court granted the Appellees motion. (Appel-lee’s Appendix at 30). Bah does not point to any designated evidence which had not been stricken to demonstrate what statements she asserts were improperly made by Ruffin to the police. Therefore, based upon the designated evidence, I would conclude that the qualified privilege applies and would affirm on all issues. See Williams, 914 N.E.2d at 769 (finding that whether the defendant’s misperception was speculative, negligent, or even reckless, it was not so obviously mistaken to permit a reasonable inference that he lied, and holding that the trial court did not err in finding a qualified privilege was established as a matter of law and thereby precluding the plaintiffs’ claim for defamation); Kelley v. Tanoos, 865 N.E.2d 593, 602 (Ind.2007) (<HOLDING>). [46] For the foregoing reasons, I
holding that summary judgment in favor of the defendant was appropriate because the plaintiff failed to designate evidence that demonstrates that the defendant abused the qualified privilege holding that the trial court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of defendant and denied plaintiffs motion for summary judgment where plaintiff failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that defendant breached its duty to act in good faith holding summary judgment appropriate where plaintiff failed to establish product identification holding that in a failuretotransfer case if after a full opportunity for discovery the summary judgment record is insufficient to establish the existence of an appropriate position into which the plaintiff could have been transferred summary judgment must be granted in favor of the defendant  even if it also appears that the defendant failed to engage in good faith in the interactive process holding summary judgment in favor of defendant was appropriate where plaintiff failed to present evidence upon which a reasonable jury could conclude that age was a determinative factor in adverse employment action