Peterson v. W.T. Rawleigh Co., however, the supreme court adopted the rule set forth in Restatement (Second) Torts § 343A (1965), clarifying that a possessor is liable to an invitee for harm caused by a known or obvious condition if the possessor should have “anticipate^] the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.” 274 Minn. 495, 496-97, 144 N.W.2d 555, 557 (1966). The Peterson court indicated that whether a possessor should have anticipated harm to an invitee depends in part on the extent of the condition’s obviousness. Id. If the obviousness is so great that a reasonable person would not anticipate harm to an invitee, the possessor is not expected to anticipate harm. Id. at 497, 144 N.W.2d at 558 (noting that “there are situations which are so obviously d 8 N.W. 586, 586 (1920) (<HOLDING>). Peterson, in adopting Restatement (Second) of
holding that it would not be unreasonable to find condition in hotel lunchroom unsafe because invitee would be distracted holding substantial evidence supported jury finding of abuse of process holding that sufficient evidence supported jurys finding of negligence when invitee had tripped on frame in department store because she was distracted by displayed goods holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination under title vii was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record