that Wolfe was represented by counsel. However, instead of contacting Wolfe’s attorney regarding the lawsuit, Stevens filed an affidavit of diligent search and inquiry and proceeded to serve Wolfe by publication. At the hearing on Wolfe’s motion to set aside the final judgment, Stevens’ attorney admitted he had the address and phone number of Wolfe’s attorney and that he could have notified him of the lawsuit but he “made the decision, knowing all the circumstances regarding the accusations that were going back and forth, that I would rather go the statutory route.” Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that Stevens exercised due diligence in attempting to locate Wolfe. Accordingly, service by publication was improper. See Levenson v. McCarty, 877 So.2d 818 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (<HOLDING>); Torelli v. Travelers Indem. Co., 495 So.2d
holding that a defendant was estopped from asserting improper service where the defendants conduct caused the allegedly improper service holding that where the plaintiff made no attempt to contact the defendant by telephone or through his known attorneys service by publication was improper holding that the plaintiff did not complete service when she made no attempt to serve the defendant within the time required by the arkansas procedural rules holding that discretionary review was improper in part because the party made no attempt to demonstrate why his case qualifies as one of these rare cases holding that the defendant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that the improper juror contact occurred and only if the contact is established must the government demonstrate absence of prejudice