all have been upheld against claims that they fall within Schwinn’s per se rule of prohibition. See Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco Inc., 472 F.2d 637 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 987, 93 S.Ct. 2274, 36 L.Ed.2d 965 (1973) (primary responsibility clause); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 76 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062, 90 S.Ct. 752, 24 L.Ed.2d 755 (1970) (exclusive dealership); Superior Bedding Co. v. Serta Associates, Inc., 353 F.Supp. 1143 (N.D.Ill.1972) (primary responsibility and profit pass-over clauses); Plastic Packaging Materials, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Co., 327 F.Supp. 213 (E.D.Pa.1971) (primary responsibility clause); but cf. Reed Brothers, Inc. v. Monsanto Company, 525 F.2d 486 (8th Cir., 1975) (<HOLDING>). A primary responsibility clause is basically
recognizing cause of action where plaintiffs allege fraud in inducing not the purchase of the bonds but their retention after purchase holding subsequent sale of property after sheriff announced he would sell no more property that day was void recognizing that courts have approved designation of areas of primary responsibility without more but holding that there was more in monsantos additional policies that effectively curtailed the ability of its distributors to sell monsanto herbicides after purchase to whomever they wished holding that there was no presumption of a gift where the wifes money was used to make the purchase but title was placed in the name of the husband and finding the facts sufficient to establish a purchase money resulting trust in favor of the wife holding that more than notice to a defendant is required