B, Part 2 as necessaries, but it has not done the same for attorney’s fees awarded to a party in a Chapter 156 modification suit. Id. § 107.023. Because Chapter 156 is devoid of similar authorization, we conclude that the Legislature did not intend to provide trial courts with discretion to characterize attorney’s fees incurred by a party in a non-enforcement modification suit as necessaries. Cf. Quick v. City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109, 122-23 (Tex.1998) (“[W]hile the Legislature clearly was well-versed in drafting statutes that explicitly provided that a local act was not effective until approved by the Commission, the Legislature chose not to include such an express provision [here]. We presume that this omission has a purpose.”); see also In re V.L.K., 24 S.W.3d 338, 343 (Tex.2000) (<HOLDING>). III. Conclusion The Legislature has provided
holding denial of motion to convert from chapter 11 to chapter 7 is interlocutory holding provisions of chapter 156 of texas family code governing modifications clearly apply to suits that attempt to effect change in custody after entry of initial custody order holding tort action accruing after original chapter 7 petition not part of estate when case converted to chapter 13 and then back to chapter 7 holding that chapter 153s statutory presumption that a childs best interest is served by awarding custody to the parent in original custody proceedings does not apply in chapter 156 modification proceedings in the absence of a similar provision in chapter 156 recognizing that the child custody act required that the natural parent presumption must be seriously considered and heavily weighted in favor of the parent but that the presumption is rebutted if the clear and convincing evidence establishes that the best interest of the child is served by awarding custody to the third party