to his parole officer in the two weeks prior to March 12, 2007, and Garcia had not been able to reach him at his parole contact number, see generally United States v. Al-Sadawi, 432 F.3d 419, 425 (2d Cir. 2005) (recognizing that flight immediately after crime can be evidence of consciousness of guilt of that crime). On this record, Coderre’s argument that the corrected affidavit would not demonstrate probable cause fails as a matter of law. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s entry of judgment in favor of defendants on both the federal and state law claims of false arrest. We also affirm the judgment for defendants on Coderre’s' claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Washington v. Blackmore, 986 A.2d 356, 361, 119 ConmApp. 218, 224 (2010) (<HOLDING>). We have considered Coderre’s remaining
recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress holding that claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotion distress fail as matter of law where challenged arrest is supported by probable cause recognizing torts of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress recognizing validity of cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotion distress for the first time in indiana