an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order of removal. Because the transitional rules apply, see Kalaw v. INS, 133 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir.1997), our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a). We review de novo, Molina-Estrada v. INS, 293 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir.2002), and deny the petition. Garza-Gorena’s sole contention is that he is a U.S. citizen and therefore cannot be removed for his criminal offenses. GarzaGorena’s alienage has been established twice, in his 1974 deportation hearing and in his 1987 conviction for illegal re-entry pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326. General principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel prevent him from re-litigating matters that were finally resolved in earlier proceedings. See Ramon-Sepulveda v. INS, 824 F.2d 749, 750 (9th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); see also Pena-Cabanillas v. U.S., 394 F.2d
holding res judicata ie claim preclusion doctrine applies to consent judgments holding res judicata also applies to those in privity with parties holding that res judicata applies when the question of jurisdiction is raised and determined holding that the doctrine of res judicata applies to deportation proceedings holding that the doctrine of res judicata is applicable to defenses that could have been raised in a prior action