530 U.S. 211, 224, 120 S.Ct. 2143, 147 L.Ed.2d 164 (2000); Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 890, 116 S.Ct. 1783, 135 L.Ed.2d 153 (1996). It is well established in this Court’s cases that an employer’s decision whether to terminate an ERISA plan is a settlor function immune from ERISA’s fiduciary obligations. See, e.g., ibid.; Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78, 115 S.Ct. 1223, 131 L.Ed.2d 94 (1995). And because “deeision[s] regarding the form or structure” of a plan are generally settlor functions, Hughes Aircraft Co., 525 U.S., at 444, 119 S.Ct. 755, PACE acknowledges that the decision to merge plans is “normally [a] plan sponsor decisio[n]” as well. Brief for Respondents 13, n. 5, 20-21; see also Malia v. General Electric Co., 23 F.3d 828, 833 (C.A.3 1994) (<HOLDING>). But PACE says that its proposed merger was
holding that a state law requiring benefit plans to include minimum benefits related to erisa plans holding that a termination of an erisa plans benefits must be based upon the plans terms and language holding that certain fiduciary duty claims did not arise out of the underlying contractual provisions holding that employers decision to merge plans did not invoke the fiduciary duty provisions of erisa holding that federal common law of erisa preempts state law in the interpretation of erisa benefit plans