of the goods is dispelled by the time any sales are consummated.” Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 382 (7th Cir.1996). For example, in Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1342 (2d Cir.1975), the defendant produced “Grotrian-Steinweg” pianos and the plaintiff produced the world-renowned “Steinway” pianos. The court explained: The issue here is not the possibility that a purchaser would buy a Grotrian-Steinweg thinking it was actually a Steinway or that Grotrian had some connection with Steinway and Sons. The harm to Steinway, rather, is the likelihood that a consumer, hearing the “Grotrian-Steinweg” name and thinking it had some connection with “Steinway”, would consider it on that basis. The “Grotrian 3 (2d Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc.,
recognizing the underlying principles of nominative fair use holding that the nominative fair use factors replace the traditional sleekcraft factors for likelihood of confusion where nominative fair use is at issue recognizing nominative fair use as an affirmative defense to trademark infringement holding that nominative fair use is an affirmative defense to a prima facie case of likelihood of confusion similar to the fair use defense holding that nominative fair use involves questions of fact whose resolution is inappropriate on a motion to dismiss