in part and dismiss in part the petition for review. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Vasquez-Rivera did not demonstrate the requisite ten years of continuous physical presence in the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(2) (departure in excess of 90 days or for any periods in the aggregate exceeding 180 days breaks continuous physical presence). Because Vasquez-Rivera’s failure to demonstrate continuous physical presence is dispositive, we need not reach his contentions regarding the IJ’s hardship determination. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l); Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 887, 889 (9th Cir.2003) (“[cjancellation of removal ... is based on statutory predicates that must first be met”); cf. Matus-Leva v. United States, 287 F.3d 758, 760 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). We lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s
holding that a court may deny a request for injunctive relief in a summary judgment proceeding if it is clear the plaintiff cannot meet the requirements for an injunction holding that equitable relief is only appropriate where legal remedies are inadequate holding that where requirements for relief are conjunctive failure to meet any one of them is fatal holding claims waived for failure to develop them holding that it is clearly settled that where there is a failure to establish an essential element of the defamation cause of action the case becomes one of law for the court