that includes (1) either an explosive, incendiary, or poison gas component and (2) all of the physical components required for it to function as one of the enumerated devices. Whether the device at issue here — the blasting cap — contained all of the physical components required for it to function as a “bomb” under ORS 166.382(l)(a)(A) requires us to determine the meaning of that term. ORS 166.382 does not define the term “bomb.” However, we have previously stated that, where the device at issue contains an explosive component, the plain meaning of the term “bomb” is “a device carrying an explosive charge fused to detonate under certain conditions.” State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Garrett, 193 Or App 629, 633, 91 P3d 830 (2004) (citing Webster’s at 249); see also Luers, 211 Or App at 54 (<HOLDING>). Here, the blasting cap that defendant
holding that an error is plain if it is clear or obvious holding that an error is plain only if it is clear under current law when there is no binding precedent on point an instruction typically will not be plain error holding that a statute requiring a natural gas producer to make gas available to pump water for agriculture irrigation at a price fixed by the corporation commission is not a regulation under the police power but a taking of the producers property without due process of law and an appropriation of the producers property without just compensation holding that the declaratory judgment act is a procedural device holding that under the plain text of ors 1663821a a device without an explosive charge may still constitute a bomb if it has an incendiary or poison gas component