Trane actually subcontracted out the engineering services, thus negating any suggestion that “the personality of the individual [engineer] play[ed] a decisive part.” § 41-16-51(a)(3); see Op. Att’y Gen., No. 84-00262 (1984). Moreover, nothing in the record indicates that the Board could not “purchase the equipment in a separate contract from the professional services.” Op. Att’y Gen., No. 84-00262 (1984). Instead, Trane, the Board, and the majority of this Court point to the financial consideration of “guaranteed savings” as the rationale supporting the Performance Contract. Such a consideration, however, falls squarely within the primary purpose of the Competitive Bid Law to assure quality and economy. See Arrington v. Associated Gen. Contractors of America, 403 So.2d 893 (Ala.1981) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the Board should have bid out the
holding that the redemption price was based on the amount bid at foreclosure  and not  what the subsequent purchaser paid  for the property holding that the interpretation of statutory language should be consistent with the legislatures purpose and intent holding that plaintiff was entitled to sue under rule 10b5 for the difference between the price and the value received from the sale of the security where as here the evil is not the price at which plaintiff bought but the fact of being induced to buy holding that courts must generally give effect to the plain meaning of a statute because that is the best evidence of the legislatures intent holding that the legislatures intent in passing the competitive bid law was to ensure that governmental entities secured the bestquality equipment at the lowest possible price