to legislation regulating abortion. The Attorney General notes that the Supreme Court applied the Salerno standard in the abortion context prior to Casey, see, e.g., Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 514, 110 S.Ct. 2972, 111 L.Ed.2d 405 (1990), and urges us to follow the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12, 14 n. 2 (5th Cir.1992), that Casey does not displace Salerno’s “no set of circumstances” test for facial challenges to abortion regulation. See also Causeway Med. Suite v. Ieyoub, 109 F.3d 1096, 1102-03 (5th Cir.1997) (declining to reverse Barnes). The overwhelming majority of circuits to address this issue, however, have disagreed with the Fifth Circuit. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent N.J. v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127, 142-43 (3d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Lawall, 180
holding undue burden standard instead of salerno standard applies in abortion context after casey holding that a finding of accommodation is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard of review instead of under a de novo standard holding that even if the standard for waiver is clear the standard was not met holding that the standard of proof for dischargeability actions is the preponderance of the evidence standard recognizing that the federal pleading standard is a less stringent standard than the delaware pleading standard