evidence but must, instead, introduce additional evidence of ... discrimination.” Id. at 1084. At this point, the record does not reflect the production of evidence above and beyond that required for a prima facie showing, although the matter of the Brian Smith declaration remains to be resolved, see Section B, infra. The third manner of showing pretext “ordinarily consists of evidence that other employees ... were not fired even though they engaged in substantially identical conduct.” Manzer, 29 F.3d at 1084. Given that Parries could not demonstrate disparate treatment, he did not satisfied the third method; he failed to show that any other employee who engaged in the same pattern of infractions was not fired. See Warfield v. Lebanon Corr. Inst., 181 F.3d 723, 730-31 (6th Cir. 1999) (<HOLDING>). Given the current state of the record, and
holding that when an employer intentionally engages in misconduct knowing it is substantially certain to cause serious injury or death to employees and an employee is injured or killed by that misconduct the employee may pursue a civil action against his employer and also pursue benefits under the workers compensation act holding that an employee could not establish pretext when the employer in good faith believed that the employee engaged in misconduct regardless whether the employee in fact engaged in the misconduct holding that proof that an employer fired an employee three months after the employee filed a charge of discrimination sufficed to state a prima facie case of causation holding that an employee fired for a series of incidents alleged to constitute misconduct must show that a similarlysituated employee engaged in a comparably serious series of bad acts not merely similar individual acts holding that because the employee had engaged in similar religious conduct on prior occasions employer had notice of the conflict