§ 2864, at 357 (2d ed. 1995). Monoson’s 2005 motion was not specific about what circumstances entitled him to relief under Rule 60(b)(6) that were distinct from his challenge to the judgment under Rule 60(b)(4). In his brief filed with this Court, Monoson refers to his contentions that he was incompetently represented throughout the proceedings against him, and asserts that the judgment against him is an “unexpected hardship.” Where it is undisputed that most, if not all, of the conduct that forms the basis of Monoson’s motion under Rule 60(b)(6) was known to him in 1988, we find no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s ruling that the portion of his motion seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) was untimely. See Moolenaar v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 822 F.2d 1342, 1348 (3d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). B We agree with the District Court’s holding
holding that a motion brought under rule 60b6 two years after the district courts judgment was untimely where the reason for the attack upon that judgment was available for attack upon the original judgment holding that a judgment is subject to collateral attack where  the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction with respect to the power of the court to render the particular judgment or decree as where the court  exceeds the powers conferred on it by constitutional or statutory provisions holding that a foreign judgment for alimony and child support arrearages was not subject to attack in wyoming except on grounds that would permit attack upon any other money judgment such as want of jurisdiction in the court entering the judgment or lack of service so as to vest jurisdiction over the defendant holding that when the district court mistakenly ordered prejudgment interest and a motion to amend was made more than one year after entry of judgment no relief was available under rule 60b6 because rule 60b1 clearly applied holding that a judgment as to the title in a prior litigation was not subject to collateral attack