includable time passed between the issuance of the mandate in his interlocutory appeal and the filing of his certiorari petition. We conclude that in the unusual circumstances of this case, Pete’s STA clock resumed running with the issuance of the mandate, but stopped soon thereafter because the period of time beginning with Pete’s motion to recall the mandate and ending with the filing of the petition is excludable. We have held that generally, after an appeal, the period of excludable delay under the STA ends on the day this court’s mandate issues, because that is the date the appellate decision is final and jurisdiction returns to the district court. See Crooks II, 826 F.2d at 5 (quoting Ross, 654 F.2d at 616); see also United States v. Lloyd, 125 F.3d 1263, 1265 n. 1 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>) (citing Crooks II, 826 F.2d at 5); United
holding that filing of suit ordinarily interrupts the running of prescription but when the action is dismissed without prejudice because of plaintiffs failure to prosecute the interruption in the running of the statute is considered as never having occurred holding issuance of building estimate constituted a denial of claim and triggered the running of the limitations period holding that the running of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense holding that under section 25506 the clock starts running on the statute of limitations when the plaintiff has inquiry notice of the alleged misconduct holding that the sta clock under  3161e began running again with the issuance of the mandate