deny all right to appeal, close the courts to petitioners, or infringe on this court's jurisdiction to promulgate rules. Thus, because only the Suspension Clause could invalidate the PCRA's time bar in this case, I confine my discussion to that constitutional provision alone. 11 . My analysis of this ques (Pa.Super.Ct.2001) (upholding one-year statute of limitations on PCRA petitions); In re Runyan, 121 Wash.2d 432, 444-45, 853 P.2d 424 (1993) (en banc) (same); see also People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424, 435 (Colo.1993) (en banc) (upholding three-year statute of limitations); Davis v. State, 443 N.W.2d 707, 709-10 (Iowa 1989) (same); Battrick v. State, 267 Kan. 389, 985 P.2d 707, 714-15 (1999) (upholding thirty-day limitation); Bartz v. State, 314 Or. 353, 839 P.2d 217, 224-25 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Potts v. State, 833 S.W.2d 60, 61-62
holding also that iiriras foreclosure of habeas review does not violate the suspension clause holding that revocation of medical license does not violate the ex post facto clause holding that 120day time limit for post conviction collateral attacks did not violate state suspension clause holding that use of the guidelines in effect at time of sentencing does not violate ex post facto clause after booker holding that district court did not violate ex post facto clause in applying remedial holding of booker at sentencing