of Alabama Courts” notwithstanding the verdict of those courts. Wilson’s claims were subsequently dismissed by a federal magistrate judge after the parties consented to the magistrate’s jurisdiction. Wilson’s claims are jurisdictionally barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 1521-22, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars state-court losers from seeking what would be, in substance, appellate review of state-court judgments in federal district court based on claims that the state-court judgment violated the losing parties’ federal rights. See Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 611 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir.2010); see also Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Because that is precisely what Wilson seeks
holding that the federal claims which arose from state court criminal contempt proceedings were inextricably intertwined with the state court action and thus the federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims pursuant to the rookerfeldman doctrine holding that if the federal claims are dismissed before trial  the state claims should be dismissed as well holding rookerfeldman also bars federal claims raised in state court as well as claims that are inextricably intertwined with the statecourt judgment holding that rookerfeldman doctrine bars federal jurisdiction when a plaintiffs suit in federal district court is at least in part a forbidden de facto appeal of a state court judgment and an  issue in that federal suit is inextricably intertwined with an issue resolved by the state court judicial decision from which the forbidden de facto appeal is taken holding that rookerfeldman bars subject matter jurisdiction where but for the statecourt judgment the plaintiff would have no claim