domiciled . . . outside of this state as of the date of perfection of service of process as provided by Code Section 9-10-94. OCGA § 9-10-90. Because the long arm statute defines “nonresident” in the disjunctive, “either a change in residence or change in domicile would suffice to make a person a nonresident.” Cooper v. Edwards, 235 Ga. App. 48, 50 (508 SE2d 708) (1998). And while “a concurrence of actual residence and intent to remain is necessary to acquire a domicile,” the same is not true to establish residence. Id. Indeed, “a person may have several residences which are not necessarily permanent or in the same locale as the domicile.” Id. Thus, regardless of whether Thornburg’s domicile remains in Georgia, she has been an Arizona resident since early October 2010. See id. at 49-50 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Thornburg is a nonresident
holding that in order to establish liability under the ada the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant was an employer within the meaning of the statute holding that trial court properly concluded minimum contacts existed when defendant had numerous telephone conversations with plaintiffs husband a resident of north carolina along with email messages and sexual relations there was a direct relationship between plaintiffs injuries and defendants contacts plaintiff a resident of north carolina could not bring suit in defendants home state because of abolition of the causes of action and defendant although residing in georgia would have only a minimal travel burden holding that a defendant who was incarcerated in south carolina was a resident of that state regardless of whether his domicile remained in georgia and was therefore a nonresident within the meaning of the long arm statute holding that in south carolina sheriffs and deputies are state officials holding that although the resident defendant had not been formally served prior to removal the resident defendant had made a voluntary appearance in state court and therefore jurisdiction was not proper under  1441b