because the statute gives the executive branch substantial control over the litigation.”); see also Robinson, 824 F.Supp. at 837. But see Riley, 982 F.Supp. at 1269 n. 5 (noting in a footnote that “the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act also raise serious constitutional concerns as to whether Congress may delegate the executive powers of law enforcement to private parties .. .”)• 3. Appointments Clause Finally, Hektoen argues that the FCA’s qui tam provisions violate the Appointments Clause, which vests the executive branch with the exclusive power to appoint officers to execute the laws of the United States. Numerous other courts have held that qui tam relators are not officers within the meaning of the Appointments Clause. See, e.g., Taxpayers Against Fraud, 41 F.3d at 1041 (<HOLDING>); Kelly, 9 F.3d 743, 757 (holding that
holding that a public trust that exercised control over the beneficiarys employment did not change the benefit plan into a government plan because the trust did not establish the plan or control it holding that the act is constitutional because it restricts who may control the images but not what the defendant may introduce at trial holding that it may not holding that relators are not officers because the government may take control of such eases whenever it wishes and because the relators position is without tenure or continuous duties recognizing that the government agreed not to take a position