with the statutes. Mother was offered numerous services in her other CHINS cases and in this case until the juvenile court granted the reasonable efforts exception, yet she remains unable to effectively parent. [15] “[T]he ADA was not intended ipso facto to re-write state substantive law.” Id. Moreover, “[e]very child is entitled to a minimum level of care regardless of the special needs or limited abilities of its parents. In the final analysis, the rights of the parents under the Fourteenth Amendment and the ADA must be subordinated to the protected rights of the children.” Id. at 831. Here, the juvenile court determined pursuant to state statute that DCS was not required to provide services to Mother due to her previous history of parental rights’ terminations. See id. at 830 (<HOLDING>). Neither the DCS request nor the juvenile
holding that the numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of the persons primarily responsible for plaintiffs termination when coupled with the timing of plaintiffs termination and the conflicting reasons given by defendants agents for the termination might well persuade a jury that defendant fired the plaintiff in retaliation for  the letter sent by her attorney to defendants general counsel holding that a termination of benefits must go handinhand with a termination of the liability of an employer holding there were no grounds for challenging in a termination proceeding the alleged failure to comply with the ada in the provision of services because services are not required by the termination statute holding that an attorneys services were personal services rendered or labor done under the predecessor statute to section 38001 holding that although a reason was provided in the termination letter the without cause termination provision was applicable