566 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e)("If a mobile home is attached in such a manner [indicating an intention that it be a permanent part of the real estate] to a homestead, it is entitled to homestead protection.”) (citations omitted); Capitol Aggregates, Inc. v. Walker, 448 S.W.2d 830, 835 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e)("All homesteads, excluding the land, consist of an aggregation of chattels. It is their attachment to realty which gives them homestead character.”); Clark v. Vitz, 190 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tex.Civ.App.Dallas 1945, writ ref'd) (approving use of homestead exemption for mobile trailer affixed to debtor’s "homestead lot” and used as an extension of family’s brick house). 12 . Gann, 210 S.W.2d at 260. See Cullers, 1 S.W. at 315 (<HOLDING>). 13 . In re Ross, 210 B.R. 320, 323
holding that homestead exemption was unavailable even though claimants were  living on the land and claiming it as homestead with the permission or acquiescence of the owner for they could have no homestead right or interest in land to which they had no title holding that a challenge to part b determinations in an order involving both part a and part b must begin in district court holding that a mill and gin could be considered part of an exempt homestead if they were part of the exempt realty holding that because nondischargeable debt based on fraud was not one of the four enumerated exceptions to exempt property the exempt property was not liable for the creditors surviving claim holding that assistant managers were exempt under the executive exemption because inter alia even taking their longer hours into account the exempt employees were paid substantially higher wages