of a case in light of the concerns that underlie the rule facilitates confident decision. In this case, the district court declined to enforce Murchison’s promises to negotiate a new, more favorable put option and to review Neeley’s salary and bonus package. We agree that those commitments must fall for indefiniteness. The first promise represents an agreement to agree. We do not doubt, however, that Neeley and Murchison, both acute businessmen, intended the engagement to have some legal effect. Moreover, the arrangement under the 1976 agreement, which at least suggests a course of dealing, provides some evidence that they had a notion of the terms they meant ultimately to embody in a formal contract. See, e.g., Morgan v. Young, 203 S.W.2d 837 (Tex.Civ.App.1947, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 33
holding that course of dealing may render uncertain terms sufficiently definite recognizing an agreement to agree is enforceable if its terms are reasonably definite and certain recognizing that a contract which is incomplete uncertain or indefinite in its material terms will not be specifically enforced in equity recognizing that course of dealing may establish limitation of damages as part of parties bargain in fact but finding record was devoid of any evidence to establish a prior course of dealing between parties holding that the trial court erred by imposing a duty of good faith on seattlefirst in relation to a course of dealing when that course of dealing conflicted with the express terms of the contract