be clear and correct). In reviewing the propriety of an instruction, appellate courts must read each instruction in the context of the entire charge and determine whether the instruction completed its purpose. See Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 391, 119 S.Ct. 2090, 144 L.Ed.2d 370 (1999). In regard to substance, the instructional issues in this case involve self-defense. The standard for self-defense is set out in Rule for Court-Martial (R.C.M.) 916(e)(1), which provides that if an individual apprehends on reasonable grounds that grievous bodily harm or death is about to be wrongfully inflicted to his or her person, then the individual may use such force as is appropriate for the circumstances, including deadly force. See United States v. Lewis, 65 M.J. 85, 88 (C.A.A.F.2007) (<HOLDING>). The right to act in self-defense, however, is
holding that a stipulation as to the law is generally not binding upon the courts holding that the preponderance standard is generally constitutional recognizing that the issuance of a writ of mandamus is itself generally a matter of discretion recognizing that rcm 916 generally restates the wellsettled law of selfdefense recognizing that a treaty is a supreme law of the land and therefore generally not subject to state regulation absent congressional cessation