terms of “any contract” or “all contracts” must be considered damages. Instead, attorney’s fees provided by contract are an example of fees that might be recoverable as an element of damages. The language of the contract and the nature of the claim are the dispositive factors concerning whether the fees are an element of damages or collateral litigation costs. More over, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have rejected Caremark’s and Allgood ’s blanket prohibition against Rule 54(d)(2) motions to recover fees provided by contract. Those circuit courts considered the text of Rule 54(d)(2) and the Advisory Committee Notes and concluded that, in appropriate situations, contractual attorney’s fees may be pursued under Rule 54(d)(2). Rissman v. Rissman, 229 F.3d 586, 587-88 (7th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Capital Asset Research Corp. v. Finnegan, 216
holding that in absence of prayer for attorneys fees trial court should have excluded a purported agreement to pay attorneys fees because there is ample opportunity for the party seeking affirmative relief to plead his case  in the body of the complaint holding that a district court may award attorneys fees while the merits are on appeal holding that no reason existed to create a uniform national rule in admiralty where the case concerned attorneys fees and whether the contractual provision which provided for attorneys fees should allow a party to recover attorneys fees where it succeeded on all but one minor issue recognizing that the party seeking attorney fees bears the burden of proving entitlement to those fees holding that the party seeking contractual attorneys fees is entitled to a decision on the merits