summons] that said you must answer the complaint within twenty-three days or judgment will be entered against you, you didn't read that?" Id. at 20. Mr. Rogers replied, "No sir, I didn't." Id. Mr. Rogers also testified that he did not call the Kentucky attorney who had represented him in his previous lawsuit, "A person of mature years and judgment and this we will assume of appellant in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, may not idly ignore a summons to defend an action." Mason, 749 N.E.2d at 1292 (quoting Carty v. Toro, 223 Ind. 1, 7, 57 N.E.2d 434, 436 (1944)). Based upon this evidence, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Rogerses' motion to set aside the default judgment on grounds of exceusable neglect. See Mason, 749 N.E.2d at 1292 (<HOLDING>); Whitaker v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 415 N.E.2d
holding that neglect was not excusable where the defendants did not do all that they were required to do after they received the summons and complaint in that they did not contact a lawyer or make any other arrangements with respect to their defense holding that appellants fourteenth amendment due process claim did not require reversal where they failed to show that they were prejudiced holding that plaintiffs did not have standing because they did not sue the party with the clear ability to act holding that plaintiffs could not relitigate their claim that they were entitled to vsf benefits and that while plaintiffs could have raised additional claims in one or more of the foregoing actions they opted not to do so and they are barred by res judicata from doing so now holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorneys fees because plaintiffs rule 54d2 motion was untimely and they had failed to show excusable neglect that would justify extending the time they had to file such a motion