certificates varied somewhat prior to 1986, all of the certificates expressly restore “any civil rights lost as a result” of the judgments of conviction and did not contain any reservation concerning firearms. Consequently, this record does not support the conclusion that Hill was not issued a discharge certificate consistent with DOC practice. Conversely, it is reasonable to infer and more likely than not that Hill was issued such a certificate after satisfying his sentence. Thus, Hill would have established that his 1976 conviction could not be counted for purposes of applying § 924(e) and he would not have been subject to the sentence enhancement imposed in his case and his sentence would 'have been significantly less harsh. See Durrive v. United States, 4 F.3d 548 (7th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Without the § 924(e) enhancement, Hill’s
holding that prejudice requires that the difference in sentencing be significant holding that an assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice holding that the prison litigation reform act requires a prior showing of physical injury that need not be significant but must be more than de minimis  holding that prejudice is shown where a sentencing error may affect the determination of sentence holding that civil commitment for any purpose constitutes significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection