not be compensable unless the injury “is caused by a special hazard on a normal and customary route used by the employee as a means of entry to and exit from the employee’s place of work.” Doctor’s Bus. Serv. Inc., 498 So.2d at 663. Here, the trial court concluded that Bruhn’s injury could not have occurred in the course of her employment with PCC because the accident did not occur on the premises of A Beka Books, finding “[t]he premises of A Beka Books ... does not encompass the entire campus of Pensacola Christian College.” However, it is clear that PCC was Bruhn’s employer and that she was on the premises of PCC, returning to work at the A Beka Books Distribution Center after a lunch break at the time she sustained her injury. See Warren’s Case, 326 Mass. 718, 97 N.E.2d 184 (1951) (<HOLDING>); Lemming v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 41 Ohio
holding that an employees injury while on college grounds to report for first day of work before he reached either the administration building where he was to complete payroll forms or the athletic field house where he was to do the work was an injury suffered in the course of the employment holding that builder who was in the business of building and selling homes and who had a contract for the building of a home in which employee of subcontractor was injured was to be considered a principal contractor for purposes of workers compensation even though at the time of injury he was the owner of the house being built holding that where the employment of the injured employees was the occasion of the injury the injuries arose out of employment holding that even though the plaintiff failed to prove that he suffered a meaningful injury he was nevertheless entitled to nominal damages for the defendants violation of his first amendment rights holding that an injury is not within the scope of employment after the employee has left work unless the injury was caused by the employers negligence