once he secured a loan for the church. While Mukes was to receive a payment, much like a bonus, for securing the financing, he was also on the church’s regular payroll and received a monthly salary. A fee such as this does not negate agency that otherwise exists. Thomas next argues that Mukes cannot be an agent because there was no evidence that Mukes had the power to bind the church or negotiate terms, citing Mukes’s statement to Thomas that the final decision on the investment program was not his to make. However, Thomas did not know that Mukes did not have t o bind the church are not determinative. See id. § 1, cmt. b (“The relation which the law calls agency does not depend upon the intent of the parties to create it, nor their belief that they have done so.”); id. § 6, cmt. b (<HOLDING>). Thomas fails to cite a theory of agency that
recognizing that the ultimate question of the voluntariness of consent is one of law holding that it may not holding that the power to produce a change in a given legal relation may exist irrespective of the consent or knowledge either of the one subject to it or of the one holding it holding that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused  violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution holding that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution