unlawfully, serve only violent purposes.” See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C, Amend. 674 (2004). 9 . Although we may depart from the categorical approach and look behind a state conviction in federal sentencing to a limited extent in the situation where the judgment of conviction and the statute are ambiguous, Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 1258, 1263, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005), the government has not explained either why the relevant statutes are ambiguous, or how such a review would produce a different result. Indeed, as Davila-Rodriguez contends, his charging documents for his Article 7 conviction are not relevant because he originally was charged with committing an Article 8 violation. See United States v. Spell, 44 F.3d 936, 940 (11th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, because the statutes are not
holding it is fundamental error to convict a defendant of crime not charged and which is not a lesser included offense of the charged crime holding that a district court may not rely on a charging document without first establishing that the crime charged was the same crime for which the defendant was convicted holding that counsel did not admit the defendant was guilty of a crime when counsel noted that if the evidence established the commission of any crime that crime was voluntary manslaughter not murder holding that once the statute is found to be divisible the court must look to the charging papers and judgment of conviction to determine if the actual crime of which defendant was convicted was a crime of violence but emphasizing that the court is not to examine the particular facts underlying the conviction holding that there was no jurisdictional defect when the language of the charging document tracked the statutory language even though the facts proffered at the plea hearing were insufficient to establish that the defendant committed the crime