prescribe the type of appellate process allowed once a party comes to court. And considering that many administrative proceedings are appealed to the district court under standards that do not provide for a hearing de novo in the district court, this Court cannot say that the standard of review under Section 73-2-21(E) is inherently inadequate. See NMSA 1978, § 39-3-1.1 (1999), cross-references (listing scores of different types of decisions that qualify for this standard of review). We conclude, therefore, that Owners’ constitutional right of access to the courts and constitutional right to appeal are not substantially impacted by Section 73-2-21(E) and that rational basis review rather than intermediate scrutiny applies. See Wagner, 2005-NMSC-016, ¶ 18, 137 N.M. 734, 114 P.3d 1050 (<HOLDING>). This is particularly true inasmuch as Owners’
holding that rational basis review applied to a workers compensation statute limiting attorney fees where the appellants did not establish that the statutory fees were so low so as to prevent litigants from being meaningfully represented in court holding that bank was entitled to attorney fees on appeal when agreement did not prohibit such fees holding proper basis for award of fees holding that chanenge to the amount of attorney fees was not preserved for appeal where appellants objection challenged only the entitlement to fees holding because an award of attorney fees is discretionary court may consider attorney fees in relation to the underlying equities in the case