rather than the county itself. The court reasoned in part that the county was the real party in interest, but it also recognized that the probation officer, untrained in and unacquainted with . . . technical questions, cannot be expected to aid the court in their solution. Nevertheless, the court must dispose of these questions. ... The effective and orderly conduct of juvenile hearings is a matter with which the state and county are both deeply concerned. Id.; accord Fuqua v. Fuqua, 88 Wn.2d 100, 102, 558 P.2d 801 (1977) (“The authority of the prosecuting attorney to appear in actions which present issues concerning county officials and their operation of county departments has been broadly construed in this state.”); Neal v. Wallace, 15 Wn. App. 506, 507-08, 550 P.2d 539 (1976) (<HOLDING>). ¶133 “RCW 36.27.020 does not except from the
holding that a holdover superior court judge could exercise the power of that office until his successor was qualified holding that a court of appeals may transfer petitions for writ of mandamus to the court of proper jurisdiction pursuant to  1631 holding that to grant a writ of mandamus a court in the exercise of its discretion must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances holding superior court civil rule 101a1 a nullity for the superior court may not adopt a rule which abridges any substantive right holding that where a superior court judge was named a defendant in an action for a writ of mandamus the prosecuting attorney is the proper court representative of the superior court judge