also indicated in response to insurer’s motion for summary judgment that she was a customer at defendant’s business, and she produced a receipt showing that she had bought three smoke detectors that day. The court largely dismissed plaintiffs latter evidence, reasoning that, even if it accepted plaintiffs contention that she was a customer, her “primary reason” for visiting defendant was social, not business-related. Thus, she was properly considered a licensee. ¶ 10. We have held that, where the facts do not conclusively establish a plaintiffs status, and a factfinder may infer multiple purposes for a plaintiffs presence on a defendant’s premises, the question of whether the dominant purpose was business or social remains a question of fact for the jury. Farnham, 2003 VT 23, ¶ 11 (<HOLDING>). We need not reach the question, however, of
holding that summary judgment against plaintiff was premature because determination of whether plaintiff was a trespasser invitee or licensee was question of fact holding that plaintiff established for purposes of summary judgment a material question as to whether he was disabled because of hernia surgery holding that summary judgment was improper because there was a question of fact pertaining to whether a motorists gratuitous signal to pass was negligent holding that estoppel was a question of fact holding that summary judgment was not appropriate because whether the danger posed by a swimming pool was known or obvious was a fact question