qualified immunity from those claims, but arrive at that conclusion by a different route. Determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop can be a tricky proposition, particularly when one of the factors motivating the stop was, as in this case, the race of the suspects. Race is of little value in distinguishing one suspect from others, particularly where everyone in the pool of possible suspects is of the same race. See United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc) (observing that where most people who transverse a checkpoint are His panic, the fact that a particular person transversing it is Hispanic is of little value in establishing reasonable suspicion); Morgan v. Woessner, 997 F.2d 1244, 1254 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). But race is a trait that, when combined with
holding that a tip may provide the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop holding that a tip to look out for a black person without more does not give rise to reasonable suspicion to stop anyone holding that an anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun  without any corroborating evidence  did not provide reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing justifying the officers stop and frisk of that person holding that an officers reasonable mistake of law can give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a traffic stop under the fourth amendment holding that a mere anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun  without any corroborating evidence  does not provide a reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing justifying the officers stop and frisk of that person