the debtors themselves. Second, following the Hospital’s argument to its logical end would prohibit [the agency] from denying any bad debt reimbursement claims because of the chance that costs might be shifted to non-Medicare patients in some way. Therefore, we conclude that Plaintiffs argument is without merit. Detroit Receiving Hosp. v. Shalala, 194 F.3d 1312 (table), 1999 WL 970277, at *6 (6th Cir. Oct. 15, 1999). Athough in this case plaintiffs may not attempt to collect the bad debts from the QMBs, Detroit Receiving v. Shalala makes clear that the ban on cross-subsidization does not guarantee recovery of all of the costs associat ed with the provision of Medicare services in every instance. See also Royal Geropsychiatric Services, Inc. v. Tompkins, 159 F.3d 238, 245 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Congress has regularly allowed the
holding that jurys failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge holding that an original eeoc charge is sufficient to support  a civil suit under the act for any discrimination  developed in the course of a reasonable investigation of that charge provided such discrimination was included in the reasonable cause determination of the eeoc holding the government waived its argument on appeal that the defendant did not have standing to challenge a search when it failed to raise the argument to the district court holding in the context of a challenge to regulations providing for reduced reimbursements for psychiatric services provided to qmbs under medicare part b that the plaintiffs argument is premised to a great degree on a flawed reading of the medicare act which nowhere guarantees 100 of a physicians reasonable charge holding that the plain error review provided for in ocga  17858 is waived where the defendant requested the charge in question and made no objection to the charge at trial