that a fact should be treated as an element which must be found by the jury suggests that the same fact should be treated as an element to be alleged in the charging instrument in order to satisfy the notice guarantee of the Sixth Amendment. See United States v. Jackson, 327 F.3d 273, 285 (4th Cir.2003) (recognizing “symmetry between indictment and fact finding” and stating that “[i]t is no doubt true, as a general principle, that the Fifth Amendment right to be charged by an indictment containing every element of the offense is no less demanding than the Sixth Amendment right to have every element of the offense found by the jury”). Conversely, the conclusion that a fa oning suggested by Apprendi. See, e.g., State v. Simuel, 357 S.C. 378, 593 S.E.2d 178, 180 (S.C.Ct.App.2004) (<HOLDING>). It remains true — and of salient significance
holding that sixth amendment not violated when sentence enhanced based on prior convictions that were not charged in indictment or admitted by defendant holding that a district court may not impose a sentencing enhancement based on conduct of which the jury acquitted the defendant holding that requirements of apprendi were not met where facts on which sentence enhancement was based were not charged and submitted to the jury holding that the  2d11b1 enhancement is not limited to the charged conspiracy holding that apprendi was not triggered because the defendants were sentenced to terms of imprisonment that were within the maximum penalties for the rico offenses that they were found guilty of committing