2084, 186 L.Ed.2d 84 (2013). That is not the situation presented in this case. First, even if the court were to use the drug equivalency tables, Mr. Stanfiel’s sentence would remain unchanged. Therefore, the principle enunciated in Peugh is inapplicable. There is no risk Mr. Stanfiel will face a higher sentence. Second, cases that arise under § 3582(c)(2) by their nature have no “bearing on the ex post facto clause, because [they] cannot increase a punishment.” United States v. Diggs, 768 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir.2014). A change in a drug equivalency table that renders a defendant ineligible for a reduction in his sentence is not the same as an increase in punishment and therefore, not an ex post facto clause violation. See e.g., United States v. Waters, 771 F.3d 679, 681 (9th Cir.2014) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. * This order and judgment is not
holding that the ex post facto clause  has no application to deportation holding the application of change in law regarding the timetable for being eligible for parole board hearings was not an increase in punishment violative of the ex post facto clause holding that application of guidelines did not violate the ex post facto clause because rico offense was a straddle crime that continued before and after the effective date of the guidelines holding that although the application of an updated version of the sentencing guidelines may have prevented the defendant from benefitting from recent reductions in drug penalties because application of the amendments would not increase the punishment for his crime over what was imposed when he was sentenced there is no ex post facto problem holding that application of an amended version of the guidelines to a conspiracy which continues both before and after the amendment does not violate the ex post facto clause