the insured contracted. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 815, 833, 836 (Ct. App. 1993) (rejecting jury instruction providing that “the exclusionary word ‘expected’ denotes that the actor knew or should have known that there was a substantial probability” of harm, explaining that what the insured “should have known . . . invited denial of coverage for conduct within the realm of negligence”); United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Elitzky, 517 A.2d 982, 991 (Pa. 1986) (rejecting objective standard based on concern that “an exclusion of injuries the insured ‘should have anticipated’ might exclude from coverage, not only intentional injuries but also those caused by negligence”); Queen City Farms, Inc. v. Cent. Nat’l Ins. Co., 882 P.2d 703, 713 (Wash. 1994) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 20. Thus, consistent with the foregoing
holding that standard occurrencebased policy was intended to provide coverage when damage or injury    occurs during the policy period holding that under maine law the occurrence provision focuses on the property damage after the initial discharge and whether it was expected or intended from the insureds point of view holding that an objective standard to determine whether the injury was intended or expected would be inconsistent with insurance coverage for damage resulting from ordinary negligence holding that where policies exclude coverage for injuries that are intended or expected the exclusion is applicable if the insured acts with the intent or expectation that bodily injury will result even though the bodily injury that does result is different either in character or magnitude from the injury that was intended holding that intentional acts do not exclude coverage under the occurrence language unless the injury was expected or intended