126 S.Ct. 952, 163 L.Ed.2d 836 (2006). These conditions, though “stringent,” see id., are satisfied in this case. As Ameziane concedes, the first requirement is satisfied because the district court’s order conclusively determined that [redacted] would not be protected under the Protective Order. Second, this issue is entirely separate from the merits of Ameziane’s habeas action. The public disclosure of [redacted] has no relevance to the underlying question on the merits, i.e., whether he has been lawfully detained. And given the foreign relations and national security concerns raised in the [redacted] Declaration, we have no difficulty finding this issue sufficiently “important” to warrant immediate appellate review. See Al Odah v. United States, 559 F.3d 539, 543-44 (D.C.Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Finally, the district court’s order would be
holding that section 236e does not strip the court of jurisdiction to consider the merits of petitioners habeas corpus petition holding that an order denying compensation under the federal criminal justice act for services performed before a state clemency board by counsel appointed to represent a state prisoner was final and appealable despite the fact that the order was separate from the merits of the habeas corpus proceeding holding that it was an abuse of discretion for the bia to fail to consider the merits of a petitioners claim holding that order mandating disclosure of classified information to habeas petitioners counsel was an important issue entirely separate from the merits of this case holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure  contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant