foundation establishing its scientific validity. See Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 127 N.J. 404, 413-14, 417, 605 A.2d 1079 (1992). No such foundation was offered in this case. The State does not attempt to defend the propriety of Dr. Kull’s testimony on its merits. Instead it argues that defendant waived any objection to the testimony because he did not assert it at trial and that, in view of the other deprecatory testimony in the record, the admission of Dr. Kull’s testimony was not prejudicial. We disagree and hold that Dr. Kull’s testimony was so prejudicial to defendant that, even if it were marginally relevant and otherwise admissible, failing to exclude it under N.J.R.E. 403 was a mistaken exercise of the trial judge’s discretion. State v. Manning, 82 N.J. 417, 413 A.2d 605 (1980) (<HOLDING>); State v. Prudden, 212 N.J.Super. 608, 613-14,
holding that trial courts instruction implying that the jury had to be unanimous in imposing a sentence of life imprisonment violated defendants constitutional rights because this instruction could have been clearerand should have been holding the admission of expert testimony that exceeded the bounds of rule 704 was prejudicial despite the fact that the court gave the jury a limiting instruction similar to the instruction in this case holding that employer waived issue on appeal of whether employees testimony was unduly prejudicial by failing to object when testimony was offered at trial holding that despite limiting instruction police officers testimony that defendants companion had implicated him in robbery should have been ex eluded as unduly prejudicial holding defendants participation in violent robbery and his fear of codefendants among other facts provided sufficient evidence that murder should have been anticipated as result of robbery