effect to a non-retroactive decision are plausible in Abu-Jamal II, in this case we have made clear that appellant’s Mills claim is defaulted, and the only cognizable .collateral claim he has is a derivative claim concerning trial and direct appeal counsel. Thus, the Third Circuit presumably would have to invoke a reason other than the one devised in Abu-Jamal if it is determined to grant retroactive Mills relief here. Justice EAKIN joins this opinion. 1 . Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 108 S.Ct. 88 A.2d 624, 629 n. 5 (2005) (noting that Atkins would qualify for retroactive application under first Teague exception). 7 . See Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495, 110 S.Ct. 1257, 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990) (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (<HOLDING>) to illustrate "the type of rule coming within”
holding that defendants have a right to counsel in criminal proceedings recognizing a defendants constitutional right to be represented by counsel of his own choice holding that a criminal defendant has a sixth amendment right to counsel at trial holding that a defendant does not have the right to be represented by counsel in postconviction proceedings which are civil proceedings holding that a defendant has right to be represented by counsel in all criminal trials for serious offenses