of the bond premium and the letter of credit is no greater than the total cost of an uncollateralized bond. In such instances, the cost of the letter of credit has been treated as the equivalent of a premium paid for the cost of an appeal bond. See, e.g., Bose Corp v Consumers Union of US, Inc, 806 F2d 304, 305 (CA 1, 1986); Lerman v Flynt Distributing Co, Inc, 789 F2d 164, 166 (CA 2, 1986); Johnson v Pacific Lighting Land Co, 878 F2d 297, 298 (CA 9, 1989) (noting the rule adopted in Bose, but disallowing costs paid for a letter of credit that were in addition to the cost of the premiums paid for supersedeas bonds, where there was no agreement by the parties for such costs). Other states have adopted this majority view. See, e.g, Whittle v Seehusen, 113 Idaho 852; 748 P2d 1382 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Creed v Apog, 377 Mass 522; 386 NE2d 1273
recognizing that no bond or a nominal bond may be appropriate in cases involving the public interest holding that the defendants were entitled to recover as costs not only bond premiums but the additional cost to obtain a letter of credit that was required by the surety as collateral before the issuance of bond holding that taxable costs included only the premium on a surety bond posted on appeal not the fees paid for letters of credit to secure the bond where the state statute and court rule only specifically allowed for premium on any surety bond holding that the bond was intended to and did substantially comply with sjection 71323 therefore because its conditions were not broader and more protective than the statute required the contention that the bond was a common law bond failed holding that the letter of credit was substantially equivalent to posting a supersedeas bond and the 100 cost was reasonable and probably less than the premium of a surety bond