underlying the instant offense. United States v. Fitzhugh, 954 F.2d 253, 254 (5th Cir.1992) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 Application Note 1). Therefore, the district court erred by considering testimony as to the weapon’s characteristics to be relevant, but the error was harmless. As noted above, Lipscomb’s single-count indictment, which the district court could consider, alleges that he possessed a sawed-off shotgun. The only remaining question is whether possessing such a weapon, “by its nature, presented a serious potential risk of physical injury.” United States v. Insaulgarat, 378 F.3d 456, 467 (5th Cir.2004). We think that the Sentencing Commission’s commentary to § 4B1.2 answers that for us. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 44-45, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993) (<HOLDING>). “Unlawfully possessing a firearm described in
holding that amendments to the sentencing guidelines commentary should be treated as legislative rulemaking due to a unique grant of power from congress holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference holding that commentary to the guidelines is treated as an agencys interpretation of its own legislative rule recognizing the guidelines commentary is authoritative holding that commentary accompanying guidelines is binding