731 F.3d 678, 686 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 323, 129 S.Ct. 781, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009)). Such a frisk is lawful only When the officer has some articulable suspicion that the subject might be armed and dangerous. Id. As we just explained, by the time Agent Reynolds encountered Thompson, he clearly had reason to believe that Thompson was participating in a drug trafficking operation. Based on that belief, it was reasonable for Agent Reynolds to suspect that Thompson was armed because guns are known tools of the drug trade, as our cases have recognized. See, e.g., United States v. Gulley, 722 F.3d 901, 909 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[I]t is widely known that guns and drugs go hand in hand.”); see also United States v. Askew, 403 F.3d 496, 507 (7th Cir. 2005) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Agent Reynolds knew that Thompson
holding that guns were properly admitted to  prove intent to distribute drugs because it has uniformly been recognized that substantial dealers in narcotics possess firearms and that such weapons are as much tools of the trade as more commonly recognized drug paraphernalia recognizing the connection between guns and drug trafficking recognizing the inherent danger in stopping those suspected of drug trafficking for which guns are known tools of the trade holding that because violence and danger are inherent in drug trafficking activity the court can reasonably infer that the informant cooperated under an implied assurance of confidentiality recognizing firearms as common tools of the drug trade