impact’ upon the duration of his custody.” Bourke v. Hawk-Sawyer, 269 F.3d 1072, 1074 (D.C.Cir.2001) (quoting Razzoli v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 230 F.3d 371, 373 (D.C.Cir.2000)) (“habeas is indeed exclusive even when a non-habeas claim would have a merely probabilistic impact on the duration of custody.”). In Razzoli, the Circuit Court held that a prisoner could not assert a claim under the Privacy Act because his only recourse was to seek relief through a habeas petition. 230 F.3d at 376. As in this case, the prisoner’s Privacy Act claim in Razzoli alleged that the Bureau of Prisons and the Parole Commission had “violated 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(5) by maintaining in their files and using a false record, [a] report of [a] drug possession incident, even though the .C.Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). In this case, as in Razzoli and Bourke,
holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release holding that where the capital defendants future dangerousness is at issue and state law prohibits the defendants release on parole due process requires that the sentencing jury be informed that the defendant is parole ineligible holding that federal prisoners claim was properly filed as an action for habeas although he was not laying claim to an immediate release or release in the near future he is however maintaining that he is being deprived of the chance to secure his release  by unlawfully being declared ineligible for parole consideration holding that habeas petition challenging the state boards decision to defer his scheduled parole release date was rendered moot by prisoners release from custody on parole and subsequent incarceration for violating his parole holding that release discharges only persons named in or sufficiently described by terms of release