and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State ...." 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2003). 7 . The Slosberg court describes one legacy of the Geiger decision's silence on the term "malice” as an invitation to some observers to collapse the two modifiers of "wilful” and "malice” into a single legal construct. Slos-berg, 225 B.R. at 20, n. 15. In fact, certain decisions outside the First Circuit have done just that; informed by both Geiger and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 8A (1964), they have unified "wilful and malicious” under § 523(a)(6) to mean any act in which the actor desires to cause the injury or believes with substantial certainty that the injury will occur. See Miller v. J.D. Abrams, Inc. (In re Miller), 156 F.3d 598, 606 (5th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Baldwin v. Kilpatrick (In re Baldwin), 245
holding that effect must be given if possible to every clause and word of a statute holding that ajggregating wilful and malicious into a unitary concept might be inappropriate if the word they modified were act but treatment of the phrase as a collective concept is sensible given the supreme courts emphasis on the fact that the word they modify is injury  holding that the word void is not sufficient holding the word individuals is not the equivalent of the dictionary acts use of the word persons holding that the word interest is to be understood in its ordinary senseto hold that congress intended to use the word in the sense of a penalty is contrary to all rules of interpretation and invokes a special definition of the word interest that is unwarranted citations omitted