(for instance, via statute or administrative policy), and the deprivation of that benefit “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, 115 S.Ct. at 2300; see, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2976, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (prisoners may not be deprived of statutory “good-time credits” without due process); cf. Dudley v. Stewart, 724 F.2d 1493, 1497-98 (11th Cir.1984) (explaining how the state, creates liberty interests). In the first situation, the liberty interest exists' apart from the state; in the second situation, the liberty interest is created by the state. Bass, 170 F.3d at 1318 (footnote omitted); see also Magluta v. Samples, 375 F.3d 1269, 1282 (11th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Applying this standard, in Bass, the Eleventh
recognizing that the federal pleading standard is a less stringent standard than the delaware pleading standard holding that the preponderance standard is generally constitutional holding that even if the standard for waiver is clear the standard was not met holding that the unwarranted hardship standard was less restrictive than the constitutional taking standard and meant the denial of the reasonable and significant use of the property recognizing a new sandin standard under which there is no liberty interest and no constitutional violation  if the sandin atypical and significant hardship standard is not met