521, 523 (1960); Escajeda v. Cigna Ins. Co., 934 S.W.2d at 404-405. Simply put, the successive steps in the progress and maturation of a claim are mandatory; therefore they must be followed. And, since those steps were implemented by the legislature, it is before the legislature that changes or additions thereto must be sought. The judiciary lacks the authority to sua sponte make those changes. In sum, we hold that the trial court had jurisdiction to afford Killion relief to the extent that the relief was not dependent upon the adjudication of a matter within the TWCC’s exclusive jurisdiction. Yet, it could not directly or indirectly adjudicate those issues within the agency’s exclusive jurisdiction. See Attaya v. Shoukfeh, 962 S.W.2d 237, 241 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1998, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, since 1) the issue of Killion’s
holding that a decision is final when it leaves nothing more for the court to do holding that plaintiffs  lack standing because the court cannot issue the requested writ of mandamus and thus cannot redress the alleged injury holding that seamen do not have a remedy of punitive damages for personal injuries but nonseamen do holding that a court cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly holding that parties to contract cannot prevent borrowed employee status from arising by providing in contract that it cannot arise