Ann. § 40-18-112 (re- quiring such a result in Tennessee). This does not mean, however, that an alternative conviction such as Coe’s represents a conviction on both theories. Put another way, if six jurors believed that Coe was guilty only of felony murder, and six others believed that he was guilty only of common-law murder, it would be proper to say that the jury believed unanimously that Coe was guilty of first-degree murder. It might be improper, by contrast, to say that the jury believed unanimously that Coe was guilty of both forms of murder at the same time. The state contends that Tennessee law dictates that a conviction like Coe’s, where the indictment charges the defendant under both theories, represents a finding of guilt on both theories. Carter, 958 S.W.2d at 625 (<HOLDING>). However, there is no evidence of jury
holding that the problem is initially one for the trial courts holding that constructive amendments alter or expand the essential elements of the offense contained in the indictment such that the possible bases for conviction go beyond what is contained in the indictment holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense holding that such an indictment and conviction cures the middlebrooks problem holding that the critical fact prompting final disciplinary action is not the fact of conviction or indictment but the underlying conduct giving rise to that indictment or conviction citation omitted