assault and battery committed by Eugene,” and as such are barred by the intentional tort exception found in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). (ECF No. 10-1, at 17 n. 6 (citing Perkins v. United States, 55 F.3d 910, 916-917 (4th Cir.1995))). The intentional tort exception provides that the United States retains immunity as to “[a]ny claim arising out of [an] assault [or] battery.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). Indisputably, Eugene’s murderous acts constituted assault and battery. That assault could not form the basis for a direct claim against the United States. See, e.g., Stepp v. United States, 207 F.2d 909, 911 (4th Cir.1953) (concluding Section 2680(h) barred respondeat superior claim where servicemember used excessive force in shooting civilian); Wise v. United States, 8 F.Supp.2d 535, 542 (E.D.Va.1998) (<HOLDING>). In other words, the intentional tort
holding criminal sexual assault and unlawful restraint included offenses of aggravated crimi nal sexual assault and vacating convictions and sentences on former offenses holding section 2680h barred direct liability claim premised on servicemembers sexual assault and murder of civilian holding that merger did not apply because sexual assault was not a lesser included offense of seconddegree kidnapping involving sexual assault holding that conduct charged under article 120k ucmj was not plainly private when the sexual activity occurred while in the presence of two additional servicemembers in the unlocked barracks room of two other servicemembers who were reasonably likely to unintentionally observe the sexual activity and therefore the failure of the military judge to raise a lawrence issue sua sponte was not plain error holding that allegations of sexual assault by an employee of the church fell within coverage for sexual misconduct