to the patent rights. Furthermore, the tortious interference claims, even though they are based in part on Cryovac’s assertion that Pechiney willfully infringed claim 11 of the ’419 patent, require Cryovac to prove a number of things in addition to willful infringement, including the existence of a contract or a valid business relationship or expectancy and the knowledge Pechiney allegedly had of the contract or the relationship (see supra at 16). See Dow Chem., 139 F.3d at 1477 (“a tort claim for intentional interference with contractual relations requires elements entirely different to those required for inequitable conduct”). Therefore, Cryovac’s tortious interference claim is not preempted by patent law. See Rodime PLC v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 174 F.3d 1294, 1306 (Fed.Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). 2. Existence of a Contract Pechiney asserts
holding that a defendant could not be liable for tortious interference with a business relation where the defendant merely exercised its legal rights holding that where both defamation and tortious interference claims are pled and are based on same facts minnesota law requires the application of the actual malice standard to tortious interference claims holding that a patentee could sue for tortious interference along with its claims of infringement holding that the plaintiff stated a claim for tortious interference recognizing action for tortious interference with prospective advantage