the trial court was free to consider the letter from Proctor to Barker, which was discussed at length during the hearing, even though the letter was not formally offered and admitted into evidence. Hendricks attached this letter to his own petition, Barker attached a copy of it to her motion to disqualify, and Proctor authenticated it at the hearing when he affirmatively stated that he had sent the letter to Barker. For all practical purposes, the letter was admitted because it was on file with the trial court, the parties treated the letter as evidence during the hearing, there were no contested issues presented with the letter, and the trial court relied on the letter when making its decision. See In re A.G.C., 279 S.W.3d 441, 450 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); cf. Sanchez v. Bexar Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t,
holding that the appellant could not complain that an affidavit and mediated settlement agreement were not in evidence even though those documents were not formally offered and admitted holding appellant could not complain of the introduction of an index card into evidence when his counsel first offered the card in evidence holding that settlement documents were admissible under both section 90408 and federal rule of evidence 408 because the documents were offered not to establish liability but to establish violation of consumer credit laws holding that trial court did not err by refusing to enforce mediated settlement agreement that contained an illegal provision holding that an incorporated affidavit did not provide particularity because the government offered no evidence that the affidavit or any copies were ever attached to the warrant or were present at the time of the search