is within the reach of the federal antitrust laws.” Flood, 407 U.S. at 259, 92 S.Ct. 2099 (emphasis added). The facts before the Supreme Court clearly implicated only the reserve clause. Id. at 264-66, 92 S.Ct. 2099. However, the holding is broader, stating that “we adhere once again to Federal Baseball and Toolson and to their application to professional baseball.” Id. at 284, 92 S.Ct. 2099 (emphasis added). Thus, when interpreting the scope of Flood, we are seemingly offered the choice between either a narrow or a broad reading of professional baseball’s antitrust exemption. The “great weight of federal cases” hold that Flood exempts the entire business of baseball from federal and state antitrust claims. See, e.g., Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 541 (7th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>); Portland Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 491
holding that it is not holding that it is clear that the entire business of baseball is exempt from antitrust claims holding that there must be a causal connection between the alleged antitrust violation and the antitrust injury for there to be antitrust standing holding that an antitrust injury is a necessary element of a  2 claim holding that an activity which is exempt from the antitrust laws cannot form the basis of an antitrust investigation