studying [the condition],” it was his opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that plaintiff’s compensable “injury could have or would have aggravated or caused the fibromyalgia.” Dr. Payne noted further that plaintiff’s history did not reveal any causative factor, other than the work-related injury, for the onset of fibromyalgia. In light of this testimony, we hold that Dr. Payne’s opinion regarding the etiology of plaintiff’s current condition is more than mere speculation and, thus, was sufficient to support the Commission’s finding that “[plaintiff’s] reactive fibromyalgia was caused or substantially aggravated by her original injury by accident.” See Hedrick v. PPG Industries, 126 N.C. App. 354, 484 S.E.2d 856, disc. review denied, 346 N.C. 546, 488 S.E.2d 801 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Keel v. H & V Inc., 107 N.C. App. 536, 421
holding that use of tangible property must be proximate cause of injury and that property does not cause injury if it does no more than furnish the condition that makes the injury possible holding that injury to broker through loss of commission was not antitrust injury holding that allegation of procedural injury does not affect the issues of injury in fact or causation recognizing the natural consequences flowing from a compensable injury absent an independent intervening cause are compensable as well as the aggravation of a preexisting condition infirmity or disease by a workrelated injury holding that although cause of dystonia unknown experts opinion regarding causation based on temporal relationship between plaintiffs workrelated injury and onset of condition was sufficient to support commission s finding that dystonia was caused by compensable injury