to reach a verdict regardless of any lack of guidance as to what conduct constituted a basis for guilt.” Appellant’s Brief at 12. However, Oatts does not challenge the trial court’s instructions regarding the elements of molestation as a Class C felony. We cannot say that the trial court’s answer to the jury’s question emphasized any particular instruction or that Oatts was prejudiced by the trial court’s answer. To the extent that Oatts argues that the jury should have been instructed on a different act for each of the three counts, we note that the trial court entered judgment only on the first count out of a concern for double jeopardy. Consequently, we cannot say that Oatts’s substantial rights have been prejudiced. See Williams v. State, 830 N.E.2d 107, 112 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (<HOLDING>), trans. denied. For the foregoing reasons, we
holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error holding that the plain error and harmless error standards of review merge in the ease of jury instructions because the duty to properly instruct the jury lies with the trial court holding that where the meaning of the jurys verdict was not clear in light of the trial courts jury instructions the court of appeals erred in directing entry of judgment for respondent the case should have been remanded to the trial judge who was in the best position to pass upon the question of a new trial in light of the evidence his charge to the jury and the jurys verdict holding that the trial courts response that the instructions and verdict forms are your best guidance was essentially a denial of the jurys request for clarification and therefore harmless error and that the jury was not provided with any information under indcode  343616 holding trial courts error in overruling objection to prosecutors misstatement of law of intoxication that differed from definition in charge was harmless when there was evidence supporting the jurys verdict and it was presumed the jury followed the instructions in the charge