877 (Tex.Crim.App.1985), Plante v. State, 692 S.W.2d 487 (Tex.Crim.App.1985), and Keller v. State, 818 S.W.2d 425 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, pet. ref'd). In Morgan, a pre-Montgomery case, the court of criminal appeals explained that: where the material issue addressed is the defendant’s intent to commit the offense charged, the relevancy of the extraneous offense derives purely from, the point of view of the doctrine of chances — the instinctive recognition of that logical process which eliminates the element of innoce ndant’s extra neous acts of nonpayment for sale, lease, or loan of goods and services were admissible in prosecution for theft by deception because defendant’s intent could not be inferred from his nonpayment in the charged offense); Keller, 818 S.W.2d at 429 (<HOLDING>). Here, Russell never contended that either he
holding intent may be inferred from all facts and circumstances holding extraneous conduct subsequent to the charged offense admissible holding defendants extraneous acts of nonpayment for goods and services were admissible in prosecution for theft of service because defendants intent could not be inferred from his nonpayment in the charged offense holding extraneous acts relevant to show intent in charged offense holding extraneous acts of touching of complainant and her friend were admissible in indecency with a child prosecution because defendants charged conduct was as consistent with accident as with a specific lascivious intent