concerns, the only question under the FFDCA is whether the intended use of the product is to prevent disease, not whether the product actually prevents disease. See United States v. Article . . . Consisting of 216 Cartoned Bottles, 409 F.2d 734, 739 (2d Cir.1969) (“Regardless of the actual physical effect of a product, it will be deemed a drug for purposes of the Act where the labeling and promotional claims show intended uses that bring it within the drug definition.”) (footnote omitted); Finished Devices, 714 F.Supp. at 1165 (“[Wjhether a product is a device turns solely on the product’s intended use.”). Accordingly, this court has applied the FFDCA to instruments that do not actually prevent disease. See Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Richardson, 437 F.2d 214, 217 (9th Cir.1971) (<HOLDING>); Drown v. United States, 198 F.2d 999,
holding that the physician who included the cost of an intrauterine contraceptive device in the fee for his insertion of the device was a seller under the uniform commercial code holding that no proximate causation existed where a treating physician is well aware of the risks of a medical device independent of any warning by the manufacturer holding that the government is immune from liability for its choice of traffic protection devices holding that where evidence shows that federal funds were expended for installation for warning devices or signs at railroad crossing state law claims based on adequacy of those warning devices are preempted by the federal railroad safety act holding that a scientology emeter was a device even though the plaintiff admitted that the devices are ineffective for any medical therapeutic purpose