as evidence of guilt, "is at least a reliable method to eliminate a person as the unidentified speaker." Id. at 383, 522 A.2d 405; see also id. at 383 n. 5, 522 A.2d 405 ("Similarly, in State v. Prudden, 212 N.J.Super. 608, 617, 515 A.2d 1260 (App.Div.1986), the court, while rejecting the use of footprint techniques to identify a defendant, recognized that the techniques were nevertheless sufficiently reliable to exclude a person as the guilty party."). See generally Davis, supra, 96 N.J. at 621, 477 A.2d 308 ("We have recognized that standards of proof may vary depending upon the litigational context.") (citing Romano, supra, 96 N.J. 66, 474 A.2d 1; In re Polk License Revocation, 90 N.J. 550, 449 A.2d 7 (1982)); State v. Millett, 272 N.J.Super. 68, 98-99, 639 A.2d 352 (App.Div.1994) (<HOLDING>) (citing State v. Sturdivant, 31 N.J. 165, 179,
holding that evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements  beyond a reasonable doubt holding that a reviewing court must determine whether viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact could have found proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each of the essential elements of the crime charged recognizing that a criminal defendant may present evidence if the proof offered has a rational tendency to engender a reasonable doubt with respect to an essential feature of the states case holding that a verdict must be sustained against a sufficiency of the evidence challenge if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt holding that proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is required by the constitution