“[i]t is settled now ... that the Constitution places limits on a State’s right to interfere with a person’s ... bodily integrity”); Doe v. Taylor Independent Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 451 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (concluding that if due process considerations protect school children from arbitrary paddlings and other corporal punishment, “then surely the Constitution protects a schoolchild from physical sexual abuse”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 70, 130 L.Ed.2d 25 (1994); Dang Vang v. Vang Xiong X. Toyed, 944 F.2d 476, 479 (9th Cir.1991) (finding that the defendant clearly “used his position in the state government to deprive these women of their constitutional right to be free from sexual assault”); Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 726-27 (3d Cir.1989) (en banc) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044, 110 S.Ct. 840,
holding that an abuse or molestation exclusion unambiguously covered claim of sexual touching even though terms abuse and molestation were not defined holding school district hable for teachers sexual harassment of student only upon knowing failure to act holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse holding that the constitutional right to freedom from invasion of personal security through sexual abuse was wellestablished even before ingraham because a teachers sexual molestation of a student could not possibly be deemed an acceptable practice holding that the district was not liable under respondeat superior for a teachers sexual assault of a student even though it occurred on school grounds and during school hours because the criminal misconduct was not within the scope of the teachers employment