rejection in bankruptcy. And, to be sure, under § 365, if a debtor rejects an execu-tory contract, “it does not completely terminate the contract.” Med. Malpractice Ins. Ass’n v. Hirsch (In re Lavigne), 114 F.3d 379, 386-87 (2d Cir.1997). But Northwest did not reject the CBA at issue pursuant to § 365. It acted with the au thority of a court order entered pursuant to § 1113. Contract rejection under § 1113, unlike contract rejection under § 365, permits more than non-performance; it allows one party, with the court’s approval, to establish new terms that were not mutually agreed upon, the antithesis of a status quo. A carrier’s obligation to comply with those new terms cannot be reconciled with the continued existence of its prior contract. Compare In re Lavigne, 114 F.3d at 389 (<HOLDING>), with Comair, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots’ Ass’n,
holding that the statute incorporated all the rights and obligations of the contract emphasis added holding that the obligation does not terminate upon death holding order granting a new trial is not a final appealable order because it does not terminate the action or any of the claims or parties in the action holding under  365 that because the rejection does not terminate all contractual and statutory obligations the parties are not absolved from compliance with the contract holding that when a conflict arises between parties to a contract regarding the subject matter of that contract the contractual relationship controls and parties are not permitted to assert actions in tort in an attempt to circumvent the bargain they agreed upon