to admit the statements in their entirety. Based on the same reasoning, he also challenges the trial court’s limitation on his cross-examinations of Agent Battle and Lieutenant Hitch-ins which prevented them from relating to the jury any information regarding the culpability of Weldon unless Weldon’s own confession corroborated it. We reject this argument because the trial court excluded only portions of Howard’s confession that inculpated Weldon and did not exculpate Howard. Due to Bruton considerations, the- trial court directed Agent Battle and Lieutenant Hitehins to omit from their testimony any part of Howard’s confessions that inculpated Weldon, his codefendant. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 133-34 & n. 10, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 1626-27 & n. 10, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) (<HOLDING>). Howard’s complete confessions, with their
recognizing the chance that the jury will credit a nontestifying codefendants incriminating statement and conclude that the statement pointed to the objecting defendant as the offender even though he could not crossexamine the declarant holding that the introduction of a jointly tried nontestifying codefendants statement violates the sixth amendment confrontation clause if the statement contains incriminating evidence concerning a defendant holding that a defendants sixth amendment confrontation clause rights are violated when a court admits into evidence an incriminating statement given by a nontestifying codefendant holding that any confrontation right is found in the fourteenth amendments due process clause not the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment holding that the sixth amendment right of confrontation applies to all three phases of the capital trial and that the admission of  hearsay statements of codefendants in the penalty phase violated the confrontation clause