for this construction, and determined that the 1997 Board decision, which was based on the totality of the evidence, was not in error. R. at 16. Because we interpret “demonstrate” to permit the Secretary, based upon the facts of a particular case, to require that a claimant do more than merely state that his or her particular situation was “compelling,” and “evaluate” and “consider” to permit the Secretary to do more than merely accept whatever a claimant might offer, we hold that the 1999 Board decision was not “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” and that the Board’s statement of reasons or bases in that decision, as described above, was adequate. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(3)(A); see Russell, supra; cf. Malone, 10 Vet.App. at 545 (<HOLDING>). C. Board’s Determination that “Compelling
holding disciplinary rules can provide guidelines relevant to a disqualification determination holding that no implied private right of action exists under the nha and noting that the district of columbia first sixth and ninth circuits have held that the housing act and regulations promulgated thereunder do not satisfy the fourpart cort test and thus have refused to create a right of action for private parties who wish to sue to enforce the statute or regulations promulgated thereunder holding that retroactive application of agency regulations promulgated after the conduct at issue is disfavored holding that statute stating nursing home care may be furnished leaves decision to secretary and although regulations promulgated by secretary provide guidelines for making such determination they do not substantively or procedurally limit that discretion holding that regulations promulgated pursuant to an express congressional grant of rulemaking authority will be upheld unless they are arbitrary capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute