to be ordered, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(a) (West 1985) (amended 1996), and replaced it with language requiring the district court to order restitution in the full amount of loss to each victim as determined by the district court, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(f)(1)(A) (West Supp.1999). Furthermore, in contrast to the VWPA, the MVRA does not contain any language requiring the district court, in determining the total amount of restitution to be ordered, to consider the financial resources of the defendant or the financial needs and earning ability of the defendant and the defendant’s dependents. Compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(f) (West Supp.1999) with 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(a) (West 1985) (amended 1996). Id. at 540 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Chay, 281 F.3d 682, 686 (7th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); United States v. McGlothlin, 249 F.3d 783,
holding the mvra prohibits the court from examining the defendants ability to pay restitution holding that court cannot order restitution under the mvra to persons who are not victims of the offenses for which the defendant was convicted holding that the ex post facto clause prohibited retroactive application of the mvra because before the mvra became effective the victim and witness protection act authorized but did not compel district courts to order restitution holding that district court may not depart downward to preserve defendants ability to make restitution holding that the relevant question in imposing restitution under the mvra is whether the loss is caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction