repeatedly, in construing a penal statute we require the legislature to define with clarity the contours of proscribed conduct. See Sung, 2000-NMCA-031, ¶ 15, 128 N.M. 786, 999 P.2d 430. In order to invoke penal sanctions under Section 31-3-9, the State and the court must also act with precision. If the magistrate judge wanted to regard this situation as a limited release of Defendant on his own recognizance, it was incumbent on the judge to say so in clear, cogent language. We will not allow the State to put the burden on Defendant to guess at the meaning of its order. {15} The requirement that a criminal defendant “appear” has usually been set forth by court process, such as notice, summons, or subpoena. See State v. Easterling, 89 N.M. 486, 488, 553 P.2d 1293, 1295 (Ct.App.1976) (<HOLDING>). The term “to appeal-” has been consistently
holding that dismissal for failure to appear at a deposition is on the merits holding that failure to appear is also a continuing offense holding that the defendants oral promise to appear was insufficient to amount to a required appearance within the meaning of the failure to appear statute holding that treating a defendants failure to appear as a waiver not only of the right to be present but of the right to have a hearing on the motion was error holding a failure to appear for sentencing constitutes an escape under the rule