for its departure from the category calculated under the guidelines and its explanation for the category it has chosen as appropriate.”). That is particularly so where, as here, the sentencing court simply selects the criminal history category that results from counting remote convictions as if they had occurred within the applicable time period. See United States v. Maurice, 69 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir.1995) (“[Wjhere a sentencing court selects a higher criminal history category under § 4A1.3 by adding point totals for remote convictions, we have held that an explanation of this calculation serves as an adequate explanation for the inappropriateness of the intervening criminal history categories.”) (citation omitted); United States v. Starr, 971 F.2d 357, 363 & n. 7 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). The strongest case the defendant cites in
holding that circuit does not require the district court to go through a ritualistic exercise in which it mechanically discusses each criminal history category it rejects en route to the category that it selects as long as the reasons for rejecting each lesser category are clear from the record as a whole holding that where court considered remote prior convictions that if counted would have put defendant in category iv rather than ii the rejection of category iii was implicit  and an explicit statement of the reasons was not required holding that request for departure in sentencing based on a criminal history category that overstated defendants record violated plea agreement that prohibited departure requests but did not stipulate to a specific criminal history category holding that when a defendant qualifies as a career felon it is not necessary to ascertain the defendants criminal history category because the sentencing guidelines mandate a criminal history category of vi holding that eight years between prior convictions and the beginning of the charged conspiracy was not too remote