(Tr. 1288:7-15.) The Court explained that the mere presence of Melo at the crime scene with the knowledge that a crime is being committed, or “the mere acquiescence by a defendant in [ ] criminal conduct of others even with guilty knowledge” would not justify aiding and abetting liability. (Tr. 1287:25; 1288:1-4.) The jury charge provided all of the elements of aiding and abetting liability and made clear that the jury could not find Melo guilty of aiding and abetting based only on his knowledge that a firearm would be used, carried, or possessed during the robberies. Nooter’s decision not to object to the Court’s aiding and abetting instruction was reasonable because the charge to the jury was an accurate statement of the law. See Aparicio v. Artuz, 269 F.3d 78, 100 (2d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). For the same reason, Melo cannot establish
holding that failure to request jury instruction about manner in which evidence was obtained was not error and thus did not constitute ineffective assistance because defendant was not entitled to instruction holding that trial courts failure to provide additional instructions as to plaintiffs burden of proof in negligence case was not reversible error there having been no proper and accurate request for such instruction holding that the failure to object to a trial courts instruction constitutes waiver holding that because the jury instructions were not improper the failure of petitioners trial counsel to object or request an additional instruction was not objectively unreasonable holding that the failure to object to an instruction constitutes a waiver of error