jurisdiction to entertain any appeal from the order compelling arbitration. Celltex first contends we lack jurisdiction because K-Stemcell’s and Biostar’s notices of appeal state they are taken from the trial court’s order signed February 12, 2015, not the September 22, 2014, order compelling arbitration. Rule 25.1 provides that a notice of appeal must state the date of the judgment or order appealed from. Tex. R. App. P 25.1(d)(2). However, the rules do not require an appellant to list in the notice of appeal every interlocutory ruling that he desires to challenge on appeal. See Ostrovitz & Gwinn, LLC v. First Specialty Ins. Co., 393 S.W.3d 379, 386 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2012, no pet.) (citing Gunnerman v. Basic Capital Mgmt., Inc., 106 S.W.3d 821, 824 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>)); Vazquez v. Vazquez, 292 S.W.3d 80, 82-83
holding that orders remanding an action to a federal agency are generally not considered final appealable orders holding same as to the filing of a notice of an interlocutory appeal holding that a notice of appeal that referred only to the final judgment was sufficient to support review of earlier orders including an order involved in an unsuccessful attempt to take a premature appeal holding that notice of appeal from final judgment brought forward the entire case including earlier interlocutory orders that were not independently appealable holding that an order was interlocutory in nature despite the trial courts certification of the order as a final appealable judgment