with putative class members). Indeed, a district court’s authority under Rule 23(d) is not limited to communications that actually mislead or otherwise threaten to create confusion, but extends to communications that interfere with the proper administration of a class action or those that abuse the rights of members of the class. Cobell v. Norton, 212 F.R.D. 14, 19 (D.D.C.2002). “A unilateral communications scheme, moreover, is rife with potential for coercion. If the class and the class opponent are involved in an ongoing business relationship, communications from the class opponent to the class may be coercive.” Kleiner, 751 F.2d at 1202 (internal quotations, citations and brackets omitted); see also Hampton Hardware v. Cotter & Co., 156 F.R.D. 630, 633-34 (N.D.Tex.1994) (<HOLDING>); Tedesco v. Mishkin, 629 F.Supp. 1474, 1484
holding that tolling applies to a subsequent class action when class certification was granted in a prior case holding that putative class members are not parties to an action prior to class certification holding evidence of letters discouraging participation in lawsuit an ongoing business relationship between the parties and plaintiffs dependence on defendant for supplies sufficient to prohibit all litigationrelated communication prior to class certification recognizing a defendants connection to dc because the plaintiff had argued and provided correspondence between the parties demonstrating an ongoing relationship between the parties including the defendant giving the plaintiff directions regarding other business projects that the defendant intended to pursue and argued that the contract would have been at least partly performed within dc recognizing correspondence appeared to establish a settlement relationship between the parties given the letters presented an attempt to curb further litigation