as a criminal punishment for the purposes of double jeopardy analysis. Therefore, we must proceed to discuss whether jeopardy attached to this tax assessment and seizure. After all, it is a fundamental principle of double jeopardy law “that an accused must suffer jeopardy before he can suffer double jeopardy.” Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 393, 95 S.Ct. 1055, 43 L.Ed.2d 265 (1975). Before we begin this analysis, however, we pause to note that both parties agree that the standards set forth in the Antiter-rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) do not apply to this case because the Wisconsin Court of Appeals found that the double jeopardy issue was moot and thus did not analyze the claim on its merits. Cf. Moore v. Parke, 148 F.3d 705, 708 (7th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Under pre-AEDPA standards, we presume that
holding that aedpa limits a federal habeas court to the record before the state court where a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by the state court holding that aedpa only applies where the state court adjudicated the constitutional issue on the merits holding that the aedpa standard of review applies even where the state court has given no indication of how it reached its decision recognizing that  2254d by its own terms applies only to claims previously adjudicated on the merits in statecourt proceedings holding that a claim brought in a pro se brief that the state court did not address was not adjudicated on the merits as required by  2254d