The MRSECA provides that a district court “shall order restitution for any offense” under chapter 110 of Title 18 of the United States Code, and that the restitution order “shall direct the defendant to pay the victim ... the full amount of the victim’s losses.” 18 U.S.C. § 2259(a), (b)(1). A “victim” is “the individual harmed as a result of a commission of a crime under this chapter.” 18 U.S.C. § 2259(c). Burgess was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252-a chapter 110 offense — and Vicky was the child victim portrayed in the materials in Burgess’ possession. Burgess, 684 F.3d at 448. Burgess was “responsible for losses sustained by Vicky that he proximately caused.” Burgess, 684 F.3d at 459; see Paroline v. United States, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1710, 1719-22, 188 L.Ed.2d 714 (2014) (<HOLDING>). In applying § 2259’s causation requirement,
holding that restitution is proper under  2259 only to the extent the defendants offense proximately caused a victims losses holding that an award of restitution is only for the loss caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction holding that under the restitution provision of the supervised release statute 18 usc  3583 restitution can be ordered only for losses caused by the specific conduct that is the basis for the offense of conviction holding that the amount of restitution is limited to the victims actual losses  holding that restitution is proper for victims losses that are directly caused by appellants conduct for which he was convicted