the child’s needs; (iii) The child has been abandoned; or (iv) The parent has failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with the child pursuant to section 4041. 22 M.R.S. § 4055(B). It is the petitioner’s burden to establish both parental unfitness and best interest by clear and convincing evidence. In re Alana S., 2002 ME 126, ¶ 15, 802 A.2d 976. Further, the court may not even contemplate the child’s best interest until it has found at least one ground of parental unfitness. Id. [¶ 17] Through many years of interpretation, we have concluded that the procedures, burdens, and standards set out in section 4055 constitute the means by which the fundamental constitutional right to parent is safeguarded. See, e.g., In re Robert S., 2009 ME 18, ¶¶ 12-16, 966 A.2d 894 (<HOLDING>); In re Crystal S., 483 A.2d 1210, 1213
holding that there is no due process right to appellate review holding that the procedure outlined in title 22 preserves a parents right of procedural due process recognizing that a parents liberty interest in the custody of a child is subject to due process protection holding a plaintiff cannot state a due process claim for defendants failure to follow statutory procedural requirements because a plaintiff cannot have a protect property interest in the procedure itself recognizing a  1983 action hvould render superfluous most of the detailed procedural protections outlined in the statute