alleged advice that the jury would have been advised of the similarity of the crimes, appellant’s propensity to commit similar crimes, and of appellant’s recent release from prison do not appear to be accurate statements. First of all, the prosecution’s presentation of similar fact evidence is generally not contingent on whether or not the defendant takes the stand. See § 90.404(2)(a), Fla.Stat. (1993); Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert, denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959). Therefore, it appears that if appellant avoided the witness stand merely to prevent the presentation of so-called Williams Rule evidence, he was ill-advised. Second, it is not apparent from this record why the fact that appellant had recently been released from prison CA 1995) (<HOLDING>). We decline to decide that issue in this case
holding that where the defendant claims he was deprived of the right to testify by reason of ineffective assistance of trial counsel both prongs of the strickland test must be satisfied in order to obtain postconviction relief recognizing that strickland applies to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims holding that the appropriate vehicle for claims alleging that defense counsel violated a defendants right to testify is a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel holding that pennsylvanias test for ineffective assistance of counsel is not contrary to strickland holding that where the defendant claims that he was deprived of the right to testify by reason of ineffective assistance of trial counsel the defendant need not also satisfy the second prong of strickland v washington 466 us 668 687 104 sct 2052 2064 80 led2d 674 693 1984 specifically that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense