The burden is on Elliott to show his entitlement to the relief sought. Williams, 199 S.W.3d at 464; see also Escalante v. Rowan, 251 S.W.3d 720, 727 (Tex.App.-[14th Dist.] 2008, pet. filed); Hall v. Provost, 232 S.W.3d 926, 929 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.); Franka v. Velasquez, 216 S.W.3d 409, 413 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2006, no pet.). Elliott did not make any assertion before the trial court, and makes none before this Court, that the acts for which Kele-men sued him were in the general scope of his employment. Further, the record contains no evidence to support a finding that Elliott’s general scope of employment included the assault of Kelemen. We thus conclude that Elliott failed to meet the burden required for dismissal under section 101.106(f). See Escalante, 251 S.W.3d at 727 (<HOLDING>). Any dismissal under section 101.106(f) would
holding that a school board policy prohibiting employees from sending their children to private schools interfered with employees constitutional right to control the education of their children holding that probation department employees are not county employees holding that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties the employees are not speaking as citizens for first amendment purposes and the constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline holding inter alia that pursuant to hrs  3868 employer entitled to reimbursement from portion of employees settlement with thirdparty tortfeasor properly allocable to employees tort claim holding employees not entitled to dismissal pursuant to section 101106f where employees failed to present the trial court with a sufficient record to satisfy their burden