of the basis for IP Holdings’ trademark and unfair-competition claims. The Court also rejects Defendants’ contention that the Amended Complaint is confusing because it contains allegations pertaining to them collectively as “Defendants.” See DE 27 at 9. A plaintiff may plead claims against multiple defendants by referring to them collectively, for example by referring to a group of defendants as “defendants.” See Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1539 (11th Cir.1997). These collective allegations are construed as pertaining to each defendant individually. Id. The practice only runs afoul of the applicable pleading standard where it denies a defendant notice of the specific claims against it. See Frazier v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 118775, 2013 WL 1337263 at *3 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 29, 2013) (<HOLDING>). Collective references to defendants most
holding that a complaint that fails rule 9b is rendered legally infirm from its inception and thus cannot preempt a laterfiled complaint under the firsttofile bar holding that the plaintiffs second complaint did not relate back to her first complaint because her second complaint was not an amendment to her first complaint but rather a separate filing holding that the complaint did not satisfy the notice pleading requirements of federal rule of civil procedure 8a because the complaint gave the defendants no notice of the specific factual allegations presented for the first time in the plaintiffs opposition to summary judgment holding that the fraud claims against the defendant should not have been dismissed as the complaint provided him with fair notice of the claims made against her holding that group pleading did not render complaint infirm where complaint provided fair notice of claims