whose last names begin with the letter "S” than to make the decision fully retroactive. The majority obviously would not countenance the latter course, but its failure to identify any truly relevant distinction between cases on direct appeal and cases raising collateral challenges makes the rule it announces equally indefensible. Shea v. Louisiana, supra, 470 U.S. [51] at 64 n. 1, 105 S.Ct. [1065] at 1072, n. 1 [84 L.Ed.2d 38] (White, J., dissenting). Griffith, supra, 107 S.Ct. at 719 n. 2 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The logic of Justice White is applicable here, for the majority "fail[s] to identify any truly relevant distinction between [this case] and cases raising collateral challenges...." Id.; cf. Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 106 S.Ct. 2878, 92 L.Ed.2d 199 (1986)
holding that alleyne does not apply to cases on collateral review holding booker is not retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review holding that batson v kentucky 476 us 79 106 sct 1712 90 led2d 69 1986 does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review holding that batson does apply retroactively to cases pending on direct review holding that batson v kentucky does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review