that plaintiffs’ unproduced state submissions qualify as “charges,” we do not know when they were “filed” with the EEOC. If plaintiffs asked the CCRD to forward their “charges” to the EEOC, a filing would have been effected under EEOC regulations at most 60 days later, on October 16, 1999. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(b)(1). However, if plaintiffs did not so request, the CCRD documents would not have been filed with the EEOC unless (i) plaintiffs filed them with the EEOC themselves, or (ii) plaintiffs alleged and provided evidence of the existence of a worksharing agreement whereby the CCRD acted as the agent of the EEOC for purposes of accepting a charge even in the absence of a forwarding request. See, e.g., Johnson v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 280 F.3d 1125, 1129-30 (7th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Because the record before us does not include
holding that in light of a worksharing agreement between the state agency and the eeoc a charge of discrimination filed with the state agency was properly filed with the eeoc on the same date holding that plaintiffs filing with the eeoc constituted a formal charge because the plaintiff attached a statement to the filed intake questionnaire that included a request for the agency to act holding that the state police is a state agency holding that a plaintiff who has filed a charge with the eeoc is foreclosed from pursuing a state civil action under  411202 because filing a charge with the eeoc is equivalent to the election of an administrative remedy under  411205 holding that an original eeoc charge is sufficient to support  a civil suit under the act for any discrimination  developed in the course of a reasonable investigation of that charge provided such discrimination was included in the reasonable cause determination of the eeoc