receiver.” 421 U.S. at 337, 95 S.Ct. at 1732 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals found this language inapplicable to the case before it because in Whiting Pools the debtor had an equitable interest in the seized property as the amount of the levy was less than the value of the property seized. 674 F.2d at 158. Second, the government cited footnote 8 in the Phelp’s opinion which stated in part that “[i]n any event, the pre-petition levy displaced any title of Chicagoland and [the taxpayer] .... ” 421 U.S. at 337, 95 S.Ct. at 1733 n. 8; 674 F.2d at 158. The Court of Appeals noted that the Supreme Court failed to cite authority for that proposition and suggested an inconsistency with the earlier Supreme Court case of Bennett v. Hunter, 76 U.S. (9 Wall) 326, 19 L.Ed. 672 (1870) (<HOLDING>). The Court continued: “[t]he remark just
recognizing the substantial body of case law discussing distinction between preliminary and postliminary activities on the one hand and principle activities of employment on the other holding that plaintiffs were not entitled to a preliminary injunction holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection holding that an arbitration clause in a title insurance policy was properly incorporated by reference into the preliminary title report and thus was binding upon the insured even though the insured had not seen the policy or the arbitration clause prior to approving the preliminary title report holding that presale activities were preliminary and did not transfer title