claims are of the same substantive scope as the cancelled claims and to proceed from there. A finding that the new claims are not substantively identical in scope would result in the limitation of TTI’s potential recovery only to infringement of the claims for the period following the issuance of the reexamination certificate, but it would not preclude those claims. Laitram, 163 F.3d at 1346. CONCLUSION Because the district court did not err in dismissing the suit as moot in light of the cancellation of the only claims asserted in the case, we affirm. AFFIRMED 1 . Courts often treat justiciability doctrines, including standing and mootness, as a subset of subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, — U.S. —, 133. S.Ct. 1523, 1532, 185 L.Ed.2d 636 (2013) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, the concepts derive from
holding that district court appropriately dismissed suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the case was moot holding after we found standing following a district courts dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction that the merits will be for the district court to decide on remand holding that rule 11 sanctions imposed by district court remained in effect after case was remanded to state court upon a finding that district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case holding that the case must be dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction where notice of appeal was untimely holding that a case is moot when the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome