including, but not limited to, calls relating to political campaigns.” S.C. Code Ann. § 16-17-446(A). Based on the express language of the statute, the Fourth Circuit found that it was content based; the statute made facial content distinctions and thus was subject to strict scrutiny. Cahaly, 796 F.3d at 405. By contrast, the IADMS does not target political speech or any other type of speech. The Plaintiff argues that the IADMS burdens political speech and therefore requires the Court to apply a strict scrutiny analysis. However, the Supreme Court has analyzed content-neutral laws that impact political communications using the time, place, and manner scheme applied to other content-neutral laws. See, e.g., Members of the City Council of Los Angeles, 466 U.S. at 803-05, 104 S.Ct. 2118 (<HOLDING>). The Plaintiff attempts to analogize the
holding that picketers at military funerals who held signs communicating their belief that god hates the united states for its tolerance of homosexuality were shielded by the first amendment from tort liability because this activity constituted speech in a public place on a matter of public concern holding that defendant must object at trial to preserve as applied challenge for appeal holding that signs placed on the inside of a leased space were not alone sufficient to provide notice of control of any part of the premises by anyone other than the debtor holding that city had a substantial interest in preventing the visual assault on the citizens of los angeles presented by an accumulation of signs posted on public property holding that a law prohibiting signs on public property in order to preserve aesthetics could be applied to politicalcampaign signs