be taken as acceptance of [the prior decision], the mere silence of [the legislature] is not a sufficient reason for refusing to reconsider the decision. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 241-42, 90 S.Ct. at 1687-88. Thus, the mere failure of the legislature to amend HRS § 378-2 after Ross I was decided, without more, is unpersuasive. Cf. Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 668, 696-700, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2038-41, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (Congress’s failure to amend the definition of “persons” as used in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 during seventeen years following Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), did not amount to an “indication[ ] of congressional acceptance of th[e] Court’s earlier on & Walberg Co., 68 Haw. 98, 106-07, 705 P.2d 28, 34-35 (1985) (<HOLDING>). See also Briones, 74 Haw. at 470, 848 P.2d at
holding that orders granting stays of proceedings and compelling arbitration are final orders under hrs  641la and overruling holding to the contrary in pfaeltzer v patterson 49 haw 59 410 p2d 974 1966 holding that orders remanding an action to a federal agency are generally not considered final appealable orders holding that orders overruling claims of privilege and requiring disclosure are immediately appealable as collateral orders holding that orders granting arbitration could not be appealed under the ruaas appeals provision only after holding that an order compelling arbitration and staying litigation is not final under utahs final judgment statute recognizing that orders denying motions to reopen are treated as final orders of removal