his hand inside appellant’s pockets and only saw the heroin fall out of his peripheral vision, the record supported an implied finding that the appellant did "pitch” the heroin, rather than it somehow being dislodged by the pal-down of appellant’s outer clothing. 4 .Appellant also challenges the pat-down because Officer Allen testified he did it as part of his routine. As already stated, though, the determination of whether the arresting officer's actions are justified are based on the collective knowledge of officers. Woodward v. State, 668 S.W.2d 337, 344 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982). Additionally, we note that Allen’s subjective state of mind is not determinative; rather, we look at the state of facts from an objective standard. See O’Hara v. State, 27 S.W.3d 548, 551 (Tex.Crim.App.2000)
holding that while the question of whether a reasonable person would believe his person was seized was normally a question of law that the district court was still entitled to deference because its determination in this case is inextricably intertwined with the credibility of the witnesses recognizing that the focus must be on whether the facts alleged would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial holding the use of deadly force is constitutionally permissible only if the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm either to the officer or to others holding that the issue is not whether officer subjectively feared suspect but whether a reasonably prudent person would justifiably believe that his safety or that of others was in danger holding that in deciding whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity it is not only the evidence of clearly established law that is for the court but also whether a reasonable officer could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful in light of the information the officer had