that, regardless of whether the post-verdict contact was improper, the exclusion of the Roberts Affidavit violates their Sixth Amendment constitutional right to trial by an impartial jury, and that they are entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine if the jury was influenced by the comments, the bailiff is alleged to have made. William also contends that courts do not have the power to enact rules such as Local Rule 5.01(d) or to exclude evidence obtained in violation of such rules. We disagree. To begin with, it is well settled that district courts have the power to make rules and issue orders prohibiting attorneys and parties from contacting jurors, whether directly or indirectly, absent prior’ court approval. See e.g., United States v. Davila, 704 F.2d 749, 754 (5th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Moten, 582 F.2d 654, 665
recognizing that verdict must be affirmed by jury in open court to have force and validity recognizing validity of these rules and noting that their principal purpose is to prevent fishing expeditions in search of information with which to impeach jury verdicts recognizing that the district court could merge duplicative convictions after the jury verdicts are recorded recognizing that the purpose of the setoff doctrine is to prevent circuity of judicial actions holding that remittitur is not designed to compensate for excessive verdicts in cases where jury is improperly instructed