21. F.3d 1558, 1564 (Fed.Cir.1994). But, of course, the Supreme Court of Virginia remains the final arbiter of the meaning and application of the Virginia long-arm statute. 11 . See, e.g., Williams Crane & Rigging, Inc. v. B & L Sys., Ltd., 466 F.Supp. 956, 957 (E.D.Va.1979); Danville Plywood Corp. v. Plain & Fancy Kitchens, Inc., 218 Va. 533, 534-35, 238 S.E.2d 800 (1977). 12 . See, e.g., Ajax Realty Corp. v. J.F. Zook, Inc., 493 F.2d 818, 821 n. 4 (4th Cir.1972) (finding no personal jurisdiction under the “transacting business” subsection when "defendant’s sole contact with Virginia was its shipment of [defective window] frames to Virginia"), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966, 93 S.Ct. 2148, 36 L.Ed.2d 687 (1973); Unidyne Corp. v. Aerolineas Argentinas, 590 F.Supp. 391, 396 (E.D.Va.1984) (<HOLDING>). 13 . Appropriately, DeSantis does not allege
holding that mere speculation is insufficient to support a jury verdict holding that the defendant had completed a substantial step toward possession with intent to distribute despite defendants refusal to complete the transaction based on acts including 1 a prior drug transaction 2 recorded phone conversations about a possible cocaine deal 3 defendants trip to the site of the deal and 4 defendants conversations with the informant at the location of the deal holding that mere telephone conversations telex messages and letters negotiating a transaction are insufficient to form a basis for in personam jurisdiction under  8013281a1 recognizing step transaction doctrine whereby courts must consider all steps of transaction in light of entire transaction so that substance of transaction will control over form of each step holding negotiating over the telephone with an ohio resident and mailing a contract to ohio to be accepted were sufficient to grant ohio courts jurisdiction