“may suspend the sentence in whole or in part, including any mandatory minimum sentence.” I draw two conclusions from the statutory language. First, the legislature selected the term “sentence” in the statute. We have repeatedly held the term “sentence” includes restitution in a criminal case. See, e.g., Izzolena, 609 N.W.2d at 551 (“Restitution ... is a part of the sentencing process.”); State v. Alspach, 554 N.W.2d 882, 883 (Iowa 1996) (recognizing that “restitution is a phase of sentencing”); see also 4 Robert R. Rigg, Iowa Practice Series™, Criminal Law § 33:5, at 905 (2016-2017 ed.) (characterizing restitution as “part of the sentence imposed” under our cases). Others authorities have come to the same conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Simpson, 885 F.2d 36, 38 (3d Cir. 1989) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827,
holding sentences include all consequences of convictions holding that although sentencing for separate convictions arising from unrelated crimes can take place on same day sentences cannot be part of same sentencing proceeding those separate convictions in same proceeding cannot be considered sequential for purposes of habitualization holding that all convictions under wisconsin sexual assault statute were not per se convictions for crimes of violence holding that all convictions remain valid for immigration purposes recognizing that abatement rests on the outdated premise that criminal convictions and sentences serve only to punish the convicted