not entertain a reserve officer’s non-promotion claim until she has first presented it to the Secretary in accordance with the clear congressional command of § 14502(g). The remaining question is whether Harkness’s constitutional claim falls within the scope of this exclusive scheme. We conclude that it does. Harkness’s claim is plainly “based in any way on [his] failure ... to be selected for promotion by a selection board.” As evidence, we need look no further than his standing to bring it. Harkness’s claim arose because he suffered injury when the 2007 board allegedly failed to promote him for religious reasons and because he is likely to suffer the same injury when he is considered for promotion by subsequent boards. Cf. In re Navy Chaplaincy, 697 F.3d 1171, 1175-77 (D.C.Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). Put another way, the sole reason Harkness has
holding that article iii standing is necessary for intervention holding that a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must show a real or immediate threat that he will be wronged again to establish article iii standing recognizing that the government not the relator must have suffered the injury in fact required for article iii standing holding that article iii standing is not a prerequisite to intervention holding that chaplains who were likely to be considered for promotion faced an imminent threat of future injury sufficient to establish article iii standing