J.A. 179. The requirement is a necessary predicate to further consideration of the request for an exemption; no requests will be considered until the inmate “ha[s] authenticated [his] Native American heritage.” J.A. 179. And, it seems the policy was just so applied in Morrison’s case. Morrison was not refused a religious exemption because he failed to meet the requirements applicable to all inmates requesting a religious exemption to the personal property restrictions. Rather, Morrison was denied an exemption, and was told that he was being denied an exemption, because he did not prove Native American heritage. The district court’s findings in this regard enjoy overwhelming support in the record. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287-88, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Defendant Millard told Morrison that he could
holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact recognizing but finding inapplicable pure question of law exception to doctrine of exhaustion holding that the issue of discriminatory intent in a race discrimination case is a factual question for the trier of fact whose findings are reviewed only for clear error holding that intent to discriminate on account of race  is a pure question of fact subject to rule 52as clearlyerroneous standard holding it is a question of fact