as to the meaning of the law, even if that party is the government and even in the context of a criminal case." United States v. Ogles, 440 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir.2006) (en banc). It is true that the Ninth Circuit has required de novo review in cases where California courts require a showing of a "strong likelihood" of group bias (as articulated in the state-law case People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748 (1978)) rather than a "reasonable inference" of group bias (as articulated in Batson). See, e.g., Fernandez v. Roe, 286 F.3d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir.2002); Cooperwood v. Cambra, 245 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir.2001); Wade v. Terhune, 202 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir.2000); see also Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 173, 125 S.Ct. 2410, 162 L.Ed.2d 129 (2005) (<HOLDING>). Here, however, the California Court of Appeal
holding that the standard for withholding of removal is a showing that it is more likely than not that a petitioner will face persecution upon her return holding that this courts procedural requirements regarding the development of a complete record to establish a prima facie case of a batson violation is an unreasonable application of federal law holding that a prima facie case is subject to independent review recognizing confusion caused by prima facie language holding that californias more likely than not standard is at odds with the prima facie inquiry mandated by batson