libel, or slander), real estate, goods and chattels, and other property may, in the manner and to the extent provided by law and by this rule, be attached and held to satisfy any judgment for damages and costs which the plaintiff may recover.” V.R.C.R 4.1(a) (emphasis added). The phrase “to the extent provided by law” implicitly limits the availability of attachment to the scope defined by laws external to the rule — including our common law. ¶ 11. This Court has long held that “[t]he estate of the wife and the husband’s interest in her tenancy by the entirety, if validly created, is protected from the husband’s sole creditors.” Rose v. Morrell, 128 Vt. 110, 112, 259 A.2d 8, 10 (1969); see also Bellows Falls Trust Co. v. Gibbs, 148 Vt. 633, 633, 534 A.2d 210, 211 (1987) (mem.) (<HOLDING>); Lowell v. Lowell, 138 Vt. 514, 515-16, 419
holding that neither spouse has a share of tenancy by entirety property which can be disposed of or encumbered without the joinder of the other spouse holding that when a spouse has given separate property to the marital community section 2640 preserves to the contributing spouse the equity value of his or her separate property contribution unless that retained interest is waived holding that absent an actionable injury to one spouse the other spouse cannot recover for loss of consortium holding that a spouse is not necessarily an agent of the debtor holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate