achieved dismissal of 59% of the Plaintiffs’ causes of action, the Court finds that McKool Smith is only entitled to that same percentage of the fees requested in the Fee Statements. See Roussell v. Brinker Int’l, Inc., No. H-05-3733, 2010 WL 1881898, at *3 (S.D.Tex. Jan.13, 2010) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933) (noting that the most important of the Johnson factors to be considered in adjustments to the lodestar fee is “overall degree of success achieved”); Arnold, 2000 WL 354395, at *7-8 (citing Shipes v. Trinity Indus., 987 F.2d 311, 320 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 991, 114 S.Ct. 548, 126 L.Ed.2d 450 (1993)) (considering the results obtained in making a downward adjustment to the lodestar fee); Migis v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 135 F.3d 1041, 1048 (5th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the Court reduces the lodestar
holding that deficiencies in a fee application justified a fortyfive percent reduction in the allowable fees holding that the district court abused its discretion by failing to award attorneys fees based on the objective unreasonableness of plaintiffs complaint holding that the court has discretion to double check the reasonableness of the percentage fee through a lodestar calculation holding that even after a ten percent reduction to the lodestar fee the district court abused its discretion by failing to adequately consider the result obtained relative to the attorneys fees requested holding that under  1988 consideration of the results obtained relative to the relief requested is required