provider class. Since judgment was entered for the providers, judgment could not also be entered for the clients to pass through to the providers. In accordance with this court’s policy of preventing double recovery, we affirm the trial judge’s ruling. ¶38 Although the parties cite no case law regarding this precise type of double recovery — judgment both for contractors that were not paid for providing services to clients and for the clients themselves — Washington courts have consistently implemented rules designed to prevent double recoveries. See Lange v. Town of Woodway, 79 Wn.2d 45, 49, 483 P.2d 116 (1971) (adopting the election of remedies doctrine for “the sole purpose of preventing double redress for a single wrong”); Rice v. Janovich, 109 Wn.2d 48, 61-62, 742 P.2d 1230 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Sherry v. Fin. Indem. Co., 160 Wn.2d 611,
holding that for res judicata purposes the cause of action is the same when substantially the same evidence would support a recovery in both actions holding that the trial court erred by giving a misleading instruction holding that the trial court erred by giving jury instructions for both assault and outrage for the same conduct because it allowed for the possibility of double recovery holding that it is wellsettled that although a plaintiff is entitled to full recovery for its damages it is not entitled to a double recovery for the same loss or injury holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder