decades after enactment of the Act. Essential a tool as the rule may be to fair elections, it cannot reasonably be viewed as a statutory mandate violated by the Board’s actions in this case. Id. at 278-79. Rather than “disregarding] a specific and unambiguous statutory directive,” UFCW Local 400, 694 F.2d at 278, the Board in fact was exercising a power specifically granted to it under § 9(c)(1) of the Act. 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(c)(1). Indeed, both the Supreme Court and the Court of Ap peals for the Third Circuit have interpreted this statutory provision to vest the Board with “wide discretion” over representation proceedings. Wells Fargo Guard Services v. NLRB, 659 F.2d 363, 370 (3d Cir.1981), relying on NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 330, 67 S.Ct. 324, 327-28, 91 L.Ed. 322 (1946) (<HOLDING>). Although the Act allowed the Board to decide
holding in part that congress has entrusted the board with a wide degree of discretion in establishing the procedure and safeguards necessary to insure the fair and free choice of bargaining representatives by employees holding vagenerated documents to be in the possession of the secretary and the board at the time of the board decision and thus constructively part of the record of proceedings as mandated by 38 usc  7252b holding due process requires that 1 the board be presented with a full statement of the facts and all supporting data bearing upon the disputes  and 2 the parties may be heard either in person by counsel or by other representatives  and the  board shall give due notice of all hearings to the employee  holding that except in rare circumstances an appellate court should not intrude upon the domain which congress has exclusively entrusted to an administrative agency holding that the nlrb has the authority to interpret cbas in the first instance where its interpretation is for the purpose of enforcing a statutory right which congress considered necessary to allow labor and management to get on with the process of reaching fair terms and conditions of employment