to obtain an “enforceable” order of relief. ii. Substantially Justified Settlement Rejection Given that R.R. did not need to continue litigation to obtain an enforceable agreement covering all requested relief, we conclude that R.R. was not “substantially justified” in rejecting EPISD’s settlement offer. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(E). Further, R.R.’s own filings indicate that he recognized that a settlement agreement made at the resolution meeting was enforceable. Because R.R. was not substantially justified in rejecting EPISD’s settlement offer, Id. § 1415(i)(3)(D) applies and prohibits an attorney’s fee award for work performed subsequent to the time of EPISD’s written settlement offer. See Shelly C. ex rel. Shelbie C. v. Venus Indep. Sch. Dist., 878 F.2d 862, 864 (5th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); Duane M., 861 F.2d at 119 (same).
holding that an award of attorneys fees under supreme court rule 38 precursor to rule 222 did not preempt an award of attorneys fees to which one is otherwise entitled and thus appellant could seek an award of attorneys fees pursuant to section 1577300 which permits an award of fees for a party prevailing in an action against a state agency holding attorneys testimony on all work performed sufficient to support attorneys fees award even though no time records presented holding that timely filed motion for sanctions which requested an award of over 40000 in attorneys fees requested a substantial change in the judgment holding that buckhannon applies to the attorneys fees provision of the idea recognizing that the idea bars an award of attorneys fees for work performed subsequent to a settlement offer of all requested relief