dock. As discussed above, the Declaration does not unambiguously create a dock easement on Parcel A and it is not an undisputed fact that the Davids took Parcel A subject to the Declaration or the dock easement. And it follows that if the Davids took Parcel A unrestricted by the Declaration, the property is also not sub" ject to the amendments that were later unilaterally executed by Ippolite, who no longer owned Parcel A. See Endruschat v. Am. Title Ins. Co., 377 So.2d 738, 741 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) (“[AJuthority throughout the country, with which we agree, would indicate that a developer cannot seek to encumber property with restrictions [a]f-tfer he has sold it.”). Furthermore, the terms of the Declaration provide that the Declaration “may be mo 1144, 1145-46 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (<HOLDING>). Reversed and remanded for proceedings
holding that an exclusionary clause in an insurance contract that lends itself to different interpretations is ambiguous and must be construed in a manner most favorably to the insured holding that when a contract is ambiguous and the parties suggest different interpretations summary judgment is inappropriate because an issue of fact exists holding that where each side ascribes a different meaning to what the sides claim is the unambiguous language in a contract the contract is ambiguous and summary judgment is improper holding that a contract is ambiguous if a reasonable person would find it susceptible to different or inconsistent interpretations holding that summary judgment is appropriate when no issue of material fact exists and the court is reviewing administrative record for sufficiency of evidence