(Weinstein, J.) (applying such a balancing test). It is in light of this background that we must address Ms. Bobkoski’s objection to the magistrate judge’s application of the deliberative process privilege. 1. Availability of Privilege to State Entity Ms. Bobkoski’s first argument is that Magistrate Judge Guzman erred by applying a federal privilege to a state entity. Because we believe there was no error, we reject this objection. The court in Moorhead v. Lane, 125 F.R.D. 680 (C.D.Ill.1989), applied the federal deliberative process privilege to an Illinois state agency. The court specifically held that it was “proper to recognize an executive predecisional deliberative process privilege for state agencies.” Id. at 686; see also N.O. v. Callahan, 110 F.R.D. 637, 642-43 (D.Mass.1986) (<HOLDING>). The Moorhead court reasoned that such a
recognizing privilege recognizing application of federal deliberative process privilege to internal state communications recognizing federal common law privilege for psychotherapistpatient communications but holding that litigant waived privilege by raising issue as to her psychological state holding that internal emails about how to present an agency decision to the public were covered by the deliberative process privilege holding that there is no statutory deliberative process privilege in arizona and declining to create such a privilege under the common law