requirement. Its allegation of decreased competition in the terminalling market is the type of harm targeted by the antitrust laws. Brunswick’s second prong is where IRM falters. IRM bases its claim upon the alleged cartelization of the international soda ash market, even though it is not a participant in this market. Because ÍRM is neither a competitor nor a consumer in the relevant market, it must allege a significant causal connection between the alleged soda ash conspiracy and the alleged anti-competitive effects in the terminalling market such that the harm to the terminalling market can be said to be “inextricably intertwined” with the alleged soda ash cartel. McCready, 457 U.S. at 484, 102 S.Ct. at 2551. See also Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 538, 103 S.Ct. at 908 (<HOLDING>); Gregory Marketing Corp. v. Wakefern Food
recognizing the sherman acts central interest in protecting the economic freedom of participants in the relevant market holding that information and documents that relate to among other things the nonu s manufacture sale and distribution of aspartame may prove relevant to establishing the existence of a global conspiracy to allocate the market for aspartame the ability of market participants to engage in domestic price fixing and the mechanisms employed by market participants in price fixing holding that governments asserted interest in protecting the privacy of arrestees is substantial under central hudson holding elements of attempted monopolization claim under  2 of sherman act are intent anticompetitive conduct and dangerous probability of success in a relevant market recognizing minnesotas interest in protecting the interests of the child