would not have understood it as assertion of right to remain silent after responding to questions for 30 minutes), rav’d on other grounds, 90 N.Y.2d 632, 665 N.Y.S.2d 30, 687 N.E.2d 1313 (1997); Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 257 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (stating that “officer need not stop his questioning unless the suspect’s invocation of rights is unambiguous, and the officer is not required to clarify ambiguous remarks”); Midkiff v. Virginia, 250 Va. 262, 462 S.E.2d 112, 115-16 (1995) (concluding that suspect’s statements during interrogation, expressing “reservations about discussing the case,” did not amount to an unequivocal invocation of right to remain silent; therefore, police were not required to cease interrogation); Vermont v. Bacon, 163 Vt. 279, 658 A.2d 54, 65 (1995) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 837, 116 S.Ct. 117,
holding that during police interrogation right to remain silent must be invoked unambiguously holding that police may continue questioning a suspect until he unambiguously invokes his right to remain silent holding that a defendant who is subject to custodial interrogation must be advised in clear and unequivocal language of his constitutional right to remain silent and his right to a lawyer recognizing that davis was concerned only with the right to counsel and not the right to remain silent holding that the rationale of davis applies equally to a defendant who has waived his rights and later ambiguously invokes the right to remain silent during  interrogation