U.S.C. § 3284 (“The concealment of assets of a debtor” in a Chapter 11 case “shall be deemed to be a continuing offense” until the date of final bankruptcy discharge). Nor does the nature of the crime involved indicate that Congress intended that it be a continuing offense. Section 1001 was intended “to protect the Government from the affirmative, aggressive and voluntary actions of persons who take the initiative; and to protect the Government from being the victim of some positive statement which has the tendency and effect of perverting normal and proper governmental activities and functions.” Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 413, 118 S.Ct. 805, 139 L.Ed.2d 830 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quotation omitted); see United States v. Niven, 952 F.2d 289, 293 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Consistent with this purpose, § 1001 makes it
holding that the relevant question in imposing restitution under the mvra is whether the loss is caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction holding that in determining whether a crime is a continuing offense the court must focus on the nature of the substantive offense and not on the specific characteristics of the conduct in the case at issue holding that kidnapping is a continuing offense because the crime by its nature involves unlawful seizure and detention and the perpetration of the offense and harm to the victim continues throughout the duration of the detention holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a charge on the lesserincluded offense when the evidence showed either the commission of the completed offense as charged or the commission of no offense such that the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser offense holding that an award of restitution is only for the loss caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction