or collateral review). Petitioner also argues that, under the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy clause, he cannot be subject to multiple punishment on multiplieitous charges. In support of this claim, Petitioner cites Braverman v. United States, in which the Supreme Court stated that “one agreement cannot be taken to be several agreements and hence several conspiracies because it envisages the violation of several statutes rather than one.... The single agreement is the prohibited conspiracy, and however diverse its objects it violates but a single statute.... For such a violation, only the single penalty prescribed by the statute can be imposed.” Braverman, 317 U.S. 49, 53-54, 63 S.Ct. 99, 87 L.Ed. 23 (1942); see also United States v. Licciardi, 30 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Launius v. United States, 575 F.2d 770, 771
holding that  1962d does not violate the principle prohibiting conviction of multiple conspiracies under an indictment charging a single conspiracy holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges holding that two conspiracies existed where the members of the second conspiracy did not know about the first conspiracy did not benefit from the first conspiracy and were connected with the first conspiracy only through a middleman holding that indictment is multiplieitous if it charges multiple conspiracies when there is only a single conspiracy to violate two statutes holding that two conspiracies existed where the first indictment was for a conspiracy to buy marijuana in mississippi and the second indictment involved a scheme to smuggle marijuana from colombia and distribute it in indiana