court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the firearms evidence because “the guns were probative of the intent to extort.” United States v. Gilley, 836 F.2d 1206, 1214 (9th Cir.1988). Because the firearms evidence did not “lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offensefs] charged,” there was no unfair prejudice. United States v. Gonzalez-Flores, 418 F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir.2005) (citation omitted). 8. There was neither a material variance nor a constructive amendment of the indictment because the government did not argue a set of facts distinctly different from those alleged in the indictment. See United States v. Shipsey, 363 F.3d 962, 974 (9th Cir.2004); see also United States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199, 1218 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). 9. The evidence
holding that the government can satisfy the hobbs act interstate commerce requirement by showing that the robbery resulted in the closure of a business engaged in interstate commerce recognizing that  the interstate nexus requirement is satisfied by proof of a probable or potential impact on interstate commerce holding that robbery of nationwide checkcashing company affected interstate commerce in violation of hobbs act holding that in the context of hobbs act prosecutions  an indictment need not set forth facts alleging how interstate commerce was affected nor otherwise state any theory of interstate impact holding after lopez that the interstate nexus element of the hobbs act still requires the government to show only a minimal connection to interstate commerce