issue or, alternatively, (2) a finding that Rodriguez did not have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” would obviate the need to analyze D.R.E. 504 since, here, a third-party videotaping police officer — not a spouse — would be testifying as to the conversations between Rodriguez and Howard, the parties having in effect waived the privilege. See Weedon v. State, De 735, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (finding that no actual subjective expectation of privacy existed in numbers dialed from home telephone when Katz subjective prong applied); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990) (finding that overnight guest had actual expectation of privacy in host’s home when Katz subjective prong applied). 21 . U.S. v. Clark, 8th Cir., 22 F.3d 799, 801-02 (1994) (<HOLDING>); U.S. v. McKinnon, 11th Cir., 985 F.2d 525,
holding that prisoners have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their prison cells holding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth holding that police officer had no reasonable expectation of privacy while in his official capacity he interrogated suspect in jailhouse holding that prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells holding that defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in statements made to companion while seated in police car