2132, 60 L.Ed.2d 713 (1979). 53 . Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59, 124 S.Ct. 1354. 54 . Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987). 55 . Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (“We must therefore turn to the historical background of the Clause to understand its meaning.’’); see also id. at 43-68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. 56 . See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989) ("If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest oij reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”). 57 .Cf. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 211, 107 S.Ct. 1702 (<HOLDING>). 58 . Id. at 208, 107 S.Ct. 1702. 59 . Id. at
holding that any confrontation right is found in the fourteenth amendments due process clause not the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment holding that the confession did not violate the confrontation clause because it was redacted to eliminate not only the defendants name but any reference to his or her existence holding that where a defendants name is replaced with a neutral pronoun as long as identification of the defendant is clear or inculpatory only by reference to evidence other than the redacted confession and a limiting instruction is given to the jury there is no bruton violation holding that hearsay argument for admission of evidence did not preserve confrontation clause challenge on appeal argument could have referred either to rules of evidence or confrontation clause but failed to identify confrontation clause as basis and thus did not put trial court on notice of issue holding that the clause was not violated by a redacted confession with a proper limiting instruction