at 583 (“This should be determined by examining the entire transaction and not by inquiring whether the defendant intended to take advantage of the consumer or acted with knowledge or conscious indifference.”). The Keys assert that that “[n]o ... factual circumstance can rescue a contract that expressly violates Texas public policy from being found unconscionable.” Accordingly, the Keys argue that because the legislature determines public policy through the statutes it passes and because LSRC’s form contract violates a statute—various provisions of insurance code chapter 4102 —LSRC’s contract therefore violates public policy set by the legislature (via insurance code chapter 4102) and is unconscionable. This is true. See Hoover Slovacek LLP v. Walton, 206 S.W.3d 557, 562 (Tex. 2006) (<HOLDING>); Sec. Serv. Fed. Credit Union v. Sanders, 264
holding that where a contract for legal services fails to expressly provide for the amount of the fee a reasonable fee is implied holding that where a successor attorney fails to inform the client of the clients duty to pay the predecessor attorney the successor assumes the obligation to pay the first lawyers fee out of his or her contingent fee holding provision in attorneys fee contract requiring client that terminated contract to immediately pay attorney fee equal to present value of attorneys interest in case was inconsistent with public policy and unconscionable holding that attorneys fee award in a common fund case must be  reasonable under the circumstances holding that where party has contracted to pay attorneys fees for collection of nondischargeable debt attorneys fee award also will not be discharged in bankruptcy