Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 94, 101 S.Ct. 1571, 67 L.Ed.2d 750 (1981)); see also Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 286, 122 S.Ct. 2268 (“[W]here the text and structure of a statute provide no indication that Congress intends to create new individual rights, there is no basis for a private suit, whether under § 1983 or under an implied right of action.”). Although the Eighth Circuit has not addressed this issue, the Tenth Circuit did so in Qwest v. City of Santa Fe 380 F.3d 1258, 1265-67 (10th Cir.2004), affirming the district court that no action under § 1983 was available because nothing in the text or structure of § 253 indicated an intention to create a private right. Cf. City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 125 S.Ct. 1453, 1454, 161 L.Ed.2d 316 (2005) (<HOLDING>). This Court concludes Level 3 has not met its
holding that the remedy in a prison conditions case must remedy actual injuries that have been identified by the court and suffered by the plaintiffs holding enforcement of the tcas substantive provisions through  1983 would distort the scheme of expedited judicial review and limited remedies created by the tcas remedial provisions after identifying the express private remedy in the tca  332c7 the court concluded that congress did not intend this remedy to coexist with an alternative remedy available in a  1983 action holding injunctive relief ordering issuance of a permit is the remedy that best serves the tcas goal of expediting resolution of actions and granting such an injunction holding that there is no enforceable private right where the statute itself creates a remedial scheme that is sufficiently comprehensive  to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under  1983 holding that where plaintiffs had an alternative remedy the court would not substitute its judgment for that of congress by creating an implied right of action