circuit court. But the conferees make crystal clear in the Statement of Managers their intent to raise the standard even beyond that level. I am not prepared to accept that. 141 Cong. Rec. H15214 (daily ed. 20 Dec. 1995) (veto message of President Clinton). Both houses of Congress subsequently overrode the President’s veto and the PSLRA was enacted into law without changes to the statutorily enhanced pleading standard. The Third Circuit in In re Advanta, nevertheless, found the legislative history of the PSLRA “contradictory and inconclusive.” 180 F.3d at 533. According to the Third Circuit, the use of the “strong inference” language in the statute is sufficient evidence that Congress intended to codify the Second Circuit standard. Id. at 533-34; but see Greebel, 194 F.3d at 194-97 (<HOLDING>); In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d
holding that the pslra imposes a more rigorous pleading standard than applied by any of the courts of appeals prior to the enactment of the statute holding the pslra codified the prior standard set up by the second circuit holding that particular facts giving rise to a strong inference of deliberate recklessness at a minimum is required to satisfy the heightened pleading standard under the pslra recognizing that the federal pleading standard is a less stringent standard than the delaware pleading standard holding the pslra standard for pleading scienter is more stringent than the second circuits standard prior to the act and that motive and opportunity is not an independent basis to show defendants had scienter