in the FDPA’s trial-like sentencing regime is particularly appropriate given the interdependence of adversarial rights. See Edmund M. Morgan, The Jury and the Exclusionary Rules of Evidence, 4 U. Chi. L.Rev. 247, 255 (1936) (arguing that the right to “cross-examine is an essential element” of any adversarial system). If capital sentencing purports to provide a full-fledged adversarial proceeding, then a true adversarial proceeding it must give. See Christopher K. Tahbaz, Note, Fairness to the End: The Right to Confront Adverse Witnesses in Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 89 Colum. L.Rev. 1345, 1368 (1989) (“Because the right of confrontation is fundamental to the adversarial process, it should be extended to capital sentencing procedures”); cf. Morgan, 504 U.S. at 727, 112 S.Ct. 2222 (<HOLDING>). In particular, a meaningful Right to Counsel
holding that if a jury is to be provided the defendant at capital sentencing regardless of whether the sixth amendment requires it the jury must stand impartial and indifferent to the extent commanded by the sixth amendment holding that the defendants sixth amendment right to a jury did not include having a jury decide whether or not he should receive a capital sentence holding federal sentencing guidelines are subject to jury trial requirements of sixth amendment holding that there is no sixth amendment right to jury sentencing holding the sixth amendment right to a jury trial applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment