appeal, and was not intended to apply later in the course of the proceeding. Chandler, 145 F.3d at 1358-59. This reasoning is consistent with the holding in eases where courts have decided whether appellate fees may be assessed for appeals pending on the effective date of the PLRA. For example, in Abdul-Wadood v. Nathan, 91 F.3d 1023, 1025 (7th Cir.1996), the court held that it could not dismiss two remaining appeals as ftivolous because appellant had used up his allotted “three strikes” during the pendency of those appeals. The court concluded that “[s]ection 1915(g) governs bringing new actions or filing new appeals — the events that trigger an obligation to pay a docket fee — rather than the disposition of existing cases.” See also Thurman v. Gramley, 97 F.3d 185, 188 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>), Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th
holding that the dispositive events for purposes of the new fee obligations under  1915b1 are the bringing of a civil action and the filing of an appeal once these milestones have passed fees do not attach to later activities holding that the filing of an opening brief within the time period for filing a notice of appeal could constitute notice of appeal holding that attorneys fees for the preparation of the fee application are compensable holding that it was unfairly prejudicial and an error to adjudicate a motion for attorney fees filed after the deadline for filing a notice of appeal had passed holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal after an untimely filing of a notice of appeal