SJM’s indebtedness to Commerce Bank? ¶29 Moreover, Sauter fails to recognize that, even had he been acting in his official capacity in executing the guaranty, no coverage would be available for his obligation to Commerce Bank for precisely that reason. Had Sauter signed the guaranty in his official capacity on behalf of SJM, the guaranty would bind SJM — not Sauter — and, thus, Sauter would not be personally liable for failure to satisfy any obligation pursuant to the guaranty. See 18B Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 1587 (2004) (noting that “an officer of a corporation is not personally liable on its contracts if he or she does not purport to bind himself or herself individually”); see also Inland-Ryerson Constr. Prods. Co. v. Brazier Constr. Co., 7 Wn. App. 558, 567, 500 P.2d 1015 (1972) (<HOLDING>). Because Sauter could not thus incur personal
holding that the code excepts from discharge debts resulting from agreements by the debtor to hold the debtors spouse harmless on joint debts to the extent those debts are in the nature of alimony maintenance or support recognizing distinction between corporate officer acting on behalf of himself and corporate officer acting on behalf of his corporation holding defendants personally liable for alleged conversion even when acting in corporate capacity holding that although a corporate officer is not presumed to be personally liable for corporate debts the officer may expressly bind himself or herself to be answerable for such debts holding that a corporate officer signing a contract in his corporate capacity is generally not liable for damages under the contract