992 (Fla.2007)). Here, the plain language of section 316.1935(3) contains additional elements that subsection (1) does not. These include an appropriately marked law enforcement patrol vehicle, lights and siren activated, and high speed or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property. The original information did not include any language related to these elements, but the amended information did. The State did not merely change a statute number. It changed much of the wording in the charge in order to assert all the additional elements required to prove a substantially different and new offense. Second, lack of prejudice does not have any bearing on whether an information can be amended to include a new charge after speedy trial has expired. See, e.g., D.A., 939 So.2d at 151 (<HOLDING>). Even if a lack of prejudice was important, we
holding that affirmance of a dismissal of new charges was required when speedy trial had lapsed despite the fact that the corree tion of the charges in the amended information would not have prejudiced das ability to address the merits of the states case in any way holding that  1983 claims accrued when all charges were dismissed rather than a previous date on which the conviction was vacated on the theory that the charges remained pending until the dismissal holding that the speedy trial clock for state charges did not begin to run when the defendant was taken into custody by federal authorities on federal charges but rather when he was indicted for the state charges holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to accept the defendants guilty pleas to two counts of the indictment and stating that even if the trial court erred the error had not prejudiced the defendant because he was found guilty by the jury of the charges to which he intended to plead and the evidence of the other crimes would have been admissible in the trial for the first degree murder charge holding that although plaintiff was liable for medical services rendered he was not bound by the amount of the charges listed in the admission contract as he was entitled to question the reasonableness of the charges