of the Zoning Code, the court of appeals did not interpret section 4-6-602 "as a grant of authority allowing the Planning Commission to deny a permitted use on the ground that it is incompatible with the surrounding neighborhood." SecurCare, 987 P.2d at 854. In large part, we disagree with the court of appeals' interpretation of the Zoning Code because we conclude that it is inconsistent with the plain language of the Zoning Code provisions. Courts interpret the ordinances of local governments, including zoning ordinances, as they would any other form of legislation. See Cherry Hills Resort Dev. Co. v. City of Cherry Hills Village, 790 P.2d 827, 830 (Colo.1990) (interpreting zoning ordinance under the general canons of statutory interpretation); Ells, 186 Colo. at 358, 527 P.2d at 541 (<HOLDING>); Glatz v. City & County of Denver, 735 P.2d
holding that mailing a copy of a notice of appeal that was filed in the trial court to the city law director does not constitute filing the notice of appeal with the city board of zoning appeals recognizing that the zoning code of a homerule city is a legislative enactment recognizing that code is speech recognizing that zoning and rezoning are legislative matters holding that a zoning decision pertaining to a specific property is not a legislative act but is rather quasijudicial in nature