contends that, “[b]ecause the issue is one of jury selection—that the defendant was required to try his case to a jury which included an individual who properly should have been the subject of his constitutionally protected exercise of a peremptory challenge—the error is structural in nature . . . .” He relies on Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235, 248 (2d Cir. 1998), wherein the Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded: “Because the effects of racial discrimination during voir dire may persist through the whole course of the trial proceedings, Powers [v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 412, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 113 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1991)], we hold that a Batson/Powers claim is a structural error that is not subj ect to harmless error review. See Ford v. Norris, 67 F.3d 162, 171 (8th Cir. 1995) (<HOLDING>); Rosa v. Peters, 36 F.3d 625, 634 n.17 (7th
recognizing that where the error involved defies analysis by harmless error standards or the data is insufficient to conduct a meaningful harmless error analysis then the error will not be proven harmless beyond a reasonable doubt holding that the omission of an element is subject to harmless error analysis holding that a constitutional violation involving the selection of jurors in a racially discriminatory manner is a structural defect    which cannot be subjected to a harmless error analysis holding that the omission of an element is not a structural error subject to automatic reversal but rather  where objected to  is subject to harmless error analysis holding that sentencing error is harmless if the error did not affect the district courts selection of the sentence imposed