entire change of parties.’ ” Parke, Davis & Co v Grand Trunk Ry System, 207 Mich 388, 391; 174 NW 145 (1919) (citation omitted). The misnomer doctrine applies only to correct inconsequential deficiencies or technicalities in the naming of parties, for example, “ ‘[w]here the right corporation has been sued by the wrong name, and service has been made upon the right party, although by a wrong name Wells v Detroit News, Inc, 360 Mich 634, 641; 104 NW2d 767 (1960), quoting Daly v Blair, 183 Mich 351, 353; 150 NW 134 (1914); see also Detroit Independent Sprinkler Co v Plywood Products Corp, 311 Mich 226, 232; 18 NW2d 387 (1945) (allowing an amendment to correct the designation of the named plaintiff from “corporation” to “partnership”)!)] and Stever v Brown, 119 Mich 196; 77 NW 704 (1899) (<HOLDING>). Where, as here, the plaintiff seeks to
holding that an amendment to substitute the plaintiffs full names where their first and middle names had been reduced to initials in the original complaint would have been permissible holding that where a witness had been convicted seventeen years earlier but had been given probation and had not been confined the date of the conviction controlled holding that the applicant had not demonstrated the government was unable or unwilling to control the perpetrators where he contended that the police failed to investigate his reports but admitted that he did not give the police the names of any suspects because he did not know any specific names and his wife testified that the police investigated the complaints but were ultimately unable to solve the crimes holding that even in separate trial other crimes evidence would not have been admissible and identification testimony would have been admissible recognizing that plaintiffs had standing to allege infringements of their first amendment rights where the record established that they had been threatened with enforcement of the statute and that such enforcement would cause them injury