court’s simultaneous dismissal of the plaintiffs emotional distress claim under the three-year statute and refusal to dismiss the malpractice claim to the extent that it alleged “economic losses incurred in the effort to retain custody of her child.” 170 Vt. 428, 435, 751 A.2d 788, 793 (2000); see also Egri, 174 Vt. at 445, 804 A.2d at 768 (“[WJhere a complaint clearly alleges injury covered by § 512 and injury covered by § 511, the two different limitation periods apply, even though there is only one wrongful act.”). ¶ 23. To be sure, the mere fact that economic harm is alleged will not invariably invoke § 511’s six-year limitation provision where the “gravamen or essence” of the claim remains personal injury. See Rennie v. State, 171 Vt. 584, 587, 762 A.2d 1272, 1276 (2000) (mem.) (<HOLDING>). Defendants assert that this is precisely the
holding that although plaintiff claimed she lost income and other economic benefits from alleged tortious interference this did not alter the underlying nature of the claim as one for personal injuries governed by  512s threeyear limitation period holding that the limitation period for commencing a judicial action for unlawful discrimination in employment is the threeyear period of nycivpracl  r  2142 holding that although plaintiff claimed that googles two top executives did have direct unique and personal knowledge of the facts at issue it made sense to require plaintiff to seek the information from other sources first holding that warranty actions for personal injury damages or tortious injury to personal property are governed by general nonucc limitations periods holding that even though constitutional claims alleged under  1983 encompass numerous and diverse topics and subtopics the state statute of limitations governing tort actions for the recovery of damages for personal injuries provides the appropriate limitation period