challenging her removal order under Section 1252(e), she may not invoke any provision of Section 1252 as authorizing a stay of removal. Given the language “[ejxcept as provided in this section,” the analysis of jurisdiction under Section 1252(g) is essentially the same as under Section 1252(e), so the Court will turn to that section. Petitioner acknowledges in her writ of habeas corpus and complaint that she is subject to an expedited removal order pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). “The scope of judicial review of orders of removal under § 1225(b)(1) is extremely narrow.” Vaupel v. Ortiz, 244 Fed.Appx. 892, 894 (10th Cir.2007). See also Lorenzo v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 1278, 1281 (10th Cir.2007) (“The avenues for review provided by § 1252(e) are strictly limited_”). Despite the .2001) (<HOLDING>). Petitioner argues that, to read the first
holding that strict limitations set forth in section 1252e preclude judicial review of any constitutional or statutory claims related to the underlying expedited removal order holding that court lacked jurisdiction to review merits of question of whether immigration officer correctly initiated expedited removal proceedings holding that section 1252e2 clearly does not permit court to review whether expedited removal statute applies in first place holding that court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to review aliens habeas claims seeking review of expedited removal order including whether expedited removal statute was lawfully applied to alien and whether expedited removal procedures violated his right to due process because language of section 1252e5 clearly precludes review in habeas proceedings of whether alien is actually inadmissible or entitled to any relief from removal holding that  1252a2a barred review of petitioners claims including asapplied due process challenges to expedited removal order