“to block or close up by an obstacle.” Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 816 (1990). Similarly, to “block” something is “to make [it] unsuitable for passage or progress by obstruction.” Id. at 160. According to its plain language, then, the statute prohibits only conduct that physically interferes with a person’s ability to enter or to exit a health care facility in a specified manner. See Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108, 111 S.Ct. 461, 465, 112 L.Ed.2d 449 (1990) (observing that courts must “giv[e] the words used their ordinary meaning” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because the statutory language “clearly and precisely delineates its reach in words of common understanding,” it is not void on its face for vagueness. Cameron, 390 U.S. at 616, 88 S.Ct. at 1338 (<HOLDING>). We also disagree with the determination of
holding that statute prohibiting affray was not impermissibly vague because ordinary people could understand the meaning of affray holding that statute prohibiting conduct that obstruets or unreasonably interfere with free ingress or egress to and from public buildings was not impermissibly vague holding that term unreasonably loud is not impermissibly vague holding an ordinance was unconstitutionally vague for prohibiting conduct entirely dependent upon whether or not a policeman is annoyed holding that plaintiff could not pursue section 521 claim on the basis of allegations that defendants used force to interfere with his right to be free from bodily restraint or harm