of information before the Commission is more directly governed by other statutes. The Open Meetings Act, K.S.A. 75-4317 et seq., and the Public Records Act, K.S.A. 45-201 et seq., are both applicable to the Commission. K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 75-4318(a); K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 45-201(a). The Open Meetings Act specifically authorizes discussion of “confidential data relating to financial affairs or trade secrets of corporations” at closed or executive meetings. K.S.A. 75-4319(h)(4). The Public Records Act exempts from disclosure “records specifically closed by law or by directive authorized by law.” K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 45-201(a). Neither of these statutes creates an affirmative right in SWB to prevent disclosure. Compare Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 60 L.Ed.2d 208, 99 S.Ct. 1705 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Nonetheless, we conclude the Commission erred
recognizing that even if a plaintiff claims certain information constitutes trade secrets its claim may not depend on that determination holding that the freedom of information acts exemption 5 usc  552b4 of trade secrets does not create an independent right to prevent disclosure holding that foia exemption 4 did not apply because agency did not meet burden of showing that desired information consisted of trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person that are privileged or confidential holding that supplier lists can be trade secrets under indianas uniform trade secrets act which uses the same definition of a trade secret as montana holding that the scope of the trade secrets act is at least coextensive with that of exemption 4 of foia