at the time they gave consent, the phrase “the Magistrate Judge” manifests their consent to the exercise of jurisdiction only by Magistrate Judge Niedermeier and not by any other magistrate judge. Even if we were to construe defendants’ initial consent as narrowly as they urge, their jurisdictional challenge would, not succeed. By appearing without objection before Magistrate Judge Conroy and filing various submissions with the court, including a motion for summary judgment, after receiving notice of the case reassignment, defendants — who had been advised of their right to decline to have their case resolved by a magistrate judge — implicitly consented to Magistrate Judge Conroy’s exercise of jurisdiction. See Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 590, 123 S.Ct. 1696, 155 L.Ed.2d 775 (2003) (<HOLDING>). To hold otherwise would effectively permit
holding that court may imply consent for purposes of  636c1 where  the litigant or counsel was made aware of the need for consent and the right to refuse it and still voluntarily appeared to try the case before the magistrate judge holding under state constitution that validity of consent search requires knowledge of right to refuse consent holding that persons knowledge of his right to refuse a consent to search is a factor but not a necessary prerequisite to demonstrating a voluntary consent holding that police must prior to entering the home inform the person from whom consent is sought that he or she may lawfully refuse to consent to the search holding that magistrate judge could without consent of parties hold a pretrial hearing and issue a report and recommendation based on the findings made