district court had original federal question jurisdiction because Harper’s state law claims were pre-empted by § 301 of the LMRA. Defendant Kelly argues that Harper’s retaliatory discharge claims require interpretation of the applicable collective bargaining agreement,' in particular, an assessment of whether Defendant Kelly mishandled his grievance over his termination. According to Kelly, “[s]uch an assessment requires interpretation'of the agreement.” We disagree. It is undisputed that theft is a dis-chargeable offense under the CBA and that Harper had certain grievance rights thereunder. But Harper’s retaliation claims were not “inextricably intertwined” with the meaning of these CBA provisions. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Harper needed to prove only that the
holding that a negligence claim is not a personal injury tort claim holding that state law claim regarding breach of settlement agreement was preempted by federal labor law holding that question of whether a state law tort claim was preempted by the lmra focused on whether evaluation of the tort claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract holding employees negligence claim not preempted by lmra holding employees negligence claim against his employer was preempted by the lmra