the totality of the circumstances, I would hold that there was no reasonable, articulable suspicion to frisk Johnson. Although the totality of the circumstances may have been puzzling or ambiguous — in fact they may have caused Officer Harvey to suspect that something was amiss — such “inchoate suspicion” is not sufficient to warrant a frisk. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868; see also Singleton v. United States, 998 A.2d 295, 300-01 (D.C.2010) (“[T]o be articulable, there must be specific evidence — not merely conclusions — that led the officer to suspect criminal activity in a particular circumstance.”). The totality of the circum stances failed to indicate why a reasonable officer would suspect that Johnson was armed and dangerous. See In re R.M.C., 719 A.2d 491, 496 (D.C.1998) (<HOLDING>); Anderson v. United States, 658 A.2d 1036,
holding there was no reasonable suspicion which would justify an investigatory stop despite report of a domestic disturbance holding that because a violation of a statute had no practical effect there was no concrete injury holding that no fiduciary duty existed between the plaintiff and defendant because there was no evidence that the parties agreed that defendant would be acting primarily for the benefit of the plaintiffs holding that there was no reasonable articulable suspicion for a frisk despite suspects walking unnaturally clutching his rib cage and acting nervously because there was no evidence to indicate a weapon and no report of criminal activity outside of a curfew violation holding that there is no constitutional right to appeal a criminal conviction