as a defense in a suit in equity for specific performance of the contract.” See Arthur L. Eno, Jr. and William V. Hovey, Real Estate Law §3.2, at 24 (3rd ed. 1995). This general rule, however, is inapposite to the case at bar. Albrecht argues that he has relied to his detriment “on the defendants o Not Sustain His Fraud Claim In Count IV of the complaint, Albrecht asserts that the defendants’ actions “constitute actionable fraud.” Albrecht claims that the “defendants made a specific promise to plaintiff to convey him the property . . . either [knowing] it was false or [acting] negligently in making it without determining if it was true or false.” As a matter of law, these allegations, even if true, do not state a valid claim for fraud. See Ranicar v. Goodwin, 326 Mass. 710, 713 (1951) (<HOLDING>); Chase v. Aetna Rubber Co., 321 Mass. 721, 724
holding part performance of an oral agreement necessary to take the oral agreement out of the statute of frauds must be consistent only  with the existence of the alleged oral contract holding that statements that merely convey an impression or understanding of a fact do not constitute a promise holding that a promise to make a loan is not covered by  1823e because a promise is not an asset holding that action against an erisa plan administrator based on his alleged oral promise to pay for the majori ty of beneficiarys medical expenses was not a colorable claim under  502a1b because dispute concerned the terms of the alleged oral promise not of the erisa plan itself holding that the failure to carry out an oral promise to convey land standing by itself is not fraud