cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1071, 113 S.Ct. 1027, 122 L.Ed.2d 172 (1993). Moreover, after Lopez, courts have recognized that this de minimis standard continues in effect. United States v. Leslie, 103 F.3d 1093, 1100 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1713, 137 L.Ed.2d 837 (1997); United States v. Grey, 56 F.3d 1219, 1224-25 (10th Cir.1995). This is because § 1956 regulates activities that, in the aggregate, have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557, 115 S.Ct. at 1629 (stating that “where a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence”); cf. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154, 91 S.Ct. 1357, 1361, 28 L.Ed.2d 686 (1971) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Staples, 85 F.3d 461, 463
holding that congress may regulate purely local intrastate activities if they are part of an economic class of activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce holding that commerce clause did not provide congress with authority to enact civil remedy provision of violence against women act inasmuch as provision was not regulation of activity that substantially affected interstate commerce recognizing that  the interstate nexus requirement is satisfied by proof of a probable or potential impact on interstate commerce holding that the government can satisfy the hobbs act interstate commerce requirement by showing that the robbery resulted in the closure of a business engaged in interstate commerce holding that commerce clause authorizes congress to punish any particular criminal action even without proof of a relation to interstate commerce when the activity is part of a class of activities determined by congress to affect interstate commerce