court possesses such broad discretion, “[o]ur standard of review of the district court’s actions ... is restricted.” Jenkins, 855 F.2d at 1299. We must “give great deference to a district court’s exercise of its broad equitable powers in crafting a remedy in school desegregation cases.” Jenkins v. Missouri, 965 F.2d 654, 656 (8th Cir.1992). The district court retains this broad equitable authority throughout the entire desegregation ease to modify the remedy as it deems necessary. Indeed, the district court has often done so during the long life of this case, and we have affirmed such modifications. The court has “inherent capacity to adjust remedies in a feasible and practical way to eliminate” the unconstitutional conditions. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 487, 489, 112 S.Ct. at 1444, 1445 (<HOLDING>). In an earlier Jenkins opinion, we described
recognizing broad district court discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to control its docket holding that the principal must have control and supervision over the details of the agents work holding that the district court had discretion to order an incremental or partial withdrawal of its supervision and control holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the withdrawal of the juiy trial waiver holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint