from making those decisions for themselves. See Tex. Bus. Orgs.Code §§ 21.101(a)(4), 21.714(b)(9). 53 . The dissent contends that "typical acts of minority oppression (refusing to pay dividends, paying majority shareholders outside the dividend process, and making fire-sale buyout offers) usually operate to benef holders outside the dividend process, and making fire-sale buyout offers certainly can harm the corporation, for instance, by lowering the value of its stock. As Patton itself demonstrates, the very conduct the dissent claims does not harm the corporation in fact can give rise (and has given rise in the past) to a breach-of-fiduciaiy-duty claim against the corporate controller who engaged in such conduct to benefit himself at the expense of the corporation. 279 S.W.2d at 853 (<HOLDING>). 54 . The dissent's contention that this Court
holding a shareholders cause of action accrued for statute of limitations purposes when shareholders and directors of a company asserted a right to stock which was hostile to the plaintiffs claim to the stock holding minority shareholders to be forced sellers for the purpose of 10b because corporation forced shareholders to sell their shares for cash or else realize no value from the stock holding that majority shareholders had legitimate business reasons for terminating a shareholder which included the reason that the shareholder was not working well with other employees holding that derivative actions do not require the support of a majority of shareholders or even all of the minority shareholders holding majority shareholder liable when he used his control of the board for the malicious purpose of  preventing dividends and otherwise lowering the value  of the stock of the minority shareholders