be hazardous to the lives of more than one person and that a great risk of death was knowingly created. See, e.g., State v. Rose, 327 N.C. 599, 605-06, 398 S.E.2d 314, 317-18 (1990) (discussing use of a weapon, whereas the case at bar involves a device, i.e., a vehicle). As to whether defendant’s Jeep was hazardous to the lives of more than one person, “ [i]t is well settled in North Carolina that an automobile can be a deadly weapon if it is driven in a feckless or dangerous manner.” State v. Jones, 353 N.C. 159, 164, 538 S.E.2d 917, 922 (2000). The conclusion is unavoidable that a vehicle driven at a high rate of speed by an intoxicated operator is normally hazardous to the lives of more than one person. See State v. McBride, 118 N.C. App. 316, 319-20, 454 S.E.2d 840, 842 (1995) (<HOLDING>). As to whether defendant knowingly created a
holding that a recklessly operated vehicle constituted a device which in its normal use is hazardous to the lives of more than one person and any reasonable person should know that an automobile operated by a legally intoxicated driver is reasonably likely to cause death to any and all persons who may find themselves in the automobiles path holding that police officers who instructed an intoxicated and unlicensed teenager who was a passenger in a vehicle operated by his intoxicated relative to drive the vehicle home rather than go through the effort of preparing arrest paperwork for the two intoxicated subjects were immune from liability for damages resulting from deaths of two innocent motorists and injuries to another cause by the drunk driving relative recognizing that on the part of a fiduciary there is a duty to make a full disclosure of any and all material facts within his knowledge and of which he knows or should know that the other person is ignorant holding that corpus delicti of dwi is that someone drove or operated motor vehicle in public place while intoxicated holding with no analysis that any person or organization who may be legally liable therefor applies to a person legally liable for injuries caused by an accident   4 when under the facts of the case the only person to whom the clause could have applied was a tortfeasor