112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992). When, as in this instance, the statutory language is unambiguous and the result required by the text is not chimerical, the proper province of the court is to enforce the statute according to its tenor. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6, 120 S.Ct. 1942, 147 L.Ed.2d 1 (2000); Lopez-Soto v. Hawayek, 175 F.3d 170, 172 (1st Cir.1999). That ends the matter. Here, the statute of conviction, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 23, specifically terms the crime of conviction “[r]ape.” Under the explicit language of the INA, all rape — including statutory rape — comes within the aggravated felony taxonomy. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A); see also Mattis v. Reno, 212 F.3d 31, 34-35 (1st Cir.2000) (superseded on other grounds) (<HOLDING>). It follows inexorably that the petitioner’s
holding that statutory rape  is an aggravated felony under ina  101a43a holding that conviction under  2702a3 or 4 is an aggravated felony under  101a43f holding that fourthdegree aggravated assault is a violent felony holding that conduct designated as a felony under state law but as only a misdemeanor under the controlled substances act does not qualify as an aggravated felony holding that drug felony under state law can constitute an aggravated felony for federal sentencing guidelines purposes even if the same conduct would not constitute a felony under federal law