(same). {22} Moreover, the stated reasons for the delay, including the district court’s “fairly busy” docket, “the traditional holiday season” and a death in the family of the district judge, are all neutral reasons which do not weigh heavily against the State. See Tortolito, 124 N.M. 368, 950 P.2d 811, 1997-NMCA-128, ¶ 9 (noting that neutral reasons, such as negligence or excessive caseload, should weigh less heavily but should nonetheless be weighed against the State since it bears the ultimate responsibility to complete the trial process). We also discern no evidence in the record that the delay in this case was the result of a deliberate attempt by the State to gain a tactical advantage or harass Defendant. See Perez, 793 F.2d at 255; see also Pollard, 352 U.S. at 361, 77 S.Ct. 481 (<HOLDING>); State v. Kilpatrick, 104 N.M. 441, 445, 722
holding that all sentencing errors must be preserved holding delay in sentencing must not be purposeful or oppressive holding that grand jury investigations for speculative purposes are odious and oppressive and that before investigation may be instituted there must be knowledge or information that a crime has been committed holding that when determining whether a delay in prosecution violates a defendants right to a speedy trial courts must consider the length of the delay the reason for the delay whether the defendant asserted his rights and the resulting prejudice to the defendant holding that prescription delay was not violation because plaintiff could not establish detrimental effect of delay in treatment