court found, that the cessation of irrigation in 1981 completed the severance process. We disagree. The deciding factor for determining whether severance has occurred is completion of the necessary administrative steps and procedures, not the unilateral cessation of irrigation of land on which irrigation is still permitted. Sun Vineyards, Inc., 107 N.M. at 527, 760 P.2d at 1293. In support of the argument that cessation of irrigation is the critical action for severance, the Bassetts rely on KRM, Inc. v. Caviness, 1996-NMCA-103, 122 N.M. 389, 925 P.2d 9. However, KRM addressed whether water rights which had never been used for irrigation were appurtenant to the land. Id. ¶ 3. In KRM, this Court determine See McCasland v. Miskell, 119 N.M. 390, 395, 890 P.2d 1322, 1327 (Ct.App.1994) (<HOLDING>). {18} KRM does not require that water rights,
holding that failure to use irrigation water rights on conveyed property for more than ten years did not sever water rights from said property absent compliance with statutory requirements recognizing that water rights constitute a real property interest holding that a water right is a property right created by a person appropriating unappropriated water and applying it to a beneficial use holding that article x  2 of the california constitution dictates the basic principles defining water rights that no one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water and that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and beneficially recognizing a presumption that the issuance of a permit by the state engineer allowing recognized irrigation water rights to be shifted to other users works as severance of those water rights from the land