The authority of a trial court to modify a judgment of dissolution of marriage is solely statutory. Spady v. Graves, 307 Or 483, 488, 770 P2d 53 (1989). Accordingly, we examine the relevant statutes to discern the legislature’s intent as applied to the above circumstances. ORS 107.135(l)(a) provides, in part, that a court may “[s]et aside, alter or modify so much of the decree as may provide * * * for the support of a party * * The key phrase in the statute is the present tense verb phrase “may provide.” That phrase implies that there must be an existing support obligation at the time that the court exercises its authority to modify. Our case law supports that interpretation of the statutory scheme. See Wrench and Wrench, 98 Or App 352, 353, 779 P2d 195, rev den, 308 Or 608 (1989) (<HOLDING>); see also Woita and Woita, 98 Or App 83, 87,
holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation holding that the trial court had erred in imposing an obligation to pay child support when clear and convincing evidence established that the husband was not the father of the child holding that benefits in excess of the support obligation could not be credited against future support holding that as with a promissory note when the final payment was made on a support judgment the obligation was discharged and after that date husband had no obligation that could support a modification holding that the trial court was without authority to modify a spousal support obligation when the modification proceeding was initiated ten years after the obligation to pay spousal support under the dissolution judgment had been terminated by order