(with which I agree), that “Lagadec qualified as an ‘essential’ patent for purposes of the Orange Book pool,” undermines Princo’s price-fixing argument. Princo sets forth the legal rule that it contends governs this case: “the pooling of non-blocking, substitute patents [is] universally recognized as highly anticompetitive” and is unlawful. If the Lagadec patent is an “essential,” or “blocking” patent, that rule by its own terms does not apply. The majority’s conclusion that the Lagadec patent was “essential” because claim 6 of that patent “reasonably might be necessary as a blocking patent to the Orange Book standard” thus takes this case outside of the legal rule on which Princo relies. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 & n. 5, 51 S.Ct. 421, 75 L.Ed. 926 (1931) (<HOLDING>); Dep’t of Justice & FTC, Antitrust Guidelines
recognizing that exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of statute serves as only effective deterrent of such violations holding that significant state involvement satisfies public participation requirement because it serves the identical purpose that the public notice provision seeks to effectuate holding that even when there is a legitimate government purpose the discrimination must bear at least some rational relationship to that purpose recognizing economic viability as a legitimate local purpose in the context of a waste flow control ordinance recognizing that the pooling of blocking patents serves a legitimate purpose