413, 415-16, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923), or by the requirements of abstention, which keep us from interfering with pending custody proceedings. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435, 99 S.Ct. 2371, 60 L.Ed.2d 994 (1979) (“We are unwilling to conclude that state processes are unequal to the task of accommodating the various interests and deciding the constitutional questions that may arise in child-welfare litigation.”); see also Morrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d 1386, 1397 (10th Cir.1996) (applying abstention to state adoption proceedings). We therefore have no jurisdiction to inquire into the constitutionality of the state court proceedings Gordon challenges. See Chapman v. Oklahoma, 472 F.3d 747, 749 (10th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). To the extent Gordon claims his
holding that a plaintiffs federal action seeking to vacate a state court judgment was a de facto appeal and thus barred under the rookerfeldman doctrine holding that a challenge by taxpayers and property owners to the issuance of municipal bonds was barred by a judgment entered in a prior action holding that challenge to state proceeding was barred by younger even if it was not barred by rookerfeldman holding that even if the plaintiffs independent claim was inextricably linked to the state court decision preclusion law was the correct solution to challenge the federal claim not rookerfeldman  holding that petition was properly filed even though the state court denied it as procedurally barred because the petition was delivered to and accepted by the state court