staying the processing of claims not yet at the Board, which means there is no party before us with any standing to oppose the Secretary’s request — there is no case or controversy with regard to claims potentially affected by Haas but not yet before the Board. Assuming arguendo that the Secretary does not have the authority to stay claims not yet on appeal to the Board, and that is a big assumption, see Ribaudo, 20 Vet.App. at 554 n. 2 (stating that the Court would render clear in its decision the scope of the Secretary’s authority to stay processing of claims, and then holding in that decision only that, absent regulation, the Secretary did not have authority to stay processing of claims at the Board as doing so contravened section 7107); Tobler v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 8,12 (1991) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Ithaca Coll. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224,
holding that the district court was authorized to remand the proceedings to the board where the board failed to make required findings holding that such a stay is appropriate where in the absence of a stay the continuation of the proceedings in the trial court disrupts the arbitration proceedings and can render them ineffective holding that an appeal to an agency review board would be futile because the board lacked authority to invalidate ordinance as requested holding that it would be reasonable for the board to stay its proceedings in a case that arguably falls within the precedent of another on appeal holding that the point on appeal and the objection in the trial court must be the same in order for it to be preserved for appeal