324.30101(r) (“ ‘[rJiparían owner’ means a person who has riparian rights”) (emphasis added); MCL 324.30101(s) (“ ‘[r]iparian rights’ means those rights which are associated with the ownership of the bank or shore of inland lake or stream”). The use of “has” indicates that MCL 324.30101(r) refers to landowners who already possess riparian rights—it does not extend riparian rights to new groups of property holders. In addition, the statute nowhere mentions that it abrogates the common law, nor does it evince intent to do so. See Hamed v Wayne Co, 490 Mich 1, 22 n 57; 803 NW2d 237 (2011) (“The Legislature is presumed to know the common law, and any abrogation of the common law must be explicit.”). See also Stidham v Algonquin Lake Community Ass’n, 133 Mich App 94, 98; 348 NW2d 46 (1984) (<HOLDING>). We therefore affirm the trial court’s grant
holding that the existence of a prior bankruptcy settlement does not preclude a subsequent criminal restitution order holding that plaintiffs state law claim against a nonsignatory to the cba was preempted by  301 holding that tjhe existence of the inland lakes and streams act subsequently recodified as part 301 of nrepa does not preclude plaintiffs commonlaw remedies holding that plaintiffs title vii claims were not preempted by section 301 despite collective bargaining agreement and stating that the purposes of  301 are not subverted when a federal court hears a claim brought under a federal statute holding that exemption under the ada does not preclude liability under the rehabilitation act