damages, Gresh must prove, inter alia, that the search and seizure were illegal. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 n. 7, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). The search of Gresh’s car was justified under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. That exception “permits law enforcement to seize and search an automobile without a warrant if probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband.” United States v. Burton, 288 F.3d 91, 100 (3d Cir.2002). Probable cause exists when, viewing the totality of the circumstances, “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); see also U.S. v. Rickus, 737 F.2d 360, 367 (3d Cir. 1984) (<HOLDING>). The police had probable cause to search
holding that iowa burglary is not categorical burglary as the elements of iowa burglary law are broader than those of generic burglary holding that direct evidence of defendants dna found at the scene was direct evidence merely of a circumstance that suggested his participation in the burglary and theft but was not direct evidence of his participation in the burglary holding that a public entitys failure to provide a transcript of hearing proceedings would not lessen the probability of an erroneous deprivation because the bulk of the evidence in this case is documentary evidence holding that objective facts of this case certainly justified the officers in concluding that there was a fair probability that evidence of a burglary would be found in the car holding that even if an officers stop of a defendant who was on foot was unlawful the search of a parked car was justified by a different officer observing a gun magazine in plain view in the car