of the incident. As to the first reason, the court may not base a downward departure on the defendant’s “intoxication at the time of the offense.” § 921.0016(5), Fla. Stat. (1999). Thus, the court erred in departing downward based on its finding that Chapman lacked the capacity to appreciate the criminal nature of the offense and that his conduct was substantially impaired. The trial court’s second reason for the down ward departure, that Chapman’s need to support his child outweighs his need for prison, has been rejected by this court as well. See Rafferty v. State, 799 So.2d 243, 248 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); State v. Bray, 738 So.2d 962, 963 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). The fact that Chapman has had no arrests since 1994, the trial court’s third reason for departing downward, is not d DCA 1988) (<HOLDING>). Reversed. CASANUEVA and STRINGER, JJ„ Concur.
holding that a circuit court has no jurisdiction to review a district courts discretionary decision not to depart downward from the guidelines but would have jurisdiction if the district court based its decision on the belief that it did not have the authority to depart holding that a conviction for receiving stolen property based on possession must be vacated because it involved the same act constituting theft based on retaining property holding that the trial court may not depart downward based on the quantity of money stolen in a theft case based on the reasoning in atwaters holding that district court did not have authority to depart downward under note 9 based on low purity of methamphetamine involved in case holding that a court may depart upward based upon a third partys injury in an assault case