conduct.” Begay, 553 U.S. at 144-45, 128 S.Ct. 1581 (internal quotation marks omitted); Alderman, 601 F.3d at 952-53. Focusing on this second step of the analysis, Crews argues that a conviction under Oregon Revised Statutes section 163.175(l)(b) does not “involve purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.” Specifically, Crews takes issue with the “purposeful” requirement, arguing that section (l)(b) punishes “knowing” conduct, which is less culpable than “purposeful” conduct. Crews notes that, contrary to the Model Penal Code’s definition, Oregon defines “knowingly” as acting with an awareness of one’s conduct, and does not require an awareness of the result of that conduct. Compare Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(b), with State v. Barnes, 329 Or. 327, 986 P.2d 1160, 1166-67 (1999) (<HOLDING>). In Begay, the Supreme Court addressed whether
holding that begay rejected that circuits earlier approach under which an offense presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another if the offense conduct had the potential for serious physical injury to another holding that an award of restitution is only for the loss caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction holding that the victim and witness protection act limits the amount of restitution to the loss caused by the specific conduct forming the basis of the offense of conviction holding that the government did not have to prove that the defendant knew that his acts violated the clean water act but merely that he was aware of the conduct that resulted in the permits violation holding that to sustain a conviction under subsection 1a of oregons seconddegree assault statute the state needs to prove only that defendant was aware of the assaultive nature of his conduct and that his conduct in fact caused the victim serious physical injury