plead guilty, because without that knowledge their decisions were not based upon all of the relevant facts. Although the Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment does not require a correct assessment of the risks and benefits of pleading guilty as opposed to proceeding to trial, it recognizes that counsel must at least be aware of such risks, especially where the lack of awareness directly impacts the reasoning behind whatever advice is provided. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970) (“Questions like these [relating to the risks of trial] cannot be answered with certitude; yet a decision to plead guilty must necessarily rest upon counsel’s answers, uncertain as they may be.”); United States v. Hanley, 906 F.2d 1116, 1121 (6th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). I also agree with the lead opinion that if
holding that a defendant must demonstrate that he would not have pled guilty but for the error holding that defendant was entitled to withdraw guilty plea upon habeas corpus proceedings where he pled guilty in exchange for an illegal sentence holding trial court had broad discretion to disbelieve defendants claim he would not have pled guilty but for counsels error holding that the defendant could not prove prejudice from alleged ineffective assistance because he has never claimed that but for counsels errors he would have pleaded not guilty and insisted upon going to trial recognizing that a reversal for ineffective assistance would be in order if the defendant had pled guilty solely in reliance upon his counsels erroneous advice that he would be eligible for parole in onethird the time he received for sentence