course of undertaking official duties. In such a context, it is often important to differentiate between situations in which the state actor is acting under exigent circumstances and those situations in which the state actor is working at a more deliberate pace. “Where a defendant is ‘confronted with a hyper-pressurized environment such as a high-speed chase ... it is usually necessary to show that the officer deliberately harmed the victim.’ Where a defendant has ‘the luxury of proceeding in a deliberate fashion ... deliberate indifference may be sufficient to shock the conscience.’ ” Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 426 (3d Cir.2006) (quoting Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 430 F.3d 140, 153 (3d Cir.2005)); see also, e.g., Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564, 581 (7th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Although courts usually are asked to assess
holding that the eighth amendment protects prisoners only from deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs holding that a difference of medical opinion was insufficient as a matter of law to establish deliberate indifference holding that deliberate indifference of jailors to prisoners repeated complaints over many days that he was being held without a hearing shocked the conscience holding that a prison official acts with deliberate indifference when he ignores the instructions of the prisoners treating physician holding that deliberate indifference to prisoners medical needs is cruel and unusual punishment