and isolated, justified response to defense counsel’s “opening the door,” we conclude that such remarks did not shift the burden of proof. Thus, our prior statement in Eley, 288 Md. 548, 419 A.2d 384, is inapposite. In Eley, we noted that [a prosecutor’s] comment upon the defendant’s failure to produce evidence to refute the State’s evidence ... might well amount to an impermissible reference to the defendant’s failure to take the stand. Moreover, even if such a comment were not held tantamount to one that the defendant failed to take the stand it might in some cases be held to constitute an improper shifting of the burden of proof to the defendant. 288 Md. at 555 n. 2, 419 A.2d at 388 n. 2 (emphasis added). But see, e.g., United States v. Williams, 990 F.2d 507, 510 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Dahdah, 864 F.2d 55, 59 (7th
holding the prosecutors statements were not an inappropriate comment on the defendants failure to testify but rather a comment on the defendants failure to present convincing evidence to support his defense holding that the prosecutors reference to the nonexistence of mitigating evidence was not a comment on the defendants failure to testify holding that prosecutors direct comments on a defendants failure to testify were not cured by subsequent inclusion in the jury charge of an instruction regarding the defendants right not to testify recognizing that the fifth amendment forbids comment by the prosecution on a defendants failure to testify holding that the prosecutors comment regarding the defendants failure to call a potential witness did not shift the burden of proof because it did not implicate the defendants fifth amendment right not to testify