of these statements did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly- established federal law because the bulk of the statements fell within firmly rooted exceptions to the hearsay rule. We agree. Some of Sheilah Evans’s statements were properly admitted as statements made by her for the purpose of obtaining a medical diagnosis. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355 n. 8, 112 S.Ct. 736, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992); United States v. Sumner, 204 F.3d 1182, 1185 (8th Cir.2000). And, as the Missouri Court of Appeals determined, the bulk of the statements were properly admitted as evidence of Sheilah Evans’s mental state— which the defense put into question when it implied she committed suicide — under the state-of-mind exception. Lenza v. Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804, 810 (8th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>); see also Hayes v. York, 311 F.3d 321, 324-25
holding codefendants confession incriminating defendant was not within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule under roberts standard holding that victims statements were hearsay admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule and constitutionally permissible under ohio v roberts citations omitted holding that evidence of customer inquiries is admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule holding victims statements admissible under state of mind exception to rebut defendants claim of accident andor suicide holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process even though statements were not admissible under mississippi law which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay