In Burford, we recognized that identification of the precise dictates of due process requires consideration of both the governmental interests involved and the private interests affected by the official action. 845 S.W.2d at 207 (citing Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 389, 95 S.Ct. 533, 42 L.Ed.2d 521 (1975)). We held that the petitioner’s interest in attacking his conviction and sentencing on constitutional grounds was greater than the state’s interest in preventing litigation of stale or fraudulent claims where the petitioner was forced to wait to bring his post-conviction claim until underlying convictions were declared invalid, at which time the three-year statute of limitations for bringing post-conviction claims had already run. Id. at 209. See also Van Tran, 66 S.W.3d at 812 (<HOLDING>); Williams v. State, 44 S.W.3d 464 (Tenn.2001)
recognizing fundamental fairness requires criminal defendants be granted a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense holding plaintiff must prove that he or she was deprived of  an opportunity  granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case holding that constitution requires  an opportunity  granted at a meaningful time and a meaningful manner  for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case holding that fundamental fairness demands at least an opportunity to present rebuttal to surprise evidence holding that considerations of fundamental fairness required that the petitioner have a meaningful opportunity to raise his substantive constitutional claim despite being contrary to the technical mandates of the postconviction procedure act and supreme court rule 28 governing waiver of issues