on how to approach it. Specifically, the legislature has directed that the ICRA “shall be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes.” Iowa Code § 216.18(1) (2011). As we pointed out in Pippen, there is no comparable language in the federal statute. 854 N.W.2d at 28. Iowa Code section 216,18(1) is an example of a provision of the ICRA that is not modeled after and does not mirror Title VII. Our better reasoned cases show that this marked textual difference is consequential. In Pippen, we pointed out that a number of other state supreme courts have construed similar statutory language in civil rights acts to require the “widest constitutional application.” Id. (quoting Fair Emp’t Practices. Comm’n v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Med. Ctr., 41 Ill.App.3d 712, 854 N.E.2d 596, 600 (1976) (<HOLDING>)); see also Wondzell v. Alaska Wood Prods.,
holding that substantive criminal statute could not be applied retrospectively because there was nothing  in the language or the legislative history that was a clear and unequivocal expression of legislative intent to rebut presumption of prospective application only holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law holding that the only showing of intent required for a vcea claim is the intent to do the act involved holding that the title of legislation is relevant to legislative intent holding that a wide application was required given the legislative intent for the remedial provisions of the act