standard is not a shield which a defendant may use to avoid a conviction for a deliberately fraudulent scheme. We therefore reject Thomas’s argument that the foolishness of Pastor Holmes’s belief in Thomas’s fraudulent scheme somehow vitiates Thomas’s fraudulent intent. We refuse to accept the notion that “‘the legality of a defendant’s conduct would depend on his fortuitous choice of a gullible victim.’ ” United States v. Benson, 548 F.2d 42, 46 (2d Cir.1977) (quoting United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 971 (D.C.Cir.1976)). Most circuits that apply the ordinary prudence and comprehension standard have already rejected some form of the “unreasonable victim” argument. See Gray, 367 F.3d at 1269-71; Coffman, 94 F.3d at 333; United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1243-44 (3d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Drake, 932 F.2d at 864; United States v.
holding that a rico plaintiff must allege at a minimum the time place and content of the alleged misrepresentations on which he or she relied the fraudulent scheme the fraudulent intent of the defendants and the injury resulting from the fraud holding in a civil rico case based upon predicate acts of mail and wire fraud that the plaintiff must plead a material misrepresentation of fact that was calculated or intended to deceive persons of reasonable prudence and comprehension and that the plaintiff relied upon that material misrepresentation to establish the fraud statutes requisite scheme to defraud holding that the victims negligence is not a defense to criminal conduct holding that although fraudulent scheme must be reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension the negligence of the victim in failing to discover a fraudulent scheme is not a defense to criminal conduct recognizing that a mailing must be sufficiently related to the fraudulent scheme to support a charge of mail fraud