two. See 2003 WL 22706781 at *72-73 (citing Salinas, 522 U.S. at 64-65, 118 S.Ct. 469). To the extent, however, that Sanchez’s arguments are simply directed toward the sufficiency of the evidence that he even conspired to violate RICO, they are belied by the evidence adduced at trial, which established Sanchez’s role in the enterprise’s activities, including collecting drug taxes, drug distribution in jail, and the conspiracy to murder Turscak. Moreover, his arguments are inconsistent with governing RICO case law, under which a defendant convicted of a substantive violation of § 1962(c) is also guilty of a § 1962(d) conspiracy to violate RICO, as long as the separate elements of the crime of conspiracy are met. See, e.g., United States v. Starrett, 55 F.3d 1525, 1549 (11th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Frega, 179 F.3d 793, 808-10
holding that circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to support a cocaine conspiracy conviction holding that evidence was sufficient to support bribery convictions because evidence established that payment was given to influence any one or more instances types or courses of official action holdingthat evidence was sufficient to support defendants convictions on rape and aggravated assault charges holding that because evidence was sufficient to support defendants  1962c convictions and jury could infer from evidence that defendants each manifested an agreement to participate in enterprises affairs evidence was sufficient to support defendants  1962d convictions for rico conspiracy holding merely that the evidence was sufficient to support the award of attorneys fees