considered in the context of a traditional understanding of the larceny statute.’ ” Calonico, supra at 154, quoting People v. Camiola, 225 A.D.2d 380, 380-381 (N.Y. 1996). 9 The defendant’s argument mirrors the dissent in Commonwealth v. Reske, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 522, 532-533 (1997) (Gillerman, 1, dissenting), which posited that because a victim’s mental incapacity is not an element of the offense of larceny, it may not be offered as proof of the crime except by legislative intervention. As did the majority in Reske, we reject that limitation on the nature of evidence probative of the defendant’s guilt. 10 The lack of consent is an implicit factor in other context ) (affirming larceny conviction because victim lacked mental capacity to consent to taking); Camiola, 225 A.D.2d at 380-381 (<HOLDING>). Cf. State v. Maxon, 32 Kan. App. 2d 67, 79-80
holding admissible testimony of the victims daughter regarding a telephone call from the defendant to the victim hours before the victims death and the victims emotions following the telephone call where defendant claimed accident holding that mental capacity may be considered on issue of victims intent holding that a jury could reasonably infer defendant and his brother engaged in victims murder with deliberation where victims hands and feet were bound expert testimony was that victims injuries were inflicted when he was alive defendants gloves were discarded in victims trailer and defendant and his brother burned the trailer in an attempt to conceal the evidence holding that the offense of sexual battery requires the state prove the victims lack of consent regardless of the victims age and charge the jury on the same holding that jury may consider victims mental capacity in determining whether defendant acted with victims knowledge and consent