notified by the jury that they were uncomfortable or whether he noticed it on his own. On this evidence alone, the defendant has certainly not carried his burden of showing that the jury was improperly influenced, much less that the influence was so serious that it required individual voir dire by the judge. III. For the foregoing reasons, both Babb and Moore’s convictions are AFFIRMED. 1 . James Moore sought, and we granted, permission to file a pro se supplemental brief after this case was calendared for oral argument. In it he raises arguments concerning speedy trial, double jeopardy, and failure to indict on conduct used as other acts evidence at sentencing. Because settled circuit precedent controls on these issues, see United States v. Keith, 42 F.3d 234, 238-39 (4th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). United States v. Camps, 32 F.3d 102, 106 (4th
holding that where a defendant acquiesces in a continuance that time is excluded from the speedy trial calculation holding that even if the calculation commenced on the date of the first indictment the defendants right to a speedy trial was not violated holding that speedy trial act requires that an ends of justice continuance be specifically limited in time holding that delay when defense counsel withdrew because of conflict is excluded from iad time calculation holding that time excluded from a speedy trial clock for pretrial motion preparation is not automatically excluded under  3161h1 but may only be excluded when a court makes appropriate reasonableness findings under  3161h7