is uncertain.” Chandras v. McGinnis, No. 01 Civ. 2519(LBS), 2002 WL 31946711, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2002); see also United States v. Zagari, 111 F.3d 307, 320 n. 13 (2d Cir.1997) (“The extent to which knowledge may be imputed from one federal investigative agency to another for Brady purposes is as yet unclear.”). At one end of the spectrum, it is clear that the investigating case agents on a particular prosecution are part of the prosecution team; their possession of producible material is imputed to the prosecutor regardless of his actual knowledge. See, e.g., Kyles, 514 U.S. at 438, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (rejecting the argument that a state prosecutor “should not be held accountable ... for evidence known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor.”); Morell, 524 F.2d at 555 (<HOLDING>). At the other end of the spectrum, government
holding sheriff not a prosecutor even though he sat at counsel table with the district attorney holding that the appellant therein showed a need for the information which outweighed the privilege the court held this despite the fact that police observed the seller on three separate occasions within the span of 24 hours on each occasion the informant was also an eyewitness the court found of particular significance the fact that the informant was the only civilian witness who actively participated in and witnessed the alleged drug transaction and that the appellant therein produced alibi witnesses at trial holding that seating arrangement in which the defendant sat in row behind counsel table did not impair the defendants presumption of innocence holding that inducement occurring before the informant was directed or supervised by the government could not support an entrapment defense holding government agent to be an arm of the prosecutor where he 1 actively participated in the investigation 2 supervised a confidential informant and 3 sat throughout trial at counsel table with the prosecutors