831, 835 (App.2002). Likewise, we review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Andrews, 201 Ariz. at 382, ¶ 8, 36 P.3d at 60. DISCUSSION ¶ 7 Although the parties raise multiple issues, one is dispositive: Did the trial court correctly rule that A.R.S. § 33-934 precludes enforcement of Maricopa County’s hen against Barfield, Meyer & Williams, P.C., and Rebanee? ¶ 8 Maricopa County argues the trial court erred in its ruling because A.R.S. § 33-934 does not provide the exclusive mechanism for hen enforcement. Specifically, the County contends that because § 33-934 provides that a lienholder “may” enforce its hen against parties liable for damages, this statute grants non-exclusive hen enforcement rights. See Walter v. Wilkinson, 198 Ariz. 431, 432, ¶ 7, 10 P.3d 1218, 1219 (App.2000) (<HOLDING>). According to the County, § 33-931 implicitly
holding that administrative exhaustion is mandatory despite legislatures use of the word may holding that a states use of the word shall is mandatory language holding that shall generally indicates a mandatory intent unless a convincing argument to the contrary is made holding use of word may generally indicates permissive rather than mandatory intent holding change of word shall to may prior to bills passage indicates legislative intent to make purchases upon bids permissive rather than mandatory