a “combination of imprisonment, fines, and restitution most likely to further rehabilitative and deterrent goals” could be compromised, if such judgments were subject to discharge in bankruptcy. Id. at 49, 107 S.Ct. at 360, 93 L.Ed.2d at 228. Thus, the Court held that the Bankruptcy Code did not act to discharge restitution obligations payable to a governmental entity and imposed in a state criminal proceeding. Id. at 52, 107 S.Ct. at 362, 93 L.Ed.2d at 230. Several courts interpreting Kelly and Section 523(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code have held that an order of criminal restitution payable to a governmental entity is exempt from discharge in bankruptcy. See Thompson v. Commonwealth, 16 F.3d 576, 577 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1221, 114 S.Ct. 2709, 129 L.Ed.2d 836 (1994) (<HOLDING>); U.S. v. Vetter, 895 F.2d 456, 459 (8th
holding that because the restitution was ordered as part of a state criminal prosecution it was excepted from discharge in bankruptcy holding that civil settlements have no bearing on decisions of criminal punishment and imposition of a restitution order is a form of punishment and part of a criminal sentence holding that any condition a state criminal court imposes as part of a criminal sentence is not dischargeable in bankruptcy holding that final judgment in a criminal case means sentence holding that action under 4701a is a criminal case because trial court functions in its capacity as a criminal magistrate