v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 269, 35 S.Ct. 783, 785, 59 L.Ed. 1300 (1915); State v. Titus, 933 P.2d 1165, 1170, 1171-72, 1173-74 (Alaska App.1997); Turpin v. State, 8 luences on their deliberations — for example, fraud, bribery, threats or coercion by third parties, or other acts of third parties in obstruction of justice. Van Huff v. Sohio Alaska Petroleum Co., 835 P.2d 1181, 1187 (Alaska 1992); West v. State, 409 P.2d 847, 852 (Alaska 1966). However, allegations of intimidation or verbal coercion by other jurors during the deliberative process do not qualify as outside influences. Evidence Rule 606(b) precludes a court from receiving testimony concerning the kinds of allegations made by the juror in Kailukiak’s case. See United States v. Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909, 914 (3rd Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Judge Wood acted properly when he refused to
holding that evidence of one jurors purported intimidation or harassment of another juror falls squarely within the core prohibition of federal evidence rule 606b holding that evidence of threats or intimidation of a witness is admissible under rule 404b to show consciousness of guilt holding that an admission  falls under the rule of completeness holding impeachment evidence falls within the brady rule holding evidence of prior witness intimidation admissible to show criminal intent and guilty conscience