cause of Morrill’s allegations of fraud, it would have been almost impossible for him to secure future employment as a physician or professor. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding, we conclude that the evidence presented by Cisek at the judgment hearing would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to find that Cisek had sustained general damage to his reputation as a result of Morrill’s letters. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827. The evidence is therefore legally sufficient to support the trial court’s award of damages for Cisek’s claim of libel per se. We further hold that legally sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding of $25,000 as a reasonable amount of damages. See Peshak, 13 S.W.3d at 427; Bellefonte, 663 S.W.2d at 583 (<HOLDING>); Bayoud v. Sigler, 555 S.W.2d 913, 916
holding that an attorneys fees award is not appealable until the amount of the award is set holding that award of 50000 was reasonable holding that a 50000 malicious prosecution compensatory damages award deviated materially from what would be reasonable compensation and ordering a new trial on the issue of damages unless plaintiff stipulated to a reduction in the award to 25000 holding that in deciding whether the jurys award is inadequate the test is whether reasonable people could not conclude that the  award was reasonable compensation holding that award of 25000 was reasonable