“whether the harm to [plaintiff] was foreseeable in the first instance.” Commerce Bank/Pennsylvania v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 911 A.2d 133, 139 (Pa.Super.Ct.2006). Therefore, it is not enough to claim that Boeing knew, at the time, that Plaintiffs husband was exposed to asbestos while working there. Rather, Plaintiff must allege that Boeing knew, or should have known, that if Mr. Gillen took home his work clothing, Mrs. Gillen would be exposed to friable asbestos while washing his work clothing at home. This Plaintiff has not done. Moreover, even if Plaintiff was deemed a foreseeable third party, foreseeability “is not alone determinative of the duty question,” and “is not necessarily a dominant factor” in the duty assessment under Pennsylvania law. Seebold, 57 A.3d 1232, 1249 & n. 26 (<HOLDING>). For example, in Estate of Witthoeft v.
holding that it is the exclusive province of the judge in nonjury trials to assess the credibility of witnesses and to assign weight to their testimony holding that courts must examine the facts surrounding the publication the context in which the statements were made and the nature of the language used holding that due process requires a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case holding the court must assign appropriate weight to each policy factor depending on the nature and context of the duty in question holding that it was appropriate for the trial court to find that lack of a prior criminal record was not a mitigating factor in light of the violent nature of the crime committed