discretion in determining the relevancy and admissibility of evidence.” United States v. Wallace, 722 F.2d 415, 416 (8th Cir.1983). Miller first asserts the lyrics were irrelevant. To the contrary, Miller testified at trial that he did not possess the handgun. Miller’s testimony made possession of the handgun a fact of consequence at trial. Accordingly, the lyrics became relevant on cross examination to show Miller, in fact, possessed the handgun because police confiscated the handgun with “one in the chamber,” paralleling the lyrics posted by Miller. The lyrics, thus, had a “tendency to make a fact”—Miller’s possession of the handgun—“more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R.Evid. 401; see also United States v. Moore, 639 F.3d 443, 447-48 (8th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). Miller also claims the lyrics were “unfairly
holding that district court did not err in determining that cocaine base was crack cocaine based on chemical analysis identifying cocaine base together with competent lay testimony bridging the evidentiary gap between cocaine base and crack cocaine and refusing to require showing of smokeability ie water solubility or melting point for purposes of establishing crack cocaine under the guidelines since smokeability distinguishes cocaine base from powder cocaine not from crack recognizing possession of cocaine as a lesserincluded offense of possession of cocaine with intent to sell holding rap recordings about dealing cocaine were relevant to show knowledge and motive when the defendant testified he had never purchased or sold cocaine holding that the term cocaine base in 21 usc  841b1 refers to cocaine in its chemically basic form which includes but is not limited to crack cocaine holding that a reasonable jury could have concluded based on repeated references to the substance as cocaine and testimony from witnesses who had used the substances which they believed to be cocaine that substance was cocaine