seller’s disclosure. According to the Diamonds, the Kolcums could not have justifiably relied on the Diamonds’ representations because of this duty to investigate the property. The Diamonds assert that, unlike federal bankruptcy law, Washington state law does not require the Kolcums to investigate the acceptability of the property. They point to a jury instruction that reads: “A purchaser has no duty to investigate a seller’s clear factual representations, and may justifiably rely on such representations.” We are not persuaded by this argument. Bankruptcy law, like Washington law, does not require the Kolcums to have investigated the Diamonds’ factual representations in order to demonstrate justifiable reliance. See Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 70, 116 S.Ct. 437, 133 L.Ed.2d 351 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the Diamonds concede that the
recognizing kansas courts adoption of restatement second of torts  909 1977 recognizing that restatement second of torts  323 and 324a correctly state pennsylvania law recognizing tentative draft of restatement second of torts  652e recognizing restatement second of torts  428 but also discussing the inherently dangerous activities standard holding that duty to investigate was not a predicate to demonstrating justifiable reliance under  523a2a discussing restatement second of torts  540 1976