resulting from that error.” Jones, 119 S.W.3d at 777 (quoting United States v. Polanco, 93 F.3d 555, 562-63 (9th Cir.1996)) (internal quotation omitted). If there is a reasonable likelihood that the error materially affected the judge’s deliberations, the error was not harmless. See id. We must “calculate, as nearly as possible, the probable impact of the error ... in light of the other evidence.” McCarthy v. State, 65 S.W.3d 47, 55 (Tex.Crim.App.2001), quoted in Jones, 119 S.W.3d at 777. If the State proffers abundant admissible evidence of a defendant’s guilt, then we may find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the improperly admitted statement did not contribute to a defendant’s adjudication of guilt. See Akins v. State, 202 S.W.3d 879, 892 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>); Jordy v. State, 969 S.W.2d 528, 533
holding that overwhelming evidence of element of crime rendered miranda error harmless when improperly admitted statement went to same element holding improperly admitted evidence was harmless error given the overwhelming evidence of guilt holding under a plain error analysis that a failure to charge the jury with an essential element did not warrant reversal of the conviction where the evidence supporting that element was overwhelming recognizing that trial courts failure to instruct jury on element of offense is harmless when existence of element is uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence holding improperly admitted evidence may be harmless if other evidence of guilt is overwhelming and the error is insignificant by comparison