1917, ch. X, pars. 1, 8, 9; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, ch. 10, pars. 1, 8, 9. Before the legislature’s adoption of the Act, a party who prevailed at an arbitration had essentially two options of enforcing an award. First, one could bring an action at law against the opposing party, usually in assumpsit. At common law, a court had no inherent authority to enter a judgment on an arbitration award because, unlike a judgment, the award itself was not self-executing. Rather, the award represented a contract between the parties, and accordingly the remedy of the prevailing party was to bring suit predicated in the law of contract. See Smith v. Douglass, 16 Ill. 34, 35 (1854) (where judgment is not sought under statute, the award may be enforced at law); Low v. Nolte, 16 Ill. 475, 476-77 (1855) (<HOLDING>); Cocalis v. Nazlides, 308 Ill. 152, 155, 139
holding that faa was inapplicable where parties involved in action are not parties to an arbitration agreement under which issues are referable to arbitration holding that the plain language of the parties contract which limited the cases eligible for submission to arbitration rendered the underlying dispute not arbitrable holding that arbitration award is binding on the parties holding that an order remanding an arbitration award is not a final appealable order when the order does not also vacate the arbitration award recognizing that an action at common law can be maintained on an arbitration award rendered under the parties submission that does not comply with the arbitration statute