he agreed to and intended to commit in furtherance of the conspiracy regardless of whether he ultimately committed the substantive act.” United States v. Jackson, 335 F.3d 170, 181 (2d Cir.2003). Further, an agreement need not be explicit, but may be implied from the totality of the evidence. See United States v. Amato, 15 F.3d 230, 235 (2d Cir.1994). From the evidence already referenced of the men’s intent to establish an ongoing distribution scheme and the fact that VanHoesen distributed over 15 grams of crack in two days, an operation halted only by his arrest on a different charge, a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that VanHoesen and Conley had tacitly agreed to distribute 50 grams or more of crack. See United States v. Dallas, 229 F.3d 105, 110-11 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, at the rate VanHoe-sen was selling
holding that the cwa does not include a remedial scheme sufficient to preclude an ex parte young action holding stare decisis does not preclude the court from abolishing the classification scheme holding that evidence tending to show knowing participation in the conspiracy is sufficient to sustain conspiracy conviction holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges holding that failure to consummate scheme does not preclude conspiracy conviction