stresses the PCRA court’s conclusion that the report was replete with “ ‘red flags’ of brain damage that indicated the need for neurop[sy]chological evaluations.” Sattazahn, No. 2194-89, slip op. at 45; accord N.T., January 20, 2005, at 185 (testimony of a clinical psychologist confirming that “there were a lot of red flags of brain damage in this case”). Appellee acknowledges the Commonwealth’s position that the record was not provided in response to a subpoena secured by trial counsel; however, he observes that it was otherwise available in court records from the Schuylkill County third-degree murder conviction, which the Commonwealth used to support an aggravating circumstance. See generally Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 389-90, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 2467, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Appellee emphasizes that the PCRA
holding that a prior conviction is not final and cannot be used to deny appellant community supervision in the primary offense if appellant still has time to file a motion for new trial in the prior conviction case holding that defendants have a federal constitutional right to make a collateral attack on a prior conviction only when that conviction was obtained without the assistance of counsel holding that where defendant failed to object to facts in psi relating to prior conviction the failure to object constituted an admission holding that where the prosecution gives notice that it will rely in aggravation on facts relating to a prior conviction capital defense counsel has an obligation to make a reasonable effort to review the court file pertaining to that conviction holding that for sentencing purposes the government does not need to allege a defendants prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact is not an element of the present crime