admissions to the jury. Instead, it sought to enter the admissions into evidence. Despite the absence of a request to publish, the trial judge allowed Contractor to argue the admissions to the jury. Contractor capitalized on this ruling by arguing the substance of the admissions to the jury and presenting the answer to admission number four during both its opening and closing arguments. We find no error. B. Jury Charge Contractor argues the trial judge denied its alternative request that the jury be instructed that the responses to the requests to admit were conclusive facts in the case. We find no merit in this contention. Generally, a party is entitled to a jury charge regarding requests to admit which were published to the jury. See McIntosh, 315 S.C. at 192, 432 S.E.2d at 487 (<HOLDING>). Here, Contractor argued at trial that “either
holding that requests for admissions are subject to discovery cutoff dates holding that rule 36 requests for admissions are not included within the parameters of a general cutoff for discovery in a scheduling order holding trial courts general charge concerning requests for admissions was a correct statement of law holding that requests for admissions that seek to render undisputed the disputed material facts of a case are per se impermissible holding that any general deadline for completion of discovery facially applies to requests for admissions