who commits a substantive violation of probation can be sentenced to the maximum sentence allowable for the original offense; the six-year limitation applicable to youthful offender sentences no longer applies. See § 958.14, Fla. Stat. (2007); State v. Meeks, 789 So.2d 982, 988-89 (Fla.2001); Lee, 67 So.3d at 1202; Swilley v. State, 781 So.2d 458, 460 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). The maximum sentence for Yegge’s original offense, armed burglary, is life in prison. See § 810.02(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2002). Therefore, Yegge’s ten-year mandatory minimum was not illegal. However, this court has repeatedly held that the sentencing court must maintain the defendant’s youthful offender status upon resentencing for a violation of probation even when the violation was substantive. See Lee, 67 So.3d at 1202 (<HOLDING>); Vantine v. State, 66 So.3d 350, 352 (Fla. 2d
holding that youthful offender could be sentenced in excess of six year cap where probation violation was substantive in that he committed several criminal offenses holding that while a defendant is not entitled to be sentenced as a youthful offender on any new offense he or she may have committed the trial court cannot revoke a defendants youthful offender status on offenses for which that defendant has already been sentenced citation omitted holding that a defendant sentenced as an habitual offender who later successfully challenges one of his predicate offenses may have his habitual offender status and sentencing enhancement vacated through postconviction relief or a motion to correct erroneous sentence holding that the defendant could not be sentenced under the patterned sex offender statute if his offense occurred before the statute became effective holding that illicit drug use because it is also a crime constitutes a substantive violation of youthful offender probation