probation. Thus, it is likely that D.I.B. would have chosen to have her adjudication, disposition, or both heard by the trial court instead of a jury had she known that the trial court possessed the ability to grant probation. The jury did not grant probation. It imposed a determinate sentence of twenty years. We conclude that under these circumstances, D.I.B. demonstrated that the court’s incorrect statement of the law was harmful. For the reasons considered above, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals, which remands this case to the juvenile court for a new trial. Justice BAKER filed a concurring opinion. 1 . See Tex. Fam.Code § 54.03(b)(2). The adjudication of D.I.B. was governed by section 54.03 as it existed prior to its amendment in 1997. Becaus s Christi 1993, no writ) (<HOLDING>); I.G. v. State, 727 S.W.2d 96, 99
holding that when none of the required explanations were given that was fundamental error requiring reversal holding that failure to give explanation of allegations required reversal holding that failure to explain allegations and possible consequences was fundamental error that required reversal even though the juvenile had not raised this in his brief holding that fundamental error occurred and reversal was required when trial court failed to explain allegations or to explain adequately future use of adjudication record holding that failure to explain allegations and possible consequences mandated reversal