of the defendant, however, will shift the burden to the State to prove that the exercised challenges were not racially motivated. To sustain this burden, the State ... must satisfy the court that its peremptory challenges were made on grounds of specific, individual juror bias, or on grounds reasonably related to the particular case or trial ... and not solely on the ground of the juror's race. Riley I, 496 A.2d at 1013 (quotation and citation omitted). 11 . See, e.g., MacKintrush v. State, 978 S.W.2d 293, 297 (Ark.1998) (describing step three of Batson as requiring "that the trial court weigh and assess what has been presented to it to decide whether in light of all the circumstances, the proponent’s explanation is or is not pretextual”); State v. Collier, 553 So.2d 815, 821 (La.1989) (<HOLDING>) (quotation omitted). 12 . This is unlike the
holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext was insufficient because the plaintiff failed to present evidence that the employer did not honestly believe its proffered reasons for its action holding that summary judgment was appropriate where plaintiff attempted to prove pretext simply by showing that the defendant knew of her complaints and took an adverse employment action shortly thereafter and did not offer reasons as to why the legitimate reasons proffered for her discharge were pretextual holding that a reasonable jury could find pretext for a termination where the plaintiff stated that her work was satisfactory and there was no indication that the plaintiffs statement was either incredible or fanciful holding that the trial judge cannot simply rjubber stamp  a prosecutors nonracial explanation no matter how whimsical or fanciful  but in order to permit a questioned peremptory challenge  must conclude that the proffered reasons are first neutral and reasonable and second not a pretext recognizing that a trial judge can implicitly find a prosecutors proffered reasons credible