a distinction “between judicial acts and the administrative, legislative, or executive functions that judges may on occasion be assigned by law to perform”), (emphasis added). Thus, in Consumers Union the Supreme Court afforded legislative immunity to the Virginia Supreme Court and its chief justice in connection with the promulgation of the state bar code. See Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 731-34, 100 S.Ct. at 1974-76 (“[T]he Virginia Court is exercising the State’s entire legislative power with respect to regulating the Bar, and its members are the State’s legislators for the purpose of issuing the Bar Code.”). Similarly, we have indicated that non-legislators performing legislative functions may claim legislative immunity. See Aitchison v. Raffiani, 708 F.2d 96, 99-100 (3d Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); see also Bogan, 523 U.S. at 55, 118 S.Ct. at
holding that in the absence of a legislative invasion of constitutionallyprotected rights the judicial branch of government must respect and defer to the legislatures exclusive policy decisions recognizing that citizens who exercise their rights under the initiative provisions act as and become in fact the legislative branch of the municipal government  recognizing that immigration policy is the clear purview of the legislative branch holding that it is not within the province of any court unless expressly authorized by law to review the determination of the political branch of the government to exclude a given alien holding that a mayor and a borough attorney were entitled to legislative immu nity with respect to their involvement in the passage of an ordinance eliminating the plaintiffs job position stating that we look to the function the individual performs rather than his location within a particular branch of government