are the same discovery requests made by counsel in other, unrelated cases to which the prosecutors responded by denying possession of Brady material. This evidence, as previously discussed, fails to show actual Brady violations, much less an unconstitutional pattern or policy. Second, Appellants’ citations to over a dozen federal and state cases to show a “continuum” of Brady violations are not probative because the vast majority of them occurred after Appellants were convicted in July 1976. The two cases that predated July 1976, Davis v. Heyd, 479 F.2d 446 (5th Cir.1973), overruled by Garrison v. Maggio, 540 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir.1976), and State v. Carney, 334 So.2d 415 (La.1976), surely did not convey the requisite notice under a failure-to-train theory. See Thompson, 131 S.Ct. at 1360 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). Third, Appellants have not
holding that the plaintiff had offered insufficient evidence to establish deliberate indifference in a failuretotrain claim in part because the plaintiff did not present evidence that the training received was inadequate or evidence of any specific additional training that the employees should have received holding evidence of single incident without any proof relating to the nature of the training itself insufficient to establish inadequate training because plaintiffs must put forward some evidence that the city itself has acted or consciously not acted holding that allegations that training was inadequate  the inadequate training constituted deliberate indifference  and the risk of constitutional injury as a result of such deliberate indifference  is very obvious were a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action and were mere conclusions that did not without additional facts state a claim for failuretotrain liability holding that not even four reversals could  have put connick on notice that the offices brady training was inadequate holding that negligent hiring and training claim was not adequately alleged where plaintiff identified no prior violation by the employee relating to sexual misconduct that could have put the defendant on notice