to them predicate acts that the jury verdicts did not. Similarly, Barragan argues that the court erred in attributing to him predicate acts of which he was acquitted or which were not formally charged in the indictment. These arguments fail. District courts are generally “free to make factual determinations not made by the jury and may base their ultimate decisions regarding the length of a convicted criminal’s sentence on these determinations.” United States v. Staten, 466 F.3d 708, 719 (9th Cir. 2006). Like our sister circuits, we have held that district courts may consider criminal conduct that the jury did not find—indeed, even conduct for which the jury acquitted—in setting the offense level for RICO sentences. See United States v. Mercado, 474 F.3d 654, 657 (9th Cir. 2007) (<HOLDING>); Carrozza, 4 F.3d at 77 (holding that
holding sentencing courts may consider evidence of conduct or charges of which a defendant was acquitted holding that a sentencing court may consider acquitted conduct or uncharged criminal conduct holding that the district court could constitutionally consider the acquitted conduct in rico sentencing holding that district court may treat acquitted conduct as relevant conduct at sentencing holding that a district court may not impose a sentencing enhancement based on conduct of which the jury acquitted the defendant