may bring suit for tortious interference with a corpse. See, e.g., id. (rejecting “the theory that a surviving custodian has quasi-property rights in the body of the deceased, and acknowledging] the cause of action for mishandling of a dead body” but declining to define precisely which class of family members has standing); Christensen v. Sup.Ct. of Los Angeles, 54 Cal.3d 868, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 79, 820 P.2d 181, 183 (1992) (concluding that the class of plaintiffs with standing to sue went beyond those “who have the statutory right to control disposition of the remains and those who contract for disposition,” to include those “close family members who were aware that the funeral ... services were being performed”); Contreraz v. Michelotti-Sawyers, 271 Mont. 300, 896 P.2d 1118, 1122 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Identifying the correct rule in Washington
holding that employers have standing to sue holding that plaintiffs did not have standing because they did not sue the party with the clear ability to act holding that an incidental beneficiary does not have standing to sue for breach of a contract holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue holding that close relatives including children and grandchildren have standing to sue