may have had with any attorney on the subject of pleading guilty, the consequences thereof and the reasons for his entering the plea.” United States v. Welton, supra, 439 F.2d at 826. In the instant case, Korenfeld has already had a hearing at which Judge Mishler determined that the failure to warn Korenfeld that he would be ineligible for parole had had no bearing on his decision to plead guilty. We have examined Korenfeld’s other claims and find them without merit. Affirmed. 1 . Since repealed. P.L. 91-513, Title III, § 1101(b) (4) (A), 84 Stat. 1292 (Oct. 27, 1970), effective May 1, 1971, but applicable only to future prosecutions. P.L. 91-513, Title III, § 1103. 2 . Accord, Fong v. United States, 411 F.2d 1181 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 968, 90 S.Ct. 450, 24 L.Ed.2d 434 (<HOLDING>). But see Jenkins v. United States, 420 F.2d
holding that when the defendant was misadvised when entering his guilty plea that he would not have to serve a mandatory parole term following his release from prison fundamental fairness required limiting the term of his sentence to that which comported with the plea bargain holding that the failure to inform the defendant of his right to a sixperson jury and the failure to consult the defendant as to his wishes was an error for which a new trial was the only remedy holding that ineligibility for parole is a consequence of a guilty plea and suggesting in dicta that for failure to inform a defendant of such ineligibility will require vacation of all guilty pleas taken after april 2 1969 the date of the mccarthy decision holding that a failure to inform the defendant of the minimum possible sentence meant that the defendant did not fully understand the consequences of his plea and his rights were therefore automatically substantially affected holding that its earlier decision of munich v united states 9th cir 337 f2d 356 1964 which held that failure to inform a defendant of his ineligibility for parole would require vacation of his plea would not be applied retroactively