but concluded that “the similarities [were] pervasive, and the dissimilarities insubstantial.” Id. at 984. It observed that the dissimilarities seemed to result only from differences in the defendant’s opportunities rather than his modus operandi. Id. (citing Chandler v. State, 442 So.2d 171, 173 (Fla.1983)); see also Schwab v. State, 636 So.2d 3, 7 (Fla.1994); Cadet v. State, 809 So.2d 43, 47 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). The Gore court ultimately stated that, in the past, it “has upheld the use of evidence of a collateral crime where the common points, when considered in conjunction with each other, establish a pattern of criminal activity which is sufficiently unique.” 599 So.2d at 984 (citing Chandler, 442 So.2d at 173); see also State v. Ackers, 599 So.2d 222, 224 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (<HOLDING>). In the instant case, the pervasive material
holding that collateral crime that occurred twelve years prior to charged offense not too remote in time holding it is fundamental error to convict a defendant of crime not charged and which is not a lesser included offense of the charged crime holding that the high level of similarity between the charged crime and prior bad acts necessary to prove common scheme or plan does not require evidence of common features to show a unique method of committing the crime holding that despite some differences between the charged offense and the collateral crime similarities between the two were striking enough to establish a unique crime pattern holding that admission of prior crime similar to the one charged increases likelihood that jury will convict based on past pattern of behavior rather than on facts of charged offense