has merit. First, the Hopkins Appraisal is not hearsay, because it is not being offered for the truth of the matters stated (e.g., that the actual value of Anand's station at the time of the appraisal was $1,560,000), but merely to prove that the appraisal was conducted. Second, the Hopkins Appraisal is properly authenticated, as Anand produced it to defendant during discovery. (See Osenbaugh Deck, ¶ 3.) Documents produced in response to discovery requests are admissible on a motion for summary judgment since they are self-authenticating and constitute the admissions of a party opponent. See Architectural Iron Worlcers Local No. 63 Welfare Fund v. United Contractors, Inc., 46 F.Supp.2d 769, 771-72 (N.D.Ill.1999); Federal Trade Commission v. Hughes, 710 F.Supp. 1520, 1523 (N.D.Tex.1989) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Anand’s husband subsequently
holding that any general deadline for completion of discovery facially applies to requests for admissions holding that rule 36 requests for admissions are not included within the parameters of a general cutoff for discovery in a scheduling order holding that documents produced in response to discovery requests were authenticated under rule 901b4 of the federal rules of evidence and constituted party admissions under rule 801d2a holding that requests for admissions are subject to discovery cutoff dates holding that plaintiff need not have submitted requests for admissions by the august 15 discovery motion cutoff date or by the discovery cutoff date of september 15 because requests for admissions are distinct from other general discovery devices and are not subject to discovery cutoff dates