majority’s view, that term must be equally unambiguous in the context of witnesses in § 6322(a)(2), for one statutory term cannot have two distinct meanings. As noted, Hall sensibly agrees with the government that “summoned” in § 6322(a) must have the same meaning in both subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2). See Oral Arg. at 4:30; Br. Def.-Appellee United States, at 34-35. If the majority’s opinion is to be read— as I believe it must — that “summoned” in § 6322(a) invariably means having received any court-issued summons, then the majority’s opinion necessarily abrogates those administrative decisions that interpret “summoned” flexibly to accommodate the limitations of the court leave system. See, e.g., In re Entitlement of Emp.-Defendant to Court Leave, 62 Comp.Gen. 87, 1982 WL 26713 (1982) (<HOLDING>); In re Pasake, 59 Comp.Gen. 290, 1980 WL 17976
recognizing that a damages remedy is not ordinarily available where the alleged agreement is entirely concerned with the conduct of the parties in a criminal case holding a person who is not a member of the bar of any court  may appear pro se but is not qualified to appear in the district court or in this court as counsel for others holding that court leave under  6322 is not available to a federal employee who appears in court as a plaintiff in her own action holding that court leave under  6322 is not available to a federal employee summoned to appear in juvenile court in her capacity as the juveniles parent as a party to the proceedings holding that court leave under  6322 is not available to a federal employee who is summoned to appear as a defendant in the court action concerned