§ 3161(h)(7) to a defendant, the delay must meet the reasonableness requirement of § 3161(h)(6),” and noting that the reasonableness requirement “comports with Supreme Court precedent”); United States v. Stephens, 489 F.3d 647, 655 (5th Cir.2007) (“Attribution of the excludable delay of one co-defendant to another co-defendant is not, however, automatic; rather the period of delay must be reasonable”) (citing Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 326-27, 106 S.Ct. 1871, 90 L.Ed.2d 299 (1986)); United States v. Cordova, 157 F.3d 587, 599 (8th Cir.1998) (applying reasonableness requirement to and finding reasonable an 80-day delay in co-defendant’s trial resulting from another co-defendant’s capture and identity hearing); United States v. Vasquez, 918 F.2d 329, 336 (2d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Mayes, 917 F.2d 457, 460
holding that limitation of liability clause was unambiguous holding that the codefendant clause exclusion requires a defendant to make a motion for severance in order to benefit from the reasonableness limitation holding that the enhancement requires that the defendant either threaten the codefendant witness or juror in his or her presence or issue the threat in circumstances in which there is some likelihood that the codefendant witness or juror will learn of the threat holding that similartransaction evidence against codefendant did not require severance given that trial court instructed jury that such evidence only pertained to codefendant holding that duration of limitation is a factor in determining whether limitation is significant