certain factors, or “badges of fraud.” The IUFTA lists eleven such badges. See 740 ILCS 160/5(b); Eckert, 388 B.R. at 840. In sufficient number, these badges of fraud may raise an inference of actual fraud. Eckert, 388 B.R. at 840; Steel Co. v. Morgan Marshall Indus., Inc., 278 Ill.App.3d 241, 251, 214 Ill.Dec. 1029, 662 N.E.2d 595, 602 (1st Dist.1996). Because the statutory badges of fraud are simply considerations, however, and not an exhaustive list, no set number or combination automatically demonstrates fraudulent intent. See Brandon v. Anesthesia & Pain Mgt. Assocs., Ltd., 419 F.3d 594, 600 (7th Cir.2005) (decrying the badges’ “mesmerizing force” and noting they “are not additive”); Lindholm v. Holtz, 221 Ill.App.3d 330, 334, 163 Ill.Dec. 706, 581 N.E.2d 860, 863 (2nd Dist.1991) (<HOLDING>). To stave off summary judgment, the Trust must
holding that proof of some or even all of the badges may not show intent holding that direct proof of intent to defraud is unnecessary and that it may be inferred from the act of the parties and from all circumstances holding that fraud may be inferred from circumstantial evidence including such badges of fraud as understatement of income inadequate records and implausible or inconsistent explanations of behavior holding proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose required to show equal protection violation holding intent may be inferred from all facts and circumstances