affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Bell, P. J., Benham and Sears-Collins, JJ., who concur specially, and Weltner, C. J., who dissents as to Divisions 1, 3 and the judgment. 1 We do not foreclose the possibility that this court may interpret the equal protection clause in the Georgia Constitution to offer greater rights than the federal equal protection clause as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 671 (398 SE2d 547) (1990) (finding 1983 Georgia Constitution provides broader protection than the First Amendment); Green v. State, 260 Ga. 625, 627 (398 SE2d 360) (1990) (finding State Constitution grants a broader right against self-incrimination than the U. S. Constitution); Fleming v. Zant, 259 Ga. 687, 690 (386 SE2d 339) (1989) (<HOLDING>). 2 The comments from the committee meetings on
holding that if a state case explicitly states that the state standard is more favorable to the defendant than the federal standard the federal claim is considered adjudicated below when the state standard is applied holding state constitutional guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment is more extensive than federal constitutional standard recognizing federal constitutional claim against the united states holding that the preponderance standard is generally constitutional recognizing defendants state and federal constitutional rights to testify