those same arguments. Like the majority of the appellate panel that first reviewed this appeal, we are not persuaded to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court on this evidential ruling. It was for the trial court to assess defendant’s prior conviction’s probative value in light of its remoteness, and we cannot say that the trial court erred in that judgment. The question is not whether we would have made a different determination in the first instance. Rather, we apply the normal, deferential standard and conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted the use of the prior conviction for impeachment purposes. The conviction was not stale by the standard in use for assessing remoteness. See Harris, supra, 209 N.J. at 436, 444-45, 38 A.3d 559 (<HOLDING>). And, we cannot say that the trial court’s
holding that prior drug convictions that were four ten and eleven years old were not so remote from the charged drug offenses as to render them inadmissible holding two prior convictions more than ten years old admissible where disorderlypersons offenses bridged the gap holding that state may charge separately for the same offense but the convictions for more than one of the offenses cannot stand holding that evidence of two intervening felony convictions removed taint of remoteness from convictions more than 10 years prior permitting analysis under rule 609a holding that prior distribution and possession convictions that were eight and ten years before the charged conduct occurred were not too remote