“officers are not required to do a more thorough investigation.” Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1116 n. 7. Next, Mocek makes two challenges based on Officer Dilley’s alleged ulterior motives. Mocek first argues that asking for identification exceeded the scope of the investigation for disorderly conduct and that Officer Dilley used § 30-22-3 as an excuse to arrest him where there were no other grounds for doing so. He relies on Supreme Court language explaining that the request for identification must be “reasonably related to the circumstances justifying 02) (rejecting argument that sometimes-protected speech can always support a retaliation claim), abrogated on other grounds by Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928 (7th Cir.2004); Blomquist v. Town of Marana, 501 Fed.Appx. 657, 659 (9th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>); Olasz v. Welsh, 301 Fed.Appx. 142, 146 (3d
recognizing first amendment petition right where inmate alleged retaliation for filing grievances holding court did not have jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs retaliation claim where plaintiff did not check the retaliation box or describe anything that indicates such a claim in the eeoc complaint holding that the plaintiffs placement on paid administrative leave constituted an adverse action for purposes of a first amendment retaliation claim recognizing first amendment retaliation right holding plaintiffs could not maintain a retaliation claim where they lacked a first amendment right to picket or otherwise occupy a nonpublic forum