the airlines’ market-by-market responses, than posited by Plaintiffs’ experts,” noting that the plaintiffs’ “antitrust claims will rise or fall with the trier of fact’s acceptance or rejection of their” argument and all that mattered at class certification is that their theory of liability rest upon “a colorable analytical method that is susceptible to generalized proof’); Columbus Drywall & Insulation, Inc. v. Masco Corp., No. 1:04-cv-3066-JEC, 2009 WL 856306, at *9-10 (N.D.Ga. Feb. 9, 2009) [hereinafter Columbus Drywall II] (even where prices were indisputably subjected to individualized negotiations, classwide impact could be shown by showing that the starting price for the negotiations was artificially increased); In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 209 F.R.D. 251, 263-64 (D.D.C.2002) (<HOLDING>); Midwestern Mach., 211 F.R.D. at 571-72
holding that the predominance requirement was satisfied where determination of each class members damages involved a straightforward calculation of which days and how many hours they  worked as well as a review of the defendants written records keeping track of class members earnings holding that predominance was satisfied even where class members purchased widely different products in completely unrelated markets holding that class certification is not appropriate because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the calculation of individualized actual economic damages if any suffered by the class members can be performed in accordance with the predominance requirement of rule 23b3 holding that a putative class action satisfied predominance because the allegations were susceptible to proof by generalized evidence holding typicality requirement satisfied because named plaintiffs claims stemmed from same legal theory as class claims notwithstanding fact that class purchased tickets at different prices according to different terms