veniremembers before attempting to strike them, or (3) attempted a jury shuffle to remove black jurors from the strike zone. See, e.g., Moore, 265 S.W.3d at 89; see also Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 233, 125 S.Ct. at 2320-21 (court considered State’s use of jury shuffle to rearrange panel members when a number of black members were seated at front as indicative of a broader pattern of discrimination, and ultimately found that State’s strikes against blacks were also racially motivated). Significantly, the prosecutor’s conduct in exercising his peremptory strikes was consistent with his representation to the trial court that he used his strikes in an attempt to remove all veniremembers who, like Robertson, initially indicated that they could not consider life. See Watkins, 245 S.W.3d at 453 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). Specifically, of those
holding that reviewing record in its entirety prosecutors raceneutral reason was not a pretext where state applied this reason to strike black veniremember and most but not all similarly situated nonblack veniremembers holding that where a nonblack juror with no prior jury experience was empaneled the proffered reason for striking a black juror for lack of jury experience was not genuine and therefore was pretextual holding that pretext may be established by proving that prosecutors used their peremptory challenges to exclude africanamerican venirepersons for a given reason or reasons but then failed to apply the same reason or reasons to exclude similarly situated white venirepersons holding that a reason cannot be proved to be a pretext for discrimination  unless it is shown both that the reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason holding that age is an acceptable raceneutral reason for striking a prospective juror