in Indonesia are a disfavored group and petitioners are Christians, we must remand to the BIA for it to determine whether the combination of disfavored group evidence and evidence of individualized risk is sufficient to establish a clear probability that petitioners will be persecuted if removed to Indonesia. Wakkary, 558 F.3d at 1067. V. CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL The IJ denied petitioners’ application for cancellation of removal because petitioners did not demonstrate that their removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to their two U.S. citizen daughters. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). This court lacks jurisdiction to review an agency’s “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” determination. See Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 887, 888 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). This court retains jurisdiction, however, to
holding that the transitional rules preclude direct judicial review of the bias discretionary determination of extreme hardship in suspension of deportation cases holding hardship is discovered in the rare case based on exceptional circumstances holding that the  exceptional and extremely unusual hardship determination is a subjective discretionary judgment that has been carved out of our appellate jurisdiction holding that the decision whether an alien meets the hardship requirement in 8 usc  1229b is  a discretionary judgment recognizing that the iirira strips the court of jurisdiction over the attorney generals discretionary extreme hardship determination but retaining jurisdiction over constitutional due process claims