imputation Whether federal common law or state law applies to imputation of knowledge under 28 U.S.C. § 2514 is a question of first impression. In O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 114 S.Ct. 2048, 129 L.Ed.2d 67 (1994), the Supreme Court held that state law governs issues of knowledge imputation when the FDIC sues as receiver of a corporation under causes of action created by state law. The Court reasoned (1) that FIRREA, which empowered the FDIC as receiver, did not preempt state imputation law and (2) that judicial creation of a special federal rule was not justified because there was no significant conflict between a federal policy or interest and the use of state law. See id. at 85-89, 114 S.Ct. 2048; cf. Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 117 S.Ct. 666, 136 L.Ed.2d 656 (1997) (<HOLDING>). In this case, however, federal law may govern
holding that trademark infringement under michigan common law is governed by the likelihood of confusion standard holding that the admissibility of expert testimony was governed by state law holding a state workers compensation regime preempted by erisa to the extent state law applied to pension plans governed by federal law holding that state law not federal common law governed legal standard of care owed to federally chartered federally insured institutions holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law