have known that the risks of waiting included possible denial of their motions to intervene as untimely. See State of Oregon, 913 F.2d at 589 (finding intervention untimely because applicants had notice of the proceeding and were aware that their interests would be discussed in settlement negotiations); Air California, 799 F.2d at 538 (requiring applicant to intervene before settlement when the applicant was aware that the parties were attempting to reach a negotiated settlement and might look to the applicant for help towards the settlement, even though the applicant did not know the terms of the settlement). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Cities’ motion to intervene as untimely. See United States v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 25 F.3d 66, 69-74 (2nd Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Further, because Cities are not parties to
recognizing objective standard applicable under 42 usc  1983 and suits under united states constitution recognizing absolute immunity to suits under 42 usc  1988 recognizing right of prisoners to seek relief under 42 usc  1983 for denial of access to the courts holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 recognizing that an untimely motion prevents intervention under cercla  113i 42 usc  9613i intervention of right under fedrcivp 24a and permissive intervention under fedrcivp 24b