to renegotiate the terms of that document. See, e.g., Driscoll v. Schuttler, 697 F.Supp. 1195, 1203 (N.D.Ga.1988) (“Plaintiffs were not precluded from reading the releases; they understood that they were releasing their claims and exercised that option rather than gambling on the legal outcome of [their action].”). 9 . Plaintiffs allege that the money was spent in an effort to contain the damages caused by DuPont's product. 10 . The court notes that plaintiffs may not now seek to tender the money received in settlement. Georgia law requires that rescission be timely. Plaintiffs learned of the alleged fraud in 1994, nearly two years prior to commencing these actions. This delay is, as a matter of law, determinative. See, e.g., Orion Capital Partners, 223 Ga.App. 539, 478 S.E.2d at 385
holding that sevenmonth delay is too late as a matter of law to constitute an effective rescission or reasonable offer to rescind the agreement holding offer of continued atwill employment did not constitute consideration for the arbitration agreement holding that seventeenmonth delay in abandoning premises is not within a reasonable time as a matter of law holding that a fiftyday delay to conduct an investigation was reasonable as a matter of law holding that after learning the information justifying rescission an insurers four month delay in seeking it was unreasonable as a matter of law