award a reasonable sum of future medical expenses. Thus, the trial court’s ruling granting a partial directed verdict on future medical expenses, even if procedurally 1 sor substantively erroneous, is not a valid basis for remanding this matter for a new trial. Jury instruction as to past medical expenses award The third and final legal error the majority cites is the tidal court’s failure to instruct the jury on the law regarding past medical expenses incurred in good faith. The majority, however, fails to cite any authority, nor could I find any, requiring a jury be instructed on the law regarding recovery of past medical expenses incurred in good faith. This law is simply a jurisprudential principle. See Watson v. Hicks, 15-0046-48, p. 26 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/27/15), 172 So.3d 655, 675 (<HOLDING>). Regardless, Plaintiffs did not raise this
holding that under title vii the ultimate issue is the reason for the individual plaintiffs treatment not the relative treatment of different groups within the workplace holding that medical treatment is included in the traditional definition of necessaries holding that a claimant establishes a prima facie case for compensable medical treatment where a qualified physician indicates treatment was necessary for a workrelated condition holding that a tortfeasor is required to pay the expenses of over treatment or unnecessary medical treatment unless such treatment was incurred by the victim in bad faith  holding ec is not responsible for medical treatment required independently by the subsequent noncompensable injury when the removal of a hindrance to recovery from the compensable injury is merely an incidental effect of such treatment