matter, we note that the State does not raise an issue on appeal regarding the merits of the motion to suppress, but argues that as a procedural matter, the trial court erred in reconsidering the motion five years after it was originally denied, without providing prior notice or an evidentiary hearing. Thus, our analysis is limited to this procedural issue, and we do not address the question of whether Miller had reasonable suspicion to detain Wolfe. This Court has held that because a motion to suppress is “nothing more than a specialized objection,” a trial court is “free to reconsider its own earlier suppression ruling.” Montalvo v. State, 846 S.W.2d 183, 137-38 (Tex.App.-Austin 1993, no pet.); see also State v. Henry, 25 S.W.3d 260, 262 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). The State argues that while a trial court may
holding that it is clear that hearsay evidence is admissible in a hearing on a motion to suppress holding that the denial of a motion to remand is interlocutory and not immediately appealable holding that ruling on motion to suppress is interlocutory and may be reconsidered holding that erroneously admitted evidence may be considered when ruling on a motion to dismiss holding that a legal conclusion on a motion to suppress is reviewed de novo