by an Act of Congress.” (citing J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 337, 64 S.Ct. 576, 88 L.Ed. 762 (1944))). If Aymes’s weighing of the Reid factors applied in the context of the anti-discrimination laws, workers and firms would be able to devise compensation packages that included a no-benefits clause and a no-tax-deductions clause, thereby all but insuring that workers are characterized as independent contractors, and permitting them to opt out of the anti-discrimination laws. See ante at 116. But the core, substantive protections of the anti-discrimination laws were not intended to be skirted by the terms of individual employment contracts — even if on their face those terms concern only the compensation of a worker. Cf. Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 832 (D.C.Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). In sum, the holding of Aymes— that the
holding that there is no individual liability under title vii holding that the court may consider collateral evidence of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the agreement in determining whether the language of the agreement is unclear and if the evidence presented is so plain that no reasonable person could hold any way but one then the court may interpret the meaning as a matter of law holding that under the mwa the question of whether an employee was an independent contractor or an employee was a question of statutory interpretation holding that the determination of whether an individual is an independent contractor lies in the common law and not under an express provision of the act holding that in determining whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor the district court relied principally if indeed not entirely on the contract language and that doing so was error because inter alia employment contracts no matter what the circumstances that justify their execution or what the terms may not be used to waive protections granted to an individual under title vii or any other act of congress