separate causes of action[J” Id. at 647. We g, Inc., 109 So.3d 752, 760-62 (Fla.2013) (stating that “[n]o Florida decision has allowed a survivor to recover under the wrongful death statute where the decedent could not have recovered” and that under Florida law “[t]he estate and heirs stand in the shoes of the decedent”) (citations and quotation marks omitted); Sanford v. Castleton Health Care Ctr., LLC, 813 N.E.2d 411, 422 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (arbitration clause bound personal representative to arbitrate wrongful death and survival action claims because Indiana law permitted personal representative to maintain action “only if the decedent, if alive, might have maintained such a cause of action”); Ballard v. Sw. Detroit Hosp., 119 Mich.App. 814, 327 N.W.2d 370, 371 (1982) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Cleveland v. Mann, 942 So.2d 108, 118-19
holding that instruction on use of deadly force was not required where there was no evidence that decedent had attempted to assault appellant appellant could not retreat or that decedent was armed holding that although the filing of suit and service of citation interrupt the running of the statute its dismissal for want of prosecution will have the same effect as if the suit had never been filed holding that michigan wrongful death action is a derivative one in which the representative in effect stands in the shoes of the decedent and thus any substantive impediment that would have prevented the decedent from commencing suit will likewise preclude suit by the personal representative holding that a prior suit and a subsequent suit between the same parties did not involve the same claim because the evidence necessary to sustain the subsequent suit was insufficient to entitle the plaintiff to relief in the prior suit recognizing that in a derivative action the corporation for whose benefit suit is brought is a necessary party to the action