of having used the drug charged. Gipson, 24 M.J. at 253; McMorris, 643 F.2d at 461-2. Is it admissible on an accused’s behalf — we think so in spite of the absolute prohibition in Military Rule of Evidence 707. See United States v. Williams, 39 M.J. 555 (A.C.M.R. 1994). We agree the President may promulgate rules of evidence for trials by court-martial. However, the President may not promulgate a rule which infringes on an accused’s constitutional right to present relevant, material, and favorable evidence. See, e.g., Ellis v. Jacob, 26 M.J. 90 (C.M.A.1988) (striking down President’s rule in R.C.M. 916(k)(2) precluding accused from presenting evidence of partial mental responsibility to negate state of mind element of an offense); United States v. Hollimon, 16 M.J. 164 (C.M.A.1983) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, we recognize a constitutional
holding that the offense of sexual battery requires the state prove the victims lack of consent regardless of the victims age and charge the jury on the same holding evidence of past uncharged sexual encounters admissible in child sexual abuse case to show relationship between defendant and alleged victim holding that sexual harassment need not take the form of sexual advances or other explicitly sexual conduct in order to be actionable under title vii holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse recognizing constitutional limit on presidents bar in milrevid 412a on admission of reputation or opinion evidence of noneonsensual sexual offense victims past sexual behavior