class members; and (ii) whether the named plaintiffs and their counsel will vigorously prosecute the action on the class’ behalf. See Rutter & Wilbanks Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 314 F.3d 1180, 1187-88 (10th Cir.2002). In considering this second question, the experience and competence of the attorney representing the class may inform the court’s analysis. See Lopez v. City of Santa Fe, 206 F.R.D. at 289-90. Although Tenth Circuit precedent suggests that the adequacy-of-counsel analysis is conducted as a part of the 276, 1280 (11th Cir.2000)(finding that representation was inadequate where the class included those “who claim harm from the very acts from which other putative class members benefit-ted”); Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 344 (4th Cir.1998)(<HOLDING>); Alston v. Va. High Sch. League, Inc., 184
holding that franchisor who sued franchisees had not invoked the judicial process for purposes of a subsequent dispute holding that former municipal judge did not have property interest in continued employment holding that plaintiffs had no vested interest in former interpretation of state law holding that the current franchisees who had an interest in the continued viability of the franchiser had an inherent conflict with former franchisees whose only interest was in the maximization of damages holding that prejudice is only presumed if there is proof of an actual conflict of interest