the NLRA, was intended by Congress “to be controlled by the free play of economic forces.” Machinists, 427 U.S. at 140, 96 S.Ct. 2548 (internal quotation and citation omitted). AB 1889 is best viewed through this lens, because the employer expressive activity at issue is not protected or prohibited by the NLRA, but rather is an essential part of the NLRA’s overall labor relations structure. In enacting a restriction on the use of state funds with the purpose of remaining neutral in labor disputes, California has not intruded on labor relations meant to be left unregulated by the states. The Supreme Court has specifically emphasized the legitimate governmental interest in re maining neutral in labor disputes. See Lyng v. UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 371-72, 108 S.Ct. 1184, 99 L.Ed.2d 380 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, state neutrality is not only
holding that sentencing criminals in part based on criminal history is rationally related to a legitimate government interest holding claims based on the fair labor standards act subject to arbitration holding that the particular method is not rationally related to legitimate government interest if it is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable holding that the nlrb was a creditor within the meaning of the code because it had been granted the power to enforce the national labor relations act even though a back pay award was made to individual workers not to the government holding that a congress decision to avoid subsidization of striking workers through a food stamp program was legitimately based in congresss considered efforts to avoid favoritism in labor disputes noting that we have little trouble in concluding that the food stamp restriction is rationally related to the legitimate government objective of avoiding undue favoritism to one side or the other in private labor disputes