relies on Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979) (Davis), to assert that disabled tenants are not qualified for a reasonable accommodation unless they are “able to meet all of a program’s requirements in spite of handicaps.” This reliance is misplaced. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 299 n.19 (1985) (Alexander), clarified the holding in Davis by stating that “the question of who is ‘otherwise qualified’ and what actions constitute ‘discrimination’ under [§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973] would seem to be two sides of a single coin; the ultimate question is the extent to which a grantee is required to make reasonable modifications in its programs for the needs of the handicapped.” See Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 932 F.2d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 1991) (<HOLDING>). 16 A joint statement of HUD and the United
holding the literal language of davis that an otherwise qualified person must meet all of a programs requirements  was modified by alexander which in effect modified the all language of davis and articulated the obligation to make reasonable accommodation part of the otherwise qualified inquiry holding that instructions are sufficient which substantially follow the language of the statute or use equivalent language holding that the court evaluating a claim of qualified immunity must first determine whether the plaintiff states a claim of a constitutional violation at all and then must determine whether the claimed right was clearly established before proceeding to the qualified immunity question holding that moral certainty language compensated for willing to act language in an otherwise proper reasonable doubt instruction holding that statutes must be read so as to give effect to all statutory language