preserved once Chapter 9 is, or can be, invoked. Because Puerto Rico is already excluded from Chapter 9, the argument goes, § 903 — including § 903(1) — does not apply because there is no need to stipulate that the remedies of Chapter 9 do not undermine Puerto Rico’s control over its own municipalities. The defendants further argue that the presumption against preemption bolsters this reasoning and provides a reason to adopt this argument. See Antilles Cement, 670 F.3d at 323. Indeed, they argue that the presumption applies to this case with particular force because “Title 11 suspends the operation of state insolvency laws except as to those classes of persons specifically excluded from being debtors under the Code.” In re Cash Currency Exch., Inc., 762 F.2d 542, 552 (7th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). “[T]o permit the blocking of [a] state
holding that where law not facts changed between filing and conversion law in effect on date of filing controls holding that currency exchanges were not excluded from being debtors under the code such that their filing under chapter 11 was permitted and rejecting the argument that a state insolvency law might preclude such exchanges from filing holding that the debtors were entitled to cure the mortgage arrearage through their chapter 13 plan because the creditors failure to record the sale deed prior to the bankruptcy filing rendered the sale incomplete under state law holding consumer debtors may be eligible for chapter 11 under certain circumstances holding that if the record does not contain an affirmative indication that the trial court permitted a late filing then the filing is a nullity