without the defendant’s consent and dismissal is not in the interest of justice. Ervin, 158 Wn.2d at 752-53. Hall’s conviction was final, and he had almost completed his full sentence for felony murder before that finality was brought into question by the State’s motion. The State argues that double jeopardy protections should not bar retrial here because jeopardy did not terminate with Hall’s felony murder conviction. ¶9 The State first asserts that Hall’s reliance on cases of acquittal terminating jeopardy are inapplicable. It points out that the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 95 S. Ct. 1013, 43 L. Ed. 2d 232 (1975), stated that the “first jeopardy continues until he is acquitted or his conviction becomes final.” Wilson, 420 U.S. at 343 n.11 (<HOLDING>). It appears the State is arguing that Hall’s
holding that the government may appeal trial courts dismissal of count in indictment because of prejudice caused by preindictment delay without violating double jeopardy principles holding that the government could appeal a criminal sentence without violating the double jeopardy clause when congress expressly authorized such an appeal holding that double jeopardy does not bar the prosecutions appeal of a trial courts ruling which overturns a jurys guilty verdict holding that where a conviction is reversed after trial the double jeopardy clause does not bar a government appeal that if successful would only reinstate the conviction and would not subject defendant to a second trial holding that the government may appeal a postverdict ruling without violating double jeopardy where the appeal does not result in a new trial