right of action under the Rehabilitation Act, it expressly provided for it. Furthermore, an implied right of action under the Rehabilitation Act would be incompatible with the adequate relief already available to Kinneary. In determining whether there is an implied right of action, the Supreme Court has identified as a factor whether that implied right is “consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme.” Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975). The First Circuit stated that the Rehabilitation Act does not provide a private right of action against a regulatory agency in part because adequate relief is available already under the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (“APA”). Cousins, 880 F.2d at 606; see also Clark, 937 F.2d 123 (<HOLDING>). The APA is “applicable to all administrative
recognizing private right of action holding that the rehabilitation act does not create a private right of action against the secretary of education acting in his role as an administrator holding that section 4625bc does not create a private right of action for money damages holding rehabilitation act applicable holding that the rehabilitation act does not create a private right of action against the secretary of transportation where the apa provides an adequate remedy