subject debt from dis-charge.” Id. at 169. The court cited evi-dence offered at trial that the landlord had allowed the debtors to reside at the rental property for eleven months without paying rent because of a series of promises of-fered by the debtors as to future payment. The court found that the landlord’s belief that the debtors had not dealt with him honestly was supported by deposition tes-timony of one of the co-debtors and bank statements obtained through a subpoena. The court also observed that the plaintiff was not a “sophisticated creditor seeking to manipulate the Debtors’ anxieties about litigation costs,” and thus, not the target of the statutory fee shifting provision. Id.; see also Stinson v. Robinson (Matter of Robinson), 525 B.R. 822, 826 n.7 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2015) (<HOLDING>); Sparks v. King (In re King), 258 B.R. 786,
holding that pro se litigants should be given reasonable opportunity to remedy the defects in their pleadings holding that congress did not want the substantially justified standard to be read to raise a presumption that the government position was not substantially justified simply because it lost the case citations omitted holding that for the administrative position of the government to be substantially justified it must have a reasonable basis both in law and fact holding that given creditors pro se status the complaint was substantially justified as it had a reasonable basis in fact and law and it would be unjust to penalize her for having only a lay persons knowledge of the law holding that the governments position must be justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person and have a reasonable basis in both law and fact citations omitted