614 (1962) (“This insistence on finality and prohibition of piecemeal review discourage undue litigiousness and leaden-foot administration of justice”). Against this doctrinal backdrop, our court has consistently held that “[ojrders granting partial summary judgment are, absent special circumstances, not appeal-able final orders under [section] 1291 because partial summary judgment orders do not dispose of all claims and do not end the litigation on the merits.” Williamson v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 160 F.3d 1247, 1250 (9th Cir.1998), citing Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Local 102 v. County of San Diego, 60 F.3d 1346, 1349 (9th Cir.1995) and Cheng v. Comm’r Internal Revenue Serv., 878 F.2d 306, 309 (9th Cir.1989); see also Way v. County of Ventura, 348 F.3d 808, 809-10 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). In this case, however, the majority casts
holding that the court lacked appellate jurisdiction over a partial summary judgment on liability in a qualified immunity case holding that ninth circuit jurisdiction over summary judgment appeals is limited we may review only the district courts legal conclusion that an officer is not entitled to qualified immunity holding that an interlocutory appeal lies from a denial of summary judgment on a qualified immunity claim holding that the court lacked jurisdiction over statelaw tort claims on an interlocutory appeal from a denial of qualified immunity holding appellate courts have jurisdiction over the district courts orders rejecting as a matter of law qualified immunity raised in a motion to dismiss