it “provide[s] a remedy for a violation of that policy”). Wal-Mart relies on Silva v. Albuquerque Assembly & Distribution Freeport Warehouse Corp., 106 N.M. 19, 738 P.2d 513 (1987), and McGinnis v. Honeywell, Inc., 110 N.M. 1, 791 P.2d 452 (1990), for the proposition that the tort of retaliatory discharge will not lie where an employee is protected against wrongful discharge by another cause of action (in those cases, breach of an employment contract). We agree with WalMart’s position to the extent it intimates that a plaintiff cannot recover twice for the same harm — once under the employment contract (or the Human Rights Act, as the case may be) and again under the tort: “It is clear that McGinnis cannot recover more than one compensatory-damage award[.]” Id. at 8, 791 P.2d at 459 (<HOLDING>). The holding in Silva echoes this concern:
holding that conduct must be beyond the fraud which supported compensatory damages to award punitive damages holding that a plaintiff who proves a cause of action under  1981 may recover punitive damages where the plaintiff is entitled to an award of compensatory damages even if nominal holding that because plaintiff recovered compensatory damages on breach of contract award  the intended protection afforded by the retaliatory discharge action is unnecessary and inapplicable  quoting silva 106 nm at 21 738 p2d at 515 recognizing that breach of contract cause of action accrues at time of the breach holding that a cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the time of the breach