and discrimination based on ‘place or nation of ... origin,’ is not a bright one.” 481 U.S. at 614, 107 S.Ct. 2022, quoting id. at 613, 107 S.Ct. 2022. The Court then concluded that “assuming for these purposes that plaintiff can prove he was subjected to discrimination of some kind, the question of the nature of the discrimination is a factual one.” 2004 WL 2471859 at *4. Other courts have reached similar conclusions. See MacDissi v. Valmont Indus., 856 F.2d 1054, 1060 (8th Cir.1988) (finding that § 1981 can apply to persons of Lebanese descent); Aggarwal v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., No. 98 Civ. 5063(DLC), 2000 WL 172787, at *5 (S.D.N.Y Feb. 10, 2000) (applying § 1981 to plaintiff of Indian ancestry); Adames v. Mitsubishi Bank, 751 F.Supp. 1548, 1560 (E.D.N.Y.1990) (<HOLDING>). The same is true here. Defendants do not
holding that plaintiffs claim that she was filipino was a sufficient basis for  1981 relief holding where corporation had acquired imputed racial identity and was direct target of discrimination it had standing to pursue  1981 claim holding that officers directors and employees of a corporation may become personally liable under  1981 holding that  1981 was appropriate as a basis of a claim by nonjapanese employees of a japanese corporation holding that plaintiff is entitled to assert claim of retaliatory transfer under  1981