the prosecutor and testified be fore the grand jury, must be considered a complaining witness, or, at the very least, an actor that conspired with a complaining witness. The question here, then, is whether a complaining witness who knowingly provides false information on which a prosecutor relies, or a defendant who conspires with one who does, is, nonetheless, entitled to at least qualified immunity. In view of the general purpose of the qualified immunity doctrine, the question almost answers itself. As the Supreme Court noted in Malley, qualified immunity does not protect those who “knowingly violate the law,” Malley, 475 U.S. at 341, 106 S.Ct. at 1096, and “[t]he right to be free from ... prosecution in t ed by Richardson confirm this result. See 521 U.S. at 404, 117 S.Ct. at 2104(<HOLDING>). With respect to common law tradition, in
holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity holding that court must look both to history and to the purposes that underlie government employee immunityto determine whether qualified immunity is available in given context holding that a court must only look to the statutory definition not the underlying circumstances of the crime to determine whether a given offense is by its nature a crime of violence for purposes of 18 usc  16 holding that the court evaluating a claim of qualified immunity must first determine whether the plaintiff states a claim of a constitutional violation at all and then must determine whether the claimed right was clearly established before proceeding to the qualified immunity question holding that private psychiatric facility that had been involved in emergency involuntary detention and treatment of arrestee pursuant to state court order was entitled to assert qualified immunity in light of policy considerations that underlie doctrine