of “no just reason for delay.” For this reason, its attempt to finalize Tyrone’s claim for appeal under Rule 2-602(b) was ineffective. Waters v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 328 Md. 700, 707-08, 616 A.2d 884 (1992); Town of Port Deposit v. Petetit, 113 Md.App. 401, 409, 688 A.2d 54 (1997). It was not until November 6, 1998, when the order granting an increase in child support was docketed, that an order constituting a final, appealable judgment was entered. Thus, the present appeal was noted prematurely, and the thirty-day period in which to note an appeal from the November 6, 1998 final judgment has expired. As we shall explain below, Rule 8-602(e) nevertheless enables us to assume jurisdiction over the appeal. Cf. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 112 Md.App. 390, 424-26, 685 A.2d 817 (1996)(<HOLDING>). Rule 8-602(e), entitled “Entry of judgment
holding that an issue was not properly before the court on appeal because the trial court did not have the opportunity to make any findings of fact regarding it holding that a subsequent action was not barred because the initial court did not have jurisdiction over the claim holding that since district court of appeal properly found that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on a 3850 motion during the pendency of a direct appeal the district court of appeal should have vacated the order rather than affirming on the merits holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal after an untimely filing of a notice of appeal holding that that court did not have jurisdiction over appeal pursuant to rule 8602e where appellant noted appeal prematurely because the trial court erroneously ordered a final judgment when it did not have such discretion under rule 2602