in some cases, interest. Kulch, 677 N.E.2d at 324. Kulch rejected the argument that a plaintiff may not premise a Greeley claim on the violation of a statute that itself provides civil remedies, holding that: [T]he civil remedies set forth in R.C. 4113.52 are not adequate to fully compensate an aggrieved employee who is discharged, disciplined, or otherwise retaliated against in violation of the statute. The existence of other remedies, therefore, does not render the public policy exception moot. Id. After Kulch, Ohio appellate and federal district courts have routinely recognized Greeley claims premised on violations of § 4123.90. Perrine v. MPW Indus. Servs., Inc., 213 F.Supp.2d 835, 848 (S.D.Ohio 2002) (citing Boyd, 727 N.E.2d at 144); Yetts v. ITW-NIFCO, Inc., 50 F.Supp.2d 776, 784 (<HOLDING>); Sidenstricker v. Miller Pavement Maint.,
holding that age discrimination claim was subject to compulsory arbitration holding on the basis of kulch and livingston v hillside rehab hosp 79 ohio st3d 249 680 ne2d 1220 1997 which recognized a common law tort claim for age discrimination notwithstanding the age discrimination remedies provided by ohio statutes that a greeley claim based on  412390 could progress since that section did not provide for recovery of full compensatory or punitive damages nor authorize trial by jury holding age discrimination claim barred holding that a statement of fact relating to the plaintiffs age was not direct evidence of age discrimination because the relevance of the comment is provided by inference holding that age discrimination is not a personal injury tort