it involves a set of facts different from those of the case in which the principle was announced. The statute recognizes, to the contrary, that even a general standard may be applied in an unreasonable manner. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 127 S.Ct. 2842, 2858, 168 L.Ed.2d 662 (2007) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 382, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (“[Rjules of law may be sufficiently clear for habeas purposes even when they are expressed in terms of a generalized standard rather than as a bright-line rule.”). As the Sixth Circuit stated, “[T]he Cronic court has only carved out a broad rule, a rule that must be applied in the many factually distinct situations that will come before the lower courts.” Caver, 349 F.3d at 350 n. 7 (<HOLDING>). Because Cronic provides a general standard
holding that the filing of a motion for a new trial is a critical stage of the prosecution and that an indigent defendant is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel at that stage holding the absence of defense counsel during jury reinstruction to be a deprivation of counsel during a critical stage under clearly established federal law holding that sentencing is a critical stage of criminal proceedings and the offer of counsel must be renewed at each critical stage where the defendant appears without counsel recognizing structural error where counsel was  prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding holding that a conviction will generally be vacated for a violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel only where the reliability of the trial has been undermined but prejudice is presumed where the defendant suffers a complete denial of counsel during a critical stage of trial