by passage of that date. Id. at 569, 655 P.2d at 523 (citations omitted). Where the escrow agreement specifies a definite time for performance, performance must be made within the time limit of the agreement, and the escrow agent is without power to deliver a deed thereafter. Pothast v. Kind, 24 P.2d 771, 772 (Cal. 1933). “It is well settled that performance must be made within the time limit of the escrow agreement.” Id. In this case, time was of the essence and NGA failed to timely record the parcel map before the date set for closing. Thus, under Goldston, NGA’s failure to record by July 12, 1995, and failures thereafter to obtain extensions, operated prima facie as a discharge of Rains’ duty to convey the property. See Roberts v. Osburn, 589 P.2d 985, 989 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979) (<HOLDING>). The issue then becomes whether NGA was
holding that the failure to satisfactorily meet the conditions of probation is not the legal equivalent of absconding and does not toll the probationary period holding that plaintiffs legal malpractice claim was not ripe until the appeal had been exhausted because plaintiffs harm remained speculative until then holding that legal title does not pass to the grantee until all conditions are performed and the deed is released from escrow recognizing that the appalling unsanitary and unprofessional conditions under which  illegal operations are in fact performed warrant the protection of the law to women holding that language in an escrow agreement stating that contract documents were not to be released unless and until a party executed and agreed to a deal on terms outlined in the agreement was an express condition precedent