“[I]t is only when evidence is marginally relevant and enormously prejudicial that a trial justice must exclude it.” State v. Mlyniec, 15 A.3d 983, 997 (R.I.2011) (quoting State v. DeJesus, 947 A.2d 873, 883 (R.I.2008)). Therefore, we find no error in the trial justice’s decision to allow admission of this evidence. Moreover, we recognize that the trial justice carefully weighed the risk of unfair prejudice and took affirmative efforts to ensure that the testimony offered was not unfairly prejudicial. First, he barred the introduction of evidence of a more remote incident of violen.ee against Hilario, fearing that admitting such evidence would extend Rule 404(b) too far and create an unnecessary and substantial risk of unfair prejudice against defendant. See Mlyn-iec, 15 A.3d at 998 (<HOLDING>). Additionally, the trial justice further
holding that juror access to several exhibits that had not been admitted into evidence was not prejudicial as they were cumulative of trial testimony holding the exclusion of cumulative evidence was not prejudicial error holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive holding that settlement evidence offered to show bias was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial where the witnesss testimony before and after plaintiff settled with her husband a defendant was inconsistent but the change was the opposite of what would result from bias holding that admittance of prioracts evidence was not unfairly prejudicial after observing that in an effort to ensure that the testimony was not unfairly prejudicial the trial justice carefully excluded the testimony because of its remoteness and its potential to be cumulative