of witness immunity for charges founded on defamation. Rather, Zagaros claims the actionable negligence was the failure of Erickson to point out her own negligence in forming the diagnosis when testifying. By reframing the issue and separating methodology from result Zagaros attempts to bypass witness immunity for defamation. We conclude that Zagaros’s cause of action for negligent testimony related to methodology and the allegedly defamatory conclusion are so intertwined as the causes of Zaga-ros’s alleged harm that it would be unfair, and probably impossible, to expect a jury to distinguish between the two. Erickson is protected by witness immunity because Zagaros’s claim is essentially relabeling a defamation claim. See Wild v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 447, 234 N.W.2d 775, 793 (1975) (<HOLDING>). III. Judicial Immunity Cutler asks this court
holding that a partys responsibility for damage from any cause included damage cause by the indemnitee holding that a prior suit and a subsequent suit between the same parties did not involve the same claim because the evidence necessary to sustain the subsequent suit was insufficient to entitle the plaintiff to relief in the prior suit holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state holding plaintiffs suit sounded in defamation because regardless of what the suit is labeled the thing done to cause any damage to plaintiff eventually stems from and grew out of the defamation holding plaintiffs supervisor subject to suit