use of the disclosed evidence.” Id. at 836 (emphasis added); accord United States v. Andrews, 532 F.3d 900, 907 (D.C.Cir.2008) (“[A] new trial is rarely warranted based on a Brady claim where the defendant ] obtained the information in time to make use of it.”). Furthermore, when a claim of delayed disclosure is at issue, the defendant “ ‘must establish that had the information or evidence been disclosed earlier, there is a probability sufficient to undermine our confidence in the actual outcome that the jury would have acquitted.’ ” Celis, 608 F.3d at 835 (quoting United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1417 (D.C.Cir.1988)). If defense counsel was able to make effective use of the tardily disclosed evidence at trial, then a Brady violation will not be found. See id. at 836-37 (<HOLDING>). In addition to the disclosure obligations
holding that a witnesss prior inconsistent statements are admissible even in the event of that witnesss actual or feigned memory loss holding that counsel was not deficient in failing to call a witness where the defendant never provided the witnesss name to counsel and no evidence existed that counsel had any notice of the witnesss identity holding that the prosecutions failure to disclose information regarding a witnesss past cooperation with law enforcement did not constitute a brady violation in light of other impeachment evidence in the record including testimony regarding the witnesss extensive drug use and past cooperation with the dea holding that a witnesss testimony or an exhibit may not explicitly and directly contain an opinion as to a trial witnesss credibility holding that defense counsel had made effective use of the materials and hence the tardy disclosure of cooperating witnesss prior statements on the eve of the witnesss testimony did not constitute a brady violation