592, 594 (9th Cir.1992), amended 997 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir.1993).] This “objective basis, or ‘reasonable suspicion,’ must consist of ‘specific, articulable facts which, together with objective and reasonable inferences, form the basis for suspecting that the particular person detained is engaged in criminal activity.’ ” Id. (citations omitted). A “gloss on this rule prohibits reasonable suspicion from being based on broad profiles which cast suspicion on entire categories of people without any individualized suspicion of the particular person to be stopped.” United States v. Rodriguez-Sanchez, 23 F.3d 1488, 1492 (9th Cir.1994). United States v. Garcia-Camacho, 53 F.3d 244, 245-46 (9th Cir.1995). See also United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (<HOLDING>) (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217,
holding that the standard of proof in revocation proceedings is a preponderance of the evidence holding that the proper standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence recognizing that the preponderance of the evidence is the quantum of proof in civil cases holding the fedrevid 801d2e requires proof of the conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence and allows consideration of the offered declaration as part of the proof of the conspiracy holding that the fourth amendment requires some minimal level of objective justification for making a terry stop which is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence