aroused but then deliberately omits to make further enquiries, because he wishes to remain in ignorance, he is deemed to have knowledge.” [United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563,] 1570 [(11th Cir.1991)] (internal quotation marks omitted). “To act ‘knowingly,’ therefore, is not necessarily to act only with positive knowledge, but also to act with an awareness of the high probability of the existence of the fact in question.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Id. at 952-53. We have explained that “[i]gnorance is deliberate if the defendant was presented with facts that put him or her on notice that criminal activity was particularly likely, yet the defendant intentionally failed to investigate those facts.” United States v. Chavez-Alvarez, 594 F.3d 1062, 1068 (8th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). In his safety-valve proffer statement, Honea
holding that husbands knowledge of his obligation of support and his subsequent election to enter employment that would substantially reduce his income and make it impossible to meet his obligations would not justify reduction in support holding evidence was sufficient to support finding that even if defendant had no actual knowledge that he was acting in furtherance of methamphetamine distribution ring his ignorance was based on his decision not to ask any questions about the suspicious circumstances of his employment holding that defendant was not resident of his mothers household even though his drivers license listed his mothers address and he received mail there because he expressed a belief that his residence was in a different location than his mothers home he rented and occupied his own residence and he testified that he was only living with his mother after expiration of his lease until he could find another place to live holding that the scope of crossexamination did not extend to any bad acts committed by the defendant during his life where defendant presented evidence of adverse circumstances that he experienced in his early childhood rather than evidence of his general good character holding that even when employee was driving employers vehicle employee was not acting within the scope of his employment absent evidence that he had undertaken a special mission at his employers direction