period.”); Ezell v. United States, 778 F.3d 762, 765 (9th Cir.2015) ("We agree with the majority of our sister circuits and hold that when a § 2255(h) motion presents a complex issue, we may exceed § 2244(b)(3)(D)’s thirty-day time limit.”); Browning v. United States, 241 F.3d 1262, 1263 (10th Cir.2001) ("[W]e agree with other circuits that the time limit in section 2244(b)(3)(D) is hortatory or advisory rather than mandatory.” (quotation omitted)). The Third, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits do not appear to have ruled on this question. And though the Fifth Circuit has said it is "statutorily required” to rule within 30 days, In re White, 602 Fed.Appx. 954, 956 (5th Cir.2015) (unpublished), it does not appear to have published a precedential opinion add t. 1173, 167 L.Ed.2d 1 (2007) (<HOLDING>); Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 349, 124
holding that blakely v washington 542 us 296 124 sct 2531 159 led2d 403 2004 and state v schofield 2005 me 82 895 a2d 927 do not retroactively apply to cases on collateral review holding the same under blakely v washington 542 us 296 124 sct 2531 159 led2d 403 2004 holding that the rule announced in crawford v washington 541 us 36 124 sct 1354 158 led2d 177 2004 applies retroactively on collateral review holding that the rule announced in bailey v united states 516 us 137 116 sct 501 133 led2d 472 1995 applies retroactively on collateral review holding that blakely v washington 542 us 296 124 sct 2531159 led2d 403 2004 did not overrule almendareztorres v united states 523 us 224 118 sct 1219 140 led2d 350 1998