or RFRA. The Government further argues that “incorporation’s basic purpose is to create a distinct legal entity, with legal rights, obligations, powers, and privileges different from those of the natural individuals who created it, who own it, or whom it employs.” Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 12-6744, 917 F.Supp.2d 394, 408-09, 2013 WL 140110, at *8 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 11, 2013) (citing Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163, 121 S.Ct. 2087, 150 L.Ed.2d 198 (2001)). As a number of courts have pointed out, however, the question of whether for-profit corporations possess free exercise rights is unresolved. Tyndale House, 904 F.Supp.2d at 118-19 (citing First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777-78 n. 14, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978) (<HOLDING>)); Stormans, 586 F.3d at 1119 (quotation
recognizing that corporations have first amendment speech rights but declining to address the abstract question whether corporations have the full measure of rights that individuals enjoy under the first amendment holding that a complete ban on contributions to federal candidates by corporations may consistent with the first amendment be applied to nonprofit advocacy corporations holding that federal employee could not sue supervisors for discharge alleged to have violated her first amendment rights holding that if the speech in question does not address a matter of public concern there is no first amendment violation recognizing first amendment retaliation right