trial testimony that Appellant alleges was improper, and one relates to the consolidation of charges. All of these claims raise underlying issues that were addressed on the merits in Appellant’s direct appeal. Neverthe less, they are not subject to the PCRA’s previous-litigation bar because they are distinct ineffectiveness claims derivative of the underlying issues. This Court has recognized that, while such ineffectiveness claims may fail for the same reason that the underlying issues faltered on direct review, the Sixth Amendment basis for an allegation of counsel ineffectiveness gives rise to a separate claim for review under the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Carson, 590 Pa. 501, 526, 918 A.2d 220, 284 (2006); see also Commonwealth v. Collins, 585 Pa. 45, 61, 888 A.2d 564, 573 (2005) (<HOLDING>); cf. Williams, 597 Pa. at 142, 950 A.2d at
holding claims must be raised on direct appeal or waived holding that ineffectiveness claims raised in a pcra petition are distinct from those claims raised on direct appeal and must be reviewed under the threeprong test of pierce but recognizing that in many instances the claim may ultimately fail on the arguable merit or prejudice prong for the reasons discussed on direct appeal holding that if the petitioner cannot prove the arguable merit of underlying claim the derivative claim of appellate counsel ineffectiveness of necessity must fail holding that derivative ineffectiveness claims are distinct sixth amendment claims albeit they may fail on the arguable merit or prejudice prong for the reasons discussed on direct appeal holding ineffective assistance of counsel claims may be decided on direct appeal where the district court has developed a record on the ineffectiveness issue