in applications for post-conviction relief. See Alexander, 14-0401, p. 2, 152 So.3d at 137-38 (quoting State v. Cotton, 09-2397, p. 2 (La.10/15/10), 45 So.3d 1030, 1030 (per curiam)) (punctuation omitted). See also State v. Daniels, 00—3369, p. 1 (La.11/2/01), 800 So.2d 770, 771 (per curiam); Cotton, 09-2397, p. 1, 45 So.3d at 1030 (An “habitual offender adjudication does not pronounce a separate conviction or institute a separate criminal- proceeding, but instead only addresses itself to the sentencing powers of the trial judge after conviction ,.. ”) (punctuation omitted). Thus, Mr. Nicholas’s motion, construed as an application for post-conviction relief, fails to raise claims that we can consider. See, e.g., State v. Hebreard, 98-0385 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/25/98), 708 So.2d 1291 (<HOLDING>). Ill Because Mr.-Nicholas failed
holding that the multiple offender could not expunge all of his convictions by simply removing them from his record one at a time holding that a habeas petitioner was not entitled to relief from a state courts determination that he had forfeited his right to counsel by physically assaulting his attorney and threatening to put a contract on his attorneys life holding that when an attorney represents multiple clients and a dispute between the attorney and one client later occurs there is a waiver of the privilege but only by the client asserting the liability holding that because the defendants challenge to his sentence implicated his plea agreement the defendants request must be construed as a petition for postconviction relief holding that a defendants claim challenging his multiple offender adjudication by asserting that the district attorney provided insufficient evidence of his boykin waiver was not entitled to be heard on postconviction relief