court reasonably found them unhelpful when submitted after the hearing on the motion to dismiss. 7 . See also Hoover v. Rortwin, 466 U.S. 558, 567-68, 104 S.Ct. 1989, 80 L.Ed.2d 590 (1984) ("When the conduct is that of the sovereign itself, ... the danger of unauthorized restraint of trade does not arise.”); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51, 63 S.Ct. 307, 87 L.Ed. 315 (1943) ("We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature.”). 8 . A hybrid regulation is only potentially preempted because the private discretionary conduct it incorporates may not "in all cases [be] a per se violation.” Sanders, 504 F.3d at 910-11; see also id. at 919 (<HOLDING>); Fisher, 475 U.S. at 270, 106 S.Ct. 1045
holding negligence per se not applicable to violation of railroad commission regulation holding such agreements to be per se illegal holding that to be preempted as a per se illegal hybrid restraint a regulation must involve a delegation of market power to private parties that is per se illegal because otherwise the hybrid restraint could not be attacked as facially invalid holding that a maximum vertical price maintenance scheme is not per se illegal holding only that a particular ancillary restraint did not constitute a per se violation of the sherman act and remanding for a determination  of the case under a rule of reason analysis