Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 10, 125 S.Ct. 377, 160 L.Ed.2d 271 (2004) (“The reckless disregard in [18 U.S.C.] § 16 relates not to the general conduct or to the possibility that harm will result from a person’s conduct, but to the risk that the use of physical foi'ce against another might be required in committing a crime. The classic example is burglary. A burglary would be covered under § 16(b) not because the offense can be committed in a generally reckless way or because someone may be injured, but because burglary, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that the burglar will use force against a victim in completing the crime.”) (footnote omitted). Leocal addressed a generic burglary, but in United States v. Becker, 919 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1990), we held that Ca Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); United States v. M.C.E., 232 F.3d 1252, 1255
holding that the texas offense of possession of a prohibited weapon could only qualify as a crime of violence under the residual clause of  4b12a2 holding that california residential burglary is categorically a crime of violence under the residual clause of ussg  4b12a2 which requires the criminal conduct to present a serious potential risk of physical injury to another holding that begay rejected that circuits earlier approach under which an offense presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another if the offense conduct had the potential for serious physical injury to another holding that attempted burglary under florida law qualified as a crime of violence under the armed career criminal act 18 usc  924e2biihereinafter acca because it involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another holding that  459 is categorically a crime of violence under guidelines  4b12a2 because the usual or ordinary firstdegree burglary in california involves conduct that presents a serious risk of physical violence and injury to others