act ... would not necessarily be immunized by the absence of such discrimination in the making of other comparable decisions.”); City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 378-79, 95 S.Ct. 2296, 45 L.Ed.2d 245 (1975) (“An official action ... taken for the purpose of discriminating ... on account of ... race has no legitimacy at all under our Constitution. ... ‘[A]ets generally lawful may become unlawful when done to accomplish an unlawful end[.]’ ”) (quoting Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Foster, 247 U.S. 105, 114, 38 S.Ct. 438, 62 L.Ed. 1006 (1918)). Dr. Sundaram set forth specific facts (his testimony that he was harassed in racial terms) from which a jury could find that the defendants’ conduct at the clinic was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. See Usher, 828 F.2d at 562 (<HOLDING>). To succeed on summary judgment, it is
holding that defendant had the right to refuse to answer questions put to him by police officer who had called him holding that contentions that police officers called him nigger and coon  are sufficient to demonstrate racial animus holding that a hostile work environment claim survived summary judgment where evidence demonstrated years of inflammatory racial epithets including nigger and little black monkey holding that a supervisors routine use of racial slurs constitutes direct evidence that racial animus was a motivating factor in the contested disciplinary decisions holding that the employers routine use of racial slurs constitutes direct evidence that racial animus was a motivating factor in the contested disciplinary decisions