fact that the fielding of payments was one of the services that ICTS chose to provide to the shippers for whom it consolidated. Its provision of that service in no way indicates that it was acting as Hawkspere’s collection agent. See Strachan Shipping Co., 701 F.2d at 486 (refusing to infer agency from fact that carrier initially directed its collection efforts to cargo consolidator). The Shippers next point out that they both “presented unrefuted testimony, that each reasonably believed that ICTS was acting for Hawkspere and relied on that.” Appellants’ Br. at 20. Under United States law, however, the Shippers’ subjective beliefs are irrelevant to the inquiry; only evidence of Hawkspere’s conduct can prove agency. See Overnite Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 140 F.3d 259, 266-67 (D.C.Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Auvil v. Grafton Homes, 92 F.3d 226, 230 (4th
recognizing that statements made by agent on behalf of principal to principals attorney may be protected by principals attorneyclient privilege holding that it is the principals conduct attitude and knowledge that determines whether an agent had apparent authority holding that agency is provable only by principals conduct and not by subjective beliefs of those dealing with alleged agent holding that a principal is bound by a contract entered into by the principals agent on her behalf if the agent had authority to bind the principal holding that the lack of evidence of the alleged principals control over the alleged agent precludes the finding of an agency relationship