separate requirement of possible harm to a person. Indeed, Velez-Alderete fails to point to any decision supporting his definition of arson as explicitly requiring the threat of harm to a person; instead, courts considering whether arson is a crime of violence agree that the generic, contemporary definition of arson involves a “ ‘willful and malicious burning’ of property.” See Velasquez-Reyes, 427 F.3d at 1230 (quoting United States v. Hathaway, 949 F.2d 609, 610 (2d Cir.1991)); see also, e.g., Whaley, 552 F.3d at 907 (“[W]e conclude that the generic offense of arson, for purposes of the sentence enhancement in [the Armed Career Criminal Act], has as elements the malicious burning of real or personal property of another.”); United States v. Craig, 236 Fed.Appx. 863, 865 (4th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Miller, 246 Fed.Appx. 369,
holding that a conviction for florida armed robbery is a crime of violence under the armed career criminal act holding that court could look only to the statutory definition of a crime the charging document written plea agreement transcript of plea colloquy and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented in determining if prior conviction qualified as a generic burglary for purposes of enhanced sentencing under armed career criminal act holding that the burning of personal property with intent to defraud  substantially corresponds to the generic definition of arson for the purposes of the armed career criminal act holding that defendants sixth amendment right to trial by a jury was not violated by district courts reliance on his prior convictions for purposes of sentencing under the armed career criminal act holding that the illinois crime of failure to report for imprisonment is not a violent felony for purposes of the armed career criminal act