at 125, 644 N.Y.S.2d 919. The City’s theory was that both it and the paint manufacturer had a duty to the tenants arising from the introduction of lead-based paint into their living residences, and so it would pay to remove the hazard and then sue the manufacturer for indemnification. Here, by contrast, the City alleges that Amtrak owed the City a duty to remove its electrical equipment from the bridge (which the City owned) and that the City owed the public a duty to keep the bridge in good repair. The City does not argue that, in paying for the removal of the electrical equipment, the City was performing its duty, but rather that it was performing Amtrak’s duty to it. That does not amount to a claim for indemnification, and so the court will grant summary judgment to Amtrak. IV 4) (<HOLDING>). 3 . See Jarcho Decl., Ex. 15 (Deed from Penn
holding that the restraint of a covenant not to compete must be reasonable under the facts and circumstances of the particular case and that only a legitimate business interest may be protected by the covenant holding that a roadway benefitting land outside the subdivision was not a residential purpose and was therefore a violation of the restrictive covenant holding that a roadway is a structure and its construction would violate the restrictive covenant limiting the land to residential purposes holding employment agreement consisting entirely of a covenant not to compete unenforceable because the covenant must be supported by valuable consideration holding that covenant to maintain and repair fences runs with the land and is an encumbrance