not the initiating officer had a well-founded “reasonable suspicion” to detain J.P. In other words, there is nothing on the record to impute to Officer Kersey. Since there are no observations of Sgt. Oprea, on the record, all that is left are Kersey’s observations. Still, the State contends Officer Kersey had, based on the totality of the circumstances, a “reasonable suspicion” that J.P. had committed, was committing, or was about to commit the crime of trespassing, when he asked him for identification. We disagree. There is no record evidence that Kersey was aware that J.P. had been asked to leave the premises. Mere presence in the parking lot of an open quasi-public business is insufficient to constitute the crime of trespass. See Smith v. State, 778 So.2d 329, 331 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>). As such, Officer Kersey lacked the authority
holding that issues of fact precluded summary judgment on the question of whether an employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment for purposes of insurance coverage when the employee was simply sitting in his vehicle in his employers parking lot waiting for the business to open at the time the accident occurred holding that injury in a parking lot did not occur on a covered situs holding that when an invitation has been extended to enter an open business actual communication is necessary to put a person on notice that he is no longer welcome on the property and may be arrested for trespassing otherwise where a store is open for business but its parking lot is posted against trespassing everyone who enters the lot on his or her way to the store risks arrest for trespass holding that an injury occurring in a parking lot which was leased but not controlled by an employer was compensable because the employer instructed its employees to park in that lot holding that no search occurred when police officers entered an open business