the district court’s attorney fees award. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees. CONCLUSION A district court lacks jurisdiction to modify a child custody award while a perfected appeal is pending and the custody issue is before this court on appeal. If a change of custody is required during an appeal, it must be accomplished through a Huneycutt remand. In the interest of judicial economy, however, we have considered the post-decree order App. 1994) (noting that “while the trial court may enforce a support and custody order, it may not modify such order without leave of court”). 6 See NRAP 3A(b)(2) (permitting an appeal from an order finally establishing or altering child custody); Burton v. Burton, 99 Nev. 698, 669 P.2d 703 (1983) (<HOLDING>). 7 See Koffley v. Koffley, 866 A.2d 161,
holding that an order addressing each parents motion to modify but failed to reference wifes motion to enforce an out of state judgment was not a final appealable order recognizing that an order denying a motion to modify a family court order where the motion is based on changed factual or legal circumstances is appealable as a special order after final judgment holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable holding that an order denying a motion to correct reduce or modify a sentence under rule 3800 is not appealable holding adjudication order based upon a determination on the merits in juvenile court is a final and appealable order