significant change.in benefits.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Lucas, citing Annett v. University of Kansas, 371 F.3d 1233, 1239 (10th Cir. 2004), argues that “[a]cts that carry a significant risk of humiliation, damage to reputation, and a concomitant harm to future employment prospects may be considered adverse actions,” Aplt. Opening Br. at 27. He claims, without evidentiary support, that the corrective action subjected him to potential humiliation as a sexual predator. But his argument rests on a flawed legal premise: Annett defined an “adverse employment action” for purposes of a Title VII retaliation claim, which is broader than the definition of an “adverse employment action” for a Title VII discrimination claim. See Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 61-65, 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (<HOLDING>); see also Piercy, 480 F.3d at 1203 (explaining
holding that a collective bargaining agreement violated the antiretaliation provision of the age discrimination in employment act because on its face it unambiguously denied an employee his contractual right to file an inhouse grievance once he elected to file an age discrimination charge holding that title vii prohibits discrimination based on any race including caucasian holding that title viis antiretaliation provision prohibits any employer action that might dissuade  a reasonable worker from making or supporting a discrimination charge and thus covers a broader range of employer conduct than its substantive discrimination provision holding that in retaliation case the requisite adverse action is one which well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination holding that an original eeoc charge is sufficient to support  a civil suit under the act for any discrimination  developed in the course of a reasonable investigation of that charge provided such discrimination was included in the reasonable cause determination of the eeoc