[he] originally asked for” and then quoted the “all documents” language from his initial FOIA request. For the reasons discussed above, Rubman’s initial request was properly understood to have been for preexisting internal documents. Once he made clear that he was not satisfied with CIS’s counteroffer of a statistical table, the agency should have performed a search of its internal documents. The cases cited by CIS on this point are not relevant because they all involved modified requests well outside of the scope of the original request. See, e.g., Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 857 (D.C.Cir. 2009) (“[Plaintiffs] FOIA request gave no indication that she sought DOS documents regarding the agency’s previous responses to her 1995 FOIA request.”); Kowalczyk, 73 F.3d at 389 (<HOLDING>). Agencies are entitled to make requesters
holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york holding that outofstate defendants transmittal into new york of ceaseanddesist letter to new york plaintiff for purported trademark infringement was insufficient to create jurisdiction over defendant in a new york declaratory judgment action holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership holding that a foia request sent to fbi headquarters and that made no reference to new york did not obligate the fbi to search records held in its new york field office holding that even though lehman banks executive officers were in new york and its board of directors met exclusively in new york lehman bank had its principal office in delaware rather than new york because the term principal office is a term of art