Corp. v. SDMS, P.C., 203 Ariz. 420, 424, ¶ 18, 55 P.3d 763, 767 (2002) (“The critical inquiry should be whether such an award is appropriate to penalize a party for ‘outwardly aggravated, outrageous, malicious, or fraudulent conduct’ that is coupled with an ‘evil mind.’ ” (quoting Linthi-cum, 150 Ariz. at 331, 723 P.2d at 680)). Petta maintains her conduct did not rise to the level of “conduct involving some element of outrage similar to that usually found in crime,” Rawlings, 151 Ariz. at 162, 726 P.2d at 578 (quoting Restatement § 908 cmt. b), and without clear and convincing evidence of an “evil mind” that caused Plaintiffs injury, the punitive damage award should be vacated. See Saucedo ex rel. Sinaloa v. Salvation Army, 200 Ariz. 179, 184, ¶ 19, 24 P.3d 1274, 1279 (App.2001) (<HOLDING>); see also Shaner v. Tucson Airport Auth, Inc.,
recognizing the conduct giving rise to punitive damages must be a proximate cause of the harm inflicted holding that negligence must be the proximate cause of injury recognizing a 1982 amendment giving rise to this claim holding that a physicians negligence need only be a proximate cause not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury holding that conduct must be beyond the fraud which supported compensatory damages to award punitive damages