the likelihood to deprive a defendant of due process of law. Courts have inherent power to protect a defendant’s rights from being violated in a criminal proceeding. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 726 (1966) (requiring the police to inform a person in custody before the police can begin an interrogation of the person’s constitutional right against self-incrimination, the right to have an attorney present at the interrogation, and the right to have an attorney appointed for them if the person cannot afford one); State v. Lawrence, 167 N.W.2d 912, 914 (Iowa 1969) (stating the court has inherent power to limit attendance at a trial “to reasonably protect the rights of parties and witnesses”); State v. Eads, 166 N.W.2d 766, 768-69 (Iowa 1969) (<HOLDING>); Hall v. Washington County, 2 Greene 473,
holding that due process rights were not violated by the district court failing to expressly articulate that it was imposing sanctions pursuant to its inherent power recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals recognizing courts inherent power to issue subpoenas recognizing the inherent power of the courts to issue warrants holding courts have inherent power to compel discovery of the states evidence to protect a defendants due process rights