588 (1995). See also Cox v. Hart, 260 U.S. 427, 435, 43 S.Ct. 154, 67 L.Ed. 332 (1922) (stating a statute “is not made retroactive merely because it draws upon antecedent facts for its operation”). Essentially, the guiding question in evaluating the constitutionality of the Iowa Code, as applied to Swartz, is “whether the law changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date.” Weaver, 450 U.S. at 31, 101 S.Ct. 960. To support his argument that a violation of the ex post facto clause occurred when the state court used his 1976 breaking and entering conviction to obtain the 1998 felon in possession of a firearm conviction, Swartz relied on authority from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. See United States v. Davis (“Davis”), 936 F.2d 352, 356-57 (8th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). See also Bell v. United States (“Bell”), 970
holding the ex post facto clause required minnesota to apply the law in effect at the time of conviction which restored the right to possess firearms upon discharge rather than the law in effect at the time of discharge which imposed a tenyear waiting period when determining whether the defendant could possess firearms upon his discharge holding that the court of appeals in applying state law on appeal of a diversity action must apply law of the state as it existed at the time of its decision rather than as it stood at the time the case was decided in district court holding that where the immediate cause or motivating factor of a discharge is the employees assertion of statutory rights the discharge is discriminatory under section 215a3 whether or not grounds for other discharge exist holding that the proper focus when determining the starting point of the limitations period  is upon the time of the discriminatory acts not upon the time at which the consequences of the acts became most painful  holding that a defendants sentence is controlled by the law in effect at the time he committed the offense