disfavors the voters in the counties in which they reside, placing them in a position of constitutionally unjustifiable inequality vis-a-vis voters in irrationally favored counties.” Id. at 207-08, 82 S.Ct. 691. The Court thus concluded that these plaintiffs had standing because they were asserting “ ‘a plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes,’ not merely a claim of the right possessed by every citizen to require that the government be administered according to the law ....” Id. at 208, 82 S.Ct. 691 (citations omitted). As already explained, plaintiff falls within the latter category. Plaintiff has also not alleged that he is being treated differently from any other voter in Tennessee. See Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 402 (6th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Instead, he asserts that he, like every other
holding that the federal due process clause protects a state employee who under state law has a legitimate claim of entitlement to state employment recognizing right to participate in state elections on equal basis with other qualified voters whenever the state has adopted an elective process for determining who will represent any segment of the states population citation omitted holding that a state may not condition voting in state elections on payment of a tax holding that where it is alleged that state has violated rights conferred by constitution governmental immunity is not available in state court action but declining to infer a right to sue the state for damages on the basis of a violation of the michigan constitution holding that the potential harm caused to uocava voters far outweighed the burden placed upon the state because of the states legally mandated obligation to provide uocava voters the ability to vote