rights, flouts the plain language of the felony harassment statute, and risks undermining attempts to achieve the trust necessary to address juvenile mental health issues. It also opens the floodgates to prosecutions for harsh language that the speaker did not intend to be frightening in other areas, like the political context. For all of these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 12 The parties and the majority also cite State v. Williams, 144 Wn.2d 197, 207-08, 26 P.3d 890 (2001), as the source of our “objective” test for knowing threats (i.e., threats that are constitutionally proscribable and covered by our felony harassment statute). Majority at 893-94. But I note that Williams quoted the objective standard only in dicta because it was not at issue in that case. 144 Wn.2d at 203-11 (<HOLDING>). 13 J.M., 144 Wn.2d at 476-82. 14 Kilburn, 151
holding factor b is not unconstitutionally vague holding that felony harassment statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because it proscribed threats to harm a persons mental health but did not define that term holding  241 not vague or overbroad holding that washingtons harassment statute was unconstitutionally overbroad because it covered constitutionally protected speech holding  3631 not vague or overbroad