these differences are irrelevant here. 13 . “We may affirm the district court’s decision on any grounds supported by the record.” Collazo v. Nicholson, 535 F.3d 41, 44 (1st Cir.2008) (quoting Estades-Negroni v. Assocs. Corp. of N. Am., 377 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir.2004)). 14 . Analogous federal law, which the SJC regards as instructive, see supra section II.B., similarly provides that an episodic condition may nevertheless constitute a disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D) (“The [ADA's] definition of ‘disability’ ... shall be construed in accordance with the following: ... An impairment that is episodic or in. remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active.”); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 635-36, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 141 L.Ed.2d 540 (1998) (<HOLDING>); School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480
holding that an entity that serves the disabled lacks standing under the ada holding that because the plaintiff was not disabled for the purposes of the ada this court need not to address the other elements of the prima facie case holding that plaintiffs hernia condition was not sufficient to render her disabled under the ada holding that the plaintiff who was under a 40pound lifting restriction was not disabled as defined by the ada and listing five cases from various circuits including our own in which courts have held that weight restrictions alone do not render a plaintiff disabled holding that hiv infected plaintiff was disabled under the ada even during the asymptomatic stage of the disease