final. Id. at 724 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. at 2438 n. 6. In that event, an injured harbor worker who, having already received benefits under the state law, sought benefits under the LHWCA, would be denied the right to the federal statute’s benefits. The court suggested that such a conflict might justify preemption of the state law’s exclusivity provision. Id. In BIW III, Judge Gignoux applied Sun Ship to a third-party claim not involving a vessel owner, and therefore not involving section 5(b) of the LHWCA. The only possible conflict in that case was between the state law bar against third-party actions and the federal law permission of such actions under Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 460 U.S. 190, 103 S.Ct. 1033, 74 L.Ed.2d 911 (1983). See BIW II, supra, 589 F.Supp. at 1571 (<HOLDING>). The underlying claims did not derive from the
holding that reasoning of in re bradley applies to section 401 holding that lockheed reasoning applies to permit thirdparty actions under the lhwca holding that the value of meals and lodging that are tax exempt under  119 is excluded from wages under the lhwca holding that the statute applies also to malicious prosecution actions holding that the state law of collateral estoppel applies in civil rights actions brought under 42 usc  1983