Wolff’s contribution to the “landscape of prisoners’ due process” did not derive from “its description of liberty interests”). Second, Scott claims that pr e-Sandin cases from this circuit require us to look to potential punishment. See McCann v. Coughlin, 698 F.2d 112, 121 (2d Cir.1983); McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930, 939 (2d Cir.1977). To the extent that we so held in those cases, Sandin is to the contrary and we follow it. In fact, those pr e-Sandin cases involved potential sentences of 14 days or less of keep-lock or SHU confinement. See McCann, 698 F.2d at 121 (“We conclude, therefore, that an inmate who is or may be sentenced to a term of confinement in a Special Housing Unit has a right to the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause.”); McKinnon, 568 F.2d at 939 (<HOLDING>). And Sandin is quite clear that exposure to
holding that due process protections do not apply where a public employee is not fired holding that punitive conditions of pretrial confinement implicate due process recognizing that before due process guarantees are implicated there must be a deprivation by the government of constitutionally protected interest holding that deprivation of property must conform to due process principles holding that two weeks of keeplock confinement was a substantial deprivation covered by due process protections