from collateral attack, even if the decree divested a spouse of separate property. See Baxter v. Ruddle, 794 S.W.2d 761, 762-63 (Tex.1990) (“[A]n apportionment of retirement benefits in a divorce decree, even if improper, is not subject to collateral attack and will be enforced.”). Edwin correctly notes that most of these cases involved agreed property divisions, and that a party may agree to divest himself of separate property even if a court could not do so. However, at least one of these cases did not involve an agreed property division. See Barnard v. Barnard, 863 S.W.2d 770, 772-74 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1993, no writ). And in some of those that did involve agreed divisions, their “res judicata” holdings do not appear to hinge on the agreement. See Baxter, 794 S.W.2d at 762-63 (<HOLDING>); Echols v. Echols, 900 S.W.2d 160, 162
holding itself not bound by the opinion of another division of its own appellate district recognizing division of separate property to be contrary to statute and constitution holding that reconsideration of the correctness of property division was barred on appeal from the judgment enforcing that division holding res judicata applied to improper property division before holding parties were bound by their division agreement holding res judicata applied to unappealed division of military retirement benefits when that division was not preempted at time of divorce but would have been preempted by later federal act had that act applied retroactively which it did not