his first issue, Samba maintains that the immigration judge placed too little weight on the length of his sentence and the assistance he provided to federal agencies in determining that the offense was a particularly serious crime. We have previously determined that such a claim, “which amount[s] to an argument that the immigration judge ‘abused [his] discretion in weighing the multiple desiderata made relevant by the [BIA’s] definition of a particularly serious crime,’ do[es] not present questions of law and therefore [is] not reviewable under section 1252(a)(2)(D).” Solorzano-Moreno v. Mukasey, 296 Fed.Appx. 391, 394 (5th Cir.2008) (third alteration in original) (quoting Petrov v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 800, 802 (7th Cir.2006)); see also Sung v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 372, 377 (5th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). To the extent that the first issue challenges
holding that a sentencing judge would commit a statutory error  if the judge failed to consider the applicable guidelines range  as well as the other factors listed in section 3553a holding that the source of the federal funds was not a relevant factor in determining the number of violations holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the board in a motion for reconsideration holding that the argument that the immigration judge did not consider all of the relevant factors in determining that his children would not suffer the requisite hardship was not a question of law under  1252a2d holding that the family court is required to consider all relevant factors in determining alimony