treated for his mental disease in order to meet the Rees standard. He pointed out, however, that Delusional Disorder “is one of the most difficult and intractable mental disorders to treat.” In our view, the State’s concession and Dr. Martell’s findings have little, if any, bearing on the issues presented in this direct appeal. While the defendant has raised the issue of his competence to stand trial, a current finding of incompetence would not affect our analysis. See Black, 815 S.W.2d at 174 (“ ‘[A] competency hearing is a very narrow inquiry aimed at determining whether one who is charged with a criminal offense is presently competent to stand trial.’ ” (quoting State v. Stacy, 556 S.W.2d 552, 553 (Tenn.Crim.App.1977))); cf. Berndt v. State, 783 S.W.2d 119, 122 (Tenn.Crim.App.1987) (<HOLDING>). Further, Dr. Martell opined during the
holding in a case considering whether the trial court should have conducted a competency hearing sua sponte that an appellate court may only consider those facts which were before the court when the trial commenced holding that a trial court must conduct sua sponte a competency hearing when the information known to the trial court at the time of the trial or plea is sufficient to raise a bona fide doubt regarding the defendants competence holding that the failure to charge an essential element of a crime in the indictment is an error which should be noted by an appellate court sua sponte as plain error holding that in the absence of a government crossappeal an appellate court may not sua sponte correct a district court error if the correction would be to the defendants detriment holding that appellate court may only review issues actually presented to and considered by the trial court