Burleson’s 2012 arrest, state law did “expressly provide[]” that Burleson may not possess firearms. So this case boils down to one question: In applying § 921(a)(20)’s “unless clause,” do we look to state firearm restrictions in effect at the time Burle-son’s civil rights were restored, or to those in effect when Burleson was arrested on the § 922(g) charge? We think the text of § 921(a)(20) unambiguously answers that question in Burleson’s favor, pointing us to the law that governed at the time of restoration. The key statutory phrase is “unless such ... restoration ... expressly provides ” for a firearm restriction. “Such restoration” plainly “refers back to the restoration of civil rights discussed in the previous clause.” United States v. Osborne, 262 F.3d 486, 491 (5th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). By stating that firearm restrictions must be
holding texas law governs the procedural matter of preservationoferror requirements even if another jurisdictions law governs substantive issues holding state law governs disputed ownership of lands recognizing rule that state law governs the substance of claims in bankruptcy proceedings holding texas law governs procedural matters holding that law at time of restoration governs  921a20 inquiry