contends that even assuming equitable estoppel and waiver are legally available defenses, they should be stricken here because the factual allegations proffered by Honeywell do not meet the high standards for maintaining such defenses. (Pl.’s Reply in Support of Mot. to Strike at 5-10.) The government’s argument has merit. Even if Honeywell’s factual asser: tions are accepted as true, and deemed incorporated into the answer, Honeywell has not set forth the elements of either estoppel or waiver that are necessary in order to maintain these defenses against the government. With respect to estoppel, Honeywell has not pointed to any definite representation by the government, only a failure of the government to accept Honeywell’s offer of test results. See, e.g., Morns, 566 F.3d at 191-92 (<HOLDING>). Nor has Honeywell shown any reasonable
holding that fccs failure to respond to plaintiffs licensing waiver request for three years was not a definite representation of approval holding no judicial remedy available to fostvedt for irs failure to timely respond to his request for technical advice holding that plaintiffs failure to respond to argument warranted dismissal with prejudice holding that facts deemed admitted as to one defendant because of his failure to respond to the plaintiffs request for admissions are not binding on a codefendant holding that new york statute of limitations for  1983 actions was three years