to his plea. See, e.g., People v. Coultas, 75 Ill.App.3d 137, 139 n. 1, 31 Ill.Dec. 110, 111 n. 1, 394 N.E.2d 26, 27 n. 1 (5th Dist.1979). Thus, Williams procedurally defaulted his claims solely on account of post-conviction counsel’s mistaken interpretation of Illinois law. Nevertheless, post-conviction counsel’s ineffective assistance provides neither an independent basis for habeas relief nor cause to excuse Williams’ procedural default. Since there is no constitutional right to post-conviction counsel, Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987), there is no right to competent counsel when the state elects to provide a lawyer in post-conviction proceedings. Cf. Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587-88, 102 S.Ct. 1300, 1301, 71 L.Ed.2d 475 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Williams waived any claim of
recognizing constitutional right to effective counsel holding a criminal defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel during a plea process recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel holding that the sixth amendment right to counsel embodies the right to effective assistance of counsel holding that in the context of a discretionary appeal before a states highest court sjince the defendant had no constitutional right to counsel he could not be deprived of the effective assistance of counsel  