718 F.2d at 1550). Therefore, the Federal Circuit, citing Miller and its progeny, has held that Congressional intent is not effectuated by an interpretation of the jurisdictional statute that would allow for concurrent jurisdiction under §§ 1581(a) and 1581(i). Nat’l Corn Growers, 840 at 1556—1558. Even though a litigant may sometimes avoid the requirement that it exhaust its available administrative remedies the CIT may not necessarily exercise both §§ 1581(a) and 1581(i) jurisdiction over any one claim. A litigant’s claim need not be subject to the administrative review process under § 1581(a) if the exhaustion of administrative remedies would be futile. See also Consol. Bearings Co. v. United States, 348 F.3d 997, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2003); George E. Warren Corp., 341 F.3d at 1351 (<HOLDING>). If futility is sufficiently shown, § 1581(i)
holding that a litigant must support an argument with legal authority holding plaintiff not required to perform its residual contract obligations after defendants material breach holding that a pro se litigant who is an attorney is not entitled to fees under  1988 holding that a litigant has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute if the law is unconstitutional as applied to that particular litigant holding that a litigant is not required to perform useless acts