proper in determining whether the defendant intended to carry out his threats. See United States v. Carter, 111 F.3d 509, 513 (7th Cir.1997) (“In deciding whether to apply the enhancement, courts may evaluate not only a defendant’s overt activity connected to the threat, but also the nature and seriousness of the threats themselves.”); United States v. Kirsh, 54 F.3d 1062, 1073 (2d Cir.1995) (considering the fact that the threatening letters contained language such as, “I’m going to blow you away,” along with the defendants’ overt act of possessing weapons in determining that the six-point enhancement was proper). The district court, however, may not rely on the threats alone to apply a § 2A6.1(b)(l) six-level enhancement. See United States v. Goynes, 175 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). But see United States v. Thomas, 155 F.3d
holding that parole status alone is insufficient to justify search of a parolee holding that the writing of multiple threatening letters and the nature of their content alone are insufficient to justify a sixlevel enhancement pursuant to  2a61b2 holding that the existence and content of a police report are not properly the subject of judicial notice holding that adverse inference alone insufficient to support a motion for summary judgment holding that the existence of a written contract gives rise to the presumption that the parties have reduced their prior agreements to writing