frequency, and intensity of the use may change over time to take advantage of developments in technology and to accommodate normal development of the dominant estate or enterprise benefited by the servitude.” Restatement (Third) of Property, Servitudes § 4.10, § 4.10 cmt. f (2000) (explaining that the policy underlying this rule is that “it permits servitudes to retain their utility over time and probably reflects the expectations of the parties who create servitudes of indefinite duration”); see also Skow v. Goforth, 618 N.W.2d 275, 278 (Iowa 2000) (deed that granted “right-of-way to drive teams” over land “must be interpreted to allow ingress and egress for modern vehicular traffic, including farm tractors and implements”); Hodgkins v. Bianchini, 80 N.E.2d 464, 467 (Mass. 1948) (<HOLDING>) (quotation omitted). In addition to this
holding that injuries must be connected to the use of the car as a car ie as a means of transportation rather than a situs for the commission of criminal acts holding that seven years of public use is sufficient to constitute acceptance of an rs 2477 right of way as opposed to the ten years required for an easement by prescription on the ground that it is not a matter of prescription but of acceptance of a grant holding that patents to lands over which rights of way created under 1875 act passed conveyed the servient estate in the right of way holding that grant of a cart road did not restrict use of easement to horsedrawn vehicles but rather created a general right of way for vehicles and stating that we should be very slow to hold that even ancient rights of way not expressly restricted as to the type of vehicle  could not be employed at all for the means of transportation in common use by a succeeding generation holding that mere use of a road will not make a road a public road even though such use is with the knowledge and consent of the landowner unless the use is accompanied by  recognition by public authority or by its maintainance sic