his bank account. The IJ was not obligated to credit these explanations, particularly given that the Government attorney had asked whether Li had sought—not received— permission to return to China. Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (explaining that the agency is not required to credit an explanation that is merely plausible or possible). Nor was the IJ obligated to credit Li’s alternative explanation that his filial duty to his father overcame his fear of returning to China. As the IJ observed, Li’s attempt to return to China undercut his professed subjective fear of persecution. In that respect, Li’s inconsistent testimony went to the heart of his claim. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 446 F.3d 289, 295 (2d Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>). Li’s false statement supports the agency’s
holding that material alterations in the applicants account of persecution are sufficient to support an adverse credibility finding holding that an adverse credibility determination must be supported by a true inconsistency holding that history of dishonesty can support an adverse credibility finding holding that a single inconsistency concerning the nature of the applicants mistreatment  afforded substantial evidence to support the adverse credibility finding holding that a material inconsistency in an aspect of the applicants story that served as an example of the very persecution from which he sought asylum affords substantial evidence to support the adverse credibility finding internal quotations omitted