of the legislature’s express purpose, we look to analogous federal precedent for guidance when interpreting the Texas Act. See NME Hosps., Inc. v. Rennets, 994 S.W.2d 142, 144 (Tex.1999). The United States Supreme Court has held that Title VII protects an employee from reverse discrimination, that is, employer discrimination against a member of a historically favored group. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280, 96 S.Ct. 2574, 49 L.Ed.2d 493 (1976). An employer’s decision to terminate a person’s employment violates the TCHRA when that decision was based on sex, whether that sex be male or female. See Martinez v. El Paso County, 710 F.2d 1102, 1105-06 (5th Cir.1983) (discussing Title VII); see also Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.Bd 419, 425 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). In review of Coastal Mart’s appeal, the
holding white female employee lacks standing under title vii to allege injury on behalf of black applicants to employment agency who were discriminated against because of race holding that an employers decision to terminate and individuals employment based on race is a violation of title vii regardless of whether that person is white or black holding allegations of race discrimination insufficiently specific to overcome assertion of qualified immunity where plaintiff alleged that employer customarily and habitually treated black employees in a less favorable fashion than white employees and her adverse comments about plaintiff based upon race and based upon plaintiffs protesting unjustified employment actions against him was  a proximate cause of an adverse employment decision holding that white woman who was not object of discrimination but who alleged injury because of race discrimination against another was a person aggrieved within the meaning of title vii holding that custody decision based on race is not justified