services workers “would disserve the broader public interest,” as it would prevent the “vigorous and fearless” performance of their duties in child dependency proceedings. Id. (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427-28, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976)); see also 63C Am. Jur.2d, Public Officers and Employees § 318 (2d ed.1997) (explaining that “mere qualified immunity is not enough protection to prevent the chilling effect of a potential suit on the exercise of a social worker’s professional judgment and discretion in operating as an arm of the Probate Court to protect abused children”). And it is for precisely those reasons that absolute immunity protects the unworthy as well as the worthy. Cf. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127, 118 S.Ct. 502, 139 L.Ed.2d 471 (1997) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our
holding that a hearing officer acting in a judicial capacity was entitled to claim judicial immunity and could not be compelled to give testimony about his mental process in deciding a case holding that judges have immunity from suit for judicial acts recognizing that absolute judicial immunity is not grounded in any special esteem for those who perform judicial functions and certainly not from a desire to shield abuses of office but because any lesser degree of immunity could impair the judicial process itself holding order of contempt sentence without statutory opportunity for appeal was in error but nevertheless involved a judicial act subject to judicial immunity recognizing judicial immunity for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction