system because without it the basic system of marshaling assets and the distribution of proceeds to creditors would be an impossible task." Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, 205 S.W.3d 690, 702 (Tex.App.2006). . 1 14 Many courts, however, have disagreed with this view. In Crawford, the Second Cireuit thoroughly addressed this precise is sue and explicitly rejected the reasoning in Kunica. The Second Circuit noted that seetion 349(b)(8) makes no distinction between property that the debtor disclosed or failed to disclose. Crawford, 758 F.3d at 484-85. And it refused to read section 554 as overriding the broad and clear language of seetion 349(b)(8) revesting the property of the estate in the debtor upon dismissal,. Id. at 484 ("We cannot vie 793, 801 N.Y.S.2d 271, 275-76 (N.Y.App.Div.2005) (<HOLDING>); Norris v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 362 S.W.3d
holding that all property regardless of disclosure revests in the debtor upon dismissal and declining to follow kunmica and kilpatrick because the debtor did not benefit from and the creditors were not impaired by the bankruptey proceedings or the dismissal holding that all property regardless of disclosure revests in the debtor upon dismissal and declining to follow kunmica because the debtor did not obtain the functional equivalent of a discharge  holding debtor could include property because the bank accepted payments directly from the debtor and had previously allowed the debtor to cure default holding that the debtor lacked standing to bring a claim against the internal revenue service for the improper assessment of a tax deficiency because the cause of action was the property of the estate and had not been abandoned to the debtor holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate