were indeed possessed with the intent to distribute. I would respectfully suggest that in circumstances involving equivocal expert testimony, and circumstantial evidence that does not support a conviction, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence fails to exclude a reasonable hypothesis of appellant’s innocence. See Dukes, 227 Va. at 123, 313 S.E.2d at 384. Accordingly, I must dissent. 5 . I also appreciate that the majority apparently does not suggest that a lack of circumstantial evidence in a case such as this can be salvaged by simply having an expert testify in support of a factual or legal proposition. 6 . I would respectfully suggest that the majority’s reliance on the analysis in McCain v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483, 545 S.E.2d 541 (2001) (<HOLDING>), cannot occur in a vacuum. In my view, the
holding that cocaine packaged in two individually wrapped blocks in a single plastic bag supported a finding of distribution holding officers observation of plastic bag protruding from defendants pocket coupled with defendants behavior and officers knowledge that the area was commonly used for narcotic transactions and narcotics are commonly packaged in plastic bags provided sufficient probable cause to seize the plastic bag and arrest the defendant holding that large amount of cocaine packaged in individual baggies was one basis for affirming conviction for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense holding there was insufficient evidence to prove intent to distribute where the defendant dropped a plastic bag containing loose white rocks of cocaine and there was no other indicia of the defendants intent such as the drugs being packaged in smaller baggies holding that a defendant may not be charged with two separate offenses premised on two amounts of cocaine one found in a box and one found in a bag located in the passenger compartment of the defendants vehicle