Gardner v. Brown, 5 F.3d 1456 (Fed.Cir.1993), aff'd sub nom Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 115 S.Ct. 552, 130 L.Ed.2d 462 (1994), the Court emphasized that the plain meaning of a statute “must be given effect unless a ‘literal application of [it] will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intention of the drafters.’ ” Gardner v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 584, 586-87 (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 102 S.Ct. 3245, 73 L.Ed.2d 973 (1982)). Only where a statute’s plain meaning leads to such an absurd result that Congress clearly never could have intended it is this “plain meaning rule” abandoned for a review of the applicable legislative history and statutory construction. Id. at 587-88. See also Thayer v. Principi, 15 Vet.App. 204, 210 (2001) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). In Mintz v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 277 (1994), the
holding that when interpreting statute court must avoid a conclusion that  is not supported when construing every part or section of the statute and would yield an absurd result recognizing the legal concept that when interpreting a statute it is presumed that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result recognizing that the cardinal rule in statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature and to avoid construing a statute in a manner that produces an absurd unjust or unreasonable result holding that courts must give effect to every word when interpreting a statute recognizing a court must look beyond the plain language of a statute when the literal interpretation would lead to an absurd result