the parameters for departure, outside of which a court cannot go without assuming the risk of acting beyond permissible limits.”). Existing caselaw is unequivocal that being an exemplary parent or spouse is not sufficient to take a case out of the “heartland.” See United States v. Sweeting, 213 F.3d 95, 102 (3d Cir.2000) (ruling that though defendant “appears devoted to her children and is a ‘substantial positive influence’ on their lives,” no departure was warranted); United States v. Tejeda, 146 F.3d 84, 87 (2d Cir.1998) (“The existence of a stable family (a wife and two children)— something that is by no means extraordinary—does not satisfy the ‘exceptional hardship’ criterion warranting family circumstance departure.”); United States v. Bell, 974 F.2d 537, 538-39 (4th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Shoupe, 929 F.2d 116, 121
holding that despite the defendants status as the sole supporter of his wife and three children the district court erred when it gave a downward departure for familial obligations because departure downward in sentencing is not justified for family reasons except in unusual circumstances holding that the district court had the discretion to grant a downward departure for postsentence rehabilitation holding that the defendants role in helping to produce a stable family and the fact that incarceration would likely disrupt his spousal and parental relationships is insufficient to grant a downward departure holding that we may not review a district courts refusal to grant a downward departure unless the court mistakenly believed that it lacked the authority to grant such a departure holding that the district courts refusal to grant a downward departure was discretionary and not because it believed it lacked the authority to depart where the court assessed the facts of the case and concluded that the departure requested does not seem  to have a basis