the door after Bushor had opened the store at 6 a.m. on the 30th of June. Meyer could have then walked to a phone booth, called, waited until 6:25 a.m., and then walked into the store to collect his personal belongings. This is entirely consistent with Meyer failing to mention the note, with Bushor and Pickett not seeing it, and with the note being dated June 30. It is true that a defendant need not present evidence to establish his innocence, but if he takes the stand, denies guilt and offers an improbable explanation for his actions, he does not thereby raise a reasonable doubt. (People v. Delp (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 463, 406 N.E.2d 903.) The jury could have reasonably disregarded the note and found defendant guilty. See People v. Stringer (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 564, 289 N.E.2d 631 (<HOLDING>). SENTENCE Meyer’s second allegation of error
holding that evidence was not so improbable as toraise a reasonable doubt and require reversal of defendants conviction holding that a potential conflict was present necessitating reversal of defendants conviction holding that the sixth amendment confrontation clause violation in that case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore did not require the conviction to be overturned holding that failure of trial court to instruct jury that state must prove beyond reasonable doubt killing was not committed in heat of passion required reversal of murder conviction even though there was general charge that state was required to prove each element of offenses beyond reasonable doubt holding potential prejudice caused by equating reasonable doubt with a substantial doubt mitigated by providing an alternate definition of reasonable doubt as a doubt that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act