be consistent with the overall legislative scheme. See, Prohaska v. Sofamor, S.N.C., 138 F.Supp.2d 422, 448 (W.D.N.Y.2001); Sita v. Danek Medical, Inc., 43 F.Supp.2d 245, 260 (E.D.N.Y.1999). Plaintiff is correct in his contention that violations of the FDCA and the New York State Education Law § 6815 can constitute negligence per se if the violations are shown to have proximately caused his injuries. See, e.g. Ezagui v. Dow Chemical Corp., 598 F.2d 727, 733 (2d Cir.1979)(hold-ing that violations of the FDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 352, and the New York Education Law § 6815, for misbranding a product by providing false or misleading labeling, is negligence per se, provided plaintiff shows that the violations proximately caused the injuries and death of the decedent); Prohaska, 138 F.Supp.2d at 448 (<HOLDING>); Sita, 43 F.Supp.2d at 262 (recognizing that a
holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment holding that violation of city ordinance does not constitute negligence per se holding negligence per se not applicable to violation of railroad commission regulation holding that a cause of action exists under negligence per se when the underlying claim is for misbranding or otherwise illegally omitting product warnings required by the fdca holding osha violations may be used as evidence of negligence per se under fela