vague under Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2557-2558, 2563 (striking down the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act as unconstitutionally vaghe). In June of 2017, we recently considered that argument and held that Johnson “does not apply to or invalidate” the risk-of-force clause under § 924(c)(3)(B). Ovalles v. United States, 861 F.3d 1257, 1263-65 (11th Cir. 2017). Mr. McKinley’s argument is therefore foreclosed by circuit precedent. Mr, McKinley also argues that his bank robbery offense does not qualify as a crime of violence under § 924(c)’s use-of-force clause because it “may be committed by ‘force and violence’ or by ‘intimidation.’” Appellant’s Br, at 3. That argument, however, is also • foreclosed, by circuit precedent. See In re Sams, 830 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2016) (<HOLDING>). We affirm Mr. McKinley’s conviction under §
holding that a bank robbery conviction under  2113a by force and violence or by intimidation qualifies as a crime of violence under the  924c3a useofforce clause holding that bank robbery by force and violence or intimidation under 18 usc  2113a is a crime of violence holding that violence is synonymous with force in affirming armed robbery conviction holding south carolina crime of criminal domestic violence of a high and aggravated nature was categorically a crime of violence under ussg  4b121 because its lesserincluded offense criminal domestic violence fell entirely within  4b12ls force clause holding that robbery is a crime of violence for purposes of habitualoffender sentencing