(emphasis added). This domestic consumptive demand exception provided for in the latter half of the provision is crucial given the facts of this case. The parties agree that no domestic cocoa production industry exists in the United States sufficient to meet domestic consumptive demand. In such instances, the statute expressly prohibits application of any of the provisions found within it. As a result, the regulations promulgated pursuant to the statute, which merely direct how Customs will implement the directives of the statute, can neither be invoked nor relied upon by plaintiffs in this case. Therefore, any injury relying on 19 C.F.R. § 12.24 cannot be redressed by this court where the consumptive demand exception applies. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (<HOLDING>). In other words, because of the undisputed
holding that the plaintiffs have the burden of proof and persuasion as to the existence of standing holding that any potential prejudice regarding burdenshifting is diminished by the prosecutors statement that the burden of proof is the governments and the courts explicit instructions regarding the burden of proof in the jury charge recognizing plaintiff met this burden holding that where prayedfor recourse to interagency rule would not redress injury claimed by plaintiffs burden of proof regarding standing could not be met holding that plaintiffs  lack standing because the court cannot issue the requested writ of mandamus and thus cannot redress the alleged injury