not allow consideration of extrinsic evidence. Jurisdictions adopting the intent rule have developed two formulations with similar purposes. Some jurisdictions hold that the parol evidence rule is inapplicable in an action by a party to a release and a stranger to that agreement. See, e.g., Neves, 769 P.2d at 1054; Sims v. Honda Motor Co., 225 Conn. 401, 623 A.2d 995, 1003 (1993). Under this formulation of the intent rule, parol evidence of the parties’ intentions is admissible even when the terms of the release are facially unambiguous. See, e.g., Sims, 623 A.2d at 1004 n. 12. Other jurisdictions hold that extrinsic evidence of the parties intent is admissible only when the court determines as a matter of law that the terms of the release agreement are ambiguous. d 1300, 1303 (1983) (<HOLDING>). A distinct minority of jurisdictions
holding that release discharges only those tortfeasors specifically named in the release agreement holding that release discharges only persons named in or sufficiently described by terms of release holding that release must specifically name or otherwise specifically identify the persons to be discharged holding that general release must name  or specifically describe parties to be discharged holding that release which discharged agents and employees sufficiently identified law firm and individual member thereof who had represented specifically named releasees