1042 (1923) (noting the fundamental individual right of choice of language); Yniguez v. Arizonans For Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 948 (9th Cir.1995) (“Since language is a close and meaningful proxy for national origin, restrictions on the use of languages may mask discrimination against specific national origin groups or, more generally, conceal nativist sentiment”), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 43, 117 S.Ct. 1055,137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997); Odima v. Westin Tucson Hotel Co., 991 F.2d 595, 601 (9th Cir.1993) (“accent and national origin are obviously inextricably intertwined”); United States v. Alcantar, 897 F.2d 436, 440 (9th Cir.1990) (recognizing “how closely tied Spanish language is to Hispanic identity”); Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591 (9th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1081, 110 S.Ct. 1811,
recognizing that the distinction between national origin and racial discrimination is an extremely difficult one to trace and holding that plaintiffs allegations of racial discrimination were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss holding that texas twoyear statute of limitations applied to section 1981 action for discrimination on the basis of national origin holding that even in the absence of an express linkage between race and national origin the specific facts alleged by a plaintiff in his or her eeoc complaint may suggest both forms of discrimination holding accent discrimination may be actionable as national origin discrimination under title vii citing with approval eeoc guidelines defining national origin discrimination to include discrimination based on the linguistic characteristics of a national origin group holding that failure to provide educational assistance to nonenglishspeaking students constituted national origin discrimination under title vi