be characterized as an obligation to pay alimony, maintenance, or support, or whether it would be characterized in some other way, such as an obligation to comply with the terms of a contract. He contends that if the quoted language is interpreted as dealing with the purpose of the debt, then it is superfluous because section 523(a)(5) already requires the debt to be for alimony, maintenance, or support. Mr. Biggs thus argues that because a Texas court would characterize the obligation under the Agreement as contractual, the debt is not “actually in the n rt decree requiring payment of $197,000 over a ten-year period was non-dischargeable support even though Indiana law did not provide for alimony in the circumstances of the case); Boyle v. Donovan, 724 F.2d 681, 683 (8th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). More significantly, Mr. Biggs’ argument
holding that a promise to pay postmajority educational expenses was nondischargeable support even though the relevant states law does not require such support past the age of majority holding that in an agreement where the father agreed to pay reasonable expenses to the extent that such expenses are not provided by any scholarship grant or other assistance for his sons education those expenses did not include loan repayment because it was not one of the forms of enumerated assistance holding that an agreement to pay sons college education expenses was nondischargeable support even though arkansas law does not require payment of such expenses holding agreement to pay for education expenses after high school not vague holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid