268 (2010) (footnote and citations omitted). While we have not found a case in Maryland on the precise point before us, the Court of Appeals has recognized that the prosecutor may not comment on the defendant’s decision not to testify during trial. See Marshall v. State, 415 Md. 248, 261, 999 A.2d 1029 (2010) (“the federal constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination prohibits prosecutorial comment on the accused’s silence or failure to testify”) (quoting Smith v. State, 367 Md. 348, 353, 787 A.2d 152 (2001), in turn, citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965)). There seems little reason to apply a different standard to Frazier’s decision whether or not to exercise the constitutional right to trial by jury. Cf. Jo 980, 985 (Colo.1988) (<HOLDING>); Bell v. State, 723 So.2d 896, 897
holding trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to improper argument about defendants exercise of his right to a jury trial and stating that the prosecution cannot use the defendants exercise of specific fundamental constitutional guarantees against him at trial holding that the prosecutors request that the jury send a message to the community was improper in the guilt phase of the trial but was not so flagrantly improper as to constitute plain error holding that a prosecutors remarks referring to defense witnesses as a pack of liars were improper but not fundamental error court unable to review on appeal because trial counsel failed to preserve error holding that the prosecutors improper remarks referring to the defendants exercise of his constitutional right to a trial by jury was not plain error requiring reversal recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights