immunity analysis is an objective inquiry; it signals the Supreme Court’s repudiation of a subjective qualified immunity standard, or “good faith” immunity, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The parties’ confusion on this matter is understandable, given that some courts define the right alleged by a § 1983 plaintiff at a very general level under the second prong and consider the specific factual circumstances under the third prong. In such cases, the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis becomes a pro forma recitation of a general constitutional right, and the real “work” (that is, the consideration of the specific facts of the case) is done under the third prong. See, e.g., Smith v. Reddy, 101 F.3d 351, 356 (4th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). But where, as here, we have defined the right
holding that clearly established means the contours of the right were so clear at the time the officials acted that a reasonable official would have understood that what he was doing violated that right holding that once probable cause was established the officer was not required to investigate whether the person arrested was a victim acting in selfdefense or the aggressor in a domestic violence situation holding that for purposes of the second question the right must have been clearly established in a particularized sense such that a reasonable official would have understood that what he was doing violated that right holding that the right to be arrested only on probable cause was clearly established and considering under the third prong whether a reasonable person in the officers position would have thought her actions violated that right holding that in excessive force cases the threshold question for the court is whether the officers conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right