of the fact that, where a prisoner has sufficient alternative opportunities for worship, his religious exercise is not substantially burdened. See, Murphy v. Missouri Dept. of Corr, supra at 983 (“A prisoner need not be afforded his preferred means of practicing his religion as long as he is afforded sufficient means to do so.”), citing Hammons v. Saffle, 348 F.3d 1250, 1256 (10th Cir.2003). We are also mindful that some District Courts, in other Districts, have found that a prisoner’s ability to pray in his cell is an adequate alternative to group prayer. See, McRoy v. Cook County Dept. of Corrections, 366 F.Supp.2d 662, 676 (N.D.Ill.2005), aff'd, 205 Fed.Appx. 462 (7th Cir.2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1027, 128 S.Ct. 624, 169 L.Ed.2d 402 (2007); Akbar v. Borgen, supra at 1187 (<HOLDING>); Anderson v. Harron, supra at *5; Ahmad v.
recognizing individual prayer as an appropriate alternative means for a muslim prisoner to express his religion holding that  relatively shortterm and sporadic  intrusions on an inmates prayer activities did not constitute a substantial burden on inmates free exercise of his religion holding a muslim prisoners free exercise claim failed because even though the prison did not provide him with halal meat he could comply with his religious requirements by simply eating a vegetarian meal and therefore the disputed policy did not force the prisoner to violate his religion recognizing a religious institutions right to free exercise of religion holding prisoner must show defendant burdened the practice of his religion by preventing him from engaging in conduct mandated by his faith