he was only seeking asylum vis-á-vis his wife’s mistreatment and not on account of any direct harm. Pet’r’s Br. at 4. We find Wang’s explanation unavailing. Like the BIA, we observe that IIRIRA— enacted ten years before Wang applied for asylum — “broadened the definition of refugee to include a person who has been [persecuted for] resistance to a coercive population control program.” Lin-Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir.2009) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, Wang’s more detailed account of the events that transpired on May 24, 1992, if believed, provided fertile ground for a claim of past persecution at the time he originally applied for asylum. Wang chose instead to pursue a claim that would eventually be foreclosed by our decision in Lin-Zheng. See id. at 156 (<HOLDING>). In any event, the BIA deferred to the IJ’s
holding that to establish asylum eligibility based on future persecution an applicant must show that he or she subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable holding that a state cannot constitutionally condition an abortion on the spouses consent holding that absent past persecution an alien can demonstrate eligibility for asylum based on a wellfounded fear of future persecution by demonstrating that he or she subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable holding that an alien cannot claim asylum based on persecution that is personally motivated holding that alien cannot rely on spouses forced abortion to establish automatic asylum eligibility based on past persecution