without the burden of invidiously discriminatory disqualifications”); Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 109, 109 S.Ct. 2324, 105 L.Ed.2d 74 (1989) (citing Turner, at 364, 90 S.Ct. 532, and holding that the government cannot require property ownership as a prerequisite to running for and holding public office). Additionally, Molina-Crespo alleges that the wealth-based classification is the result of disparate impact. Under the Supreme Court’s disparate impact jurisprudence, however, an individual claiming discrimination based on disparate impact must also show evidence of a discriminatory animus by Congress when it passed the statute. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 67, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Molina-Crespo shows no evidence of such
holding that there is no disparate impact claim under the adea holding that causal nexus did not exist where there was no evidence that the disclosure had an impact on the testimony of witnesses holding that an election system that had the impact of disadvantaging minorities was not to be subjected to strict scrutiny unless there was proof of a discriminatory purpose holding that where there is no essential conflict as to the facts and the evidence the trial court was correct in refusing to submit the theory of strict liability to the jury holding that an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts