days after it filed its original answer in the suit in 1999, and thus the motion was untimely under section 11.051. See id. § 11.051(1) (allowing defendant to move trial court to declare plaintiff vexatious litigant if motion filed on or before ninetieth day after defendant files original answer or makes special appearance). Even if Transportation’s motion—which was úndisputedly filéd more than ninety days after its original answer but was filed within the same instrument as its response to Akinwamide’s 2014 motion to set aside the 2000 judgment—is considered untimely, this Court has held that a trjal court may make a vexatious litigant declaration on its own motion, if it provides the plaintiff with notice and the opportunity for a hearing. See In re Douglas, 333 S.W.3d at 284-87 (<HOLDING>); see also Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code ANN. §
holding summary judgment may only be entered for one who has filed a motion asking that relief and only after notice and hearing on that motion holding that appellate court may judicially notice its own records holding that section 11101 permits trial court to make vexatious litigant determination on its own motion after notice and hearing as provided by subchapter b sections 11051057 holding trial court abused its discretion by refusing to conduct hearing and render decision on motion holding that a motion for a preliminary injunction and a hearing on that motion were insufficient to prevent the plaintiff from dismissing by notice