of a conspiracy, but who happens to act in a way which advances some purpose of one, does not thereby become a conspirator. See Lively, 803 F.2d at 1128-29. The court committed no error here, much less an abuse of discretion, because the jury charge “adequately and correctly cover[ed] the substance of the requested instruction.” Id. at 1128. Addressing his sentence, Spratt argues that the court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial by fashioning a Guidelines sentence based on the drug quantity it found, rather than the drug quantity the jury found. His argument is meritless because the court treated the Guidelines as advisory, rather than mandatory. United States v. Chau, 426 F.3d 1318, 1324 (11th Cir.2005); United States v. Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297, 1304-05 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Thomas, 446 F.3d
holding that district court may treat acquitted conduct as relevant conduct at sentencing holding that the trial court violated the defendants due process rights by relying on conduct of which he had actually been acquitted when imposing a sentence holding that the district court was permitted to find conduct that had been acquitted by the jury when determining the defendants sentence holding that a district court may not impose a sentencing enhancement based on conduct of which the jury acquitted the defendant holding that a district court may find acquitted conduct by a preponderance of the evidence