which the sentencing court relies without previously notifying the defendant is of the same character, allows the same inferences, and, most importantly, is subject to the same arguments in rebuttal as evidence in the record of which the defendant is already aware, it seems logical to conclude that advance notice would not give the defendant any additional incentive or ability to challenge the evidence. See U.S. v. DeBardeleben, 740 F.2d 440, 447 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1028, 105 S.Ct. 448, 83 L.Ed.2d 373 (1984) (upholding sentence based on extraneous evidence in part because the defendant did “not suggest what rebuttal he could make other than his blanket denial, which the court had already heard”). See also United States v. George, 911 F.2d 1028, 1029-30 (5th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we hold that, because advance
holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment holding that the defendant insufficiently pled the brady claim because he failed to assert how the evidence was material or how he was prejudiced by the states nondisclo sure holding that district court complied with former rule 32a1 where court asked counsel during sentencing hearing whether circumstances warranted upward departure and counsel responded court rejected defendants argument that notice provided was insufficient and stated that defendant has not shown how he was prejudiced by this notice given how he could have been helped by additional notice or time recognizing in summaryjudgment context that party must show he was prejudiced by lack of notice or other procedural irregularities to prove he is entitled to relief from district courts ruling holding that the defendant did not require advance notice where he could not show how he was prejudiced by late notice or how he could have been helped by additional notice