defendants); accord People v. Carrington, 47 Cal.4th 145, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 117, 211 P.3d 617, 647 (2009) (“An indictment and an information initiate ‘separate proceedings.’ ”); State v. Thomas, 625 S.W.2d 115, 125 (Mo.1981) (“The second indictment began a new and separate criminal proceeding... .”). In fact, the circumstances of this case illustrate the independent nature of the grand jury as a separate charging body. Under Rule 17.01, only a grand jury indictment could have charged Hohenwald with first-degree murder because a conviction for that offense is punishable by life imprisonment. Minn. R.Crim. P. 17.01, subd. 1 (“An offense punishable by life imprisonment must be prosecuted by indictment.”) (emphasis added); see also State v. Kivimaki, 345 N.W.2d 759, 763 (Minn.1984) (<HOLDING>). The indictment, therefore, necessarily
holding that it was not error to allow the penalty phase jury to hear evidence that the defendants previous conviction of seconddegree murder was obtained pursuant to an indictment for firstdegree murder recognizing that rule 1701 required an indictment to proceed on charges of firstdegree murder holding that indictment for murder in the first degree charges murder by whatever means it may have been committed regardless of the theory of murder presented to the grand jury holding that conspiracy to commit murder is not lesserincluded offense of firstdegree murder holding that conviction for seconddegree murder operates as implied acquittal on firstdegree murder count