298 (1989) (“NOPSI ”), we hold that it is generally appropriate for a district court to abstain on Burford grounds only when asked to provide equitable relief. Alternatively, we hold that even if Burford abstention would be available when a district court is not asked to grant equitable relief, the district court in this case did not abuse its discretion when it declined to abstain on Burford grounds. We therefore affirm. I. Background Because we are reviewing the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss, we must accept as true the allegations of the complaint. Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1174 (2d Cir.1993) (reviewing grant of motion to dismiss under Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)); see also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (<HOLDING>). We accordingly relate the plaintiffs’ version
holding that a pro se complaint  should not be dismissed unless it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief recognizing the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief holding that dismissal is proper only if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief holding that a court should not dismiss a complaint pursuant to rule 12b6 for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief  holding that a complaint will not be dismissed unless it appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim