of implementing policy, is the very raison d’etre of our federal system. Id. at 989-90, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). In preserving the narrow proportionality principle in Harmelin, the Supreme Court adhered to the notion expressed in previous cases that severity alone does not render a sentence grossly disproportionate: By contrast, Rummel and Davis, decisions in which the Court upheld sentences against proportionality attacks, did not credit such comparative analyses. In rejecting this form of argument, Rummel noted that “even were we to assume that the statute employed against Rummel was the most stringent found in the 50 states, that severity hardly would render Rummel’s punishment “grossly disproportionate” to his offenses. Id. at 1005, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (<HOLDING>). Appellant fails to demonstrate that section
holding that intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional analyses are appropriate only in the rare cases in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality holding that the imposition of a life sentence for failure to register as a sex offender constituted cruel and unusual punishment because the sentence was so harsh in comparison to the crime holding the crime of conspiracy is committed or not before the substantive crime begins holding that even  gross negligence does not of itself justify an inference of intent to deceive holding that defendants 25year sentence did not raise threshold inference of gross disproportionality when the evidence showed that during one of numerous acts of child molestation the defendant placed his penis to the young victims mouth ejaculated and made her lick the semen off his penis