permissible substantive reasons that a petroleum franchisor can terminate a franchisee” because “[t]he goal of the framers of the PMPA was to create a uniform system of franchise termination, not a uniform system of contract law.” Id. at 592-93. We concluded that the plaintiffs state law “contract claims ... in no way involved procedures for or notification requirements with respect to termination,” and thus were not preempted by the PMPA. Id. at 592 (quotation marks omitted). Subsequently, the Eleventh Circuit, in Shukla v. BP Exploration & Oil, Inc., 115 F.3d 849 (11th Cir.1997), considered what claims are preempted by the PMPA. Shuk-la held that “[t]he PMPA provides exclusive remedies for disputes relating to the nonrenewal of franchises and preempts state law claims b th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Consumers, 804 F.2d at 915-16 (holding that
holding state law claim premised on implied duty of good faith was preempted by the pmpa because it concerned the termination of a petroleum franchise holding that fraud claim concerning nonrenewal of franchise agreement was preempted by pmpa holding that pmpa preempted new york statutory law governing the termination or nonrenewal of franchises but did not preempt state contract claim which did not involve the termination of the franchise relationship holding that the plaintiffs state law claims were preempted by pmpa because they sought to impose standards more stringent than the pmpa regarding the termination or nonrenewal of his franchise holding that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was preempted where it was based on the same conduct as a preempted claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing