the government challenges the court’s award of compound rather than simple interest. It is well settled that the determination whether to award simple or compound interest is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial court. RiteHite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1555, 35 USPQ2d 1065, 1077 (Fed.Cir.1995) (in banc); accord City of Milwaukee v. Cement Div. Nat’l Gypsum Co., — U.S.-,-, 115 S.Ct. 2091, 2096, 132 L.Ed.2d 148 (1995) (stating that the allowance of prejudgment interest “rests very much in the discretion of the tribunal which has to pass upon the subject, whether it be a court or a jury” (quoting The Scotland, 118 U.S. 507, 518-19, 6 S.Ct. 1174, 1175-76, 30 L.Ed. 153 (1886))); Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 766 F.2d 518, 520, 226 USPQ 622, 623 (Fed.Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). The government has failed to establish that
recognizing general rule that prejudgment interest may be awarded in claims for liquidated amounts holding that prejudgment interest may inelude compound interest holding in patent litigation that district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding simple rather than compound prejudgment interest holding in adea action that district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding compound rather than simple prejudgment interest holding that award and rate of prejudgment interest are within trial courts discretion