(quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965)). “Procedural due process rules are meant to protect persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property.” Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978). “[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). In resolving claims that an individuals procedural due process rights have been violated, three factors are considered: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the pr D.C.2005) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 440 F.3d 489, 503 (D.C.Cir.2006)
holding that neither the fifth amendment nor due process requires application of privilege against selfincrimination in sexually dangerous persons proceedings recognizing  1983 substantive due process claim holding that the act violates neither separation of powers nor principles of due process by allowing a victim veto that precludes application of the act as well as holding that the act is not void for vagueness and does not constitute a form of cruel or unusual punishment holding that adam walsh act violates fifth amendments guarantee of procedural due process holding that dna act violates neither substantive nor procedural due process under the fifth amendment