the court house would be a profound miscarriage of justice. Id. Thus, in accordance with the legislative history, case law, and North Carolina public policy, the Court finds that the North Carolina Legislative did not intend the statute of repose clause in § 1-52(16) to refer to latent diseases. Instead, latent diseases are only governed by the statute of limitations in § 1-52(16), giving plaintiffs three years to file from when they should have reasonably have discovered the existence and cause of their illnesses. Constitutionality of § 1-52(16) To interpret § l-52(16)’s statute of repose as applying to latent diseases would likely render the statute unconstitutional under the North Carolina’s Constitution’s art. I, § 18, known as the “open courts” provision. Th 5, 464 A.2d 288 (1983) (<HOLDING>); Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416
holding the twoyear period for filing a particular tort action such as assault and battery controls over the more general threeyear statute of limitations for tort actions holding that connecticuts threeyear limitations period for tort suits set forth in conn genstat  52577 is the appropriate limitations period for civil rights actions under  1983 holding 12year period of repose and threeyear period of limitations contained in statute operated to eliminate a cause of action before wrong could reasonably be discovered were unconstitutional in consolidated product liability actions holding that threeyear statute of limitations was not an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus holding that in connecticut the general threeyear personal injury statute of limitations period set forth in connecticut general statutes  52577 is the appropriate limitations period for civil rights actions asserted under 42 usc  1983