fears that are chimerical and those that are realistic. The best that we have been able to do is to insist that, in these purlieus, standing requires an “objectively reasonable” fear of prosecution. Id.; see also Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (1972) (stating that “[a]llegations of a subjective ‘chill’ [produced by government intelligence-gathering] are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm”). Determining objective reasonableness demands a frank consideration of the totality of the circumstances, including the nature of the conduct that a particular statute proscribes. See New Hampshire Right to Life, 99 F.3d at 16; cf. Camilo-Robles v. Zapata, 175 F.3d 41, 43 (1st Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Here, the Association intends to solicit new
holding that the reasonableness inquiry is based upon the totality of the circumstances in determining whether or not a search was reasonable holding that the qualified immunity determination does not entail an inquiry into the officers subjective intentions merely his knowledge holding that reasonableness for qualified immunity purposes requires an objective inquiry into the totality of the circumstances holding reasonable suspicion is based on totality of circumstances holding that the courts inquiry into the reasonableness of the governments proposed corrective action was proper