to this appeal, I dissent. It is well established that the question of a temporary injunction’s propriety becomes moot once the injunction is inoperative, and no longer of force and effect. Parr v. Stockwell, 159 Tex. 440, 322 S.W.2d 615, 616 (1959). And it is equally well established that appellate courts are prohibited from deciding moot controversies. Camarena v. Texas Employment Comm’n, 754 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tex.1988). When a temporary injunction issues to ensure that an allegedly ineligible athlete will continue to compete until the question of his eligibility is resolved, the question of the temporary injunction’s validity is rendered moot once the athlete graduates. See University Interscholastic League v. Jones, 715 S.W.2d 759, 760 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>); see also McPherson v. Michigan High Sch.
holding that the validity of a collateral waiver is a threshold issue holding that the burden is on the defendant when the validity of the warrant is challenged holding that application of equitable principles in evaluating requests for permanent injunctions under the patent act should not differ from treatment of permanent injunctions in other fields of law holding that where a temporary order is later made permanent the permanent order may be challenged holding that the issue of a permanent injunctions validity was mooted by the athletes graduation