limited range of issues. In either case such persons assume special prominence in the resolution of public questions. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351, 94 S.Ct. 2997. On appeal, Kennedy cites no South Carolina authority on point, but references South Carolina cases holding police officers and assistant police chiefs are public officials for purposes of defamation actions. See, e.g., Miller v. City of West Columbia, 322 S.C. 224, 471 S.E.2d 683 (1996) (applying Constitutional actual malice standard in case involving assistant police chief); Beckham v. Sun News, 289 S.C. 28, 344 S.E.2d 603, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1007, 107 S.Ct. 646, 93 L.Ed.2d 702 (1986) (applying Constitutional actual malice standard in case involving former police officer); McClain v. Arnold, 275 S.C. 282, 270 S.E.2d 124 (1980) (<HOLDING>); Gause v. Doe, 317 S.C. 39, 451 S.E.2d 408
holding that where a public official takes discretionary action that the official knows will directly benefit a financial interest that the official has concealed in violation of a state criminal law that official has deprived the public of his honest services under  1346 holding that a police officer speaking to a public official about his concerns over public safety issues is speaking in his capacity  as a police officer and not as a citizen holding police officer is a public official holding that private party can assert official immunity if it contracted with a public official to perform governmental duties holding that mayor is a high public official