in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). An untimely application may be considered “if the alien demon-strafes ... either the existence of changed circumstances which materially affect the applicant’s eligibility for asylum or extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay in filing an application within the period specified in subparagraph (B).” Id. at § 1158(a)(2)(D). The IJ and BIA found that Kemur filed his application after the one-year period had lapsed and that there was nothing to excuse the late filing. Thus, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review these findings. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3) (“No court shall have jurisdiction to review any determination of the Attorney General under paragraph (2).”); see Mendoza v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 327 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). We must also affirm the
holding that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review the attorney generals decision as to timeliness of an asylum request pursuant to 8 usc  1158a3 the attorney generals decision regarding whether an alien complied with the oneyear time limit or established extraordinary circumstances such that the time limit should be waived is not reviewable by any court holding that  1158a3 divests the court of jurisdiction to review decisions of whether an alien complied with the oneyear time limit or whether extraordinary circumstances were present to justify untimely filing of the asylum application citing mendoza v us atty gen 327 f3d 1283 1287 11th cir2003 holding that the alien in that case had not established such circumstances holding that section 1158a3 divests our court of jurisdiction to review a decision regarding whether an alien complied with the oneyear time limit or established extraordinary circumstances that would excuse his untimely filing holding that certification of a remand order divests federal court jurisdiction