their under-insured vehicle coverage. They offer two alternative arguments. First, they contend that in determining whether a vehicle is underinsured, any recovery from the mother’s policy, which did not name the vehicle involved in the accident, must be disregarded. In the alternative, they contend that if the law is interpreted to focus on whether an individual is underinsured, the father is underinsured because his policy provides inadequate coverage for his vicarious liability for his son’s tortious conduct. [¶ 5] Reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo as we must, Lever v. Acadia Hosp. Corp., 2004 ME 35, ¶ 2, 845 A.2d 1178, 1179; Botka v. S.C. Noyes & Co., 2003 ME 128, ¶ 18, 834 A.2d 947, 952, we conclude that the tort-feasor’s vehicle was not 935 (Me.1983) (<HOLDING>). [¶ 8] In the present case, the vehicle driven
holding that under the plain and obvious meaning of the uim statute a prerequisite to the term underinsured motor vehicle is the existence of  bodily injury liability insurance coverage which is less than the liability for damages imposed by law  and where no such coverage existed tortfeasor was not underinsured under the statute but rather uninsured concluding that terms underinsured and uninsured are mutually exclusive as applied to the same motor vehicle and the combination of these two coverages by the insured was contrary to legislative intent holding that the insurance applicable to the tortfeasors vehicle must be compared to the underinsured vehicle policy limits to determine whether a vehicle is underinsured holding that policies must be aggregated to determine underinsured status holding that such broken up transactions must be aggregated into one holding that the amount of coverage determines whether a vehicle is underinsured