due and owing at the time of the award or whether they are incurred in the future. Accordingly, we conclude that Foote’s claim in the instant case is not barred because he is simply asking the compensation court to exercise its continuing jurisdiction over medical benefits to enforce the terms of its 1996 award. See § 48-120(1) (stating that liability for medical expenses is “subject to the approval of and regulation by the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court”). See, also, Barnes v. W.C.A.B., 23 Cal. 4th 679, 2 P.3d 1180, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 638 (2000) (noting distinction between rescinding and enforcing award and holding that workers’ compensation board retained jurisdiction over award of future medical benefits); St. Clair v. County of Grant, 110 N.M. 543, 797 P.2d 993 (N.M. App. 1990) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION We determine that Foote’s claim
holding contempt proceeding inappropriate to enforce the trial courts order requiring payment of a sum certain within seven days holding that a federal court must enforce a state court judgment under the full faith and credit statute where diversity jurisdiction exists holding that the trial court had continuing jurisdiction over all subsequent custody orders once the trial court acquired jurisdiction holding that court had continuing jurisdiction to enforce judgment requiring payment of future medical expenses holding that district court had subjectmatter jurisdiction and yet that judgment void for lack of jurisdiction to render the particular judgment