agreement, Furesz voluntarily waived the right to file any appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 except “to appeal the sentencing court’s determination of the criminal history category” or to challenge the imposition of a sentence outside the Guidelines range. App. at 47. Furesz, however, argues that the District Court’s sentence was substantively unreasonable because it was “based on a criminal history category that vastly overstated the seriousness of Mr. Furesz’s record.” Appellant’s Reply Br. at 2. This argument is not a challenge to the District Court’s determination of Furesz’s criminal history category, but to the Court’s failure to grant his motion for a downward variance. It is therefore barred by his plea agreement. Cf. United States v. Williams, 510 F.3d, 416, 425-26 (3d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). For the reasons set forth, we will affirm the
holding that request for departure in sentencing based on a criminal history category that overstated defendants record violated plea agreement that prohibited departure requests but did not stipulate to a specific criminal history category holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing an upward variance after finding that the defendants criminal history category of i understated the seriousness of his criminal history holding a district courts failure to specifically mention each intermediate criminal history category was not dispositive where its findings were adequate to explain the departure holding that when a defendant qualifies as a career felon it is not necessary to ascertain the defendants criminal history category because the sentencing guidelines mandate a criminal history category of vi holding a court may consider a defendants criminal history even if that history is included in the defendants criminal history category