over their management or disposition. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i) (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court has instructed, “[w]e do not lightly assume that Congress has omitted from its adopted text requirements that it nonetheless intends to apply, and our reluctance is even greater when Congress has shown elsewhere in the same statute that it knows how to make such a requirement manifest.” Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 125 S.Ct. 694, 700, 160 L.Ed.2d 708 (2005). Day points to nothing — in either ERISA or the caselaw interpreting it — to overcome this reluctance. Day undeniably had “authority or control”, over the “disposition” of the plans’ “assets.” The plans sent to Day checks made payable to him. Day then deposited the plans’ funds -22 (3d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); LoPresti v. Terwilliger, 126 F.3d 34, 40 (2d
holding that a termination of an erisa plans benefits must be based upon the plans terms and language holding that a bank which does no more than hold plan funds and generate reports is not a fiduciary holding that employers decision to merge plans did not invoke the fiduciary duty provisions of erisa holding a bank is a fiduciary under the disposition clause where it wrongfully disbursed the plans funds recognizing that benefit plans must designate a fiduciary to serve as the plan administrator