claim, Panaro moved to amend his complaint, claiming that he had new evidence indicating that he had filed a grievance form. The district court denied the motion, because "The 'new' evidence was at all times in the possession of Plaintiff, and can not be considered newly discovered for purposes of Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b).” Because Panaro does not appeal the district court’s order denying the motion to amend the complaint, Panaro’s “new” evidence is not before us. The record in this appeal does not indicate that Panaro filed a grievance form. 5 . The Ninth Circuit had not squarely addressed this issue in the context of section 1983 actions at the time Panaro filed this suit. However, shortly before Panaro filed his complaint we decided Lunsford v. Jumao-As, 155 F.3d 1178, 1178 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Because "Actions under § 1983 and those under
holding that the plra did not require administrative exhaustion in suits for money damages under bivens v six unknown named agents 403 us 388 91 sct 1999 29 led2d 619 1971 when the administrative grievance process only offered injunctive relief holding exhaustion is required regardless of the relief offered through administrative procedures holding that exhaustion is required even where the relief sought is not available in the administrative process holding that bivens plaintiff was not required to exhaust administrative remedies where administrative remedy program provided only for injunctive relief holding that exhaustion is required under the plra even if the plaintiff seeks only money damages and money damages are not available as relief