the New York support decree expired by its own terms, Pastor provided no authority for this position and, in fact, UIFSA provides to the contrary. To begin with, as set forth above, section 159.205 provides only two ways in which a court may lose its continuing exclusive jurisdiction: (1) the obligor, the obligee, and the child move out of the rendering state; or (2) all individuals file written consents in Texas allowing a Texas court to assume jurisdiction and modify the other state’s decree. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 159.205. We agree with Martinez that if the Texas Legislature had intended to provide an additional opportunity for Texas courts to gain jurisdiction it certainly could have, but did not. See, e.g., Mid-Century Svs. Co. of Tex. v. Kidd, 997 S.W.2d 265, 273-74 (Tex.1996) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, despite the expiration of the
holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law holding that for purposes of statutory construction expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other holding that the title of legislation is relevant to legislative intent holding that maxim of expression of one implies exclusion of another is aid to determine legislative intent holding that the narrowing of the use of parnar claims only applies absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary and citing to hrs  37869 as an example of such legislative intent