or remove the fiduciary for breach of fiduciary duty, and the court has discretion under any of the civil enforcement provisions to award attorneys’ fees and costs to either party. Id. at 1078-79. It is well settled that “these civil enforcement provisions are ‘e for Met-Life’s alleged improper processing of plaintiffs benefits claim to “benefits due ... under the terms of the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). The Kentucky Act therefore “allows plan participants ‘to obtain remedies ... that Congress rejected in ERISA.’ ” Rush Prudential, 536 U.S. at 377, 122 S.Ct. 2151 (quoting Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54, 107 S.Ct. 1549). Accordingly, plaintiff's claims under the Kentucky Act are preempted by ERISA. See, e.g., Dearing v. Cont'l Assur. Co., 1993 WL 4168, at *2 (W.D.Ky. Jan.6, 1993) (<HOLDING>); Cummings v. Thomas Indus., Inc., 812 F.Supp.
holding claims under the kentucky act were preempted because they conflicted with erisas civil enforcement scheme holding that kentucky counties tenthamendment challenge to the clean air act obviously fails under garcia holding that the plaintiffs causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an erisa plan holding claims under the kentucky act were preempted because the kentucky act conflicts with the most specific and important of the erisa civil enforcement provisions holding the state law claims were not preempted