of the facts or by mistake”; or it could mean that the court’s earlier comments regarding deliberate misrepresentations did not apply to unintentional falsehoods and that the latter “would not avoid [a] policy.” Whether or not Willis controls, we conclude that only wilful misrepresentations, made with knowledge of their falsity, can be the basis for voiding a policy under ORS 743.612. The statute provides that a policy will be void if the insured wilfully conceals or misrepresents material facts. The statute also provides for avoidance in the event of “fraud” and “false swearing.” As pointed out in Transamerica v. Bloomfield, supra, however, ORS 743.612 does not incorporate all the elements of common law fraud. Cf. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. v. McBride, 295 Or 398, 667 P2d 494 (1983) (<HOLDING>). The objective of ORS 743.612 is to discourage
holding that the presumption of validity  and its concomitant clear and convincing evidence standard  does not apply to section 101 claims the court reasoned because no evidence outside the pleadings is considered in deciding a motion to dismiss  it makes little sense to apply a clear and convincing standard  a burden of proof  to such motions citation omitted holding that the proper standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence holding that in a proceeding to terminate parental rights the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof violates the due process clause and that due process requires at least a clear and convincing evidence standard holding that the standard of proof for dischargeability actions is the preponderance of the evidence standard holding that the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof applicable in fraud actions does not apply to the proof of misrepresentations under ors 743612