the entry of the judgment appealed from, but because they were filed before the trial court had resolved all the claims between all the parties. Ms. Spann’s notice of appeal differs from the premature notice of appeal at issue in the Steele case. Here, there were no post-trial motions pending when Ms. Spann filed her notice of appeal. Because the trial court’s order itself was final and because there were no post-trial motions pending at the time, Ms. Spann’s notice of appeal was not premature. At the time she filed it, the trial court had fully and finally resolved all the claims between all the parties. Ms. Spann “perfected” her appeal on August 28, 1996, when she filed her notice of appeal and appeal bond. See Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Tenn v. Eddins, 516 S.W.2d 76, 77 (Tenn.1974) (<HOLDING>). The legal effect of perfecting an appeal is
holding that even though the bankrupt has filed a supersedeas bond his creditors have a stake in the outcome of the appeal and the appeal therefore is stayed holding that it is proper for a district court to considered sic the possibility that an appeal may result in the award of attorneys fees in determining the appeal bond amount holding that an appeal is perfected when the appeal bond is filed holding that a notice of appeal filed when an appeal bond is required to perfect is a bona fide attempt to invoke appellate jurisdiction and that the court of appeals dismissal was improper without first affording an opportunity to correct the defective perfection of appeal holding that intermediate appellate courts have jurisdiction to address merits of appeal when amended notice of appeal is filed before briefs are filed