(“The Government must prove that the defendant [had] a purpose of causing actual financial harm to another.”), aff'd, 462 F.3d 131 (2d Cir.2006); United States v. Thomas, 315 F.3d 190, 200 (3d Cir.2002) (“We believe that, given the legislative intent, harm or loss to the bank must be contemplated by the wrongdoer....”); United States v. Jimenez, 77 F.3d 95, 97 (5t Cir.2003) (“We agree that the intent must be to injure or harm.... It is sufficient that the defendant by material misrepresentations intends the victim to accept a substantial risk that otherwise would not have been taken.”). We can say with confidence that our analysis of “intent to harm” is consistent with the analysis of at least three of the circuits relied on by defendants. See, e.g., Edelmann, 458 F.3d at 812 (<HOLDING>); Carlo, 507 F.3d at 802; United States v.
holding that proof of willfulness in criminal tax cases requires negating a defendants claim of ignorance of the law or a claim that because of a misunderstanding of the law he had a goodfaith belief that he was not violating the law holding that a defendants goodfaith belief that he intended to repay the loans he procured through misrepresentation was not a defense to wire fraud holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid the securities fraud exception by pleading mail fraud or wire fraud if the conduct giving rise to those offenses also amounts to securities fraud holding in a civil rico case based upon predicate acts of mail and wire fraud that the plaintiff must plead a material misrepresentation of fact that was calculated or intended to deceive persons of reasonable prudence and comprehension and that the plaintiff relied upon that material misrepresentation to establish the fraud statutes requisite scheme to defraud holding that such a belief is a knowing misrepresentation