rescue doctrine, a public entity has a “special” duty “to exercise reasonable care after assuming a duty to warn or come to the aid of a particular p licit assurances. “Even where an offer to seek or render aid is implicit and unspoken, a duty to make good on the promise has been found by most courts if it is reasonably relied upon.” Brown v. MacPherson’s, Inc., 86 Wn.2d 293, 301, 545 P.2d 13 (1975). But the Osborns do not claim Mason County promised to warn them of Rosenow’s presence. ¶13 A public entity also has a duty under the rescue doctrine when an injured party reasonably relies on a third party that “refrains from acting” as a result of the public entity’s assurances. Chambers-Castanes v. King County, 100 Wn.2d 275, 286 n.3, 669 P.2d 451 (1983). See also Brown, 86 Wn.2d at 301 (<HOLDING>); Meneely v. S.R. Smith, Inc., 101 Wn. App.
holding that determination of whether an official was acting on behalf of the state or the local government is determined by state law holding a duty to act is created by reliance not by the person to whom the aid is to be rendered but by another who as a result of the promise refrains from acting on that persons behalf holding that a promise to make a loan is not covered by  1823e because a promise is not an asset holding that while a series of alleged misrepresentations may have been actionable by the persons who suffered a loss as a result of advancing funds in reliance on the statements it was not actionable when complained of by the company or its shareholders holding that ignorance by one prosecutor of promise made by another is irrelevant since the prosecutors office is an entity and  a promise made by one attorney must be attributed for these purposes to the government