litany of all the constitutional rights that are waived. See Brown v. Jernigan, 622 F.2d 914, 916 (5th Cir.1980); McChesn ade voluntarily and intelligently, and the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. 1 . The complete exchange was: THE COURT: ... Will you present the balance of the indictment to the jury, please? (Whereupon the indictment is read in its entirety to the jury) THE COURT: To which the defendant pleads true or not true? MR. GORDON: True, if the Court please. THE COURT: Is that your plea, sir? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Very well. You may have your seat. 2 . The state does argue that Holloway's failure to raise this issue in a previous federal habeas application constitutes abuse of the writ procedure. See, e.g., Hamilton v. McCotter, 772 F.2d 171, 176 (5th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). In view of our resolution of the merits of
holding that the pendency of a petitioners federal habeas corpus petition does not divest a trial court of jurisdiction to address a pcra petition holding habeas petitioners may show cause for such default in specific circumstances in states that require petitioners to raise iatc claims in initial state habeas proceedings rather than on direct appeal holding that district court properly dismissed claims in  2241 petition that had been decided in previous habeas action recognizing that a previous panels review of the same habeas petition is the law of the case holding that a petitioners deliberate failure or inexcusable neglect in raising a claim in a previous habeas petition justifies dismissal