July 2007, the trial court entered separate orders terminating respondent’s parental rights to B.L.H. and Z.L.H. The only ground found by the trial court for terminating respondent’s parental rights to the minor children was under N.C.G.S. § 111 ly to fill procedural gaps where Chapter 7B requires, but does not identify, a specific procedure to be used in termination cases. In re S.D.W. & H.E.W., 187 N.C. App. at 421, 653 S.E.2d at 432; see also In re McKinney, 158 N.C. App. 441, 443, 581 S.E.2d 793, 795 (2003) (applying the Rules of Civil Procedure to determine whether the contents of a motion .filed to terminate the respondent’s parental rights were sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the trial court); In re Triscari Children, 109 N.C. App. 285, 426 S.E.2d 435 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Article 11 of Chapter 7B expressly states
holding that trial court erred in granting petition for termination of parental rights based on noncompliance with case plan when case plan was not filed and approved by the court until seven months after petition for termination was filed recognizing this substantial interest in context of termination of parental rights holding that a respondent in a termination of parental rights proceeding may not file a counterclaim holding that the due process clause of the alaska constitution guarantees the right to effective counsel in proceedings for the termination of parental rights holding the requirements for verification established in chapter 1a rule 11b should determine whether a petition for the termination of a respondents parental rights has been properly verified