(4th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Such cases, naturally, frame their discussion in terms of Congress’ exercise of the purse strings under Article I: The legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the “contract.” There can, of course, be no knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it. Accordingly, if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously. By insisting that Congress speak with a clear voice, we enable the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17, 101 S.Ct. 1531 (internal citations omitted) (<HOLDING>). At least one subsequent opinion has posited
holding that despite the housing authorities challenge to the plaintiffs proof that she is disabled under the federal disability statutes for the purposes of preliminary injunction motion the plaintiff was likely to prevail on showing she was disabled based on 1 the plaintiffs personal declaration concerning the nature of her disabilities 2 the declaration of her social worker and 3 evidence that plaintiff is receiving ssi disability benefits holding that section 6010 of the developmentally disabled assistance and bill of rights act did not unambiguously condition receipt of federal funds on providing residents of disabled home a right to appropriate treatment services and habilitation in the setting that is least restrictive of the persons personal liberty holding that employees requests for accommodation were not protected activity because the evidence did not show that he had a reasonable good faith belief that he was disabled or perceived as disabled holding that congress did not intend to prevent children from voluntarily terminating entitlement to benefits under the account of one disabled parent in order to apply on the account of the other disabled parent holding that an employer did not regard the plaintiff as disabled