still owns the Spark Street property, he has abandoned — or forfeited — that property as his homestead. On that question, the Debtor does not deny that he moved from Spark Street to his wife’s home years ago, lives there with his wife and child, and that he had no intent to return to the Spark Street home either at the time he moved out, or at the time he filed his Petition. His assertion that “nothing prohibits [him] from moving out of his wife’s house today and into his real estate, the only real estate Debtor owns, should that be required” does not state any fixed or actual purpose or intent to return and reside there. He has, therefore, abandoned the Spark Street property as his homestead. The Debtor asserts that the Bankruptcy Court’s denial of his April 2, 1997) (not reported) (<HOLDING>). 17 . Hewitt v. Carlson, 60 S.D. 168, 244 N.W.
holding that where appellants owned and resided upon contiguous 60acre rural farm and used 18 acres as a mobile home park 18acre tract was part of the rural homestead holding that the relevant intent is not the intent to return ultimately but the intent to return to the united states within a relatively short period holding even though debtor would have been entitled to iowa homestead exemption but for former spouses iowa code section 59821 lien debtor could not avoid the lien because it attached to the homestead prior to or simultaneously with debtors acquisition of the interest in the homestead holding that the general rule is that temporary absence from the premises will not itself cause an abandonment of the homestead but to retain the homestead exemption one leaving the homestead must in good faith intend to return albeit the intent to return need not be at any particular time in the future holding that debtor could not claim homestead in rural property which he owned but did reside and to which he indicated no intent to return