in order to insure the jurors’ lack of knowledge regarding Green’s prior capital murder trial. The court then stated: This comment coming from a medical examiner testifying about the cause of death was a lead into what he was actually talking about, to his actual point. The [c]ourt would have to assume that the jurors know much more than voir dire indicated for this unsolicited phrase to have any effect, therefore, the motion for a mistrial is denied. We agree with the circuit court’s conclusions. Contrary to Green’s assertion, Dr. Abrenio’s reference to his prior testimony did not signal the jury that Green had been previously convicted for the capital murder of Mrs. Vaughan. Thus, Green’s reliance on our decision in Barker v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 370, 375, 337 S.E.2d 729, 733 (1985) (<HOLDING>), is misplaced. Although Dr. Abrenio did not
holding that where a juror did not disclose that she knew someone who had been sexually abused the conviction and sentence must be reversed holding that evidence of the same name the fact that the previous conviction occurred in precinct of defendants residence and that although the defendant testified he did not deny that he was the person described in the record of the previous conviction was sufficient to establish identity holding that a venire person who knew of the defendants prior conviction of the same offense for which he was being retried could not sit as a juror holding that where the court records in the present case and the records in a previous conviction reflected the same name and date of birth as well as a signature and the defendant did not object that he was not the same person as had been previously convicted the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction holding that where defense turned on defendants credibility there could be no strategic basis for allowing jury to hear defendant had prior conviction for same offense for which he was being tried and concluding counsel rendered ineffective assistance