rather than the probate division of the common pleas court, R.C. 2311.04, rather than 2101.31, would have governed the proceedings at trial and would have mandated that the factual issues be tried to a jury. We are not persuaded, however, that R.C. 2311.04 would have conferred upon appellants a right to a jury trial on the factual issues presented in the complaint and in their counterclaims. As we noted above, R.C. 2721.10 and 2311.04 mandate a jury trial of factual issues arising in a declaratory judgment action instituted in the general division of the common pleas court if the action is construed to be “for the recovery of money only, or specific real or personal property.” The right to a jury trial thereby (1983), 12 Ohio App.3d 113, 114, 12 OBR 420, 421, 467 N.E.2d 564, 566 (<HOLDING>). In its complaint, FNB sought declaratory
holding that a cross claim or counterclaim for affirmative relief must be filed before the statute of limitations expires because a claim is not stripped of its character as an independent action by acquiring the label counterclaim holding that the due process clause confers a right to direct a childs education holding that a jury trial was not required when the money demand although specific was incidental and ancillary to the equitable relief requested and would ripen only if equitable relief were granted holding that rc 231104 confers a right to a jury trial on a legal counterclaim that if true would extinguish the original equitable claim but confers no right on a legal counterclaim that is incidental or ancillary to the original claim holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in considering merits of state law counterclaim that formed part of the same case as federal counterclaim even though court had dismissed federal counterclaim quoting 28 usc  1367a