that point was unnecessary. Turning to O’Neal’s argument that counsel should have objected to Owens’s testimony about what O’Neal’s accomplice said during the drive to Lake Oolagah, the district court correctly noted that the accomplice’s statements were admissible non-hearsay. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 2801(B)(2)(e). Consequently, failing to object was not deficient performance. Regarding counsel’s failure to request a jury instruction about Oklahoma’s 85% rule, the district court correctly observed that there is no federal requirement for instructing jurors about parole eligibility in a non-capital case, and that when O’Neal was tried, Oklahoma law did not require such an instruction. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 156, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Anderson v. State, 130 P.3d 273, 283
holding that when a state asserts future dangerousness as grounds for imposing a death sentence due process requires that a defendant be entitled to inform the jury that he is parole ineligible holding that where the capital defendants future dangerousness is at issue and state law prohibits the defendants release on parole due process requires that the sentencing jury be informed that the defendant is parole ineligible holding that the parole commission is required to state reasons for its finding that an inmate continues to be a poor candidate for parole release holding that habeas petition challenging the state boards decision to defer his scheduled parole release date was rendered moot by prisoners release from custody on parole and subsequent incarceration for violating his parole holding that a defendant at federal sentencing who is on state parole where no parole revocation has occurred is not subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment thus ussg  5g13 is inapplicable