for damage to the plaintiffs vessel. The district court’s order merely struck the plaintiffs claim for damages for loss of use of its vessel. That order did not dispose of a separate claim for relief, and thus did not determine liability, as required by the statute. See Apando v. Swan Lake, 643 F.2d 1109, 1113 n. 6 (5th Cir.1981) (citation omitted) (stating “an order that dismisses on the merits one of several separate claims for relief is appeal-able under § 1292(a)(3)”). In Albatross Shipping Corp. v. Stewart, 326 F.2d 208 (5th Cir.1964), this court held that it did not have jurisdiction to review the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment limiting an element of the plaintiffs damages to $300. See also Ford Motor Co. v. S.S. Santa Irene, 341 F.2d 564 (5th Cir.1965) (<HOLDING>). As in any other case, the plaintiff here may
holding no appellate jurisdiction over order concluding that each of the damaged automobiles was to be considered the customary freight unit within the purview of the carriage of goods by sea act and damages could not exceed 50000 per vehicle holding that a judge who convicted defendant for contempt an act within the courts jurisdiction but without the affidavit required by statute to confer jurisdiction over the offense charged was still entitled to immunity his act was merely in excess of his jurisdiction holding that each allegation of cue is separate and must be specifically considered by the board before the veterans court has jurisdiction holding that directors who sat on over fifteen boards and received over 50000 in compensation were not interested holding that alleged breach of child abuse reporting act did not amount to negligence per se because analysis of statute indicated no private cause of action could be implied under the act