exceptions applied, including that the reduction did not apply if the quantity of cocaine base was more than 4.5 kilograms. Id. The Supreme Court has held that a sentencing adjustment, pursuant to § 3582(c)(2), is not a resentencing proceeding. Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, -, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 2690-91, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010) (providing that § 3582(c)(2) does not authorize a resen-tencing, but instead permits a modification by giving courts the power to reduce a sentence within the narrow bounds established by the Sentencing Commission). A § 3582(c)(2) proceeding has a limited scope and purpose, is “not constitutionally compelled,” and represents a “congressional act of lenity.” Id. at -, 130 S.Ct. at 2691-92; see also United States v. Bravo, 203 F.3d 778, 781-82 (11th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Rather, all original sentencing
holding that johnson did not support the defendants collateral challenge under 28 usc  2255 to his sentence enhanced under the residual clause of the ussg holding in a federal prisoners habeas case under 28 usc  2255 that the district court may raise the question of procedural default even if that defense was waived by the government holding in 28 usc  2255 proceeding that lafler does not establish new rule of constitutional law holding that constitutional claims are extraneous resentencing issues that a court cannot address during a  3582c2 proceeding and that a defendant is entitled to raise constitutional challenges to a sentence by making a collateral attack under 28 usc  2255 holding that proceedings under  3582c2 do not constitute a full resentencing of the defendant