We do not discern any inconsistency between the judgments and, even if there.were any inconsistency, it would not provide a basis for avoiding the application of collateral estoppel. See Steen v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 106 F.3d 904, 913 (9th Cir.1997) (collateral estoppel applies even if the prior case was erroneously decided). Moreover, Healy’s assertion that the state court judgments did not include any affirmative findings of fraud or willful and malicious conduct is flatly contradicted by the record. The bankruptcy court correctly analyzed the relevant factors under Washington state law in determining that Healy was collaterally estopped from relitigating the issues decided in the state court actions. See Diamond v. Kolcum (In re Diamond), 285 F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm the bankruptcy court’s
holding that to determine collateral estoppel effect of a federal civil rights action fjederal law governs the preclusive effect of a claim arising under federal law recognizing that state law controls applicability of res judicata or collateral estoppel in nondiversity action where prior judgment involved issues of state law holding that in a subsequent criminal action for driving under the influence collateral estoppel did not apply to issues decided at a prior administrative hearing held pursuant to implied consent statute holding that state law controls whether issues decided in a prior state court action are entitled to preclusive effect and setting forth the elements of collateral estoppel under washington law holding that federal rules of res judicata and collateral estoppel determine preclusive effect of prior federal ftca judgments even though liability is based on state law