in killing Paguada was to avoid arrest. Although Robertson testified at the penalty phase of the trial that Pa-guada saw him clearly after he shot Najar-ro, he denied killing Paguada to prevent her from identifying him. As this Court stated in Hansbrough v. State, 509 So.2d 1081, 1086 (Fla.1986), “[t]he mere fact that the victim might have been able to identify her assailant is not sufficient to support finding this factor.” The facts indicate that Robertson shot Paguada instinctively and without a plan to eliminate her as a witness. The State failed to show any other facts that would establish that Robertson’s dominant motive was to eliminate Pa-guada as a witness. See Lightbourne v. State, 438 So.2d 380 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051, 104 S.Ct. 1330, 79 L.Ed.2d 725 (1984) (<HOLDING>); see also Young v. State, 579 So.2d 721, 724
holding that evidence the defendant knew the victim supported a finding that the murder was committed to avoid arrest holding that before a defendant is entitled to introduce evidence of the victims character for violence there must be sufficient evidence to support a finding that the victim was the first aggressor and that once the defendant testified that he was attacked and cut by the victim without provocation before using the victims utility tool to stab the victim the defendant was clearly entitled to question the victim about past acts of violence reflected in court documents from the state of oregon holding that uncharged sexual acts committed upon the same victim are admissible to show the conduct of the defendant toward the victim and to corroborate the evidence of the offense charged in the indictment holding that evidence the victim tried to keep defendant from fleeing the scene of a crime and defendant killed victim in order to escape supported the finding that murder was committed to avoid arrest holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record