of this exception and concluded that Apprendi does not impart a fundamental procedural right that is a necessary component of a fair trial. Id.; see also United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664, 670 (9th Cir.2002) (“Sending the drug quantity determination to the jury cannot be fundamental to the fairness of the proceeding if the judge is allowed to make such findings in some circumstances.”), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 939, 123 S.Ct. 48, 154 L.Ed.2d 243 (2002); United States v. Mora, 293 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir.) (noting that Apprendi is “clearly not on the same level as a truly landmark decision such as Gideon [v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) ].”), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 961, 123 S.Ct. 388, 154 L.Ed.2d 315 (2002); McCoy, 266 F.3d at 1258 (<HOLDING>); Sanders, 247 F.3d at 151 (same). Just
holding that apprendi does not apply retroactively in florida in postconviction proceedings to cases that were final on direct review at the time of the apprendi decision holding apprendi is not retroactive holding that apprendi does not apply retroactively holding apprendi does not satisfy second exception in teague holding that apprendi does not apply on collateral review