between the two employers. John B. Cruz Constr. Co. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 33, 907 F.2d 1228, 1231 (1st Cir.1990). The second major distinction that must concern a court faced with a secondary boycott claim is the one between proper and improper secondary activity. It is well-settled that not all secondary pressure exerted by a labor organization is prohibited by law. “Unions may make peaceful appeals for support from the management of companies dealing with the primary employer.” Abreen Corp., 709 F.2d at 757. The federal reports are replete with explanations of the distinction between proper and improper secondary pressure. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 577-79, 108 S.Ct. 1392, 99 L.Ed.2d 645 (1988) (<HOLDING>); NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 53-54,
holding phrase based upon or attributable to is not ambiguous and rejecting secondary suit construction holding that prohibited secondary pressure involves coercion or threats holding that speech must be a threat or coercion to be actionable holding that a threat of serious disciplinary action constituted pressure to conform holding that duress or coercion would invalidate a contract if the coercion comes from the opposing party not the claimants attorney