Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Once this prima facie case has been established, there is a presumption of discrimination, and the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817. If such a showing is made, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the articulated reason was merely a pretext for intentional discrimination. Id. The third step of the McDonnell Douglas test has been altered by the Supreme Court’s decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003) (<HOLDING>). In light of Desert Palace, the Fifth Circuit
holding that in title vii cases the mixedmotives theory of discrimination is available in cases with circumstantial evidence of discrimination holding that such circumstantial evidence may be used to prove discrimination holding that mcdonnell douglas framework which is used in title vii cases applies to ada cases when only circumstantial evidence of discrimination is offered holding that direct evidence of discrimination is not required to prove discrimination in mixed motive cases under title vii holding that a claim for discrimination in private employment is not preempted by title vii