participation a controverted issue — • one that the jury resolved against him — he never controverted drug quantity, either at trial or during sentencing. Thus, we conclude that the Apprendi error claimed by Carrington “did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings” because the evidence that the conspiracy— indeed Carrington’s personal involvement in the conspiracy — involved at least 50 grams of cocaine base was “overwhelming” and “essentially uncontroverted.” Cotton, — U.S. at -, 122 S.Ct. at 1786. “Surely the ... jury, having found that the conspiracy existed, would have also found that the conspiracy involved at least 50 grams of cocaine base.” Cotton, — U.S. at -, 122 S.Ct. at 1786; see also Strickland, 245 F.3d at 379 (<HOLDING>). Indeed, we note, as did the Court in Cotton,
holding factual finding authorizing death penalty must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt holding that there was no error at all much less plain error in failing to instruct the jury that it was required to find drug quantity beyond a reasonable doubt holding that defendants who do not object to jury instructions at trial are subject to a plain error standard of review on appeal holding that before an error can be held harmless the reviewing court must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the defendants conviction holding that on plain error review the defendants must  demonstrate that the jury would not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants conspired to traffic in at least  50 grams of crack