that the enactment of the subject statute does not change the analysis of when the right to counsel under Miranda is applicable. The fact that a second or subsequent refusal can now be a first- degree misdemeanor under certain circumstances, as opposed to merely subjecting the defendant to license suspension, is not the relevant inquiry. Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether there is a right to counsel at all prior to deciding to refuse to take the test. Initially, we note that Busciglio admirably bases his right-to-counsel argument as arising only from article I, section 9, of the Florida Constitution. He contends the Florida Constitution creates a greater right to counsel than that provided by the United States Constitution. See State v. Hoch, 500 So.2d 597, 599 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (<HOLDING>). Article I, section 9, provides that “[n]o
holding that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the sixth amendment right to counsel holding that the sixth amendment right to counsel embodies the right to effective assistance of counsel holding that a criminal defendant has a sixth amendment right to counsel at trial recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel and the right to waive counsel holding 1 that administering a breath test is not a critical stage of the proceedings to which a sixth amendment right to counsel attaches and 2 that the results of a breath test are physical evidence  not testimonial  and thus no fifth amendment right to counsel attaches