students. Therefore, E.C. does not have a plausible claim pursuant to Section 1981 against Saint Stanislaus and McRaney. B. MHSAA, Gulfport School District, and Howard McNeill The defendants argue that, pursuant to Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 126 S.Ct. 1246, 163 L.Ed.2d 1069 (2006), E.C.’s Section 1981 claim must be dismissed, because his claim is not based on a contractual relationship under which he has rights. However, the Domino’s case related solely to a contract claim made pursuant to Section 1981. See Domino’s, 546 U.S. at 475-76, 126 S.Ct. 1246. E.C.’s Section 1981 claim is made pursuant to the equal benefits clause of the statute. Therefore, the Domino’s case is distinguishable. See Mazloum v. D.C. Metro. Police Dep’t, 522 F.Supp.2d 24, 38-39 (D.D.C.2007) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the defendants’ arguments in this
holding that in light of engquist the equal protection clause does not apply to a public employee asserting a violation of the clause based on a class of one theory of liability holding that when an arbitration clause has provisions that defeat the remedial purpose of the statute  the arbitration clause is not enforceable and that the language insulating an employer from damages and equitable relief renders the clause unenforceable holding that neither the due process clause nor the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment require the appointment of counsel on a petition for discretionary review to a state supreme court holding that discrimination based on religion is subjected to strict scrutiny whether a claim arises under the establishment clause the free exercise clause of equal protection clause holding that the dominos decision only pertained to the contract clause of the statute and that a plaintiff asserting an equal benefits clause claim need not rely on a contractual relationship