failure would not be considered violations of the [ADA] or this part” because “[i]t is, of course, impossible to guarantee that mechanical devices will never fail to operate.” Guidance on ADA Regulation on Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and in Commercial Facilities, originally published on July 26, 1991, 28 C.F.R. Pt. 26, App. C (Mar. 15, 2011). Courts accordingly have held that an isolated or temporary hindrance to access does not give rise to a claim under the ADA or the state equivalent. See, e.g., Foley v. City of Lafayette, Ind., 359 F.3d 925, 929 (7th Cir.2004); Sharp v. Capitol City Brewing Co., LLC, 680 F.Supp.2d 51, 59 (D.D.C.2010); Thill v. Olmsted County, No. 08-CV-4612 (PSJ/JSM), 2010 WL 3385234, at *6 (D.Minn. Aug. 14, 2010) (<HOLDING>). Chasewood again maintains that neither
holding that because the plaintiff was not disabled for the purposes of the ada this court need not to address the other elements of the prima facie case holding on this record even if the door was not in compliance with the ada when plaintiff was injured given olmstead countys maintenance practices and its prompt response to plaintiffs complaint about the door a reasonable jury would not find defendants liable under the ada for the doors mechanical failure on a single occasion holding that in order to establish liability under the ada the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant was an employer within the meaning of the statute holding ada claim was discharged holding the ada and the rehabilitation act applicable