officials through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, thereby rendering our state exclusionary rule superfluous after nearly four decades of independent application). This exclusionary rule has always been understood to bar evidence gathered under the authority of an unconstitutional statute (see Brocamp, 307 Ill. 448 (adopting the reasoning in Weeks for purposes of our state exclusionary rule); Weeks, 232 U.S. at 394, 58 L. Ed. at 656, 34 S. Ct. at 345 (making it clear that the federal exclusionary rule was intended to apply to evidence gathered by officers acting under "legislative *** sanction”)), so long as that statute purported to authorize an unconstitutional search or seizure (see Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 61 L. Ed. 2d 343, 99 S. Ct. 2627 (1979) (<HOLDING>)). Consequently, to adopt Krull’s extended
recognizing good faith exception to fourth amendment exclusionary rule holding that fourth amendment claims are not cognizable on habeas review because the fourth amendment exclusionary rule does not relate to the accuracy of the factfinding process holding that the fourth amendment and the exclusionary rules are not implicated by a private search holding that the exclusionary rule under the fourth amendment applies to civil forfeiture proceedings recognizing a substantiveprocedural distinction not at issue here specifically holding that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule did not apply where an ordinance was held unconstitutional on vagueness grounds