or offer was made in that case, the automatic suspension remained in place. In In re Long, 984 S.W.2d 623 (Tex.1999), the supreme court again recognized the trial court’s discretion to deny suspension of a final “other judgment” and again placed the burden on the appellee to request that the trial court deny suspension of the judgment or to offer to post a bond. In that case, the court first noted the appellant’s exempt status: As a county official sued in his or her official capacity, a district clerk’s notice of appeal operates as a supersedeas bond. As a general rule, a district clerk’s appeal, when perfected, automatically supersedes the trial court’s judgment, and that suspension remains in eff ies for Affordable Util. Rates, 776 S.W.2d 221, 222 (Tex.App.-Austin 1989, no writ) (<HOLDING>)).... But [the ap-pellee did not seek denial of
holding that district court has discretionary authority under former rule 47f to deny a city suspension of an injunction pending appeal holding that appellate jurisdiction to review special appearance rulings was not limited solely to interlocutory appeal authorized by section 51014a7 of the civil practice and remedies code holding same as to the filing of a notice of an interlocutory appeal holding that mandamus is an appropriate remedy because the trial courts issuance of temporary orders is not subject to interlocutory appeal holding that when a state commission has the right under section 6001 of the texas civil practice and remedies code to supersede an order the trial court cannot deny suspension of a temporary injunction under former rule 43a currently texrapp p 291b pending an interlocutory appeal