plaintiffs, demarcates the boundaries of the legal dispute and makes provision to protect absent class members. In so doing, of course, the district court may take advantage, to the extent appropriate, of the parties’ own agreements and stipulations describing the nature of the suit and the existence of a class. See Willie M. v. Hunt, 657 F.2d 55 (4th Cir.1981). While express class certification is a fundamental requirement, uncertified actions have on occasion been recognized as class actions. When the parties stipulate that the action is a class action and clearly define the members of the class, and the court enters judgment pursuant to the stipulated terms, this may sufficiently imply certification for purposes of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(1). See Oburn v. Shapp, 393 F.Supp. 561 (E.D.Pa.) (<HOLDING>), aff'd on other grounds, 521 F.2d 142 (3d
holding that in the rule 23 class action context named plaintiff may appeal a denial of class certification even if his or her individual claims had been satisfied through the entry of judgment holding that where the action was filed as a class action and a consent decree was entered into entry of the consent decree was sufficient certification of the action as a class action under rule 23 holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because there was no  consent decree left to be terminated holding that a district of columbia consumer protection statute that authorized representative actions and did not reference class action requirements or mandate class certification was a separate and distinct procedural vehicle from a class action and thus did not constitute a class action under cafa holding that the right of all putative members of a proposed class in an action filed pursuant to kansass class action rule of civil procedure to file a separate action is preserved pending the determination of whether the initial case shall be maintained as a class action