the sentences he negotiated with the State — concurrent sentences of forty years in prison, followed by ten years of sex offender probation. Resentencing was prompted by Farrar’s motion to correct an illegal sentence, in which he argued that the statute covering life felonies at the time of his offenses provided for a sentence of natural life or a term-of-years sentence not to exceed forty years. The State conceded error based on Ward v. State, 558 So.2d 166 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). On resentenc-ing, the trial court accomplished the same sentencing goal by imposing a forty-year prison sentence on the first charge, and a consecutive ten-year prison sentence on the second charge. We affirm the sentences. See, e.g., Everett v. State, 824 So.2d 211 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (recognizing A 2007) (<HOLDING>). As such, the rule 3.800(b)(2) motion was
holding that a defendant waived an argument under section 2  610b by failing to raise it in the trial court holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel holding that constitutional claim that paternity suit should not be barred by statute of limitations is waived by failing to raise the issue before the trial court holding that the defendant waived an argument by failing to raise it in his appellants brief holding trial court properly denied relief under rule 3800b2 where defendant attempted to attack his convictions rather than his sentences with argument that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him of or raise before the court meritorious statute of limitations defenses