from “discovery of the fraudulent nature of the transfer.” Cf Samples v, Fla. Birth-Related Neurological, 40 So.3d 18, 22 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (declining to apply principle that statutes in derogation of the common law are strictly construed where the statutory language was unambiguous). The language that the legislature enacted is “discovery of the transfer,” and it is that understanding we are obliged to follow. The decision in Schmidt took the remedial-purpose argument a step farther and reasoned that interpreting the savings clause in accord with its plain language is so inconsistent with that purpose that it leads to absurd results and thus justifies departing from the clear text of the savings clause. 319 P.3d at 427; see also Maddox v. State, 923 So.2d 442, 448 (Fla. 2006) (<HOLDING>). We cannot agree. The text of section 726.110
recognizing a court must look beyond the plain language of a statute when the literal interpretation would lead to an absurd result holding that a literal interpretation should not be adhered to when it would lead to absurd results holding that a narrow interpretation of the word fraud in tolling statute would lead to absurd and unjust results holding that courts adopt statutes interpretation that is supported by statutes plain language if statute is unambiguous unless such interpretation would lead to absurd results holding that contracts should be interpreted to avoid absurd results