that the source of the Municipality’s authority to secure the construction site stemmed from its proprietary capacity under the contract, and not its sovereign capacity. Because the Municipality is not alleged to have engaged in a sovereign act, there is no substantial constitutional claim that would support a cause of action pursuant to § 1983. Thus, here, the Municipality’s acts of terminating the construction contract and temporarily detaining OSSAM’s property do not give rise to constitutional claims cognizable under § 1983. Finally, to the extent that OSSAM complains about its exclusion from the construction site, OSSAM had no constitutional right to access the Municipality’s construction site that would give rise to a § 1983 cl Fin. Corp., 282 F.2d 439, 447 (9th Cir, 1960) (<HOLDING>); Brasier v. United States, 223 F.2d 762, 766
holding that tjermination of the government contract  frustrated appellant in obtaining anticipated profits and advantages therefrom but  qrustration and appropriation are essentially different things there was here no taking of appellants property which entitled the company to just compensation under the fifth amendment citation omitted recognizing that just compensation was required by the fifth amendment in a ease where the federal government deprived a tenant which held a longterm lease of occupancy of portions of a leased building holding that the fifth amendment did not apply to tribal government holding that californias mandatory iota program does not involve a taking of property without just compensation as prohibited by the fifth amendment to the united states constitution holding that a termination of a government contract does not constitute a taking of the plaintiffs property without just compensation or without due process of law