fleeing and attempting to elude a police officer. Thus, Gillespie’s sentence was properly enhanced pursuant to the ACCA. Gillespie replied that the government could not rely on any of his other prior convictions to classify him as an armed career criminal. The magistrate recommended that the district court deny Gillespie’s § 2255 motion. He concluded Gillespie had three prior convictions that qualified as violent felonies under the ACCA: (1) shooting into a dwelling and a vehicle, (2) armed trespass, and (3) fleeing and attempting to elude an officer. Gillespie had conceded that two of these convictions — shooting into a dwelling and a vehicle and armed trespass — were violent felonies under the ACCA. See Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. —,—, 131 S.Ct. 2267, 2273, 180 L.Ed.2d 60 (2011) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Gillespie was not entitled to relief
holding that under indiana law fleeing an officer in a vehicle constitutes a violent felony under begay because the flight must be done knowingly or intentionally  holding that escape is categorically a violent felony under the acca holding fleeing police officers in a vehicle was a violent felony under the acca holding massachusetts conviction for larceny from the person constitutes violent felony under the residual clause of the acca holding that attempted burglary as defined by florida law is a violent felony under acca