leave of the district judge or, when authorized by local rule, by a magistrate judge.” This Court has noted that scheduling orders “are not set in stone, but may be relaxed for good cause, extraordinary circumstances, or in the interest of justice.” Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 954 (4th Cir.1984). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that after a responsive pleading has been served, a party may amend its pleading “only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Furthermore, leave to amend is a liberal standard and will not be denied unless the amendment will cause actual prejudice to the adverse party. See Ward Elees. Serv., Inc. v. First Commercial Bank, 819 F.2d 496, 497 (4th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Here, the District Court properly exercised
recognizing several reasons to deny leave to amend a complaint holding that it is abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend absent a clear or declared reason such as delay bad faith prejudice or a repeated failure to cure a problem in the complaint holding that a change in the theory of recovery and one prior amendment is not sufficient to deny a motion to amend the complaint where no evidence of bad faith existed holding that a bad faith claim is a tort holding that bad faith includes lack of good faith in investigating the facts of a complaint