district court concluded on the basis of these facts that Carmichael had reasonable suspicion to stop Estrada-Nava and Colin for lane straddling because “[a] common sense definition of lane straddling ... includes a situation in which a 3291, at *2 (D.Neb. May 26, 2000) (interpreting a similar Nebraska statute and concluding that touching, but not crossing, the broken line between two southbound lanes twice in a half mile did not violate the statute’s “near as practicable” requirement), aff'd, 262 F.3d 751 (8th Cir.2001); Rowe v. State of Maryland, 363 Md. 424, 769 A.2d 879, 889 (2001) (concluding that “momentary crossing of the edge line of the roadway and later touching of that line” was not reasonable suspicion to justify traffic stop); State v. Caron, 534 A.2d 978, 979 (Me.1987) (<HOLDING>); State v. Tarvin, 972 S.W.2d 910, 912 (1998)
holding there was no reasonable suspicion which would justify an investigatory stop despite report of a domestic disturbance holding that single brief straddling of the center line of the undivided highway with no oncoming traffic in sight and no vehicles passing on the left  did not give rise to an objectively reasonable suspicion of intoxication or fatigue holding that a tip may provide the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop holding that an officers reasonable mistake of law can give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a traffic stop under the fourth amendment holding that there was not reasonable suspicion to justify a stop because a vehicles one time straddling of the center line of an undivided highway is a common occurrence