element required for imposition of the harsher sentence. Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, supra. In addition, where jeopardy attaches and has not terminated, considerations of double jeopardy are not implicated. Id. at 106. Consequently, we conclude that the violation of G. L. c. 278, § 11 A, that took place in this proceeding did not subject the defendant to double jeopardy. See Commonwealth v. Zuzick, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 71, 75 (1998) (denying dismissal of subsequent offense portion of complaint on double jeopardy grounds where judge, after primary conviction, sentenced defendant as repeat offender without trial on subsequent offense); Commonwealth v. Owen, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 711, 714 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1001 (2005), citing Commonwealth v. Miranda, 441 Mass. 783, 789 n.9 (2004) (<HOLDING>). Procedural errors at the sentencing stage do
holding that the dismissal of an indictment before trial and institution of a superseding indictment does not trigger double jeopardy holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense recognizing double jeopardy bar is inapplicable where a variance between indictment and proof necessitated prosecution under a new indictment holding that the government may appeal trial courts dismissal of count in indictment because of prejudice caused by preindictment delay without violating double jeopardy principles holding that trial on second indictment alleging repeat offender count separate from indictment on primary offense for which defendant was convicted did not offend principles of double jeopardy