470, 472 & n. 1 (Tex.1991) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431 cmt. a (1965)); see also Borg-Wamer Corp. v. Flores, 232 S.W.3d 765, 770 (Tex.2007). In other words, for an act or event to rise to the level of cause in the legal sense, the act or event must be such that reasonable jurors would identify it as being actually responsible for the ultimate harm. The cause must be more than one of the countless ubiquitous and insignificant causes that in some remote sense may have contributed to a given effect as, for example, simply getting up in the morning. That the term substantial factor is given to this commonsense aspect of legal causation simply makes plain to jurors that more than causation in this indirect, “philosophic sense” is required. See Staggs, 134 S.W.2d at 1030 (<HOLDING>). It does not demand, nor even imply, a higher
recognizing that butfor language repeated something already included in the usual and ordinary meaning of cause and draws juror attention to the importance of an unbroken causal connection holding that failure to demonstrate a causal connection is fatal to a  1983  cause of action holding that we must give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of a statutes language holding that the language of the statute clearly requires  proof of a causal connection between the drivers intoxication and the death of another person recognizing that where the statutory language is not ambiguous  the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute must be given effect