forth in § 925(c). The sole, dispositive question, then, is whether the ATF “denied” McHugh’s petition. The district court held that “the Secretary’s refusal to entertain any applications for a permit during the past six years because Congress has precluded its use of funds to investigate or act upon such applications is unquestionably a de facto denial.” McHugh, 49 F.Supp.2d at 111. The district court is not alone in holding this view. See Bean v. United States, 89 F.Supp.2d 828, 837 (E.D.Tex.2000) (“[T]his Court holds that inaction by the ATF constitutes a defacto denial of an application such that a United States district court may consider a petition for judicial review of the denial.”); cf. Rice v. United States, Dep’t of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 68 F.3d 702, 709 (3d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin,
holding that defendant seeking credit for time served must exhaust administrative remedies within the department of corrections prior to seeking judicial relief holding that federal prisoners need not exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court holding that section 925c authorizes judicial review of only the denial of an application for relief holding that persons seeking restoration of federal firearms privileges need not exhaust administrative remedies to invoke the judicial review provision of section 925c holding that a plaintiff need not exhaust his administrative remedies to bring a retaliation claim