damages, attorneys’ fees, and other costs, as well as insulation from civil penalty liability. Despite the lost fees and costs, the Trus an resting on a faulty application of the prevailing legal principles, was a result of the parties’ calculated gamble on an undecided question. Third, no evidence exists of the Trustees’ commission of an unlawful act, which is a necessary predicate to a finding of undue advantage or duress. See Cary, 91 S.E. at 168. Virginia Lee may have entered into the settlement agreement reluctantly, but that alone does not constitute duress. See id. Furthermore, a supervening change in law will not alone suffice as a ground for invalidating a settlement agreement. See, e.g., Anita Foundations, Inc. v. ILGWU Nat’l Retirement Fund, 902 F.2d 185, 189 (2d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Sentry Indem. Co. v. Peoples, 800 F.2d 1547,
holding that direct payment of attorney fees for representation before the court is to be made on the basis of the claim or application for benefits underlying the issues successfully appealed to this court holding that it was not essential to an action by a supplier on a payment bond under the miller act that a demand be made on the general contractor for payment  although there was evidence in the case from which it could be found that the materialman looked to the general contractor for payment  since the statute does not require a demand for payment but merely requires written notice of the claim holding that a settlement payment made when the law was uncertain cannot be successfully attacked on the basis of any subsequent resolution of the uncertainty holding acceptance of settlement estopped plaintiff from subsequent suit holding that in light of the statutory framework created by the code  522f lien avoidance cannot be made subject to any subsequent event