F.3d at 114. DTR II, in contrast, found that the employer’s similar predictions about sole-source business, when combined with an explicit statement that the decrease in business would lead to layoffs, constituted a coercive threat unprotected by NLRA § 8(c). 297 Fed. Appx. at 493. Based on these cases, the district court concluded that the Board’s letter to Hughes was permissible employer expression because the only conceivable “threat” in the letter — an official request for a retraction of HCEA’s statements or a statement by the Board correcting HCEA’s statements — was “incomparable with the predictions of dire economic ruin” in DTR II and other cases, where § 158(c)’s protection did not apply. The district court correctly demarcated the line between threats and n 58) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Second, HCEA argues that Stewart’s comments
holding that a back pay award should make injured parties whole by placing them in the position that they would have been but for the discrimination holding that an employer did not violate nlra  8a1 by notifying strikers that they had been temporarily replaced and would be permanently replaced unless they reported for work because the statement simply stated the employers legal position that it was entitled to make employment replacements to take over the positions of the strikers holding that neglect was not excusable where the defendants did not do all that they were required to do after they received the summons and complaint in that they did not contact a lawyer or make any other arrangements with respect to their defense holding that an injury is not within the scope of employment after the employee has left work unless the injury was caused by the employers negligence holding that defendants had no standing where they conceded that they did not own the automobile searched and were simply passengers the owner of the car had been the driver of the vehicle at the time of the search