have been considered disabled had they been adults. Although some of the exclusions were clearly perfectly proper under the statute, the Court invalidated the rule, saying that “a facial challenge [was] a proper response to the systemic disparity between the statutory standard and [HHS’s] approach to child-disability claims.” Id. at 537 n. 18, 110 S.Ct. 885. Our own cases confirm that the normal Chevron test is not transformed into an even more lenient “no valid applications” test just because the attack is facial. We have on several occasions invalidated agency regulations challenged as facially inconsistent with governing statutes despite the presence of easily imaginable valid applications. See, e.g., Health Ins. Ass’n of America, Inc. v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 418-20 (D.C.Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). To be sure, the Supreme Court has recently
holding that the irs has notice of plaintiffs alternate ground of recovery because it had considered and evaluated the applicability of the code provision under which the plaintiff sought recovery holding that recovery is limited to the portion of the medicaid recipients thirdparty recovery representing compensation for past medical expenses holding that an employer is only allowed to be reimbursed from a tort recovery to the extent that the recovery duplicates the elements of damage covered by compensation benefits holding that agency exceeded statutory authority in enacting regulation concerning medicare payment recovery because rule plainly covered some situations in which recovery was barred by statute holding that the avoidance powers provide for recovery only if the recovery is for the benefit of the estate