be reduced merely because the fee would be disproportionate to the financial interest at stake in the litigation.” Kassim v. City of Schenectady, 415 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Millea, 658 F.3d at 169 ("Especially for' claims where the financial recovery is likely to be small, calculating attorneys' fees as a proportion of damages runs directly contrary to the purpose of fee-shifting statutes: assuring that civil rights claims of modest cash value can attract competent counsel.”). 5 . Moreover, there is no merit to any argument that plaintiff achieved only "partial success" in this action because he volition applies a nominal offset of $1.00 to be collected from the judgment. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Goord, No. 01-CV-9585 SHS, 2014 WL 4058662, at *13 (S.D.N.Y, Aug. 14, 2014) (<HOLDING>). 8 . Several attorneys are listed as both
holding that under 42 usc  1997ed2 a district court may apply less than 25 percent of the judgment as long as it applies some portion of the judgment to satisfy the attorneys fee award quoting parker v conway 581 f3d 198 205 3d cir 2009 holding that under the plra no attorneys fee award greater than 150 percent of the monetary judgment may be entered against a defendant citing 42 usc  1997ed2 holding that plaintiffs were prevailing parties under 42 usc section 1988 despite dismissal of the appeal as moot and vacation of the district court judgment holding that under 42 usc  1988 which allows the award of attorneys fees in a civil rights action under  1983 a prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily recover an attorneys fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust  quoting srep no 941011 p 4 1976 holding that the same standards apply for setting reasonable attorneys fees under the clean air acts fee shifting provision as under 42 usc  1988