possessed in committing an offense. Searcy <& Patterson, Practice Commentary, 1 Texas Penal Code Annotated § 16.01 (Vernon 1974), quoted in Eodice, 742 S.W.2d at 846. The authors’ emphasis on the word “specially” suggests that the Legislature intended a narrow construction of what constitutes a criminal instrument. Finally, Janjua conflates two separate elements of the statute. The statute forbids possession of “a criminal instrument with intent to use it in the commission of an offense.” Thus, to be guilty of this offense, a person must (1) possess a criminal instrument, and (2) have the intent to use it in the commission of an offense. But rather than treating intent as a separate element, Janjua folds intent into the definition of “criminal instrument.” See 991 S.W.2d at 426 (<HOLDING>). We agree with Eodice and Andrews that intent
recognizing that the district court is not bound by its prior factual findings determined in a preliminary injunction hearing holding that the constitutional level of punitive damages is not a finding of fact that must be determined by the jury it may be determined de novo by the court holding that what constitutes a criminal instrument is determined by both its design or adaptation and its intended use holding that a contract was implied where the special employer allowed the claimant to come onto its premises use its equipment and participate in its show under its direction holding nature of motion is determined by its substance not its title