plaintiffs’ suit should have taken the form of a facial challenge to Act 34, and not an attack upon ORIL’s orders, which it had full authority to promulgate. We believe this argument is based upon a misconstruction of Burford, the subsequent case law, and the case at hand. In Burford, plaintiffs’ challenge centered on the reasonableness of a particular administrative order. Since they did not attack either the authority of the Texas Railroad Commission or its adjudicative methods, the constitutional issue was merely a gloss upon the challenge to the administrative decision, the wisdom of which was truly at the heart of the matter. See Burford, 319 U.S. at 328 n. 24, 63 S.Ct. 1098; see also Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. S. Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 343, 71 S.Ct. 762, 95 L.Ed. 1002 (1951) (<HOLDING>). That is plainly not the case here. Plaintiffs
holding that court is bound by prior panels interpretation of supreme court decision holding that the supreme courts proper scope of review of a trial courts decision in a trial de novo of an assessment matter is whether the decision of the trial court was clearly erroneous holding that abstention was proper when the plaintiffs claim consisted of a challenge to an administrative decision born out of a scheme already held constitutional by the supreme court holding that even though petition for allowance of appeal was pending before the pennsylvania supreme court decision remained binding precedent as long as the decision had not been overturned by our supreme court holding that the discovery of evidence of crimes in the course of an otherwise proper administrative inspection does not render that search illegal or the administrative scheme suspect