the public was allowed to enter for a recreational purpose (indeed, that was the only public purpose for the land). Likewise, the public license to recreate was clear in Widman v. Johnson, 81 Wn. App. 110, 111-12, 912 P.2d 1095 (1996), where a private company opened its forest land to the public exclusively for recreational purposes and posted signs stating, “ ‘The Forest Land Behind This Sign Is Open For RECREATIONAL USE ONLY5 ” on “ ‘virtually all entrances to its logging roads.’ ” That the logging roads could be used for nonrecreational uses, such as a driving shortcut by the nonrecreating public, did not change the fact that “[e]very reasonable person would also believe that [the company] had opened the [roads] for recreational use.” Id. at 114; see also Gaeta, 54 Wn. App. at 607 (<HOLDING>). ¶33 In Chamberlain v. Department of
holding that whether the public invitee may have some commercial purpose in mind was irrelevant to recreational immunity instead by opening up the lands for recreational use without a fee the landowner brought itself under the protection of the immunity statute holding that a beach bordering on puget sound used extensively for public recreation was completely wild open vacant unoccupied and in its natural state and therefore public use was presumed to have originated by permission until some act  of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege holding that so long as seattle city light opened up the diablo dam to the public for recreation immunity applied despite a contractual provision compelling it to open land for public recreational purposes holding contractors could not claim recreational immunity because they had no continuing authority to determine whether the land should be open to the public holding that a universityowned land used as a park was open to the public for purposes of section 602n