period will accrue interest at the utility’s weighted average cost of capital as reported in the commission’s earnings surveillance reporting requirement for the prior year. SACE argues (1) that section 366.93 delegates legislative authority to the PSC in violation of the separation of powers clause of the Florida Constitution and, alterna tively, (2) that the PSC’s finding that the utility companies demonstrated an intent to build for cost recovery purposes under the statute is arbitrary and unsupported by competent, substantial evidence. We reject both arguments. A. Separation of Powers The PSC did not, and indeed could not, rule on the constitutionality of section 366.93, Florida Statutes (2010). See Fla. Hosp. v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 823 So.2d 844, 849 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (<HOLDING>). We therefore consider this matter as one of
recognizing that administrative agencies routinely apply equitable estoppel in administrative hearings and that permitting them to do so is consistent with administrative remedy exhaustion requirements and separation of powers recognizing that administrative agencies lack to power to consider or determine constitutional issues recognizing that administrative agencies are not bound by rules of evidence holding that we consider issues not raised at administrative level waived recognizing that we lack jurisdiction to consider issues not raised in the parties briefs