function exception where the action taken violated a legal duty.” Dougan v. Rossville Drainage Dist., 243 Kan. 315, 322, 757 P.2d 272 (1988). In the present case, we must first determine what duty was owed Lamb by the City before we can determine whether the court erred in concluding on a motion for summary judgment that the discretionary function exception was a defense to the breach of that duty. In Webb v. City of Oswego, 149 Kan. 156, Syl. ¶ 1, 86 P.2d 553 (1939), the Supreme Court held that “[a] city which owns and operates an electric light plant and distribution system for the benefit of its inhabitants is bound to the same degree of care in the maintenance thereof as though' it were an ordinary public utility.” See Gilmore v. Kansas City, 157 Kan. 552, 554, 142 P.2d 699 (1943) (<HOLDING>). “The degree of care required of distributors
holding that city attorneys promise in an oral settlement agreement for city to annex and rezone land was within the legal authority of the city of joliet to accomplish and were not absolutely void acts per se therefore city could be estopped from avoiding enforcement of contract holding that a jurys finding that a city had delegated its final policymaking authority in the area of law enforcement to a city police chief was supported by the evidence and warranted imposing liability upon the city holding that a city manager was the final policymaker for purposes of section 1983 liability because of provisions in the norfolk city code requiring that all orders rules and regulations applicable to the entire police department must be approved by the city manager other than some police standard operating procedures holding a city liable for personal injuries caused by a driver colliding with a girder in the center of a city street where the city did not give a warning recognizing the holding in webb and stating operation of the plant for the city by a separate agency does not relieve the city from liability