and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.’ ” Al Naj-jar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir.2001) ( ut the Country Reports indicate that while attacks on churches had risen from three to ten, overall incidence of inter-religious strife had decreased. See AR at 163, 177. Moreover, the picture as to development of inter-religious cooperation was mixed at best, with some areas demonstrating increased cooperation and others demonstrating decreased cooperation. See AR at 163. Furthermore, incidents against ethnic Chinese had decreased in the last year. See AR at 171. Thus, the 2004 Country Reports indicated a mixed picture at best, which would not compel a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that Tan would face discrimination. See Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1230 (<HOLDING>). As a result, Tan has failed to demonstrate
holding that the ijs decision can be reversed only if the evidence compels a reasonable fact finder to find otherwise holding that fact finder may draw reasonable inferences from evidence and choose which inference is most reasonable holding that if a reasonable fact finder could make a particular finding on the administrative record then the finding is supported by substantial evidence holding that the bia adopts the ijs entire decision when it cites burbano and expresses no disagreement with the ijs decision holding that the decision to allow attorney fees rests with the trial judge and that decision may only be reversed for an abuse of discretion