charge and the contentions contained therein, this Court does not find that Reno’s sexual harassment claim would have been developed and subsequently investigated during the course of the EEOC proceedings. The facts allegedly forming the basis of Reno’s charge o discrimination she advanced in her EEOC charge is sufficiently broad enough to encompass her sexual harassment claim. However, simply “[b]ecause a claim of sexual harassment may constitute sexual discrimination does not imply that a charge consisting of facts which purportedly constitute sexual discrimination necessarily includes all forms of sexual discrimination.” Sandom v. Travelers Mortgage Servs., Inc., 752 F.Supp. 1240, 1247 (D.N.J.1990); see Riley v. Tech. & Management Servs. Corp., 872 F.Supp. 1454, 1459 (D.Md.1995) (<HOLDING>). For instance, in the pending action, Reno’s
recognizing that a claim of hostile environment sex discrimination is actionable under title vii holding that harassment of women working alongside plaintiff was relevant to question of creation of environment viola tive of title vii  although vinson was a sexual harassment case the principles underlying a hostile environment theory are equally applicable in sexual harassment and racial harassment cases holding that allegations of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation necessarily state a claim of discrimination on the basis of sex holding that eeoc charge filed by plaintiff more than 180 days after alleged incident of sexual harassment was timely where alleged sexual harassment violation continued as hostile work environment through time of plaintiffs termination holding that a charge that alleged discrimination on the basis of sex did not support a complaint for hostile environment sexual harassment