on Ms. Copp, who is being forced to devote some of her time and services to the Colorado litigation in a remote venue. The debtors also raise the concern that a judgment in the SCTC litigation may have preclusive effect upon their litigation with LTI in this forum. Debtors’ Memorandum at 46. In deciding whether the debtors have demonstrated a right to enjoin LTI from proceeding against SCTC, I note that the purpose of the injunction has some relationship to the debtors’ earlier judicial es-toppel argument. I also note that the pledge agreement, as well as Delaware law, acknowledges a distinction between the right of the limited partner to receive partnership distributions and the right to vote on partnership issues. See generally Hillman v. Hillman, 910 A.2d 262, 274-75 (Del.Ch.2006) (<HOLDING>). In support of their proposed third-party
recognizing that a compelled medical examination implicates the rights of the party being examined recognizing a difference between a partners economic rights and voting rights with the former typically being freely assignable to a third party holding that state rights are equivalent to federal rights in this area holding that the court should look to the actions of the relevant party and determine whether that party fails to insist on its contractual rights or acts inconsistently with such rights holding that a litigant may not claim standing to assert the rights of a third party