indicate that Judge Sylvester acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. We will accept Gallas’ allegation that Judge Sylvester violated a court “rule” which allowed the release of an impounded PFA only for purposes of its use as evidence in a judicial proceeding, and only then upon judicial order following a verified petition properly noticed to all interested parties. Yet, such a procedural error at most might establish that Judge Sylvester acted in excess of her jurisdiction, not that she acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. See id. at 359, 98 S.Ct. at 1106 (“A judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.”); see also Mí-reles, 502 U.S. at 13, 112 S.Ct. at 289 (<HOLDING>); Rolleston v. Eldridge, 848 F.2d 163, 164-65
holding that deputies use of a police dog is subject to excessive force analysis holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim holding that ordering police officers to use excessive force in bringing a lawyer into court was a judicial act recognizing that the fourth amendment protects against the use of excessive force by police officers in carrying out an arrest holding that a judge merely acted in excess of his authority in ordering police officers to use excessive force in bringing an attorney to his courtroom for a calendar call