the crime and they were the only suspects shown to the witnesses. Moreover, as in Brownlee, there was a risk here that the witnesses influenced each other. In particular, when the officers pulled up to the robbery scene with the appellants in police vehicles, the eyewitnesses waiting outside of the house approached the patrol car tions while the witnesses’ memories were still fresh. See United States v. Funches, 84 F.3d 249, 254 (7th Cir.1996) (“We have also recognized that immediate show-ups can serve other important interests. For example, show-ups allow identification before the suspect has altered his appearance and while the witness’ memory is fresh, and permit the quick release of innocent persons.” (quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Watson, 76 F.3d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 1996) (<HOLDING>). Despite the urgency at hand, however, the
holding due process requires suppression of testimony regarding pretrial identification when procedure employed is impermissibly suggestive holding that a showup identification was not impermissibly suggestive where it took place immediately after the unlawful conduct and was necessary to avoid arresting the wrong person holding that showup identification procedure was not unduly suggestive where defendant was handcuffed and placed under police spotlight holding that a showup identification was valid even though the suspect was handcuffed holding that to protect defendants sixth amendment rights a court must determine whether witness identification testimony was tainted by impermissibly suggestive procedures