entered in absentia. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1), (b)(4)(iii)(D). We conclude that the IJ also acted contrary to law and applied an erroneous legal standard by denying equitable tolling solely because Rivera did not allege a delay in receiving notice of the prior IJ decision denying his first motion to reopen. Under the federal regulations, a motion to reopen to rescind a deportation order entered in absentia can be filed more than 180 days after the order only if the petitioner “demonstrates that he or she did not receive notice” of the order. Id. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A)(2). However, in Fajardo, we held that the 180-day limit can also be equitably tolled on the basis of IAC, regardless of whether the petitioner received timely notice of prior orders. See 300 F.3d at 1019 n. 2, 1022 (<HOLDING>). In particular, equitable tolling is available
holding that where petitioner did not challenge notice of any prior order her motion to reopen on the basis of iac must be tolled until she was aware of the harm resulting from the misconduct of two nonattorney immigration consultants holding that the bia did not abuse its discretion in denying a petitioners untimely motion to reopen where she submitted proof of the birth of her two sons a letter from her parents warning of the danger of forced sterilization and a purported sterilization certificate for her cousin who also had two children holding that the statute of limitations should be tolled until both the motion for ifp and the motion for counsel are ruled upon holding that the limitations period should be tolled until the plaintiff became aware of the facts necessary to support a charge of discrimination holding that the bia did not abuse its discretion in denying a petitioners untimely motion to reopen where petitioner submitted proof of the birth of her two sons a letter from her parents warning of the danger of forced sterilization and a purported sterilization certificate for her cousin who allegedly also had two children