in the intra-district transfer program, because all parents in the district had to pay for transportation costs in order to participate in the program. Id. at 971-72. We concluded all of the disabled child’s educational needs were being met by the school within the neighborhood boundaries, and the request for transportation to a school outside the boundaries was “for reasons of parental preference” only. Id. at 973. In short, Timothy H. indicates a school district may apply a facially neutral transportation policy to a disabled child without violating the law when the request for a deviation from the policy is not based on the child’s educational needs, but on the parents’ convenience or preference. See also N. Allegheny Sch. Dist. v. Gregory P., 687 A.2d 37, 40 (Pa.Commw.Ct.1996) (<HOLDING>). We conclude Timothy H. controls our decision
recognizing that a school district must be a prevailing party in order to be entitled to attorneys fees under the idea holding that the idea requires a school district to provide the educational equivalent of a serviceable chevrolet  not  a cadillac holding that when a school district  knows or should know that a disabled childs educational program is deficient yet fails to correct the problem the child is entitled to compensatory education for a period equal to the period of deprivation but excluding the time reasonably required for the school district to rectify the problem holding that a school district was not required to move a nurse to a students neighborhood school to comply with the idea holding idea requires transportation of disabled child only to address his educational needs and does not require school district to accommodate a parents unrelated noneducational preferences