pushed the sheriffs deputy who was attempting to restrain him). If feasible, even in summary proceedings for an act of direct contempt occurring in open court, an “adequate opportunity to defend or explain one’s conduct is a minimum requirement before imposition of punishment.” In re Klecan, 93 N.M. at 639, 603 P.2d at 1096 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (reversing a direct contempt citation for failure of the judge to permit the contemnor to explain his conduct). {28} When the judge has not personally witnessed the defendant’s contemptuous behavior in the course of a court proceeding, the contempt is classified as indirect criminal contempt and must be resolved through more traditional due process procedures. State v. Stout, 100 N.M. 472, 474, 672 P.2d 645, 647 (1983) (<HOLDING>). {29} The contempt power of a court is so
holding that an attorney charged with contempt for failing to attend a scheduled hearing could be charged only with indirect not direct contempt because the contempt did not occur in open court and the judge did not have personal knowledge of the reasons for the attorneys nonappearance holding evidence insufficient to show direct contempt and no basis for indirect contempt because of failure to meet procedural requirements holding that where criminal contempt charged has in it the element of personal criticism or attack upon the judge and where delay would not be impracticable a different judge should preside over the criminal contempt trial holding that a civil contempt defendant has a right to a jury trial when the act of contempt was not committed in the presence of the court and when the incarceration is in part punitive holding that in addition to statutory contempt powers city courts have inherent contempt power