848 (1992); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 392, 106 S.Ct. 1121, 1124, 89 L.Ed.2d 390 (1986). In fact, the Supreme Court limited Roberts to its facts, holding that an unavailability analysis is necessary under the Confrontation Clause only when the challenged out-of-court statement was made in the course of a prior judicial proceeding. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394, 106 S.Ct. at 1125. It confirmed this limitation in White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. at 354, 112 S.Ct. at 741. Despite this express limitation of Roberts, Texas courts have continued to read an unavailability requirement into an analysis of claimed Confrontation Clause violations even when the out-of-court statement was not made in a prior judicial proceeding. See e.g., Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 155 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) (<HOLDING>); Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 751
holding that there was no confrontation clause violation arising from admission of excited utterance since victim was unavailable and the exception is firmly rooted thereby providing adequate indicia of reliability holding that statements within a firmly rooted hearsay exception do not violate the confrontation clause holding that the sixth amendment confrontation clause was not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under a georgia statute permitting an exception for statements by coconspirators where there was sufficient indicia of reliability supporting the truth of the statements holding that the exception is not firmly rooted holding that hearsay evidence does not violate the confrontation clause if declarant is unavailable and it bears adequate indicia of reliability