all improper trade practices.” (quoting D.C.Code § 28-3901(b)(1))). Hence, the DCCPPA subsumes a Sherman Act claim and creates an indirect purchaser cause of action for conspiratorial price fixing regardless of whether defendants have engaged in deceptive conduct. See Osbourne v. Capital City Mortgage Corp., 727 A.2d 322, 326 (D.C.1999); see also TFT-LCD, 586 F.Supp.2d at 1126; NMV, 350 F.Supp.2d at 183. For these 157219, at *1 (D.Kan. Mar. 13, 1996) (stating that the purpose of the KCPA “is to encourage aggrieved consumers with small claims to file suit” (quoting Equitable Life, 757 P.2d at 307)). The statute is therefore inapplicable to price-fixing claims such as those at issue in the present case. See Schoenbaum v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 517 F.Supp.2d 1125 (E.D.Mo.2007) (<HOLDING>), vacated in part on other grounds, No.
holding that in determining whether a discovery violation warrants the sanction of exclusion of evidence a court must look to whether the violation was substantial the timing of the violation the reason for the violation the degree of prejudice to the parties whether such prejudice may be cured by a postponement and the desirability of a continuance holding that the defendants failure to inform consumers of collusive prices did not constitute a violation of the kcpa holding that because code  19260 a procedural statute did not expressly provide a right of suppression of evidence a violation of that provision did not require application of the exclusionary rule in the absence of a constitutional violation holding that officers failure to talk to asserted alibi witnesses did not constitute a violation of the defendants constitutional rights holding that a plaintiff in a lanham act trademark violation action must demonstrate that the defendants violation tended to deceive consumers