suppressed evidence obtained from that encounter. On interlocutory review, we agreed with the trial court that an investigative stop, not a consensual interview, occurred under the totality of the circumstances and facts found by the trial court. See id. at 814. The instant case, however, is clearly distinguishable. In Padgett, the officers’ intrusion, altered Padgett’s course of travel and required him to stop against his repeatedly expressed desire to leave, thus impeding his liberty or freedom of movement. To the contrary, in this case, Paynter was seated, was not moving or walking, and did not express a desire to leave, nor did he at anytime indicate that Officer Guzman prevented him from going about his business. See United States v. Jordan, 958 F.2d 1085, 1088 (D.C.Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Savage, 889 F.2d 1113, 1117
holding that a detained defendants consent to search his car was voluntary even though the police did not tell him he was free to leave holding that issues of fact precluded summary judgment on the question of whether an employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment for purposes of insurance coverage when the employee was simply sitting in his vehicle in his employers parking lot waiting for the business to open at the time the accident occurred holding that claimant was entitled to workers compensation because he was injured in a parking lot which was leased by his employer holding that defendant was seized where defendant was intent on getting into waiting car to leave bus terminal parking lot and thus retention of his drivers license prevented him from going about his business holding that the prisoner should have been allowed to choose whether to leave his car parked in a public parking lot