this suit, its decision was in error. IV. For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the district court’s grant of Lucy Corr and Mast’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for Talbot’s failure to exhaust her state administrative remedies and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. VACATED AND REMANDED. 1 . As Lucy Corr noted in its brief supporting its motion to dismiss in the district court, the Medicare Act does contain an explicit exhaustion requirement for claims contesting the determination of entitlement to benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(a). See 42 U.S.C. § 1395Ü (incorporating requirements contained in certain sections of 42 U.S.C. § 405 into Medicare Act); Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 614, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 2021, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984) (<HOLDING>). However, this exhaustion requirement applies
holding exhaustion requirement inapplicable when requiring exhaustion would be futile holding that exhaustion requirement applies to excessive force claims recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different holding that exhaustion requirement contained in  1395u applies to claim for benefits holding that the ideas exhaustion requirement applies to claims asserted under  1983