was insufficient). This court was similarly unanimous. See Wheeler, 121 Hawai'i at 385, 219 P.3d at 1172. It was not debatable whether the failure to allege the public-road element (i.e., the definition of "operating”) yields a sufficient charging instrument, because this would have been in derogation of a settled constitutional principle. See State v. Jendrusch, 58 Haw. 279, 281, 567 P.2d 1242, 1244 (1977) (noting that a charge omitting an element of the offense constitutes a denial of due process). 33 . See also United States v. Rivera-Nevarez, 418 F.3d 1104, 1107 (10th Cir.2005) (''Decisions of statutory interpretation are fully retroactive because they do not change the law, but rather explain what the law has always meant.”); In re Blackshire, 98 F.3d 1293, 1294 (11th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Nunez v. United States, 96 F.3d 990, 992 (7th
holding that the us supreme courts interpretation of 18 usc  924c in an earlier case was not an expression of a new rule because the court merely interpreted a substantive criminal statute using rules of statutory construction holding that for purposes of statutory construction expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other holding that a prior us supreme court decision did not present a new rule of criminal procedure but merely interpreted a statute holding that in relation to is an element of 18 usc  924c holding that court lacked jurisdiction on appeal from injunction because the order was simply an interpretation of an earlier order