because Morales’s slaying was a direct result of the robbery. By virtue of this cross-reference, Rodriguez-Matos’s base offense level skied to 43, mandating a sentence of life imprisonment. See USSG § 2A1.1. The court sentenced her to a lesser term' — -twenty years — because that is the statutory maximum for violation of the Hobbs Act. That ends this aspect of the matter. Given the murder cross-reference, the leadership enhancement had no practical effect. We therefore decline to review it. Cf. United States v. Roselli, 366 F.3d 58, 63-64 (1st Cir.2004) (“A district court does not have to determine the exact offense level where such a determination would not affect the court’s sentencing decision under the Guidelines.”); United States v. Ventura, 353 F.3d 84, 90-92 (1st Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). 4. Absence of Findings. Finally,
holding that 24 criminal history points was so high that even placement in category vi did not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendants criminal past holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing an upward variance after finding that the defendants criminal history category of i understated the seriousness of his criminal history holding that when a defendant qualifies as a career felon it is not necessary to ascertain the defendants criminal history category because the sentencing guidelines mandate a criminal history category of vi holding a court may consider a defendants criminal history even if that history is included in the defendants criminal history category holding that request for departure in sentencing based on a criminal history category that overstated defendants record violated plea agreement that prohibited departure requests but did not stipulate to a specific criminal history category