decision to place their cotton in the program, which decision was made postpetition (by submitting their application). Their right to the LDP, it is argued, could not have become fixed until the day they actually filed their application because only then would the average world price of cotton be known. 14. That the Government’s liability to Debtors depended on Debtors’ decision to place their cotton in the LDP program and on the adjusted world price of cotton makes the Government’s liability to Debtors contingent and unliquidated. The critical factor is whether the Debtors’ right to an LDP accrued prepetition. See 11 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2002); § 101(12); § 101(5)(A); Sherman v. First City Bank of Dallas (In the Matter of United Sciences of Am., Inc.), 893 F.2d 720, 724 (5th Cir.l990)(<HOLDING>). 15. Characterizing the LDP as a
holding that a postpetition claim under section 1305 is a liability that arises postpetition and relates only to postpetition activity holding that debt from debtor to bank in the form of chargebacks to the debtors account for credit card transaction rescissions was prepetition debt even though customers rescinded transactions postpetition and the bank therefore chargedback postpetition because a customers right to rescind and thereby the banks right to chargeback accrued at the time the customer made a purchase even though such customer exercised his right to rescind postpetition holding a bank officer who informed a third party that it would be safe to extend 8000 credit to bank customer although customer did not have an open account at the bank could be held liable for the material misrepresentation holding that a banks claim of irreparable harm through delay of postpetition interest payments was insufficient to lift the automatic stay under the provisions of section 1301 as the debtor proposed to pay 100 of the plan including postpetition interest holding that bank had right to set off funds in a customers account against debt that the bank customer had incurred as a surety or guarantor