rescheduled, there was no indication that Dr. Das would be any more willing or able to make himself available for the rescheduled trial dates. Thus, the court properly exercised its discretion in concluding he was unavailable under Rule 32(a)(3)(E) and in admitting his deposition testimony. ¶ 15. Plaintiff also argues on appeal that defendant “suggested” to Dr. Das a way to make himself unavailable when defendant laid out his expectations as to the court’s analysis of the issue, such that defendant essentially procured his absence. See Rule 32(a)(3) (“A deponent is not unavailable as a witness if the ... absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of the deposition----”). Plaintiff did not make this claim in his oppo .2d 570, 572 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (<HOLDING>). By contrast, Dr. Das is not a party, nor was
holding that a fiduciary corporation was a purchaser within the meaning of  12a2 and was entitled to bring suit on its own behalf or on behalf of its clients holding that plaintiff avis was obligated to produce in person its employee who was designated to testify on behalf of the company holding that the right to testify on ones own behalf does not include the right to lie holding that an employers promise to pay a bonus to an employee was not enforceable where the employee was already obligated under a written contract to perform the services in question holding in context of control person analysis that because defendant founded the company and was its largest shareholder he may be able to influence the company