96 L.Ed.2d 682 (1987). Furthermore, a survey of those decisions finding counsel’s actions or omissions to be unreasonable indicate a level of incompetence far greater than that exhibited in this case. See, e.g., Horton, 941 F.2d at 1462 (concluding that counsel "began to follow one path, based upon a misinterpretation of the law, without ever evaluating the merits of alternative paths” when attorneys admitted during state habeas corpus eviden-tiary hearing that they never investigated any mitigating circumstances); Armstrong, 833 F.2d at 1433 (concluding that failure to present background evidence was not strategic when trial counsel’s testimony at evidentiary hearing revealed negligible preparation and investigation for penalty phase); Magill v. Dugger, 824 F.2d 879 (11th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); Elledge, 823 F.2d at 1445 (holding that
recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel holding that ineffective assistance of counsel constitutes cause for procedural default only if counsels performance was constitutionally ineffective holding that performance of counsel whose first involvement with the case came on the morning of trial constituted ineffective assistance holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record recognizing that the defendant whose trial counsel represented him on motion for new trial had no opportunity to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim prior to appeal and remanding the case for a hearing solely on this issue