to and redress through the courts. Before trial, Petitioner requested that he be allowed to represent himself. (T. of 11/27/96 at 5-16). After reviewing Petitioner’s educational background, experience with the law, the consequences of proceeding pro se, and his general capacity to knowingly waive his right to counsel, the trial court granted his request. (T. of 11/27/96 at 6-16). However, the trial court appointed standby counsel for Petitioner to consult with at any time he had a question during the proceedings. (T. of 11/27/96 at 15-16). Additionally, standby counsel would be in attendance at all court appearances and would be available to take over as lead counsel should Petitioner change his mind about proceeding pro se. Id.; see Spates v. Manson, 644 F.2d 80, 84 (2nd Cir.1981)(<HOLDING>); see also Benjamin v. Kerik, 102 F.Supp.2d
holding that although prison inmates have a first amendment right to access to the courts prison officials may regulate law library access including reasonable time place and manner of access taking into account the administrative needs of the institution holding that the total denial of all access to the law library for seven months violated the plaintiffs constitutional right of access to the courts holding that right of access to courts not infringed where prisoners supplied with an inadequate prison library so long as they were provided with appointed counsel holding that prisoner did not have right to access law library because he had courtappointed counsel holding that during a postriot lockdown refusal of access to main law library is constitutional as long as access to basic law library for initial legal research is permitted