a duty of care to the injured third party boils down to issues of knowledge and causation ***”). It is undisputed that Kinko’s had no such information. No duty arose, and consequently, Kinko’s cannot be liable under a negligent supervision theory. Further, Kinko’s did not undertake to supervise Albear. In fact, the majority opinion castigates Kinko’s for what it terms turning a “blind eye” to Albear’s activities. Consequently, unlike training, no duty to supervise arises because of an undertaking. See 30 C.J.S. Employer— Employee §205, at 255 (2007) (“The tort of negligent supervision is separate from those of negligent hiring and retention”); Lowe v. Surpas Resource Corp., 253 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1245 (2003); but cf. Allen v. Posternock, 107 Pa. Super. 332, 335, 163 A. 336, 336 (1932) (<HOLDING>). Even if a duty to supervise did somehow
holding that the employer had a duty to ensure her instructions not to smoke were obeyed because inter alia she had knowledge the employee was not obeying her instructions holding plaintiff had exhausted sex discrimination claim because inter alia she had identified an instance of disparate treatment in an attachment to her eeo complaint holding that a plaintiff could not show that she engaged in protected activity because she did not present evidence that she informed her employer that her complaints were based on race or age discrimination holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment holding that employee had sufficient notice because she knew in advance of her termination that the county attorney proposed to eliminate her job