neither. The condition of supervised release that Qu seeks to challenge, even if it is an unreasonable one, does not exceed a “stat-1 utory maximum.” See Ferguson, 669 F.3d at 766 (rejecting challenge to.special condition of supervised release that defendant claimed constituted a sentence exceeding statutory minimum because it required a “strained construction” of appellate waiver and neither sentence nor supervised release exceeded statutory maximum or Guidelines range); United States v. Stevenson, 281 Fed.Appx. 85, 86 (3d Cir.2008) (finding that appeal of condition requiring defendant to submit to search of place of business was barred by waiver of appeal because challenged condition did not exceed statutory maximum); United States v. Hartshorn, 163 Fed.Appx. 325, 330 (5th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Appellate waivers foreclose challenges to
holding that there was no ineffective assistance for failing to hire a dna expert because the defenses theory was that the defendants dna was planted so the dna evidence would not seem to be an issue recognizing that in prior decisions the court had used the term inconclusive to mean that dna evidence did not exclude an individual but clarifying that in the future the term inconclusive would be used only when a dna sample does not contain enough dna to draw a conclusion dna is degraded or for other reasons a dna test yields no results or the examiner draws no conclusion holding the condition of supervised release that requires dna testing under the act is not unconstitutionally vague and therefore meets procedural dueprocess requirements holding that retroactively applying new version of dna act authorizing collection of defendants dna as a condition of supervised release did not constitute a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release