of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” According the government, admitting Fulero’s testimony would incite unfair prejudice because his assertions would confuse and mislead jurors about their role as the ultimate arbiters of eyewitnesses’ credibility. The Eleventh Circuit has not had occasion to address whether eyewitness-identification expert testimony would violate Rule 403, and other circuits have split on this question. The Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have reasoned that eyewitness-identification expert testimony might usurp the jury’s role of determining witness credibility, thus causing jurors to be confused and misled regarding their role as the trier of fact. United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 289 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 884 (8th
holding that the trial court was within its discretion to exclude because the record showed considerable confusion on the part of the juror holding it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude testimony holding trial court acted within its discretion in excluding expert testimony recognizing that the need for the expert was so great that the decision to preclude the expert effectively amounted to dismissal of case holding a district court was within its discretion to exclude an expert who would effectively have inserted his own view of the officers credibility for that of the jurors thereby usurping their role