significant danger [to] the physical well being of the community.’ ” Referring to this assessment as a “diagnosis,” the court held that it was error to admit the psychotherapist’s opinion in evidence because the juvenile’s communications were implicit in the diagnosis. Id. at 526. 8 Because of the waiver, we do not view as controlling the intimation in Clancy, supra at 667, that, when the purpose of a hospitalization requires disclosure of a diagnosis, “the purpose is within the privilege” and therefore not admissible. Reference to specific diagnostic terms cataloged in the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) would, in most instances, not fall under the privilege. See Lambley v. Kameny, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 277, 278 n.4 (1997) (<HOLDING>). There may, of course, be instances when
holding that the standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence is the same as the standard for denying a motion for a directed verdict recognizing dsm as standard authority for diagnostic criteria of mental disorders holding that the standard for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as the standard for a motion to dismiss recognizing frequent use of respect for municipal boundaries as criteria in evaluating redistricting plan recognizing culpability as important criteria for eighth amendment excessive fines claim