an instruction, but that the court failed to comply, instructing only that “Suiter . . . claims that the Defendant. . . was negligent in one or more of the following ways: 1. In failing to keep a proper lookout; 2. In failing to exercise reasonable control[.]” Instruction No. 2. We find that there was no error in failing to instruct on the meaning of these terms because an expression of common usage requires no definition in instructions to a jury. See Clark Bilt, Inc. v. Wells Dairy Co., 200 Neb. 20, 261 N.W.2d 772 (1978). The terms “lookout” and “control” are ordinary terms well within the understanding, common sense, and usage of the average juror. It is not error to refuse to give an instruction defining such terms. Compare Danielsen v. Eickhoff, 159 Neb. 374, 66 N.W.2d 913 (1954) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, at the core of automobile
recognizing that we must give meaning to all the words in the claims recognizing that claim meaning will sometimes be readily apparent even to lay judges and that claim construction in such cases involves little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words holding that proximate cause is legal concept with particular meaning in law and is not in category of words or phrases commonly known and understood by lay public thus it was error not to give instruction defining it holding that the meaning of doubtful terms or phrases may be determined by reference to their relationship with other associated words or phrases noscitur a sociis recognizing that the court must give meaning to all the words in the claims