County had a pattern and practice of applying excessive force in the context of mental health extractions. This Circuit recently reiterated in the case of Pineda v. Toomey that a supervisory official may be held liable under § 1983 as a secondary violator for the behavior of his subordinates only if: (1) the behavior of [his] subordinates results in a constitutional violation, and (2) the [supervisor]^ action or inaction was affirmativefly] link[ed] to that behavior in the sense that it could be characterized as supervisory encouragement, condonation or acquiescence or gross negligence amounting to deliberate indifference. 533 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir.2008) (quoting Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 902 (1st Cir.1988)); see also Camilo-Robles v. Zapata, 175 F.3d 41, 44 (1st Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, “[t]o succeed on a supervisory
holding that where plaintiff brings  1983 claim against a defendantsupervisor liability attaches if the responsible official supervises trains or hires a subordinate with deliberate indifference toward the possibility that deficient performance of the task eventually may contribute to a civil rights deprivation holding that liability under  1983 can be established by showing that the defendants either personally participated in a deprivation of the plaintiffs rights or caused such a deprivation to occur holding that a failure to adequately train will only result in  1983 liability where that failure amounts to a deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact holding that a supervisor with no personal involvement may be liable for the constitutional violation of a subordinate for culpable action or inaction in the training supervision or control of his subordinates acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation  or reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others recognizing a claim for civil liability against municipalities  under  1983