within the Rule 404(b) exception. Next, we consider whether, under Rule 403, the probative value of the prior-crime evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Cluck maintains that the circuit court abused its discretion because it failed to weigh the probative value of the evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice. We note, however, that this argument was not made to the circuit court and is made for the first time on appeal. Moreover, it is incumbent on defense counsel to get a ruling from the circuit court on issues he now argues on appeal. Because Cluck runs afoul of both of these bedrock principles for appellate review, we hold that the Rule 403 issue is not preserved for our consideration. See Riggs v. State, 339 Ark. 111, 3 S.W.3d 305 (1999) (<HOLDING>). Finally, the fact that Cluck was on parole
holding that counsel was ineffective for failing to assert an entrapment defense that was legally available and where there was no other viable defense to present holding that the victims negligence is not a defense to criminal conduct holding that defense counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for presenting a diminished capacity defense as opposed to a defense of legal insanity holding that defendants failure to assert the defense in any pretrial motions did not waive defendants limitations defense because the assertion of a limitations defense in the answer preserved defendants right to raise the defense both during the first trial and before the second holding that it is incumbent on defense counsel to request the trial court to conduct a probativeprejudicial weighing with respect to evidence if the defense considers such weighing to be important or legally required