that, in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, the attorney’s fees are often incurred for the benefit of the child, such fees are not automatically “in the nature of child support.” These fees were not incurred for the enforcement of a child support obligation. Rather, the fees arise from a joint divorce proceeding and suit affecting the parent-child relationship, in which a child support obligation was created. Because these fees were specifically designated as costs under § 11.18 [currently Section 106.002], and are part of the divorce proceedmgs, we find that the fees are a debt Daggett, 869 S.W.2d at 637. Inexplicably, the Hardin Court cited Daggett as authority, even though Daggett is directly at odds with Hardin’s ultimate conclusion. See Hardin, 161 S.W.3d at 26-27 (<HOLDING>). With the exception of Hardin and today’s
holding that the order on the wifes petition for modification of child support was a final order because it disposed of all the issues except for the ancillary issue of attorneys fees holding that a judgment for attorneys fees may be rendered in the nature of child support regardless of whether the underlying action is one of enforcement or modification holding in modification suit in which no enforcement was ordered that trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering father to pay mothers attorneys fees as child support under the necessaries rule holding that attorneys fees and costs may not be awarded as child support when they are incurred in a suit to modify the parentchild relationship that does not involve the enforcement of a child support obligation holding in nonenforcement modification suit that court of continuing jurisdiction may order one parent to pay the reasonable attorneys fees of the other parent as additional child support if the fees are necessaries for the benefit of the children