are evaluated under this exemption based on their content, and not simply whether they have been included in a particular type of file. ¶23. In reaching our conclusion, we found the term “personal documents” to be vague and potentially limitless. Id. at 109, 624 A.2d at 863. “In its broadest sense,” we explained, the term would include “any document about specific people,” including most court opinions. Id. Because such a construction would consume the disclosure rule, we limited the exemption to instances where disclosure would invade personal privacy. Id. We recognized that § 317(c)(7) did not explicitly contain a privacy proviso, but we found support for incorporating such a provision in the PRA’s statement of general policy. Id. at 109-10, 624 A.2d at 863; see 1 V.S.A. § 315 (<HOLDING>). We thus directed the trial court to balance
recognizing limits on an individuals right to privacy and requiring the government to move a compelling interest only if there will be disclosure of protected information holding that specific guarantees in the bill of rights have penumbras one of which is the right of privacy recognizing the right of persons to privacy in their personal    pursuits which ought to be protected unless specific information is needed to review the action of a government officer recognizing that there is an important privacy interest in corporate financial documents the court agrees that the information can be protected therefore the court  required that the information be disclosed pursuant to a confidentiality order only to be used in connection with this litigation recognizing a right to privacy in avoiding disclosure of personal matters