“does not require ‘any particularity in connection with an averment of intent, knowledge or condition of the mind.’ ” In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.Bd 1541, 1547 (9th Cir.1994) (en banc) (quoting Walling v. Beverly Enters., 476 F.2d 393, 397 (9th Cir.1973)) (emphasis in GlenFed); Gottreich v. San Francisco Inv. Corp., 552 F.2d 866, 866-67 (9th Cir.1977) (sustaining con-clusory allegation that defendants “knew” their representations were false as sufficient to plead element of fraudulent intent). Rules 8(a) and 9(b) therefore preclude district courts from applying a heightened pleading for allegations of malice or fraudulent intent. Cf. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 1163, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993) (<HOLDING>). In federal court, a plaintiff may include a
holding that the fact that federal rule of civil procedure 9b requires a heightened pleading standard for some claims but not for a section 1983 claim against a municipality means that the rules do not require a heightened pleading standard for such a claim holding that federal courts could not impose heightened pleading requirement in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability because such requirement conflicted with rule 8 holding that rule 9bs heightened pleading requirement applies to allegations of mail and wire fraud used as predicate acts for a rico claim holding that district court could not apply florida statute requiring heightened pleading for punitive damages because statute conflicted with lenient requirements of rules 8 and 9b holding that a court may not apply a heightened pleading standard more stringent than the usual pleading requirements of rule 8 in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under  1983