broad trustee authority to determine the content of the rules they promulgate. The document provides no reason for finding any significant difference between 1) determining content through promulgating new rules, and 2) determining content by interpreting old ones. Hence, consistent with our discussion above, we interpret the document’s explicit, and broad, power to create “rules” governing “conditions of eligibility” as carrying with it a similarly broad implied power to interpret those rules. And, the existence of such a delegated power seems to be what Firestone had in mind when it called for “evidence” of a grant of discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 111, 109 S.Ct. at 954; cf. Curtis v. Noel, 877 F.2d 159, 161 (1st Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); Jett v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama,
holding that plan language giving plan administrator power to determine which employees are eligible to participate in the plan and providing all parties dealing with the plan an interpretation of plan provisions on request indicates deferential standard of review of trustee eligibility decisions holding that professionals who advised the plan were not fiduciaries because they had no decision making authority over the plan or plan assets also noting that the power to act for the plan is essential to status as a fiduciary holding that plan administrator of an erisa health plan did not have to anticipate the confusion of a plan participant holding that plan fiduciary is entitled to deferential review if empowered by the plan to construe its terms in order to determine benefit eligibility holding that a payment is under the plan when the debt is provided for in the plan