claims before the Commission, the claims are properly before us because they were actually addressed by the Commission. We disagree. The mere fact that the Commission discusses an issue does not mean that it was provided a meaningful “opportunity to pass” on the issue. It is only through the adversarial process (or analogous circumstances) that the Commission is afforded such an opportunity within the meaning of § 405. We, of course, recognize that § 405 does not require that the party seeking judicial review of an issue be the party that provided the Commission with the opportunity to pass on the discussion of an issue in an ALJ opinion adopted by the Board was “insufficient to satisfy the requirements” of § 10(e) of the NLRA); Burkhart v. WMATA, 112 F.3d 1207, 1215 (D.C.Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). In any event, Bartholdi’s challenge to the
holding that a district courts ruling may be upheld on an alternative ground supported by the record holding that the court of appeals erred in granting habeas corpus when it only addressed one of the state courts alternative grounds for rejecting a brady claim noting that the ground it addressed was introduced by the state court with the word moreover confirming that it was an alternative basis for its decision holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its ruling whether to proceed with a declaratory judgment action holding an issue not preserved when one ground is raised to the trial court and another ground is raised on appeal holding that district courts discussion of an alternative ground for its decision did not undermine its ruling that appellants claim was untimely raised