for additional workers’ compensation benefits; however, the parties ultimately entered into an agreement compromising all claims and releasing the insurer and employer from paying any expenses that may be incurred in the future. Thirteen years later, Sopko filed a petition with Department for additional compensation. After a hearing before Department, the agreement was set aside because “Sopko demonstrated a substantial, and unforeseen, post-release, physical change of condition.” Id. ¶ 5, 575 N.W.2d at 227. On appeal, this Court noted that “[o]rdinarily 16, 232 N.W.2d 463, 467 (1975) (concluding that when the consequences of an injury are newly discovered after the release is signed, the release may be set aside); Chittenden v. Jarvis, 68 S.D. 5, 11, 297 N.W. 787, 789-90 (1941) (<HOLDING>). Further, Sopko is distinguishable from the
holding that claimant may simultaneously receive unemployment benefits and workers compensation for temporary partial disability where statute only precludes receipt of workers compensation for temporary total or permanent total disability if claimant is receiving unemployment benefits holding that similarity between florida workers compensation disability law and social security disability law require that the alj give great weight to the florida determination holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding holding that in a workers compensation case a third party bad faith cause of action does not accrue until judgment is entered on the underlying case holding that discovery of a disability after a workers compensation award is entered will not justify reopening