immediately dismiss the case. In re Calloway, 70 B.R. 175 (Bankr.N.D.Ind.1986); In re Jones, 112 B.R. 770 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1990); In re Anderson, 94 B.R. 153 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1988); In re Busick, 719 F.2d 922, 926, n. 7 (7th Cir.1983) (stating in dicta that, “[wjere we to reach the issue, we might well be inclined ... to characterize the defect in the original joint involuntary petition as jurisdictional rather than as an ‘insubstantial procedural defect’. ...”). Other courts faded with the prospect of an aberrant joint involuntary petition have allowed the defect to be procedurally remedied and have either skirted the jurisdictional issue or boldly declared that the court does indeed retain subject matter jurisdiction to allow the cure of the defect. In re Allen, 896 F.2d 416 (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); In re Benny, 842 F.2d 1147 (9th Cir.1988),
holding that the relevant time of inquiry is the date of the filing of the complaint holding pursuant to bankruptcy rule 7004b9 that because the creditor mailed the complaint and summons to the debtors attorney and to the address listed in the debtors bankruptcy petition service of process was sufficient even if the debtors were out of the country and did not actually receive notice of the complaint and summons holding that utility customers mailing of a petition did not constitute the filing of the petition as filing was not effectuated until the petition was received by the clerk holding under a prior immigration statute that rule 26c did not enlarge the period for filing a petition for review of the bias decision because rule 26c refers to service while the time for filing under the statute at issue commenced upon the date of the issuance of the final deportation order holding that the submission of a defective involuntary joint petition corrected to include only one debtors name at the time of filing and prior to the issuance of the summons was a filing against only one debtor and consequently valid