and (b)(1)(C). His counsel has moved to withdraw and filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), arguing that the district court should not have applied a career-offender enhancement because to do so it had to determine, in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), that Owens’s prior convictions were crimes of violence or controlled-substance offenses; counsel concedes, however, that Owens explicitly admitted to career-offender status in his plea agreement. Owens has filed a pro se supplemental brief and a “Summary of Arguments,” arguing that his plea was not knowing and voluntary in light of Blakely. Counsel’s argument fails. See United States v. Lucca, 377 F.3d 927, 934 (8th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); cf. United States v. Nolan, 397 F.3d 665, 667
holding that blakely was not implicated where defendant was sentenced based solely upon facts admitted as part of guilty plea holding that a defendants guilty plea was unconditional where the guilty plea was not in writing and the government did not consent to it being conditional holding that when the defendant admitted that he pleaded guilty for reasons other than to have the judge who took his plea sentence him the defendant could properly be sentenced by a different judge holding that trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider defendants motion to withdraw guilty plea filed beyond term of court in which defendant was sentenced holding that defendant was entitled to withdraw guilty plea upon habeas corpus proceedings where he pled guilty in exchange for an illegal sentence