that the Constitution prohibits under the rubric of contemporary conscience shocking substantive due process. State tort law is, instead, a proper source of any remedy. Plaintiffs rely on several cases from other jurisdictions, which they contend support a contrary conclusion. After reviewing those decisions and many others, we are satisfied that they only illustrate that the sheriffs alleged conduct here (with the exception of his physical conduct toward Ms. Springer) does not rise to a “sexual assault” in violation of the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. See, e.g., Wudtke v. Davel, 128 F.3d 1057, 1063 (7th Cir.1997) (facts showing school superintendent forced teacher to perform fellatio supported substantive due process violation); Jones v. Wellham, 104 F.3d 620, 628 (4th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Bennett v. Pippin, 74 F.3d 578, 589 (5th
holding that forcible rape of a suspect by a police officer may constitute a violation of the substantive due process right under the fourteenth amendment not to be subjected by anyone acting under color of state law to the wanton infliction of physical harm holding a judgment in the absence of notice violates due process rights holding forcible extraction of the contents of defendants stomach shocks the conscience and violates due process recognizing that an officers forcible rape of a woman violates her substantive due process rights recognizing  1983 substantive due process claim