the rule is part of our “jurisprudence,” it is the Court’s unswerving endorsement of its deterrent purpose that accounts for this. It is therefore an exaggeration to say that the rule, though markedly broadened, has acquired constitutional stature. It might be argued (though not by the majority) that the exclusionary rule is constitutional because it is directly related to “judicial integrity.” We, however, have not subscribed to the view that “judicial integrity” is the purpose served by the exclusionary rule, although in particular cases “judicial integrity” may be threatened by certain kinds of police misconduct and itself would justify application of the rule. See, e.g., Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978); State v. Howery, 80 N.J. 563 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Just last term we reiterated the position
holding that because evidence supporting search warrant was illegally obtained evidence recovered by executing warrant was fruit of the illegal search holding for an administrative search to be constitutional under the fourth amendment the subject of the search must be afforded an opportunity to obtain precompliance review before a neutral decisionmaker which requirement would be satisfied by an administrative subpoena holding that a search warrant is invalid if not based on an affidavit holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant holding that the fourth amendment requires that a defendant be allowed an opportunity to challenge the veracity of an affidavit supporting a search warrant