defendants settled with appellees, leaving no issue concerning them for the jury to determine, the trial court erred in allowing the McAdams and Chilcoat third-parties to participate in the trial as adversaries of appellants; and (3) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the “reasonably prudent operator standard” is not “reduced” as to appellants because of the fact that appel-lees have other lessors in the same pooled unit and that other lessors should not be considered in deciding whether appellees failed to comply with their duty of good faith to appellants. We first address appellants’ contention that the trial court erred in permitting appellees to join the McAdams and Chil-coat groups as third-party defendants p.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ refd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). Had appellants prevailed on their claim to
holding in summary judgment context that appellate court may consider other grounds that the movant preserved for review and trial court did not rule on in the interest of judicial economy holding that the trial court did not err in denying a plea in abatement to obtain joinder of other royalty owners in a pooled unit on grounds that the presence of the other royalty owners was not necessary to determine whether sabre pooled in bad faith and breached the terms of the lease holding that the trial court did not err in denying a plea in abatement on grounds that individuals owning the balance of the working interest were not necessary parties holding that trial court did not err holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment