by showing that Kom-pan’s trade dress is functional. As noted above, a showing of likelihood of success also creates a presumption of irreparable harm. PSI has done nothing to rebut this presumption, so Kompan is entitled to injunctive relief on its trade dress claim. III. False Advertising Claim Kompan also claims that PSI violates the Lanham Act by false advertising. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act protects against two distinct wrongs: false designation of origin and false description or representation (false advertising). 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) and (B) ; Agee v. Paramount Communications, 858 F.Supp. 778, 790 (S.D.N.Y.1994), aff'd in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 59 F.3d 317 (2d Cir.1995); cf. Forschner Group, v. Arrow Trading Co., 30 F.3d 348, 357, 360 (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Kompan blurs the line between these two
holding that section 43a of the lanham act protects trade dress holding in a false advertising case under the lanham act that a proposed disclaimer would not suffice to cure the misleadingness of an advertising claim holding that defendants use of the phrase swiss army knife did not constitute false advertising under section 43a of the lanham act but remanding to consider whether among other things use of the same phrase constituted false designation of origin holding that defendants statement that it owned the rights to a trademark did not give rise to a false advertising claim under the lanham act holding that both lanham act false advertising claim and a false advertising claim made under section 349 or section 350 require a showing that the advertisement was false or misleading