other grounds, 997 S.W.2d 229 (Tex.1999) (corr. op. on motion for reh’g.) (quoting Delp v. Douglas, 948 S.W.2d 483, 495 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997), rev’d on other grounds, 987 S.W.2d 879 (Tex.1999)) (adopting rule previously applied in medical malpractice cases that expert testimony not required in cases where lay person competent to determine causation). Weatherspoon offered summary-judgment evidence through Judge Nelms’s affidavit that Weatherspoon had nothing to do with Rodgers’s bond being held insufficient. The judge stated that he made the decision to hold Rodgers’s bond insufficient on his own. After Weatherspoon produced this evidence, Rodgers then had the burden of introducing his own evidence to raise an issue of material fact about causation. See Arce, 958 S.W.2d at 253-54 (<HOLDING>). Rodgers failed to meet this burden. He
holding that once movant established right to summary judgment burden shifts to nonmovant to demonstrate otherwise holding that burden shifts to nonmovant to raise issue of fact holding that section 523a2c shifts the burden of production and not the burden of proof on the issue of intent only holding that the nonmovant failed to raise a fact issue on mitigation by not raising a fact issue as to the amount of damages that could have been avoided had the movantproperly mitigated his damages holding that in a traditional motion for summary judgment the burden shifts to the nonmovant to raise a fact issue after the movant has facially established its right to judgment as a matter of law