VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988). Both Title VII and the ADEA define "employer" substantially identically to the ADA definition. Alberte, 232 Wis. 2d 587, ¶ 11. 6 This inadequacy is even more apparent in cases where the employer is an insolvent corporation. In such cases "[t]o permit an agent of a corporation ... to inflict wrong and injuries upon others, and then shield himself [or herself] from liability behind his [or her] vicarious character, would often both sanction and encourage the perpetration of flagrant and wanton injuries by agents of insolvent and irresponsible corporations." See Hoang v. Arbess, 80 P.3d 863, 867 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003) (citation omitted) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 2003 Colo. LEXIS 954 (No.
holding that where state attorney general files suit on behalf of a specified group of individuals that suit qualifies as a de facto class action and the statute of limitations is tolled during the period in which the individuals are participants in the attorney generals suit holding that nothing in the legislative history of the pennsylvania consumer fraud act suggests that the legislature ever intended statutory language directed against consumer fraud to do away with the traditional elements of reliance and causation and accordingly in order to maintain a class action suit under the pennsylvania consumer fraud act a plaintiff must allege reliance holding that the colorado consumer protection act allowed suit against agents as individuals holding that erisa preempts a plaintiffs claims for violation of the state insurance code and consumer protection act holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state