Forest River, Inc. v. Heartland Rec. Vehicles, LLC, 753 F.Supp.2d 753, 766 (N.D.Ind. 2010) (evaluating the fair use defense in connection with a motion to dismiss, but denying the motion on substantive grounds); Karll v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 39 F.Supp. 836, 837-38 (E.D.Wis.1941) (granting motion to dismiss infringement claim because of fair use defense); Shell v. De Vries, 07-1086, 2007 WL 4269047, at *1-2, 2007 U.S.App. LEXIS 28317, at *4 (10th Cir.Colo. Dec. 6, 2007) (same); Burnett v. Twentieth Century Fox, 491 F. Supp 2d 962, 971-72 (C.D.Cal.2007) (same); Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Svcs. v. Delsman, No. 09-1468, 2009 WL 2157573, at 7*, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61825, at *20 (N.D.Cal. July 16, 2009) (same); see generally Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). The court proceeds to the substance of the
holding that the application of the fair use doctrine at the pleading stage is appropriate holding that plaintiffs need not reveal confidential sources at the pleading stage recognizing that the artful pleading doctrine in practice is subsumed by the complete preemption doctrine holding that the filing of a motion for a new trial is a critical stage of the prosecution and that an indigent defendant is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel at that stage holding that fair use is an affirmative defense