event, not reasonably foreseeable, which completely breaks the connection between the defendant’s negligent act and the plaintiffs injury. An intervening cause breaks the chain of events so that the defendant’s original negligent act is not a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury in the slightest degree. Appellees’ App. at 47. The Estate did not object to these instructions. During closing arguments, the Defendants argued, without any objection from the Estate, that Dyer’s speed was the proximate cause of his death. We conclude that the Estate waived any argument that Dyer’s speed could not be an intervening or proximate cause of Dyer’s death by failing to object at trial. See, e.g., Estate of Hunt v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Henry County, 526 N.E.2d 1230, 1236 n. 5 (Ind.Ct.App.1988) (<HOLDING>), trans. denied; see also Ind. Trial Rule 51(C)
holding that the failure to object to an instruction constitutes a waiver of error holding that a party waived an allegation that an instruction was erroneous where the party failed to object at trial to the instruction on those grounds holding that the failure to object to a trial courts instruction constitutes waiver holding that unless an erroneous instruction was unlikely to have changed the result of the trial a reviewing court cannot say that giving the instruction was harmless error holding that party waived complaint regarding instruction where it did not raise specific objection