and we think the better course is for the district court to address those issues in the first instance. * * * We REVERSE the district court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings. 1 . 158 Miss. 847, 130 So. 745, 746-47 (1930). 2 . Id. at 748. 3 . Id. 4 . 101 Miss. 341, 58 So. 102, 104 (1912). 5 . Id. (quoting Jones v. Ala. & Vicksburg Ry. Co., 72 Miss. 22, 16 So. 379, 382 (1894)). 6 . Id. ("The evidence in this case clearly and indisputably shows that the most shameful imposition was practiced upon appellee by the railroad company and its employés, in making the alleged settlement and in procuring Ault to sign the releases. Without entering into a full recital of the facts, it is sufficient to say that at the time Ault signed thi 67 Ohio St. 494, 150 N.E.2d 295, 300 (1958) (<HOLDING>). 10 . See generally Betzel v. State Farm
holding that a defamation claim is a personal injury tort claim holding that to allow the releasor to recover more than anyone agreed to give for his tort claim because the releasor was induced by fraud to believe that claim was worth less than its value  he must set aside not affirm his agreement not to sue for those personal injuries holding that a libel claim is not a personal injury tort claim holding that ajbsent fraud on the court the trial court did not have jurisdiction to set aside the 1982 judgment of paternity more than one year after its rendition holding that a negligence claim is not a personal injury tort claim