the policy decision is made to do so, then it would constitute ‘absence’ under section 101.060(a)(2).” Id. at 280 (citations omitted). Thus, the court concluded that “the Act waives immunity when the city exercises its discretion in deciding to install a traffic control device but does not implement that decision within a reasonable amount of time.” Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.060(a)(2); City of Fort Worth v. Robles, 51 S.W.3d 436, 442 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied)). We have not previously construed the term “absence” as used in subsection 101.060(a)(2). But see Gonzalez, 82 S.W.3d at 325 (using the phrase “the signs’ absence” to describe two stop signs that were removed after being in place); Alvarado v. City of Lubbock, 685 S.W.2d 646, 649 (Tex.1985) (<HOLDING>). As noted by the parties, our courts of
holding police officer engaged in a high speed pursuit of a traffic offender had not seized the offender holding that a traffic stop is valid under the fourth amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring holding that a speedlimit sign posting the wrong speed limit constituted the absence of or condition of a traffic sign holding that an insureds compliance with a condition precedent is not tested by the presence or absence of prejudice to the insurer but only by whether the condition has been fulfilled by the insured under all the circumstances holding that condition included an intended if dangerous cycling of a traffic light