methodologies in rendering his expert opinions, and unreliably applied his principles and methodologies to the facts and data on which he relies. It specifically argues that Dr. Bailie’s opinions are not supported by the scientific evidence provided in the articles he reviewed. As stated above, the Court finds sufficient support for Dr. Bailie’s opinions through the literature and his clinical experience. 19 . The Court notes that this motion in part repeats challenges to the medical literature that the Court has already addressed. 20 . See, e.g., Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592, 113 S.Ct. 2786 ("[A]n expert is permitted wide latitude to offer opinions, including those that are not based on firsthand knowledge or observation"); Sementilli v. Trinidad Corp., 155 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). 21 . Woo Young also argues that Dr. Parisian
recognizing that while a testifying expert may rely upon facts or data made known to the expert before the hearing and even may rely upon opinions if reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field the ipse dixit of that reliance does not make those facts data or opinions true particularly where  they are derived largely from hearsay holding that due process is violated if evidence of prior bad acts goes only to character and there are no permissible inferences the jury may draw from it internal quotation marks omitted holding that a foreign entity without property or presence in this country has no constitutional rights under the due process clause or otherwise internal quotation marks omitted holding that an expert may base his or her opinions and inferences on facts andor data perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing internal quotation marks omitted holding that trial counsels performance was not deficient for failing to give a mental health expert additional information because the expert testified at the evidentiary hearing that the collateral data would not have changed his testimony