exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant. 445 U.S. at 589-590, 100 S.Ct. at 1382 (alterations in original). The Fourth Amendment does not differentiate among types of “homes.” The term is of course broader than, for example, a single-family house. See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 90, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 1019, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (Fourth Amendment protection applies to an apartment, “the equivalent of a single-family house”), citing Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 42, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 1634-35, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454-55, 69 S.Ct. 191, 192-93, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948) (defendant’s room in a “rooming house” treated as a home); Serpas v. Schmidt, 827 F.2d 23, 28 (7th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). The principal protection against unnecessary
holding that contractual conditions printed on cruise ticket were valid even though they were in small type holding that vague on schedule and on track statements were immaterial misrepresentations holding that ontrack dormitory rooms for racetrack employees were homes under the fourth amendment even though they were small temporary located near stables and accessible to track authorities by master keys holding that film negatives and master recordings were tangible personal property even though they were valued in part for their intellectual content because they were also physically useful in the manufacturing process holding that the juvenile defendants who voluntarily left their homes in the middle of night to ride to the police department in patrol cars and who were told they were not under arrest were not in custody