)4 mile away. Fifth, also at this time, a vehicle registered to Nelson pulled in and parked next to Miller’s car. Sixth, the note at the boat ramp informed Kaplan that he was being watched. Seventh, Miller and Nelson both left the lake at the same time Kaplan left. Eighth, Nelson arrived at the same McDonald’s immediately after Kaplan arrived. Ninth, a passenger from Nelson’s car approached Kaplan’s vehicle and peered into Kaplan’s vehicle from a distance of 10 feet away. Tenth, Nelson drove home from the McDonald’s using what would normally be described as counter-surveillance techniques. Finally, Miller changed his story as to why he was at the lake that day at that time. See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 1284, 1289-90, 43 L.Ed.2d 616 (1975) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Penagos, 823 F.2d 346, 348
holding that an agreement may be inferred entirely from circumstantial evidence holding that the conspiratorial agreement may be proved by circumstantial evidence including the acts and conduct of the coconspirators and the inferences that may be drawn from their acts holding that intent and knowledge can be proved by circumstantial evidence recognizing that identity of a substance as cocaine may be proved by circumstantial evidence holding that there was no evidence or inferences to be drawn from the evidence to support the damage award