and, Whitney claims, Whitney has been engaged in “settlement discussions” with plaintiffs for the seven months between that time and July 2007, when Whitney sought the Court’s permission to file the instant motion. See Whitney Mem. at 12; Waldner Deck Ex. R (email from Whitney’s counsel to plaintiffs dated 12/21/06); Declaration of Thomas Attonito dated July 18, 2007, ¶ 8 (“Whitney has not filed the instant application to vacate the default until now since I was in negotiations with the Funds in an attempt to settle this matter.”). However, these allegations, even if true, make Whitney’s delay in moving to vacate the default judgment less reasonable, not more so, as they show a conscious decision to delay. See Dow Chem. Pac. Ltd. v. Rascator Mar. S.A., 782 F.2d 329, 336 (2d Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). In sum, Whitney has offered nothing that
holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that motion to set aside default made at least seven months after defendant learned of entry of default was not made within a reasonable time holding that the trial court was without authority to set aside entry of default on motion to set aside default judgment holding that in considering the appellants opposition to the motion for a default judgment it is proper to apply the rule 55c standard for setting aside the entry of a default holding that superior court did not abuse its discretion in finding that rule 60b6 motion was made within a reasonable time holding that trial court must make entry of default prior to entry of default judgment and court may not make entry of default when there is no default in law or in fact