that he described, and conveyed sufficient specificity regarding the van that there was a very low probability that the officers would have stopped the wrong vehicle. Thus, we cannot say the district court’s finding was clearly erroneous. 5 . Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Burns did not inform the dispatcher why he suspected the van was carrying undocumented aliens, we do not reach the question of whether Healy had reasonable suspicion to stop the van had this information been provided. That said, under similar circumstances, when the informant conveyed the reasons for her suspicions, we have held that reasonable suspicion existed to stop a vehicle. See United States v. Leos-Quijada, 107 F.3d 786, 788-89, 794 (10th Cir.1997)
holding that officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle when confidential informant personally observed the vehicle provided a description of the vehicle and its direction detailed the basis for her suspicion that the vehicle was engaged in illegal activity and had previously given reliable information that led to the successful apprehension of individuals engaged in various criminal activity holding that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle solely because the vehicle drove onto a lot after hours and then left in a hurry holding that the stop of defendants vehicle was unlawful where officers stopped the vehicle to check the license and registration but had observed no suspicious activity holding that a conclusion that reasonable suspicion supported the stop of a vehicle was subsumed within the trial courts ruling that the officer had probable cause for the stop holding reasonable and articulable suspicion existed to support the investigatory stop of a vehicle in view of the time of day and the officers prior knowledge of reports of criminal activity in the area