cross-points in his appel-lee's brief was an acceptable way of presenting these issues to this Court. See John Hill Cayce, Jr., Anne Gardner, & Felicia Harris Kyle, Civil Appeals in Texas: Practicing Under the New Rules of Appellate Procedure, 49 Baylor L.Rev. 867, 962-65 (1997). 4 . This case is particularly persuasive considering it was decided under an earlier statutory-fraud provision specifically defining actual damages as the difference between the value of the property as represented and as acquired. Act of March 11, 1919, 36th Leg., R.S., ch. 43, §§ 1-3, 1919 Tex. Gen. Laws 77, 78 (Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4004, since repealed and codified at Tex. Bus. & Com.Code Ann. § 27.01 (West 1987)). But see Bush v. Gaffney, 84 S.W.2d 759, 765 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1935, no writ) (<HOLDING>). 5 . We also note that since the holding in
holding elements of rescission are 1 holding rescission incompatible with statutory fraud in light of limited definition of actual damages contained in article 4004 holding that a plaintiff can seek statutory damages even in the absence of actual damages holding that recovery is limited to actual compensatory damages holding that under the first amendment where there is no proof of actual malice damages are limited to actual injury which excludes punitive damages but is not limited to outofpocket loss