working and has suggested that working be viewed as a residual life activity, considered, as a last resort, only '[i]f an individual is not substantially limited with respect to any other major life activity.' ” Ibid, (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(j) (1998)) (emphasis added by Court). The Court did not, however, rule on whether an individual’s relative inability to work constitutes a disability under the ADA because that issue was not disputed by the parties. See ibid. ("Because the parties accept that the term 'major life activities’ includes working, we do not determine the validity of the cited regulations”). 5 . The ADA itself provides that "reasonable accommodation” may include "reassignment to a vacant position.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B); Williams, 101 F.3d at 349 (<HOLDING>). 6 . Although the Supreme Court has held that
holding that the disabled individual bears the initial burden of proposing an accommodation and showing that that accommodation is objectively reasonable and that the defendant was entitled to prevail because the plaintiffs proposed accommodation of remaining on unpaid medical leave until another customer service or receptionist position opened up was not a reasonable accommodation under the ada holding that an employer is not liable where it takes reasonable steps to provide an accommodation and the employee is responsible for a breakdown in the process of identifying a reasonable accommodation holding that the district court erred in suggesting that a qualified ada plaintiff can never rely on reassignment to a vacant position as a reasonable accommodation holding that once a reasonable accommodation is made the employer has fulfilled its obligation under the ada holding that employee who frequently missed work was not a qualified individual able to perform the essential functions of her job either with or without a reasonable accommodation as required to support disability discrimination and reasonable accommodation claims under the rehabilitation act