Id. at 1263. Likewise, Morris argues that the assumption underlying the “objective” probability of the doctrine of chances “necessarily depends — in a mathematically demonstrable manner — on the assumption that the defendant’s character is unchanging.” Morris, supra, at 201. Nonetheless, despite the apparently flawed reasoning underlying the doctrine of chances, the majority of courts have adopted the doctrine without question. See, e.g., State v. Sullivan, supra; People v Crawford, supra; State v. Sadowski, supra. (b) Factual Disparity Even assuming that the doctrine of chances is the law in this jurisdiction, a matter we have never specifically addressed and do not now address, the facts of the instant case do not satisfy the doctrine’s requirements. See, State v. Sullivan, supra (<HOLDING>); People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314 (Colo. 1990).
holding that police officers were not entitled to qualified immunity where they used threats and physical violence against the plaintiff in march 1992 to coerce a confession that was later used to convict him of murder holding that two acts were not sufficiently similar when one consisted of verbal threats and other resulted in physical violence holding that harassment threats and one beating did not constitute persecution holding that two isolated criminal acts perpetrated by unknown assailants which resulted only in the theft of some personal property and a minor injury are not sufficiently severe to be considered persecution holding that verbal threats if they are specific can constitute adverse action for retaliation purposes