to admit that he had committed robbery with a deadly weapon, which would have qualified the D.C. robbery offense as a crime of violence under the Maryland predecessor statute to CL section 14-101. The State points out that here, in contrast to Bowman, Scott agreed to facts proffered by the government that would constitute a crime of violence under CL section 14-101(a)(19). It maintains that Scott’s agreement, without reservation, to these facts was sufficient for the sentencing court to infer that he had an intent to cause serious physical injury. A factfinder “may infer the necessary intent from an individual’s conduct and the surrounding circumstances[.]” Chilcoat v. State, 155 Md.App. 394, 403, 843 A.2d 240 (2004). See also In re Lavar D., 189 Md.App. 526, 590, 985 A.2d 102 (2009) (<HOLDING>). As such, the facts underlying Scott’s D.C.
holding that torture occurs when the victim is subjected to serious physical abuse before death that serious sexual abuse may constitute serious physical abuse that facts supporting a finding of torture will also support a finding of depravity of mind and that the age of the victim may be considered in determining whether the evidence shows depravity of mind holding purposely inflicts  serious injury and intended to cause serious injury convey the same specific intent such that it is impossible to commit one without the other holding that the court as the factfinder was permitted to draw the inference that a group of juveniles intended to inflict serious physical injury by repeatedly hitting punching and kicking the victim holding that begay rejected that circuits earlier approach under which an offense presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another if the offense conduct had the potential for serious physical injury to another holding that noncompetitors injury was an antitrust injury as it was inextricably intertwined with the injury the conspirators sought to inflict