to disbelieve what a person who is accused of a crime might testify to in his defense solely because he is the defendant? In addition, if the testimony given by a law enforcement agent conflièts with the defendant's testimony, would you be inclined to believe the former and disbelieve the latter solely because the former is a police officer? 2 . A previous Eleventh Circuit panel has noted that Jackson and Gassaway govern our review of a district court’s decision not to question prospective jurors regarding their attitudes towards law enforcement officers’ testimony. See United States v. Vadino, 680 F.2d 1329, 1336-37 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1082, 103 S.Ct. 1771, 76 L.Ed.2d 344 (1983). See generally Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). 3 . The court below, in fact, went further in
recognizing circuit split holding in an appeal from the denial of a rule 32 petition that the appellants claim that the circuit court erred in not ruling on his motion to subpoena a transcript of his guilty plea proceedings was not preserved for review because the circuit court never ruled on the motion and the appellant never objected to the circuit courts failure to rule on the motion recognizing that the findings of the circuit court on factual issues arising on a motion to quash service of process for lack of jurisdiction are binding on the appellate court unless wholly unsupported by the evidence or controlled by error of law holding that all fifth circuit cases decided before the close of business on september 30 1981 are binding on the eleventh circuit recognizing a split in the circuit as to whether objections to prudential standing can be waived and listing circuit cases