a New York State court. Nonetheless, the same provision of the Revival Act that excluded the claims for breach of warranty, does appear to include actions for fraud as actions that have been revived. As discussed above, the phrase “injury to property” as defined by GCL § 25-b includes any action lessening the value of the plaintiffs estate except actions for personal injury or breach of contract. Fraud does not fall within either exception and is therefore an action within the meaning of the phrase “injury to property.” Thus, an action for fraud is revived by the Revival Act to the extent it lessens the value of the plaintiffs estate. This construction is supported by New York law. See Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Weinbach, 635 F.Supp. 1460, 1462 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (Weinfeld, J.) (<HOLDING>); Primoff v. Duell, 85 Misc.2d 1047, 1051, 381
holding that property of a public entity includes having exclusive control and possession of  property holding that if state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions the general or residual statute for personal injury actions should be used for 1983 actions holding that the expansive definition of injury to property in gcl  25b  includes actions sounding in fraud holding that fraud loss includes interest that the defendant promised would accrue holding that the definition of operating deficits is not ambiguous despite the absence of a definition of the phrase in the contract