even if the employee’s disclosure is later found unprotected, so long as the retaliation was taken in response to the disclosure. Here, Messrs. Burton and Kaufman concede knowledge of Ms. Montgomery’s allegations, but neither concedes the legitimacy of her allegations. Messrs. Burton and Kaufman did not perceive Ms. Montgomery as a whistleblower; rather they perceived her allegations as frivolous at best and dishonest at worst. Because her allegations were frivolous, it would be unreasonable for OIG to perceive her as a whistleblower and retaliate against her. Accordingly, absent specific evidence that OIG retaliated against Ms. Montgomery for her frivolous allegations, the perceived whistleblower doctrine does not apply. See Special Counsel v. Spears, 75 M.S.P.R. 639, 654-55 (1997) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s order
holding misrepresentation must at least be partial cause of plaintiffs injury holding there must at least be a distinct possibility that a viable fca action could be filed holding that the employee must at least provide his employer with enough information for the employer to be put on notice that the fmla is a consideration holding that a party must at least have a subjective belief that litigation was a real possibility and that belief must have been objectively reasonable holding that the alleged disclosure must at least be reasonable for the perceived whistleblower doctrine to apply