83 L.Ed. 104 (1938); see also Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 244 U.S. 25, 29, 37 S.Ct. 492, 61 L.Ed. 966 (1917) (“A court that renders judgment against a defendant thereby tacitly asserts, if it does not do so expressly, that it has jurisdiction over that defendant.”). By rendering judgment against Appellant, the district court tacitly — and validly — concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the case. See United States v. Long, 706 F.2d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir.1983). AFFIRMED. ** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. 1 . Appellant does not argue that the district court lacked jurisdiction because his vessel was not, in fact, stateless. See United States v. Mathews, 833 F.2d 161, 164 (9th Cir.1987)
holding that a defendants objection to facts in the presentence report on the basis that they went beyond any prior jury verdict or guilty plea is sufficient to prevent those facts from being relied upon in sentencing holding that plea of guilty admits all facts well pleaded and sentence imposed and is not subject to collateral attack on ground that as factual matter accused was not guilty of the offense charged holding that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge holding that the voluntary entry of an informed and counseled guilty plea constitutes an admission of all facts necessary to convict holding that a plea of guilty is an admission of all material facts alleged in the charge including those facts that serve as factual predicates to subject matter jurisdiction