it paid him and therefore ratified the contract in its entirety. We disagree. The Georgia Supreme Court has previously held that a county commission’s “power to approve the whole includes the power to approve any part thereof less than the whole. [Cits.]” Bd. of Public Ed. &c. v. Zimmerman, 231 Ga. 562, 568 (II) (203 SE2d 178) (1974). In this case, the county commission voted against approving Powell’s written contract. Under these circumstances, we cannot find that its later payment to Powell for work provided should be construed as approval or ratification of his entire written contract. Instead, as held by the trial court, Powell’s payment should be construed as approval of at-will employment by the board of tax assessors. Cf. Ogletree v. Chester, 682 F2d 1366, 1371 (11th Cir. 1982) (<HOLDING>). Decided March 25, 2008 Groover & Childs,
holding that an atwill employee may not recover for discriminatory discharge under section 1981 because the atwill relationship was not sufficiently contractual under tennessee law holding that an atwill employee may not be discharged for refusal to violate the law holding that an atwill employee may bring a cause of action under section 1981 holding that absent a law or collective bargaining agreement a municipal employee is an employee atwill holding county employee with unenforceable contract was atwill employee