— which we discuss below — “also selves to establish that the final rule was not arbitrary and capricious.” 204 F.3d at 235. 10 . See also Animal Legal Def. Fund, 204 F.3d at 235 ("[W]e accord agencies broad deference in choosing the level of generality at which to articulate rules.”); Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. Prof'l Fire Fighters Ass'n v. United States, 959 F.2d 297, 300 (D.C.Cir.1992) (“[JJudicial deference is at its highest in reviewing an agency's choice among competing policy considerations, including the 186, 197 (D.C.Cir. 1993) ("The requirement that agency action not be arbitrary or capricious includes a requirement that the agency ... respond to 'relevant' and ‘significant’ public comments.” (citation omitted)). 14 . Compare General Motors, 363 F.3d at 448 (<HOLDING>), and General Elec., 290 F.3d at 382 (holding,
holding that the court has no authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of an action to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action holding that chevron deference is due only when the agency acts pursuant to delegated authority and the agency action has the force of law holding that the ultimate focus of the inquiry into whether this court has jurisdiction under rcra is whether the agency action partakes of the fundamental characteristic of a regulation ie that it has the force of law quoting molycorp 197 f3d at 545 internal quotation mark omitted holding that there is nothing for a court to review when an agency has never issued a final and binding judgment that has the force of law recognizing that this court has rejected the notion that the agency must expressly parse or refute on the record each individual argument or piece of evidence offered by the petitioner internal quotation marks omitted