to avoid physical combat before resorting to the use of deadly force, and (3) used no more force than was reasonably necessary in all the circumstances of the case. Commonwealth v. Curtis, 417 Mass. 619, 632, 632 N.E.2d 821, 830 (1994), quoting Commonwealth v. Harrington, 379 Mass. 446, 450, 399 N.E.2d 475, 479 (1980). Reed argues that he had an “imperfect self-defense” justification, meaning that he used excessive force in defending himself. His position is therefore that he acted in self-defense but that he did not use the amount of force that the third prong of the self-defense standard requires. This “imperfect self-defense” reduces a defendant’s culpability from murder to voluntary manslaughter. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Boucher, 403 Mass. 659, 663-64, 532 N.E.2d 37, 40 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, only the first two prongs of the
holding that when selfdefense is carried out with excessive force a defendant would be guilty of manslaughter holding that defendant properly raised selfdefense but passing on the applicable burden of proof for establishing selfdefense in a voluntary manslaughter prosecution in the virgin islands holding that both involuntary manslaughter and selfdefense instructions are proper when there is evidence that the killing was accidental holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim recognizing that a defendant may commit involuntary manslaughter if he acts in selfdefense but is criminally negligent in doing so