and the “execution of parole revocation procedures,” tasks integrally related to an official’s decision to grant or revoke parole. Anderson, 714 F.2d at 909. We have also explained, however, that parole officials are not “entitled to absolute immunity for conduct not requiring the exercise of quasi-judicial discretion.” Id. “There is no reason to clothe actions taken outside an official’s adjudicatory role with the absolute immunity tailored to the demands of that role.” Id. Thus, while parole officials “may claim absolute immunity for those actions relating to their responsibility to determine whether to revoke parole, their immunity for conduct arising from their duty to supervise parolees is qualified.” Id. at 910; see also Sepulveda v. Ramirez, 967 F.2d 1413, 1415-16 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Anderson, therefore, expresses the broad
holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity holding that defendant is entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff failed to allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right holding that in determining whether a state officer is entitled to qualified immunity for  1983 purposes courts may not consider whether the constitutional right was clearly established before determining first that a constitutional right was violated holding that in deciding whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity it is not only the evidence of clearly established law that is for the court but also whether a reasonable officer could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful in light of the information the officer had holding that a parole officer was not entitled to qualified immunity for depriving a woman of her clearly established due process right to bodily privacy by entering a bathroom stall and watching her urinate