and an effective screening device for avoiding the unnecessary harassment of defendants by un-meritorious actions which threaten the free exercise of rights of speech.’ ” Mitchell v. Villien, 08-1470, p. 7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/26/09), 19 So.3d 557, 563 (quoting Kennedy v. Sheriff of East Baton Rouge, 05-1418, p. 25 (La.7/10/06), 935 So.2d 669, 686). This case, however, involves a private citizen suing a private citizen on a matter of private concern; "[hjere, the constitution arguably may not impose any restrictions.” Frank L. Maraist and Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., LOUISIANA TORT LAW § 19.02[8] (2004 ed.). 6 . Mr. Bandaries contends that there are disputed issues of fact as to the reason for Mr. Schmidt’s statements and the damages the statements allegedly caused. He points ou Alaska 2000) (<HOLDING>); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d
holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under missouri law holding that news broadcast which fell within several of the historical categories for per se defamation was not defamatory per se where plaintiffs identity was not shown on its face holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se holding statements regarding plaintiffs unsatisfactory job performance not defamatory per se holding that defendant could not be liable for distributing defamatory statements unless it knew or had reason to know of statements