because, it says, the Supreme Court of Alabama simply held that the Department had introduced “no evidence” to justify the alleged discriminatory sales-tax exemption. The Department implies that because a summary judgment was entered against it, the issue at hand was neither “actually litigated” nor decided “on the merits.” That contention, however, is in direct contradiction to the nature of a summary judgment, which is a conclusive judgment rendered upon a determination that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P.; Hoover, Inc. v. State Dep’t of Revenue, 833 So.2d at 34 (quoting Payton v. Monsanto, 801 So.2d 829, 832-33 (Ala.2001)); Ex parte D.M. White Constr. Co., 806 So.2d 370 (Ala.2001) (<HOLDING>); and W.C.R. v. D.A.L., 963 So.2d 99
holding that a dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is an adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicata holding that we will not review the pretrial denial of a motion for summary judgment after a full trial and judgment on the merits holding that a motion for a summary judgment is an appropriate means of seeking an adjudication on the merits holding that an adjudication on summary judgment is an adjudication on the merits holding we will not review a pretrial denial of a motion for summary judgment after a full trial and judgment on the merits