or possess child pornography directly contribute to this continuing victimization.”). Also, the fact that the offender did not commit a more serious crime by molesting a child, did not mean his offense was dramatically different from other child pornography cases so as to warrant a substantial downward variance. Id. at 260. We have no difficulty concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in evaluating the seriousness of the offense by finding that the further distribution of child pornography by defendant involved re-victimization of the children in those images, or by rejecting the claim that the sharing and redistribution of child pornography already in circulation did not result in additional harm. See United States v. Bistline, 665 F.3d 758, 766 (6th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>), petition for cert. filed, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct.
holding twentyeight charges against defendant for possession of child pornography were not multiplicious recognizing continuing harm from defendants knowing possession of child pornography recognizing common use of computers and internet in child pornography offenses holding that private possession of child pornography is not protected by the first amendment holding that possession of a pistol in public requires knowing possession