not based an exception to mootness on any nonlegal consequence. See Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 88 Harv.L.Rev. 373, 381 n.38 (1974). 12 . United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 39, 71 S.Ct. 104, 95 L.Ed. 36 (1950); Bagby v. Beal, 606 F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1979). Vacating the district court’s judgment of civil contempt should satisfy Berwick’s concern that the court’s order may work further injury by Ber-wick’s being considered a recidivist in any future proceeding. It is doubtful, however, that a company that had purged its civil contempt would be characterized as a recidivist in a subsequent contempt proceeding. Cf. In re Application to Adjudge Ohio New and Rebuilt Parts, Inc. and Melvin Booher in Civil and Criminal Contempt, No. C 79 214 (N.D.Ohio May 1, 1979) (<HOLDING>). We also note that had Berwick been convicted
holding that a contempt order labeled by the district court as civil was actually a criminal contempt because the order was retroactive seeking to penalize previous violations and was punitive serving no compensatory purpose holding corporation and its president in criminal contempt because previous order of civil contempt had not been purged holding that in addition to statutory contempt powers city courts have inherent contempt power holding that a civil contempt defendant has a right to a jury trial when the act of contempt was not committed in the presence of the court and when the incarceration is in part punitive holding that judgment of civil contempt against homes association was rendered moot and unappealable when association purged itself of contempt by complying with underlying order