of certain issues of fact that were necessarily resolved in the defendant’s favor in the first trial.” Blackwell, 900 F.2d at 745 (quoting United States v. Ragins, 840 F.2d 1184, 1194 (4th Cir.1988) (citations omitted)). In the present case, the only litigated issue was whether the federal prosecutor’s post-indictment delay in bringing defendant to trial violated section 3162 of the Speedy Trial Act. The federal district court determined that it did and dismissed the case. Defendant now argues that that determination bars the State from further prosecution. Under the “dual sovereignty” doctrine, principles of collateral estoppel generally cannot be invoked to bar the relitigation of an issue by a separate sovereign. See United States v. Smith, 446 F.2d 200, 202 (4th Cir.1971) (<HOLDING>); Belcher, 762 F.Supp. at 670 (noting general
holding federal government not barred from relitigating facts resolved in defendants favor in prior state prosecution because federal government is neither the same as nor in privity with state holding that neither mere participation in a federal program nor provision requiring compliance with federal law is sufficient to establish that the state consented to be sued in federal court recognizing that stateimposed restrictions upon property may be attributed to the federal government for purposes of a takings analysis where the state officials acted as agents of the federal government or pursuant to federal authority holding that a federal regulation did not create privity of contract between the plaintiff and the government holding the federal and state tests to be the same