might possibly in some situations, by virtue of some special circumstances, be characterized as one where 'the behavior of ... law enforcement officials was such as to overbear petitioner’s will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined’ ”) (quoting Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544, 81 S.Ct. 735, 5 L.Ed.2d 760 (1961)). 8 . The development of the jurisprudence governing Miranda violations similarly addresses whether initial misstatements by a law enforcement officer are sufficient to taint later statements, thereby requiring suppression. “Miranda violations have not been treated as creating ... an automatic taint.” United States v. Jackson, 608 F.3d 100, 103 (1st Cir.2010); see also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 314, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (<HOLDING>); State v. Smith, 675 A.2d 93, 97 (Me.1996)
holding that police officers sworn affidavit that miranda warnings were given was held sufficient to deny suppression of defendants postarrest statement in the absence of properlysupported statement by defendant to the contrary holding that in the absence of police coercion a subsequent administration of miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement holding that although defendants voluntarily given initial statement was inadmissible because of miranda violation subsequent statement made after careful miranda warnings were given and waiver was obtained was admissible holding that a statement given after miranda warnings have been administered may be inadmissable when police have elicited a previous unwarned statement during a custodial interrogation holding that where a suspect was given miranda warnings and then immediately spoke without police prompting that statement was voluntary and therefore admissible