against because she is transgendered, she makes no affirmative arguments — either directly or in response to River Oaks’ Motion for Final Summary Judgment — that she is entitled to prevail under the theory that discrimination based upon an individual’s gender identity is sex discrimination per se. Lopez does argue that River Oaks rescinded its job offer because "Lopez ‘passed’ as a female during her job interview,” but was later determined, "in its view, [that] she is a male,” and that that constitutes discrimination "because of sex.” Plaintiff's MPSJ [Doc. #21], at 11. However, the Court construes this as merely a vari ation of her primary claim that she was discriminated against for failing to conform with traditional gender stereotypes. Cf. Et-sitty, 502 F.3d at 1221-22 (<HOLDING>). Indeed, Lopez makes clear that "this action
recognizing that a claim of hostile environment sex discrimination is actionable under title vii holding that title vii did not provide exclusive remedy for sex discrimination in public employment claim could also be brought under equal protection clause holding that allegations of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation necessarily state a claim of discrimination on the basis of sex holding discrimination based on pregnancy was not sex discrimination holding that transsexuals are not a protected class under title vii in response to the plaintiffs argument that because a persons identity as a transsexual is directly connected to the sex organs she possesses discrimination on this basis must constitute discrimination because of sex