we cannot conclude that the Bessemer Division erred in transferring the cause. See § 6-3-21.1, Ala.Code 1975 (statute allowing discretionary transfer of actions from one proper forum to another “in the interest of justice”). We now turn to the substantive issues raised by the parties. Kaufmann contends that the trial court should not have dismissed its spoliation-of-evidence claim against Blue Dot and Davis. However, Kaufmann asserted that issue during the earlier litigation involving the parties, and the jury in that case was given a spoliation instruction based upon Kaufmann’s claim that Davis had destroyed evidence. Such an instruction is a remedy available when a party to pending litigation is alleged to have spoliated evidence. See Smith v. Atkinson, 771 So.2d 429, 438 (Ala.2000) (<HOLDING>). Principally because such a remedy exists, the
holding that an adverseinference jury instruction was an appropriate sanction for spoliation of evidence holding that spoliation may be a basis for a cause of action where a third party has negligently destroyed material evidence but stating that jury charges that presume missing evidence weighs against the spoliator and discovery sanctions  are available when spoliation is charged against an opposing party holding that an adverse inference for spoliation of evidence requires proof that evidence was destroyed with a culpable state of mind and that it was relevant to the partys claim or defense recognizing a tort for the intentional spoliation of evidence holding that to consider whether to apply a spoliation sanction the evidence must be relevant to an issue in the case and the party who destroyed the evidence must be under a duty to preserve the evidence