brief: that the government did not need additional time to conduct debriefings with Mr. Shuck or to find additional witnesses, that the continuance did not result in the government locating additional witnesses for its case-in-chief, and that the continuance was not proper under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(C). Because these arguments were not raised in Mr. Watson's opening brief, they are waived. See, e.g., United States v. Benoit, 713 F.3d 1, 12 n. 2 (10th Cir.2013); United States v. Bader, 678 F.3d 858, 894 (10th Cir.2012). 9 . Indeed, Williams is part of our long line of cases rejecting the grant of an ends-of-justice continuance where the district court failed to make any specific ends-of-justice findings. See, e.g., United States v. Saltzman, 984 F.2d 1087, 1090-91 (10th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Doran, 882 F.2d at 1515 (holding that the
holding that the endsofjustice continuances were inappropriate because no endsofjustice findings were made holding that the litigation privilege did not preclude a malicious prosecution claim where the accusatorial statements that led to the plaintiffs arrest were made before the charges against him were filed and were not made during and were unrelated to the judicial proceeding holding it an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny equitable relief by relying on its own findings that were inconsistent with the jurys findings holding that a reviewing court will only presume that the trial court made implicit factual findings when such findings were necessary to its ultimate conclusion holding that because the state court made no findings as to the merits of the petitioners claim it is axiomatic that there are no findings to which we can give deference and thus  2254d does not apply