implied, this court concluded that the General Assembly “did not intend the 200-foot width limitation to apply to the condemnation of private property for the construction of a railroad’s physical facilities ... which have a sufficiently direct functional relationship to the operation of the railroad....” Id. at 352 (emphasis added). In this case, the parking facility that CDOT seeks to build has no “functional” relationship to the highway project. Rather, the trial court determined that the purpose of the parking facility was compliance with contractual and environmental obligations that have no bearing on the functional aspects of the highway project. See State Dep’t of Highways v. Denver and Rio Grande Western R.R. Co., 757 P.2d 181, 183 (Colo.App.1988), aff'd 789 P.2d 1088 (<HOLDING>). Thus, even the majority’s reliance on Buck to
holding property settlement to be contractual obligation from date of final judgment of divorce holding that property owner still has relief in the form of the return of his property though condemnation was complete and a highway was constructed across the property recognizing that the section does not  authorize suits for cancellation in the district courts recognizing that publicly targeting a property for condemnation resulting in economic damage to the owner generally does not give rise to an inverse condemnation cause of action unless there is some direct restriction on use of the property holding that section 431208 does not expressly or implicitly authorize condemnation of a private way of necessity for property having no connection with highway alteration other than to fulfill a contractual obligation