record, it appears that at the time the City stopped complying in 1992, it gave no notice to the Court, the lawyers for the plaintiff class, the public and perhaps even the City Council and the Mayor. If true, the City’s action was unacceptable and potentially contumacious. The City should have asked the Court to modify or dissolve the decree if it thought it had achieved compliance. The City’s argument that a Court Order of this magnitude would just dissolve of its own accord, like a divorce decree’s alimony payments, is simply wrong. Not surprisingly, the City has pointed to no cases that support that position; indeed, the authorities are to the contrary. See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249-50, 111 S.Ct. 630, 112 L.Ed.2d 715 (1991) (<HOLDING>); GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of the
holding that good faith compliance with desegregation decree is relevant factor in district courts determination as to whether vestiges of past discrimination have been eliminated such that decree should be terminated holding that the trial judge had the power to incorporate a settlement agreement in a decree following the entry of a decree of divorce holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because the challenged provisions of the decree had expired holding that a lower court is bound by the decree of the appellate court and can only enter a judgment or decree in strict compliance with the appellate courts mandate holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because there was no  consent decree left to be terminated