not “vacate a guilty plea that was voluntarily and knowingly made.”). Coon’s Amended Motion does not explain how trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress influenced the knowing and voluntary nature of his guilty plea. See Rule 24.035(e) (requiring a post-conviction mov-ant to allege all facts necessary to show an entitlement to relief). In fact, the plea record indicates that Coon pled guilty aware that by doing so, he was waiving any right to challenge the legality of his arrest or the admissibility of evidence at trial. As a result, Coon has not demonstrated that trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress had any bearing on the knowing and voluntary nature of Coon’s plea. Coon cannot satisfy the first prong of the Strickland analysis. Lynn, 417 S.W.3d at 803-04 (<HOLDING>). Even if Coon could overcome this
holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel holding that the strickland test applies to claims  that counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal holding that the defendants guilty plea was entered into knowingly voluntarily and intelligently holding that when the defendant voluntarily and knowingly pleaded guilty he waived any claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the defendants inculpatory statements holding petitioner cannot claim he was denied right to assistance of counsel when he knowingly and voluntarily decided to represent himself