a disruption of the State’s efforts to protect interests which it deems important.” O’Neil v. City of Philadelphia, 32 F.3d 785, 791 (3d Cir.1994) (quoting Huffman, 420 U.S. at 608, 95 S.Ct. 1200). Fedei*al intervention with Laurel’s claim would not only cast aspersions on the MDE process of determining liability but would also annul the results of MDE’s determination that Laurel is in fact liable for the Thomas well failure. Although Laurel purports to fall within an exception to Younger by seeking wholly prospective relief—a declaration that the Dewatering Act as applied violates constitutional requirements and an injunction against future application of the Dewatering Act— this claim is without merit. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 711, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) (<HOLDING>). Laurel seeks attorney fees incurred in this
holding before huffman was decided that younger abstention was inapplicable to an eminent domain proceeding holding that younger abstention is jurisdictional holding that younger abstention was appropriate while the case works its way through the state appellate process holding that because the federal plaintiffs claims were essentially derivative of the state defendants younger abstention applied holding younger abstention inapplicable where the suit is in no way designed to annul the results of a state trial and the relief sought is wholly prospective