(following Grayson). If the sentencing court believes that a defendant offered perjured testimony, the court may take that into account in imposing sentence. See United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 97 (1993) (“It is rational for a sentencing authority to conclude that a defendant who commits a crime and then perjures herself in an unlawful attempt to avoid responsibility is more threatening to society and less deserving of leniency than a defendant who does not so defy the trial process.”); see also Grayson, 438 U.S. at 55 (same); Noyes, 157 Vt. at 119, 596 A.2d at 343 (same). ¶ 7. The same principle applies if the sentencing court finds that a defendant suborned perjury. Fuller v. State, 860 A.2d 324, 333 (Del. 2004); see United States v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 208, 216 (2d Cir. 1992) (<HOLDING>); Fabiano v. Wheeler, 583 F.2d 265, 270 (6th
holding that there is no sixth amendment right to jury sentencing holding that there is no distinction in the right to jury trial between sentencing factors and elements holding that federal sentencing guidelines allow sentencing court to enhance sentence based on finding of suborned perjury even if there is no necessary inconsistency between jury verdict and alleged perjured testimony holding that minnesota stay of imposition is sentence for purposes of federal sentencing guidelines even if no term of probation was imposed holding federal sentencing guidelines are subject to jury trial requirements of sixth amendment