employees) be left to its unfettered discretion. In the present case, Diercks sought review of a sale of property by the FSLIC in its corporate capacity. Yet, as we have noted, Congress left the decision of what to sell, how to sell and when to sell to the discretion of the corporation. Thus, the corporation could have sold the property without taking bids or by any other procedure it saw fit. That it chose the reasonable and commendable procedure of accepting bids and choosing the one that provided it with the greatest return is a decision which this court cannot question. Cf. § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (which prohibits judicial review of agency action “committed to agency discretion by law”) and Ferry v. Udall, 336 F.2d 706, 714 (9th Cir. 1964) (<HOLDING>). The decision of the district court dismissing
holding that due process does not require notice or hearing before writ of garnishment issues holding that due process does not require a hearing where only a potential privilege to purchase united states land is involved holding that due process does not require the state to provide an impartial decisionmaker at the pretermination hearing where posttermination remedies are available holding that prosecution of defendant in the united states for hostage taking based on acts committed outside the united states did not violate due process holding that doctrine does not violate due process