to apply a pollution exclusion on grounds of ambiguity. Id. at 852. The question is whether the language in the Policies is sufficiently unambiguous to identify pet coke’as one of the “petroleum products” covered by Exclusion K. Beemsterboer asserts that the term “petroleum products” in Exclusion K is ambiguous given the vast number of products made from petroleum, including all types of plastic products. Beemsterboer asserts that because the term “petroleum products” is vague, the Court should refuse to apply Exclusion E on the grounds of ambiguity. Continental appears to concede this point, as it fails to reply to Beemsterboer’s argument in its summary judgment briefs. See Johnson v. Gen. Bd. of Pension & Health Benefits of United Methodist Church, 733 F.3d 722, 729 (7th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). The Court finds that Exclusion E is ambiguous
holding that arguments not presented to the district court in response to a motion for summary judgment are waived holding that arguments not raised in opposition to a motion for summary judgment are waived holding that claims raised for the first time in an opposition to a motion for summary judgment are not properly before a court holding that arguments not raised before the trial court are waived holding that arguments not raised in district court are waived