an insurance policy from Life Investors. As a result, Mary’s selection of optional insurance did not create a separate, binding insurance contract, but instead arose out of the original Lease. Moreover, Mary did not allege in her complaint that she was an “insured or beneficiary under any insurance policy” as stated in section 15-48-10(b)(4). Instead, Mary’s complaint alleged Harrelson breached its fiduciary duty and breached the parties’ contract by failing to procure the credit life insurance from Life Investors. Because Mary’s asserted causes of action arise out of an automobile lease agreement and not an insurance contract, the circuit court properly held Mary was required to submit her claims against Harrelson to binding arbitration. See Cox, 347 S.C. at 468, 556 S.E.2d at 402 (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION We conclude the Lease between Mary
holding section 15  4810b4 is a specific exemption limited only to entities within the insurance industry recognizing only specific limited forms of pleadings holding that section 12a2 did not apply to a private placement memorandum which was subject to a section 42 exemption holding a writ was appropriate when the authorization was not limited as to time and not limited to specific healthcare providers holding that bankruptcy jurisdiction is not within section 5 of the fourteenth amendment