grant of authority to an independent counsel, on the other. In resisting a constitutional attack on the vesting of power in the Special Division, the Court observed: In order for the Division’s definition of the counsel’s jurisdiction to be truly “incidental” to its power to appoint, the jurisdiction that the court decides upon must be demonstrably related to the factual circumstances that gave rise to the Attorney General’s investigation and request for the appointment of the independent counsel in the particular case. Id. at 679, 108 S.Ct. 2597. Here, of course, the defendant is not challenging the constitutionality of the Special Division’s grant of jurisdiction, but the fit of the present prosecution within that grant. Cf. United States v. Tucker, 78 F.3d 1313, 1321 (8th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). As we mentioned above, a number of clauses of
holding that instructions are sufficient which substantially follow the language of the statute or use equivalent language holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute holding that similar language provided a sufficient general jurisdiction allegation recognizing that defendant must show 1 that counsels performance was deficient and 2 that counsels errors prejudiced the defense holding that the demonstrably related language did not govern the independent counsels jurisdiction under a referral