of success on the merits. Anderson challenges the district court’s conclusion about reasonable accommodation. “A reasonable accommodation of an employee’s religion is one that ‘eliminates the conflict between employment requirements and religious practices.’ ” Wright v. Runyon, 2 F.3d 214, 217 (7th Cir.1993) (quoting Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70, 107 S.Ct. 367, 93 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986)). However, it is well settled that “Title VII ... requires only reasonable accommodation, not satisfaction of an employee’s every desire.” Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771, 776 (7th Cir.1998) (internal citations omitted). Further, a finding of reasonable accommodation is a finding of fact entitled to deference. See Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 903 (7th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). Anderson first argues that the district court
recognizing that mixed questions of fact and law that are essentially factual in nature should be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard as opposed to the generally administered de novo standard holding that the appellate standard of review of ineffectiveness claim is de novo holding that a finding of accommodation is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard of review instead of under a de novo standard holding that review of the denial of a motion to compel arbitration is under the de novo standard recognizing de novo standard of review