by them. Indeed, in the two published opinions relied upon by Marshak, both district judges expressly declined to consider whether Marshak and his assignors had defrauded the PTO when they failed to disclose Treadwell’s superior rights in their trademark application: These arguments miss the mark, however, because they could only accrue, if at all, to Treadwell’s benefit, not to Sheppard’s. Sheppard argues that the rights to “The Drifters” were lodged in the group’s manager, Treadwell, and the corporation he set up to control the group’s assets. In this case, however, when only Marshak’s and Sheppard’s rights are at stake, these arguments are irrelevant. Marshak v. Sheppard, 666 F.Supp. 590, 598-600 (S.D.N.Y.1987); see also Marshak v. Green, 505 F.Supp. 1054, 1060-61 (S.D.N.Y.1981)(<HOLDING>). For these same reasons, this Court rejects
holding that dock green was estopped from asserting a claim of fraudulent registration because green swore to and signed the application holding that tribal entity was not equitably estopped from asserting immunity because misrepresentations of the tribes officials or employees cannot affect its immunity from suit holding that a defendant was estopped from asserting improper service where the defendants conduct caused the allegedly improper service holding that the insurer was not estopped from asserting a policy defense not contained in its reservation of rights letter where the delay was not unreasonable and the insured was not prejudiced holding that the postmark on the registration application was the determining factor when a registration is subsequently approved