the evidence at sentencing was insufficient to prove that it was. We held that federal double jeopardy principles protected the defendant from being "subjected to two hearings to determine an[] enhanced mandatory sentence under § 643B(c)[.]” Id. at 324, 416 A.2d 773. See also Ford v. State, 73 Md.App. 391, 534 A.2d 992 (1988) (relying upon Butler to hold that when the State failed to introduce any competent evidence of sh.2d 379, 670 P.2d 256 (1983)); Bell v. State, 994 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (overruling Carter v. State, 676 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984), based on Monge). In addition, appellate courts addressing for the first time whether resentencing is governed by double jeopardy principles have held that it is not. See State v. Collins, 985 So.2d 985, 993 (Fla. 2008) (<HOLDING>); State v. McLellan, 149 N.H. 237, 243, 817
holding that where the evidence offered by the state and admitted by the trial court  whether erroneously or not  would have been sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict the double jeopardy clause does not preclude retrial holding that under monge double jeopardy does not prevent retrial of an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes holding the double jeopardy clause applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment holding based on monge that floridas double jeopardy clause does not preclude granting the state a second opportunity to demonstrate that the defendant meets the criteria for habitualization holding double jeopardy does not bar second trial after granting of new trial for reason other than insufficiency of evidence