have been perceived and treated with caution by the District. John Doe’s behavioral history did not put the District on notice of any “propensity” to be sexually victimized. Although it was reported that John Doe had looked over bathroom stalls to observe other children while at Bethel Springs, his teachers and the Assistant Director of Special Education all stated that they did not believe these acts were sexual in nature. John Doe’s mother, who holds an advanced degree in school nursing, also testified to that effect. Ms. Reichert corroborated the teachers’ explanation that John Doe liked to climb, and that he used the bathroom to escape the supervision of his female teachers. See, e.g., Doe v. Allentown, No. 06-1926, Order on Summ. J., at *9, E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2012 (Docket No. 286) (<HOLDING>); see also Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist.,
holding that the officers awareness that the defendant could be dangerous and that he had a previous weapons conviction was not enough to justify the sweep because once the defendant was in custody he no longer posed a threat to the police holding delayed title vii suit not frivolous where there was no evidence that the plaintiff knew he had been given a right to sue letter holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present holding that although school officials knew that the eventual perpetrator had a history of misbehaving in sexually suggestive ways there is no evidence that he had done anything that would have put officials on notice of the serious risk he posed holding that the trial court properly failed to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication and manslaughter where there was no evidence that the appellant was intoxicated at the time of the offense although there was evidence that the appellant had been drinking beer on the day of the offense where there was no evidence concerning the quantity of beer he had consumed