and the Aeronautical Center Counsel....”) with § 13.20(a) ("This section applies to orders of compliance, cease and desist orders, orders of denial, and other orders issued by the Administrator to carry out the provisions of the Federal Aviation ” clause re-starts the 60-day period instead of tolling it. See 116 F.3d at 1262-63. We need not take a definitive position here because this calculation does not affect the outcome of our analysis. 7 . Jan's and Americopters claim that the FAA raised this ripeness argument for the first time on appeal and thus it should be deemed waived. Because we must consider any potentially dispositive jurisdictional issues sua sponte, we are compelled to consider this argument. See S. Cal. Aerial, 881 F.2d at 675. 8 . See Crist, 138 F.3d at 802-03, 805 (<HOLDING>); Foster, 70 F.3d at 1086-88 (holding that
holding that district court had no jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs claims that his constitutional rights were violated in state divorce proceeding holding that the superior court had no jurisdiction over the division of marital property when the district court had properly invoked jurisdiction over the property holding that district court had jurisdiction over claims that the faa violated due process by spoiling evidence during the pendency of the plaintiffs hearings before the faa holding that district court lacked jurisdiction over claim for interim social security benefits during pendency of administrative proceedings holding that district court had no jurisdiction over bivens claims challenging an faa order where neither plaintiff nor his attorney  pursued the matter through any appeal to the faa administrator or otherwise