contains the right of passage and access to the premises. Thus, the fact that TIA had such a right does not distinguish the present case from Gibbs, in which the defendant also had a license to use the premises but was not found to have maintained or controlled the premises. The plaintiffs’ argument in this case is further weakened by the fact that, under the contract between NYCCOC and TIA, just as was the case in Gibbs, NYCCOC, the “licensor,” explicitly retained the duty of maintenance and repair. (Varvaro Deck Ex. I, Feb. 10, 2006 Revised Agreement ¶ 22.) Hence, the plaintiffs have failed to present evidence showing that TIA owned, maintained, or controlled the space to justify imposing on TIA the nondelegable duty of the owner of premises. See Lyons, 2007 WL 2265577, at *5 (<HOLDING>). Because the plaintiffs have not proffered any
holding that the decoration contractor freeman was not subject to premises liability because it did not occupy own control or make special use of the premises at the javits center holding that defendant properly established that it did not owe premises liability duty because it did not own occupy or control premises where injury occurred but that defendant was not entitled to traditional summary judgment because it failed to address duty arising out of alleged creation of dangerous condition holding that while a lawfully issued warrant to search premises authorizes the officers executing it to search in a reasonable manner whatever spots within the described premises their professional experience indicates may be used as a cache for the items named in the warranty such a warrant does not by its own force permit a search of the persons residents or visitorswho chance to be at the premises at the time the warrant is executed or belongings of a nonresident visitor present on the premises holding that the policy insured property but failure to occupy premises negated coverage holding that a contractor had no duty of care to a third party under a premises liability theory because the contractor was not a landowner or occupier but expressing no opinion as to whether the contractor owed a duty to the third party under general negligence principles because the third partys legal theory was restricted to premises liability