existed to justify defendant’s untimely request to substitute counsel, but proceeding to analyze whether trial court properly canvassed defendant on his request to proceed pro se, made at same time as request to substitute counsel). Such a conclusion is consistent with the fact that a defendant’s right to self-representation raises distinctly different, and more compelling, concerns than does his right to replace competent counsel on the eve of trial. Compare, e.g., State v. Drakeford, supra, 202 Conn. 83 (“There is no unlimited opportunity to obtain alternate counsel. ... It is within the trial court’s discretion to determine whether a factual basis exists for appointing new counsel.” [Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]), with State v. Brown, supra, 256 Conn. 302 (<HOLDING>), and Williams v. Bartlett, supra, 44 F.3d 99
holding defendant waived selfrepresentation right by proceeding with assigned counsel and walking out of faretta hearing holding that right of selfrepresentation did not attach because defendant had made no indication of his desire to proceed without counsel recognizing the inviolability of the right of selfrepresentation holding that after trial court follows procedure outlined in nelson v state 274 so2d 256 fla 4th dca 1973 and denies motion to discharge counsel court is not thereafter obligated to inform defendant of his or her right to selfrepresentation absent an unequivocal request for selfrepresentation holding that written waivers referring only in general terms to potential advantages of representation by counsel and potential disadvantages of selfrepresentation did not sufficiently demonstrate awareness of the dangers of selfrepresentation