it didn’t bother me, but I knew they did it because of retaliation.” Def.’s Mot., Ex. A, Jones Dep. at 106. Furthermore, he was informed by his supervisor at that time, Laura Gaskins, that he was being transferred because he had stated that he did not want to work under Mr. Wallace’s supervision. Id. at 107; see also Def.’s Mot., Ex. E, Declaration of Laura Gaskins, (“Gaskins’ Decl.”) ¶ 3 (stating that the plaintiff was transferred to the building services area in accordance with his request that he not work in an area th f cannot refute the defendant’s legitimate reason for his transfer, namely, that the defendant complied with plaintiffs request that he not work under Mr. Wallace’s supervision. See Lofton v. Roskens, 743 F.Supp. 6, 10 (D.D.C.1990), aff'd, 950 F.2d 797 (D.C.Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); cf. Villines v. United Brotherhood of
holding that plaintiff established a prima facie claim of retaliation because the defendants failure to transfer her out of her abusive working environment could be viewed as an adverse personnel action and there was a causal link between the filing of plaintiffs complaint and the defendants failure to transfer her holding that plaintiff is entitled to assert claim of retaliatory transfer under  1981 holding employee had cause of action against her employers when nonemployee harassed her and employers failed to take corrective action holding that a plaintiff can establish pretext only by showing that her employers explanation is a he holding that plaintiff failed to establish that her transfer to another department was retaliatory as opposed to her employers attempt to diffuse a personality conflict