the Kansas statute, does not expressly deprive acquitted indigent defendants of the benefit of the exemptions available to civil judgment debtors. Nonetheless, the court’s authority under section 815.9(7) to order payment in reasonable installments is unrestricted and allows circumvention of the protections provided by our statutes governing execution on a civil judgment. The effect, therefore, is to deny to acquitted defendants the protection of the exemptions available to civil judgment debtors, which is exactly what occurred in this case. For the reasons discussed in James, the different treatment of acquitted defendants such as Dudley as compared to ordinary civil judgment debtors violates the Equal Protection Clause. See Alexander v. Johnson, 742 F.2d 117, 124 (4th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Upon remand, any payment plan must not
holding because the svp is civil the accused has no constitutional right to counsel recognizing constitutional right to effective counsel holding for recoupment statute to pass constitutional muster it must not expose defendant accepting courtappointed counsel to more severe collection practices than the ordinary civil debtor holding that constitutional due process in civil contempt proceedings requires notice and a hearing but not the right to counsel holding that more than notice to a defendant is required