debate that an officer’s subjective intent is irrelevant to the probable cause determination. See Apo-daca, 443 F.3d at 1289. We therefore hold Officer Dilley is entitled to qualified immunity on Mocek’s Fourth Amendment claim. Mocek also asserts Fourth Amendment claims against the other officers and the TSA agents on the theory that they acted in concert with Officer Dilley. His brief advances no theory as to how they could be liable where the arresting officer had arguable probable cause — at worst, based on a reasonable mistake of law — in choosing to arrest him. Accordingly, we hold that all of the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. 3. First Amendment Claims Mocek next contends that he had a First Amendment right to film at the s 7, 988-89 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); Szymecki v. Houck, 353 Fed.Appx. 852, 853
holding it was not clearly established that police violated the first amendment by destroying recordings of police activity at roadside sobriety checkpoints holding that it was not clearly established that independent contractor claiming denial of public contract because of political affiliation was protected under first amendment holding that retaliatory discharge is a clearly established first amendment violation holding there was no clearly established right to videotape police officers during a traffic stop holding the right to record police activity on public property was not clearly established