counsel, for example, if the record had been ambiguous as to which of the two rights — the right to counsel or the right to self-representation — the defendant wished to invoke. In any event, although we recognize that, in Faretta, the Court did conclude that defendant's waiver of the right to counsel was knowing and voluntary, see 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, and did cite the trial judge’s warning to Faretta that self-representation was "a mistake" as supportive of that conclusion, id., we do not understand every identification of a factor relevant to the assessment of a knowing and intelligent waiver of a constitutional right to establish the factor as a prerequisite to a valid waiver. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 232-33, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (<HOLDING>); Willbright v. Smith, 745 F.2d 779, 780 (2d
holding under state constitution that validity of consent search requires knowledge of right to refuse consent holding that the mere assertion of constitutional right to refuse consent to search does not supply probable cause to search holding threat to obtain a search warrant if individual does not consent to a search is just one factor in deciding whether the totality of the circumstances supports a voluntary consent finding holding that persons knowledge of his right to refuse a consent to search is a factor but not a necessary prerequisite to demonstrating a voluntary consent holding that defendants consent to search his person while on board an interstate bus was voluntary even though the police did not tell the defendant of his right to refuse consent