by a state officer and the subsequent participation in joint activity by the two to violate the civil rights of an individual will suffice. But these particular instances of state-individual joint undertakings are hardly exhaustive of the circumstances that will necessitate the application of the state actor doctrine. As the Supreme Court has stated repeatedly, what is necessary — in pure and simple terms — is that the private actor be “a willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents. Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged action, are acting ‘under color’ of law for purposes of § 1983 actions.” Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980); see also Jackson v. Pantazes, 810 F.2d 426, 429-30 (4th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). This principle, formulated in United States
holding that where statutory remedies exist private employees do not have a private cause of action for violation of state constitutional rights holding police officer is a public official holding that texas democratic party was subject to the fourteenth amendment as a state actor and rejecting as a slight  change in form defendants argument that because the democratic party was a private entity it was not a state actor recognizing affirmative duty of a police officer to prevent the violation of constitutional rights by another officer holding that bail bondsman was state actor where he searched a home for a felon with a police officer the court wrote that in cases where a private party and a public official act jointly to produce the constitutional violation both parts of the lugar test are simultaneously satisfied