in an area where other people had access to the drugs and might even throw them away, it reinforced the State’s case that Jamison was knowingly in actual or constructive possession of the drugs at the time of his arrest, a key element of the trafficking charges. We therefore hold the trial court did not err by allowing Grounsell to testify about the street value of the drugs found in Jamison’s truck. AFFIRMED. HEARN, C.J., and STILWELL, J., concur. 1 . We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR. 2 . See, e.g., U.S. v. Gastiaburo, 16 F.3d 582, 589 (4th Cir.1994) (noting the court has "repeatedly upheld the admission of law enforcement officers' expert opinion testimony in drug trafficking cases.”); U.S. v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1150, 1156-57 (4th Cir. 1-995) (<HOLDING>). 3 . See State v. Matthews, 720 So.2d 153
holding that the trial court did not err in allowing a witness with an extensive background in arson investigation to testify as an expert in a case involving a shipboard fire even though the majority of his experience concerned fires on land holding that expert testimony from a detective about the reluctance of witnesses residents of gang neighborhoods to testify in cases involving gang activity is relevant to the credibility of a witness holding the district court did not err in qualifying a detective as an expert and allowing the detective to testify about the current street price of illegal drugs holding that trial court did not err holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing plaintiffs expert witness to testify when it also allowed defendants expert witness who disputed the methodology used by plaintiffs expert to testify