defined as sedentary and, even with arthritis, she could perform some sedentary jobs. In reaching this conclusion, however, the ALJ neglected to evaluate whether the claimant’s arthritis would prevent her from writing and typing — skills required by the particular type of sedentary work she had performed. Id. The ALJ’s error, which required us to remand the case, “lay in equating [the claimant’s] past relevant work to sedentary work in general.” Id. Other circuits have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Bowman v. Astrue, 511 F.3d 1270, 1272-73 (10th Cir .2008) (remanding to the agency where the ALJ did not address the impact of the claimant’s limited use of her hand on her ability to perform her past relevant work as cashier); Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 845 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 973 (8th Cir.
holding the alj does not have to specifically refer to every piece of evidence so long as the decision is not a broad rejection that is insufficient to permit a court to conclude that the alj considered the claimants medical condition as a whole recognizing the principle that an administrative agency error should not work to a claimants detriment holding that the alj should have considered that the claimants past relevant work required constant stooping and bending recognizing the established principle that the alj is not required to take the claimants assertions of pain at face value holding that at step four the claimant bears the burden of proving that she cannot perform her past relevant work