the actor’s mental state. The statute requires that a person “willfully” expose the person’s body or private parts. Minn.Stat. § 617.23(a)(1) (1996). ‘Willfully” is not among the terms used to denote a specific intent. State v. Wickstrom, 405 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn.App.1987), review denied (Minn. June 30, 1987); see also State v. Green, 351 N.W.2d 42, 44 (Minn.App.1984) (“willful” generally means bad purpose or evil intent in statutes involving moral turpitude and in misdemeanor statutes denotes an intentional, as opposed to accidental, act). Thus, there is no language in Minn.Stat. § 617.23 indicating that a specific intent to offend the sensibilities of others is required. A statute must be construed according to its plain language. See Anker v. Little, 541 N.W.2d 333, 340 (Minn.App.1995) (<HOLDING>), review denied (Minn. Feb. 9, 1996). Although
holding that when a statutes terms are clear and unambiguous on their face there is no room for statutory construction and a court must apply the statute according to its literal meaning holding that if words of statute are unambiguous there is no room for judicial construction holding that if the statutory terms are unambiguous a courts review ends and the statute is construed according to the plain meaning of its words holding that a courts prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion holding that the term shall is mandatory for purposes of statutory construction when the statute is unambiguous