courts reached a decision contrary to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law, or alternatively, whether the Iowa courts correctly identified the applicable principles of federal law but then unreasonably applied that law to the facts of Swartz’s claim. See, e.g., Newman, 247 F.3d at 850-52 (discussing Williams); Weaver, 241 F.3d at 1029-30 (same); Closs v. Weber, 238 F.3d 1018, 1020 (8th Cir.2001) (same); Copeland v. Washington, 232 F.3d 969, 973 (8th Cir.2000) (same). The United States Constitution provides that: “No ... ex post facto Law shall be passed.” U.S. Co conjunction with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)). Swartz also relied on Supreme Court precedent and asked the court to extend one of its legal principles to a new context. See Weaver, 450 U.S. at 24, 101 S.Ct. 960 (<HOLDING>). In response, the respondent cited a Fourth
holding that every law that changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed is an ex post facto law within the words and the intent of the prohibition holding similar statutory amendment violated ex post facto clause when applied to inmate who committed his crime before enactment of amendment holding that the ex post facto clause  has no application to deportation holding that state work release regulation was not an ex post facto law holding law which decreased the amount of gaintime credits awarded for an inmates good behavior violated the ex post facto clause because the application of such law changed the legal consequences for a crime committed before the law took effect