consider the amount of time between the illegal action and the acquisition of the evidence, the presence of intervening circumstances (like consent), and the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 548 (4th Cir.1998). Consistent with these principles, voluntary consent — when sufficiently an act of free will to dissipate the taint — can provide an independent basis for admitting evidence despite an earlier unlawful entry by police. See, e.g., Seidman, 156 F.3d at 549 n. 10 (“We see no reason why [consent] could not also sever the connection between an unlawful act and the acquisition of additional evidence. Indeed, voluntary consent is the quintessential act of free will.”); United States v. Dickson, 64 F.3d 409, 410-11 (8th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Valencia, 913 F.2d 378, 382
holding that acquiescence to a strip and body cavity search did not extend the scope of defendants consent to search his person because of the highly intrusive nature of the search holding that search of shoulder bag was not authorized by search warrant for apartment holding that observations made a during prior illegal search should not have been included in the affidavit for the search warrant holding that defendants voluntary consent to search his apartment dissipated taint of prior illegal search holding that the defendants consent to search was voluntary although he had been served with a subpoena