therefore, the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a continuance to submit a written brief regarding the departure issue. We disagree. Beatty received sufficient notice about the departure issue. The presentence investigation report (PSR) included a section entitled “Factors That May Warrant Departure,” which listed the specific factors that could justify an upward departure under U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 and specifically informed Beatty that “upward departure might be warranted.” (See PSR at 16-17.) We conclude that the PSR provided sufficient information to Beatty about the possibility that the district court might depart upward. See United States v. Andrews, 948 F.2d 448, 449 (8th Cir.1991) (citing Burns v. United States, — U.S.—,—, 111 1017-18 (8th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). The district court, however, did not actually
recognizing potential upward adjustment beyond that provided by guidelines for aggravating role in the offense holding government did not breach plea agreement where government provided information to probation department that would support higher base offense level and aggravated role but encouraged court not to consider such information and to calculate base offense level consistent with plea agreement holding that a reduction for minor role in an offense cannot be awarded when the larger offense was not taken into account in setting the base level holding that defendants concealment of crime does not warrant adjustment for obstruction of justice because commission provided for concealment in base offense level holding that arithmetical error that resulted in an increase to a defendants base offense level pursuant to the sentencing guidelines affected his substantial rights even though the resulting sentence was within the range for the correct offense level