a blood test certificate issued pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-11 is “testimonial” under Crawford, and therefore triggers a defendant’s right to confrontation. Id. at 467, 915 A.2d 1081. Similarly, in State v. Kent, 391 N.J.Super. 352, 354-55, 918 A.2d 626 (App.Div.2007), we reaffirmed our holding in State v. Berezansky, 386 N.J.Super. 84, 94, 899 A.2d 306 (App.Div.2006), that a State Police chemist’s laboratory report is “testimonial” under Crawford, and thus cannot be used in lieu of presenting the testimony of the chemist who actually performed the test. These decisions have a common element triggering a defendant’s right of confrontation: the State’s use of a document created for the specific purpose of establishing an essential element of the offense. By contrast, the certifi y.2006) (<HOLDING>); State v. Fischer, 272 Neb. 963, 726 N.W.2d
holding that records of a criminal defendants previous convictions in state court are nontestimonial holding that driving records were nontestimonial holding that certified records of maintenance are nontestimonial and are not prepared for any particular defendant holding that certifications of a breathtest machine are nontestimonial because they are not prepared for any specific defendant or any specific litigation holding that warrants of deportation were properly characterized as nontestimonial official records that were prepared independent of this litigation and were not prepared to prove facts for use in future criminal prosecutions