in Deck, [t]here will be cases, of course, where these perils of shackling are unavoidable. We do not underestimate the need to restrain dangerous defendants to prevent courtroom attacks, or the need to give trial courts latitude in making individualized security determinations. We are mindful of the tragedy that can result if judges are not able to protect themselves and their courtrooms. But given their prejudicial effect, due process does not permit the use of visible restraints if the trial court has not taken account of the circumstances of the particular case. Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2014 (citation omitted). As such, in making the calculus whether to shackle, the district court may not bolster its determination on the basis of other, unrelated cases. See Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2009 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). Rather, Deck has made clear
holding that the use of visible shackles is prohibited unless that use is justified by an essential state interest  such as the interest in courtroom security  specific to the defendant on trial holding security interest in insurance premiums perfected by creation of security interest holding that the use of a corset spring device was public although the use was by its nature not visible to the general public holding courts must look to the law of the state in which the security interest was created to determine if creditor retains a purchase money security interest despite refinancing holding that the trustee could not avoid a security interest under section 549 when that security interest was authorized by the bankruptcy court