of the Strickland test,” a defendant’s ability to make the “requisite showing will turn on the facts of a particular case”); 528 U.S. at 487, 120 S.Ct. 1029 (vacating because the “court below undertook neither part of the Strickland inquiry”). Accordingly, as the Wiggins Court could, consistent with AEDPA, look to Williams as illustrative of the proper application of Strickland to a particular factual scenario, we can look to Flores-Ortega as illustrative of the proper application of Strickland here. The propriety of looking to Flores-Ortega as illustrative of “clearly established Federal law” under AEDPA should not be surprising. Rather, such use simply accords with the fact that, as Judge Duncan has explained, Supreme Court precedent establishes Flores-Ortega as an old rule under )(<HOLDING>). In sum, Wiggins and the case at hand
holding that counsels failure to file appeal was not deficient performance under strickland where the petitioner in  2255 action did not direct counsel to file an appeal and acquiesced in counsels decision to pursue as an alternative a reduction in sentence holding that trial counsel owes a criminal defendant a duty to file a notice of appeal regardless of whether the attorney was retained for the appeal or not holding that the granting of an application to file an appeal out of time is considered part of the direct appeal process under oklahoma law holding that the strickland test applies to claims  that counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal recognizing that roe v floresortega clarified the application of the strickland standard to a claim that an attorney was constitutionally deficient for failing to file a notice of appeal