is analogous to the attorney-client privilege’s underlying purpose, is that “effective and efficient governmental decision making requires a free flow of ideas among government officials and that inhibitions will result if officials know that their communications may be revealed to outsiders.” In re Franklin National Bank, 478 F.Supp. at 581; see also Carl Zeiss Stifung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 325 (D.D.C. 1966) (finding that “government, no less than the citizen, needs open but protected channels for the kind of plain talk that is essential to the quality of its functioning”), aff'd, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952, 88 S.Ct. 334, 19 L.Ed.2d 361 (1967); Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corp. v. United States, 157 F.Supp. 939, 946, 141 Ct.Cl. 38 (1958) (<HOLDING>). Thus, it is clear that the deliberative
holding that disclosure of predecisional documents would injure the consultative process within the government holding that foia exemptions are not mandatory bars to disclosure because the purpose of foia is to provide broad disclosure of government documents recognizing governmental privilege precluding disclosure of official information that would be injurious to the consultative functions of the government holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure  contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant holding that the government must provide the party seeking disclosure with a detailed index describing the documents the government claims are exempt from disclosure under foia