with the City required that Tanda follow the relevant safety regulations and maintain appropriate safeguards. Thus, Cherry argues, it is entitled to sue Tanda for the alleged breach of these contractual obligations. This argument is clearly contrary to the plain meaning of the exclusive-remedy provision, which unequivocally states that The rights and remedies granted to an employee subject to the provisions of this chapter, on account of injury or death, shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies of the employee. . . . Ark. Code Ann. § ll-9-105(a) (Supp. 1995) (emphasis added). Whether Cherry couches his complaint against Tanda in terms of contract, or tort, his action is barred under the exclusive-remedy provision. See Gullett v. Brown, 307 Ark. 385, 820 S.W.2d 457 (1991) (<HOLDING>). 4. Waiver of the Exclusive Remedy Protection
holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state holding that an employees private arbitration agreement with her employer precluded her from filing suit against the employer under the adea holding that a damages suit against a state officer in his official capacity was barred because it was functionally a suit against the state holding that an employees action against her employer for negligent supervision lies not in tort but with an action for breach of contract holding that the exclusiveremedy provision barred the employees suit against his employer for enforcement of an underinsuredmotorist insurance contract