as the trial court determined, Appellant’s trial did not commence until the parties were present and voir dire occurred on February 8, 2016, which was three days after the mechanical run date. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 cmt. (“A trial commences when the trial judge determines that the parties are present and directs them to proceed to voir dire or to opening argument, or to the hearing of any motions that had been reserved for the time of trial, or to the taking of testimony, or to some other such first step in the trial.”) (citations omitted)); Commonwealth v. Brock, 619 Pa. 278, 61 A.3d 1015, 1020-21 (2013) (“It is not intended that preliminary calendar calls should constitute commencement of a trial.”) (quotation omitted)); Commonwealth v. Lamonna, 473 Pa. 248, 373 A.2d 1355 (1977) (<HOLDING>). This does not end our inquiry, however, as
holding that even if the calculation commenced on the date of the first indictment the defendants right to a speedy trial was not violated holding that trial court erred in denying defendants request to allow standby counsel to conduct voir dire where there was no indication that the trial court considered the koehler factors or that granting the request would have disrupted or delayed the trial holding that even where the case has been called for trial the trial is not deemed to have commenced for speedy trial purposes until the jury is empaneled voir dire has occurred or some other substantial step of trial begins holding a selfrepresentation request untimely where made after voir dire had begun but before the jury had been empaneled holding no violation of substantial rights occurred during voir dire where record did not show that defendant was denied fair and impartial trial