the “reasonable suspicion” standard discussed in United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273-274, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). (Docket No. 108 at 2). The Plaintiffs rely on United States v. King, 604 F.3d 125 (3d Cir.2010), for the proposition that the “probable cause” standard should be applied in this case. (Docket No. 111 at 3). Unfortunately, King provides little guidance as to this issue for two separate reasons. First, the sentence in King relied upon by the Plaintiffs directly contradicts the Supreme Court’s decision in Steagald. Compare King, 604 F.3d at 137 (“Officers may enter a third party’s residence to arrest the subject of an arrest warrant if they have probable cause to believe she is inside”) (emphasis added), with Steagald, 451 U.S. at 205-206, 101 S.Ct. 1642 (<HOLDING>). Second, the decision in King was issued more
holding that an arrest warrant  without a search warrant  does not permit law enforcement authorities to enter a third partys home to legally search for the subject of the arrest warrant holding that absent consent or exigent circumstances law enforcement officers cannot legally search for the subject of an arrest warrant in the home of a third party without first obtaining a search warrant holding that in die absence of exigent circumstances the mere existence of probable cause does not justify a nonconsensual entry by police into a home without an arrest or search warrant holding that arrest warrant does not authorize search of thirdparty dwelling in which arrestee does not reside in the absence of consent or exigent circumstances holding that in the absence of consent or exigent circumstances a law enforcement officer must procure a search warrant before searehing for the subject of an arrest warrant in the home of a third party