suspect the appellant was using for criminal purposes, even including the. appellant’s bedroom — at least in the absence of any agreement between the two that would expressly prohibit the grandfather from making such an intrusion, or some other obvious indicium of exclusion, such as a lock on the door to demonstrate that the grandfather was, de facto, excluded from the room. We hold that, on the facts as the trial court was entitled to view them, Reed had actual authority to consent to the search of the appellant’s bedroom. Apparent Authority The State alternatively contends that Reed had apparent authority to consent to the search of the appellant’s bedroom, i.e., that the officers reasonably believed Reed S.Ct. 2013, 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999) (citing Californ Christi 1990, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>); U.S. v. Lin, 131 Fed.Appx. 884 (3d Cir.2005)
holding that mother who was resident of house shared with adult daughter could give valid consent to search premises holding cotenants consent to search valid where rodriguez who was asleep inside the house was not asked for his consent if police reasonably believed the consenter possessed common authority over the premises holding that defendants adult son who was living on defendants property had equal control over use of premises and had authority to consent to a search holding that consent to search premises includes consent to search washing machine on those premises holding that a warrantless search of a shared dwelling was reasonable as to one occupant who gave consent but not to another who did not