States v. Garcia, 179 F.3d 265, 269 (5th Cir.1999) (“[T]he requisite ‘fair probability’ is something more than a bare suspicion, but need not reach the fifty percent mark.”); United States v. Limares, 269 F.3d 794, 798 (7th Cir.2001) (“ ‘[P]robable cause’ is something less than a preponderance.”); United States v. Donnelly, 475 F.3d 946, 954 (8th Cir.2007) (“Probable cause ... does not require ... evidence demonstrating that it is more likely than not that the suspect committed a crime.”) (quotations omitted). And several of our sister circuits have upheld searches involving dogs with track records on par with this one. See Limares, 269 F.3d at 798 (62% accuracy rate suffices to demonstrate probable cause); United States v. Anderson, 367 Fed.Appx. 30, 33 (11th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Koon Chung Wu, 217 Fed.Appx.
holding dog was reliable with a 55 accuracy rate holding that evidence was sufficiently reliable because there was corroboration holding that the addition of a enough cereal to dog food to place it in a tariff provision with a lower rate of duty was within the importers right to fashion merchandise to obtain a lower rate of duty holding that once a rate is filed with the appropriate agency except for review of the agencys orders the courts can assume no right to a different rate on that ground that in its opinion it is the only or the more reasonable rate holding that with respect to the eaja the local or national market rate for legal services cannot be a special factor used to increase the rate beyond the statutory rate