undisputed that Singh's offense under Or.Rev.Stat. § 166.065(l)(a)(A) was a misdemeanor. See Or.Rev.Stat. § 166.065(3) ("Harassment is a Class B misdemeanor.”). Accordingly, we assess only whether Singh’s offense was a “crime of violence” under § 16(a). 4 . The Ninth Circuit has held that the Taylor categorical approach and the "modified categorical approach” of Taylor’s progeny, such as United States v. Rivera-Sanchez, 247 F.3d 905 (9th Cir.2001), and United States v. Franklin, 235 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir.2000), govern the analysis of whether a prior state law conviction was a "domestic offense” such that it qualifies as a predicate offense for alien removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). Tokatly, 371 F.3d at 624-25. Contra Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666, 668, 670-71 (7th Cir. 2003) (<HOLDING>). Here, Singh has waived the issue of whether
holding that that the trial court erred when it determined that firstdegree sexual offense was an aggravated offense holding that the categorical approach applies to the identical definition of crime of violence in 18 usc  16 holding that a domestic relationship must exist as part of the facts giving rise to the predicate offense but it need not be an element of the prior offense holding that the domestic nature of the offense can be determined without a taylor approach because all aspects of the definition are federal holding that a determination of unfair discrimination requires a court to consider all aspects of the case and the totality of all the circumstances