on the secured creditor’s position.” Boodrow, 126 F.3d at 49 n. 6 (quoting Joann Henderson, The Gaglia-Lowry Brief: A Quantum Leap from Strip Down to Chapter 7, 8 Bankr.Dev.J. 131, 137 (1991)). 11 . Since the debtors have failed to either redeem or reaffirm, the Bank concludes that cause has been shown to modify the automatic stay. As discussed above, however, I am addressing the § 521 issue on its own merits and not in support of a claim for modification under § 362(d)(1). In any event, it is unclear whether a violation of § 521(2) would necessarily constitute cause for modification under § 362(d)(1). See Boodrow, 126 F.3d at 48 ("It is not clear to us that violation of § 521(2) would automatically require a bankruptcy court to lift the automatic stay.”); Lowry, 882 F.2d at 1546 (<HOLDING>); but see Johnson, 89 F.3d at 252 ("If the
holding that if the application for a warrant contains probable cause apart from the improper information then the warrant is lawful and the independent source doctrine applies providing that the officers were not prompted to obtain the warrant by what they observed during the initial entry holding that a similar denial was not superseded because the appellant did not seek a stay of the trial courts order holding that noncompliance with  5212 did not warrant relief from the automatic stay so that the creditor could repossess the collateral holding that the warrant application at issue did not specifically mention the presence of criminal activity at defendants residence but that the executing officers reasonably relied on the warrant holding that an appeal was not moot because the amendment to the ordinance at bar did not give the petitioner the relief sought so that the petitioners claim and injury remain viable