relief is accompanied by an affidavit stating that the practice or procedure set forth pursuant to the provisions of section two is known to exist by the agency or official therein described and that reliance on administrative relief would be futile. G.L.c. 231A §3. In this case, there is no allegation that any DIA practice would preclude Percoco’s obtaining administrative relief. Finally, the decision to grant declaratory relief is generally a matter within the court’s discretion. G.L.c. 231A §3 states: The court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment . . . where such judgment . . . would not terminate the uncertainly or controversy giving rise to the proceedings or for other sufficient reasons. See also National Shawmut Bank v. Morey, 320 Mass. 492, 497 (1946) (<HOLDING>). Here, a discretionary denial is particularly
recognizing a district courts vast discretion in the declaratory judgment context holding that this court does not have jurisdiction over tax claims for declaratory or equitable relief holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion recognizing that the court has historically retained the discretion to decline purely declaratory relief and that glc 231a 3 codifies this discretion holding that the relevant inquiry is not whether the court has discretion to facilitate notice but whether this is an appropriate case in which to exercise discretion