clemency hearing in 1987 at which he was represented by counsel. When the death warrant was signed on April 20, 2009, it stated that “it has been determined that Executive Clemency, as authorized by Article IV, Section 8(a), Florida Constitution, is not appropriate.” Thus, clemency was again considered by the executive branch prior to the signing of the warrant in this case. Moreover, we have considered and rejected this same claim in other cases where a full clemency proceeding had been held and because the clemency process is a matter for the executive branch. See, e.g., Rutherford v. State, 940 So.2d 1112, 1122-23 (Fla.2006) (rejecting attack on clemency process where a clemency hearing was held and because it is an executive function); King v. State, 808 So.2d 1237, 1246 (Fla.2002) (<HOLDING>); Glock v. Moore, 776 So.2d 243, 252 (Fla.2001)
holding that on questions of law we adopt rule that is most persuasive in light of precedent reason and policy holding that a condition was precedent to performance because the contract language did not explicitly state that it was precedent to formation holding that the court of appeals erred in declining to apply supreme court precedent even though the reasoning of that precedent had been eroded by subsequent decisions holding that clemency claim was meritless in light of precedent holding that the section is unconstitutional as applied to private individuals in nonfederal elections in light of supreme court precedent