opens the door by suggesting the victim’s behavior is inconsistent with that of an abused child. As noted below, many other courts have allowed testimony that a child victim’s behavior or symptoms are “consistent with” child abuse trauma as rebuttal evidence. That is not what happened in this case. Just two years ago, in State v. Favoccia, the Supreme Court of Connecticut thor oughly reviewed the conflicting precedent and policy considerations in reaching the same conclusion we reach today. 306 Conn. 770, 51 A.3d 1002, 1012-22 (2012). The Favoccia court overturned its own precedent to hold that “the trial court abused its discretion in permitting [the expert] to testify about the complainant’s behaviors being consistent -with those generally characteristic 6, 671 N.E.2d 984, 985 (1996) (<HOLDING>); State v. Chamberlain, 137 N.H. 414, 628 A.2d
holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in dismissing the case without allowing appellants an opportunity to amend holding that a trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of an expert witness where the testimony would have been relevant to show that the defendant breached a duty of care holding admission of expert testimony not erroneous where expert described typical traits and characteristics of sexually abused children holding that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing expert testimony that directly linked the characteristics of sexually abused children to the complainants in this case holding that the testimony of an expert witness is admissible when the witness outlines the general characteristics of sexually abused children and then states that the victims symptoms are consistent with those characteristics