to the misdemeanor penalties provided in § 924(a)(3). The district court agreed with the defendant, reasoning that a licensed dealer must be punished under § 924(a)(3) because: (i) the plain language of § 924(a)(3) makes that provision applicable to licensed dealers; (ii) the legislative history is ambiguous as to whether § 924(a)(3) applies to violations of § 922(b)(5); and (iii) statutory interpretation principles require the court to resolve ambiguous statutes in favor of lenity. Id. at 1017-19. The defendant’s reliance on Busic and Percival is misplaced. Those cases address the question of penalties and not the question of “whether a prosecutor may elect to charge under the less specific of two applicable statutes.” United States v. Jackson, 805 F.2d 457, 461 n. 4 (2d Cir. 1986) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the cases cited by the defendant
holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001 holding that a sentencing court is required by 18 usc  3583g to revoke the defendants term of supervised release  unless defendant could come under the exception in 18 usc  3583d holding that the defendant could be prosecuted for making false claims against the government under either the false claims statute 18 usc  287 or the mail and wire fraud statutes 18 usc  1341 1343 holding that the defendant could be prosecuted for corrupt persuasion of a jury witness under either 18 usc  1503 which prohibits obstruction of justice or 18 usc  1512 which prohibits tampering with a witness holding that the government may charge a defendant who forges an endorsement on a us treasury check under either 18 usc  641 the general conversion statute or 18 usc  510 which specifically prohibits forging endorsements on treasury checks