motorist to make final decision); Conrad v. Schwendiman, 680 P.2d 736 (Utah 1984) (applying statute that requires a motorist to take the test “immediately” upon request). Cases from those jurisdictions are of no instructive value here. Among, the states where the issue has been addressed by case law rather than by statute, we find two competing schools of thought. One school teaches that the motorist’s initial expression of unwillingness is a “refusal,” complete unto itself, and that such a “refusal” cannot be recanted by any subsequent assent. Webb v. Miller, 187 Cal.App.3d 619, 232 Cal.Rptr. 50 (1986); Wisch v. Jensen, 221 Neb. 609, 379 N.W.2d 755 (1986); State v. Corvado, 184 N.J.Super. 561, 446 A.2d 1229 (App.Div.1982). Cf. Harlan v. State, 113 N.H. 194, 308 A.2d 856, 858 (1973) (<HOLDING>). These cases rely heavily upon a perceived
holding that a test need not be administered once a substantial time has elapsed from the initial refusal holding that the court may presume it has jurisdiction over a case once the plaintiffs initial burden of establishing jurisdiction has been satisfied recognizing that because accuracy of a chemical test under the implied consent law does not depend upon its being administered immediately after an arrest  a delay for a reasonable period of time while an arrested person considers or reconsiders a decision to take a test will not frustrate objective of law holding that refusal to submit to breathalyzer test did not result from custodial interrogation holding that a refusal to sign an implied consent form is not a refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test for purposes of section 1547