of a case can vary. In Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361 (2d Cir.1997), the Second Circuit dealt with the 30-day timeframe “by denying the motion within thirty days” and "then stay[ing] [the] mandate and ordering] briefing on the question of whether or not it was appropriate to reconsider that decision.” Id. at 367. Of course, whether a court proceeds through the steps taken in Triestman or the more straightforward one of simply holding a case in abeyance beyond the time limit, the outcome is the same. Although we see no problem with the Triestman approach, we also don't believe that the statute requires it. 5 . Our research has revealed only nine such cases since AEDPA went into effect 20 years ago: Montgomery v. Louisiana, - U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016) (<HOLDING>); Chaidez v. United States, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct.
holding that rule announced in mcconnell applies retroactively holding that the rule announced in miller v alabama 567 us  132 sct 2455 183 led2d 407 2012 applies retroactively on collateral review holding that the rule announced in crawford v washington 541 us 36 124 sct 1354 158 led2d 177 2004 applies retroactively on collateral review holding that the rule announced in mills v maryland 486 us 367 108 sct 1860 100 led2d 384 1988 doesnt apply retroactively on collateral review holding that the rule announced in bailey v united states 516 us 137 116 sct 501 133 led2d 472 1995 applies retroactively on collateral review