States v. Cherry, 50 F.3d 338, 342 (5th Cir.1995). However, even if the alleged error was exhausted and preserved, Wade's argument is without merit. The State moved to exclude Breakenridge for cause. During voir dire, Breakenridge indicated that the evidence would have to be “outstanding” for her to consider the "extreme” penalty of death. Although the trial judge denied the State’s challenge for cause, he found that the question of whether Break-enridge should be struck for cause was "a close, close call" and that he “certainly [thought] a peremptory challenge should be issued, if there is any doubt by the State....” Given the judge's findings, we cannot hold the state court’s denial of Batson relief was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See Forbes, 816 F.2d at 1010 (<HOLDING>). 5 . Wade asks the court to consider the juror
holding that batson v kentucky 476 us 79 106 sct 1712 90 led2d 69 1986 does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review holding that the district courts observation that a challenge for cause might have been justified as to this juror was more than sufficient under batson which emphasized that the prosecutors explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause quoting batson 476 us at 97 106 sct 1712 holding jury trial waiver valid although district court did not inform defendant of his attorneys ability to make challenges under batson v kentucky 476 us 79 8889 106 s ct 1712 90 l ed 2d 69 1986 holding that a postconviction petitioner has 60 days from the date of publication of 1997 philadelphia magazine article to raise claims based thereon under batson v kentucky 476 us 79 106 sct 1712 90 led2d 69 1986 holding belief of prosecutor that potential juror might know crucial witnesses was sufficient explanation to defeat batson challenge