entering onto the path of inference in the first place____ [W]hile it may not always be simple for the ... jury to obey the instruction that they disregard an incriminating inference, there does not exist the overwhelming probability of their inability to do so that is the foundation of Bruton’s exception to the general rule. Id. at 208, 107 S.Ct. at 1708. Nevertheless, the Court “express[ed] no opinion on the admissibility of a confession in which the defendant’s name has been replaced with a symbol or neutral pronoun.” Id. at 211 n. 5, 107 S.Ct. at 1709 n. 5. The Circuits have, however, held redacted statements, which do not on their face incriminate the defendant, can be admitted with a limiting instruction. See, e.g., United States v. Chrismon, 965 F.2d 1465, 1472-73 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Washington, 952 F.2d 1402,
holding that admission of statement with references to we or they which did not directly implicate defendant did not violate defendants confrontation rights holding that because closing arguments do not constitute evidence a prosecutors statement did not implicate the confrontation clause holding that the introduction of driving records without a witness did not violate a defendants right to confrontation holding that doctrine does not violate right of confrontation holding that two or three references to everyone and they in testimony about confession did not violate bruton because testimony did not implicate the defendant expressly nor was it incriminating on its face