a special relationship between the state and the claimant exists that creates a constitutional duty to protect. Addressing the due process claims raised in DeShaney, the Court argued that the Due Process Clause is merely a limitation on government action, and that neither its text nor history imposes upon the government an affirmative duty to act. See id. at 196-97, 109 S.Ct. 998. Relying on DeShaney, the Eighth Circuit held in Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729 (8th Cir.1993), that a student’s claim against a school district based on sexual assault by another student is not actionable under section 1983. The court rejected the claimant’s argument that the school district’s custodial relationship with him gave rise to a constitutional duty to protect him. See id. at 732 (<HOLDING>). Although Dorothy J. appears to foreclose his
holding that the law imposes on every person who enters upon an active course of conduct the positive duty to exercise ordinary care to protect others from harm and calls a violation of that duty negligence  that a complete binding contract between the parties is not a prerequisite to a duty to use due care in ones actions     and that architects may be held liable for a breach of the duty of care and breach of contract that results in foreseeable injury economic or otherwise holding that a constitutional duty of care arises only when the state by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individuals liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs  citing deshaney 489 us at 200 109 sct 998 holding that under either theory the duty is the same ordinary care holding that a general acute care hospital may not delegate its duty to provide physicians for emergency room care because the law imposes a duty on hospital to provide that health care holding that a state is required to provide medical care to incarcerated individuals