could inhibit the inspections, again relying on the exis tence of sufficiently defined regulations to provide an adequate substitute for the particularity requirements of a warrant. See, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (upholding warrantless inspections required by the Mine Safety and Health Act); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972) (upholding warrantless inspections required by the Gun Control Act of 1968). In addition to the need for discretion-limiting regulations, the Supreme Court has also required that the primary purpose of such searches to be something other than general crime control. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47-48, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000) (<HOLDING>). Despite these limitations, the Supreme Court
holding that a complaint that included only allegations of intentional wrongdoing also set forth grounds for liability based on unintentional wrongdoing holding that if an agent does not develop reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before the justifying purpose of a checkpoint stop has been accomplished he may not prolong the stop holding that questioning of a juvenile by a principal in presence of a police officer did not constitute an interrogation because principal was sole questioner and was not acting as an agent for police holding that a traffic stop is reasonable under the fourth amendment when police have probable cause to believe a traffic infraction has occurred holding a police checkpoint to interdict narcotic traffic invalid because the principal purpose of the checkpoint was to detect evidence of criminal wrongdoing