of reasoning, Cogswell argues that application of the obstruction enhancement requires proof that Lewis actually learned of the threat against him, or at a minimum, that Cogswell intended that Lewis would learn of the threat. However, the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Brooks has been characterized as an outlier and no other circuit that has addressed the issue has followed that path. See, e.g., United States v. Searcy, 316 F.3d 550, 552-53 (5th Cir.2002) (characterizing Brooks as an “outlier”). The Second, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have all ruled that indirect threats made to third parties may constitute obstruction under § 3C1.1 absent a showing that they were communicated to the target. See United States v. Fleming, 667 F.3d 1098, 1109 (10th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Talley, 443 Fed.Appx. 968,
holding that the attempt to possess the cocaine can be inferred from defendants attempt to pick up the package holding that an individual cannot attempt to commit murder of the second or third degree because the crime of attempt is a specific intent crime and an attempt to commit second or third degree murder would require proof that the individual intended to perpetrate an unintentional killing which is logically impossible holding that to qualify as an attempt to obstruct justice a defendant need not actually threaten the witness he need only attempt to influence him holding that evidence of a threat to a witness by the defendant is relevant as showing an attempt to prevent a witness from testifying and avoid punishment for the crime holding that citys policy need not be unconstitutional per se but need only cause a constitutional violation