inconsistent with Jacobson because they equate a person already willing to commit a crime with a person predisposed to commit a crime prior to being approached by the government. Under the district court’s instructions, the jury could have reasonably found that Williams was predisposed because he was willing to sell crack at the time Richardson arranged the crack deal. The jury could have made this finding without regard to whether Williams was willing to sell crack before he met Richardson. Therefore, because Jacobson and our subsequent decisions dictate that a defendant cannot lawfully develop a disposition during the course of dealing with the government, cf. United States v. North, 746 F.2d 627, 630 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1058, 105 S.Ct. 1773, 84 L.Ed.2d 832 (1985) (<HOLDING>), the district court’s instructions misstate
holding that a government agency seeking to enforce a prior order regarding prepetition acts of a debt or is not bound by a confirmed plan a if such agency fails to participate in the confirmation of such plan b if the obligations that such agency seeks to impose upon such debtor do not constitute claims c notwithstanding that such plan purports to treat such debtors obligations to such agency and d since it thus is not a named entity within  1141a holding summary judgment motions in abeyance for possible evidentiary hearing recognizing such an exception holding that such a decision was within the trial courts discretion holding prejacobson that such development was possible