or fact common to the class.” This standard is not strictly construed: Rule 23(a)(2) has been construed permissively. All questions of fact and law need not be common to satisfy the rule. The existence of shared legal issues with divergent factu or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” “Typicality and commonality requirements are similar and tend to merge.” Californians for Disability Rights, Inc. at 346 (N.D.Cal.2008); see also Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct. at 2551, n. 5. “Under the rule’s permissive standards, representative claims are ‘typical’ if they are reasonably coextensive with those of absent class members; they need not be substantially identical.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020; see also L.H v. Schwarzenegger, 2007 WL 662463, at *12-13 (<HOLDING>). Although the claims of the purported class
holding that minor differences among the class are inconsequential and rejecting the defendants assertion that plaintiffs had not shown sufficient evidence that each plaintiff was disabled since the deprivations complained of by plaintiffs affected the entire class holding that to maintain a class action the existence of the class must be pleaded and the limits of the class must be defined with some specificity holding that the filing of a class action by a class representative without standing tolls the period of limitations with regard to all asserted members of the class and that the amendment of the complaint by the addition of a class member with standing relates back to the original complaint holding that where material misrepresentations are made to class members an inference of reliance arises to the entire class recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members