entertain the churches’ belated petition to modify the estate plan. Second, even if the probate court would entertain the petition, we view the chances of the churches winning reformation as small. Third, even if the churches were to prevail in reforming the indentures of trust, it is problematic whether that victory would change the ultimate analysis vis-a-vis BRMC’s entitlement to the bequest. After all, at the time of Ms. Krauss’s death, BRMC was functioning as a hospital and, thus, was still capable of applying the bequest to the care of indigent patients. And, finally, even if the churches succeeded in stripping away BRMC’s entitlement to the bequest, it is not certain that they would benefit. Cf., e.g., Town of Brookline v. Barnes, 324 Mass. 632, 87 N.E.2d 843, 845-47 (1949) (<HOLDING>). The bottom line, then, is that the churches’
holding that a charitable gift which could not be distributed because of the legatees unwillingness to carry out the testators charitable intent could inspire an application of the doctrine of cy pres so that the court could order the bequest paid to a different institution and thus effectuate the testators charitable intent holding that a bankrupt hospital is not capable of implementing the purpose of a charitable bequest and that the hospital is therefore ineligible to receive the bequest holding that a charitable organizations religious purposes will not remove it from the purview of a property tax exemption holding that claim that trust should have been distributed directly to plaintiffs was for the benefit of the estate because it allegedly was to implement testators intent holding that the doctrine of ademption seeks to give effect to a testators probable intent by presuming he intended to extinguish a specific gift of property when he disposed of that property prior to his death