the court stated: we cannot see why evidence gathering for prosecution for driving under the influence using implied-consent procedures is any less subject to constitutional scrutiny than other evidence-gathering procedures such as searches, use of informers, or custodial interrogation. Id. at 410, 247 N.W.2d at 389. In 1978, the legislature signified its concurrence with Pri-deaux by expanding the implied consent advisory to include notice to the driver of the right to counsel. See 1978 Minn. Laws ch. 727, § 3. The 1984 legislature again amended the law by removing from the advisory the language that, in effect, gave the driver a limited right to consult with an attorney before submitting to a chemical test. See Nyflot v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 369 N.W.2d 512, 515 (Minn.1985) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Nyflot eliminated any basis— statutory
holding that the 1984 amendment controls and that a driver arrested for dwi no longer has even a limited statutory right to consult with counsel before deciding whether to submit to chemical testing holding that there is no constitutional right to refuse chemical testing under the implied consent law holding a minnesota statute that required police to advise drivers that they were not permitted to consult with an attorney prior to deciding whether to submit to or refuse blood alcohol content testing and one that imposed criminal penalties on individuals who refused to submit to blood alcohol testing within five years of a prior drivers license revocation unconstitutional as applied holding that there is no federal or colorado constitutional right to postconviction counsel but there is a limited statutory right holding that the right to have counsel present means the right to have counsel physically present during the interrogation not merely the right to consult an attorney by telephone