or discriminatory conduct toward women in the office), alongside Junk’s discriminatory statements about women in the workplace, R. 31-3 (Gullett Aff. ¶ 20) (Page ID #407), would permit a reasonable juror to conclude that there was a hostile work environment. In one particularly egregious example, reasonable jurors could even find that Junk’s conduct was “physically threatening.” Phillips, 854 F.3d at 327, At a point when Junk and Daniels “were not on good terms,” Junk— while holding an AR-15—told Daniels, “Don’t worry, I’m not that mad, ha, ha, ha, ha.” R. 26-2 (Daniels Dep. at 30-31) (Page ID #235-36). Other courts have held similar behavior to constitute a hostile work environment, and I would do the same here. See Cordero-Suárez v. Rodríguez, 689 F.3d 77, 79, 82-83 (1st Cir. 2012) (<HOLDING>). I would also reverse the district court’s
recognizing that the elements of title vii sexually hostile work environment claims apply to icra sexually hostile work environment claims holding that a supervisor who approached an employees desk with a workissued gun and said im going to screw you up contributed to a hostile work environment recognizing a hostile work environment claim under section 1983 holding that a viable hostile work environment claim requires an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive holding that there was nohostile work environment where a supervisor after negotiating with another supervisor for a printer told a jewish employee soon im going to be the only one at this terminal wearing a yarmulka