that Baldón was aware he had little expectation of privacy after he signed the parole agreement. On appeal, the State reiterated its claim of consent. Alternatively, however, the State argued the search was reasonable under a general search-and-seizure analysis because Baldon’s minimal expectation of privacy was outweighed by the interests of society in managing parolees and preventing recidivism, as well as reasonable suspicion. We find the State waived the general reasonableness argument by not presenting it ict court that a balancing test under article I, section 8 would weigh in favor of the State in this case. For sure, the evidence at the suppression hearing was directed at Baldon’s parole status and putative consent as the basis for the search. See Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 291 (<HOLDING>). The State did not introduce evidence of any
holding that notwithstanding an agreement the state still must have reasonable grounds for investigating whether a parolee has violated the terms of parole or committed a crime holding that arrest of a parolee for parole violation does not trigger the speedy trial period for the underlying offense holding parolee waives constitutional searchandseizure rights by voluntarily signing parole agreement holding that parole status alone is insufficient to justify search of a parolee holding parolee consented to search of his email based on the parole agreement