by the sentencing judge in this case” because nothing in the record indicates that the judge might have imposed a different sentence in the new advisory regime. Dowling therefore cannot meet her burden to show prejudice and overcome the third prong of plain error analysis. Id. at 1301. The sentencing judge did express some concern and an “intellectual difficulty” with applying the Guidelines’ cross, reference for murder because murder was not charged by the prosecutor. We recognize that statements made by a sentencing judge expressing hesitation when applying the Guidelines as mandatory can serve as evidence that the result may have been different if the Guidelines had been applied as advisory. See United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325, 2005 WL 435120 (11th Cir. Feb. 25, 2005) (<HOLDING>). However, we need not decide whether the
holding that consideration by a sentencing court of acquitted conduct was appropriate in establishing the applicable guideline range or in determining the sentence to impose within the guideline range holding that the fact that the defendant was sentenced to the bottom of the mandatory guidelines range without more was insufficient to satisfy the third prongs requirement that the defendant show a reasonable probability of a lesser sentence under an advisory guideline system holding in booker error case where defendant was sentenced at lowend of guideline range that defendant did not establish a reasonable probability of a different result where court expressed no desire to impose a lower sentence holding that a defendant met the third prong of plain error analysis demonstrating prejudice resulting from a booker error where the sentencing judge made several statements indicating the mandatory guideline sentence was very very severe and sentenced the defendant at the low end of the guideline range holding that denial of right to allocute was not prejudicial because district court sentenced defendant to low end of guideline range