.the pendent appeal involved a separate cause of action from the one giving rise to the appealable order, rather than an ancillary matter; the appeal-able order was itself interlocutory, suggesting a greater threat to orderly procedure when the appeals court broadly intervened before the district court had an opportunity to render a final judgment on any of the claims in the case; and the court of appeals complicated the appeal by bringing in “pendent parties,” i.e., parties who were not involved in the appealable order but were parties to the pendent order. Review of the attorney’s fees order is certainly within our Article III power. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725, 86 S.Ct. at 1138; Chicago, Rock Isl. & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574, 578, 74 S.Ct. 290, 293-94, 98 L.Ed. 317 (1954) (<HOLDING>). Also, unlike the extra-statutory exercise of
holding that the court had jurisdiction to hear the suit under the citizen suit provision of the caa holding that although the filing of suit and service of citation interrupt the running of the statute its dismissal for want of prosecution will have the same effect as if the suit had never been filed holding circuit court reviewing the dismissal of one suit had jurisdiction to review denial of a remand motion in a separate suit arising from same set of events holding that reviewing court may consider trial evidence in reviewing denial of motion to suppress holding that a prior suit and a subsequent suit between the same parties did not involve the same claim because the evidence necessary to sustain the subsequent suit was insufficient to entitle the plaintiff to relief in the prior suit