express application to “any person,” the language of the statute also must embrace every character of plaintiff, be he county employee or private citizen. Only the Commonwealth itself has been held not to be a “person” under this statute. See Commonwealth ex rel. Pross v. Board of Supervisors, 225 Va. 492, 303 S.E.2d 887, 890 (1983) (citing rule that “[N]o statute of limitations has been held to apply to suits by the crown, unless there has been an express provision including it.” (quoting Levasser v. Washburn, 52 Va. (11 Gratt.) 572, 576 (1854))). The court has found very few limitations on Va.Code §§ 15.2-1248. One is that it potentially bars only monetary claims, and not “proceedings for declaratory judgment and mandamus.” Nuckols v. Moore, 234 Va. 478, 362 S.E.2d 715, 717 (1987) (<HOLDING>). In this respect, Count Three is not subject
holding that nonmonetary claims are not subject to these requirements recognizing that this amendment provided the united states court of federal claims with jurisdiction over a nonmonetary substitute for monetary relief holding that excessive force claims are not subject to exhaustion requirement holding federal sentencing guidelines are subject to jury trial requirements of sixth amendment holding that the tucker act grants the united states court of federal claims jurisdiction to grant nonmonetary relief in connection with contractor claims including claims requesting an interpretation of contract terms