515, 521 (7th Cir.1997). Three factors are relevant to this analysis: “(1) the time elapsed between the illegality and the acquisition of the evidence; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.” Green, 111 F.3d at 521 (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975)). The second factor is dispositive here: the agents possessed probable cause to arrest Snowden when they recognized him and realized that he had outstanding arrest warrants. As we have explained, it “would be startling to suggest that because the police illegally stopped an automobile, they cannot arrest an occupant who is found to be wanted on a warrant” and search him incident to that arrest. Green, 111 F.3d at 521-23 (<HOLDING>); see Johnson, 383 F.3d at 546 (same).
holding that defendants voluntary consent to search his car dissipated taint of officers illegal entry holding taint from illegal detention attenuated by discovery of outstanding warrant where there was no evidence officer stopped appellant solely to request identity in order to run warrant check holding that defendants voluntary consent to search his apartment dissipated taint of prior illegal search holding that an officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop even when his suspicion that a law has been violated is based on a reasonable mistake of law holding that lawful arrest based on outstanding warrant constituted intervening circumstance that dissipated any taint caused by stop that lacked reasonable suspicion