court ruled against Sprint on two of its critical claims. The parties thereafter consented to dismissal of Sprint’s remaining claims, and the district court entered summary judgment for the City. Ill A The interpretation of the statutory provisions of the Telecom Act and the Utilities Code presents questions of law which receive de novo review. Carson Harbor Vill, Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 870 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc). However, if this Court reviews the evidence relied upon by the City in denying the permits, the City must satisfy the substantial evidence standard. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). We have described the substantial evidence standard as “deferential.” See MetroPCS, Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco, 400 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir.2005); see also id. at 723 (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation omitted). B 1 The Telecom
holding that traditional allocation of burden of proof to the party challenging the decisions applies to decisions under the tca holding that substantial evidence implies the traditional standard used for judicial review of agency decisions holding that because here the statutes in issue provide for judicial review via citizen suit provisions yet do not set forth a standard for that review judicial review is limited to apa review on the administrative record holding that the standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence is the same as the standard for denying a motion for a directed verdict holding that the supreme court has final appellate review of agency decisions