pursuing the public interest in a discrimination-free work place, and it must be allowed to do so in federal court, as authorized by the ADA, notwithstanding the charging party’s agreement to arbitrate. In seeking to “vindicate rights belonging to the United States as sovereign,” EEOC v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 813 F.2d 1539, 1543 (9th Cir.1987) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), which are not necessarily identical to the interests of the individual charging party, the EEOC’s course of conduct should not be affected by the actions of an individual in entering into a private arbitration agreement. See Part III, supra. In similar contexts where charging parties have been deprived of their right to sue either by settling their claims or having their claims dism Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Harris Chernin, 10 F.3d at 1291 (following
holding that the pjlaintiff was not seeking the enforcement of a final eeoc order because he specifically requested more relief than the eeoc awarded holding that the doctrine of res judicata barred the eeoc from seeking individualized benefits under the adea on behalf of individuals whose own suits were unsuccessful because the eeoc was in privity with those individuals holding that in light of a worksharing agreement between the state agency and the eeoc a charge of discrimination filed with the state agency was properly filed with the eeoc on the same date holding res judicata also applies to those in privity with parties holding that neither the faa nor principles of preclusion or waiver could operate to bar the eeoc from seeking monetary relief on behalf of aggrieved individuals