at 621 (“We have not yet determined which pleading standard best effectuates Congress’s intent.”). And there are at least three different standards currently “in play” among our sister circuits. At one end of the spectrum is the relatively lenient standard espoused by the Second Circuit. Under that standard, a plaintiff may plead scienter by alleging specific facts that either (1) establish “both motive and opportunity to commit fraud” or (2) constitute “strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness.” See Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 138-39 (2d Cir.2001). At the other end of the spectrum is the relatively strict “deliberate recklessness” standard espoused by the Ninth Circuit. See In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Secs. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). In between is an intermediate standard
holding that particular facts giving rise to a strong inference of deliberate recklessness at a minimum is required to satisfy the heightened pleading standard under the pslra holding that the fact that federal rule of civil procedure 9b requires a heightened pleading standard for some claims but not for a section 1983 claim against a municipality means that the rules do not require a heightened pleading standard for such a claim holding that the pslra particularity requirement compels plaintiffs to allege severe recklessness holding that the pslra imposes a more rigorous pleading standard than applied by any of the courts of appeals prior to the enactment of the statute recognizing that the federal pleading standard is a less stringent standard than the delaware pleading standard