a union meeting to determine whether Plaintiff would remain in his role as staff representative and chief negotiator. See id. ¶ 125. Acknowledging the power of persuasion, as Fritz does, makes eminent sense; a person of ordinary firmness would likely be deterred from participating in protected activity by the prospect of an influential public official endangering his or her economic livelihood, irrespective of whether a third party was necessary to, or even did,' pull the proverbial trigger. See Fritz, 592 F.3d at 726 (“A person of ordinary firmness would be deterred from engaging in protected conduct, if as a result, a public official encouraged her employer to terminate the person’s contract or to have her change her behavior.”); Harris v. Bornhorst, 513 F.3d 503, 519 (6th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Paige v. Coyner, 614 F.3d 273, 281 (6th
holding that plaintiffs complaint against tribal officials was barred under doctrine of sovereign immunity because the officials votes individually had no legal effect and it was the official action of the band following the officials votes that caused plaintiffs injuries holding that for purposes of a title vii retaliation claim an action is cognizable as an adverse employment action if it is reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in protected activity holding that public officials comments to plaintiffs prospective employer regarding the officials own opinion as to whether plaintiff was guilty of a crime for which plaintiffs conviction had been reversed would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from protected activity holding that summary judgment for defendant officials on the basis of qualified immunity was improper given officials indefinite refusal to treat plaintiffs cavity holding that alleged misconduct by public officials particularly by law enforcement officials is matter of public concern