that only if a plaintiff demonstrates that an employer delegates in order to facilitate discrimination, rather than for legitimate management reasons, should a policy of decentralized decisionmaking provide a sufficient nexus for class certification). Reap does not allege that CNA intended to use its delegation policy to discriminate against women or older women in its work force, that CNA encouraged local managers to discriminate against women or older women, or that CNA condoned such discrimination. In fact, any such discrimination would violate CNA’s written policy of non-discrimination. (See Samuel Aff. ¶ 10 & Ex. 1 Procedure 1500.) Instead, Reap submits self-created statistical evidence purporting to show that CNA’s policy of delegating employment decisions to local supervisors h (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, we conclude that Reap has
holding that under wilkerson it was error for district court to deny class action certification motion of named plaintiffs whose claims were resolved after filing motion for class certification but before district court decided motion holding that an inmates eighth amendment legal claims were straightforward and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to appoint counsel holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give a mere inspection instruction in a firearm possession case holding that where named plaintiff was employee of class counsel district court did not abuse its discretion by denying class certification holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to certify class action when claims were so individualized that certification was improper