had passed since the will was admitted to probate. We held that her claim was barred because she had constructive notice of the filing of the will for probate. She could have determined that she had been excluded from the estate by examining the public records. Id. at 85. Similarly, in Neill v. Yett, 746 S.W.2d 32, 33-34 (Tex.App.—Austin 1988, writ denied), a granddaughter sued to set aside her grandfather’s will more than three years after it had been admitted to probate, alleging that the will had been fraudulently probated. The court of appeals held that her suit was time-barred because an examination of the probate records would have revealed there was no bequest to the granddaughter. Id. at 36; see also Estate of Ross, 672 S.W.2d 315, 318 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1984, ref'd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). These decisions are illuminating because they
holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city holding that four daughters who sought to set an aside order admitting their fathers will to probate had constructive notice because pjersons interested in an estate are charged with notice of the contents of probate records holding that the trial court was without authority to set aside entry of default on motion to set aside default judgment holding that a defendant is not entitled to relief from default judgment because notice to an attorney of filing of motions and orders is constructive notice to the client even when the client did not have actual notice holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner