conducting a review for harm — even if the error is not preserved. See Baker v. Hansen, 679 S.W.2d 480, 481 (Tex.1984). Second, we apply fundamental-error review when an important public interest or public policy is at stake. See, e.g., Ramsey, 205 S.W.2d at 983. “Pub . 1350, 25 L.Ed.2d 594, on remand, 457 S.W.2d 275 (Tex.1970). Substantively, public-interest-based fundamental error is rare, implicated only when our most significant state public interests are at stake. The meaning of the “public interest” that is adversely affected must be extremely circumscribed, or the exception would swallow the rule. Thus, it cannot be enough to allege that an error violates a party’s constitutional rights. See Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs. v. Sherry, 46 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex.2001) (<HOLDING>) (citing Dreyer v. Greene, 871 S.W.2d 697, 698
holding that by fading to timely raise the issue before the trial court the defendant had waived the right to raise the issue on appeal that the trial court failed to consider less severe sanctions holding that defendant failed to raise a constitutional issue at trial and thus waived appellate review of that issue holding that because appellant had waived review of constitutional challenge to sentencing statute by failing to raise it at the first opportunity the trial court correctly proceeded to examine whether the appellants trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise constitutional challenges to the sentencing statutes holding that constitutional claim that paternity suit should not be barred by statute of limitations is waived by failing to raise the issue before the trial court holding that appellant waived issue by failing to raise it in opening brief