attack on the justice court’s judgment because it is presumed regular and there is no nonextrinsic evidence showing that it is void due to the applicability of the automatic stay. See In re A.G.G., 267 S.W.3d at 169. We conclude and hold that the trial court could not hear the dispute independently of the DJA; thus, it could not hear the dispute within the procedural framework of the DJA. See Chenault, 914 S.W.2d at 141; Buttitta, 274 S.W.3d at 853. In addition, York may not collaterally attack the justice court’s judgment based on the alleged unconstitutionality of article 47.01a. A challenge to the constitutionality of a criminal statute must be brought in the trial court or it is forfeited. Karenev v. State, 281 S.W.3d 428, 434 (Tex.Crim.App.2009); see White, 930 S.W.2d at 675 (<HOLDING>). That a criminal proceeding is based upon an
holding that final judgment in a criminal case means sentence holding that a psychiatrist appointed by the court to conduct a competency examination of a criminal defendant performs functions essential to the judicial process and as such enjoys absolute immunity in performance of such functions holding that action under 4701a is a criminal case because trial court functions in its capacity as a criminal magistrate holding that any condition a state criminal court imposes as part of a criminal sentence is not dischargeable in bankruptcy holding that a disqualification order in a criminal case is not appealable