for reasonably needed products, services and accommodations, including but not limited to charges for medical and dental care, rehabilitation, and other remedial treatment and care including mental health services for the victim .... RSA 651:62, III (2007). The defendant first argues that the trial court erred in ordering the payment of restitution directly to Kutch, as she is neither a victim nor a collateral source subrogated to the rights of a victim. We agree. The prior version of the restitution statute defined “victim” as a person who suffers economic loss as a direct result of the offender’s criminal conduct. We agree with the defendant that Kutch did not suffer any economic loss as a “direct result” of the defendant’s criminal conduct. Cf State v. Springer, 133 N.H. 223 (1990) (<HOLDING>). The State concedes in its brief that Kutch is
holding that insurer that compensated its insured for consequences of a crime did not suffer loss as a direct result of criminal conduct and is not a victim holding insurer did not have to cover insured for a breach of contract because it was not an accident holding that proof of loss is not evidence of extent of loss and insured is not precluded from showing his damages were greater than shown in proof of loss holding despite a reservation of rights that when the insurer provides a defense to its insured the insured has no right to interfere with the insurers control of the defense and a stipulated judgment between the insured and the injured claimant without the consent of the insurer is ineffective to impose liability upon the insurer holding that if the insured is only partially compensated by the insurer both the insurer and the insured are real partiesininterest