parole agreement. Although the State also seemed to argue more generally before the district court that suspicionless searches of parolees did not violate the Search and Seizure Clause of either the Iowa or Federal Constitution because parolees have a diminished expectation of privacy, it never argued the State had reasonable suspicion or other reasonable grounds to conduct the search of Baldón apart from consent. While the record is sketchy, the diminished-expectation-of-privacy argument was, instead, tied to the State’s consent claim to support the prop ticular need for the parole officer e addressed the same question in the context of parole agreements that we face in this case, with mixed results. See United States ex rel. Coleman v. Smith, 395 F.Supp. 1155, 1157 (W.D.N.Y.1975) (<HOLDING>); Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235, 1241-42
holding that consentsearch provision of a probation agreement was voluntary even though defendant would have been sent to prison if he rejected it holding defendant does not waive fourth amendment protection by signing parole agreement but the search condition does confirm right of parole officer to conduct reasonable searches within scope of parole mission holding probationer voluntarily accepted consentsearch provision by accepting probation holding consentsearch provision in parole agreement was coerced and involuntary holding defendants agreement to consentsearch provision not coerced merely because it was one of two undesirable options