law partner represented codefendants who testified for the prosecution, was sufficiently similar “to the typical multiple representation case to warrant application of the same principles and analysis”); People v. Grigsby, 47 Ill.App.3d 812, 820, 8 Ill.Dec. 243, 248, 365 N.E.2d 481, 486 (1977) (“the disqualification of one partner from a case disqualifies his copartners”); The People v. Stoval, 40 Ill.2d 109, 112-113, 239 N.E.2d 441, 443-444 (1968); State v. Lem’Mons, 238 Kan 1, 8-10, 705 P.2d 552, 556-557 (1985) (a conflict of interest existed where the husband, in a husband and wife law firm, represented one codefendant while the wife represented the other, and the codefendants attempted to implicate each other); Commonwealth v. Hodge, 386 Mass. 165, 169, 434 N.E.2d 1246, 1248 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Geraway, 364 Mass. 168,
holding that it was immaterial for conflict of interest purposes whether one attorney or two attorneys in the same firm represented the witness and the defendant holding that when two executives of the same firm make a decision to discriminate in furtherance of the purposes of the business this decision cannot be called a conspiracy for purposes of  1985 holding that defense counsel suffered from an actual conflict of interest in representing two codefendants because had the attorney not been facing a conflict of interest he might have been able to negotiate a plea agreement on one defendants behalf in return for becoming a prosecution witness against the eodefendant recognizing the conflict holding the burden of proving that a conflict of interest rises to the level of ineffective assistance rests on the one asserting the conflict