so a particular intent will control a general one that is inconsistent with it.” Section 1-2-102, MCA; see also State v. Garner, 1999 MT 295, ¶ 26, 297 Mont. 89, 990 P.2d 175 (‘[T]he Rules of Civil Procedure apply in a post-conviction relief proceeding only when they are applicable and not inconsistent with post-conviction statutes.”) (italics in original); Rierson v. State, 191 Mont. 66, 70, 622 P.2d 195, 198 (1981) (‘Only in the broadest sense could these limitations [for written contracts or other obligations] be considered to be controlling, and since there is a more specific statute involving injury to personal property rights, of which retirement benefits are one, we are constrained to follow the more specific statute.”); Weston v. Cole, 233 Mont. 61, 63, 758 P.2d 289, 291 (1988) (<HOLDING>). ¶17 Because the specific statutory procedures
holding that an action for consequential damages to property whether the action is brought in contract or in tort is an action for injury to property within the threeyear statute of limitations holding that plaintiffs unjust enrichment claim was predicated on tort and that it was therefore subject to the statute of limitations for tort actions recognizing that a specific statute controls over a general one holding that connecticuts threeyear limitations period for tort suits set forth in conn genstat  52577 is the appropriate limitations period for civil rights actions under  1983 holding the twoyear period for filing a particular tort action such as assault and battery controls over the more general threeyear statute of limitations for tort actions