bodily injury arising out of a street fight. We leave for another day the question whether consent may be a defense to assault in contexts such as official or unofficial sporting events, or whether such acts even are properly considered assaults. III. C r. 1, 753 P.2d 1052, 1072 (1988) (en banc) ("Voluntary mutual combat outside the rules of sport is a breach of the peace, mutual consent is no justification, and both participants are guilty of criminal assault. Thus, where the prosecution’s evidence shows a jailhouse scuffle, the scene as witnessed does not suggest defendant may have been acting in self-defense, and defendant presents no evidence in mitigation, a finding of criminal assault is justified.”) (citation omitted); State v. Weber, 137 Wash.App. 852, 155 P.3d 947, 951 (2007) (<HOLDING>); People v. Reckers, 251 Ill.App.3d 790, 191
holding that counsel was deficient when he failed to object to error in jury charge referring to aggravated assault when the charge was assault on a public servant holding that consent is not a defense to the charge of second degree assault where the assault occurred in the context of a prison fight between inmates holding that consent to participate in the initiation into a prison gang is not a defense to the charge of battery holding that a reference to the violent crime sentencing statute in the second degree assault statute required automatic imposition of violent crime sentencing for a defendant convicted of second degree assault holding that an assault that occurred immediately after the employee was discharged was in the course of the employment