before the PSR was created and Otero sentenced, there was existing case law calling into doubt whether simple assault qualified as a crime of violence for sentence enhancement purposes. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Taylor had years earlier enunciated the categorical approach rule under which counsel could have argued that simple assault was not a crime of violence because the minimum mens rea required for a conviction under the Pennsylvania statute is lower than intent. Additionally, our decision in Parson, supra., was available at the time of Otero’s sentencing. In Parson, we stated that an offender has committed a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) only if he acted with an intent to use force. 955 F.2d at 866. See also Jobson v. Ashcroft, 326 F.3d 367, 372-73 (2d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Also, in United States v. Vargas-Duran, 356
holding that an aliens psas conviction was not a crime of violence under 18 usc  16a that would render the alien removable as an aggravated felon holding that manslaughter was an infamous crime under a divorce statute because it was a felony holding that seconddegree manslaughter was not a crime of violence and thus was not an aggravated felony warranting an aliens removal holding that washington seconddegree assault with a deadly weapon statute was a crime of violence under guidelines section 4b12a1 without considering whether it was a per se crime of violence under the application notes holding that first and seconddegree intentional murder verdicts are consistent with a felony murder verdict because lack of intent is not an element of seconddegree felony murder