is limited to one hour per day in a small indoor room, only annual reviews occur, and otherwise eligible inmates are disqualified for parole consideration, that regardless of how the baseline was defined, the restrictions imposed an atypical and significant hardship. Id. Thus, a liberty interest was implicated. Id. Consistent with Sandin and Wilkinson, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that a prisoner can be deprived of his liberty in violation of due process in two ways: The first is when a change in a prisoner’s confinement is so severe that it essentially exceeds the sentence imposed by the court. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995); see e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492-93, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 1263-64, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980) (<HOLDING>). The second is when the state has consistently
holding that foreign states are not persons entitled to rights under the due process clause holding that clear and convincing standard is required by due process in a civil proceeding brought under state law to commit an individual involuntarily for an indefinite period to a state mental hospital because civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection holding that a prisoner is entitled to due process prior to being transferred to a mental hospital holding that there is no due process right to appellate review holding informal process is sufficient because medicaid providers are not entitled  under constitutional due process standards to a full administrative hearing prior to termination of their provider agreement