created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth.” United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 710 (1974) (emphasis added). Adherence to that principle has caused us, in the Rule 501 cases we have considered to date, to reject new privileges, see University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U. S. 182 (1990) (privilege against disclosure of academic peer review materials); United States v. Gillock, 445 U. S. 360 (1980) (privilege against disclosure of “legislative acts” by member of state legislature), and even to construe narrowly the scope of existing privileges, see, e. g., United States v. Zolin, 491 U. S. 554, 568-570 (1989) (permitting in camera review of documents alleged to come within crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege); Trammel, supra (<HOLDING>). The Court today ignores this traditional
holding that voluntary testimony by spouse is not covered by husbandwife privilege holding that marital communications which arise from an act of violence by a spouse committed against the children of either spouse should constitute an exception to the marital privilege because such communications fail to satisfy the conditions underlying the creation of the privilege holding that the information is not protected by attorneyclient privilege holding that the initial disclosure of a crime to one spouses without more is covered by the marital communications privilege recognizing privilege