defendants’ motion to dismiss the DCCPPA is denied. iii. Kansas The Kansas Consumer Protection Act (“KCPA”) provides that “[n]o supplier shall engage in any unconscionable act or practice in connection with a consumer transaction. An unconscionable act or practice violates this act whether it occurs before, during or after the transaction.” KaN. Stat. Ann. § 50-627(a). Defendants, as manufacturers and distributors of chocolate candy, qualify as “supplier^]” within the meaning of the Act. Id. § 50-624(j). Despite the KCPA’s seemingly broad language, the Supreme Court of Kansas has distinguished between consumer harms re-dressable thereunder and pricing harms governed by the Kansas antitrust statute. Equitable Life Leasing Corp. v. Abbick, 243 Kan. 513, 757 P.2d 304, 306-08 (1988) (<HOLDING>); see also Maberry v. Said, No. 94-2416, 1996
holding that plaintiff could recover both treble damages under state racketeering statute and punitive damages under fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims because the statute provided that actions brought under it are remedial and not punitive and that civil remedies provided under it are supplemental and not mutually exclusive holding that a plaintiff who proves a cause of action under  1981 may recover punitive damages where the plaintiff is entitled to an award of compensatory damages even if nominal holding that while punitive damages were proper under antitrust law the plaintiff could not recover them under the kcpa which is designed to redress other forms of consumer harm holding that punitive damages are not allowed under the flsa holding that where plaintiffs were entitled to recover both treble damages and punitive damages under the illinois nursing home care reform act both issues could be submitted to the jury and the plaintiff could choose which award to be reflected in the judgment