of this circuit. Moreover, Boggs did not break new ground so much as simply recognize a distinction explicit in Davis itself. See Boggs, 226 F.3d at 736-37. In Hargrave, the panel concluded that the defendant had a constitutional right to cross-examine a witness not about credibility but about competency — about “mental limitations affecting her ability accurately to perceive and recall the events at issue.” Hargrave, 248 Fed.Appx. at 727. Even there, however, the panel recognized that the case would be different if the cross-examiner simply sought to show that the witness "might be a person who was more willing to lie under oath than the average person.” Ibid. Absent clearly established Supreme Court law to the contrary, we continue to adhere to Boggs. See Jordan, 675 F.3d at 596-97 (<HOLDING>), cited approvingly by Jackson, 133 S.Ct. at
recognizing distinction between two types of waiver recognizing distinction made by majority recognizing this distinction recognizing distinction between tolling and estoppel recognizing the boggs distinction