of procedurally defaulted claims, but is rather a rule of administrative convenience. (See People v. Owens (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 303, 317.) Thus, the strict application of res judicata and waiver will be relaxed "where fundamental fairness so requires.” (People v. Gaines (1984), 105 Ill. 2d 79, 91; People v. Hamby (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 290, 291.) Further, where the alleged waiver stems from incompetency of appointed counsel on appeal, the doctrine is also relaxed. (People v. Barnard (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 218, 229; People v. Frank (1971), 48 Ill. 2d 500, 503.) The rule is also relaxed in instances where the facts relating to the claim do not appear on the face of the original appellate record (see People v. Eddmonds (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 501, 528; see also People v. Thomas (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 321 (<HOLDING>)) and could not have been supplemented to that
holding that res judicata did not preclude the subsequent filing of an action which was a permissive claim in a prior action holding that res judicata does not bar reconsideration of the constitutionality of a petitioners death sentence during postconviction relief proceedings holding that res judicata applies in deportation proceedings holding res judicata does not preclude consideration of constitutional questions in postconviction proceedings which by their nature depended upon facts not found in record holding that a defendant does not have the right to be represented by counsel in postconviction proceedings which are civil proceedings