to a child. Similarly, the jury’s acquittal on the manslaughter charge has no bearing on the second prosecution for injury to a child. Manslaughter is not the same as injury to a child for the same reasons that criminally negligent homicide is not the same as injury to a child. Application of the Blockburger principles to the charge of capital murder leads us to a slightly different result. Capital murder does include an element not required to prove injury to a child, namely the death of the victim. Therefore, capital murder is not subsumed within the offense of injury to a child. Cf. Wright v. State, 866 S.W.2d 747, 750 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1993, pet. refd) (citing United States v. Webb, 796 F.2d 60 (5th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1038, 107 S.Ct. 894, 93 L.Ed.2d 846 (1987)) (<HOLDING>). The opposite is true also: injury to a child
holding noncapital murder and injury to a child not same offenses for doublejeopardy purposes noting murder requires proof of death while injury to a child does not holding that where both firstdegree and felony murder were possible bases for a murder conviction a jury instruction that suggested the jury could rely on felony murder as the predicate offense for a conviction for conspiracy to commit murder was improper because under arizona law a conviction for conspiracy to commit firstdegree murder requires a specific intent to kill holding an unborn child is a child for purposes of prosecuting chemical endangerment of a child holding an unborn child is not a child for purposes of criminal prosecution of mistreatment of a child holding a fetus is not a child person or individual for purposes of criminal prosecution under the reckless injury to a child statute