2 . See Favoccia, 306 Conn. 770, 51 A.3d at 1015 n. 26 (surveying cases); see also United States v. Lukashov, 694 F.3d 1107, 1116 (9th Cir.2012) ("We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing [the doctor] to testify about the characteristics that she looks for when assessing a child victim's story of sexual abuse, and to opine that her evaluation of [the child] was consistent with [the child’s] allegations of sexual abuse.”); Steward v. State, 636 N.E.2d 143, 146 (Ind.Ct.App.1994) (“Indiana courts have consistently allowed expert testimony concerning whether a particular victim’s behavior is consistent with the behavioral patterns of victims of sexual abuse.”), aff'd, 652 N.E.2d 490 (Ind.1995); State v. McIntosh, 274 Kan. 939, 58 P.3d 716, 728-30 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Spicola, 922 N.Y.S.2d 846, 947 N.E.2d at 635
holding that proper foundation existed for qualified experts testimony regarding child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome where expert had extensive training and experience with sexually abused children expert testified regarding the characteristics of the syndrome and its recognition by specific agencies and defense counsel rigorously crossexamined witness concerning the basis of her knowledge of the victims conduct holding that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing expert testimony that directly linked the characteristics of sexually abused children to the complainants in this case holding admission of expert testimony not erroneous where expert described typical traits and characteristics of sexually abused children holding that the testimony of an expert witness is admissible when the witness outlines the general characteristics of sexually abused children and then states that the victims symptoms are consistent with those characteristics holding that an expert testifying to child sexual abuse symptoms must limit the testimony to general characteristics that cannot directly concern the particular victims