the report and recommendation did not notify the parties that they must file timely objections to preserve their right to appellate review. He argues that the firm waiver rule should not be enforced in the absence of such an explicit notification. While we have held that the firm waiver rule is inapplicable when pro se litigants are not given explicit notice of the rule, see id. at 659, we have never extended that practice to counseled cases. We decline to do so today, because we expect counsel to know the rules. See Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 n. 5 (10th Cir.2007) (“[W]e expect counsel to know the pleading rules of the road without being given personal notice of them by the district court.”); United States v. Windrix, 405 F.3d 1146, 1157 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). While 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) provides that a
holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in striking fact statements that did not comply with the local rules holding that a criminal defendants counsel is charged with knowledge of the local criminal rules in their entirety including those parts of the local civil rules incorporated by reference holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying its own local rules even though those rules prevented it from considering some facts improperly alleged by plaintiffs that might have been relevant to the summary judgment motion holding that the federal expert witness compensation rules are in direct conflict with the state rules even when the state rules allow for a greater recovery holding that defendants have a right to counsel in criminal proceedings