consisting of both full sentences should come into evidence to give full context to that admission. At trial, the entire statement was admitted pursuant to defense counsel’s choice. We find no error in the trial court’s admission of defendant’s statement “because what I say could put me in jail for a long time.” Our research has disclosed no case on all fours, where the defendant in the same breath first invoked his right to remain silent and then volun teered an incriminating statement. However, the law is clear that even after a suspect has invoked his right to remain silent,an inculpatory statement is admissible if it was voluntary and initiated by the defendant. See State v. Evans, 462 So.2d 596 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). See also Christopher v. State, 269 Ga. 382, 497 S.E.2d 803 (1998) (<HOLDING>); People v. Eveans, 277 Ill.App.3d 36, 214
holding that although defendants voluntarily given initial statement was inadmissible because of miranda violation subsequent statement made after careful miranda warnings were given and waiver was obtained was admissible holding that police officers sworn affidavit that miranda warnings were given was held sufficient to deny suppression of defendants postarrest statement in the absence of properlysupported statement by defendant to the contrary holding that in the absence of police coercion a subsequent administration of miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement holding that where a suspect was given miranda warnings and then immediately spoke without police prompting that statement was voluntary and therefore admissible holding that selfinitiated statements volunteered after miranda warnings had been given are admissible