however, in that the defendant contends that the evidence was admitted because of his trial counsel’s conduct. The issue here was not litigated fully on direct appeal. See Humphrey v. Cunningham, Warden, 133 N.H. 727, 733, 584 A.2d 763, 766 (1990). In its order on the instant claim, the trial court characterized trial counsel’s decision to “take full advantage of the court’s pretrial rulings by portraying the defendant in a most favorable light” to be “a calculated risk falling within the limits of reasonable practice.” We agree. Further, the court gave a limiting instruction to the jury, instructing it not to consider the evidence in determining the defendant’s guilt. See Fecteau, 133 N.H. at 874, 587 A.2d at 599; State v. Perron, 122 N.H. 941, 949-50, 454 A.2d 422, 426-27 (1982) (<HOLDING>). We also agree with the trial court’s
holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to present mental mitigation that would have opened the door to testimony that the defendant was a sadistic sexual psychopath holding that defense counsel opened the door to the states rebuttal remarks when defense counsel raised the issue in his closing argument holding that opinion testimony was inadmissible to prove a persons character or character trait when maine rule of evidence 405 permitted only evidence of reputation or specific instances of conduct holding that any relevant mitigating evidence concerning a defendants character should not be excluded holding counsel was not ineffective for making tactical decision to present character evidence in favor of the defendant which opened the door to states presentation of evidence of defendants bad character especially when limiting instruction mitigated any potential prejudice