right to due process, however, “the unavailable evidence [must have] possessed ‘exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and is of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.’ ” United States v. Riverar-Relle, 333 F.3d 914, 922 (9th Cir.2003) (quoting United States v. Cooper, 983 F.2d 928, 931 (9th Cir.1993)). Because the identity of the number (and its owner) is unknown, Espinoza-Rebollar has not shown a Brady violation. Nor has Espinoza-Rebollar made a showing of the government’s bad faith in delaying the production of the phone number list, which Espinoza-Rebollar alleges was potentially exculpatory. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). Indeed, it is difficult to
holding that a bad faith claim is a tort holding that a mere failure to accord procedural protection called for by state law or regulation does not of itself amount to a denial of due process holding that suppression of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process when evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution holding that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused  violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution holding that unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith   failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law