between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct.” Key v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 1996-NMSC-038, 121 N.M. 764, 768, 918 P.2d 350, 354 (discussing the requirements of standing). Denials of ingress and egress easement rights to an owner’s property, if proved, constitute an injury in fact to the owner traceable to the defendants’ conduct. See N.M. Gamefowl Ass’n, 2009-NMCA-088, ¶ 30 (setting out ACLU’s explanation that “an association has standing to sue on behalf of its members when (1) the members would otherwise have standing to sue, (2) the interests that the association seeks to protect are germane to the association’s purpose, and (3) the claim asserted and the relief requested do not require the individual members to participate in the lawsuit”); Crumpacker, 1998-NMCA-169, ¶ 41 (<HOLDING>). Los Vigiles itself, in fact, filled the role
holding that in order to establish standing a plaintiff must show 1 it has suffered an injury in fact  2 the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and 3 it is likely as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision holding that the decedents estate had standing because the traditional requirement that the plaintiff show an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the conduct of the defendant is met by the allegation in the complaint that the defendants actions resulted in the diminishment of the assets of the estate holding that an injured person having a possible claim against an insurer who has been made a party defendant to an action for declaratory judg ment possesses the requisite interest to be heard on appeal holding that the injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action to be redressable by the court recognizing that standing turns on whether the plaintiff can show an injury in fact traceable to the defendants conduct whereas the real party in interest concept entails identification of the person who possesses the particular right soixght to be enforced