(1) the age of his 1991 conviction and corresponding prison sentence, (2) the de mini-mus risk that his criminal conduct in a school zone actually presented to children given the time of the crime (1:45 in the morning) and (3) the so-called “parsimony” principle. The first two claims amount to little more than disagreeing with the weight that the sentencing judge afforded to certain aspects of the sentencing factors. This exercise, however, is peculiarly within the sentencing court’s discretion, and Gallardo offers no meritorious reason to interfere with that judgment. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51-52, 128 S.Ct. 586 (noting that sentencing judge has a judicial vantage point superior to that of the reviewing appellate court); United States v. Madera-Ortiz, 637 F.3d 26, 31 (1st Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); see also Davila-Gonzalez, 595 F.3d at 49
holding that only relevant factors must be considered recognizing that the weight to be afforded any given argument made pursuant to one of the section 3553a factors is a matter firmly committed to the discretion of the sentencing judge holding that a district court is entitled to give more weight to the seriousness of the offense than to other factors holding the question of whether an accomplice is credible and the weight to be given to the testimony are issues for the jury to determine holding that judgment calls on the weight to be given various relevant factors are for the sentencing court not for this court