was interviewed by Detective Walls for some period of time; Ms. Clodfelter then joined them in the interview room and encouraged defendant Clodfelter to talk to Detective Walls and Special Agent Mayes; defendant Clodfelter made incriminating statements; defendant Clodfelter then signed a Miranda form waiving his rights; and then defendant Clodfelter gave the formal statement above, which was written down by Special Agent Mayes. Defendant Clodfelter argues that, because the written statement was essentially a memorialization of the oral statement he gave without having waived his rights, the written statement should not have been admitted as evidence, as it was tainted by the pre-Miranda statement. See, e.g., Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 616-17, 159 L. Ed. 2d 643, 657-58 (2004) (<HOLDING>). However, while defendant Clodfelter made a
holding that the sixth amendment generally permits interrogation of a represented person only 1 if it was the defendant and not the government who initiated the interrogation and 2 if the defendant voluntarily waived his right to counsel holding that whether a statement made in response to interrogation is testimonial depends on whether the objective purpose of the interrogation was to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution or to meet an ongoing emergency holding that where a second interrogation postmiranda attempted to recreate a first interrogation premiranda statement from the latter was inadmissible holding that the district court did not err in admitting evidence of an allegedly coerced interrogation where the taped interrogation was played for jurors and the defendant crossexamined the witness at length about the interrogation holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation