regarding an appeal.") In reaching this holding, the Supreme Court described the cireumstances that must be present for there to be a duty on counsel to consult about the possibility of appeal: [Clounsel has a constitutionally imposed duty to consult with the defendant about an appeal when there is reason to think either (1) that a rational defendant would want to appeal (for example, because there are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal), or (2) that this particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing. Id T6 Petitioner has not shown either of these circumstances was present in his case. Moreover, Petitioner's Alford pleas entered for a second time as part of a plea agreement are certainly not indicative of any desire to appeal. See id. (<HOLDING>). On this record, Petitioner has not shown that
holding that a highly relevant factor concerning whether there was a breach of duty to consult about appeal is whether the conviction follows a trial or a guilty plea both because a guilty plea reduces the seope of potentially appealable issues and because such a plea may indicate that the defendant seeks an end to judicial proceedings holding that plea of guilty or nolo contendere is not rendered involuntary because it is a product of plea bargaining an accepted plea bargain must be recorded and court may accept a bargained plea to a lesser offense reasonably related to a charged offense holding that a defendants guilty plea was unconditional where the guilty plea was not in writing and the government did not consent to it being conditional recognizing timing of guilty plea and prejudice to codefendants rele vant when deciding whether to accept guilty plea holding that the defendants guilty plea was valid where the district court carefully questioned the defendant about whether he understood the consequences of his guilty plea