RCRA and the analogous statute, explain the different outcomes. Given this, our responsibility is to follow the Supreme Court’s oft-cited instruction that “[i]f a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which dix-ectly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989); see also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997) (reaffirming this requirement). In my view, Porter and Mitchell, not Meghrig, “directly control” this case. Several r , 267 F.3d 687, 695-700 (7th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>), rev’d on other grounds, 537 U.S. 393, 123
holding that plaintiffs cannot claim that a conspiracy to violate rico existed if they do not adequately plead a substantive violation of rico holding that equitable relief under rico is available only to the government holding that claims for equitable relief under  502a3 are only available when a plaintiff has no other relief under erisa holding damages do not constitute other equitable relief holding that private plaintiffs can seek equitable relief under rico