Gomer’s own testimony that she did not expect to receive uninterrupted possession of the dog until Ar-tall’s death. Section 10.004(d), however, provides that the trial court “may not award monetary sanctions against a represented party for a violation of Section 10.001(2).” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 10.004(d) (Vernon 2002). Here, the trial court imposed $5,000 in sanctions against Gomer, a represented party. Under these facts, therefore, section 10.001(2) cannot support this sanctions award against Gomer, although Gomer’s attorney may be sanctioned under this section. See Univ. of Tex. at Arlington v. Bishop, 997 S.W.2d 350, 357 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied); see also Loejfler v. Lytle Indep. Sch. Dish, 211 S.W.3d 331, 349-50 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2006, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the only other subsection of section
holding that in a situation where the police have probable cause to arrest one party and reasonably mistake a second party for that first party the arrest of the second party is still a valid arrest holding party must support argument with legal authority holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees holding that a third party holding legal title to property is a necessary party in an action for equitable distribution holding that because attorney decides which legal claims to file and party provides at most factual basis for claims party should not be punished for their attorneys conduct unless the party is implicated apart from having entrusted its legal representation and trial court abused its discretion in sanctioning party under chapter 10