authority fails to make a written offer to settle the claim or which otherwise cannot be resolved using the benefits analysis in section (1).” 715 So.2d at 966-67. This is so because section 73.092 contains a “gap” by failing to provide a method for calculating attorney’s fees in cases in which the benefits analysis is not applicable and the proceeding is not a supplemental one. Id. at 966. Application of subsection (2) in those proceedings is necessary to give effect to the legislature’s intent that the landowner receive attorney’s fees under section 73.092 based on the landowner’s constitutional right to full compensation in eminent domain proceedings. Id.; see also City of N. Miami Beach v. Reed, 28 Fla. L. Weekly D2219, - So.2d -, 2003 WL 22187977 (Fla. 3d DCA Sept.24, 2003) (<HOLDING>). Because it was impossible to measure the
holding trial court had no authority to award attorneys fees when arbitrator had stated he would not award attorneys fees holding that offer of judgment made to fee owner under statutes and rules no longer applicable did not cut off fee owners right to fees because offer did not state it was being made free and clear of the tenants claims and because in any event condemning authority had made substantial changes to the construction plans and design which decreased the scope of the taking thereby reducing the amount awarded to landowner at trial holding defendant landowner entitled to appellate attorneys fees and costs where condemning authority appealed fee award and defendant prevailed holding that section 730922 should be applied to determine an attorneys fee award in eminent domain proceedings when no offer is made by the condemning authority thus making subsection 1 inapplicable holding that when an attorney fee award is made under a statute that does not define reasonable the award should be determined in light of all cetreumstances emphasis added