should be his or her limited guardian. Clearly, the presence of a respondent in court would facilitate this determination. Finally, we note that our interpretation of § 45a-675 corresponds with the holdings of courts in other jurisdictions that have addressed the presence issue in analogous contexts. These courts have held that a guardianship statute providing a respondent with a right to be present means that a respondent must be present, in the absence of a valid waiver or statutory exception. See In re Link, supra, 713 S.W.2d 494 (statutory right to be present at guardianship proceeding “reflects a legislative intent to provide greater protection for the rights of incompetents than previously existed under Missouri law”); Guardianship of B.A.G., 794 S.W.2d 510, 513 (Tex. App. 1990) (<HOLDING>). We therefore hold that § 45a-675 requires a
holding that this section article 1 section 3 guaranteeing all persons equality of rights was designed to prevent any person or class of persons from being singled out as a special subject for discrimination holding that the fact that the incapacitated person has assets in the district alone provides a sufficient basis for keeping the case here holding that in temporary guardianship proceeding for woman with mental retardation the allegedly incapacitated person must appear because that persons rights are being limited even if for a short period of time holding a complaint against a public official or employee must explicitly state it as being brought against the person in the persons individual capacity or else the complaint will be construed as suing the person only in the persons official capacity recognizing that permitting delays are similar to temporary moratoria and further noting that even a total moratorium on new development for a limited time period is not a taking