omitted). 25 See Easley v. State, 262 Ga. App. 144, 149 (2) (584 SE2d 629) (2003) (“Since verdicts acquire their legality from return and publication, there was no verdict in this case until it was received and published in open court.” (citations and punctuation omitted)); Irvine v. Grant, 15 Ga. App. 269, 269 (82 SE 819) (1914) (“A verdict is not a verdict in law until received and published in open court.”); see also OCGA § 17-9-21 (“Verdicts shall he received only in open court, in the absence of agreement of the parties.”). 26 See Merchants’ Bank of Macon v. Rawls, 7 Ga. 191, 200 (4) (1849) (“The rule on this subject is more one of expediency than of principle. We believe that the e SE2d 616) (1993); see Maltbie v. State, 139 Ga. App. 342, 344-45 (2) (228 SE2d 368) (1976) (<HOLDING>); Ezzard v. State, 11 Ga. App. 30, 30 (1) (74
holding that after court dismissed case at plaintiffs request notwithstanding the fact that jury had deliberated upon the case and indicated that it had reached a verdict there was no case pending in court on which a verdict could be predicated and the information which the judge got from an inspection of the petition handed to him by the foreman of the jury was information which he received as an individual and not as a judge of the court and further holding that despite violation of defendants right to receive the verdict that was purportedly reached the writing incorporated in the bill of exceptions as a verdict of the jury was in law no verdict because it was not received in court and published as required by law and was instead entirely extraneous and extrajudicial holding that a jury verdict of guilty constitutes a conviction for purposes of the federal firearms statute and therefore the defendant was convicted of a felony during the interval between the jurys return of its guilty verdict and his scheduled sentencing holding that jurys original verdict of guilty without intent and recommend mere was an acquittal such that after it was presented to an officer of the court and the court the trial had ended  and the trial court was without authority to return the jury to its room for any further action holding that trial court did not err in declining to accept jurys first verdict when form stated that the jury found the defendant undecided and trial courts interpretation of the verdict form to mean that the jury was either not unanimous or had not decided yet whether defendant was guilty or not guilty was reasonable and thus trial court properly instructed jury to continue deliberating holding that where the meaning of the jurys verdict was not clear in light of the trial courts jury instructions the court of appeals erred in directing entry of judgment for respondent the case should have been remanded to the trial judge who was in the best position to pass upon the question of a new trial in light of the evidence his charge to the jury and the jurys verdict