v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 96 S.Ct. 2709, 49 L.Ed.2d 534 (1976); Burris v. Davis, 46 Ariz. 127, 46 P.2d 1084 (1935). On the other hand, in situations in which the inferior court system meets constitutional criteria, a surprising number of decisions have held that the ‘trial de novo’ guaranteed by statute is limited in scope. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Canaan Municipal Court, 116 N.H. 616, 366 A.2d 208 (1976) (appeal after guilty plea limited to sentencing questions); State ex rel. Kansas City v. Meyers, 513 S.W.2d 414 (Mo.1974) (appeal after guilty plea limited to questions of jurisdiction, sufficiency of criminal charges, and to appellate review of validity of plea). But see, e.g., State v. Fox, 34 N.C.App. 576, 239 S.E.2d 471 (1977); State ex rel. O’Neill v. Gay, 285 S.E.2d 637 (W.Va.1981) (<HOLDING>).” 104 N.M. at 182-83, 718 P.2d at 692-93. We
holding that a defendant has right to be represented by counsel in all criminal trials for serious offenses holding subsequently reversed by legislation forbidding appeals from guilty pleas where defendant was represented by counsel wvacode  50513 cumsupp1985 recognizing a defendants constitutional right to be represented by counsel of his own choice holding that a corporate entity must be represented by licensed counsel holding that pleadings filed by a criminal defendant who is represented by counsel are generally treated as a nullity