Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 apply to this case because removal proceedings were initiated against petioner after April 1, 1997. See Kalaw v. INS, 133 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir.1997). We have jurisdiction to consider whether petitioner has committed a deportable offense, but must dismiss his petition for lack of jurisdiction if we conclude that he has. See Flores-Miramontes v. INS, 212 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir.2000). We dismiss. Petitioner’s second state court conviction for possession of cocaine in violation of Section 11350(A) of the California Health and Safety Code is an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), rendering him removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). See United States v. Garcia-Olmedo, 112 F.3d 399, 400-01 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Petitioner was not entitled to notice under
holding that a second state court conviction for simple possession of narcotics is an aggravated felony as defined in 8 usc  1101a43 holding second simple possession conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony regardless of whether it was actually prosecuted as recidivist possession holding second simple possession conviction was not an aggravated felony because it was not prosecuted as recidivist possession holding that a conviction for simple assault under pennsylvania law does not qualify under 18 usc  16b by way of 11 usc  1101a43 as an aggravated felony holding that defendants prior felony convictions in georgia state court for drugrelated conspiracy and simple possession qualified as predicate prior felony drug offenses for  841b1a because under the plain language of the statute  felony drug offense includes any criminal conduct relating to narcotics including simple possession which a state has proscribed as a felony