for delaying payment of judgments and for filing frivolous appeals.... ” Nissho-Iwai Co. v. Occidental Crude Sales, Inc., 848 F.2d 613, 623 (5th Cir.1988) (citation and internal quotations omitted). Although parties may contract around 28 U.S.C. § 1961, “to do so, they must specifically contract around the general rule that a cause of action reduced to judgment merges into the judgment and the contractual interest rate therefore disappears for post-judgment purposes.” In re Riebesell, 586 F.3d 782, 794 (10th Cir.2009) (citation and internal quotations omitted). To satisfy this standard, the parties’ contract must expressly state that the chosen interest rate specifically applies to judgments or judgment debts. See FCS Advisors, Inc. v. Fair Fin. Co., 605 F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). The parties 2005 Agreement does not meet this
holding that the proper rate for prejudgment interest is the rate fixed by the parties in a contract holding that the mclendon standard applied where an agreement between the parties granted the parties joint legal custody of the child with physical custody to the mother and the agreement had been adopted by the trial court holding that section 1961 applied where the parties agreement failed to specify that the selected interest rate applied to either judgements or judgment debts holding that bankruptcy plan of reorganization rather than  1961 controlled the setting of the interest rate holding that walsh was entitled to postjudgment interest on child support arrearage but vacating and remanding the arrearage judgment because the judgment did not state the interest rate or specify that the interest was fully or partially waived as required by section 1602c