immoral purpose was one of the defendant’s dominant purposes and that specifically stated it need not be the defendant’s sole or single purpose); Bush v. United States, 267 F.2d 483, 485 (9th Cir.1959) ("It is not necessary that such intent be the sole and single purpose of the transportation, if such purpose and intent was one of the reasons for the transportation.”). Other circuits interpreted the Act's purpose element similarly, consistently holding that the Act did not require "that the sole and single purpose of the transportation of a female in interstate commerce was such immoral practices.” Dunn v. United States, 190 F.2d 496, 497 (10th Cir.1951); see also Forrest v. United States, 363 F.2d 348, 349-50 (5th Cir.1966); United States v. Salter, 346 F.2d 509, 511 (6th Cir.1965) (<HOLDING>); Dingess v. United States, 315 F.2d 238, 240
recognizing the term act includes a failure to do any act which the law requires one to perform holding the enhancement inappropriate for a mann act violation because the victims were typical of the victims the mann act was designed to protect   holding that absent clear congressional intent a defendant charged with transporting two women in interstate commerce at the same time could be charged with only one violation of the mann act which criminalized transporting any woman in interstate commerce for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery or for any other immoral purpose holding that mann act requires only that the defendants immoral purpose is only one of the dominant purposes holding that an attorney is a necessary witness for purposes of tennessee rule of professional conduct 37a only if there are things to which he will be the only one available to testify 