all actions taken by an appellant that cause mootness necessarily bar vacatur of the district court’s judgment. For an appellant’s conduct to constitute “forfeiture” of the benefit of vacatur, see U.S. Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 25, 115 S.Ct. 386, we believe he must have intended that the appeal become moot, either in the sense that mootness was his purpose or that he knew or should have known that his conduct was substantially likely to moot the appeal. Accordingly, an appellant’s conduct that is undertaken with an intent to escape the collateral consequences of the decision below may defeat vacatur. See Nat’l Black Police Ass’n v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 346, 354 (D.C.Cir.1997) (finding “manipulative intent” relevant); cf. Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1371-72 & n. 6 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, if the appellant’s conduct of the
holding that even though appellant was not entitled to appellate review of order vacating award and directing rehearing  as of right  the minnesota constitution gave the minnesota supreme court independent power to review any case holding that if appellant did not intend to avoid appellate review and to have the district courts order vacated that factor may weigh equitably in favor of vacating the order holding the district courts of appeal have the ability to review a pretrial evidentiary order where the state would suffer irreparable harm if the order were not reviewed holding that circuit courts do not have jurisdiction to enter an order either vacating or retroactively affecting an administrative support order holding that an appellate court may not exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction to review a nonfinal district court order where the merits of the nonfinal order are not inextricably intertwined with the properly appealed collateral order or where review of the former is not necessary to ensure meaningful review of the latter