sentence will not be misused as a substitute for the consideration of parole by the Parole Board.” 516 F.2d at 1289. Likewise, in United States v. Mendoza, 565 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir.1978), the Fifth Circuit noted that limiting the retention of Rule 35 jurisdiction to a reasonable time “should prevent the possibility, however remote, of a district court usurping the function of the Parole Board. .. . ” Id. at 1291. Most recently, in United States v. Kajevic, 711 F.2d at 767, the Seventh Circuit held that “[wjhen a district judge delays action on a Rule 35(b) motion till long after the expiration of the 120 days, for the purpose or with the likely effect of assuming the function of the parole authorities, his delay is unreasonable.” Id. 772. See also United States v. Krohn, 700 F.2d at 1033 (<HOLDING>). In this case, the trial judge purposely
holding that the defendants sentence was reasonable when the district court considered the parties arguments and provided a reasoned basis for its choice of sentence holding that booker does not prohibit the limitations on a judges discretion in reducing a sentence imposed by  3582c2 and the applicable policy statement by the sentencing commission holding that twoyear delay was not reasonable holding district courts tenmonth delay in reducing defendants sentence was reasonable because court did not deliberately or effectively intervene in matters committed to authority or parole commission holding unconstitutional defendants sentence of death based upon the holding in roper supra and remanding for the montgomery circuit court to set aside the defendants death sentence and to sentence him to the only other sentence available  life in the penitentiary without the possibility of parole