charge” and because he checked the “continuing action” box on the EEOC form. Appellant’s Br. 21. In the amended EEOC charge, Jones made the following allegations: I had been returned to work on 07/13/09. When I presented my return to work letter, I was informed that the statement was insufficient because the doctor did not state whether or not I had restrictions. On 07Z14/09[,] I was allowed to work my shift after presenting a revised doctor’s statement. At the end of the day[,] I was told that I was not allowed to return to work until I got a release from my doctor who was treating my disability. Although we recognize a judicial exception to the exhaustion doctrine, that exception is not nearly as broad as Jones would have it, and it does not apply here. See Wedow, 442 F.3d at 672-73 (<HOLDING>). Jones’s amended EEOC.charge describes his
recognizing but finding inapplicable pure question of law exception to doctrine of exhaustion recognizing doctrine recognizing exception recognizing a judicial exception tothe exhaustion doctrine and noting that this court has considerably narrowed our view of what is like or reasonably related to the originally filed eeoc allegations recognizing exception to the exhaustion doctrine where the states highest court has explicitly and recently addressed the precise issue advanced by the petitioner