debtors are accorded notice before their wages are garnished, are notified of the procedure by which to challenge the garnishment within ten days of receiving that notice, are given the opportunity to object after the court orders the garnishment, and are entitled to a hearing within seven days of that objection. R. 4:59-1(d). Consistent with Caldwell, those protections are at least as comprehensive, if not more so, than those required by other jurisdictions. See, e.g., McCahey v. L.P. Investors, 774 F.2d 543, 549 (2d Cir.1985) (finding due process satisfied when judgment debtors are notified about garnishment and available exemptions after property is seized, and when they have opportunity to challenge seizure promptly); Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp., 539 F.2d 1355, 1368 (5th Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, we agree with those courts that
holding that notice of condemnation and availability of a state court injunction writ of mandamus and writ of certiorari in an eminent domain case satisfied due process holding that doctrine does not violate due process holding that due process does not require a hearing where only a potential privilege to purchase united states land is involved holding that due process does not require notice or hearing before writ of garnishment issues recognizing due process right to notice and informal hearing in school disciplinary process