inability to perform according to the dictates of the order or decree; however, the defendant bears the duty to prove his inability with particularity and not in general terms. In re Guardianship of McClinton, 157 So.3d 862, 873 (¶ 33) (Miss.Ct.App.2015) (internal citations omitted). ¶ 27. Although the chancellor found Karen in contempt, he also found Karen’s contempt was not willful since the parties’ verbal communications about Karen’s failure to satisfy her obligations were open to more than one interpretation. In reviewing this issue, we find it was within the chancellor's discretion to find that, although Karen failed to comply with the prior court order, her noncompliance was neither willful nor deliberate. See Brawdy v. Howell, 841 So.2d 1175, 1181 (¶23) (Miss.Ct.App.2003) (<HOLDING>). Because we cannot say that the chancellor’s
holding it was within the chancellors  discretion to find that though the husband was in contempt the contempt was not willful holding that a civil contempt defendant has a right to a jury trial when the act of contempt was not committed in the presence of the court and when the incarceration is in part punitive holding that an attorney charged with contempt for failing to attend a scheduled hearing could be charged only with indirect not direct contempt because the contempt did not occur in open court and the judge did not have personal knowledge of the reasons for the attorneys nonappearance holding one man grand jury that held witness in contempt and sentenced him to prison was contempt proceeding to which there was a right to public access holding that in addition to statutory contempt powers city courts have inherent contempt power