assault offense, from which I dissent. A court-martial with members properly instructed in the law found appellant guilty of (among other offenses) the offense of indecent assault. To be convicted of an indecent assault, there is no requirement that the offensive touching itself be indecent. It is merely a simple assault committed by one with a prurient state of mind. United States v. Hoggard, 43 M.J. 1 (1995); United States v. Rodriguez, 31 M.J. 150 (C.M.A.1990). There is no requirement that the accused actually gratify his lust or sexual desires through the offensive touching. In addition, evidence of other misconduct is admissible to show the requisite intent. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 29 M.J. 105, 109 (C.M.A.1989); United States v. Cox, 18 M.J. 72, 74-75 (C.M.A.1984) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the record shows that the
holding that motive is circumstantial evidence of intent holding that employers intent may be inferred through circumstantial evidence holding that a pattern of lustful intent was circumstantial evidence relating to all charges in the case holding that intent and knowledge can be proved by circumstantial evidence holding that circumstantial evidence alone may establish discriminatory intent