to take prompt and emphatic action could constitute reckless indifference rather than mere laxity. Ill CONCLUSION As the “deliberate indifference” standard for supervisory liability has not been met by the evidence proffered against the defendant-supervisors, the district court judgment must be affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs. SO ORDERED. 1 . All material facts in genuine dispute are related in the light most favorable to Sanchez. Velez-Gomez v. SMA Life Assur. Co., 8 F.3d 873, 875 (1st Cir.1993) 2 . We assume, without deciding, that all PREPA supervisory personnel named as defendants were in fact “supervisors” potentially subject to liability under § 1983 in that Santiago was their subordinate. See Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 902 (1st Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); see also p. 227 infra (quoting Lipsett). 3 .
holding that individual liability under  1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation recognizing that deprivation of a right was a necessary predicate to  1983 conspiracy liability holding that a constitutional violation by a subordinate is a predicate for supervisory liability under  1983 holding that iqbal eliminated supervisory liability previously permitted by colon in situations where the supervisor knew of and acquiesced to a constitutional violation committed by a subordinate holding that supervisory liability under  1983 requires a showing that the supervisory official at least implicitly authorized or approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending subordinate