Ga. App. at 323 (1) (“[Rjights such as those conferred by the Fourth Amendment are personal in nature, and cannot bestow vicarious protection on those who do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place to be searched.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 49 See Division 1 (a), supra. 50 See McClain v. State, 267 Ga. 378, 383 (3) (a) (477 SE2d 814) (1996) (while reiterating that the issue of the defendant’s future dangerousness may be relevant to sentencing but not to the question of his guilt, the Court concluded that, given the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt, it was highly unlikely that the improper portion of the prosecutor’s closing argument contributed to the jury’s verdict); cf. Collier v. State, 266 Ga. App. 345, 351-355 (2) (596 SE2d 795) (2004) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. State, 261 Ga. App. 511, 517-518
holding counsels failure to investigate alibi witness and eyewitnesses to the crime amounted to constitutionally deficient performance holding that there was no material prejudice arising from trial counsels repeated references to an accuseds invoking his right to counsel holding that trial counsels failure to object to the prosecutors repeated pervasive and clearly improper references during closing arguments to similar transactions committed by the defendant constituted deficient performance and amounted to prejudice that required a new trial holding that plaintiffs failure to object to the improper comments of defendant during closing arguments resulted in waiver of plaintiffs right to argue the issue on appeal because the trial court was not given an opportunity to rule on the issue holding that failure to object to properly admitted evidence was not deficient performance by trial counsel