imprisonment than to death.” Id. at 1633. Further, “black-defendant status correlates with stronger findings of remorse than white-defendant status.” Id. at 1626-27. The importance of Bey’s right to allocution thus becomes all the more pressing if race truly impacts the extent to which a jury might be moved by his statement. See, e.g., infra at 308-09 n. 2, 736 A.2d at 510-11 n. 2 (indicating that in highly aggravated capital cases allocutions of black defendants influenced imposition of life sentence). The importance of allocution, as recognized by this Court, also comes into sharp relief when analyzed in the context of the Court’s finding that victim-impact statements may be submitted to a jury in the penalty-phase proceeding. See State v. Muhammad, 145 N.J. 23, 678 A.2d 164 (1996) (<HOLDING>). In Muhammad, supra, the Court held that
recognizing defendants state and federal constitutional rights to testify holding statute denying putative father standing to bring legitimation action under statute in effect at the time did not violate due process or equal protection of state or federal constitutions holding that alleged violations of a state statute did not give rise to federal constitutional claims holding the argument that the state and federal constitutions required appointed counsel in adoption proceeding was not preserved holding victimimpact statute njsa 2c113c6 constitutional under federal and state constitutions