Guy name and logo in the operation of the business.” (Doc. No. 60-A3.) This sentence does not support a construction that the term “exclusive” places an affirmative duty on the Defendants to protect the Plaintiffs from third-party infringement. Moreover, aside from the term “exclusive,” the agreements are entirely devoid of any indication that the Defendants assumed the affirmative duty to protect the Plaintiffs from third-party infringement. In the alternative, the Plaintiffs argue that the term “exclusive” is ambiguous, and the Court should therefore consider parol evidence to clarify its meaning. However, a term is not ambiguous where the ambiguity arises only after a court considers potential inconsistencies between contract terms and extrinsic evidence. Lambert, 680 So.2d at 590 (<HOLDING>). “The court must give full force to the plain
holding public bodies may not be bound by contracts without evidence of the contract terms in the minutes holding that the court was not bound by the parties agreement that contracts were unambiguous and holding that contracts were ambiguous holding that the district court properly declined to consider extrinsic evidence where the plea agreement was unambiguous holding that the trial court impermissibly created ambiguity by comparing the contracts to extrinsic evidence holding that at will contracts of employment are subject to tortious interference with contracts claims