and could “only be dismissed for just cause,” id. § 62e. The Act establishing the Planning Board contains no general provision granting the Governor authority to direct its operations — its decisions are made through majority vote of the Planning Board members. Id. § 62i. SGCP develops no argument that the Governor has authority to direct the operations of either the Planning Board or ARPE. SGCP also does not claim that if the Governor had such authority, it could be used to direct ARPE to violate Puerto Rico law in suspending SGCP’s permits. It is clear that the Governor lacks authority under Puerto Rico law to alter or exceed the authority conferred by duly enacted statutes. See, e.g., Díaz de Llovet v. Office of the Governor, 12 P.R.Offic.Trans. 941, 112 D.P.R. 747 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, it would be illogical for a
holding that the governor had no power to make the appointment of officer of the school commissioner for cecil county without the consent of the senate when the office was not vacant because the legislature which had created and therefore controlled the office had not delegated that power to the governor holding that legislation governing classification of employees in the governors office did not confer certain authority on the governor and lacking this power the governor could not change the legislative will through a set of regulations holding that a states governor and attorney general were not proper defendants when they had no power to enforce the challenged statute holding that the governor erred in considering evidence that was not before the board holding that the governor did not have to obtain the consent of the senate for the appointment of a candidate when the first candidate had been rejected by the senate the senate was not in session at the time that the second candidate was appointed and because the legislature which created and therefore controlled the office did not require by statute that the governor seek the senates approval in those circumstances