based on conflict with Fabre v. Marin, 597 So.2d 883 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). The trial judge denied Wells Fargo’s motion, relying on the third district’s disposition of the issue in Fabre. The supreme court, in its conflict review of the two cases, quashed the third district’s Fabre decision, and approved the fifth district’s Messmer decision. Fabre v. Marin, 623 So.2d 1182 (Fla.1993). The supreme court held that, with respect to non-economic damages, section 768.81(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1988), requires that a party’s percentage of fault must be determined based on “all ... entities who contributed to the accident, regardless of whether they have been or could have been joined as defendants.” Fabre, 623 So.2d at 1185; see also Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Fox, 623 So.2d 1180 (Fla.1993) (<HOLDING>). We therefore must reverse and remand for a
holding that with respect to noneconomic damages section 768813 requires that an employers comparative fault must be considered by the jury in a negligence suit by an employee against a manufacturer even though the employer is immune from liability under the workers compensation law holding that the rule applies regardless of the comparative fault of the employer versus the employee holding that when an employee is injured by his employers tortious conduct his employer owes him damages and compensation under the act holding that once the workers compensation act provides a remedy it is exclusive and the employee has no right to bring an action in commonlaw negligence against his employer holding that glc 152 15 provides that the only party immune from suit under the statute is the direct employer a special employer is not immune because the special employer is not liable for the payment of workers compensation and there was no agreement between the direct employer and the special employer that the special employer would be liable for the payment of such compensation