committed it[ ]”—a function fulfilled by the grand jury on direct indictment. Id.; Britt v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 906, 907, 121 S.E.2d 495, 496 (1961). The same limitation applies when a prosecution that began with a felony arrest warrant is terminated at the preliminary hearing in district court whether by dismissal of the charge, Moore, 218 Va. at 394, 237 S.E.2d at 192, or by nolle prosequi of the charge, Armel v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 407, 505 S.E.2d 378 (1998). When the charges against an accused are dismissed or nolle prosequied the accused is no longer a person “whose freedom of movement and liberty” are “subject to any legal restriction” because those charges no longer exist. See Moore, 218 Va. at 394, 237 S.E.2d at 192; see also Armel, 28 Va.App. at 409, 505 S.E.2d at 380 (<HOLDING>). Thus, when the original prosecution in this
holding that the amendment of the indictment was permissible under the statutory predecessor to code  192231 because the amendment did not within the meaning of the statute change the nature of the offense charged in the original indictment holding admission of preliminary hearing testimony did not violate the sixth amendment where defendants motive during crossexamination was the same as at trial holding that appellant was not entitled to a preliminary hearing under code  192218 because following the entry of the nolle prosequi at the preliminary hearing the original charges were terminated and the situation was the same as if the commonwealth had chosen to make no charge  until the return of the direct indictment quoting watkins v commonwealth 27 vaapp 473 475 499 se2d 589 590 1998 en banc holding that the commission is a commonwealth agency entitled to sovereign immunity holding that defendants successful completion of pretrial intervention program in one county and the entry of a nolle prosequi as to the relevant charges in that county barred subsequent prosecution in a separate county for charges arising out of the same conduct