of a fresh start); Bodily v. Morris (In re Morris), 193 B.R. 949, 952-53 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1996) (recognizing that benefits of a "fresh start" to debtor are not always immediately obvious, holding that time of trial provides more accurate analysis of parties' circumstances); Becker v. Becker (In re Becker), 185 B.R. 567, 570 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1995) (stating that the relevant time of inquiry is “the time of the bankruptcy,” but looking at economic changes post petition); but see Taylor v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 191 B.R. 760, 765 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1996) (noting split of authority); Carroll v. Carroll (In re Carroll), 187 B.R. 197, 200 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1995) (stating that the relevant time of inquiry is the filing of bankruptcy); Hill v. Hill (In re Hill), 184 B.R. 750, 754 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1995) (<HOLDING>). 13 . The Dressier plaintiff had already paid
holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act holding that the relevant time of inquiry is the date of the filing of the complaint holding that the relevant time is the time of the employment decision holding that where the violation of the fdcpa was the filing of a lawsuit the statule of limitations begins to run on the date of filing holding that the date of death is relevant date of inquiry for the applicability of section 541a5a