the Commission the power to issue policy statements to address, among other things, “the appropriate use of ... the sentence modification provisions set forth in” § 3582(c). 18 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(C). So rather than conflicting with congressional intent, as Terce-ro argues, the revisions to § 1B1.10 fall squarely within the scope of Congress’s articulated role for the Commission. Finally, we reject Tercero’s claim that revised § 1B1.10 is arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). The Commission is not an agency subject to the requirements of the APA but “an independent entity in the judicial branch.” Wash. Legal Found, v. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 17 F.3d 1446, 1450 (D.C.Cir.1994); see also United States v. Berberena, 694 F.3d 514, 526-27 (3d Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). Although Congress does require the Commission
holding that statutory notice provisions for notice of default and opportunity to cure were waived by provisions of note as to one obligor though provisions applied to coobligor who used property as residence holding that the esa citizen suit provision creates an express adequate remedy rendering the apas scope of review inapplicable to the substantive provisions of the esa holding the commission is not required to abide by the apas notice andcomment provisions when issuing policy statements holding that the ordinary meaning of federal employee theft policy which contained identical exclusions is that no coverage exists unless written notice is given within the period prescribed by the policy the instant provisions clearly reveal a claims made type policy holding that more than notice to a defendant is required