the occupants to vacate the premises, defects in the foreclosure process are not relevant to possession. Glapion, 2014 WL 2158161, at *2; Williams v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 315 S.W.3d 925, 927 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.). Of course, the displaced party can still dispute the purchaser’s title, but it must bring a separate suit to do so. Maxwell, 2013 WL 3580621, at *3. Appellees argue they are not subject to the tenant-at-sufferance clause because they are not parties to the deed of trust. However, we have held that a deed of trust’s tenant-at-sufferance clause binds subsequent occupants whose interests are junior to the deed of trust. Id. at *4; see also U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Farhi, No. 05-07-01539-CV, 2009 WL 2414484, at *3-4 (Tex.App.-Dallas Aug. 7, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (<HOLDING>). Appellees argue that Maxwell was wrongly
holding that where a purchaser of realty from the united states under a contract for deed giving the purchaser a contractual interest in and equitable title had taken possession of the realty and was using it as a commercial enterprise the purchasers interest was subject to taxation holding that while nondebtor purchase money deed of trust can be described as part of the same transaction by which the buyer acquired debtors real property that does not elevate the deed of trust to status of something under a plan confirmed holding intervening purchaser of property was subject to tenantatsufferance clause in deed of trust holding that when note and deed of trust were null and void and of no legal effect because of forgery assignee of note and deed of trust nevertheless had equitable lien upon property for value of construction work for which note and deed of trust were given holding that a beneficiary under a deed of trust was entitled to reformation of the grantors deed