message as the exclusive subject matter of the speech,” Hurley eliminated the “particularized message” aspect of the Spence-Johnson test. Id. at 569-70, 115 S.Ct. 2338. The Hurley Court had no need to formulate a new test, however, because — unlike conduct that is not normally communicative — parades are inherently expressive. Id. at 568, 115 S.Ct. 2338 (“Parades are thus a form of expression, not just motion, and the inherent expressiveness of marching to make a point explains our cases involving protest marches.”). Thus Hurley left open how courts should evaluate symbolic speech claims. Before Hurley, we treated the Spence-Johnson factors as prerequisites for conduct to be deemed expressive. See Steirer by Steirer v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 987 F.2d 989, 995, 997 (3d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). But after Hurley, our decision in Troster v.
holding that raising chickens is not an expressive act for the purposes of the first amendment holding that participating in community service is not expressive conduct holding that students action wearing black armbands was expressive conduct entitled to first amendment protection holding that government has more latitude in restricting expressive conduct than in curtailing pure speech holding that service is not avoided by service on a partys attorney as service on an attorney is ineffective unless he has been authorized to accept such service