The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Harvey that Ms. Toomer offers, no evidence of Ms. Stiger’s threat other than her own self-serving assertions and that such unsupported, self-serving assertions do not give rise to a triable issue of fact. See, e.g., Taylor v. FDIC, 132 F.3d 753, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (when scrutinizing motions for summary judgment courts “examine the facts in the record and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, but do not accept bare conclusory allegations, as fact”) (internal citations omitted); Ward v. District of Columbia, 950 F.Supp.2d 9, 17 (D.D.C. 2013) (“[S]elf-serving assertions are not sufficient to create an issue of material fact.”); Musgrove v. Gov’t of the District of Columbia, 775 F.Supp.2d 158, 170 (D.D.C. 2011) (<HOLDING>). Even if unsupported, self-serving assertions
holding conclusory statements in affidavits and deposition testimony standing alone are insufficient to withstand a properlysupported motion for summary judgment holding that evidence of alleged limitations obtained soon after accident was without more insufficient to survive summary judgment holding that adverse inference alone insufficient to support a motion for summary judgment holding that a plaintiffs selfserving deposition testimony was not enough for her fdcpa claim to survive summary judgment but that a consumer survey may have been sufficient holding that selfserving deposition testimony standing alone is insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment