that motion without prejudice and instructed the clerk to forward the motion to Abdullah's attorney. 4 . Under the actual innocence showing, a petitioner must demonstrate not only actual innocence of the gun charge but also of the more serious charges the government dismissed in exchange for the guilty plea. See Dejan, 208 F.3d at 686. Abdullah contends the dismissed drug counts were not "more serious” than the gun charge because, had he been convicted of the six dismissed drug counts, the counts would have been grouped with his conspiracy conviction under the Sentencing Guidelines and would have had less of an impact on his total sentence than the mandatory consecutive sentence he received on his § 924(c)(1) conviction. See United States v. Halter, 217 F.3d 551, 553-54 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). 5 . The dissent suggests Abdullah’s inability
holding that when no statutory exception applies  the district court lacks the authority to impose a sentence less than the statutory mandatory minimum holding that dismissed drug counts are not more serious if their effect on the total sentence is less than the  924c fiveyear mandatory consecutive sentence holding that a defendant is subject to a mandatory consecutive sentence for a  924c conviction and is not spared from that sentence by virtue of receiving a higher mandatory minimum on a different count of conviction holding that consecutive sentences imposed on multiplieitous counts  two counts of conspiracy for one drug smuggling enterprise  violated double jeopardy clause holding that to compare severity of sentences the proper procedure is first to disregard the sentence originally imposed on the dismissed count and then compare the total remaining sentence imposed on the remaining counts with the petitioners present position