States v. Kin-caide, 145 F.3d 771, 781 (6th Cir.1998), cert. denied, sub nom., Key v. United States, 525 U.S. 1166, 119 S.Ct. 1085, 143 L.Ed.2d 86 (1999). In Washington, the Supreme Court indicated that the easiest justification for applying manifest necessity was when the jury was deadlocked. Washington, 434 U.S. at 509, 98 S.Ct. 824. See also Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 323-24, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984); Daniels v. Burke, 83 F.3d 760, 763 (6th Cir.1996). The application of the test is left to the broad discretion of the trial judge. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 461-63, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 35 L.Ed.2d 425 (1973)(citing United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 579, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824)). See also United States v. Stevens, 177 F.3d 579, 583 (6th Cir.1999)(<HOLDING>). Generally, if the defendant requests the
recognizing the range of discretion of the trial judge holding that a trial judge has discretion to exclude evidence of pending charges and that where the defendant was given a full opportunity outside the presence of the jury to develop a foundation for bias but failed to do so the trial judge did not abuse its discretion recognizing that the trial judge must be given a wide range of discretion in determining whether a mistrial should be declared recognizing that wide discretion in imposition of sentence reposes in the trial judge recognizing that agencies have discretion to identify the range of reasonable alternatives