however, he is wrong. In Clark’s initial appeal, our principal concern was that, “[wjhile the [district court] might reasonably come to the conclusion that Clark is responsible for between 3.5 and 5 kilograms of cocaine, [it] did not set forth any basis for actually doing so.” Id. at 535. Given the absence of any specific findings whatsoever, as well as the fact that the amount of cocaine attributable to Clark was in dispute, we held that the district court’s drug-quantity determination was insufficient under Federal Rute of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(3)(B),- which requires sentencing courts to rule on any disputed portion of the presentence report that is material to the sentencing decision. Clark, 254 Fed.Appx. at 536; see United States v. Orlando, 281 F.3d 586, 601 (6th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). We also suggested that the district court had
recognizing general rule holding that a failure to update sexoffender registration should not be considered a minor or technical offense when committed as part of a more general course of conduct that demonstrates a deliberate general unwillingness to comply with the sex offender registration requirements recognizing this as the general rule holding that to comply with rule 32i3b a district court should refer to particular evidence or present  more than general conclusions holding that a court may sua sponte dismiss pursuant to rule 41b for failure to comply with a court order