a general rule ... the master remains liable for the servant’s conduct even though the servant is himself not liable because of a personal immunity.” James v. Prince George’s Cnty., 288 Md. 315, 332, 418 A.2d 1173, 1182 (1980) (citations omitted). Moreover, we opined that “the doctrine of respondeat superior should not ... permit a principal to assert the immunity of the agent in a suit founded on the agent[’s] conduct.” Id. In discussing public official immunity specifically, we held in James that “the government, when it has waived immunity ... is liable for torts committed by its officers even though those officers themselves are not liable because of public-official immunity.” James, 288 Md. at 333, 418 A.2d at 1183 (citations omitted); see Parker, 337 Md. at 286, 653 A.2d at 443 (<HOLDING>). Relying on the rationale in James, in
holding that the qualified immunity of a public official does not necessarily protect a government employer sued on a theory of respondeat superior  holding that the doctrine of qualified immunity does not protect a government official who is sued in an official capacity under title vii because title vii does not impose personal liability holding a local government sued under  1983 has no immunity even if its employee is entitled to qualified immunity and the court of appeals does not have jurisdiction over the local governments interlocutory appeal recognizing as a general matter that official immunity would protect official decisions to investigate suspected fraud in the administration of government contracts holding that the first amendment does not protect the use of racial invective by a public official against a member of the public in a bar