a compelling purpose. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997). Here, Bar-tell has not alleged that the process she was afforded failed to comply with constitutional standards, and we will therefore confine our analysis to her substantive due process claim. This is a path we do not lightly tread. Although Bartell has a fundamental right to raise her son, the State has a concomitant interest in the welfare and health of children in its jurisdiction, and in certain narrowly-defined circumstances, the State’s interest in a child’s well-being may supersede that of a parent. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766-67, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982); see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) (<HOLDING>). In determining the constitutional legitimacy
recognizing that because the state has cognizable interests in the safety of children in its jurisdiction neglectful parents may be separated from their children recognizing parents fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children recognizing fundamental right of parents to care for their children holding that it is in the interest of both parents and children that parents have ultimate authority to make medical decisions for their children unless neutral fact finder determines through due process hearing that parent is not acting in childs best interests recognizing that competing interests of parents children and the state requires additional analysis