cases where no murder occurs, would turn around and not intend to impose cumulative punishments in cases where there are actual murder victims. Third, §§ 2113(a) and (e) and §§ 924(c) and (j) were clearly designed for different purposes: the armed robbery statute was designed to punish those who take money from banks by force or violence, whatever the means, and the firearm statute was designed to punish those who use or carry firearms during violent crimes, whatever the underlying crime. We therefore conclude, notwithstanding our assumption of the likely failure of the two statutes to pass the Blockburger test, that Congress fully and clearly intended to permit cumulative punishments for violations of § 2113 and § 924(j). See United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 864 (8th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). We also reject Allen’s proposed reliance on
holding that conspiracies can serve as predicate acts for a rico conspiracy recognizing the two different types of conspiracies under the federal statute holding that congress intended to allow multiple punishments for rico conspiracies and conspiracies to commit the underlying predicate offense even though the offenses were the same under the blockburger test holding that because the ultimate question is legislative intent the blockburger test cannot authorize two punishments where the ljegislature clearly intended only one holding that  1962d does not violate the principle prohibiting conviction of multiple conspiracies under an indictment charging a single conspiracy