the abuse and neglect case or derives from other sources. We hold that this part of the order is overbroad; it is not narrowly tailored, nor does it use the least restrictive means to accomplish its purpose. There is no valid reason to issue such a blanket order for any and all future pleadings or suits. The second part of the order, preventing Cole from publicly disclosing information from the court records, which is consistent with RSA 169-C:25 (2014), adequately serves the confidentiality interests identified by DCYF and CASA. There is no justification for additionally requiring that allegations that may be contained in Cole’s lawsuit but are not based upon information gleaned from the abuse and neglect case should be shielded from the public. See Petition of Brooks, 140 N.H. at 821 (<HOLDING>). DCYF and CASA contend that the order is
holding that first amendment protections apply to compelled speech as well as restrictions on speech holding that rules requiring nondisclosure in the attorney discipline context prohibited more speech than was necessary by preventing disclosure of wellfounded complaints as well and accordingly were overbroad holding the language of the statute applicable to floating buffer zones was substantially overbroad and burdened substantially more speech than necessary to serve the states interest holding that a statute must burden a substantial amount of protected speech to be unconstitutionally overbroad holding new yorks disclosure law unconstitutionally overbroad