whether the jury found appellants guilty of violating only one statute or both,” the defendants “were not prejudiced; they were sentenced as if they had violated only one of the statutes, each of which ... carries the same penalties.” Murray, 618 F.2d at 898. Our analysis in Murray is directly applicable to the present case. As in Murray, there is no danger here of prejudice in connection with a lack of notice or double jeopardy rights. Nor is there a threat of a completely non-unanimous verdict that would undermine the validity of defendant’s conviction, to the extent such conviction is premised on defendant’s participation in only one of the two transactions, because we may assume that the jury followed the court’s unanimity instruction. See Abney, 431 U.S. at 655, 97 S.Ct. 2034 (<HOLDING>). Rather, the verdict simply suffers from a
holding with respect to unanimity instruction that we cannot assume that the jury disregarded these clear and unambiguous instructions holding that this court is required to assume that the jury followed the limiting instructions given by the district court holding that if jury instructions viewed as a whole fairly state the applicable law to the jury the failure to give particular instructions will not be error holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant holding that the trial court plainly erred in failing to provide a specific unanimity instruction to the jury