revoked, and most States allow the motorist’s refusal to take a BAC test to be used as evidence against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution.” Id. (emphasis added). Considering the Court’s action in Aviles and its reasoning and statements in McNeely, we hold that an implied consent statute such as Washington’s and Idaho’s does not justify a warrantless blood draw from a driver who refuses to consent, as did Aviles, or objects to the blood draw, as did Defendant in this case. Consent to a search must be voluntary. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 232-38, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2050, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 865-66 (1973). Inherent in the requirement that consent be voluntary is the right of the person to withdraw that consent. See McNeely, 569 U.S. at -, 133 S.Ct. at 1566, 185 L.Ed.2d at 712 (<HOLDING>). By objecting to the blood draw, Defendant
recognizing that a motorist can withdraw consent holding that defendants failure to withdraw consent to search for criminal activity in his home included the top floor because he did not withdraw his consent to search when he observed the officer go upstairs holding there is no consent as a matter of law where the consent was given under coercion recognizing that consent is an exception to the warrant requirement and that voluntariness of consent depends on the totality of the circumstances recognizing the late date of a motion to withdraw filed three weeks before trial