decision was motivated in part by a discriminatory animus, even though other factors besides the discrimination influenced the employer’s decision. See Sher v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 488 F.3d 489, 508 n.22 (1st Cir. 2007) (“In a mixed motive case, the plaintiff would only have to establish that national origin ... discrimination was a motivating factor in the analysis, rather than the sole basis for the decision.”) Additionally, the plaintiff need not present direct evidence of discrimination to pursue a mixed-motive theory. Rather, “[a] plaintiff is entitled to prove discrimination by circumstantial evidence alone.” Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 46 (1st Cir. 2009); see also Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98-99, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003) (<HOLDING>). Once the plaintiff demonstrates that his
holding that title vii does not mention much less require that a plaintiff make a heightened showing through direct evidence in mixedmotive cases holding that direct evidence of discrimination is not required to prove discrimination in mixed motive cases under title vii holding that in title vii cases the mixedmotive theory of discrimination is available in cases with circumstantial evidence of discrimination holding that the mixedmotive framework does not apply to retaliation cases under title vii holding the title vii mixedmotive theory does not apply to adea claims