defendant from liability, given that when a party wishes to exculpate itself from negligence liability “a greater degree of clarity is necessary to make the exculpatory clause effective than would be required for other types of contract provisions.” Id. at 375, 553 A.2d at 145. The opening paragraph of the release recites that operating a motorcycle is inherently dangerous and that operation may result in injury. The release then waives “any claim” resulting from the operation. Base aska Supreme Court’s decision in Moore v. Hartley Motors Inc., 444, 447 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (finding release not specific enough to bar recovery for injuries from amusement park’s negligence during a horseback ride). But see Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 711-12 (Wyo. 1987) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, we conclude that plaintiff
holding that the basis of liability is negligence and not injury holding that exculpatory clause in release plaintiff signed as part of a health club membership agreement was not specific enough to release club from negligence liability holding the district courts revocation of defendants term of supervised release did not end the courts jurisdiction over defendants release holding a defense based on a contractual waiver and release of liability did not permit the award of attorneys fees in a negligence action holding that release unambiguously released defendants from negligence liability even though the release did not include the word negligence because there was no other rational purpose for which the exculpatory language could have been intended