We discussed this point above, so we need not address it extensively here. As explained, there is evidence that each of the individual defendants acted with malice and that three of the individual defendants committed fraud, In sum, only one of the five reprehensibility factors is present in this case. We believe the fact that only Campbell’s fifth factor (harm resulting from intentional malice, trickery, or deceit) is present demands the conclusion that the exemplary damages award remains excessive despite the court of appeals’ suggested remittitur. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425, 123 S.Ct. 1513 (refusing to adopt a bright-line rule but noting that “four times the amount of compensatory damages might be close to the line of constitutional impropriety”); Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 308-10 (<HOLDING>). 2. Disparity Between Compensatory and
holding factor b is not unconstitutionally vague holding that the public interest factor was not implicated in a noncompete case because the specific action at issue would not help or harm the public and the public interest factor is generally considered within the confines of disputes involving governmental agencies or programs rather than in the adjudication of private controversies holding that provision in wrongful death act that allowed parents to recover exemplary damages was invalid under art 16  26 since legislature could not enlarge on exemplary damages holding that a 4331 ratio was unconstitutionally excessive where only the fifth reprehensibility factor was present and explaining that pjushing exemplary damages to the absolute constitutional limit in a case like this eg purely economic harm leaves no room for punishment in cases involving death grievous physical injury financial ruin or actions that endanger a large segment of the public holding the death penalty excessive punishment for the crime of rape