The Court held that knowledge of character and content was all that was required under the statute and the Constitution. Id. at 123-24, 94 S.Ct. 2887. The Court explained that, to “require proof of a defendant’s knowledge of the legal status of the materials [as obscene] would permit the defendant to avoid prosecution by simply claiming that he had not brushed up on the law. Such a formation is required neither by 18 U.S.C. § 1461 nor by the Constitution.” Id.; see also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 644-45, 88 S.Ct. 1274, 20 L.Ed.2d 195 (1968) (finding constitutional a New York obscenity statute that defined the term knowingly as knowledge or reason to know “the character and content of the material”); Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 41-42, 16 S.Ct. 434, 40 L.Ed. 606 (1896) (<HOLDING>). We agree with the Hamling Court. Nothing in
holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001 holding that a sentencing court is required by 18 usc  3583g to revoke the defendants term of supervised release  unless defendant could come under the exception in 18 usc  3583d holding that the relating to parenthetical in 18 usc  1961 was merely to aid identification of 18 usc  2314 rather than to limit its application holding that because the bank had no duty to report defendants structured transactions these transactions did not constitute material facts within the meaning of 18 usc  1001 consequently defendant may not be held criminally liable under 18 usc  2b for causing the bank to fail to disclose a material fact holding that the forerunner to 18 usc  1461 did not require the defendant to know that the material could be classified as obscene rather only knowledge of the character and content was required