which in turn caused his inability to recall the murder.” Id. at 728-729, 931 P.2d at 73-74. I respectfully disagree with this conclusion. Because I am not persuaded that the evidence offered at trial was sufficient to support a jury determination that Brown, by reason of intoxication, did not have the subjective or actual knowledge required by the statute, I cannot say the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on intoxication. Brown testified that he did not recall what happened because he had consumed an excessive amount of alcohol. The majority suggests this evidence is sufficient to support a jury determination that Brown lacked subjective or actual knowledge that his conduct was greatly dangerous. See generally State v. Privett, 104 N.M. 79, 80, 717 P.2d 55, 56 (1986) (<HOLDING>). I respectfully disagree. Perhaps I do not
holding that unlike the specificintent crime of firstdegree murder seconddegree murder is a generalintent crime for which the defense of voluntary intoxication is not available holding that under florida precedent trial court erred in excluding expert testimony on intoxication as voluntary intoxication was a valid defense to a specific intent crime and expert testimony is relevant to a disputed voluntary intoxication defense holding premeditated murder and felony murder are the same crime with various means of commission holding intoxication is only a defense to specific intent crimes and not general intent crimes holding intoxication to a degree that made specific intent impossible was a valid defense to a charge of willful premeditated firstdegree murder