from the Second, Fourth, Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal holding that imprisonment does not per se mean “custody”). “When a defendant is already incarcerated at the time of interrogation, the traditional custody analysis is inappropriate because, by its very nature, a prison setting restrains the freedom of movement of its inmates.” Ford, 144 N.H. at 63 (citing United States v. Conley, 779 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 830 (1986)). Additionally, Mathis must be read in light of more recent developments in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. The Court has suggested that “[t]he bare fact of custody may not in every instance require a warning even when the suspect is aware that he is speaking to an official.” Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 299 (1990) (<HOLDING>); see also People v. Alls, 629 N.E.2d 1018,
holding that questions as to whether defendant was in the country legally were not routine booking questions but rather constituted interrogation requiring miranda warnings where defendant faced the charge of being an unlawful alien in possession of a firearm holding that undercover officers questions posed to defendant in prison need not be preceded by miranda warnings because there was no compulsion or coercion holding that statements given after miranda warnings are admissible even when the arrest that preceded the statements was constitutionally deficient holding that although miranda warnings were not given to defendant police officers they had no cause of action under 42 usc  1983 because they were never prosecuted holding that the warnings in their totality satisfied miranda