of the District Court’s inherent authority. See Appellee’s Br. 14-15. We decline the invitation, because the District Court did not purport to rely on its inherent authority. Instead, it specifically granted the sanctions award under § 1927. The court’s passing reference to the.“reasons offered by Plaintiff’ in the subsequent order liquidating the award of sanctions, Manion v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 96-2094, Order (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2003), App. 169, does not indicate that the District Court intended to rely on a different sanctioning authority than that pursuant to which the sanction was expressly granted. We therefore conclude that the sanctions award was ordered solely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927. . See GRiD Sys. Corp. v. John Fluke Mfg. Co., 41 F.3d 1318, 1320 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); cf. Ashby v. McKenna, 331 F.3d 1148, 1151
recognizing inherent power of federal district court to sanction conduct abusive of judicial process holding the court has the inherent authority to enter an order of confidentiality holding that the district court possessed the inherent judicial authority to empanel a resentencing jury on remand from  reversal of the respondents enhanced sentence and because the district court erred by failing to recognize that it possessed this inherent judicial authority boehl reversed and remanded for the district courts discretionary determination of whether to exercise that authority recognizing district courts inherent authority to dismiss with prejudice for abuse of judicial process holding that a sanction cannot be affirmed under the district courts inherent authority where the court relied on  1927