in all branches of the law for generations,” and that it was sufficiently objective to save the ordinance from vagueness. Id. at 677, 683, 470 N.W.2d 296. Although there are cases to the contrary, see, e.g., Langford, 755 F.Supp. 1460, and Dupres v. City of Newport, 978 F.Supp. 429 (D.R.I.1997), anti-noise ordinances that incorporate a “reasonable person” standard have generally withstood constitutional scrutiny. Gruwell, supra, at 367; e.g., Howard Opera Assocs. v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 322 F.3d 125, 128 (2d Cir. 2003) (upholding noise ordinance prohibiting “unreasonable noise,” defined as that which “disturbs, injures or endangers the peace or health of another or ... endangers the health, safety or welfare of the community”); Reeves v. McConn, 631 F.2d 377, 386. (5th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>); see also Jim Crockett Promotion, Inc. v. City
holding that statute prohibiting conduct that obstruets or unreasonably interfere with free ingress or egress to and from public buildings was not impermissibly vague holding that term unreasonably loud is not impermissibly vague holding factor b is not unconstitutionally vague holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance holding that term unreasonable noise was not vague