implausible explanation for being there, given that his time card from his job at Luby’s proved that he did not work that evening. Although circumstantial proof, both are evidence of identity and, in turn, guilt. See, e.g., Windsor v. State, 338 Ark. 649, 1 S.W.3d 20 (1999) (proximity testimony); Remeta v. State, 300 Ark. 92, 777 S.W.2d 833 (1989) (same); Goff v. State, 329 Ark. 513, 953 S.W.2d 38 (1997) (false explanation of suspicious circumstances). Further, the state presented circumstantial hair and fiber evidence linking the appellant to the crime. While the DNA evidence is substantial standing alone, it is undeniably sufficient when considered with the additional circumstantial evidence adduced at trial. This court has, since Moore v. State, 323 Ark. 529, 915 S.W.2d 284 (1996) (<HOLDING>), consistently accepted DNA evidence as proof
holding that the erroneous admission of dna evidence is never harmless holding use of mtdna analysis to prove identity satisfied frye test for admissibility of new or novel scientific evidence holding that dna evidence is no longer con sidered novel scientific evidence holding that there was no ineffective assistance for failing to hire a dna expert because the defenses theory was that the defendants dna was planted so the dna evidence would not seem to be an issue holding that product rule method of dna statistical evidence is now generally accepted in the relevant scientific community