is financially able to pay and the other defendants are not, the other defendants’ culpability is demonstrably greater. The government charged, and the jury found, that defendants engaged in a single, continuing conspiracy to rig bids on certain cost-plus contracts between 1981 and 1984. It is well-established that, as a participant in this conspiracy, MIA is legally liable for all the acts of its co-conspirators in furtherance of this crime. See United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608, 31 S.Ct. 124, 126, 54 L.Ed. 1168 (1910) (“[T]he conspiracy continues up to the time of abandonment or success.”) (“A conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes ... [and] an overt act of one partner may be the act of all without any new agreement specifically directed to tha , 435 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1042, 108 S.Ct. 773,
recognizing forfeiture liability among criminal confederates to be joint and several holding that the repair or replace limitation of liability capped the insurers liability at the amount necessary to return the car to substantially the same condition as before the loss and did not include liability for loss due to stigma on resale holding that joint and several liability for entire actual loss could have been imposed on each fraud defendant as condition of probation holding that an intended loss  cannot exceed the loss a defendant could have occasioned if his or her fraud had been entirely successful holding proposition 51 which eliminated joint and several liability for noneconomic damages to have prospective effect only