and making policy. In accord with this proposition, several circuits have adopted approaches to analyzing claims of legislative immunity that, in one way or another, look to whether the defendant official was enacting or promulgating a policy or rule as opposed to simply enforcing, monitoring, or applying the policy. Thus, for example, in Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054, 105 S.Ct. 2115, 85 L.Ed.2d 480 (1985), the Ninth Circuit held that a city council was not acting legislatively when it voted to disapprove certain proposed concerts for the city’s amphitheater because the council was merely monitoring and enforcing its contract with the concert promoter. See also Zamsky v. Hansell, 933 F.2d 677, 679 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, the Fourth Circuit recently
holding a dedication of a rightofway in connection with a subdivision did not vest rights in the property owner for the purpose of estopping the county from changing the zoning classification absent a showing that the planning commission or county knew that the sewer permit would not be granted or that the countys subdivision regulations guaranteed the zoning of the property would not change holding that land use planning commission was not acting in a legislative capacity in requiring county to rezone certain property because that act involved ad hoe decisionmaking rather than formulation of policy such as would be involved in promulgating the statewide planning standards holding that individuals acting in a legislative capacity at a regional level are entitled to absolute immunity holding that land sales contracts were not securities because they involved no investment in an enterprise even if land was bought on expectation that development of the area would increase the value of the land holding that a judgment in a suit in which a trustee was acting individually would not bind him acting in his capacity as trustee