prejudicial and on a practical level is not easily subject to testing by cross examination or contradiction”). Thus, neither a lay nor an expert witness “may testify to his opinion as to the guilt of a defendant, whether by direct statement or inference.” Black, 109 Wn.2d at 348. A law enforcement officer’s opinion testimony may be especially prejudicial because the “officer’s testimony often carries a special aura of reliability.” Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d at 928. ¶14 The State conceded Officer Starks’ opinion testimony was improper. “As in Montgomery Officer Starks’ testimony would be considered improper under current case law because it is an expression by a police officer that goes to the guilt of Defendant.” Br. of Resp’t at 12; see State v. Montgomery, 163 Wn.2d 577, 183 P.3d 267 (2008) (<HOLDING>). But, the State argues, because the officer’s
holding that error in classifying agents testimony as lay opinion and failing to subject it to the disclosure requirements was harmless holding states opinion testimony was improper but finding that error harmless and concluding on other grounds that defendant had been prejudiced holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error holding improper vouching is subject to harmless error analysis holding exclusion was harmless error