previously granted defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment, ruling that, pursuant to the parties’ agreement, defendant's liability herein is limited to the sum of $250,000. See Tucson Elec. Pwr. Co. v. Bailey Controls Co., No. CIV 92-185 TUC RMB, slip op. at 8, 1992 WL 430467 (Oct. 8, 1992). 2 . It appears that the State of Arizona follows this second approach: "We feel that where, as here, the insured has no interest in the recovery the insurance company cannot circumvent Rule 17(a) by means of a fictitious loan agreement with the insured." Hamman-McFarland Lumber Co. v. Arizona Equipment Rental Co., 16 Ariz.App. 188, 190, 492 P.2d 437 (1972) (citing City Stores Co. v. Lerner, supra); accord Northern Ins. Co. of New York v. Mabry, 4 Ariz.App. 217, 219, 419 P.2d 347 (1966) (<HOLDING>). 3 . The Wright, Miller, and Kane treatise
holding despite a reservation of rights that when the insurer provides a defense to its insured the insured has no right to interfere with the insurers control of the defense and a stipulated judgment between the insured and the injured claimant without the consent of the insurer is ineffective to impose liability upon the insurer holding that if the insured is only partially compensated by the insurer both the insurer and the insured are real partiesininterest holding that insured may recover attorneys fees from insurer where insurer acts in bad faith recognizing that where insured has been paid in full insurer is the real party in interest holding that a party does not automatically qualify as a real party in interest merely because it has been named as a defendant in a declaratory judgment action