resources and ability to assess the settlement agreement beyond the average layperson or enterprise. Moreover, there were only 364 requests for exclusion from the Class, which is 2.76% of the Notice addressees, or virtually di min-imis in light of the over 13,200 Notices of settlement that were sent (as well as published notices and press releases about the settlement). Furthermore, many of the 364 requests for exclusion come from entities or subsidiaries organizationally related to other opt-out filers, and so the Court understands that the number of distinct, independent parties who have excluded themselves likely is less than 364 in number. Keough Aff. ¶ 17. As such, this factor weighs in favor of the proposed settlement’s fairness and adequacy. See Cendant Corp., 264 F.3d at 234-35 (<HOLDING>). c. The Stage of the Proceedings and the
recognizing that low number of objectors and optouts strongly favors settlement and that the vast disparity between the number of potential class members who received notice of the settlement and the number of objectors creates a strong presumption that this factor weighs in favor of the settlement holding that small proportion of objectors constituted tacit consent to settlement holding that in the context of a settlement contract the defrauded party may either 1 rescind the settlement or 2 ratify the settlement retain the proceeds and institute an action to recover fraud damages holding that entry of settlement decree without notice to putative class members violated the due process rights of the class members holding that only 29 objections in 281 member class strongly favors settlement