the United States nor the District of Columbia may be held liable based on the MVSRA in this case. IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, the Court shall GRANT Defendant United States’ [13] Motion to Dismiss and GRANT Defendant District of Columbia’s [6] Motion for Summary Judgment. The United States and the District of Columbia shall be dismissed from further proceedings in this case. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 1 . Sullivan individually filed an Answer to Sheppard’s Complaint on March 6, 2009. 2 . All parties agree that the law of the District of Columbia, the situs of the accident and the alleged negligence, governs Sheppard’s claims against the United States and the District of Columbia. Cf. Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 697, 711 (D.C.Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Although Sheppard repeatedly remarks that
holding that employees defamatory statements made at work about matters relating to work were within the scope of their employment for purposes of respondeat superior and recognizing that californias respondeat superior doctrine imposes a broad rule of liability on employers holding that the inquiry into whether an employee was acting within the scope of his employment depends on the respondeat superior law of the state in which the tort occurred recognizing respondeat superior liability holding that issues of fact precluded summary judgment on the question of whether an employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment for purposes of insurance coverage when the employee was simply sitting in his vehicle in his employers parking lot waiting for the business to open at the time the accident occurred holding that the doctrine of respondeat superior in maryland allows an employer to be held vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of its employee when that employee was acting within the scope of the employment relationship citations omitted