Pursell’s claim that Massiah governed DeFoy’s testimony, I can only conclude that defense counsel was reasonable to assume that Massiah did not apply. Nonetheless, even if DeFoy’s testimony was barred by Massiah, counsel’s decision was still objectively reasonable under Strickland. “[A] court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the particu- lar case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. At the time in question, nearly every court to have addressed the issue held that statements that were inadmissible under Massiah as substantive evidence were nonetheless admissible for impeachment purposes. United States v. McMa-naman, 606 F.2d 919, 925 (10th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Taxe, 540 F.2d 961, 968-69
holding that statements taken in violation of massiah can be used for impeachment purposes holding evidence of pending charges against a witness is inadmissible for impeachment purposes holding that it is proper to refer to evidence of prior acts of misconduct in the closing arguments on the issue of credibility but it is improper to argue about misdeeds for any purpose other than impeachment because the acts were submitted for impeachment purposes only holding that a conviction under a new york state statute for failure to file tax returns requires proof of a specific intent to evade taxes and as such can be used for impeachment purposes consistently with the third circuit holding in cree holding that juvenile adjudications may not be used for impeachment purposes because the disposition of a juvenile does not constitute a criminal conviction