appellee’s consent to seize his buccal cells was involuntary as a matter of law. This is incorrect because Miranda — and by extension Edwards — “serves the Fifth Amendment,” not the Fourth Amendment. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306, 105 S.Ct. 1285. Within the context of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court in United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 643-44, 124 S.Ct. 2620, 159 L.Ed.2d 667 (2004), held that the Fourth Amendme lso Burns, 33 M.J. at 320 (reaffirming analysis in Roa and holding that determination of whether consent is voluntary is based on the totality of the circumstances). Thus, an Edwards violation does not implicate the Fourth Amendment or the corresponding military rules of evidence. Burns, 33 M.J. at 320; Roa, 24 M.J. at 300; see also Patane, 542 U.S. at 640, 124 S.Ct. 2620 (<HOLDING>). This does not, however, end our analysis
holding that the physical fruits of a miranda violation must be suppressed holding that the fifth amendment did not require the suppression of the physical fruits of a miranda violation where the statement was voluntary holding that suppression of the evidence or dismissal of an indictment are not required to remedy a violation of  6103 holding that suppression of derivative evidence from a miranda violation cannot be justified  under the supreme courts closefit requirement holding that miranda violation did not require suppression of immigrants fingerprints