remained at all times with the Trustee, but did assign to the Arbogasts “the burden of producing at least some useful evidence regarding what the funds deposited into an entireties account are ultimately spent on.” Arbogast, 466 B.R. at 308. The Trustee argues that the law’s exemption for constructive fraud purposes of funds later used for “reasonable and necessary expenses” constitutes an affirmative defense, and that the burden of persuasion should therefore have rested with the Arbogasts. Pennsylvania law appears to us to be silent as to whether the demonstration that funds were used for “reasonable and necessary expenses” is an affirmative defense or instead, a negation of the plaintiffs prima facie case. See, e.g., Watters v. DeMilio, 16 Pa. D. & C.2d 747, 752-53 (Ct.Com.Pl.1957) (<HOLDING>). Cases from other jurisdictions arising in
holding nature of motion is determined by its substance not its title recognizing this rule recognizing this as the general rule recognizing rule recognizing the rule but offering no hint as to its nature