issue — one that does not implicate federal statutory rights — we need only engage in the first two steps , Local Union No. 89 v. Riss & Co., 372 U.S. 517, 519, 83 S.Ct. 789, 791, 9 L.Ed.2d 918 (1963)). See also Wasyl, Inc. v. First Boston Corp., 813 F.2d 1579, 1580-82 (9th Cir.1987) (finding an enforceable agreement to arbitrate when the parties had simply agreed that certain disputed issues “shall be established by three independent appraisers”); Butler Products Co. v. Unistrut Corp., 367 F.2d 733, 734-36 (7th Cir.1966) (treating as an arbitration clause contract language providing that “the items in dispute shall be submitted for determination to the firm of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.”); Mencher v. B. & S. Abeles & Kahn, 274 A.D. 585, 84 N.Y.S.2d 718, 721 (1st Dep’t 1948) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, it is not dispositive that the
holding that binding review by a designated third party is arbitration even if not denominated as such in the contract holding that an action to compel arbitration accrues only when the respondent unequivocally refuses to arbitrate either by failing to comply with an arbitration demand or by otherwise unambiguously manifesting an intention not to arbitrate the subject matter of the dispute holding that arbitration award is binding on the parties holding that the terms arbitration or arbitrate need not be used as long as binding review by a third party is clearly the intention of the parties holding that purpose of stay pending arbitration is twofold it relieves the party entitled to arbitrate of the burden of continuing to litigate the issue while the arbitration process is ongoing and it entitles that party to proceed immediately to arbitration without the delay that would be occasioned by an appeal of the district courts order to arbitrate