and hag at least begun to develop plans to build a rabbinical college,, though the extent of that development is in dispute, (compare Defs.’ 56.1 ¶¶ 26-27, with Pis.’ Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 26-27 (discussing the state of the curriculum)), and Defendants have offered no evidence to rebut Plaintiffs’ second allegation, which is supported by evidence, that the Congregation purchased the Subject Property to build a rabbinical college.. (See Pis.’ 56.1 ¶ 102 (citing Decl. of Michael Tauber (“Tauber Decl.”) ¶ 3 (Dkt. No. 148)).) Moreover, Plaintiffs need not prove the fifth allegation—that the provisions were enacted to prevent the rabbinical college from being built—in order to establish standing to challenge them. See Chabad Lubavitch v. Borough of Litchfield, 796 F.Supp.2d 333, 338 (D.Conn.2011) (<HOLDING>); cf Lamar Advert. of Penn, LLC v. Town of
holding that plaintiff could not request damages for a facial challenge to a zoning ordinance under the first amendment because the provision had not yet harmed the plaintiff holding that defendant had standing to challenge the seizure of a box regardless of who owned it because it was in a house owned and possessed by defendant holding that religious corporation which owned property had standing to challenge zoning ordinance holding that the plaintiffs due process challenge to a city ordinance was barred because it was inextricably intertwined with a statecourt ruling that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the ordinance holding that a plaintiff had standing to attack an entire ordinance including portions of the ordinance not applied to the plaintiff