859 (1997); both of which I will discuss later in this opinion. The collateral source rule is a rule that is firmly rooted in the law of Connecticut. It “provides that a defendant is not entitled to be relieved from paying any part of the compensation due for injuries proximately resulting from his act where payment [for such injuries or damages] comes from a collateral source, wholly independent of him. . . . The basis of our well-established collateral source rule is that a wrongdoer shall not benefit from a windfall from an outside source. That rule is applicable ... in any tort case.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 556-57, 590 A.2d 914 (1991); see also Gorham v. Farmington Motor Inn, Inc., 159 Conn. 576, 5 9 Conn. 579-80 (<HOLDING>); Roth v. Chatlos, 97 Conn. 282, 287-88, 116 A.
holding that a jury cannot award damages for medical expenses and lost wages without also awarding damages for pain and suffering where the plaintiff was injured due to the defendants negligence holding that plaintiff could recover medical fees not actually paid by the insurance company pursuant to an insurance contract holding that medical expenses and wages paid pursuant to employment contract were collateral sources and that defendant could not reduce personal injury damages because of such benefits holding that unemployment compensation benefits received by plaintiff are collateral source and that defendant could not reduce personal injury damages because of such benefits holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid