a challenge to a regulation that “implicate[d] only the more general contours of the substantive liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Kelley, 425 U.S. at 245, 96 S.Ct. at 1444. Unlike the court in Pienta, however, we do not read Kelley as applicable only to challenges based on general liberty interests, and we decline to follow the approach taken in Pienta. There is ample support for Kelley’s status-oriented approach. Regulations limiting even those rights guaranteed by the explicit language of the Bill of Rights are reviewed more deferentially when applied to certain public employees than when applied to ordinary citizens. See United States Civil Serv. Comm’n v. National Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 567, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 2891, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973) (<HOLDING>); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,
holding that activities of stateregulated political parties constitute state action recognizing that discrepancy regarding political activities went to the heart of petitioners claims where those activities formed the basis of the persecution claim holding that persecution was on account of political opinion because petitioners prosecutorial investigation into acts of political corruption was by its very nature political holding that njeither the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is absolute and congress may prohibit federal employees from participating in political activities in view of its interest in maintaining a nonpartisan work force recognizing the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs and the right of qualified voters regardless of their political persuasion to cast their votes effectively