issue with the analogy drawn between the district court’s order in this case and the granting of a motion for new trial. 307 S.W.3d at 271 (“The Company argues that the district court’s order should not be appealable because it was like granting a motion for new trial in a case, which is not appealable. But the analogy does not fit.”). Whether the Court can find a more fitting analogy is beside the point: both precedent and the statute itself direct us to treat much of the process as we would a civil trial, and “an order vacating an arbitration award and directing a rehearing is the functional equivalent of an order granting a new trial.” Stolhandske, 14 S.W.3d at 814; see also Bison Bldg. Materials, Ltd. v. Aldridge, 263 S.W.3d 69, 75 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. granted) (<HOLDING>); Thrivent, 251 S.W.3d at 623 (same); Me. Dep’t
holding order granting motion to withdraw plea to be the functional equivalent of an order granting a new trial because like a postverdict mistrial it returns case to posture it had been before trial holding that an order remanding an arbitration award is not a final appealable order when the order does not also vacate the arbitration award holding that an order vacating an arbitration award and directing a rehearing is the functional equivalent of an order granting a new trial holding that order to vacate award and order new arbitration is the functional equivalent of an order granting a new trial  and therefore not subject to direct appellate review quoting stothandske 14 sw3d at 814 holding that order vacating award and ordering rehearing is analogous to order granting new trial