the record contains evidence supporting the trial court’s determination that the father had not willfully failed or refused to comply with the divorce judgment, we hold that the trial court did not exceed its discretion by concluding that the father was not in contempt. The mother further contends that the trial court should have entered an order compelling the father to allow her to retrieve her personal property and that, by failing to compel the father to allow her to retrieve the personal property, the trial court impermissibly modified the property-division provisions of the divorce judgment. We disagree that the trial court’s judgment has modified any part of the property-division provisions of the divorce judgment. See Rhyne v. Rhyne, 564 So.2d 966, 967 (Ala.Civ.App.1989) (<HOLDING>). The record indicates that several attempts
holding that the circuit courts statutory power in a divorce suit did not inherently extend to the disposal of the personal property of a party holding property settlement to be contractual obligation from date of final judgment of divorce holding that while certain elements of the divorce judgment may be supportable independently the evidence did not support the cumulative effect of the judgment holding that an order pending divorce is not a final judgment that creates a right of appeal holding that the apparent denial of the husbands request for an order compelling the wife to deliver to him the personal property he had been awarded in their divorce judgment did not constitute a modification of the original divorce judgment