attack on the order of the district court by which Wal-Mart’s lawsuit against the City was dismissed because the order specifically references the settlement, and because the settlement contains the terms of the very development agreement that Petitioner seeks to overturn. We are unpersuaded for several reasons. {10} First, we do not regard Petitioner’s administrative appeal as a collateral attack. A collateral attack is “an attempt to avoid, defeat, or evade [a judgment], or deny its force and effect, in some incidental proceeding not provided by law for the express purpose of attacking” the judgment. Lucus v. Ruckman, 59 N.M. 504, 509, 287 P.2d 68, 72 (1955) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Kalosha v. Novick, 84 N P. 682, 685 (1918) (<HOLDING>); Dugan v. Montoya, 24 N.M. 102, 115, 173 P.
holding that dormant judgment is voidable and therefore not subject to collateral attack holding that a judgment establishing a partys exclusive light to use a trade name was not subject to collateral attack holding that prior ro decision that had not become final was not subject to cue collateral attack recognizing collateral attack on void order holding that a judgment as to the title in a prior litigation was not subject to collateral attack