of interest.” Rubin v. Gee, 292 F.3d 396, 401 (4th Cir.2002) (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348-50, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980); Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981)). Here, we have an instance of successive representation. For a criminal defendant to prove a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in cases involving successive representation, he must demonstrate that: 1) counsel’s “representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, and 2) “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different,” id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see Lordi v. Ishee, 384 F.3d 189, 193 (6th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Here, Appellant asserts he was prejudiced by
holding that the strickland test applies to claims  that counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal recognizing that strickland applies to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims recognizing that generally pennsylvania applies decisions involving changes in the law in civil cases retrospectively le to cases pending on appeal holding that conflicts of constitutional magnitude can arise from cases of successive representation holding that strickland applies to cases involving successive representation