sergeants. 2 . This court has reviewed the consent decree on three occasions. See Massachusetts Ass’n of Afro-American Police, Inc. v. Boston Police Dep’t, 973 F.2d 18 (1st Cir.1992) (dismissing Federa.tion's 1991 challenge to the decree); Stuart v. Roache, 951 F.2d 446 (1st Cir.1991) (rejecting reverse-discrimination challenge to decree); Massachusetts Ass’n of Afro-American Police, Inc. v. Boston Police Dep’t, 780 F.2d 5 (1st Cir.1985) (rejecting Federation’s motion to intervene). 3 . Defendants do not argue the defense of qualified immunity, a defense supported by Evans’s reliance on the court's contemporaneous construction of the decree — even if'that construction turned out to be, as we now hold, wrong. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (<HOLDING>). We would scarcely expect a reasonable
holding that reasonable person would have known based on ros relatively contemporaneous communications about what evidence was missing in order to substantiate claim holding that immunity extends to actions that do not violate norms of which a reasonable person would have known holding that the public policy considerations supporting public officials immunity required that the immunity be applied to bar contribution actions as well as direct actions holding that a plaintiff seeking to establish inducement to infringe must show that the alleged infringers actions induced infringing acts and that he knew or should have known his actions would induce actual infringements holding that a person is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave