confession, it might, in some cases, render that violation harmless. Cruz, 481 U.S. at 193-94, 107 S.Ct. 1714. Recently, in Crawford v. Washington, -U.S.-, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), the United States Supreme Court receded from the Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), “indicia of reliability” test and held that “[w]here. testimonial evidence is at issue, ... the Sixth Amendment demands what common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Crawford, 124 S.Ct. at 1374. We have previously recognized that admissions by acquiescence or silence do not implicate the Confrontation Clause. See Nelson v. State, 748 So.2d 237 (Fla. 1999); see also United States v. Kehoe, 310 F.3d 579, 590-91 (8th Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1048, 123 S.Ct. 2112,
holding that the confrontation clause does not apply to the sentencing hearing holding that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule where the defendant was able to confront and crossexamine the witness who claimed that the statements at issue were made holding that an absent witnesss statements are admissible under the confrontation clause only where the declarant is unavailable and only where the defendant   had a prior opportunity to crossexamine holding that any confrontation right is found in the fourteenth amendments due process clause not the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment holding that the confrontation clause did not guarantee the defendant the right to crossexamine a speaker whose state ments were imputed to the defendant as adoptive admissions of a party opponent