will not suffice.” 12 Moore et al., § 60.24[2], The analysis of Virginia Lee’s threshold showing of a meritorious claim or defense poses a somewhat unusual question. Whereas the more common application of Rule 60(b) requires the court to analyze the merit of a movant’s claim or defense where there has been a default, as in Augusta es specifically contracted that the settlement document would be “governed by, and construed in accordance with the laws of the United States and, to the extent not preempted, the substantive law of the Commonwealth of Virginia.” (Agmt. at 4.) Such a choice of law clause is presumptively valid, so long as it is not unreasonable. See Allen v. Lloyd’s of London, 94 F.3d 923, 928 (4th Cir.1996); see also Poole v. Perkins, 126 Va. 331, 101 S.E. 240, 242 (1919) (<HOLDING>). A binding settlement in Virginia is judged by
holding that parties implicitly stipulated to choice of law holding that where congressional intent is clear a court must give effect to such intent holding that settlement agreements like consent judgments are not given preclusive effect unless the parties manifest their intent to give them such effect holding that under texas choice of law principles contractual choice of law provisions are generally upheld holding that intent of parties to choice of law must be given effect