of the actual punishment inflicted. See, e.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 482-83 (criticizing “legislative scheme[s] that removef] the jury from the determination of a fact that, if found, exposes the criminal defendant to a penalty exceeding the [statutory] maximum” (emphasis deleted)). Perhaps recognizing this, the Court used Blakely to clarify the holding of Apprendi: “In [Apprendi], we concluded that the defendant’s constitutional rights had been violated because the judge had imposed a sentence greater than the maximum he could have imposed under state law without the challenged factual finding.” 542 U.S. at 303 (emphasis added). Like Apprendi, Allen contains wording one could quote to bolster the position of the Court of Appeals. See, e.g., 359 N.C. at 439, 615 S.E.2d at 266 (<HOLDING>). But see 359 N.C. at 444 n.5, 615 S.E.2d at
holding that factual conclusions of sentencing court which must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence are reviewed for clear error holding that after alleyne v united states it is wellestablished that sentencing factors need not be charged in an indictment and need only be proved to the sentencing judge by a preponderance of the evidence holding unconstitutional those portions of the structured sentencing act which permit the judge to impose an aggravated sentence after finding    aggravating factors by a preponderance of the evidence emphasis added holding that the government must prove the facts used in sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence recognizing that sentencing facts are based on the evidence and testimony presented at sentencing under a preponderance of the evidence standard