of all persons involved in the legal process with courtesy and respect.”). But zeal cannot go unchecked, and many mechanisms, including sanctions, exist to ensure that advocacy supports instead of erodes justice. Yet, while these mechanisms serve a vital purpose, their overuse may chill an attorney’s enthusiasm and creativity, in turn impeding both a tribunal’s decision-making process and the creation of new case law. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Sala, 822 F.2d 882, 887 (9th Cir.1987) (quoting the Rule 11 advisory committee’s note and expressing concern that broad interpretations of Rule 11 would increase “excess litigation” and “would blur the roles of attorneys and finders of fact.”); see also Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393, 408, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990) (<HOLDING>). For this reason, sanctions should not result
holding that the mere determination that removal was improper does not require a district court to award attorneys fees holding that rule 11 does not authorize a district court to award appellate attorneys fees due to similar concerns holding that an award of attorneys fees under supreme court rule 38 precursor to rule 222 did not preempt an award of attorneys fees to which one is otherwise entitled and thus appellant could seek an award of attorneys fees pursuant to section 1577300 which permits an award of fees for a party prevailing in an action against a state agency holding that a district court may award attorneys fees while the merits are on appeal holding trial court had no authority to award attorneys fees when arbitrator had stated he would not award attorneys fees