(1989). A reasonable attorneys fee should be “consistent with market rates and practices” in the community. Id. at 287, 109 S.Ct. 2463. Such a fee, of course, must include “reasonable out-of-pocket expenses of the kind normally charged to clients by attorneys.” Pinkham, 84 F.3d at 294-95 (characterizing the inclusion of charges for long distance telephone calls, facsimile transmissions, messenger services, and express mail as taxable costs under § 1920(4) as harmless error “because such costs were reasonable out-of-pocket expenses of the kind normally charged to clients by, attorneys, and thus should have been included as part of the reasonable attorneys fees awarded”) (citing WVUH, 499 U.S. at 87 n. 3, 111 S.Ct. 1138); Neufeld v. Searle Laboratories, 884 F.2d 335, 342 (8th Cir.1989). (<HOLDING>). Thus, even though plaintiffs improperly
holding that the district court abused its discretion by failing to award attorneys fees based on the objective unreasonableness of plaintiffs complaint holding that district court abused its discretion in refusing to include in its attorneys fees award the depositionrelated travel expenses incurred by prevailing plaintiffs counsel in an adea case holding that the district court abused its discretion by telling the jury about the right of a prevailing plaintiff to attorney fees under 42 usc  1988 recognizing that a court can exercise its discretion not to award costs to a prevailing party as long as the court states its reasons for refusing to permit the award holding that by choosing the words any actual expenses including attorneys fees incurred congress did not intend to remove the discretion of the district court to award fees in cases such as contingent fee or pro bono cases where the client has not actually incurred the obligation to pay her attorneys fees