“unless the defendant is given an opportunity to participate, his speedy trial rights may be whittled away in the non-adversary context of ex parte communications between the government and the court.” Id. at 743. The Fifth Circuit has similarly held that continuances that are “granted ex parte or sua sponte or occur[] accidentally .. . thwart the purposes of the IAD[] and chisel away defendants’ rights to a speedy trial under the agreement.” Birdwell, 983 F.2d at 1339; see also United States v. Collins, 90 F.3d 1420, 1428 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining that “there is no provision [in the IAD] for the district court to unilaterally and without a hearing extend the continuance — and its attendant tolling — an additional four days”); Stroble v. Anderson, 587 F.2d 830, 839-40 (6th Cir. 1978) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 940 (1979); Abramson,
holding that a district courts marginal order granting summary judgment did not meet the strict requirements of rule 58 because a party may reasonably be confused as to the standing of its ease when a decision is rendered in such an informal manner holding interpretation may not be inconsistent with regulation holding that openended continuances to serve the ends of justice are not prohibited if they are reasonable in length holding that both the lodestar and the percentage of the fund methods are permitted holding that informal methods of granting continuances are inconsistent with the requirements of the iad