analogous to the kind of government overreaching proscribed by the doctrine of sentencing factor manipulation that has been described as a “kissing cousin of the doctrine of entrapment.” United States v. Gibbens, 25 F.3d 28, 30 (1st Cir.1994). The doctrine of sentencing factor manipulation prevents the government from “improperly enlarging] the scope or scale of the crime” in order to increase a defendant’s sentence. United States v. Montoya, 62 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1995); see also United States v. Connell, 960 F.2d 191, 194 (1st Cir.1992) (coining the term “sentencing factor manipulation”). Although the doctrine developed in the context of the sentencing guidelines, it also has been applied to conduct that manipulates mandatory minimum sentences imposed by statute. Montoya, 62 F.3d at 3 (<HOLDING>). Unlike entrapment, which requires evidence of
holding the use of a drug that carries a higher sentence rather than another drug does not amount to sentencing factor manipulation holding that cr 60b applies to criminal as well as civil judgments holding that it is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy spacious as well as clean wellbalanced as well as carefully patrolled holding that sentence factor manipulation applies to statutory minimums as well as to the guidelines holding that  3553a did not permit courts to sentence below the statutory minimums in 21 usc  841b