for the sentence. He contends that the district court failed to explain the denials of his request to impose a lower sentence on the basis that he had been rehabilitated while serving a sentence in state prison and his request that the court sentence him using the range set forth in a rejected fast-track plea offer. The district court adequately explained the reasons for the sentence. See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc). The court addressed Cabrera’s argument related to his state sentence, and the district court was not required to address Cabrera’s frivolous argument that he should receive a sentence based on a rejected fast-track plea agreement. See Carty, 520 F.3d at 992-93; cf. United States v. Gonzalez-Zotelo, 556 F.3d 736, 739-41 (9th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Cabrera also contends that the sentence is
holding that any disparity between the defendants sentence and sentences imposed in fasttrack districts was considered appropriately as a single and not controlling factor holding that any disparity between the defendants sentence and those available or imposed in fasttrack jurisdictions was considered appropriately as a single and not controlling factor holding that the district court erred when it used rule 36 to amend the defendants sentence to include an order of forfeiture that had been agreed to in the plea agreement but which the court failed to make a part of its judgment at sentencing holding that district court plainly erred when it decided to impose a sentence comparable to a fasttrack sentence where the defendant did not enter into a fasttrack plea agreement holding that the sentence disparities arising from fasttrack programs do not make  the defendants sentence unreasonable