that term was defined in § 13102(12). B. The Secretary of Transportation Has Discretion Over Cargo Liability Insurance Although Congress’ aim was to eliminate the separate registration requirements for common and contract carriers, we do not believe that fact is dispositive in this case. Rather, what is most important is the method by which Congress saw fit to implement the Termination Act. With respect to insurance, Congress left it to the Secretary of Transportation’s discretion to require cargo liability insurance. As we have stated, § 13906(a)(3) replaced former § 10927(a)(3) and gave the Secretary discretion over whether “a registered motor carrier,” including carriers once classified as common or contract, must insure cargo. The district court relie Ct. 1375, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948) (<HOLDING>). The only ICC interpretation of the Motor
holding that congress incorporation of jury provisions of the fair labor standards act into the age discrimination in employment act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions holding that the emergency price control act of 1942 did not unconstitutionally delegate the legislative power of congress to the office of price administration holding that when congress included provisions of compulsory testimony act of 1893 in the emergency price control act of 1942 it necessarily adopted settled judicial construction of the 1893 act holding when congress reenacted the voting rights act it necessarily adopted justice departments longstanding interpretation of acts requirements holding that the phrase  shall be granted in the injunctive enforcement provision of the emergency price control act of 1942 is less mandatory than a literal reading might suggest we cannot but think that if congress had intended to make such a drastic departure from the traditions of equity practice an unequivocal statement of its purpose would have been made