had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant and could therefore ask him questions “ ‘reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation.’ ” United States v. Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d 825, 830 (9th Cir.2005) (per curiam) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). That included questions “ ‘about [Defendant’s] citizenship and immigration status,’ ” and questions seeking “ ‘to explain suspicious circumstances.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-82, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975)). The fact that Special Agent Gal-lardo placed Defendant in handcuffs did not, without more, convert the lawful stop into a custodial arrest. Id.; see also United States v. Medina-Villa, 567 F.3d 507, 520 (9th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. *** This disposition is not
holding that a border patrol agents blocking the stopped vehicle approaching the vehicle with his gun drawn and interrogating the individual about his citizenship and immigration status did not convert the stop into a custodial arrest holding that the arresting officer did not have probable cause to stop the defendant for obstructing traffic because there was no evidence of intent to impede or hinder traffic where the vehicle was only briefly stopped in the roadway and the officer approaching the vehicle from behind did not have to stop or drive around the defendants vehicle holding that when a border patrol officers observations lead him or her to reasonably suspect that a vehicle may contain illegal aliens the officer may stop the vehicle question its occupants as to citizenship and immigration status and ask them to explain suspicious circumstances but stating that any further detention or search must be based on consent or probable cause holding that the stop of defendants vehicle was unlawful where officers stopped the vehicle to check the license and registration but had observed no suspicious activity holding that vehicle owner not present in the vehicle when it was stopped had not suffered interference with his possessory interest and could not challenge the constitutionality of the stop