This was improper since the issue of the voluntariness of a confession — i.e. whether it was obtained in a manner which did not violate the due process rights of the defendant under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions — is entirely separate from the issue of whether a defendant’s admissions in the confession conclusively establish, factually, that he or she committed the acts which form the basis for his or her conviction. As these are two separate and distinct questions, the resolution of each involves fundamentally different considerations. When a court is called upon to determine whether a confession is voluntary and, hence, admissible at trial, it examines the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession to ascertain whether it i .2d 775, 779 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Rather, a court is constrained to examine
holding the determination of the voluntariness of a confession is a determination uninfluenced by the truth or falsity of the confession holding that question of whether a confession was coerced was not to be resolved by considering the truth or falsity of the confession holding introduction of actually coerced confession constitutes reversible error even where confession was cumulative in nature holding that under elstad the first question that must be answered when determining whether a subsequent confession is tainted by an earlier confession is whether the initial confession was obtained in violation of the defendants fifth amendment rights  ie whether it was involuntary  or whether the confession was voluntary but obtained in technical violation of miranda  holding that trial judges determination of the admissibility of a confession is based on whether the confession was voluntarily given