to the numerous excessive force complaints against him conveyed a message of approval to him. Turpin, 619 F.2d at 201; see also Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971-76 (3d Cir.1996) (evidence of a series of prior written civilian complaints of a similar nature concerning a police officer’s use of force and the city’s lack of responsive action was sufficient evidence from which a jury could have inferred that the city knew, and acquiesced in, the tacit use of excessive force by its police officers). Kreger’s history, as well as the City’s prior history of excessive force complaints, should have put the City on notice of the need to re-train or discipline Kreger. See Bryan County, 520 U.S. at 407, 117 S.Ct; 1382; but see Reitz v. County of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that
holding that trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of insurer on badfaith claim because reasonable dispute existed as to whether policy covered insureds claim holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment since the physical evidence and unrebutted expert testimony left no genuine issue of material fact holding that trial court did not err holding that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to county on monell claim where plaintiff presented no evidence that similar conduct occurred in the past