however, has effectively eroded the reasoning of these cases. See e.g., Coastal Group, Inc. v. Dryvit Systems, Inc., 274 N.J.Super. 171,179-180, 643 A.2d 649 (App.Div.l994)(finding the Act applicable to commercial entities and stating that “both Unifoil and Werner & Pfleiderer were based on an overly expansive reading of .Spring Motors[ Distributors Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 489 A.2d 660 (1983) ], which is inconsistent with [state statutory provisions] as well as with state decisional law”); see also Naporano Iron & Metal Co. v. American Crane Corp., 79 F.Supp.2d 494 (D.N.J.1999)(Greenaway, J.)(corporate purchaser of crane stated claim against manufacturer under the Consumer Fraud Act); Florian Greenhouse, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Corp., 11 F.Supp.2d 521 (D.N.J.1998)(Walls, J.)(<HOLDING>); Alloway v. General Marine Indus., 149 N.J.
holding that a garnishment proceeding is an action against the consumer recognizing cause of action holding that nothing in the legislative history of the pennsylvania consumer fraud act suggests that the legislature ever intended statutory language directed against consumer fraud to do away with the traditional elements of reliance and causation and accordingly in order to maintain a class action suit under the pennsylvania consumer fraud act a plaintiff must allege reliance recognizing the cause of action recognizing the availability of a cause of action by manufacturer against supplier under consumer fraud act