v. State, 959 So.2d 702, 713 (Fla.2007). Under the plain meaning rule, “may” denotes a permissive term; however, if reading “may” as permissive leads to an unreasonable resült or one contrary to legislative intent, courts may look to the context in which “may” is used and the legislature’s intent to determine whether “may” should be read as a mandatory term. See Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Sidky, M.D., 936 So.2d 715, 721 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Comcoa v. Coe, 587 So.2d 474, 477 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Allied Fidelity Ins. Co. v. State, 415 So.2d 109, 110-11 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (rejecting the appellant’s argument that “shall” always means “shall”). Here, the context in which “may” is used in section 456.072(6) does not permit us to read it as “shall.” Cf. Comcoa, 587 So.2d at 477 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we cannot give section
holding that a court may grant a writ of mandamus if 1 the petitioner demonstrates that he lacks an adequate alternative 2 the petitioner demonstrates a clear and indisputable right to the writ and 3 the court is convinced that issuing the writ is warranted holding that a trial court had no discretion to enter a writ of replevin after finding that the statutory requirements for issuing the writ had been met even though the statute provided that a circuit court may issue a writ of replevin reasoning that based on the context may implied an imperative obligation holding that circuit court violated the essential requirements of the law in not issuing an order to show cause after receiving a facially sufficient petition for writ of certiorari holding that to grant a writ of mandamus a court in the exercise of its discretion must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances holding that demonstration of error does not necessarily entitle petitioners to a writ unless the standards for granting a writ have been met