to the Legislature’s intent. See Nat’l Liab. & Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen, 15 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex.2000). If possible, we must ascertain that intent from the language the Legislature used in the statute and not look to extraneous matters for an intent the statute does not state. Id. If the meaning of the statutory language is unambiguous, we adopt the interpretation supported by the plain meaning of the provision’s words. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp. v. Agbor, 952 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex.1997). We must not engage in forced or strained construction; rather, we must yield to the plain sense of the words the Legislature chose. See id. IV. Analysis A. Does this court have appellate jurisdiction? The State asserts that we lack appellate jurisdiction for the fol , 727 So.2d 404, 405 (Fla.Ct.App.1999) (<HOLDING>); People v. White, 165 Ill.App.3d 249, 116
holding that a party who had demonstrated an injury sufficient to confer standing to appeal from an agency decision could raise  any relevant question of law in respect of the order of the agency holding nonparty agency had standing to appeal order committing to agencys custody an individual found incompetent to stand trial for capital murder agency asserted trial court lacked authority to issue commitment order holding that an order by the trial court remanding the cause to the agency to impose a sanction other than the one imposed by the agency was not a final and appealable order because it did not terminate the litigation between the parties on the merits holding nonparty department of mental health had standing to appeal commitment order regarding person found not guilty by reason of insanity because department had direct interest that was affected by commitment order and because employees of the department conceivably could be held in contempt of court for failing to comply with the order holding provision in contempt order void because it punished relator for violating order that trial court lacked authority to enter