in this circumstance does not encourage unjustified suits or force attorneys to defend themselves against casual purchases of causes of actions. The sanctity of the attorney-client relationship is not invaded and the assignment does not foster the establishment of a general market for such claims. A claim for costs of defense is akin to the sort of fee-shifting arrangements courts oversee every day. It is not a claim for the specific performance of personal services. Nor does it involve matters of personal trust and confidence. In light of these arguments, Roberts’ inapplicability, and Colorado’s preference for assignability of claims, we conclude the assignment of Officer Gray’s cross-claim for defense costs to Mr. Brown was proper. Cf. Baker v. Young, 798 P.2d 889 (Colo.1990) (<HOLDING>). 2. Colorado Constitution Denver next claims
holding that an insurers duty to defend arises from the allegations in the complaint against the insured holding that the waiver of immunity from other liability did not explicitly waive immunity from prejudgment attachment but supporting the attachment on other grounds holding that admonishment for breach of insurers obligation to insured is not applicable to equitable share dispute between insurers holding that an insurers obligation to defend an insured was a property interest subject to prejudgment attachment holding that there may be an obligation to defend under an insurance policy even though there is no obligation to indemnify