and armed robbery would authorize a jury to find that Simpkins was willing to commit murder for pecuniary gain. OCGA § 17-10-30 (b) (4). Although the evidence probably will authorize a jury to find these two aggravating factors in the vast majority of armed robbery-murder cases, and although these aggravating factors arise from the same conduct in this case, the aggravating circumstances reveal different characteristics of the defendant and his crimes, and each aggravating circumstance genuinely serves to narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty. 9 Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862, 877 (103 SC 2733, 77 LE2d 235) (1983); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U. S. 231, 244 (108 SC 546, 98 LE2d 568) (1988). 10 See generally Henderson v. Dugger, 925 F2d 1309, 1319 (11th Cir. 1991) (<HOLDING>). 11 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 221,
holding that the crime of attempted felony murder no longer existed in florida holding that in florida there is no impermissible doublecounting of aggravating circumstances when the same facts   reveal different characteristics of the crime holding that the determination whether relevant facts are extraordinary aggravating circumstances  is a conclusion of law that remains within the discretion of the trial court if it is based on blakelycompliant or blakelyexempt facts holding that there is no crime of attempted felony murder in florida holding that the public disclosure must reveal both the true state of facts and that the defendant represented the facts to be something other than what they were