were “similarly situated [to her] in ah rele vant respects .” Lynn, 160 F.3d at 487. The district court rejected Bogren’s reliance on comparable-trooper evidence because, with the exception of one officer, all of the troopers to whom Bogren compared herself were beyond the probationary period and were thus governed by a collective bargaining agreement. The court reasoned the collective bargaining agreement, with its attendant grievance procedures, would' create a different response by the patrol in disciplining or terminating those officers. We agree with the premise underlying the district court’s conclusion; troopers beyond the probationary period are not similarly situated to a probationary trooper. See Blanding v. Pennsylvania State Police, 12 F.3d 1303, 1309-10 (3d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); see also Ghane v. West, 148 F.3d 979, 982
holding that arguments that are not raised or that are not accompanied by factual and legal support are deemed waived recognizing that individuals are generally not similarly situated when different decision makers are involved in the respective disciplinary action recognizing that act and wetlands regulations are generally applicable to all similarly situated property owners and cannot be viewed as being directed solely at the plaintiffs recognizing the potential for discrimination by local officials among similarly situated property owners who are underrepresented in the general population recognizing that tenured troopers are not similarly situated to probationary troopers