Boyd’s allegation, in claim XII, paragraphs 110-116, of his petition, that the trial court’s instruction on reasonable doubt was erroneous. 11. Boyd’s allegation, in Claim XIII, paragraphs 117-120, of his petition, that the manner of execution used by the State of Alabama is unconstitutional. 4. “Cumulative Effect” of Alleged Trial Errors In Issue VIII of his appellate brief, Boyd also argues that the cumulative effect of the alleged trial errors raised in his petition and listed above resulted in a denial of his right to due process. This specific claim was not presented to the circuit court in Boyd’s Rule 32 petition and is raised for the first time on appeal. Ac cordingly, it is not properly before us for review. See, e.g., Arrington v. State, 716 So.2d 237, 239 (Ala.Crim.App.1997)(<HOLDING>). See also, e.g., McGahee v. State, 885 So.2d
holding that an appellant cannot raise an issue on appeal from the denial of a rule 32 petition which was not raised in the rule 32 petition holding that where the petitioner alleges that he failed to receive notice of the dismissal of his rule 32 ala rcrim p petition in time to effect a timely appeal therefrom and the events about which the petitioner complains all occurred before june 1 2005 the effective date of the amendment to rule 32 providing a different remedy for obtaining an outoftime appeal from the dismissal of a rule 32 petition a petition for a writ of mandamus is the only appropriate remedy holding in an appeal from the denial of a rule 32 petition that the appellants claim that the circuit court erred in not ruling on his motion to subpoena a transcript of his guilty plea proceedings was not preserved for review because the circuit court never ruled on the motion and the appellant never objected to the circuit courts failure to rule on the motion holding that a similar claim in a rule 32 petition was procedurally barred because it was raised at trial and because it was raised on direct appeal recognizing that rule 32 is a postconviction remedy