of that section: there can be no cause of action unless the statute alleged to be violated “secures” an enforceable right. In Pennhurst, the Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 6010, of the Developmental^ Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, created no substantive rights in the mental ly retarded and therefore could not form the basis for a section 1983 action. 451 U.S. at 11 & 28 n.21, 101 S.Ct. at 1536 & 1545 n.21. The Court also remanded the case for a determination of whether conditions on the grant of federal funds to the states contained in other sections of the same act created causes of action under § 1983 against states for failing to comply with those conditions. Id. at 28-30, 101 S.Ct. at 1545-1546. See also Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 518 F.Supp. 1161, 1176 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (<HOLDING>); Perry v. Housing Authority of City of
recognizing  1983 substantive due process claim holding that  16 of the urban mass transit act  1656 of the federalaid highway act and other acts created no substantive rights sufficient to invoke  1983 holding no violation of the travel act holding retroactive application of the act to prosecution that was pending before the effective date of the act was precluded because the act is prospective holding that c 151b precludes claims under mass gen l c 214  1c civil rights act and equal rights act