to offenses generally" suggests that the General Assembly intended it to apply broadly. See Carrillo, 120 (interpreting the word "offense" in a statute to suggest broad application); of. Black's Law Dictionary 1186 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "offense" as a "violation of the law"). 23 Portions of the legislative history also support the interpretation that the section was intended to apply to all types of crimes where criminality depends on a victim's age. During a 2001 committee hearing, one House sponsor said that the purpose of moving the provision was to "go[ | along" with recent court precedent holding that the affirmative defense now found in section 18-1-508.5(1) applied to an offense in a different part of the Criminal Code. See Gorman v. People, 19 P.3d 662, 667 (Colo.2000) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, one of the witnesses testified
holding that the same standard applies to claims of discrimination based upon gender and age holding that the former section 18150351 applies when the criminality of conduct depends upon a child being a certain age holding that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the physical endangerment portion of the statute when the defendant was charged only with the risk of injury to a child by doing an act likely to impair the morals of a child under the age of sixteen recognizing that moving to the second stage of the saucier analysis is appropriate when the existence of a constitutional violation depends upon the resolution of uncertain state law holding that inferred intent rule applies regardless of the age of the actor