allowed Beehive to be represented only by Beehive’s CEO, Mr. Brothers, and to act without counsel while the Commission knew a fine could be imposed as a result of Beehive’s actions raises due process concerns. However, Utah Administrative Code section R746-100-6(B) explicitly allows for such representation by providing that “[ijndividuals who are parties to a proceeding, or officers or employees of parties, may represent their principals’ interests in the proceeding.” Utah Admin. Code § R746-100-6(B) (Jan. 1, 1996) (emphasis added). No Utah case law forbids this type of representation in administrative proceedings, and other jurisdictions have explicitly upheld similar standards. See, e.g., Idaho State Bar Ass’n v. Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 102 Idaho 672, 637 P.2d 1168, 1172 (1981) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Mr. Brothers’s representation of
recognizing that no guarantee of payment exists even if administrative expense allowed holding  2254 applies to administrative proceedings holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation recognizing that representation of a corporation by its officers in administrative proceedings is allowed holding that there is no right to habeas review of administrative evidentiary determinations before a district court where direct review of the administrative proceedings is available in the appellate courts