of a single controlling criterion, each reflects a careful scrutiny of all the surrounding circumstances. Schnekloth, 412 U.S. at 226, 93 S.Ct. at 2046, 36 L.Ed.2d at 861. Accordingly, this Court has held that an analysis of the voluntariness of a confession is a factual question that must take into account the totality of the circumstances. State v. Mayes (1992), 251 Mont. 358, 376, 825 P.2d 1196, 1208 (citing Allies, 606 P.2d at 1050). Pursuant to § 46-13-301(1), MCA, a defendant may move to suppress a confession that the defendant feels was involuntary. This section places the burden on the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was voluntary. The central question is whether the State has established by a preponderance of the . 844, 2 L.Ed.2d 975 (<HOLDING>); Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (holding
holding that physical brutality led to an involuntary confession holding that an officers promise to bring defendants cooperation to the attention of the prosecutor did not make confession involuntary holding that impermissible police procedures rendered confession involuntary holding that mental coercion led to an involuntary confession holding that under elstad the first question that must be answered when determining whether a subsequent confession is tainted by an earlier confession is whether the initial confession was obtained in violation of the defendants fifth amendment rights  ie whether it was involuntary  or whether the confession was voluntary but obtained in technical violation of miranda 