and leave little room for doubt that penetration occurred. Furthermore, Dr. Roberson testified that prior to examining T.L., she was informed that the child had disclosed having vaginal, anal, and oral sex with the perpetrator. This hearsay testimony was admitted without objection, although Appellant would later argue that it was inadmissible because the information was supplied by a social worker, not T.L. Because defense counsel did not object to the testimony, the trial court did not err in considering it. Jones v. State, 332 Ark. 617, 967 S.W.2d 559 (1998); Brown v. State, 330 Ark. 603, 954 S.W.2d 273 (1997). Hearsay evidence, when admitted, may constitute substantial evidence. Johnson v. State, 298 Ark. 617, 770 S.W.2d 128 (1989). See also Jameson, 333 Ark. 128, 970 S.W.D 785 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the testimony that T. L. had
holding that in employees age discrimination suit against former employer supervisors statement to employee was not hearsay even though the statement was offered for its truth because the statement was an admission by a party opponent holding that a hearsay statement can itself be considered in first determining if a conspiracy existed when the statement was made holding that substantial evidence of rape may be found even though there was only a hearsay statement of the child victim holding that mistake as to the age of the victim is no defense to statutory rape holding that because the crime of rape involved a nonconsensual act there was a substantial risk that physical force may be used in committing the offense