454 n 2, 944 P2d 969 (1997); Springer v. Golly horn, 146 Or App 389, 393-94, 934 P2d 501 (1997). No decree of final distribution has been entered in the probate proceeding, see ORS 116.113(4); rather, the “judgment” that appellants seek to challenge is merely an interim order in that proceeding. As we explained in Springer, “[u]ntil a decree of final distribution is made [in a probate proceeding], any determination of the interested parties’ rights, no matter what it is called, is not final and is subject to modification.” 146 Or App at 393-94. Nor is the court’s order an “order affecting a substantial right, and which in effect determines the action or suit so as to prevent a judgment or decree therein.” ORS 19.205(2)(a); see Gillespie v. Kononen, 310 Or 272, 279, 797 P2d 361 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Stanwood v. Multnomah County, 135 Or App 58,
holding that an order denying an allegedly indigent plaintiffs motion for a fee waiver or deferral was appealable under former ors 190102a because the order closed the courthouse door holding that when the trial court signed an order dismissing the plaintiffs complaint but refused to enter a final judgment on that order the order refusing to enter judgment was appealable under former ors 190102a holding that an order dismissing a claim without prejudice is a final appealable order if the statute of limitations for that claim has expired holding that an order was interlocutory in nature despite the trial courts certification of the order as a final appealable judgment holding that an order dismissing a complaint without prejudice is a final appealable order only if no amendment to the complaint could cure the defects in the  case internal quotation marks omitted