based on a state ground independent from federal law, made apparent by Villa’s detailed reasoning and its numerous citations to California statutes and cases. Villa’s conclusion that state habeas relief is only available to those in custody stemmed from its interpretation of California Penal Code section 1473. Such an interpretation of a state statute constitutes an independent state ground, unrelated to federal law. Although Villa cites to a federal case, Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 109 S.Ct. 1923, 104 L.Ed.2d 540 (1989), the discussion there was to provide examples of collateral consequences of a criminal conviction, similar to Villa’s deportation, which do not constitute “custody” for the purpose of California state habeas. 45 Cal.4th at 1070-71, 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 344, 202 P.3d 427 (<HOLDING>). Although Villa also cites Maleng for the
holding that collateral consequences such as the loss of the license to practice medicine sex offender registration inability to vote or inability to serve on a jury do not constitute constructive custody holding that an individual who is required to register as a sex offender is not in custody holding expired domestic violence restraining order not moot because of collateral legal consequences such as consideration in custody determination and nonlegal collateral consequences such as reputational harm holding evidence was legally insufficient to support conviction for violation of sex offender registration requirement holding that sex offender registration and notification do not constitute punishment