unspecified “rules and regulations” promulgated by “Defendants” that allegedly “provided plaintiff with certain due process rights.” (Id. ¶ 25). As to the first two theories, it might be assumed that if Plaintiff could show that he was a Bibb County employee subject to the personnel system established by § 45-4-120 or the County Personnel Policies, such could confer a legitimate expectation of continued employment giving rise to a property interest. See Brown v. Georgia Dep’t of Rev., 881 F.2d 1018, 1028 (11th Cir.1989); Lassiter v. Covington, 861 F.2d 680, 683-84 (11th Cir. 1988); Haddler v. Walker County, Ala., 2014 WL 2465322, at *4 n. 3 (N.D.Ala. May 30, 2014); Key v. Morgan County Sheriffs Office, 2012 WL 1340099, *7 (N.D.Ala. Apr. 12, 2012). However, under Alabama law, c .1988) (<HOLDING>), nor to a personnel policies manual covering
holding a county and a road district had standing to sue state highway commission and county tax collector based on their interest in and control over the public roads of the county holding that investigator employed by the etowah county district attorney was a state employee not covered by a county merit system holding that the county attorney had de facto authority and noting that the objection to the county attorneys authority was first made on appeal recognizing county officers as  those whose general authority and jurisdiction are confined within the limits of the county in which they are appointed who are appointed in and for a particular county and whose duties apply only to that county and through whom the county performs its usual political functions  holding that a county investigator was not entitled to protection under veterans tenure act