See Executive Order No. 10096, 15 Fed.Reg. 389 (1950). Consequently, the Commissioner could not have addressed the on-sale bar even if it had been raised by the government. Because the on-sale bar was not and could not have been raised before the Commissioner, the court cannot conclude that, during the rights determination, this issue was (1) decided, (2) actually litigated, (3) essential to the judgment, or (4) that the government had a fair opportunity to litigate the issue. In other words, not one of the four requirements of issue preclusion is satisfied with respect to the on-sale bar. The government cannot, therefore, be collaterally estopped from raising that issue in the instant case. Cf. Zacharin v. United States, No. 96-5076, 1997 WL 63177, at *5 n. 4 (Fed.Cir. Feb. 14, 1997) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff argues that a decision regarding
holding that age disclosed on a drivers license constituted an admission where the party swore to the truth of the statements made in the license application holding that the government could not be precluded from raising the express license in the instant infringement suit on the basis of the commissioners earlier decision because the commissioner did not have authority under executive order 10096 to consider the express license holding that the plaintiff was precluded from raising the issue for the first time on appeal holding that possession of a drivers license is irrelevant to the offense of failing to present a license which is completed by failing to present the license when requested to do so by an officer holding that department of transportation did not have control of motorists drivers license because although the department of transportation may have had a duty to recall the motorists license this authority to revoke does not involve physical possession or actual control sufficient to bring the license within the ambit of the personal property exception to sovereign immunity