as an applicant, not yet employed by the City, it is undisputed that the adverse actions for which he claims retaliation occurred after he became employed by the City as a firefighter trainee. Thus, for purposes of this Order only, I will assume, without ruling, that Andrade was an employee of the City and will proceed to analyze whether his speech involved matters of public concern. 109 . See Thompson v. City of Starkville, 901 F.2d 456, 460 (5th Cir.1990) (citations omitted). 110 . Lukan v. North Forest ISD, 183 F.3d 342, 345 (5th Cir.1999) (citing Harris v. Victoria Ind. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 216, 220 (5th Cir.1999)). 111 . See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-47, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983); Kirkland v. Northside Ind. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 02-03 (5th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). 171 . See Board of Commissioners, Bryan
holding that section 1983 liability for a city can only be based on a deliberate choice to follow a course of action made by final policymakers holding that city policymakers who owed an independent duty to pretrial detainees were individually liable under  1983 for prisoner suicide even though factfinder determined that the turnkey had not violated prisoners constitutional rights holding that individual liability under  1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation holding that there can be only one final appealable order holding that only deliberate conduct by a municipality which actually causes an injury is compensable under section 1983