omitted). Both of these requested instructions were substantially covered by the court’s reasonable-doubt instructions. They stated: MacHauer was presumed to be innocent; the Government bore the burden of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and the jury was required to acquit MacHauer if the Government failed to meet its burden. The jury was also instructed: “Proof beyond a reasonable doubt ... is proof of such a convincing character that you would be willing to rely and act upon it without hesitation in the most important of your own affairs”. The district court did not err in denying the above two requested instructions. See Clements, 73 F.3d at 1338; see also United States v. Skelton, 514 F.3d 433, 446 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 102, 172 L.Ed.2d 32 (2008) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, to the extent MacHauer contends
recognizing district court does not err by giving instruction that tracks pattern instruction and correctly states the law holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given holding that district court did not err in giving an instruction identical to that proposed by jenkins holding that the trial court erred by giving a misleading instruction holding that unless an erroneous instruction was unlikely to have changed the result of the trial a reviewing court cannot say that giving the instruction was harmless error