(2) Attorney Harvatin’s fax was a communication directed solely at Attorney Apple-bee, not at Diesi, thereby removing any grounds Diesi may have for suit against WMB. Communications between a debt collector and a consumer’s attorney are not actionable under the FDCPA. See Zaborac v. Phillips & Cohen Assoc., Ltd., 330 F.Supp.2d 962, 966, 2004 WL 1766118, *3 n. 5 (N.D.Ill.2004) (“Reading ‘collection of the debt’ to apply only to consumers, and not to all of their attorneys’ communications with the debt collectors, is sound because a consumer’s attorney is quite properly considered an intermediary between the debt collector and the consumer, and as such has his or her own responsibility for protecting the consumer.”); Tromba v. M.R.S. Assoc., Inc., 323 F.Supp.2d 424, 428 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (<HOLDING>); Phillips v. North American Capital Corp.,
holding that a suspended attorney should not be permitted to have contact with clients holding that if an attorney is discharged without cause he is entitled to a charging lien for the reasonable value of his services rendered prior to the date of the substitution of counsel where 1 his representation was entirely competent and successful up until his discharge 2 any potential conflict of interest was disclosed and the plaintiff chose to continue to be represented by the attorney and 3 the discharge of the attorney occurred solely because of a fee dispute holding that debt collectors fax to consumers attorney provided plaintiff  no cause of action under the fdcpa where a communication was solely directed to her attorney and no threat was made regarding contact with the debtor herself holding an arrestee has the right to contact an attorney but not a specific attorney who is unavailable when called holding attorney general could not contract on behalf of the state to employ an assistant attorney beyond the attorney generals own term