purpose in enacting TRIA § 201 was to “ ‘deal comprehensively with the problem of enforcement of judgments rendered on behalf of victims of terrorism’ ” (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 107-779, at 27 (2002) (Conf.Rep.), reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1430, 1434)). Making the FSIA’s standard more flexible does not help, either. If either the Samantar non-individual, requirement or the majority-ownership requirement is applied, TRIA § 201 would still be toothless. Sovereign countries — the parties the FSIA contemplates- — operate with more transparency, and their agencies or instrumen-talities are likelier to be diplomatic organs or state-owned enterprises with clear ownership structures that makes application of § 1603(b) feasible. See, e.g., Filler v. Hanvit Bank, 378 F.3d 213, 217 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); S & S Mach. Co. v. Masinexportimport, 706
holding that the actual amount of capital employed in the state by a foreign corporation was to be based on the property of the corporation that was within the state and that was used in business transacted within the state holding that the hague convention applied because while minnesota law permitted a foreign corporation to be served with process through the secretary of states office the applicable statute also required the secretary of state to mail a copy of the summons to the foreign corporation before service was effectuated holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because the challenged provisions of the decree had expired holding that resident shareholder of s corporation is eligible for tax credit for taxes paid by corporation in another state and noting that this conclusion is consistent with the internal revenue code which provides that shareholders of an s corporation are entitled to a foreign tax credit for their share of foreign income tax paid by an s corporation holding that the korean deposit insurance corporation was an organ of a foreign state because it was formed by statute  and presidential decree