not barred by it. Specifically, the Johnsons argue that Natalie “has causes of action for malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, quantum meruit, and breach of contract all of which ... do not arise under .the Act because she was not an employee of AS-ARCO.” But. Natalie’s claims, like Glenn’s, arise out of Crawford’s conduct in investigating, handling, and settling Glenn’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits. Specifically, she complains that Crawford breached promises to pay her to provide services to Glenn and that Crawford maliciously caused her to be prosecuted for insurance fraud. We have held that an employee’s spouse cannot bring a separate action alleging claims under the Act. See Rodriguez v. Naylor Indus., Inc., 763 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Tex.1989) (<HOLDING>). The only noted exception to this rule is if a
recognizing that any claims compensable under the act could not be brought by nonemployee spouse except for intentional tort claims holding that tort actions brought against a state actor must be brought in the illinois court of claims and the district courts dismissal of such claims was proper holding that this language applies to tort claims brought under the federal tort claims act  against a contractor who has a selfdetermination contract holding section 101106f cannot be used by employees to obtain dismissal of common law intentional tort claims because those claims could not have been brought under the texas tort claims act holding that claims under 42 usc  1983 are not personal injury tort claims