8 . Prior to Amendment 674, application note 1 merely instructed that a " '[cjrime of violence’ does not include the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon.” See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b), comment, (n.l) (2003). Thus, pursuant to Amendment 674, felons that possess those firearms described in § 5845(a) now do not fall within the rule that excludes felons in possession offenses from the definition of "crime of violence.” See id. In amending this commentary, the Sentencing Commission explained that "Congress has determined that those firearms described in [§ 5845(a)] are inherently dangerous and when po uous, the rule of lenity is not applicable. See United States v. Camacho-Ibarquen, 410 F.3d 1307, 1315 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 457, 163 L.Ed.2d 347 (2005) (<HOLDING>). 10 . In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held
holding that the rule of lenity applies to sentencing guidelines holding that rules of contract construction are to be applied where the language used is ambiguous holding that the rule of lenity applies only if the provision being construed is still ambiguous after the application of normal rules of construction holding in sentencing guidelines context that the rule of lenity requires that we construe ambiguous terms in favor of the accused recognizing that the rule of lenity applies only after courts exhaust all other evidence of congressional meaning