of common law assault, to which consent is a defense,” citing Guarro, 237 F.2d at 581. Appellant’s argument is misguided as Guarro involved a non-violent sexual touching, which, as already discussed, is not analogous to an assault stemming from a street fight in which one of the participants suffered significant bodily harm. Appellant cites no other case in which consent was held to be a viable defen in original). 6 . People v. Jovanovic, 263 A.D.2d 182, 700 N.Y.S.2d 156, 168 n. 5 (1999) ("[A]s a matter of public policy, a person cannot avoid criminal responsibility for an assault [(sadomasochistic activity) ] that causes injury or carries a risk of serious harm, even if the victim asked for or consented to the act.”); State v. Fransua, 85 N.M. 173, 510 P.2d 106, 107 (Ct.App.1973) (<HOLDING>). 7 . Even if Hickman were the applicable law,
holding that consent is not a defense to the crime of aggravated battery even though the defendant alleged that the victim  procured the weapon and invited the defendant to shoot him because the public has a stronger and overriding interest in preventing and prohibiting such acts holding that battery is an inherently included offense of aggravated battery holding the defendant was not without fault in bringing on the difficulty because the defendant carried the cocked weapon in open view into an already violent attack in which he had no prior involvement and his actions including the unlawful possession of the weapon proximately caused the exchange of gunfire and ultimately the death of the victim holding that uncharged sexual acts committed upon the same victim are admissible to show the conduct of the defendant toward the victim and to corroborate the evidence of the offense charged in the indictment holding that the defendant could be convicted of sexual battery a lesser crime not included in the offense for which he was indicted where the defendant requested that sexual battery be submitted to the jury