Fed.R.Crim.P. 8(a). Defendants may be joined if “they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction, or in the same series of acts or transactions, constituting an offense or offenses.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 8(b). Under Rule 8, “ ‘transaction’ is a flexible term i rge against Nichols was occasioned by her alleged effort to conceal the joint conduct with which Gilmore and Church are charged. The criminal charges thus involve the s , there will be no unfair prejudice to Gilmore, the only party who objects to consolidation. Nothing in Nichols’ defense is antagonistic to that of Gilmore. While noncapital defendants sometimes object to joint trial with defendants charged with capital offenses, see Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 417-20, 107 S.Ct. 2906, 97 L.Ed.2d 336 (1987) (<HOLDING>), it is Nichols, the noncapital defendant, who
holding that severance pay policy was part of employment contract holding that death qualification of jury is not of itself grounds for severance of a noncapital defendant holding that a plan providing severance pay for reduction in work force simply did not contemplate the effect of a sale of a business on the availability of severance pay holding that possession of a weapon is not in an of itself a crime holding the lumpsum payment of a severance benefit to be evidence of lack of an administrative scheme