The several eonflict>of-interest eases on which plaintiffs rely all involved elected officials of political subdivisions such as cities and towns which do not raise similar separation-of-power concerns. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), on which plaintiffs also substantially rely, is equally unavailing. There the Supreme Court held that twenty state senators from Kansas had standing to challenge the constitutionality of a vote on a proposed amendment to the United States Constitution based on their claim that a tie-breaking vote east by the state’s lieutenant governor did not represent a ratification by the state “Legislature,” as required by Article V of the United States Constitution. As the Supreme Court more recently explained in Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 823 (1997) (<HOLDING>), Coleman stands “at most” for the narrow
holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the hatch act because the nature of the political activities they intended to engage in was a matter of speculation holding that a litigant has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute if the law is unconstitutional as applied to that particular litigant holding that members of congress lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the line item veto act holding that a passenger who lacked a property or possessory interest in the automobile or property seized lacked standing to challenge a search of the car holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue