was inconsistent and incomplete. While some of the discrepancies in petitioner’s testimony appear relatively minor, we afford “ ‘particular deference’ ” in applying the substantial evidence standard when a factual challenge pertains to a credibility finding made by an IJ and adopted by the BIA. Zhou Yun Zhang v. United States, 386 F.3d 66, 73 (2d Cir.2004) (quoting Montero v. INS, 124 F.3d 381, 386 (2d Cir.1997)). At the very least, petitioner’s testimony, coupled with petitioner’s wife’s rebuttal affidavit, did not establish the type of consistent, complete, and plausible explanation necessary for overcoming the IJ’s finding with regard to the fabricated documents — a finding that, as discussed above, is supported by substantial evidence. See In re O-D-, 211. & N. Dec. at 1084 (<HOLDING>). Finally, Petitioner asserts (as he did before
holding that it is the appellants burden to present a record to overcome the presumption of correctness of the trial courts findings holding that it is the duty of the appellant to overcome the presumption of the correctness of the trial courts judgment by demonstrating some reversible error holding that the remaining inconsistent record presented by the respondent is insufficient to overcome the pall cast on the respondents credibility by virtue of his submission of the counterfeit document holding that where there is thrust upon the government either by virtue of the defense raised by the defendant or by virtue of the elements of the crime charged the affirmative duty to prove that the underlying prohibited act was done with a specific criminal intent other acts evidence may be introduced under rule 404b holding evidence insufficient to overcome presumption of correctness