142 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 637, 598 A.2d 110 (1991). It places the averments contained in the notice of suspension at issue, including the date the alleged refusal occurred. Id. at 641, 598 A.2d at 112. Because each and every instance of a refusal under Section 1547(b)(1) constitutes a separate and cognizable basis for suspension, a discrepancy in the date of refusal alleged on a notice of suspension is material. Ballock, supra at 641, 598 A.2d at 112. The date alleged in the notice of suspension is the only way in which PennDOT identifies the refusal for which it is attempting to revoke a driver’s license and it is the only notice which informs the licensee of what he must defend against. C.f Hughes v. Pa. Board of Probation and Parole, 81 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 87, 473 A.2d 225 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Since each refusal separately dated
holding that violation of state law was not a per se constitutional violation holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act holding that where the date of the offense is not an element of the charge  a variance between the indictment date and the proof at trial is not fatal so long as the acts charged were committed within the statute of limitations period and prior to the return date of the indictment holding variance in location of alleged parole violation not material when violation identified not only by where it took place but also by date of arrest date of conviction and specification of violation holding that section 10b violation occurs on date of alleged misrepresentation not the date of the sale or purchase of securities