the FAA would necessarily govern the parties’ arbitration agreement; Plaintiffs definition of “transportation employees” is overly broad. Under the FAA, “[a] written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract” shall be valid. 9 U.S.C. § 1. Nevertheless, § 1- of the FAA provides, in pertinent part: “but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” Id. The scope of § l’s exclusion has been narrowly construed by a large number of circuit courts, including the Third Circuit. Tenney Eng’g v. United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 207 F.2d 450, 452 (3d Cir. 1953) (<HOLDING>). To date, virtually every circuit having
holding that the government can satisfy the hobbs act interstate commerce requirement by showing that the robbery resulted in the closure of a business engaged in interstate commerce holding that the district court lacked the authority to compel arbitration  because the faa is inapplicable to employees who are engaged in interstate commerce holding that the exclusionary language of  1 should only apply to those workers who are actually engaged in the movement of interstate or foreign commerce or in work so closely related thereto as to be in practical effect part of it holding that the hobbs act did not apply to the robbery of a computer company executive in his home even though the crime may have prevented him from getting to work or making busi ness calls because his only connection with interstate commerce was his employment by a business engaged in interstate commerce holding that dairy products that originated outside of texas and shipped to texas then stopped in dallas were part of a continuous movement in interstate commerce the truck drivers who delivered the products locally in texas were engaged in interstate commerce for purpose of the motor carrier act exemption