discrimination. S.Rep. No. 417 at 27-28 n. 109, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 177, 205-06. Contrary to the two judges’ assertion, the terms “racial bias,” “intent,” and “invidious discrimination” do not appear anywhere explicitly or implicitly in the text of section 2. Had Congress meant to require an inquiry into the racial bias of the voting community, it certainly would have recorded that intent more fully in the language of the amended statute. It did not. The two judges’ intimation that our interpretation might render section 2 unconstitutional is also groundless. As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court never applied the Fifteenth Amendment and its implementing legislation to activities of private individuals. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 23 L.Ed. 588 (1876) (<HOLDING>); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 339, 25 L.Ed. 676
holding that fourteenth amendment only applies to state action holding that the fourteenth amendment protects property interests however only from a deprivation by state action holding the sixth amendment right to a jury trial applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment holding that while the fourteenth amendment is directed against state action and not private action the state action requirement is met in a civil action where state law is applied whether by statute or common law holding that the second amendment fully applies to state and local regulation through the fourteenth amendment