matter to the BIA for a ruling on its merits. I also note that the majority concedes that the BIA may require that the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel address the Lozada factors. Nonetheless, as the majority contravenes controlling precedent by expanding our jurisdiction to cover an issue not raised before the BIA and not factually supported, I respectfully dissent. 1 . Moreover, Dearinger ex rel. Volkova v. Reno, 232 F.3d 1042, (9th Cir.2000), which was cited in Ray, suggests that despite the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, an alien may file a habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in his or her immigration proceedings. Id. at 1044; see also Hernandez v. Reno, 238 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). But see Goonsuwan v. Ashcroft, 252 F.3d 383,
holding that a habeas corpus petitioner who did not raise an ineffective assistance claim in his first state habeas petition satisfied the cause prong of the cause and prejudice test when counsel on the first state habeas petition was also trial counsel whose performance was allegedly inadequate holding that the appropriate vehicle for claims alleging that defense counsel violated a defendants right to testify is a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel holding that under oregon law a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be raised in the initial habeas proceeding holding that a district court had jurisdiction to consider a habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in an immigration proceeding when the petitioner is threatened with immediate deportation