entirely before or entirely after the date on which the predecessor judge’s term expired. For example, in Laca the court of appeals held “there is no provision, for the instant situation, where the trial judge has been replaced as the result of an election” and thus remanded the case for a new trial. 243 S.W.3d at 796 (citing Larry F. Smith, 110 S.W.3d at 611). But the trial judge’s term of office did not expire until after the final due date for filing the findings. Id. The same was true in Larry F. Smith, 110 S.W.3d at 616 (“[T]he trial court judge’s term of office did not expire until ... more than a year after the period for filing findings of fact and conclusions of law ended.”), and in Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Morris, 782 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Here, because Judge Lowy’s term expired
holding that a reviewing court has the power to reject the findings and conclusions of the trial court where the findings are not supported by the evidence holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case holding there was no remedyfor lack of findings when the request for findings came after the presiding judges term expired holding that objections are required to challenge magistrate judges findings as well as magistrates failure to make additional findings holding that it is the commissioners findings of fact to the extent they modify or replace the administrative law judges findings that are relevant on appeal