case had been taken under advisement. Thus, he could not withdraw them as a matter of right. At appellant’s hearing on his pleas, he testified that no one had forced him to plead guilty or forced him to plead true. He was not threatened or promised anything in return for his pleas. Appellant further testified he was entering the pleas freely and voluntarily and understood that a plea of guilty to the charged offenses could result in deportation. Thé trial court admonished appellant on the range of punishment for each offense. All parties agreed appellant did not have any plea agreements with the State as to punishment. Appellant freely and voluntarily sig .App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. ref'd), overruled on other grounds by Whitelaw v. State, 29 S.W.3d 129 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the record reflects appellant was
holding the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendants motion to withdraw his guilty plea because the defendant did not admit to facts demonstrating the required mental state holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendants request to withdraw his plea although the accused claimed the report contained factually inaccurate material holding a motion to withdraw a guilty plea and grant trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and the supreme court will not upset the courts ruling unless there is a sufficient showing of abuse of discretion holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to withdraw guilty plea filed three weeks after entering the plea