427 F.2d at 581. This construction is supported by other Texas court of appeals cases construing the privilege as inapplicable only when it is not invoked in good faith, or to protect against a reasonable fear of self-incrimination, but to prevent discovery necessary to the development of the opposing party’s case. See Denton, 897 S.W.2d at 760; Marshall v. Ryder Sys., Inc., 928 S.W.2d 190, 195-96 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied) (upholding sanctions against plaintiff who used privilege against criminal activity offensively to refuse to answer request for admission concerning “other criminal activity” where assertion of privilege would “deny appellees .information crucial to their defense”); Stewart v. Frazier, 461 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1970, no writ) (<HOLDING>). The construction of Katin and Speer that
holding that facts deemed admitted as to one defendant because of his failure to respond to the plaintiffs request for admissions are not binding on a codefendant holding that the defendants discovery requests were untimely because they were not served in time for the responses to be due before the discovery deadline holding trial courts general charge concerning requests for admissions was a correct statement of law holding that trial court properly deemed defendants responses to requests for admission admitted because defendants real purpose in refusing to answer the request for admissions was not to prevent being a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution but to hinder the plaintiff in this common law damage suit from proving an essential element in his case holding that failure to file timely responses to a request for admissions renders them admitted