or concerted refusals to deal, or other competition-minimizing activities — commonly referred to as “horizontal restraints” — are examples of practices that receive per se treatment under § 1 of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212, 79 S.Ct. 705, 3 L.Ed.2d 741 (1959) (finding group boycotts unreasonable per se); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 228, 60 S.Ct. 811, 84 L.Ed. 1129 (1940) (finding price fixing unreasonable per se). By contrast, agreements between persons or entities at different levels of a market structure, such as between a manufacturer and distributor — commonly referred to as “vertical restraints” — are analyzed under the rule of reason. See GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. at 58-59, 97 S.Ct. 2549 (<HOLDING>); Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS,
holding vertical price restraints subject to the rule of reason holding vertical price restraints are judged according to the rule of reason holding that vertical minimum pricefixing agreements like vertical maximum pricefixing agreements should be evaluated under the traditional rule of reason holding that a maximum vertical price maintenance scheme is not per se illegal holding nonprice vertical restrictions are analyzed under the rule of reason