and the provision expressly requiring delinquency proceedings to be tried in equity was removed. Compare Iowa Code § 232.13 (1962), with Iowa Code § 232.58 (1966). In its place was the directive that “an interested party ..'. may appeal to the supreme court for review of questions of law and fact.” Id. § 232.58 (1966). Identical language is still in effect in section 232.133(1) (2011). However, in cases following the revision of chapter 232, we continued to assert that our review was de novo without acknowledging that particular change in the statutory language. See, e.g., In re Henderson, 199 N.W.2d 111, 116 (Iowa 1972). Instead, we cited to the old rule of appellate procedure which indicated that our review of equity cases was de novo. Id. The State points o 57 N.E.2d 908, 923 (1995) (<HOLDING>); J.D.P. v. State, 857 N.E.2d 1000, 1010
holding that on appeal a defendant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence and that the relevant question is whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt footnote and punctuation omitted holding that in evaluating sufficiency of the evidence in habeas corpus petitions we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt holding the standard of review in juvenile adjudication is whether after viewing evidence in light most favorable to the state any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt holding that when reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a state criminal conviction the relevant question under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt holding that when conducting a legal sufficiency review the reviewing court should view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt