(3) the de fendant’s culpability in the fraud perpetrated by the controlled person. See Securities & Exchange Com’n v. First Jersey Securities, Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1472 (2d Cir.1996). First, as the Court has found, plaintiffs have failed properly to plead a violation of the 1934 Act. Second, as we also have noted, plaintiffs have failed properly to allege scienter and/or culpability on the part of “Merrill Lynch.” Even had we found a properly pled violation of the 1934 Act, we would not automatically impute this violation to “Merrill Lynch” as a controlling entity. See Baesa, 969 F.Supp. at 242 (“[T]he law in this circuit is clear that a subsidiary’s fraud cannot be automatically imputed to its corporate parent.”). See also Chill v. General Elec. Co., 101 F.3d 263, 270 (2d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Novak, 997 F.Supp. at 435. Finally the Court
holding that a parent must exercise some control over the subsidiarys activities which does not require that the subsidiary be controlled to an ultimate degree by its parent  although something more than mere passive investment by the parent is required the parent must have and exercise control and direction  over the affairs of its subsidiary in order for venue to be proper holding that district court has the power to decide what portion of subsidiarys income should be reallocated to its parent holding that a parent company would at the very least have to have been deliberately blind to its subsidiarys fraud in order to have the requisite scienter holding that even in separate trial other crimes evidence would not have been admissible and identification testimony would have been admissible holding that a subsidiarys contacts can be imputed for purposes of service of process where a parent uses the subsidiary to do what it otherwise would have done itself 