632 (Utah 1987). Because the length of the delay is only a starting point, we must also evaluate other factors. The second and often dispositive factor involved in questions of speedy trial is the cause of delay. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31, 92 S.Ct. at 2191-92. The trial court found, “All of the delays since charges were originally filed in 1990 have been based on issues of Defendant’s competency to proceed.” That delays caused by questions of competency do not impinge on an accused’s right to a speedy trial is well established. See Johnson, 333 F.2d at 374; United States v. Abou-Kassem, 78 F.3d 161 (5th Cir.1996) (stating that where defendant requests mental evaluation, resulting delay does not violate right to speedy trial); Lokos v. Capps, 625 F.2d 1258, 1268 n. 5 (5th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). Because time spent evaluating competency may
holding that when determining whether a delay in prosecution violates a defendants right to a speedy trial courts must consider the length of the delay the reason for the delay whether the defendant asserted his rights and the resulting prejudice to the defendant holding that a 19month delay between indictment and trial did not violate the constitutional right to a speedy trial holding that the state does not have to prove a defendants competency to stand trial holding that whether a pretrial motion actually caused or is expected to cause delay of trial is irrelevant to the speedy trial act holding that delay resulting from prior incompetence to stand trial does not violate speedy trial guarantee