or office," that Freer seeks to squeeze what Matchette told Sherman. She fails because there is nothing inherently defamatory about Matchette's statements. ¶ 12. It is settled in Wisconsin that words are not slanderous per se if anything other than the words are needed to make them defamatory. Bauer, 191 Wis. 2d at 530, 530 N.W.2d at 6; Kassowitz v. Sentinel Co., 226 Wis. 468, 472, 476, 277 N.W. 177, 179, 180-181 (1938) (The defamation must be "apparent from the words themselves"; " '[w]ords which are defamatory per se do not need an innuendo, and, conversely, words which do need an innuendo are not defamatory per se.'") (quoted source omitted), criticized on other grounds, Martin, 15 Wis. 2d at 460-461, 113 N.W.2d at 139; see Bauer, 191 Wis. 2d at 530-531 n.12, 530 N.W.2d at 6 n.12 (<HOLDING>). This is the law elsewhere as well. See
holding such agreements to be per se illegal holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under missouri law recognizing that slander per se is actionable without a showing of actual or special damages holding that under south carolina law slander is actionable per se where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery recognizing continued vitality of kassowitz on what is slander per se