Shriver testified that even today he “would not try to get Ms. Sinclair taken off a case,” and that “[s]he’s wonderful. She might demean[] her abilities, but she’s a dam good attorney.” ¶ 64 The relative inexperience of a second-chair defense attorney in capital trials does not in itself constitute IAC, especially when the first-chair attorney, like Sinclair, was experienced. Indeed, “[defendants facing the death penalty do not have a per se constitutional right to the assistance of two attorneys.” State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1, 35 (Tenn. 2010); see also Bell v. Watkins, 692 F.2d 999, 1009 (5th Cir. 1982) (“Although Mississippi courts may customarily appoint two lawyers in a capital case, the Constitution dictates no such requirement.”); Smith v. State, 445 So.2d 227, 230 (Miss. 1984) (<HOLDING>). This is reiterated in Committee Comment to
holding that when counsel is constitutionally mandated under weeks and graham section 9240519 does not prohibit or preclude appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in seeking collateral review holding that the constitution does not require the appointment of two attorneys for indigent capital defendants recognizing the common practice of substituting specialized capital counsel for habeas petitions filed by capital defendants holding that an indigent litigants right to appointed counsel has been recognized to exist only where she may be deprived of her physical liberty that the constitution does not require the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in every parentalstatus termination proceeding and that the decision whether due process calls for the appointment of counsel is to be answered in the first instance by the trial court subject to appellate review holding on equal protection grounds that meaningful first appeal requires appointment of counsel for indigent defendants