necessarily characterize it as an “accrued benefit” under the 2002 Regulation. Under this interpretation of the 2002 Regulation, Defendants’ rescission of the 1999 Benefits Increase for pre-February 1, 1999 retirees would clearly violate the anti-cutback rule. We reject Thornton’s interpretation of the 2002 Regulation because of the false dichotomy he draws between “ancillary” and “accrued” benefits. The Seventh Circuit recognized that a particular benefit, even if non-ancillary, would not be “accrued” for a retired participant if the benefit was “not included in the plan during the term of the participants’ employment.” See Williams, 497 F.3d at 713-14. Williams clarified the Seventh Circuit’s earlier position in Hickey v. Chicago Truck Drivers, 980 F.2d 465, 468-69 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>), upon which Thornton relied for the
holding pension conferred cola was an accrued benefit and not ancillary because it was intended to provide retirement income commenced only at retirement and was a benefit generally transferrable to succeeding employers holding that retirement benefits are accrued benefits under erisa holding that an extended earnings plan was not an employee pension benefit plan because the payment of benefits was not contingent upon retirement or the employee attaining a certain age holding former wifes cause of action accrued at the time of former husbands failure to pay her the portion of his retirement benefits to which she was entitled which was no earlier than the date of his actual retirement holding that  disposable retirement pay  from military pension was equal to gross retirement pay less federal income taxes