any violation of the CB at 1088. 46 . 911 F.2d at 239-40. 47 . Id. at 239. 48 . Miller, 850 F.2d at 550 n. 5 (citing Tellez v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 817 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1987)). 49 . Perugini, 935 F.2d at 1088-89. The difficulty, of course, and the source of some inconsistency in our case law, is how to determine whether the CBA "covers” the conduct at issue. Sometimes a fairly broad CBA provision is read as vesting discretion in the employer to take the action at issue and therefore as preempting an intentional infliction claim based on that conduct, see, e.g., Cook, 911 F.2d at 239; but sometimes a seemingly applicable provision will be read as not contemplating or envisioning the disputed conduct, and therefore the outrage claim will not be preempted. See Tellez, 817 F.2d at 539(<HOLDING>). The inconsistency often appears to be
holding that a cba provision authorizing discipline of employees did not envision circulation of a suspension letter claiming that an employee had purchased cocaine during work hours and so did not preempt an outrage claim based on that conduct holding flsa did not preempt state law fraud claim holding that internal policy memorandum not generally distributed to employees did not create an implied condition to an employees contract even though that employee had requested an obtained a copy holding that a government employee has a privacy interest in any file that reports on an investigation that could lead to the employees discipline or censure holding that congress did not intend to preempt state common law actions for personal injury based on the negligence of the airline or its employees