sentence, or resentencing. See id. § 9546. Consequently, because the only claim at issue in a motion for post-conviction DNA testing is a convicted individual’s eligibility for such testing under the aforementioned provisions of Section 9543.1, when the trial court enters an order either granting or denying the testing, the litigation under this section is at an end: the sole claim between the parties — the Commonwealth and the movant — has been addressed by the trial court and finally disposed of. Thus, under the plain language of Rule 341(b), because a trial court order granting or denying the motion for DNA testing disposes of all claims raised by all parties to the litigation, it is, therefore, a final order. See Commonwealth v. Bryant, 566 Pa. 307, 310-11, 780 A.2d 646, 648 (2001) (<HOLDING>). In the instant matter, the Commonwealth, as
holding that a nonfinal order is immediately appealable where it finally determined claims of right separable from and collateral to rights asserted in the action emphasis added holding sanctions order pursuant to district courts inherent powers not immediately appealable holding that pursuant to parap 341b order of pcra court which fully and finally disposed of all issues before it was final and immediately appealable holding that this court lacked preliminary authority to review the district courts jurisdiction because there was no immediately appealable order before the court holding such denial to be an immediately appealable collateral final order