Smith Barmy, Inc., 416 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir.2005). The doctrine, however, is not a complete bar to liability. As the District Court for the District of Columbia recently explained, “[N]o degree of cautionary language will inoculate statements that the defendants knew were simply not true when made.” See Freeland v. Iridium World Comm’ns, Ltd., 545 F.Supp.2d 59, 71-72 (D.D.C.2008) (citing Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1097, 111 S.Ct. 2749, 115 L.Ed.2d 929 (1991)). In other words, the bespeaks caution doctrine does not immunize forward-looking statements, even if accompanied by cautionary language, when a defendant asserts forward-looking statements with knowledge or awareness of their falsity. See, e.g., Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1493-94 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); FSP Stallion 1 v. Luce, 2009 WL 1219683
holding that the general corporate laws are incorporated into the corporate charter holding that access to financial information was reasonably related to a defendants narcotics convictions because financial gain motivated the underlying crimes holding that the bespeaks caution doctrine did not immunize a corporate executive from liability when the executive made financial projections while aware of information that rendered those projections unreasonable holding that a federal cause of action accrues when the plaintiff is aware or should be aware of the existence of and source of the injury not when the potential claimant knows or should know that the injury constitutes a legal wrong holding that foia exemption 4 did not apply because agency did not meet burden of showing that desired information consisted of trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person that are privileged or confidential