is not always necessary, see United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 112 (2d Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit has not yet reached this issue. See Cantrell, 433 F.3d 1269, 1280 n. 3 (noting but not deciding same issue). Given that the threat-of-death enhancement ordinarily does not present a difficult factual issue — and that here, the defendant has conceded that the statement at issue was in fact made — this case is not a proper vehicle to consider the question. Accordingly, as we did in Cantrell, we leave that question for another day. 4 . The Seventh Circuit has concluded, as do we, that the application of the threat-of-death enhancement actually involves two separate determinations, one legal and the other factual. See United States v. Gibson, 155 F.3d 844, 846 (7th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Gray, 177 F.3d 86,
holding that whether consent was valid under the fourth amendment is a question of law to be reviewed de novo holding that whether a robbers statement can constitute an express threat of death involves the legal interpretation of a sentencing guideline which is reviewed de novo but whether the statement amounts to a threat of death under the circumstances is a factual question to be reviewed for clear error holding that the statement i have a gun is a threat of death holding that the determination of whether there was joint access and control for actual authority is a fact question reviewed under the plainerror standard but a determination of whether the government reasonably relied on a third partys consent is a question of law to be reviewed de novo holding that the threshold question of whether to adopt a doctrine is reviewed de novo