and continued to sell its products to that third-party.”); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, 175 F.R.D. 640, 646 (C.D.Cal.1997) (“An allegation of mere negligence in supplying a product used to infringe does not meet this standard.) Inwood, 456 U.S. at 854 n. 13, 102 S.Ct. 2182 (disapproving standard under which defendant would be liable for contributory infringement if defendant ‘could reasonably anticipate’ use of product to infringe).”); David Berg & Co. v. Gatto Int'l Trading Co., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1070, 1988 WL 117493, at *11 (N.D.Ill.1988) (“That one ‘could reasonably anticipate’ an illegal use of the mark, however, is not sufficient” to establish contributory trademark infringement.); but see Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 547 F.Supp. 1095, 1116 (D.N.J.1982) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 719 F.2d 56 (3d Cir.1983) (but see
holding that section 43a of the lanham act protects trade dress holding under third circuit law that the denial of a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for abuse of discretion holding that the statute of limitations for all of plaintiffs eleven causes of action including those brought under lanham act  43a 15 usc  1125a and lanham act  43c 15 usc  1125c is four years holding that reasonable anticipation standard for the tort of passing off under section 43a of the lanham act remains the law in the third circuit holding that the standard of review for the denial of a motion for reconsideration is governed by the law of the regional circuit