accounts were used to ensure the separation of recreational and transportation funds.” Id. While it recognized that “the path can be used for recreational purposes,” WSDOT perceived these uses to be minimal and fairly insignificant in comparison to its transportation function. See id. ¶38 Furthermore, viewed in the light most favorable to Camicia, the deed conveying portions of the trail to the City suggests the City lacks the ability to close the trail to transportation. A fact finder could reasonably infer that the 1-90 trail would be open to public bicycling for transportation purposes regardless of any recreational use or function and that the public invitation was therefore not “for the purposes of outdoor recreation.” ¶39 In short, genuine issues of fact remain (9th Cir. 1999) (<HOLDING>). Washington’s recreational use immunity
holding that the courts analysis should focus on the nature of the abuse injuries inflicted and the effect of both holding that in determining whether a crime is a continuing offense the court must focus on the nature of the substantive offense and not on the specific characteristics of the conduct in the case at issue holding that the proper focus when determining the starting point of the limitations period  is upon the time of the discriminatory acts not upon the time at which the consequences of the acts became most painful  holding that the proper focus is on the landowners intent and not the injured invitees citing gaeta 54 wn app at 60809 holding that proper focus is reasonableness of inquiry not frivolousness