to do so caused Appellant egregious harm. (2) Overly Broad Definition of Reckless Because' the applicable mental state of a result-oriented offense relates to the “result of the conduct” rather than the “nature of the conduct,” a charge containing the full statutory definition of the applicable mens rea is erroneous. Cook, 884 S.W.2d at 491; Anaya, 381 S.W.3d at 664. Here, Appellant contends felony-murder is a “result-oriented offense,” and therefore, the full statutory definition of “reckless” given by the trial court was inapplicable. Citing Price v. State, 457 S.W.3d 437, 441 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015)- (finding a “trial court errs when it fails to limit the language in regard to the applicable culpable mental states to the appropriate conduct element”) and Cook, 884 S.W.2d at 491 (<HOLDING>), she concludes the trial'court erred by
holding that a trial court errs by failing to limit the definitions of the culpable mental states as they relate to the conduct elements involved in the particular offense holding that trial court was not required to include all statutory definitions in its instructions but rather should refer only to those definitions having a rational basis in the evidence adduced at trial and not otherwise excludable holding that trial counsel did not act unreasonably in failing to raise the issue of the defendants mental health at trial holding defendant culpable for the natural and probable consequence   of his conduct holding that statutory appeal bonds relate to the jurisdiction of the court