By holding that the State lacks parens patriae standing because § 1132(a)(3) does not expressly provide for such standing, we do not of course intend to imply that states may only sue in their parens patriae capacity when a statute specifically provides for suits by states. States have frequently been allowed to sue in parens patriae to ... enforce federal statutes that ... do not specifically provide standing for state attorney generals. Id. at 121 (quotations and internal brackets omitted). To underscore the importance of this qualification, the court noted that unlike the carefully circumscribed standing provisions of ERISA, standing provisions in many other statutes implicitly authorized parens patriae standing by using language that permits any “person” who is “a 46 (3d Cir.1971) (<HOLDING>). Although these authorities do not address the
holding title viii standing as broad as is permitted by article iii of the constitution and extends to indirect victims of defendants housing discrimination holding that article iii standing is not a prerequisite to intervention holding that article iii standing is necessary for intervention holding that title viis term a person claiming to be aggrieved demonstrated congressional intent to confer standing to the fullest extent permitted by article iii holding that because article iii standing is jurisdictional it must be decided before other legal issues