made to a debtor on or within ninety days before the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition). Such a motivation is not without precedent and is proper in light of the equitable nature of substantive consolidation. Cf. In re Giller, 962 F.2d at 799; In re Kroh Bros., 117 B.R. at 502. Absent express preservation of the trustee’s avoidance power, an order of substantive consolidation would ordinarily eliminate that power. For example, in Parkway Calabasas, the bankruptcy court held that the trustee’s fraudulent conveyance cause of action in an adversary proceeding was rendered moot by the substantive consolidation of two bankruptcy cases where the bankruptcy court order failed to preserve the trustee’s avoidance powers. See 89 B.R. at 834; see also In re Giller, 962 F.2d at 798-99 (<HOLDING>). However, “[t]he bankruptcy court has the
recognizing a distinction between the power of a federal court to hear statelaw claims and the discretionary exercise of that power holding that directors of an insolvent corporation are trustees for the creditors recognizing that ordinarily substantive consolidation would eliminate justification for exercise of trustees avoidance power holding that a commission is a body with special and limited power and it can only exercise the power expressly or impliedly granted to it and any reasonable doubt of existence of any power must be resolved against the exercise thereof recognizing use of ancillary jurisdiction in subsequent proceedings for the exercise of the courts inherent power to enforce its judgments