1085 (9th Cir. 2003). 23 . 798 F.3d at 747. 24 . Id. at 745-48; see also Lair y. Bullock, 697 F.3d. 1200, 1204-06 (9th Cir. 2012). 25 . 335 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 26 . Lair, 798 F.3d at 747; accord Lair, 697 F.3d at 1204 (“Randall is not binding authority because there was no opinion of the Court.”). 27 . Lair, 798 F.3d at 748; accord Lair v. Motl, No. CV 12-12-H-CCL, 189 F.Supp.3d 1024, 1031, 2016 WL 2894861, at *4 (May 17, 2016) (noting Eddleman "provides the overall analytical framework” for evaluating the constitutionality of a contribution limit).' 28 . Lair, 798 F.3d at 742 (quoting Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1092). 29 . Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1094 (quoting Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 397, 120 S.Ct. 897). 30 . Contra Motl, 189 F.Supp.3d at 1035, 2016 WL 2894861, at *7 (<HOLDING>). 31 . 424 U.S. at 30, 96 S.Ct. 612. 32 . Id.
holding that directors of a whollyowned corporation could consider the interests of the parent company as well as the interests of their corporation because there was only one substantive interest to be protected holding on summary judgment that a regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest holding base limits at issue in that case could never be said to focus narrowly on a constitutionallypermissible anticorruption interest because they were expressly enacted to combat the impermissible interests of reducing influence and leveling the playing field holding that claim preclusion did not apply even though the legal theory at issue in that case was addressed in a previous case because the case at issue was based on a different set of operative facts holding previous case when no one challenged the issue could not be precedent on the issue