decree that Sanderson had chosen not to include in her motion for contempt. 3 . The use of a judge’s stamped signature is permissible and valid. See In re Barber, 982 S.W.2d 364, 367 (Tex.1998) (orig. proceeding) ("[A] judge may sign a document by directing another person who is under the judge’s immediate authority to affix the judge’s signature using a rubber stamp.”). 4 . Sanderson complains that there is no docket entry indicating the existence of a final order prior to the trial court's dismissal order. However, the mere absence of a docket entry regarding the approval of the Report for Contempt does not operate to invalidate the trial court's approval of the Report for Contempt as an order of the court. See Guyot v. Guyot, 3 S.W.3d 243, 246-48 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Sanderson also contends that the report
holding that evidence not submitted to the district court cannot be part of the record on appeal holding that testimony concerning the content of certified docket entries admitted into evidence only through an fbi agent who read the docket entries into the record in lieu of admission of the redacted docket was pursuant to the public records exception to the hearsay rule under the federal rules of evidence admissible to show the existence of prior misdemeanor convictions for certain purposes recognizing that docket entries form no part of the record that may be considered on appeal because they are inherently unreliable holding appeal of termination is limited to information that is part of the record holding that opinions of nonexamining sources may be considered where they are supported by evidence in the record