violated his substantive due process rights. In so doing, Ahmed has incorrectly “presuppose[d] ... [that he has] a constitutionally protected right to actual discretionary relief from removal or to be eligible for such discretionary relief....” Manzano-Garcia, 413 F.3d at 471. This circuit has repeatedly held that discretionary relief from removal, including an application for an adjustment of status, is not a liberty or property right that requires due process protection. See, e.g., Assaad v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 471, 475 (5th Cir.2004) (stating, in a removal context, that due process claims revolving around an alleged failure to receive discretionary relief are not based upon a constitutionally protected liberty interest); Mireles-Valdez v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 213, 219 (5th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). In keeping with the well-established
holding that aliens lack of a protected liberty or property interest in the relief he sought  a discretionary waiver of deportation  was a circumstance fatal to his due process claim holding that civil commitment for any purpose constitutes significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection recognizing that a parents liberty interest in the custody of a child is subject to due process protection holding that eligibility for discretionary relief from a removal order is not a liberty or property interest warranting due process protection recognizing that it is well established that where a state provides a discretionary parole regime prisoners do not have a liberty or property interest in parole