342 (3d Cir.1999) (internal quotations omitted). II. Request for Declaratory Judgement In his Motion to Dismiss, Defendant argues that Hartford is collaterally estopped from seeking declaratory relief before this Court because it has acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the arbitration panel. (Def. Mot. at ¶ 14; Def. Mem. at 7). Both parties admit that the O’Maras’ insurance policy contains a valid arbitration clause; the question is whether that clause applies to .the present dispute. Based on our reading of state law and other courts’ related holdings, we find that it does. Defendant correctly points out that arbitration panels are generally given broad authority to resolve claim disputes. Brennan v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 524 Pa. 542, 574 A.2d 580, 583 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Hartford contends, however, that Defendant
holding that question was within arbitration provision because provision contained no specific language precluding arbitrators from reaching question holding that an arbitration provision that waived class actions and thus required the consumer to pay a 125 fee to vindicate a 150 claim was substantively unconscionable but also holding that the waiver provision was severable from the remainder of the arbitration provision which would be enforced holding wills more specific provision prevails over general provision holding the question of whether insurance companys requests were reasonable under policy language was a fact question holding that a dispute arising out of an insurance policy was not covered by the arbitration provision in the parties separate premium payment agreement because if the party had intended to subject this dispute to the arbitration provision it could easily clearly and unequivocally have done so either by including an arbitration provision in the insurance policy itself or by adding to the above arbitration provision