but they cite no Pennsylvania cases nor is there any rationale to support their argument. Buergers’ Sur-Reply Br. at 4-5. To the contrary, Pennsylvania courts have found that the borrowing statute applies to counterclaims. See Stoody Co. v. Wandel, 6 Ches. Co. Rep. 219, 220 (1954) (applying the borrowing statute to hold that defendant’s counterclaim that arose in California and was time-barred in California was also barred in Pennsylvania although the Pennsylvania limitations period had not expired.) 13 . Contrary to arguments in the briefing, under Pennsylvania law, the filing of a complaint does not toll the statute of limitations applicable to compulsory or permissive counterclaims. See Buergers’ Opp. Br. at 14; Harmer v. Hulsey, 321 Pa.Super. 11, 467 A.2d 867, 868-69 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, the Court finds no support in
recognizing twoyear statute of limitations for section 1981 claims filed in federal court in georgia holding that where counterclaim arises out of same transaction alleged in plaintiffs complaint is not barred by a running of the statute of limitations thereafter rather statute of limitations is suspended until counterclaim is filed holding that a twoyear statute of limitations applies to negligence claims under texas law holding that a compulsory counterclaim was barred by pennsylvanias twoyear statute of limitations notwithstanding that the plaintiff filed his complaint late in the twoyear limitations period holding that a twoyear statute of limitations period applies to all  1983 actions brought in pennsylvania