and (3) that the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the exercise of the ust demonstrate not only that a correctional officer took an adverse action, but that the action “would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing in the [protected] activity.” 382 F.3d at 876. “The ordinary-firmness test is well established in the case law, and is designed to weed out trivial matters from those deserving the time of the courts as real and substantial violations of the First Amendment.” Garcia v. City of Trenton, 348 F.3d 726, 728 (8th Cir.2003). We have adopted the “ordinary-firmness” requirement for First Amendment claims of retaliation, see id., and have applied it in the First Amendment prisoner retaliation context, see Lewis v. Jacks, 486 F.3d 1025, 1029 (8th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). The “ordinary-firmness” test is an “objective
holding that harassment physical threats and transfer to the area of the prison used to house mentally disturbed inmates especially combined with the conditions allegedly present there would likely deter a prisoner of ordinary firmness from exercising a right to access the courts holding that prisoner justifiably failed to file ordinary grievance when prisoner reasonably believed that department of corrections regulations foreclosed such recourse holding that the record contained insufficient evidence that increasing the prisoners work load would chill a prisoner of ordinary firmness from using the prison grievance process holding that due process requires that the findings and actions of a disciplinary prison board be supported by some evidence in the record holding that the plra mandates that prisoners exhaust internal prison grievance procedures before filing suit emphasis added