her, not the parking lot lights, and that she was not injured when she stepped in a hole or otherwise injured because of some condition of the land, and, therefore, this case is not a “condition of the land” case where duty has already been declared or articulated. We agree with Wilson in this regard. Jones’s injuries resulted from the conduct of a third person, and we find that the foreseeability test outlined in Goodwin and Rogers must be applied to see if a duty exists at all. Under that test—examining (1) the broad type of plaintiff and (2) the broad type of harm, without consideration of the actual facts—we find that the harm inflicted on Jones was not normally to be expected, and thus not foreseeable, and Wilson did not owe a duty to Jones. See Goodwin, 62 N.E.3d at 393-94 (<HOLDING>); Rogers, 63 N.E.3d at 326 (“Although house
holding tavern owner not liable for injuries sustained when intoxicated patron assaulted a police officer holding that the district court  did not abuse its discretion in denying his petition for reinstatement where membership in good standing in the state bar was required before attorney could be admitted to the federal bar and applicant had not been readmitted to state bar recognizing that although bars can often set the stage for rowdy behavior bar owners do not routinely contemplate that one patron might shoot another and shooting inside neighborhood bar was not foreseeable such that bar owner did not owe duty to injured patron in that case holding that exception applied where bar counsel was subject to adverse discovery order and another professional conduct board hearing panel had directed a similar order to bar counsel in another matter holding that the oneyear bar contained in  2255 acts as an affirmative defense and not a jurisdictional bar