would have revealed its defective condition. Velez asserts that a trained technician familiar with moldings and casings would have spotted the defect, though an ordinary user, like Velez, might not. Although constructive notice can be inferred from circumstantial evidence, see Rogers, 32 N.Y.2d at 561, 347 N.Y.S.2d 22, 300 N.E.2d 403, Velez does not offer any evidence to support her assertions. There is no expert testimony or other evidence demonstrating that a reasonably prudent technician would have found the defect during a regularly scheduled inspection. See Buria, 7 A.D.2d at 488, 184 N.Y.S.2d at 397 (“Negligence is not established unless it be shown that proper testing would have disclosed the [mechanism] to have been defective.”); cf. Albergo, 138 A.D.2d 656, 526 N.Y.S.2d 580 (<HOLDING>). As explained above, Velez cannot simply rely
holding the question of whether an accomplice is credible and the weight to be given to the testimony are issues for the jury to determine holding that defendants truthfulness and the credibility of and weight to be given expert medical testimony are issues of fact for jury holding any error in admitting testimony of expert witness was harmless because it was cumulative of same testimony given by six other expert witnesses who testified at trial holding that the jury is the judge of the weight and credibility given to witness testimony holding that because the plaintiff presented expert testimony that a reasonable inspection of the shopping cart would have given defendant notice of the wheels defective condition the case was properly given to the jury