case in Mitchell. < See id. As in Mitchell,: considering the deed as a whole, the parties clearly intended that the mineral rights in the land be reserved to the grantors. Id. at 274, 243 P.2d at 415; see also Gibson v. Pickett, 256 Ark. 1035, 512 S.W.2d 532, 537-88 (1974) (giving effect to a mineral reservation within a deed's habendum clause even though the deed failed to mention the reservation in its granting clause); Jones v. Am. Ass'n, 120 Ky. 413, 86 S.W. 1111, 1112 (1905) ("[Rleservations or exceptions are enforced, although contained in the habendum clause of the deed, as fully as if set out in the granting clause, when on the whole instrument the intention of the parties is sufficient ly expressed to be enforced."); Price v. Johnson, 78 N.M. 123, 428 P.2d 978, 980-81 (1967) (<HOLDING>). T23 Based on Mitchell and other authorities
holding that claim construction is an issue of law for the court not a question of fact for the jury recognizing that a clause in an insurance policy was susceptible to a construction in favor of the insured but that such a construction would be unreasonable absurd and produce results never intended or contemplated by the parties holding that an insurance contract should be construed as a reasonable person in the position of the insured would have understood it and that if the language used in the policy is reasonably susceptible to different constructions it must be given the construction most favorable to the insured holding that we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party recognizing that where a deed is susceptible to alternative construction the construction most favorable to the grantee will be adopted but still finding that in light of the modern rule the reservation in the habendum at issue was not void for repugnancy