federal statutory right. There is no dispute that the officers were acting under color of state law. The dispute in this ease was whether the officers unreasonably searched [Henderson’s] house in violation of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir.2002) (citation omitted). [1] It is axiomatic that “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.” United States v. S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987) (concluding that state’s operation of a probation system “presents ‘special needs’ beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable cause requirements”); Ca-mara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967) (<HOLDING>). However, the special needs doctrine applies
recognizing that  exigent circumstances do not excuse the failure to secure a warrant when those circumstances are created by government officials who unreasonably and deliberately delay or avoid obtaining the warrant holding that in criminal case a continuous chain of custody need not be proven as long as the evidence as a whole establishes that it is more probable than not that the object introduced is the same as that seized holding telephonic search warrant as reasonable in certain circumstances holding that a contract need not have mutuality of obligation as long as it is supported by consideration holding that in certain circumstances government investigators need not adhere to the usual warrant requirement as long as their searches meet reasonable legislative or administrative standards