is also cited by plaintiff in this connection, clearly supports this proposition. See 903 F.2d at 1531-33. Garvin also acknowledged the history of Congressional deference to such interests. See 787 F.2d at 915-18: see also Mizenko, 419 S.E.2d at 644. 7 . Indeed, the language of the Virginia Act’s exclusivity provision is arguably broad enough to be read as purporting to preclude not only tort claims, but even the receipt of benefits under the Longshore Act — a reading that would place the Virginia Act in direct opposition to the express purposes of the Longshore Act and, thus, be clearly invalid under the Supremacy Clause. But see, e.g., Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep't of Labor, 583 F.2d 1273, 1277-78 (4th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). 8 . As noted above, defendant’s voluntary
holding that legislature clearly intended that workers compensation act and unemployment security act be construed together thus prohibiting worker from receiving both unemployment compensation and workers compensation payments for same period holding that the longshore and harbor workers compensation act specifically relates to business of insurance holding that an injured workers initial election to seek state compensation does not implicate the exclusivity provision to preclude the worker from later seeking compensation under the longshore act holding that exclusivity provision of workers compensation act barred wifes loss of consortium claim holding that rule 6e did not extend the period in which a workers compensation carrier was required to pay a compensation award under the longshore and harbor workers compensation act where the act required payment within ten days of filing of the order as opposed to within ten days of service of notice provided for in the rule