Gilkey states "it is purely speculation to conclude that this third referral separately triggered an additional juvenile sentence of at least sixty days.” Appellant Reply Br. at 3. This claim raises factual questions which are not reviewable, even for plain error. See United States v. Ciapponi, 77 F.3d 1247, 1252 (10th Cir.), cert. denied., U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 1839, 134 L.Ed.2d 942 (1996). Furthermore, neither of the orders of custody in the first two adjudications contained specific terms, yet Gilkey concedes that the confinement which resulted therefrom qualified under § 4A1.2(d)(2)(A). Additionally, he cites circuit authority which this court finds applicable to the order of continued custody in the third adjudication. See United States v. Birch, 39 F.3d 1089, 1095 (10th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). 3 . The first two custody orders followed
holding individual defendants are not an employer within meaning of title vii holding juveniles statement inadmissible when after being placed in custody police took juvenile to police station and held juvenile in area where adult suspects were held instead of taking juvenile to a juvenile processing office or any of the places listed as an alternative in section 5202 and placing juvenile in specifically designated office for juveniles holding defendants placement into kansas juvenile custody qualified as confinement within meaning of ussg  4a12d2a holding that although police initially took juvenile into custody juvenile arrested on drug charge did not have standing to challenge constitutionality of pretrial detention statute in relation to his drug case where juvenile was never detained for drug offense holding that chapter 39 provides the juvenile judge the flexibility to factor a childs safety into a custody decision at all stages of a juvenile proceeding