time, is all the more meritless. Plaintiff has misconstrued the effect of the Township’s continuing to pay her salary and other benefits during the time that the assessor position was vacant. This fact did not make the Township her employer. See, e.g., Orenic v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 127 Ill. 2d 453, 476, 537 N.E.2d 784, 795 (1989) (fact that a county pays salaries of nonjudicial employees in the judicial branch does not in constitutional or statutory terms make the county their employer); Drury v. County of McLean, 89 Ill. 2d 417, 425, 433 N.E.2d 666 (1982) (fact that counties pay salaries and expenses of circuit court clerks does not make the office of circuit court clerk a county office); Levin v. Civil Service Comm’n, 52 Ill. 2d 516, 521, 288 N.E.2d 97, 100 (1972) (<HOLDING>). In accordance with the applicable statutory
holding a county and a road district had standing to sue state highway commission and county tax collector based on their interest in and control over the public roads of the county holding that notwithstanding language of statute authorizing appointment of a county architect by the board of commissioners of cook county such appointee is not an officer where he has no stated salary but is employed on a commission basis and where his work is generally casual and not continuous even though he is frequently referred to in the records of the county board as an officer holding that plaintiffs had a particularized need for cook county jail prebudget documents after observing that the plaintiffs theory is that the county allegedly approved the dental services budget despite knowing that it might create unconstitutional conditions at the jail accordingly  the countys deliberative process is directly at issue in this case holding that public employees working for the office of cook county assessor and receiving their compensation from cook county had no vested right in the expectation of the continuance of this compensation holding that both saline county and grant county had jurisdiction to try the appellant for murder where the actual killing occurred in one county but the acts requisite to the consummation of the murder and the subsequent disposal of the body occurred in the other county