“Such actions do not reflect the kind of considered judgment ‘grounded in social, economic, and political policy’” that the discretionary function exception shields “from ‘judicial “second guessing.”’” Id. (quoting Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814, 104 S.Ct. 2755). The same must be said with respect to SSgt. Raventos’ alleged negligence. It simply goes too far to hold that his decisions to hoist the obstacle’s plank ont tionary function exception applies “is not whether there is any discretion at all, but whether the discretion is grounded in the policy of the regulatory regime,” the proper analysis looks to “whether the decision is fraught with economic, political, or social judgments.” Cope v. Scott, 45 F.3d 445, 449-50 (D.C.Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (<HOLDING>); see also Boyd v. United States, 881 F.2d 895,
holding that an agent acting outside his delegated authority is not protected by the discretionary function exception holding that the discretionary function exception may apply in the absence of a conscious decision  recognizing a discretionary function exception to that waiver holding that asserted failure to post adequate warning signs along commuter road not shielded by discretionary function exception holding asserted negligence in failure to provide adequate lighting or warning in federally controlled parking lot not shielded by discretionary function exception