that may assist district courts when contemplating what often seem like “no-win” conflict decisions. Specifically, the Court clarifies that only “actual” conflicts are unwaivable and, even then, only if they are so severe as to (a) indicate per se ineffective assistance of counsel or, (b) be analogous to per se ineffectiveness in the conflict’s “breadth and depth.” [See ante at 126] (quoting United States v. Fulton, 5 F.3d 605, 613 (2d Cir.1993)). On the other hand, if an attorney suffers from a “lesser [actual] or only a potential conflict,” the conflict is waivable, provided the defendant’s choice is knowingly and intelligently made. [See ante at 126] (quoting United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 153 (2d Cir.1994)); of. United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 931 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Arrington, 867 F.2d 122, 129
holding that defendants waiver was knowing and intelligent even when police withheld information from defendant that his attorney sought to consult with him holding a waiver of a substantial constitutional right must be a voluntary knowing and intelligent act recognizing requirement of knowing intelligent waiver recognizing courts discretion to reject knowing and intelligent waiver when attorney conflict infects the integrity of judicial proceedings holding that a defendants waiver of the right to testify must be knowing informed and intelligent