Liotta could make a substantial argument that in view of the allegations against him, he had a liberty interest protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573-75, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2707-08, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); Unger v. National Residents Matching Program, 928 F.2d 1392, 1396 (3d Cir.1991). We add, however, in fairness to the district court, that Liotta does not contend that he has a liberty interest and, indeed, does not even distinguish between procedural and substantive due process, though obviously we are concerned with the former, as there could not possibly be substantive due process protection against the termination in the circumstances of this case. See Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City of Philadelphia, 945 F.2d 667, 684 (3d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1668, 118
holding substantive due process not violated when licensing decisions are based on scheme rationally related to a governmental interest holding that the particular method is not rationally related to legitimate government interest if it is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable holding that a state action that neither utilizes suspect classifications nor implicates fundamental rights will violate substantive due process rights only where it is shown that the action is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose recognizing  1983 substantive due process claim holding that sentencing criminals in part based on criminal history is rationally related to a legitimate government interest