of Columbia, is subject to numerous delay-causing vicissitudes) could not be assured to arrive in time to extend the 60-day period. Requiring unduly early mailings to compensate for unknown mail delivery delays would force government agencies to decide large and complex monetary claims in significantly less time than the 60 days provided by statute, and thus, presumptively, in less time than intended by Congress. Plaintiff’s interpretation also would require the courts and Boards of Contract Appeals to act on claims that were not ripe and that might have been resolved more fairly, economically, and efficiently in the first instance, by those more familiar with the contract’s administration, at the agency level. Moreover, if the date hinged on actual receipt, contractor 1 BCA ¶ 28,981 (<HOLDING>); Northrop Grumman Corp., (1999 ASBCA) 99-1 BCA
holding that the 60day rule under the wisconsin controlled substances act is mandatory and that failure to set the hearing within that period deprived the trial court of jurisdiction holding the 60day claim period applicable to a constitutional challenge of an assessment and of the statute authorizing the assessment holding that a notification letter dated 10 days before the expiration of the 60day period was timely  and ignoring the date of receipt holding that the state was estopped to argue that the 90day notice period  expired on a date prior to the expiration date it cited to the claimant holding that the charge was timely when filed within the statute of limitations period even though served after the period