Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc). What matters is that Renb-A-Center’s interest in assuring that its employees focus on their work while on the job is a rational one, and the company’s prohibition on non-emergency, personal phone calls is a reasonable manifestation of this policy. Certainly, Rent-A-Center has a legitimate interest in ensuring that Bradford’s personal phone calls do not disrupt business meetings or interfere with his daily responsibilities. See, e.g., Koons v. Aventis Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 367 F.3d 768 (8th Cir.2004) (affirming district court’s holding that the discharge of an employee for making excessive personal calls was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason); Paluck v. Gooding Rubber Co., 221 F.3d 1003, 1011 (7th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Because Renb-A-Center has successfully set
holding that termination of individuals employment for making personal phone calls was a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for discharge recognizing that even a personal grudge can constitute a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse employment decision holding that employer met its burden of articulating  a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiffs termination by offering admissible evidence sufficient for the trier of fact to conclude that plaintiff was fired because of his failure to maintain accurate attendance records  holding that drugrelated misconduct is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for termination holding that employees threats of violence against a coworker were legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for termination