at the Operating Companies’ level, that “excess” cash is not being offered to Colony which is continuing to accrue unpaid interest and enforcement expenses. Further, the Debtors’ budget proves that any net operating income that is being realized is insufficient to cover the costs of this case. Allowing such a case to remain in chapter 11 when it is administratively insolvent is not appropriate. The Debtors argue that the operating cash can be used to pay administrative expenses of these cases. They assert that the provision of the Limited Liability Company Agreement prohibiting Mezz II from incurring any obligations so long as Colony remains unpaid is not enforceable because it interferes with Mezz II’s fundamental right to file bankruptcy. See, e.g., Gen. Growth, 409 B.R. at 55, 72 (<HOLDING>); In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 275 B.R.
holding pursuant to bankruptcy rule 7004b9 that because the creditor mailed the complaint and summons to the debtors attorney and to the address listed in the debtors bankruptcy petition service of process was sufficient even if the debtors were out of the country and did not actually receive notice of the complaint and summons holding employer bank violated section 525b when it transferred debtor from a position as a teller to a position in the bookkeeping department that did not involve the handling of cash transactions solely because of a notice of debtors bankruptcy in the local newspaper holding that debtors special purpose entity structure did not prevent the upstreaming of cash from the operating entities to other debtors pursuant to a motion for use of cash collateraldip financing motion and that trust structure used did not make one debtor ineligible to file for bankruptcy holding that a debtor in bankruptcy may claim as exempt the cash surrender value of a life insurance policy insuring the life of the debtor that is payable to a beneficiary other than the debtor under dccode ann  314716a2001 despite the absence of the term cash surrender from the statute holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing