recognized that her statements could later be used prosecutorially. {57} Next, the State argues that the statement cannot be testimonial because the trial court made a preliminary finding that it was admissible under the hearsay exception for statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. See Rule 11-803(D) NMRA. The State contends that this ruling necessarily indicates that “[the victim’s] motive for making the statement, and ... Tucker’s motive for eliciting it, was not to perpetuate her testimony for use in a future trial.” {58} We disagree. Even if a statement falls within the hearsay exception for statements made for the purpose of obtaining medical diagnosis or treatment, it may still be testimonial. See, e.g., State v. Stahl, 2005-Ohio-1137, ¶ 13, 20 912 (2005) (<HOLDING>). {59} In this case, the facts suggest that the
holding a victims statements to emergency room doctor not testimonial where the purpose of the examination was for medical diagnosis and treatment holding that statements made by a child who was brought to an emergency room by her mother were admissible when the child knew a doctor would conduct a medical exam the physician explained he was a doctor and he asked questions about medical history and performed a physical examination of the child holding that there was insufficient evidence that alleged victim made statements to forensic nurseexaminer for purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment in part because there was no evidence regarding alleged victims past experience with medical facilities or medical providers holding that statements in medical records given for the primary purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment are nontestimonial holding that federal rule of evidence 8034 the hearsay exception for statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment does not apply to statements made by doctors