the jury that had been chosen. Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his requested habeas corpus relief, in part, based on the Bauder standard, as amplified in Peterson. As mentioned, Bauder and Peterson have been overruled and are no longer governing authority. Appellant also asserts, “The inadmissibility of polygraph tests is so well settled that the prosecutor had to have been aware of the risk that Appellant would have to move for a mistrial, despite her denials.” We disagree. The case law demonstrates that the law is not “so well settled” with regard to whether admission of evidence that the defendant refused to take a polygraph always requires a mistrial. See Kugler v. State, 902 S.W.2d 594, 595-97 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995 pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>). Here, the evidence, when viewed in favor of
recognizing and discussing difficulty in determining whether mistrial should be declared when error involves evidence that defendant refused to take polygraph exam rather than involving clearly inadmissible evidence regarding results of exam recognizing that the trial judge must be given a wide range of discretion in determining whether a mistrial should be declared holding admissibility of polygraph evidence should be resolved under fedrevid 403 balancing test but reliability of polygraph test may be included to determine how probative particular polygraph test is holding that evidence that a polygraph test was offered to or refused by a defendant was not admissible holding that evidence of a witnessess refusal to take a polygraph exam is inadmissible