was hardly deliberate or voluntary. The trial court was of the view that plaintiffs failure to heed NJNG’s safety manual and policies pertaining to meter readers’ exposure to dogs justified the presentation of plaintiffs negligence to the jury on retrial. According to Rossi, he was prepared to demonstrate that NJNG’s manual warned meter readers to look for signs that an animal is present and “don’t go into yards ... until you’re sure all pets have been properly restrained.” Further, an NJNG’s supervisor had testified in deposition that, in the presence of a “Beware of Dog” sign on the gate and plaintiffs knowledge of the presence of a “bad dog,” her entry into the yard was not a “safe procedure.” However, even assuming a violation of NJNG’s safety policies, N.W.2d 468, 472 (1976) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, evidence of the dog bites suffered
holding that the knowledge requisite to knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as distinguished from knowledge of the law holding that one who brings action under a dogbite statute is not required to establish dogs past conduct or owners knowledge thereof holding that affidavit of merit is not required in common knowledge cases holding that no abuse of discretion occurred in admitting evidence regarding a lack of pri or complaints to establish defendants knowledge or lack thereof of a defect in the safety glasses that it produced or sold holding that dog owners were entitled to summary judgment either under the premisesliability or dangerousanimalliability theories when the dog that bit the plaintiff had never previously attacked or bitten a human and the owners had no superior knowledge of the dogs propensity to bite