673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000). This makes sense. Terry balanced the government’s interest in protecting the public and the police from unnecessary risks and a suspect’s interest in avoiding a brief frisk of his person. See 392 U.S. at 20-25, 88 S.Ct. 1868. When an officer has a reasonable suspicion that an armed robbery is about to occur, this balance favors the government. Sparing a victim the trauma of being held up with a gun — not to mention the possibility of being injured or killed — as well as sparing an officer and suspect the risk of an armed confrontation justifies the utilization of a brief protective measure. The Constitution does not command an officer to stand idly by and run the risk that a suspect will commit a violent crime on his watch. See id. at 24, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (<HOLDING>). Because of its focus on police action
holding that it would be clearly unreasonable to deny a police officer the ability to neutralize the threat of physical harm if he has reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and dangerous holding that a limited search of the outer clothing of a suspect for weapons is reasonable where the officer has a reasonable articulable basis for believing that the suspect may be armed and presently dangerous recognizing that police officer may stop a suspect if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot holding the use of deadly force is constitutionally permissible only if the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm either to the officer or to others holding that it is not unreasonable to believe that burglars can be armed and dangerous