the time of the offense. The court apparently followed the rule that application of the guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, see United States v. Bell, 991 F.2d 1445 (8th Cir.1993); USSG § lBl.ll(b), although the endurance of that rule is an open question in this circuit after United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), now that the guidelines are merely a starting point that a court must consult and take into account. See United States v. Anderson, 570 F.3d 1025, 1033 n. 7 (8th Cir.2009) (assuming, without deciding, that the Ex Post Facto Clause applies to a district court’s application of the sentencing guidelines after Booker); compare, e.g., United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 795 (7th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>), with United States v. Turner, 548 F.3d 1094,
holding that revocation of medical license does not violate the ex post facto clause holding that use of the guidelines in effect at time of sentencing does not violate ex post facto clause after booker holding that the application of the guidelines in effect at sentencing rather than at the time of defendants conduct does not violate the ex post facto clause even if the current guidelines suggest a harsher sentence because the guidelines are only advisory not binding holding that parole guidelines are subject to the ex post facto clause holding that district court did not violate ex post facto clause in applying remedial holding of booker at sentencing