In re Fierro, 476 SW2d 870, 871 (Tex Civ App 1972) (noting that the standard, whereby the record must show that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer, is applicable to juveniles at the adjudication stage). 4 Wenote that the juvenile file contains a written Miranda waiver that youth’s father signed, indicating that he knew that his son was entitled to counsel when questioned in connection with the acts that formed the basis for the petition. The trial court noted the existence of that form but, correctly, did not rely on it as a basis for finding a waiver of the right to representation at the actual adjudication of the petition. A Miranda waiver clearly would not suffice for such a purpose. See generally Jackson, 172 Or App at 424 (<HOLDING>). 5 Courts in other jurisdictions have
holding that right of selfrepresentation did not attach because defendant had made no indication of his desire to proceed without counsel holding that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel even though the exchange between the magistrate and the defendant was inadequate standing alone to inform the defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation holding that trial judges must be satisfied that an accused is making a knowing voluntary and intelligent waiver of counsel having been advised of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation such that there is a record demonstration that an accused elected to proceed without counsel with eyes open holding that a defendant can knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel only after his sic is aware of the nature of the charges against him the possible penalties and the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation holding that written waivers referring only in general terms to potential advantages of representation by counsel and potential disadvantages of selfrepresentation did not sufficiently demonstrate awareness of the dangers of selfrepresentation