vehicle. So we deal only with the search of Althaus’ residence and the evidence seized there. [2] The good-faith exception has a fair share of critics in addition to the dissenters in Leon. Appellate courts in a number of states have specifically rejected a comparable exception to the exclusionary rule in construing protections in their respective state constitutions corresponding to tire Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 278, 292-93 (Iowa 2000), overruled on other grounds State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 2001); State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 157-58, 519 A.2d 820 (1987); State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431, 432, 863 P.2d 1052 (1993); State v. Crawley, 61 Wash. App. 29, 35, 808 P.2d 773 (1991). Kansas is not among them. Daniel, 291 Kan. at 498-500 (<HOLDING>). In this case, Althaus neither explicitly
holding that the fourth amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures was applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment so that evidence seized in violation of the constitution could no longer be used in state courts holding the parolees signature on parole agreement is not to be taken as an unrestricted consent to any and all searches whatsoever or as a blanket waiver of all constitutional rights to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures holding sbm is not a violation of the defendants fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures holding  15 of the kansas constitution bill of rights affords rights identical to the fourth amendment and therefore the leon goodfaith exception should be woven into state constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures holding that forfeiture statute is subject to the fourth amendments prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures