(1967). Williams, however, contends that Ohio’s doctrine of res judicata does not constitute an adequate and independent state ground. First, he argues that Ohio courts do not consistently apply this procedural rule in capital cases. Second, he argues that Ohio’s post-conviction system does not meet the requirements of due process in that it does not provide adequate discovery. Williams’s arguments are without merit. First, “this court has rejected claims that Ohio has failed to apply [the doctrine of res judicata ] consistently.” Greer v. Mitchell, 264 F.3d 663, 673 (6th Cir.2001); see also Monzo v. Edwards, 281 F.3d 568, 577 (6th Cir.2002) (deeming Ohio’s doctrine of res judicata an adequate and independent state procedural ground); Jacobs v. Mohr, 265 F.3d 407, 417 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Mopes v. Coyle, 171 F.3d 408, 421 (6th
holding that the doctrine of res judicata applies to deportation proceedings holding that res judicata did not apply where a trial courts order was not a final judgment holding that ohios doctrine of res judicata as a procedural bar is regularly applied by the ohio courts holding that the doctrine of res judicata barred successive lawsuits by siblings asserting the same claims because the doctrine of res judicata bars both parties and their privies from relitigating an issue already decided holding that the doctrine of res judicata is applicable to defenses that could have been raised in a prior action