have an improper relationship with a student even if the student was not a minor at the time. See Colleps v. State, No. 02-12-00396-CR, 2014 WL 1324422, at *1-2 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth Apr. 3, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (upholding defendant educator’s convictions under Section 21.12 for acts committed with consenting adult students); Ex parte Morales, 212 S.W.3d 483, 487 (Tex.App.-Austin 2006, pet. ref'd) (student above the age of seventeen). We overrule Collins’s first point of error. In her remaining points of error, Collins challenges' the constitutionality of Section 21.12(a)(3) based upon its incorporation of Section 33.021 — a statute that has been held to be unconstitutionally overbroad in part. See Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10, 14 (Tex.Crim.App.2013) (<HOLDING>). The constitutional complaints raised by
holding that section 33021b was overbroad because it prohibited a wide array of constitutionally protected speech and was not drawn narrowly enough to achieve only the legitimate objective of protecting children from sexual abuse holding that washingtons harassment statute was unconstitutionally overbroad because it covered constitutionally protected speech holding that a photo array in which all of the men in the array were of similar age there was no striking difference in the amount of head hair each had and the skin color of the members of the array was not strikingly different was not impermissibly suggestive holding that a statute must burden a substantial amount of protected speech to be unconstitutionally overbroad holding that after the district court determined that the plaintiffs speech was protected the court was required to inform the jury of its ruling that knapps speech was constitutionally protected