Schneckloth. 412 U.S. at 248, 93 S.Ct. 2041. Whether a consent is voluntary is to be determined from all the circumstances. Id. at 248-49, 93 S.Ct. 2041. In this case there are few facts bearing on the voluntariness of the consent: (1) the bail bond was signed by Ullring and in it he stated that he agreed to obey the random search condition; and (2) he was in custody when he signed the bond on December 10. [¶ 11] Ullring suggests that a defendant who is in custody and who is required to sign a bail bond with conditions before being released is signing the bond under coercion. The mere fact that Ullring was in custody at the time the consent was given does not demonstrate that the consent was coerced. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424-25, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (<HOLDING>). Ullring’s written statement that he agreed to
holding consent not voluntary where police threatened to arrest defendants girlfriend if he refused to sign consent form holding that a detained defendants consent to search his car was voluntary even though the police did not tell him he was free to leave holding that defendants consent to search his person while on board an interstate bus was voluntary even though the police did not tell the defendant of his right to refuse consent holding that the defendants consent to search was voluntary although he had been served with a subpoena holding that warrantless search of defendants vehicle was legal because defendants consent was voluntary even through he was in police custody at the time of giving consent