the corporate context and noting that doctrine is “analogous to the approach this Court adopted for use when a party seeks to depose [a] high-ranking governmental official”); Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Garcia, 904 S.W.2d 125 (Tex.1995) (applying the “apex” doctrine to the deposition of a corporate officer); K.C.R. v. County of Los Angeles, CV 13-3806 PSG SSX, 2014 WL 3434257, at *6 (C.D.Cal.2014) (finding the “apex” doctrine precluded the deposition of a high-ranking government official). We note that no Florida court has adopted the apex doctrine in the corporate context. In Citigroup Inc. v. Holtsberg, the Fourth District indicated in dicta that it would not be inclined to do so because it arguably conflicts with Florida’s discovery rules. 915 So.2d 1265, 1267 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (<HOLDING>). However, the Citigroup court noted that to
recognizing doctrine holding that in a diversityjurisdiction case involving only state claims the primaryjurisdiction doctrine does not apply in favor of a state agency as compared to a federal agency and holding that even if the doctrine were to apply a federal district court sitting in diversity would defer to a state agencys primary jurisdiction only if state courts would so defer holding that even if the court were to apply the apex doctrine the doctrine would not preclude the deposition of two corporate executives in that case holding the doctrine applied in a case of mistake holding that if presented with this situation as a matter of first impression the court would not extend the doctrine where the new lender is not a guarantor because in that case the earmarking doctrine does not help either the new creditor nor the debtor