F.3d 1030, 1049 (11th Cir.1995). Congress explicitly included certain private rights of action in the IGRA; for example, a Tribe may sue the Chairman of the National Indian Gaming Commission if a management contract is not approved or disapproved within the period set by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 2711(d), and all decisions of the Commission are subject to federal judicial review, 25 U.S.C. § 2714. See Tamiami Partners, Ltd., 63 F.3d at 1049. “‘[Wjhen legislation expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, courts should not expand the coverage of the statute to subsume other remedies.’ ” Id. (quoting National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Assoc. of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458, 94 S.Ct. 690, 693, 38 L.Ed.2d 646 (1974)); Davids v. Coyhis, 869 F.Supp. 1401, 1410 (E.D.Wis.1994) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, the Court holds that plaintiffs
holding the federal tort claims act did not permit exercise of pendant jurisdiction over additional parties as to which no basis for federal jurisdiction existed holding that just because a claim implicates a federal issue or involves construction of federal law does not necessarily give rise to a federal question and confer removal jurisdiction on a federal court holding that igras specific grant of federal jurisdiction for certain actions indicates congress intended to limit federal jurisdiction to those instances holding that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over securities act class actions recognizing that the csra did not explicitly limit federal court jurisdiction to enjoin unconstitutional personnel actions by federal agencies