errors in the record; and (5) the relative strength and weakness of the case. Id. (citing State v. Buck, 670 S.W.2d 600, 609 (Tenn.1984)). We have reviewed the record in this case and conclude that the prosecutor’s conduct does not mandate reversal under Bigbee. Hunter’s testimony was relevant to respond to defense claims contesting identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of the prior offenses about which the clerk testified. See Cozzolino, 584 S.W.2d at 768. It was inappropriate, however, to introduce evidence of the facts and circumstances of those prior crimes that was not relevant to the identification issue. The prosecutor could have elicited testimony from Hunter limited to Hunter’s ability to identify the defendant. Cf. State v. Dyle, 899 S.W.2d 607, 612 (Tenn.1995) (<HOLDING>). As for the argument, this case is
holding that jury must be instructed that value of identification testimony may depend upon the witnesss capacity and opportunity to observe the offender holding that agents testimony as to witnesss identification was not hearsay holding that a federal courts inquiry into the reliability of expert testimony is flexible and may depend upon a variety of considerations holding that whether and to what extent a witnesss testimony should be believed is a matter to be decided by the jury that saw and heard the testimony not by an appellate court reviewing a transcript holding that a witnesss testimony or an exhibit may not explicitly and directly contain an opinion as to a trial witnesss credibility