as "extreme” any argument (not made by the government in that case) that the federal statute proscribed firearms possession by “even a person whose predicate conviction in the interim had been finally reversed on appeal and thus no longer was outstanding.” 445 U.S. at 61 n. 5, 100 S.Ct. at 918 n. 5; see also Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 115, 103 S.Ct. 986, 993, 74 L.Ed.2d 845 (1983); State v. Gomez, 212 Ariz. 55, ¶ 16, 127 P.3d 873, 876 (2006). In other words, the prohibited possessor charge in Lewis presumably would not have stood had the underlying, predicate conviction been reversed or vacated before the defendant committed the weapons offense. That, however, is not the situation presented in this case. 7 . See People v. Quintana, 707 P.2d 355, 360 (Colo.1985) (<HOLDING>); State v. Portsche, 258 Neb. 926, 606 N.W.2d
holding district court lacked discretion to permit defendant to stipulate to prior conviction in prosecution for being a felon in possession of a firearm holding that prior indiana felony was conviction for purposes of defendants  922g1 prosecution and noting that although state law determines whether there is a predicate statelaw conviction once the conviction is established federal law dictates that the convicted felon may not possess any firearm holding that a prior nonarizona conviction to be used as a prior felony conviction under the statute must both be for an offense that would constitute a felony in arizona and be classified as a felony in the other jurisdiction holding that defendants have a federal constitutional right to make a collateral attack on a prior conviction only when that conviction was obtained without the assistance of counsel holding that a prior conviction obtained in violation of a defendants constitutional rights cannot be used as the underlying conviction in a prosecution under colorados felon with a gun statute