the firearm. See United States v. Dillon, 150 F.3d 754, 759 (7th Cir.1998). Where the intent of the accused is an ingredient of the crime, its existence is a question of fact, which must be submitted to a jury. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 274, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952). A mistake-of-fact defense relieves a person of criminal liability where a reasonable mistake of certain facts means that the person did not have the culpable mental state required for the commission of the offense. 1 Wharton’s Criminal Law § 78 (15th ed.). To that end, § 922(a)(6) requires that the government establish that the defendant acted “knowingly,” meaning that Bowling knew that his statement was false. See Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193, 118 S.Ct. 1939, 141 L.Ed.2d 197 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Also, § 922(a)(6) requires the government to
holding state must prove every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt and a scheme that shifts the burden of proof to the defendant by presuming a fact upon proof of the other elements of the offense violates due process holding that unless otherwise directed by the statute the term knowingly merely requires proof of knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense holding that the term knowingly under  2252a applies to both the nature of the material and the age of the children depicted holding the fedrevid 801d2e requires proof of the conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence and allows consideration of the offered declaration as part of the proof of the conspiracy holding that the knowledge requisite to knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as distinguished from knowledge of the law