by sheer momentum. This is a danger independent of the materials used in the bike’s construction. To link a failure to warn of the potential of damaged carbon fiber to fail to Miguelez’s choice of bicycle, and, in turn, to an event that might occur to any bicyclist using the equipment as intended, is stretching the concept of proximate legal causation too far. See Gooding v. Univ. Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So.2d 1015, 1018 (Fla.1984) (“A mere possibility of such causation is not enough; and when the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant” (quoting W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 41 (4th ed. 1971))); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Jones, 138 Fla. 746, 190 So. 26, 27 (1939) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that Mi-guelez failed to prove
holding that the basis of liability is negligence and not injury holding in the medical malpractice context that a plaintiff must prove that the alleged negligence more likely than not caused the victims death holding that in negligence actions florida courts follow the more likely than not standard of causation ie they require proof that the negligence probably caused the plaintiffs injury holding that an injury is not within the scope of employment after the employee has left work unless the injury was caused by the employers negligence holding that the intervening act breaks the chain of causation set in operation by a defendants negligence thereby insulating his negligence as a direct cause of the injury