expressly advance “tradition” as a rational basis for Section 32, they refer to the “traditional definition of marriage” and appeal to how it is “traditionally understood.” However, tradition, alone, cannot form a rational basis for a law. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Preserving the traditional institution of marriage ... is just a kinder way of describing the State’s moral disapproval of same-sex couples,” which, in turn, is not a legitimate reason); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 239, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970) (“Neither the antiquity of a practice nor the fact of steadfast legislative and judicial adherence to it through the centuries insulates it from constitutional attack.”); Perry, 704 F.Supp.2d at 998 (“[T]he 3, at *29 (<HOLDING>); Obergefell, 962 F.Supp.2d at 993-95, 2013 WL
holding that to constitute persecution harm must be more than harassment holding that a secured creditor is not entitled to receive any more than that to which it was entitled pursuant to the terms of the confirmed plan holding that permitting samesex couples to receive a marriage license does not harm or erode the procreative origins of the marriage institution any more than marriages of couples who cannot or do not ever wish to naturally procreate holding that on its face the unambiguous language of the dppa does not provide any protection for traffic violations or information relating to the revocation suspension or violation of a drivers license holding that written description requires more than a mere wish or plan for obtaining the claimed chemical invention