therefore constitute circumstantial evidence that, when considered together with other evidence, may give rise to a reasonable inference of age discrimination.” Fisher v. Pharmacia & Upjohn, 225 F.3d 915, 923 (8th Cir.2000) (internal citations omitted). The Court notes that plaintiff admits the comments made by Joe Maynard were not directed specifically at her. Further, the meeting at which he made these comments occurred almost one year before plaintiff was terminated — and eight months prior to the first company lay-off. Based on these two facts, the Court finds that the remarks — while they might be seen as evidence of some discriminatory animus — are somewhat “outdated” and also lack significant probative value. See Walton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 167 F.3d 423 428 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the Court finds that these remarks by
holding that absent a casual link between supervisors isolated racial remarks and employers decision to promote stray remarks cannot support a verdict for race discrimination holding that ageist comments by coworkers were merely  stray remarks that while indicating an agediscriminatory animus on the part of those employees under the circumstances of the case were of no probative value as to the employers decisionmaking process holding that stray remarks made almost two years prior to employment action was outdated and lacking in apparent probative value holding that a comment made by a person who played no role in the employment decision was a stray remark that lacked any probative value as a matter of law holding that comments which were considered by personnel board in normal course of considering employment action were relevant to establish discriminatory intent and were not just stray remarks