by permitting a party’s delay in moving for disqualification to justify the continuance of a breach of the Code of Professional Responsibility.” Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 574 (2d Cir.1973). See also Pastor v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 951 F.Supp. 27, 33 (E.D.N.Y.1996) (“ ‘In this circuit, laches is generally not a defense to a motion to disqualify.’ ” (citations omitted)); Gov’t of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 422 F.Supp. 1057, 1059-60 n. 4 (S.D.N.Y.1976) (“[L]aches is normally not a defense to a motion to disqualify.”). The Second Circuit noted that in extreme cases delay in making a motion for disqualification might be given some weight but that “the court will not bar a claim on that ground where no prejudice has resulted from the delay.” 478 F.2d at 574. (<HOLDING>). See also British Airways, PLC v. Port
holding that a fivemonth delay in filing a motion to disqualify did not bar the motion where there was a reasonable explanation for the delay holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by implicitly rejecting a waiver argument where the motion to disqualify was filed after a threemonth delay holding that a threeyear delay in filing a motion to disqualify did not warrant barring such claim where the party seeking disqualification did not demonstrate any prejudice as a result holding that a year delay in filing a motion to disqualify did not bar the motion where there was no evidence that the motion was inspired by dilatory tactics holding that a tenmonth delay did not bar the motion where there was no demonstration of prejudice and because disqualification is in the public interest where there is an ethical violation