statutes as providing tax exemptions unless those exemptions are “clearly expressed”). See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94-95, 122 S.Ct. 528, 151 L.Ed.2d 474 (2001). As the Supreme Court has cautioned, canons serve as “guides,” not “mandatory rules.” Id. at 94, 122 S.Ct. 528. Moreover,’ “[sjpecific canons are often countered ... by some maxim pointing in a different direction.” Id. (quotation omitted) (“[T]he canon that assumes Congress' intends its statutes to benefit [Native American] tribes is offset by the canon that'warns'us against interpreting federal statutes -as providing tax exemptions unless those exemptions are clearly expressed.”); see N. Arapaho Tribe v. Burwell, No. 14-CV-247-SWS, 118 F.Supp.3d 1264, 1284, 2015 WL 4639324, at *15 (D.Wyo. July 2, 2015) (<HOLDING>). See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on
holding indian tribes subject to gamblingrelated taxes from which states are exempt holding that indian tribes lack tribal jurisdiction over crimes committed by nonmember indians within the tribes reservation holding that federal legislation with respect to indian tribes  is not based upon impermissible racial classifications and noting that article i  8 of the constitution gives congress the power to regulate commerce  with the indian tribes holding the americans with disabilities act not to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity and declaring congress abrogates tribal immunity only where the definitive language of the statute itself states an intent either to abolish indian tribes common law immunity or to subject tribes to suit under the act holding that large employer mandate and related tax from the affordable care act apply to tribal nations despite congresss failure to specify tribes as large employers if congress wished to exempt indian tribes from this mandate that otherwise might be reasonably construed as applying to them it needed to do so explicitly