a second chance to remove on the same basis that was earlier eschewed”). A considerable, long-standing body of case law, however, holds that an amendment that substantially changes the character of a lawsuit can give rise to a new right to remove, irrespective of whether the legal basis for removal (such as diversity or federal-question jurisdiction) is the same as before. See, e.g., Wilson, 668 F.2d at 965 ("The courts ... have read into [§ 1446(b)] an exception for the case where the plaintiff files an amended complaint that so changes the nature of his action as to constitute `substantially a new suit begun that day’") (quoting Fletcher v. Hamlet, 116 U.S. 408, 410, 6 S.Ct. 426, 29 L.Ed. 679 (1886)). Cf. Sehl v. Safari Motor Coaches, Inc., No. C 01-1750, 2001 WL 940846, at *4 (<HOLDING>). There is no litmus test for whether an
holding that the trial court properly struck the amended complaint when the plaintiff offered no reason to refute the trial courts finding that the new allegations in the amended complaint were based on facts the plaintiff had known since the beginning of the action holding defendant waived complaint holding that the amended complaint could not relate back to the original complaint in which all claims were barred by the statute of limitations holding original complaint was admission where it alleged an accident occurred on a different date than the amended complaint holding that since defendant failed to timely remove the original complaint which was removable based on federal question jurisdiction defendant thereby waived its right to file a subsequent removal even though the complaint was amended to add a new federal claim where the amendment to the complaint did not change the nature of the action so as to constitute a substantially new suit since the new allegations and claims were not substantially different from those in the original complaint