of subsection 42-4-201(4) prevented it from making factual findings, or, at the very least, colored those findings, I would remand for reconsideration of the facts under the interpretation of subsection 42-4-201(4) articulated in this opinion. I therefore respectfully dissent. I am authorized to state that JUSTICE RICE and JUSTICE COATS join in this dissent. 1 . The majority does not specifically address the trial court's conclusion that the stop was pretex-tual, a conclusion based on the fact that Officer Gray had been told to develop an independent basis to stop the defendant's vehicle. If Officer Gray had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant for an obstructed view, it would not matter what his subjective motivations were. See People v. Thompson, 793 P.2d 1173 (Colo.1990)
holding that the objective standard for determining probable cause obviates the need to analyze the officers subjective motivation holding that an officers subjective reason for making an arrest need not include the criminal offense that later establishes probable cause holding that the courts determination of whether an officer had probable cause for an arrest is an independent and objective determination and an officers own subjective reason for the arrest is irrelevant holding that the subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause holding by failing to raise it to the district court the government waived its argument the subjective intent of the officers was irrelevant for establishing probable cause