federal courts, applying similar reasoning, have found that regulation of landing sites, or land-use regulations in general, are not subject to field preemption. Condor Corp. v. City of St. Paul, 912 F.2d 215, 219 (8th Cir.1990) (“We see no conflict between a city’s regulatory power over land use and the federal regulation of airspace”); Broadbent v. Allison, 155 F.Supp.2d 520, 524 (W.D.N.C.2001) (“deciding whether to allow planes to land and takeoff from a certain location is a quintessential land use issue over which state and local governments possess near-plenary authority”); City of Cleveland, 893 F.Supp. at 751 (“The Federal Aviation Act does not occupy the field of land use regulations”); Faux-Burhans v. County Comm’rs of Frederick County, 674 F.Supp. 1172, 1173-74 (D.Md.1987) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 859 F.2d 149, 1988 WL 97345 (4th
recognizing that zoning and rezoning are legislative matters holding a state agency is subject to local zoning restrictions absent legislative direction to the contrary holding that zoning restrictions on private airfield operations are not preempted holding that because zoning restrictions are in derogation of property rights where a term in a zoning ordinance is undefined an ambiguity in that term must be construed in favor of the property owner and the least restrictive use of the land holding that the llupa does not provide for judicial review of requests to change zoning or comprehensive zoning plans