us that one can peep upon a naked or partially naked person but not view any of the parts listed in the statute. Any number of possibilities exist where an accused could observe a naked person but not violate Article 120, UCMJ, because his view is obscured in some fashion or because of his particular vantage point, for example. We need not belabor the point. 4 . As noted above, the stipulation itself falls short of the factual admission required to uphold a guilty plea in this case. 5 . As we are confined by the definitions formulated by Congress, we are similarly confined to that which is objectively verifiable in the record to determine whether an appellant was properly advised on matters of law. See Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 646-47, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976) (<HOLDING>); Pretlow, 13 M.J. at 88. Our system of
holding where neither defense counsel nor the trial court explained to the defendant that intent to cause death was an element of seconddegree murder and there was no factual statement or admission implying intent the plea was involuntary holding that waiver by attorney was binding upon the accused when before the state introduced the evidence complained of on appeal counsel for the state in the presence of the accused and his counsel stated the agreement and the evidence of the witness was then read to the jury in the presence of the accused and his counsel without objection holding that failure to instruct on an essential element was harmless error because the element was so clearly established holding a guilty plea involuntary where the record established that neither judge nor defense counsel explained to the accused an essential element of the offense and where the accused did not sufficiently admit to such element holding under a plain error analysis that a failure to charge the jury with an essential element did not warrant reversal of the conviction where the evidence supporting that element was overwhelming