to make a motion for JMOL at the close of all the evidence may “lull the opposing party into believing that the moving party has abandoned any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence” and thereby prejudice the opposing party. Farley, 786 F.2d at 1346. Wal-Mart asks for a case-specific determination of prejudice here, but Farley requires otherwise. See id. (“A strict application of Rule 50(b) obviates the necessity for a court to engage in a difficult and subjective case-by-case determination of whether a failure to [present] a motion for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence has resulted in such prejudice to the opposing party under the particular circumstances of that case.”); see also Image Tech. Serv., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1212 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). V. The district court did not abuse its
holding that argument was not preserved where defendant did not file a pretrial motion to suppress and did not object or make a motion to exclude the evidence until his motion to dismiss at the close of all of the evidence holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion holding that a litigants summary judgment motion does not satisfy the requirement for a motion for jmol at the close of the evidence holding that even when a defendant moves under rule 50 at the close of plaintiffs evidence  and autocentro did not even do that  if a defendant wishes to renew a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the posttrial stage with a view to having denial of that motion considered by the court of appeals the defendant is required to have moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence holding that the courts denial of either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is not reviewable 