knowledge or veracity.’ ” Id. at 270, 120 S.Ct. at 1378 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990)). On facts virtually identical to this case, the Court concluded the informant’s tip was not proved reliable and reached the holding recited above. If, as the majority opinion here suggests, the issue in J.L. concerned the failure of the informant’s tip to convey evidence of criminal conduct, the resolution of that case would not have required any discussion about the informant’s reliability. In that circumstance, regardless of the informant’s reliability, the officer would have been operating only on a bare suspicion and would not have had a basis to detain J.L. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (<HOLDING>). See also Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99
recognizing that police officer may stop a suspect if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot holding that a police officer may not detain a person for investigative purposes based on his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch  that criminal activity may be occurring holding that when an officer has reasonable suspicion that a probationer who is already subject to a search condition pursuant to his probation agreement is engaged in criminal activity then there is enough likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring that an intrusion on the probationers  privacy interests is reasonable holding that an officer  may detain a person in order to determine identity and circumstance when that officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot holding officer may search vehicle for weapons if officer has reasonable belief based on articulable facts that officer or another may be in danger