Beverage, 842 F.2d at 584 n. 1 (internal citations omitted). The district court’s holding in this case that only competing vendors would have standing to sue on the basis of the challenged vendor payments effectively imposed a “primary line” competitive injury requirement on the Blue Tree Owners’ § 2(c) claim. As the Supreme Court explained in Simplicity Pattern, however, [s]ubsections (c), (d), and (e) [of § 2 of the Robinson-Patman Act] unqualifiedly make unlawful certain business practices other than price discriminations .... [T]he proscriptions of these three subsections are absolute. Unlike § 2(a), none of them requires, as proof of a prima facie violation, a showing that the illicit practice has had an injurious or destructive effect on competition. 360 U.S. at 65, 79 S.Ct. 1005 (<HOLDING>); see also Biddle, 96 F.2d at 690 (noting that
holding that a prima facie case is subject to independent review recognizing confusion caused by prima facie language holding that nominative fair use is an affirmative defense to a prima facie case of likelihood of confusion similar to the fair use defense holding that a rule 60b6 movant must show the existence of a meritorious prima facie defense holding that absence of competitive injury was not a defense to prima facie violation of  2e