waiving the requirement of an injunction bond or limiting the amount of such bond.” The new statute is not applicable to this case, however, because subsection (3) provides that “[tjhis act shall apply prospectively, and it shall not apply in actions determining the enforceability of restrictive covenants entered into before July 1,1996.” Second, today we decide only that the circuit court correctly enforced a pre-July 1, 1996 contract provision waiving the requirement that a movant post a bond in order to obtain a temporary injunction. We have not determined whether, in light of Parker, such would affect an enjoined party’s right to recover damages if the injunction is found to have been wrongful. See Provident Management Corp. v. City of Treasure Island, 718 So.2d 738 (Fla.1998) (<HOLDING>). Affirmed. CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and GREEN, J.,
holding that rule 6e is inapplicable where the time for filing begins to run on the date of mailing holding that relief under rule 60b6 is not available unless the other clauses 1 through 5 are inapplicable holding that parker analysis is inapplicable where no bond whatsoever is posted by a municipality as permitted under rule 1610b holding that equitable defense of laches is inapplicable to claims of fraud holding that where no factual dispute is raised no hearing is required