745, 751 (2001); Nevin v. Union Tmst Co., 726 A.2d 694, 701 (Me.1999); Noble v. Bnice, 349 Md. 730, 709 A.2d 1264, 1278 (1998); Swanson v. Ptak, 268 Neb. 265, 682 N.W.2d 225, 231 (2004); Deeb v. Johnson, 170 A.D.2d 865, 566 N.Y.S.2d 688, 689 (N.Y.App.Div.1991); Simon v. Zipperstein, 32 Ohio St.3d 74, 512 N.E.2d 636, 638 (1987); Copenhaver v. Rogers, 238 Va. 361, 384 S.E.2d 593, 595 (1989). 2 . The definition of “personal representative” includes an "executor, independent executor, administrator, independent administrator, [or] temporary administrator, together with their successors.” TEX. PROB. CODE § 3(aa). 3 . A number of other jurisdictions have allowed legal malpractice claims to survive a decedent. See, e.g., Loveman v. Hamilton, 66 Ohio St.2d 183, 420 N.E.2d 1007, 1008 (1981) (<HOLDING>); see also Jones v. Siesennop, 55 Ill.App.3d
holding that whether in tort or contract all malpractice claims are covered by the same statute of limitations holding that regardless of whether a legal malpractice action sounds in contract or tort the gist of the action is the attorneys breach of his contractual obligation to represent his client holding that an action for consequential damages to property whether the action is brought in contract or in tort is an action for injury to property within the threeyear statute of limitations holding that there must be a tort distinguishable from or independent of the breach of contract in order for a party to bring a valid claim in tort based on a breach in a contractual relationship holding that a private antitrust action for injury sounds in tort and is subject to a three year statute of limitations