about the continued vitality of the prior conviction exception, we conclude that it remains valid after Blakely.” Lopez, 113 P.3d at 723. See also State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20, 118 S.Ct. 275, 139 L.Ed.2d 199 (1997) (stating that it is the “[Supreme] Court’s prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents”). Therefore, we decline to readdress this issue. Secondly, Huber urges us to hold that the prior-conviction exception to Blakely violates the Colorado Constitution. In support of this argument, Huber reminds us of the familiar principle that .nothing in our federal system of government prohibits the Colorado Constitution from offering greater protections than the federal Constitution. See People ex rel. Juhan v. District Court, 165 Colo. 253, 261, 439 P.2d 741, 745 (1968) (<HOLDING>). Along, with Juhan, Huber cites People v.
recognizing the authority of each state to create protections for its citizens which might not be required under the federal concept holding that sovereign immunity barred a federal question suit against a state brought by one of its own citizens even though the text of the eleventh amendment only addresses suits brought by citizens of another state holding citizens lacked standing to challenge statute when all citizens affected in the same way recognizing that state agencies which are independent of the state are citizens of the state holding state immune from suit brought by its own citizens