his arguments, none of which are binding upon this Court. Importantly, Marshall has not alleged that the Defendants based their expulsion decision on less than “some evidence”, arguing instead that the standard of review should change. As the law stands in Indiana and in the Seventh Circuit, the Defendants were not required to give Marshall any more process than he received; and, therefore, dismissal of Marshall’s due process claims is warranted. Further, because Marshall has failed to identify a knowing violation of clearly established due process rights, as defined by Indiana law or the Seventh Circuit, the individual Defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity against Marshall’s due process claims. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 236, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (<HOLDING>); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
holding that clearly established means the contours of the right were so clear at the time the officials acted that a reasonable official would have understood that what he was doing violated that right holding that government officials receive qualified immunity unless their conduct violated a constitutional right and the law to this effect was clearly established under thenexisting law such that a reasonable official would have known that his behavior was unlawful recognizing that qualified immunity shields officials unless the plaintiff demonstrates the defendant violated a constitutional right that was clearly established holding that if official has violated clearly established law he is entitled to qualified immunity only if reasonable official could have believed conduct was lawful holding that second element of qualified immunity test is whether the law violated was clearly established