v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 477 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir.2007); Slaney v. The Int’l. Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 244 F.3d 580, 597 (7th Cir.2001). The question before the Court, however, is whether responses to affirmative defenses which allege fraudulent concealment must also be pleaded with the particularity required by Rule 9(b). The Seventh Circuit has yet to hold that such specificity in this context is required. What the Seventh Circuit has clearly held is that “a plaintiff is not required to negate an affirmative defense, such as the statute of limitations, in his complaint.” Clark v. City of Braidwood, 318 F.3d 764, 767 (7th Cir.2003) (vacating and remanding lower court’s dismissal of a complaint); U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Indiana Gas Co., Inc., 350 F.3d 623, 626 (7th Cir. 2003) (<HOLDING>). Thus, in this case, Plaintiffs need not plead
holding that the defendant could not raise affirmative defenses initially in its dispositive motion but remanding the case to the trial court to determine if leave to amend answer to incorporate affirmative defenses was appropriate so that the defendant could then properly raise those defenses in its dispositive motion holding that a complaints failure to overcome affirmative defenses does not warrant dismissal recognizing that the statute of limitations provision of the aedpa is an affirmative defenses rather than jurisdictional recognizing the existence of antagonistic defenses does not require severance unless defenses are actually irreconcilable holding that affirmative defenses are waived if not pled