than 30 days after the final order of exclusion or deportation. Narayan v. INS, 105 F.3d 1335, 1335 (9th Cir.1997). This statute of limitation is a jurisdictional bar. Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405, 115 S.Ct. 1537, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995). Furthermore, the filing of a motion to reopen does not toll the statutory time for filing the petition for review of the underlying final deportation order. Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1258 (9th Cir.1996). Moutafov filed his petition for review with this court over one year after the BIA’s August 24, 1999 final order of deportation. According to the declaration he filed in support of his motion to reopen, Moutafov learned that his appeal from the immigration judge’s decision had been dismissed in December 1999 , 1190-91 (9th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>); Namkung v. Boyd, 226 F.2d 385, 389-90 (9th
holding that alien need not receive actual notice for due process requirements to be satisfied holding that due process rights were not violated when alien claimed a lack of actual notice but his attorney received notice holding that actual notice fulfills a notice requirement that an applicable federal regulation be conspicuously posted because actual notice is the best notice holding that due process is satisfied where notice is mailed to the wrong address if the appellant received actual notice holding that a notice of deficiency was invalid where it was the second notice mailed for that year and the taxpayer timely petitioned the court as to the first notice