misses the point. Even if, as the concurrence suggests, the Court used this term in Graham — a case centering on the use of excessive force during an investigatory stop of a citizen, 490 U.S. at 388-89, 109 S.Ct. 1865 — to distinguish between the constitutional protections afforded to civilians, pretrial detainees, and incarcerated individuals, this says nothing about whether a claim that falls outside of these set boundaries is "covered by” the Fourth Amendment. Where, as here, a non-citizen alleges excessive force abroad, and there is no indication that the show of authority was directed at apprehension, it cannot be that the claim arises under the Fourth Amendment or not at all. The cases the concurrence cites are not to the contrary. Cf. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 843-44, 118 S.Ct. 1708 (<HOLDING>); Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273-74, 114
holding that there is no substantive due process right under the fourteenth amendment to be free from malicious prosecution holding that fourth amendment rights of a passenger of a legally stopped vehicle were not violated by police officers instruction that he remain inside the vehicle during traffic stop after passenger repeatedly tried to exit holding that the passenger of a vehicle being pursued by police was not seized during a fatal collision and therefore could assert a substantive due process claim under the fourteenth amendment holding excessive force in public school context is a violation of substantive due process guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment recognizing  1983 substantive due process claim