case violates the Due Process Clause was certainly an open question before Cage.” Adams, 41 F. 3d, at 178; see also Gaines, supra, at 606-607 (noting that Cage led to reversals of numerous convictions that had been based on similar reasonable-doubt instruction); State v. Humphrey, 544 So. 2d 1188, 1192 (La. App.) (citing multiple decisions by Louisiana Supreme Court which had upheld reasonable-doubt instructions like that invalidated in Cage), cert. denied, 550 So. 2d 627 (1989). And our holding that such a misdescription of the burden of proof means that “there has been no jury verdi olding that application of double jeopardy bar to successive noncapital sentencing would not be unfair and would enhance rather than hinder accuracy); Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U. S. 227, 242-244 (1990) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Teague, supra, at 314 (plurality
recognizing the availability of summary judgment based on absolute prosecutorial immunity holding that the rule in caldwell v mississippi 472 u s 320 1985 did not fit within the second teague exception even though it added to an existing guarantee of due process protection against fundamental unfairness holding that absolute prosecutorial immunity extends to civil forfeiture proceedings recognizing fundamental error as an exception to the general rule of preservation holding that rule which provided an additional measure of protection to existing prohibition on prosecutorial remarks that render a proceeding fundamentally unfair was not an absolute prerequisite to fundamental fairness  that would fall within the second teague exception