or business purposes, and that Dow was sued in those capacities. See Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 95.001(3). Appellants further alleged that Dow was “charged with the duty of reasonable, or ordinary, care in being sure that the premises upon which Angelia Stewart was working and the equipment Plaintiff [sic] was using were reasonably safe.” Similarly, appellants claim “damages,” for Stewart’s “personal injuries]” and “death,” allegedly caused by negligence (and gross negligence) “arising from” Dow’s “failure to provide a safe workplace.” See Tex. Crv. PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. §§ 95.002(1), 95.003. Appellants summarize their numerous, specific allegations of misconduct or lack of conduct by Dow as “constit[ing] negligence as that term is defined at law.” See Francis, 130 S.W.3d at 88 (<HOLDING>); Dyall v. Simpson Pasadena Paper Co., 152
holding that trial courts recognizing some evidence of negligence of premises owner that proximately caused alleged injuries did not give rise to commonlaw duty beyond scope of chapter 95 holding police officer who was shot by occupier of premises could not recover from premises owner for injuries the officer should have reasonably expected to sustain while engaged in the line of duty holding that alleged violations of a state statute did not give rise to federal constitutional claims holding that when chapter 95 applies it is the plaintiffs exclusive remedy and precludes common law negligence liability holding that chapter 95 precludes commonlaw negligence claims