SVP criteria are no longer met. These procedural safeguards ensure that the committed person is not in indefinite confinement, but that the person remain confined only so long as the SVP criteria are met. At the time of his civil confinement, Russ was mentally ill and had been determined to be dangerous, with a high likelihood of committing further sexual offenses. Thus, there was no due process violation in committing him civilly. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 85-86, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992). The United States Supreme Court has not definitively addressed the constitutionality of release procedures that place the burden of proof upon the person challenging the continued commitment. Cf. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-27, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979) (<HOLDING>). We decline to extend the reach of Addington
recognizing that the burden of proof is an essential element of the claim itself and that one who asserts a claim has the burden of proof that normally comes with it holding that the possibility that a sex offender could face civil commitment under a state statute was a collateral consequence because civil commitment does not flow automatically from the plea holding petitioner has the burden of proof under the strickland test holding that for an initial civil commitment the state has the burden of proof holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant