contrast to Paulsen, plaintiffs here seek the direct payment of benefits that they claim they are owed under the plans, and that defendants allegedly have in their possession. Consequently, their claims for tortious interference with contract and inducing breach of contract seek to "duplicate, supplement, or supplant" the remedies provided by ERISA. See Dishman v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America, 269 F.3d 974, 983 (9th Cir.2001) ("Claimants simply cannot obtain relief by dressing up an ERISA benefits claim in the garb of a state law tort"). Consequently, all of plaintiffs’ state law causes of action are preempted to the extent they seek to recover compensation owed under the top hat plans. See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 375, 122 S.Ct. 2151, 153 L.Ed.2d 375 (2002) (<HOLDING>). D. Whether Plaintiff’s Complaint States a
holding that erisas preemption of state contract claims in a benefitsdue action is an affirmative defense subject to waiver recognizing that a court must balance the policy in favor of hearing a litigants claims on the merits with the policy in favor of finality holding that erisa preemption is an affirmative defense where erisas preemptive effect would result only in a change of the applicable law and would not subject the claim to exclusive federal jurisdiction recognizing that federal preemption is affirmative defense as to which defendant has burden of proof recognizing that erisas preemption regime is driven by the overpowering federal policy in favor of federal regulation