“detail” Gilday’s telephone calls unlawfully, and thus constituted a clear violation of the Gilday injunction, see Kemp, 947 F.2d at 17. Once again we emphasize the obvious simply because it is so consistently elided by Gilday, both below and on appeal: The Gil-day injunction grants Gilday no right or privilege to place any telephone call, nor has Gilday cited any authoritative decision indicating that conditioning prison-telephone utilization on informed prisoner consent to reasonable prison-security safeguards violates a federal or state right. See Langton, 71 F.3d at 936 (stating: “at the least, grounds exist for genuine dispute” about whether DOC “defendants are authorized by law” to require prisoner consent to MITS regime) (citing Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112 (1st Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>)); see also Washington, 35 F.3d at 1100 (prison
holding that implied consent is inferred from circumstances indicating that party knowingly agreed to surveillance holding that direct proof of intent to defraud is unnecessary and that it may be inferred from the act of the parties and from all circumstances holding the intent of parties can be inferred from sufficient details contained within the consent judgment indicating the parties understood the consent judgment operated as a final adjudication of the factual issues holding intent may be inferred from all facts and circumstances holding specific intent to harm may be inferred from the circumstances and that finding is a matter for the jury