in state court. Therefore, Cu-rhan’s reliance on that decision at the time of Goldman’s direct appeal was reasonable. Similarly, prior to Goldman’s filing of his first § 2255 motion in 1995, the Supreme Court’s 1994 decision in Custis made clear that the appropriate place and time to challenge the use of his 1977 conviction as a federal sentencing enhancement was in a motion to reopen Goldman’s federal sentence after he successfully challenged his 1977 conviction in state court. Custis, 511 U.S. at 497, 114 S.Ct. 1732. At the time he filed his first § 2255 motion in 1995, he had not yet successfully challenged his 1977 conviction in state court and, therefore, a “fact” necessary to his § 2255 motion was “reasonably unavailable.” See Johnson, 544 U.S. at 304-07, 125 S.Ct. 1571 (<HOLDING>). Goldman had no incentive to include his
holding that absent exceptional circumstances mootness by reason of a postjudgment settlement does not justify vacatur of a judgment under review holding that the appropriate remedy on vacatur is to remand the case for further arbitration proceedings consistent with the cba holding premagwood that where a first  2255 motion was granted so movant could file a direct appeal the second  2255 motion was not a successive motion under aedpa holding that the application of revised  2255 which would have barred the petitioner who had filed his first  2255 motion prior to aedpas enactment from filing a second  2255 motion would have had retroactive effect because the petitioner might well have waited to file that initial motion had he foreseen aedpas revision of  2255 holding that vacatur of predicate conviction was fact necessary for filing  2255 motion based on such vacatur