of action and requires parties to raise in a single lawsuit all the grounds for recovery arising from a single transaction or series of transactions that can be brought together. See Bio-Technology Gen. Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 80 F.3d 1553, 1563 (Fed. Cir.1996); Hawkins v. Dawn, 208 Tenn. 544, 548, 347 S.W.2d 480, 481-82 (1961); Vance v. Lancaster, 4 Tenn. (3 Hayw.) 130, 132 (1816). The principle is subject to certain limitations, one of which is that it will not be applied if the initial forum did not have the power to award the full measure of relief sought in the later litigation. See Davidson v. Capuano, 792 F.2d 275, 279 (2d Cir.1986); Carris v. John R. Thomas & Assocs., P.C., 896 P.2d 522, 529-30 (Okla.1995); see also Rose v. Stalcup, 731 S.W.2d 541, 542 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1987) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the Restatement of Judgments points
holding subsequent action not barred by res judicata because the thing sued for in the initial action was an injunction against heathrows threatened breach of contract while the thing sued for in the subsequent action was money damages allegedly sustained as a result of heathrows actual breach of contract where the damages alleged in the subsequent action unlike the damages alleged here arose after trial of the initial action holding that a subsequent action was not barred because the initial court did not have jurisdiction over the claim holding that because the circuit court did not have subjectmatter jurisdiction over the unlawfuldetainer action the district courts unauthorized transfer of the action could not transfer jurisdiction over that action to the circuit court holding because an initial order contemplated the subsequent entry of a judgment the initial order was not considered a final adjudication holding that the court of claims did not have jurisdiction over plaintiffs first amendment claim of improper removal