of medical devices, as well as the brief mention of Med-tronic’s profits from off-label uses) is based on Plaintiff’s Original Complaint, see Docket Entry No. 1, which the Court must assume to be true at this stage. 2 . See also Gavin, 2013 WL 3791612, at *17 (dismissing all claims except a failure-to-report adverse events to FDA claim); Ledet v. Medtronic, Inc., 2013 WL 6858858, at *4-6 (S.D.Miss. Dec. 30, 2013) (dismissing all claims as expressly or impliedly preempted). 3 . See also McDonald-Lerner, M.D. v. Neurocare Assocs., P.A., No. 373859-V (Md.Cir.Ct. Aug. 29, 2013) (adopting Ramirez’s reasoning and denying motion to dismiss). 4 . Courts have drawn this same distinction in other areas of preemption law. See, e.g., Martin v. Ford Motor Co., 914 F.Supp. 1449, 1454 (S.D.Tex.1996) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Because of the importance of this issue,
holding in preemption case involving car manufacturer that material omission claims were preempted but that false representation claims survived holding that fraud claim requires proof that the defendant made a material representation that was false holding the state law claims were not preempted holding that state law fraud claims are preempted by the federal labor law duty of fair representation holding that a false representation of a material matter of fact is a necessary element of a rescission claim