and subsequently entering a new order and judgment, we believe that the district court in effect vacated the earlier order. See Nichols v. Nichols, 98 N.M. 322, 326-27, 648 P.2d 780, 784-85 (1982). Notably, “[t]he fact that the court did not state in the second judgment that the first had been vacated or withdrawn is irrelevant, especially in light of the rule that when there are two conflicting judgments rendered by a court upon the same rights of the same parties that which is later in time prevails.” Id.; see Gilmore v. Gilmore, 106 N.M. 788, 790-91, 750 P.2d 1114, 1116-17 (Ct.App.1988) (concluding that based on the law of successive judgments, the more recent judgment supersedes any earlier judgments); Hort v. Gen. Elec. Co., 92 N.M. 359, 360, 588 P.2d 560, 561 (Ct.App.1978) (<HOLDING>). {13} Further, we observe that Respondent does
holding that a default judgment was not void because the bankruptcy court that entered the judgment had proper jurisdiction over the party seeking relief holding the judgment premature citing one case holding the judgment void and another holding the judgment irregular holding that a second judgment controls over an earlier judgment entered in the same case holding that the trial court in entering judgment affirming an earlier judgment for an award of attorney fees after having discovered that it mistakenly entered the earlier judgment before the expiration of time for the filing of objections had the inherent power under orcp 71 cs modification authority to change the effective date of the judgment without vacating or setting aside the judgment recognizing that a specific statute controls over a general one