to resist the search. The situation is instinct with coercion-albeit color-ably lawful coercion. Where there is coercion there cannot be consent.” Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968). Lying about a drug-dog alert could, under some circumstances, including those in this case, convey a message that consent to search is unnecessary. See United States v. Cabrera, 117 F.Supp.2d 1152, 1158 (D.Kan.2000) (finding defendant did not voluntarily consent to a search when an officer lied about a drug dog alerting, noting the officer “relied on a blatant deeeption-the positive dog alert-to further the impression that [the defendant] had no choice but to permit [the] search”); see also United States v. Pena-Saiz, 161 F.3d 1175, 1177-78 (8th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Severe, 29 F.3d 444, 446
holding that our use of the subjunctive in mentioning an argument in passing suggests that we knew that we were not addressing and that we could not address that argument holding the district courts noconsent finding was not clearly erroneous because the individual felt she was under arrest and had to submit to the patdown search in part based on the officers saying this is what we do we talk to people we search peoples bags we pat search people this is what we do everyday holding that we will overturn the factual findings of the district court only where we have a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed holding that the nonprevailing party in district court proceedings here is asking that we anticipate the birth of a state law doctrine in the womb of time but whose birth is distant we have been asked to deliver prematurely a new doctrine of pennsylvania tort law and as a federal court we are unwilling to do so holding that we could not weigh the prejudice suffered as a result of the exclusion of plaintiffs testimony because we had no way of knowing what the plaintiffs testimony would have been