that his possible diabetic episode did not prompt an early return to the facility by the public-works detail, Davis is similarly situated to the non-homosexual, diabetic prisoners who, he alleged, were allowed to continue working in the public-works program. Thus, Davis’s allegations, accepted as true, support an inference that the prison officials purposefully engaged in discrimination based upon his sexual orientation when they removed him from the public-works program, and his complaint adequately states a claim for relief. Moreover, even if Davis had failed to include allegations about similarly-situated prisoners, his complaint still should not have been dismissed at the pleadings stage. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511-12, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 530-31 (5th
holding that the burden of establishing prima facie case of discriminatory treatment may be satisfied by minimal showing holding that the burdenshifting test established by mcdonnell douglas v green 411 us 792 93 sct 1817 36 led2d 668 1973 does not apply at the pleading stage holding that a title vii plaintiff need not plead the elements of a mcdonnell douglas prima facie case to survive a motion to dismiss holding that plaintiffs alleging discriminatory treatment are not required to plead facts establishing a prima facie case under mcdonnell douglas corp v green 411 us 792 93 sct 1817 36 led2d 668 1973 because its burdenshifting framework does not apply in every discrimination case holding that a plaintiff in a discrimination case need not demonstrate that she was replaced by a person outside her protected class in order to carry her burden of establishing a prima facie case under mcdonnell douglas corp v green 411 us 792 93 sct 1817 36 led2d 668 1973 