employees. In support of his claim, Gross suggests that our reading of “any benefit of employment” fails to account for the fact that as an anti-discrimination provision, § 4311 protects a broader category of rights than those outlined in § 4316 applicable to service members on leave. In Crews, we first considered the plaintiffs claim under § 4316 and concluded that because subsection (b)(1) requires ‘“only equal but not preferential’ ” treatment for military employees the police department had no obligation under § 4316 to afford preferential scheduling benefits to its Guard employees. Crews, 567 F.3d at 865 (quoting Rogers v. City of San Antonio, 392 F.3d 758, 769 (5th Cir.2004)); see also Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 452 U.S. 549, 561, 101 S.Ct. 2510, 69 L.Ed.2d 226 (1981) (<HOLDING>). Despite Gross’s insistence that the language
holding that userras predecessor statute did not require employers to provide special benefits unavailable to other employees to military reservists holding that an employees claim for breach of a letter agreement was preempted by erisa where the agreement did not specify the amount or other terms of the employees retirement benefits and the court would have to refer to the employers erisagoverned retirement plan to determine the employees retirement benefits and calculate the damages claimed holding that military retirement benefits are current pay and thus significantly different than other retirement benefits holding that an employers knowledge that an employee was diabetic did not equate to notice that the employees diabetes was so limiting as to be disabling and to require special accommodations holding that a civilian employee injured when her automobile was hit by a military vehicle while she was driving on a road on the employers premises the military base to report to work sustained a compensable injury under the federal employees compensation act