Ct. 2950, 49 L. Ed. 2d 929 (1976), which we quoted in the very passage of Jacob to which he cites: “The fact that such a determination is difficult, however, does not mean that it cannot be made. Indeed, prediction of future criminal conduct is an essential element in many of the decisions rendered throughout our criminal justice system. The decision whether to admit a defendant to bail, for instance, must often turn on a judge’s prediction of the defendant’s future conduct. And any sentencing authority must predict a convicted person’s probable future conduct when it engages in the process of determining what punishment to impose. For those sentenced to prison, these same predictions must be made by parole authorities.” Id., 274-75; see also Addington v. Texas, supra, 441 U.S. 429-30 (<HOLDING>). In the present case, where the court had
holding doctors differential diagnosis testimony admissible recognizing that the need for the expert was so great that the decision to preclude the expert effectively amounted to dismissal of case recognizing need for expert testimony despite fallibility and lack of certainty of psychiatric diagnosis recognizing decades of study established fallibility of eyewitness testimony that jurors are unaware of such deficiencies and that such expert testimony will assist trier of fact holding that jurors do not need expert testimony on matters of common knowledge