and he did not “knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Edüd 271 (1986). So denial of immunity cannot rest on those grounds. In my view, the majority’s reversal of the trial judge’s grant of immunity undercuts the interests protected by the immunity doctrine. The purposes of granting qualified immunity include: avoiding “excessive disruption of government,” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); giving “a fairly wide zone of protection in close cases,” Roy v. Inhabitants of Lewiston, 42 F.3d 691, 695 (1st Cir.1994); allowing officers “reasonably [to] anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages,” Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 13 r.2002) (<HOLDING>); Clue v. Johnson, 179 F.3d 57, 60, 61-62 (2d
holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity holding under facts presented that probation officer was entitled to at least qualified immunity holding that officers were entitled to qualified immunity on first prong of test despite jury verdict because evidence at trial did not establish unreasonableness of seizures under the fourth amendment holding that officers were entitled to qualified immunity where defendant officers could have reasonably believed that they were given sufficient third party consent to search holding that officers were entitled to qualified immunity despite their ignoring the arrestees complaints that the handcuffs were too tight