to engage in similar future conduct, id. at 148, 128 S.Ct. 1581. That is, having once been involved in “purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct,” it is “more likely that an offender, later possessing a gun, will use that gun deliberately to harm a victim.” Id. at 145, 128 S.Ct. 1581; accord id. at 146, 128 S.Ct. 1581 (“In order to determine which offenders fall into this category, the Act looks to past crimes ... because an offender’s criminal history is relevant to the question whether he is a career criminal, or, more precisely, to the kind or degree of danger the offender would pose were he to possess a gun.”). The Court juxtaposed the kind of conduct that typifies the armed career criminal with that which does not. Under this latter category it placed strict liabi Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). With Begay’s analysis in mind, we hold that
holding that a careless driving statute could not be used as a predicate for vehicular homicide because careless driving can occur without criminal negligence holding that under the particular facts alleged in the indictment vehicular homicide was a lesser offense included in the murder charge holding that vehicular homicide involving criminal negligence is not a crime of violence under begay holding that dwi manslaughter and vehicular homicide are different forms of the same offense holding that theft from the person is not a crime of violence