We review a district judge’s statutory interpretation and applieation de novo. See United States v. Grigsby, 111 F.3d 806, 816 (11th Cir.1997). When a statute has been duly enacted and the language is plain, “ ‘the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.’ ” Central Trust Co. v. Official Creditors’ Comm. of Geiger Enters., Inc., 454 U.S. 354, 359-60, 102 S.Ct. 695, 698, 70 L.Ed.2d 542 (1982) (per curiam) (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 37 S.Ct. 192, 194, 61 L.Ed. 442 (1917)). “Review of the legislative history is not necessary unless a statute is inescapably ambiguous.” Solis-Ramirez v. United States Dept. of Justice, 758 F.2d 1426, 1430 (11th Cir.1985) (per curiam); see United States v. Rush, 874 F.2d 1513, 1514 (11th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b)
recognizing that a court may turn to legislative history when literal statutory language is unclear holding that even where there are  contrary indications in the statutes legislative history we do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear holding that where the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting to the rules of interpretation recognizing that legislative history is not used to create ambiguity where statutory language is clear holding that legislative history cannot supply a clear statement