530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). This contention is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Arellano-Rivera, 244 F.3d 1119, 1127 (9th Cir.2001) (concluding, on de novo review, that Apprendi did not limit application of Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998) to cases where defendant admits prior conviction on the record). Barajas-Hernandez next contends that the district court erred in imposing a 16-level enhancement to his sentence, because his 1988 conviction for aggravated assault was not considered an aggravated felony for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) at the time of its commission. This contention is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Maria-Gonzalez, 268 F.3d 664, 669 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Mendoza-Iribe, 198 F.3d 742,
holding that  212c applies to all applications for relief filed after november 29 1990 regardless of when conviction occurred for offenses within the original definition of aggravated felony recognizing that 1996 amendment specifically applies regardless of date of prior conviction constituting aggravated felony recognizing that 1996 amendment to definition of aggravated felony applies retroactively holding that the expanded definition of aggravated felony applies retroactively in actions taken on or after september 30 1996 holding that an ij or bia decision that occurs after september 30 1996 is an action taken that triggers iiriras aggravated felony rules