abuse reviewed as a postanswer judgment and not a default judgment). If we held that notice to Metrovend itself was required, trial courts could effectively sua sponte strike counsel when a summary judgment is entered based on deemed admissions. Metrovend finally argues that because Gem Vending accepted the $2,000 in attorney’s fees that were awarded in the order granting Metrovend a new trial, Gem Vending is estopped from asserting that the rest of the order is invalid. We disagree. The parties cannot consent and give a trial court more plenary power than it has by rule; thus, estoppel does not apply when the trial court enters an order it has no power to enter. See Insurance Corp. v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 702, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 2104, 72 L.Ed.2d 492, 500-01 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Shirley v. Maxicare Texas, Inc., 921 F.2d
holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact holding that estoppel was a question of fact holding that the courts statute of limitations is jurisdictional in nature and is thus not subject to waiver or estoppel holding that collateral estoppel does not apply when there is a significant change in the legal climate holding consent is irrelevant and estoppel does not apply when subject matter jurisdiction is in question