the gate was necessary for the Hunts' use of their property. Because the Hunts had properly stated the inquiry as focusing on the Richardsons’ use of their property, we assume the trial court misstated the Richardsons’ names in this portion of its ruling. 7 . The Richardsons did not comply with Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(2) by filing a separate statement of facts in opposition to the one filed by the Hunts in support of their cross-motion for summary judgment. Regardless, the Richardsons filed a response to the motion, citing testimony from the evidentiary hearing held on the application for TRO. The trial court was required to consider that evidence in deciding the merits of the Hunts’ motion. State ex rel. Corbin v. Sabel, 138 Ariz. 253, 256, 674 P.2d 316, 319 (App.1983) (<HOLDING>). 8 . In Squaw Peak, this court applied the
holding that a trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment recognizing that nonmovant can oppose a proper summary judgment motion via affidavits depositions answers to interrogatories and admissions on file but not mere pleadings themselves and indicating that it is from this list that one would normally expect the nonmoving party to make the showing to which we have referred holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion holding that a court may not consider hearsay contained in an affidavit when ruling on a summary judgment motion holding that in ruling on summary judgment motion the court is required to consider portions of verified pleadings depositions answers to interrogatories and admissions on file which are brought to the courts attention by the parties