a home and family support structure in place to help him upon release. Given this evidence of changes in appellant’s life and the judge’s finding that appellant has never “done anything bad” to these children, we conclude the evidence is factually insufficient for the trial court to have formed a firm conviction or belief that terminating appellant’s parental rights is in the children’s best interest. See In re W.C., 98 S.W.3d 753, 766 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (finding factually insufficient evidence to support best interest finding where mother, despite past bad conduct, had “made significant progress, improvements, and changes in her life,” had a good support system in place, and had done everything possible to have her children returned); In re C.T.E., 95 S.W.3d at 467-69 (<HOLDING>); In re K.C.M., 4 S.W.3d 392, 399
holding that a credibility determination based on among other things a tendency to exaggerate was supported by substantial evidence holding evidence insufficient to support finding of implied contract holding evidence to support best interest finding factually insufficient when among other things incarcerated father had prepared to be reunited with his family by taking parenting courses anger management classes and job training holding that pleading was insufficient where the plaintiff failed to among other things set forth the dates of any fraudulent statements holding it error to admit testimony where among other things there was no evidence that defendants appearance had changed since the time of the robbery