need not even be asked — unless the defendant also establishes a nexus to the crime. The State claims that “the Fifth Circuit’s Penry I jurisprudence is not at issue” in this case. Brief for Respondent 35, n. 21; Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. To the contrary, that jurisprudence is directly at issue because the Fifth Circuit denied Tennard relief on the ground that he did not satisfy the requirements imposed by its “constitutional relevance” test. As we have explained, the Fifth Circuit’s screening test has no basis in our precedents and, indeed, is inconsistent with the standard we have adopted for relevance in the capital sentencing context. We therefore hold that the Fifth Circuit assessed Tennard’s Penry claim under an improper legal standard. Cf. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U. S., at 341 (<HOLDING>). C We turn to the analysis the Fifth Circuit
holding on certiorari review of the denial of a coa that the fifth circuit had applied an incorrect standard by improperly merging the requirements of two statutory sections holding that review by common law certiorari in district courts of appeal is limited to circuit court decisions constituting denial of procedural due process application of incorrect law or miscarriage of justice holding that the standard of review for the denial of a motion for reconsideration is governed by the law of the regional circuit holding that the judge did not abuse his discretion but applied an incorrect standard holding that the standard of review for the denial of rule 11 sanctions is governed by the law of the regional circuit