of a limitations defense. In this case, however, the federal court confronted no intelligent waiver on the State’s part, only an evident miscalculation of the elapsed time under a statute designed to impose a tight time constraint on federal habeas petitioners. In the circumstances here presented, we hold, the federal court had discretion to correct the State’s error and, accordingly, to dismiss the petition as untimely under AEDPA’s one-year limitation. Id. at 1679-80 (footnote omitted). The Court concluded that the “district courts are permitted, but not obligated, to consider, sua sponte, the timeliness of a state prisoner’s habeas petition.” Id. at 1684. That holding is consistent with our prior case law. See Jackson v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 292 F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Sweet argues that Day and Jackson are somehow
holding that a district court has the discretion to raise a  2254 timeliness consideration sua sponte holding that the court can raise res judicata sua sponte even on appeal holding that the district court cannot remand sua sponte for defects in removal procedure recognizing that a district court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint for failure to serve after notice to the plaintiff holding that a district court has the power to raise the aedpa limitations period sua sponte because the defense implicates values beyond the interests of the parties