deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Because the Sixth Amendment did not require the evidence’s admission, the decision to prohibit its admission was reasonable and fell within the judge’s wide latitude and the zone of reasonable dis agreement to limit Johnson’s method of cross-examination. The court of appeals rightly concluded as much, and the Court should affirm its judgment. 1 . Ante, at 913. 2 . Tex. R. Evid 412(b)(2)(C) & (b)(3). 3 . See Irby v. State, 327 S.W.3d 138, 152 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) (interpreting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), and requiring a "logical connection between the evidence suggesting bias or motive and the witness’s testimony.”). 4 . Ante, at 911. 5 . See, e.g., State v. Mendoza, 365 S.W.3d 666, 669 (Tex.Crim.App.2012) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Ante, at 913. 7 . Irby, 327 S.W.3d at
holding in light of this courts decision in harkness ii that section 774 was not an unconstitutional infringement on this courts exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law holding that nontreating physicians opinions are entitled to little weight when contradictory to treating physicians opinions and will not constitute substantial evidence standing alone holding that unpublished opinions have precedential effect holding that statements that employee was doing a good job are more akin to opinions than statements of fact and on this basis are not actionable in fraud and citing a state case as holding that neither opinions nor statement that are general and indefinite are representations of fact giving rise to a misrepresentation claim recognizing this courts limitations in rendering qualitative opinions about witnesses testimony