of New York law on this subject indicates that it is evolving. While plaintiffs contend that in New York, the complaint itself can constitute reasonable notice after discovery of the breach, the case they cite for that proposition makes clear that plaintiffs in that action provided other forms of pre-suit notice that may have satisfied the notice requirement. Panda Capital Corp. v. Kopo Intern., Inc., 242 A.D.2d 690, 662 N.Y.S.2d 584, 586-87 (1997); see also Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 87 NY.2d 248, 273, 639 N.Y.S.2d 250, 662 N.E.2d 730 (N.Y. 1995) (Simons, J., dissenting) (suggesting that a requirement of timely notice should not be imposed in cases involving “tortious personal injury,” and citing Fischer v. Mead Johnson Laboratories, 41 A.D.2d 737, 341 N.Y.S.2d 257, 259 (1973) (<HOLDING>)). Certain class members’ claims could stand or
holding that in a personal injury suit the timely notice requirement does not apply  holding that personal representative may amend personal injury suit to state wrongful death claim following plaintiffs death holding that to apply the personal injury endorsement montana law requires the complaint to allege facts establishing the elements of one of the enumerated torts listed under the insurance policys definition of personal injury holding that federal courts apply the forum states personal injury statute of limitations for section 1983 claims holding that age discrimination is not a personal injury tort