297 (citing United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157, 117 S.Ct. 633, 136 L.Ed.2d 554 (1997) and United States v. Chance, 306 F.3d 356, 396 (6th Cir.2002)). Quoting United States v. Solorio, 337 F.3d 580, 597 n. 14 (6th Cir.2003), we stated that “[i]t is entirely plausible that a district judge could find one drug quantity made out by a preponderance of the evidence even though the jury found a lesser quantity proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Wilson, 94 Fed.Appx. at 297. Further, in Chance, we held that “a district court may take into consideration uncharged conduct or even conduct for which the defendant has been acquitted so long as that conduct has been proven by a preponderance of the evidence.” 306 F.3d at 396; see also United States v. Vaughn, 430 F.Sd 518, 526-27 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Magallanez, 408 F.3d 672,
holding that a district court may not impose a sentencing enhancement based on conduct of which the jury acquitted the defendant holding that a district court may find acquitted conduct by a preponderance of the evidence holding that the district court was permitted to find conduct that had been acquitted by the jury when determining the defendants sentence holding that after booker a district court may sentence a defendant taking into account acquitted conduct and explaining that there is no logical inconsistency in determining that a preponderance of the evidence supports a finding about which there remains a reasonable doubt holding that criminal conduct of which defendant is acquitted may be used as sentencing factor if proved by preponderance of the evidence