— Protecting People, Not Places Because “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 349, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), it “provides sanctuary for citizens wherever they have a legitimate expectation of privacy,” Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96 n. 5, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990), and there is no dispute that Hardin was entitled to Fourth Amendment protection while in Ms. Reynolds’s apartment. But, because “Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which ... may not be vicariously asserted,” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133— 34, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), Hardin may not assert Ms. Reynolds’s rights, he may assert only his.own. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 120, 126 S.Ct. 1515, 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006) (<HOLDING>). And, because Hardin was the subject of an
holding search invalid under the fourth amendment when a physicallypresent occupant expressly objected to a search  notwithstanding the consent of a fellow occupant holding that mother who was resident of house shared with adult daughter could give valid consent to search premises holding that a warrantless search of a shared dwelling was reasonable as to one occupant who gave consent but not to another who did not holding defendants girlfriend had authority to consent to search as a joint occupant holding defendant gave a valid and knowing consent to a search of his dwelling and automobile when he agreed to the terms of probation