at trial. Specifically, this Court “mandate[d] that trial courts make an independent pretrial determination of the accuracy of transcripts, and give a cautionary instruction to the jury regarding the limited use to be made of the transcript, prior to employment of these demonstrative aids during trial.” McCoy, 853 So.2d at 405. A trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to follow the McCoy mandates. Davis, 121 So.3d at 491. The claim that the trial court failed to make an independent pretrial determination of the accuracy of the transcript is preserved for review because Pasha argued in his motion to suppress that the transcript was “altered,” and this claim is fairly equivalent to a claim that the transcript is not “accurate.” See Wilcox v. State, 143 So.3d 359, 373 (Fla. 2014) (<HOLDING>). However, we find that any error in the
holding that although pro se litigants are entitled to liberal construction of their pleadings pro se litigants must follow procedural rules recognizing that courts generally afford pro se litigants leniency in technical matters holding that leniency should be accorded to pro se litigants when the defect in a complaint is merely procedural and there are potential grounds for relief recognizing that although pro se litigants are not entitled to greater rights than represented litigants due process principles permit the imposition of a procedural bar only after consideration of the pro se litigants reasonable expectations about what had occurred recognizing that courts freely grant pro se litigants leave to amend