claims, we need not, and do not, address whether section 1823(e) also bars his claims or ting that every circuit court of appeals that has expressly addressed the asset limitation argument under the D’Oench doctrine has rejected it); Timberland Design, Inc. v. First Serv. Bank for Sav., 932 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir.1991) (“D’Oench protects the FDIC from [the plaintiffs] affirmative claims which are based upon an alleged oral agreement to lend money in the future.”); Bell & Murphy and Assocs. v. Interfirst Bank Gateway, N.A, 894 F.2d 750, 753 (5th Cir.1990) (rejecting argument that the D’Oench doctrine “bars only claims or defenses based upon unrecorded side agreements that defeat the FDIC’s interest in a specific asset acquired from a bank”); Hall v. FDIC, 920 F.2d 334, 339 (6th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit specifically
holding that the federal common law doench doctrine protects the fslic and the fdic in both receiver and corporate capacities holding that while section 1825b2 does not extinguish an earlier lien or excuse the payment of a tax by the fdic it does deny the ability to use a lien on fdic property as a vehicle for collection of delinquent tax holding that claims that do not diminish or defeat the fdics interest in any specific asset are nevertheless doench barred in light of the established purpose of the doench  doctrine to protect the fdics reliance on the banks records holding that a lien cannot be extinguished through a tax sale without the consent of the fdic holding that the doench doctrine protects the fdic even where the fdic does not have an interest in an asset