are not persuaded that the effectiveness inquiry under the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the assistance of counsel informs the inquiry relevant to an alleged violation of access to the courts. We first observe that the two rights— assistance of counsel and access to the courts — do not share a common constitutional source. The right to assistance of counsel — interpreted as the right to effective assistance of counsel, see Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932)—is explicitly guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, which provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. Const, amend. VI; see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (<HOLDING>). By contrast, the right of access to the
holding the sixth amendment right to a jury trial applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment holding that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the sixth amendment right to counsel holding the sixth amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment holding that it is wellsettled that the sixth and fourteenth amendments of the united states constitution guarantee a defendant on trial for his life the right to an impartial jury holding that the sixth amendments guarantee of the assistance of counsel is made obligatory upon the states by the fourteenth amendment