Shrum v. Kluck, 249 F.3d 773, 781 (8th Cir.2001) (citing Doe v. Wright, 82 F.3d 265, 268 (8th Cir.1996)); see Norfleet ex rel. Norfleet v. Arkansas Dep’t of Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289, 293 (8th Cir.1993); Gregory v. City of Rogers, 974 F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir.1992) (en banc). The later exception, upon which Sophapmysay relies, applies where the state affirmatively puts a person in a position of danger that the person would not otherwise have been in but for the state’s intervention. See S.S. ex rel. Jervis v. McMullen, 225 F.3d 960, 962 (8th Cir.2000) (en banc) (noting that constitutional tort may be committed where “state acts affirmatively to place someone in a position of danger that he or she would not otherwise have faced ...”); Greer v. Shoop, 141 F.3d 824, 827-28 (8th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Davis v. Fulton County, Ark., 90 F.3d 1346,
holding that transporting a person from shoulder of highway to convenience store where that person is later raped is not actionable under statecreated danger theory because the officials act did not increase the risk recognizing that laws and regulations may bear upon the existence of a constitutional interest recognizing the existence of the special relationship recognizing theory of constructive possession recognizing the existence of the statecreated danger theory of constitutional liability