Id. at 519, 602 A.2d at 555. While our holding would not appear to admit of any exceptions based on the particular identity of the secret recorder, properly understood it is not the breadth of our holding in Blow but rather its underlying reasoning that dissolves any constitutionally significant distinction between that case and this. This is readily discerned from two of the principal cases on which we relied, Commonwealth v. Blood, 507 N.E.2d 1029 (Mass. 1987), and State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1978). In both cases, the high courts of Massachusetts and Alaska held, respectively, that the electronic recording of a conversation by a confidential informant in the defendant’s home violated the defendant’s right to privacy under the state constitution. See Blood, 507 N.E.2d at 1034 (<HOLDING>); Glass, 583 P.2d at 880 (construing state
holding warrantless search of probationers home by probation officers based on reasonable suspicion was constitutionally permissible when conditions of probation required probationer to submit to home visits but not searches holding that a plaintiff must show his belief was objectively reasonable in light of the facts and record presented holding that the warrantless search of an electronic device such as the digital camera at issue in that case is not reasonable incident to a valid arrest absent a showing that the search was necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence to ensure officer safety or that other exigent circumstances exist footnote omitted holding warrantless search of probationers home by law enforcement officer for investigatory purposes was reasonable when conditions of probation included a search term and search was supported by reasonable suspicion holding that it was objectively reasonable to expect that conversational interchange in a private home will not be invaded surreptitiously by warrantless electronic transmission or recording