Courts ordinarily rely in deciding a motion to dismiss, "while constantly assuming the plaintiff's allegations to be true.” Id. at 2509, 2511-12. 75 . Id. at 2504-05. 76 . Id. at 2510 (citation omitted). 77 . Id. at 2511. Accord id. at 2510 ("A complaint will survive ... only if a reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.”). 78 . ATSI, 493 F.3d at 99 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(Z)). 79 . Id. at 105 (affirming the dismissal of plaintiffs' misrepresentations claims) (citing Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 172 (2d Cir.2005)). 80 . Rombach, 355 F.3d at 172 (quotation omitted). Accord In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 381 F.Supp.2d 158, 182 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (<HOLDING>); In re Oxford Health, 187 F.R.D. 133, 140
holding that statements that a company was financially solid were actionable where defendants did not have a reasonable basis for them holding that alleged statements to thirdparties did not substantiate a hostile work environment claim where there was insufficient information as to when the statements were made how knowledge of them was acquired and when the plaintiff was informed of them if she was holding that public utility company is not liable for inaccessible bus company it licenses where there is no contract between them holding that even if defendants knew that the company had inventory problems  that fact standing alone does not show that defendants knew that the statements in their prospectus or other representations were materially false or misleading at the time the material statements were made holding that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity where it was not objectively reasonable for them to believe that failing to develop ieps which contained the required information did not violate the plaintiffs statutory rights