of B. & V. Distributing.” (12/15/2005 Complaint at ¶ 11.) It is clear, then, that the alleged transaction was for the sale and purchase of corporate assets. Battler has not cited any authority for the proposition that a corporate officer or shareholder may be deemed a party to a contract for the sale of corporate assets merely because the payments were to be directed to and received by this individual. Indeed, such a proposition would run directly counter to the “well-settled” general rule, recognized in Ohio and elsewhere, that “only a corporation and not its shareholders can complain of an injury sustained by, or a wrong done to, the corporation.” Adair v. Wozniak, 23 Ohio St.3d 174, 492 N.E.2d 426, 428 (1986); see also NBD Bank, N.A. v. Fulner, 109 F.3d 299, 301 (6th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). This rule remains fully applicable even
holding that an action brought in the name of a person adjudicated as incapacitated instead of in the name of her guardian cannot be corrected as a misnomer recognizing that agents of a corporation may be held criminally responsible for crimes committed in the name of the corporation recognizing as a matter of federal law that an action to redress injuries to a corporation cannot be maintained by a shareholder in his own name but must be brought in the name of the corporation holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation recognizing that the corporation is always deemed to be an indispensable party in a shareholder derivative action