remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. MONROE and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. CRAWLEY, J., concurs specially. ROBERTSON, P.J., concurs in the result. 1 . Rodriguez had filed an amended complaint in January 1997, alleging retaliatory discharge and the tort of outrage. These claims were settled and the parties filed a stipulation for dismissal of these claims in May 1998. CRAWLEY, Judge, concurring specially. I write to point out that Rule 59(g), Ala. R. Civ. P., states that Rule 59 motions “shall not be ruled upon until the parties have had opportunity to be heard thereon.” Rule 59(g) has not been interpreted to require a hearing in every case. Historic Blakely Authority v. Williams, 675 So.2d 350, 352 (Ala.1995) (<HOLDING>). In this case, there is probable merit in the
recognizing that a partys lack of response to a motion or argument therein is grounds for the district court to assume opposition to the motion is waived and grant the motion holding that the standard for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as the standard for a motion to dismiss holding that the denial of a postjudgment motion without a hearing thereon is harmless error where 1 there is  no probable merit in the grounds asserted in the motion or 2 the appellate court resolves the issues presented therein as a matter of law adversely to the movant by application of the same objective standard of review as that applied in the trial court holding that a motion to continue a hearing on a postjudgment motion was ineffective to extend the period for the trial court to rule on the motion absent the express consent of the parties holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion