point, this court “must consider only the evidence and inferences tending to support the trial court’s finding, disregarding all contrary evidence and inferences.” Continental Coffee Prods. Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 450 (Tex.1996). However, meager circumstantial evidence from which equally plausible but opposite inferences may be drawn is speculative and thus legally insufficient to support a finding. See Hammerly Oaks, Inc. v. Edwards, 958 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Tex.1997); Tubelite v. Risica & Sons, Inc., 819 S.W.2d 801, 805 (Tex.1991); Fifty-Six Thousand Seven Hundred Dollars in U.S. Currency v. State, 730 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Tex.1987); Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Gammage, 668 S.W.2d 319, 324 (Tex.1984); see also Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Reyna, 865 S.W.2d 925, 928 (Tex.1993) (<HOLDING>). No witnesses testified that they had seen or
holding that probable cause is something more than mere suspicion holding that explicit credibility finding must be more than passing remark of disbelief and must be supported by specific cogent reasons holding that a factual finding must be supported by more than mere surmise or suspicion holding a finding of fact by the commission may not be based upon surmise conjecture or speculation but must be founded on evidence of sufficient substance to afford a reasonable basis for it holding a claimant must prove entitlement to benefits by the preponderance of the evidence which is not sustained by mere surmise or conjecture