or court of the United States on a prior application for a writ of habeas corpus.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a), (b)(2); see also id. § 2255(h) (listing exceptions to successive restrictions). 8 . 561 U.S. 320, 130 S.Ct. 2788, 177 L.Ed.2d 592 (2010). 9 . Id. at 323, 130 S.Ct. 2788. 10 . Id. at 323-24, 130 S.Ct. 2788. 11 . See Johnson v. United States, 623 F.3d 41, 44-46 (2d Cir.2010); Marmolejos v. United States, 789 F.3d 66, 70, 2015 WL 3499660, at *4 (2d Cir. June 4, 2015) ("Magwood and Johnson ... stand for the principle that when a judgment is entered on account of new substantive proceedings involving reconsideration of either the defendant’s guilt or his appropriate punishment, it is a new judgment for purposes of AEDPA.”); see also Urinyi v. United States, 607 F.3d 318, 321 (2d Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). 12 . 204 F.3d 1221, 1222 (9th Cir.2000). 13 .
holding that the application of revised  2255 which would have barred the petitioner who had filed his first  2255 motion prior to aedpas enactment from filing a second  2255 motion would have had retroactive effect because the petitioner might well have waited to file that initial motion had he foreseen aedpas revision of  2255 holding that defendant could not raise in a  2255 motion an issue previously decided on direct criminal appeal holding premagwood that where a first  2255 motion was granted so movant could file a direct appeal the second  2255 motion was not a successive motion under aedpa holding that motion filed under fedrcivp 60b properly construed as successive  2255 motion holding that a district court lacks jurisdiction to review a second or successive  2255 motion where the movant failed to obtain authorization to file the motion from this court