judges may “refer to mediation any civil or criminal case.” The “judge,” who the summonsing documents claim to have ordered the mediation, is never identified in the record, leading to a reasonable conclusion that there was none. Notably, Appellant’s writ petition did not seek relief against any judge, named or unnamed. However, our agreement with Appellant’s contention that this is not an action arising from the district court does not end the inquiry in his favor. His chosen form of relief was to petition the Court of Appeals for a writ of prohibition against Roberts and Collier. A writ of prohibition may be issued only against judicial officers, and neither Roberts nor Collier is a judicial officer. See Commonwealth ex rel. Breckinridge v. Wise, 351 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Ky.1961) (<HOLDING>) Denial of Appellant’s claim was proper because
holding that for public policy reasons the mere filing of a bar complaint by a defendant against his attorney does not mandate removal of the attorney holding attorney general could not contract on behalf of the state to employ an assistant attorney beyond the attorney generals own term holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider an award of sanctions entered against attorney because the notice of appeal did not provide that attorney was appealing in his own name holding attorney lacked standing to challenge amount of attorney fees awarded plaintiffs not parties to the appeal holding that a writ of prohibition could not be issued against a commonwealths attorney because a commonwealths attorney is not a judicial officer