underway for nearly a year. Initially, the defendants did not bring in an antitrust expert either. 10 . See also Georgia Court & Bar Rules, EC 7-7, stating that "it is for the client to decide whether he will accept a settlement offer." 11 . Standard 31(c) allows for contingency fees. It does not state, however, that an attorney may retain a veto over settlement in order to possibly increase the contingency by going to trial or negotiating further against the client’s wishes. The attorney approval requirement of the April 22nd agreement might result in such a situation. 12 .F & W merely asserts that Sweeney did not raise the Standard 31(c) argument in the district court. Therefore, this Court should not consider it on appeal. Lee v. Celotex Corp., 764 F.2d 1489, 1492-93 (11th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). 13 . Sweeney finally argues that the
recognizing that factual findings were clearly erroneous where the record before the court was simply devoid of any basis for the district courts conclusion holding that balancing must be based on factual findings holding that a district court satisfies its obligation to make factual findings when it explicitly adopts the factual findings set forth in the presentence report holding that a trial courts ruling on a motion for new trial will be upheld if it is correct on any applicable legal theory even if the court articulated an invalid basis holding that factual findings by the district court were needed before a newly articulated legal theory could be considered