Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 758, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982) (setting forth the Article III requirements), it argues that prudential standing requirements bar IHS from asserting a claim under either statute. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) (generally, a party “must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties”). Specifically, the City argues that the discrimination statutes confer rights on a narrow class of persons, namely “qualified individuals] with a disability,” as set forth in both statutes’ definitions of discrimination by public entities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132; 29 U.S.C. § 794; see also Kessler, 876 F.Supp. at 653 (<HOLDING>). At first blush, this argument has appeal. The
holding that when an employer takes steps to accommodate an employees restrictions it is not thereby conceding that the employee is disabled under the ada or that it regards the employee as disabled holding that no ada violation was shown because the disabled were not denied benefits that were otherwise available holding that plaintiffs hernia condition was not sufficient to render her disabled under the ada holding that an entity that serves the disabled lacks standing under the ada holding that because the plaintiff was not disabled for the purposes of the ada this court need not to address the other elements of the prima facie case