that a few courts have held that section 363(f) applies only to in rem interests, while numerous other courts have interpreted the statute more broadly, applying it, for example, to product liability and employment discrimination claims). Yet while the plain meaning of the phrase “interest in such property” suggests that not all general rights to payment are encompassed by the statute, Congress did not expressly indicate that, by employing such language, it intended to limit the scope of section 363(f) to in rem interests, strictly defined, and we decline to adopt such a restricted reading of the statute here. Accord P.K.R. Convalescent Centers v. Commonwealth of Virginia, Dep’t of Medical Assistance Servs. (In re P.K.R. Convalescent Centers), 189 B.R. 90, 92-94 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1995) (<HOLDING>). Contra Fairchild Aircraft Inc. v. Cambell (In
holding that because creditors claim was unsecured after application of section 506a and because section 1325a5 does not apply to unsecured claims creditors lien could properly be avoided holding that section 363f applies only to in rem interests which have attached to the property by way of either the debtors consent to a security interest or the creditors attachment of the property resulting in a lien holding that property seized by a creditor prior to debtors bankruptcy was property of the estate even though creditor  the irs  held a secured interest  a tax lien  in the property recognizing virginias interest in protecting defendants from claims and in holding down insurance costs holding that section 363f permitted a sale free and clear of virginias depreciationrecoupment interest in the debtors property even though that interest was unsecured by lien or otherwise