an employer’s proffered reason for an employment action was pretextual, we are not concerned with the correctness or desirability of reasons offered for employment decisions, but rather the issue of whether the employer honestly believes in the reasons it offers.” Grayson v. O’Neill, 308 F.3d 808, 820 (7th Cir.2002). Nothing in the record indicates that Parker did not give credence to the complaints at the time they were filed or that he was presented with evidence that would have warranted his believing that the reports were not true. Consequently, even if Ms. DeBruin did make out her prima facie case, she is unable to establish that Appleton’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her was pretextual. See, e.g., Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Ms. DeBruin submits that Parker and Stieber’s
holding that statistical evidence presented by the plaintiff showing an employers pattern of conduct toward a protected class is relevant to a showing of pretext and can create an inference of discrimination holding that a plaintiff can establish pretext only by showing that her employers explanation is a he holding that plaintiff can show pretext by demonstrating that an employers proffered reason for an adverse employment action has no basis in fact holding that a plaintiff can establish a causal link by showing that the employers decision  was based in part on knowledge of the employees protected activity holding that plaintiff cannot establish pretext because she is unable to show any causal connection her complaints and the adverse action