his and her own injuries although arising from a single occurrence, i.e., Andrea’s death.” Op. at p. 744. It is only because Andrea was an insured under each of the Boullt’s policies that the policies provide coverage for Andrea’s wrongful death. The fact that this is a wrongful death action does not transform the parents into the “insured” under the anti-stacking statute. That they were each an insured under their respective policies likewise does not make them the “insured” under the statute. |4Because clearly Andrea is the “insured” referred to in La. R.S. 22:1406(D)(l)(c)(i), the parents are prohibited from each recovering under their respective UM policies. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. • 1 . See Salter v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 520 So.2d 877 (La.App. 3 Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); Sheppard v. State Farm Ins. Co., 614 So.2d
holding that an insurer who brought a declaratory judgment action and out of an abundance of caution named the injured party as an additional defendant 1 must have thought the injured party had some potential interest in the insurance policy and 2 had tacitly conceded the injured partys standing to appeal by not contesting the appeal on the ground of lack of standing holding that an injured party in an underlying tort action was not a necessary party in an action by an insurer for declaratory judgment of nonliability where the injured person had not obtained judgment against the insured holding that there is an actual controversy between an insurer and the party injured by the insured holding that an insurer which insures a tortfeasor under a liability policy has no obligation of good faith and fair dealing to an injured third party even where the injured third party also carries a separate policy with the insurer holding that the party referred to in the clear language of lsars 221406d1c is the injured party who has sustained bodily injury while occupying an automobile not owned by that injured party not the children of the decedent