prosecutorial immunity, but rather, only qualified immunity, when they engage in activities outside their quasi-judicial role, such as investigatory or administrative functions. Id. at 430, 96 S.Ct. 984. Further, the Court established that to determine whether the prosecutor’s actions are more closely akin to the function of an advocate rather than of an investigator or administrator, the court must determine whether the prosecutor’s conduct is “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Id. at 430-31, 96 S.Ct. 984. Federal courts have concluded that a number of actions taken by a prosecutor are so intimately associated with judicial roles so as to afford prosecutorial immunity. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 123, 118 S.Ct. 502, 139 L.Ed.2d 471 (1997)(<HOLDING>); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 492, 111 S.Ct.
holding that a prosecutor was protected by absolute immunity for preparing and arguing a warrant application but not for providing legal advice to investigating police officers holding that a police officer who secures an arrest warrant without probable cause cannot assert an absolute immunity defense holding that the prosecutors activities in preparing and filing an information and motion for an arrest warrant were protected by absolute immunity holding that prosecutors have absolute immunity holding that a prosecutors filing of an arrest warrant and charging documents are protected by absolute immunity