(“The theoretical basis for the duress defense is excuse____[A]l though a defendant has the mental state [that] the crime requires, his conduct ... is excused or justified because he has ... avoided a harm of greater magnitude.”) (emphasis omitted), rev’d, 444 U.S. at 397, 100 S.Ct. 624; see also Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 5.3, at 614-15 (1986) (noting that duress does not negate mental state or volitional act, but instead justifies the intended criminal act). But cf. United States v. Mitchell, tion, Driving While Intoxicated: “Choice of Evils” Defense That Driving Was Necessary to Protect Life or Property, 64 A.L.R.4th 298 passim (1989) (discussing defense of necessity in DWI cases); but compare id. at § 1(a) (asserting legal distinc 985) (<HOLDING>); see also State v. Alexander, 24 Kan.App.2d
holding that delay while awaiting arrival of dwi enforcement officer even though officer who initiated the stop was qualified to perform dwi investigation was for legitimate law enforcement purposes because dwi officer brought greater expertise to scene and could complete dwi investigation more rapidly holding that a party who can show a significant risk of irreparable harm has demonstrated that the harm is not speculative recognizing that damages are speculative only if their existence is uncertain not if the amount itself is uncertain holding that delay while awaiting arrival of dwi enforcement officer was for legitimate law enforcement purposes because dwi officer was more experienced and could complete dwi investigation faster holding in dwi case that defense of competing harms was unavailable where threatened harm was only speculative and uncertain