about these discussions, that evidence does not support an intent not to perform by Cracraft at the time of the June 20, 2003 oral fee agreement. 3. Only Inferences and Speculation— Cracrañ’s Fraudulent Intent Dynegy asserts there is no evidence in the record to support a finding that Cracraft, as the corporate speaker who made the oral fee agreement, had the intent not to perform the oral contract at the time she made it. See FirstMerit, 52 S.W.3d at 758. It contends that Yates’ theory of fraud is mere inference stacking and thus cannot support the verdict. Yates stresses that, when combined with Dynegy’s breach of the oral contract, only “slight circumstantial evidence” of fraud is required to support the jury’s finding of fraudulent intent by Dynegy. See Huynh, 2007 WL 495023, at *4 (<HOLDING>). Yates argues that there is “an abundance of
holding that circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to support a cocaine conspiracy conviction holding evidence legally sufficient holding slight circumstantial evidence of fraud in combination with failure to perform as promised was legally sufficient to support finding of fraudulent intent holding that motive is circumstantial evidence of intent holding that fraud may be inferred from circumstantial evidence