conduct ‘shows a fixed intention to abandon, renounce, and refuse to perform the contract.’ ” Hunter, 339 S.W.3d at 802 (quoting SAVA gumarska in kemijska industria d.d. v. Advanced Polymer Sci, Inc., 128 S.W.3d 304, 315 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.)). But such repudiation “must be absolute and unconditional.” Id. In other words, “[t]he declaration of intent to abandon the obligation must be in positive and unconditional terms.” Narvaez v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 757 F.Supp.2d 621, 631 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (citing Preston v. Love, 240 S.W.2d 486, 487 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1951, no writ)). Thus, to show anticipatory repudiation, Texas courts have required that a party overtly communicate its intent not to perform under a valid and enforceable agreement. Compare Hunter, 339 S.W.3d at 803 (<HOLDING>), with Hauglum v. Durst, 769 S.W.2d 646, 649,
holding that mere presentation of a settlement agreement absent direct language or conduct evincing intent not to perform did not constitute a fixed intention to abandon the original contract quoting sava 128 sw3d at 315 holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party holding that agreement did not constitute a binding preliminary agreement to negotiate in good faith a mortgage contract holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt