calls were made. He does not plead when he asked Green Tree to cease calling him, nor how he asked. The factual allegations in the complaint represent nothing more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, and such “[tjhreadbare recitals ... supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Hanley merely states what he understands the TCPA to proscribe, and then goes on to plead threadbare and conclusory facts that allege the elements of a prima facie cause of action under the Act, but nothing more. Hanley’s complaint, therefore, is highly suspect because it merely recites naked facts mimicking the elements of a cause of action under the TCPA. See McCauley, 671 F.3d at 617 (<HOLDING>). The Court explained in Iqbal that “the
holding that the plaintiffs complaint was insufficient under twombly and iqbal because most of the facts alleged were actually legal conclusions or elements of the cause of action which may be disregarded on a motion to dismiss holding prior to twombly that courts were not required to accept the truth of legal conclusions contained in a plaintiffs complaint holding that a court is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged holding that the elements of a cause of action were not subject matter jurisdictional simply because the statute that created the cause of action provided that district courts shall have jurisdiction of such actions holding that the court may consider an article not attached to the complaint in determining whether to dismiss the complaint because the article was integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint and because the plaintiffs did not challenge its authenticity