that any of the other medical personnel were informed that the catheters used for the procedures were still experimental and not publicly available. Nor were any of the patients asked to sign consent forms or otherwise informed that they were participating in experimental use of a medical product. As Dr. Ross explained, “Because the Cannon Catheter had been approved by the FDA before I first used it, there were no special consent forms needed from the patients.” In other words, the Cannon Catheter was used precisely as any other medical device of its type would be used on patients in a hospital. The fact that this use occurred in an inherently non-public environment does not by itself render the use non-public under § 102(b). Cf. Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 833, 26 L.Ed. 755 (1881) (<HOLDING>). Finally, I consider the evidence of
holding that public use of a beach was presumed to have originated by permission and to have continued as a license until some act  of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public holding that the public use exception was not applicable because the injury to the tenants employee occurred in an area of the leased premises that was not open to the public but was used only by employees holding that the use of a corset spring device was public although the use was by its nature not visible to the general public holding that the first amendment does not protect the use of racial invective by a public official against a member of the public in a bar