claims and state law false arrest/false imprisonment claims. See Rankin, 133 F.3d at 1435 (stating that probable cause constitutes an absolute bar to both state and § 1983 claims alleging false arrest); Dahl v. Holley, 312 F.3d 1228, 1236 (11th Cir.2002) (“[T]he existence of probable cause to arrest Dahl defeats her First Amendment claim.”). In addition, because any contact ■with Sada, and any injury therefrom, was incidental to a lawful arrest, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Sada’s battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress c arrest for battery, the district court properly concluded that the question of whether there was probable cause to arrest for disorderly conduct is moot. See Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1195-96 (11th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm. AFFIRMED. 1 .
holding that an officers subjective reason for making an arrest need not include the criminal offense that later establishes probable cause holding that the courts determination of whether an officer had probable cause for an arrest is an independent and objective determination and an officers own subjective reason for the arrest is irrelevant holding that when an arrest is properly supported by probable cause as to any offense neither the officers subjective reliance on an offense for which no probable cause exists nor his verbal announcement of the wrong offense vitiates the arrest holding that the subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause holding that a warrantless arrest does not violate the fourth amendment if at the time of the defendants arrest police had probable cause to believe that an offense has been is being or will be committed