courts have characterized the Second Circuit’s position as absolute, see, e.g., Rodwell, 324 F.3d at 69 (stating that ”[t]he Second Circuit has ruled categorically” that no Rule 60(b) motions are SSHPs); Dunlap v. Litscher, 301 F.3d 873, 876 (7th Cir.2002) ("The Second Circuit[ ] ... in Rodriguez ■ .. did not limit its ruling to [true Rule 60(b) motions]."), I do not wish to mischarac-terize its holding. Even after Rodriguez, I am unable to say for certain that a litigant in the Second Circuit could maintain a purported Rule 60(b) motion whose true aim is to challenge the underlying conviction on constitutional grounds. 19 . The Third and Fifth Circuits may also fall within this category, but their precedent is unclear. See United States v. Edwards, 309 F.3d 110, 113 (3d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Hess, 281 F.3d at 214-15 (noting "the
holding without extended discussion that the peti tioners rule 60b motion was an sshp under aedpa holding without extended discussion that even if the district court should have construed the petitioners motion under 18 usc  3582c2 as a rule 60b motion the court would nonetheless have had to recharacterize the rule 60b motion as an sshp holding that motion for reconsideration would be construed not as a rule 60b motion but rather as an unauthorized successive motion under  2255 which the district court may have been without jurisdiction to consider holding that the district court erred in failing to recharacterize a rule 60b motion as an sshp and reversing with the instruction to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction holding that motion filed under fedrcivp 60b properly construed as successive  2255 motion