final version of the statute, "the standard was to be an objective one, not dependent on the `intent' or schemes of the possessor." 457 F.2d at 1118. This view of "design" as objective is also found in the cases that contrast proof of a destructive device under subpart (3) through either design or intent. See, e.g., Urban, 140 F.3d at 232-34; Lussier, 128 F.3d at 1315. 7 . See Copus, 93 F.3d at 273 (question of whether detonators were designed as weapons was a jury question); see also United States v. Thomas, 111 F.3d 426, 428 (6th Cir.) (noting that the testimony of record established that the device in question. was not good for any industrial or social use), cert. denied, - U.S. , 118 S.Ct. 209, 139 L.Ed.2d 145 (1997); cf. United States v. Reindeau, 947 F.2d 32, 35-36 (2d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). 8 . As a practical matter, we think it likely
holding that the defendant was denied due process because the procedural rule was not followed in any respect by the trial court holding no right to crossexamine in grand jury proceedings holding that the plaintiffs claim that he was wrongfully denied a promotion prior to his retirement accrued on the date that he was finally denied that promotion  the date of his retirement at the lower rank holding that the defendant was denied wrongfully his right to crossexamine on the issue of whether the device was designed as a pipe bomb or as a firecracker and that the jury may have found reasonable doubt if that right was not denied holding that the defendant was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel when a codefendants plea bargain including a promise to testify against the defendant was negotiated by the law partner of the defendants counsel