(emphasis omitted). Accordingly, “contractual language disclaiming tort liability [must] be clear enough that the intent of both parties to reheve the defendant of the claimed liability [is] unmistakable.” Id. ¶ 39. We have explained that “[t]he most effective way for parties to express an intention to release one party from liability flowing from that party’s own negligence is to provide explicitly that claims based in negligence are included in the release.” Id. at 376, 553 A.2d at 146. In Colgan, we concluded that broad exculpatory language at the end of a limited warranty clause was insufficient to shield the defendant from liability for negligent design. Compare id. at 376-77, 553 A.2d at 146, with Douglass v. Skiing Standards, Inc., 142 Vt. 634, 635-37, 459 A.2d 97, 97-99 (1983) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 40. In addition, we have recognized that
holding that a professional owes no duty to third persons unless the professional had actual knowledge that those persons would rely on his rendering of professional services holding that district courts failure to hold evidentiary hearing to ascertain whether defendant breached plea agreement was harmless when it was clear defendant breached agreement holding that burden is on government to show that error in failure to provide notice is harmless holding that agreement viewed in its entirety was sufficiently clear to show that experienced professional skier intended to hold ski area harmless holding that government must merely show that defendant knew that it was a bank that he intended to influence