legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer’s action.” That is a significant enough burden to relieve any practical concerns over the rule we have limned today. If it is clear that that obligation cannot be met, defendants will prevail at summary judgment. [Id at 455-56, 867 A.2d 1133 (quoting Fuentes, supra, 32 F.3d at 764).] We note, as well, that we review orders and not, strictly speaking, reasons that support them. We have held, in other contexts, that a correct result, even if predicated on an erroneous basis in fact or in law, will not be overturned on appeal. See, e.g., Govilo v. West Jersey Health System, Inc., 332 N.J.Super. 293, 321, 753 A.2d 716 (App.Div.2000)(<HOLDING>); Gerber v. Springfield Bd. of Educ., 328
holding that resigntorun requirement in delaware judges code of judicial conduct did not violate first amendment interests of judges holding that judges erroneous legal reasoning nonetheless produced the correct result holding that the sentencing judge need only provide an adequate statement of the judges reasoning consistent with section 3553a for thinking that the sentence selected is indeed appropriate for the particular defendant holding that clearly erroneous standard of review governs review of trial judges findings on batson claims because they turn largely on credibility holding that bankruptcy judges are not bound by appellate ruhngs of single district judges even those from their own district