the “stan dards” of the ADA on which she bases her claims. Opp’n at 3 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794(d)). In its reply, Defendant argues that the Court should not grant leave to amend right now, because there is a split of authority regarding the extent of the Rehabilitation Act’s incorporation of the ADA due to the fact that the Rehabilitation Act only refers to the “standards” of the ADA; Reply at 9 n.4 (Docket No. 12). Defendant’s argument is unpersuasive. “The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2).. The cases cited by Defendant differ on whether certain of the ADA’s procedural limitations also apply under the Rehabilitation Act. Compare Flynn v. Distinctive Home Care, Inc., No. 5:13-CV-0936-RP, 2015 WL 1004404, at *3-5 (W.D.Tex. Mar. 5, 2015) (<HOLDING>), with Adams v. District of Columbia, 740
holding that the adas bar on claims by independent contractors applied to rehabilitation act claims holding that the same standards apply to claims under the ada and under the rehabilitation act holding the ada and the rehabilitation act applicable holding that the adas exhaustion requirement did not apply to rehabilitation act claims holding rehabilitation act applicable