of Ind. Code § 9-30-5-5 and provides: “A person who operates a vehicle with a controlled substance listed in schedule I or II of IC 35-48-2 or its metabolite in the person’s body commits a Class C misdemeanor.” The State presented evidence that Radick operated the vehicle with THC, the active ingredient in marijuana, in his system. Marijuana is a controlled substance listed in schedule I of Ind.Code § 35-48-2-4. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Radick’s conviction for operating a vehicle with a controlled substance listed in Schedule I or II as a class C misdemeanor. Despite any inconsistency in the verdicts, the convictions are permissible because they are supported by sufficient evidence. See, e.g., Slate v. State, 798 N.E.2d 510, 519-520 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Radick’s
holding that a jury verdict of guilty constitutes a conviction for purposes of the federal firearms statute and therefore the defendant was convicted of a felony during the interval between the jurys return of its guilty verdict and his scheduled sentencing holding that court of appealss remedy on remand from reversal for harmful charge error based on failure to meet second step of rousseau lesserincludedoffense test was to remand for a retrial for the lesser offense  because the jurys verdict that the appellant was guilty of the lesserincluded offense  operates as an acquittal of the greater offense  to which jeopardy had attached this prevents a retrial for the greater offense but not for the lesser offense holding that jurys failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge holding that a defendant cannot challenge his conviction merely because it is inconsistent with jurys verdict of acquittal on another count holding that the jurys guilty verdict for the offense of operating a vehicle while intoxicated as a class a misdemeanor was not wholly inconsistent with its acquittal of the defendant on the charge of public intoxication