into the existence of a protected, state-created liberty interest in avoiding restrictive conditions of confinement is not the language of regulations regarding those conditions but the nature of those conditions themselves ‘in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’ ” Id. at 223, 125 S.Ct. 2384 (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293). The district court did not err in concluding that Watkins’s 14 days of disciplinary segregation and three-month loss of commissary, visitation, and telephone privileges did not implicate a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485-86, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (finding no liberty interest protecting against a 30-day period of disciplinary segregation); Malchi v. Thaler, 211 F.3d 953, 958 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 508 (5th
holding that 30day commissary and cell restrictions did not implicate the due process clause holding that mere negligence does not implicate the right to due process holding that 30day loss of cell and commissary privileges does not implicate due process concerns holding that punitive conditions of pretrial confinement implicate due process holding that thirtyday commissary and cell restrictions did not implicate due process concerns