trial be granted on the grounds that the State knowingly used perjured testimony. In making this recommendation, the magistrate judge relied primarily on Prewitt’s testimony that (1) Jones wielded a knife as he approached Fairman before their altercation, and (2) the police coerced him to lie at Fairman’s trial. The magistrate judge found Prewitt’s testimony “wholly credible” in light of his courtroom demeanor and awareness that he risked prosecution for perjury. The district court adopted the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge in its entirety, and we will not reverse the district court where the factual predicate at issue is susceptible to two, equally compelling, views. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (<HOLDING>). We pause in conclusion to address several
holding that the clearly erroneous standard of review applies unless judgment is entered on the basis of documentary evidence alone holding that a court would abuse its discretion by relying on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence holding that the factfinders choice between two views of the evidence cannot be clearly erroneous holding that pretext is subject to the clearly erroneous standard holding bankruptcy courts finding of proximate causation not to be clearly erroneous