in this case. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994) ("if the statute would operate retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such a result.”). 7 . Notwithstanding the unavailability of a private cause of action, § 1640(e) "does not bar a person from asserting a violation of this subchapter in an action to collect the debt which was brought more than one year from the date of occurrence of the violation as a matter of defense” to the collection action. However, under Rooker-Feldman, the Debtor cannot interpose § 1640 as a defense at this point in time. Velardo, 298 Fed.Appx. at 892; Goodman ex rel. Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). 8 . Similarly, the Debtor's ability to raise
holding that the federal claims which arose from state court criminal contempt proceedings were inextricably intertwined with the state court action and thus the federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims pursuant to the rookerfeldman doctrine holding rookerfeldman doctrine deprived district court of jurisdiction to review decision of west virginia state bar holding that a state court judgment that modifies a discharge in bankruptcy is void ab initio and the rookerfeldman doctrine would not bar federal court jurisdiction holding that the rookerfeldman doctrine is broad enough to bar all federal claims that were or should have been central to the state court decision holding rookerfeldman doctrine inapplicable to claims that do not require review of a judicial decision in a particular case