by the government or any other description of the offense charged which indicates the nature and scope of the activity which the government sought to punish in each case, and (5) places where the events alleged as part of the conspiracy took place. Marable, 578 F.2d at 154. We required that these factors be reviewed in tandem for a reason. A single agreement can have as its object several different actions or activities. Moreover, the object of the agreement can be achieved over a period of days, weeks, or months. And the people involved in executing the agreement can change from time to time. In none of these situations, however, can a person be punished under one drug conspiracy statute for more than just the single agreement. See, e.g., Braverman, 317 U.S. at 53, 63 S.Ct. at 101 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Nichols, 741 F.2d 767, 771
recognizing that where liability is joint and several among multiple parties complete relief may be granted with respect to any one of them holding that the district courts conclusion that the plaintiff spoke as an employee rather than a private citizen is supported by the facts that she aired her complaints only to several school administrators rather than to the public  recognizing forfeiture liability among criminal confederates to be joint and several holding that one agreement cannot be taken to be several agreements and therefore several conspiracies because the agreement envisages the violation of several statutes rather than one holding that delay of several hours after the vehicle was seized was reasonable