v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 32 (5th Cir.1995). “It is therefore axiomatic that because Texas prisoners have no protected liberty interest in parole they cannot mount a challenge against any state parole review procedure on procedural (or substantive) Due Process grounds.” Johnson, 110 F.3d at 308. Therefore, as Plaintiffs’ first due process claim relates solely to the parole policies and procedures, the district court did not err in dismissing this claim. See Orellana, 65 F.3d 29 at 31(denying claim that parole review procedures deny due process because they give no advance written notice of hearings, no opportunity to be heard, and deny access to materials and right to be accompanied by person of choice); Brandan v. District of Columbia Bd. of Parole, 823 F.2d 644, 649 (D.C.Cir. 1987) (<HOLDING>). In contrast, parole revocation hearings do
holding that the due process clause protects only those liberty interests created by the state recognizing that a parents liberty interest in the custody of a child is subject to due process protection holding that liberty interests that are protected by procedural due process are generally limited to freedom from restraint holding that procedures adopted by the state to guide its parole release determinations are not themselves liberty interests entitled to constitutional due process protection recognizing that early release statutes can create a liberty interest protected by due process guarantees 