91 L.Ed. 451 (1947); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii). “[T]he purpose of the work product privilege is to protect the integrity of the adversary process.” Parrott v. Wilson, 707 F.2d 1262, 1271 (11th Cir.1983); see also Admiral Ins. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., Dist. of Az., 881 F.2d 1486, 1494 (9th Cir.1989) (“The conditional protections afforded by the work-product rule prevent exploitation of a party’s efforts in preparing for litigation.”). Not surprisingly, it does not apply to foster a distortion of the adversary process by protecting illegal actions by an attorney. Because its purpose “is to protect the integrity of the adversary process[,] ... it would be improper to allow an attorney to exploit the privilege for ends that are antithetical to that process.” Parrott, 707 F.2d at 1271 (<HOLDING>) (citing Moody v. I.R.S., 654 F.2d 795, 800
holding an attorneys unethical conduct in secretly recording conversations with witnesses vitiated the work product protection as to those recordings holding that the party asserting work product protection has the burden of establishing that the doctrine applies holding that the burden of proof lies on the party asserting the protection of the work product doctrine holding that opinion work product is entitled to nearly absolute protection with limited exceptions holding that the protection of the work product rule continues after litigation has terminated