of title. Appellants have provided uncontroverted proof that the Bennetts received a quitclaim deed to the property on June 11, 1996 and that the Bennetts then transferred the property to the Phillipses by warranty deed on June 13, 1997. The evidence shows that the Phillipses lived on the property until they sold it, by warranty deed, to the Shains on April 12, 2001. The Johnstons argue that appellees failed to prove adverse possession because the title from the IRS to the Bennetts was void and because there was not sufficient proof that the Bennetts adversely possessed the property. It is true that title cannot be conveyed for purposes of adverse possession by a void deed. See Field Measurement Serv. v. Ives, 609 S.W.2d 615, 620 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). However, we have already held that the deed
recognizing that most other courts apply title vii principles to title ix cases but refusing to apply title viis knew or should have known standard to a title ix claim holding that sellers agreement to furnish title policy was a separate agreement not superseded by the deed and properly not included in the deed holding that void deed is neither title nor color of title recognizing that the right to seek reformation of a deed is limited to the original parties to the deed and their successors in title holding that a renter who stole a motor home had void title not voidable title and could not convey good title