term conforms to the plain and ordinary dictionary meaning of express or formal consent. The act of “agreeing” connotes explicit or formal authorization. Clearly the word “agreeing” would be unnecessary in Article 11 if, as plaintiff argues, a contracting state already “permitted” any service method it had not expressly prohibited. See United Savings Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371, 108 S.Ct. 626, 98 L.Ed.2d 740 (1988) (supporting the proposition that terms of a statute should be interpreted in a uniform manner). Additionally, plaintiffs reading of “permits” in Article 19 would render Article 11 redundant and hence unnecessary. See Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency and Service, Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 837, 108 S.Ct. 2182, 100 L.Ed.2d 836 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Finally, the most telling argument against
holding rules of procedure interpreted in same manner as statutes holding that statutes should be interpreted so as to fit if possible all parts into a harmonious whole holding that contracts should be interpreted to give effect to all provisions holding ambiguous provisions are to be interpreted so as to provide maximum coverage to the insured holding that statutes should not be interpreted so as to render any of its provisions nugatory