hoodwinked.” Harmon disputes the existence of any “startling event or condition” as required by the rule. While Waitt suggests the signing of the January Will could constitute such an event, he had no personal knowledge of the event and Harmon and Sullivan vigorously disputed that Cecelia appeared to be under any undue stress. ¶30 Furthermore, the signing occurred numerous hours prior to the alleged statement. Case law suggests a more demanding standard under the rule for excitement and closeness in time. See e.g. State v. Norgaard, 201 Mont. 165, 176, 653 P.2d 483, 488 (1982) (upholding a district court’s conclusion that the excited utterance rule should not apply to a statement made one hour after a verbal argument); State v. Swazio, 173 Mont. 440, 443-44, 568 P.2d 124, 126 (1977) (<HOLDING>); Sullivan v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 96 Mont.
holding eyewitnesss statement made an hour after the crime properly admitted as excited utterance based on magnitude of crime and officers testimony that witness was excited and upset when making the statement recognizing statement could be admissible as an excited utterance and still constitute a testimonial statement for purposes of a confrontation clause analysis holding statement must be made contemporaneously with the excitement or stresscausing event holding that trial counsel was not ineffective when he failed to introduce defendants prior consistent statement statement was not admissible because it was made after defendant had been arrested clearly not a time when the effect of the statement could not have been foreseen holding that a statement made by a witness to a shooting an hour or two after the incident was not an excited utterance as it was not made while the speaker was laboring under excitement and before he had to time to reflect