only to a very limited extent to organizations ... which normally have other objectives.” Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 n. 7, 79 S.Ct. 705, 710 n. 7, 3 L.Ed.2d 741 (1959). The Supreme Court addressed the applicability of the Sherman Act to the NCAA in National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104 S.Ct. 2948, 82 L.Ed.2d 70, holding that the NCAA’s plan to restrict television coverage of intercollegiate football games violated section 1. The Court discussed the procompetitive nature of the NCAA’s activities such as establishing eligibility requirements as opposed to the anti-competitive nature of the television plan. See id. at 117, 104 S.Ct. at 2969. Yet, while the Court distinguished the NCAA’s 2 F.Supp. 295, 303 (D.Mass.1975) (<HOLDING>); College Athletic Placement Service, Inc. v.
holding discovery rules apply to civil forfeiture proceedings holding that antitrust law cannot be used to invalidate ncaa eligibility rules but noting in dicta that the noagent and nodraft rules have primarily procompetitive effects holding that antitrust law does not apply to ncaa eligibility rules recognizing that the federal rules of evidence do not apply to sentencing hearings holding that preclusion rules apply in 1983 actions