no clear textual invitation for courts to explore the “employer’s awareness,” Dissent at 971, whatever that indeterminate phrase might mean. In short, we fail to see how the dissent’s special new rule of imputation for punitive damages finds any grounding in the statute’s “plain language.” We note in conclusion that our decision today aligns us with all but one of the several circuit courts to address this question. See McKinnon v. Kwong Wah Restaurant, 83 F.3d 498, 508 (1st Cir.1996) (endorsing concept of a higher standard for punitive damages under § 1981a, and noting that such damages “are awarded as a matter of public policy to punish outrageous conduct by the defendant or to deter similar conduct in the future”); Harris v. L & L Wings, Inc., 132 F.3d 978, 982 (4th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted); Turic v. Holland
holding improper conduct to be an element of the tort of intentional interference with an advantageous business relationship holding that an injunction is an extraordinary remedy holding that an accounting is an extraordinary remedy holding that under  1981a pjunitive damages are an extraordinary remedy to be reserved for egregious eases and are not an element of recovery in every case involving an intentional tort recognizing recovery under common law for tort damages that are proven to be reasonably foreseeable damages of ones tortious acts