and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 1521-22, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005); see also Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486-87, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). We must therefore decide whether Mothershed’s claims fall within the Rook-er-Feldmandoctrine’s narrowed scope. A Under Rooker-Feldman, lower federal courts are without subject matter jurisdiction to review state court decisions, and state court litigants may therefore only obtain federal review by filing a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States. See Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416, 44 S.Ct. 149 (<HOLDING>); Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486-87, 103 S.Ct. 1303
holding that the federal district court had no subject matter jurisdiction to review the courts denial of a particular application for admission to the district of columbia bar holding that a federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that effectively sought review of an indiana state courts decision holding that rule 11 sanctions imposed by district court remained in effect after case was remanded to state court upon a finding that district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case holding that the federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review plaintiffs complaint to the extent they sought review  of the district of columbia court of appeals denial of their petitions holding that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review a final state court decision in a particular case