a standard of review, the government did not know what its burden would be. Like the district court, it proceeded on the assumption that the highest standard of scrutiny applied and then relied almost entirely on conclusory reasoning by analogy from Heller’s reference to the “presumptive” constitutionality of felon-dispossession laws. That was a mistake, for the reasons we have explained. In any event, our discussion here of the appropriate standard of review should provide guidance for the proceedings on remand. Before closing, we offer a few additional observations to help those proceedings along. Intermediate scrutiny tolerates laws that are somewhat overinclusive. See, e.g., Fox, 492 U.S. at 480, 109 S.Ct. 3028; Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 101 F.3d 325, 327-28 (4th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). How much is too much is hard to say; it
holding that appropriate standard of review regarding campaign finance disclosure laws is intermediate not strict scrutiny holding that the commonlaw distinction between governmental and proprietary acts known as the proprietarygovernmental dichotomyapplies in the contractclaims context just as it does in the tort claims context recognizing that intermediate scrutiny in the commercialspeech context allows some latitude between the regulation and the governmental objective holding that some form of heightened constitutional scrutiny applies recognizing a hearing officers latitude in making credibility calls