testified on Watkins’s behalf in an effort to undermine the credibility of three of the Government’s witnesses. The district court found that counsel’s advice about the consequences of the 2005 proffer agreement was deficient but went on to find that Watkins failed to prove that the erroneous advice prejudiced him. The single witness that counsel would have presented would have offered, at best, tenuous impeachment testimony against three of the Government’s fourteen witnesses. As the district court explained, in light of the totality of the evidence presented in the Government’s case-in-chief, Watkins failed to establish a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different but for the erroneous advice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Watkins was also subject to the
holding that in determining the voluntariness of a waiver of miranda rights a court must evaluate the totality of the circumstances recognizing that totality of circumstances must be considered in determining permissible inferences holding that in determining prejudice a court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury holding that the court must consider the totality of the circumstance when determining whether a law enforcement officer faced an emergency that justified acting without a warrant holding that the reasonableness inquiry is based upon the totality of the circumstances in determining whether or not a search was reasonable