of Texas has done the opposite. For the need factor, courts are concerned with “the seriousness of the crime or accident to which the officer responds” before the high-speed pursuit begins. See Wadewitz, 951 S.W.2d at 467. For the risk factor, “an officer in a police pursuit must assess both the risk that the suspect will injure a third party and the risk that the officer himself will injure a third party.” Clark, 38 S.W.3d at 583 (emphasis in original). I also note that the majority criticizes Martinez for being speculative about whether the fleeing driver would have returned to normal driving practices if Deputy Johnson has discontinued pursuit. Of course it was the County’s burden to establish as a matter of law that the need outweighed the risk. See Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 653 (<HOLDING>). Given the County’s and the majority’s
recognizing that the defendant bears the burden of establishing that plain error was prejudicial holding that a defendant bears the burden of establishing affirmative defenses under the wprkers compensation statute holding defendant bears burden of establishing affirmative defense of official immunity holding that appellant bears burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence holding that unless an affirmative defense is established as matter of law defendant bears burden of obtaining jury findings necessary to support defense