or transferred to another for that purpose does not constitute [an] ‘access device’ within [the] statute.” See Motion to Dismiss, ¶ 2. In support of his argument, Defendant cites United States v. Brady, 820 F.Supp. 1346 (D.Utah 1993), aff'd 13 F.3d 334 (10th Cir.1993). In Brady, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered whether a cellular telephone used to free-ride was an “access device” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1029(e)(1). The court concluded it was not because the individual who was free-riding, while he did access the system of the cellular carrier, did not access the account of a legitimate subscriber of the carrier. See Brady, 13 F.3d at 339. Other courts that have considered this issue have reached the opposite conclusion. See e.g. Ashe, 47 F.3d at 774 (<HOLDING>); Bailey, 41 F.3d at 418 (holding that 18
holding that an antitrust injury is a necessary element of a  2 claim holding that prejudice or injury is a necessary element of standing holding intent as an essential element to an invasion of privacy by intrusion and not listing intent as a required element of invasion of privacy by publication holding that invasion of an identifiable customers account is not a necessary element proof under the statute holding that a direct physical invasion of the property was not necessary under the 1876 constitution for a taking to occur