estoppel as a defense against suit, existing cases suggest this result. In S.A.P., for example, the court held that the state can be equitably estopped from asserting section 768.28(13), Florida Statutes (1993), which sets a period of four years from the accrual of a caúse of action to commence suit against it, as a defense to an untimely claim. 835 So.2d at 1097-98. In reaching that conclusion, the court characterized section 768.28(13) as a “conventional statute of limitations” and distinguished it from “a statute of repose that forecloses all forms of equitable relief.” Id. at 1100. The implication of that distinction is that had the statute been one of repose, an equitable doctrine such as estoppel would not have spared the plaintiffs claim. See also May, 771 So.2d at 1161 (<HOLDING>); cf. Aristide v. Jackson Mem’l Hosp., 917
holding that the statute must specify the states intention to subject itself to suit in federal court in order to constitute a waiver holding that nonclaim statute in probate code is not subject to waiver or extension in the probate proceedings holding that the statute of limitations contained in section 2501 is jurisdictional and is not subject to tolling waiver or estoppel holding that the courts statute of limitations is jurisdictional in nature and is thus not subject to waiver or estoppel holding that the right to support is not subject to waiver by either parent