the airplane in the hangar, that the hangar itself was only accessible to Lyddon Aero Center employees or other customers, and that the facility was located on fenced property accessible only through a coded gate. Even if this information had been included, however, it is not “so probative as to negate probable cause,” Stewart, 915 F.2d at 582 n. 13, because it does not establish that Mr. Ruiz had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the hangar in the circumstances of this case. Mr. Ruiz urges us to find he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hangar comparable to a tenant’s expectation of privacy in his rented house or a motel occupant’s expectation of privacy in his motel room. See, e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 487-90, 84 S.Ct. 889, 11 L.Ed.2d 856 (1964) (<HOLDING>); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610,
holding that absent consent or exigent circumstances law enforcement officers cannot legally search for the subject of an arrest warrant in the home of a third party without first obtaining a search warrant holding that the defendants unlawful arrest in his hotel room rendered his subsequent consent to the search of his room invalid even though he signed a consent form allowing the search after his arrest because the government  completely failed to address whether there was a break in the causal relationship between the unlawful arrest and the subsequent search holding that hotel night clerks consent to search an occupied guest room was not valid consent and the evidence obtained from the search was inadmissible holding that search of hotel room without a search warrant and without consent of absent guest was unlawful even though hotel clerk had consented to search holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises