allowed to draw weekly benefits simultaneously from a permanent total and a permanent partial award, it may be more profitable for him to be disabled than to be well—a situation which compensation law always studiously avoids in order to prevent inducement to malingering. 2 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 59.41(a), at 10-561 to 10-567 (1995) (footnotes omitted). The Board relied on this argument to rule in Stuekagain’s favor. We also find it persuasive. Where possible, courts should interpret workers’ compensation as one consistent structure intended to further this overall purpose and should award compensation for one type of disability in light of compensation for others, particularly where both are for the same accident. See Wien, 592 P.2d at 356 (<HOLDING>); see, e.g., Grant, 693 P.2d at 876 (requiring
holding it is clear that the constitution permits retrial after a conviction is reversed because of a defect in the charging instrument in a case where the prose cution relied on the wrong statute in the charging instrument and the defendant could have been convicted on the right statute holding that court should interpret statute in light of purpose of whole instrument holding that a contract will be read as a whole and the intent of each part will be gathered from a consideration of the whole holding that when interpreting a statute or regulation courts must read the provisions of the law as a whole and in context recognizing that a statute should be read as comprehensive whole