v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that "invocation of Article Ill’s 180-day time limit generally requires strict compliance with the Article’s requirements”); United States v. Collins, 90 F.3d 1420, 1426 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that “Fex instructs us that the IAD means what it says. And when it says that the prisoner must have his demand ‘delivered to the ... appropriate court,’ that is what it means.”); Bryant v. Com., 199 S.W.3d 169, 173-74 (Ky. 2006) (explaining that the court cannot demand less than strict compliance with the plain language of the IAD because to do so would “ignore controlling case law on this subject, in particular, .the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Fex v. Michigan’’); McNelton v. State, 115 Nev. 396, 990 P.2d 1263, 1274-75 (1999) (<HOLDING>); State v. Mae, 581 N.W.2d 468, 472 (N.D. 1998)
holding that a defendant is not entitled to dismissal of an indictment under the iad as no detainer had been lodged against him holding that the 180day time period in article 111a of the iad does not commence until the prisoners request for final disposition of the charges against him has actually been delivered to the court and prosecuting officer of the jurisdiction that lodged the detainer against him recognizing that under fex prisoners request for final disposition requires actual delivery to court and prosecuting officer of jurisdiction that lodged detainer against him holding that prisoners complaint alleging that he was punished for filing a grievance against a correctional officer was sufficient to provide notice of claim that he was retaliated against for exercising his first amendment rights holding that a prisoners allegations that a corrections officer retaliated against the prisoner for the prisoners report charging the officer with misconduct properly stated a claim for retaliation noting that aji allegation of retaliation should not be ignored simply because the charge was later dismissed 