S.W.2d 598, 601 (Tex.1999). However, a careful review of the Scotts’ motion shows that its substance is consistent with its title. The pertinent portions of the motion assert “good cause” for an extension under section 13.01(f). The Scotts do not cite section 13.01(g), and they do not assert that their failure to timely file the expert reports and curricula vitae within 180 days was the result of accident or mistake rather than intentional conduct or conscious indifference. Finally, although not dispositive, the motion does not even contain a general prayer; rather, it ends by praying “for all the relief requested above.” The record shows that the Scotts never sought an extension under section 13.01(g). See Rosa v. Caldwell, 159 S.W.3d 695, 698-99 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2004, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). And, in their appellate briefing, the Scotts
holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form holding that a motion to continue a hearing on a postjudgment motion was ineffective to extend the period for the trial court to rule on the motion absent the express consent of the parties holding trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion for new trial by operation of law because motion was not properly presented even though a notice of presentment was filed and the docket sheet contained an entry for the motion having been filed holding that substance of motion to extend time was a section 1301f motion rather than a section 1301g motion and that trial court did not abuse discretion in denying the section 1301f motion holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing