order meets the definition an “acquittal” for double jeopardy purposes if it “actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.” Id. at 468, 125 S.Ct. 1129 (quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977)). In this context, “what matters is that” the judge “evaluated the [ ] evidence and determined that it was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction.” Id. at 469, 125 S.Ct. 1129 (quoting Martin Linen, 430 U.S. at 572, 97 S.Ct. 1349). Conversely, a trial court’s order terminating a prosecution is not an acquittal if it is entered “on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence.” United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98-99, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978) (<HOLDING>). The United States Supreme Court has declared
holding that trial on second indictment alleging repeat offender count separate from indictment on primary offense for which defendant was convicted did not offend principles of double jeopardy holding that the government may appeal trial courts dismissal of count in indictment because of prejudice caused by preindictment delay without violating double jeopardy principles holding that the government could appeal a criminal sentence without violating the double jeopardy clause when congress expressly authorized such an appeal holding that the government may appeal a postverdict ruling without violating double jeopardy where the appeal does not result in a new trial holding that the dismissal of an indictment before trial and institution of a superseding indictment does not trigger double jeopardy