at 511, 784 P.2d 715 (“That some other such properties may have received variances is immaterial else each grant of a variance would effect a city-wide zoning change.”). ¶ 26 Additionally, the statute and the Zoning Ordinance require that the special circumstances cannot be created by the owner or applicant, but rather must relate to the property, the land, building or use, as opposed to any personal hardship suffered by the owner or applicant. See AR.S. § 9-462.06 H 2; Phx., Ariz., Zoning Ordinances §§ 303.B.2.b, 307.A9.b, 10.b; see also Arkules, 151 Ariz. at 441, 728 P.2d 657 (stating that the board has “no authority to grant a variance to allow [applicant’s] personal preference for a color which would enhance the design he chose for his house”); Burns, 156 Ariz. at 505, 753 P.2d 193 (<HOLDING>); Rivera v. City of Phoenix, 186 Ariz. 600,
holding that an ordinance exempting certain signs from a general sign ban was an unconstitutional contentbased restriction on speech holding that variance applicants decision to be a threecar dealership necessitating sign large enough to meaningfully display three manufacturers logos in excess of sign size permitted by city ordinance was a special circumstance or hardship that was selfinflicted holding city ordinance preempted by state law because ordinance prohibited act specifically allowed under state law holding that a plaintiff did not have a redressable injury where its sign permit applications were denied on the basis of one provision in a countys sign ordinance but could have been denied on the basis of some alternate but unchallenged regulation holding that the plaintiffs due process challenge to a city ordinance was barred because it was inextricably intertwined with a statecourt ruling that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the ordinance