for a crime punishable by death but does not seek the death penalty. United States v. Waggoner, 339 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 2003). Acknowledging this Court’s precedent in Waggoner, Wells argues that this case is distinguishable, because Waggoner fails to address the impact of 18 U.S.C, § 3599(e), on which Wells relies to urge an enhanced statutory right to continuity of counsel. Because we find that Wells failed to properly present this statutory argument below, we decline to entertain it on appeal. See Peterson v. Highland Music, Inc., 140 F.3d 1313, 1321 (9th Cir. 1998). Instead, we address Wells’ assertion that Mr. Ofifenbecher’s removal constituted an abuse .of discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. See Martel v. Clair, 565 U.S. 648, 659, 132 S.Ct. 1276, 182 L.Ed.2d 135 (2012) (<HOLDING>). The CJA does not pi’ohibit courts from
holding that even capital prisoners have no constitutional right to counsel in habeas cases recognizing the common practice of substituting specialized capital counsel for habeas petitions filed by capital defendants recognizing that congress enacted the legislation now known as  3599 to govern appointment of counsel in capital cases thus displacing  3006a for persons facing execution but retaining that section for all others holding that the constitution does not require the appointment of two attorneys for indigent capital defendants holding no right to counsel for capital defendants in state habeas proceedings