hearing would not be meaningful and have the potential to advance one or more of the petitioner’s claims. Campbell v. Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280, 287 (3rd Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1084, 121 S.Ct. 789, 148 L.Ed.2d 685 (2001). For the reasons more bally explained below, the Court believes that an evidentiary hearing would not be a warranted use of its discretion under the AEDPA because Whitepipe is not entitled to habeas relief under settled law. 5 . The "miscarriage of justice” exception extends primarily to cases in which the constitutional violation "has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986); accord Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324-27, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995) (<HOLDING>). "Actual innocence” is not an issue in
holding that the carrier probably resulted standard governs the miscarriage of justice inquiry when a petitioner who has been sentenced to death raises a claim of actual innocence to avoid a procedural bar to the consideration of the merits of his constitutional claim holding that when a defendant raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel the trial judge must conduct an inquiry into the claim holding that fundamental miscarriage of justice standard requires petitioner to make threshold showing of actual innocence holding that if the state court addresses both the procedural default and the merits of a federal claim in the alternative a federal court should apply the state procedural bar and decline to reach the merits of the claim holding that a petitioner does not fairly present his claim where the claim has been presented for the first and only time in a procedural context in which its merits will not ordinarily be considered