but they were not “actually” available and were not publicly disclosed under the FCA. See Meyer, 565 F.3d at 1201 (“[E]ven when the government has the information, it is not publicly disclosed under the Act until it is actually disclosed to the public.”). Further, the AAA reports were not publicly disclosed when the government provided them to EMP2, a private company hired by the government to audit the energy performance savings contract (“ESPC”). In Schumer, the court distinguished public disclosures from “the release of information within a private sphere,” stating that under a “practical, commonsense interpretation, ... information that was disclosed in private has not been publicly disclosed.” 63 F.3d at 1518 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Meyer, 565 F.3d at 1200 (<HOLDING>). In Seal 1 v. Seal A, 255 F.3d 1154, 1161-62
holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure  contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant holding that in the absence of public disclosure the court need not address whether relator was original source of the information holding that county defendant was a person within meaning of fca for purposes of suit by private plaintiff holding that where an authorized disclosure is voluntarily made to a nonfederal party whether or not that disclosure is denominated confidential the government waives any claim that the information is exempt from disclosure under the deliberative process privilege recognizing that information disclosed in private is not a public disclosure under the fca