charge at issue, we conclude that this standard has at least two critical flaws. First, any standard requiring dispositive evidence to avoid the strictures of section 10(b) is contrary to the concept of “tolling,” and is thus wrong as a matter of law. The purpose of tolling the limitations period is to allow consideration of the merits of claims that would otherwise be time-barred. See, e.g., Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 246-53 (D.C.Cir.1986) (remanding certain claims for trial on the merits after determining that defendant United States’s fraudulent con cealment of facts giving rise to cause of action tolled applicable statute of limitations), vacated on other grounds, 482 U.S. 64, 107 S.Ct. 2246, 96 L.Ed.2d 51 (1987); Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 32-42 (D.C.Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084, 105 S.Ct. 1843,
holding that the limitations period is not tolled while a federal habeas petition is pending holding that the plaintiffs mere failure to execute on a judgment the only allegedly fraudulent act is not fraudulent concealment holding that certain claims were properly tried to jury because defendants fraudulent concealment tolled applicable limitations period holding statute of limitations should not be equitably tolled for taxpayer who filed a refund claim after the applicable statute of limitations holding misleading partial disclosures may constitute fraudulent concealment