that such a defense were available, it was not supported by the evidence in this case. At trial the government presented uncon-troverted evidence that Appellant entered the gun shop and shooting range on two occasions, that he physically picked up the Kimber .45 caliber firearm, that he repeatedly referred to the firearm as “my gun,” and that he requested, purchased, and carried away ammunition for the firearm. Furthermore, the very reason why Appellant’s possession of the ammunition did not extend for a longer period of time was his arrest upon exiting Ace’s and the officers’ seizure of the box of bullets. Indeed, Appellant presented no affirmative evidence whatsoever that he attempted to rid himself of the ammunition. These facts simply do not support an “innocent transi r.1997) (<HOLDING>). The District of Columbia Circuit is the only
holding that the defendants possession of the firearm was not so fleeting as to warrant an instruction on temporary innocent possession holding that trial court acted properly in refusing to give jury instruction on fleeting possession theory holding that the attachment statute which did not expressly reach property beyond territorial limits of state would not be construed to apply to property outside state holding that possession was not so fleeting as to extend the statute beyond its arguable limits holding that policy limits are not a defense to coverage and that policy limits define the amount of coverage