the § 1983 claim against Sup’r Robinson will be dismissed. Centro is a public benefit corporation, N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 1328(a), and is therefore considered a municipal entity for purposes of § 1983. See Byrd v. Metro. Transit Auth., 2015 WL 4546718, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 28, 2015) (“Public benefit corporations, such as the MTA, are municipal entities for the purpose of Section 1983.”). It would therefore follow that Sup’r Robinson, a Centro employee, acted “under color of state law” during the incident. Cf. Louis v. Metro. Transit Auth., 145 F.Supp.3d 215, .223 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (concluding public bus driver acted under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 when he ejected passenger with police assistance); see also Hollander v. Copacabana Nightclub, 624 F.3d 30, 33 (2d Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>). But both parties’ accounts of events,
holding that state action occurs when inter alia the party charged with the deprivation is a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor holding that a school was not a state actor even though it had to comply with many state regulations to be eligible for state funding and almost all of its students had been referred to it by the state recognizing that the party charged with the deprivation of a federal right must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor and rejecting the notion that a private partys mere invocation of state legal procedures satisfies the stateactor requirement internal quotation marks and citation omitted holding that for a retaliation claim to be viable a prisoner must allege inter alia that a state actor took adverse action against him because of his protected conduct holding that a state agency created under state law was a state actor