court to conduct FAA analysis, the panel in Wedding affirmed the lower court without any further instruction. Since the Wedding footnote amounted to dicta that was not essential to the judgment in that case and (hat cannot bind this Court, see Marlene Indus. Corp. v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 1011, 1016 (6th Cir.1983), I believe Asplundh remains the law of this Court regarding the proper interpretation of § 1 of the FAA. 11 . Courts faced with similar factual scenarios have declined to exclude employment contracts under § 1 of the FAA. See, e.g., Rojas v. TIC Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 748 (5th Cir.1996) (following Asplundh and holding that § 1 did not exclude the employment contract of a disc jockey at a radio station); Powers v. Fox Television Stations, 923 F.Supp. 21, 24 (S.D.N.Y.1996)
holding that personal injury exception should be construed narrowly so as not to include torts without physical injury holding that the definition of customer under sipa should be construed narrowly holding that  1 narrowly construed did not exclude employment contract of television news reporter holding that general categorical release clauses are narrowly construed holding that television stations failure to claim liquidated damages under its contract with television ratings service did not preclude it from later amending its complaint to claim such relief