and supplemental jurisdiction over his PHRA claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. We have appellate jurisdiction over the final decision of the District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 6 . We have applied Twombly and Iqbal’s pleading requirements to employment discrimination claims, see Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-12 (3d Cir.2009); Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch., Inc., 522 F.3d 315, 322 (3d Cir.2008), but the quantum of facts that a discrimination complaint should contain may bear further development. This case, though, provides a poor vehicle for that task because Guirguis relies in large measure upon bare legal conclusions that would likely have been insufficient even under the pre-Twombly pleading standard. See, e.g., Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932 (<HOLDING>). They are certainly deficient in the
holding that a court is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged holding that the plaintiffs complaint was insufficient under twombly and iqbal because most of the facts alleged were actually legal conclusions or elements of the cause of action which may be disregarded on a motion to dismiss holding that district court properly refused to rely on affidavits to the extent that they contained only legal conclusions holding that at the motion to dismiss stage a court is not obliged to accept as true legal conclusions holding prior to twombly that courts were not required to accept the truth of legal conclusions contained in a plaintiffs complaint