charge of the crew.” Criminal cabals do not normally have formal organizational charts, and a finding of managerial control can support-ably be premised on how the enterprise operated in practice. See United States v. Cruz, 120 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1997) (en banc). Here, the record is replete with evidence that, either directly or by fair inference,, solidly supports the district court’s conclusion that the appellant was not “out on the street” but, instead, was responsible for overseeing retail sellers and trusted by Cabrera to exert control over other players in the enterprise. No more was exigible to ground the role-in-the-offense- enhancement. See United States v. Cruz-Rodríguez, 541 F.3d 19, 33 (1st Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Savoie, 985 F.2d 612, 616 (1st Cir. 1993) .(<HOLDING>). Next, the appellant argues that the district
holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges recognizing that a defendant need not be the head of a conspiracy in order to warrant managerial roleintheoffense enhancement holding that heightened evidentiary standard of proof is not required where the sentencing enhancement is based entirely on the extent of the conspiracy to which the defendant pled guilty holding that sentence enhancement for crimes committed against law enforcement officers may be applied when information charges qualifying offense information does not need to recite enhancement statute holding that the  2d11b1 enhancement is not limited to the charged conspiracy