billing, as well as other physicians, testified that “other appropriate source” included self-referrals by patients, referrals by a patient’s neighbor or friends, even referrals from a patient selecting a physician from the phone book. Blue Cross’ legal counsel admitted that she had never seen “other appropriate source” defined. Dr. Hooshmand argues that his consultation billings to private insurers fell within the private manuals’ definition of consultation. Moreover, he claims that “other appropriate source” is so vague that criminally prosecuting him for falsely submitting a consultation claim to private insurers violates due process. To establish that a statute is void for vagueness on due process grounds requires a showing that the st 2 U.S. 29, 83 S.Ct. 594, 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963) (<HOLDING>). As noted above, a conviction for mail fraud
holding that to violate a specific intent statute the defendant must act with the purpose of violating the law holding that a kickback scheme that raised prices in violation of erisa did not violate the antitrust laws because it did not restrain competition holding that noerrpennington doctrine exempts from antitrust liability any legitimate use of the political process by private individuals even if their intent is to eliminate competition holding that attempted sexual abuse is a specific intent crime holding statute making it a crime to sell goods at unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to sales made below cost without any legitimate commercial objective and with specific intent to destroy competition