a noninvasive procedure which posed little risk of harm. He had done similar tests many times on, in his view, similarly rusty boilers without cooling them down first. And nothing in his observations or discussions with Mr. Nelson suggested that this particular boiler posed a heightened risk of danger. Mr. Reimer’s version of events will, of course, be subject to challenge by defendants, but, at this stage, these facts create a genuine issue as to Mr. Reimer’s actual knowledge of the risk in this case. See Kraft, 136 F.3d at 586 (reversing summary judgment to defendant and finding significant to appreciation of risk element that plaintiff “had placed her hands and feet into this gap before without incident.”); Piotrowski v. Southworbh Prods. Corp., 15 F.3d 748, 753 (8th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. S. Minn. Mach. Sales, Inc., 442
holding that an individual is not qualified for a job if there is a genuine substantial risk that he could be injured or could injure others and the employer cannot modify the job to eliminate that risk holding that plaintiff who was injured in fall from table did not have actual knowledge of a known risk and he did not make the choice to chance the risk rather than avoid it where he and other employees had similarly stood or stomped on the lift table without incident for seven months holding that a plaintiff who did not show that he was paid at a lower rate than similarly situated employees could not survive summary judgment holding that where the debtor did not act but merely had knowledge of and benefit from the fraudulent transfer he was not considered to have performed it holding that the government must prove actual subjective knowledge and that a defendant may not be convicted on just what he should have known