an impermissible collateral attack on a judgment) (followed in State v. Seeber, No. A04-560, 2005 WL 406210 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2005)); State v. Sims, 66 P.3d 472, 473, 475 (Or. 2003) (prohibiting collateral attack on administrative order revoking driver's license in criminal prosecution for driving while revoked, where the statute required only that (1) the defendant's license had been revoked, and (2) the defendant drove a motor vehicle while the revocation order was in effect); State v. Canney, 562 A.2d 1315, 1316-17 (N.H. 1989) (stating the general rule that a "defendant may not collaterally attack an [administrative] habitual offender determination" in a criminal enforcement action). In other contexts, see, e.g., Martin v. Wolfson, 16 N.W.2d 884, 888-89 (Minn. 1944) (<HOLDING>); Department of Conservation v. Sowders, 244
holding that a judgment is subject to collateral attack where  the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction with respect to the power of the court to render the particular judgment or decree as where the court  exceeds the powers conferred on it by constitutional or statutory provisions recognizing extension of the rule prohibiting collateral attacks to administrative orders other than rulemaking where the asserted errors render the decisions voidable as opposed to in excess of constitutional power or statutory authority holding that this courts review of board decisions is limited to final orders or final decisions recognizing that administrative agencies lack to power to consider or determine constitutional issues holding amtraks condemnation power to be of the more limited statutory variety as opposed to the broader sovereign power of eminent domain