debtor contends they do, the Missouri Supreme Court later addressed the issue in Tower Grove Bank & Trust v. Duing, et al., 346 Mo. 896, 144 S.W.2d 69, 70 (1940), and Casper v. Bell’s Estate, 358 Mo. 995, 218 S.W.2d 606 (1949), and, in this Court’s opinion, held to the contrary in those more recent cases. In the later of the two cases, Casper, an extension agreement on a mortgage note provided that “default for thirty days in any obligation pertaining to either mortgage resting upon [the purchaser] will mature all obligations thereof.” Casper, 218 S.W.2d at 607. One of the express issues in Casper was whether this acceleration provision was “optional.” Relying directly on Court of Appeals’ decision in Putthoff v. Walker, discussed above, and its own previous decision Tower Grove Bank (<HOLDING>), the Missouri Supreme Court held that the
holding that because a mortgage provides the security for the repayment of the note the person having standing to foreclose a note secured by a mortgage may be either the holder of the note or a nonholder in possession of the note who has the rights of a holder holding that an acceleration provision in a deed of trust securing a note which provided that failure to pay any interest note when due would cause the whole sum to become due was optional holding that when note and deed of trust were null and void and of no legal effect because of forgery assignee of note and deed of trust nevertheless had equitable lien upon property for value of construction work for which note and deed of trust were given holding failure to pay a debt due under a promissory note is a breach of contract claim under florida law holding that application note 6 is not mandatory