(providing words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage); Id. § 312.002(a) (providing that words in statutes shall be given their ordinary meaning). 25 . Webster’s New International Dictionary 1620, 1659 (3d ed.1981). 26 . See Bivins, 936 S.W.2d at 421 (noting that the Act's purposes are (1) to protect public employees from retaliation by their employer when, in good faith, employees report a violation of law, and (2) to secure lawful conduct on the part of those who direct and conduct the affairs of public bodies). 27 . Dillard, 883 S.W.2d at 168 (rejecting argument that governmental entities should be liable for persons who act on entities' behalf without compensation). 28 . Id.; see also Fed. Sign, 951 S.W.2d at 405 (<HOLDING>); Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v. Henry, No.
holding that substantive criminal statute could not be applied retrospectively because there was nothing  in the language or the legislative history that was a clear and unequivocal expression of legislative intent to rebut presumption of prospective application only holding that if the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous a court must derive legislative intent from the words used without involving rules of construction or speculating as to what the legislature intended holding that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous no need exists for the court to examine the legislative histo ry and the court must give effect to the plain meaning of the statute holding that illegal state regulation can be accomplished either by an award of damages or by legislative enactment holding that legislative consent to suit must be by clear and unambiguous language in either a statute or by other express legislative permission