founded upon conclusory, vague or general allegations, but must instead, allege facts that show the existence of the asserted constitutional rights violation recited in the complaint and what each defendant did to violate the asserted right.” Terrance v. Northville Reg’l Psychiatric Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 842 (6th Cir.2002). Further, “a supervisory official’s failure to supervise, control or train the offending individual is not actionable unless the supervisor either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir.1999)(internal quotation marks omitted). Moniz’s general allegations of Cox’s failure to supervise and investigate are insufficient to state a claim under these standards. See id. (<HOLDING>). In sum, we agree with the district court that
holding that supervisory liability under  1983 must be based on active unconstitutional behavior and cannot be based upon a mere failure to act internal quotation marks omitted holding that a rule 26b application based on ineffective assistance cannot function to save the underlying substantive claim from procedural default internal quotation marks omitted recognizing that the declaratory judgment act is only procedural and does not create substantive rights internal quotation marks and citations omitted holding that state officials cannot have been expected to predict the future course of constitutional law internal quotation marks omitted holding that individual liability under  1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation