unlawfully prescribed Schedule II controlled substances, namely methadone and morphine, by Defendant. Expert testimony established that at the time of death, Lindsey had a lethal amount of methadone in her system. Expert testimony further established that Brogan died as a result of the fatal combination of morphine and other drugs, all prescribed by Defendant. The record supports the jury’s finding, which was consistent with the language of the statute and the jury instructions, that Lindsey’s and Brogan’s deaths “resulted from” health care fraud. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a rational jury could have concluded that Lindsey’s and Brogan’s deaths were a natural and foreseeable result of Hancock’s criminal conduct. Cf Martinez, 588 F.3d at 319-23 (<HOLDING>). III. Conclusion For the reasons stated, we
holding that the decedents estate had standing because the traditional requirement that the plaintiff show an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the conduct of the defendant is met by the allegation in the complaint that the defendants actions resulted in the diminishment of the assets of the estate holding that notwithstanding defendants consent the verdict was a nullity where the trial court proceeded to verdict with a jury of eleven holding that the evidence supported the jury verdict that the defendants criminal conduct under  1347 resulted in the death of two patients holding that where the meaning of the jurys verdict was not clear in light of the trial courts jury instructions the court of appeals erred in directing entry of judgment for respondent the case should have been remanded to the trial judge who was in the best position to pass upon the question of a new trial in light of the evidence his charge to the jury and the jurys verdict holding that under aspinwall when the trial court submits to the jury a good count  one that is supported by the evidence  and a bad count  one that is not supported by the evidence  and the jury returns a general verdict this court cannot presume that the verdict was returned on the good count in such a case a judgment entered upon the verdict must be reversed