deposited in an appropriate receptacle, it is presumed to have been received by the addressee in the ordinary course of the mails. Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 430, 52 S.Ct. 417, 419, 76 L.Ed. 861 (1932). In order to rebut this •presumption, something more than a mere declaration of a creditor alleging non-receipt is required. For example, the Ninth Circuit has held that the mailing presumption is rebutted when the notice sent by certified mail was returned unclaimed. In re Carter, 511 F.2d 1203 (9th Cir.1975); See also Bucknum, 951 F.2d at 207 (“[m]ail that is properly addressed, stamped and deposited into the mail is presumed to be received by the addressee”) (quoting Ricketts, 80 B.R. 495, 498-99 (9th Cir. BAP 1987) (Jones, J., concurring)); In re Ricketts, 80 B.R. at 497 (<HOLDING>). See generally, Barry Russell, Bankruptcy
holding that congress could not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity under the bankruptcy code because if the fourteenth amendment is held to apply so broadly as to justify congress enactment of the bankruptcy code as a requirement of due process then the same argument would justify every federal enforcement scheme as a requirement of due process under the fourteenth amendment holding the broad jurisdictional grant given the bankruptcy courts under the 1978 bankruptcy act unconstitutional recognizing bankruptcy judges have discretion to set bar dates for administrative expenses holding that if denial of receipt alone could rebut presumption that notice was given then the scheme of deadlines and bar dates under the bankruptcy code would come unraveled holding that the eleventh amendment does not bar a bankruptcy court from issuing a money judgment against a state under the bankruptcy code