at 476, 101 A. at 105. Furthermore, the Court held that “the mother is entitled to damages for her distress and disappointment at the time of the birth because through the defendant’s negligence she has been deprived of the right and the satisfaction of bearing a sound child, if it be found that the child’s deformity is due to the injury she received through the defendant’s negligence.” Id. The plaintiffs propose that Gagnon stands for a general rule that a pregnant woman can collect damages for her apprehension that she would give birth to a deformed child. They also cite various cases from other jurisdictions to support their argument that Mrs. Perrotti should be able to recover damages for her alleged mental suffering. See, e.g., Prescott v. Robinson, 74 N.H. 460, 69 A. 522 (1908) (<HOLDING>); Fehely v. Senders, 170 Or. 457, 135 P.2d 283
holding that fundamental error occurred in the prosecution of a mother for aggravated manslaughter of her child when the prosecutor commented on the fact that the mother had contemplated having an abortion during the course of her pregnancy with the child holding that the mother was permitted to recover damages for mental anguish because of the reasonable probability that the defendants negligent act of severely injuring her would cause her to produce an abnormal child holding that evidence was sufficient to support trial courts best interest finding where mother allowed child to be in contact with individual who had physically abused her mother was not capable of caring for child on her own mother admitted at trial she had not found stable employment and child was doing well in her current placement holding that mother did not waive the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction by failing to raise it in her first responsive pleading ie her answer to dhrs  petition to terminate her parental rights because the mother sought leave to amend her answer to include the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction  dhr did not object to that motion and  the juvenile court allowed the mother to amend her answer holding that nonsignatory wife asserting in her individual capacity claims for damages such as her own mental anguish and loss of consortium earnings companionship society and inheritance lacked the type of privity contemplated for the contracting parties to bind her to a contract that she did not sign in her individual capacity