outside the scope of his employment. See Brown v. King, 328 Ill.App.3d 717, 262 Ill.Dec. 897, 767 N.E.2d 357, 361 (2001) (“[A]n off-duty officer may often be found to be acting within the scope of his employment.’’) (collecting cases). The mere fact that Moussa was outside Chicago is not necessarily disposi-tive either. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 234 (1958) (“One may be a servant, although a bad servant, in performing his master’s business at a forbidden place' if the place is within the general territory-in which the servant is employed.”). But Anderson points to no case in which a police officer who was both off-duty and far outside his jurisdiction was held to be acting within the scope of his employment. See Karas v. Snell, 11 Ill.2d 233, 142 N.E.2d 46, 49, 57-58 (1957) (<HOLDING>); Brown, 262 Ill.Dec. 897, 767 N.E.2d at 359,
holding that the trial court did not err in charging the jury that the defendant was in the custody of the victim officer when he shot and killed the officer due to the undisputed evidence presented at trial including the defendants pretrial statement to police admitting that fact holding that scope of employment was an issue for the jury where a chicago police officer was off duty but within the city limits when he shot the plaintiff holding that a suspended chicago police officer was not acting within his scope of employment when discharging his weapon in the neighboring municipality of cicero holding that a reasonable jury could find that an offduty chicago police officer acted within the scope of his employment during a roadside altercation on interstate 55 near the damen street exit which is in chicago holding as a matter of law that a police officer was not acting within the scope of his employment when assaulting an acquaintance of a woman he had detained