rather than a PTO interference proceeding, we similarly have applied the person of ordinary skill standard in interferences when assessing priority under § 120, see Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed.Cir.2006), and see no reason to depart from that standard here. Moreover, § 120 requires that the disclosure actually appear within the specification, Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1571-72 (“It is the disclosures of the applications that count. Entitlement to a filing date does not extend to subject matter which is not disclosed, but would be obvious over what is expressly disclosed. ), and amendments in later applications cannot cure an otherwise defective application in the priority chain, see Encyc. Britannica, Inc. v. Alpine Elecs. of Am., Inc., 609 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed.Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). The incorporation by reference analysis,
holding that dismissal with leave to amend should be granted even if no request to amend was made holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint holding that ijlater applications cannot amend an application and restore its entitlement to priority holding that a court may deny leave to amend when the moving party had the opportunity to amend earlier but waited after judgment to do so holding the district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff who is represented by counsel never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court