with “intentionally and knowingly” causing the death of a police officer. The trial court’s charge to the jury authorized conviction upon a finding that he “intentionally or knowingly” caused such result. In his first point of error, appellant complains that the trial judge improperly permitted conviction on a theory other than that alleged in the indictment. This Court has long approved the practice of prosecuting authorities to plead culpable mental states conjunctively and submit them for jury consideration disjunctively whenever the statutory language is disjunctive. Ely v. State, 582 S.W.2d 416, 421 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) (on original submission); Cowan v. State, 562 S.W.2d 236, 240 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) (rehearing denied en banc). But cf. Hunter v. State, 576 S.W.2d 395 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) (<HOLDING>); Montgomery v. State, 639 S.W.2d 949
holding that courts look to substance of plea for relief to determine nature of pleading not merely title of pleading recognizing by citing several cases that diametric opposing lines of case law authority exist with one line suggesting that information need not allege each element of offense charged because notice pleading is sufficient distinguishing pleading elements from pleading facts holding that pleading rules are substantive holding that no discovery is permissible in similar circumstances holding that disjunctive pleading of culpable mental states is permissible