BIA in Pickering had meant to require an adjudication of the merits of aliens’ claims of substantive defects in the original conviction in order to make out an adequate ‘basis,’ it could have said so. But it did not.”). Thus, there is no difference between the stipulation here and the settlement in Pinho in terms of whether the state court addressed and adjudicated the underlying claims of error. Third, the majority notes that Pinho obtained a vacatur of his conviction before the agency had to take action in his case, whereas Rumierz obtained a vacatur after a final order of removal was reached in his case. This distinction is inapposite for two reasons. First, as I have explained above, the BIA effectively reopened Rumierz’s case, thus vacating the final order of remov 12 (BIA 1999) (<HOLDING>). Where the order does not specify its
holding that to establish a conviction for immigration purposes a court must accept a guilty plea or jury verdict make an adjudication and impose a sentence holding that a conviction under the registration clause is not properly distinguishable from a conviction for failure to register for purposes of fifth amendment analysis holding that a conviction vacated by operation of a state rehabilitative statute still constitutes a conviction for immigration purposes holding that a conviction vacated under ohio revised code  2943031 for the trial courts failure to advise the alien defendant of the possible immigration consequences of a guilty plea is no longer a valid conviction for immigration purposes holding that a conviction vacated pursuant to article 440 of the new york criminal procedure law which is neither an expungement statute nor a rehabilitative statute did not constitute a conviction for immigration purposes