did.” Trial Tr. Vol. II at 142. On direct appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) acknowledged that these incidents “did, tangentially, reveal [petitioner’s] pre-arrest silence and lack of cooperation.” Carter v. State, No. F 99-1293, at 4 (Okla.Crim.App. Jan. 4, 2001). However, the OCCA concluded that, in any event, “because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming, any relationship between these comments and [petitioner’s] right to remain silent was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)). The magistrate judge took a similar view in this habeas, proceeding. Noting that this circuit had extended the rule of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (<HOLDING>), and Miranda v., Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.
holding fifth amendment prohibits comment on accuseds testimonial silence holding fifth amendment prohibits comment on accuseds silence during police custodial interrogation holding that the fifth amendment in its direct application to the federal government and in its bearing on the states by reason of the fourteenth amendment forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accuseds silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt holding that the fifth amendment  forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accuseds silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt holding that it is improper for prosecutor to comment on accuseds postarrest silence