§ 7553b(b) and claim the court was divested of authority to maintain the hold-without-bail order after two months. The delay in trial pending pretrial discovery would be attributable to defendant within the meaning of the statute. ¶ 11. At heart, § 7553b is a speedy trial rule. It is a fundamental characteristic of speedy trial assertions that a defendant must make his or her desires to get to trial known to the court. Indeed, this Court adopted this principle in response to U.S. Supreme Court precedent. This adoption — as well as the four factors used to determine whether violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial has occurred — was described in State v. Unwin, 139 Vt. 186, 424 A.2d 251 (1980). There, this Court stated that “[i]n Barker, the Cou 971 A.2d 665 (mem.) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 13. Following this precedent, it is clear
holding that defendants assertion of his right to a speedy trial two months before his trial began did not satisfy this barker factor holding the defendant did not demonstrate a denial of his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial where even though the delay was substantial and the defendant was detained pretrial for three years the fault for the delay was shared and the defendant continued to request continuances following his assertion for the right to a speedy trial holding a trial court erred in determining that a motion to suppress was waived by a speedy trial demand holding original proceeding appropriate vehicle for resolution of defendants pretrial claim that he has been denied a speedy trial holding that aggressiveness with which defendant asserted his speedy trial right was lacking because he merely filed one demand for speedy trial and opposed his original counsels withdrawal