release benefits only those persons specifically designated in the release document. There is a rebuttable presumption that a general release benefits only those persons specifically designated. As noted recently by our Court of Appeals, there are three approaches to determining the scope of a general release. See Perea v. Snyder, 117 N.M. 774, 778, 877 P.2d 580, 584 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 118 N.M. 90, 879 P.2d 91 (1994). These three approaches are known as the absolute or flat bar rule, the intent rule, and the specific identity rule. See id. at 778-79, 877 P.2d at 584-85 (discussing the three approaches). In Perea the Court of Appeals reasoned that our decisions in Mark V and C.R. Anthony indicated New Mexico should fol d 196, 77 Ill.Dec. 738, 740-41, 461 N.E.2d 361, 363-64 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Aid Ins. Co., 426 N.W.2d at 633-34 (holding
holding that release must specifically name or otherwise specifically identify the persons to be discharged holding that release must specifically identify persons to be discharged in order to ensure that intent of parties is fulfilled holding that release discharges only those tortfeasors specifically named in the release agreement holding that in order to fulfill legislative intent to abolish commonlaw release rule general release must specifically identify parties to be released holding that general release must name  or specifically describe parties to be discharged