remaining reasons were pretextual, it is impossible to say on this record whether that determination was improperly tainted by the prior erroneous discounting of Sprint’s other race-neutral reasons. Because a new trial is required by the inconsistent verdicts, a separate remedy for the error in applying Batson is not necessary. III. Miscellaneous Evidentiary Issues We need not address Sprint’s claims of evidentiary error at length given our disposition of the case. However, for benefit of the district court and the parties on remand, we make the following observations. First, only the Title VII claim against Sprint and the § 1981 claims against Sprint and Crowder are at issue on retrial. Any evidence which was permitted based on the retaliatory hostile env 3d 1325, 1330 (6th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Finally, stray racial comments should
holding that negligence must be the proximate cause of injury holding that a physicians negligence need only be a proximate cause not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury holding proximate cause required for claim of breach of special duty holding that whether the negligent acts of parties combined to become the proximate cause of the injury was a question for the jury holding that district court should evaluate whether other acts were proximate to relevant action