the 2008 policy was any different from the 2006 policy, see id. at 853 (“Although the [2008] policy went into effect after the date of the loan, no prior policy was introduced by either Adamov or the bank.”). We now know, thanks to Adamov’s filing of the 2006 policy, that the operative ethics policy at the time of Adamov’s termination did not proscribe his behavior. See R. 108-4 (2006 Policy at 18) (Page ID # 1105) (prohibiting employees “from borrowing from customers” but not from lending to them). Therefore, there is a genuine issue of material fact on whether U.S. Bank’s proffered reason for terminating Adamov—the $10,000 loan to his college friend—was the real reason for its action. See Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d at 767; Upshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 576 F.3d 576, 590 (6th Cir. 2009) (<HOLDING>). Second, a reasonable jury could conclude that
holding that although reasons given by a prosecutor would normally be adequately neutral explanations taken at face value the fact that two of the four proffered reasons do not hold up under judicial scrutiny militates against their sufficiency holding no pretext for not following progressive discipline where policy contemplated immediate termination for certain offenses holding that the conflicting explanations given by defendants agents for the plaintiffs termination were also sufficient to raise a reasonable inference that defendants proffered reasons for the termination were pretextual the inconsistent testimony  regarding the motivating reasons for plaintiffs termination cast doubts on the asserted nondiscriminatory legitimate reasons and may alone  be sufficient to preclude summary judgment on plaintiffs claim holding that there was pretext when two of fords four proffered reasons for terminating upshaw  do not typically warrant any formal discipline at fords sharonville plant let alone termination holding that inconsistency in employers reasons for the termination is an indication of pretext