1090, 99 S.Ct. 873, 59 L.Ed.2d 57 (1978). Moreover, it is well established that the identity in language between 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) and 15 U.S.C. § 15 is not a mere happenstance; Congress consciously patterned the RICO section after the antitrust prototype. See, e.g., 115 Cong.Rec. 6992, 6993 (1969) (statement of Sen. Hruska). Legislators must have known that courts have construed virtually identical language as giving federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over antitrust claims. It would be anomalous for this court to hold that the jurisdictional grant in the RICO statute did anything other than create exclusive federal jurisdiction over civil claims by persons injured by violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962. But see Luebke v. Marine National Bank of Neenah, 567 F.Supp. 1460 (E.D.Wis. 1983) (<HOLDING>) The court concludes, therefore, that res
recognizing presumption holding rico claim could have been raised in state court because of presumption of concurrent jurisdiction but not addressing whether statutes language and legislative history rebuts the presumption holding that child support formula creates a rebuttable presumption and an inequitable result rebuts the presumption holding that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over rico claims and that plaintiffs federal rico claim was barred by res judicata since he failed to bring his rico claim along with his state fraud claims in prior state court action holding that the absence of plausible grounds for relief rebuts the presumption of prejudice