until a final decision were issued in this case on PNM’s Emergency Fuel Clause.... We supported giving PNM an interim fuel clause solely as a way to give PNM some interim relief until we and the rest of the [PRC] had the opportunity to determine, based on the record in this case, whether a more permanent fuel clause or some other relief should be given to PNM. {42} It is well established that adverse rulings do not constitute a valid basis for disqualification based on personal bias or prejudgment of a disputed factual issue. See, e.g., Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 541, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994) (“[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute valid basis for a bias or partiality recusal motion.”); State v. Hernandez, 115 N.M. 6, 20, 846 P.2d 312, 326 (1993) (<HOLDING>); United Nuclear Corp. v. Gen. Atomic Co., 96
holding that personal bias cannot be inferred from an adverse ruling holding that an unconstitutional policy may be inferred from an officials single decision or act holding that fraud may be inferred from circumstantial evidence holding that an agreement may be inferred entirely from circumstantial evidence holding intent may be inferred from all facts and circumstances