because, if prosecuted for violating Wis. Stat. 941.29, his earlier felony convictions could have been predicates without violating the ex post facto clause); United States v. Matassini, 565 F.2d 1297, 1307 (5th Cir.1978) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1), the predecessor to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)) (determining Congress intended statutes prohibiting felons from possessing firearms to reach “persons convicted of felonies prior to [the effective date of the statute]”); Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 921 (1st Cir.1942) (finding, if a statute “is a bona fide regulation of conduct which the legislature has power to regulate, it is not bad as an ex post facto law even though the right to engage in the conduct is made to depend on past behavi-our, even behaviour before (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Cf. United States v. Baca-Valenzuela, 118
holding that the ex post facto clause  has no application to deportation holding no ex post facto violation because enhancement provision was already on the books when the defendant committed the 1985 firearm offense holding that the supreme courts ex post facto precedents do not clearly establish that amended section 29336 violates the ex post facto clause holding no violation of ex post facto clause because enhancement provision increases the punishment for being a felon in possession of a firearm that traveled in or affected interstate commerce and it does not affect the punishment previously meted out to the defendant for the  crimes he committed prior to the effective date of the statute holding that parole guidelines are subject to the ex post facto clause