the United States. See Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 230, 45 S.Ct. 257, 69 L.Ed. 585 (1925) (noting that an alien “stopped at the boundary line” of th ns specifically authorized the Attorney General to remove Arar “without further inquiry or hearing by an immigration judge” if the Attorney General, after reviewing the evidence establishing his inadmissibility, determined that a hearing “would be prejudicial to the public interest, safety, or security.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c)(2)(B). Arar does not claim that the Attorney General failed to properly review the evidence of his inadmissibility. Nor does he contend that the procedures set forth in section 1225(c) were constitu-tionally inadequate. Cf. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 73 S.Ct. 625, 97 L.Ed. 956 (1953) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Arar fails to establish that he
holding that due process rights were not violated when alien claimed a lack of actual notice but his attorney received notice holding that the constitutional rights in a termination proceeding  are derived from the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the united states constitution and not the sixth amendment holding that due process guarantees were not violated where a defendant was excluded from a witness competency hearing and noting that the hearing did not concern the witnesses substantive testimony holding that the due process rights of an unadmitted alien barred from entry on security grounds were not violated when he was excluded from the united states without a hearing holding that the ijs failure to inform alien that he was eligible for relief from deportation constitutes a due process violation if alien establishes prejudice