the plaintiff returned to work with a note from his doctor stating that he was cleared for full duty. The meeting had no other purpose other than to discuss.the plaintiffs job status. The statements were made in the presence of the decisionmaker who affirmatively stated his agreement with them. And the statements “directly reflected] the alleged animus and b[ore] squarely on the contested employment decision.” Febres, 214 F.3d at 60. As said in another context equally applicable here, “[g]iven these attributes, the statement cannot be dismissed as mere background noise or as a stray remark.” Id. at 61 (citing Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, 199 F.3d 572, 583 (1st Cir.1999), abrogated on other grounds by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003) (<HOLDING>)). Further, in my opinion, the statements are
holding that in a discrimination case plaintiff must prove that firing was a result of intentional discrimination holding that direct evidence of discrimination is not required to prove discrimination in mixed motive cases under title vii holding that in title vii cases the mixedmotives theory of discrimination is available in cases with circumstantial evidence of discrimination holding that in title vii cases the mixedmotive theory of discrimination is available in cases with circumstantial evidence of discrimination holding that a claim for discrimination in private employment is not preempted by title vii