“changing clothes or washing at the beginning or end of each workday which was excluded from measured working time during the week involved by the express terms of or by custom or practice under a bona fide collective-bargaining agreement applicable to the particular employee.” By their express terms §§ 203(o) and 254(a) do not apply to activities that occur during the continuous workday. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (excluding time spent changing clothes or washing “at the beginning or end of each workday”), § 254(a) (limiting exclusion to activities “prior to the time on any particular workday at which such employee commences, or subsequent to the time on any particular workday at which he ceases, such principal activity or activities”); see also Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 37, 126 S.Ct. 514 (<HOLDING>). With these legal principles in mind, the
holding that walking time performed after an employee performs the first principal activity and before the end of the last principal activity is not excluded by  254a holding that agency relationship existed where principal paid plaintiff directly and written agreement stated agent was signing on behalf of principal holding that a principal is bound by a contract entered into by the principals agent on her behalf if the agent had authority to bind the principal holding that questioning of a juvenile by a principal in presence of a police officer did not constitute an interrogation because principal was sole questioner and was not acting as an agent for police holding that where the first amendment does not protect a certain activity there can be no first amendment right of association to engage in that activity