for consumption to a person enrolled in the delayed entry program. The military judge’s exceptions and substitutions did not substantially change the nature of the offense. The primary difference between the charged offense and the offense of which the military judge found Appellant guilty went to the acts taken in furtherance of that conspiracy — specifically, in the location of the consumption of the alcohol that was provided and the exact manner by which it was provided. This Court has held that “minor variances, such as the location of the offense or the date upon which an offense is allegedly committed, do not necessarily change the nature of the offense and in turn are not necessarily fatal.” Teffeau, 58 M.J. at 66. Compare United States v. Wray, 17 M.J. 375, 376 (C.M.A.1984) (<HOLDING>). In light of the ongoing socializing on the
holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act recognizing that questions of changed conditions and the amount of child support must be resolved on the particular facts of each case holding that changing the date and amount of the larceny under the circumstances of that case changed the identity of the offense holding that an alien failed to qualify for the changed circumstances exception by asserting only that his personal circumstances had changed by the birth of a child holding that where the date of the offense is not an element of the charge  a variance between the indictment date and the proof at trial is not fatal so long as the acts charged were committed within the statute of limitations period and prior to the return date of the indictment