to the revivor of an action is a statute of limitation, rather than a statute relating to pleading, practice, or procedure”). Moreover, the revival statute “has always been strictly construed.” Daniel, 445 S.W.2d at 701. “[T]he period set forth in the statute is mandatory and not subject to enlargement.” Hammons, 887 S.W.2d at 338. However, this alone does not felly answer whether the stay provision of the Kentucky Insurance Guaranty Association Act can have any effect on the revival limitation period, which is an issue of first impression in Kentucky. This Court’s review of foreign cases applying analogous provisions has revealed only two states to have addressed the issue, and there is a split of opinion between them. Compare White v. Haydel, 593 So.2d 421, 422 (La.Ct.App.1991) (<HOLDING>), with Skrbic v. QCRC Assoc. Corp., 761 So.2d
holding that it was an abuse of discretion to deny stay while matter was pending in neighboring state holding that insurance guarantee association stay statute did not suspend limitation period because action was not pending when stay was entered holding that the automatic stay did not bar the filing of a proof of claim where the debtor actively litigated a separate action during the pending bankruptcy proceeding because to permit the automatic stay provision to be used as a trump card played after an unfavorable result was reached  would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the automatic stay holding that a federal action to enforce the stay put provision is not itself a pending proceeding under  1415 that triggers stay put holding dismissal is not precluded by bankruptcy stay