mandate issues. Mr. Webber argues that, when Wheat was decided, a defendant was required to file a Form 40 while his or her direct appeal was pending, whereas now a defendant is required to file a Form 40 after the mandate issues from , the direct appeal. Accordingly, in his view, .under current Rule 29.15, a defendant cannot be considered to have waived claims in a direct appeal that were not raised in a Form 40, because the defend ant cannot even pursue a Rule 29.15 action until the direct appeal is complete. In Wheat, the defendant conceded that he failed to file a motion to vacate in the trial court under Rule 29.15, and he recognized “the nominal effect of this failure.” Wheat, 775 S.W.2d at 157. Mr. Wheat then argued that, under former Rule 27.26, appellate co App. W.D. 2014) .(<HOLDING>); State v. Finster, 985 S.W.2d 881, 884 (Mo.
holding that res judicata does not bar a defendant from raising a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for the first time in a postcollateral proceeding if the defendant was represented by the same counsel at trial and on direct appeal or if an actual conflict of interest enjoined appellate counsel from raising a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record holding that to the extent defendants claim is one of ineffective assistance of counsel it is not cognizable on direct appeal and rule 2915 is the exclusive procedure by which a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be advanced holding that defendants claim for ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest was not cognizable on direct appeal recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel