he would have had to carry the rifle with the intent to go armed. [The] warrant ... does not contain facts stating that [he] intended to go armed. Thus, he is factually innocent. This issue as framed brings to mind interesting issues such as whether the claim is justiciable in a post-conviction proceeding, see Dellinger v. State, 279 S.W.3d 282, 291 (Tenn.2009) (noting that the justiciability of free-standing actual innocence claims as part of a collateral attack was “ ‘left open’ and ‘unresolved’ ” in the wake of Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 113 S.Ct. 853, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993) (quoting House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 554-55, 126 S.Ct. 2064, 165 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006))), and whether the otherwise valid guilty plea on weapon possession foreclosed the claim, see Pettus, 986 S.W.2d at 542 (<HOLDING>). We do not address these issues, however,
holding that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge holding that the voluntary entry of an informed and counseled guilty plea constitutes an admission of all facts necessary to convict holding entry of guilty plea waives challenges to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea  emphasis added recognizing that a voluntary and understanding guilty plea entered without the benefit of a plea bargain waives all nonjurisdictional defects that occurred before the entry of the plea holding that a plea of guilty is an admission of all material facts alleged in the charge including those facts that serve as factual predicates to subject matter jurisdiction