is no genuine dispute of material fact, the inferences arising from the facts in this case are susceptible to more than one reasonable conclusion precluding summary judgment.” However, Bagley does not identify any facts that purportedly give rise to inferences susceptible to more than one reasonable conclusion, and, ultimately, his generalized argument to that effect is not materially different from his argument in support of his first assignment of error. Accordingly, we reject that alternative argument without further discussion. 5 Although existing Oregon case law on point is limited, several other states have similarly reasoned that a former minor’s acceptance of the benefits of a contract may constitute a ratification. See, e.g., Jones v. Dressel, 623 P2d 370, 372-74 (Colo 1981) (<HOLDING>); Parsons ex rel Cabaniss v. American Family
recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract holding the contract was not authorized by law holding that even though certain corporate formalities had not been complied with in the execution of the subject contract the corporation had knowledge of the existence of the contract and treated it as a valid and binding contract and thus ratified the contract by accepting the benefits thereunder holding that for a suit to be brought in the venue in which the contract was to be performed the contract must expressly state where the performance of the contract was to occur holding that a former minor who had signed a release at age 17 in order to skydive ratified the contract as a matter of law by accepting the benefits of the contract when he used the defendants facilities and further stating that the question whether that former minors subsequent actions constituted disaffirmance of the contract was not relevant because the former minor had already ratified the contract