on the claimed 200 hours. In addition, Scott has failed to explain how his position as a government lawyer translates to damages sufficient to meet the jurisdictional threshold. To the extent that Scott is implying that the underlying criminal proceedings could adversely affect his anticipated security clearance review in 2013, any damages in that regard are purely speculative. Finally, the Court is not persuaded that Scott’s arrest, custody, fingerprinting, detention in Illinois, or the alleged psychological damage that he suffered as a consequence gave rise to “embarrassment, damage to reputation, harassment, emo tional distress, loss of time, and other damages” supported by evidence or facts of specific injury. See, e.g., Lewis v. Weiss, 631 F.Supp.2d 1063, 1066 (N.D.Ill. 2009) (<HOLDING>). The Court therefore finds that these
holding that absent any actual evidence of injury the plaintiffs allegations were too vague to establish the jurisdictional floor for damages holding that allegations of reputational harm emotional harm emotional suffering and humiliation in addition to substantial legal expenses were too vague to establish the jurisdictional floor for damages absent any actual evidence of injury holding that actual damages under respa included emotional damages holding that even emotional damages could constitute actual damages for purposes of  2605f1a holding in a fcra case that plaintiffs may not rely on mere  conclusory statements  rather they must  sufficiently articulate  true demonstrable emotional distress  including the factual context in which the emotional distress arose evidence corroborating the testimony of the plaintiff the nexus between the conduct of the defendant and the emotional distress the degree of such mental distress mitigating circumstances if any physical injuries suffered due to the emotional distress medical attention resulting from the emotional duress psychiatric or psychological treatment and the loss of income if any