And that is to say that under the clause in question there must be some exercise of the option, some affirmative act skowing an intent to elect to accelerate So.2d 1041 (Ala.1982); Trigg v. Arnott, 22 Cal.App.2d 455, 71 P.2d 330, 332 (1937); Kamaole Resort Twenty-One v. Fiche Hawaiian Invs., 60 Haw. 413, 418, 591 P.2d 104, 108 (1979) (concluding that where there was “no finding” or “any suggestion in the record” indicating that a mortgagee had exercised its acceleration option after the mortgagor defaulted on his or her interest payments, it was error for the trial court to compute interest at the 15% default rate for any period prior to the date the principal matured under the promissory note at issue); United Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Holman, 177 Neb. 682, 130 N.W.2d 593, 595 (1964) (<HOLDING>); Florance v. Friedlander, 209 Va. 520, 165
holding that where a mortgagee is acting on behalf of the note holder there is no disconnection between note and mortgage and the mortgagee may foreclose holding that a mortgage transfer does not take effect until the mortgagee gives value in exchange for the mortgage holding the assignment of the mortgage once the original grant by the mortgagor to the mortgagee has been perfected does not involve a transfer of the property of the debtor  holding that in a case in which an omitted junior mortgagee foreclosed its mortgage the junior mortgagee had the absolute right to redeem from the senior mortgagee who had purchased the property at a sale following foreclosure of the senior mortgage holding that where acceleration of the maturity of a mortgage debt on default is made optional with the mortgagee the mortgagee must take some affirmative action evidencing its election to take advantage of the accelerating provision and until such action has been taken the provision has no operation