of the law until his eventual capture. According to the government, Mendez-Casillas was therefore in violation of § 1326 at the time of his capture in 1998, and the 1998 (post-IIRI-RA) version of the criminal statute should apply to his case. Notably, IIRIRA removed the “arrest” requirement, such that an alien only has to reenter the country after having “been denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed, or has departed the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding” to be in violation of the statute. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (1999). We have held, in accordance with the government’s position, that a § 1326 violation constitutes a continuing offense for sentencing and venue purposes. See United States v. Ruelas-Arreguin, 219 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Salazar-Robles, 207 F.3d 648
holding that title vii does not include a continuing violation doctrine holding that because a  1326 violation constitutes a continuing offense venue may lie in any district in which the continuing conduct occurred holding that the doctrine may only be predicated on continuing unlawful acts and not on the continuing effects of earlier unlawful conduct holding that because a  1326 violation constitutes a continuing offense the iiriraamended sentencing guidelines applied to the case holding that failure to appear is also a continuing offense