infringe upon” his right to a jury trial under Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution. Id. In Bousquet, by holding that the defendant could “reasonably be deemed to have waived his right to a trial by jury,” id. (emphasis added), we recognized that in cases such as this, “the issue [is] not ‘waiver’ in the sense of voluntary relinquishment of a known right, but ‘deemed waiver,’ ” Preston v. Seay, 541 F. Supp. 898, 899 (D. Mass. 1981), aff'd, 684 F.2d 172 (1st Cir. 1982). In other words, RSA 502-A:12 dictates that by taking a direct appeal from a class A misdemeanor conviction to this court, a defendant must forego an appeal to superior court for a de novo trial to a jury; thus, he is deemed to have waived his right to a jury trial. Cf. Preston, 541 F. Supp. at 900 (<HOLDING>). The task before us is to determine whether
recognizing the right to waive a jury trial recognizing doctrine holding that the selection of the jury constitutes part of a public trial recognizing massachusetts doctrine that solid default of appearance constitutes a deemed waiver of the right to jury trial holding that the failure to object to a trial courts instruction constitutes waiver