the defendant’s confession, and that the trial court gave the defendant an opportunity to explain or present evidence, consistent with Dowling. Id. Whitehead, unlike Seays, involved pending charges stemming from a prior arrest. Id. Seays concerned a pending charge that arose from a subsequent arrest, i.e., an arrest that occurred after the crime for which the sentence was being imposed. 789 So.2d at 1209. As discussed above, Seays could reasonably be interpreted as holding that s 1999) (explaining that subsequent arrests are proper considerations in sentencing because “[t]his information is relevant to the court’s assessment of the defendant’s character and the risk that he will commit another crime.”); People v. Jones, 142 Ill.App.3d 51, 96 Ill.Dec. 469, 491 N.E.2d 515, 518-19 (1986) (<HOLDING>) (citing People v. Young, 138 Ill.App.3d 130,
holding a court may consider a defendants criminal history even if that history is included in the defendants criminal history category holding that criminal conduct of which defendant is acquitted may be used as sentencing factor if proved by preponderance of the evidence recognizing that sentencing facts are based on the evidence and testimony presented at sentencing under a preponderance of the evidence standard holding that the sentencing judge could consider the defendants subsequent arrest even though the charges were dismissed during sentencing holding that evidence of subsequent criminal conduct may be used at sentencing hearing on prior criminal charge and stating that misdeeds occurring up to the time of sentencing whether before the finding of guilty or subsequent are relevant as they go to the defendants history and character 