have been offered for that purpose.” Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 129-30, 103 S.Ct. 2906, 2917-18, 77 L.Ed.2d 509 (1983) (quoting Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352, 24 L.Ed. 195 (1877)). This doctrine serves the public policy of preserving repose and “putting an end to litigation.” Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475- 76 (Fed.Cir.1991). A plaintiff is barred from relitigating the same transactional facts even though they are cloaked in a different cause of action or theory of recovery. Vitaline Corp. v. General Mills, Inc., 891 F.2d 273, 275 (Fed.Cir.1989) (citing Young Eng’rs, Inc. v. United States, 721 F.2d 1305, 1314 (Fed.Cir.1983)); see Woods v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 972 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.1992), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 977, 122 L.Ed.2d 131 (1993) (<HOLDING>), Vitaline, 891 F.2d 273 (holding that prior
holding that antidiscrimination rights under title vii cannot be waived by a collective bargaining agreement holding that employees claim alleging discharge in violation of collective bargaining agreement precluded subsequent action under title vii for the same discharge holding that where the immediate cause or motivating factor of a discharge is the employees assertion of statutory rights the discharge is discriminatory under section 215a3 whether or not grounds for other discharge exist holding that petitioners remedy under title vii of the civil rights act was in addition to remedies available under the collective bargaining agreement in force between his employer and his union holding that an employee does not forfeit his title vii right of action if he first seeks relief under an arbitration clause in his collective bargaining agreement