price of the previously bargained-for fees. Plaintiff points out that while there are exceptions to Section 406(a) prohibited transactions under Section 408, there are no exceptions to Section 406(b) prohibited transactions. Thus, Plaintiff argues that even if the fees are reasonable, the disbursement of any fees by the fiduciary to pay itself for its services is prohibited. This argument goes too far. Section 406(b)’s purpose is to prohibit transactions that might involve self-dealing by a fiduciary, not to prevent fiduciaries from being paid for their work. A service provider cannot be held liable for merely accepting previously bargained-for fixed compensation that was not prohibited at the time of the bargain. See Chi. Dist. Council of Carpenters Welfare Fund, 474 F.3d at 472 n. 4 (<HOLDING>); Schulist v. Blue Cross of Iowa, 717 F.2d
holding that a claim did not arise under a workers compensation law when it stated a right to relief in tort and sought common law damages distinct from statutory compensation scheme holding that a schoolteacher elected by the school board was an employee not an official and therefore entitled to benefits under the workers compensation act holding that a provider of software and hardware was not an information provider and thus could not be charged with negligent misrepresentation holding that a fiduciary who receives consideration in connection with a transaction involving plan assets violated section 406b and a nonfiduciary who facilitated that transaction could be liable holding that a service provider who accepted compensation prescribed by an armslength agreement was not a fiduciary for compensation purposes and therefore not liable under section 406b