that a preindictment delay is á due process violation, th able as a witness, this also does not constitute actual prejudice. Contrary to Overton’s argument, there is no evidence that she would have been able to provide any information involving the allegation that Detective Visco planted Overton’s DNA. See Overton, 801 So.2d at 897 (“[T]he defense failed to produce a scintilla of evidence that Detective Visco planted the seminal fluids.”) (emphasis added). During the evidentiary hearing, Detective Visco testified that he did not receive a used condom from Swaby and he had no knowledge that Overton’s semen was planted. Finally, Overton’s argument that the delay led to degradation or cont on for the delay by law enforcement. But cf. Scott v. State, 581 So.2d 887, 892-93 (Fla.1991) (<HOLDING>). During the evidentiary hearing, F.K. Jones,
holding that the preindictment delay was a due process violation because actual prejudice was shown and the state had shown absolutely no need for any investigative delay holding that prescription delay was not violation because plaintiff could not establish detrimental effect of delay in treatment holding that if delay in the prosecution of disciplinary charges substantially impaired the attorneys ability to defend against the charges  the constitution might compel a different analysis a delay coupled with actual prejudice could result in a due process violation  holding that prejudice was not shown where there was overwhelming evidence of guilt holding that when determining whether a delay in prosecution violates a defendants right to a speedy trial courts must consider the length of the delay the reason for the delay whether the defendant asserted his rights and the resulting prejudice to the defendant