woman could not be.” (citing State v. Carey, 76 Conn. 342, 56 A. 632 (1904) (differentiating between those actions by a third party and those taken upon oneself))). As a result, abortion statutes have traditionally criminalized the behavior of third parties to protect the health of pregnant women. See id. As one court noted: The obvious purpose [of the abortion statute enacted in 1846] was to protect the pregnant woman. When one remembers that the passing of the statute predated the advent of antiseptic surgery, the Legislature’s wisdom in making criminal any invasion of the woman’s person, save when necessary to preserve her life, is unchallengeable. People v. Nixon, 42 Mich.App. 332, 201 N.W.2d 635, 639 (1972); see also Gaines v. Wolcott, 119 Ga.App. 313, 167 S.E.2d 366, 370 (1969) (<HOLDING>). Most modern state criminal statutes continue
holding valid conditions for execution of the warrant which are constitutionally satisfactory stated in the affidavit that solicits the warrant and accepted by the issuing magistrate recognizing that the appalling unsanitary and unprofessional conditions under which  illegal operations are in fact performed warrant the protection of the law to women recognizing that the sentence imposed should be consistent with the protection of the public holding that legal title does not pass to the grantee until all conditions are performed and the deed is released from escrow holding that evidence obtained from a search made subsequent to an illegal stop was admissible when before the search the police officer discovered that there was an outstanding arrest warrant for the defendant and the defendant was thereupon arrested pursuant to that warrant