are not clearly erroneous, and it did not abuse its discretion in awarding back pay and a limited amount of front pay where the jury determined that such a remedy was warranted by the facts. See Selgas, 104 F.3d at 12 (A court’s decision to uphold a jury’s award of damages is within the district court’s discretion, and we will not disturb this discretion unless we find “strong evidence of a lapse in judgment.”). (2) Punitive damages This circuit has held that under federal law the evidence of intent that is necessary to support a punitive damages award “is the same [evidence of] ‘intent’ that is required for a finding of discrimination in the first place.” Dichner v. Liberty Travel, 141 F.3d 24 (1st Cir.1998) (citing Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 832 F.2d 194, 205 (1st Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>)). Rowlett, relying on Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S.
holding that a hearing on a motion to amend to allege punitive damages is not necessary recognizing the financial position of the defendant as a factor in assessing a punitive damages award recognizing that the state of mind necessary to trigger liability for the wrong is at least as culpable as that required to make punitive damages applicable holding that in order to submit a claim for punitive damages to a jury in a product liability action a plaintiff is required to produce evidence of actual knowledge holding a court may not award punitive damages