have been held unreliable (and, therefore, inadmissible) because it failed to comply with the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP). In other words, Whitehouse casts USPAP compliance vel non as an issue of reliability (and thus admissibility), not credibility. Whitehouse claims: both experts acknowledged they were bound by USPAP; Louisiana law requires that all licensed appraisers shall comply with USPAP; such compliance is required for all federal ly related transactions; and the IRS treats USPAP as providing the applicable appraisal standards. Further, Whitehouse claims Argote’s valuation is merely ipse dixit, an insufficient basis upon which to admit opinion testimony. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997) (<HOLDING>). Whitehouse points to several instances where
holding that it was error to admit into evidence a gun purchased by the defendant which was not connected with the charged crimes recognizing district courts authority to exclude opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert should it conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered holding agency may not rely on expert opinion without disclosing hard data supporting opinion to the public holding district court is not required to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert recognizing that while a testifying expert may rely upon facts or data made known to the expert before the hearing and even may rely upon opinions if reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field the ipse dixit of that reliance does not make those facts data or opinions true particularly where  they are derived largely from hearsay