Uniform Commercial Code by broadening consumer remedies, it does not relax the meaning and definition of terms within that Code. See Am. Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Superior Ct., 37 Cal.App.4th 1291, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 526, 528 (Cal.Ct.App.1995) (analyzing Song-Beverly Act implied warranty claim under case law interpreting UCC implied warranty provisions). 12 . In its motion to dismiss, Whirlpool seeks dismissal of the Magnuson-Moss claims because the Plaintiffs have failed to allege "a violation of any specific warranty provision.” [Doc. 21 at 2.] Although it is not certain that the Plaintiffs’ Magnuson-Moss claims may proceed on the basis of the nontraditional warranties, see 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6) (defining written warranty); Skelton v. Gen. Motors Corp., 660 F.2d 311, 322 (7th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>), Whirlpool has not pushed this argument in its
holding county does not fit statutory definition of victim under restitution statutes holding that the statutory definition of motor vehicle is not controlling holding that support does not encompass miscellaneous expenses holding that statutory written warranty definition does not encompass statements in brochures and advertising holding that the definition of employer for title vii purposes does not encompass individu al supervisors even if such individuals are acting as agents of the employer