should hold the Association liable to each of them as a matter of law. Instead, the record shows that liability was disputed. Thus, even if the evidence, for example, could support a finding of an arbitrary and capricious denial as to the Feldmans, as well as an arbitrary and capricious denial as to the Trustee, “the verdict does not clearly show that that is what the jury intended to find.” J & C Drilling, 866 S.W.2d at 641. We are simply not “permitted to speculate as to what the jury intended by an ambiguous answer which, because of its ambiguity, cannot constitute a proper basis for a judgment.” Cactus Drilling Co. v. Williams, 525 S.W.2d 902, 907 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Parker v. Keyser, 540 S.W.2d 827, 831 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ) (<HOLDING>). To the extent plaintiffs contend the cases
holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate holding jury finding that one andor another defendant wrongfully removed property was ambiguous and could not support judgment and concluding evidence showing both defendants had removed property could not sustain finding because the evidence nevertheless is conflicting and in view of the andor submission  we could only speculate what the jury intended holding that because property was no longer property of the estate the court could not order turnover holding that evidence of a defendants prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate