when they find that magistrate judges have dealt with the issues fully and accurately and that they could add little of value to that analysis. We cannot interpret the district court’s statement as establishing that it failed to perform the required de novo review. In re Griego, 64 F.3d at 584. Notably, because “Congress intended to permit whatever reliance a district judge, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, chose to place on a magistrate’s proposed findings and recommendations,” United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 676, 100 S.Ct. 2406 (emphasis omitted), a district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recom mendations made by the magistrate,” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). See Bratcher v. Bray-Doyle Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 42, 8 F.3d at 724-25 (<HOLDING>). Where no party objects to the Magistrate
holding that a magistrate judges ruling on dispositive motions such as those for the suppression of evidence must be reviewed de novo by the district court holding in the criminal context that a district courts obligation to make a de novo determination with respect to the portions of a magistrate judges report and recommendation to which objections are made did not require a de novo hearing holding that a court of appeals should review de novo a district courts determination of state law holding that the district courts adoption of the magistrate judges particular reasonablehour estimates for attorneys fees is consistent with the de novo determination that 28 usc  636b1 and united states v raddatz require holding that the error caused by the magistrate judges unauthorized postjudgment order was cured by the district courts later de novo review of the magistrates findings and conclusions