v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 166, 82 S.Ct. 248, 253, 7 L.Ed.2d 207 (1961); Jones v. Thieret, 846 F.2d 457, 460 (7th Cir.1988) (quoting same). Jones v. Thieret aptly demonstrates the operation of this principle to facts similar to those of the instant case. In Jones, the Illinois trial judge had invoked the extended sentencing statute against the defendant because the judge opined that the defendant’s conduct was “exceptionally brutal.” Jones, 846 F.2d at 458 (citing People v. Jones, 73 Ill.App.3d 99, 29 Ill.Dec. 342, 391 N.E.2d 767 (4th Dist.1979)). The judge had applied an expansive interpretation of “brutal,” which the Illinois Supreme Court rejected in a later case. Id. 846 F.2d at 459 (citing People v. LaPointe, 88 Ill.2d 482, 501, 59 Ill.Dec. 59, 67, 431 N.E.2d 344, 352 (1981) (<HOLDING>)). In denying the defendant’s petition for a
holding that what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is a question of law holding that even though the governments conduct may have been negligent or even grossly negligent it did not rise to the level of flagrant misconduct holding that the word brutal contemplates only that conduct which is grossly ruthless or cruel and coldblooded holding that it is cruel and unusual to execute the insane holding that a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole for possession of 650 or more grams of cocaine is so grossly disproportionate that it violates the prohibition of cruel or unusual punishment in const 1963 art 1  16