but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.” Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935). Accordingly, prosecutors “may strike hard blows,” but they may not “strike foul ones” in the form of “improper suggestions, insinuations and, especially, assertions of personal knowledge,” which “carry much weight against the accused when they should properly carry none.” Id. For that reason, it is improper for a prosecutor to state or imply that the defendant will commit future crimes. Broom, 441 F.3d at 413; see also Bates v. Bell, 402 F.3d 635, 643-44 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). It is improper to “appeal[ ] to the national
holding that contemporaneous objections were required to preserve for appeal improper comments on defendants right to remain silent holding that plain error is the appropriate standard of review when a defendant objects to a prosecutors comments at trial does not move for a mistrial and then on appeal argues that the comments deprived him of a fair trial holding that comments that implied that the drug trade would continue if the jury did not convict the defendant were improper holding that alleged prosecutorial misconduct must be evaluated in light of the prosecutors argument and the entire record and if a review of the record convinces the court that the jury would have convicted defendant even if it were not exposed to the alleged improper prosecutorial comments then no actual prejudice occurred holding that comments that if jurors acquit then they are accomplices to future murders were improper