retroactively on collateral review.”); United States v. Moss, 252 F.3d 993 (8th Cir.2001) (“[W]e hold ... that Apprendi is not of watershed magnitude and that Teague bars petitioners from raising Apprendi claims on collateral review.”); Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1236 (9th Cir.2000) (“[T]he non-retroactivity principle pronounced in Teague prevents Petitioner from benefitting from Apprendi’s new rule on collateral review.”); United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 148 (4th Cir.2001) (“[T]he new rule announced Appreridi does not rise to the level of a watershed rule of criminal procedure which ‘alters our understanding of the bedrock elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.’ ”) (quoting Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 242, 110 S.Ct. 2822); In re Turner, 267 F.3d 225, 231 (3d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. -, 122 S.Ct.
holding the supreme court has not held in a case or a combination of cases that the rule in johnson is retroactive to cases on collateral review and therefore it has not made johnson retroactive holding that petitioner was barred from bringing apprendi claim on second or successive motion to vacate because supreme court had not made apprendi retroactive to cases on collateral review holding that until the supreme court rules otherwise apprendi is not a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review  that was previously unavailable holding that apprendi does not apply on collateral review holding apprendi is not retroactive