causal link between these events. Pomales relies primarily on the chronological proximity between her complaint and discharge to establish the requisite connection. Temporal proximity can create an inference of causation in the proper case. See Wyatt v. Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 16 (1st Cir.1994). But to draw such an inference, there must be proof that the decisionmaker knew of the plaintiffs protected conduct when he or she decided to take the adverse employment action. See Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 16-17 (1st Cir.1997). There is no evidence that Vargas, the CTI employee who discharged Po-males, had any knowledge that Pomales complained to Rodney Rodriguez about Peter Rodriguez’s conduct. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Denver Pub. Schs., 164 F.3d 527, 533-34 (10th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813,
holding that the fact that employer had knowledge of the employees protected activity was not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation where the timing of the discharge was not proximate to the protected activity holding that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of retaliation without evidence that the decisionmaker knew about plaintiffs protected activity when he made the decision that resulted in the adverse action holding that the plaintiff failed to show retaliation where there was no evidence that the employees who disciplined him knew of his protected activity holding that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because there was no evidence that the decisionmaker knew of the plaintiffs protected conduct holding that close temporal proximity is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation