the second suit is unnecessary and consequently vexatious. The rule against splitting causes of action is closely related to the doctrine of res judicata in this respect. Id. at 500-01 (citation omitted). The right which AMEC had to institute a judicial proceeding was to sue on the one cause of action it had, the breach of an indivisible contract for the entire project. In both the initial action and the present case, the “thing sued” for was money damages allegedly sustained by AMEC as a result of the Department’s breach of the indivisible contract. The declaratory judgment count does not alter this overriding fact. Accordingly, there is identity of the “thing sued for.” Compare Inter-Active Servs., Inc. v. Heathrow Master Ass’n, Inc., 809 So.2d 900, 902-03 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (<HOLDING>). AMEC relies on the decision in U.S. Project
holding subsequent action not barred by res judicata because the thing sued for in the initial action was an injunction against heathrows threatened breach of contract while the thing sued for in the subsequent action was money damages allegedly sustained as a result of heathrows actual breach of contract where the damages alleged in the subsequent action unlike the damages alleged here arose after trial of the initial action holding damages for emotional distress are not recoverable in an action for breach of contract whether express or implied in the absence of a showing that the parties contemplated such damages at the time the contract was made holding that a cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the time of the breach holding that res judicata did not preclude the subsequent filing of an action which was a permissive claim in a prior action holding that a subsequent action was not barred because the initial court did not have jurisdiction over the claim