Garcia argues that despite the agency relationship described above, because the Village was not a named party in his appeal to the circuit court, the Village is not in privity with the Board. “The law cannot tolerate such an absurdity.” McKinney, 188 N.E.2d at 343, quoted in Dempsey v. City of Harrisburg, 3 Ill.App.3d 696, 279 N.E.2d 55, 57 (1971). The correct rule is: when a judgment is rendered against an officer of a municipal corporation who sues or is sued in his official capacity, the judgment is binding upon the corporation, upon other officers of the same municipal corporation who represent the same interest, and upon all residents and taxpayers thereof. Id. (citing 38 Am. Jur. Municipal Corporations § 729). See also Davis v. City of Chicago, 53 F.3d 801, 803 (7th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Because the Board is an agent of the Village,
holding that there is a rational basis for the distinction holding that a purported distinction between the citys personnel board and the city itself is a distinction without a difference the personnel board is part of chicago and acted on the citys behalf it is not a separate legal entity holding that distinction between trading a gun for drugs and trading drugs for a gun is a distinction without a difference recognizing this distinction recognizing distinction between tolling and estoppel