this was a simple request for consent to search devoid of the interrogative atmosphere that the CAAF implicitly found in Hutchins. Nothing about this particular request for consent is suggestive or likely to have led to an interrogation. Second, SA KS’s follow-up communication after the appellee refused consent was designed to reduce the appellee’s stress by explaining to him why he would be sitting in the room for an extended period. We discern no “compelling influences [or] psychological ploys,” Mauro, 481 U.S. at 529, 107 S.Ct. 1931, associated with this interaction and the military judge found none. Thus, we conclude that this interaction by SA KS was not calculated or likely to “lead to further interrogation.” Hutchins, 72 M.J. at 298; see Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 106, 130 S.Ct. 1213 (<HOLDING>) (citation and internal quotation marks
holding that a judicially crafted rule like edwards or assuming arguendo hutchins  is justified only by reference to its prophylactic purpose holding that conspiracy requires an agreement to accomplish either an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means holding that the question of whether an interest is a claim for bankruptcy purposes is to be resolved by reference to the text history and purpose of the bankruptcy code holding that by its terms rule 50 applies only to jury trials holding that a defendant is in custody and miranda applies even when the purpose of defendants detention is unrelated to the purpose of the interrogation