1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993)) (internal quotations omitted). The transcript clearly shows that Patyrak’s attorney had notice of the dismissal on November 6, 2008; accordingly, Patyrak is charged with having notice as of that date and his argument that he did not receive notice until 2011 fails. Patyrak argues that the District Court did not consider the fact that his complaint contained claims of fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud, both of which are subject to a six-year statute of limitations in New Jersey. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-1. However, his complaint contains no mention of fraud, and any allegation of conspiracy is encompassed in his § 1983 claim, which is subject to the two-year limitations period. See Knoll v. Springfield Twp. Sch. Dist., 763 F.2d 584, 585 (3d Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, Patyrak’s argument that illness
holding that in actions brought under 42 usc  1983 federal courts apply the states statute of limitation for personal injury holding that the statute of limitations for  1983 claims is the most closely analogous state limitations period for general personal injury claims holding that the appropriate state statute of limitations to borrow for section 1983 actions is that for recovery of damages for personal injuries holding that if state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions the general or residual statute for personal injury actions should be used for 1983 actions holding that even though constitutional claims alleged under  1983 encompass numerous and diverse topics and subtopics the state statute of limitations governing tort actions for the recovery of damages for personal injuries provides the appropriate limitation period