were for “generic burglary” — a burglary committed in a building — or for one of the other types of burglary contained in Massachusetts’s burglary offense. In answering this question, the Court recognized that judicial inquiry into the facts of the defendant’s prior convictions would implicate the Appren-di rule. The Court held that the sentencing court’s inquiry must be “limited to the terms of the charging document, the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in which the fact Cir. 2005) (upholding trial judge’s consideration of defendant’s probationary status because “the conviction itself and the type and length of a sentence imposed seem logically to fall within [the prior conviction] exception”); cf. Ryle, 842 N.E.2d at 325, 323 n. 5 (<HOLDING>). But see State v. Jenkins, 199 Or.App. 384,
holding that where defendant admitted to two violations of probation and was sentenced therefor court could not enter second order of revocation and resentence defendant on third charge of violation of probation which was pending at time defendants probation was first revoked holding that judge could rely on presentenee report to determine that defendant was on probation at the time of the offense but declining to base this holding the theory that probation is derivative of criminal history holding that under statutes in effect at the time a court may not by revocation and granting a second period of probation extend the total time on probation beyond five years as the statutes do not speak of terms of probation but speak in plain language of the total time which may be spent on probation for a felony holding that probation and suspension of sentence may not be revoked based solely on a violation or criminal offense that was committed before the offender was actually placed on probation holding that probation is not a sentence