for themselves. Second, Scheetz was not the only witness to the incident. Jurors may hear from several witnesses who were also present for all or part of the incident, including some who were in a better position to view the events than Scheetz. Because Scheetz is but one of many individuals present at the revocation hearing, the likelihood that he could sway the jury by subtly imparting to them his firsthand knowledge of events is largely eliminated. Whatever remote possibilities of such conduct that remain can be curtailed through vigorous monitoring to ensure that Scheetz does not improperly imply that any witness’s version of events is inaccurate or otherwise provide impermissible unsworn testimony. See Fonten Corp. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 469 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Thus, I conclude that Judge Scoles’s decision
holding that trial counsel did not act unreasonably in failing to raise the issue of the defendants mental health at trial holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel holding that trial judge ably ensured that counsel did not cross any lines by warning counsel not to imply that any witnesss version of events was inaccurate and monitoring counsels actions at trial holding counsels failure to object to victim impact testimony and evidence was not ineffective assistance of counsel when the trial record was silent as to counsels strategy holding that counsel was not deficient in failing to call a witness where the defendant never provided the witnesss name to counsel and no evidence existed that counsel had any notice of the witnesss identity