waived his attorney-client privilege when his attorney failed to make timely objections to questions that it alleged sought privileged communications. This argument has no merit for two reasons. First, many of the questions Airdata asked did not seek confidential communications. Therefore, no objection was necessary to preserve the privilege. Second, Jenney’s current attorney did make timely objections to those questions actually seeking confidential communications. The fact that Jenney’s attorney had to interrupt him to make the objection is not sufficient to establish a waiver. Because the objections were made as soon as the confidential nature of the communication became apparent, Jenney did not waive the privilege. Cf. Gen. Motors Corp. v. McGee, 837 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (<HOLDING>); Abamar Hous. & Dev., Inc. v. Lisa Daly Lady
holding that the inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document does not waive the attorneyclient privilege if attorney took all reasonable steps to avoid disclosure and asserted the privilege as soon as the disclosure became known holding that where an authorized disclosure is voluntarily made to a nonfederal party whether or not that disclosure is denominated confidential the government waives any claim that the information is exempt from disclosure under the deliberative process privilege holding that disclosure orders adverse to the attorneyclient privilege do not qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine holding attorneyclient privilege protects disclosure of communications but does not protect client from disclosure of underlying facts holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure  contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant