speaking, there are two distinct purposes of a standby counsel. One is to “stand by” and be ready to proceed if the defendant should choose to cease self-representation, or if there is any other reason why self-representation cannot continue. The second purpose of a standby counsel is to help a self-representing defendant if, and to the extent, assistance is requested. As discussed above, the Supreme Court in Faret-ta expressly recognized both these applications, see 422 U.S. at 834 n. 46, 95 S.Ct. 2525, even though it left the precise scope of standby counsel’s role not fully charted. In the wake of Faretta, however, federal courts have adopted both these rules in delineating standby counsel’s role. See, e.g., United States v. Gomez-Rosario, 418 F.3d 90, 96-97, 102 (1st Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Lawrence, 161 F.3d 250, 252
holding that although the defendant filed a number of motions because the original trial date never changed as a result of those motions no delay could be attributed to the motions holding that district court could consistent with faretta require that standby counsel screen pro se defendants motions to facilitate the orderly functioning of the proceedings after the unassisted defendant deluged the district court with nearly 100 long and frivolous motions holding that motions to dismiss should have been converted into motions for summary judgment where the district court relied upon contract documents submitted by the defendant holding in part that the presumption of public access attaches to pretrialnondiscovery motions whether preliminary or dispositive and the materials briefs and documents filed with the court in support of or in opposition to such motions but not to pretrial discovery motions holding that a court commits no error in refusing to rule on pro se motions raised by a represented party