they were not constitutionally required to do so. The officers’ behavior, therefore, did not violate plaintiffs rights under the Due Process Clause. Without a valid constitutional claim under the Fourth Amendment or the Due Process Clause against the arresting officers, plaintiffs claims against the officers were properly dismissed following defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The District Court also properly granted summary judgment for the City, as plaintiff failed to show that a municipal policy or custom caused a violation of plaintiffs constitutional rights. First, plaintiff identifies no specific policy or custom as the source of the alleged constitutional violations. See Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694-95, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, plaintiff asserts no constitutional
holding that alleged violations of a state statute did not give rise to federal constitutional claims holding individual officers entitlement to qualified immunity does not immunize municipalities from monell liability holding municipalities liable only when specific policies or customs cause constitutional violations and expressly stating that vicarious liability for constitutional violations does not apply to municipalities holding that a municipality may not be held liable under section 1983 under a theory of respondeat superi or but may be liable for policies or customs that violate an employees constitutional rights recognizing a claim for civil liability against municipalities  under  1983