the form referring Kollin to a hospital at 8:15 p.m. because he “[could not] stand up” and was “incoherent.” And as established above, Carney may not challenge the district court’s determination that “there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the point at which [Carney] realized that Mr. Kollin needed urgent medical assistance.” See See, 502 F.3d at 490 (“[A] determination that an issue of fact is ‘genuine’ is unreviewable.”). Carney fails to premise his legal argument on the view of the facts most favorable to the estate. Because Carney’s sole legal argument relies on his own version of the facts, we may not consider it. And though a purely legal argument might have been made using the estate’s version of the facts, Carney did not make it here. See McKenna, 469 F.3d at 562 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we do not have jurisdiction to
holding that reconsideration may not be based on evidence and legal arguments that could have been presented at the time of the challenged decision holding that despite the possibility of legal arguments relying on facts favorable to the plaintiff the court did not have jurisdiction because the officers have in fact made no arguments concerning the denial of qualified immunity that do not rely on disputed facts holding that the court of claims did have jurisdiction over plaintiffs statutory claim for back pay including arguments based on the first amendment holding that this court does not entertain arguments made for the first time on appeal as the case must be decided on the facts contained in the record and not on assertions in the brief holding that the court lacks jurisdiction to review legal arguments not raised before the bia