court should be affirmed. BROWN, Ju 458, 172 L.Ed.2d 331 (2008). Because Carter’s trial counsel did not object to the instruction at trial, his appellate counsel would have been required to raise the issue on direct appeal as fundamental error. The Indiana Supreme Court has held that when we consider a claim of fundamental error, “we look to the jury instructions as a whole to determine if they were adequate.” Ringham v. State, 768 N.E.2d 893, 898 (Ind.2002), reh’g denied. Even in cases of “clear Spradlin error,” the Indiana Supreme Court has refused to vacate an attempted murder conviction if “the instructions as a whole sufficiently suggested the requirement of intent to kill.” Williams v. State, 737 N.E.2d 734, 737 (Ind.2000) (citing Ramsey v. State, 723 N.E.2d 869, 873 (Ind.2000)) (<HOLDING>). Here, the instruction first provided that
holding that the jury instructions taken as a whole sufficiently informed the jury of the states burden of proving that the defendant specifically intended to kill the victim holding that if jury instructions viewed as a whole fairly state the applicable law to the jury the failure to give particular instructions will not be error holding that although the instruction at issue could have been worded more specifically the jury instructions as a whole did not mislead the jury as to the law holding that there was no error where one instruction did not inform the jury that in order to convict defendant of attempted murder the evidence must show that defendant had a specific intent to commit murder but where subsequent instruction did inform jury of this requirement and concluding that the instructions when read as a whole adequately informed the jury of the requirement of specific intent to kill holding that the defendant bears the burden of proving outside contact with the jury