articulation in the witness’s testimony, and because the amplification may go undetected, the best solution would be to adopt a per se exclusionary rule. Ibid. Despite the lack of general acceptance among the scientific community, we did not impose a per se rule with Zani. Rather, citing the United States Supreme Court decision in Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987), we “declinefd] to adopt an exclusionary rule prohibiting hypnotic recall in every case.” Zani, 758 S.W.2d at 243. Although the law governing scientific evidence, the general acceptance standard of Frye, militated in favor of a per se exclusionary rale, the Supreme Court’s decision in Rock “rendered such a position untenable.” Id. at 242. See Rock, 483 U.S. 44, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (<HOLDING>). Yet the question of the reliability of
holding that  707b does not violate the equal protection guarantees of the fourteenth and fifth amendments of the united states constitution and rejecting debtors voidforvagueness argument holding a per se exclusionary rule banning hypnotically refreshed testimony of defendants testifying on their own behalf unconstitutional under the fifth sixth and fourteenth amendments of the united states constitution holding that the constitutional rights in a termination proceeding  are derived from the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the united states constitution and not the sixth amendment holding that it is wellsettled that the sixth and fourteenth amendments of the united states constitution guarantee a defendant on trial for his life the right to an impartial jury holding that the fifth amendments protection against selfincrimination is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment