decisions of other circuits. He first directs our attention to the Tenth Circuit’s en banc opinion in United States v. Jackson, 921 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.1990). Jackson, however, is directly contrary to Bridges’ position. The court did hold, as we have above, that in departing on the basis of criminal history a court should use a higher category “as a reference.” But it stressed that “[t]he reference should not be mechanical. A district court need not exhaust in sequence each higher criminal history category. Rather, the court may use any reasonable methodology hitched to the Sentencing Guidelines.... ” 921 F.2d at 991 (internal quotation and citations omitted). To simi lar effect is a First Circuit opinion cited by defendant, see United States v. Ocasio, 914 F.2d 330, 336 (1st Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>), as well as the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in
recognizing that sentencing judges have the discretion to reject any sentencing guideline but no judge is required to do so holding that the sentencing judge could consider the defendants subsequent arrest even though the charges were dismissed during sentencing recognizing that shull does not apply to habitual offender sentencing and stating that this was not a case where the judge relied upon a reason for departure that was later declared invalid but rather one in which the judge considered his sentence to be one to which the guidelines did not apply holding that sentencing judge must offer a rationale for the degree of departure but rejectfing any brightline rule that requires a sentencing judge  to subrogate his or her residual discretion to some explicit or external criteria holding that a defendant was not entitled to a relief under section 2255 when he asserted that the sentencing judge who was not the trial judge was influenced by the sentence imposed by the trial judge on a codefendant