However, as in Kane, we need not address this issue here because even under the more stringent subjective standard, the evidence ■ supports the Bankruptcy Court's finding that Monson intentionally committed an act that he knew was substantially certain to injure Segundo. See id. Moreover, in light of Kane, the Bankruptcy Court was incorrect that an “intentional tort” is required for nondis-chargeability under § 523(a)(6), See id. Rather, all that is required is that Monson’s behavior was "willful” and "malicious,” which the Bankruptcy Court found. Thus, the Bankruptcy Court actually imposed a higher standard than what our case law requires, and it still determined that his actions met that standard. 10 . Monson’s reí janee on our decision in In re Wolfson, 56 F.3d 52 (11th Cir. 1995) (<HOLDING>), is misplaced. In Wolfson, two brothers ran a
holding the university owes a landownerinvitee duty to its students to take reasonable steps to protect against foreseeable acts of violence on its campus and the harm that naturally flows therefrom holding impairment of secured creditors foreclosure remedy permissible holding an unsecured creditors postconfirmation suit against a secured creditor for fraudulent misrepresentation at a creditors meeting constituted a collateral attack on the confirmation order holding that during an investigatory detention officers are authorized to take such steps as are reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo holding that a secured creditors failure to take reasonable steps to protect its collateral prevented application of  523a6s exception to discharge