a First Amendment retaliation claim must allege that: (1) he or she has an interest protected by the First Amendment; (2) the defendant’s actions were motivated by or substantially caused by the plaintiffs exercise of that right; and (3) the defendant’s action effectively chilled the exercise of the plaintiffs First Amendment rights. Connell v. Signoracci, 153 F.3d 74, 79 (2d Cir.1998); Kerman v. City of New York, 261 F.3d 229, 241-42 (2d Cir.2001). “The chilling effect cannot be remote or speculative. Actual inhibition is required.” Colondres v. Scoppeta, 290 F.Supp.2d 376, 382 (E.D.N.Y.2003) (citing Spear v. Town of West Hartford, 954 F.2d 63, 67 (2d Cir.1992); Hankard v. Town of Avon, 126 F.3d 418, 424 (2d Cir.1997); Curley v. Village of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>)). Moreover, a de minimus deterrence from
holding that plaintiff must show her first amendment rights were actually chilled holding record must affirmatively show that the substitution was actually made by the prosecutors written motion and the trial courts order holding that federal employee could not sue supervisors for discharge alleged to have violated her first amendment rights recognizing first amendment retaliation right recognizing that corporations have first amendment speech rights but declining to address the abstract question whether corporations have the full measure of rights that individuals enjoy under the first amendment