The answer to that question turns, therefore, on whether the amendment is one affecting a substantive right or affecting only a procedure or remedy. If the former is the case, the 1995 amendment operates prospectively, because it is presumed to do so and there is no clear statement of legislative intent partment of Natural Resources, 92 Md.App. 659, 675, 610 A.2d 314 (1992). In our view, the 1995 amendment to F.L. § 5-1038 is not procedural. It did not specify or delineate the measures that must be taken by a party to a paternity action to seek revision of an enrolled paternity judgment. Indeed, the process for seeking revision of a paternity judgment is no different today than it was before F.L. § 5-1038 was amended. Compare Colgan v. Hammond, 58 Md.App. 120, 472 A.2d 497 (1984)(<HOLDING>). Rather, the amendment to F.L. § 5-1038(a)
holding that husband who was excluded from paternity of children and could not intervene in a paternity action to obtain custody would be able to bring an independent action per tql recognizing dual paternity where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of childs birth he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action holding that 1982 statutory amendment allowing certain blood test results to be used as affirmative evidence of paternity was procedural in nature did not affect parties substantive rights and therefore applied retrospectively to paternity action filed in 1981 holding presumption of paternity that applies to intact family prevented an order by the court for a blood test or the use of privately obtained blood test to rebut the presumption of legitimacy holding that although a putative father had standing to bring a paternity action the action could not proceed and the blood tests could not be ordered unless the trial court determined that the paternity action would serve the best interest of the child