omitted). In that context, with intention-based constitutional claims in mind, the Supreme Court held that a supervisor’s “mere knowledge of his subordinate’s discriminatory purpose” does not amount to the supervisor’s violating the constitution. Id. at 1949. However, “the factors necessary to establish a Bivens [v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) ] violation will vary with the constitutional provision at issue.” Id. at 1948. Here, the underlying constitutional right of the inmate is to be free from the use of excessive force by his jailers. In such a case, I conclude that the traditional Colon categories of supervisory liability still apply. See Jackson v. Goord, 664 F.Supp.2d 307, 324 & n. 7 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (<HOLDING>). Following Iqbal, other judges in the Second
holding that deliberate indifference standard for imposing supervisory liability based on an eighth amendment violation is consistent with iqbal and collecting cases holding that iqbal eliminated supervisory liability previously permitted by colon in situations where the supervisor knew of and acquiesced to a constitutional violation committed by a subordinate holding colon standard is unaffected by iqbal in deliberate indifference case because iqbal involved discriminatory intent holding that the plaintiffs complaint was insufficient under twombly and iqbal because most of the facts alleged were actually legal conclusions or elements of the cause of action which may be disregarded on a motion to dismiss holding that at a minimum the deliberate indifference standard of estelle v gamble must be met