considering the one erroneous reference to him in Williams’s hearsay. C. Claims Based on Timing of Disclosure of Witnesses and Impeachment Material (Hughes) Hughes claims that his right to present a defense was infringed by the denial of his motion for discovery of the government’s witness list, or, as he styles it, the “anonymous witness procedure.” Since he did not know whom the government was planning to call to testify, the argument goes, he was less able to cross-examine witnesses, develop inconsistencies in their testimony, and, further down the road, impeach them. The constitutional right to cross examine has never been held to encompass a right to pretrial disclosure of prosecution witnesses. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559, 97 S.Ct. 837, 845, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Bolden, 514 F.2d 1301, 1312
holding the right to counsel extends to preliminary hearing where defendant enters a plea and such idea is put into evidence at subsequent trial white v maryland 373 us 59 83 sct 1050 10 led2d 193 to be retroactive holding that brady v maryland 373 us 83 83 sct 1194 10 led2d 215 1963 creates no government duty to disclose names of witnesses holding the right to assistance of counsel as announced in gideon v wainwright 372 us 335 83 sct 792 9 led2d 799 to be retroactive holding that counsel must be appointed to indigents for purposes of appeal as announced in douglas v california 372 us 353 83 sct 814 9 led2d 811 to be retroactive holding that exculpatory evidence withheld by government was not material for purposes of brady v maryland 373 us 83 83 sct 1194 10 led2d 215 1963 when there was considerable forensic and other physical evidence linking the defendant to the crime