his desire and ability to proceed pro se on the record, and that a medical expert determined he was competent. The Commonwealth maintains that, based on these factors, the PCRA court properly concluded that Appellant waived counsel under Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(H)(1)(a). The Commonwealth em phasizes that at the May 13, 2013 proceeding, Appellant asserted that he “understands the ramifications and the pitfalls of self[-]representation ...” and “would like to proceed pro se with this case so the Defendant can perfect the record, bring the case before the Court and argue and litigate the proceedings.” N.T., May 13, 2013, at 27-28. Appellant further stated that he was confident that he could represent himself competently. Id., at 28. He acknowledged that if he is not successful, “Atto uper.2005) (<HOLDING>); and United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237,
holding that the forfeiture of the right to counsel unlike the waiver of such right does not require that the defendant intend to relinquish a right but rather may be the result of the defendants extremely serious misconduct or extremely dilatory conduct holding that a defendants unprovoked physical battery of his attorney in the courtroom constituted extremely serious misconduct that amounts to the forfeiture of the right to counsel regardless of whether the defendant intended to relinquish the right holding that a defendants unprovoked physical battery of his attorney at a hearing qualifies as the sort of extremely serious misconduct that amounts to the forfeiture of the right to counsel holding that treating a defendants failure to appear as a waiver not only of the right to be present but of the right to have a hearing on the motion was error recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel