(emphasis in original). In addition to attacking the common course of action which gave rise to the noncompetitive structure of the petroleum industry, the Exxon complaint charged that respondents, as a group, “exercised monopoly power in the refining of petroleum products.” This theory of shared monopoly power was then, and still is, beyond the reach of § 2 of the Sherman Act. This venture into the outer reaches of § 5 of the FTC Act came to an inconclusive end. In re Exxon, 98 F.T.C. 453 (1981) (dismissing action). Antitrust doctrine has yet to adopt the theory that a shared monopoly is a violation of the antitrust laws. See Harkins Amusement Enters., Inc. v. General Cinema Corp., 850 F.2d 477, 490 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1019, 109 S.Ct. 817, 102 L.Ed.2d 806 (1989) (<HOLDING>); cf. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines,
recognizing general rule recognizing admissibility of eeoc reasonable cause determination but declining to adopt per se rule of admissibility recognizing that shared monopoly theory was novel and holding that no  2 claim was stated in this case but declining to adopt a general rule recognizing this rule recognizing this as the general rule