in United States v. Lemaster, 403 F.3d 216 (4th Cir.2005), we extended our general rule concerning appeal waivers and held that a defendant may waive in a plea agreement his right under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to attack his conviction and sentence collaterally. Whether a defendant has effectively waived the right to appeal is an issue of law that we review de novo. Marin, 961 F.2d at 496. Where, as here, the United States seeks enforcement of an appeal waiver, see Brock, 211 F.3d at 90 n. 1 (declining to consider an appeal waiver that “arguably” barred the appeal on one issue because the United States “expressly elected not to argue waiver with regard to this issue”), and there is no claim that the United States breached its obligations under the plea agreement, see Bowe, 257 F.3d at 342 (<HOLDING>), we will enforce the waiver to preclude a
holding that a waiver of right to appeal contained in a plea agreement is enforceable holding that the court had no jurisdiction over an alleged breach of a plea agreement holding that the united states breach of the plea agreement releases the defendant from the appeal waiver holding that a waiver of appellate rights precluded a defendant from arguing on appeal that the prosecution violated the plea agreement and explaining wjaiver of appeal means that the final decision concerning whether there was a breach of the plea agreement will be made by one article iii judge rather than three article iii judges   holding that a plea agreement with a waiver of direct appeal rights does not include a waiver of collateral remedies because the government could have included a waiver of collateral rights in the plea agreement and chose not to do so