at-will employment or (2) breach of a promise to be given at-will employment subject to certain conditions (which the plaintiff alleges he eventually fulfilled). Aside from certain statutory exceptions (which the plaintiff does not allege), “[i]t has long been settled in the District of Columbia that an employer may discharge an at-will employee at any time and for any reason, or for no reason at all.” Thigpen v. Greenpeace, Inc., 657 A.2d 770, 771 (D.C.1995). In considering this general principle, “[mjost courts ... have concluded that individuals who are promised at-will jobs, but whose offers of employment are retracted before the employment is to begin, have no remedy in contract law against the prospective employer.” Hyman v. First Union Corp., 982 F.Supp. 8, 13,14 (D.D.C.1997) (<HOLDING>); see also Pfeffer v. Ernst, 82 A.2d 763, 764
holding that an atwill employee may not be discharged for refusal to violate the law holding that language in employee handbook stating that it was not to be considered as creating terms and conditions of an employment contract and that the employment relationship was employment atwill  was sufficiently explicit to preclude the creation of implied contractual obligations as a matter of law holding that under new york law employment is atwill unless the duration of an employment contract is set forth explicitly holding that under district of columbia maryland or virginia law no remedy exists for the claim of breach of a promise to be considered for atwill employment holding that an atwill employee may not recover for discriminatory discharge under section 1981 because the atwill relationship was not sufficiently contractual under tennessee law