the trial court’s conclusion that Charles should be credited for these debts and Karen’s argument to the contrary is an invitation to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses — an invitation we decline. Next, Karen argues that the trial court erroneously valued the marital residence at $72,000 because, although the home was originally appraised at $72,000, the condition of the residence had deteriorated markedly since the appraisal. Karen, however, testified only that she believed that the home was worth “less than that” but neglected to state what she believed the value of the residence to be. Id. at 37. Consequently, Karen may not now complain that the evidence of the home’s value is inaccurate. See Church v. Church, 424 N.E.2d 1078, 1081 (Ind.Ct.App.1981) (<HOLDING>). Inasmuch as the trial court’s valuation of
holding that a party who fails to provide sufficient evidence at trial cannot object to the resulting determination on the basis of inadequate evidence holding that if the market value of an asset can be ascertained the decree should account for the change in value between the date of the decree and the timely execution of the distribution plan in the decree the distribution based on value at the distribution date holding that the objective of maintaining the marital residence for the best interest of the minor children is properly accomplished not by granting exclusive ownership of the home to the wife but by granting the wife exclusive use and possession of the marital residence during the minority of the children holding that a party who fails to introduce evidence of the specific value of the marital residence is estopped from appealing the distribution based on that absence of evidence holding invited error doctrine bars appellant from appealing the admission of evidence where appellant invited the error by being the first to introduce the evidence thus injecting the issue into tjie case