its discretion by providing a copy of the victim's videotaped interview to the jury, I generally concur with the majority's opinion. I write separately because I do not fully agree with the majority's broad approach, its criticisms, and suggestions. Trial courts have 1). While Montoya addressed Crim. P. 57(b)'s command to look to the rules of civil procedure when no rule of criminal procedure controls, and more specifically C.R.C.P. 47(m) (dealing with evidence juries may take into deliberations), it recognized that C.R.C.P. 47(m) did not address videotaped statements. 778 P.2d at 626. CRCP. 47(m) was later changed, but those later changes did not address videotaped statements. See People v. McKinney, 80 P.3d 823, 829 (Colo.App.2008), rev'd on other grounds, 99 P.3d 1038 (Colo.2004), (<HOLDING>). Though trial courts must look to the rules of
holding that statements made in the course of negotiation were not contracts and such statements were merged into the final written agreement holding that permitting written statements into the jury room was not an abuse of discretion under the new crcp 47m holding that the sixth amendment confrontation clause was not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under a georgia statute permitting an exception for statements by coconspirators where there was sufficient indicia of reliability supporting the truth of the statements holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion holding that the judges restriction of the class was not an abuse of discretion