a constitutional deprivation. At best, her complaint asserts that she was removed from an uncompensated work assignment. Grievances of this nature are simply not actionable under the Constitution. See, e.g., Schoppa Family, 2002 WL 31730375, at *4-*5 (finding a publieally employed physician did not have a property interest in uncompensated title or laboratory privileges); Kinsey v. Salado Indep. Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 988, 997 (5th Cir.1992) (en banc) (public employee did not have “a constitutionally protected property interest in the non-economic benefit of serving as superintendent”); Daly, 675 F.2d at 726-27 (stating publicly employed physician did not suffer deprivation of property interest when clinical privileges revoked); Raju v. Rhodes, 809 F.Supp. 1229, 1238-39 (S.D.Miss.1992) (<HOLDING>). Even assuming arguendo that Dr. Ash-faq plead
holding a physician plaintiff did not have a property interest in his clinical access privileges holding that state medical director of prison medical services corporation was not final policymaker holding physician employed by public medical school and removed as director of transplant program was not deprived of property interest when his salary was not decreased holding that the medical director of the episode care clinic was primarily engaged in administrative duties and was not performing the duties of an attending physician and was therefore entitled to immunity holding that a school district was not required to make dramatic changes to its program in order for a child to attend his neighborhood school