from crime cannot be doubted.”). Because of such a paramount objective, the First Amendment’s protection of religious exercise does not typically extend to violent acts. See American Life League v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 656 (4th Cir.1995) (“we do not think the Free Exercise Clause shields conduct violating a criminal law that protects people and property from physical harm”); United States v. Mullet, 868 F.Supp.2d 618, 624 (S.D.Ohio 2012) (“violence is not a protected form of religious exercise”); see also Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455, 460, 66 S.Ct. 233, 90 L.Ed. 198 (1946) (“bona fide religious beliefs cannot absolve one from liability under the Federal Kidnapping Act.”); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 345, 10 S.Ct. 299, 33 L.Ed. 637 (1890), abrogated by R .D.Wisc.1994) (<HOLDING>). The Government has therefore shown a
holding that hate crimes prevention act does not violate rfra holding that the freedom of access to clinic entrances law does not violate rfra because face addresses governmental interests in preventing violence holding rfra does not protect tithing holding that a nocontact order did not violate the right to freedom of association holding that disclosure of home addresses implicates privacy interests because although addresses are publicly available inclusion of addresses in the notification may expose offenders to harassment