effect on commerce. Cf. United States v. Amato, 495 F.2d 545, 548 (5th Cir.1974) (sustaining a Hobbs Act conviction when the evidence showed that the defendants’ actions caused a business operating in interstate commerce to shut down temporarily). Zuñiga also argues that his conviction must be reversed because the indictment failed to allege that the crimes had an adverse impact on commerce. That allegation is meritless. Count 1 of the indictment charged in the plainest of terms that the appellants conspired “to unlawfully interfere with interstate commerce by robbery.” That was enough to put the appellants on fair notice of the interstate commerce element of the crimes charged in counts 1 and 2. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Cianci, 378 F.3d 71, 81 (1st
holding that the insertion of surplus words in the indictment does not change the nature of the offense charged holding that it is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself holding that an allegation as to the time of the offense is not an essential element of the offense charged in the indictment and within reasonable time limits proof of any date before the return of the indictment and within the statute of limitations is sufficient recognizing that this courts construction of a statute becomes as much apart of the statute as the words of the statute itself and that change is a matter that addresses itself to the general assembly not this court holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense