these textual differences do not assist us one way or another in our determination. Vasquez also contends that the simple fact that Article 1, § 4 has different language from the Fourth Amendment demonstrates an intent to provide greater protection. Again, we have no way of knowing whether this is true, and tend to think that the slight textual difference demonstrates little. Nor do we think that had the provisions been identical, it would demonstrate an intent that the Wyoming provision provide the same protection as the federal provision. See Si-bron v. Neio York, 392 U.S. 40, 60-61, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1901-02, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62, 87 S.Ct. 788, 791, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967); People v. Belton, 55 N.Y.2d 49, 447 N.Y.S.2d 873, 432 N.E.2d 745 (1982) (<HOLDING>). In general, the Wyoming Constitution does
holding that when language is exactly the same in two statutory provisions the meaning of that language is also identical holding erisa plan interpretation is simply one of contract interpretation recognizing that identical provisions do not mean that an independent interpretation is not warranted holding that an emergency mortgageassistance loan is not an other similar grant and stating that when an unambiguous statute is interpreted to mean what it says the interpretation is not narrow recognizing that deference to an agencys interpretation of the written law is appropriate only when that interpretation is within the written laws language