interested entities, is not a proper party to challenge the trial court’s orders severing Triton 88 from the underlying case and appointing a receiver for Triton 88 and Triton 2000. We conclude that BJVSD may not invoke the doctrine of virtual representation under the circumstances of this case. See Lumbermens, 184 S.W.3d at 723-25. Because BJVSD was not a party to the underlying judgment or the complained-of orders and has not established its right to participate on appeal on the basis of the virtual-representation doctrine, we hold that BJVSD lacks standing to pursue this appeal. Id. at 723 (stating that, generally, only parties of record may appeal trial court’s judgment). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Tex.R.App. P. 42.3(a); Novak, 52 S.W.3d at 708 (<HOLDING>). Conclusion We dismiss the appeal for lack of
holding that a reviewable final order is necessary for subjectmatter jurisdiction holding that a persons lack of standing to institute or maintain a derivative action on behalf of a texas corporation deprives texas courts of subjectmatter jurisdiction and the proper procedure is to dismiss the derivative action for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction holding that standing is component of subjectmatter jurisdiction and subjectmatter jurisdiction is essential to courts authority to hear case holding that a district court had jurisdiction to impose rule 11 sanctions regardless of the existence of subjectmatter jurisdiction holding that failure to comply with statutory prerequisite deprived the courts of subjectmatter jurisdiction