when the investigation focuses on a particular suspect and the officer has probable cause to believe that a particular crime has been committed. See, e.g., State v. Simpson, Utah, 541 P.2d 1114 (1975). See also Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 565 (1970). Under the objective-subjective test, Miranda applies if the actions of the police and the surrounding circumstances, fairly construed, would reasonably have led the defendant to believe that he was not free to leave at will. See Smith, supra, at 710-14. I agree with the majority opinion’s statement of the general rule that “temporary detention for the purpose of investigating alleged traffic violations is not synonymous with in-custody interrogation which requires a Miranda warning.” See, e.g., State v. Tellez, 6 Ariz.App. 251, 431 P.2d 691 (1967) (<HOLDING>); Annot., 31 A.L. R.3d 565 (1970); Annot., 25
holding that reasonable suspicion standard applies to routine traffic stops holding that fresh miranda warnings are necessary after right to silence has been invoked recognizing that miranda warnings are unnecessary for the investigation of routine traffic offenses holding that the warnings in their totality satisfied miranda holding that miranda warnings do not have to be given in the exact form stated in the miranda opinion as long as an effective equivalent is given