DCA 1987). The trial court denied his motion. The district court reversed. On review of the defendant’s petition for habeas corpus, we held that the “trial court may not enunciate new reasons for a departure sentence after the reasons given for the original departure -requires written reasons for departing from the guidelines, section 775.084 now requires written reasons only when the court finds that a habitual felony offender sentence is “not necessary for the protection of the public.” § 775.084(3)(a)6., Fla. Stat. (2001); see Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.701(d)(11). Even if the statutes had not been amended, the underlying reason for our decision in Shull—preventing after-the-fact justifications for a previously imposed departure sentence — is not implicated here. See Jones, 559 So.2d at 206 (<HOLDING>). On remand for resentencing as a habitual
holding for crimes committed on or after october 1 1988 the sentencing guidelines do not apply to habitual offender sentences recognizing that shull does not apply to habitual offender sentencing and stating that this was not a case where the judge relied upon a reason for departure that was later declared invalid but rather one in which the judge considered his sentence to be one to which the guidelines did not apply holding that a district judge does not enjoy the benefit of a legal presumption that the guidelines sentence should apply holding that blakely does not apply to the federal sentencing guidelines holding that where original sentencing judge imposed a guidelines sentence defendant could not be sentenced as a habitual offender upon violation of probation