has been interpreted to provide for full recovery regardless of contributory fault. Leaving aside for the moment the definitional condition, we turn our attention to the exception in the comment. As we said, if the statute in question has been construed to provide for full recovery rfegardless of contributory fault, the statutory tort action is not covered. We have construed our dram shop statute in just such a manner. Before comparative fault supplanted comparative negligence, we held that contributory negligence was no defense to a dram shop action. Williams, 197 N.W.2d at 617. Following our adoption of comparative negligence in Goetzman, we similarly held that this newly adopted doctrine was no defense to a dram shop action. Martin v. Heddinger, 373 N.W.2d 486, 488-89 (Iowa 1985) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the Iowa legislature was presumed to
holding that claims based on grounds not objected to at trial cannot be considered on appeal holding based only on commonlaw doctrine statutory comparative fault not considered recognizing that the tgaa was enacted to abrogate the commonlaw right of election doctrine recognizing doctrine holding that fault is considered in disposing of the marital homestead