(1965); Hoffman, 268 F.2d at 296-97; Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138, 147 (2d Cir.1999). Thus, the cryptic reference to the common law in Malley’s footnote 7 would appear to preclude judicial action as a superseding cause only in the situation in which the information, submitted to the judge, was deceptive. Egervary also cites case law from other circuits to argue that, because each of the defendants allegedly participated in one way or another in making representations to the District Judge prior to the execution of the Order, all of the defendants should be held liable for the subsequent deprivation of his rights. These cited cases, however, are not inconsistent with the conclusion we reach above. The cited cases include Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 353-54 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Warner v. Orange County Dep’t of Probation,
holding that the district court abused its discretion in denying the defendants timely motion for the substitution of the participating prosecutor in order to permit the defense to call the prosecutor as a witness holding that the chain of causation was not broken where the prosecutor allegedly fabricated evidence holding that it was permissible for prosecutor to comment on the general failure of the defense to produce any evidence holding that the race of the prosecutor is irrelevant holding the prosecutor is required to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury