the State’s appeal of a criminal matter. The State is only permitted to appeal where the right is explicitly conferred by statute and where no double jeopardy can result. Id. at 315. Because the double jeopardy issue goes to the jurisdiction of the court, it is properly raised sua sponte even though it is not raised by the parties. State v. Reed, 770 S.W.2d 517, 519 (Mo.App.1989). It has been held that in a jury trial jeopardy attaches when the jury is impaneled and sworn. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 95 S.Ct. 1055, 43 L.Ed.2d 265 (1975). However, the conclusion that jeopardy has attached begins, rather than ends, the inquiry as to whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial. See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 467, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 1072, 35 L.Ed.2d 425, 433 (1973) (<HOLDING>). In United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82,
holding that since the mistrial met the manifest necessity requirement of our cases  the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment  did not bar retrial under a valid indictment holding that where defense counsel made a timely objection and it was overruled by the trial court a further request for a mistrial was unnecessary and futile since the reasons for the objection were apparent and the trial courts denial of the objection indicated its belief the jury could properly hear the matter which was the subject of the objection holding that if defendant moved for or consented to mistrial retrial of defendant was not barred on double jeopardy grounds holding that the granting of a mistrial due to a defect in the wording of the indictment did not prevent retrial even though the mistrial was declared after the jury was impaneled and sworn and over the objection of defendant holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted