of other portions of the court’s opinion makes clear that the court’s use of the word “scheme” refers to the combined federal and state provisions. See, e. g., id., at 26 (expressly referring to both federal and state statutory provisions in discussing the “unemployment compensation scheme”); id., at 25 (referring to the intent of Congress and the California Legislature in discussing the “unemployment compensation tax scheme”). Moreover, the District Court’s analysis leading to its order holding the California provision unconstitutional is based solely on its understanding of the operation and effect of FUTA, which of course prompted the passage of the corresponding state statute in the first place. Cf. St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U. S., at 780, n. 9 (<HOLDING>). Finally, in its second supplemental opinion,
holding that the court could review the south dakota supreme courts interpretation of its unemployment compensation tax statute because its analysis depended entirely on its understanding of the meaning of futa and the first amendment holding futa after which florida molded its unemployment law is phrased entirely in terms of the nature of the employer and not in terms of the work performed or the place at which the employee works holding an administrative interpretation cannot change the meaning of a statute or control the courts interpretation of it holding that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is applicable to the states and therefore the us supreme courts interpretation of the provision is binding upon this court holding district court erred in relying on authority other than that of the supreme court of the united states in its analysis under  2254d