Board’s ability to consider plaintiffs claims. Defendants further contend that there is no jurisdiction here because Congress expressly granted the PTO authority and discretion “to establish regulations governing the conduct of proceedings in the Office,” including the procedures, deadlines, and requirements for the examination of applications. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A); In re Bogese, 303 F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed.Cir.2002). But even where the manner of an agency’s action is left to that agency’s discretion, courts may compel the agency to take discrete and legally required agency action without dictating the content of that action. SUWA, 542 U.S. at 65, 124 S.Ct. 2373; Kaufman v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1334, 1338 (D.C.Cir.2008); see also Hamandi v. Chertoff, 550 F.Supp.2d 46, 50 (D.D.C.2008) (<HOLDING>). It is plain, therefore, that even though the
holding that warning that this plea may have a bearing on whatever relationship you have with the immigration and naturalization service completely failed to specify consequences of plea as required by statute holding that all convictions remain valid for immigration purposes holding that regulations that permitted an immigration official to reinstate removal orders violated the immigration and nationality act holding that the plaintiffs could not recover fees for postlitigation administrative proceedings before the immigration and naturalization service because the pjroceedings under the immigration and nationality act lacked the specific features of the ssa proceedings that in hudson demonstrated the intimate tie between administrative and judicial proceedings holding that where us citizenship and immigration services was required to adjudicate naturalization applications it was required by the apa to do so within a reasonable time regardless of whether the immigration and naturalization act specifies a timeframe for action