464, 27 P.3d 456; State v. Meadors, 121 N.M. 38, 42, 908 P.2d 731, 735 (1995); see also Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 717-18, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989) (“[t]he defendant may not have constitutionally sufficient notice to support a lesser included offense instruction requested by the prosecutor if the elements of that lesser offense are not part of the indictment.”). Committing an aggravated battery against Thomas does not presume that an assault would therefore be committed against Thompson. {12} Here, alleging the existence of a new victim of a separate criminal act altered a material element of the crime with which Child was originally charged and about which he was entitled to notice. See State v. Mankiller, 104 N.M. 461, 466, 722 P.2d 1183, 1188 (Ct.App.1986) (<HOLDING>). This is basically unfair. {13} Furthermore,
holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act holding that the date of the offense was material to the defense where defendant could not have anticipated from the date specified in the indictment that the state would present evidence that the crime occurred nearly two months later recognizing that the government need only prove that crime occurred reasonably near the date stated in the indictment holding that where the date of the offense is not an element of the charge  a variance between the indictment date and the proof at trial is not fatal so long as the acts charged were committed within the statute of limitations period and prior to the return date of the indictment holding that the date of sale for an installment contract was the date of contract formation not the date of the last payment due