under the FDCPA. Second, he contends, the court erroneously found that the Firm’s failure to answer his First Request for Admissions did not constitute technical admissions that bound Gustino, the Firm’s sole practitioner and owner, for purposes of summary judgment. These arguments regarding the propriety of summary judgment are nonstarters, however, because a party may not appeal an order denying summary judgment after a full trial on the merits has occurred. Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180, 188-84, 131 S.Ct. 884, 888-89, 178 L.Ed.2d 708 (2011) (“May a party, as the Sixth Circuit believed, appeal an order denying summary judgment after a full trial on the merits? Our answer is no.”) (footnote omitted); Lind v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 254 F.3d 1281, 1286 (11th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). An order denying summary judgment is “simply
holding that a grant of summary judgment in favor of one party creates a final judgment allowing appellate review of denial of opposing partys summary judgment motion holding that we will not review the pretrial denial of a motion for summary judgment after a full trial and judgment on the merits holding that denial of motion for summary judgment is interlocutory even though trial judge had stated that there was no just reason for delay because denial of motion for summary judgment was not a final determination of defendants rights and the appeal did not affect defendants substantial rights holding that the courts denial of either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is not reviewable  recognizing that we can consider trial evidence in reviewing the denial of a pretrial suppression motion