limited to, the obligation to act as the thirteenth juror. Other post-verdict obligations may include sentencing the defendant as well as conducting hearings on other post-verdict proceedings such as a motion to arrest judgment. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 34. Because the grant of a new trial would not be appropriate in the event the successor judge concluded that he could not conduct, for instance, the sentencing hearing, Rule 25 employs the term “may.” While this use of the term “may” indicates that it is within the successor judge’s discretion whether to grant a new trial, a successor judge must decide whether to act as the thirteenth juror if the original trial judge did not. That decision is mandatory, not discretionary. See Nail, 963 S.W.2d at 765; see also Carter, 896 S.W.2d at 120 (<HOLDING>). That mandatory decision is the decision we
holding that though judge did not question juror individually note from juror to judge requesting private meeting to ask legal question did not suggest juror would not base verdict on evidence holding that rule 33s thirteenth juror provision is mandatory and requires a trial judge to act as the thirteenth juror holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when the trial judge questioned the juror extensively enough to satisfy itself that the juror was not biased emphasis added recognizing that the duty of an appellate court is limited to reviewing whether a trial court performed its obligation as the thirteenth juror and does not include reweighing or reassessing the evidence holding that successor judge could not act as thirteenth juror because the case involved accusations by the victim and her parents and a denial of any wrongdoing by the defendant with no physical evidence present witness credibility was an overriding issue