not persuade this Court to apply Turner to the facts at bar. Ultimately, defendant’s Turner argument fails for the same reason that defendant’s Hudson argument failed. Like Hudson. Turner cited Bell with approval and did not at any point suggest that Bell’s approach to Fourth Amendment claims should no longer be controlling law. Turner, 482 U.S. at 87, 107 S.Ct. 2254 (citing to the portions of Bell which discussed petitioners’ First Amendment claims). This Court will not disregard controlling Supreme Court precedent that has not been specifically overruled by subsequent Supreme Court cases. See Powell, 541 F.3d at 1302 (declining to apply the Turner test to custodial strip searches on this ground); cf. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 509-10, 125 S.Ct. 1141, 160 L.Ed.2d 949 (2005) (<HOLDING>). Like the many courts that have addressed the
recognizing in a  1983 case brought by a deathrow prisoner that the deferential turner standard differs from the strict standards of scrutiny applicable to the con stitutional rights of persons in free society holding that strict scrutiny applies holding that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review for racial classifications even in the prison context recognizing that strict scrutiny applies to facial discrimination against a suspect class holding that turner did not cast doubt on the courts previous holding that strict scrutiny applies to racial classifications in prisons