the reverse merger. This injury, if it occurred, is an injury to the corporation, not a special injury to Mr. Chien. And, in fact, Mr. Chien conceded as much in his original Complaint. See Notice of Removal [doc. # 1] Ex. A, ¶ 66 (“Defendants had and have fiduciary duties of loyalty, good faith and due care to the Company’s property and all shareholders’ interests ... Unfortunately, they violated all these.”) (emphasis added). Having concluded that Mr. Chien’s breach of fiduciary duty claim is derivative in nature, the Court further concludes that Mr. Chien lacks standing to bring the claim. For “[ojnce a shareholder disposes of his shares, he loses standing to bring a derivative action.” Halo Tech Holdings, 2008 WL 4080081, at *3; see also Guarnieri, 104 Conn.App. at 821, 936 A.2d 254 (<HOLDING>); Cohen v. Mirage Resorts, Inc., 119 Nev. 1,
holding that a persons lack of standing to institute or maintain a derivative action on behalf of a texas corporation deprives texas courts of subjectmatter jurisdiction and the proper procedure is to dismiss the derivative action for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction recognizing that a corporation is properly aligned as a defendant in a shareholder derivative suit when the corporation is in antagonistic hands holding that in order to maintain a derivative cause of action a shareholder must maintain a continuous ownership interest in the corporation holding that a shareholder who disposes of his shares loses standing to bring a derivative action no longer a shareholder in the corporation the defendant cannot maintain a derivative action on its behalf recognizing that the corporation is always deemed to be an indispensable party in a shareholder derivative action