eight, nine, and ten of the indictment allege distinct offenses based on different conduct, and because the evidence supports the jury’s findings on the counts, Hiatt’s fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth issues are overruled. Jury Charge Hiatt argues the trial sjunctive, but was required to reach a verdict as to each count. Thus, no charge error exists on this basis. Hiatt’s thirteenth issue is overruled. Evidentiary Rulings A.Confrontation Clause Hiatt asserts the trial court’s limitation of his right to cross-examine D.H. and Crystal Espino violated his right of confrontation. Hiatt has failed to preserve his complaint for appellate review because he never made a Confrontation Clause objection at trial. See Reyna v. State, 168 S.W.3d 173, 179-80 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (<HOLDING>). Hiatt’s twenty-sixth, twenty-seventh, and
holding appellate court erred in reversing conviction on confrontation clause grounds because appellant did not clearly articulate to trial court that confrontation clause demanded admission of evidence in question holding that hearsay argument for admission of evidence did not preserve confrontation clause challenge on appeal argument could have referred either to rules of evidence or confrontation clause but failed to identify confrontation clause as basis and thus did not put trial court on notice of issue holding that a proffer of evidence to established a witnesss bias and motive to lie did not preserve a confrontation clause argument because a defendant must specifically articulate that the confrontation clause demands admission of proffered evidence to preserve error on this ground holding that any confrontation right is found in the fourteenth amendments due process clause not the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment holding that in reviewing confrontation clause challenge appellate courts must first determine whether the confrontation clause is implicated