presumption of correctness. See, e.g., Leith v. Pope, 2 Black. W. 1327, 1328, 96 Eng. Rep. 777, 778 (C.P.1779) (“[I]n cases of tort the Court will not interpose on,account of the largeness of damages, unless they are so flagrantly exces sive as to afford an internal evidence of the prejudice and partiality of the jury”). At-some point, however, when the facts indicated that the presumption of correctness waned and was finally overcome, common law judges used remittitur to reduce unreasonable awards that resulted from the passion or prejudice of the jury. Numerous English cases upheld the power of common law courts to order a new trial if the judges deemed the punitive damages unreasonable. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Burtenshaw, 1 Cowper 230, 98 Eng. Rep. 1059 (K.B.1774) (Mansfield, J.) (<HOLDING>). American courts adopted the same procedure.
holding that explanations of arbitration awards are not required holding a circuit courts authority to grant a new trial is so necessary to the judicial process and so essential to fair trials that its existence is a necessary incident to the exercise of judicial power by the circuit court holding that judicial review of arbitration awards is narrow in scope recognizing such a ground for judicial review of arbitration awards in this circuit recognizing judicial power to grant new trial when jury awards of damages are excessive