insurer is liable either while the policy is in effect or after it has expired by its own terms. See Mezzacappo v. Travelers Ins. Co., 523 So.2d 291, 294 (La.Ct.App. 3d Cir.) (stating that there is “a distinct and important difference between ‘cancellation’ of an insurance contract by the insurer and ‘termination’ of coverage under a contract of insurance”), writ denied, 531 So.2d 473 (1988). Moreover, the cases do not consistently support Mrs. Gahn’s argument: depending on the factual context, opinions are split on whether an insurer must pay for treatment of a disease if the illness arises during the coverage period specified in the contract, but the actual services are rendered after that period. See, e.g., Matherne v. Prudential Ins. Co., 362 So.2d 823, 825 (La.Ct.App. 3d Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>); Tusa, 825 F.2d at 73 n. 3 (discussing the
holding that the incontestability provisions of the policy did not cause a preexisting illness to be covered because the illness first manifested itself before the policy became effective holding that defendant was not resident of his mothers household even though his drivers license listed his mothers address and he received mail there because he expressed a belief that his residence was in a different location than his mothers home he rented and occupied his own residence and he testified that he was only living with his mother after expiration of his lease until he could find another place to live holding that where employer paid benefits under group disability policy to employee under mistaken belief that his condition resulted from illness rather than injury arising out of and in course of employment employees acceptance of such benefits did not bar him from benefits to which he was entitled under workers compensation law and employer was properly allowed credit for payments made under disability policy holding that employee was consumer of medical insurance purchased by employer for employees benefit holding that the insured covered by a group insurance policy purchased through his employer was not entitled to continue receiving coverage for the treatment of his daughters illness after he terminated his employment