Co., 590 So.2d 258, 259 (Ala.1991); cf. Pack, 612 So.2d at 403. Because Matthews has alleged in his amended complaint that the university employees acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, and beyond their authority, and because the university employees presented no evidence indicating that they were exercising a discretionary function when Matthews was arrested for allegedly trespassing on the A & M campus, but instead relied solely on the pleadings, we cannot conclude that they are entitled either to sovereign immunity or to qualified/substantive/ discretionary-function immunity. See Ex parte Alabama Dep’t of Forensic Sciences, 709 So.2d 455, 457 (Ala.1997); Wright v. Wynn, 682 So.2d 1, 2 (Ala.1996); Pack v. Blankenship, 612 So.2d 399, 403 (Ala.1992); Phillips, 555 So.2d at 86 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the trial court erred in entering
recognizing that even where a party has the burden of proof at trial that party need not produce proof supporting his claim in response to a motion for summary judgment unless the movant has first presented evidence that would negate an element of the nonmovants claim or indicates that the nonmovant will be unable to meet his burden at trial it is never enough simply to state that the nonmoving party cannot meet its burden at trial holding that in the absence of a statute providing immunity the defense of sovereign immunity is not available to a municipal corporation in an action for damages alleged to be caused by the tortious conduct of the municipality holding that to be entitled to qualifiedsubstantivediscretionaryfunction immunity at the summaryjudgment stage the defendant must meet his burden of showing that the alleged tortious act or omission arose out of a discretionary function holding the moving party must meet its burden by showing  that is pointing out to the trial court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving partys case holding that the filing of a motion for a new trial is a critical stage of the prosecution and that an indigent defendant is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel at that stage