Aleman v. Sternes, 320 F.3d 687, 690-91 (7th Cir.2003), which applied the two-step approach); Gutierrez, 389 F.3d at 306. The Fifth Circuit has suggested in dicta that it might do the same. See Garcia v. Quarterman, 454 F.3d 441, 447 (5th Cir.2006). Taking guidance from Esparza, we now join those circuits. We hold that AEDPA replaced the Brecht standard with the standard of Chapman plus AEDPA deference when, as here, a state court made a harmless-error determination. This result makes practical sense for two reasons. First, a judicially crafted standard generally gives way when Congress steps in to address the same issue, as long as the original standard was not constitutionally required. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 425, 108 S.Ct. 2460, 101 L.Ed.2d 370 (1988) (<HOLDING>). That is precisely what happened here. The
holding that social security regulations and procedures precluded a bivens action holding that the courtcreated bivens remedy is unavailable when congress through the social security act provided an alternative mechanism for a plaintiff to vindicate his due process rights holding that the csra precludes even those bivens claims for which the act prescribes no alternative remedy because it found no inadvertence by congress in omitting the remedy holding that where plaintiffs had an alternative remedy the court would not substitute its judgment for that of congress by creating an implied right of action holding the privacy act to constitute a special factor precluding a bivens remedy