“official policy must be ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation’ in order to establish the liability of a government body under § 1983.” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). But we need not decide whether the district court erred or abused its discretion in using the “moving force” formulation in this individual liability case, because any error was harmless. The jury affirmatively found both that “Plaintiff suffered injury as a result of’ the fabricated evidence and that the fabricated evidence was “the moving force that caused the ultimate injury.” (Emphases added.) See Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013) (<HOLDING>). Nor were Defendants prevented from arguing
holding that government must show both butfor and proximate causation in establishing loss holding that where no underlying constitutional violation occurred the city cannot be liable under monell holding that moving force in the monell context includes both causationinfact and proximate causation holding that city may properly be held liable where policy is moving force behind constitutional violation holding that the policy or practice must be the direct cause or moving force behind the constitutional violation