however, cannot grant a remand merely because it is unhappy with the ALJ’s result, Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 100-01, 111 S.Ct. 2157, 2163-64, 115 L.Ed.2d 78 (1991), or “ ‘because substantial evidence would have supported an opposite decision.’ ” Frankl v. Shalala, 47 F.3d 935, 937 (8th Cir.1995) (quoting Smith v. Shalala, 987 F.2d 1371, 1374 (8th Cir.1993) in turn quoting Baker v. Heckler, 730 F.2d 1147, 1150 (8th Cir.1984)). Further, in order to remand a case such as this one, which falls under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the court must either affirm, modify or reverse the decision so that it will be considered a final judgment. Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 101, 111 S.Ct. at 2163; see also Shalala v. Schaefer, -U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 2625, 2627, 125 L.Ed.2d 239 (1993) (<HOLDING>). With this jurisdictional basis in mind, the
holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction and remanding the matter to state court holding that it is axiomatic that remanding a case to state court terminates the jurisdiction of a federal bankruptcy or district court over that case holding a district court remanding a case pursuant to sentence four of  405g must order judgment in the case and may not retain jurisdiction over the ad ministrative proceedings on remand holding that bankruptcy court has discretion to retain jurisdiction over related case after dismissal of the underlying bankruptcy case holding that a sentence four remand under 42 usc  405g is a final appealable decision and that a party who wins a remand under sentence four is a prevailing party for purposes of the eaja