of the traffic code; in the Section 1983 litigation, the relevant question is whether an objectively reasonable officer, knowing the facts known to defendant at the time of arrest, would be warranted in the belief that plaintiff had committed a crime. Escalera, 361 F.3d at 743; Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371, 124 S.Ct. 795. The absence of precise identity bars the application of collateral estoppel here. Barring plaintiff from contesting the circumstances surrounding his arrest in this civil rights lawsuit would also raise serious constitutional concerns. Such an approach would allow an administrative law judge to usurp the important fact-finding function that the Seventh Amendment properly vests with a jury. But see Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980) (<HOLDING>); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322,
holding that issue preclusion extends to a matter that the court must necessarily albeit implicitly have decided holding that a state habeas proceeding decided on the merits precluded a section 1983 action in federal court holding that preclusion rules apply in 1983 actions holding issue preclusion bars section 1983 plaintiff from relitigating fourth amendment issue decided in state court criminal proceeding holding that preclusion rules apply in section 1983 actions