being precluded by § 1152(a)(2)(B)(ii). See Abu-Khaliel, 436 F.3d at 632. In Kucana, however, the Supreme Court found no such distinction and held that the “adjudicator in immigration cases ... exercises authority delegated by the Attorney General.” 130 S.Ct. at 832. Kucana further held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) precludes judicial review of determinations of the Attorney General — and of the IJ— made discretionary by statute, but does not preclude review of those determinations made discretionary by regulation. Id. at 831. An IJ’s discretion to grant a motion for a continuance derives not from statute but from 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29, and, therefore, we hold that the denial of such a motion is subject to review by this court. Cf. Thimran v. Holder, 599 F.3d 841, 844-45 (8th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Juarez v. Holder, 599 F.3d 560, 562 (7th
holding that the criminal jurisdiction bar applies to the denials of motions to reopen holding that discretionary denials of motions to reopen are reviewed only for abuse of that discretion holding that kucana compelled the conclusion that appellate courts have jurisdiction to review denials of motions for a continuance holding that bia denials of motions to reopen or reconsider are reviewed for abuse of discretion holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts