(utilizing “coercion ... to attend” and would effectively prevent the State from collecting monies otherwise due to it, and it is difficult to draw a rational distinction between a bankrupt’s attempt to recover funds already paid to the state from one that seeks to discharge present debts to the state. Finally, suits only requesting non-monetary relief do not divest the state of its immunity. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 58, 116 S.Ct. 1114 (“The Eleventh Amendment does not exist solely in order to ‘preven[t] federal-court judgments that must be paid out of a State’s treasury ....’”) (quoting Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 48, 115 S.Ct. 394, 130 L.Ed.2d 245 (1994)); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (<HOLDING>). This principle reinforces the notion that we
holding that the eleventh amendment applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought holding that the defendants were not entitled to eleventh amendment immunity where the plaintiffs claims showed chronic and ongoing election violations and sought only prospective relief holding that coeur dalene exception to ex parte young applies only if the plaintiffs action implicates special sovereignty interests and the relief sought is the functional equivalent to a form of legal relief against the state that would otherwise be barred by the eleventh amendment citation and internal quotations omitted holding that the eleventh amendment applies in  1981 litigation holding that the eleventh amendment precludes an award of injunctive or declaratory relief that is not prospective in nature