acted to extend the time for closing. For example, defendant never indicated to the escrow office that the time for performance under the agreement had expired. Rather, she went to the escrow office on June 13, 2003, to sign closing documents, and she deposited a check for taxes and closing costs with the escrow company. Also, plaintiff sent defendant a letter on June 24, 2003, stating that closing was postponed until the lis pendens issue was resolved, and, thereafter, the parties stayed in contact with each other regarding the agreement by phone. In light of the conduct of the parties, it is apparent that neither party sought to enforce the May 31 deadline, even if that had been the intent of their original agreement. See Patterson v. Amundson, 201 Or App 486, 496, 119 P3d 264 (2005) (<HOLDING>). Secondly, there is no evidence that plaintiff
holding that even though the contract limited the buyers remedies to specific performance or a refund of earnest money they were entitled to damages in the amount of the difference between the contract price and the fair market value of the property where the seller thwarted the buyers right to specific performance by selling the property to another at a higher price holding the insurer liable for failing to settle the claim when time was of the essence holding that by his actions the seller waived the time is of the essence provision in leasewithpurchase agreement by not demanding a timely closing indeed the seller negotiated with the buyers about the condition of property for over a year accepted the buyers monthly payments for nearly seven years and never reinstated the time is of the essence provision holding that a provision of the constitution is to be construed in the sense in which it was understood by the framers and the people at the time of its adoption but that if new products or circumstances that did not exist at the time the constitutional provision was enacted fall within the meaning of the provision the constitutional provision applies to them holding in an action brought by buyers for specific performance of a contract for the sale of stock that the judicial admission exception was not satisfied by the sellers deposition testimony admitting that after meeting with the buyer he shook the buyers hand and stated weve got a deal because the statement even when taken in context with the preceding negotiations described by the seller in his deposition established neither a quantity nor price for the stocks