for the State to revoke appellant’s probation. Nevertheless, we conclude the Ex Post Facto Clause did not apply to appellant’s cases. To fall within the ex post facto prohibition, a criminal law must contain two critical elements: first, the law must be retrospective; and second, it must disadvantage the offender affected by it. Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987). A law is retrospective if it changes “the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date.” Id. The completed “acts” in a probation revocation case are those that make up the underlying offense. See Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700, 120 S.Ct. 1795, 146 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000); see also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973) (<HOLDING>). The prohibition against ex post facto laws
holding probation revocation is not a stage of a criminal prosecution holding that revocation of probation is merely an extension of a sentencing proceeding holding that standard for revocation of probation is preponderance of the evidence holding that the filing of a motion for a new trial is a critical stage of the prosecution and that an indigent defendant is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel at that stage holding that probation revocation proceedings are clearly not criminal proceedings