Kansas, and Louisiana continue to adhere to a per se exclusionary approach to the admission of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification. State v. Gaines, 260 Kan. 752, 926 P.2d 641 (1996); State v. Young, 35 So.3d 1042 (La.2010); Simmons, supra. Recent state high court decisions make manifest the movement towards abandoning an absolute exclusion approach in favor of a discretionary approach to the admission of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification. Guilbert, 306 Conn. 218, 49 A.3d 705 (2012) (undertaking encyclopedic review of topic and overruling prior precedent prohibiting expert testimony on eyewitness identification based upon extensive and comprehensive scientific research on fallibility of eyewitness identification); Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103 (Utah 2009) (<HOLDING>); People v. LeGrand, 8 N.Y.3d 449, 835 N.Y.S.2d
recognizing decades of study established fallibility of eyewitness testimony that jurors are unaware of such deficiencies and that such expert testimony will assist trier of fact holding that jurors do not need expert testimony on matters of common knowledge holding that expert testimony should not be admitted as to a matter that is obviously within the common knowledge of jurors because such testimony almost by definition can be of no assistance holding admissible expert testimony concerning factors that may impair eyewitness identification and rejecting that concerning a particular eyewitness credibility and the statistical probability of eyewitness misidentification recognizing need for expert testimony despite fallibility and lack of certainty of psychiatric diagnosis