Co., 528 F.2d 423, 425 (4th Cir.1975). Determining whether there has been a true meeting of the minds is ultimately resolved by looking to the parties’ intent, as objectively manifested. See Snyder-Falkinham, 457 S.E.2d at 39. Once a party objectively manifests its intention to compromise and then “acts affirmatively to enter into such settlement, [that party’s] second thoughts at a later time upon the wisdom of the settlement do not constitute good cause for setting it aside.” Id. at 41. Thus, it is well-established in Virginia that compromise and settlement of a suit or disputed claim is binding unless it is shown that it was the result of fraud, mistake, or undue advantage. See, e.g., Metrocall of Delaware, Inc. v. Continental Cellular Corp., 246 Va. 365, 437 S.E.2d 189, 193 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Seaboard Ice Co. v. Lee, 199 Va. 243, 99
holding that an oral compromise and release agreement was unenforceable where there was no written stipulation between the parties holding that as a matter of law where the procurement decision was rational a reviewing court may not award injunctive relief despite the presence of procedural irregularities in the procurement process holding that the definition of procurement under the tucker act is broader than the definition of procurement contract in the fgcaa such that an agency can engage in a procurement process for the purposes of the tucker act even though it is using a cooperative agreement instead of a procurement contract to memorialize the parties agreement holding that a written mutual release memorializing a compromise and settlement may be rescinded for fraud in its procurement holding that without a valid reason for cancelling the procurement  the government violated its duty to conduct a fair procurement