of habeas corpus, as no direct review is available. See Board of Pardons & Paroles ex rel. Keene v. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Dist., 910 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (a claim that parole has been unlawfully revoked must be brought to the attention of the convicting court via an Article 11.07 application for writ of habeas corpus); see also Campos v. Johnson, 958 F.Supp. 1180, 1186 (W.D.Tex.1997); Flores v. Johnson, 957 F.Supp. 893, 904 (W.D.Tex.1997). Hence, notwithstanding Teague, this court is obliged to consider the merits of Alexander’s claims. Furthermore, the retroactivity analysis of Teague applies only to new rules of criminal procedure, not to changes in the substantive law. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998) (<HOLDING>); Teague, 489 U.S. at 310, 109 S.Ct. 1060;
holding that new rules of criminal procedural are generally not retroactive holding that teague applies only to procedural rules and not to decisions of the supreme court deciding the meaning of criminal statutes holding that the court of appeals lacks the authority to overrule decisions of the supreme court of north carolina and has a responsibility to follow those decisions until otherwise ordered by the supreme court holding that cue review applies only to prior final decisions of agencies of original jurisdiction ros and not to prior decisions of the board holding that the supreme court has final appellate review of agency decisions