trial, he could have used it to further undermine Jackson’s already shaky credibility and bolster his argument that Jackson had invented a third perpetrator in order to minimize his own level of involvement in the crime. Under these circumstances, the state court’s determination that the Police Activity Sheet did not satisfy the favorability prong of the Brady doctrine was unreasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). When this matter was last before us, we held that the state court’s deter 256, 157 L.Ed.2d 1166 (2004) (rejecting the state’s argument that no Brady violation had occurred because the witness was heavily impeached at trial, and thus that his status as a paid informant would have been merely cumulative impeachment evidence); Slutzker v. Johnson, 393 F.3d 373, 387 (3d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). We remain convinced that there is “a
holding that the information contained in the police files with regard to other possible suspects was not brady material holding that although the defendant was able to impeach the prosecution in certain respects the suppressed information was material under brady because there was a significant difference between the suppressed material and the information to which the defense had access holding that although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged brady material a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material holding that the alleged brady material was merely cumulative to the significant impeachment that already occurred during trial so there was no prejudice for a brady violation holding that such information is not material under securities law