reached, two were struck for cause, and two were seated on the jury. The prosecutor then argued that defense counsel had not shown a prima facie case of discrimination. The trial court overruled appellant’s motion. After the jury was sworn and dismissed for the day, the prosecutor asked that she be allowed to explain on the record why she struck the contested jurors. Following the prosecutor’s presentation, defense counsel stated why she thought the State’s reasons were merely pretextual. Appellant claims the State waived its right to maintain that no prima facie showing of discrimination was made when it chose to give its reasons for striking jurors Delaney and Jones. See Hill v. State, 827 S.W.2d 860, 865 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 297, 121 L.Ed.2d 221 (1992) (<HOLDING>). We disagree. The record shows that the State
holding that a prima facie case is subject to independent review recognizing that whether the employee uses the mcdonnell douglas framework or other evidence to create a prima facie case when the employer offers a legitimate nondiseriminatory reason for its adverse action the question is whether a rational trier of fact could conclude that the employers action was taken for impermissibly discriminatory reasons holding that once prosecutor makes raceneutral explanation for peremptory challenge and trial court rules on question of intentional discrimination issue of prima facie case becomes moot holding that without more the mere fact that the prosecutor used a high number of strikes to remove women from the venire is insufficient to establish a prima facie case holding that when the prosecutor articulates reasons for strikes and the trial court makes a ruling on discriminatory intent the question of whether a prima facie case was made is moot