to facilitate William’s pick ups and returns of the children. The record reflects that Lacey, out of distrust, often would record her interactions with William. William admitted that he routinely avoids interaction with Lacey unless necessary. After reviewing the record under the applicable standard of review, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the circumstances of the children or a conservator have materially and substantially changed since rendition of the divorce decree and that it is in the children’s best interests to modify the decree to give Lacey the exclusive right to consent to psychiatric and psychological treatment of the children. See Swaab v. Swaab, 282 S.W.3d 519, 534 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (<HOLDING>); Baltzer, 240 S.W.3d at 477 (holding that
holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting such a temporary injunction holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting mother the exclusive right to consent to all psychiatric and psychological treatment of the child holding district court did not abuse its discretion in not granting plaintiffs leave to amend complaint for a third time holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding violation was willful and substantial holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in changing the surname of the child where the court made factual findings that the name change would be in the best interest of the child