that the financing deal would not go through if Mates was not terminated, see First Am.Compl. ¶ 27. The Court does not believe that any of these allegations, viewed individually or collectively, are sufficient to make out a cognizable claim for tortious interference. They simply do not rise to the level of conduct that is independently wrongful or unlawful, nor do they constitute “violence or intimidation, defamation, injurious falsehood or other fraud, violations of criminal law, and the institution or threat of groundless civil suits or criminal prosecutions in bad faith.” Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. B. Dixon Evander Assocs., Inc., 336 Md. at 657, 650 A.2d at 260; see also Volcjak v. Washington County Hosp. Ass’n, 124 Md.App. 481, 512, 723 A.2d 463, 479 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.1999) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the absence of such conduct is fatal to
holding improper conduct to be an element of the tort of intentional interference with an advantageous business relationship recognizing that an otherwise tortious act of interference with a business relationship will not subject the putative tortfeasor to liability if its act is privileged holding that the plaintiff stated a claim for tortious interference holding that under colorado law tjortious interference with a prospective business relation requires a showing of intentional and improper interference preventing formation of a contract holding that tortious or deliberate intent to harm a plaintiffs business relationship is not alone sufficient to support an intentional interference claim there must also be proof that the defendants interference was accomplished through improper means