power to borrow so that it includes the power to loan. See Gouldy, 12 S.W. at 831. Therefore, as Edythe’s agent under the power of attorney, Richard had neither the power to make, nor the power to execute an agreement authorizing him to make, loans to himself from Edythe’s funds. In further support of his argument, Richard cites Neill v. Kleiber, 51 Tex.Civ.App. 552, 112 S.W. 694 (1908). In that case, the agent named in a power of attorney was authorized to “sell, contract and convey all or any part” of a specified tract of land. Id. at 695. He also was granted “full power by this to do with the said land as if the same was his own property.” Id. But the language in Edythe’s power of attorney is not the “functional equivalent” of the language in Neill. See Cohen, 2008 WL 1728234, at *6 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, Neill is inapposite. Conclusion
holding that instructions are sufficient which substantially follow the language of the statute or use equivalent language holding when ordinance language is clear courts must give language its plain meaning holding that when language is exactly the same in two statutory provisions the meaning of that language is also identical holding equivalent language is a paywhenpaid clause holding that language authorizing an agent to act in my name place and stead in any way which i myself could do is not functional equivalent of language in neill