statutory postjudgement interest obligation, imposed under RCW 4.56.110(3). However, I disagree with the extent to which the majority has broadened the compelling interest standard in its first holding. Madsen, J. ¶44 The majority holds that “any records that were filed with the court in anticipation of a court decision (dispositive or not) should be sealed or continue to be sealed only when the court determines — pursuant to Ishikawa — that there is a compelling interest which overrides the public’s right to the open administration of justice.” Majority at 549 (citing Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 97 Wn.2d 30, 640 P.2d 716 (1982)). While I believe the majority correctly determined that the compelling interest standard should be broad c., 142 N. J. 356, 662 A.2d 546 (1995) (<HOLDING>). See also United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d
holding in part that the presumption of public access attaches to pretrialnondiscovery motions whether preliminary or dispositive and the materials briefs and documents filed with the court in support of or in opposition to such motions but not to pretrial discovery motions holding that there is no right of public access to documents considered in civil discovery motions holding that there is a presumptive common law right to public access to all material filed in connection with nondiscovery pretrial motions  but no such right as to discovery motions and their supporting documents holding that although the defendant filed a number of motions because the original trial date never changed as a result of those motions no delay could be attributed to the motions holding that motions to dismiss should have been converted into motions for summary judgment where the district court relied upon contract documents submitted by the defendant