the trial court sincerely and eloquently expressed its concern to continue in such a fashion. Trial Court Opinion, 1/8/01, at 11-12. ¶ 14 In so ruling, Judge Knight relied heavily on the recitation of the law set forth in Leister, 712 A.2d at 335, wherein we stated: When judges doubt their own ability to adjudicate impartially, they should re-cuse themselves. Commonwealth v. Boyle, 498 Pa. 486, 490, 447 A.2d 250, 252 (1982); In Interest of Morrow, 583 A.2d at 819. Such an inability to be objective creates a manifest necessity for the declaration of a mistrial, particularly when a judge must exert the broad discretion that a bench trial demands. [Commonwealth v. Smith, 321 Pa.Super. 51, 467 A.2d 888 (1983)]. See also Commonwealth v. Berrigan, 369 Pa.Super. 145, 535 A.2d 91 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Id. 535 A.2d at 104. Even though the trial
holding that a prosecution for the same offense was barred by double jeopardy where a mistrial was declared without manifest necessity holding recusal not required holding that while a judge need not have declared a mistrial where his bias never infected the jury necessity required his recusal during sentencing to allow one without hint of animosity toward appellant to exercise such largely unfettered  discretion holding that where appellant moved to recuse trial judge from deciding the motion for new trial the judge of the administrative district was required to designate a judge to hear the recusal motion recognizing that the trial judge must be given a wide range of discretion in determining whether a mistrial should be declared