underlying justification”); see also United States v. Manbeck, 744 F.2d 360, 379 n. 30 (4th Cir.1984) (‘‘[T]here are two types of seizures, one a permissible investigative stop, the second a detention equivalent to arrest. The Supreme Court has implied that custodial interrogations and Terry stops are mutually exclusive, i.e., if one is interrogated in a custodial situation the limits of Terry have necessarily been exceeded.... The type of ‘seizure’ that is similar to ‘custody,’ then, is seizure equivalent to arrest.” (citation omitted)). 28 . See United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 673-74 (2d Cir.2004) (recognizing debate among federal courts and citing cases that reached opposite conclusions on same question); see also United States v. Revels, 510 F.3d 1269, 1274 (10th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1464
holding that comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions associated with ordinary traffic stops explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that terry stops are subject to the dictates of miranda  holding a fourth amendment terry detention is not a custodial arrest and the use of handcuffs does not automatically convert a temporary detention into a fourth amendment arrest holding that a consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of miranda  holding although some detentions not rising to the level of a formal arrest may be reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment those same detentions may nonetheless create the custodial situation in which miranda was de signed to operate holding that the warrantless search of knights supported by reasonable suspicion and authorized by a condition of probation was reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment