district courts may resolve factual disputes relating to exhaustion. Pavey, 544 F.3d at 740-41; see also Begolli v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 701 F.3d 1158, 1160 (7th Cir.2012). Here the district court permissibly found that Palmer first interacted with Fenoglio only after Palmer lodged his grievances; therefore the only two grievances in the record, which name no doctors at Lawrence, could not have challenged Fenoglio’s conduct. Based on the medical records showing that Fenoglio first saw Palmer in June, and the counsel- or’s response to the grievances, which reflect that Fenoglio became involved after Palmer filed them, no clear error undermines the conclusion that Palmer’s grievance did not challenge Fenoglio’s conduct in May. See Pavey v. Conley, 663 F.3d 899, 904 (7th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Norris, 640 F.3d 295, 297 n.
holding that trial court did not err holding that district court did not clearly err in declining to credit prisoners testimony about exhaustion holding that a district court did not clearly err in crediting agents testimony that a defendant had orally consented despite his refusal to sign consent form holding that district court did not clearly err in giving twolevel enhancement for similar conduct holding that the district court did not err in determining that inadvertent disclosure did not result in waiver