of law”). Here, a determination of whether Michael committed the acts alleged by Angel would be derived from the evidence, not from applying any rule of law; thus, such a determination would be a finding of fact. Whether the facts found by the court constitute domestic abuse would require the application of law and, thus, would be a conclusion of law. We now examine whether the trial court’s ruling contains such findings of fact and conclusions of law. Michael relies on the court’s statement in its order that the court “finds from the evidence ... that [the domestic abuse action] shall be and the same is hereby dismissed .... ” We think this statement is insufficient to qualify as a finding of fact or a conclusion of law. See State v. Kingman, 77 Wash.2d 551, 463 P.2d 638, 639 (1970) (<HOLDING>); cf. Palmer v. First Minneapolis Trust Co.,
holding that a district court order denying anonymity to the parties is a collateral order holding trial court order denying states petition for an order of public use and necessity for good cause appearing did not constitute a finding of fact or a conclusion of law holding that the trial courts conclusion regarding an easement of necessity was clearly erroneous holding that the oral rendition of an order in open court does not constitute entry of that order holding that the appellants claim that the circuit court improperly adopted the states proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in an order denying the appellants postconviction petition was not preserved for review because the appellant never objected to the circuit courts order