of these arguments has merit. First, “criminal intent” to violate the AKS is not the applicable standard. Instead, the AKS punishes “knowing and willful” violations. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(h) (“[A] person need not have actual knowledge of this section or specific intent to commit a violation of this section.... ”). The defendants need only have acted with a wrongful purpose. See United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 441 (8th Cir. 1996). Moreover, in FCA cases involving AKS violations, courts have found scienter where one purpose of the remuneration was to induce referrals. See Feldstein v. Nash Cmty. Health Servs., Inc., 51 F.Supp.2d 673, 681 (E.D.N.C. 1999); cf U.S. ex rel. Sharp v. E. Oklahoma Orthopedic Ctr., No. 05-CV-572-TCK-TLW, 2009 WL 499375, at *25 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 27, 2009) (<HOLDING>). Here, Su Kim’s affidavit (¶¶ 11, 12, 14, 24,
holding that test for whether two offenses are not the same is whether each offense requires proof of a fact that the other does not holding that test for whether copay waiver constituted remuneration is whether one purpose was to induce patient referrals recognizing that the necessary inquiry  is not whether there was a warrant or whether there was time to get one but whether there was probable cause for the arrest holding that in deciding whether the jurys award is inadequate the test is whether reasonable people could not conclude that the  award was reasonable compensation holding that touchstone in determining whether one act is part of continuing violation is whether employee was put on notice that his rights had been violated