the future, the SEC would be justified in suspending him more permanently. With the evidence found, it suspended him only for a limited period. That sanction not only protects the investing public but clarifies to Jones that the provisions he violated cannot be relegated in his mind merely to obstructive operating requirements. The public interest demands enforcement and compliance with the rules for fair disclosure, adequate operating capital, recordkeep-ing, and reporting in connection with securities offerings. We believe that the SEC acted well within the discretion conferred on it in sanctioning violations of the securities laws by the suspensions imposed in this case. See, e.g., Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm’n Co., 411 U.S. 182, 185-86, 93 S.Ct. 1455, 1458, 36 L.Ed.2d 142 (1973) (<HOLDING>); Svalberg v. SEC, 876 F.2d 181, 185
holding that an agencys choice of sanction should be overturned only if unwarranted in law or  without justification in fact holding that the evidence must be sufficient to support the agencys findings of fact and that the agencys inferences from those facts must be reasonable holding that party waived an objection to choice of law holding that an agencys decision is to be set aside only if it is arbitrary capricious an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law  holding that under texas choice of law principles contractual choice of law provisions are generally upheld