that if Robinson failed to pay its premiums by the end of the ten-day grace period, the Contract could be terminated as of the date the premiums were due. See Novak, 986 F.2d at 472 (explaining that a provision in an ERISA plan is ambiguous if reasonable persons could disagree as to the provision’s meaning and effect). Further, even if Foundation had written internal policies that modified the Contract, binding precedent precludes these policies from modifying the unambiguous terms of the Contract. Nachwalter, 805 F.2d at 960 (explaining that Congress rejected the use of informal written agreements to modify an ERISA plan); see also Adams v. Thiokol Corp., 231 F.3d 837, 843 (11th Cir.2000) (citing Nachwalter); Smith v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin. Bd., 36 F.3d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Foundation did not wrongfully terminate
holding that the eighth amendment applies only after the state has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with the due process of law holding that any modification or amendment to an erisa plan can be supplemented or applied only after the amendment has been appropriately adopted in a formal complete and written form holding public had fair notice of adopted zoning amendment where uses permitted in adopted amendment were a subset of those permitted in the proposed amendment holding the sixth amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment holding amendment to statute of limitations was a procedural amendment to be applied retroactively in a medical malpractice case