that Wilma had commenced a divorce action against Harold in California. Wilma argued that there was no evidence that Elsie’s good faith belief in the validity of her marriage’ to Harold continued beyond I960. Because the trial court had not found “as to Elsie’s good faith on any date subsequent to the time of her .marriage to Harold,” the appellate court determined that “Elsie’s continuing belief in the legality of her marriage to Harold [was] not altogether free from conflict.” Id. at 519-20, 47 Cal.Rptr. 139 (emphasis added). The court then remanded the case for a trial court determination of the duration of Elsie’s putative marriage and to award benefits accordingly. See id. at 520, 47 Cal.Rptr. 139; see also In re Marriage of Monti, 135 Cal.App.3d 50, 55, 185 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1982) (<HOLDING>). In Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich, 88 Cal. App.2d
holding that although a spouse may have had a right to apportion military retirement benefits at one time the act requires the spouse to assert that right before entry of a finalized divorce decree or waive the right to the benefits holding that californias putative spouse statute must be interpreted to include a divorced spouse who continues to live with the exspouse in ignorance of the final divorce decree and with a good faith belief in the continuing validity of the marriage emphasis added holding that a wife obtained a vested interest in her portion of the retirement benefits as of the date of the divorce decree and any act of the military spouse that unilaterally decreases the nonmilitary spouses vested interest is an impermissible modification of a division of marital property and a violation of the final decree of divorce holding that the test for good faith is the actual belief of the party and not the reasonableness of that belief recognizing the right of a former spouse to seek contribution for payment of community debts not allocated by the divorce decree