program was rationally related to the legitimate government purpose of protecting Davis’s health and the public at large and attempt to rebut Davis’s allegations of anti-gay animus by asserting “as the Step I grievance [response] indicates, Davis’[s] situation presented a safety risk.” The question of whether Davis was removed from the public-works program because of safety reasons or because of anti-gay animus, however, is the issue in dispute in this case, and the defendants’ arguments are better suited for a motion for summary judgment. At this stage of the proceedings, the district court was required to treat Davis’s allegations — not the contested statements contained in the grievance response — as true. See Delay, 585 F.3d at 1005; Hill, 630 F.3d at 471. Because Davis al ir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Davis’s complaint likewise contains
holding that a prisoner stated a valid equal protection claim when he alleged he was denied a work assignment because of his sexual orientation holding that an isolated comment is not direct evidence of discrimination even if a plaintiff interpreted it as motivated by a discriminatory animus holding that a gay prisoner alleging discriminatory treatment because of his sexual orientation was not required to identify any nonhomosexual prisoners who were similarlysituated but treated better because the complaint contained allegations that if true constituted direct evidence of discriminatory motive and animus holding that sexual orientation and sexual identity are immutable holding that evidence which suggests but does not prove a discriminatory motive is circumstantial evidence by definition