Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Kevin C. Armstrong, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee. For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Creamer’s motion to suppress evidence. Judgment affirmed. Phipps, P. J., and Peterson, J., concur. 1 See, e.g., Christian v. State, 329 Ga. App. 244, 245 (1) (764 SE2d 573) (2014). 2 At the suppression hearing, the investigator testified that, although the Cl was later terminated from the City of Atlanta for stealing, she was considered reliable at the time of the controlled purchases at issue in this case. 3 See OCGA § 16-13-30. 4 Minor v. State, 298 Ga. App. 391, 392 (680 SE2d 459) (2009) (punctuation omitted). 5 See U. S. Const. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their perso 9 SE2d 796) (1996) (<HOLDING>). 13 331 Ga. App. 447 (771 SE2d 135) (2015)
holding that consent searches do not require probable cause to justify the search of a home holding that a controlled buy at a particular home provided probable cause for the search of that residence holding that there was probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant where the officers corroboration of events that occurred during the controlled buy as set forth in the affidavit provide sufficient probable cause holding that probable cause existed to search the defendants residence because the warrant affidavit established probable cause that the defendant possessed stolen firearms and because people generally keep firearms at home or on their persons holding that an officers account of a controlled buy made by an informant was by itself sufficient to es tablish probable cause for issuance of a search warrant