should be read so that the Section 3161(h) exclusions do not apply to the computation of time under Section 3164. The short answer to this argument is that, if Congress’ intent was that the Section 3161(h) exclusions would not apply under Section 3164, the statute would have been worded exactly that way. The statute reads, however, that the “periods of delay ... are excluded”, which is exactly the language used in Section 3161(h). This conclusion is strengthened by reference to the legislative history of the 1979 amendment when this sentence was added. Congress was faced at that time with conflicting decisions from different circuit courts on the question whether the Section 3161(h) exclusions applied under Section 3164. Compare United States v. Tirasso, 532 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>), with United States v. Corley, 548 F.2d 1043
holding that factual issues essential to determining whether state law bar applied should be submitted to a jury holding that factor 10 should not be applied when the victim is the only one at risk holding that virtually no exclusions should be applied holding that the first amendment definition should be applied by analogy in the franks setting holding generally that new rules of law should not be applied retroactively in habeas corpus cases