“[t]he concept of negligence thus imposes a ‘minimum standard’ for employer liability—direct liability—under title VII, a standard that is supplemented by the agency-based standards for vicarious liability as articulated in Faragher and [Ellerth].” Id. (citation omitted); see also Debord v. Mercy Health Sys. of Kan., Inc., 737 F.3d 642, 650-53 (10th Cir. 2013) (analyzing employer liability for supervisor harassment under both negligence and vicarious liability standards); Dees v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 168 F.3d 417, 421 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[A]n employer can be held directly liable for a supervisor’s harassment when the employer either intended, or negligently permitted, the tortious conduct to occur.”); Wilson v. Tulsa Junior Coll., 164 F.3d 534, 540 n.4 (10th Cir. 1998) (<HOLDING>). HES cites no decision that holds a plaintiff
holding that the basis of liability is negligence and not injury recognizing continuing validity of the butner decision holding that ordinary negligence and gross negligence are not separate causes of action holding that employer liability could arise under the principles of restatement  2192 if 1 the employer was negligent or reckless or 2 the employee relied on the supervisors apparent authority or 3 the supervisor was aided in his harassment by the existence of the agency relationship recognizing the continuing validity of negligence as a separate basis for employer liability in action in which employee alleged supervisor harassment