(1982). Assuming that the Clubs have a property interest in the club permits issued by the TABC, they cannot demonstrate that they were denied due process. “[WJhen a legislature extinguishes a property interest via legislation that affects a general class of people, the legislative process provides all the process that is due.” McMurtray v. Holladay, 11 F.3d 499, 504 (5th Cir.1993). The Clubs argue that § 32.03(k) affected a small number of establishments and was narrowly focused on certain SOBs, notwithstanding its broad language and statewide applicability. The Clubs erroneously focus on the total number of establishments ultimately affected by § 32.03(k). The proper focus, however, is on whether the legislature intended to single out certain individuals or establishments. See id. (<HOLDING>). Section 32.03(k) was intended to affect every
holding that doctrine does not violate due process holding statute criminalizing speech intended to influence a juror did not violate the first amendment holding that states inadvertent or negligent destruction of evidence did not violate defendants due process rights holding that a law extinguishing property rights of certain government employees did not violate due process where the act was intended to affect every employee first emphasis added holding that the ij did not violate petitioners due process rights by not discussing each piece of evidence