mentioned in section 547.210 and in all other criminal cases except in those cases where the possible outcome of such an appeal would result in double jeopardy for the defendant.... In State v. Casaretto, 818 S.W.2d 313 (Mo.App.1991), the court, referring to § 547-200.2, said: Double jeopardy is an issue which is always raised 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2198, 57 L.Ed.2d 65, 79 (1978), the court held that a defendant who, after the introduction of evidence, deliberately chooses to seek termination of the proceedings against him by a motion to dismiss, unrelated to factual guilt or innocence, suffers no injury cognizable under the Double Jeopardy Clause if the State is permitted to appeal and seek reversal of the dismissal. See also United States v. Kehoe, 516 F.2d 78, 86 (5th Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>). We do, therefore, find that this appeal is
holding that where the evidence offered by the state and admitted by the trial court  whether erroneously or not  would have been sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict the double jeopardy clause does not preclude retrial holding that the double jeopardy clause bars retrial when the commonwealth intentionally undertakes to prejudice the defendant to the point of the denial of a fair trial holding that a defendant who delays for reasons of trial tactics filing a motion attacking an indictment until after the jury is sworn and some evidence has been heard is not entitled to prevent a retrial on the basis of the double jeopardy clause holding that under monge double jeopardy does not prevent retrial of an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes holding that the granting of a mistrial due to a defect in the wording of the indictment did not prevent retrial even though the mistrial was declared after the jury was impaneled and sworn and over the objection of defendant