is necessary” to put the defendants on notice of the claim. Williams v. Sabin, 884 F.Supp. 294, 297 (N.D.Ill.1995). In addition, the complaint and its incorporated exhibits do reflect that the defendants' standard forms purported to waive the EFTA disclosures, and a reasonable inference is that the plaintiff in fact did not receive the required disclosures. Thus, for purposes of resolving the motion to dismiss, the complaint does allege that Cobb suffered "damage” as a result of the misleading practice. However, we observe that whether the failure to receive disclosures actually resulted in compensable, monetary damages might be the proper subject of a motion for summary judgment. Cf. Dwyer v. American Express Co., 273 Ill.App.3d 742, 210 Ill.Dec. 375, 381, 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1357 (1995) (<HOLDING>). 21 . The remaining claims are: (a) Count I,
holding that when plaintiff has proven injury but has failed to prove the amount of damages the plaintiff is only entitled to nominal damages holding that a plaintiff could recover actual damages under the tcpa for loss of credit if the plaintiff submitted sufficient proof of the amount damages requested holding that plaintiffs respa claim failed as a matter of law where it did not allege actual damages holding that the plaintiff failed to allege damages under the icfa because the only damages that the plaintiffs could have suffered was a surfeit of unwanted mail holding that both punitive and treble damages were recoverable under the texas deceptive trade practices act because each of the plaintiffs claims resulted from a distinct act however because the plaintiff suffered only one compensable injury she could only be awarded one recovery for actual compensatory damages