regulation, the application of which to the plaintiff’s lots 3 and 4 did not impermissibly deprive him of the protection to which he was entitled under G. L. c. 40A, § 6, sixth par. Judgment affirmed. 2 This statute pertinently provides: “When a plan referred to in [G. L. c. 41, § 8 IP] . . . has been submitted to a planning board [and proper writ s. App. Ct. 467, 471 (1976) (citing Bellows Farms, supra, in support of its enforcement of dimensional and intensity regulations significantly limiting the number of buildable condominium units but not amounting to “ ‘a total or virtual prohibition of the use of the locus for’ a purpose permitted at the time of submission of the [ANR] plan”). Cf. Radcliffe College v. Cambridge, 350 Mass. 613, 618-619 (1966) (zoning bylaws tha pra at 356-357 (<HOLDING>). 6 General Laws, c. 40A, § 6, fifth par., as
holding that all property owners affected by a residential use permit are necessary parties holding that the state is obligated to pay property owners when it regulates private property under its police power in such a manner that the regulation effectively deprives the owner of the economically viable use of that property holding evidence which established that use of property was permissive showed use of property was not adverse holding that the amendment was a use regulation which was in effect a condition on the use of property in the affected zone holding that allowing moderate use of the resources on the property was not inconsistent with exclusive use