step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, defendant offers the same qualifications-based justification as discussed in Part II.B, supra, and as in the race discrimination context, this justification is sufficient. Unlike Ms. Simpson’s race discrimination claim, however, at the final stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis her age discrimination claim is supported by evidence sufficient to permit an inference that defendant’s proffered explanation is pretextual. Klafehn’s statements were not “direct” in the sense that they applied specifically to Ms. Simpson or to this position specifically because there were directed at hiring decisions more generally. They may, however, support an inference of age-based discrimination. See Threadgill v. Spellings, 377 F.Supp.2d 158, 164-66 (D.D.C.2005) (<HOLDING>); see also Lindahl v. Air France, 930 F.2d
holding that biased remarks by decisionmakers in combination with evidence of a minor qualification gap in favor of the plaintiff were sufficient to support  an overall inference of discriminatory preference and preclude summary judgment for the defendant holding that remarks made by decisionmakers could be viewed as reflecting discriminatory animus holding that repeated remarks about need to bring in new blood or young blood by one of the decisionmakers were not stray remarks and may permit inference of discrimination holding that absent a casual link between supervisors isolated racial remarks and employers decision to promote stray remarks cannot support a verdict for race discrimination recognizing that stray remarks are insufficient to raise an inference of discrimination and concluding that a comment by the decisionmaker that he selected a candidate for a promotion because the candidate was a bright intelligent knowledgeable young man was a stray remark that did not raise an inference of age discrimination