in which this Court engaged in a detailed analysis of the proper method of calculating a statutorily-dictated period of time and reasoned as follows: Where “month,” as employed in a statute, judicial proceeding, or contract, means calendar month, a period of a month or months is to be computed not by counting days, but by looking at the calendar, and it runs from a given day in one month to a day of the corresponding number in the next or specified succeeding month ... that is, if it begins on the 5th of January, it would end on the 5th of February, although thirty-one days would elapse. If it begins on the 5th of February, it would end on the 5th of March, although but twenty-eight days have elapsed, leap year being excepted. Or if it begins App.—San Antonio 1941, writ ref d w.o.m.) (<HOLDING>). This method applies with equal force to
holding that twoyear limitation period did not prevent trustee from relying defensively on  502d holding that twoyear delay was not reasonable holding that a oneyear limitation provision was unreasonable and thus unenforceable because it conflicted with the motor vehicle reparations acts twoyear limitation period holding that where plaintiffs cause of action for personal injuries accrued on june 17 1989 twoyear limitations period expired on june 17 1991 holding that where conversion occurred on september 4 1935 twoyear limitation period expired on and with september 4 1937