means that a trial judge cannot constitutionally override a jury recommendation of life.” Lusk v. Dugger, 890 F.2d 332, 341 n. 8 (11th Cir.1989). It is well established that, contrary to Bolender’s position, “the mere presence of mitigating evidence does not automatically provide a reasonable basis for the jury’s recommendation.” Francis, 908 F.2d at 704. As noted above, the proper inquiry when a defendant challenges the propriety of a death sentence is whether, absent counsel’s allegedly inadequate performance, a reasonable probability exists that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. We agree with the district court’s conclusion that the prejudice component of the Strickland standard was not met in this case. See Bolender, 757 F.Supp. at 1408 (<HOLDING>). The Florida Supreme Court upheld the trial
holding that in granting summary judgment the trial courts disregard of the plaintiffs proffered expert testimony was not erroneous because that testimony would go not to the question of whether defendants decision took safety into account but rather would go to the question of the quality of the decision holding that the prejudice prong in strickland was not satisfied because counsels failure to raise an evidentiary issue would not have altered the result of the proceedings because the erroneous admission of the evidence would have constituted harmless error holding that the states failure to designate its expert witnesses was not harmless in trial for sexual battery and lewd and lascivious molestation where it was reasonably possible that defendant would have altered his trial preparation or strategy and that defendant would have deposed experts and possibly procured his own expert holding that the proffered changes in strategy would not have altered trial courts judgment holding that there is no brady violation unless a reasonable probability exists that the disclosed evidence would have altered the result of trial