[over a private decision] or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State”; or (2) where “the private entity has exercised powers that are ‘traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.’ ” Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-05, 102 S.Ct. 2777, 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982) (quoting Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351, 95 S.Ct. 449); see also Desiderio, 191 F.3d at 206. Under the Blum test, even heavily-regulated private entities generally are held not to be state actors. Desiderio, 191 F.3d, at 206 (“[T]he fact that a business entity is subject to ‘extensive and detailed’ state regulation does not convert that organization’s actions into those of the state.”); see also Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350, 95 S.Ct. 449 (<HOLDING>). It has been found, repeatedly, that the NASD
recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public holding that foster parents are not state actors holding that massachusetts statute did not create a sufficiently close nexus between private hospital and the state to warrant labeling private actors state actors holding that extensively regulated public utilities are not state actors holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability