been met. Thus, I do not believe that Rudebusch loosened the requirement that a job category must be traditionally segregated before an affirmative action plan is permissible. 2 . We have considered the validity of affirmative action plans in a wide variety of contexts, and we have always applied the same Title VII standard. See, e.g., Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 979 F.2d 721, 723, 725-26 (9th Cir.1992) (evaluating a police examination scoring regime designed "to promote a higher percentage of minority officers” under an unmodified Title VII standard); Higgins v. City of Vallejo, 823 F.2d 351, 356-58 (9th Cir.1987) (evaluating a fire department's affirmative action program under an unmodified Title VII standard); La Riviere v. EEOC, 682 F.2d 1275, 1278-80 (9th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>); see also Gilligan v. Dep’t of Labor, 81 F.3d
holding that same standard applies to equal pay act and title vii wage discrimination claims holding that fair use is an affirmative defense holding that a failure to advise even when the defendant has an affirmative obligation to do so is not the same as engaging in affirmative misconduct  holding that affirmative action plans by public employers should be subjected to an unmodified title vii standard and evaluating a california highway patrol affirmative action program under that standard holding that laches is an affirmative defense