was not to consider the fingerprints as evidence of guilt. Id. In the case at bar, defendant’s request did not go to the proper consideration of the evidence; rather, defendant’s requested instruction would have required the jury to return a verdict of not guilty if it found the fingerprint evidence to be unreliable. That instruction is simply not a correct statement of law where there was additional evidence, albeit contradicted by further testimony, that defendant was present on the night of the robbery. Had defendant requested an instruction, such as that seen in Moore, which pertained to the consideration of the evidence, the trial court would have been required to give that instruction in substance, but that is not the case here. See Bradley, 65 N.C. App. at 363, 309 S.E.2d at 513 (<HOLDING>). In sum, because the requested instruction was
holding that the trial court committed prejudicial error by failing to give a requested instruction on the probative value of fingerprint evidence where the state relied primarily on that evidence holding probative value of evidence must be balanced against any prejudicial effect holding that the district court committed plain error by admitting evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment where the error did affect a substantial right of the defendants and the admission of evidence which should have been excluded did have a prejudicial impact on the jury holding that the trial court committed prejudicial error when it excluded expert testimony on false confessions holding refusal to give pretext instruction was error but not prejudicial