the crime, the person engages in conduct that in fact constitutes a substantial step toward its commission.” 17-A M.R.S. § 152(1) (2014). [¶ 6] Clarke stipulated that he understood that a criminal charge was pending against him, and the witness testified that he had been subpoenaed as a witness in that pending matter. The witness also testified that Clarke suggested he should “be quiet and not say anything” or that he “could miss [the] court date.” This testimony, including all reasonable inferences regarding Clarke’s intent, constitutes a sufficient basis on which reasonable jurors could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Clarke committed each element of tampering with a witness. See State v. Perkins, 2014 ME 159, ¶ 13, 107 A.3d 636; State v. Seymour, 461 A.2d 1060, 1062 (Me.1983) (<HOLDING>). [¶ 7] Contrary to Clarke’s suggestion, that
holding that the jury could have reasonably inferred the requisite intent to induce the witness to lie or testify falsely from the defendants statements to the witness recognizing that where witness has no constitutional or statutory right to refuse to testify jurors are entitled to draw negative inference from witness refusal to testify holding that in order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness to testify the claimant must allege 1 the identity of the potential witness 2 that the witness was available to testify at trial 3 the substance of the witnesss testimony and 4 an explanation of how the omission of the testimony prejudiced the case holding that testimonial hearsay statements of a witness who does not appear at trial are inadmissible under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment unless the witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the witness holding that the defendants due process rights were violated when the trial judge singled out the only defense witness and indicated to that witness that he expected the witness to he and would personally ensure that the witness was prosecuted for perjury and thereby effectively drove that witness off the stand