(reasoning that plaintiffs retaliation claims “are certainly thin and may well not survive a future summary judgment motion. Nevertheless, to dismiss them or convert this into a motion for summary judgment is premature at this time because Plaintiff has not had the benefit of any discovery to bolster her claims.”); McWay v. LaHood, 269 F.R.D. 35, 37-38 (D.D.C.2010) (“[T]he D.C. Circuit has directed that because it is difficult for a plaintiff to establish proof of discrimination, the court should view [prediscovery] summary-judgment motions ... with special caution.”) (citing Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 879-80 (D.C.Cir.1997), overturned on other grounds, 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C.Cir.1998) (en banc)); Gray v. Universal Serv. Admin. Co., 581 F.Supp.2d 47, 56 (D.D.C.2008) (<HOLDING>) (internal citations omitted). As the Court
holding that in title vii cases the mixedmotives theory of discrimination is available in cases with circumstantial evidence of discrimination holding that motions for summary judgment in patent cases must be considered with unusual caution recognizing that summary judgment must be approached with special caution in discrimination cases holding that in title vii cases the mixedmotive theory of discrimination is available in cases with circumstantial evidence of discrimination holding that where the destruction was negligent rather than willful special caution must be exercised to ensure that the sanction is commensurate with the information that was reasonably likely to have been contained in the destroyed evidence