our courts have viewed áctions for UM benefits either as contract actions, see, e.g., Howard v. Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 373 So.2d 628, 629 (Ala.1979), or as “unique,” because they contain elements of both contract actions and tort actions, see Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ryan, 589 So.2d 165, 167 (Ala.1991). Third, Alabama courts have never held that “any defense” that is theoretically available to the uninsured motorist is also available to the insurer. Instead, our courts have stated that the insurer has available to it the “substantive defenses that would have been available to the uninsured motorist.” State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Griffin, 51 Ala.App. at 431, 286 So.2d at 306. Accord Allstate Ins. Co. v. Boynton, 486 So.2d 552, 558-59 (Fla.1986) (<HOLDING>); Application of Travelers Indem. Co., 226
holding that neb rev stat  446413le reissue 2004 barring actions for um or uim coverage when insureds underlying claim against tortfeasor expires is inapplicable when insured timely files action against tortfeasor in that circumstance applicable statute of limitations on claim against insurer for um or uim benefits is statute governing actions on written contracts holding that um carriers are subrogated to any substantive defense that the tortfeasor may have been able to assert against the insured holding that because plaintiff released the tortfeasor plaintiff may not assert a claim against the uim carrier because of the derivative nature of the uim carriers liability holding that section 319s mandate that the employer is subrogated  to the extent of compensation payable does not mean that the sole right to recover from the tortfeasor is in the employer rather the right of action against the tortfeasor remains in the injured employee and suit is to be commenced in his name recognizing that the insured and his subrogated insurer were seeking to recover damages arising from the same cause of action and thus holding that they may not split their claims into separate actions