nor the trial court was required to séarch the trial record in an attempt to determine what grounds Horton may have intended to raise by means of his bare conclusory statements or what factual substantiation there may have been for an asserted ground. See Wilburn v. State, 292 Ark. 416, 730, 730 S.W.2d 491 (1987) (per curiam). As to the notation on the Rule 37.1 order that a deputy prosecuting attorney drafted it, we have rejected the argument that the circuit court judge must personally draft each border in a matter. We have held that when a court approves and signs the order, the trial court has approved and adopted the order; accordingly, it makes no difference what person drafted the order so long as the court approved it. Scott v. State, 267 Ark. 628, 631, 593 S.W.2d 27, 29 (1980) (<HOLDING>); see also Maldonado v. State, 2011 Ark. 452,
holding that an order in a criminal matter drafted by the prosecutor and signed by the circuit judge was in compliance with requirements of the law holding a plaintiffs complaint must allege compliance with the signature and certification requirements of the wyoming constitution in order to invoke the courts subject matter jurisdiction holding that a transfer order issued by a district court in another circuit is reviewable only in the circuit of the transferor district court holding that the district court abused its discretion in denying the defendants timely motion for the substitution of the participating prosecutor in order to permit the defense to call the prosecutor as a witness holding that a postconsent reference order signed by the district judge was required to vest authority in a magistrate judge for disposition of a summary judgment motion