that Mumford was injured in the scope and course of her employment with Interplast. As we have already discussed, acts committed after working hours are generally outside of the scope of employment. See Biddle, 43 Ohio App. at 8-9, 182 N.E. at 601-602; Knecht, 14 Ohio App.3d at 132, 14 OBR at 147-148, 470 N.E.2d at 233. There is nothing on the face of the complaint to suggest that Mumford acted within the scope of her employment when she was injured. In fact, Mumford was injured in an automobile accident while driving from Interplast hours after her work shift had ended. Based upon the face of the complaint, Mumford’s travel from her place of employment was not related to her employer’s business. Cf. Faber v. Metalweld, Inc. (1992), 89 Ohio App.3d 794, 797, 627 N.E.2d 642, 643-644 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Mumford was not injured within
holding that glc 152 15 provides that the only party immune from suit under the statute is the direct employer a special employer is not immune because the special employer is not liable for the payment of workers compensation and there was no agreement between the direct employer and the special employer that the special employer would be liable for the payment of such compensation holding employees negligence claim against his employer was preempted by the lmra holding that a change in employer from one federal contractor to another caused employees no lack of work holding that employer is not vicariously hable for employees negligence while driving to work where such driving conferred no special benefit upon employer other than to make employees services available holding that employee was consumer of medical insurance purchased by employer for employees benefit