of law and thus the district court wrongly granted Gallagher summary judgment (and this is the most the panel could have held). To that extent the panel’s statement was pure dicta. Gallagher pointed out in a motion for rehearing to the panel that the language quoted above could be erroneously interpreted as a factual finding, but, alas, the panel did not alter its opinion. However, the fact that the panel did not correct the quoted language does not mean that dicta somehow becomes the law of the ease. Significantly, after the Society I panel remande se does not apply where the first appellate ruling transpired before the parties had the opportunity to present all their evidence to the district court. See Enlow v. Tishomingo County, Mississippi, 45 F.3d 885, 888 n. 8 (5th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Given this authority, the law of the case
holding that because plaintiff failed to advance evidence rebutting motion for summary judgment alongside a concession in their interrogatory response the district court did not err in granting defendants motion for summary judgment holding that the trial court erred in granting the school boards posttrial motion for directed verdict because although the school board timely moved for a directed verdict during trial it did not serve its motion for directed verdict until the eleventh day after the verdict holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment holding defendants failure to file motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict did not prevent district court from granting motion for directed verdict for which court reserved decision holding that under law of the case appellate decision that material factual issues precluded summary judgment on plaintiffs claims did not preclude district court from later granting defendants motion for a directed verdict because by then the parties had presented all of their evidence