standard by which conduct can be judged, the required specificity may nonetheless be provided by the common knowledge and understanding of members of the particular vocation or profession to which the standard applies.”). We believe that there could be no misunderstanding by a veteran of the horse-racing industry like Perez — indeed, by any reasonable person — that banging on tables, repeatedly shouting obscenities and threatening to choke a racing official at an official Stewards’ meeting would impede the Stewards’ efforts to investigate Perez’s very serious allegations — that Lakow was “fixing” races by manipulating race entries — and, thus, constitute conduct “detrimental to the best interests of racing generally.” See Hadges v. Corbisiero, 739 F.Supp. 792, 793 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (<HOLDING>); cf. LeRoy v. Illinois Racing Bd., 39 F.3d
holding that statute that permitted termination of teachers for due and sufficient cause was not vague as applied holding that attorney disciplinary rule was unconstitutionally vague as applied holding that harnessracing regulation prohibiting conduct detrimental to the best interests of racing was not vague as applied to plaintiff who was an experienced horseman and should have known that passing wagering information was prohibited holding facta was not vague and ambiguous and that defendants conduct was willful holding that a request is sufficiently clear if the administrator knew or should have known that plan information was requested