these circumstances, we conclude that the EEO was justified in dismissing her complaint for failure to cooperate, see 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.107(a)(7), 1614.108(c)(3) (2012), and that her actions were inconsistent with exhaustion of her administrative remedies, see Woodard v. Lehman, 717 F.2d 909, 913-17 (4th Cir.1983); Johnson v. Bergland, 614 F.2d 415, 417 (5th Cir.1980); cf. Jasch v. Potter, 302 F.3d 1092, 1094-96 (9th Cir.2002). Finally, Kobraei argues that she is entitled to review of the merits of her claim because the EEO office took more than 180 days to investigate her claim and to reach a final determination. Because Ko-braei did not raise this issue in the district court, we decline to review it in the first instance. See Muth v. United States, 1 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, although we conclude the
holding that issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered recognizing that issues raised for first time on appeal generally are not considered absent exceptional circumstances holding that issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered absent exceptional circumstances of plain error or fundamental miscarriage of justice holding that absent exceptional circumstances arguments not raised before the bankruptcy court in the first instance are waived holding that issues raised for first time on appeal generally will not be considered absent exceptional circumstances of plain error or fundamental miscarriage of justice