id., Instruction 53-9 (defining elements of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d)). 17 . Section 3559(c) does not specifically define "convicted,” a term that "can mean either the finding of guilt or the entry of a final judgment on the merits.” Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 131, 113 S.Ct. 1993, 124 L.Ed.2d 44 (1993). Nevertheless, because the statute first employs "convicted” to refer to the person standing before the court for sentence, we can easily conclude that the term there alludes simply to a guilt determination. In subpart (1)(A), however, Congress employs additional language to clarify its intent for an inquiry into more than guilt determina tions when assessing a defendant’s prior convictions. It there specifies that the defendant must have “been conv , 351 & n. * (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). In the district court, Snype argued that the
holding that for sentencing purposes the government does not need to allege a defendants prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact is not an element of the present crime holding that a prior conviction is not final and cannot be used to deny appellant community supervision in the primary offense if appellant still has time to file a motion for new trial in the prior conviction case holding that uncounseled conviction could not be considered by court in sentencing defendant after subsequent conviction holding that a prior conviction is a sentencing factor under 8 usc  1326b2 and not a separate criminal offense holding that prior final conviction is separate from conviction on which defendant faces sentencing if defendant had a meaningful opportunity to refrain from criminal activity and instead engaged in criminality anew