Williams I), we conclude that these claims were properly dismissed. Williams provided no evidence that Hal-ford was directly responsible for supervis ing the Council’s compliance with its contract. In fact, the IDOC official who signed the 1997 Council-IDOC contract attested that he — not Halford — oversaw the IDOC’s religion-related policies and practices. Williams also failed to establish that Halford knew of the alleged contract breaches or Tawil’s alleged improper activities (admitting on appeal that he believes she was unaware of either), or the other alleged violations of his rights. Thus, his claims against Halford rested on respondeat superior, which is not a proper basis for section 1983 liability. Cf. Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer Serv., Inc., 85 F.3d 1365, 1370 (8th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). As to the claims against Tawil and the
holding that to state  1983 claim against defendant plaintiff must allege that defendant was personally involved in or had direct responsibility for incidents that resulted in injury holding that a plaintiff in a bivens action must allege that the individual defendant was personally involved in the constitutional violation holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment holding that where there was no evidence that program director was personally or directly involved in alleged violation of constitutional rights or that as supervisor she knew about allegedly unlawful conduct and facilitated approved or deliberately ignored it summary judgment was properly granted in her favor in  1983 action holding that a supervisor with no personal involvement may be liable for the constitutional violation of a subordinate for culpable action or inaction in the training supervision or control of his subordinates acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation  or reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others