opinion that Innomed is not entitled to a new trial on its Robinson-Patman Act claims, Innomed’s contention that its breach was excused by the alleged price discrimination is moot. See Medforms, Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Solutions, Inc., 290 F.3d 98, 115 (2d Cir.2002) (declining to address challenge to summary judgment ruling because it was mooted by the jury’s verdict). Innomed also asserts that, in terminating the Distribution Agreement, ALZA breached the parties’ January 26 agreement, in which ALZA promised to allow Innomed to pursue the assignment with AHP, because the termination hat ALZA breached the January 26 agreement without speculating as to the scope of ALZA’s obligations under the contract. See Harlen Assocs. v. Inc. Vill. of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 502 (2d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Innomed also asserts that ALZA violated the
recognizing that the burden on summary judgment shifts to the nonmoving party once the moving party has met its initial responsibility of showing the absence of a triable issue of fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case holding that the nonmoving party must produce more than a scintilla of evidence to survive summary judgment holding that grant of summary judgment is appropriate where the nonmoving party adduces nothing more than speculation to support its claims holding speculation insufficient to avoid summary judgment holding that a trial court may enter summary judgment for a nonmoving party under appropriate circumstances