briefs at 36-37. However, this , statute “does not overrule the long line of cases in our Supreme Court which hold that a slander per se is actionable without proof of special damage.” Walker v. Grand Cent. Sanitation, Inc., 430 Pa.Super. 236, 634 A.2d 237, 242 (1993) (adopting Restatement of Torts as applicable law regarding defamation per se). Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts,, defamation per se occurs when the statement ascribes to the plaintiff any of the following: commission of a criminal offense, a loathsome disease, serious sexual misconduct, or conduct or characteristics that adversely affect the plaintiffs fitness to properly conduct his profession, trade or business. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 570. See Livingston v. Murray, 417 Pa.Super. 202, 612 A.2d 443 (1992) (<HOLDING>). As we delineated in Kurowski v. Burroughs,
holding that the elements of a claim under  3729a2 are 1 that the defendant made used or caused to be made or used a record or statement to get a claim against the united states paid or approved 2 the record or statement and the claim were false or fraudulent and 3 the defendant knew that the record or statement and the claim were false or fraudulent emphasis added holding that attorneys claim for professional services against person sui juris or against property of such person must rest upon contract of employment express or implied made with person sought to be charged or with his agent holding that merely declining to rehire a person did not constitute defamation for deprivation of liberty interest purposes absent any charges against the good name or reputation of that person holding a person is not an accomplice if the person knew about the offense and failed to disclose it or helped the accused conceal it holding a statement defamatory if it blackens or injures a person in his business or professional reputation