the merits of a constitutional claim, but that every prisoner will at some point have the opportunity for such review. See, e.g., Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236, 1244 (11th Cir.1999). According to Wofford, the entire federal criminal procedure statutory scheme, encompassing trial, direct appeal, and one opportunity for collateral review, ensures that “a petitioner will have had ‘an unobstructed procedural shot at getting his sentence vacated.’ That does not mean that he took the shot ... the Constitution requires [only] that the procedural opportunity existed.” Id. (quoting In Re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir.1998)). Townsend, of course, has already had two opportunities to raise the claim he asserts here. See Lee v. Chandler, No. 98-6721, 2000 WL 658019 (6th Cir. May 8, 2000) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, Townsend presented this very
holding that that if the success of a  1983 damages claim brought by a prisoner would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence the prisoner may only bring the claim where the conviction or sentence has been invalidated holding that prisoner has had multiple unobstructed procedural shots at his conviction and sentence holding a prisoner has no constitutional right to a job in prison holding that a state prisoner may not challenge the constitutionality of his conviction in a suit for damages under 42 usc  1983 holding that the county was liable for the sheriffs failure to release a prisoner who had completed a sentence