regulations implementing the VCAA. The petitioners objected to 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) on the ground that it was inconsistent with section 5103(a), in part because it did not require VA to provide specific notice to claimants. Paralyzed Veterans, 345 F.3d at 1347. In refusing to hold the regulation invalid for this reason, we stated that “the regulation is clearly consistent with the statute, and its requirements are both reasonable and sufficient.” Id. at 1348. Finally, while we think that section 5103(a) must be interpreted as requiring only generic notice at the outset, even if the statute were ambiguous, we would be required to defer to the VA’s interpretation under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) (<HOLDING>). The Secretary of Veterans Affairs has
holding that a court is not empowered to substitute its judgement for that of the agency holding that chevron deference is due only to a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency holding that a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency holding that the court may not under the guise of statutory construction rewrite a statutory provision holding that court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency