of Phillips from the case on other grounds. The Ewings allege no personal involvement by Phillips in the relevant events, and there is no respondeat superi- or liability under § 1983. See Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir.2002) (“In order for a person acting under color of state law to be liable under section 1983 there must be a showing of personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation: there is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983.”). The Ewings fare no better proceeding against Phillips in his “official capacity.” Setting aside the issue of whether official capacity claims against a district attorney are subject to dismissal under the Eleventh Amendment, see Pitts v. County of Kern, 17 Cal.4th 340, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 823, 949 P.2d 920, 930-31 (1998) (<HOLDING>), and assuming arguendo that appellants could
holding that california district attorneys act as agents of the state when they prosecute cases and establish policy and train employees in this area holding that california courts assertion of personal jurisdiction over floridabased reporters did not violate due process when allegedly defamatory article that was the basis of the suit focused on the california activities of california residents holding that the ninth circuit is bound by the california supreme courts interpretation of california law holding that personal jurisdiction in california was appropriate over nonresident journalist where harmful effects of allegedly defamatory article would be exclusively felt in california and california was the state of newspapers greatest circulation recognizing a hypothetical situation where california law left a party free to sue on a claim in maryland even after the claim was precluded in california because the california statute of limitations had expired