was created by the Government achieving its goal of removing MAJ CW without sanction, a rehearing before any military judge other than MAJ CW would simply perpetuate this perception of unfairness. Further, even if we wished to consider ordering a rehearing before MAJ CW, that option is unavailable in light of her ac-knowledgement that the conduct of the SJA “invaded [her] deliberative process” and influenced her specific decision to disqualify herself from this case. We have long held that dismissal is a drastic remedy and courts must look to see whether alternative remedies are available. United States v. Cooper, 35 M.J. 417, 422 (C.M.A.1992). Dismissal of charges with prejudice, however, is an appropriate remedy where the error cannot be rendered harmless. Gore, 60 M.J. at 189 (<HOLDING>). Having found that the unlawful command
holding the military judge did not abuse his discretion in dismissing charges with prejudice for violation of speedy trial courtmartial rule and recognizing that the military judge assessed the prejudice that would result from remedies short of dismissal holding that the judge did not abuse his discretion but applied an incorrect standard holding that a military judge did not abuse his discretion in dismissing charges with prejudice to remedy unlawful command influence holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a complaint with prejudice based on the plaintiffs failure to amend the complaint by the deadline imposed by the court holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing an indictment with prejudice where the prosecutor showed reckless disregard for the prosecutions constitutional obligations