Legislature modified the words used in section 38.001 in order to preserve the precedent of excluding governmental entities from the class of parties against whom attorneys’ fees could be recovered. See Crespi, 65 SMU L. Rev. at 73-74; Civ. Prac. & Rem. § 38.001 re-visor’s note 2. In doing so, the Legislature excluded from that class other legal entities against whom the predecessor statute had allowed attorneys’ fees to be recovered. See Fleming, 425 S.W.3d at 575. Even if we concluded that the broader effects of this change were unintended or under-inclusive, we could not conclude that application of the statute according to its plain meaning would lead to an absurd result. See Combs, 401 S.W.3d at 630; see also Greco v. Nat’l Football League, 116 F.Supp.3d 744, 752 (N.D.Tex.2015) (<HOLDING>). We hold that section 38.001 of the Civil
holding plainfaced interpretation of section 38001 does not lead to absurd results holding that section 704 does not bar district court jurisdiction when the claims court does not provide a special and adequate review procedure for that claim holding that section 2621 does not apply to claims for breach of warranty holding that section 311034 does not make section 890041 jurisdictional holding that section 1495 does not stand alone and must be read in conjunction with section 2513