have construed the phrase “unable to stand trial” as including within the article VI tolling provision only those periods of delay occasioned by the defendant’s physical or mental incapacity. See, e.g., Birdwell v. Skeen, 983 F.2d 1332, 1340-41 (5th Cir.1993); Stroble v. Anderson, 587 F.2d 830, 838 (6th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 940, 99 S.Ct. 1289, 59 L.Ed.2d 499 (1979). A majority of the federal courts, on the other hand, have defined the “unable to stand trial” language as including within the article VI tolling provision “all those periods of delay occasioned by the defendant, and specifically, the periods of delay occasioned by the ... motions filed on behalf of the defendants.” United States v. Dawn, 900 F.2d 1132, 1136 (7th Cir.1990) (internal quotation marks omitted) (<HOLDING>) (citing United States v. Nesbitt, 852 F.2d
holding that the limitations period is likewise not tolled during the pendency of a certiorari petition to the supreme court holding that the oneyear statute of limitations was not tolled during the pendency of petition for certiorari to the united states supreme court seeking review of denial of state postconviction relief holding that aedpas oneyear limitations period is not tolled during the pendency of a petition for certiorari to the united states supreme court that seeks review of a state courts denial of postconviction relief holding that tolling of the statute of limitations was not tolled during the pendency of a claim dismissed without prejudice for want of prosecution holding that time period of article iii of the iad tolled during the pendency of defendants motion to dismiss