in federal court. Rubio is essentially asking this court to read another basis for a plea in bar into the statute. However, where the lan guage of a statute is plain and unambiguous, no interpretation is needed and a court is without authority to change such language. State v. Johnson, 259 Neb. 942, 613 N.W. 2d 459 (2000). It is not within the province of a court to read a meaning into a statute that is not warranted by the language; neither is it within the province of a court to read anything plain, direct, or unambiguous out of a statute. State v. Cuny, 257 Neb. 168, 595 N.W.2d 899 (1999). Because Rubio has not been acquitted, convicted, or pardoned, his pleading cannot be properly labeled as a plea in bar under § 29-1817. See Melcher v. State, 109 Neb. 865, 192 N.W. 502 (1923) (<HOLDING>). Because his pleading is not a plea in bar, it
holding that plea in bar may be based only on grounds set forth in statute holding that it is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself holding that oneyear limitations period set forth in  2255 is not a jurisdictional bar and is thus subject to equitable tolling holding that the 1996 personal restraint petition of an individual committed in 1980 pursuant to an insanity plea was procedurally barred because it was filed after the oneyear time bar set forth in rcw 1073090 and because the grounds for relief did not fall within the exceptions to the limitation period holding that a complaint that included only allegations of intentional wrongdoing also set forth grounds for liability based on unintentional wrongdoing