of certain instances of fraudulent conduct does not satisfy Rule 9(b). Indeed, Defendant goes so far as to argue that Rule 9(b) requires no less than the identification of every ineligible prescription submitted to the government for payment. This view of Relator’s pleading obligation may fit a scenario where the alleged fraud is confined to a small number of transactions about which Relator had knowledge. However, where the alleged scheme of fraud is complex and far-reaching, pleading every instance of fraud would be extremely ungainly, if not impossible. Courts facing similar claims under the FCA have not placed the bar so high as to require pleading with total insight. See United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 20 F.Supp.2d 1017, 1049 (S.D.Tex.1998) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Kensington Hosp., 760
holding that rule 9b was not satisfied where the relator was a doctor who did not allege firsthand knowledge of the hospitals submission of false claims holding relator satisfied rule 9b by alleging the basic framework procedures the nature of fraudulent scheme and the financial arrangements and inducements among the parties and physicians that give rise to relators belief that fraud has occurred holding that rule 9b was satisfied where the relator was a nurse practitioner in the defendants employ whose conversations about the defendants billing practices  with the defendants office manager formed the basis for the relators belief that claims were actually submitted to the government holding that relators failure to meet the particularity requirements of rule 9b did not bar his claim where the relator was a former employee of the defendants and lacked access to records and documents in the possession of the defendants that contained information necessary to plead with particularity holding that a plaintiff satisfied rule 9b by pleading which machines were the subject of alleged fraudulent transactions and the nature and subject of the alleged misrepresentations