Cir.2001) (internal citation omitted). See also Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1079 (9th Cir.2007) (“Whether the right at issue in a claim of qualified immunity is clearly established ... is a pure question of law....”); Williams v. Ala. State Univ., 102 F.3d 1179, 1182 (11th Cir.1997) (same); Warren v. Dwyer, 906 F.2d 70, 76 (2d Cir.1990) (“The ultimate legal determination whether, on the facts found, a reasonable police officer should have known he acted unlawfully is a questi h Cir.2003) (en banc) (“The initiation of criminal charges without probable cause may set in force events that run afoul of explicit constitutional protection — ■ the Fourth Amendment if the accused is seized and arrested, for example.... ”); Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 748 (6th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Smart v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 34
holding the same for malicious prosecution holding that excessive force claims are to be treated under the fourth amendment holding that in  1983 claims for malicious prosecution the fourth amendment applies to those actions which occur between arrest and pretrial detention holding that traditional claims for malicious prosecution must be pursued and treated as fourth amendment violations when the gravamen of the complaint is continued detention without probable cause holding that a malicious prosecution plaintiff must show inter alia that the criminal proceeding was initiated without probable cause