should be reversed. See Pullman-Standard, Padgett, Ortiz, Robinette, and Gilbert, all supra. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 1 . Indeed, the Board rejected Mr. Washington's statement because it was, in the Board's view, uncorroborated and because he was not competent as a layperson to render a medical opinion, not because he lacked credibility. Contrary to the Board's assertions, there is no requirement that Mr. Washington's statement be corroborated, and service connection may be shown through lay evidence. See Rowell v. Principi, 4 Vet.App. 9, 19 (1993) (Board must explain why lay evidence alone is insufficient to establish entitlement to benefits; holding lay evidence alone may be sufficient to establish benefits); Smith v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 147, 148 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Cartright v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 24, 25-26
holding that a causal connection may be established indirectly with circumstantial evidence for example by showing that the protected activity was followed by discriminatory treatment or through evidence of disparate treatment of employees who engaged in similar conduct or directly through evidence of retaliatory animus holding that absent specific evidence indicating otherwise va is presumed to have reviewed all evidence in the record when making a determination as to service connection holding that va regulations do not provide that service connection can only be shown through medical records but rather allow for proof through lay evidence and that lay evidence may serve to place evidence in equipoise holding that the corroborating evidence need not be medical evidence if the appellant explains why medical evidence is not available holding that employers intent may be inferred through circumstantial evidence