telephone, or otherwise. Even while he was homeless, Lane was a short distance from the probation office and could have traveled there at minimal cost or by walking. In fact, he managed to travel quite a distance away from his mother’s residence on the day of his arrest. See Hernandez v. State, 723 So.2d 886, 887 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (stating that the state met its burden of proof-the greater weight of the evidence-in finding that the defendant’s failure to report to his probation was a willful and substantial violation of probation). The trial court’s sentencing order, however, was erroneous in that it failed to award Lane credit for time served on the split sentence pursuant to the judge’s order at the sentencing hearing. See Amador v. State, 713 So.2d 1121, 1122 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)(<HOLDING>). We thus affirm the violation of probation,
holding a sentencing court is not required to grant probation holding that the trial court is required to enter sentencing order for probation violation that reflects the trial courts oral pronouncement that gives the defendant prison credit for time served on a split sentence prior to sentencing holding that disposition order be remanded to the trial court for revision to conform to the trial courts oral pronouncement holding that in cases of direct conflict between a courts oral pronouncement of sentence and the written judgment the oral pronouncement controls holding that the trial courts oral pronouncement must conform to the written judgment