decided by summary judgment. See, e.g., Gliottone v. Ethier, 870 A.2d 1022, 1028 (R.I.2005) (“[IJssues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication, but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner.”) (quoting Rogers v. Peabody Coal Co., 342 F.2d 749, 751 (6th Cir.1965)); see generally Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) (“We believe that summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play leading roles, the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot.”); Schmidt v. McKay, 555 F.2d 30, 37 (2d Cir.1977); see also Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552, 119 S.Ct. 1545, 143 L.Ed.2d 731 (1999) (<HOLDING>); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
holding that whether the gerrymandering at issue was the product of impermissible racial motivation was a disputed fact and that it was error in this case for the district court to resolve the disputed fact of motivation at the summary judgment stage holding that the documentary evidence was unclear as to whether group one was offering only to license the patent to hallmark and was not offering to license or sell the invention as such and that as a result the district judge erred in deciding this disputed question of fact on summary judgment holding that the disputed issue with respect to the state law bar was properly submitted to the jury holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case holding that defense of fraud was waived where no special issue was submitted and there was disputed evidence