a legally executable lease. In fact, the very same e-mail that Andersen argues creates a promise notes that “[Kranz] needs to get [the lease] signed, or it is going to cause some serious problems with them opening on-time as they have to order supplies, and everything else for the store.” Pl. App. 44. Andersen cannot parse certain statements FCOA made, leaving out words and relying on only those portions favorable to Andersen. FCOA also represented to Andersen that it could not install any fixtures or move any merchandise to the Coralville site until the parties executed a lease agreement. These statements, taken in their entirety, did not amount to “[a] declaration ... to do or forbear a certain specific act,” and were instead in the nature of an opinion. See Schoff, 604 N.W.2d at 51 (<HOLDING>). In Chipokas v. Hugg, 477 N.W.2d 688 (Iowa
holding that statements that merely convey an impression or understanding of a fact do not constitute a promise holding that a promise to make a loan is not covered by  1823e because a promise is not an asset holding a provision that criminalized sexually explicit images that appear to be a minor or convey the impression that a minor is depicted unconstitutionally vague because it was unclear whose perspective defines the appearance of a minor or whose impression that a minor is involved leads to criminal prosecution holding damages do not constitute other equitable relief holding that the failure to carry out an oral promise to convey land standing by itself is not fraud