between ‘lawfully positioned’ and ‘lawful right of access’ is thus that the former refers to where the officer stands when she sees the item, and the latter to where she must be to retrieve the item.” Boone v. Spurgess, 385 F.3d 923, 928 (6th Cir.2004) (citations omitted). Therefore, Officer Frisby properly seized the firearm pursuant to the plain-view doctrine. We agree with the district court that the pat search was irrelevant to the seizure of the firearm. We need not, therefore, consider the lawfulness of the pat search or whether, as the Government asserts, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable to the Glock’s seizure because there was no causal, or “but-for,” connection between the pat search and its discovery. See United States v. Pearce, 531 F.3d 374, 381 (6th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION Because the district court did not
holding that evidence obtained pursuant to an unlawful stop should have been suppressed because there were no intervening events that purged the illegal taint holding judicial exclusionary rule inapplicable to administrative license revocation proceedings but acknowledging application of statutory exclusionary rules where applicable holding that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable where evidence has been obtained by means sufficiently separate from the illegal activity to be free of any taint holding exclusionary rule inapplicable to evidence obtained by police officers acting in reasonable reliance on search warrant later held invalid holding that an exception to the fourth amendment exclusionary rule applies where the police would have obtained the evidence if no illegality had occurred