to “an otherwise qualified individual with a disability” constitutes discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). And, on its face, the ADA’s definition of “qualified individual with a disability” does not differentiate between the three alternative prongs of the “disability” definition. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2), 12111(8). The absence of a stated distinction, however, is not tantamount to an explicit instruction by Congress that “regarded as” individuals are entitled to reasonable accommodations. Moreover, because a formalistic reading of the ADA in this context has been considered by some courts to lead to bizarre results, Weber, 186 F.3d at 917, we must look beyond the literal language of the ADA. See Royal Foods Co., Inc. v. RJR Holdings, Inc., 252 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). In Weber, the Eighth Circuit explained: The
holding that a court can look beyond the statutory language when plain meaning would compel an odd result holding that courts adopt statutes interpretation that is supported by statutes plain language if statute is unambiguous unless such interpretation would lead to absurd results holding that we may look beyond text of statute or rule where plain language is unambiguous but would lead to an absurd result that drafters cannot have intended recognizing a court must look beyond the plain language of a statute when the literal interpretation would lead to an absurd result holding that a literal interpretation should not be adhered to when it would lead to absurd results