to extreme cruelty. Because we grant the petition on other grounds, we do not reach the issue of extreme cruelty. The BIA did not reach the other four statutory requirements for relief. We remand for consideration of those requirements and any other issues not addressed by this opinion. Petition GRANTED; case REMANDED. 1 . As originally enacted, special-rule cancellation of removal under VAWA was codified at a different section of the United States Code. We agree with the parties that, because there is no relevant difference in this case between the current statute and its predecessor, the discussion in Hernandez applies with equal force. 2 . There is some uncertainty about the correct standard of review, because we gave arguably conflicting indicators in Hernandez. See 345 F.3d at 834 (<HOLDING>); id. at 840-41 (announcing our "hoicking]”
holding that battery is clearly a factual determination readily resolved by the application of a legal standard defining battery to the facts in question holding that battery is an inherently included offense of aggravated battery holding that the defendant could be convicted of sexual battery a lesser crime not included in the offense for which he was indicted where the defendant requested that sexual battery be submitted to the jury holding that under maryland common law an assault is an attempted battery an actual battery or a combination of the two holding that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction for aggravated battery when the bodily member that is lost or rendered useless in the battery is a tooth