Tenn. Const, art. I, § 9. Although these provisions are not identical, the most significant difference between the provisions is that the test of voluntariness for confessions under Article I, § 9 is broader and more protective of individual rights than the test of voluntariness under the Fifth Amendment. See State v. Crump, 834 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Tenn.1992); State v. Smith, 834 S.W.2d 915 (Tenn.1992). Prior to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the admissibility of an accused’s in-custody statements depended on whether they were “voluntary” within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 10 L.Ed.2d 513 (1963); Harris v. State, 217 Tenn. 582, 399 S.W.2d 749 (1966) (<HOLDING>). In Miranda, however, the U.S. Supreme Court
holding execution of mentally retarded individuals fails to achieve legitimate penalogical objectives for punishment as required by the eighth amendment to the united states constitution and article i  16 of the tennessee constitution holding that a criminal defendants right to an impartial jury is guaranteed by article 1 section 9 of the pennsylvania constitution holding that the tennessee plan as it relates to state appellatecourt judges does not violate the state constitution holding that because the due process clause in the federal constitution is applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment the right is also guaranteed to defendants pursuant to the identical provision in article i section 5 of the hawaii constitution holding that the test of admissibility of an incriminating statement under article i section 9 of the tennessee constitution is whether it was freely and voluntarily made