jurisdiction over the state law claims. D. Ct. Op. at 27 n. 17. The court found that even though Michigan Compiled Laws § 750.337 (criminalizing indecent language in the presence of women or children) had been invalidated by the Michigan Supreme Court, other statutes, criminalizing conduct for which Leonard had not been charged, supported the arrest, viz., §§ 750.103 (swearing), 750.170 (disturbing a meeting), and 750.167 (disorderly person). Therefore, based upon these statutes, Robinson had probable cause to arrest Leonard because he had violated the plain language of those statutes and Robinson was “to enforce laws until and unless they are declared unconstitutional.” D. Ct. Op. at 12. See also Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153, 125 S.Ct. 588, 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004) (<HOLDING>). The district court denied Leonard’s First
holding that the subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause holding that when an arrest is properly supported by probable cause as to any offense neither the officers subjective reliance on an offense for which no probable cause exists nor his verbal announcement of the wrong offense vitiates the arrest holding that the courts determination of whether an officer had probable cause for an arrest is an independent and objective determination and an officers own subjective reason for the arrest is irrelevant holding that an officers subjective reason for making an arrest need not include the criminal offense that later establishes probable cause holding that the existence of probable cause vitiated the need for an inquiry into an underlying motive for the arrest