both actions entail a determination of the validity of the same employment transaction. That is, it would be impossible for Rivera to prevail on his federal claim that he should have been allowed to remain, and should be reinstated, in the Collection and Garnishment Division Supervisor position without flatly contradicting the state court’s affirmation of the defendants’ decision to remove him thereof. Moreover, the fact that plaintiff Rivera now advances a different legal theory — namely, disparate treatment — does not undermine the identity of cause in both lawsuits inasmuch as both claims arise from a single nucleus of operative facts. See Muniz Cortez v. Intermedics, Inc., 229 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir.2000) (citing Boateng v. InterAmerican Univ., Inc., 210 F.3d 56, 62 (1st Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>)). We conclude, therefore, that the requisite
holding that a single cause of action arises out of the same set of facts holding that under puerto rico law there is no right to bring separate and successive suits on different legal theories arising out of a single nucleus of operative facts holding where there is a single wrong to plaintiff for which relief is sought arising from an interlocked series of transactions there is no separate and independent claim or cause of action under  1441c holding that there is no implied cause of action against a municipality arising out of the fourteenth amendment and cognizable under  1331a holding that there was no legal right to court review of parole board decision because there is no legal right to release on parole