of such, in the reconstruction proceeding. Here, there has been no showing even of an appearance of bias or interest. Unlike the judge in Murchison, Judge Moriarty was not involved in the prosecution of the case or in any other conduct which might be perceived as tilting the scales in favor of the prosecution. Instead, to show “bias” or “interest,” Quinones relies upon the fact that Judge Moriarty accepted the initial pleas and verified their lawfulness. From this singular fact, Quinones speculates that Judge Moriarty’s conduct at the reconstruction hearing either was, or appeared to be, biased. Such rank speculation about a judge’s possibly improper motives is clearly insufficient to implicate Murchison’s prophylactic rule. United States v. Smith, 337 F.2d 49, 51 (4th Cir.1964) (<HOLDING>); cf. United States v. Martorano, 620 F.2d 912,
holding that an appellant has no standing to raise a due process issue where he has not shown that the alleged deficiency in the notice had any connection in fact with his own failure to seek review of the denial of his claim holding that due process requires a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case holding that consistent with due process a judge presiding over a reconstruction hearing may use his own recollection of the initial plea in reaching his decision if there has been no showing of bias holding that a sua sponte dismissal by the court for failure of the plaintiff to comply with an order of the court should operate as an adjudication on the merits because the defendant has been put to the trouble of preparing his defense because there was no initial bar to the courts reaching the merits holding that a defendant who has successfully challenged his plea in one ease should be allowed to withdraw his plea in a second case when both cases were part of one negotiated settlement of his charges