602. ¶24. Moreover, Rule 801(d)(2) describes five classes of party-opponent statements excluded from the definition of hearsay. With respect to four of the classes, the rule says nothing concerning the reliability of the statement; with respect to the fifth class — statements by co-conspirators — the rule provides that such nonhearsay statements may be admitted only if the court finds that the declarant is unavailable and that there is sufficient indicia of reliability to show its trustworthiness. V.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E). If trustworthiness, in the form of personal knowledge, was otherwise a prerequisite to admission under 801(d)(2), the specific inclusion of that requirement in 801(d)(2)(E) would be redundant. Grenafege v. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 134 Vt. 288, 290, 357 A.2d 118, 120 (1976) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 25. The Advisory Committee Notes to the
holding that maxim of expression of one implies exclusion of another is aid to determine legislative intent recognizing timehonored precept of expressio unius est exclusio alterius   the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another recognizing principles of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of smother and expressum facit cessare taciturn if some things are expressly mentioned the inference is stronger that those omitted were intended to be excluded holding second sentence of a nearly identical exclusion did not limit the scope of the exclusion holding that for purposes of statutory construction expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other