658 F.3d at 252. Petitioners also fail to specifically challenge the agency’s permissible rejection of Piao’s explanations — that she had unsuccessfully asked her mother for a statement and did not think to ask her father, although he could have provided one from South Korea. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254(b)(4); cf. Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005) (stating that agency need not accept an applicant’s explanation unless a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to do so). In addition, as the government correctly notes, Petitioners failed to exhaust their argument that Piao was prevented from adequately explaining the absence of her medical records because the IJ failed to sufficiently develop the record. See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 124 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Petitioners do not explain what new facts
recognizing that issue exhaustion is a mandatory although not jurisdictional requirement holding that this time requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different holding that exhaustion of issues is jurisdictional holding that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional