required then&emdash;and all we require now&emdash;is that the employer show that it established a § 207(k) work period and that the § 207(k) work period was regularly recurring. Id. (citations omitted). Specific reference to § 207(k) is not necessary to satisfy this standard. Consistent with our sister circuits, we decline to require more of employers to qualify for the § 207(k) exemption. See Rosano v. Twp. of Teaneck, 754 F.3d 177, 187-88 (3d Cir. 2014); Calvao v. Town of Framingham, 599 F.3d 10, 16-17 (1st Cir. 2010); Brock v. City of Cincinnati, 236 F.3d 793, 810 (6th Cir. 2001); Freeman v. City of Mobile, 146 F.3d 1292, 1297 n.3 (11th Cir. 1998); Spradling, 95 F.3d at 1505; Barefield, 81 F.3d at 710; see also Milner v. Hazelwood, 165 F.3d 1222, 1223 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). The City has satisfied the criteria for
holding that no liberty interest was implicated where the public reason for employees dismissal was that their services did not meet the expectations of the public employer holding that glc 152 15 provides that the only party immune from suit under the statute is the direct employer a special employer is not immune because the special employer is not liable for the payment of workers compensation and there was no agreement between the direct employer and the special employer that the special employer would be liable for the payment of such compensation holding that defendant need not establish that he was not engaged in unlawful activity under section 776012 holding that employer need not establish the exemption through public declaration holding that insurance company administering employerprovided disability plan was not place of public accommodation under ada because employees received their benefits through employment not through a public accommodation