of a debt collector carved out by Section 1692a(6)(F)(ii) of the statute. As a result, the Court will not reach the additional bases for the Defendants’ argument pertaining to dismissal of the FDCPA claim. Section 1692a(6)(F)(iii) exempts from the definition of “debt collector” any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another to the extent such activity ... concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii). Thus, the FDCPA is inapplicable to “collection efforts by those who obtained the right to payment on the debt before the debt was in default.” Franceschi, 22 F.Supp.2d at 253; See also Healy v. Jzanus Ltd., No. 02 CV 1061, 2006 VJL 898067, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2006) (<HOLDING>). In this case, Plaintiffs do not allege the
holding that fdcpa applies to attorneys who regularly engage in consumer debt collection activities holding that an entity engaged in collection activity on a defaulted debt acquired from another is a debt collector under the fdcpa even though it may actually be owed the debt holding that where the defendant obtained a nondefaulted debt under the mistaken belief that the debt was in default and where the defendants subsequent collection activities were based on that mistaken belief the defendant was a debt collector for purposes of the fdcpa holding that the fdcpa did not apply to a collection agency retained by a hospital seeking medicaid reimbursement because the underlying debt was not in default even though the agency identified itself as a debtcollector holding that reporting a consumers debt to a creditreporting agency constitutes collection of the debt under  1692gb