threatened to use a firearm during the commission of the crime”; (2) where the defendant admitted to use or threatened use; and (3) where the court convened a special proceeding and found use or threatened use of a firearm. Or Laws 1979, ch 779, § 2. The third option, action by the sentencing judge, could only occur if, before sentencing, the judge determined that the “conviction” did not necessarily establish use or threatened use of a firearm. That order of events — “conviction” followed by sentencing — indicates that the legislature intended the term “conviction” in ORS 161.610 to mean the finding of guilt as to the underlying criminal charge, and not that finding of guilt combined with the attendant criminal sentence. Compare State v. Isbell, 178 Or App 523, 527, 38 P3d 272 (2001) (<HOLDING>), and State v. Allison, 143 Or App 241, 246,
holding that because any precedes the list of items a felon is prohibited from possessing double jeopardy precludes more than one conviction for possession of any of the items listed holding that for sentencing purposes the government does not need to allege a defendants prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact is not an element of the present crime holding that the term conviction means a finding of guilt and not a judgment where it refers to an event that precedes sentencing holding that where trial court is trier of fact and has made an affirmative deadly weapon finding it retains discretion to enter finding in judgment holding that trial court may arrest judgment on conviction for possession with intent to deliver and enter judgment of guilt on simple possession