Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir.1990); see also Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Coop. Extension of Schenectady County, 252 F.3d 545, 554 (2d Cir.2001). Importantly, summary judgment is not appropriate where “questions regarding an employer’s motive predominate in the inquiry regarding how important a role the protected speech played in the adverse employment decision.” Morris, 196 F.3d at 110 (citation omitted). Here, Sebast has sufficiently established a claim for unconstitutional retaliation to survive summary judgment. While all inferences drawn from the current record would lead the court to find that Sebast engaged in protected speech by complaining to Sheriff Campbell about Undersheriff Mahan’s potential misconduct, see, e.g., Fikes v. City of Daphne, 79 F.3d 1079, 1084 (11th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>), the court is presently unable to conclude as
holding that the absence of a motivating desire to address a matter of public concern was not dispositive as to whether the speech addressed a matter of public concern holding that law enforcement agents internal reports of misconduct by fellow officers involved matters of public concern and contrasting such speech with employees complaints in tang holding that an officers report of misconduct by fellow officer is a matter of public concern holding that alleged misconduct by public officials particularly by law enforcement officials is matter of public concern holding that employees voluntary testimony is also inherently a matter of public concern