where officer lacked specific articulable facts at time defendant misidentified himself to create reasonable suspicion connecting him with criminal activity). 53 . See, e.g., Holladay v. State, 805 S.W.2d 464, 472-73 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), overruled on other grounds by Hunter v. State, 955 S.W.2d 102 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Glass v. State, 681 S.W.2d 599, 602 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984); LeBlanc v. State, 138 S.W.3d 603, 608 n. 6 (Tex.A 278 Ill.Dec. 522, 798 N.E.2d 1279, 1285 (2003) (refusing to fill gap in evidence by taking judicial notice of meaning of absence of record of license when officers provided no explanation as to why result of license check of "no record on file” was inherently suspicious). 57 . See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1401, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (<HOLDING>). 58 . See Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 64 (noting that
holding that a traffic stop is reasonable under the fourth amendment when police have probable cause to believe a traffic infraction has occurred holding random traffic stops for license and registration checks are contrary to fourth amendment holding that random drug testing for student athletes did not violate their fourth amendment rights holding that reasonable suspicion standard applies to routine traffic stops holding that comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions associated with ordinary traffic stops explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that terry stops are subject to the dictates of miranda 