‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard.” Id. at 1285. Here, the 1993 Plan contains no express delegation of authority to any body, save the Trustees. Neither Jack Snow, the MRC, nor VPA (the contract administrator) expressly were granted fiduciary authority or the authority to use discretion in determining claims. (In contrast, the 2002 Plan grants the Contract Administrator discretion to determine whether total disability exists and to construe and interpret the plan. Hodge Deck, Ex. A at 11 & 32.) While the Trustees did have the power to delegate their discretionary authority, nothing presented to the Court indicates that such authority was properly delegated. The deposition testimony offered by Mr. Hodge is insufficient to establish otherwise. See Rodriguez-Abreu, 986 F.2d at 584 (<HOLDING>); citing Sanford v. Harvard Indus., 262 F.3d
holding that professionals who advised the plan were not fiduciaries because they had no decision making authority over the plan or plan assets also noting that the power to act for the plan is essential to status as a fiduciary holding abuse of discretion review is appropriate when erisa plan grants discretion to the plan administrator holding that plan administrator of an erisa health plan did not have to anticipate the confusion of a plan participant holding that because no plan document granted discretion to the plan administrator and because the fiduciaries had not expressly delegated their discretionary authority to the plan administrator the district court properly employed the de novo standard of review holding that one who is named in documents as plan administrator signs documents as plan administrator and assumes discretionary authority in the administration of the pension plan is a fiduciary