particular occasion, and "clothing the opinion in the garb of an interviewing technique does not help." State v. Elnicki, 279 Kan. 47, 105 P.3d 1222, 1229 (2005) (quoting State v. Jones, 117 Wash.App. 89, 68 P.3d 1153, 1155 (2003)). 129 More fundamentally, the majority's holding, though framed as an exception to CRE 608, rewrites that rule. CRE 608 controls the admissibility of character evidence offered to support or attack the credibility of a witness. By its terms, CRE 608 does not permit admission of a witness's opinion about whether another witness was telling the truth on a particular oceasion-such as the interrogations at issue here. CRE 608(a); Liggett, 135 P.3d at 731. Until today, our cases have uniformly held as much. See, e.g., People v. Eppens, 979 P.2d 14, 18 (Colo.1999) (<HOLDING>); People v. Gaffney, 769 P.2d 1081, 1088
holding that plaintiffs own testimony and hearsay testimony constituted weak and insubstantial evidence holding harmless the improper admission of a social workers hearsay testimony concerning a childs report of sexual abuse where the credibility of the childs testimony was supported by other witnesses holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive holding that a social workers testimony that a child was sincere constituted impermissible character testimony holding that a trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion to exclude testimony of a witness for an alleged sequestration violation where no impermissible harmonization of testimony could be inferred from the witnesss reading of the newspaper in the absence of any evidence that this testimony was based on what he read