of his supervised release during an appeal of the revocation of supervised release). Brimm contends that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a special condition of supervised release which forbid him from using a computer with access to any on-line services, except for use with his employment and after the approval of the probation officer, because the condition constitutes an unwarranted occupational restriction. The district court did not abuse its discretion because the condition does not interfere with Brimm’s employment. See United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 621-22 (9th Cir.2003). We also reject Brimm’s contention that the district court impermissibly delegated its authority to the probation office when it imposed the challenged condition. Cf. id. at 619 (<HOLDING>) Appeal No. 08-10008, DISMISSED. Appeal No.
recognizing that probation officers are mandated to enforce a sentencing courts terms and conditions of supervised release holding that district courts have the authority to order terms of supervised release following reimprisonment holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release holding that defendant is not entitled to a jury trial to determine whether terms of supervised release have been violated recognizing district courts wide latitude in imposing supervised release conditions