When reviewing jury instructions, we must consider the challenged instruction in context. See Cheves v. Williams, 1999 UT 86, 137, 993 P.2d 191; Jensen v. Intermountain Power Agency, 1999 UT 10, ¶16, 977 P.2d 474. Generally, the rewording of a statute as a jury instruction is not error as long as it does not change the essential meaning of the statute. See 75A Am.Jur.2d Trial § 1182, at 648; accord Holmes v. Heidebrecht, 10 Utah 2d 74, 75-76, 348 P.2d 565, 566 (1960). Therefore, we must determine the meaning of the omitted sentence to ascertain whether its omission from the jury instruction changed the meaning from that of the statute. 147 When interpreting a statute, we must first look to the statute's plain language for the legislative intent. See Coleman v. Thoma 067, 1069 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Schaeffer v. Craden, 800 S.W.2d 165, 166
holding that plaintiff could not recover medical bills that were discharged in bankruptcy holding that statute provides medical bills are admissible as evidence of necessary fair and reasonable charges holding that state did not submit sufficient evidence to establish amount of restitution to victim for medical bills incurred when it did not introduce any medical bills holding that statute provides medical bill is admissible to prove amount fairness and reasonableness of charges holding that statute does not alleviate plaintiffs burden to provide additional evidence that medical bills were reasonable and necessary