authority to bind the church when he induced Mukes to travel to New York. Only when Thomas wanted some documents signed did Mukes inform Thomas that he “did not have the final say-so.” Thus, the evidence at trial would support an inference that when Thomas induced Mukes to come to New York, he thought Mukes had the authority to bind the church. Mukes’s travel was indeed essential to Thomas’s scheme — without convincing Mukes of the viability of the investment program, Thomas would never have met Pastor Holmes or have had the opportunity to defraud the church. Moreover, a reasonable inference from the evidence is that Thomas’s overall plan was to use Mukes, Pastor Holmes, and anyone else necessary to effectuate his scheme. Cf. United States v. Kelly, 569 F.2d 928, 935-36 (5th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). Mukes’s statements or beliefs on his capacity
holding that the statute requires actual intent to hinder delay or defraud creditors or the trustee constructive intent to defraud does not suffice holding other acts evidence that was permissible to demonstrate a plan to defraud was also admissible to establish intent knowledge and absence of mistake holding that actual intent to defraud is not necessary to finding of constructive fraud holding that a finding of specific intent to defraud necessarily excludes a finding of good faith holding that  2314 does not require specific intent to defraud a certain person a general intent to defraud any person who might fall victim to the schemers plan is sufficient