sec. 9-402(8), 3A U.L.A. 54 (1981), from which sec. 409.402(8), Stats., is drawn, provides: Subsection (8) is in line with the policy of this Article to simplify formal requisite and filing requirements and is designed to discourage the fanatical and impossibly refined reading of such statutory requirements in which courts have occasionally indulged themselves. As an example of the sort of reasoning which this subsection rejects, see General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Haley, 329 Mass. 559, 109 N.E.2d 143 (1952). (Emphasis added.) In that case, the court held that a filing listing the debtor as "E.R. Millen Company" was insufficient to perfect a security interest in property of E.R. Millen, Co., Inc. It is this rejection of overly strict appli Rep. Serv. 907 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1971) (<HOLDING>); has been criticized. For example, in Citizens
holding that a court may not enter an injunction freezing assets in action for damages where there is no equitable interest in frozen assets holding a filing under hatfield wayne l sufficient to perfect an interest in the assets of a corporation called hatfield construction company holding a filing under mccauleys reprographics and mapping insufficient to perfect a security interest in the assets of the debtor corporation holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation holding that directors of a whollyowned corporation could consider the interests of the parent company as well as the interests of their corporation because there was only one substantive interest to be protected