following separation. The trial court found that the proceeds from her loan were used to pay off a marital loan, and therefore Defendant was entitled to treat the reduction of principal in her loan as divisible. Plaintiff, however, contends that a small portion of the proceeds from this loan did not go to pay off marital debt but rather was received by Defendant at closing. Defendant concedes in her brief that she did, in fact, receive $2,163.00 as a cash out from her loan which is supported by the evidence. Otherwise, neither party challenges the trial court’s decision to divide this divisible property unequally based on the amount that each party contributed towards the establishment of the divisible property. Stovall v. Stovall, 205 N.C. App. 405, 413, 698 S.E.2d 680, 686 (2010) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we reverse and remand the Final
holding that separate property may become marital property if spouse donates it to marital unit with intent at time of donation that property become marital holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny an award of attorneys fees to the wife holding that it was error but not error necessitating remand for a trial court to mischaracterize postseparation payments made prior to 11 october 2002 towards marital debt as divisible property and to distribute all such payments to the party who made them holding that severance pay received postseparation was not marital property as the condition to receive the pay was related to the sale of the corporation not to husbands work during his marriage holding that it was not an abuse of discretion to award a spouse all of the divisible property attributable to his postseparation payments which reduced marital debt