service per formed by an attorney/parent who obtains special education benefits” under the IDEA. Def.’s Supp. Opp’n at 3. The plaintiffs acknowledge the general rule prohibiting pro se attorney-parents from recovering fees, but they contend that this rule only applies to biological parents of children and not to independent, emotionally detached counsel. Pis.’ Opp’n at 7. The plaintiffs argument is unpersuasive. The Supreme Court has denied attorney’s fees to a pro se attorney-parent to avoid ethical dilemmas “that may make it inappropriate for him to appear as witness” and to encourage retention “of an independent counsel[, insuring] that reason, rather than emotion, dictates the proper tactical response.” Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 435, 437, 111 S.Ct. 1435, 113 L.Ed.2d 486 (1991) (<HOLDING>); accord. Woodside v. School Dist. of
holding that a case awarding fees under 42 usc  1988 has no application in a private claim for attorneys fees sounding in mississippi contract law holding that 42 usc  1988 authorizes the grant of attorneys fees for services on appeal though statute does not specifically so provide holding that a pro se litigant who is an attorney is not entitled to fees under  1988 holding that a contingentfee agreement should not act as a ceiling on the award of attorney fees under 42 usc  1988 holding that a pro se attorney is ineligible for attorneys fees under 42 usc  1988 despite handling his professional responsibilities  in a competent manner