United States v. Ruiz-Terrazas, 477 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir.2007). Defendant’s challenge to the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss is premised on the Speedy Trial Act’s requirement that a defendant be given at least 30 days to prepare for trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c). In United States v. Rojas-Contreras, 474 U.S. 231, 236,106 S.Ct. 555, 88 L.Ed.2d 537 (1985), however, the Supreme Court held that the Speedy Trial Act “does not require that the 30-day trial preparation period be restarted upon the filing of a superseding indictment....” The Court further made clear that although the 30-day period does not start over at the filing of a superseding indictment, this does not mean “that a defendant must always be compelled to go to trial less than 3 6 (10th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>), abrogated on other grounds, United States v.
holding that proper remedy for failure to exhaust is dismissal of the claim without prejudice holding that the proper remedy if the superseding indictment operates to prejudice a defendant is a continuance holding that there was no violation of defendants speedy trial act rights where the district court granted a continuance due to a superseding indictment returned five days before trial which added new charges based on recently acquired information holding that the dismissal of an indictment before trial and institution of a superseding indictment does not trigger double jeopardy holding initial indictment which was subsequently found to be invalid tolled the thirtyday period and superseding indictment alleging different charges based on same fraudulent acts as earlier indictment was therefore timely