statute, which is patterned on the Model Penal Code, permits prosecution “against a person who places another in fear of bodily injury, even if the alleged assailant acts without purpose to carry out the threat”). I, therefore, disagree with the majority opinion’s holding that although Carter “had no actual ability to harm the officer with a gun, his conduct ... denoted an intention and the present ability to harm the officer.” I would hold that Carter committed an “act accompanied with circumstances denoting an intention” to menace but it was not “coupled with a present ability of using actual violence” or “calculated to produce the end if carried into execution.” Harper, 196 Va. at 733, 85 S.E.2d at 255. See e.g. People v. Marceaux, 3 Cal.App.3d 613, 83 Cal.Rptr. 798, 803 (1970) (<HOLDING>); People v. Vaiza, 244 Cal.App.2d 121, 52
holding that specific intent is not element of assault resulting in serious bodily injury holding that evidence that a defendant would have had an intent to mil only if a particular event occurred is not sufficient to convict defendant of assault with intent to mil holding that an information charging defendant with offense of burglary that alleged that the defendant had committed an assault was not defective for failing to further allege specific facts that constituted assault holding that an assault cannot be accomplished by words alone there must be an overt act evidencing some corporeal threat holding that an assault conviction cannot be predicted upon an intent only to frighten