[an attorney] may have been personally involved with.” (People v. Kester (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 162, 167-68.) Here, however, the majority ignores the difficulties of gauging the effects of subtle or subliminal pressures that arise from friendship or loyalty to a lawyer’s colleagues and conflict with his duty to his client. Compounding the problems this decision will create for the lower courts, the majority fails to provide any guidance when it applies its rule that “a case-by-case inquiry should be conducted to determine whether any circumstances peculiar to the case indicate the presence of an actual conflict of interest.” (121 Ill. 2d at 44.) Whether or not one labels them per se, the conflicts present in these cases are very real. (See People v. Walton (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 197, 200-01 (<HOLDING>).) Nevertheless, the court’s “case-by-case
recognizing distinction between actual and per se conflicts of interest recognizing distinction between two types of waiver recognizing distinction between tolling and estoppel recognizing this distinction recognizing that slander per se is actionable without a showing of actual or special damages