v. Carlson et al., 1994 WL 83270 (8th Cir. March 16, 1994 (D.Minn)) (finding Witzke’s § 1983 action “meritless” and “frivolous”). Moreover, this court notes that those courts which have addressed the retroactive applicability of § 1915(g) are all in agreement that there is no impermissible retroactive effect by applying the statute to complaints which were filed prior to April 26, 1996, the enactment date of the PLRA See, e.g., Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383 (5th Cir.1996) (finding that § 1915(g) did not impose new or additional liabilities, and, thus, it could be applied retroactively); Green v. Nottingham, 90 F.3d 415, 420 (10th Cir.1996) (finding that § 1915(g) announces procedural rule and has no retroactive effect); Lyon v. Vande Krol, 940 F.Supp. 1433, 1436 (S.D.Iowa 1996) (<HOLDING>); McCray v. Kralik, 1996 WL 378273 (S.D.N.Y.
holding that apprendi does not apply retroactively holding that the rule announced by booker  does not operate retroactively holding that  1915g does not operate retroactively simply because dismissals entered before the enactment of the plra are considered in applying  1915g holding that for purposes of counting strikes under  1915g it is irrelevant whether the strikes occurred prior to or after the effective date of the aedpa holding that the fair sentencing act does not apply retroactively to defendants whose criminal conduct occurred before its enactment even if those defendants were sentenced after its enactment