result from Grimes’s criminal act was decided in a prior adjudication. Because defining the question presented in the present action is “crucial in determining whether issue preclusion is available,” see FAG Bearings, 335 F.3d at 759, we proceed by applying Missouri law to the language of the policy in an effort to define clearly the question presented under the second part of the exclusion. First, it is important to note that the policy defines bodily injury as “physical harm to the body,” and states that whether the bodily injury is “of a different kind or degree than that intended or reasonably expected” is irrelevant. Even if the policy had not included this provision, such would be the default rule in Missouri. See Hanover Ins. Co. v. Newcomer, 585 S.W.2d 285, 289 (Mo.Ct.App.1979) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the issue is narrowed to whether, in a
holding that where policies exclude coverage for injuries that are intended or expected the exclusion is applicable if the insured acts with the intent or expectation that bodily injury will result even though the bodily injury that does result is different either in character or magnitude from the injury that was intended holding that the standard policy exclusion of injuries expected or intended by the insured refers only to bodily injury that the insured in fact subjectively wanted intended to be a result of his conduct or in fact subjectively foresaw as practically certain expected to be a result of his conduct holding that intentional acts do not exclude coverage under the occurrence language unless the injury was expected or intended holding that the fatal injury to a murder victim may be considered as satisfying the bodily injury component of the capital felony of kidnapping with bodily injury holding that bodily injury does not include purely emotional injuries