had temporarily disabled the sprinkler system while it was under repair. Little, 301 Mass. at 158-59, 16 N.E.2d 688. The court held that because there was no evidence to suggest that the fire started as a result of landlord’s act or omission, the plaintiff was required to prove that defendant was aware of the fire to hold it liable for the spread. Id. at 160, 16 N.E.2d 688. The court, however, made no mention of whether or not expert testimony was required to demonstrate that the lack of sprinklers caused the fire to spread. Unlike Little, there was evidence here that defendant was aware both of this specific fire before it spread to the building and of the increased risk o ass. 297, 302, 151 N.E. 320 (1926)); see also Commonwealth v. Levesque, 436 Mass. 443, 454, 766 N.E.2d 50 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the initial cause of the fire
holding that even without  expert testimony the grand jurors common knowledge of the nature of fire would have allowed them to conclude that a fire spreads and becomes more dangerous the longer it is left unattended holding that jurors do not need expert testimony on matters of common knowledge holding that the relationship between fire insurance regulation and rating fire loss fire prevention and fire investigation is rational and reasonable holding that petition failed to allege fire hydrants were physically defective where fire hydrants did not work and plaintiffs decedent was killed in fire holding that the fact that the fire was communicated to other property may reasonably be inferred from common knowledge of the operation of the established laws of nature in the familiar forms of combustion  and the effects of wind on fire 