all of the challenged actions “occurred in the course of judicial proceedings, and neither (1) relied upon knowledge acquired outside such proceedings nor (2) displayed deep-seated and unequivocal antagonism that would render fair judgment impossible.” Id. (emphasis in original). Here, the magistrate judge did not abuse her discretion in denying Bevan’s motion for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) or (b) because Bevan provides no evidence to establish that the magistrate judge had any personal bias against him. For example, he provides no evidence that the magistrate judge knew that he was attempting to expose her allegedly criminal activities, or, even if she did know, how that affected her rulings. See Switzer v. Berry, 198 F.3d 1255, 1258 (10th Cir.2000) (persuasive authority) (<HOLDING>). Nothing in the magistrate’s reports would
holding that prejudgment constitutes cause for recusal holding that the term commerce in the faa is to be broadly construed holding that a statute should not be construed so as to invalidate other parts of the same statute holding that the recusal statute should not be construed so broadly as to become effectively presumptive or to require recusal based on unsubstantiated suggestions of personal bias or prejudice recognizing that statutes mandating recusal for actual bias have constitutional bases unlike those that require recusal for a mere appearance of bias or prejudice