in the United States, after a conviction for a felony that is a crime of violence.” Corresponding official comments further explain that a “crime of violence” includes the attempted “burglary of a dwelling.” USSG § 2L1.2 cmt. nn.1 (B)(iii) & 5 (2004). Ibarra-Hernandez contends, however, that the district court had the requisite discretion to depart downward from this 16-level adjustment because the Sentencing Commission’s 2001 amendments changed the nature of § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). Specifically, Ibarra-Hernandez points to Application Note 5 of the former version of USSG § 2L1.2, which allowed a sentencing court the discretion to depart only in situations where the factors explicitly enumerated in Application Note 5 existed. See USSG § 2L1.2 cmt n.5 (2000); Taylor, 286 F.3d at 306-07 (<HOLDING>). Ibarra-Hernandez argues that, when the
holding that in order for insured to qualify for uim benefits there must have been a liability policy in effect um coverage does not satisfy this requirement holding that constitutional claim must be fairly presented to state court in order to satisfy exhaustion requirement holding that to grant a new trial the error must be more than harmless holding that a defendant must satisfy the enumerated criteria contained in application note 5 in order for the court to grant a downward departure holding that the employer must offer a medical leave of absence in order to satisfy the requirement of providing a reasonable accommodation