995 F.Supp.2d at 52 (termination three days shy of six months after plaintiff lodged complaints does not sustain finding of causation). In the main, plaintiffs retaliation claim rests on her letter of February 23, 2009 denouncing sex discrimination, and the transfer made in January of 2010, eleven months later, following Manzur’s administrative complaint. In her view, the transfer was but a fabrication for complaining of sex discrimination and the hostile work environment (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 55). These circumstances undercut any cognizable claim of causation. See, Velazquez-Ortiz v. Vilsack, 657 F.3d 64, 73 n. 8 (1st Cir.2011)(eight-month gap between events considered insufficient to raise an inference of retaliation); Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 828 (1st Cir.1991)(<HOLDING>); King, 116 F.3d at 968 (finding that
holding that a threeyear gap between the protected activity and the adverse employment action was insufficient to support an inference of causation holding that three and onehalf months between the filing of an eeoc charge and the adverse employment action was insufficient by itself to establish causation holding that a time lapse of nine months between the filing of a formal grievance and the adverse employment action undercuts any inference of causation holding that although evidence that the alleged adverse action occurred shortly after the employer became aware of the protected activity is sufficient to make a prima facie causation case the opposite is equally true  a lengthy time lapse between the employer becoming aware of the protected activity and the alleged adverse employment action  negates any inference that a causal connection exists between the two holding that adverse employment activity that occurred 10 months and 17 months after protected activity was insufficient on its own to create a reasonable inference of causation