identification document,” 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(1), he will serve time in federal prison. In other words, Melendrez will be punished for creating false identification. The question is whether the identity theft enhancement applies. In my view, it does not because only a single means of identification was involved. As the majority aptly notes, we are presented with “the convoluted wording and structure of the enhancement and its commentary.” Op. at 881-32. The language is ambiguous at best — a point underscored by the ink spilled by both the majority and the dissent. Here, the lack of clarity requires that we invoke the rule of lenity and adopt a narrow construction of the enhancement, the one most favorable to Melendrez. See United States v. Ramirez, 347 F.3d 792, 799-800 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). I. The Text of the Sentencing Provision
holding in sentencing guidelines context that the rule of lenity requires that we construe ambiguous terms in favor of the accused holding that criminal statutes of limitation should be construed in favor of the accused holding rule of lenity in the penal context to be a rule of last resort holding that the rule of lenity applies only if the provision being construed is still ambiguous after the application of normal rules of construction holding that the rule of lenity applies to sentencing guidelines