194 (1902). MacNeill asks this Court to declare that there has been a violation of the Seventh Amendment because the Court’s answer to the jury question in its view took away the issue of literal infringement from the jury. To the extent this Court took an issue from the jury, however, it did so by making a legal determination — the Court did not impede the jury’s fact finding role. Furthermore, vehicles exist within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for directing the jury to a particular verdict, or even for taking the verdict away from a jury after it has been rendered. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 50 (governing judgment as matter of law). These mechanisms, when properly utilized, are constitutional. E.g., Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 388-94, 63 S.Ct. 1077, 87 L.Ed. 1458 (1943) (<HOLDING>). Although the law does not change during the
holding that dismissal pursuant to federal rule of civil procedure 56 did not violate the seventh amendment holding that a posttrial motion is not required after a grant of a directed verdict holding that the trial court erred in granting the school boards posttrial motion for directed verdict because although the school board timely moved for a directed verdict during trial it did not serve its motion for directed verdict until the eleventh day after the verdict holding that seventh amendment right to jury trial not violated by courts dismissal for lack of jurisdiction holding that directed verdict does not violate seventh amendment