the challenged action creates a ‘direct and immediate’ dilemma for the parties.” Id. (citation omitted). The relationship between these two parts of the test — fitness and hardship — has never been precisely defined. Though some commentators have suggested that either of the two showings may suffice to allay ripeness concerns, see, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 3-10, at 80 (2d ed. 1987), the predominant weight of authority supports the opposite view, see, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 509, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 1759, 6 L.Ed.2d 989 (1961) (dismissing for lack of ripeness despite the predominantly legal nature of the question presented and the minimal need for an extensive factual record); Cedars-Sinai Medical Ctr., v. Watkins, 11 F.3d 1573,1581 (Fed.Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal
holding that it is inappropriate to conclude that because both sides moved for summary judgement that both concede that the case is ready for disposition holding that a ripe case must meet both prongs of abbott labs holding that these prongs are distinct statutory definitions holding that medical expenses must be proven to be both reasonable and necessary holding that jury must determine voluntariness of statements to both private citizens and police