of the duties assigned to DEA agents, and therefore, DEA agents do not meet the test set forth in H. Landau. Cruz-Pagan, 35 Fed.Cl. at 61-62. Alternatively, the Court held that DEA agents could not have implied actual authority because DEA’s “internal regulations specifically preclude [them] from exercising such authority.” Id. at 62-63 (explaining that section 6612.45 of the DEA Agent’s Manual controls the manner in which such awards may be approved, the persons who are permitted to approve such awards, and expressly prohibits agents from promising “any award in any amount to an individual”). In each of the subsequent cases in which the implied actual authority issue was addressed, the Court has agreed with the conclusion drawn in Cruz-Pagan. Doe v. United States, 48 Fed.Cl. at 503 (<HOLDING>); Khairallah, 43 Fed.Cl. at 62-63 (concluding
holding that while a purported agent must possess actual authority to accept service of process such authority may be implied rather than express holding that a principal is not hable for the actions of an agent when these actions exceed the agents authority and the thirdparty has knowledge that the agent does not have the authority asserted holding that dea agents lack implied actual authority because contracting authority is not an integral part of their duties and deas internal procedures expressly preclude dea agents from exercising contractual authority holding that when an agent has limited authority and informs the third party of this limitation the principal is not bound by the agents actions that exceed that authority holding that the principal is liable for an agents acts committed within the scope of the agents employment