and provide reliable information. The Charitable Solicitations Ordinance, however, does not appear to allow “ample alternatives for communication.” Indeed, in the absence of a permit, the ordinance shuts down all means of solicitation in Davidson County. The ordinance is unlike the ordinance at issue in Thomas, where applicants had to obtain a permit to use a park for a gathering of fifty or more persons. In Thomas, unlike in the case at bar, an unsuccessful applicant could use any location other than the park and could use whatever method of communication it wanted. In this case, an unsuccessful applicant may not solicit at any location in Davidson County by any means. The Charitable Solicitations Ordinance also does not appear to be narrowly tailored. First, the statute aff Ct. 826 (<HOLDING>). Third, although the plethora of information
holding that a rico plaintiff must allege at a minimum the time place and content of the alleged misrepresentations on which he or she relied the fraudulent scheme the fraudulent intent of the defendants and the injury resulting from the fraud holding that a local ordinance enacted to prevent fraud by prohib iting solicitations by charities not using at least 75 of its receipts for charitable purposes is not narrowly tailored partly because the municipality could simply outlaw fraudulent misrepresentations and punish such activity directly holding direct misrepresentations were not required for mail fraud conviction holding that fiduciaries may not sue for benefits simply by using section 502a2 holding that if the alleged misrepresentations are material a plaintiff is entitled to recovery whether or not the misrepresentations caused the alleged damage