S. C. § 78n(a), “where a legal structure of private statutory rights has developed without clear indications of congressional intent,” a federal court has the limited power to define “the contours of that structure.” Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U. S. 1088, 1104 (1991). As to this proposition we were unanimous. See ibid. (Souter, J., joined by Rehnquist, C. J., and White, O’Connor, and Scalia, JJ.); id., at 1114 (Kennedy, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Where an implied cause of action is well accepted by our own cases and has become an established part of the securities laws ... we should enforce it as a meaningful remedy unless we are to eliminate it altogether”). See also Blue Chip Stamps, supra, at 737 (<HOLDING>). We are not alone in recognizing a judicial
recognizing the cause of action recognizing the authority of federal courts to define the contours of a private cause of action under rule 10b5 and to flesh out the portions of the law with respect to which neither the congressional enactment nor the administrative regulations offer conclusive guidance holding that neither the language nor the legislative history of the fcpa indicates the congressional intent to create a private right of action recognizing cause of action holding that there was no federal subject matter jurisdiction under the private cause of action provision of the act