manufacture of things specially designed for the purpose of accomplishing a criminal objective is strong evidence of criminal intent. The instrument must be specially designed, made, or adapted for the commission of an offense, however; things frequently used in crime, but which have common, lawful uses, are excluded from the purview of Section 16.01 because possession of such things, alone, is conduct too ambiguous for imposition of the criminal sanction. In addition, the section requires proof of specific intent to use the i a separate element of the offense. See Andrews, 814 S.W.2d at 841 (“An object does not become a criminal instrument by the context of its use, but by the limited nature and specialized criminal use of its own distinctive properties.”); Eodice, 742 S.W.2d at 847 (<HOLDING>). Sufficiency of the Evidence We turn, then, to
holding that where congressional intent is clear a court must give effect to such intent holding that intent is a separate element and evidence relating to intent is irrelevant to determining whether an object is a criminal instrument holding that motive is circumstantial evidence of intent holding that for purposes of the aggravated assault statute if the instrument used is a firearm as defined by section 7900016 then that instrument is a deadly weapon as a matter of law  regardless of whether it is loaded or capable of being fired and holding that for purposes of the aggravated assault statute if the instrument is not a firearm then courts are to apply an objective test and look to the nature and actual use of the instrument and not to the subjective fear of the victim or intent of the perpetrator in determining whether the instrument is a deadly weapon holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law