has particular force in the context of jury instructions, because the question of whether a party has affirmatively requested a specific jury instruction should be readily apparent from the trial record. ¶ 23 Under these circumstances, we must conclude that Yegan, by requesting that the court instruct the jury based on the definition of sexual conduct found in the obscenity statutes, is now precluded from complaining of its use at trial. See id. at 565, ¶ 8, 30 P.3d at 633 (finding that defendant invited error by requesting the theft instruction complained of on appeal and that “equity favors the application of the usual rule of invited error rather than the exceptional rule of fundamental error”) (citation omitted); see also State v. Diaz, 168 Ariz. 363, 365, 813 P.2d 728, 730 (1991) (<HOLDING>); State v. Evans, 88 Ariz. 364, 369, 356 P.2d
holding that a claim not raised before the trial court will not be considered for the first time on appeal holding that issues raised for the first time on appeal are reviewed for plain error holding that a party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal holding that defendant could not claim error for the first time on appeal by reason of an instruction given at his request holding that defendant could not address merits of claim of error for first time in reply brief even though defendant cited to statute governing issue in initial brief claim of error deemed waived on appeal