Split-second absurdities are not justified by the actualities of working conditions or by the policy of the Fair Labor Standards Act. It is only when an employee is required to give up a substantial measure of his time and effort that com-pensable working time is involved. Id. at 692, 66 S.Ct. at 1195. More recently, in Lindow v. United States, 738 F.2d 1057 (9th Cir.1984), the Ninth Circuit explained that three factors should be examined to assess whether otherwise compensable time should be considered de minimis, and therefore not compensable: (1) the practical administrative difficulty of recording the additional time; (2) the size of the claim in the aggregate; and (3) whether “the claimants performed the work on a regular basis.” Id. at 1062-63. See also Hill, 751 F.2d at 815 (<HOLDING>). Applying these factors, the Ninth Circuit
holding that to demonstrate retaliation complainedof action must be more than de minimis  holding that fiveday suspension was not a de minimis deprivation holding that district court properlydiscounted four calls as de minimis holding that interruption of postal worker during lunch was de minimis requiring no compensation under the flsa holding that a robbery of 40 to 50 satisfied the de minimis standard