demonstrated a reasonable possibility that she would be singled out individually for persecution based on her practice of religion after her return to China.” (Id.) Because a petitioner may prove an objective fear of future persecution by demonstrating a pattern or practice of persecution or that she will be singled out for persecution, it was necessary that the BIA’s determination as to both prongs be supported by substantial evidence. However, it appears that the BIA based its decision concerning whether Wu would be singled out for persecution on its mistaken reading of the IJ’s opinion. While we do apply the harmless error doctrine in immigration proceedings, we cannot say that that the BIA’s error in this case was harmless. See Yuan v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 420, 427 (3d Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). We will thus vacate the BIA’s final order of
holding cumulative error not reversible if it is more probably harmless than not holding that bia error is harmless when it is highly probable that error did not affect cases outcome holding that sentencing error is harmless if the error did not affect the district courts selection of the sentence imposed holding that an error is harmless where it is highly probably that the error did not affect the outcome of the case holding that noneonstitutional errors in civil suits are harmless only if it is highly probable that the errors did not affect the outcome of the case