to pursue his career. But the Court does not discern that this is a meaningful distinction, because the university professor in Roth also might have had to move geographic locations to teach at another university. To be sure, in Roth, the Supreme Court noted that a different result might be called for if the state had invoked any regulations “to bar the respondent from all other public employment in state universities.” Roth, 408 U.S. at 573-74; Cf. Wilkerson v. Johnson, 699 F.2d 325, 327-29 (6th Cir.1983) (recognizing a due process violation where a member of the state licensing board intentionally misapplied licensing law to foreclose Plaintiff from barbering anywhere in the state); Parate, 868 F.2d at 831. See also Phillips v. Vandygriff, 711 F.2d 1217, 1221-22 (5th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Here, Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that
holding in the context of a prosecution for second degree escape that although defendant was not handcuffed he had nonetheless been placed under arrest had had his liberty restrained in that he was not free to leave and at that point the first step in the process of transporting him to the police station had begun consequently the defendants arrest was complete and he was in custody holding that a prisoner stated a valid equal protection claim when he alleged he was denied a work assignment because of his sexual orientation holding that the plaintiff has not raised a colorable claim that he was denied procedural due process because he did not allege that the available state remedies are constitutionally inadequate holding that the plaintiff had stated a claim under 42 usc  1981 when he alleged that he was prohibited from using the restroom at a burger king after ordering and eating a meal because he was black holding that plaintiff stated a valid liberty interest claim where he contended that based on industry custom he was foreclosed from working at any savings and loan in the state where he had been denied a de facto license