to the Central Bank opinion because the law, prior to the PSLRA, “was not uniform on the issue of what constituted the requisite scienter for aiding and abetting liability,” and Congress was well-aware of the divergence in the law when it passed Section 20(e). KPMG LLP, supra, 412 F.Supp.2d at 383. Thus, upon review of the plain language and legislative history of Section 20(e), as well as the compelling rationales set forth in Johnson, Fehn, and KPMG, the Court concludes that the SEC must show that the aider-abettor had actual knowledge of the underlying securities violation to establish an aiding and abetting claim under Section 20(e). Recklessness, even “extreme recklessness” in the presence of a fiduciary relationship, is insufficient. Accord Kushner, supra, 417 F.Supp.2d at 334 (<HOLDING>). In addition to actual knowledge, the SEC must
holding notice no longer required even for traditional departures holding that twostep sequence is no longer an inflexible requirement holding that recklessness even for fiduciaries is no longer sufficient holding that tax courts miller opinion will no longer be followed holding that a court lacks jurisdiction when the issues in a case are no longer live