F.3d 967, 974 (8th Cir.2006) (en banc), abrogated in part on other grounds by Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008)). If the court is not allowed to rely on factual statements included in an unobjected-to PSR because those statements were based on police reports, it follows the court should not be allowed to rely on other unadopted statements similarly based on police reports. See United States v. Alston, 611 F.3d 219, 221-22, 226 (4th Cir.2010) (vacating sentence because district court erred in relying on facts included in the transcript for an Alford plea when such facts were the prosecution’s proffer for the plea and had not been accepted or admitted by the defendant); United States v. Weicks, 362 Fed.Appx. 844, 848 (9th Cir.2010) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>); cf. McCall, 439 F.3d at 973-74 (rejecting
holding that police officers have a duty to conduct an investigation into the basis of the witness report holding that police were justified in arresting person on basis of information provided directly to police by named citizen informer reliance on the information was justified in part because the informant by giving her name presumably knew that the police could arrest her for making a false report holding that an ij could not consider a police report as part of the record of conviction to determine whether an alien had committed a firearms offense because the police report could encompass many offenses with which the alien was never charged or convicted holding that the plaintiff may not rely on expenses for identity theft protection as a basis for standing holding that because the court could not consider police reports it could not rely on an attorneys argument based on the police report as the basis for determining the statutory basis for a conviction