effect even though it does not permit a personal-capacity officer suit. The WPA does not require a plaintiff to name a state entity as a defendant. Hence, in cases where a plaintiff elects not to name a state entity as a defendant, the statutory term “officer” in Section 10-16C-2(C)(4) works to create vicarious liability in a state entity for retaliatory actions taken by officers of that state entity. The inclusion of the statutory term “officer” in the definition of “public employer” ensures that a state entity will be liable if an officer of that entity violates the requirements of the WPA and that a state entity cannot avoid liability merely by arguing that the retaliatory action taken by an officer is outside the scope of his or her employment. Cf. Cummings, 163 S.W.3d at 431 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, this Court is not required to read
holding that the lottery commission as part of the commonwealth is not liable under the unfair practices act holding that a controversy that is a labor dispute within the meaning of the massachusetts act is not taken outside the scope of that act merely because it also involves breaches of an employment contract holding that school districts do not share in the commonwealth of pennsylvanias eleventh amendment sovereign immunity because they are not alter egos of the commonwealth holding that a similar statutory provision in kentuckys whistleblowerprotection act was not surplusage because it ensured that the commonwealth    will be liable if   managers take actions later to be found a violation of the act but also to ensure that the commonwealth    cannot avoid liability by arguing that a    manager acted outside the scope of his or her employment holding that ujnlike for local agency employees willful misconduct does not vitiate a commonwealth employees immunity because sovereign immunity protects a commonwealth employee acting within the scope of his or her employment from liability even for intentional torts