argues that Weber’s proffered reasons for not passing on Ms. Tesser’s name are incredible, and therefore the only rational conclusion is that he is trying to hide his discriminatory motives. In particular, Plaintiff points to the fact that Weber continued to employ and approve of Ms. Tesser’s work during the same period of time he claims that she began acting irrationally and incapable of taking on the position of principal. (Id. at 16-17.) As a matter of law, Plaintiffs suggestion that a clear showing of pretext establishes discrimination in this case is wrong. While proof of pretext combined with circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to prove discriminatory intent, it does not require such a finding. See Zimmermann v. Associates First Capital, 251 F.3d 376, 381-82 (2d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). In other words, the jury might have
holding on interlocutory appeal that expert testimony not always required by the terms of the louisiana product liability act to prove prima facie design defect holding the plaintiff satisfies the burden of a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence holding that a prima facie case is subject to independent review holding combination of prima facie case and evidence of pretext is neither always sufficient nor always insufficient holding that an employees attempt to prove actual discrimination requires more substantial evidence than a prima facie case because evidence of pretext and discrimination is viewed in light of the employers justification