or information, or the defendant’s status as the accused. Indeed, the focus of the instructions was on evidence in the case, namely, the defendant’s testimony, not on factors outside that evidence. We turn, therefore, to the remainder of the defendant’s claim, namely, that the lack of evenhandedness in the instructions impermissibly reduced the state’s burden of persuasion in proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and impermissibly burdened the defendant’s right to testify. We agree. The particular language of this instruction reduced the state’s burden of proof by permitting the jury to consider an essential fact or facts proven by the state, at least in part, from the jury’s disbelief of the defendant’s testimony. See People v. Russell, 266 N.Y. 147, 153-54, 194 N.E. 65 (1934) (<HOLDING>). The standard of proof beyond a reasonable
recognizing burden holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant holding that a similar instruction reduced the states burden of proof recognizing that the burden of proof is an essential element of the claim itself and that one who asserts a claim has the burden of proof that normally comes with it holding defendant failed to preserve burden of proof issue for appeal