mobile devices. Plaintiff maintains that these agreements also allow Maryland subscribers of U.S. telecoms to send infringing text messages internationally through the use of the foreign Defendants’ networks. Courts in Maryland have interpreted subsection (b)(2) as relating only to contract actions, and, as it appears to the Court, this subsection is inapplicable to this case. McLaughlin v. Copeland, 435 F.Supp. 513, 529 (D.Md.1977) (stating that “[sjubsection (b)(2), by its terms, relates only to contract actions”). This action, although it may be tangentially related to an agreement between the parties, is nonetheless an infringement suit, which is out side the purview of subsection (b)(2). United Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc. v. David & Dash, Inc., 439 F.Supp. 1078, 1082-83 (D.Md.1977) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, jurisdiction under subsection
holding that a patent infringement action is essentially a tort holding that the economic loss rule does not preclude independent tort claims that fall outside the scope of a breach of contract holding that even though plaintiffs claim was barred by the cgia because it sounded in tort attorney fees were not appropriate where it was a contract claim that was pleaded and thus a contract claim that was dismissed holding that a consent judgment is essentially a contract holding that a suit for infringement of federal copyright and unfair competition which the court acknowledged was essentially a tort action was outside the scope of subsection b2 even though it related to a contract