under Section 1988 that the standards it set forth for interpreting the term “prevailing party” would be “generally applicable in all cases in which Congress has authorized an award of fees to a ‘prevailing party.’ ” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). Indeed, in Buckhannon itself, the Court — in assessing whether the legislative history supported the catalyst theory-r-examined not the legislative history of the Fair Housing Amendments Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, but rather the legislative history of Section 1988. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 607-08, 121 S.Ct. 1835. Accordingly, in a recent First Circuit case involving attorneys’ fees under Section 1988, New England Regional Council of Carpenters v. Kinton, 284 Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Crabill v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 259 F.3d 662,
holding buckhannon applicable to the fair credit reporting act 15 usc  1681 et seq which authorizes attorneys fees for prevailing parties holding that buckhannon applies to the attorneys fees provision of the idea holding buckhannon applicable to the equal access to justice act 28 usc  2412 et seq which authorizes attorneys fees for prevailing parties holding buckhannon applicable to the freedom of information act 5 usc  552 et seq which provides attorneys fees for complainants who have substantially prevailed holding habeas corpus is not a civil action for purposes of the equal access to justice act provision for award of attorney fees to prevailing party