Anticompetitive Conduct Novell has raised a genuine question of material fact concerning whether Microsoft’s behavior; taken as a whole, was anticompetitive. Microsoft attacks Count I by arguing that Novell has not presented evidence that Microsoft did anything beyond refusing to cooperate with Novell, and refusing to assist a competitor is not anticompetitive conduct in violation of § 2. Although a monopolist generally has a right to refuse to cooperate with a competitor, this right is not unqualified: a refusal to cooperate may be anticompetitive if it is an “attempt! 1 to exclude rivals on some basis other than efficiency!.]” See Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 600-01, 605, 105 S.Ct. 2847 (internal citations and quotations omitted); accord Data Gen. Corp., 36 F.3d at 1183 ( (<HOLDING>). As an initial matter, it is not entirely
holding that an individuals property interest in a 10 pool pass was de minimis recognizing the purpose of crossexamination is to enlighten the jury as to whether the witness actuallyas a matter of fact knows the general reputation of the defendant and to place the jury in a better position to pass upon the credibility of the witness testimony holding that a monopolistski mountain owners refusal to continue offering a multiday lift pass with a competitor mountain could violate  2 because i they had offered the pass successfully for years ii the monopolist refused to even let the competitor buy the monopolists lift tickets at retail price iii the pass had great appeal among consumers iv elimination of the pass undermined the smaller competitors ability to compete and v the facts suggest that the monopolist was willing to sacrifice shortrun benefits and consumer goodwill in exchange for a perceived longrun impact on its smaller rival holding that where the meaning of the jurys verdict was not clear in light of the trial courts jury instructions the court of appeals erred in directing entry of judgment for respondent the case should have been remanded to the trial judge who was in the best position to pass upon the question of a new trial in light of the evidence his charge to the jury and the jurys verdict holding that even if an agreement that title would pass once financing was obtained the most a creditor could claim was a security interest once the good was delivered