debtors make mistakes on their bankruptcy forms. To be sure,- Marshall had a “duty” to disclose potential claims on her bank-ruptcy forms and to amend those forms when she filed suit. Moses, 606 F.3d at 793. She violated the bankruptcy code by failing to do so. But this fact, without more, does not answer the question before us: whether Marshall’s noncompliance with the bankruptcy code warrants the application of judicial estoppel in her current lawsuit. Judicial estoppel is appropriate only if Marshall’s failure was deliberate, and not merely because she violated her duty to disclose. See Ryan Operations, 81 F.3d at 364 (“[T]he requisite intent for judicial estoppel [cannot] be inferred from the mere fact of nondisclosure in a bankruptcy proceeding.”); see also Moses, 606 F.3d at 798 (<HOLDING>). I agree with the majority that Marshall’s
holding that the concept of collateral estoppel cannot apply when the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the earlier case holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals recognizing that courts of appeals generally apply judicial estoppel when a debtor deliberately fails to disclose her pending suit in an earlier bankruptcy case recognizing same judicial estoppel principle under kansas law