carry on business.” That does not make an embezzlement or a conversion of assets. The Court agrees with Judge Conrad’s findings that Essenfeld failed, as a matter of law, to prove that the debtor acted with fraudulent intent or malice when he continued to service his previous clients. In fact, the statement of admitted and uncontested facts submitted by the parties’ indicated that “[t]he defendant continues to service clients amounting to approximately fifty (50%) percent of the previous partnership.” Judge Conrad’s conclusion that the plaintiff failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the debtor acted with fraudulent intent or malice and with intent to injure is supported by the record. See Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, -, 118 S.Ct. 974, 977, 140 L.Ed.2d 90 (1998) (<HOLDING>) Therefore, the Court affirms the decision of
holding that the word willful in a6 modifies the word injury indicating that nondischargeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury holding that a mere deliberate or intentional act that causes injury is not sufficient to establish willfulness in the context of 11 usc  523a6 holding that  523a6 requires the actor to intend the injury not just the act that leads to the injury holding that there must be proof of both a willful act and malicious injury to establish nondischargeability under section 523a6 holding that the debtors knowing act of failing to obtain workers compensation insurance so that the employer owed an employee a debt after the employee suffered a workplace injury was not the sort of willful and malicious injury required for nondischargeability under  523a6 because it cannot not be said that the employer intended for the employee to suffer a fall or that there was an unbroken chain of events leading from the employers intentional act to the employees physical injury