case. We therefore reject the school’s officials’ argument that Stroud's acts were not under col- or of state law.”). This statement of the issue begs the essential question. 22 . See Tex.Civ.Prac. and Rem.Code §§ 101.021 and .051 (1986); Tex.Educ.Code § 21.912(b) (1987); Tex. Penal Code § 22.011(a)(2) (1989); Salinas v. Fort Worth Cab & Baggage Co., 725 S.W.2d 701 (Tex.1987) (suit against cab company based on its employee’s rape of plaintiff). Stroud, in fact, "pled guilty to criminal charges stemming from his molestation of Jane Doe.” Maj. op. at 449. 23 . The fatal flaw in the majority’s analysis can be shown with one hypothetical: assume that a teacher shoots a student for not turning in his or her homework. Following the majority's approach, there exists a "real nex 1th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1467 (8th
holding that to prevail on a  1983 claim a plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law in other words that there was state action holding that a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing the traditional functions of counsel to a criminal defendant holding that a town manager did not act under color of state law when making allegedly defamatory statements about the plaintiff holding that public defenders do not act under color of state law and therefore are not subject to suit under 42 usc  1983 holding um did not act under color of state law when it terminated an employee