respect.” Id. at 290-91. “Since Daubert does not explicitly take such a position, and nothing in the Evidence Rules compels it, it seems unlikely that the Court intended such a departure from past practice.” Id. at 291. First, this broad interpretation conflicts with the policy of preserving the jury’s traditional power to weigh evidence and determine credibility of witnesses. Id. at 263, 289. The other language quoted above from Daubert (“Vigorous cross-examination ....”) strongly suggests that the jury is to decide many issues of reliability. Second, this broad interpretation would raise the bar for admission of expert testimony from the prior requirements under Frye — contrary to Daubert’s intention to liberalize admission of expert evidence. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (<HOLDING>). Wright observes, “In overturning Frye, it is
holding that the federal expert witness compensation rules are in direct conflict with the state rules even when the state rules allow for a greater recovery recognizing the liberal thrust of the rules and their general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to expert evidence holding that liberal pleading standards of rules 8 and 9 applied to prayer for punitive damages recognizing the liberal notice and simplified pleading principles underlying the federal rules of civil procedure holding that our liberal rules of notice pleading do not require that specific evidentiary detail be alleged in the complaint