wrong.” TFWS, Inc. v. Franchot, 572 F.3d 186, 194 (4th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted). Hendrix attempts to meet his burden in two ways. First, he argues the ruling in Hendrix I is supported only by dicta from the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 120 S.Ct. 1795, 146 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000). This court, however, “considers itself bound by Supreme Court dicta almost as firmly as by the Court’s outright holdings” Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 217 (10th Cir. 1996). Further, as Hendrix himself concedes, other circuit courts of appeals have also relied on Johnson for the proposition that a district court may extend a term of supervised release even if it was previously revoked. See, e.g., United States v. Winfield, 665 F.3d 107, 112 (4th Cir. 2012) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Vargas, 564 F.3d 618, 622-23
holding that the revocation of one term of supervised release did not automatically terminate another holding the district courts revocation of defendants term of supervised release did not end the courts jurisdiction over defendants release holding that term of supervised release was not automatically terminated when defendant was deported from united states and thus defendants subsequent commission of another offense illegal reentry after deportation prior to expiration of term of supervised release violated condition of supervised release that defendant commit no new offenses holding that a statute requiring a threeyear term of supervised release did not eviscerate the district courts discretion to adjust the term of supervised release pursuant to  3583e holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release