occurs. The CPEA does not direct the Inmates “to engage in, or to refrain from, any conduct.” Texas, 523 U.S. at 301, 118 S.Ct. 1257. The CPEA is thus fundamentally different from the statutes at issue in the decisions the Inmates have relied upon in support of their argument that their Electrocution Causes of Action are ripe. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2334, 2347, 189 L.Ed.2d 246 (2014) (stating that “denying prompt judicial review would impose a substantial hardship on petitioners, forcing them to choose between refraining from core political speech on the one hand, or engaging in that speech and risking costly Commission proceedings and criminal prosecution on the other”); Erwin Billiard Parlor v. Buckner, 156 Tenn. 278, 300 S.W. 565, 566 (1927) (<HOLDING>); Blackwell v. Haslam, No.
holding that property is not abandoned by operation of law unless the debtor formally scheduled the property before the close of the case holding that although an article 78 proceeding is not the proper vehicle to challenge the constitutionality of town legislative enactments the court would treat the portion of the petition which sought a declaration that a town law was unconstitutional as a declaratory judgment action and thereby dispose of the proceedings on the merits holding that a property appraiser who is dissatisfied with the wisdom of a taxation statute cannot challenge the validity of the statute in an action for declaratory relief holding that a declaratory judgment action brought by proprietors of pool rooms against the sheriff to challenge the constitutionality of a law declaring the operation of pool rooms unlawful was ripe because the plaintiffs property rights in their businesses would be destroyed by the enforcement of the statute holding that where the question to be resolved in the declaratory judgment action will be decided in a pending action it is inappropriate to grant a declaratory judgment