arguably below the norm. See Meyenburg v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 05-cv-15 DGW, 2006 WL 2191422, at *2 (S.D.Ill. July 31, 2006) (“33 1/3% to 40% (plus the cost of litigation) is the standard contingent fee percentages in this legal marketplace for comparable commercial litigation”). Indeed, using the market percentage method in the courts of the Seventh Circuit, as one court has observed, results in awards of attorney’s fees “equal to approximately one-third or more of the recovery.” Teamsters Local Union No. 601 v. Inter-Rail Transport, Inc., 02-cv-1109 DRH, 2004 WL 768658, at *1 (S.D.Ill. Mar. 19, 2004) (“In this Circuit, a fee award of thirty-three and one-third (33 1/3%) in a class action in [sic] not uncommon”); see also In re Mexico Money Transfer Litig., 164 F.Supp.2d at 1033 (<HOLDING>); Spicer v. Chicago Bd. Options Exch., Inc.,
holding proper basis for award of fees recognizing that an appeal filed within 30 days of the entry of an order awarding attorney fees was timely filed as to the issue of attorney fees holding that a class action tolls the statute of limitations only for subsequent individual actions not for subsequent class actions recognizing the established 30 benchmark for an award of fees in class actions holding that an award of attorneys fees under supreme court rule 38 precursor to rule 222 did not preempt an award of attorneys fees to which one is otherwise entitled and thus appellant could seek an award of attorneys fees pursuant to section 1577300 which permits an award of fees for a party prevailing in an action against a state agency