Clarks’ property. Although some of the off-duty officers acknowledged that they had their guns with them during the surveillance period, there was no evidence from which a jury could find that the guards were authorized to use a firearm or that Lloyd’s knew they had guns. To the contrary, testimony indicated that the guards were expressly instructed that “no guns” were allowed. Based on this evidence, a jury could not reasonably find that the guards were authorized to shoot the Clarks’ dog. Shooting the Clarks’ dog also could not reasonably be considered incidental to and in furtherance of an authorized act. Shooting the dog was not related to nor would it have advanced the guards’ limited employment duties of watching for and reporting signs of fire. Cf. Tulsa General, 288 P.2d at 753 (<HOLDING>). The guards were not instructed to conceal
holding that despite the inclusion of negligencebased counts because sexual assault was the only act alleged in the writ as a cause of bodily injury the injuries alleged had to be viewed as repercussions of the assault holding that a healthcare power of attorney includes the authority to bind the principal to an optional arbitration agreement because among other reasons an agent has authority  to do everything necessary or proper and usual in the ordinary course of business for effecting the purpose of his agency and that the decision to enter into such agreements in connection with placement in a healthcare facility  is a proper and usual exercise of an agents powers internal quotation marks and citation omitted holding that the insurer is not bound by acts of the agent which are beyond the scope of his authority when the insured has notice of the limitations upon an agents authority or when the circumstances are sufficient to suggest that an inquiry should be made as to such limitations holding that an agents assault on the target of a picketline could not properly be contemplated as an incident to the exercise of ordinary authority to act as a peaceable picket holding that the principal is liable for an agents acts committed within the scope of the agents employment