underlying the entry of the guilty plea; (5) the defendant’s nature and background; (6) the degree to which the defendant has had prior experience with the criminal justice system; and (7) potential prejudice to the government if the motion to withdraw is granted. Id. (citation omitted). Upon a review of these factors, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Taylor’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The first factor weighs against Taylor. Six months elapsed between the entry of his guilty plea and his motion to withdraw. As the district court noted, the Sixth Circuit has affirmed denials of motions to withdraw in cases involving delays far shorter than the delay in this case. See, e.g., United States v. Valdez, 362 F.3d 903, 912-13 (6th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Durham, 178 F.3d 796, 798-99
holding that a 75day delay justified the denial of a motion to withdraw holding that the district courts denial of motion to continue even though it required counsel to withdraw due to a scheduling conflict protected the adversarial process and the defendants substantial rights holding that a fivemonth delay in filing a motion to disqualify did not bar the motion where there was a reasonable explanation for the delay recognizing the late date of a motion to withdraw filed three weeks before trial holding that the presumption of prejudice must extend as well to the denial of counsel on appeal when the granting of an attorneys motion to withdraw had left the petitioner entirely without the assistance of counsel on appeal