per month (18% annual rate) until paid in full.” 3 . We do not decide the validity of Simplot's contractual claims since the district court has not addressed the issue. 4 . The district and bankruptcy courts are split on the issue of whether this language supports a PACA trust claim for contractual rights to attorneys’ fees and interest. See JC Produce Inc. v. Paragon Steakhouse Restaurants, 70 F.Supp.2d 1119, 1123 (E.D.Cal.1999) (basing decision on plain language of "sums owing in connection with”); E. Armata Inc. v. Platinum Funding Corp. 887 F.Supp. 590, 595 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (same); Morris Okun, Inc. v. Zimmerman, Inc. 814 F.Supp. 346, 351 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (same). For cases excluding such costs, see Crown Foodservice Group, Inc. v. Hughes 1999 WL 33117269, *14 (S.D.Ohio July 12, 1999) (<HOLDING>); In re Richmond Produce Co., Inc. 112 B.R.
holding that the settlor could divest the beneficiaries of their vested interests only by completely revoking the trust because she had limited her ability to eliminate the beneficiaries interests by including language in the trust stating that the interests of the beneficiaries  shall continue until this trust is revoked or terminated internal quotation marks omitted holding that a union health trust had standing to sue tobacco companies to recover medical expenses paid by the trust and allegedly caused by beneficiaries smoking holding that trust beneficiaries have no authority to maintain an action as third party beneficiaries of contracts between the trustee and agents of the trustee concerning the internal affairs of the trust holding that plaintiffs are normal judgment creditors not trust beneficiaries with respect to contractual fees holding that beneficiaries could not sue attorneys of the trust for legal malpractice because beneficiaries are not direct recipients of the attorneys services