sentence Johnson to imprisonment solely in order to rehabilitate him. Instead, the district court sentenced Johnson to additional prison time because Johnson had violated the terms of his supervised release by possessing crack cocaine. See Jackson, 70 F.3d at 879 n. 5 (“In the case of a mandatory revocation of supervised release ... the district court is required to impose a sentence of imprisonment. Therefore, the District Court ... considered rehabilitative goals only in determining the length of defendant’s sentence, not in determining whether to impose a sentence.”). Section 3583(d), which requires that a sentencing court consider drug-treatment programs as an alternative to prison, does not eliminate the mandatory nature of imprisonment under § 3583(g). See Crace, 207 F.3d at 835 (<HOLDING>). Thus, under § 3583(g), revocation of parole
holding that a sentencing court is required by 18 usc  3583g to revoke the defendants term of supervised release  unless defendant could come under the exception in 18 usc  3583d holding that when revocation  is mandatory under 18 usc  3583g the statute does not require consideration of  3553a factors holding that 18 usc  3583d requires that the court determine the number of drug tests to which the defendants must submit holding that supervised release provisions remained advisory after amendments to 18 usc  3583 holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001