that similarly situated persons were treated differently. See Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1173 (10th Cir.2011) (“The pleading requirement of an allegation that a similarly situated person was treated differently applies both when the plaintiff challenges a government action that discriminates based on membership in a non-protected class, or membership in a ‘class of one.’ ”)(internal citations omitted)(citing Price-Cornelison v. Brooks, 524 F.3d 1103, 1120 (10th Cir.2008); Kansas Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d at 1216). As the Supreme Court set forth in Vill .O.C., 462 U.S. 669, 676, 103 S.Ct. 2622, 77 L.Ed.2d 89 (1983) (extending this proposition to Equal Protection Clause violations); Reynolds v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, 69 F.3d 1523, 1532 & n. 10 (10th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). The Tent Circuit has noted: “ ‘The
recognizing that the equal protection clause proscribes discrimination against whiteanglos holding that title vii proscribes racial discrimination against whites upon the same standards as racial discrimination against nonwhites holding that discrimination based on religion is subjected to strict scrutiny whether a claim arises under the establishment clause the free exercise clause of equal protection clause holding that the equal protection clause also prohibits discrimination in jury selection on the basis of gender holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause