that Medical Services is equitably estopped from arguing that the arbitration provision does not apply. First, we note that the Standard Form of Agreement specifically names Waldheim as the “architect.” The definition of “architect” found in section 4.1.1 of the general-conditions document includes the architect’s “authorized representative,” and paragraph 4.6.4 of the general-conditions document prohibits the arbitration of claims against both the architect and the “Architect’s employees or consultants.” Medical Services argues that Watkins provided architectural services; however, there is no evidence in the record indicating that Watkins was Waldheim’s “authorized representative” or his employee or consultant. See Providian Nat’l Bank v. Conner, 898 So.2d 714, 719 (Ala.2004) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, Medical Services did not meet its
holding that statements in motions and briefs are not evidence to be considered in ruling on a motion to compel arbitration recognizing that in reviewing ruling on motion to compel arbitration we first determine whether party seeking arbitration established existence of arbitration agreement holding that issues not clearly raised in initial briefs are considered abandoned holding that trial court did not err in ruling on appellees motion for summary judgment before appellees complied with appellants discovery request when the record reflected that appellant filed a motion to compel three days before the hearing and the record did not reveal any effort on the part of appellant to secure a ruling from the trial court on its motion to compel or object at the trial court hearing the motion for summary judgment prior to ruling on the motion to compel holding that erroneously admitted evidence may be considered when ruling on a motion to dismiss