S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004) (“[G]iving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility.”)); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n. 20,104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (“[C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was ‘compelled’ despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.”). A court must consider the “totality of the circumstances” in determining whether a Defendant’s statement was voluntary. DeWeaver, 556 F.3d at 1003 (citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit has held that serious pain and discomfort does not necessarily render confessions involuntary. See United States v. Martin, 781 F.2d 671, 673-74 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). In United States v. Coleman, 208 F.3d 786
holding that warrantless search of defendants vehicle was legal because defendants consent was voluntary even through he was in police custody at the time of giving consent holding that even though defendant began to display physical signs of withdrawal his waiver was voluntary because he remained coherent and responsive was aware of what was going on and told the  agents that he was able to continue with questioning holding that trial court did not err in admitting statements made two hours after defendants blood alcohol level was 026 when trial court found that during questioning the defendant was coherent and that his answers  were extremely reasonable responsive and appropriate  holding victims statement testimonial where it was elicited in response to structured police questioning pursuant to a police investigation holding that a defendants statement made outside of police custody was voluntary because he was awake and relatively coherent during the questioning despite painful injuries