post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. Because this law went into effect on April 24, 1996, after Lightner’s conviction became final, Lightner had until April 24, 1997, to file his petition. See United States v. Hurst, 322 F.3d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir .2003). On appeal, Lightner concedes his petition was untimely under AEDPA. He argues, however, that we should equitably toll his petition because he is actually innocent. This actual innocence claim, however, is nothing more than an unsubstantiated allegation that the state destroyed exculpatory evidence. As such, we reject it. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Lightner also argues his delay in filing his
holding that hgn evidence is scientific and therefore must satisfy the pertinent delaware rules of evidence governing the admission of such evidence holding that new evidence must be evidence that is not merely cumulative holding that to be credible a petitioner must support his allegations of innocence with new rehable evidence  whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence trustworthy eyewitness accounts or critical physical evidence  that was not presented at trial holding that new evidence is evidence not previously of record and not merely cumulative of other evidence holding that to justify a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence 1 the evidence must have been discovered after trial 2 the failure to discover this evidence must not be attributable to a lack of due diligence on the part of the movant 3 the evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching 4 the evidence must be material and 5 the evidence must be likely to produce an acquittal if a new trial is granted