information and notice “as required” by “this subtitle” and various sections therein. CP 2010 § ll-721(a). Clearly then, if appellant is not “required” to register under MSORA, he cannot be convicted of failing to register under CP 2010 § 11-721. Notably, when the Fourth Circuit reviewed the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), it also concluded that a registration requirement was an element of the failure-to-register offense. See United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 470 (4th Cir.2009) (“As noted above, the elements of a SORNA failure to register offense ... are that the defendant (1) was required to register....”), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 974, 130 S.Ct. 1686, 176 L.Ed.2d 186 (2010); see also State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 677 S.E.2d 444, 449 (2009) (<HOLDING>). We acknowledge that the basis for removing
holding that the defendant could not be charged with bail jumping for failing to pay a fine and emphasizing that an essential element of the crime of failure to appear was that the defendants personal appearance was actually required in a criminal proceeding holding that it is clearly settled that where there is a failure to establish an essential element of the defamation cause of action the case becomes one of law for the court holding that one essential element of the crime of failing to notify the appropriate sheriff of a sex offenders change of address is that the defendant is a person required  to register  holding that the specific intent to deprive the owner permanently of his property is an essential element of the crime of larceny holding that failure to identify the defendant in the information is an omission of an essential element because the primary purpose of the charging document is to inform the defendant of the nature of the accusations brought against him