permitted to speak made statements similar to the one the excluded witness would have made. We hold that the IDC did not violate appellant’s constitutional right to due process by denying him the right to call his third witness. Although the Supreme Court has recognized that “the unrestricted right to call witnesses from the prison population carries obvious potential for disruption,” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566, 94 S.Ct. at 2979, and that prison disciplinary committees may sometimes deny a defendant the right to call redundant and unnecessary witnesses, see, e.g., Malek v. Camp, 822 F.2d 812, 815 (8th Cir.1987), prison disciplinary committees may not deny a defendant the right to call important witnesses solely for the sake of administrative efficiency. See, e.g., Graham, 772 F.2d at 446 (<HOLDING>); cf. Bartholomew, 665 F.2d at 918 (“A blanket
holding that a student has a right to counsel in a university disciplinary hearing where there is a pending criminal charge for the same incident but noting that the attorneys role at the disciplinary hearing is limited to safeguarding the students rights at the criminal proceeding and not to affecting the outcome of the disciplinary hearing holding that where the conviction was final the disciplinary commission was not authorized to assume the roles of both an accusatory tribunal and the ultimate determiner of guilt and that the separation of responsibility between the disciplinary board and the disciplinary commission provides constitutional due process holding that a prison disciplinary committee violated inmates rights to procedural due process by refusing to call their witnesses even though the disciplinary hearing took place in the aftermath of a riot and the resulting disciplinary caseload was ex tremely heavy recognizing due process right to notice and informal hearing in school disciplinary process holding that prison disciplinary hearing committee members are entitled to qualified immunity