of triggering the ninety day limitations period. The RTC argues that the ninety day period should not begin to run until it is formally substituted in the state court action. Plaintiffs argue that the ninety day period should begin to run from the day the RTC is appointed receiver. Although there is no relevant authority in this circuit clarifying this point, other courts have decided the issue.' Most courts that have faced the issue have determined that the ninety day period begins to run from the day the RTC is appointed receiver. See Montalvo Santiago v. Resolution Trust Corp., 779 F.Supp. 632, 633-34 (D.P.R.1991); Towns Real Estate & Appraisal v. Resolution Trust Corp., 753 F.Supp. 914 (N.D.Ala.1991). Cf. Woburn Five Cents Sav. Bank v. Hicks Inc., 930 F.2d 965 (1st Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). According to these courts, to hold otherwise
holding that the oneyear period begins to run when the mandate of the court of appeals issues holding that a banks fdic certificate of insurance was sufficient to establish that the bank was insured by the fdic holding that limitation period begins to run at the time of the breach holding that the limitation period for the fdic to remove begins to run when the fdic is appointed receiver holding that the statute of limitations period begins to run when the allegedly discriminatory pension plan is applied to the plaintiffs and leaving determination of the actual date the statute begins to run on each claim to the district court