(explaining that Section 1 of the Sherman Act “does not purport to cover a conspiracy which consists merely in the fact that the officers of the single defendant corporation did their day to day jobs in formulating and carrying out its managerial policy”). To hold otherwise would render Section 2 of the Act meaningless. See Hartley, 678 F.2d at 971. In Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir.1972), the Seventh Circuit extended the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to § 1985 claims. The Dombrowski court held that when two executives of the same firm make a decision to discriminate in furtherance of the purpose of the busi ness, that decision cannot be called a conspiracy for purposes of § 1985(3). Id. at 196. See also Hartman v. Board of Trustees, 4 F.3d 465, 469-70 (7th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Travis v. Gary Community Mental Health Ctr.,
holding that harm purely motivated by wealth is not persecution holding that public speech motivated by personal displeasure with policies was not covered by the first amendment holding that extortion motivated in part by political opinion could qualify as persecution holding the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine is not avoided in  19853 claims by a showing that corporate employees were motivated in part by personal bias holding that even if the court were to apply the apex doctrine the doctrine would not preclude the deposition of two corporate executives in that case