from other jurisdictions have held that a municipality may not use parkland for a public highway. See Village of Riverside v. MacLain, 210 Ill. 308, 323-24, 71 N.E. 408 (1904) (village’s contention that proposed roadway through park would be a “pleasure driveway” was unsupported by evidence; injunction of construction affirmed on basis that the extension of roadway through the park “will be a perversion of the use, for which the premises . . . were originally dedicated”); City of St. Louis v. Bedal, 394 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Mo. 1965) (while proposed roadway would in some ways enhance use of park, it was still a diversion from park uses; “The park was not created for surface traffic.”); and see City of Hermosa Beach v. Superior Court, 231 Cal. App. 2d 295, 297, 41 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1964) (<HOLDING>). ¶46 The fact that the Fred Meyer Parties
holding that the venice beach boardwalk is a traditional public forum holding that the city had standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute allowing certain communities within the same county as the city to incorporate as towns without the citys consent recognizing taxpayers standing to challenge construction of road across beach property deeded to city as a public pleasure ground holding that public use of a beach was presumed to have originated by permission and to have continued as a license until some act  of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege holding that because public use of a beach was permissive the public was a licensee and as such could be excluded from the whole area at any time by the title owner