to his accomplices was an important part of the factual background concerning how and why this crime came to be committed. Nevertheless, we recognize that defendant’s prior-arson statement, in addition to its relevance in proving several essential aspects of the crime for which he was accused, was also relevant to show that defendant’s character was less than sterling and that he had acted in conformity with his prior act of arson on the night in question. But the mere fact that the jury is capable of using prior-bad-act evidence for such purposes does not mandate its exclusion under Rule 404(b) because that rule does not “require exclusion of otherwise legally probative evidence simply because such evidence might also suggest past criminal activity.” See Gordon, 508 A.2d at 1348 (<HOLDING>). In Gordon, we upheld as relevant background
holding that any error in the exclusion of evidence is cured by the subsequent admission of the evidence holding that the prohibition against use of evidence of a defendants prior criminal conduct to infer bad character and action in conformity therewith on the occasion in question does not mandate exclusion of all evidence regardless of how otherwise legally probative containing any reference to past criminal conduct holding that criminal conduct on premises was not foreseeable holding that the victims negligence is not a defense to criminal conduct holding that evidence of subsequent criminal conduct may be used at sentencing hearing on prior criminal charge and stating that misdeeds occurring up to the time of sentencing whether before the finding of guilty or subsequent are relevant as they go to the defendants history and character 