refers to advertising and marketing of Med-tronic products off-label, she does not specifically state what Medtronic expressly warranted”); Schouest, 13 F.Supp.3d at 708 (“While conceptually an express warranty claim could' avoid express preemption, what is missing from Schouest’s complaint, in its current form, is a description of what specific warranties Medtronic made to Schouest or her physicians”); Ramirez, 961 F.Supp.2d at 1001 (dismissing breach of express warranty claim because “any affirmation that forms the basis of an express warranty must be between the seller and the buyer” and Ramirez “does not allege (in anything other than the most conclusory manner) that Medtronic targeted her with its guarantees of safety in off-label use of Infuse”); Houston I, 957 F.Supp.2d at 1181 (<HOLDING>). IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the
holding that a plaintiff is not required to state the statutory or constitutional basis for his claim only the facts underlying it recognizing that it is not dispositive that the facts alleged in the ihra claim may be duplicative of facts alleged for the negligent retention claim holding so where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had colluded to claim falsely that the plaintiffs physician had informed the claims adjuster that the plaintiff had been released to work and where the plaintiff was later discharged from employment and denied workers compensation benefits holding that although the express warranty claim was not federally preempted the plaintiff had not alleged sufficient facts for the claim to survive dismissal under rule 8 where the pjlaintiff alleged no facts demonstrating that defendants made any affirmations specifically to plaintiff or her physician so as to form the basis of the bargain holding that the plaintiff had not stated a claim for inducement to breach a contract where she had not alleged facts sufficient to show the existence of an enforceable underlying contract