may recover reasonable attorney’s fees if the claim is for an oral or written contract.” Barnett v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 723 S.W.2d 663, 667 (Tex.1987). While Barnett did not mention either the court of appeals’ opinion or our per curiam in Burke, it did cite to one of Burke’s, progeny. Id. (citing Texas Farmers Ins. Co. v. Hernandez, 649 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tex.App. —Amarillo 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). Far from being disposi-tive, however, Barnett did not explore the attorney’s fees issue and did not mention the apparent exception found in section 38.006. In two other cases since Barnett, we have indicated our apparent approval for using the attorney’s fee statute against an insurance carrier. See Maryland Ins. Co. v. Head Indus. Coatings & Servs., Inc., 938 S.W.2d 27, 29 (Tex.1996)(<HOLDING>); Chitsey v. National Lloyd's Ins. Co., 698
recognizing a partys right to receive postjudgment fees for collection when the original judgment awarded that party attorney fees holding as a mutter of law that divorce actions are civil actions within the meaning of the postjudgment interest statute and that the wife was entitled to postjudgment interest under the statute with respect to unpaid spousal support payments ordered under a divorce judgment holding that bank was entitled to attorney fees on appeal when agreement did not prohibit such fees holding that the insured was entitled to prejudgment and postjudgment interest and attorney fees as found by the jury holding that an insurers obligation to defend an insured was a property interest subject to prejudgment attachment