a whole to determine whether state action existed. The pres F.2d at 1388-89; Holloway, 813 F.2d at 879. 15 . 128 F.3d 1074 (7th Cir.1997). 16 . Id. at 1081-83. The court also noted that, if a court were to take judicial notice of another court's findings of fact, it would render the doctrine of collateral estoppel superfluous. Id. at 1083. 17 . Id. at 1082 n. 6. 18 . We note, however, lhal we have difficulty conceiving of an adjudicative fact found in a court record that is not subject of reasonable dispute and, therefore, of which a court could take judicial notice. If such a fact were to exist, it would seem that it would have to obtain its "indisputable” status from some source other than a court's imprimatur in the form of a factual finding. 19 . See C.A. Hardy, 681 F.2d at 347-48 (<HOLDING>); Cf. Harcon Barge Co., Inc. v. D & G Boat
holding that district court abused its discretion in taking judicial notice that asbestos causes cancer because proposition is inextricably linked to a host of disputed issues holding district court abused its discretion in admitting state court findings of fact holding court abused its discretion when it excluded psychologists testimony regarding host of identification issues among which was crossracial identification holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint holding that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing expert testimony that directly linked the characteristics of sexually abused children to the complainants in this case