its actual decision,” United States v. Garner, 767 F.2d 104, 116 (5th Cir.1985); “whether the decision was based on a consideration of relevant factors, whether there has been a clear error of judgment and whether there is a rational basis for the conclusions ...," Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of Energy, 610 F.2d 796, 801 (Temp.Em.Ct.App.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 937, 100 S.Ct. 2156, 64 L.Ed.2d 790 (1980) (review of agency rulemaking) (quoting Texaco, Inc. v. Federal Energy Admin., 531 F.2d 1071, 1076-77 (Temp.Em.Ct.App.1976)). When applying the arbitrary and capricious standard, a reviewing court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the original trier of fact. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416, 91 S.Ct. 814; see also Lonergan v. Sec’y of HHS, 27 Fed.Cl. 579, 580 (1993) (<HOLDING>) (citing Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416, 91
holding that party timely objected to appointment of special master and did not waive its right to object when it objected to appointment several days before it participated in proceedings before special master holding that the decision of whether to accord greater weight to contemporaneous medical records or later given testimony is uniquely within the purview of the special master holding that the special masters refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing rejection of affidavits and medical reports proffered by peti tioner but sua sponte introducing her own independent research into the record was fundamentally unfair and the special masters rulings were either inadequately explained or arbitrary and capricious holding that reviewing court should accord deference to special masters decision and may not substitute its own judgment for that of the special master holding that a reviewing court is not to substitute its decision for that of the board