(In re Sholdan), 108 F.3d 886, 888 (8th Cir.1997); Fed. R. Bankr.P. 8013. 2 . Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). 3 . See 2 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 105.09[2][a], pp. 105-91 (Lawrence P. King, et al., 15th ed. rev. 1999) ("Perhaps the most common group of additional elements whose presence will result in an order for substantive consolidation is poor or nonexistent record keeping of, or commingling of, separate assets (particularly cash and other liquid assets) and liabilities and inter-affiliate transactions, whether by design or otherwise, that makes it prohibitively expensive or impossible to sort out the proper allocation of assets and liabilities.”). See also, e.g., In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., 860 F.2d 515 (2nd Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); In re Affiliated Foods, Inc., 249 B.R. 770,
holding that substantive consolidation should be allowed a when the creditors dealt with separate entities as a single economic unit and did not rely on the companys separate identity or b when the detangling of the intertwined companies is either impossible or costly holding unanimity requirement not violated when charge stated two separate counts with two separate and distinct offenses in each case holding the separate document rule violated when the alleged judgment was included with the memorandum and order of the court recognizing concept of joint employer when separate entities share or eodetermine conditions of employment holding that when the state prosecutes and obtains a conviction on separate charges as to which the rule of merger does not apply the state is entitled as a matter of law to a conviction and a separate sentence on each charge