of limitation to revive claims that are otherwise barred. See, e.g., Middleton, 578 F.3d at 663 (“[E]ven if we could interpret § 4327(b) to apply to some USERRA claims filed before October 10, 2008, this would not save Middleton’s thirteen-year-old cause of action, which was already time-barred when § 4327(b) took effect.”); In re Enter. Mortg. Acceptance Co., LLC, 391 F.3d 401, 406 (2d Cir.2004) (“[Bjecause neither the language nor the legislative history of Section 804 requires that we do so, we decline to apply Section 804 retroactively to revive plaintiffs’ previously expired securities fraud claims and instead defer to the longstanding presumption against retroactive application.”); Kansas Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v. Reimer & Koger Assocs., Inc., 61 F.3d 608, 615 (8th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Vill. of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521,
holding that a shortened statute of limitations should not be applied retroactively as to bar otherwise valid civil claims holding statute that extended statute of limitations for certain criminal sexual conduct could not be applied retroactively to a prosecution commenced after the limitations statute in effect at the time of the alleged offense had expired holding that even though statute of limitations on claims brought by the kansas public employees retirement system explicitly applied retroactively it was not intended to revive lapsed actions holding amendment to statute of limitations was a procedural amendment to be applied retroactively in a medical malpractice case holding that because the act lacked an expression of specific intent to apply retroactively the extended limitations period did not revive claims