strong protection because it concerns “areas of Art. II duties [in which] the courts have traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities.” 418 U.S. 683, 710, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974). The Nixon Court went on to recognize that, to the extent an executive claim of privilege “relates to the effective discharge of a President’s powers, it is constitutionally based.” Id. at 711, 94 S.Ct. 3090. Significantly, the Executive’s constitutional authority is at its broadest in the realm of military and foreign affairs. The Court accordingly has indicated that the judiciary’s role as a check on presidential action in foreign affairs is limited. See, e.g., Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 348, 125 S.Ct. 694, 160 L.Ed.2d 708 (2005) (<HOLDING>); Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S.
holding that 1 our decision in timken addressed commerces interpretation of section 167735 and 2 we give commerce substantial deference in its administration of the statute because of the foreign policy implications of a dumping determination holding state buy american statute unconstitutional because it interfered with federal foreign affairs power emphasizing its effect on foreign commerce recognizing strong need for a healthy deference to legislative and executive judgments in the area of military affairs recognizing judiciarys customary policy of deference to the president in matters of foreign affairs holding that a domestic plaintiffs choice of forum is entitled to more deference than a foreign plaintiffs