§ 13-917(B) and instead allowed Botkin to continue on standard probation. The State filed a notice of appeal after the December 2006 ruling and a “supplemental” notice of appeal after the February 2007 ruling. The State is entitled to challenge the trial court’s refusal to apply the mandatory sentencing feature of § 13-917(B), and we have jurisdiction in accordance with Ariz. Const, art. 6, § 9, AR.S. § 12-120.21(A)(1) (2003), and § 13-4032(5) (2001). See State v. Dawson, 164 Ariz. 278, 281, 792 P.2d 741, 744 (1990) (“The trial court’s failure to impose a sentence in conformity with the mandatory provisions of the sentencing statute makes that sentence ‘illegal’ ... and therefore properly appealable.”); State v. Vargas-Burgos, 162 Ariz. 325, 326-27, 783 P.2d 264, 265-67 (App.1989) (<HOLDING>). Statutory Analysis ¶ 10 This appeal presents
holding a specific sentencing statute controls over the general sentencing provisions of section 9031 holding that a sentence was based on a mandatory statutory minimum sentence even though it was lowered under another statute holding if the plea agreement was not conditioned on the sentencing guidelines an appellant is not entitled to relief because his sentence is not illegal holding that a sentence not in compliance with the mandatory provisions of a sentencing statute was illegal and appealable holding that the statute is mandatory