reason to hold the ninety day period in the Massachusetts tolling amendment unreasonable in this federal civil rights action. The Supreme Court has observed that, “... many prisoners are willing and able to file § 1983 suits while in custody thus, a State reasonably could decide that there is no need to enact a tolling statute applicable to such suits.” Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. at 544, 109 S.Ct. at 2003. The Massachusetts legislature determined that imprisonment should no longer toll the statute of limitations when it enacted St.1987, c. 198. Its judgment was not inconsistent with federal policy, as expounded by the Supreme Court. Thus, we are bound to apply the present tolling provision. Judgment affirmed. 1 . But see Prather v. Norman, 901 F.2d 915, 919-920 and n. 8 (11th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). 2 . This court has borrowed this statute
holding that where plaintiff sought relief from custody his complaint sounded in habeas corpus not civil rights holding the plaintiffs allegation that correction officers either prevented or discouraged him from filing his complaint on the same day the event occurred  raises estoppel as a second potential excuse for nonexhaustion holding that district court improperly dismissed pro se prisoners civil rights complaint by sua sponte raising statute of limitations defense that was neither patently clear from the face of the complaint nor rooted in adequately developed facts recognizing that a district court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint for failure to serve after notice to the plaintiff holding sua sponte dismissal of civil rights complaint was error where complaint was treated as habeas corpus petition and dismissed on nonexhaustion grounds although nonexhaustion was waivable defense and not jurisdictional