how to interpret the terms “arising under” and “workmen’s compensation laws” with respect to retaliatory discharge claims premised on Michigan law. In answering this question, we apply federal law criteria. Grubbs v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699, 705, 92 S.Ct. 1344, 31 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). a. “Arising Under” When interpreting § 1445(c), we are guided by the fact that Congress invoked the identical “arising under” language when it enacted the federal question jurisdiction statute, which provides that “[t]he district courts shall have jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Cf. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 829-30, 122 S.Ct. 1889, 153 L.Ed.2d 13 (2002) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating
holding that statutes conferring general jurisdiction including 28 usc  1331 do not waive sovereign immunity holding that 28 usc  1331 does not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity holding that the district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 usc  1338a over a legal malpractice claim that was based upon an alleged attorney error in drafting a patent claim in a manner that narrowed the scope of the patent holding that 28 usc  2401 is a jurisdictional statute of limitations holding that  ijinguistic consistency  required that the same arising under test be applied to the jurisdictional statute for patent claims 28 usc  1338a as is used for the general federal jurisdiction statute 28 usc  1331