project). Finally, Morgan Keegan’s allegations fail to show that the municipality would have obtained any profit or benefit from the construction of this facility, except for job creation and other economic stimulation. In fact, any payments Defendants received as a result of this project were to be used to repay bondholders. [Doc. # 25-2 at 326-27]. Consequently, this case is distinguishable from those cases cited by Morgan Keegan in which the municipality actually operated a business for profit. Cf. Junior Coll. Dist. of St. Louis, 149 S.W.3d at 448 (“[W]hen a municipality is in the business of selling water to customers for profit or revenue, it is engaged in a proprietary function.”); Pierson v. Cumberland Cnty. Civic Ctr. Comm’n, 141 N.C.App. 628, 540 S.E.2d 810, 813-14 (2000) (<HOLDING>); Susla v. State, 311 Minn. 166, 247 N.W.2d
holding that the percentage of minority faculty need not approximate the percentage of minority students holding that the court has discretion to double check the reasonableness of the percentage fee through a lodestar calculation holding that the fee applicant bears the burden of showing that  an adjustment is necessary to the determination of a reasonable fee  holding that where a contract for legal services fails to expressly provide for the amount of the fee a reasonable fee is implied holding that the leasing of an event center was proprietary where the public entity charged each promoter a fee for leasing the facility and received a percentage of the total ticket sales