damages in an amount that bore no relation to the evidence presented at trial. See, e.g., Bradner, 362 S.E.2d at 720 n. 2 (“We have repeatedly held that although a trier of fact must determine the weight of the testimony and the credibility of witnesses, it may not arbitrarily disregard uncontradicted evidence of unimpeached witnesses which is not inherently incredible and not inconsistent with facts in the record, even though such witnesses are interested in the outcome of the case.”). Therefore, even without considering the extent to which Stebbins established his entitlement to an award for his emotional damages, I simply cannot find the jury’s verdict to be reasonable compensation for the economic loss as established by the evidence presented at trial. See Downer, 507 S.E.2d at 615 (<HOLDING>). My review of the record convinces me that the
holding that in deciding whether the jurys award is inadequate the test is whether reasonable people could not conclude that the  award was reasonable compensation holding that award of 25000 was reasonable holding that to offset a jurys damage award a separate thirdparty insurance award must cover the same loss which served as the basis for the jury award holding that award of 50000 was reasonable holding that an attorneys fees award is not appealable until the amount of the award is set