and not to whether one or more conspiracies existed.” Broce, 781 F.2d at 796 (citing Launius v. United States, 575 F.2d 770 (9th Cir.1978)). 9 . We emphasize, however, that none of our cases interpreting Menna has been faced with the question of whether, consistent with Menna, a double jeopardy claim may be waived by the kind of deliberate relinquishment of a known right which the Supreme Court first described in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). See United States v. Broce, 781 F.2d 792, 802 (10th Cir.1986) (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that a "deliberate decision to relinquish a legal claim" within the meaning of Johnson v. Zerbst should constitute a waiver of a double jeopardy claim); Launius, 575 F.2d at 772 (<HOLDING>). For example, we have never been faced with a
holding that the waiver in two previous contracts was insufficient to support waiver of the contract at issue in that appeal holding that the word waiver is not required to waive a right even when a statute requires clear and unmistakable evidence of waiver holding that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy may be waived pursuant to a bargainedfor plea holding that a defendant and his attorney are a single entity with respect to double jeopardy waiver holding that when the court in menna suggested that a double jeopardy claim may be waived it is clear that the court was referring not to waiver conclusively presumed from a guilty plea but to waiver as defined in johnson v zerbst