similarly alleges that IHS had a duty to control Bullis, and its failure to do so “proximately caused Mario to suffer ■... damage.” (Id. ¶¶ 33, 34.) Finally, Count V alleges the sexual assaults occurred while Bullis was in “the employ and control of IHS,” that IHS had a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff which it breached, and that the Plaintiff suffered injuries as a result. (Id. ¶¶ 36, 37.) Each of these claims are based upon the injury caused by Bullis’ sexual assaults upon the Plaintiff and his misuse of his professional relationship with the Plaintiff. Thus, each of these claims “arises out of’ the sexual assaults and other intentional torts alleged in the complaint, notwithstanding the Plaintiffs efforts to characterize these claims as sounding in negligence. See Hoot, 790 F.2d at 838 (<HOLDING>); Naisbitt v. United States, 611 F.2d 1350
holding in any case in which the employee has intentionally injured another the tort asserted against the government regardless of whether it is called negligence is indeed an intentional tort attributable to the government holding comparative negligence not defense to intentional tort recognizing a tort for the intentional spoliation of evidence holding that 28 usc  2680h bars suits against the government in all eases where the intentional tort was committed by a government employee recognizing tort of negligence by words