753 So.2d 650 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Johnson v. State, 736 So.2d 708 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Robinson v. State, 702 So.2d 1346 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Hill v. State, 692 So.2d 277 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Johnson v. State, 678 So.2d 934 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Dunbar v. State, 664 So.2d 1093 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Reeves v. State, 605 So.2d 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). While no Florida decision until Meeks had undertaken the task of specifically defining “substantive” or “technical/nonsubstantive,” we do gain some insight through an analysis of how specific violations have been classified by various courts. In so doing, one observation is obvious: violations which are based on the commission of a new criminal offense are consistently classified as “substantive” violations. See, e.g., Escutary, 753 So.2d at 651 (<HOLDING>); Robinson, 702 So.2d at 1347 (“Committing a
holding that illicit drug use because it is also a crime constitutes a substantive violation of youthful offender probation holding that while a defendant is not entitled to be sentenced as a youthful offender on any new offense he or she may have committed the trial court cannot revoke a defendants youthful offender status on offenses for which that defendant has already been sentenced citation omitted holding that where original sentencing judge imposed a guidelines sentence defendant could not be sentenced as a habitual offender upon violation of probation holding that youthful offender could be sentenced in excess of six year cap where probation violation was substantive in that he committed several criminal offenses holding that probation and suspension of sentence may not be revoked based solely on a violation or criminal offense that was committed before the offender was actually placed on probation