the second prong [of] the Lemon test .... Aplt. Br. at 20-21 (footnote omitted); cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971) (articulating three-part test for Establishment Clause challenges: first, the governmental action at issue “must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, [it] must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Beyond Lemon, Plaintiffs cite no legal authority for these assertions. Because the challenged policies are both generally applicable and neutral as to religion, the free exercise claims must fail. See Shaffer v. Saffle, 148 F.3d 1180, 1181-82 (10th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); accord Employment Div., Dep’t of Human
holding that a law that treats religious and nonreligious organizations differently offends the principles of the free exercise clause because it is not neutral or generally applicable recognizing a religious institutions right to free exercise of religion holding that religious exercise is any exercise of religion whether or not compelled by or central to a system of religious belief and that the use building or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered  religious exercise holding that free exercise clause did not require government to grant religious exemption from generally applicable religionneutral statutory requirement that welfare recipients furnish their social security numbers where no individualized exemptions were allowed holding that religionneutral law that is generally applicable does not violate free exercise clause despite incidental effect on religious practice