disinterest or independence are rebutted by well-pleaded facts; and, if not, (2) whether the complaint pleads particularized facts sufficient to create a reasonable doubt that the challenged transaction was the product of a valid exercise of business judgment.” Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 205 (Del.1991); see Litman v. Prudential-Bache Props., Inc., CIV. A. No. 12137, 1993 WL 5922, at *2-3 (Del.Ch. Jan. 4, 1993) (“Litman II”) (applying the rational utilized in Levine to a derivative claim in the partnership context). Plaintiffs’ pleading burden in the demand context is “more onerous than that required to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Levine, 591 A.2d at 207 (citing Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 187 n. 6 (Del.1988)); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del.2000) (<HOLDING>). As to independence and disinterest,
holding it is not enough for the emergency suspension order merely to allege statutory violations the allegations of continuing harm must be particularized not general and conclusory or related to stale actions holding that allegations against nondiverse defendants must be factual not conclusory because conclusory allegations do not state a claim holding that complaint alleging a conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of his civil rights cannot survive motion to dismiss based on conclusory allegations of conspiracy which are not supported by references to material facts holding plaintiffs must provide particularized allegations as to why demand would be futile to survive a motion to dismiss conclusory allegations are not enough holding that plaintiffs allegations of abuse did not amount to the allegations of torture required by  1605a7 to survive a motion to dismiss