25 U.S.C. § 81. In addition, I would allow the plaintiffs to pursue their claim that the defendants have violated the Indian Traders Licensing Act, 25 U.S.C. § 264, by virtue of their having standing under § 201. Sections 201 and 264 existed within the same title (Title XVIII of the Revised Statutes) of the federal statutes as early as 1834, and since that time both have been recodified under Title 25 of the United States Code. The historical linkage between these two sections suffices to establish that a penalty imposed under § 264 may be recovered in a suit brought pursuant to § 201, though the case law from other circuits indicates that plaintiffs’ potential recovery may be limited. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hornell v. One 1976 Chevrolet, 585 F.2d 978, 981 (10th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). The most difficult issue raised in this case,
holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance holding that a proceeding under section 547 is a core proceeding holding that a litigant has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute if the law is unconstitutional as applied to that particular litigant holding that arbitration is not a civil action as that term is used in section 76873 florida statutes 1991 holding that a forfeiture of merchandise under  264 is not a penalty as that term is used in  201 and thus cannot be recovered by a qui tam litigant proceeding under that section