risks. Here, Scheuring alleges that the boat was subject to sea swells, wind waves, vessel wakes and tidal currents. He further alleges that the barge fleeted on her anchor lines on a daily basis. And, most importantly, on at least three occasions, the plaintiff was aboard the barge as it was unmoored and moved by a tugboat. The plaintiff contends that during those movements, he performed duties that could be characterized as “sea-based” duties, such as handling lines, weighing and dropping anchors, standing lookout, monitoring the marine band radio and splicing wire and rope. These claims show the existence of a factual dispute whether the plaintiffs employment was land-based or sea-based. See Sw. Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni 502 U.S. 81, 84, 92, 112 S.Ct. 486, 116 L.Ed.2d 405 (1991) (<HOLDING>). The district court incorrectly described the
holding that summary judgment on plaintiffs res ipsa loquitur theory was precluded both because there existed genuine issues of material fact as to the cause of the accident and whether or not one of the defendants had exclusive control over the instrumentality of the accident holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether plaintiff who was approaching a car to enter it as a passenger was occupying a motor vehicle holding that summary judgment was improper where genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether prison officials prevented inmate from filing grievances holding that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the contractor where genuine issues of material fact existed regarding a duty to an injured construction worker holding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to the plaintiffs seaman status where the plaintiff rode on floating platforms as they were towed into place occasionally served as a lookout and gave maneuvering signals to the tugboat operator and received lines passed to the platforms by the ships crews to secure the platforms