that induced the execution of the contract. Thus Capital City argues that the district court misinterpreted D.C. law when it instructed the jury (and affirmed in its post-trial order) that the breach of an implicit term of a contract could be tortious. We review the district court’s legal instructions de novo. See Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron) Inc., 999 F.2d 549, 556 (D.C.Cir.1993). It is true that no reported D.C. case has held that a mere intent not to perform a contractual duty can give rise to a cause of action sounding in tort. Nevertheless, such a holding is not precluded by any of the cases that have recognized that a misrepresentation of one’s intent to perform a collateral commitment might be tortious. See, e.g., Howard v. Riggs Nat’l Bank, 432 A.2d 701, 706-07 (D.C.1981) (<HOLDING>); see also Shear v. National Rifle Ass’n, 606
holding that defendant had not committed tort because its agents collateral comment had been made in good faith holding that the trial court committed no error in sustaining objection to plaintiffs testimony that the water had been there for some time because the plaintiff had no personal knowledge of how long the puddle had been there holding that a bad faith claim is a tort holding that a sale must be both fair and reasonable in price and made in good faith holding that the defendant did not establish good faith as a matter of law