have been apparent on the face of a disclosure statement. Because § 1641(e) provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided in this subchapter,” this is the “only” circumstance in which a TILA action with respect to a consumer credit transaction secured by real property may be maintained against an assignee, it follows that assignee liability is unavailable here and that plaintiffs cannot pursue their TILA claim against FNMA for violation of § 1639f. In opposing this outcome, plaintiffs urge the Court to expand § 1640(a) civil remedies for TILA violations to reach all creditors and assignees. They are absolutely correct that TILA is a consumer protection statute to be construed liberally. See, e.g., Brown v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 817 F.Supp.2d 1328, 1334-35 (S.D.Ala.2011) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). However, the liberal
holding that courts must construe the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff by  giving the plaintiff the benefit of all the inferences that can be reasonably drawn from the pleaded facts recognizing the strong remedial purpose of tila and the obligation to construe tila  liberally in the consumers favor recognizing courts special duty to construe liberally a pro se plaintiffs pleadings holding that courts should liberally construe the requirements of rule 3 recognizing that we construe pro se complaints liberally