curtail the risk of a double recovery and already would sap the plaintiffs incentive to pursue another claim. In other words, it makes just as much sense to apply the bar when the government wins the initial case. Better under these circumstances, we submit, to follow the language of § 2676 where it leads • us, which is to the conclusion that the identity of the victor in an. FTCA claim does not delimit the reach of a bar that applies to all “judgment[s].” Nor does the Supreme Court’s decision in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980), support a contrary interpretation. In Carlson, the Court refused to condition the availability of .a Bivens claim on the federal government’s waiver of sovereign immunity through the FTCA. See id. at 20, 100 S.Ct. 1468 (<HOLDING>). Nothing about our decision, however,
holding qualified immunity defense unavailable to the united states in ftca action recognizing cause of action against federal officials for violation of constitutional rights holding that ajlthough the  action is nominally one against individual defendants the acts complained of consist of actions taken by defendants in their official capacity as agents of the united states and that under such circumstances the action is in fact one against the united states recognizing federal constitutional claim against the united states holding that plaintiffs in the absence of a contrary expression from congress  shall have an action under ftca against the united states as well as a bivens action against the individual officials alleged to have infringed their constitutional rights