Morgan had no reasonable expectation of privacy when he voluntarily displayed his cell-phone screen in the presence of the detectives. Morgan had his phone because he asked for it. He did not object when the detective observed his activities. And—according to the detective’s uncontested testimony—Morgan spontaneously shared information about his contacts with the detective. This is unlike officers looking on their own through the contents of a cell phone. See Riley v. California, — U.S.-, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2480-82, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014). Instead, it is “an officer’s mere observation of an item left in plain view,” which “generally involves no Fourth Amendment search.” Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738 n.4, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983). See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32, 121 S.Ct. 2038 (<HOLDING>). Morgan believes that the plain-view doctrine
holding that a visual body cavity search requires probable cause and a search warrant holding a visual strip and visual cavity search unreasonable when done beside a police car recognizing the courts continued holding that visual observation is no search at all holding that there is no illegal search within the fourth amendment where a police officer makes a visual observation of contraband from a vantage point he rightfully occupies holding a month delay in search of a computer constitutional because probable cause continued to exist at the time of the search and no prejudice occurred