orders of probation. Ms. Clussman preserved the necessary points by filing motions pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2). First, the sentences imposed in count II of each case — sixty months in prison followed by two years of probation — are illegal, because Ms. Clussman was convicted of third-degree felonies in each of these counts. A sixty-month term of imprisonment is the maximum sentence that the trial court could have legally imposed for a third-degree felony. See § 775.082(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (2010). The state concedes error on this point. Next, the trial court did not orally pronounce special conditions of probation 3 and 20 at sentencing. They must therefore be stricken from the written order of probation. See Justice v. State, 674 So.2d 123, 124 (Fla.1996) (<HOLDING>). Finally, the trial court erred by imposing a
holding that a condition of probation requiring the defendant to spend up to one year in a halfway house at the discretion of the probation officer was lawfully imposed under as 1255100a5 because it was imposed as part of the original sentence recognizing that before a special condition of probation may be imposed there must be an oral pronouncement of the condition at sentencing holding that all special conditions of probation must be orally pronounced at sentencing holding that the requirement that a defendant pay for drug testing is a special condition of probation which must be pronounced at sentencing holding special conditions of probation must be imposed at sentencing and may not be imposed at resentencing