the Convention.” Friedrich II, 78 F.3d at 1066. Consent or Acquiescence. As discussed above, Javier consented to C.F.’s initial removal from Mexico. The relevant inquiry now is whether he acquiesced to C.F.’s retention in the United States. Acquiescence requires either (1) a formal act or statement, such as testimony in a judicial proceeding, (2) a written renunciation of rights, or (3) a consistent attitude of acquiescence over a significant period of time. Friedrich II, 78 F.3d at 1070. As with all exceptions under the Hague Convention, this defense must be narrowly construed, and “[e]ach of the words and actions of a parent during the separation are not to be scrutinized for a possible waiver of custody rights.” Id.; see also Nicolson v. Pappalardo, 605 F.3d 100, 107 (1st Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Panteleris, 601 Fed.Appx. at 352 (finding
holding that evidence that parent is victim of spousal abuse and that parent is unemployed living in crowded conditions and had multiple visits to mental hospital was no evidence that awarding custody to parent would significantly impair child holding protection from abuse consent order did not constitute acquiescence to granting custody to other parent holding that psychological parent was not entitled to custody or visitation holding that a parent has a right of custody by reason of that parents ne exeat right the authority to consent before the other parent may take the child to another country recognizing that a foster parent may attain the status of psychological parent when the relationship is not temporary in duration and exists with the consent and encouragement of a childs legal parent or guardian