law and Michigan law; however, neither of these states banned class actions outright. In fact, the Tennessee law was silent on the questions of class actions and the Michigan law under consideration allowed class actions, but with certain requirements that were additional to those set forth in Rule 23. In contrast, federal courts considering the laws of the states at issue here have concluded that class actions were precluded in federal courts based on the respective state law bans. See e.g., In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 230 F.R.D. 61, 84 (D.Mass.2005) (excluding consumers from Alaska, Georgia and Montana from class because consumer protection statutes in those state prohibit class actions); O’Quin v. Verizon Wireless, 256 F.Supp.2d 512, 519 (M.D.La.2003) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants’
holding the court was not required to decide the issue of whether the district court properly certified a rule 23b2 class because the court already concluded that the district court appropriately certified the class under rule 23b3 citing authority for the proposition that a court need only find that a class action may be maintained under any of the three subdivisions holding that a class could not be certified because the definition made class members impossible to identify prior to individualized factfinding and litigation and thereby failed to satisfy one of the basic requirements for a class action under rule 23 holding that in the absence of an express provision excluding class actions from arbitration an individual claimant could not get out of his agreement to arbitrate simply by filing his claims in a class action recognizing louisianas ban on class actions and expressing view that plaintiffs could not get a class certified under that particular law in either state or federal court holding that a district of columbia consumer protection statute that authorized representative actions and did not reference class action requirements or mandate class certification was a separate and distinct procedural vehicle from a class action and thus did not constitute a class action under cafa