against a physician or health care provider that are not founded upon a breach of an accepted standard of care. Id. The court pointed out that claims that are “health care liability claims” may not be “recast” as other causes of action in order to avoid requirements of the Act. Id. at 242. The underlying nature of the claim determines whether it is truly a health care liability claim, and thus governed by the Act. Id. As one court has noted, “[i]f the cause of action is based on the physician’s breach of the accepted standard of medical care, the cause of action is nothing more than a health care liability claim, no matter how the plaintiff labels it.” Wright v. Folder, 991 S.W.2d 343, 352 (TexApp.—Fort Worth 1999, no pet.); see also Earle v. Ratliff, 998 S.W.2d 882, 892-93 (Tex.1999) (<HOLDING>). Just as a health care liability claim may not
holding statute of limitations for dtpa action including claim for breach of express or implied warranty under the dtpa is two years holding that since the court could disentangle the inadequately pleaded fraud claims from the plaintiffs dtpa causes of action the defendant was not entitled to dismissal of the plaintiffs dtpa claims for failure to meet rule 9b pleading requirements holding that the plaintiffs causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an erisa plan holding that ordinary negligence and gross negligence are not separate causes of action holding that plaintiffs dtpa causes of action were actually negligence claims because they all complained of earles failure to hold to the applicable standard of care