other than UTSWMC was assigned to the “Institutional Trust Fund.” Powell also supported his motion for summary judgment with an affidavit from a UTSWMC human resources supervisor testifying that Powell was a full-time employee of UTSWMC during the relevant time. The Knipps filed an amended petition in which they alleged that Powell was a borrowed employee of, and under the control of, Children’s. A few days later, the Knipps filed their response to Powell’s motion for summary judgment arguing that Powell was a borrowed employee of Children’s such that Powell was not a governmental employee within the meaning of the Act’s definition of employee. The trial court denied Powell’s motion and he perfected this interlocutory appeal. See Franka v. Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367, 371 n. 9 (Tex.2011) (<HOLDING>). ANALYSIS A. Applicable Law 1. Standard of
holding that a denial of a motion for partial summary judgment is interlocutory and subject to revision at discretion of the court recognizing jurisdiction for interlocutory appeal brought by government employeedoctor for denial of motion for summary judgment based on section 101106f holding that denial of motion for summary judgment is interlocutory even though trial judge had stated that there was no just reason for delay because denial of motion for summary judgment was not a final determination of defendants rights and the appeal did not affect defendants substantial rights holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable holding that an interlocutory appeal lies from a denial of summary judgment on a qualified immunity claim