because its potential to mislead the jury outweighs its minimal utility. Justice EID dissents. Justice BOATRIGHT dissents. 1 . CJI-Civ. 4th 9:11 states: "A person who, through no fault of his or her own, is placed in a sudden emergency, is not chargeable with negligence if the person exercises that degree of care that a reasonably careful person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances." 2 . See, eg., Wiles v. Webb, 329 Ark. 108, 946 S.W.2d 685, 689 (1997) (abolishing sudden emergency instruction); Knapp, 392 So.2d at 198-99 (same); McClymont v. Morgan, 238 Neb. 390, 470 N.W.2d 768, 772 (1991) (same); Dunleavy v. Miller, 116 N.M. 353, 862 P.2d 1212, 1216-19 (N.M.1993) (same); see also Lyons v. Midnight Sun Transp. Servs., Inc., 928 P.2d 1202, 1206 (Alaska 1996) (<HOLDING>); Di Cenzo v. Izawa, 68 Haw. 528, 723 P.2d 171,
holding that a trial judge is obliged to give a correct jury instruction notwithstanding that request for instruction was technically erroneous if the evidence generates the subject matter of the jury instruction holding that sudden emergency instruction should rarely if ever be used holding that in a criminal trial the trial court must correct or amend an improper instruction if the proper instruction is necessary for the jury to understand the case holding that a request for an instruction on entrapment should be refused even if there is evidence to support the defense if the defendant has denied under oath the acts constituting the crime that is charged holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given