have fired the recovered materials. Therefore, the court will limit LaCova to stating that his conclusions were reached to a “reasonable degree of ballistics certainty” or a “reasonable degree of certainty in the ballistics field.” Second, Laurent requests that LaCova be precluded from testifying that ballistics is a “science” or from stating his conclusions in “scientific-sounding” terms. (Mot. at 1, 5.) To the court’s knowledge, the Government has not claimed that toolmark and firearms identification is a field of “science.” As an initial matter, whether forensic science is a true “science” or rather, a technical field, does not affect whether it is the proper subject of expert testimony. See Fed.R.Evid. 702; Kumho, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167; see also Glynn, 578 F.Supp.2d at 570 (<HOLDING>). Thus, the issue is not whether the expert
holding that federal rule of evidence 702 superceded the frye standard of admissibility of scientific evidence and that under rule 702 the district court had to determine that proffered expert testimony was both reliable and relevant holding that the general principles of rule 702 recognized by the daubert decision are applicable to other species of expert testimony holding that ballistics identification lacks sufficient rigor to be received as science but nevertheless analyzing the field under rule 702 and daubert holding that daubert sought only to clarify the standard for evaluating scientific knowledge under rule 702 holding that federal rule of evidence 702 supersedes the general acceptance rule regarding scientific evidence and that the adversarial process including vigorous crossexamination provides safeguards against admission of junk science evidence