which was granted from the bench after defendants formally waived the issue at oral argument. We therefore do not consider the qualified immunity defense. 2 . Defendants moved for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's evidence at the first trial, arguing at length that Barkoo’s speech was not of "public concern.” However, the issue was not preserved for appeal because defendants failed to renew their motion within 10 days of the discharge of the jury, pursuant to Fed.R. Civ.P. 50(b). The same motion for directed verdict was made at the same juncture of the second trial, but this time was properly preserved by a timely post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 3 . See e.g. Schachar v. American Academy of Ophthalmology Inc., 870 F.2d 397, 399 (7th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Barkoo also maintains that her speech is
holding that if the trial court would have had no discretion to deny summary judgment on an alternative ground the appellate court can on that alternative ground sustain the order granting summary judgment holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that motion for summary judgment was not opposed holding that a motion to intervene filed after final judgment should have been granted holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that a motion for summary judgment was not opposed holding that antitrust lawsuit in which a jury after a monthlong trial found for the defendants should never have reached the jury and affirming the district court on the alternative ground that it should have granted defendants pretrial motion for summary judgment