following that standard of skill and care, the defendant’s conduct was a proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff (causation). See Standardized Civil Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 9.03 (2002 ed. rev.). 2 . Three notes were previously sent to the court but none are relevant to this appeal. 3 . Neither of these jurors raised these conflicting obligations during the initial voir dire. 4 . See generally Winters v. United States, 317 A.2d 530 (D.C.1974) (en banc). 5 . The court even checked one more time with the parties to confirm that they wanted the court to Winterize the jury: "Both sides asked me, at this point, to give the Winters instruction?" Dr. Dass's counsel responded, "I think so,” and Ms. Blackwell’s counsel responded, "We are fine, your Honor.” 6 1991) (<HOLDING>). We also reject Ms. Blackwell’s argument that
holding that jury could have relied upon other evidence besides plaintiffs expert witness testimony that would have supported its verdict holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of firstdegree murder holding that a jury verdict will be sustained on any reasonable theory based on the evidence holding that despite a jury verdict against the insured hospital for medical malpractice liability was not beyond dispute holding that a defendant in a medical malpractice case who acquiesced to a general verdict form despite several theories of breach could not then challenge the verdict on the basis that jurors may have relied on a theory not supported by sufficient evidence