about signing the statement, but “believe[d] it was somebody in [Reed’s] family.” Nor could Coleman recall the gender of this family member or the “eireumstance[s] of the person coming to [him].” At the request of Reed’s family member, Coleman went to a notary public to sign the affidavit. However, he could not remember specifically where he went. Finally, Coleman said that Richards had no bias against him that he was aware of, and therefore, no discernable reason to lie about Coleman’s involvement. On this record, the state court had reasonable grounds for concluding that Coleman was an incredible witness, and thus, that counsel’s failure to investigate Coleman and pursue him as a witness would not have prejudiced Reed. See Sullivan v. DeLoach, 459 F.3d 1097, 1109-10 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Thompson v. Nagle, 118 F.3d 1442, 1453 (11th
holding that to establish stricklandpierce prejudice in the appellate representation context the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the direct appeal proceeding would have been different but for counsels deficient performance holding that a petitioner must show  that the outcome of his appeal would have been different had counsel raised the issue holding that petitioner failed to establish a reasonable probability that had his trial counsel interviewed renee and called her as a witness at trial the trial outcome would have been different because renees testimony wholly lacked credibility holding that a new trial was warranted where there is reasonable probability that the false testimony introduced by the government influenced the outcome of the trial holding that the outcome of the case could have been different if the trial court had imposed the appropriate burden