and their respective representatives are acting. My Bread Baking Co. v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 353 Mass. 614, 619, 233 N.E.2d 748, 751-52 (1968); see also American Home Assur. Co. v. Sport Maska, Inc., 808 F.Supp. 67, 73 (D.Mass.1992). There are no such circumstances here, and therefore the liabilities MAI accrued when it entered into contracts with Majestic in 1986 and 1989 cannot be attributed to OAM. First, although DTI did own both MAI (100%) and OAM (84%) in the late 1980s, and even though DTI was largely owned by Alejandro DeTomaso (80%), as noted above, these facts alone are not enough to disregard the corporate separateness of the two corporations. My Bread Baking Co., 353 Mass. at 619, 233 N.E.2d at 751-52; Miller v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 779 F.2d 769, 772 (1st Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, something more is needed, but is
holding that corporate law should apply because key question was legal effect of contracts between corporations holding that because the corporate parent and subsidiary defendants before it observed all of the corporate formalities necessary to maintain corporate separateness notwithstanding the parents active involvement in the subsidiaries operations the evidence did not establish that the entities were alter egos of one another holding that a corporate officer acting in his or her official capacity could not tortiously interfere with a corporate contract because corporations act only through their officers and agents holding common officers between corporations are not enough to disregard corporate separateness recognizing that insolvent corporations officers are directors and may have fiduciary duty to existing creditors not to dissipate corporate assets