actions that occurred before Esparza filed her EEOC charge could not have been'caused by the EEOC filing. See Gumpert v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 293 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2009, pet. denied) (plaintiff cannot show a causal link in a retaliation claim when the employer’s alleged acts in retaliation occurred long before the plaintiff engaged in any protected activity); see also Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Farran, 409 S.W.3d 653, 656 (Tex.2013) (in Whistleblower Act claim, plaintiff failed to show his report to law enforcement caused the adverse personnel action, because the personnel action occurred before plaintiffs report to law enforcement). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing Esparza’s retaliation claim. Further, to the extent Es 031-32 (8th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Jackson v. City of Columbus, 194 F.3d 737,
holding oneday unpaid suspension not an adverse employment action holding that a suspension with pay and full benefits pending a timely investigation into suspected wrongdoing is not an adverse employment action holding that a suspension with pay may constitute materially adverse action for the purposes of retaliation claims depending on the facts of the case holding that termination is an adverse employment action holding that suspension with pay was not adverse employment action