interpretations of state criminal statutes. The fact that the convictions thus obtained must now be vacated is the result of extraordinary circumstances outside the State’s control. 124 Wn. App. at 342. We agree. ¶23 In Andress, the Supreme Court made the extraordinary decision to go behind a facially valid judgment and sentence in a collateral attack and then beyond the plain language of the statute to interpret the legislature’s intent 30 years ago when it enacted the second degree felony murder statute. Accordingly, we, like Division One, also hold that this nearly unprecedented procedure triggered the “ends of justice” exception to another procedural rule — the mandatory joinder rule set out in CrR 4.3.1. See Ramos, 124 Wn. App. at 337; see also Wright, 131 Wn. App. 474 (<HOLDING>). ¶24 Both the trial court and this court are
holding the states failure to request an intentional murder instruction at the initial trial had no effect on the states ability to proceed on that alternative and rejecting the defendants claims under the mandatory joinder rule holding the district court did not err in denying the defendants rule 60b3 motion where the defendant had an opportunity to cure any prejudice because the plaintiffs failure to disclose evidence did not interfere with the defendants ability to proceed holding that the land under navigable waters was not granted by the constitution to the united states but was reserved to the states respectively and that new states have the same rights jurisdiction and sovereignty over the soil under navigable water as the original states holding that the defendant had waived any challenge to the district courts failure to give a limiting instruction addressing rule 404b evidence by failing to request one at trial or raise the issue on appeal holding that the united states adoption of a states seizure of currency has the same effect as if the united states had originally seized the currency