the result of the proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). A “reasonable probability” does not require a showing that a different verdict would have resulted, but that “in [the] absence [of the evidence] [defendant] received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555. We agree with the district court’s conclusion that the Shea statement, if it did anything, implicated Tapia as well as holding that Brecht/Kotteakos should be applied to all habeas review, as reasons given by Supreme Court in Brecht are fully applicable whether or not state court conducted Chapman review); Sherman v. Smith, 89 F.3d 1134 (4th Cir.1996) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); Castro v. Oklahoma, 71 F.3d 1502 (10th
holding that a petitioner should be permitted to seek habeas review in state court even if there were doubt that the states substantive law would permit a habeas petition holding that brechtkotteakos should be used in habeas even when state courts failed to use chapman holding that brechtkotteakos should be applied on habeas even when no state court had ever evaluated claim using chapman on direct review holding that federal courts should apply state substantive law holding that infirmities in state habeas proceedings do not constitute grounds for federal habeas relief