lands, and toward unproductive efforts to protect lizard habitat on private lands. 8 . Plaintiffs contend that if the Secretary wished to challenge the district court’s 2005 remand order, he ought timely to have appealed that order immediately after it was issued. See Alsea Valley Alliance v. Dep’t of Commerce, 358 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining the general rule that only an agency may appeal a court's remand order). Regardless, the issue on appeal is whether the 2006 withdrawal complied with the requirements laid out in Defenders, and thus we cannot avoid interpreting that case on this appeal. 9 . A district court in the Tenth Circuit has disagreed with this court’s analysis in Defenders. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 411 F.Supp.2d 1271, 1279 (D.N.M.2005) (<HOLDING>). In rejecting Defenders' gloss on the ESA,
holding that a contract must be read as a whole in order to give a reasonable and harmonious meaning and effect to all of its provisions citation omitted holding that the statutory phrase significant portion of its range refers to biological significance and crediting the secretarys argument  specifically rejected in defenders   that in order to be significant the species as a whole must be threatened with extinction holding that in order for claim to be within scope of coverage of title insurance policy it must be specifically provided for holding that the possibility of a mistaken understanding of the phrase preponderance of the evidence on the part of the jury is too remote to constitute plain error when counsel gave the jury an accurate explanation of the legal meaning of the phrase in his closing argument and that meaning is consistent with the common understanding of the words in the phrase holding that whether in federal or state court a challenge to the validity of the contract as a whole and not specifically to the arbitration clause within it must go to the arbitrator and not the court