that the term “action taken” in subsection 9613(h)(4) does not speak in clear terms either. See Neighborhood Toxic Cleanup Emergency v. Reilly, 716 F.Supp. 828, 833 (D.N.J.1989) (“[T]he statute’s language fails to answer the question of how much must be done before review is available.”). Senator Stafford’s comments supply a pragmatic guideline to interpretation. He said that “the courts must draw appropriate distinctions between dilatory or other unauthorized lawsuits by potentially responsible parties involving only monetary damages and legitimate citizens’ suits complaining of irreparable injury that can be only addressed only [sic] if a claim is heard during or prior to response action.” 132 Cong.Rec. 28,409 (1986); see also Cabot Corp. v. EPA, 677 F.Supp. 823, 829 (E.D.Pa.1988) (<HOLDING>). The problem may be illustrated by an extreme
holding that potential loss of a contract constitutes irreparable injury holding that evidence of specific competitive injury establishes irreparable injury warranting injunctive relief recognizing significant differences in text of state and federal equal protection clauses holding that movant must demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction recognizing differences between compensatory and irreparable injury in selecting proper remedies under subsections 9613h1 h4