the 910 Provision. See In re Carver, 338 B.R. 521 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.2006); In re Johnson, 337 B.R. 269 (Bankr.M.D.N.C.2006); In re Brown, et al., 339 B.R. 818 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.); In re DeSardi et al., 340 B.R. 790 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.); In re Montoya, 341 B.R. 41 (Bankr.D.Utah). Most of the courts interpreting the 910 Provision have held that it merely prevents the bifurcation of an allowed claim into a secured component and an unsecured component and ultimately reach the conclusion that the claims of 910 Creditors are to be treated as fully “secured claims.” In re Johnson, 337 B.R. 269 (Bankr.M.D.N.C.2006); In re Brown, et al., 339 B.R. 818 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.); In re DeSardi, et al., 340 B.R. 790 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.); In re Montoya, 341 B.R. 41 (Bankr.D.Utah); hut see In re Carver, 338 B.R. 521 (<HOLDING>). The challenge for courts seeking to interpret
holding that the meaning of allowed secured claim in  506a does not determine the meaning of allowed secured claim in  506d holding that the words allowed secured claim in  506d refer to a claim that is secured by a lien and allowed under  502 holding that if claim is not an allowed secured claim pursuant to section 506a by its terms section 1325a5b is inapplicable holding that a bank receiver by filing a claim permits challenge to the secured portion of its claim holding that if  506 does not apply to an allowed claim such claim cannot become a secured claim