the three-year suspension of a license did not constitute custody See In re Liberty, 154 Vt. 643, 644, 572 A.2d 1381, 1382 (1990). There, we turned to what other courts have called “useful indicia” of custody. Id. Those indicia are: [T]he petitioner’s conduct must be to some degree under the supervision or direction of judicial officers; or the petitioner may face the possibility of imminent incarceration without a formal trial and criminal conviction, creating a restraint on liberty sufficient to constitute custody. At a minimum, the combination of such incarceration with even minimum supervision could constitute custody Id. (citations omitted). We have adhered to this standard in defining custody in subsequent cases. See, e.g., State v. Yates, 169 Vt. 20, 22, 726 A.2d 483, 485 (1999) (<HOLDING>); Wargo, 168 Vt. at 234, 719 A.2d at 409-10
holding that third state petition for postconviction relief that was dismissed as an abuse of the writ was properly filed holding that a ground for relief not pled in a motion for postconviction relief is waived and cannot be raised on appeal holding statute of limitations for filing petition for postconviction relief not tolled by general savings statute tolling limited to reasons enumerated in state postconviction relief act holding that identical language in montana postconviction relief statute bars application of laches holding that probation was custody and permitted jurisdiction under postconviction relief statute