work here. Second, because SFS owned or leased the offices from which it operated, Jackson Hewitt was not in control of the premises where the tort was committed. And, third, Jackson Hewitt was not in control of either Prewett or JHIS. Jackson Hewitt had no contractual relationship with either Prewett or JHIS. Prewett was employed by SFS, not Jackson Hewitt, and JHIS was an independent corporate entity. Under these circumstances, Jackson Hewitt had no duty to the Kamans, and the Kamans did not meet the threshold requirement necessary to establish their negligence claim. See Cantalupo v. Lewis, 47 So.3d 896, 900 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (stating that one of two brothers did not have a duty to prevent the other brother from driving under the influence of alcohol); Demelus, 24 So.3d at 765-66 (<HOLDING>); Pompano Motor Co. v. Chrysler Ins. Co., 875
holding automobile exeeption did not apply to warrantless search of vehicle where vehicle was not readily mobile because the vehicle was legally parked in parking lot occupants of vehicle were seated on a bench in the playground near the parking lot police officers surrounded the vehicle and the driver of the vehicle was handcuffed for safety purposes holding that criminal conduct on premises was not foreseeable holding that an automobile dealership which kept its cars locked in a secured lot did not create a foreseeable zone of risk of thirdparty criminal conduct by a juvenile gang that stole vehicles from the lot one of which collided with another vehicle and injured the driver holding that an injury occurring in a parking lot which was leased but not controlled by an employer was compensable because the employer instructed its employees to park in that lot holding that claimant was entitled to workers compensation because he was injured in a parking lot which was leased by his employer