efforts to persuade an Immigration Judge to exercise her discretion to grant him a deportation waiver — the removal of that discretion would constitute a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Furthermore, given that parole eligibility is “considered an integral part of any sentence,” Shepard, 556 F.2d at 654; see also Warden, 417 U.S. at 658, 94 S.Ct. at 2535-36, I think that the availability and likelihood of a deportation waiver should also be so considered. In explaining the basis for its con- elusion that parole eligibility or gain time should be considered part of 86, 68 L.Ed. 549 (1924) (“It is well settled that deportation, while it may be burdensome and severe for the alien, is not a punishment.”); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591, 33 S.Ct. 607, 608, 57 L.Ed. 978 (1913) (<HOLDING>) (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
holding that the amount of sanctions is appropriate only when it is the minimum that will serve to adequately deter the undesirable behavior holding that the determination that an alien is an undesirable person is not a conviction of crime nor is the deportation a punishment it is simply a refusal by the government to harbor persons whom it does not want holding that it is not holding that for sentencing purposes the government does not need to allege a defendants prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact is not an element of the present crime holding that habeas review is  for any alien held in custody pursuant to an order of deportation