(i.e., delinquency proceeding), in which the juvenile is entitled to certain rights such as counsel and a jury. See M.C.L.A. § 712A.17(1) & (2), .17c(1), .17d; In re Carey, 241 Mich.App. 222, 615 N.W.2d 742, 745 (2000) (“Although juvenile proceedings are not considered adversarial in nature, they are closely analogous to the adversary criminal process.”). In lieu of a criminal “conviction,” the court renders an order of disposition, see M.C.L.A. § 712A.18(1), from which the court has authority to impose sentence, including incarceration, see M.C.L.A. § 712A.18(1)(a)-(1), .18g, .18h. Here, Morris was sentenced to a period of probation. Therefore, we hold that Heck v. Humphrey is applicable to the present case. See also Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca, 410 F.3d 1136, 1137 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). After carefully reviewing the record, the
holding that for an initial civil commitment the state has the burden of proof holding that claims for civil rights violation and false imprisonment arising out of civil commitment are not appropriate for tribunal review holding that the possibility that a sex offender could face civil commitment under a state statute was a collateral consequence because civil commitment does not flow automatically from the plea holding heck applicable to claims that implicate the validity of civil commitment proceedings holding that heck is applicable to  1983 suits premised on alleged violations of prison disciplinary procedures