seemingly straightforward application of the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Fisher to the present case. Instead, Plaintiff argues that the Feres doctrine should be found to be inapplicable because she claims that her Title VII claim “does not involve military decision-making but instead involves the military’s contravention of its own [EEO] regulations and procedures.” [Resp. Br., p. 9] Therefore, Plaintiff argues that at least that portion of her claim which seeks injunctive and declaratory relief to compel Defendant to comply with the EEOC orders is justiciable. However, as Defendant notes, Plaintiff can have no right to injunctive or declaratory relief if she has no viable underlying substantive cause of action. See Heussner v. National Gypsum Co., 887 F.2d 672, 677 n. 3 (6th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); Goryoka v. Quicken Loan, Inc., 519 Fed.Appx.
holding that because no class was certified at the time the individual claims were dismissed the class action was properly dismissed holding that where all substantive claims are properly dismissed there is no basis for injunctive relief holding that when a prisoners deliberate indifference claim is covered by the eighth amendment the substantive due process claims are duplicative and thus the substantive due process claims should be dismissed holding that claims not properly raised on direct appeal will not be considered as a basis for collateral relief holding that if the federal claims are dismissed before trial  the state claims should be dismissed as well