discussed, was premised on the fact that the First Amendment rights of free citizens were implicated by the censorship of prisoners’ mail. Without notifying the free citizen of the impending rejection, he would not be able to challenge the decision which may infringe his right to free speech. Cf. Trudeau v. Wyrick, 713 F.2d 1360, 1366 (8th Cir.1983) (author of letter brought a First Amendment challenge); Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015, 1027-28 (2d Cir.1985) (the author would have standing to challenge interference with prisoners’ mail). Second, since the inmate-recipient would not have seen the contents of the withheld letter, he may require the aid of the author to meaningfully challenge the rejection decision. See Cofone v. Manson, 409 F.Supp. 1033, 1042 (D.Conn.1976) (<HOLDING>). We conclude, finally, that a mail censorship
holding that a pro se prisoner complaint is deemed filed as of the date the prisoner gives the complaint to prison officials to be forwarded to the court holding that substantive changes made by administrative agencies in regulations are required to comply with certain notice and comment requirements which include publication of a notice of proposed rulemaking in the federal register an opportunity for interested persons to comment on that notice and after consideration of these comments publication of the final rule with a general statement of its basis and purpose citing 5 usc  553b c holding a prisoner has no constitutional right to a job in prison holding that a publisher must receive notice when a prison official decides to withhold a particular publication since a prisoner cannot be expected to marshal arguments in favor of its admission without the assistance of someone familiar with the material holding that a prisoner has no constitutionallybased liberty interest in a particular prison classification  because an inmate is not entitled to a particular degree of liberty in prison