in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” We find it unnecessary to resolve the recusal question presented here, however, because recusal error, if any occurred, was harmless. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 862, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988) (noting that “there is surely room for harmless error” in the recusal context because “[tjhere need not be a draconian remedy for every violation of § 455(a)”). Although we apply the harmless-error doctrine with great caution, we are convinced it applies in this case given the inescapable legal conclusion that the parties reached an enforceable oral settlement agreement. See Morgan v. Money, No. 99-3251, 210 F.3d 372, 2000 WL 178421, at *2 (6th Cir.2000) (unpublished table decision) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we decline to determine whether
holding that we review factual findings underlying a decision to apply a sentencing enhancement for clear error and give due deference to the district courts application of the guidelines to the facts holding that a district courts determination as to the applicability of a privilege is reviewed for clear error holding that district court error was not clear error in denying petition for mandamus holding that district court error was not clear error because no prior ninth circuit authority prohibited the course taken by the district court holding that district judges failure to recuse was harmless error where the underlying question was patently clear and so there was no need to vacate the district courts decision and to remand to another district court judge to make the same clear determination