intended. We are unwilling to give our imprimatur to so large a loophole. We find further support for our initial impression in Casas Office Machines, Inc. v. Mita Copystar America, Inc., 42 F.3d 668 (1st Cir.1994). There, the plaintiff replaced fictitious defendants with named, non-diverse defendants after removal to federal court. Id. at 670. On appeal, we ruled that this substitution defeated diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 675. Of particular pertinence for present purposes, we rejected the plaintiffs absolutist interpretation of Freeport-McMoRan. See id. at 673-74. At least two other courts have taken a similar stance where, as here, a plaintiff has introduced a non-diverse defendant to an action by amending his or her complaint under Rule 15(a). See Alvarez, 213 F.3d at 995-96 (<HOLDING>); Ingram, 146 F.3d at 861-62 (similar); cf. 13B
holding that there was no federal subject matter jurisdiction under the private cause of action provision of the act holding that the information must establish that the court has jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties holding that a lack of a waiver of sovereign immunity deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction holding that because the contract dispute between the parties in this case constitutes a justiciable matter that is cognizable in our trial courts our courts had subject matter jurisdiction holding that the introduc tion of new parties destroyed the federal courts subject matter jurisdiction