of lawyering — that is, the representation of the client in a legal capacity — should be excluded for public policy reasons. See Krawczyk v. Stingle, 208 Conn. 239, 246, 543 A.2d 733 (1988).” Jackson v. R. G. Whipple, Inc., 225 Conn. 705, 730-31, 627 A.2d 374 (1993) (Berdon, J., concuriing). Other jurisdictions have reached a similar result with respect to the medical profession. The Washington Court of Appeals has held that although the entrepreneurial or commercial aspects of the practice of medicine are covered as “trade or commerce” under that state’s consumer protection act, violations predicated on negligence or malpractice, whether legal or medical, are not covered because those claims address only competence. See Quimby v. Fine, 45 Wash. App. 175, 180, 724 P.2d 403 (1986) (<HOLDING>), rev. denied, 107 Wash. 2d 1032 (1987); see
holding when constitutional claims are premised on the notion that the united states has some contractual obligation to the plaintiff that it has failed to satisfy the claims are contractually based and must be heard in the court of federal claims holding that medical expenses were within meaning of ascertainable loss under that states consumer protection statute holding that claims that relate to actual competence of the medical practitioner are not recognized under states consumer protection act but claims implicating entrepreneurial aspects of practice of medicine may be sufficient holding that common questions predominated with respect to plaintiffs claims under state consumer protection laws because the merits of the claims did not overlap with the predominance inquiry holding that erisa preempts a plaintiffs claims for violation of the state insurance code and consumer protection act