of the defendant, that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant. Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954), citing Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 150, 13 S.Ct. 50, 36 L.Ed. 917 (1892). Moreover, the Seventh Circuit has stated that “the unusual practice of a judge entering the jury room to speak privately with jurors is almost certain to run afoul of a defendant’s right to be present during trial proceedings.” United States v. Smith, 31 F.3d 469, 471 (7th Cir.1994). Before the Government is put to its burden of showing that an improper contact by an outsider with the jury is harmless, however, a defendant must first establish that an ex parte communication occurred. See Owen v. Duckworth, 727 F.2d 643, 646 (7th Cir.1984)(<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Wilson, 715 F.2d
holding that employer bears the burden of proving applicability of flsa exemptions holding that the defendant bears the burden of proving outside contact with the jury holding that the defendant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that the improper juror contact occurred and only if the contact is established must the government demonstrate absence of prejudice holding that the government bears the burden of proving voluntary consent under the totality of the circumstances holding defendant bears the burden of proving an accord and satisfaction defense