over the sidewalk, but merely an unopposed remedial action. See generally Underhill, supra (examining parties’ commercial lease to determine who retained control over maintenance of shopping center parking lot). Second, the city, which is the owner of the sidewalk here, is a public entity statutorily tasked with control of sidewalk maintenance and repair. See G. L. c. 84, § 1, as amended by St. 1991, c. 552, § 52 (‘“[T]own ways . . . shall be kept in repair at the expense of the town in which they are situated, so that they may be reasonably safe and convenient for travelers”); Myers v. Lee, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 874 (1979); Farrell v. Boston Water & Sewer Commn., 24 Mass. App. Ct. 583, 587 (1987) (defect on public sidewalk falls within scope of G. L. c. 84). Compare Davis, supra at 747 (<HOLDING>); id. at 745, quoting from G. L. c. 81, § 13
holding that a state agency created under state law was a state actor holding that when presented with petitioners claim based upon state and federal law and the state court confined its analysis  to state law aedpa deference does not apply holding a defendant is liable as a control person if the defendant had the power to control the general affairs of the entity primarily liable at the time the entity violated the securities laws but declining to decide whether power to control means simply abstract power to control or actual exercise of the power to control internal quotations omitted holding that the state police is a state agency holding that power to control state highway lies with the state and not with nongovernmental parties