the broader language of § 11-603(a), the LGIT is a victim of “a” crime for which Pete was convicted under Case No. 11332, and because the second degree assault conviction occurred under Case No. 11332, restitution as a condition for probation is appropriate. Our analysis under § 6-221 begins with consideration of the scope of the trial court’s power to order probation. The relevant portion of § 6-221 provides a trial court broad discretion to suspend the enforcement of a sentence (or portion thereof), following a conviction, and order probation with such conditions as “the court considers proper.” We, have vacated, on occasion, ordered conditions of probation on the grounds that they were an illegal sentence or otherwise improper. See Sheppard, 344 Md. at 154, 685 A.2d at 1181 (<HOLDING>); Walezak, 302 Md. at 433, 488 A.2d at 954
holding that in probation revocation proceeding evidence failed to establish necessity for driving without a license where defendant claimed to have been a passenger in a car being driven by his pregnant fiance who allegedly began to experience such extreme pain that defendant had to drive holding that probation is not a sentence holding that probation and suspension of sentence may not be revoked based solely on a violation or criminal offense that was committed before the offender was actually placed on probation holding that a trial court improperly conditioned probation on the defendant not being able to drive where the transportation article enabled the maryland transit authority to regulate the suspension of drivers recognizing of course the suspension of the imposition of sentence and the grant of probation