gives that court authority to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1994). The Supreme Court has interpreted this language to mean that a plaintiff w 977). When determining jurisdiction, however, we must look to the true nature of the underlying action. See Katz v. Cisneros, 16 F.3d 1204, 1207 (Fed.Cir.1994); Livingston v. Derwinski, 959 F.2d 224, 225 (Fed.Cir.1992). Here, Terran’s claim for relief is based on the Vaccine Act and is a claim for money—that is, compensation un 28 F.2d 844, 846 (Ct.Cl.1970) (<HOLDING>). We are therefore convinced that Terran’s
holding that the court of claims did have jurisdiction over plaintiffs statutory claim for back pay including arguments based on the first amendment holding that an award of back pay is an issue for the court holding that the court of claims did not have jurisdiction over plaintiffs first amendment claim of improper removal holding that prisoner waived first amendment claim because he failed to brief arguments on appeal holding that a subsequent action was not barred because the initial court did not have jurisdiction over the claim