liberties with the actor or another,” Utah courts have read this language narrowly, holding that "indecent liberties” refers only to "acts of equal magnitude of gravity” to those specifically set forth in the statute. Kennedy, 616 P.2d at 597; see also State in the Interest of J.L.S., 610 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Utah 1980) (reading the term "indecent liberties” as not "subsuming a mere offensive touching when the circumstances do not indicate conduct of sufficient gravity to be equated with the specific descriptions [of offensive touching] set forth in the statute.”) 7 . If attempted sexual abuse of a child is a crime of violence, a fortiori, the completed offense of sexual abuse of a child is a crime of violence. Cf. United States v. Coronado-Cervantes, 154 F.3d 1242, 1244-45 (10th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Passi, 62 F.3d 1278, 1282
holding that a court must only look to the statutory definition not the underlying circumstances of the crime to determine whether a given offense is by its nature a crime of violence for purposes of 18 usc  16 holding that sexual abuse of a minor is a violent crime within the meaning of the sentencing guidelines and noting that definitions of crime of violence in 18 usc  16 and ussg  4b12 differ slightly finding reyescastro to be persuasive in its  4b12 analysis holding that a sentencing judge retains discretion to examine the underlying facts of a case in deciding whether an offense is a crime of violence under section 4b12 holding that the definition of a violent felony  is nearly identical to the definitions of a crime of violence used in the guidelines holding that sexual assault of a child qualified as crime of violence under 18 usc  16