contamination.” Licciardi v. Murphy Oil USA Inc., 1995 WL 45861, at *2 (EJD.La. Feb.2, 1995) (citing examples). But as the Licciardi court also observed, a complete immunization of investigatory response costs from the requirement of NCP consistency is contrary to the text of CERCLA. “It is well-established that costs of investigation, assessment, or monitoring of potential environmental harm qualify as ‘costs of response’ under CERCLA.” Id. at *1 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (defining “response” to include “removal”); 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (defining “removal” to include “such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances”)); Tanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1575 (5th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). And CERCLA plainly allows private parties to
holding that the proper remedy for future response costs is not a present lumpsum payment of anticipated expenses but instead a declaratory judgment award dividing future response costs among prps holding that courier and messenger costs are not taxable costs holding that costs are not fixed until judgment is entered and interest can only run on costs when due holding that investigatory costs are considered costs of response under cercla holding that no distinction exists between investigatory costs and onsite cleanup costs for purposes of recovery