entry) (that statute also covered lawful entry, another reason it was broader than Taylor "burglary,” see Ortega-Gonzaga, 490 F.3d at 396 & n. 5). Of course, if the intent could be formed anytime, then every crime committed after an unlawful entry or remaining in would be burglary. Re-latedly, one who lawfully enters a building does not "unlawfully remain” just because he later commits a crime, parlaying the crime into burglary because now intent and unlawful remaining coincide — a shoplifter, for instance, who enters lawfully but intending to steal does not "unlawfully remain” when he commits the theft. 2 . The plain text of § 39-14-402(a)(3) does not require such intent, as a Tennessee court has recognized. See State v. Wesemann, 1995 WL 605442, at *2 (Tenn.Crim.App. Oct. 16, 1995) (<HOLDING>). 3 . One could argue that the teenagers
holding that  3914402a3 requires only that a crime be committed or attempted once the perpetrator enters the building  criminal intent does not have to occur either prior to or simultaneous with the entry  holding that attempted sexual abuse is a specific intent crime holding that the exclusion of prospective jurors from either the area where the crime was committed or where the defendant resided does not violate the sixth amendment holding that  201b makes attempted bribery a crime and so long as a bribe is offered or promised with the requisite intent to influence any official act the crime is committed holding the crime of conspiracy is committed or not before the substantive crime begins