closing arguments of both the State and the defendant (see Cloutier, 156 Ill. 2d at 507; Kitchen, 159 Ill. 2d at 38). In closing argument, defense counsel reminded the jury that Dornbos was the lead investigator in this case, and that Dornbos had interrogated Rinaldi. Defense counsel then suggested that the jury consider why, if Dornbos had not made promises or threats to Rinaldi upon Rinaldi’s arrest, as Rinaldi had originally testified at the suppression hearing, the prosecution had not called Dornbos to testify to that fact. In response to defense counsel’s argument, the prosecutor pointed out on rebuttal that defendant could have called Dornbos as a witness. In so responding, the prosecutor did not shift the burden of proof to defendant. See People v. Redd, 173 Ill. 2d 1, 31 (1996) (<HOLDING>); People v. Brown, 172 Ill. 2d 1, 42 (1996)
holding that the failure of a witness to appear in response to a subpoena was an indirect contempt since the court did not witness all of the essential elements of the misconduct holding that the burden of proof was not shifted when the prosecutor in closing argument referred to the defendants right to  subpoena each and every witness he may want to and put anybody at all on the witness stand  holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness holding that the defendants due process rights were violated when the trial judge singled out the only defense witness and indicated to that witness that he expected the witness to he and would personally ensure that the witness was prosecuted for perjury and thereby effectively drove that witness off the stand holding that error is preserved regarding a defendants right to confront a witness if the defendant identifies for the trial court the subject matter about which he or she desired to examine the witness and the subject had a tendency to affect the witness credibility