receive if the claim were bifurcated and crammed down (i.e., secured portion paid with interest and unsecured portion paid pro-rata).” In re Carver, 338 B.R. at 527-28. Despite the utility of the judicial remedy fashioned in Carver, this Court declines to adopt it until a higher court has interpreted the flush language of § 1325(a), and mandated such a rule. III. The Court’s Interpretation Given the overall structure of the Bankruptcy Code and legislative history which indicates that Congress did not intend to disfavor the class of secured creditors subject to the flush language of § 1325(a), this Court adopts the majority interpretation of the flush language described by the courts in Ezell, Wright, Horn, Robinson, and Johnson. See Hillman v. I.R.S., 263 F.3d 338, 342 (4th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Such an interpretation appears strongly
holding that statutory language is conclusive in absence of clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary  holding that if statutory language is plain and unambiguous this court will not look beyond the same to divine legislative intent recognizing that courts can look beyond an unambiguous statute and consult legislative history to divine its meaning if the literal application of the statutory language produces an outcome that is demonstrably at odds with clearly expressed congressional intent to the contrary or if the literal application of the statutory language results in an outcome that can truly be characterized as absurd ie that is so gross as to shock the general moral or common sense  recognizing that a court may turn to legislative history when literal statutory language is unclear recognizing a court must look beyond the plain language of a statute when the literal interpretation would lead to an absurd result