this test the trial court ascribed insufficient weight to the government’s interest in the children’s well-being, in the context of this narrowly-tailored statute addressing grandparent involvement in non-intact families. In this regard, the classification under Section 5312 is not based on antagonism against non-intact families, but, like Section 5311, reflects circumstances where the child’s family environment has been disturbed. Accord Seagrave v. Price, 349 Ark. 433, 79 S.W.3d 339, 344 (2002) (“Because the differences in the circumstances between married and divorced parents established the necessity to discriminate between the classes, the [grandparent visitation] statute at issue would not be found unconstitutional.”); Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649, 774 N.E.2d 1052, 1064 (2002) (<HOLDING>); see also Curtis, 542 Pa. at 261-68, 666 A.2d
holding that under strict scrutiny a grandparent visitation statute did not violate equal protection principles given legislative recognition that children of unmarried or separated parents may be at heightened risk for certain kinds of harm when compared with children of intact families holding that nearly identical kansas statute did not violate equal protection clause when subjected to strict scrutiny recognizing that because the state has cognizable interests in the safety of children in its jurisdiction neglectful parents may be separated from their children holding that the state law violated equal protection principles holding that biological grandparents were statutory strangers to children following their adoption by stepfather statute authorizing grandparent visitation violated parents constitutional right to privacy