110 Stat. 1214,1277 (Apr. 24,1996), was imper-missibly applied to him retroactively. Second, in a letter dated January 10, 2000,' Diaz made a motion for custody re-determination pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 236(a)(1) that appears to have been served on “the pro se office of Magistrate Judge Frank A. Maas” and the Government. Finally, Diaz has filed a post-petition “Motion for Release on Health Related Basis” dated June 4, 1999, which requests that he be released on a bond due to his chronic epilepsy. II. DISCUSSION A. The Removal Order Because the BIA affirmed the removal order on October 7, 1999, Diaz has exhausted his administrative remedies and the petition is properly before the Court. See, e.g., Herrerar-Mesa v. McElroy, No. 98 Civ. 5376(DC), 2000 WL 109052 *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2000) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, pursuant to the Second Circuit’s
holding that a district court must dismiss habeas petitions containing any claims that have not been exhausted in state court holding that administrative remedies must be exhausted prior to filing a claim in court holding that the ftca bars claimants from bringing suit in federal court until they have exhausted their administrative remedies holding that if adequate administrative remedies are available it is improper to seek relief in court before those remedies are exhausted holding that habeas corpus petitions are premature until administrative remedies have been exhausted