in any case,” 28 U.S.C. § 1927. This unambiguous statutory language necessarily excludes the complaint that gives birth to the proceedings, as it is not possible to multiply proceedings until after those proceedings have begun. To the extent that the Seventh Circuit held otherwise in In re TCI, Ltd,., 769 F.2d at 448, we find the court’s reasoning questionable. There, the Seventh Circuit looked beyond § 1927’s language to (1) a failed amendment that would have required a warning prior to sanctions; and (2) the “new” Fed.R.Civ.P. 11. which, the court observed, “requires the attorney to take care before filing a complaint.” Id. We see no reason to look past § 1927’s clear language. See BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 187 n. 8, 124 S.Ct. 1587, 158 L.Ed.2d 388 (2004) (<HOLDING>). [14] Because Gage acquiesced in Winn’s first
recognizing longstanding precedents that permit resort to legislative history only when necessary to interpret ambiguous statutory text holding that even where there are  contrary indications in the statutes legislative history we do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear recognizing that courts may look beyond the statutory text to determine legislative intent only when the statute is ambiguous holding that we may consult legislative history as an aid to the interpretation of ambiguous text holding that unless a statute is ambiguous on the point at issue a court should not resort to legislative history in interpreting it