to testify on his behalf and some were not. He freely and voluntarily chose not to take his chances with a trial. The fact that at some point on or after October 13, some—though not all—witnesses appear to have recanted previous incriminating statements or returned to original statements does not change the fact that Woods decided not to risk the consequences of facing a trial on two counts of first-degree murder and one count of aggravated battery. Moreover, our caselaw in Kansas is clear and longstanding. Where judgment and sentence have been entered upon a plea of guilty, diere can be no review of the sufficiency of the evidence in a K.S.A. 60-1507 proceeding. Hughes, 206 Kan. at 517; see also Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621, 118 S. Ct. 1604, 140 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1998) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569,
holding that a guilty plea must be both knowing and voluntary and must be a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action available to a defendant holding that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person who has been advised by competent counsel may not be collaterally attacked holding that trial judges must be satisfied that an accused is making a knowing voluntary and intelligent waiver of counsel having been advised of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation such that there is a record demonstration that an accused elected to proceed without counsel with eyes open holding that due process requires state courts to make an affirmative showing that a guilty plea is intelligent and voluntary holding that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge