in the context of an election case, even in the absence of a class action, and concluding that the case was not moot); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 756 n. 5, 93 S.Ct. 1245, 36 L.Ed.2d 1 (1973) (concluding that plaintiffs’ class action challenge to New York’s Election Law was capable of repetition yet evading review, although primary election had passed and the petitioners would be eligible to vote in the next primary); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 333 n. 2, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) (in challenge to a provision of Tennessee’s election law, concluding that, although plaintiff would be eligible to vote in the next election, the controversy was capable of repetition yet evading review); Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 882 F.2d 621, 628 (2d Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). We adopt the approach of the former cases,
holding that appeal was not moot despite the fact that the election had passed because there would be every reason to expect the same parties to generate a similar future controversy emphasis added holding that although the 1972 election had long since passed the case was not moot because the statute under review would apply to other candidates in the future holding that election case was not moot after election because there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining parties would be subject to that same action in the future holding that issues as to whether declaratory relief should be granted had become moot and would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction but that under hallman the entire appeal was not moot because there still was a live controversy as to whether appellee was entitled to recover attorneys fees under the declaratory judgments act and therefore issues regarding attorneys fees were not moot and would be decided holding that plaintiffs claims were not moot although the election was over because the same issues would affect minorparty candidacies in the future but failing to address whether fulani herself would be affected