Scott and Ascher on Trusts § 35.1.2, at 2286 (5th ed.2008). “[C]ourts[, however,] have often been willing, in appropriate circumstances, to find compliance with the terms of the trust, though there has plainly not been literal compliance.” Id. at 2287 (referring also to Unif. Trust Code § 602(c)(1) (“The settlor may revoke ... a revocable trust ... by substantial compliance with a method provided in the terms of the trust ....”); compare N.D.C.C. § 59-14-02(3) (Supp.2007) (containing U.T.C. § 602)). See also Paul v. Arvidson, 123 P.3d 808, 811 (Okla.Civ.App.2005) (dismissing requirement that sole remaining grantor/trustee deliver notice to self as absurd and holding grantor revoked trust by deeding property to later trust); Argo v. Moncus, 721 So.2d 218, 221-22 (Ala.Civ.App.1998) (<HOLDING>). [¶ 30] Here, if “substantial compliance” with
holding that the trustee cannot rely on its own failure to give notice to escape its own liability even though an event of default could be triggered by notice either from the trustee or from twentyfive percent of the security holders recognizing that production of a written insurance policy was unnecessary to prove the existence of the policy because the proof required was proof of the fact of insurance and not of the contents of a writing holding that there is a difference between a debtor attempting to pursue an action for his own benefit and a trustee pursuing an action for the benefit of the creditors holding grantortrustee was not required to give self written notice since writing was for benefit of trustee and could be waived holding trustee has not waived the right to bring a preference objection