courts when asked to oversee state law enforcement authorities.” Lyons, 461 U.S. at 112, 103 S.Ct. at 1670; see also O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 499, 94 S.Ct. at 678. “[0]ur review of the injunction must be more rigorous when we review an injunction against a state as opposed to a federal agency, since the Supreme Court requires a showing of an intentional and pervasive pattern of misconduct in order to enjoin a state agency.” Thomas v. County of Los Angeles, 978 F.2d 504, 508 (9th Cir.1993) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375, 96 S.Ct. 598, 606, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976)). Such a pervasive pattern of misconduct can be demonstrated by showing “that the police misconduct flowed from a policy [or] plan” of the CHP. Thomas, 978 F.2d at 509; see also Lyons, 461 U.S. at 106, 103 S.Ct. at 1667 (<HOLDING>). “Specific findings of a persistent pattern of
holding that a suspects statements to the police to the effect that his constitution will protect him that the police have nothing along with his negative response to a police question whether he had anything to say about what he was being arrested for followed by his question who said i did this did not amount to a clear invocation of the right to remain silent under davis holding that the due process clause requires the responsible government or governmental agency to provide medical care to suspects in police custody who have been injured while being apprehended by police holding that under state law the police commissioners are not authorized to remove police officers at will but for good and sufficient cause and after due hearing emphasis added holding that lyons could have established a caseoreontroversy for injunctive relief if he asserted that the city ordered or authorized police officers to impose chokeholds on suspects holding that even if the plaintiff had asserted a cause of action under the virginia wrongful death act against the city police officers the police officers would be entitled to sovereign immunity