illegal presence.” Clarke, 312 F.3d at 1347. In Clarke, we noted that our approach was consistent with “[sjeveral of our sister circuits [which] have elaborated that for a defendant to be ‘found,’ the government must either know or, with the ‘exercise of diligence typical of law enforcement authorities,’ could have discovered the illegality of the defendant’s presence.” Id. at 1346-47 (citing United States v. Herrera-Ordones, 190 F.3d 504, 510-11 (7th Cir.1999); United States v. Bencomo Castillo, 176 F.3d 1300, 1303 (10th Cir.1999); United States v. Santana-Castellano, 74 F.3d 593, 598 (5th Cir.1996); United States v en arrested under an alias and not discovered to be prior deportee until more than one year later was not “found” at time of his arrest); but see Gomez, 38 F.3d at 1037 (<HOLDING>). On this record, we cannot say the district
holding that defendant could be charged for making false statements to treasury officials under the tax evasion statute or the statute prohibiting false statements to government officials holding that evidence of the same name the fact that the previous conviction occurred in precinct of defendants residence and that although the defendant testified he did not deny that he was the person described in the record of the previous conviction was sufficient to establish identity holding that a cause of action for illegal arrest and false imprisonment accrued at the time plaintiff was released from his alleged illegal restraint and not when the proceedings by which his arrest occurred terminated holding that ins officials did not exercise sufficient diligence in ascertaining the defendants illegal status when although the defendant provided a false name ins had his fingerprints holding the trial court properly denied defendants motion for judgment of acquittal although defendant offered evidence as to how his fingerprints were placed on a candy box found at the scene of the crime