158 N.C. App. 441, 445, 581 S.E.2d 793, 796 (2003) (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also S.D.W. & H.E.W., 187 N.C. App. at 422-23, 653 S.E.2d at 432 (stating that “where the juvenile code does not identify a specific procedure to be used in termination cases, the Rules of Civil Procedure will fill the procedural gaps that Article 11 [of Chapter 7B] leaves open.”). Chapter 7B is devoid of any provision dealing with the amendment of pleadings in termination of parental rights proceedings. Clearly, there must be a mechanism for the amendment of pleadings. Otherwise, petitioner would be required to dismiss and refile to correct pleading defects, a procedure that would only serve to needlessly delay these time-sensitive cases. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1100(2) (2007) (<HOLDING>). I would hold, in the absence of provisions in
recognizing the necessity of permanency for juveniles at the earliest possible age holding that a statement of fact relating to the plaintiffs age was not direct evidence of age discrimination because the relevance of the comment is provided by inference holding that the statement at your age i dont believe you could pass the test is not direct evidence of age discrimination holding that juveniles are constitutionally ineligible for death penalty holding that if the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of age discrimination the employer must show that the discharge was based on reasonable factors other than age  and if the employer meets that burden the plaintiff must show that age was a determining factor in the discharge