of a firearm, in the absence of any aggravating circumstances charged in the indictment, does not constitute a per se ‘crime of violence’ .... ” Johnson, 953 F.2d at 115. The court reasoned that “[t]he danger inherent in the mere possession of a firearm is, in many cases, too highly attenuated to qualify the offense as a per se ‘crime of violence.’ ” Id. “While a felon in possession of a firearm may pose a statistical danger to society,” the offense in and of itself cannot be categorically considered a crime of violence. Id. While I recognize that, strictly speaking, the holding of Johnson applies only in the context of the Sentencing Guidelines, I can discern no basis to decline to apply its reasoning here. But cf. Fonner v. Thompson, 955 F.Supp. 638, 640-641 (N.D.W.Va.1997) (<HOLDING>). This is especially true in light of the very
recognizing that the standard of review for issues of statutory interpretation and construction is de novo holding an administrative interpretation cannot change the meaning of a statute or control the courts interpretation of it holding that bop interpretation of  922g1 as a crime of violence is permissible construction of  3621e2b and limiting the holding of johnson to the interpretation of sentencing guidelines holding erisa plan interpretation is simply one of contract interpretation holding that in reviewing a claim construction decided under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard we determine whether the interpretation is within the range of reasonableness