but rather affords a bright-line, legal presumption of coercion, requiring suppression of all unwarned statements.” Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 n. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1292 n. 1, 84 L.Ed.2d 222, 23 2 L.Ed.2d 975 (1958) (same). Essentially, the Court determined that the prejudicial quality of testimony regarding an actually coerced confession is, like all other improperly introduced testimony at trial, capable of review. At this point in time, the Fulminante decision stands as the sole, albeit the dispositive, case on this point. In contrast, cases applying the harmless error analysis to the introduction of presumptively coerced statements are legion. See e.g. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 605 & n. 22, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 2652 & n. 22, 110 L.Ed.2d 528, 555 & n. 22 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 443, 104
holding that waiver of miranda rights was valid where  finding  that the defendant initiated the conversation  was  implicit in the district judges denial of the suppression motion  holding that in order to conclude that federal constitutional error is harmless court must find that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt holding that booker constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because on remand the district court would have given defendant the same sentence holding that although defendant was a deputy sheriff miranda warnings were required irrespective of defendants knowledge of his fifth amendment rights holding that although miranda required the suppression of testimonial statements made before defendant was advised of his constitutional rights the state court is free of course to consider this harmless error question upon remand