comprising the estate is to be determined ... is the date upon which the petition is filed”); Caplin, 406 U.S. at 429 & n. 19, 92 S.Ct. at 1685 & n. 19; Cissell, 521 F.2d at 792. In assessing whether HMK possessed a claim against Shearson, we ask whether, assuming the truth of all the facts set forth above, — which are uncontested except for the degree of Shearson’s knowledge of or participation in HMK’s actions — Shearson could have been held liable on any legal theory presented in the demand for arbitration. Normally this would include not only a determination that the right would run to the corporation rather than to its creditors, but also a determination that HMK would have been able to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See, e.g., Cissell, 521 F.2d at 792 (<HOLDING>). The circumstance that sets this case apart is
holding that the cause of action accrued on the date of sale holding that cause of action for malpractice had accrued before underlying actions dismissal holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue a permanent nuisance action for injury to property because none of the plaintiffs were the owners of the land when the cause of action accrued with the first injury holding that under the rule against splitting a cause of action a new claim for damages is not barred if the underlying cause of action had not accrued at the time of filing the previous lawsuit holding as a matter of law that when condition precedent clear on the face of the insurance policy had not been met before insolvency trustee had no cause of action because none had accrued before bankruptcy