prescribed by the Guidelines in effect at the time of the offense, the court must apply the Guidelines as they existed at the time of the crime. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § lBl.ll(b)(l) (2000); United States v. Omoruyi 260 F.3d 291, 297 (3d Cir.2001). Prior to November 1, 2000, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2Fl.l(b)(4)(B) (1999) provided for a two level increase in offense score if the offense involved a “violation of any judicial or administrative order, injunction, decree or process.” In interpreting that version of § 2F1.1(b)(4)(B), we held that a bankruptcy proceeding was not a “judicial process” and that a bankruptcy rule did not constitute a “judicial order.” See United States v. Thayer, 201 F.3d 214, 226-28 (3d Cir.1999). However, on November 1, 200 Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). According to Brennan, the ending date of the
holding that application of guidelines did not violate the ex post facto clause because rico offense was a straddle crime that continued before and after the effective date of the guidelines holding that parole guidelines are subject to the ex post facto clause holding that revocation of medical license does not violate the ex post facto clause holding that use of the guidelines in effect at time of sentencing does not violate ex post facto clause after booker holding that application of an amended version of the guidelines to a conspiracy which continues both before and after the amendment does not violate the ex post facto clause