with the use of the automobile as an ambulance and thus allowed coverage. We agree with Hisaw that, under the broad interpretation required by our supreme court, there was a causal connection between Struthers’s use of the van and Hisaw’s injuries. But for Struthers’s use and operation of the van in such a manner as to drive it off the road, Hisaw would not have responded to the accident, undertaken his official duties, and ultimately received his injuries. Further, the fact that his injuries were inflicted by the underinsured vehicle itself takes this case out of the realm of those decisions in which the vehicle was the mere situs of an injury that could just as easily have occurred elsewhere. See, e.g., Carter v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 10 Ark. App. 16, 660 S.W.2d 952 (1983) (<HOLDING>). In light of the foregoing, we reverse the
holding that the govemment is not liable under the federal tort claims act for injuries to service members where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to military service holding that the sensible and popular understanding of what a motor vehicle accident entails necessarily involves the motor vehicle being operated as a motor vehicle  holding that victims injuries did not arise out of the use of a motor vehicle when the victim received injuries from a gun fired in the vehicle holding that the wcabs decision that an employees motor vehicle accident did not cause his injuries precluded a subsequent tort action on the same issue holding that the united states is immune from monetary damages for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service