proof of the four factors alleged to permit intervention in lieu of establishing venue. Since, under that interpretation, we are not permitted to make our own independent evaluation of the propriety of intervention or joinder from the record, our review becomes a review of the trial court’s abuse of discretion — and then only for abuse of discretion with respect to its ruling on the four factors that permit intervention or joinder of plaintiffs unable to establish proper venue — contrary to the express mandate of section 15.003(c)(1). Not only is Collier’s interpretation of section 15.003(c) contrary to the plain language of that section, it is contrary to the Texas Supreme Court’s interpretation of it. See Surgitek, Bristol-Myers Corp. v. Abel, 997 S.W.2d 598, 601 (Tex.1999) (<HOLDING>). Collier would have us give absolute deference
holding that a ruling of the trial court to which no error has been assigned becomes the law of the case and is not subject to review by the court of appeals holding that an exhaustion of appellate remedies is required to make a trial courts ruling the law of the case holding that plain language of subsection 15003c requires court of appeals to make its own determination of the propriety of joinder under subsection 15003a with no deference to the trial courts ruling  emphasis added appellate court is not constrained solely to review the pleadings and affidavits but should consider the entire record including any evidence presented at the hearing holding that the appeals court may affirm the ruling of the district court on any basis which the record supports holding that the trial court properly added a party defendant to conform to the evidence presented at the trial