it significant; that after 2000, the FDA has been very consis tent. On four occasions — -in the Colacic-co Amicus, the Preemption Preamble, the Kallas Amicus, and the Motus Amicus — it set forth detailed analyses of its position that the Supremacy Clause bars state tort liability specifically for failure to include a warning on a drug label that is in conflict with or contrary to the warnings approved by the FDA. See Colacicco Amicus, Preemption Preamble, Kallas Amicus, Motus Amicus. Moreover, the 1998 and 2000 statements in the Federal Register referred more generally to the regulations and not to the specific circumstances here — where Plaintiffs proposed warning would have misbranded the drug. Dusek v. Pfizer, Inc., No. Civ.A. H-02-3559, 2004 WL 2191804, *6 (S.D.Tex. Feb.20, 2004) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, even though the FDA’s prior
holding the state law claims were not preempted holding that failuretowarn claims based on theory that faarequired warnings are insufficient are preempted holding that state jurisdiction over claims by union members against employer for false arrest false imprisonment and malicious prosecution were not preempted under garmon holding that a failuretowarn claim against a pharmaceutical company was not impliedly preempted holding state failuretowarn claims were preempted because any warning label linking said drugs to suicide would have been false and misleading