v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977). “[A]n invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the [practice] bears more heavily on one race than another.” Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976). This framework has been applied in a number of cases in this and other circuits involving allegations of discriminatory police enforcement practices. See, e.g, United States v. Bullock, 94 F.3d 896, 899 (4th Cir.1996) (applying selective enforcement test to criminal defendant’s claim that officer tended to escalate traffic stops of young black males into drug investigations); United States v. Bell, 86 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 955, 117 S.Ct. 372,
holding that defendant was required to demonstrate discriminatory effect to sustain defense based upon theory that police enforced bicycle headlight law only against black offenders holding that arbitration clauses as contractual agreements must be enforced to their terms holding that property settlement agreements may be specifically enforced recognizing that an implied contract must result from a meeting of the minds of the parties in mutual assent to the terms and must be based upon a sufficient consideration free from fraud or undue influence not against public policy and sufficiently definite to be enforced recognizing that an insurance contract will generally be enforced as written unless to do so would violate the law or public policy