affirmed. 1 . G.R. Porter & Sons was named as a defendant in this case, but the trial court granted its unopposed motion to dismiss it from the case prior to trial. 2 . We do not reach the parties’ arguments regarding the trial court’s interpretation of their stipulations at trial because, on the facts of this case, County Forest and Porter are jointly and severally liable as a matter of law. 3 . We acknowledge a line of cases holding that materiality is a question of fact. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Co. v. El Paso Pipe & Supply Co., 978 F.2d 1185, 1189-192 (10th Cir.1992) (remanding the case for a trial court to determine, as a matter of fact, whether the addition of an attorney fees clause was material); Comark Merch., Inc. v. Highland Grp., Inc., 932 F.2d 1196, 1202-03 (7th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). We decline to follow this reasoning in
holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment holding that a trial court did not clearly err in finding that an attorney fees clause materially altered a contract holding that superior court did not clearly err in finding that the parent had not remedied the problematic conduct holding that trial court did not err holding that the district court to not clearly err in finding that a distance of 100 feet is within the curtilage