a capital offense. The State further argues that Harley’s expected testimony could have subjected Harley to perjury charges. We are gravely concerned with the State’s assertions. At the time of Willett’s trial, Harley’s plea had been accepted and he had been sentenced for the homicide at issue in this case. We therefore find it difficult to see how Harley could contend that he had a real and demonstrable fear of future prosecution for the same offense. See Affleck v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 655 P.2d 665, 667 (Utah 1982). Although the State concedes that the privilege against self-incrimination ends when a witness pleads guilty and is sentenced, it asserts that this rule applies only to the crime for which conviction was obtained. See State v. Parham, 220 N.W.2d 628, 627 (Iowa 1974) (<HOLDING>). Yet the State fails to identify what
recognizing privilege holding that an adverse inference cannot be drawn from a defendants failure to call a witness if the states evidence establishes that the witness is an accomplice who would be entitled to assert a fifth amendment privilege holding that when a witnesss previous disclosure is not an actual admission of guilt or incriminating facts the witness subsequently may assert the privilege and decline to testify as to matters that might incriminate him holding that if testimony could incriminate the witness for other crimes he may properly assert the privilege holding that article i section 19 of the missouri constitution requires that once a witness claims the privilege against selfinerimination afforded by that provision a rebuttable presumption arises that the witness answer might tend to incriminate him