investigation. Ex parte proceedings are disfavored, but the district court’s approach here was justified by the interest in maintaining grand jury secrecy. We also share the district court’s concern that jointly-represented witnesses should not be able to gain information about confidential grand jury proceedings through a hearing on their attorney’s conflict of interest. Assuming that a grand jury witness could waive his interest in conflict-free assistance of counsel, cf. In re Grand Jury, 446 F.Supp. 1132, 1140 (N.D.Tex.1978), the district court did not engage in judicial usurpation of power by concluding that no such waiver was feasible or permissible under the circumstances presented here. Cf. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 162, 163, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Each client, of course, is free to retain
holding that defendant must demonstrate both that counsel actively represented conflicting interests and that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyers performance to establish a sixth amendment violation holding the existence of a possible conflict required remand for a determination of whether an actual conflict of interest existed and holding a new trial would be required if an actual conflict existed holding that even where the sixth amendment applies a court presented with an actual conflict of interest has broad latitude and may decline a proffer of waiver and insist that multiple defendants be separately represented holding that the defendant was deprived of his sixth amendment right to counsel where appointed counsels representation presented a conflict of interest holding that to demonstrate that a conflict of interest violated his sixth amendment rights a defendant must establish that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyers performance