light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The nonmoving party must, however, identify sufficient evidence that would require submission of the case to the jury, and factual disputes about immaterial matters are irrelevant to a summary judgment determination. See id. at 248-49. We affirm for substantially the same reasons set forth by the district court in its comprehensive and well-reasoned decision. The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, does not support a reasonable inference that he was subjected to unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, see Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320, 322, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986), nor does i 1993) (<HOLDING>). The judgment of the district court is
holding that although pro se litigants are entitled to liberal construction of their pleadings pro se litigants must follow procedural rules recognizing that although pro se litigants are not entitled to greater rights than represented litigants due process principles permit the imposition of a procedural bar only after consideration of the pro se litigants reasonable expectations about what had occurred holding that although pro se briefs are liberally construed even pro se litigants must brief arguments in order to preserve them holding that rule 56f applies to pro se litigants holding that although a pro se litigants pleadings are construed liberally a pro se litigant must still follow the same rules that govern other litigants including the requirement of constructing and supporting arguments with legal authority