not violate the injunction. The injunction had an exception. The FmHA could “take the necessary steps to protect the secured property,” “where the borrower has totally abandoned [the] secured property and that property is at substantial risk of irreparable injury.” Coleman, 580 F.Supp. at 211. The Loves had abandoned the pigs and machinery, those chattels were in danger of irreparable injury, and the FmHA agents did what was necessary to protect the FmHA’s security interest in the chattels. Therefore, the FmHA agents acted properly under the exception to the Coleman injunction. Because we find the Coleman injunction was not violated, we do not reach the Loves’ contention that the injunction proclaimed clearly established federal law. Cf. McBride v. Taylor, 924 F.2d 386 (1st Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). C. CONCLUSION The Loves have not shown the
holding coleman injunction is not clearly established law holding that clearly established law is construed as supreme court or tenth circuit decisions on point or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts holding that retaliatory discharge is a clearly established first amendment violation holding that the injunction did not constitute a claim holding that second element of qualified immunity test is whether the law violated was clearly established