court concerning whether a trial court may summarily dismiss a defendant’s habeas corpus petition. The Second District has addressed the issue involving 175, 176-79, 802 N.E.2d 381, 383-86 (2d Dist. 2003), appeal allowed, 208 Ill. 2d 552, 809 N.E.2d 1291 (2004) (relying on Gaines and holding that a trial court is not authorized to summarily dismiss a mandamus complaint). However, the Fourth District reached the opposite conclusion and holds that a trial court has the inherent authority to strike a section 2 — 1401 petition sua sponte if the court finds the petition is frivolous and without merit. People v. Bramlett, 347 Ill. App. 3d 468, 472-73, 806 N.E.2d 1251, 1254-55 (4th Dist. 2004). See also Mason v. Snyder, 332 Ill. App. 3d 834, 839-43, 774 N.E.2d 457, 461-64 (4th Dist. 2002) (<HOLDING>). This district has not addressed the issue in
recognizing a district judge may dismiss a case sua sponte under either rule 41b or its inherent authority to manage its docket recognizing that a district court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint for failure to serve after notice to the plaintiff holding that district courts possess the inherent authority to dismiss an action sua sponte for failure to prosecute with or sans notice to the parties holding that a court may sua sponte take judicial notice of its docket holding that a trial court may evaluate mandamus petitions to determine their sufficiency and has inherent authority to strike those petitions sua sponte