agreement’s language about an employee’s rights’. 8 F.3d at 380-381. In the same vein, in DiPuccio, the court flatly held that plaintiffs ADA claim “cannot be preempted in the same manner as plaintiffs state law claims (could be) ... ” DiPuccio, 890 F.Supp. at 692. The court rejected defendant’s contention that Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991), controlled and that plaintiff should have pursued his remedies through the arbitration process of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. The Ohio court noted that “It was significant that the circumstances of Gilmer did not involve any tension between collective representation and individual statutory rights.” Id.; See also, Pelech v. Klaff-Joss, LP, 828 F.Supp. 525 (N.D.Ill.1993) (<HOLDING>). 828 F.Supp. at 531. Defendant also argues
holding that plaintiffs title vii claims were not preempted by section 301 despite collective bargaining agreement and stating that the purposes of  301 are not subverted when a federal court hears a claim brought under a federal statute holding that  301 preempts state claims against nonsignatories where interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement is required for resolution holding state law claim preempted by  301 of labor management relations act only if application of state law requires interpretation of collective bargaining agreement holding that the statute of limitations applicable to a section 301 suit was the same as that which applies to suits against an employer for breach of the collective bargaining agreement holding section 301 preempted plaintiffs claim for tortious interference with contract because that claim would require interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement