of his mental illness. Both the ADA and the appellant’s counsel spent considerable time discussing insanity and mental illness. During voir dire, the ADA admitted the appellant was mentally ill. The record reflects that the appellant’s only-defense to the State’s murder allegation was the insanity defense. Accordingly, the appellant was entitled to question the veni-re on how they might give effect to mitigating evidence of insanity, mental illness, mental defect, and other elements of the anticipated defense. See Shipley v. State, 790 S.W.2d 604, 609 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). The appellant should have been allowed to question the prospective jurors about their feelings on punishment and whether they could consider probation. See Mathis v. State, 576 S.W.2d 835, 839 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (<HOLDING>). Although the majority acknowledges that
holding the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow a question to prospective jurors on their feelings against recommending probation as punishment in a murder case holding the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow a question seeking to determine bias or prejudice in favor of the victim because she was a nun holding trial judge was at the very limit of his discretion in refusing to remove prospective jurors for cause holding trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow questions regarding victims status as a child holding trial court abused its discretion by refusing to conduct hearing and render decision on motion