of harassment”) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 722 (7th Cir.1982)). Goldsmith contends that her expert services for Dyson in this case are not contrary to any understanding she previously had with Bissell when performing services for Bissell. The court first notes that although Bissell contends that Goldsmith performed certain services for Bissell relating to this case, the record does not reflect that Bissell ever listed Goldsmith as its expert in this case. The mere fact that Goldsmith may have provided consulting services for Bissell relating to this ease prior to agreeing to serve as an expert for Dyson does not disqualify Goldsmith as an expert in this case. Rosenthal Collins Group, LLC, 2008 WL 4542948, at *1 (<HOLDING>). The record also reflects that Bissell and
holding that a lawyer forgoes workproduct protection for communications with an expert witness concerning the subject of the experts testimony even if the expert also plays a consulting role holding that the plaintiff was entitled to recover reasonable expert fees for a rehabilitation expert and economist holding that the prosecution could not retain as a testifying expert for trial a nontestifying expert the defendant had previously retained holding that an expert witnesss testimony on an ultimate issue was admissible recognizing that the expert did not specifically testify that the defendant was guilty or that as a matter of law the facts satisfied the applicable legal standard holding that an expert that had provided consulting services to the defendant relating to the litigation was not precluded from serving as an expert for the plaintiff