on January 11, 2012. Rather, they urge that Lapiner’s January 11 motion for new trial was ineffective to extend the appellate timetable because he was not a party below. It is a general rule in Texas that only named parties may appeal the trial court’s judgment. City of San Benito v. Rio Grande Valley Gas Co., 109 S.W.3d 750, 754 (Tex.2003); see Tex.R.App. P. 25.1 (“The filing of a notice of appeal by any party invokes the appellate court’s jurisdiction over all parties to the trial court’s judgment or order appealed from.”). La-piner is a nonparty. Lapiner filed a petition in intervention in the action. Defendants moved to strike the intervention. The trial court granted defendants’ motion and struck Lapiner’s intervention. Lapi-ner S.W.2d 224, 227 (Tex.App.-Austin 1996, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). However, Texas recognizes that one may be a
holding that any change to a judgment made by the trial court while it retains plenary jurisdiction will restart the appellate timetable but only a motion seeking a substantive change will extend the appellate deadlines and the trial courts plenary power holding that trial court has no power to allow party to amend motion for new trial more than thirty days after trial court signed the final judgment and that denial of amended motion for new trial filed more than thirty days after judgment preserved nothing for appellate review holding that a nonpartys motion for new trial and petition for intervention filed after the trial court signed a final judgment did not extend the courts plenary jurisdiction holding that because appellant did not become a party by intervention before judgment was rendered appellant may not extend the time to appeal by filing a motion for new trial holding that only a motion seeking a substantive change in a judgment will extend the appellate deadlines and the trial courts plenary power