two problems with this view. As Judge Lansing pointed out in Gillihan I, the first is that: The opening words of subsection (1) make it clear that it does not apply in cases that are subject to subsection (4), and the opening words of subsection (4) establish that it governs “[i]n actions for personal injury, where the amount of plaintiffs claim for damages does not exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,-000).” Gillihan I at 696, 99 P.3d at 1086. The two subsections do not govern together in personal injury actions, and to read them as though they do, as Gonzalez points out, is to edit the statutory language of I.C. § 12-120. The plurality’s interpretation is strained, and both parties in this case have agreed ural High School Dist. No. 1, 34 Idaho 222, 224, 200 P. 138, 140 (1921) (<HOLDING>); Beker Industries Inc. v. Georgetown Irr.
holding legislatures removal of language allowing director to approve change in nature of water use prior to bills passage can only be interpreted as intent that director not have that power holding removal of word unanimous from bill prior to passage demonstrates legislative intent to change law from requiring board unanimity to segregate school districts to requiring only majority recognizing that statutes requiring intent are not likely to be invalidated because of vagueness holding change of word shall to may prior to bills passage indicates legislative intent to make purchases upon bids permissive rather than mandatory holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law