Dist. No. One, 894 S.W.2d 441, 447 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1995, writ denied). Second, Texas courts have long held that the term “encumbrance” includes easements. See, e.g., City of Dayton v. Allred, 123 Tex. 60, 68 S.W.2d 172, 178 (Tex.1934); Smith v. McMillan, 352 S.W.2d 871, 877 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston 1962), aff'd, 363 S.W.2d 437 (Tex.1962); Uszenski v. McNabb, 225 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1949, writ ref'd) (op. on reh’g); Shaw v. Morrison, 14 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1929, no writ). Holder argues that the parties did not intend the word “encumbrance” to include easements. “The language in an agreement is to be given its plain grammatical meaning unless to do so would defeat the parties’ intent.” DeWitt County Ele (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1940, no writ) (<HOLDING>). We hold that the easement granted by Lavigne
holding that in contrast to foreclosure of a mortgage secured by personal property foreclosure of real property under a deed of trust need hot be at a commercially reasonable sale and the failure to conduct a commercially reasonable foreclosure sale of real property is not actionable holding foreclosure of prior deed of trust extinguished subsequent easement holding that while nondebtor purchase money deed of trust can be described as part of the same transaction by which the buyer acquired debtors real property that does not elevate the deed of trust to status of something under a plan confirmed holding that buyer who purchased property at foreclosure sale took title free from easement granted after deed of trust holding that the terms of the trust deed foreclosure statutes must be strictly complied with