of this argument. To the contrary, the cases Marshak has most heavily relied upon in this litigation show that “in general, neither opposition to registration nor a petition for cancellation under 15 U.S.C., section 1064, is a prerequisite to a cancellation counterclaim in an infringement action.” Marshak v. Green, 505 F.Supp. at 1060; see also Orient Express Trading Company, Ltd. v. Federated Department Stores, Inc., 842 F.2d 650 (2d Cir.1988). d) Equitable Relief In light of the overwhelming evidence of fraud presented in this case, the Court declines to exercise its equitable powers on Marshak’s behalf. This Court therefore rejects Marshak’s invocation of the doctrine of laches. See Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Leupold & Stevens, Inc., 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1497, 1499, 1986 WL 83320 (TTAB 1986)(<HOLDING>). The Court also declines to grant Mars-hak
recognizing laches as an equitable defense to a motion to reopen holding that laches is an affirmative defense holding that equitable defense of laches is inapplicable to claims of fraud holding that a laches defense is inapplicable to a statute providing that a motion to vacate a sentence may be made at any time holding that where defense of laches was not pleaded denial of equitable relief on grounds of laches was error