Riverboat Amusement Corp., 52 F.3d 560 (5th Cir. 1995), and King v. Grand Casinos of Mississippi, Inc., 697 So.2d 439, 442 (Miss.1997), is misplaced. In Pavone and King, for example, the courts treated whether a floating gaming casino was a vessel for purposes of the Jones Act and the general maritime law, not for purposes of Mississippi state tax law or any other purpose. 10 . See, e.g., Motorola Communications & Elecs., Inc. v. Dale, 665 F.2d 771, 773 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Richardson v. Borden, 42 Miss. 71, 75-76 (1868)) (describing Mississippi law on fixtures); Bondafoam v. Cook Constr. Co., Inc., 529 So.2d 655, 658 (Miss. 1988) (same); Ziller v. Atkins Motel Co., 244 So.2d 409, 411 (Miss. 1971) (same). 11 . See Watson v. Caffery, 236 Miss. 223, 109 So.2d 862, 866 (1959) (<HOLDING>). 12 . We also note that this issue will not
holding that in action by property owner to recover land taken by eminent domain current titleholder to land might be necessary party if district court were to restore land to plaintiff holding that the term personal property in its broadest legal signification includes everything the subject of ownership not being land or any interest in land holding that the deed and not the historical description of the land determines what land constitutes the forfeitable property recognizing general proposition that if land is artificially submerged for the statutory period necessary to change ownership of the land title to the submerged land is passed to the state in trust for the public holding that land sales contracts were not securities because they involved no investment in an enterprise even if land was bought on expectation that development of the area would increase the value of the land