language similar to the language at issue here — any claim “arising under” the Medicare or Social Security Acts, § 405(h)— would have led it to a different legal conclusion. See id., at 494 (using as an example a statute precluding review of “ ‘all causes ... arising under any of’ ” the immigration statutes). In Eldridge, the Court held permissible a District Court lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of agency proce dures authorizing termination of Social Security disability payments without a pretermination hearing. See 424 U. S., at 326-332. Eldridge, however, is a case in which the Court found that the respondent had followed the special review procedures set forth in § 405(g), thereby complying with, rather than disregarding, the strictures of § 405(h). See id., at 326-327 (<HOLDING>). The Court characterized the constitutional
holding jurisdiction available only under  405g holding a district court remanding a case pursuant to sentence four of  405g must order judgment in the case and may not retain jurisdiction over the ad ministrative proceedings on remand holding that 42 usc  405g limits the district courts discretion to remand for reconsideration in light of new evidence holding that equitable relief under rico is available only to the government holding that a sentence four remand under 42 usc  405g is a final appealable decision and that a party who wins a remand under sentence four is a prevailing party for purposes of the eaja