by senior bank officials, and prevent fraudulent insertion of new terms, with the collusion of bank employees, when a bank appears headed for failure. Id. However, it is “clear that the D’Oench doctrine applies even where the customer is completely innocent of any bad faith, recklessness, or negligence.” Baumann v. Savers Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 934 F.2d 1506, 1515 (11th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 908, 112 S.Ct. 1936 ) generally applied only to preclude defenses raised by borrowers to avoid repaying their loans. Thigpen v. Sparks, 983 F.2d 644, 647-48 (5th Cir.1993). Courts applied the federal common law D’Oench doctrine to bar the assertion of affirmative claims against the FDIC, including claims sounding in tort. See RTC v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 595 (11th Cir.) (en bane) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied sub nom. Jones v. RTC, — U.S. -,
holding section 101106f cannot be used by employees to obtain dismissal of common law intentional tort claims because those claims could not have been brought under the texas tort claims act holding that the application of feca to tort claims bars all other recovery holding that doench bars defenses and affirmative claims whether cloaked in terms of contract or tort as long as those claims arise out of an alleged secret agreement quoting timberland 932 f2d at 50 holding that whether in tort or contract all malpractice claims are covered by the same statute of limitations holding that the public harm requirement applies to fraudulent inducement claims because the fraud claims arise from related contract claims