Milton in response to his ailment when it could have been easily accommodated by a dispensation, then Defendants violated the statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Conditions apparently less severe than Milton’s have been held to meet ADA or Rehabilitation Act requirements in the past. See, e.g., Guice-Mills v. Derwinski, 967 F.2d 794, 797 (2d Cir.1992) (finding that nurse suffering from depression and migraine headaches is “handicapped” under Rehabilitation Act); Harmer v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 831 F.Supp. 1300, 1306 (E.D.Va. 1993) (considering plaintiffs bronchial asthma a “disability” under the ADA for purposes of deciding if employer failed to reasonably accommodate plaintiff by refusing to ban smoking in plaintiffs work area); Watson v. United States, 1985 WL 9646 (D.D.C.) (<HOLDING>). The Court does not here rule that Milton’s
holding that teacher with long dormant disease of tuberculosis that had recently reoccurred was handicapped within meaning of rehabilitation act holding that an employee could not recover damages and medical monitoring costs under the federal employers liability act unless or until he manifested symptoms of a disease holding rehabilitation act applicable holding under rehabilitation act that epileptics are handicapped individuals holding that plaintiff with obstructive airway disease and symptoms of fatigue headaches and myalgias is handicapped under the rehabilitation act