It is well-established that a substantial showing of the informant’s untruthfulness is not sufficient to warrant a Franks hearing. The Supreme Court made clear throughout Franlcs that a substantial preliminary showing of intentional or reckless falsity on the part of the affiant must be made in order for the defendant to have a right to an eviden-tiary hearing on the affiant’s veracity. Id. at 677. The opinion does not, however, draw a distinction between the state of mind of the affiant and the state of mind of other police officers. In fact, the Franlcs court noted that "police could not insulate one officer's deliberate misstatement merely by relaying it through an officer-affiant ignorant of its falsity.” 438 U.S. at 163-64 n. 6, 98 S.Ct. 2674; see also Calisto, 838 F.2d at 714 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Kennedy, 131 F.3d 1371, 1376
holding that a statement that the affiant is president of the company asserting a claim on an account is sufficient to affirmatively show how the affiant has personal knowledge of the affidavit statements regarding the account holding that although affiantofficer filed affidavit in good faith the conduct of police officers who relayed the facts to the affiant was relevant to the franks showing holding that because the information omitted from the affidavit was immaterial to the investigation there was no error in denying defendants motion for a franks hearing holding that a challenge to the truth of the affidavit was not sufficient for a franks hearing where defendant offered no evidence that the affiant knowingly or recklessly gave false statements holding that section 144 requires both a factual affidavit and a separate certificate that the affidavit was made in good faith