(D. Md. 2014). With no record of comprehensive state regulation or paying clients before us, we cannot say that the ordinance regulates professional speech. C. Because the commercial speech and professional speech doctrines are inapplicable in this case, the Baltimore ordinance’s compulsion “to utter or distribute speech bearing a particular message” receives heightened scrutiny. Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 642, 114 S.Ct. 2445. As a result, the ordinance calls for more searching review than the relaxed standards advocated by the City. The essentially factual nature of the compelled disclaimer does not diminish the need and philosophical beliefs that the state wishes to have said. See W. Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943) (<HOLDING>). These adjunct rights have become crucial to
holding that school district policy requiring that students obtain the review and approval of school officials prior to distributing any written material violated free speech rights of students holding that students refusal to stand during the pledge of allegiance was constitutionally protected by first amendment holding that school could not compel students to salute american flag holding that a public school cannot compel students to perform the pledge of allegiance holding that the government may not compel school students to recite the pledge