1083 (“If we deny fees, the Church will pay the fees. If we award fees, [the Government] will pay the fees. The Church is the beneficiary of any award of fees, not the individual appellants, and thus the Church can fairly be characterized as the real party in interest.”). But since the Church had more than 600 employees, it was barred from receiving an award of litigation costs under Section 2412(d)(2)(B) of the EAJA, despite the other named plaintiffs being individuals with a net-worth below the statutory threshold. Id. at 1092. In this case, however, BASR is obligated to pay the litigation costs under Texas law and therefore is the “real-party-in-interest” with respect to the litigation costs, if the court-awarded litigation costs are denied. See Unification Church, 762 F.2d at 1082 (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, the court has determined
holding that public policy considerations require that the burden be placed on the attorney to provide for allocation of courtawarded attorneys fees in the contingent fee agreement recognizing that the party seeking attorney fees bears the burden of proving entitlement to those fees holding that each plaintiff is liable for fees if he would have been entitled to his fees if he had prevailed holding that where a state statute provides for the award of attorneys fees those fees can be considered as part of the amount in controversy for the purpose of determining federal diversity jurisdiction holding that the court shall consider only the qualification  of those parties that will be themselves liable for fees if courtawarded fees are denied