that the “claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable,” §2244(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added); §2244(b)(4). Relying on Circuit precedent, see Brown v. Leming, 171 F. 3d 1031 (CA5 1999); In re Smith, 142 F. 3d 832 (CA5 1998), the Court of Appeals concluded that Tyler did not meet this standard because he “could not show that any Supreme Court decision renders the Cage decision retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” App. 15. The Courts of Appeals are divided on the question whether Cage was “made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court,” as required by 28 U. S. C. § 2244(b)(2)(A). Compare Rodriguez v. Superintendent, 139 F. 3d 270 (CA1 1998) (<HOLDING>); Brown, supra (same); In re Hill, 113 F. 3d
holding that child support should have been made retroactive holding the supreme court has not held in a case or a combination of cases that the rule in johnson is retroactive to cases on collateral review and therefore it has not made johnson retroactive holding that cage has been made retroactive to cases on collateral review holding that the act is not retroactive holding that cage has not been made retroactive by the supreme court