critical time. The last of these is the principal vehicle by which the majority finds qualified immunity here. Judge Ervin’s dissent persuasively demonstrates the error in that analysis. The majority holds today that “[ojrdinarily, ... courts in this circuit need not look beyond the decisions of the Supreme Court, this court of appeals, and the highest court of the state in which the ease arose to determine whether a right was clearly established at a particular time.” Maj. op. at 709. I disagree that such an approach should inevitably be applied, and would consider pertinent authority from other jurisdictions in determining whether a constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. See, e.g., United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 650 (D.C.Cir.1971) (<HOLDING>); Emmett v. Ricketts, 397 F.Supp. 1025, 1040-42
holding that the failure of two government agencies to process a disclosure request within the time provisions of the foia was not in effect a denial of the request because those agencies were faced with an unpredictable backlog of requests that were being processed in chronological order holding that the government must provide the party seeking disclosure with a detailed index describing the documents the government claims are exempt from disclosure under foia holding that state and local government agencies were not persons under the fca holding that the duty of disclosure affects not only the prosecutor but the government as a whole including its investigative agencies holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure  contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant