(e), and the warden did not argue the statute before the habeas court. This argument therefore was not properly raised at trial or preserved below. Moreover, even assuming that it is appropriate for us to review subsection (e)’s application to this case, it would be of no help to the warden. OCGA § 17-2-2 (e) applies only when “it cannot readily be determined in which county the crime was committed.” Here, because the informant would have known the general locations where the two sales occurred and because the agents knew the exact route that the informant and Brown traveled, the State could have readily determined whether the drug sales occurred in Toombs County and offered evidence to the jury on that essential point. See Rogers v. State, 298 Ga. App. 895, 899 (681 SE2d 693) (2009) (<HOLDING>). OCGA § 17-2-2 (e) is therefore inapplicable
holding that the exclusion of prospective jurors from either the area where the crime was committed or where the defendant resided does not violate the sixth amendment holding that no error was committed where issue of whether the defendant had committed another crime was injected into the trial by the codefendant but was immediately followed by the trial courts instructions to the jury that only the counts listed on the indictment be considered holding that ocga  1722 e was inapplicable because the state could have readily determined where the crime was committed holding that when evidence exists that the crime may have been committed outside marylands territorial jurisdiction and a defendant disputes the territorial jurisdiction of the maryland courts to try him or her the issue of where the crime was committed is factdependent and thus for the trier of fact holding the crime of conspiracy is committed or not before the substantive crime begins