had produced no evidence that the wife’s access to the apartment was limited. Similarly, in United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 866, 109 S.Ct. 171, 102 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988), we upheld the consent given by the owner of a shack who had permitted the defendant to stay there for one month. We noted that the shack had only one habitable room, that both the defendant and the owner left personal property in that room, and that the defendant had a key to the shack. In Yarbrough, we stated that the owner “had complete access throughout the property in general, and to the room lived in by [the defendant] in particular. It was as much his own place as it was [the defendant’s].” Id. at 1534. See also United States v. Sealey, 830 F.2d 1028 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hamilton, 792 F.2d 837 (9th
holding that a wife validly consented to a search of the garage when she was married to the defendant was part owner of the home and had unlimited access to all areas holding consent invalid when a housemate had unlimited access to the common areas of the apartment but only limited access to her housemates bedroom holding that the evidence obtained as part of an illegal stop should have been suppressed even where the defendants consented to the search holding that an attached garage is part of the home for payton purposes even when the garage door is open holding that the defendants mother validly consented to a search of a motor home parked in the driveway of her house when the motor home was connected by an electrical cord to her house the mother was observed entering the motor home repeatedly and the mother apparently had supervisory authority over two teenage girls who were inside the motor home because it was reasonable to conclude that the mother had common authority over the motor home sufficient to give valid consent