has long required that, when the trial court does not state the grounds on which summary judgment was granted, we must affirm the judgment if any of the theories presented to the trial court and preserved for appellate review are meritorious. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 216 (Tex.2003); Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex.1989). A requirement that the trial court state its reasons for granting summary judgment is discordant with this principle. Second, although rule 296 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a party to request findings of fact and conclusions of law following a bench trial, this rule does not apply in the summary-judgment context. See, e.g., IKB Indus. (Nigeria) Ltd. v. Pro-Line Corp., 938 S.W.2d 440, 441 (Tex.1997) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, it is well established that
holding that erroneous findings of fact not necessary to support the judgment are not grounds for reversal holding that findings of fact and legal conclusions are neither necessary nor proper in summary judgment proceeding holding that appellate deadlines are not extended by request for findings of fact and conclusions of law following summary judgment because they have no place in a summary judgment proceeding holding that a trial courts judgment must comply with the statutory requirement that the judgment contain written findings of fact and conclusions of law holding that motion accepting judgment but requesting findings of fact and conclusions of law was not directed against the judgment