for his removal.” Marin-Marin v. Sessions, No. 15-2074, 852 F.3d 192, 193-94, 2017 WL 1130182, at *1 (2d Cir. Mar. 27, 2017). It is well settled “that deportation, being a civil procedure, is not punishment and the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment accordingly is not applicable.” Santelises v. INS, 491 F.2d 1254, 1255-56 (2d Cir. 1974); see also INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984). Moreover, because removal is not a punishment, the Due Process Clause does not require an assessment of whether removal is excessive when compared to the grounds for removal. Marin-Marin, 852 F.3d at 194-95, 2017 WL 1130182, at *2; cf. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins, Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416-17, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003) (<HOLDING>). And, while the Supreme Court in Padilla v.
recognizing that the bill of attainder prohibits punitive legislation holding a court may not award punitive damages holding that a reduction in punitive damages to comply with the due process clause is a federal constitutional issue not a fact issue requiring jury consideration holding punitive damages nondischargeable under  523a6 when such damages are based on the same conduct as the underlying nondischargeable judgment recognizing that the due process clause prohibits grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor because such punitive damages serve the same purposes as criminal penalties