the district court’s decision to dismiss the case de novo. III. Discussion At the heart of this controversy lies a single question: whether a plaintiff must allege a concrete injury such as an overcharge in order to have standing for a RESPA violation. The Carters contend that the district court erred in finding that they lack standing to sue under § 8 of RESPA because they “do not allege any overcharge or other concrete injury.” Carter I, 493 F.Supp.2d at 927. Specifically, the Carters argue that the district court’s interpretation of § 8 does not accord with the plain meaning of the statutory language and is inconsistent with Congress’ intent. Appellant Br. 7-8. Further, the Carters believe that the court should have followed the reasoning in Kahrer. See Kahrer, 418 F.Supp.2d at 753 (<HOLDING>). In contrast, Appellees rely on the Moore,
holding only payee has standing to bring suit for banks violation of midnight rule holding that an overcharge is not necessary for a plaintiff to bring suit on a respa violation holding a plaintiff alleging a constitutional claim of gender discrimination may bring suit under  1983 alone and is not required to plead concurrently a violation of title vii holding that shareholders had standing to bring derivative suit against the government but not direct suit due to lack of privity holding that a prior suit and a subsequent suit between the same parties did not involve the same claim because the evidence necessary to sustain the subsequent suit was insufficient to entitle the plaintiff to relief in the prior suit