for the 8(a) program, see 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(4)(A), but Rothe does not challenge that aspect of the statute. 2 . We refer to those statutory provisions collectively as "section 8(a),” after the section of the public law that originally authorized the SBA’s contracting program, see Small Business Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-536, § 8(a)(1) — (2), 72 Stat. 384, 389-91, but otherwise cite the codified versions of the relevant provisions. We refer to the contracting program as a whole, including the SBA’s regulations, as the "8(a) program.” 3 . The Supreme Court in Fullilove sustained the Public Works Employment Act’s minority set-aside provision against an equal protection challenge on grounds that the Court in Adarand substantially clarified. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 236, 115 S.Ct. 2097 (<HOLDING>). 4 . By the same token, we do not reach the
holding a mandatory sentence is still subject to constitutional scrutiny holding contribution limits even those that operate as a ban not subject to strict scrutiny holding racebased affirmative action subject to strict judicial scrutiny and noting that to the extent if any that fullilove held federal racial classifications to be subject to a less rigorous standard it is no longer controlling recognizing that strict scrutiny is applied to classifications based on race or national origin and classifications affecting fundamental rights holding that an acceleration clause is not subject to antitrust scrutiny where plaintiffs conceded that they could be procompetitive in some circumstances but noting that noag clauses are subject to antitrust scrutiny