would be known within the community. This same constant observation ordinarily is not present in the civilian community. Thus, in the military it is difficult to mask a peremptory challenge based on race, Batson v. Kentucky, supra, gender, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reí. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994); or ethnicity, United States v. Santiago-Davila, 26 MJ 380. HARD v. SOFT DATA A peremptory challenge might be based on “hard data” or “soft data.” Hard data would include being an accuser, RCM 912(f)(1)(C); a witness, RCM 912(f)(1)(D); or an investigating officer for the offense charged, RCM 912(f)(1)(F). Hard data as a basis for a challenge for cause also includes a member’s possessing a rigid notion of punishment, United States v. Smart, 21 MJ 15, 19-20 (CMA 1985)(<HOLDING>), or being the principal law enforcement
holding petitioner cannot claim he was denied right to assistance of counsel when he knowingly and voluntarily decided to represent himself holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force holding that a defendant was not entitled to a relief under section 2255 when he asserted that the sentencing judge who was not the trial judge was influenced by the sentence imposed by the trial judge on a codefendant holding military judge erred when he denied challenge for cause against captain who indicated he would not consider a nopunishment option holding that party who had sought disqualification of the judge who heard his cause only from the assignment judge and not the judge himself could not appropriately raise recusal issue on appeal