conclusion that Parr would be entitled to raise his objection to the without-prejudice dismissal of his first indictment if he were convicted in the second proceeding. That conclusion was based in turn on the Court’s view of the proceeding initiated by the first indictment as essentially an interlocutory step in the proceeding that continued with the filing of the second indictment. In the civil setting, however, the same analysis does not apply. To the contrary, in the civil setting the second complaint initiates a separate civil action. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 2. All the requirements of service apply to the second complaint, and the filing of the first complaint does not establish the starting date for the second action. See Davis v. Smith’s Transfer, Inc., 841 F.2d 139, 140 (6th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). If the two civil complaints initiate separate
holding that the concealment of ones identity does not toll the running of the statute of limitations holding that although the filing of suit and service of citation interrupt the running of the statute its dismissal for want of prosecution will have the same effect as if the suit had never been filed holding that the relevant time of inquiry is the date of the filing of the complaint holding that filing of suit ordinarily interrupts the running of prescription but when the action is dismissed without prejudice because of plaintiffs failure to prosecute the interruption in the running of the statute is considered as never having occurred holding that the initial filing of a suit later voluntarily dismissed is not the effective date of a second suit because a voluntary dismissal does not toll or affect in any way the continuous running of the applicable statutory time period