that time, no obligation existed under judgment. On October 30, 2002, before spousal support was scheduled to end, wife moved to modify the judgment to provide for indefinite support. Husband moved for summary judgment, ORCP 47 C, on the ground that the court was without authority to extend the duration of spousal support because he had satisfied the support obligation before wife’s motion was filed. The trial court denied husband’s motion, reasoning that husband’s payment accrued on November 1, 2002, and that “[t]he fact that [husband] made this payment early does not change the payment’s due date. [Wife] filed her Motion and Order to Show Cause RE: Modification of Support before November 1, 2002 and therefore that support payment had not yet acc P2d 504, rev den, 308 Or 608 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Park and Park, 43 Or App 367, 602 P2d 1123
holding that the trial court lacked authority to renew spousal support payments pursuant to a motion that was filed after the expiration of time during which spousal support was required to be paid under the original judgment holding that the trial court was without authority to modify a spousal support obligation when the modification proceeding was initiated ten years after the obligation to pay spousal support under the dissolution judgment had been terminated by order holding that a court is without authority to modify its spousal support decree retroactively and relieve a party of the obligation to pay past due installments holding that as with a promissory note when the final payment was made on a support judgment the obligation was discharged and after that date husband had no obligation that could support a modification holding that a trial court has broad discretion to modify a spousal maintenance award