finding. Therefore, the Commission’s finding on the claimant’s inability to work is conclusive on appeal. See Adams, 349 N.C. at 681, 509 S.E.2d at 414. Moreover, contrary to the majority’s position, the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata do not apply to the case sub judice. Although our Court in Lewis I affirmed the Commission’s finding that the claimant “had wage earning capacity” for a claim of a change in condition pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-47, we did not litigate the claimant’s earning capacity as it relates to the issue of whether the Form 26 agreement was improvidently approved by the Commission. See Lewis v. Craven Regional Medical Center, 122 N.C. App. 143, 468 S.E.2d 269 (1996); Brooks v. Stroh Brewery Co., 95 N.C. App. 226, 382 S.E.2d 874 (1989) (<HOLDING>); King v. Grindstaff, 284 N.C. 348, 200 S.E.2d
holding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars readjudication of issues when 1 the prior suit resulted in judgment on the merits 2 identical issues are involved 3 the issue was actually litigated 4 the issue was actually determined and 5 the determination was necessary to the resulting judgment holding that a prior administrative decision actually decided ultimate factual issues that are essential to plaintiffs present claims and that issue preclusion therefore bars the relitigation of those issues holding that a civil claim is barred by collateral estoppel even though the prior adjudication was in criminal proceedings and the parties are not the same because the matters were actually litigated and decided in the prior trial holding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies when an issue of ultimate fact has necessarily been determined by a valid final judgment holding that the issues implicated by  523a6 were actually litigated in a california state intentional tort suit and therefore according the judgment collateral estoppel effect under california law