not be hostile or adverse and could not evolve into a subsisting title on which recovery could be had, unless the record owner had notice that the continuing possession was under a claim of right, since it is the intent with which possession is continued that gives it its character as adversary. Hungerford, 234 Md. at 341, 199 A.2d at 211 (citing, inter alia, Feldstein v. Segall, 198 Md. 285, 81 A.2d 610 (1951)). Because the public’s use of the privately owned, dry sand portion of the beach on Dobbins Island was presumptively permissive, Appellees had the burden to show that the use was, in fact, adverse from the outset, or that its character became adverse at a point in time sufficient to meet the twenty-year prescriptive requirement. See State ex. rel Shorett, 156 P.2d at 670-71 (<HOLDING>); Houghton v. Johnson, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 825, 887
holding that a beach bordering on puget sound used extensively for public recreation was completely wild open vacant unoccupied and in its natural state and therefore public use was presumed to have originated by permission until some act  of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege holding that the first amendment does not protect the use of racial invective by a public official against a member of the public in a bar holding that because public use of a beach was permissive the public was a licensee and as such could be excluded from the whole area at any time by the title owner recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public holding that public use of a beach was presumed to have originated by permission and to have continued as a license until some act  of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege