to preserve the [defendant’s] right to testify,” and holds that “if [a defendant] has been convicted of a felony the prosecutor will be entitled to ask him about it and thereby disclose it to the jury.” By contrast, Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence places restrictions on what felony convictions may be used to impeach the credibility of a witness. Mr. Prieto argues that he was misled by the district court’s advisement because federal law and Colorado law differ in what felonies can be used for impeachment purposes. We do not resolve the issue, because Mr. Prieto’s failure to object to the advisement means that we may reverse only if the advisement was plain error and he has not argued any such error. See United States v. Blechman, 657 F.3d 1052, 1063 n. 12 (10th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). The failure to do so “on appeal ... marks the
holding that there can be no plain error where neither we nor the supreme court has addressed an issue holding that we will not consider an argument of plain error where the defendant has neither mentioned the plainerror standard nor made any attempt to show how he can satisfy that standard holding forfeited theories will be reversed on appeal only if the appellant can satisfy the plain error standard holding that a silent defendant has the burden to satisfy the plainerror rule holding the abuseofdiscretion standard applied because the government did not request the heightened standard and we do not apply plainerror review unless a party asks