refer- ence to “manipulation of the system” was in necessary reference to Taylor’s judicial challenges. We have already pointed out that this attribution of intent is a conclusion, not a factual allegation. A trial court’s non-specific statement of admonition or criticism regarding a defendant’s behavior or conduct is not self-proving of retaliatory intent. Thus, to determine whether the first prong of the “evidentiary hearing” test is satisfied, we must explore Taylor’s Motion to locate contested factual allegations which, if proven, would warrant relief. In application, this principle requires the assertion of facts sufficient to satisfy the standard applicable to assess the mei’-its of the underlying allegation. See, e.g., Morrow v. State, 21 S.W.3d 819, 823-24 (Mo. banc 2000) (<HOLDING>). To apply that principle here, we must first
holding that where movant alleged the names of uncalled witnesses and them anticipated testimony which would have been relevant mitigation evidence in the penalty phase but did not allege that trial counsel knew of the witnesses or that the witnesses were available to testify at trial the movant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his postconviction relief motion because he did not allege facts sufficient to satisfy the standard applicable to his claim holding that the failure to call certain witnesses was not ineffective assistance because witnesses already presented similar evidence and counsel is not required to present cumulative evidence holding that an evidentiary hearing was not required on a postconviction motion because the movant did not allege facts sufficient to establish each of the necessary elements of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on an allegation of failure to investigate and call witnesses holding the failure to call alibi witnesses promised during opening statement was not ineffective assistance of counsel holding that the postconviction court erred in finding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim proeedurally barred because the courts opinion did not comment specifically on the ineffective counsel argument and the overall holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jurys verdict could not be viewed as an adjudication on the merits of the ineffective assistance claim