See id. {10} The State argues that once prosecution is brought under the habitual offender statute, the mandatory terms of the enhanced sentence apply in all circumstances. We disagree. Although our Supreme Court has held that the provisions of the habitual offender statute are mandatory, see State v. Davis, 104 N.M. 229, 230, 719 P.2d 807, 808 (1986), not every sentence will withstand constitutional scrutiny if it is found to contravene rights guaranteed under either the federal or state constitution. See In re Ernesto M., Jr., 1996-NMCA-039, ¶ 22, 121 N.M. 562, 915 P.2d 318 (reviewing whether sentencing child as adult pursuant to youthful offender statute constituted cruel and unusual punishment); State v. Arrington, 115 N.M. 559, 561, 855 P.2d 133, 135 (Ct.App.1993) (Arrington I) (<HOLDING>). It is the province of the judiciary to review
holding that an acceleration clause is not subject to antitrust scrutiny where plaintiffs conceded that they could be procompetitive in some circumstances but noting that noag clauses are subject to antitrust scrutiny holding that a mandatory life sentence for cocaine possession is not unusual in the constitutional sense holding that a defendant is subject to a mandatory consecutive sentence for a  924c conviction and is not spared from that sentence by virtue of receiving a higher mandatory minimum on a different count of conviction holding that the statute is mandatory holding a mandatory sentence is still subject to constitutional scrutiny