Law §§ 290 et seq., and her claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for, inter alia, retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and procedural history, and we affirm the district court’s judgment. We hold that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the defendants on Kearney’s age-discrimination claims. Regarding Kearney’s reassignment to the Criminal Unit, the district court held that no evidence supported the element of Kearney’s prima facie case requiring proof of a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment. See Galabya v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 202 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir.2000) (setting forth this requirement); Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 466 (2d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). The district court was correct to require
holding that claims under the adea and the nyshrl are subject to the same analysis holding that disparate impact claims are not cognizable under the adea holding that plaintiffs equal protection claim pursuant to 42 usc  1983 for agebased employment discrimination fails for the same reasons that her adea and nyshrl claims fail under mcdonnell douglas analysis holding no individual liability under the adea holding that when the district court disposed of the adea claims the pendent claims became subject to dismissal for want of subject matter jurisdiction