courts should consider when exercising this discretion, namely, “frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and in the legal components of the case) and the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence,” id. at 534 n. 19, 1 rp., 81 F.3d 881, 890 (9th Cir.1996) (awarding fees because, inter alia, plaintiffs claims were “factually unreasonable”); Diamond Star Bldg. Corp. v. Freed, 30 F.3d 503, 506 (4th Cir.1994) (affirming award of fees because, inter alia, “the objective reasonableness factor strongly weighted] in favor of awarding attorney’s fees and costs”). The same is true of the district courts in this Circuit. See, e.g., EMI Catalogue P’ship v. CBS/Fox Co., 1996 WL 280813, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 1996) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. Crichton, 891 F.Supp. 120, 122
holding that the copyright act distinguishes between employees and independent contractors for copyright possession holding that conversion and unjust enrichment claims were preempted by the copyright act since they were not qualitatively different from a copyright claim because they contained no extra element beyond those necessary to show copyright infringement holding that while the computer program at issue was within the subject matter of copyright the right sought under state law pursuant to a license was not equivalent to the exclusive rights under copyright as such copyright preemption did not apply holding that where the plaintiffs copyright infringement claim was without a reasonable legal basis an award of attorneys fees to the defendants was a proper exercise of judicial discretion holding that copyright owners claim was not so objectively unreasonable as to justify an award