declaration, and whether the statement is made in response to a question, are considerations in determining whether the statement is admissible as an excited utterance, but they are not disposi-tive. Lawton v. State, 913 S.W.2d 542, 553 (Tex.Crim.App.1995). The critical factor is whether the emotions, excitement, fear, or pain of the event still dominated the de-clarant at the time of the statement. Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 596. If the statement is made while the declarant is still in the grip of emotion, excitement, fear, or pain and the statement relates to the exciting event, it is admissible even after an appreciable amount of time has elapsed. Penry v. State, 691 S.W.2d 636, 647 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); Jones v. Stat ouston [1st Dist.] 1983), affirmed, 671 S.W.2d 888 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (<HOLDING>). Further, we find that the trial court could
holding fourandonehalf hours was not too long a period of time between exciting event and a statement made by a child still in extreme pain regarding the cause of his injury holding coconspirators later testimony did not obviate the efficacy of the first statement made closer in time to the event in question holding that a two to threeday time period between the employees complaint and his discharge was sufficient holding that statement to police made thirtysix hours after a different statement to police was not part of one confession and not admissible under the rule of completeness holding that critical factor is whether the declarant was still dominated by the emotions excitement fear or pain of the event