Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 57 S.Ct. 797, 81 L.Ed. 1182 (1937), the Supreme Court explained the reach of the Ex Post Facto Clause as follows: [T]he ex post facto clause looks to the standard of punishment prescribed by a statute, rather than-to the sentence actually imposed_ [A]n increase in the possible penalty is ex post facto, regardless of the length of the sentence actually imposed, since the measure of punishment prescribed by the later statute is more severe than that of the earlier. Id. 57 S.Ct. at 799 (citations omitted). Prior to the enactment of the MVRA, the district courts had the discretion to order “that the defendant make restitution to any victim of the offense.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663 (West 1985). See United States v. Williams, 128 F.3d 1239, 1241 (8th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). In exercising this discretion, the court was
holding that the ex post facto clause prohibited retroactive application of the mvra because before the mvra became effective the victim and witness protection act authorized but did not compel district courts to order restitution holding that court cannot order restitution under the mvra to persons who are not victims of the offenses for which the defendant was convicted holding that retroactive application of mvra does not violate the ex post facto clause because restitution is not a criminal punishment holding ex post facto clause barred application of mvra to defendant whose criminal conduct occurred before the effective date of the statute holding retroactive application of idra would violate the ex post facto clause