identifies no case, nor is the Court aware of any, that has allowed changes to the actual text of a regulation that otherwise falls outside of the interpretative rule exception on the ground that those changes were merely technical or stylistic. In the absence of such precedent — and given that the interpretative rule exception is only reluctantly countenanced — the Court cannot conclude that a doctrine that forbids agencies from “constructively rewriting] [a] regulation” in the guise of clarifying it allows them to literally rewrite a portion of a regulation with the same justification. See Nat’l Family Planning & Reprod. Health Ass’n, Inc. v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 236 (D.C.Cir.1992); cf. British Caledonian Airways, Ltd. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 584 F.2d 982, 990 (D.C.Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the Court concludes that the
holding that the statute incorporated all the rights and obligations of the contract emphasis added holding that an order requiring the agency to search the records did not constitute courtordered change in the relationship of the parties holding an agency order to be interpretative where it clarified existing rights and obligations without any change in the content of the relevant language holding that a party who had demonstrated an injury sufficient to confer standing to appeal from an agency decision could raise  any relevant question of law in respect of the order of the agency holding that when the agency reopens a proceeding for any reason and after reconsideration issues a new and final order setting forth the rights and obligations of the parties that order  even if it merely reaffirms the rights and obligations set forth in the original order  is reviewable on its merits