which tends to disprove the People’s position ... that the defendant was the person [who attacked the victim].” Id., 441:6-9. Gueits’s counsel argued that the witness’s reluctance to testify was insufficient to establish a basis for impeachment under § 60.35(1), but the trial court rejected this argument. Id., 441:22-442:7. Gueits argues that his trial counsel failed to lodge the proper objection to Jag-pal’s impeachment, namely that Jagpal’s trial testimony did not “tend to disprove” the prosecution’s position. As Gueits as serts, § 60.35(1) only permits impeachment where the trial testimony of a witness “affirmatively damage[s]” the case of the party calling that witness. Gueits Br. at 45 (citing People v. Fitzpatrick, 40 N.Y.2d 44, 52, 386 N.Y.S.2d 28, 351 N.E.2d 675 (1976) (<HOLDING>)). The propriety of the trial court’s decision
holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the defendant an opportunity to recall a witness who had already testified and been subject to crossexamination holding that sentencing court did not violate defendants due process rights when it reasonably refused to recall a witness for crossexamination holding that the testimony of a witness who states that he cannot recall the events in question does not tend to disprove the prosecutions case holding that in order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness to testify the claimant must allege 1 the identity of the potential witness 2 that the witness was available to testify at trial 3 the substance of the witnesss testimony and 4 an explanation of how the omission of the testimony prejudiced the case holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness