evidence of juror misconduct or extrinsic influence on the jury. • The allegations in the Roberts Affidavit, on the other hand, clearly involve extrinsic communications that, if properly presented to the district court, necessitate further inquiry. See e.g., Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 363, 365, 87 S.Ct. 468, 470-71, 17 L.Ed.2d 4 ing with the jury’s duty to deliberate specifically instructs the jury that “[yjour deliberations will be secret; you will never have to explain your verdict to anyone.” Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instmctions, Criminal Cases, Basic Instruction No. 11 (West 1997). Equally important is the court’s interest in preserving the finality of the jury’s verdict. See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120, 107 S.Ct. 2739, 2747, 97 L.Ed.2d 90 (1987) (<HOLDING>). The court’s ruling excluding the Roberts
recognizing that investigation into other criteria of section 2272a2a unnecessary if adequate investigation shows one criterion lacking recognizing that postverdict investigation seriously disrupts finality of process holding that after a reasonable investigation an insurer must promptly settle a claim for the value or within the range assigned to the claim as a result of its investigation holding the itc may reasonably interpret the subject to investigation provision to mean that imports covered by a suspension agreement in which an investigation is temporarily terminated are not subject to investigation while under that agreement emphasis added recognizing that the expectation of finality and tranquility is an interest protected by the prohibition on double jeopardy