354 So.2d 353, 358 (Fla.1977) (“The 1977 Legislature’s inclusion of an effective date of July 1, 1977, in Ch. 77-281 effectively rebuts any argument that retroactive application of the law was intended.”); Foreman; Middlebrooks v. Department of State, Div. of Licensing, 565 So.2d 727 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). If the Legislature intended to make the statute retroactive it could easily have said so, as it did when it enacted the 2003 version of section 489.128. It is not our function to divine legislative intent of retroactivity with guess or assumption. If there is not clear evidence that the Legislature intended to apply the statute retroactively, and there is not with regard to the 2000 version of section 489.128, we must answer the first inquiry in favor on non-retroactivity. See Mivan (<HOLDING>). Hence, our inquiry as to the retroactive
holding that the 2000 version of section 489128 may not be retroactively applied holding generally that new rules of law should not be applied retroactively in habeas corpus cases holding that kotecki limit applied retroactively holding that consumer lien avoidance powers of section 522f cannot be applied retroactively holding the batson rule was not to be applied retroactively to a state conviction on federal habeas review