from the state court case recite that the Brackins “sold” the horses to the debtor and her husband. (Exs. 1 & B.) The debtor testified that she has sold horses without registration papers. Even Ms. Brackin testified that if one of the horses had died during the payment period (before the registration papers were executed), the debtor would still have had to pay for it. The Brackins also argue that the contract with the debtor is executory and, by means of the turnover motion, she is attempting to “force completion” of the executory contract without satisfying the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1). (Resp. to Debtor’s Mot. at 2-3.) This argument, however, is without merit. The contract is not executory. See Chattanooga Mem’l Park v. Still (In re Jolly), 574 F.2d 349, 350 (6th Cir.)(<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 929, 99 S.Ct. 316, 58
holding that the debtor had the right to cure the default because the foreclosure sale was not complete under state law until it was confirmed by a court holding that a debtor could not relitigate the claim that the trustee breached his fiduciary duty because the bankruptcy court had already held that the trustees actions were not improper holding under the bankruptcy act that contract to purchase burial plots was no longer executory where the debtor had breached and the seller had obtained a default judgment for damages in state court prepetition holding that a default judgment was not void because the bankruptcy court that entered the judgment had proper jurisdiction over the party seeking relief holding debtor could include property because the bank accepted payments directly from the debtor and had previously allowed the debtor to cure default