be given controlling effect; rather, all the provisions must be considered -with reference to the whole instrument.” Id. Here, we believe the policy at issue can be given a definite legal meaning and is not reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning; therefore, we hold the policy is unambiguous as a matter of law. The policy specifies SLIC will provide Wink a defense against claims arising from negligent errors or omissions resulting in civil violation of “[a]ny federal, state or local Truth-in-Lending statute.” We see nothing in the policy’s language that would limit Wink’s coverage to actions based on alleged violations of the federal TILA and its specific state or local counterparts. See Fredericks v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 140 Or.App. 269, 915 P.2d 472, 476 (1996) (<HOLDING>). We therefore hold the policy’s plain language
holding the same where the plaintiff alleged breach of a contract provision that incorporated federal law by reference and breach of a new york statute by failing to provide uniform rates allegedly required by federal law holding policy provision promising defense costs for an alleged violation of any federal state or local    truth in lending    law was unambiguous and required a defense whenever a cause alleged facts that could be a violation of any law that has as its purpose the same objectives as the federal truthinlending act tila and its state and local counterparts holding that violation of state law was not a per se constitutional violation holding that the state law contract claim alleged the same conduct as in the erisa claim and was therefore preempted recognizing that plaintiff failed to prove a violation of the law of the land clause in the north carolina constitution because pjlaintiffs were unable to establish a federal due process violation and the constitutional claims state and federal are analyzed the same way