deadlines — and then apply that concept using conventional computer technology and the Internet, they fail to meet section 101’s subject matter eligibility requirements. “While running a particular process on a computer undeniably improves efficiency and accuracy, cloaking an otherwise abstract idea in the guise of a computer-implemented claim is insufficient to bring it within section 101.” My Space, Inc. v. Graphon Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1267 (Fed. Cir.2012) (Mayer, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted); see Bancorp Servs., LLC v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir.2012) (concluding that claims directed to a computerized method of managing a stable value protected life insurance policy fell outside section 101); Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed.Cir. 2012) (<HOLDING>); Fort Props., Inc. v. Am. Master Lease LLC,
holding that officers were entitled to qualified immunity because they did not know the residence for which they obtained a warrant actually contained multiple units holding that section 1823e applies only to assets and does not apply to claims regarding letters of credit because letters of credit are liabilities rather than assets holding that a credit issuing bank did not breach a credit agreement when it unilaterally modified the terms holding that claims drawn to a method of applying for credit did not satisfy section 101 notwithstanding the fact that they contained a limitation requiring the invention to be computer aided recognizing statutory credit