and omissions in his arrest-warrant application and investigative report. This circuit has had few opportunities to address the nexus between an officer’s statements in his or her investigatory materials and the institution of a criminal prosecution sufficient to sustain a claim for malicious prosecution. It is absolutely clear, however, that an officer will not be deemed to have commenced a criminal proceeding against a person when the claim is predicated on the mere fact that the officer turned over to the prosecution the officer’s truthful materials. McKinley, 404 F.3d at 444; Skousen, 305 F.3d at 529; Wysong v. City of Heath, 377 Fed.Appx. 466, 470 (6th Cir.2010) (unpublished opinion); Kinkus v. Village of Yorkville, Ohio, 289 Fed.Appx. 86, 91 (6th Cir.2008) (unpublished opinion) (<HOLDING>). As discussed above in the context of Sykes’s
holding that rule was not violated where officer stated he made a report but was unable to find it because there was no report to tender to counsel holding that the officer played no role in the prosecution because the police report provided to the prosecutor did not contain false information holding that police were justified in arresting person on basis of information provided directly to police by named citizen informer reliance on the information was justified in part because the informant by giving her name presumably knew that the police could arrest her for making a false report holding an analogous violation harmless on the ground that the psi report did not contain any information that the defendant could not have anticipated despite the fact that the defendant received it five minutes before the disposition hearing holding that a police officer cannot be held liable for malicious prosecution when he did not make the decision to prosecute the plaintiff