Defendants’ Motion does not address Plaintiffs claim arising from the right to travel, see Complaint ¶ 31, and therefore the Court will deny Defendants’ Motion on that ground alone. However, it bears mentioning that while the right to interstate travel is well established, see, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 119 S.Ct. 1518, 143 L.Ed.2d 689 (1999), the same is not trae of the right to intrastate travel, which is at issue here. See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 537-38 (D.C.Cir.1999) (noting split in the circuits on issue of right to intrastate travel). Without expressing any opinion as to Plaintiffs constitutional claim, the Court notes that the Third Circuit has recognized a constitutional right to intrastate travel. See Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255 (1990) (<HOLDING>). The merits of Plaintiffs surviving claims are
holding that while there is not a constitutionally protected right of intrastate travel under equal protection there is a constitutionally protected right to intrastate travel arising from the due process clause recognizing  1983 substantive due process claim holding right to travel emanates from concept of substantive due process holding that when a prisoners deliberate indifference claim is covered by the eighth amendment the substantive due process claims are duplicative and thus the substantive due process claims should be dismissed holding that there is no substantive due process right under the fourteenth amendment to be free from malicious prosecution