that he knew that the loan to Segundo was outstanding and he appropriated the equipment anyway. Monson makes various excuses for his behavior, including: (1) Segundo knew what they were entering into a high-risk venture, and so once their business got closed down by law enforcement, the Agreement between them became null and void; (2) other creditors had claims or potential claims against the equipment; (3) Segundo never owned or had a valid security in ptcy court’s determination that a judgment in favor of plaintiffs, resulting from an automobile accident, was dis-chargeable in bankruptcy because “the appellants did not prove by inference or innuendo that [the defendant] intended to cause the accident or resulting injury”); see also Kawaauhau, 523 U.S. at 61-64, 118 S.Ct. at 977 (<HOLDING>). Finally, a preponderance of the evidence
holding expert testimony not required to defeat summary judgment in medical malpractice suit because defendant doctors admissions were sufficient to establish the standard of care holding that general medical malpractice claims do fall with waiver provision of ttca holding that a debt arising from a medical malpractice judgment which was attributable to a doctors negligent or reckless conduct did not fall within the willful and malicious injury exception to discharge holding that a patients settlement of a prior action brought against him by doctors for payment of a bill did not bar medical malpractice action against doctors holding that if both willful and malicious are not met the debt is dischargeable