the decision. Other federal courts are split on the question. See Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 496-97 (2d Cir.1999) (noting split among district courts but declining to decide issue). Judge Crabb, in the Western District of Wisconsin, has concluded that the burden of proof rests with the party seeking to overturn the decision. She reasons that this is the traditional allocation, and that it is consistent with the deferential standard afforded to agency decisions and with the Seventh Circuit’s approval of the conventional substantial evidence standard. APT Minneapolis, Inc. v. Eau Claire County, 80 F.Supp.2d 1014, 1022 (W.D.Wis.1999). At least one circuit court agrees with this view. See S.W. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc. v. Todd, 244 F.3d 51, 63 (1st Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). I agree with Judge Crabb’s reasoning and,
holding that traditional allocation of burden of proof to the party challenging the decisions applies to decisions under the tca holding that in the absence of an express statutory allocation of the burden of proof the board of immigration appealss placement of the burden on the alien was reasonable under chevron holding that substantial evidence implies the traditional standard used for judicial review of agency decisions holding that cue review applies only to prior final decisions of agencies of original jurisdiction ros and not to prior decisions of the board holding that this courts review of board decisions is limited to final orders or final decisions