for these provisions is that they support small businesses. The record does not contain any evidence of the alleged safety concerns incumbent in regulating liquor sales in this way. Without any other supportable police power justification present, economic protectionism for a certain class of retailers is not a constitutionally sound basis for regulating liquor sales. See Bacchus Imports v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200 (1984) (“State laws that constitute mere economic protectionism are ... not entitled to the same deference as laws enacted to combat the perceived evils of an unrestricted traffic in liquor.”); McCullough v. Brown, 41 S.C. 220, 247-48, 19 S.E. 458, 472-73 (1894), overruled on other grounds by State ex rel. George, 42 S.C. at 254, 20 S.E. at 233 (<HOLDING>). Not only is there no indication in this
holding pennsylvania statute regulating subrogation is a law regulating insurance holding that the mccarranferguson act which bars application of a federal law in the face of a state law enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance did not preclude the concurrent assertion of the federal rico statute and nevada insurance law holding that if a statute regulating alcoholic liquors is enacted for economic purposes rather than as a police regulation of the business of selling intoxicating liquors it is unconstitutional holding that effect of suit rather than the purpose for which it was brought is controlling for purposes of the fifth factor holding that a statute of general applicability was not enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance