776 F.2d 1304, 1305 n.10 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing 10 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1138 at 261 (1985 Pocket Part)). With the liberalizing of Rule 4(m), there is reason and support for now limiting the inquiry to its contents. See Petrucelli, 46 F.3d at 1302-03 (panel did not consider Rule 6(b) in majority opinion affirming the denial of motion for extension and the granting of a dismissal). Many courts have analogized the good cause and excusable neglect standards. See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Teleconcepts, Inc., 71 F.3d 1086, 1097-98 (3d Cir. 1995); Petrucelli, 46 F.3d at 1312 (Becker, J. concurring) (citing to 2 James W. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 4.18[2] (2d ed. 1994)); Braxton v. United States, 817 F.2d 238, 241 (3d Cir. 1987) (<HOLDING>). See also Dominic v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 841
holding that an undefined statutory term should be given its natural ordinary meaning holding the aedpa standard is demanding but not insatiable holding that the standard for withholding of removal is more demanding than the standard for asylum recognizing that although the term good cause is undefined it is at least as demanding as the excusable neglect standard holding that good cause means at a minimum excusable neglect