the child pornography. This notion is merely ‘unsupported speculation’ and lacks a sufficient nexus to link [J.H.] to the crime charged.” See supra at 991 (setting out entirety of the district court’s order). As noted by Meisel, however, neither the government nor the district court has identified case law holding that alternative perpetrator evidence is admissible only if it conclusively demonstrates the guilt of the alleged alternative perpetrator. Instead, such evidence is admissible if a defendant’s “proffered evidence on the alleged alternative perpetrator ..., on its own or in combination with other evidence in-the record, ... show[s] a nexus between the crime charged and the asserted ‘alternative perpetrator.’ ” McVeigh, 153 F.3d at 1191; see also Jordan, 485 F.3d at 1222 '(<HOLDING>). Second, the district court indicated “the
holding test for admissibility of alternative perpetrator evidence is not as onerous as the standard courts apply in determining whether evidence is sufficient to support a conviction holding that circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to support a cocaine conspiracy conviction holding review of sufficiency of evidence of juvenile adjudication is same as reviewing substantial evidence to support a criminal conviction holding that if no evidence was presented to support the prevailing party there is no evidence upon which to apply the substantial evidence test and therefore the capricious disregard standard applies holding that jackson standard is only standard to use when determining sufficiency of evidence