with notice of their placement on the Registry, violated DSS regulations, that alone does not give rise to a substantive due process violation. As noted above, violations of state law or regulations do not, themselves, amount to infringements of substantive due process interests. Rather, the Plaintiffs must either show that a recognized liberty interest was implicated here or that Agent Gingras’s actions shocked the conscience. The scant ease law that exists on this subject indicates that no protected liberty interest was implicated by Neil and Heidi’s placement on the Registry, particularly given the absence of any allegation that Neil and Heidi’s placement on that list imposed a tangible injury, other than stigma, upon them. See Hodge v. Jones, 31 F.3d 157, 164-165 (4th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Glasford v. New York State Dep’t of Soc.
holding that no constitutional interest was implicated by the placement of plaintiffs on registry of abusers even though abuse had been officially ruled out because the placement did not tangibly affect their rights to family integrity or privacy but only resulted in a reputational injury holding that rookerfeldman does not apply when the plaintiffs injury rests not on the state court judgment itself but rather on the alleged violation of his constitutional rights by the defendant holding that placement in disciplinary segregation does not implicate a liberty interest because it falls within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a sentence holding that if trial courts verdict was based on hearsay statements of victim admitted in violation of the confrontation clause the error clearly would not only affect substantial rights but would seriously affect the fairness and integrity of the proceedings holding that a plain error did not seriously affect the fairness integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings even though the error was assumed to have affected substantial rights