from working; or (3) diminished patronage by customers, which produces unemployment). The appellate courts of Illinois have also consistently equated stoppage of work to a substantial curtailment of business within each individual premises, not the employer’s business as a whole. See Central Foundry Div. v. Holland, 36 Ill. App.3d 998, 1002, 345 N.E.2d 143, 147 (1976) (“Stoppage of work refers ‘to a stoppage of work of the plant or particular department of a plant and not to the individual unemployment of the worker or workers.’ ”) (quoting Robert S. Abbott Publ’g Co. v. Annunzio, 414 Ill. 559, 569, 112 N.E.2d 101, 106 (1953)); Be-Mac Transp. Co. v. Grabiec, 20 Ill.App.3d 345, 351, 314 N.E.2d 242, 247 (1974) (same); Walgreen Co. v. Murphy, 386 Ill. 32, 37, 53 N.E.2d 390, 393 (1944) (<HOLDING>). The appellate courts of Missouri are in
holding that there was a work stoppage at a warehouse because of a shutdown substantially interfering with warehouse operations curtailing them to approximately twenty per cent of normal production holding that for a compilation or derivative work there should be only one award of statutory damages per registration holding that longevity pay was part of salary because it was not a true fringe benefit but rather a normal payment made regularly in the course of the plaintiffs work for regular work done holding that in computing the present worth of such future payments same should have been discounted to their present worth at the date of judgment at 6 per cent interest per annum holding that the fact that the insurance agents perform functions that are an essential part of the companys normal operations is a decisive factor