documents from the offender tracking system, which he speculates would confirm a pre-grievance visit to Fenoglio in March. Palmer gives us no reason to believe that Fenoglio possesses these documents or that they show which medical personnel an inmate sees. But in any case the district court ordered Fenoglio to produce “medical records.” Given the district court’s broad discretion to determine whether a party has complied with discovery orders, see Melendez v. Illinois. Bell Tel. Co., 79 F.3d 661, 670-71 (7th Cir.1996), the court did not err in concluding that Fenoglio complied with the order. If Palmer wanted more expansive records to prove exhaustion, the time to seek them was before the hearing, not after. See Kalis v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 231 F.3d 1049, 1057 (7th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Palmer’s post-hearing affidavit, in
holding that it was within the trial courts discretion to refuse any additional discovery and that the courts refusal to allow additional discovery was not an abuse of discretion holding that district court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion to extend discovery where no effort was made to explain why the requested discovery could not have taken place within the original discovery period holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law recognizing trial courts decision on discovery issues implies a finding that requested discovery was not reasonably available holding that district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing jurisdictional discovery where the plaintiffs state only that they believe discovery will enable them to demonstrate sufficient california business contacts to establish the courts personal jurisdiction