a parole hearing but instead was seeking to be released. See Rather, 973 P.2d at 1267. 7 . We give Fields’s pro se petition the benefit of the doubt by reading it broadly to include an allegation that a recalculation of his parole eligibility date may determine his assignments to work and educational opportunities within the DOC at the present time. Even so, such an allegation does not constitute an immediate practical effect on the restraint of Fields or on any of his fundamental rights. 8 . Fields cites federal authority indicating that the federal writ of habeas corpus is broad enough to entitle him to a hearing on his claims at this time (or at least after he has exhausted his state remedies). See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (<HOLDING>); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 66-67, 88 S.Ct.
holding that managing conservator while in texas to seek return of child by writ of habeas corpus may not be served with civil process and is subject to jurisdiction of court in which habeas corpus is pending and only for purpose of prosecuting writ of habeas corpus holding that a writ of habeas corpus is a state prisoners sole federal remedy for challenging the duration of his imprisonment in order to obtain a speedier release in the future holding that it is well settled in this jurisdiction and elsewhere that  2255 will lie only to attack the imposition of a sentence and that an attack on the execution thereof may be accomplished only by way of habeas corpus in the district of confinement holding that the district court mischaracterized a state prisoners  1983 claim as a petition for writ of habeas corpus because the prisoner did not attack his conviction challenge the fact or length of his confinement or seek immediate release from prison holding that recent cases have established that habeas corpus relief is not limited to immediate release from illegal custody but that the writ is available as well to attack future confinement and obtain future releases