and bilked investors of millions of dollars. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act reaches Panice’s misconduct. Perhaps consideration of the stiffer penalties under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Enron and WorldCom cases would weigh in favor of a “downward departure” for Panice. But such a consideration would be more appropriately given by the district court when evaluating the sentencing factors, particularly § 3553(a)(6) — the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. Finally, Panice argues the application of the victim enhancement offends the ex post facto clause. The amendment to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 became effective January 25, 2003; Panice’s conduct in the Receiver case occurred from 2001 to 2002. This argument is foreclosed by United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 795 (7th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). See also United States v. Nurek, 578 F.3d
holding that retroactive application of advisory sentencing guidelines violated ex post facto clause because guidelines increased minimum sentencing range holding that application of guidelines did not violate the ex post facto clause because rico offense was a straddle crime that continued before and after the effective date of the guidelines holding that retroactive application of advisory sentencing guidelines violated ex post facto clause because guidelines created sufficient risk of increased sentencing range holding that use of the guidelines in effect at time of sentencing does not violate ex post facto clause after booker holding that the application of the guidelines in effect at sentencing rather than at the time of defendants conduct does not violate the ex post facto clause even if the current guidelines suggest a harsher sentence because the guidelines are only advisory not binding