Inc., 2005 WL 1917869 (Aug. 10, 2005). “[A] premature appeal taken from an order which is not final but which is followed by an order that is final may be regarded as an appeal from the final order in the absence of a showing of prejudice to the other party.” Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918, 922 (3d Cir.1977); see also 2-J Corp. v. Tice, 126 F.3d 539, 541 (3d Cir.1997). The Jama Action plaintiffs are not prejudiced by our decision to hear Esmor's appeal because we affirm the District Court's order extending the opt-out period. Jama Action plaintiffs additionally assert that even if the District Court’s order in the Brown Class Action is a final judgment, the pendency of the Jama Action deprives us of jurisdiction under Bergman v. City of Atlantic City, 860 F.2d 560, 566 (3d Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Bergman is not controlling in this context,
holding that there can be only one final appealable order recognizing that an order granting discovery may be a final appealable order where the sole object of a postjudgment proceeding is discovery of the judgment debtors assets and the assets discovered may then be levied without a court order holding that a rehearing order was not final or appealable holding where two actions have been consolidated for discovery and trial or for all purposes  an order concluding one of the consolidated cases should not be considered final and appealable holding that an order is not a final appealable order when it does not dispose of the complaints against all of the defendants