standard strikes an acceptable balance between the interest in requiring plaintiffs promptly to file suit and the competing interest in avoiding the encouragement of baseless or premature suits by requiring plaintiffs to sue before they can discover the facts underlying their claims. See New England Health Care Employees Pension Fund, 336 F.3d at 501; Young, 305 F.3d at 9; Sterlin, 154 F.3d at 1202. B We have previously stated that, if we were to adopt an inquiry notice standard for § 10(b) suits, we would apply a standard similar to that applied by the Tenth Circuit. See Livid Holdings, 416 F.3d at 951; Berry, 175 F.3d at 704. Today we adopt the inquiry-plus-reasonable-diligence test used by the Tenth Circuit. See, e.g., Sterlin v. Biomune Sys., 154 F.3d 1191, 1201 (10th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Under that standard, to determine when the
holding that the statute of limitations begins to run on the date the alleged malpractice is discovered holding that the statute of limitations period begins to run when the allegedly discriminatory pension plan is applied to the plaintiffs and leaving determination of the actual date the statute begins to run on each claim to the district court holding that the limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff was privy to facts which would provoke inquiry in the mind of a person of reasonable prudence and which if followed up would have led to the discovery of the fraud holding that disputed factual issue existed as to whether claimant knew or by exercise of reasonable diligence should have known prior to running of statute of limitations existence of compensable claim holding that inquiry notice triggers an investors duty to exercise reasonable diligence and that the  statute of limitations period begins to run once the investor in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the facts underlying the alleged fraud