properly sustained because there were no facts in evidence suggesting that Graham had never been convicted of a felony. See Charriez v. State, 96 So.3d 1127, 1128 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) (stating that it is improper for a prosecutor to refer to facts not in evidence). The prosecutor’s statements also constituted improper bolstering. See Hutchinson v. State, 882 So.2d 943, 953 (Fla.2004) (“Improper bolstering occurs when the State ... indicates that information not presented to the jury supports the witness’s testimony.”), abrogated on other grounds by Deparvine v. State, 995 So.2d 851 (Fla.2008) (“Improper bolstering occurs when the State ... indicates that information not presented to the jury supports the witness’s testimony.”); cf. Welch v. State, 940 So.2d 1244, 1246 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>). At that time, Brin-son moved for a mistrial.
holding that testimony supporting the witnesss character for truthfulness was improperly admitted on redirect examination because there was no attack on the witnesss credibility or character during crossexamination holding that trial court improperly dismissed charges pretrial because the state did not disclose the identity of a confidential informant holding that it was error for the trial court to allow the state to question the confidential informant on direct examination about her lack of felony charges when there was no prior attack of the witnesss credibility holding that the trial courts error in not allowing defendant to testify on direct examination as to nature and circumstances of prior convictions was not harmless error where credibility of the defendant was critical to the deliberations of the jury holding that a trial witnesss testimony as to the credibility of another witness was prejudicial error