consisting of threats or fighting words, could be found by a jury to be purposefully intimidating or alarming to a juror in retaliation for the juror’s lawful participation in the jury process. We conclude the statute does not violate the First Amendment for two reasons: (1) harassing conduct is not protected by the First Amendment; and (2) to the extent there is infringement on protected speech, such infringement is justified by the state interests at stake. Under section 720.4, the criminality of one’s conduct turns on whether the defendant acts (1) without legitimate purpose, (2) with an intent to intimidate, an noy, or alarm the juror, and (3) in retaliation for the juror’s performance of his or her civic duty as a juror on a case. Such conduct, even when it includes 819 (1985) (<HOLDING>); cf. Turney v. State, 936 P.2d 533, 540-41
holding that to violate a specific intent statute the defendant must act with the purpose of violating the law holding that statute which prohibited polygamy did not violate first amendment holding statute that prohibited repeated telephone calls  with intent to harass did not violate the first amendment holding that a law did not violate the first amendment because it did not burden the exchange of ideas and noting most laws restricting a states initiative process would not implicate the first amendment holding statute criminalizing speech intended to influence a juror did not violate the first amendment