this appeal to proceed appears to be contraindicative of the type of scenario contemplated by this Court in McGourty[ v. Pennsylvania Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 704 A.2d 663, 665 (Pa.Super.1997)], wherein characterization of the [common pleas court’s] orders as collateral would merely “caus[e] litigation to be interrupted and delayed by piecemeal review of trial court decisions.” McGourty, 704 A.2d at 665. Pridgen v. Parker Hannifin Gorp., Nos. 3114 & 3115 EDA 2003, slip op. at 6 (Pa.Super.Apr. 26, 2005). After the submission of briefs and the presentation of oral argument in this Court, the parties offered supplemental submissions expressing general agreement that the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. at 313-20, 115 S.Ct. at 2156-59 (<HOLDING>), is consistent with a proper application of
holding that the issue of whether the attorney general was entitled to qualified immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine holding that defendant may not pursue interlocutory appeal of the denial of qualified immunity insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a genuine issue of fact for trial holding that the existence of genuine issues of material facts render not appealable a pretrial denial of summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity holding in the context of the assertion of a qualified immunity defense that a trial courts summary judgment order that merely determines that the pretrial record sets forth a genuine issue of fact for trial does not meet the requirements of the federal collateral order doctrine holding that a defendant entitled to invoke a qualified immunity defense may not appeal a district courts summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a genuine issue of fact for trial