evidence, not conclusive proof, that he owned the foreshore. I find that Defendants disputed Plaintiffs claim of ownership to the foreshore long before trial, and therefore arguments that the deed was. defective should have been anticipated. Plaintiff and his lawyer made an affirmative choice not to pursue these documents, and to permit the introduction of such evidence in these circumstances would grant Plaintiff “a second bite of the apple” to correct his oversight. See Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir.1998). The interests of justice do not dictat his issue, the United States Supreme Court has noted that “[i]n New York, it was long considered as settled law that the State succeeded to all the rights of the crow 755, 410 N.Y.S.2d 199, 207 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1978) (<HOLDING>). Though the Dongan Grant was not as large as
holding as a matter of law that police departments are purely instrumentalities of the municipality with no separate identity thus they are not persons for purposes of  1983 and not capable of being sued under  1983 holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability holding that the conclusion is inevitable that the parliament and the crown together were not competent to grant to a private corporation for private purposes the seacoast around the island below the shore line without violating established principles of law holding that grants from parliament and the crown for purely private purposes are ineffective holding that the pennsylvania sentencing guidelines are purely advisory in nature