at 821, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (only testimonial state ments cause the declarant to be a “witness” within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment). A criminal defendant’s right to confront witnesses is an important right, the denial of which can nullify the result of a trial. See Crawford, at 69, 124 S.Ct. 1354; Davis, at 834, 126 S.Ct. 2266. [¶ 14] Shane Duncan correctly observes the United States Supreme Court reversed a conviction based on introduction of a 911 call in Davis because the declarant was unavailable and because Davis had no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. 547 U.S. at 817, 126 S.Ct. 2266. However, interpretation of the confrontation clause has been anything but consistent since the 2004 Crawford decision. See, e.g., Shorter v. State, 33 So.3d 512, 523 (Miss.App.2009) (<HOLDING>); State v. Wright, 726 N.W.2d 464, 474
holding that the victims statements to a 911 operator while the perpetrator was in the home were nontestimonial because their primary purpose was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency holding statements on 911 tape admissible as present sense impression where call was made almost immediately after the defendant left the store after a shooting incident holding testimonial statements to include those involving a declarants knowing responses to structured questioning in an investigative environment holding declarants statements to 911 operator were not testimonial when defendant was still present during phone call holding that accusers 911 call initial statement to police upon their arrival at the crime scene and statements made to police a short time later were testimonial