determine whether a red light violation has occurred, and the evidence reflects that the TIEOs determine that no probable cause exists for approximately fifty percent of the events placed into the working queue. See Jimenez, _ So.3d at _, 41 Fla. L. Weekly at D1757 (observing that the TIEOs “do not ‘merely acquiesce[] in the vendor’s decision to issue a citation’ .... [when] only between sixty-five percent (65%) and seventy percent (70%) are approved as a violation” (first alteration in original) (quoting Arem, 154 So.3d at 365)). Because the TIEO makes the determination about whether probable cause for a violation exists and whether to issue a notice of violation, no unauthorized delegation of police power has occurred. See State v. State Road Dep’t., 173 So.2d 693, 696 (Fla. 1965) (<HOLDING>); Cty. Collection Servs. Inc. v. Charnock, 789
holding that the district court was authorized to remand the proceedings to the board where the board failed to make required findings holding that a municipal ordinance creating a sanitary board and authorizing this board to contract for the construction of a sewage system is within the police power of the state holding that an appeal to an agency review board would be futile because the board lacked authority to invalidate ordinance as requested holding that taxpayer could not have presented substantive due process claim to the board of assessment review because of the limited jurisdiction of that board holding that an act creating a board of highway secondary funds trustees to review applications by counties for the financing of road projects and to make recommendations to the road department did not create an unlawful delegation of power because the board acted only in an advisory capacity