in which there may be legitimate expectations of privacy, is based upon societal expectations that have deep roots in the history of the Amendment.”). 27 . 1 LaFave, supra note 20, § 2.4(b) at 627. 28 . Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470, 105 S.Ct. 2778, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985). 29 . United States v. Morton, 17 F.3d 911, 913 (6th Cir.1994) (discovery and seizure of the gun did not violate the Fourth Amendment; testimony fairly established that the auto shop was open to the public for business, so the officers lawfully entered the shop, and, when the defendant stood up, an officer saw, in plain vie , 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000) (recognizing that a canine sniff of an automobile is not a search); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983) (<HOLDING>). These holdings are based on the legal theory
holding that a dog sniff of the exterior of luggage in a public airport does not constitute a search under the fourth amendment holding that a canine sniff of luggage does not constitute a search holding that canine sniff not a search under the fourth amendment holding canine sniff during traffic stop is not illegal search under fourth amendment holding that a canine sniff is a search for purposes of the fourth amendment