deportation’ before a [guilty] plea” is accepted, is “transferrable to a similar Fourteenth Amendment requirement that a trial court provide a ‘warning regarding deportation’ to unrepresented defendants.” (Brackets omitted). Thus, she contends, there is no need to classify immigration as either a direct or collateral consequence because, following Padilla’s logic, “awareness of potential deportation proceedings is central to a knowing plea” under our constitution. We decline to accept the defendant’s broad reading of Padilla. In Padilla, the Supreme Court addressed “whether, as a matter of federal law, [the defendant’s] counsel had an obligation to advise him that the offense to which he was pleading guilty would result in his removal.” Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478; id. at 1486 (<HOLDING>). In addressing this issue, the Court explained
holding statements during voir dire and oral motion in limine were merely opaque references to deportation but  silent about whether appellant was actually informed that a guilty plea could result in his deportation and insufficient to support inference appellant knew consequences of his plea holding that trial counsel had a duty to inform client who is a resident legal alien whether his guilty plea carries a risk of deportation holding record insufficient to support inference appellant knew consequences of his plea when record is silent about whether appellant was actually informed that a guilty plea could result in his deportation holding that an attorneys filing a notice of appearance on behalf of his or her client constitute a waiver of service of process by the client holding counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation