also trickles down to particular agency officials: “When a statute delegates authority to a federal officer or agency, subdelegation to a subordinate federal officer or agency is presumptively permissible.” U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 565 (D.C.Cir.2004). A necessary corollary to this principle is that the particular official acting on behalf of the agency must have been delegated the authority to act; otherwise such agency action is invalid. Ctr. for Auto Safety & Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 452 F.3d 798, 810 (D.C.Cir.2006); Flav-O-Rich, Inc. v. NLRB, 531 F.2d 358, 363 (6th Cir.1976); Pa. Mun. Auths. Ass’n v. Horinko, 292 F.Supp.2d 95, 104 (D.D.C.2003); see also Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. Reilly, 938 F.2d 1390, 1394 (D.C.Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Thus, a court may uphold agency action only
holding that chevron deference is due only when the agency acts pursuant to delegated authority holding that discretionary function can derive only from properly delegated authority holding that chevron deference is due only when the agency acts pursuant to delegated authority and the agency action has the force of law holding that agency action is final  and thus has legal effect  only if taken by officials possessing properly delegated authority holding that when congress has implicitly delegated legislative authority to an agency a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency