by that order, that is, parties “directly and adversely affected pecuniarily.” Harker v. Troutman (In re Troutman Enters., Inc.), 286 F.3d 359, 364 (6th Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, as we explain below, the doctrine of appellate standing is not applicable under the circumstances of this case. We are aware of no case that applies the appellate-standing doctrine when it is undisputed that the party who initially challenged the bankruptcy court’s order— here Hyundai — had appellate standing to do so. The appellate-standing doctrine has been applied almost exclusively in cases in which the question is whether the party who appealed the bankruptcy court’s order was sufficiently aggrieved by that order. See, e.g., In re Troutman Enters., 286 F.3d at 364-65 (<HOLDING>); Marlow v. Rollins Cotton Co. (In re The
holding that shareholders of debtor corporation lacked appellate standing to appeal bankruptcy courts order awarding insurance proceeds to trustee holding that bankruptcy discharge eliminates only a debtors personal liability and not the debt itself and that a bankruptcy trustee stands in the shoes of the debtor and can bring a legal malpractice claim as trustee holding that creditor lacked appellate standing to appeal order of bankruptcy court absent permission of bankruptcy court holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue holding that a trustee lacked standing to sue a third party for damages incurred by debenture holders of the corporate debtor