arrived to pick her up, she said “see ya” to Livengood, made a waving gesture towards the individual she thought was her friend, and began either walking or running toward the individual’s truck. There is conflicting testimony as to whether Livengood yelled “hey” or “stop.” In any event, even if Livengood only yelled “hey,” as plaintiff contends, the court finds that Livengood’s act of restraining plaintiff to stop her from fleeing pending the investigation was objectively reasonable. Liven-good reasonably presumed that plaintiff was attempting to flee the scene of the investigation. In these circumstances, a reasonable officer, forced to make a split second judgment, may have done the same. See Giese v. Wichita Police Dep’t, No. 94-3439, 1995 WL 634173, at *2 (10th Cir. Oct. 30, 1995) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, there is no evidence in the record
holding that an officer intentionally hitting the plaintiffs head into the top of the police car as the plaintiff was being placed in the police car could be excessive force holding that a police officers tackling of a handcuffed suspect hitting him in the face twice and banging his head on the floor three times was unconstitutional holding that plaintiff failed to establish pretext where plaintiff was terminated after the employer conducted an investigation into a subordinates allegations of misconduct on the part of the plaintiff and believed the allegations to be true even though plaintiff presented evidence in the lawsuit that the allegations may have been false holding that when plaintiff a suspect was shown officers credentials and ordered into a police car and plaintiff decided to run running after and tackling plaintiff was not constitutionally excessive holding that there was no arrest when suspect was moved from his own truck to a police car