of the particular prospective juror, thereby protecting their identities and privacy. 34 . Courts have rejected defendants’ arguments that the exclusion of felons or those charged with a felony violates the fair cross-section requirement or equal protection. See, e.g., United States v. Barry, 71 F.3d 1269, 1274 (7th Cir.1995) (“Even were the prima facie case made, we would find ... that the governmental interest in juror probity outweighs a defendant's interest in having a jury which could include someone accused of a felony.”); United States v. Arce, 997 F.2d 1123, 1127 (5th Cir.1993) (“We have no trouble concluding that § 1865(b)(5) is constitutional. The constitutionality of § 1865(b) is subject to rational basis review.”); United States v. Greene, 995 F.2d 793, 798 (8th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Foxworth, 599 F.2d 1, 4 (1st
holding that exclusionary rule only requires exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights and that exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of statutory rights is not necessarily required holding exclusion was harmless error holding exclusion was not ambiguous holding that even if defendant established prima facie fair cross section violation based on the exclusion of persons charged with  but not convicted of  felonies exclusion was permissible based on the significant governmental interest in having jurors who can be relied upon to perform their duties conscientiously and in accordance with the law holding second sentence of a nearly identical exclusion did not limit the scope of the exclusion