omitted). The next step of the qualified immunity inquiry is actually two steps. It asks whether the defendant violated a constitutional right and whether the “right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Townsend v. Jefferson Cnty., 601 F.3d 1152, 1157 (11th Cir.2010) (internal citations omitted). Lever and Holt are not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage because a material factual dispute remains about whether Plaintiffs constitutional right to procedural due process was violated. Moreover—based on Hargray—if Plaintiffs allegations prove true, it should have been clear to Lever and Holt that their conduct was unlawful; thus, Plaintiffs constitutional right was clearly established. See Loftus v. Clark-Moore, 690 F.3d 1200, 1204 (11th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). As discussed above, Lever and Holt at least
holding that the question of whether a municipal official is a policymaking official is a matter of state law to be decided by the court holding that government officials receive qualified immunity unless their conduct violated a constitutional right and the law to this effect was clearly established under thenexisting law such that a reasonable official would have known that his behavior was unlawful holding that the relevant inquiry is not whether the court has discretion to facilitate notice but whether this is an appropriate case in which to exercise discretion holding that the relevant dispositive inquiry  is whether it would be clear to a reasonable state official that his conduct was unlawful holding that the only relevant inquiry to determine whether a suspect was in custody is how a reasonable man in the suspects position would have understood his situation