award is likewise nondis-chargeable. The district court reluctantly distinguished In re Miera, noting that the jury instructions in the underlying case in In re Miera allowed an award of punitive damages if the debtor’s acts were based on “willful indifference” to the rights of the plaintiff. Thus, in In re Miera, punitive damages were awarded only if the conduct was willful. Under the instructions in this case, punitive damages could' have been awarded if Scarborough merely acted with reckless indifference to others. We need not distinguish In re Miera in the same manner as the district court did, however, because, as noted above, the willful and malicious conduct und , 626-27 (4th Cir.1995) (same; collecting cases); Moraes v. Adams (In re Adams), 761 F.2d 1422,1428 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). III. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the
holding nature of motion is determined by its substance not its title holding that the constitutional level of punitive damages is not a finding of fact that must be determined by the jury it may be determined de novo by the court holding that the domestic nature of the offense can be determined without a taylor approach because all aspects of the definition are federal holding that the applicability of  523a6 is determined by the nature of the act and applies to all liabilities flowing therefrom holding that the nature of the taxpayers legal interest in the subject property is determined by reference to state law