the existence of an attorney-client relationship be waived her right to complain about Proctor’s involvement because she did not file her motion to disqualify in a timely manner. More specifically, Hendricks argues that the motion was untimely because Barker knew that Proctor represented him “some three years” before suit was filed. See Vaughan v. Walther, 875 S.W.2d 690, 690 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (“A party who fails to file its motion to disqualify opposing counsel in a timely manner waives the complaint.”). Hehdricks did not preserve this point because he did not raise it in the trial court. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. that she did not waive her complaint. See In re Hoar Constr., L.L.C., 256 S.W.3d 790, 798 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, orig. proceeding) (<HOLDING>). We overrule Hendricks’s second issue.
holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to disqualify an attorney based on a matter not raised by the opposing party until only weeks prior to trial holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that a tenmonth delay in filing a dismissal motion was reasonable holding that a fivemonth delay in filing a motion to disqualify did not bar the motion where there was a reasonable explanation for the delay holding that a year delay in filing a motion to disqualify did not bar the motion where there was no evidence that the motion was inspired by dilatory tactics holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by implicitly rejecting a waiver argument where the motion to disqualify was filed after a threemonth delay