fire, which they ignited with a thermal lance, to commit their crimes. Nothing in section 844(h)(1) insulates defendants from sentencing enhancements simply because the fire they used emanated from the torch of a.thermal lance and not from a less sophisticated fire-generating device. Section 844(h)(1) also requires the use of fire to commit “any felony____” 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(1) (emphasis added). “Read naturally, the word ‘any has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.’ ” United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5, 117 S.Ct. 1032,137 L.Ed.2d 132 (1997). Because Congress “did not add any language limiting the breadth of that word,” id., the word “any” in section 844(h)(1) refers to all, not a specific subset of, felonies. See Wildes, 120 F.3d at 471 (<HOLDING>); United States v. LaPorta, 46 F.3d 152, 156
holding that  any felony as used in  844h1 is not limited to offenses involving the commission of arson and therefore includes conspiracy to violate civil rights by burning a cross holding that a conspiracy to violate section 1959 is not the same offense as a conspiracy to violate section 1962 holding that defendants prior felony convictions in georgia state court for drugrelated conspiracy and simple possession qualified as predicate prior felony drug offenses for  841b1a because under the plain language of the statute  felony drug offense includes any criminal conduct relating to narcotics including simple possession which a state has proscribed as a felony holding that the prior conspiracy to which honken had pleaded guilty was not the same as the conspiracy underlying the capital offenses holding that proof of an agreement to commit a felony is not a necessary element in a conviction for the commission of the felony