and rejected the merits of King’s Batson challenge on direct appeal. King, 89 So.3d at 229-31. As we indicated then, the reason proffered by the State— that Juror Ill’s brother was facing a criminal charge—is a valid race-neutral reason to exercise a peremptory strike. Id. at 230 (citing Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So.2d 784, 788 (Fla. 1992); Bowden v. State, 588 So.2d 225, 229 (Fla. 1991)); see also Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341, 126 S.Ct. 969, 163 L.Ed.2d 824 (2006) (concluding that it was reasonable for the trial court to accept as race-neutral reasons for striking a minority female juror the facts that she was nineteen years old, single, lacked ties to the community, and might be too tolerant of the crimes at issue); cf. Nowell v. State, 998 So.2d 597, 604-05 (Fla. 2008) (<HOLDING>). The reasons offered by the State during trial
holding that the states agebased justification for exercising a strike was pretextual in that case but noting that a jurors age can be a relevant consideration when evaluating the genuineness of a proffered justification holding that an employees attempt to prove actual discrimination requires more substantial evidence than a prima facie case because evidence of pretext and discrimination is viewed in light of the employers justification holding that where justification for strike was not corroborated by the record and the prosecutor was not credible the proffered justification could not support state courts conclusion that petitioner had failed to prove purposeful discrimination holding that if the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of age discrimination the employer must show that the discharge was based on reasonable factors other than age  and if the employer meets that burden the plaintiff must show that age was a determining factor in the discharge holding sanctions were appropriate when the party had no reasonable justification for his repeated failures to designate an expert