debtors, Triton 88 and Trito st for both Triton 88 and Triton 2000,” it has a privity, of interest with those entities and a “strong identity of interest between BJVSD and Triton 88 and Triton 2000.” It argues that the trial court’s post-judgment rulings “had a direct impact of harm on BJVSD.” However, all of BJVSD’s interest in the underlying judgment and any resulting harm flow solely from its role as the limited partner of Triton 88 or as a member of Triton 2000, the entities actually bound by the judgment. “An individual stakeholder in a legal entity does not have a right to recover personally for harms done to the legal entity.” Nauslar v. Coors Brewing Co., 170 S.W.3d 242, 250 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005); see also Hall v. Douglas, 380 S.W.3d 860, 873 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2012, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); Swank v. Cunningham, 258 S.W.3d 647, 661
holding that employers have standing to sue recognizing that same principle applies where defendant is general partner of limited partnership which in turn is general partner of limited partnership with contacts with state holding that the information contained in the certificate of limited partnership binds the partnership and the partners with respect to third parties holding that an incidental beneficiary does not have standing to sue for breach of a contract holding that limited partner does not have standing to sue for injuries to partnership that merely diminish value of that partners interest