filing the motion with the court, the court will not dispose of plaintiff's motion on this ground, for two reasons. First, defense counsel formally advised plaintiff, in her July 24, 2015 letter, of defendant’s position that there was no basis for sanctions, effectively declining the opportunity created by the safe harbor provision to correct the purported violation. Second, defendant did not raise the violation of the service requirement in its response in opposition to plaintiff’s motion for sanctions. 5 . Indeed, even courts use the term "discharge” when referring to retired service members. See, e.g,, Smith, 384 F.3d at 1296 (addressing the possibility that the plaintiff's retirement could be characterized as an "involuntary dischargel]" (emphasis added)); Adkins, 68 F.3d at 1321 (<HOLDING>); Coon, 30 Fed.Cl. at 540 (“By the date of
holding that mandatory language such as will pay or shall pay creates the necessary moneymandate for tucker act purposes holding voluntary plea of guilty or no contest waives objections to prior defects in the proceedings and also operates as a waiver of statutory or constitutional rights emphasis added holding with respect to the plaintiff a retired army officer that if the plaintiffs discharge was voluntary and improper his statutory right to pay was not extinguished and thus serves as a basis for tucker act jurisdiction emphasis added holding that the due process and equal protection clauses do not trigger tucker act jurisdiction in the courts holding that the tucker acts waiver does not extend to statutory claims