conclude that knowledge of a financial relationship between Thurman and ICE can be equated with knowledge of the existence of ICE's security interest in the truck, let alone with knowledge that the sale of the truck from Thurman to Chris-man violated ICE's rights. This is the case even when we consider that the sale took plaee at another auction after the auction ended because, by all accounts, it was Thurman's subsequent failure to pay ICE, not the sale of the truck, that violated ICKE'3 rights. In the absence of designated evidence showing that Chrisman or the Aldersons had knowledge that the sale of the truck violated ICE's rights, Chris-man and the Aldersons were buyers in the ordinary course of business. See Madrid v. Bloomington Auto Co., 782 N.E.2d 386, 397 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (<HOLDING>). ICE also argues that Indiana Code Section
holding in an action brought by buyers for specific performance of a contract for the sale of stock that the judicial admission exception was not satisfied by the sellers deposition testimony admitting that after meeting with the buyer he shook the buyers hand and stated weve got a deal because the statement even when taken in context with the preceding negotiations described by the seller in his deposition established neither a quantity nor price for the stocks holding that where no evidence was designated to show that a car buyer knew that a sale violated the rights of the dealership that owned the car the buyers were buyers in the ordinary course of business for purposes of indcode  26112019 holding that a purchaser of a vehicle was a buyer in the ordinary course of business even though the car dealer did not provide the certificate of title at the time of the sale holding that auctioneer who handled sale of car between seller and buyer could not be held liable for allegedly defective condition of car holding that even though the contract limited the buyers remedies to specific performance or a refund of earnest money they were entitled to damages in the amount of the difference between the contract price and the fair market value of the property where the seller thwarted the buyers right to specific performance by selling the property to another at a higher price