Defendant’s Motion In Limine Re: Evidence That Defendant Was A Principal (docket no. 463) (published at United States v. Johnson, 377 F.Supp.2d 689 (N.D.Iowa 2005)). More specifically, evidence suggesting that Johnson was the “principal,” rather than an “aider and abettor,” was not patently inconsistent with the government’s theory of the case in the trial of Johnson’s co-defendant, Dustin Honken, or patently inconsistent with the government’s original theory in this case, where Johnson was originally indicted as both a “principal” and, alternatively, as an “aider and abettor,” so that there was no due process violation, particularly where the issue of Johnson’s level of involvement was ultimately left to the jury to resolve. See Smith v. Groose, 205 F.3d 1045, 1051 (8th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied sub nom. Gammon v. Smith, 531
holding that an adversecredibility determination was supported where the applicants testimony included at least one internal inconsistency and one omission and the petitioner did not provide corroborating evidence that would have rebutted those inconsistencies and omissions holding that the district court complied with the requirements of  lb13alb where it made specific references to testimony in the record relating to the scope of the defendants involvement in the drug trafficking conspiracy noted that the relevant testimony was unrefuted and stated that the testimony was internally consistent holding that trial court did not err in refusing to allow defendant to introduce evidence of witnesss pending indictment when witnesss testimony regarding defendants participation in murder was virtually identical to witnesss written statement which was sworn to on day of murder and prior to offense for which witness was indicted holding that after booker a district court may sentence a defendant taking into account acquitted conduct and explaining that there is no logical inconsistency in determining that a preponderance of the evidence supports a finding about which there remains a reasonable doubt recognizing that there was no due process violation where an inconsistency in a witnesss testimony related only to the defendants level of involvement in the offense and the jury was left to resolve that inconsistency