in the most general terms and does not inform us of where in the record we might find any evidence of them. This lack of developed appellate argumentation constitutes an independently sufficient basis for deeming the argument abandoned. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.1990) ("It is not enough merely to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel's work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its bones.”). 5 . Although we assume arguendo the correctness of the Secretary's assessment of what transpired in 1998, we note that the district court made a series of contemporaneous written findings, which may well have satisfied the narrowness-need-intrusiveness requirements. See Morales II, 13 F.Supp.2d at 212 (<HOLDING>). 6 . We reject out of hand the Secretary's
holding that  1983 does not provide a remedy if there is no violation of federal law holding that a class plaintiff who seeks to assert statutory rights to protect a class of which he is a member is not asserting rights antagonistic to any members of that class recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members holding that entry of settlement decree without notice to putative class members violated the due process rights of the class members holding that privatization is necessary to protect the members of the plaintiff class from cruel and unusual punishment through constitutionally unacceptable health care services that the remedy extends no further than is necessary to correct the violation of the federal rights of members of the plaintiff class that such relief is narrowly drawn and that there is no less intrusive means to correct the violation of plaintiffs federal rights