of the Mother’s argument that the juvenile court had to stay the TPR proceedings and, on the other hand, the Department’s argument that the juvenile court was required to deny the motion, brings us to the conclusion that the juvenile court was not required to rule in any particular way. Rather, as in many other contexts, the decision of whether to grant the Mother’s motion to stay was within the court’s discretion. Id. at 82, 70 A.3d 276 (emphasis in original). Our holding here goes no further than did the Court of Appeals in Jayden G. Simply put, it was within the juvenile court’s sound discretion to consider or refuse to consider the TPR petition, notwithstanding a permanency plan remaining reunification, and father’s due process rights were not violated. See id. at 69, 70 A.3d 276 (<HOLDING>). II. Father’s second contention is that the
holding that cooperation between parents is essential if the arrangement is to be in the best interests of the child holding that a parents right to appeal the change of permanency plan is limited by the sound discretion of the court taking into account the best interests of the child holding court cannot change custody without showing that change is in best interests of child holding that requiring a petitioner to establish by clear and convincing evidence that visitation is in the best interests of the child would provide effective protection for a parents choice except where the choice is plainly contrary to a childs best interests holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in changing the surname of the child where the court made factual findings that the name change would be in the best interest of the child