the involved officers themselves. Gov’t Br. at 33. This argument, too, is unpersuasive. As we have noted above, “the prosecutor is responsible for ‘any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police,’ ” Strickler, - U.S. at - n. 12, 119 S.Ct. at 1945 n. 12 (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437, 115 S.Ct. 1555), and particularly including the MPD, see Brooks, 966 F.2d at 1503. Accordingly, defense counsel was no more required to subpoena the officers to learn of their agreements, than she was to subpoena the prosecutor to learn of hers. The appropriate way for defense counsel to obtain such information was to make a Brady request of the prosecutor, just as she did. See United States v. Iverson, 648 F.2d 737, 739 (D.C.Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, at oral argument the government
holding that the government must provide the party seeking disclosure with a detailed index describing the documents the government claims are exempt from disclosure under foia holding that the right of privacy does not attach to matters already within the public domain holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure  contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant holding that the determination of public policy lies almost exclusively in the legislative domain and the decision of the general assembly in that regard will not be interfered with by the courts in the absence of palpable error holding that the primary obligation for the disclosure of matters which are essentially in the prosecutorial domain lies with the government