with sentences for the like offenses of perjury, obstruction of justice, and civil contempt. See e.g., U.S. v. Gracia, 755 F.2d 984, 990 (2dCir.1985) (comparing sentences for criminal contempt to perjury and holding that “it would be anomalous to encourage those who would otherwise remain silent to choose, instead, to lie”); U.S. v. Gomez, 553 F.2d 958, 959 .(5th Cir.1977) and U.S. v. Leyva, 513 F.2d 774, 780 (5th Cir.1975) (both holding that a two year sentence was appropriate after comparing the sentences for the offenses of perjury (five years), obstruction of justice (five years), and civil contempt (eighteen months) to the sentence imposed by the trial court); U.S. v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381, 393 (7th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931, 97 S.Ct. 1551, 51 L.Ed.2d 775 (1977) (<HOLDING>). Even though Art. 1, § 16 does not require
holding that a sentence imposed for a violation of supervised release will be upheld where 1 the district court considered the applicable policy statements 2 the sentence is within the statutory maximum and 3 the sentence is reasonable recognizing that we review the sentence imposed by a district court under the abuse of discretion standard holding that the four year sentence imposed by the district court was appropriate as it was comparable to the five year sentence for perjury or obstruction of justice holding that a condition of probation requiring the defendant to spend up to one year in a halfway house at the discretion of the probation officer was lawfully imposed under as 1255100a5 because it was imposed as part of the original sentence holding that the fifteen year minimum sentence imposed under section 924e does not violate the eighth amendment