answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). “When applying this standard, we view the evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 427 F.3d 775, 782 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). Purkey argues that the district court erred in eight respects: (1) weighing evidence and making credibility determinations; (2) penalizing him for not complying with local rules; (3) analyzing his due process claim under Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (<HOLDING>), rather than Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
holding that atypical and significant hardships imposed against a convicted prisoner implicate due process holding that 30day commissary and cell restrictions did not implicate the due process clause holding that liberty interests implicating the due process clause are generally limited to freedom from restraint which  imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life holding that mere negligence does not implicate the right to due process holding that punitive conditions of pretrial confinement implicate due process