tory and contractual' context. Regarding statutes with fee-shifting provisions, the D.C. courts have observed that “[generally speaking, the term ‘prevailing party’ is understood to mean’ a party ‘who has been awarded some relief by the court’ (or other tribunal).” Settlemire v. D.C. Office of Emp. Appeals, 898 A.2d 902, 907 (D.C.2006) (quoting Buckhannon Bd. & Care Borne, Inc., 532 U.S. at 603, 121 S.Ct. 1835)). And the D.C. courts have been even clearer regarding contractual fee-shifting provisions: To “meet the threshold requirement” of a “prevailing party,” the party must “prevail on the merits.” Fleming v. Carroll Pub. Co., 621 A.2d 829, 837 (D.C.1993) (applying lease agreement’s fee-shifting clause); see also Chang v. Louis & Alexander, Inc., 645 A.2d 1110, 1115-16 (D.C.1994) (<HOLDING>). Emery will not receive any “relief’ from the
holding that the consent of both parties is required to annul their contract holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering a separate trial for the counterclaims where the convenience of the parties would be served holding that the information must establish that the court has jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties holding that parties can stipulate that they were both parties to a contract and thus the real parties in interest even when one party did not sign the contract holding that both plaintiff and defendant could be prevailing parties within meaning of lease agreement because both parties achieved some judgment on the merits of their claims or counterclaims at trial