have considerable doubt whether the failure-to-train claim survived either the dismissal of the § 1983 claim against Grayson, individually, see supra Section II.A, or the Monell policy-based claims against the Town and Grayson, in his official capacity, supra. If Grayson never violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights in the first instance, it is difficult to see how a failure to train him could have caused any "constitutional injury” to plaintiffs. Compare Evans v. Avery, 100 F.3d 1033, 1040 (1st Cir.1996) (affirming dismissal of § 1983 substantive-due-process claim against City where its agents were found not to have violated plaintiff's constitutional rights) (citing Heller, 475 U.S. at 799, 106 S.Ct. at 1573), with Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 1063 (3d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); de Feliciano v. de Jesus, 873 F.2d 447, 450
holding that routine strip searches of pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners conducted after contact visits were constitutional recognizing pretrial detainees constitutional right to be from excessive force holding that city policymakers who owed an independent duty to pretrial detainees were individually liable under  1983 for prisoner suicide even though factfinder determined that the turnkey had not violated prisoners constitutional rights holding doc and its personnel had independent legal duty to prevent prisoner from committing suicide holding that because pretrial detainees fourteenth amendment rights are comparable to prisoners eighth amendment rights the same standards apply