allowing the files to be moved to another area and by using the telephone to make personal calls), and in response to Stutter’s complaint to Assistant Warden Bass that Rockett had her do personal favors, which are not protected activities under Title VII. Because we find the conduct that Stutter endured was not sufficiently severe to rise to the level of an adverse employment action (and probably not causally connected to protected activity), we need not determine whether IDOC was vicariously liable for Rockett’s conduct or if it could establish the affirmative defense set forth in Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998), and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998). See Knox, 93 F.3d at 1334 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we do not consider whether IDOC’s
holding that the elements of a hostile environment claim under title vii equally apply under title ix holding that allegations of employer retaliation are properly governed by title vii and cannot support a claim under  1983 holding that  final responsibility for enforcement of title vii is vested with federal courts holding that title vii retaliation claims must be proved according to traditional principles of butfor causation which requires proof that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer holding that there is nothing to indicate that the principle of employer responsibility does not extend equally to other title vii claims such as a claim of unlawful retaliation