233 F.Supp.2d 319, 327 (D.Conn.2002) (adopting the Mathews approach wit 447, 451 (5th Cir.1995); Cooper v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 19 F.3d 562, 566-67 (11th Cir.1994); Quinn, 14 F.3d at 652-55 (D.C.Cir.); United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus. Inc., 971 F.2d 548, 552-53 (10th Cir.1992). 74 . See Mathews, 166 F.3d at 863 (7th Cir.); Siller, 21 F.3d at 1348 (4th Cir.); LeBlanc II, 874 F.Supp. at 40-41 (D.Mass.); LaValley, 707 F.Supp. at 1366-67 (D.Mass.). 75 . Siller, 21 F.3d at 1348. 76 . See O’Keeffe, 131 F.Supp.2d at 92. 77 . See id. at 92-93 (adopting the majority view that "based upon” means "similar to” or the "same as”); LeBlanc II, 874 F.Supp. at 41 (suggesting the court's agreement with the minority position); LaValley, 707 F.Supp. at 1366-67 (<HOLDING>). 78 . See Mathews, 166 F.3d at 863; Siller, 21
holding that the knowledge requisite to knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as distinguished from knowledge of the law holding that harold fine did not have direct and independent knowledge because he did not personally conduct the audits that led to the public disclosures holding there was no rule 404b violation where the evidence was admitted to show knowledge and knowledge was an element of the crime charged holding that plaintiffs knowledge was not based upon the public disclosures because plaintiffs knowledge was independent of those disclosures holding work product protection waived for disclosures to independent auditor who did not share common interests with corporation