of state law. (Doc. 168 at 157). Consequently, Plaintiffs contend that in this case, the funeral directors are more analogous to the hypothetical insurance salesperson in Walker, because the FDL forces cremation customers to interact with a funeral director who will not be the individual performing the cremation. (Id. at 157-58). As to the third element, they argue that Defendants present no evidence of consumer harm from contracting for cremation services directly with cemeteries and crematories. (Doc. 140 at 172). On the other hand, Plaintiffs highlight that Defendants have not provided any evidence that requiring consumers to purchase cremation services directly from licensed funeral directors prevents consumer harm. (Id. (citing Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770-71, 113 S.Ct. 1792 (<HOLDING>))). Concerning the fourth element, Plaintiffs
holding that a state must demonstrate  that its restriction will in fact alleviate the harms to a material degree holding that danger must justify the degree of interference imposed holding that petitioner must demonstrate it is more likely than not that he will be tortured upon his return holding that inmates must demonstrate an actual injury holding that a defendant must demonstrate a knowing waiver