state court findings of fact: §§ 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1). In reviewing evidence presented to the state court, we rely on § 2254(d)(2). See Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351, 358 n. 1 (9th Cir.2006). Under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court “may not second-guess a state court’s fact-finding process unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the state court was not merely wrong, but actually unreasonable.” Taylor, 366 F.3d at 999 (discussing § 2254(d)(2)). Looking at the record before us, it was not unreasonable for the trial court and the California Supreme Court to credit Baroni’s testimony over Cunningham’s. A criminal defendant’s vague testimony, standing alone, does not demonstrate that an officer’s contrary version of the facts was wrong. Cf. Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1006 (<HOLDING>). The California Supreme Court also reasonably
holding that the state courts rejection of the petitioners ineffective assistance of counsel claim was an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence before the state court holding that the state supreme courts summary adjudication of habeas petitioners claims left intact the reasoning of the lower court and that the state is accordingly entitled to the benefit of the more thorough treatment of petitioners strickland claims in that court holding that the denial of petitioners appeal to the bia would have put a reasonable person in the petitioners position on notice that something was wrong with his attorneys preparation for the removal hearing holding that the state court unreasonably credited the officer when the petitioners attorney provided accurate corroboration of the petitioners version of the postarrest interview holding that attorneys admission to an element of the offense in the petitioners presence at a deportation hearing was binding on the petitioners