respects.”). While federal courts have not interpreted the Interstate Land Sales Act’s contribution clause, the language in Section 1709(d) is virtually identical, in pertinent part, to the contribution clauses in the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f), and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(f) & 78r(b), which frequently have been construed by federal courts. Courts interpreting the contribution language in the Securities Acts consistently have found that payment by a potentially liable party is a precondition to that party seeking contribution from a jointly liable party. See, e.g., Asdar Group v. Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, 99 F.3d 289, 295-96 (9th Cir.1996); Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Mustek, Peeler & Garrett, 954 F.2d 575, 578-79 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>), aff'd on other grounds, Musick, Peeler &
holding a plaintiff must provide sufficient evidence for the court to conclude a holding company has been brought into court for something it has done rather than for something its subsidiary has done holding that more than notice to a defendant is required holding that effect of suit rather than the purpose for which it was brought is controlling for purposes of the fifth factor holding that when contribution is brought as a separate cause of action rather than through thirdparty practice the plaintiff ointtortfeasor must allege that it has paid more than its fair share of the liability recognizing common law cause of action as thirdparty beneficiary