employee of Chevron Products Company, not Chevron, and because Kehm provides no reason to ignore the corporate separateness of these two entities, Barnes’s acts cannot be attributed to Chevron. See Escude Cruz v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 619 F.2d 902, 905 (1st Cir.1980) (“The mere fact that a subsidiary company does business within a state does not confer jurisdiction over its nonresident parent, even if the parent is sole owner of the subsidiary.”) (citation omitted). Moreover, the fact that Chevron sent Kehm a cease and desist letter does not rise to the level of purposeful availment for purposes of jurisdiction in Pennsylvania, since the letter expresses the goal not to do business in Pennsylvania. See Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed.Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>) Accordingly, Kehm has not shown sufficient
holding that personal jurisdiction over a party is proper if the party has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum holding that the massachusetts longarm statute provides for jurisdiction over a nonresident personal representative when the decedent had sufficient contacts with the forum such that the decedent would have been subject to personal jurisdiction had he lived holding that the effects of a tortious act cannot subject a defendant to personal jurisdiction in a forum where no other contacts exist holding that personal jurisdiction is proper if party has sufficient minimum contacts holding that a patentee does not subject itself to personal jurisdiction in a forum solely by informing a party who happens to be located there of suspected infringement as grounding personal jurisdiction on such contacts alone would not comport with principles of fairness