signaled that he posed a real and serious risk of violence. The fact that, after serving a 40-month prison term, Jackson committed two serious assaults while on supervision demonstrated that the original concern not only persisted but that supervision was an inadequate deterrent. On this record, we cannot conclude that the district court’s imposition of a maximum sentence was substantively unreasonable. See United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir.2008) (en banc) (explaining that sentence will be deemed substantively unreasonable only “in exceptional cases where the trial court’s decision ‘cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions’ ” (quoting United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208, 238 (2d Cir.2007))); United States v. Hargrove, 497 F.3d 256, 259 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Fleming, 397 F.3d at 100
recognizing district courts broad discretion to impose prison term up to the statutory maximum for violations of supervised release internal quotation marks omitted holding that failure to explain the effect of a term of supervised release was harmless error where term of imprisonment combined with maximum imprisonment for violation of supervised release was still less than statutory maximum holding the district courts revocation of defendants term of supervised release did not end the courts jurisdiction over defendants release holding that a statute requiring a threeyear term of supervised release did not eviscerate the district courts discretion to adjust the term of supervised release pursuant to  3583e recognizing that we review a trial courts jury instruc tions for abuse of discretion and that a district court abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law internal quotation marks omitted