the legislature’s authority to determine the sanctions to be imposed for contempt and a circuit court’s inherent constitutional power to determine the species of contempt it chooses to use to enforce its orders and vindicate its authority. We conclude, therefore, that the legislature’s authority to restrict the sanctions which courts may impose after a finding of contempt does not give it the concomitant authority to completely eliminate the power itself. See State ex rel. Franks v. Clark, 46 So.2d 488. We note that Florida is not alone in espousing this fundamental doctrine. Other states with constitutionally created courts also recognize this concept. See, e.g., State ex rel. Oregon State Bar v. Lenske, 243 Or. 477, 495, 407 P.2d 250, 256 (Or.1965) (and cases and authorities cited) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 943, 86 S.Ct. 1460, 16
recognizing inherent power of supreme court independent of statutory authority to punish for contempt of court holding that it is a well established rule that the power to judge a contempt rests exclusively with the court contemned and that no court is authorized to punish a contempt against another court holding that the inherent power of the district court includes the power  to santion attorneys for  violations of court orders or other conduct which interferes with the courts power to manage its calendar and the courtroom   recognizing inherent power in the courts to preserve the efficient and expeditious administration of justice and protect it from being impaired or destroyed holding that the power of a constitutionally established court to punish for contempt may be regulated within reasonable bounds by the legislature but not to the extent that the courts power is substantially impaired or destroyed