of the notice and the UTC that follows if the vehicle’s registered owner does not reply to the notice do not constitute the power to decide whether those documents should issue. Rather, those tasks are merely part of the ministerial process of implementing the TIEO’s decision to issue them. Accordingly, the completion of the tasks of preparing and mailing the notice and the UTC upon authorization by the TIEO does not constitute the unauthorized delegation of police power. Cf. Gard v. State, 521 So.2d 369, 370 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (rejecting the defendant’s argument “that the trial court could not delegate to the prosecutor the task of writing the sentencing order pursuant to findings specifically made by the trial court.”); Reid v. State, 673 So.2d 972, 973 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (<HOLDING>). VII. CONCLUSION Based upon the foregoing
holding that a trial court fulfilled its duties to pronounce sentence and to specify reasons for departure and did not improperly delegate its authority by directing the prosecutor to perform the clerical task of preparing a written order consonant with the courts decision holding district court correctly reversed a departure sentence where the trial court failed to provide written reasons for the departure holding that the government did not waive its objections to the district courts departure decision and the resulting sentence by failing to reiterate these objections after the sentence was imposed holding that this court laeks the authority to review a sentencing courts denial of a downward departure unless the court failed to understand its authority to do so holding that the trial court is required to provide reasons for its decision prior to appeal