favor of the accused, (3) the absence of probable cause for the criminal proceeding and (4) actual malice. Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir.1997); O'Brien v. Alexander, 101 F.3d 1479, 1484 (2d Cir.1996). The first element is met because the plaintiff was charged with counts of assault and trespass arising out of her arrest on January 5, 2000. The second element is also satisfied for the purpose of the present motion because the certificate of disposition of the plaintiffs criminal case, of which this Court may take judicial notice, states that a grand jury dismissed the charge of assault and the District Attorney dismissed the trespass charges in the interest of justice. See Cantalino v. Danner, 96 N.Y.2d 391, 392, 729 N.Y.S.2d 405, 754 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y.2001) (<HOLDING>). With respect to the third element, “probable
holding that a dismissal of a defendant who did not agree to settlement is not a favorable termination if dismissal of that defendant was a condition of settlement holding that in certain circumstances fraud can be prosecuted under the statute holding that a dismissal in the interest of justice can be a favorable termination under certain circumstances holding that a dismissal under heck is without prejudice to a claims reassertion following a favorable termination holding that a dismissal in the interest of justice was a favorable termination for the purposes of a malicious prosecution action where the courts reasons for dismissing the criminal charges were not inconsistent with the innocence of the accused