from his home in response to shouted commands, Morgan could not have known that his vehicle was blocked or his home surrounded by officers. The same is true here. Because Young apparently did not hear Raifsnider’s knocking at the front door, he presumably did not know that police were present at the front and a the rear of his property or that his vehicle was blocked. 11 . “When he stood up, when I saw this man stand up, I saw there was a gun in a hoster on his right side. I yelled, told the officers that he had a gun.” Burton’s Resp. to Young's Interrog. 10. 12 . The Sixth Circuit has, under some circumstances, recognized the legitimacy of the knock and talk technique beyond the front door to inquiry at the back door. See Hardesty v. Hamburg Township, 461 F.3d 646, 654 (6th Cir.2006)(<HOLDING>); Thomas, 430 F.3d at 280 (offi cers knocking
holding that the warrantless entry was permissible where the officers knew the defendant was inside had been involved in a serious accident was bleeding and where they received no response after knocking on the front door for several minutes entered the residence holding that the defendant committed assault under section 70813 where he came into the apartment for about two seconds with a gun in his right hand held the gun straight down at his side said wrong door then closed the door and started knocking on the other apartments door holding that the protective sweep incident to the defendants arrest in front of his house on suspicion of murder was not justified because the evidence that an accomplice was involved in the murder did not equate to evidence that someone would be hiding out in the defendants house a month after the crime occurred and at the time of the arrest the officers were not chasing the defendant from a crime scene holding where knocking at the front door is unsuccessful in spite of indications that someone is in or around the house an officer may take reasonable steps to speak with the person being sought out even where such steps require an intrusion into the curtilage holding that a drug sniff outside the front door of the defendants residence was not a fourth amendment search because the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy at the entrance to property that is open to the public including the front porch