the only previously dismissed defendant that plaintiff wishes to include as a named defendant. When the motion was filed, Nattah’s claims against Secretary Gates had been dismissed with prejudice. This Court agrees with the approach that “[w]hen a plaintiffs first amended complaint asserts claims against defendants who have been dismissed from the suit,” courts have “discretion in denying amendment as to those defendants.” Johnson v. Dist. of Columbia, 244 F.R.D. 1, 4 (D.D.C.2007) (Lamberth, J.); see Bancoult v. McNamara, 214 F.R.D. 5, 8-9 (D.D.C.2003) (granting motion to amend complaint “as a matter of course” as to defendants against whom claims remained pending, but denying the motion as futile as to dismissed defendant); see also Cassell v. Michaux, 240 F.2d 406, 408 (D.C.Cir.1956) (<HOLDING>). Thus, plaintiff lost the ability to amend as
holding that the circuit courts order concluding that it was without jurisdiction to entertain a complaint because the case had been dismissed without prejudice constituted a final order because all other claims either had been refiled or dismissed with prejudice holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint holding that application of  1b13a2 to a dismissed count was not inequitable because the plea bargain did not impliedly preclude the district court from considering evidence of the conduct charged in the dismissed count and the defendant could have predicted that the court would aggregate the conduct holding that although the trial court had dismissed the cause with prejudice it retained jurisdiction to give effect to the settlement order holding that the district court had discretion where plaintiff sought to amend a count that had been dismissed with prejudice