violation is one of federal law, a different result obtains. In fact, the Court of Appeals has held that UCL claims may be based on federal statutes, unless the federal statute completely preempts the action. See Lippitt, 340 F.3d at 1042. Defendant does not contend that plaintiffs UCL claim is preempted. Moreover, it has not tendered any evidence that by its amendment of 12 U.S.C. § 2604(c), Congress intended to bar pri vate enforcement for failure to provide a GFE under 24 C.F.R. § 3500.7(b)(1). Because Wells Fargo has failed to tender any evidence that it ensured that a GFE was provided to plaintiff, its conduct violated RESPA, which constituted an unlawful business practice under the UCL. See McKell v. Washington Mut., Inc., 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1471-1472, 49 Cal. Rptr.3d 227 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs motion is therefore granted on
holding that a loan transaction is a business practice under the ucl holding that consideration for guaranty of loan previously made was that guarantors friend the bank manager who issued the loan would not lose his job for making a bad loan holding out admission to practice law when not admitted to practice holding that where parties to an oral loan agreed that the loan would be repaid on demand the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the date plaintiff demanded repayment of the loan holding that fraudulent loan transaction exposed financial institutions to risk of loss even though loan was secured