See Cal. Lab.Code § 2699.3(a). Thus, LWDA retains “primacy over private enfprcement efforts,” Arias, 46 Cal.4th at 980, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 588, and will be bound by any final judgment entered against its deputized plaintiff. Iskanian, 59 Cal.4th at 387, 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 289 (observing that a “judgment in a PAGA action is binding on the government”). In this way, a “PAGA representative action is [ ] a type of qui tam action.” Id. at 382, 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 289. Against this background, it is clear that a PAGA representative suit, like Gillette’s, differs significantly from class actions and - other suits in which a private plaintiff seeks relief on behalf of himself, fellow class members, or even the public. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 733 F.3d 928, 934-38 (9th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). Unlike these other types of suit, a PAGA
holding that the faa preempts californias broughtoncruz rule which prohibited mandatory arbitration of three particular types of claims if the plaintiff sought a public injunction holding that the faa requires arbitration of age discrimination claims when a valid arbitration agreement exists holding that californias ellis act preempts both ordinances holding that mandatory arbitration agreements in the employment context fall under the faa holding that the faa mandates courts to direct parties to arbitration on issues to which a valid arbitration agreement has been signed