due process. In some cases, such a reservation is improper and subject to reversal on appeal from the order reserving jurisdiction. See, e.g., Herman v. Herman, 889 So.2d 128 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Gergen v. Gergen, 48 So.3d 148 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Martinez v. Martinez, 573 So.2d 37 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Gruner v. Westmark, 617 So.2d 420 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Bovet v. Bovet, 563 So.2d 154 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). But there is no violation of the right to due process unless the litigant is deprived of either notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard before the court reaches a final decision on the matter as to which jurisdiction has been retained. See Poynter, 51 So.3d at 546 (defining the constitutional right to procedural due process); West v. West, 301 So.2d 823, 824 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974) (<HOLDING>). The father has not disputed that he received
holding new york could lawfully modify a florida custody decree because florida court had right under florida law to change the decree holding that no acts by the outofstate defendant  would place her within the florida longarm statute in entering into a contract with a florida resident for an office to be run in mississippi holding that another states reservation of personal jurisdiction over a florida resident for the purpose of modifying its decree may last as long as the effectiveness of the decree and that no dueprocess violation occurs by the entry of a default modification against the florida resident if the florida resident was afforded proper notice holding that when an accident occurs outside florida workers compensation benefits are payable only if the contract of employment was made in florida or if the employees employment is principally located in florida holding that the full faith and credit clause precluded modification of a foreign states decree with regard to the age of majority where the obligor remained a resident of the rendering state