F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.2005) (noting that the elements of a Section 10(b) claim and a Rule 10b-5 claim are the same). The date on which a violation ends is simply not a necessary element of proving a violation. Maxxon and Mabie also argue that, without a jury finding as to the end-date of the violation, the district court could not properly calculate disgorgement. Disgorgement being remedial rather than punitive, see S.E.C. v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 116 & n. 25 (2d Cir.2006), some end-date determination is certainly necessary so that the defendant is not required to disgorge profits not “causally connected to the violation.” Arnold S. Jacobs, Disclosures & Remedies Under the Securities Latos § 20:109 (footnote omitted); cf. S.E.C. v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 52-55 (1st Cir.1983) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). However, here, the district court did
holding that where oral loan was silent as to the time of repayment the statute of limitations began to run at the time the contract was made holding that admission contained in an answer was binding despite the fact that it was made on information and belief holding that a statement made by a witness to a shooting an hour or two after the incident was not an excited utterance as it was not made while the speaker was laboring under excitement and before he had to time to reflect holding that disgorgement was appropriate only as to the profits made prior to the time insider information was made public holding that the ada only applies to employees and that requests for accommodations must be made prior to termination