intended to put on evidence of J.G.’s abuse for a full year prior to trial, because Defendant was formally charged with abusing J.G. in Count 6 of the first and second superseding indictments. It was only six days prior to trial that defense counsel learned that Count 6 would be dropped for want of federal jurisdiction; by then, defense counsel surely had sufficient time to investigate J.G.’s allegations and prepare a defense. We decline to elevate form over function by reversing Defendant’s convictions just because the government did not announce its intent to offer J.G.’s testimony under Rule 413 at least fifteen days prior to trial, because there is no possibility that Defendant was unfairly surprised by the evidence. See United States v. Benais, 460 F.3d 1059, 1062 (8th Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, Rule 413(b) permits a district
recognizing rule holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure  contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant holding that rule 413b only requires disclosure of the evidence itself fifteen days prior to trial and the rule does not impose  on the government a separate obligation to specifically disclose or declare the intention to rely upon rule 413 for admissibility holding rule 403 does not exclude all prejudicial evidence the rule focuses only on the danger of unfair prejudice holding that the exception to the general rule applied even though the court did not specifically rule the evidence was inadmissible because the ruling was definitive and reached the ultimate issue of admissibility