253 F.3d 443 (9th Cir.2001) (interpreting whether a delay was “reasonably necessary”); Hondras, 296 F.3d at 602 (stating that there is no dispute that the violation warrant complied with the Warrant Clause). “In construing a statute as a matter of first impression, we first must look to the statutory language:’The starting point in interpreting a statute is its language, for if the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter.’ ” Morales-Alejo, 193 F.3d at 1105 (quoting Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 409, 113 S.Ct. 2151, 124 L.Ed.2d 368 (1993)). Vargas contends that the plain meaning of the term “warrant” means a document that is based upon probable cause and supported by sworn facts. See United States v. Mohrbacher, 182 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). We agree. It is a well-established canon of
holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance recognizing that in the absence of a statutory definition statutory terms are construed in accordance with their ordinary or natural meaning holding that an undefined statutory term should be given its natural ordinary meaning holding that in the absence of a statutory definition a term should be accorded its ordinary meaning holding that a broad statutory definition of a term that was inconsistent with the terms plain meaning did not affect the terms definition in other contexts