is a presumption of arbitrability.... Such a presumption is particularly applicable where the clause is [ ] broad.... In such cases, ‘[i]n the absence of any express provision excluding a particular grievance from arbitration, we think only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail.’ ” Id. at 650, 80 S.Ct. 1347 (quoting Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582-85, 80 S.Ct. 1347). Applying the above principles, the Second Circuit has repeatedly relied on the presumption of arbitrability to find that arbitration clauses, which are arguably geared toward employee grievances, also allow employer-initiated disputes to go to arbitration. See Coca-Cola, 242 F.3d at 57; see also Interstate Brands Corp. v. Bakery Drivers, 167 F.3d 764, 767-68 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); ITT World Communications, Inc. v.
holding that after two years of litigation the employer had waived any right it had to compel arbitration holding employer had contractually waived its right to litigate contract claim and was bound to arbitrate holding unconscionable an arbitration agreement requiring employees to arbitrate claims against the employer but not requiring the employer to arbitrate claims against the employees holding that the trial court must determine whether there was an agreement to arbitrate when the party contesting arbitration claimed she had never signed the contract or intended to be bound holding that the agreement was not illusory because it was supported by consideration insofar as the employee and employer were equally bound by a promise to arbitrate disputes