in question, immediately entitled to a benefit while others, though designated by the participant, only stand to become entitled to a benefit upon some contingency such as the participant’s death. In both situations, the threshold requirement of having been designated by the participant (or by the terms of the plan) would be satisfied. In this case it was not. Because Mrs. Park died without applying for pension benefits, Mr. Park (who, as her spouse, is the beneficiary designated by the terms of the plan), is the only person eligible to receive her pension benefits. (See Plan Document, attached as Ex. B to Mendes Aff., at 86-87.) If Mrs. Park had submitted an application to receive her pension benefits before she died, as required for 35 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 923 F.2d 844 (2d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>)). The Estate was, during Mrs. Park’s lifetime,
holding that the son of a pension plan participant who had not been designated to receive any of his fathers pension benefits stood no closer to beneficiary status than any other person holding that a pension plan participants son not designated a beneficiary lacked standing to maintain an erisa action in both his individual capacity and his capacity as the representative of the deceased participants estate holding that the defendant withheld pension benefits in breach of the plan holding that appropriate remedy was to compute service credit for veterans in accordance with vrra rather than pursuant to employers pension plan and requiring retroactive pension plan payments to be made holding that a waiver would not be enforceable where the participant has retired and the pension plan clearly states that beneficiary election is irrevocable upon retirement