Clause is ensuring the availability of cross-examination. The Court stated: To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. The Clause thus reflects a judgment, not only about the desirability of reliable evidence (a point on which there could be little dissent), but about how reliability can best be determined. Id. at 61, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 198. However, Crawford suggests that business records “by their nature” may not be testimonial. Id. at 56, 1-58 L. Ed. 2d at 195-96. See also State v. Windley, 173 N.C. App. 187, 194, 617 S.E.2d 682, 686 (2005) (<HOLDING>). In State v. Smith, 312 N.C. 361, 323 S.E.2d
holding that driving records were nontestimonial holding that a fingerprint card maintained in a national database the automated fingerprint identification system afis was a business record and therefore nontestimonial holding that a certified abstract of a defendants driving record was nontestimonial holding that voluntary statements to police initiated by witness are not interrogation and therefore are nontestimonial holding that the defendant maintained a passive website and was therefore not subject to general jurisdiction