or capricious deprivation those facets of a convicted criminal’s existence that qualify as ‘liberty interests.’ ” Harper v. Young, 64 F.3d 563, 564 (10th Cir.1995), aff'd, 520 U.S. 143, 117 S.Ct. 1148, 137 L.Ed.2d 270 (1997). An inmate’s interest in participating in a state’s parole program is one such liberty interest inhering directly in the Due Process Clause itself, and thus is not subject to deprivation without strict procedural safeguards. Id. Although certain deprivations of process impacting on parole decisions may be “too attenuated to invoke the procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause,” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487, 115 S.Ct. 2293, Reed’s claim that he is being denied parole solely on the basis of his failure to participate in the SATP is not so attenuated. Cf. id. (<HOLDING>). Reed’s claim might, therefore, potentially
holding that the state courts decision to uphold the parole boards denial of parole was an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence holding that the defendants arrest for parole violations did not trigger the running of the speedy trial clock on murder charges even though the murder charge arose from the same conduct as the parole violations holding that even though the complaint was dismissed without prejudice as a sanction for misconduct and even though the order of dismissal was therefore not an adjudication on the merits the defendants were nevertheless properly considered the prevailing party for purposes of attorneys fees holding that the effect of a misconduct record on the duration of an inmates sentence was too attenuated even though it was a relevant consideration for parole holding that a sentence was based on a mandatory statutory minimum sentence even though it was lowered under another statute