thus appealable, see Jenkins v. United States, 548 A.2d 102, 107 (D.C.1988), we are satisfied that the motions to dismiss in the trial court cannot reasonably be interpreted as petitions for such a writ. At no point did appellants request their release, the relief for which the writ is intended. See Bennett v. Ridley, 633 A.2d 824, 826 (D.C.1993) (noting the “grand purpose” of a writ of habeas corpus is “protection of individuals against erosion of their right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their liberty”). Further, appellants did not raise the theory that their motions should be treated as petitions for habeas corpus before the trial court for its considered review, so we are unable to consider this claim on appeal. See Dorm v. United States, 559 A.2d 1317, 1318 (D.C.1989) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, because appellants have not
holding that a defendant must present to the trial court all the issues to be raised or else forego their consideration later by this court holding that issues not raised before the trial court cannot be raised on appeal holding that issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised for the first time before this court holding that issues must be raised and ruled upon in the trial court to be preserved for appellate review holding that issues not raised in the trial court may not be raised later on appeal