status as a person on felony probation and the murder, this claim is unpreserved. See id. (declining to address the appellant’s argument that the trial court improperly found the victims’ ages as mitigating circumstances where there was no causal link between the children’s ages and their deaths, because the appellant failed to raise that argument before the trial court). Even if this claim were not barred, we would find it to be without merit. As noted above, Caylor does not dispute that he was on felony probation at the time of the murder. Instead, he argues that because this Court has imposed a nexus requirement on the “avoid arrest” aggravator, a similar requirement should apply to the felony probation aggravating circumstance. See Connor v. State, 808 So.2d 598, 610 (Fla.2001) (<HOLDING>). However, the felony probation aggravator is
holding that failure of trial court to instruct jury that state must prove beyond reasonable doubt killing was not committed in heat of passion required reversal of murder conviction even though there was general charge that state was required to prove each element of offenses beyond reasonable doubt holding that to establish that a murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding a lawful arrest the state must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the sole or dominant motive for the murder was the elimination of a witness holding that indictment for murder in the first degree charges murder by whatever means it may have been committed regardless of the theory of murder presented to the grand jury holding that in order to establish this aggravator the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt only that the murder was motivated at least in part by a desire to obtain money property or other financial gain  holding that evidence the defendant knew the victim supported a finding that the murder was committed to avoid arrest