a corporation the opportunity to cure, the trial court should not be allowed to overrule a motion for new trial because it was filed by a non-attorney on behalf of a corporation. On the facts presented in the case under review, we disagree. Butt filed a motion for new trial purportedly on behalf of Rabb in the afternoon of the twenty-ninth day after the trial court signed the judgment. To cure this defective motion, an attorney would have had to file an amended motion for new trial on Rabb’s behalf. Though this defective motion extended the time to perfect appeal and the trial court’s plenary power, the trial court did not have the power to extend the deadline to file a timely amended motion for new trial. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 5, 329b(b); Moritz v. Preiss, 121 S.W.3d 715, 720 (Tex.2003) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the absolute deadline for Rabb to
holding that trial court has no power to allow party to amend motion for new trial more than thirty days after trial court signed the final judgment and that denial of amended motion for new trial filed more than thirty days after judgment preserved nothing for appellate review holding that the trial court had no jurisdiction to modify its final order more than 30 days after its final judgment holding that a nonpartys motion for new trial and petition for intervention filed after the trial court signed a final judgment did not extend the courts plenary jurisdiction holding that a party waives remand on the basis of a procedural defect by filing a motion to remand more than thirty days after the case is removed holding as applied challenges preserved because motion for new trial was filed and the trial court ruled