Apfel, 149 F.3d 844, 846 (8th Cir.1998); Torres v. Chater, 125 F.3d 166, 171 (3d Cir.1997). Before today, we had not decided whether to adopt either the adjudication or the disability interpretation. See Maggard v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 376, 379 (7th Cir.1999) (electing not to decide between the disability and adjudication interpretations). Today, we adopt the adjudication interpretation. A. Plain Language of Statute The plain language of the Amendments supports the adjudication interpretation. When interpreting congressional statutes, we first look at the plain language of the statute because that is the best way to determine congressional intent. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177, 113 S.Ct. 1163, 122 L.Ed.2d 525 (1993); United States v. Hayward, 6 F.3d 1241, 1245 (7th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). The disability interpretation muddles the
holding that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous no need exists for the court to examine the legislative histo ry and the court must give effect to the plain meaning of the statute recognizing that where the statutory language is not ambiguous  the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute must be given effect holding that we must give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of a statutes language holding when ordinance language is clear courts must give language its plain meaning holding that an appellate court must give a statute its clear and plain meaning when the statute is unambiguous