Texas Bar for just over two years. 5 . Ex parte Kerr, 64 S.W.3d 414, 418-19 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). 6 . This was not technically true. The number of applications an inmate could file was not limited by statute, but an inmates ability to seek relief was regulated by the abuse of the writ procedure. Ex parte Davis, 947 S.W.2d 216, 226 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). 7 . When the applicant's initial habeas counsel was appointed by this Court to another capital murder defendant's case, such was the state of his resume. See Second Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus, at 8, Ex parte Etheridge, No. 36-443-02 (Tex.Crim.App. hied Oct. 31, 2001). We appointed the same counsel to the applicant’s case less than a year later. 8 . Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 559, 107 S.Ct 1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987) (<HOLDING>). 9 . Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10, 109
holding that there is no federal or colorado constitutional right to postconviction counsel but there is a limited statutory right holding that there is no right to counsel beyond the initial direct appeal and thus no right to counsel on discretionary review recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel recognizing the right to counsel on appeal holding that a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel as a matter of right on direct appeal