F.3d 1348, 1353 (11th Cir.2012). Thus, Plasencia’s claim is not proeedurally barred because the state court did not “clearly and expressly [state] that its judgment rests on a procedural bar.” See Johnson, 938 F.2d at 1173. Furthermore, Plasencia exhausted his state court remedies because he presented his claim to the state’s highest court in his motion for rehearing on direct appeal, and in his Rule 3.850 motion, which was affirmed per curiam by the Second District Court of Appeal. See Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1156 (11th Cir.2010) (stating to exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must have presented the issues raised in the federal habeas petition to the state’s highest court,' either on direct appeal or collateral review); see also Jenkins v. State, 385 So.2d 1356, 1359 (Fla.1980) (<HOLDING>). II. BLAKELY ERROR Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d),
holding that statute could not grant jurisdiction to dis trict courts of appeal over nonfinal arbitration order because the florida constitution reserved to the florida supreme court the power to define the interlocutory jurisdiction of district courts holding new york could lawfully modify a florida custody decree because florida court had right under florida law to change the decree holding a per curiam affirmance from a florida district court of appeal is not renewable by the florida supreme court holding that where florida state court had not addressed choiceoflaw issues with regard to directors liability federal court could presume that florida court would follow the restatement second of conflict of laws based on the florida courts past reliance on the treatise holding that district court opinion which cites controlling authority that is pending review in florida supreme court allows supreme court to exercise jurisdiction