in an opinion subsequent to Griffith, supra, the Supreme Court stated: We have already endorsed Justice Harlan’s retroactivity analysis for cases pending on direct appeal, see Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. [314], 107 S.Ct. 708, 713 [93 L.Ed.2d 649] (1987); United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 [102 S.Ct. 2579, 73 L.Ed.2d 202] (1982), and we have noted, as Justice Harlan did, [Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 682-87, 91 S.Ct. 1160, 1174-77, 28 L.Ed.2d 404 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)]; Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 260 [89 S.Ct. 1030, 1039, 22 L.Ed.2d 248] (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting), the important distinction between direct review and collateral review. Compare Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 106 S.Ct. 2878 [92 L.Ed.2d 199] (1986) (<HOLDING>), with Griffith, supra, 479 U.S. at [323], 107
holding that a postconviction petitioner has 60 days from the date of publication of 1997 philadelphia magazine article to raise claims based thereon under batson v kentucky 476 us 79 106 sct 1712 90 led2d 69 1986 holding that the district courts observation that a challenge for cause might have been justified as to this juror was more than sufficient under batson which emphasized that the prosecutors explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause quoting batson 476 us at 97 106 sct 1712 holding that batson v kentucky does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review holding that batson v kentucky 476 us 79 106 sct 1712 90 led2d 69 1986 does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review holding that batson does apply retroactively to cases pending on direct review