permit Bakke to compete for all 100 places in the class, simply because of his race.” Bakke, 438 U.S. at 280-81 n. 14, 98 S.Ct. at 2743 n. 14 (opinion of Powell, J.). As stated above, “[t]he ‘injury in fact’ ... is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit.” Jacksonville, -— U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 2303. Similarly, the injury to the Belmont plaintiffs cannot be defeated by showing that, as a practical matter, the plaintiffs would never receive housing assistance anyway. The injury is not the failure to obtain housing assistance in the suburbs, but is the missed opportunity to compete for suburban housing on an equal footing with the local residents. See Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 208-12, 93 S.Ct. at 366-68 (<HOLDING>); Havens, 455 U.S. at 372-74, 102 S.Ct. at
holding that the white defendants association with a black defendant was not sufficient to give them standing to join in the black defendants batson challenge holding that a white and a black tenant had standing to challenge their landlords acts of discriminating against nonwhite rental applicants holding that a white office was not similarly situated to a black officer who was charged with more offenses than the white officer holding white female employee lacks standing under title vii to allege injury on behalf of black applicants to employment agency who were discriminated against because of race holding that white female had standing under title vii to challenge her employees alleged racial discrimination against blacks