the bankruptcy estate from Claim 7 when they executed the Release. Debtor argues that at the time the Release was signed, the Mahans did not own Claim 7 and therefore could not have been deemed to release it. Settlements are construed according to state law. In re Almengual, 301 B.R. 902, 906 (Bankr. M.D.Fla.2003). Under Florida law, when the language of a release is clear and unambiguous, a court cannot “indulge in construction or interpretation of its plain meaning.” Hurt v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 380 So.2d 432, 433 (Fla.1980). In the instant case the Release clearly and unambiguously states that the Mahans released the bankruptcy estate “from any and all claims which the Relea-sors [including the Mahans] have knowledge of against the Releasees [including the Bankrupt t. Ct.App.1999) (<HOLDING>). “Conversely, a general release cannot be held
holding that release which barred all claims from the beginning of the world to the day of these presents included claims which the releasor had or could have had against the releasee up to the date of its execution holding that a release of such claims or other matters arising from the beginning of time to the date of execution of this agreement did not protect the defendant from liability arising from unconstitutional conduct that occurred after the agreements execution holding that all inclusive language  from the beginning of the world to the days present barred all claims arising prior to releases execution holding equitable estoppel barred the plaintiffs claims because all of the claims of the amended complaint were in existence during the bankruptcy proceedings yet the plaintiff did not disclose any of the claims in its bankruptcy petitions plans of reorganization or disclosure statements holding that despite release language discharging defendant from claims upon or by reason of any matter cause or thing whatsoever from the beginning of the world to the day of these presents release did not bar any claims accruing after the date of execution