are higher than in a(b)(2) declaratory/injunctive relief action because “monetary relief ... is less of a group remedy and instead depends more on the varying circumstances and merits of each class member’s case.” Karnette v. Wolpoff & Abramson, No. 06-44, 2007 WL 922288, at *10, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20794, at *33 (E.D.Va. Mar. 23, 2007) (quoting Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 413 (5th Cir.1998)). Consequently, courts are required to provide notice of a certified (b)(3) action to all class members and an opportunity for them to opt-out of the class (so that they will not be bound by any final judgment and can bring individual actions if they wish). Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-812, 105 S.Ct. 2965, 86 L.Ed.2d 628 (1985) (<HOLDING>). In this section, the Court will consider the
holding that the due process clause requires notice of right to optout of suits for money damages holding that constitutional due process in civil contempt proceedings requires notice and a hearing but not the right to counsel holding that the court lacks jurisdiction over an alleged violation of the due process clause because the clause does not obligate the government to pay money damages holding that the due process clause does not obligate the government to pay money damages holding that due process requires that notice be reasonably calculated under all circumstances to provide parties with notice of the pending action