to § 157(d).”). This opinion constitutes the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. A separate order shall be entered pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr.P. 9021. ORDER Pursuant to the memorandum opinion entered contemporaneously herewith, it is ORDERED that this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to decide the Plaintiffs’ defamation claims. The Plaintiffs have until August 7, 2009 to either (A) dismiss their defamation claims, so that their unfair trade practice and nondis-chargeability claims may be tried in this Court or (B) move the United States District Court to withdraw the reference and try the defamation claims or all of the claims in this adversary proceeding in the District Court. 1 . Compare Moore v. Idealease of Wilmington, 358 B.R. 248, 250 (E.D.N.C.2006) (<HOLDING>); In re Erickson, 330 B.R. 346, 349
holding that claims under 42 usc  1983 are not personal injury tort claims holding that retaliation claims are not cognizable under 42 usc  1981 holding that civil rights claims under 42 usc  1981 and 1982 are personal injury tort claims holding that civil rights claims at least those arising under 42 usc  1983 were subject to the applicable states personal injury statute of limitations holding that a civil rights deprivation is a personal injury tort