and misunderstanding of the local rules involving summar he district court abused its discretion in denying their Rule 60(b)(3) motion for relief from judgment. See Hesling v. CSX Tramp., Inc., 396 F.3d 632, 638 (5th Cir.2005). The Sangis did not provide the district court with clear and convincing evidence that FCC engaged in fraud or other misconduct or that any misconduct prevented them from fully and fairly presenting their case. See Gov’t Fin. Servs. v. Peyton Place, Inc., 62 F.3d 767, 772 (5th Cir.1995). Rather the Sangis offered only allegations of fraud and misconduct. Nor have the Sangis shown exceptional circumstances to merit relief under Rule 60(b)(6). See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 393, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993) (<HOLDING>). IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the
holding that the general rule that issues not raised in the lower court may not be addressed on appeal applies only to appellants holding that privilege applies in similar factual circumstances holding that when determining whether a delay in prosecution violates a defendants right to a speedy trial courts must consider the length of the delay the reason for the delay whether the defendant asserted his rights and the resulting prejudice to the defendant holding that cjredibility determinations are questions of fact and should only be overturned in extraordinary circumstances holding that rule 60b6 only applies in extraordinary circumstances suggesting that the party is faultless in the delay