of the roadblock was to regulate vehicular traffic by allowing police to check drivers’ licenses and vehicle registrations.” 275 U.S.App.D.C. at 213-14, 865 F.2d at 1312-13. The court noted the importance of this finding in assessing the legality of a police traffic roadblock, observing that “[i]t is possible that a roadblock purportedly established to check licenses could be located and conducted in such a way as to indicate that its principal purpose was the detection of crimes unrelated to licensing.” Id., 865 F.2d at 1312 (emphasis in original) (citing 4 LaFave, supra, § 10.8(a) at 63-64). “Such a subterfuge might result in an infringement of Fourth Amendment rights, and some courts have so held.” Id., 865 F.2d at 1312; see also Webb v. State, 739 S.W.2d 802 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (<HOLDING>). The first interest described by Judge Huhn is
holding that for purposes of determining whether the roadblock worked a fourth amendment seizure the controlling considerations are whether 1 the motorist was meant to be stopped by the physical obstacle of the roadblock and 2 the motorist was so stopped holding that a mixed motive roadblock used primarily to interdict drugs but also to check drivers licenses and registration was constitutional recognizing the test set forth in strickland as clearly established law for aedpa purposes holding unconstitutional a roadblock purportedly established to check for licenses and registrations which was in fact established for general law enforcement purposes holding that a fleeing motorist was not seized for fourth amendment purposes until the law enforcement officers were successful in stopping the motorist at a roadblock