restraint but because few facial challenges satisfy the high burden normally imposed. As a general rule, a law is vague on its face “only if [it] is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.” See Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495 & n. 7, 102 S.Ct. 1186. What the majority ignores is the exception to this general rule: when “a law reaches ‘a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct,’ ” facial vagueness challenges are “permit[ted]” and a plaintiff may attack the law “ ‘as being vague as applied to conduct other than his own.’ ” See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 & n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 1855 (citations omitted) (First Amendment rights and freedom of movement affected by regulation of loitering and wandering); see also Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494-95, 102 S.Ct. 1186 (<HOLDING>); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521, 92
recognizing that general rule applies only to statutes that implicate  no constitutionally protected conduct emphasis added holding that a school principals suspension with pay did not implicate a constitutionally protected property interest holding that false statements are constitutionally protected holding a law is void for vagueness when it offers no standard of conduct that was possible to know emphasis added recognizing general rule