to present witnesses comply with procedural rules governing subpoenas and other trial functions, the Court said, because “[l]awyers are accustomed to meeting deadlines” and “[r]outine preparation involves location and interrogation of potential witnesses and the serving of subpoenas on those whose testimony will be offered at trial.” Id. at 415-16, 108 S.Ct. at 656. In this case, there was nothing constitutionally deficient in the district court’s refusal to issue a writ of habeas corpus ad testifi-candum to secure Thompson’s testimony. Despite notice, Bolender failed to satisfy the state procedural rules for service of a subpoena. Moreover his petition was untimely, coming as it did after the state had rested its case. Cf. United States v. Rinchack, 820 F.2d 1557, 1568 (11th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). In addition to the untimeliness of the
holding that a district court may refuse to issue a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum solely on the grounds that the petition is untimely when the request was not filed until the trial actually began holding that petitioner could not challenge his conviction on the grounds that the indictment failed to charge an essential element of the crime through a writ of habeas corpus holding that active jurisdiction arose when the petitioner was detained for purposes of habeas corpus when the petition was filed holding that managing conservator while in texas to seek return of child by writ of habeas corpus may not be served with civil process and is subject to jurisdiction of court in which habeas corpus is pending and only for purpose of prosecuting writ of habeas corpus holding that because an untimely pcra petition was premised on claims that were cognizable under the pcra the statutory writ of habeas corpus was unavailable