of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. “Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question under that instrument.” 315 U.S. at 571-72, 62 S.Ct. 766 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940)). ¶ 15 This seemingly broad language from Chaplinsky has been oft-quoted, though it has also been accurately described as dictum. See William S. Cohen, A Look Back at Cohen v. California, 34 UCLA L.Rev. 1595, 1599 (1987); Jeffrey M. Sh r v. State, 343 Ark. 727, 38 S.W.3d 350, 353 (2001) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 17 We thus disagree with the juvenile
holding that under chaplinsky any statute punishing or regulating the use of abusive language must be limited to fighting words holding unconstitutional a statute barring the use of opprobrious words or abusive language tending to cause a breach of the peace holding that instructions are sufficient which substantially follow the language of the statute or use equivalent language holding a georgia statute that criminalized using opprobrious words or abusive language tending to cause a breach of peace unconstitutional because first amendment protections forbid the states to punish the use of words or language not within narrowly limited classes of speech  holding that although words any person or persons in maritime robbery statute are broad enough to comprehend every human being    general words must not only be limited to cases within the jurisdiction of the state but also to those objects to which the legislature intended to apply them