against a foreign national. See United States v. Santos-Riviera, 183 F.3d 367, 370-71 (5th Cir.1999). The only intent requirement is the intent to take a hostage “in order to compel a third person or a governmental organization to do or abstain from doing any act.” 18 U.S.C. § 1203(a). Put another way, the proviso making the statute applicable to the kidnaping of foreign nationals inside the United States is simply a jurisdictional hook and, by its own terms, does not demand that the defendant have actual knowledge of the victim’s citizenship or nationality. Courts routinely have held that the government need not prove intent with respect to similar jurisdictional requirements in other criminal statutes. See, e.g., United States v. Scarborough, 813 F.2d 1244, 1246 (D.C.Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Napier, 518 F.2d 316, 319
holding that while the government was required to prove that the defendants phone call crossed a state line  the government did not need to prove that the defendant knew of the interstate nexus holding that the government need not prove that interstate transport was foreseeable in order to obtain a conviction under 18 usc  2314 which prohibits the interstate transportation of stolen goods holding that the defendant could be prosecuted for transporting stolen motor vehicles in interstate commerce under either 18 usc  2314 which prohibits interstate transportation of stolen goods or 18 usc  2312 which specifically prohibits interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles and airplanes holding that the defendants stipulation that the gun had moved in interstate commerce was sufficient evidence to support his conviction under 18 usc  922g1 holding in a prosecution for the interstate transportation of forged securities that the government was permitted to prove and comment on a defendants refusal to produce exemplars as tending to prove his guilt of the offense charged