as “murder which is ... wilful, deliberate or premeditated ... or which is committed ... in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, ... robbery.” (Quoting Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 13-452 (Supp. 1973).) At trial, the prosecution sought to prove the capital murder offense by advancing both a theory of premeditated murder and one of felony murder. Schad, 501 U.S. at 629, 111 S.Ct. 2491. The jury returned a general verdict of guilty, witho Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (<HOLDING>); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d
holding that counsel did not admit the defendant was guilty of a crime when counsel noted that if the evidence established the commission of any crime that crime was voluntary manslaughter not murder holding that conspiracy to commit murder is not lesserincluded offense of firstdegree murder holding that unlike the specificintent crime of firstdegree murder seconddegree murder is a generalintent crime for which the defense of voluntary intoxication is not available holding that where both firstdegree and felony murder were possible bases for a murder conviction a jury instruction that suggested the jury could rely on felony murder as the predicate offense for a conviction for conspiracy to commit murder was improper because under arizona law a conviction for conspiracy to commit firstdegree murder requires a specific intent to kill holding that firstdegree murder is one crime although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways