being evidence of incompetence, is the hallmark of effective appellate advocacy.” Commonwealth v. Robinson, 581 Pa. 154, 864 A.2d 460, 479 n. 28 (2004) (quoting Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 536, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986)). Accord Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 746, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983) (“experienced advocates since time beyond memory emphasized the importance of winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on one central issue if possible, or at most on a few key issues.”). Finally, Appellant has failed to satisfy his burden of establishing a reasonable probability that the outcome of his appeal would have been different had appellate counsel pursued the issues he currently proffers. Commonwealth v. Blakeney, - Pa. -, 108 A.3d 739, 750 (2014) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to
holding that to establish stricklandpierce prejudice in the appellate representation context the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the direct appeal proceeding would have been different but for counsels deficient performance holding that ineffective assistance of counsel occurs when there is deficient performance and prejudice which is a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different holding that to establish prejudice there must be a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different holding that in order to show prejudice defendant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different holding that to show prejudice in a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors the result of the proceeding would have been different