of appeals—which is to say, a motion to recall the mandate—is a ‘second or successive’ application for purposes of § 2244(b)____ Otherwise the statute would be ineffectual.”); McQueen v. Scroggy, 99 F.3d 1302, 1335 (6th Cir.1996) (“We agree with those circuits that have held that a Rule 60(b) motion is the practical equivalent of a successive habeas corpus petition____”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 2422, 138 L.Ed.2d 185 (1997); Felker v. Turpin, 101 F.3d 657, 661 (11th Cir.) (stating that “the established law of this circuit, like the decisions ... from other circuits, forecloses [the] position that Rule 60(b) motions are not constrained by successive petition rules.”); cert. denied, — U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 451, 136 L.Ed.2d 346 (1996); Hunt v. Nuth, 57 F.3d 1327, 1339 (4th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1054, 116 S.Ct. 724,
holding that a rule 60b motion ordinarily should be treated as a successive habeas petition but declining to adopt a bright line rule equating all rule 60b motions with successive habeas petitions holding that a certificate of appealability is unnecessary where a district court dismisses a rule 60b motion as an unauthorized successive habeas motion holding that district courts may properly treat rule 60b motions as successive habeas petitions holding that motion filed under fedrcivp 60b properly construed as successive  2255 motion holding that second and third state habeas petitions that were dismissed as impermissible successive petitions were properly filed