exceptions from the confrontation requirement to be developed by the courts.” 541 U.S. at 54, 124 S.Ct. 1354. While several hearsay exceptions had become established before 1791, when the Sixth Amendment was adopted, the Court found “scant evidence” that such exceptions ever “were invoked to admit testimonial statements against the accused in a criminal case.” Id. at 56, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (emphasis in original). Rather, as the Court observed, Most of the hearsay exceptions covered statements that by their nature were not testimonial — for example, business records or statements in furtherance of a conspiracy. We do not infer from these that the Framers thought exceptions would apply even to prior testimony. Id. See also Davis v. Washington, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006) (<HOLDING>). In short, as the Court succinctly stated in
holding that testimonial statements are subject to the requirements of the confrontation clause even if they are otherwise admissible under the hearsay exception for excited utterances recognizing that statements admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule may be inadmissible when tested against the confrontation clause  because confrontation clause analysis differs from hearsay rule analysis holding that the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial hearsay holding the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial statements holding that when declarant is unavailable outofcourt statements that are testimonial are inadmissible even if they meet an exception to the hearsay rules