to that fact. A jury could infer that Kudner made the statement with the intent to induce the plaintiffs to sign the agreements and that the plaintiffs relied on the statement: Krupnick’s and Schapiro’s affidavits and testimony indicate that their signing the agreement was contingent on Avecia’s obtaining the registrations. (Exhibit P-6, Krupnick dep., 7/14/00, at 87; Krupnick aff. ¶¶17, 18; Schapiro aff. ¶¶29, 30.) There is evidence that the plaintiffs’ reliance on Kudner’s statements was justified: Kenline testified that it was Avecia’s responsibility to obtain the Reputex registrations and that Avecia had more regulatory experience than the plaintiffs. (Exhibit P-53, Kenline dep., 7/26/00, at 696); Wilmington Trust Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 690 A.2d 914, 916-17 (Del. 1996) (<HOLDING>). Finally, there is evidence of damages: the
holding that whether the plaintiffs reliance on a negligent misrepresentation is justified generally raises a question of fact holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment holding that plaintiffs did not allege actual reliance on defendants misrepresentations  and thus could not rely on  552 of the second restatement  where plaintiffs proffered only fraudonthemarket theory alleging that defendants negligent misrepresentations affected market prices which induced plaintiffs to enter into certain transactions holding it is a question of fact holding that whether a plaintiffs reliance on defendants misrepresentations was justified is a question of fact precluding summary judgment