of Columbia that it intended to forfeit his money. (Dkt. No. 11-1 at 1-2). 3 . In the alternative. Plaintiffs seek to certify the class either as a Rule 23(b)(2) class or as a hybrid 23(b)(2)/(b)(3) class. Because the classes will be certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the Court need not reach this request. In any event, the Court has already held that "[t]here is no reason to consider whether the action would be a hybrid because the only injunctive relief Plaintiffs point to—the "return of money”—is actually part of the claim for money damages.” (Dkt. No. 31 at 8). Moreover, it is clear that certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is inappropriate in this case after the Supreme Court's decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes. See - U.S. - , 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2557, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs make no compelling argument for
holding that putative class members are not parties to an action prior to class certification holding that a class plaintiff who seeks to assert statutory rights to protect a class of which he is a member is not asserting rights antagonistic to any members of that class recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members holding that class seeking monetary damages in addition to medical monitoring did not seek certification pursuant to 23b2 only 23b3 holding that rule 23b2 calls for injunction as to all class members or to none of them and does not authorize class certification when each class member would be entitled to an individualized award of monetary damages