Tex. 360, 190 S.W.2d 709, 712 (1945). Appellees further allege that a valid takings claim requires that the governmental entity act pursuant to its eminent domain powers and that the DPS officials and the justice of the peace were acting “under color of right” granted by article 47.01a rather than exercising their eminent domain powers. But this is not a valid challenge to a takings claim. See Steele, 603 S.W.2d at 789; VSC, 242 S.W.3d at 592-93; Tex. Workforce Comm’n v. MidFirst Bank, 40 S.W.3d 690, 697 (Tex.App.-Austin 2001, pet. denied). Indeed, it would negate the validity of inverse condemnation claims based on regulatory actions (rather than actual physical takings), which have long been permissible in Texas. See, e.g., Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 933 (Tex.1998) (<HOLDING>), cert, denied, 526 U.S. 1144, 119 S.Ct. 2018,
holding that zoning ordinance can effect a regulatory taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner all economically viable use of his land holding that a zoning regulation which deprives property of all economically beneficial or productive use is a categorical regulatory taking holding that a regulation prohibiting a landowner from building houses on his beachfront property denied him all economically viable use of his land and therefore was a taking requiring compensation recognizing categorical taking when regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land holding city ordinance preempted by state law because ordinance prohibited act specifically allowed under state law