to this conclusion. Defendants, however, object on two grounds. First, defendants argue that a prior suit filed in another district court and subsequently nonsuited should not toll plaintiffs’ limitations period. This prior action played no part in the magistrate judge’s analysis and thus, this objection is appropriately overruled. Second, defendants contend that a motion for class certification does not toll the limitations period where, as here, the proposed class fails to satisfy any of the requirements of Rule 23, Fed.R.Civ.P. This position is contrary to the holdings of the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit. See Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 352-53, 103 S.Ct. 2392, 76 L.Ed.2d 628 (1983); Bridges v. Dep’t of Md. State Police, 441 F.3d 197, 210 (4th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the objection is appropriately
holding that limitations periods are tolled regardless of why the district court denied certification holding that periods of limitations in federal statutes are universally regarded as nonjurisdictional recognizing that  2244dlds statute of limitations can be tolled holding that fela statute of limitations is tolled by incompetence holding that the untimely petition in that case tolled the aedpa statute of limitations