established an elaborate network of prohibited ownership and compensation arrangements resulting in the submission and payments of millions of dollars in Medicare claims for patients referred by physicians who were prohibited from making these patient referrals to Columbia under the Stark laws. Columbia was expressly barred from submitting those claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(l), while it was prohibited from receiving payment for those claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g)(l). In sum, Relator charges that Columbia’s Medicare claims violate the FCA because their presentation and payment were statutorily prohibited. By analogy, Relator relies on Peterson v. Weinberger, 508 F.2d 45, 52 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Peterson v. Mathews, 423 U.S. 830, 96 S.Ct. 50, 46 L.Ed.2d 47 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Relator points to the legislative history of
holding that the treating physician rule applies in a ease where a plaintiff sought reimbursement for air ambulance services under medicare part b holding that county of delaware was not a person for purposes of fca liability holding that the knowing submission of medicare claims for services that were not covered and payable under the medicare act was an fca violation holding that the psro was an agency under the apa where in practically all cases medicare or medicaid benefits are not paid unless the psro makes its conclusive affirmative determinations of medical necessity holding that rule 9b applies to fca