entity” and “representative” must be construed with reference to the ordinary, common meaning of the statutory text. Defs.’ Mot. at 7. They deny that § 552’s text incorporates all the “nuances and intricacies” of the U.K.’s constitutional system. Id. Rather, they contend that the term “government” may mean “any political organ exercising any type or shade of political authority (whether executive, legislative or judicial) at any level.” Id. The defendants thus maintain that under any plain-meaning analysis, the plaintiffs are encompassed by the foreign government entity exception. Id. The court begins its inquiry with the axiom that statutory interpretation begins with the plain language of the statute itself. Wall v. Kholi, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1278, 1284, 179 L.Ed.2d 252 (2011) (<HOLDING>); Conn. Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249,
holding that statutory words must be given their ordinary contemporary meaning holding that we must give the words in statutes their plain and ordinary meaning holding that the clear and unambiguous words of an insurance contract should be given their plain and ordinary meaning holding that courts give the words of a statute their ordinary contemporary common meaning absent an indication congress intended them to bear some different import recognizing that undefined words in a statute ordinarily should be interpreted as taking their ordinary contemporary common meaning