revocation of supervised release are attributable to the original conviction, not a punishment for a new offense). The Crawford, holding does not apply to supervised release revocations because they are not “criminal prosecutions” under the Sixth Amendment. See United States v. Kelley, 446 F.3d 688, 691-92 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Rondeau, 430 F.3d 44, 47-48 (1st Cir.2005); United States v. Hall, 419 F.3d 980, 985-86 (9th Cir.2005); United States v. Kirby, 418 F.3d 621, 627-28 (6th Cir.2005); United States v. Aspinall, 389 F.3d 332, 342-43 (2d Cir.2004), abrogated on other grounds as recognized in United States v. Fleming, 397 F.3d 95, 99 n. 5 (2d Cir.2005); United States v. Martin, 382 F.3d 840, 844 n. 4 (8th Cir. 2004); cf. Ash v. Reilly, 431 F.3d 826, 829-30 (D.C.Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Next, Crawford argues the court’s admission
holding that crawford does not apply to sentenceselection phase of capital sentencing holding that  1447c does not apply to counsel holding crawford does not apply to parole revocations holding that apprendi does not apply retroactively holding that title ii does not apply to the states