available to the State to justify such a search. Unlike the situation in Zap, the voluntary nature of the consent to search was not supported by the benefit of the bargain found on the face of the parole agreement in this case. We appreciate that the bargain under a contract can, at times, involve a choice between two unpalatable alternatives, which does not defeat the voluntariness of the consent. See Barnett, 415 F.Sd at 692 (declaring that a choice between accepting probation as a term of a plea bargain is more valuable than the risk of going to prison following a trial); Benton, 695 N.E.2d at 762 (rejecting an argument that defendant “had no choice but to sign a waiver as a condition of his parole, thereby implying that the waiver was not voluntary”); Anderson, 507 S.E.2d at 341 (<HOLDING>). However, this proposition does not mean a
holding that appellee was bound by the arbitration clause contained in an agreement signed by its assignor when all of appellees claims arose out of and were directly related to the agreement holding grant of consent in a parole agreement was voluntary even though the terms of the agreement were dictated by the commonwealth and the defendant signed only to avoid time in jail holding that the defendants possession of contraband in a jail was not the result of a voluntary act on his part because officers brought him into the jail under arrest holding that the court must determine whether the employees consent to the settlement agreement was knowing and voluntary holding that a federal habeas court may grant specific performance of a plea agreement in the face of evidence that the state has breached the terms of such an agreement