liable under § 1983 for the actions of its employees. See 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. at 2037. Instead, a municipality can only be held liable if the constitutional violation of which a plaintiff complains resulted from an official custom, policy, practice, or usage of the municipality. See id. at 690-91, 98 S.Ct. at 2035-36. The Second Circuit, along with every other court of appeals that has considered the issue, has held that Monell applies with equal force to private corporations sued under § 1983. See Rojas v. Alexander’s Dep’t Store, Inc., 924 F.2d 406, 408-09 (2d Cir.1990); Powell v. Shopco Laurel Co., 678 F.2d 504, 506 (4th Cir.1982); Iskander v. Village of Forest Park, 690 F.2d 126, 128-29 (7th Cir.1982); Sanders v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 984 F.2d 9 upp. 1126, 1132 (D.Del.1992) (<HOLDING>). See generally Jeffes v. Barnes, 208 F.3d 49,
holding that charging fees for medical services did not violate the eighth amendment where prisoner did not allege denial of medical care holding that copayment requirements for prison medical services is constitutionally permissible holding that facility manager of particular halfway house run by private corporation was not final policymaker recognizing that prison officials should defer to medical professionals on medical matters holding that state medical director of prison medical services corporation was not final policymaker