Gas, 910 N.E.2d at 293. Thus, fact-based allocation should apply when “a more accurate estimation” of the quantum of property damage that took place during the triggered policy years is “feasible.” Id. at 314, 316. As we have noted, mooring the start of the property damage to the commencement of the policy period on December 19, 1983 indeed bears a fictional quality. The revised report, however, adopted that start date as previously determined by the district court in its 2010 order, which was generally based on the evidence and on the jury’s findings. Although the Polaroid burden-shifting rule also influenced the start date finding, that date is no less a factual finding under the circumstances of this case. No more is required under Boston Gas. Cf. Boston Gas, 708 F.3d at 259, 260 (<HOLDING>). Neither did the district court err in
holding that the trial courts decision to apply timeontherisk was reasonable because the record would not allow a factfinder to specify damages in time and degree with any level of certainty emphasis added holding that the decision to allow attorney fees rests with the trial judge and that decision may only be reversed for an abuse of discretion holding that the statute incorporated all the rights and obligations of the contract emphasis added holding that an application is  pending from the time it is first filed  emphasis added holding that the prosecution must present sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that defendant committed a crime emphasis added