language, petitioner urges us to entertain jurisdiction on two bases. First he argues that because he challenges the constitutionality of INA § 212(a)(2)(C), resolution of the constitutional claim is a necessary part of the jurisdictional inquiry. Sareang Ye v. INS, 214 F.3d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir.2000) (when determination of the merits is necessary to determine jurisdiction, “the jurisdictional question and the merits collapse into one”). We have held that “the terms of [IIRIRA section 309(c)(4)(G) ] preclude direct appellate review of constitutional issues” and that “[a] literal reading of IIRIRA section 309(c)(4)(G), precluding direct review of constitutional claims, is consistent with one of the central purposes of IIRIRA.” Alfaro-Reyes v. INS, 224 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, because the constitutionality of
holding that because 28 usc  2241 habeas corpus relief is available to review constitutional claims congress preclusion of direct appeals in iirira see tion 309c4g does not offend the due process clause of the constitution holding that iirira  309c4g repealed this courts jurisdiction over petitions for review filed by aliens who are deportable for having committed enumerated criminal offenses but did not repeal 28 usc  2241 recognizing that after iirira habeas review remains available  to raise substantial constitutional questions holding that because the farr act does not expressly mention habeas corpus or 28 usc  2241 it does not eliminate habeas jurisdiction holding that jurisdictionstripping provisions of iirira did not preclude aliens convicted of aggravated felonies from pursuing habeas relief pursuant to 28 usc  2241