vehicles. The endorsement listed no additional charge for the "non-owned" portion and $108 per year for the "hired" portion, for $1 million in coverage. Putting aside actuarial questions as to what a "reasonable" insurance company might charge for this coverage and whether such charge might be partially included in the overall premium for the policy, this argument fails to create a material issue of fact with respect to Monroe's seeking reformation of the policy. That Monroe might have intended to exclude coverage for IU students driving IU vehicles and charged a premium accordingly again only reveals a mistake on its part in the drafting of the endorsement, not a mistake on IU's part. See First Equity Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Keith, 164 Ind.App. 412, 419-20, 329 N.E.2d 45, 50 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Second, Monroe directs us to a page in a
holding that an insurance company may limit coverage only if the limitation does not contravene public policy holding that liability insurance policy that expressly excluded coverage for the insureds intentional acts did not cover punitive damages award assessed against the insured and stating in dictum that public policy forbids insurance coverage for punitive damages holding evidence including that insurer only charged life insurance premium that would ordinarily apply to onehalf the amount of coverage actually permitted by policy as written did not warrant retroactive reformation of policy to reduce coverage amount because it did not demonstrate mistake on insureds part and insurance company did not present evidence on what parties agreed to before the policy was issued holding that policy limits are not a defense to coverage and that policy limits define the amount of coverage holding that when an insurance policy contains an antistacking clause the insurance company must obtain a written rejection of um coverage for each additional vehicle covered by a policy in order to clarify the insureds expectations and to make certain that the insured gets only what he or she has paid for