the peculiar circumstances of the case. For example, the delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31, 92 S.Ct. at 2191-92; see also Roller, 956 F.2d at 1413. The Supreme Court has said that “the lower courts have generally found postaccusation delay ‘presumptively prejudicial’ at least as it approaches one year.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 2691 n. 1, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Ring, 909 F.Supp. 369, 372 (E.D.Va.1995). We shall assume, under the foregoing, that the fifteen month delay in this ease was “presumptively prejudicial” so as to trigger further inquiry as to Santiago, see, e.g., Roller, 956 F.2d at 1414 (<HOLDING>); Colombo, 852 F.2d at 24 (holding that a
holding a plaintiffs rule 60b3 motion untimely where a three and onehalf month delay had occurred with no explanation as to the reason for the delay holding a three and onehalf year delay was unreasonable holding that a five month delay was unreasonable holding that a 13 month delay was unreasonable holding that an eight and onehalf month delay was enough to warrant further inquiry