of prejudice” and allowing for automatic reinstatement of direct appeal rights because there is ineffectiveness per se. Commonwealth v. Fransen, 986 A.2d 154, 158 (Pa. Super 2009). A petitioner alleging that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a post-sentence motion must instead satisfy the Pierce three-part test for ineffectiveness. See Commonwealth v. Reaves, 592 Pa. 134, 923 A.2d 1119, 1128-29 (2007). The Pierce standard applies because failure to file a post-sentence motion—unlike failure to file an appeal, a Rule 1926(b) statement, or a brief that complies with the Rules of Appellate Procedure—“does not waive any and all appellate issues; it waives only those claims subject to issue preservation requirements which were not otherwise already properly preserved.” Id. at 1129 (<HOLDING>). . We recognize Appellant’s view that the
holding that failure to file a rule 2119f statement generally constitutes waiver of all discretionary sentencing issues holding ineffectiveness cannot be raised for first time on appeal recognizing that test for counsel ineffectiveness under strickland and pierce is identical holding that failure to file for sentencing reconsideration which resulted in waiver of right to appeal discretionary aspects of sentence must be evaluated under pierce standard for ineffectiveness holding that a failure to file an appeal is within the scope of the waiver because the failure does not undermine the validity of the plea or waiver