of action against state officials in their individual capacities because the legislation was enacted pursuant to Congress’ spending power, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(b)(l), which allows the imposition of conditions, such as individual liability, only on those parties actually receiving the state funds. See, e.g., Smith, 502 F.3d at 1272-75 (“[I]t is clear that the ‘contracting party’ in the RLUIPA context is the state prison institution that receives federal funds; put another way, these institutions are the ‘grant recipients’ that agree to be amenable to suit as a condition to receiving funds — but their individual employees are not ‘recipients’ of federal funding.”); cf. Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640-41, 119 S.Ct. 1661, 143 L.Ed.2d 889 (1999) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, “[t]o decide otherwise would create
holding that for title ix enacted pursuant to congress authority under the spending clause the governments enforcement power may only be exercised against the funding recipient recognizing that most other courts apply title vii principles to title ix cases but refusing to apply title viis knew or should have known standard to a title ix claim holding that congress may abrogate a states immunity pursuant to its enforcement power under  5 of the fourteenth amendment holding that title ix was enacted pursuant to  5 of the fourteenth amendment consequently under seminole tribe title ix 42 usc  2000d7 abrogated states eleventh amendment immunity holding that a claim for retaliation does not lie under title ix