evidential basis for the court’s conclusion of liability, although what it was is unknown to us. However, if the finding of liability had no evidential basis, that fact would provide an additional ground for reversal in this case. We find that Newman had no obligation in the proof hearing to demonstrate fault on the part of the settling tortfeasors, with the exception of Rosalie Holmes, upon whose liability that of Dean depends. Dean did not appear in the action, and he thus filed neither a erossclaim for contribution nor any other document that would provide notice to Newman that he was asserting a right to a credit based upon the settlements reached in the matter. Thus his right to an apportionment of damages was waived. See Young v. Latta, 123 N.J. 584, 596-98, 589 A.2d 1020 (1991) (<HOLDING>). See also Green v. General Motors Corp., 310
holding that for an act to be inconsistent with the right to arbitrate and thus constitute a waiver of that right it must repudiate the right of the party who does the act recognizing a right to contribution recognizing that a claim is an assertion of a right and if there is no assertion of a right there is no claim to deduct holding that the right of a nonsettling defendant to a credit as the result of a settlement with a codefendant can be asserted without a crossclaim for contribution but that fair and timely notice to plaintiff of an assertion of that right must be given holding that treating a defendants failure to appear as a waiver not only of the right to be present but of the right to have a hearing on the motion was error