a “magical incantation ... to ‘raise’ this procedural defect in [his] Motion to Remand,” and to hold otherwise would be contrary to the requirement that courts strictly construe removal jurisdiction. (Doc. 15 at 3-4.) Lunsford is correct in noting that removal jurisdiction must be strictly construed. See Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chem. Co., Inc., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir.1994). H is argument as to jurisdictional amount does not suffice to raise a section 1445(c) objection. Indeed, the Magistrate Judge plainly stated that he was recommending a disposition on a ground not raised by the parties. While Lunsford filed a motion to remand, his failure to invoke section 1445(c) waived his objection to the procedural defect. See, e.g., Foulke v. Dugan, 148 F.Supp.2d 552, 555 (E.D.Pa. 2001) (<HOLDING>); Denman, 131 F.3d at 548 (same); Holguin v.
holding objection to affidavit on ground it states legal conclusion relates to defect in substance holding that objection to procedural defect was waived where plaintiffs failed to articulate it in removal holding that party waived an objection to choice of law holding that speculation objection as to expert testimony was waived where a different ground for objection was offered below holding that parties waived any choice of law objection by not raising an objection