the Coast Guard, during time of war,” 28 U.S.C. § 2680; yet Feres applies to all claims, combat-related or not, wartime or peacetime. See, e.g., United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 105 S.Ct. 3039, 87 L.Ed.2d 38 (1985) (applying Feres to claim involving crime off duty and off base). Indeed, any inferences against Feres drawn from a statute’s explicit coverage and partial exemptions of the military are weaker for Privacy Act damage actions than for the FTCA. The Privacy Act creates a range of specific, non-damage remedies, see 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(2) & (3), which the government concedes remain fully applicable. Navy Br. at 25. Cf. Jorden v. National Guard Bureau, 799 F.2d 99, 110-11 (3d Cir.1986) (distinguishing between monetary and injunctive relief in applying Feres to (2d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). In the Privacy Act there is no more of an
holding that in the absence of some express indication from congress title vii does not apply to the military holding that title vii does not apply to seminary faculty holding the title vii mixedmotive theory does not apply to adea claims holding that title ii does not apply to the states holding that the mixedmotive framework does not apply to retaliation cases under title vii