lewd and lascivious conduct contains neither of these elements. Indeed, lewd and lascivious conduct does not necessarily require physical contact between the perpetrator and victim, see, e.g., State v. Johnson, 158 Vt. 344, 348, 612 A.2d 1114, 1116 (1992) (upholding lewd and lascivious conduct conviction when defendant encouraged child to masturbate in the presence of others), though contact was a part of the charge in this case. Further, lewd and lascivious conduct includes the element of appealing to or gratifying one’s sexual desires. Though appealing to sexual desire may be often associated with sexual assault, such motive is not an element of that crime, and lewd and lascivious conduct may thus be distinguished on that basis. See State v. Norton, 332 S.E.2d 531, 532-33 (S.C. 1985) (<HOLDING>). But see Meador v. State, 711 P.2d 852, 855-56
holding that the defendant could be convicted of sexual battery a lesser crime not included in the offense for which he was indicted where the defendant requested that sexual battery be submitted to the jury holding that voluntary intoxication is a defense to a charge of assault and battery with intent to gratify sexual desires holding that reindictment for committing a lewd act upon a child after acquittal for sexual battery on a minor did not place defendant in double jeopardy because lewdness did not require sexual battery and lewdness requires intent of appealing to sexual desires of himself or child holding the death sentence proportional for the sexual battery beating and strangulation of victim where there were three statutory aggravators hac pecuniary gain and sexual battery and both statutory mental mitigators holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse