motion was filed prior to the trial court’s order of April 26, 2001. However, the order is silent as to this motion and the language of the order does not indicate multiple modification requests. Rather, the order expressly references the hearing of August 16, 2000, and refers to the “petition to modify.” Moreover, the record reflects that a hearing on Hargrave’s motion was set and reset for dates after April 26, 2001. Based on the record before us, the order is premised solely upon Lefever’s “petition” and the hearing held on August 16, 2000, which addressed this “petition.” Accordingly, we cannot say that the order of April 26, 2001, subsumed and disposed of Hargrave’s motion. Zellers, 727 S.W.2d at 365;- also Cozby v. Cozby, 597 S.W.2d 808, 809 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1980, no writ) (<HOLDING>); In the Interest of J.M. and G.M., 585 S.W.2d
holding that district court must conduct individualized assessment based on particular facts of each case recognizing that statute of limitations questions may be resolved on a motion to dismiss recognizing that questions of changed conditions and the amount of child support must be resolved on the particular facts of each case holding that changing the date and amount of the larceny under the circumstances of that case changed the identity of the offense holding that the court could award child support without a showing of changed circumstances where the original divorce decree awarded child support to be set after a specified time upon petition to the court