construed, however, the record is clear that the district court was fully aware of both Jones’s role in the conspiracy and his arguments regarding the proper effect of his prior incarceration on his sentence when it denied resentencing. See Crosby, 397 F.3d at 113 (finding no “rigorous requirement of specific articulation by the sentencing judge” of its consideration of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors). Jones argues that the district court erred proeedurally by failing to consider his post-sentencing rehabilitation. A district court on a Crosby remand, however, is obligated to consider whether to resentence based on “the circumstances existing at the time of the original sentence.” Crosby, 397 F.3d at 117 (emphasis added); United States v. Ferrell, 485 F.3d 687, 688-89 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Jones’s argument that the district court
holding district courts may consider rehabilitation when deciding whether to impose a more lenient sentence at a defendants resentencing holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding hearsay evidence and evidence that violated the best evidence rule in deciding a summary judgment motion holding that a district court is not to consider evidence of postconviction rehabilitation in deciding whether to resentence under crosby holding that resentencing should consider all sentencing arguments and remanding for court to consider defendants argument for downward departure based on postconviction rehabilitation holding that the district court may consider evidence of a defendants postsentence rehabilitation and that such evidence may support a downward variance from the federal sentencing guidelines