exempts from income taxation any damages received on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness. See Luk-hard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 376, 107 S.Ct. 1807, 95 L.Ed.2d 328 (1987) (rejecting the argument “that personal injury awards are [generally] not treated as income under the Internal Revenue Code” and noting that “in each of these instances [where personal injury awards are excluded from § 61(a) ] there is an express provision that personal injury awards are not to be treated as income — which causes them not only to fail to support the proposition that the term ‘income’ automatically excludes personal injury awards, but to support the opposite proposition that absent express exclusion it embraces them”). See also Murphy v. I.R.S., 493 F.3d 170, 180 (D.C.Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Mrs. Stadnyk’s $49,000
holding that money received in compensation for emotional injuries is taxable income pursuant to  61a because the 1996 amendments to  104a2 would make little sense if  61a did not include compensation for personal injuries holding that punitive damages are not awarded on account of personal injuries or sickness pursuant to 26 usc  104a2 and therefore constitute gross income holding that bodily injury does not include purely emotional injuries holding that recovery for loss of consortium is a right  separate and apart from right of injured spouse to receive compensation for personal injuries holding that victims injuries did not arise out of the use of a motor vehicle when the victim received injuries from a gun fired in the vehicle