Whiting and Fidelity, supra, in which the collateral order doctrine applied. Thus, the order denying Mr. Norman’s motion did not resolve an “important issue” as required under the collateral order doctrine. Moreover, the order does not meet the fourth requirement under the collateral order doctrine because the circuit court’s order denying Mr. Norman’s motion was not effectively unreviewable on appeal. We remain cognizant that the collateral order doctrine is limited in scope and tightly construed. See Kurstin, 191 McLApp. at 144-46, 990 A.2d 594. A prominent feature of the collateral order doctrine cases is that there is a time-bound right that will be lost if an appeal cannot be taken immediately. See Hudson v. Housing Authority of Baltimore City, 402 Md. 18, 935 A.2d 395 (2007) (<HOLDING>). That is not the situation in the case at bar.
holding that notice of appeal from default judgment that was the final order in the case also allowed appellant to raise appellate issues challenging prior interlocutory order dismissing part of case for want of prosecution holding that the collateral order doctrine permits a reviewing appellate court to treat as final without consideration of the procedural posture of a case a narrow1 class of interlocutory orders in extraordinary circumstances  recognizing the collateral order doctrine for the first time holding that a bankruptcy court order denying a trustees claim to immunity was final and appealable under the collateral order doctrine holding that an order was interlocutory in nature despite the trial courts certification of the order as a final appealable judgment