however, argues that the District failed to properly convene a meeting of his IEP team when DCPS forcibly excluded his attorney, who had represented Mr. Douglas for eight months, from the May meeting. Id. at 8. The Court agrees. Because Douglas designated Mr. Nabors to attend the meeting as an “individual who ha[s] knowledge or special expertise regarding the child,” Mr. Nabors is a member of the IEP team. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(l)(B)(vi). The “IEP team” therefore did not meet as required by the HOD when DCPS barred Mr. Nabors from attending. The Court therefore disagrees with the Special Master’s conclusion that “an IEP meeting was convened on May 27th.” Rep. at 9. The May 27, 2014 meeting was a nullity. See, e.g., M.L. v. Fed. Way Sch. Dist., 387 F.3d 1101, 1115 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). A meeting of the IEP team did occur, however,
holding that an iep team that excludes the individuals identified by congress as necessary participants is illegally constituted holding that an antitrust injury is a necessary element of a  2 claim holding that wjhatever the procedure authorized by congress is it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned holding that even if construction commences but it is based on an illegally issued permit no vested right is created holding that congress may impose its will on the states as long as it is acting within the powers granted by the constitution