before the IJ took place in 1993 and 1994. While the 2011 decision found that what “[t]he evidence indicates” is insufficient to meet the burden of showing changed circumstances, it is unclear whether the BIA considered all of the evidence before it or only that evidence which it viewed as timely submitted under the incorrect legal standard. In light of the foregoing, we are unable to determine whether the BIA abused its discretion. See Abulashvili v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir.2011) (reviewing the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion). The BIA’s decisions must allow us to “ ‘discern its reasons for declining to afford relief.’ ” Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 268 (3d Cir.2008) (quoting Wang v. BIA 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir.2006)). Compare id. at 268-71 (<HOLDING>), ivith Liu v. Att’y Gen., 555 F.3d 145, 148-50
holding the bias analysis insufficient to support its decisions holding that mere speculation is insufficient to support a jury verdict holding that traditional allocation of burden of proof to the party challenging the decisions applies to decisions under the tca holding evidence insufficient to support finding of implied contract holding that this courts review of board decisions is limited to final orders or final decisions