of title IX. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(b). Therefore, Lowrey was entitled to raise complaints on behalf of the female students at Tarleton, provided she otherwise qualified under the terms of the regulations. 13 . Perhaps there is a factual question as to whether Lowrey participated in the complaints and investigations covered by these administrative regulations, but this is an issue of fact for the district court. For purposes of rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must be liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff, and all facts pleaded in the complaint must be taken as true. Campbell, 781 F.2d at 442. Therefore, we must assume arguendo that Lowrey qualifies as a complainant under the regulations. 14 . See also Boucher v. Syracuse Univ., 1996 WL 328444, at *3-*4 (N.D.N.Y. June 12, 1996) (<HOLDING>); Bryant v. Colgate Univ., 1996 WL 328446, at
holding that a class of all high school female athletes could not be certified  even if the alleged conduct of the defendant school system was discriminatory  when some female athletes did not share the same goals or interests as the named female plaintiffs because those unnamed female athletes were satisfied with andor benefitted from the alleged discriminatory treatment holding that a teacher who complained of sex discrimination on behalf of his students had standing to raise an individual retaliation claim under title ix recognizing that most other courts apply title vii principles to title ix cases but refusing to apply title viis knew or should have known standard to a title ix claim holding that third persons do not have standing to assert title ix claims on behalf of female athletes holding that title vii principles govern retaliation claims arising under title ix and assuming that teachers have standing to raise retaliation claims under title ix based upon complaints raised on behalf of their students