expertise than the average comparable case. We find this alternative formulation unpersuasive as well. These cases might, arguably, have been resolved more readily than the average federal civil rights suit. The DOE itself contends, however, the relevant point of comparison is other state administrative proceedings. We see nothing in the record to show that these two cases were simpler than the average impartial hearing. Nor did the District Court abuse its discretion in crediting the plaintiffs’ evidence over the evidence offered by the DOE. As the DOE admits, its own affiant declared that “attorneys who represent parents and students in administrative impartial hearings ... charge approximately $200 per hour.” This is the same lodestar rate the magistrate re 3 & n. 14 (D.C.Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). We therefore reject the DOE’s argument. See
holding that physician was an independent contractor and thus could not sue hospital under title vii of the civil rights act of 1964 holding that surgeon with surgical privileges was not an employee of hospital and thus could not bring suit under either the age discrimination in employment act or title vii of the civil rights act of 1964 holding that congress intended for idea to be interpreted consistent with fee provisions of statutes such as title vii of the civil rights act of 1964 holding that physician with staff privileges is not an employee and thus cannot bring claim under title vii of 1964 civil rights act holding that title vii of the civil rights act of 1964 provides the exclusive remedy for claims of employment discrimination by federal agencies