under N.C.G.S. § 1111(a)(2) when such grounds were not alleged in the petitions. Respondent contends the trial court erred in permitting petitioner to amend its petitions to conform to the evidence presented at the adjudication hearing to add N.C.G.S. § 1111(a)(2) as an alleged ground of termination. Petitioner’s response is that the trial court correctly allowed the petitions to be amended under Rule 15(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. We disagree. This Court has held that the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure do “not provide parties in termination actions with procedural rights not explicitly granted by the juvenile code.” In re S.D.W. & H.E.W., 187 N.C. App. 416, 421, 653 S.E.2d 429, 432 (2007) (citing In re Jurga, 123 N.C. App. 91, 472 S.E.2d 223 (1996)) (<HOLDING>); In re Curtis v. Curtis, 104 N.C. App. 625,
recognizing that where the juvenile code sets forth specific procedures governing termination actions those procedures apply to the exclusion of the rules of civil procedure recognizing this substantial interest in context of termination of parental rights holding that parents could not execute a declaration of voluntary termination of parental rights because the juvenile code did not provide procedures for this type of unilateral declaration holding that foster parents have standing to intervene to seek termination of parental rights recognizing that the department is required to present clear and convincing evidence to support termination of a parents parental rights