co-worker engaged in repeat harassing behavior after LMC responded to his complaints. Thus, because the harassment by individual co-workers did not persist, LMC’s response was presumptively effective. Cf. Adler, 144 F.3d at 676 (noting that, when the harassment by the employee persists, the court examines “the timeliness of the plaintiffs complaint, whether the employer unduly delayed, and whether the response was proportional to the seriousness and frequency of the harassment”). Dr. Chawla’s criticisms of LMC’s response fail to rebut this presumption. Docket No. 41 at 20. First, Dr. Chawla fails to identify any evidence to suggest that his coworkers were somehow motivated to engage in harassing behavior based on the alleged inadequacy of LMC’s response. See Adler, 144 F.3d at 678 (<HOLDING>). Second, Dr. Chawla claims that LMC failed to
holding that the plaintiff must establish that a supervisors harassment was within the scope of his employment and that the employer failed to respond adequately and effectively when it learned of the harassment holding that school districts are hable for peer sexual harassment in their schools under title ix only if they have actual knowledge of the harassment and act with deliberate indifference in response to it holding that the allegations of plaintiffs coemployees of sexual harassment by manager were irrelevant to plaintiffs hostile work environment claim absent evidence that plaintiff was contemporaneously aware of the alleged harassment holding that unless plaintiff establishes a nexus between a prior response and later harassment by others the later harassment is irrelevant to the adequacy of the prior response holding that a defendants notice of prior harassment against victims other than the plaintiff can give rise to title ix liability so long as the defendant possessed enough knowledge of the harassment that it could reasonably have responded with remedial measures to address the kind of harassment upon which the plaintiffs legal claim is based