or employee to join or contribute to a labor organization is a “concerted activity] for the purpose of collective bargaining” protected by section 7. 29 U.S.C. § 157; see Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors of Mass./R.I., Inc., 507 U.S. 218, 225, 113 S. Ct. 1190, 122 L. Ed. 2d 565 (1993). 7 The NLRA, section 8(a)(1), makes it a ULP for an employer “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [section 7].” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). 8 In Belknap, the Court explained its reasoning in Sears without mentioning the deeply rooted exception, stating that NLRA preemption did not apply to the state claim because the “state court and Board controversies could not fairly be called identical.” Belknap, 463 U.S. at 510 (<HOLDING>); see, e.g., Farmer v. United Bhd. of
holding that misrepresentation and breach of contract claims in state court did not interfere with the nlrbs determination of related matters holding immaterial breach did not constitute breach of contract holding that breach of contract claim related back to misrepresentation claim because operative facts upon which the breach of contract claim was based were contained in the misrepresentation counts of the original complaint recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract holding only that although a party cannot interfere with its own contract a supervisor who is not an officer of a plaintiffs employer is not a party to the plaintiffs employment contract and therefore can interfere with it