pro se motion to withdraw plea, he argued that “the plea offered ... was not the plea [a]greed upon [b]y the State and the Defendant” and that he “signed a plea under false pretenses and [was] led to [b]elieve it [was] the State[’]s offer.” These allegations — if taken alone — were sufficiently refuted by the written plea agreement and the plea colloquy. However, Davis’s counsel also filed a motion to withdraw plea, asserting that Davis told counsel that “he was not properly served by undersigned counsel”; counsel also asserted that “[presumably this ... resulted in an involuntary plea being entered by Defendant.” We are not entirely convinced that such a general allegation was sufficient to warrant a Sheppard hearing. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 52 So.3d 697, 698 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (<HOLDING>); Carter v. State, 22 So.3d 793, 795 (Fla. 1st
holding that juveniles may waive right to counsel only upon advice of counsel holding that counsels motion was not sufficient where counsel alleged only that counsel and appellants positions had become adverse holding that even if counsel had performed as petitioner alleged counsel should have governments case was still as strong and guilty plea was prudent course holding that counsel was not deficient in failing to call a witness where the defendant never provided the witnesss name to counsel and no evidence existed that counsel had any notice of the witnesss identity holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel