maritime scenario presented by this appeal, one which should be properly guided solely by the uniquely federal admiralty laws, practices and traditions. See U.S. Const, art. III, § 2 (specifically extending federal judicial power to “all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction”); Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(h), 14(c), 38(e), & 82 (applying a distinct set of rules for admiralty eases); see generally Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 3-2 (3d ed.2001) (explaining the uniqueness of admiralty law). I. Discretionary immunity only applies if the actor had actual authority Discretionary immunity protects government decisions from tort liability only when the decision-maker is acting within the scope of his actual authority. See, e.g., Hatahley, 351 U.S. at 180-81, 76 S.Ct. 745 (<HOLDING>); K.W. Thompson Tool Co. v. United States, 836
holding that the discretionary function does not apply where the decisionmaker lacks authority holding that the discretionary function exception may apply in the absence of a conscious decision  holding federal tort claims act discretionary function exception does not apply if prison personnel violate a mandatory regulation holding that discretionary function can derive only from properly delegated authority recognizing a discretionary function exception to that waiver