when the defendant objects. In reaching this conclusion, we rely on several factors. First, it appears that at common law a court had the power to order a change of venue on its own motion if necessary to ensure the defendant a fair trial. See Crocker v. Justices of Superior Court, 94 N.E. at 372-75. Pursuant to section 2-4-211, IB C.R.S. (1980), the common law of England, with certain limited exceptions, “so far as the same is applicable and of a general nature, ... shall be the rule of decision, and shall be considered as of full force until repealed by legislative authority.” See also Lovato v. District Court, 198 Colo. 419, 425, 601 P.2d 1072, 1075 (1979); Young v. Colorado Nat’l Bank, 148 Colo. 104, 111, 365 P.2d 701, 706 (1961); State v. Valdez, 495 P.2d at 1084, 497 P.2d at 233 (<HOLDING>). The relevant constitutional and statutory
recognizing that new mexico has adopted the common law unless otherwise abrogated by specific statutory provisions and that the power of a trial court to change venue on its own motion if necessary to assure the defendant a fair trial is part of that common law holding that the statutes abrogated the common law holding that the defendant waived the issue of change of venue where the trial court denied the motion for a change of venue without prejudice stating that it was willing to reconsider the motion at any time during the jury selection process but the defendant never renewed the motion for a change of venue holding that a change of venue has no affect on the applicable state law and that change of venue is but a change of courtrooms recognizing that in the united states it has been held that a court has the inherent power to change venue without reliance on constitutional or statutory authority when necessary to assure a fair trial