1954. This latter factor highlights that only governmental actions based upon considerations of public policy are exempt. Id. at 537, 108 S.Ct. 1954. Here, Congress authorized the FAA to enter into contracts, as necessary, to carry out the functions of the FAA, and thus the government did not violate a specific mandatory statute, regulation or policy in hiring Midwest to provide training and oversight at Meigs. The plaintiffs also fail to identify any mandatory statute or regulation dictating how the FAA must oversee private contractors or assure the contractor complies with federal regulations and the contract provisions. Where the plaintiffs’ claim is premised on negligent oversight, such a showing is imperative. See, e.g., Kirchmann v. United States, 8 F.3d 1273, 1276 (8th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Because the plaintiffs failed to establish
holding that the statute is mandatory holding that the plaintiffs first amendment retaliation claims are deficient because in each case the incidents upon which plaintiffs base their pleadings concerned personal grievances expressed as employees generally relating to their official duties work schedules working conditions or employer administrative policies and internal operations rather than to any matters of public concern raised by plaintiffs as private citizens holding that the federal regulatory provisions relied upon by the plaintiffs in their ftca claim did not implicate a mandatory statute because each regulation governs operations where the air force itself rather than a contractor performed the specific operation holding that the county government not the federal government was liable for the taking of an air easement over plaintiffs property even though the airport was funded in part by a federal grant based on compliance with federal regulations holding that a sentence not in compliance with the mandatory provisions of a sentencing statute was illegal and appealable