Co., 168 N.C. 296, 84 S.E. 363 (1915); Plemmons v. Southern Improvement Company, 108 N.C. 614, 13 S.E. 188 (1891). This rule was amended somewhat by the enactment of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 4(b), (hereinafter N.C.R. Civ. P.), which provides that a summons shall be directed to the defendant rather than to a process officer ordering him to summon the defendant. Still, the strict requirement that the summons command the appearance of the defendant and not that of an individual designated an agent or officer of the defendant has been carried over in the interpretation of the sufficiency of summonses under Rule 4. Carl Rose & Sons Ready Mix Concrete, Inc. v. Thorp Sales Corporation, 30 N.C. App. 526, 227 S.E. 2d 301 (1976); see also, Philpott v. Kerns, 285 N.C. 225, 203 S.E. 2d 778 (1974), (<HOLDING>). In reviewing the summons issued in this case,
holding that the statutory definition of motor vehicle is not controlling holding that the sensible and popular understanding of what a motor vehicle accident entails necessarily involves the motor vehicle being operated as a motor vehicle  holding that insurance provisions excluding damage arising out of the use of land motor vehicles subject to registration and damage arising out of the use of land motor vehicles if the injury or damage occurs away from the insured premises were ambiguous because together they could be read in four different ways holding that a summons directed to the commissioner of motor vehicles was defective process as against a nonresident defendant in an action arising out of operation of a motor vehicle in this state recognizing that in 1982 kentucky converted to a new title system for motor vehicles under which the secured creditor must perfect its security interest by noting the lien on the certificate of title to the motor vehicle