cases. However, the statute does not so provide, and the legislative record reflects no such intent. The Vaccine Act contains no basis for the majority’s hypothesis that Congress imposed an absolute and irremediable bar to any petition filed beyond the three-year statutory limitations period. Indeed, the Vaccine Act itself extends the period of limitations for cases erroneously filed in the district court instead of under the Vaccine Act; this congressional action to relieve a specific foreseeable problem does not establish congressional intent to prohibit relief for every other tardy fifing. The absence from the Vaccine Act of explicit authorization for equitable tolling is not unusual, and does not defeat the courts’ equitable power. See American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 558, 94 S.Ct. 756 (<HOLDING>). In justifying its decision to bar the
recognizing judicial immunity for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction recognizing judicial power to grant new trial when jury awards of damages are excessive recognizing that court has inherent power to control the judicial business before it recognizing judicial power to toll periods of limitation recognizing inherent power of federal district court to sanction conduct abusive of judicial process