incident of misconduct during his prosecution.”). Yet he fails to specifically identify even one document with such demonstrative value — let alone “many.” At one point— again, in a footnote — Bartko cites to his pending habeas proceedings in the Eastern District of North Carolina and its “hundreds of pages of exhibits,” but such a cursory gesture hardly constitutes a “meaningful evidentiary showing.” Id. at 33 n. 6; Favish, 541 U.S. at 175, 124 S.Ct. 1570. Even in Bartko’s earlier motions in this case, which he also blithely “incorporat[es] by reference,” Cross-Mot. at 13, he fails to clearly explain where in the record the Court might find evidence of government misconduct. These vague statements are simply not enough. See Oguaju v. United States, 378 F.3d 1115, 1117 (D.C.Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Although the Court could have ended its
holding that plaintiff had failed to make showing required by favish where he alleged that government informant committed perjury at his trial because such assertion even if stated in sworn affidavit of plaintiff was too insubstantial to establish likelihood of government impropriety recognizing that dismissal is required if a plaintiff has had fair opportunity to make his case but has failed holding that the perjury by a key government witness irrespective of whether the government knew of the perjury at the time of trial infected the trial proceedings and required reversal holding that plaintiff stated a claim for breach of contract when it alleged the government failed to purchase insurance for plaintiff as agreed by contract holding an individuals admission to a government agent prior to trial that he had previously committed perjury did not waive his privilege to invoke the fifth amendment as to that matter at trial