argued that the murder-for-hire statute under which he was found guilty, 18 U.S.C. § 1958 — which sets a punishment of “death or life imprisonment, or ... [a] fine[] [of] not more than $250,000, or both” if death results from an attempted murder-for-hire — does not prescribe a mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment because it appears to authorize a sentence of simply a fine in lieu of any term of imprisonment. Judge Chin rejected this argument, concluding that the statute did not permit any discretion and that life imprisonment was a mandatory minimum, and that even if there were discretion to depart, he would not exercise that discretion to do so. Although we strongly doubt the merits of Marmolejas’s statutory argument, see United States v. James, 289 F.3d 120 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>), we need not reach the question because of
holding discretion of district court for sentencing is explicitly limited in this case by the statute which provides that life imprisonment may be imposed only if death results from the defendants actions and if the jury directs the imposition of the sentence holding that this court has jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals in situations where a defendant may possibly be sentenced to life imprisonment or death holding that this court has jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals in cases involving a sentence of life imprisonment or death holding that 18 usc  1959a1 which provides for a punishment of death or life imprisonment or a fine under this title or both id emphases added provides a mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment holding life sentence mandatory under 21 usc  841b and district court could not depart from the mandatory life sentence unless government made a motion