prohibition, the duration of the stay is not a part of the time within which the action must be commenced.’ ” McKinnis v. Williams, No. 00 Civ. 8357(RWS), 2001 WL 873078, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2001); Hayes v. N.Y.S. D.O.C. Officers, No. 97 Civ. 7383(MBM), 1998 WL 901730, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 1998) (“Had plaintiff pursued his administrative remedies after the effective date of the PLRA, when doing so became mandatory, there would be no question that the statute of limitations would have been tolled during the pen-dency of those proceedings.”); see also Dixon v. Page, 291 F.3d 485, 490 (7th Cir.2002) (“[T]he time spent in exhausting administrative remedies is tolled for purposes of limitations on filing a federal complaint.”); Johnson v. Rivera, 272 F.3d 519, 521 (7th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). But cf. Thomas v. Henry, No. 02 Civ.
holding that the question whether a cause of action exists is not a question of jurisdiction and therefore may be assumed without being decided holding that where congress does not establish a statute of limitations applicable to a federal cause of action a void which is commonplace in federal statutory law  this court has repeatedly borrowed the state law of limitations governing an analogous cause of action holding that under the law of the district of columbia the filing of a complaint does not toll the statute of limitations on a counterclaim holding that duress toll to statute of limitations under state law had no application to federal rico statute of limitations holding tjhere can be no question that a federal court applying illinois law similar to ny cplr 204a  must toll the statute of limitations if a statutory prohibition exists that prevents a plaintiffs cause of action and noting the fifth and sixth circuits agree that the plra is such a prohibition