pass it on to another, not when it is merely foreseeable that it will do so. Id. at 180 (“foreseeability of harm is not the test”) (citation omitted). See Bank of New Orleans and Trust Co. v. Monco Agency Inc., 719 F.Supp. 1328, 1332 (E.D.La.1989) (“[s]ince section 552 specifically uses the word ‘know’ as opposed to ‘should know1 or ‘reason to know,’ ” plaintiff must prove defendant accounting firm knew audit reports would be furnished to a third party); Bad-ische Corp. v. Caylor, 257 Ga. 131, 356 S.E.2d 198, 200 (1987) (limiting duty to those whom the maker of a statement “is actually aware will rely upon” it; rejecting argument that duty is owed to “foreseeable” users of the information); Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 322 N.C. 200, 367 S.E.2d 609, 618 (1988) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis in original); Webb v. Leclair, 182
holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client recognizing that a lawyer hired by a third person to represent a client should exercise judgment on behalf of the client independent from the interests of the third person holding that  1997ea requires an inmate to identify in his grievance each individual he intends to sue holding that an accountant owed a duty of care not only to his own client but to a limited and foreseeable class of third parties for whose benefit and guidance the accountant knows the information is intended holding in accountant ease that the restatement provision requires that the auditor know that his client intends to supply information to another person or limited group of persons