property while keeping up installment payments without a reaffirmation of personal liability allows a debtor to force a new arrangement on a creditor.” In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383, 1386 (7th Cir.1990) (affirming bankruptcy court’s order that the debtor choose between reaffirmation, redemption, or surrender); see also In re Taylor, 3 F.3d 1512, 1516 (11th Cir.1993) (same); accord In re Chavarria, 117 B.R. 582, 585 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1990) (Pappas, Bankr. J.); In re Stevens, 85 B.R. 854, 855 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1988) (Hagan, Bankr. J.); In re Kennedy, 137 B.R. 302, 304 (Bankr.E.D.Ark.1992) (Scott, Bankr. J.); In re Griffin, 143 B.R. 535, 537 (Bankr.E.D.Ark.1991) (Fussell, Bankr. J.); In re Gerling, 175 B.R. 295, 298 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1994); cf. In re Bell, 700 F.2d 1053, 1056-58 (6th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). I agree with the courts which have considered
holding debtor could include property because the bank accepted payments directly from the debtor and had previously allowed the debtor to cure default holding that debtor cannot redeem by installments under  722 holding debtor could cure after the debtor had previously made payments to the bank holding that the principal of a corporate debtor does not become a transferee by the mere act of causing the debtor to make a fraudulent transfer holding that debtor cannot take advantage of  522f after debtor has transferred his exempt property