that the contract “creates an employment relationship for a term and shall not be construed as creating an ‘at will’ employment relationship.” Accordingly, the contract establishes that Feeley’s employment agreement was not at-will, and it is within this context we must construe the meaning of the provision at issue. The ground for termination at issue is “materially violating] any- specific written instructions or policies of Employer.” Choice argues that the only reasonable construction of this provision is to interpret it to mean that Choice had “the right to terminate the Agreement for cause if Feeley violate[d] ‘any’ of Choice o the employment agreement as a whole and would ignore the contract requirement that a violation must be material. See J.M. Davidson, 128 S.W.3d at 229 (<HOLDING>). Resolution of whether the three emails by
holding that court must examine and consider the entire writing in an effort to harmonize and give effect to all the provisions of the contract so that none will be rendered meaningless holding courts may not consider any single provision taken in isolation as controlling but must consider all provisions in context of entire instrument holding that when interpreting a statute or regulation courts must read the provisions of the law as a whole and in context holding that in construing an instrument any apparently conflicting expressions should be reconciled if possible so as to give full effect to all provisions contained in the instrument holding appellate courts must consider the trial courts jury charge as a whole