of the prior conviction did not substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect. A prior conviction is presumptively inadmissible for impeachment if more than ten years has elapsed since the date of conviction or of the witness’ release from the confinement imposed for the prior conviction, whichever is later. Id. 609(b). More than ten years had elapsed between Butler’s prior conviction (November 13, 1980) and his current trial (June 28-29, 1993). The State argues, however, that the record does not establish that the prior conviction was too remote under Rule 609(b) because Butler failed to show when he was released from confinement under the prior offense. We reject this contention because it misplaces the burden of proof. See Theus v. State, 845 S.W.2d 874, 880 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (<HOLDING>). The State indeed failed to establish that
holding that burden of proof is on party urging admission of prior conviction for impeachment holding that the burden is on the plaintiff holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant holding that burden of proof is on party challenging attorneyofrecords authority to settle case holding burden of proof is on one asserting an affirmative defense