the value Travelers sought to deliver to its customers and by undermining customer good will. In response, plaintiffs point to the portion of the complaint alleging that Mathwich and Scholfield “[a]t all times acted within the scope of its agency, on behalf of Travelers.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 41.) This is only a legal conclusion, which is no longer adequate to meet the pleading standards imposed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) after Twombly and Iqbal, even if it might arguably have been before. Plaintiffs’ blunt allegation that the Manson defendants were acting to further Travelers’ interests shares the very weakness criticized in Iqbal—it attributes a facially implausible state of mind to a defendant without any support from concrete factual allegations. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680-81, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (<HOLDING>). Indeed, it is contradicted by the specific
holding that a court is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged holding that while legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint they must be wellsupported by factual allegations holding that at the motion to dismiss stage a court is not obliged to accept as true legal conclusions recognizing that when the facts alleged in the administrative complaint are not disputed this leaves only conclusions of law to be drawn as to whether the admitted facts constitute a violation of the statutes as charged and penalties to be imposed holding prior to twombly that courts were not required to accept the truth of legal conclusions contained in a plaintiffs complaint