acquired through the knowing use of perjured testimony by the prosecution violates due process. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959). This is true regardless of whether the prosecution solicited testimony it knew to be false or simply allowed such testimony to pass uncorrected. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972); Napue, 360 U.S. at 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173. And, knowingly false or misleading testimony by a law enforcement officer is imputed to the prosecution. See Wedra v. Thomas, 671 F.2d 713, 717 n. 1 (2d Cir.1982); Curran v. Delaware, 259 F.2d 707, 712-13 (3d Cir.1958) (citing Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 63 S.Ct. 177, 87 L.Ed. 214 (1942)); cf. Boone v. Paderick, 541 F.2d 447, 450-51 (4th Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>). But see Koch v. Puckett, 907 F.2d 524, 530-31
recognizing that withholding of exculpatory evidence by police is imputed to the prosecution holding that prosecutors were absolutely immune for withholding exculpatory evidence in violation of a court order because the order was issued in response to a defense motion for any exculpatory evi dence and thus required the prosecutors to make judgments recognizing a crime lab as part of the prosecution team and that any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the governments behalf is imputed to the prosecution holding that the prosecution must disclose to the defense all exculpatory evidence known to the state or in its possession holding absolute immunity protects prosecutor from liability for withholding exculpatory evidence from grand jury