been decided at the time of trial), it was not plain error in the present case because the defendants would have been convicted even if the enor had not been committed and thus the enor would not have resulted in a miscarriage of justice that seriously affects the fairness of the judicial proceedings. Id.; Baker, 78 F.3d at 1246-47. Unlike our recent decision in Webster, the evidence in the case before us was overwhelming that the defendants both transported loaded firearms in the drug-laden Taurus and actually brandished the weapons, thereby satisfying the requirements of section 924(c)(1). Therefore, even if giving the pre-Bailey instruction to the jury constituted plain error, it would have been harmless in this case. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 76 F.3d 526, 529 (3d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). 5 . The Jencks Act requires the government to
holding that unless an erroneous instruction was unlikely to have changed the result of the trial a reviewing court cannot say that giving the instruction was harmless error holding that the giving of an erroneous reasonable doubt instruction can never be harmless error holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error holding that giving prebailey jury instruction on 924c1 count was an erroneous statutory interpretation but not constitutional in nature and thus harmless error analysis applied holding that federal appellate courts are authorized to engage in constitutional harmless error analysis in the first instance when a state appellate court does not undertake such an analysis and that such error must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt