individual capacities. d. Farmer, Dunbar, Sarnecky, and Wattai — Official Capacities — All Claims Longoria’s remaining claims are against individual state officers acting in their official capacities. Because a suit against an officer in his or her official capacity is effectively a suit against the state itself, only prospective injunctive relief is available against such defendants, absent a waiver by the state of its sovereign immunity. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664-68, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908)). Relief may only be had when there is an ongoing violation of federal law extant at the outset of the suit. See B.H. Papasan v. Attain, 478 U.S. 265, 278, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289-90, 97
recognizing the ex parte young  exception is narrow it applies only to prospective relief and does not permit judgments against state officers declaring that they violated federal law in the past holding that minnesota law prohibiting ex parte interviews was not integral to its privilege law but was merely procedural rule and therefore not controlling in diversity action and the federal rules allow ex parte interviews as method of informal discovery holding that ex parte young permits jurisdiction over officials who have authority to control the assessments of railroad taxes that are in violation of federal law holding that the cwa does not include a remedial scheme sufficient to preclude an ex parte young action holding that ex parte young exception to states sovereign immunity applies only where violation of federal law is ongoing not where federal law was violated only in the past