retained the duties which were not assigned under the contracts. See Task Order 139; see also PI. Ex. A. As such, KBR’s activities at the RPC are inextricably intertwined with the policy-based decisions made by the military and the issue of proximate causation cannot be evaluated without questioning these military decisions. See Carmichael, 572 F.3d at 1295 (explaining “it would be impossible to determine that [KBR’s conduct] alone was the sole cause of the accident or to possibly apportion blame without ruling out the potential' causal role played by pivotal military judgments”). In addition, KBR’s defenses of assumption of the risk, contributory negligence and comparative negligence raise further questions which are not suited for judicial review. See Taylor, 658 F.3d at 411-12 (<HOLDING>). ■ This case is even more problematic in that
holding that defense of contributory negligence would implicate sensitive military judgment regarding power generation holding that defendants bear the burden of proving contributory negligence by a preponderance of the evidence holding invalid an instruction regarding intervening cause of act of plaintiff as a defense to strict liability in a case when the former contributory negligence may have been a defense holding that mere negligence does not implicate the right to due process recognizing contributory negligence as a defense to professional malpractice claims