signed. 84. The Court finds that Durham’s § 113(f)(1) contribution claim was timely filed and is not barred by CERCLA’s statute of limitations. B. Durham’s State-Law Claims 85. Defendants have also asserted as an affirmative defense that Durham’s state-law claims under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 22a-16 and § 22a-452 are barred by the applicable state statute of limitations. Defendants have raised three possible statute of limitations that could apply to Durham’s state-law claims: (i) Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-577, the three-year statute of limitations applicable to tort actions; (ii) Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-584, the two-year statute of limitations applicable to injuries to real or personal property caused by negligence or reckless or wanton misconduct; and (iii) Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52 441 (D.Conn.1994) (<HOLDING>)- 87. This Court has previously rejected the
holding that plaintiffs claims under  22a452 were barred by the statute of limitations regardless of whether  52577c  52582 or  52577 was applied holding that the plaintiffs claims under  22a452 were barred by the statute of limitations but declining to decide which statute to apply holding that section 1 claims of direct purchasers of buspirone products were not barred by the statute of limitations holding that the amended complaint could not relate back to the original complaint in which all claims were barred by the statute of limitations holding that parents were not entitled to use infancy tolling provisions and that the statute of limitations barred their claims