sole contribution of [Lamar] and that [Lamar] was the only party at risk on the purchase of the condominium.” Elizabeth contends that this ruling was in error. This court reviews division of marital property cases de novo. Copeland v. Copeland, 84 Ark. App. 303, 139 S.W.3d 145 (2003). In reviewing a trial court’s decision on whether an item is marital property, we will not reverse unless the court’s ruling is clearly erroneous. See Nicholson v. Nicholson, 11 Ark. App. 299, 669 S.W.2d 514 (1984). We first consider whether Lamar’s execution of the real-estate purchase contract created a property interest. We believe that it did. In executing the contract, Lamar acquired the right to enforce the sale of the condominium. See generally Bharodia v. Pledger, 340 Ark. 547, 11 S.W.3d 540 (2000) (<HOLDING>); Hawkins v. Lamb, 210 Ark. 1, 194 S.W.2d 5
holding that persons not parties to a contract did not have standing to seek declaratory judgment on contracts validity holding that the supreme court has final appellate review of agency decisions holding that the information must establish that the court has jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties holding that the court of appeals lacks the authority to overrule decisions of the supreme court of north carolina and has a responsibility to follow those decisions until otherwise ordered by the supreme court recognizing that the supreme court has allowed both the buyers and the sellers of land to seek specific performance on realestate contracts