limitation of any sort on Ms. Chapman’s acknowledged authority was ever communicated to Ms. Santillan. Nor was there any indication that Plaintiff, who visited Ms. Barron at the nursing home a number of times, objected to Ms. Chapman having acted on Ms. Barron’s behalf. To the contrary, Ms. Barron did not limit Ms. Chapman’s authority to act on her behalf in completing the admission paperwork and nothing in the record indicates that either Ms. Barron or Plaintiff ever questioned Ms. Chapman or Ms. Santillan about what would be or had been agreed to as part of the admission process. Like the Carraway, Garrison, and Hogan courts, we view Ms. Barron’s words and actions as indicating No. 98,124, 2008 WL 4140635, at *1-2 (Kan.Ct.App. Sept. 5, 2008) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision) (<HOLDING>); Tex. City-view Care Ctr., L.P. v. Fryer, 227
holding that a healthcare power of attorney conferred by a resident to his wife explicitly limited the powers of the agent to those set out in writing in the document holding that a healthcare power of attorney includes the authority to bind the principal to an optional arbitration agreement because among other reasons an agent has authority  to do everything necessary or proper and usual in the ordinary course of business for effecting the purpose of his agency and that the decision to enter into such agreements in connection with placement in a healthcare facility  is a proper and usual exercise of an agents powers internal quotation marks and citation omitted holding that a probate courts jurisdiction is limited to that expressly conferred or which is necessarily implied from those expressly conferred holding that unless that power is restricted by the principal an agent under a california statutory healthcare power of attorney has the power to execute applicable admission forms including arbitration agreements holding a writ was appropriate when the authorization was not limited as to time and not limited to specific healthcare providers