cases cited by the majority are distinguishable from appellant’s case and do not support the conclusion that appellant’s mere failure to object to Officer Reardon’s picking up and searching the bag proved his original consent was intended to cover the bag. For example, in Grinton, the defendants consented to a search of “the contents and containers” of their vehicle without mention of the vehicle’s trunk. 14 Va.App. at 850-51, 419 S.E.2d at 862-63. In Grinton, because the defendants failed to object as the search progressed and because the challenged area of the car could reasonably be construed to fall within the scope of the defendants’ original consent, we held the challenged search valid. Id.; see McNair v. Commonwealth, 31 Va.App. 76, 82-85, 521 S.E.2d 303, 306-08 (1999) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Rison, 946 F.2d
holding that a warrant authorizing the search of a residence vehicles at the residence and all persons found in the residence was not overly broad given that search was limited to places were drugs or weapons might be found holding that defendant was not in custody during search of his residence holding that defendants failure to withdraw consent to search for criminal activity in his home included the top floor because he did not withdraw his consent to search when he observed the officer go upstairs holding that where defendant consented to search of his car and stood by as agent conducted a thorough and systematic search which included removal of vehicles back seat and raising of cars rear quarter panel defendants failure to object to search indicated search was within scope of consent holding that where defendant contacted police to report robbery in progress said robbers might still be in his residence allowed officers to search his twolevel residence and did not object when an additional officer went upstairs to search for clues search of second level for clues was within scope of defendants original consent