argument that “unusual circumstances” warranted a departure from the rule. We now turn to our reasons for abrogating Coulter. At issue is Coulters holding that [i]n the absence of unusual circumstances, the hours allowed for preparing and litigating the attorney fee case should not exceed 3% of the hours in the main case when the issue is submitted on the papers without a trial and should not exceed 5% of the hours in the main case when a trial is necessary. Coulter, 805 F.2d at 151. Pla the right to revisit this question, see Collard v. Kentucky Board of Nursing, 896 F.2d 179, 183 (6th Cir. 1990). This is true even in the unusual situation where binding circuit precedent overlooked earlier Supreme Court authority. Ballinger v. Prelesnik, 709 F.3d 558, 561-62 (6th Cir. 2013) (<HOLDING>); see also Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex
holding that the rule for habeas review in brown v smith 551 f3d 424 6th cir 2008 had been called into doubt by harrington v richter 562 us 86 131 sct 770 178 led2d 624 2011 even though robinson v howes 663 f3d 819 823 n2 6th cir 2011 which was decided after harrington applied brown holding that we are bound to follow almendareztorres v united states 523 us 224 118 sct 1219 140 led2d 350 1998 even though it has been called into question unless it is explicitly overruled by the supreme court holding that ylsts look through doctrine survives harrington v richter  us  131 sct 770 178 led2d 624 2011 holding that  an award of makewhole relief in the form of surcharge was within the scope of appropriate equitable relief for purposes of  502a3 quoting cigna corp v amara  us  131 sct 1866 1880 179 led2d 843 2011 holding government had not met its burden allowing it to invoke the brown v ohio 432 us 161 97 sct 2221 53 led2d 187 1977 exception