and issues presented under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), and has asked for permission to withdraw as counsel. The Government recognizes that there is an arguable issue in that the Sentencing Guidelines were applied by the District Court as mandatory. At the time of Orozsco’s sentencing hearing, the Supreme Court had not yet issued its decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). We would ordinarily remand so that the District Court could reconsider its sentence, see United States v. Davis, 407 F.3d 162 (3d Cir.2005) (en banc), but in this case we see no need to remand the matter of sentencing because Orozsco has waived any such issue. See United States v. Lockett, 406 F.3d 207, 214 (3d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Orozsco is therefore not entitled to
holding that an appeal waiver is valid when it is entered into knowingly and voluntarily holding defendant who voluntarily dismissed his appeal of one conviction based on plea agreement for separate charges was not entitled to outoftime appeal holding that a merger clause normally prevents a criminal defendant who has entered into a plea agreement from asserting that the government made oral promises to him not contained in the plea agreement itself holding that where a criminal defendant has voluntarily and knowingly entered into a plea agreement in which he or she waives the right to appeal the defendant is not entitled to resentencing in light of booker  holding that the defendants guilty plea was entered into knowingly voluntarily and intelligently