to the marijuana being grown in those patches. He also insists that a reasonable fact finder could only conclude that, in accompanying Lewis to the area of the marijuana patches on the morning of their arrests, his purpose was innocent: to simply help Lewis retrieve his ATV, just as any father would help his son. Unfortunately for Larry, however, “[cjircumstantial evidence sufficient to support a conspiracy conviction need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, provided the summation of the evidence permits a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Burgos, 94 F.3d at 858. And “a variety of conduct,” apart from personally manufacturing or possessing the drugs in issue, “can constitute participation in a conspiracy sufficient to sustain a conviction.” Id. at 859 (<HOLDING>). Here, an agreement between Larry and Lewis to
holding the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it may find the defendant guilty if the jury found the defendant had conspired with the two coconspirators named in the indictment or both of them or others where evidence tended to show a conspiracy between the defendant and some person other than the named coconspirators holding that district court erred in finding that shooting was not reasonable foreseeable merely because the coconspirators had agreed not to discharge their firearms holding that evidence was sufficient for jury to find that the defendant participated in the conspiracy even though he did not have a relationship with all of his fellow coconspirators recognizing that participation may assume a myriad of  forms such as supplying firearms or purchasing money orders for coconspirators or permitting them to store narcotics and other contraband in ones home or purchasing plane tickets for coconspirators internal citations omitted holding that no independent inquiry into reliability is required when the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception like that for coconspirators under rule 801d2e internal quotation marks omitted