trial that the State’s timeline was very improbable, if not impossible. Serrano has not demonstrated that this investigation and strategy regarding the travel timeline was unreasonable. See generally Atkins v. Dugger, 541 So.2d 1165, 1166 (Fla. 1989) (“One tactic available to counsel is to present expert testimony. However, it is by no means the only tactic, nor is it required.”). Second, Serrano has failed to demonstrate prejudice. During the post-conviction proceedings, Serrano never introduced any evidence indicating that a more complete investigation into the time-line or hiring an individual to reenact the timeline would have changed Serrano’s defense at trial or would have further called the State’s timeline into question. Cf. Conahan v. State, 118 So.3d 718, 727-28 (Fla. 2013) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Serrano has failed to establish a
holding that trial counsels performance was not deficient for failing to give a mental health expert additional information because the expert testified at the evidentiary hearing that the collateral data would not have changed his testimony holding that defense counsels failure to object to testimony did not warrant a new trial because there was no prejudice from admission of the testimony holding that the defendant could not establish prejudice for trial counsels failure to hire an expert when the experts testimony would not have changed the nature of the states evidence holding that the prejudice prong in strickland was not satisfied because counsels failure to raise an evidentiary issue would not have altered the result of the proceedings because the erroneous admission of the evidence would have constituted harmless error holding that the states failure to designate its expert witnesses was not harmless in trial for sexual battery and lewd and lascivious molestation where it was reasonably possible that defendant would have altered his trial preparation or strategy and that defendant would have deposed experts and possibly procured his own expert