instructed the jury in a way that was unconstitutionally vague itself. Although the instruction given in Pur-sell’s case differs slightly from the one given in Maynard, these differences do not cure the vagueness problem at issue. First, the trial court added the phrase “manifesting exceptional depravity” to the clearly unconstitutional phrase “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.” While this addition was meant to limit the “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” phrase, it actually exacerbated the constitutional problem. For one, the United States Supreme Court has held that the use of the word “depravity,” even when accompanied by the words “especially heinous [or] cruel,” is unconstitutionally vague. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 654, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 47, 113 S.Ct.
holding that heinous atrocious or cruel is unconstitutionally vague language holding unconstitutionally vague under the reasoning of godfrey an aggravatingcircumstances instruction directing jurors to determine whether the murder was especially heinous atrocious and cruel holding factor b is not unconstitutionally vague holding that oklahomas especially heinous atrocious or cruel aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally vague holding that there is no serious argument that the especially heinous cruel or depraved aggravating factor is not facially vague