(Mo. banc 2012). “ ‘The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider the words in their plain and ordinary meaning.’” Id. (quoting S. Metro. Fire Prot. Dist. v. City of Lee’s Summit, 278 S.W.3d 659, 666 (Mo. banc 2009)). “Absent statutory definition, words used in statutes are given their plain and ordinary meaning with help, as needed, from the dictionary.” Am. Healthcare Mgmt., Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 984 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Mo. banc 1999). However, where the legislature has defined a term in one statute, its failure to do so in another may be instructive on the subject of intent. See, e.g., Hudson v. Dir. of Revenue, 216 S.W.3d 216, 223-24 (Mo.App.W.D.2007) (<HOLDING>); State v. Bouse, 150 S.W.3d 326, 330-31
holding there was no rule 404b violation where the evidence was admitted to show knowledge and knowledge was an element of the crime charged holding that knowledge element could not be deemed in favor of plaintiff where defendant objected to the omission of that element from the jury charge holding the connection is an element holding that the trial court committed fundamental error in not instructing the jury on the knowledge element of the offense of resisting an officer without violence when that element was in dispute at trial holding that by including a knowledge element in two sections of a statute the legislature demonstrated that it knew how to express its intent to require a knowledge element rendering the absence of the element in another statute supportive of the inference that the legislature did not intend for there to be a knowledge element