inadequate notice of the requirement to reimburse the costs of his defense and no opportunity to be heard. Dudley’s notice claim focuses on the period before he was appointed counsel. He claims he should have been told prior to his acceptance of court-appointed counsel that he would be required to repay the costs of his defense. We conclude Dudley had notice of this responsibility because a defendant’s repayment obligation was a matter of public record at the time counsel was appointed to represent him. See Iowa Code § 815.9(3) (“If a person is granted an appointed attorney, the person shall be required to reimburse the state for the total cost of legal assistance provided to the person.”); see also People v. Bramlett, 118 Ill.App.3d 1056, 74 Ill.Dec. 468, 455 N.E.2d 1092, 1094 (1983) (<HOLDING>), superseded by statute on other grounds as
holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute not of challenge to statute itself recognizing that this courts construction of a statute becomes as much apart of the statute as the words of the statute itself and that change is a matter that addresses itself to the general assembly not this court holding that health care liability claimants failure to include authorization form with notice precluded claimants from availing themselves of statutory tolling provision because statute provided that notice must be accompanied by the authorization form recognizing that the applicant received notice from the plea form even though such notice was not required holding recoupment statute itself served as a form of notice