not assert cause of action under § 1983 to enforce 42 U.S.C. § 1437(e) because providing decent and safe housing was a condition of federal funds and did not confer enforceable rights). As the Supreme Court has made clear, statutory language that merely benefits putative plaintiffs without specific rights-creating language is insufficient to confer a new federal right enforceable under § 1983. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283, 122 S.Ct. 2268. In addition, the Court has observed that “statutes that focus on the person regulated rather than the individuals protected create ‘no implication of an intention to confer rights on a particular class of persons.’ ” Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 275, 121 S.Ct. 1511; See also Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 691, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Gonzaga highlighted the type of
recognizing that title vi of the civil rights act of 1964 and title ix of the educational amendments of 1972 created individual federal rights because those statutes were phrased with an unmistakable focus on the benefitted class holding that title vii of the civil rights act of 1964 provides the exclusive remedy for claims of employment discrimination by federal agencies holding that because the proper defendant in a title vi case is an entity rather than an individual plaintiff could not be sued in his individual capacity under title vi holding there is no private right of action to enforce disparateimpact regulations brought under title vi of the civil rights act of 1964 in part because of the enforcement scheme congress provided in that statute holding that congress intended for idea to be interpreted consistent with fee provisions of statutes such as title vii of the civil rights act of 1964