value consistent with Fed. R.App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 1 . Stewart argues that the probation search violated the Fourth Amendment because his probation agreement did not contain his consent to the search nor did it reduce his expectation of privacy. More specifically, Stewart contends that the agreement merely granted him the option to choose between allowing the officers to search or violating his probation. However, Griffin and Lewis make it clear that the Fourth Amendment analysis of a search pursuant to an alleged probation violation proceeds under a reasonableness inquiry rather than under the contractual analysis asserted by Stewart. In any event, we recently considered and foreclosed Stewart’s argument. See United States v. Carter, 511 R3d 1264) 1268 (10th Cir.2008)
holding in part that the utah state probation agreement does not create such an option holding that upon revocation of probation a court must grant credit for time served on probation and community control towards any newly imposed term of imprisonment and probation so that the total period of control probation and imprisonment does not exceed the statutory maximum holding that probation does not constitute a sentence holding that probation is not a sentence holding that even if the doctrine applies to option contracts no conversion would take place until the option were exercised by the party having the right of election