highly fact-intensive nature of determining monopoly power. A defendant “deserves summary judgment if it can establish that, as a matter of indisputable fact, it lacks sufficient [market] power.” Town Sound v. Chrysler, 959 F.2d 468, 479 (3d Cir.1992). The Third Circuit recognizes that “the question of market power is certainly dependant on factual findings, and some older cases did state that summary judgments against plaintiffs are particularly disfavored in complex antitrust cases,” however, “many courts, including the Supreme Court, have more recently held defendants entitled to summary judgment in antitrust cases ... the standard of F.R.C.P. 56 remains the same.” Id. at 481; see also Geneva Pharmaceuticals Technology Corp. v. Barr Laboratories Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 495 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>) citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
holding that summary judgment may be reversed when it is based on an error of law holding that proof of relevant market is essential under  2 holding summary judgment is an essential tool in the area of antitrust law because it helps avoid wasteful and lengthy litigation that may have a chilling effect on procompetitive market forces holding that a prior settlement of an antitrust conspiracy case and the resulting judgment dismissing the suit with prejudice could not have res judicata effect in a later suit against additional parties in which the plaintiffs alleged claims based on new types of antitrust violations that were not contemplated by the earlier settlement when it would have the effect of conferring on defendants partial immunity from civil liability for distinct future antitrust violations holding speculation insufficient to avoid summary judgment