a competitive injury and those without it do not. Because the majority’s construction of the PSA avoids this straightforward conclusion only by reading absent terms into the statute, it should be rejected. The district court correctly held that the language of § 192(a) and (b) is plain, clear, and unambiguous, and that it does not require the Growers to prove an adverse effect on competition. Because § 192(a) and (b) plainly, clearly, and unambiguously do not require an adverse effect on competition, I would so hold and go no further. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 167, 125 S.Ct. 577, 160 L.Ed.2d 548 (2004) (“Given the clear meaning of the text, there is no need to ... consult the purpose of [the statute] at all.”); Lamie, 540 U.S. at 534, 124 S.Ct. 1023 (<HOLDING>); Rogers, 513 F.3d at 225-26 (citing Carrieri
holding that we may consult legislative history as an aid to the interpretation of ambiguous text recognizing longstanding precedents that permit resort to legislative history only when necessary to interpret ambiguous statutory text holding that even where there are  contrary indications in the statutes legislative history we do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear holding that unless a statute is ambiguous on the point at issue a court should not resort to legislative history in interpreting it holding courts must adhere to legislative intent when interpreting a statute