grounds for his termination. The provision that allegedly proscribes Adamov’s behavior, see Appellant’s Br, at 24, applies to "employees in the securities industry,” R. 108-4 (2006 Policy at 19) (Page ID # 1106), not to retail bankers such as Adamov, R. 50-1 (Adamov Resume) (Page ID # 573). Moreover, the 2006 policy did not prohibit lending to customers. See R. 108-4 (2006 Policy at 18) (Page ID # 1105). Without evidence that U.S. Bank “previously contemplated” terminating Adamov when it interviewed him regarding the $10,000 loan, we cannot discount the suspicious temporal proximity between Adamov's complaint of discrimination at that interview and U.S, Bank’s decision to terminate him. See Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 272, 121 S.Ct. 1508, 149 L.Ed.2d 509 (2001) (<HOLDING>). 6 . U.S. Bank repeatedly stresses that “[a]t
holding that standing alone even very close temporal proximity cannot operate as a proxy for a plaintiffs evidentiary requirement and is insufficient to carry a plaintiffs burden on the third prong of his prima facie case holding that close temporal proximity is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation holding that onemonth temporal proximity was sufficient to establish causation and noting that the prima facie burden in this context is not an onerous one holding that temporal proximity did not support a prima facie case where the employer was contemplating the transfer before it learned of the suit holding that a prima facie case is subject to independent review