detained in July 1953. It was reasonable for the court to infer that he also was deported then, in view of his admission that he was removed on several occasions under that name. 3. Similarly, we see no clear error in the district court’s adverse credibility finding with respect to Petitioner’s wife. She was u , 829 (9th Cir.2011) (observing that the district court “based its credibility determination on inconsistencies in [a witness’] testimony”). Here, the trial court identified inconsistencies that were particularly significant because they involved the very fact at issue—the place of Petitioner’s birth. In addition, trial courts are generally permitted to evaluate credibility of testimony by assessing its level of detail. See Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); see also Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035,
holding that the odor of marijuana is still a relevant factor in the totality of the circumstances analysis holding that the level of detail in testimony is a relevant factor in the totality of the circumstances test of credibility employed by immigration judges holding reasonable suspicion is based on totality of circumstances holding that the plaintiffs burden at summary judgment in a case involving a totality of the circumstances test is whether the facts put forth by petitioners  examined in their totality and in the light most favorable to  the nonmoving party  might satisfy a trier of fact that the  test was met holding that an adverse credibility determination under the real id act must take into account the totality of the circumstances and all relevant factors