in specific instances where an officer or director is found to have engaged in any unsafe or unsound practice does not limit the Board’s power to individual instances. As the Defendants’ point out, the NASCUS Plaintiffs’ theory is flawed because under that theory the agency would be limited to taking action against particular institutions or individuals after problems had developed, never allowing the agency to address problems through rules of general applicability. See Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan, 458 U.S. at 163, 102 S.Ct. 3014 (“‘all parts of a statute, if possible, are to be given effect’ ”) (quoting American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 513, 101 S.Ct. 2478, 69 L.Ed.2d 185 (1981); United Air Lines v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 766 F.2d 1107, 1111 (7th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>)). Finally, Plaintiffs contend that the NCUA
holding that the regulations giving the corps authority to issue cease and desist orders with respect to filling in absence of a permit and to order removal of fill placed in the absence of apermit were reasonably related to the corps statutory permit granting authority and therefore valid holding that chevron deference is due only when the agency acts pursuant to delegated authority and the agency action has the force of law holding that agency has the authority to issue regulations prohibiting deceptive practices pursuant to its general rulemaking authority and noting in the statute indicates that statutory cease and desist proceedings were intended to be exclusive holding grant of authority to an agency to adopt rules necessary to carry out this chapter clearly vested in the agency authority to interpret a statute holding that regulations promulgated pursuant to an express congressional grant of rulemaking authority will be upheld unless they are arbitrary capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute