verdict. Therefore, under Webb, a court would not inquire as to whether improperly admitted other-acts evidence affected the outcome of the case, and yet precluding a jury from considering whether a defendant acted in conformity with a prior bad act is precisely the purpose of excluding evidence under Evid.R. 404(B). State v. Nichols, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 97APA09-1162, 1998 WL 226430, *3 (May 5, 1998) (the risk of other-acts evidence is that the jury will use it to “infer character and conformity therewith”). Therefore, instead of relying on Webb, I would look to the federal nonconstitutional harmless-error standard of review as set out in Kotteakos, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557. See United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986), fn. 9 (<HOLDING>). {¶ 67} In Kotteakos, the issue was “whether
holding that the constitutionally improper denial of a defendants opportunity to impeach a witness for bias like other confrontation clause errors is subject to chapman harmlesserror analysis holding that courts may review nonconstitutional claims holding that the omission of an element from the jury charge is subject to harmlesserror review recognizing that harmlesserror analysis applies to britt violations recognizing that kotteakos sets out the harmlesserror standard for nonconstitutional errors