RFC.”). Despite this clear directive from the regulations, Social Security Rulings, and our case law, which all require ALJs to take the claimant’s symptom testimony into account in determining the RFC, ALJs with frequency include the boilerplate language discrediting the claimant’s symptom testimony because it is “inconsistent with” the RFC in their disability determinations. See, e.g., Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 2014). By doing so, the ALJ indicates that he or she did not properly “incorporate a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective symptoms and pain into the RFC finding, as [he or she] is required to do.” Trevizo v. Berryhill, 862 F.3d 987, 1000 n.6 (9th Cir. 2017); see also Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 639 (4th Cir. 2015) (<HOLDING>). This practice “inverts the responsibility of
holding that a rule that conflicts with a subsequent adopted statutory amendment may not be enforced holding that 9 usc  1 conflicts with the inclusive language of the convention and thus may not restrict its scope holding that agency regulations cannot be applied retroactively unless congress has so authorized the administrative agency and the language of the regulations require it holding that the most significant relationship test as espoused in the restatement of conflicts governs conflicts cases sounding in tort in case where automobile collision occurred in mexico holding that this boilerplate language conflicts with the regulations and rulings