behavior reaches the point of violence. See State v. James M., 806 P.2d 1063, 1066 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990) (finding it unreasonable to impose a requirement that a police officer wait until the hearer actually violently reacted to defendant’s speech before charging disorderly conduct). ¶ 11. Finally, the dissent suggests that in our holding today we overreach and unnecessarily “criminalize speech.” We find it hard to support the notion that criminalizing the rage of epithets and accusations of passing on a sexually-transmitted disease hurled by defendant at Foster constitutes the type of speech intended to be protected by the First Amendment. There are certainly instances in which the profanity and insults used by defendant would be protected speech. See e.g., John W., 418 A.2d at 1108 (<HOLDING>); Ware v. City & County of Denver, 511 P.2d
holding that passengers of automobiles that are pulled over by a police officer for a traffic stop are seized under the fourth amendment holding epithets directed at police officer as a protest to arrest after officer refused to tell juveniles why they had been pulled over were constitution ally protected speech holding that although jury found officer not to have had probable cause for arrest officer was entitled to immunity because law was not clearly established as to circumstances in which officer found himself holding testimony of officer explaining how officer came to suspect appellant was not objectionable as hearsay because it was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted but to show why the officer got an arrest warrant for and arrested appellant holding police officer is a public official