employment-related connection to a vessel in navigation,” Ckandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 357, 115 5. Ct. 2172, 2184, 132 L.Ed.2d 314 (1995) (quotations omitted). The Stewart Court held that, although it was idle, with one scow at sea and the other without a working engine, the Super Scoop was a vessel in navigation because it “had not been taken out of service, permanently anch “repairs,” the “necessaries” for which maritime liens are authorized under the Federal Maritime Lien Act specifically include towage. See 46 U.S.C. § 31301(4). Although she could not self-propel, the BETTY LYN II could be towed upon 24 hours notice. Nor does the fact that the BETTY LYN II was drydocked for the repairs divest her of vessel status. See N. Pac. S.S. Co., 249 U.S. at 128, 39 S.Ct. at 224 (<HOLDING>); Jones v. One Fifty Foot Gulfstar Motor
holding that rule 4 displaced service provision in the admiralty act holding that courts apply substantive admiralty law to claims that sound in admiralty regardless of whether the complaint invokes diversity or admiralty jurisdiction holding that admiralty jurisdiction extends to maritime insurance contracts holding that admiralty jurisdiction extended to an action for ship repairs performed in drydock because there is no difference in character as to repairs made upon the hull of a vessel dependent upon whether they are made while she is afloat while in dry dock or while hauled up by ways upon land the nature of the service is identical in the several cases and the admiralty jurisdiction extends to all holding that a complaint that asserts both admiralty jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction is not an adequate 9h designation to trigger admiralty procedures