Cir.1996); McDonald v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare, 62 F.3d 92, 94 (3d Cir.1995); Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 447, 455 (9th Cir.1996), except that it is limited to programs that receive federal financial assistance — which the Indiana prison system admittedly does. Since the ADA has a broader scope, we shall confine our discussion to it. The district court dismissed the suit on the pleadings, on the ground that the Act is inapplicable to prison inmates — a question of first impression in this circuit, having been expressly left open in Bryant v. Madigan, supra, and Love v. Westville Correctional Center, 103 F.3d 558, 559 (7th Cir.1996). The circuits that have addressed the question disagree about the proper answer. Compare White v. Colorado, 82 F.3d 364, 367 (10th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>), and Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1344-52
holding that the mcdonnell douglas framework applies equally to ada and rehabilitation act cases holding that exemption under the ada does not preclude liability under the rehabilitation act holding that the same standards apply to claims under the ada and under the rehabilitation act holding that neither the ada nor the rehabilitation act applies to prison employment holding the ada and the rehabilitation act applicable