omitted). We pause for further discussion of the absence of instruction on venue only because of occasional references in case law that “venue is an element of every offense.” United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 329 (3rd Cir.2002) (collecting cases). But cf. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 969 (2nd Cir.1990) (“venue however is not an element of the offense”). There is of course considerable support for the proposition that the failure to charge on an element of the offense is error. As the Supreme Court has stated, “[t]he Constitution gives a criminal defendant the right to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, his guilt of every element- of the crime with which he is charged.” United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 522-23, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 2319-20, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995) (<HOLDING>). That said, failure to instruct remains
holding that materiality necessary element of section 1001 holding that materiality does not require a showing that the creditors were prejudiced by the false statement holding that materiality is not an element of  1542 because any false statement is sufficient holding that materiality is an element of false statement prosecutions which must be submitted to the jury holding any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an element that must be submitted to the jury