... is bounded by the foreseeable range of danger, and [Reasonable foreseeability of harm is the very prototype of the question a jury must pass upon in particularizing the standard of conduct in the case before it.” (Citing Bidar v. Amfac, Inc., 66 Haw. 547, 552-53, 669 P.2d 154, 159 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (ellipses in original) (some brackets added)); Janssen v. American Hawaii Cruises, Inc., 69 Haw. 31, 34, 731 P.2d 163, 165 (1987) (“[A] defendant owes a duty of care only to those who are foreseeably endangered by the conduct and only with respect to those risks or hazards whose likelihood made the conduct unreasonably dangerous.” (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.) (Emphasis added.)); Ono v. Applegate, 62 Haw. 131, 138, 612 P.2d 533, 539 (1980) (<HOLDING>). As discussed more fully infra, these same
holding that duty to protect from criminal acts does not arise in the absence of a foreseeable risk of harm holding that criminal conduct on premises was not foreseeable holding that negligence may be predicated on the foreseeable acts of third persons holding the federal government responsible for the immediately foreseeable consequences of its actions holding that consequences of serving liquor to intoxicated driver such as further inebriation and injurious conduct were foreseeable intervening acts that would not relieve bar of liability