to the plea bargaining process than it does in determining the guideline range. Furthermore, the plea bargaining process before the implementation of the guidelines system allowed a sentencing court to exercise virtually unrestrained discretion in sentencing within the statutory limits. Even with the potential that a district court may depart, a defendant faces more certainty in sentencing under the guidelines scheme than under the prior system. In sum, we reject Appellants’ argument that the guidelines proscribe reliance on uncharged or dismissed conduct in determining whether a departure from the guideline range is warranted and align this circuit with those that have adopted the better reasoned rule to the contrary. Compare United States v. Baird, 109 F.3d 856, 864-65 (3d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Ashburn, 38 F.3d 803, 807-08
holding that a defendants assertion that the district court did not believe it had the statutory authority to depart from sentencing guideline range  presents a cognizable claim on appeal holding that consideration by a sentencing court of acquitted conduct was appropriate in establishing the applicable guideline range or in determining the sentence to impose within the guideline range holding that conduct contained in dismissed counts may be considered by a district court in determining whether to depart from the applicable guideline range holding that district court must provide reasonable notice of intent to upwardly depart from guideline range holding that a court may depart downward from the applicable guideline range under section 4a13