§ 3161(e) “by analogy.” See United States v. Crooks, 804 F.2d 1441, 1445 (9th Cir.1986) (“Crooks I ”), modified by Crooks II, 826 F.2d at 5. Here, unlike in Vo, Crooks II, or Van Brandy, the relevant time period is the one between Pete’s arrest and his indictment, which is governed by § 3161(b). But the STA makes no distinction regarding the applicability of the exclusions under § 3161(h)(1) to the pre-indictment period (governed by § 3161(b)) and the pretrial period (governed by §§ 3161(c) and (e)), and nothing in Vo, Crooks II, or Van Brandy suggests such a distinction. We therefore hold that the automatic exclusion of time for interlocutory appeals under § 3161(h)(1)(F) is applicable pre-indictment under § 3161(b). Cf. United States v. Robinson, 887 F.2d 651, 656 (6th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Montoya, 827 F.2d 143,
holding that an initial pleading triggered the thirtyday time limit for removal under  1446b because it sets forth on its face express allegations as to the monetary amount of damages holding that the relevant time is the time of the employment decision holding that the circuit judge did not have the authority to extend the thirtyday time limit for filing a notice of appeal holding that the crossappeal time limit is jurisdictional holding that the exclusion of time under  3161h1d from the thirtyday preindictment time limit under  3161b of the sta is automatic and no causal connection is required