[jmentioned address and has purchased crack cocaine for money.” J.A. 229. Second, the mere possibility that “George” did not retrieve the drugs from inside Morris’s home did not negate probable cause that “George” did just that. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); United States v. Clark, 638 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir.2011) (“[Pjrobable cause to search is demonstrated where the totality of circumstances indicates a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Third, because the issuing judge found that probable cause existed as to the lower dwelling, there was no need to establish “George’s” control over that unit. See United States v. Clark, 638 d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); see also Herring v. United States, 555 U.S.
holding that issuing judge may draw reasonable inferences from the material presented in the warrant application holding that defense counsels failure to object to testimony did not warrant a new trial because there was no prejudice from admission of the testimony holding that a prior application might affect the issuing judges finding of necessity holding that shepard did not affect the continuing validity of almendareztorres holding that failure to follow state law requiring issuing judge to record testimony did not affect validity of warrant