because the Rogerses' no-evidence motion addressed only McCoy’s fraud claims. Compare Maranatha Temple, Inc. v. Enter. Prods. Co., 893 S.W.2d 92, 106 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (declining to address only unchallenged grounds after addressing challenged grounds) with Smith v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 7 S.W.3d 287, 290-91 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet) (affirming summary judgment on all possible grounds because unchallenged ground would have been dispositive of entire case). 7 . As part of issues two and three, McCoy contends that he was not provided the opportunity to “point out property to be levied upon,” as required by rule 637. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 637; Collum v. DeLoughter, 535 S.W.2d 390, 393 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). McCoy did not, however, present this argument
holding that even though statute did not provide for attorneys fees against county its failure to object constituted waiver holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate holding that failure of executing officer to provide opportunity for debtor to designate property for levy constituted irregularity holding debtor could include property because the bank accepted payments directly from the debtor and had previously allowed the debtor to cure default holding that failure to furnish proper training instruction training manuals and documents to officer who injured plaintiff failure to provide adequate tests for that officer and failure to discipline that officer fell outside ttcas property waiver