this regard, VIPA contends that Joseph is a month-to-month tenant who continues to possess the premises by force after his tenancy was properly terminated. Under these circumstances, VIPA argues, the trial court had jurisdiction over its FED complaint, and the court should have awarded possession of the premises to VIPA. This argument implies, however, that the trial court should have taken the allegations in the complaint as true and ignored the defenses asserted by Joseph. One of these defenses is that VIPA is estopped to deny the existence of a lease between the parties that has not yet expired. Although we render no opinion here as to the merits of this defense, Joseph was nevertheless permitted to raise the defense in response to VIPA’s FED complaint. See Dunagan, 904 F.2d at 191 (<HOLDING>); Inter Car, 21 V.I. at 158-59 (ruling that
holding defenses concerning the contract as a whole must be referred to ah arbitrator while defenses to the arbitration provision itself are considered by the court holding that the defendant could not raise affirmative defenses initially in its dispositive motion but remanding the case to the trial court to determine if leave to amend answer to incorporate affirmative defenses was appropriate so that the defendant could then properly raise those defenses in its dispositive motion holding that since the officer was entitled to order defendant out of the car he was equally entitled to open the door to accomplish that object holding that the trial court properly added a party defendant to conform to the evidence presented at the trial recognizing that trial court properly left the door open for defendant to prove its defenses to the fed complaint