part of public policy.” Courts may vacate arbitration awards that violate “well-defined and dominant” public policies only if those policies “can be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.” United Transp. Union, 3 F.3d at 258, 260-261, quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int’l Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of Am., 461 U.S. 757, 766, 103 S.Ct. 2177, 76 L.Ed.2d 298 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). Sullivan does not explain how the award violates public policy. Rather, he contends the award affirms an action (his termination) that violates public policy (his due process rights). But this is not a valid reason to set aside an award. See generally id. at 261 (<HOLDING>). Instead, it is an improper attempt to have
holding that where evidence shows that federal funds were expended for installation for warning devices or signs at railroad crossing state law claims based on adequacy of those warning devices are preempted by the federal railroad safety act holding that in a personal injury action against a railroad a report containing the conclusions of a hearing examiner of the public utilities commission regarding an alleged hazardous railroad crossing was obvious hearsay holding that reinstatement of the grievant a railroad employee terminated for drug and alcohol use violated the welldefined and dominant public policy against a railroads employment of individuals whose impaired judgment due to the use of drugs or alcohol could seriously threaten public safety and placed the railroad at risk of violating the federal railroad administration regulations recognizing a selfevaluative privilege to railroad companys investigation of an accident in light of the publics stake in the improvement of railroad safety holding railroad regulation requiring random drug testing without particularized suspicion to be reasonable in light of connection to public safety