expressly.’ Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 54, 107 S.Ct. 1549 (quoting Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146, 105 S.Ct. 3085, 87 L.Ed.2d 96 (1985)). See also Davila, 542 U.S. at 209, 124 S.Ct. 2488 ("[A]ny state-law cause of action that duplicates, supplements, or supplants the ERISA civil enforcement remedy conflicts with the clear congressional intent to make the ERISA remedy exclusive and is therefore pre-empted"). Consequently, if an employee’s claim can be characterized as a claim "to recover benefits due ... under the terms of the plan" as allowed by ERISA § 502(a)(t)(B)), "the claim [is] likely... conflict preempted because ERISA would provide both a cause of action and an enforcement remedy." Paulsen, 559 F.3d at 1084; Cleghorn, 408 F.3d at 1226 (<HOLDING>); see also id. at 1225 (characterizing ERISA’s
holding that a claim based on an insurers failure to provide emergency benefits under state law is completely preempted because the factual basis of the complaint  was the denial of reimbursement of plan benefits holding that claims were preempted where the factual basis of the complaint was the denial of reimbursement of plan benefits holding that where the basis of state claims for medical malpractice relates to the administration of plan benefits those claims fall squarely within the scope of erisa holding that the plaintiffs causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an erisa plan holding the state law claims were not preempted