791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The relevant consideration is whether the justifications underlying the issuance of the injunction refer to the content of the restricted ex pression. See id. (examining content neutrality of local ordinance and concluding that “[a] regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of the expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others”). Contrary to Scott’s contentions, the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that an injunction is content-based simply because it restricts only the speech of anti-abortion protestors. See Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 762-63, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1994) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that the purpose of the modified
holding that the fact that injunction at issue did not restrict the expression of those demonstrating in favor of abortion rights was justly attributable to the lack of any similar demonstrations by those in favor of abortion rights and noting that the state court imposed restrictions on petitioners incidental to their antiabortion message because they repeatedly violated the courts original order holding that where the issue is one of arbitrability the federal presumption in favor of arbitration shifts to favor a court determination recognizing that a court is without jurisdiction to issue an injunction which would interfere with the rights of those who are not parties to the action holding as moot appeal from circuit court injunction prohibiting abortion where abortion performed during appellate stay recognizing that a court must balance the policy in favor of hearing a litigants claims on the merits with the policy in favor of finality