Sivitz and Lebed Assoc., 798 A.2d 281, 237 (Pa.Super.2002) (indicating that “the fact that a plaintiff is not aware that the defendant’s conduct is wrongful, injurious or legally actionable is irrelevant to the discovery rule analysis”), but the general rule is most often stated in terms of the plaintiffs actual or constructive awareness of an injury caused by another. Even the limited focus on injury and cause is subject to reasonable controversy, since this Court, on occasion, has suggested a broader focus on the plaintiffs knowledge of the fact of a cause of action. See, e.g., Pastierik, 514 Pa. at 524, 526 A.2d at 327. Finally, different decisions may be read as suggesting differing litmuses in the application of the terms “injury” and “cause.” Compare, e.g., Caro, 867 A.2d at 538 (<HOLDING>), with Fine, 582 Pa. at 272-73, 870 A.2d at
holding that the statute of limitations for an attorney malpractice suit did not begin to run until the client had suffered some actual damage holding at least under the facts of the case that the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice action did not begin to run until the plaintiff secured a specific medical diagnosis holding that a notice of claim period did not begin to run until discovery of the injury holding that the statute of limitations for attorney malpractice may begin to run before the plaintiff knows the full extent of his damages holding that plaintiffs claim that medical providers did not comply with baker act was not subject to medical malpractice statutes ajlthough a medical diagnosis is necessary in order to involuntarily commit a patient the process of complying with the statute does not require medical skill or judgment