to its own whims or caprice. Saffle, 494 U.S. at 493, 110 S.Ct. at 1262-63 (citations omitted; emphasis in original). Our own precedent has developed along similar lines. In Commonwealth v. Lesko, 509 Pa. 67, 501 A.2d 200 (1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1101, 107 S.Ct. 1328, 94 L.Ed.2d 179 (1987), this Court addressed a claim that the trial court erred in its instruction to the sentencing jury to disregard sympathy in reaching its sentencing decision. The Court concluded that where the trial court had properly instructed the jury concerning the broad mitigation provision at Section 9711(e)(8), 42 Pa.C.S. §9711(e)(8), it had satisfied all pertinent constitutional requirements. Id. at 80-81, 501 A.2d at 207; see also Commonwealth v. Rainey, 540 Pa. 220, 234-35, 656 A.2d 1326, 1334 (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1008, 116 S.Ct. 562,
holding that where trial court instructed jury on catchall provision of section 9711e8 and informed jury that its verdict was to be reached by weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances against each other such instruction was correct and nothing further was required holding that after court dismissed case at plaintiffs request notwithstanding the fact that jury had deliberated upon the case and indicated that it had reached a verdict there was no case pending in court on which a verdict could be predicated and the information which the judge got from an inspection of the petition handed to him by the foreman of the jury was information which he received as an individual and not as a judge of the court and further holding that despite violation of defendants right to receive the verdict that was purportedly reached the writing incorporated in the bill of exceptions as a verdict of the jury was in law no verdict because it was not received in court and published as required by law and was instead entirely extraneous and extrajudicial recognizing that a trial court has the authority before accepting a verdict and before discharging a jury to send the jury back to correct a mistake in its verdict but concluding that jury had been discharged because jury was allowed to return to court on following day and was allowed to deliberate same issue it previously had decided holding that jurys original verdict of guilty without intent and recommend mere was an acquittal such that after it was presented to an officer of the court and the court the trial had ended  and the trial court was without authority to return the jury to its room for any further action holding that a trial courts weighing of mitigating and aggravating factors will not be disturbed absent a showing that the trial court abused its discretion