provisions, including laws on the tality subject to claims made under the TCHRA. The DFW Board contends that it is not a state instrumentality because it is an instrumentality of a municipality and therefore is not an employer under the Act. But the DFW Board took the opposite position in City of Irving — arguing it was an agent of the state of Texas — and in that case we upheld the constitutionality of Texas Transportation Code subsections 22.074(c) and (d), vesting power over the airport property exclusively with the DFW Board, to the exclusion of the municipalities. City of Irving, 894 S.W.2d at 467-68. By virtue of this statute, the DFW Board cannot be considered a mere agent of a municipality. See Tex TRAnsp. Code Ann. § 22.074(c), (d); City of Irving, 894 S.W.2d at 467-68 (<HOLDING>). We thus decline to adopt the DFW Board’s
holding that county airport board and twenty board members in their representative capacities had sovereign immunity in suit for negligence holding that the county government not the federal government was liable for the taking of an air easement over plaintiffs property even though the airport was funded in part by a federal grant based on compliance with federal regulations recognizing the unique status of counties and cities that enables the legislature to regulate their tort liability recognizing legislature reallocated the regulatory authority from the cities over the property on which dfw airport is located to the airport board recognizing that presence of sectarian chapel in airport impaired use of airport by passengers