in the underlying felony and demonstrates a reckless indifference to human life. 481 U.S. at 157-58, 107 S.Ct. 1676. If the death penalty is not disproportionate for this type of defendant, it follows inexorably that the death penalty is not disproportionate for Sampson — a defendant who (the jury found) intentionally murdered his victims. In all events, neither Tison nor En-mund was concerned with the evaluation of a specific aggravating factor. The im~ plausibility of Sampson’s attempted application of these cases to an aggravating factor is underscored by the fact that the Supreme Court implicitly has approved the use of other aggravating factors not directly related to a capital defendant’s mental state at the time of the crime. See, e.g., Zant, 462 U.S. at 879, 103 S.Ct. 2733 (<HOLDING>). We therefore reject Sampson’s claim that the
holding that consideration of hypothetical aggravating factors and criminal history is inappropriate when determining whether prior offense constitutes felony holding that escape from secure custody is a violent felony holding that felony conviction for which imposition of sentence was stayed could be counted as prior felony conviction under sentencing guidelines recognizing the validity of aggravating factors such as escape from confinement and prior felony conviction holding that a prior nonarizona conviction to be used as a prior felony conviction under the statute must both be for an offense that would constitute a felony in arizona and be classified as a felony in the other jurisdiction