believed that the prospect of finding a DNA expert favorable to the defense was an indulgence in speculation. Second, the court noted that the trial court had authorized funds for defense counsel to retain a DNA expert, and there was no reason to assume that the effort was not made. Those conclusions are reasonable. The petitioner has not offered even a suggestion of what a defense DNA expert might have contributed to the trial inquiry. Moreover, it is reasonable to conclude that defense counsel attempted to locate someone who could provide expert advice, and no one answered the bell. The decision not to call such a witness, therefore, must be relegated to trial strategy, which is beyond the realm of criticism for defective performance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (<HOLDING>); Higgins v. Renico, 470 F.3d 624, 632 (6th
holding that a defendant claiming ineffective assistance  must overcome the presumption that under the circumstances the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy holding that counsels conduct is entitled to the strong presumption that it falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and the petitioner must overcome the presumption that the conduct might be considered sound trial strategy quoting michel v louisiana 350 us 91 101 76 sct 158 100 led 83 1955 recognizing presumption and finding that it was overcome recognizing presumption holding that because there were several reasons why counsel might have made a particular deci sion petitioner had failed to overcome the presumption that under the circumstances the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy