in finding that Hunter waived any claim of privilege to the materials in his first attorney’s case file by disclosing the materials in Hunter Habeas I. We must decide whether this error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993); accord Pulido v. Chrones, 629 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir.2010), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 338, 181 L.Ed.2d 212 (2011). We conclude that it did not. First, the State confined its use of Dr. Berg’s testimony and the Aniline letter to impeachment and rebuttal of Hunter’s diminished capacity defense. This limited use of the contested evidence was permissible. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (<HOLDING>); Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 422-23,
holding that where a defendant expressly manifested his belief in the truth of the statements contained in the motion to dismiss thereby adopting those statements as his own such statements are admissible against the defendant in the states case in chief holding that a defendant who chooses to testify in his or her own defense may not conceal contradictory statements obtained in violation of the fifth amendment from the jury holding that a conviction for an offense involving dishonesty or false statement may be used to impeach the credibility of a defendant who chooses to testify holding that right to testify not denied where inter alia defendant made no objection to his attorneys statements that defendant would not testify and made no request to testify holding that defendants exercise of right to testify in own behalf waives his fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination