employed to perform.” In fact, his conduct violated a D.C. statute, see D.C.Code § 50-2201.05(b)(1)(A)(i) (prohibiting the operation of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol), and FBI regulations and procedures, see Def. U.S.’s Mot., Ex. 3 at 1 (prohibiting members of the force from engaging in conduct resulting in criminal or quasi-criminal offenses). Sheppard does not argue otherwise. Second, at the time of the accident Sullivan was acting within the “time and space” of his employment only to the extent that he was driving a vehicle owned by his employer and was possibly on duty while consuming alcohol at a party. On these facts, it cannot be said that Sullivan was substantially within the authorized time and space limits of his employment. See Boykin, 484 A.2d at 564-65 (<HOLDING>). Nothing in Sheppard’s Oppositions persuades
holding school district hable for teachers sexual harassment of student only upon knowing failure to act holding that a school district was not liable for sexual molestation of plaintiffs daughter by a teacher even though the acts occurred on school property and during school hours holding that a collective bargaining agreement between school board and teachers union established a teachers legitimate claim of entitlement to their positions at elementary school holding that the district was not liable under respondeat superior for a teachers sexual assault of a student even though it occurred on school grounds and during school hours because the criminal misconduct was not within the scope of the teachers employment holding that a school district owed the highest degree of care to a student on a school bus such that the district could be liable for the sexual abuse of the student by the school bus driver