See White’s Place, 222 F.3d at 1329; and, Hallandale, 922 F.2d at 760 (emphasis added). It is this standard which guides this Court, in finding that the Plaintiffs have standing to pursue this action, as the injury-to-the-Plaintiffs is manifested in the genuine and credible threat of prosecution in the form of potential future disciplinary action as well as through the Plaintiffs’ self-censorship resulting from a fear of enforcement of the Defendants’ Advisory Opinions’ “enforcement policies.” Specifically, the “injury in fact” standing element — an invasion of a legally protected interests which is concrete and particularized, actual or imminent, and not conjectural or hypothetical — has been established by the Plaintiffs. See Kemler v. Poston, 108 F.Supp.2d 529, 534 (E.D.Va. 2000) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs have alleged an injury that is
holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring securities claims relating to funds that plaintiffs did not own holding that this court lacked jurisdiction under  46110 for lack of finality and that the district court also lacked jurisdiction because the orders were not final and thus not ripe for review holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue holding that plaintiffs lacked standing because the case was not ripe for adjudication holding that the history of enforcement of a statute is relevant to standing and ripe ness inquiry