prong, nothing in Freeman suggests that Freeman’s agreed range was outside of the applicable range, or that it arose from a departure or variance. Freeman’s sentence thus satisfied “the second of § 3582(e)(2)’s conditions” because the amendment had “ ‘the effect of lowering [his] applicable guideline range.’ ” Id. at 2700 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B)). But Pleasant’s circumstances differ from Freeman’s because Pleasant’s “agreed sentence [was] outside the applicable guideline range.... ” U.S.S.G. § 6B1.2. In short, Freeman only addressed when a sentence is “based on” a subsequently amended sentencing range, and its holding does not control the question presented in this appeal. See United States v. Ware, 694 F.3d 527, 534 (3d Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>); see also Freeman, 131 S.Ct. at 2701 (Roberts,
holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance holding that what is important is not simply that the element at issue is defined in terms of what it does but that the term as the name for a structure has a reasonably well understood meaning in the art holding the sixth amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment holding that the meaning of the term based on  and hence the holding of freeman  is simply not germane to  1b110a2s requirement that the amendment have lowered the defendants applicable guideline range holding that the lowering requirement of  3582c2 is identical to the requirement in ussg  ib 110a2 that the amendment to the guidelines have the effect of lowering the defendants applicable guideline range 