officials performing discretionary functions are immune “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). To determine whether an officer is qualifiedly immune from suit, we ask (1) whether the officer violated a constitutional light, and (2) whether the right was clearly established, such that “it would [have been] clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Although we have discretion to tackle the
holding that the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right holding that clearly established means the contours of the right were so clear at the time the officials acted that a reasonable official would have understood that what he was doing violated that right holding that the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he or she is doing violates that right holding that if official has violated clearly established law he is entitled to qualified immunity only if reasonable official could have believed conduct was lawful holding that for purposes of the second question the right must have been clearly established in a particularized sense such that a reasonable official would have understood that what he was doing violated that right