cannot grant a new trial on its own motion. Only a defendant can request and receive a new trial in a criminal case. Nor, even if we were to construe Appellant’s letters as a motion for new trial, are the bare assertions contained in them sufficient to create a record supporting involuntariness where none exists in the appellate record before us. We overrule Appellant’s second issue. Conclusion Having overruled Appellant’s two issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. 1 . Tex Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12 § 5(b) (West Supp.2013). 2 . Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim.App.1984). 3 . Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). 4 . Jones v. State, 571 S.W.2d 191, 193-94 (Tex.Crim.App.1978); see Gobell v. State, 528 S.W.2d 223, 224 (Tex.Crim.App.1975) (<HOLDING>); Ross v. State, 523 S.W.2d 402, 404
holding drivers license revocation was not moot because collateral consequences of revocation may be substantial including higher insurance rates and adverse employment consequences holding that there is no significant conceptual difference between the revocation of probation or parole and the revocation of supervised release holding hearsay admissible in revocation hearings holding revocation proper because even if his contentions were correct gobells revocation was based on two offenses and he challenged only one holding that revocation of the harriss parole like revocation of a defendants probation did not subject him to double jeopardy under the united states constitution because of similarities between the two