by discrimination either when it declined to promote him or when it discharged him. First, in claiming discriminatory termination .3d 326, 331 (3d Cir.1995) (“[T]he factual dispute at issue is whether a discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Indeed, Duviella has not identified any evidence indicating that the actions of either Julia Gomez, who investigated the harassment claims and recommended termination, or Barbara Shea, who made the ultimate termination decision, were motivated by Du-viella’s age or race. In Gomez’s case, the only record evidence indicates that she was unaware of that information. See Woodman v. WWOR-TV, Inc., 411 F.3d 69, 87 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Second, although Duviella identified one
holding that summary judgment was appropriate where plaintiffs admissions in her deposition undermined her claims holding that the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact regarding her retaliation claim because she failed to offer any evidence of a causal relationship between her involvement in protected activity and the adverse employment action holding that the plaintiffs conclusory statement that the student who was hired instead of her had less experience and education could not defeat summary judgment because absent supporting facts  a jury would be in no position to assess her claim of superiority holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment holding that to defeat summary judgment plaintiff was obliged to offer evidence indicating that persons who actually participated in her termination decision had  knowledge of her protected characteristics