duty” for purposes of the Indictment. Government’s Response at 2-3. As such, the Government urges the court to deny Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Id. at 5. The Government did not specifically respond to Defendant’s assertion that because there is no “federal jurisdiction” alleged by the Indictment, the Indictment fails to state a federal offense. Defendant’s argument as to any asserted lack of jurisdiction, however, ignores prevailing judicial tests as to whether the Indictment was facially valid. First, while Defendant asserts a lack of jurisdiction, Defendant fails to cite any authority demonstrating why the Indictment on its face does not invoke the criminal jurisdiction of the United States. See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568, 3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883) (<HOLDING>); See also United States v. Kostadinov, 734
holding that tribal indians domiciled within the territorial limits of an indian nation in indian territory and who consummated a marriage or divorce in accordance with recognized tribal custom before such customs had been superceded by other law were bound by the legal effect given to such customs holding that states may enforce their own laws for disabled children and are not limited to the minimum standards of the federal law holding that the state did not have jurisdiction over crime committed on land held by the bureau of indian affairs for the use and benefit of a discrete indian community holding federal government could not prosecute an american indian who on indian territory had murdered another member of his tribe as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the indians to engage in selfgovernment ie the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs holding that assumption of jurisdiction by the state court would infringe upon the right of reservation indians to make their own laws and be governed by them