fundamental error in instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter. We affirm the first issue without further comment, and we affirm the second issue for the reasons that follow. In Montgomery, the supreme court held that the standard jury instruction for manslaughter by act was fundamentally erroneous because it required the state to prove that the defendant “intentionally caused the death of (victim)” even though intent to kill was not an element of the offense. 39 So.3d at 256. In Rushing v. State,—So.3d-(Fla. 1st DCA 2010), we concluded that the standard jury instruction for attempted voluntary manslaughter “suffers from the same infirmities as the instruction in Montgomery.” See also Lamb v. State, 18 So.3d 734 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (<HOLDING>). Rushing and Lamb are distinguishable from
holding erroneous jury instruction on manslaughter by intentional act not fundamental error where trial court also instructed jury on manslaughter by culpable negligence holding that erroneous manslaughter instruction that defendant intentionally caused the death of the victim did not constitute fundamental error certifying question  if a jury returns a verdict finding a defendant guilty of seconddegree murder in a case where the evidence does not support a theory of culpable negligence does a trial court commit fundamental error by giving a flawed manslaughter by act instruction when it also gives an instruction on manslaughter by culpable negligence holding that freestanding claim that the trial court committed fundamental error in giving a jury instruction after deliberations had begun was unavailable in postconviction proceedings holding that the trial court committed fundamental error by giving the standard jury instruction for attempted manslaughter by act holding appellate counsel ineffective for failing to argue the trial court committed fundamental error in giving the thenstandard jury instruction for manslaughter by act even though controlling precedent in the district had approved the instruction when the instruction had been found fundamentally erroneous in another district and conflict between the two districts would have allowed defendant to seek relief in the supreme court