imposing the term of supervised release. II. DISCUSSION Love first argues the court may not impose any term of supervised release for a violation of § 401. He points out § 401 itself does not authorize supervised release; rather, the statute provides the court may punish contempt by “fine or imprisonment, or both.” Although he acknowledges 18 U.S.C. § 3583 authorizes supervised release for most offenses, he contends the statute is inapplicable to criminal contempt because it mentions only felonies and misdemeanors, and contempt is an offense mi generis, neither felony nor misdemeanor. See Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380, 86 S.Ct. 1523, 1526, 16 L.Ed.2d 629 (1966) (noting contempt is an offense sui generis); see also United States v. Holmes, 822 F.2d 481, 493-94 (5th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Alternatively, Love argues the maximum term
holding that in addition to statutory contempt powers city courts have inherent contempt power holding a statute authorizing fines for felonies or misdemeanors was inapplicable to criminal contempt because contempt is neither a felony nor a misdemeanor holding evidence insufficient to show direct contempt and no basis for indirect contempt because of failure to meet procedural requirements holding it was within the chancellors  discretion to find that though the husband was in contempt the contempt was not willful holding corporation and its president in criminal contempt because previous order of civil contempt had not been purged