well below the Guidelines range. See Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 27-34. Accordingly, and contrary to his contention on appeal, Simpson did have an opportunity at his sentencing hearing to present argument consistent with the law as later set forth in Booker. It is true that the district court did not address the two specific mitigating circumstances Simpson cites in his appellate briefs. That was not, however, because the court barred their consideration. Rather, it was because Simpson failed to suggest them. In the closest analogy under the mandatory Guidelines regime, this Circuit initially ruled that it could not discern error at all in a court’s failure to address unrequested grounds for a discretionary sentencing departure. See United States v. Leandre, 132 F.3d 796, 808 (D.C.Cir. 1998) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Pinnick, 47 F.3d
holding that in the absence of a government crossappeal an appellate court may not sua sponte correct a district court error if the correction would be to the defendants detriment holding that the district court could consider increased sentence severity resulting from deportable alien status holding that the district court cannot remand sua sponte for defects in removal procedure holding that defendants status as a deportable alien could be considered by the district court at sentencing holding that the district court cannot be faulted for failing sua sponte to also address whether the defendants deportable status would affect the severity of his sentence