of another,” it only had to show that someone other than the appellant had a possessory or proprietary interest in it. The appellant concedes that Rowena had such an interest. Our interpretation of “property of another,” for purposes of § 569.120, is in accord with other jurisdictions and legal authorities that have interpreted this phrase in a comparable context. See State v. Superior Court, 188 Ariz. 372, 936 P.2d 558, 559 (Ct.App.1997) (noting the general rule that, when interpreting criminal damage statutes without a precise definition of “property of another,” the term included any property in which the defendant had anything less than exclusive ownership); State v. Coria, 146 Wash.2d 631, 48 P.3d 980, 983-84 (2002); State v. Webb, 64 Wash.App. 480, 824 P.2d 1257, 1263 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Model Penal Code § 220.3 cmt. 3 (1980)
holding that any property in which the taxpayer has any right title or interest is subject to foreclosure proceeding including property in which others claim an interest so long as all persons having liens or claiming any interest in the property are joined as parties to the suit holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property holding that property of a public entity includes having exclusive control and possession of  property holding that scope of property subject to forfeiture is defined by the instrument creating an interest in the property holding that the phrase property of another as used in defining the comparable offense of malicious mischief includes property coowned by the defendant or in which the defendant shares an interest