argument by claiming further that the First Amendment prohibits only categorical exclusions, such as those based on race or sex, during the nominating phase. We disagree. Below we explain why the First Amendment applies to the nominating phase, describe the scope of protection that it guarantees to voters and candidates, and conclude that the District Court applied the proper standard on the facts of this case. 1. The First Amendment’s Guarantee of Freedom of Association Applies to New York’s Judicial Nominating Process It is true, as defendants contend, that “the processes by which political parties select their nominees are [not] ... wholly public affairs that States may regulate freely.” Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 572-73, 120 S.Ct. 2402, 147 L.Ed.2d 502 (2000) (<HOLDING>). But the fact that a political party’s
holding that a political party chairman had standing to appeal a district court decision striking down state election laws even though the state board of elections had decided against appealing holding that a state may not condition voting in state elections on payment of a tax holding that the right to vote is fundamental holding that state may not compel political party to allow nonmembers to vote in its primary elections recognizing that a board of elections is not a political subdivision and its members are not county officers