under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2). Lopez, 549 U.S. at 55 n. 6, 127 S.Ct. 625 (stating that Congress “counterintuitively” defined recidivist possession as a drug trafficking offense); 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). The district court concluded Santana-Illan’s 2003 Georgia conviction for simple possession of cocaine could have been prosecuted as recidivist possession under the CSA and, thus, it is a drug trafficking crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) and an aggravated felony for purposes of § 2L1.2(b)(l)(C). Santana-Illan challenges this approach, arguing his 2003 simple possession conviction was not actually prosecuted as recidivist possession and, thus, it cannot be an aggravated felony. The circuit courts of appeals are split on this issue. Compare Alsol v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 207, 219 (2d Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>), and Rashid v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 438, 442-48
holding that defendants prior felony convictions in georgia state court for drugrelated conspiracy and simple possession qualified as predicate prior felony drug offenses for  841b1a because under the plain language of the statute  felony drug offense includes any criminal conduct relating to narcotics including simple possession which a state has proscribed as a felony holding that possession with intent to distribute and simple possession are the same offense under blockburger holding that a second state court conviction for simple possession of narcotics is an aggravated felony as defined in 8 usc  1101a43 holding that trial court may arrest judgment on conviction for possession with intent to deliver and enter judgment of guilt on simple possession holding second simple possession conviction was not an aggravated felony because it was not prosecuted as recidivist possession