(Pa.Super.2007) (citation omitted). See also 1 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 1922(1). ¶29 “The purpose of post[-]judgment interest is to compensate a successful plaintiff for being deprived of compensation for his or her loss during the time between ascertainment of the damage and payment by the defendant.” 47 C.J.S. InteRest & Usury § 110. Giving the judgment debtor the benefit of an erroneous court ruling, during which time the judgment debtor is relieved from paying post-judgment interest, hampers the very purpose behind such a policy. Such a construction needlessly and, we find, unjustly benefits the recipient of an erroneous ruling, while depriving an innocent plaintiff of his or her rightful award. See, e.g., Hewitt v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 5 Utah 2d 379, 302 P.2d 712, 714 (1956) (<HOLDING>); Espinoza v. Rossini, 257 Cal.App.2d 567, 573,
holding that the trial court erred in denying as untimely a postjudgment motion to intervene filed promptly after judgment and noting that this holding was consistent with several decisions of the federal courts permitting postjudgment intervention for the purpose of appeal holding that the insured was entitled to prejudgment and postjudgment interest and attorney fees as found by the jury holding that plaintiff was entitled to postjudgment interest from date of original verdict and not just from the date on which the supreme court reversed the trial courts entry of a directed verdict noting we cannot see any good reason why plaintiff should lose his postjudgment interest because defendant was able to convince the trial court to make an erroneous ruling  holding that interest does not begin to accrue until the date of judgment not the date of verdict holding that the trial court erred in granting the school boards posttrial motion for directed verdict because although the school board timely moved for a directed verdict during trial it did not serve its motion for directed verdict until the eleventh day after the verdict