on a defendant can only lead him to believe that the law contrives against him.” Id. at 834, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (emphasis added). Faretta does not address whether a trial court can offer a procedural benefit to a defendant that necessarily requires the defendant to waive his or her Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. Pasha correctly notes that the trial court’s offer of counsel on November 19, 2012, simultaneously included a procedural benefit: permitting Hernandez to refile and relitigate Pasha’s previously denied motions. However, contrary to Pasha’s assertion, the trial court’s offer did not violate his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation because the trial court did not force Pasha against his will to accept Hernandez as counsel. See id. at 807, 835-36, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (<HOLDING>). Rather, the record reflects that the trial
recognizing that when a defendant voluntarily intelligently and unequivocally elects to proceed without counsel under the sixth amendment a court cannot force the defendant to accept counsel against his or her will holding that one must voluntarily and intelligently waive the right to counsel holding that a defendant in a state criminal trial has an independent constitutional right of selfrepresentation and that he may proceed to represent himself without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so holding that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to proceed without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel and the right to waive counsel