owed to a licensee and those owed to an invitee in premises liability cases based on conditions of the land. Id. at 94. In neither case did the parties assert or the court address whether a premises liability claim could arise out of an activity on the land. Here, defendant’s activity of mopping the floor created a condition in the concourse that led to plaintiffs injury. The legal rules concerning defendant’s liability for that injury apply, even if its activity created the condition on the premises that led to plaintiffs injury. See Ragnone v. Portland School Dist. No. 1J, 291 Or 617, 621-22, 633 P2d 1287 (1981) (describing duties of an occupier of land as to both conditions of and activities on the land); Bryant v. Sherm’s Thunderbird Mkt., 268 Or 591, 602-03, 522 P2d 1383 (1974) (<HOLDING>). Defendant next argues that the evidence did
holding that a company that cut removed and sold timber from land that secured a debt held by the plaintiff was liable as a matter of law under the gtccs because it had not first obtained the written consent of the plaintiff holding that a company that cut and removed timber from land that secured a debt held by the plaintiff was liable as a matter of law under an earlier version of the gtccs because it had not first obtained the written consent of the plaintiff recognizing duty of possessor of land or chattels to control conduct of licensee holding that as one who does an act or carries on an activity upon land on behalf of the possessor refrigeration supply company could be liable for physical injury caused to others on premises as though it were a possessor of land when its employees allegedly removed plywood covering trench inside market and plaintiff tripped over exposed cables holding that land sales contracts were not securities because they involved no investment in an enterprise even if land was bought on expectation that development of the area would increase the value of the land