matter is therefore without merit. Compare Brownfield v. City of Yakima, 612 F.3d 1140, 1147-48 (9th Cir.2010) (police officer’s interoffice memo criticizing his colleague’s competence and complaining of favoritism in work assignments was “the stuff of internal power struggles within the workplace” and “decidedly personal”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Desrochers, 572 F.3d at 711 (police sergeants’ formal grievance criticizing their supervisor’s management style, read in context, addressed only private grievances). Furthermore, because Karl’s' deposition testimony was offered in the context of a judicial proceeding addressing a matter of public concern, it is immaterial to our public concern analysis whether th S. 20, 33, 104 S.Ct. 2199, 81 L.Ed.2d 17 (1984) (<HOLDING>). We see no basis, however, for affording a
holding that a protective order prohibiting the disclosure of pretrial discovery does not offend the first amendment holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it modified a protective order after settlement to permit public access to pretrial materials in spite of a protective order to the contrary which it viewed as having had been initially justified holding that  106a  b offend the eleventh amendment holding that the public records act does not mandate disclosure of documents sealed by a protective order entered pursuant to the tennessee rules of civil procedure holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law