that it is significant that he is a participant or beneficiary of a plan, while the Menhom plaintiff was not. This distinction does nothing to limit the effect of Menhom. Menhom’& holding is unambiguous: unless the critical acts occurred after January 1, 1975, a district court may not take jurisdiction over an ERISA action. Plaintiff’s status as a participant or beneficiary is relevant only when the plaintiff has cleared this initial hurdle. We also reject plaintiff's contention that the critical acts occurred after January 1, 1975. Under Menhorn, 738 F.2d at 1501-03, the critical acts have occurred when it becomes inevitable that the plaintiff will be denied benefits. Cf. Freeman v. Jacques Orthopaedic and Joint Implant Surgery Medical Group, Inc., 721 F.2d 654, 656 (9th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Lee makes much out of the revision of the
recognizing cause of action for equitable estoppel under erisa holding that ejven if there were no express preemption under erisa  514a of the cause of action in that case it would be preempted because it conflicted directly with an erisa cause of action recognizing cause of action recognizing the cause of action holding that events surrounding cause of action for fraud in erisa case had occurred before january 1 1975 despite continuing effects