being taxed interest”). However, because the trial court erroneously concluded that no post-judgment interest had been incurred, it did not reach the question of whether good cause had been shown to waive post-judgment interest. Therefore, this issue should be determined on remand. [¶ 23] A court’s decision to grant or deny a waiver petition is discretionary. See Carter v. Williams, 2002 ME 50, ¶ 31, 792 A.2d 1093, 1101. A number of facts could support a determination of good cause here. First is the fact that Habrle filed the appeal and thus caused the delay. Although appealing the judgment was an exercise of Habrle’s legal rights, the court could decide that Brown should not be penalized for a delay that she did not control. Cf. Tarbuck, 2000 ME 105, ¶¶ 21, 25, 752 A.2d at 182, 183 (<HOLDING>); Austin, 2000 ME 61, ¶ 10, 748 A.2d at 1000
holding that waiver of interest was proper where there had been a long delay in the enforcement action holding that a delay in challenging personal jurisdiction may result in waiver holding that a tenmonth delay did not bar the motion where there was no demonstration of prejudice and because disqualification is in the public interest where there is an ethical violation holding venue proper where proper when the action was commenced holding that the trial court committed no error in sustaining objection to plaintiffs testimony that the water had been there for some time because the plaintiff had no personal knowledge of how long the puddle had been there