in other contexts not to limit the application of the relevant definition to that section only, see Johnson v. United States, 206 F.2d 806, 808 (9th Cir.1953), and there is no reason to believe a different conclusion should be reached when the word “chapter” is substituted for “section.” Finally, our precedent portends our holding today that “merchandise” under section 545 includes marijuana. Steiner v. United States, 229 F.2d 745, 747 & n. 5 (9th Cir.1956), opined in dicta that the definition of “merchandise” in 19 U.S.C. § 1401(c) probably applies to violations of 18 U.S.C. § 545, and Olais-Castro v. United States, 416 F.2d 1155, 1158 n. 7 (9th Cir.1969), assumed without deciding that Steiner was correct. See also United States v. Jerome-Oboh, 883 F.Supp. 917, 923 n. 4 (W.D.N.Y.1995) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Meza-Arcadia, 458 F.2d 31,
recognizing the irony that a state officials conduct may be considered  state action for fourteenth amendment purposes yet not for purposes of the eleventh amendment holding that student loans for debtors sons education were for family purposes and should be considered consumer debt holding that the combined effect of trial counsels errors should be considered holding that lawyer who acted as mere depository for funds was nominal party whose citizenship should not be considered for diversity purposes holding that hjeroin should be considered merchandise for purposes of the smuggling statute