I was “inconsistent with a majority of the district court decisions,” but Defendants nonetheless argued that it was the proper result, as the statute “did not intend to shift the matter from an administrative waiting room to one in the courthouse.” Defs.’ Br. at 4. The Court, however, agrees with the reasoning set forth in Walji II and the majority of courts which have held that the 120-day period starts at the completion of the interview. See, e.g., Walji II, at 436 (explaining that the plain language of the statute suggests that 120-day triggering event is a distinct, single event — -the date on which the interview occurs — not an ongoing fluid process) (cases cited therein); Khan v. Gonzales, No. 07-cv-29, 2007 WL 1560321, *1, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38912, at *4 (D.Neb. May 29, 2007) (<HOLDING>); Khelifa v. Chertoff, 433 F.Supp.2d 836,
holding that the defendants reading of the statute as making the same distinction was overliteralistic holding that the 120day period commences when the applicant appears in person for the interview holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute holding that case law and a reasonable reading of the statute support the conclusion that the examination is complete when cis finishes its interview of the applicant holding that the 120day time period begins to run after the agencys initial interview of the applicant