by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In movant’s case, § 2255(1) and (3) provide the possible starting date for the one-year limitations period. The Third Circuit’s mandate affirming movant’s conviction and sentence was issued on January 19, 1996, and he did not petition for certiorari. As a result, movant’s conviction became final on April 24,1996, and he had until April 24, 1997 to file a timely § 2255 motion. See Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 565, 577 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Duffus, 174 F.3d 333, 335 (3d Cir.1999); Wilson v. Beard, 426 F.3d 653, 662-63 (3d Cir.2005)(<HOLDING>). Movant, however, did not file the instant §
holding that dismissal pursuant to federal rule of civil procedure 56 did not violate the seventh amendment holding that in california the oneyear statute applies to a  1983 action holding that the aedpa oneyear statute of limitations applies to amendments to  2255 motions holding that federal rule of civil procedure rule 6a applies to the calculation of the aed pas oneyear limitations period holding that former federal rule of civil procedure 6a and e applies to federal habeas petitions