informant who was not yet employing the practices for which he would later be indicted. This requires us to determine whether the state court’s factual determination was objectively unreasonable, a standard which, as we noted above, affords the state court determination the utmost deference. Despite this deferential review, “deference does not by definition preclude relief. A federal court can disagree with a state court’s credibility determination and, when guided by AEDPA, conclude the decision was unreasonable or that the factual premise was incorrect by clear and convincing evidence.” Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 340, 123 S.Ct. 1029. We have, on occasion, concluded that a state court’s factual determination was unreasonable. See, e.g., Cooke v. Solis, 606 F.3d 1206, 1216 (9th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000 (holding that the
holding that there was no legal right to court review of parole board decision because there is no legal right to release on parole holding that habeas petition challenging the state boards decision to defer his scheduled parole release date was rendered moot by prisoners release from custody on parole and subsequent incarceration for violating his parole holding that the state courts rejection of the petitioners ineffective assistance of counsel claim was an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence before the state court holding that the state courts decision to uphold the parole boards denial of parole was an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence holding that parole boards do not have to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment