11 F.3d 563, 567 n. 6 (5th Cir.1994) (“Experts generally may rely on hearsay, however, if the data is reliable and qualified under Rule 703”) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); Gong v. Hirsch, 913 F.2d 1269, 1273 (7th Cir.1990) (“Given the obvious concern over the trustworthiness of a statement made under circumstances such as these, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in preventing the plaintiffs medical expert from reading from [the] letter or otherwise stating that his opinion was based on the letter” when the letter was presumably for the purpose of getting disability benefits for the decedent in the malpractice lawsuit, who was also the likely source of the letter’s information); Ricciardi v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Center, 811 F.2d 18, 24-25 (1st Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); Soden v. Freightliner Corp., 714 F.2d 498,
holding the district courts decision not to allow an expert to rely on a note found in a hospital record was within the courts discretion because the court found that the note was too unreliable to be used as the basis for an expert opinion holding that such a decision was within the trial courts discretion recognizing that the need for the expert was so great that the decision to preclude the expert effectively amounted to dismissal of case holding that the affidavit of an expert proffered in opposition to summary judgment motion was assertedly in conflict with the experts prior deposition testimony but the court found that the affidavit could generate genuine issues of material fact because the expert explained the basis for his apparently changed opinion holding that an expert that had provided consulting services to the defendant relating to the litigation was not precluded from serving as an expert for the plaintiff