to confer upon Dillard Nolen any cognizable interest or legal standing with respect to matters concerning his former wife. See, e.g., Gloth v. Gloth, 154 Va. 511, 535, 153 S.E. 879, 886 (1930) (following divorce “the marriage bond is completely severed”). One of the principal effects of a decree of divorce is to sever the property interests of the two parties including the extinguishing of all contingent property rights of one spouse to the property of the other. Code § 20-111. Similarly, to the extent that the authority to determine the disposition of a decedent’s remains is a quasi-property right of a surviving spouse, Goldman, 168 Va. at 354, 191 S.E. at 631, that right would not survive the entry of a divorce decree. Cf. Vaughan v. Vaughan, 200 N.E. 912, 913-14 (Mass. 1936) (<HOLDING>). In short, under the specific facts of this
holding that a wife obtained a vested interest in her portion of the retirement benefits as of the date of the divorce decree and any act of the military spouse that unilaterally decreases the nonmilitary spouses vested interest is an impermissible modification of a division of marital property and a violation of the final decree of divorce holding that wife had standing to seek disinterment where death of husband occurred prior to entry of decree of divorce holding trial court erred in modifying terms of divorce decree regarding possession where party did not seek that relief holding a motion to revise an enrolled divorce decree because of a discrepancy between the separation agreement and the decree filed more than 5 years after entry of the enrolled decree was properly denied holding that the trial judge had the power to incorporate a settlement agreement in a decree following the entry of a decree of divorce