committee. (Compl. 6 at ¶ 28.) If Devlin, as the ultimate decisionmaker, routinely excluded applications from homosexual applicants (which Gill implies by asserting that she has not been hired for any of the 32 positions at TCCD she applied for since she first was not hired for a permanent position) and if Howell and other TCCD administrators failed to appropriately address Gill’s complaints because of the alleged animus, these allegations along with Devlin’s isolated comment about TCCD not “liking homosexuals” suffices under Rule 12(b)(6) to plausibly allege a persistent and widespread custom of not hiring homosexual applicants that TCCD would or should have been aware of. (Compl. 7 at ¶ 30-34.) See, e.g., Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 356 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). The Court recognizes that a municipal policy
holding isolated comment by senior official evidencing managerial policy coupled with discriminatory comments by individuals in high positions might reflect a cumulative managerial attitude among the employers managers that has influenced the decisionmaking process for a considerable time holding managers discriminatory remark indicative of age bias where buttressed by other evidence of discrimination and thus remark was not an isolated comment holding that an isolated comment is not direct evidence of discrimination even if a plaintiff interpreted it as motivated by a discriminatory animus recognizing that the seventh circuit consistently has held that isolated comments that are no more than stray remarks in the work place are insufficient to establish that a particular decision was motivated by discriminatory animus holding plaintiff failed to meet de minimis burden where he introduced only two isolated comments made by individuals who had no involvement in his termination