accept as true that its water rights are rendered sufficiently without value as to satisfy the second prong of M & J Coal, 47 F.3d at 1153-54 (Fed.Cir.1995) (setting forth the nature of the loss that is necessary to constitute a taking), its claim fails because, under the first prong, grazing is not a stick in the bundle of rights that it has ever acquired, id. at 1154 (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027, 112 S.Ct. 2886). Colvin’s related claim for a taking of its ranch also fails. That the ranch may have lost value by virtue of losing the grazing lease is of no moment because such loss in value has not occurred by virtue of governmental restrictions on a constitutionally cognizable property interest. See also United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 493, 93 S.Ct. 801, 35 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973) (<HOLDING>). Next, Colvin’s argument that the government’s
holding that the fifth amendment did not apply to tribal government holding that the fifth amendment does not require the government to pay for that element of value based on the use of respondents fee lands in combination with the governments permit lands holding that multifaceted approach to amending provisions in article 10 regarding state trust lands did not violate separate amendment rule holding the same with respect to violations of the fifth amendment holding that whether the public invitee may have some commercial purpose in mind was irrelevant to recreational immunity instead by opening up the lands for recreational use without a fee the landowner brought itself under the protection of the immunity statute