single question strongly implied that Leja had “said nothing” to police upon her arrest in Mississippi. But Leja never answered the question, and the jury was instructed to disregard it. The general rule is that the jury must be presumed to have followed the trial court’s instructions. See State v. Pippitt, 645 N.W.2d 87, 94 (Minn.2002). This is not a case of repeated questioning aimed at planting an improper inference. See State v. Harris, 521 N.W.2d 348, 352-53 n. 5 (Minn.1994) (questioning whether curative instruction would have prevented prejudice from repeated improper questioning). Rather, the prosecutor’s question was brief, although, as the last question on cross-examination and one followed by a lengthy bench conference, it was not “undramatic.” Cf. Dunkel, 466 N.W.2d at 429 (<HOLDING>). But the jury had already heard abundant
holding that in order to conclude that federal constitutional error is harmless court must find that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt holding that brief undramatic reference to defendants prearrest silence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt holding that harmless beyond a reasonable doubt analysis not applicable in habeas cases holding that appellate court should review error in trial procedure to determine if it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt holding that trial court must determine whether fifth amendment violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt