not provide an adequate basis for punishing Hale and McRee’s activity. In addition, the majority’s recognition that the government could arguably have prosecuted Hale and McRee under 18 U.S.C. § 2232 does little more than acknowledge that Hale and McRee were engaged in prosecutable .activity. Section 2232 prohibits a person from destroying or removing property in order to prevent seizure. The majority’s assertion, however, that the government chose to prosecute Hale and McRee under the wrong statute misapprehends the discretionary nature of criminal prosecution under the Code. The mere existence of a basis for prosecution under one section of the Code does not preclude prosecution under a different section, if applicable. See United States v. Perez, 707 F.2d 359, 362 (8th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Spear, 734 F.2d 1, 2 (8th
recognizing that the government did not err in charging a defendant with violation of section 641 even though either section 641 or section 2233 of title 18 could have formed the basis for prosecution holding that a party waives an argument that it raises in the background section of its brief but not in the argument section holding that the invalidity of a provision for a de novo trial in superior court in the appeal section of an act did not affect the validity of the remainder of the appeal section holding that section 311034 does not make section 890041 jurisdictional holding that section 4a12 is a broadly applicable section of the guidelines