the location of the children’s bodies to the authorities. Maj. Op. at 1245-46. As McClure notes, both case law and current ethical standards have long required that an attorney have a substantial basis for her belief that a client plans to engage in criminal conduct, before disclosing to the authorities. See, e.g., United States v. Omene, 143 F.3d at 1171 (stating that the court was “concerned that Omene’s counsel did not lay out a firm factual basis for his position.”); United States v. Scott, 909 F.2d 488, 493 (11th Cir.1990) (advising defendant that “he could be precluded from testifying, without confirmation that[he] intended to commit perjury ... forced [him] to choose between two constitutionally protected rights.”); United States v. Long, 857 F.2d 436, 445-46 (8th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Jackson v. United States, 928 F.2d 245, 248
holding that lawyer who made deliberate misrepresentations to his client to conceal his negligence and improperly retained a fee from that client had a dishonest or selfish motive holding that disbarment was proper where the attorney misappropriated payments from clients of his firm for his own use and took steps to conceal his conduct from his firm recognizing that a judge is not absolutely immune from criminal liability holding that it is absolutely essential that a lawyer have a firm factual basis before adopting a belief of impending criminal conduct by his client holding that even where a client was more sophisticated in business matters than the lawyer himself the lawyer should have assumed the client was relying on the lawyer for the legal aspects of the loan from the client to the lawyer to the same extent that the client would rely on the lawyer for advice were the client making the loan to a third person