inadequacies in Ohio’s DNA testing law.” On balance then, the district court concluded injunctive relief was not warranted. Durr now appeals to this Court. II. First we consider whether it was proper for the district court to treat Durr’s action as a second or successive habeas petition rather than as a § 1983 action. Although most habeas corpus challenges will also, prima facie, state a claim under the plain language of § 1983, the Supreme Court has created an implied exception to § 1983’s broad scope for cases that lie “within the core of habeas corpus.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973). The Supreme Court has explored the relationship between the two statutes in a series of cases. See Preiser, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (<HOLDING>); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct.
holding that a prisoner who challenged prison procedures used to deny him goodtime credits and not actual denial of those credits stated a cognizable claim under  1983 holding that state prisoners challenges to revocation of their goodtime credits through disciplinary proceedings could be brought as a  1983 action because inmates sought only a declaration that the disciplinary proceedings were invalid and thus attacked only wrong procedures and not wrong result holding that state prisoners challenges to the constitutionality of prison disciplinary proceedings that led to the deprivation of goodtime credits fell within the core of habeas holding that depriving inmates of statecreated right to goodtime credits in prison disciplinary proceedings requires due process holding that inmates serving life terms were not entitled to goodtime credits because state statute expressly foreclosed the granting of goodtime credits to such inmates