of care. He also argues that, even if Geneser’s testimony was expert testimony that should have been disclosed under Rule 26(a)(2)(A), the district court abused its discretion by excluding such testimony, since the failure to properly disclose Geneser was harmless. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c)(1) (providing that sanction of automatic exclusion of witness does not apply where failure to properly disclose witness was substantially justified or harmless). CPS argues that Clifford waived two of his arguments — that Geneser was a lay rather than expert witness and that, even if he was an expert witness, the failure to disclose him was harmless — by failing to raise them in the district court. See, e.g., Marseilles Hydro Poioer, LLC v. Marseilles Land & Water Co., 518 F.3d 459, 470 (7th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). In this court, Clifford does not respond to
holding that arguments not raised in district court are waived holding that arguments not raised in opposition to a motion for summary judgment are waived holding arguments not raised on appeal waived holding that arguments not raised in the opening brief are waived holding that arguments not raised below are waived for appeal