under the former statute, testimony concerning “every variety of affairs which could form the subject of negotiation, interviews, or actions between two persons and every method by which one person could derive impressions or information from the conduct, condition or language of another” was excluded. Embrey v. Southern Gas & Electric Corp., 63 So.2d 258, 263 (Fla.1953) (quoting from Chapin v. Mitchell, 44 Fla. 225, 32 So. 875, 876 (1902)). It is apparent, however, that the present version of the Deadman’s Statute excludes only oral communications, and the “interested person” is competent to testify concerning written communications or transactions that such person had with the decedent. 5 West’s Florida Practice, Florida Evidence § 602.1 (1977). See also Day v. Stickle, 113 So.2d 559 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we think it clear that those
holding that when the language of a statute is clear courts should not substitute their judgment for that of congress and should enforce the statute according to its terms holding that statutory construction act applies when statute does not define meaning of key terms holding that a courts prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion holding that the statutes 30 day provision is mandatory and may not be extended and dicta that it may not be extended by release from incarceration holding that the deadmans statute should not be extended by judicial construction to cases not clearly within its terms