not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial”). 14 . Argus Mgmt. Group v. GAB Robins, Inc. (In re CVEO Corp.), 327 B.R. 210, 214 (Bankr.D.Del.2005) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505). 15 . Id. at 210 (citing Horowitz v. Federal Kemper Life Assurance Co., 57 F.3d 300, 301 (3d Cir.1995)). 16 . UPMC Health Sys. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 391 F.3d 497, 502 (3d Cir.2004) (citing Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 435 n. 2 (3d Cir.2003)). See also Interim Investors Comm. v. Jacoby, 90 B.R. 777, 780 (W.D.N.C.1988), aff'd, 914 F.2d 1491, 1990 WL 136663 (4th Cir.1990); In re Holzinge nsulting, LLC (In re Radnor Holdings Corp.), Case No. 06-10894, 2009 WL 2004226, *6, 2009 Bankr.LEXIS 1815, at *15 (Bankr.D.Del. July 9, 2009) (<HOLDING>); Hunter v. Amerisource Corp. (In re Parkview
holding that a five day discrepancy between average days outstanding during the prepreference period versus during the preference period did not make the payments out of the ordinary course of business holding that a difference between approximately 54 days prepreference average days to payment and approximately 67 days preference average days to payment did not make the payments out of the ordinary course of business holding that the average number of days to payment nearly doubled between the historical period and the preference period which based on the facts of that particular case made the payments outside the ordinary course of dealings between the plaintiff and defendant holding that a difference between 384 days prepreference average number of days to payment and 547 days preference average number of days to payment did not make the payments out of the ordinary course of business holding that payments made 25 days after the average were within the ordinary course of dealings but payments made 50 days after the average were not