the questioning; and the use of physical punishment.” Id. at 278 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978)). The District Court’s finding of voluntary consent was not clearly erroneous. Although the police did not inform Martinez of his constitutional right to refuse consent, the subject’s “knowledge of a right to refuse is not a prerequisite of a voluntary consent.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 234, 93 S.Ct. 2041. The finding that Martinez’s consent was voluntary was not clearly erroneous in light of the police officer’s brief encounter, calm demeanor, and lack of repeated questioning, as well as Martinez’s immediate consent to the search and his prior experience as a police officer in the Dominican Republic. See Price, 558 F.3d at 279-80 (<HOLDING>). IV. For the reasons set forth above, we will
holding that defendants consent to search his person while on board an interstate bus was voluntary even though the police did not tell the defendant of his right to refuse consent holding under state constitution that validity of consent search requires knowledge of right to refuse consent holding that warrantless search of defendants vehicle was legal because defendants consent was voluntary even through he was in police custody at the time of giving consent holding district courts finding of voluntary consent not clearly erroneous when police encounter lacked drawn weapons threats or prolonged questioning and consent was given without reluctance or hesitation even though police did not advise defendant of right to refuse consent holding that persons knowledge of his right to refuse a consent to search is a factor but not a necessary prerequisite to demonstrating a voluntary consent