have accomplished the deprivation, i.e., the state must be the actor since private conduct, no matter how unfair, is not subject to scrutiny under due process requirements. Natl. Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Tarkanian (1988), 488 U.S. 179, 190, 109 S.Ct. 454, 461, 102 L.Ed.2d 469, 483, citing Shelley v. Kraemer (1948), 334 U.S. 1, 13, 68 S.Ct. 836, 842, 92 L.Ed. 1161, 1180; Gotsis v. Lorain Community Hosp. (1974), 46 Ohio App.2d 8, 15, 75 O.O.2d 18, 21, 345 N.E.2d 641, 645. Plaintiff has failed to establish (1) that he had a property right in his continuing membership and possible future election to office as a delegate in the FCSU or (2) that his dismissal involved any state action whatsoever. See Cleveland Bd. of Edn. v. Loudermill (1985), 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (<HOLDING>). To the contrary, plaintiff brought his claim
holding that a tenured teacher who can be dismissed only for good cause has a legitimate claim of entitlement to his or her position and may not be deprived of it without due process of law holding that the federal due process clause protects a state employee who under state law has a legitimate claim of entitlement to state employment recognizing due process right to notice and informal hearing in school disciplinary process holding that plaintiffs tenured public employment is not a fundamental property interest entitled to substantive due process protection  thereby joining the great majority of courts of appeals that have addressed this issue and citing cases holding a tenured state employee has a property right to continued employment and must be accorded due process before serious disciplinary sanctions