what sort of conduct “offend[s] the most fundamental moral values of society” a comparative approach must be used: namely, we must “compare a crime’s depravity with that of crimes we have previously determined to be base, vile and depraved — crimes such as murder, rape, and incest.” Id. at 1074-75. It likewise noted that assault with a deadly weapon was not a crime involving moral turpitude. Id. at 1074. Throughout the en banc panel’s effort to delimit the boundaries of crimes involving moral turpitude, the majority and the concurrence stated three times that the offense of assault with a deadly weapon is not a crime involving moral turpitude. See, e.g., id. at 1072 (“No court has ever found possession of a weapon to be a crime involving moral turpitude. Cf. Carr, 86 F.3d at 950-51 (<HOLDING>)”); id. at 1073 (“We have held that neither
holding that robbery under california law categorically qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude and noting precedent in this and other circuits that theft crimes are crimes involving moral turpitude holding that an intentional battery that involves the use of a deadly weapon constitutes a crime of moral turpitude holding that new yorks reckless conduct statute establishes a crime involving moral turpitude holding that assault with a deadly weapon was not a crime involving moral turpitude holding that missouris reckless conduct statute establishes a crime involving moral turpitude