interpretation. A district court’s authority to compel arbitration arises under Section 4 of the FAA. Section 1 of the FAA, titled “exceptions to operations of this title,” explicitly carves out a category of cases exempt from the provisions of the Act. See S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2 (1924) (stating that Section 1 defines the contracts to which “the bill will be applicable.”); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119, 121 S.Ct. 1302, 149 L.Ed.2d 234 (2001) (stating that Section 1 of the FAA “exempts contracts from the FAA’s coverage”). It follows that a district court has no authority to compel arbitration under Section 4 where Section 1 exempts the underlying contract from the FAA’s provisions. See Harden v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 249 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>). Here, Defendants moved to invoke the District
holding that all arbitration provisions dealing with transactions involving interstate commerce are subject to the faa holding that the district court lacked the authority to compel arbitration  because the faa is inapplicable to employees who are engaged in interstate commerce recognizing that the faa is applicable to only those transactions involving interstate commerce holding that the flsa applies to the employees of a us navy contractor because they were considered engaged in interstate commerce holding that the government can satisfy the hobbs act interstate commerce requirement by showing that the robbery resulted in the closure of a business engaged in interstate commerce