that, due to their association with young children, would seem normal in a car full of children. Moreover, Cervante-Sanchez put substances that are normally used to conceal the scent of drugs from law enforcement canine in the boxes, demonstrating that he contemplated that he might be stopped by law enforcement during the trip. That decision supports the district court’s finding that Cervante-San-chez also brought the children on the trip to avoid detection of his illicit activity. Taking these circumstances together, “[w]e cannot say the district court clearly erred in its factfinding that [Cervantes-Sanchez] was using the [children] to ... conceal” drugs or that the court “committed legal error in its conclusion that the § 3B1.4 enhancement applied to the facts here.” See id. at 897 (<HOLDING>). Ill Cervante-Sanchez also claims that the
holding that the term cocaine base in 21 usc  841b1 refers to cocaine in its chemically basic form which includes but is not limited to crack cocaine holding that district court did not err in determining that cocaine base was crack cocaine based on chemical analysis identifying cocaine base together with competent lay testimony bridging the evidentiary gap between cocaine base and crack cocaine and refusing to require showing of smokeability ie water solubility or melting point for purposes of establishing crack cocaine under the guidelines since smokeability distinguishes cocaine base from powder cocaine not from crack holding that the  3b14 enhancement was appropriate where the defendant placed a baby on top of cocaine to hide the cocaine holding that a reasonable jury could have concluded based on repeated references to the substance as cocaine and testimony from witnesses who had used the substances which they believed to be cocaine that substance was cocaine recognizing possession of cocaine as a lesserincluded offense of possession of cocaine with intent to sell