dog despite knowing that Chester had inappropriately attacked people in the past. Davis's argument here essentially describes his negli-genee claim. Davis cites no authority, and there appears to be none, suggesting that when a police officer performs his duties in a negligent manner, the officer is no longer "enforcing a law." To exempt negligent acts from immunity under the Act, the explicit purpose of which is to shield government entities from liability for losses resulting from the performance of various governmental functions, would render the act largely meaningless. It is, after all, the Tort Claims Act. Indeed, police officers may be immune when their conduct is intentionally tortious, see City of Anderson v. Weatherford, 714 N.E.2d 181, 186 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trans. denied (<HOLDING>), and even when it is "egregious" and
holding that act did not bar intentional infliction of emotional distress claim holding that police officers were immune from liability for damages resulting from alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress recognizing validity of cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress holding that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from a claim for emotional distress damages under the employment discrimination statute