the limited and often insufficient— financial resources of prisons, I believe it to be rash and imprudent to hold at this time, without much more information about prison security concerns, that Doe has a constitutional right to privacy in his HIV-positive status, any more than he has a constitutional right of privacy in his cell. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-26, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984). I recognize, of course, that the rationale of Hudson, analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, dealt with the lack of privacy an inmate has in his cell accommodation, whereas here our attention is drawn to rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and the “penumbras” of rights encompassing privacy. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965) (<HOLDING>). However, certainly Doe’s expectation of
holding that by articulating a specific prohibition against unreasonable invasions of privacy the people of south carolina have indicated a higher level of privacy protection than the federal constitution recognizing the right of persons to privacy in their personal    pursuits which ought to be protected unless specific information is needed to review the action of a government officer holding that while an individual has a right to possess obscene material in the privacy of his home there is no corresponding privacy right to purchase such material holding that specific guarantees in the bill of rights have penumbras one of which is the right of privacy holding that even where the underlying complaint made no mention of the right of privacy a violation of privacy  is implicit in a tcpa faxad claim