have little or nothing to do with the present case. The statute does not bear on First Amendment rights, it prohibits no conduct and gives rise to no civil or criminal enforcement action. If there is a constitutional bar of vagueness applicable to a statute like this, all that it requires is “legislative language which is not so conflicting and confused that it cannot be given meaning in the adjudication process.” Id. This standard is readily met as the statute merely sets out circumstances under which a guardian can be appointed; the definition of such circumstances is found elsewhere in the statutes. Merely because judges are given discretion to appoint guardians does not mean that the statute is unconstitutionally vague. See Coghill v. Coghill, 836 P.2d 921, 929 (Alaska 1992) (<HOLDING>). IV. CONCLUSION R.R.’s claim that the superior
holding that government officials are provided with qualified immunity so long as their actions could have been reasonably thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated holding that absolute immunity protects  judges  so long as their acts are judicial  in nature internal quotation omitted holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion holding that district courts have inherent power to control their dockets as long as its exercise is not inconsistent with a rule or statute holding exceptions such as good cause not unconstitutionally vague so long as judges and hearing commissioners contin ue to exercise their discretion to achieve equitable results consistent with existing case law