focused on whether communications were made with a reasonable expectation of confidentiality. See, e.g., id. at 239-40, 246, 751 A.2d 620 (finding that communications to pastor and deacon, who was also State Trooper, made after deacon searched defendant and advised him of his right to remain silent, were not privileged because defendant could not have reasonably expected that his communications would remain confidential); State v. List, 270 N.J.Super., 169, 174-75, 636 A.2d 1054 (App.Div.1993) (finding that defendant’s letter to his pastor, “left for anyone to find and read” in unsealed file folder in a file cabinet in defendant’s abandoned house, was not made with “a reasonable expectation of confidentiality”); see also In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 377 (3d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). We agree that the test should be an objective
holding that clergycommunicant privilege protects persons who reasonably expect that their words will be kept in confidence holding that statutory words must be given their ordinary contemporary meaning holding that no direct contractual relationship is required between the alleged tortfeasor and the person who justifiably relies to his or her detriment on the alleged tortfeasors representations because under restatement second of torts section 533 1977 hereinafter restatement persons who fraudulently misrepresent the truth can be held liable to third parties if they have a reason to expect their misrepresentation will be communicated to third parties holding that exemption 7c protects the privacy interests of all persons mentioned in law enforcement records whether they be investigators suspects witnesses or informants and their names are generally exempt from disclosure holding that we must give the words in statutes their plain and ordinary meaning