(First) of Torts §§ 569 (libel), 570 (slander per se) (1938). Just as the common law permitted suit in such instances, the violation of a procedural right granted by statute can be sufficient in some circumstances to constitute injury in fact. In other words, a plaintiff in such a case need not allege any additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.” Id. (emphasis in original). The Court then offered two examples: “Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20-25, 118 S.Ct. 1777, 141 L.Ed.2d 10 (1998) (confirming that a group of voters’ ‘inability to obtain information’ that Congress had decided to make-public is a sufficient injury in fact to satisfy Article- III),” and “Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449, 109 S.Ct. 2558, 105 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989) (<HOLDING>).” Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. at 1549-50. Because the
holding that two advocacy organizations failure to obtain information subject to disclosure under the federal advisory committee act constitutes a sufficiently distinct injury to provide standing to sue holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue holding that employers have standing to sue holding that an informational interest in allowing the public to evaluate the advocacy document is not sufficiently important to sustain compelled disclosure of an advocates identity on the document itself holding that beneficiaries of an estate lacked standing under rico to sue for an injury derivative of the estates injury