the assignment of antitrust claims. See Gulfstream III Associates, Inc. v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 995 F.2d 425, 431, 438-439 (3d Cir.1993). The assignment agreement in Gulfstream “sold, assigned, transferred and set over ... all of the rights, title, and interest in and to” an aircraft and the related Purchase Agreement. Id. The assignment did not mention the transfer of any rights in and to legal claims, let alone claims specifically arising under the antitrust laws. See id. Shortly after Gulfstream was decided, the Third Circuit clarified that for an assignment to be express, it need not name the type of claims included in the assignment (e.g. antitrust or RICO) but rather must be "unambiguous and all-inclusive.” See Lerman v. Joyce Intern., Inc., 10 F.3d 106, 112 (3d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); accord In re Linerboard Antitrust Litigation,
holdingthat the language of an arbitration clause applying to all claims demands disputes or controversies of every kind or nature that may arise  concerning the vehicle was not ambiguous and was broad enough to encompass the claims at issue holding that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over rico claims and that plaintiffs federal rico claim was barred by res judicata since he failed to bring his rico claim along with his state fraud claims in prior state court action holding that a preliminary injunction was a reasonable means of preserving the status quo and was of the same character as the ultimate relief sought when a few but not all of the causes of action in the complaint were of an equitable nature including causes of action for unjust enrichment and imposition of constructive trust holding that an assignment of all causes of action  claims and demands of whatsoever nature constituted an express assignment of rico claims holding that the plaintiffs causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an erisa plan