immunity. Walrath, 35 F.3d at 282 (quoting Trotter v. Klincar, 748 F.2d 1177, 1182 (7th Cir.1984)). The parole revocation functions to which the Seventh Circuit accords absolute immunity are “not only the actual decision[s] to revoke parole, but also the activities that are part and parcel of the decision process.” See Trotter, 748 F.2d at 1182. We see no reason to hold differently. The conduct of which Hulsey complains is conduct for which the Board members are absolutely immune from suit. First, Hul-sey’s claim that his parole revocation was based on an assault charge that was later dropped is a challenge to a “decision that involved an exercise of discretion in determining whether parole revocation was appropriate in this particular instance.” See Wal-rath, 35 F.3d at 282-83 (<HOLDING>). Second, Hulsey’s claim that the Board failed
holding that there was no legal right to court review of parole board decision because there is no legal right to release on parole holding a parole rule equivalent to a statute holding that the members of the dc parole board were entitled to absolute immunity against the claim that they violated the parolees constitutional rights when they failed to provide him with a timely parole revocation hearing holding parole board members to be absolutely immune from charge that they conspired to revoke inmates parole based on charges they knew to be false holding that prosecutors are absolutely immune from claims alleging conspiracy to present false testimony but witnesses including police officerwitnesses are not absolutely immune from such claims