on the part of the outside directors than the fact that said directors are being ‘controlled’ by defendant.” Id. Third, while well-compensated membership on multiple boards within a fund complex is one factor in the control crucible, most courts have concluded that it is not sufficient evidence by itself to rebut the statutory presumption. See id. at 258-59 (rejecting a control claim where the complaint alleged service by “independent directors” on twenty-one boards with compensation ranging from $140,000 to $160,000); Krantz v. Prudential Invs. Fund Management LLC, 77 F.Supp.2d 559, 563 (D.N.J.1999) (rejecting a claim that overlapping service on between 15 and 38 boards with an average compensation of $90,000 constituted control); Langner v. Brown, 913 F.Supp. 260, 266 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (<HOLDING>); Olesh v. Dreyfus Corp., No. CV-94-1664, 1995
holding danger was not so obvious to invitee as to relieve defendant of liability as a matter of law holding that the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence is insufficient to create a dispute of fact that is genuine holding that jjust as the mere receipt of director fees does not constitute a disqualifying interest as a matter of law so too are crossdirectorships insufficient to create interests holding that the mere failure to investigate does not constitute suppression of the evidence holding that a negative performance evaluation on its own is insufficient to constitute an adverse employment action as a matter of law