or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 6. These provisions have been narrowly construed to prohibit certain forms of direct discrimination between States within the legislative spheres to which the provisions apply: taxation and port-related commerce-and-revenue regulation,' respectively. See, e.g., United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 85-86, 103 S.Ct. 2239, 2245-46, 76 L.Ed.2d 427 (1983) (upholding against a Uniformity Clause challenge an oil taxation scheme that had the effect of giving a unique exemption to Alaskan oil, on the grounds that the exemption was based on “neutral factors” and was not intentionally discriminatory); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 433-35, 15 L.Ed. 435 (1855) (<HOLDING>). Nevada correctly notes that the Supreme Court
holding over holding that the port preference clause prohibits only positive legislation by congress that gives a direct privilege or preference to the ports of any particular state over those of another not federal enactments that merely confer incidental advantages on one port over others holding that congress may not direct a state to enact or enforce a particular law or type of law recognizing that the bill of attainder prohibits punitive legislation holding that the flsa does not confer jurisdiction over ambulance services