to Life Political Action Comm. v. Gardner, 99 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1996), to support their standing argument in this regard. In that case, the court held that if a plaintiff launches a pre-enforcement challenge to a statute, which, “on its face, abridges First Amendment rights,” the plaintiff can claim injury from either a threat of enforcement or a First Amendment chilling effect. Id. at 13. Both injuries, however, “hinge on the existence of a credible threat that the challenged law will be enforced.” Id. at 14; see also Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (“A plaintiff who challenges a statute must demonstrate a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute’s operation or enforcement.”); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 17. At the trial court hearing, Mr. Carter
holding that the threat of irreparable harm must be immediate holding that plaintiffs who alleged a subjective chill of their first amendment rights failed to establish specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm holding that chilling effect claim must still be rooted in specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm to convey standing recognizing that violation of privacy right even without objective harm is still compensable holding all that is required to impose a duty to warn is that the defendant knew or should have known of a specific threat made to harm a specific person