knowledge of misrepresentations on the application should be imputed to defendant. Id. at 292-94, 368 S.E. 2d at 395-96 (Parker, J., dissenting). Defendant appealed on the basis of the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals, and we allowed defendant’s petition for discretionary review of the additional issue regarding the motion to strike portions of plaintiff’s affidavit. II. As to the trial court’s order striking portions of plaintiff’s affidavit, we hold the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed as to those portions of the affidavit designated above as [3] and [4] inasmuch as those portions are conclusions rather than statements of fact. See 1 Brandis on North Carolina Evidence § 130 (3d ed. 1988); see also Singleton v. Stewart, 280 N.C. 460, 467, 186 S.E. 2d 400, 405 (1972) (<HOLDING>). We also hold the Court of Appeals correctly
holding that experts testimony that defendants engaged in fraud and deceit was admissible because the words were used in colloquial fashion but statement that defendants violated federal regulations was inadmissible as a legal conclusion holding an affidavit statement referring to the notice required for a binding contract was inadmissible as a legal conclusion holding that a statement implying that the defendant was guilty of the crime for which he was on trial was inadmissible hearsay holding that the victims statement was inadmissible when made two to three hours after victim was allegedly raped because the victims testimony supported the conclusion that her statement was made with conscious reflection holding inadmissible an affidavit by copyright law expert opining that a term was suggestive rather than descriptive because his opinion was a conclusion of law