these arguments is sufficient to override the designation of Shar-key which appears in the record and Pine Tree did not abuse its discretion is so concluding. First, plaintiff contends that Sharkey waived her rights to the death benefits under the pension program when, attendant to the dissolution of her marriage to Decedent, she executed a Voluntary Separation Agreement, which was incorporated into, but not merged in the judgment of divorce. The Separation Agreement contained, inter alia, a mutual release by the Decedent and Sharkey of “any and all rights or interests which [they now have] or may hereafter acquire in the real, personal or other property of the other.” See Defs.’ Ex. 14. This contention founders on the rule of Estate of Altobelli v. IBM, 77 F.3d 78, 81 (4th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). The Separation Agreement in this case neither
holding that erisa permits suits to recover benefits only against the plan as an entity and thus the beneficiary had erred by suing her exhusbands employer and plan administrator when proper party would have been the benefits plan itself holding that a termination of an erisa plans benefits must be based upon the plans terms and language holding that plan participants in a defined benefit pension plan have no claim to the plans surplus assets holding that the family courts award to exwife of interest in 387 of debtors military pension payable directly from the plan was not subject to discharge because interest in pension plan was not a debt rather it was considered exwifes separate ownership interest holding that exwife had no interest in exhusbands erisa plan because each party clearly intended by the terms of a property settlement to relinquish all interests in the pension plans of the other