of course, insufficient to create an Article III case or controversy where none exists on the merits of the underlying claim” (citing Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 70-71, 106 S.Ct. 1697, 90 L.Ed.2d 48 (1986))); Swan v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 20, 22-23 (1990) (appellant must have standing to pursue appeal); Mokal v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 12, 13 (1990) (Court adopted jurisdictional restrictions of Article III ease- or-controversy rubric). Although Mrs. Padgett is without standing to seek an EAJA award in her own capacity because she has been substituted for her husband for the purposes of this EAJA application, the Court will continue its inquiry into whether she is entitled to EAJA fees and expenses on his behalf as the personal representative of his estate. See Cohen, 8 Vet.App. at 7 (<HOLDING>). C. Substantial Justification Because Mrs.
holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees holding that payment of eaja fees directly to the attorney also is consistent with the broad purpose for enacting the eaja  if the commissioners narrow position was adopted there would be a substantial risk that counsel for a successful plaintiff might not be paid which would have a chilling effect on the willingness of attorneys to represent indigent claimants in social security cases thus thwarting the primary purpose the eaja was enacted holding that a cause of action based on eaja will be deemed to have survived the death of the aggrieved party and  the personal representative of the deceased partys estate or any other appropriate person may be substituted as the prevailing party to whom payment of an eaja award may be made holding that a remand due to an intervening court decision did not render the appellant a prevailing party for eaja purposes holding that incurred within the meaning of the eaja requires an express or implied arrangement that the fee will be paid over to a legal representative