the hozada requirements with respect to the allegation set forth in his motion to rescind. However, Samartsiev made an additional allegation of misconduct in his motion to reopen, claiming that Lynn instructed him to sign a blank Notice of Appeal form which he subsequently filed with the BIA without Samartsiev’s knowledge or consent. This claim was a separate and independent allegation of ineffective assistance, and Samartsiev failed to separately and independently satisfy the procedural requirements set forth in Matter of Lozada with respect to that allegation. Because Samartsiev made no effort to comply with Matter of Lozada in advancing this new claim of ineffective assistance, the BIA did not err in denying his motion. See Ruiz-Martinez v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 102, 121 (2d Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Samartsiev argues that he should not be
holding that to the extent defendants claim is one of ineffective assistance of counsel it is not cognizable on direct appeal and rule 2915 is the exclusive procedure by which a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be advanced recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel holding that failing to substantially comply with the matter of lozada requirements in a motion to reopen before the bia forfeits an ineffective assistance claim in this court holding that the petitioner was not entitled to claim ineffective assistance because she did not comply with the lozada requirements and made no effort to explain her lack of compliance recognizing that while slavish adherence to matter of lozada is not required when an alien does not comply with those requirements in any respect the ineffective assistance of counsel claim is forfeited