judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.”). A de novo determination does not require the Court to conduct a new hearing; rather, it mandates that the Court give fresh consideration to those issues to which specific objections have been made. See New Leadership Comm. v. Davidson, 23 F.Supp.2d 301, 304 (E.D.N.Y.1998); Gwen Sportswear, Inc. v. State Mutual Life Assurance Co. of America, No. 85 Civ. 3502, 1991 WL 130892, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 1991); 12 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller and Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3070.2 at p. 374 (1997); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Alfredo Versace apparently requests
recognizing de novo standard of review holding that sentencing upon general remand is to be de novo requiring the district court to consider new objections to the presentence report holding that we review a district courts interpretation of a statute de novo holding that a court of appeals should review de novo a district courts determination of state law holding in the criminal context that a district courts obligation to make a de novo determination with respect to the portions of a magistrate judges report and recommendation to which objections are made did not require a de novo hearing