state judge believes a ‘better’ decision could be made.” Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72-73, 120 S.Ct. at 2064, 147 L.Ed.2d at 61. If the parent is not fit, no presumption arises and the parent’s wishes are due no deference. The close scrutiny that we apply to any infringement on a person’s right to parent a child, see In re Guardianship of Aschenbrenner (1979), 182 Mont. 540, 544-45, 597 P.2d 1156, 1160, and Pierce v. Pierce (1982), 198 Mont. 255, 260, 645 P.2d 1353, 1356, requires that the petitioning grandparent prove by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the child’s best interest to have contact with the grandparent, and, in the case of an objecting fit parent, that the presumption in favor of the parent’s wishes has been rebutted. See Evans v. McTaggart (Alaska 2004), 88 P.3d 1078 (<HOLDING>); cf. In re Custody & Parental Rights of P.M.,
holding that cooperation between parents is essential if the arrangement is to be in the best interests of the child recognizing that a trial court must make a finding that the timesharing schedule is in the childs best interests holding that a modification of custody should not be based on one parents default because it is the childs best interests that are at stake holding that requiring a petitioner to establish by clear and convincing evidence that visitation is in the best interests of the child would provide effective protection for a parents choice except where the choice is plainly contrary to a childs best interests holding that postadoption visitation of child who was adopted by grandparents on basis of biological parents unconditional consent was required to promote childs best interests