to support a trial court’s choice of sanction. See Hummer v. Pulley, Watson, King & Lischer, P.A., 140 N.C. App. 270, 285, 536 S.E.2d 349, 358 (2000) (reversing sanction of $2,500.00 imposed as compensation for an increase in attorney’s malpractice insurance deductible when the order contained no finding that he had purchased such insurance and the evidence did not support a finding that the increase was due to the pending suit); Davis, 121 N.C. App. at 160, 464 S.E.2d at 711 (reversing and remanding for additional findings when “there is nothing in the order to explain the appropriateness of the sanction imposed ($6,692 in attorney’s fees) or to indicate how the court arrived at that figure”); Rivenbark v. Southmark Corp., 93 N.C. App. 414, 420-21, 378 S.E.2d 196, 200-01 (1989) (<HOLDING>). While the same findings of fact may not be
holding that no single factor controls and that all factors must be weighed in light of fundamental fairness and the circumstances of the case holding that where no discovery order was violated sanctions could not imposed pursuant to rule 37 but nevertheless upholding the sanction order under the courts inherent power recognizing that an order of restitution  is available as a freestanding sanction to be imposed alone or in combination with other sanctions holding that sanctions may not be imposed mechanically but rather the circumstances of each case must be carefully weighed so that the sanction properly takes into account the severity of the partys disobedience holding that the suspension or revocation of a drivers license is not a sanction which once imposed precludes the application of criminal sanctions