applies to his first claim because the Supreme Court narrowed the definition of what constitutes a violent felony for purposes of determining armed career criminal status in Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008). Under this new law, he argues, he is actually innocent of being an armed career criminal. However, he does not argue that he is actually innocent of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Claims alleging “actual innocence” of a sentencing enhancement cannot be raised under § 2241. Raymer v. Barron, 82 Fed.Appx. 431, 432 (6th Cir.2003); Kinder v. Purdy, 222 F.3d 209, 212-14 (5th Cir.2000) (dismissing petition raising claim of “actual innocence” of career-offender enhancement); In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 609-10 (7th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Jones relies on Gilbert v. United States, 640
holding that a  2241 petitioners claim was not cognizable under  2241 and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction holding challenge to armedcareercriminal enhancement improper under  2241 holding   2241 is the proper avenue by which to challenge pretrial detention holding that  2241 was the proper statute for the petitioners pretrial double jeopardy challenge holding that prisoners challenge to his sentencing enhancement under  841 and 846 was not cognizable under  2241