as the case may be, may commence the action, after the removal of such disability, within the time of limitation for the particular cause of action, unless it exceeds three (3) years, and in that case within three (3) years from the removal of such disability. TenmCode Ann. § 28-1-106 (2000) (emphasis added). The parties in this case are not contesting before this Court that Hunt was, at the time this action accrued, and still is, of unsound mind. Abels argues that because Hunt has been of unsound mind since his injury, Tennessee’s legal disability statute tolls the running of the statute of limitations in this case. RSC contends that Hunt’s disability was removed when Abels was appointed Hunt’s legal guardian, so that the one-year statute of limitati 39, 541 N.E.2d 334, 337 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Talley v. Portland Residence, Inc., 582
holding that attorneys mental illness may justify equitable tolling holding that tolling statute applicable to incompetent plaintiffs continues in effect in spite of appointment of guardian ad litem holding that appointment of guardian does not operate to start statute of limitations running in cases where title to cause of action is in person belonging to class of disabled persons encompassed within tolling provision holding that tolling statute applicable to those disabled by minority or mental illness continues to operate regardless of guardians appointment holding that where client was abandoned by attorney due to attorneys mental illness equitable tolling may be appropriate