engaged in conduct that endangered the physical and emotional well-being of the children, and that termination was in the children’s best interest. Id. at 24. Francisco filed a petition for review challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence as to the trial court’s section 161.001(1)(E) and best-interest findings, which we granted. 55 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 461 (Mar. 30, 2012). II. Standard of Review Termination of parental rights requires proof by clear and convincing evidence. This heightened standard of review is mandated not only by the Family Code, see Tex. Fam.Code § 161.001, but also the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. See, e.g., In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex.2002); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) (<HOLDING>). The Family Code defines clear and convincing
holding that state intervention to terminate the relationship between a parent and child must be accomplished by procedures meeting the requisites of the due process clause recognizing the fundamental liberty interest a parent has in his or her child and concluding that the state must provide a parent with fundamentally fair procedures including a clear and convincing evidentiary standard when seeking to terminate parental rights recognizing that the child custody act required that the natural parent presumption must be seriously considered and heavily weighted in favor of the parent but that the presumption is rebutted if the clear and convincing evidence establishes that the best interest of the child is served by awarding custody to the third party holding that in a proceeding to terminate parental rights the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof violates the due process clause and that due process requires at least a clear and convincing evidence standard holding that the clear and convincing standard provides appropriate due process in cases involving parental rights