II. D.W. contends that the court should have suppressed his statements to Officer Farris because they were made without the officer having advised D.W. of his Miranda rights. He also argues that his statements during the interview with Detective Bookard should also have been suppressed because the purported waiver -of his Miranda rights was not voluntary, an argument D.W. raises for the first time on appeal, and because police engaged in the type of two-step interrogation prohibited under the Supreme Court’s ruling in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004). The rights established under Miranda are triggered only when an individual is in custody and under interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445, 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (<HOLDING>). In determining whether an individual is in
holding that where a defendant expressly manifested his belief in the truth of the statements contained in the motion to dismiss thereby adopting those statements as his own such statements are admissible against the defendant in the states case in chief recognizing that safeguards are required in the case of incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a policedominated atmosphere resulting in selfincriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights holding of suspect incommunicado contributes to suppression of confession holding that statements given after miranda warnings are admissible even when the arrest that preceded the statements was constitutionally deficient holding that voluntary statements to police initiated by witness are not interrogation and therefore are nontestimonial