that the finding instruction adequately stated the elements of the offense. Accordingly, I would reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial. The majority opinion also holds that the last paragraph of Hall’s proposed instruction was improper because it was derived from civil model jury instructions. In so finding, the majority relies on Hubbard v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 1, 413 S.E.2d 875 (1992). Hubbard, however, does not stand for the principle that language which properly defines a criminal law concept is improper simply because it is drawn from a civil jury instruction. The Supreme Court rejected Hubbard’s proposed jury instructions because they inappropriately injected definitions of civil negligence in a case concerning criminal negligence. See id. at 15, 413 S.E.2d at 882-83 (<HOLDING>). Hall merely relied on the applicable language
holding that documents that are created in the ordinary course of business or would have been created irrespective of litigation are not protected by the work product doctrine holding that even in separate trial other crimes evidence would not have been admissible and identification testimony would have been admissible holding that by attempting to inject inapplicable principles of civil negligence into a criminal trial instructions b and c would have created confusion and would have been misleading holding that trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion to sever because trial of three defendants would not create confusion holding that to prove ineffectiveness where defendant rejected plea offer upon advice of counsel defendant must show he would have accepted the offer had counsel advised correctly the state would not have withdrawn its offer the court would have accepted the offer and the resulting sentence would have been less severe