pre-1991 Rule required disclosure of records only of those statements "which the government intended] to offer in evidence at the trial.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(1)(A) (1991). The purpose of the 1991 amendment, there fore, was merely to require full disclosure of every statement of the defendant, regardless of whether the government intended to use the statement at trial. It follows that Brown's assertion that the 1991 amendment significantly changed the types of records that must be disclosed is incorrect. 19 . We engage in a detailed comparison of Agent Burton's notes and the 302 in Part II.D. of this opinion, in which we address Brown's claims under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). 20 . See United States v. Kimbrough, 69 F.3d 723, 731 (5th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Manetta, 551 F.2d 1352, 1356
holding a statutory violation insufficient to justify imposition of the exclusionary rule absent an underlying constitutional violation or right holding that a defendants personal involvement in an alleged deprivation of constitutional rights is a necessary element of a  1983 complaint holding that violation of rule 16 in that case was not harmless error holding that reversal is proper only when a rule 16 violation results in prejudice to substantial rights holding that any prejudice or technical violation of rule 16 is insufficient to comprise a deprivation of the defendants constitutional rights and therefore upholding his conviction