404, 416-17 n. 18, 89 S.Ct. 1144, 22 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969)). In light of this duty to turn c. 494 F.2d 866, 870 (1st Cir.1974) (noting that “the authorities are virtually unanimous that maritime liability encompasses the gangway”). There is a genuine issue of material fact whether the ramp at issue in the present case is more like a gangway than a dock or pier. In order to board the barge, the plaintiff and the other individuals working aboard the William F had to use the ramp. There were no other means of embarking. Some of our sister circuits have held that a gangway or ramp which is “necessarily used for embarking and disembarking” becomes a “basic appurtenance of the vessel.” Sarauw v. Oceanic Navigation Corp., 655 F.2d 526, 528 (3d Cir.1981); see also Romero Reyes, 494 F.2d at 869 (<HOLDING>). Even if the ramp could not be fairly
holding that riverboat casino was not a vessel holding regular use of process cannot constitute abuse of process holding that the arbitrator was without jurisdiction to consider an issue which was not included in the written notice of arbitration and was added on the first day of the arbitration hearing holding that the apparatus which was the regular means of boarding and leaving the vessel was included in the seaworthiness warranty holding that to establish a claim for abuse of process a claimant must demonstrate  an act in the use of the process not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceedings