burden of proving that she suffered carpal tunnel syndrome during the course and scope of her employment. Thus, the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board and the Commonwealth Court erred in awarding workers’ compensation benefits based on the ground that the WCJ capriciously disregarded Claimant’s medical evidence. The fact that Employer presented factual evidence as opposed to medical evidence does not alter the analysis. As to the application of the capricious disregard standard in the appropriate case, I would adhere to the case law holding that such standard applies only where the party with the burden of proof is the sole party to present evidence, yet does not prevail before the fact finder. See Russel v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 121 Pa.Cmwlth. 436, 550 A.2d 1364 (1988) (<HOLDING>). The majority finds difficulty with this
holding that if no evidence was presented to support the prevailing party there is no evidence upon which to apply the substantial evidence test and therefore the capricious disregard standard applies holding that prevailing party has no standing to appeal holding that error is harmless if there is substantial independent evidence of guilt satisfying the reviewing court there is no substantial likelihood the challenged evidence contributed to the conviction holding that there was no new and material evidence to reopen claim where newly presented evidence was not accompanied by any medical evidence indicating a nexus to service holding that there was no evidence or inferences to be drawn from the evidence to support the damage award