that the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” Id. at 536, 571 S.E.2d at 59. Defendant first argues that N.C.G.S. § 20-38.6(a) infringes on the right of a person charged with an implied-consent offense in district court to exercise his or her fundamental right to a fair trial, since it requires that such defendants move to suppress evidence' or dismiss charges pretrial without the benefit of any statutory right to pretrial discovery. We disagree. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the fundamental right to a fair trial is “the most fundamental of all freedoms.” See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540, 14 L. Ed. 2d 543, 549, reh’g denied, 382 U.S. 875, 15 L. Ed. 2d 118 (1965); see also State v. White, 331 N.C. 604, 616, 419 S.E.2d 557, 564 (1992) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 936, 136 L. Ed. 2d 229
recognizing a fundamental right to marry holding right to be fundamental holding that the right to vote is fundamental holding that the right to drive is not a fundamental right recognizing that a criminal defendants right to a fair trial is fundamental