553, 562 (6th Cir.1999). Factors for consideration include the “frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 23, 114 S.Ct. 367. Goller could state only that Smith called her “Barbie” at least thirty times, and did not produce evidence of the frequency with which Smith called her an offensive term proceeded by the modifier “white.” Smith never physically threatened Goller. Moreover,- while offensive, the names Smith called Goller are readily distinguishable from racial slurs that reference a history of racial discrimination. See, e.g., Jordan v. City of Cleveland, 464 F.3d 584, 596-97 (6th Gir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, Goller alleged only that she
holding without discussing the plaintiffs burden of persuasion that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment holding that the district court erred in ruling that a plaintiff had failed to offer any evidence to survive summary judgment on its discrimination claim where the district court had simply discounted plaintiffs admissible evidence as less probative than defendants holding that a plaintiffs racially hostileworkenvironment claim should survive summary judgment when the plaintiff was subject to a plethora of racially offensive jokes racist graffiti and derogatory comments including being called a sambo and a welfare fighter  as well as other forms of demeaning treatment holding that an atwill employee may sue under  1981 for racially discriminatory termination holding that six cited cases were sufficient to inform a reasonable government official in 1988 that racially based retaliatory actions may violate the employees rights as enumerated in  1981