however, that rather than attribute Hemphill’s acceptance of the plea offer to coercion by the district court, we may logically conclude that Hemphill accepted the plea offer on September 28 because the Government had reduced the agreed-to sentence from seven years to five years. But what “we do not and cannot know [is] whether [Hemphill] would have accepted the plea agreement absent participation by the court.” Id. The record in fact suggests otherwise. Hemphill indicated on September 20 that he wanted to proceed to trial, he was diligently preparing for trial, and he gave no contrary indication prior to accepting the plea offer on the morning of September 28. The district court imparted the knowledge that several defendants who . 74, 83, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 2340, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004) (<HOLDING>). IV. The district court did more than offer
holding that a reasonable probability is one that in the judgment of the reviewing court is  sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding citation omitted holding that a new trial was warranted where there is reasonable probability that the false testimony introduced by the government influenced the outcome of the trial holding that to establish stricklandpierce prejudice in the appellate representation context the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the direct appeal proceeding would have been different but for counsels deficient performance holding reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome holding that improper prosecutorial references did not raise a reasonable probability that but for the remarks the outcome would be different due to sufficient independent evidence establishing guilt