to be drawn from the facts or legal conclusions set forth in the complaint are not required to be taken as true.” National Gas Dist. v. Sevier County Utility Dist., 7 S.W.3d 41, 43 (Tenn.Ct.App.1999). IV. We need not parse the language of a multitude of state and federal cases for the parameters of the requirement of standing; the Tennessee Supreme Court has already done that for us in its opinion in American Civil Liberties Union of Tennessee v. Darnell, 195 S.W.3d 612, 619-21 (2006): Courts employ the doctrine of standing to determine whether a particular litigant is entitled to have a court decide the merits of a dispute or of particular issues. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); Knierim v. Leatherwood, 542 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tenn.1976) (<HOLDING>); City of Brentwood v. Metropolitan Bd. of
holding that congress cannot consistent with the constitutional principles of the separation of powers confer standing on a qui tam plaintiff who has suffered no cognizable injury to allow that plaintiff to prosecute an fca action on the governments behalf holding that where one plaintiff has standing we need not consider whether the other individual and corporate plaintiffs have standing to maintain the suit holding that a similarly situated employee is one who is comparable to plaintiff in all material respects recognizing doctrine holding that courts use the standing doctrine to decide whether a particular plaintiff is properly situated to prosecute the action