two theories in support of his contention: a “temporary injury” theory and a “continuing contract” theory. First, Cline argues the gas company’s responses to his requests for free gas— namely its assertions he was required to pay a connection fee or deposit in order to receive the gas—constituted a series of temporary injuries, each of which gave rise to a new and independent cause of action. Kansas courts have recognized a temporary injury theory in nuisance actions, where a plaintiff suffers temporary, occasional, or recurrent physical damage to his real property. See, e.g., Dougan v. Rossville Drainage Dist., 270 Kan. 468, 15 P.3d 338, 346 (2000) (allowing independent causes of action for periodic episodes of flooding); Henderson v. Talbott, 175 Kan. 615, 266 P.2d 273, 281 (1954) (<HOLDING>). Cline has cited no case, however, in which a
holding that ordinary negligence and gross negligence are not separate causes of action holding the same for the other separate rate plaintiffs in this action holding that although money had and received and unjust enrichment were pled as separate causes of action they are really the same cause of action holding that a forest preserve will be liable for injuries only in the case of willful and wanton negligence that proximately causes such injuries recognizing separate causes of action for injuries to plaintiffs land caused by occasional flooding