apply because the putative class includes some individual policyholders who received something other than shares of ... common stock ... and thus were not “purchasers” of “covered securities.” This argument is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Dabit, holding that it is not “the identity of the plaintiffs,” but the alleged conduct of the defendants that “determine[s] whether the complaint alleges fraud ‘in connection with the purchase or sale’ of securities.” Accordingly, [the plaintiff] cannot avoid SLUSA’s application by including some nonpurchasers or nonsellers of covered securities in the putative class. Sofonia v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 465 F.3d 873, 879 n. 4 (8th Cir.2006); see also Spencer, 2006 WL 3408043, at *6-*7 (<HOLDING>). Because both Dabit and Sofonia focus on the
holding that a third party who receives trust property on inquiry notice that a trustee has misappropriated trust funds is also liable for breach of trust holding that slusa preempts claims which allege a material misrepresentation or omission in connection with the purchase or sale of securities whether or not that allegation is an element of or otherwise necessary to the putative state claim holding that a trust beneficiarys state law claims concerning investment of trust assets in affiliated mutual funds satisfied the in connection with a purchase or sale of security requirement of slusa holding that a claim arises from the purchase or sale of a security only if there is an allegation of fraud in the purchase sale or issuance of the  instrument holding that the beneficiary of a trust was not the real party in interest regarding rights owned by the trust