of the Contract would survive termination of the Contract. If the Option Holders could have exercised the Option simply by giving notice to Grace of their acceptance and intent to exercise the Option and without purchasing the remaining shares from Grace, such an exercise would have imposed a binding obligation on the Option Holders to purchase the remaining shares by a lump-sum payment. But this construction of the Contract would render the Termination Provision meaningless. See Kruegel v. Berry, 75 Tex. 230, 9 S.W. 863, 863-64 (1888) (stating that option holder under lease had to tender purchase price before lease terminated in order to exercise option to buy leased premises for a specified price); Nguyen v. Woodley, 273 S.W.3d 891, 898 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); Cate v. Woods, 299 S.W.3d 149, 153
holding that an attorney approval clause in a contract for the sale of real estate was a part of that contract and would have to be satisfied for the underlying contract to be enforceable holding that contract for purchase of real property terminated by its own terms upon buyers giving of a certain notice and that therefore the contract was no longer valid and enforceable recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract holding that trial court erred as a matter of law by enforcing contract for purchase of real property that had terminated by its own terms holding that buyers of real property who were in constructive possession of the property had made a down payment and had signed a contract to purchase at the time of the loss had an insurable interest in the property despite a court determination two years after the loss that the agreement to purchase was not binding