theoretical underpinnings of the Act, we can discern why retroactive application is not only counter-intuitive, but legally improper. Landgraf again provides the analytical framework. Landgraf identified three examples of laws which generally do not have retroactive effect: (1) those which authorize or affect the propriety of prospective relief; (2) those which confer or oust jurisdiction and (3) those which make changes to procedural rules. 511 U.S. at 273-75, 114 S.Ct. at 1501-02. Legislation which operates in futuro by definition generally does not have retroactive implications. The classic example' is injunctive relief which proscribes present and fu ture conduct. See, e.g., American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 42 S.Ct. 72, 66 L.Ed. 189 (1921) (<HOLDING>). However, habeas corpus relief involves
holding that rule 11 applied to a letter sent with the intent to influence the court with respect to injunctive relief holding that a court may award injunctive relief against a state officer holding that the tucker act does not provide independent jurisdiction over claims for injunctive relief in contractual dispute cases holding that tillman applied to cases then pending on direct appeal ie in the pipeline holding that the clayton acts provisions on injunctive relief applied to pending cases