(Beam, 111 S.Ct. at 2448). In Melkonyan, the Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings. (Melkonyan, 111 S.Ct. at 2165). The Court noted that the district court’s remand to the Secretary was prompted by the discovery of new evidence. (Id. at 2163). Although this fact would evidence that the district court remanded to the Secretary pursuant to the sixth sentence of § 405(g), the Court declined to decide the issue because of the possibility that the remand was “a voluntary dismissal under Fed. R.Civ.Proc. 41(a).” (Id. at 2165). Moreover, the Court specifically stated that if it was not a sentence six remand but a dismissal order, then “... timeliness of the application [would] not be an issue.” (Id. at 2166). In such a case, the petitioner would not be entitled to fee 992) (<HOLDING>)). It should be noted that, in Hudson, the
holding that a remand order entered by a magistrate judge was beyond his statutory authority and concluding that review was proper because the court of appeals was not reviewing the merits of the remand order itself holding that plain error analysis is the proper standard for review of forfeited error in the rule 11 context holding that denial of remand was proper where plaintiff failed to raise the proper objection holding that the fourth circuit has jurisdiction to review a district courts sua sponte remand order even when that remand order is styled as a remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if the order was in fact based on the procedural insufficiency of the notice of removal holding that fourth sentence remand rule was not applied to the litigants in melkonyan therefore chevron analysis was proper