same benefit. Flowing from that principle is the logical conclusion that § 3553(a)(6)’s avoidance of unwarranted sentencing disparities does not require courts to sentence similarly individuals who go to trial and those who plead guilty. They are not similarly situated for sentencing purposes. E.g., United States v. Perez-Pena, 453 F.3d 236, 243 (4th Cir.2006) (“[C]omparing the sentences of defendants who helped the Government to those of defendants who did not ... is comparing apples and oranges. For this reason, Congress could not have intended that disparities resulting from the exercise of prosecutorial discretion could be determined to be ‘unwarranted.’”); see also United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 187, 181 L.Ed.2d 95 (2011), (<HOLDING>). Here, the district court was dialoguing with
holding that a defendant who pleads guilty in exchange for a reduced sentence is not similarly situated to a defendant who contests his charges recognizing that  3553a6s consideration of sentencing disparities does not reflect that a defendant who goes to trial should be sentenced similarly to a cooffender who pled guilty and testified against the defendant and received a reduced sentence as a result of his cooperation holding that the district courts consideration of whether the defendant pled guilty pursuant to a plea agree ment did not render the sentence unreasonable holding defendant who is sentenced to a mandatoryminimum sentence may still be eligible to receive a reduced minimum sentence under the rrri act holding that in conjunction an information with a narrow charge and an abstract of judgment indicating that a defendant pled guilty to that charge prove the precise elements of the offense to which the defendant pled guilty