falls within the state of mind hearsay exception under Rule 803(3), the trial court could sustainably have found that the defendant failed to establish an objective basis for concluding that the question would not elicit inadmissible hearsay about what McIntyre may have told Longval. Id. In any event, even if we assume that the defendant was entitled to inquire whether Longval remembered hearing Rivera tell McIntyre that he planned to rob the defendant, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s ruling prejudiced the defendant. Based on Longval’s testimony and defense counsel’s offer of proof, we have no basis for concluding that Longval heard Rivera’s statement and thus no foundation for determining what her testimony would have been. See McMullin v. Downing, 135 N.H. 675, 679 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Saulnier, 132 N.H. at 415 (“Absent an offer
holding the district courts noconsent finding was not clearly erroneous because the individual felt she was under arrest and had to submit to the patdown search in part based on the officers saying this is what we do we talk to people we search peoples bags we pat search people this is what we do everyday holding that we could not weigh the prejudice suffered as a result of the exclusion of plaintiffs testimony because we had no way of knowing what the plaintiffs testimony would have been holding a proffer of testimony is required to preserve the issue of whether testimony was properly excluded by the trial judge and an appellate court will not consider error alleged in the exclusion of testimony unless the record on appeal shows fairly what the excluded testimony would have been holding that we will not reverse in the absence of prejudice holding that defense counsels failure to object to testimony did not warrant a new trial because there was no prejudice from admission of the testimony