authority must “be derived from the plain wording of the statutes.” Arem, 154 So.3d at 363-64. In addition, we have no quarrel with the Arem court’s conclusion that “[ijn Florida ... only law enforcement officers and [TIEOs] are entitled to determine who gets prosecuted for a red light violation.” Id. at 364 (citing §§ 316.0083(3), .640(5)(a)). However, we part company with the Fourth District when it concludes that “the TIEO[ ] merely acquiesces in the vendor’s decision to issue the citation,” and that under the initial review of the computer images of purported violations that the processors exercise “unfettered discretion to decide which images are sent to the TIEO[ ] and which ones are not.” Id. at 365. Undoubtedly, section 316.0083(l)(a) permits “a review of information fro 0) (<HOLDING>). Although ATS processors initially screen the
holding that to the extent the staff of the casino control commission erred in approving payment on outstanding counter checks at branch offices the commission properly exercised its authority to reopen and vacate the approvals holding that the legislature granted exclusive authority over ratemaking to the public service commission holding sec decision reviewable when commission has reviewed staff decision holding that service is not avoided by service on a partys attorney as service on an attorney is ineffective unless he has been authorized to accept such service holding that the florida public service commission did not improperly delegate to its staff the authority to approve a revised supplemental service rider when the staff merely carried out the ministerial task of seeing whether the conditions specified by the board were met