corporations were employees for purposes of the antidiscrimination laws (there, the ADEA), no matter how significant a role they played in managing t ividuals from the protection of Title VII simply by draping them in grandiose titles which convey little or no substance. In our judgment, the correct course is to undertake a case-by-ease analysis aimed at determining whether an individual described as a partner actually bears a close enough resemblance to an employee to be afforded the protections of Title VII. See Strother v. Southern Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 79 F.3d 859, 867-68 (9th Cir.1996) (reversing grant of summary judgment where the trial court based its status determination principally on the fact that the plaintiff was called a partner); see also Devine, 100 F.3d at 81 (<HOLDING>). After all, form should not be permitted to
holding that if a motion implicates the merits of a cause of action the district court should find jurisdiction exists and treat the objection as a direct attack on the merits of the plaintiffs case holding that a professional owes no duty to third persons unless the professional had actual knowledge that those persons would rely on his rendering of professional services holding that mere fact that clerk assigned defendants case a civil docket number did not demonstrate that the district court failed to treat the case as a criminal matter holding that as a general matter membership or shareholder status in a professional corporation does not shield an attorney from individual liability for his own mistakes or professional misdeeds holding in a case involving a professional services corporation that a court should not treat either the individuals title or the entity form as determinative