pleading he filed in the mother’s post-divorce proceeding. However, the issue whether the father waived his objection to the Mobile Circuit Court as the venue for litigating the mother’s postdivoree proceeding is irrelevant to the issue whether she is entitled to a writ of mandamus directing the Elmore Circuit Court to vacate its April 13, 2011, order denying the mother’s summary-judgment motions because, due to the mother’s waiver of her affirmative defense based on § 6-5-440, the father is entitled to prosecute his post-divorce proceeding in the Elmore Circuit Court separately from, and independently of, the mother’s postdivoree proceeding unless she should revive and assert her affirmative defense based on § 6-5-440 in the future. See Washington Mutual Bank, 24 So.3d at 437 n. 2 (<HOLDING>); and Regions Bank, 60 So.3d at 884 (holding
holding that a subsequent action was not barred because the initial court did not have jurisdiction over the claim holding that because the circuit court did not have subjectmatter jurisdiction over the unlawfuldetainer action the district courts unauthorized transfer of the action could not transfer jurisdiction over that action to the circuit court holding that when the district court improperly purported to transfer to the circuit court an action over which the circuit court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction the circuit court was without jurisdiction to enter its judgment which was void and dismissing the appeal from that void judgment holding that  65440 does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over the secondfiled action or render the secondfiled action void holding that district court had subjectmatter jurisdiction and yet that judgment void for lack of jurisdiction to render the particular judgment