delay excludable under the speedy trial act was excludable under the IAD). Although this court has not previously addressed tolling requirements in relation to the IAD, we find persuasive the analysis and interpretation of the courts that held that delay occasioned by the defendant is excludable, particularly in light of recent application of speedy trial provisions to IAD cases by Pennsylvania courts. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Woods, 444 Pa.Super. 321, 663 A.2d 803 (Pa.Super.1995)(applying speedy trial provisions to the IAD in holding that defendant’s continued presence in federal custody constitutes an inability to stand trial, thereby tolling the statute). Cf. Commonwealth v. Riffert, 379 Pa.Super. 1, 549 A.2d 566 (Pa.Super.1988), alloc. denied, 522 Pa. 602, 562 A.2d 825 (Pa.1989)(<HOLDING>). The Woods court determined that the IAD is
holding subsection h1d stops the speedy trial act clock upon filing of a pretrial motion regardless of whether the motion has any impact on the trial setting holding original proceeding appropriate vehicle for resolution of defendants pretrial claim that he has been denied a speedy trial holding that the limitations period is not tolled while a federal habeas petition is pending holding that the speedy trial provision is tolled when a defendants pretrial motion is pending holding that whether a pretrial motion actually caused or is expected to cause delay of trial is irrelevant to the speedy trial act