premises, and the owner or occupant is under no duty to reconstruct or alter the premises so as to obviate known and obvious dangers. Dixon v. General Grocery Co., 293 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Mo.1956) (citations omitted). Thus, “[a possessor] is under no duty to protect an invitee who is in an equal position to protect himself [or herself]. Where the danger is obvious or known to the invitee he [or she] consents to the risk and the [possessor] owes no duty.” Sellens v. Christman, 418 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Mo.1967). The possessor’s liability is based upon its superior knowledge of the dangerous condition of the premises which results in injury. E.g., Ward v. Temple Stephens Co., 418 S.W.2d 935, 938 (Mo.1967), abrogated in part by Sheil v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co., 781 S.W.2d 778, 780-81 (Mo.1989) (banc) (<HOLDING>); White v. Kroger Co., 573 S.W.2d 375, 376
holding that speculative theory of possible injury insufficient to establish injury in fact under article ills case or controversy requirement holding general allegations of injury satisfy requirements of article iii and a plaintiff need not allege each specific subsidiary fact that supports its general claim of injury holding that foreseeability of causing injury in texas though not determinative is important consideration in establishing minimum contacts holding that the time to disposition is more important than time to trial holding method of merchandising and nature of article causing injury more important than length of time dangerous article has been in area in which injury occurs