P’ship III, 213 Ga.App. 333, 444 S.E.2d 814, 817 (1994)), as the Consent Order neither directed the Bank to sell stock as its sole means of raising capital nor authorized doing so at the expense of another’s legal rights. In determining whether a defendant acted “without- privilege” in aiding a breach of fiduciary duty, the Georgia Court of Appeals has instructed courts to apply the stranger doctrine. See Am. Mgmt. Servs. E., LLC v. Fort Benning Family Cmtys., LLC, 333 Ga.App. 664, 774 S.E.2d 233, 250-53 (2015). As such, liability for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty requires that the defendant be a stranger to both the contract at issue and the business relationship giving rise to and underpinning the contract. Id. (citing Atlanta Mkt. Ctr. Mgmt., Co., 503 S.E.2d at 278) (<HOLDING>). Presumably, then, “parties] to an interwoven
holding that a parent company was not liable for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty by its subsidiary because the parent company was not a stranger to the business relationship between its subsidiary and the plaintiff giving rise to and underpinning the contract recognizing separate corporate identity of parent despite evidence that parent was alterego of its subsidiary and was being sued for acts of its subsidiary holding that american subsidiary of a japanese parent had no treaty defense because the subsidiary was not a company of japan holding that parent is liable for acts of subsidiary under agency theory only if parent dominates subsidiary parent of whollyowned subsidiary that had seats on board took part in financing and approved major policy decisions was not liable because parent did not have daytoday control holding that a close relationship between a parent corporation and a subsidiary may justify finding that the parent engages in business in the jurisdiction through the local activities of its subsidiary