or suppose the men demean the women. Such misconduct may be actionable under the Constitution.”); Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 721 (7th Cir.2006) (“In the first amendment context, harassment ... may be actionable if it is designed to deter a public employee’s free speech.”); Tierney v. Vahle, 304 F.3d 734, 740 (7th Cir.2002) (“[D]efamation inflicts sufficient harm on its victim to count as retaliation.... ”). Our standard for actionable retaliatory speech was acknowledged with approval by the Supreme Court in Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 76 n. 8, 110 S.Ct. 2729, 111 L.Ed.2d 52 (1990) (“[T]he First Amendment ... protects state employees ... from ‘even an act of retaliation as trivial as failing to hold a birthday party for a public employee ... when i r.1999) (<HOLDING>); cf. Keenan v. Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252, 258 (5th
holding that the action taken need not be the substantial equivalent of dismissal in order to constitute adverse employment action recognizing that outside of the employment context speech that would chill a person of ordinary firmness is actionable holding that termination is an adverse employment action holding that in the first amendment employment context harassing speech must constitute constructive adverse employment action to be actionable holding that conduct causing public humiliation was not an actionable adverse employment action because public perceptions were not a term or condition of employment of the plaintiffs employment