13-40856, 2014 WL 2624911, at *8 (Bankr.E.D.Tex. June 12, 2014). This is true even under the “heightened culpability standard for defalcation” announced by the Supreme Court in Bullock, because intentional self-dealing “clearly meets the [.Bullock ] definition [of defalcation].” Id. at *8-9. The Court construes all relevant facts in Whittington’s favor (as the Court must at summary judgment), but nonetheless, any reasonable fact-finder would have to find that he met the “culpable state of mind requirement” in light of his “gross recklessness in respect to the improper nature of the relevant fiduciary behavior.” Bullock, 133 S.Ct. at 1759. He “ ‘consciously disregarded]’ (or [was] ... willfully blind to) ‘a substantial an V-A-H-12-819, 2012 WL 4339286, at *2-3 (S.D.Tex. Aug. 31, 2012) (<HOLDING>), adopted by No. CIV-A-H-7-12-819, 2012 WL
holding that under texas law limited partner could not bring breach of fiduciary duty claims without the partnership because the partners claims would be indirect and duplicative of the partnerships claims holding that several claims including one for breach of fiduciary duty against a volunteer school board member were timely without addressing the merits of the claims holding that because negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims are covered by the martin act these claims must be dismissed holding only a party to the partnership agreement can breach it and be liable for a breach of fiduciary duty relating to partnership obligations holding that minority partners claim against the majority partner for breach of fiduciary duty was not barred under the gist of the action doctrine because pennsylvania law imposes a fiduciary duty that is separate and distinct from the particular contractual obligations contained in the joint venture agreement