compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (emphasis added). Citing this language, we have extended Title VII to situations where a defendant has interfered with an individual’s employment relationship with a third party. See Pardazi v. Cullman Med. Ctr., 838 F.2d 1155, 1156 (11th Cir. 1988) (concluding that Title VII covered a doctor’s claim that a hospital discriminated against him in denying him privileges which interfered with his employment at a separate corporation). Thus, Scott’s Charge of Discrimination against the Hospital — even if ultimately unsuccessful at trial — was cognizable under Title VII, so filing it was certainly a protected activity. See Rollins v. State of Fla. Dep’t of Law Enforcement, 868 F.2d 397, 400 (11th Cir. 1989) (<HOLDING>). We also conclude that Scott established a
holding that an employee seeking the protection of the opposition clause must demonstrate a good faith reasonable belief that the challenged practice violates title vii recognizing that title vii protects individuals from retaliation regardless of the merit of their complaints so long as they can show a good faith reasonable belief that the challenged practices violate title vii holding that relief granted under title vii is against the employer not individual employees whose actions constituted a violation of title vii emphasis in original holding that title vii protects an employees spouse from retaliation even though thirdparty claims are beyond the literal language of the statute holding that a title vii plaintiff could not hold coworkers liable in their individual capacities under title vii