excuse, or explain defendant’s subsequent conduct that resulted in Sergeant Johnson’s death. The court’s rejection of the police stop as a mitigating factor, or as some type of threat or duress ameliorating defendant’s actions, was well within its broad sentencing discretion, and therefore can not be disturbed on appeal. Ingerson, 2004 VT 36, ¶ 10. Indeed, even if we disagreed with the trial court’s finding in this regard — which we do not • — ■ it would not warrant a reversal of the sentence. See State v. Simoneau, 2003 VT 83, ¶ 21, 176 Vt. 15, 833 A.2d 1280 (noting general rule that we will not disturb discretionary rulings of trial court that have a reasonable basis even if this or another court would have reached a different conclusion); White, 172 Vt. at 502, 782 A.2d at 1193-94 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we discern no basis to disturb
holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it gave aggravating factors considerable weight holding that in order to sustain death sentence as a matter of fundamental fairness the jury must find that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors and this balance must be found beyond a reasonable doubt holding that trial court retains wide discretion to apply or reject mitigating and aggravating factors as well as to interpret meaning of individual factors and its determination must be upheld absent abuse of discretion holding that a trial courts weighing of mitigating and aggravating factors will not be disturbed absent a showing that the trial court abused its discretion holding that the relative weight or value assignable to aggravating and mitigating factors properly found is not subject to review for abuse of discretion