filed a sexual harassment complaint. The jury answered “no.” Because Chesloff was no longer working in the hostile environment, we hold that these post-termination acts are not within her hostile environment claim. See, e.g., Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714, 731 (6th Cir.2014) (“Unlike a Title VII anti-discrimination claim, - ‘the anti-retaliation provision does not confine the actions and harms it forbids to those that are related to employment or occur at the workplace,’ ”) (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2409, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006)). Filing a lawsuit against a former employee is a discrete act that is not inherently harassing conduct of the type prohibited by sexual harassment law. See, e.g., Bartosh, 259 S.W.3d at 325-26 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we hold that the June 2009 and
holding that employee failed to preserve hostile work environment claim when only timely allegation of discrimination was based on termination because termination is not itself harassing conduct recognizing hostile work environment discrimination in ada context holding that a hostile work environment is a form of discrimination that is actionable under the statute recognizing a hostile work environment claim under section 1983 holding that a viable hostile work environment claim requires an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive