and social gatherings. They further allege that their cause of action arose from these transactions because Peas-lee defamed them “in furtherance of his employment by Euro Brokers in an effort to interfere with Cantor’s effectiveness in the marketplace as a competitor.” While Peas-lee may have had a professional interest in keeping in touch with his colleagues, however, it is not alleged that his social meetings were “essential to the formation or continuance” of any business relationship such that his two-day visit should invoke the jurisdiction of the New York courts. Pneumau-Flo Sys., Inc. v. Universal Mach. Corp., 454 F.Supp. 858, 866 & n. 21 (S.D.N.Y.1978) (collecting eases); see McKee Elec. Co. v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 20 N.Y.2d 377, 382, 283 N.Y.S.2d 34, 37, 229 N.E.2d 604 (1967) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, there was nothing in the record
holding that television station was not subject to personal jurisdiction in  new york under that states longarm statute since libel claim did not arise from defendants delivery of mail orders to new york holding that for purposes of longarm jurisdiction because plaintiff was employed in new york the original event causing his injury occurred in new york holding that neither the new york location of the terrorist attack giving rise to the policyholders claim nor the new yorkbased claims adjustor rendered new york the locus of operative facts because new york was not the site of the contracts execution holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership holding that passing the time of day with a customer in new york does not give rise to personal jurisdiction