arranged, the district court properly applied § 2Fl.l(b)(4). Contrary to Hoffman’s view, the Government does not have to show that Hoffman intended serious bodily injury, only that Hoffman intended to cause the accidents. See United States v. Guadagno, 970 F.2d 214, 222 (7th Cir.1992) (proving reckless endangerment under U.S.S.G. § 2K1.4 requires showing that defendant intended to cause dangerous fire, not consciously harm others). We also reject Hoffman’s contention that the victims of the fraud, in this ease the insurance companies, must face the risk of serious bodily injury for § 2Fl.l(b)(4) to apply. Unlike other guidelines sections that apply only if the offense involves injury to a victim of the offense, see, e.g., United States v. Passmore, 984 F.2d 933, 936-37 (8th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>), § 2Fl.l(b)(4) does not specify any particular
holding that the fourteenth amendment only applies to state action holding that fourteenth amendment only applies to state action holding that  215 is categorically a crime of violence for purposes of ussg  2l12 holding ussg  5k23 applies only to direct victim of crime holding mailing a threatening letter was a crime of violence for the purposes of ussg  4b11