of Adidas’s claims was proper. Therefore, we have jurisdiction to consider this appeal. II. On the substance of the appeal, we hold that the District Court erred by granting summary judgment to Payless based on the 1994 settlement agreement. A plain reading of the agreement demonstrates that Adidas released only those claims against Payless that Adidas “brought or could have brought” before the dismissal of the action that was the subject of the settlement. The shoe stripe designs at issue in the present dispute, however, were not produced by Payless until after the 1994 agreement was concluded. Adidas could not have brought a claim against shoes not in existence prior to the execution of the settlement. Cf. Botefur v. City of Eagle Point, 7 F.3d 152, 157-58 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the 1994 settlement agreement does
holding that release which barred all claims from the beginning of the world to the day of these presents included claims which the releasor had or could have had against the releasee up to the date of its execution holding that a release of such claims or other matters arising from the beginning of time to the date of execution of this agreement did not protect the defendant from liability arising from unconstitutional conduct that occurred after the agreements execution holding that release which barred all claims from the beginning of the world to the day of the date of these presents included all claims which had matured at the time of its execution holding that despite release language discharging defendant from claims upon or by reason of any matter cause or thing whatsoever from the beginning of the world to the day of these presents release did not bar any claims accruing after the date of execution holding that all inclusive language  from the beginning of the world to the days present barred all claims arising prior to releases execution