claims against the remaining Defendants necessarily fail as well. Defendants’ statements before Congress were made forty-two years after the Plaintiffs became addicted to cigarettes. Thus, these statements cannot have formed the “basis of the bargain” for the Plaintiffs’ initial purchase of cigarettes. See generally Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d at 436 (explaining that “basis of the bargain” is analogous to the common law “reliance” element). And, to the extent Plaintiffs’ argument rests on the contention that they continued to smoke in reliance on the Defendants’ 1994 statement, we agree with the district court that “any express warranty within the limitations period was negated by the common knowledge that smoking is addictive and dangerous to one’s health.” Cf. Allgood, 80 F.3d at 172 (<HOLDING>). III. PLAINTIFFS’ CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
recognizing under illinois law that pharmaceutical manufacturer has duty to warn of any dangers associated with offlabel use of product if such dangers were reasonably known holding that seller of frontend loader had no duty to warn injured worker concerning the dangers of operating the loader without a rops because the dangers were obvious under an objective standard holding that manufacturer had no duty to warn its purchasers retailer and transporter of gas of dangers where those purchasers had operated a gas business for years were familiar with the trade journals and already knew the dangers holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution holding manufacture had no duty to warn of the dangers of smoking because the dangers of cigarette smoking have long been known to the community