restricting hunting by nonmembers or by other less restrictive alternative means or methods. The State counters that its laws that directly regulate the time, place, and manner of hunting must satisfy only the first three factors. And the State maintains that it need not establish any of these factors if its law 1) does not directly regulate the time, place, and manner of hunting, and 2) has no more than an incidental effect on the hunting right. Over the past century, the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have, on multiple occasions, elucidated the principles guiding analysis of sovereignty issues relating to treaty-reserved usufructory rights “in common with the citizens of the state” in Washington. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 378, 25 S.Ct. 662, 49 L.Ed. 1089 (1905) (<HOLDING>); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85, 62
recognizing corollary right under copyright law to exclude others under licensing right recognizing that tribes and states understood that they shared the right to manage the exercise of in common hunting and fishing rights holding right to testify was federal constitutional right holding that the right to drive is not a fundamental right holding that state license did not give washington settler the right to exclude the indian seeking to enjoy his in common fishing right