announced, “I am going to find the [appellant] is guilty of malicious wounding of ... [“brother”] as charged in [the] indictment[ ],” the trial court convicted appellant of malicious wounding. While we agree that the trial court used the words “malicious wounding” in the pronouncement of guilt, the written conviction order relating to the wounding of “brother” states, “the Court finds [appellant] GUILTY as charged in said indictment, to-wit: Felonious Assault (Virginia Code Section 18.2-51).” Settled principles provide that “[a] court speaks through its orders and those orders are presumed to accurately reflect what transpired.” McBride v. Commonwealth, 24 Va.App. 30, 35, 480 S.E.2d 126, 128 (1997); see also Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 280-81, 257 S.E.2d 808, 822 (1979) (<HOLDING>). We note that the indictment for the wounding
holding that when the courts oral statements in the plea colloquy conflict with the written agreement the courts oral statements control holding that a defendant has the right to an order permitting him to inspect his own written or recorded statements absent a basis for a protective order holding that when a courts statements from the bench conflict with its written order the order controls holding that in cases of direct conflict between a courts oral pronouncement of sentence and the written judgment the oral pronouncement controls holding that under the doctrine of direct estoppel a law firms failure to appeal the bankruptcy courts earlier order barred it from challenging the courts holding on its appeal from a subsequent order