applied”—meaning they only challenge' the facially neutral voting procedures insofar as the procedures apply unequally to rural voters, (See Docket No. 155, at 61 & 61 n. 10). They do not argue or allege that the voting procedures burden San Juan County voters generally, only those who live in rural- areas. This challenge may be incomplete, however, without some allegation or proof of a discriminatory purpose. See Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 207, 128 S.Ct. 1610, 170 L.Ed.2d 574 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“A voter complaining about a [facially neutral] law’s effect on him has no valid equal-protection claim because, without proof of discriminatory intent, a generally applicable law with disparate impact is not unconstitutional.”); Gamza, 619 F.2d át 453-54 (<HOLDING>); Harris Cty. Dep't of Educ. v. Harris Cty.,
holding that a claim of inadvertent errors in administration of election procedure without some allegation of intentional discriminatory conduct did not properly allege a denial of equal protection of the laws holding that segregation in public education is a denial of equal protection of the laws holding intentional or purposeful discrimination a necessary element of equal protection violation holding proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose required to show equal protection violation holding the statutory scheme of two federal laws was not void for vagueness and did not violate equal protection or due process even though the defendants conduct violated both laws