conference at which a juror is discussed and dismissed is not “present” to the extent required under the federal and state Constitutions. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U. S. 509, 523 (124 SCt 1978, 158 LE2d 820) (2004) (“The Due Process Clause and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment . . . both guarantee to a criminal defendant... the ‘right to be present at all stages of the trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings.’ ”) (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806, 819, n. 15 (95 SCt 2525, 45 LE2d 562) (1975)); Zamora v. State, 291 Ga. 512, 518 (731 SE2d 658) (2012) (recognizing defendant’s right to be present during bench conference where dismissal and removal of juror were discussed). Compare Parks v. State, 275 Ga. 320 (565 SE2d 447) (2002) (<HOLDING>). This right belongs to the defendant, however,
holding that defendants right to be present does not extend to bench conferences on legal and scheduling issues in which defense counsel participated and to which defendant could not have made a meaningful contribution holding that an indigent defendant does not have a constitutional right to press issues even if nonfrivolous which counsel in his professional judgment decides not to present recognizing a right to contribution holding that the sixth amendment right to present a meaningful defense does not entitle a defendant to present evidence on a question of law holding that statute which permitted judge to deny defense closing in bench trial violated right to counsel and emphasizing the importance of argument by counsel in the factfinding process