any claims based on events prior to Hawkins’ tenure at the CSC were time-barred. The parties proceeded to trial on Hawkins’ remaining claims of discriminatory and retaliatory discharge. After Hawkins had presented her case, Pepsi moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(a). The district court granted Pepsi’s motion on two alternative grounds. See Hawkins v. PepsiCo, Inc., 10 F.Supp.2d 548 (M.D.N.C.1998). First, the court held that an at-will employee cannot maintain a § 1981 action for wrongful termination because the employer and employee have no contractual relationship concerning the duration of employment. See id. at 553-54. This ground has subsequently been rejected by our decision in Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 165 F.3d 1015, 1018-19 (4th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Second, the district court held that Hawkins
holding that language in employee handbook stating that it was not to be considered as creating terms and conditions of an employment contract and that the employment relationship was employment atwill  was sufficiently explicit to preclude the creation of implied contractual obligations as a matter of law holding that atwill employees have no contractual relationship with their employers to support a cause of action under section 1981 holding that an atwill employment relationship is contractual and may serve as a predicate contract for a  1981 claim holding that an atwill employee may bring a cause of action under section 1981 holding that an atwill employee may not recover for discriminatory discharge under section 1981 because the atwill relationship was not sufficiently contractual under tennessee law