liability on such an owner or lessor in such circumstances would, to say the least, create an obstacle to fulfilling that policy and goal. We recognize that the case authorities regarding the preemptive effect of this provision are far from consistent in either their conclusions or their reasoning. See Matei v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 35 F.3d 1142 (7th Cir.1994) (affirming unreported district court decision, 1990 WL 43351 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 30, 1990), and holding that liability under Illinois bailment law was preempted, but also discussing the fact that the state law would not have provided relief); Rogers v. Ray Gardner Flying Serv., Inc., 435 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1970) (noting that 49 U.S.C § 1404 “appears clearly and forthright WL 1793907 (R.I.Super.Ct. Jul. 18, 2005) (unpublished decision) (<HOLDING>); Retzler v. Pratt & Whitney Co., 309
holding that a somewhat different indiana state statute imputes liability to absent owner of an aircraft holding flsa did not preempt state law fraud claim holding that vicarious coconspirator liability need not be charged in the indictment holding that 49 usc  44112 did not preempt state law imposing vicarious liability on an owner of an aircraft recognizing common law right to indemnity when a partys liability is vicarious