status as an independent contractor does not preclude Rehabilitation Act/Title III ADA claims for other than employment discrimination, and such claims were tried before a jury properly resolved by the district court. The district court found that Levinger was not disabled and not a “qualified individual with a disability.” The district court may have erred in finding that Levinger was not disabled, because previous case law has established that Levinger’s diagnosed condition of bipolar disorder is recognized as causing a disability protected by the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. See, e.g., Bergsrud v. Columbia-Lea Reg’l Med. Ctr., 2000 WL 33287447 (D.N.M.2000); see also Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482-83, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 2146-47, 144 L.Ed.2d 450, 462-63 (1999) (<HOLDING>). However, the district court correctly
holding that a social security disability determination is a legal proceeding holding that determination of causation in permanent disability hearing not barred by estoppel because wlhether an industrial accident caused temporary total disability or permanent partial disability are two distinct questions holding disability discrimination claim barred holding disability determination is made at time of alleged discrimination not later when remedial measures are used to correct disability holding that west virginia disability discrimination law is not mechanically tied to federal disability discrimination jurisprudence