history points “if the defendant committed the instant offense while under any criminal justice sentence, including probation.” U.S.S.G. § 4Al.l(d). Barrera argues that once he was deported to Mexico, he was no longer on probation for purposes of § 4Al.l(d). Specifically, Barrera asserts that because Oregon no longer exercised authority over him, his deportation terminated his probation. This argument is without merit. Although this is an issue of first impression in our circuit, other circuits have expressly held that deportation does not automatically extinguish penal supervision such as parole and supervised release. See, e.g., United States v. Carrasco-Mateo, 389 F.3d 239, 247 (1st Cir.2004). We believe the same principle applies to probation and hold that Barrera (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Akinyemi, 108 F.3d 777, 779
holding that deportation does not extinguish term of parole holding that the attorney generals discretionary power to suspend deportation did not apply to aliens within the country on parole because parole by statute was not to be regarded as an admission of the alien citation and internal quotation marks omitted holding that parole is not a right in pennsylvania recognizing detention during deportation proceedings as a constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process holding that parole survives deportation