the “Total Price Paid” in each case as in excess of $200,000. These documents are not, however, dispositive of the issue. Indeed, the transfer tax returns explained that the “price paid” simply represented Stowe’s current “assessed value” and that the conveyances represented merely a “[c]apital contribution to [a] limited liability company.” Furthermore, information set forth in a property tax return raises only a “presumption” of accuracy which “may be fairly rebutted.” Imported Car Ctr., Inc. v. Billings, 163 Vt. 76, 82, 653 A.2d 765, 770 (1994) (quotation omitted). Nor does the venerable doctrine of “estoppel by deed” necessarily bind the parties to the recited consideration of “ten and more dollars” in the deeds. See Weed v. Weed, 2008 VT 121, ¶ 13, 185 Vt. 83, 968 A.2d 310 (<HOLDING>); Means v. United Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 550
holding that deed was valid when the deed was conveyed to grantee corporation which formally incorporated after the conveyance recognizing that the right to seek reformation of a deed is limited to the original parties to the deed and their successors in title holding that the transfer of stock in an insolvent corporation did not constitute fair consideration to support conveyance of property to its stockholder holding that a spouse was bound by a conveyance of community property to which she was not a party because of her knowledge and acquiescence to the conveyance holding that extrinsic evidence proved that parties here did not bargain for the recited sum of ten dollars set forth in deed and that conveyance was without consideration