to the plaintiff. “A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); see also Roy v. City of Augusta, Maine, 712 F.2d 1517, 1522 (1st Cir.1983). IV. ANALYSIS A plaintiff cannot bring an unlawful discrimination action in federal court under Mass. Gen. L. ch. 151B unless she has first filed a compl nistrative charge will survive if it “is reasonably within the scope of an agency investigation of [the] administrative charge.” Lattimore, 99 F.3d at 464. This scope-of-the-investigation rule “reflects the idea that the scope of a civil action is not de 4-75 (D.Mass.1998) (<HOLDING>). On the other hand, the rule precludes a
holding that a plaintiff could not add civil claim based upon different facts that are separate and distinct both qualitatively and temporally  and relate to the conduct of different individuals from facts in administrative charge holding sexual harassment claim was not like or related to retaliation allegations and therefore was outside the scope of the administrative charge holding that plaintiff who filed administrative charge for racial harassment and discrimination could add claim for retaliation because some of the same facts supported both types of claims holding that discrimination and retaliation claims are considered distinct types of claims that must be raised independently if the retaliation occurred prior to the filing of the administrative charge holding defense applicable to both types of claims