system of government is personal.” Id. (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 178, 71 S.Ct. 624, 652, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951)). Any determination that Russell’s identity in the Fast Freddy’s offense was more probable because of Russell’s subsequent association with Barnes in the Vogt Street offense constituted an abuse of discretion because it authorized an inference of guilt by association, that is, an inference that because Russel acted with Barnes in the Vogt Street offense, he also was the person who acted with Barnes in the Fast Freddy’s offense. See generally Tex.R. Evid. 404(b) (prohibiting the use of extraneous offenses to prove character and subsequent conduct in conformity with that character); Ford v. State, 484 S.W.2d 727, 729 (Tex.Crim.App.1972) (<HOLDING>). The Vogt Street offense was not relevant to
holding that extraneous offense evidence must be relevant on some theory other than the general proposition that one who commits one crime is prone to commit another holding that an indictment charging one offense during the commission of another crime need not allege the elements of the latter offense holding extraneous acts relevant to show intent in charged offense holding that an employer who caused his agent to commit a crime in another county was deemed to have been personally present where the crime occurred holding that firstdegree murder is one crime although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways