vulnerable to them.” Id. In light of DeShaney, a plaintiff seeking to hold a state official liable for private acts must allege more than a failure to act. Cartwright, 336 F.3d at 493. He must point to conduct which either created or increased the risk of harm, and show not only that he could have been saved, but also that he was “safer before the state action than he was after it.” Id. To the extent that Engler claims that “Arnold’s inaction,” that is, his refusal to investigate or report allegations of abuse, is the conduct at issue, Engler has failed to state a claim. See R. 1 (Compl. at ¶ 4) (Page ID #2). A state official’s failure to investigate or report allegations of child abuse does not constitute an affirmative act. Langdon v. Skelding, 524 Fed.Appx. 172, 176 (6th Cir. 2013) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, under DeShaney, even returning a
holding that a child has a  1983 action against the state while in foster care where the state is deliberately indifferent to the likelihood that a foster home is unsafe yet places the child there or allows the child to remain there holding that failing to remove a child from a foster home is not an affirmative act under the statecreated danger exception even where the officials investigation revealed obvious dangers to the childs safety holding that when a state obtains an order to remove a child from his home and takes the child into protective custody it is exercising affirmative state power over the child to the extent that it has a due process obligation to assume responsibility to provide for the childs basic needs holding foster parents not liable for willful act of their foster child holding that the trial court did not err in finding that a trust relationship existed between a foster mother and foster child where it found that the child immediately became attached to the foster mother and was confiding in her when she made statements admitted under the hearsay exception