to the delay in issuance of the title—and consequently, the delay in the notation of the Lien on the title—Plaintiff should not be permitted to avoid the Lien. As discussed above, however, while state law may dictate the existence of property interests, (“[w]hat constitutes a transfer and when it is complete’ is a matter of federal law.” Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 397-98, 112 S.Ct. 1386, 118 L.Ed.2d 39 (1992) (quoting McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 323 U.S. 365, 369-370, 65 S.Ct. 405, 89 L.Ed. 305 (1945)). Thus, whether Defendant timely caused title to be issued to Mr. Haggerty under Ohio law is immaterial for purposes of determining whether the Lien is avoidable under § 547. See Bank One, Dayton, N.A. v. Bavely (In re Phillips), 103 B.R. 893, 895 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989) (<HOLDING>). Defendant may be attempting to rely on the
recognizing that a secured creditor is at the mercy of an administrative official to timely issue the certificate of title but nonetheless holding that a lien is avoidable if the lien is not perfected within the statutory period set forth in  547 recognizing that in 1982 kentucky converted to a new title system for motor vehicles under which the secured creditor must perfect its security interest by noting the lien on the certificate of title to the motor vehicle holding that the lien bond releases the property from the lien but the lien is then secured by the bond holding state courts authority under iowa code section 59821 not the lien created there under prevented debtor from claiming the iowa homestead exemption and therefore the debtor could not avoid the lien because the lien did not impair an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled but for the lien recognizing kentucky as a state where actual notation of the secured partys lien on the certificate of title is a prerequisite for perfection of a security interest in a motor vehicle