to appeal his sentence. However, because the district court did not discuss Pugh’s waiver of his right to appeal his sentence during the change of plea hearing, we decline to enforce that waiver. See United States v. Arellano-Gallegos, 387 F.3d 794, 796-97 (9th Cir. 2004). Our independent review of the record pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), discloses no arguable grounds for relief on direct appeal with regard to Pugh’s sentence. Accordingly, we affirm the sentence. In his pro se supplemental brief Pugh contends that his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. We decline to review Pugh’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal. See United States v. Rahman, 642 F.3d 1257, 1260 (9th Cir. 2011) (<HOLDING>). We leave open the possibility that Pugh might
holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record holding that we review ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal only in the unusual cases where the record is suffi ciently developed or the legal representation is so obviously inadequate that it denies a defendant his sixth amendment right to counsel holding that ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be brought in collateral proceedings not on direct appeal holding ineffective assistance of counsel claims may be decided on direct appeal where the district court has developed a record on the ineffectiveness issue holding that the sixth amendment right to counsel embodies the right to effective assistance of counsel