to use the object as a dangerous weapon. Stroman v. United States, 878 A.2d 1241, 1245 (D.C.2005) (emphasis added). See also Alfaro v. United States, 859 A.2d 149, 161 (D.C.2004); Scott v. United States, 243 A.2d 54, 56 (D.C.1968). We recently have equated the term “great bodily injury,” used to define a “dangerous weapon” under the weapons provisions of chapter 45 of Title 22 of the D.C.Code, with the “serious bodily injury” that constitutes an element of aggravated assault under D.C.Code § 22-404.01, i.e., bodily injury “that involves a substantial risk of death, unconsciousness, extreme physical pain, protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty.” Alfaro v. United States, supra, 859 A.2d at 161-62 (<HOLDING>). See also Nixon v. United States, 730 A.2d
holding evidence insufficient to support conviction of attempted possession of a prohibited weapon holding evidence insufficient to support finding of implied contract holding that the texas offense of possession of a prohibited weapon could only qualify as a crime of violence under the residual clause of  4b12a2 holding that mere possession of a dangerous weapon is insufficient to support a charge of robbery with a dangerous weapon holding that possession of a weapon is not in an of itself a crime