charge. See, e.g., Connelly v. State, 298 Ga. App. 223, 225 (679 SE2d 790) (2009) (physical precedent) (defendant’s knowledge that he did not have the right to flee the encounter); Williams v. State, 285 Ga. App. 190, 192 (1) (645 SE2d 676) (2007) (physical precedent) (defendant’s knowledge that the officer was pursuing him); Veal v. State, 226 Ga. App. 897 (487 SE2d 696) (1997) (defendant’s knowledge that the officer “sought him”); Cline v. State, 221 Ga. App. 175, 175-176 (471 SE2d 24) (1996) (defendant’s knowledge that the officers had come to “effectuate his arrest”). At trial, Green challenged the state’s ability to show that he knowingly failed to comply with a lawful command of a law enforcement officer. In defense of the obstruction charge, Green argued that d 861) (2004) (<HOLDING>); McClendon v. State, 12 Ga. App. 691, 692 (78
holding that defendant who admitted that he knew when he deliberately drove off in his truck that he was disobeying an officers lawful order to park his truck at the side of the road had engaged in conduct that was both knowing and willful holding that a truck drivers injury from a fall in the shower of a truck stop while off duty was not compensable holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present holding that an officers belief that he had observed the occupants of a truck participate in a drug transaction supported a valid investigatory detention of the truck and its occupants holding that a fire fighter was using a fire truck when he was standing 2025 feet from the truck using a clipboard and writing pad that were stored in the truck