preempts the Lacey Act to that extent. Contrary to appellants’ assertion, nothing in the Lacey Act suggests that the Magnuson Act preempts 18 U.S.C. § Cir.1983) (stating that the rule of lenity has no application to defendant’s preemption claim where “the elements required to prove the respective statutes differ so unambiguously”). IV. Accordingly, we hold that 16 U.S.C. § 1857(1)(I), the Magnuson Act’s criminal false statement provision, does not preempt 18 U.S.C. § 1001, the general federal criminal false statement provision. Appellants’ convictions therefore are AFFIRMED. 1 . Stated another way, appellants claim that 16 U.S.C. § 1857(1)(I), as applied to the facts of this case, implicitly repealed 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Cf. United States v. Herring, 916 F.2d 1543, 1547 (llth Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). 2 . The interim rule originally was effective
holding that 18 usc  1920 the misdemeanor false statement provision of the federal employees compensation act feca preempted 18 usc  1001 because  41 of feca expressly repealed all inconsistent statutes holding for the purposes of 18 usc  924e that being a felon in possession of a firearm is not a violent felony as defined in 18 usc  924e2b holding that where defendant lied to a federal magistrate performing an administrative function there was a violation of 18 usc  1001 holding that good faith is a defense to the willful filing of false statements under 18 usc  1001 holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001