for rates exceeding the statutory cap under the EAJA. The Court reasoned that the factor of “the results obtained” is “applicable to a broad spectrum of litigation” and is “little more than routine reasons why market rates are what they are.” Id. Likewise, “the result obtained” here is too “generally applicable” as a factor to constitute a “special” reason for exceeding the statutory cap. The circuit court also relied on the fact that the Division vigorously pursued Cooling and opposed payment of attorney’s fees, resulting in prolonged litigation and repeated appearances in courts. However, that is relevant to the number of hours expended and whether they are reasonable under the statute, not the rate of attorney’s fees. See Estate of Cervin v. C.I.R., 200 F.3d 351, 357 (5th Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>). Cooling fails to demonstrate why the
holding that with respect to the eaja the local or national market rate for legal services cannot be a special factor used to increase the rate beyond the statutory rate holding under special circumstances exception that where one or more ineligible parties are willing and able to pursue the litigation against the united states the parties eligible for eaja fees should not be able to take a free ride through the judicial process at the governments expense holding res judicata did not bar current litigation when prior litigation between the parties involved one breach of obligation under a joint venture agreement and instant litigation was based upon a different cause of action from a subsequent interference with the same agreement holding that the governments litigation position which allegedly prolonged the litigation cannot be a special factor warranting an increase above the statutorily allowed 75 per hour under the eaja holding that to qualify for a special factor increase the attorney must have some distinctive knowledge or specialized skill needful for the litigation in question  