there was no depi’ivation of due process here, where Schultz had a full year and forty-two days within which to file but chose to wait over three years because he incorrectly believed the law allowed him to wait. This choice is not “extraordinary circumstances beyond [a petitioner’s] effective control,” as discussed in Amboh, sufficient to trigger equitable tolling. We will not address any tolling arguments concerning Schultz’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim for his attorney’s failure to file a timely appeal because Schultz did not plead this claim below. A petitioner cannot amend his petition once a responsive pleading has been filed without permission of the court or written permission of the State. I.R.C.P. 15(a); Cole v. State, 135 Idaho 107, 111, 15 P.3d 820, 824 (2000) (<HOLDING>). The record here shows that Schultz did not
holding that even where postconviction petitioner reserved the option to file an amended petition in his opening petition simply filing an amended petition is insufficient to request leave to file an amended petition a motion for leave to file an amended petition was required before it was necessary for the district judge to consider the amended petition holding trial court did not err by failing to consider amended petition filed after hearing without leave of court holding a petitioner accomplished a full and fair presentation of his claims because they were included in a copy of the amended petition for postconviction relief which was attached in the appendix of his petition for review to the arizona supreme court holding that the filing of an amended petition in the same cause in which a final judgment had already been entered was like an original petition sufficient to invoke the trial courts jurisdiction holding that after original petition had been properly served on defendant failure to serve amended petition was not error since it contained only insignificant changes