as a “hands-down” winner, we cannot address the ineffectiveness question because of the state of the record. Although Broussard filed a motion for new trial asserting ineffective assistance of counsel, he never raised the ground he now asserts on appeal. Thus, the record is silent as to why his counsel might have acted as he did. In such circumstances, our duty is clear — -we must presume counsel made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex.Crim.App.1994). The Court of Criminal Appeals has repeatedly held that without a sufficient record, an appellant cannot overcome this presumption, and we cannot conclude counsel was ineffective. See Chuong Duong Tong v. State, 25 S.W.3d 707, 714 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1053, 121 S.Ct. 2196,
holding that without some explanation as to why counsel acted as he did we presume that his actions were the product of an overall strategic design recognizing strict product liability actions holding that where the defendants expert described the product design using superlatives namely the safest design you could possibly put on the machine the plaintiff should have been permitted to impeach the expert by inquiring why the safest design possible was modified following the plaintiffs accident holding that using a trade secret to produce a design for which a patent application is then submitted and using a product design to procure financing for development of that product constitute use holding that defendant waived his right to selfrepresentation where he told the trial judge before trial that he did not want to represent himself and the public defender acted as counsel for the remainder of trial without objection