in fact to the NAACP. Schedler argues that the NAACP failed to prove that Taylor was acting on its behalf, noting that the NAACP president was unaware that Taylor was registering voters. Schedler also argues that no NAACP money was spent on Taylor’s registration drives. We nevertheless hold that the NAACP has suffered injury in fact. We think that the district court did not err in finding that the NAACP’s head of voter registration was acting on behalf of the NAACP in conducting voter-registration drives, despite these drives’ not being attended by other NAACP officials. Even if Taylor had spent none of the NAACP’s money, the NAACP would have still devoted resources to counteract Schedler’s allegedly unlawful practices because Taylor devoted his time to the drives. Cf. id. at 360-61 (<HOLDING>). Although Taylor estimated but was not sure of
holding that rule 58 allows inclusion of at least one citation to legal authority and at least a onesentence explanation of the courts reasoning holding that the township could not be compelled to submit the disputes to binding arbitration because collective bargaining did not begin at least six months before the start of the new fiscal year and because the demand for binding arbitration was not made at least 110 days before the start of the new fiscal year holding that where a defendant serves one year or more on concurrent sentences for separate convictions this amounts to serving at least a full year on each sentence and satisfies section 991983 holding that the mere possibility of an upward departure beyond one year qualifies a kansas offense as one punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year holding that acorn has standing because it conducted at least one voter registration drive a year in louisiana