Sec. 632.480(5), RSMo 2000. In contrast, persons are subject to civil commitment merely if, as a result of mental illness, they present a “substantial risk” of serious harm to themselves or others. Secs. 632.335, 632.005(9), RSMo 2000. It is not necessary to show, as is required in SVP cases, that the person has committed a sexually violent offense in the past, that the chance of serious harm is “more likely than not,” or even that the potential harm would be the result of a criminal act. These distinctions preclude SVPs from being similarly situated with persons under other civil commitments, and for this reason, I would hold that there is no equal protection violation. See In re Detention of David C. Samuelson, 189 Ill.2d 548, 244 Ill.Dec. 929, 727 N.E.2d 228, 237 (2000) (<HOLDING>); Westerheide v. State, 831 So.2d 93, 112
holding states are not persons for the purposes of section 1983 holding that a plaintiffs lack of knowledge regarding the number of affected persons does not bar class certification when defendant has the means to identify those persons at will holding that states are persons but conceding that this change was not envisioned as broadening the class of persons who could be held liable under the act holding equal protection under the federal constitution applies to similarly situated persons holding that svp defendants are not similarly situated to other civil detainees because persons subject to illinois svpa possess characteristics which set them apart from the greater class of persons who fall within illinois civil commitment statutes and such persons present different societal problems