comments so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986). Several factors work to Bockting’s disadvantage here. First, the prosecutor did not ask the jury to accept Laura’s credibility based on his endorsement alone; rather, he explained that “[t]he evidence shows that [Laura] was candid” (emphasis added), and he identified several specific instances where Laura made no attempt to conceal facts damaging to Autumn’s allegations (e.g., Autumn observing her parents engaged in sexual relations) or to her own reputation and credibility as a government witness (e.g., her drug and alcohol problems, her occupation as a nude dancer). See Necoechea, 986 F.2d at 1276 (<HOLDING>). Second, the trial court significantly
holding that prosecutors phrasing argument in terms of i think or i think the evidence shows to which trial counsel did not object is not prosecutorial misconduct if the arguments are based on evidence or reasonable inferences recognizing that prosecutors must have reasonable latitude to fashion closing arguments and thus can argue reasonable inferences based on the evidence including that one of the two sides is lying holding that because closing arguments do not constitute evidence a prosecutors statement did not implicate the confrontation clause recognizing that a district attorney must have reasonable latitude in fairly presenting a case to the jury and that the trial judge must have reasonable discretion in deciding whether the bounds of propriety have been exceeded holding that congress has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence when it had before it evidence including some memory surveys