his motion to reopen without allowing sufficient time for further briefing. As to the former, because the ability to adjust one’s status is not an exception to the statutory filing deadline for a motion to reopen, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), an alien seeking reopening on that basis in an untimely motion to reopen is invoking the BIA’s authority to reopen proceedings sua sponte, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). The BIA’s exercise of its sua sponte authority is a matter entirely within its discretion and, thus, beyond the scope of our jurisdiction. See Azmond Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 518 (2d Cir.2006). As to the latter argument, Shih is correct that the BIA ignored it. However, even if this was an error, it was a harmless one. Cf. Dedji v. Mukasey, 525 F.3d 187, 192 (2d Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Because Shih offered no proper basis for
holding that us are accorded wide latitude in calendar management and the court will not micromanage their scheduling decisions any more than when it reviews such decisions by district judges recognizing the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions and that strategic choices made after less than complete investigation may be reasonable if reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation holding that subject to the duty to bargain in good faith parties should have wide latitude in their negotiations holding that counsels strategic decisions should be afforded wide latitude holding that this court is not bound by decisions of the appellate division or the third circuit even where those decisions concern the same parties and legal issues