and placed in Dolan’s position, could be expected to act in the same manner, the Quarles public safety exception applies. See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 991 F.2d 1308, 1313 (7th Cir.1993); Fleming v. Collins, 954 F.2d 1109, 1113-14 (5th Cir.1992) (en banc); United States v. Knox, 950 F.2d 516, 519 (8th Cir.1991). 2. Lack of Probable Cause for Arrest Dodge also asserts that the warrant pursuant to which he was arrested was not supported by probable cause, and argues that the arresting officers thus had no legitimate authority to arrest him in his home. See Deft’s Amended Mot. to Suppress at 1. Any statements made would be the product of this unlawful arrest and thus would be sub ject to suppression. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2261, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (<HOLDING>). In particular, Dodge claims that probable
holding that statements given after miranda warnings are admissible even when the arrest that preceded the statements was constitutionally deficient holding that miranda warnings do not have to be given in the exact form stated in the miranda opinion as long as an effective equivalent is given holding that although defendants voluntarily given initial statement was inadmissible because of miranda violation subsequent statement made after careful miranda warnings were given and waiver was obtained was admissible holding incustody statements which stem from an illegal arrest are not rendered admissible merely because defendant had been given miranda warnings holding that selfinitiated statements volunteered after miranda warnings had been given are admissible