and practicalities of the first trip, and not the exclusivity of that trip. [¶ 10] Indeed, any other interpretation would create the absurd result that Medei-ros would be forced to litigate the issue of travel every year that she wanted to take the child to visit her maternal grandmother. See Griffin v. Griffin, 2014 ME 70, ¶ 18, 92 A.3d 1144 (requiring courts to interpret plain language to avoid “absurd, illogical or inconsistent results” (quotation marks omitted)). To interpret the divorce judgment to invite or require a yearly motion to modify is contrary to the strong public policy in favor of finality in divorce judgments and in decisions regarding the care of children. See Black v. Black, 2004 ME 21, ¶ 15, 842 A.2d 1280; Spaulding v. Spaulding, 460 A.2d 1360, 1364 (Me. 1983) (<HOLDING>). “If the divorce judgment had intended that
holding unconstitutional a statute authorizing courts to recognize grandparents as having the same standing as parents for evaluating what custody arrangements are in the best interest of the child where the child actually resided with the grandparents in a stable relationship holding that an order compelling arbitration in an independent proceeding is appealable as a final order because in that context the order compelling arbitration resolves the sole issue before the court holding that the uccja applied to a california child custody order granting temporary custody of two children to their father recognizing that a parents liberty interest in the custody of a child is subject to due process protection recognizing the compelling need to give a measure of finality to custody decrees in order to ensure a more stable environment for the child