(Oakes, C.J., dissenting), as well as the fact that an airport terminal is wholly different from a post office sidewalk, see id. at 584-87, I believe that the panel’s reading of Kokinda will, at a minimum, constitute bad law for our circuit and, at most, have extremely deleterious consequences for future public fora jurisprudence. Third, I would grant rehearing to reconcile the panel’s conclusion that a forum’s purpose alone can determine its public or non-public status, see Lee, 925 F.2d at 581-82, with our circuit’s longstanding doctrine that the status of a forum is determined by a complex balancing of competing factors, none of which alone is dispositive. See Wolin v. Port of New York Auth., 392 F.2d 83, 89 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940, 89 S.Ct. 290, 21 L.Ed.2d 275 (1968) (<HOLDING>). I should suppose that rehearing en banc could
holding that the doorway of the home is a public place for purposes of the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment holding that a forums status is determined by whether the character of the place the pattern of usual activity the nature of its essential purpose and the population who take advantage of the general invitation extended make it an appropriate place for communication of views on issues of political and social significance holding that it violated the first amendment to prohibit announcement of views on disputed legal and political issues by candidates for judicial election holding nature of motion is determined by its substance not its title holding that one of several houses throughout the world among which the defendant divided his time constituted a dwelling house or usual place of abode for purpose of service of process regardless of the facts that it was not the defendants principal domicile and that he spent comparatively little time there