did not provide for such an award. This court rejected the husband’s argument, noting that it was “clear from the trial court’s language . . . that notwithstanding its use of the word ‘alimony,’ it in fact awarded the wife ‘support and maintenance’ under the terms of § 42-362.” Black, 223 Neb. at 207, 388 N.W.2d at 819. In the present case, it is clear that the district court, notwithstanding its employment of the term “spousal support,” in fact awarded the appellee alimony. This result is consistent with authority from other jurisdictions holding that labels placed upon payments made under the terms of divorce judgments are not determinative of their nature. In re Marriage of Kessler, 110 Ill. App. 3d 61, 441 N.E.2d 1221 (1982); Knipfer v. Knipfer, 259 Iowa 347, 144 N.W.2d 140 (1966) (<HOLDING>); 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 309 (1986); 24 Am. Jur.
holding that the term final and conclusive precludes judicial review of army claims decisions holding that the amendment was a use regulation which was in effect a condition on the use of property in the affected zone recognizing a divorce decree which incorporates a property settlement agreement is a final and conclusive adjudication   holding that a trial courts use of the term alimony was not conclusive against a claim that the award was actually a property settlement holding evidence which established that use of property was permissive showed use of property was not adverse