is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”) The District Court also did not err in denying Day’s due process claim to the extent that Day claimed that his classification deprived him of liberty without due process. Day did not have a liberty interest in the degree of his confinement. See Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976) (“As long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.”); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (<HOLDING>). The District Court also did not err in
holding that inmates protected liberty interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the due process clause of its own force nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life holding that liberty interests that are protected by procedural due process are generally limited to freedom from restraint holding that a statecreated liberty interest in ones classification may exist where classification imposes atypical and significant hardship holding that liberty interests implicating the due process clause are generally limited to freedom from restraint which  imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life holding that administrative punishment does not implicate a liberty interest protected by the fifth amendment unless the punishment imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life quoting sandin v conner 515 us 472 484 115 sct 2293 132 led2d 418 1995