has consistently invoked state law throughout this litigation, neither party argues that any of the state-law provisions exceeds the scope of Fourth Amendment protections. Because the briefs do not provide specific arguments or authorities to distinguish the state-law claims from the federal-law claims, we will limit our analysis to the Fourth Amendment. Welch v. State, 93 S.W.3d 50, 52 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). 9 . St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex.Crim.App.2007). 10 . Id.; Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). 11 . Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996). 12 . The court of appeals’s opinion cites Maxwell v. State for the proposition that "whether consent was valid is a question of fact.” Hubert, 286 S.W.3d h Cir. 1999) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Kim, 105 F.3d 1579, 1581-82
holding that the determination of whether there was joint access and control for actual authority is a fact question reviewed under the plainerror standard but a determination of whether the government reasonably relied on a third partys consent is a question of law to be reviewed de novo holding that antitrust standing is question of law reviewed de novo holding that the threshold question of whether to adopt a doctrine is reviewed de novo holding question of law applied to undisputed facts reviewed de novo holding that whether consent was valid under the fourth amendment is a question of law to be reviewed de novo