to the public in general, beginning in 1987. Moreover, the claim that Odettes did not know about the rotating pass-thru port is relevant to the issue of when to start the period of delay, not to whether the length of that period, once it began, was reasonable; indeed, Odeties advanced this same argument in support of its assertion that the laches period did not begin until late 1993. Odeties next contends that its delay should be excused because it had neither a legal department nor formal patent enforcement procedures during the period of delay. As a matter of law, however, this fact does not excuse Odeties’ failure to investigate the Sto-ragetek ATLs until some six years after the alleged infringement commenced. See Coleman v. Corning Glass Works, 619 F.Supp. 950, 952 (W-D.N.Y.1985) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 818 F.2d 874 (Fed.Cir. 1987). Further,
holding that an over twoyear delay without any excuse was unreasonable as a matter of law holding that a fiftyday delay to conduct an investigation was reasonable as a matter of law holding that plaintiffs inability to stand more than two hours was insufficient as a matter of law to prove that she was disabled holding that an eightmonth delay without excuse was unreasonable as a matter of law holding inability to locate attorney who would prosecute infringement suit inadequate as matter of law to excuse delay