his July, August, and September 2009 reregistration forms. We assume Purvy “presses this separate challenge surely well aware of the ‘venerable principle of double jeopardy jurisprudence,’ that ‘[t]he successful appeal of a judgment of conviction, on any ground other than the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, poses no bar to further prosecution on the same charge.’” United States v. Farr, 536 F.3d 1174, 1186 (10th Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 90-91, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2193-94, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978)). We thus address Purvy’s insufficiency argument because, if successful, it might impose a double jeopardy bar to reprosecution under properly worded indictments. Compare Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400, 404, 107 S.Ct. 1825, 1827, 95 L.Ed.2d 354 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Charles E. Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Law §
holding it is clear that the constitution permits retrial after a conviction is reversed because of a defect in the charging instrument in a case where the prose cution relied on the wrong statute in the charging instrument and the defendant could have been convicted on the right statute holding that the deferential standard of review of a plan interpretation is appropriate only when the trust instrument allows the trustee to interpret the instrument and when the trust ee has in fact interpreted the instrument holding that once the statute is found to be divisible the court must look to the charging papers and judgment of conviction to determine if the actual crime of which defendant was convicted was a crime of violence but emphasizing that the court is not to examine the particular facts underlying the conviction holding that court should interpret statute in light of purpose of whole instrument holding that the gravamen of the offense is the physical adaptation of the instrument