constitutional sense or just exceptionally weak, I recommend that the court dismiss the pendent claims as an exercise of its discretion. This would be appropriate not just because the federal claims bordered on the frivolous all along, but because it was, or should have been, clear that even if they were meritorious, there was no further relief that the court could have granted on them, since all the conduct on which they were based occurred before November 21, 1991. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 251, 281-295, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1490, 1506-1508, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994) (remedies available under Title VII for harm occurring prior to date of amendment of Title VII, November 21, 1991, are limited to back pay and other “equitable” remedies); DeNovellis, 124 F.3d 298, 308-309 (<HOLDING>). IV. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION For all the
holding no remedy available under amended provisions of title vii for violations occurring prior to date of amendment november 21 1991 where discriminatory acts did not continue into the postamendment period holding that the damages and jury trial provisions of the 1991 act apply to conduct occurring prior to the date of enactment holding that plaintiff who sued for damages under title vii after effective date of 1991 amendment was entitled to jury trial holding that individual defendants may not be held liable for violations under title vii holding that there is no individual liability under title vii