493 U.S. at 173, 110 S.Ct. 482. Moreover, both the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit have held that permitting contractual waiver of the other rights and remedies provided alongside the collective action provision in § 216(b) — the right to minimum wage, overtime compensation, liquidated damages, and attorney’s fees — would nullify the purposes of the Act. Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. at 707, 65 S.Ct. 895 (addressing whether an employee’s written waiver of rights under § 216 barred a subsequent action to recover statutory damages and reasoning that “a statutory right conferred on a private party, but affecting the public interest, may not be waived or released if such waiver or release contravenes the statutory policy”); Silva v. Miller, 307 Fed.Appx. 349 (11th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). “Recognizing that there are often great
holding that where a state statute provides for the award of attorneys fees those fees can be considered as part of the amount in controversy for the purpose of determining federal diversity jurisdiction holding that money received in settlement refers to the injured persons net recovery after paying attorney fees and costs a client does not receive attorneys fees under the statute because a lawyer has a claim to such fees as soon as a settlement agreement is reached holding that plaintiff was not the prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorneys fees even where the court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of a settlement agreement because there was insufficient judicial sanctioning of the alteration of the parties legal relationship holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement holding that the flsa provides for reasonable attorneys fees and the parties cannot contract in derogation of flsas provisions even in a settlement agreement