persons confined in prison” under the second category of § 3626(g)(2), since such awkward language would not, ordinarily, be used to describe such incidents. In his dissent from the Third Circuit’s decision in Booth v. Churner, Judge Noonan, sitting by designation, vividly argues this point: A guard hits you on the mouth. Would you report the blow by saying, “A government official has taken an action having an effect on my life?” No speaker of English would use such a circumlocution. Why should we attribute such circuitousness to Congress? When bones are broken or mouths are mauled, no one on earth, educated or uneducated, would use such roundabout phraseology to express the blow. Booth, 206 F.3d at 302 (Noonan, J., concurring and dissenting); see Giannattasio, 2000 WL 335242, at *12 (<HOLDING>). The use of “roundabout phraseology,” of
holding that the use of excessive force does not constitute a prison condition in the ordinary sense of the term holding that the risk posed to third parties by the official use of force is not to be considered in determining whether an official used excessive force as against a particular plaintiff holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim holding that the right to be free from the use of excessive force has been well established since 1976