30 (9th Cir.1983): [T]he wording of the statute does not disclose a congressional intent to provide a damage remedy. The statute does confer on district courts the power to give all “appropriate relief,” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2), but absent legislative history suggesting the contrary, such a phrase is usually construed as a mere grant of jurisdiction to enforce and supplement the administrative procedures for identification, evaluation, and placement of the child, and not of authority to award retrospective damages. See also Taylor v. Honig, 910 F.2d 627, 628 (9th Cir.1990) (stating that “injunctive or other prospective relief is ordinarily the remedy under the [predecessor to the IDEA] and damages are usually inappropriate”); Charlie F. v. Board of Educ., 98 F.3d 989, 991 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Because Plaintiff seeks only monetary
holding that by its terms the idea does not require exhaustion where the relief sought is unavailable in an administrative proceeding under the idea monetary damages are not available so exhaustion is not required holding that damages are not relief that is available under the idea holding that exhaustion is not required for plaintiffs seeking money damages because damages are unavailable through the administrative process and because all other relief available to the plaintiffs under the idea had already been provided through a settlement agreement holding reimbursement for private tutoring available under the idea holding that exhaustion is required under the plra even if the plaintiff seeks only money damages and money damages are not available as relief