333 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2003) (“given the policy underlying Brady, we think it plain that evidence itself inadmissible could be so promising a lead to strong exculpatory evidence that there could be no justification for withholding it. Wood ... implicitly assumes this is so.” (emphasis original)); United States v. Gil, 297 F.3d 93, 104 (2nd Cir.2002) (evidence that is inadmissible at trial may be material under Brady if, inter alia, it “could lead to admissible evidence”); United States v. Phillip, 948 F.2d 241, 249-50 (6th Cir. 1991) (information withheld by the prosecution, even if inadmissible at trial, is material for Brady purposes if it “would lead directly to ... evidence admissible at trial for either substantive or impeachment purposes”); and Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d at 703 (<HOLDING>). Finally, the Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth
holding that ijnadmissible evidence may be material if the evidence would have led to admissible evidence holding that evidence that would normally be admissible may be excluded if the evidence was a direct or indirect product of an unlawful search holding that hearsay evidence may be considered on summary judgment if the same evidence would be admissible in another form at trial holding that even in separate trial other crimes evidence would not have been admissible and identification testimony would have been admissible holding claim requires showing that additional evidence would have been produced that might have led to a different decision