For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court was without jurisdiction to try defendant on the larceny charge and that it erred in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the felony breaking or entering charge. Because there was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for misdemeanor breaking or entering, we remand for entry of judgment and resentencing on that offense. VACATED, in part; REVERSED, in part; and REMANDED. Judges STEPHENS and McCULLOUGH concur. 1 . See, e.g., State v. Cook, 242 N.C. 700, 703, 89 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1955) (evidence sufficient to preclude inference where the defendant did not flee when discovered, explained that he was looking for a particular person, and left when requested), State v. Moore, 62 N.C. App. 431, 434, 303 S.E.2d 230, 232 (1983) (<HOLDING>), State v. Humphries, 82 N.C. App. 749, 751,
holding that evidence of the same rather unusual name that the former conviction was in same county and city as the present case where evidence showed defendant lived and that the character of offenses was the same was sufficient to establish identity holding that the rule 404b evidence admitted to prove intent was clearly relevant because intent was at issue in the trial holding that a defendant owed no duty to a plaintiff with regard to the safekeeping of evidence because there was no promise by the defendant or its employees to inspect or safeguard the evidence for the plaintiffs benefit and destruction of physical evidence was not criminal because destruction was innocent and designed to ensure the safety of the defendants employees holding that the evidence was insufficient to show intent to steal if the evidence showed only possession of the materials as a normal incident of employment holding that there was sufficient evidence of innocent intent where both the states and defendants evidence showed that the defendant was coerced at knifepoint to enter