arises solely from their efforts to modify Struble’s mortgage loan and prevent foreclosure. “Generally, a person cannot qualify as a consumer if the underlying transaction is a pure loan because money is considered neither a good nor a service.” Id. at 160. Courts have held that “subsequent actions related to mortgage accounts — for example, extensions of further credit or modifications of the original loan — do not satisfy the ‘good or services’ element of the DTPA.” Broyles v. Chase Home Fin., 2011 WL 1428904, at *4 (N.D.Tex. Apr. 13, 2011). Because the plaintiffs sought to modify their mortgage loan and not to acquire, by purchase or lease, a “good” or “service,” they do not have a viable DTPA claim. See, e.g., Montalvo v. Bank of Am. Corp., 864 F.Supp.2d 567, 575-81 (W.D.Tex.2012) (<HOLDING>); Cavil v. Trendmaker Homes, Inc., 2010 WL
holding that a person involved in a motor vehicle accident with a customer of enterprise was not a consumer or competitor of enterprise or other business person affected by enterprises conduct holding commercial franchises are not covered by new jersey consumer fraud act because they are businesses and not consumer goods holding that a person seeking a mortgageloan modification was not a consumer under the dtpa holding that a consumer reporting agency which gives a consumer report to the attorney representing the agency is not subject to the fcra because the attorney is not a traditional third party holding that a writ of execution under new jersey law is not an action against the consumer