a reverse palming off claim under the Lanham Act is designed to prevent against unfair competition, which looks at the marketing, not the manufacturing of a product. See Donald Frederick Evans & Assoc., Inc. v. Continental Homes, Inc., 785 F.2d 897, 913 (11th Cir.1986) (citing B.H. Bunn Co. v. AAA Replacement Parts Co., 451 F.2d 1254, 1263 (5th Cir.1971)); Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 604 (9th Cir.1981). b. Lanham Act Differs From Trade Secret Law Del Monte’s argument regarding the presence of MD-2 in the public domain confuses the scope of the Lanham Act with that of trade secret protection, which is a product of state law. Articles in the public domain usually are not protected by trade secret law, see Roboserve, Ltd. v. Tom’s Foods, Inc., 940 F.2d 1441, 1454-55 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>), but, as discussed in the following
holding that disclosure of trade secret without protection of express confidentiality agreement was not fatal to trade secret protection where disclosure occurred during sale negotiation holding that a machine that allegedly eliminated lumps from womens breasts was governed by the ffdca even though the fda did not require the use of such a machine holding that printouts from a breath test machine are not hearsay but rather the mechanicallygenerated reports automatically created by the machine they do not constitute outofcourt statements by any person or the conclusion of a third party not before the court   internal citations omitted holding that state trade secret law could not protect vending machine mechanism where machine was sold to third party holding that allegations that injuries were caused by misuse of ekg machine did not fall within waiver provisions of ttca because plaintiff had not made affirmative allegation that ekg machine was incorrectly used or that its results were erroneous and reasoning that misuse of information produced by ekg machine caused injuries rather than device itself