Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867-68, 114 S.Ct. 1992, 128 L.Ed.2d 842 (1994). The collateral order doctrine, however, “entitles a party to appeal not only from [ordinary final judgments] ... but also from a narrow class of decisions that do not terminate the litigation, but must, in the interest of achieving a healthy legal system, ... nonetheless be treated as final.” Digital Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 867, 114 S.Ct. 1992 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). We have held that denials of special motions to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute fall into this narrow class. Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1024-26 (9th Cir.2003) (noting that anti-SLAPP motions to strike assert a form of immunity from suit); but cf. Englert v. MacDonell, 551 F.3d 1099, 1106-07 (9th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Thus, we are satisfied that we have
holding that the denial of a motion to disqualify counsel in a civil case is not appealable holding that the denial of a motion to remand is interlocutory and not immediately appealable holding such denial to be an immediately appealable collateral final order holding that the denial of an antislapp motion under thencurrent oregon law is not an appealable collateral order while recognizing that the denial of a california antislapp motion is holding that denial of a postconviction motion without prejudice and with leave to amend is not a final appealable order