representation proceedings cannot properly be invoked in this case. The Leedom v. Kyne exception applies only to “specific prohibitions” of the Act. 358 U.S. at 188, 79 S.Ct. at 183-84. In decisions construing the scope of the Leedom v. Kyne exception, courts have examined whether the Board’s actions contradicted specific language in the Act. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has ruled that district court jurisdiction under Leedom v. Kyne exists where the Board “attempted [to] exercise [a] power that had been specifically withheld” from it in the statutory grant of power. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Samoff, 365 F.2d 625, 627 (3d Cir.1966) (quoting Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. at 189, 79 S.Ct. at 184); see NLRB v. Interstate Dress Carriers, Inc., 610 F.2d 99, 106 (3d Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). The district courts within the Third Circuit
recognizing a distinction between the power of a federal court to hear statelaw claims and the discretionary exercise of that power recognizing the inherent power of indian tribes  to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all indians holding that under leedom v kyne jurisdiction exists over challenges addressed to the very existence of board power as opposed to its exercise of that power holding amtraks condemnation power to be of the more limited statutory variety as opposed to the broader sovereign power of eminent domain holding that a commission is a body with special and limited power and it can only exercise the power expressly or impliedly granted to it and any reasonable doubt of existence of any power must be resolved against the exercise thereof