Rules of Evidence. His critiques of Kumho Tire are thus especially persuasive. 51 . Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588, 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786. 52 . Id. at 588, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (internal citations omitted). 53 . Widmyer v. Southeast Skyways, Inc., 584 P.2d 1, 8 (Alaska 1978). 54 . Coon, 974 P.2d at 390, 391, 394-96. 55 . See, e.g., Mogck, supra n. 50, at 321. 56 . Id. at 322 (quoting Marilee M. Kaspa & Carl B. Meyer, Scientific Experts: Making Their Testimony More Reliable, 35 Cal W.L.Rev. 313, 319 (1999)). 57 . Stephen A. Saltzburg, Questioning the Judicial Role in Dealing With Expert Testimony in Complex and Non-Complex Cases, 3 Sedona Conf. J. 185, 185 (2002). 58 . Mogck, supra n. 50, at 315-18 (internal citations omitted). 59 . See Logerquist v. McVey, 196 Ariz. 470, 1 P.3d 113, 125-30 (2000) (<HOLDING>); Gilkey v. Schweitzer, 295 Mont. 345, 983 P.2d
holding that the result reached in kumho  would seem directly opposed to the principle of liberalized admissibility that engendered the abolition of frye and approaches a reduction or obliteration of the jury function holding that the frye test and the federal rules can coexist holding that a trial judge cannot usurp the function of the jury as triers of fact if the amount awarded by their verdict is supported by sufficient evidence and is reached by a fair and impartial jury holding that frye was inapplicable when evidence is in the nature of physical comparisons as opposed to scientific tests or experiments holding use of mtdna analysis to prove identity satisfied frye test for admissibility of new or novel scientific evidence