additional journal entries offered in this case did not provide much additional information to assist in this inquiry. The state court’s journal entry for the plea hearing simply states that Thornton pleaded guilty to Count II of the information: burglary, in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3715 (1992); the entry for the sentencing hearing adds nothing substantive to the journal entry for the plea hearing. To the extent these are “comparable judicial records,” they are unable to provide the necessary information to determine whether Thornton pleaded guilty to generic burglary. See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26, 125 S.Ct. 1254 (including “comparable judi cial records” as documents to be utilized in determining whether a conviction qualifies under the ACCA); see also Forrest, 611 F.3d at 913 (<HOLDING>). We conclude that Shepard requires more than
holding that a court can look only to the statutory elements charging documents and jury instructions to determine whether an earlier conviction after trial qualified as a violent felony under the acca holding that courts should look to the statutory definition of the crime charged rather than the actual facts of the individuals prior conviction to determine whether the crime qualifies as a violent felony under the acca holding there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the defendant did not intend to perform when the promise was made holding that the district court did not err in finding the record sufficient to conclude prior conviction qualified as a violent felony for purposes of the acca as the evidence was sufficient to conclude the criminal action charged in one court was the basis for a judgment against the defendant in a different court holding that district court did not abuse discretion in denying motion for new trial because nonmovant presented sufficient evidence at trial for the district court to conclude that the outcome was not against the great weight of the evidence so as to constitute a miscarriage of justice