court found, albeit implicitly, Cravath’s conduct to be in bad faith”). We conclude the district court’s attorney-fee award can be upheld based on its implicit rejection of Riverdale’s good-faith, reasonable delay defense without an express finding the City acted in bad faith. D. Did the District Court Err in Rejecting Riverdale’s Advice-of-Counsel Defense? We must now determine whether the record supports the district court’s implicit rejection of River-dale’s good-faith defense notwithstanding the City’s reliance on advice of legal counsel. To resolve that issue we must decide whether the City established a “good-faith, reasonable delay” as a matter of law under section 22.8(4). “Good faith” is not defined in chapter 22. “ ‘In the absence of legisla tive definition, we owa 1992) (<HOLDING>), Meyers v. Canutt, 242 Iowa 692, 698, 46
holding that a plaintiff must show that a defendant did not have an honest good faith belief in marking its products holding that a party must at least have a subjective belief that litigation was a real possibility and that belief must have been objectively reasonable holding that determining what care is reasonable under iowa code section 8527 is a question of fact holding term good faith in iowa code section 23272 rests on a defendants subjective honest belief holding that the test for good faith is the actual belief of the party and not the reasonableness of that belief