that express advocacy existed only because the advertisement “explicitly exhorted” voters to defeat then-President Carter. Thus, there is no doubt the Commission understands that its position that no words of advocacy are required in order to support its jurisdiction runs directly counter to Supreme Court precedent. II. In the face of the unequivocal Supreme Court and other authority discussed, an argument such as that made by the FEC in this case, that “no words of advocacy are necessary to expressly advocate the election of a candidate,” simply cannot be advanced in good faith (as the disingenuousness in the FEC’s submissions attests), much less with “substantial justification.” See e.g., Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 568-71, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 2551-53, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988) (<HOLDING>). It may be that “[images and symbols without
holding that the vas position was substantially justified even though the regulation on which it relied was invalidated as exceeding its statutory authority recognizing that in those cases where the jurisdictional facts are intertwined with the facts central to the merits of the dispute it is the better view that  the entire factual dispute is appropriately resolved only by a proceeding on the merits citations omitted holding that if a motion implicates the merits of a cause of action the district court should find jurisdiction exists and treat the objection as a direct attack on the merits of the plaintiffs case recognizing that sanctions are collateral to the merits of the case and may be considered even after the merits are no longer before the district court holding that views expressed by other courts on the merits and in particular a string of losses together with the actual merits of the governments litigating position are central to issue of whether position was substantially justified