agency’s interpretation.” Hennepin County Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 81 F.3d 743, 748 (8th Cir.1996). The RRA does not define “personally assisted.” In the absence of an express definition for a term used in a statute, we interpret words as having their ordinary, common mean ing. United States v. Fountain, 83 F.3d 946, 952 (8th Cir.1996). We have previously held that conduct similar to that admitted by Hansl constitutes personal assistance in persecution. Friedrich, 402 F.3d at 846 (“By guarding the perimeters of ... [three] concentration camps to ensure that prisoners did not escape from these unspeakable conditions, Friedrich personally assisted in the persecution that occurred in those camps, within the meaning of the RRA.”); see also Ne-gele v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Kumpf, 438 F.3d 785, 2006 WL
holding that serving as an armed ghetto and concentration camp guard for the ss deaths head battalion constitutes assisting in nazi persecution for purposes of the holtzman amendment 8 usc  1182a3ei holding that persecution based on being a current member of the military national police force or us embassy guard does not qualify as persecution on a protected ground holding that the illinois crime of failure to report for imprisonment is not a violent felony for purposes of the armed career criminal act holding that a conviction for florida armed robbery is a crime of violence under the armed career criminal act holding that to show an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution an applicant must establish that he would be singled out for persecution or that there was a pattern or practice of persecution of similarlysituated individuals