within the meaning of the applicable regulation. See FAR § 33.207(c)(2)(i) & (ii). Consequently, the critical issue remaining in resolving defendant’s motion to dismiss case No. 90-296 is whether Jones was, at the time of certification, an officer of plaintiff corporation “having overall responsibility for the conduct of [its] affairs.” See FAR § 33.-207(c)(2)(ii). B The second category of certifying corporate representative, defined in FAR § 33.-207(c)(2)(ii), has been interpreted to require “ ‘overall responsibility for the conduct of the contractor’s affairs’ in general.” Grumman, 927 F.2d at 580. In Grumman, the Federal Circuit made it clear that responsibility for a particular aspect of a company’s business is not sufficient to meet the “overall responsibility” test. See id. (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff argues that Grumman can be
holding that a motion to certify a district court order for interlocutory appeal is dispositive holding that senior vice president in charge of financial affairs could not properly certify under second prong of test holding that a disclosure by a vice president and sales manager of a corporation did not constitute waiver because he did not seek authorization from the board of directors holding that plaintiffs failure to mention vice president of thirdparty company in initial disclosures was harmless because plaintiffs mentioned president of company and defendants conducted no discovery of company holding that the responsibility of another did not absolve the plaintiff of his own responsibility where the plaintiff helped incorporate the company served as vice president and president owned varying levels of stock and possessed authority to hire and fire