on certain criminal charges. Contemporaneously with the filing of his answer, the appellee moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was not accompanied by the supporting affidavit of an expert as required by OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a). The trial court granted the motion, and this appeal followed. Held: 1. The trial court did not err in refusing to appoint counsel to represent the appellant in the action. “[T]his being a civil proceeding, [the appellant], though indigent, was not entitled to have . . . appointed counsel. . . .” Crawford v. Linahan, 243 Ga. 161, 165 (253 SE2d 171) (1979). 2. The trial court did not err in granting the appellee’s motion to dismiss. Accord Barr v. Johnson, 189 Ga. App. 136 (375 SE2d 51) (1988). Compare Glaser v. Meck, 258 Ga. 468 (369 SE2d 912) (1988) (<HOLDING>). The appellant’s constitutional attack upon
holding that if the states criminal complaint against defendant had a jurisdictional defect the prosecution had the right to attempt to correct the defect and a motion to dismiss is one method of doing this holding that the statute of limitations begins to run on the date the alleged malpractice is discovered holding that the defendant was estopped from moving to dismiss a malpractice action based on the failure to file the required affidavit where he waited until after the statute of limitation had run to assert the defect holding that affidavit submitted to the court after the plaintiffs motion to remand was sufficient to cure the defect in the removal petition holding that employer was estopped to assert a statute of limitations defense where the insurer had arranged to have the claimant examined by one of its physicians after the statute of limitations had run