precedent, Bates’s Missouri § 569.055 conviction is a crime of violence for purposes of § 4B1.2(a). See United States v. Whaley, 552 F.3d 904, 907 (8th Cir.2009) (“[A] conviction for knowingly burning or exploding in Missouri constitutes a violent felony for purposes of the sentence enhancement under [the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e),]” because “[t]he elements of the Missouri offense of knowingly burning or exploding ... substantially correspond to those of generic arson.”); United States v. Furqueron, 605 F.3d 612, 613 (8th Cir.2010) (“We recognize the term ‘violent felony’ under the ACCA as synonymous with the term ‘crime of violence’ under [U.S.S.G.] § 4B1.2.”); see also United States v. Lennex, 320 Fed.Appx. 481, 482 (8th Cir.2009) (unpublished per curiam) (<HOLDING>). We therefore affirm the judgment of the
holding that misdemeanor offense of driving while intoxicated constitutes a crime of violence under ussg  4b12a holding morevstat  569055 qualifies as a crime of violence for purposes of ussg  4b12a holding that for purposes of 18 usc  924e involuntary manslaughter in ohio is a violent felony the definition of which is identical for all relevant purposes to the definition of crime of violence in  4b12a holding mailing a threatening letter was a crime of violence for the purposes of ussg  4b11 holding that  215 is categorically a crime of violence for purposes of ussg  2l12