similar to his demeanor, could have impacted the weight the jury gave to his testimony. See Trial Tr. 725, ECF No. 355 (discussion at a bench conference where Morpho’s counsel complained that Dr. Denton was speaking for five to eight minutes in response to a single question to which the Court: (1) noted that it had previously commented on such problem; (2) opined that Smiths was getting the testimony it wanted but not “the way [Smiths] need[ed] it for [its] case”; and (3) warned Smiths that it was “going to lose the jury on the whole issue”). The Court does not suggest that Dr. Denton lacked credibility or that the jury was free to wholly disregard his largely unrebutted opinion on this issue. See Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Martin, 283 U.S. 209, 216, 51 S.Ct. 453, 75 L.Ed. 983 (1931) (<HOLDING>). However, in this Court’s view, the fervid
recognizing that although the question of the credibility of witnesses is one for the jury alone such rule does not mean that the jury is at liberty under the guise of passing upon the credibility of a witness to disregard his testimony when from no reasonable point of view is it open to doubt recognizing the purpose of crossexamination is to enlighten the jury as to whether the witness actuallyas a matter of fact knows the general reputation of the defendant and to place the jury in a better position to pass upon the credibility of the witness testimony recognizing that in any criminal trial the credibility of the prosecutions witnesses is central holding that the jury is the judge of the weight and credibility given to witness testimony holding that the postconviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses