and commercial” law that does not “more than incidentally impact lending operations,” pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(c)(1). The breach of contract claim, as opposed to the statutory claims asserted under NYRPL § 249-a or NYRPAPL § 1921, does not seek to impose specific substantive requirements upon the operations of defendants, apart from compliance with specific contractual obligations. It cannot be fairly said that the common law claim for breach of contract, which merely seeks to make defendants live up to the word of their agreements they sign with their customers, “more than incidentally affects” lending operations. The claim is therefore not preempted, pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(c)(1). See, e.g., Davis v. Chase Bank U.S.A., N.A, 650 F.Supp.2d 1073, 1086 (C.D.Cal.2009) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis in original); see also Nava v.
holding breach of contract claim not preempted noting that such a claim would have at most an incidental effect on the exercise of chases lending powers  such a claim does not seek to force chase to set its contracts in a certain way but rather merely to adhere to the contracts it does create holding that at will contracts of employment are subject to tortious interference with contracts claims holding that a breach of contract claim was properly dismissed where plaintiff did not identify the contracts allegedly breached holding that an incidental beneficiary does not have standing to sue for breach of a contract holding that if  506 does not apply to an allowed claim such claim cannot become a secured claim