at 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3)); United States v. Boccagna, 450 F.3d 107, 115 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Boccagna”); United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 137 (2d Cir.2006) (“Reifler”); United States v. Nucci, 364 F.3d 419, 423-24 (2d Cir.2004) (“Nucci”). In determining the appropriate measure of value for property relevant to restitution, a district court must consider that the purpose of restitution is essentially compensatory: to restore a victim, to the extent money can do so, to the position he occupied before sustaining injury. See Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 416, 110 S.Ct. 1979, 109 L.Ed.2d 408 (1990) (observing that the “meaning of ‘restitution’ is restoring someone to a position he occupied before a particular event”); United States v. Coriaty, 300 F.3d 244, 253 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Because the MVRA mandates that restitution be
holding that the impact upon the victims is relevant to circumstances of the crime holding that statutory focus of the mvra is upon making victims whole holding that the relevant question in imposing restitution under the mvra is whether the loss is caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction holding that the ex post facto clause prohibited retroactive application of the mvra because before the mvra became effective the victim and witness protection act authorized but did not compel district courts to order restitution holding that court cannot order restitution under the mvra to persons who are not victims of the offenses for which the defendant was convicted