Employers Ins. Co. v. Johnston, 238 Ala. 26, 32, 189 So. 58, 63 (1939). “The word ‘residence’ means ‘a building used as a home.’” Waites v. Toran, 411 So.2d 127, 129 (Ala.1982) (quoting Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary, “Residence,” at 1931 (1971)). However, under a number of authorities, “[t]he word is not confined merely to the dwelling house, but it may include everything used to make the home more comfortable and enjoyable.” 77 C.J.S. Residence, at 293 (1952) (citing Linn v. Ziegler, 68 Kan. 528, 531, 75 P. 489, 490 (1904) (construing homestead exemption statute)); accord, State v. Gardella, 156 Ariz. 340, 342, 751 P.2d 1000, 1001 (Ct.App.1988) (construing residential burglary statute); see also Thomas v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 241 S.W.2d 955, 959 (Tex.Civ.App.1951) (<HOLDING>); cf. In re Estate of Sandersfeld, 187
holding that swimming pool contributed to use of home quoting ashton v ingle 20 kan 670 681 1878 holding that babysitter living in home connected via ramp to defendants home had no authority to consent to search of defendants home holding that a wife with a child from a prior relationship was not entitled to use and possession of the family home holding that home purchased with separate funds and titled in one spouses name was transmuted into marital property because home was used as marital residence and the other spouse contributed to payments and repairs on home holding that 89 sales in 20 years was not the kind of bona fide use intended to afford a basis for trademark protection