actual content of [Hamas social media posts]. They do not claim that [Defendants’] ads (which are themselves third-party content) are objectionable, or that the ads played any role in making [Hamas’s content] unlawful. For example, Plaintiffs do not allege that any ads paired with [Hamas]-related content offered tools or instructions on how to cany out [Hamas’s] threats, or otherwise encouraged individuals to commit acts of terrorism. The [First Amended Complaint] contains [four] screenshot example[s] of an alleged targeted ad next to [a Hamas] video on YouTube.... [FAC ¶¶42, 96,] Plaintiffs do not make any allegations about the relationship between [the products advertised ] and terrorism. See, e.g., Jones [v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 416-17 (6th Cir. 2014)] (<HOLDING>). See Gonzalez, 282 F.Supp.3d 1150 at 1168-69,
holding that defamatory comments negatively affecting the plaintiffs business did not support a substantive due process claim holding that a supervisors repeated comments to an employee that the supervisor wanted to have sex with the employees fifteenyearold daughter were extremely severe because the comments were significantly more offensive than the typical crass comments we have found to be insufficient to constitute harassment in other cases holding interactive service provider was not information content provider as to allegedly defamatory third party posts even though provider appended his own comments to the posts the plaintiff did not allege that the providers comments were themselves defamatory holding that a town manager did not act under color of state law when making allegedly defamatory statements about the plaintiff holding that in order to raise prejudicial comments of trial court on appeal defendant must object to comments when made and move for a mistrial