4(a). See Fed.R.Bank.P. 8002 Advisory Committee Notes. Accordingly, we cannot construe Williams’s late notice of appeal as a motion for extension of time due to excusable neglect. See Deyhimy v. Rupp (In re Herwit), 970 F.2d 709, 710 (10th Cir.1992) (concluding that district court lacked jurisdiction to consider appeal from judgment of bankruptcy court where appellant filed notice of appeal eleven days after bankruptcy court entered judgment and did not file a motion for extension of time within the initial ten-day period or within the twenty days after the first ten-day period alleging that her failure to file a notice of appeal within the initial ten days was due to excusable neglect); see also Walker v. Bank of Cadiz (In re LBL Sports Ctr., Inc.), 684 F.2d 410, 412 (6th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). “The Supreme Court has emphasized that the
holding that district court erred in passing upon defendants claim of excusable neglect where defendant never requested an extension of time from the bankruptcy judge but only opposed plaintiffs motion to dismiss by alleging in oral argument before the district court facts which were claimed to establish excusable neglect holding that the trial court erred by granting the defendants motion to dismiss holding that although that the district court erred in finding that plaintiffs lacked standing the appellate court may nonetheless proceed to consider the district courts determination that plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted holding that an argument raised for the first time in response to defendants motion to dismiss instead of in an amended complaint was not properly raised before the district court and would not be considered on appeal holding that an argument was barred where the movant could have but did not raise its argument before the district court ruled in the original motion