petition claim is that it was not ripe at the time he filed his first habeas petition in 1989 because the state did not use that method of execution at that time. That is true, but Florida adopted lethal injection as a method of execution in 2000, Henyard v. Sec’y, DOC, 543 F.3d 644, 647 (11th Cir.2008) (“On January 14, 2000, Florida adopted lethal injection as a method of execution.”), and Tompkins could have filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit challenging the method and procedures at any time during the eight years since then. A § 1983 lawsuit, not a habeas proceeding, is the proper way to challenge lethal injection procedures. See Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 579-83, 126 S.Ct. 2096, 2101-04, 165 L.Ed.2d 44 (2006); see also Grayson v. Allen, 491 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Not only that, but binding precedent
holding that district courts may properly treat rule 60b motions as successive habeas petitions recognizing that before hill we required litigants raising methodofexecution challenges to bring them in second or successive habeas petitions instead of  1983 actions holding that second and third state habeas petitions that were dismissed as impermissible successive petitions were properly filed holding that a rule 60b motion ordinarily should be treated as a successive habeas petition but declining to adopt a bright line rule equating all rule 60b motions with successive habeas petitions holding that such claims required prisoner to obtain prefiling authorization to file second or successive habeas petition