by appellant would not fall within the conduct prohibited by the statute. Appellant suggests Section 38.122 restricts communications where an individual identifies as a lawyer or a florist. Appellant also contends the statute touches on statements made by a lawyer who “worked as a lawyer for 20 years” and is now applying for a non-legal job. However, none of those communications violate Section 38.122 unless the individuals seek to obtain an economic benefit by holding himself or herself out as a lawyer when he or she is not licensed to practice law in Texas (or another jurisdiction) and is not in good standing. We conclude that the State of Texas has a compelling state interest in the regulation of lawyers. See Celis, 354 S.W.3d at 33 (citing Sperry, 373 U.S. 379, 383, 83 S.Ct. 1322) (<HOLDING>). We agree with Celis and hold that Section
holding that state has interest in regulating businesses that distribute defective products in that state holding that state court could regulate the practice of law in federal courts located in the state holding a state has a substantial interest in regulating the practice of law within the state holding that the mere fact that a cba contains antidiscrimination provisions regulating conduct that also violates state law does not render the state law dependent on the terms of the contract holding pennsylvania statute regulating subrogation is a law regulating insurance