polygraph results. We recently restated our long-standing rule that “ ‘[pjolygraph test results are not admissible in evidence in a criminal trial in this State.’” Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Chambers, 194 W.Va. 1, 459 S.E.2d 112 (1995) (quoting Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Frazier, 162 W.Va. 602, 252 S.E.2d 39 (1979)). Appellant argues that the rationale underlying Frazier is no longer valid since the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). In Frazier, we explained that our rule regarding the inadmissibility of polygraph test results was premised on “the questionable scientific accuracy of the test.” 162 W.Va. at 608, 252 S.E.2d at 43 (citing Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923)) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court in Daubert concluded that
holding that calculations done by applying product rule were generally accepted in relevant scientific community holding that expert testimony may be admissible even if not generally accepted in the relevant scientific community provided that it qualifies in some other way as reliable under federal rule of evidence 702 holding under the restrictive frye test that pcrstr testing is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community holding that product rule method of dna statistical evidence is now generally accepted in the relevant scientific community holding that expert opinion based on scientific technique is inadmissible unless technique is generally accepted as reliable in relevant scientific community