pursue a grievance in the event [he] was not satisfied with their findings or conclusion of the investigation” (emphasis added). Because this is an appeal from an order granting a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, we view the facts in the light most favorable to Brown. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 617 (1993). Without further discovery, we conclude that there is insufficient evidence to find that Brown failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Cf. Ray, 285 F.3d at 297 (explaining that “[without further inquiry, the District Court was not in a position to reach the conclusion that Ray failed to exhaust his administrative remedies”); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 342 (3d Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Defendants have not met their burden of
holding that a district court may not grant summary judgment without giving plaintiff an opportunity to submit materials admissible in a summary judgment proceeding or allowing a hearing on defendants motion holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that motion for summary judgment was not opposed holding that the trial court may not grant summary judgment on a ground not raised in the motion holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that a motion for summary judgment was not opposed holding that a grant of summary judgment in favor of one party creates a final judgment allowing appellate review of denial of opposing partys summary judgment motion