a jury trial. Id., 546 A.2d at 1224. Although it is indeed true that the PHRA to a large extent reflects the aims and substance of Title VII, in deciding whether a statutory right to a jury trial exists, it is the remedial provisions of the two laws that are crucial. Lorillard, Div. of Loew’s Theatres, Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584, 98 S.Ct. 866, 872, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978). In 1972, Congress amended Title VII to provide for bench trials exclusively in all Title VII actions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(4). However, prior to that amendment, federal courts based their determinations that plaintiffs had no right to a jury trial under Title VII on the equitable nature of the remedial provisions of that act. See, e.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir.1969) (<HOLDING>). Conversely, in Lorillard, Div. of Loew’s
holding that back pay was an integral part of title vips equitable remedies and that therefore no right to jury trial existed holding that no right to a jury trial existed after one of the plaintiffs claims was dismissed leaving only an equitable claim holding that an award of back pay is an issue for the court holding there was no jury trial right where court ordered reinstatement and back pay to teachers fired after desegregation order in discrimination case back pay is equitable holding that an award of back pay under title vii remains an equitable remedy to be awarded by the district court in its discretion