with [her] problems with Be[d]ini and his associates, there is no evidence that the government of Albania has a policy of ignoring torture if they are specifically aware of [its] occurrence at the time it is occurring and also there is no evidence that [Mrs. Demiraj and her son] would be detained on behalf of the government and subjected to torture with the government’s acquiescence. We decline to disturb this finding. We may only reject the finding of fact that Mrs. Demiraj was not likely to be tortured “if the evidence presented by [the petitioner] was such that a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude that” the finding was incorrect. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992); see also Chen v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 1131, 1134 (5th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Mrs. Demiraj only presented evidence that her
holding that the standard of review under  1252b4b essentially codifies the substantial evidence test established by the supreme court in  eliaszacarias holding that as to the scope of court review substantial evidence is a stringent limitation holding that the standard of review where a trial court terminates parental rights on the basis of egregious conduct is whether the order is supported by competent substantial evidence holding that the standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence is the same as the standard for denying a motion for a directed verdict recognizing that we review the sentence imposed by a district court under the abuse of discretion standard