with Markby was not similar to Seltzer’s current position, as it was an administrative assistant position. (Id. ¶ 8). Also, Dresdner did not hire anyone for the Markby position; the floater who had been working for him simply remained in the position. (Id.). c. The Record As a Whole Considering the evidence as a whole, and resolving all conflicts in the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor, I conclude that no reasonable jury could find that plaintiffs age was a factor in her dismissal. The only admissible, probative evidence of age discrimination is the bare fact that plaintiff was 72 years old when she was discharged. By itself, this evidence is not enough to defeat summary judgment. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 517, 113 S.Ct. 2742 (<HOLDING>); James, 238 F.3d at 157; Pullin v. Potter, No.
holding discrimination based on pregnancy was not sex discrimination holding that evidence of egregiousness is required for punitive damages since otherwise every employment discrimination claim could include a punitive damage award because every employment discrimination plaintiff must demonstrate an intentional unlawful discrimination holding in the discrimination context that a plaintiff may challenge incidents which occurred outside the statute of limitations period if the various acts of discrimination constitute a continuing pattern of discrimination holding that direct evidence of discrimination is not required to prove discrimination in mixed motive cases under title vii holding that in a discrimination case plaintiff must prove that firing was a result of intentional discrimination