in the litigation whenever state policies or procedures are at stake. This commonsense observation of the State’s real interest when its officers are named as individuals has not escaped notice or comment from this Court, either before or after Young. See, e. g., Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 846-847 (1824) (stating that the State’s interest in the suit was so “direct” that “perhaps no decree ought to have been pronounced in the cause, until the State was before the court”) (Marshall, C. J.); Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89, 114, n. 25 (1984) (noting that Young rests on a fictional distinction between the official and the State); see also Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U. S. 670, 685 (1982) (opinion of Stevens, J.) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the suit in Young, which sought to
holding that a county is not an arm of the state for purposes of the eleventh amendment holding that the fourteenth amendment only applies to state action holding california school district a state agency for purposes of the eleventh amendment recognizing the irony that a state officials conduct may be considered  state action for fourteenth amendment purposes yet not for purposes of the eleventh amendment holding that the supreme court of pennsylvania is a state entity for purposes of the eleventh amendment