the state could have elected to charge Reynolds with both burglary and theft and, upon conviction, would have been entitled to a separate sentence on both charges. Reynolds cannot complain that it was improper to deny an instruction on theft that would have permitted the jury to consider the offense only as a lesser alternative to burglary. Reynolds’ conviction is REVERSED, and this case is REMANDED for a retrial in conformity with the views expressed herein. 1 . See Whitton v. State, 479 P.2d 302, 306-314 (Alaska 1970). 2 . See abo Catlett v. State, 585 P.2d 553, 558 (Alaska 1978) (citing Mead with approval in holding that offenses of grand larceny and theft from an airplane do not merge and are subject to separate punishment). 3 . Cf. State v. Occhipinti, 562 P.2d 348 (Alaska 1977) (<HOLDING>). 4 .Here, as in Mead, "we are presented with
holding that as a matter of state law nonmutual offensive issue preclusion does not apply against the state holding that when the state prosecutes and obtains a conviction on separate charges as to which the rule of merger does not apply the state is entitled as a matter of law to a conviction and a separate sentence on each charge holding unanimity requirement not violated when charge stated two separate counts with two separate and distinct offenses in each case holding the petitioners challenge of his conviction is not rendered moot by the expiration of the underlying sentence because collateral consequences flowing from the conviction give the petitioner a substantial stake in the judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence imposed on him holding defendant who voluntarily dismissed his appeal of one conviction based on plea agreement for separate charges was not entitled to outoftime appeal