the substantive motor carrier safety standards for which B&T was cited. Ohio Adm.Code 4901:2-5-02(A) contains no substantive motor carrier safety standards. Finally, this is not a case in which the federal government has authorized Ohio to directly enforce federal regulations, and Ohio Adm.Code 4901:2-5-02 serves merely to provide notice of Ohio’s intent to enforce the federal regulations. In the case of the FMCSRs, the federal government expressly chose to encourage the states to adopt motor carrier rules of their own that are “identical to, or have the same effect as, the FMCSRs,” rather than to authorize the states to directly enforce the FMCSRs. Section 350.105, Title 49, C.F.R.; Section 31142, Title 49, U.S.Code. See Bragg v. West Virginia Coal Assn. (C.A.4, 2001), 248 F.3d 275 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, when the PUCO cited B&T for
holding that states may enforce their own laws for disabled children and are not limited to the minimum standards of the federal law holding that congress did not authorize the states to enforce federal law where it gave states regulatory control through enforcement of their own laws holding that the united states may bring suit against a state to enforce compliance with federal law holding that the rights and duties of the united states on commercial paper which it issues are governed by federal law and that in the absence of an applicable act of congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to their own standards holding that upon approval by congress a compact between states becomes federal law that binds the states