as a fixed list of requirements.” 55 Fed.Reg. at 8793. The court therefore disagrees with Cooper’s suggestion that this case can be decided on the basis of a simple comparison of Aviall’s conduct with the “potentially relevant” provisions that the NCP cites. The fact that Aviall did not adhere to particular provisions of the NCP is not controlling, and the court declines to undertake the potentially antially comply with the NCP, have emphasized what the party did, without explaining why the actions were sufficient. See La.-Pac. Corp., 24 F.3d at 1576 (emphasizing various meetings that party had held, along with fact that feasibility study was made publicly available at party’s office). But while a guiding principle is not always expressed, 7 F.Supp.2d 1118, 1168 (C.D.Cal.2003) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 433 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir.2006); Norfolk
holding that the ncp public participation requirement was fulfilled because the indiana department of environmental management gave public notice and received public comments before issuing an npdes permit for the cleanup even if it did not hold a public hearing holding that public participation requirement was satisfied in part because the ncp policy is  to allow potentially responsible parties an opportunity to comment before costs are incurred and no prps were denied an opportunity to comment holding that the department of transportation was liable under the mtca but that it was not responsible for any of the cleanup costs holding that government involvement must be accompanied by public comment because a purpose of ncp is to ensure that those responsible for the cleanup receive citizens input regarding environmental conditions in the community holding that significant involvement of government agency charged with protecting public environmental interest satisfies public participation requirement in certain circumstances