denied the motion. The court failed to attach any portions of the record, even though it based its denial on the motion and “court files.” We hold that the trial court erred when it summarily denied appellant’s motion for po h DCA 1998) (reversing order summarily denying motion for post-conviction relief, inter alia, because any error involved in counsel’s failure to object to prosecutor’s comments concerning defendant’s post-arrest silence was not preserved for appeal due to counsel’s failure to object, which may be sufficient to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to a rule 3.850 motion). The state contends, inter alia, that there was no indication that appellant actually remained silent, citing, e.g., Ivey v. State, 586 So.2d 1230, 1234 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (<HOLDING>). However, appellant alleges in his motion that
holding testimony that defendant had no response to question during police interview was not impermissible comment on his constitutional right to remain silent where defendant had voluntarily waived his miranda rights holding state did not impermissibly comment on defendants right to remain silent when it crossexamined him on the inconsistency of his testimony with the prior statement he made to the arresting officer after being given the miranda warnings recognizing a public safety exception to the requirement that miranda warnings be given in order to use a suspects statement as evidence against him at trial holding that once miranda warnings have been given if the individual indicates in any manner  that he wishes to remain silent the interrogation must cease any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion subtle or otherwise holding that although defendants voluntarily given initial statement was inadmissible because of miranda violation subsequent statement made after careful miranda warnings were given and waiver was obtained was admissible