of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program. The statutory language does not leave wriggle room; a convict out on parole is not a “person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is ... adjudicated delinquent for, violations of ... the terms and conditions of parole”. Most sections of the plra use the term “prisoner”, and we held in Robbins v. Switzer, 104 F.3d 895 (7th Cir.1997), that in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) this term does not comprehend a felon who has been released. § 1997e(h) shows that the same reading is right for § 1997e. So by waiting until his release from prison Kerr avoided § 1997e(e). Cf. Abdul-Wadood v. Nathan, 91 F.3d 1023 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). And a distinction between current and former
holding that a court must first determine whether the intent of congress is clear or instead the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue holding that the plras three strikes provision applied to an appeal pending prior to the effective date of the plra and authorized denial of in forma pauperis status based on lawsuits and appeals dismissed as frivolous prior to the effective date of the plra holding with respect to another part of the plra that the court must determine the prisoners status on the date the suit or appeal is brought rather than at some other time holding that the court of appeals in applying state law on appeal of a diversity action must apply law of the state as it existed at the time of its decision rather than as it stood at the time the case was decided in district court holding in a patent case that when the plaintiff brought the suit in federal district court it submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court with respect to all the issues embraced in the suit including those pertaining to the counterclaim of the defendants