contained within the Family Code constitutes a presumptive minimum amount of time for possession of a child by a joint managing conservator who is not awarded physical residence of the child. Nothing in these sections or any other section of the Family Code, however, precludes the court from ordering equal amounts of time for possession and access. The majority finds that because Gary has the right to establish the primary residence of the child, he must be given physical possession of the child for greater than fifty percent of the time. The exclusive right to select the child’s domicile, however, does not require the parent with that right to have possession for greater than fifty percent of the time. See Dennis v. Smith, 962 S.W.2d 67 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Thus, I would conclude the trial court did
recognizing presumption holding where there is no duty to defend there is no duty to indemnify holding that a state law requiring the jury to decide the issue of contributory negligence cannot interfere with authority of a federal court to direct a verdict where there are no facts in dispute holding there is no presumption that the conservator with the longer period of possession should decide where a child lives or goes to school holding when real estate is conveyed to a child and consideration is paid by the parent the presumption is that the purchase was a gift to the child and thus no resulting trust arises