employs in cases involving § 301” and quoting the Lueck passage quoted above); Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 123-24, 114 S.Ct. 2068, 2078, 129 L.Ed.2d 93 (1994) (“it is the legal character of a claim, as independent of rights created under the collective-bargaining agreement, that decides whether a state cause of action may go forward”) (citation omitted). To determine whether a claim is preempted, and hence removable, the Supreme Court has said that “an application of state law is pre-empted by § 301 ... if such application requires the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement.” Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, 486 U.S. 399, 413, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1885, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988) (em phasis added); Shafii v. British Airways, PLC, 83 F.3d 566, 569-70 (2d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>) (quota? tion omitted). However, the Lingle
holding that if the resolution of a statelaw claim depends upon the meaning of a collectivebargaining agreement the application of state law  is preempted and federal laborlaw principles  necessarily uniform throughout the nation  must be  employed to resolve the dispute holding that a wrongful discharge claim based on violation of a state public policy is not preempted because it is a nonnegotiable independent statelaw right holding that the iccta preempted statelaw tortiousinterference claim holding that the statelaw protecting employees from retaliatory discharge was independent from the cba because the statelaw claim could be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself holding that a statelaw claim is preempted and removable from state court if resolution of the claim depends on an interpretation of the collectivebargaining agreement