Rainer’s Rule 37 petition on ground one, which was an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and thus that was the claim before the Arkansas Supreme Court on appeal. Although Rain-er acknowledges in his Reply on this appeal, his “ineffective assistance and due process claims are separate but intertwined,” Reply 1, Rainer faults the Arkansas Supreme Court for considering this intertwined argument as it was presented on appeal. Whether or not Rainer maintained a due process claim entirely independent of his ineffective assistance claim, Rainer did not rebut the presumption that the Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision adjudicated his due process claim on the merits, and the decision is therefore entitled to deference. See § 2254(d)-(e); Nash v. Russell, 807 F.3d 892, 897 (8th Cir. 2015) (<HOLDING>). We further hold that the district court,
recognizing the rock solid basis for such a deferential standard of review holding that the intent to discriminate under batson is a pure issue of fact subject to review under a deferential standard holding that the standard of review for an award of statutory damages is even more deferential than an abuse of discretion standard recognizing that the interaction of general constitutional rules governing pretrial identification procedures and the deferential standard of habeas review affords significant discretion to the state court recognizing the deferential aedpa standard noting this court will take only a limited and deferential review of underlying state court decisions  quoting worthington v roper 631 f3d 487 495 8th cir 2011