As Central States points out, the court noted there that “had the parties intended to bind [the employer] to [the trust agreement’s] terms, they could easily have done so by having [the employer] sign the Agreement or by referencing it in the collective bargaining agreements.” Id. at 40. Here, of course, the trust agreement was specifically referenced. Thus, we find that Hi-Way is bound by the terms of the trust agreement. It is well established that parties can agree to an interest rate other than the standard one contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1961. See Hymel v. UNC, Inc., 994 F.2d 260, 265 (5th Cir.1993) (quoting In re Lift Equipment Service, Inc., 816 F.2d 1013, 1018 (5th Cir.1987)); see also Ocasek v. Manville Corp. Asbestos Disease Compensation Fund, 956 F.2d 152, 154 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). We find that Hi-Way has made such an
holding that bankruptcy plan of reorganization rather than  1961 controlled the setting of the interest rate holding that postconfirmation income that is not necessary to the fulfillment of the plan of reorganization does not become pari of bankruptcy estate holding that state property tax liens are not entitled to the states statutory interest rate as a matter of law rather the appropriate rate of interest is determined by the equities of each case holding that remedies provided in the bankruptcy code for enforcing a chapter 11 plan of reorganization are not exclusive holding that postconfirmation income that is not necessary to the fulfillment of the plan of reorganization does not become part of the bankruptcy estate