Railroad Commission regulation by claiming that the regulation did not, as a matter of law, give rise to a duty in Coastal to Francis. In challenging Coastal’s right to prevail by summary judgment, Francis asserts that Coastal violated the Commission’s regulation and was, therefore, negligent per se. Negligence per se is a common-law doctrine that imposes a duty based on a penal statute, as opposed to the reasonably-prudent-person standard that applies to pure negligence claims. Reeder v. Daniel, 61 S.W.3d 359, 361-62 (Tex.2001); Smith v. Merritt, 940 S.W.2d 602, 607 (Tex.1997). Because Railroad Commission regulations are not penal statutes, they do not provide a basis for claims of negligence per se. See Entex v. Gonzalez, 94 S.W.3d 1, 8-9 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] pet. denied) (<HOLDING>); Hicks v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 970 S.W.2d
holding railroad rate exempt from state regulation holding that violation of city ordinance does not constitute negligence per se holding hearing in chambers was not per se a violation of due process holding negligence per se not applicable to violation of railroad commission regulation holding that violation of state law was not a per se constitutional violation