bringing a deliberate-indifference claim). Appointment of counsel in a civil case “is a privilege justified only by exceptional circumstances, such as where the facts and legal issues are so novel or complex as to require the assistance of a trained practitioner.” Fowler v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1088, 1096 (11th Cir.1990). We conclude from the record that the magistrate judge did not abuse its discretion in denying Wallace’s request for appointment of counsel. Though the magistrate judge determined that Wallace stated a claim sufficient to survive preliminary dismissal, that, alone, is not an exceptional circumstance. Wallace’s claims were fairly straightforward and did not present complex or novel issues. See Fowler, 899 F.2d at 1096; Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Wallace demonstrated his ability to
holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to certify class action when claims were so individualized that certification was improper holding that an inmates eighth amendment legal claims were straightforward and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to appoint counsel holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give a mere inspection instruction in a firearm possession case holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order production of government files under rule 16a1c holding district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to sever numerous substantively unconscionable terms from arbitration agreement