clear that Buitrago-Cuesta remains good law with respect to this case, where the conviction was obtained after a trial, see Reid v. Holmes, 323 F.3d 187, 189 (2d Cir.2003) (per curiam). 8 . Even if Petitioner were correct, it might be that the five-year bar would independently preclude him from 212(c) eligibility. Buitra-go-Cuesta seemingly did not address whether the five-year bar applies retroactively to pending proceedings, and, in view of our holding, see infra, that Petitioner's removal proceedings commenced in 1998, we need not consider whether it does. 9 . Since both the service and filing of the Notice to Appear occurred after April 1, 1997, we need not address an issue that has divided some circuits. Compare, e.g., Jimenez-Angeles v. Ashcroft, 291 F.3d 594, 598 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Armendariz-Montoya v. Sonchik, 291 F.3d 1116,
holding that the exclusionary rule generally does not apply to immigration proceedings holding that for purposes of the iirira proceedings commence only upon the inss filing of a notice to appear with the immigration court holding that the filing of an opening brief within the time period for filing a notice of appeal could constitute notice of appeal holding in the iirira context that service of the notice to appear was on the facts of that case sufficient to start proceedings holding in the iirira context that the combination of service of the order to show cause and the issuance of a detainer notice sufficed to begin the proceedings