estate were “at best speculative and hypothetical”). Neither of the cases Cytomedix cites, In re Ames Department Stores Inc., 190 B.R. 157, 161 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (“related to” jurisdiction proper where recovery in the case was accounted for in the structure of the reorganization plan); Larami Limted v. Yes! Entertainment Corp., 244 B.R. 56, 60 (D.N.J.2000) (“related to” jurisdiction over patent infringement suit against debtor appropriate during ongoing Chapter 11 proceedings) provides support for its argument. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit has rejected the Pacor analysis applied in these cases, settling on a more limited definition of “related to” jurisdiction. See FedPak, 80 F.3d at 213 (rejecting “sweeping test” adopted in Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3rd Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>)). Cytomedix points out that in confirming its
holding that a proceeding that by its nature could arise only in the context of a bankruptcy case is a core matter subject to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court holding that related to jurisdiction exists whenever a proceeding could conceiv ably have any effect on the bankruptcy estate holding that bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction to control disposition of chapter 13 debtors property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate unless the property is related to the bankruptcy proceedings of the code holding that if dispute involves funds that are not property of estate it cannot be maintained in the bankruptcy court unless it is related to the bankruptcy proceeding which means it is likely to affect the debtors estate holding that congress jurisdictional grant to bankruptcy courts to hear proceedings related to a bankruptcy case suggests a grant of some breadth and includes inter alia suits between third parties which have an effect on the bankruptcy estate