to discipline or discharge plaintiff, however, are relevant. JA at 268-69 (emphasis added). In the context of this instruction, “stray remarks” clearly refers to those comments that are not made by decisionmakers at Roadway. The district court is correct that those remarks should not be considered. See, e.g., Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 355 (6th Cir.1998). Tooson contends that the Supreme Court held in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989), that “stray remarks” can be considered as evidence of discrimination. We, however, can find no support in Hopkins for the proposition that the remarks of individuals without any decisionmaking authority over the plaintiff can provide evidence of discriminatory intent. Id. at 251 (<HOLDING>). Tooson also argues that Brown was so clearly
holding that comments which were considered by personnel board in normal course of considering employment action were relevant to establish discriminatory intent and were not just stray remarks holding that stray comments without more cannot establish a case of employment discrimination but if other indicia of discrimination are properly presented the remarks can no longer be deemed stray and the jury has a right to conclude that they bear a more ominous significance holding that ageist comments by coworkers were merely  stray remarks that while indicating an agediscriminatory animus on the part of those employees under the circumstances of the case were of no probative value as to the employers decisionmaking process holding that isolated remarks are insufficient to prove discriminatory intent recognizing that the seventh circuit consistently has held that isolated comments that are no more than stray remarks in the work place are insufficient to establish that a particular decision was motivated by discriminatory animus