his true intent in driving by the Johnson home was to harass and cause distress to Johnson. There was also evidence from which the jury could have concluded that Dubian’s surveillancé contributed to causing Johnson’s psychological injury. Johnson’s psychiatrist, George Milowe, stated that Johnson was terrified in part because strange cars were following him, and Johnson himself testified that he was frightened by being followed. Even if Dubian’s conduct was not the sole, initial, or primary cause of Johnson’s symptoms, the jury could reasonably have concluded that the surveillance activity was a substantial factor in causing Johnson’s distress, warranting a liability finding and a damages award. See Edgecomb v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 127 Conn. 488, 18 A.2d 364, 365 (1941) (<HOLDING>); Antz v. Coppola, 137 Conn. 69, 75 A.2d 36, 39
holding that no private right of action exists holding that no recovery exists for speculative damages holding that a claim for damages exists in an action to enforce title ix holding that a private right of action exists holding that causation exists when the defendants action was a substantial factor in producing the plaintiffs damages