Once the court has given an instruction, we must “determine whether the charge, taken as a whole and viewed in the light of the evidence, fairly and adequately submits the issues in the case to the jury.” Ayoub v. Spencer, 550 F.2d 164, 167 (3d Cir.1977). We will only reverse the district court if its instruction was capable of confusing and thereby misleading the jury. Fischbach, 750 F.2d at 1195. Consequently, we need not reverse if we conclude that the “jury would have reached the same result had it been instructed according to the correct legal standard.” Hopp, 194 F.3d at 440 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiffs § 1983 claim is subject to a two-year statute of limitations. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-78, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Smith v. City of Pittsburgh, 764 F.2d 188,
holding that in actions brought under 42 usc  1983 federal courts apply the states statute of limitation for personal injury holding that the state law of collateral estoppel applies in civil rights actions brought under 42 usc  1983 holding that federal courts apply the forum states personal injury statute of limitations for section 1983 claims holding that the states personal injury statutes of limitation should be applied for claims under section 1983 holding that claims under 42 usc  1983 are not personal injury tort claims