at *2 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist] Dec. 15, 2005, no pet.) (applying section 154.001 to modification suit under Chapter 156) (mem. op.). 5 . These statutes permit a trial court to order a parent to pay the other parent or an amicus attorney reasonable attorney’s fees as child support in a non-enforcement modification suit. Because these statutes do not expressly mention attorney's fees, our dissenting colleagues conclude that no statute permits such an order. See post at pp. 718-21. But the Texas Legislature is free to express itself through general rather than specific language, and the meaning of a statute can be implied from the express statements in the statutory text. See Tex. Indus. Energy Consumers v. CenterPoint Energy Houston Electric, LLC, 324 S.W.3d 95, 105-07 (Tex.2010) (<HOLDING>); Sturgis Air One, L.L.C. v. Harris County
holding that the fee applicant bears the burden of showing that  an adjustment is necessary to the determination of a reasonable fee  holding that an attorney was entitled to a quantum meruit recovery even though his oral contingency fee agreement with the client violated the ind rules of professional conduct which require a contingency fee agreement to be in writing holding that transferors request to recover fee it had paid was within the scope of the general statutory language allowing recovery of reasonable costs of participating in a proceeding even though other party was initially responsible for paying this fee and even though statute did not specifically provide that such recovery was allowed holding that where a contract for legal services fails to expressly provide for the amount of the fee a reasonable fee is implied holding that an award of attorney fees for services rendered at the instance of the custodial parent in defending an action for change of custody may be allowed even though the defense was unsuccessful and even though it was claimed that such an award violated public policy