conviction became final.” The two exceptions set forth in Teague are inapplicable here. The “rule” in question would not “place[] certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.” Teague, 489 U.S. at 307, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (citing Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692, 91 S.Ct. 1160, 28 L.Ed.2d 404 (1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nor would it “require[ ] the observance of those procedures that ... are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Id. (citing Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693, 91 S.Ct. 1160; quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 58 S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242, 110 S.Ct. 2822, 111 L.Ed.2d 193 (1990) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, 109 S.Ct.
recognizing the rule and the exception but holding facts did not support claim to exception holding the rule of ejusdem generis inapplicable to interpret the nonspecific term otherwise improve where the legislature had expressly defined the word improve holding rules of appellate procedure are obviously procedural in nature holding that the court of appeals correctly stated the public policy exception but erroneously concluded that the exception did not apply holding that for exception to apply procedure must not only improve accuracy but also alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of the proceeding