Garcia-Lopez and Fer-reira held, in circumstances indistinguishable from these, that section 19 applies. Accordingly, we must follow those cases and analyze whether Petitioner’s crime was a misdemeanor or a felony. Barapind, 400 F.3d at 750-51; Gammie, 335 F.3d at 899-900. The minute order here designated Petitioner’s conviction as a felony. That fact is not necessarily conclusive, however. Ferreira, 382 F.3d at 1051 n. 3. If section 17(b) applies, the conviction “is automatically converted for all purposes into a misdemeanor.” Id. Unfortunately for Petitioner, section 17(b) does not apply. Section 17(b)(1) does not apply because the state court suspended the imposition of the sentence and ordered probation instead, just as in Garcia-Lopez. See Garcia-Lopez, 334 F.3d at 844 (<HOLDING>). Nor does section 17(b)(3) apply. Unlike in
holding that petitioners divorce was a purely personal change in circumstances that does not constitute changed conditions or circumstances in jordan holding that because petitioners habeas petition was converted to a petition for review under the real id act whether jordon was in custody under  2241  is a jurisdictional inquiry no longer relevant to our analysis here holding that a losing priority judgment in an interference proceeding bars the loser from obtaining a patent containing claims that are patentably indistinguishable from the claims corresponding to the lost count holding petitioner not entitled to habeas relief on claim state court improperly used petitioners prior federal offense to enhance punishment holding in circumstances indistinguishable from petitioners here that because garcialopez was never subject to a judgment imposing punishment  17b1 is inapplicable to his case