the public interest and ‘[considerations based on the allocation of powers within our federal system’ require that the district court defer to local government administrators.” Id. In Sweeton, 27 F.3d at 1166, the Sixth Circuit was very clear that, where “decisional law has changed so that the enjoined behavior, which once might have been a violation of federal law, is no longer a matter of federal law at all” the injunction must be vacated. In light of the fact that no federal right underpins the 1974 decree — as well as the fact that the “local government administrators” in this case appear to favor vacating the decree — the court can identify no reason that the 1974 consent decree should remain in effect. Cf. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 216, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (<HOLDING>); Railway Employees v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642,
holding that a consent decree should be vacated under rule 60b in light of amendments to the railway labor act holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because the challenged provisions of the decree had expired holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because there was no  consent decree left to be terminated holding that a court errs when it refuses to modify an injunction or consent decree in light of  changes in statutory or decisional law holding that statutory authority to modify does not contemplate fundamental changes