activity had been established, since the defendant physically used his judicial office (“i.e. the telephones and the physical office itself’) in engaging in the predicate acts, as well as the prestige and power of the office. Id. Here, the first indictment specifically alleges that the defendant used his official position as Page County Sheriff to commit the racketeering acts charged in the indictment, and that certain acts were committed in the defendant’s physical office. In light of the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Grubb, the court concludes that the allegations in the first indictment are clearly sufficient to establish the requisite nexus between the Page County Sheriffs Office and the alleged racketeering activity. See also United States v. Ruiz, 905 F.2d 499, 504 (1st Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). The court is also unpersuaded by the
recognizing affirmative duty of a police officer to prevent the violation of constitutional rights by another officer holding that the trial court did not err in charging the jury that the defendant was in the custody of the victim officer when he shot and killed the officer due to the undisputed evidence presented at trial including the defendants pretrial statement to police admitting that fact holding police officer is a public official holding that prior bad acts of a police officer which indicate a propensity for violence aggression or abuse of police powers  were highly relevant to the defendants selfdefense claims holding that there was ample room for the jury to find a snug fit between the defendants acts and the enterprise a city police department since the defendants illegal activities were clearly helped along by the authority vested in him as a police officer and by the reactions  which a police officer uniquely has the ability to engender in others by virtue of his position