standing doctrine resembles its federal counterpart. See Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 134 Ohio St.3d 13, 979 N.E.2d 1214, 1218-20 (2012). By contrast, the Ohio state courts repeatedly have held that statutory standing is a question to be resolved with reference to the specific language of the applicable statute rather than to abstract standing principles. See, e.g., Ohio Valley Assocd. Builders & Contractors v. DeBra-Kuempel, 192 Ohio App.3d 504, 949 N.E.2d 582, 585-87 (2011) (discussing statutory standing and stating that the “only issue” is whether the plaintiff was an “interested party” as defined in the relevant statute, “common-law standing notwithstanding”); Rose-Gulley v. Spitzer Akron, Inc., No. 21778, 2004 WL 1736982, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2004) (<HOLDING>). “To incorporate common-law standing
holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue holding that a plaintiff may not assert claims based on statements she did not view holding that plaintiff lacked standing to assert cspa claim because she was not a consumer within the meaning of that statute holding that a litigant may not claim standing to assert the rights of a third party holding that plaintiff lacked standing to assert rico claim for mail fraud based on misrepresentations made to third parties