court acted unreasonably in refusing to grant relief from the judgment. On the other hand, a trial court may err as a matter of law in entering a default judgment. See, e.g., Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 95 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (indicating that amount of damages awarded in default judgment cannot exceed amount prayed for in complaint or be unsupported by evidence in record); Stevens v. Collard, 837 P.2d 593, 595 (Utah App.1992) (concluding that before rendering judgment by default, trial court must first conclude that “the uncontroverted allegations of an applicant’s petition are, on their face, legally sufficient to establish a valid claim against the defaulting party”), cert. denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993); P & B Land, Inc. v. Klungervik, 751 P.2d 274, 276-77 (Utah App.1988) (<HOLDING>). Even in these cases, the party asserting the
holding that in considering the appellants opposition to the motion for a default judgment it is proper to apply the rule 55c standard for setting aside the entry of a default holding that the trial court was without authority to set aside entry of default on motion to set aside default judgment holding that trial court must make entry of default prior to entry of default judgment and court may not make entry of default when there is no default in law or in fact holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that motion to set aside default made at least seven months after defendant learned of entry of default was not made within a reasonable time holding that default termination is government claim