in order to receive proper care. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355-56, 112 S.Ct. 736, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992). As such, courts have interpreted the exception to be limited to statements made by the one actually seeking medical treatment or care. See Stull v. Fuqua Inds., Inc., 906 F.2d 1271, 1273-74 (8th Cir.1990) (“[T]o fall within the exception [of Fed.R.Evid. 803(4) ], the statement must be obtained from the person seeking treatment, or in some instances from someone with a special relationship to the person seeking treatment, such as a parent.”); Bulthuis v. Rexall Corp., 789 F.2d 1315, 1316 (9th Cir.1985) (“Rule 803(4) applies only to statements made by the patient to the doctor, not the reverse.”); see also Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 564 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). We agree that the hearsay exception set forth
holding that statements by a cooperating coconspirator to known authorities made after the commencement of cooperation are not admissible under rule 801d2e because such statements are not made in furtherance of the conspiracy holding that statements made by a doctor to a patient are not admissible under fedrevid 8034 because the rule does not except statements by the person providing medical care holding statements inadmissible under colo r evid 8034  which was identical to the federal rule  because there was no evidence that the fiveyearold child was capable of recognizing at the time the challenged statements were made the need to provide accurate information for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment within the meaning of fedrevid 8034 holding that federal rule of evidence 8034 the hearsay exception for statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment does not apply to statements made by doctors holding that nonself inculpatory statements are not statements against penal interest under fedrevid 804b3