in this sense, inasmuch as he has alleged an imminent violation of his statutory right to personal privacy within the trial court’s power to enjoin. “Standing” can also refer to various judicially-created limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction, such as “the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiffs complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984). It is not, however, standing in this so-called prudential sense with wh out the phrase, in Rector v. City of Bowling Green, 594 S.W.2d 891 (Ky.1979) (<HOLDING>). The question thig case presents is who, aside
holding that nonindustrial property owners did not have standing under the asserted statute to challenge an annexation holding that representation by state officials that they have no present plan to enforce a statute does not divest plaintiffs of standing to challenge the statute because the states position could well change holding that petitioners who asserted neither a property interest nor a possessory interest in property searched or seized were not entitled to assert a constitutional challenge to the search holding annexation ordinance void holding that person who is not party to contract does not have standing to challenge contract