However, we presume prejudice from deficient performance of defense counsel only in a narrow set of circumstances. The presumption arises when the client shows that during the criminal proceedings, he was actually or constructively denied the assistance of counsel altogether. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). Under such circumstances, “[n]o specific showing of prejudice [is] required,” because “the adversary process itself [is] presumptively unreliable.” Id. The United States Supreme Court has held that counsel’s failure to advise a defendant about the consequences of a plea does not fall into this category. See Hill, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we do not presume prejudice. Given
holding that a plea was voluntary and intelligent despite the states failure to supply the defendant with information about his parole eligibility date holding the inherent prejudice in such cases results from the defendants inability due to counsels neglect to make an informed decision whether to plea bargain holding that an attorney is required to advise a defendant of the direct consequences of a plea and will not be found ineffective for failing to advise of collateral consequences of the plea holding that counsels failure to advise the defendant of the collateral consequences of a guilty plea cannot rise to the level of constitutionally ineffective assistance holding defendant did not show required prejudice from counsels alleged failure to advise him about eligibility for parole under the sentence agreed to in the plea bargain