18 Bennett v. Mullally, 263 Ga. App. 215, 217-18 (1) (587 SE2d 385) (2003) (physical precedent only) (punctuation omitted). 19 Wood, 314 Ga. App. at 133 (4) (punctuation omitted). 20 Id. (punctuation omitted); see also Harper, 313 Ga. App. at 476 (1) (“[B]ecause trial courts are vested with hroad discretion in evaluating and ruling upon a potential juror’s impartiality, we will only reverse when there has heen a ‘manifest abuse’ of the trial court’s discretion.”). 21 See Hardy v. Tanner Med. Ctr., Inc., 231 Ga. App. 254, 256 (4) (499 SE2d 121) (1998) (trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion to strike juror when juror’s answers to questions gave assurance that juror could be fair to both sides and listen to the evidence). Compare Harper, 313 Ga. App. at 478 (1) (<HOLDING>). 22 See, e.g., Crusselle v. State, 303 Ga.
holding that jurors who expressed residual doubt about the defendants right to silence should have been dismissed for cause holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike for cause two potential jurors who had heard andor read about the case but indicated that they could render a fair and impartial verdict based on the evidence presented holding that double jeopardy barred the second prosecution when one of the jurors in the first trial became disabled and the trial court declared a mistrial instead of proceeding with eleven jurors holding statute stating that judge could excuse jurors was violated when jury commissioners excused jurors holding that trial court abused its discretion in failing to make a proper inquiry of jurors andor failing to strike jurors for cause after jurors explicitly expressed bias