serves to toll it. See Fisher v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1135, 1142-43 (10th Cir.2001). Thus, Mr. Hubler’s July 2003 and June 24, 2005, applications for post-conviction relief are of no consequence. The limitations period for § 2254 motions is also subject to equitable tolling in extraordinary circumstances, Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 808 (10th Cir.2000), such as where “a constitutional violation [will] result[ ] in the conviction of one who is actually innocent or incompetent,” Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998). But in order for a petitioner to avail himself of the actual innocence exception he must demonstrate that his claim is based on a an independent constitutional violation. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400, 404, 113 S.Ct. 853, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Mr. Hubler’s claim of actual innocence is
holding that although actual innocence is not itself a recognized constitutional claim it can serve as a gateway through which a habeas petitioner may advance an otherwise procedurally barred constitutional claim holding that the defendants habeas claim was procedurally barred because it could have been or was raised in his postconviction motion holding that habeas claim not included in petition and never raised by petitioner before the district court as basis for habeas relief is procedurally defaulted holding that a habeas claim is procedurally barred where it was already raised on direct appeal and decided on the merits by this court holding that a caldwell claim is procedurally barred if it is not raised on direct appeal