technology available that others might use to infringe. According to CoStar, once it gave notice of specific alleged infringe ments to LoopNet, LoopNet had knowledge of ongoing infringements by its users. CoStar asserts that this knowledge, coupled with the lack of more drastic measures to prevent infringement, constitutes inducement and so renders LoopNet liable for contributory infringement. CoStar attempts to distinguish this case from Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 104 S.Ct. 774, 78 L.Ed.2d 574 (1984), where the mere provision of means, capable of substantial non-infringing uses, was not a basis for contributory infringement. Instead, CoStar seeks to bring the current case under the analysis in Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction, 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>) and A & M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004,
holding that a patent infringement claim against a reseller of infringing products is only peripherally related to a claim against the manufacturer holding that the knowing provision of swap meet facilities necessary to the sale and distribution of infringing works was a material contribution to the infringement of others holding that defendants testimony that he did not see a provision in the agreement because the plaintiffcounterparty failed to direct him to the provision was insufficient as a matter of law to establish fraud and defendant was therefore bound to the terms of the provision holding that where the plagiarized material comprised 35 of the work and the commercial value of the whole was likely attributable in some part to the remaining 65 percent 50 percent of the profits were allocated to the infringing material holding that posting of infringing copyrighted material may give rise to jurisdiction where the victiimplaintiff was a resident of the forum state