cannot be controlled by mandamus.” Wilbur v. United States, 281 U.S. 206, 218-19, 50 S.Ct. 320, 324-25, 74 L.Ed. 809 (1929). We agree with the district court that Edison’s showing falls far short of this high standard. To begin with, the Attorney General obtained the surcharge and now retains it pursuant to a federal court order. He is thus complying with — not violating — his legal obligations. Resisting this obvious proposition, Edison argues that the Attorney General’s possession of the surcharge is so plainly wrong that it amounts to a violation of a ministerial duty. In our view, however, this argument amounts to a completely inappropriate collateral attack on the Alabama court’s judgment. See Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 26, 63 S.Ct. 938, 941, 87 L.Ed. 1185 (1946) (<HOLDING>). Although Edison never formally asked the
holding that it is improper to exercise general jurisdiction when defendants purchases combined with its sales in the forum yielded 129 of its total income holding that mandamus is only available to confine an inferior comt to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so holding that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion by stating that it did not have the ability to present the transcript to the jury holding that an exercise by the state of its police power is presumed to be valid when it is challenged under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment recognizing the supreme courts longstanding jurisdiction over writs of prohibition and mandamus to courts of inferior jurisdiction