of the Ex parte Young doctrine in Verizon, 535 U.S. at 645-48, 122 S.Ct. 1753, its discussion of tribal sovereign immunity in Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58-59, 98 S.Ct. 1670, or its decisions allowing affirmative injunctions against state officers under Ex parte Young, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977). Ill-positioned as we are to issue retractions for the highest court in the land, we will assume arguendo that footnote 11 is not a dead letter circa 2008. But our discussion should not be mistaken for an endorsement of its continuing vitality, and any court that would rely on footnote 11 to bar an Ex parte Young suit would have to grapple with the issue of its possible obsolescence. Taking a cue from P Ct. 164, 31 L.Ed. 216 (1887) (<HOLDING>). These cases, from whence came Larson’s
holding that sovereign immunity prevents suit to enjoin state officer from bringing tax collection suits against persons who had paid taxes with bond coupons where such collection was alleged to breach bondholders contract and where specific performance of acceptance of coupons was requested holding that sovereign immunity prevents suit to compel state comptroller general to levy a tax to fund redemption of revenue bond scrip holding that sovereign immunity prevents mandamus action to compel state officers to levy a tax to pay bondholders holding that sovereign immunity prevents bondholders foreclosure suit holding that immunity from suit precluded claim for breach of contract for sale of county property and request for specific performance of contract