Cocaine conspiracy and possession offenses under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), without specified drug quantities or mandatory minima, are lesser-included offenses of the aggravated crimes under § 841(b)(1)(A). See Burrage v. United States, - U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 881, 887 n. 3, 187 L.Ed.2d 715 (2014). TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge (Concurring). I write separately in response to the preceding concurrence and its inventive gloss on Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999), and its progeny. Neder simply applied the standard constitutional harmless-error rule articulated nearly fifty years ago in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), to a jury instruction that omitted an element of an offense. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 4, 119 S.Ct. 1827 (<HOLDING>). Contrary to the position taken by Judge
holding that the harmlesserror rule of chapman v california  applies to the failure of a trial judge to submit an element of the offense to the jury holding that the omission of an element from the jury charge is subject to harmlesserror review holding that failure to submit an element of the offense to the jury is subject to harmless error analysis holding that the cause and prejudice standard applies on collateral review when an element of an offense has been decided by a court rather than a jury and rejecting the contention that the failure to submit an element to the jury is necessarily prejudicial merely because it requires speculation about what a hypothetical jury could have decided had it been allowed to do so holding that preserved apprendiblakely error like the failure to submit an element to the jury in neder  is not structural error and is instead subject to harmlesserror review