namely that appellant killed someone in revenge for having robbed his brother, an alleged co-conspirator, in the same place where they dealt drugs — the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence as intrinsic to the conspiracy charge. United States v. Badru, 97 F.3d 1471, 1475 (D.C.Cir.1996) (“In cases where the incident offered is a part of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment, the evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) because it is not an ‘other’ crime.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 22 Charles A. Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure, Evidence § 5239, at 450 (1978))). Nor does the admission of such evidence violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. See United States v. Lukens, 114 F.3d 1220, 1221-22 (D.C.Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Third, appellant argues that the government
holding that double jeopardy clause did not apply to forfeiture proceeding before the court holding that defendant waived double jeopardy claim by obtaining severance of charges at first trial holding uncharged acts of violence evidence of  the background of the charges the parties familiarity with one another and their concert of action  quoting united states v oleary 739 f2d 135 136 3d cir1984 cert denied 469 us 1107 105 sct 782 83 led2d 776 1985 cert denied 493 us 821 110 sct 78 107 led2d 44 1989 holding that collateral estoppel component of tire double jeopardy clause did not preclude government from introducing defendants prior acquittal at trial because government was presented with lower standard of proof in the later case holding that even though defendant was previously acquitted of bribery charges double jeopardy clause did not prohibit government from introducing evidence of acts of bribery in furtherance of a conspiracy because defendant made no showing that issue whose relitigation he sought to foreclose was actually decided in the first proceeding quoting dowling v united states 493 us 342 350 110 sct 668 107 led2d 708 1990