Barring Dodson from relitigating that issue would not offend “the primary purposes of collateral estoppel,” which are “to preserve the integrity of the judicial system, promote judicial economy, and protect litigants from harassment by vexatious litigation.” Riverdale Dev. Co., LLC v. Ruffin Bldg. Sys., Inc., 356 Ark. 90, 146 S.W.3d 852, 858 (2004) (quotation omitted). As all of the elements of collateral estoppel are satisfied, Dodson II precludes relitigation of whether, upon dissolution of Dodson and Lay’s marriage, UAMS acquired full authority to control the disposition of the embryos. That finding forecloses Dodson from establishing a constitutional deprivation based on her alleged right to control the disposition of her embryos. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn.1992) (<HOLDING>). The bulk of Dodson’s § 1983 claim is founded
holding that where a contract containing an arbitration clause is challenged as unconscionable those disputes should first be resolved by an arbitrator recognizing that a states interest in providing for the just and orderly disposition of property at death is of considerable magnitude holding that disputes involving the disposition of frozen embryos should be resolved first by looking at progenitors prior agreement concerning disposition holding that factual disputes are inappropriate for disposition on a motion to dismiss recognizing the disposition of property for charitable purposes  can be in the form of an absolute transfer subject to conditions