no “final adjudication of the action” within the meaning of the PSLRA because the district court “impliedly determined that [he] lacked statutory standing under the Exchange Act and prudential standing under [Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 728, 95 S.Ct. 1917, 44 L.Ed.2d 539 (1975) ],” Appellants’ Br. at 27, this argument is not supported by the record. Even assuming arguendo that a dismissal for lack of standing would not constitute a final adjudication for purposes of the PSLRA, the district court’s decision makes clear that it is an adjudication of the merits (ie., the timeliness) of Libaire’s claims, not a determination of whether he had standing to bring suit. See generally Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 228, 115 S.Ct. 1447, 131 L.Ed.2d 328 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, it is undisputed that Libaire is a
holding that under federal law the dismissal of a claim as timebarred is adjudication of merits for purposes of res judicata holding that an unappealed order is a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes holding that a dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is an adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicata holding that application of res judicata requires that a prior adjudication include a ruling on the merits holding that a federal courts dismissal of state claims without prejudice is not res judicata as to adjudication in either state or federal courts