was mistaken. In certain cases, we have recognized that a departure based on a single act of aberrant behavior may be warranted. Ibid.; but see United States v. Bieri, 21 F.3d 811, 819 (8th Cir.) (first-time offender status does not justify a downward departure), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 208, 130 L.Ed.2d 138 (1994). We have defined a single act of aberrant behavior as an act that is “spontaneous and seemingly thoughtless.” United States v. Atkins, 25 F.3d 1401, 1405 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 371, 130 L.Ed.2d 322 (1994). The defendant’s ongoing involvement in the drug conspiracy and in the transfer of drug proceeds over a five-year period does not appear to fall into the category of aberrant behavior. See United States v. Premachandra, 32 F.3d 346, 349 (<HOLDING>). Thus, the Court’s denial of the defendant’s §
recognizing that a spontaneous and seemingly thoughtless act may be a basis for departure holding that notice must state the specific grounds for the departure holding that conduct from dismissed counts cannot be relied upon as a basis for departure recognizing that postoffense rehabilitative efforts while normally not grounds for departure may support departure in extraordinary circumstances and noting that the totality of the circumstances may justify a departure where a single circumstance is not alone sufficient holding district court correctly reversed a departure sentence where the trial court failed to provide written reasons for the departure