More fundamentally, we think that the Order did not clearly establish that there were no assets from which fees could be paid. The phrase “$140,000,000 in U.S. currency” does not itself identify assets or state whether it is inclusive of all assets belonging to Saccoccia. Further, the Order did not itself distinguish between tainted and substitute assets; it instead referred only to assets “for which [Saccoccia is] jointly and severally liable.” A reasonable person, reading the Order in 1993, could have had legitimate doubts as to whether it restrained any “substitute assets,” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m). Indeed, that year, several courts held that such substitute assets may not be restrained prior to conviction. See, e.g., In re Assets of Martin, 1 F.3d 1351, 1362 (3d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Thus the Order, when issued, could have been
recognizing that the section does not  authorize suits for cancellation in the district courts holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001 holding that 18 usc  1963d1a does not authorize preconviction restraints on substitute assets holding for the purposes of 18 usc  924e that being a felon in possession of a firearm is not a violent felony as defined in 18 usc  924e2b holding that 15 usc  1125a does not authorize suits by consumers