plain language of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See id. at 833 (noting that § 552 of the Restatement refers to “false” information). The commentary on that section of the Restatement contradicts that court’s strict interpretation of the word “false,” explaining that the professional “must exercise reasonable care and competence in communicating the information so that it may be understood by the recipient” and to ensure that “information accurately obtained [is not] so communicated as to be misleading.” Restatement (Second) Torts § 552 cmt. f (emphasis added). Moreover, other Texas courts have used the terms “false” and “misleading” interchangeably when discussing negligent misrepresentation claims. See, e.g., K3C Inc. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 204 Fed.Appx. 455, 462 (5th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added); Hagans v. Woodruff, 830
holding negligent misrepresentation sufficient holding that there was no inference of scienter based on defendants knowledge of facts or failure to monitor information because plaintiffs did not specifically identified any reports or statements that existed or would have come to light in a reasonable investigation that would have demonstrated the falsity of the allegedly misleading statements holding under texas law that appellants could not have prevailed on the merits of their negligent misrepresentation claim because they had not identified any statements of fact by boa that were actually false  or so incomplete as to be misleading holding that misleading newspaper ads and letters which were mailed need not be false or fraudulent on their face and the accused need not misrepresent any fact since it is just as unlawful to speak half truths or to omit to state facts necessary to make the statements made in light of the circumstances under which they were made not misleading holding that the furnishing of misleading information cannot support a claim for negligent misrepresentation the information must be false