speech was protected to begin with and must be kept separate from that preliminary question. c. Causation The district court concluded that Nagle’s speech could not have caused the adverse employment action because Fried had already decided not to recommend her for tenure before he learned of her Virginia speech: “[a]lthough Superintendent Fried cannot recall exactly when he became aware of [Nagle’s protected speech in Virginia], he believes he was, at the time, already leaning toward not recommending [Nagle] for tenure.” Order at 20. This testimony, however, by itself, indicates that a grant of summary judgment against Nagle is reversible error. First, it is established that an adverse employment action occurs on the date that a decision was formally reached. Cioffi, 444 F.3d at 163 (<HOLDING>). Events leading up to a formal decision will,
holding that suspension with pay was not adverse employment action holding that denial of a bonus was not an adverse employment action holding that an adverse employment action dated not from a closed meeting at which an informal consensus regarding the matter was reached but rather from an official meeting with a formal vote and a publicly declared outcome holding that termination is an adverse employment action holding that while the contract did not establish a formal fiduciary relationship the pleadings were sufficient to raise an issue as to the existence of an informal one