proceeding. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284, 42 S.Ct. 492, 66 L.Ed. 938 (1922); see also Frank v. Rogers, 253 F.2d 889, 890 (D.C.Cir.1958) (“Until the claim of citizenship is resolved, the propriety of the entire proceeding is in doubt.”). Id. at 1136. As in Rivera, if the government’s argument that exhaustion is required were correct, “it would be possible to unintentionally relinquish U.S. citizenship .... The Constitution does not permit American citizenship to be so easily shed.” Id. Thus, “[t]he statutory administrative exhaustion requirement of § 1252(d)(1) does not apply” to “a person with a non-frivolous claim to U.S. citizenship” even if he has previously been (illegally) deported by the government. Id. at 1140. See also Moussa v. INS, 302 F.3d 823, 825 (8th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Because Minasyan’s claim to citizenship is
holding that an alien may apply for asylum successively based on any material changed conditions for 90 days after a final order of removal but not thereafter holding that the requirement that an alien appeal a removal order within 30 days is jurisdictional holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to review the merits of a petition challenging a removal order or to stay a removal order where the petitioner was not specifically challenging his physical detention holding that the farr act is expressly limited to claims arising out of a final order of removal and does not confer any legal rights outside of the removal setting holding that the exhaustion requirement of  1252d1 applies only to an alien  challenging a final order of removal and not to  any person 