context. We must presume that the Legislature — as well as the Model Penal Code drafters — chose the language of the statute carefully and intentionally. ¶ 10. We also decline the dissent’s urging to read the recklessness intent requirement to require a showing of “intent to provoke an immediate act of violence.” We cannot agree that the disorderly conduct statute as written is overbroad if it criminalizes any conduct just short of that which prompts the hearer to an immediate violent reaction. Certainly the very notion of prohibiting disorderly conduct is to permit the state to intervene before such abusive, aggre 476 (Colo. 1973) (ruling defendant’s saying “fuck you” during political speech at university was protected speech); In re Louise C., 3 P.3d 1004, 1006 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (<HOLDING>). But that is not the case here. ¶ 12. As the
recognizing districts obligation to maintain special needs student at specific private school where hearing officer had directed district to place and fund student pending development of iep holding that no special relationship existed between the school and student holding that juveniles use of the f word in dispute with principal and another student over whether student had stolen her money did not constitute fighting words holding proper remedy when a christian student newspaper was denied student activities funds was to make funds available to the religious paper not to deny funds to nonreligious student groups holding that search of middle school student violated her fourth amendment rights