Davis, 362 U.S. at 44, 80 S.Ct. at 512. The boundry separating the Colgate doctrine — the simple unilateral refusal to deal — from the non-simple unilateral refusal to deal is the presence of a “contract, combination, or conspiracy:” that is, either an express, implied or tacit agreement among two or more parties, or an involuntary acquiescence to one party’s trade restraining policy. See generally 2 Kintner Federal Antitrust Law sec. 10.22 at 137 (1980). In this context, the Supreme Court has ruled repeatedly that where a manufacturer’s refusal to deal either promotes or enforces a trade policy which is unreasonable per se, the manufacturer’s refusal is a per se violation of Section 1. E.g., Federal Trade Comm’n v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 42 S.Ct. 150, 66 L.Ed. 307 (1922) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.,
holding that atfs refusal to act on application did not constitute denial holding in a package deal case that a right of first refusal  empowers the rights holder with a preferential right to repurchase the property subject to the right of first refusal on the same terms offered by a bona fide purchaser holding that a companys refusal to deal with those dealers who did not observe resale prices violated section 5 of the federal trade commission act holding refusal to sign hospital waiver of liability form is not a refusal under section 1547 holding that a company policy violated the act by prohibiting employees from discussing employment conditions with the companys clients