by the Motor Carrier Act”). I. Allegations in Complaint The court notes initially that in the complaint, Plaintiffs allege that “[a]t all times relevant TBC was not a ‘motor carrier’ as that term is used in the ’Motor Carrier’ exemption of the FLSA.” (Compl. Par. 11). Plaintiffs further allege that “[a]t all times relevant, the armored truck messengers were not covered by the Motor Carrier exemption of the FLSA.” (Compl. Par. 11). Such allegations in the complaint are legal arguments and legal conclusions rather than factual allegations. Thus, even if this court were to proceed under the motion to dismiss legal standard, such assertions by Plaintiffs in the complaint would not be controlling at this juncture. See Cty. of McHenry v. Ins. Co. of the West, 438 F.3d 813, 818 (7th Cir.2006)(<HOLDING>)(internal quotations omitted)(quoting Hickey v.
holding that a court is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged holding that at the motion to dismiss stage a court is not obliged to accept as true legal conclusions holding that a court is not bound to accept as a true legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation and should disregard mere conclusory statements holding prior to twombly that courts were not required to accept the truth of legal conclusions contained in a plaintiffs complaint holding that the court need not accept as true  unwarranted factual inferences