on the language of the statute while, at the same time, applying the statute in a constitutional manner. {¶ 13} The parties do not dispute that pursuant to R.C. 2152.19(A)(1) and 2151.353(A)(2), the juvenile court was statutorily authorized to commit J.D. to the temporary custody of FCCS. The disputed issue resolves into whether, after granting FCCS legal custody, the court could properly order FCCS to place J.D. at Cove Prep, a residential treatment facility. Although FCCS acknowledges the court’s authority to order FCCS to place a juvenile in an unspecified residential facility for treatment, as well as the court’s authority to directly place a juvenile in a specific facility under R.C. 2152.19(A)(2), it denies that the court may dictate the specific Ohio-2137, 2003 WL 1962419, ¶ 22 (<HOLDING>). {¶ 15} Despite the broad statutory authority
holding that proposition 200 does not apply to juveniles because its goals are redundant with that of the juvenile court system holding juveniles statement inadmissible when after being placed in custody police took juvenile to police station and held juvenile in area where adult suspects were held instead of taking juvenile to a juvenile processing office or any of the places listed as an alternative in section 5202 and placing juvenile in specifically designated office for juveniles recognizing juveniles right to counsel in certain juvenile proceedings recognizing the juvenile courts broad discretion in fashioning orders specifically tailored to address each juveniles particular treatment and rehabilitative needs in order to effectuate the purposes and goals underlying the juvenile court system recognizing that juveniles have no right to jury trial and that juvenile proceedings unlike adult prosecutions are rehabilitative in nature