his text messages with Krueger because those text messages would have “supported a [motion] to dismiss for prosecutorial misconduct.” As Prozer contends, and the government concedes, the district court violated Clisby when it failed to address those two ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Prozer raised those constitutional claims in clear and simple language. See Dupree v. Warden, 715 F.3d 1295, 1299 (11th Cir. 2013) (“A claim must be presented in clear and simple language, such that the district court may not misunderstand it.”). Although the court resolved most of Prozer’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims in rejecting Ground Three, it did not mention Prozer’s ineffective assistance claims concerning counsel’s failure to file the pretrial motions or the subpoena. See id. (<HOLDING>). For that reason, we vacate the district
holding that to demonstrate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel petition must establish that the alleged error was prejudicial in fact holding that the district court violated clisby by failing to address an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that consisted of two sentences found in the middle of a fifteenpage memorandum attached to the  2254 petition holding that the postconviction court erred in finding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim proeedurally barred because the courts opinion did not comment specifically on the ineffective counsel argument and the overall holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jurys verdict could not be viewed as an adjudication on the merits of the ineffective assistance claim holding that the appropriate vehicle for claims alleging that defense counsel violated a defendants right to testify is a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel