a petition — waited the full ninety days after the denial of rehearing permitted by the Supreme Court rules, see Sup.Ct. R. 13, should not change the timing of the government’s obligation to file an indictment under the STA. The government has no control over the defendant’s choice in this regard. Under these circumstances, it would make little sense to require — as opposed to allow — the government to proceed against a defendant within thirty days after the mandate issues even though the defendant has said he will file a petition for writ of certiorari (which he has ninety days after judgment or the denial of rehearing to file), only to pause the criminal proceedings once a timely cer-tiorari petition is actually filed to await the Supreme Court’s decision. Cf. Tyler, 878 F.2d at 759 (<HOLDING>). We conclude, instead, that the least awkward
holding that a trial judges denial of a recusal motion can be challenged on appeal or in a petition for a writ of mandamus recognizing in the context of a petition for a writ of mandamus that although the district court retained jurisdiction over the case following the governments mandamus petition the district court justifiably could defer trial until resolution of the appellate proceedings had the government prevailed on the merits of the mandamus petition  the trial strategies of the government as well as the defense would surely have been altered holding that district court error was not clear error in denying petition for mandamus holding that a petition for a writ of mandamus is the appropriate mechanism for challenging a trial courts grant of leave to amend a complaint holding that when a respondent fails to challenge factual allegations contained in a petition for the writ of mandamus the appellate court accepts as true the factual statements in the petition