and the form and content of that writing. Morgan makes clear that a debtor must satisfy these state procedural requirements in order to perfect a homestead exemption in bankruptcy. In other words, Morgan establishes that when a state opts out of the federal exemption scheme, the debtor’s right to an' exemption is subject to state rules of procedure. See Morgan, 689 F.2d at 472; see also Dominion Bank, 780 F.2d at 417 (Hoffman, D.J., concurring specially) (“[.Morgan] rested on Virginia’s having opted out because, by so doing, bankruptcy exemptions depend on Virginia law both for substance and for procedure.”); In re Pinner, 146 B.R. at 660 (noting that exemptions of bankruptcy debtors in North Carolina depend on state law for both substance and procedure); In re Swift, 96 F.Supp. at 46 (<HOLDING>). But cf. Matter of Crowell, 138 F.3d 1031,
holding act qualifies as exemption statute under exemption 3 holding that the general rule is that temporary absence from the premises will not itself cause an abandonment of the homestead but to retain the homestead exemption one leaving the homestead must in good faith intend to return albeit the intent to return need not be at any particular time in the future holding that the general homestead exemption may not be invoked to defeat claims against the holder for taxes and assessments against the homestead property holding that virginia statute limiting time to set apart homestead exemption permissibly regulated procedure in bankruptcy holding that a debtors technically incorrect exemption in a wrongful death claim based on west virginias homestead exemption stands as claimed because the trustee did not object to the exemption in time