implicates various constitutional rights, and we review sentences under distinct doctrines. Terms of supervised release, for instance, must be “reasonably related to the [sentencing] factors” and “involve[ ] no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary.” § 3583(d)(l)-(2). Thus, in assessing the need for incapacitation, see § 3553(a)(2)(C), a court could conceivably limit a defendant’s Internet access if full access posed too high a risk of recidivism. United States v. Scott, 316 F.3d 733, 736-37 (7th Cir.2003). The alternative to limited Internet access may be additional time in prison, which is surely more restrictive of speech than a limitation on electronics. This option is not without limits, see United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 878-79 (7th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>), but terms of supervised release or parole may
holding that allegations that the defendants provided substantial assistance and encouragement to the other defendants  in connection with the breaches by such other defendants of duties owed by them to the plaintiffs were too broad to be sustained holding total internet ban was too broad and compiling similar cases from other circuits holding the plaintiffs general claim that both parties market their products over the internet was insufficient to establish that they used similar marketing channels recognizing similar duties holding that section 10 does not confer subject matter jurisdiction and listing cases from dc second sixth seventh ninth and eleventh circuits holding same