paid by the witness, and the law enforcement procedures used to elicit the witness’s memory”); U.S. v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1101 (7th Cir.1999) (no abuse of discretion where district court excluded expert testimony regarding “the scientific bases for eyewitness identification” and “factors that give rise to suggestiveness and the likelihood of mistaken identification”); United States v. Daniels, 64 F.3d 311 (7th Cir.1995); United States v. Larkin, 978 F.2d 964 (7th Cir.1992) (finding that the “hazards [of eyewitness identification] are well within the ken of most lay jurors” and counsel was “granted ample opportunity at trial to discuss those hazards and cast doubt upon the witnesses’ eyewitness identification of his client”); United States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hudson, 884 F.2d 1016 (7th
holding no abuse of discretion to exclude expert eyewitness identification testimony where governments case relied on more than eyewitness identification holding that although no governmental action contributed to the eyewitness identification and no due process rights were implicated fairness required preclusion of the evidence holding admissible expert testimony concerning factors that may impair eyewitness identification and rejecting that concerning a particular eyewitness credibility and the statistical probability of eyewitness misidentification recognizing that expert testimony on eyewitness identification may not be totally unhelpful given that most persons do not understand the intricacies of perception retention and recall but holding that the district courts preclusion of such evidence was a proper exercise of discretion whether under rule 702 or 403 holding that federal rule of evidence 702 superceded the frye standard of admissibility of scientific evidence and that under rule 702 the district court had to determine that proffered expert testimony was both reliable and relevant