because there was “insufficient evidence which proves that defendant McClure caused the termination of the contract.” Id. at 841. DISCUSSION Summary judgment is appropriately granted when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). ‘We review a district court’s summary judgment determination de novo, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Artes-Roy v. City of Aspen, 31 F.3d 958, 961 (10th Cir.1994). Although neither party has raised this issue, we first determine whether Mr. Umbehr has standing to bring this ease. Standing is a threshold issue, “jurisdictional in nature.” Doyle v. Oklahoma Bar Ass L.Ed.2d 175 (1984); Horn v. Kean, 796 F.2d 668 (3d Cir.1986) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); Sweeney v. Bond, 669 F.2d 542, 545 (8th Cir.)
holding that independent contractor claiming loss of and denial of contracts because of political affiliation was not protected by first amendment holding that the court was not bound by the parties agreement that contracts were unambiguous and holding that contracts were ambiguous holding that independent contractor claiming termination of contract because of political affiliation not protected by first amendment holding that independent contractors whose contracts were terminated following a change in administration were not protected by the first amendment holding that independent contractor claiming termination of contract in retaliation for petition was not protected by first amendment