based on general policy. Instead, this exception provides that a court can prohibit disclosure of records on an individual basis only when privacy interests outweigh the public interest favoring disclosure. Although the supreme court obviously may waive or modify its own rules, it has not done so here. See C.R.C.P. 121 § 1-5.2 (order limiting access to court files shall not be granted except upon a finding that harm to privacy outweighs public interest); Anderson v. Home Insurance Co., supra (interpreting § 24-72-204(1)(e) as allowing a court to limit access only when right of privacy outweighs public interest). SCA relies on Florida law to support its assertion that judicial records are exempted from the Open Records Act. See Times Publishing Company v. Ake, 660 So.2d 255 (Fla.1995) (<HOLDING>). However, Florida’s definition of public
holding that court clerks performing duties relating to the administrative operation of the courts including the release of judicial records are subject to the control of the florida supreme court not the legislative branch holding that in the absence of a legislative invasion of constitutionallyprotected rights the judicial branch of government must respect and defer to the legislatures exclusive policy decisions holding a per curiam affirmance from a florida district court of appeal is not renewable by the florida supreme court recognizing that immigration policy is the clear purview of the legislative branch holding that statute could not grant jurisdiction to dis trict courts of appeal over nonfinal arbitration order because the florida constitution reserved to the florida supreme court the power to define the interlocutory jurisdiction of district courts