rule is limited to questions that seek evidence about the informant’s police sanctioned conduct in apprehending a suspect, then the informant’s claim of privilege under such circumstances would be spurious. In this context he is immune from prosecution. We believe that this is the correct limitation because Norman is premised on a line of cases holding that state agents are not accomplices to illegal conduct of which they are charged to discover. Norman quotes Ex parte Turner, 545 S.W.2d 470 (Tex.Cr.App.1977) for the proposition that the law is well settled that if an informant is acting as a state agent, then the informant’s claim of privilege under the Fifth Amendment is spurious. Id. at 344. In turn, Turner, supra, is premised upon Woodward v. State, 490 S.W.2d 850 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) (<HOLDING>). See also, Vela v. State, 373 S.W.2d 505
holding that an employer who caused his agent to commit a crime in another county was deemed to have been personally present where the crime occurred holding that an undercover agent is not an accomplice as long as the agent does not bring about the crime but merely obtains evidence to be used against those engaged in crime holding that expert testimony of irs agent regarding tax liability did not usurp the function of the jury as agent did not give her opinion about the guilt of the defendant holding that a private citizen acting as undercover agent is not an accomplice witness so long as he does not bring about the crime holding that the employer was not the insurers agent