practice, the burden does not shift to the opposing party to disprove prejudice. Additionally, we clarify that the “probability of prejudice” and “likelihood of prejudice” standards are one and the same, although the term “probability of prejudice” is to be preferred, because it more accurately characterizes the moving party’s burden of proof. {23} The question remains, how can the moving party prove and the trial court assess a probability of prejudice at an evidentiary hearing in which the jurors are precluded fr -court evidentiary hearing in which all interested parties are permitted to participate, Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229-30, 74 S.Ct. 450, although in certain rare circumstances, an evidentiary hearing may be conducted in camera, Mann, 2002-NMSC-001, ¶ 37, 131 N.M. 459, 39 P.3d 124 (<HOLDING>). {24} With these principles in mind, we turn
holding that the defendant by not bringing his knowledge of possible juror bias to the attention of the district court prior to verdict waived his right to a new trial recognizing in dicta that the juror affidavit submitted in support of the second new trial motion was obtained in clear violation of the district courts order and the courts local rule against juror interviews  on this basis alone the district court would have been acting within its discretion in disregarding the affidavit holding that the trial courts in camera interviews were within its discretion because the defendant had waived his right to be present during the juror interviews holding that juror interviews were not permissible where the alleged jury misconduct of premature deliberations constituted internal influence holding that such a decision was within the trial courts discretion