of ineffective assistance of counsel. In his reply to the state’s response, Bailey stated that at the time he filed his first rule 3.850 motion, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider it. Despite Bailey’s reply, the trial court, adopting the state’s response, denied relief finding the motion to be successive. Attached to the state’s response was the trial court’s earlier order of April 9, 1997, denying relief. Consequently Bailey appealed the summary denial of his motion and filed an initial brief. In turn, the Attorney General filed its answer brief explaining that because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider Bailey’s first rule 3.850 motion on the merits, his second rule 3.850 motion was not successive. See Daniels v. State, 712 So.2d 765 (Fla.l998)(<HOLDING>). The State concedes that trial court decision
holding that defendant was procedurally barred from raising issue on appeal where issue was listed as grounds in motion for new trial holding that a prosecutorialmisconduct claim was procedurally barred when raised for the first time on appeal holding that the defendants habeas claim was procedurally barred because it could have been or was raised in his postconviction motion holding that where a defendants first motion was both filed and denied while his conviction was on appeal his second motion is not procedurally barred holding that defendants 3850 motion for postconviction relief was procedurally barred as successive where the defendants current rule 3850 motion is one that could have or should have been raised in his first rule 3850 motion