statute? [Counsel]: There’s no answer that I can give Your Honor, just wasn’t done, and my argument is that the merits of the statute, the substance, the intent of it has been fulfilled based on the report that has been provided. It is apparent that non-compliance with the statute in this case was due to attorney carelessness. An attorney’s carelessness does not qualify as an extraordinary circumstance. See Palanque, supra, 327 N.J.Super. at 164, 742 A.2d 1002; see also Burns v. Belafsky, 326 N.J.Super. 462, 471-72, 741 A.2d 649 (App.Div.1999); Hyman Zamft Manard, L.L.C. v. Cornell, 309 N.J.Super. 586, 593, 707 A.2d 1068 (App.Div.1998); cf. Hartsfield v. Fantini, 149 N.J. 611, 619, 695 A.2d 259 (1997) and Wallace v. JFK Hartwyck at Oak Tree, Inc., 149 N.J. 605, 610, 695 A.2d 257 (1997) (<HOLDING>). The order is reversed. The case is remanded
holding in both eases that an attorneys mistake cannot give rise to extraordinary circumstances capable of relaxing the thirtyday limitations period for filing a demand for a trial de novo after arbitration holding that the proper review for the trial courts application of the law is de novo holding plaintiffs motion for trial de novo of award in counterclaim only but not of damages awarded in main cause of action was not void and remanding for a trial de novo of both the main cause of action and the counterclaim holding that review of the denial of a motion to compel arbitration is under the de novo standard recognizing de novo standard of review