local land office. Section 4 of the 1875 Act ... recognized that: all such lands over which such right of way shall pass shall be disposed of subject to such right of way. 43 U.S.C. § 937. By making the disposition of such lands “subject to” the right-of-way, the Act explicitly negated the theory that these lands were not included in the “disposition.” To the contrary, the Act recognized the future disposition of the lands over which the right-of-way passes. Id. at 1314. See also Chicago & North Western Ry. Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 253 F.2d 468 (10th Cir.1958) (oil and gas within right of way under 1875 Act belonged not to railroad but to private owner of the servient estate, who had leased oil and gas rights to Continental Oil); Beres v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 403, 427 (2005) (<HOLDING>). Section 4 of the 1875 Act thus undercuts AT &
holding under basic principles of property law that easement rights are subject to regulation by the forest service as the owner of the servient estate holding that grant of a cart road did not restrict use of easement to horsedrawn vehicles but rather created a general right of way for vehicles and stating that we should be very slow to hold that even ancient rights of way not expressly restricted as to the type of vehicle  could not be employed at all for the means of transportation in common use by a succeeding generation holding that patents to lands over which rights of way created under 1875 act passed conveyed the servient estate in the right of way holding that the burden on the servient estate cannot be increased without the consent of the owners of the servient estate and that the owner of the dominant estate to which the appurtenant easement is attached has no power to convey or expand use of that easement in connection with a tract of land owned by another holding that railroad right of way under the act of march 3 1875 ch 152 18 stat 482 vested upon actual construction of the road