stall area between the collection of each inmate’s urine. The majority reasons that the search did not violate clearly established law because the prison officials did not touch the prisoners. Yet the principle that this circuit has articulated as central to the Fourth Amendment inquiry is the more general one that searches must be conducted in a sanitary fashion. Vaughan, 859 F.2d at 740. Certainly, searches that involve touching may present uniquely unhygienic circumstances, as, for example, when officials fail to change gloves between searches of each prisoner, see Bonitz, 804 F.2d at 169, or fail to wash their hands between searches, see Vaughan, 859 F.2d at 741. Searches that involve touching may be reasonable, however. See Hemphill v. Kincheloe, 987 F.2d 589, 592 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). The important question is not whether
holding that qualified immunity applies if either a the defendants action did not violate clearly established law or b it was objectively reasonable for the defendant to believe that his action did not violate such law internal quotation marks omitted holding that policy requiring strip searches of prisoners prior to transfer did not violate fourth amendment holding that clearly established law is construed as supreme court or tenth circuit decisions on point or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts holding coleman injunction is not clearly established law holding that digital rectal probe searches of inmates did not violate clearly established law