pleas; (3) the analysis under long-standing principles of the right to effective assistance of counsel; and (4) the absence of any mention of retroactivity, the conclusion that the opinion does not announce a new rule of criminal procedure seems self-evident to this court. See Padilla, 559 U.S. at -, 130 S.Ct. at 1478 (stating “[i]n this postconviction proceeding ... ”); 1485-86 (discussing “nature of relief secured by a successful collateral challenge to a guilty plea” and “collateral challenge to a conviction”). Nonetheless, we recognize that some courts that have addressed whether Padilla applies retroactively have concluded that it does announce a new rule of criminal procedure. See Marroquin v. United States, No. M-10-156, 2011 WL 488985, at *2 & nn. 3-4 (S.D.Tex. Feb. 4, 2011) (<HOLDING>). Because Padilla’s holding effectively
holding that apprendi announced a rule of criminal procedure forecloses  argument that ring announced a substantive rule holding that reasonable reliance upon the old rule is an important factor supporting prospective application of the new rule holding simply that padilla was not made retroactive to cases on collateral review without further analysis holding that simmons announced a new rule and retrospective application of the rule was barred by teague holding that padilla does not announce a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure and listing in footnotes three eases finding that padilla announced a new rule of criminal procedure and seven cases finding that padilla is simply the application of an old rule