a reasonable [prisoner] would have done.” Id. Rather, the test is what a prisoner of ordinary firmness would have done in reaction to the death threats. Id. “Ultimately, this sort of question is usually best left to the judgment of a jury....” Id. In the circumstances before us, we conclude that a reasonable jury could find that threats of death, issued by a correctional officer tasked with guarding a prisoner’s segregated cell, would chill a prisoner of ordinary firmness from engaging in the prison grievance process. See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 474 (6th Cir.2010) (“[T]hreats alone can constitute an adverse action if the threat is capable of deterring a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in protected conduct.”); Van Deelen v. Johnson, 497 F.3d 1151, 1157 (10th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Further, there is sufficient evidence of a
holding that the remedies available under massachusetts law to challenge tax assessments were sufficient to preclude federal declaratory action holding that the plaintiffs allegations of physical and verbal intimidation including a threat by a deputy sheriff to shoot him if he brought any more tax appeals would surely suffice  to chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to seek redress for allegedly unfair property tax assessments holding that state legislature should determine whether to cure discriminatory tax by enforcing tax as to all or forgiving tax in its entirety holding that property tax was a state tax and was thus disproportionate unreasonable and unfair because of discrepancies in tax rates of up to 400 between school districts holding that the tax was indirect even though the recipient could not shift the tax to others