dictionary meaning that arguably lowers the State’s burden of proof on an essential element of a crime cannot be reasonably categorized as a juror examining “his or her own conscience from within.” Cf. Robinson, 438 F.3d at 363. Moreover, to rely on a dictionary definition of an essential element (specifically, the essential element in the alleged crime in this case), is clearly straying from the instructions given by the trial judge. Indeed, as the dissent in the North Carolina Court of Appeals decision noted, the “universal rule appears to be that a dictionary constitutes extraneous material that may not be consulted by a jury.” Bauberger, 176 N.C.App. at 477, 626 S.E.2d at 708 (Geer, J., dissenting) (collecting cases); see also Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499, 504-06 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). In sum, to be sure it is by now clearly
holding that chapman mandates harmless error analysis of griffin error holding that consulting a dictionary definition for the meaning of malice constituted the consideration of extrinsic information finding prejudice under the chapman harmless error standard and affirming the district courts grant of conditional habeas relief holding that the trial courts definition of normal use was harmless error holding that chapman harmless error review will be conducted when error is tested for harmlessness for the first time on habeas recognizing that the state court need not explicitly rely on chapman to warrant federal review under brecht but not deciding the issue because the error was also harmless under chapman