(finding that “equitable es-toppel applies when the signatory to a written agreement containing an arbitration clause must rely on 'the terms of the written agreement in asserting its claims against the nonsignatory.”) (quoting MS Dealer Svc. Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942, 947 (11th Cir.1999)); LaSonde v. Citi-Financial Mortgage Co., Inc., 273 Ga.App. 113, 614 S.E.2d 224, 226 (2005) (“Federal law provides guidance for determining the circumstances under which a nonsignatory may be bound by such agreements. ' And as found by both Georgia, and federal courts, the theory of equitable estoppel provides one basis for bringing a nonsigna-tory within an arbitration agreement.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Dodds v. Pulte Home Corp., 909 A.2d 348, 351 (Pa.Super.Ct.2006) (<HOLDING>). Estoppel “can bind a non-signatory to an
holding that when a contract is unambiguous the court will enforce the plain meaning of the contract as the intention of the parties holding that for the government to be sued on a contract pursuant to the tucker act there must be privity of contract between the plaintiff and the united states holding contract not unconscionable where parties were of equal bargaining power plaintiff had opportunity to have an attorney review the contract the contract was clear and easily read the plaintiff had been a party to similar contracts in the past and was under no financial pressure to sign the con tract holding that nonsignatories to a contract may be compelled to arbitrate when there is an obvious and close nexus between the nonsignatories and the contract or the con tracting parties holding that nonsignatories to a contract have no rights under the contract and thus no standing to assert claims under the contract