positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Int’l Union v. Cummins, Inc., 434 F.3d 478, 485 (6th Cir.2006) (citing United Steel-ivorkers v. Mead Cot"p., 21 F.3d 128, 131 (6th Cir.1994)). “The presumption favoring arbitration is based on a policy recognizing arbitration as a ‘substitute for industrial strife,’ see Malone & Hyde, 23 F.3d at 1043 (quoting Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 578, 80 S.Ct. 1347)), and on the belief that arbitrators, more so than the courts, possess the proper experience and expertise to resolve labor disputes,” id. (citing Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 213-14, 111 S.Ct. 2215, 115 L.Ed.2d 177 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). The question presented he 31 (4th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); United Steelworkers v. The Duluth Clinic,
holding that a letter of understanding was collateral to the cba and therefore not governed by the cbas arbitration clause holding that when an arbitration clause has provisions that defeat the remedial purpose of the statute  the arbitration clause is not enforceable and that the language insulating an employer from damages and equitable relief renders the clause unenforceable holding that district courts are required to compel arbitration of claims subject to arbitration clause even if the result is piecemeal litigation holding that an addendum to the cba was integral to it and therefore subject to the arbitration clause holding that the best way to harmonize a choice of law clause and an arbitration clause is to apply the substantive case law of the named state to the entire agreement including the arbitration clause