to state a claim under § 1983 because none of the defendants are alleged to have acted under color of state law. See Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir.1995) (setting forth elements of a prima facie case under § 1983). Thus, the first two counts of Varma’s complaint were properly dismissed. In counts three and four of his amended complaint, Varma raised Bivens claims asserting that the individual defendants failed to provide necessary medical treatment. The Magistrate Judge construed Varma’s complaint as also asserting Bivens claims against Cornell and MVCC. To the extent Varma intended to assert such claims, Varma fails to state a claim against Cornell and MVCC. See Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456 (2001) (<HOLDING>). The Magistrate Judge further concluded that
holding that facility manager of particular halfway house run by private corporation was not final policymaker holding that no bivens claim existed against a defendant bank that supplied information required by law to the federal bureau of investigations holding that privately operated prisons may not be sued under the bivens doctrine holding that bivens should not be extended to allow recovery against a private corporation operating a halfway house under contract with the bop holding no action lies under bivens against a private corporation operating a halfway house under a contract with the bureau of prisons