Elaborating on this “general principle,” we explained that “[t]he automatic stay serves to protect the bankruptcy estate from actions taken by creditors outside the bankruptcy court forum, not legal actions taken within the bankruptcy court.” Id. (quoting In re Sammon, 253 B.R. 672, 681 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2000)). While the language in Campbell could suggest a broad rule, the holding was narrow: the automatic stay does not bar the filing of proofs of claims in the debtor’s bankruptcy case. Id. at 356-57. Thus Campbell does not determinatively resolve our inquiry. Yet, even assuming error in entering the Countrywide Adversary Judgment because of the automatic stay, such error would be harmless. See United States v. Ruff (In re Rush-Hampton Indus., Inc.), 98 F.3d 614, 617 (11th Cir, 1996) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Jones (In re Jones), 230
holding that the otherwise harmless violation of the automatic stay did not suffice to deprive the irs of the postpetition interest setoff to which  it would have been entitled had it first sought a lifting of the stay from the bankruptcy court holding that the automatic stay did not bar the filing of a proof of claim where the debtor actively litigated a separate action during the pending bankruptcy proceeding because to permit the automatic stay provision to be used as a trump card played after an unfavorable result was reached  would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the automatic stay holding that bankruptcy court order that a stay applied to a particular party was a final order and noting that bankruptcy court orders lifting or denying relief from an automatic stay are final for purposes of appeal holding that an appeal challenging a bankruptcy court order lifting the automatic stay became moot when the underlying bankruptcy case was dismissed holding that the plaintiff had standing even though automatic stay had terminated and his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot because he also sought actual damages for violation of the automatic stay