attempt to categorize Dr. Pitt as a layperson runs afoul of a 2000 amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 701, which "ensures that a party will not evade the expert witness disclosure requirements set forth in Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 and Fed.R.Crim.P. 16 by simply calling an expert witness in the guise of a layperson.” Fed.R.Evid. 701 advisory committee’s notes. 2 . See, e.g., Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal.3d 809, 169 Cal.Rptr. 691, 620 P.2d 141, 149 n. 7 (1979) (en banc) (allowing future policy benefits as part of compensatory damages if the jury could reasonably con-elude that the policy holder would have been entitled to receive future benefits had the contract not been terminated). 3 . See e.g., DeChant v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 204 Wis.2d 137, 554 N.W.2d 225, 229 (Ct. App.1996) (<HOLDING>). 4 . The jury’s decision to award future
holding that party may not recover damages for breach of contract where its own bad faith caused the other partys breach holding that an insurance contract between the parties and a breach thereof by the defendant is an element of a bad faith refusal claim holding that a bad faith claim is a tort holding that the district court should consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the patentee acted in subjective bad faith and should consider whether circumstantial evidence would support an inference of bad faith holding that future benefits are available upon a finding of bad faith because repudiation is a legal conclusion which the trial court reaches after the fact finder makes its determinations about whether there was a breach and whether the breach was in bad faith