panel of the Superior Court, two years later, found a prima facie showing sufficient to undergird recovery when a plaintiff merely established (1) an asbestos-related condition; (2) shortness of breath; and (3) a causal connection between the two. McCauley v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 715 A.2d 1125 (Pa.Super.1998). As noted above, an integral part of the analysis of this case is whether Appellants, in the first instance, even suffer from a compensable injury under Simmons and its progeny. To that end, we agree with the OISR below that, under either the Taylor/While standard, or the McCauley three-part structure, Appellants instantly have clearly demonstrated a compensable injury. See Summers, 886 A.2d at 248 (OISR) (“I express no opinion on wh .Cmwlth. 445, 583 A.2d 512 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Hickey, 136
holding that a physicians negligence need only be a proximate cause not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury holding that questions of proximate cause are within the exclusive domain for the jury and may only be removed when reasonable minds cannot differ holding proximate cause almost always a question solely for the jury holding that negligence must be the proximate cause of injury holding where reasonable difference of opinion as to whether the defendants act was the or a proximate cause of the injury the matter is for the jury to decide