not need a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity for an investigatory stop, because the initial traffic stop was valid and appellant was not detained beyond the time necessary to issue a citation. See Cresswell v. State, 564 So.2d 480, 481 (Fla.1990) (citing State v. Anderson, 479 So.2d 816, 818 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)); K.G.M. v. State, 816 So.2d 748, 752 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). Further, once appellant was lawfully stopped for the traffic violation, the officer was authorized to order him out of his vehicle. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (<HOLDING>); Faulkner v. State, 834 So.2d 400, 402 (Fla.
holding that for general safety purposes an officer may routinely order the driver of a lawfully stopped vehicle to exit the vehicle because when the vehicle is already stopped the slight additional intrusion associated with being directed to exit the car can only be described as de minimis holding that a police officer may as a matter of course order the driver of a lawfully stopped car to exit his vehicle holding that the additional intrusion into a drivers personal liberty by an order to step out of the vehicle after having been stopped for a traffic violation is de minimus holding that once a vehicle has been lawfully stopped an officer may order the driver out of the vehicle without violating the fourth amendment holding that the officer acted within the scope of his authority in requiring the defendant stopped in middle lane of traffic to exit his vehicle