it has failed to allege sufficient facts with respect to the conspiracy count. As such, Russo failed to allege sufficient facts on the conversion, civil theft, and conspiracy counts to bring Marilyn Fink within the reach of the long-arm statute. Finally, a review of the record indicates that Marilyn Fink’s activities within Florida have not been “continuous and systematic” as required to subject her to the trial court’s general jurisdiction under section 48.193(2). See Two Worlds United v. Zylstra, 46 So.3d 1175, 1178 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010); Bafitis v. Ara, 815 So.2d 702, 703 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002). Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal. The trial court should have dismissed the amended complaint as to Marilyn Fink without prejudice. See Henderson v. Elias, 56 So.3d 86, 90 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (<HOLDING>) (citing World Class Yachts, Inc. v. Murphy,
holding that dismissal with leave to amend should be granted even if no request to amend was made holding that a plaintiff should be allowed to amend the complaint to add a claim holding that dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim should generally be without prejudice but if the plaintiff has been given an opportunity amend his complaint and fails to do so the dismissal may be with prejudice holding that dismissal of a complaint for insufficient jurisdictional allegations should be without prejudice to amend holding that a review committee of the kansas board for discipline of attorneys had the authority to dismiss a complaint against an attorney with or without prejudice and when dismissal was ordered without specifying the nature of the dismissal the dismissal was without prejudice to the filing of later proceedings on the same matter