then proceed either with a bench trial or a trial to me on stipulated facts? “THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.” Furthermore, in the stipulated facts agreement, Rizo acknowledged his waiver: “1. Defendant, having previously knowingly, intelligently, freely, and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial on all charges in the Information filed in this case, now agrees to proceed to bench trial by stipulated facts.” Rizo does not cite any authority requiring the district court to explain other trial rights to a defendant in order to obtain a knowing and voluntaiy jury trial waiver. Further, our caselaw has upheld jury trial waivers even when the district court fails to explain the particulars surrounding the right to a jury trial. See State v. Lewis, 301 Kan. 349, 377-78, 344 P.3d 928 (2015) (<HOLDING>); Beaman, 295 Kan. at 859, 862 (holding jury
holding that the district courts observation that a challenge for cause might have been justified as to this juror was more than sufficient under batson which emphasized that the prosecutors explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause quoting batson 476 us at 97 106 sct 1712 holding that a postconviction petitioner has 60 days from the date of publication of 1997 philadelphia magazine article to raise claims based thereon under batson v kentucky 476 us 79 106 sct 1712 90 led2d 69 1986 holding that batson v kentucky 476 us 79 106 sct 1712 90 led2d 69 1986 does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review holding jury trial waiver valid although district court did not inform defendant of his attorneys ability to make challenges under batson v kentucky 476 us 79 8889 106 s ct 1712 90 l ed 2d 69 1986 holding jury trial waiver valid although district court did not inform defendant of right to unanimous verdict