manifested its intent to preempt 18 U.S.C. § 1001 by imposing misdemeanor penalties for violations of 16 U.S.C. § 1857(1)(I), in contrast to the felony penalties associated with 18 U.S.C. § 1001. As this court has held, however, the fact that Congress has passed a specific statute with lenient penalties does not indicate that Congress intended to preempt a more general but more severe statute that would apply to the same offense. See Anderez, 661 F.2d at 407 (citations omitted). Furthermore, appellants fail to consider a crucial difference between 16 U.S.C. § 1857(1)(I) and 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Section 1857(1)(I) does not mention materiality and thus imposes no materiality requirement upon the government, cf. United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 117 S.Ct. 921, 927, 137 L.Ed.2d 107 (1997) (<HOLDING>), while § 1001 does have an explicit
holding that materiality necessary element of section 1001 holding that materiality does not require a showing that the creditors were prejudiced by the false statement holding that unlike  1001  1542 does not have a materiality requirement holding that the fca includes a materiality requirement holding that 18 usc  1014 has no materiality requirement because the statute does not so much as mention materiality