F.3d at 1216. It does not apply to the declarant’s after-the-fact statements made about his past state of mind. Id. It similarly does not apply to the “declarant’s statements as to why he held the particular state of mind.” United States v. Duran, 596 F.3d 1283, 1297 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 210, 178 L.Ed.2d 46 (2010). “A district court has wide discretion to control the cross-examination of witnesses.” United States v. Guzman, 167 F.3d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir.1999). Cross-examination is limited by the relevance of the material. United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1296 (11th Cir.2009). Generally, inflammatory testimony is prohibited and may be grounds for reversal if considered unduly prejudicial. United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1230-31 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). But where a defendant raises an entrapment
holding that the admission of highly inflammatory evidence of the defendants participation in a double murder cast doubt enough to warrant reversal on the defendants firearms convictions holding that the district court made sufficient factual findings and adequately determined the scope of defendants participation in a conspiracy under  1b13 even though the district court did not expressly determine the scope of the defendants participation holding that probable cause existed to search the defendants residence because the warrant affidavit established probable cause that the defendant possessed stolen firearms and because people generally keep firearms at home or on their persons holding that even if evidence admitted in error admission must result in material prejudice to warrant reversal holding that admission in evidence of certified copies of docket sheets of defendants prior convictions did not violate defendants sixth amendment right to confrontation because such records are not testimonial