and the order denying reconsideration are both properly before this court, as both were filed within 30 days of the trial court’s original nonfinal order. Otherwise, the order denying the Partnership’s motion for reconsideration of an appealable nonfinal order is not in itself, alone, an appealable order. Agere, 931 So.2d at 245. Furthermore, while “a legally insufficient motion to vacate a default cannot be corrected as a matter of right by a motion for reconsideration or hearing, a trial court does have the inherent discretionary power to reconsider any order entered prior to the rendition of final judgment in the cause.” City of Hollywood v. Cordasco, 575 So.2d 301, 302 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (emphasis in original); Monte Campbell Crane Co., Inc., 510 So.2d 1104 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (<HOLDING>); see generally, James H. Wyman,
holding that motion for reconsideration would be construed not as a rule 60b motion but rather as an unauthorized successive motion under  2255 which the district court may have been without jurisdiction to consider holding that an unauthorized motion for rehearing does not toll defendants time for filing a notice of appeal holding that unauthorized motion for rehearing to set aside default heard by trial court will be considered as motion for reconsideration holding that the trial court was without authority to set aside entry of default on motion to set aside default judgment holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing