the identity of those purportedly helping him commit the fraud. Before it could be tried, though, Barnhill “resolved” her claim against her husband, according to.her counsel’s email and affixed her signature. to a divorce decree dividing , the marital estate. Above her signature appeared the words: “APPROVED AND CONSENTED TO AS TO BOTH FORM AND SUBSTANCE.” One need only peruse that decree, which the trial court ultimately signed, to see that she received substantial property. .More importantly, the distribution was deemed by the trial court as “a just and right division of the parties’ marital .estate, having due regard for the rights of each party and the child of the marriage.” See Ginsburg v. Chernoff/Silver & Assocs., 137 S.W.3d 231, 237 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Following Cohrs, we too presume that the
holding that where an agreement constituting criminal conspiracy was made in clackamas county it was irrelevant to the venue issue that the object of the conspiracy  robberywas intended to be committed in multnomah county because actual commission of the object crime is not an element of conspiracy holding that evidence tending to show knowing participation in the conspiracy is sufficient to sustain conspiracy conviction holding that as a result of the settlement agreement dividing the marital estate dr ginsburg could not present evidence sufficient to raise a material fact issue concerning the element of damages as to his claims against chernoff for conversion conspiracy to convert fraud and conspiracy to defraud holding that once a defendant becomes associated with a conspiracy he is responsible for all of the acts of the conspiracy even those which occurred before or after his association with the conspiracy holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges