jail facility becomes part of the time served on the convicted person’s sentence.” Giving effect to the plain meanings of both section 17-22.5-104(2)(b) and section 16-11-306, Fields is therefore entitled to credit for the period of his presentence confinement against the twenty “calendar years” he must serve before being eligible for parole consideration. Second, even if we were to find the term “calendar years” in section 17-22.5-104(2)(b) to be subject to alternative interpretations, the rule of lenity would persuade us to adopt the construction we do today. The rule of lenity “requires us to construe any ambiguities in a penal statute in a manner favoring the person whose liberty interests are affected by the statute.” Faulkner v. District Court, 826 P.2d 1277, 1278-79 (Colo.1992) (<HOLDING>). Third, again assuming that section
holding that statutory good time credits must be calculated under the law in effect at the time of resentencing after an appeal of the sentence is determined holding that due process requires some evidence to support official revocation of good time credits holding that although the statutes governing good time credits were capable of alternative interpretations concerning their applicability to persons serving jail time as a condition of probation such persons are eligible for good time credit holding that a defendant is not entitled to credit for time served as a condition of probation holding that a defendant must be granted credit for time served in any institution serving as the functional equivalent of a county jail