is that the 60-day vacancy clause was waived because one of Kelleher’s adjustors advised him that there were no time constraints for repairs of property damaged by Hurricane Katrina and that the 60-day vacancy clause was waived for such properties. According to Dr. Chapital, he was never informed that the 60-day vacancy clause had been reinstated until Citizens denied his fire claim. Dr. Chapital’s sole support for his position is his own affidavit, quoted earlier in this opinion, in which he attests to these facts. Kelleher, joined by Citizens, contends that Dr. Chapital’s affidavit should be disregarded because it is inconsistent with his earlier deposition testimony. See Row v. Pierremont Plaza, LLC, 35,796, p. 15 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/3/02), 814 So.2d 124, 131 (citation omitted) (<HOLDING>). In his deposition, Dr. Chapital testified
holding that a deposition is the time for the plaintiff to make a record capable of surviving summary judgment  not a later filed affidavit holding that to have standing under the cfa a private party must plead a claim of ascertainable loss that is capable of surviving a motion for summary judgment holding that it is well settled that a plaintiff may not create a factual issue for the purpose of defeating a motion for summary judgment by filing an affidavit contradicting a statement the plaintiff made in a prior deposition holding that in order to have standing under the act a private party must plead a claim of ascertainable loss that is capable of surviving a motion for summary judgment holding that the court may disregard an affidavit submitted solely for the purpose of opposing a motion for summary judgment when that affidavit is directly contradicted by deposition testimony and the nonmovant does not explain the discrepancies