274 (1969). Although no eviden-tiary hearing was held on Wolfs collateral attack, the court also found that the plea was involuntary under the factual circumstances. The circuit court struck the 2005 DUI conviction from the part II information, and we granted the State’s petition for an intermediate appeal. [¶ 5.] A procedural question has developed since we granted the petition for intermediate appeal. Based on our recent decision in Chant, 2014 S.D. 77, 856 N.W.2d 167, we must determine whether Wolfs collateral attack was procedurally barred. In Chant this Court held that “a defendant may only collaterally attack prior convictions used for enhancement if he or she was unrepresented by counsel when pleading guilty.” Id. ¶ 12, 856 N.W.2d at 170. Wolf was unrepresented in t Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Moore v. United States, 178 F.3d 994, 997-98
holding that in determining whether there exists a valid waiver of the right to counsel in the criminal setting the court may consider a defendants lack of good faith in working with appointed counsel including an unreasonable refusal to cooperate with counsel or an unreasonable request for substitution of appointed counsel and the timeliness of defendants request for new counsel particularly when a defendant makes an untimely request for new counsel  under circumstances which are likely to result in a continuance holding that the defendants prior conviction was not obtained in violation of his right to counsel because he had the opportunity for appointed counsel at public expense holding that defendants have a federal constitutional right to make a collateral attack on a prior conviction only when that conviction was obtained without the assistance of counsel recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel recognizing a defendants right to dismiss retained counsel in favor of appointed counsel