that the lapse period constitutes a prior restraint on speech confer Article III standing. To have standing to challenge a law as a prior restraint, Isle of Dreams “must establish that the challenged provision pertains to its activity, and not merely that it is ‘subject to the law.’ ” CAMP Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d 1257, 1276 (11th Cir.2006) (quoting City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755-56, 108 S.Ct. 2138, 100 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988)). Because no lapse would occur until two years after Isle of Dreams obtains approval, which has never happened, its allegation that the lapse period “pertains to its activity” is merely conjectural and hence not a constitutionally cognizable injury sufficient to give Isle of Dreams standing. See id. (<HOLDING>). Nor does Isle of Dreams’ as-applied challenge
holding that a plaintiff had standing to attack an entire ordinance including portions of the ordinance not applied to the plaintiff holding that plaintiff could not request damages for a facial challenge to a zoning ordinance under the first amendment because the provision had not yet harmed the plaintiff holding that the plaintiffs due process challenge to a city ordinance was barred because it was inextricably intertwined with a statecourt ruling that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the ordinance holding that plaintiff did not have standing to challenge the permit process where it could not show that it would ever be genuinely threatened by an unconstitutional prior restraint in this case holding that a plaintiff lacked standing to challenge an ordinance imposing higher permit fees on commercial events as a prior restraint because the city had not yet characterized the plaintiffs events as commercial