since the document was sent internally to Tripodi, in his capacity as university counsel. Contrary to the dissent’s view, the fact that another University employee may have been copied on the email does not defeat its confidential nature because as a fellow employee with an interest in the matter, he shared Sharp’s interest in protecting the University from liability. See Mead Data Ctr., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 253 n. 24 (D.C.Cir.1977) (noting that communications circulated among more than one employee of the client can still be confidential as long as those employees are authorized to act for the corporation in relation to the subject matter of the communication); cf. Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 863-64 (D.C.Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). See also Murphy v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 571
holding that if documents are privileged in the hands of the client they retain that privilege when given to an attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice holding that a client only waives the privilege to the extent necessary to reveal the advice of counsel he placed at issue holding that the inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document does not waive the attorneyclient privilege if attorney took all reasonable steps to avoid disclosure and asserted the privilege as soon as the disclosure became known holding that when an attorney represents multiple clients and a dispute between the attorney and one client later occurs there is a waiver of the privilege but only by the client asserting the liability holding that distributing a memo widely within an agency defeated the privilege but noting that when the client is by nature a group as is true of  corporations the courts have agreed that the privilege should not be defeated by some limited circulation beyond the attorney and the person within the group who requested the advice and advising that if disclosure had been limited to personnel responsible for the matter at issue the court would have a different case