of the brief contempt orders, reciting that each Pe titioner had already been “held in direct contempt of court,” reflected that criminal convictions had already been entered, with nothing left to be adjudicated. Those orders cannot be reconciled with the scheduling of an “arraignment” on the charges several days later. An arraignment is “[t]he initial step in a criminal prosecution whereby the defendant is brought before the court to hear the charges and to enter a plea.” Black’s Law Dictionary 123 (9th ed. 2009). But any further contempt proceedings would have been barred by our constitutional protections against double jeopardy after Petitioners already had been found in criminal contempt for the same behavior. State v. Driscoll, 89 N.M. 541, 546-47, 555 P.2d 136, 141-42 (1976) (<HOLDING>). {40} Even if we construe the contempt orders
holding that a civil contempt defendant has a right to a jury trial when the act of contempt was not committed in the presence of the court and when the incarceration is in part punitive holding that further contempt proceedings after a lawyer was summarily jailed for contempt in open court would constitute double jeopardy holding that an attorney charged with contempt for failing to attend a scheduled hearing could be charged only with indirect not direct contempt because the contempt did not occur in open court and the judge did not have personal knowledge of the reasons for the attorneys nonappearance holding it was within the chancellors  discretion to find that though the husband was in contempt the contempt was not willful holding that in addition to statutory contempt powers city courts have inherent contempt power