plea) was wrongful. Poventud cannot evade this fact by “ ‘[s]eeking damages only for punishment he suffered in excess of the one-year imprisonment he accepted as part of his plea.’ ” Maj. Op. at 65 (quoting Appellant Br. 32). Turning elsewhere, the majority posits the hypothetical of a defendant who is tortured, then confesses, then successfully challenges his conviction, then pleads guilty prior to retrial (under no compulsion), and is then released from prison. I have three short responses: • Such a defendant would not need to rely on § 1983 because he could pursue intentional tort claims against the offending officers — state or federal. See N.Y. Ct. Cl. Act § 8 (McKinney) (waiving sovereign immunity); Millbrook v. United States, — U.S.-, 133 S.Ct. 1441, 1446, 185 L.Ed.2d 531 (2013) (<HOLDING>). • I agree with the majority that “the claim
holding that the tucker acts waiver of sovereign immunity for contract claims does not extend to claims for contracts implied in law holding that waiver of sovereign immunity under federal tort claims act for intentional acts committed by federal law enforcement was not limited to investigative activities holding that claims not pursued within two years of their accrual fall outside of the federal tort claims acts limited waiver of sovereign immunity holding that the alien tort statute itself is not a waiver of sovereign immunity holding that waiver of federal tort claims act sovereign immunity is conditioned upon strict compliance with exhaustion requirement