that, if Sprague had appeared before him earlier, he would have already been in prison. Based on the totality of the circumstances, we are satisfied that petitioner appeared to prejudge Sprague on the basis of his criminal record. He also erred when he declared that if Sprague exercised his right to counsel the offer would be withdrawn. The commission has characterized petitioner’s actions as “conditioning] the plea agreement on [Sprague’s] waiver of his right to counsel[.]” Although this is an exaggerat 5, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975)). Although we commend the commission for its work in this case, we respectfully disagree with its finding that petitioner enga ngle case that arose during the course of a long and distinguished judicial career. Judge Pirraglia 218, 221 (1979) (<HOLDING>). We agree with the Maine Supreme Judicial
holding that the claimant committed willful misconduct when she did not return to work at the end of her leave and did not comply with her employers notification policy holding that claimant committed willful misconduct when she did not return to work at the end of her leave and did not comply with her employers notification policy holding that the district court did not err in failing to address the defendant personally to determine whether she understood the rights she was waiving by admitting that she violated the conditions of her probation holding that a judge committed misconduct when for six years she followed a course of judicial conduct that violated the legal and constitutional rights of the parties appearing before her holding that the employee was acting within the course of her employment when she died while returning from the workrelated session because her death occurred on a public highway which was brought within the scope of her employment by her employers requirement that she attend training at the state police academy