“their claims arose sometime in 1977, the date Mary Van Brunt alleged that Grossman’s product exposed her to asbestos.” Id. Plaintiffs’ argument that the holding in Grossman’s is limited to asbestos-related cases is unconvincing. The court’s decision did not include any language limiting its holding in that way. (See Pis.’ Br. (ECF No. 69) at 2.) Notably, the court recognized that, after overruling Frenville, it was tasked with filling a void in its jurisprudence about when a claim arises. To limit its holding to asbestos cases would undoubtedly fall short of filling that void. Indeed, one recent decision by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit applied the holding in Grossman’s irrespective of the existence of a product claim. See In re Rodriguez, 629 F.3d 136, 142 (3d Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). Because the holding in Grossman’s applies to
holding no liability existed under the circumstances holding that a prepetition equitable distribution right to equalization relief constitutes a discharged prepetition claim and distinguishing while agreeing with in re marriage of seligman 14 calapp4th 300 18 calrptr2d 209 214215 1993 wherein it was held that a prepetition equitable distribution right to in kind relief does not constitute a prepetition claim holding that under grossmans a mortgagees right to collect successfully escrow payments existed prepetition and thereby constituted a claim under  1015 holding postpetition payments due to the debtor under a prepetition noncompete agreement were not property of the estate because the debtor had not done all acts necessary to accrue his right to the future payments holding that when a creditor files a proof of claim the bankruptcy court has core jurisdiction to determine that claim even if it was a prepetition contract claim arising under state law