also a valid regulation of professional conduct that only incidentally — if at all — affects physician speech. The Act’s harassment provision, § 790.338(6), similarly targets professional conduct within the physician-patient relationship. Harassment can involve speech, but any speech that the harassment provision reaches is — like that involved in the Act’s other provisions — private, personalized speech between a physician and patient, involving the physician’s professional judgments and tailored to the patient’s individual circumstances. Of course, harassing speech may in some cases be protected by the First Amendment, such as when such speech is made in a public place regarding a matter of public concern. See Snyder v. Phelps, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1207, 1219, 179 L.Ed.2d 172 (2011) (<HOLDING>). Although we accept that firearm safety may be
holding that picketers at military funerals who held signs communicating their belief that god hates the united states for its tolerance of homosexuality were shielded by the first amendment from tort liability because this activity constituted speech in a public place on a matter of public concern holding that if the speech in question does not address a matter of public concern there is no first amendment violation holding that a public employees internal memoranda raising concerns about public corruption are protected first amendment speech because they addressed a matter of public concern holding that the absence of a motivating desire to address a matter of public concern was not dispositive as to whether the speech addressed a matter of public concern recognizing the need to balance the states interest in fulfilling its responsibilities to the public the extent to which the speech in question involves a matter of public concern and the manner time place and context of the speech