878 So.2d at 395. On appeal, Wakeman argues that, under the agreements between the parties, she has been granted the status of a parent for the two minor children born to Dixon and that the trial court erred in not extending the protections of chapter 61, Florida Statutes, to her and the two children. We find that the appellant’s arguments lack support in Florida law. The Florida Supreme Court has held that, under the privacy provision in the Florida Constitution, a third party, even a grandparent, cannot be granted by statute the right to visitation with minor children, because, absent evidence of a demonstrable harm to the child, such a grant unconstitutionally interferes with a natural parent’s privacy right to rear his or her child. See Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So.2d 1271 (Fla.1996)(<HOLDING>); Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So.2d 510
holding that foster parents have standing to intervene to seek termination of parental rights holding that ocs is not required to wait to intervene until a child has suffered actual harm before requesting a finding that a child is in need of aid holding that county was not immune from liability for continued sexual abuse of child resulting from social workers failure to convey information to supervisor about report of child abuse stating that failure to communicate did not involve planning decisions or the balancing of policy objectives holding that a party who can show a significant risk of irreparable harm has demonstrated that the harm is not speculative holding that the state may not properly intervene in parental decisionmaking absent significant harm to the child threatened by or resulting from those decisions