as “strong medicine” to be employed “sparingly and only as a last resort.” Id. at 613, 93 S.Ct. 2908. Thus, before the doctrine may be invoked, the overbreadth must be real and substantial, “judged in relation to the [law’s] plainly legitimate sweep.” Id. at 615, 93 S.Ct. 2908; see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767-73, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982). A law is unconstitutional in every application if the law itself — as opposed to some number of its applications — contains a defect that renders it unconstitutional under the applicable substantive constitutional standard. See Munson, 467 U.S. at 967 n. 13, 104 S.Ct. 2839; see also Schultz v. Frisby, 807 F.2d 1339, 1349 (7th Cir.1986), rev’d on other grounds by 487 U.S. 474, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988) (<HOLDING>). In Munson, the Court noted that courts
recognizing that the possibility of a tradeoff between merits relief and attorneys fees is often implicit in class action settlement negotiations recognizing difference between tolling and equitable estoppel recognizing distinction between two types of waiver recognizing difference in elements between offense of actual entry and attempted entry recognizing difference between two forms of facial challenges and stating that they are often conflated