provision, its application to plaintiff, or the governmental interests it serves. Without such evidence, there is no showing at this juncture that plaintiff, or anyone else, is likely to be harmed by its continued enforcement. The City ordinances that prohibit “sales or exchanges,” § 62 — 5(b)(9), and establishment or acceptance of “a price or fee ... for observing or participating in a display or performance, other than ... a tip the amount of which is not solicited,” § 62-5(b)(10), along with the categorical ban on commercial activity, § 62-4, present thornier questions. I now turn to those provisions. B. Restrictions on Commercial Expression and Activity Section 62 — 5(b)(10), quoted above, plainly regulates speech. See Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1051 (9th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>) (quoting regulation; emphasis in original).
recognizing the need to balance the states interest in fulfilling its responsibilities to the public the extent to which the speech in question involves a matter of public concern and the manner time place and context of the speech holding that campaign money laundering was in furtherance of political speech but an invalid exercise of free speech rights because it was illegal holding that restriction on government employee speech was unconstitutionally vague recognizing that code is speech holding that a regulation forbidding street performers to  solicit donations  except by  passively  informing the public that such donations are sought  with written signs constituted a restriction on speech because it allows the conduct exchange of money but regulates only the speech by specifying the manner of requesting money  only  passively