as a mitigating circumstance that warranted a downward departure under the Sentencing Guidelines. See Floyd’s Br. at 1. In particular, he argues that the Court did not recognize the “unique psychological aspects” of his case (as reported in a psychological evaluation he obtained) when it opted not to sentence him below the recommended Guidelines range. See id. at 9; see also App. 10-23. This assertion of error does not constitute an unusual circumstance sufficient to give rise to a miscarriage of justice. See United States v. Price, 558 F.3d 270, 283-84 (3d Cir.2009) (determining that enforcement of an appellate waiver did not result in a miscarriage of justice where the Government refused to request an applicable point reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(b)); Jackson, 523 F.3d at 244 (<HOLDING>). III. Floyd knowingly and voluntarily agreed
holding that it is not an appellate courts function to make findings of fact holding that a failure to file an appeal is within the scope of the waiver because the failure does not undermine the validity of the plea or waiver holding that the failure to object to an instruction constitutes a waiver of error recognizing that an effective waiver is not an absolute bar to appellate review holding that an alleged failure of the district court to reduce a sentence did not work a miscarriage of justice sufficient to make an appellate waiver unenforceable