United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corporation, 89 F.Supp. at 358. 6 . As recently noted by the Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC”), "cases have not defined a crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege with any precision.” Purcell v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District, 424 Mass. 109, 676 N.E.2d 436, 439 (1997). 7 . Case law outside Massachusetts as well as the United Shoe formulation provides some support for this principle. See Coleman v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 106 F.R.D. 201, 207 (D.D.C.1985) (citing and quoting United Shoe as formulating "exception in broader terms,” to wit, " 'for the purpose of committing a crime or tort’ ’’); see also Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 46, 52-53 (M.D.N.C.1987) (<HOLDING>); Horizon of Hope Ministry v. Clark County,
recognizing such an exception recognizing the rule and the exception but holding facts did not support claim to exception recognizing cases which extend the exception beyond instances of fraudulent or illegal conduct such as patent antitrust and securities matters and which may even extend exception to nonbusiness torts recognizing exception recognizing the public interest exception