to an inland city in the United States were "maritime contracts," even though the bills of lading called for some transportation on land. Kirby, 543 U.S. at 24-25, 125 S.Ct. 385. The Supreme Court held that the fact that the final leg of the journey occurred by rail did "not alter the essentially maritime nature of the contracts.” Id. at 24, 125 S.Ct. 385. For reasons discussed below, the essential nature of the D'Amico/Primera contract is not maritime. 2 . The plaintiff also argues in its post-trial papers that the FFA is a maritime contract because it was a contract that involved mixed maritime and non-maritime obligations, and that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that such contracts fall within admiralty jurisdiction. See Fireman's Fund, 822 F.3d at 625-26 (<HOLDING>), Williamson v. Recovery Ltd. P’ship, 542 F.3d
holding that covered employee stands in the same position as an insured in a private insurance contract recognizing that production of a written insurance policy was unnecessary to prove the existence of the policy because the proof required was proof of the fact of insurance and not of the contents of a writing holding pollution insurance policy that covered the costs of removing a dry dock and the pollutants it produced upon sinking in navigable waters was a marine insurance contract subject to the doctrine of uberrimae fidei holding that the primary goal when interpreting an insurance contract is to ascertain the intent of the parties as manifested by the language of the specific insurance policy holding that under georgia law a holder of a master insurance policy is an agent of the insurance company and not the insurer