v. King County, 96 Wn.2d 538, 543, 637 P.2d 656 (1981)). Chapter 7.21 RCV is easily harmonized with CR 37(b)(2)(D). The eontemp statute creates contempt of court as a sanction and estab lishes procedures governing its use. We have limited this power through the court rules and prohibited its use t< sanction a failure to submit to a psychological exam. Ther< is no conflict with the contempt statute. This is doubly trus when we follow our mandate to give effect to both provisions whenever possible. See Thomas, 121 Wn.2d at 511. ¶31 Courts have traditionally relied on the “civil” naturt of the SVP statute to strip the accused of most protections offered by the Washington and United States constitutions See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 138 L. Ed. 2d 501 (1997) (<HOLDING>); In re Det. of Young, 122 Wn.2d 1 (holding
holding that the supreme courts ex post facto precedents do not clearly establish that amended section 29336 violates the ex post facto clause holding because kansass svp statute is civil the accused has no fifth amendment or ex post facto protections holding that the ex post facto clause  has no application to deportation holding that because of its civil nature section 881 is not subject to the ex post facto clause holding that the ex post facto clause did not apply because the civil contempt citation was not punitive