or even knew any of the Defendants, before enrolling at Warrior Fitness. Several other clients, whom Plaintiffs alleged had been solicited by Defendants, testified at trial that they were not, in fact, solicited by Defendants, nor had they ever been in contact with any of the Defendants about Warrior Fitness. Other clients testified that they had learned about Warrior Fitness from Brenner herself, or on Face-book. Further, several Pure Power clients stated that they had left Pure Power, not because Defendants encouraged them to do so, but because they valued the instruction provided by drill instructors Belliard and Fell, and wanted them to continue to be their instructors. See, e.g., Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P. v. Chiampou, 222 A.D.2d 1026, 1027, 636 N.Y.S.2d 679, 679 (4th Dep’t 1995) (<HOLDING>). Finally, the record shows that some clients
holding that defendant who had copied plaintiffs perfume formula had a right to market it under defendants name because it identified to public plaintiffs product as competition holding that preliminary injunction to enforce covenant not to compete cannot apply to plaintiffs former clients who had voluntarily and without solicitations sought out defendants after defendants left plaintiffs employ holding that plaintiffs did not have standing to bring survival act suit because decedent left heirs at law but plaintiffs were not among them holding that the plaintiffs argument rebutting the defendants legitimate nondiscriminatory reason on the plaintiffs discrimination claim also rebutted the defendants reason on the plaintiffs retaliation claim because they were the same holding district court had no authority to require plaintiffs to obtain courts permission to dismiss defendant who had not served answer or motion for summary judgment as plaintiffs had absolute right to dismissal without prejudice and thus court could not sanction plaintiffs for filing notice of voluntary dismissal rather than motion