claim 1 does not specify that the markings on the golf training mat consist essentially of first, second, and third foot and ball position markings. Rather, claim 1 states that the mat consists essentially of a “surface including mai’kings” and that the markings “include” first, second, and third foot and ball positions. Such a construction is reasonable in view of Pelz’s use of the open-ended transition “including” after the structural limitation “ball striking surface” in claim 1. See SanDisk Corp. v. Memorex Prods., Inc., 415 F.3d 1278, 1284 (Fed.Cir.2005) (“Neither includes, nor comprising, forecloses additional elements that need not satisfy the stated claim limitations.”); see also Mannesmann Demag Corp. v. Engineered Metal Prods. Co., 793 F.2d 1279, 1282-83 (Fed.Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). It is reasonable to find that this open-ended
holding that a later concession to strike an unconscionable term does not change the fact that the arbitration agreement as written is unconscionable and contrary to public policy holding that reservation of federal asapplied takings claims that have issues that are not distinct from antecedent state issues does not defeat application of collateral estoppel in later federal suit holding that an overall transitional phrase does not trump later transitional language holding that a hearing does not contemplate an oral presentation unless required by express language or context holding that a criminal acquittal does not have collateral estoppel effect on a later civil forfeiture proceeding based on the same conduct