hand, evidence that is merely cumulative of information already disclosed to the PTO examiner is not considered material. See Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1367. With respect to the second prong of inequitable conduct, intent to deceive, the Federal Circuit has emphasized that “materiality does not presume intent, which is a separate and essential component of inequitable conduct.” Id. at 1366 (internal quotation omitted). The alleged conduct must not amount “merely to the improper performance of, or omission of, an act one ought to have performed. Rather, clear and convincing evidence must prove that an applicant had the specific intent to ... mislead[ ] or deceiv[e] the PTO.” Id. (emphasis and alteration in original, internal quotation omitted); see also Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 876 (<HOLDING>). Because direct evidence of intent is rarely
holding that negligence does not violate the due process clause but reserving the question whether gross negligence does holding that ordinary negligence and gross negligence are not separate causes of action recognizing that a jury is permitted to infer an intent to deceive from circumstantial evidence holding that amendment made as of right under mpep weighs against an inference of intent to deceive holding that conduct amounting to gross negligence does not by itself justify an inference of intent to deceive