he provided after December 31, 2005, and more importantly, he gives us no reason to question the District Court’s finding that “he had already become aware that [he] was not going to receive what he believed he was entitled to” prior to that date. App. 10. In fact, Steudtner had already tendered his resignation in October 2005. Steudtner argues that his contract claims were timely by virtue of the “continuing violation” doctrine because Duane Reade continued refusing to promote him and pay him what he supposedly deserved up until his departure in 2006 (and to the present day, for that matter). But the mere fact that the repudiation of a contract has continuing effect does not trigger the continuing violation doctrine. See Selkirk v. State, 249 A.D.2d 818, 671 N.Y.S.2d 824, 825 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the District Court did not err
holding that the doctrine may only be predicated on continuing unlawful acts and not on the continuing effects of earlier unlawful conduct holding that title vii does not include a continuing violation doctrine holding that negligence may be predicated on the foreseeable acts of third persons holding that because original interception was not unlawful subsequent use by prosecutor could not be found unlawful holding that because a  1326 violation constitutes a continuing offense venue may lie in any district in which the continuing conduct occurred