thirds of the members of the proposed plaintiff class are citizens of the state where the action was originally filed. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i). However, this provision does not apply if, "during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that class action” another class action has been filed "asserting the same or similar factual allegations against any of the defendants on behalf of the same or other persons.” Id. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(ii). The Meek-Horton class action proceeding before Judge Patterson asserts similar factual allegations against largely the same defendants on behalf of substantially the same class. See generally Docket, 11 Civ. 6054. Thus, the Court is not required to decline jurisdiction under CAFA, even though it is apparent th Cas., 903 F.2d 480, 488 (7th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>)). In addition, although a literal reading of
holding that land dedicated for a public street may not be leased to a private entity for private use holding that the crucial distinction that rendered the public entity liable for a private actors inaccessibility was that the public entity had contracted with the private actor for it to provide aid benefits or services to beneficiaries of the public entitys redevelopment program holding that plaintiffs claims against private fiscal intermediary were subject to exhaustion requirement and that plaintiff may not circumvent the terms of section 405h simply because a private entity the defendant serves a public function holding that the fact that the city had delegated its municipal engineering functions to a private entity was dispositive in establishing that documents generated by the private entity were public records holding that excessive force claims are not subject to exhaustion requirement