are Legislative to one; those which are Executive to another, and those which are Judicial to another; and no person, or collection of persons, being of one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly attached to either of the others, except in the instances herein expressly permitted. Tex. Const, art. II, § 1. Appellant contends that Section 12.31 is unconstitutional because it allows the judicial department to invade the province of the executive. Specifically, he argues that the statute shifts power away from the Board of Pardons and Paroles (“Board”), which is an executive agency, and into the hands of the prosecutor, who is an officer of the judiciary. See Tex. Const. art. IV, § 11; Tex. Const. art. V, § 21; Meshell v. State, 739 S.W.2d 246, 253 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) (<HOLDING>). Appellant’s argument focuses on the
holding in virginia county police officers  1983 action against ms department and various county officials that the departments violation of the law enforcement officers procedural guarantees does not necessarily compel a finding of a due process violation holding that the county attorney had de facto authority and noting that the objection to the county attorneys authority was first made on appeal holding that county and district attorneys are officers within the judicial department holding that probation department employees are not county employees recognizing county officers as  those whose general authority and jurisdiction are confined within the limits of the county in which they are appointed who are appointed in and for a particular county and whose duties apply only to that county and through whom the county performs its usual political functions 