must rely on to evaluate purpose. Govt. Mem. in, Opp’n at 42-43 (“[C]ourts may not ‘look behind the exercise of [Executive] discretion’ taken ‘on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason.’ ”). Only a few weeks ago, the Ninth Circuit commanded otherwise: “It is well established that evidence of purpose beyond the face of the challenged law may be considered in evaluating Establishment and Equal Protection Clause claims.” Washington, 847 F.3d at 1167-68 (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993) (“Official action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality.”); Larson, 456 U.S. at 254-55, 102 S.Ct. 1673 (<HOLDING>); and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro.
holding that substantive criminal statute could not be applied retrospectively because there was nothing  in the language or the legislative history that was a clear and unequivocal expression of legislative intent to rebut presumption of prospective application only holding no violation of federal establishment clause holding that minority tolling statute did not apply to extend time provided under corporate survival statute holding that a facially neutral statute violated the establishment clause in light of legislative history demonstrating an intent to apply regulations only to minority religions holding that we are to apply the legislative intent underlying a statute and to construe the statute in such a way as to prevent absurdity