concept have focused similarly on the issue of witness credibility in determining whether a successor judge may act as the thirteenth juror. For instance, the Supreme Court of Arizona has recognized that “[t]he extent to which a judge who did not try the case can review the weight of the evidence is severely lim- ited, essentially because a successor judge is in no position to pass on the credibility of witnesses whom he has not seen.” Daru v. Martin, 89 Ariz. 373, 363 P.2d 61, 64 (1961); see also Connelly v. United States, 249 F.2d 576, 580 (8th Cir. 1957) (recognizing that, where the credibility of the government’s witnesses was a serious issue in a criminal case, a successor judge should not rule on a motion for new trial); Anderson v. Dewey, 82 Idaho 173, 350 P.2d 734, 737 (1960) (<HOLDING>); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 835,
holding that it is function of trial court to judge witnesses credibility and to weigh conflicting evidence holding that on a motion for summary judgment it is settled that a trial court is not permitted to weigh material conflicting evidence or pass upon the credibility of the witnesses holding that it is trial courts function to evaluate witness credibility and weigh conflicting evidence holding that a successor judge may consider a motion for new trial in a case tried to the court where she is not required to weigh conflicting evidence or pass upon the credibility of witnesses but can resolve such issues  upon evidence which is not materially in conflict holding that in resolving sufficiency of evidence appeals court does not weigh evidence or review credibility of witnesses