facts sufficient to show that Gutman took non-judicial actions against him, or that Gutman’s judicial actions were taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. See Meek v. County of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that “[a] judge is not deprived of immunity because he takes actions which are in error, are done maliciously, or are in excess of his authority”). 3. The district court 'also properly dismissed Read’s claims against Senior Assistant Attorney General Foote on the basis of prosecutorial immunity. Read failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Foote’s actions did not relate to Foote’s preparation for the initiation of a judicial proceeding, or the presentation of the state’s case. See Fry v. Melaragno, 939 F.2d 882, 837-38 (9th Cir. 1991) (<HOLDING>). 4. Dismissing Read’s claims against members
holding that government attorney performing acts intimately associated with the judicial phase of litigation is entitled to absolute immunity holding that an officer applying for a warrant without probable cause may be entitled to qualified immunity but is not entitled to absolute immunity holding selsky entitled to absolute immunity holding that prosecutors are absolutely immune for activities intimately associated with the judicial process such as initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution recognizing judicial immunity for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction