990 So.2d 578, 581 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (citing Analyte Diagnostics, Inc. v. D’Angelo, 792 So.2d 1271, 1272 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)). Stated differently, the scope of the law of the case is “limited to rulings on questions of law actually presented and considered on a former appeal.” U.S. Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bould, 487 So.2d 1061, 1068 (Fla. 1983); see also Gabor v. Gabor & Co., 599 So.2d 737, 738-39 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Gibson v. Maloney, 263 So.2d 632, 635 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972). The applicability of rule 3.212(d)’s conditions was neither raised nor addressed in Petition I. Thus, our disposition in McCray did not foreclose the State from raising the argument anew upon release of the opinion. See, e.g., Arch Se. Commc’ns, Inc. v. Abraham Commc’ns, Inc., 702 So.2d 556, 558 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (<HOLDING>); Harbour Club Condo. No. Three, Inc. v.
holding that in ruling on a motion to compel arbitration a court must consider 1 whether the parties have entered into a valid arbitration agreement 2 whether an arbitrable issue exists and 3 whether the right to arbitration has been waived holding that once the party seeking to compel arbitration establishes the existence of an arbitration agreement and that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement the trial court must compel arbitration holding trial court must decide whether to compel arbitration of personal injury claim of party who was not signatory to arbitration agreement holding that faa does not require appellate review of order interlocutory under state law denying motion to compel arbitration and overruling prior decision finding such a requirement holding that prior per curiam affirmance of the trial courts decision denying motion to compel arbitration was not law of the case concerning whether buyer and seller entered into valid oral agreement settling disposition of escrowed money