the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Erwin, 155 F.3d 818, 822 (6th Cir.1998). If Jones’s stop of the car was based neither on probable cause to believe that it was involved in a traffic violation nor reasonable suspicion that the occupants were engaged in illegal activity, the ensuing search was illegal and the evidence obtained is inadmissible against Humphrey unless the government can demonstrate that the evidence was obtained independently of the illegal search. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). Here, if the Defendant was illegally stopped, then the consent obtained was likely a product of that illegal stop and was vitiated. See e.g. United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874 (10th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). But if Jones had probable cause to stop the
holding that consent given immediately after an illegal stop was vitiated by the illegality holding evidence that derived so immediately from violation is fruit of illegality and should be suppressed holding there is no consent as a matter of law where the consent was given under coercion holding that consent was freely and voluntarily given despite officers advisement that the police could get a search warrant if consent was not given holding that because the individual was being illegally detained when he consented to the search of his luggage that  consent was tainted by the illegality