instant motion to dismiss, the issue is whether Malac, as a foster mother, qualifies as a state actor such that a Section 1983 suit can be brought against her. The factual allegations of this case — that is, the Plaintiffs’ allegation that not only did Malac abuse Ethan, but that DSS agents colluded with her in her abusive behavior — render this an unusually difficult question. In general, the “state action” doctrine encompasses a number of tests for determining whether a non-governmental entity or official qualifies as a state actor for purposes of Section 1983. In other circuits, the courts applying those tests in specific cases have concluded that foster parents are not state actors for purposes of Section 1983. See, e.g., Rayburn v. Hogue, 241 F.3d 1341, 1349 (11th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); KH., 914 F.2d at 852 (“We may assume, without
holding that foster parents are not state actors holding that a private actors conduct was not state action just because the government failed to supervise that partys conduct holding that massachusetts statute did not create a sufficiently close nexus between private hospital and the state to warrant labeling private actors state actors holding that extensively regulated public utilities are not state actors holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability