care provider with respect to the negligent treatment, can shift through indemnification the responsibility for an enhanced injury. See Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal.App.2d 69, 38 Cal.Rptr. 490, 493-94 (1964); Gertz, 302 N.E.2d at 43-44; Hunt v. Ernzen, 252 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1977); New Milford Bd. of Educ. v. Juliano, 219 N.J.Super. 182, 530 A.2d 43, 45 (1987); Musco v. Conte, 22 A.D.2d 121, 254 N.Y.S.2d 589, 594 (1964); see also Amrep Southwest, Inc. v. Shollenbarger Wood Treating, Inc. (In re Consolidated Vista Hills Retaining Wall Litigation), 119 N.M. 542, 545-46, 893 P.2d 438, 441-42 (1995) (discussing circumstances in which traditional indemnification arises between parties not in pari delicto). But see Transcon Lines v. Barnes, 17 Ariz.App. 428, 498 P.2d 502, 509 (1972) (<HOLDING>); Teepak, Inc. v. Learned 237 Kan. 320, 699
holding that fouryear limitation period on indemnification claim does not commence until the party seeking indemnification has paid a judgment or has made a voluntary payment of its legal liability to an injured party holding original tortfeasor had no right to indemnification because it was not an innocent party holding that indemnification  without regard to  the negligence of any party clearly and unequivocally provided bay drilling with indemnification for its own negligence holding that right of one joint tortfeasor to implead a second joint tortfeasor and have the jury apportion the damages according to their relative degrees of fault was not merely a procedural right but a substantive right holding original tortfeasor had no right to indemnification because claim properly was for contribution