factors: (1) interrelation of operations; (2) centralized control of labor relations; (3) common management; and (4) common ownership or financial control. See Cook v. Arrowsmith Shelburne, Inc., 69 F.3d 1235, 1240 (2d Cir.1995); Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers Local 2 v. C.G. Yantch, Inc., 316 F.Supp.2d 130, 143 (N.D.N.Y.2003). However, whether a particular defendant can be considered a plaintiffs “employer” is a fact-specific inquiry. Thus, on a motion to dismiss, and therefore a motion to amend futility analysis, the relevant inquiry is whether a defendant has been put “on notice of the theory of employer liability”. See Fowler v. Scores Holding Co., Inc., 677 F.Supp.2d 673, 681 (S.D.N.Y.2009); see also Zhong v. August August Corp., 498 F.Supp.2d 625, 628-29 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (<HOLDING>). Here, the Plaintiffs have put the Defendants
holding that no fiduciary duty existed between the plaintiff and defendant because there was no evidence that the parties agreed that defendant would be acting primarily for the benefit of the plaintiffs holding that the complaint did not satisfy the notice pleading requirements of federal rule of civil procedure 8a because the complaint gave the defendants no notice of the specific factual allegations presented for the first time in the plaintiffs opposition to summary judgment holding that a complaint that fails to meet the pleading requirements does not invoke the statutory waiver of sovereign immunity holding that an flsa complaint is sufficient under the liberal pleading requirements of rule 8a if the pleading enables the defendant to conclude that the plaintiff is asserting that an employeeemployer relationship existed between the parties and alleges that the defendant meets the flsa definition of an enterprise engaged in commerce holding that our liberal rules of notice pleading do not require that specific evidentiary detail be alleged in the complaint