inviting RMST to submit a formal motion for approval of any new deal. Also challenging jurisdiction under § 1292(a)(3), the amicus argues that Congress limited interlocutory review in admiralty cases to interlocutory decrees that determine rights and liabilities, and it did not grant a right to appeal every interim order. See Pickle v. Char Lee Seafood, Inc., 174 F.3d 444, 448 n. 1 (4th Cir.1999); Evergreen Int’l (USA) Corp. v. Standard Warehouse, 33 F.3d 420, 425 (4th Cir.1994). We agree with the amicus that if RMST is appealing orders under § 1292(a)(1) that simply clarify or interpret earlier orders that it failed to appeal, its appeal rights would be forfeited by its failure to appeal the earlier orders. See, e.g., Major v. Orthopedic Equip. Co., 561 F.2d 1112, 1115 (4th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). This principle is based on the notion that
holding that because the order lacked an independent basis it was an abuse of discretion to issue the mutual restraining order holding the order on appeal fails to address likelihood of success on the merits or considerations of public interest the order also fails to require a bond accordingly we remand with instructions to the trial court to either enter an order that satisfies all requirements for entry of a temporary injunction or if appropriate an order denying the injunction holding that court lacked jurisdiction on appeal from injunction because the order was simply an interpretation of an earlier order holding that under the doctrine of direct estoppel a law firms failure to appeal the bankruptcy courts earlier order barred it from challenging the courts holding on its appeal from a subsequent order holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal because it was filed before the final order awarding attorneys fees