is so because, “[i]n order for an act of negligence to proximately cause the damage, the fact finder must find that the negligence was ouses of child molesters is actual knowledge. Chaney, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d at 76 (quoting Uccello v. Laudenslayer, 44 Cal.App.8d 504, 118 Cal.Rptr. 741, 748 n. 4 (1975)) (“Only where the circumstances are such that the defendant ‘must have known’ and not ‘should have known’ will an inference of actual knowledge be permitted.”); see also J.S. v. R.T.H., 155 N.J. 330, 714 A.2d 924, 930 (1998) (adopting the “particularized foreseeability” test for spouses of child molesters, “a standard of foreseeability ... that is based on ‘particular knowledge’ or ‘special reason to know’”) (citations omitted). But see Doe v. Franklin, 930 S.W.2d 921, 928 (Tex.Ct.App.1996) (<HOLDING>). Because we find Mississippi’s public policy
holding that the deceased defendant trustees wife was a representative of her husbands estate and a proper party for substitution purposes where the wife was the primary distributee of her deceased husbands estate holding that a cause of action accrues when the claimant knew or reasonably should have known of the wrong holding that a wife is not liable simply by virtue of the marital relationship for her husbands fraudulent acts holding that a request is sufficiently clear if the administrator knew or should have known that plan information was requested holding the test for foreseeability is whether the wife knew or should have known of her husbands proclivities