has uniformly been held to be applicable to a corporate debtor.”); Budget Service Co. v. Better Homes of Virginia, Inc., 804 F.2d 289, 292 (4th Cir.1986) (“[W]e construe the word 'individual' to include a corporate debtor.”). Applying principles of statutory construction enunciated in United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 109 S.Ct. 236 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1991) (“Although ‘individual’ is not a defined term in the Code, Congress’ use of the term can leave no doubt that it is limited to a natural person.”); In re Prairie Truck Ry., 125 B.R. 217, 220 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1991) (“[Ojnly natural persons can recover damages as individuals under section 362(h).”); First RepublicBank Corp. v. NCNB Texas Nat'l Bank (In re First RepublicBank Corp., 113 B.R. 277, 279 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1989)) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that the Second Circuit’s
holding that a municipal corporation cannot form the requisite criminal intent and cannot be held liable under civil rico laws holding that claims under 11 usc  362h must be brought in the bankruptcy court rather than in the district court which only has appellate jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases holding that a plan participant or beneficiary may not recover extracontractual damages in an erisa suit for breach of fiduciary duty under  502a2 and 409a only the plan may recover damages in such cases holding that in a partial breach case the plaintiff cannot recover prospective damages for anticipated future nonperformance holding a corporation cannot recover damages under  362h