at 584. In the end, the Briggs court was equivocal about what the constitutional provision actually required. To the extent it suggested a surety option is required, we agree. ¶25 Admittedly, it is challenging to sort through the cases relied on by Barton and the State because many involve slightly different questions than are presented here. For example, Barton cites several cases that reject cash-only bail but do not specifically address whether allowing for “cash or other security” would satisfy their state constitutions’ bail provisions. See, e.g., Two Jinn, Inc. v. District Court, 150 Idaho 647, 249 P.3d 840, 847 (2011) (explaining that “the Idaho Constitution prevents cash-only bail” under its sufficient sureties clause); State v. Hance, 2006 VT 97, 180 Vt. 357, 910 A.2d 874, 876 (<HOLDING>); Smith v. Leis, 106 Ohio St. 3d 309,
holding an allcash bail violated ohios sufficient sureties clause holding that an allcash bail violates vermonts sufficient sureties clause holding that rluipa violates establishment clause holding that  16913a violates the commerce clause holding that the statute as applied violates the commerce clause