equipment. Appellant sub mitted to Canan’s authority, and was thus seized, when he stopped and let Canan board his vessel. See id,.; see also State v. Sanchez, 856 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (stopping a vehicle constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment). The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all searches and seizures, only those that are deemed unreasonable. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1446, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960). Generally, this means a government official may not conduct a search and seizure unless there is some individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308, 117 S.Ct. 1295, 1298, 137 L.Ed.2d 513 (1997); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (<HOLDING>). However, under certain limited circumstances,
recognizing exceptions to immunity recognizing that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless they fall within one of a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions holding that bodycavity searches of prisoners are not unreasonable holding that tenants had standing to bring fourth amendment claim where tenants were threatened with eviction unless they consented to allegedly unreasonable warrantless searches holding sixmonth delay in rendering final decision not per se unreasonable