have not been concluded, finished, or determined by a final judgment.’” US West, 1999-NMSC-024, ¶ 14, 127 N.M. 375, 981 P.2d 789 (quoting Stockard v. Hamilton, 25 N.M. 240, 245, 180 P. 294, 295 (1919)). As stated in Stockard, This provision of the Constitution was inserted for the purpose of curing a well-known method, too often used in the days when New Mexico was under a territorial form of government, to win cases in the courts by legislation which changed the rules of evidence and procedure in cases which were then being adjudicated by the various courts of the state. Id. at 245, 180 P. at 295. Article IV, Section 34 applies as well to legislative action that changes a substantive right or remedy. See Hillelson v. Republic Ins. Co., 96 N.M. 36, 37-38, 627 P.2d 878, 879-80 (1981) (<HOLDING>). Although it may not be easy to discern the
holding that change of statutory interest rate on judgments from six to ten percent per annum affected a right or remedy under article iv section 34 holding that nonconsensual oversecured tax claim is entitled to the statutory rate of interest unless the statutory rate constitutes a penalty holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding prejudgment interest at the colorado statutory rate of 8 percent holding that where the proper rate of interest was eight percent but the court ordered six percent movant had waived right to higher rate by not raising the issue earlier in its petition for review holding that bonds that bore interest at one percent per annum plus on supplemental coupons up to 212 additional interest per annum to the extent net revenues are available were not negotiable instruments because the supplemental coupons indefinite interest rate failed to state a sum certain under section 3106