which explained that if, at the close of the evidence, the plaintiff failed to provide proof of an intentional lawful act — which distinguishes prima facie tort from traditional intentional torts — prima facie tort could not be submitted to the jury. Our Supreme Court recognized that this principle “has long been established in New Mexico by our cases stating that a court may properly refuse to submit a theory to the jury if it is not supported by the evidence.” Aetna Fin. Co., 118 N.M. at 249, 880 P.2d at 860 (citing Fleet Mortgage Corp. v. Schuster, 112 N.M. 48, 50, 811 P.2d 81, 83 (1991) (affirming summary judgment dismissal of prima facie tort claim where the plaintiff failed to present evidence of element of intent), and State v. Akin, 75 N.M. 308, 312, 404 P.2d 134, 137 (1965) (<HOLDING>)). Similarly, in Beavers v. Johnson Controls
holding that the failure to properly instruct the jury on the burden of proof required a new trial holding that seventh application for postconviction relief which was rejected because evidence on which it was based was not properly authenticated was properly filed holding that a defendant abandons an issue for which no argument is offered on appeal holding that the court properly refused to instruct on an issue for which no evidence was offered holding that the failure to instruct on a definition or to amplify an element is not a failure to instruct on an essential element