in full satisfaction of the debt. This overstates the effect of § 506(a)(2). Surrender would satisfy the creditor’s secured claim, not the entire debt. If a creditor holds an undersecured claim, the creditor would still have an unsecured claim to the extent the debt exceeds the collateral’s judicially-determined replacement value. Santander also argues that applying § 506(a)(2) would be absurd because it eliminates creditors’ contract and state law rights to liquidate and pursue an unsecured claim for any deficiency. But state law does not govern if the Bankruptcy Code requires a different result. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55, 99 S.Ct. 914, 918, 59 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979); Raleigh v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20, 120 S.Ct. 1951, 1955, 147 L.Ed.2d 13 (2000) (<HOLDING>). Here, the Bankruptcy Code is contrary to
holding that creditors rights are subject to any qualifying or contrary provisions of the bankruptcy code holding that the purpose of the bankruptcy codes avoidance provisions is to prevent a debtor from making transfers that diminish the bankruptcy estate to the detriment of creditors holding that administrative expense claims are accorded special treatment under the bankruptcy code and are not subject to section 502d holding that the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over counterclaims asserted by the bankruptcy estate against a creditor where the claim is a state law action independent of the federal bankruptcy law and not necessarily resolvable by a ruling on the creditors proof of claim in the bankruptcy emphasis added recognizing distinction between perfection which governs secured creditors rights against third parties and enforcement of liens which controls creditors rights against its debtor rejecting theory that such inchoate or unenforced security interests are voidable under bankruptcy code  544a