In context; this evidence is hardly sufficient to support the Board’s finding that Horsehead refused to bargain in good faith. In addition to the nine meetings up to this point, the evidence shows continued serious bargaining, substantial personal involvement by the company’s president, development of a creative new offer to address the union’s desire for more money within the economic constraints facing the company, and an offer to extend the expired contract to facilitate further bargaining. Just as the Board has no authority to pass judgment on the content of bargaining proposals (at least if the proposals are not unusually harsh and unreasonable), the Board- is not empowered to flyspeck a party’s choice of bargaining tactics. See Insurance Agents’, 361 U.S. at 488, 80 S.Ct. 419 (<HOLDING>). To borrow a formulation employed in Pease,
recognizing duty to deal in good faith in workers compensation setting holding that counsels strategic decisions should be afforded wide latitude holding that the duty of good faith and fair dealing is a contractual duty holding that whether impasse exists rests upon factintensive inquiry into the bargaining history the good faith of the negotiating parties the length of negotiations the importance of the issues about which there is disagreement and the contemporaneous understanding of the parties as to the state of negotiations holding that subject to the duty to bargain in good faith parties should have wide latitude in their negotiations