intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.” Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997) (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 249, 100 S.Ct. 2636). However, I disagree that plaintiffs should be held to that burden, in this case, where the legislative intent is ambiguous at best. The Supreme Court has not resolved this particular question directly. However, where the legislature fails to make its intent clear through express language, or by implication through a law’s broader structure, or even through legislative history, there is strong support for the proposition that a challenged law should be subjected to neutral evaluation when determining its effect. See Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169, 83 S.Ct. 554 (<HOLDING>); Smith, 538 U.S. at 107, 123 S.Ct. 1140
holding that in presence of any doubt a penal statute is to be strictly construed holding that ajbsent conclusive evidence of congressional intent as to the penal nature of a statute these factors must be considered in relation to the statute on its face holding that where congressional intent is clear a court must give effect to such intent holding analogous circumstances conclusive  of legislative intent recognizing that mere passage of time does not make evidence irrelevant as it will also depend on the nature of the evidence and its relation to what is to be proven