or practice, and there was an unwarranted refusal by such party to fully resolve the matter which constitutes the basis of such suit; or (2) The party instituting the action knew, or should have known, the action was frivolous and malicious. N.C.G.S. § 75-16.1 (1999). The Court of Appeals reversed the award of attorneys’ fees, holding that there was no violation of N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1. Having concluded that plaintiffs have established such a violation, we reverse that portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision that reverses the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees. Upon remand, the trial court may consider an award of attorneys’ fees for services rendered after the entry of its judgment. See City Fin. Co. of Goldsboro, Inc. v. Boykin, 86 N.C. App. 446, 449-50, 358 S.E.2d 83, 85 (1987) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the
holding that the defendant is entitled to be present at all stages of his trial  and a judges response to a note from the jury is one of those stages holding that rule 43aentitles a defendant to be present at all stages of his trial and that cjommunication between the judge and the jury or a single juror is one of those stages holding that the right to counsel applies in all critical stages of state and federal criminal proceedings holding that ncgs  75161 includes fees for services rendered at all stages of litigation including appeals holding that an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review not merely at the time the complaint is filed