be extended by the court. United States v. Gonzalez-Perez, 629 F.2d 1081, 1083 (5th Cir.1980). The purpose of the time constraint is that “[s]ome limitation on jurisdiction to seek a reduction of sentence is necessary to protect the district judges from repeated entreaties by a defendant to change a penalty.” Id. [Cites omitted.] “Rule 35 is intended to establish ‘clear lines of demarcation so that all concerned would know exactly when the time for filing would expire.’” Id. [Cite omitted.] “A defendant through his own volition cannot confer jurisdiction to reduce sentence on the district court by purporting to activate a new 120-day period through the filing of a pleading years after the case is essentially over.” Id. See United States v. Kirk, 761 F.2d 463 (8th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>) Jensen was convicted, and that conviction
holding that aedpas oneyear limitations period is not tolled during the pendency of a petition for certiorari to the united states supreme court that seeks review of a state courts denial of postconviction relief holding that the longer appeal period from a judgment controlled over the shorter appeal period in a certiorari proceeding when the two proceedings were consolidated in the district court and the certiorari proceeding was not an independent proceeding holding that the limitations period is likewise not tolled during the pendency of a certiorari petition to the supreme court holding that supreme court need not consider issue not raised in petition for certiorari holding that the 120day period ran from the original sentence in 1975 or the supreme courts denial of certiorari in 1977 and not from any subsequent event