appointed by the Jefferson Probate Court provided that consent. DHR makes a single-sentence, passing reference to the fact that the Macon Probate Court appointed S.C. as J.C.’s guardian and, as a result, that she had standing to oppose J.C.’s adoption. The Jefferson Probate Court determined that S.C. was without standing to oppose J.C.’s adoption, and, based on certain discussions at trial, it appears that the Jefferson Probate Court found that S.C. had not been properly appointed J.C.’s guardian. S.C. did not appeal the Jefferson Probate Court’s conclusion in this regard. DHR, which was unaffected by the Jefferson Probate Court’s conclusion as to S.C.’s rights, is without standing to assert S.C.’s purported rights as J.C.’s guardian. See Ex parte Izundu, 568 So.2d 771, 772 (Ala.1990) (<HOLDING>). The Jefferson Probate Court’s conclusion that
holding that a receiver may lack standing to sue if the party he is representing cannot allege an injury or assert a claim holding that a litigant may not claim standing to assert the rights of a third party holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant holding that plaintiff lacked standing to assert rico claim for mail fraud based on misrepresentations made to third parties recognizing that either party to a divorce action may bring in third parties who claim an interest in the property alleged to be community or third parties themselves may intervene and have their rights therein determined