when the jury reached a verdict on one charge. When viewing the totality of the circumstances, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when instructing the jurors to continue deliberations. Defendant has failed to point to any statement, act, or omission by the trial court which could be interpreted as coercive. Defendant also notes that the jury deliberated nine hours without a mistrial being declared. However, our prior cases indicate that the amount of time that the jury deliberated in the case at bar was not so long as to be coercive in nature. See State v. Jones, 47 N.C. App. 554, 562, 268 S.E.2d 6, 11 (1980) (stating a two-day period is not an “unreasonable” period under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1235); see also State v. Beaver, 322 N.C. 462, 465, 368 S.E.2d 607, 609 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Without any other evidence of coercion or
holding that there was no coercion by the trial court where the jury deliberated all day friday and all day saturday holding that in computing time to determine whether an act was performed within a specified period of time under the statute of limitations the first day is excluded and the last day of the period is included holding that a telephone request to the court for a continuance the day before the trial was to start was a nullity holding that the trial court properly failed to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication and manslaughter where there was no evidence that the appellant was intoxicated at the time of the offense although there was evidence that the appellant had been drinking beer on the day of the offense where there was no evidence concerning the quantity of beer he had consumed holding that trial court may modify sentence on the same day as the assessment of the initial sentence and before the court adjourns for the day