in ongoing litigation.”). Conditioning Gutten-berg’s dismissal on an attorney’s-fees-and-costs award is therefore inappropriate at this juncture. Emery disagrees. He implies that Gut-tenberg’s filings — and Emery’s responses to them — were unnecessary, because they “resulted in the Court’s rejection of three of the four claims originally asserted by Plaintiffs.” Def.’s Resp. at 7. But winning and losing has never been the stick by which courts have measured whether to impose fees-and-costs conditions. See SBM Wageneder Gesellschaft, 113 F.R.D. at 663 (“To condition a voluntary dismissal on an award of fees, the case law requires that defendant’s efforts must have been unnecessary, not that the plaintiff must prevail.”); Combo v. Viacom, Inc., 2007 WL 39410, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 5, 2007) (<HOLDING>). Put differently, the mere fact that
holding a district court may in its discretion award attorneys fees upon a finding that plaintiffs action was frivolous unreasonable or without foundation even though not brought in subjective bad faith holding trial court had no authority to award attorneys fees when arbitrator had stated he would not award attorneys fees holding merely that the evidence was sufficient to support the award of attorneys fees holding that whether plaintiffs arguments were frivolous was irrelevant to the question of whether to award attorneys fees and costs upon his motion to voluntarily dismiss the suit recognizing that an award of temporary attorneys fees and costs is based on an assessment of need and ability to pay as well as the reasonableness of the fees and costs