not submit evidence inconsistent therewith to avoid summary judgment. Entry of summary judgment for Debtor on these claims was appropriate. The Court acknowledges that, absent the deemed admissions, Creditor may'well have been able to establish her claims. That she was estopped from doing so based on an inadvertent admission of a material fact strikes the Court as beyond the intended purpose of Rule 36. Indeed, some courts have questioned the efficacy of requests for admissions going to the very heart of disputed material facts. Pickens v. Equitable Life Ins. Assur. Soc. of the U.S., 413 F.2d 1390, 1393-94 (5th Cir.1969) (“requests for admissions as to central facts in dispute are beyond the proper scope of the rule”); Jefferson v. Perez, 2012 WL 671917, at *2 (E.D.Cal. Feb. 29, 2012) (<HOLDING>); In re Savage, 303 B.R. 766, 772-73
holding that requests for admissions are subject to discovery cutoff dates holding that requests for admissions that seek to render undisputed the disputed material facts of a case are per se impermissible holding trial courts general charge concerning requests for admissions was a correct statement of law recognizing that where material facts are undisputed the court only decides the application of relevant law holding that jurisdiction exists for determining if disputed facts are material