expert’s testimony”); Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342, 345, 426 S.E.2d 785, 786 (1993) (“A physician is not incompetent to testify merely because he is not a specialist in the particular branch of his profession involved.”). However, “[r]egardless of the area in which the prospective expert witness practices, he must set forth the applicable standard of care for the medical procedure under scrutiny and he must demonstrate to the coui-t that he is familiar with the standard of care.” David, 367 S.C. at 250, 626 S.E.2d at 5. Further, if the expert merely testifies as to his own personal standard of care, rather than the generally recognized and accepted standard of care, such testimony is insufficient to survive summary judgment. See Guinan, 383 S.C. at 57, 677 S.E.2d at 37-38 (<HOLDING>). After reviewing Melton’s arguments, we
holding that an experts personal preference does not establish a national standard of care recognizing that a defendant physicians own practice was at least some evidence of the standard of care and concluding that the case was properly submitted to the jury notwithstanding the plaintiffs failure to call an independent expert on the standard of care holding that even if an experts testimony arguably embraced the ultimate issue such testimony is permissible as long as the experts testimony assists rather than supplants the jurys judgment holding experts testimony was insufficient to survive summary judgment because the testimony at most showed the defendant deviated from the experts personal standard of care rather than the generally recognized and accepted standard of care holding that defendant did not preserve state constitutional challenge to experts testimony at punishment hearing because defendant relied exclusively on federal cases in arguing for exclusion of experts testimony