hearing the Assistant United States Attorney downplayed the effect of Littleton’s testimony by stating that “[Littleton] is in no position to exercise any ... right on behalf of her son,” the fact remains that even though exercising a right to counsel belonged to Littleton’s son and not to Littleton, her testimony was material because it tended to corroborate her son’s position that he asked for counsel. The question whether Littleton’s son asked for counsel was a critical issue at the suppression hearing at which Littleton testified. Whether the testimony actually influenced the court in deciding the motion to suppress is irrelevant so long as it was intended to influence the court. Cf. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770, 108 S.Ct. 1537, 1546, 99 L.Ed.2d 839 (1988)) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). Because Littleton’s
holding that misrepresentation was essential to plaintiffs claim holding as to a fraudulent misrepresentation claim under michigan law that the sixyear statute of limitations begins to run when the misrepresentation was perpetrated and not when the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the misrepresentation recognizing fraud to be a known misrepresentation or a nondisclosure holding misrepresentation claim to be preempted recognizing test for materiality as whether misrepresentation has a natural tendency to influence or was capable of influencing the court