sought to discharge. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking the motion. See Jackson v. State, 767 So.2d 1156, 1159 (Fla.2000); State v. Tait, 387 So.2d 338, 340 (1980). We find that claim (6) regarding inadequate funding of CCR is without merit and is further improperly brought as a successive claim. See Remeta v. State, 710 So.2d 543, 546 (Fla.1998); see also Arvelaez v. Buttenvorth, 738 So.2d 326, 326 (Fla.1999). Moreover, Rose has not alleged how he was prejudiced by the inadequate funding. Likewise, we find that claim (7) regarding electrocution is without merit. See § 922.10, Fla. Stat. (1999), amended by ch.2000-02, § 1, Laws of Fla. ("A death sentence shall be executed by electrocution or lethal injection...."); Bryan v. State, 753 So.2d 1244, 1253 (Fla.2000) (<HOLDING>). In claim (8), Rose alleges constitutional
holding that floridas current statutory scheme that provides defendants with a choice of either electrocution or lethal injection as the method of execution is constitutional and could be retroactively applied to criminal defendants sentenced prior to the statutes enactment holding that the fair sentencing act does not apply retroactively to defendants whose criminal conduct occurred before its enactment even if those defendants were sentenced after its enactment holding that a change of an element of an offense could not be applied retroactively to a crime committed prior to the statutes enactment holding statutes are not applied retroactively absent clear legislative intent recognizing the objection requirement for new state constitutional rules applied retroactively