415 U.S. 361, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (“The challenged legislation in the present case does not require appellee and his class to make any choice comparable to that required of the petitioners in Gillette. The withholding of educational benefits involves only an incidental burden upon appellee’s free exercise of religion — if, indeed, any burden exists at all.”); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (1961) (using “[statutes which [both] tax income and limit the amount which may be deducted for religious contributions impose an indirect economic burden on the observance of the religion of the citizen whose religion requires him to donate a greater amount to his church” as example of insubstantial burden.); Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1070 (<HOLDING>). The case law supports the conclusion that the
holding that the burden was insubstantial when there was no governmentcoerced action or governmentforced choice between the plaintiffs practicing their religion or receiving a government benefit holding that there is no basis in law to submit the issue of plaintiffs negligence to the jury when there was no evidence that plaintiff incited the dog or voluntarily or unreasonably exposed herself to a known risk holding that plaintiffs claim was moot because there was no standing because the supreme court considered plaintiffs claims to have drifted into the area of speculation and conjecture  so that there was no cognizable injuryinfact and hence no case or controversy upon which jurisdiction could stand holding that absent privity between plaintiffs and the government there is no ease holding that no fiduciary duty existed between the plaintiff and defendant because there was no evidence that the parties agreed that defendant would be acting primarily for the benefit of the plaintiffs