first deducting an acquisition fee of $25. However, the parties’ contract does not state that rebates on acceleration triggered by default are computed under the pro rata method. Incongruously, this results in a larger rebate of unearned finance.charges on acceleration than on voluntary prepayment. The appellees state that this situation is created by the dictates of Georgia’s Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act. Code Ch. 96-10. On appeal in this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the argument advanced by the appellees in their counterclaim, holding that, under TILA, acceleration rebate practices must be disclosed whenever the method of rebating unearned finance charges on acceleration differs from d 257 (3rd Cir. 1975); Price v. Franklin Investment Co., 574 F2d 594 (D. C. Cir. 1978) (<HOLDING>); McDaniel v. Fulton Nat. Bank, 571 F2d 948
holding lender loses right to a premium when it elects to accelerate the debt and declining to allow lender to avoid the consequences of its choice of acceleration recognizing need to balance interests of debt or and creditor in determining nature of protection to be afforded creditor holding that the existence of the acceleration clause is required to be disclosed except when the creditor is under a legal obligation to treat acceleration and voluntary prepayment alike for rebate purposes holding that an acceleration provision in a deed of trust securing a note which provided that failure to pay any interest note when due would cause the whole sum to become due was optional holding that the right of acceleration need not be disclosed when state law or the contract compels the creditor to rebate under acceleration as under voluntary prepayment