uncovering the fraud.” Id. at 363 (quoting United States v. Uzzell, 648 F.Supp. 1362, 1367 (D.D.C.1986)). In the final analysis, the court concluded that “the common knowledge of the Island Park affair at all levels of the federal government” — specifically, at HUD and its Office of Inspector General — reasonably could be attributed to the Department of Justice. Island Park, 791 F.Supp. at 363-64. Based on this conclusion, the court held that the government’s FCA claim was time-barred. Id. at 364. This Court agrees with Island Park’s conclusion that there may be circumstances in which the knowledge of government agencies other than the Department of Justice might trigger the running of the FCA statute of limitations. See also United States v. Kass, 740 F.2d 1493, 1498 (11th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Kensington Hospital, No.
holding that the statute does not begin to run until at least a demand has been made upon the government but determining that the facts of that case made it unnecessary to choose between the date of demand and the date of actual payment as the triggering date for the running of the statute of limitations holding that the limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff was privy to facts which would provoke inquiry in the mind of a person of reasonable prudence and which if followed up would have led to the discovery of the fraud holding that oneyear limitations periods under sections 2244 and 2255 are virtually identical holding that the government through its agent blue shield had the facts making up the very essence of the right of action  thereby triggering the limitations period in  2415  2416c which are virtually identical to  3731b holding that the insurer is not bound by acts of the agent which are beyond the scope of his authority when the insured has notice of the limitations upon an agents authority or when the circumstances are sufficient to suggest that an inquiry should be made as to such limitations