are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.”). The required evidence test “focuses upon the evidence nece ether a manifest necessity exists, it has been held that there must be a “ ‘high degree’ [of necessity] before concluding that the mistrial is appropriate.” Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 506, 98 S.Ct. 824, 831, 54 L.Ed.2d 717, 729 (1978) (footnote omitted). In the instant case, the State concedes that there was no manifest necessity to declare a mistrial as to Count 3, the possession count, because the jury had reached a verdict on that count at the time the mistrial was declared. Thus, double jeopardy prohibits retrial of Count 3. See Jourdan v. State, 275 Md. 495, 511-12, 341 A.2d 388, 398 (1975) (<HOLDING>). While it is undisputed that there was no
holding that if defendant moved for or consented to mistrial retrial of defendant was not barred on double jeopardy grounds holding that a prosecution for the same offense was barred by double jeopardy where a mistrial was declared without manifest necessity holding that since the mistrial met the manifest necessity requirement of our cases  the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment  did not bar retrial under a valid indictment holding that the greater offense is  by definition the same for purposes of double jeopardy as any lesser offense included in it holding that double jeopardy barred the second prosecution when one of the jurors in the first trial became disabled and the trial court declared a mistrial instead of proceeding with eleven jurors