the State had the burden of disproving the defense. That course was inconsistent with the Model Jury Charge (Criminal), Homicide § 6, and violated the legislative commands contained in N.J.S.A. 2C:1-13b(1) and (2). Under those subsections, the State is required to disprove an affirmative defense if there is evidence supporting it, unless the code or another statute “requires the defendant to prove [the defense] by a preponderance of evidence or such other standard as specified in this code.” Since the felony murder affirmative defense does not contain language placing the burden of persuasion on a defendant, a proper jury instruction must advise that the State has the burden of disproving the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf. State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 200, 478 A.2d 364 (1984) (<HOLDING>). The difficulty with defendant’s position in
holding that if any evidence raising the issue of selfdefense is adduced  the jury must be instructed that the state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the selfdefense claim does not accord with the facts holding that the trial judge correctly instructed the jury that in resolving whether the crime occurred in tennessee they must be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence introduced on that issue holding that a challenged jury instruction did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof when the trial court elsewhere instructed the jury that the state must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt holding that the state must prove juvenile delinquency beyond a reasonable doubt holding that failure of trial court to instruct jury that state must prove beyond reasonable doubt killing was not committed in heat of passion required reversal of murder conviction even though there was general charge that state was required to prove each element of offenses beyond reasonable doubt