at 1136, was inappropriate given the pattern-or-practice nature of plaintiffs’ claim. In particular, this factor encompasses factual issues relevant to both the first and second stages of the pattern-or-practice trial, i.e., whether the blocker policy continued after Lanik’s alleged repudiation and, if it did, whether a link existed between that policy and the individual employment decisions affecting the named plaintiffs. Although these issues could be considered in the context of a properly framed summary judgment motion, it was improper for the district court to consider, and effectively make findings regarding, these questions in determining whether the plaintiffs were similarly situated for purposes of certifying a class. See Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 668, 676 (10th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Anderson v. City of Albuquerque, 690 F.2d
holding that putative class members are not parties to an action prior to class certification holding that tolling applies to a subsequent class action when class certification was granted in a prior case holding that a district of columbia consumer protection statute that authorized representative actions and did not reference class action requirements or mandate class certification was a separate and distinct procedural vehicle from a class action and thus did not constitute a class action under cafa holding that where named plaintiff was employee of class counsel district court did not abuse its discretion by denying class certification holding that district court in making class certification decision should avoid focusing on merits of underlying class action