function or duty by a municipality ... whether or not the discretion involved is abused." 23 . Guerrero ex rel. Guerrero v. Alaska Hous. Fin. Corp., 123 P.3d 966, 976 (Alaska 2005) (citing Estate of Arrowwood v. State, 894 P.2d 642, 645 (Alaska 1995)). 24 . Id. (citing Johnson v. State, 636 P.2d 47, 64 (Alaska 1981)). 25 . See id. at 977 ("Our cases have recognized that if decisions require the state to balance 'the detailed and competing elements of legislative or executive' policy, they nearly always deserve protection by discretionary function immunity." (quoting Indus. Indem. Co. v. State, 669 P.2d 561, 563 (Alaska 1983))). 26 . KIBC 08.25.065(E) (1996) (superseded in 2010). 27 . See State, Dep't of Transp. & Pub. Facilities v. Sanders, 944 P.2d 453, 457-58 (Alaska 1997) (<HOLDING>). We also reject Cutler's argument that the
holding that where department of transportation regulations did not require department officials to enforce vehicle regulations the departments decision not to do so was discretionary holding that the company administering a selfinsurance program for the department of transportation was an agent for the department and was therefore immune from suit holding that agency regulations cannot be applied retroactively unless congress has so authorized the administrative agency and the language of the regulations require it holding that because the department of revenue is subordinate to the board of tax review in the decision making process the department is not an adversely affected or aggrieved party having standing to petition for judicial review of the boards order reversing a decision of the department holding that a state department of transportation employee was subject to patronage dismissal where his duties included serving as a liaison between the director of the department and the general public and other government officials including representing the department at meetings and conferences