We are not persuaded by this argument. Contrary to the scenario contemplated in Jenkins, Barghi presented no evidence disputing the trial court’s earlier rul E2d 460) (2010) (noting differences between a jury trial and a bench trial, and that with a jury trial “[12] persons... sit in judgment..., and... the prosecutor . . . bearfs] the burden of convincing each one of the twelve persons of [the defendant’s] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” and that by waiving the right to a jury trial, a defendant “forfeit[s] the voir dire process and his right to have the 12 persons chosen through that process decide his guilt or innocence, and that the judge instead . . . mak[es] that determination.”); Hopkins v. State, 209 Ga. App. 337, 338 (3) (433 SE2d 423) (1993) (physical precedent only)
holding that where there is competent evidence to support the courts findings the admission of incompetent evidence is not prejudicial holding that the trier of fact must be allowed to consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence holding that a trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment holding that in a bench trial it is presumed that the judge as trier of fact is able to distinguish between competent and incompetent evidence and consider only that evidence which is admissible holding that there must be sufficient competent evidence from which the trier of fact could estimate the amount of damages with a reasonable degree of certainty