courts have discussed arguments regarding prior restraints and improper time, place, or manner restrictions as being overbreadth claims, see, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12, 93 S.Ct 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973), other courts have discussed them as distinct doctrines. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Morales, 556 F.3d 1037, 1046-48 (9th Cir.2009). In this case, because Plaintiffs seek damages, they must prove a violation of their own rights, regardless of the precise characterization of their claims. 3 . The district court also found that Dowd did not have standing to challenge LAMC § 42.15 (2004) because it was never enforced against him. Plaintiffs do not appeal this determination. 4 . See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56, 62, 119 S.Ct 1849, 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999) (<HOLDING>); Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531,
holding that a provision of the constitution is to be construed in the sense in which it was understood by the framers and the people at the time of its adoption but that if new products or circumstances that did not exist at the time the constitutional provision was enacted fall within the meaning of the provision the constitutional provision applies to them holding a provision criminalizing loitering which is defined as to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose void for vagueness where the provision was infierently subjective because its application depends on whether some purpose is apparent to the officer on the scene holding that defendants testimony that he did not see a provision in the agreement because the plaintiffcounterparty failed to direct him to the provision was insufficient as a matter of law to establish fraud and defendant was therefore bound to the terms of the provision holding that a written statement could not be regarded as an affidavit sufficient in law for any purpose because it was not sworn to by any one or before any officer recognizing that the collateralsource statute has the apparent purpose of preventing windfalls by plaintiffs at the expense of the defendants