employees, one exception applies to so-called “mixed cases,” which arise when "an employee complains of a, personnel action serious enough to appeal .to the [Merit Systems Protection Board] and alleges that the action was based on discrimination.” See Kloeckner v. Solis, — U.S.-, 133 S.Ct. 596, 601; 184 L.Ed.2d 433 (201-2) . (citing 29 C.F.R, § 1614 302 (2012)). While Plaintiff has raised allegations of discrimination, the personnel action in question — Plaintiff's removal from his position as HOCALJ— was not serious enough to entitle him to appeal the decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board. Therefore, this case is not a “mixed case.” 16 . Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). 17 . See Hubbard, 809 F.2d at 11 n. 15 (<HOLDING>). 18 . Whether exhaustion is required before a
recognizing that the csra did not explicitly limit federal court jurisdiction to enjoin unconstitutional personnel actions by federal agencies holding that federal courts do not have jurisdiction over a suit to enjoin a tax lien holding that igras specific grant of federal jurisdiction for certain actions indicates congress intended to limit federal jurisdiction to those instances holding that plaintiffs were not released from the exclusive remedial framework of the csra when their claims arose from their federal employment even though the csra provided plaintiffs with no remedy holding that just because a claim implicates a federal issue or involves construction of federal law does not necessarily give rise to a federal question and confer removal jurisdiction on a federal court