‘aided Mr. Coffey in protecting his assets from the reach of creditors.’ ” Reasonably read, this passage merely demonstrates that the JCC did not believe that an explicit finding on the issue of intent to defraud was necessary in light of Judge Coffey’s admission that she had aided her husband in protecting his assets from creditors. See Edwards v. RAL Automotive, 156 N.H. 700, 705 (2008) (“The interpretation of final judgments, like the interpretation of other written documents, is a question of law, which we review de novo!’). In any event, an order stating unequivocally that the conveyance was fraudulent is not required for us to find, for purposes of this disciplinary proceeding, that Judge Coffey was complicit in a fraudulent conveyance. Cf. Eshleman’s Case, 126 N.H. 1, 5 (1985) (<HOLDING>). It is well within our authority, and indeed
holding that the critical fact prompting final disciplinary action is not the fact of conviction or indictment but the underlying conduct giving rise to that indictment or conviction citation omitted holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense holding that constructive amendments alter or expand the essential elements of the offense contained in the indictment such that the possible bases for conviction go beyond what is contained in the indictment holding that an indictment will stand despite a violation of criminal rule 6 unless the violation contributed to the return of the indictment or otherwise gave rise to unfair prejudice holding that for sentencing purposes the government does not need to allege a defendants prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact is not an element of the present crime