v. Waxfield Ltd., 424 F.3d 278, 283-85 (2d Cir.2005); Personal Sec. & Safety Sys. Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 297 F.3d 388, 395-96 (5th Cir.2002). Escobal next contends that he cannot be compelled to arbitrate his claim against Celebration Cruise Line because it is not a signatory to the arbitration agreement. Again, we disagree. Escobal’s claim against Cruise Line is inextricably intertwined with his claims against the contract signatory Celebration Cruise Operator. Thus, the district court properly applied equitable estoppel in requiring Es-cobal to arbitrate his claim against Cruise Line. See MS Dealer Serv. Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942, 947-48 (11th Cir.1999), abrogated on other grounds, Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 631, 129 S.Ct. 1896, 1902, 173 L.Ed.2d 832 (2009) (<HOLDING>). Escobal next contends that if he must
holding that nonsignatory was estopped from denying applicability of arbitration clause where nonsignatory received direct benefits from contract including lowered insurance rates and the ability to sail under the french flag holding that when an arbitration clause has provisions that defeat the remedial purpose of the statute  the arbitration clause is not enforceable and that the language insulating an employer from damages and equitable relief renders the clause unenforceable holding that the best way to harmonize a choice of law clause and an arbitration clause is to apply the substantive case law of the named state to the entire agreement including the arbitration clause holding that state law governs whether an arbitration clause is enforceable against a nonsignatory under the faa holding that an exception to the rule that a nonsignatory cannot invoke arbitration exists when under agency or related principals the relationship between the nonsignatory and a signatory is sufficiently close that the only way to avoid eviscerating the arbitration agreement is to allow the nonsignatory to compel arbitration