Martin testified that after he left the Boy Scouts in or around 1981, the abuse affected his life by causing him to become very angry at Brehaut for causing him pain, as well as at his parents for not discovering the abuse. Martin testified that this “rage” that he “felt from inside” is still going on today. Deposition of Martin, Vol. II, p. 23, lines 5-8. Martin also admitted that the abuse caused him to become heavily involved in drugs, alcohol, and criminal activities. Id. at p. 20, lines 13-18. It is these psychological symptoms that Martin disclosed to Grubmán-Black in 1992, when he was twenty-four years old. Finally, this case does not involve a circumstance in which the victim was unable to recognize that the abuser’s conduct represented sexual abuse. See Ross, 433 Mass. at 366 (<HOLDING>). Here, Martin recognized that Brehaut’s sexual
holding that where the conduct of a defendant is privileged plaintiff bears burden of pleading and proving that the defendants conduct was unjustified or malicious holding that third partys suit against plan administrator for misrepresentation was not related to erisa plan because the finder of fact need only determine 1 the amount and terms of reimbursement that plaintiff could reasonably have expected given what could fairly be inferred from defendants statements and 2 whether defendants subsequent disposition of the reimbursement claims was consistent with that expectation holding that summary judgment was inappropriate because while the plaintiff knew that the defendants conduct was contrary to accepted church or family morals a fact finder could have reasonably found that the plaintiff did not understand that the defendants conduct represented sexual abuse holding where the plaintiff presented evidence which demonstrates that the terms alleged by the defendants to be indefinite were in fact sufficiently well delineated to all parties the entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the defendants was inappropriate despite the fact that the defendants contested the plaintiffs evidence concerning the manner in which the relevant contractual language should be construed holding at summary judgment that the plaintiff had to show a reasonable jury could find the defendants allegedly anticompetitive conduct was a material cause of plaintiffs injury