a reasonable jury could reach such a conclusion, and so we conclude, as a matter of law, that Moe did not violate Schreiber’s Fourth Amendment rights with respect to the warrantless entry. Moe learned from the 911 dispatcher that a caller claimed to have heard screaming and believed that Sarah was being beaten by her parents. The caller claimed to have heard on the telephone the altercation as it was occurring. The caller asked to remain anonymous, which made it impossible for Moe or the dispatcher to assess the caller’s credibility. See Kerman v. City of New York, 261 F.3d 229, 235-36 (2d Cir.2001) (concluding that an anonymous 911 call, by itself, provides an insufficient basis for a finding of exigency); cf Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 274, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000) (<HOLDING>). Even assuming that an anonymous 911 call by
holding that an anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun  without any corroborating evidence  did not provide reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing justifying the officers stop and frisk of that person holding an anonymous tip had the requisite indicia of reliability to justify a stop when the caller told the police of the alleged erratic driving automobile location and vehicle description holding that anonymous call that gave police no predictive information to corroborate tip lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to justify stop and frisk holding that an anonymous tip must have sufficient indicia of reliability to justify a stop and frisk holding that an anonymous tip lacking indicia of reliability that an individual is carrying a gun is not enough to justify a terry stop