on the partial summary judgment and reverse it. See Elder Const., Inc. v. City of Colleyville, 839 S.W.2d 91, 92 (Tex.1992). Satterfield cannot maintain her vested-right argument based on a trial-court ruling that was interlocutory. See Middleton, 185 S.W. at 561 (concluding that law may be changed by legislature so long as it does not destroy or prevent adequate enforcement of vested rights); Dickson, 139 S.W.2d at 259-60 (setting aside default judgment that was not final and was not immune to subsequent legislative action). Satterfield has not demonstrated that chapter 149 violates the constitutional prohibition against retroactive laws because she has not shown that she had a vested right to a successor-liability remedy through choice-of-law rules. See De Cordova, 4 Tex. at 479-80 (<HOLDING>); see also Corpus Christi People’s Baptist
holding that state appropriation to ports authority violated constitutional prohibition against state debt and other constitutional provisions holding that the act is retroactive recognizing that constitutional prohibition against retroactive laws is not violated without destruction or impairment of vested right holding a defendant is not vested with a right to be absent from trial holding that the act is not retroactive