no authority for the proposition that this distinction is relevant to Section 51.014(a)(8), and we are aware of none. Thus, the court of appeals erred in concluding it was without jurisdiction to hear McLellan’s appeal. IV. Conclusion With respect to the trial court’s denial of Texas A & M’s plea to the jurisdiction, we affirm the portion of the court of appeals’ judgment holding that Koseo-glu’s breach of contract claims against Texas A & M were barred by sovereign immunity. But because Koseoglu’s pleadings are incurably defective, remanding the cause to the trial court will serve no legitimate purpose. Therefore, we reverse the court of appeals’ remand order and dismiss Koseoglu’s claims against Texas A & M with prejudice. See Harris County v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 636 (Tex.2004) (<HOLDING>). With respect to McLellan’s appeal, having
holding that dismissal pursuant to a plea to the jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity is with prejudice holding that congress could not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to the patent clause of article i holding that a district courts order of dismissal with prejudice was a nullity because the court lacked jurisdiction recognizing that the state enjoys sovereign immunity in regard to tort actions unless the legislature waived immunity pursuant to a specific statute recognizing that a defense based on sovereign immunity is not coextensive with the limitations on judicial power in article iii