by choosing not to testify, the defendant failed to preserve for the court’s review whether the trial court violated his constitutional privilege against compelled self-incrimination when it ruled that, if he testified for a limited purpose at sentencing, the government could cross-examine him about “everything” (quotation omitted)); United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110, 1115-17 (1st Cir. 1989) (concluding that the defendant’s argument that the trial court erred when it denied his request for a pretrial ruling that would have limited the government to cross-examining him only upon matters about which he testified on direct examination and about his credibility was foreclosed because he never, in fact, testified); cf. United States v. Wilson, 307 F.3d 596, 598-601 (7th Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, at least two state courts have also
holding unreviewable the defendants assertion that his fifth amendment right to remain silent was violated by the trial courts conditional ruling to allow the government to introduce evidence of his selective silence if he referred to the associate he had originally mentioned to a federal agent because although the defendant testified he did not in fact mention the associate quotation omitted holding an individuals admission to a government agent prior to trial that he had previously committed perjury did not waive his privilege to invoke the fifth amendment as to that matter at trial holding that the movants assertion that he failed to advise the plea court of counsels alleged deficiencies because he blamed himself for his lack of funds was undermined by the fact that the plea court advised the movant that he had the right to appointed counsel if he could not afford to pay for counsel holding that a suspect must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law that he has the right to the presence of an attorney and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present