here, because he possesses “special expertise in litigation” through “practicing almost exclusively asylum law for more than 10 years and ... representing] over 750 individuals in immigration cases.” As in Ruedar-Menicucci, however, we conclude that “[w]hile we believe that a speciality in immigration law could be a special factor warranting an enhancement of the statutory rate, ... we find that counsel’s specialized skill was not needful for the litigation in question.” Id.; cf. Johnson v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 205, 213 (3d Cir.2005) (“Although Johnson’s counsel is an experienced attorney who specializes in immigration, he was here faced with a case of straightforward application of the substantial evidence and asylum standards.”); Muhur v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 653, 656 (7th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). We decline to adopt counsel’s proposed per se
holding that unless otherwise directed by the statute the term knowingly merely requires proof of knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense holding there was no rule 404b violation where the evidence was admitted to show knowledge and knowledge was an element of the crime charged recognizing that immigration laws are complex and their application often requires knowledge of foreign cultures unfamiliar to most americans but concluding that fee enhancement requires a showing by counsel that knowledge of foreign cultures or of particular esoteric nooks and crannies of immigration law  was needed to give the alien a fair shot at prevailing holding that the knowledge requisite to knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as distinguished from knowledge of the law holding that we consider an agencys expertise or special knowledge when  application of the regulation is primarily factual and necessarily requires application of the agencys technical knowledge and expertise to the facts presented citation omitted internal quotation marks omitted