9 . We recognize that the Supreme Court made these statements in the context of discussing the direct advancement prong of Central Hudson, not the final "reasonable fit” prong. As we noted earlier, we think the government’s consumer fraud justification satisfies the direct advancement prong. We rely on Ibanez and Edenfield here because we see no reason why the government’s evidentiary burden at the final step of Central Hudson should be any less than at the direct advancement step. 10 .Similarly, we see no problem with the FDA imposing an outright ban on a claim where evidence in support of the claim is qualitatively weaker than evidence against the claim — for example, where the claim rests on only one or two old studies. 11 . Compare Nutritional Health Alliance, 144 F.3d at 227-28 (<HOLDING>) with Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 571 n. 13,
holding that prior restraint analysis applies to commercial speech but that the general health claim regulation 21 cfr  10114 was sufficiently welldefined to survive prior restraint analysis holding that a plaintiff lacked standing to challenge an ordinance imposing higher permit fees on commercial events as a prior restraint because the city had not yet characterized the plaintiffs events as commercial holding that a state may not exercise a prior restraint on publishing a newspaper holding that a regulation was not a prior restraint because it did not authorize suppression of speech in advance of its expression holding that strict scrutiny applies to a prior restraint enforcing a contentbased restriction on speech in a traditional public forum