156 F.3d at 1291, it “[ujsually ... will be enough to get a plaintiffs claim to a jury,” George, 407 F.3d at 413 (internal quotation marks omitted). Reviewing the evidence ourselves, we conclude that the district court got it right the first time when it denied the Board’s motion for summary judgment. We start with Jones’s prima facie evidence of the temporal proximity between his September 2000 request for a hearing and the October 2000 evaluation. According to the Board, this timing of events cannot support an inference of retaliatory motive for two reasons. The Board first claims that the temporal proximity evidence is worthless absent additional evidence that Jones’s supervisors knew of his September 2000 request— knowledge the Board insists they lacked. We agree that Jon r.2006) (<HOLDING>); Singletary v. District of Columbia, 351 F.3d
holding in a discrimination case that a close temporal proximity sufficient to survive summary judgment existed where the challenged employment action occurred one month after the protected activity holding that temporal proximity between the alleged retaliators knowledge of a protected activity and an adverse employment action may be sufficient to establish causal connection or retaliatory motive in some cases holding that a three to four month period between the protected activity is not enough to show very close temporal proximity recognizing temporal proximity when agency had knowledge of employees protected activity holding that a temporal proximity of one month between the plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to establish a causal connection