was the owner, owner pro hac vice, agent, operator, or charterer of the vessel.” 33 U.S.C. § 905(b). In Bush v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 927 F.2d 445, 449 (9th Cir.1991), we incorrectly stated in dicta that the amendment barred all dual-capacity suits. We have already acknowledged this error. See Heise v. Fishing Co. of Alaska, Inc., 79 F.3d 903, 907 n. 2 (9th Cir.1996) (noting that the statement in Eagle-Picher that the 1984 amendment barred dual-capacity suits was incorrect dicta). To the extent any confusion remains, the 1984 change bars only shipbuilders, ship repairers and ship breakers from bringing a claim where the employer and the vessel owner are the same entity. See also Morehead v. Atkinson-Kiewit, J/V, 97 F.3d 603, 608 (1st Cir.1996) (en banc); G 5, 1033 (5th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). The Second Circuit, in a case preceding Jones
holding that the duty owed by a shipowner to a longshoreman under section 905b is that established by scindia and its progeny this duty is neither heightened nor diminished when the longshoreman is employed directly by the vessel holding that the duty of good faith and fair dealing is a contractual duty holding that clause eight requires time charterer to indemnify shipowner for any damages awarded because of injury to longshoreman holding that a charter party creates no contractual duty towards a longshoreman on the part of a time charterer holding that shipowner owed the plaintiff longshoreman a duty of care to keep the vessel free of dangerous and nonobvious tripping hazards and remanding for determination of breach