[EEOC] charge and grow out of such allegations.” ’ Nicol, 767 F.Supp. at 752. As to the retaliation claim (COUNT II), the Fourth Circuit explicitly has held that retaliation is reasonably related to a previous charge of discrimination. See Nealon v. Stone, 958 F.2d 584, 590 (4th Cir.1992) (“All other circuits that have considered the issue have determined that a plaintiff may raise the retaliation claim for the first time in federal court. On consideration, we find these rationales persuasive and we adopt this position.”). This approach makes intuitive sense because of the special nature of a retaliation claim—there can be little expectation of conciliation with an employer whose response to a charge of discrimination can be to retaliate. See Malhotra v. Cotter & Co 2 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); and Nicol, 767 F.Supp. at 752-54 (holding
holding that reference to termination based on race in charge did not reasonably relate to unmentioned racial harassment holding that custody decision based on race is not justified holding that a charge that alleged discrimination on the basis of sex did not support a complaint for hostile environment sexual harassment holding that plaintiff who filed administrative charge for racial harassment and discrimination could add claim for retaliation because some of the same facts supported both types of claims holding that because the amendment added a new substantive theory which is fundamentally distinct from the original race discrimination charge it did not relate to or grow out of the plaintiffs original eeoc charge