such contention.”); United States v. Green, 389 F.Supp.2d 29, 41-42 (D.Mass.2005), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. In re United States, 426 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.2005) (“By choosing federal court and thereby expanding the jury district to include the more racially homogenous suburbs, the government invariably dilutes minority — and even urban — representation in the pool from which defendants’ juries will be selected. While the Sixth Amendment demands representativeness, it does not require courts to second-guess the boundaries of the judicial district. Thus, when the government federalizes local crime in the more diverse cities ... it homogenizes the decisionmaker. And the law allows it to do so.”) (footnote omitted); cf. United States v. Davis, 27 Fed.Appx. 592, 592, 597 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Zicarelli v. Dietz, 633 F.2d 312, 318 (3d
holding that reviewing court may not reverse trial courts judgment on property division unless trial court has clearly abused its discretion or has made inequitable division holding that a transfer was a demotion where there was testimony that few people transferred voluntarily from jobs in the plaintiffs prior division to jobs in the plaintiffs new division  everybody viewed a transfer from the plaintiffs new division to the prior division as a promotion and the two departments had different seniority systems holding that there is no constitutional or statutory requirement that a defendants trial take place in a specific courtroom or division within a federal district and that the jury pool need not include anyone from the division in which the crime occurred holding that no closure occurred when judge did not allow anyone to enter or leave courtroom during jury instructions holding that reconsideration of the correctness of property division was barred on appeal from the judgment enforcing that division