nonetheless, may be insufficient to coerce the particular defendant and, when that happens, duress is not present for that defendant. Ibid. The jury, therefore, must assess the sincerity of the defendant’s asserted perception of an imminent threat of harm. The second component of the defense is objective in nature: a defendant’s level of resistance to the particular threat must meet community standards of reasonableness. The jury must evaluate a defendant’s response to the threat by applying the standard of the “person of reasonable firmness.” N.J.S.A. 2C:2-9a. The norm presupposes an ordinary person without “serious mental and emotional defects.” See McAllister, supra, 41 N.J. at 353-54, 196 A.2d at 792; State v. Van Dyke, 361 N.J.Super. 403, 417, 825 A.2d 1163, 1172 (App.Div.) (<HOLDING>), certif. denied, 178 N.J. 35, 834 A.2d 407
recognizing duress as establishing standard measured by the societal objective norm of the person of reasonable firmness rather than by the particular attributes which characterize defendant holding jury instruction for depraved mind murder improper where it set out objective standard of knowledge of the risk rather than subjective standard entitling defendant to new trial recognizing abuse of discretion rather than de novo standard of review holding when no objection is made to jury issue sufficiency of the evidence is measured against charge given by court rather than some other unidentified law holding that sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction is not measured by the jury charge actually given but rather measured by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct charge