clearly be insufficient to meet the elements of the Texas indecency-with-a-child statute, even if performed to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of the actor. See United States v. Brown, 3 USCMA 454, 457, 13 C.M.R. 10 (1953) (noting “it became necessary for Congress and the President to cover a wider field of sex crimes practiced on minors or committed in their presence,” and “the many variations in which it is possible to take indecent liberties with a child”). The two Paragraph 87 offenses at issue here are “much broader and cover[ ] a significant amount of conduct that the Texas offense does not.” Anderson, 394 S.W.3d at 539. “While the elements of ... offenses need not ‘parallel’ one another to be ‘substantially similar,’ they must criminalize a similar ‘range of conduct.’ ” Id. (<HOLDING>). The Paragraph 87 offenses are much broader
holding that a debtor is required to claim any exemptions under north carolina law because north carolina is an opt out state under 11 usc  522b holding that north carolina court lacked personal jurisdiction over illinois bank even though some of its customers resided in north carolina and loan proceeds were used in north carolina holding that because north carolina has opted out of the exemptions provided under 11 usc  522d the exemptions available for bankruptcy debtors in north carolina depend upon the law of north carolina holding the north carolina statute encompasses a markedly different range of conduct than the texas offense to which it is compared holding that a foreign subsidiary that is not registered to do business in north carolina has no place of business employees or bank accounts in north carolina does not design manufacture or advertise its products in north carolina and does not solicit business in north carolina cannot be subject to personal jurisdiction in north carolina even if some of the companys products do enter north carolina through the stream of commerce