“(1) whether there is a contractual relationship; (2) whether the change in the law impairs that contractual relationship; and whether the impairment is substantial.” Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 93, 533 S.E.2d 578, 585 (2000) (citing Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 112 S.Ct. 1105, 117 L.Ed.2d 328 (1992)). It is undisputed a contractual relationship existed. Thus, we must ask whether the statute, as applied retroactively, substantially impairs in the traditional definition of occurrence with the faulty workmanship exclusion in the insurance contract. Occurrence, as we confirmed in Crossmann II, traditionally means an “accident” or a “continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.” Crossmann, 395 S.C. at 47, 717 S.E.2d at 592; 1937) (<HOLDING>); Superior Motors, Inc. v. Winnebago Indus.,
recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract holding that the terms of an employment contract are not entitled to presumptive reasonableness where the contract was ultimately rejected holding a deviation from the terms of a contract constitutes an impairment of contract holding that an assignment does not modify the terms of the underlying contract recognizing that courts will not add terms to a contract about which the contract is silent