I would hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined under section 21.560(b) that Lapiner was an affected shareholder entitled to notice of a right to object to the proposed settlement, and thus Lapiner had standing to object to the settlement. Other courts agree that shareholders who receive notice of a proposed settlement may object regardless of whether they could institute or maintain the action themselves. Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721, 724 (6th Cir.1942) (treating an objector responding to a trial court’s notice of proposed settlement like “a defendant who is summoned by process into court and after an adverse ruling has the right to appeal,” and holding dismissal of objector’s intervention was “not decisive”); see also Kaplan, 192 F.3d at 66 (<HOLDING>); Rosenbaum v. MacAllister, 64 F.3d 1439, 1443
holding appellant waived her complaint that trial court gave her no notice of summaryjudgment hearing by not raising the objection in the trial court holding that appellant had waived any objection to an instruction that he had himself introduced and which was amended by the state without objection from appellant holding that the point on appeal and the objection in the trial court must be the same in order for it to be preserved for appeal holding that appellant who properly filed an objection in accordance with the notice he received from the trial court had standing to appeal holding that states failure to afford defendant proper notice in accordance with procedural due process in a probation revocation could not be raised on appeal absent an objection in the trial court