Device Exemption process at issue in Baird, supra, 155 N.J. at 58-9, 713 A.2d 1019, or even the more rigorous Premarket Approval (“PMA”) process, at issue in Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 126 F.3d 902, 905 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1020, 118 S.Ct. 1300, 140 L.Ed.2d 467 (Mar. 23,1998). Rather, Abbott’s test was subject to specific requirements, unique to the HIV antibody test, that exceeded even the rigorous PMA process that a majority of courts have concluded is a specific federal requirement that triggers preemption. An examination of those cases discloses that much of the reasoning of the courts is consistent with an implied preemption analysis. See, e.g., Worthy v. Collagen Corp., 967 S.W.2d 360, 376 (Tex.1998), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 954, 118 S.Ct. 2372, 141 L.Ed.2d 740 (1998) (<HOLDING>); see also Gade, supra, 505 U.S. at 103 n. 2,
recognizing presumption against preemption presumption is properly applied to state law design defect claims against manufacturer of pacemaker fda premarket approval of device did not require preemption recognizing the cause of action holding that in the field preemption context the hardship is the process itself holding that to establish a claim for abuse of process a claimant must demonstrate  an act in the use of the process not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceedings holding that it was the degree of fdas involvement in the approval process of a particular device not the pma process itself that resulted in preemption of state cause of action