fees in arbitration. For instance, in Green Tree Fin. Corp.Alabama v. Randolph, the Court recognized that “[i]t may well be that. the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant such as Randolph from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum.” 531 U.S. 79, 90, 121 S.Ct. 513, 148 L.Ed.2d 373 (2000). Ultimately, however, the Court sidestepped the issue because Randolph “failed to support” her assertion that “arbitration costs are high” with probative evidence. Id. at 90 n. 6, 121 S.Ct. 513. In Rent-A-Center, the Court once again recognized that a sufficiently robust challenge to arbitration fee-splitting could invalidate an arbitration clause, and specifi cally a delegation clause. See Rentr-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 74, 130 S.Ct. 2772 (<HOLDING>). And in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors
holding dispute under collective bargaining agreement not arbitrable as delegation of nondelegable authority without reference to whether provision was consented to by parties holding that litigant could have challenged substantive unconscionability of delegation clause by showing that he was subject to an unfair   feesplitting arrangement but noting that the plaintiff did not make any arguments specific to the delegation provision holding claim of unconscionability requires showing of both procedural and substantive elements holding that courts should address a procedural unconscionability defense to the enforcement of an arbitration provision holding that the plaintiff had failed to establish procedural unconscionability since he had a reasonable opportunity to consider the agreement and the arbitration clause was clearly set forth in the contract