per the exclusivity provisions of the Act. 1. Massachusetts Law At the outset, the Court observes that the appellate cases Molina cites, namely, Nurhberg v. GTE Transport, 34 Mass.App.Ct. 904 (1993), and Lang v. Edward J. Lamothe Co., 20 Mass.App.Ct. 231 (1985), do not control the case at bar given the distinguishing factual circumstances here present. While Nurhberg and Lang recite the familiar principle that only direct employers, and not “special employers,” are immune from common-law personal injury suits under the Workers’ Compensation Act, the decisions do not address whether the same result obtains in the face of an alternate employer endorsement written into the applicable workers’ compensation insurance policy. See Nürnberg, 34 Mass.App.Ct. at 904; Lang, 20 Mass.App.Ct. at 234 (<HOLDING>); cf. Fleming, 71 Mass.App.Ct. at 228 (noting
holding that the statutory restrictions relative to an employers affirmative defenses where the employer elects not to operate under the respective workers compensation law cannot extend so as to deprive the employer of being able to require the plaintiffemployee to establish a case of negligence against the employer holding that an employees private arbitration agreement with her employer precluded her from filing suit against the employer under the adea holding that a lent employees acceptance of his special employment status could be implied from his acquiescence to the control and direction of the special employer holding that the employer was not the insurers agent holding that glc 152 15 provides that the only party immune from suit under the statute is the direct employer a special employer is not immune because the special employer is not liable for the payment of workers compensation and there was no agreement between the direct employer and the special employer that the special employer would be liable for the payment of such compensation