this represents a “very narrow exception,” AIU Ins. Co. v. Block Marina Inv., Inc., 544 So.2d 998, 1000 n. 1 (Fla.1989), to the general rule that “equitable estoppel may be used to prevent a forfeiture of insurance coverage but not to create coverage where none exists.” Cummins v. Allstate Indem. Co., 732 So.2d 380, 382 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Regarding the representation element, courts have required that the promise be definite, and when the promise is “ ‘entirely indefinite as to terms and time,”’ this is insufficient to support an estoppel claim. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Geodata Servs., Inc., 547 So.2d 919, 924 (Fla.1989) (quoting Hygema v. Markley, 137 Fla. 1, 187 So. 373, 380 (1939)). See also Prof'l Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Freytes & Sons Corp., 565 So.2d 900, 903 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (<HOLDING>). Here, Tome’s only basis for the assertion
holding that when a representation was that the insured had what coverage it needed  such a statement does not rise to the level of specificity required to be a representation of liquor liability coverage holding named driver exclusion eliminating liability coverage as well as um coverage did not contravene um statute because statute required um coverage only if the claimant otherwise qualifies for liability coverage under the policy holding that the plaintiffs asserted legal basis for coverage is irrelevant to the determination of whether the insurance policy provides coverage and instead looking to the facts underlying the claim for coverage holding that a representation which is merely a statement of intent to perform under the contract cannot constitute fraud holding that when the insured brings an action for a declaration of coverage and prevails absent a bad faith denial of coverage by the insurer attorneys fees incurred by the insured in the prosecution of that action are not incurred at the request of the insurer