juncture because of the absence of any formal discovery. See Enron, 284 F.Supp.2d 511, 534 n. 3 (S.D.Tex.2003) (“A determination as to whether an ESOP fiduciary breached its fiduciary duty should not be made on a motion to dismiss, but only after discovery develops a factual record.”). Furthermore, the Court cannot reconcile Lalonde’s requirement that plaintiffs must plead facts rebutting an evidentiary presumption with Rule 8(a)’s requirement that the complaint must only “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swier-kiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512, 122 S.Ct. 992. Thus, the Court rejects the Lalonde holding and Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs must plead facts rebutting the ESOP presumption. See Stein, 270 F.Supp.2d at 172 (<HOLDING>). Count II: Failure to Monitor In Count II,
holding that to rebut presumption plaintiff need only allege specific facts not plead evidence holding that a civilrights plaintiff need not plead facts relevant to a qualified immunity defense in order to state a claim recognizing presumption holding a plaintiff must plead sufficient factual allegations to establish that a plausible contract exists but need not plead every detail of the contract holding that plaintiffs need not plead facts rebutting the esop presumption