under an abuse-of-discretion standard, while legal issues are reviewed de novo. Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W.3d 643, 648 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). Because the court denied Whitfield’s speedy trial motion, we presume all disputed fact issues were resolved in the State’s favor and defer to any of these implied findings that are supported by the record. Id. Length of the delay The length of the delay is considered a “triggering mechanism,” because absent a presumptively prejudicial delay the other Barker factors need not be considered. Delays of eight months or longer are usually considered presumptively unreasonable. Kelly v. State, 122 S.W.3d 227, 237 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.); see also Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652,112 S.Ct. 2686, 2691,120 L.Ed.2d 520, 528 (1992) (<HOLDING>). “[T]he delay that can be tolerated for an
holding a three and onehalf year delay was unreasonable holding that a five month delay is unreasonable holding that a twoyear postindictment delay presumptively prejudicial holding that a five month delay was unreasonable holding a delay approaching one year is presumptively unreasonable