the bathroom unattended, but also by the fact that the teacher’s aide, Diana Rogers, immediately apprehended the assailant during the second assault upon James. Liability under the Due Process Clause may not be based on negligent action by Moore. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 1718, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“liability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process”); Collins, 503 U.S. at 128, 112 S.Ct. 1061 (a substantive due process violation must be more than an ordinary tort to be actionable under § 1983); DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 202, 109 S.Ct. 998 (the Due Process Clause “does not transform every tort committed by a state actor into a constitutional violation”). See also Uhlrig, 64 F.3d at 573-574 (<HOLDING>). Thus, since the amended complaint does not
recognizing such a claim under  1983 holding that plaintiff must allege conduct so arbitrary and unreasonable that it shocks the conscience in order to state substantive due process claim in context of social workers alleged interference with parents custody rights recognizing  1983 substantive due process claim recognizing that not all criminal assaults will constitute violations of a constitutional right but that the right to be free from intrusions into bodily security that shock the conscience is unmistakably established in our constitutional decisions as an attribute of the ordered liberty that is the concern of substantive due process recognizing that the shock the conscience standard requiring high level of outrageousness is employed so that substantive due process claim under  1983 does not replace state tort law