so that Lexington could make an informed decision whether to incur the expense of defending against the action. Because the complaint failed to give such notice, Lexington asserts that entry of the default judgment violated its due process rights and deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to enter a default judgment. Moreover, Lexington argues that the posited defect necessarily infected the entire default judgment, rendering it void. We begin our analysis by noting what is not in dispute on review: the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction in this action and, because Lexington was properly served with summons and the original complaint, the court also had personal jurisdiction over Lexington. See School Dist. No. 1, Mult. Co. v. Nilsen, 262 Or 559, 566, 499 P2d 1309 (1972) (<HOLDING>); Woods v. Carl Karcher Enterprises, Inc., 341
holding that the information must establish that the court has jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties holding that court had jurisdiction over common law counts related to fca claim even though not presented to contracting officer holding that court had no supplemental jurisdiction over claim by shareholder for breach of merger agreement that was the subject of the dispute between the merger partners over which the district court had subject matter jurisdiction holding that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over a commonlaw wrongful discharge claim holding that an oregon court has subject matter jurisdiction over an action if constitution statute or common law tells court to do something about specific kind of dispute presented