petition is less than clear. Because Sherratt does not challenge any aspect of his conviction or sentence, but instead directs his habeas-type claims to prison disciplinary proceedings, it would appear Sherratt’s petition should properly be construed, if a habeas petition at all, as a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition. Cf. Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 865 (10th Cir.2000); Brown v. Smith, 828 F.2d 1493, 1494-95 (10th Cir.1987). This court need not trouble itself in this case with the distinction between § 2241 and § 2254 petitions, however, because each of the reasons identified by the district court for denying Sherratt’s petition is equally applicable whether the instant petition is considered a § 2254 or § 2241 petition. See Rael v. Williams, 223 F.3d 1153, 1154 (10th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); May v. Workman, 339 F.3d 1236, 1237 (10th
holding that conditionsofconfinement claims must be brought in 42 usc  1983 civil rights complaint rather than in  2241 petition holding that claims under 42 usc  1983 are not personal injury tort claims holding that civil rights claims at least those arising under 42 usc  1983 were subject to the applicable states personal injury statute of limitations holding that the state law of collateral estoppel applies in civil rights actions brought under 42 usc  1983 holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983