injury to an individual” and "commit an act clearly dangerous to human life,” this Court held that the lesser offense of manslaughter was functionally equivalent to the greater offense of murder because the "commission of an act clearly dangerous to human life, shooting with a firearm, is the circumstance surrounding the conduct, which would be the same under either murder or manslaughter.” Cavazos v. State, 382 S.W.3d 377, 384 (Tex.Crim.App.2012). Furthermore, as another example of functional equivalence, this Court has held that indecency with a child by contact was a lesser-included offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child even though it contained an element, intent, that was not found in the greater offense. See Evans v. State, 299 S.W.3d 138, 142-43 (Tex.Crim.App.2009) (<HOLDING>). PRICE, J., filed a concurring opinion. I join
holding that indecency with a child by contact is lesserincluded offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child because even though the latter offense did not include intent as an express element lascivious intent was implicitly included holding extraneous acts of touching of complainant and her friend were admissible in indecency with a child prosecution because defendants charged conduct was as consistent with accident as with a specific lascivious intent holding in a juryunanimity case that indecency with a child by contact is a conductoriented offense holding that failure to give lesserincluded charge of simple assault as lesserincluded offense of aggravated assault on police officer was reversible error holding that it was error to direct entry of a conviction for a permissive lesserincluded offense based on the fact that it was supported by the evidence because the greater crime was not charged in a manner that encompassed the intent element of the permissive lesserincluded offense and the jury did not make a finding regarding that intent element