its discretion by denying defense counsel an opportunity to impeach a government witness through cross examination on the matter of the witness’s use of aliases. Because the court properly determined that the witness’s use of the alias was remote in time from the present offense, and because ample evidence was admitted to impeach the witness, we determine that the district court did not abuse its discretion. United States v. Kallin, 50 F.3d 689, 693 (9th Cir.1995) (stating that a reviewing court can only reverse for abuse of discretion if it has a definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in reaching its conclusion, or based its decision on an erroneous conclusion of law); Cf. United States v. Jackson, 882 F.2d 1444, 1446 (9th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Next, counsel references the district court’s
holding that the trial courts error in not allowing defendant to testify on direct examination as to nature and circumstances of prior convictions was not harmless error where credibility of the defendant was critical to the deliberations of the jury holding that a trial courts refusal to allow the defendant to attend the jury view was not prejudicial holding that defendants right to crossexamine a witness for bias or motivation to lie is not grounds for reversal where the jury had enough information despite the limits placed on otherwise permitted crossexamination to assess the defense theory of bias or improper motive holding that a district courts refusal to allow cross examination as to certain prior conduct was not reversible error where the jury had sufficient information to appraise the bias and motives of the witness holding that defendant could not claim error in part because he did not request the district court to review the witness reports in question which would allow the district court to review the statements and excise incriminating information