for holding that [defendant Bubar’s counsel’s] conduct necessarily caused juror animus against Bubar's co-defendants." Id. The Court also found that by keeping themselves separate from Bubar’s counsel, the co-defendants' attorneys created an equally plausible inference of juror sympathy towards their clients. Id. The facts in this case are similar to those in Bubar. There is no evidence that there was any juror animosity directed towards Garrett because of the antics of Williams’s counsel. Secondly, early in the trial, Garrett and his counsel moved to a separate defense table in order to isolate themselves from Williams and his counsel. Finally, it is possible that Hughes’s actions caused the jury to sympathize with Garrett. See also United States v. Boyd, 610 F.2d 521 (8th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Although Garrett correctly points out
holding that the defendant may not state one ground at trial and another on appeal holding that cumulative evidence of prior sexual assaults allegedly committed by defendant were prejudicial entitling defendant to new trial holding prejudicial effect of prosecutors comment not rendered harmless by courts general instruction that the arguments of counsel are not evidence holding that allegedly inflammatory and prejudicial arguments by one defendants counsel did not have an impermissible effect on the trial of another defendant holding instruction to jury that counsels arguments were not evidence did not negatej the prejudicial effect of the prosecutors inflammatory comments