of ultimate fact in the two proceedings are identical, we hold that the RTC was precluded from asserting its “participation in a fraudulent scheme” theory of nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2)(A), and the district court was bound by the jury’s verdict in Carpenter’s favor on the factual issue underlying the RTC’s theory. We do not hold that a finding of nonliability for civil conspiracy to defraud necessarily precludes litigation of nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2)(A). Rather, we hold that where, as here, the factual issue that forms the basis for the creditor’s theory of nondischargeability has been actually litigated in a prior proceeding, neither the creditor nor the debtor may relitigate those grounds. See Sheerin v. Davis (In re Davis), 3 F.3d 113, 115-16 (5th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Lacy v. Dorsey (In re Lacy), 947 F.2d 1276,
holding that federal law defines fiduciary capacity and fraud or defalcation holding a duty of care without more insufficient to satisfy the fiduciary relationship element of  523a4 the federal courts adopting this narrow interpretation of fiduciary for purposes of the bankruptcy code gen erally hold that an express or technical trust is necessary to trigger the defalcation provision of  523a4 holding that jury verdict in prior state court fraud action including finding that debtor willfully breached fiduciary duty had preclusive effect on courts determination of nondischargeability based on defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity under  523a4 holding that an attorney is a fiduciary under section 523a4 holding that judgment in prior state court proceeding against debtor in which court found that debtor made false representations had preclusive effect on courts determination of nondischargeability under  523a2a based on false representations