then the Court will give effect to the statute as written and will refrain from adding or deleting language to reflect an intent not evidenced in that language. Moore v. Miley, 372 Md. 663, 677, 814 A.2d 557, 566 (2003). Hence, we examine the CPA’s language to determine whether the Legislature intended for the CPA to apply to the activities of the State. Appellants argue that the CPA applies to the State’s conduct because the CPA broadly applies to all sales of services primarily for personal, household, or family purposes, and thus includes the collect call telephone charges accepted by Appellants. This argument fails because, while the CPA applies broadly to the kinds of sales it governs, the statute also describes the actors to whom it applies and 78 A.2d 1326, 1330 (1977) (<HOLDING>); Harden v. Mass Transit Admin., 277 Md. 399,
holding that federal courts are bound by state interpretations of state law holding that when applying state law a federal court is bound to follow the highest court in the state holding that the legislature did not intend the state to be bound by local zoning regulations when constructing a communications tower because the legislature neither named the state nor manifested an intention that it be bound by the provisions of the enabling act which granted zoning authority to the city holding federal courts are bound by state court determinations of state law holding that because no clear implication could be derived from the language of the statute that the state should be bound by the local zoning ordinances the state was not bound