cruel or unusual punishment because, under Iraqi law, he could be subjected to the death penalty despite the fact that his alleged crimes did not result in any fatalities. Am. Pet. ¶¶ 43-45. The respondents assert that this line of argument is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Munaf. Respts’ Mot. at 15-16. In Munaf, the Supreme Court held that “[t]hose who commit crimes within a sovereign’s territory may be transferred to that sovereign’s government for prosecution.” 128 S.Ct. at 2224-25 (reasoning that the “same principles of comity and respect for sovereigns that preclude judicial scrutiny of foreign convictions necessarily render invalid attempts to shield citizens from foreign, prosecution”); see also Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 125, 21 S.Ct. 302, 45 L.Ed. 448 (1901) (<HOLDING>). As the Munaf Court explained, [t]he
holding that habeas corpus was not available to prevent the petitioners extradition to cuba despite the fact that he would not be afforded the full panoply of rights afforded to him by the us constitution in a cuban criminal proceeding holding that the rights afforded prisoners set a floor for those that must be afforded sexually violent predators subject to civil detention holding that the decision as to the weight to be afforded to documentary evidence  lies largely within the discretion of the ij holding that the federal role in reviewing an application for habeas corpus is limited to evaluating what occurred in the state or federal proceedings that actually led to the petitioners conviction what occurred in the petitioners collateral proceeding does not enter into the habeas proceeding holding that an order denying compensation under the federal criminal justice act for services performed before a state clemency board by counsel appointed to represent a state prisoner was final and appealable despite the fact that the order was separate from the merits of the habeas corpus proceeding