means of acquiring knowledge.” Spear-Newman, Inc. v. Modern Floors Corp., 149 Conn. 88, 91-92, 175 A.2d 565 (1961) (citations omitted). Though estoppel need not be specifically pleaded, Winchester and Devanney must at least allege facts in their complaint on which a claim for estoppel could lie. See Jenkins v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 152 Conn. 249, 255-56, 205 A.2d 780 (1964). Here, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is based in part on count one of the complaint, which sounds in breach of contract. The court cannot infer an estoppel claim based on the facts in that portion of Winchester and Devan-ney’s complaint, nor can they raise this claim for the first time in their opposition to the motion for summary judgment. See Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Further, Linda Devanney, who was in charge of
holding that a motion to intervene is not dispositive of a claim or defense of a party holding that a party may not raise a claim on appeal that was not presented to the trial court holding movant may not raise new grounds for summary judgment in reply to nonmovants response holding that a party may not raise a new claim in its response to a dispositive motion holding that a plaintiff may not raise a new legal claim in response to summary judgment