was not under arrest and elected to say nothing in response. In his closing argument, the prosecutor twice referred to Edwards’ failure to respond to the officer’s statement. The prosecutor pointed out that Edwards neither professed his ignorance about the bulge nor asked the officer what he was talking about when the officer said he noticed a large bulge. The State contends the two statements should not be construed as comments on Edwards’ silence because Edwards had not invoked his right to remain silent but instead, had volunteered information and engaged in conversation with Bishop, the investigating officer. Pre-arrest silence has not been accorded the same federal constitutional protection as post-arrest silence. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U. S. 610 (96 SC 2240, 49 LE2d 91) (1976) (<HOLDING>); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U. S. 231, 239 (100
holding that the government can use prearrest silence for impeachment purposes against a defendant because no government action induced the silence holding that the government may comment on a defendants prearrest premiranda silence as well as his postarrest pr emiranda silence holding that fresh miranda warnings are necessary after right to silence has been invoked holding that it is improper for prosecutor to comment on accuseds postarrest silence holding that the government cannot use postarrest silence against a defendant because miranda warnings give implicit assurances that silence will not be used against a person and accordingly it would be fundamentally unfair and a violation of due process to allow a defendants silence to be used to impeach him at trial