She argues, inter alia, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the terms of her probation because more than 60 days had passed since the initial order reimposing the original conditions was rendered. We agree and remand for imposition of the original conditions of probation. Bowling’s probation officer filed an affidavit of violation of probation alleging that Bowling had violated three conditions of probation. At the violation of probation hearing in June 1995, no evidence was presented. The court had a brief discussion with Bowl- tog’s probation officer, found the alleged violations “de minimis,” and without objection from the State, the court cautioned Bowling to adhere to her probation and reimposed the original conditions of probation. No appeal w 1st DCA 1994) (<HOLDING>); Weaver v. State, 588 So.2d 53 (Fla. 3d DCA
holding that the court lacks jurisdiction where a complaint was filed more than 30 days after the filing of the summons holding that the court erred in failing to inform the defendant that it could impose restitution but that the error did not affect the defendants substantial rights because the court informed the defendant that it could impose a maximum fine of an amount higher than the restitution amount imposed holding that where an action was commenced less than 60 days after a notice of claim was served on the port authority the action must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction holding that court lost jurisdiction to impose restitution payments where it attempted to add that condition more than 60 days after the original sentence was imposed holding trial court without jurisdiction to impose additional restitution because more than 60 days had passed between the sentencing hearing and the second restitution hearing