separate recording of the trust or declaration of trust. As there is no evidence on the face of the deeds indicating a. contrary intent, the Personal Representatives, pursuant to their fiduciary responsibilities, seek a declaration that, pursuant to section 689.07(1), Norman held fee simple title to the properties on the date of his death. These allegations are clearly sufficient under the plain language of the statute. See Raborn, 974 So.2d at 328 (stating that under section 689.07(1), a deed that simply refers to grantee as “trustee” conveys a fee simple estate, and applying the statute to find that deed at issue fell under “contrary intention” exception such that grantee held mere legal title as trustee); One Harbor Fin, Ltd. v. Hynes Props., LLC, 884 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (<HOLDING>); Heiskell v. Morris, 182 So.3d 714 (Fla. 1st
holding that where grantee was named as trustee without identification of the beneficiaries or the nature and purposes of the trust and no trust agreement of record was identified the grantee received fee simple title holding that debtor as grantor and trustee of a trust that held legal title to the property held a sufficient equitable interest in the property to claim it as exempt homestead where she resided on the property prepetition with the intent to maintain it as her primary residence holding that trial court erred by granting surviving spouse fee simple title to estates exempt property holding that trial court correctly applied section 689071 to find that grantee who held title as trustee owned property in fee simple absolute holding that where individual held title to property as trustee but gave mortgage to bank in her individual capacity a title reference on the mortgage to the deed into her as trustee provided constructive notice that the mortgage was supposed to be from the individual as trustee or at the least that the holder of a subsequent interest would not be a bona fide purchaser