the trial judge had seen the videotape of James Eas-ley impheating Woodard, the trial court’s conclusion, without explanation or a hearing, that there was no “deceit or trickery” appears unsupported by the bare record before us. Whether the government indeed threatened Woodard with a murder charge if he did not testify before the grand jury, or diverted him from consulting with his attorney before he did so, or misled him into thinking he was not a target, are open questions of fact that must be tested at a hearing. Whether all or some of those alleged facts, even if true, undercut the voluntariness of his grand jury testimony despite the Miranda waiver, is a question that only a hearing can begin to answer. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 115, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985) (<HOLDING>)”. I’m sure that the government will object to
holding that under 28 usc  2254d the ultimate question of the admissibility of a confession merits treatment as a legal inquiry requiring plenary  review recognizing the possibility that 28 usc  1331 supplies jurisdiction for violations of international law but not reaching the ultimate merits of the issue holding that the ninth circuits decision exceeded the limits imposed on federal habeas review by 28 usc  2254d holding that a claim brought in a pro se brief that the state court did not address was not adjudicated on the merits as required by  2254d recognizing that the ultimate question of the voluntariness of consent is one of law