kicking Perez and threatening Perez with serious injury or death, and that Perez was 'not capable of protecting himself, even if no kick was actually administered by Marquez. The scenario may look different when gauged against the “20/20 vision of hindsight,” but we must look at the situation as a reasonable officer in Gutierrez’s position could have perceived it. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205, 121 S.Ct. 2151(quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In that light, we believe that a reasonable officer could believe that shooting one inmate in the leg to stop an assault that could have seriously injured or killed another inmate was a good faith effort to restore order, and thus lawful. Cf. Jeffers, 267 F.3d at 912(<HOLDING>) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320, 106 S.Ct.
holding that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure holding that expert testimony on what constitutes deadly physical force and whether the use of force was justified should have been excluded holding that under whitley a prison guard is permitted to use deadly force in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline  holding intent to use or threaten to use force is required under  2l12bla holding that the core judicial inquiry in resolving an eighth amendment excessive force claim is whether force was applied in a goodfaith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm