rt in the past has quite broadly construed Article 66(c), UCMJ, to provide to a Court of Criminal Appeals an essentially unreviewable “carte blanche to do justice” for a military accused. See United States v. Claxton, 32 MJ 159, 162 (CMA 1991). In Claxton, this Court approved the service appellate court's decision to ignore the law of waiver in order to grant sentencing relief to an accused for an unobjeeted to ss as a means for a subordinate court to evade or avoid unpopular legal precedent of this Court. See United States v. Sills, 56 MJ 239 (2002). This is neither the letter nor the spirit of Article 66(c), UCMJ, nor is it what the Supreme Court meant by the “power to determine sentence appropriateness.” See Jackson v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 569, 576, 77 S.Ct. 1027, 1 L.Ed.2d 1045 (1957) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Healy, 26 MJ 394,
holding that a court may not change the term of sentence by subsequent amendment after the sentence becomes final holding that lack of appellate jurisdiction is fundamental error holding that under federal rule of appellate procedure 52b plain error in a jury charge may be considered by an appellate court although it was not brought to the attention of the trial court holding article 66c permits reassessment of sentence by service appellate court after legal error found recognizing that the findings of the circuit court on factual issues arising on a motion to quash service of process for lack of jurisdiction are binding on the appellate court unless wholly unsupported by the evidence or controlled by error of law