the statute applicable to Terre Haute, Ind.Code § 19-1-29.5-13, does not specifically limit the mayor’s power to appoint a chief of police. Rather, Ind.Code § 19-1-29.5-13 focuses on the protection of members of the police department that are appointed to the position of chief of police and this protection does not compel the conclusion that only members of the police department can be appointed as the chief of police. Accordingly, even assuming, without deciding, that the Police Merit Commission could not amend the merit plan, we cannot say that Ind.Code § 19 — 1— 29.5-13 prevented the appointment of Ral-ston as chief of police. Thus, the trial court did not err by granting Terre Haute’s motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Langman v. Milos, 765 N.E.2d 227, 236 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the
holding district court did not err by considering a contract central to the dispute without converting the motion to a motion for summary judgment holding that trial court did not err holding that because plaintiff failed to advance evidence rebutting motion for summary judgment alongside a concession in their interrogatory response the district court did not err in granting defendants motion for summary judgment holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment holding that the trial court erred by granting the defendants motion to dismiss