493 F.2d 346, 350 (10th Cir.1974); see also Thompson, 970 F.2d at 748 n. 5 (listing possible exceptions to liability where one spouse records conversation of another spouse and including Extension Phone Exemption contained in § 2510(5)(a)(i)); Newcomb, 944 F.2d at 1536 (“The interception of a family member’s telephone conversations by use of an extension phone in the family home is arguably permitted by a broad reading of the exemption contained in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(1).”); cf. Scheib, 22 F.3d at 151 (addressing merits of the plaintiffs Extension Phone Exemption argument without first discussing whether ion Phone Exemption covered situations in which parents recorded “their minor child’s phone conversations out of concern for the child’s well-being”); cf. Harpel, 493 F.2d at 351-52 (<HOLDING>). But see Campbell v. Price, 2 F.Supp.2d 1186,
holding that individuals could not maintain action against private citizens and law enforcement officers who intercepted individuals cordless telephone conversations as users of cordless telephone did not have justifiable expectation of privacy for their conversations holding outside context of recording of a minor childs phone conversations that a telephone extension used without authorization or consent to surreptitiously record a private telephone conversation is not used in the ordinary course of business  holding that spying on ones spouse does not constitute use of an extension phone in the ordinary course of business for purposes of title iii holding that monitoring telephone calls is in the ordinary course of business where the employer has reason to suspect an employee of disclosing confidential information to business competitor holding that the alaska constitution requires police to obtain judicial authorization before electronically monitoring or recording a persons private conversations