officer to find that an inmate “committed the prohibited act(s) charged, and/or a similar prohibited act{s) as described in the [notice],” id. § 541.8(a)(1) (emphasis added). Santiago-Lugo also asserts that he should have received notice that the “kite” would be used against him at his hearing. But nothing in Wolff’s due process requirements requires advance notice of specific evidence that will be used against a prisoner at a disciplinary hearing. AFFIRMED. 1 . The district court also relied on one Supreme Court decision, see Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524, 122 S.Ct. 983, 988, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002), but that reliance was misplaced. The Porter decision held that an inmate had to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit under the Pri 1th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Hogan, 986 F.2d
holding state and federal actions not parallel for colorado river purposes because the remedies were different  one was equitable and the other compensatory  and the sources of law came from different states holding that an arbitrator was not bound by an earlier award involving a different contract and different union holding that the plaintiffs had relied on illinois law because they could have filed in a different forum having a different statute of limitations holding that a states law is materially different from california law if application of the other states law leads to a different result holding that one of our prior panel precedents was undermined to the point of abrogation by begay v united states 553 us 137 128 sct 1581 170 led2d 490 2008 even though begay addressed a different crime and a different sentencing law