period satisfies duration element “because the duration of the permit is too short to allow full litigation before the permit expires”); Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1329-30 (9th Cir.1992) (regulation “in effect for less than one year” met durational requirement). Defendants do contest that there may be a reasonable expectation that Plaintiff will confront the same action again. Defs.’ Reply at 5-6. Plaintiff argues that its litigation history with the Forest Service reflects that it will. PL’s Response at 7-8. The “capable of repetition test” is different from the one for voluntary cessation in that it examines the likelihood of the issue resurfacing, rather than the specific activity challenged. Biodiversity Legal Found. v. Badgley, 309 F.3d 1166, 1174 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). For example, the expiration of Forest Service
holding res judicata applied to prevent relitigation of liability where defendant was subject to two lawsuits under different theories of liability on the same note holding that a reasonably certain threat of imminent harm to a protected species is sufficient for issuance of an injunction under section 9 of the esa holdingthat endangered species act claim at issue was capable of repetition where parties have been through the same controversy many times even though previous lawsuits were about different species holding in suit under endangered species act that the desire to use or observe an animal species even for purely esthetic purposes is undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of standing holding that defendants stock options are concrete and personal because they represent a species of compensation different from the one ordinarily accumulated by corporate officers and directors