1997))). However, most courts have interpreted “conduct” to refer to the defendant’s underlying conduct giving rise to the plaintiff-relator’s cause of action. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bergman v. Abbot Labs., 995 F.Supp.2d 357, 380, No. 09-4264, 2014 WL 348583, at *17-18 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 30, 2014) (noting a ease “allowing claims under the Texas statute to proceed without intervention if filed after the date of the amendment, but only as they pertain to fraudulent conduct occurring after the date of amendment” and dismissing a plaintiff-relator’s TMFPA claims as “ap-plie[d] to allegedly fraudulent conduct that occurred before May 4, 2007” (citing United States ex rel. Streck v. Allergan, Inc., 894 F.Supp.2d 584, 604 (E.D.Pa.2012))); Streck, 894 F.Supp.2d at 604-05 (E.D.Pa.2012) (<HOLDING>); United States v. HCA Health Servs. of
holding that the 2007 amendments to the tmfpa allow a plaintiffrelator to proceed without the state only with regard to fraudulent acts that occurred after the effective date of the amendment holding that the commission on remand can set the effective date of a rate to be the effective date of the original commission activity holding that the date of discrimination is the date on which a decision not to hire a plaintiff becomes effective holding that wife could receive permanent total disability payments after the death of her husband where the husbands claim was pending before the effective date of the 2008 statutory amendments and was still pending at the time of his death even though husbands death occurred after the effective date of the 2008 statutory amendments as wifes status as a dependent was subject to determination as of the time of husbands injury holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act