not entitled to receive benefits because Section 10.6 of the Plan grants the Plan administrator discretion to interpret the Plan’s terms. Raytheon’s argument misses the mark, however, because the Plan administrator in this case did not interpret the Plan’s terms, but rather interpreted the meaning of a separate document, i.e., the Decree. In effect, in denying Ms. Hogan’s claim, Plan administrators were required to answer two questions: (1) whether the Decree constitutes a QDRO for Plan purposes, and (2) if the Decree was not a QDRO, whether a domestic relations order can be qualified posthumously under ERISA. These questions do not require an interpretation of the Plan’s terms, and therefore de novo review was appropriate. See, e.g., Samaroo v. Samaroo, 193 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Dial v. NFL Player Supplemental Disability
holding that the trustee did not breach its fiduciary duty when its actions were consistent with the trust instrument holding that the gravamen of the offense is the physical adaptation of the instrument holding that the deferential standard of review of a plan interpretation is appropriate only when the trust instrument allows the trustee to interpret the instrument and when the trust ee has in fact interpreted the instrument holding that insurance instrument was fixed annuity exempt from securities regulation because the instrument provided a guaranteed return of four percent 4 holding that the omission of the date of execution on the acknowledgment did not render it invalid when read in conjunction with the instrument