does not purport to claim different equipment than that also claimed by DKS, the pleadings suggest that there may be some dispute between Appellant and Respondents over the identification of the actual equipment provided to Respondents. No dispute about the identity of the equipment at issue was apparent in Trimco. In addition to demonstrating a right to immediate possession, the plaintiff in a replevin action must also be entitled to exclusive possession of the property. Vahey v. Vahey, 120 S.W.3d 288, 291 (Mo.App.E.D.2003). As a result, “[w]here sev eral parties have an ownership interest in the property, [and ownership is the basis of the right to possession], all of the owners must be joined in the suit.” Id.; but see Foulke v. McIntosh, 234 S.W.2d 805, 808 (Mo.App.Spfld.D.1950) (<HOLDING>). Vahey was a case in which four of seven
holding that one of the two owners by tenancy in the entireties was able to maintain an action in replevin to reacquire property taken from the land holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue a permanent nuisance action for injury to property because none of the plaintiffs were the owners of the land when the cause of action accrued with the first injury holding that in action by property owner to recover land taken by eminent domain current titleholder to land might be necessary party if district court were to restore land to plaintiff holding that the owner of the land could not bring a 93a action against a prior owner of the land who was not the seller because there was no business connection between the two parties holding that a cause of action for damages to property resulting from a permanent nuisance accrues to the owner of the land at the time the injury begins to affect the land and mere transfer of the land by deed does not transfer the claim for damages