entire sentencing package despite the fact that it includes an unchallenged sentence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2106; see also Johnson v. United States, 619 F.2d 366, 368 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Moore, 540 F.2d 1088, 1091 (D.C.Cir.1976). This power allows an appellate court, in a ease on a direct appeal from multiple count criminal convictions where the several sentences are interdependent, to vacate all sentences even if only one is reversed on appeal. United States v. Rosen, 764 F.2d 763, 767 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1061, 106 S.Ct. 806, 88 L.Ed.2d 781 (1986); United States v. Busic, 639 F.2d 940, 947 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918, 101 S.Ct. 3055, 69 L.Ed.2d 422 (1981); see Pennsylvania v. Goldhammer, 474 U.S. 28, 30, 106 S.Ct. 353, 354, 88 L.Ed.2d 183 (1985) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that defendant’s sentences for
holding that the government could appeal a criminal sentence without violating the double jeopardy clause when congress expressly authorized such an appeal holding that the double jeopardy clause did not bar resentencing on counts that were affirmed on appeal when a sentence of imprisonment on another count was vacated holding that in some circumstances a sentence on one count may be increased after the sentence on a similar or related count has been vacated on appeal holding that on direct appeal appellate court may remand for resentencing of all counts holding that double jeopardy does not prohibit resentencing on unchallenged count after appeal of defendant on another count and vacatur of entire sentence but explicitly noting that what we have said  in no way is addressed to a situation involving concurrent or noninterlocking sentences