Trust, 491 F.3d 320, 331 (6th Cir.2007) (“To establish a Magnuson-Moss claim, a plaintiff must show that the item at issue was a ‘consumer product.’ This disputed fact therefore goes to the merits.”); Miller v. Willow Creek Homes, Inc., 249 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir.2001) (noting that it would “not reach the merits” of the dispute but nonetheless commenting that “it seems doubtful at best that a court would find the mobile home in question to be a consumer product covered by the Act”). The conflation of jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional limitations on causes of action is not an uncommon occurrence. Indeed, the Supreme Court has taken up the issue on several occasions, as have we. See, e.g., Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, - U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1237, 1246, 1249-50, - L.Ed.2d - (2010) (<HOLDING>); Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 511, 126 S.Ct. 1235
holding that standing is component of subjectmatter jurisdiction holding that prejudgment interest ordinarily should be awarded on damages pursuant to claims under the copyright act of 1909 17 usc  1 et seq 1976 ed superceded by the copyright act of 1976 17 usc  101 et seq holding that the registration requirement in 17 usc  411a of the copyright act imposes a precondition to filing a claim and does not restrict a federal courts subjectmatter jurisdiction holding that failure to comply with statutory prerequisite deprived the courts of subjectmatter jurisdiction holding that standing is component of subjectmatter jurisdiction and subjectmatter jurisdiction is essential to courts authority to hear case