had reasonable suspicion to initiat ent claims because the Fifth Amendment does not apply to state actors. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462, 62 S.Ct. 1252, 86 L.Ed. 1595 (1942) (“Due process of law is secured against invasion by the federal Government by the Fifth Amendment and is safeguarded against state action in identical words by the Fourteenth.”), overruled on other grounds by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). The record does not support Farley’s First Amendment claim for intimidation and/or retaliation. There is nothing in the record suggesting that a reasonable person would have been prevented from engaging in protected speech in similar circumstances. See Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted).
holding that the proper inquiry asks whether an officials acts would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future first amendment activities holding that plaintiffs who alleged a subjective chill of their first amendment rights failed to establish specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm holding that the proper harmlesserror inquiry asks absent the improperly introduced evidence is it clear beyond reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty holding that the proper harmlesserror inquiry asks whether absent the improperly introduced evidence it is clear beyond reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a guilty verdict holding that whether a person has a disability under the ada is an individualized inquiry