on the statement and surrounding circumstances, Boswell had apparent authority to consent to the search under the standards that we derive from Bearing. Our conclusion that Boswell had apparent authority to authorize search of the case comports with the most fundamental justifications for the apparent authority doctrine. As explained in a leading treatise: “[I]f it is accepted that the making of searches by consent should not occupy second-class status in the hierarchy of law enforcement practices, then certainly the search should not be undone by reasonable good-faith mistakes of fact concerning the authority of the consenting party.” Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.3(g) at 173 (4th ed.2004) (emphasis in original). See United States v. Jenkins, 92 F.3d 430, 438 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). We do not depart from the well-established
holding that child residents had no actual or apparent authority to consent to search of mothers home holding search not to violate fourth amendment where officers belief that apparent landlord had the power to consent and that he had not revoked that consent was reasonable emphasis added holding that when law enforcement officers obtain consent to search pursuant to apparent authority if the surrounding circumstances are such that a reasonable person would doubt that authority exists and not act upon the consent without further inquiry  then the warrantless search without further inquiry is unlawful unless authority actually exists emphasis added holding that it was unreasonable to believe that womans boyfriend had authority to consent to the search of her purse even though he had authority to consent to the search of the car in which it was kept holding that a driver of a tractor trailer had apparent authority to consent to a search of a trailer even though he stated its not up to me i dont own the stuff before signing a consent form when the surrounding cireumstances suggested that he had such authority