suspicion”). In State v. Cobbs, the majority correctly notes that “[unsupported intuition and inarticulate hunches are not sufficient.” 103 N.M. 623, 626, 711 P.2d 900, 903 (Ct.App.1985); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (“[I]n determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.”). The reasonable suspicion standard is “a commonsensieal proposition,” and “[e]ourts are not remiss in crediting the practical experience of officers who observe on a daily basis what transpires on the street.” United States v. Lender, 985 F.2d 151, 154 (4th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,
holding that there was reasonable suspicion to stop an occupant of a parked car based on his presence late at night in an area known for drug activity his leaning over the car console with a faint light and his attempt to hide something upon seeing a police officer holding that ones presence in a high crime area late at night without more will not justify an investigatory stop holding that an officers observation of exchange of small object and money in a known drug trafficking area constituted reasonable suspicion holding that an officers observation of a man holding his hand out with a group of other men looking down at his open palm in an high drug trafficking area late at night constituted reasonable suspicion holding that officers had reasonable suspicion to stop suspect seen driving late at night only a short distance from the area in which a crime had been committed