as applied to him, and there is no indication that the information about prescription medi-cátions could not be provided confidentially, and treated so, unless the test results come back positive. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 659-60, 115 S.Ct. 2386. Therefore, like the Supreme Court, "we will not assume the worst” and will not invalidate the policy on this ground. Id. at 660, 115 S.Ct. 2386. 6 . Our decision today comports with an opinion from the Seventh Circuit in a case that is nearly identical to this one on the facts. See Todd v. Rush County Schools, 133 F.3d 984 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,- U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 68, 142 L.Ed.2d 53 (1998); see also, Willis v. Anderson Community Sch. Corp., 158 F.3d 415 (7th Cir.1998), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 1254, - L.Ed.2d - (1999) (No. 98-1183)
holding that when the district court imposed drug testing in connection with a special condition of substance abuse program participation  it was  not required to specify the number of drug tests a defendant must undergo as a part of the treatment program holding railroad regulation requiring random drug testing without particularized suspicion to be reasonable in light of connection to public safety holding that random drug testing for student athletes did not violate their fourth amendment rights holding that required drug testing of student who had been suspended for fighting was unconstitutional because there was no reasonable suspicion of drug use and no special needs requiring a suspicionless search distinguishing todd and vemonia on their facts holding that the requirement that a defendant pay for drug testing is a special condition of probation which must be pronounced at sentencing