to by the parties, which include preservation obligations, would be enforceable by Rule 37(b)(2) sanctions. If so, then it is equally compelling that a preservation order issued by the court sua sponte, and designed to govern the discovery process by ensuring that the evidence to be preserved, if within the scope of discoverable information, may be provided in response to an appropriate discovery request, also is an order to “permit discovery.” To reach a contrary conclusion would be to exalt form over substance. Moreover, it is clear that courts have broadly interpreted the authority granted by Rule 37(b)(2) to permit sanctions for failures to obey a wide variety of orders intended to “permit discovery.” See, e.g., Hathcock v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Co., 53 F.3d 36, 40 (4th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Quela v. Payco-Gen. Am. Creditas, Inc., No.
holding that a trial court had the authority to impose a default judgment as a sanction for violating a rule 16 scheduling order pursuant to rule 37b2 stating we agree with the basic premise that a default sanction can under certain circumstances be an appropriate response to a violation of a rule 16 order after all the express terms of rule 37 permit a trial court to impose sanctions when a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery holding that where no discovery order was violated sanctions could not imposed pursuant to rule 37 but nevertheless upholding the sanction order under the courts inherent power holding that violation of rule 16 in that case was not harmless error recognizing that courts have discretion to exclude evidence as a sanction for violation of a discovery order holding that a court entering a directed verdict pursuant to rule 50 should set forth an explanation sufficient to permit this court to understand the legal premise for the courts order