Racette, 318 Ga. App. at 175 (1) (a) (i). 8 Racette, 318 Ga. App. at 175 (1) (a); see also Se. Timbe SE2d 698) (1951) (“The test as to the sufficiency of the description of property contained in a deed is whether or not it discloses with sufficient certainty what the intention of the grantor was with respect to the quantity and location of the land therein referred to, so that its identification is practicable, but when its descriptive averments are so indefinite and uncertain that no particular tract or quantity of land is described thereby or pointed out with certainty by the instrument itself, the description must be held defective and therefore insufficient to pass title.” (citation omitted)); White v. Plumbing Distributors, Inc., 262 Ga. App. 228, 230 (1) (585 SE2d 135) (2003) (<HOLDING>). 11 See Ceasar v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 322
holding that it may be decided as a matter of law holding that where an oral contract was removed from the statute of frauds by clear and convincing evidence under arkansas law the defendant could not terminate the contract at its will only a contract of indefinite duration may be so terminated  holding in the context of a conveyance that it is only when a description is manifestly too meager imperfect or uncertain to serve as adequate means of identification that the court can adjudge the description insufficient as a matter of law punctuation omitted holding that words which expressly refer to adequate legal description provide nucleus of description that is legally sufficient for statute of frauds holding that under the statute of frauds a description will be insufficient as a matter of law if it is indefinite to the degree that no particular tract of land is identified nevertheless a description which is vague will be sufficient if its precise location may be determined upon competent parol evidence