does not merely prescribe a procedure, but rather a substantive right of a defendant to a reduction in its liability for fault that is fairly attributable to others and not to it. See Krieser v. Hobbs, 166 F.3d 736, 739 (5th Cir.1999) (applying § 85-5-7 after stating that “for a diversity action, we apply state substantive law”). Moreover, in terms of intendment and effect in general, app (D.N.J.1999) (applying conflicts analysis to issue of apportionment of fault to determine whether Maryland or New Jersey law substantive law governed); Stingley v. Raskey, 1995 WL 696591, at *7 (D.AIaska 1995) (describing right of third-party plaintiff to an equitable apportionment of fault between all parties as substantive right); Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gray, 475 F.Supp. 679, 680 (E.D.Mo.1979) (<HOLDING>). Having determined that the issue under
recognizing ability of one or more joint tortfeasors to settle on behalf of themselves and another joint tortfeasor and then pursue that joint tortfeasor for its share of the settlement payment holding that right of one joint tortfeasor to implead a second joint tortfeasor and have the jury apportion the damages according to their relative degrees of fault was not merely a procedural right but a substantive right recognizing right of contribution against joint tortfeasor where release is obtained on his behalf holding that a right to be released when a joint tortfeasor has been released is a vested right recognizing necessity of release of joint tortfeasor against whom contribution is sought