prior restraint. In a post-trial interview, juror Dorothy Roy stated, “I voted for [the verdict], but it was not my verdict_ I had no choice. It was 11 to 1. It had to be unanimous_ They wanted to get on with other trials.” Roy added that there were “things” that she did not want published until the trial judge made his decision, but she gave no indication what these were. This Court has held that a district court’s refusal to permit juror interviews will be reversed only upon a showing of abuse of discretion. See United States v. Cuthel, 903 F.2d 1381, 1382 (11th Cir.1990). In Cuthel, this Court upheld a district court’s authority, under the very same rule at issue in this case, to refuse permission to defense counsel to interview jurors on grounds similar to these. Id. at 1382-83 (<HOLDING>); see also O’Rear v. Fruehauf Corp., 554 F.2d
holding that trial courts denial of motion for new trial based on juror misconduct was justified where there was no evidence presented at hearing on motion that juror had knowingly concealed relevant litigation experience during voir dire and identity of juror as county court litigant was not demonstrated holding that the statement contained in a juror pamphlet that a reasonable doubt is one for which should he be called upon a juror can give a reason was obviously erroneous under our law holding harmless under either standard ex parte communication consisting of telephone call by trial judge to individual juror at home to verify medical condition resulting in replacement by alternate juror without notice to counsel holding that though judge did not question juror individually note from juror to judge requesting private meeting to ask legal question did not suggest juror would not base verdict on evidence holding phone call to defendant from purported juror saying we were pressured into making our decision inadequate to permit juror interview