accord Davis v. Mullins, 251 Va. 141, 148-49, 466 S.E.2d 90, 94 (1996). In the present case, the circuit court suspended the January 6th final order within the 21-day period allowed in Rule 1:1 by entering the order of stay on January 27, 1998. Contrary to Shird’s position, the duration of the stay was not tied to the court’s resolution of the motion for remittitur. Instead, it was expressly limited to “a period of 30 days.” Since the court did not enter an additional order within that 30-day period to continue the stay, the January 6th order became final well before April 21, 1998. The pendency of Shird’s motion for remittitur on the last day of the stay did not extend or toll the running of the 30-day period. See School Bd. of City of Lynchburg, 237 Va. at 556, 379 S.E.2d at 323 (<HOLDING>). Nor does the fact that the circuit court had
holding that the concealment of ones identity does not toll the running of the statute of limitations holding that ignorance or misunderstanding of the law would not toll the running of the statute of limitations holding that motion to extend time period for filing dischargeability complaint must be made before the running of that period and that court lacks discretion to grant late filed motion to extend time to file dischargeability complaint holding that a motion to continue a hearing on a postjudgment motion was ineffective to extend the period for the trial court to rule on the motion absent the express consent of the parties holding pendency of postjudgment motion does not toll or extend running of 21day period prescribed in rule 11