have also stated — without analysis other than citation to the above cases declining to reach the issue — that the personal injury limitations period applies to ADA claims. See, e.g., Thunderbird v. Or., 570 Fed.Appx. 693, 694 (9th Cir.2014); Hubbs v. Cnty. of Son Bernardino, 519 Fed.Appx. 468, 469 (9th Cir.2013); Lancaster v. City of Reno, 479 Fed.Appx. 774, 774 (9th Cir.2012). 4 . Although we find that section 11135 provides the most analogous state-law claim to an ADA Title II claim, we note that the other state statutes proffered by Sharkey — the Unruh Civil Rights Act and the California Disabled Persons Act (DPA) — also provide analogous causes of action for disability discrimination. See Cal. Civ.Code §§ 51(f); 54(c); Cohen v. City of Culver City, 754 F.3d 690, 701 (9th Cir.2014) (<HOLDING>). 5 . The principal difference between section
holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that motion for summary judgment was not opposed holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that a motion for summary judgment was not opposed holding that a county was entitled to summary judgment where the claims against the individual defendants had failed holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment holding that because the city was not entitled to summary judgment on cohens ada title ii claim the district court also erred in granting summary judgment to the city on cohens claims under the dpa and the unruh act