not reach) the question whether [the open dump] site is a ‘facility for the disposal of hazardous waste’ ”). 25 . Plaintiffs’ complaint was filed and served on May 16, 1994. See Aff. of Service of Jennifer Lupo, May 16, 1994; Compl. at 1. In their complaint they alleged in respect to each RCRA claim, as well as in respect to their CWA claim, that all requisite notices had been duly given on May 10, 1994, and “that this lawsuit would be immediately commenced.’’ Compl. ¶¶ 29, 40, 45. Because the Town denied information or knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of these allegations, the Court ordered plaintiffs to provide proof of compliance with the notice requirements. See Order of the Court, Feb. 15, 2001; see also Linardos v. Fortuna, 157 F.3d 945, 947 (2d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs thereafter made an uncontested
holding that the district court cannot remand sua sponte for defects in removal procedure holding that the court can raise res judicata sua sponte even on appeal holding that a party must support its allegations of a proper basis for jurisdiction by competent proof when a court sua sponte raises the question holding that a court may sua sponte take judicial notice of its docket recognizing every federal appellate court has a special obligation to consider its own jurisdiction even if it must do so sua sponte