entitled to stay. Second, the trial remained open to the public and any press that were already present in the courtroom. Third, the record does not contain any evidence that locking the courtroom doors denied any members of the public, Silvernail’s family or friends, or any witnesses access to the trial. In fact, Brown is distinguishable only because the closure in this case occurred at a different stage of the criminal trial: the State’s closing argument rather than the reading of the jury instructions. That distinction, however, does not alter the constitutional analysis, particularly because the Lindsey factors point equally to the conclusion in both instances that the closures were trivial. See People v. Woodward, 4 Cal.4th 376, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 434, 841 P.2d 954, 955, 959-60 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, appellant recognizes that our
holding that comment by prosecutor in closing argument that defense counsel did not produce evidence of the defendants innocence was not a comment on the defendants failure to testify holding that plainerror exception did not apply where prosecutor asked jury to assume the role of the victim in closing argument holding that the district courts act of locking the courtroom doors and posting a do not enter sign outside the courtroom for approximately 90 minutes while the prosecutor completed his closing argument did not violate the defendants publictrial right holding that the district courts failure to give the instruction was not error given that the defendants theory was fully explained  in his opening and closing argument holding defense counsel waived objection where he remained silent despite the district courts specific inquiry during a side bar conference whether there were any concerns about closing the courtroom to the public