equitable tolling for Sykes and Perez may necessitate the district court to limit the sorts of claims that these named plaintiffs may bring, that is a determination for the district court to make in the first instance. It is certainly not a justification for reversing the district court’s grant of class certification: at the most, if Sykes’s and Perez’s FDCPA claims are time-barred, this only means that they cannot assert claims under the FDCPA. The practical import of such a rule is that Sykes and Perez may be members of a subclass, advancing only a portion of the claims certified under Rule 23(b)(3). Such subclasses are contemplated by the Federal Rules, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(5), and may be certified after the original certification order is upheld. See Marisol, 126 F.3d at 378 (<HOLDING>). It is within plaintiffs’ prerogative to
holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in reconsidering a prior interlocutory ruling holding that where named plaintiff was employee of class counsel district court did not abuse its discretion by denying class certification holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class but suggesting that prior to trial the district court ensure that appropriate subclasses are identified holding that district court abused its discretion in certifying class in light of the individ ual calculation of damages that is required holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its ruling whether to proceed with a declaratory judgment action