their legal duty of affirmative, reasonable care to Roque and the public, or to conclude that A.R.S. § 4-311(A) does not allow for consideration of the employees’ ameliorative acts as related to duty, the question, then, is whether the tavern’s act of serving alcohol to Roque and her consumption of the alcohol may be held to be a proximate cause of Patterson’s injury and property damage. See A.R.S. § 4-311(A); Herzberg, 49 Ariz. at 321, 66 P.2d at 257; Chavez v. Tolleson Elem. Sch. Dist., 122 Ariz. 472, 475, 595 P.2d 1017, 1020 (App.1979) (“The well-settled standard of liability is based upon a duty owed to the plaintiff and a breach of the duty which is the proximate cause of the injury.”); see also W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 42, at 273-74 (5th ed.1984) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 18 In Ontiveros, our supreme court stated
recognizing that limitations on the scope of a defendants liability may be analyzed under the rubric of proximate cause holding that negligence must be the proximate cause of injury holding proximate cause required for claim of breach of special duty holding where reasonable difference of opinion as to whether the defendants act was the or a proximate cause of the injury the matter is for the jury to decide holding that a physicians negligence need only be a proximate cause not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury