747 (6th Cir.1999), it can hardly be said that the petitioner was on notice that he would lose the right to raise such a claim if he failed to do so on direct appeal. (The reverse might, of course, be true— that is, a trial record could be sufficiently developed to permit review of counsel’s competency, if the defendant chose to raise the issue on direct appeal, but we know of no circuit authority that would force the defendant to do so or forfeit the right to litigate the issue collaterally.) We are, therefore, content to adhere to existing Sixth circuit precedent and hold that the ineffective-assistance claims are subject to review in the district court, having been timely raised in the petitioner’s § 2255 motion. See Hughes v. United States, 258 F.3d 453, 457, n. 2 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). C. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate
holding that defendants claim for ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest was not cognizable on direct appeal holding that petitioner did not procedurally default his ineffective assistance of counsel claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record holding that to the extent defendants claim is one of ineffective assistance of counsel it is not cognizable on direct appeal and rule 2915 is the exclusive procedure by which a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be advanced holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel