evidence of Joseph Grendi’s activities that the plaintiffs have presented, there is clearly evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Joseph Grendi exercised actual control over JWP’s procedures and activities. Joseph Grendi next argues that he may not be subject to control person liability based on the activities of McGinn and McQuade because the class plaintiffs have failed to allege that McGinn and McQuade committed primary violations of the securities laws. This argument is more persuasive. While the class plaintiffs need not name McGinn and McQuade as defendants in order to recover under § 20, they must at least allege that McGinn and McQuade committed primary violations. See In re Citisource, Inc. Securities Litigation, 694 F.Supp. 1069, 1072, 1077 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (<HOLDING>). The class plaintiffs’ complaint is, however,
holding that the presence of conclusory terms in a complaint does not insulate it from dismissal when the facts alleged cannot support the charges contained in the complaint holding that plaintiff need not name alleged primary violators as defendants but describing detailed allegations of their wrongdoing contained in complaint holding that a court need not accept as true conclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint recognizing that one of those conditions for a district judge to grant leave to amend the complaint may properly be that claims contained in the original complaint but not included in the amended complaint be considered dismissed with prejudice  holding that a complaint that included only allegations of intentional wrongdoing also set forth grounds for liability based on unintentional wrongdoing