period of suspension when it revoked appellant’s suspended sentence in 1998. Appellant alleges that his original sentencing order in 1996 imposed a ten-year period of suspension. Appellant argues that the trial court impermissibly extended the period of s a collateral attack on the 1998 sentencing order. Because we find that appellant cannot collaterally attack the 1998 sentencing order through his appeal in the instant ease, it is not necessary to determine whether the trial court erred by extending the period of suspension in the 1998 sentencing order. Appellant did not appeal the 1998 sentencing order. Unless the 1998 sentencing order was void, appellant may not collaterally attack that sentencing order. See Simmers v. Commonwealth, 11 Va.App. 375, 379, 398 S.E.2d 693, 695 (1990) (<HOLDING>). A sentencing order revoking a suspended
holding that a suspended lawyer remains subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the court for acts committed while suspended holding that code sections dealing with suspended sentences are to be liberally construed and that revocation of a suspended sentence lies within the trial courts sound discretion holding that the judgment of the trial court revoking the appellants suspended sentence was not void and thus could not be collaterally attacked holding that a default judgment was not void because the bankruptcy court that entered the judgment had proper jurisdiction over the party seeking relief holding that a court could not agree to impose a sentence within the guidelines but then give a sentence that suspended all but an amount within the guidelines because a reasonable defendant would believe that within the guidelines included suspended time