may give such retroactive effect to these legal clarifications because “where ... a court is addressing transactions that occurred at a time when there was no clear agency guidance, it would be absurd to ignore the agency’s current authoritative pronouncement of what the statute means.” Id. Therefore, unless the new regulation “replaces a prior agency determination,” this Court may find that the amendment merely provides an explanation for what the law always has been. Id. In order to determine if the amendments to Regulation E marked a change in the rules or served as an interpretation of existing law, this Court will first look to the stated intent of the Board in proffering the amendments. See First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Standard Bank & Trust, 172 F.3d 472, 478 (7th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). If an agency plainly states that it is merely
holding that the drastic sanction of preclusion of expert witnesses was not warranted based on failure to furnish discovery by the discovery deadline when the deadline could have been shifted holding that a bankruptcy rule equivalent to rule 6a ala r civ p should be construed to give the benefit of extending the deadline for submission to the day after the holiday regardless of whether the deadline is expressed as the last day of a period of days or as a date certain holding regulatory amendment extending a banks deadline for returning checks could be given retroactive effect holding that where a legislative amendment changed the exemption provisions of a tax statute defining those eligible for certain exemptions and refunds the amendment could only be applied to tax years after its effective date even where the legislature expressly stated the amendment should have retroactive effect and looked to the law in place during the taxable events to determine if the taxpayer was eligible for a refund holding random traffic stops for license and registration checks are contrary to fourth amendment