impinges upon that right without a legitimate, governmental purpose. The majority here simply relies upon the Court’s approval of the regulation in Griffin to conclude that Mr. Herring’s privacy right was not clearly established in this case. In so doing, the majority extrapolates from the Court’s naked holding without ever acknowledging the underlying analysis and reasoning, and fails entirely to apply that analysis and reasoning to the facts of this case. The majority thus ignores the clear holding in Griffin that a probationer has a constitutional right to privacy which is only limited insofar as the limitation is.justified by “the ‘special need[s]’ of the probation system.” Id. at 875, 107 S.Ct. 3164. See also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Doe v. Attorney Gen., 941 F.2d 780, 796 (9th
holding that regulations may impinge constitutional rights if the regulation is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests holding that prison regulations impinging on prisoners constitutional rights are only valid where reasonably related to legitimate penological interests holding that prison administration may infringe upon prisoners first amendment rights as long as the infringement is reasonably related to legitimate penological interest holding that when a prison regulation impinges on inmates constitutional rights the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests holding a publisheronly rule was constitutional because prison administrators are accorded deference and rule was reasonably related to the penological interest of maintaining internal prison security