is focused solely on explaining why our decision on the main statutory issue necessitates remand on these diverse claims as well. Ironically, the only allusion to their merits occurs in the concurrence’s gratuitous characterization of them as "novel” and “dubious,” and in its citation of a case finding no constitutional right to nondisclosure of private information. Id. at 92 & n. 2. 28 . Much of the court’s discussion in Logan focused on whether District of Columbia law recognized a common-law cause of action for breach of the confidentiality of the physician-patient privilege. The court’s conclusion on this issue may no longer be accurate in view of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ recent decision in Vassiliades v. Garfinckel’s, Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580, 591 (D.C.1985) (<HOLDING>). The Vassiliades decision, however, does not
holding that there must be a tort distinguishable from or independent of the breach of contract in order for a party to bring a valid claim in tort based on a breach in a contractual relationship recognizing privilege recognizing the tort of breach of physicianpatient privilege recognizing that breach of contract cause of action accrues at time of the breach holding no reasonable expectation of privacy in medical records because of statutory exception to physicianpatient privilege in homicide trials