1354 and 459 U.S. 906, 103 S.Ct. 208, 74 L.Ed.2d 166 (1982). 24 . See Loney, 959 F.2d at 1343 (stating that it was not impermissible to call defendant a "liar" based on evidence that indicated that defendant's statements and actions were not consistent). 25 . United States v. Olano, - U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1777-78, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993); see Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b) (“Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.”); see, e.g., Bradford v. Whitley, 953 F.2d 1008, 1013 (5th Cir.) (referring to defendant as “liar" no violation of substantive rights in context of entire closing argument), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 91, 121 L.Ed.2d 53 (1992); United States v. Nanez, 694 F.2d 405, 410 (5th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 909, 103 S.Ct. 1884,
holding that while the question of whether a reasonable person would believe his person was seized was normally a question of law that the district court was still entitled to deference because its determination in this case is inextricably intertwined with the credibility of the witnesses holding that for bolstering to constitute plain error the prosecutor must have intertwined his own personal and official credibility with that of the witnesses holding that the postconviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses holding that in light of defendants attack on credibility of states witnesses prosecutor did not commit misconduct during closing argument when he implied states witnesses were credible holding that prosecutors reference to cooperation agreements with government witnesses was not plain error