his apartment building. We decline to do so. As New York’s highest court aptly recognized, “the determination of whether a particular location is part of a defendant’s dwelling [for the purpose of self-defense] depends on the extent to which defendant (and persons actually sharing living quarters with defendant) exercises exclusive possession and control over the area in question.” People v. Hernandez, 98 N.Y.2d 175, 746 N.Y.S.2d 434, 774 N.E.2d 198, 203 (2002). Stated differently, the castle doctrine extends to “a house, an apartment or part of a structure where defendant lives and where others are ordinarily excluded — the antithesis of which is routine access to or use of an area by strangers.” Id.; see also People v. Aiken, 4 N.Y.3d 324, 795 N.Y.S.2d 158, 828 N.E.2d 74, 79 (2005) (<HOLDING>). Devens enjoyed a significant property
holding that the defendant had consented where he allowed the police officers into his apartment building and allowed the officers to follow him into his apartment without impediment or objection to the entry of the police holding that statements by defendant and apartment manager that defendant lived in the apartment where drugs were found demonstrated his control over the apartment even though no documents personal effects or keys were found holding that the defendant had no expectation of privacy in the hallway of an apartment building where the building door was unlocked and the hallway was easily accessible to the public holding that the defendant had a duty to retreat from the doorway between his apartment and the apartment hallway because that area functioned as a hybrid privatepublic space holding that a dog sniff outside the defendants door in his apartment building was not a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment so long as the police were lawfully present in the hallway when the search occurred