Amendment in his effort to confer with counsel. Although the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), found in that clause a right to counsel, calling the presence of counsel “the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege,” id. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602, and “[a]lthough conduct by law enforcement officials prior to trial may significantly impair that right [to avoid self-incrimination], a constitutional violation occurs only at trial.” United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264, 110 S.Ct. 1056, 108 L.Ed.2d 222 (1990). That is of no help to Padilla, who does not face the prospect of a trial. But see Martinez v. City of Oxnard, 270 F.3d 852 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>), cert. granted sub nom. Chavez v. Martinez, —
holding that police officers were not entitled to qualified immunity where they used threats and physical violence against the plaintiff in march 1992 to coerce a confession that was later used to convict him of murder holding that application of statutory mandatory minimum in  841b1a does not violate defendants fifth and fourteenth amendment rights holding that mental coercion led to an involuntary confession holding that under elstad the first question that must be answered when determining whether a subsequent confession is tainted by an earlier confession is whether the initial confession was obtained in violation of the defendants fifth amendment rights  ie whether it was involuntary  or whether the confession was voluntary but obtained in technical violation of miranda  holding that a plaintiff may bring a  1983 action alleging a violation of fifth and fourteenth amendment rights to be free from police coercion in pursuit of a confession even though statements were not used against him at trial