but it must have been foreseeable. Id. at 707-08, 125 S.Ct. 2129. Thus, the defendant “must believe that his actions are likely to affect a particular, existing or foreseeable official proceeding.” United States v. Kaplan, 490 F.3d 110, 125 (2d Cir.2007) (citing Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 708, 125 S.Ct. 2129). While the Court in Arthur Andersen interpreted § 1512(b)(2)(A) and (B) only, the Court’s analysis and application of the “nexus” requirement applies with equal force to § 1512(b)(1). All three subsections qualify the prohibited conduct by requiring that the defendant target testimony or evidence in an “official proceeding.” Consistency demands that we apply the Arthur Andersen nexus requirement to § 1512(b)(1). See United States v. Matthews, 505 F.3d 698, 708 (7th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); Kaplan, 490 F.3d at 126 (noting that the jury
holding subsection 1103g unconstitutional to the extent that it regulates the conduct of former government employees who are also attorneys holding that the special relationship exception does not apply to the relationship between a student and a school holding that no special relationship existed between the school and student holding that the yearlong relationship did not create the kind of significant relationship of which molded acoustical speaks holding that arthur andersen applies to prosecutions under  1512c1 because that subsection also speaks in terms of the relationship between obstructive acts and a proceeding