shot on one of its properties. Id. at 17. The reasoning applied in Trammell Crow, like the reasoning applied in Timber-walk, should not apply to the instant case, for the same reasons discussed here. Moreover, Chief Justice Jefferson, in a concurring opinion, explained that bare application of the Timberwalk factors might not allow for consideration of all relevant factors. See id. at 18 (Jefferson, J., concurring). For example, Chief Justice Jefferson noted that the ‘‘prior-similar-incidents inquiry” under Timberwalk does not properly "account for crimes that may have been eminently foreseeable despite their never having occurred at a particular place before.” See id. at 19. This same reasoning applies here. Although the record does not show that Love 690 S.W.2d 546, 549-50 (Tex.1985) (<HOLDING>). Here, Whataburger operated a late night
holding that the victims negligence is not a defense to criminal conduct holding that criminal conduct on premises was not foreseeable holding that a private actors conduct was not state action just because the government failed to supervise that partys conduct holding that criminal conduct of third party is not superseding cause that relieves negligent actor from liability when criminal conduct is foreseeable result of actors negligence holding that a district court may depart upward based upon based criminal conduct when such conduct is not included in the computation of criminal history category