and during a period of total disability resulted from claimant’s wife’s efforts and a “return on the investment” the couple made in the business and could not be used to determine claimant’s post-injury earning capacity. See Clark v. Bobby L. Clark Trucking, 679 So.2d 157, 161-62 (La.Ct.App.1996). Although Clark involved a sole proprietorship whereas Joyce and Paoletti involved subchapter S corporations, we hold that the principles applicable to wholly-owned subchapter S corporations are equally applicable in cases involving sole proprietorships. Virginia’s Workers’ Compensation Act, like Illinois’, see Paoletti, 216 Ill.Dec. 447, 665 N.E.2d at 511-12, defines wages as “earnings.” See Code § 65.2-101. We hold this definition does not include profits. But see Oberley, 940 S.W.2d at 957 (<HOLDING>); Thompson v. Harold Thompson Trucking, 12
holding that a company that generated revenue from the sale of its assets remained in business holding that unless a shareholder can show personal cause of action and personal injury claims for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty belong to the corporation and not the shareholder holding that sole shareholder could recover on behalf of company but not in individual capacity for former shareholder and officers misappropriation of corporate assets holding that an order not denominated a judgment is not final for purposes of appeal holding that where subchapter s corporations revenue was generated from professional accounting services of its sole shareholder or from personal services performed under him funds generated by the business which shareholder withdrew to pay personal expenses although not denominated wages for purposes of bookkeeping could be considered wages for purposes of calculating preinjury wage