examination, and representation by counsel. Isaac, 605 N.E.2d at 148 (footnote omitted). In Strowmatt v. State, 686 N.E.2d 154, 158 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), we concluded that the trial court did not violate a probationer’s due process rights by hearing the evidence at trial as evidence in the probation revocation proceedings. We determined that during the criminal trial, the defendant had the representation of counsel and the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses as required by Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(e). Judicial economy mandates that some flexibility be taken in probation revocation proceedings. “[D]ue process is not so rigid as to require that the significant interests in informality, flexibility, and economy must always be sacrificed.” Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 788, 93 S.Ct. 1756 (<HOLDING>). We conclude that Lightcap was afforded the
holding that the right to counsel in probation revocation proceedings is not absolute where the defendant has been convicted of or has admitted to committing a crime holding that probation revocation proceedings are clearly not criminal proceedings holding that the general rules of preservation apply in probation revocation proceedings recognizing right of allocution in probation revocation proceedings holding that a defendant was not constitutionally entitled to counsel at a probation revocation hearing when he admitted to violating the terms of his probation and refused the district courts offer to appoint counsel