context of enabling loans. Other dr- cuits have, and they have split over whether to transport the ten-day period specified in the relation-back provision, id. § 547(e)(2)(A), into “substantially contemporaneous,” or instead define the term in a way that requires a case-by-case consideration of all the facts in order to decide if a given transfer was substantially contemporaneous. Compare Collins v. Greater Atl. Mortg. Corp. (In re Lazarus), 478 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir.2007) (interpreting “substantially contemporaneous” as requiring the exchange to occur within the ten day relation-back period under § 547(e)(2)(A)), and Ray v. Sec. Mut. Fin. Corp. (In re Arnett), 731 F.2d 358, 363 (6th Cir.1984) (same), with Lindquist v. Dorholt, Inc. (In re Dorholt Inc.), 224 F.3d 871, 874 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>), and Dye v. Rivera (In re Marino), 193 B.R.
holding that a rent payment made 15 days late was substantially contemporaneous holding a contemporaneous objection is required to preserve an issue for appellate review holding that whether an exchange is substantially contemporaneous must be determined on a casebycase basis holding that probable cause may be determined on basis of collective knowledge of police holding that a state medicaid agency can review the medical necessity of treatment prescribed by a doctor on a casebycase basis