statute’s “Omnibus Clause,” which functions as a catchall provision, and “is far more general in scope than the earlier clauses of the statute” covering grand jurors and court officers. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 598, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 2362, 132 L.Ed.2d 520 (1995). At trial, Sussman did not object to the Court’s obstruction of justice instructions, so we review the charge for plain error. See Lee, 612 F.3d at 191. “A ‘plain error’ is one that affects substantial xdghts,” and “[a]n error affects ‘substantial rights’ if it was px-ejudicial in that it affected the outcome of the District Court proceedings.” United States v. Ozcelik, 527 F.3d 88, 96 (3d Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also United States v. Dalfonso, 707 F.2d 757, 760 (3d Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). The defendant bears the burden of
holding that issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered absent exceptional circumstances of plain error or fundamental miscarriage of justice holding that error in classifying defendant as a violent offender caused a miscarriage of justice holding that courts may only review claims for fundamental miscarriage of justice holding that the error must be egregious or othexnvise constitute a manifest miscarriage of justice citation omitted holding that failure to consider an improper jury instruction would constitute a miscarriage of justice