or shelter to Rampage, but rather merely owned the property on which Morton gave Rampage shelter. As discussed above, this mere ownership of property is not enough to conclude that the landlord was the harborer of Rampage. Additionally, in this case, Respondent did not give permission for Rampage to be on the premises and in fact expressly prohibited Rampage’s presence through the provisions of the lease. Thus, Respondents did not harbor Rampage and therefore could not be liable as an owner or harborer of an abnormally dangerous domestic animal. Finally it is noteworthy that the lease in this case was for a private dwelling, and it is clear that the premises were not leased for public or quasi-public purposes. Cf. Austin v. Buettner, 211 Md. 61, 74-75, 124 A.2d 793, 800-01 (1956) (<HOLDING>). THE LEASE AS A SOURCE OF LANDLORD CONTROL
holding that the public use exception was not applicable because the injury to the tenants employee occurred in an area of the leased premises that was not open to the public but was used only by employees holding that where a commercial lease requires landlords consent before assigning the lease or subletting the leased premises implied covenant prohibited landlord from withholding consent unreasonably holding that abandonment requires that tenant vacate the leased premises holding under kansas law that a plumber who was injured while inspecting the leased premises in order to prepare an estimate for plumbing work had not entered the premises for the purpose for which they were leased and thus could not rely on the public use exception recognizing a landlords duty for injuries sustained on leased premises where the landlord is aware that the premises are leased with intent to admit the public