he contends that he alleged that the Department stripped him of the “integral and material responsibilities of a detective.” According to Thompson, he no longer functions as a detective; he has been effectively demoted to the position of an assistant detective. This court has recognized that the mere “loss of some job responsibilities” does not constitute an adverse employment action. See Williams v. U.S. Dept, of Navy, 149 Fed.Appx. 264, 269-70 (5th Cir.2005); Hernandez v. Crawford Bldg. Material Co., 321 F.3d 528, 532 n. 2 (5th Cir.2003) (citing Mota v. Univ. of Tex. Hous. Health Sci. Ctr., 261 F.3d 512, 521 (5th Cir.2001) for the proposition that the “loss of some job duties” is not an ultimate employment decision); Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 511-12 (5th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Other circuits similarly agree that “a mere
holding that transfer involving no reduction in pay and only a minor change in working conditions does not rise to the level of a material adverse employment action holding that defendants decision to change the office schedule without allowing plaintiff leave to alter his personal schedule did not constitute an adverse action although plaintiff alleged that because of the schedule revisions he was forced to come in two hours early for his shift a mere inconvenience is not sufficiently adverse to sustain a prima facie case recognizing that a set of actions may constitute an adverse employment action when considered collectively even though some actions do not rise to the level of an adverse employment action individually holding a transfer or reassignment may rise to the level of an adverse employment condition if it is a significant change in working conditions holding that a change in work schedule and request that an employee perform two additional tasks did not rise to the level of an adverse employment action