App. 170, 293 S.E.2d 235 (1982), this Court defined an obstmction as “anything, including vegetation, which ren ders the public passageway less convenient or safe for use.” Id. at 174, 293 S.E.2d at 237. Plaintiff’s expert stated that the vegetation was an obstruction and defendant Logan in his deposition stated that the position of the parked cars caused him to drive down the center of the road. Under the Cooper definition, both the vegetation and parked cars could constitute obstructions which might violate the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 160A-296. Defendant City further argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because there was no evidence that it had notice of the alleged obstructions. See Bowman v. Town of Granite Falls, 21 N.C. App. 333, 334-35, 204 S.E.2d 239, 240-41 (1974) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff counters there are genuine issues
holding that a constitutional violation by the individual defendants is required in order to sustain a claim against the municipality recognizing that a sheriff contracting for services with a municipality is clearly different from a municipality transferring or contracting away the authority to supervise and control its police powers to the county government holding that a municipality may be held liable as a person under  1983 holding that where a city enters contract in excess of its statutory power the mere fact that the municipality has received the benefits of the contract which has been performed by the other party does not make the municipality liable either on the theory of ratification estoppel or implied contract in order to do justice to the other party by paying the reasonable value of the property or services holding notice of the defect actual or constructive and a failure to act on the part of the municipality to remedy the situation are prerequisites to recovery in an action involving a municipality