protected speech as opposed to “non-communicative” conduct. The statute specifically restricts an individual from taking, recording, broadcasting, or transmitting photographs of others in public places— places other than a bathroom or private dressing room — when the individual has the intent to “arouse” or “gratify” someone’s sexual desires. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.15(b)(1). Therefore, the statute not only restricts an individual’s right to photograph, a form of speech protected by the First Amendment, see Stevens, 130 S.Ct. at 1584, but the statute also restricts a person’s thoughts, which the U.S. Supreme Court has held is “wholly inconsistent with the philosophy of the First Amendment.” See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565-66, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, unlike the statute in Scott,
holding in the context of a sexual offense that the statutory definition of mentally defective encompasses those incapable of assessing the right and wrong or moral quality of a persons conduct holding authority to control limits duty to control holding government does not have right to control moral content of persons thoughts holding that the fourteenth amendment does not secure to persons the right to prevent disclosure of their arrest holding criminal defendant does not have constitutional right to have guilty plea accepted by court