locations, Hickerson v. City of New York, 146 F.3d 99, 107-08 (2d Cir.1998), and whether these alternatives afford a reasonable opportunity to locate and operate such a business, Buzzetti, 140 F.3d at 140-41. See also Isbell v. City of San Diego, 258 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir.2001) (“To decide whether constitutionally sufficient alternatives exist, [a court should] first ... determine how many sites are available and then determine whether that number is sufficient to afford adult establishments a reasonable opportunity to locate.” (internal citations omitted)). In approaching these inquiries, we look also to the time, place, and manner cases, from which the adult zoning cases descend, and to which they bear a strong family resemblance. See Young, 427 U.S. at 63 & n. 18, 96 S.Ct. 2440 (<HOLDING>). Although the two inquiries are not equivalent
holding that contentneutral time place and manner regulations are acceptable so long as they are narrowly tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication holding that regulating the location of adult films does not violate the first amendment and citing as support the proposition that reasonable regulations of the time place and manner of protected speech where those regulations are necessary to further significant governmental interests are permitted by the first amendment holding that the video games at issue are expressive and qualify as speech for purposes of the first amendment holding that possession of marijuana is not protected by the free exercise clause of the first amendment holding that even in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time place or manner of protected speech provided the restrictions are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information