this Court held that the place of business was not a person’s usual place of abode. More recently, in Truss v. Chappell, 4 So.3d 1110 (Ala.2008), this Court held that the default judgment against the defendant was void because service of process was invalid where the evidence, in the form of affidavits, indicated that the defendant was served at his mother’s house. The mother’s affidavit stated that the defendant was in the armed services and that he had been called to service in Iraq and may have been overseas or “stationed” in another state at the time service was attempted. In Truss, there was no evidence before the trial court indicating that the defendant was, at the time of the alleged service, or ever had been, a resident of t 9 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, there is evidence to
holding that due process requires that notice be reasonably calculated under all circumstances to provide parties with notice of the pending action holding that actual receipt of notice is not necessary to satisfy  1607 or due process the government need only make an effort that is  reasonably calculated to apprise a party of the pendency of the action holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city holding that notice of administrative forfeiture sent to prisoner did not require actual notice to the property owner only notice reasonably calculated to apprise a party of the pendency of the action holding that procedural due process requires adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard