has never explicitly adopted or rejected the doctrine of implied bias [and] has not looked favorably upon attempts to impute bias to jurors.’ " The Andrews court, 21 F.3d at 620-21, went on, however, to cite and apply Justice O’Connor’s opinion, concluding that the juror was not a "close relative” of the victim even though his daughter had been married to the victim’s deceased grandson. Nothing about Broolcs overruled Andrews, so we may not disregard Broolcs. "Our rule of orderliness prevents one panel from overruling the decision of a prior panel.” Van Staden v. St. Martin, 664 F.3d 56, 58 n. 3 (5th Cir.2011) (citation omitted), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 110, 184 L.Ed.2d 24 (2012). 8 . See also, e.g., Seigfried v. Greer, 372 Fed.Appx. 536, 540-41 (5th Cir.2010) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Although Torres and Seigfriéd are unpublished
holding that a defendants exercise of peremptory challenges  is not denied or impaired when the defendant chooses to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause holding that it was not iac to decline to use peremptory strike on a potential juror whose statements hinted at possible bias against defendant where counsel strategically used peremptory strikes against jurors who might have been more likely to convict holding that it is impermissible to use a peremptory challenge to exclude a potential juror based on race holding racebased use of peremptory strikes against jurors unconstitutional holding use of peremptory strike against gay juror failed heightened scrutiny