public at large, simply because relief comes in the form of a declaratory judgment, rather than injunctive relief, elevates form over substance when, as explained earlier, there is little practical difference between the two forms of relief in this context. Consequently, I do not believe that the Legislature intended the majority’s interpretation of MCL 15.271(4), which undermines the OMA’s purpose. In this case, plaintiff requested both injunctive and declaratory relief and was ultimately awarded the latter. Because declaratory relief is sufficient to trigger attorney fees and costs under MCL 15.271(4), I would hold that plaintiff is entitled to costs and attorney fees, consistent with Ridenour and its progeny. In light of the language, history, and purpose of 67; 577 NW2d 706 (1998) (<HOLDING>); Manning v East Tawas, 234 Mich App 244,
holding that the absence of a formal injunction does not preclude the plaintiff from recovering costs and attorney fees under mcl 152714 recognizing that an award of temporary attorneys fees and costs is based on an assessment of need and ability to pay as well as the reasonableness of the fees and costs holding that the legal remedy of declaratory relief is adequate to trigger an award of attorney fees and costs under mcl 152714 recognizing that a party can obtain declaratory relief but still not be entitled to an award of attorneys fees under the declaratory judgments act holding that a declaratory judgment entitles a plaintiff to actual attorney fees and costs under mcl 152714 despite the fact that the trial court found it unnecessary to grant an injunction given defendants decision to amend the notice provision after plaintiffs filed the present suit