during a civil forfeiture. Such a purpose suggests that there can be no meaningful difference between 18 U.S.C. § 982’s invocation of the “provisions” of § 853 and 28 U.S.C. § 2461(e)’s reference to “procedures” of the same. Thus, to limit applicability of § 853(p) in the context of civil forfeiture would subvert the clear legislative intent that “the civil and criminal forfeiture statutes were intended to be largely coterminous.” Day, 524 F.3d at 1377. Consistent with this interpretation, the Fourth Circuit has held that “federal law requires a court to substitute assets for the unavailable tainted property,” implicitly recognizing that Section 853(p) is incorporated into the civil forfeiture context through Section 2461. See United States v. Alamoudi, 452 F.3d 310, 314 (4th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); cf. Kalish, 626 F.3d at 169 (stating there is
holding that exclusionary rule does apply to civil forfeiture proceedings holding that when a plea agreement or consent order does not explicitly prohibit seeking the forfeiture of substitute assets via civil forfeiture under  981 the statutory scheme controls and requires the forfeiture of substitute assets pursuant to  2461c and 853p holding that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over a criminal forfeiture action where a state court in a related state court forfeiture proceeding had in personam jurisdiction over the same currency subject to forfeiture holding discovery rules apply to civil forfeiture proceedings holding that since the reference in  2461c to the procedures of  853 includes the latter statutes implicit authorization of in personam money judgments we see no reason why this reference should not also include the forfeiture of substitute assets