an insufficient showing of the materiality of Hayes’s anticipated testimony. We agree with defendant. Defendant informed the trial court that a continuance was needed to procure the appearance of Hayes, “an eyewitness to this incident,” and defendant informed the court that Hayes had given a “statement that was favorable to [defendant].” Despite that very “shorthand” description of Hayes’s anticipated testimony, i.e., that it would be “favorable” for defendant, we conclude that it was sufficient information, along with the information that defendant was proceeding on a self-defense theory, for the trial court to understand that, as an eyewitness, Hayes would provide testimony in support of defendant’s self-defense theory. See State v. Morgan, 251 Or App 99, 105-07, 284 P3d 496 (2012) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, we conclude from its discussion
holding to prove possession the state must show that a defendant possessed a certain substance the substance was illegal and he had knowledge of the presence of the substance holding that a formal offer of proof was not required to challenge an evidentiary ruling because the substance of excluded testimony was apparent from the context holding a proffer of testimony is required to preserve the issue of whether testimony was properly excluded by the trial judge and an appellate court will not consider error alleged in the exclusion of testimony unless the record on appeal shows fairly what the excluded testimony would have been holding the excluded testimony was relevant to whether a signature was that of a deceased party and since a statement regarding the issue was the only testimony that could be given by the witness no offer to prove was necessary because the substance of the evidence was apparent from the context of the question asked holding that an evidentiary hearing is not required when the petitioner relies solely upon conclusory unsworn statements unsupported by any proof or offer or proof