v. Virginia, 475 U.S. 1099, 1100, 106 S.Ct. 1503, 89 L.Ed.2d 903 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari); Jackson, 475 U.S. at 626, 106 S.Ct. 1404, overruled by Montejo, 556 U.S. at 795, 129 S.Ct. 2079; Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51, 55, 105 S.Ct. 1065, 84 L.Ed.2d 38 (1985); Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1043, 103 S.Ct. 2830; Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 46, 103 S.Ct. 394, 74 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982); Johnson v. Virginia, 454 U.S. 920, 920, 102 S.Ct. 422, 70 L.Ed.2d 231 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 20 . Federal circuits that have considered scenarios in which there is a temporal break between invocation and subsequent initiation have uniformly held that there was no Edwards violation. See McKinney v. Ludwick, 649 F.3d 484, 491 (6th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1559, 182
holding that the sixth amendment generally permits interrogation of a represented person only 1 if it was the defendant and not the government who initiated the interrogation and 2 if the defendant voluntarily waived his right to counsel holding that the automobile exception applied to a car that had broken down and was to be repaired during the night and operable the next morning because the car had not lost its inherent mobility holding that the decision to seek the death penalty is made by a separate branch of the government and is therefore not a cognizable federal issue holding that in the absence of an edwards violation the amount of time between interrogation and a defendants statement is only one measure of  voluntariness holding that even if a detectives statement  that the case might be prosecuted by the federal government and that mr mckinney could face the death penalty  made to mr mckinney postinvocation amounted to interrogation mckinneys decision the next morning to flag down the detective from his cell constituted initiation for purposes of edwards