has repeatedly taken to the nearly identical language found in § 922(g)”), pet. for cert. filed, No. 04-9627 (Apr. 7, 2005). Simply put, under our uniform line of controlling precedent, § 922(g) is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power. Taylor’s admission, at the plea colloquy, that he possessed a gun that had traveled in interstate commerce was sufficient to demonstrate the required nexus to interstate commerce. Accordingly, we affirm Taylor’s conviction. As for Taylor’s Booker claim, the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury is violated where, under a mandatory Guidelines system, a sentence is increased because of an enhancemen mproper factfinding in imposing sentence, it did commit Booker statutory error when it sentenced Taylor under a mandatory scheme. Id. (<HOLDING>). Booker statutory errors are harmless if
holding that even without booker constitutional error in the district courts application of the guidelines there could be nonconstitutional error where the court applied the guidelines in a mandatory fashion holding that there is no nonconstitutional error under booker where the district court sentencing in the alternative sufficiently considered the guidelines as well as the other factors listed in  3553a holding that the mere mandatory application of the guidelines  the district courts belief that it was required to impose a guidelines sentence  constitutes error recognizing that booker error may occur even in the absence of judicial factfinding where district court treats guidelines as mandatory holding nonconstitutional booker error occurs when the district court applies the guidelines in a mandatory rather than advisory fashion even though the resulting sentence was calculated based solely upon facts admitted by the defendant or found by a jury