as a matter of law that Ellins acted in his capacity as a public employee when he led the no-confidence vote. There was sufficient evidence to suggest that this was not a task he was paid to perform. Therefore, a jury could reasonably conclude that Ellins’s union activities and related speech were undertaken in his capacity as a private citizen. An the Seventh Circuit has recently held, comments made by a police officer acting in his capacity as a union representative are spoken as a private citizen, rather than pursuant to the officer’s official duties. Fuerst v. Clarke, 454 F.3d 770 (7th Cir.2006). In Fuerst, the plaintiff, a deputy sheriff who also served as the president of the Milwaukee County deputy sheriffs’ union, publicly criticized the county sheriffs proposal to hi C.2011) (<HOLDING>). Given the inherent institutional conflict of
holding that private possession of child pornography is not protected by the first amendment holding that detectives statements critical of a departmental staffing initiative were protected by the first amendment because the detective spoke as a police union representative holding that comments made by deputy sheriff as president of sheriffs union were prima facie protected by the first amendment as a contribution to political debate holding first amendment claim requires actual protected conduct holding that the defendants sixth amendment confrontation clause rights were not violated by the admission of the child victims statements to her mother grandmother a detective and a forensic investigator