grants relief by using the rules of procedural default to hold that Appellant preserved his claim. Thus, the majority explicitly declines to address the merits of the State’s voidability issue, but it proceeds to grant the relief it would have granted if it had held the orders in this case were void. Maj. Op. at 843, 847. I am unable to join the majority in concluding that the dispositive issue here is that Appellant preserved his claim by making a timely and specific objection at trial when we decline to address the voidability issue. If the question of whether the orders in this case are void or voidable has not been answered, I think that ambiguity is derived from Davis, where we apparently began returning our relevant case law to its oldest roots. See Garrett, 6 Tex. at 448 (<HOLDING>). Unlike the majority, I would reach the merits
holding that court lacked jurisdiction on appeal from injunction because the order was simply an interpretation of an earlier order holding that when the district court improperly purported to transfer to the circuit court an action over which the circuit court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction the circuit court was without jurisdiction to enter its judgment which was void and dismissing the appeal from that void judgment holding that court lacked jurisdiction because no warrant or summons was issued during term of supervision recognizing that under the rule of necessity where all judges would be disqualified in a suit brought against every district and circuit court judge in the circuit none are disqualified holding that an order or judgment issued by a disqualified judge is void but not because the court lacked jurisdiction