or expectation element of the prima facie case seems to preclude an otherwise meritorious claim, the plaintiff is free to demonstrate that the employer’s qualifications or expectations are not, in fact, “legitimate.” This flexibility, inherent in the McDonnell Douglas framework, is true to the goal of “progressively ... sharpening] the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination,” Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original), and the recognition that the shifting burdens of McDonnell Douglas are “meant only to aid courts and litigants in arranging the presentation of evidence,” Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986, 108 S.Ct. 2777, 101 L.Ed.2d 827 (1988). Cf. Miles, 429 F.3d at 488-89 (<HOLDING>). The same considerations apply to the
holding that because the plaintiff was not disabled for the purposes of the ada this court need not to address the other elements of the prima facie case holding that although a jury instruction that included the phrase prima facie case and referred to defendants burden of production created a distinct risk of confusing the jury in certain instances it would be appropriate to instruct the jury on the elements of a prima facie case recognizing that there may be circumstances where application of the traditional elements of the prima facie case might improperly screen out cases where a presumption of discrimination could still exist holding to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination a plaintiff must show he 1 holding that plaintiff could not establish prima facie case of discrimination where plaintiff failed to meet minimum qualifications for job