of the analysis — requiring an examination of current federal law and federal law as it existed at the time of the alleged violation — makes for an awkward determination by the jury, at best. Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625, 634 .3d 432, 434 (7th Cir.1994) (“If malicious prosecution ... is committed by state actors and results in the arrest or other seizure of the defendant, there is an infringement of liberty, but we now know that the defendant’s only constitutional remedy is under the Fourth Amendment....”); Taylor v. Meacham, 82 F.3d 1556, 1561 (10th Cir.1996) (noting that “in the § 1983 malicious prosecution context, [the relevant] constitutional right is the Fourth Amendment’s right to be free from unreasonable seizures”); Uboh v. Reno, 141 F.3d 1000, 1003 (11th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). To the best of our knowledge, only one
holding that a  1983 due process claim that essentially contests the fairness of the plaintiffs prosecution  is  similar to his malicious prosecution claim and claims resembling malicious prosecution do not accrue until the prosecution has terminated in the plaintiffs favor  holding the same for malicious prosecution holding that for a state actor to violate the fourth amendment by initiating a malicious prosecution against someone the criminal charges at issue must have imposed some deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of a seizure citation omitted holding that malicious prosecution is actionable under  1983 where the plaintiff as part of the commencement of a criminal proceeding has been unlawfully and forcibly restrained in violation of the fourth amendment and injuries due to that seizure follow as the prosecution goes ahead citation omitted holding that the fourth amendment right implicated in a malicious prosecution action is the right to be free of unreasonable seizure of the person