going to do. And, everybody, oh my God, did you hear that? So the whole room basically lost control at that point. ¶ 27 Although B.B. was not tempted to retaliate with violence against Juvenile, her subjective reaction is not dispositive. An “ordinary citizen” bombarded with such personal epithets shouted from close range by an increasingly angry and agitated speaker, see Citizen Publ’g, 210 Ariz. at 519, ¶ 24, 115 P.3d at 113, could be expected to retaliate in some fashion, especially when that person is unable to “avert her ears” or leave the premises. Cf. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21, 91 S.Ct. 1780 (deeming it significant that bystanders could simply avert their eyes to avoid viewing the profane language on defendant’s jacket). See also In re S.J.N-K, 647 N.W.2d 707, 711, ¶ 12 (S.D.2002) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted); In re Welfare of M.A.H.
holding that test for whether two offenses are not the same is whether each offense requires proof of a fact that the other does not holding that the availability of the icrp is but one factor to be considered in determining undue hardship but it is not determinative holding that foreseeability of causing injury in texas though not determinative is important consideration in establishing minimum contacts holding that whether the target of such provocation does not in fact retaliate is not determinative holding that it is the inefficacy of the remedy not the personal inability to use it that is determinative under  2255