posed by Walker’s use of a firearm in connection with two crimes of violence and one drug trafficking crime more than he might have been punished for “actual” violent crime. Walker also argues that Section 924(c)(1) is irrational because it fails to differentiate between a first time offender who commits more than one Section 924(c)(1) offense and a recidivist. Consequently, he contends that he is being punished as a recidivist even though he has not “failed to learn his lessons from the initial punishment” and committed a repeat offense. The Supreme Court has rejected the contention that the second or consecutive sentencing provision of Section 924(c)(l)(C)(i) could only rationally apply to “recidivists.” See Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 113 S.Ct. 1993, 124 L.Ed.2d 44 (1993) (<HOLDING>). In rejecting the contention that application
holding that when two underlying offenses are charged in an indictment for capital murder the state need only prove one of the two offenses to support the conviction holding that when defendants plead not guilty the government is required to prove all elements of charged offenses including intent holding that in the conviction and sentencing for criminal offenses committed in the course of one criminal episode it is the intent of the legislature that there be a separate conviction and sentence for each criminal offense unless one of the offenses is a degree of the other a necessarily included lesser offense subsumed in the other or both offenses are identical holding that a defendants statements regarding offenses for which he had not been charged were admissible notwithstanding the attachment of his sixth amendment right to counsel on other charged offenses holding that congress intended that the mandatory terms of 20 years each for second and subsequent offenses required by section 924c1c be imposed even if all of the offenses were charged in the same indictment