This fact is significant because, in Pennsylvania, with only a specified exception; a claim against an attorney for either legal malpractice or breach of an attorney-client agreement, must be asserted by the attorney’s actual client. See Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47, 459 A.2d 744, 748 (1988) (plurality); Cost v. Cost, 450 Pa.Super. 685, 677 A.2d 1250, 1253-54 (1996). The only exception to this rule is for a “narrow class of third party beneficiaries,” specifically, for named legatees of a will, whose legacies have failed as a result of attorney malpractice. Guy, 459 A.2d at 746-52. Otherwise, the requirement of a relationship between the defendant attorney and the plaintiff client remains. See Cost, 677 A.2d at 1254; see also Florentino v. Rapoport, 693 A.2d 208, 212 (Pa.Super.1997) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 29 For the above reasons, we conclude that
recognizing viability of malfunction theory in pennsylvania holding that normal attorneyclient relationship does not bar rule 60b relief when the evidence is clear that the attorney and his client were not acting as one holding that in pennsylvania an individual who has taken part in an attorneyclient relationship may sue his attorney for malpractice under either a trespass or assumpsit theory holding that a defendant must demonstrate that the governments intrusion upon his relationship with his attorney created a possibility of either injury to his defense or benefit to the government in order to establish a violation of the right to counsel holding that there is no right to a meaningful attorneyclient relationship