with WTA and WPLLC amount to no more than providing counsel to his clients and being copied on various emails written by WTA members. Second, Wright’s claims under Title 18, except the civil RICO claims, failed as a matter of law because no private remedy exists for the criminal violations Wright alleged. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 316, 99 S.Ct. 1705, 60 L.Ed.2d 208 (1979) (noting that the Supreme Court “has rarely implied a private right of action under a criminal statute”). Third, Wright’s First Amendment claim failed to state a cause of action because he had failed to allege any factual evidence indicating a nexus between the conduct of Defendants — all of whom are private actors — and state action. See Cooper v. U.S. Postal Serv., 577 F.3d 479, 491 (2d Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover,
holding that a constitutional claim against nongovernment entities only lies where there is a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the challenged action of the  entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the state itself holding state of the law must be determined at time of challenged action holding that while the fourteenth amendment is directed against state action and not private action the state action requirement is met in a civil action where state law is applied whether by statute or common law holding that an action naming a state entity as a defendant did not constitute an action against the state because the state entity was sued in its capacity as receiver holding that there is no private right of action against a state governmental entity for violations of the texas constitution