role of an advocate in prosecuting Srivastava. Likewise, the doctrine of judicial immunity precludes Srivastava’s claims against the judge who presided over her criminal case. See Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1015 (7th Cir.2000) (judicial immunity shields judges from civil actions for their judicial acts unless they have acted in the clear absence of jurisdiction); John v. Barron, 897 F.2d 1387, 1393 (7th Cir.1990) (mere allegations of conspiracy insufficient to overcome judicial immunity). Additionally, Srivastava cannot sue employees of the Marion County Public Defender’s Office under § 1983 because they are not acting under “color of state law,” a requisite element of any § 1983 claim. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317 n. 4, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981) (<HOLDING>). As for Srivastava’s claim against the officer
holding that a town manager did not act under color of state law when making allegedly defamatory statements about the plaintiff holding um did not act under color of state law when it terminated an employee holding that a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing the traditional functions of counsel to a criminal defendant holding that public defenders do not act under color of state law and therefore are not subject to suit under 42 usc  1983 holding that to prevail on a  1983 claim a plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law in other words that there was state action