it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392, 397 (C.M.A.1993) (citations omitted). Therefore, even though dismissing charges with prejudice is a “drastic remedy” requiring military judges to “look to see whether alternative remedies are available,” Gore, 60 M.J. at 187, the military judge’s decision will be upheld so long as it was “within the range of remedies available and not otherwise a clear error of judgment.” Id. at 189. Second, the abuse of discretion standard grants trial judges wide latitude for matters concerning control of the courtroom and docket and rulings on continuances. See United States v. Wellington, 58 M.J. 420, 425 (C.A.A.F.2003) (quoting Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983)) (<HOLDING>). We will not overturn a military judge’s
holding that district courts discretion is extremely broad holding denial of continuance to be an abuse of discretion holding the immigration judges denial of a continuance request did not constitute an abuse of discretion recognizing that the district court is afforded broad discretion in ruling on motions for relief from judgment recognizing that military judges enjoy broad discretion on matters of continuance