the jury, not the judge, would determine the facts in the case. The trial court also explained that the judge’s role was to direct the trial process and to instruct the jury on the applicable law. Therefore, we find no plain error in the trial court’s statement. The appellant also argues that the trial court’s instruction on reasonable doubt violated the principles of Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990). After reviewing the instruction on reasonable doubt, we conclude that it does not violate the principles set forth in Cage. Although the trial court did refer to a reasonable doubt as an “actual doubt,” it did not state that the doubt must be “grave” or “substantial,” as the faulty charge in Cage instructed. See Cage, 498 U.S. at 40, 111 S.Ct. at 328 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the trial court’s instruction
holding a higher grade than the employee being searched holding the prosecution to a higher burden of proof than the law required is a valid raceneutral reason for excluding a juror holding that beyond reasonable doubt standard not required in termination cases holding potential prejudice caused by equating reasonable doubt with a substantial doubt mitigated by providing an alternate definition of reasonable doubt as a doubt that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act holding that the terms grave and substantial suggest a higher degree of doubt than that actually required to acquit