have long recognized an inherent authority to suspend or disbar lawyers”); United States v. Seltzer, 227 F.3d 36, 36 (2d Cir.2000)(speaking of a district court’s power to discipline attorneys as part of its “inherent power to manage its own affairs”). The Supreme Court has explained that this power “derives from the lawyer’s role as an officer of the court which granted admission.” In re Snyder, 472 U.S. at 643, 105 S.Ct. 2874. Consistent with this derivation, the cases in which courts have found inherent power to discipline attorneys appear to be limited to those in which the attorney being disciplined violated a court order, disrupted a court proceeding, or otherwise abused the judicial process, and those involving suspension or censure. See, e.g., Seltzer, 221 F.3d at 42 (<HOLDING>). Such cases should not be read to mean that
holding that the recognition power is not limited to a determination of the government to be recognized but rather includes the power to take actions without which the power of recognition might be thwarted recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals recognizing the inherent power of the court to coerce compliance with its orders holding that the inherent power of the district court includes the power  to santion attorneys for  violations of court orders or other conduct which interferes with the courts power to manage its calendar and the courtroom   recognizing the inherent power of the courts to issue warrants