F.2d 1407, 1409 (9th Cir.1984) (same). As to the jury-cost sanction, the District Court purported to rely on its inherent powers. “It has long been understood that ‘[cjertain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institution,’ powers ‘which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others.’ ” Chambers, 111 S.Ct. at 2132 (quoting United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Crunch) 32, 34, 3 L.Ed. 259 (1812)). The Chambers Court explicitly recognized courts’ inherent power to “assess attorney’s fees when a party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Id., 111 S.Ct. at 2133 (internal quotations omitted); see also Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 767, 100 S.Ct. at 2464 (<HOLDING>). The Chambers Court also held that the
holding attorneys fees not recoverable under pre1980 version of section 1927 but remanding because they might be justified under the courts inherent power holding that attorneys fees and court costs are recoverable under general hold harmless indemnity agreement holding attorneys fees not generally recoverable unless party prevails under cause of action for which attorneys fees are recoverable and damages are recovered holding that a law clerks time is recoverable as part of attorneys fees under  1988 recognizing that sanctions under  1927 may be imposed against a law firm