the New York legislature, without expressly saying so, intended plans with such features to be outside the reach of § 5205(c)(1). There is good reason to question the proposition that § 5205(c)’s “conclusive presumption” controls the issue of whether an express “trust” exists within the meaning of § 541(c)(2). See Wimmer, 129 B.R. at 567 (For purposes of § 541(c)(2), the “Illinois [legislature] cannot define a spendthrift trust any way it pleases.”); In re Templeton, 146 B.R. 757, 763 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1992) (“declining to give effect to an Illinois statute similar to § 5205(c), and opining that the Illinois legislature may not employ the sophistry of a conclusive presumption to” transform an IRA into “a traditional spendthrift trust”); VanMeter, 137 B.R. at 912; Kazi, 125 B.R. at 986 (<HOLDING>); Wimmer, 121 B.R. at 543 (same, and
holding an illinois statute and regulation that conflicted with the social security act invalid under the supremacy clause recognizing that the supremacy clause is not a source of any federal rights holding the provisions of a new york welfare program that conflicted with federal regulations under the social security act invalid under the supremacy clause holding the illinois statute at issue in templeton invalid under the supremacy clause holding a california regulation that conflicted with the social security act invalid under the supremacy clause