is adverse to its interests. Lamar cites no authority establishing that either “fact” was material to determining whether City exceeded the scope of its powers by surrendering and contracting away zoning authority that would otherwise have applied to Lamar’s efforts to rebuild or relocate eight of the forty-two signs identified in the Agreement. For reasons we explain, neither factual contention prevented the entry of summary judgment in favor of City as a matter of law. We have already explained that the Agreement hindered City’s zoning authority, and that zoning authority is an exercise of police powers. City thus established all that was necessary to demonstrate that the Agreement exceeded the scope of City’s powers in violation of section 432.070. Stewart, 165 S.W.2d at 629 (<HOLDING>). It is true that “[t]he due process clauses of
recognizing governmental interest in rehabilitation holding that a local governmental body exceeds its jurisdiction under crcp 106a4 when it exercises discretion it does not have holding that if a contract surrenders or contracts away governmental functions then it exceeds the scope of a governmental entitys powers and is void holding governmental immunity is no defense to contractual liability holding section 1010215 does not waive governmental immunity merely because a governmental action falls within the listed governmental functions thus further inquiry under the act is necessary