they filed this action. The Court finds that the plain language of § 1997e(e) is particularly clear—its limitation is confined to “prisoners confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility.” Certainly, if Congress intended to extend the reach of this section to cover inmates who have been released from incarceration, it would have chosen language indicating so. As the Second Circuit held when interpreting the exact same language in a different section of the PLRA: “[t]he reference to a prisoner’s ‘confine [merit in] any jail, prison, or other correctional facility’ thus seems to describe the status of a plaintiff at the time of filing, not that of the plaintiff at some later time.” Perez v. Westchester Cnty. Dep’t of Corrs., 587 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir.2009) (emphasis added) (<HOLDING>). That the district court in In re Nassau Cnty.
holding that 42 usc  1997ea requires prisoners to exhaust a process and not a remedy holding that 42 usc  1997edls attorney fee cap only applies to prisoners still incarcerated at the time of their cases resolution holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 holding that the plra only applies to plaintiffs who are incarcerated at the time an action is commenced recognizing right of prisoners to seek relief under 42 usc  1983 for denial of access to the courts