was instructed, in Final Instruction No. 9, that John Morrell was liable only for those injuries “proximately caused by the wrongful conduct of the defendant.” The jury heard evidence that Baker’s injuries resulted from being subjected to a hostile work environment, retaliated against, and constructively discharged. John Morrell thoroughly cross-examined Baker’s physicians, Baker’s witnesses, and Baker with respect to the causation of these damages and other “stressors” in her life, but the jury evidently chose to believe the plaintiffs evidence, which established that her condition was the result of discrimination. It is well-settled that causation is ordinarily left for a jury to determine. See Exxon Co., USA v. Sofec Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 840-41, 116 S.Ct. 1813, 135 L.Ed.2d 113 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Here, there was evidence which, if believed,
holding that the issue of proximate causation involves application of law to fact which should be left to the fact finder subject to limited review holding that conflicting testimony raised fact issue fact finder was not obliged to accept one experts testimony over the other holding that the issue of defendants actual knowledge should not be resolved on summary judgment but should be left to the trier of fact holding that the facts asserted that a breach of contract may have occurred under virginia law based on a tpp agreement but concluding the question is best left to the finder of fact holding the question of necessity is one of mixed law and fact and accordingly one for the fact finder in the ordinary case