the trial court in 2010 to set aside the 2000 judgment based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and this Court dismissed his appeal, specifically stating that the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the 2000 judgment, that the judgment was not void, and that the trial court lacked plenary power over the case at the time Akinwamide filed the 2010 motion. See Akinwamide TV, 2012 WL 3861229, at *2. We conclude that the record is replete with evidence that there is no reasonable probability that Akinwamide will prevail in his litigation against Transportation and that, after the litigation was finally determined against Akinwamide, he has repeatedly relitigated or attempted to reliti-gate the validity of the determination in favor of Transportation. See Forist, 141 S.W.3d at 670 (<HOLDING>). We therefore hold that the evidence supports
holding that if defendant could establish ineffective assistance of counsel in failure to file petition for review in his direct appeal then appropriate remedy would be to allow filing of petition for review out of time holding that bill of review is exclusive remedy on direct attack where court had jurisdictional power even if judgment void holding that the meritorious defense requirement in a bill of review proceeding violates due process where the bill of review plaintiff has no notice of the proceeding in which the default judgment was rendered holding that plaintiffs bill of review filed after texas supreme court denied her petition for review of direct appeal from final judgment constituted attempts to relitigate cause of action and thus satisfied vexatious litigant criteria holding that the supreme court has final appellate review of agency decisions