that only Oxford moved for removal of the default in the December 4, 2007 motion, so the default is still in effect as to B&M. 9 This language falls within the recording requirements for “(ljiens under sections two and four ...” G.L.c. 254, §8. A lien under section one, however, incorporates the above-quoted language by requiring “a like statement. . .” Id. 10 See The American Heritage Dictionary College Edition at 307 (2d ed. 1985) (defining “conditioned” as “[p]repared for a specific action or process”). 11 bn Count II of the Lead case the Plaintiffs assert a claim for breach of contract under 29 U.S.C. §185 against B&M. Count II is not dependent on the existence of the Lien and therefore survives Oxford’s motion. See Driscoll v. Boston Edison Co., 25 Mass.App.Ct. 954, 955 (1988) (<HOLDING>). In May of 2007, however, the clerk entered a
holding that state law controls whether issues decided in a prior state court action are entitled to preclusive effect and setting forth the elements of collateral estoppel under washington law holding that an action under 29 usc  185 may be brought in a state court    but federal law controls over inconsistent state law internal citations omitted holding that federal courts presiding over causes of action created by state law should apply state substantive law but federal procedural law holding that state court with jurisdiction over  301 claim should have applied federal labor law rather than state contract law holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law