fees if the offending complaint was not withdrawn, the Third District held that this actual notice through a letter did not comport with the statutory requirement that a motion be served twenty-one days prior to it being filed with the court, reversing a section 57.105 award. See Anchor Towing, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 10 So.3d 670, 672 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). In finding section 57.105 should be strictly construed as in derogation of the common law, Montgomery cited cases construing proposals for settlement under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442, allowing for attorney’s fees, which is also strictly construed and requires strict compliance with the provisions of the rule. See Montgomery, at 1072-73 (citing Cano v. Hyundai Motor Am., Inc., 8 So.3d 408 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Brower-Eger v. Noon, 994 So.2d 1239,
holding that a statute enacted in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed   holding that sjection 76879 and rule 1442 are strictly construed because they are in derogation of the common law rule that each party pay their own fees  holding that if a statute is in derogation of a common law right it must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent holding that restrictive covenants are not favored by the law and should be strictly construed as they are an interference with an owners free and full enjoyment of his property holding pcra time limits are jurisdictional in nature and must be strictly construed