engaged in a cordial conversation, the agents calmly explained the purpose of their presence and requested entry, and then Cooper, with knowledge that the agents were conducting a narcotics investigation, invited the agents into the room. Even assuming that this “invitation” was non-verbal, Cooper gave officers the type of “implied consent” that we have found sufficiently voluntary in similar circumstances. See Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d at 751-52 (finding a defendant’s “yielding the right-of-way” to officers at the front door to be voluntary consent to enter where four officers were present and no guns were drawn). In contrast to the purported consent at issue in Bautista, Cooper’s consent was not simply the product of compliance with police demands. See Bautista, 362 F.3d at 591-92 (<HOLDING>); see also Tobin, 923 F.2d at 1512 (explaining
holding consent not voluntary where police threatened to arrest defendants girlfriend if he refused to sign consent form holding that police officers should have been entitled to qualified immunity when they entered onto a groundlevel deck on the back of a home to knock on a slidingglass door believing the door to be a customary entryway holding that opening the door in response to a police demand and then failing to object when officers entered was not voluntary consent holding that warrantless search of defendants vehicle was legal because defendants consent was voluntary even through he was in police custody at the time of giving consent holding that no search occurred when police officers entered an open business