a more recent diagnosis by a treating physician in favor of an older diagnosis that the treating physician since retracted as inaccurate. Thus, this lack of reasoned explanation in Dr. You’s opinion weighs heavily in favor of finding that Defendant Hartford acted unreasonably in crediting Dr. You’s opinion over that of Dr. Raster. See Black & Decker, 538 U.S. at 834, 123 S.Ct. 1965 (“Plan administrators, of course, may not arbitrarily refuse to credit a claimant’s reliable evidence, including the opinions of a treating physician”); Calvert, 409 F.3d at 293 (“a plan administrator may not arbitrarily disregard the medical evidence proffered by the claimant, including the opinions of her treating physicians”); Glenn v. MetLife (Metro. Life Ins. Co.), 461 F.3d 660, 671 (6th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, when faced with this inconsistency in
holding that evidence contrary to an administrators decision does not make the decision arbitrary and capricious so long as a reasonable basis appears for the decision holding that a plan administrators decision may not be deemed arbitrary and capricious so long as it is possible to offer a reasoned explanation based on the evidence for that decision holding that lack of consideration of relevant evidence from treating physician weights heavily in favor of finding administrators decision arbitrary and capricious holding that under the arbitrary and capricious standard this court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment holding that the plan administrators failure to address the social security administrations finding of the claimants disability rendered the decision arbitrary and capricious