congressional intent in enacting the 1982 amendments. If we were to read the statute as the defendants invite us to read it, and hold that a death caused by fire could be punished under the first degree murder guideline but that a death caused by a bomb was to be punished more leniently, we could, no doubt, reach a semantically plausible result. However, such a reading would attribute to Congress a result that would be anything but realistic or rational. We decline to attribute such a result to the legislative branch. Congress understandably equated the killing of a human being by burning and the killing of a human being by explosion. Thus, we conclude that the court correctly applied the first degree murder guideline. See also United States v. Martinez, 16 F.3d 202 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). 2. After determining the applicable
holding that the crime of attempted first degree felony murder does not exist holding that although premeditation is outside the heartland of seconddegree murder guideline upward departure from seconddegree murder guideline based on premeditation was improper because commission considered the defendants state of mind in assigning a higher base offense level to firstdegree murder than to seconddegree murder holding that murder guideline is appropriate when death results from arson but not reaching issue of whether first or second degree murder guideline is appropriate because the district court although initially applying the guidelines for first degree murder had departed downward pursuant to application note 1 to ussg  2a11 on the ground that the death was not caused intentionally or knowingly holding different rule applicable for conviction of second degree murder holding that indictment for murder in the first degree charges murder by whatever means it may have been committed regardless of the theory of murder presented to the grand jury