more stringent regulations, only if the state law is (1) “necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety hazard,” (2) is not “incompatible” with any federal laws, and (3) “does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce.” Id. Although the express preemption clause in the FRSA speaks in terms of preemption of state law, and the plaintiffs action here is brought pursuant to FELA, a federal law, at least one court has held that in reconciling the two federal statutes, “the FRSA will supersede the FELA based on the policy embodied in the FRSA to ensure uniformity in law relating to railway safety.” Rice v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Pacific Ry. Co., 955 F.Supp. at 740 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 20106); accord Waymire v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 218 F.3d 773, 776-777 (7th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Thirkill v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 950
holding that in order to uphold the frsas goal of uniformity the frsa supercedes fela where the trains speed and warning devices complied with the frsa holding that the commission may not order reparations where a carrier complied with the commissions earlier order declaring its rate to be reasonable holding that officers observations of the speed of the truck coupled with the sound of the engine racing and the bouncing of the truck as it passed through the intersection gave officer probable cause to believe that truck was exceeding a speed greater than was reasonable and prudent under the conditions holding that the federal standard requiring the verdict to be against the clear weight of the evidence governs in a fela case holding that the cause of action under fela vests in the personal representative of the estate not in the beneficiaries