to duplicate section 844(h)(1) with section 844(i). Instead, section 844(h)(1) applies to anyone who uses fire to commit any felony and is not limited just to arson cases. See Freytag v. C.I.R., — U.S. —, -, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2638, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991) (noting that courts should have “ ‘a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment’ ”); see also United States v. Roy, 830 F.2d 628, 634 (7th Cir.1987) (stating that in construing a legislative enactment, “we presume that the legislature intended that each section was a necessary component of the statutory scheme and not surplusage”), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068, 108 S.Ct. 1033, 98 L.Ed.2d 997 (1988). Compare United States v. Fiore, 821 F.2d 127, 130-32 (2d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>) with United States v. Chaney, 559 F.2d 1094,
holding that fedrcrimp 12b2 requires that challenges based on multiplicitous counts in an indictment and related doublejeopardy problems be raised before trial or they are waived holding that sections 844h1 and 844i are not multiplicitous recognizing rule of statutory construction that statutes must be read as a whole and sections which are part of the same general statutory scheme must be construed together and each given effect if it can be done by any reasonable construction holding that when regulations are intended to have different purposes and are not dependent on each other they are not intertwined holding that arguments that are not raised or that are not accompanied by factual and legal support are deemed waived