before the Commission, but focuses solely on the subsequent superior court complaint. While the complaint was a separate filing, however, it did not comprise independent litigation based on a separate common law right to relief. Rather, the complaint sought statutory compensation under a provision of the workers’ compensation law vesting in the superior court equitable powers to enforce Commission orders and to issue pro forma decisions enforcing Commission benefit awards. As an integral part of the administrative enforcement scheme, the superior court action was merely supplementary to the Commission proceeding, and both proceedings obviously arose under the workers’ compensation law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c). Cf. Spearman v. Exxon Coal USA, 16 F.3d 722, 725 (7th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 377, 130
holding that because maryland law expressly creates right to file workers compensation claim action exists for wrongful discharge for termination based solely on the filing of a workers compensation claim recognizing a tort action when employee was dismissed for filing a workers compensation claim holding the retaliation claim did arise under states workers compensation laws holding that retaliation claim did not arise under states workers compensation laws holding that a claim did not arise under a workers compensation law when it stated a right to relief in tort and sought common law damages distinct from statutory compensation scheme