thirty days. 22 . 28 U.S.C. § 1291; see Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 530 (7th Cir. 1995) ("The denial of summary judgment is not -a final judgment; rather, it is an interlocutory order.”); R.R. Donnelley & Sons v. FTC, 931 F.2d 430, 431 (7th Cir.1991) (noting that denial of a motion for summary judgment is not a final order). 23 . See UAW v. Randall Div. of Textron, Inc., 5 F.3d 224, 227 (7th Cir. 1993); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 353 n. 55 (7th Cir.1988). 24 .See Glass v. Dachel, 2 F.3d 733, 739 (7th Cir.1993) ("Where facts are not disputed, if a district court grants one party’s motion for summary judgment and denies the other party’s cross-motion, this court can reverse and award summary judgment to the losing party below.”); Morgan Guar. Trust, 466 F.2d at 600 (<HOLDING>); see also, e.g., Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d
holding that this court has power to direct the entry of summary judgment when it would be just under the circumstances holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to alteramend judgment where the plaintiff raised the choice of law issue for the first time after the entry of summary judgment holding that the issuing court necessarily has the power to enforce a protective order it issued at any point it is in effect even after entry of a final judgment and courts enjoy the inherent power to modify any discovery related orders postjudgment holding the standard of proof in summary judgment rulings is the same as it would be at trial holding that a circuit courts entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo