sixth issues, Lopez contends that his sentence violates both' the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the “due course of law” guarantee found in Article I, section 19 of the Texas Constitution; Multiple Texas appellate courts have held that mandatory sentencing statutes do not violate constitutional due process rights. See, e.g., Lewis, 448 S.W.3d at 147; Moore v. State, 54 S.W.3d 529, 544 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. refd) (mandatory life sentence did not violate due process rights and defendant had no right to mitigation hear ing); Williams v. State, 10 S.W.3d 370, 372-73 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1999, pet. refd) (mandatory life sentence did not violate due process fights). Lopez relies oh Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657-58, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1216, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) (<HOLDING>), and Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542-43, 91
holding unwed father entitled to hearing on his fitness as a parent before children could be taken from him after death of their mother holding unconstitutional a statute providing for children to be declared dependent and removed from their unwed fathers custody based on the presumption that unwed fathers are unfit parents holding that an illinois statute that conclusively presumed every father of a child born out of wedlock to be an unfit person to have custody of his children violated the due process clause and that due process required the father to be given an opportunity to present evidence regarding his fitness as a parent holding that parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on parental fitness before children are removed from their custody holding due process was violated by the automatic rejection of an unwed fathers custodial relationship without granting the father opportunity to present evidence regarding his fitness as a parent