have never been governed by the three-part extent-of-conflict analysis applicable to defendants seeking new court-appointed counsel. Unless the substitution would cause significant delay or inefficiency or run afoul of the other considerations we have men tioned, a defendant can fire his retained or appointed lawyer and retain a new attorney for any reason or no reason. See Miller v. Blacketter, 525 F.3d 890, 896 (9th Cir.2008) (in a case in which the defendant sought to replace his court-appointed attorney with retained counsel, evaluating “whether the trial judge’s decision was an unreasonable exercise of its discretion to balance Miller’s right to his chosen counsel against concerns of fairness and scheduling”); Bradley v. Henry, 510 F.3d 1093, 1096-98 (9th Cir.2007) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Conflict between the defendant and his
holding that denial of request for continuance to allow retained counsel to prepare for trial did not deny defendant effective assistance of counsel when defendant had waited more than two months to retain an attorney courtappointed counsel appeared competent and defendants motion failed to state when retained counsel would be ready recognizing right to privately retained counsel holding the state courts denial of a motion to substitute retained counsel for appointed counsel to be an unreasonable application of gonzalezlopez because it was not justified by undue delay and the trial court wrongly assumed without questioning the defendant that she could not afford to pay retained counsel holding that in determining whether there exists a valid waiver of the right to counsel in the criminal setting the court may consider a defendants lack of good faith in working with appointed counsel including an unreasonable refusal to cooperate with counsel or an unreasonable request for substitution of appointed counsel and the timeliness of defendants request for new counsel particularly when a defendant makes an untimely request for new counsel  under circumstances which are likely to result in a continuance recognizing a defendants right to dismiss retained counsel in favor of appointed counsel