and Kilcullen’s motions to intervene has implications both for the court’s ability to grant the motions to intervene as well as for the permissibility of the petition to properly go forward. In addition to the fact that their motions to intervene came well after the thirty-day period for petitioning for judicial review, Towson Lubrication, Keplinger, and Kilcullen did not participate as parties in the Board proceedings in the PUD approval case. As we have explained, the first of the two requirements to establish a party’s standing to petition for judicial review is participation as a party before the Board. See Bryniarski, supra, 247 Md. at 143, 230 A.2d 289; see, e.g., Shore Acres Improvement Ass’n v. Anne Arundel Cnty. Bd. of Appeals, 251 Md. 310, 317-18, 247 A.2d 402 (1968) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, even if we assumed arguendo that
holding that the findings of fact conclusions of law and decision signed by the school boards president constituted the decision of the board holding that the district court was authorized to remand the proceedings to the board where the board failed to make required findings holding that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider whether the board had erred in finding that certain picketing was lawful because no party had raised the issue to the board either during the initial proceedings or on motion for reconsideration holding that an associations president who was not a party before the board of appeals was not entitled to appeal the boards decision granting a zoning application that his association had opposed in the board proceedings holding that the findings of fact conclusions of law and decision signed by the school board president constituted the decision of the board