it is not excessive and does not work as an affirmative disability or restraint for ex post facto purposes. Williams, 574 Pa. at 507, 832 A.2d at 973-74 (“Such liberty is, of course, tempered by the reality that registrants deemed sexually violent predators [with respect to the statute commonly known as Megan’s Law, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9791-9799.9] may, as a consequence of public notification, be foreclosed from certain employment positions, particularly working with children. But any such restriction is in direct furtherance of the government’s compelling interest in keeping sexually violent predators away from children to the extent possible.”). Regarding the second factor, such an employment ban has not been historically regarded as punishment. See De Veau, 363 U.S. at 160, 80 S.Ct. 1146 (<HOLDING>); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 196, 18
holding that the jury is not to consider the potential punishment which could result from a conviction holding prison officials ultimately violated the plaintiffs right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment holding that forbidding felons from working as union officials is not punishment holding that one who is precluded from working a narrow range of jobs is not disabled holding that prohibiting felons from practicing medicine is not punishment