itself have been established through procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees.” Id. at 249, 119 S.Ct. 1215. Huber argues that this language forbids the use of a prior conviction unless the conviction was the result of a jury verdict. This argument misapprehends the rationale behind the prior-conviction exception. Apprendi and Blakely set limits on judicial factfinding. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-04, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (“[T]he ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant”) (em 80 (App.2005) (upholding sentencing enhancement based on prior misdemeanor conviction); Goldsberry v. State, 821 N.E.2d 447, 461 (Ind.App.2005) (<HOLDING>). We recognize that some courts and
holding that we cannot properly receive and consider evidence that was not presented to and considered by the trial court holding that trial judge did not err in refusing to transfer to another judge defendants motion for substitution of judge for cause where defendants motion lacked specificity holding that trial judge properly considered defendants misdemeanor convictions holding when defendant waived objection to introduction of evidence but evidentiary hearing granted and judge considered claim defendants waiver was effectively waived by judge holding that trial judge did not err in refusing to transfer to another judge defendants motion for substitution of judge for cause where defendants motion was not made in good faith