the jury foreman violated Pullin’s unwaived constitutional rights. The United States Supreme Court has held that in order for a petitioner to be denied a constitutional right through the use of a dynamite instruction (or “supplemental charge”), the instruction must be coercive. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 239-41, 108 S.Ct. 546, 551-53, 98 L.Ed.2d 568, 578-80 (1988). In that case, the Supreme Court rejected a claim that giving a dynamite instruction was unconstitutional. In doing so, the Supreme Court rejected several arguments based on its own precedents, because those precedents had been based on the Court’s supervisory powers over federal courts rather than on the Constitution. See Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 446, 85 S.Ct. 1059, 1060, 13 L.Ed.2d 957, 958 (1965) (<HOLDING>); Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448,
recognizing that before the case was submitted to the jury the trial court charged the jury that if it were unable to reach a unanimous recommendation the court would impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole holding that after court dismissed case at plaintiffs request notwithstanding the fact that jury had deliberated upon the case and indicated that it had reached a verdict there was no case pending in court on which a verdict could be predicated and the information which the judge got from an inspection of the petition handed to him by the foreman of the jury was information which he received as an individual and not as a judge of the court and further holding that despite violation of defendants right to receive the verdict that was purportedly reached the writing incorporated in the bill of exceptions as a verdict of the jury was in law no verdict because it was not received in court and published as required by law and was instead entirely extraneous and extrajudicial holding that it was not error for the court to give a substantive new instruction to the jury after deliberations began where the instruction was given in court with the defendant and his counsel present holding that an instruction given after the jury informed the judge that it was unable to reach a verdict and the judge told the jury it had to reach a decision was improper after relying on other cases involving the exercise of supervisory powers and not relying on constitutional grounds holding that the jury is the judge of the weight and credibility given to witness testimony