whether a Terry stop was reasonable, we look at the totality of the circumstances, see Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8, 109 S.Ct. at 1585, and we review the district court’s determination de novo, see United States v. Maragh, 894 F.2d 415, 417-18 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 214, 112 L.Ed.2d 174 (1990). McKie acknowledges that the police undoubtedly had reason to stop Clipper. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990) (informant’s tip can provide reasonable suspicion). It is argued, however, that the police did not have reasonable suspicion that McKie himself was involved in criminal activity and that they stopped him only because he was with Clipper. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S.Ct. 338, 342, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979) (<HOLDING>). McKie urges us not to adopt an “automatic
recognizing that an officer must have a reasonable articulable suspicion that the person has been is or is about to be engaged in criminal activity to frisk an individual for weapons and must have probable cause to conduct a further seizure holding that the mere assertion of constitutional right to refuse consent to search does not supply probable cause to search holding that probable cause is something more than mere suspicion holding that a persons mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not by itself constitute probable cause to search or reasonable suspicion to frisk holding that a mere anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun  without any corroborating evidence  does not provide a reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing justifying the officers stop and frisk of that person