3—asking whether Bartush or Cimco breached first—asked which party committed the first material breach. This argument fails in light of the plain language of question 3 and the jury’s subsequent finding in question 4 that Bartush’s failure to comply was not excused based on a prior material breach by Cimco. See, e.g., Cont’l Dredging, Inc., 120 S.W.3d at 394. 8 . Having sustained Cimco’s third issue, we need not address Cimco's other issues. See Tex. R. App, P, 47.1. (requiring appellate court to address issues necessary for final disposition of the appeal). 9 . Cimco raises no specific issue on appeal challenging the jury’s failure to award it attorneys’ fees but requests in its prayer that we remand the case "to the trial court w App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). We therefore decline to remand the case to
holding party that failed to object to instruction conditioning submission of a jurys question on its answer to a question waived that partys right to have the jury make findings as to the subsequent question holding appellant could not complain of jurys failure to answer question because the charge instructed the jury not to do so based on its answer to a prior question and because appellant did not object to this instruction holding that party that failed to object to instruction that jury not answer a question based on its answer to the prior question waived that partys right to have the jury make findings as to the subsequent question holding that the failure to object to an instruction constitutes a waiver of error holding failure to object to conditioning instructions waived error arising from the jurys failure to answer question