the time limitation provided in subdivision (d)(1) unless it alleges that (A) the facts on which the claim is predicated were unknown to the movant or the movant’s attorney and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence, or (B) the fundamental constitutional right asserted was not established within the pe riod provided for in subdivision (d)(1) and has been held to apply retroactively, or (C) postconviction counsel, through neglect, failed to file the motion. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2). 2 . Neither argument is presented with great clarity. However, Sweet presents absolutely no argument or citation of authority in support of his due process claim. Thus, we decline to address it. See Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1573 n. 6 (11th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the state argues that Sweet failed
holding that issues not argued on appeal are deemed abandoned holding that issues are deemed abandoned when the brief only makes a passing references to an issue holding that issues not argued on appeal are deemed waived and that a passing reference to an issue in a brief was insuffiment to properly raise that issue holding that issues not argued in initial brief are deemed waived holding that failure to raise issue in brief constitutes waiver of appeal of the issue