and, therefore, are not entitled to immunity. See, e.g., Colley, at 849. In this case, defense counsel objected to the appellant’s testifying about matters that were the subject of the criminal case. The trial court overruled the objection, and the appellant was required to answer questions about events related to the three-count indictment. Thus, he was compelled to testify. Although the State contends that the trial court properly denied the motion because the appellant “did not provide any specific testimony concerning the case” and the State “did not learn anything new from [his] testimony,” neither point matters. Pursuant to the plain language of the statute and the legislative intent, the appellant is still entitled to transactional immunity. See also McCollum, 904 S.W.2d at 116 (<HOLDING>) (quoting State v. Stone, 161 Tenn. 74, 29
holding that protection of a defendants constitutional right to be convicted only after a jurys consideration of every essential element of the charged offense demands that the jury be given proper instructions regarding all elements of the crime recognizing that testimony given might be utterly insufficient to form the basis of a prosecution against the witness nevertheless if it related to the offense later charged against him he would be within the protection of the statute holding that the jury is the judge of the weight and credibility given to witness testimony holding that an allegation as to the time of the offense is not an essential element of the offense charged in the indictment and within reasonable time limits proof of any date before the return of the indictment and within the statute of limitations is sufficient holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness