the Court entered an order that allowed the movant relief from the stay if the debtor did not obtain adequate insurance by a certain date. Based on the representation of the movant’s attorney subsequent to that order, the debtor has obtained satisfactory insurance. 2 . If section 109(g)(2) applied to this matter, there would be an issue of how to apply that section. The court in Chrysler Financial Corp. v. Dickerson (In re Dickerson), 209 B.R. 703, 705-706 (W.D.Tenn.) explains: Although seemingly unambiguous on its face, there are at least three distinct lines of cases interpreting this statute. One line of cases holds th holding that § 109(g)(2) "applies only if there is a contested matter pending at the time of the voluntary dismissal”); In re Patton, 49 B.R. 587 (Bankr.M.D.Ga.1985) (<HOLDING>). A third line of cases holds that a court has
holding that  109g2 does not apply when the creditor seeking relief in the first case received the requested relief holding that even if indirect purchasers are barred from seeking damages relief they may still obtain injunctive relief holding that ridas elimination of habeas corpus does not violate the suspension clause where the petitioner had a means for seeking relief direct review  and simply failed to pursue the relief that the statutory scheme allows holding that where the final judgment provided relief that was not requested  its entry constituted reversible error holding that the case was not moot even though claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were no longer alive because the plaintiff had requested pecuniary relief