Club v. Copolymer Rubber & Chemical Corp., 621 F.Supp. 1013, 1015 (M.D.La.1985)). Thus, it cannot be said that the First Circuit has adopted a restrictive interpretation of the CWA citizen’s suit provision. Furthermore, other courts have interpreted the CWA and Gwaltney expansively, holding that the continuing migration of pollutants from past discharges is sufficient to establish jurisdiction under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a). See North Carolina Wildlife Fed’n v. Woodbury, 1989 WL 106517 at *2 (E.D.N.C.1989) (finding “it is not the physical act of discharging dredge wastes itself that leads to the injury giving rise to citizen standing, but the consequences of the discharge in terms of the lasting environmental degradation.”); Werlein v. United States, 746 F.Supp. 887, 897 (D.Minn.1990) (<HOLDING>), class, cert. vacated by 793 F.Supp. 898
holding that failure to appear when released on bond was a continuing offense holding that the time to disposition is more important than time to trial holding that the plra bar applies to lawsuits brought by inmates regardless of whether the inmate is incarcerated at the time of filing or whether the plaintiff is subsequently paroled sentenced or released holding pollutants from past discharges that are released over time by infiltration of contaminated soil is ongoing pollu tion holding that the relevant time is the time of the employment decision