Although the Second Circuit has recognized that members of a town board may be entitled to legislative immunity, such immunity extends only to legislative activity, such as the adoption of zoning law amendments. See Orange Lake Assocs,, Inc. v. Kirkpatrick, 21 F.3d 1214, 1221-24 (2d Cir.1994). The Court therefore agrees with the District of Connecticut’s analysis in South Lyme Property Owners Association v. Town of Old Lyme, 539 F.Supp.2d 547, 558 (D.Conn.2008): The availability -of legislative immunity depends on the form of the act, not on the office of the actor, and legislative officials may therefore be liable for their enforcement and administrative-actions. Supreme Court of Virginia [v. Consumers Union of U.S. Inc. 446 U.S. [719], at 736, 100 S.Ct. 1967 [64 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980) ]. (<HOLDING>); see also Bogan [v. Scott-Harris], 523 U.S.
holding that a minimum fee schedule enforced by the virginia state bar did not fall within the parker exception because the fee schedule was not mandated by the virginia supreme court and thus it could not fairly be said that the state of virginia through its supreme court rules required the anticompetitive activities holding that eleventh amendment does not bar suits for prospective injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacity holding that the doctrine of legislative immunity did not bar prospective  injunctive relief against the chief justice of the virginia supreme court insofar as he was acting to enforce rather than legislate disciplinary rules holding that injunctive relief was unwarranted when the jurys award already included prospective relief holding that eleventh amendment does not bar federal suit against state official for prospective injunctive relief