as well as private attorneys, for, although the Attorney General opinions noted above purport to restrict the payment of fees to appointed attorneys to those fees allowed by statute, the authorities relied upon in the Attorney General opinions do not apply specifically to the award of attorneys’ fees to court-appointed attorneys for indigents; neither do they restrict the payment of fees to appointed attorneys to situations involving only a statutory basis. Presumably, such attorneys are as eligible for an award of fees under the doctrines and rules noted above as would be private attorneys, given the existence of an appropriate public policy which would be vindicated by the award of fees. (See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal. 3d 25, 48 [141 Cal.Rptr. 315, 569 P.2d 1303] (<HOLDING>).) The Public Guardian also asserts that
recognizing rule recognizing this as the general rule holding that appeal from denial of rule 60b motion raised for review only the district courts order of denial and not the underlying judgment itself recognizing general rule holding that the denial of the benefits of the private attorney general rule to attorneys employed by nonprofit public interest law firms would be inconsistent with the rule itself