Costantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1087, 103 S.Ct. 570, 74 L.Ed.2d 932 (1982). Considering the FDIC’s concession that the Shields plaintiffs could have brought a proper double derivative suit, it naturally follows that such claims are barred by claim preclusion. Furthermore, the Shields judgment plainly released any and all claims that could be brought against “present and former” officers. See Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1287-88 (9th Cir.) (upholding release of claims that were not alleged), cert. denied sub nom. Hoffer v. City of Seattle, 506 U.S. 953, 113 S.Ct. 408, 121 L.Ed.2d 333 (1992); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Epstein, — U.S. —, —-—, 116 S.Ct. 873, 880-81, 134 L.Ed.2d 6 (1996) (<HOLDING>). V For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the
holding that a federal court acting under its federal as opposed to diversity jurisdiction may also give greater preclusive effect to a state court judgment than the state courts would give holding that a federal court litigant who is forced into state court under pullman may reserve a right to return to federal court in that the plaintiff can preserve the right to the federal forum for federal claims by informing the state court of his or her intention to return following litigation of the state claims in the state court holding that state court judgment settling shareholders state and federal claims had preclusive effect in federal court even though shareholders could not have pressed their federal claims in state court holding that even though  24 only refers to actions in state court it applies to state claims brought in federal court holding that after all federal claims had been dismissed if the district court does decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction these state claims shall be remanded to state court rather than dismissed because this case was originally filed in state court and removed to federal court