Given that on appeal we do not reweigh evidence or choose between competing inferences, it would be inappropriate to. reverse the ALJ’s decision when Shea’s own evidence reasonably could be found insufficient to prove her case, See Shea II, 267 P.3d at 634; see also Road v. Alaska State Comm’n for Human Rights, 86 P.3d 899, 903 (Alaska 2004) (“In applying tire substantial evidence test we view the evidence in favor of the findings.” (citing Alaska State Comm’n for Human Rights v. Yellow Cab, 611 P.2d 487, 490 (Alaska 1980))). 42 . See AS 39.35.680(27) (defining "occupational disability” as "a physical or mental condition that ... presumably permanently" prevents the employee from performing the employee's usual or comparable duties (emphasis added)); Hester, 817 P.2d at 476 n.7 (<HOLDING>); see also Shea II, 267 P.3d at 631 ("[A]n
recognizing distinction between tolling and estoppel holding that there is no distinction in the right to jury trial between sentencing factors and elements holding that there is a rational basis for the distinction holding there is no distinction in the occupational disability context between the worsening of the underlying disease process and worsening of the symptoms holding there is no meaningful distinction between due course and due process