be invalid where used to enter a private residence. Further, there are a host of “retake” state statutes and at least one federal statute authorizing the Attorney General to issue arrest warrants (arrest warrants for aliens pending deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)) that authorize nonjudicial arrest warrants. Thus, despite my position the search of Lucas’s primary residence was conducted pursuant to an invalid administrative warrant, I conclude it was objectively reasonable for officers, in arresting Lucas in his primary residence, to rely on the statute that authorized the issuance of the arrest warrant. As a result, I disagree with Judge Beam’s view that the good-faith exception was inapplicable in this case. See, e.g., United States v. Hunt, 893 F.2d 1028, 1031-32 (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>), opinion withdrawn in part on other grounds,
holding that an arrest warrant  without a search warrant  does not permit law enforcement authorities to enter a third partys home to legally search for the subject of the arrest warrant holding that the vehicle of a recent occupant may be searched incident to arrest as an exception to the warrant requirement where it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest holding that a warrant lacking a description of items to be seized was not facially invalid and finding in the alternative that even if the warrant were found to be deficient the seized evidence was admissible under the good faith exception holding that it is a violation of the fourth amendment for police to bring members of the media or other third parties into a home during the execution of a warrant when the presence of third parties in the home was not in aid of the execution of the warrant holding the leon goodfaith excep tion applied to save evidence seized as part of the execution of an arrest warrant issued by the oregon department of corrections pursuant to its authority under an oregon statute and citing the krull decision in support