placed most of the blame for the murders on Huerstel. As discussed earlier, admission of such a statement directly implicates the Confrontation Clause. Consequently, neither of the State’s arguments for avoiding the application of the Confrontation Clause is convincing. ¶ 41 Because Prasertphong’s hearsay statement to the police blaming Huerstel for the murders neither fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception nor bore sufficient indicia of reliability, its admission violated Huerstel’s Confrontation Clause rights. 2. ¶42 At retrial, if the State again seeks to admit Prasertphong’s statement to the police, the trial court may admit the statement only for the limited purpose of impeachment. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414, 417, 105 S.Ct. 2078, 85 L.Ed.2d 425 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Martinez v. McCaughtry, 951 F.2d 130, 133
recognizing that other crimes evidence may be admissible if offered for any nonpropensity purpose and identifying the need to provide necessary background information about the relationships among the players as a proper purpose holding that any confrontation right is found in the fourteenth amendments due process clause not the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment holding that certain outofcourt statements offered to explain the course of police conduct may be admissible because they are not offered for the truth of the matters asserted but rather to show the information upon which the police acted the trial court must balance the prosecutions need for the statements against any prejudice arising therefrom holding that evidence of a defendants prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt holding testimony that would violate the confrontation clause if introduced for the truth may nonetheless be admissible if offered for the limited purpose of impeachment