the Court used two years earlier in Wilder. Instead, the Court distinguished Suter from Wilder, explaining that Wilder “relied in part on the fact that the statute and regulations set forth in some detail the factors to be considered in determining the methods for calculating rates.” Id. at 359, 112 S.Ct. at 1368. Thus, the Supreme Court left the obligation of harmonizing these cases to the various Courts of Appeals. See, e.g., Howe v. Ellenbecker, 8 F.3d 1258, 1262 n. 5 (8th Cir.1993) (explaining how “Suter weakened earlier precedent in vital respects”), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1005, 114 S.Ct. 1373, 128 L.Ed.2d 49 (1994); Chan v. City of New York, 1 F.3d 96, 104 (2d Cir.1993) (adopting “the Wilder analysis or, to the extent that it differs, the Suter analysis”); Stowell, 976 F.2d at 68 (<HOLDING>). This Court addressed the problem in Clifton
holding that courts are to construe statutes so as to harmonize with other relevant laws if possible recognizing possible conflict between the cases holding that the reference to any court encompasses both state and federal courts recognizing it is both prudent and possible to synthesize the teachings of suter with the courts prior precedents recognizing that the focus must be on whether the facts alleged would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial