be incomplete without a discussion as to the status of the Mountain States judgment lien on Debtors’ home. As previously explained, the two inherited properties became property of the bankruptcy estate pursuant to § 1306(a) when Debtors acquired them, and remain so today. The same is not true, however, of the Debtors’ home. When Debtors initiated this bankruptcy case, their home became part of the bankruptcy estate pursuant to § 541(a). However, pursuant to the terms of their plan and § 1327(b), the home revested in Debtors upon confirmation, and was thereafter not part of the bankruptcy estate. As a result, the automatic stay did not prohibit the attachment of Mountain States’ judgment lien with respect to Debtors’ home. See In re Petruccelli, 113 B.R. 5, 17 (Bankr.S.D.Cal. 1990) (<HOLDING>). Conclusion Mountain States did not violate
holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or holding that a debt collectors filing of a lawsuit on a debt that appears to be timebarred  is an unfair and unconscionable means of collecting the debt holding that reporting of historically accurate debt may violate the fcra when the reporting did not include that the debt was discharged in bankruptcy or that the debt was in dispute holding that the irss full participation in the bankruptcy proceeding in relation to an income tax debt did not bar it from collecting a gift tax debt that had also been listed in the debtors schedules where the irs did not file a proof of claim and the debtor did not force the irs into the proceeding on the gift tax debt holding that  362 did not prevent the irs from collecting a postpetition debt by levying upon property of the debt or