of its traditional discretionary sentencing authority. Id. We further concluded in Kaua that, insofar as the “hate-crime” law at issue in Appren-di—establishing an extended term for a defendant who committed a crime motivated by an improper bias toward, inter alia, the victim’s race, gender, or religion —was clearly intrinsic in nature, Apprendi, like Jones, comported with our intrinsic/extrinsic analysis in Tafoya and Schroeder II and did not require that extrinsic facts, including those extrinsic facts implicated in HRS § 706-662(4), be found by the trier of fact rather than the judge. Id. at 12-13, 72 P.3d at 484-85 (citing Tafoya, 91 Hawai'i at 271-72, 982 P.2d at 900-01; Schroeder II, 76 Hawai'i at 528, 880 P.2d at 203; State v. Carvalho, 101 Hawai'i 97, 63 P.3d 405 (App.2002) (<HOLDING>)). In the years following Apprendi, the United
holding that apprendi does not apply retroactively holding that apprendi does not apply retroactively in florida in postconviction proceedings to cases that were final on direct review at the time of the apprendi decision holding apprendi is not retroactive holding that group pleading did not render complaint infirm where complaint provided fair notice of claims holding that hrs  706662 was not constitutionally infirm and reading tafoya in harmony with apprendi