108 S.Ct. 636, 98 L.Ed.2d 782 (1988)). Rather, a plaintiff will satisfy the “injury” requirement if it demonstrates merely a credible or well-founded fear that the statute will be enforced against it. See id. (citing Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979)). A plaintiff demonstrates proof of a credible or well-founded fear of prosecution if the statute in question can reasonably be construed to cover the expressive or communicative activities in which a plaintiff presently engages or reasonably intends to engage in the future. See id. at 380-83; Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 299-300, 99 S.Ct. 2301; Landell v. Sorrell, 118 F.Supp.2d 459, 475-76 (D.Vt.2000). Compare Fifth Ave. Peace Parade Comm. v. Gray, 480 F.2d 326, 331 (2d Cir.1973) (<HOLDING>). The government’s contention that it does not
holding that because fact of injury was a distinct question from quantum of injury common proof could establish classwide injury even though amount of damage to each plaintiff was uncertain holding that speculative theory of possible injury insufficient to establish injury in fact under article ills case or controversy requirement holding that to have standing a plaintiff must establish an injury in fact a casual connection between the injury and that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision holding that allegation of procedural injury does not affect the issues of injury in fact or causation holding that unsubstantiated  alllegations of a subjective chill  do not establish an injury in fact