independently of the CBA,” not whether it arises solely out of statute. Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1059 (“If the right exists solely as a result of the CBA, then the claim is preempted, and our analysis ends there.”). A claim is not preempted just because it is based on a state statute that refers to rights included in a CBA. For example, in Liradas, the Supreme Court concluded that LMRA § 301 did not preempt a claim challenging an employer’s failure to promptly pay wages at the time of severance. 512 U.S. at 125, 114 S.Ct. 2068. The court recognized that the employee’s right to be paid arose from the CBA, but because the employee contested the failure to pay severance wages promptly, and the right to prompt payment was afforded only by the state statute, the claim was not preempted. Id. (<HOLDING>). Our recent decision in Kobold supports
holding that the flsa does not prohibit changes in wage rates it prohibits the payment of overtime at less than one and onehalf times the regular wage rate holding that the factual questions underly ing the tort of retaliatory discharge for filing a workers compensation claim including whether the employer had a nonretaliatory reason for the discharge would not required a court to interpret any term of a collectivebargaining agreement and would not turn on the meaning of any provision of a collectivebargaining agreement holding the right at issue arose out of state law because bjeyond the simple need to refer to bargainedfor wage rates in computing the penalty the collectivebargaining agreement was irrelevant to the dispute holding that the need to refer to wage rate in the cba to calculate damages did not preempt a state rule governing the timing of severance pay holding illinois wage law only applied where at least some work was performed within the state