Law § 6-28, at 1177 (3d ed.2000). Thus, despite our primary focus on the text of § 276(c), it bears mentioning that the Supreme Court has recognized at least two types of implied pre-emption: field pre-emption, where o state requirements that are inconsistent with the federal regulations, Congress signaled its intent not to occupy the entire field of payphone regulation. See Ishikawa v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 343 F.3d 1129, 1133 (9th Cir.), amended by 350 F.3d 915 (9th Cir.2003) (“[T]he ‘express provisions for preemption of some state laws,’ the inconsistent ones, ‘imply that Congress intentionally did not preempt state law generally.’ ” (quoting Keams v. Tempe Technical Inst., Inc., 39 F.3d 222, 225 (9th Cir.1994))); Total TV v. Palmer Commc’ns, Inc., 69 F.3d 298, 303 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Our conclusion is reinforced by the
holding that an express provision preempting all state laws relating to railroad safety was broad and would preempt state claims that cover the same subject matter holding that because the first sentence of  45106a expressly limited the preemptive effect to inconsistent state regulation it would not infer a negative pregnant from the second sentence of subsection a that laws other than the specific state criminal laws described would be preempted holding that infringement laws simply do not apply to a nontrademark use of a mark recognizing the presumption that congress does not intend to violate international law holding that a provision preempting inconsistent state laws was simply a recognition that congress did not intend to fully occupy the field