that the state court’s decision conflicts with this Court’s precedents.”). Our dissenting colleague makes one bare-bones reference to the fair-minded-jurist standard at the end of his opinion. Dissenting Op. at 310. The dissent instead emphasizes that the Michigan Court of Appeals simply ignored, misapplied, or failed to consider the relevant legal principles. Id. at 303-04, 307-08. But the Michigan Court of Appeals in fact cited cases from our sister circuits that have interpreted the FECA’s preemption clause, discussed the purposes of the FECA, and weighed the competing federal-state considerations. See, e.g., Thornburgh, 39 F.3d at 1280-81. Indeed, the cases cited by the Michigan Court of Appeals directly address the various theories of preemption in the context of the FECA. See id. (<HOLDING>); see also Stern v. Gen. Elec. Co., 924 F.2d
holding that erisa preemption is an affirmative defense where erisas preemptive effect would result only in a change of the applicable law and would not subject the claim to exclusive federal jurisdiction holding that when erisas preemptive effect results in change of applicable law rather than choice of forum preemption is an affirmative defense that must be set forth in defendants answer or it is waived holding that the ada preemption clause expresses a broad preemptive purpose holding that courts have given section 453 a narrow preemptive effect in light of its legislative history and rejecting an argument based on conflict preemption recognizing conflict