to treat similarly situated people alike. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). To establish such a claim, a prisoner can allege that: “(1) he is similarly situated with other prisoners who received more favorable treatment; and (2) his discriminatory treatment was based on some constitutionally protected interest, such as race.” Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944, 946-47 (11th Cir.2001) (internal quotations omitted); Damiano v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm’n, 785 F.2d 929, 932-33 (11th Cir.1986). If a suspect classification, such as race, or a fundamental right is implicated, a court must apply strict scrutiny to that claim. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 506-07, 125 S.Ct. 1141, 1147, 160 L.Ed.2d 949 (2005) (<HOLDING>). There is no fundamental right implicated,
holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion holding that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review for racial classifications even in the prison context holding that strict scrutiny applies holding that turner did not cast doubt on the courts previous holding that strict scrutiny applies to racial classifications in prisons holding that appropriate standard of review regarding campaign finance disclosure laws is intermediate not strict scrutiny