(2009) states that “Entry of Judgment” is defined as “when sentence is pronounced,” but in this case, there was no “sentence” pronounced. Thus, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-101(4a) does not establish when “entry of judgment” occurs where a trial court grants a defendant’s motion to suppress. Our Supreme Court has determined that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-101(4a) is “sufficiently analogous” to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 58 “to pro vide guidance” in “constru[ing] G.S. § 15A-101(4a).” State v. Boone, 310 N.C. 284, 290, 311 S.E.2d 552, 556 (1984). Accordingly, in the criminal context, we have stated that “[e]ntry” of an order occurs when it is reduced to writing, signed by the trial court, and filed with the clerk of court. West v. Marko, 130 N.C. App. 751, 756, 504 S.E.2d 571, 574 (1998) (<HOLDING>); cf. N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 58 (Supp. 1997)
holding that the oral rendition of an order in open court does not constitute entry of that order holding that an order is not a final appealable order when it does not dispose of the complaints against all of the defendants recognizing that an authorized and timely motion for rehearing serves to toll rendition of a final order holding that oral rendition of judgment supported by the courts docket sheet was insufficient express specific written order is required holding that mere entry of a remand order divests a federal court of jurisdiction even where no certified copy of the order was mailed to a state court