above, the court finds that MCS’s summary judgment motion with regard to Mason’s hostile work environment claim is due to be granted. 2. Racial Discrimination Claim — Title VII and § 1981 (i) Statement of the Law Mason’s claims are brought pursuant to Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and consist of disparate treatment claims alleging discriminatory pay seful discrimination. See General Building Contractors Association v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 389, 102 S.Ct. 3141, 73 L.Ed.2d 835 (1982); Lincoln v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, 697 F.2d 928, 935 n. 6 (11th Cir.1983). Thus, a showing of disparate impact through a neutral practice is insufficient to prove a § 1981 violation because proof of discriminatory intent is essential. See id. at 388, 102 S.Ct. 3141. (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, only direct or circumstantial
recognizing that the drafters of  1981 were not concerned with practices that were facially neutral holding that the challenged practices were not consumeroriented under  349 because they were directed only at prospective insurance agents holding that the litigation privilege did not preclude a malicious prosecution claim where the accusatorial statements that led to the plaintiffs arrest were made before the charges against him were filed and were not made during and were unrelated to the judicial proceeding holding that plaintiffs had standing because they were directly affected by the laws and practices against which their complaints were directed holding that parents who brought suit challenging certain religiouslyrelated practices in public schools were without standing to challenge religious practices at baccalaureate programs because their children who were enrolled in elementary schools were not adversely affected by the challenged practice