Rule 173). We hold that a parent’s obligation to provide her child with medical care, standing alone, does not create a conflict of interest within the confines of Rule 173. Because the pretrial judge should have removed Milutin at the time he considered Richardson’s motion to reconsider and Mi-lutin’s response, we hold that any services rendered by Milutin after that time were not necessary and thus not compensable under Rule 173. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 173.6(a) (providing that a guardian ad li-tem may be compensated for necessary services performed). Therefore, the pretrial judge abused his discretion when he awarded compensation for Milutin’s non-necessary services, which included Milu-tin’s time spent defending his appointment in the mandamus proceeding. See Garcia, 363 S.W.3d at 582 (<HOLDING>). While the evidence is legally insufficient to
holding that a trial court abuses its discretion when it awards compensation for a guardian ad litems nonnecessary activities holding that guardian ad litems extensive advice to plaintiffs attorney and daily involvement in case exceeded formal role of guardian ad litem holding that the trial court did not err by permitting the guardian ad litem to give his recommendation or by relying on the guardian ad litems recommendation as the recommendation was supported by evidence received at trial holding a court abuses its discretion when it commits an error of law recognizing that the trial court abuses its discretion when it commits an error of law in reaching a discretionary decision