v.] Willis, 967 F.2d [1220], 1224 [ (8th Cir.1992) ]. [United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 917 (8th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1113, 115 S.Ct. 1970, 131 L.Ed.2d 859 (1995).] Ill Applying these principles to the circumstances of this case leads us to conclude that the combination of the duration of the detention and the degree of intrusion upon the liberty of the motorists exceeded that measure authorized by Terry and its progeny. A. Was the “detention too long in duration”? Sharpe, supra, 470 U.S. at 686, 105 S.Ct. at 1575, 84 L.Ed.2d at 615. Defendant does not dispute that the initial traffic stop was valid. Whren, supra, expressly authorizes a traffic stop based on probable cause to believe that a driver is violating an applicable motor vehicle law. 517 U.S. at ir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Barahona, supra, 990 F.2d at 416 (holding
holding that an officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop even when his suspicion that a law has been violated is based on a reasonable mistake of law holding that reasonable suspicion justifies an investigatory detention holding that a traffic stop is valid under the fourth amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring holding this framework applies whether the traffic stop is based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion holding that reasonable suspicion that there is contraband in the vehicle justifies greater intrusion unrelated to the traffic stop