although the exclusion of attorney’s fees from a statute usually would not allow an award of attorney’s fees, under the “lemon law” a different conclusion was intended). As a result of the approach taken by the drafters of the Uniform Act, most jurisdictions interpreting it have found the language of AR.S. § 12-1514 permits the award of attorney’s fees incurred in confirmation proceedings despite the absence of any language expressly authorizing attorney’s fees. See, e.g., Anchorage Medical & Surgical Clinic v. James, 555 P.2d 1320, 1324 (Aaska 1976); County of Clark v. Blanchard Constr. Co., 98 Nev. 488, 492, 653 P.2d 1217, 1220 (1982); Wachtel v. Shoney’s, Inc., 830 S.W.2d 905 (Tenn.Ct.App.1991). But see Floors, Inc. v. B.G. Danis, Inc., 380 Mass. 91, 100, 401 N.E.2d 839, 844 (1980) (<HOLDING>). The Nevada Supreme Court, referring to the
holding that salaries of management and personnel are recoverable as indirect costs associated with general operation of response action holding that lexis fees are not taxable as costs but reserving ruling on whether such fees are recoverable as attorneys fees holding attorneys fees not generally recoverable unless party prevails under cause of action for which attorneys fees are recoverable and damages are recovered holding that fees associated with obtaining and confirming the arbitration award are not recoverable holding that fees are not recoverable for work for which the client could not be charged