had “not satisfied] the second prong of the Strickland test by demonstrating prejudice” since he “merely allege[d] that he would have gone to trial if he received adequate advise [sic ]” and had “not established any likelihood or even a reasonable possibility that he would have been acquitted following trial .... [g]iven the strength of the People’s case----” Id. at 4." Even assuming that Petitioner’s trial counsel engaged in conduct that was deficient under Padilla such that the trial court’s conclusion that Petitioner failed to satisfy the first Strickland prong was contrary to, or reflected an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, Petitioner’s claim nonetheless fails because he has not demonstrated prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (<HOLDING>). “To determine whether the decision to proceed
holding that the fact that an ineffectiveness claim is raised and adjudicated on direct appeal will not procedurally bar an ineffectiveness claim in a proceeding under 28 usc  2255 where new reasons are advanced in support of that claim holding that if it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice which we expect will often be so that course should be followed holding that an issue must be presented to the lower court and the specific legal argument or ground to be argued on appeal must be part of that presentation if it is to be considered preserved holding that if there is only one construction that will permit all parts of the deed to be given effect it should be followed holding that the appellate standard of review of ineffectiveness claim is de novo