v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985). There are, however, “a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions” to this general rule. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). With these standards in mind, and having reviewed the transcript of the suppression hearing and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying Escue’s motion to suppress. The record amply supports the district court’s finding that Escue consented to the search of his bedroom. Further, we conclude after review of the record that Escue voluntarily consented to the search. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647, 650
recognizing that the ultimate question of the voluntariness of consent is one of law holding that the government bears the burden of proving voluntary consent under the totality of the circumstances holding threat to obtain a search warrant if individual does not consent to a search is just one factor in deciding whether the totality of the circumstances supports a voluntary consent finding holding that in determining the voluntariness of a waiver of miranda rights a court must evaluate the totality of the circumstances recognizing that consent is an exception to the warrant requirement and that voluntariness of consent depends on the totality of the circumstances