Mr. Cooper. All of the information that was disclosed by the government at sentencing was known by the government when it made the plea agreement. Given this knowledge, it is difficult to understand how the government could, in good faith, proceed to enter into an agreement with Mr. Cooper that could not, consistent with its ethical duty of disclosure, be fulfilled. Second, Jimenez recognized that the agreed sentence must still be recommended by the government. Although the Jimenez court noted that “the government attorney undeniably demonstrated a clear lack of enthusiasm for the recom mended sentence, an unenthusiastic recommendation is still a recommendation,” id. at 364; see also United States v. Benchimol, 471 U.S. 453, 455, 105 S.Ct. 2103, 2104, 85 L.Ed.2d 462 (1985) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>), it is clear under the facts of that case that
holding that the government is no longer bound by its obligations under a plea agreement when a defendant commits a material breach holding that a merger clause normally prevents a criminal defendant who has entered into a plea agreement from asserting that the government made oral promises to him not contained in the plea agreement itself holding that defendant has the right to refuse a plea of insanity holding that a defendant generally has no right to an enthusiastic recommendation unless the plea agreement commits the government to make the recommendation enthusiastically holding that a joint recommendation is akin to a criminal defendant entering into a plea agreement with the prosecution whereby the defendant agrees to plead guilty to the offense in return for the prosecutions promise of a specific recommended sentence to the judge for consideration