("[The use of the word 'shall in a statute usually is deemed to involve a mandatory connotation."); City of Colorado Springs v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 895 P.2d 1105, 1117-18 (Colo.App.1994) (finding that two provisions conflict when harmonization would effectively nullify one of them). Thus, to resolve this conflict, we consider the statute's legislative history to determine legislative intent. See Rowe v. People, 856 P.2d 486, 489 (Colo.1993) (looking to legislative history to determine legislative intent); People v. Carrillo, 2018 COA 3, 1 23, 297 P.3d 1028 (turning to "other statutory aids" when the plain text of statutes conflicts). b. Manifest Intent 120 The General Assembly's intent is "manifest" only when such intent is "clear and unmistakable." See Falls, 58 P.3d at 1142 (<HOLDING>). 121 In 2001, the General Assembly passed the
holding that a general statute should not be interpreted as repealing a specific statute albsent clear and unmistakable legislative intent to the contrary recognizing the principle that gives precedence to the terms of the more specific statute where a general statute and a specific statute speak to the same concern holding that a phrase should be interpreted consistent with the context of the statute in which it is contained holding that specific statutes create exceptions to general statutes therefore if a provision of a specific statute is inconsistent with one in a general statute on the same subject the specific statute controls holding the general rule is that in the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary a law affecting substantive rights liabilities and duties is presumed to apply prospectively