the owner’s property, the owner does not thereby lose its superior right to possession of the property upon recovery of it following the crime. Though Helfman’s conduct may have been objectionable, inappropriate, negligent, or even grossly negligent, under the plain and common meaning of article 47.01a, the State does not S.W.2d 783, 788 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1998, no pet.) (stating that a buyer who tenders part payment and takes possession of a vehicle becomes the owner of that vehicle within the meaning of an insurance policy covering the vehicle); Lockwood Nat’l Bank v. T.W. Jennings, 381 S.W.2d 682, 683 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (same holding as Glasscock); Credit Ins. Corp. v. Pacific Fin. Corp., 329 S.W.2d 945, 946 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1959, writ ref'd) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Because Universal seeks the same relief
holding that the lien bond releases the property from the lien but the lien is then secured by the bond holding that one finance company did not perfect its lien in the mobile home in question and that second finance company which financed purchase of the home by a bona fide purchaser for value did perfect its lien holding that creditor who did not timely perfect lien in mobile home after refinancing loan notentitled to subrogation even though delay resulted from prior pmsi holders delay in releasing lien holding that the refiling of a tax lien during bankruptcy proceedings did not create perfect or enforce a lien in violation of the  362a4 holding that a bona fide purchaser may be considered in privity with its predecessor