resources pointed to by Chesser is for either Hospital or LMS. Considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the third element of the jury’s joint enterprise finding, we hold that no evidence exists of a community of pecuniary interest in the common purpose of the enterprise between Hospital and LMS. See St. Joseph Hosp., 94 S.W.3d at 531; David L. Smith & Assocs., L.L.P., 327 S.W.3d at 878-79; Omega Contracting, Inc., 191 S.W.3d at 851. We sustain Appellees’ fourth issue. We next address what effect sustaining Appellees’ fourth issue has on the judgment. The purpose of the theory of joint enterprise is to make each party to the enterprise the agent of the other and thereby to hold each responsible for the negligent act of the other. See, e.g., Able, 35 S.W.3d at 616 (<HOLDING>); Shoemaker, 513 S.W.2d at 16 (explaining that
holding that the jones act did not operate to make negligent crew members liable to their employers for damages paid to other seamen under the jones act because crew members cannot sue each other for negligence holding that a clause providing that the insurer has a right to recover damages from a responsible third party referred to a tortfeasor because the use of damages in bodily injury cases means pecuniary compensation resulting from an unlawful or negligent act by a wrongdoer recognizing as viable actions in tort negligent hiring and negligent retention holding that for a plaintiff to recover on claim of negligent hiring the negligent hiring of the employee must have been the proximate cause of the injury at issue recognizing that each party in a joint enterprise is responsible for the negligent act of the other