of Section 15. There is no reason to believe that the Board, in exercising its discretion under Section 15, could not only protect the citizens of the Commonwealth, but also recognize when licensees may be rehabilitated and so able to continue working in their chosen profession without harm to the public. Because we conclude that, even after applying the general rules of statutory construction, the language in question remains ambiguous, the Board’s arguments that we do not need to apply Section 1928(b) and the rule of lenity are unpersuasive. Moreover, in several of the opinions the Board cites, the courts held that the plain language of the statute reflected the General Assembly’s intent and, thus, did not apply any principles of statutory construction. Whalen, 32 A.3d at 680-84 (<HOLDING>); Harmer, 83 A.3d at 299-300 (holding that the
recognizing that under california law violating section 23140 is equivalent to driving a vehicle while under the influence of drugs or alcohol in violation of the california vehicle code holding that criminal defendant was not entitled to a jury trial on the issue of restitution under the oregon vehicle code holding that after making an arrest of the driver of a vehicle the police may search the passenger compartment of the vehicle holding that an indictment that is substantially in the language of the code is sufficient inform and substance holding that the plain language of the statutory language associated with the ignition interlock requirements set forth in section 3805 of the vehicle code 75 pa cs  3805 mandated such a device for an individual who accepts accelerated rehabilitative disposition for driving under the influence dui after a prior offense because that acceptance is an acknowledgement that the individual violated section 3802 of the vehicle code 75 pa cs  3802 prohibiting dui all that is required under the plain language of section 3805 of the vehicle code 75 pa cs  3805