Resolution of Plaintiffs tortious interference with contract claim is substantially dependent — if not utterly reliant — on the interpretation of the CBA, and is therefore preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA. See Sampson v. Medisys Health Network Inc., No. 10-CV-1342 (SJF)(ARL), 2011 WL 579155, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 08, 2011) (“[A]ny claims arising from breach of a plaintiffs [collective bargaining agreement] are preempted by section 301.”); Arnold v. Beth Abraham Health Servs., Inc., No. 09 Civ. 6049(DLC), 2009 WL 5171736, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2009) (“Such claims [of tortious interference with contract] must necessarily fail because they are preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA.”); Korthas v. NE Foods, Inc., No. 5:03-CV-552 (HGM/DEP), 2006 WL 519401, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2006) (<HOLDING>); Amendolare v. Schenkers Int’l Forwarders,
holding section 301 preempted plaintiffs claim for tortious interference with contract because that claim would require interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement holding plaintiffs state law claims of inter alia tortious interference with contract are preempted by section 301 of lmra holding that plaintiffs title vii claims were not preempted by section 301 despite collective bargaining agreement and stating that the purposes of  301 are not subverted when a federal court hears a claim brought under a federal statute holding state law claim preempted by  301 of labor management relations act only if application of state law requires interpretation of collective bargaining agreement holding that the lmra preempted plaintiffemployees claim under michigan law for tortious interference with contractual relations breach of contract is an essential element of a tortious interference claim and resolution of such claim would require the court to interpret collective bargaining agreement to determine if that agreement had been breached