precedent and several state court decisions based on federal due process principles. In light of these facts, Davis has done enough to present his claim to the Supreme Judicial Court. He explicitly alleged the factual basis of his claim and identified the guarantee of due process as the legal framework in support of his claim. While it is true that the FAR petition approaches the issue from a slightly unique angle, i.e., requesting an eviden-tiary hearing to examine the allegation, some “reformulation” of the legal claim alleged in the state courts is permissible as long as the core issue has been presented. See Lanigan v. Maloney, 853 F.2d 40, 44 (1st Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1007, 109 S.Ct. 788, 102 L.Ed.2d 780 (1989); Watkins v. Callahan, 724 F.2d 1038, 1041 (1st Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, as the First Circuit explained
holding that the evidence obtained as part of an illegal stop should have been suppressed even where the defendants consented to the search holding substance of claim must have been presented to state court holding that an evidentiary hearing should have been held where the creditors rationale for a late filing hinged on the question of fraud and estoppel holding federal evidentiary hearing not statutorily barred when petitioner had sought to develop factual basis for claim in state court holding that where petitioner argued in the state court system that certain statements should be suppressed his federal claim that an evidentiary hearing should have been held to determine who initiated these conversations was adequately presented