See, e.g., Smith, 490 U.S. at 799, 109 S.Ct. 2201; McCullough, 475 U.S. at 138-39,106 S.Ct. 976; United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 373, 102 S.Ct. 2485, 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982); Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 27-28, 93 S.Ct. 1977; Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 116-17, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972). And, for purposes of AEDPA, “[t]he more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in ease-by-case determinations.” Yarbor-ough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004). As the Ohio Court of Appeals recognized in this case, it is highly implausible that Craycraft’s sentence was the product of actual vindictiveness. See Craycraft, 2012 WL 699577, at *3. The Ohio Supreme Court unexpectedly changed 104 S.Ct. 3217, 82 L.Ed.2d 424 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Absent Pearce’s aid, the burden remained on
recognizing presumption holding that intervening conduct may be used to rebut the presumption of vindictiveness holding that the trial court must specifically consider whether it would be in the best interest of the child for the case to proceed before a putative father may be permitted to seek blood tests in an attempt to rebut the presumption of paternity holding that the imposition of a harsher sentence after trial than what had been offered by the state pretrial does not create a presumption of vindictiveness holding that the presumption of vindictiveness only applies when the new sentence is actually harsher than that imposed prior to the successful appeal