she was a chapter president, Kaur stated only “I do not know.” We are not compelled to credit this explanation. Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005). Because the aforementioned discrepancies fundamentally undermine the Petitioners’ claims for relief, we can confidently predict that the same result would ensue even if some other findings of the IJ are erroneous. See Xiao Ji Chen, 471 F.3d at 339-40. Finally, as the government notes, the Petitioners never sought relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) before the IJ. Although we note that the Petitioners raised the issue in their brief to the BIA, it is nevertheless unexhausted because the IJ, as fact-finder, never had the opportunity to review the claim. See Karaj v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 113, 119 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(3)(iv), 1003.3(f)
holding that a petitioner must raise each category of relief to the agency before subsequently raising it in this court holding that when a state court adjudication is contrary to clearly established supreme court precedent this court must review de novo whether petitioner is entitled to habeas relief holding that where defendant failed to raise defense of plaintiffs fraud in federal court defendant is barred from raising that issue in state court holding that plaintiffs failure to raise his constitutional claims in the military court system bars him from raising them in federal court recognizing general requirement that subpoenaed taxpayer must present himself with his records for questioning and as to each question and each record elect to raise or not raise the defense of selfincrimination