added). AMT failed to establish that the transportation of Farr to Peakwood for radiation therapy was a medical emergency covered by the Act. Finally, section 197.5(c) states that the prehospital provider acts as the agent of “the physician providing medical direction.” Id. AMT offered no competent summary judgment proof to show that Dr. Smith was the physician providing medical direction when Fan* was transported to Peakwood. For the foregoing reasons, we decline to infer from section 197.5(c) of the Emergency Medical Service Act that AMT’s employees were acting as agents of a health care provider in transporting Farr for purposes of article 4590i, section 1.03(a)(3). See Townsend v. Catalina Ambulance Co., Inc., 857 S.W.2d 791, 791, 795-96 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1993, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Based upon the foregoing, points of error one
holding that a general acute care hospital may not delegate its duty to provide physicians for emergency room care because the law imposes a duty on hospital to provide that health care holding that a negligent misrepresentation claim brought by an independent third party health care provider was not preempted by erisa holding an emergency ambulance service is not a health care provider for purposes of article 4590i holding that standard of care need not be listed separately in report when same standard applies to each health care provider recognizing that a licensed chiropractor is a health care provider competent to testify as a medical expert