the use of the words "shall seek” somewhat ambiguous. We resolve that ambiguity, however, with the presumption that, absent a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, Congress intended the words “shall seek” to be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 2527, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1980). The legislative history cited by Conille is not a clearly expressed congressional intent that "shall seek” means “shall.” 13 . While we agree with our own district court on this issue, we also find helpful the reasoning of other courts that have approached this issue, albeit, from slightly different angles. See Chase v. Theodore Mayer Bros., 592 F.Supp. at 97-98; see also Mann v. Pierce, 803 F.2d 1552, 1557-58 (11th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). 14 . We have pointed out, supra note 10, that
holding that generally punitive damages are not available for a breach of contract holding that provision barring recovery of consequential damages did not necessarily bar all loss of use damages but damages for loss of use of money were consequential holding that plaintiffs consequential damages were too speculative because no evidence connected damages to defendants breach of contract holding that consequential damages are not to be considered holding that secretarys sovereign immunity defense to tenants claim for damages for breach of implied warranty of habitability does not bar tenants right to seek restitution but leaving open question whether consequential damages available