practices complained of here by the United States fall outside the comprehension of the consent decree. To suggest that the United States may proceed by way of a “fresh” complaint if it desires to litigate this issue, App. I at 5, undermines the purpose of a consent decree in the first instance — namely, to avoid protracted litigation by entering into a court-supervised agreement that resolves the dispute to the satisfaction of all parties concerned and guarantees the viability of the agreement under the watchful eye of the judge whose signature appears at the end of the document. If the defendant violates the terms of the consent decree, the plaintiff’s recourse is to bring an action to enforce the decree. See E.E.O.C. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 714 F.2d 567, 573-574 (5th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>), rehearing denied, 720 F.2d 677, certiorari
holding individual defendants are not an employer within meaning of title vii holding that relief granted under title vii is against the employer not individual employees whose actions constituted a violation of title vii emphasis in original holding that individual employees are not liable under title vii holding that states may waive the title vii 60day deferral period but retain jurisdiction over discrimination charges by entering into worksharing agreements with the eeoc holding that actions to consider or enforce voluntary conciliation agreements between the eeoc and the defendants under title vii are properly within the jurisdiction of the federal courts