proceedings, we find no indication in the record that the Tribe actually participated or formally intervened in the ancillary proceedings prior to 1998. Our conclusion on this point finds further support in the fact that the Tribe’s interest in the District’s and Corkill’s petitions for review of the Engineer’s decision changed dramatically when, upon the Engineer’s ultimate decision' disposing of the remaining applications, the Tribe’s status changed from applicant to victor. Prior to that time, as one applicant among many, the Tribe could not reasonably have foreseen that its rights in a future action reviewing the Engineer’s ultimate decision could be foreclosed by the outcome of an ancillary proceeding. See Moore v. District Court, 77 Nev. 357, 363, 364 P.2d 1073, 1077 (1961) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, although the ancillary proceedings
holding that because appellant did not become a party by intervention before judgment was rendered appellant may not extend the time to appeal by filing a motion for new trial holding that a motion requesting a trial judge to disqualify himself and the affidavit in support thereof were insufficient in part due to their conclusory nature holding that an intervening party was not precluded from filing an affidavit to disqualify a judge despite the fact that there had been an earlier motion to set the cause for trial because the intervenors did not become parties to the action until their motion for intervention was granted holding that a year delay in filing a motion to disqualify did not bar the motion where there was no evidence that the motion was inspired by dilatory tactics holding that a fivemonth delay in filing a motion to disqualify did not bar the motion where there was a reasonable explanation for the delay