nary trial.” Justice Marshall dissented on the grounds that the Court has repeatedly acknowledged that the Constitution requires stricter adherence to procedural safeguards in a capital case than in other cases____ In my view, a person on death row, whose counsel’s performance fell below constitutionally acceptable levels, should not be compelled to demonstrate a ‘reasonable probability’ that he would have been given a life sentence if his lawyer had been competent ... [Id. at 716-17,104 S.Ct. at 2079-80, 8 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“In no other circumstance would the Double Jeopardy Clause countenance the offer of a second chance to the State and the trial judge to find a better theory upon which to base a conviction”); Smith v. Murray, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 106 S.Ct
holding that petitioner did not procedurally default his ineffective assistance of counsel claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal holding that defendant waived his blakely claim as issue on appeal by failing to raise it in his initial brief holding that a defendant forfeited his confrontation clause claim by failing to properly preserve it at trial holding that petitioner had forfeited his right to object to psychiatric testimony by failing to raise the claim on initial appeal holding plaintiffs waived their right to appellate review of the admission of an experts testimony by failing to object to it at trial