the district court erroneously: (i) admitted evidence of three prior bad acts under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b); and (ii) denied his motion to sever Count Three. Finding no error, we affirm Davis’s convictions and sentence. First, we reject Davis’s assertion that the district court erred in admitting evidence of three other burglaries he was accused of having committed because the evidence’s prob tive value of the prior bad acts evidence was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect, we conclude that the district court’s limiting instructions to the jury, as well as the prior notice regarding the evidence that was given to Davis by the prosecution, was sufficient to reduce any prejudicial effect the evidence may have had. See United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 997 (4th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Given the striking similarity of the
holding that the fear a jury may improperly use rule 404b evidence subsides when the trial judge gives the jury a limiting instruction regarding proper use and that the fear of a trial by ambush recedes when the prosecution has given notice of the evidence to be introduced and there is no evidence that the prosecution is placing the defendants entire earlier life on trial holding that suppression of evidence by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the defendant upon request violates the defendants right to due process where the evidence is material recognizing that upon request the trial court may provide a limiting instruction to the jury holding that in a criminal trial the trial court must correct or amend an improper instruction if the proper instruction is necessary for the jury to understand the case holding that when defendant argued on appeal that the trial justice should have given the jury a sua sponte limiting instruction regarding alleged rule 404b evidence defendants failure to object at trial constituted a waiver of that issue