identical under either RLUIPA, or Section 1983 for his constitutional claims, and because courts generally seek to avoid adjudicating constitutional issues if at all possible, we will not review Rowe’s Section 1983 constitutional claims. See Borzych v. Frank, 439 F.3d 388, 390 (7th Cir.2006) (addressing prisoner’s claim of infringement of religious liberty solely under RLUIPA and refusing to address his First Amendment claims); see also Koger, 523 F.3d at 801 (same). Not allowing Rowe to proceed on his Section 1983 constitutional claims will preclude him from recovering nominal monetary damages against Hall, but such preclusion is not a reason for reversing the grant of summary judgment on those claims. See Gewartowski v. Tomal, 125 Ind.App. 481, 486, 123 N.E.2d 580, 582 (1955) (<HOLDING>). Thus, we affirm the grant of summary judgment
holding that the right to nominal damages was waived in a breach of duty action when plaintiff failed to raise the issue of nominal damages until after the verdict holding that even if there is error in failing to award nominal damages to a plaintiff such error is not a basis for reversal holding that the first amendment right to free speech is absolute and an award of nominal damages is required even if the defendant fails to object to the nominal damages instruction holding that plaintiff waived the right to nominal damages in an excessive force case because nominal damages were not requested until after the verdict holding that a plaintiff who proves a cause of action under  1981 may recover punitive damages where the plaintiff is entitled to an award of compensatory damages even if nominal