118 L.Ed.2d 543 (1992). Thus, § 1823(e) and the D’Oench doctrine encourage “banks and their customers [to] include the entire extent of their obligations in the bank’s records.” Id.; see also Bell & Murphy & Assoc. v. Interfirst Bank Gateway, N.A., 894 F.2d 750, 754 (5th Cir.) (“The D’Oench, Duhme doctrine ... favors the interests of depositors and creditors of a failed bank, who cannot protect themselves from secret agreements, over the interests of borrowers, who can.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 895, 111 S.Ct. 244, 112 L.Ed.2d 203 (1990); In re NEW Commercial Paper Litigation, 826 F.Supp. 1448, 1461-62 (D.D.C.1992) (describing D’Oench and § 1823(e) as “a regime that places the risk on borrowers if they do not get all of .2d 206 (1994); Oliver v. RTC, 955 F.2d 583, 585-86 (8th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, as originally enacted, §
holding that doench applies to secret side agreements made by subsidiaries and subsubsidiaries of the failed institution in receivership holding that the doench doctrine extends to claims involving a wholly owned subsidiary of the failed financial institution in receivership holding that the commonlaw doench doctrine applies to bar suit even when the rtc does not acquire a specific asset whose value is affected by the alleged secret agreement holding receipt of cab fare sufficient financial interest holding that the doench doctrine extends broadly to cover any secret agreement adversely affecting the value of a financial interest that has come within the rtcs control as receiver of a failed financial institution including the financial interest of a whollyowned subsidiary