to this general rule, however, where the defendant has a “special relationship with either the dangerous person or the potential victim.” Shepard, 390 N.W.2d at 241; see also Welke, 375 N.W.2d at 405; Duvall, 362 N.W.2d at 278. In addition to a special relationship, whether a duty exists also depends upon “the foreseeability that the actor’s conduct would create a risk of harm to the victim.” Duvall, 362 N.W.2d at 278. In Shepard, for example, a physician failed to diagnose a woman’s spinal meningitis, and she subsequently passed it on to her infant son, Eric, who died two days later. The defendant hospital argued that it owed no duty to Eric because he was never a patient. The court held that a physician-patient relationship is a special relationship that may gi 1, 489 (1983) (<HOLDING>). In this case, it is undisputed that there was
holding that psychiatrist had duty to protect individuals endangered by his epileptic patient holding that a psychiatrist had no duty to detain a patient who killed himself and injured his wife because the patient was outside of the scope of the facilitys range of observation and control even when the psychiatrist agreed to treat the patient the patient had suicidal tendencies and the psychologist took the patient into custody but then later permitted him to leave holding that when a psychiatrist determines or  should determine that a patient poses a serious threat of danger to a third party the psychiatrist has a duty of reasonable care to that party holding that a psychiatrist owed a duty to a person foreseeably injured by his patient holding law enforcement owed duty similar to that owed by dshs under rcw 2644050