or she does not behave in accordance with an employer’s expectations for men or women.” Other-Circuits have similarly interpreted the sex discrimination .provisions under Title IX and Title VII to protect transgender individuals' from discrimination. See, e.g., Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[Discrimination against a transgender individual because of her gender-nonconformity is sex discrimination, whether it’s described as being on the basis of sex or gender.”); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[A] label, such as ‘transsexual,’ is not fatal to a sex discrimination claim where the victim has suffered discrimination because of his or her gender non-conformity.”); Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215-16 (1st Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>); Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1,
holding that the mere allegation that a female professor was paid less than a male colleague for equal work stated a claim under the equal pay act holding that to establish a prima facie equal pay act claim the plaintiff must show that the jobs being compared are substantially equal holding hospitals equal protection claim arises under the medicare act holding plaintiff stated claim in his individual capacity holding that a transgender individual stated a claim forsexdiscrimination under the equal credit opportunity act