in a sale, the text of the listing agreement nevertheless indicates that this is precisely what must happen if Harris is to earn his commission. For starters, the aceeptance-of-an-offer provision is qualified by important language: that Oak Knoll “agrees to pay the AGENT a commission as per this AGREEMENT.” The last four words dictate that we read this provision consistent with the contract as a whole. And indeed, the sale requirement is unambiguously reflected in the contract. Cf. Ramirez, 938 A.2d at 587 (explaining that courts should not “import terms into [an] agreement ... that are not reflected in the contract” (emphasis added)). For example, the listing agreement is titled a “Non-Exclusive Agency Sale Agreement.” Cf. Bialowans v. Minor, 209 Conn. 212, 550 A.2d 637, 639-40 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, the first sentence of the quoted
holding that when language is exactly the same in two statutory provisions the meaning of that language is also identical holding when ordinance language is clear courts must give language its plain meaning holding in the context of interpreting contract language that a section heading delimited the scope of language appearing under said heading holding that instructions are sufficient which substantially follow the language of the statute or use equivalent language holding that the primary goal when interpreting an insurance contract is to ascertain the intent of the parties as manifested by the language of the specific insurance policy