toward accomplishing this end.” I believe that the focus in (i)(8) should not be on whether the murder furthered the escape. Whether a murder was committed to further an escape or to avoid an arrest is specifically addressed by Tenn.Code Ann. § 39 — 13—204(i)(6). The focus in (i)(8), however, is on the defendant’s status when the murder was committed. I believe that circumstance (i)(8) was codified to provide protection to society from escaped convicts who are less likely to be deterred by the prospect of further confinement from committing additional crimes. The danger Odom posed to society as a desperate escaped convict needing ase. The third prong encompasses a murder that occurs “during escape from lawful custody or confinement.” See State v. Workman, 667 S.W.2d 44, 49 (Tenn.1984) (<HOLDING>). If this language is construed only to
holding i8 applicable when a fleeing defendant killed officer who had arrested and escorted defendant from a wendys restaurant holding that the initial stop by officer was based on reasonable suspicion that defendant was impersonating a police officer although another officer arrested defendant for privacy act violation holding that plaintiff had not stated an equal protection claim where plaintiff had not alleged that the defendant treated him differently from anyone else who both had problems with alcohol and had been arrested holding that an officer may use deadly force when a fleeing suspect threatens the officer with a weapon holding a police officer who was pursuing a fleeing suspect was immune from his torts when he ran a red light and collided with plaintiffs vehicle