bad faith may certainly compel an adverse infer ence, the absence of bad faith may not necessarily preclude one. “Destruction of potentially relevant evidence obviously occurs along a continuum of fault—ranging from innocence through the degrees of negligence to intentionality.” Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239, 1246 (6th Cir.1988). Within the bounds of its discretion, the circuit court has the flexibility to fashion an appropriate sanction based on the facts of the case. In the present case, the missing evidence was the very object that plaintiffs alleged caused Stender’s injuries. Thus, although the circuit court found no bad faith or intentional misconduct on the plaintiffs’ part, we cannot say that it abused its discretion by giving the adverse infer 6, 79-80 (3d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). The instant case, however, raised complex
holding that plaintiffs did not need to identify the specific defective lawn mower to sustain their claim of a design defect recognizing that because plaintiff alleged a design defect the need for immediate access to the particular saw involved in the accident was greatly diminished holding that complaint alleging design defect likely to cause damage failed to state a claim holding that where the defendants expert described the product design using superlatives namely the safest design you could possibly put on the machine the plaintiff should have been permitted to impeach the expert by inquiring why the safest design possible was modified following the plaintiffs accident holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit a design defect products liability expert to submit an untimely addendum stating a new claim of failure to warn after defense expert refuted the basis of original design defect opinion