indicate that identifying the proper FDCPA subsections is typically sufficient for pleading purposes. See, e.g., McMillan v. Collection Professionals, Inc., 455 F.3d 754, 759 (7th Cir.2006) (complaint simply alleging that a collection letter was “confusing” in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g was enough to survive a motion to dismiss); Som, 573 F.Supp.2d at 358-59 (complaint alleging violations of enumerated FDCPA subsections adequately stated a claim to survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)); Edwards v. Zigler, 2009 WL 3429661, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Oct. 22, 2009) (granting motion to dismiss FDCPA claim, but specifically noting that plaintiff did not specify which statutory subsection was allegedly violated); Stark v. Hudson & Keyse LLC, 2008 WL 4866046, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2008) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, this case is virtually identical to a
holding that a single violation of 15 usc  1692e was enough to allege civil liability under the fdcpa holding that equitable relief is not available to an individual under this section of the fdcpa holding that back rent is debt under the fdcpa holding that debt under the fdcpa is limited to liability arising out of consensual consumer transactions and not tortious activity holding that pleadings are initial communication under fdcpa