into a custodial account in its own name and, after a [debt relief company] negotiates a settlement, [the company] distributes money to the creditor in payment or partial payment of the consumer’s debt.” Id. at 324, ¶ 10. In so holding, the court noted that “the debt adjusting statute should be construed liberally in favor of the consumers it aims to protect.” Id. at 326, ¶ 17. ¶ 34 Consistent with the Washington Supreme Court’s reasoning in Carlsen, it would be unreasonable to construe A.R.S. § 6-701(4) to allow a company to avoid licensure simply by splitting its operations into multiple entities, then putting one in charge of receiving money and another in charge of distribution. See Carlsen, 256 P.3d at 325, ¶ 12; see also Browne v. Nowlin, 117 Ariz. 73, 77, 570 P.2d 1246 (1977) (<HOLDING>); Perini Land & Dev. Co. v. Pima County, 170
holding that a plaintiff who had asserted no claim against a thirdparty defendant lacked standing to complain of the courts action with regard to the thirdparty defendant holding that a thirdparty providers claim against insurer for promissory estoppel was not preempted by erisa because the thirdparty provider was not bound by the terms of the erisa plan holding that plaintiff could not prevail as a thirdparty beneficiary where contract was not valid holding that the governments cooperation with a thirdparty is not sufficient to establish a thirdparty beneficiary relationship holding a lender could not circumvent a statutory prohibition against collecting certain fees by using a thirdparty escrow agent as a camoflauge