See Heck, 512 U.S. at 484, 114 S.Ct. at 2371. Courts have further reasoned that “only terminations that indicate that the accused is innocent ought to be considered favorable.” Hilfirty, 91 F.3d at 580 (relying on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 660 cmt. a (“Proceedings are ‘terminated in favor of the accused’ ... only when their final disposition is such as to indicate the innocence of the accused.”)); Taylor v. Gregg, 36 F.3d 453, 456 (5th Cir.1994) (per curiam) (same); Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 193 (2nd Cir.1980) (same). Thus, courts have found that withdrawal of criminal charges pursuant to a compromise or agreement does not constitute favorable termination and, thus, cannot support a claim for malicious prosecution. See, e.g., Taylor, 36 F.3d at 455-56 (<HOLDING>); Laster v. Star Rental, Inc., 181 Ga.App. 609,
holding that criminal statutes of limitation should be construed in favor of the accused holding the same for malicious prosecution holding that a dismissal in the interest of justice was a favorable termination for the purposes of a malicious prosecution action where the courts reasons for dismissing the criminal charges were not inconsistent with the innocence of the accused holding that a  1983 due process claim that essentially contests the fairness of the plaintiffs prosecution  is  similar to his malicious prosecution claim and claims resembling malicious prosecution do not accrue until the prosecution has terminated in the plaintiffs favor  holding that pretrial diversion agreement in which accused must acknowledge responsibility for offense conduct does not terminate the criminal action in favor of the criminal defendant for purposes of bringing a malicious prosecution claim