slip op. at 12. In our view, however, the use of “code words” can, under circumstances such as we encounter here, violate Title VII. Indeed, a reasonable jury could conclude that the intent to discriminate is implicit in these comments. Cf. Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1482 n. 3 (“The intent to discriminate on the basis of sex in cases involving sexual propositions, innuendo, pornographic materials, or sexual derogatory language is implicit, and thus should be recognized as a matter of course.”). There are no talismanic expressions which must be invoked as a condition-precedent to the application of laws designed to protect against discrimination. The words themselves are only relevant for what they reveal — the intent of the speaker. See Futrell v. J.I. Case, 38 F.3d 342, 347 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). A reasonable jury could find that statements
holding that loose figurative or hyperbolic language may indicate that the statement could not reasonably be interpreted as a statement of fact holding that the commission reasonably interpreted the statute as requiring it to assess the condition of the industry as a whole holding that such statements were not even enough for an evidentiary hearing holding that ambiguity exists when a statute can be interpreted by reasonably wellinformed people in two or more ways holding that statements like sharp young people and that the employee was not a forward enough thinker could reasonably be interpreted as evidence of bias under the adea