1092, 1096-97 (Ind.Ct.App.2008), reh’g denied, trans. denied. In order to claim the pro- teetion of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must demonstrate that he personally had an expectation of privacy in the place to be searched and that his expectation was reasonable. Carter, 525 U.S. at 88, 119 S.Ct. 469. Fourth Amendment rights are personal and may not be vicariously asserted. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133-34, 99 S.Ct. 421; Allen, 893 N.E.2d at 1096. A defendant aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by the search of a third person’s premises has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 134, 99 S.Ct. 421; Allen, 893 N.E.2d at 1096; see also Johnson v. State, 472 N.E.2d 892, 898-99 (Ind.1985) (<HOLDING>), reh’g denied. In this case, Brian, who lived
holding that a defendant has no constitutional right to challenge the search or seizure of property belonging to a third party even if the search was without probable cause holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant holding a month delay in search of a computer constitutional because probable cause continued to exist at the time of the search and no prejudice occurred holding that the mere assertion of constitutional right to refuse consent to search does not supply probable cause to search holding that owner of a chattel seized during an illegal search of a car owned by a third party has standing to object to the seizure but no standing to object to the search