they would not otherwise be required to discuss. The time spent in those negotiations is itself a concrete injury. Second, the ASPA has shown a sufficient “line of causation” between the City’s actions and this injury. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984), abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 1377, 188 L.Ed.2d 392 (2014). The injuries it claims are directly linked to the City’s conduct: The City has made section 25 a mandatory component of its standard licensing contract for service providers at LAX, and section 25 will force service providers to spend time negotiating about a labor peace agreement. This is a sufficient causal .connection. See Cent. Ariz., 990 F.2d at 1538 (<HOLDING>). Finally, the remedies the ASPA seeks would
holding that delay caused by or consented to by a defendant is not unreasonable holding that immunity is not waived for injury or death caused by negligent supervision holding that an injury is not within the scope of employment after the employee has left work unless the injury was caused by the employers negligence holding that to the extent compliance with the flsa interferes with the state budgetary process that interference is caused by state law not federal law holding that eco nomic injury caused by contractual obligations that stemmed from compliance with a regulation were sufficiently caused by the regulation to support standing