single, ambiguous phrase found in the footnote of a per curiam Supreme Court opinion, justify such a result. Consequently, we hold that Menna does not restrict a defendant’s ability to raise a double jeopardy claim after a guilty plea to cases where the double jeopardy violation is clear from the face of the indictment. Similarly, therefore, we hold that Menna does not require us to look only to the indictment when reviewing a double jeopardy claim which follows a guilty plea. By holding that Menna does not limit a court’s examination to the indictment, we do not imply that it will always be necessary, or even appropriate, to look farther. As our cases demonstrate, our concern is caused by the freedom which the government has in drafting an indictment. See, e.g., Levy, 803 F.2d at 1395 (<HOLDING>); Dunn, 775 F.2d at 607 (expressing concern
holding that in a conspiracy case venue lies where the conspiracy agreement was formed or in any jurisdiction where an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed by any of the conspirators holding that two conspiracies existed where the members of the second conspiracy did not know about the first conspiracy did not benefit from the first conspiracy and were connected with the first conspiracy only through a middleman recognizing that the government carved out a portion of a larger conspiracy and alleged it as a separate conspiracy holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges holding that once a defendant becomes associated with a conspiracy he is responsible for all of the acts of the conspiracy even those which occurred before or after his association with the conspiracy