discharge. Rather than claim a substantive right to her discharge, Rasmussen argues here only that there was no procedure available to the bankruptcy court to revoke the action it had already taken. She first urges that the bankruptcy court had no authority to consider the § 727 claim because Disch raised it after the time period for raising objections to discharge allowed by Bankruptcy Rule 4004 had expired and the order of discharge had issued. If by this she means that we should treat Bankruptcy Rule 4004’s 60-day time limit for filing a § 727 objection as a jurisdictional predicate that deprives the court of all power to consider a late claim, the short answer is that the Supreme Court has rejected this characterization of the rule. See Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 447, 124 S.Ct. 906 (<HOLDING>). If she is arguing that orders of discharge
holding that bankruptcy jurisdiction is not within section 5 of the fourteenth amendment holding the broad jurisdictional grant given the bankruptcy courts under the 1978 bankruptcy act unconstitutional holding that bankruptcy rule 4004 is not jurisdictional and falls within a courts adjudicatory authority holding that stem does not change bankruptcy courts authority to decide fundamental core procedures of bankruptcy court holding time limitation on statement of costs is not jurisdictional and late filing is within courts discretion