chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that activity, and (3) the government’s actions were substantially motivated as a response to his constitutionally protected conduct.” Nielander v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 582 F.3d 1155, 1165 (10th Cir.2009). Recognizing his threshold problem under this standard, Mocek asks us to rely on cases from other circuits holding there is First Amendment protection for creating audio and visual recordings of law enforcement officers in public places. See ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595 (7th Cir.2012); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir.2011); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir.2000); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir.1995). But see Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir.2014) (<HOLDING>); Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248,
holding that the constitutional reasonableness of a traffic stop did not depend on the actual motivation of the officer involved as long as the officer articulated a lawful reason for the stop holding the right to film an officer at a traffic stop was not unlimited holding that a traffic stop is valid under the fourth amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring holding that an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to exit the car pending completion of the stop holding that it was impermissible for an officer to question a driver about matters unrelated to the traffic stop after the officer had fulfilled the purpose of the stop by issuing a written warning to the driver