elements of these “independent torts.” Koffman, 574 S.E.2d at 261. The Court explained that the “tort of assault consists of an act intended to cause either harmful or offensive contact with another person or apprehension of such contact, and that creates in that other person’s mind a reasonable apprehension of an imminent battery.” Id. The Court defined the tort of battery as “an unwanted touching which is neither consented to, excused, nor justified.” Id. In moving for summary judgment with respect to these claims, the Sheriffs Office defendants argue that the deputies’ actions were justified in light of the circumstances that they faced in this case, and thus, that the claims for assault and battery are without merit. See, e.g., McLenagan v. Karnes, 27 F.3d 1002, 1009 (4th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). In response to the defendants’ motion, the
holding that the plaintiffs claims for assault and battery were patently without merit since the officers actions under the circumstances were justified holding that claims were clearly excluded from coverage under assault and battery exclusion and therefore insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify holding that district court could impose attorney fees where plaintiffs lawsuit patently had no legal merit holding that under maryland common law an assault is an attempted battery an actual battery or a combination of the two holding that the actions were not actions of public and general applicability but were actions directed principally and primarily at plaintiffs