to falsely tell traffic offenders they are free to go, only for the purpose of eliciting their uncoerced agreement to search their automobiles.” Id. at ¶ 17. Therefore, we held that telling the defendant she was free to go, essentially eliminated the officer’s limited authority to act upon any objectively reasonable suspicions he may have previously developed. Id. We did not, however, discount the validity of the officer’s suspicions under the circumstances. [¶ 20.] The length of the investigative detention in this case was not unreasonable. The United States Supreme Court has specifically rejected any “hard- and-fast time limit” regarding Terry stops. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L.Ed.2d 605, 615 (1985). See also Foley, 206 F.3d at 806 (<HOLDING>). The investigating officer is not constrained
holding that a citation process that lasted around thirty minutes and during which the officer asked the defendant three questions about narcotics and weapons did not exceed the scope of the traffic stop holding duration of stop was reasonable as it lasted under thirty minutes holding that a traffic stop which lasted 105 minutes from the time of the initial stop until the defendant was arrested on drugrelated charges was unreasonable because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop for purposes of conducting a drug dog sniff because there was insufficient evidence that the defendant was engaged in drugrelated activity holding that a twominute delay beyond the conclusion of a traffic stop which itself lasted twelve to thirteen minutes was not unreasonable holding that the delay of approximately two minutes that occurred prior to the police officer developing reasonable suspicion to further investigate the defendants identity was de minimis and did not unreasonably extend the duration of the traffic stop