likelihood that [S.L.J.’s words] would tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace or to provoke violent reaction by an ordinary, reasonable perso a given group to a hostile reaction,” Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 1786, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971), is analyzed according to whether the language in question is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and * ⅜ * likely to incite or produce such action.” Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 1829, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969). See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20, 91 S.Ct. at 1785-86 (rejecting independent arguments that wearing jacket emblazoned with “F* ⅜ * the Draft” constituted fighting words and/or incitement); accord, Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107-08, 94 S.Ct. 326, 328, 38 L.Ed.2d 303 (1973) (<HOLDING>). Disorderly Conduct Standards “Charges brought
holding that test was not applicable where victory has neither been attained nor assured holding that a warrant to search 626 pueblo street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavits reference to both 624 pueblo street and 626 pueblo street holding that court will not take judicial notice of foreign law that is neither pleaded nor proven holding that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street holding that antiwar demonstrators announcing to no particular individual or group well take the f  ting street again after police had cleared street in question was neither fighting words nor incitement under applicable precedent