used the word “cause” in the assault-fear provision, but chose the word “infliction” for the assault-harm provision. Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 10 (defining assault-fear as “an act done with intent to cause fear,” and assault-harm as “the intentional infliction of’ bodily harm (emphasis added)). Dorn argues that “inflict” is a stricter standard than “cause” and requires direct, not just proximate or “substantial factor,” causation. See State v. Gatson, 801 N.W.2d 134, 146 (Minn. 2011) (explaining that under a homicide statute in which the word “cause” is used, the State need only prove that the defendant’s acts were a “ ‘substantial causal factor’ leading to the death”) (quoting State v. Olson, 435 N.W.2d 530, 534 (Minn. 1989)); see also Olson, 435 N.W.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1997) (<HOLDING>). Assuming without deciding that an
holding that the injury was inflicted by the defendant when it occurred while the defendant applied force directly to the victims person holding that a plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress caused by observing the negligently inflicted injury of a third person if but only if said plaintiff 1 is closely related to the injury victim 2 is present at the scene of the injury producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the victim and 3 as a result suffers serious emotional distress holding that the injury was inflicted by the defendant when it occurred as a result of the defendants combative conduct recognizing that the assessment of victim injury points depends on whether the victims injury was a direct result of the defendants crimes holding that the injury was not inflicted by the defendant when it may have resulted from the actions ie the headbutt of the victim himself