minor changes as, in the judgment of Tanglewood, are necessitated by the efficient installation of improvements 9 . The Association also asserts in passing that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s determination regarding waiver and estoppel. But it provides no analysis or record citations to support these assertions, so we do not consider them. See San Saba Energy, L.P. v. Crawford, 171 S.W.3d 323, 338 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). 10 . Plaintiffs challenge the trial court’s rejection of these contentions in their cross-appeal, which we address below. 11 . Chief Justice Frost does not join this Section V.C., which is the opinion of only Justice Busby. 12 . See BHP Petroleum Co. v. Millard, 800 S.W.2d 838, 840-41 (Tex.1990) (<HOLDING>); Funes v. Villatoro, 352 S.W.3d 200, 216-17
holding trial courts refusal to dismiss entire lawsuit following plaintiffs nonsuit was proper because defendants declaratory judgment counterclaim addressed matters not raised in the plaintiffs original claim holding that because trial courts order did not dispose of the defendants counterclaim that order was not a final judgment that would support an appeal holding property owner not entitled to award of attorneys fees under declaratory judgments act because his declaratory judgment counterclaim did not present any issues beyond the homeowners associations cause of action holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in severing defendants counterclaim after summary judgment was granted as to plaintiffs claim holding thirdparty complaint proper in action for declaratory judgment even though the defendant would have no pecuniary liability to plaintiffs