the court to take additional evidence if necessary, to re-evaluate the award, and to explain its “thought process” (id. at 456, 812 A.2d 1089) in regard to FL § ll-106(c)(2). As the case law illustrates, making the type of prediction required by FL § ll-106(c)(2) is sometimes an exceptionally difficult task. In the present case, the trial court made a commendable attempt to reach an equitable result despite the gulf between the analysis dictated by the statute and the evidence offered by the parties. The evidence conclusively showed that, even after imputing income to Wife, she was entitled to alimony at least in the 2015 and 2016 calendar years. Husband conceded as much in his closing argument, and rightly so. See Rogers v. Rogers, 80 Md.App. 575, 591-92, 565 A.2d 361 (1989) (<HOLDING>). The court evidently agreed that Wife had
holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint holding that court abused discretion in denying alimony where highest salary ever earned by wife was small fraction of husbands current salary holding that bia abused its discretion in denying motion to reopen holding that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering temporary alimony that exceeded the husbands ability to pay holding that equitable principles prevent the revival of alimony where it would be inequitable to allow wife to receive support from two husbands