claim is not reasonably expected to grow out of her actual disability claim. The key question presented by the exhaustion argument is whether Vasquez’s claim that she was “regarded as” disabled falls within the scope of her existing discrimination charge. This, in turn, depends on whether her allegations could have been “reasonably expected to grow out of [the] EEOC charge.” Dyer v. Wiregrass Hospice, L.L.C., 532 F.Supp.2d 933, 935 (M.D.Tenn.2008), citing Smith v. Ky. State Univ., 97 Fed.Appx. 22, 26 (6th Cir.2004); Ang v. Procter & Gamble Co., 932 F.2d 540, 545 (6th Cir.1991). Vasquez’s charge stated that “I was discriminated against because of my ... disability in the manner described above in violation of... Title I of the Americans with Disabilities A d 758, 786 (N.D.Ill.2007)(<HOLDING>); Larimer v. Int’l Bus. Machines, Corp., No. 02
holding that retaliation claim was reasonably related to prior sex discrimination claim holding disability discrimination claim barred holding that regarded as claim was reasonably related to claim of discrimination on the basis of disability holding that allegations of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation necessarily state a claim of discrimination on the basis of sex holding that fraudulent collection on promissory note was reasonably related to breach of contract claim