a liberty interest regardless of the protections state law provides or fails to provide. See id. One of those eases involved an inmate’s involuntary transfer to a mental hospital, and the other involved the involuntary administration of pyschotropic drugs to an inmate. See id. (citations omitted). In these situations, the conditions of confinement “exceeded] the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force.” Id. at 484, 115 S.Ct. at 2300. Confinement to administrative segregation, under conditions substantially similar to those experienced by the general population of the prison, does not implicate liberty interests in the way that involuntary transfer to a mental hospital or involuntary administration of p 1998) (<HOLDING>); see also Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612 (5th
holding there was no constitutional requirement that the administrative hearing be postponed pending disposition of the criminal charges holding that the final termination of the criminal proceedings occurred when criminal charges  were dismissed with prejudice rather than when the accused was released from prison pending a retrial holding that no liberty interest existed when plaintiff was kept in administrative confinement for two months pending the resolution of criminal charges arising from an altercation with a corrections officer holding that placing a prisoner in disciplinary confinement clearly effects liberty interest recognizing a liberty interest in reasonably safe conditions of confinement