“more lucrative uses,” this “reasonable possibility” should also be considered. Id. 6 As the plurality recognizes, “at the time defendants acquired their Novi property, beginning in 1988, the property was more valuable in their eyes because of the looming possibility of a future zoning change.” Ante at 140. 7 MDOT does not argue that the admission of the posttaking rezoning violated the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Michigan. It only argues that the evidence is not relevant and that, even if it is relevant, it should be excluded pursuant to MRE 403, as discussed later in this opinion. 8 I do not know why the plurality suggests that I “misidentifyD the ‘fact that is of consequence,’ ” ante at 138 (emphasis deleted), because 5, 137 (Tex App, 1972) (<HOLDING>); Reeder v Iowa State Hwy Comm, 166 NW2d 839,
holding that upon remand if the trial court determined that the testimony in a newly discovered evidence claim was reliable the trial court must review that new evidence as well as brady claims that were previously rejected in a prior postconviction motion because the evidence was equally accessible to the defense and there was no reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different had the evidence been disclosed holding that a cause of action for an unconstitutional taking accrues at the time the taking occurs holding that if subsequent to the taking and before the trial the ordinance was actually amended to permit the previously forbidden use then that of  itself was weighty evidence of the existence at the time of the taking of the fact that there was a reasonable probability of an imminent change holding that the type of evidence which has been admitted as material as tending to prove a reasonable probability of change includes    the actual amendment of the ordinance subsequent to the taking holding that ajctual amendment of the zoning law subsequent to the taking may be weighty evidence of such a prospect