The agency reasonably found that unfulfilled threats, which were the only individualized harm Yang alleged he had suffered, did not rise to the level of persecution. See Ci Pan v. United States Atty. General, 449 F.3d 408, 412-13 (2d Cir.2006). This is so, even when considered in conjunction with his father’s alleged beating, because, as the IJ noted, Yang did not allege that this incident resulted in any injuries to his father or caused Yang any continuing harm. See Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 308 (2d Cir.2007) (“the statutory scheme unambiguously dictates that applicants can become candidates for asylum relief only based on persecution that they themselves have suffered or must suffer”); see also Tao Jiang v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 137, 141-42 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the agency did not err in finding
holding that an asylum applicant cannot claim past persecution based solely on the harm that was inflicted on a family member on account of that family members political opinion or other protected characteristic recognizing that an applicant may be able to demonstrate persecution based on persecution of family members where the applicant shares  the characteristic that motivated persecutors to harm the family member was in the zone of risk when the family member was harmed and suffered some continuing hardship after the incident citing jorgetzoc v gonzales 435 f3d 146 150 2d cir2006 holding that absent a pattern of persecution linked to the applicant persecution of family members is insufficient to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution recognizing that the harm suffered by family members in combination with other factors  would presumably only be persecution where  the applicant not only shares or is perceived to share the characteristic that motivated persecutors to harm the family members but was also within the zone of risk when the family member was harmed and suffered some continuing hardship after the incident holding the wifes testimony that husbands release would cause psychological harm to other family members was insufficient to support commitment courts finding that husband would cause serious bodily harm to another person