for Sarvis is that even if there is a windfall vote, his complaint would still fail to raise the “reasonable inference” that Virginia’s ballot ordering law creates constitutionally significant burdens. The fact remains that, “windfall” or not, the Virginia ballot ordering law still does not “restrict access to the ballot or deny any voters the right to vote for candidates of their choice.” Sonneman v. State, 969 P.2d 632, 638 (Alaska 1998). The law instead “merely allocates the benefit of positional bias, which places a lesser burden on the right to vote.” Id. And contrary to Sarvis’s cursory equal protection argument, Appellant’s Opening Br. 12-13, it makes this allocation in a neutral, nondiscriminatory manner. Compare Graves v. McElderry, 946 F.Supp. 1569, 1582 (W.D. Okla. 1996) (<HOLDING>), with Bd. of Election Comm’rs of Chicago v.
holding petition nominating candidate under social democratic party violated party name protection act holding that the state law violated equal protection principles holding that an oklahoma law placing democratic party candidates in the highest ballot positions violated the equal protection clause holding that an illinois countys facially neutral twotiered ballot ordering system did not violate the equal protection clause holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause