F.2d 1346, 1354 (9th Cir.1984), but it must consist of “more than a mere refutation of the employer’s legitimate reason and [a mere assertion] that the discriminatory reason be the cause of the firing,” Wallis, 26 F.3d at 890 (citation omitted). Little established a prima facie case. The district court correctly found that Little could have reasonably believed that, in reporting the rape to Scott, she was opposing an unlawful employment practice. See Moyo, 40 F.3d at 985. Given Little’s belief that her relationship with Guerrero was strictly business, and that she met with him because it was part of her job as a Windermere employee, her belief that Windermere was required to take action in response to his assault of her was eminently reasonable. See, e.g., Fuller, 47 F.3d at 1528-29 (<HOLDING>). Second, Glew’s reduction of her guaranteed
holding that restatement  2191 is inapplicable to alleged sexual harassment by a supervisor was sexual harassment within the scope of antonis employment of course not holding employer may be hable for sexual harassment of employee by independent contractor holding that sexual harassment is a personal injury tort holding that harassment of women working alongside plaintiff was relevant to question of creation of environment viola tive of title vii  although vinson was a sexual harassment case the principles underlying a hostile environment theory are equally applicable in sexual harassment and racial harassment cases holding that an employer must remedy situation of sexual harassment