the condominium is cabined by time restraints. Individual sections of a statute must be considered in the context of the entire statutory scheme, and not as stand-alone provisions. R & R Associates v. City of Providence Water Supply Board, 765 A.2d 432, 436 (R.I.2001). Because by enacting § 34-36.1-2.05 the Legislature decreed that special rights and development rights in a condominium project must be time-restricted, we are of the opinion that § 34-36.1-2.18(i) must be interpreted in harmony with the legislative goal of restricting the exercise of those rights. See United States v. Verrecchia, 196 F.3d 294, 299 (1st Cir.1999) (noting that the interpretation of statutory language should be consistent with other provisions of the statute); State v. Enos, 21 A.3d 326, 330-31 (R.I.2011) (<HOLDING>); State v. Dearmas, 841 A.2d 659, 666
recognizing that the sentence imposed should be consistent with the protection of the public holding that a reviewing court must defer to an agencys interpretation of an operable statute as long as that interpretation is consistent with legislative intent and is supported by substantial competent evidence holding that the interpretation of statutory language should be consistent with the legislatures purpose and intent holding that interpretation of a constitutional provision begins with examination of the provisions explicit language and that a court must endeavor to construe the provision in a manner consistent with the intent of the framers and voters holding that when the contract language is unambiguous we take these words to represent the parties intent and the plain meaning of this language governs its interpretation