Plaintiffs argument, however, ignores the only relevant inquiry under Section 207(a): Whether or not Defendant properly calculated Plaintiffs’ overtime pay. Plaintiffs do not dispute that Defendant actually and in fact paid them at a lower hourly rate than the posted rate. Furthermore, “Plaintiffs do not dispute that they were paid time and a half of the [lower 12 hour shift rate] for each hour work [sic] in excess of 8 hours in a single day.” The parties therefore do not dispute the calculation Defendant employed, but which rate qualifies as the “regular rate” under 29 C.F.R. § 778.110(a). Defendant contends that the “regular rate” has been judicially defined as the hourly rate “actually paid” to an employee. See York v. City of Wichita Falls, Tex., 48 F.3d 919, 921 (5th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360,
holding that the proper rate for prejudgment interest is the rate fixed by the parties in a contract holding that once a rate is filed with the appropriate agency except for review of the agencys orders the courts can assume no right to a different rate on that ground that in its opinion it is the only or the more reasonable rate holding that under the filed rate doctrine a question regarding reasonable rates should be addressed to the department of insurance and that the rate plaintiff was charged is conclusively presumed reasonable under the filed rate doctrine holding that an employees regular rate of pay is the hourly rate actually paid the employee for the normal nonovertime workweek for which he is employed  quoting walling v youngermanreynolds hardwood co 325 us 419 425 65 sct 1242 89 led 1705 1945 holding that with respect to the eaja the local or national market rate for legal services cannot be a special factor used to increase the rate beyond the statutory rate