document, each of which listed his address as on Walnut Street. We need not resolve the factual issue of how the Walnut address came to be listed on these forms, because Gomez-Gutierrez received one form and signed the other with this address. Given Gomez-Gutierrez’s failure to change the document to reflect the Wood-worth address, the INS reasonably sent the notice of the hearing to the Walnut address, his last known address. Gomez-Gutierrez’s argument that he must have signed this form without noticing the incorrect address is unpersuasive. In other contexts, we have held that the affixing of a signature is not a mere formality, but rather signifies that the signer has read the document and attests to its accuracy. See, e.g., United States v. Cain, 130 F.3d 381, 383 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Especially critical is the fact that on one
holding that it is not the courts role to decide whether an experts opinion is correct holding that in connection with a motion to dismiss the court may consider a document not attached to the pleadings where the plaintiffs claim depends on the contents of a document the defendant attaches the document to its motion to dismiss and the parties do not dispute the authenticity of the document even though the plaintiff does not explicitly allege the contents of that document in the complaint holding that under the mailbox rule a pro se inmates document is deemed filed at the moment in time when the inmate loses control over the document by entrusting its further delivery or processing which is usually when the inmate places the document in the hands of prison officials holding that attorneys signature is certification that the document is correct holding that a bank customer was not bound to arbitrate where the signature card that was signed referenced a collateral document which contained an arbitration clause but the bank never sent the customer a copy of the collateral document