in the district court to his own or Plaskett’s statements, our review of challenges to those statements is limited to plain error. See United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262, 130 S.Ct. 2159, 176 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2010). Here, we identify no error, much less plain error, in any of the district court’s rulings. In evaluating Barnes’s challenge to the admission of his own statement about killing a rival drug dealer who had intruded on his crack-dealing territory, we note at the outset that the statement was not admitted as “other crime” evidence, see Fed.R.Evid. 404(b), but as direct proof of the charged crack conspiracy and of Barnes’s firearms possession related to that conspiracy. As such, it was highly probative. See United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 392 (2d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Jamil, 707 F.2d 638, 643 (2d
recognizing the probative value of objective and reliable hearsay evidence recognizing high probative value of act done in furtherance of conspiracy because it is part of the very act charged recognizing high probative value of evidence providing conduct that was part of the very act charged recognizing that while the evidence at issue was admissible under rule 407 its probative value was minimal recognizing substantial probative value of tape recording that provided direct evidence of knowledge element of crime charged