colleges. What procedural safeguards then are required in this context by the Due Process Clause? In Goss the Court said, “[T]he very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.” 419 U.S. at 577; Boykins v. Fairfield Bd. of Educ., 492 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975). Flexibility and elbow room are to be preferred over specificity. Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970). Again in Goss, the Court said that a student facing suspension is entitled to, at the very minimum, “some kind of notice and . . . some kind of hearing.” 419 U.S. at 579. See also University of Houston v. Sabeti, 676 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (<HOLDING>). A full-dress judicial hearing is not
recognizing that the essential requisites of procedural due process are notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard holding that a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process holding that notice and opportunity to be heard in matters which materially affect a litigants rights are essential elements of due process that may not be disregarded and that notice of a motion to convert a decree under rcw 2609150 may not be dispensed with holding that procedural due process requires adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard holding basic elements of due process are notice and a right to be heard