consequences); Schallenkamp v. DelPonte, 29 Conn. App. 576, 579, 616 A.2d 1157 (1992) (expired suspension not moot only because it falls within “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception), aff'd, 229 Conn. 31, 639 A.2d 1018 (1994); Dragan v. Connecticut Medical Examining Board, 24 Conn. App. 662, 669, 591 A.2d 150 (1991) (challenges to procedures attendant to consent order permitting plaintiff to continue medical practice while license suspension held in abeyance pending resolution of criminal action against plaintiff was rendered moot because period of abeyance ended and medical examining board rendered final judgment revoking license), rev’d on other grounds, 223 Conn. 618, 613 A.2d 739 (1992); see also Marilyn T., Inc. v. Evans, 803 F.2d 1383, 1384 (5th Cir. 1986) (<HOLDING>); Betts v. Dept. of Registration & Education,
holding that plaintiffs appeal from denial of preliminary injunctive relief against suspension of commercial lessors license on ground that procedural due process had not been afforded was rendered moot once license permanently was revoked noting that plaintiff still could pursue constitutional claim in pending action for damages holding that where a noncompetition clause in a contract had expired by its own terms the plaintiffs appeal from the district courts denial of the plaintiffs request for a preliminary injunction enforcing the clause was moot holding that the case was not moot even though claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were no longer alive because the plaintiff had requested pecuniary relief holding plaintiffs appeal of the denial of a preliminary injunction moot where defendants directive no longer in effect holding that even if indirect purchasers are barred from seeking damages relief they may still obtain injunctive relief