purposes of an appellate review.” Shannon v. Gen. Elec. Co., 186 F.3d 186, 192 (2d Cir. 1999). We conclude, however, that the district court properly dismissed these claims as time-barred. Under both the ADEA and Title VII, a plaintiff must file a complaint with the Equal Em-' ployment Opportunity Commission within 300 days of a discriminatory act. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l). Claims outside this window will be time-barred, except when the time-barred claims are part of a continuing violation. Fitzgerald v. Henderson, 261 F.3d 345, 359 (2d Cir. 2001). However, the continuing violation doctrine does not apply to Var-no’s demotion because it was a single discrete act. See Nat’l B.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (<HOLDING>). We further conclude that the district court
holding that the plaintiff was precluded from asserting her failure to promote claim as a continuing violation holding that the continuing violation doctrine does not apply to discrete acts of discrimination such as termination failure to promote denial of transfer or refusal to hire holding that plaintiffs failure to promote claim and train claims are discrete instances of alleged discrimination that are not susceptible to a continuing violation analysis holding that title vii does not include a continuing violation doctrine holding failure to promote was an isolated incident of discrimination which is insufficient to prove a continuing violation