quo,” and thus cannot be deemed equitable “restitution” within the meaning of § 209 of the ESA. In support of its claim, TCC makes several, more specific arguments. First, plaintiff asserts that — because DOE has not rebutted TCC’s expert testimony that the bulk of the value of the entitlement benefits went to Champlin and has failed to show how the three parties divided the benefits — DOE has not met its burden of proof in showing that TCC was unjustly enriched. This argument is without merit. TECA has made clear that the government’s recovery is not limited to the amount which a wrongdoer can be shown to have been enriched by that wrongdoing. See United States v. Sutton, 795 F.2d 1040, 1063 (Temp.Emer.Ct.App.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1030, 107 S.Ct. 873, 93 L.Ed.2d 828 (1987) (<HOLDING>). [19] Second, TCC argues that requiring TCC to
holding officer personally liable because he agreed to personally guarantee payment on an account holding that a person who is the animating force for regulatory violations is fully liable even though he does not personally receive all benefits of his illegal activities holding that an applicant may establish eligibility for asylum based exclusively on activities undertaken after his arrival in the united states so long as he demonstrates that authorities in his country are aware of his activities or likely to become aware of his activities holding that employee stated claim by alleging he was wrongfully discharged for refusing to commit criminal act for which he would be held personally liable holding defendants personally liable for alleged conversion even when acting in corporate capacity