Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152-53, 29 S.Ct. 42, 53 L.Ed. 126 (1908). Amicus’s theory of course goes further, trying to defeat jurisdiction not on the basis of a hypothesized defense but on a hypothesized response to a hypothesized defense. Our own recent cases have been equally clear on the distinction between contract claims and their statutory context. We have held that even though Title VII might have been the basis of a settlement agreement, a breach claim is a straightforward contract dispute. Hansson v. Norton, 411 F.3d 231, 232 (D.C.Cir.2005) (“This court generally treats settlement agreements as contracts subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims .... ”); Brown v. United States, 389 F.3d 1296, 1297 (D.C.Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, we find that Green-hill’s claim
holding that the claims court has no jurisdiction under the tucker act over claims to social security benefits holding that a breach of settlement claim should have been brought in the court of federal claims pursuant to the tucker act holding that the trial court should have dismissed the employees breach of contract claim holding in a breach of contract action brought by a government contract surety under the tucker act that the tucker act contains an unequivocal expression waiving sovereign immunity as to claims not particular claimants recognizing that the reference to the united states court of federal claims in section 1346a1 is merely a crossreference to the tucker act