whom RAMIL, J., joins. I concur in the result reached, but must disagree with the totality of circumstances formulation seemingly adopted in this case. The facts of this ease call for a straightforward application of fundamental precepts established in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and certain of its progeny. Basic Miranda-related propositions bear recounting (1) to demonstrate their applicability to this case, (2) to elucidate the perplexity that may result from reformulating them, and (3) to highlight the harm that would be caused by them misapplication. I. Miranda extends the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination to out-of-court statements obtained from an individual during custodial interrogation. See id. at 461, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (<HOLDING>). That decision defined custodial interrogation
holding that the drug tax violated the privilege against selfincrimination holding that on march 13 2004 it was clearly established that the fourth amendment protects people from medical procedures induced by lawenforcement officers recognizing commonlaw privilege against selfincrimination holding that the privilege against selfincrimination protects individuals from informal compulsion exerted by lawenforcement officers during incustody questioning holding that waiver of privilege against selfincrimination is proceeding specific