the payment of “prevailing rates” and “regular charges,” Payne could not maintain a cause of action alleging unreasonable, unconscionable and excessive charges. See id. at 1241. The trial court dismissed the complaint; however, on appeal, the First District reversed holding that Payne had alleged the necessary elements to state a cause of action, that he did not need to anticipate Humana’s affirmative defenses, and that Humana’s arguments were more properly raised in an answer rather than in a motion to dismiss. See id. The court held that since the contract between Humana and Payne did not expressly set the governing prices within its four corners, Humana was bound by a reasonableness requirement. See id. (citing F.L. Stitt & Co. v. Powell, 94 Fla. 550, 556, 114 So. 375, 378 (1927)(<HOLDING>); McGill v. Cockrell; 88 Fla. 54, 58, 101 So.
holding that aln attorney who is employed under a contingent fee contract and discharged pri or to the occurrence of the contingency is limited to quantum meruit recovery for the reasonable value of the services rendered to the client and may not recover the full amount of the agreed contingent fee holding that where a contract for legal services fails to expressly provide for the amount of the fee a reasonable fee is implied holding that petitioner had failed to exhaust alternative remedies for review of his fee agreement because the ssa notified petitioner he could obtain his fee by filing a fee petition holding that in determining the reasonableness of attorneys fees under federal fee shifting statutes courts may not enhance the fee award above the lodestar amount to compensate attorneys for assuming the risk of receiving no payment for their services if the lawsuit failed holding that the fee applicant bears the burden of showing that  an adjustment is necessary to the determination of a reasonable fee 