a former statute is amended, or a doubtful interpretation of a former statute rendered certain by subsequent legislation, it has been held that such [an] amendment is persuasive evidence of what the Legislature intended by the first statute.” Sheriff v. Smith, 91 Nev. 729, 734, 542 P.2d 440, 443 (1975); accord Beazer Homes Nevada, Inc. v. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 575, 580-81, 97 P.3d 1132, 1135-36 (2004). Although this statute has only a prospective effect and is inapplicable here, Nevada Power v. Metropolitan Development Co., 104 Nev. 684, 686, 765 P.2d 1162, 1163 (1988), the amendment demonstrates that our interpretation of the interrelation between NRS 40.655, NRCP 68, and NRS 17.115 comports with legislative intent. 16 See Bowyer v. Taack, 107 Nev. 625, 627, 817 P.2d 1176, 1177 (1991) (<HOLDING>), overruled in part on other grounds by McCrary
holding that the defendant was only permitted to recover attorney fees as an item of special damages with respect to the underlying action in which the defendant was sued and was not permitted to recover attorney fees incurred in the malpractice portion of the case as damages holding that bank was entitled to attorney fees on appeal when agreement did not prohibit such fees holding that transferors request to recover fee it had paid was within the scope of the general statutory language allowing recovery of reasonable costs of participating in a proceeding even though other party was initially responsible for paying this fee and even though statute did not specifically provide that such recovery was allowed holding that an award of attorney fees for services rendered at the instance of the custodial parent in defending an action for change of custody may be allowed even though the defense was unsuccessful and even though it was claimed that such an award violated public policy holding similarly where appellant claimed that she was entitled to recover attorney fees under nrs 18010 even though nrcp 68f and nrs 171154 foreclosed such a recovery