to show a need or lack of another source for the information. See Doe, 781 F.2d at 243-49; Klein, 776 F.2d at 632-33; Schofield, 721 F.2d 1221, 1222-23 (9th Cir.1983); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 708 F.2d 1571, 1575 (11th Cir.1983) (“Freeman ”). We now address the relators’ second argument that the Department of Justice Guidelines require the government to attempt to secure the information from alternative sources prior to issuing attorney subpoenas. Relators claim that the requested fee information is available from many other sources. We need not resolve the issue of alternative sources because we hold that the Department of Justice Guidelines create no rights in favor of grand jury witnesses. See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 99 S.Ct. 1465, 59 L.Ed.2d 733 (1979) (<HOLDING>). We agree with the Seventh Circuit’s holding
recognizing that exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of statute serves as only effective deterrent of such violations holding that agents violation of irs regulations did not mandate exclusion of evidence obtained as a result of violation holding that failure of irs agent to follow irs electronic surveillance regulations before recording conversations between taxpayer and agent did not require suppression of tape recordings in prosecution of taxpayer accused of bribing irs agent since irs was not required by constitution to adopt its regulations governing electronic surveillance violation of agency regulations did not raise constitutional questions holding that a statement obtained in violation of miranda does not by its own force mandate the inadmissibility of subsequent similar statements that were constitution ally obtained holding that exclusionary rule only requires exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights and that exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of statutory rights is not necessarily required