rights. We disagree, however, that the actions attributed to the City Council and Link were sufficiently egregious to “chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing ... in that [constitutionally protected] activity.” Bloch, 156 F.3d at 678. In some cases, embarrassment, humiliation and emotional distress may be sufficient to support a § 1983 claim. Mattox v. City of Forest Park, 183 F.3d 515, 521 (6th Cir.1999). But, “ ‘it would trivialize the First Amendment to hold that harassment for exercising the right of free speech was always actionable no matter how unlikely to deter a person of ordinary firmness from that exercise.’ ” Bloch, 156 F.3d at 679 (quoting Bart v. Telford, 677 F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir.1982)); cf. Bechtel v. City of Belton, 250 F.3d 1157, 1162 (8th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). The harassing comments Theresa attributes to
holding that in a  1983 action issue of probable cause is for the jury holding that it is clearly established that retaliation against private citizens for exercising their first amendment rights is actionable holding that not all adverse action taken against a public employee in retaliation for exercising first amendment rights is sufficient to support a cause of action under  1983 holding that due to the csra a federal employee has no independent right of action for damages against a supervisor who improperly disciplined the employee for exercising his first amendment rights recognizing first amendment retaliation right