by the federal government for the damages sustained by the claimant as a result of the seizure. Such an interpretation would amount to the assessment of damages beyond the amount of monies received pursuant to the illegal seizure, which would, absent waiver, trespass upon the government’s sovereign immunity. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 475, 114 S.Ct. 996; United States v. Timmons, 672 F.2d at 1380. Courts have generally prohibited consequential damages from the government for loss of value. See, e.g., One (1) 1979 Cadillac Coupe De Ville, 833 F.2d at 998-99 (reversing award of damages for depreciation and holding by virtue of doctrine of sovereign immunity government not liable for such consequential damages under § 2465); United States v. $277,000, 69 F.3d 1491, 1498 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Silvers, 932 F.Supp. 702,
holding that plaintiffs claim was not barred by sovereign immunity because he sought specific relief against a government official holding that sovereign immunity barred claim for compensatory sanctions against the government holding that liability for depreciation would constitute consequential damages barred by sovereign immunity where government did not benefit from property that lost value during seizure period holding that seizure of tribal property is barred by sovereign immunity after the supreme courts ruling in manufacturing technologies holding that sovereign immunity does not protect the state from claims for statutory employment benefits that constitute a protected property interest