if necessary.” Mosley v. Cozby, 813 F.2d 659, 660 (5th Cir. 1987). We lack jurisdiction to review either of the district court’s orders because they are not final judgments for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291; they are not among the type of orders listed in § 1292(a); they were not certified by the district court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) or 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) to be final appealable orders; and they do not fall within a jurisprudential exception, such as the collateral-order doctrine, that would render them final, appealable orders. See Dardar v. Lafourche Realty Co., 849 F.2d 955, 957-59 (5th Cir. 1988); Save the Bay, Inc. v. United States Army, 639 F.2d 1100, 1102-03 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1981); see also In re Macon Uplands Venture, 624 F.2d 26, 27-28 (5th Cir. 1980) (<HOLDING>); Melancon v. Texaco, Inc., 659 F.2d 551,
holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable holding that the denial of a motion to remand is interlocutory and not immediately appealable holding an order allowing a motion under rule 60b is not immediately appealable because it is interlocutory and does not affect a substantial right holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable holding that a rehearing order is interlocutory and not appealable