at LCC, and past dealings with the College may provide further context for the terms of the agreement. These are questions of fact better addressed on summary judgment, and not on this motion to dismiss. Next, defendants argue that there was no contract because the conditions to plaintiffs reappointment were conditions precedent to formation of the contract and not, as plaintiff argues, to performance. This issue depends on the intent of the parties as discerned from the language of the contract. See Garrett v. Music Pub. Co. of Am., LLC, 740 F.Supp.2d 457, 462-63 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). And, where the parties’ intent is not clear from the agreement, courts treat any conditions as conditions precedent to performance. See SCS Comm., Inc. v. Herrick Co., Inc., 360 F.3d 329, 341 (2d Cir. 2004) (<HOLDING>); Catskill Dev., LLC v. Park Place Entm’t
holding that parol evidence is admissible to establish a condition precedent to the existence of a contract recognizing that although federal precedent was not binding it was persuasive authority holding that a contract is not effective until the performance of the conditions precedent and that a condition precedent calls for the happening of some event or the performance of some act after the terms of the contract have been agreed on before the contract shall be binding on the parties holding the trial court may determine issue of condition precedent to enforcement of agreement to arbitrate holding that a condition was precedent to performance because the contract language did not explicitly state that it was precedent to formation