of imprisonment” requirement, such that the defendant is entitled to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. United States v. Reilley, 948 F.2d 648, 653-54 (10th Cir. 1991). Accord United States v. Foster, 904 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Leavitt, 608 F.2d 1290 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. White, 529 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1976); State v. DeRosa, 633 A.2d 277 (Vt. 1993); contra United States v. Nash, 703 F. Supp. 507 (W.D. La.), aff'd 886 F.2d 1312 (5th Cir. 1989). The Commonwealth affords trial courts broad discretion in revoking suspended sentences. See Code § 19.2-306 (stating that the court can revoke a suspended sentence “for any cause deemed by it sufficient” within the applicable statutory time limits); Singleton v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 575, 400 S.E.2d 205 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 111 Va. 325, 228
holding that a suspended lawyer remains subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the court for acts committed while suspended holding that code sections dealing with suspended sentences are to be liberally construed and that revocation of a suspended sentence lies within the trial courts sound discretion holding that a court could not agree to impose a sentence within the guidelines but then give a sentence that suspended all but an amount within the guidelines because a reasonable defendant would believe that within the guidelines included suspended time holding that whether dismissal or transfer is appropriate lies within the sound discretion of the district court holding that pleadings under the rico act are to be liberally construed