action would begin. Although the judge conceded that on the merits of the action the landlord had a “powerful case,” he nevertheless entered a judgment for the tenant, ruling that the language of the service statute forbade the landlord’s premature mailing. II. At the outset, we look at the language of the statute; specifically, whether the meaning of “within 3 calendar days” as used in § 45-1406 is plain or ambiguous. The trial court ruled that there was no ambiguity in the wording of the statute, and that the mailing of a copy of the notice must occur within three days after posting of the notice on the premises. However, as evidenced by the court’s interpretation in Gantt, supra, and the cases from other jurisdictions cited by the landlord, it is equally p 91 P.2d 699, 701 (1948) (<HOLDING>). In resolving the question whether the statute
holding that a creditors pmsi in goods sold to debtors did not survive consolidation of the original installment contract with a later contract for the purchase of additional goods holding that a statement of conditional sale of goods can be filed with the state auditor before the delivery of goods where statute says the statement must be filed within ten days of delivery of goods holding that proper delivery occurred under harter act when the carrier relinquished custody and control of the goods to the national port authority of monrovia holding that a buyer who purchases goods subject to an express warranty that the goods are free from all liens takes free of any unperfected security interest holding that the single transaction rule protects a purchaser of stolen goods who by definition must know the goods to be stolen from being made party to the original theft via conspiracy