418 (1995). Hornsby’s punishment was hardly atypical. As a result of his disciplinary convictions, he received a total of 20 days of segregation, a reduction in credit level for 60 days, and two separate fines. These do not rise to the level of disciplinary measures that “inevitably affect the duration of [Hornsby’s] sentence.” Id. at 487, 115 S.Ct. 2293. Further, inmates have no constitutionally protected interest in the opportunity to earn discretionary good time credits and thus have no interest in any particular credit classification level. Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1262 (10th Cir.2006). Finally, a sentence of 20 days in disciplinary segregation does not rise to the level of punishment that would invoke constitutional concern. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 488-84, 115 S.Ct. 2298 (<HOLDING>). Because no liberty interest is implicated in
holding that plaintiff state employees contract right to be discharged only for cause was not protected by due process clause because it did not rise to level of fundamental right holding thirty days in disciplinary segregation does not rise to the level of punishment invoking the due process clause holding that the inmate had no cognizable due process claim because he had no liberty interest in being free from disciplinary segregation recognizing due process right to notice and informal hearing in school disciplinary process holding that lack of notice of charges in disciplinary proceedings violates the due process clause