he cannot now claim that the delay caused by his actions constitutes cruel and unusual punishment."); Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473, 1491-92 (9th Cir.1991) (A petitioner "should not be able to benefit from the ultimately unsuccessful pursuit of [his constitutional] rights."); see also Andrews v. Shulsen, 600 F.Supp. 408, 431 (D.Utah 1984), aff'd 802 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir.1986) (The procedures that led to delay in executing the petitioner "serve[d] the important state interest of keeping the post conviction process moving forward at the same time it preserve[d] petitioner's due process rights.... To accept petitioner's argument would create an irreconcilable conflict between constitutional guarantees and would be a mockery of justice."). 234 . Allen, 435 F.3d at 957-58. 235 . See id. (<HOLDING>). The Allen court was far from alone in
holding that consideration of a claim in a petition for habeas corpus can be barred by failure to comply with state procedural rules holding that active jurisdiction arose when the petitioner was detained for purposes of habeas corpus when the petition was filed holding that the defendants habeas claim was procedurally barred because it could have been or was raised in his postconviction motion holding lackey claim barred under the aedpa as a successive habeas corpus petition because the petitioner could have raised the claim in prior petitions filed respectively when incarceration had persisted for six or nine yearsthe claim did not become ripe only after fourteen years holding that the aedpa applies to those habeas corpus petitions filed after its effective date of april 24 1996