been “afforded an opportunity to contest ,.. whether [LPOA’s attorneys’ fees] were reasonable and necessary.” LPOA responded that the chancellor’s post-trial instructions put the Berlins on notice that the court intended to rule on the issue without a further hearing. LPOA also argued that its attorney’s affidavit was sufficient and that no hearing was necessary. On September 3, 2015, the chancellor denied the Berlins’ motion without specifically addressing the issue of attorneys’ fees. ¶ 33. The Berlins do not dispute that a prevailing party in an action to enforce the covenants is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees, and section 14.01 makes clear that a prevailing party is entitled to such an award. See Journeay v. Berry, 953 So.2d 1145, 1162-63 (¶¶ 63-66) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (<HOLDING>). However, “[a] contractual provision to pay
holding trial court had no authority to award attorneys fees when arbitrator had stated he would not award attorneys fees holding that an award of attorneys fees under supreme court rule 38 precursor to rule 222 did not preempt an award of attorneys fees to which one is otherwise entitled and thus appellant could seek an award of attorneys fees pursuant to section 1577300 which permits an award of fees for a party prevailing in an action against a state agency holding that valid restrictive covenants are contractual in nature and therefore may support an award of attorneys fees holding that a district court may award attorneys fees while the merits are on appeal holding merely that the evidence was sufficient to support the award of attorneys fees