at 738, 121 S.Ct. 1819. The word “exhausted” refers to “procedural means, not the particular relief ordered”. Id. at 739, 121 S.Ct. 1819 (“It makes no sense to demand that someone exhaust ‘such administrative [redress]’ as is available; one ‘exhausts’ processes, not forms of relief, and the statute provides that one must.”). Further, exhaustion must be proper, that is, an inmate is required to follow “all steps that the agency holds out” for the purposes of giving the agency a full and fan- opportunity to adjudicate the inmate’s claims and correct its own errors. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90, 94, 126 S.Ct. 2378. Finally, it is the TDCJ’s procedure, not the PLRA, “that define[s] the boundaries of proper exhaustion”. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007) (<HOLDING>). This court has held that, pursuant to the
recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different holding that where a prisons procedure did not require naming particular officials in a grievance a court rule imposing such an exhaustion requirement was not warranted holding that an ineffective grievance procedure bars employers defense based on that procedure recognizing that a prisoner satisfied the exhaustion requirement by showing his grievance had been rejected as untimely because he could go no further in the prisons administrative system no remedies remained available to him holding that because plaintiffs were reasonable in interpreting defendants grievance procedure to apply only to active employees plaintiffs did not act in bad faith when they alleged that no applicable grievance procedure existed