every rule, an exception exists. Liability for nonfeasance may exist if an independent, non-contractual duty to speak is established. See Loeffler v. McShane, 372 Pa.Super. 442, 539 A.2d 876, 879 (1988) (finding that a title insurance company owed a duty, independent of any contractual obligation, to use reasonable care in handling the mortgagor’s financial resources). This exception is consistent with general principles of tort law. In the context of fraudulent conduct, the failure to disclose may not be conflated with making an affirmative misstatement. See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 611 (3d Cir.1995) (stating “to be liable for material nondisclo-sures, a party must have a duty to speak”); Sewak v. Lockhart, 699 A.2d 755, 759 (Pa.Super.1997) (<HOLDING>); Sevin v. Kelshaw, 417 Pa.Super. 1, 611 A.2d
holding that upon choosing to speak one has a duty to be both accurate and complete  holding that the government cannot use postarrest silence against a defendant because miranda warnings give implicit assurances that silence will not be used against a person and accordingly it would be fundamentally unfair and a violation of due process to allow a defendants silence to be used to impeach him at trial holding that objection was called for by the party to be estopped since an  estoppel may arise as effectually from silence where it is a duty to speak as from words spoken  holding that mere silence without a duty to speak will not constitute fraud holding that silence can constitute misrepresentation when there is duty to speak