as a third-party launderer under subsection (a)(2). These offenders generally are not involved in the underlying offense and their sentencing base level is set by the “value of the laundered funds.” Id. § 2S1.1(a)(2). Blackmon argues that he should have been considered a third-party money launderer under § 2Sl.l(a)(2). He contends that there was no underlying offense because the $15,000 he received representing drug proceeds was supplied by the Government as part of a sting transaction and not by Williams. Put another way, he argues that the first condition required to be treated as a direct launderer, subpart (A), was not met. This argument is untenable. The laundering offense is not “fictional,” as Blackmon states. See United States v. Perez, 992 F.2d 295, 298 (11th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Contreras, 950 F.2d 232, 237
holding that because proceeds of a letter of credit were not secured by estate collateral the proceeds were not property of the estate holding that the defendant was entitled to a new trial where the only witnesses to a drug transaction other than the defendant were an fbi agent and a cl holding that a money laundering enhancement was applicable because defendant knew the funds were represented to be proceeds of a drug transaction holding that evidence of prior drug sales was sufficiently similar to the crimes charged  to be probative of the fact that the defendant was not merely an innocent driver who was involved in the drug transaction by accident holding that to establish a money laundering offense the laundering of funds cannot occur in the same transaction through which those funds first become tainted by crime