to admonitions from the court and from counsel that Rowell not cause a mistrial by testifying about other bad acts that Cousin had committed. Rowell foreshadowed in chambers, however, what he would later assert in court: that the district attorney and Rowell's attorney had instructed him to implicate Cousin falsely. 8 . Rowell testified, "My lawyer came to me with a file, and he said the only [w]ay I can get you lesser time is if I testify against Shar-eef Cousin on a murder charge.” 9 . The colloquy was as follows: "[Question:] Now, do you also remember telling homicide detectives ... about this conversation you had with Shareef Cousin on March 4, 1995? [Answer:] I only told them what you all told me to say.” 10 . See Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3d 653, 662-63 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); see also Milstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004,
holding fabrication not protected because no probable cause holding that the existence of probable cause determines whether fabrication is investigatory or advocatory holding that the existence of probable cause in a  1983 case is a jury question holding that the purpose of a preliminary examination is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed it holding that the existence of probable cause is a complete defense to a  1983 claim alleging false arrest