of “sexual abuse of a minor” “encompassed statutory rape crimes only,” and recognized that a residual category of “sexual abuse of a minor” exists that encompasses statutes where (1) “the conduct proscribed ... is sexual;” (2) “the statute protects a minor;” and (3) “the statute requires abuse.” Id. at 513-14. In turn, we defined the term “abuse” as “physical or psychological harm in light of the age of the victim in question.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We have noted that sexual contact with a victim under the age of fourteen is categorically “abuse,” see United States v. Lopez-Solis, 447 F.3d 1201, 1209 (9th Cir. 2006), but we have never held that such a per se rule applies to consensual sex with persons fourteen and older, see Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d at 1107 & n. 2 (<HOLDING>); Pelayo-Garcia, 589 F.3d at 1015-16 (rejecting
holding that attempted sexual abuse of a child under the age of fourteen is a crime of viqlenee recognizing that estradaespinoza and medinavilla set out two different generic federal definitions of sexual abuse of a minor  and looking to both definitions to determine whether conviction under calpenal code  2615d qualifies as generic federal crime of sexual abuse of a minor under categorical approach recognizing the two distinct generic definitions of sexual abuse of a minor and holding that a statute contains the element of abuse under the medinavilla definition if it applies to sexual conduct with children younger than fourteen years holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse holding that the illinois statutory definitions of sexual penetration and sexual conduct cover clearly distinct conduct and that therefore the statute was not unconstitutionally vague