absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is undermined. Id. at 1208-09. To meet that test, the law on jury unanimity would need to be clear so that the trial judge can properly be charged with knowledge of it. No fair review of our case law regarding juror unanimity could result in the conclusion that the proper rules are obvious. Absent true clarity in our law, a trial judge should not be reversed because we later conclude, as Justice Stewart has, that there is some way to reconcile our various prior decisions. This is particularly true in an area where, as here, the majorities in our prior cases have been badly fractured. See State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah 1989) (<HOLDING>); State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 786 (Utah
holding that the obviousness of an error is hard to determine where there is no settled appellate law on point holding that it is clearly settled that where there is a failure to establish an essential element of the defamation cause of action the case becomes one of law for the court holding that an error is plain only if it is clear under current law when there is no binding precedent on point an instruction typically will not be plain error holding that under the harmless error standard an appellate court must determine whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error complained of might have contributed to the conviction holding that it is well settled that there is no constitutional right to an appeal