vitiate the probable cause that existed at the time of his prosecution. The fourth element of a malicious prosecution claim requires a termination of criminal charges in the plaintiffs favor. This element “is designed principally to ensure against inconsistent judgments and to avoid parallel litigation as to questions of probable cause.” Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938, 948 (2d Cir.1997) (internal citations omitted). Where the criminal proceedings do not end in an acquittal, the element of favorable termination is satisfied “only when [the] final disposition is such as to indicate the innocence of the accused.” Id. An adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (“ACD”) does not qualify as a favorable termination. Id. at 949; Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 193 (2d Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>); Daniel v. Safir, 175 F.Supp.2d 474, 480-81
holding that an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal like a consent decree involves the consent of both the prosecution and the accused and leaves open thequestion of the accuseds guilt holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because there was no  consent decree left to be terminated recognizing that consent is an exception to the warrant requirement and that voluntariness of consent depends on the totality of the circumstances holding that consent decree could not preclude plaintiffs from bringing claims that could not have been brought at time consent decree was filed and to which they were legally and procedurally entitled holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because the challenged provisions of the decree had expired