valid unless it was un conscionable, which the court concluded it was not. Farrar offers several challenges to the district court’s analysis, which we consider seriatim. Farrar first maintains that the district court erred in not recognizing that Miller’s warranty failed of its essential purpose, and therefore that Farrar was entitled to all of the remedies listed in § 25-2-714, including consequential damages. A limited, exclusive remedy fails of its essential purpose when “unanticipated circumstances preclude the seller from providing the buyer with the remedy to which the parties agreed.” Computer Network, Inc. v. AM Gen. Corp., 265 Mich.App. 309, 696 N.W.2d 49, 55 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Stutts v. Green Ford, Inc., 47 N.C.App. 503, 267 S.E.2d 919, 926 (1980) (<HOLDING>). We see no basis for concluding that Farrar
holding while there may be some case law to support plaintiffs argument the majority approach is that the failure to attach process defect is merely procedural and that this particular procedural defect may be cured holding that notice of a defect could not be imputed to a defendant inasmuch as it created the defect holding that the district court which erred in its conclusion that there was jurisdictional defect abused its discretion in denying a plaintiffsmotion for leave to amend his complaint because the proposed amendment would not cure the jurisdictional defect holding that a warranty fails of its essential purpose when there is a defect which is not or cannot be repaired within a reasonable period as required by the warranty holding that a violation of the forum defendant rule is a jurisdictional defect