omitted). The rationale for the exception is that there are certain matters for which Congress so strongly intended [for there to be] an exclusive federal cause of action that what a plaintiff calls a state-law claim is to be recharacterized as a federal claim. Id. at 45. The United States Supreme Court has described complete preemption as a “narrow exception” to the general rule that an anticipated federal defense cannot support removal to federal court. Beneficial Nat. Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 5, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 156 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003). The Court finds that the instant action does not satisfy the second criteria for complete preemption because the FDCA expressly states that it does not provide a private federal cause of action. 21 U.S.C. § 337(a); see, e.g., Fayard, 533 F.3d at 48 (<HOLDING>); Asahi Kasei Pharma Corp. v. Actelion Ltd.,
holding that there was not complete preemption because the applicable federal statute did not provide a private right of action to redress the same kind of injury alleged in the plaintiffs statelaw claims recognizing private right of action holding that there was no federal question removal jurisdiction under the complete preemption exception to the wellpleaded complaint rule holding that a district court retained supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs statelaw claims after dismissing the plaintiffs federal claims and did not abuse its discretion by declining to remand the case to state court holding that removal is proper based on complete preemption only when congress intended the federal cause of action to be exclusive