law. Courts were unwilling to recognize a common law cause of action against purveyors of intoxicating beverages because, as a matter of law, consumption, rather than the furnishing of alcohol, was considered the proximate cause of the ultimate damages. See Haafke, 347 N.W.2d at 384; Snyder v. Davenport, 323 N.W.2d 225, 226 (Iowa 1982). Thus, dram shop statutes were enacted to enable tort plaintiffs to bridge the proximate cause gap between the sale of an intoxicating beverage and the subsequent injury or damage caused by the intoxicated patron. In exchange for this new claim, the legislature mandated that liquor purveyors were strictly liable and carefully prescribed the means by which liability may be ascertained. Snyder, 323 N.W.2d at 227. The statute limits recovery for injuri 984) (<HOLDING>); Bauer v. Dann, 428 N.W.2d 658, 661 (Iowa
holding tavern employees could be held liable for negligently furnishing alcohol to a patron in violation of a criminal statute or ordinance holding proprietor of a tavern was not liable to officer who sustained injuries caused by a patron while the officer was attempting to make an arrest holding that employer who failed to take remedial action could be held liable for sexual harassment of employee by subcontractors employees holding that tavern will be held liable for serving alcohol to visibly intoxicated patron who then foreseeably becomes involved in a motor vehicle accident holding tavern owner not liable for injuries sustained when intoxicated patron assaulted a police officer