by ordinance that applications satisfy the council’s subjective finding of public health, safety and general welfare. These are not necessitated by a preamble of intent; they must be specified as requirements to be met and found as facts by the council or board. The City found that petitioner had satisfied all of the development standards for approval of the application. “[W]here a zoning ordinance specifies standards to apply in determining whether to grant a special use permit and the applicant fully complies with the specified standards, a denial of the permit is arbitrary as a matter of law.” Woodhouse, 299 N.C. at 219, 261 S.E.2d at 887 (quoting Hay v. Township of Grow, 296 Minn. 1, 5, 206 N.W.2d 19, 22 (1973). See also, In re Ellis, 277 N.C. 419, 425, 178 S.E.2d 77, 81 (1970) (<HOLDING>). A municipality may not deny an application
holding that where appellant did not submit permit application until four years after the ordinance in question was amended appellant had no vested rights holding that where applicant had satisfied all ordinance requirements commissioners could not deny permit simply in their discretion holding that it would be inequitable to allow a town to deny a permit based on a new ordinance after the property owner was denied a permit three times and brought suit to determine the validity of the prior ordinance holding that a plaintiff had standing to attack an entire ordinance including portions of the ordinance not applied to the plaintiff holding certain plaintiffs did not have standing to attack ordinance governing sexually oriented businesses where the record did not reveal that any one of these plaintiffs was subject to the ordinance even though the city attorney conceded at oral argument before the supreme court that one or two of them had had their licenses denied under the ordinance