violations noted by the officers after the incident — were sufficient to deny the defendants’ motion to suppress. See Hartwell, 67 F.Supp.2d at 790 (“Accordingly, the initial parking violation relied upon by the government did not provide the troopers with probable cause to stop defendant Hartwell’s vehicle. Nevertheless, the government now urges this Court to consider other additional violations allegedly committed by defendant Hartwell.”). In particular, the ■ government argued that in parking the vehicle as they did, the defendants necessarily obstructed traffic and drove on the wrong side of the road. On appeal, the defendants argue that the government is precluded from advancing additional bases for probable cause with the benefit of hindsight. See Ferguson, 8 F.3d at 391-92 (<HOLDING>). The government counters that Whren provides
holding that probable cause determinations turn on what the officer knew at the time he made the stop holding that the subjective intent of the officer is no longer determinative wjhen applying the objective test generally the only determination to be made is whether probable cause existed for the stop in question and that per whren a violation of traffic law provided sufficient probable cause to make the subsequent search and seizure reasonable holding that a conclusion that reasonable suspicion supported the stop of a vehicle was subsumed within the trial courts ruling that the officer had probable cause for the stop holding arrest was valid because there was probable cause of cdw even though officer incorrectly believed at the time that he had probable cause of ppw holding that there is no probable cause when an officer makes a stop based on a mistake of law