191 F.Supp.3d 1046, 2016 WL 3163049, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74192 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2016), that the residual clause in § 924(c)(3)—which Mr. Johnson challenges here—is unconstitutionally vague based on Johnson II and Dimaya. Nevertheless, the government asks the Court to reconsider its decision because, since Baires-Reyes was decided, several circuit courts have held that either the residual clause of § 924(c)(3) or § 16(b) (the statute at issue in Dimaya) is not void for vagueness. See, e.g., United States v. Prickett, 839 F.3d 697 (8th Cir. 2016) (§ 924(c)(3)(B)); United States v. Hill, 832 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2016) (§ 924(c)(3)(B)); United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (§ 16(b)); see also United States v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 340 (6th Cir. 2016) (<HOLDING>). But see Baptiste v. AG United States, 841
holding factor b is not unconstitutionally vague holding an identical residual clause in the us sentencing guidelines unconstitutionally vague holding that johnson did not support the defendants collateral challenge under 28 usc  2255 to his sentence enhanced under the residual clause of the ussg holding that the vagueness doctrine does not apply to advisory sentencing guidelines notwithstanding the governments position that the residual clause of  4b12a was unconstitutionally vague following johnson holding before bairesreyes was decid ed that the residual clause of  924c3 is not unconstitutionally vague recognizing that the seventh and ninth circuits recently invalidated 18 usc  16b under johnson ii  s reasoning1 but declining to follow those cases