award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title.” 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1970) (emphasis added). See, e.g., Cullen v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 863 F.2d 851, 854 (11th Cir.) (noting that “[a] confirmation proceeding under 9 U.S.C. § 9 is intended to be summary: confirmation can only be denied if an award has been corrected, vacated, or modified in accordance with the Federal Arbitration Act”) (quoting Taylor v. Nelson, 788 F.2d 220, 225 (4th Cir.1986)), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 3159, 104 L.Ed.2d 1022 (1989). The Act, like the Georgia proceeding at issue in Weems, enumerates only a few, strictly limited defenses to the confirmation of an award. Saxis Steamship Co. v. Multifacs Int’l Traders, Inc., 375 F.2d 577, 581-82 (2d Cir.1967) (<HOLDING>). The Act’s enunciation of specific defenses to
holding that a transcript is necessary if the asserted grounds for vacatur of arbitration award are grounded in the conduct of the proceeding holding that because the federal arbitration act provides that requests for relief should be made by motion rather than by filing a complaint the rules of notice pleading provided for in fedrcivp 8 do not apply to a proceeding to vacate an arbitration award holding that the courts review is limited to ascertaining whether there is clear error on the face of the record holding in the context of an arbitration award confirmation proceeding that the decision as to whether to allow additional discovery is an entirely practical one involving a balancing of the need for additional information with its effect on the arbitration process holding that the role of the courts is limited to ascertaining whether there exists one of the specific grounds for the vacation of an award as provided in  10 of the arbitration act and that the court should not review the arbitration proceeding for errors of law or fact