. . . “(iii) A mental or emotional impairment which results from a personnel action, including, but not limited to, a transfer, promotion, demotion or termination.” 5 We recognize that the enactment of § 31-275 (16) (B) (i) raises questions about the continued viability of the McNamara decision with respect to the facts of that case. See remarks of Representative Lucien A. Dimeo on House Bill 7172, enacted as Public Acts 1993, No. 93-228. 36 H.R. Proc., Pt. 18, 1993 Sess., pp. 6201-6202. Nevertheless, the general principles outlined in that opinion are still applicable. 6 At oral argument, Sherwood’s counsel conceded that, following his discharge, the claimant remained on Sherwood’s premises with the status of licensee, and perhaps even had hio St. 66, 70, 60 N.E.2d 660 (1945) (<HOLDING>); see also A. Larson, supra, § 26.31, pp.
holding that injury incurred when employee returned to retrieve paycheck six days after employment had been terminated occurred in course of employment holding that a plaintiff had an employment interest until the date his appointment terminated holding compensable injuries sustained when employee returned to employers premises two days after employment had been terminated in order to retrieve personal tools and tool box holding that an assault that occurred immediately after the employee was discharged was in the course of the employment holding that plaintiffs claims were precluded by csra because actions complained of arose from federal employment relationship even though many of the alleged violations occurred after the employment relationship was terminated