18 U.S.C. § 1542 contains a materiality element, although other circuits have addressed the question. Most recently, the Second Circuit determined that by its plain terms, 18 U.S.C. § 1542 does not require that the false statement be material. United States v. Hasan, 586 F.3d 161, 2009 WL 3737521 (2d Cir. Nov. 10, 2009). The handful of other circuits to consider the question have also found that materiality is not an element of a § 1542 violation. See, e.g., United States v. Salinas, 373 F.3d 161, 167 (1st Cir.2004) (noting that § 1542 does not contain a materiality requirement such as that found in 18 U.S.C. § 1001); United States v. Hart, 291 F.3d 1084, 1085 (9th Cir.2002) (finding no materiality requirement in § 1542); United States v. Ramos, 725 F.2d 1322, 1323 (11th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). To the extent that Jimenez is arguing that
holding that materiality necessary element of section 1001 holding that materiality is an element of false statement prosecutions which must be submitted to the jury holding that unlike  1001  1542 does not have a materiality requirement holding that materiality is not an element of  1542 because any false statement is sufficient holding that materiality does not require a showing that the creditors were prejudiced by the false statement