the opportunity to reply prior to the hearing. 2 . March 25, 1995, was a Saturday. 3 . Defendants assert that they were not properly outh Carolina has determined that S.C.Code Ann. § 15-3-30 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Harris v. Dunlap, 285 S.C. 226, 228-29, 328 S.E.2d 908, 909 (1985). This determination, however, is not dispositive of the Commerce Clause analysis. The Bendix Court specifically noted that "state interests that are legitimate for equal protection or due process purposes may be insufficient to withstand Commerce Clause scrutiny.” Bendix, 486 U.S. at 894, 108 S.Ct. at 2222. 6 . See also Catawba Indian Tribe v. South Carolina, 978 F.2d 1334, 1348-49 (4th Cir.1992), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1415, 122 L.Ed.2d 785 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Witt v. American Trucking Ass’n, 860 F.Supp.
holding tolling principles do not apply because the purpose of the statute of repose is clearly to serve as a cutoff holding that the general equitable tolling doctrine is read into every statute of limitations holding that because purpose of tolling statute is to remedy problem of locating a nonresident defendant before expiration of statute of limitations tolling statute does not apply to adverse possession action because of statutory scheme allowing for service by publication on parties outside state in such actions holding that minority tolling statute did not apply to extend time provided under corporate survival statute holding that an ohio tolling statute violated the commerce clause because it gave nonresident corporations the choice between being subject to general jurisdiction in the state by appointing an instate agent for service of process or being subject to a tolling of the statute of limitations on claims against them