States cites to "Exhibits A — D” in support of its assertion that "the IRS repeatedly told Scripps that the remittance was a deposit and not a payment." (Doc. # 24 at 9.) No exhibits are attached to that filing, and the Court is unable to discern to what exhibits the United States refers. 9 . The Court notes that even if the remittance in question is found to be a deposit, Scripps still may not recover under its theory of equitable estoppel. "[J]udicial use of the equitable doctrine of estoppel cannot grant respondent a money remedy that Congress has not authorized.” Office of Personnel Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 426, 110 S.Ct. 2465, 110 L.Ed.2d 387 (1990). The United States Code does not authorize payment of interest on cash bonds. See Rosenman, 323 U.S. at 662-63, 65 S.Ct. 536 (<HOLDING>). Consequently, if Scripps's remittance was a
holding the rule against taxpayer standing applies both to federal taxpayers and state taxpayers challenging state tax or spending decisions simply by virtue of their status as state taxpayers holding that a challenge by taxpayers and property owners to the issuance of municipal bonds was barred by a judgment entered in a prior action holding that the nature of the taxpayers legal interest in the subject property is determined by reference to state law holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity recognizing that taxpayers are not entitled to interest on cash bonds