18, 1997, when her time to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court expired. See Michigan Court Rule 7.302(C)(2). Although Allen’s brief is not clear on this point, she appears to argue that her conviction was actually final much earlier, on October 14, 1994, when the Michigan Supreme Court denied her application for leave to cross-appeal the Court of Appeals’s decision affirming her assault conviction. She argues for this earlier date in the apparent belief that it bolsters her contention that equitable tolling should be applied. See Part II.C.l. below. Because Allen’s conviction, under this theory, would have been final prior to the enactment of AEDPA, Allen’s time to file her habeas petition would have expired on April 24, 1997. See Austin v. Mitchell, 200 F.3d 391, 393 (6th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Allen, however, did not file her habeas
holding that habeas petitions challenging judgments of conviction that became final before the effective date of the aedpa are not time barred if filed within one year from aedpas effective date april 241996 holding aedpa applicable to petition filed on or after aedpas effective date holding that petitioners whose convictions became final before the enactment of aedpa had a oneyear grace period after aedpas effective date to file their federal habeas petitions holding that the aedpas tolling provision is inapplicable under peterson v demskie where petitioners conviction became final prior to the effective date of the aedpa holding that  2254 petitions of prisoners whose convictions became final before the passage of the aedpa are timely if filed within one year from the aedpas effective date