until all appellate rights are exhausted. These rules apply to a district clerk’s appeal of injunctions. Id. at 625 (citations omitted). As in Dallas Area Rapid Transit, however, the court in Long went on to emphasize that the appel-lee could have invoked the trial court’s discretion to deny suspension of the judgment but had not done so: [The appellee] had possible mechanisms for seeking enforcement of the injunction before February 13, 1995 [the date the mandate had issued]. [The appellee] could have sought denial of suspension of the injunction. See former Tex. R.App. P. 47(f) (allowing trial court to decline to permit other judgments to be suspended) (currently Tex.R.App. P. 24.2(a)(3)); City of Robstown v. Westergren, 774 S.W.2d 739, 740-41 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 1989, no writ) (<HOLDING>). But cf. Public Util. Comm’n v. Coalition of
holding that district court has discretionary authority under former rule 47f to deny a city suspension of an injunction pending appeal holding that district court has discretion under appropriate circumstances to rule on summary judgment motion before addressing pending class certification motion holding that when a state commission has the right under section 6001 of the texas civil practice and remedies code to supersede an order the trial court cannot deny suspension of a temporary injunction under former rule 43a currently texrapp p 291b pending an interlocutory appeal holding that a district court of appeal opinion which cites as controlling authority a decision that is either pending review in or has been reversed by the court constitutes prima facie express conflict and allows the court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction recognizing that the district court has discretion to admit or deny motive evidence