presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 1 . The district court’s order is not an immediately appealable interlocutory or collateral order. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). 2 . Our decision in In re Wright, 826 F.3d 774 (4th Cir. 2016), is distinguishable. The prisoner in Wright challenged, among other things, the execution of his sentence based on his claim that the state erroneously applied a statutory sentencing scheme, which adversely affected the calculation of his good-time and gain-time credits and which could, if successful, result in his speedier release from prison. Id. at 777; see id. at 779 (<HOLDING>). Unlike the prisoner in Wright, Hawkins made
holding that a district court lacks jurisdiction to review a second or successive  2255 motion where the movant failed to obtain authorization to file the motion from this court holding habeas petition was not second or successive where first petition did not attack conviction but alleged due process violation due to delay in adjudication of direct appeal in state court holding that a  2255 petition seeking only reinstatement of the right to a direct appeal does not render any later petition a second or successive petition under the aedpa holding that a petitioner may amend a habeas petition rather than filing a second or successive petition when the first petition has not yet reached a final decision holding that such claims required prisoner to obtain prefiling authorization to file second or successive habeas petition