opinion, we VA CATE the sentence and REMAND for resentencing. 1 . Before Pulido, we often applied an "impossible to tell” harmless-error standard to alternative-theory errors. See United States v. Howard, 517 F.3d 731, 736 (5th Cir.2008) (cataloguing cases). This standard had its origins in Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 77 S.Ct. 1064, 1 L.Ed.2d 1356 (1957), which states that a general verdict should be set aside when it "is supportable on one ground, but not on another, and it is impossible to tell which ground the jury selected.” Id. at 312, 77 S.Ct. 1064 (emphasis added). The impossible-to-tell standard is more stringent than the Neder standard; it is closer to the "absolute certainty” standard that the Supreme Court invalidated in Pulido. See Pulido, 129 S.Ct. at 533 (<HOLDING>). Because the impossible-to-tell standard is
holding that a violation of the hearsay rule was harmless holding that the absolutecertainty standard is similar to a finding that no violation had occurred at all rather than that any error was harmless holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error holding that in similar factual situation no due process violation occurred holding that violation of rule 16 in that case was not harmless error