a crime”). The existence of a continuing duty to return after an unauthorized departure indicates that the offense is continuing as well: If the crime of escape occurred only during the course of the escapee’s initial departure from custody, and did not continue thereafter, there would be no duty (1967) (same); see also 30A C.J.S. Escape § 3, at 401 (1992 & Supp.1997) (“Escape is a continuing offense such that escapee continues to commit the offense as long as he voluntarily remains at large.”). Likewise, escape is not considered a continuing offense in jurisdictions that do not require an escapee to return to custody, but rather use such evidence merely as a discretionary factor in applying the necessity defense. See People v. Mendoza, 108 Mich.App. 733, 310 N.W.2d 860, 862-64 (1981) (<HOLDING>); Spokes v. State, 913 S.W.2d 597, 598 n. *
holding that in light of our recognition that escape presents a continuing threat of violence until the escapee is safely returned to custody we hold that for purposes of  2k21b5 every escape is sufficiently continuing such that possession of a gun subsequent to the initial departure from custody can qualify as being in connection with the escape holding a failure to appear for sentencing constitutes an escape under the rule holding felony escape in north carolina to be crime of violence under acca because escape presents risk of injury to others holding that because the necessity defense requires a defendant to turn himself in escape is a continuing offense holding that necessity defense to escape did not require defendant to turn herself in and that escape is not a continuing offense