would nevertheless violate those rights if taken in the absence of such state law. For example, a defendant convicted of larceny may be constitutionally incarcerated for 20 years if the applicable state statute provides for such a term. However, it is a violation of both state law and the federal Constitution for a state to incarcerate a defendant for larceny for a 20-year period if the applicable state statute provides for only a 10-year term. My colleagues err by concluding that merely because California could have constitutionally burdened Galin-do’s right to testify in his own defense by enacting certain rules, his constitutional rights were not violated when the state burdened that right in the absence of such rules. See, e.g., Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 672 (9th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). Because Galindo was induced to waive his
holding that a defendant who was denied the right to exercise half of the twentysix preemptory challenges he was allowed under state law had a federal constitutional claim cognizable on habeas despite the fact that the constitution does not require that a defendant be given twentysix challenges holding that courts should exercise judicial restraint and decide asapplied challenges before facial challenges holding that the constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges holding that where the appellants listed challenges in the statement of issues but failed to brief them the challenges were waived holding that sufficiency challenges are cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding