Noriega-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 874, 884 (9th Cir.2003) (“[T]he BIA’s lack of authority to enter Noriega-Lopez’s removal order renders that component of his proceedings ‘in essence, a legal nullity.’ ”) (quoting Reynaga v. Cammisa, 971 F.2d 414, 417 (9th Cir.1992)). III. CONCLUSION Our decision to vacate the removal order does not prevent the Service from issuing a new Notice to Appear. But, because the first NTA was the subject of a final judgment on the merits, res judicata bars the Service from “initiating a second deportation case on the basis of a charge thatfit] could have brought in the first case,” but did not. Bravo-Pedroza v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 1358, 1358 (9th Cir.2007) (emphasis added); see also Ramon-Sepulveda v. INS, 824 F.2d 749, 750-51 (9th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Should the Service decide to initiate new
holding that lear does not abrogate general principles of res judicata or the res judicata effect of a consent decree regarding patent validity holding res judicata also applies to those in privity with parties holding that res judicata applies when the question of jurisdiction is raised and determined holding res judicata ie claim preclusion doctrine applies to consent judgments holding that res judicata applies in deportation proceedings