is in the best interest of the child.”). See In the Interest of C. A J., 331 Ga. App. 788, 790, n. 2 (771 SE2d 457) (2015). 3 Freeman v. State, 215 Ga. App. 341, 341-342 (450 SE2d 346) (1994). 4 Transport Indem. Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 198 Ga. App. 265, 266 (401 SE2d 294) (1990). 5 OCGA § 5-6-41 (f). See generally Hixson v. Hickson, 236 Ga. App. 894, 895 (1) (512 SE2d 648) (1999). 6 Holzmeister v. State, 156 Ga. App. 94 (1) (274 SE2d 109) (1980) (citations and punctuation omitted). 7 See generally Laviano v. Travelers Ins. Co., 276 Ga. App. 611, 612-613 (624 SE2d 189) (2005); Hickson, supra; Jahncke Service v. Dept. of Transp., 134 Ga. App. 106, 107 (1) (213 SE2d 150) (1975); see also Stephens v. Alan V. Mock Construction Co., 302 Ga. App. 280, 284 (1) (b) (690 SE2d 225) (2010) (<HOLDING>). 8 Rouse v. Arrington, 283 Ga. App. 204, 207
holding that violation of city ordinance does not constitute negligence per se holding hearing in chambers was not per se a violation of due process holding that a cognovit clause which provided for judgment without notice or hearing was not unconstitutional per se because due process rights are subject to waiver holding there to be no due process violation where excluded testimony bore none of the indicia of substantial trustworthiness that were crucial in chambers holding that violation of state law was not a per se constitutional violation