See Peralta v. Holder, 567 F.3d 31, 33 (1st Cir.2009); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). Here, however, the BIA chose not to use its sua sponte authority to relax the time bar. Given the circumstances of this case, the BIA’s decision is readily understood: the petitioner’s request for an exception depended on his Padilla argument, but he had made no effort in the New York courts to set aside the auto-stripping conviction. The BIA’s refusal to allow the petitioner to mount a collateral challenge to a criminal conviction in the immigration court seems eminently reasonable. See Gouveia v. INS, 980 F.2d 814, 817 (1st Cir.1992) (“Criminal convictions cannot be collaterally attacked during immigration proceedings.”); cf. Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 497, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 128 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994) (<HOLDING>). We need not probe this point too deeply. In
holding that a defendant cannot collaterally challenge a prior conviction used to calculate criminal history points holding that due to statute defendant cannot collaterally attack prior convictions used to enhance sentence unless in violation of the right to counsel holding that petitioner could not collaterally attack his state court conviction on a petition for review of an agency decision holding that a defendant cannot collaterally attack a prior state conviction during a federal sentencing proceeding in a different case holding that a habeas petitioner cannot collaterally attack the conviction serving as a predicate for a removal order