“a legitimate expectation of privacy in the areas searched or the items seized.” Id.; see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). The question is whether the defendant demonstrates a sufficient connection to the areas searched or the items seized based on the totality of the circumstances. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980); People v. Whisler, 724 P.2d 648, 649 (Colo.1986); People v. Spies, 200 Colo. 434, 439-40, 615 P.2d 710, 714 (1980). A subjective expectation of privacy is legitimate for purposes of the Fourth Amendment only if it is “one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J. concurring) (<HOLDING>); see also Rakas, 439 U.S. at 144 n. 12, 99
holding that telephone users have no expectation of privacy in dialed telephone numbers because they voluntarily expose such information to the service provider holding that a customer has no reasonable expectation of privacy in dialed telephone numbers which were conveyed to the telephone company holding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth holding defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in blood sample drawn by hospital holding that defendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building