determinations.” (citing Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 554-55, 110 S.Ct. 1331, 108 L.Ed.2d 504 (1990))). 26 . Lytle v. Bexar Cnty., 560 F.3d 404, 413 (5th Cir.2009). 27 . Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) (providing this standard when an offic'er faces a fleeing suspect); see also Ramirez v. Knoulton, 542 F.3d 124, 129 (5th Cir.2008) (applying the same standard to a non-fleeing suspect). 28 . See Plumhoff v. Rickard, — U.S.-, 134 S.Ct. 2012, 2022; 188 L.Ed.2d 1056 (2014) (suggesting, in dicta, that a Fourth Amendment violation might occur if the defendant officers "had initiated a second round of shots after an initial round had clearly incapacitated” the decedent); see also Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 502 (5th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Cir.2002) (en banc) (“[I]n the absence of
holding that instruction on justifiable use of nondeadly force was of the essence of appellants defense and clearly should have been given holding that an officer may use deadly force when a fleeing suspect threatens the officer with a weapon holding that repeatedly striking a subdued individual would constitute an objectively unreasonable use of force under the fourth amendment holding that an officer cannot use further nondeadly force against a restrained and subdued suspect holding that where use of reasonable nondeadly force causes death defendant entitled to instruction on selfdefense