that professor did not have a property interest sufficient to trigger Fourteenth Amendment protection). Therefore, we hold Unger’s attempt to state a claim arising out of a property interest in the pursuit and continuance of her graduate medical education fails as a matter of law. 2. In her complaint, Unger also states that her participation in the Matching Program resulted in a contract between her and Temple. Thus, we must also decide whether Unger’s contract with Temple constitutes a property interest protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. Today it is beyond dispute that a contract with a state entity can give rise to a property right protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Perry v. Sinder-mann, 408 U.S. 593, 599-601, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2698-2700, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has never
holding that fourteenth amendment only applies to state action holding that a mississippi statute providing that employees could be terminated only for cause establishes a property interest under the fourteenth amendment holding that contract of employment providing that professor could be terminated only for cause constituted property right protected by fourteenth amendment holding that the fourteenth amendment only applies to state action holding that a public employee who may only be terminated for cause has a property interest in his position that is protected by the 14th amendment