2244(d)(1)(D) in different contexts. See, e.g., Ybanez v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 645, 646 (5th Cir.2000) (rejecting the petitioner’s argument that the one-year clock began when the state court made errors in disposing of a state habeas application); Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196, 199 (5th Cir.1998) (stating that the petitioner learned of the factual predicate for his claims for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(D) when he executed his own affidavit stating that he did not know he could refuse to testify at trial). 4 . Courts from other jurisdictions also have touched upon whether a habeas petitioner acted with due diligence to learn of the factu al predicate for a claim under § 2244(d)(1)(D), but the facts of those cases are not on point. See Daniels v. Uchtman, 421 F.3d 490, 492 (7th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); Schlueter v. Varner, 384 F.3d 69, 74 (3d
holding that the plaintiffs cause of action accrued on the date of the repealer statute not on the date the wrong occurred despite the federal courts ruling as to the statutes unconstitutionality holding that routine monitoring and recording of the calls of convicted prisoners does not violate the prisoners fourth amendment rights holding that habeas petitioner scheduled to be executed in the state of virginia for capital murder could not raise claim of violation of his rights under the vienna convention on federal habeas review where he failed to preserve the claim by raising it in state court proceedings vienna convention does not trump subsequent federal statute requiring habeas petitioners who claim to be held in violation of treaties of the united states to develop factual bases for their claims in state court as a precondition of federal habeas review holding that the cause of action accrued on the date of sale holding that the petitioners federal habeas action accrued when a witness executed an affidavit recanting the testimony he gave during a prisoners murder prosecution not on the date that the state supreme court rejected the prisoners claim