(D.Mass.1985) in an attempt to argue the contrary is misplaced. In Kirane, the court stated that where an affidavit was filed to prove those facts necessary to invoke the fifth amendment, no waiver of the fifth amendment privilege would be found. See id. at 265-66; see also United States v. Doe, 628 F.2d 694, 696 (1st Cir.1980). Laliberte’s affidavit clearly was filed with the intent of doing much more than simply reciting those facts necessary to justify Laliberte’s invocation of the fifth amendment. Consequently, the district court had ample authority to strike the affidavit once Laliberte shielded his account of the “facts” from scrutiny by invoking the fifth amendment at his deposition. See United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 758, 103 S.Ct. 1548, 1553, 75 L.Ed.2d 521 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Laliberte next contends that even if the
holding that the trial court properly disregarded a witnesss ex parte affidavit and his direct testimony when the witness declined to submit to crossexamination holding that although not required to do so trial court had discretion to strike defendants affidavit when he refused to submit to crossexamination holding that a trial witnesss testimony as to the credibility of another witness was prejudicial error holding that it was not erroneous for committing court to refuse to admit an affidavit from a private investigator that provided evidence of a witnesss lack of credibility when the affidavit would not have explained away the witnesss testimony but only challenged its credibility holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to strike witnesss testimony on direct examination when witness asserted fifth amendment on collateral matters on crossexamination particularly when witness was required to invoke privilege in presence of jury