The district court apparently reached the legal conclusion that the six instances of speech that the plaintiff relies upon were protected by the First Amendment under the first two parts of the Pickering/Connick analysis. The district court erred, however, by failing to inform the jury of this legal finding. The record is filled with expression by Gardetto which may or may not be protected by the First Amendment as a matter of law. Thus, the district court must tell the jury which incidents of expression deserve First Amendment protection to enable the jury to apply the third and fourth steps of the Pickering/Connick analysis to Gardetto’s legally protected expression. See Knapp v. Whitaker, 757 F.2d 827, 845 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 803, 106 S.Ct. 36, 88 L.Ed.2d 29 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Instructions Nos. 3 and 7 fail to ameliorate
holding that the plaintiffs speech was not constitutionally protected because it was made in his official capacity and there was simply no evidence that he was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern holding that washingtons harassment statute was unconstitutionally overbroad because it covered constitutionally protected speech holding that speech about financial assistance and handling racial discrimination does not qualify as protected speech holding that when protected speech is inextricable from unprotected speech the court will treat the entire message as protected holding that after the district court determined that the plaintiffs speech was protected the court was required to inform the jury of its ruling that knapps speech was constitutionally protected