a criminal investigation into the escape.” Id. These allegedly defamatory remarks arose out of Director Brown’s handling of the plaintiffs’ discipline following an internal investigation designating them responsible (in part) for the jail break. “A supervisor’s explanation of his handling of adverse employment actions, even if made outside the formal process, falls within the scope of the CMPA because the explanation relates to a ‘personnel issue.’ ” Sanders, 16 F.Supp.2d at 15 (discussing and quoting Stockard v. Moss, 706 A.2d 561, 565 (D.C.1997)). They fall strictly within the employment adverse action context contemplated by the CMPA. The latter’s remedies are, therefore, exclusive. See Sanders v. Dist. of Columbia, 16 F.Supp.2d 10, 12-15 (D.D.C.1998); Johnson, 368 F.Supp.2d at 47 (<HOLDING>). The court, therefore, concludes that
holding that the test for good faith is the actual belief of the party and not the reasonableness of that belief holding that officers were entitled to rely on the judicial officers finding of probable cause in issuing the search warrant unless they knowingly made false statements to obtain the warrant and that a challenge to the adequacy of the officers investigation does not rise to level of clearly established constitutional violation holding that statements to the washington post seeking to explain and justify the removal of law enforcement officers by explaining the administrations belief that those officers negligence was responsible for the detainee escapes fell within the scope of the cmpa holding corrections officers are not law enforcement officers under  41412 holding that police officers were not entitled to immunity under the itca law enforcement immunity provision where the officers violated their statutory duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all individuals while acting within the scope of their employment