parte nature of the Florida custody decree, we hold that the allegations do not support such a conclusion. Section 9-201 of the UCCJA provides definitions for many of the terms used throughout the rest of the subtitle, including ones for “custody determination,” “custody proceeding,” and “decree or custody decree.” Id. § 9-201. Yet within these definitions and other subsections, there is no express indication as to whether the UCCJA is intended to apply to temporary custody proceedings or determinations. In the absence of an express provision, courts have been left to consider this issue as it arises. At least three courts that have directly addressed the issue have concluded that the UCCJA does apply to temporary orders. See Me Bride v. McBride, 688 So.2d 856, 859 (Ala.Civ.App.1997) (<HOLDING>); Kaiser v. McClendon, 230 Kan. 472, 639 P.2d
holding that mandamus is an appropriate remedy because the trial courts issuance of temporary orders is not subject to interlocutory appeal holding that the 1999 version of the sorp like the 1997 version is nonpunitive in both intent and effect holding that alabamas version of the uccja applies to temporary custody orders holding that mandamus is appropriate to challenge temporary orders holding that mandamus is appropriate to challenge temporary orders because they are not subject to interlocutory appeal