are separated in the alternative using the word “or,” the provisions share a common focus, and the offenses tend to indicate a single instance of conduct. However, Appellant concedes that the punishment ranges for these offenses are different. Nonetheless, Appellant concludes that the Ervin factors support his assertion that the Legislature did not intend to authorize separate punishments in this case. III. The Law Both parties’ arguments are predicated on the assumption that the proper analysis includes the application of the Blockburger test and the cognate-pleadings approach. However, we employ that analysis only when the charged conduct involves multiple offenses in different statutory provisions that are the result of a single course of conduct. See Vick, 991 S.W.2d at 830 (<HOLDING>). In this case, the proper analysis is to
holding that test for whether two offenses are not the same is whether each offense requires proof of a fact that the other does not holding that congress intended to allow multiple punishments for rico conspiracies and conspiracies to commit the underlying predicate offense even though the offenses were the same under the blockburger test holding that because the ultimate question is legislative intent the blockburger test cannot authorize two punishments where the ljegislature clearly intended only one holding that the legislature can define separate offenses within the same statutory subsection even if the acts are in close temporal proximity holding that when the legislature intends to punish separate acts even ones in close temporal proximity the blockburger test does not apply because the precondition for employing that test that the two offenses involve the same conduct is absent