are deemed removable because they were convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude. See INA § 242(a)(2)(C) [8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) ] (precluding jurisdiction where alien is removable pursuant to § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii)). In addition, we lack jurisdiction to review purely discretionary decisions, see INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii) [8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) ], such as the “manner in which the BIA balanced the various positive and negative factors which typically inform the exercise of its discretion under” INA § 240A. Cruz-Camey v. Gonzales, 504 F.3d 28, 29 (1st Cir.2007). Despite these jurisdiction-stripping provisions, we may review “constitutional claims and questions of law presented in petitions for review of fin scretion. See Paredes v. Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 196, 198-99 (3d Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, we will grant the
holding that all convictions remain valid for immigration purposes holding that the oneyear statute of limitations was not tolled during the pendency of petition for certiorari to the united states supreme court seeking review of denial of state postconviction relief holding pendency of postconviction judicial proceedings relevant to immunity determination holding that regulations that permitted an immigration official to reinstate removal orders violated the immigration and nationality act holding that the pendency of postconviction motion does not negate the finality of convictions for immigration removal purposes