to a jury trial to juveniles. See, e.g., David G. v. Pollard ex rel. County of Pima, 207 Ariz. 308, 314, 86 P.3d 364 (2004) (concluding trial court erred when it allowed a jury trial for a juvenile charged with traffic offenses because forcing a juvenile to be tried by a jury did not promote informality and flexibility of juvenile system and subjected juvenile to very stigma leg islature sought to prevent); A.C., IV v. People, 16 P.3d 240, 244-45 (Colo. 2001) (upholding statute that allowed trial court discretion in determining whether to allow a juiy trial); In re J.T., 290 A.2d 821(D.C.), cert. denied 409 U.S. 986, (1972) (upholding statute that required trial court to hear and adjudicate juvenile cases without a jury); McMullen v. Geiger, 184 Neb. 581, 584, 169 N.W.2d 431 (1969) (<HOLDING>); R. v. Cory, 44 App. Div. 2d 599, 353 N.Y.S.2d
holding that there is both a statutory and a constitutional right to a jury trial under erisa because congress lacks constitutional authority to limit right to a jury holding that juveniles are not entitled to jury trials holding juveniles do not have constitutional right to a jury trial but striking down statute that allowed juveniles to receive adult sentence without a jury trial three justices dissented reasoning juveniles should be entitled to a juiy trial under all cases because changes to juvenile justice code treated juveniles like criminals holding juveniles do not have right to jury trial because it is a civil proceeding under states parens patriae authority four justices dissented recognizing that juveniles have no right to jury trial and that juvenile proceedings unlike adult prosecutions are rehabilitative in nature