evidence and where such evidence may lead to admissible evidence), Opinion, ¶ 52, the jury must be instructed on how it is to evaluate this sort of evidence if such inadmissible evidence comes up in the UTPA trial. ¶82 While the lawyers and the trial judge know that inadmissible evidence will not be allowed into the underlying case on the merits, lay jurors, obviously, do not. For example, it is common knowledge that lay persons conflate criminal liability for a traffic accident-i.e., the issuance of or conviction on a traffic citation-with civil liability or “fault.” Likewise, lay jurors typically believe that a party is not civilly liable or at “fault” if that party was not cited with a traffic offense in the accident. See Smith v. Rorvik, 231 Mont. 85, 90, 751 P.2d 1053, 1056 (1988) (<HOLDING>). ¶83 Therefore, in cases where the insurer has
holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact recognizing that the preponderance of the evidence is the quantum of proof in civil cases holding that because the elements of proof in civil and criminal trials are decidedly different evidence of the issuance or nonissuance of a traffic citation is generally irrelevant to the question of negligence and thus inadmissible in a civil trial holding that there is no distinction having any first amendment significance between criminal libel and civil libel or criminal fraud and civil fraud for libelous or fraudulent speech both have no first amendment protection in either the civil or criminal context holding that civil rules of pleading not criminal rales apply to traffic offenses punishable by civil forfeiture