is a “fact-intensive issue,” and requires more than a “defendant’s mere presence during a police search of a residence.” United States v. Payton, 636 F.3d 1027, 1043 (8th Cir.2011). Shores’s participation in this transaction outside of 3714 Melba Place the day before drugs were seized at the residence supports the inference that one of the purposes for which Shores maintained those premises during the relevant time period was the distribution of drugs. See United States v. Holliman, 291 F.3d 498, 502 (8th Cir.2002). Similarly, testimony describing Shores’s participation in a hand-to-hand transaction on September 15, 2009 also falls within the conduct charged in the two possession-with-intent-to-distribute charges. Cf. United States v. Williams, 165 F.3d 1193, 1195 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that the evidence is part of the
holding defendant could only be sentenced to a single offense under section 1244011 not both conspiracy with intent to deliver and possession with intent to deliver holding that an allegation as to the time of the offense is not an essential element of the offense charged in the indictment and within reasonable time limits proof of any date before the return of the indictment and within the statute of limitations is sufficient holding that a witnesss description of the defendant giving him methamphetamine in exchange for a car was admissible because it relates to events occurring around the time period alleged in the superseding indictment and tended to prove an element of the offense of possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine holding that the dismissal of an indictment before trial and institution of a superseding indictment does not trigger double jeopardy holding an indictment legally insufficient when it failed to inform the defendant of the gravamen of the alleged offense