to twenty minutes later “after embles our own in that it provides operators a thirty-minute period to contact an attorney to decide whether to take the te ld with a rule of law which would rigidly and unreasonably bind an arrested person to his first words spoken, no matter how quickly and under what circumstances those words are withdrawn.”); In re Smith, 770 P.2d 817, 821 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989) (concluding that flexible rule “better serves the public interest in obtaining scientific information about the blood-alcohol levels of motorists accused of driving under the influence”); Standish, 683 P.2d at 1280 (“We believe that the administration of the test should be encouraged and the person arrested should be given every reasonable opportunity to submit to it.”); Lund, 224 N.W.2d at 557 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added); Baldwin, 849 P.2d at 405-06
holding that there is no constitutional right to refuse chemical testing under the implied consent law recognizing that because accuracy of a chemical test under the implied consent law does not depend upon its being administered immediately after an arrest  a delay for a reasonable period of time while an arrested person considers or reconsiders a decision to take a test will not frustrate objective of law holding that denial of an independent chemical test after defendant refused to submit to a policeadministered test did not violate due process holding that a person arrested for dui has the right to consult an attorney before taking a breath test when such consultation would not delay or interfere with the investigation or test taking holding the limit of two tests in section 5770202 applies to the types of chemical test performed and not the number of times the same chemical test is performed