1330 (8th Cir.1985) (staling that Fifth Amendment right to counsel stems from privilege against self-incrimination and is not an independent right and that consent to search is not an incriminating statement because it is not testimonial, nor is physical evidence obtained pursuant to search); State v. Moralo, 619 N.W.2d 655, 662 (S.D.2000) (stating that "[a]n officer's request that a suspect consent to a search, however, is not an interrogation or its functional equivalent” and "Morato’s consent to search does not constitute an incriminating statement”); State v. Crannell, 170 Vt. 387, 750 A.2d 1002, 1009 (2000) (concluding that the request for consent to search did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights); contra United States v. Yan, 704 F.Supp. 1207, 1211-12 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (<HOLDING>); State v. Britain, 156 Ariz. 384, 752 P.2d 37,
holding that a consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of miranda  holding that because consent is not a statement and a request for consent is not an interrogation giving consent to search is a neutral fact which has no tendency to show that the suspect is guilty of any crime recognizing two aspects to assertion of fifth amendment rights 1 a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand request was made for an attorney and 2 the request was for assistance with a custodial interrogation not for subsequent hearings or proceedings holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation holding that the district court did not err in admitting evidence of an allegedly coerced interrogation where the taped interrogation was played for jurors and the defendant crossexamined the witness at length about the interrogation