that contained both exhausted and unexhausted claims. See Taylor, 134 F.3d at 986. The procedure included (1) allowing a petitioner to amend his petition to remove the unexhausted claims — as Rose indieat- ed; (2) staying and holding in abeyance the amended, fully exhausted petition to allow a petitioner the opportunity to proceed to state court to exhaust the deleted claims; and (3) permitting the petitioner after completing exhaustion to amend his petition once more to reinsert the newly exhausted claims back into the original petition. Id. While the court in Taylor expressed reservations about the three-step procedure, it concluded the district court did have discretion to stay an exhausted petition. Id. at, 988; see also Fetterly v. Paskett, 997 F.2d 1295, 1301 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). This court later approved the three-step
holding seventh state petition for postconviction relief which was based on newly discovered evidence but rejected by the state courts because the evidence was not newly discovered was properly filed holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence where the evidence would serve only to impeach  testimony holding that it was an abuse of discretion for a district court not to stay an exhausted petition pending exhaustion of a newly discovered claim holding that a district court faced with a mixed petition should stay the unexhausted claims pending exhaustion rather than dismiss them without prejudice for the same purpose it is preferable to stay proceedings pending exhaustion holding that it was an abuse of discretion to deny stay while matter was pending in neighboring state