requirement has long existed in statutes and court rules. See, e.g., Minn.Stat. § 629.14 (2000) (requiring that arrested person be taken before a judge “with all practicable speed”). In 1943, the United States Supreme Court first explained the importance of such rules: For this procedural requirement checks resort to those reprehensible practices known as the “third degree” which, though universally rejected as indefensible, still find their way into use. It aims to avoid all the evil implications of secret interrogation of persons accused of crime. It reflects not a sentimental but a sturdy view of law enforcement. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 344, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1943); see also Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) (<HOLDING>). In both McNabb and Mallory, the Court applied
holding delay in arraignment must not be of a nature to give opportunity for the extraction of a confession holding threeyear delay between indictment and arraignment caused by the serious negligence of the government presumptively prejudicial holding that where trial court erred in applying established law to the facts of the case it must be reversed and remanded for a new hearing to give the trial court an opportunity to address the issue holding that when determining whether a delay in prosecution violates a defendants right to a speedy trial courts must consider the length of the delay the reason for the delay whether the defendant asserted his rights and the resulting prejudice to the defendant holding a party must timely present his legal theories to the trial court so as to give the trial court an opportunity to rule properly