(concluding that it was unlikely that defendants were misled by “ambiguous” statutory language in light of multiple warnings received). . Similarly unconvincing is defendants’ vagueness challenge to § 830(b)(l)(A)’s reporting requirement with respect' to “any other circumstance that the regulated person believes may indicate that the listed chemical will be used in violation of [the Controlled Sub stances Act].” While this language is certainly broad, its application is limited to what “the regulated person believes.” Such a scienter requirement generally saves a statute from unconstitutional vagueness. See United States v. Curcio, 712 F.2d 1532, 1543 (2d Cir.1983) (Friendly, J.); cf. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395, 99 S.Ct. 675, 58 L.Ed.2d 596 (1979) (and cases cited therein) (<HOLDING>). Further, in this case, defendants were
recognizing that the federal pleading standard is a less stringent standard than the delaware pleading standard holding that the standard of review for an award of statutory damages is even more deferential than an abuse of discretion standard holding that the standard of proof for dischargeability actions is the preponderance of the evidence standard holding that even if the standard for waiver is clear the standard was not met recognizing that the constitutionality of a vague statutory standard is closely related to whether that standard incorporates a requirement of mens rea 