nothing more than a sexual harassment case. Record at 323. No doubt, these comments, coupled with the lack of any credible evidence indicating that the appellant’s conduct was not sexual harassment and the overwhelming evidence of sexual harassment, made the members’ decision regarding the sexual harassment offenses a relatively easy venture. In all probability, the challenging issue debated during deliberations was whether the terminal element of an Article 134 offense was proved. The comments also lessened the chances that the members were either confused or misled by the military judge’s instructions (i.e., lessened the chances of the instructions infecting the trial with prejudicial error). Fifth, State v. Sanderson, 33 Or.App. 173, 575 P.2d 1025 (1978), quoted in the lead opinion (<HOLDING>) is inapposite. That decision involved a
holding unconstitutional a sexual harassment statute prohibiting conduct that alarmed or seriously annoyed the victim holding that sexual harassment need not take the form of sexual advances or other explicitly sexual conduct in order to be actionable under title vii holding that an employer must remedy situation of sexual harassment holding that sexual harassment is a personal injury tort holding an ordinance was unconstitutionally vague for prohibiting conduct entirely dependent upon whether or not a policeman is annoyed