13 of the Convention applies in this case. Under this exception, a district court is not bound to return a wrongfully removed or retained child if the respondent demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner “had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention.” Hague Convention, art. 13(a); see also 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(B). We agree with the district court that Rivera Castillo’s argument is unavailing. As previously discussed in the context of our review of the parties’ latest “shared intent,” Asuncion Mota’s consent to her daughter’s relocation was conditioned upon her own ability to join father and daughter in New York. The failure of this condition annulled Asuncion Mota’s consent. Cf. Baxter v. Baxter, 423 F.3d 363, 371 (3d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Rivera Castillo also urges us to consider
holding there is no consent as a matter of law where the consent was given under coercion holding that legislature does not specify when consent must be given or limit the form or nature of consent to any particular type for purposes of compliance with family code section 102004a2 holding that the nature and scope of the petitioners consent and any conditions or limitations should be taken into account in examining a consent defense under article 13 of the convention recognizing that consent is an exception to the warrant requirement and that voluntariness of consent depends on the totality of the circumstances holding that a search exceeded the scope of the initial oral consent and was not validated by a subsequent written consent an allegedly consensual seizure must stand or fall on the basis of the consent preexisting the seizure