officials to suppress disfavored speech arbitrarily. See FW/PBS v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 226-28, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990). However, the procedural safeguards requirement has little relevance to the present case. The doctrine comes into play primarily “when a State undertakes to shield the public from certain kinds of expression it has labelled offensive.” M.I.C. Ltd. v. Bedford Township, 463 U.S. 1341, 1343, 104 S.Ct. 17, 77 L.Ed.2d 1442 (Brennan, Circuit Justice 1983). Few cases invoke the requirement for procedural safeguards unless an explicit censorship scheme — which by definition is not content-neutral — is under attack, and the Supreme Court recently has confirmed that the procedural safeguards doctrine is so limited in scope. See Thomas, 122 S.Ct. at 779-80 (<HOLDING>). To the extent its concerns are not subsumed
holding that a litigants summary judgment motion does not satisfy the requirement for a motion for jmol at the close of the evidence holding that contentneutral regulations need not satisfy freedmans requirement for procedural safeguards holding that constitutional claim must be fairly presented to state court in order to satisfy exhaustion requirement holding that court may satisfy factual basis requirement by examining presentence report holding that charge of money laundering need not satisfy rule 9b