614 (1983) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). In Lehr, the Court held that a putative father who had never established a substantial relationship with his child was not entitled to notice of adoption proceedings as a matter of due process. Id. at 265, 103 S.Ct. 2985. This Court, too, has long recognized that any constitutional interest a putative father may claim stems from his acceptance of “the legal and moral commitment to the family,” not from a mere biological relationship. In re K., 535 S.W.2d 168, 171 (Tex.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 907, 97 S.Ct. 273, 50 L.Ed.2d 189 (1976); see also In re T.E.T., 603 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex.1980), cert. denied sub nom., Oldag v. Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Galveston-Houston, 450 U.S. 1025, 101 S.Ct. 1732, 68 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981) (<HOLDING>); In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 195 (Tex.1994)
holding that termination of fathers parental rights should be reversed since it was done to facilitate childs adoption and would prejudice rights of child and mother to receive support from father holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection holding that new york statutory scheme governing adoption did not violate unmarried fathers right to equal protection by according different legal rights as between birth mother and putative father holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection holding that statute that imposed different requirements to establish parental rights on father than on mother did not violate fathers right to equal protection under the law