reasonably be viewed as so affecting the fairness and reliability of the proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined. See Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So.2d 927, 933 (Fla.1986) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Thus, based on Strickland and Maxwell, we find that the record conclusively shows Franqui is not entitled to relief on this claim. Finally, in the penalty phase, the prosecutor made comments that tended to disparage Franqui’s mitigation. The prosecutor argued, “That’s the world of Dr. Toomer [Franqui’s mental mitigation expert], folks. Through the looking glass at Disney World. Make believe. Use your common sense.” This comment, suggesting that the mental mitigation is make-believe or a fantasy, is improper. See, e.g., Brooks, 762 So.2d at 904 (<HOLDING>). We have “long recognized that a prosecutor
holding that it is not holding that a district court can cure the effect of an improper prosecutorial comment with a jury instruction holding that alleged prosecutorial misconduct must be evaluated in light of the prosecutors argument and the entire record and if a review of the record convinces the court that the jury would have convicted defendant even if it were not exposed to the alleged improper prosecutorial comments then no actual prejudice occurred holding that prosecutorial denigration of a defendants mitigation by suggesting it is phantom is improper holding failure to turn over brady material after prosecutorial phase of case had begun was covered by absolute prosecutorial immunity