Ex. 11, 12, 13, 14 (media coverage surrounding proposed policy changes); Ex. 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 (documents outlining department changes based on 1999 policy including formation of oral review board on which 2/5 of the members were black (see Doc. 163 at 9) and establishment of recruitment section). Adapting the 1982 consent decree to hiring practices that began in 1999 could well prove problematic. The Court also considered whether it would have been inclined to modify the decree. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 388, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992) (“A consent decree must ... be modified if, as it later turns out, one or more of the obligations placed upon the parties has become impermissible under federal law.”). See also City of Miami, 2 F.3d at 1505 (<HOLDING>). However, given that the decision to modify a
holding that a class action tolls the statute of limitations only for subsequent individual actions not for subsequent class actions holding that principles articulated in rufo  are applicable to requests to modify or terminate decrees in employment discrimination class actions holding  95114c generally applicable to employment discrimination cases holding that one may waive his right to sue as a class even though the age discrimination in employment act adea expressly references a right to class remedies holding that disparate impact analysis may be applied to subjective employment practices in employment discrimination actions