absent a specific state statute to the contrary, constructive trusts are not properly invoked to gain super-priority over the trustee in bankruptcy” followed neither state law nor bankruptcy law. 183 B.R. at 157 n. 7. He used the classic approach and decided that under Illinois law, a party in a position like those of Datacomp’s and Wilfarm’s, lacking a judicial declaration of constructive trust, have no equitable interest in property of the estate. Id. at 157-160. How did the majority reach this result if, as Judge Barliant stated, and as I agree, it was not based on state law or the plain meaning of § 541 of the Bankruptcy Code? I conclude that the rationale is solely bankruptcy policy. Cf. Federal Land Bank of Louisville v. Glenn (In re Glenn), 760 F.2d 1428, 1436 (6th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). And, although the Omegas court’s
holding that the debtors right to deaccelerate a mortgage through chapter 13 is cut off at the foreclosure sale and by doing so explicitly eschewing any effort to analyze the transaction in terms of state property law holding chapter 13 plan funded by sale of property was not feasible where the debtor had not stated the time period or terms of the sale and no provision was made for failure to sell the property holding that a debtors right to strip off a wholly unsecured lien is conditioned on the debtors obtaining confirmation of and performing under a chapter 13 plan that meets all of the statutory requirements rather than on a debtors discharge holding that in contrast to foreclosure of a mortgage secured by personal property foreclosure of real property under a deed of trust need hot be at a commercially reasonable sale and the failure to conduct a commercially reasonable foreclosure sale of real property is not actionable holding that the debtors were entitled to cure the mortgage arrearage through their chapter 13 plan because the creditors failure to record the sale deed prior to the bankruptcy filing rendered the sale incomplete under state law