to constitute sentencing factor manipulation.” Id. Dawes did not meet his burden of showing the Government committed sentencing factor manipulation. The Government engaged in a sting operation to explore the extent of Dames’ criminal activity and drug trafficking network by increasing the amount of drugs requested, which is not “extraordinary misconduct.” See id. at 1271. We have held that neither the use of a large drug quantity of drugs in a reverse sting operation nor the use of one type of drug over another drug, which caused a difference in sentence, constituted sentencing factor manipulation. See United States v. Williams, 456 F.3d 1353, 1370-71 (11th Cir.2006), abrogated on other grounds by Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 128 S.Ct. 558, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Sanchez, 138 F.3d 1410, 1414
holding that a defendant who stipulated his drug amounts prior to sentencing waived his right to appeal on the issue of the drug amounts holding prior use of one type of drug is not relevant to establish use of another type of drug on a different occasion holding prior drug deals admissible to prove knowledge of the drug trade holding the use of a drug that carries a higher sentence rather than another drug does not amount to sentencing factor manipulation holding that sentence factor manipulation applies to statutory minimums as well as to the guidelines