hearing, the superior court carefully evaluated a medical report and all of the victim statements contained in the probation report, and concluded that only two of the five acts committed by Carty against the child victims involved conduct that constituted “substantial sexual conduct.” Finally, even looking to the Supreme Court cases on which Carty relies, he was not denied the necessary safeguards required by the Constitution. Particularly, at his initial civil commitment hearing in June 1999, Carty was represented by counsel, was given an opportunity to challenge the evidence used by the District Attorney, waived his right to a trial by a jury, and was adjudged, beyond a reasonable doubt, as an SVP who required civil commitment. See, e.g., Addington, 441 U.S. at 432-33, 99 S.Ct. 1804 (<HOLDING>); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 508-14, 92
holding that in a proceeding to terminate parental rights the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof violates the due process clause and that due process requires at least a clear and convincing evidence standard holding that for an initial civil commitment the state has the burden of proof holding that the standard of proof in revocation proceedings is a preponderance of the evidence holding that the standard of proof for dischargeability actions is the preponderance of the evidence standard holding that to meet due process demands the standard of proof for civil commitment proceedings must be higher than the preponderanceoftheevidence standard