terms, which does not include former employees. This interpretation is supported by neither Amara, see 131 S.Ct. at 1879-82 (identifying three alternative — not interdependent — equitable avenues for obtaining monetary compensation for misleading disclosures), nor equity, see Baltzer v. Raleigh & Augusta Air-Line R. Co., 115 U.S. 634, 645, 6 S.Ct. 216, 29 L.Ed. 505 (1885) (“[I]t is well settled that equity would reform the contract, and enforce it, as reformed, if the mistake or fraud were shown”); Hogg v. Maxwell, 218 F. 356, 358 (2d Cir.1914) (observing that if court of equity granted relief of contract reformation, it could “go on and do complete justice by awarding damages for the breach”); see also Johnson v. Meriter Health Servs. Emp. Ret. Plan, 702 F.3d 364, 369 (7th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). As to the contention that Osberg cannot
holding that retirement benefits are accrued benefits under erisa holding that employer was acting as erisa fiduciary when it misled employees regarding security of their benefits holding that an employees claim for wrongful discharge based on the employers desire to avoid contributing to or paying benefits under the employees pension fund is preempted by erisa even though the claims are asserted under tort theories not erisa and seek damages only in the form of lost wages mental anguish and punitive damages not benefits under the plan holding that it is not necessary to ascertain whether a plan is tax qualified but only that it is covered by erisa holding that erisa authorizes former employees to sue for unpaid benefits whether under the plan as it is or as it should be once reformed