our view, this “conduct [is] sufficiently deliberate that ex case could have called a magistrate judge on the telephone that very morning to obtain a new search warrant for the second-floor apartment. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(d)(3) (“[A] magistrate judge may issue a warrant based on information communicated by telephone or other reliable electronic means.”); see also United States v. Turner, 558 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir.1977) (“The Fourth Amendment is sufficiently flexible to account for such technological advances.”). And we have little doubt that Raab and the other officers involved could have detained Voustianiouk outside his apartment while they obtained a new warrant to search his home on the second floor. See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 328, 121 S.Ct. 946, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, while courts must sometimes “allow
holding that probable cause to believe the traffic code had been violated rendered the stop reasonable under the fourth amendment regardless of officers subjective intent holding that the fourth amendment was not violated when police officers with probable cause to believe that a man had hidden marijuana in his home prevented that man from entering the home for about two hours while they obtained a search warrant holding consent invalid when given under coercive circumstances in which police misrepresented that they had a warrant to search the home holding that police officers warrantless search of rented home with consent of landlord but not tenant violated tenants fourth amendment rights holding that an illegal arrest occurred when the defendant was transported without probable cause from his home to the police station for fingerprinting and that the line is crossed when the police without probable cause or a warrant forcibly remove a person from his home or other place in which he is entitled to be and transport him to the police station where he is detained although briefly for investigative purposes