government’s case rather than to rely on expert voice identification testimony — was unreasonable. Accordingly, his representation of Drones was not constitutionally deficient. B Additionally, Drones cannot prevail under Strickland because he is unable to prove that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s actions. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. In order to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland, Drones must show “more than the mere possibility of a different outcome.” Ransom, 126 F.3d at 723. Rather, a petitioner must present “evidence of sufficient quality and force to raise a reasonable probability that,” had it been presented to the jury, the outcome would have been different. Id.; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (<HOLDING>). We find that, under the facts of this case,
holding that to satisfy the prejudice prong a petitioner must establish that but for counsels errors there is a reasonable probabil ity the result of the proceeding would have been different holding that in order to show prejudice defendant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different holding that to show prejudice in a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors the result of the proceeding would have been different holding that defendant must show reasonable probability that but for counsels errors the sentence would have been significantly less harsh holding that ineffective assistance of counsel occurs when there is deficient performance and prejudice which is a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different