assumed by the bondsman from the beginning. Id. at 215. Because the new charges were in the same class (all felonies) and originated from the same transaction, the court held the surety’s obligation was not discharged. Id. Similarly, in State v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America, 672 P.2d 251 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983), the defendant was originally charged with aggravated assault, released on bail and later charged with rape, kidnapping, and unlawful restraint. Even with the addition of three serious new felonies, the court concluded that “[t]he fact that the State proposed to try [defendant] for additional crimes ... did not alter the surety’s obligation to produce him on the original charge.” Id. at 253; see also People v. Soto-Gallegos, 953 P.2d 946, 947-48 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997) (<HOLDING>); State v. Pashall, 174 A. 175, 176-77 (Conn.
holding that where the writings on file were insufficient to constitute an effective charge a charge had not been effectively filed despite the fact that the eeoc had assigned the case a charge number holding that because the amendment added a new substantive theory which is fundamentally distinct from the original race discrimination charge it did not relate to or grow out of the plaintiffs original eeoc charge holding that failure to charge jury that state had burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not act in the heat of passion was harmless because the evidence did not support a charge on passionprovocation manslaughter holding that addition of charge for crime committed while the defendant was released on bail did not discharge suretys obligation to produce the defendant on original charge holding that because a mutual combat charge authorizes a jury to find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter in lieu of murder it is a charge that benefits a defendant and as such a convicted defendants complaint that it was improper to give the charge is without merit