not. It relied on Tate v. S. Jitney Jungle Co., 650 So.2d 1347 (Miss.1995), a case in which the Mississippi Supreme Court noted that a curb is not an unreasonably dangerous condition because it is a type of “danger[ ] which [is] usual and which customers normally expect to encounter on the business premises.” Id. at 1351. In Wood, we noted that “we are ... uncertain about the present role in [Mississippi] law of this principle that usual and normally expected hazards are not unreasonably dangerous” in light of the Mississippi Supreme Court’s pronouncement that a finding that a danger is open and obvious does not bar recovery for negligence. 556 F.3d at 276 (noting the confusion about how the Supreme Court’s decision in Tharp v. Bunge Corp., 641 So.2d 20, 23-24 (Miss. 1994) (en banc) (<HOLDING>), can be reconciled with its decision in Tate,
holding that federal comparative negligence principles prevailed over state comparative negligence principles on the basis that admiralty is not merely a basis of jurisdiction but instead it is a body of substantive principles as well holding comparative negligence not defense to intentional tort holding that the obviousness of a danger is a factor for comparative negligence not a bar to recovery holding when reasonable minds cannot differ the question of comparative negligence is a question of law appropriate for summary judgment recognizing an exception to the general rule that the patients conduct prior to treatment should not be considered in assessing damages holding that comparative negligence applies when the plaintiffs negligence is a legally contributing cause of his harm if but only if it is a substantial factor in bringing about his harm and there is no rule restricting his responsibility for it