plaintiffs to prove: (1) that Northshore violated federal antitrust law; and (2) that the antitrust violation caused them some injury. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir.2008); Blades, 400 F.3d at 566; Bell Atlantic Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 339 F.3d 294, 302 (5th Cir.2003). The same cases, and many others, also show that plaintiffs also must show damages, but individual proof of this element of a claim under the Clayton Act is not an obstacle to a showing of predominance. It is well established that the presence of individualized questions regarding damages does not prevent certification under Rule 23(b)(3). See WalMart v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2558 (deeming it “clear that individualized monetary claims belong in Rule 23(b)(3)”); Arreola, 546 F.3d at 801 (<HOLDING>); Hardy v. City Optical, Inc., 39 F.3d 765, 771
holding that appeal from denial of rule 60b motion raised for review only the district courts order of denial and not the underlying judgment itself holding that class seeking monetary damages in addition to medical monitoring did not seek certification pursuant to 23b2 only 23b3 holding that certification under rule 23b3 was not appropriate because plaintiffs claims for compensatory and punitive damages must therefore focus almost entirely on facts and issues specific to individuals rather than the class as a whole recognizing that actions for damages are best certified under rule 23b3 recognizing that the need for individual damages determinations does not in and of itself require denial of a motion for certification under rule 23b3