of Commerce only. (See Compl. ¶ 3.) 2 . In their filings, the parties did not address the issue of venue regarding Walden’s § 1981 claims. 3 . "The D.C. Circuit has not endorsed Hayes' principle that there is a fundamental policy consideration which compels recognition of Title VII as the principal cause of action and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as only secondary." Ifill, 2006 WL 3349549, at *2 (internal quotation omitted) (citing Stebbins v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 757 F.2d 364, 367 (D.C.Cir.1985) (expressing no opinion on whether Hayes correctly decided the issue of venue in a case with multiple employment discrimination claims); id. at 369 (Edwards, L, concurring) (noting that Hayes is not “the law of this circuit”)). 4 . Accord, Sulton v. Peters, 532 F.Supp.2d 150, 152 (D.D.C.2008)
holding that plaintiffs claims under 42 usc  1981 are also governed by the special venue provision of title vii holding that retaliation claims are not cognizable under 42 usc  1981 holding that the timely filing of an eeoc charge pursuant to  706 of title vii 42 usc  2000e5 did not toll the statute of limitations for an action brought on the same facts under 42 usc  1981 holding that allegations of employer retaliation are properly governed by title vii and cannot support a claim under  1983 holding that civil rights claims under 42 usc  1981 and 1982 are personal injury tort claims