to documents ‘served’ on opposing counsel, not to documents such as complaints or notices of appeal that must be filed in court.” Johnson, 381 F.3d at 589. It is clear that, pursuant to Rule 6(a)(1)(B), McCarty’s deadline for filing a notice of appeal was May 8, 2007. That should have been clear to any federal litigator, and to read it the way McCarty’s attorney has constitutes inexcusable neglect. Like the attorney in Guy, McCarty’s attorney is an experienced federal litigator, having thirty-nine years of experience and having argued before this Court at least a dozen times. McCarty’s attorney’s interpretation that the Administrative Policies and Procedures Manual for the Southern District of Indiana would dictate fib ings in this Court is also implausible. See Guy, 140 F.3d at 736 (<HOLDING>). This mistake amounts to inexcusable neglect,
holding rules of civil procedure are appropriate in determining what constitutes proper service by certified mail holding that a district court may award attorneys fees while the merits are on appeal holding that attorneys reliance on district court rules of procedure in filing an appeal constitutes inexcusable neglect holding that reliance on an attorneys erroneous belief as to the date of an estate tax filing deadline is insufficient to constitute reasonable cause holding that the states failure to object to a late petition for appeal of a termination order granted by the trial court on the basis of excusable neglect constituted a waiver of the states right to contest excusable neglect on appeal to the court of appeals