which would have reported violence at New York City detention facilities. Complt. ¶¶ 19-22. He conclusorily alleges that these prior incidents established a policy or custom of violence against prisoners, and that the Supervisory Defendants were aware of and allowed this policy to continue. Complt. ¶¶ 13-26. Given the passage of time and the installation of a new DOC Commissioner and other supervisory staff between the prior violent incidents and the alleged abuse of Plaintiff, as well as the general failure of Plaintiff to plausibly allege that a policy or custom underlay these acts of violence, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that the violence which harmed him was part of a larger policy or custom at the DOC. See, e.g., Burton v. Lynch, 664 F.Supp.2d 349, 367 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotations omitted); Carson v.
holding that in the first amendment retaliation context there is no bright line to define the outer limits beyond which a temporal relationship is too attenuated to establish a causal relationship so courts judge the permissible inferences that can be drawn from temporal proximity in the context of particular cases quoting gormanbakos v cornell coop extension 252 f3d 545 554 2d cir2001 espinal v goord 558 f3d 119 129 2d cir2009 holding that close temporal proximity is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation holding that in addition to temporal proximity plaintiff must show further evidence supporting a causal connection holding that a close temporal proximity between a public employees speech and a defendants actions suggested a causal relationship holding that onemonth temporal proximity was sufficient to establish causation and noting that the prima facie burden in this context is not an onerous one