over the message’s direct effect on those who are exposed to it.” Ranch House, Inc. v. Amerson, 238 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir.2001). On its face, § 32.03(k) concerns the regulation of alcohol, not the suppression of erotic speech. Section 32.03(k) regulates no aspect of any protected expressions exhibited in the erotic dancing offered at the Clubs. Even with § 32.03(k) enforced, the Clubs could nonetheless offer erotic dancing, albeit not together with the service of alcohol. Section 32.03(k), however, references SOBs and applies to them, but that a statute references content does not alone mean that it is intended to suppress speech, even without a legislative record to suggest a purpose unrelated to speech. See id.; see also Barnes, 501 U.S. at 570, 111 S.Ct. 2456 (plurality opinion) (<HOLDING>); Sammy’s of Mobile, 140 F.3d at 998 (noting
holding that legislative history cannot supply a clear statement recognizing a settlement prevented a municipal referendum as it was not a legislative action holding that the purpose of a statute that prevented nude dancing was not to suppress protected speech despite no legislative history holding that even where there are  contrary indications in the statutes legislative history we do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear holding that substantive criminal statute could not be applied retrospectively because there was nothing  in the language or the legislative history that was a clear and unequivocal expression of legislative intent to rebut presumption of prospective application only