The decree was thus subject to vacation. We remand to give the court an opportunity to address the parties’ other arguments. Reversed and remanded. Baker and Appelwick, JJ., concur. After modification, further reconsideration denied August 30, 2004. 1 Kong did not cite a specific subsection of the rule, but alleged that her challenge to the decree of dissolution would be based on fraud and duress surrounding the decree of separation. 2 In re Marriage of Moody, 137 Wn.2d 979, 988, 976 P.2d 1240 (1999). 3 Mu Chai contends a decree of separation may be converted to a decree of dissolution ex parte, so the service requirements of CR 5 do not apply. Mu Chai is mistaken. Service of such motions is required. CR 5(a); see In re Marriage of Mahalingam, 21 Wn. App. 228, 230, 584 P.2d 971 (1979) (<HOLDING>). 4 CR 6(a), (d). 5 Yi Kong alleges Mu Chai
holding that notice to counsel may be waived recognizing that the essential requisites of procedural due process are notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard holding basic elements of due process are notice and a right to be heard holding that notice and opportunity to be heard in matters which materially affect a litigants rights are essential elements of due process that may not be disregarded and that notice of a motion to convert a decree under rcw 2609150 may not be dispensed with holding that procedural due process requires adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard