(delinquency proceedings) and rule 8.285(b) (dependency proceedings) provide that a juvenile accused of indirect criminal contempt must be provided with a show cause order, arraignment, representation by counsel, opportunity for bail, opportunity to personally appear before the court to offer facts in defense or mitigation of the contempt, and personal presence of the contemnor in open court upon pronouncement of sentence. In a criminal contempt proceeding, a defendant must be afforded the due process rights provided by statute and rule. See Bowen v. Bowen, 471 So.2d 1274 (Fla.1985) (stating that indirect criminal contempt proceeding must fully comply with the procedural rule and defendants are entitled to due process protections); J.M.P.U. v. State, 858 So.2d 389 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (<HOLDING>); Kersh v. State Fam Fire & Cas. Co., 686 So.2d
holding evidence insufficient to show direct contempt and no basis for indirect contempt because of failure to meet procedural requirements holding that an order to show cause was deficient when it merely stated that the defendant had violated a prior court order and did not include the facts that purportedly constituted the criminal contempt holding that a juvenile defendant could not be found in indirect criminal contempt where defendant was not given specifics as to the acts which constituted the alleged contempt and there was no information in the order to show cause informing defendant that he was subject to possible criminal penalties holding that a contempt order labeled by the district court as civil was actually a criminal contempt because the order was retroactive seeking to penalize previous violations and was punitive serving no compensatory purpose holding that a civil contempt defendant has a right to a jury trial when the act of contempt was not committed in the presence of the court and when the incarceration is in part punitive