to the water, no matter how small, violates the upland ower’s riparian rights. However, such a reading is problematic for two reasons. First, such a reading is far broader than the actual facts of Tiffany, where the defendant had blocked approximately fifty percent of the frontage of the plaintiffs property. As a result, there can be no question that the language is merely dicta. Second, subsequent New York cases indicate that this more narrow reading is correct. Cases citing Tiffany have largely recognized that the upland ower’s right of access is not absolute; rather, riparian owers have the mere right to reasonable access to navigable waters. See e.g. Town of Oyster Bay v. Commander Oil Corp., 96 N.Y.2d 566, 734 N.Y.S.2d 108, 113, 759 N.E.2d 1233 (2001)(hereinafter “Commander ”) (<HOLDING>). In Commander, the Court of Appeals ruled that
recognizing common law right of access to judicial documents recognizing that in hilt it was held that the boundary line of riparian owners along the great lakes is the waters edge and not the meander line the riparian owner has the right to accretion holding after analysis of tiffany and other similar cases that well over a century of common law adjudication has established the riparian owers right to reasonable access holding that a plaintiff has no absolute unconditional right of access to the courts and no constitutional right of access to prosecute frivolous or malicious actions holding that petitioners construction of commercial dockage over more than anacreandahalf of public waters  exceeded the reasonable scope of the common law rights it has acquired by virtue of its owership of a small parcel of riparian land