of proof applied by the fact finders in his case with the standard a federal court employs in determining whether findings by prison authorities satisfy due process. See Plunk v. Givens, 234 F.3d 1128, 1129-30 (10th Cir.2000) (rejecting similar claim that district court erred in applying “some evidence” standard in determining whether disciplinary conviction complied with dictates of due process). The Court stated in Hill that “[t]he fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Due Process Clause does not require courts to set aside decisions of prison administrators that have some basis in fact.” 472 U.S. at 456, 105 S.Ct. 2768. Consistent with Hill, we conclude that the district court did not err in applying the “some evidence” standard in this case. Cf. Gwinn, 354 F.3d at 1214, 1218-19 (<HOLDING>). Because Mr. Firth does not advance any
holding that error in classifying defendant as a violent offender caused a miscarriage of justice holding that some of the sex offender conditions imposed on defendant as part of his sentence for possessing a firearm were unreasonable where defendants sole sex offense was over a decade old at the time of sentencing holding that classifying the defendant as a sexually oriented offender after he was convicted of kidnapping minors without a sexual purpose violated the defendants right to substantive due process where the statutory definition of sexual offender included one who had committed certain criminal offenses against a minor regardless of sexual intent holding some evidence standard applicable to cdoc decision classifying inmate who had not been convicted of a sexual offense as a sex offender holding that an individual who is required to register as a sex offender is not in custody