Later in its petition for rehearing, the Department again, without any case authority or statutory support, says: “The Administrative Review Law provides that final orders are those orders by an administrative agency, ‘rendered in a particular case, which affect the legal rights, duties or privileges of parties, and which terminate the proceedings before the administrative agency.’ 735 ILCS 5/3 — 101 (1996).” Contrary to the Department’s claim, section 3 — 101 does not say that final orders are administrative decisions. 735 ILCS 5/3 — 101 (West 1996). It merely defines an administrative decision as detailed above. We have found no language in either the Act or the Administrative Review Law that explicitly defines either “final order” or “final 006, 1008, 443 N.E.2d 268 (1982) (<HOLDING>). We again point out that where either a
holding that the appellate court had jurisdiction despite a remand to the bankruptcy court for more specific findings of fact and for further proceedings to apply the correct burden of proof holding that rule 32 petition should have been granted where defendant was convicted in circuit court on indictment entered while case was on appeal from transfer order because circuit court lacked jurisdiction where we remanded the case to the juvenile court for further proceedings holding the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal where the circuit court had the power to remand the agency decision for further proceedings holding that the appellate court had jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal on a restraining order and the district court retained jurisdiction to proceed with the trial holding in pertinent part that this court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal