are not only based upon a misreading of binding Supreme Court precedent, but they are also inconsistent with it. Relying on Charles and its progeny, both the majority and the district court failed to even consider the substantive due process right to be free of arbitrary or capricious government behavior within the context of rational basis scrutiny. It is this category of substantive due process that is most clearly implicated in the Plaintiffs’ complaint. The Plaintiffs clearly pleaded that PMHA’s alleged conduct, which included self-dealing, arbitrariness, and capriciousness, was not rationally related to any legitimate governmental interest. Therefore, the pleadings should have survived PMHA’s motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Johnson, 699 F.2d 325, 328-29 (6th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). IY. Equal Protection The Supreme Court has
holding that a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the officials office holding that such claims however cannot be brought directly against the state or a state agency but only against state officials in their official capacities holding that a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is a suit against the state itself and not cognizable under  1983 holding that plaintiffs due process rights were violated when state licensing officials misapplied state licensing law in order to keep plaintiffs from competing in business against one official holding that barring waiver by the state the eleventh amendment precludes federal courts from hearing state claims brought against state officials in their official capacities