to the Chuangs, the relocation of their laboratory space unquestionably qualifies as an adverse employment action. Title VII provides that it is unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” 42 Ü.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). The Supreme Court has held that “this not only covers ‘terms’ and ‘conditions’ in the narrow sense, but ‘evinces a congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment ... in employment.’ ” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998) (quoting Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986)). Cf. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Here, the forcible relocation of the Chuangs’
holding that for purposes of a title vii retaliation claim an action is cognizable as an adverse employment action if it is reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in protected activity holding that a verbal threat of being fired is not an adverse employment action for purposes of title vii holding that a temporal link between protected activity and an adverse employment action may in some cases be sufficient to create an inference of retaliation holding that a plaintiff bringing a retaliation claim under title vii must establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing that she engaged in a protected activity that she was subjected to an adverse employment action by her employer and that there was a causal link between the two holding that termination is an adverse employment action