as from the actual criminals themselves.” Spano, 360 U.S. at 320-21, 79 S.Ct. 1202. Schneckloth stands equally for the proposition that society’s fundamental sense of “fairness” is a guiding consideration in determining voluntariness. Id. at 225, 93 S.Ct. 2041. For example, it is generally fair in terms of due process for the police to mislead a suspect regarding the extent of evidence then in police possession concerning the offense the suspect knows the police are actually investigating (i.e., intrinsic fabrication). In the confession context, this is the type of police deception that this Court and the United States Supreme Court have previously held does not by itself per se vitiate voluntariness. See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (<HOLDING>); Burch v. State, 343 So.2d 831, 833 (Fla.1977)
holding in a plurality opinion that a confession obtained through a twostep questions first interrogation technique whereby the police deliberately questioned a defendant in custody until that defendant confessed followed by a miranda warning and reiteration of the confession was inadmissible because the police strategy undermined the effectiveness of the miranda warning holding that a confession was voluntary despite the fact that an officer falsely told the defendant that physical evidence connected him to the crime recognizing that under totality of circumstances test a threat or promise does not render confession inadmissible absent reliance holding that the fact that police falsely told defendant that his companion had confessed to the crime under investigation though relevant was insufficient to render otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible holding that a police officers lie to defendant about his cousin confessing to the commission of a murder was insufficient in the supreme courts view to make an otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible