contends. Any such suggestion by Browning was not part of its holding, but a mere statement of reasons for why the debtor’s blanket reservation in that case did not give sufficient notice to creditors. See id. at 775; Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821) (noting that reasoning that goes “beyond the case ,.. may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision”). Rather what Browning held is that a debt- or’s reservation is sufficient so long as it enables creditors to (1) identify the claims (or potential claims) at issue and (2) evaluate whether those claims might provide additional assets for distribution. See Browning, 283 F.3d at 774-75; see also P.A. Bergner, 140 F.3d at 1117 (<HOLDING>); Harstad v. First Am. Bank, 39 F.3d 898, 903
holding that the reservation of a claim need not name a defendant but only identify the type of claim the debtor seeks to retain holding that the burden of showing that a harm will result from disclosure is on the party that seeks nondisclosure rather than on the party that seeks access holding that the fee applicant must produce specific evidence of the prevailing market rates in the relevant community for the type of work for which he seeks an award holding that a defendant who seeks to retain private counsel must receive proper notice of the date by which counsel must enter his appearance holding that an appellant must not only specifically identify the deficiencies in counsels performance but also identify the specific objection that should have been made and provide authority in support of his argument that the objection would have been meritorious