certain federal lands to the federal magistracy. The statutes refer ring such trials did not require the defendant’s consent as a prerequisite to the magistrate’s jurisdiction. See statutes cited supra note 10. This fact is relevant for two reasons. First, it shows that the dissent is wrong to claim that the federal magistracy has always been an “adjunct body,” “statutorily, historically, and doctrinally” (footnotes omitted). Second, the Supreme Court’s non-delegation caselaw requires us to consider historical context and practice when construing the “literal command of Art. III.” N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 64, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982) (plurality opinion); see also NLRB v. Canning, - U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2550, 2560, 189 L.Ed.2d 538 (2014) (<HOLDING>). We have not found evidence that a defendant
holding that historical practice is important when courts interpret the constitution even when the nature or longevity of that practice is subject to dispute and even when that practice began after the founding era holding that sponsoring applicants for pro hac vice admission to practice law is not a core component of the fundamental right to practice law holding out admission to practice law when not admitted to practice holding due process is not violated when failure to receive notice is the result of attorneys decision to abandon law practice holding that the term manufacture applied not only to things made but to the practice of making to principles carried into practice in a new manner to new results of principles carried into practice