the later date.” Rule 609(b), Preliminary Draft, 1969 (emphasis supplied), available in Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 6131, n. 51 (1998). This rule was amended in 1972, however, and now states that a conviction is not admissible if more than ten years have elapsed since “release from confinement.” United States v. Daniel, 5th Cir., 957 F.2d 162, 168 (1992). The General Assembly’s adaption of the amended version of Rule 609(b) forecloses the interpretation of the Superior Court. See id; THK Amer., Inc. v. NSK, Ltd., N.D.Ill., 917 F.Supp. 563, 569 (1996). See also United States v. Lorenzo, 9th Cir., 43 F.3d 1303, 1307 (1995); United States v. Lopez, 5th Cir., 979 F.2d 1024 (1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 913, 113 S.Ct. 2349, 124 L.Ed.2d 258 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Cf. D.C.Code § 14-305 (containing language
holding that where a witness had been convicted seventeen years earlier but had been given probation and had not been confined the date of the conviction controlled holding the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing inapplicable when a witness had been deported during the period of time the defendant had been a fugitive holding that a claim for surcharge had been plausibly stated even though the precise term had not been used holding the drivers license compact requires that the same effect be given to a conviction reported by a party state as the conviction would have been given had the licensee engaged in substantially similar conduct and been convicted of a substantially similar offense in pennsylvania holding that because the term conviction is ambiguous to lawyers judges and laymen the claimant did not commit misconduct when she wrote she had not been convicted of felony where adjudication had been withheld