Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 90, 105-06, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 156 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003) (finding that Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration Act was remedial and non-punitive, and therefore civil, even though an offender’s failure to comply with the act could result in criminal prosecution); Creekmore v. Attorney Gen. of Tex., 341 F.Supp.2d 648, 663 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (deeming the SORP a civil statute in deference to legislative intent); Ex parte Robinson, 80 S.W.3d 709, 715 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002) (finding that the SORP is non-penal because the disability it imposes is not meant to punish, but to accomplish the legitimate governmental purpose of “protecting the public from sex offenses that could be perpetrated by adult and youthful sex' offenders”), aff'd, 116 S.W.3d 794 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (<HOLDING>); Dean v. State, 60 S.W.3d 217, 225 (Tex.
holding that application of an amended version of the guidelines to a conspiracy which continues both before and after the amendment does not violate the ex post facto clause holding that when a video recording of an alleged excessive force incident contradicts the nonmoving partys version of the incident to the extent that no reasonable jury could believe it a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment holding that the 1999 version of the sorp like the 1997 version is nonpunitive in both intent and effect recognizing that the appellant improperly premised his arguments on his evidence and his version of the disputed facts despite his purporting to accept the plaintiffappellees version and proceeding with our appellate review by accepting the plaintiffappellees version of the disputed facts and evidence holding that a statute of limitations defense raised for the first time during trial was waived construing a previous version of federal rule of criminal procedure 12 that was not substantively different from the current version