a parolee does not enjoy “the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only [] the conditional liberty properly dependant on observance of special parole restrictions.” Id. at 365, 118 S.Ct. 2014 (quotation omitted); accord Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973) (“[R]evocation[ ] is not a stage of a criminal prosecution, [even if it] does result in a loss of liberty.”); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (recognizing that a parolee does not have the full panoply of constitutional rights to which a criminal defendant is entitled). Relying on these cases, we have reached the same- conclusion in the supervised-release context. See United States v. Soto-Olivas, 44 F.3d 788, 792 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). The panel’s decision is thüs- contrary to
holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release holding that  3605 authorizes a transferee court to revoke a term of a defendants supervised release for violations committed prior to the transfer of jurisdiction holding that the fourth amendment does not require a warrant based on an oath or affirmation to revoke an individual on supervised release holding that constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants through the sixth amendment apply in nonsummary criminal contempt prosecutions just as they do in other criminal prosecutions holding that proceedings to revoke supervised release  need not comply with the procedural protections constitutionally guaranteed for criminal prosecutions