memorandum stated only one reason for the recommendation. It recommended: “an additional four-point downward adjustment for stipulating to removal pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0.” (emphasis added). One can stipulate to removal (i.e. agree not to contest a notice of intent to reinstate an order of deportation) without waiving appeal and participating in the “fast track” program. By not stating all of the reasons for the recommendation as is promised by the “on the basis” language of the agreement, the government did not literally comply with the agreement’s terms. Thus, the issue is not enthusiasm, but the government’s obligation under the language of the agreement to disclose all of its reasons in support of the recommendation. See United States v. Fisch, 863 F.2d 690, 690 (9th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Second, and more significantly, the
holding that defendant was not entitled to specific performance of alleged cooperation agreement entered into with fbi agent who allegedly promised defendant he would not be prosecuted if he cooperated in making a statement where there was no evidence establishing that agent was authorized to make promises to obtain defendants cooperation holding that the district court abused its discretion in denying the defendants timely motion for the substitution of the participating prosecutor in order to permit the defense to call the prosecutor as a witness holding that where the plea agreement required the government to inform the sentencing court of all defendants cooperation the issue  is not whether the prosecutor enthusiastically disclosed his cooperation but whether the prosecutor disclosed all cooperation holding that cooperation agreement defendant entered into with the government did not include defendants testifying at trial where there was no meeting of the minds as to that point holding although different sentencing court may have given more weight to defendants cooperation disagreement with the courts assessment does not warrant reversal since our task is confined to determining whether the district court considered the appropriate range of factors and arrived at a reasonable sentence