“good cause.” Here the statute is silent as to the President’s removal authority, and therefore appellants argue that he has none. However, statutory silence could imply that the President actually enjoys an unrestricted power of removal. See Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 316, 23 S.Ct. 535, 536, 47 L.Ed. 828 (1903). The Commission suggests that the President can remove the commissioners only for good cause, which limitation is implied by the Commission’s structure and mission as well as the commissioners’ terms. We think the Commission is likely correct, but, in any event, we can safely assume that the President would at minimum have authority to discharge a commissioner for good cause — if for no other. See SEC v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 855 F.2d 677, 681 (10th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). * * ' * * * * We turn now to appellants’ more
holding that an extension of time in which to serve process may be granted despite the absence of good cause holding lack of prejudice to the defendant is not good cause recognizing common law authority of stockholders to remove a director for cause recognizing the cause of action recognizing the presidents authority to remove sec members for good cause despite governing statutes silence