in imposing the sentence itself. Second, the statute vests the Attorney General, not the district court, with the authority to curtail a prison sentence for the purpose of deportation. As discussed earlier, a district court cannot sua sponte issue a deportation order without a request from the United States Attorney. 8 U.S.C. § 1252a(e)(l). Thus, the district court could not depart downward pursuant to section 1231(a)(4)(B) because the statute does nothing to expand its rather limited powers on issues of deportation. In sum, Marin-Castaneda invokes section 1231(a)(4)(B) at the wrong juncture and directs his argument at the wrong branch of government. In fact, Marin-Castaneda does not even have standing to enforce this statute. See Thye v. United States, 109 F.3d 127, 129 (2d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). The Attorney General may still exercise her
holding attorney general could not contract on behalf of the state to employ an assistant attorney beyond the attorney generals own term holding that attorney generals authority to deport creates no private right of action for a criminal alien because attorney general must act in best interest of united states not the criminal alien recognizing burden is on alien when alien is removable holding that the phrase resident alien means an alien lawfully residing in the united states holding that erisa creates no private right of action