gun at a building that happens to be occupied without actually shooting, attempting to shoot, or threatening to shoot another person.” Id. By contrast, 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/24-1.2(a)(2) only mentions vehicles. Buildings are confined to subsection (a)(1). Vehicles as a class are generally quite smaller than buildings. This difference in size in proportion to the average size of a person causes us to draw a conclusion opposite Alfaro: shooting in the direction of an occupied vehicle has as a necessary element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force against a person because one cannot commit that act without shooting, attempting to shoot, or threatening to shoot at that person in the vehicle. See generally United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 467 F.3d 492, 495 (5th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). As the government properly conceded at oral
holding that to enhance a sentence because of the defendants use of a firearm the jury must find the defendant guilty of a crime involving a firearm or otherwise specifically find that a firearm was used holding that a statute requiring the discharge of a firearm in the direction of a person is unlike alfaro holding that a statute imposing a mandatory minimum sentence on a person convicted of a crime of violence if the person visibly possessed a firearm or replica of a firearm cannot be applied to a coconspirator who did not visibly possess a firearm or replica holding that to apply the firearm enhancement the firearm need only reflect the context of the defendants possession and the defendants ability to use the firearm to promote the controlled substance offense holding that a person who cut and removed timber pursuant to the direction of the person in possession of the property but without the written consent of the company holding legal title to the land could be held liable under the gtccs