degree murder, committed G.O. to the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division, until his “21st birthday, without the possibility of parole, furlough, or non-emergency authorized absence for a period of 5 years.” See 705 ILCS 405/5 — 33(1.5) (West 1996). The appellate court reversed, holding the failure to provide G.O. with a jury trial violated his right to equal protection because the General Assembly provides jury trials for juveniles charged as either violent or habitual juvenile offenders which carry similar mandatory minimum sentences. The majority reverses and holds that G.O. does not have a constitutional right to a jury trial because the mandatory minimum sentencing provision for first degree murder was declared unconstitutional in People v. Cervantes, 189 Ill. 2d 80 (1999) (<HOLDING>). The majority concludes that Cervantes
holding that the due process clause contained in the colorado constitution encompasses a guarantee of equal protection holding that illinois public policy did not require the application of illinois law to an illinois accident involving only indiana residents insured in indiana holding public act 88  680 which contained the sentencing provision for first degree murder violated the single subject clause of the illinois constitution holding that executive branch prosecution of disciplinary charges against a judge violated the separation of powers provision in the nevada constitution a provision identical to article v section 1 of the utah constitution holding that because the due process clause in the federal constitution is applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment the right is also guaranteed to defendants pursuant to the identical provision in article i section 5 of the hawaii constitution