laws. Two of those protections include the right to be free from the deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law, and the prohibition on passing bills of attainder. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) and (9). Accordingly, Defendant argues that the Tribe’s ordinance excluding him from the Reservation deprives him of his property without due process, and constitutes a bill of attainder. However, as the Tribe points out, the Supreme Court has held that there is no right to bring a civil action under the ICRA against a tribe or its officers in federal court, and thus, this Court cannot consider Defendant’s argument. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 51-52, 98 S.Ct. at 1673-74; R.J. Williams Company v. Fort Belk-nap Housing Authority, 719 F.2d 979, 981 (9th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, Defendant is not bringing an
holding that the rule applies for purposes of habeas corpus under section 2254 holding that managing conservator while in texas to seek return of child by writ of habeas corpus may not be served with civil process and is subject to jurisdiction of court in which habeas corpus is pending and only for purpose of prosecuting writ of habeas corpus recognizing that santa clara precludes bringing civil actions in federal court under the icra other than habeas corpus holding that the federal habeas corpus court could reach the merits of a due process claim even though there was no contemporaneous objection in state court trial where the state habeas corpus court reached the merits rather than rely on the procedural default defense holding that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law