grounds”); People v. Ruiz, No. H026609, 2005 WL 1670426, at *3 (Cal.Ct. App. July 19, 2005) (unpublished) (“[C]ounsel expressly argued that the admission of the wife’s hearsay statements violated the confrontation clause in the sense that they were not trustworthy____ Under the circumstances, this was more than adequate to preserve defendant’s Crawford contention.”). Given the trial court’s statement and Defendant’s assertions in his motion, we hold that Defendant “fairly invoked a ruling [by] the trial court” that admission of the victim’s statements would violate his confrontation rights. Accordingly, we hold that Defendant’s general Confrontation Clause arguments were sufficient to preserve his Crawford claims. See also State v. Lopez, 2000-NMSC-003, ¶ 11, 128 N.M. 410, 993 P.2d 727 (<HOLDING>). {16} The State next argues that Defendant
holding that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule where the defendant was able to confront and crossexamine the witness who claimed that the statements at issue were made holding that objection on the grounds of inability to cross examine or confront the witness was adequate to raise confrontation clause claims even though the defendant did not mention the sixth amendment holding that error is preserved regarding a defendants right to confront a witness if the defendant identifies for the trial court the subject matter about which he or she desired to examine the witness and the subject had a tendency to affect the witness credibility holding that any confrontation right is found in the fourteenth amendments due process clause not the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment holding that testimonial hearsay statements of a witness who does not appear at trial are inadmissible under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment unless the witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the witness