(Id. at 465; see id. at 651-53, 660-63). He conceded, with respect to the Lighting division, that “if ... there was no buyer, no independent buyer ... in 1984, it would [have been] inappropriate to apply a control premium in determining the fair value of those businesses.” (Id. at 539). Yet, he failed to consider whether such buyers actually existed. (Id.). Instead, he assumed they existed and engaged in a purely “theoretical exercise.” His conclusions, therefore, amount to no more than theoretical speculation. See, e.g., Estate of Godley v. Comm’r, 286 F.3d 210, 215 (4th Cir.2002) (“A premium for control or discount for lack of control may be appropriate as a factual matter for several reasons.” (emphasis added)); Ahmanson Found, v. United States, 674 F.2d 761, 770 (9th Cir. 1981) (<HOLDING>); Eckelkamp v. Beste, 201 F.Supp.2d 1012, 1028
holding that payment under settlement agreement between insurer and insureds concerning disputed premium claims was a compromise that did not violate antirebate statute holding funds received by plaintiff from an insurance policy that was procured by the defendant and for which a premium was paid are not a collateral source holding that district judge did not err in declining to apply a control premium where party advocating application of such a premium did not prove existence of prospective buyer who was willing to pay a premium holding that taxable costs included only the premium on a surety bond posted on appeal not the fees paid for letters of credit to secure the bond where the state statute and court rule only specifically allowed for premium on any surety bond holding that no binding insurance contract took effect because the initial premium was not paid