— or limit — the issue of whether a transfer of income may be considered when a community spouse resource allowance adjustment is contemplated under § 1396r-5(e)(2)(C). Second, the attribution of income provisions upon which the district court relied do not, by their very terms, apply to subsection (e)(2)(C). Those income provisions apply “in determining the income of an institutionalized spouse or community spouse for purposes of the post-eligibility income determination described in subsection (d).” 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(b)(2); see also Cleary v. Waldman, 959 F.Supp. 222, 232 (D.N.J.1997). Accordingly, subsections (b) and (d) do not provide guidance for the revision of the community spouse resource allowance pursuant to subsection (e)(2)(C). In light of the for ary, 959 F.Supp. at 232 (<HOLDING>), and Thomas, 682 N.E.2d at 879 (same); see
holding erisa plan interpretation is simply one of contract interpretation holding that incomefirst approach is permissible interpretation of mcca holding that bop interpretation of  922g1 as a crime of violence is permissible construction of  3621e2b and limiting the holding of johnson to the interpretation of sentencing guidelines holding that massachusetts incomefirst approach was a valid interpretation of  1396r5 holding that no discovery is permissible in similar circumstances