that Gentry was an incorrigible liar and had lied numerous times during the proceedings, including while under oath. See United States v. Lopez, 577 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir.2009) (distinguishing between favorable evidence that must be produced under Brady and material evidence whose suppression requires a court to set aside the challenged conviction or sentence). Specifically, correcting testimony or disclosing information related to Gentry’s criminal activity would have been redundant with the history of passing bad checks, petty theft and theft of rental cars exposed during Gentry’s testimony. Payment for transportation, meals and lodging to facilitate testimony is petty in comparison to Gentry’s receipt of immunity. Cf. Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 986-87 (9th Cir.2005) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Nor is it reasonably likely that cumulative
recognizing that the critical question is whether any present violation exists holding that napue error concerning a critical deal is material holding that sentencing is a critical stage of criminal proceedings and the offer of counsel must be renewed at each critical stage where the defendant appears without counsel holding that the most critical factor is the degree of success obtained holding that the critical vendor order was not a defense because it permitted rather  than mandated payment of prepetition claims of critical vendors