certain or readily apparent; therefore, the important second factor does not support sua sponte harmless-error review. And, at least under the circumstances here, this conclusion is dispositive. That is, I need not go beyond this second factor. I conclude that it is inappropriate to conduct harmless-error review sua sponte of the constructive-possession instructional error. To be sure, after seemingly overlooking the government , 695 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that “if the government demonstrates that the defendant had ‘exclusive control’ over the property where the contraband was discovered, a jury may reasonably infer that he constructively possessed the items, including the contraband, found on that property” (emphasis added)); United States v. Alanis, 265 F.3d 576, 592 (7th Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, though the majority relies on the
holding that to apply the firearm enhancement the firearm need only reflect the context of the defendants possession and the defendants ability to use the firearm to promote the controlled substance offense holding that the defendants dominion control and knowledge may be inferred if he had exclusive possession of the premises on which the object was found emphasis added holding that an argument of actual notice has some appeal and weakens a constitutional vagueness challenge citing united states v saffo 227 f3d 1260 1270 10th cir 2000 holding that evidence was insufficient to prove constructive possession where the defendant was in jail at the time the drugs were seized from his residence holding that constructive possession may be established by a showing that the firearm was seized at the defendants residence emphasis added quoting united states v walls 225 f3d 858 867 7th cir 2000