436, 475, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (discussing waiver of Fifth Amendment right to counsel); see also Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516, 82 S.Ct. 884, 890, 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962) (“Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible.”). Only if silence is joined with some showing that defendant, having comprehended his rights, nonetheless thereafter followed a course of conduct suggesting an abandonment of his entitlement to counsel, may an implied waiver be found. See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1757, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979); United States v. Auen, 864 F.2d 4, 5 (2d Cir.1988) (per curiam). Even in such circumstances a defendant’s relinquishment may not be presumed; the prosecution is required to prove it. Butler, 441 U.S. at 0th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012, 101 S.Ct. 568,
holding that defendants failure to obtain counsel despite opportunities to do so implied a waiver of counsel holding waiver of right to counsel not voluntary and knowing when defendant terminated counsel and requested another attorney but the trial court would allow delay and appointment only upon waiver of speedy trial right holding that stubborn failure to hire attorney after being told disadvantages constituted waiver of counsel at trial holding that trial judges must be satisfied that an accused is making a knowing voluntary and intelligent waiver of counsel having been advised of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation such that there is a record demonstration that an accused elected to proceed without counsel with eyes open holding that the failure to object to a defect in the arbitrator selection process constituted a waiver