and therefore, need only show that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his challenges for cause. “[A] challenge for cause should be granted, even when a prospective juror declares his ability to remain impartial, if the juror’s responses as a whole reveal facts from which bias, prejudice or inability to render judgment according to law may be reasonably implied.” State v. Hallal, 557 So.2d 1388, 1389-90 (La.1990). The proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his views on capital punishment is whether the juror’s views would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.” Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968) (<HOLDING>); see also Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412,
holding that graham which prohibited the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide does not apply to a lengthy termofyears sentence that might constitute a de facto life sentence holding that an effective life sentence of fortyfive years for seconddegree forgery was excessive and that a life sentence was cruel and unusual in violation of the eighth amendment holding that a prospective juror who would vote automatically for a life sentence is properly excluded holding life sentence mandatory under 21 usc  841b and district court could not depart from the mandatory life sentence unless government made a motion holding that time excluded from a speedy trial clock for pretrial motion preparation is not automatically excluded under  3161h1 but may only be excluded when a court makes appropriate reasonableness findings under  3161h7