or entered á plea of guilty to the habitual criminal allegations. Id. at 754. For these reasons, we held: The trial court clearly was without authority to preempt the defendant’s right to a jury trial on the habitual criminal counts solely on the basis of the defendant’s testimony given in defense of the substantive charge. Likewise, there was no legal basis for the court sua sponte to adjudicate the defendant a habitual criminal because of his trial testimony. Such an adjudication is tantamount to violating the universal maxim that a guilty verdict may never be directed against the defendant in a criminal trial, even if he confesses to the charge while on the witness stand. Id. As a result, we reversed the defendant’s adjudication and sentence as an habitual criminal. Id. at 755. W (<HOLDING>). Cf. People ex rel. Faulk v. District Court,
recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights recognizing constitutional right to effective counsel holding that the creditor must prove the elements of actual fraud recognizing that the burden to establish a valid waiver of a constitutional right is upon the prosecution recognizing defendants constitutional right to have the prosecution prove the elements of habitual criminality