discretion. It is an abuse of discretion, however, to fail to award support from the date of the petition for modification where the need for the support and the ability of the former spouse to pay existed at the time that the modification petition was filed. Anderson v. Anderson, 609 So.2d 87, 89 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (citation omitted). In Beal v. Beal, 666 So.2d 1054 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), this court held that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award retroactive child support to the date that the petition for dissolution was filed. The Beal court explained that “the child’s needs and the [fa-therms ability to pay existed at the time of the filing of the petition for dissolution.” Beal, 666 So.2d at 1054. See also Campbell v. Campbell, 635 So.2d 44, 46 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)(<HOLDING>); Brock v. Brock, 695 So.2d 744 (Fla. 1st DCA
holding that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award the increased child support retroactive to the date of the petition for modification because the childs increased need for support and the former husbands ability to pay the increased child support existed at the time the former wifes petition for modification was filed holding that the court could award child support without a showing of changed circumstances where the original divorce decree awarded child support to be set after a specified time upon petition to the court holding that the order on the wifes petition for modification of child support was a final order because it disposed of all the issues except for the ancillary issue of attorneys fees holding that an outofwedlock childs pending claim for retroactive child support was nondischargeable in bankruptcy because a debt for child support arises upon the birth of the child and that the fact that no court had yet ordered the debtor to support the child does not take the debt outside the scope of 11 usc  523a5 holding that trial court abused its discretion in failing to order child support retroactive to date of filing where there was no evidence that husband was unable to pay the ordered amount during that period of time