by Illinois state law. We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment d.e novo and affirm if the record shows there is no genuine issue of material fact. Mobley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 531 F.3d 539, 544-45 (7th Cir.2008). Although his argument is confusing, Hopkins appears to contend that the district court misinterpreted Illinois state law discussing the covenant. The district court correctly concluded, though, that no duty of good faith or fair dealing arises unless the parties have contracted with each other. See Cramer v. Ins. Exch. Agency, 174 Ill.2d 513, 221 Ill.Dec. 473, 675 N.E.2d 897, 903 (1996) (observing that covenant exists between insurer and policy-holder); Martin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 348 Ill.App.3d 846, 283 Ill.Dec. 497, 808 N.E.2d 47, 51 (2004) (<HOLDING>). Hopkins’s complaint stems from the fact that
holding that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is limited to performance under a contract holding that where the conduct forming the basis of the plaintiffs breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing claim is the same conduct forming the basis for the breach of contract claim the claims merge and there is no separate cause of action for breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing holding that a duty of good faith and fair dealing is implied in insurance contracts in pennsylvania and allows for the award of compensatory damages pursuant to a breach of contract claim in a first party insurance case explaining that the difference between first and third party claims does not matter to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing holding that the duty of good faith and fair dealing is a contractual duty holding that duty of good faith and fair dealing did not extend to thirdparty claimant