prohibition....” Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29-30, 101 S.Ct. 960, 964-65, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981); Jones v. Georgia State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 59 F.3d 1145, 1148 n. 6 (11th Cir.1995). 10 . The dispute appears to turn on whether a rule is legislative (based on a delegation of statutory authority) or merely interpretive, and whether a legislative rule is binding or merely guides the exercise of discretionary power. See, e.g., Jones, 59 F.3d at 1149 n. 8 (applying Clause to state parole rules and comparing cases); Kellogg v. Shoemaker, 46 F.3d 503, 509 (6th Cir.) (applying Clause to binding parole regulations), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 120, 133 L.Ed.2d 70 (1995) and - U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 274, 133 L.Ed.2d 195 (1995); Francis v. Fox, 838 F.2d 1147, 1149-1150 (11th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Faruq v. Herndon, 831 F.Supp. 1262, 1279-1280
holding that state work release regulation was not an ex post facto law holding that parole guidelines are subject to the ex post facto clause holding that the ex post facto clause  has no application to deportation holding that work release and security classification regulations were not ex post facto laws holding that the supreme courts ex post facto precedents do not clearly establish that amended section 29336 violates the ex post facto clause