by specific data to meet the burden of proof. See, e.g., Hechinger Liquidation Trust v. Rager (In re Hechinger Invest. Co. of Del.), 298 B.R. 240, 242 (Bankr.D.Del.2003) (rejecting hearsay statements generalizing about the industry standard); Harbour v. ABX Enters. (In re APS Holding Corp.), 282 B.R. 795, 803 (Bankr.D.Del.2002) (finding testimony where the witness “guessed” about what would comply with the standard was inconclusive); Sacred Heart Hosp. of Norristown v. E.B. O’Reilly Serv. Corp. (In re Sacred Heart Hosp. of Norristown), 200 B.R. 114, 119 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1996) (rejecting the defense because “the evidence presented by the Defendant was totally lacking in specificity, consisting merely of broad estimates of a wide range of delay time in payments”); Parkline, 185 B.R. at 166 (<HOLDING>). The Defendant’s expert did not present any
holding that an insured did not violate a similar voluntary payments clause merely by waiving a statutory credit for workers compensation payments such a clause pertains only to the insured voluntarily making payments or incurring expenses and not to a nonmonetary requirement simply to refrain from doing something holding that the action on the part of the corporation in making payments for so long a period without objection constituted a ratification of the agreement by the corporation holding that where the policy includes indemnification coverage to the corporation proceeds are not property of the estate where there is no proof of payments by corporation of payments holding that the industry norm was established by expert who presented percentages of the industry making late payments holding that the district court properly admitted expert testimony to interpret contract provisions having a specialized meaning in the railroad industry