was terminable at will and that he could simply “walk away” from his representation of appellee. On the basis of this proposition, appellee contends there was no mutuality of obligation requiring appellee to fulfill a contractual commitment to appellant. We disagree with this argument for several reasons. First, in appellant’s summary judgment affidavit, he expressly denied having acknowledged in his deposition testimony that he could have terminated the agency agreement at will. In the deposition testimony relied upon by appellee, the ap orceable for want of mutuality of obligation must be determined as of the time of the alleged breach, not at the time of the making of the contract. United Appliance Corporation v. Boyd, 108 S.W.2d 760, 764 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1937, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Here, the summary judgment evidence shows
holding that it is not holding that place of performance of a life insurance contract was the state where premiums were made payable even if the contract was made in another state holding that even if contract lacks mutuality at time it is made whole or partial performance may render it enforceable holding that it may not holding that a court may only enforce a settlement agreement if it constitutes an enforceable contract