In Hernandez, the timeliness of the notice of appeal for purposes of the limitations period was not dependent on actions occurring after Hernandez initiated the process by tendering the requisite papers to prison officials for mailing to the court; similarly, the timeliness of Spotville’s petition for purposes of application of the effective date of the AEDPA depends, not on a fee payment, but on when Spotville delivered his papers to prison authorities for filing. Furthermore, a rule that payment of a filing fee upon the subsequent denial of IFP status determines the applicability of the AEDPA would be contrary to this court’s traditional disposition of leniency toward pro se litigants. See Gallegos v. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedures Art. 658, 858 F.2d 1091, 1092 (5th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Moawad v. Childs, 673 F.2d 850, 851 (5th
holding that leniency should be accorded to pro se litigants when the defect in a complaint is merely procedural and there are potential grounds for relief recognizing that pro se litigants must be accorded special solicitude holding that although pro se litigants are entitled to liberal construction of their pleadings pro se litigants must follow procedural rules recognizing that courts generally afford pro se litigants leniency in technical matters recognizing that although pro se litigants are not entitled to greater rights than represented litigants due process principles permit the imposition of a procedural bar only after consideration of the pro se litigants reasonable expectations about what had occurred