Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44, 111 S.Ct. at 2132 (citation omitted). Accordingly, a court’s inherent power to shift attorneys’ fees “should be used sparingly and reserved for egregious circumstances.” Jones, 990 F.2d at 3. Significantly, we have held that a district court exercising its inherent powers in this fashion must describe the bad faith conduct with “sufficient specificity,” accompanied by a “detailed explanation of the reasons justifying the award.” See Gradmann & Holler v. Continental, 679 F.2d 272, 274 (1st Cir.1982) (vacating fee award for district court’s failure to provide a sufficiently detailed justification) (citing F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129, 94 S.Ct. 2157, 2165, 40 L.Ed.2d 703 (1974)); cf. Janes, 990 F.2d at 3-4 (<HOLDING>). These principles, when combined with the
holding that a bad faith claim is a tort holding that a finding of plaintiffs bad faith is not a prerequisite to the trial courts exercise of discretion to award fees holding that although the fee award was assessed against plaintiffs in a complex civil rights suit it was proper because the district courts order imposing fees meticulously describes each instance of perjury and bad faith holding that the district courts good faith finding is reviewed for clear error holding that the district courts specific meticulously detailed finding of bad faith was supportable on appeal