doubt” submitted to the jury that convicted him may have been unconstitutional. Moreover, as discussed infra, because trial counsel manifestly intended, at the end of the trial, to defend Mercer based solely on an insanity defense, counsel was reasonably unconcerned about the reasonable doubt instruction as it had no relevance to such defense upon which Mercer as the defendant earned the burden. Indeed, as discussed, Discussion, infra, at 240-43, because trial counsel tactically chose to rely on a concession that Mercer had committed the crimes charged in order to sustain the insanity defense for Mercer, such indifference to the reasonable doubt charge as given by Judge Han-nigan was completely understandable. Because as of the date of Mercer’s trial, t 46, 150 (N.D.N.Y.1996) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, insofar as Cage is, for
holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record holding that failure to object to admissible evidence was not ineffective assistance of counsel holding no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim for failure to raise as basis for appeal of conviction ineffective assistance of trial counsel where basis for the latter claim was inadequate