Mayer contends that this provision establishes an exemption of the remaining 85% of unpaid wages not subject to collection under a deduction order. Mayer is correct. In determining whether a statutory provision confers an exemption, the critical question is whether it protects an asset of the debtor against all collection activities: While state courts frequently refer to statutes which prohibit only certain forms of judicial process as “exemption” statutes, the term “exemption” conventionally connotes protection against all forms of process.... [I]t is appropriate, in our view, to give the word its common meaning in the absence of any legislative indication to the contrary. Geise, 992 F.2d at 658 (internal citations omitted); accord In re Allard, 196 B.R. 402, 410 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1996) (<HOLDING>). See also In re McClure, 175 B.R. 21, 23
holding that provision is a statute of repose and noting that the word extinguished is emphasized because of its substantive effect holding the word individuals is not the equivalent of the dictionary acts use of the word persons holding that a states use of the word shall is mandatory language holding that the word interest is to be understood in its ordinary senseto hold that congress intended to use the word in the sense of a penalty is contrary to all rules of interpretation and invokes a special definition of the word interest that is unwarranted citations omitted holding that a statute need not explicitly use the word exempt in its text as a litmus test before the functional effect of the statutes language is applied or implemented