legal scholars in Maryland, as well as in other jurisdictions, have endorsed the use of an approved pattern jury instruction on reasonable doubt and the presumption of innocence to ensure that a criminal defendant’s due process rights are protected and to create uniformity in criminal jury trials. See Miller v. State, 380 Md. 1, 30, 843 A.2d 803, 819 (2004) (stating that the concurring opinion in Wills “wisely suggested that trial judges ‘closely adhere’ to Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 2:02 when attempting to define ‘reasonable doubt’ ”); Wills v. State, supra, 329 Md. at 388-392, 620 A.2d at 304-305 (concurring opinion); Himple v. State, 101 Md.App. 579, 584-585, 647 A.2d 1240, 1243 (1994). See also Arizona v. Portillo, 182 Ariz. 592, 596, 898 P.2d 970, 974 (Ariz.1995) (<HOLDING>); Winegeart v. State, 665 N.E.2d 893, 902
holding that even though the reasonable doubt instruction given in the case was not the preferred instruction it was not a misstatement of the law and therefore was legally appropriate holding that in a criminal trial the trial court must correct or amend an improper instruction if the proper instruction is necessary for the jury to understand the case holding that in every criminal case trial courts shall give the reasonable doubt instruction set forth by the court holding that no person shall suffer the onus of a criminal conviction except upon sufficient proof  defined as evidence necessary to convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the offense holding that proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is required by the constitution