that a judicial sale may be set aside “by reasons of fraud, accident, surprise, or mistake, irregularities in the conduct of the sale, and so on,” but cautioned that a judicial sale is not ordinarily vacated “on the ground of mistake flowing from [a moving party’s] own culpable negligence.” 122 N.J. Eq. at 528,194 A 545. Karel represents an overview of those decisions, many from the nineteenth century, which reflected an intent to protect a mortgagor, particularly in those instances where the mortgagor’s home was being foreclosed, and to protect all parties in interest where the mortgage foreclosure process was fraught with some deficiency which deprived an interested party of sufficient notice of the proceedings. See Kirkpatrick v. Corning, 48 N.J. Eq. 302, 24 A 441 (E. & A. 1891) (<HOLDING>). See also Heintze v. Bentley, 34 N.J. Eq. 562,
holding that purchasers at judicial sales subject themselves to the courts power to guard on equitable terms against hardship surprise mistake misrepresentation or undue advantage even though purchasers are not at fault holding that the power to terminate a contract atwill subsumes the power to modify its terms holding that the states allegation that the congressional act at issue that went beyond the power of congress and impinged on that of the state  did not suffice as a basis for invoking an exercise of judicial power holding that trial courts have the power to sanction parties for bad faith abuse of the judicial process not covered by rule or statute holding that another courts decision is a proper subject of judicial notice