on the pleadings focused on the allegations in the complaint, whereas the court’s analysis of the motion for summary judgment looked to the evidence presented in the light most favorable to Mr. Springer. See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 809, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996). Due to the difference in analysis, [1]t is clear that a defendant may assert qualified immunity through a motion to dismiss, take an appeal from the denial of such a motion, and if the appeal is resolved unfavorably to him, renew the issue of qualified immunity by way of a motion for summary judgment, appealing once again, if necessary, from the denial of the summary judgment motion. Walker v. City of Orem, 451 F.3d 1139, 1146 n. 5 (10th Cir.2006); see also Behrens, 516 U.S. at 306-11, 116 S.Ct. 834 (<HOLDING>). Next, Mr. Springer argues that we lack
holding that an interlocutory appeal lies from a denial of summary judgment on a qualified immunity claim holding that a denial of a motion for partial summary judgment is interlocutory and subject to revision at discretion of the court recognizing that the denial of qualified immunity at the dismissal stage does not preclude a renewal of that defense at summary judgment after further factual development has occurred recognizing that interlocutory appeals are permitted both at appeal of denial at dismissal stage and at later appeal of denial of summary judgment after further factual development holding that denial of motion for summary judgment is interlocutory even though trial judge had stated that there was no just reason for delay because denial of motion for summary judgment was not a final determination of defendants rights and the appeal did not affect defendants substantial rights