substantial factor in bringing about injury,” without which the harm would not have occurred. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d at 477, Cause in fact is not shown if the defendant’s negligence did no more than furnish a condition which made the injury possible. See Bell v. Campbell, 434 S.W.2d 117, 120 (Tex.1968). Instead, the evidence must go further and “show that such negligence was the proximate, and not the remote, cause of resulting injuries .... [and] justify the conclusion that such injury was the natural and probable result thereof.” Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d at 477 (quoting Carey v. Pure Distrib. Corp., 133 Tex. 31, 124 S.W.2d 847, 849 (Tex.1939)); see also Boyd v. Fuel Distribs., Inc., 795 S.W.2d 266, 272 (Tex.App.-Austin 1990, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). “In other words, even if the injury would not
holding that convenience stores sale of beer to eighteenyearold was not cause in fact of drunk drivers fatal car accident because sale was to passenger and not to driver holding that a motion to strike was improper where defendant assisted a drunk minor in his negligence by driving the drunk minor to his car holding in the analogous context of choiceoflaw in relation to the sale of personal property that compensation for arranging the sale is assessed apart from underlying sale holding that the cause of action accrued on the date of sale holding a driver had standing to suppress the drugs found in the underwear of the drivers passenger during an unreasonably prolonged roadside stop of both driver and passenger