because "our constitutional system is primarily designed to protect the innocent, not punish the guilty," the supreme court determined that a new trial was warranted despite the potential consequences to the State and the victim. Id. ¶ 29. 117 The unusual cireumstances faced by the supreme court in McClellan are simply not comparable to those we face today. First, unlike the McClellan defendant, who was not responsible for the delays in that case, Finlayson is primarily responsible for failing to move his petition forward. See-ond, a post-conviction proceeding is ultimately civil in nature, see Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-102(1) (LexisNexis 2012), and does not implicate the same constitutional protections as do criminal prosecutions, cf. Hutchings v. State, 2003 UT 52, ¶ 20, 84 P.3d 1150 (<HOLDING>). Finally, the question before us is not
holding that pro se pleadings from defendants who are represented by counsel in the pending criminal proceedings are unauthorized recognizing a right of access to civil proceedings recognizing limited statutory right to counsel in postconviction proceedings where allegations are factually sufficient to warrant a hearing holding that a defendant does not have the right to be represented by counsel in postconviction proceedings which are civil proceedings holding that defendants have a right to counsel in criminal proceedings