Generally, when a trial judge has discretion to award attorney’s fees, that discretion may be invoked after an appeal has resolved the merits of the case. See White v. New Hampshire Dep’t of Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 102 S.Ct. 1162, 71 L.Ed.2d 325 (1982). A request for attorney’s fees and costs has traditionally been deemed to be collateral to the judgment because the request seeks a benefit as a consequence of the judgment. See id. at 451-52, 102 S.Ct. at 1166-67; see also Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 168-69, 59 S.Ct. 777, 780-81, 83 L.Ed. 1184 (1939). Thus, a trial judge’s award of attorney’s fees under Code § 20-103 for services rendered on appeal is collateral to the remand order contained in the mandate. Accord Wheeler v. Wheeler, 636 A.2d 888, 890 (Del.1993) (<HOLDING>); Dahnke v. Dahnke, 571 N.E.2d 1278, 1282
holding that an attorneys fees award is not appealable until the amount of the award is set holding trial court had no authority to award attorneys fees when arbitrator had stated he would not award attorneys fees holding that an award of attorneys fees under supreme court rule 38 precursor to rule 222 did not preempt an award of attorneys fees to which one is otherwise entitled and thus appellant could seek an award of attorneys fees pursuant to section 1577300 which permits an award of fees for a party prevailing in an action against a state agency holding that trial judges statutory power to award attorneys fees following an appeal is not dependent upon a remand  for that purpose holding that a district court may award attorneys fees while the merits are on appeal