received from Virginia Lee full satisfaction of the estimated sum of past-due, premium assessments. A clear meeting of the minds is shown by the facts. Virginia Lee has failed to allege the existence of either fraud, mistake, or undue advantage, as would be necessary to undercut the binding effect of settlement in this case. First, there has been no allegation of wrongdoing by the Trustees to indicate fraud or misrepresentation. Second, any attempt by Virginia Lee to characterize this case as one of mutual mistake is misplaced. A claim of mutual mistake of law, which would appear to be the only plausible mistake claim here, is clearly distinguishable from a claim resting on a change in the law. See Piedmont Trust Bank v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 210 Va. 396, 171 S.E.2d 264, 268 (1969) (<HOLDING>). In fact, the decision to settle here, rather
holding that where there is no essential conflict as to the facts and the evidence the trial court was correct in refusing to submit the theory of strict liability to the jury holding that a statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived of to justify it holding that where both parties had all the facts needed to form a correct conclusion as to the law a settlement will not be set aside on theory of mutual mistake holding that a unilateral mistake by an unrepresented claimant would not support a decision to set aside a settlement agreement that the plaintiff had signed holding that the trial court was without authority to set aside entry of default on motion to set aside default judgment