as the basis for a motion for sanctions, attorneys’ fees, or other costs. And while the Builders’ summary-judgment motion suggests that Landrah was in contempt for failure to appear at a deposition, the motion seeks only attorneys’ fees “incurred in this matter” — not attorneys’ fees as sanctions for Landrah’s failure to appear. (Emphasis added.) Even if we were to construe the Builders’ motion as a motion for sanctions, a trial court may not award sanctions on a basis not asserted in the motion. See Greene v. Young, 174 S.W.3d 291, 298-301 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (reversing sanctions awarded because parties did not have notice of legal basis or conduct under consideration for sanctions); Ball v. Rao, 48 S.W.3d 332, 338 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Neither the summary-judgment motion nor the
holding trial court erred by imposing sanctions under section 9 of civil practice and remedies code because claim for sanctions was based solely on section 10 of code and rule 13 of rules of civil procedure holding that statute of limitations for contribution actions found in section 13  204 of the code applies over limitations period for malpractice actions found in section 13  212 of the code where the plaintiffs complaint was based solely on contribution act ill rev stat 1985 ch 70 par 301 et seq section 13  204 is more specific than section 13  212 holding that section 343909c cannot be tolled by california code of civil procedure  351 holding that limitations period in section 13  214a of the code applies over limitations period for contribution actions found in section 13  204 of the code because former provision is more specific recognizing distinction between findings of fact under section 6711 of the family code and findings of fact under rules of civil procedure