See, e.g., Elementis Chems., Inc. v. T.H. Agric. & Nutrition, L.L.C., 373 F. Supp. 2d 257, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (describing the exceptions to strict liability imposed by the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 — exceptions that are substantively similar to those in section 143-215.83(b)(2) — as affirmative defenses), superseded in part on other grounds by Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., v. UGI Utils., Inc., 423 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2005); Grand St. Artists v. Gen. Elec. Co., 28 F. Supp. 2d 291, 295-96 (D.N.J. 1998) (same); United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (same); see also City of Brentwood v. Cent. Valley Reg’l Water Quality Control Bd., 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 322, 329-30 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, it is well-established that
holding that the defendant could not raise affirmative defenses initially in its dispositive motion but remanding the case to the trial court to determine if leave to amend answer to incorporate affirmative defenses was appropriate so that the defendant could then properly raise those defenses in its dispositive motion recognizing that cases have generally treated statutory exceptions from remedial statutes as affirmative defenses holding that affirmative defenses are waived if not pled holding that exceptions  such as the act or omission of a third party  to strict liability under section 13385 of californias water code are affirmative defenses holding that apart from threshold defenses such as lack of in personam jurisdiction service of process standing and the like the enumerated 547c preference exceptions are the ex elusive defenses to liability for an otherwise avoidable preferential transfer