to challenge the trial court’s order. We reject this argument. The district court had jurisdiction to review the order under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(1)(C), which grants appellate jurisdiction over criminal court orders “entered after final judgment or finding of guilt.” See also art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const, (granting district courts authority to review interlocutory or ders to the extent provided by rules of the Supreme Court). The designation of an offender as a sexual predator is based on the offender’s conviction for one of the crimes specified in the Act. § 775.21(4)(c), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). The order designating a defendant a sexual predator is thus entered after final judgment or a finding of guilt. See Thomas v. State, 716 So.2d 789 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (<HOLDING>); Downs v. State, 700 So.2d 789 (Fla. 2d DCA
holding that rule 6e motion filed after criminal proceedings terminated was independent proceeding and that order entered was final and appealable under  1291 because it conclusively resolved disclosure issue which was only issue raised holding that an order awarding attorney fees is not appealable and instead the proper appeal lies from the judgment or amended judgment entered on the order holding that the judgment was entered without jurisdiction and was therefore a nullity holding that an order designating a defendant a sexual predator was entered after defendant was convicted and sentenced and is therefore appealable as an order entered after a finding of guilt pursuant to rule 9140b1c holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions