estate. 11 U.S.C. §§ 323, 704(a)(1) (2007); Fields v. Byrd, supra. Bibbs argues first that his causes of action accrued after he filed bankruptcy. If he were correct, the lawsuit would belong to him rather than the bankruptcy estate. Our reading of the complaint and Bibbs’s deposition, however, convinces us that Bibbs’s causes of action accrued prior to his filing bankruptcy. First, the core ofBibbs’s complaint is that the Bank forced him into bankruptcy, which necessarily entails pre-bankruptcy misconduct. Secondly, the numerous incidents of wrongdoing on which Bibbs’s causes of action were based generally occurred before Bibbs filed bankruptcy on August 25, 2003. Bibbs’s causes of action were viable at that point. See Courtney v. First Nat’l Bank, 300 Ark. 498, 780 S.W.2d 536 (1989) (<HOLDING>). The fact that some of the Bank’s alleged
recognizing cause of action recognizing the cause of action holding that a cause of action accrues the moment the right to commence the action comes into existence holding that a cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the time of the breach holding that the right to recover statutory damages accrues at the moment the privacy act was violated