argues that our ease law also recognizes that because the Act is imprecise, the plain meaning rule should be cautiously applied in the workers’ compensation context. Chavez v. Mountain States Constructors, 1996-NMSC-070, ¶ 25, 122 N.M. 579, 929 P.2d 971. Worker relies on the definitions in Section 52-l-25.1(A) and Section 52-1-50.1 for his argument that TTD is a benefit based on total disability but is awarded for a temporary period of time. Worker cites to several New Mexico cases in which the courts distinguished between partial and full TTD benefits. See Lackey, 1998-NMCA-121, ¶ 10, 125 N.M. 592, 964 P.2d 153 (recognizing that the award of benefits under Section 52-1-25.1(0 is a partial benefit); Ortiz v. BTU Block & Concrete Co., 1996-NMCA-097, ¶¶ 8, 10, 122 N.M. 381, 925 P.2d 1 (<HOLDING>). Worker acknowledges that the distinction
holding the record does not show that the statement to the social worker was for medical treatment because the social worker testified that he questioned the child to determine whether he needed to notify child protective services of a case of suspected child abuse holding child welfare worker entitled to qualified immunity where child removed on reasonable suspicion of abuse holding that the worker was entitled to full ttd benefits because the employer never made an offer of employment once the worker was released to work holding that statements made to a social worker that may have bearing on a childs health safety and welfare are not privileged and are subject to compulsory disclosure under the harmful acts exception to social worker privilege holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support a finding of abandonment when the defendant knew his child was in the hospital but never visited or arranged for anyone to claim the child never voluntarily sought out his children despite the opportunity to do so and the case worker had to search for him