employer does not alter the analysis because both general and special employers are entitled to tort immunity once workers' compensation has been paid. See Antheunisse, 551 A.2d at 1007. Nor do I find Taylor distinguishable because there was no change in corporate form in that case. Taylor addresses the precise issue before me: whether an employment relationship with an unincorporated entity within a corporation gives rise to an employment relationship with the corporation for the purposes of workers’ compensation tort immunity despite the employee’s belief that the unincorporated entity is the employer and unawareness of any relationship with the corporation. I find no support for plaintiff’s argument in Santos v. Standard Havens, Inc., 225 N.J.Super. 16, 541 A.2d 708 (App.Div. 1988) (<HOLDING>). 8 . This New Jersey precedent emphasizing
holding that glc 152 15 provides that the only party immune from suit under the statute is the direct employer a special employer is not immune because the special employer is not liable for the payment of workers compensation and there was no agreement between the direct employer and the special employer that the special employer would be liable for the payment of such compensation holding that plaintiffs decedent became special employee of separately incorporated subsidiary after general employer parent corporation lent his services to subsidiary under circumstances that satisfied special employment factors recognizing that a foreign company as a special employer under the lent employee doctrine was subject to arizonas workers compensation statutes for injuries sustained by an employee recognizing special circumstances exception holding that a lent employees acceptance of his special employment status could be implied from his acquiescence to the control and direction of the special employer