from prosecuting the state court action, and not the state court action itself, the Anti-Injunction Act is inapplicable. However, this is a distinction without a difference. As thé United States Supreme Court found in Atlantic Coast Line, the Anti-Injunction Act “cannot be evaded by addressing the order to the parties or prohibiting utilization of the results of a completed state proceeding”. Atl. Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 287, 90 S.Ct. 1739; see also Pathways, Inc. v. Dunne, 329 F.3d 108, 113 (2d Cir.2003) (citing County of Imperial v. Munoz, 449 U.S. 54, 58-59, 101 S.Ct. 289, 66 L.Ed.2d 258 (1980) for the proposition that federal court may not effectively enjoin state proceeding by framing injunction as restraint on parties); Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir.1966) (<HOLDING>). Thus, unless the Plaintiffs’ federal
holding the antiinjunction act  does not bar an injunction of a state court proceeding which purports to exercise jurisdiction over a removed case holding that  1983 is not an exception to the state tax injunction act holding that the statutory bar set by the antiinjunction act cannot be avoiding by directing the injunction solely to a party as distinguished from the state court holding the antiinjunction provision inapplicable to a states challenge to the constitutionality of a federal tax exemption provision  103a of the code which exempts from a taxpayers gross income the interest earned on the obligations of any state as amended by  310b1 of the tax equity and fiscal responsibility act of 1982 96 stat 596 because the antiinjunction provision was not intended to bar an action where    congress has not provided the plaintiff with an alternative legal way to challenge the validity of a tax holding federal injunction countermanding a state court injunction did not violate antiinjunction act