results in the conclusion that, at the time of the commencement of the mother’s action, Canada was the children’s home state. Thus, because another “state” had jurisdiction to enter a child-custody determination pursuant to the UCCJEA, the trial court in Alabama lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody determination in the present case. Subject-matter jurisdiction may not be conferred by agreement or consent. § 30-3B-201, Official Comment (“It should also be noted that since jurisdiction to make a child custody determination is subject matter jurisdiction, an agreement of the parties to confer jurisdiction on a court that would not otherwise have jurisdiction under this Act is ineffective.”); see also C.J.L. v. M.W.B., 868 So.2d 451, 453-54 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (<HOLDING>). Because a judgment entered without
holding that a mothers actions in litigating the propriety of the judgment under review could not confer jurisdiction by consent in violation of the uccjea holding that the mere delivery of documents  does not confer jurisdiction holding that allegation of cipa violation is sufficient to confer standing holding that partys consent to the trial courts entry of judgment waives any error except for jurisdiction error contained in the judgment   holding that the flsa does not confer jurisdiction over ambulance services