discussed. Brush thus had another opportunity to address in full the issue of her immunity and Holloway’s arguments to the contrary. The issue is, therefore, properly before this court. III Judges and other court officers are absolutely immune from suit on claims arising out of their performance of judicial or quasi-judicial functions, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967); Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir.1994), but not from suits that arise out of other conduct, Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 r.1989) (recognizing the functional orientation of the absolute immunity doctrine and holding that social workers are entitled to absolute immunity when filing child abuse petitions); but see Achterhof v. Selvaggio, 886 F.2d 826, 830 (6th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). In all three of these cases, this court has
holding that conclusory statements without factual support are of no value to the court when deciding a summary judgment motion holding that social workers are not entitled to absolute immunity when deciding whether to open or continue an investigation or when deciding to enter a parents name in a central register of abusers all of which are administrative or investigative by nature rather than prosecutorial holding that social workers are entitled to absolute immunity when prosecuting child delinquency petitions holding that a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity from a civil suit for damages under  1988 in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the states case including deciding which evidence to present holding that in deciding whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity it is not only the evidence of clearly established law that is for the court but also whether a reasonable officer could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful in light of the information the officer had