2004 judgment was rendered. This is a direct attack. See id. We recognize the existence of case law indicating that a collateral attack is any proceeding to avoid the effect of a judgment that does not meet all the requirements of a valid direct attack. See, e.g., Texas Dep’t of Tramp, v. T. Brown Constructors, Inc., 947 S.W.2d 655, 657-59 (Tex.App.-Austin 1997, pet. denied) (construing bill of review as collateral attack because it failed to meet all requirements of valid direct attack); Glunz v. Hernandez, 908 S.W.2d 253, 256-57 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1995, writ denied) (construing as collateral attack a lawsuit alleging coui't entered default judgment after expiration of plenary power); Outlaw v. Noland, 506 S.W.2d 734, 735 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). However, such an approach runs counter to the
holding that a state court criminal judgment is final for purposes of collateral attack in federal court at the conclusion of review in the united states supreme court or when the time for seeking certiorari review expires holding that bill of review brought in wrong court constitutes collateral attack recognizing bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over such a collateral attack holding that bill of review is exclusive remedy on direct attack where court had jurisdictional power even if judgment void recognizing collateral attack on void order