speedy-trial argument to be disingenuous due to his seven requests for continuance. ¶ 46. Although Bateman’s requests for continuance caused the most significant delay to Bateman’s trial date, this Court has held that well-taken motions for continuance may justify delay in a criminal trial. Flora v. State, 925 So.2d 797, 815 (Miss.2006). This period must be subtracted from the total period of the delay. See Taylor, 672 So.2d at 1259. Therefore, the State is left with an unexplained 380-day delay in this case, representing the time between his arrest and his first motion for continuance. This period does not include the 120-day continuance ordered sua sponte by the trial court, which was justified and will not count against either side. We must weigh this factor in Bate-man’s (<HOLDING>). ¶ 49. This Court has held that a defendant’s
holding the defendant did not demonstrate a denial of his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial where even though the delay was substantial and the defendant was detained pretrial for three years the fault for the delay was shared and the defendant continued to request continuances following his assertion for the right to a speedy trial holding that defendants assertion of his right to a speedy trial two months before his trial began did not satisfy this barker factor holding request made two months before trial timely holding that the defendants failure to assert his right to a speedy trial until one year after his arrest weighed heavily against him under this barker factor holding that a defendants failure to assert the right to speedy trial must be weighed against him in barker analysis