contention that use of “misrepresentation to induce him into agreeing to the trip” constituted wrongful removal of the child); McKie v. Jude, 2011 WL 53058, at *6 (E.D.Ky.2011) (declining to “recast” initial removal as wrongful “once Respondent exceeded the scope of [Petitioner’s] consent to remain in the United States”). Instead, “[t]he case law reflects in cases where the petitioning parent initially gave consent for the child to travel to another country for some period of time,” retention of the child in that country becomes wrongful only when the petitioning parent clearly “communicates that he or she no longer consents to the child remaining in that country.” Selo v. Selo, 929 F.Supp.2d 718, 727 (E.D.Mich. 2013); see also Karkkainen v. Kovalchuk, 445 F.3d 280, 290 (3d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Javier consented to C.F. traveling to
holding wrongful retention began once petitioning parent clearly communicated her opposition to the childs presence in the united states holding that the fourteenth amendment which makes persons bom in the united states and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the united states and requires that representatives be apportioned among the states based on population excluding indians not taxed did not make an indian a citizen of the united states recognizing that a foster parent may attain the status of psychological parent when the relationship is not temporary in duration and exists with the consent and encouragement of a childs legal parent or guardian recognizing federal constitutional claim against the united states holding that the commandant of the united states disciplinary barracks and the united states are identical parties