against the plaintiff based on race. See, e.g., Holland v. Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 217 (4th Cir.2007); Hawkins v. PepsiCo, Inc., 203 F.3d 274, 279-80 (4th Cir.2000). Rather, the focus concerns whether plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext within the meaning of Reeves and its Fourth Circuit progeny. See, e.g., Hux, 451 F.3d at 314-19; Dugan v. Albemarle Cty. Sch. Bd., 293 F.3d 716, 722 (4th Cir.2002). In asserting that the ECSU’s justifications for promoting Gray are pretex-tual, Cherry fist argues that ECSU tailored the position description for captain to mirror Gray’s experience. See [D.E, 37-1] 19-21, Notably, however, ECSU initially reposted-the position before either Gray or Cherry applied, College, 57 F.3d 369, 383-84 (4th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Next, Cherry árgues- that his experience was
holding that title vii does not prescribe an employers determination of preferred or required job requirements holding that a title vii plaintiff could not hold coworkers liable in their individual capacities under title vii holding that the doctrine of qualified immunity does not protect a government official who is sued in an official capacity under title vii because title vii does not impose personal liability holding that because plaintiff did not apply for a job he could not be rejected in a title vii case holding that title vii does not include a continuing violation doctrine