Steel Corp. v. Review Bd., 117 Ind.App. 379, 72 N.E.2d 662 (1947))); Shell Oil Co. v. Brooks, 88 Wash.2d 909, 913, 567 P.2d 1132, 1134 (1977) (“ ‘[Stoppage of work’ is most often defined in terms of a substantial curtailment of the employer’s overall operations at the particular situs in question.”). Finally, we note that Lewis, supra, at 343, summarized the case law with a similar interpretation to that which we adopt today: The general rules in stoppage of work jurisdictions, as they have been judicially construed, are: benefits will be denied for any week during which (1) a claimant-striker will not perform available work and there is a substantial curtailment of production or operations at the employer’s establishment which curta 164-65, 216 A.2d 597, 605 (App.Div. 1966) (<HOLDING>); In re Falco-Ward, 129 A.D.2d at 930, 514
holding that for purposes of longarm jurisdiction because plaintiff was employed in new york the original event causing his injury occurred in new york holding that truck drivers who picked up items from a foundry and returned there at the end of the day were last employed there holding that there was insufficient probable cause for a dui arrest when inter alia although the defendants eyes were bloodshot and watery there was no evidence that her eyes were glassy or unfocused holding that there was insufficient probable cause for a dui arrest when inter alia there was testimony that the defendants eyes were bloodshot and watery holding inter alia that newspaper employees who operated in the field but took orders from the new york city office attended meetings there and were paid there were employed there