VTI.’ ” Thomas v. Denny’s Inc., 111 F.3d 1606, 1513 (10th Cir.1997) (citation omitted). Second, as the jury was properly instructed, “Sprint is a corporation .... [and] may act only through natural persons as its agents or employees.” I R. at 198. The Eleventh Circuit has noted: Undoubtedly, a verdict exonerating an agent while holding his principal liable for his actions would be an inconsistent resolution of factual questions.... We have no doubt that a judgment holding a principal liable in a Title VII [disparate impact case] would be inconsistent with a verdict exonerating under § 1981 the employees from whose actions Title VII liability derives. Lincoln v. Board of Regents, 697 F.2d 928, 934-35 (11th Cir.1983). See also Hinton v. City of Elwood, 997 F.2d 774, 782 (10th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); de Feliciano v. de Jesus, 873 F.2d 447, 450
holding that a section 1983 failuretotrain claim cannot be maintained against a governmental employer in a case where there is no underlying constitutional violation by the employee holding that city may properly be held liable where policy is moving force behind constitutional violation holding that where no underlying constitutional violation occurred the city cannot be liable under monell holding that a city may not be held liable under  1983 where there was no underlying constitutional violation by any of its officers holding that a municipality may be held liable as a person under  1983