Guidelines overruled Becker’s holding that such burglary was categorically a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). Id. at 1112-13. We reasoned that our recognition in Aguila-Montes that § 459’s unlawfulness requirement was different than federal generic burglary’s unlawfulness requirement did not change the fact that the conduct prohibited by § 459 involved a substantial risk of force. Every violation of § 459 might not present that level of risk, but “the proper inquiry for the categorical approach is whether the conduct covered by the crime presents the requisite risk of injury ‘in the ordinary case.’ ” Id. at 1112 (quoting James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 208, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007)); see also United States v. Park, 649 F.3d 1175, 1179-80 (9th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, we concluded that Becker’s
holding that kidnapping is a crime of violence which involves a serious potential risk of injury under 18 usc  924 holding that  459 is categorically a crime of violence under guidelines  4b12a2 because the usual or ordinary firstdegree burglary in california involves conduct that presents a serious risk of physical violence and injury to others holding that california residential burglary is categorically a crime of violence under the residual clause of ussg  4b12a2 which requires the criminal conduct to present a serious potential risk of physical injury to another holding that attempted burglary under florida law qualified as a crime of violence under the armed career criminal act 18 usc  924e2biihereinafter acca because it involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another holding that burglary of commercial building is crime of violence under guidelines