rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice. Id. (quoting Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325); see also United States v. Shockey, 538 F.3d 1355, 1357 & n. 2 (10th Cir.2008). i. Whether Richardson’s new arguments fall within his appeal waiver In his plea agreement, Richardson waived his right to appeal with the exception of “only those issues raised and subsequently denied by the Court with regard to the defendant’s motion to suppress.” (R. (Richardson) v. 1, doc. 112, plea agreement at 7, para. 11 (emphasis added).) That language clearly precludes Richardson from raising on appeal any new arguments in support of his suppression motion. See Anderson, 374 F.3d at 957-58 (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Ochoa-Colchado, 521
holding that a waiver of right to appeal contained in a plea agreement is enforceable holding that defendants failure to appeal the voluntariness of a plea constitutes waiver of the issue on subsequent appeal holding that the united states breach of the plea agreement releases the defendant from the appeal waiver holding appeal waiver in conditional guilty plea agreement precluded defendant from asserting new argument on appeal in support of suppression motion holding that a defendants guilty plea was unconditional where the guilty plea was not in writing and the government did not consent to it being conditional