Thus, the NCAA plays a vital role in enabling [intercollegiate sports] to preserve its character, and as a result enables a product to be marketed which might otherwise be unavailable. In performing this role, its actions widen consumer choice ... and hence can be viewed as proeompetitive. Id. at 101-02, 104 S.Ct. at 2960-61 (footnote omitted). In particular, the Court explained that “[i]t is reasonable to assume that most of the regulatory controls of the NCAA are justifiable means of fostering competition among amateur athl at 304 (noting in dicta that “any limitation on access to intercollegiate sports is merely the incidental result of the organization’s pursuit of its legitimate goals”); see also Justice v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 577 F.Supp. 356, 379 (D.Ariz.1983) (<HOLDING>). We agree with these courts that, in general,
holding that a motion for rule 37 sanctions is dispositive holding sanctions order not final where the amount of sanctions had not yet been determined holding that ncaa sanctions such as rendering a college team ineligible for postseason play and for television appearances imposed for violations of rule against providing compensation to studentathletes did not violate antitrust law because sanctions were reasonably related to the ncaas goals of preserving amateurism and promoting fair competition holding that a motion for rule 11 sanctions is dispositive holding that trial court erred by imposing sanctions against attorney without notice and hearing but error was cured by attorneys subsequent challenge to sanctions