which caused Niles to experience an uncontrollable impulse to do violence. In my opinion, there is. First, as the court of appeals noted, the unprovoked shooting by Salter amounted to evidence sufficient for a jury to infer that there was legal provocation. See State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 573, 647 S.E.2d 144, 168 (2008) (“This court has previously held than an overt, threatening act or a physical encounter may constitute sufficient legal provocation.”). Second, I agree with the court of appeals that Niles’s testimony that he immediately returned fire out of fear for himself and his fiancee provided evidence from which a jury could find that Niles was acting pursuant to an uncontrollable impulse to do violence. State v. Wiggins, 330 S.C. 538, 549, 500 S.E.2d 489, 495 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, I would affirm the court of
holding that the lower court properly charged the jury on voluntary manslaughter where defendant testified he was in fear of the threat of physical assault holding that the trial court properly failed to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication and manslaughter where there was no evidence that the appellant was intoxicated at the time of the offense although there was evidence that the appellant had been drinking beer on the day of the offense where there was no evidence concerning the quantity of beer he had consumed holding erroneous jury instruction on manslaughter by intentional act not fundamental error where trial court also instructed jury on manslaughter by culpable negligence holding that trial court should instruct the jury that if they had any reasonable doubt as to whether unlawful killing was murder or manslaughter it was jurys duty to convict defendant of the lesser offense manslaughter holding that the threat of injury was not speculative because the plaintiffs had been previously charged under the challenged statute