not appeal the trial court’s order striking his intervention. Therefore, Lapi-ner is not an intervenor and not a named party in this Texas derivative action. See, e.g., Johnston v. Crook, 93 S.W.3d 263, 268 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (“[A]n intervenor is a party for purposes of appeal only if (1) she timely files a pleading, and (2) the trial court does not strike the pleading before the entry of a final judgment.”). And where, as here, a nonparty has the right to appeal a decision of the trial court granting a motion to strike, such nonparty nonetheless cannot extend the appellate timetable by assailing the final judgment with a motion for new trial. Cf., e.g., Cent. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dunker, 799 S.W.2d 334, 336 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (<HOLDING>); State & Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Kelly,
holding that a letter utilized by the appellant in his argument would not be considered on appeal because it was not properly before the trial court holding trial court reversibly erred in not permitting appellant to withdraw his plea where court erroneously stated appellant could appeal motion was in fact not dispositive and appellant was entitled to rely on the courts statement holding that claims raised by appellant for first time in motion for new trial were untimely and therefore waived holding that because appellant did not become a party by intervention before judgment was rendered appellant may not extend the time to appeal by filing a motion for new trial holding that a nonpartys motion for new trial and petition for intervention filed after the trial court signed a final judgment did not extend the courts plenary jurisdiction