by treating the question of statelessness as one of jurisdiction, but as my analysis above seeks to demonstrate, the status of Trinidad’s boat goes far beyond the question of whether United States courts have jurisdiction. It goes to the very heart of whether there has been any crime committed at all. Matos-Luchi, 627 F.3d at 14 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (“[A] failure to prove that defendants’ conduct, occurred on board a covered vessel amounts to a failure to prove that the defendants violated the MDLEA.”). If Trinidad cannot face any criminal penalty at all in the absence of proof of his vessel’s statelessness, how can proof of his vessel’s statelessness possibly be subjected to a preponderance of the evidence standard? See United States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149, 1167 (9th Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>). IV. With due respect, I cannot join an
holding that common issues of fact did not predominate because it was necessary to make an individualized inquiry into equitable circumstances holding that exhaustion of issues is jurisdictional holding that disputed issues of fact cannot be resolved based on affidavits and must be decided based on evidentiary hearings the only admissible procedure for resolving such issues holding that because article iii standing is jurisdictional it must be decided before other legal issues holding that when a jurisdictional inquiry into statelessness turns on factual issues then it must be  resolved by a jury