to the multiple conspiracies instruction that he seeks, which allows a jury to find a defendant not guilty if the charged conspiracy did not exist or the defendant was not a member. 12 . We reject the defendants’ argument that Baker was overruled by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Though Apprendi did overrule portions of Baker permitting the district court to find drug quantities for sentencing purposes, it did not address the use of prior state convictions to enhance federal sentences. See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1059, overruled on other grounds by United States v. Buckland, 289 F.3d 558 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc). 13 . Two of our sister circuits have reached the same conclusion. See United States v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 224-25 (4th Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Fink, 499 F.3d 81,
holding that defendants prior felony convictions in georgia state court for drugrelated conspiracy and simple possession qualified as predicate prior felony drug offenses for  841b1a because under the plain language of the statute  felony drug offense includes any criminal conduct relating to narcotics including simple possession which a state has proscribed as a felony holding that prior felony drug convictions that fall within the conspiracy period may be used to enhance the defendants sentence if the conspiracy continued after his earlier convictions were final holding that due to statute defendant cannot collaterally attack prior convictions used to enhance sentence unless in violation of the right to counsel holding that once a defendant becomes associated with a conspiracy he is responsible for all of the acts of the conspiracy even those which occurred before or after his association with the conspiracy holding amended language gives district courts discretion to permit collateral attack on prior convictions used to enhance sentence