term of imprisonment....” United States v. Binford, 108 F.3d at 728. The courts have concluded that the use of the term “sentence” in § 2255 is not necessarily as narrow as defendants contend. For example, the statute refers to a “prisoner in custody under sentence of a court.” But since the mandatory five-year sentence imposed under § 924(c) runs consecutively to the unexpired sentences on their drug trafficking crimes, defendants are currently “in custody” serving the “sentence” for the drug crimes. See, e.g., United States v. Hillary, 106 F.3d at 1172. That being the case, defendants were able to challenge their § 924(c) convictions only by accepting some form of an aggregate sentence theory. See id.; Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 67, 88 S.Ct. 1549, 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 426 (1968) (<HOLDING>); Garlotte v. Fordice, 515 U.S. 39, -, 115
holding that consecutive sentences were warranted because of the multiple separate and distinct criminal acts holding that the cumulative effect of consecutive sentences does not make punishment cruel and unusual holding that courts are duty bound to correct sentences violating the trial courts statutory authority to issue consecutive sentences under indiana code section 355012 holding that a prisoner serving consecutive sentences is in custody under any one of them for purposes of  2241 holding that the federal constitutional right to a jury trial does not apply to decisions to impose consecutive sentences