(Fla.1997), the supreme court recognized that the list in Poore “merely sum-marizefed] the complex statutory sentencing options available at that time” and held that a true split sentence could, as in this case, suspend the entire period of incarceration. Florida courts have also recognized that it is possible to structure a true split sentence with a longer supervision period than suspended incarceration term. Chupka v. State, 775 So.2d 315 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). “The class of true split sentences has now been expanded to include sentences in which the entire in-carcerative term is suspended, and sentences in which the probationary term is longer than the suspended jail term.” Evans v. State, 730 So.2d 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). See also Liles v. State, 837 So.2d 1151 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (<HOLDING>). Essentially, these cases recognize that
holding that a sentence structured with three years incarceration suspended and eight years of sex offender probation was a true split sentence holding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the sentence originally imposed by imposing an additional term of fifteen years suspended sentence holding sentence of thirtyfive years in prison with ten years probation for seconddegree murder is within the statutory maximum under 1997 statutes holding that probation is not a sentence holding that a defendant who received a suspended sentence of 157 days in jail was convicted of an offense punishable by more than oneyear of incarceration because california law provided for a sentence of up to three years imprisonment