about him to the media; and (4) sent out an email threatening to terminate the employment of any WDEQ employees who speak to him. Even assuming that defendants undertook these actions in response to Armstrong’s decision to report what he viewed as the illegal permitting of the landfill, Armstrong makes no- effort to explain whether or how defendants were “acting within the scope of their duties in the operation” of the landfill when they allegedly defamed him. § l-39-108(a) (emphasis added). See City of Torrington v. Cottier, 145 P.3d 1274, 1278, 1280 (Wyo. 2006) (defining term “operation” and concluding that § 1-39-108 “waives immunity for negligence in keeping the public utility operable or functional”); see also Sinclair v. City of Gillette, 270 P.3d 644, 646, 648 (Wyo. 2012) (<HOLDING>). Because Armstrong’s defamation claim doesn’t
holding that ordinary negligence and gross negligence are not separate causes of action holding that the citys acceptance or nonacceptance of the contractors work would have no bearing on the issue of the contractors liability since it was his primary and active negligence that created the dangerous situation and the citys negligence in failing to remedy the situation would be only secondaiy and passive holding that the intervening act breaks the chain of causation set in operation by a defendants negligence thereby insulating his negligence as a direct cause of the injury holding that the indemnity plaintiffs liability was due only because of its legal duty as the property owner and not because of any active or independent negligence holding that citys negligence in determining the legal status of plaintiffs property wasnt negligence in the operation of the storm drain that city installed on that property because citys negligence was unrelated to actual operation of storm drain