simply directs the jury to review the instructions again, the defendant’s due process rights are not violated. See McCracken v. Gibson, 268 F.3d 970, 980-81 (10th Cir.2001); McGregor v. Gibson, 219 F.3d 1245, 1256 (10th Cir.2000), overruled en banc on other grounds by 248 F.3d 946 (10th Cir.2001). Conversely, in cases in which the trial court informs the jury that it is not to consider the issue of whether the defendant is parole ineligible, we have found a due process violation. See Mollett v. Mullin, 348 F.3d 902, 915 (10th Cir.2003) (determining trial court violated defendant’s due process rights by stating, “matters of parole are beyond the purvue [sic] of the jury or the court to consider”) (quotation marks omitted); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1164, 1166 (10th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>) (quotation marks omitted). Even assuming the
holding appellant could not obtain a new trial so that jury could answer liability question because the charge instructed the jury not to answer the question based on its answer to a prior question and because appellant did not object to this instruction holding that party that failed to object to instruction that jury not answer a question based on its answer to the prior question waived that partys right to have the jury make findings as to the subsequent question holding failure to object to conditioning instructions waived error arising from the jurys failure to answer question when answer could not be implied and that lack of objection waived right to new trial to have jury answer questions holding trial courts response it is inappropriate for you to consider the question asked did more than give a nonresponsive answer but contrary to supreme court precedent told the jury that parole eligibility could not be considered holding appellant could not complain of jurys failure to answer question because the charge instructed the jury not to do so based on its answer to a prior question and because appellant did not object to this instruction