the State’s question referred to pre-arrest silence, post-arrest and pre-Mi-randa silence, or post-arrest and post-Miranda silence; (2) the defendant’s citation to any state constitutional provision specifying the grounds on which he was objecting; and (3) the trial court’s comments regarding the objection. Id. at 542-43. The Heidelberg court held that the defendant’s federal constitutional objection was not sufficiently specific to put the trial court on notice of his state constitutional objection because it was not apparent from the context of the situation that the defendant was objecting to improper questions concerning his post-arrest, pre-Mmmda right to silence protected by the state constitution. Id; see Cantu v. State, 994 S.W.2d 721, 732-33 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, pet. dism’d) (<HOLDING>); see Barnum v. State, 7 S.W.3d 782, 794
holding experts testimony was insufficient to survive summary judgment because the testimony at most showed the defendant deviated from the experts personal standard of care rather than the generally accepted standard of care holding that defendant did not preserve state constitutional challenge to experts testimony at punishment hearing because defendant relied exclusively on federal cases in arguing for exclusion of experts testimony holding that testimony of two experts was unreliable because they relied on the testimony of two other experts which was also unreliable holding that even if an experts testimony arguably embraced the ultimate issue such testimony is permissible as long as the experts testimony assists rather than supplants the jurys judgment holding experts testimony was insufficient to survive summary judgment because the testimony at most showed the defendant deviated from the experts personal standard of care rather than the generally recognized and accepted standard of care