only learned about it indirectly. Thus, Johnson points to just two incidents of discriminatory conduct over the course of his twenty-eight-month tenure at Riverside, and only one in which he was the victim. In the past, we have held that isolated incidents, unless “extremely serious,” are insufficient to state a claim for hostile work environment. Manatt, 339 F.3d at 798 (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275); Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 642-43 (9th Cir.2002) (concluding that employee failed to state a hostile work environment claim under Title VII where he was yelled at in front of others and told that he had “a typical Hispanic macho attitude,” and that he should work in the field because “Hispanics do good in the field”); Kortan, 217 F.3d at 1110-11 (<HOLDING>). Thus, to establish the severe or pervasive
holding that comments not directed at plaintiff including a supervisor who called another worker the nword were relevant to the evaluation of hostile work environment claim holding that a plaintiffs psychological distress was not vicarious in a hostile work environment case where she experienced her workplace as hostile by reason of the alleged harassment of other women out of her presence holding that the fact that the offensive material was not directed specifically at the plaintiff does not as a matter of law preclude a jury from finding that the conduct subjected her to a hostile work environment based on her sex holding that supervisors routine vulgar references to plaintiff could not support a hostile work environment claim because plaintiff was unaware of the comments and to show that he or she perceived the environment as hostile a title vii plaintiff must at least have been aware of those comments holding that a plaintiff failed to state a hostile work environment claim where her supervisor referred to other females as castrating bitches madonnas or regina in her presence and called the plaintiff medea at least once