but those findings are intertwined with the implicit findings of the state trial court. 5 . Although the district court recited § 2254(d)(2) at other places in its opinion, it is not evident that the court actually analyzed the state courts’ factual findings in light of AEDPA. The court noted that Texas “appellate courts must defer .to any reasonable implied factual findings tfiat the trial court might have made in denying a motion for a new trial,” but it decided that it could not agree with the TCCA’s conclusion that "the trial court’s finding ... was reasonable[.]” The district court’s conclusion appears to be that the TCCA incorrectly deferred to the trial court’s implicit finding of fact. The proper question, instead, is whether ive. 10 . Cf, e.g., Torres, 395 Fed.Appx. at 108 (<HOLDING>); Seigfried, 372 Fed.Appx. at 540-41
holding that where a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is grounded in the claim that counsel failed to strike a biased juror a defendant must show that the juror was actually biased against him holding that district courts decision that trial counsels failure to object to crawford material was based on a reasonable trial strategy and did not constitute deficient performance under washingtons  first prong was not debatable holding that defendant failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not objecting to the states leading questions when there was no evidence that such failure was not based on trial strategy holding that the failure to strike potentially biased juror was not iac where decision was based on trial strategy holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when the trial judge questioned the juror extensively enough to satisfy itself that the juror was not biased emphasis added