viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable fact finder would have found the movant guilty of the offense, or (2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ¶ 8. However, “[t]he AEDPA does not define ‘second or successive motion’ in [section 2255] or ‘second or successive habeas corpus application’ in [section 2254].” Galtieri v. United States, 128 F.3d 33, 37 (2d Cir.1997). In our efforts to define the meaning and scope of these terms, we have recognized instances in which a subsequent § 2255 motion or § 2254 petition was not properly considered “second or successive.” See, e.g., id. at 37-38 (<HOLDING>); Chambers v. United States, 106 F.3d 472, 474
holding that where a defendants first motion was both filed and denied while his conviction was on appeal his second motion is not procedurally barred holding that a second motion to reconsider served within ten days of the denial of the first motion does not extend the time period for filing a notice of appeal from the underlying judgment holding premagwood that where a first  2255 motion was granted so movant could file a direct appeal the second  2255 motion was not a successive motion under aedpa holding that when a first  2255 motion succeeds in obtaining a sentence amendment a subsequent motion will be considered a first motion to the extent that it challenges a new or amended component of the sentence and a second motion to the extent that it challenges either a component of the original unamended sentence or the underlying conviction holding that defendant cannot successfully challenge legal sentence or attack underlying conviction through motion for sentence reconsideration