no effort to interfere with Crossland’s payments through 2006, but instead acted in a way that increased those payments, is an indication of good faith. Ms. Rhodes has breached no contract, written or oral. Tortious Interference Crossland’s second cause of action is against Mr. Rhodes and North Monroe Capital for tortious interference with Crossland’s contractual right, or reasonable expectation, to receive continuing payments after 2006. This claim fails for two reasons. First, as set forth above, Crossland had no con tractual right or reasonable expectation to receive continuing payments after 2006. Interfering with a non-existent right or expectation is not actionable tortious interference. See, e.g., Miller, Cowherd & Kerver, Inc. v. De Montejo, 406 So.2d 1196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (<HOLDING>). Second, Mr. Rhodes and North Monroe Capital
holding that injury to broker through loss of commission was not antitrust injury holding that contract providing commission was to be paid within 72 hours of closing did not condition the payment of commission on the closing holding that broker whose contract called for commission on sale of property was not entitled to commission on transfer of property to partnership in which owner had an interest and that because broker was not entitled to commission under terms of his contract he also could not recover against a third person on theory of tortious interference with that contract holding broker not a party to a purchase contract and therefore not liable for attorneys fees even though provision providing for payment of the brokers commission was contained in the contract holding that the validity of a contract for a commission for the sale of real estate is determined by the law of the state where the contract is made