has a great deal of discretion in evaluating the relevancy and admissibility of evidence. Jefferson v. State, 818 So.2d 1099, 1104(¶ 6) (Miss.2002). “Unless the judge abuses this discretion so as to be prejudicial to the accused, the Court will not reverse” the trial judge’s rulings. Id. (citing Hughes v. State, 735 So.2d 238, 270 (¶ 134) (Miss.1999)). Turner v. State, 950 So.2d 243, 246(¶ 5) (Miss.Ct.App.2007). “However, the discretion of the trial judge must be exercised within the boundaries of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence.” Stubbs v. State, 878 So.2d 130, 134(¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.2004). ¶ 13. Kea claims that the passports and the stamps on them were not properly authenticated as required by Mississippi Rules of Evidence 901 and 902(3), which deprived him of the rig h Cir.1940) (<HOLDING>). The State argues that the passports were
holding that attorneys affidavit was not competent evidence of his clients agreement or communications with the defendants because it was not based on personal knowledge holding that the evidence that the defendant violated a probation condition was not competent and substantial because the state presented only hearsay evidence holding that a signed but unsworn letter which is not otherwise authenticated is hearsay and should not be considered as evidence in opposition to a motion for summary judgment holding that seventh application for postconviction relief which was rejected because evidence on which it was based was not properly authenticated was properly filed holding that a passport which was not authenticated or identified was not competent evidence to prove the facts stated therein