that [Banks] was ever offered a plea bargain,” and that, therefore, this court should affirm the district court’s procedural default finding. Appellee’s Br. at 21. Because a procedural bar is not clearly applic to make it difficult to decide, as Gray requires, that state law clearly would bar Banks’ motion for relief from judgment. Cf. Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 134-135, 107 S.Ct. 1671, 95 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987) (“If, for example, the ease presents an issue on which an unresolved question of fact or of state law might have an important bearing, both comity and judicial efficiency may make it appropriate for the court to insist on complete exhaustion to make sure that it may ultimately review the issue on a fully informed basis.”); Brewer v. Dahlberg, 942 F.2d 328, 340 (6th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Where, as here, the unexhausted claims in a
holding that habeas petitioner scheduled to be executed in the state of virginia for capital murder could not raise claim of violation of his rights under the vienna convention on federal habeas review where he failed to preserve the claim by raising it in state court proceedings vienna convention does not trump subsequent federal statute requiring habeas petitioners who claim to be held in violation of treaties of the united states to develop factual bases for their claims in state court as a precondition of federal habeas review holding that a habeas corpus petitioner who did not raise an ineffective assistance claim in his first state habeas petition satisfied the cause prong of the cause and prejudice test when counsel on the first state habeas petition was also trial counsel whose performance was allegedly inadequate holding that habeas claim not included in petition and never raised by petitioner before the district court as basis for habeas relief is procedurally defaulted recognizing that federal habeas statutes require petitioner to be in custody when petition filed holding that a petitioner should be permitted to seek habeas review in state court even if there were doubt that the states substantive law would permit a habeas petition