of a fair jury. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 419-20, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985) (recognizing, in a criminal case, that jurors may be asked to commit to follow law and statute); see also Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 630, 111 S.Ct. 2077, 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (1991) (“Civil juries, no less than their criminal counterparts, must follow the law and act as impartial factfin-ders.”). The trial court thus abused its discretion by refusing to permit the line of questioning. Hill preserved error by asking a proper question and receiving a direct ruling rejecting it. See Vasquez, 189 S.W.3d at 758 (to preserve error, a party must “adequately apprise the trial court of the nature of the inquiry” (quotations omitted)); Babcock, 767 S.W.2d at 708 (<HOLDING>). The trial court abused its discretion in
holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact holding party that failed to object to instruction conditioning submission of a jurys question on its answer to a question waived that partys right to have the jury make findings as to the subsequent question holding that a refusal to allow a question is an implicit ruling on a request to ask that question holding it is a question of fact holding that the question of whether an existing constitutional right is infringed is strictly a question of law