established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). Hence, the issue this Court must address in the present case is whether Wyche’s initial consent to give the saliva swabs was given voluntarily and freely. CONSENT TO SEARCH When the State desires to rely upon consent to justify a search, the State has the burden of proving that the consent was freely and voluntarily given, and showing mere acquiescence to authority is not enough to discharge this burden. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968); see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (<HOLDING>); Jorgenson v. State, 714 So.2d 423, 426
holding that warrantless search of defendants vehicle was legal because defendants consent was voluntary even through he was in police custody at the time of giving consent holding that persons knowledge of his right to refuse a consent to search is a factor but not a necessary prerequisite to demonstrating a voluntary consent holding that when entry is demanded under color of office and consent is given in submission to authority rather than as an understanding and intentional waiver of a constitutional right consent is not voluntary holding miranda violation does not vitiate voluntary consent holding that the state must prove consent was voluntary not simply a submission to authority