and trial preparation — and was not asserting a sufficient basis to support a contention that his attorneys were incompetent — we find Morrison’s claim is without merit. Id. at 442 (emphasis added). The facts in this case are distinguishable from Morrison because the trial court here did not make any inquiry to determine whether Milkers counsel was not rendering effective assistance and Milkey was not given any opportunity to articulate the basis for his dissatisfaction with counsel. Other cases which have found a Nelson inquiry unnecessary also reflect some discussion between the trial court and the defendant supporting a conclusion that the defendant’s complaints had nothing to do with allegations of counsel’s incompetence. See, e.g., Gudinas v. State, 693 So.2d 953, 961 (Fla.1997) (<HOLDING>); Lowe v. State, 650 So.2d 969, 975 (Fla.1994)
holding that failure to conduct nelson inquiry was not error where defendant never specifically claimed that counsel was acting incompetently despite the fact that the trial judge went to great lengths to determine the basis of his complaint holding that any vouching by prosecutor was harmless error because the judge informed the jury not to consider the relevant comments there was a great deal of evidence to support the conviction and defendant was not prejudiced holding that the fact that a judge had ruled against the defendant is not a basis for finding the judge prejudiced holding that the failure to inform the defendant of his right to a sixperson jury and the failure to consult the defendant as to his wishes was an error for which a new trial was the only remedy holding that a defendant was not entitled to a relief under section 2255 when he asserted that the sentencing judge who was not the trial judge was influenced by the sentence imposed by the trial judge on a codefendant