with Massachusetts law is only the first step. At issue in this case is MERS’s power to assign the mortgage. The prevailing view in Massachusetts is that MERS has the power of assignment by virtue of its nominee status. See, e.g., In re Marron, 455 B.R. at 7; Aliberti, 779 F.Supp.2d at 249; Kiah, 2011 WL 841282, at *8; see also Randle v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, No. MISC 408202(GHP), 2010 WL 3984714, at *7 (Mass.Land Ct. Jan. 4, 2011) (Piper, J.) (accepting validity of assignment by MERS without question as to its authority); Amtrust Bank v. T.D. Banknorth, N.A., No. 07 Misc. 350750(KCL), 2010 WL 1019638, at *2 n. 2 (Mass. Land Ct. Mar. 22, 2010) (Long, J.) (same). These courts have focused on the agency relationship inherent in MERS’s designation as nominee. See Kiah, 2011 WL 841282, at *4 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, although the standard MERS mortgage
holding that unless that power is restricted by the principal an agent under a california statutory healthcare power of attorney has the power to execute applicable admission forms including arbitration agreements holding that a commission is a body with special and limited power and it can only exercise the power expressly or impliedly granted to it and any reasonable doubt of existence of any power must be resolved against the exercise thereof holding that the inherent power of the district court includes the power  to santion attorneys for  violations of court orders or other conduct which interferes with the courts power to manage its calendar and the courtroom   holding that the recognition power is not limited to a determination of the government to be recognized but rather includes the power to take actions without which the power of recognition might be thwarted holding that merss power to act as the agent of any valid note holder includes the power to assign