mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of his trial, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Under the Eighth Amendment, juries may not be precluded from considering any relevant, mitigating “facets of the character and record of the individual offender” during capital sentencing proceedings. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 8, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982) (“Just as the State may not by statute preclude the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evidence.”); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 978 (1978) (<HOLDING>) (footnote omitted). During the penalty phase
holding that any relevant mitigating evidence concerning a defendants character should not be excluded holding that a trial court must not preclude the jury from considering any aspect of the defendants character or circumstances as a mitigating factor holding that a sentencer must not be precluded from considering  any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers holding that juries may not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor any aspect of a defendants character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death holding that the mandatory sentencing scheme was flawed because it gave no significance to the character and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the offense and excluded from consideration  the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors