state interest, see Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126, 109 S.Ct. 2829, 106 L.Ed.2d 93 (1989). On the other hand, mere “regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication” are permitted. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct. 948. In evaluating whether a regulation is a content-based restriction, the Fourth Circuit has adopted a pragmatic, rather than formalistic, test. See Clatterbuck, 708 F.3d at 556; Brown v. Town of Cary, 706 F.3d 294, 302-04 (4th Cir.2013). Under this test, a district court should first determine whether a regulation facially distinguishes based on content. Cf. Clatterbuck, 708 F.3d at 556 (<HOLDING>). If the court determines that the regulation
holding that a court must first determine whether the intent of congress is clear or instead the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue holding regulation facially distinguished based on content but remanding to district court to determine whether regulation also distinguished with a censorial intent holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction and remanding the matter to state court holding that eco nomic injury caused by contractual obligations that stemmed from compliance with a regulation were sufficiently caused by the regulation to support standing holding district court should have abstained pursuant to younger and thus remanding to district court to dismiss without prejudice