that the State’s prosecution was not barred by the statute of limitation but, rather, simply reiterated her earlier legal arguments. Furthermore, and also unlike the scenario contemplated in Jenkins, Barghi elected to waive her right to a jury trial and instead proceeded to a bench trial with the same finder of fact who presided over her plea in bar and who had, therefore, already ruled upon the identical arguments less than two weeks earlier. And given that the statute of limitation is not an element of the crime per se, it was perfectly appropriate for the trial court, as the trier of fact, to rely on evidence that was already a part of the case record. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in considering evidence presented during the plea in 642, 645 (3) (621 SE2d 595) (2005) (<HOLDING>); Jones v. State, 302 Ga. App. 147, 150-51 (690
recognizing that a court may rely on matters of which a court may take judicial notice holding that the appellate court may take judicial notice of its own records in related proceedings holding that a trial court may take judicial cognizance of records on file in its own court punctuation omitted holding that appellate court may judicially notice its own records recognizing that the court may take judicial notice of its own docket