Treesdale) controls. Our Treesdale opinion is inapplicable because, unlike Rauscher and the case at hand, it dealt solely with the standard for intervention under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24, and altogether failed to discuss or address the principle of standing. Further, we note that neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has determined whether a potential intervenor must even have Article III standing. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68-69, 106 S.Ct. 1697, 90 L.Ed.2d 48 (1986) (“We need not decide today whether a party seeking to intervene before a district court must satisfy not only the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2), but also the requirements of Art. III.”). Those Courts of Appeals that have addressed this issue have been split. Compare Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 830 (5th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>), Associated Builders & Contractors v. Perry,
holding that because article iii standing is jurisdictional it must be decided before other legal issues recognizing that the government not the relator must have suffered the injury in fact required for article iii standing holding noneconomic harm satisfies article iii standing requirements holding that article iii standing is not a prerequisite to intervention holding that article iii constitutional standing must be addressed before considering lanham act prudential standing