legislative history); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1234 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “property of the estate” to include “the debtor’s tangible and intangible property interests (including both legal and equitable interests)”). Indeed, the Whiting Pools Court expressly stated that “interests in [repossessed] property that could have been exercised by the debtor — in this case, the rights to notice and the surplus from a tax sale — are already part of the estate by virtue of § 541(a)(1).” 462 U.S. at 207 n. 15, 103 S.Ct. 2309 (internal citation omitted). Consequently, Moffett’s statutory right to redeem the vehicle was properly made part of her bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). Accord Charles R. Hall Motors, Inc. v. Lewis (In re Lewis), 137 F.3d 1280, 1284 (11th Cir.1998)(<HOLDING>); see also Bell-Tel Fed. Credit Union v. Kalter
holding that bankruptcy court may enjoin federal administrative proceedings when they threaten the debtors estate holding that a statutory right of redemption under alabamas ucc is part of a debtors bankruptcy estate holding that bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction to control disposition of chapter 13 debtors property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate unless the property is related to the bankruptcy proceedings of the code holding that a debtors interest in a tenancy by the entirety is property of the bankruptcy estate under section 541 because of debtors undivided present interests in the use possession income and right of survivorship of the property holding that if dispute involves funds that are not property of estate it cannot be maintained in the bankruptcy court unless it is related to the bankruptcy proceeding which means it is likely to affect the debtors estate