is construed broadly. Pennington, 261 F.3d at 1266. Although close temporal proximity can indicate causation, the temporal proximity must be “very close.” Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273, 121 S.Ct. 1508, 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 509 (2001). This court has held that “in the absence of any other evidence of causation,” a three-month proximity is insufficient to establish causation. Drago v. Jenne, 453 F.3d 1301, 1308 (11th Cir.2006); see also Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1220 (11th Cir.2004) (“If there is a substantial delay between the protected expression and the adverse action in the absence of other evidence tending to show causation, the complaint of retaliation fails as a matter of law.”); Wascura v. City of South Miami, 257 F.3d 1238, 1248 (11th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). After a thorough review, we conclude that
holding that three and onehalf months between the filing of an eeoc charge and the adverse employment action was insufficient by itself to establish causation holding a three and onehalf year delay was unreasonable holding that by itself three and onehalf months was insufficient to prove causation holding that a three and onehalf month temporal proximity is insufficient to create a jury issue on causation holding one and onehalf months establishes causation while three months is too long and does not