These exceptions apply only to a “State ... law, regulation, or order ...” 49 U.S.C. § 20106 (emphasis added). As Plymouth is not a “State,” the challenged Plymouth ordinance is not within the FRSA’s preemption clause exceptions. In Donelon v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 474 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 855, 94 S.Ct. 157, 38 L.Ed.2d 105 (1973), the Fifth Circuit held that “individual [local, parish] officials are without authority under the [FRSA] to require the Railroad to meet any safety standard beyond those provided for in the national Act.” Id. at 1113. The Michigan Supreme Court has noted that “a unanimous line of precedent in the lower federal courts” supports these holdings. Grand Trunk W. R.R. v. City of Fenton, 439 Mich. 240, 482 N.W.2d 706, 709 (1992) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1050, 113 S.Ct. 1943,
holding that statute allowing states to regulate the sale or use of any federally registered pesticide or device  if and to the extent the regulation does not permit any sale or use prohibited by the federal statute did not preempt local regulation since mere silence  cannot suffice to establish a clear and manifest purpose to preempt local authority holding that these exceptions apply in any event only to the states and not to local governments holding that title ii does not apply to the states holding that equitable tolling principles apply to suits against the united states in the same manner as they apply to private parties holding a local government sued under  1983 has no immunity even if its employee is entitled to qualified immunity and the court of appeals does not have jurisdiction over the local governments interlocutory appeal