course obliged to follow its articulation of the state tort of outrage. In contrast to the more overtly abusive conduct at issue in Commodore, in the present case we have no explanation from Humble as to how the alleged conduct (a failure to assign Humble work consistent with her injury) could plausibly be viewed as outrageous indepen 8, 108 S.Ct. 1877. 24 . Commodore v. Univ. Mech. Contractors, Inc., 120 Wash.2d 120, 839 P.2d 314, 320 (1992); Ware v. Mnt. Materials Co., 93 Wash. App. 639, 970 P.2d 332, 334 (1999). 25 . 66 F.3d 1514 (9th Cir.1995). 26 . Id. at 1527. 27 . Id. 28 . Cramer, 255 F.3d at 691, 693. 29 . Under liberal notice pleading standards, we do not construe Humble's complaint as alleging that she could only have been acc v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. at 122-24, 114 S.Ct. 2068 (<HOLDING>)). 35 . See id. at 691. 36 . Id.; see also
holding that defendant did not have a special responsibility to exercise independent judgment in the plaintiffs behalf and to look after the plaintiffs interests holding that the need to look to the cba to determine the plaintiffs rate of pay did not trigger preemption holding the same for the other separate rate plaintiffs in this action holding that with respect to the eaja the local or national market rate for legal services cannot be a special factor used to increase the rate beyond the statutory rate holding that the need to refer to wage rate in the cba to calculate damages did not preempt a state rule governing the timing of severance pay