Forster & Garbus, but they are sued herein as "Foster and Garbus.” 2 . This Agreement is in the form of a letter agreement countersigned by both parties, dated June 5, 1997 (Forster Aff. Ex. B). 3 . Most of the cases which have considered this section of the statute have focused on whether the violation occurs on the date the letter is mailed or the date it is received. See, e.g., Bates v. C & S Adjusters, Inc., 980 F.2d 865, 868 (2d Cir. 1992) (observing that harm does not occur until receipt of the collection notice); Berrios v. Sprint Corp., No. 97 CIV 0081, 1997 WL 777945 at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 1997) (finding that the statute of limitation on plaintiff’s FDCPA claim “is one year from the date she received the letter”). See also, Naas v. Stolman, 130 F.3d 892, 893 (9th Cir. 1997) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Defendants served written interrogatories
holding that rule 6e is inapplicable where the time for filing begins to run on the date of mailing holding that the relevant time of inquiry is the date of the filing of the complaint holding that the statute of limitations begins to run on the date the alleged malpractice is discovered holding that the statute of limitations period begins to run when the allegedly discriminatory pension plan is applied to the plaintiffs and leaving determination of the actual date the statute begins to run on each claim to the district court holding that where the violation of the fdcpa was the filing of a lawsuit the statule of limitations begins to run on the date of filing