of seven months with no threat of continuity into the future was not substantially long enough to be considered a pattern. Finding that “... the predicate acts themselves were concluded in less than seven months”, the c 901, slip op., Kram, J., 1989 WL 146212 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 1989) (activities occurring over ten months do not satisfy the continuity requirement for a closed-ended pattern); Fry v. General Motors Corp., 728 F.Supp. 455 (E.D.Mich.1989) (closed-ended period of one year and seven months was not sufficiently long enough to be considered a pattern.); Hutchinson v. Wickes, 726 F.Supp. 1315 (N.D.Ga.1989) (questioning whether a two year closed-ended period is of sufficient length.); Banks v. Wolk, No. 89-7219, slip op., Broderick, J., 1989 WL 153936 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 15, 1989) (<HOLDING>); Azurite Corp., Ltd. v. Amster & Co., 730
holding that a six month closedended period did not satisfy the continuity requirement holding that a six month delay was unreasonable holding that discharge six months after eeoc settlement and a month after an informal complaint satisfies causation requirement holding that a jury could find a nineteen month period of racketeering activity sufficient to satisfy continuity requirement holding that a closedended period of less than thirteen months was not sufficiently long to be considered a pattern