to cumu-late. Appellant also appears to argue that the statutes allowing the trial court to cumulate the sentences in this way violate the Apprendi-Blakely-Ring line of cases recently handed down by the United States Supreme Court by increasing the maximum punishment for the offenses without a jury finding. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Appellant does not argue that the stacking order violated a statutory provision. See Tex.Code CRim. PROC. Ann. art. 42.08 (Vernon Supp.2004-05); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 3.03 (Vernon 2003); see also LaPorte v. State, 840 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Tex. Crim.App.1992) (<HOLDING>). Both the Austin and Waco courts of appeals
holding that cumulation order not authorized by statute is in essence a void sentence and any error cannot be waived holding standing cannot be waived and may thus be raised at any time holding the contract was not authorized by law holding temporary restraining order void because court waived bond holding that a defendant cannot be punished by contempt proceedings for disregarding a void order