immigration agents target individuals solely on the basis of their foreign-sounding names. Like one’s appearance, one’s name is frequently correlated with one’s racial or ethnic background, and in both instances the racial or ethnic background which results in adverse action by immigration officers almost always is that of people of color. Because the Brignoni-Ponce principle was firmly established at the time Smirnoff and his compatriots went to Orhorhaghe’s apartment, we conclude that a reasonable officer should have known that both the seizure of Orhorhaghe and the unlawful entry into his apartment violated the Constitution. Thus, under Adamson, we hold that the Fourth Amendment violations were egregious. See Adamson, 745 F.2d at 545; see also Arguelles-Vasquez, 786 F.2d at 1435 (<HOLDING>). In addition, the Fourth Amendment violations
holding that violation of state law was not a per se constitutional violation holding that section 1983 actions based on violation of the fourth amendment may not rest on violation of state law holding that parole boards do not have to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment holding that a violation of the hearsay rule was harmless holding that a violation of the wellestablished rule of brignoniponce constituted an egregious violation of the fourth amendment