those guilty verdicts against Muller (on Counts IV and V) were their independent verdicts. Wrensford moved for a mistrial as to Counts III and IV and Muller moved for a mistrial as to all counts. In response, the District Court excused the jury to discuss with the parties whether it should deliver a jury instruction directing the jury to rede-liberate on Counts III and IV for Wrens-ford and Count I for Muller. D ir. 1994) (ruling that an illegal ■ arrest occurred when officers stopped a cab in which the defendant was riding on an interstate •highway, read him his Miranda rights, and brought him to an airport police station in a police cruiser, and noting that “(w]hile [the defendant] was not taken from his home to the police station, he was taken ‘forcibly' from -36 (9th Cir. 1984) (<HOLDING>). Not every transportation by police, however,
recognizing that a prosecutors office is an entity and that information in the possession of one attorney in the office must be attributed to the office as a whole holding that the defendants unlawful arrest in his hotel room rendered his subsequent consent to the search of his room invalid even though he signed a consent form allowing the search after his arrest because the government  completely failed to address whether there was a break in the causal relationship between the unlawful arrest and the subsequent search holding that the court of appeals erred in declining to consider whether the arrest was illegal and whether the consent was tainted by the potentially illegal police activity holding that escorting the defendant from a baggage claim area to a dea office approximately 75 yards away was an arrest and that his consent to the search of his bag in that office was tainted by the illegal seizure holding that an employee had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his office even though the papers seized from the office were not the property of the employee