give rise to criminal liability without the need to establish any additional elements, provided that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is met by the prosecution. Cf. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75, 85 S. Ct. 209, 13 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1964) (concluding, in criminal libel context, that criminal libel prosecutions are permissible so long as the malice standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964) — a civil libel case — is met); Mink v. Knox, 613 F.3d 995, 1005 n.7 (10th Cir. 2010) (“Civil and criminal libel cases ‘are subject to the same constitutional limitations.’ ”) (quoting Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 157, 99 S. Ct. 1635, 60 L. Ed. 2d 115 & n.1 (1979)); In re Gronowicz, 764 F.2d 983, 988 & n.4 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc) (<HOLDING>), cert, denied sub nom. Gronowicz v. United
holding that there is no distinction having any first amendment significance between criminal libel and civil libel or criminal fraud and civil fraud for libelous or fraudulent speech both have no first amendment protection in either the civil or criminal context holding that jurisdiction of the subject matter  in either a civil or criminal action may be raised at any stage of the proceedings even after a plea of guilty and for the first time in the appellate court holding civil factual sufficiency preservation requirements do not apply in criminal context holding that the first amendment right of access applies to a summary judgment motion in a civil case holding civil action cannot be joined to a criminal appeal