end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation. 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.1949). Relying on this reasoning, the court in Amove held that because Novarro “acted deliberately and rationally in seeking to determine the then-valid, applicable and enforceable law before taking the actions for which the plaintiff now seeks to hold him accountable, we cannot say that Novarro’s arrest of Amore was objectively unreasonable.” Amove, 624 F.3d at 535. Accordingly, the Second Circuit held that even where a defendant violates a clearly established right, he may still be entitled to qualified immunity in limited circumstances. Id.; see also Friedman v. Boucher, 580 F.3d 847, 859 (9th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, a finding that the
holding that a police officer is not entitled to qualified immunity based on his reliance on a prosecutors advice when the law is clearly established and would be known to a reasonable officer in the circumstances quoting stevens v rose 298 f3d 880 884 9th cir2002 emphasis added holding that in deciding whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity it is not only the evidence of clearly established law that is for the court but also whether a reasonable officer could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful in light of the information the officer had holding that although jury found officer not to have had probable cause for arrest officer was entitled to immunity because law was not clearly established as to circumstances in which officer found himself holding that the actions of an officer in reliance on what proves to be the flawed conclusions of a fellow officer may be reasonable nonetheless and thus protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity holding that an officer is not entitled to qualified immunity on the grounds that the law is not clearly established every time a novel method is used to inflict injury