See id. We similarly held in White v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 766 So.2d 1228, 1229 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the appellant’s motion for mistrial after the appellees’ counsel, who advised the jury during opening statements that the investigating highway patrolman talked to everyone who was at the accident scene, stated, “ ‘I think the evidence will show that no one claimed that [the appellee] had anything to do with this accident at the scene of the accident.’ ” We determined that the only reasonable inference to be made from the statement was that the appellee was not charged with any traffic infraction in connection with the accident. See id. at 1233; see also Galgano v. Buchanan, 783 So.2d 302, 306-07 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (<HOLDING>); Wainer v. Banquero, 713 So.2d 1104, 1105
holding that the appellant was deprived of a fair trial as a result of the admission of evidence that she received a traffic citation following the accidentand concluding that the trial court erred in denying the appellants motion in limine to preclude the appellee from questioning her and the investigating officer as to whether she received a citation holding that the trial court reversibly erred in denying the appellants motion for mistrial following the investigating officers affirmative response to the appellees counsels question of whether any traffic citations had been issued as a result of the parties collision holding that although the parking citation that the plaintiff received did not indicate where and how to contest the allegation the plaintiff was not deprived of procedural due process because he received a summons to appear in court via first class mail before he was deprived of any liberty interest holding that the trial court reversibly erred in denying the appellants motion for mistrial following the appellees negative response to his attorneys question of whether he had been cited for a traffic violation following the parties accident and concluding that the question and answer were highly improper and prejudicial and that the harm was hot cured by the trial courts instruction to the jury holding that appellants could have amended as of right after they received the motion to dismiss and prior to the trial courts decision