brought within 820 days, section 337.19 should be interpreted as a limited sovereign immunity statute. See Department of Transportation v. White Construction Company, Inc., 452 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). While such an interpretation may have been correct before the decision in Pan-Am Tobacco Corp. v. Department of Corrections, 471 So.2d 4 (Fla.1984), the argument no longer has any continuing validity. Under Pan-Am, the state has been deemed to waive sovereign immunity for suits alleging breach of an express contract with the state. The waiver applies to DOT. The time limit in section 337.19(2) is solely a limitations period. See Hypower, [Inc. v. State], 839 So.2d [856], 857 [Fla. 1st DCA 2003]. Id. at 1067. See also Pan-Am Tobacco Corp. v. Department of Corr., 471 So.2d 4 (Fla.1985)(<HOLDING>). Accordingly, since Bush Hog was not required,
recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract holding the contract was not authorized by law holding that the validity of a contract for a commission for the sale of real estate is determined by the law of the state where the contract is made holding that where the state has entered into a contract fairly authorized by the powers granted by general law the defense of sovereign immunity will not protect the state from an action arising from the states breach of that contract holding that a plaintiff may proceed with a claim against the state for breach of contract only where the state implicitly waives its sovereign immunity by expressly entering into a valid contract through an agent of the state expressly authorized by law to enter into such contract