On Criminal Jurisprudence, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 1060, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003). We hold the government has an important interest in protecting its citizens from covert photography that may invade their expectation of privacy. See id. Thompson also challenges the third and fourth O’Brien factors — the statute’s governmental interest suppresses free expression, and the statute significantly restricts alleged First Amendment freedoms. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673. Specifically, Thompson argues the statute is “not sufficiently narrow ... to bring it into the realm of constitutionality.” See Olvera v. State, 806 S.W.2d 546, 550 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (en banc) (citing Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983)) (<HOLDING>). Thompson contends the statute is not narrowly
holding that contentneutral time place and manner regulations are acceptable so long as they are narrowly tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication holding that even in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time place or manner of protected speech provided the restrictions are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information holding on summary judgment that a regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest recognizing that time place and manner restrictions must be content neutral holding restrictions embodied in content neutral statute must be narrowly tailored to serve significant government interest while leaving open sufficient alternative channels of communication