for its end of the bargain, but the immediate benefit flowed to Dr. Cravens individually, not back to Willmar. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 129 (Tex.2004) (“As a rule, parties have the right to contract as they see fit as long as their agreement does not violate the law or public policy.”). Because Willmar and the Partnership clearly intended to secure a benefit for Dr. Cravens and contracted directly for his benefit, we hold that Dr. Cravens was not prohibited from securing a judgment against Appellants individually for statutory fraud under business and commerce code section 27.01. See' MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Tex. Utils. Elec. Co,, 995 S.W.2d 647, 651 (Tex.1999) (describing contours of third-party beneficiary status); AVCO Corp.,. 251 S.W.3d at 653-54 (<HOLDING>). We overrule the RCC Appellants’ issue 2a and
holding that insureds widow as beneficiary of life insurance policy had standing as an injured person under the insurance code recognizing ability of beneficiary to claim exemption in bankruptcy holding that lack of justiciable interest resulted in lack of standing to pursue claim and that lack of standing deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to act holding that an incidental beneficiary does not have standing to sue for breach of a contract holding that affiliate entity had standing to pursue fraudulent inducement claim as beneficiary of second addendum to master supply agreement