his characterization of the payments”). We cannot accept appellants’ contention that their payments must be deductible because they were made in connection with the performance of a religious service, the benefit of which inures directly to the public and only indirectly to the person being audited. See Murphy, 54 T.C. at 253. As the enrollment form provided by the Church to new auditees states, “[t]he benefits obtainable from Church services ... are personal and are experienced by the individual himself or herself.” If the Church’s literature suggests that the auditee is the direct and primary beneficiary of the auditing services which are the fruits of his payments, then the IRS was not clearly erroneous in making a similar finding. See Estate of Wood v. Comm’r, 39 T.C. 1, 6 (1962) (<HOLDING>). The Tax Court had sufficient evidence to
holding that attempted conveyance of remainder interest in a trust was invalid because the spendthrift provision prohibited beneficiary from making any binding commitment of principal or income during the life of the trust holding that transfer of stock in exchange for care of cemetery lot was noncharitable because trust agreement made no provision for expenditure of income on the cemetery as a whole but reserve all the income for care of a private lot holding that for abovemedian income debtors projected disposable income calculated on form b22c is the starting point but not the ending point in determining debtors correct minimum obligation and both income and expenses must be determined as of date of confirmation holding that care of the grounds was part of the business of the hospital holding that restitution for lost income in property cases was improper under the plain language of the statute because restitution for lost income is authorized only for victims of bodily injury