are distinguishable as individual actions when they are outside the scope of his employment. McGehee v. DePoyster, 708 So.2d 77, 80 (¶ 10) (Miss.1998). In McGehee, the supreme court made clear the fact a defendant was a government employee at the time he committed the alleged tortious acts does not in itself mandate notice. “[G]overnmental employment, standing alone, does not trigger the notice provision of the [MTCA].” Id. (quoting Bienz v. Bloom, 674 N.E.2d 998, 1004 (Ind.Ct.App.1996)). If “a government employee [is] sued in his individual capacity for actions not within his scope of employment,” then section 11-46-1 l(l)’s notice provision does not apply. McGehee, 708 So.2d at 78 (¶ 1). But see Holmes v. Defer, 722 So.2d 624, 625 (¶ 9) (Miss.1998) (overruled on other grounds) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 42. Mississippi Code Annotated section
holding a suit against a sheriff in his individual capacity was subject to section 1146llls notice requirements because the sheriff was acting in his official capacity holding plaintiff stated claim in his individual capacity holding that suit against county sheriff in his official capacity was suit against county holding that acts by a sheriff which gave rise to the plaintiffs claim against him were taken in the execution of his duties as sheriff and thus the sheriff was immune under  14 from an action seeking damages against him in his individual capacity holding that in a bivens action service upon employee in his official capacity does not amount to service in his individual capacity