Cir. 1976)). The Due Process Clause imposes “less stringent procedural requirements in the case of an academic dismissal,” id. at 86, 98 S.Ct. 948, recognizing that judges are ill-equipped to second-guess the academic judgment of school administrators. But this hands-off approach is appropriate only when the school’s decision is, in fact, academic. If, as the administrators contend, the reason for the dismissal was “the violation by a student of valid rules of conduct”—here, the College’s Code of Conduct—the Supreme Court has said the dismissal is properly characterized as disciplinary, not academic. Id. at 86-90, 98 S.Ct. 948 (characterizing sanctions for “disruptive or insubordinate behavior” as disciplinary); see also Monroe v. Ark. State Univ., 495 F.3d 591, 595 (8th Cir. 2007) (<HOLDING>); Pugel v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 378
holding that plaintiffs dismissal of personal injury action and subsequent dismissal of declaratory judgment action concerning extent of tortfeasors insurance coverage did not trigger double dismissal rule holding that plaintiffs were entitled to vacate final order of dismissal as void when they did not receive the motion for dismissal or notice of the hearing on the order until after the dismissal was entered recognizing that a dismissal for alleged but not conceded drug use might constitute a disciplinary dismissal holding dismissal for failure to comply with rule 8 was dismissal of entire action which was appealable final order holding that in considering dismissal of an appeal the court should exercise discretion to determine whether dismissal is appropriate in the circumstances presented by the case