re ceiving his consensual blood test result. An affirmative duty to release “following a legal warrantless arrest based on probable cause ... arises only if the arresting officer ascertains beyond a reasonable doubt that the suspicion (probable cause) which forms the basis for the privilege to arrest is unfounded.” Thompson v. Olson, 798 F.2d 552, 556 (1st Cir.1986) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 134 cmt. f (1965)). Mr. Titus’s .02% BAC did not exonerate him. Rather, the facts known to Officer Ahlm were sufficient to justify his filing of the DWI charge. If the sum of the facts could not sustain a charge under applicable law, a criminal filing would not be proper, but that is not the case here. Cf. Strickland v. City of Dothan, 399 F.Supp.2d 1275, 1291, 1293 (M.D.Ala.2005) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 210 Fed.Appx. 983 (11th Cir.2006).
holding that on the basis of the totality of the evidence when viewed objectively we conclude that a reasonable persons consent to this blood draw would have contemplated the potentiality of the results being used for criminal investigative or prosecutorial purposes thus officer agostino validly obtained from appellee his consent for the blood alcohol test holding that in order to convict a defendant of dui under subsection 3802b the commonwealth cannot rely on the blood serum analysis alone it must introduce evidence of alcohol by weight in terms of whole blood holding that independent of the implied consent law the fourth amendment requires an arrestees consent to be voluntary to justify a warrantless blood draw holding that once the officer received the arrestees blood test results showing the arrestee had a blood alcohol level of 000 the officer had actual knowledge of the arrestees innocence of the dui charge  and had an affirmative duty to release him holding that the fourth amendment is implicated by the withdrawal of blood to test its alcohol content