under the FCRA for “loss of sleep, nervousness, frustration and mental anguish”). In other contexts, however, the term has been used or construed more narrowly to authorize, damages for only pecuniary harm. In the wrongful-death provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), for example, Congress authorized “actual or compensatory damages, measured by the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death.” 28 U. S. C. § 2674, ¶2. At least one court has defined “actual damages” in the Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U. S. C. § 101(b) (1970 ed.), as “the extent to which the market value of a copyrighted work has been injured or destroyed by an infringement.” Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 772 F. 2d 505, 512 (CA9 1985); see also Mackie v. Rieser, 296 F. 3d 909, 917 (CA9 2002) (<HOLDING>). And some courts have construed “actual
holding that a plaintiff can seek statutory damages even in the absence of actual damages holding that severance payments are compensable as actual damages and not speculative in nature like damages for lost opportunities and profits holding that  hurt feelings over the nature of the infringement have no place in the actual damages calculus holding that actual confusion though not required is the best evidence supporting trademark infringement holding that contributory trademark infringement requires some predicate act of infringement