to maintain a proper lookout because he was texting or looking at the floorboard for something he had dropped. These clearly would be acts. We conclude that the McGuire indictment adequately tracked the language of the penal statute to put forth a felony-murder charge based on dangerous inattentiveness in the course of a felony DWI. There is a second reason that we reject McGuire’s contention that the indictment was defective: McGuire’s voluntary act of driving after consuming alcohol could be, depending on the evidence, an act clearly dangerous to human life. See McGuire, 2012 WL 344952, at *3. The Court of Criminal Appeals stated in Johnson v. State that the felony, itself, may satisfy the requirement of an act clearly dangerous to human life. 4 S.W.3d 254, 255-58 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (<HOLDING>); see Lawson v. State, 64 S.W.3d 396, 400-01
holding that under the elements test possession of a firearm was passive and not a felony inherently dangerous to human life holding that drug felony under state law can constitute an aggravated felony for federal sentencing guidelines purposes even if the same conduct would not constitute a felony under federal law holding that same act may constitute both underlying felony and act clearly dangerous to human life except manslaughter holding that although the specific underlying felony is an essential element of felonymurder the government is not required to include the elements of the underlying felony or state the specific means by which it alleges the defendant committed the underlying felony holding that a prior nonarizona conviction to be used as a prior felony conviction under the statute must both be for an offense that would constitute a felony in arizona and be classified as a felony in the other jurisdiction