complaint an injury that would meet the constitutional standing criteria. Our ruling, of course, does not preclude another lawsuit by Schmier alleging (subject to the pleading requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 11) a situation in which he did immediately face sanctions for citing an unpublished disposition. Nor does it preclude him from attempting to rely on an unpublished disposition in the course of representing a client with a bona fide case or controversy. In either event, the standing doctrine would not divest us of the authority to address Schmier’s claims on the merits. V. We note, however, that precedent — in the form of a published opinion by the Ninth Circuit — would appear to foreclose one of the many theories alleged by Schmier. See Hart, 266 F.3d at 1160-61, 1163, 1165-67, 1175 (<HOLDING>). Given the wide range of interest shown in the
holding that contrary to the nowvacated opinion in anastasoff the ninth circuit rule about unpublished dispositions not carrying precedential force did not violate the judicial power clause of article iii of the us constitution holding that the contracts clause article i section 10 clause 1 to the united states constitution does not apply to the actions of the federal government recognizing that a defense based on sovereign immunity is not coextensive with the limitations on judicial power in article iii holding the exclusion did not violate the equal protection clause of the wyoming constitution or the fourteenth amendment to the united states constitution holding that the exercise of judicial power under article iii of the united states constitution requires an actual case or controversy