waives its immunity, the scope of the waiver is construed to achieve its remedial purpose. As the Supreme Court observed in Block v. Neal, 460 U.S. 289, 103 S.Ct. 1089, 75 L.Ed.2d 67 (1983), “[t]he exemption of the sovereign from suit in volves hardship enough where consent has been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by refinement of construction where consent has been announced.” Id. at 298, 103 S.Ct. at 1094 (citations omitted); see also Franchise Tax Board v. United States Postal Service, 467 U.S. 512, 521, 104 S.Ct. 2549, 2554, 81 L.Ed.2d 446 (1984) (instructing that the scope of a waiver of sovereign immunity is ascertained “by reference to congressional policy”); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69, 76 S.Ct. 122, 126, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955) (Frankfurter, J.) (<HOLDING>). The language and legislative history of
holding that a court should not act as selfconstituted guardian of the treasury and import immunity back into a statute designed to limit it holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute holding that washingtons statute tolls the statute of limitations for a legally incompetent person notwithstanding the appointment of a guardian this is so because the right to the tolling statute vests in the incompetent person not in the guardian from this premise it follows that the guardians subsequent actions on the incompetent persons behalf should have no additional effect upon the statute of limitations unless they result in res judicata holding that railroad immunity act should be strictly construed holding that as a general rule interlocutory trial court orders rejecting defenses of common law sovereign immunity governmental immunity public official immunity statutory immunity or any other type of immunity are not appealable under the maryland collateral order doctrine