he wanted Graham to speak. Cf. United States v. Corr, 543 F.2d 1042, 1046 (2d Cir.1976) (recognizing directed trades as evidence of manipulation). Graham testified that, as a result, she assumed Broumas controlled the shares in the accounts or at least “had connections” with them. Perhaps most important, Graham recognized, and discussed with Pasztor, the fact that Broumas had “a peculiar way of trading.” J.A. at 306. Although these were “big money trades” involving thousands of shares, and although he was repeatedly buying and selling and paying commissions on the transactions, Graham realized that Broumas was not making any money on the trades. See id. at 380. This economically irrational trading was a large red flag. See Edward J. Mawod & Co. v. SEC, 591 F.2d 588, 595 (10th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). At the same time that she was noting these
holding that the government must show that defendant aided and abetted the specific crime not just the overall scheme holding that period of limitations on a patients negligence cause of action began to run when the patient knew or had reason to know about the foreign object left in her body holding that defendant could not be liable for distributing defamatory statements unless it knew or had reason to know of statements holding that broker willfully aided and abetted manipulative wash and match trades scheme when he knew or had reason to know that such trading was economically irrational holding that broker violated  11a and rule llala when he shared in the profits and losses of trades in one of his customers accounts