have contributed to Farmland’s damages. This argument is insufficient to withstand Mid-America’s motion to dismiss for a number of reasons. First, neither Farmland’s complaint nor the KCC Order suggests that Mid-America’s violation of a tariff provision forms the basis of Farmland’s negligence per se claim. Additionally, Farmland has not cited any authority or presented any meaningful argument to support the proposition that a tariff violation can satisfy the “statute, ordinance, or regulation” element of a negligence per se claim. And, perhaps most importantly, the record of the KCC proceedings does not reveal that Farmland has exhausted its administrative remedies on this issue. See generally Grindsted Prods., Inc. v. Kan. City Power & Light Co., 21 Kan.App.2d 435, 901 P.2d 20 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the court will grant
holding that a plaintiff who proves a cause of action under  1981 may recover punitive damages where the plaintiff is entitled to an award of compensatory damages even if nominal holding plaintiff must move before public interests are involved to bring suit for ejectment but allowing single action for past present and future damages holding the kcc must first interpret a tariff before a plaintiff can bring an action in court seeking damages under  66176 holding that a plaintiff can seek statutory damages even in the absence of actual damages holding that the plaintiff could bring an action for negligent misrepresentation although the plaintiff could not sue on the contract because the contract was void