show that the identification was unreliable. See Diaz, 248 F.3d at 1102. During the robbery, Spence did not wear a mask or hat, and the teller was face-to-face with Spence for a "significant amount of time.” [Dkt. 72 at 50], The next morning, the detective prepared the photograph lineup, and he told the teller that the suspect’s photo might not be included. The teller still identified Spence without any doubt or hesitation. [Dkt. 76 at 55], 2 . Even assuming arguendo that there was error in failing to strike Yunta, Spence still cannot show reversible error. Yunta ultimately did not sit on the jury because Spence struck her with a peremptory strike. Spence must show that his actual jury still included an impartial juror. See United States v. Farmer, 923 F.2d 1557, 1566 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Spence contends that because he improperly
holding that a defendants claim that a jury was not impartial must focus on the jurors who ultimately sat holding that a defendant could not establish stricklands prejudice prong because any erroneous exclusion of an impartial juror was harmless because we have every reason to believe the replacement was also an impartial juror the defendant does not dispute that he was convicted and sentenced by an impartial jury and he presents no reason to think that a jury composed of a slightly different set of impartial jurors would have reached a different verdict holding that the defendants right to an impartial jury was not impaired when there was no common thread or similarity among the group of excluded jurors recognizing that the focus must be on whether the facts alleged would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial holding that the trial court should have granted the defendants motion for mistrial after it was revealed that a police officer who also was a prosecution witness had sat with several jurors during a lunch break even though the witness testified that he did not discuss the business of the case with the jurors