of the Rehearing Order. Had Williston filed a timely petition for judicial review of the Rehearing Order, which it knew to be a final order subject to judicial review, this court would have been obliged to consider the petition on its merits. The logical extension of Williston’s argument, which we cannot accept, is that a petitioner can file a request for reconsideration of a Commission order whenever it desires, and that such filing tolls the 60-day statute of limitations for judicial quirements, such as the provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 717r, are not mere technicalities that can be brushed aside by a court. And a petitioner cannot escape the NGA’s jurisdictional requirements by filing an untimely or procedurally defective request for reconsideration. See Moreau, 982 F.2d at 563 (<HOLDING>). The simple point here is that “subject-matter
holding that in a case in which petitioners did not move for rehearing of fercs order until approximately eight months after the order issued the court would not exempt from the time limit those who like petitioners choose to sit on the sidelines to wait and see what happens in ferc proceedings holding that the denial of petitioners appeal to the bia would have put a reasonable person in the petitioners position on notice that something was wrong with his attorneys preparation for the removal hearing holding that petitioners have not established the requisite  need    of the highest order holding that the federal role in reviewing an application for habeas corpus is limited to evaluating what occurred in the state or federal proceedings that actually led to the petitioners conviction what occurred in the petitioners collateral proceeding does not enter into the habeas proceeding holding that attorneys admission to an element of the offense in the petitioners presence at a deportation hearing was binding on the petitioners