implicit in all indictments for substantive offenses); United States v. Clark, 980 F.2d 1143, 1146 (8th Cir.1992) (“It is well established that a defendant may be convicted of aiding and abetting even though he was not charged in that capacity. Aiding and abetting is an alternative charge in every count, whether implicit or explicit.”) (citatio . 257, 765 P.2d 419, 433 n. 12 (1989) (“[I]n California the definition of a principal has historically included those who aid and abet ... and notice as a principal is sufficient to support a conviction as an aider or abettor.”); Hoskins v. State, 441 N.E.2d 419, 425 (Ind.1982) (“One can be charged as a principal and convicted on proof that he aided or abetted another in committing the crime.”); State v. Satetn, 516 N.W.2d 839, 843 (Iowa 1994) (<HOLDING>); State v. Pennington, 254 Kan. 757, 869 P.2d
holding there was no error in giving an instruction on aiding and abetting when defendant was not charged with aiding and abetting because ajiders and abettors  are chargeable directly as principals recognizing aiding and abetting conversion holding it was not a surprise or unfair to the defendant for the state to pursue a theory of aiding and abetting at trial when the charging document did not refer to aiding and abetting recognizing both aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duties and aiding and abetting conversion recognizing aiding and abetting trespass