though he was sentenced more than five years before it was decided because his case was "not yet final" when Blakely was decided. Additionally, Smylie holds that defendants sentenced before Blakely was handed down, but whose appeals were "on direct review" on that date, may raise a Sixth Amendment challenge to their sentences for the first time on appeal. Smylie, 823 N.E.2d at 690-91. Turning to the merits of Sullivan's arguments, we observe that his prior conviction for one count of trespassing, although exempt from Blakely's jury-finding requirement, clearly is insufficient by itself to sustain a maximum sentence for class A felony child molesting and, indeed, may not qualify as a significant aggravating cireumstance at all. See, e.g., Cotto v. State, 829 N.E2d 520, 526 (Ind.2005) (<HOLDING>). There also appears to be no
holding that criminal history consisting of five misdemeanor convictions was at best marginally significant in determining sentence for class a felony holding that an aggravated misdemeanor conviction under section 7191 is a felony for purposes of assessing criminal history points under ussg  4a12c recognizing that felony and misdemeanor dwi are separate offenses because a prior conviction is an essential element of felony driving while intoxicated but it is not an element of the misdemeanor offense holding a court may consider a defendants criminal history even if that history is included in the defendants criminal history category holding that trial judge properly considered defendants misdemeanor convictions