of real property comprising a state, county, or municipal park.” § 893.13(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2013). As this Court explained in Maestas v. State, “[s]ection 893.13 offenses are general intent crimes” and “[although knowledge of presence is not expressly required by the text of section 893.13, such knowledge has always been required in drug possession cases.” 76 So.3d 991, 994-95 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). In other words, “knowledge of the presence of the substance” is a required element of the charged crime in this case, one which the State was required to prove regardless of Appellant’s defense of misidentification. See, e.g., Scott v. State, 808 So.2d 166, 171 (Fla. 2002), superseded on other grounds by § 893.101, Fla. Stat. (2002), as recognized in State v. Adkins, 96 So.3d 412 (Fla. 2012) (<HOLDING>). For the same reason, the error cannot be
holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given holding good faith jury instruction is not necessary when the court has given an adequate specific intent instruction holding that because the requirement that an instruction must be given does not depend on the defense espoused  an instruction on a required element must be given even when the defendant simply requires the state to prove its case and offers nothing by way of an affirmative defense holding that beck requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given when the evidence warrants such an instruction as a matter of due process in a capital case holding that issue of inadequate jury instruction was waived because the instruction given was the one expressly requested by defense counsel