notation does not demonstrate the necessary clear intent to directly contract for the primary benefit of Dorsett Concrete with respect to the funds represented by the cheek. We agree. Dorsett Concrete has directed us to no summary judgment proof that raises fact questions that if resolved favorably to Dor-sett Concrete would establish the clear intent by Safeco Title and the Project’s owner to primarily benefit Dorsett Concrete. At best, the check and notation establish that Dorsett Concrete was an incidental beneficiary of the contract. But a mere incidental beneficiary may not enforce a provision of a contract. Id. at 383; see, e.g., Citizen’s Nat’l Bank v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 136 Tex. 333, 150 S.W.2d 1003, 1006-1007 (1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 656, 62 S.Ct. 109, 86 L.Ed. 526 (1941) (<HOLDING>). We find that the summary judgment dismissing
holding that an order to disgorge funds was final even though the order did not distribute the funds holding that defendant violated section 4b when she misappropriated pool participant funds by soliciting funds for trading and then trading only a small percentage of those funds while disbursing the rest of the funds to investors herself and her family holding that materialmen and laborers are not thirdparty beneficiaries of funds retained under construction contracts even if a contracting party holds the retained funds for the purpose of satisfying claims and hens holding that a plaintiff surety had to pay all outstanding claims owed by the contractor or it otherwise would not be permitted to share in any retained funds held by the government holding in part that a paymentbond surety is entitled to the benefit of the equitable rights of both the contractor had the contractor completed performance and paid his laborers and materialmen and the subcontractors