listed bad faith, fraud, malice, and knowing infringement as non-exclusive examples of the sort of culpable conduct that could support a fee award. Moreover, the culpable conduct may relate not only to the circumstances of the Lanham Act violation, but also to the way the losing party handled himself during the litigation. Second, if the District Court finds culpable conduct, it must decide whether the circumstances are “exceptional” enough to warrant a fee award. Green v. Fornario, 486 F.3d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted). The requirement that a district court find culpability before awarding attorneys’ fees under the Lanham Act has been in place in this Circuit for over two decades. See Ferrero U.S.A., Inc. v. Ozak Trading, Inc., 952 F.2d 44, 48 (3d Cir. 1991) (<HOLDING>). While this action was on appeal, the Supreme
holding that trial court must make a threshold finding of plaintiffs bad faith before awarding fees to a prevailing defendant holding that in the context of the criminal tax statute in question willfully meant prompted by bad faith or evil intent holding that a bad faith claim is a tort holding that a finding of plaintiffs bad faith is not a prerequisite to the trial courts exercise of discretion to award fees holding that awarding fees under  35a is inappro priate absent an explicit finding  that the losing party acted willfully or in bad faith