In addition to the required Miranda advisement, a defendant's self-incriminating statement must also be voluntarily given. Crain, 736 N.E.2d at 1230 (citing Gregory v. State, 540 N.E.2d 585, 592 (Ind.1989); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 2336, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000) ("The requirement that Miranda warnings be given does not, of course, dispense with the voluntariness inquiry."). The trial court's decision regarding admissibility of a confession or incriminating statement is controlled by determining from the totality of the circumstances whether the statement was given voluntarily, rather than through coercion or other improper influence so as to overcome the free will of the accused. Hartman, 988 N.E.2d at 787-788; see also Treadway, 924 N.E.2d at 635 (<HOLDING>); Griffith v. State, 788 N.E.2d 835, 841
holding that the test of admissibility of confessions as voluntary is whether state officials behavior overcame the defendants will to resist and brought about a confession that was not freely selfdetermined not the probable truth or falsity of confessions holding that the admissibility of a state ment is controlled by determining from the totality of the cireumstances whether it was made voluntarily and not induced by violence threats or other improper influences that overcame the defendants free will holding that the reasonableness inquiry is based upon the totality of the circumstances in determining whether or not a search was reasonable holding that the jury must determine whether the partys conduct was reasonable under the cireumstances holding that admissibility of a confession is governed by determining from the totality of the circumstances whether or not it was made voluntarily