the intervening act of a third person is a superseding cause which discharges the original actor from liability may be a question for the trier of fact. But, when the evidence presented and the logical inferences deducible therefrom admit of but one conclusion, the question becomes one of law. Katz v. Holsinger, [264 Md. 307, 286 A.2d 115 (1972)]; Farley v. Yerman, [231 Md. 444, 190 A.2d 773] (1963). It is true that the facts of a case may place it in the middleground where the issue of the existence of superseding negligence is properly left for the trier of fact; but, some cases are such that they gravitate so close to one or the other of the two poles that resolution of the issue becomes one of law. (Emphasis added). See also Jubb v. Ford, 221 Md. 507, 513, 157 A.2d 422 (1960)(<HOLDING>). As noted earlier, Manor Inn, the decision
recognizing the issue may be decided as a question of law if the facts are undisputed and support only one inference holding that the question whether a cause of action exists is not a question of jurisdiction and therefore may be assumed without being decided holding that whether the negligent acts of parties combined to become the proximate cause of the injury was a question for the jury holding that when the facts of a robbery are undisputed the imposition of the enhancement is a question of the application of the guidelines to be reviewed de novo holding that whether proximate cause exists is to be decided in a common sense fashion in the light of the attending facts and circumstances and unless the facts are undisputed and admit of but one inference the question is for the jury