to detain before the legitimate purpose of the traffic stop has ended. Burks v. State, 362 Ark. 558, 210 S.W.3d 62 (2005) (citing Sims v. State, 356 Ark. 507, 157 S.W.3d 530 (2004)). Whether there is reasonable suspicion depends upon whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the police have “specific, particularized, and articulable reasons indicating that the person may be involved in criminal activity.” Id. (citing Laime v. State, 347 Ark. 142, 155, 60 S.W.3d 464, 473 (2001)). The State first contends that the canine sniff occurred before the legitimate reason for the traffic stop was completed. Therefore, the State claims, the canine sniff was neither a Fourth Amendment violation nor a violation of Rule 3.1. See Sims, supra; Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (<HOLDING>). It is not clear from the testimony in this
holding a canine sniff on a legitimately detained automobile is not a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment holding that a canine sniff is a search for purposes of the fourth amendment holding that a dog sniff of a vehicle during a traffic stop conducted absent reasonable suspicion of illegal drug activity did not violate the fourth amendment because it did not implicate any legitimate privacy interest holding that a canine sniff of luggage does not constitute a search holding canine sniff during traffic stop is not illegal search under fourth amendment