appear as a result of the offense committed by the defendant. Fujimoto interprets Section 557.041 as restricting who may testify, and argues the plea court erred in allowing Wright and Hanrahan to testify because they fall outside of the permitted class of witnesses. Fujimoto additionally claims the plea court erred by allowing Hanrahan to characterize Fujimoto as a “predator” in her testimony. Fujimoto argues that such testimony was not relevant and was unduly prejudicial because the State was not seeking sexual predator status. ' It is well settled that Section 557.041 is intended to guarantee the right of victims to testify at a sentencing hearing and does not limit testimony from other witnesses the court deems appropriate. See Sharp v. State, 908 S.W.2d 752, 756 (Mo.App. E.D.1995)(<HOLDING>); Figgins v. State, 858 S.W.2d 853, 856
holding statute does not prohibit victim from making a specific sentencing recommendation holding that erroneous use of statutorily unqualified person to prepare posttrial recommendation requires new recommendation and action holding a specific sentencing statute controls over the general sentencing provisions of section 9031 holding that presentencing waiver did not prevent appeals from the punishment phase of trial because without a sentencing recommendation the waivers consequences could not be known and the appellant neither bargained for a sentencing recommendation nor waived his right to appeal after sentencing holding that the eleventh amendment does not prohibit the united states from prosecuting a claim of contribution