notice. Although in R.G. the record contained an order that notice be sent, we nonetheless find it controlling here. Appellant next argues that R.G. was wrongly decided because it did not require the State affirmatively to show he received notice. Appellant cites no authority holding section 54.11 places this burden on the State. Rather, he analogizes to Family Code section 53.06, which provides, “The juvenile court shall direct issuance of a summons to ... the child named in the petition.... ” Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 53.06 (Vernon 1996). He also relies on the case law interpreting section 53.06, which requires the State affirmatively to show the juvenile received service of summons for jurisdiction to vest in the juvenile court. See In the Matter of D.W.M., 562 S.W.2d 851, 853 (Tex.1978) (<HOLDING>); see also Grayless v. State, 567 S.W.2d 216,
holding juveniles statement inadmissible when after being placed in custody police took juvenile to police station and held juvenile in area where adult suspects were held instead of taking juvenile to a juvenile processing office or any of the places listed as an alternative in section 5202 and placing juvenile in specifically designated office for juveniles holding that juvenile court has no jurisdiction to consider constitutional claims recognizing juveniles right to counsel in certain juvenile proceedings holding the trial court had jurisdiction where summons was served on the attorney advocate for the juveniles guardian ad litem holding 1 record must affirmatively show summons with which juvenile was served for jurisdiction to vest in juvenile court and 2 no jurisdiction existed despite juveniles attendance because no affirmative showing of service was made