583) (1998). 8 (Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 107 (1). 9 See, e.g., Dixie Group, Inc. v. Shaw Indus. Group, 303 Ga.App. 459, 467-468 (4) (693 SE2d 888) (2010) (collecting cases). 10 We note that there also is a failure of evidence that Salter’s knew or should have known that the switch was defective. 11 See Hudgins v. Bacon, 171 Ga.App. 856, 861(3) (321 SE2d 359) (1984) (“The law imposes upon building contractors and others performing skilled services the obligation to exercise a reasonable degree of care, skill, and ability, which is generally taken and considered to be such a degree of care and skill as, under similar conditions and like surrounding circumstances, is ordinarily employed by others of the same profession.”) (punctuation omitted). 12 Cf. Dupree, 199 Ga. App. at 143 (2) (<HOLDING>). 13 See R & R Insulation Svcs., 307 Ga.App. at
holding that the defendant complied with the requirements of  1681ea because it obtained a blanket certification and because the plaintiff did not submit any evidence to prove that the defendant knew or should have had reason to know that the subscriber would access the report for an impermissible purpose holding danger was so open and obvious to plaintiff that as a matter of law he knew or should have known of danger holding that jurys verdict for the defendant in a breach of contract action did not establish the absence of breach because the jury was instructed that it could find for the defendant if it concluded that the defendant had not breached the contract or if the defendant proved an affirmative defense holding that liability for a manufacturer follows only if it knew or should have known of the inherent dangerousness of the product and failed to accompany   it with the quantum of warning which would be calculated to adequately guard against the inherent danger  holding that even if the industry and federal regulations evidenced an inherent danger and the defendant knew or should have realized that the device was or was likely to be dangerous for the use for which it was supplied there was a complete absence of evidence that the defendant had reason to believe that the plaintiff or its employees would not realize the danger