for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 144 or § 455, must be based upon prejudice from an extra-judicial source.”); United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir.1997) (“The substantive standard for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455 is the same: '[Wjhether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.’ ") (quoting United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1986)). To the extent the standard under the sections differ, it is that section 144 requires proof of actual bias whereas section 455(a) requires only the reasonable appearance of bias. Hoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc., 368 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir.2004); cf. Apple v. Jewish Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 829 F.2d 326, 333 (2d Cir. 1987) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, a failure to show an appearance
holding this court may affirm on any grounds supported by the record even if different from the district courts grounds holding that the statement of specific grounds in a motion for a new trial waives all other grounds not specified recognizing that while section 455a provides broader grounds for disqualification than   144 when as here a party has not alleged any grounds for recusal other than those relating to the district courts alleged bias or prejudice those broader grounds are not implicated holding that where specific grounds for an objection are stated at trial all other grounds are waived and will not be considered for the first time on appeal recognizing that this court may affirm summary judgment on grounds other than those relied upon by the motion justice