against aiders and abettors of § 22(a) violations. To be sure, § 13(a) was amended in 1983 to remove language that limited its applicability to administrative proceedings, but we do not believe this alteration justifies construing the statute in such a way as to eviscerate the exclusivity proviso in § 22(a)(2). Rather, the better interpretation of this amendment is that it granted additional power to the CFTC to bring judicial, as well as administrative, proceedings against those who aid and abet violations of § 22(a). Plaintiffs argue that aiding and abetting liability under § 13(a) should be inferred into the statute in the same manner as responde-at superior liability has been imputed to principals through § 2(a)(1) of the CEA. See Bosco v. Serhant, 836 F.2d 271, 280 (7th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056, 108 S.Ct. 2824,
recognizing respondeat superior liability holding that the liability reform act preempted in part the common law doctrine of respondeat superior holding that a municipality cannot be liable on a respondeat superior theory holding that employees defamatory statements made at work about matters relating to work were within the scope of their employment for purposes of respondeat superior and recognizing that californias respondeat superior doctrine imposes a broad rule of liability on employers holding that county liability under  1983 cannot rest on a theory of respondeat superior