or control of the residence. The evidence showed that Appellant maintained some furniture and belongings at the residence. Appellant’s frequent and prolonged absences from the registered i-esidence did not establish that he had stopped using the house as his primary residence. See Shelton v. State, No. 05-01-00458-CR, 2003 WL 1870529, at *2-4 (Tex.App.-Dallas Apr. 14, 2003, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (finding that the appellant had not , moved from his registered residence even though he would frequently spend several consecutive nights at local motels). Nor did the lack of utility services at the registered address establish that Appellant no longer used the house as his residence. See Silber v. State, 371 S.W.3d 605, 609-13 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). As the offense was alleged in the indictment,
holding that the appellant had not changed his residence from his registered address despite the fact that the house had never had electricity service during the time that he had lived there holding that service was proper where a copy of the summons and complaint was left with the defendants wife at the defendants maryland house in which the defendant had lived before moving ahead of his family to arizona where he had purchased a house intending never to return to maryland and to move his family to arizona noting that the service was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of service at the defendants dwelling house or usual place of abode where the service succeeded in actually apprising him of the lawsuit holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present holding that a defendant had constructive possession over firearms located in a residence where he lived and kept his personal effects holding defendants 15yearold daughter had actual authority to consent because she lived full time in the house and had unrestricted access to it