added). “Rule 32.1, in contrast ... does not mention anything about the court addressing the defendant personally.” Rausch, 638 F.3d at 1300; see also Nanez, 419 Fed.Appx. at 882 (“Rule 32.1 does not specify if it is the court’s responsibility to offer the opportunity to allocute or the defendant’s responsibility to request it.”). Thus, because Defendant never requested an opportunity to give a second allocution at his hearing, to address his supervised release revocation in particular, any error the court may have committed by not sua sponte offering him the opportunity to do so “was certainly not plain” under either Rule 32.1, the advisory committee’s notes, or our precedent. Nanez, 419 Fed.Appx. at 883. But see, e.g., United States v. Daniels, 760 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir.2014) (<HOLDING>). Regardless, even assuming Defendant could
holding that an error is plain if it is clear or obvious holding on plain error review that rule 321  makes clear that despite the linguistic differences between rules 32 and 321 a court engaging in postrevocation sentencing must personally address a supervised releasee to ask if he wants to speak before sentencing holding that a defendant has the right both to present evidence to prove that the defendant does not qualify for sentencing under the act and to challenge the states evidence regarding the defendants eligibility for sentencing as a prison releasee reoffender holding that appellate courts may not on appeal from the dismissal of a rule 32 petition consider claims not raise in the rule 32 petition holding that appellate courts may not on appeal from the dismissal of a rule 32 petition consider claims not raised in the rule 32 petition