benefit from the unlawful search because it was an important element in creating a coercive atmosphere that led to her consent. Generally, it can be said the validity of a person’s consent “is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of the circumstances” and the district court’s findings will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Taylor, 956 F.2d 572, 577 (6th Cir.) (quoting Schneckloth v. Busta-monte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2048, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 404, 121 L.Ed.2d 330 (1992); see United States v. French, 974 F.2d 687, 693 (6th Cir.1992), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1012, 122 L.Ed.2d 160 (1993). But cf. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 1791-92, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968) (<HOLDING>). After her arrest, Calhoun was read her
holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because there was no  consent decree left to be terminated holding that consent was freely and voluntarily given despite officers advisement that the police could get a search warrant if consent was not given holding there is no consent as a matter of law where the consent was given under coercion holding that because consent is not a statement and a request for consent is not an interrogation giving consent to search is a neutral fact which has no tendency to show that the suspect is guilty of any crime holding under state constitution that validity of consent search requires knowledge of right to refuse consent