of the detention”). While the detention approved in Terry itself was a momentary frisk for weapons, see 392 U.S. at 29-30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, the courts have subsequently sanctioned Terry stops of longer- — -but still limited — duration. See, e.g., Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 687, 105 S.Ct. 1568 (20 minutes); Glover, 957 F.2d at 1013 (30 minutes); United States v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1093, 1097-98 (7th Cir.1990) (45 minutes); United States v. Borren, 770 F.Supp. 1178, 1189-91 (E.D.Mich.1991) (70 minutes); cf. Place, 462 U.S. at 709, 103 S.Ct. 2637 (“[W]e have never approved a seizure of the person for the prolonged 90-minute period involved here and cannot do so on the facts presented by this case.”); Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. City of Springboro, 477 F.3d 807, 828-29 (6th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Although “brevity” is an important
holding that a seventyfive minute terry stop was reasonable holding that officers action of putting suspects on the ground and searching for weapons was within the scope of a terry stop holding that agents did not escalate terry stop into custodial arrest by blockading suspects car and approaching with guns drawn holding that threehour stop of terrorism suspects far exceeded the bounds of terry holding that the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a socalled terry stop terry v ohio 392 us 1 88 sct 1868 20 led2d 889 1968 and applying a reasonable suspicion standard