unique facts and circumstances of each case” to determine whether an individual voluntarily consented to a search. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 233, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). The district court’s sifting of the unique facts and circumstances in this case changed from its first order to its second order. When the district court reviewed the evidence through the lens of an unlawful seizure, it was then-and only then-the court found Loos’s and Escobar’s consents were constitutionally deficient. The district court properly considered the legal effect of the officer’s lie about the drug dog alerting when pondering whether Loos and Escobar voluntarily consented to the searches of their luggage. The Supreme Court has “stated that even when of 86, 1191 (8th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Realizing there is “a vast difference between
holding that a fiftynine minute detention to wait for a drug dog was reasonable where the officer requested the dog immediately after developing reasonable suspicion holding that a district court did not clearly err in finding consent where two agents testified that the defendant orally consented but the defendant denied having orally consented and would not sign a written consent form holding that officers release of police dog to assist in arrest was discretionary act holding district courts finding of consent was not clearly erroneous when the defendant consented after officers told him they could get a drug dog even though the defendant knew the dog would alert holding that defendant voluntarily consented where defendants only basis for coercion was that the officers said that if he did not consent they would get a warrant which would take a while