entered a judgment for Ms. Pilz on all counts. We find reversible error on five of these six counts. The analysis on the claims for the two promissory notes is identical. The verdict form inquired whether Ms. Pilz proved her claim against Mr. Medinis for nonpayment of each note, and the jury answered each question in the affirmative. However, the verdict form failed to provide for a jury finding on the amount of damages accruing from the failure to pay the notes. Nevertheless, the trial judge set the amount of damages in the final judgment. This was error. In a jury trial, it is the duty of the jury, not the judge, to make a factual finding on damages. The trial court had no authority to make a specific award in this case. See Cory v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 257 So.2d 36, 41 (Fla.1971) (<HOLDING>). We reverse for a new trial on both liability
holding that the trial court properly refused defendants instruction because it invaded the province of the jury holding that a jury does not invade the province of the board when it determines the probability of a capital defendants future dangerousness holding that no mental health expert is competent to express an opinion about whether a particular set of facts constitutes a mitigating circumstance because that would invade the province of the judge and jury holding that the court is limited in amending a verdict after discharge of the jury and cannot invade the province of the jury holding that district court could not decide after jury returned verdict to treat jury verdict as advisory on issue not triable of right by jury but which was tried by consent of parties to nonadvisory jury