which included most of the pertinent witnesses, and that the prejudice to his ability to present his case was not lessened by depositions of Cargill employees that Cargill voluntarily provided. Furthermore, he asserts that document review voluntarily permitted by Cargill was so restrictive — particularly in Cargill’s refusal to allow him the assistance of an expert to review the mountain of undifferentiated documents provided and other assertions of privilege — that his case was prejudiced. This appears to the court to be a challenge founded to some extent on 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3), which concerns the arbitrators’ misconduct or refusal to hear material evidence, and to some extent upon an assertion of “fundamental unfairness” of proceedings. See P & P Indus., Inc., 179 F.3d at 870 (<HOLDING>). Hoffman’s second challenge is based on the
holding that section 34810 is an adequate and independent state ground recognizing review for fundamental unfairness of the proceedings as an independent extrastatutory ground recognizing such a ground for judicial review of arbitration awards in this circuit holding right to be fundamental recognizing plain or fundamental error