the magistrate's role in assessing credibility at a preliminary hearing is limited and that the magistrate is to take reasonable inferences in the prosecution's favor. {17 These statements, while true, do not limit the ability of a defendant to conduct a full eross-examination at a preliminary hearing. Although "principal fact finding" and determinations of credibility are left until trial, such considerations impose no obvious structural limitation on the seope or depth of cross-examination a defendant may conduct at a preliminary hearing. We are therefore unable to conclude that eross-examinations conducted within Utah's preliminary hearing framework can never satisfy a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. See, e.g., State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 541-42 (Utah 1981) (<HOLDING>). 1 18 We need not decide today whether the
holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial recognizing defendants right to due process includes the right to present a defense by crossexamining witnesses holding that outofcourt statements by witnesses that are testimonial in nature are barred under the confrontation clause unless witnesses are unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to crossexamine them holding that criminal defendants are entitled to obtain for impeachment purposes statements made by government witnesses to government agents that relate to the subject matter of the witnesses direct testimony holding that the defendants opportunities for erossexamination during a preliminary hearing were constitutionally adequate for confrontation clause purposes despite defense counsel being unaware of the witnesses prior statements to police and thus being unable to crossexamine the witnesses about those statements because defense counsel apparently advisedly and intentionally decided to refrain from crossexamining the witnesses about the challenged topics