to the pollution. Br. of Resp’t at 26. But these are policy arguments. Such policy arguments are better suited for the legislature’s consideration. ¶38 In addition, DNR conflates the threshold determination of liability under MTCA with the final apportionment of the extent of liability. We are tasked with determining whether summary judgment on the issue of whether DNR can be liable as an “owner or operator” is appropriate—not the scope or propriety of the final apportionment of the extent of liability. As Ecology notes, “[i]t is possible for DNR to be liable for a site under MTCA and not bear any equitable portion of the cleanup costs for the site.” Br. of Amicus Curiae Ecology at 16 n.8 (citing Seattle City Light v. Dep’t of Transp., 98 Wn. App. 165, 174, 177, 989 P.2d 1164 (1999) (<HOLDING>)). Thus, we decline to determine the legal
holding that no distinction exists between investigatory costs and onsite cleanup costs for purposes of recovery holding that debtor was liable to the commonwealth for past and future cleanup costs holding that the department of transportation was liable under the mtca but that it was not responsible for any of the cleanup costs holding that an action by plaintiffs who had a legal obligation to conduct cleanup pursuant to a  106 order and then sought costs for cleanup from other prps was the quintessential action for contribution holding that the company administering a selfinsurance program for the department of transportation was an agent for the department and was therefore immune from suit