Apprendi. We have held unequivocally that imposition of imprisonment following the revocation of supervised release is part of the original sentence authorized by the fact of conviction and does not constitute additional punishment beyond the statutory maximum. See United States v. Liero, 298 F.3d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir.2002) (affirming circuit precedent holding that “the punishment for violating the conditions of supervised release is itself a part of the original sentence”). Nor does a judge’s finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant violated the conditions of supervised release raise Sixth Amendment concerns. There is no right to a jury trial for such post-conviction determinations. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480-88, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hall, 419 F.3d 980, 985 n. 4
holding that a right to confrontation exists in parole revocation proceedings holding that probation revocation proceedings are clearly not criminal proceedings holding probation revocation is not a stage of a criminal prosecution holding that an important part of due process in the context of parole revocation is a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole holding that parole revocation proceedings require only basic due process rather than the full protection of the sixth amendment because they are not part of a criminal prosecution