summary judgment on its motion. The court disagrees. The mere fact that a plaintiff, without proving NCP compliance, can prevail on its own motion for partial summary judgment does not mean that a defendant is precluded from obtaining summary judgment dismissing the entire claim when there is no genuine question of fact that NCP compliance is lacking. Because Av-iall will bear the burden at trial of proving NCP compliance, Cooper can move for summary judgment by pointing the court to the absence of evidence of such compliance. If the summary judgment evidence that Aviall produces (viewed favorably to Aviall) is insufficient to establish NCP compliance, Cooper is entitled to summary judgment. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069,
holding that when there are no genuine issues of material fact summary judgment is appropriate holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment holding that rule 56c requires summary judgment against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that partys ease and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial holding that the moving party for summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial holding that movant is entitled to summary judgment when party with burden of proof fails to establish genuine fact issue