alleging a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The district court adopted the recommendation of the magistrate judge, and denied the writ on the basis that some evidence supported the guilty finding. The question presented to this court is whether there was any evidence to support the prison disciplinary board’s guilty finding. We review this issue of law de novo. See Dyer v. Johnson, 108 F.3d 607, 609 (5th Cir.1997) (citation omitted). As a preliminary matter, we note that the alleged deprivation of Hudson’s accrued good-time credits rises to the level of a constitutional violation only if Hudson can first establish that he has a protected liberty interest in those credits. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has explicitly held that
holding that inmates serving life terms were not entitled to goodtime credits because state statute expressly foreclosed the granting of goodtime credits to such inmates holding that there is no protected liberty interest in the restoration of goodtime credits forfeited for disciplinary infractions under an older statutory scheme holding that a prisoner who challenged prison procedures used to deny him goodtime credits and not actual denial of those credits stated a cognizable claim under  1983 holding that a prisoner cannot be deprived of a protected liberty interest in goodtime credits without procedural due process holding that depriving inmates of statecreated right to goodtime credits in prison disciplinary proceedings requires due process