Immediately on redirect, the State then asked Lynch-Stanley, “Does the length of the delay in the disclosure have any — in your opinion, does it erode the credibility of the disclosure?” Smith objected, but the trial court overruled the objection. Lynch-Stanley then responded, “[I]t really doesn’t [erode the credibility]” and “[W]hen you’re looking at credibility, you’re looking for other types of things, but not necessarily the length of disclosure.” By coaxing a response from Lynch-Stanley that inherently implicated the credibility of the victim’s three-year delay in disclosure, the State was able to present a comment on the victim’s veracity — a comment that has been expressly prohibited by our supreme court in State v. Jennings. See 394 S.C. 473, 480, 716 S.E.2d 91, 94 (2011) (<HOLDING>); id. at 480, 716 S.E.2d at 94-95 (noting there
holding that the improper admission of hearsay testimony concerning a childs report of sexual abuse warranted reversal where the childs otherwise uncorroborated testimony was the sole basis for conviction and the hearsay augmented the childs testimony with additional detail in certain areas holding that it is improper for an expert to comment on the veracity of a childs accusations of sexual abuse citations omitted holding that it is improper to ask a witness to comment on the credibility of another witness holding harmless the improper admission of a social workers hearsay testimony concerning a childs report of sexual abuse where the credibility of the childs testimony was supported by other witnesses holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse