as part of a bargained-for exchange to unilaterally revoke that consent, and we decline to read such a provision into the act. As an initial matter, Reyes is correct that when Congress uses a term, such as “consent,” that has “accumulated [a] settled meaning un der ... the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of th[at] term[ ].” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 21, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (citation omitted). The text of the TCPA evidences no intent to deviate from common law rules in defining “consent,” and the FCC and other federal appellate courts have applied the common law definition of the term when interpreting the act. See Gager, 727 F.3d at 270; 2015 FCC Ruling at *7961 (<HOLDING>). “Consent,” however, is not always revocable
recognizing that consent is an exception to the warrant requirement and that voluntariness of consent depends on the totality of the circumstances holding there is no consent as a matter of law where the consent was given under coercion holding under state constitution that validity of consent search requires knowledge of right to refuse consent holding that because consent is not a statement and a request for consent is not an interrogation giving consent to search is a neutral fact which has no tendency to show that the suspect is guilty of any crime holding that permitting unwanted texts and voice calls is counter  to commonlaw notions of consent