the exercise of the discretion of an officer. It can only direct affirmative action where the officer having some duty to perform not involving discretion, but merely ministerial in its nature, refuses or neglects to take such action. In that case the court can direct the defendant to perform this merely ministerial duty.” 209 U.S. at 158, 28 S.Ct. 441 (emphasis added) (citing Bd. of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531, 541, 23 L.Ed. 623 (1875)). This language suggests that “affirmative action” is not universally condemned in suits against officers, and that some “affirmative action” is permissible. Footnote 11 is not to the contrary, provided we read may to mean what it says. What, then, of that type of “affirmative action” that Lar .S. 446, 450-57, 3 S.Ct. 292, 27 L.Ed. 992 (1883) (<HOLDING>); Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52, 65-71, 6
holding that sovereign immunity prevents suit to compel state comptroller general to levy a tax to fund redemption of revenue bond scrip holding that sovereign immunity prevents bondholders foreclosure suit holding that sovereign immunity prevents suit to enjoin state officer from bringing tax collection suits against persons who had paid taxes with bond coupons where such collection was alleged to breach bondholders contract and where specific performance of acceptance of coupons was requested holding that a state may waive its sovereign immunity holding that sovereign immunity prevents mandamus action to compel state officers to levy a tax to pay bondholders