under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. See United States v. Barahona-Montenegro, 565 F.3d 980, 983 (6th Cir.2009) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007)). McFalls does not invoke the abuse-of-discretion standard; indeed, there is no reason to think that the district court abused its discretion. B. Law of the case Next, McFalls argues that the original judge’s decision to run Count 1 concurrently was the law of the case, binding upon Judge Haynes. The resolution of this argument follows naturally from a finding that the remand was general. As noted above, a general remand wipes the slate clean. The consequence is that the law of the case doctrine does not apply with respect to the original sentencing. See Moored, 38 F.3d at 1422 (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court recognized this principle
recognizing that the lawofthecase doctrine applies to preliminary injunctions and stating that tjhe exception to law of the case where evidence on a subsequent trial is substantially different is inapplicable where by the prior appeal the issue is not left open for decision holding that a party waives remand on the basis of a procedural defect by filing a motion to remand more than thirty days after the case is removed holding that the lawofthecase doctrine is inapposite after a general remand recognizing doctrine holding in a prisoner civil rights action that the lawofthecase doctrine does not apply to preclude reconsideration of a prior order denying a motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds in light of an intervening change in the law by the supreme court which called into question the prior ruling