trial, however, those factors “will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 350 n.7, 108 S.Ct. 614; see also Edmondson & Gallagher v. Alban Towers Tenants Ass’n, 48 F.3d 1260, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (finding the discretion set out in Carnegie-Mellon Univ. “unaffected by the subsequent enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), in the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990”). These factors weigh against retention here. The Court is dismissing both federal claims against Defendants. This case has not progressed in federal court past this Motion for Summary Judgment, and the Court has developed no familiarity with the additional issues presented. Cf. Schuler v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 595 F.3d 370, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>). Although dismissal of the remainder of the
holding that when original jurisdiction claims are dismissed before trial the district court must decline to exercise jurisdiction over pendent state claims unless there is an affirmative justification for doing so holding the district court retained jurisdiction to reconsider its order granting the defendants motion to dismiss notwithstanding the fact that the district court had remanded the remaining pendent state claims to state court pursuant to 28 usc  1367c holding that a district court retained supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs statelaw claims after dismissing the plaintiffs federal claims and did not abuse its discretion by declining to remand the case to state court holding that district court appropriately retained pendent jurisdiction over state claims where it had invested time and resources in the case holding that the district court erred in retaining jurisdiction over pendent state law claims raising novel issues of state law on the basis of judicial economy