conduct — conduct that is “characteristic of [crimes committed by] the armed career criminal,” id. at 145, 128 S.Ct. 1581 (internal quotation marks omitted) — the perpetrator is more l section (l)(b) of Oregon’s second-degree assault statute clearly involves “purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.” The subsection applies when a defendant acts more than just negligently or recklessly, and punishes assaultive conduct when the “defendant was aware of the assaultive nature of his conduct.” See Barnes, 986 P.2d at 1167. To be sure, to act knowingly in Oregon does not require knowledge that physical injury could possibly occur as a result of particular conduct, or conscious disregard of risks associated with that conduct. See State v. Jantzi, 56 Or.App. 57, 641 P.2d 62, 63-64 (1982) (<HOLDING>), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Boone,
holding that officers reliance on accountant negated a finding that he acted consciously voluntarily intentionally knowingly or recklessly in his failure to pay tax holding that mere possession of a dangerous weapon is insufficient to support a charge of robbery with a dangerous weapon holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present holding that where defendant knew he had a dangerous weapon and it was possible that an injury would occur he acted recklessly not knowingly under oregon law holding that it was not necessary for the state to prove that the defendant knew the precise nature of the controlled substance he was convicted of delivering when evidence established that he knew it was a controlled substance