of crime is reasonable, the trial court “must consider the totality of the circumstances as viewed by an experienced police officer.” Dewberry v. State, 905 So.2d 963, 966 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). A “mere ‘hunch’ that criminal activity may be occurring” is insufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion to justify stopping an individual. J.P. v. State, 855 So.2d 1262, 1264 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). The officer stopping the individual “must articulate in particular and objective terms his reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” Daniels v. State, 543 So.2d 363, 365 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Case law indicates that walking behind a closed business in the evening is insufficient to justify a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See, e.g., L.N.D. v. State, 884 So.2d 515, 515 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (<HOLDING>); Errickson v. State, 855 So.2d 700 (Fla. 4th
holding that the initial stop by officer was based on reasonable suspicion that defendant was impersonating a police officer although another officer arrested defendant for privacy act violation holding an officer may order a passenger to get out of a car during a traffic stop and may frisk a passenger for weapons if the officer reasonably suspects the passenger is armed and dangerous holding that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the car in which the defendant was a passenger when the officer saw the vehicle come out from behind a closed building at 330 am and the building had been recently burglarized holding that the police officer had reasonable suspicion when he saw a vehicle moving with its lights off in the parking lot of a closed business in a rural area at 300 am holding that a conclusion that reasonable suspicion supported the stop of a vehicle was subsumed within the trial courts ruling that the officer had probable cause for the stop