jurors whether they could sign a death verdict and announce this finding in court. See Isaacs, 386 S.E.2d at 328-29 (concluding that there was no error in questioning a potential juror whether she could say in open court that the defendant be sentenced to death because “agreeing to a sentencing verdict is a part of every juror’s duty, since a poll of the jury is required at the sentencing phase of a death penalty trial”); People v. Ganus, 148 Ill.2d 466, 171 Ill.Dec. 359, 594 N.E.2d 211, 215 (1992) (“A venireman’s professed inability to sign the death warrant forms and impose the death penalty has been held to indicate that that venireman would not meet the requisite standard for performance of his duties as a juror.”); State v. Kreutzer, 928 S.W.2d 854, 866 (Mo.1996) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Holland, 518 Pa. 405, 543
holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion noting that the court had previously and repeatedly rejected the claim that asking whether a prospective juror could sign a death verdict if selected as foreperson improperly seeks a commitment from the venireperson and that ability to assess the death penalty as jury foreperson is a proper basis for followup questioning directed to an equivocating venireperson holding that the trial court did not err in overruling a challenge for cause of a venireperson who stated that he leaned toward the death penalty holding that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion by stating that it did not have the ability to present the transcript to the jury holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty holding that if a trial court has rejected death as a possible sentence double jeopardy bars the state from seeking the death penalty at resentencing even where rejection of the death sentence was based on a legal error