Cordova’s final policymaking authority concerning the termination or transfer of employees. For the aforesaid reasons, I conclude summary judgment should enter against Singer on the § 1981 and § 1983 claims against the School District. B. Liability of Cordova under § 1981. I have concluded the School District is not liable to Singer under § 1981. I consider Defendants’ additional argument concerning the § 1981 claim since it remains of relevance to Singer’s § 1981 claim against Cor-dova. Defendants argue § 1981 does not apply to religious discrimination and the claim should be dismissed insofar as it is based on such discrimination. See Shapolia v. Los Alamos Nat’l Lab., 992 F.2d 1033, 1036 n. 3 (10th Cir.1993); Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968, 971 (10th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). Singer cites the holding in Shaare Tefila
holding discrimination based on pregnancy was not sex discrimination holding that allegations of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation necessarily state a claim of discrimination on the basis of sex holding that a violation of  1981 requires purposeful race discrimination holding that racial discrimination is not a personal injury tort holding  1981 is directed to racial discrimination although not necessarily limited to the technical or restrictive meaning of race but does not apply to sex or religious discrimination