its mind and attempt to reinstate the challenged contract after the district court dismissed the federal government’s request for an injunction as moot.” We are unpersuaded. The timing of the contract termination-just five days after the United States moved to invalidate it, and just two days before the District Court’s hearing on the motion-strongly suggests that the impending litigation was the cause of the termination. Additionally, the Governor’s sole justification for the termination of the contract was that “such termination is in the best interest of the Government.” But this statement is extremely general, and surely does not provide any assurance that a similar contract would not be entered into again. Cf. Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F.2d 306, 313 (3d Cir.1981) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). In short, the mere fact that the Governor has
holding that consideration of a moot case was not required when there was no award of attorneys fees that would be affected by appellate review and the issue has not been preserved for appeal holding that voluntary cessation of a challenged action does not make a case moot unless the defendant can show that there is no reasonable expectation that the challenged action will be repeated holding that issues as to whether declaratory relief should be granted had become moot and would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction but that under hallman the entire appeal was not moot because there still was a live controversy as to whether appellee was entitled to recover attorneys fees under the declaratory judgments act and therefore issues regarding attorneys fees were not moot and would be decided holding that the state failed to meet its burden when the record failed to show that the jurors would or would not be available after a weeks continuance holding that a case was not moot where city failed to provide assurance that policeman charged with misconduct would not be rehired or that challenged conduct would not be resumed