asserting the duty to warn is in a better position because of expertise to discern and appreciate the danger.” Meyers v. M/V Eugenio C, 919 F.2d 1070, 1072 (5th Cir.1990) (citing Polizzi v. M/V Zephyros II Monrovia, 860 F.2d 147 (5th Cir.1988); Casaceli v. Martech Int’l, Inc., 774 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir.1985)). However, while such claims may demonstrate that Roulston’s injuries were caused, at least in part, by his own negligence, they do not operate to absolve Ya-zoo River of all liability in the event that it was also negligent. See Miles v. Melrose, 882 F.2d 976, 984 (5th Cir.1989) (stating that comparative negligence principles apply in Jones Act cases and prevents an “injured party from recovering for the damages sustained as a result of his own fault”); Gautreaux, 107 F.3d at 335-37 (<HOLDING>). Should the plaintiff present sufficient
recognizing pro se litigants pleadings are held to a less stringent standard holding that premises owner had duty to use degree of care in performing activities that owner of ordinary prudence would use under same or similar circumstances holding that it is inconsistent with ordinary business care and prudence to rely unquestioningly on advice about an extended deadline holding employers to an ordinary prudence standard of care holding that seamen are also held to a standard of ordinary prudence to avoid injury