chose not to assert claims against Officers Gubitosi, Reynolds, and Thomas in the amended complaint. (Defs.’ Br. at 22.) “[W]hile t that plaintiff’s voluntarily dismissed claims were inflated or specious. 6 . In any event, even if the Court considered those discussions, it would not alter , the Court’s view regarding plaintiff’s degree of success in this lawsuit, 7 . As noted surpa, defendants do not dispute that $7,500 is an appropriate measure of attorneys' fees under the PLRA with respect to plaintiff's excessive force claim against Officer Cotter. The Court has independently reviewed plaintiff's calculations and determined that that sum, which by law is capped at 150 percent of plaintiff’s $5,000 jury award, is reasonable. See Shepherd v. Goord, 662 F.3d 603, 607 (2d Cir. 2011) (<HOLDING>), Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2), the
holding that attorneys fee award in a common fund case must be  reasonable under the circumstances holding that under 42 usc  1988 which allows the award of attorneys fees in a civil rights action under  1983 a prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily recover an attorneys fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust  quoting srep no 941011 p 4 1976 holding that under the plra no attorneys fee award greater than 150 percent of the monetary judgment may be entered against a defendant citing 42 usc  1997ed2 holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 holding that under 42 usc  1997ed2 a district court may apply less than 25 percent of the judgment as long as it applies some portion of the judgment to satisfy the attorneys fee award quoting parker v conway 581 f3d 198 205 3d cir 2009