also reveals that the State challenged the motion, although not on the issue of appellee’s standing to contest the search. Article 44.01(a)(5), V.A.C.C.P., conferred upon the State the right to appeal the granting of the suppression order. The State properly appealed pursuant to Article 44.01(a)(5), V.A.C.C.P., challenging the trial court’s determination that appellee’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated. By raising the issue of standing for the first time on appeal, the State did not raise a new issue. Rather it challenged the trial court’s holding that appellee met her burden of establishing that the government violated her reasonable expectation of privacy. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 149-50, 99 S.Ct. at 433, 58 L.Ed.2d at 405; United States v. Caicedo-Llanos, 960 F.2d at 162 (<HOLDING>). Appellee was on notice that it was her
holding that excessive force claims are to be treated under the fourth amendment recognizing that the application of fourth amendment rights are personal in nature and are invariably intertwined with the concept of standing holding that fourth amendment claims are not cognizable on habeas review because the fourth amendment exclusionary rule does not relate to the accuracy of the factfinding process holding courts are powerless to rule on fourth amendment rights which do not belong to the parties before them and that a defendant cannot convincingly argue surprise in such circumstances because he carries the burden of proving the extent of his fourth amendment rights from the outset holding that the fourth amendment does not mandate payment and therefore such claims are not within the jurisdiction of the court