was beyond the scope of the proceedings before the superior court. CONCLUSION We hold that 1-776 embraced a single subject and expressed that subject in its title, that 1-776 did not “substantially impair” King County’s contractual obligations to its bondholders, and that the additional constitutional claims that the superior court did not reach were unavailing. We therefore reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and remand the matter for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Salish’s request for attorney fees at trial and on appeal is denied. Alexander, C.J., and Johnson, Madsen, Sanders, and Fairhurst, JJ., concur. 1 Regarding the prior license tab initiative, see Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wn.2d 183, 256, 11 P.3d 762, 27 P.3d 608 (2000) (<HOLDING>). 2 The original plaintiffs (now respondents
holding that one agreement cannot be taken to be several agreements and therefore several conspiracies because the agreement envisages the violation of several statutes rather than one holding that the official proponents of an initiative measure are recognized as having a distinct role  involving both authority and responsibilities that differ from other supporters of the measure recognizing that where liability is joint and several among multiple parties complete relief may be granted with respect to any one of them holding that initiative measure 695 violated several state constitutional provisions among them the requirement that a bill embrace no more than one subject holding that it was plain error for trial court to allow more than one conviction of grossly negligent operation of a vehicle where more than one person was injured