through a writ of habeas corpus. See O.C.G.A. § 9-14-1. If the examining judge determines that imprisonment or restraint is illegal, he or she will grant the writ, requiring the prisoner to be released. See O.C.G.A. § 9-14-5. Because we accept the well-pleaded facts as true, and view them in the light most favorable to Mr. Jones, we find that the complaint sufficiently alleges that his term of imprisonment was invalidated with the successful granting of a habeas corpus petition by Judge Russell. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364. Therefore, even if Mr. Jones’ claim is decided in his favor, his allegations do not improperly call into question the validity of his conviction or sentence. See Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81-82, 125 S.Ct. 1242. See also Morrow, 610 F.3d at 1272 (<HOLDING>). At the very least, Mr. Jones sufficiently
holding ftca claim barred bivens claim the moment judgment was entered against the government holding that a prisoners claim under the ftca based on being imprisoned for an extra ten days did not call into question the conviction or sentence and was not barred by heck holding that equitable tolling could not apply to the plaintiffs ftca claim because she was not diligent and her lack of diligence was evidenced by her failure to call the ftca helpline search a website that included a relevant link or ask for an address before the limitations period ran holding that heck v humphrey bars abioduns claims under the ftca holding that the plaintiffs claim against the united states for negligence was not a tort claim within the ftca where it was founded upon an alleged failure to perform explicit or implicit contractual obligations