Norton. AffiRmed in part and Reversed in part 1 . The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 and 1985. The plaintiffs did not appeal these dismissals; therefore, these claims are not before this court. 2 . Ms. Gleason and Mr. Belcher have since married, and Ms. Gleason has taken her husband’s last name. Because the briefs refer to Ms. Gleason by her maiden name, we also shall refer to her in the same manner throughout this opinion. 3 . We believe the record establishes that, even if some of Deputy Marshal Norton's remarks were directed principally toward Mr. Belcher, Ms. Gleason reasonably could have understood that her freedom of movement also was restricted. See Brendlin v. California, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 2407-08, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, since the van was titled in her name,
holding that a passenger has standing to challenge a stops constitutionality because the passenger is seized from the moment a car is stopped holding an officer may order a passenger to get out of a car during a traffic stop and may frisk a passenger for weapons if the officer reasonably suspects the passenger is armed and dangerous holding that a vehicles passenger had been seized and was entitled to challenge the traffic stop holding that police officers may stop vehicles when they observe minor traffic violations holding that an officer may order a passenger out of a vehicle during a stop for a traffic infraction