the concurrence offers its own “expert opinion” of the incentives driving the behavior of past RICO violators. See sep. op. at 1203-05, 1205-06. According to the concurrence, the most appropriate deterrence will stem from the “spotlight of the lawsuit,” if properly “amplif[ied]” by “transparency-enhancing and prior-approval measures.” Id. at 1205. Perhaps so, but “on summary judgment, the evidence should be viewed in favor of the nonmoving party, not,” as the concurrence would have it, “the other way around.” Langon v. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 959 F.2d 1053, 1059 (D.C.Cir.1992) (reversing district court grant of summary judgment where that court disregarded admissible expert testimony); see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 553 F.2d 1378, 1381-83 (D.C.Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). At this stage of the litigation, then, we
holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that a motion for summary judgment was not opposed holding that district court inappropriately granted summary judgment where experts disagreed about whether certain data constituted a trade secret from which an intelligent competitor could gain information holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that motion for summary judgment was not opposed holding that disclosure of trade secret without protection of express confidentiality agreement was not fatal to trade secret protection where disclosure occurred during sale negotiation recognizing a legitimate need to protect an employee from disclosing an employers trade secrets or other confidential information to a competitor