We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. Cabrera contends that the district court did not adequately explain the reaso tantively unreasonable. We review for abuse of discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169. L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The district1 court did not abuse its discretion. The sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, including not only Cabrera’s state prison sentence and efforts towards rehabilitation, but also his rejection of the fast-track plea agreement and his criminal history, which is entirely distinct from the offense at issue here. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586; cf. United States v. Defterios, 343 F.3d 1020, 1023-24 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. ** This disposition is not
recognizing that delay in indictment may sometimes be a basis for a sentencing departure but holding that district court erred when it decreased sentence based on a delay in an indictment where the offenses were separate crimes distinct in time place and victims holding trial court erred in denying defendants motion for arrest of judgment where indictment was insufficient holding that district court erred in dismissing the indictment based on sufficiency of evidence recognizing that an indictment may be dismissed in part holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense