August 1, 1964, a period of more than 90 days. Etheridge testified that when he issued the August 11 endorsements he knew the dwelling had been vacant since Wesley’s death, a period of about 10 days, and he knew the Executor planned to sell the property. He was asked: “Did you further know that it was likely and probable that the property would remain unoccupied for a considerable period of time and in all probability for longer than a period of 90 days?” He answered: “It was possible, yes.” We have consistently held that an insurance company cannot rely on a provision of its policy to defeat coverage if the facts making the provision operative were known to the company when it issued the policy. E.g. Virginia Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Richmond Mica Co., 102 Va. 429, 46 S.E. 463 (1904) (<HOLDING>). We do not have such a case before us now,
holding provision in attorneys fee contract requiring client that terminated contract to immediately pay attorney fee equal to present value of attorneys interest in case was inconsistent with public policy and unconscionable holding that a fee substantially less than the lodestar amount is permissible holding that it is difficult to imagine any language more forceful than the words absolutely and in fee simple to bestow complete ownership upon zella koval and where a fee simple in real property or the equivalent in personal property is given an attempted gift over of any property remaining after the designated persons death is of no effect holding that trial court erred by granting surviving spouse fee simple title to estates exempt property holding that a company which knew when it issued a policy that the insureds interest in the insured property was less than fee simple could not rely upon a provision rendering the policy void if the insureds interest was less than fee simple