agreement generated under California law constituted consent). Of course, it is beyond dispute that the drafters of both our federal and state constitutions took the right to be free from unreasonable, warrantless searches seriously. See generally Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 269-75 (explaining events surrounding the drafting and ratification of the Federal and Iowa Constitutions). Yet, we need not comb for textual differences between the Fourth Am voluntarily consent to these search provisions, however. See United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 & n. 15 (9th Cir.1975) (rejecting an argument that the “contract theory” of parole could be applied to probationers so as to make “[sjubmission [to any search] the price of probation”); Grubbs v. State, 373 So.2d 905, 910 (Fla.1979) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. LaFrance, 402 Mass. 789, 525
holding warrantless search of probationers home by probation officers based on reasonable suspicion was constitutionally permissible when conditions of probation required probationer to submit to home visits but not searches holding warrantless search of probationers home by law enforcement officer for investigatory purposes was reasonable when conditions of probation included a search term and search was supported by reasonable suspicion holding that warrantless search as probation condition was a valid limitation to the defendants fourth amendment rights when defendant asserted the condition was not reasonably related to rehabilitation holding that the special needs of wisconsins probation system justified a warrantless search of a probationer by probation officers pursuant to a wisconsin regulation that allowed probation searches based on reasonable grounds holding condition of probation requiring probationer to consent at any time to a warrantless search by a law enforcement officer was unconstitutional