settled upon a precise definition of the phrase “interest in such property,” see Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 195 B.R. 716, 730-32 (N.D.Ind.1996), we find that the District Court in Leckie Smokeless applied an unduly broad interpretation of the statute when it stated that one has an interest in a debtor’s property simply when one has a right to demand money from the debtor. We have previously observed, for example, that “courts have recognized that general, unsecured claims do not constitute ‘interests’ within the meaning of § 363(f).” Yadkin Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. McGee (In re Hutchinson ), 5 F.3d 750, 756 n. 4 (4th Cir.1998); see also Ninth Ave. Remedial Group, 195 B.R. at 729-32 (obse e Fairchild Aircraft Corp.), 184 B.R. 910, 917-19 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1995) (<HOLDING>). It is difficult to make further categorical
holding that  522f1 requires a debtor to have possessed an interest to which a lien attached before it attached to avoid the fixing of the lien on that interest holding that unless security interest or lien is avoided bankruptcy discharge has little if any impact on creditors ability to proceed in rem against property securing claim holding that section 363f permitted a sale free and clear of virginias depreciationrecoupment interest in the debtors property even though that interest was unsecured by lien or otherwise holding that the debtor must have had an interest in the property before the lien attached to take advantage of  522f holding that section 363f applies only to in rem interests which have attached to the property by way of either the debtors consent to a security interest or the creditors attachment of the property resulting in a lien