enough to compel a finding of past persecution under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Not all “exceptional treatment” constitutes persecution. Zheng v. United States Att’y Gen., 451 F.3d 1287, 1290 (11th Cir.2006). We have held that persecution is “an extreme concept, requiring more than a few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation, and that mere harassment does not amount to persecution.” Id. (quotation omitted). First, the threatening phone calls and notes that Prado received were harassment, not persecution. Though Prado received death threats, such threats alone do not compel a finding of past persecution. See Silva v. United States Att’y Gen., 448 F.3d 1229, 1237 (11th Cir.2006) (concluding that a Colombian applicant failed to establish ‘persec 68, 1174 (11th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Prado has not shown that being
holding that even if a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave the police station to which morris had been taken for questioning and where he had been for more than four hours and even if morris had thus been detained the restraint was not the equiva lent of a formal arrest and morris was not in custody for miranda purposes when he made an incriminating admission holding that a chinese applicant was not persecuted though he had been arrested detained for five days and forced to stand in the sun and watch reeducation videos holding that an applicant who had been detained for 36 hours and suffered a beating by the police but without serious injury had not been persecuted holding that an asylum applicant had not suffered past persecution where she claimed to have been beaten and to have suffered some bodily injuries but she was not detained imprisoned tortured or sexually assaulted in any way holding that where a witness had been convicted seventeen years earlier but had been given probation and had not been confined the date of the conviction controlled