in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations stemming from a lockdown affecting Muslim inmates. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Morrison v. Hall, 261 F.3d 896, 900 (9th Cir.2001), and we affirm. The district court properly granted summary judgment on Ford’s First Amendment claim because Ford did not raise a triable issue as to whether the lockdown was a legitimate action taken by the prison to maintain security or as to whether the lockdown prevented Ford from engaging in religious conduct mandated by his faith. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (outlining criteria for analyzing legitimacy of regulation of religious expression in prison); Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). The district court properly granted summary
holding that when determining the proper amount for a burdened property that was purchased in a package only two methods suggest themselves as arguably appropriate 1 a determination of the fair market value of the  property burdened by the right of first refusal or 2 a determination of the portion of the  purchase price which based on the percentage of the fair market value of the entire package represented by the  property burdened by the right of first refusal should be allocated to the  property burdened by the right of first refusal holding that when an employee is injured by his employers tortious conduct his employer owes him damages and compensation under the act holding that a state prisoner must bring his claim in habeas only if by prevailing he would necessarily prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement recognizing individual prayer as an appropriate alternative means for a muslim prisoner to express his religion holding prisoner must show defendant burdened the practice of his religion by preventing him from engaging in conduct mandated by his faith