justification or authorization. We recognize that the military judge had previously instructed the members on an assault consummated by a battery, but those instructions did not include guidance on how to evaluate the offer-type assault that preceded the killing of Mansur. See Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (MCM) pt. IV, ¶ 54.c.(1)(b) (2012 ed.). Thus, the members were never instructed that for Appellant to have assaulted Mansur by pointing the pistol at him, Mansur had to reasonably apprehend immediate bodily harm. See MCM pt. IV, ¶ 54.c.(1)(b)(ii). The two varieties of assault are sufficiently different that, even when the instructions are viewed holistically, the first portion of the instruction was incomplete. See United States v. Marbury, 56 M.J. 12, 17 (C.A.A.F.2001) (<HOLDING>). More importantly, the second emphasized
holding that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction for aggravated battery when the bodily member that is lost or rendered useless in the battery is a tooth holding that aggravated battery of peace officer encompasses both insulting or provoking contact and battery resulting in bodily harm recognizing that the critical question is whether any present violation exists holding that a victim who sees another person in the act of shooting at him evidences a wellfounded fear of imminent bodily harm when he ducks to avoid being shot holding the critical issue in offertype assaults is whether the victim reasonably apprehended imminent bodily harm as compared to assaults consummated by a battery in which the critical issue is actual bodily harm