that he [or she] is awaiting transfer from one facility to another is of no consequence to the operation of the [IAD].” Id. at 444. Relying on Felix v. United States, 508 A.2d 101, 106 (D.C.1986), the Court of Criminal Appeals held that “once a person has been convicted, sentenced, and has begun serving that sentence in the sending jurisdiction, that person’s status is distinguishable for purposes of invoking the [IAD’s] protections from that of a pretrial detainee.” Lock, 839 S.W.2d at 444. The court reasoned that given the remedial nature of the IAD, the classification of the facility in which the prisoner is confined should not control the IAD’s application. See id. A number of courts have reached a similar conclusion. See United States v. Dobson, 585 F.2d 55, 58-59 (3d Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Small, 209 F.Supp.2d 1114,
holding that   3584a allows the district judge to specify the sequence of service of terms of imprisonment only when sentences are imposed at the same time or the other sentence is an undischarged term of imprisonment to which the defendant is already subject  holding that the court of criminal appeals has jurisdiction to review fines under the criminal sentencing reform act of 1982 because sentence is a broad term which encompasses a fine probation a term of imprisonment or any other form of punishment imposed by the court holding that a term of imprisonment begins at the time a prisoner is sentenced holding that the natural meaning of the phrase serving a term of imprisonment denotes no more or less than that definable period of time during which a prisoner must be confined in order to complete or satisfy the prison term or sentence which has been ordered recognizing that the term solicit denotes more than simple contact it consists of an attempt to obtain something by persuasion or to ask for the purpose of receiving