risked losing their last chance to defend themselves. Taking into consideration all of these factors, particularly the split-second nature of the decision, we conclude as a matter of law that Appellants had probable cause to believe that Waterman’s oncoming vehicle posed an immediate threat of serious physical harm at least to Officers Batton and Heisey. While reasonable officers would have recognized the possibility that Waterman intended only to accelerate by them rather than at them, they also — in the instant they had to decide — could have interpreted the acceleration in the face of their show of force as the initiation of a second attempt by Waterman to avoid capture by using his vehicle as a weapon against law enforcement personnel. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 11, 105 S.Ct. 1694 (<HOLDING>). Thus, although Appellants could have held
holding that an officer cannot use deadly force unless a suspect poses an imminent threat of serious physical harm holding the use of deadly force is constitutionally permissible only if the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm either to the officer or to others holding that use of deadly force was justified against a suspect when officer forced to make a splitsecond decision relied on his reasonable belief that another officer had seen a gun in the suspects hands even though the suspects hands were handcuffed in front of him and the defendant officer never saw a weapon holding that an officer may use deadly force when a fleeing suspect threatens the officer with a weapon recognizing that deadly weapon finding may be made even when weapon used is unknown