this, issue in the administrative tribunal.” Jeffreys v. Griffin, 1 N.Y.3d 34, 39, 769 N.Y.S.2d 184, 801 N.E.2d 404 (N.Y.2003); see also Burkybile v. Bd. of Educ., 411 F.3d 306, 310 (2d Cir.2005) (“New York courts give quasi-judicial administrative fact-finding preclu sive effect where there has been a full and fair opportunity to litigate”). Although there have been instances where a particular governmental entity’s administrative procedure has been deemed to have too much “procedural laxity” for collateral estoppel to apply, see Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 869 (2d Cir.1995), the Second Circuit has tacitly recognized that no such issue exists with respect to NYPD administrative disciplinary hearings, such as the one that Plaintiff currently faces. See Locurto, 447 F.3d at 170-72 (<HOLDING>). Having determined that collateral estoppel
holding that to determine collateral estoppel effect of a federal civil rights action fjederal law governs the preclusive effect of a claim arising under federal law holding that unreviewed state administrative proceedings do not have preclusive effect on title vii claim recognizing the doctrine of collateral estoppel in agency proceedings recognizing that nypd disciplinary hearings can have preclusive effect but ultimately holding that collateral estoppel did not apply due to issues specific to the administrative proceedings in that case holding that state law controls whether issues decided in a prior state court action are entitled to preclusive effect and setting forth the elements of collateral estoppel under washington law