district court judges were responsible for appointing magistrate judges, removing them from office, and maintaining plenary authority over what matters were delegated to the magistrate judges once they were appointed. Id. at 937-39, 111 S.Ct. 2661. The Supreme Court held that because the entire process of magistrate ad judication “takes place under the district court’s total control and jurisdiction,” there was no danger that the structural protections of Article III would be violated. Id. at 937, 111 S.Ct. 2661. Prior to Peretz, the Ninth Circuit used similar reasoning to uphold the constitutionality of the Magistrates Act in Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc., 725 F.2d at 540. See also Technical Automation Servs. Corp. v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., 673 F.3d 399 (5th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). When the structural protections under Article
holding that circuit court should defer to supreme courts interpretation of the act holding that a condition was precedent to performance because the contract language did not explicitly state that it was precedent to formation holding that the supreme courts holding in stem did not extend to magistrate judges when fifth circuit precedent which was not overruled concluded that the magistrate act was constitutional holding that a threejudge panel may depart from circuit precedent that has not been expressly overruled when an intervening en banc or supreme court decision has undercut the theory or reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable holding that an intervening supreme court case can overturn circuit precedent