. Id. 10 . 527 U.S. 373, 377, 119 S.Ct. 2090, 144 L.Ed.2d 370 (1999) (explaining that the jury's finding of the statutory intent and statutory aggravating factors under the FDPA comprises the eligibility phase of sentencing). 11 . See id. (explaining that once the defendant is death eligible, the jury may consider non-statutory factors in making the “selection decision,” i.e., the decision whether to recom mend a punishment of life imprisonment or death). See also United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232, 240 (5th Cir.1998) (noting that the jury may consider non-statutory aggravating factors only after finding the existence of statutory aggravating factors). 12 . See also United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 298 (4th Cir.2003), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 627, 160 L.Ed.2d 456 (2004) (<HOLDING>). 13 . Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788,
holding death penalty proportionate where there were two aggravating factors  avoiding arrest and commission during course of a burglary  with some nonstatutory mitigation holding imposition of the death penalty proportionate where the trial court found two aggravating circumstances ccp and contemporaneous murder two statutory mitigating factors and a number of nonstatutory mitigating factors holding that the grand jury need not find nonstatutory aggravating factors holding that the fifth amendment does not require the government to charge nonstatutory aggravating factors in the indictment because the finding of a nonstatutory aggravated alone will not support imposition of the death penalty holding that failure to charge nonstatutory aggravating factors in indictment is not constitutional error because under the fdpa only statutory factors expose a criminal defendant to the death penalty