A.2d 35, 36 (Me.1991) (“the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify”), citing Merrimack, 534 A.2d at 354. Except in limited circumstances, we have held that an insurer cannot avoid its duty to defend by establishing, before the underlying action has concluded, that ultimately there will be no duty to indemnify. In determining the duty to defend, regard less of when that ruling is made, the court’s consideration is limited to the underlying complaint and the insurance policy. Cumberland Cold Storage, 373 A.2d at 249. Even when evidence could conclusively establish the absence of a duty to indemnify, ordinarily that evidence is irrelevant to the determination of the duty to defend. See Horace Mann Insurance Co. v. Maine Teachers Association, 449 A.2d 358, 360-61 (Me.1982) (<HOLDING>). Given the unusual procedural posture of this
holding that in determining whether a state officer is entitled to qualified immunity for  1983 purposes courts may not consider whether the constitutional right was clearly established before determining first that a constitutional right was violated holding that an adjudication on summary judgment is an adjudication on the merits holding that as a general rule an issue raised initially in a reply brief will not be considered on appeal holding that facts established in underlying administrative adjudication could not be considered in determining whether there was initially a duty to defend holding that the court cannot examine the underlying merits of the claims in determining whether to certify a class