condemned by the Supreme Court.” Ibid, (citing O & Y Old Bridge, supra, 120 N.J. at 458, 577 A.2d 137). That remains the test. However, for the guidance of the bench and bar some elaboration is required. The Court did not define the term “windfall.” We conclude, from the language of the Wattles and O & Y Old Bridge opinions and the intent of N.J.S.A. 54:5-89.1, that by “windfall,” the Court meant a disproportionate gain after the fair market value of the property, as set by an arm’s length sale or appraisal, is reduced by any legitimate expenses in redeeming the property, including the payoff of the tax liens, and costs of environmental remediation. See Cherokee Equities v. Garaventa, 382 N.J.Super. 201, 212, 887 A.2d 1203 (Ch.Div.2005), certif. granted, — N.J. - (March 29, 2006) (<HOLDING>). We discern from these authorities an intent
holding that in determining whether a prior conviction is a violent felony a court generally must look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense holding that in determining whether constructive indictment occurred court must look at the allegedly erroneous instruction in context of the charge as a whole holding that additional consideration is a factor in determining whether there is an implied contract of employment holding that in determining whether a purchase is for nominal consideration the trial court must look to the reasonable value of the interest acquired holding courts must look to the law of the state in which the security interest was created to determine if creditor retains a purchase money security interest despite refinancing