stimulant, or hallucinogenic drugs in these two sections demonstrates their intent to include these drugs within the class of drugs that limit or bar recovery of workers’ compensation benefits. See State v. Gonzales, 78 N.M. 218, 219, 430 P.2d 376, 377 (1967) (“We have held that it is proper for this court to consider prior and subsequent statutes in pari materia to determine legislative intent.”). {20} In addition, the Legislature’s substitution of “controlled substance,” which refers us to the CSA, for “depressant, stimulant or hallucinogenic drug” in 1972, demonstrates its intention that we should look to the CSA to determine which drugs limit or bar recovery of workers’ compensation benefits. See State v. Maestas, 2007-NMSC-001, ¶ 21, 140 N.M. 836, 149 P.3d 933 (filed 2006) (<HOLDING>); see also Las Cruces v. Rogers, 2009-NMSC-042,
holding that a statutory right is a creature of the legislature and does not exist where the legislature has not acted recognizing the legal concept that when interpreting a statute it is presumed that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result holding that whether the legislature has complied with article iii section 61 of the texas constitution which states that the legislature shall provide suitable laws for the administration of workers compensation insurance for municipalities is a political question committed to the legislature holding that in order for there to be state debt in the constitutional sense one legislature in effect must obligate a future legislature to appropriate funds to discharge the debt created by the first legislature holding that when the legislature enacts a statute it is presumed that the legislature is aware of existing statutes