during the course of the carjackings and who was harmed by the carjacking itself, it is incontrovertible that the victims of the offenses were the same. Section 3D1.1 mandates that “[w]hen a defendant has been convicted of more than one count, the court shall: (1) [g]roup the counts resulting in conviction into distinct Groups of Closely Related Counts.... ” U.S.S.G. § 3D1.1(a)(1) (emphasis added). Section 3D 1.2 further provides that “counts involving substantially the same harm shall be grouped.” Use of the word “shall” in the statute indicates that Congress intended grouping to be mandatory if the appropriate requirements are met. See Matter of DP Partners Ltd. Parternship, 106 F.3d 667, 670-71 (5th Cir.1997); see also Manatee County, Fla. v. Train, 583 F.2d 179 (5th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). Because the firearm conspiracy count and the
holding that shall generally indicates a mandatory intent unless a convincing argument to the contrary is made holding that a states use of the word shall is mandatory language holding use of word may generally indicates permissive rather than mandatory intent holding that generally or is a disjunctive that indicates congress intended exclusive alternatives unless the context or congressional intent intends otherwise holding change of word shall to may prior to bills passage indicates legislative intent to make purchases upon bids permissive rather than mandatory