government to treat similarly situated people alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). Dissimilar treatment of dissimilarly situated persons does not violate equal protection. See Barket, Levy & Fine, Inc. v. St. Louis Thermal Energy Corp., 21 F.3d 237, 242 (8th Cir.1994). Thus, the first step in an equal protection case is determining whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that she was treated differently than others who were similarly situated to her. See, e.g., Samaad v. City of Dallas, 940 F.2d 925, 940-41 (5th Cir.1991). Absent a threshold showing that she is similarly situated to those who allegedly receive favorable treatment, the plaintiff does not have a viable equal protection claim. See id. at 941 (<HOLDING>). Thus, before we may reach the merits of their
holding that since congress created separate classifications for lawful permanent residents lprs and nonlawful permanent residents nlprs and treated each class differently throughout the immigration statutes lprs and nonlprs are not similarly situated and different treatment of them does not violate the equal protection component of the due process clause holding that black residents failed to state an equal protection claim where they did not allege the existence of a similarly situated group of white residents who were treated differently holding that dawful permanent residents and nonlawful permanent residents are not similarly situated holding that a white office was not similarly situated to a black officer who was charged with more offenses than the white officer holding that to assert a viable equal protection claim plaintiffs must first make a threshold showing that they were differently treated from others who were similarly situated to them