to use Craig Ball as “the independent forensic examiner” as ordered by the trial court. It was not an agreement that a special master be appointed. And it was both executed and filed after Ogden had withdrawn as Harris’s counsel. Arthur also argues that delay alone is a valid ground for denying Harris’s request for mandamus relief and that Harris fatally delayed in asserting his objections to the appointment of a special master. See In re Xeller, 6 S.W.3d 618, 624 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, orig. proceeding) (“[JJudicial economy would have been better served if relators’ [sic] had sought mandamus relief immediately after the appointment of the master.”); Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. Caldwell, 830 S.W.2d 622, 625 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, orig. proceeding) (<HOLDING>). The record, however, shows that Harris
holding that issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised for the first time before this court holding that an issue was not properly before the court on appeal because the trial court did not have the opportunity to make any findings of fact regarding it holding that because the appellant did not present a question before a hearing examiner or district council the question was not properly before this court holding that party may object to appointment of master either before participating in any proceeding before the master or before parties master and trial court have acted in reliance on appointment holding that arguments not raised before the trial court are waived