emphasis on the fact that upon induction, the drafted individual was subject to military punishment by military courts. See also Donohue v. Huie (1940), 259 App. Div. 645, 20 N.Y.S.2d 347, aff’d (1941), 285 N.Y. 557, 33 N.E.2d 241 (reversing a decision of the trial court (Donohue v. Huie (1940), 173 Misc. 362, 17 N.Y.S.2d 962) which had held that a person similarly situated was not “an honorably discharged soldier *** having served as such in the Army *** of the United States during *** the World War” (17 N.Y.S.2d 962, 963) within the meaning of the applicable veterans’ preference law); and Lore v. Forbes (1939), 173 Misc. 1066, 19 N.Y.S.2d 631, aff’d (1940), 259 App. Div. 806, 19 N.Y.S.2d 655. But see Dunn v. Commissioner of Civil Service (1933), 281 Mass. 376, 183 N.E. 889 (<HOLDING>); and City of New York v. City Civil Service
holding that under the applicable statutory provisions a person need not be impoverished or devoid of all assets to qualify as an indigent sick person but only that the person be unable to pay for necessary medical care holding that only courts in the county where property was situated had jurisdiction to hear an action concerning the property holding that the burden is upon the state under the applicable federal rules of evidence holding that a similarly situated person had not served in the army under the applicable veterans preference provision holding that the penalty is applicable