know that he has sustained the requisite serious injury. As a limited tort plaintiff, appellant herein did not have a valid cause of action, and the statute of limitations period did not begin to run, until she knew or reasonably should have known that she sustained a “serious injury.” The MVFRL defines a serious injury as “[a] personal injury resulting in death, serious impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1702. When the accident in this case first occurred, appellant sustained injuries to her face and jaw that appeared to result in only minor bruises and contusions. Consistent with recent caselaw, these injuries would not rise to the level of a serious injury. See, e.g., Dodson v. Elvey, 445 Pa.Super. 479, 483-84, 665 A.2d 1223, 1225 (1995) (<HOLDING>), alloc. granted, 544 Pa. 608, 674 A.2d 1072
holding that allegation of procedural injury does not affect the issues of injury in fact or causation holding purposely inflicts  serious injury and intended to cause serious injury convey the same specific intent such that it is impossible to commit one without the other holding that bruising and soft tissue injury even accompanied by residual pain does not rise to the level of a serious injury holding that use of tangible property must be proximate cause of injury and that property does not cause injury if it does no more than furnish the condition that makes the injury possible holding that it was a double jeopardy violation to convict and sentence for both dui with serious bodily injury and driving without a valid license with serious bodily injury based on an injury to a single victim