as of right. It would therefore be improper to interpret “occasions,” and § 1915(g) generally, to limit the Court’s appellate function in a defined class of cases. With these considerations in mind, we must decide what Congress intended the term “occasions” to encompass and, therefore, what qualifies as a “prior occasion[ ]” on which a dismissal may count as a strike under § 1915(g). The interpretation of “occasions” which adheres most closely to Congress’s dual intentions is one that includes both the appeal and its underlying action. We hold, therefore, that a “prior occasion[ ]” under § 1915(g) cannot include the dismissal of the underlying claim, and such a dismissal cannot act as a strike to preclude IFP status on its own appeal. See Pigg v. 106 F.3d 1497, 1498 (10th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). In practice, our interpretation preserves the
holding fda seizure action did not constitute final agency action holding that a routine dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies does not count as a strike under  1915g holding that plaintiffs dismissal of personal injury action and subsequent dismissal of declaratory judgment action concerning extent of tortfeasors insurance coverage did not trigger double dismissal rule holding that the action taken need not be the substantial equivalent of dismissal in order to constitute adverse employment action holding district court dismissal of plaintiffs present action did not constitute prior action  and thus did not count as third strike