GAWTHROP, District Judge. Before the court in this sexual discrimination case is a motion to dismiss the individual defendants under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”), the Act of October 27, 1955, P.L. 744, as amended February 28, 1961, P.L. 47, 43 P.S. § 951 et seq., upon the proposition that they may not be sued in their individual capacities. Defendants argue that the PHRA should follow the Federal Title VII provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1994 & 1995 Supp.), which has been interpreted by some to preclude individual liability. See, e.g., Ascolese v. SEPTA 902 F.Supp. 533 (E.D.Pa.1995); Caplan v. Fellheimer Eichen Braverman and Kaskey, 882 F.Supp. 1529 (E.D.Pa.1995) (same). But cf. Doe v. William Shapiro, Esq., P.C., 852 F.Supp. 1246 (E.D.Pa.1994) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff counters that the PHRA expressly
holding that relief granted under title vii is against the employer not individual employees whose actions constituted a violation of title vii emphasis in original holding that individual defendants may not be held liable for violations under title vii holding that there is no individual liability under title vii holding that a title vii plaintiff could not hold coworkers liable in their individual capacities under title vii holding individual employees may be liable under title vii