9 .See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987) (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987)); Shaheed v. Winston, 885 F.Supp. 861, 869 (E.D.Va.1995) (plaintiffs must provide evidence that a "discriminatory purpose” was a motivating factor in the defendants' actions); cf. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979) (stating that discriminatory purpose "implies that the decisionmaker ... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,’ not merely 'in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group”); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-67, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977) (<HOLDING>). 10 . In Islam, Ramadan is the ninth month of
holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law holding that the historical background of the decision particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes is significant in determining discriminatory intent holding that circumstantial evidence alone may establish discriminatory intent recognizing the importance of historical analysis in determining whether legislation is punitive recognizing that the mcdonnell douglas framework is less useful in the context of an alleged discriminatory disciplinary decision than in the context of an alleged discriminatory hiring decision