report and were afforded an opportunity to comment on its findings. 35 See Dripps, “Living with Leon," 95 Yale L.J. 906 n.5 (1986). 36 Other commentators have expressed similar concerns. See Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 26, at 109-10, 114-15; Kamisar, supra note 1, at 662-63. 37 It should be noted that Justice White assumes that the application of the exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings would nevertheless be accompanied by a good-faith exception. 38 Compare McFarland v. State, 284 Ark. 533, —, 684 S.W.2d 233, 243 (1985) (adopting modification to exclusionary rule as set forth in Leon); McCary v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 219, 231-33, 321 S.E.2d 637, 644 (1984) (“embracing” the good-faith exception announced in Leon); State v. Bolt, 142 Ariz, 260, 269, 689 P.2d 519, 528 (1984) (<HOLDING>); State v. Welch, 316 N.C. 578, 588-89, 342
holding as a general rule of contract law if no other meaning is reasonable the court shall rule as a matter of law that the meaning is established holding that due process requires exclusionary rule to be applied in state trials holding that exclusionary rule to be applied as a matter of state law is no broader than the federal rule holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to proceedings other than criminal trials holding that the exclusionary rule should not be applied to searches which relied on fifth circuit law that was subsequently overturned