intent of section 1983 to convert every breach of contract claim against a state into a federal claim.”). Thus, even if we distill a version of Dodson’s § 1983 claim based on UAMS’s conduct after Dodson II, dismissal was proper pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 6 . See Allison B. Jones, Note, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: What does it Mean to be Inextricably Intertwined?, 56 Duke L.J. 643, 665 (2006) ("With so little clear guidance from the Supreme Court concerning 'inextricably intertwined,' many lower courts have embraced this lucid definition from Justice Marshall.”); Thomas D. Rowe Jr. & Edward L. Baskauskas, “Inextricably Intertwined’’ Explicable At Last? Rooker-Feldman Analysis After the Supreme Court’s Exxon Mobil Decision, 2006 F d.Appx. 89, 91 (5th Cir.2008) (unpublished per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Indus. Comm'ns & Elec., Inc. v. Monroe
recognizing that in reviewing ruling on motion to compel arbitration we first determine whether party seeking arbitration established existence of arbitration agreement holding that rookerfeldman precludes jurisdiction over a federal lawsuit to compel arbitration under the federal arbitration act because the action was inextricably intertwined with the plaintiffs failed statelaw action to compel arbitration under the louisiana arbitration act holding that district courts are required to compel arbitration of claims subject to arbitration clause even if the result is piecemeal litigation holding that once the party seeking to compel arbitration establishes the existence of an arbitration agreement and that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement the trial court must compel arbitration holding that an aaa arbitration was a private proceeding and therefore that a decision by the arbitrator pursuant to the federal arbitration act did not constitute state action