above, there is some risk that the jury, relying solely upon the definition of practice or custom in Model Instruction 9.4, would have thought it improper to consider such evidence at all. Consequently, we cannot conclude that it is more probable than not that the instructional error was harmless. Ill We hold that the District Court prejudicially erred in refusing to instruct the jury that, for purposes of proving a Monell claim, a custom or practice can be supported by evidence of repeated constitutional violations which went uninvestigated and for which the errant municipal officers went unpunished. We therefore vacate the judgment and remand for a new trial. VACATED AND REMANDED. 1 . See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (<HOLDING>). 2 . The numbers for these instructions
holding that a municipality may be sued as a person under 42 usc  1983 when the municipalitys policy or custom whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy inflicts a constitutional injury holding that a municipality may not assert the defense of qualified immunity but may be held liable under  1983 only for a constitutional deprivation inflicted by the execution of a governments policy or custom whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy  holding that a defendant can only be sued in his official capacity under  1983 if he acted pursuant to an official policy or custom in causing the constitutional injury holding that a local government may be held liable for its employees constitutional violation only when the employee is executing the governments policy or custom whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may be fairly said to represent official policy holding that a municipality may only be held liable under  1983 for a policy practice or custom