this extraordinary relief, Harris cited a declaration in which his former lawyer swore that his representation in the first habeas proceeding had been ineffective. We ruled in Rodriguez v. Mitchell, 252 F.3d 191 (2d Cir.2001), that relief under Rule 60(b) is available with respect to a previous habeas proceeding only when the Rule 60(b) motion attacks the integrity of the habeas proceeding and not the underlying criminal conviction. Harris has cast his Rule 60(b)(6) motion as such an attack on the integrity of his initial habeas proceeding, although the ground cited by Harris for reopening the first habeas proceeding would (if valid) require the habeas court to consider whether the sentencing judge committed reversible error. See Mayo v. Henderson, 13 F.3d 528, 534 (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Harris’s attack on the integrity of the
holding that an ineffectivenessofappellatecounsel claim is only valid if the appellate error prejudiced the defendant holding that lack of appellate jurisdiction is fundamental error holding that appellate review is precluded when the error is invited holding that where the state commits a discovery violation the standard for harmless error is extraordinarily high a defendant is presumed to be procedurally prejudiced if there is a reasonable probability that the defendants trial preparation or strategy would have been materially different had the violation not occurred and a states discovery violation is harmless only if the appellate court can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense was not procedurally prejudiced recognizing under plain error review that the burden to show that substantial rights have been prejudiced is on the party that failed to raise the issue below and for an error to have affected substantial rights the error must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings