those offenses, but not on any greater offense. See Stone, 188 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d at 822. However, where the record is not clear as to whether the jury was deadlocked over acquittal, a greater offense, or a lesser-included offense at the time of discharge, the court must presume that it was the least serious lesser-included offense. See Tate, T183 A2d at 825-26; Castrillo, 566 P.2d at 1151-52. Thus, the retrial of the greater offenses would be barred by double jeopardy. Here, the record does not reveal the specific charges on which the jury was deadlocked. Based on Richardson's specific objection to retrial on first- and second-degree murder only, I would hold that double jeopardy bars retrial on those two offenses. See People v. Ortiz, 196 Colo. 438, 439, 586 P.2d 227, 228 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, I would make the rule to show
holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted holding that if defendant moved for or consented to mistrial retrial of defendant was not barred on double jeopardy grounds holding defendant implicitly consented to trial courts declaration of a mistrial holding that a prosecution for the same offense was barred by double jeopardy where a mistrial was declared without manifest necessity holding that a sua sponte dismissal of the charges during trial was not an acquittal that barred retrial based on double jeopardy