of merit regarding the prejudice component of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim was ruled “even more stark.” Id. at 700, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The Court wrote: [E]ven assuming the challenged conduct of counsel was unreasonable, respondent suffered insufficient prejudice to warrant setting aside his. death sen-tence____ [T]here [was] no reasonable probability, that the omitted evidence would have changed the conclusion that the aggravating circumstances [of the three capital murder crimes] outweighed the mitigation circumstances and, hence, the sentence imposed. Id, at 698-700,104 S.Ct. 2052. The performance and prejudice prongs of Strickland may be addressed in either order. Id. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052. “ e is a “most deferential one[.]” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105, 131 S.Ct. 770 (<HOLDING>). State court determinations are given
recognizing that a state courts determination is not an unreasonable application of law merely because it is erroneous holding that state courts acceptance of counsels decision not to consult blood evidence experts was not an unreasonable application of strickland holding that counsels decision not to call witnesses was unreasonable because counsels stated reasons for disputing the witnesses credibility were not supported by objective evidence holding that counsels failure to file appeal was not deficient performance under strickland where the petitioner in  2255 action did not direct counsel to file an appeal and acquiesced in counsels decision to pursue as an alternative a reduction in sentence holding that the federal habeas courts task is to determine if the state courts decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the supreme court of the united states