Elliott v. Webb, 98 F.R.D. 293, 297 (D.Idaho 1983). Without making their reasoning completely clear, these courts seem to assume that there is a greater risk that officers doing this work would not express their views honestly if they knew their words might be used against individual officers or the police department by a civil rights plaintiff. But see, e.g., Mercy v. County of Suffolk, 93 F.R.D. 520, 522 (E.D.N.Y.1982) (rejecting the view that candor will be chilled by limited disclosure). This premise, coupled with the notion that it is important to preserve the vigor of disciplinary procedures within police departments, has led some courts to conclude either that a plaintiff never should be able to discover such material, see, e.g., Kott v. Perini, 283 F.Supp. 1 (N.D.Ohio 1968) (<HOLDING>); but see Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D.
holding that statute making child welfare agency records confidential but disclosable pursuant to a court order did not create an absolute privilege for such records recognizing an absolute privilege for police records in a habeas corpus action recognizing privilege under federal rules recognizing privilege recognizing the statelaw privilege because there was no federal claim to which the records sought would be relevant