show that “substantial prejudice” resulted from the delay. Id. (opining that while defendant “may have suffered some prejudice due to his pre-trial incarceration, he is unable to point to a particular prejudice impacting his ability to receive a fair trial, so we do not regard his near 15-month incarceration as resulting in substantial prejudice”); see also Ferreira, 665 F.3d at 706 (“The final factor requires a defendant to show that substantial prejudice has resulted from the delay.”) (internal quotations omitted). While it is possible that Francis suffered some prejudice from the 35-month delay that this case has been pending, he has not been able to point to any particular prejudice impacting his ability to receive a fair trial. See Taylor v. State, 162 So. 3d 780, 787 (Miss. 2015) (<HOLDING>). As noted by the United States Supreme Court,
holding that a nineteenmonth delay standing alone was not sufficient to constitute a speedy trial violation holding that strong evidence of guilt weighs against finding fundamental unfairness holding lack of prejudice to the defendant is not good cause holding prominence of trade names  weighs heavily against a finding of consumer confusion holding that unquestionable lack of actual prejudice weighs against a finding of a speedy trial violation