out of every breach of contract. Nothing in the PSA suggests that Congress intended this result. The Growers also argue that because other subsections require proof of a competitive injury, limiting subsection (a) to anticompetitive acts would render it superfluous and would therefore violate one of the “cardinal principiéis] of statutory construction” to “give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (quotation omitted). To the contrary, such an interpretation is far from rendering subsection (a) superfluous because it serves as a catchall for acts that Congress could not, at the time of enactment, have foreseen and specified. Cf. Excel Corp. v. USDA, 397 F.3d 1285, 1293 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). While the other subsections make certain acts
holding that in adjudicating property rights affected by new yorks act of attainder of 1779 neither the supreme court nor any court of new york state has ever declared the act to be invalid recognizing that new techniques and tools utilized by covered entities can violate the psa even if the usda has not previously declared them unlawful holding that notice statute applies to both municipal entities and employees of municipal entities acting within the scope of their employment holding entities created by statute can only exercise the powers granted to them by the legislature recognizing that the new mexico legislature declared that new mexico public policy rendered governmental entities and public employees liable only within the nmtcas limitations and in accordance with the principles established in that act