so ordered. See infra. It is inconsistent with the foregoing cases for the majority to void the entire extended sentencing regime, simply because the statute’s prescription that “the court” make the findings is invalid, when the case may be readily remanded for a jury, instead, to render such a determination. The majority’s contradictory position thus flies in the face of our own precedent. Second, it is not necessary to nullify the entire statute where some portions of the extended term sentencing statute may be constitutionally applied. Other jurisdictions facing similar issues, in light of Apprendi, Blakely, and Cunningham, have also upheld the constitutional portions of their respective extended term sentencing regimes. See State v. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d 131, 143 n. 11 (Minn.2005) (<HOLDING>); State v. Dilts, 337 Or. 645, 103 P.3d 95,
holding that portions of the sentencing scheme were unconstitutional as applied because the traditional rule is that a law is facially unconstitutional only if it is unconstitutional in all of its applications citing united states v salerno 481 us 739 745 107 sct 2095 95 led2d 697 1987 to succeed in facial challenge challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the act would be valid holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants holding that a statute may be facially challenged only  by establishing that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid ie that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications or at least that the statute lacks a plainly legitimate sweep  holding that person challenging statute as facially vague must show that the challenged law is unconstitutional in every possible application holding  1130 to be unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff