the enticing-a-child-for-indecent-purposes charge. 4. Wheeler further contends that the trial court erred when it responded to the jury’s question as to whether child molestation “requires sex” by instructing the jury to review its copy of the charges and the indictment regarding child molestation. Again, we disagree. We first note that the “need, breadth, and formation of additional jury instructions are left to the sound discretion of the trial court.” And here, shortly after beginning its deliberations, the jury submitted a note to t 2-83 (2) (724 SE2d 366) (2012) (explaining that affirmative waiver, as opposed to mere forfeiture by failing to object, prevents a finding of “plain error” under OCGA § 17-8-58 (b)). 27 See Jackson v. State, 274 Ga. App. 26, 31 (4) (619 SE2d 294) (2005) (<HOLDING>); see also Millhollan v. State, 221 Ga. 165,
holding that a broad statutory definition of a term that was inconsistent with the terms plain meaning did not affect the terms definition in other contexts holding that a petitioners conviction for indecent assault and battery under massachusetts law constituted a crime of violence because any offense under the state statute was by definition nonconsensual and thus any violation of the statute by its nature presents a substantial risk that force may be used to overcome the victims lack of consent and accomplish the indecent touching holding that the term indecent act required no further definition holding that in the absence of a statutory definition a term should be accorded its ordinary meaning holding that when a term is defined in the statute it need not be further alleged in the indictment