not in any supervisory capacity with these girls. However, in the present case, appellant is a thirty-seven-year-old man who repeatedly raped his daughter and raped her friend while both were in his care. Based upon the foregoing analysis, appellant meets the criteria for relevancy in our pedophile-exception cases. For these reasons, Clay, supra is distinguishable, and appellant’s argument on this point fails. Thus, we conclude that such evidence would be independently admissible under Rule 404(b). Because each victim’s testimony would be admissible in the trial of the other to show appellant’s intent, motive, or common scheme or plan, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to sever the two cases. See Lukach v. State, 310 Ark. 119, 123, 835 S.W.2d 852, 854-55 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court on
holding that trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion to sever because trial of three defendants would not create confusion holding district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to sever numerous substantively unconscionable terms from arbitration agreement holding that trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion to sever because codefendants defenses were not antagonistic holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the withdrawal of the juiy trial waiver holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing a motion to sever separate charges of rape committed against the appellants two nieces