585 F.3d 1247, 1261 (9th Cir.2009) (en banc) (“[T]he scope of our review limits us to determining whether the trial court reached a decision that falls within any of the permissible choices the court could have made. In other words, the Supreme Court’s precedent convinces us that any ‘definite and firm conviction’ of the reviewing court must still include some measure of deference to the trial court’s factual determinations.”). Credibility findings demand even greater deference. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575, 105 S.Ct. 1504; see also Allen v. Iranon, 283 F.3d 1070, 1078 n. 8 (9th Cir.2002). When applying this standard of review, we necessarily incorporate an understanding of the appropriate burden of proof in the district court. See Marsellus v. Comm’r, 544 F.2d 883, 885 (5th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>); see also MacDonald v. Kahikolu, Ltd., 581
holding that burden of clear and convincing proof cannot be satisfied by mere conjecture or speculation holding that the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof applicable in fraud actions does not apply to the proof of misrepresentations under ors 743612 holding that a finding of fraud may be reversed only for clear error but that the finding must be judged in view of the clear and convincing burden of proof holding that fraud on the court must be supported by clear unequivocal and convincing evidence holding that despite the lack of a statutory requirement that severe child abuse be shown by clear and convincing evidence due to the consequences of such a finding the clear and convincing standard must be applied