again, and KEB confirmed that it had, in fact, conveyed KLI’s notice to Morgan, but that Morgan had stated that it would not execute KLI’s demand to unwind. Kim called Morgan, and Morgan stated that it would not execute KLI’s demand because KEB did not want the transaction to be unwound. Morgan does not dispute these facts, and must concede, therefore, that it knew, by reason of both KLI’s written and oral notices, that KLI wanted its baht position unwound, and that it was Morgan’s decision not to comply with the demand. Clearly, Morgan had actual knowledge, and therefore is deemed to have notice that KLI made demand pursuant to the unwind provision, section 2(e) of the Morning Glory/KEB swap agreement. Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Diamond Timber, Inc., 559 F.Supp. 972, 978 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (<HOLDING>) (internal citation omitted). Morgan’s position
holding that actual notice fulfills a notice requirement that an applicable federal regulation be conspicuously posted because actual notice is the best notice holding that constructive knowledge satisfies the reason to know standard holding that  1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury holding that a  1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury holding that notice occurs when party charged with having notice has actual knowledge or when from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time in question he has reason to know that it exists