and that the error affected his substantial rights. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770. Even if Shorter can satisfy these requirements, correction of the error remains within our discretion, which we “should not exercise ... unless the error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’ ” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985)). Here, Shorter has failed to show even that the district court erred. The indictment against Shorter Shorter was “found” guilty of Counts Eight and Nine, it further states that he was “adjudged” guilty of Counts “Eight and Nine (merged for sentencing purposes).” J.A. 329. And, the judgment makes clear that no s (6th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). We note that the result here is not
holding that duplicative  922g convictions should have been merged for sentencing purposes recognizing that the district court could merge duplicative convictions after the jury verdicts are recorded holding that under byrd kidnaping and sexualabuse convictions do not merge recognizing that sanctions are collateral to the merits of the case and may be considered even after the merits are no longer before the district court holding that the plain error and harmless error standards of review merge in the ease of jury instructions because the duty to properly instruct the jury lies with the trial court