difficulty in carrying out population studies from which inferences about extinction risk can be made, given budgetary constraints and short regulatory and court ordered time frames for decision-making). Apparently, the Secretary infers from the uncertainty in the population studies that lizard populations “remain[] viable throughout most of [the lizard’s] current extant range.” 71 Fed.Reg. at 36,751. This conclusion is conceptually distinct from and relied on different evidence than the Secretary’s determination that the species does not face significant threats in most of its current range. The latter conclusion is premised on an estimate of existing and potential threats to lizard habitat, existing management pl Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103, 103 S.Ct. 2246, 76 L.Ed.2d 437 (1983) (<HOLDING>). But this is a different case. The Secretary
holding that judicial scrutiny of attorney performance must be highly deferential holding that a reversal of the plan administrators decision is in order under the most deferential arbitrary and capricious standard when no reasonable grounds exist to support the decision holding that a reviewing court is not to substitute its decision for that of the board holding that when examining decisions made under conditions of scientific uncertainty a reviewing court must generally be at its most deferential holding that reviewing court may consider trial evidence in reviewing denial of motion to suppress