alleged cheating on his expense account regarding a $15.00 lunch; (2) DeBord’s approval of a $4,000 lease of computer equipment from a firm in which he or his son allegedly had an interest; and (3) the alleged interest of Vrungos and DeBord in TRW’s acquisition of Nations, an acquisition which never occurred. None of these activities attributed to DeBord or Vrungos constitutes an activity of TRW. These activities were not remotely on TRW’s behalf and did not advance TRW’s interests. To the contrary, if Roach’s allegations were true, TRW was the victim. We are persuaded that the Legislature in enacting CEPA did not intend that the disclosure of employee activities victimizing the employer would fall within CEPA. See Littman v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 715 F.Supp. 90 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (<HOLDING>). CEPA’s definition of “employer” supports our
holding that the coemployee immunity provision in workers compensation law was constitutional holding the defendant does not possess statutory standing to attack the subpoena  because he has not demonstrated that he was within the zone of interests intended to be protected by  876a holding that although the defendant in that case was convicted after the effective date of the new statute  1137118 he nevertheless was required to register as a sex offender because  113716 was in effect at the time he was charged holding that plaintiffs allegation that he was fired because he disclosed fraudulent activity by coemployee was not covered by new jerseys cepa because the employer was the sole victim of the alleged fraud indirect impact on shareholders does not bring case within cepa holding that the fact that employer had knowledge of the employees protected activity was not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation where the timing of the discharge was not proximate to the protected activity