generally Stewart v. Coalter, 48 F.3d 610, 613-14 (1st Cir.1995). 33 . This standard is similar, but not identical, to the formulation used by federal courts in criminal cases to determine whether the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard of proof. See generally Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 229, 232-33 (D.C.Cir.1947); United States v. Taylor, 464 F.2d 240, 243 (2nd Cir.1972); see also 2A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 467 (3rd ed.2000). 34 . See Southwest Key Program, Inc. v. Gil-Perez, 81 S.W.3d 269, 270 (Tex.2002) (rendering judgment against the plaintiff in a negligence case when there was legally insufficient evidence of proximate cause); Vista Chevrolet, Inc. v. Lewis, 709 S.W.2d 176, 176-77 (Tex. 1986) (<HOLDING>); see also In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625, 642
holding venue proper where proper when the action was commenced holding that the obviousness of an error is hard to determine where there is no settled appellate law on point holding that rendition is proper when a no evidence point is sustained holding that rendition is remedy for no evidence holding that the reviewing court must thus be satisfied that there is no reasonable possibility that evidence complained of whether erroneously admitted or excluded may have contributed to rendition of guilty verdict