is sufficient to uphold the conviction. We have addressed the issue as follows: Malice does not require proof of a subjective intent to kill. Malice may be established by evidence of conduct which is reckless and wanton, and a gross deviation from a reasonable standard of care, of such a nature that a jury is warranted in inferring that defendant was aware of a serious risk of death or serious bodily harm. United States v. Black Elk, 579 F.2d 49, 51 (8th Cir.1978) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added). Finally, assuming specific intent is required for a conviction under either § 2113(e) or § 924(j) or both, we find that any error in the district court's instructions was harmless. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.s. 1, 8-15, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (<HOLDING>); Id. at 35, 119 S.Ct. 1827 ("The failure of
holding that the harmlesserror rule of chapman v california  applies to the failure of a trial judge to submit an element of the offense to the jury holding trial errors are subject to a harmless error analysis holding that the omission of an element is subject to harmless error analysis holding that the omission of an element is not a structural error subject to automatic reversal but rather  where objected to  is subject to harmless error analysis holding that failure to submit an element of the offense to the jury is subject to harmless error analysis