93, 95 (1971) (attorney general, not county attorney, represents state’s interests with respect to revocation of drivers’ licenses). Because the county attorney did not represent the DOT in the criminal proceedings and had no independent authority, any representation by the county attorney that section 321.209 did not apply to Schumacher is not binding on the DOT. Cf. Bassion, 568 A.2d at 1320 (because department of transportation was not a party to criminal proceeding, any order entered in criminal case concerning the defendant’s operating privileges would not be binding on the department). For the same reasons, a county attorney does not have the authority to waive the applicability of section 321.209 as part of plea bargaining in a criminal case. State v. House, 192 N.W.2d at 95 (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Lefever, 533 A.2d 501, 503
holding that officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct a vehicle stop where official license and registration records reflected that the vehicle was registered to a driver with a revoked license holding that a guilty plea to underage drinking could not be withdrawn based on fact defendant was unaware that his drivers license would be suspended because of his conviction as the license suspension was a civil consequence of the conviction holding that county attorney had no authority to agree during plea negotiations that defendants drivers license would not be revoked holding that the county attorney had de facto authority and noting that the objection to the county attorneys authority was first made on appeal holding that district attorney had no power during plea bargaining to bind the state department of transportation to forego license suspension