See also Berkeley v. Commonwealth, 88 Va. 1017, 1017-18, 14 S.E. 916, 916 (1892). In the present case, the issue concerns whether the pointing of a finger while uttering the word “pow” is an act performed either “by means calculated to produce the end if carried into execution” or “with a present ability of using actual violence,” which is an illustrative circumstance contained in the definition of assault. , 970 (1997) (noting that by statute Maryland provides for alternative forms of assault, one of which is “an assault of the intentional frightening variety ... [that only] required in terms of perception ... an apparent present ability from the viewpoint of the threatened victim”); State v. Riley, 141 Vt. 29, 442 A.2d 1297, 1298 (1982) (noting that Vermont’s a r. 733, 735 (1966) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. State, 158 Ga.App. 432, 280 S.E.2d
holding that punching another person is a statutory assault holding that statute which defined sexual contact as any touching of the anus breast or any part of the genitals of another person with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person was not vague holding that a threat to harm another person is a crime of violence holding that if a person threatens to shoot another with  a chocolate candy pistol there is no ability to commit  any injury with it on the person of another holding that testimony regarding use of pistol was insufficient where it was uncontroverted that pistol was toy gun