31 at 26-27. Plaintiff does not attempt to identify a single similarly situated male who engaged in a single act of work performance deficiencies similar to, or as serious as, any of those cited by defendant as grounds for plaintiffs termination. Therefore, under defendant’s interpretation of “same or similar conduct,” plaintiff has not met her burden in establishing a prima facie case for summary judgment purposes. In summary, regardless of how “same or similar conduct” is defined, plaintiff is unable to establish the third element of her prima facie case. Thus, her claim of sex discrimination fails and it is unnecessary to examine the fourth element of a prima facie case or the issue of pretext. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (<HOLDING>). See also Hawkins v. Ceco Corp., 883 F.2d 977,
holding that direct proof of intent to defraud is unnecessary and that it may be inferred from the act of the parties and from all circumstances holding trial court should have required segregation because tort claims entailed proof of facts unnecessary for proof of the contract claim recognizing that production of a written insurance policy was unnecessary to prove the existence of the policy because the proof required was proof of the fact of insurance and not of the contents of a writing holding that a failure of proof regarding a required element of a case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial and further analysis unnecessary holding that a failure to prove one essential element necessarily renders all other facts immaterial