such eases (that is, empowered to revoke a prisoner’s mandatory parole before the prisoner is actually released on parole), the superior court correctly denied Gwalthney’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The judgement of the superior court is AFFIRMED. 1 . 963 P.2d 1074, 1075. 2 . Id., 963 P.2d 1074, 1075-1076. 3 . 738 P.2d 356 (Alaska App.1987). 4 . 738 P.2d at 360-61 & n. 6. 5 . Id., 738 P.2d at 361. 6 . See SLA 1990, ch. 188, § 1. 7 . AS 12.55.085(b)(3), enacted by SLA 1990, ch. 188, § 2. 8 . AS 33.16.220(a)(2), enacted by SLA 1990, ch. 188, § 10. 9 . See Webb, 963 P.2d at 1076 & n. 4. 10 . Id., 963 P.2d at 1076. 11 . 872 P.2d 1218, 1226-27 (Alaska 1994). 12 . AS 11.41.434(a)(1); AS 11.31.100(d)(2). 13 . AS 12.55.125(c)(1). 14 . See Smith v. State, 711 P.2d 561 (Alaska App.1985) (<HOLDING>). 15 . See AS 12.55.165 — 175. 16 .The
holding that the commission did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in denying a rulemaking petition because it considered several factors to determine whether an amendment to the regulations was  appropriate or necessary such as the potential benefits of the requested amendment potential costs and the relation between the potential benefits and costs recognizing the potential length of the deprivation in evaluating whether a procedure is adequate recognizing the nonstatutory mitigating factor of exceptional potential for rehabilitation holding 50 potential members was not sufficient recognizing potential reversible error by disclosing defendants prior jury conviction