Fuller was clearly aware that he was required to register and update his registration by virtue of his voluntary agreement to and participation in Missouri’s sex offender registration scheme, his failure to register upon his interstate travel, with either New York or Missouri authorities, was a knowing act, see Bryan, 524 U.S. at 192-93, 118 S.Ct. 1939, and was therefore sufficient to sustain the indictment for violating SORNA, see 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a); cf. Gould, 568 F.3d at 468. C. Fuller’s Remaining Arguments Fuller advances several additional arguments that require only brief consideration. First, he argues that his conviction violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. Since we hold that SORNA applied to Fuller upon its enactment, this argument is foreclosed. See Guzman, 591 F.3d at 94 (<HOLDING>). Additionally, Fuller argues that his
holding 18 usc  922g9 penalizes the possession of a firearm after its effective date and therefore does not constitute a violation of the ex post facto clause holding that the ex post facto clause  has no application to deportation holding that where a sorna defendants travel and failure to register occurred after sornas enactment and the effective date of the act there is no ex post facto problem emphasis added holding ex post facto clause barred application of mvra to defendant whose criminal conduct occurred before the effective date of the statute holding that application of guidelines did not violate the ex post facto clause because rico offense was a straddle crime that continued before and after the effective date of the guidelines