is such that it is generally out of the public view .... [and] visibility is limited to those informants who are discovered.” 23 I. & N. Dec. at 960. The BIA has continued to apply social visibility analysis in later cases, determining that “no particular social group” exists for individuals seeking protection as “affluent Guatemalans,” In re A-M-E & J-G-U, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 75-76, or for Salvadoran youths who had rejected or resisted criminal gang recruitment efforts, In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dee. 579 (BIA 2008), or for young Hondurans resistant to gang membership, In re E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591 (BIA 2007). A number of our sister circuits have adopted the BIA’s use of social visibility as a relevant criterion. See, e.g., Davila-Mejia v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 624, 629 (8th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940, 945 (9th
holding the applicant must show social visibility and particularity holding that status as competing family business owners did not give petitioners sufficient social visibility to be perceived as a group by society holding a court need not find the harassment to be psychologically injurious so long as the environment would reasonably be perceived and is perceived as hostile or abusive holding that the proposed social group of affluent guatemalans depends on no disadvantage other than purported visibility to criminals so that the scales are tipped away from considering those people a particular social group  holding that government informants are not members of a particular social group