closing argument. Clark makes no persuasive argument that flaws in the record warrant a reversal of his sentence. The trial court did not err by failing to grant Clark’s motion for a new sentencing heari 86, 95 (1992) (en banc) (reviewing a defendant’s wish to waive his general appeal with the understanding that he could not waive statutory review, following determination that he was competent and his decision to waive his general right of appeal was made knowingly and voluntarily); see also State v. Sagastegui, 135 Wash.2d 67, 954 P.2d 1311, 1320 (en banc), dismissal of post-conviction relief reversed by Vargas v. Lambert, 159 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir.), stay vacated, 525 U.S. 925, 119 S.Ct. 313, 142 L.Ed.2d 274 (1998). 4 . See State v. Berry, 74 Ohio St.3d 1504, 659 N.E.2d 796, 796 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Grosso v. State, 857 P.2d 802, 806
holding that a capital defendant is mentally competent to abandon any and all challenges to his or her death sentence including appeals state postconviction collateral review and federal habeas corpus if he or she has the mental capacity to understand the choice between life and death and to make a knowing and intelligent decision not to pursue further remedies holding that this court has jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals in cases involving a sentence of life imprisonment or death holding that once the defendant has submitted to the control of the officer and the process of taking him or her to the police station  has commenced his or her arrest is complete and he or she is in custody for the purposes of the escape statute holding that state courts determination that the petitioner was competent to waive his right to pursue further postconviction review of his claims was a factual one and therefore presumed correct under the federal habeas corpus statute holding that if a trial court has rejected death as a possible sentence double jeopardy bars the state from seeking the death penalty at resentencing even where rejection of the death sentence was based on a legal error