candidate whose name appears on the sign could be prosecuted for the state employee’s misdeed, even though the candidate did not know the volunteer personally; did not solicit the help; and, had no idea that the person joining him to spread his campaign message was even a state employee. If applied in this fashion, we agree with Mr. Siplin that this statute would be unconstitutional on both over-breadth and substantive due process grounds. However, criminal statutes are generally read to include a mens rea element, even when not expressly included in the statute. E.g., State v. Giorgetti 868 So.2d 512, 515-516 (Fla.2004); see also, State v. Oxx, 417 So.2d 287 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Deehl v. Knox, 414 So.2d 1089 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); but see, Suit v. State, 906 So.2d 1013, 1022 (Fla.2005) (<HOLDING>). As explained in Giorgetti there are two
recognizing that our task as a reviewing court is to afford a logical construction according to the general terms and intentions of the entire  act and that it is axiomatic that we construe the statute as a whole entity  in order to arrive at a construction which avoids illogical results holding that the general equitable tolling doctrine is read into every statute of limitations recognizing that unreversed statutory construction is to be held part of the statute as if originally so written recognizing this rule but concluded that the statute in that case was incapable of a narrower construction because there is no logical way to read a specific intent element into the statute as it is currently written recognizing that this courts construction of a statute becomes as much apart of the statute as the words of the statute itself and that change is a matter that addresses itself to the general assembly not this court