a religious, nonprofit institution of higher learning would also be exempt from that same requirement. Put another way, as a non-profit institution, if Chabad had proposed to place a higher education yeshiva in the proposed facility, instead of a synagogue, it would have been exempt from section 7-147d. That is, both the general scheme and the exemption apply equally to religious and secular groups alike. As a result, the statutory exception is neutral and generally applicable because the exception is granted to any organization, religious or secular, that meets the defined category. See Ungar, 363 Fed.Appx. at 56 (“In the present case, [the scheme] is facially neutral, making no reference to religious practice.”); see also Konikov v. Orange Cnty., 410 F.3d 1317, 1326 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). As a result, the statutory scheme is neutral
holding that possession of marijuana is not protected by the free exercise clause of the first amendment recognizing a religious institutions right to free exercise of religion holding that a law that treats religious and nonreligious organizations differently offends the principles of the free exercise clause because it is not neutral or generally applicable holding that religious exercise is any exercise of religion whether or not compelled by or central to a system of religious belief and that the use building or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered  religious exercise holding that religionneutral law that is generally applicable does not violate free exercise clause despite incidental effect on religious practice