impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000). Arrington asserts that he meets either definition (A) or definition (B) because he suffers from diabetes. Specifically, he argues that this circuit held, in Gonzales v. City of New Braunfels, 176 F.3d 834, 837 (5th Cir.1999), that insulin-dependent diabetes is a “disability” as that term is defined in the ADA. SW Bell disagrees, and contends that Arrington must produce evidence suggesting that his diabetic condition “substantially limits” at least one of his “major life activities.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A); EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645, 655 (5th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). SW Bell correctly identifies the flaws in
holding that a plaintiffs ability to work is substantially limited when his impairment foreclosed him generally from obtaining jobs doing the type of work plaintiff has chosen as his field holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment holding that 42 usc  405g may be equitably tolled based on a plaintiffs mental impairment holding that impairment has not substantially limited the major life activity of lifting where an individual could clean his dishes clean the yard bathe his dog do the groceries take out the garbage and prepare his own meals holding that for a plaintiff to prove that he has a record of impairment under 42 usc  121022b there must be a record of an impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities