has adequately provided the quid pro quo necessary to allow it to assert the worker’s compensation immunity defense. Plaintiffs further contend that state law would prevent the United States from seeking subrogation if they were a private employer, and, therefore, since it is demanding reimbursement for its FECA payments, it cannot also seek the protection of the Worker’s Compensation Act, which would not allow for such a claim. While it is true that generally a private employer in Georgia who pays worker’s compensation benefits to an employee cannot later recover from that employee benefits paid should the employee subsequently recover from a tortfeasor for the same injury, this is not an absolute rule. See Aetna Insurance Company v. Windsor, 133 Ga.App. 159, 210 S.E.2d 373 (1974) (<HOLDING>). On the contrary, state law recognizes the
holding that the right of the debtor to claim property as exempt is generally determined on the facts as they exist on the date of the filing of the petition holding that the right to subrogation generally ceased to exist after the repeal of gacode ann  114403 in 1972 holding that if no notice was given prior to the institution of an action a condition precedent to the right to bring the action does not exist and the buyerplaintiff has lost the right of his remedy holding without addressing the potential impact of hcfas letter that the repeal of the boren amendment removed a partys ability to enforce any substantive right holding that subrogation rights are not security interests under ucc article 9