his DUI-3 does not even fall under the purview of Rule 35, which is focused on sentences, not on convictions. His challenge is a challenge to a conviction, not a challenge to a sentence, because a DUI-3 is a chargeable offense rather than simply an enhanced sentence. See State v. Morrissette, 170 Vt. 569, 569, 743 A.2d 1091, 1091 (1999) (mem.) (upholding defendant’s DUI-3 conviction, where he was both charged with and convicted of DUI-3, rather than merely subject to enhanced punishment), overruled on other grounds by In re Manosh, 2014 VT 95, 197 Vt. 424, 108 A.3d 212. Moreover, as defendant concedes, the “[third conviction] was correct when it was entered” because it was based on the two prior unsealed DUI convictions. See State v. Oscarson, 2006 VT 30, ¶ 9, 179 Vt. 442, 898 A.2d 123 (<HOLDING>). In short, the DUI-3 cannot now be amended
holding that defendant cannot successfully challenge legal sentence or attack underlying conviction through motion for sentence reconsideration holding that when a first  2255 motion succeeds in obtaining a sentence amendment a subsequent motion will be considered a first motion to the extent that it challenges a new or amended component of the sentence and a second motion to the extent that it challenges either a component of the original unamended sentence or the underlying conviction holding that a judge who imposes a more severe sentence after the original sentence is successfully attacked must affirmatively state objective reasons for the harsher sentence to ensure that vindictiveness against the defendant plays no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial holding that a habeas petitioner must be in custody under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his petition is filed holding that a court may not impose a harsher sentence on a defendant who successfully challenges his sentence on appeal