and his cooperation was motivated, in part, by a desire to “get back” at her. 6 . Because Pam Gutierrez, with full knowledge of her rights, voluntarily agreed to make a statement, the constitutional principles enunciated in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972), are inapplicable to her claim. See United States v. Dornau, 491 F.2d 473, 479, 480 n. 13 (2d Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872, 95 S.Ct. 132, 42 L.Ed.2d 111 (1974). See generally Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 1574, 48 L.Ed.2d 39 (1976) (absent compulsion, fifth amendment is inapplicable); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439-46, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 2361-65, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974) (same). But see United States v. Kurzer, 534 F.2d 511, 513 n. 3 (2d Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>). If, however, she had been compelled to
holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit holding that the defense of sovereign immunity is not available in the absence of a statute providing immunity to a municipal corporation in a negligence action holding that in the absence of a statute providing immunity the defense of sovereign immunity is not available to a municipal corporation in an action for damages alleged to be caused by the tortious conduct of the municipality holding that as a general rule interlocutory trial court orders rejecting defenses of common law sovereign immunity governmental immunity public official immunity statutory immunity or any other type of immunity are not appealable under the maryland collateral order doctrine holding that in the absence of explicit language to the contrary an informal immunity agreement confers the minimum immunity required by the constitution