we conclude that the district court could not properly entertain the motion, and hereby vacate the district court’s order amending its earlier judgment. Although we find that Rule 60(b)(1) fully and sufficiently supports our decision to vacate the district court’s order, we do not view the decision as harsh to appellees. Appellees drafted and submitted the judgment to the district court, so they in fact caused the mistake in the first place. They accepted payment of that judgment without protest, and they did not raise the issue when the case was before this court on appeal the first time. Consequently, they could be deemed to have waived any statutory right to higher interest that they might have had. See Feaster Trucking Service, Inc. v. Kindsvater, Inc., 460 F.2d 180 (10th Cir.1972) (<HOLDING>); Clinton v. Joshua Hendy Corp., 264 F.2d 329
holding that where the proper rate of interest was eight percent but the court ordered six percent movant had waived right to higher rate by not raising the issue earlier in its petition for review holding that a four percent error rate constitutes substantial compliance with a statute holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding prejudgment interest at the colorado statutory rate of 8 percent holding that once a rate is filed with the appropriate agency except for review of the agencys orders the courts can assume no right to a different rate on that ground that in its opinion it is the only or the more reasonable rate holding that the proper rate for prejudgment interest is the rate fixed by the parties in a contract