43(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly gives a defendant the right to be present “at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury.” The rule was adopted, with modifications not pertinent here, from Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. State v. Kirk, 699 S.W.2d 814, 818 (Tenn.Crim.App.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1023, 106 S.Ct. 1215, 89 L.Ed.2d 327 (1986). Rule 43 embodies the protections afforded by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, the right to be present derived from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the common law privilege of presence. 8B Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 43.02[1] (2d ed.1996). Thus, its scope is broader than the constitutional right alone. See, e.g., Gagnon, supra (<HOLDING>). In this case, the Court finds that the
holding there was no constitutional presumption of juror bias where counsel asked the district court to make an inquiry into potential prejudice because the defendant was black and the prospective jurors were white holding that the failure by a criminal defendant to invoke his right to be present  at a conference which he knows is taking place between the judge and a juror in chambers constitutes a valid waiver of that right holding that defendant acquiesced in inchambers conference occurring in his absence when trial court discussed the subject of the conference and its ruling and neither defense counsel nor defendant raised an objection holding that the defendants presence at an in camera conference between the judge defense counsel and a juror regarding the jurors possible bias while not constitutionally mandated was required by rule 43 holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying zelinkas motion for a mistrial based upon alleged juror bias noting that the remmer hearing was unhurried and thorough and that defense counsel were permitted to question the jurors and did so at some length