42 U.S.C. section 1988). Because the Court entered judgment in their favor, Plaintiffs are likely “prevailing parties” entitled to fees even though the case became moot on appeal— at least as things stand now. See Higher Taste, Inc. v. City of Tacoma, 717 F.3d 712, 717 (9th Cir. 2013); UFO Chuting of Hawaii, Inc. v. Smith, 508 F.3d 1189, 1197 & n.8 (9th Cir. 2007). But vacating the judgment might invite the argument that doing so doomed any forthcoming effort to recover attorney’s fees. See Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 480, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 108 L.Ed.2d 400 (1990) (“An order vacating the judgment on grounds of mootness would deprive [the plaintiff] of its claim for attorney’s fees.... ”). But see Williams v. Alioto, 625 F.2d 845, 847-48 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); UFO Chuting, 508 F.3d at 1198 (citing
holding that 42 usc  1988 authorizes the grant of attorneys fees for services on appeal though statute does not specifically so provide recognizing absolute immunity to suits under 42 usc  1988 holding that plaintiffs were prevailing parties under 42 usc section 1988 despite dismissal of the appeal as moot and vacation of the district court judgment holding that a contingentfee agreement should not act as a ceiling on the award of attorney fees under 42 usc  1988 holding that the district court abused its discretion by telling the jury about the right of a prevailing plaintiff to attorney fees under 42 usc  1988