempt by “Illinois ... to make, by means of a conclusive presumption, a goose into a duck, despite the fact that it does not walk, sound or look much like a duck”); In re Kleist, 114 B.R. 366, 369-70 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y.1990) (referring to the “rather broad language” of § 5205 and characterizing the statute as an example of “ ‘bootstrapping,’ that is, statutorily plac ing certain property under the control of the debtor within the protection ordinarily provided only to trusts possessing traditional spendthrift qualities”); see also In re Heilman, 241 B.R. 137, 162 (Bankr.D.Md.1999) (quoted supra p. 430, n. 6); cf. In re Marchiando, 13 F.3d 1111, 1116-17 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). But see In re Block, 121 B.R. 810, 813
holding general fiduciary duties of confidence trust loyalty and good faith insufficient to establish the necessary fiduciary relationship for purposes of  523a4 holding that an attorney is a fiduciary under section 523a4 holding that for purposes of  523a4 no fiduciary relationship existed between a lotteryticket vendor and the state notwithstanding a state statute declaring that proceeds from the sale of such tickets were held in trust holding a duty of care without more insufficient to satisfy the fiduciary relationship element of  523a4 the federal courts adopting this narrow interpretation of fiduciary for purposes of the bankruptcy code gen erally hold that an express or technical trust is necessary to trigger the defalcation provision of  523a4 holding that a statutorilyimposed fiduciary obligation created an express trust fiduciary relationship for purposes of  523a4