evidence in the light most favorable to the government, no reasonable factfinder could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Lemus possessed more than 50 grams of methamphetamine. Because the drug quantity finding fails based on insufficient evidence, the government may not retry that issue, and instead must seek resentencing based solely on the basic possession conviction, i.e., pursuant to the statutory range set forth in 2i U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). “The Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a second trial for the purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first pro ceeding.” Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978); see also United States v. Vera, 770 F.3d 1232, 1250 (9th Cir. 2014) (<HOLDING>). II. The District Court’s Decision Not to
holding that where the evidence offered by the state and admitted by the trial court  whether erroneously or not  would have been sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict the double jeopardy clause does not preclude retrial holding reversal unwarranted in circumstantial evidence case absent substantial trial error holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted holding that retrial did not violate the double jeopardy clause where reversal based on trial error distinguishing reversal for insufficient evidence holding that a sua sponte dismissal of the charges during trial was not an acquittal that barred retrial based on double jeopardy