of Blakely. But “[wjithout an express waiver by the state, a federal court is allowed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) to grant a state prisoner’s habeas petition only if the petitioner has exhausted all available state remedies.” Bronshtein v. Horn, 404 F.3d 700, 725 (3d Cir.2005). Here, it is clear that Sharrieff has not exhausted all available state remedies. He does not dispute the State’s assertion that he could obtain relief through state post-conviction proceedings. And since the Supreme Court of New Jersey exercises discretionary review, N.J. Ct. R. 2:12-4, it was not enough for Sharrieff to assert, for the first and only time in state court, his Blakely claim in his petition for certification. See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S.Ct. 1056, 103 L.Ed.2d 380 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, even though the State concedes
holding that the injunction did not constitute a claim holding that the submission of a new claim to a states highest court on discretionary review does not constitute a fair presentation of that claim for exhaustion purposes holding that presentation of an untimely petition to the states highest court satisfied the exhaustion requirement holding that the united states court of federal claims does not have jurisdiction over a new claim or a claim of different scope that was not previously presented and certified to the contracting officer for decision holding by implication that where a claimant fails to return to the secretary a formal claim application within one year of the submission of his informal claim his informal claim is not a cognizable claim for effective date purposes