have contributed to [Petitioner’s] conviction,” Sawyer, 88 Hawai'i at 329 n. 6, 966 P.2d at 641 n. 6 (emphases added), for attempted murder in the second degree as opposed to attempted EMED manslaughter. The misconstruction of the law and the lack of curative instruction bore directly on Petitioner’s EMED defense. Hence, the reasonable “possibility” that the error “might” have contributed to Petitioner’s conviction for attempted murder rather than attempted EMED manslaughter was plainly established. Id. However, because it cannot be said that the prosecutor’s conduct was so egregious that viewed under an objective standpoint, Petitioner was denied his or her right to a fair trial, reprosecution is not barred under the double jeopardy clause. Rogan, 91 Hawai'i at 423, 984 P.2d at 1249 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). XI. Respondent cites to
holding that beyond reasonable doubt standard not required in termination cases holding that proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is required by the constitution holding that appellant was deprived of a fair trial where the jury was instructed in such a way that it was not required to find at least two elements of the offense of capital murder to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt holding that appellate court should review error in trial procedure to determine if it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt holding that reprosecution is barred where in the face of egregious prosecutorial misconduct it cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant received a fair trial