in violation of [the] automatic stay are void.”); In re Stringer, 847 F.2d 549, 551 (9th Cir.1988) (“Any proceedings in violation of the automatic stay in bankruptcy are void.”). Although Shamblin and Stringer suggest that violations of the automatic stay are void and not merely voidable, the void/voidable distinction was not dispositive in those cases, and the Ninth Circuit has not directly addressed the precise issue presented in this appeal. See Shamblin, 890 F.2d at 124-26 (debtor affirmatively challenged and litigated potential automatic stay violation); Stringer, 847 F.2d at 550 (same). Our decision today clarifies this area of the law by making clear that violations of the automatic stay are void, not voidable. See In re Williams, 124 B.R. 311, 316-18 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1991) (<HOLDING>). Before addressing the interplay between
holding that when the district court improperly purported to transfer to the circuit court an action over which the circuit court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction the circuit court was without jurisdiction to enter its judgment which was void and dismissing the appeal from that void judgment recognizing that this test applies in every federal circuit save the fourth and the ninth recognizing that the ninth circuit adheres to the rule that violations of the automatic stay are void and criticizing the bap decision in this case holding that the role of the bap is as an adjunct to the circuit court and explaining the importance of that relationship to the constitutionality of the bap recognizing this rule