programs. It concluded that those disparities did not furnish a basis for sentencing Salazar-Alpizar outside of the applicable advisory Guideline range, in view of the other relevant sentencing factors. That decision is consistent with Morales-Chaires, as well as every other circuit court decision that has addressed the matter. See United States v. Marcial-Santiago, 447 F.3d 715, 718-19 (9th Cir.2006) (“By authorizing fast-track programs without revising the terms of § 3553(a)(6), Congress was necessarily providing that the sentencing disparities that result ... are warranted [and] ... [e]ven if the[se] disparities] were assumed to be unwarranted, ... that factor alone would not render Appellants’ sentences unreasonable; the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing 8th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Martinez-Flores, 428 F.3d at 30 n. 3 (stating
holding that district court plainly erred when it decided to impose a sentence comparable to a fasttrack sentence where the defendant did not enter into a fasttrack plea agreement holding that any disparity between the defendants sentence and sentences imposed in fasttrack districts was considered appropriately as a single and not controlling factor holding that any disparity between the defendants sentence and those available or imposed in fasttrack jurisdictions was considered appropriately as a single and not controlling factor holding that probation is not a sentence holding that the sentence disparities arising from fasttrack programs do not make  the defendants sentence unreasonable