involved in criminal activity.” Whitaker v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 268, 274, 687 S.E.2d 733, 736 (2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Ewell v. Commonwealth, 254 Va. 214, 217, 491 S.E.2d 721, 722 (1997)). Reasonable suspicion “is more than an ‘unparticular-ized suspicion or “hunch.” ’ ” Bass v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 470, 475, 525 S.E.2d 921, 923 (2000) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). Nevertheless, it “requires only ‘some minimal level of objective justification.’ ” Branham v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 273, 280, 720 S.E.2d 74, 78 (2012) (quoting I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 1763, 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984)). The existence of reasonable suspicion permits a brief seizure “while .Ct. 1598, 1604, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (<HOLDING>). Applying these principles, we conclude that
holding that probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law