equipment,” held controlling as to coverage); American States Ins. Co. v. Dick’s Crane Serv., Inc., 399 So.2d 442, 443-44 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981) (declining to order trial court, on remand, to grant insurer’s summary-judgment motion, based upon automobile policy’s “mobile equipment” exclusion, because policy schedules showed that a premium had been charged for coverage of the truck crane at issue); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Gillis, 164 Ga.App. 278, 282, 296 S.E.2d 253, 256 (1982) (affirming a summary judgment in favor of insureds under a commercial automobile policy where, among other things, the only truck listed as a “covered auto” fell within the definition of “mobile equipment”); and Canal Ins. Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 315 S.C. 1, 3, 431 S.E.2d 577, 579 (1993) (<HOLDING>). But see Mouton v. Armco, Inc., 431 So.2d 776,
holding location of named driver exclusion in endorsement did not make it ambiguous exclusion applied to all coverage afforded by the policy including the um coverage holding that a household exclusion in the policy was void insofar as it denied coverage in the amount required by  3031902 but it was valid as to any coverage exceeding that amount holding that trial court properly construed mobile equipment exclusion as not prohibiting coverage for the only vehicle contemplated by the parties to the policy citing gillis supra holding named driver exclusion eliminating liability coverage as well as um coverage did not contravene um statute because statute required um coverage only if the claimant otherwise qualifies for liability coverage under the policy holding that the plaintiffs asserted legal basis for coverage is irrelevant to the determination of whether the insurance policy provides coverage and instead looking to the facts underlying the claim for coverage