as a special education teacher, and commencing her intended career. Compl. at ¶ 77. These allegations are sufficient to demonstrate ongoing harm. Likewise, Plaintiffs requested injunctive relief — that the Individual Defendants change Plaintiffs grade and permit her to continue her studies at Hunger College — is purely prospective, as it would require state officials to take future action to prevent present and future harm. See Flint, 488 F.3d at 825. The fact that this injunction also remedies a past harm does not “render[ ] an otherwise forward-looking injunction retroactive. If it did, the rule allowing prospective relief would be substantially undermined because the need for prospective relief often arises out of a past injury.” Russell v. Dunston, 896 F.2d 664, 668 (2d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>) (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 97
holding that criticism of judicial action already taken even though the cases were still pending on other points or might be revived by rehearings was not enough to satisfy the clearandpresentdanger standard holding that courts should order reinstatement under the adea whenever it is an appropriate remedy because reinstatement best serves congress purpose in enacting the adea and an award of front pay is always somewhat speculative holding that an award of attorney fees for services rendered at the instance of the custodial parent in defending an action for change of custody may be allowed even though the defense was unsuccessful and even though it was claimed that such an award violated public policy holding that trial court did not have jurisdiction to order reinstatement of previously dismissed action and thus reinstatement order was void and of no effect and previous order of dismissal was still in effect holding that reinstatement is prospective even though it contemplated changing the result of an action  already taken