next argue that the district court erred by declining to instruct the jury that Plaintiff was required to prove that, setting aside the fabricated evidence, probable cause was lacking. We disagree. The only two sister circuits to have addressed this issue directly have held that the plaintiff need not prove a lack of probable cause for the prosecution. Halsey, 750 F.3d at 292-93; Ricciuti, 124 F.3d at 129-31. Although we have not addressed the question squarely, our cases strongly suggest that a lack of probable cause to prosecute a defendant is not an element of a deliberate-fabrication claim. See Gausvik, 345 F.3d at 817-18 (analyzing whether the allegations met the standard for deliberate fabrication, even though probable cause existed); see also Costanich, 627 F.3d at 1113 (<HOLDING>); Crowe v. County of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406,
holding that the test for good faith is the actual belief of the party and not the reasonableness of that belief holding the crime of conspiracy is committed or not before the substantive crime begins holding that before the accessory to a crime can be convicted as such it must be shown that the crime has been committed by the principal holding that the investigators belief that a crime had been committed does not permit or excuse deliberate fabrication of evidence holding that the prosecution must present sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that defendant committed a crime emphasis added