ease, and as a standard practice in her business, of accepting a money order from the customer payable to the Clerk of the Court to pay filing fees. The U.S. Trustee points out that several courts have held that this practice violates § 110(g)(1), which provides that a BPP shall not “collect or receive any payment from the debtor ... for the court fees in connection with filing the petition.” See, e.g., In re Green, 197 B.R. 878, 879-881 (Bankr.D.Ariz.1996) (concluding that where BPP took possession of the filing fee and controlled the ultimate filing of the petition, the BPP violated § 110(g)(1)). Ms. Scott responds to the U.S. Trustee’s contention by noting other courts have construed the statute to allow this practice. E.g., In re Reed, 208 B.R. 695, 696-698 (Bankr.N.D.Cal.1997) (<HOLDING>). No Ninth Circuit appellate guidance exists
holding that petitioner had failed to exhaust alternative remedies for review of his fee agreement because the ssa notified petitioner he could obtain his fee by filing a fee petition holding that where a contract for legal services fails to expressly provide for the amount of the fee a reasonable fee is implied holding that due process prohibits a state from denying indigent parties access to its divorce court based on their inability to pay filing fees and costs holding that  110 only prohibits bpp from accepting money for its own account to cover the filing fee recognizing conflict between filing motion to dismiss and fee application and noting postponement of fee application resulted in no prejudice to any party