and defendants entered into evidence were not admitted for their truth, but for the context of defendants’ statements contained therein. Because the admitted statements were not hearsay, Sanchez’s credibility was irrelevant, and Rule 806 of the Federal Rules of Evidence therefore did not apply. See Fed.R.Evid. 806 (permitting impeachment of declarant when hearsay statement admitted in evidence); United States v. McGowan, 58 F.3d 8, 15-16 (2d Cir.1995). Second, Wagner and Hernandez contend that the district court should have provided a missing witness charge as to Sanchez. Given all the attendant facts and circumstances, however, we conclude that it was well within the district court’s discretion to refuse such a request. See United States v. Rollins, 487 F.2d 409, 412 (2d Cir.1973) (<HOLDING>). Defense counsel requested the charge only
holding that trial court erred in prohibiting discovery or testimony from a witness it deemed an expert when appellant merely sought to discover facts that were observed by the witness holding that in order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness to testify the claimant must allege 1 the identity of the potential witness 2 that the witness was available to testify at trial 3 the substance of the witnesss testimony and 4 an explanation of how the omission of the testimony prejudiced the case holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to strike witnesss testimony on direct examination when witness asserted fifth amendment on collateral matters on crossexamination particularly when witness was required to invoke privilege in presence of jury holding that in considering witness availability court should review all the facts and circumstances bearing upon the witnesss relation to the parties rather than merely on physical presence or accessibility holding that the enhancement requires that the defendant either threaten the codefendant witness or juror in his or her presence or issue the threat in circumstances in which there is some likelihood that the codefendant witness or juror will learn of the threat