statute impacts the employers’ or plan sponsors’ discretion as to how health benefits may be structured under their employee benefit plans. It e^gplieitly directs that they may not structure their programs so as to exclude any provider willing and able to participate. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 737-41, 105 S.Ct.. 2380, 2388-89, 85 L.Ed.2d 728 (1985) (state statute requiring all insured benefit plans to purchase specific benefits when purchasing insurance ‘relates to’ employee benefit plans); Stuart Circle Hosp. Corp. v. Aetna Health Management, 995 F.2d 500, 502 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 579, 126 L.Ed.2d 478 (1993) (Virginia’s ‘any willing provider statute’ ‘relates to’ employee benefit plans); cf. United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1193 (<HOLDING>). Having determined that the Any Willing
holding that a statute regulating only hospital rates did not relate to erisa plans merely because it had the net result of increasing insurers and selffunded plans costs of providing benefits holding that selffunded employee benefit plans governed by erisa are not subject to direct state regulation holding that a termination of an erisa plans benefits must be based upon the plans terms and language holding that a statute relates to erisa plans for the purposes of preemption if it requires the plans to purchase the  benefits specified in the statute when they purchase a certain kind of common insurance policy holding that a state law requiring benefit plans to include minimum benefits related to erisa plans