since a finding in his favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction under Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a). Id. at 1409-10, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 269. In addition, the Court of Appeal contrasted Susag’s situation to the one presented in Sanford, noting that, “[Susag] has alleged no claims of excessive force that took place after he was finally subdued and placed in the patrol car.” Id. at 1410, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 269. (emphasis added.) The majority argues that Smith’s conviction might have been based only on his conduct whi l.Rptr. 212 (1981). Had discrete acts of resistance taken place over the course of an hour rather than five minutes, they might not have constituted the same offense. See People v. Moreno, 108 Cal.Rptr. 338, 32 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 8-9 (1973) (<HOLDING>). Here, however, it is undisputed that Smith’s
holding that when two underlying offenses are charged in an indictment for capital murder the state need only prove one of the two offenses to support the conviction holding that two robberies of different people at the same time are two separate offenses calling for two judgments and two sentences when the defendants were convicted of taking a grandfathers wallet pistol and car and taking a grandsons fishing equipment holding these two statutes are not criminal offenses and only affect sentencing holding two instances of violating  148 were two offenses because thirty minutes elapsed between the two incidents and in the intervening space of time the defendant had completely calmed down and ceased his criminal activity holding that two separate incidents of rape were perpetrated against the same victim where an appreciable period of time elapsed between the incidents and intervening events occurred during the interim