to the continuing offense theory of the crime. Under Taylor, therefore, Garcia-Caraveo’s conviction for robbery in California was for a “crime of violence,” and the district court’s imposition of a sixteen-point increase in his offense level was not error. C. Even if California’s Robbery Statute is Broader Than the Uniform Generic Definition of Robbery, Garcia-Caraveo has Failed to Show Plain Error Had the sentencing court committed error in applying the sixteen-level increase in U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, Garcia-Caraveo cannot demonstrate that that error would be plain. Drawing every conceivable inference in Garcia-Caraveo’s favor, at best he can point only to some uncertainty as to the breadth of California Penal Code § 211, as compared to generic robbery. See Juarez-Galvan, 572 F.3d at 1161 (<HOLDING>). Where there is uncertainty in the law, we
holding that because of unsettled case law district courts error was not obvious and therefore not plain holding that omission was not plain error holding that the district courts conclusion that  211 is not broader than generic robbery was not plain error holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error holding that the courts review is conducted under the plain error standard