of the condition of private individuals, we conclude that it is more akin to the laws of “contract, tort, marriage, divorce, insanity, [or] descent,” than to an assertion of sovereignty like “the power to tax [or] grant franchises.” Bryan, 426 U.S. at 384 n. 10, 96 S.Ct. 2102 (quoting Israel & Smithson, supra, at 296) (internal quotation marks omitted). The result we reach here with regard to chapter 253B is in accord with results reached in other states. For example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that section 1360(a) expressly granted a state court subject matter jurisdiction to civilly commit a tribal member as a sexually dangerous person. In re Commitment of Burgess, 262 Wis.2d 354, 665 N.W.2d 124, 133 (2003); see also Burgess v. Watters, 467 F.3d 676, 687 (7th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Applying Caba-zon, the Wisconsin Supreme
holding that the wisconsin supreme court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law in determining that public law 280 conferred civil jurisdiction to the state of wisconsin to commit burgess an enrolled member of an indian tribe as a sexually violent person holding that where the supreme court has expressly left an open question circuit precedent is immaterial and there is no clearly established law for the state court to have unreasonably applied holding that state failed to assume even partial jurisdiction in compliance with public law 280 holding that pursuant to amended public law 280 a tribe must consent to state court civil jurisdiction over actions arising against member indians in indian country holding the existence of jurisdiction in state courts to hear a dispute by a materials supplier against a contractor in an indian housing agency under the authority of public law 280