not come to pass—the wife’s obtaining refinancing of the marital home. And, most significantly, it fails to define what the “disposition” of the home' would entail. Accordingly, the reservation of jurisdiction signals to us that additional judicial labor will be required. See Caufield v. Caufield, 837 So.2d 371, 375 (Fla. 2002) (“A final judgment is one which ends the litigation between the parties and disposes of all issues iftvolved such that no further action by the court will be necessary.”); Demont v. Demont, 24 So.3d 699, 699 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (dismissing appeal where “final” judgment expressly reserved jurisdiction “to consider the division of the parties’ marital personal property,” citing Caufield, 837 So.2d at 375); Wilson v. Wilson, 906 So.2d 356, 357 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (<HOLDING>); Thomas v. Thomas, 902 So.2d 881 (Fla. 1st DCA
holding that an order which purports to become final upon the happening of an event specified in the order is not a final order and the happening of the event does not operate to render the order final holding adjudication order based upon a determination on the merits in juvenile court is a final and appealable order holding that an order remanding an arbitration award is not a final appealable order when the order does not also vacate the arbitration award holding that an order is not a final appealable order when it does not dispose of the complaints against all of the defendants holding that a bankruptcy order is not final unless it 1