of construction, neither Congress nor the Secretary can know how to write authorities in a way that conveys their intent and no practitioner or — more importantly- — -veteran can rely on a statute or regulation to mean what it appears to say.”). E. Legislative history cannot trump plain meaning of statute. We acknowledge the Secretary’s reference to (1) a congressional compromise agreement t , Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 567, 125 S.Ct. 2611, 162 L.Ed.2d 502 (2005) (stating that legislative history is “often murky, ambiguous, and contradictory”); United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757, 117 S.Ct. 1673, 137 L.Ed.2d 1001 (1997) (“[W]e assume that in drafting this legislation, Congress said what it meant.”); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147, 114 S.Ct. 655, 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, it is axiomatic that, had Congress
recognizing longstanding precedents that permit resort to legislative history only when necessary to interpret ambiguous statutory text holding that legislative history cannot supply a clear statement holding that we may consult legislative history as an aid to the interpretation of ambiguous text recognizing that legislative history is not used to create ambiguity where statutory language is clear holding that even where there are  contrary indications in the statutes legislative history we do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear