jury, by depriving him of the opportunity to expose alleged biases of the jurors through individual questioning. a.) Procedural Bar The State again has argued that Davis’ claim that he was improperly denied individually-sequestered voir dire is procedurally defaulted. The court has reviewed the record in this case and concludes that the State is correct that, on post-conviction review, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals erroneously concluded that this claim was raised and addressed on direct appeal. See Davis, 720 So.2d at 1017-18. In fact, this claim was not addressed on direct appeal and, thus, could be procedurally defaulted from a merit review by this court for that reason. See Ala. R.Crim. P. 32.2(5); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977) (<HOLDING>). However, the last state court to review this
holding that managing conservator while in texas to seek return of child by writ of habeas corpus may not be served with civil process and is subject to jurisdiction of court in which habeas corpus is pending and only for purpose of prosecuting writ of habeas corpus holding that consideration of a claim in a petition for habeas corpus can be barred by failure to comply with state procedural rules holding on habeas corpus that claims regarding sentencing phase jury charges in a death penalty case are never barred by procedural default holding generally that new rules of law should not be applied retroactively in habeas corpus cases holding that a petition for review is an adequate substitute for habeas corpus