471 U.S. 290, 296, 105 S.Ct. 1953, 85 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Department of Labor’s (“DOL”) regulations, which provide “[gjuiding principles for applying coverage and exemption provisions,” state that “[i]t is clear that Congress intended the Fair Labor Standards Act to be broad in its scope.” 29 C.F.R. § 779.101. Moreover, an employer who claims an exemption under the Act has the burden of showing that it applies. Id. (citing Mitchell v. Kentucky Finance Co., 359 U.S. 290, 79 S.Ct. 756, 3 L.Ed.2d 815 (1959); Walling v. General Indus. Co., 330 U.S. 545, 67 S.Ct. 883, 91 L.Ed. 1088 (1947); Fleming v. Hawkeye Pearl Button Co., 113 F.2d 52 (8th Cir.1940)); see also Bilyou v. Dutchess Beer Distrib., Inc., 300 F.3d 217, 222 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>) (citing Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S.
holding that employer bears the burden of proving applicability of flsa exemptions holding under flsa holding that the scope and application of state exemptions are defined by the state courts and that we are bound by their interpretations recognizing the exemptions under the flsa are narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them and their application limited to those establishments plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit  and that the burden of invoking these exemptions rests upon the employer holding that a company exercising substantial control of the terms and conditions of the work of the employees is an employer under the flsa