as to justify the court's dismissal without jurisdiction.’ ”) (quoting Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 542-43, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974)). In 1974, when the consent decree was entered, and in 2005, when the present enforcement action was filed, the Bell v. Hood requirements were satisfied. As will be discussed below, in 1974, it was far from clear that a Constitutional right did not protect the information at issue in this case. Although the Constitutional law appears to have shifted before the institution of the present action, the very existence of the federal consent decree which purports to protect the information at issue in this case is enough to show that the plaintiff's claim is not "wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 90, 118 S.Ct. 1003 (<HOLDING>). 4 . Although the plaintiff, in his most
holding that it was fanciful to think that the court had revised its jurisprudence that the failure of a cause of action does not automatically produce a failure of jurisdiction recognizing the cause of action holding that it is clearly settled that where there is a failure to establish an essential element of the defamation cause of action the case becomes one of law for the court recognizing cause of action holding that failure to record an assignment does not give rise to a cause of action