damages and liability may be indivisible”); N.J. Election Law Enforcement Comm’n v. Citizens to Make Mayor-Council Gov’t Work, 107 N.J. 380, 388, 526 A.2d 1069 (1987) (explaining that, “[i]n choosing between [retroactivity/prospective application] options, the court must weigh considerations of fairness to the litigants as well as the dictates of sound public policy”); Riley v. New Rapids Carpet Ctr., 61 N.J. 218, 227, 294 A.2d 7 (1972) (stating class action rules “should be applied liberally ... if it is possible to do so with fairness to the litigants”); State v. McCann, 391 N.J.Super. 542, 553, 919 A.2d 136 (App.Div.2007) (stating that judicial disqualification implicates, among other concerns, fairness to litigants); Arenas v. Gari, 309 N.J.Super. 1, 19, 706 A.2d 736 (App.Div.1998) (<HOLDING>); Klajman v. Fair Lawn Estates, 292 N.J.Super.
recognizing that the focus must be on whether the facts alleged would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike for cause two potential jurors who had heard andor read about the case but indicated that they could render a fair and impartial verdict based on the evidence presented holding that a defendant could not establish stricklands prejudice prong because any erroneous exclusion of an impartial juror was harmless because we have every reason to believe the replacement was also an impartial juror the defendant does not dispute that he was convicted and sentenced by an impartial jury and he presents no reason to think that a jury composed of a slightly different set of impartial jurors would have reached a different verdict holding that a defendants claim that a jury was not impartial must focus on the jurors who ultimately sat holding that jurors must not only be fair and impartial they also must appear so in order to maintain the litigants confidence in the basic fairness of the trial