counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to secure additional expért testimony regarding those impairments is not an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying federal habeas relief on Wesbrook’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. B. We now turn to consider Wesbrook’s claim that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by the State’s use of an undercover informant to obtain incriminating statements while he was incarcerated and represented by counsel. “The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused, at least after the initiation of formal charges, the right to rely on counsel as a ‘medium’ between him and the State.” Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (<HOLDING>). “[I]ncriminating statements pertaining to
holding that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the sixth amendment right to counsel holding that states use of informant to obtain incriminating evidence from defendant about pending charges violated defendants sixth amendment right to counsel notwithstanding that state was also investigating other charges as to which the sixth amendment right to counsel had not attached holding that the sixth amendment right to counsel embodies the right to effective assistance of counsel recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel and the right to waive counsel holding that a criminal defendant has a sixth amendment right to counsel at trial