all his or her peremptory challenges before jury selection is completed. See Fuson v. State, 105 N.M. 632, 634, 735 P.2d 1138, 1140 (1987). The State urges this Court to overrule Fuson because the federal precedent upon which it was based has been eliminated by the Supreme Court in Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988), which held that: "So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated." Because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Clark’s motions for removal for cause, it is unnecessary to reach this argument. 2 . See State v. Brewer, 170 Ariz. 486, 826 P.2d 783, 791 (1992) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); Massie v. Sumner, 624 F.2d 72, 74 (9th
recognizing that where the juvenile code sets forth specific procedures governing termination actions those procedures apply to the exclusion of the rules of civil procedure holding that the rules of criminal procedure should be common knowledge to lawenforcement and judicial officers who have the duty and responsibility to authorize searches holding that the defendant may not restrict the mandatory appeal provided for him pursuant to the states capitalsentencing procedures because doing so would be a renunciation of the courts duty imposed by the statutes and rules of criminal procedure holding rules of procedure interpreted in same manner as statutes holding that the plaintiffs motion for extension of time to file appeal qualified as a notice of appeal because it met the requirements of rule 4 of the federal rules of appellate procedure