states a designated reviewer may review the actions of the grievance committee. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.5(b). The word “may” when given its ordinary meaning denotes a permissive term rather than the mandatory connotation of the word “shall.” See Harper v. State, 217 So.2d 591, 592 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968). We reject Trazenfeld’s argument because the language of rule 3-7.5(b) is permissive rather than mandatory. Finally, case law from other jurisdictions supports the Bar’s argument that the doctrine of res judicata is not a 214 (Miss.1987) (proceedings under complaint were not precluded by dismissal of former complaint where there was no final judgment entered on merits of former complaint); State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass’n v. Kirshen, 232 Neb. 445, 441 N.W.2d 161, 177 (1989) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing reasons, we
holding that the doctrine of res judicata applies to deportation proceedings holding that res judicata did not apply where a trial courts order was not a final judgment holding res judicata doctrine did not apply to bar proceedings where the committees dismissal of the first complaint occurred at a preliminary inquiry stage holding res judicata inapplicable where previous dismissal was based on lack of jurisdiction holding that res judicata applies in deportation proceedings