and sureties. Respondents contend that section 38-26-105 only applies to amounts directly payable to the laborer, and since the moneys involved here were to be paid to trust funds, this statutory provision is not applicable. We disagree. The trust funds in these cases, created specifically for the purpose of receiving payments of this type, comply with federal requirements, which preclude payment directly to the employee or to the labor union. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (1976). Nevertheless, benefits such as these are “payments . . . lawfully due” under the collective bargaining agreements involved here. The legislature has made no such distinction regarding to whom the payments are made, and we find no reason to establish one here. Cf. Hartman v. Freedman, 197 Colo. 275, 591 P.2d 1318 (1979) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court of the United States, in
holding that depriving an employee of vacation days to which he was entitled would constitute adverse action holding that the definition of average weekly wages and the range of alternatives set forth in the five methods of computing such wages as specified in the first two paragraphs of ncgs  9725 do not allow the inclusion of wages or income earned in employment or work other than that in which the employee was injured holding that vacation pay not yet paid to the employee was wages or compensation as defined by section 841049 crs 1973 holding that vacation pay is shortterm compensation because an employee must work six months before getting any vacation vacation pay was computed on the basis of the employees weekly earnings and if an employee was laid off he received vacation pay on a pro rata basis holding under indiana law that profits are not wages and neither is a fraction of profits wages and so a bonus that is based on the performance of a plant rather than on the time or determinable output of the employee is not wages either