to leave either a copy of the warrant or a receipt for the items taken did not render the search unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment does not mention notice, and the Supreme Court has stated that the Constitution does not categorically proscribe covert entries, which necessarily involve a delay in notice. See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 247-48, 99 S.Ct. 1682, 60 L.Ed.2d 177 (1979). And, insofar as the August search satisfied the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, i.e., it was conducted pursuant to a warrant based on probable cause issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, we perceive no basis for concluding that the 45-day delay in notice rendered the search unconstitutional. See United States v. Pangburn, 983 F.2d 449, 453-55 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). But see United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d
holding that more than notice to a defendant is required holding that the notice requirement found in rule 41d is not required by the fourth amendment holding that the doorway of the home is a public place for purposes of the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment holding that fourth amendment claims are not cognizable on habeas review because the fourth amendment exclusionary rule does not relate to the accuracy of the factfinding process holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment