claims would have necessitated evidence outside of the administrative record (i.e., Garcia’s testimony in the Martinez case, Garcia’s conversations with Steiner), the limited scope of a circuit court’s administrative review which prevents the consideration of such “new” evidence, 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/3— 110 (1998), would have prevented him from fully and fairly litigating his civil-rights claims. This contention is premised on the idea that somehow his administrative appeal of the Board’s decision would subsume his. civil-rights claims. But Title VII and §§ 1981 and 1983 claims are original actions independent of the administrative review proceeding and are therefore plenary in scope. See Stykel, 252 Ill.Dec. 368, 742 N.E.2d at 914; Stratton, 141 Ill.Dec. 453, 551 N.E.2d at 646 (<HOLDING>). Because a civil-rights claim under federal
holding that where an action is brought by the debtors at the initial proceeding the appeal of that action is not a continuing proceeding against the debtors holding that where defendant erroneously filed a request for declaratory relief in criminal action rather than filing an independent action for judicial review we would evaluate sufficiency of pleading as a petition for judicial review holding that  1983 claims may be joined with an administrative review holding that a  1983 claim is an independent original action rather than a review proceeding even when it challenges an administrative action holding that there was adequate opportunity when state court judicial review of an administrative proceeding was available