was a “misunderstanding” or “mistake” and that appellant did not intend to engage in the charged offense. See id. at 642; see also Gaytan v. State, 331 S.W.3d 218, 227 (Tex.App.—Austin 2011, pet. ref'd) (“[B]ecause the [extraneous offense] testimony was remarkably similar to [the complainant’s], the trial court could have reasonably found that its inherent probative force was significantly bolstered.”). A claim that an extraneous offense is relevant to show a signature crime is often a shorthand way of saying it is relevant to show the identity of the perpetrator of the charged offense, his modus operandi, or the absence of a mistake or accident. Abshire v. State, 62 S.W.3d 857, 866 (Tex.App,—Texarkana 2001, pet. ref'd) (citing Taylor v. State, 920 S.W.2d 319, 322 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (<HOLDING>), and Owens v. State, 827 S.W.2d 911, 915-16
holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a charge on the lesserincluded offense when the evidence showed either the commission of the completed offense as charged or the commission of no offense such that the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser offense holding that extrinsic offense evidence was admissible to prove intent where the prosecutor stated that she anticipated the defendant would deny his intent to be involved in the charged offense and defense counsel did not even mention that he would refrain from contesting the intent issue holding extraneous acts relevant to show intent in charged offense holding evidence of virtually identical offense was relevant to show intent among other things in trial of charged offense holding that one company was the alter ego of another where among other things the ownership of both entities has been held out to third parties as identical with an identical place of business