was a practical but not logical necessity.” (footnote omitted)). It is clear that conspiracy to commit murder and the substantive offense of murder are discrete crimes to which Wharton’s Rule does not ordinarily apply to bar the imposition of cumulative sentences. Unlike the crime of pandering and the “classic Wharton’s Rule offenses — crimes such as adultery, incest, bigamy, dueling” — which, by their nature, necessarily require the participation of two persons for their commission, murder obviously can be committed by one person acting alone. Stewart, 225 Va. at 478, 303 S.E.2d at 879. Thus, “separate sanctions may be imposed” at a single trial for both murder and conspiracy to commit murder. Iannelli, 420 U.S. at 771, 95 S.Ct. at 1287; see Ramsey, 2 Va.App. at 272, 343 S.E.2d at 470 (<HOLDING>); Boyd, 236 Va. at 351, 374 S.E.2d at 303
holding with respect to the application of whartons rule that where it is impossible under any circumstances to commit the substantive offense without cooperative action the preliminary agreement between the same parties to commit the offense is not an indictable conspiracy holding that prior felony drug convictions that fall within the conspiracy period may be used to enhance the defendants sentence if the conspiracy continued after his earlier convictions were final holding different rule applicable for conviction of second degree murder holding that failure to consummate scheme does not preclude conspiracy conviction holding that under whartons rule the defendants convictions of forgery and uttering as a principal in the second degree did not preclude her conviction of conspiracy to commit uttering