with respect to an untimely section 2254 petition); Warren v. Garvin, 219 F.3d 111, 113-14 (2d Cir.2000) (same). Two principles emerge from our decisi Cir.1996) (per curiam) (pro se supplemental brief “substantially constitutes the motion envisioned by § 2244(b)(3)(A), and will be treated' as satisfying the motion requirement”). We see no reason why the general rule should not apply to pro se motions filed pursuant to section 2255. Where a motion, nominally seeking an extension of time, contains allegations sufficient to support a claim under section 2255, a district court is empowered, and in some instances may be required, under Haines to treat that motion as a substantive motion for relief under section 2255. See Fleming v. United States, 146 F.3d 88, 90 (2d Cir.1998) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048,
holding no presumption of acquiescence because defendant was never allowed to proceed pro se holding that a defendant has a right to proceed pro se at trial holding defendants pro se motion to reduce sentence was not properly before the trial court when defendant was represented by counsel since defendant may not proceed both by counsel and pro se holding that a pro se defendant is not held to a different or more lenient standard merely because he elected to proceed pro se one who knowingly elects to represent himself assumes full responsibility for complying with the substantive and procedural requirements of the law holding that a district court must review pro se petitions with a lenient eye allowing borderline cases to proceed