a hearing on a motion for attorney’s fees as sanctions is not the type of proceeding against the state contemplated by the statute; (2) the Legislature did not intend a parent in a dependency proceeding to be a “party” under the statute because the parent did not initiate the suit— DCF initiated by filing a petition; and (3) providing notice to DFS at the outset of the action is not possible where sanctiona-ble conduct has yet to occur. Because we hold that the plain language of the statute supports N.S.’s position, we do not address the entirety of her arguments. Courts in our state have held that section 284.30 requires notice to DFS as a condition precedent when the claim for fees is made pursuant to other statutes. Hale v. Dep’t of Rev., 973 So.2d 518, 521-22 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (<HOLDING>); Dep’t of HRS v. Cordes, 644 So.2d 609, 610
holding that section 12309 is a condition precedent to the accrual of rights against a municipality recognizing that the notice required by section 28430 is a condition precedent to the recovery of attorneys fees pursuant to section 12057lb in hospitals suit against the state holding that the notice requirement is a condition precedent for attorneys fees from section 12069 proceedings in action by plaintiff against state holding that section 28430s notice requirement is a condition precedent for fees in action by taxpayer against dor pursuant to section 213015 holding that rcras notice provision is a condition precedent to all claims