Relator Co-sens, relying on the same authority, argues that the information provided by Maier was too generic to constitute an “allegation,” as that term has been interpreted by the courts. See Id. As one circuit court has observed, the FCA “bars suits based on publicly disclosed ‘allegations or transactions,’ not information.” United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. County of Delaware, 123 F.3d 734, 740 (3d Cir.1997) (quoting Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1418 (9th Cir.1992)). Therefore, “either the allegations of fraud or the elements of the underlying transaction” must be present in the public disclosure in order to invoke the jurisdictional bar. Id.; see also United States ex rel. Minnesota Ass’n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health System Corp., 276 F.3d 1032, 1044 (8th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). In the Springfield Terminal Ry. case, cited
holding the record did not contain enough facts to determine whether the statute was constitutional as applied to the particular facts and circumstances of the case holding that the public disclosure must reveal both the true state of facts and that the defendant represented the facts to be something other than what they were holding that the defendant must provide facts to establish what the conflict was holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure  contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant holding that the facts pertaining to the victims special status and the defendants knowledge of that status were intrinsic to the crime and hence that the sixth amendment required that the facts be found by the trier of fact