2786. Lack of definitive guidance in Daubert left Judges with the task of deciphering Daubert’s impact on non-scientific testimony. Kimberly M. Hrabosky, Note, Kumho Tire v. Carmi chael: Stretching Daubert Beyond Recognition, 8 Geo. Mason L.Rev. 203, 207 (1999). Logical arguments regarding Daubert’s applicability to non-scientific expert testimony remained an open issue until the Kumho Tire decision. In the interim, there was a split between Federal Circuit Courts as to whether the Daubert decision applied to non-scientific experts (whatever that concept may include). Some Federal Circuits, including the Fifth and the Eighth Circuits, held that Daubert was applicable to the non-scientific expert testimony. See Moore v. Ashland Chemical, Inc., 5th Cir., 151 F.3d 269, 275 n. 6 (1998) (<HOLDING>); Dancy v. Hyster Co., 8th Cir., 127 F.3d 649,
holding that federal rule of evidence 702 superceded the frye standard of admissibility of scientific evidence and that under rule 702 the district court had to determine that proffered expert testimony was both reliable and relevant holding that the general principles of rule 702 recognized by the daubert decision are applicable to other species of expert testimony holding that under fedrevid 702 expert testimony must be reliable to be admissible holding that daubert sought only to clarify the standard for evaluating scientific knowledge under rule 702 holding that the basic gatekeeping obligation of daubert applies to all expert testimony