(1987) (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n. 15, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2533 n. 15, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975)). The decision about whether to testify rests with the defendant, and it cannot be, asserted by counsel. Id. at 52. Courts will “not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights” and “courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights[.]” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). Moreover, any waiver of the right to testify must be “knowing and intelligent.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 236-37, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2052, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), and cases cited. “This implies an understanding of the consequences of the decision.” Ouber v. Guarino, 293 F.3d 19, 31 (1st Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Cormier contends that the state court
holding that a defendants waiver of the right to testify must be knowing informed and intelligent holding that under the sixth amendment a criminal defendant may waive his right to counsel if that waiver is knowing intelligent and voluntary recognizing requirement of knowing intelligent waiver holding that the constitutional right to a sixmember jury may be waived by a knowing and intelligent waiver holding a waiver of a substantial constitutional right must be a voluntary knowing and intelligent act