than the name implies.’ ” United States v. Lilly, 13 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir.1994) (quoting United States v. Zapata, 1 F.3d 46, 47 (1st Cir.1993)). Double counting “is often perfectly proper” and the Guidelines themselves are “the most helpful aid in the task of separating permissible double counting from its impermissible counterpart.” Id. Mr. McCarty’s argument fails because if it is double counting, it is permissible under the Guidelines. Even assuming ar-guendo that Mr. McCarty’s possession of a short-barreled shotgun were counted twice, first in the base offense level and next in the enhancement, under First Circuit authority, the same factor may “serve double duty,” if the Guidelines direct it. Zapata, 1 F.3d at 50 (citing United States v. Newman, 982 F.2d 665, 673 (1st Cir.1992)) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Vazquez-Molina, 389 F.3d 54,
holding that the two instances may include the charged conduct holding application of vulnerable victim and sadistic or masochistic image adjustments was not impermissible double counting because the adjustments account for distinct wrongs holding that the commissions express prohibition of double counting in certain instances indicates its intent to permit double counting in other instances holding that public policy may be found in letter or purpose of constitutional statutory or regulatory provisions in judicial decisions of state and in certain instances in professional codes of ethics recognizing that the expectation of finality and tranquility is an interest protected by the prohibition on double jeopardy