Koonin, argued that the indictment was filed one day too late. Id. The government countered that when “computing the time within which a prosecution may be commenced, the first day counted is the day following that on which the offense was committed.” Id. (emphasis added). The Second Circuit agreed with the government’s argument, noting that”[t]he long-established general rule is that a statute of limitations begins to run on the day following the day on which the event giving rise to the cause of action occurred.” Id. at 901 (citing Burnet v. Willingham Loan & Trust Co., 282 U.S. 437, 439, 51 S.Ct. 185, 75 L.Ed. 448 (1931)). This principle, the Court noted, had been applied in criminal as well as civil cases. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 533 F.2d 921, 923, 926 (5th Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). As Davis illustrated, this
holding that government may prove facts outside the overt acts alleged in the indictment holding that in a conspiracy case venue lies where the conspiracy agreement was formed or in any jurisdiction where an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed by any of the conspirators recognizing requirement that defendant conspired to commit an overt act in state in furtherance of the conspiracy holding that for an indictment returned on september 5 1974 to be timely the government had to prove that the defendant committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy on or after september 5 1969 holding criminal conspiracy is sustained where the commonwealth establishes the defendant entered into an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful act with another person with a shared criminal intent and an overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy a coconspirator may commit the overt act and conspirators are liable for acts of the coconspirators committed in furtherance of the conspiracy