Court analyzed the Act’s provision that “ ‘no franchisor... may... terminate any franchise,’ except for an enumerated reason and after providing written notice.” Id. at 1257 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 2802(a)-(b)). The Court explained that the term “terminate” means to “put an end to,” and that “cancel,” which the Act specifically incorporated into the term “termination,” means to “annul or destroy.” Id. (quotations omitted). Thus, the Court concluded, “a franchisee cannot recover for constructive termination under the [Act] if the franchisor’s allegedly wrongful conduct did not compel the franchisee to abandon its franchise.” Id. at 1255. The Court explained that “[requiring franchisees to abandon their franchises before claiming constructive termination is also consistent with th 99) (<HOLDING>). In Flaherty v. Metromail Corp., 235 F.3d 133,
holding that prison officials could prevent the issuance of an injunction by proving  that they were no longer unreasonably disregarding an objectively intolerable risk of harm and that they would not revert to their obduracy upon cessation of litigation  holding that a complaint satisfied rule 9b because it identified the misrepresentations at issue the specific dates on which they were made and the specific persons responsible for making them holding employees claims accrued on the dates they submitted their resignations because by those dates they were aware that conditions had become intolerable and that they felt compelled to resign holding that all claims submitted by defendant were false because they were acquired by kickback holding that neglect was not excusable where the defendants did not do all that they were required to do after they received the summons and complaint in that they did not contact a lawyer or make any other arrangements with respect to their defense