prejudicial.” Id. at 229, 74 S.Ct. 450. Remmer’s presumption of prejudice does not apply to Garcia because the jurors’ alleged observations of Garcia and his pickup truck do not constitute direct or indirect private “communication, contact, or tampering.” Seeing Garcia arrive at court in his truck is not extraneous evidence, in the same way that it is not extraneous evidence when a juror observes the defendant walking down the corridor of the courthouse between trial dates, or sees the defendant at the grocery store. “To hold otherwise would require a Rem-mer hearing based on each of the multiple ordinary incidental contacts between non-sequestered jurors and virtually any other person during the course of a trial.” United States v. Brooks, 161 F.3d 1240, 1246 (10th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Remmer and its applications in this Circuit
holding remmer inapplicable where juror spoke with security officers during lunch break on first day of trial without evidence that their conversa tions were about the matter pending before the jury holding that the trial court should have granted the defendants motion for mistrial after it was revealed that a police officer who also was a prosecution witness had sat with several jurors during a lunch break even though the witness testified that he did not discuss the business of the case with the jurors holding petitioners reliance on remmer misplaced as statement from restaurant cashier to juror expressing cashiers hope that the juror find the defendant not guilty did not refer to the factual evidence not developed at trial recognizing a remmer presumption but noting that sometimes the circumstances are such that the remmer presumption does not even apply holding in a postaedpa habeas case that the remmer presumption did not apply due to the innocuous nature of an intrusion upon a jury implying that the remmer presumption could apply in the habeas context