amount.” 11 U.S.C. § 502(b); see In re McLaren, 3 F.3d 958, 965-66 (6th Cir.1993); In re Hallahan, 936 F.2d 1496, 1508 (7th Cir.1991). Thus, it is illogical to separate th t in the bankruptcy court’s inherent equitable powers. It has long been the rule that bankruptcy courts sit as courts of equity, see Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304-05, 60 S.Ct. 238, 244, 84 L.Ed. 281 (1939), and once a court sitting in equity has jurisdiction over the parties to a controversy brought before it, the court can decide all disputed matters and decree complete relief. Alexander v. Hillman, 296 U.S. 222, 242, 56 S.Ct. 204, 211, 80 L.Ed. 192 (1935); see also In re Hallahan, 936 F.2d at 1508; In re Beck Indus., 605 F.2d 624, 634 (2d Cir.1979); cf. Abramowitz v. Palmer, 999 F.2d 1274, 1279 (8th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). The bankruptcy court properly exercised such
holding that bankruptcy court possessed jurisdiction to enter money judgment in noncore proceeding against third party holding that after stem bankruptcy judges have the authority to enter interlocutory orders in noncore proceedings and in core proceedings as to which the bankruptcy court may not enter final orders or judgment consistent with article iii absent consent recognizing that where a bankruptcy court makes proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in a noncore proceeding its action would  become final and effective if a party did not file timely objections holding that in a noncore proceeding a bankruptcy court may enter final orders with the consent of all the parties to the proceeding holding that the eleventh amendment does not bar a bankruptcy court from issuing a money judgment against a state under the bankruptcy code