building is a “violent felony.” The law is extremely clear that, for the purposes of determining armed career criminal status, burglary of a commercial establishment does fall within the meaning of “violent felony.” See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598-602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990). The Fourth Circuit has specifically held that burglary, for purposes of § 924(e), means “generic burglary, a crime consisting of three necessary elements: (1) an unlawful or unprivileged entry or remaining in; (2) a building or other structure; (3) with intent to commit a crime.” United States v. Bowden, 975 F.2d 1080, 1083 (4th Cir.1992) (applying North Carolina law); see also United States v. LaForce, 1994 WL 584678, 1994 U.S.App. LEXIS 29873 (4th Cir.1994) (unpublished opinion) (<HOLDING>). Defendant’s offenses, on January 22, 1992,
holding that iowa burglary is not categorical burglary as the elements of iowa burglary law are broader than those of generic burglary holding that possession of burglary tools is an offense separate from burglary holding that virginia burglary statute comes within definition of generic burglary holding that first degree burglary under oregon law is broader than the definition of generic burglary because the statute does not limit burglary to buildings or structures but also includes nonstructures such as booths vehicles boats and aircraft that are regularly or intermittently used as lodgings holding that a conviction under a divisible statute could not qualify as acca burglary pursuant to the modified categorical approach when there were no shepard documents to show that the crime of conviction was generic burglary