addition to failing to comply with Rule 26(a)’s disclosure requirements, he filed motions to extend the discovery period and to extend the time to file a response to REI’s motion for summary judgment. When the court granted his motion to extend the discovery period, he failed to conduct any discovery. Allowing Nance to supplement his complaint would have been akin to starting a new action because his current employment discrimination claim was in summary judgment proceedings, and the discoveiy period was to end in two days. Moreover, the district court correctly noted that its denial of Nance’s motion would not cause him prejudice because he was not precluded from bringing a separate action based on the later conduct. See Manning v. City of Auburn, 953 F.2d 1355, 1360 (11th Cir. 1992) (<HOLDING>). Upon review of the record and consideration
holding that res judicata does not bar those claims that arose after the original pleading is filed in the earlier proceeding holding that res judicata does not bar litigation of a claim pleaded in an earlier case if the record of the case shows that the court refused to decide the issue holding that earlier suits different legal theory did not save the later action from the res judicata bar because the central factual issues are identical holding that res judicata is not applicable to a claim for relief that was unavailable in the earlier action holding res judicata also applies to those in privity with parties