given for a peremptory challenge is a pretext for purposeful discrimination and upholds a Batson motion, the court has “the discretion to fashion a remedy for a Batson violation that addresses and resolves the specific harm caused by that violation.” Jones, 343 Md. at 602-03, 683 A.2d at 529. V. Turning to the merits of petitioner’s Batson challenge, we note first that step one, whether petitioner has made a prima facie showing that the State’s challenges were racially motivated, is not at issue in this case. The issue is moot because the State offered explanations for its peremptory challenges and the court ruled, in part, on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1866, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991)(plurality opinion)(<HOLDING>); Gilchrist v. State, 340 Md. 606, 628, 667
holding that when the prosecutor articulates reasons for strikes and the trial court makes a ruling on discriminatory intent the question of whether a prima facie case was made is moot holding that the fourteenth amendment precludes peremptory challenges predicated upon race and that once a defendant in a criminal case makes a prima facie showing of discrimi nation the burden shifts to the prosecution to demonstrate a neutral explanation for the challenges holding that once prosecutor makes raceneutral explanation for peremptory challenge and trial court rules on question of intentional discrimination issue of prima facie case becomes moot holding to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination a plaintiff must show he 1 holding that the jury need only decide the ultimate issue of intentional discrimination and usually need not make findings on the prima facie case or whether the defendants explanation is pretextual