have both the opportunity in accordance with the provisions of law to be considered for jury service in this state and the obligation to serve as a juror when selected. Iowa Code § 607A.1. This statement mirrors the fair-cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment and the purposes underlying that requirement. See State v. Lohr, 266 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 1978) (noting Iowa’s statutes governing jury-selection procedures seek to discharge the constitutional requirements that the jury be drawn from a fair cross section of the community and that no identifiable group be systematically excluded). Consequently, any departure from the statutory requirements that does not frustrate the goal of attaining a fair cross section of the community is not material. See Langdon, 126 Cal.Rptr. at 579 (<HOLDING>). We have previously held that the
holding that it is error to conduct most of the jury selection process in the absence of the defendant holding that a defendant could not establish stricklands prejudice prong because any erroneous exclusion of an impartial juror was harmless because we have every reason to believe the replacement was also an impartial juror the defendant does not dispute that he was convicted and sentenced by an impartial jury and he presents no reason to think that a jury composed of a slightly different set of impartial jurors would have reached a different verdict holding that a criminal defendants right to an impartial jury is guaranteed by article 1 section 9 of the pennsylvania constitution holding a material departure from statute governing jury selection is one that affects the substantial rights of a defendant in securing an impartial jury holding no violation of substantial rights occurred during voir dire where record did not show that defendant was denied fair and impartial trial