Second, we decline appellants’ invitation to invoke the rule of lenity. That rule is inapplicable where, as here, a defendant was convicted under a statute that plainly proscribed his conduct and the defendant only argues that he should have been prosecuted under another, more specific statutory provision. See United States v. Jackson, 805 F.2d 457, 465 (2d Cir.1986); United States v. Hansen, 772 F.2d 940, 948-49 (D.C.Cir.1985) (Scalia, J.); cf. Muscarello v. United States, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1911, 141 L.Ed.2d 111 (1998) (stating that the rule of lenity applies only where the criminal statute at issue contains a “grievous ambiguity or uncertainty”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 1144, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Zabel, 702 F.2d 704, 708
holding that contracts should be interpreted to give effect to all provisions holding ambiguous provisions are to be interpreted so as to provide maximum coverage to the insured holding that the rule of lenity is inapplicable where the statutory provisions  are unambiguous on their face and the legislative history  gives us no reason to pause over the manner in which these provisions should be interpreted holding that specific statutory provisions take priority over general statutory provisions holding that rule of construction that specific statutory provisions control general ones should not be applied where provisions can be harmonized