dictates how cases against the Engle defendants should proceed. If the Majority mean to suggest that Douglas III instituted an "unorthodox” and "novel notion of res judicata,” Ante at 1183, 1184— 85, our duty as a recognizing court, under Florida law and the U.S. Constitution, would shift to evaluating whether the newly created law “eliminate[s] the basic common law protection against an arbitrary deprivation of property.” Douglas III, 110 So.3d at 431 (citing Oberg, 512 U.S. at 432, 114 S.Ct. at 2339). Does it, for example, allow plaintiffs to preclude the Engle defendants from litigating matters—such as whether their tortious conduct caused an individual plaintiff's injuries— on which they have never had an opportunity to be heard? Douglas III leaves no doubt. See 110 So.3d at 429 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the law to which the Majority hint
holding a person commits aggravated dui when his or her driving under the influence was a proximate cause of the injuries  citation not the sole and immediate cause of the victims injuries emphasis omitted holding the plaintiff must show that the defendants departure from such generally recognized practices and procedures was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs alleged injuries and damages holding that the injury was inflicted by the defendant when it occurred as a result of the defendants combative conduct holding that when a plaintiff proves that addiction to the engle defendants cigarettes containing nicotine was a legal cause of the injuries alleged injury as a result of the engle defendants conduct is assumed emphasis added recognizing the phase i trial was conducted for the explicit purpose of determining issues related to the engle defendants conduct which were common to the entire class meaning they had every reason to litigate each potential theory of liability to the fullest extent possible