e.g., Wells v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Express, Inc., 72 N.Y.2d 11, 530 N.Y.S.2d 517, 523-24, 526 N.E.2d 8,14-15 (1988); Krauss v. Utah State Dep’t of Transp., 852 P.2d 1014, 1019-20 (Utah Ct.App.), cert. denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993). Jurisdictions adopting the specific identity rule conclusively presume that the liability of a party not named or otherwise specifically identified by the terms of the release is not discharged. The specific identity rule compels the settling parties either to name nonsettling tortfeasors, see, e.g., Young v. State, 455 P.2d 889, 893 (Alaska 1969), or to include such terms or descriptions as make the identity of the unnamed beneficiaries or the class thereof reasonably apparent, see, e.g., Aid Ins. Co. v. Davis County, 426 N.W.2d 631, 633 (Iowa 1988) (<HOLDING>); Pakulski v. Garber, 6 Ohio St.3d 252, 452
holding that a settlement agreement in which the parties failed to agree upon the terms of a release was unenforceable holding that release discharges only persons named in or sufficiently described by terms of release holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release holding that terms identifying persons in a manner that the parties to the release would know who was to be benefitted sufficient under specific identity rule holding that a release between two parties cannot bind a thirdparty who was a stranger to the release