of [fee] agreements [for representation before the Court] is exclusively within the province of the Court.” R. at 3, 6. On December 2, 1998, the attorney appealed that BVA decision through other counsel. On June 29, 1999, the Secretary filed a motion in that appeal, seeking Court review of the fee agreement for the attorney’s representation before the Court in connection with the October 1991 Court remand in McCreary, supra. As a basis for his motion, the Secretary asserts that the Court’s review of the reasonableness of the fee agreement “may result in a prompt, favorable determination for the appellant which would moot this appeal and conserve judicial resources”; the Secretary cites In the Matter of the Fee Agreement of Mason, 13 Vet.App. 79, 86 (1999) (Mason Fee Agreement) (<HOLDING>). Motion at 2-3. On July 12, 1999, the attorney
holding that where attorney successfully represents a va claimant before this court  the secretary is obligated under certain circumstances to pay directly to the attorney 20 of the pastdue benefits awarded on the basis of the claim or application for benefits underlying the issues successfully appealed to this court holding that the delivery of an eeoc decision to the former attorney of a claimant did not constitute notice to the claimant holding that the plain language of the regulations requires a claimant to have an intent to file a claim for va benefits holding that a claim based on an insurers failure to provide emergency benefits under state law is completely preempted because the factual basis of the complaint  was the denial of reimbursement of plan benefits holding that a claimants failure to list an impairment either in her application for disability benefits or through her testimony disposes of the claim because the alj was under no obligation to investigate a claim not presented at the time of the application for benefits and not offered at the hearing as a basis for disability