because his interests clashed with those of other members of the class). By contrast, Ms. Puffer contends that although she participated in some succession planning meetings and supervised some of the putative class members, she did not possess decision-making authority as to employee job moves, succession planning, compensation, or promotions, and thus she did not actually implement any of Allstate’s allegedly discriminatory employment policies (Pl.’s Class Cert. Mem. at 20-21; Pl.’s Class Cert. Reply at 17-18). Rather, Ms. Puffer claims that she witnessed the subjective nature of Allstate’s employment processes and the resulting disadvantages to women in salary, promotion, and career advancement opportunities (id.). See Wagner v. NutraSweet Co., 170 F.R.D. 448, 451-52 (N.D.Ill.1997) (<HOLDING>). Thus, we agree that Ms. Puffer’s claims and
holding that supervisor was adequate representative because her interests were not antagonistic to those of other class members where her involvement in implementing allegedly discriminatory salary system was minimal and she had no salarysetting authority with regard to any class members holding that competition among class members is insufficient to demonstrate antagonistic interests holding that a class plaintiff who seeks to assert statutory rights to protect a class of which he is a member is not asserting rights antagonistic to any members of that class holding that the claims of the class representative and class members must be based on the same legal or remedial theory holding that the filing of a class action by a class representative without standing tolls the period of limitations with regard to all asserted members of the class and that the amendment of the complaint by the addition of a class member with standing relates back to the original complaint