matter of fact; ...” Prosser, Torts, 182; 206-7 (4th ed. 1971). 12 . On lack of foreseeability of criminal conduct see Prosser, supra, 73, cited in Irby; Goldberg v. Housing Authority, 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1967); Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 619; see also Lige v. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co., 275 Mo. 249, 204 S.W. 508 (1918), which is ill-considered since it involved both a special relationship of passenger and carrier and the special fact of intoxication, and seems contrary to Hughes v. St. Louis National League Baseball Club, Inc., 359 Mo. 993, 224 S.W.2d 989 (Mo. banc 1949). 13 . Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp., 141 App.D.C. 370, 439 F.2d 477 (1970) (involving an apartment hotel but discussing innkeeper law in depth). See also Scheibel v. Hillis, 531 S.W.2d 285 (Mo. 1976) (<HOLDING>); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302B, 344,
holding that liability may not be predicated upon a theory of respondeat superior because a supervisor can be liable only for his own acts or omissions holding a business owes a duty to protect invitees from reasonably foreseeable harm by third persons holding that the doctrine may only be predicated on continuing unlawful acts and not on the continuing effects of earlier unlawful conduct holding that criminal conduct on premises was not foreseeable holding that negligence may be predicated on the foreseeable acts of third persons