consider the “against any consumer” language in the FDCPA venue provision at all, and Adkins considered it in the context of an entirely different state statutory scheme. See Smith, 887 F.Supp.2d at 339. Furthermore, if we were to interpret the FDCPA venue provision as Fox and Adkins do, it would be impossible for a debt collector to enforce a prior judgment through trustee process in Massachusetts unless the judgment debtor happened to reside or to have signed the underlying contract in the same county in which the trustee had a usual place of business. See Smith, 887 F.Supp.2d at 340. We do not read the FDCPA as mandating such a strange result. We turn, finally, to the defendants-appellees’ request for fees P.A., No. 2:1 1-cv-00619, 2012 WL 604249, at *4-7 (S.D.Ohio Feb. 24, 2012) (<HOLDING>). 2 . An order approving trustee process can
holding that a garnishment proceeding is an action against the consumer holding that a writ of execution under new jersey law is not an action against the consumer holding that garnishment is a distinct civil action holding that where an action is brought by the debtors at the initial proceeding the appeal of that action is not a continuing proceeding against the debtors holding that garnishment of wages is a deprivation