explosives — may involve merely negligent or reckless conduct” (citations omitted)); United States v. Zuniga, 553 F.3d 1330, 1334-35 (10th Cir.2009) (finding it "reasonable to surmise that those who possess deadly weapons in a penal institution typically intend to possess them,” and thus concluding that the Texas statute criminalizing that conduct, whether intentional, knowing or reckless, satisfied Be-gay ). Furthermore, in pre-Begay cases, we held in other contexts that a PSAS violation is not a crime of violence because such a violation may be committed with a mens rea lower than intent. See United States v. Otero, 502 F.3d 331, 335 (3d Cir.2007) (concluding that a PSAS violation is not a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2); Popal v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 249, 254 (3d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). 9 . Johnson argues that Pennsylvania simple
holding that a conviction under colorevstat  186401 for criminally negligent child abuse was not a crime of violence under 18 usc  16a because physical force was not an element of that crime holding that bank robbery by force and violence or intimidation under 18 usc  2113a is a crime of violence holding that seconddegree manslaughter was not a crime of violence and thus was not an aggravated felony warranting an aliens removal holding that sexual assault of a child qualified as crime of violence under 18 usc  16 holding that an aliens psas conviction was not a crime of violence under 18 usc  16a that would render the alien removable as an aggravated felon