n.3. The circumstances of this case are distinguishable from those in Bruton. Here, unlike Bruton, the statements at issue do not involve a custodial confession by Permanian, and the statements were admissible under the coconspirator hearsay exception. Permanian’s statements were also generally made under circumstances that indicate their reliability including that Permanian had personal knowledge of the incident, it was unlikely that Permanian’s statements were founded upon a faulty recollection, the statements were against Permanian’s penal interest given their context, and the statements did not contain any express factual assertion of defendant’s guilt but only an inference of guilt. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 87-89, 27 L. Ed. 2d 213, 226-27, 91 S. Ct. 210, 219-20 (1970) (<HOLDING>); Goodman, 81 Ill. 2d at 284-85 (finding
holding rule 16a1a does not include statements made by coconspirators even if those statements can be attributed to the defendant for purposes of the rule against hearsay holding that the sixth amendment right of confrontation applies to all three phases of the capital trial and that the admission of  hearsay statements of codefendants in the penalty phase violated the confrontation clause holding that the defendants sixth amendment confrontation clause rights were not violated by the admission of the child victims statements to her mother grandmother a detective and a forensic investigator holding that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule where the defendant was able to confront and crossexamine the witness who claimed that the statements at issue were made holding that the sixth amendment confrontation clause was not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under a georgia statute permitting an exception for statements by coconspirators where there was sufficient indicia of reliability supporting the truth of the statements