limitation encompassed in section 4, it has implicitly held that a district court may determine issues of arbitrability even if it is not located in the district where arbitration is to take place. For example, in First of Mich. Corp. v. Bramlet, 141 F.3d 260 (6th Cir.1998), in which the plaintiffs brought suit to enjoin an arbitration proceeding, the Sixth Circuit held that the district court erred in finding that venue was not proper. Id. at 264. The court explained that “venue is proper where the underlying transactions and investments took place and is not limited to the forum where the defendants filed a request for arbitration.” Id. (construing 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)); see also Sec. Serv. Network, Inc. v. Cromwell, 62 F.3d 1418, 1995 WL 456374, at *4 (6th Cir. Aug.l, 1995)(Ta-ble)(<HOLDING>). Similarly, in Inland Bulk Transfer Co. v.
holding venue proper where proper when the action was commenced holding that venue was proper in district where underlying transactions and investments occurred and was not limited to district where party filed arbitration request holding that venue is proper in any district where any act in furtherance of the conspiracy took place recognizing that venue was proper both in district where indictment was filed and district of confinement holding that venue in the district identified in  9 was mandatory