statute was satisfied and he was not denied his right to allocution. Accordingly, any objection by Pepe-Frazier’s trial counsel would have lacked merit and, thus, counsel was not ineffective. Decided March 18, 2015 The Pate Law Firm, Page A. Pate, Jess B. Johnson, for appellant. Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Arthur C. Walton, Sheila E. Gallow, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee. Pepe-Frazier also seems to argue that his defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request a presentence investigation or present mitigating evidence, pointing to counsel’s testimony at the motion-for-new-trial hearing in which he conceded that he “probably” should have done those things. However, Pepe-Frazier fails to identify exactly what an inve (712 SE2d 633) (2011) (<HOLDING>). 15 See, e.g., Morris v. State, 294 Ga. 45, 49
holding that the average number of days to payment nearly doubled between the historical period and the preference period which based on the facts of that particular case made the payments outside the ordinary course of dealings between the plaintiff and defendant holding that payments made 25 days after the average were within the ordinary course of dealings but payments made 50 days after the average were not holding that a conference discussing the dismissal of a juror outside of the presence of the defendant violated rule 43a but was not a constitutional violation holding that an improved public street is a structure within the meaning of illinois workers compensation law holding that the meaning of certain street slang or drug terminology was outside the ken of the average juror