be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” Miller-El v. Cockrell (“Miller-El I"), 537 U.S. 322, 348, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1041, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When performing a review under § 2254(d), a federal court presumes the state court’s factual findings to be sound unless the petitioner rebuts the “presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 340, 123 S.Ct. 1029 (explaining that a federal court can disagree with a state court’s factual finding and, when guided by the AEDPA, “conclude the decision was unreasonable or that the factual premise was incorrect by clear and convincing evidence”); Jones, 496 F.3d at 1226-1227 (11th Cir.2007)(<HOLDING>). As stated above, only if this court finds
holding the manifest error standard of review is the proper standard to be applied to the mixed question of law and fact presented by a determination of whether a defect presents an unreasonable risk of harm holding that  2254d2s unreasonable determination standard must be met by clear and convincing evidence and concluding that the standard was satisfied where prisoner showed clearly and convincingly that the state courts decision contained an unreasonable determination of fact holding that despite the lack of a statutory requirement that severe child abuse be shown by clear and convincing evidence due to the consequences of such a finding the clear and convincing standard must be applied holding that even if the standard for waiver is clear the standard was not met holding that a bad faith claim must be met through the clear and convincing evidence standard