instigate robberies and beatings merely to gather evidence to convict other members of a gang of hoodlums.”). Even accepting the facts as Appellant described them on direct examination, there is no evidence on which a rational member could rely to conclude that Appellant was not the initial aggressor. The next question is whether a rational member could have found that Appellant regained the right to act in self-defense as a result of either Mansur’s escalating the conflict or Appellant’s withdrawing in good faith. Under our ease law, Mansur could not have escalated the level of force in this situation, as Appellant had already introduced deadly force. See United States v. Stanley, 71 M.J. 60, 63 (C.A.A.F.2012); see also Armstrong v. Bertrand, 336 F.3d 620, 623, 625-26 (7th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law §
holding that an armed gunman did not regain the right to selfdefense even though the victim threatened to kill the gunman and lunged for his gun holding defendants phone call to his exwife announcing his intent to kill the victim was not an unrelated act of misconduct and permissible to rebut defendants testimony that he did not threaten the murder victim holding that defendant may be entitled to selfdefense instruction even though he did not testify holding that evidence that the defendant had stalked threatened and assaulted the victim his exgirlfriend was evidence as to the nature of the defendants relationship with the victim and that it was relevant to establish motive holding that the validity of the defendants selfdefense claim was an issue for the jury where the victim retreated after starting an altercation