dispute whether the second requirement of the DOL Regulation is met. There are two ways to satisfy this second requirement. First, the second requirement is met if the person (Boswell) had “discretionary authority or control” with respect to purchasing property for the plan. See id. § 2510.3 — 21(e)(l)(ii)(A) (“Subpart (ii)(A)”). Subpart (ii)(A) of the DOL Regulation appears to overlap with subsection (i) of 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A), which we discussed above. If a person has discretionary authority or control with respect to purchasing or selling securities or other property for the plan, that person would satisfy subsection (i) of 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) as well as satisfy Subpart (ii)(A) of the DOL Regulation. See Olson v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 957 F.2d 622, 626 n. 4 (8th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). For the reasons discussed above, we hold that
holding that the statutory definition of motor vehicle is not controlling holding that a broad statutory definition of a term that was inconsistent with the terms plain meaning did not affect the terms definition in other contexts recognizing that the regulation was drafted pursuant to direct statutory authority recognizing that in the absence of a statutory definition statutory terms are construed in accordance with their ordinary or natural meaning recognizing that subpart iia of the dol regulation overlaps with subsection i of the statutory definition