given regulatory area. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 541, 121 S.Ct. 2404; Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95-101, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983). Three clearly established principles guide any express preemption analysis. First, it is well settled that “[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone” of any preemption analysis. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516, 112 S.Ct. 2608 (quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103, 84 S.Ct. 219, 11 L.Ed.2d 179 (1963)). Accordingly, when Congress has enacted an express preemption clause, the central duty of a reviewing court is “to identify the domain expressly pre-empted” by that clause, because “an express definition of the pre-emptive reach of a statu 04, 525, 101 S.Ct. 1895, 68 L.Ed.2d 402 (1981) (<HOLDING>); Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. at 526, 97 S.Ct.
holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law holding that federal common law of erisa preempts state law in the interpretation of erisa benefit plans holding that ejxcept in matters governed by the federal constitution or by acts of congress the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state holding that a state election law is preempted only to the extent that it conflicts with federal law holding a state workers compensation regime preempted by erisa to the extent state law applied to pension plans governed by federal law