§ 2802(c) dealing with franchisee misconduct was proper, but refusing to extend that rationale to § 2802(c)(4)); accord Marathon Petroleum v. Pendleton, 889 F.2d 1509, 1512 (6th Cir.1989) (“[W]e must scrutinize the reasonableness of terminations even when an event enumerated in § 2802(c) has occurred.”). Sun’s contention that courts are not authorized to second guess franchisors’ decisions pursuant to the underlying lease exception in § 2802(c)(4) is grounded in our holding in Lugar that there is no statutory basis to inquire into the objective reasonableness of franchisor business decisions made in conformity with § 2802(c)(4). See 755 F.2d at 58. The Patels challenge the viability of Lugar, arguing that the decision is in conflict with our earlier opinion in Rago, 741 F.2d at 673 (<HOLDING>), and that the 1994 Amendment to § 2802(e)(4)
holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment holding that violation of state law was not a per se constitutional violation holding that the enumerated events in  2802c are not per se reasonable holding that constructive amendments which are per se reversible under harmless error analysis are also per se reversible under plain error analysis holding such agreements to be per se illegal