except when the court extends the time on reasonable notice and for good cause. The court may impose such terms for the extension of time as justice requires. (3) When the initial pleading does not show that the action is founded on a duly recorded instrument or on a lien claimed under part I of chapter 713, the court may control and discharge the notice of lis pendens as the court may grant and dissolve injunctions. § 48.23, Fla. Stat. (2006)(emphasis added). The case law construing the lis pendens statute makes it clear that the statutory language “founded on a duly recorded instrument” imposes the strict requirement that the lawsuit must be based on the terms contained in the recorded document itself. See American Legion Community Club v. Diamond, 561 So.2d 268, 272 (Fla.l990)(<HOLDING>). See also DeGuzman v. Balsini 930 So.2d 752,
holding that the phrase or ganic diseases of the nervous system contained in 38 usc  11013 was ambiguous because the statute did not define the phrase holding that a phrase should be interpreted consistent with the context of the statute in which it is contained holding that in construing an instrument any apparently conflicting expressions should be reconciled if possible so as to give full effect to all provisions contained in the instrument holding that the possibility of a mistaken understanding of the phrase preponderance of the evidence on the part of the jury is too remote to constitute plain error when counsel gave the jury an accurate explanation of the legal meaning of the phrase in his closing argument and that meaning is consistent with the common understanding of the words in the phrase holding that the phrase founded on a duly recorded instrument in the lis pendens statute applies only to those cases in which the suit is based on the terms and provisions contained in the recorded document