ongoing, can never constitute a materially adverse action. Mot. to Dismiss at p. 9. Plaintiff responds that this decision, when viewed in context of all other events in this case, was sufficiently harmful to dissuade a reasonable worker from engaging in protected activity and is therefore a materially adverse action. Opp’n at p. 3. The Court of Appeals does not appear to have addressed this question, and neither party has identified a case directly on point. However, the Government cites to a number of cases in this District holding that placing an employee on paid administrative leave does not, in and of itself, constitute an adverse employment action for purposes of a Title VII discrimination claim. Mot. to Dismiss at 9 (citing Jones v. Castro, 168 F.Supp.3d 169, 180-81 (D.D.C. 2016) (<HOLDING>) (citing inter alia Bland v. Johnson, 66
holding that a period of paid leave does not qualify as a suspension holding that suspension with back pay was materially adverse because plaintiff presented evidence of a demonstrable effect involving objectively tangible harm which included personal bankruptcy two real estate foreclosures and negative marks on her employment record holding that the plaintiffs placement on paid administrative leave constituted an adverse action for purposes of a first amendment retaliation claim holding that initial paid suspension of two weeks periodically extended to total 19 months while an internal investigation was conducted is not an adverse action because plaintiff cannot show objectively tangible harm resulting from paid leave holding that employee does not suffer adverse employment action when placed on paid administrative leave pending investigation and citing cases