distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops. Carty, supra, 170 N.J. at 641, 644, 646, 790 A.2d 903. That is not to say that a person will not feel some degree of compulsion whenever a police officer makes a request. See State v. McCloskey, 90 N.J. 18, 24, 446 A.2d 1201 (1982); State v. Hickman, 335 N.J.Super. 623, 633, 763 A.2d 330 (App.Div.2000). Surely, during a field inquiry, when a police officer asks a question of a person on the street, although that person is lawfully free to leave, he may feel some compulsion to respond. Nonetheless, we do not mandate that police officers have reasonable suspicion before making an inquiry. See State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. , 934 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Detective Peacock did in this case what
holding that defendants consent to search his person while on board an interstate bus was voluntary even though the police did not tell the defendant of his right to refuse consent holding under state constitution that validity of consent search requires knowledge of right to refuse consent holding that persons knowledge of his right to refuse a consent to search is a factor but not a necessary prerequisite to demonstrating a voluntary consent holding that police must prior to entering the home inform the person from whom consent is sought that he or she may lawfully refuse to consent to the search holding that the mere assertion of constitutional right to refuse consent to search does not supply probable cause to search