without authority to grant JNOV judgments). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court’s grant of a JNOV in this case was improper. Nevertheless, trial courts do maintain the authority to order new trials for eviden-tiary insufficiency in criminal cases; a power which is the functional equivalent of granting a JNOV in a civil case. Therefore, when a jury returns a guilty verdict and the trial court grants the defendant’s motion for new trial based upon insufficiency of the evidence under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 30(b)(9), double jeopardy prevents the trial court from entering any other judgment than an acquittal. Tex.R.App. P. 30(b)(9); Moore v. State, 749 S.W.2d 54, 58 (Tex.Cr.App.1988); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2147, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, a trial court’s JNOV ruling after
holding that the jeopardy clause bars retrial when the prosecution failed to supply sufficient evidence to merit conviction holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met holding that where the evidence offered by the state and admitted by the trial court  whether erroneously or not  would have been sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict the double jeopardy clause does not preclude retrial holding that the double jeopardy clause bars retrial when the commonwealth intentionally undertakes to prejudice the defendant to the point of the denial of a fair trial holding that retrial did not violate the double jeopardy clause where reversal based on trial error distinguishing reversal for insufficient evidence