for belated appeal, while Missouri had no such rule in Streu and simply adjudicated the motions on an ad hoc basis. Whether the appeal was “pending” before the motion was filed, however, does not depend on whether a State has codified the procedure for belated appeals. Missouri (through decisional law) and Arkansas (through Rule. 2(e)) both allow for belated appeals based on motions that are filed months after the ordinary time for filing an appeal has expired. Streu established that even when the court grants a motion to proceed with a belated appeal, the application for post-conviction relief is not considered “pending” during the period after the original deadline and before the motion for belated appeal is granted. Accord Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 806-07 (10th Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>). The district court thus ruled correctly that
holding that an appeal was not moot because the amendment to the ordinance at bar did not give the petitioner the relief sought so that the petitioners claim and injury remain viable holding that despite state rules that allow a petitioner to file an appeal out of time a petitioners state postconviction relief was not pending until the petitioner complied with those state procedures to seek an appeal holding petitioner not entitled to habeas relief on claim state court improperly used petitioners prior federal offense to enhance punishment holding federal habeas proceeding was properly dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies when petitioners direct appeal from resentencing was still pending in state court at the time he sought habeas relief holding that the granting of an application to file an appeal out of time is considered part of the direct appeal process under oklahoma law