harm analysis for non-constitutional errors, and admits of no exceptions whatsoever. To this extent, it is consistent with Cain ’s pronouncement with respect to Rule 81(b)(2), namely, that it applies categorically to all non-constitutional errors. Rule 44.2(a), by contrast, actually includes within its text an explicit limitation. It applies Chapman ⅛ constitutional harm analysis, but only when the constitutional error “is subject to harmless error review” in the first place. This language more than suffices to accommodate the Supreme Court’s doctrine of structural error. In fact, the language of Rule 44.2(a) is sufficiently generalized that I feel compelled to question the Court’s continued adherence to Cain. See, e.g., Schmutz v. State, 440 S.W.3d 29, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (<HOLDING>). Under Rule 44.2(a), who determines whether
holding error was structural because of the difficulty of assessing the effect of the error holding that the omission of an element is not a structural error subject to automatic reversal but rather  where objected to  is subject to harmless error analysis holding that even if there is error in failing to award nominal damages to a plaintiff such error is not a basis for reversal holding that complete denial of summation amounts to structural error and that existing case law did not clearly establish the restriction of summation as structural error holding that even after the enactment of rule 442 only structural error requires reversal without any harm analysis