thereafter accurately describing the line at which Eaton’s thirty-foot strip ends and England’s property now begins. Affirmed as modified and remanded. Pittman, C.J., Bird, and Heffley, JJ., agree. Griffen and Baker, JJ., dissent. Karen R. Baker, Judge. The majority is left with a firm conviction that the circuit court erred in its factual determination that possession of a portion of land was not exclusive to the adverse possessor. They reason that the adverse possessor permitted the record owner’s renters to use the disputed area; therefore, the record owner’s use of her own property did “not destroy the exclusiveness of the adverse claimant’s possession.” The case relied upon to support this contention is Anderson v. Holliday, 65 Ark. App. 165, 174, 986 S.W.2d 116, 120-21 (1999) (<HOLDING>). Neither this case, nor any other, supports
holding that the publics use of the disputed road to access the adverse possessors business did not destroy the exclusiveness of the adverse possessors use holding that the agency cannot use insufficient evidence as a basis for finding no adverse impact holding evidence which established that use of property was permissive showed use of property was not adverse holding that the need to maintain the secrecy of the governments investigation outweighed the publics right of access to sentencing documents holding that mere use of a road will not make a road a public road even though such use is with the knowledge and consent of the landowner unless the use is accompanied by  recognition by public authority or by its maintainance sic