he was coming to pick up drugs. This is not a case where a layperson is forced to make subtle legal distinctions about the precise boundaries of probable cause but rather is an instance where ordinary common sense dictates only one conclusion: viz., that the practice in question, assuming Airborne participated in it knowingly, which we must for these purposes, was patently abusive. Therefore, plaintiffs’ version of the facts would warrant the conclusion that Airborne possessed information that made it objectively unreasonable for a private actor in its position to believe that the Meji-as’ arrest was not patently abusive, and Airborne is consequently not entitled to qualified immunity on the Mejias’ § 1983 false arrest claims. See Green v. Montgomery, 219 F.3d 52, 59 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). b. Qualified immunity from liability for
holding that defendants claiming qualified immunity to  1983 action were entitled to summary judgment where factual disputes were not material holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity holding that where defendant claiming qualified immunity relies on facts that are in dispute qualified immunity cannot be granted holding trial court improperly granted dismissal on ground of immunity because the defendant had qualified statutory immunity rather than absolute immunity