Court has described that language as containing an “intent element,” United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 526 U.S. 398, 404, 119 S.Ct. 1402, 143 L.Ed.2d 576 (1999), namely, a “connection between respondent’s intent and a specific official act,” id. at 405, 119 S.Ct. 1402. This court has reached the same conclusion. See United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 138 F.3d 961, 966 (D.C.Cir.1998) (“To satisfy the criminal intent requirement embodied in the phrase ‘for or because of any official act,’ the giver must intend either to reward some past concrete official act or acts, or to enhance the likelihood of some future act or acts.”), aff'd 526 U.S. 398, 119 S.Ct. 1402, 143 L.Ed.2d 576 (1999); see also United States v. Gatling, 96 F.3d 1511, 1522 (D.C.Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Courts have been particularly concerned to
holding the trial courts subsequently corrected instruction that the jury must find the defendant personally committed the offenses in order to convict the defendant on those charges did not prejudice the defendant holding that the united states court of federal claims may not reweigh the factual evidence quoting munn 970 f2d at 871 holding that to find negligence jury need not find violation of federal motorcarrier regulation holding that to convict for accepting a gratuity the jury need only find that the defendant acted knowingly and willingly  quoting united states v campbell 684 f2d 141 14950 dccir1982 holding that the jury need not be specifically instructed to find whether there is a connection between the defendant the weapon and the crime