account of the events at issue.” Id. “And the Sixth Amendment may be implicated when a defendant establishes that the victim engaged in a similar pattern of sexual acts.” Id. Consequently, to determine whether Oatts’s rights were violated, we move beyond a pure rape shield act analysis to consider whether evidence to show the child’s pre-existing sexual knowledge is admissible. See State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis.2d 633, 456 N.W.2d 325, 331 (1990) (“Despite the virtue of the general rule that such evidence is inadmissible, however, in the circumstances of a particular case evidence of a complainant’s prior sexual conduct may be so relevant and probative that the defendant’s right to present it is constitutionally protected. [Wisconsin’s rape shield law], as app 333, 1337 (Ind.Ct.App.1981) (<HOLDING>). Oatts argues that the trial court erred by
holding that because the line of questioning was not relevant to the credibility of the witness and sought information about which the witness had no knowledge it was not a constitutional violation to sustain the objection holding that it is within the discretion of the trial judge to sustain the states objection where questions to a witness go to his understanding of the law concerning parole and call for the legal knowledge of a lay witness holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness holding that error is preserved regarding a defendants right to confront a witness if the defendant identifies for the trial court the subject matter about which he or she desired to examine the witness and the subject had a tendency to affect the witness credibility holding that it is improper to ask a witness to comment on the credibility of another witness