length of the delay ... is a triggering mechanism”, there must be some delay that is “presumptively prejudicial” that would necessitate an inquiry in the three remaining factors. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31. “If the delay is relatively brief, then it is not necessary to consider the other Barker factors.” Battis, 589 F.3d at 678. Conversely, “[i]f the delay is sufficiently long, courts assess the extent to which the delay was long enough to ‘intensify’ the prejudice caused by the delay.” Id. In Doggett, the United States Supreme Court recognized that “lower courts have generally found post-accusation delay ‘presumptively prejudicial’ at least as it approached one year.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 120 L. Ed. 2d 520 (1992); Carty, 56 V.I. at. 365 (<HOLDING>); People of the Virgin Islands v. Rivera, 54
holding a delay approaching one year is presumptively unreasonable holding based on similar facts and a delay of three and onehalf years that it would have been an abuse of discretion for the district court to have held that these circumstances resulted in laches recognizing that other circuits have held that a delay that exceeds one year has even been presumed to be sufficiently prejudicial to require evaluation of the three remaining factors holding a three and onehalf year delay was unreasonable holding that erroneous admission of improper and prejudicial evidence did not require reversal because the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty against the defendant even without the prejudicial testimony