Gregg, at ¶ 20, by providing a disadvantaged spouse an opportunity to acquire an education, training, work skills, or experience to become self-supporting, Heley v. Heley, 506 N.W.2d 715, 719 (N.D.1993). “Although temporary, spousal support to rehabilitate a disadvantaged spouse is preferred, it may be required indefinitely to maintain a spouse who cannot be adequately restored to independent economic status.” Heley, at 720. Thus, a court should consider whether, in addition to rehabilitative support, permanent spousal support is also necessary. Riehl v. Riehl, 595 N.W.2d 10, 1999 ND 107, ¶ 18. A trial court awarding rehabilitative support may order permanent support if a subsequent change in circumstances warrants permanent support. Cf Schmitz v. Schmitz, 1998 ND 203, 586 N.W.2d 490 (<HOLDING>). [¶ 10] The spousal support provisions in the
holding that a bankruptcy court may not extend the 30day objection period holding a trial court may extend rehabilitative support when maximum rehabilitation does not occur within the originally specified time holding that if good cause does not exist the court has the discretion to either dismiss the action without prejudice or direct that service be effected within a specified time holding that apprendi does not apply to a judges exercise of sentencing discretion within a statutory range so long as a defendants sentence is not set beyond the maximum term specified in the substantive statute holding that apprendi does not apply to judges exercise of sentencing discretion within statutory range so long as defendants sentence is not set beyond maximum term specified in substantive statute