probation differ only in that the former follows a prison term and the latter is in lieu of a prison term.”). 10 See United States v. Kissinger, 309 F.3d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 2002) (discussing similarities between probation and supervised release); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1 (“Revoking or Modifying Probation or Supervised Release.”). 11 For instance, federal law generally directs that filings attacking the validity or length of a conviction or sentence be made in the sentencing court. See, e.g., In re Nwanze, 242 F.3d 521, 525 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[O]rdinarily a petitioner should present [an attack on a conviction] to the sentencing court rather than the court in the district in which he is confined.”). 12 See 18 U.S.C. § 3605; cf. United States v. Adams, 723 F.3d 687, 689 (6th Cir. 2013) (<HOLDING>). 13 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(4), (5). 14 We
holding  3583a itself authorizes a term of supervised release in addition to a maximum term of imprisonment authorized by the statute of conviction holding the district courts revocation of defendants term of supervised release did not end the courts jurisdiction over defendants release holding that term of supervised release was not automatically terminated when defendant was deported from united states and thus defendants subsequent commission of another offense illegal reentry after deportation prior to expiration of term of supervised release violated condition of supervised release that defendant commit no new offenses holding that a statute requiring a threeyear term of supervised release did not eviscerate the district courts discretion to adjust the term of supervised release pursuant to  3583e holding that  3605 authorizes a transferee court to revoke a term of a defendants supervised release for violations committed prior to the transfer of jurisdiction