observed that the “law gives a defendant access for the first time to far more probative evidence: specific prior sexual conduct with third persons, if it is relevant for the purposes set forth in Code § 18.2-67.7.” Winfield, 225 Va. at 220, 301 S.E.2d at 20. Thus, to the extent that Pilcher contends the statutory change affects the rules of evidence, we note that the United States Supreme Court also has held that “the prescribing of different modes or procedure ..., leaving untouched all the substantial protections with which the existing law surrounds the person accused of crime, are not considered within the constitutional inhibition.” Dun can v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377, 382-83, 14 S.Ct. 570, 572, 38 L.Ed. 485 (1894). Likewise, “[s]o far as mere mo Ill.Dec. 300, 396 N.E.2d 827 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Finney v. State, 179 Ind.App. 316, 385 N.E.2d
holding that evidence is not required to support an an assertion relating to discovery when evidence is unnecessary to decide the matter holding that the supreme courts ex post facto precedents do not clearly establish that amended section 29336 violates the ex post facto clause holding that a rape shield statute was not ex post facto when it barred evidence of a prior sexual relationship that was admissible before enactment of the statute holding that a statute is not ex post facto when it created an alteration in rules of evidence   which served only to prevent use of certain evidence relating to the alleged victims credibility and had no bearing upon evidence relating to the crime itself holding that the ex post facto clause  has no application to deportation