dismissing the defendants’ argument, the court relied on the statute’s language permitting the action to be brought after the removal of the disability, “not after appointment of a legal guardian.” Weaver, 819 N.E.2d at 1082. The court expressly declined to add an exclusion “not expressly incorporated into this statute by the legislature,” id. at 1083, and noted that “Ohio’s General Assembly could have provided that a disability is removed upon the appointment of a guardian, but to date it has not chosen to do so.” Id. at 1086. The court also noted that “the cause of action belongs to the ward, not to the guardian; hence, ... tolling ... applies as long as the ward suffers from the disability.” Id. at 1083; see also Freeman v. Alex Brown & Sons, Inc., 73 F.3d 279, 282 (10th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Mason v. Ford Motor Co., 755 F.2d 120, 121
holding that under oklahoma law the tolling statute preserves a legallydisabled persons cause of action regardless of whether he is represented by a guardian who might otherwise bring the action within the normal limitation period holding that while the fourteenth amendment is directed against state action and not private action the state action requirement is met in a civil action where state law is applied whether by statute or common law holding that appointment of guardian does not operate to start statute of limitations running in cases where title to cause of action is in person belonging to class of disabled persons encompassed within tolling provision recognizing the cause of action recognizing cause of action