“an ordinary and knowledgeable person will know what he is contracting away.” Id. (quoting Gayon v. Bally’s Total Fitness Corp., 802 So.2d 420 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)); see also Raveson v. Walt Disney World Co., 793 So.2d 1171 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). A phrase in a contract is ambiguous when it is of uncertain meaning and may be fairly understood in more than one way. Tatman, 27 So.3d at 110 (citing Nagel v. Cronebaugh, 782 So.2d 436, 439 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)). The exculpatory clause at issue here did not expressly inform Ereck that he would be contracting away his right to sue UCFAA for its own negligence. This, alone, would be enough to render the clause unenforceable in any District in Florida other than ours. See Give Kids the World, Inc. v. Sanislo, 98 So.3d 759, 759 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) (<HOLDING>), rev. granted, Sanislo v. Give Kids the World,
holding that ordinary negligence and gross negligence are not separate causes of action holding that indemnification provision did not expressly state the party was seeking indemnity for its own negligence so as to satisfy express negligence test holding that negligence does not violate the due process clause but reserving the question whether gross negligence does holding that an exculpatory clause need not have an express reference to negligence in order to render it effective as to negligence actions and certifying conflict with the first second third and fourth district courts of appeal as to this issue holding that an effective notice of appeal must be filed for this court to have jurisdiction to hear the case