violation by someone acting under color of state law, then the plaintiff has a cause of action under Section 1983, regardless of Title VII's concurrent application.” Starrett v. Wadley, 876 F.2d 808, 814 (10th Cir.1989). 6 . "In the equal protection context ... in light of the abhorrent history of race-based classifi cations, facial racial classifications carry a presumption of bad faith and automatically trigger strict scrutiny regardless of evidence of intent.” Gonzalez-Rivera, 22 F.3d at 1450; see also Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 546, 119 S.Ct. 1545, 143 L.Ed.2d 731 (1999) ("all laws that classify citizens on the basis of race ... are constitutionally suspect and must be strictly scrutinized”); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Thigpen v. Bibb County, 223 F.3d 1231,
holding that turner did not cast doubt on the courts previous holding that strict scrutiny applies to racial classifications in prisons holding that strict scrutiny applies to a prior restraint enforcing a contentbased restriction on speech in a traditional public forum holding that some form of heightened constitutional scrutiny applies recognizing that strict scrutiny applies to facial discrimination against a suspect class holding that strict scrutiny applies