of limitations. The district court was required to adopt, from the forum state, the statute of limitations governing the state cause of action most closely analogous to Hickey’s Rehabilitation Act claims. See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Company, 482 U.S. 656, 660, 107 S.Ct. 2617, 2620, 96 L.Ed.2d 572 (1987) (“[Fjederal courts should select the most appropriate or analogous state statute of limitations.”); Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of New York v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483-84, 100 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 64 L.Ed.2d 440 (1980) (“[T]his Court has repeatedly ‘borrowed’ the state law of limitations governing an analogous cause of action.”). This Court has not yet decided which Texas statute of limitations governs claims under the Rehabilitation Act. Texas law supplie 2d 511, 514 (5th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Because we find personal injury claims to be
holding that texas twoyear statute of limitations applied to section 1981 action for discrimination on the basis of national origin holding accent discrimination may be actionable as national origin discrimination under title vii citing with approval eeoc guidelines defining national origin discrimination to include discrimination based on the linguistic characteristics of a national origin group recognizing twoyear statute of limitations for section 1981 claims filed in federal court in georgia holding that a twoyear statute of limitations applies to negligence claims under texas law holding that texas twoyear statute of limitations applied to suit alleging racial discrimination under 42 usc  1981