overseeing the “volatile and esoteric futures trading complex.” Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 356, 102 S.Ct. 1825, 1828, 72 L.Ed.2d 182, 187 (1982). The CEA was intended by Congress to preempt the regulation of commodity futures trading. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Conaway, 515 F.Supp. 202, 211 (N.D.Ala.1981). The legislative history of the amendments to 7 U.S.C. § 25 shows that “Congress evidently wanted to make clear that violations of the Act could be redressed only through procedures specified in the Act. It did not intend to extinguish state common law claims that do not arise from the Act.” Sall v. G.H. Miller & Co., 612 F.Supp. 1499, 1504 (D.C.Colo.1985). See e.g., Kerr v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston, 735 F.2d 281 (8th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); Kotz v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 685 F.2d
holding a court may not award punitive damages holding that conduct must be beyond the fraud which supported compensatory damages to award punitive damages holding flsa did not preempt state law fraud claim holding section 10 of faa is procedural and does not preempt state common law holding that the cea does not preempt punitive damages for common law fraud in commodities cases