stepfather was emboldened by a sense of impunity to kill T.F. In fact, we do not even know whether T.F.’s stepfather knew that anyone was aware of the abuse, let alone that Arnold determined that an investigation was unnecessary. T.F.’s death was a tragedy. Although we are appalled by the sinister acts that led to his death, it was Engler’s role, as T.F.’s representative, to present us with all of the facts that support his constitutional claim against Arnold. Plaintiffs who seek to hold state officials constitutionally liable on a “failure-to-protect” claim face a high burden under DeShaney. Engler’s complaint falls far short. An assertion of a failure to act does not support a state-ereated-dan-ger theory, and we may not presume facts not presented. See Kottmyer, 436 F.3d at 689 (<HOLDING>). Because Engler’s complaint fails to state
holding that for purposes of a class certification motion the court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and may draw reasonable inferences therefrom holding that in the absence of an adverse credibility determination the court must accept petitioners testimony as true holding that the court need not accept as true  unwarranted factual inferences holding that a court need not accept as true conclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint holding that a court is not bound to accept as a true legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation and should disregard mere conclusory statements