When Gerald signed a contingent fee agreement with Foelber, Foelber included the following in the agreement: "We also understand that Joseph Pearman has done a good deal of work in preparing this case and we will work with him and you in determining fair compensation for those efforts." Appellant's Appendix at 87. Pearman's complaint alleged that his work on behalf of the Sisons was significant, that the case against Daimler Chrysler could not have been successfully maintained without it, and that he was entitled to the value of the work that he performed. Although Pearman did not have a written or oral contingency fee agreement with the Sisons, the Sisons' agreement with Fo-elber indicates a clear intent to benefit Pearman as a third-party beneficiary. Cf. Galanis, 715 N.E.2d at 861 (<HOLDING>); Major v. OEC-Diasonics, Inc., 748 N.E.2d 276,
holding that an attorney was entitled to a quantum meruit recovery even though his oral contingency fee agreement with the client violated the ind rules of professional conduct which require a contingency fee agreement to be in writing holding that where a successor attorney fails to inform the client of the clients duty to pay the predecessor attorney the successor assumes the obligation to pay the first lawyers fee out of his or her contingent fee holding that a discharged firms recovery is limited to quantum meruit holding that where a contract for legal services fails to expressly provide for the amount of the fee a reasonable fee is implied holding that aln attorney who is employed under a contingent fee contract and discharged pri or to the occurrence of the contingency is limited to quantum meruit recovery for the reasonable value of the services rendered to the client and may not recover the full amount of the agreed contingent fee