dichotomy in stressing that, because Congress failed to address the retroactive impact of the Act’s amendments to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 and 2255, no legislative intent can be discerned and the courts should proceed to the second stage of Landgraf analysis wherein retroactivity is predicated upon considerations of basic fairness and settled legal rights. Reyes v. Keane, 90 F.3d 676, 679 (2d Cir.1996); see also Hunter v. United States, 101 F.3d 1565, 1570 (11th Cir.1996) (en banc) ("The fairest inference from the variety of applicability provisions throughout the [Act] is that Congress was quite capable of and willing to express its intent about prospective or retrospective application when it had such an intent.”); but see Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1494-97 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). 4 . See footnote 2. 5 . See, e.g., Griffith
holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty holding that subsequent acts cannot be applied retroactively to the bioc analysis holding that the first stage of landgraf analysis is conclusive and that only the acts habeas amendments for death penalty cases may be applied retrospectively holding that defendant may be subject to death penalty on resentencing holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants