suggested that an honorable discharge could be stigmatizing if prospective employers had some reason to know of the reasons for the honorable discharge. See Beller, 632 F.2d at 807 (rejecting claim that an honorable discharge resulted in stigma because there was “no evidence indicating that the plaintiffs’ service records [we]re likely to impose stigma upon them or make it more difficult for them to seek post-discharge employment”). However, the record does not reflect what will appear on her discharge certificate and, thus, whether any stigma will occur. Accordingly, the pro cedural due process claim is not ripe for adjudication on this record because the injury that Major Witt asserts may or may not occur. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708-10, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976) (<HOLDING>). We hesitate to dismiss the claim at this
holding that defamation by a state official alone does not violate a liberty interest of a plaintiff absent the alteration or extinguishment of a right or status previously recognized by state law holding that im proper means may be wrongful by reason of a statute or other regulation or a recognized rule of common law or perhaps an established standard of a trade or profession holding that defamation standing alone is not sufficient to establish a claim for deprivation of a liberty interest citations omitted holding that a defamation claim is a personal injury tort claim holding that defamation standing alone does not suffice for a stigmaplus claim there must be a right or status previously recognized by state law that was distinctly altered or extinguished