citations omitted). The purpose of the statute is to avoid dilatory tactics, to deter unnecessary delays in litigation, and to deter bad faith conduct by attorneys. See United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Am., AFL-CIO, 948 F.2d 1338, 1345 (2d Cir.1991); Hudson Motors P’ship v. Crest Leasing Enters., Inc., 845 F.Supp. 969, 978 (E.D.N.Y.1994); Herrera v. Scully, 143 F.R.D. 545, 551-552 (S.D.N.Y.1992). Furthermore, § 1927 “requires a clear showing of bad faith,” unlike the objective standard of Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 11. Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Stern, 136 F.R.D. 63, 72-73 (S.D.N.Y.1991); see also Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 948 F.2d at 1345 (“Bad faith is the touchstone of an award under this statute.”); Hudson Motors 845 F.Supp. at 978 (<HOLDING>). In the present matter, Plaintiffs attorney
holding deathpenalty sanctions inappropriate where party inadvertently failed to comply with courts order and nothing in the record  even approaches the flagrant bad faith or abuse necessary for the imposition of such sanctions holding that a bad faith claim arises out of contract for attorney fee statute holding that a bad faith claim is a tort holding that a finding of bad faith on the part of the offending lawyer is a prerequisite for imposing sanctions under 1927 holding that without a demonstration of bad faith on the part of the attorney in question sanctions pursuant to this statute are inappropriate