106 S.Ct. 1431. The district court likewise did not wrongly limit counsel from repetitive cross-examination because any limitations on counsel’s ability to elicit cumulative testimony did not affect the jury’s ability to evaluate the credibility of witnesses. See United States v. Davis, 393 F.3d 540, 548 (5th Cir.2004). The district court also properly limited counsel’s use of argumentative questions, cf. United States v. Tansley, 986 F.2d 880, 886 (5th Cir.1993) (concluding that defendant’s rights were not infringed upon when the district court imposed limitations after cross-examination became redundant and argumentative) and permissibly set forth limitations on the subjects on which parties could question witnesses. Cf. United States v. Martinez, 151 F.3d 384, 389-90 (5th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Obregon has not shown that the
holding inter alia that common law claims were preempted holding that the constitutional right to crossexamination must be satisfied first before the court can exercise its discretion in limiting the scope or extent of crossexamination holding that inter alia employees criminal conviction for alleged tortious act demonstrated employee was not acting in scope of his employment holding that limitation on scope and breadth of crossexamination did not significantly curtail effectiveness of witness crossexamination because crossexamination was lengthy and extensive holding that court did not prejudice defendant by limiting his counsel to preestablished limitations on inter alia the scope of crossexamination