to similarly modify A.R.S. § 25-553. ¶ 23 The continuing three-year limitation on the collection of spousal maintenance arrearages is consistent with the accounting and notice factors recognized in Hayden, 210 Ariz. at 526-27, ¶ 17, 115 P.3d at 120-21. Additionally, allowing a protracted period for recovery of arrearages is contrary to the policy underpinning spousal maintenance, namely, to encourage and assist a spouse’s independence within a limited timeframe. See Schroeder v. Schroeder, 161 Ariz. 316, 321, 778 P.2d 1212, 1217 (1989) (explaining the purpose of spousal maintenance “is to achieve independence for both parties and to require an effort toward independence by the party requesting maintenance”); Rainwater v. Rainwater, 177 Ariz. 500, 503-04, 869 P.2d 176, 179-80 (App.1993) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, nothing in A.R.S. § 25-553(C)
holding that public policy favors the exclusion of intentional acts as contained in the mjua policy holding that duration of spousal maintenance award is measured by the duration of the period of incapacity and survives the death of the obligor recognizing that texas public policy favors charitable gifts holding that a trial court has broad discretion to modify a spousal maintenance award recognizing that public policy favors limiting the duration of spousal maintenance to encourage a transition toward independence