Court has been clear that there is no heightened pleading standard in civil rights cases, see Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 591-92, 118 S.Ct. 1584, 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998), it has also been clear that qualified immunity should be resolved “at the earliest possible stage in litigation,” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). This creates a tension between a civil-rights plaintiffs entitlement to meet only the liberal notice pleading standards of Rule 8, and an individual civil-rights defendant’s entitlement to have the court scrutinize the facts early in the proceedings to determine whether the defendant’s alleged conduct was legally reasonable. Compare, e.g., Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 639-40, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980) (<HOLDING>), with Beh-rens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299,
holding that the plaintiff waived an objection to the defendants failure to plead qualified immunity as an affirmative defense holding that a civilrights plaintiff need not plead facts relevant to a qualified immunity defense in order to state a claim holding that to rebut presumption plaintiff need only allege specific facts not plead evidence holding that where defendant claiming qualified immunity relies on facts that are in dispute qualified immunity cannot be granted holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity