property to another and in turn receives from the latter his property without having an agreed value placed on [either].’ ” Id. (quoting Griswold v. Tucker, 216 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Tex.Civ.App.1948)) (brackets in original). After finding this, the court of appeals applied the canon of statutory construction known as ejusdem generis to the term “other disposition” and stated that: Employment of the doctrine mandates that “other disposition” refer to a transaction of the same general type as a sale or exchange. Therefore, though “other disposition” cannot technically be characterized as a sale or exchange, at the minimum it must meet the threshold test of these two transactions by effecting a transfer of property. See Barnard v. Barnard, 91 Ga.App. 502, 502-503, 86 S.E.2d 533, 536 (1955) (<HOLDING>). Id. See also Corwin v. RCA Corp. (In re
holding the word passion as applied to a jurys action means anger resentment heat absence of reflection disregard of the rights of others and kindred motives holding that notice of appeal did not divest the district court of jurisdiction at the time it was filed because a motion for reconsideration was pending holding that a partys filing of a statutory disclaimer of all interfering claims does not divest the board of jurisdiction to enter judgment against that party holding that since the word sell means to divest ones self of all rights and interest in a thing sold the doctrine of ejusdem generis compels that exchange and dispose also carry that connotation holding that an order is not a final appealable order when it does not dispose of the complaints against all of the defendants