any effect that their interpretation gives to subsection (c)(2). Finally, petitioner’s reliance on the legislative history of § 106(c) is.also misplaced. He points in particular to floor statements to the effect that “section 106(c) permits a trustee or debtor in possession to assert avoiding powers under title 11 against a governmental unit.” See 124 Cong. Rec. 32394 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); id., at 33993 (statement of Sen. DeConcini). The Government suggests that these statements should be construed as referring only to cases in which the debtor retains a possessory or ownership interest in the property that the trustee seeks to recover, Brief for United States 20, and cites as an example this Court’s decision in United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U. S. 198 (1983) (<HOLDING>). The weakness in petitioner’s argument is more
holding that because debtor retained control of property a transfer had not yet occurred holding secured creditors refusal to turn over property of debtors estate to debtor upon demand constituted an exercise of control over such property in violation of automatic stay holding that the internal revenue service could be required to turn over to bankrupt estate tangible property to which debtor retained ownership holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate holding that the debtor lacked standing to bring a claim against the internal revenue service for the improper assessment of a tax deficiency because the cause of action was the property of the estate and had not been abandoned to the debtor