class must “be defined in such a way that anyone within it would have standing.” Bur-dick v. Union Sec. Ins. Co., No. 07-4028, 2009 WL 4798873, at *4 (C.D.Cal. Dee. 9, 2009). Defendant contends that the class definitions include members who were either unexposed to the alleged misrepresentations or whose purchasing decisions were unaffected by the representations and accordingly suffered no injury. In the Ninth Circuit, “standing is satisfied [under the UCL and FAL] if at least one named plaintiff meets the requirements.... Thus, we consider only whether at least one named plaintiff satisfies the standing requirements.” Stearns v. Ticketmaster Corp., 655 F.3d 1013, 1021 (9th Cir.2011); see also Kwikset Corp. v. Sup. Ct., 51 Cal.4th 310, 328-29, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 741, 246 P.3d 877 (2011) (<HOLDING>). Here, Plaintiff Larsen contends that she was
holding alleged false information on labels sufficient for standing for ucl and fal claims holding that the furnishing of misleading information cannot support a claim for negligent misrepresentation the information must be false holding that the provisions of the false claims act allowing suit imposing liability on any person who presented false claims to the federal government did not allow suits against state governments holding that apparel cleaners submission of false statements of their receipts a percentage of which were to be paid to the united states did not constitute false claims within the meaning of the federal false claims act holding that false arrest and false imprisonment claim were not duplicative