United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 204, 103 S.Ct. 2309, 76 L.Ed.2d 515 (1983) (determining that “Congress intended a broad range of property to be included in the estate”). “Courts have uniformly held that the broad scope of § 541 encompasses causes of action existing at the time” the bankruptcy action commences. Cain v. Hyatt, 101 B.R. 440, 441-42 (E.D.Pa.1989) (citations omitted); see also In re Ozark Restaurant Equipment Co., 816 F.2d 1222, 1225 (8th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848, 108 S.Ct. 147, 98 L.Ed.2d 102 (1987) (stating that “it is clear that causes of action belonging to the debtor at the commencement of the case are included within the definition of property of the estate”) (emphasis in original); Tignor v. Parkinson, 729 F.2d 977, 980 (4th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); Lambert v. Fuller Co., Inc., 122 B.R. 243,
holding that a preliminary injunction was a reasonable means of preserving the status quo and was of the same character as the ultimate relief sought when a few but not all of the causes of action in the complaint were of an equitable nature including causes of action for unjust enrichment and imposition of constructive trust recognizing broad scope of the reorganization estate holding that there is no question  that the estate includes causes of action such as the truth in lending claims holding that the scope of section 541 is broad and includes all kinds of property including causes of action holding that a debtors interest in a tenancy by the entirety is property of the bankruptcy estate under section 541 because of debtors undivided present interests in the use possession income and right of survivorship of the property