faith. We have explained that when an affiant “in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth” of his statements or when “circumstances evincing obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the allegations” were present, the affiant can be said to have crossed the line into recklessness. Ranney, 298 F.3d at 78 (quoting United States v. Williams, 737 F.2d 594, 602 (7th Cir. 1984)); accord Tanguay, 787 F.3d at 52. In contrast, small inaccuracies in a warrant affidavit do not invalidate the warrant if those inaccuracies result from good-faith mistakes. See, e.g., United States v. Capozzi, 347 F.3d 327, 332-33 (1st Cir. 2003) (emphasizing importance of leeway for affidavits drafted by nonlawyers “under significant time pressure”); United States v. Brunette, 256 F.3d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>). So, too, incorrect assertions made in good
holding that when a warrant did not describe the items to be seized at all it was so obviously deficient that we must regard the search as warrantless  holding that an enhancement for distribution of child pornography to a minor was improper because the pornographic materials at issue were transmitted to an undercover law enforcement officer who was not a minor holding that evidence seized pursuant to a warrant based on materially false and misleading information is inadmissible at trial holding that primary jurisdiction did not apply where the court had to determine whether defendants all natural claims were misleading holding that statement that all seized images were pornographic when at least two of thirtythree were not was misleading but did not justify suppression