probative value. The two-pronged test must also be met in order to introduce flight evidence. Austin v. State, 784 So.2d 186, 194 (Miss.2001) (citing Fuselier v. State, 702 So.2d 388, 390 (Miss.1997)). This means that Mississippi, unlike some jurisdictions, does not distinguish between the admissibility of flight evidence and the propriety of instructing the jury on the law of flight. Cf. U.S. v. Martinez, 681 F.2d 1248, 1257 (10th Cir.1982) (“Trial courts usually focus not upon the admissibility of flight evidence but upon the propriety of including a jury instruction highlighting already admitted flight evidence.”); but see United States v. Register, 496 F.2d 1072, 1077 (5th Cir.1974), cert. denied sub nom. Cochran v. U.S., 419 U.S. 1120, 95 S.Ct. 802, 42 L.Ed.2d 819 (1975) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 28. Here, both prongs were met. ¶ 29. The
holding that it was not error for the court to give a substantive new instruction to the jury after deliberations began where the instruction was given in court with the defendant and his counsel present holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to accept the defendants guilty pleas to two counts of the indictment and stating that even if the trial court erred the error had not prejudiced the defendant because he was found guilty by the jury of the charges to which he intended to plead and the evidence of the other crimes would have been admissible in the trial for the first degree murder charge holding that because the jury was given a proper flight instruction the federal district court did not err in allowing testimony from a teenage girl babysitting defendants child in defendants apartment in which the girl told the jury that after defendant was informed of drug raid defendant failed to return to his apartment the court of appeals found the flight evidence was admissible even though the drug raid was conducted by state officials on a different charge holding that the twolevel enhancement was appropriate where the gun cash and a drug ledger were found in one apartment and the drugs were found in a different apartment in the same building holding that statements by defendant and apartment manager that defendant lived in the apartment where drugs were found demonstrated his control over the apartment even though no documents personal effects or keys were found