neither FERC nor this Court have the discretion to contravene clear congressional intent, field preemption should apply. The ripeness of N.E. Hub’s conflict preemption claim is therefore irrelevant. III. Finally, I address the merits of N.E. Hub’s field preemption claim. First of all, it is clearly ripe. We require that a claim satisfy three elements in order to be ripe for decision: “adversity of the interests of the parties, conclusiveness of the judicial judgment and the practical help, or utility, of that judgment.” Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 912 F.2d 643, 647 (3d Cir.1990). All three are satisfied. The state proceedings' themselves constitute an injury establishing adversity of interest. See Sayles Hydro Assocs. v. Maughan, 985 F.2d 451, 454 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). A decree indicating that FERC’s 7(c)
holding that in light of the presumption against preemption there is no field preemption of state unfair competition claims that rely on a substantial question of federal patent law because congress has not expressed its clear and manifest intention to preempt that area of law holding removal and preemption are distinct concepts erisa preemption does not allow removal unless complete preemption exists holding that a field preemption claim was ripe because the plaintiff did not challenge the states ultimate substantive decision but rather its authority to conduct proceedings holding that it was the degree of fdas involvement in the approval process of a particular device not the pma process itself that resulted in preemption of state cause of action holding that in the field preemption context the hardship is the process itself