“state contract law must yield to the developing federal common law, lest common terms in bargaining agreements be given different and potentially inconsistent interpretations in different jurisdictions.” Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 122, 114 S.Ct. 2068, 129 L.Ed.2d 93 (1994). This is the case even though the August 1 agreement was not itself a comprehensive collective bargaining agreement, but rather an agreement regarding the return to work of one employee. As the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit observed in a similar situation, an agreement between a union and an employer regarding the terms under which an employee will return to work is “a creature wholly begotten by the [collective bargaining agreement].” Jones v. General Motors Corp., 939 F.2d 380, 383 (6th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); see also Davis v. Bell Atlantic-West
holding state law claim preempted by  301 of labor management relations act only if application of state law requires interpretation of collective bargaining agreement holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law holding that state law claim regarding breach of settlement agreement was preempted by federal labor law holding that state law fraud claims are preempted by the federal labor law duty of fair representation holding that an employees state law claim against employer for breach of settlement agreement arrived at by virtue of grievance process established by the collective bargaining agreement was preempted by labor management relations act