The Landmark court expressly rejected the argument that restitution was due for contributions made in the spirit of performance under the contract. Id. Thus, Landmark directly forecloses Castle and Harlan’s entitlement to restitu-tionary damages. Castle and Harlan also contend that the $15.12 million damages award is justified under the reliance theory of damages.. This argument also fails. As we have previously explained, Castle and Harlan are the only parties who have standing to allege that they suffered injury from the alleged breach of contract. The other shareholder-plaintiffs cannot accomplish indirectly what they may not do directly; thus, Castle and Harlan lack standing to assert any reliance interest on behalf of the other shareholders. Cf. Glass, 258 F.3d at 1353-54 (<HOLDING>). Consequently, Castle and Harlan are not
holding that standing to sue under a contract requires plaintiff to be in privity or be an intended thirdparty beneficiary holding that the shareholders were not thirdparty beneficiaries because they were not directly benefited by the contract between the government and the thrifts recognizing noncontracting parties rights as thirdparty beneficiaries of an insurance contract holding that plaintiffs status as thirdparty beneficiaries cannot be used as both a sword to reap the benefits    and a shield to protect them holding that shareholders lack standing to sue as thirdparty beneficiaries to allegedly breached contract unless the contract indicates the intent to benefit them directly independently of their shareholder status