be given their plain and common meaning. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (Vernon 1989); Monsanto Co. v. Cornerstones Mun. Util. Dist., 865 S.W.2d 937, 939 (Tex.1993). If we substitute that definition into the statutory language, the statute reads that it applies to situations involving “the particular mode or state of being of a traffic or road sign, signal, or warning device.” It is fair to say that the “state of being” of the stop sign at issue in this case was that it was the subject of repeated vandalism. Thus, we hold that the condition of being the subject of repeated and extraordinarily frequent vandalism can be a condition for purposes of section 101.060(a)(2) liability. See also City of Baytown v. Peoples, 9 S.W.3d at 396-97 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Further, we find the evidence to be
holding that remedial scheme afforded by federal tort claims act was not exclusive absent explicit congressional declaration that it was holding that exclusive method for determining tort claims act liability for malfunctioning traffic signal was under 101060a2 holding that carmark act preempted state law claims including those for liability for payment of claims holding that this language applies to tort claims brought under the federal tort claims act  against a contractor who has a selfdetermination contract holding section 101106f cannot be used by employees to obtain dismissal of common law intentional tort claims because those claims could not have been brought under the texas tort claims act