judge expressly stated in his sentencing order that he gave “due regard against inappropriate double consideration” and found that this aggravator merged with another aggravator, i.e., that the murders were committed during the course of a burglary, arson, or robbery; therefore, both aggravators were only “considered as one” by the trial court. See Sentencing Order at 4, 10, State v. Looney, No. 97-215 (Fla.2d Cir.Ct. Feb. 18, 2000). Having merged the two, the trial court was correct in setting forth the basis for doing so, as there is ample evidence in the record to prove Looney benefitted financially from these murders. 32 . Moreover, any argument that this Court should unilaterally reject Dempsey's testimony is also without merit. See Brown v. State, 721 So.2d 274, 282 (Fla.1998) (<HOLDING>). Here, the judge and the jury were made aware
holding that the function of the trial court on a motion for summary judgment is to determine whether issues of fact exist and not to decide the merits of the issues themselves holding that the jury is the judge of the weight and credibility given to witness testimony holding the question of whether an accomplice is credible and the weight to be given to the testimony are issues for the jury to determine holding that defendants truthfulness and the credibility of and weight to be given expert medical testimony are issues of fact for jury holding that the applicable rule of procedure vests a successor judge with judicial discretion to review the jury verdict on a motion for new trial on the ground that such verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence where the record clearly discloses that no question of the credibility of the witnesses or the weight to be given to their testimony will require resolution by him