to the corpora tion and the plaintiff stockholder is merely “a nominal plaintiff.” Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty, 330 U.S. 518, 523, 67 S.Ct. 828, 91 L.Ed. 1067 (1947); Reilly Mortgage Group, Inc. v. Mount Vernon Savings and Loan Assoc., 568 F.Supp. 1067, 1073 (E.D.Va.1983). Even so, the complaining stockholder often names the corporation as a defendant in a derivative action, as was done here, to ensure the presence of an indispensable party in the litigation. See, e.g., Liddy v. Urbanek, 707 F.2d 1222, 1223 (11th Cir.1983); Reilly, 568 F.Supp. at 1073. Thereafter, once the corporation is properly joined in the suit, it can then be realigned as a plaintiff, if appropriate, in accordance with its true interests in the litigation. See Indianapolis, 314 U.S. at 69, 62 S.Ct. 15 (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). The third relevant legal
holding that courts must look to the state that rendered the judgment to determine whether the courts of that state would afford the judgment preclusive effect recognizing that courts may look beyond the statutory text to determine legislative intent only when the statute is ambiguous recognizing a court must look beyond the plain language of a statute when the literal interpretation would lead to an absurd result recognizing that federal courts must look beyond the pleadings and arrange the parties according to their sides in the dispute holding that in construing statute courts must first look to its plain language