the defendant’s motion for new trial would be sustained. We stated that “[u]nless we can say that there is no legal cause or reason for ordering the conditional remittitur or granting a new trial, the action of the trial court must be sustained.” Id. at 748, 224 N.W.2d at 187. We affirmed the trial court’s decision, concluding: It is only necessary that we find tenable grounds to support the conclusion that the jury verdict ... is excessive. Such grounds are clearly present. The trial court was acting within the proper bounds of its discretion in entering the order granting a new trial upon the refusal of the plaintiff to file the remittitur. Id. at 750, 224 N.W.2d at 188. See, also, e.g., Scherz v. Platte Valley Public Power and Irrigation District, 151 Neb. 415, 37 N.W.2d 721 (1949) (<HOLDING>). The dissent to this case concedes that this
recognizing that appellate court is in same position as trial court to assess evidence when all of the proof is contained in the record by deposition holding that there is a presumption that new evidence discovered by criminal defendant after trial is over would not change outcome of trial holding that an order granting a new trial in a civil action is appealable holding that superior court erred in reversing trial courts order granting new trial and remanding for a new trial limited to apportionment of damages holding that where there is evidence sufficient to sustain finding of trial court that prejudicial error was contained in record there is no basis for stating that trial court abused discretion in granting new trial