fashion. See PSCNY, 813 F.2d at 465. The second time, FERC posited directly — with only the flimsiest of support — its theory that investors need over six months to ascertain and take into account the market interest rates prevailing at any given time. See Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 46 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,089, at 61,-383-84 (1989) (Order on Remand); Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 49 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,392, at 62,419-23 (denying rehearing of Order on Remand). I heartily agree with the court’s rejection of the Commission’s more recent explanation. At the very least, FERC was obliged to offer some convincing evidence in support of its facially implausible economic assumption, cf. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (<HOLDING>), and some explanation why accepting that
holding that the nonmoving party must produce more than a scintilla of evidence to survive summary judgment holding that summary judgment on chapter 93a claim is appropriate when summary judgment is granted on fraud claim and chapter 93a claim is solely based on the underlying claim for common law fraud holding that on a motion for summary judgment the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiffs position will be insufficient and there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff holding that for summary judgment purposes if the claim is one that simply makes no economic sense  plaintiffs must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim than would otherwise be necessary holding that where litigation involves more than one claim the origin of the claim test must be applied separately to each part