that supports his conclusion” f Dr. Rushing’s causation opinion is sufficient as to the medical doctors, it is nevertheless insufficient as to Dr. Davis-son because it fails to specifically discuss or link Dr. Davisson’s failure to meet the standard 981565, at *3 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi Nov. 25, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Therefore, we conclude and hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling appellants’ objections as to the causation part of Dr. Rushing’s report. And because Dr. Rushing’s report is sufficient as to causation, it is of no import that Dr. Helge is not qualified to render an opinion on causation. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 74.351(i); Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Rosa, 240 S.W.3d 565, 570-72 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>); cf. Walgreen Co. v. Rieger, 243 S.W.3d 183,
holding that causation section of expert medical report was not eonclusory when read in context of entire report holding expert report requirement fulfilled in claim against nurse by providing expert report of nurse as to standard of care and expert report of medical doctor as to causation holding that a nurse practitioners opinion constituted an acceptable medical source where the nurse worked closely under the supervision of the doctor such that the nurse was acting as an agent of the doctor holding that nurse who is familiar with the standard of care at another similar hospital can qualify by experience to testify as a medical expert in a medical malpractice action recognizing that purely vicarious liability claim against entity as opposed to direct liability claim did not require expert report in addition to report filed regarding doctor employed by entity