in original). A judge no more has to find additional facts when the defendant’s prior conviction is for a misdemeanor than when it is for a felony. In light of this, the proper reading of the above language in Jones is that, as long as the prior conviction arose from procedures that satisfy the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, the judge may consider the prior conviction at sentencing. Cases from other jurisdictions support this conclusion. See United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183, 1191 (11th Cir.2005) (“Accordingly, [a] prior nonjury juvenile adjudication that was afforded all constitutionally-required procedural safeguards can properly be characterized as a prior conviction for Apprendi purposes.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Ryle v. State, 842 N.E.2d 320, 323 (Ind.2005) (<HOLDING>); State v. Aleman, 210 Ariz. 232, 109 P.3d 571,
holding that the prior conviction exception should not extend to nonjury juvenile adjudications holding that juvenile adjudications are prior convictions for purposes of the apprendi exception and indicating that the main concern in apprendi was whether the prior convictions procedural safeguards ensured a reliable result not that there had to be a right to a jury trial holding that juvenile adjudications fit within the priorconviction exception because the main concern of the priorconviction exception was whether the prior convictions procedural safeguards ensured a reliable result not that there had to be a right to a jury trial holding apprendi exception for prior convictions encompasses juvenile adjudications recognizing exception