and (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). (Compl. ¶¶ 134^-48.) Federal courts possess “supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy,” but may decline supplemental jurisdiction if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The United States Supreme Court has held that it remains within the court’s discretion to retain jurisdiction over state law claims where all federal claims have been resolved. Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 245, 127 S.Ct. 881, 166 L.Ed.2d 819 (2007); see also Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350-51, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86
holding that when the federal character of a removed case is eliminated the court has discretion to retain jurisdiction to remand or to dismiss recognizing that pleadings filed in federal court while the federal court has jurisdiction become part of the state court record on remand holding that bankruptcy court has discretion to retain jurisdiction over related case after dismissal of the underlying bankruptcy case holding an appellate court has the discretion to retain jurisdiction to render a decision on the merits of a case notwithstanding the filing of a notice of voluntary dismissal holding that a party waives remand on the basis of a procedural defect by filing a motion to remand more than thirty days after the case is removed