was not involved in the crime, Willett was not unduly prejudiced in not being allowed to extend cross-examination. We now briefly address the remainder of Willett’s claims. He contends that the court improperly admitted the eyewitness testimony of Jess Stoddard because (1) the testimony was unreliable under the criteria set out in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991); and (2) the two photo arrays initially shown Stoddard were lost before Willett had an opportunity to examine them. We find that under the Ramirez criteria, Stoddard’s identification of Willett was sufficiently reliable to be admitted into evidence. As to the photo arrays, Willett has failed to show that they were constitutionally material to his case. See State v. Nebeker, 657 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Utah 1983) (<HOLDING>). Willett also asserts that the testimony of
holding that courts must consider any adverse effect that the prosecutors failure to disclose might have had on not only the presentation of the defense at trial but the preparation of the defense as well holding that a defendant must have notice that the trial court might sentence him to death holding that the rights of an aggrieved party are substantially affected if the outcome either would have or may have been different had the error not occurred recognizing under plain error review that the burden to show that substantial rights have been prejudiced is on the party that failed to raise the issue below and for an error to have affected substantial rights the error must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings holding that  the mere possibility that an item of undisclosed evidence might have helped the defense or might have affected the outcome of the trial does not establish materiality in the constitutional sense  citations omitted quoting state v hudspeth 22 washapp 292 593 p2d 548 550 1978