Finally, he argues that the district court should have at least instructed the jury that his attorney was not at fault for arguing that it could not find a conspiracy that began substantially later than the starting date alleged in the indictment. Although we have not previously addressed in any comprehensive way the issue of whether the trier of fact must find that the starting date of a conspiracy coincide with the starting date alleged in the indictment, we conclude that it need not do so. Rather, the trier of fact may find that the starting date of a conspiracy begins anytime in the time window alleged, so long as the time frame alleged places the defendant sufficiently on notice of the acts with which he is charged. Cf. Harms v. United States, 272 F.2d 478, 482 (4th Cir.1959) (<HOLDING>); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82, 55
holding that the proper focus when determining the starting point of the limitations period  is upon the time of the discriminatory acts not upon the time at which the consequences of the acts became most painful  holding that  1962d does not violate the principle prohibiting conviction of multiple conspiracies under an indictment charging a single conspiracy holding that the date of the offense was material to the defense where defendant could not have anticipated from the date specified in the indictment that the state would present evidence that the crime occurred nearly two months later holding that plea to multidefendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment holding that an instruction that limited the jurys ability to find a conspiracy to finding conspiracies starting 14 months after the starting date alleged in the indictment was proper