outside intervention.” Id. Thus, Restatement (2nd) § 259(1) states that in the absence of a direction by the debtor, a creditor may direct application of a debtor’s payments but such application is not effective unless, within a reasonable time, the creditor notifies the debtor or otherwise makes the application known to the debtor. Under the Colorado Supreme Court approach favored by the majority, the creditor may apply the payments in any way the creditor desires. I do not believe the Colorado rule is consistent with fundamental principles of fairness and justice as such principles have evolved, and that such an approach only engenders the type of controversy which presents itself in this case. Cf. Bank of Hawaii v. Kunimoto, 91 Hawai'i 427, 436, 984 P.2d 1253, 1262 (App.1997) (<HOLDING>). II. Second, I agree that we should adopt
holding that a promissory note is not enforceable against a party who signed the deed of trust but did not sign the promissory note inasmuch as promissory notes and deeds of trust are separate legal documents with unique purposes holding that the option to accelerate a promissory note does not operate automatically but some act is required to effect such acceleration holding that a bank is required to notify the maker of a promissory note by some affirmative act upon exercise of its option to accelerate the maturity date of the note holding that because a mortgage provides the security for the repayment of the note the person having standing to foreclose a note secured by a mortgage may be either the holder of the note or a nonholder in possession of the note who has the rights of a holder holding that when the basis of the earlier suit was that the plaintiff had had defaulted on a promissory note and the claim in the instant action is whether that promissory note was valid the transaction test is met