statutes applied to convicted defendants in Fuller and Haines is absent here. See Haines, 360 N.W.2d at 797 (“It is this ‘reasonably able to pay1 standard which allows section 910.2 to withstand constitutional attack.”). We conclude chapter 815.9, as applied to acquitted defendants, infringes on their federal and state right to counsel. See Olson v. James, 603 F.2d 150, 155 (10th Cir.1979) (stating court may not constitutionally order a defendant to repay court-appointed attorney fees “unless he is able to pay them or will be able to pay them in the future considering his financial resources” and concluding statute that made repayment mandatory without regard to ability to pay had chilling effect on defendant’s right to counsel); Fitch v. Belshaw, 581 F.Supp. 273, 277 (D.Or.1984) (<HOLDING>); State v. Tennin, 674 N.W.2d 403, 410-11
holding that a criminal defendant has a sixth amendment right to counsel at trial holding that the sixth amendment right to counsel embodies the right to effective assistance of counsel holding that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the sixth amendment right to counsel recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel and the right to waive counsel holding statute that imposed repayment obligation without any procedure to determine defendants ability to pay unconstitutionally chills an indigent defendants exercise of sixth amendment right to counsel