public domain. It is the character of the relator’s discovery and investigation that controls this inquiry. Id. (emphasis added). We conclude that the extent of reliance on information already in the public domain should be a consideration during the original source inquiry, even if that information is not a public disclosure within the meaning of § 3730(e)(4)(A). While it is true that reliance solely on “public disclosures” under § 3730(e)(4)(A) is always insufficient under § 3730(e)(4)(B) to confer original source status, reliance on public information that does not qualify as a public disclosure under § 3730(e)(4)(A) may also preclude original source status depending on the extent of that reliance and the nature of the information in the public domain. See BaHh, 44 F.3d at 703-04 (<HOLDING>). Thus, in deciding whether a relator’s
holding that a relator did not have direct knowledge of an alleged fraud when the knowledge was obtained in part by review of publiclyfiled payroll records recognizing common knowledge exception holding that rule 9b was not satisfied where the relator was a doctor who did not allege firsthand knowledge of the hospitals submission of false claims holding that the knowledge requisite to knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as distinguished from knowledge of the law holding there was no rule 404b violation where the evidence was admitted to show knowledge and knowledge was an element of the crime charged