public, may be constitutionally protected.” 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S.Ct. 507, 511, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 582 (1967). See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1873, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 898-99 (1968), in which, quoting Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251, 11 S.Ct. 1000, 1001, 35 L.Ed. 734, 737 (1891), the Supreme Court held that “ ‘[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.’ ” To be sure, the Court, in some cases, has reformulated the probable cause standard, see Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1736, 18 L.Ed.2d 930, 941 (1967) (<HOLDING>) and See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545,
holding that a vehicle may be seized without a warrant if there is probable cause to believe that it is subject to forfeiture holding that probable cause alone justifies a warrantless search or seizure of a vehicle lawfully parked in a public place holding that if a valid public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant holding that if sufficient untainted evidence was presented in the warrant affidavit to establish probable cause the warrant was nevertheless valid