from property of the estate when it filed the instant contested claim — an act not in violation of the automatic stay. Therefore, § 362(c)(2)(C) is applicable in this case at bar, the automatic stay was no longer in effect, and the NPL is not void. On November 28, 1990, the Debtor consented to the denial of his discharge. All of these action taken by IDOR were taken to perfect an interest in property of the Debtor. All these actions occurred in 1991. Accordingly, pursuant to the plain meaning of the statutory language contained in § 362(c)(2)(C), the automatic stay was not in effect as to the Debtor and any post-petition property of the Debtor when these actions were taken. See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 1030-31, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the NPL is not void because the
holding that court of appeals erred in relying on the plain meaning of a statute when the legislative history clearly indicated another meaning holding that the clear and unambiguous words of an insurance contract should be given their plain and ordinary meaning holding that a statute should where possible be construed according to its plain meaning and as a whole giving meaning to all its parts holding that plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive recognizing that plain meaning does not control where context shows that the parties have assigned an unusual meaning to a term