“additional-insured coverage ... as ‘obliged.’ ” Id. at -, 2015 WL 674744 at *9 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). And the court appeared to treat the “where required” and “Insured Contract” provisions as functionally identical when it stated that “[t]he language in the insurance policies providing additional-insured coverage ‘where required’ and as ‘obliged’ requires us to consult the Drilling Contract’s additional-insured clause to determine whether the statéd conditions exist.” Id. at -, 2015 WL 674744 at *9. Finally, the court’s use of the word “moreover” when describing the effect of the “where required” provision suggests that the provision was an alternative ground for its holding. Cf. Wetzel v. Lambert, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1195, 1198 & n. *, 182 L.Ed.2d 35 (2012) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Our Erie guess, therefore, is that the
holding that the court of appeals erred in granting habeas corpus when it only addressed one of the state courts alternative grounds for rejecting a brady claim noting that the ground it addressed was introduced by the state court with the word moreover confirming that it was an alternative basis for its decision holding that review under  2254d1 is limited to the record before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits rejecting the petitioners claim that the federal habeas court could consider evidence introduced in an evidentiary hearing holding that the court of appeals in applying state law on appeal of a diversity action must apply law of the state as it existed at the time of its decision rather than as it stood at the time the case was decided in district court holding that an appellate court may affirm the result reached by a district court on alternative grounds holding that if the trial court would have had no discretion to deny summary judgment on an alternative ground the appellate court can on that alternative ground sustain the order granting summary judgment