to sovereignty suits involving border disputes, and is equally clear with respect to proprietary suits, since a state cannot suffer employment discrimination. The court therefore finds that Congress, by authorizing state governments to bring suit under Title VII, must have envisioned such suits being brought in the states’ capacity as parens patriae. Reading § 2000e-5 to allow for parens patriae standing. also comports with the remedial purposes of Title VII. Congress passed Title VII with the intention of eradicating employment discrimination from the national economy. To effectuate this goal, courts have liberally interpreted Title VII’s standing provision to allow for overlapping enforcement. See e.g., Clayton v. White Hall School District, 875 F.2d 676, 679-80 (8th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F.2d 846, 850 (7th
holding that white woman who was not object of discrimination but who alleged injury because of race discrimination against another was a person aggrieved within the meaning of title vii holding that white woman who sued under title vii to enjoin racially discriminatory employment practices was aggrieved person within meaning of the statute holding that direct evidence of discrimination is not required to prove discrimination in mixed motive cases under title vii holding white female employee lacks standing under title vii to allege injury on behalf of black applicants to employment agency who were discriminated against because of race holding that white female had standing under title vii to challenge her employees alleged racial discrimination against blacks