him with child molestation; (2) a pretrial arraignment and bail hearing (the CrR 3.2 hearing); and (3) a pretrial evidentiary hearing (the CrR 3.5 hearing) to determine the admissibility of his confession. The question is whether these forms of reliance on Paul’s statements constitute “use” in a “criminal ease” under Chavez. We conclude that (1) and (2) above do constitute such “use.” Although we have not, after Chavez, addressed the scope of the “use” concept for Fifth Amendment purposes, other circuit courts have, with mixed results. The Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits have applied Chavez to bar recovery under the Fifth Amendment unless the allegedly coerced statements were admitted against the defendant at trial. See Burrell v. Virginia, 395 F.3d 508, 513-14 (4th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis in original); Murray v. Earle, 405
holding fifth amendment not violated under above rationale holding that the fourteenth amendment  and therefore also the fifth amendment  gives rise to a cause of action on behalf of a class of one where the plaintiff did not allege membership in a class or group holding that a defendants fifth amendment rights were violated when an interpreter was withdrawn by the court holding that because plaintiff did not allege any trial action that violated his fifth amendment rights  ipso facto his  1983 claim fails holding defendants fifth amendment rights had been violated when his probation was revoked based on his failure to complete a sexual treatment program that required incriminating admissions