themselves. We determined that this combination of two words, even reversed as to order, in the context of the product’s package label and intended use as a wipe for computer screens, was sufficient evidence of the fact that the mark “is generic and would be perceived by the purchasing public as merely a common name for its goods rather than a mark identifying the good’s source.” Id. We noted that we had reached similar results in other cases, upholding as generic, for example, TURBODIESEL for diesel engines with exhaust-driven turbine superchargers, see Cummins Engine Co. v. Continental Motors Corp., 53 C.C.P.A. 1167, 359 F.2d 892, 149 USPQ 559 (CCPA 1966), and GASBADGE for a gas exposure monitoring badge, see In re Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 816, 200 USPQ 215, 219 (CCPA 1978) (<HOLDING>). We, therefore, held that the PTO can satisfy
holding that where no evidence was designated to show that a car buyer knew that a sale violated the rights of the dealership that owned the car the buyers were buyers in the ordinary course of business for purposes of indcode  26112019 holding that courts must examine the facts surrounding the publication the context in which the statements were made and the nature of the language used holding gasbadge generic because evidence of the context in which a mark is used on package labels is probative of the reaction of prospective buyers holding limited use of a mark did not constitute prior use in commerce sufficient to establish rights in the mark holding that under the probate exception to federal diversity jurisdiction a court must examine the substance of the relief that plaintiffs are seeking and not the labels that they have used