of lowering his sentencing range, and § 3582(c)(2) does not afford him relief. Moore, 541 F.3d at 1327-28. Smith’s argument that we are not bound by Moore because Moore violates Booker is unavailing as we are bound to follow prior binding precedent “unless and until it is overruled by this [C]ourt en banc or by the Supreme Court.” United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 1236 (11th Cir.2008) (quotations omitted), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 2825, 174 L.Ed.2d 556 (2009). There is no dispute that Moore has not been overruled by either this Court sitting en banc or the Supreme Court, and we are therefore bound to follow it. See id. Finally, Smith’s argument that Moreno is inapplicable here also fails, given our holding in United States v. Melvin, 556 F.3d 1190, 1192 (11th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 2382, 173
holding that a sentence imposed for a violation of supervised release will be upheld where 1 the district court considered the applicable policy statements 2 the sentence is within the statutory maximum and 3 the sentence is reasonable holding that the limitations on the degree of a sentence reduction under  3582c2 are mandatory holding that  3582c2 does not authorize a resentencing but merely provides for a sentence reduction within the bounds established by the sentencing commission and that booker does not apply to  3582c2 proceedings holding that a defendant is not eligible for a sentence reduction under section 3582c2 when the application of that amendment does not result in a lower sentencing range holding that booker does not prohibit the limitations on a judges discretion in reducing a sentence imposed by  3582c2 and the applicable policy statement by the sentencing commission