arm of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in so far as they are sued in their official capacities. See, e.g., Temple Univ. v. White, 941 F.2d 201, 214 (3d Cir.1991) (barring legal remedies against Pennsylvania’s Department of Public Welfare on Eleventh Amendment grounds); Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 254 (3d Cir.2010) (“Individual state employees sued in their official capacity are also entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”). Second, to the extent that Matthews sues the Defendants in their individual capacities under § 1983, his complaint fails to state a claim because he has not alleged any personal involvement by the Defendants in violation of his civil rights. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981) (<HOLDING>). The only conceivable claim is against
holding that individual liability under  1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation recognizing respondeat superior liability holding that liability may not be predicated upon a theory of respondeat superior because a supervisor can be liable only for his own acts or omissions holding that liability in a  1983 action must be predicated on personal involvement not on the basis of respondeat superior holding that county liability under  1983 cannot rest on a theory of respondeat superior