absence of an implied right of action). In either instance, the court’s review and plaintiffs’ rights are derived from and determined by statute. The court recognizes that there is some older authority (not pressed by plaintiffs), dealing primarily with trust asset management, that could be construed more broadly to be contrary to the court’s holding today. See Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219, 229, 43 S.Ct. 342, 67 L.Ed. 622 (1923) (voiding, under trust law principles, a United States land patent that conveyed Indian lands to a railway and holding that “the fact that [the Indians’] right of occupancy finds no recognition in any statute or other formal governmental action is not conclusive”); Manchester Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 363 F.Supp. 1238, 1245 (N.D.Cal.1973) (<HOLDING>); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354
holding that a third party who receives trust property on inquiry notice that a trustee has misappropriated trust funds is also liable for breach of trust holding that a constructive trust had arisen on a third partys house due to her use of trust assets which had been diverted by the paca trustee to pay the mortgage and finding that the trust beneficiary plaintiffs are entitled to a lien on the property in the amount of the diverted funds holding that the united states bears the fiduciary trust duty to make trust property productive and relying at least primarily on the common law of trusts holding that the beneficiary of a trust was not the real party in interest regarding rights owned by the trust holding that trustees fiduciary duty exists independent of any clause in trust agreement