becoming final, and the filing of his first state habeas petition. Ramos offered no justification for this 240-day delay, which is substantially longer than the 90-day period in which the courts presume timeliness under California law. See In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153, 959 P.2d 311, 317 (1998) (“[A] habeas corpus petition is not entitled to a presumption of timeliness if it is filed more than 90 days after the final due date for the filing of appellant’s reply brief on the direct appeal.”). Without the required justification for his delay, Ramos’s state petitions were not “properly filed,” making the time they were pending before the California courts ineligible for statutory tolling. See Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1047 (9th Cir.2010) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Without statutory tolling of the time his
holding that an unexplained gap of 101  days between filing of state habeas petitions made petition untimely under california law and not subject to statutory tolling recognizing that a habeas petitioner may be entitled to tolling during a second round of petitions but holding that the statute is not tolled between rounds holding that a california habeas petition is timely if filed within a reasonable time holding that california supreme courts denial of habeas petition becomes final thirty days after filing holding that the filing of a first federal habeas petition is not an application for other collateral review under the tolling provision of  2244d