that although “[flew courts have had the opportunity to pass on the retroactivity of CAFRA’s provisions, ... those that have done so appear to have looked solely to when the civil forfeiture complaint was filed vis-a-vis the effective date of the Act, and not to when the fraudulent acts underlying the forfeiture action took place.” Id. at 61. Based on these cases and the statute’s language, the court held that Congressional intent is clear and express: [the] CAFRA, by its terms, ‘shall’ apply to all forfeiture cases commenced on or after August 23, 2000.... Had Congress wanted to exclude from [the] CAFRA’s reach cases that are commenced after the effective date of the Act but where the underlying fraudulent conduct occurred prio operty in Section 9, 241 F.3d 796, 799 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). This Court agrees with the All Funds on
holding that the cafras heightened burden of proof was not applicable to a civil forfeiture action in which the complaint had been filed on november 9 1999 congress manifested a clear intent to apply the cafras heightened burden of proof only to judicial forfeiture proceedings in which the governments complaint was filed on or after august 23 2000because congressional intent is clear we need not resort to judicial default rules to determine the retroactive scope of the legislation holding that for an initial civil commitment the state has the burden of proof holding that the cafras heightened burden of proof standard was applicable to a civil forfeiture action that was pending at the time of cfras enactment holding that the statute at issue created a new cause of action because the burden of proof needed under the statute was less rigorous than the common law burden holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant