taken together can be reasonably construed to be based on personal belief.” Id. at 1176-77 (citing Bess). We not only found that this constituted misconduct calling for the trial court to take corrective measures, but we also characterized the prosecutor’s conduct as “inexcusable.” Id. at 1177. Similarly, in United States v. Dandy, 998 F.2d 1344, 1353 (6th Cir.1993) (citing Bess), we held: “It was improper for the prosecutor to state [in his closing argument] that [a witness] is honest. Such a statement conveys a conviction of personal belief regarding the witness’s veracity.” The error might have been reversible had the trial court not immediately instructed the jury that all assertions are to be made from the evidence. See also United States v. Hart, 640 F.2d 856, 858-59 (6th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 992, 101 S.Ct. 2334,
holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to intervene ex mero motu to prevent closing argument by the prosecutor that the defendant lied during his testimony holding that a defendant bears the burden of objecting to an allegedly improper closing argument at the time the improper argument is made holding it was improper for prosecutor to inject personal opinion in statements to the jury in closing argument holding that it was harmless error when the prosecutor focused on a single incident in closing argument holding that various expressions of personal belief by the prosecutor in closing argument were improper warrant ing admonishment by the trial court