‘worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage.’ ” Henry v. United States, 913 F.Supp. 334, 336 (M.D.Pa.) (quoting O’Halloran v. Ryan, 704 F.Supp. 70, 74 (E.D.Pa.1989)), aff'd, 96 F.3d 1435 (3d Cir.1996). A petitioner need not, however, demonstrate cause and prejudice when he raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel initially in a § 2255 motion. The Third Circuit has clearly stated its preference that such claims be addressed in the first instance by the district court under a § 2255 motion. See United States v. Nahodil, 36 F.3d 323, 326 (3d Cir.1994); United States v. DeRewal, 10 F.3d 100, 103-04 (3d Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1033, 114 S.Ct. 1544, 128 L.Ed.2d 196 (1994); see also Hernandez v. United States, No. 94-60, 1998 WL 554942 at *4 (D.Del. Aug. 13, 1998) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Reed, No. 96-6425, 1997 WL
holding that the appropriate vehicle for claims alleging that defense counsel violated a defendants right to testify is a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel holding no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim for failure to raise as basis for appeal of conviction ineffective assistance of trial counsel where basis for the latter claim was inadequate recognizing that third circuit has stated that  2255 is the proper and indeed preferred vehicle for challenging ineffective assistance of counsel holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel