172 F.3d at 615 n. 3, which was authored by the same judge. Calvit v. Minneapolis Public Schools, 122 F.3d 1112 (8th Cir.1997), also authored by the same judge, apparently based its reversal of a grant of summary judgment on direct evidence of retaliation. Id. at 1118 (“There is evidence that the school district denied him a fair opportunity to be reappointed to Four Winds because of his speech. The school district sent him a letter stating that he would not be reassigned to Four Winds in order to ‘forestall any complaint of Whistle Blowing.’ ”) (emphasis added). The panel in Stever v. Independent School District No. 625, 943 F.2d 845 (8th Cir.1991), applied a “pretext” analysis (consistent with McDonnell Douglas) to conclude that the plaintiff presented a submissible case. Id. at 853 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). There is no indication that
holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment holding that evidence raised a disputed issue of fact regarding whether the district used stevers purported nursing expertise as a pretext for transferring her in retaliation for her outspokenness on matters of public concern holding that the absence of a motivating desire to address a matter of public concern was not dispositive as to whether the speech addressed a matter of public concern holding that the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact regarding her retaliation claim because she failed to offer any evidence of a causal relationship between her involvement in protected activity and the adverse employment action holding that a plaintiff who pled in her complaint that her law firm actively misled her in support of her request for application of the discovery rule had sufficiently pled the application of the doctrine