for example, notes that a number of elements in the consent decree go beyond the remedies sought in the Complaint, and suggests that the decree should simply enjoin collusion and punish the alleged colluders rather than compelling the Settling Defendants to terminate their contracts with third-party retailers. Apple argues that the decree should do no more than preclude the Settling Defendants from coercing retailers to adopt the agency model, since this is what the Complaint alleges that the defendants did as to Amazon. A variety of comments note that neither agency agreements nor vertical price restraints are necessarily disallowed under the antitrust laws. On this latter point of law, at least, these comments are undoubtedly correct. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 882, 127 S.Ct. 2705 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S.
holding vertical price restraints subject to the rule of reason holding that plaintiff was entitled to sue under rule 10b5 for the difference between the price and the value received from the sale of the security where as here the evil is not the price at which plaintiff bought but the fact of being induced to buy holding that vertical minimum pricefixing agreements like vertical maximum pricefixing agreements should be evaluated under the traditional rule of reason holding that a maximum vertical price maintenance scheme is not per se illegal holding nonprice vertical restrictions are analyzed under the rule of reason