115 S.Ct. 1624, it “did not ... extend the ‘substantial effects’ test to all Commerce Clause legislation.” Page, 167 F.3d at 334-35. Where Congress seeks to regulate the channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, it is not bound by the “substantial effects” test and retains plenary power to regulate things and activity that cross state lines. Id. (citing United States v. Robertson, 514 U.S. 669, 670, 115 S.Ct. 1732, 131 L.Ed.2d 714 (1995)). Certain civil remedy provisions of the 1994 Violence Against Women Act do exceed Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause because they attempt to regulate intrastate activity that is not economic and does not have a substantial relation to commerce. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000) (<HOLDING>). The bulk of the criminal remedy provisions of
holding that 42 usc  13981 exceeds congresss authority under the commerce clause holding  13981 constitutional under the commerce clause holding that the gunfree school zone act exceeds congresss authority to regulate commerce holding that enactment of  13981 exceeded congressional authority under either the commerce clause or section 5 of the fourteenth amendment holding that enactment of the civil remedy provision of the violence against women act of 1994 42 usc  13981 exceeded congresss power under the commerce clause noting that  13981 contained no jurisdictional element