to reopen the action after March 1, 2007 had the administrative adjudication of Berishev’s application for naturalization not been completed. As a result of the need for a written motion for remand, this Court’s discretion to act upon that motion as it saw fit, and its discretion to apply conditions on the remand, this Court finds sufficient judicial imprimatur to satisfy the “prevailing party” requirement of the statute. See Doe v. Boston Public Schs., 358 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir.2004) (defining “judicial imprimatur” as requiring a party to achieve a “court-ordered” change in the legal relationship). Such a decision comports with the decisions of other district courts in the District of Massachusetts that have addressed this legal issue on similar facts. See Aronov, No. 06-11526, at 4 (<HOLDING>); Smirnov v. Chertoff, No. 06-10563-RWZ, at 4
holding that issuance of an order to show cause satisfied this requirement holding that a remand order entered by a magistrate judge was beyond his statutory authority and concluding that review was proper because the court of appeals was not reviewing the merits of the remand order itself holding that an order of remand so that uscis could grant the plaintiffs application for naturalization satisfied the requirement for judicial imprimatur holding that the fourth circuit has jurisdiction to review a district courts sua sponte remand order even when that remand order is styled as a remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if the order was in fact based on the procedural insufficiency of the notice of removal holding that a remand on a claim that could not be supported by the record would be a waste of judicial resources