his brother on the date at issue, the totality of circumstances supports Judge Bianco’s finding that the refusal could not reasonably be understood to have coerced Schaefer’s subsequent consent to search, see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d at 131, particularly as Schaefer’s consent was given in writing on a form that specifically advised him of his right to refuse consent. Schaefer’s other challenges to the findings of fact informing the district court’s assessment of consent are similarly m g off the computer, he told the agent, “I changed my mind,” the district court acted well within its discretion in discrediting this testimony. See United States v. Isiofia, 370 F.3d 226, 232 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the credibility of Schaefer’s
holding that the jurys resolution of questions of credibility and demean or  is entitled to special deference  recognizing aljs credibility assessment is entitled to great weight and deference recognizing great deference due district courts credibility findings because it alone can observe variations in demean or and voice bearing on witness veracity holding that when findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses rule 52 demands even greater deference to the trial courts findings for only the trial judge is in a position to be aware of the variations in demeanor including but not limited to the actions mannerisms and facial expressions that bear so heavily on the listeners understanding of and belief in what is said holding that the district courts credibility assessments are entitled to deference and reviewed for clear error