In his first point of error, appellant argues that section 21.02 does not plainly dispense with a culpable mental state, that a culpable mental state is therefore required, and that the indictment in this case was fundamentally defective because it did not allege a culpable mental state. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.02(b) (West Supp. 2009). The acts of sexual abuse alleged in the indictment were violations of statutes that themselves require a culpable mental state. See id. § 21.11(a)(1), (c) (indecency with child), § 22.021(a)(1)(B) (aggravated sexual assault). Whether section 21.02 requires proof of any further culpable mental state, and how the applicable culpable mental state or states should be alleged in the charging instrument, are issues we do not address bec m.App.2010) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Aggravated kidnapping and burglary of a
holding that medical report was not material for brady purposes where report at best showed lack of vaginal penetration of sexual abuse victim penetration was not necessary for conviction of sexual abuse of a minor under iowa law holding that each subsection of penal code section 22021a1b creates separate offense holding that a jury instruction listing additional modes of sexual penetration than those listed in the information did not impermissibly amend the charge of sexual assault becausein part the added modes of sexual penetration did not change the applicable statute sentence or level of offense holding that charges submitting instances of penetration and contact occurring in the same transaction did not deprive the appellant of a unanimous verdict because all of the jurors who believed there was penetration necessarily also believed that antecedent contact had occurred holding that penetration of anus and penetration of sexual organ although found in same subsection of section 22021a1b are separate offenses