of other affirmative defenses and probable cause in three precedential opinions. Holman, 564 F.3d 225 (3d Cir.2009); Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263 (3d Cir.2007); Radich v. Goode, 886 F.2d 1391 (3d Cir.1989). In Holman, the Third Circuit held that the “necessity” affirmative defense “need not have been considered in the assessment of probable cause for arrest for trespass at the scene.” 564 F.3d at 231. The Circuit held that a ruling to the contrary would require the arresting officer to “examine countless factual permutations to determine the ‘necessity’ of specific conduct at a given moment in time.” Id. at 231. In Sands, the Circuit held that an officer need not consider whether the charges are barred by a statute of limitations when determining whether there is probable .2012) (<HOLDING>). The Gorman court explained that: [CJlaims of
holding that once probable cause was established the officer was not required to investigate whether the person arrested was a victim acting in selfdefense or the aggressor in a domestic violence situation holding that once probable cause is established officer is not required to investigate further holding that a defendant who alleges selfdefense can show through the testimony of another witness that the alleged victim had a propensity for violence thereby inferring that the alleged victim was the aggressor a defendants prior knowledge of the victims reputation for violence is irrelevant because the evidence is offered to show the conduct of the victim rather than the defendants state of mind holding that before a defendant is entitled to introduce evidence of the victims character for violence there must be sufficient evidence to support a finding that the victim was the first aggressor and that once the defendant testified that he was attacked and cut by the victim without provocation before using the victims utility tool to stab the victim the defendant was clearly entitled to question the victim about past acts of violence reflected in court documents from the state of oregon holding that the right to be arrested only on probable cause was clearly established and considering under the third prong whether a reasonable person in the officers position would have thought her actions violated that right