either Rule 65.1’s summary procedure or through an independent action [pursuant to Section 1352].”); see also 11 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2972. In either case, however, the party seeking to recover must show that it was “wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 65(c); see Blumenthal v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 910 F.2d 1049, 1054-55 (2d Cir.1990). . Neither Rule 65 nor Rule 65.1 defines the meaning of “wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” In Blumenthal, however, the Second Circuit held that “[a] party has been ‘wrongfully enjoined’ ... if it is ultimately found that the enjoined party had at all times the right to do the enjoined act.” 910 F.2d at 1054; see also H.E. Fletcher Co. v. Rock of Ages Corp., 326 F.2d 13, 16-17 (2d Cir.1963) (<HOLDING>); accord Note, Recovery for Wrongful
recognizing that the district court is not bound by its prior factual findings determined in a preliminary injunction hearing holding that the injunction bond renders the movant liable for damages if in the end it was determined that the enjoined party was within its rights in engaging in enjoined conduct holding that movant must demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction holding that the excusable neglect inquiry is at bottom an equitable one that should be made by considering the danger of prejudice to the nonmoving party the length of the delay and its potential impact upon judicial proceedings the reason for the delay including whether it was in the reasonable control of the movant and whether the movant acted in good faith  holding that the failure of the applicant to file a bond before the issuance of the temporary injunction renders the injunction void ab initio