Standards Embodied in Sections 7 and 9 of the Endangered Species Act, 7 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 197 (1993). At this juncture, it would seem improper to require a plaintiff to meet a different injunctive standard with respect to the substantive § 9 claim than a § 7 claim, when the provisions are intended to work in tandem towards the same objective, namely, protection of endangered species. Other courts have concluded the same, holding that, when faced with a request for injunctive relief under the ESA, a plaintiff need only show that a defendant has violated the act to be entitled to injunctive relief. See Sierra Club, 816 F.2d at 1384 (Sierra Club is “entitled to relief if the [defendants] violated a substantive or procedural provision of the ESA.”); Loggerhead Turtle, 896 F.Supp. at 1178 (<HOLDING>). Thus, plaintiffs’ challenge raises a serious
holding that if defendants violated substantive or procedural provision of esa a court does not have traditional equitable discretion instead any threatened harm is per se irreparable harm and  public interest always favors the imposition of an injunction holding that a reasonably certain threat of imminent harm to a protected species is sufficient for issuance of an injunction under section 9 of the esa holding that evidence of threatened loss of prospective customers or goodwill supports a finding of irreparable harm holding that the threat of irreparable harm must be immediate holding that a party who can show a significant risk of irreparable harm has demonstrated that the harm is not speculative