with the disqualification issue. The mandamus proceeding was assigned to a different panel of this t a time when there was no final judgment or appealable interlocutory order. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014 (enumerating the types of interlocutory appeals that may be taken). His notice of appeal was filed prematurely, but it was deemed effective when the trial court finally dismissed the case for want of prosecution. See Tex. R. App. P. 27.1(a) (“In a civil case, a prematurely filed notice of appeal is effective and deemed filed on the day of, but after, the event that begins the period for perfecting the appeal.”); cf. Brooks v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. 14-12-01048-CV, 2013 WL 3477288, at *2 n.2 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] July 9, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (<HOLDING>). Hendricks also amended his notice of appeal
holding premature notice of appeal was treated as entered on date of entry of final judgment holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that a motion for summary judgment was not opposed holding that a premature notice of appeal from an interlocutory summary judgment was deemed effective when the trial court granted a severance and rendered the summary judgment final holding that an interlocutory appeal lies from a denial of summary judgment on a qualified immunity claim holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that motion for summary judgment was not opposed