another hearing until March, 2009, and that if granted parole at that time his earliest release date would be August, 2009. It is axiomatic that although we give deference to an administrative agency’s expertise, we must be presented with the reasons for the board’s actions. Here, the board — in denying the motion to reschedule the hearing and proceeding to immediate classification, eight months prior to the next parole hearing, and ultimately four years prior to Doe’s scheduled release — identified no basis grounded in statute or regulation, and did not address Doe’s staleness claims. We appreciate that the board has an administrative interest in classifying an offender prior to release. Cf. Doe, No. 3844, 447 Mass, at 775, quoting from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (<HOLDING>). In this case, however, the board has provided
recognizing that the governments failure to prevail is a factor that may be considered holding that the objection had been sufficiently timely when the defense waited until the governments rebuttal to object to a statement made during the governments closing statement recognizing that courts may not confine defendants to work off court costs in order to satisfy the governments contractual interest recognizing the public interest exception recognizing the governments interest including    the fiscal and administrative burdens involved