the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, seeking a “declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction restraining the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania from disbarring [the plaintiff] and other similarly situated attorneys unless the Supreme Court ... first grant[ed] an evidentiary hearing to the attorney” in question. Stem, 840 F.2d at 212. We held that Rooker-Feld-man prevented the plaintiff from obtaining an injunction against his disbarment, reasoning that “any attempt to enjoin the enforcement of a state court judgment ... is suspect. If [the proposed injunction were] granted[,] the federal court would effectively reverse the state court judgment, and thus ‘review [a] final judgment ] of a state court in judicial proceedings,’ contrary to Rooker-Feldman.” Id.; cf. Centifanti, 865 F.2d at 1429-30 (<HOLDING>). Thus, Rooker-Feldman does not allow a
holding that a plaintiffs suit in federal court which sought an injunction against future denials of petitions for readmission to the pennsylvania bar without certain procedural safeguards was not barred by rookerfeldman because it sought only prospective relief and thus would not prevent the enforcement of the pennsylvania supreme courts order denying the plaintiffs petition for readmission holding that plaintiffs claim was not barred by sovereign immunity because he sought specific relief against a government official holding that the district court could properly deny attorneys readmission on the ground that he had not been readmitted to the bar of the state of new york holding that rookerfeldman doctrine barred plaintiffs claim because alleged legal injuries arose from the state courts purportedly erroneous judgment and the relief sought would require the district court to determine that the state courts decision was wrong and thus void holding that rookerfeldman did not bar the plaintiffs federal action where a pennsylvania state court had previously dismissed the plaintiffs petition for review of an agencys decision for failure to comply with the pennsylvania rules of appellate procedure since the extent of the plaintiffs compliance with those rules had no bearing on the merits of the plaintiffs constitutional claims