speedy trial statute and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The state court acknowledged that the right to a speedy trial is ■ grounded in the Sixth Amendment, but the entirety of its analysis centered upon counting days and continuances under the strict time limit set forth in Ohio Rev.Code § 2945.71. The court denied Brown’s claim, stating “appellant was brought to trial within the 270 day speedy-trial limit. Accordingly, appellant’s first assignment of error is without merit.” State v. Brown, 03-MA-32, 2005 WL 1385715, at *8 (Ohio App. June 7, 2005). This exclusive focus on Ohio’s statutory limit may have previously led to the conclusion that the court did not adjudicate Brown’s federal speedy-trial claim. See Lyell v. Renico, 470 F.3d 1177, 1182 (6th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Danner v. Motley, 448 F.3d 372, 376 (6th
holding that de novo standard of review applies on federal claims never addressed by state courts holding that a court of appeals should review de novo a district courts determination of state law holding that there was no adjudication on the merits and applying de novo review where petitioner presented claims based upon both federal and state law and the state court addressed them only in statelaw terms holding that review is de novo where there has been no adjudication on the merits in state court holding that when presented with petitioners claim based upon state and federal law and the state court confined its analysis  to state law aedpa deference does not apply