During the suppression hearing, J.P.'s mother testified that she did not believe that J.P. had done "anything wrong with that barn fire" and told the officers that she thought it was a good idea if the truth came out during the interview. (Tr. 67). When J.P. admitted that he was present at the scene when the barn was set fire, J.P.'s mother started crying. Aside from J.P.'s testimony during the suppression hearing that he "felt that [he] had to" answer Officer Bickel's questions, the record does not contain any evidence of police force, coercion or improper inducement to secure J.P.'s statement. Id. at 72. Under the totality of the cireumstances, J.P.'s statement was voluntary and was properly admitted into evidence. See, e.g., Borton v. State, 759 N.E.2d 641, 647 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (<HOLDING>), trans. denied. 2. Sufficiency of Evidence The
holding that statements to the jury made by the prosecutor asserting that a defense witness was lying was improper but considering all the facts and circumstances revealed in the record which showed overwhelming evidence against the defendant such statements did not constitute a prejudicial error holding that the government bears the burden of proving voluntary consent under the totality of the circumstances holding that a witness could testify about statements made to him by a police department investigator because the statements were an admission by partyopponent and were thus not excluded by the hearsay rule holding that statements made in the course of negotiation were not contracts and such statements were merged into the final written agreement holding that the juveniles statements to police were properly admitted into evidence where the totality of the circumstances showed that the juveniles statements were voluntary