for the trier of fact is whether the employer’s selection of a particular applicant over the plaintiff was motivated by discrimination, and evidence of the plaintiff’s superior qualification is thus probative of pretext. However, the bar is set high for this kind of evidence of discrimination because differences in qualifications are generally not probative evidence of discrimination unless those disparities are of such weight and significance that no reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial judgment, could have chosen the candidate selected over the plaintiff for the job in question. Celestine v. Petroleos de Venezuella SA, 266 F.3d 343 (5th Cir.2001), abrogated on other grounds, National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 105, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (<HOLDING>). 19 . From Agoh’s testimony during his
holding that relief granted under title vii is against the employer not individual employees whose actions constituted a violation of title vii emphasis in original holding that a title vii plaintiff could not hold coworkers liable in their individual capacities under title vii holding that title vii does not include a continuing violation doctrine holding that title vii does not address samesex harassment holding that the doctrine of qualified immunity does not protect a government official who is sued in an official capacity under title vii because title vii does not impose personal liability