resolved to transfer key LVRC documents and information to his personal computer to further his own competing business, and at that point his authorization to access the computer would have ended. Applying this reasoning, Brekka would have acted “without authorization” for purposes of §§ 1030(a)(2) and (4) once his mental state changed from loyal employee to disloyal competitor. We are unpersuaded by this interpretation. First, and most important, § 1030 is primarily a criminal statute, and §§ 1030(a)(2) and (4) create criminal liability for violators of the statute. Although this case arises in a civil context, our interpretation of §§ 1030(a)(2) and (4) is equally applicable in the criminal context. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n. 8, 125 S.Ct. 377, 160 L.Ed.2d 271 (2004) (<HOLDING>). It is well established that "ambiguity
holding that where a statute has both criminal and noncriminal applications courts should interpret the statute consistently in both criminal and noncriminal contexts holding that the reference to any court encompasses both state and federal courts holding that when the relevant criminal statute encompasses both violent and nonviolent felonies a sentencing court may go beyond the statutory language holding that the language of the statute and the courts duty to apply the statute as written requires the court to interpret the statute to apply when the prisoner is sentenced without regard to the institution where the prisoner is incarcerated after the sentencing holding that the district court may enhance a sentence for the use of a deadly weapon or under the habitual criminal statute but not both