to which Padilla was subjected. They argue, however, that it was clearly established that Padilla possessed such rights because any reasonable official would have understood during 2001 to 2003 that a citizen detained as an enemy combatant had to be afforded at least the constitutional protections to which convicted prisoners and ordinary criminal suspects were entitled. That argument is foreclosed by al-Kidd, which compels us “not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” Id. at 2084. Granted, it may sometimes be permissible to rely on cases involving one type of detainee to establish clearly established constitutional rights of another type of detainee. See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244-46, 103 S.Ct. 2979, 77 L.Ed.2d 605 (1983) (<HOLDING>); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16,
holding that pretrial detainees have at least the same protections under the fourteenth amendment as posttrial detainees have under the eighth amendment holding that pretrial detainees possess a constitutional right against deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs because the due process rights of a pretrial detainee are at least as great as the eighth amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner holding in light of the supreme courts observation that the due process rights of pretrial detainees are at least as great as the eighth amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner  that the eighth amendment provides a minimum standard of care for determining the rights of pretrial detainees quoting revere 463 us at 244 103 sct 2979 holding that the eighth amendment protects prisoners only from deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs recognizing a state doctor may violate a detainees right to substantive due process by exhibiting deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs