S.Ct. at 1941. On appeal, “this court has a duty to affirm an [attorney’s fee] award which falls within the district court’s broad discretion.” Daly v. Hill, 790 F.2d 1071, 1085 (4th Cir.1986). See also Ballard v. Schweiker, 724 F.2d 1094, 1098 (4th Cir.1984). This abuse of discretion standard serves several policies of overriding importance. First, district courts enjoy a decided advantage over appellate courts in calculating fee awards. As a trial court, the district court has a “ringside view of the relevant conduct of the parties and of the underlying legal dispute,” Alexander v. Mayor & Council of Cheverly, Md., 953 F.2d 160, 162 (4th Cir.1992), and accordingly has ready access to the data that should inform a fee calculation. See also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S.Ct. at 1941 (<HOLDING>); Ballard, 724 F.2d at 1098 (noting that a
recognizing that the abuse of discretion standard is fitting in view of the district courts superior understanding of the litigation and the desirability of avoiding frequent appellate review of what essentially are factual matters holding that the standard of review under rule 60 is abuse of discretion holding that appellate courts should review district court determinations of the adequacy of damage awards under an abuse of discretion standard recognizing that we review the sentence imposed by a district court under the abuse of discretion standard holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion