substances, and the district court did not err in denying Young’s motion for judgment of acquittal. IV. Post-Trial Error Claims Although we affirm the convictions of Jones, Drake and Young, for the reasons explained below we must vacate the sentences of Jones, Mockabee, and Drake, and remand their cases for further proceedings. A. Jones — Fair Sentencing Act Following his conviction, the district court sentenced Jones to life on Count Eleven and 120 months on Count Twelve, to be served concurrently. Jones maintains that the district court’s denial of his request to be sentenced under the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010(FSA), 124 Stat 2372, was error because the Act applied to him at the time of sentencing. See Dorsey v. United States, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2321, 2331, 183 L.Ed.2d 250 (2012) (<HOLDING>). The government has admitted error. We agree
holding that the date of discrimination is the date on which a decision not to hire a plaintiff becomes effective holding that the fsas more lenient penalties apply to defendants who committed their crimes before the acts effective date but were sentenced after that date holding that guidelines did not become effective until adopted by the legislature on july 1 1984 and those who committed their offenses before the effective date must affirmatively elect to be sentenced under the guidelines holding that  3582c2 does not provide means to apply fair sentencing act fsa minimums to defendants sentenced before fsas effective date holding that the commission on remand can set the effective date of a rate to be the effective date of the original commission activity