post facto violation under the United States Constitution. Id. at 1241. The Superior Court also determined that Appellant was not entitled to withdraw his plea even though he and the trial court may have been under a mistaken impression as to the length of Appellant’s registration obligation. The court based its determination on the conclusion that the registration requirements of Megan’s Law are a collateral as opposed to a direct consequence of the criminal conviction. The court noted that this Court has consistently held that a defendant’s lack of knowledge of collateral consequences to the entry of a guilty plea does not render a plea unknowing or involuntary. Commonwealth v. Leidig, 850 A.2d 743, 746 (Pa.Super.2004) (citing Commonwealth v. Frometa, 520 Pa. 552, 555 A.2d 92 (1989) (<HOLDING>); and Commonwealth v. Duffey, 536 Pa. 436, 639
holding that appellant was harmed by trial courts failure to admonish him of deportation consequences of his guilty plea where the record was silent about whether he was ever specifically informed that his guilty plea could result in deportation and record showed that appellant moved to the united states from korea holding statements during voir dire and oral motion in limine were merely opaque references to deportation but  silent about whether appellant was actually informed that a guilty plea could result in his deportation and insufficient to support inference appellant knew consequences of his plea holding record insufficient to support inference appellant knew consequences of his plea when record is silent about whether appellant was actually informed that a guilty plea could result in his deportation recognizing that where a defendant enters a plea to a crime without having been informed of the crimes elements  the plea is invalid  holding that a plea was valid even though the defendant had not been informed that as a foreign national who had immigrated to this country he would face deportation as a result of the plea