shall administer and enforce the provisions of this chapter.”); Heidemann v. Sweitzer, 375 N.W.2d 665, 668 (Iowa 1985). Additionally, the county attorney did not represent the DOT in the plea negotiations. First, the DOT was not a party to the criminal case. State v. Juarez, 345 N.W.2d 801, 802 (Minn.Ct.App.1984) (parties to criminal proceedings and revocation proceedings are not the same because the state, which prosecutes the criminal case through the local prosecuting attorney, is not the same party as the commissioner of public safety who initiates the revocation proceeding). Secondly, unless specifically provided otherwise, the attorney general, not the county attorney, represents the DOT. Iowa Code § 307.23 (1993); accord State v. House, 291 Minn. 424, 192 N Commw.Ct.1987) (<HOLDING>). The administrative penalties of chapter 321
holding that department of transportation did not have control of motorists drivers license because although the department of transportation may have had a duty to recall the motorists license this authority to revoke does not involve physical possession or actual control sufficient to bring the license within the ambit of the personal property exception to sovereign immunity holding that the governments attorney had the implicit authority to bind the government although the contracting officer had the express authority holding that where department of transportation regulations did not require department officials to enforce vehicle regulations the departments decision not to do so was discretionary holding that district attorney had no power during plea bargaining to bind the state department of transportation to forego license suspension holding that county attorney had no authority to agree during plea negotiations that defendants drivers license would not be revoked