faith, such as willful improper conduct.” Fjeldsted v. Lien (In re Fjeldsted), 293 B.R. 12, 26 (9th Cir. BAP 2003). Where a court imposes a sanction under its inherent power, it must make a finding of bad faith. E.g., Knupfer v. Lindblade (In re Dyer), 322 F.3d 1178, 1196 (9th Cir.2003); Fjeldsted, 293 B.R. at 26; Deville, 280 B.R. at 495. In its Amended OSC, the court specified both the authority for the sanction and the sanctionable conduct. See Dagget v. Cardinal (In re DeVille), 361 F.3d 539, 550 (9th Cir.2004). The Amended OSC served on Kalicki, Rosalind J. Kalicki and Winters described the speci ssing the violation of a cash collateral order. In re Spanish River Plaza Realty Co., Ltd., 155 B.R. 249, 253 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993); see In re Krisle, 54 B.R. 330, 337 (Bankr.D.S.D. 1985) (<HOLDING>). In a civil contempt action, the moving party
holding that a civil contempt defendant has a right to a jury trial when the act of contempt was not committed in the presence of the court and when the incarceration is in part punitive holding corporation and its president in criminal contempt because previous order of civil contempt had not been purged holding that chapter 13 debtor lacked standing under 11 usc  548 but finding limited authority for the debtor to avoid a transfer under 11 usc  522h holding that in order for a claim to be reasonably ascertainable the debtor must have in his possession at the very least some specific information that reasonably suggests both the claim for which the debtor may be liable and the entity to whom he would be liable holding that the debtor in possession was liable for civil contempt when he disobeyed the courts order to turn over the cash collateral and violated 11 usc  363