features of a city.” Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 129, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978). Thus, the Supreme Court held in Penn Central Transportation Company that landmark-preservation laws, based partly on aesthetics, are valid. See id. at 128-38, 98 S.Ct. 2646. Other land-use restrictions, such as local zoning laws, also may properly take aesthetics into account. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974) (it is “permissible” for zoning laws to promote aesthetic considerations); Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 495 (2d Cir.1999) (“[i]n New York, aesthetics can be a valid ground for local zoning decisions”); see also Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 645 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,
holding preenforcement review of regulation not ripe for adjudication the legal issue could arise in a variety of contexts thus review would be better served in context of specific application of the regulation than in the context of a general challenge and hardship to challengers was minimal if judicial review was withheld the regulation did not affect the primary conduct of the challengers business and at most they would only suffer suspensions of certification for noncompliance holding that a showing of prejudice is generally required in the context of an ineffectiveassistance claim holding in context of local environmental review process that ajesthetics is generally a valid subject of  regulation and concern recognizing that a treaty is a supreme law of the land and therefore generally not subject to state regulation absent congressional cessation holding that pma process is not specific regulation because the requirements are not contained in formal regulation