somehow displaces our original jurisdiction under the constitution, given that no such jurisdiction has been invoked. Winward's other constitutional arguments ask us to strike down the PCRA's time bar under a range of other constitutional provisions, including article 1, section 9 (excessive bail and cruel punishments); article I, section 11 (open courts); article V, section 1 (distribution of powers); article VIII, section 4 (supreme court rulemaking power); and article VIII, section 5 (right of appeal). Even assuming that such arguments are properly before us, they nonetheless fail. A time bar for post-conviction relief simply does not implicate any of these provisions. A statute that prescribes time limits for invocation of a judicial remedy cannot possibly amount to cruel punishm ) (<HOLDING>). 13 . See also Passanisi v. Dir., Nev.
holding that a writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to review the weight of evidence  holding that a writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to review the weight of evidence   holding that managing conservator while in texas to seek return of child by writ of habeas corpus may not be served with civil process and is subject to jurisdiction of court in which habeas corpus is pending and only for purpose of prosecuting writ of habeas corpus holding that threeyear statute of limitations was not an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus holding that petitioner could not challenge his conviction on the grounds that the indictment failed to charge an essential element of the crime through a writ of habeas corpus