to an agent of that entity,’” id. (quoting Rustici, 673 S.W.2d at 768), we find the public duty doctrine does not render section 537.600 meaningless, as argued by Appellant. In the next prong of her point relied on, Appellant asserts the public duty doctrine is an affirmative defense and, in the instant matter, has no bearing on whether a petition states a cause of action. We again disagree. The public duty doctrine is not an affirmative defense, but rather serves “to delineate the legal duty which the defendant official owes to the plaintiff.” Scher v. Purkett, 847 S.W.2d 76, 78 (Mo.App.1992). Here, Appellant bore the burden of pleading facts in her petition which were sufficient to support the existence of a legal duty. Claxton v. City of Rolla, 900 S.W.2d 635, 636 (Mo.App.1995) (<HOLDING>). In our review of Appellant’s amended
holding tort of negligence must be based upon duty other that one imposed by contract holding violation of the rules of professional conduct does not create a legal duty on the part of the lawyer nor constitute negligence per se although it may be used as some evidence of negligence holding that to establish tort liability in a negligence action there must be a legal duty on the part of the defendant to plaintiff holding that in order to establish liability under the ada the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant was an employer within the meaning of the statute holding that the essential elements of any cause of action are the existence of a legal right in plaintiff with a corresponding duty in defendant coupled with a violation of that duty which results in injury or damages to the plaintiff