to allege that she was ever diagnosed with a chronic mental or emotional disorder, that she was ever hospitalized, or that Plaintiff was otherwise debilitated as a result of Bess’ alleged behavior. In spite of Plaintiffs reaction to Bess’ behavior, “[a]bsent an allegation that [Plaintiff] suffered an emotional or mental disorder that was severe or disabling, [her] claim must be dismissed.” See Lemay, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114086, at *9, 2012 WL 3524838, at *3 (citing Waddle v. Sparks, 331 N.C. 73, 414 S.E.2d 22, 27-28 (1992)). In light of the court’s recommendation allowing Defendants’ motion to dismiss the IIED claims against Clemons and Bess, the court further recommends allowing Defendants’ motion to dismiss with regards to their employer LipoScience. See Guthrie, 567 S.E.2d at 410 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the court recommends that
holding that a promissory estoppel claim failed where the plaintiff provided no evidence that the employer defendant did not follow the employment manuals requirements holding that jurys verdict for the defendant in a breach of contract action did not establish the absence of breach because the jury was instructed that it could find for the defendant if it concluded that the defendant had not breached the contract or if the defendant proved an affirmative defense holding that the plaintiff stated a claim for tortious interference holding that having concluded that defendant individual did not engage in the alleged tortious behavior we necessarily conclude that plaintiff has no claim against defendant employer holding that a civil rights plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under fmla against individual individual is not employer subject to liability under the act