omitted). Accordingly we concluded that because misdemeanor battery could be violated through the “least touching,” the statute did not require the use of violent force and thus was not a crime of violence under the federal generic statute. Id. Ortegar-Mendez, however, is readily distinguishable because a conviction under § 273.5(a) requires more than a simple battery. Unlike § 242, which criminalizes the use of “force or violence,” § 273.5(a) contains no differentiating provision. California Penal Code § 273.5(a) requires that the defendant “willfully inflict ... corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition.” (emphasis added). The commonsense reading of this language is that § 273.5(a) requires the use of violence. See United States v. Jimenez, 258 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Unlike simple battery, which requires
holding that marital communications which arise from an act of violence by a spouse committed against the children of either spouse should constitute an exception to the marital privilege because such communications fail to satisfy the conditions underlying the creation of the privilege holding that a spouse is not necessarily an agent of the debtor holding that absent an actionable injury to one spouse the other spouse cannot recover for loss of consortium holding that a defendant could not reasonably  dispute that inflicting corporal injury on his spouse involved the use of violence holding that knowledge of prohibited activities is not necessarily the same as fraudulent intent and that the code does not allow attribution of intent from spouse to spouse