Because I conclude that DiTo-masso consented to law enforcement search of his emails when he agreed to AOL’s terms of use, no ruling on the metadata issue is necessary. 69 . Opp. Mem. at 13. 70 . Probation Order at 2 ¶ U. 71 . See Reyes, 283 F.3d at 462 (focusing exclusively on home visits and searches by probation officers, not by law enforcement in general). 72 .In the Second Circuit, the rule is that consent-to-search provisions attenuate, but do not destroy, the need for a baseline level of suspicion in searches by probation officers. See Lifshitz, 369 F.3d at 181-82 (explaining that consent-to-search terms in probation agreements lessen expectations of privacy, but they do not give probation officers carte blanche to perform truly suspicionless searches); Newton, 369 F.3d at 665 (<HOLDING>) (quoting Reyes, 283 F.3d at 461). See also
holding that probationers who sign consenttosearch agreements have a  severely diminished expectation of privacy  in connection with their supervision by probation officers holding that prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells holding that prisoners have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their prison cells holding search of probationers computer by probation officers was reasonable even in absence of a search provision when conditions on probationers computer use reduced his expectation of privacy in his computer holding that a probationers challenge to a condition of his probation was moot in light of the supreme courts reversal of the underlying conviction and the probationers apparent completion of probation 