corrections and issued an order specifying that defendant had to complete the one-year period of mandatory parole under the supervision of the Probation Department. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court’s order constitutes an illegal sentence because the Department of Corrections, through the division of adult services, is vested with the sole authority to supervise an inmate’s parole. We disagree. Prior to July 1993, the trial courts were accorded discretion to impose up to one year of post-release supervision, to be supervised by the county probation department, following a defendant’s completion of a sentence to a residential community corrections facility. See Colo. Sess. Laws 1982, ch. 74, §17-27-105(5) at 311; see also People v. Herrera, 734 P.2d 136 (Colo.App.1986) (<HOLDING>). However, §17-27-105(5) was repealed in 1993.
holding that a district court had jurisdiction to impose rule 11 sanctions regardless of the existence of subjectmatter jurisdiction holding that the sentence entered by the circuit court was illegal because the court had no authority to impose a sentence that exceeded the punishment fixed by the jury holding that under former 17271055 the district court possessed jurisdiction to impose a oneyear period of postrelease supervision following the discharge of a direct sentence to community corrections holding that government waived right to challenge alleged error of district court in failing to impose statutory minimum sentence under  841b1b by failing to object to sentence announced by district court holding it is denial of due process to impose vindictive sentence following successful appeal