874, 882 (5th Cir.2003). 13 . Celestine v. Petroleos de Venezuella SA, 266 F.3d 343, 357 (5th Cir.2001). 14 . See Odom v. Frank, 3 F.3d 839, 847 (5th Cir.1993). 15 . See Odom, 3 F.3d at 847. 16 . Manning, 332 F.3d at 882. 17 . See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 18 . See Ackel v. Nat’l Comm. Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 385 (5th Cir.2003); see also Mota v. Univ. of Tex. Houston Health Ctr., 261 F.3d 512, 519 (5th Cir.2001). 19 . See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 20 . See Walker v. Thompson, 214 , 414-15 (5th Cir.2003) (recognizing that a six-year lapse between the filing of an EEOC charge and the employee's dismissal did not necessarily mean the plaintiff failed to show causation where the plaintiff presented direct evidence of retaliation); Strouss v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 250 F.3d 336, 344 (6th Cir.2001)
holding that a sixmonth gap between the protected activity and the employees termination was insufficient to infer that the protected activity was a contributing factor holding that a threeyear gap between the protected activity and the adverse employment action was insufficient to support an inference of causation holding that a threeyear gap was insufficient to demonstrate staleness where the criminal activity was ongoing holding that adverse employment activity that occurred 10 months and 17 months after protected activity was insufficient on its own to create a reasonable inference of causation holding that the more than three month gap between the plaintiffs eeoc complaint and the allegedly adverse action was insufficient to show causation