risk that the actor will intentionally use force in the furtherance of the offense.’ ” 493 F.3d at 307 (quoting Tran, 414 F.3d at 471). Likewise, Popal's discussion emphasizes that the focus of the § 16(b) analysis should be on whether the crime at issue "involves ‘a substantial risk that the actor will intentionally use ... force.’ ” 416 F.3d at 255 (citing Tran, 414 F.3d at 472). 16 . Citing to various cases from our sister circuits, Aguilar argues that reckless crimes cannot be crimes of violence under § 16(b). Those cases are inapposite because they either do not involve § 16(b), or a similarly worded statute, or they do not create the same inherent substantial risk that force will be used, as § 3124.1 does. See Jimenez-Gonzalez v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 557, 561 (7th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Zuniga-Soto, 527 F.3d 1110,
holding that because the crime of rape involved a nonconsensual act there was a substantial risk that physical force may be used in committing the offense holding that the mere fact that the fda does not require a warning on a product label does not necessarily create a conflict holding that a felony of criminal recklessness was not a crime of violence under  16b because it does not require any purposeful conduct and does not necessarily create a risk that force may be used as a means to an end during the commission of the offense holding that under iowa code  7098 the offense of lascivious acts with a child was a crime of violence because it involved a substantial risk that physical force would be used against the child victim in the course of committing the offense holding that unlawful imprisonment of a minor or incompetent adult is not a crime of violence under  16b because the crime can be accomplished with the victims acquiescence