1998). The defendant argued that the statute was unconstitutionally vague because it was not clear when an obstruction was significant enough to violate the law. Arciniega, 569 F.3d at 397-98. In holding that the statute was constitutional, the court noted that “the plain language of the statute unambiguously provides that any object that obstructs a clear and full view through the windshield violates Nebraska law.” Id. at 398 (quoting United States v. Ramos-Caraballo, 375 F.3d 797, 801 (8th Cir. 2004)); accord United States v. Yang, No. 8:09CR287, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112285, at *6-8 (D. Neb. Nov. 12, 2009) (Findings and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge), approved and adopted, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112170 (D. Neb. Dec. 3, 2009); cf. State v. Rose, 677 P.2d 1011, 1013-17 (Kan. 1984) (<HOLDING>). The Court finds that Va. Code § 46.2-1054
holding that a statute prohibiting the operation of a motor vehicle in such a manner as to likely endanger persons or property is open to conjecture and unconstitutionally vague holding that plaintiff who slipped and fell on ice while securing cars on his employers motor vehicle carrier preparing to travel was very close to the vehicle and engaged in a task related to the vehicle and therefore was an occupier of a motor vehicle holding that the sensible and popular understanding of what a motor vehicle accident entails necessarily involves the motor vehicle being operated as a motor vehicle  holding that the statutory definition of motor vehicle is not controlling holding that a kansas statute providing among other things that no motor vehicle could be operated on the highways equipped with oneway glass or adhesive film which prohibits or substantially impairs the ability to see into such motor vehicle from the outside was not unconstitutionally vague