a hearing. See Apolskis v. Concord Life Ins. Co., 445 F.2d 31, 34 n. 1 (7th Cir.1971) (stating that “[cjredibility determinations are the province of the district judge” but that “a trial judge may not totally disregard uncontradicted and apparently creditable testimony where no basis for so doing appears in the record”). In the instant case, Petitioner’s statement was not so inherently incredible as to warrant out-right rejection. The Chief Adjudicator stated summarily that “[Petitioner’s] statement is not credible and no independent documentation in support of her statement was submitted,” adopting “the expedient of technically accepting the offered proof but summarily rejecting its weight or credibility.” Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Morton Foods, Inc., 316 F.2d 298, 301 (10th Cir.1963) (<HOLDING>); cf. Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158, 1170 (9th
holding that the right to choose counsel cannot be manipulated so as to obstruct the orderly procedure in the courts or to interfere with the fair administration of justice holding that publicity serves to guarantee the fairness of trials and to bring to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the administration of justice holding that the extension of judicial immunity to witnesses attorneys and parties  was regarded by us as necessary to the proper administration of justice holding that the time of discovery of fraud is not a proper matter for summary judgment holding that the summary rejection of a witness as noncredible is prejudicial and the proper administration of justice requires more