Ungar elected not to contest the majority of Islamov’s testimony. Regarding the court’s jurisdiction to enter a judgment against Ungar after making its determination of non-discharge-ability, our review is de novo. We agree with the determinations of the other circuits that have addressed this issue and unanimously concluded a “bankruptcy court, in addition to declaring a debt non-dischargeable, has jurisdiction to liquidate the debt and enter a monetary judgment against the debtor.” Morrison v. W. Builders of Amarillo, Inc. (In re Morrison), 555 F.3d 473, 478 (5th Cir.2009); see also Johnson v. Riebesell (In re Riebesell), 586 F.3d 782, 793 (10th Cir.2009) (collecting cases from the Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits); Abramowitz v. Palmer, 999 F.2d 1274, 1279 (8th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Ungar’s argument appears to go further than
holding creditor willfully violated the automatic stay in refusing after notified of debtors bankruptcy filing to turn over debtors funds in his possession holding that a debtors  522d1 exemption was invalid when the debtor exempted proceeds from the prepetition sale of the debtors marital home which were paid to a judgment creditor with an attachment on the debtors interest in the home holding that a lender who held a deed of trust had priority over a debtors subsequent judgment creditor holding a bankruptcy court possessed relatedto jurisdiction to impose a constructive trust on a debtors home and enter a monetary judgment against the debtors wife where the wife had colluded in perpetrating a fraud on the creditor holding pursuant to bankruptcy rule 7004b9 that because the creditor mailed the complaint and summons to the debtors attorney and to the address listed in the debtors bankruptcy petition service of process was sufficient even if the debtors were out of the country and did not actually receive notice of the complaint and summons