argues that since Kinston’s city council declined to seek a declaratory judgment that the change to nonpartisan elections had neither a discriminatory purpose nor a discriminatory effect, “Kinston’s decision to continue its partisan election system was ... ‘the independent action of [a] third party not before the court,’ that is, the City of Kinston.” Att’y Gen.’s Br. 39 (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130). This argument also fails. As an initial matter, case law makes clear that private parties who otherwise satisfy the requirements for standing may challenge federal preemption of state actions even if state officials have abandoned their legal challenges. See, e.g., Schulz v. Williams, 44 F.3d 48, 52-53 (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, although causation and
recognizing that a board of elections is not a political subdivision and its members are not county officers holding that a county liquor license board had no standing to appeal the reversal of its decision holding that state may not compel political party to allow nonmembers to vote in its primary elections holding that a political party chairman had standing to appeal a district court decision striking down state election laws even though the state board of elections had decided against appealing holding that a state may not condition voting in state elections on payment of a tax