at 380, 608 A.2d 254. I agree with the Law Division that the true cause of this accident was the failure to provide an ordinary traffic signal at the intersection. As we stated in Weiss, supra, 128 N.J. at 385, 608 A.2d 254: “When the absence of a traffic signal * * * is the true culprit, government is immune.” To hold a public entity liable for its failure promptly to replace an ordinary traffic signal would undermine the Legislature’s policy judgment that a public entity should be immune for an injury caused by its failure to provide a stop sign. See Kolitch, supra, 100 N.J. at 496, 497 A.2d 183 (“[Bjoth the decision [to post a sign] and the act of implementation are one and the same for the purposes of the [traffic-sign immunity].”); Smith, supra, 247 N.J.Super. at 69, 588 A.2d 854 (<HOLDING>). I agree. Ill Against the overwhelming
holding that the problem is initially one for the trial courts holding that because there is immunity for not posting a sign initially and for where the sign is placed immunity also exists for not replacing a missing sign holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit holding that as a general rule interlocutory trial court orders rejecting defenses of common law sovereign immunity governmental immunity public official immunity statutory immunity or any other type of immunity are not appealable under the maryland collateral order doctrine holding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred a claim for money damages against the librarian of congress in his official capacity because immunity had not been waived and the exceptions to immunity did not apply