to this hypothetical contract, the actual contract at issue here does not seek to directly penalize Miller for his sexual preference. Rather, it seeks to directly penalize Miller for his business competition with DeMuth in violation of Miller’s written promise not to compete. Thus, court enforcement of this covenant not to compete does not lend direct support or give direct effect to a private bias. According to Palmore, a court also cannot indirectly support or give effect to a private bias. Id. This area of indirect support is a delicate one, however, as it was not the intention of the Supreme Court to convert all private actions into state actions based solely on judicial enforcement of a private contract. See Luria Brothers and Company v. Allen, 672 F.2d 347, 354 (3rd Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>) (citing Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S.
holding that when a statute includes a specific enforcement provision an additional private cause of action based upon the statute cannot be judicially inferred holding that judicial enforcement of a contract cannot convert what would otherwise be a private matter into state action holding that a private right of action exists recognizing private right of action holding that a state law cannot be applied where its application would defeat an otherwise meritorious maritime cause of action