arose from “rough sex;” (2) the bad acts evidence was not unduly prejudicial; and, (3) the trial court had issued appropriate instructions explaining the limited use of the prior bad acts evidence. Considering these findings, the Commonwealth maintains, Elliott cannot now contend credibly that the admission of relevant evidence, which was more probative than prejudicial, was unfair, let alone so fundamentally unfair as to violate Elliott’s federal constitutional right to due process. The Commonwealth’s argument is sound. The PCRA court properly determined that Elliott is not entitled to relief, notwithstanding that it erroneously characterized the issue as previously litigated, and, thus, not cognizable under the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Collins, 585 Pa. 45, 888 A.2d 564, 573 (2005) (<HOLDING>). Unlike the instant claim, Elliott’s
holding that a sixth amendment claim of ineffectiveness raises a distinct legal ground for purposes of state pcra review under 42 pacs  9544a2 than the underlying claim of trial court error holding that the fact that an ineffectiveness claim is raised and adjudicated on direct appeal will not procedurally bar an ineffectiveness claim in a proceeding under 28 usc  2255 where new reasons are advanced in support of that claim holding that when a defendant raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel the trial judge must conduct an inquiry into the claim holding that the appellate standard of review of ineffectiveness claim is de novo holding that claim alleging counsels ineffectiveness during the plea bargaining process is cognizable under the pcra