for both prejudgment and postjudgment interest on personal injury money judgments which the judgment debtor does appeal. See Ackerman v. Power Equip. Co., 881 P.2d 451, 452-53 (Colo.App.1994); John C. Tredennick, Jr. & Gregory B. Cairns, Collecting Pre- and Post-Judgment Interest in Colorado: A Primer, 15 Colo. Law. 753, 758 (1986). However, the lack of ambiguity in section 13-21-101 does not ensure its constitutionality. Thus, we examine the Rodriguezes’ argument that the statute violates equal protection. IV The Rodriguezes argue that, as applied, the alternative interest rates established by section 13-21-101 violate their right to equal protection of the laws. See U.S. Const, amend. XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 25; Millis v. Board of County Comm’rs, 626 P.2d 652, 657 (Colo.1981) (<HOLDING>). The threshold question we must ask is
holding that the due process clause contained in the colorado constitution encompasses a guarantee of equal protection holding that neither the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment nor article i  2 of the constitution guarantee against errors in the administration of an election holding the exclusion did not violate the equal protection clause of the wyoming constitution or the fourteenth amendment to the united states constitution holding that an amendment to the colorado constitution that repealed all local and statewide laws prohibiting sexualorientation discrimination violated the federal equal protection clause holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause