little problem in applying the holding of Chu to the situation at bar. A third party, such as King, cannot be held, liable in tort when community property is taken by one of the spouses. Chu v. Hong, 249 S.W.3d at 445. Thus, and to the extent that she asserted tort claims sounding in legal malpractice, breached fiduciary, duty, fraud and the like to recover community property or the value of her lost interest in it, her remedy was and is restricted to pursuing a just and right distribution of the marital estate. Of course, she was free to also seek, during the divorce, a reconstitution of that estate per § 7.009 of .the Family Code to assist in achieving a just and right distribution. Barnhill, however, attempts to distinguish Chu and Schlueter v. Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d 584 (Tex.1998) (<HOLDING>), by contending that “[s]he is not suing the
holding that no right of action is given to the estate of the victim of a tort but is granted only to his heirs  if there are no heirs no right of action vests in anybody recognizing the cause of action holding there was no independent tort cause of action between spouses for damages to the community estate holding that while punitive damages are normally not recoverable for breach of contract where acts constituting a breach of contract also amount to a cause of action in tort there may be recovery of exemplary damages  however the breach must be attended by some intentional wrong insult abuse or gross negligence which amounts to an independent tort recognizing cause of action