satisfied the definition of “distribution” contained in § 2G2.2(b)(2). It is this finding that Hill challenges. In United States v. Canada, this court held that the term distribution was not limited to pecuniary gain and that it also included distribution based on non-monetary gains. See 110 F.3d 260, 263 (5th Cir.1997) (“[T]he intended definition of ‘distribution’ for the sake of the guideline is meant to be inclusive of pecuniary gain purposes, but not exclusive of all other purposes.”). Therefore, we held that because Canada’s distribution “was accompanied by an additional element,” namely the potential gain of enticing a minor to have sexual relations with him, the five-level enhancement was warranted. See id.; see also United States v. Fowler, 216 F.3d 459, 460 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). However, Canada and subsequent cases have
holding that mailing child pornography to another in the expectation of receiving similar materials in return constituted distribution for purposes of  2g22b2 holding that an enhancement for distribution of child pornography to a minor was improper because the pornographic materials at issue were transmitted to an undercover law enforcement officer who was not a minor holding that trading of child pornography is distribution for purposes of  2g22b2 holding that distribution of child pornography to encourage a meeting to engage in sex was sufficient to warrant enhancement holding that trading tapes of child pornography in order to augment a defendants personal collection constitutes distribution 