Depo. Ex. 4). Mr. Tuszkiewicz has simply not met his burden of showing that at the time of the adverse employment action, which he alleges, and the defendant concedes, took place in December, 1994, he was a qualified individual under the ADA. In an analogous case, the court of appeals for the seventh circuit held that because the plaintiff “failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to his ability to perform the essential functions of his job with reasonable accommodation” and because in the plaintiffs deposition, he stated that he was “unable to work” during the relevant time, summary judgment against his claim under the ADA was proper. Bombard, 92 F.3d at 564; see also Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 525 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Lewis v. Zilog, Inc., 908 F.Supp. 931, 946
holding an employee must be able to perform essential job functions at the time of termination holding that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she was unable to present evidence that she was qualified for the position holding that ada may obligate employer to reassign disabled employee who can no longer even with reasonable accommodation perform the essential functions of her job holding that plaintiff lacking standing to challenge employers policy that an employee had to be 100 healed before being permitted to return to work where plaintiff could not gain any relief from the per se violation of the ada because the plaintiff was not a qualified individual with a disability holding that the ada plaintiff was unable to perform essential functions of job when the plaintiffs psychotherapist had told the employer that the plaintiff was unable to work in any position when the plaintiff did not disagree with that point and when the plaintiff in response to a request for admission conceded that she was no longer able to work