days after the beginning of discovery. Noting that it could nevertheless grant Vig’s motion if he showed good cause, the district court refused to do so, because he had not alleged any previously unavailable facts and had not been diligent in pursuing the newly asserted causes of action. The district court correctly ruled that Vig had not shown good cause. He pointed to no new evidence to support his proposed second amended complaint, and there.is no reason that he could not have alleged, in an earlier pleading, the new claim it attempted to raise. Vig’s untimeliness and failure to show good cause amount to a “substantial reason” to deny him leave to amend, meaning the district court did not abuse its discretion. See Shipner v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 868 F.2d 401, 406-07 (11th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Vig’s second contention is that the district
holding that although district courts have discretion to deny leave to amend they may only do so for a substantial reason holding the district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff who is represented by counsel never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court recognizing several reasons to deny leave to amend a complaint recognizing that although leave to amend generally should be freely granted that decision is left to the district courts discretion and as in the present case not only was there no abuse of discretion it appears that appellants never properly requested an opportunity to amend in the district court holding that a court may deny leave to amend when the moving party had the opportunity to amend earlier but waited after judgment to do so