675 (Ala.Cr.App.1983) ]. Although intoxication in itself does not constitute a mental disease or defect within the meaning of § 13A-3-1, Code of Alabama 1975, intoxication does include a disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting from the introduction of any substance into the body. § 13A-3-2. The degree of intoxication required to establish that a defendant was incapable of forming an intent to kill is a degree so extreme as to render it impossible for the defendant to form the intent to kill ... ‘“Ex parte Bankhead, 585 So.2d 112, 121 (Ala.1991).’ ” “Smith v. State, 646 So.2d 704, 712-13 (Ala.Cr.App.1994).” Smith v. State, 756 So.2d 892 (Ala.Cr.App. 1998) (emphasis added). See also Windsor v. State, 683 So.2d 1027, 1037 (Ala.Cr.App. 1994), aff'd, 683 So.2d 1042 (Ala.1996) (<HOLDING>) In Smith v. State, supra, this Court concluded
holding that where all of the testimony established unequivocally that the appellant was the aggressor and there was no shred of evidence to indicate otherwise there was no adequate support in the evidence to generate a genuine jury issue as to selfdefense perfect or imperfect holding that the trial court did not err by refusing to give a voluntary intoxication charge because even though there was testimony that the appellant had consumed some alcohol prior to the killing there was no evidence that the appellant had been overwhelmed or overpowered by alcohol holding that although there was evidence of discrimination by the employer based on race there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the employer had constructively discharged the plaintiff holding that the trial court properly failed to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication and manslaughter where there was no evidence that the appellant was intoxicated at the time of the offense although there was evidence that the appellant had been drinking beer on the day of the offense where there was no evidence concerning the quantity of beer he had consumed holding that although the investigation of the traffic offense that served as the basis for the stop was complete when the officer issued the citation the officers continued detention of the appellant thereafter for a canine search was lawful because during the investigation of the traffic offense the officer had developed a reasonable suspicion that the appellant had committed a drugrelated offense