the arbitration provision at issue (the “Distributor Agreement”) to CT and that CT signed the Distributor Agreement and sent it back to SELA. 2. The claims at issue fall within the scope of the arbitration provision in the Distributor Agreement and SELA has not waived its right to arbitrate pursuant to the arbitration provision. 3. CT has not overcome the presumption that the contract that CT signed is a valid and binding agreement to arbitrate. See Thompkins v. Lil' Joe Records, Inc., 476 F.3d 1294, 1305 n. 12 (11th Cir.2007) (quoting Dodge of Winter Park, Inc. v. Morley, 756 So.2d 1085, 1085-86: “Generally, it is enough that the party against whom the contract is sought to be enforced signs it.”); Dodge of Winter Park, Inc. v. Morley, 756 So.2d 1085, 1085-86 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>). 4. Furthermore, the Court finds based on the
recognizing that generally a nonparty to an arbitration agreement does not have standing to invoke the agreement but considering whether the nonparty could force arbitration because it was a third party beneficiary of the contract a successor in interest to the contracting party or an agent of the contracting party holding that a person signing an arbitration agreement using power of attorney is not a party to that agreement merely by virtue of having signed it holding a party seeking mandamus must serve the party against whom relief is sought holding that an arbitration agreement enforceable against party who signed the agreement even where the other party did not sign it because generally it is enough that the party against whom the contract is sought to be enforced signs it holding that the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have been a party to the prior action