contained signatures from 85 of the 159 freeholders in the proposed conservancy district. While the trial court erroneously withdrew ten of those signatures from the remonstrators’ petition, four of the signatures were properly removed. Thus, the remonstrators’ petition contained 81 valid signatures, or 50.9% of the freeholders in the proposed district. While this number is only one-tenth of a percent less than the 51% required for the trial court to dismiss a petition, we must conclude that the remon-strators’ petition did not contain 51% of the freeholders’ signatures. Indiana Code section 14-33-2-15 unambiguously establishes that 51% of the freeholders’ signatures are required for the trial court to dismiss the petitioners’ petition, and 50.9% is not 51%. Elmer, 744 N.E.2d at 942 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we must conclude that, despite
holding that when a statutes terms are clear and unambiguous on their face there is no room for statutory construction and a court must apply the statute according to its literal meaning holding that the clear and unambiguous words of an insurance contract should be given their plain and ordinary meaning holding that an appellate court must give a statute its clear and plain meaning when the statute is unambiguous holding that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous no need exists for the court to examine the legislative histo ry and the court must give effect to the plain meaning of the statute holding when ordinance language is clear courts must give language its plain meaning