abrogation of virtually every hearsay exception, 497 U.S. at 848, as well as other exceptions such as the removal from the courtroom of a defendant whose behavior is disruptive. 497 U.S. at 850. See also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1980). The Court in Craig, after reviewing prior Confrontation Clause cases, held: In sum, our precedents establish that “the Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial,” [Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63], a preference that “must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case,” [Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243]. “[W]e have attempted to harmonize the goal of the Clause— placing limits on the kind of evidence that may be received again .S. at 64 (<HOLDING>). Thus, although the right is not absolute, a
holding confrontation clause inapplicable at sentencing recognizing that the confrontation clauses preference for facetoface confrontation at trial must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case quoting mattox v united states 156 us 237 243 15 sct 337 39 led 409 1895 holding errors based on the constitutional rights to confrontation and due process may be waived by failure to object at trial holding that competing interests if closely examined may justify dispensing with facetoface confrontation at trial holding that the confrontation clause guarantees the defendant a physical facetoface meeting with the witnesses appearing before the trier of fact