that the admiralty law has always aimed to create uniform laws and standards and that subjecting a vessel to different state laws runs counter to the spirit of admiralty law. II. The motion for summary judgment is DENIED. Neither party offers much detail or legal precedent to support their position. In this Circuit, generally, state law is preempted by the Jones Act. See Southworth Machinery Co., Inc. v. F/V Corey Pride, 994 F.2d 37, 41 (1st Cir.1993) (attorneys fee provision in state statute, “being inconsistent with maritime law, cannot be applied in this case”); Carey v. Bahama Cruise Lines, 864 F.2d 201, 207 (1st Cir.1988) (Mass, comparative negligence law deemed incompatible with maritime law and therefore inapplicable); Clancy v. Mobil Oil Corp., 906 F.Supp. 42 (D.Mass.1995) (<HOLDING>). State law is generally preempted where “it
recognizing cause of action for loss of consortium holding that wifes recovery for loss of consortium should not be reduced by the proportion of negligence attributable to husband because claim for loss of consortium is independent of the damages claim of the injured spouse holding that plaintiffs claim for loss of consortium can proceed even where the injured spouse was contributorily negligent holding that injured seamans loss of consortium claim under state law was preempted by jones act recognizing loss of consortium claims