is that he did not sign the waiver voluntarily and therefore the waiver was invalid. See, e.g., Pierson v. Grant, 527 F.2d 161, 164-65 (8th Cir.1975) (requiring a voluntary and knowing waiver); Hinton v. Moritz, 11 F.Supp.2d 272, 275 (W.D.N.Y.1998) (noting that plaintiff did not allege his signing of the waiver was not knowing and voluntary). In his deposition testimony, Mr. Reed explained that he agreed to sign the parole “contract” only because “they were going to leave me in solitary confinement for 15 more years if I didn’t put my name on [the waiver].” Aplt’s App. vol. I, doc. 6, at 000200 (Mr. Reed’s deposition testimony). We are doubtful that Mr. Reed’s statement, by itself, establishes coercion. See Forester v. California Adult Authority, 510 F.2d 58, 61 (8th Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>); see also Pierson, 527 F.2d at 164 (“[P]arole
holding that the conditioning of parole on the execution of an extradition waiver is not per se coercion holding such agreements to be per se illegal holding that violation of state law was not a per se constitutional violation holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment holding that denial of access per se is noncompensable