as to whether § 1396n is privately enforceable through § 1983. See e.g., Ball v. Rodgers, 492 F.3d 1094, 1116-17 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding sufficient rights-containing language under § 1396n(c)(2)(C)); Michelle P. ex rel. Deisenroth v. Holsinger, 356 F.Supp.2d 763, 769 (E.D. Ky. 2005) (same); Steward v. Abbott, 189 F.Supp.3d 620, 635-37 (W.D. Tex. 2016) (finding § 1396n(c)(2)(B) and (C) reflect a “congressional intent to create a right in those individuals to such evaluations and information”); Masterman v. Goodno, No. Civ.03-2939, 2004 WL 51271, at *10 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2004) (disagreeing that § 1396n is not privately enforceable simply because it speaks about the entity regulated rather than individuals benefit). But see M.A.C. v. Betit, 284 F.Supp.2d 1298, 1307 (D. Utah 2003) (<HOLDING>); Gaines v. Hadi, No. 06-60129-civ-seitzmc,
holding that the interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law holding that under texas choice of law principles contractual choice of law provisions are generally upheld recognizing freedom of personal choice in matters concerning marriage and family life protected by fourteenth amendment holding freedom of choice plans unconstitutional holding that the freedom of choice provisions do not contain the unambiguous rightscreating language of gonzaga