issue once the defendant admitted the intercourse, we specifically held that the other alleged rape was irrelevant and we reversed the rape conviction. Subsequent ly, we stated that Meeks stands for the principle that: “... evidence of prior crimes is inadmissible in rape cases where the act charged has been proven or admitted and the only issue concerns the consent of the prosecu-trix.” Miller v. State, (1982) Ind., 436 N.E.2d 1113, 1121; Woods v. State, (1968) 250 Ind. 132, 143, 235 N.E.2d 479, 486. Although we have distinguished Meeks, we have limited its authority only to those rape prosecutions in which the defendant raises consent as the sole defense. Austin v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 529, 531, 319 N.E.2d 130, 132, cert. denied, (1975) 421 U.S. 1012, 95 S.Ct. 2417, 44 L.Ed.2d 680 (<HOLDING>); Miller v. State, (1971) 256 Ind. 296, 299,
recognizing distinction between illegal voter cases and irregular ballot cases holding that a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases  pending on direct review  with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a clear break with the past recognizing the rule and the exception but holding facts did not support claim to exception recognizing possible conflict between the cases holding to the distinction between sodomy cases involving the depraved sexual instinct exception to the general rule of inadmissibility and rape cases