presented above, the district court erred in considering his incriminating statements during sentencing. A review of the record reveals that the district court clearly stated that, even without Brent’s own incriminating statements, life imprisonment was appropriate given his history as a violent career offender. Thus, even if any — or all — incriminating statements made by Brent during his arrests were erroneously admitted at sentencing, it was harmless and the conviction stands. C. Government’s Explanation for Striking a Juror Brent argues that the district court erred in accepting the government’s nondiscriminatory reason for striking a minority juror and that his rights under Batson were thereby violated. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Brent asserts that, while the court had a
holding that the equal protection clause forbids the prosecution from challenging potential jurors solely on the basis of race or assumptions drawn from their race holding that a criminal defendant can bring a third party challenge to the peremptory striking of jurors based on race whether or not he is of the same race as the jurors who are struck holding that plaintiff stated viable equal  protection clause claim where officer humiliated and harassed the plaintiff on basis of race prior to and during a lawful arrest recognizing that certain forms of race consciousness do not lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination holding that the race of the prosecutor is irrelevant