requirement of NRCP 55 is not implicated. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order denying Durango’s motion to set aside the judgment. Douglas, J., concurs. 1 See Britz v. Consolidated Casinos Corp., 87 Nev. 441, 447, 488 P.2d 911, 915 (1971) (“A point not urged in the trial court, unless it goes to the jurisdiction of that court, is deemed to have been waived and will not be considered on appeal.”). 2 Christy v. Carlisle, 94 Nev. 651, 654, 584 P.2d 687, 689 (1978). 3 See Young v. Johnny Ribeiro Building, 106 Nev. 88, 92, 787 P.2d 111, 119 (1990) (cautioning litigants and attorneys that district courts have inherent equitable powers, not specifically proscribed by statute, to dismiss an action for litigation abuses). 4 Kahn v. Orme, 108 Nev. 510, 513, 835 P.2d 790, 792 (1992) (<HOLDING>). 5 NRCP 60(b)(1). 6 Lowrance v. Lowrance, 87
holding that the trial court grants or denies motions for summary judgment on the basis of what is contained in the motions for summary judgment and the responses thereto holding that district courts discretion is extremely broad recognizing that trial court has broad discretion in ruling on admissibility of evidence and party claiming abuse of that discretion bears a heavy burden holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its ruling whether to proceed with a declaratory judgment action recognizing that the district court is afforded broad discretion in ruling on motions for relief from judgment