prohibition,” but rather "viewed the San Diego ordinance as a total ban on billboards because it believed that the ordinance would have the practical effect of eliminating the billboard industry in San Diego and thereby would eliminate billboards as an effective medium of communication.” Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1058. Because of these sharp differences, neither opinion has any controlling precedential force. 11 . We note that the Dimmitt/Metromedia-plu-rality approach is consistent with the prevailing approach among other Circuits. See, e.g., Nat’l Adver. Co. v. Town of Niagara, 942 F.2d 145, 147 (2d Cir.1991) (observing that the Second Circuit "has adopted the plurality decision in Metromedia concerning billboard regulation”); Nat’l Adver. Co. v. Town of Babylon, 900 F.2d 551 (2d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Gilleo v. City of Ladue, 986 F.2d 1180 (8th
holding that an ordinance exempting certain signs from a general sign ban was an unconstitutional contentbased restriction on speech holding that prohibiting external illumination of political signs while allowing it for other signs was an unconstitutional contentbased restriction since the message on the sign determines whether or not it may be externally illuminated holding ban on newsracks to be contentbased because determining whether a newsrack fell within ban required reference to a publications content holding that restriction on government employee speech was unconstitutionally vague holding that strict scrutiny applies to a prior restraint enforcing a contentbased restriction on speech in a traditional public forum