Cir.2009), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 130 S.Ct. 1311, — L.Ed.2d - (2010) (Michigan’s fleeing offense is a violent felony), and United States v. Spells, 537 F.3d 743, 749-53 (7th Cir.2008), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 2379, 173 L.Ed.2d 1299 (2009) (Indiana fleeing offense is a violent felony). We have also split on the question of whether fleeing or eluding is a crime of violence following Begay and Chambers. For example, in Hudson, we held that the Missouri offense of resisting arrest by fleeing in such a manner that created a substantial risk of serious physical injury or death to any person was a crime of violence. 577 F.3d at 885-87; see also United States v. Richardson, 581 F.3d 824, 825 (8th Cir.2009) (per curiam), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1538, 176 L.Ed.2d 134 (2010) (<HOLDING>). Kluge, however, urges us to follow United
holding that the sensible and popular understanding of what a motor vehicle accident entails necessarily involves the motor vehicle being operated as a motor vehicle  holding in addressing crime of obstructing an officer in serving or attempting to serve or execute a legal process or order that it is not enough that the accused should know that the person attempting to make the arrest is an arresting officer it must also appear that he knew that the officer was attempting to execute a lawful process or order holding police officer had probable cause to believe defendant was operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol holding that the kansas offense of fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer where the defendant is involved in a motor vehicle accident or intentionally causes property damage was a crime of violence holding that assault conviction for driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol and causing serious bodily injury to the person of another with the motor vehicle qualified as a crime of violence under ussg  4b12a