were similar in their overall purpose — trafficking in cocaine). After a defendant puts his intent at issue by pleading not guilty, the strength of the government’s case on intent must be “overwhelming” in order to render extrinsic evidence on intent unnecessary. See United States v. Dorsey, 819 F.2d 1055, 1060-61 (11th Cir.1987) (“Moreover, the government’s proof of intent at trial was not so overwhelming as to render the extrinsic offense evidence merely cumulative.”); United States v. Hicks, 798 F.2d 446, 451-52 (11th Cir.1986). We have found that an intervening period of as much as fifteen years did not render evidence of prior convictions inadmissible. United States v. Lampley, 68 F.3d 1296, 1300 (11th Cir.1995); cf. United States v. Sanders, 668 F.3d 1298, 1315 (11th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>)- A defendant’s incarceration for a substantial
holding that in determining whether a prior conviction is a violent felony a court generally must look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense holding that defendants have a federal constitutional right to make a collateral attack on a prior conviction only when that conviction was obtained without the assistance of counsel holding that uncounseled conviction could not be considered by court in sentencing defendant after subsequent conviction holding the district court abused its discretion in admitting a 22yearold conviction involving 14 grams of marijuana and recognizing that although we have declined to establish a brightline rule for when a prior conviction is too old to be admissible the conviction at issue was nearly fifty percent older than the oldest conviction we have previously allowed in lampley holding that where a statute provides for an enhanced penalty based on a defendants prior conviction the fact of conviction is a sentencing factor to be determined by the court rather than a jury