that the patent was procured by fraud on the PTO and thereafter enforced in the marketplace with bad faith. The state law claims alleged here “require[ ] entirely different elements” than “those required for inequitable conduct before the PTO,” Dow, 139 F.3d at 1477, and “the tort occurred not at the PTO but later in the marketplace, even though the conduct before the PTO might be used to prove it.” In re DDAVP Indirect Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 903 F.Supp.2d 198, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Dow, 139 F.3d at 1477-78) (internal citation omitted). Furthermore, state law claims based on Walker Process-type fraud do not frustrate the purposes or objectives of federal patent law for the same reasons their federal counterparts do not. See Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 177-78, 86 S.Ct. 347- (<HOLDING>). The preemption argument for the state law
holding that same activity violated  2 of the sherman act holding that a plaintiff may state a claim under the sherman act for a defendants enforcement of a patent procured by fraud on the pto where the plaintiff alleges deliberate fraud and the other elements of a monopolization claim under section 2 of the sherman act holding that plaintiffs complaint failed to state a claim under section 1 of the sherman act holding ban violated the sherman act holding that complaint alleging defendant attempted to monopolize by threatening to and pursuing legal enforcement of patent procured by fraud on patent office stated claim under  2 of sherman act