violation of petitioner’s right to a speedy trial where the lower court would have rejected claim as merit-less, and where petitioner could not have shown prejudice because government could have acquired new indictment on the same conduct); Walker v. Bennett, 262 F.Supp.2d 25, 37 (W.D.N.Y.2003) (denying petitioner’s- ineffective assistance of counsel claim premised upon counsel’s alleged failure to move for recovery from a speedy trial where the under lying speedy trial claim “would not have been successful[.]”). “Failure to make a meritless argument does not amount to ineffective assistance.” United States v. Arena, 180 F.3d 380, 396 (2d Cir.1999) abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Sekhar, 683 F.3d 436 (2d Cir.2012) rev’d — U.S.-, 133 S..Ct. 2720, 186 L.Ed.2d 794 (2013). (<HOLDING>). 3. Rule as Applied to Appellate Counsel
holding the defendant did not demonstrate a denial of his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial where even though the delay was substantial and the defendant was detained pretrial for three years the fault for the delay was shared and the defendant continued to request continuances following his assertion for the right to a speedy trial recognizing in a case where the court sua sponte reduced the attorneys fee request that the district court has discretion to reduce the amount of the fee request and stating when  defense counsel fails to do so the district court should not reward the defendants by denying the plaintiffs counsel an opportunity to defend his claim against specific challenges whatever their source holding defendants right to counsel not violated despite district court denying pretrial request by the defendant to discharge his attorney where request was made on eve of trial and was openly part of attempt to have the district judge recuse himself and delay trial holding that where appellant moved to recuse trial judge from deciding the motion for new trial the judge of the administrative district was required to designate a judge to hear the recusal motion holding that trial court erred in denying defendants request to allow standby counsel to conduct voir dire where there was no indication that the trial court considered the koehler factors or that granting the request would have disrupted or delayed the trial