Id. The logic of the AEDPA is flatly inconsistent with such an approach. Mindful of these background principles, we turn to the SJC’s determination that the petitioner was not entitled to inquire along the line that he proposed. As we already have observed, cross-examination is subject to reasonable restrictions. One well-established basis for circumscribing cross-examination is a party’s inability to lay a proper evidentiary foundation for the questions that he wishes to pose. See, e.g., United States v. Ovalle-Marquez, 36 F.3d 212, 218-19 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Carty, 993 F.2d 1005, 1010 (1st Cir.1993). The SJC relied upon this principle to conclude that the petitioner’s Confrontation Clause claim lacked merit. See Bui I, 419 Mass, at 401, 645 N.E.2d at 694-95 (<HOLDING>). This brings us to the offer of proof. It
holding that an offer to donate cannot be an offer to sell holding that a formal offer of proof was not required to challenge an evidentiary ruling because the substance of excluded testimony was apparent from the context holding that defense counsels offer of proof was inadequate and that it was proper for the trial justice to preclude admission of contested evidence recognizing further that the offer of proof allows the aggrieved party to present a proper record for review on appeal and in the absence of such an offer error may not be preserved holding that the petitioners offer of proof was too tenuous to justify the desired inquiry