of causation — which, if used for this purpose, would suppress evidence “simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police.” Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488, 83 S.Ct. at 418. Instead, “a finding with respect to attenuation ... can only be made after consideration of all the circumstances of the case.” United States v. Wellins, 654 F.2d 550, 554 (9th Cir.1981). This necessarily requires a “careful sifting of the unique facts and circumstances of each case.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 233, 93 S.Ct. at 2051. There being no fixed formula, cou th Cir.1990) (“Even assuming the initial entry was illegal, we agree with the district court that that entry did not taint Valencia’s subsequent consent.”); United States v. Sheppard, 901 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); State v. Owen, 453 So.2d 1202, 1207 (La.1984)
holding that defendants voluntary consent to search his car dissipated taint of officers illegal entry holding that a detained defendants consent to search his car was voluntary even though the police did not tell him he was free to leave holding that defendants consent was involuntary where defendant consented to search following a warrantless entry and officers explained that absent consent the officers would obtain a warrant holding that officers request for defendants name during an illegal entry constituted exploitation of the illegal entry under hall holding that it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search the respondents car included consent to search a bag within that car