court by an attorney, not to questionable attorney conduct in general.”); Adduono v. World Hockey Ass’n, 824 F.2d 617, 621 (8th Cir.1987) (“The settlement agreement ... neither was submitted to the court nor reviewed by the court nor incorporated into the court’s order of dismissal. Thus, no matter how improper [the attorney’s] alleged conduct may have been, Rule 11 is an inappropriate vehicle for reviewing and disciplining such conduct.”). See also Buck, 89 Hawai'i at 250, 971 P.2d at 723 (“The primary purpose of Rule 11 is to ‘set a more demanding standard for establishing the propriety of court filings [.] ” (Quoting Lepere v. United Pub. Workers, Local 646, 77 Hawai'i 471, 474, 887 P.2d 1029, 1032 (1995).) (Emphasis added.)); Legault v. Zambarano, 105 F.3d 24, 27-28 (1st Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). The term “paper” does not apply to discovery
holding that a letter to an opposing party was a paper for purposes of frcp rule 11 where the attorney writing the letter sent a copy to the presiding judge in the case holding that rule 11 applied to a letter sent with the intent to influence the court with respect to injunctive relief holding that one letter sent a year prior to the filing of a motion to compel was insufficient to satisfy the requirement to confer holding that even if the trial court erred in excluding a letter from evidence that fell within an exception to the hearsay rule the error was harmless where admission of the letter would not have had a substantial effect on a partys rights holding that a bank fee for a letter of credit to secure a stay pending appeal was not a taxable cost where no statute or court rule allowed such a cost and where the letter of credit was unnecessary and therefore a discretionary expense to which the opposing party had objected