with a four-year figure, the majority erroneously assumes that Paz could have raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim as soon as his attorney filed Paz’s opening brief in that appeal. That is utter nonsense. In order to make out a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), a defendant must show not only deficient performance by counsel but also prejudice resulting therefrom. Thus, Paz could not state a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal under the Strickland test until he had suffered the prejudice of losing on appeal. Hence, the date from which the majority should set its clock is the date the appeal became final. Cf. Chicoine v. Bignall, 122 Idaho 482, 835 P.2d 1293 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Paz’s appeal was decided on June 13, 1990,
holding that a notice of claim period did not begin to run until discovery of the injury holding that the statute of limitations for an attorney malpractice suit did not begin to run until the client had suffered some actual damage holding that the statute of limitations for attorney malpractice may begin to run before the plaintiff knows the full extent of his damages holding at least under the facts of the case that the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice action did not begin to run until the plaintiff secured a specific medical diagnosis holding the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the owning spouse reaches a pay status