a provision in the Youthful Offender Act which provides that: “[N]o youthful offender shall be committed ... for a substantive violation [of probation] for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he or she was found guilty, ... or for a technical or nonsubstantive violation for a period longer than 6 years.” § 958.14, Fla. Stat. (2004). Christian argues that his violation cannot be classified as substantive because the State did not charge and convict him of any new crime related to his illicit drug use. As such, he argues that this violation must be classified as technical or nonsubstantive, and that he could only be sentenced to six years in prison. We reject this argument based upon our precedent in Robinson v. State, 702 So.2d 1346 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (<HOLDING>). In Robinson, as in this case, the state did
holding that probation and suspension of sentence may not be revoked based solely on a violation or criminal offense that was committed before the offender was actually placed on probation holding that illicit drug use because it is also a crime constitutes a substantive violation of youthful offender probation holding that while a defendant is not entitled to be sentenced as a youthful offender on any new offense he or she may have committed the trial court cannot revoke a defendants youthful offender status on offenses for which that defendant has already been sentenced citation omitted holding that youthful offender could be sentenced in excess of six year cap where probation violation was substantive in that he committed several criminal offenses holding that a defendant who scored more than sixty points on his sentencing scoresheet and was not convicted of an offense specifically referenced in the drug offender probation statute was ineligible to receive drug offender probation