used by Mr. Carty on behalf of American and the unrebutted evidence concerning the understanding of American’s Mr. Carty and TWA’s Mr. Compton, the Court disagrees with Plaintiffs’ contention. During his Senate Subcommittee testimony, Mr. Carty stated, “We intend to offer retirees pass privileges, Mr. Senator.” D.I. 99, Ex. 25 (2/1/01 Subcommittee Testimony) (emphasis added). In the Court’s view, Mr. Carty’s statement is, at most, a statement of future intent, and therefore, it is insufficient to constitute a binding contractual offer. See e.g., Koshatka v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 762 F.2d 329, 337 (3d Cir.1985) (“[M]ere oral promises stating a future intention to make a contract are not binding.”); Beverage Distribs., Inc. v. Olympia Brewing Co., 440 F.2d 21, 29 (9th Cir.1971) (<HOLDING>) Plaintiffs also direct the Court to the
holding that where a city enters contract in excess of its statutory power the mere fact that the municipality has received the benefits of the contract which has been performed by the other party does not make the municipality liable either on the theory of ratification estoppel or implied contract in order to do justice to the other party by paying the reasonable value of the property or services holding that something more than a mere error of law is required to constitute misconduct holding that the relevant question is not whether risk is involved or assumed but rather whether that or something else to which it is related in the particular plan is its principal object and purpose holding that probable cause is something more than mere suspicion holding that a gratuitous and unsolicited statement of policy or of intention which receives the concurrence of the party to whom it is addressed does not constitute a contract and a mere expression of intention or general willingness to do something on the happening of a particular event or in return for something to be received does not amount to an offer