issue, particularly here where the court expressly qualified its initial determination with the caveat “at this stage of the proceedings” and invited the Warden to re-raise the matter. Accordingly, Ivy’s reliance on the summary judgment standard is misplaced. More significantly, Ivy’s appellate brief is devoid of any affirmative substantive argument maintaining that his plea-offer claim is not procedurally defaulted. He not only fails to explain why the district court was wrong in its final order (which is, of course, the subject of this appeal), he also fails to explain why the court may have been correct in deciding that the Warden was not entitled to summary judgment based on procedural default in its December 2009 order. Cf. United States v. Clark, 469 F.3d 568, 570 (6th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Instead, all of the legal points and
holding that the appellant waived an argument listed only in his summary of the argument holding that defendant failed to raise a constitutional issue at trial and thus waived appellate review of that issue holding that defendant failed to raise a constitutional issue at trial and thus failed to preserve the issue for appellate review holding that the appellant developed his argument sufficiently to raise the issue for appellate review recognizing that the specific argument regarding an issue must be made in the trial court to preserve that issue for appellate review