have interpreted pre-existing condition language in health insurance contracts differently. The District Court relied most heavily on Hughes v. Boston Mutual Life Insurance Co., 26 F.3d 264 (1st Cir.1994). In Hughes, the insured claimant suffered from and was 2 (8th Cir.1994) (finding a pre-existing condition where the claimant was treated for muscle pain, which was later diagnosed as chronic fatigue syndrome); McWilliams v. Capital Telecommunications Inc., 986 F.Supp. 920 (M.D.Pa.1997) (disagreeing with Hughes, following Bullwinkel and Cury, and concluding that the insurance policy language did not limit pre-existing conditions to those that were diagnosed before the effective date of the plan); Cury v. Colonial Life Insurance Company of America, 737 F.Supp. 847, 854 (E.D.Pa.1990) (<HOLDING>); see also Mutual Life Insurance Company of New
holding that the preexisting duty exception does not apply where the preexisting duty is a limited one and the alleged negligence is the failure to provide a level of assistance beyond that required by the preexisting duty holding on rehearing that exclusion for disabilities caused by a preexisting medical condition would not support denial of benefits caused by staph infection resulting from surgery for a preexisting condition holding that where the claimants cancer was not evident as a condition before the coverage period began and where the symptoms before diagnosis were nonspecific coverage should not be excluded under the preexisting condition clause holding that treatment for symptoms of undiagnosed multiple sclerosis activated the preexisting condition exclusion and stating that there is no requirement that a diagnosis definite or otherwise of the preexisting condition must be made during the preexisting condition period holding that receiving advice or treatment during the exclusionary period for a condition which proves to be the same condition the claimant seeks benefits for qualifies as a preexisting condition regardless of whether there was an accurate diagnosis