between innocent parties, tracing should not and will not apply”); Durham, 86 F.3d at 73 (“The lower court in this case chose not to impose a constructive trust in Claremont’s favor because it seemed inequitable to allow Claremont to benefit merely because the defendants spent the other victims’ funds first. Claremont would obtain a preferred claim over funds if the court were to impose a constructive trust. To the district court, all the fraud victims were in equal positions and should be treated as such____ Sitting in equity, the district court is a ‘court of conscience.’ Acting on that conscience, the lower court in the instant case rationally considered the positions of the victims and held that following the tracing principle would be inequitable.”); Vanguard Inv., 6 F.3d at 227 (<HOLDING>). A proposed distribution plan is not presently
holding that equitable relief is only appropriate where legal remedies are inadequate holding that the allocation of response costs under  113f is an equitable determination based on the district courts discretionary selection of the appropriate equitable factors in a given case recognizing that petitioners due process claim stemming from denial of motion to reopen to apply for cancellation of removal was flawed in part because an alien does not have a legal entitlement to discretionary relief holding that a district court in its discretionary supervision of an equitable receivership may deny remedies like reeission and restitution where the equities of the situation suggest such a denial would be appropriate noting that entitlement to assets under state law is not dispositive of entitlement under federal equity receivership holding that equitable restitution is available but that legal restitution is not