required that in addition to outrageous or wanton and inhuman conduct, there must be a finding of depravity of mind. This requirement distinguishes the instant case from [Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988)], in which the instruction only required a general finding that the murder was ‘especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.’ ” Id. at 1435 (footnote omitted). The court held that the instruction “did not undermine the accuracy of the sentencing determination.” Id. The instruction at issue here specifically defines “depravity of mind,” and the Court therefore concludes that the instruction adequately channels the sentencer’s discretion by clear and objective standards. Cf. Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 113 S.Ct. 1534, 123 L.Ed.2d 188 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Because the Court concludes that the
holding that aggravating circumstance of utter disregard for human life was not facially invalid when construed by state supreme court to refer to coldblooded pitiless slayer holding that a sentencing judge sitting without a jury may not find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty holding that an aggravating circumstance that justifies a life sentence is a planned deliberate killing including a killing for hire holding that death sentence need not be set aside where one of three statutory aggravating circumstances found by juror was subsequently held to be invalid by state supreme court but other two were specifically upheld and stating that the absence of legislature or courtimposed standards to govern the jury in weighing the significance of either or both of those aggravating circumstances does not render capital sentencing statute invalid as applied holding that an aggravating circumstance in the georgia death penalty statute was unconstitutionally vague