of a restitution order. In contrast to Freeman’s claims in the present case, the defendant in Sharp could not have plausibly contested the fact that his restitution order was based on the conduct underlying the “offense of conviction,” i.e., the conspiracy that formed the basis of Sharp’s guilty plea. Although Sharp also indicates that a defendant signing a similar appellate waiver has waived the right to appeal any facet of the court’s restitution order, this broader language was not necessary for the narrower conclusion that Sharp had waived the right to appeal whether the conspiracy count could form the basis of his restitution order. Sharp’s overly broad language is thus dicta that does not bind us in the present case. See United States v. Burroughs, 5 F.3d 192, 194 (6th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). As the Tenth Circuit explained in its
holding that one panel of this court is bound by the precedent of an earlier panel absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision of the supreme court holding that a panel of this court is bound by a holding of a prior panel but is not bound by a prior panels dicta holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panels published decision holding that one panel of this court is not bound by dicta in a previously published panel opinion holding that the panel is bound by decisions of prior panels