and purpose of the [FDCPA].” Id. (citing Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 399 (6th Cir.1998)). Moreover, “[permitting the use of settlement letters may allow resolution of a claim without the ‘needless cost and delay of litigation ... [and] is certainly less coercive and more protective of the interests of the debtor.’” Campuzano-Burgos, 550 F.3d at 299 (quoting Lewis, 135 F.3d at 399). Here, Plaintiff claims that Defendant’s use of the term “settlement offer” misrepresented the legal status of the debt or implied that litigation is imminent. This argument is unconvincing. See Campuzano-Burgos, 550 F.3d at 299 (“There is nothing improper about making a settlement offer.”); Kryluk v. Northland Grp., Inc., No. 14-cv-3198, 2014 WL 6676728, at *5 (E.D.Pa. Nov. 25, 2014) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly
holding that the mere use of the term settlement offer is permissible and indeed desirable in the course of resolving debts holding that purported acceptance letter was a counteroffer when it conditioned settlement upon additional act of resolving medical liens that were not mentioned in offer holding an unaccepted settlement offer or offer of judgment does not moot a plaintiffs case emphasis added holding that a trial courts use of the term alimony was not conclusive against a claim that the award was actually a property settlement recognizing the permissible use of hearsay without corroboration