of a statement or evidence on the jury,” and a defendant “must show that his substantial rights are prejudicially affected. This occurs when there is a reasonable probability that, but for the remarks, the outcome of the trial would have been different.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “The mere utterance of the word jail, prison, or arrest does not, without regard to context or circumstances, constitute reversible error per se.” Id. With respect to Jasmin’s statement that Miller “had just got out of jail the day before,” the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Miller’s motion for a mistrial. The record reveals that the statement, when made, was volunteered by Jasmin and not expected by the prosecutor. See United States v. Veteto, 701 F.2d 136, 139-40 (11th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). It does appear that the prosecutor attempted
holding that a mistrial was not warranted because the statement that the defendant had been in prison before was volunteered unexpected and added nothing to the governments case holding that because the record in the case had not been developed sufficiently to determine whether a childs statement was admissible under the tender years exception a new trial was warranted holding that the objection had been sufficiently timely when the defense waited until the governments rebuttal to object to a statement made during the governments closing statement holding that a mistrial was not required after a police officer testified that he had once chased the defendant after the defendant had fired a gun where the testimony was a logical response to the prosecutors questions the statement was not made maliciously the evidence against the defendant was great and the jury was instructed to disregard the testimony holding that the court correctly denied a mistrial when the statement that the witness saw the defendant when the defendant was signing in as a condition of bail was brief and added nothing to the governments case