sanction violated the Due Process Clause; and (2) trial ssion of his work boots would have cast doubt on the prosecution’s contention one person committed the crime and would have lent credence to his assertion he arrived at the scene after the murders had already taken place. He further asserts the decision of the OCCA is unreasonable because it fails to adequately recognize the power of this rebuttal evidence. In response, Oklahoma merely quotes the opinion of the OCCA on direct appeal and asserts that decision is not an unreasonable application of Strickland. The decision of the OCCA — that there is no reasonable probability the outcome of the guilt phase of Hooks’s trial would have been different if the boots had been admitted — is not unreasonable. See McLuckie, 337 F.3d at 1197 (<HOLDING>). As recognized by the OCCA, the boot print was
holding that state court could not have unreasonably applied federal law if no clear supreme court precedent existed holding this court can issue habeas writ only if state courts application of supreme court precedent is objectively unreasonable holding that when a state court adjudication is contrary to clearly established supreme court precedent this court must review de novo whether petitioner is entitled to habeas relief holding that the federal habeas courts task is to determine if the state courts decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the supreme court of the united states holding a court cannot issue and make returnable to it a writ of habeas corpus if the petitioner is outside the courts authority