theory, due merely to her having received a remand in this case. See Sumner, 15 Vet.App. at 262 (explaining that, although Stillwell v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 291, 299-300 (1994), could be read to mean that “a remand alone” conferred prevailing-party status upon appellant, Still-well remand was in fact based on BVA error). Finally, the appellant argues that she has obtained prevailing-party status under the inevitable-victory test. The inevitable-victory test has been raised to the Court, but we have never accepted it. See, e.g., Lematta v. Brown, 8 Vet.App. 504, 510 (1996) (citing Perket v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 905 F.2d 129, 132 (6th Cir.1990), and holding that test inapplicable where there had been no superseding legislation); Chandler v. Gober, 11 Vet.App. 6, 8 (1997) (<HOLDING>), overruled in part by Miley v. Principi, 242
holding that there can be no plain error where neither we nor the supreme court has addressed an issue holding that designation is neither a sentence nor a punishment holding that where judgment was not entered the appeals period neither triggered nor expired holding that the common law principle of absolute judicial immunity for judicial acts has neither been abrogated nor been modified in maryland emphasis added holding that test was not applicable where victory has neither been attained nor assured