60(b) motion does not pertain to "territory occupied by AEDPA”), cert. denied sub nom. Lanzotti v. United States, 537 U.S. 1140, 123 S.Ct. 937, 154 L.Ed.2d 836 (2003), cert. denied sub nom. Hunt v. United States, 537 U.S. 1234, 123 S.Ct. 1353, 155 L.Ed.2d 199 (2003), cert. denied sub nom. Dunlap v. Frank, - U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 2644, 156 L.Ed.2d 662 (2003); Boyd v. United States, 304 F.3d 813, 814 (8th Cir.2002) (per curiam) (directing district courts to conduct "a brief initial inquiry to determine whether the allegations in the Rule 60(b) motion in fact amount to a second or successive collateral attack” in which case the motion should be denied as barred or transferred to the Court of Appeals for certification); Thompson v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 918, 921 & n. 3 (9th Cir.1998) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). The Fifth Circuit appears to take a dim view
holding that district courts may properly treat rule 60b motions as successive habeas petitions holding that motion filed under fedrcivp 60b properly construed as successive  2255 motion holding in a preaedpa context that a rule 60b motion is the practical equivalent of a successive habeas corpus petition and therefore is subject to a cause and prejudice analysis holding that a rule 60b motion ordinarily should be treated as a successive habeas petition but declining to adopt a bright line rule equating all rule 60b motions with successive habeas petitions holding that a certificate of appealability is unnecessary where a district court dismisses a rule 60b motion as an unauthorized successive habeas motion