of the three means of tampering.” Rabb, 387 S.W.3d at 72. The court of appeals simply declined to extend the definition of “destroy” that we put forth in Williams to the situation in this case in which Appellant’s “action so clearly constitut[ed] a concealment.” Id. While the words chosen by the Legislature in defining this offense each have a distinct purpose, this does not preclude overlap among those meanings. See, e.g., Clinton v. State, 854 S.W.3d 795, 801 (Tex.Crim.App.2011) (concluding that “uses” and “presents” have some overlap in the debit-card-abuse statute); Taylor v. State, 117 S.W.3d 848, 851 (Tex.Crim.App.2003) (stating there is nothing “unusual” in overlap between the terms “manager” and “employee”); Patterson v. State, 769 S.W.2d 938, 941 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, while “conceal,” “destroy,” and
holding that once a party had admitted that the opposing partys unauthenticated exhibit contains truthful information the court may consider the material in that exhibit because an admission is of course admissible in evidence holding because legislature knew how to include terms within statutory definition and did not do so statutory definition did not include terms in light of the terms contemporaneous inclusion of the same terms in a separate provision holding that purchase of search terms is a use in commerce holding that there is overlap in the terms use and exhibit in the deadlyweapon statute holding that jurisdiction to hear a motion for new trial was granted by statute and could be exercised solely in accordance with the terms of the statute