which must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965), quoting Grannis at 394. A hearing in which there is no consideration of a juvenile’s amenability to rehabilitation and treatment in the juvenile-justice system is not a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Because the limited process provided by Ohio’s mandatory-transfer statute falls short of due process and fundamental fairness for the juvenile, I would conclude that it is unconstitutional. {¶ 109} I do not quarrel with the notion that a juvenile who commits a serious, violent crime should be punished or that transfer to adult court is proper in some instances. See, e.g., State v. Watson, 47 Ohio St.3d 93, 547 N.E.2d 1181 (1989) (<HOLDING>). But the suggestion that this court is not
recognizing that only void judgments are subject to collateral attack and that a judgment is void only when court had no jurisdiction of the parties or property no jurisdiction of the subject matter no jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment or no capacity to act holding that a juvenilecourt judges broad discretion to retain or relinquish jurisdiction included discretion to order the transfer of a 15yearold male with no prior criminal record no major disciplinary issues at school and no psychiatric disorder because he had beaten another juvenile to death with a tree limb holding that statute allowing for transfer of juvenile to adult criminal court does not implicate apprendi because the judges transfer determination does not subject the juvenile to enhanced punishment it subjects the juvenile to the adult criminal justice system holding 1 record must affirmatively show summons with which juvenile was served for jurisdiction to vest in juvenile court and 2 no jurisdiction existed despite juveniles attendance because no affirmative showing of service was made holding that juvenile court has no jurisdiction to consider constitutional claims