of a subordinate employee, while not unfairly tagging employers with the discriminatory motives of subordinate employees who have not been entrusted with formal decision-making authority. I believe this is the better course to follow. The premise behind the “rubber-stamp” or “cat’s paw” analysis is fairly simple. An employer should not automatically be held hable for the discriminatory motivation of a subordinate employee t .3d 542, 547 (7th Cir.1997) (noting that “there can be situations in which the forbidden motive of a subordinate employee can be imputed to the employer because, under the circum stances of the case, the employer simply acted as the ‘cat’s paw" of the subordinate”); cf. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998) (<HOLDING>). In cases like this, where the person
recognizing that an appeal has never been an evidentiary proceeding so appellate court will not consider evidence not presented to the lower tribunal because function of appellate court is to determine whether lower tribunal committed error based upon the issues and evidence before it holding that issues not raised to or ruled upon by the lower court are not preserved for appellate review recognizing that the cats paw doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers holding that a court is not bound by a lower tribunals decision under the law of the case doctrine holding that employers knowledge of employees injury followed by the employers failure to provide the necessary medical services sufficient to impose liability upon the employer for medical services selected by the employee