to Prevent Him from Videotaping Since there is no policy in place on SCCC’s campus regarding videotaping, the Court must analyze whether the application of either section 140.10(b) or section 140.05 of the trespassing statute was constitutional as applied to Plaintiff Davis. Since the undisputed facts show that Plaintiff did not violate any regulation and was not disruptive, any attempt to exclude Plaintiff from the Quad for merely being present would have been improper. See D’Annibale Dep. at 14 (conceding that the public at large is permitted to utilize the campus without prior permission). Similarly, excluding Plaintiff for his preaching of the Gospel or handing out of leaflets would be unconstitutional. See e.g. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S.Ct. 276, 90 L.Ed. 265 (1946) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the central question remaining before
holding that state trespassing statute could not be used to prevent the distribution of religious materials on a towns sidewalk even though the sidewalk where the distribution was taking place was part of a privatelyowned company town holding wife was not prejudiced by the trial courts refusal to consider the tax consequences of assets awarded to her in part because it did not affect the overall property distribution holding employee manual binding based in part on its widespread distribution holding that settlement notice that failed to detail a distribution plan was not inadequate holding that if the market value of an asset can be ascertained the decree should account for the change in value between the date of the decree and the timely execution of the distribution plan in the decree the distribution based on value at the distribution date