the plain meaning of ERISA. The State tries to distinguish Cunningham by incorrectly suggesting that the decision turned on the FLSA’s definition of “employer,” which expressly includes a “public agency.” While the FLSA does define “employer” to include a “public agency,” 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), that definition played no role in Cunningham, where the relevant statute imposed liability upon any “person” who violates the FLSA, not any “employer.” Cunningham, 108 F.3d 1376, 1997 WL 123750, at *2 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)). And the Sixth Circuit'reached its holding even though the FLSA’s definition of “person,” unlike the ELSA’s definition of “employer,” does not explicitly list local governments. Compare , 29 U.S.C. § 203(a) (person), wi 8, 64, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (<HOLDING>); This presumption, of course, does not impose
holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of  1983 holding that person in 42 usc  1983 does not include states holding that suits under 42 usc  1983 do not override state immunity holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 holding state university is not a person under  1983