v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 157 Colo. 188, 196, 402 P.2d 194, 198 (1965)). The absence of an established market for an asset does not, however, preclude application of the fair market value standard. Rather, fair market value is a term that has long been used in the law as applicable to property having no actual current market place. Whitlow v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 82 F.2d 569, 572 (8th Cir.1936) (noting that in such a case, the term means “the sum that would in all probability result from fair negotiations between an owner who is willing to sell and a purchaser who desired to buy,” quoting De Laval Steam Turbine Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 61, 72, 52 S.Ct. 78, 80, 76 L.Ed. 168 (1931)); see also Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U.S. 254, 258, 61 S.Ct. 507, 509, 85 L.Ed. 813 (1941) (<HOLDING>). Here, Commerce City presented expert
holding merely that to the extent a breaching party claims that the appropriate measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the market price it holds the burden of proving that there is in fact an available market for the goods in issue holding that evidence of contamination is relevant and admissible on the issue of market value in an eminent domain valuation trial holding that the measure of damages for the breach of a contract of sale where no fraud is shown is the difference between the contract price and the market price of the goods on the date of the breach holding that the market price is understood to mean the current market price being paid for gas at the well where it is produced holding that the absence of a market price is no barrier to valuation for purposes of assessing tax liability