by allowing him to plead his complaint generally at the outset and to “fill in the blanks” following discovery. The issue of whether to relax Rule 9(b)’s pleading requirements for complaints brought under the FCA and to permit early discovery is one of first impression in this circuit. “[S]ome courts have recognized in theory that the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) may be relaxed in an FCA qui tam action where the information relevant to the fraud is ‘peculiarly within the perpetrator’s knowledge.’ ” United States ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose-Wakefield Hosp., 360 F.3d 220, 229 (1st Cir.2004) (quoting United States ex rel. Doe v. Dow Chem. Co., 343 F.3d 325, 330 (5th Cir.2003)). However, few courts have actually applied such a standard. Karvelas, 360 F.3d at 229, 231 (<HOLDING>). We join the more recent decisions and
holding a qui tam relator may not present general allegations in lieu of the details of actual false claims in the hope that such details will emerge through subsequent discovery holding a complaints general allegations lacking any details or facts setting out the who what when where and how of the allegedly fraudulent conductwere insufficient to satisfy rule 9b internal quotation marks omitted holding that plaintiff could not maintain a qui tam fca action against a municipal entity holding that a special relaxing of rule 9b is a qui tam plaintiffs ticket to the discovery process that the statute itself does not contemplate holding that specific details about time place and substance of the fraud satisfy rule 9b