J., dissents with separate written opinion joined by THOMAS, P.J., COLEMAN, and DIAZ, JJ. HINKEBEIN, J., dissenting: ¶ 13. Since neither of the parties have ever disputed the property settlement agreement’s validity, the only issue in this case is whether Mr. Prine abandoned the personal .property settlement agreements, our supreme court has held that “[w]hen the parties have reached agreement and the chancery court has approved it, we ought to enforce it and take as dim a view of efforts to modify it as we ordinarily do when persons seek relief from their improvident contracts.” Bell v. Bell 572 So.2d 841, 844 (Miss.1990). Accordingly, it is reversible error for a chancellor to attempt to modify the terms of a valid property settlement agreement. See Mount, 624 So.2d at 1005 (<HOLDING>); Bowe v. Bowe, 557 So.2d 793, 795 (Miss.1990)
holding that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that an oral agreement existed and that it was not modified holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement holding that chancellor committed manifest error when he modified property settlement agreement holding that it was error for the court to enter a modified agreement which materially altered the agreement reached by the parties