Cir.1999). To prove this connection, the government’s evidence must support a finding that the defendant “intended the weapon to be available for use” during the underlying offense. Id. (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted). A defendant cannot “intend” a firearm to be available without knowing that he possesses it. Thus, the “in relation to” language that accompanies the “carrying” prong of section 924(c) precludes defendants from being convicted under § 924(c) for accidentally or unknowingly “carrying” weapons. See United States v. Mancillas, 183 F.3d 682, 708 (7th Cir.1999) (stating that, as to jury instructions, the “during and in relation to” element of section 924(c) “encompasses a knowledge requirement”); United States v. Santeramo, 45 F.3d 622, 624 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the government presented
holding that constitutional claim must be fairly presented to state court in order to satisfy exhaustion requirement holding that when a term is defined in the statute it need not be further alleged in the indictment holding that as to indictment scienter need not be expressly alleged in section 924c count because the language during and relation to fairly imports the knowledge requirement holding that the legislature imposed a requirement implicitly rather than by means of statutory language expressly stating the requirement holding that the warden expressly waived the exhaustion requirement because her counsels conduct during the district court proceedings manifested a clear and unambiguous intent to waive the requirement