a contributory negligence defense would absolve such providers from tort responsibility in the event of medical negligence and thus operate to undermine substantially such providers’ duty of reasonable care. Numerous other jurisdictions agree that, where a patient seeks medical treatment for a condition that may have arisen in whole or in part from the patient’s own negligence, such negli Dist.Ct.App.1975) (“[C]onduct of a patient which may have contributed to his illness or medical condition, which furnishes the occasion for medical treatment ... simply is not available as a defense to malpractice which causes a distinct subsequent injury — here, the ultimate injury, wrongful death”). But see Krklus v. Stanley, 359 Ill.App.3d 471, 480, 295 Ill.Dec. 746, 833 N.E.2d 952, 960 (2005) (<HOLDING>) (quotation marks omitted). The convergence of
holding that the absence of privity does not constitute a policy reason for not imposing liability where negligence is a substantial factor in causing the harm alleged holding that a motion for rule 37 sanctions should be promptly made thereby allowing the judge to rule on the matter when it is still fresh in his mind and that the motion should normally be deemed waived if it is not made prior to trial recognizing the general rule that a property owner is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor holding that the obviousness of a danger is a factor for comparative negligence not a bar to recovery recognizing an exception to the general rule that the patients conduct prior to treatment should not be considered in assessing damages holding that comparative negligence applies when the plaintiffs negligence is a legally contributing cause of his harm if but only if it is a substantial factor in bringing about his harm and there is no rule restricting his responsibility for it