Texas law)). Some courts refer to this Section as “the malfunction doctrine.” See, e.g., Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp., 460 F.2d 631, 638-40 (8th Cir. 1972); Daleiden v. Carborundum Co., 438 F.2d 1017, 1022 (8th Cir. 1971); Greco v. Bucciconi Engineering Co., 407 F.2d 87, 89-90 (3rd Cir. 1969); see Sochanski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 689 F.2d 45, 50 (3d Cir. 1982). Moreover, the use of circumstantial evidence to prove vehicle defects is widespread. See, e.g., Frankel v. Lull Eng’g Co., 334 F. Supp. 913, 919 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (finding that circumstantial evidence of a defect in a high-lift loader that flipped over was sufficient to show a defect without testimony by an expert witness); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Haven Hills Farm, Inc., 395 So. 2d 991, 995-96 (Ala. 1981) (<HOLDING>); Montoya v. General Motors Corp., 1975- NMCA
holding that an eight and onehalf month delay was enough to warrant further inquiry holding that a three and onehalf month temporal proximity is insufficient to create a jury issue on causation holding that proof of a tire blowout on a four and onehalf month old tire was not by itself sufficient to prove defect in product holding a four month delay to be reasonable under  3161h7 holding that by itself three and onehalf months was insufficient to prove causation