to excuse plaintiffs failure to comply with an analogous provision of the PLRA, § 1997e(e)). Id. The Cox panel’s dicta do not bind us. See, e.g., BDT Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 742, 750 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[O]ne panel of [the Sixth Circuit] is not bound by dicta in a previously published panel opinion.” (quoting United States v. Burroughs, 5 F.3d 192, 194 (6th Cir. 1993))). But in any event, as Mattox correctly argues, Cox is distinguishable. The plaintiff in Cox had not exhausted any of his claims before filing suit in federal court. Cox, 332 F.3d at 424. The Cox panel was thus likely correct that Rule 15(d) could not save an action that did not comply with the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement in any way. See Floyd v. U.S. Postal Serv., 105 F.3d 274, 278 (6th Cir. 1997), (<HOLDING>), abrogated on other grounds by Callihan v.
holding that discovery under the federal rules of civil procedure is broad in scope and freely permitted holding rules of procedure interpreted in same manner as statutes holding that a shotgun pleading is in no sense the short and plain statement of a claim required by rule 8 of the federal rules of civil procedure recognizing the liberal notice and simplified pleading principles underlying the federal rules of civil procedure holding that subsequently enacted federal statutes trump the rules of civil procedure