to choose without being p .2d 66, 68-69 (2003), disc. review denied, 358 N.C. 157, 593 S.E.2d 81 (2004) (finding Lawrence does not control in statutory rape charge due to the express exceptions relating to minors). We further note that many of our sister courts have likewise interpreted Lawrence to apply to the limited liberty interest of personal relations, and have upheld statutes criminalizing acts outside that boundary. See State v. Thomas, 891 So.2d 1233, 1238 (La. 2005), (declining to use Lawrence to strike down a Louisiana law criminalizing solicitation of a crime against nature); People v. Williams, 811 N.E.2d 1197, 1199 (Ill. App. 2004) (noting Lawrence specifically excludes prostitution from its holding); see also Anderson v. Morrow, 371 F.3d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 2004) (<HOLDING>). Having considered the United States Supreme
holding that a statute violated the federal constitutional right of privacy when applied to heterosexual nonviolent consensual activity between adults in private and pointing out that twentytwo states have decriminalized private consensual sodomy between adults holding that member of clergy had no liberty interest to engage in sexual activity through abuse of his position of trust and authority holding lawrences recognition of right of individuals to engage in fully and mutually consensual private sexual conduct does not affect a states legitimate interest to interpose when consent is in doubt holding that a seventeenyearold student lacked the capacity to consent to engage in sexual conduct with a teacher and consequently her allegations of a seeminglyconsensual sexual relationship with the teacher were sufficient to state a  1983 claim based on a violation of substantive due process recognizing private right of action