analysis applies. Inquiry notice may be found as a matter of law only when uncontroverted evidence clearly demonstrates when the plaintiff should have discovered the fraudulent conduct. Staehr, 547 F.3d at 427 (citation omitted). “[T]he specificity of storm warnings bears directly on the determination of whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a plaintiff should be charged with a duty to inquire.” Id. at 428. That the misconduct ultimately alleged “must be probable, not merely possible,” means just that: information that does not, on its face, indicate the misconduct, and that is consistent with a perfectly likely innocent explanation, is unlikely to trigger a duty of inquiry. Newman v. Warnao Grp., Inc., 335 F.3d 187, 193 (2d Cir.2003). Cf Lentell, 396 F.3d at 170-71 (<HOLDING>); Newman, 335 F.3d at 194-95 (“It was
holding that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded a violation of the fcra based on extraneous information where it was alleged that the document included broad language regarding disclosure of the information the accuracy of the information the consequences of providing a false statement and the effect of a photocopy holding that under the pre1986 jurisdictional limitation a claim by the state which discovered the fraud investigated the fraud disclosed the fraud to the federal government and which was the original source of the information was jurisdictionally barred holding that fraud on the court was demonstrated clearly and convincingly where party had submitted false evidence and concealed authentic evidence holding that selfserving statements about the invalidity of the suit do not  negate the other pertinent information that otherwise put plaintiff on inquiry notice holding that information showing opportunities for fraud does not itself evidence fraud and that such information together with stray and indiscriminate evidence of false statements was insufficient to put plaintiffs on inquiry notice of the specific frauds alleged