gives rise to an inference that his purportedly protected speech was a motivating factor in two of the termination charges filed against him. Specifically, Kidwell contends that the department officials did not follow the requirements of the Uniform Police Officers’ Disciplinary Act (“UPODA”), 50 111. Comp. Stat. 725/1, et seq., when it questioned him after the Burlington, Iowa incident, and that the officials failed to follow the department’s internal policies when investigating Kidwell’s role in the accident during the high-speed chase. In another context, we stated that an employer’s “systematic abandonment of its hiring policies is circumstantial evidence” of a retaliatory motive. Rudin, 420 F.3d at 723; see also Giacoletto v. Amax Zinc Co., 954 F.2d 424, 427 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, we do not require that an
holding that fraud may be inferred from circumstantial evidence holding that lack of consent may be established by adequate circumstantial evidence holding that admission of hearsay was harmless where strong circumstantial evidence established the same facts holding that employers intent may be inferred through circumstantial evidence holding that the employers deviation from its established procedure when terminating the plaintiff was circumstantial evidence of retaliation