carrying, pushing or pulling while at work, and that she was limited in her ability to sit, stoop, and bend. (T. 180). In spite of Dr. Riggs’ assessment, the ALJ ruled that plaintiff was not disabled, and he denied benefits. Although the ALJ ruled that she could not still perform her past work as a laborer in a canning factory or as a home health care aide, he found that plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform light work, based on his application of the medical-vocational guidelines (“the grids”). (T. 27-28). DISCUSSION A. The Standard of Review The first issue to be determined by this Court is whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standard. Tejada v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 770, 773 (2d. Cir.1999); see also Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); see also Townley v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 109,
holding that the court must first review the aljs decision for correct legal principles before applying the substantial evidence standard to uphold a finding of no disability holding that the magistrate was correct in applying the knowing and voluntary standard in this instance holding that the standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence is the same as the standard for denying a motion for a directed verdict holding that appeal from a decision of the attorney general denying legal representation was before the appellate division as of right to review the final decision of a state officer holding that appellate court could not review the sufficiency of the evidence  based on a particular legal standard because that standard was not submitted to the jury and no party objected to the charge on this ground or requested that the jury be charged using this standard