before her husband’s injury manifested itself. Id. at 1272. Affirming the constitutionality of the statute, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Jones still had a legal remedy because she was able to pursue her claims against other defendants. See id.; see also Gomez, 246 S.W.3d at 314; Wilson, 864 N.E.2d at 695. The court noted that Jones had sued her s merely regulate the remedy are not within constitutional prohibition against retrospective laws); Villiers v. Republic Fin. Servs., Inc., 602 S.W.2d 566, 572 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (noting that generally, statutes concerning remedies are to be applied to actions tried after their passage even though action arose beforehand); Sergeant Enters., Inc. v. Strayhorn, 112 S.W.3d 241, 250 (Tex.App.-Austin 2003, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); see 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 267
holding that expenditures on architectural planning do not create vested right recognizing that remedial statutes may be applied to pending cases because they usually do not affect vested right holding that the clayton acts provisions on injunctive relief applied to pending cases holding a defendant is not vested with a right to be absent from trial recognizing that cases have generally treated statutory exceptions from remedial statutes as affirmative defenses