fact that the right and the limitation are written into the same statute does not indicate a legislative intent as to whether or when the statute of limitations should be tolled.” Burnett, supra, 380 U.S. at 427 n. 2, 85 S.Ct. at 1054 n. 2. See also Leake v. University of Cincinnati, 605 F.2d 255, 259 (6th Cir.1979). Additionally, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) does not speak in specific jurisdictional terms or affirmatively grant jurisdiction to the district courts, and must be read with 28 U.S.C. § 1337, supra, to most accurately describe the statutory source of the jurisdictional grant. Cf Zipes, supra, 455 U.S. at 393-94,102 S.Ct. at 1132-33 (similar structural analysis used under Title VII to support tolling statute); Ruiz v. Shelby County Sheriffs Department, 725 F.2d 388 (6th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Appellee is mistaken to suggest that
holding that equitable tolling of the time to file a notice of appeal is not permitted holding title vii subject to equitable tolling holding that the filing deadline under title vii is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court but a requirement that like a statute of limitations is subject to waiver estoppel and equitable tolling holding claims based on title vii subject to arbitration holding as subject to equitable tolling title vii statute authorizing suit brought within 90 days of receipt of right to sue notice