2008) (per curiam). Other Circuits have held that persons with pre-SORNA sex-offense convictions became subject to the Act’s registration requirements upon the statute’s enactment in July 2006. See, e.g., May, 535 F.3d, at 915-919; United States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 929-935 (CA10 2008). Because Carr traveled from Alabama to Indiana before both the enactment of SORNA and the Attorney General’s regulation, we have no occasion to consider whether a pre-SORNA sex offender whose travel and failure to register occurred between July 2006 and February 2007 is subject to liability under § 2250, and we express no view on that question. We similarly express no view as to whether § 72.3 was properly promulgated—a question that has also divided the Circuits. Compare Cain, 583 F.3d, at 419-424 (<HOLDING>), with United States v. Dean, 604 F.3d 1275,
holding that district court lacked jurisdiction over claim for interim social security benefits during pendency of administrative proceedings holding that the attorney general lacked good cause for issuing the interim regulation without adhering to the noticeandcomment and publication requirements of the administrative procedure act apa holding that judicial review of final agency action under the administrative procedure act  provides the proper procedure to challenge the sufficiency of an eis holding that court may not impose procedural requirements on agency decisionmaking that go beyond those of the administrative procedure act holding that when an agency fails to follow the proper procedure under the illinois administrative procedure act for the adoption of rules the rule is invalid