.(2) relying on the allegedly unconstitutional conviction to uphold the forfeiture of street time, and (3) relying alternatively on other parole violations to uphold the peremptory forfeiture of all street time without regard to the actual periods of material noncomplianee with his parole agreement. Discussion Mr. Strachan argues that the district court erred in finding his new conviction was counseled. If a record of conviction does not indicate representation by counsel where so entitled, or an effective waiver, the defendant enjoys a presumption that he was denied his right to counsel, and that his conviction is therefore void. See Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 114, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516, 82 S.Ct. 884, 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962) (<HOLDING>). Mr. Strachan’s right to counsel under the
holding that waiver of the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination the right to a trial by jury and the right to confront ones accusers cannot be presumed from a silent record holding that jury waiver stating that it was made knowingly and voluntarily raised presumption of same and that burden was on party challenging enforceability of jury waiver to present evidence overcoming presumption recognizing this presumption holding presumption of waiver from a silent record is impermissible recognizing presumption