with Fed.R.Evid. 403 and 404(b) if it is relevant to a proper purpose and if the probative value outweighs any unfair prejudice. Rule 404(b) expressly recognizes “knowledge” and “intent” as issues for which uncharged bad act evidence may be admitted. In this case, the district court found that the prior forged check deposits were relevant to these sharply disputed issues and that the probative value of this evidence outweighed any unfair prejudice. We review the district court’s ruling for “clear abuse of discretion,” United States v. Pipola, 83 F.3d 556, 566 (2d Cir.1996), and find none in this case. When knowledge and intent are disputed, a defendant’s commission of similar bad acts is generally deemed probative. See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 297 F.3d 52, 59 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). While the charged and uncharged acts must be
holding corporate officer liable as aider and abettor in filing of false reports even though reports were not authorized or approved of by officers holding that where defendant disputed his knowledge and intent to facilitate securities fraud by producing false audit reports evidence of his prior preparation of false audit reports in connection with a similar fraud scheme was properly admitted holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid the securities fraud exception by pleading mail fraud or wire fraud if the conduct giving rise to those offenses also amounts to securities fraud holding that fraud claim requires proof that the defendant made a material representation that was false holding that the chief financial officer of a hospital had sufficient access to the allegedly false cost reports resulting from the false invoices to require him to plead at least one example of a false claim with particularity