omitted). Further, we have repeatedly distinguished J.L.’s anonymous tipster from persons who divulge “sufficient details ... to render [themselves] readily identifiable by police.” United States v. Brown, 496 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir.2007). In other words, “[t]he fact that the officers did not know the caller’s name is not dispositive on the question of anonymity.” Id. at 1075. Here, the caller did not disclose his name but provided enough information to render himself readily identifiable — he gave the operator his phone number and address. See, e.g., Chavez, 660 F.3d at 1222-23 (finding the caller “readily identifiable” where he did not provide his name but indicated he was a Wal-Mart employee at a specific store); United States v. Copening, 506 F.3d 1241, 1247 (10th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); Johnson, 364 F.3d at 1191 (tip was
holding that tip from known reliable informant that was immediately verifiable at the scene could form basis for reasonable suspicion and forcible terry stop holding that an anonymous tip lacking indicia of reliability that an individual is carrying a gun is not enough to justify a terry stop holding that an unverified tip from a known informant was sufficiently reliable to justify a terry stop and frisk holding that an anonymous tip supported a terry stop where the informant provided several details but refused to give his name holding that an anonymous tip must have sufficient indicia of reliability to justify a stop and frisk