in an Article III court with the safeguards to which criminal defendants are entitled, including the right not to provide adverse testimony and entitlement to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Ninestar cites United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 114 S.Ct. 2552, 129 L.Ed.2d 642 (1994), in which the Court stated that a monetary penalty is akin to “criminal contempt,” for in cases “[w]here a fine is not compensatory, it is civil only if the contemnor is afforded an opportunity to purge.” Id. at 829, 114 S.Ct. 2552. In Bagwell the Court held that a contempt fine of $52 million against the United Mine Workers for violation of a labor injunction was criminal in nature and required a jury trial. See also United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993) (<HOLDING>). In Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99,
holding that an individual charged with criminal contempt is entitled to the full procedural protections afforded the defendant in any other criminal proceeding holding that proceedings to revoke supervised release  need not comply with the procedural protections constitutionally guaranteed for criminal prosecutions holding that constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants through the sixth amendment apply in nonsummary criminal contempt prosecutions just as they do in other criminal prosecutions holding that a criminal defendant has a sixth amendment right to counsel at trial holding that constitutional protections against double jeopardy apply to a defendant prosecuted as an habitual criminal