outcome satisfies “wilful” under § 523(a)(6), Slosberg states that more is required; there must be proof of the debtor’s malice. Slosberg, 225 B.R. at 19-20. After reviewing pre and post-Geiger First Circuit case law on the subject, Slosberg concludes that “malice” under § 523(a)(6) requires “a showing that the debtor’s wilful, injurious conduct was undertaken without just cause or excuse.” Id. at 21. According to the Slosberg court, this formulation leaves intact that portion of the First Circuit’s Printy decision defining “malice,” and it provides a meaningful standard for removing from § 523(a)(6)’s exception to discharge those injurious acts of the debtor “done for reasons that justify or excuse the act.” Id.; see Printy v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 110 F.3d 853, 859 (1st C 69) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis supplied); Cooper v. McKenna, 124
holding that a threat to harm another person is a crime of violence holding that punching another person is a statutory assault holding that an assault and battery is an unlawful and unjustifiable use of force and violence however slight upon the person of another holding that under maryland common law an assault is an attempted battery an actual battery or a combination of the two holding that a texas assault statute requiring that the defendant intentionally knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another  may be violated by the defendant so causing such injury by means other than the actual attempted or threatened use of physical force against the person of another and hence does not have such use of force as an element alteration in original