not provide a mechanism for taking investigative depositions. Third, the fact that Squaw Creek seeks presuit discovery under rule 202 rather than final adjudication of its claims militates against application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine. Primary jurisdiction precludes a court from “finally adjudicating a claim until the agency has an opportunity to act on the matter.” Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 221 (Tex.2002) (emphasis added). Squaw Creek does not seek final or even preliminary adjudication of its claims; rather, it seeks only to investigate potential claims. Under these circumstances, primary jurisdiction does not preclude the trial court from allowing Squaw Creek to take investigative depositions. See Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 209, 211-12 (<HOLDING>). We hold that the district court has
holding that the trial court had continuing jurisdiction over all subsequent custody orders once the trial court acquired jurisdiction holding that although doctrine of primary jurisdiction required trial court to abate claims over which agency had primary jurisdiction trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing temporary injunction to maintain the status quo holding that primary jurisdiction did not apply where the court had to determine whether defendants all natural claims were misleading holding primary jurisdiction doctrine does not apply because defendant did not identify with precision any relevant proceedings to which this court should defer for the resolution of the question presented holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting such a temporary injunction