L.Ed.2d 949 (2005) (noting that prison regulations that restrict a prisoner’s First Amendment rights are not unconstitutional if they are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests). A relationship between Mends is not privileged. A Mend’s mail does not enjoy Sixth Amendment protection or a presumption of confidentiality. The practical problem in this case is how Defendants may differentiate “legal mail” from a Mend’s letters. Plaintiffs’ arguments that (a) any publicly available document (whether or not a published case) must be available to Witherow without redaction and (b) any communication from Evans must be presumed “legal mail,” even in the face of a multi-faceted relationship, are not persuasive. See United States v. Griffin, 440 F.3d 1138, 1140-41 (9th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 2006 WL 2066670 (U.S. Oct.2,
holding that the special relationship exception does not apply to the relationship between a student and a school holding that even where a client was more sophisticated in business matters than the lawyer himself the lawyer should have assumed the client was relying on the lawyer for the legal aspects of the loan from the client to the lawyer to the same extent that the client would rely on the lawyer for advice were the client making the loan to a third person recognizing the existence of the special relationship holding that attorneys should be disqualified where the substantial relationship test is met in order to assure that the confidentiality of the attorneyclient relationship and the loyalty between attorney and client are preserved recognizing that not all correspondence between a lawyer and a client are privileged depending on whether the two have a personal relationship separate and apart from the lawyerclient relationship