received from union and non-union applicants alike). Here, Roche’s testimony that FES had consistently applied the wage compatibility criterion amounts to an unsupported, eonclusory assertion, which we have held is inadequate to satisfy the movant’s burden of proof on summary judgment. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Ramirez, 757 F.2d 48, 51 (3d Cir.1985) (“An affidavit that is essentially eonclusory and lacking in specific facts is inadequate to satisfy the movant’s burden.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, we hold that the Board’s finding that FES had failed to establish its wage compatibility affirmative defense is supported by substantial evidence. See Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 366-67, 118 S.Ct. 818, 139 L.Ed.2d 797 (1998) (<HOLDING>). III. For the foregoing reasons, we will deny
holding substantial evidence supported jury finding of abuse of process holding that if a reasonable fact finder could make a particular finding on the administrative record then the finding is supported by substantial evidence holding a determination regarding eligibility for asylum is conclusive if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole holding that under the substantial evidence standard the reviewing court must decide whether on this record it would have been possible for a reasonable jury to reach the agencys conclusion holding that a finding of fact is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole if it would have been possible for a reasonable jury to reach the boards conclusion