“no additional proof of discrimination is required.” Thus, [plaintiff] did not fail to offer sufficient evidence of discrimination by not presenting more evidence after [defendant] endeavored to provide a nondiscriminatory reason for his actions. Cabrera v. Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372, 385 (2d Cir.) (quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511, 113 S.Ct. at 2749) (emphasis and alterations to Hicks quotation in original), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 205, 130 L.Ed.2d 135 (1994). Moreover, the trier of fact can decide not only that the reasons proffered by defendant are pretextual but can also “generally infer discrimination when it finds that the employer’s explanation is unworthy of credence.” Binder v. Long Island Lighting Co., 57 F.3d 193, 200 (2d Cir.1995). See also, Ethan Allen, 44 F.3d at 120 (<HOLDING>); Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d
holding that if factfinder rejects employers proffered nondiseriminatory reasons as unbelievable it may infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination without additional proof of discrimination holding that a finding of pretextuality allows a juror to reject a defendants proffered reasons for a challenged employment action and thus permits the ultimate inference of discrimination holding that plaintiff need only point to sufficient evidence to support an inference that the employer did not act for its proffered nondiscriminatory reasons holding that the conflicting explanations given by defendants agents for the plaintiffs termination were also sufficient to raise a reasonable inference that defendants proffered reasons for the termination were pretextual the inconsistent testimony  regarding the motivating reasons for plaintiffs termination cast doubts on the asserted nondiscriminatory legitimate reasons and may alone  be sufficient to preclude summary judgment on plaintiffs claim holding that discriminatory remarks made nearly a year before the challenged employment decision could not support an inference of discrimination