is “justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,” or serves purposes unrelated to the content of the expression, it is deemed content-neutral. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293-95, 104 S.Ct, 3065, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984). This remains true even if the regulation has an' incidental effect on a particular category.of speech. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1984). An ordinance can meet the content-neutrality requirement if it seeks to control only “secondary effects” related to protected, expression, and not the protected expression itself.- This conclusion emanates from the controlling holding of Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. at 584, 111 S.Ct. 2456 (Souter, J. concurring) (<HOLDING>). See Triplett Grille, Inc. v. City of Akron,
recognizing the protection of preliminary governmental materials recognizing secondary effects as a sufficient basis for governmental regulation of sexually oriented businesses recognizing utswmc as a governmental unit under the act recognizing governmental interest in rehabilitation holding section 1010215 does not waive governmental immunity merely because a governmental action falls within the listed governmental functions thus further inquiry under the act is necessary