environment,” the “economic benefit gained from the violation,” and “the state’s actual costs of enforcement”); see also id. § 8001 (explaining that the legislative purposes underlying the secretary’s civil-enforcement powers include the “protection of environmental and human health” and “prevent[ing] the unfair economic advantage obtained by persons who operate in violation of environmental laws”). These considerations strongly suggest, in turn, a legislative intent to assign the careful balancing of equities that must necessarily underlie the decision to impose such civil penalties, and the amount of any penalty to be assessed, with the agency traditionally entrusted with such decisions: a judge rather than a jury. See DiPirro v. Bondo Corp., 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 722, 747 (Ct. App. 2007) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 19. Our holding that the civil-penalties
holding that under the sixth amendment right to trial by jury aggravating factors that operate as the functional equivalent of an element of a charged offense must be found by a jury holding that where as here the state environmentalenforcement statute has delegated the assessment of civil penalties in accordance with a highly discretionary calculation that takes into account multiple factors this is the kind of calculation traditionally performed by judges rather than a jury and does not require a jury trial holding that the trial judge rather than the jury makes the determination of whether the defendant violated the implied consent law holding that the court has discretion to double check the reasonableness of the percentage fee through a lodestar calculation holding that the judges entry into the jury room constituted reversible error