Carmickle also argues that the ALJ erred by not classifying his carpal tunnel syndrome as a “severe” impairment at step two of the analysis. However, the only medical evidence addressing such impairment is a letter dated in 1996 (well before Carmickle’s alleged onset of disability) stating that the physician “identified a probably unrelated carpal tunnel syndrome and peripheral neuropathy” and notes from a follow-up visit indicating that “over the past couple of weeks [Carmickle] has had further improvement in his ... arm symptoms such that he states that over the past several days he has few, if any, arm complaints.” Furthermore, the medical record does not establish any work-related limitations as a result of this impairment. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 682 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, we
holding that a medical impairment is deemed  severe  when alone or in combination with other medically determinable physical or mental impairments it significantly limits an individuals physical or mental ability to do basic work activities holding that emotional distress requires a showing of either physical symptoms or mental illness holding that rule 35 does not permit sweeping examinations of a party who has not affirmatively put into issue his own mental or physical condition by asserting his mental or physical condition either in support of or in defense of a claim and that mere relevance to the case is insufficient holding that a general statement about how the defendant wanted to introduce evidence of medical or mental impairment to show that the defendant lacked the proper mental state was an insufficient offer  there must be some meat of the actual evidence holding testimony about plaintiffs mental and physical state before treatment by physician was relevant