employee is ‘otherwise qualified,’ with or without reasonable accommodation, to perform the job, a factual dispute that is resolved through traditional methods of proof” 337 F.3d at 1189 (emphasis added). In Davidson, as in this case, the decisive issue was whether the plaintiff was “otherwise qualified” for the position, i.e., whether he could, with or without reasonable accommodation, perform the essential functions of the position. As here, that key issue depended on whether the employer’s requirement related to an “essential function” of the job. And that is a fact question for the jury: “Determining whether a particular function is essential is a factual inquiry.” Id. at 1191 (emphasis added); see also Kellogg v. Energy Safety Services, Inc., 544 F.3d 1121, 1127-28 (10th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Bartee v. Michelin North America, Inc., 374
holding inter alia that the jury could properly have found that neither of the employers claimed job requirements was an essential function of ms kelloggs job holding inter alia that common law claims were preempted holding that the trial court properly excluded evidence that other persons had a motive to kill the victims because inter alia such evidence was speculative holding that an arbitration agreement was invalid because inter alia the employer could modify the rules at any time without notice holding that the district court properly admitted expert testimony under daubert that was based on inter alia the doctors clinical experience and review of the medical records