may be limited by the legislature, for example, by disregarding the privilege “in weighing the needs of parties to civil litigation”); State ex rel. Udall v. Superior Court, 183 Ariz. 462, 465, 904 P.2d 1286, 1289 (App.1995) (stating that statute abrogates physician-patient privilege in cases involving abuse of a child); State v. Wilson, 200 Ariz. 390, 394-95, ¶ 11, 26 P.3d 1161, 1165-66 (App. 2001) (stating that physician-patient privilege is not absolute as legislature has created exceptions). Thus, we must look at the statute that creates the statutory privilege to determine what “privileged” means in a specific context. The same is true of statutes that make certain records or communications “confidential.” See Hanson v. Rowe, 18 Ariz. App. 131, 134, 500 P.2d 916, 919 (1972) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 19 The above federal and state statutes do
holding that records relating to a student court were not education records recognizing an absolute privilege for police records in a habeas corpus action holding that ferpa and state law did not create an educational records privilege recognizing that refinement of rule governing confidential court records was a necessary step in providing the public electronic access to court records holding that statute making child welfare agency records confidential but disclosable pursuant to a court order did not create an absolute privilege for such records