had consented in cases of direct appeal to review post-conviction claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel where a record in the trial court was sufficient to permit appellate review. Id. The court declined Mr. Wheat’s argument and held that the new rule explicitly provides the “exclusive procedure” by which a person may seek relief in the sentencing court for ineffective assistance of counsel, and “failure to file such motion constitutes a complete waiver of the right.” Id. at 157-58. A change to the Rule 29.15 timing requirement does not change its plain language, which continues to provide the exclusive means by which an ineffective assistance of counsel claim may be raised. And this has been confirmed in cases decided since Wheat. See, e.g., Brown, 438 S.W.3d at 506 n.5 (<HOLDING>); State v. Celis-Garcia, 420 S.W.3d 723, 731
holding that ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not cognizable on direct appeal because it was not presented under the postconviction procedures set forth in rules2915 or 24035 which allow for the development of a full and complete record holding that defendants claim for ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest was not cognizable on direct appeal holding that to the extent defendants claim is one of ineffective assistance of counsel it is not cognizable on direct appeal and rule 2915 is the exclusive procedure by which a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be advanced holding that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must be raised on direct appeal when the facts supporting the claim are presented on the face of the record holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record