Id. at 153, 121 S.Ct. 2079; see also United States v. Parker, No. WDQ-09-0360, 2011 WL 4682177, at *2 (D.Md. Oct. 3, 2011) (“Article IV(e)’s dismissal is strictly interpreted; there are no exceptions for de minimis, technical, or harmless errors.”); United States v. Gezelman, 522 F.Supp.2d 344, 347 (D.Mass.2007) (interpreting Bozeman as rejecting the view that a prisoner must be involved in rehabilitative programs for the IAD to apply and holding that the IAD must be strictly applied). Because the interpretation of the IAD is a question of federal law, we must follow the Supreme Court of the United States’ holding in Bozeman. See Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 438, 101 S.Ct. 703; In re All Assessments, 67 S.W.3d 805, 818-19 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001) (“[O]nly the decisions of the United Stat t.App.2000) (<HOLDING>); State v. Breen, 126 Idaho 305, 882 P.2d 472,
holding the iad inapplicable to a prisoner at a temporary holding facility and noting that while there may be an occasional case in which a prisoner awaiting transfer is involved in rehabilitative programs offered at the local facility such rehabilitation efforts themselves ultimately would be disrupted by that prisoners transfer to his permanent correctional residence holding that because the stated purpose of the iad is to prevent interference with a prisoners rehabilitative environment there is no reason for the iad to apply to a prisoner until he or she is assigned to the institution where the sentence will be served holding that an inmate had no liberty interest in avoiding transfer to a more restrictive facility holding the iad was not applicable to a prisoner who had been sentenced but was incarcerated in a local jail or holding facility while awaiting transfer to the assigned penal institution holding that court would not imply a bivens cause of action for a prisoner held in a private prison facility