102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) (citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 817, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 44 L.Ed.2d 600 (1975)). 29 . 539 U.S. at 120, 123 S.Ct. 2191 (emphasis in original). 30 . id. 31 . See Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 59, 130 S.Ct. 1195, 175 L.Ed.2d 1009 (2010). 32 . 768 P.2d at 455-56 ("[T]he federal rules on standing ... are not binding on state courts, and the article III constitutional restrictions and federalistic prudential considerations that have guided the evolution of federal court standing law are not necessarily relevant to the development of the standing rules that apply to Utah’s state courts.”) 33 . See id. at 456-57 (remarking on the "rather narrow standing doctrines developed by the federal courts” and quoting the Suprem 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963) (<HOLDING>). 43 .See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
recognizing the application of overbreadth doctrine to state laws and explaining that because first amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity holding that a claim under the first amendment overbreadth doctrine will not succeed unless  the challenged statute itself will significantly compromise recognized first amendment protections of parties not before the court holding that overbreadth claimant must still show that enforcement of the challenged statute against him is actual or imminent and quoting prime media v city of brentwood 485 f3d 343 350 6th cir 2007 because overbreadth creates an exception only to the prudential standing inquiry the supreme court has made clear that the injury in fact requirement still applies to overbreadth claims under the first amendment recognizing in criminal case exception to standing rules where statute involving first amendment freedoms is challenged on vagueness grounds holding that where first amendment freedoms are not infringed by the statute a vagueness claim must be evaluated as the statute is applied to the facts of the case