in those cases that also could corroborate the accomplice testimony. While there was additional corroborating evidence in both cases, the court’s language does not suggest that a less-than-positive identification requires such additional evidence, and appellant has been unable to direct us to any authority so holding. This cause is also distinguishable from other situations in which courts of appeals have found insufficient corroboration of juvenile accomplice testimony. See In re J.R.R., 689 S.W.2d 516, 519 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth) (reversing for insufficient corroboration where accomplice witness “was the only witness who in any way connected appellant to the crime”), modified, 696 S.W.2d 382 (Tex.1985); In re A.D.L.C., 598 S.W.2d 383, 385-86 (Tex.Civ.App.— Amarillo 1980, no writ) (<HOLDING>). In contrast, Green’s testimony, while not a
holding that new evidence is evidence not previously of record and not merely cumulative of other evidence holding insufficient corroboration where nonaccomplice evidence merely placed juvenile in same city and no evidence placed youth at scene of crime holding that new evidence must be evidence that is not merely cumulative holding that direct evidence of defendants dna found at the scene was direct evidence merely of a circumstance that suggested his participation in the burglary and theft but was not direct evidence of his participation in the burglary holding evidence legally and factually sufficient under sections d and e to terminate mothers parental rights based in part on evidence that mother placed children with physically abusive father