matters here, in defendant Smith’s case, the violation of the rule is clear. The record does not contain Smith’s written consent to the student’s representation, and the transcript does not indicate that the trial judge was made aware that a 711 student was participating in the suppression hearing. I would therefore grant Smith a new trial. Respondent Denzel W’s case is more problematic. By failing to address the consent portion of the rule, the court bypasses the more fundamental question of whether the rule even applies to juvenile proceedings. Rule 711 states that eligible students may participate in civil and criminal matters. The rule does not specifically refer to juvenile proceedings, which are neither criminal nor civil proceedings. See In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 326 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Assuming Rule 711 does apply to juvenile
holding that requiring a petitioner to establish by clear and convincing evidence that visitation is in the best interests of the child would provide effective protection for a parents choice except where the choice is plainly contrary to a childs best interests recognizing that a juvenile proceeding is nonadversarial and designed to further the best interests of the minor holding that paramount consideration in terminationofparentalrights proceeding is best interests of the child recognizing that a trial court must make a finding that the timesharing schedule is in the childs best interests holding that cooperation between parents is essential if the arrangement is to be in the best interests of the child