infliction of discipline upon an attorney previously qualified and in good standing will not and should not transform his services into ineffective assistance. 785 F.2d at 697. The court noted that his admission to the bar allowed it to assume that counsel had the training, knowledge, and ability to represent a client, regardless of his disbarment for unrelated conduct by another court. Circumstances similar to those before us in the present case were considered in Vance v. Lehman, 64 F.3d 119 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, Vance v. Horn, 516 U.S. 1059, 116 S. Ct. 736, 133 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1996). In that case, defense counsel had originally been properly admitted to practice law in California. After disciplinary proceedings were brought against him in that state, he relocated to P (1996) (<HOLDING>). In State v. Bennett, 256 Neb. 747, 591 N.W.2d
holding that an attorneys conflict of interest gives rise to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the sixth amendment and establishes prejudice per se holding that the test for ineffective assistance of counsel in termination cases is generally the same as in criminal proceedings recognizing reluctance to designate any error as per se ineffective assistance holding criminal defendant received per se ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorneys practice had been taken over by state bar and court pursuant to statute which allowed takeover after determination that attorney was incompetent to represent clients holding attorneys suspension during proceedings did not result in per se ineffective assistance of counsel distinguishing case from those in which laypersons masquerade as attorneys