to eliminate not only the defendant’s name, but any reference to his or her existence.” We have interpreted Bruton as prohibiting the presentation of a redacted statement that “draws the jury’s attention to the fact that a name was omitted and invites the jury to fill in the blank.” United States v. Long, 900 F.2d 1270, 1280 (8th Cir.1990) (citing United States v. Garcia, 836 F.2d 385, 390-91 (8th Cir.1987)). We find constitutionally problematic cases “in which the redacted statement alerts the jury to the fact that a name available to the prosecution has been purposely omitted ... [T]his may improperly lead the jury to infer that the omitted name must be the defendant’s.” Garcia, 836 F.2d at 390; see also Gray v. Maryland, — U.S. -, -, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 1156, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Valdez never mentioned in his confession the
holding that the name under which a debt collector is licensed to do business is the debt collectors true name for purposes of the fdcpa holding that redactions that replace a proper name with an obvious blank the word delete a symbol or similarly notify the jury that a name has been deleted render the admission of a codefendants confession unconstitutional holding harmless the admission of a nontestifying codefendants confession in violation of the confrontation clause when there was extensive evidence of the defendants guilt including the defendants allegedly coerced confession and an eyewitness who testified that he was absolutely certain that the defendant committed the crime holding that an action brought in the name of a person adjudicated as incapacitated instead of in the name of her guardian cannot be corrected as a misnomer holding that counsels failure to move to suppress the defendants confession constituted ineffective assistance because it was obvious that the confession would have been suppressed