804 (Sup.Ct.1997). However, the Dolías court determined its remittitur by “[c]onsidering all the testimony as to the suffering of the respective decedents, including the period of time of such suffering”, not by merely calculating the duration of the disease. Justice Helen Freedman initially applied monthly multipliers to recalculate pain and suffering damages. See, Didner v. Keene Corp., N.Y.L.J., Jan. 4, 1991 at 22 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. Dec. 17, 1990), aff'd, 188 A.D.2d 15, 593 N.Y.S.2d 238 (1st Dept.1993), modified, 82 N.Y.2d 342, 604 N.Y.S.2d 884, 624 N.E.2d 979 (1993). More recently, however, Justice Freedman has retreated from this practice and applied a reasonableness standard to remittitur motions. Manning v. Georgia Pacific Corporation, Index No. 102757/94, slip op. (February 3, 1995) (<HOLDING>). The rationale behind the abandonment of
recognizing as separate from pain and suffering holding that pain and suffering does not survive the death of the injured holding that didner may no longer be controlling and remitting pain and suffering verdict of 5 million to 4 million holding that claims for pain and suffering are the separate property of a spouse recognizing as an element of pain and suffering