as well.” (Emphasis added.) This argument is speculative since the form simply indicates a determination of guilt for “[d]riving while intoxicated, first offense.” It is unclear from Defendant’s argument how this initial order operates as an acquittal on the refusal basis apart from simply being “a writing.” As noted above, not all writings by a judge are final orders. As Defendant has no persuasive or clear argument on how the June 3, 2003, writing could operate as a final verdict of acquittal, we reject it as being without merit or support in the record. {22} We also reject Defendant’s contention that the June 3, 2003 order imposed a deferred sentence, which would bar any later sentence of confinement under State v. Lopez, 99 N.M. 791, 795-96, 664 P.2d 989, 993-94 (Ct.App.1982) (<HOLDING>). Because this order was interlocutory, it was
holding that trial judge was not authorized to impose jail time as condition of probation and deleting the 90 day jail penalty holding that a youth detention facility was a jail for purposes of statute requiring credit for time served in jail while awaiting trial holding that a court has no power to impose jail time as a condition of a deferred sentence holding that the sentence entered by the circuit court was illegal because the court had no authority to impose a sentence that exceeded the punishment fixed by the jury holding trial court lacked authority to impose electronic monitoring condition and deleting the provision as a condition of applicants deferred adjudication probation