offered not by the defendant ... but by a third party who shares access to the ... object being searched.” Glenn, 275 Va. at 130, 654 S.E.2d at 913. The person authorizing the search can be one with either actual or apparent authority. Id. at 132, 654 S.E.2d at 914. Actual authority exists where the third party has “(1) mutual use of the property by virtue of joint acces[] or (2) control for most purposes.” Id. (quoting United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 716 (10th Cir.2007)). However, the mere fact that a container owned by one person is located on residential premises belonging to or under the control of another does not mean that the person in charge of the premises has actual authority to consent to a search of the container. Compare id. at 129, 133, 654 S.E.2d at 912, 915 (<HOLDING>), with Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89
holding that where a container belonged exclusively to the defendant who lived on particular premises with the owners permission the owner of the premises did not have actual authority to consent to a search of the container holding that the defendant who owned the premises could discharge its duty by either warning the plaintiff or making the premises reasonably safe holding that while a lawfully issued warrant to search premises authorizes the officers executing it to search in a reasonable manner whatever spots within the described premises their professional experience indicates may be used as a cache for the items named in the warranty such a warrant does not by its own force permit a search of the persons residents or visitorswho chance to be at the premises at the time the warrant is executed or belongings of a nonresident visitor present on the premises recognizing that a search incident to a lawful arrest permits a law enforcement officer to conduct a warrantless search of a container located in the area of the arrestees immediate control holding that consent to search premises includes consent to search washing machine on those premises