negated any voluntary intoxication defense that trial counsel could have presented on Reaves’ behalf on retrial. See Pace v. State, 854 So.2d 167, 177 (Fla.2003) (finding counsel’s rejection of an intoxication defense was not deficient performance where Pace’s confession “indicated a clear recollection of the facts of the offense and involved deliberate behavior”); Davis v. State, 875 So.2d 359, 367 (Fla.2003) (finding competent, substantive evidence supported trial court’s determination that counsel made an informed, strategic decision not to pursue an intoxication defense where defendant gave detailed confessions as to the circumstances of the crime that “substantially undermined the viability of a voluntary intoxication defense”); Damren v. State, 838 So.2d 512, 517-18 (Fla.2003) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, Hinton, the first person to see
holding counsels strategic decision not to present a voluntary intoxication defense did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel determined the murder was not committed while floyd was under the influence of cocaine holding that failure to object to admissible evidence was not ineffective assistance of counsel holding that defense counsels decision not to call defendant to the stand despite defendants repeatedly expressed desire to testify on his own behalf was not ineffective assistance of counsel but was a reasonable tactical decision by counsel not to subject defendant to all of the risk attendant on crossexamination holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel holding that defense counsels failure to present voluntary intoxication as a defense in a capitalmurder prosecution was not beyond the range of reasonable professional judgment and thus did not amount to ineffective assistance in view of inconsistency of intoxication defense with deliberateness of the defendants actions during the shootings