the intent rule. The Court went on to hold that “an absolute bar will be presumed to be the intent of the parties to a general release unless an ambiguity is shown to exist by extrinsic evidence.” Id at 779, 877 P.2d at 585. Ford relies extensively on the Court of Appeals’ analysis in Perea to support the trial court’s entry of summary judgment. Hansen replies that the district court’s decision is erroneous under Perea. Because the arguments in support of and against the Court of Appeals’ reasoning and conclusions have been fuHy briefed, we take this opportunity to review the Perea decisio , 903 & n. 3 (1992) (noting that rule that only specifically identified tortfeasors are released eliminates need to inquire into intent); Saranillio v. Silva, 78 Hawai'i 1, 889 P.2d 685, 700 (1995) (<HOLDING>); Alsup v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 101
holding that release discharges only persons named in or sufficiently described by terms of release holding that release discharges only those tortfeasors specifically named in the release agreement holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release holding that a release of unknown claims has no effect in the absence of evidence apart from the words of the release holding that a release between two parties cannot bind a thirdparty who was a stranger to the release