summary judgment does not present the sort of purely abstract issue of law that is immediately appealable under Mitchell. This conclusion makes sense given the jurisdictional principles underlying the Mitchell decision. As described above, Mitchell relied on the collateral order doctrine established in Cohen. This judicially created rule is but “a narrow exception to the normal application of the final judgment rule.” Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 798, 109 S.Ct. 1494, 103 L.Ed.2d 879 (1989). To qualify for immediate appeal under this doctrine, an otherwise non-final order must “involve[] issues significantly different from those that underlie the plaintiffs basic case.” Johnson, 515 U.S. at 314, 115 S.Ct. 2151; see also Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221 (<HOLDING>). In this case, the district court’s partial
holding that a nonfinal order is immediately appealable where it finally determined claims of right separable from and collateral to rights asserted in the action emphasis added holding that pursuant to parap 341b order of pcra court which fully and finally disposed of all issues before it was final and immediately appealable holding such denial to be an immediately appealable collateral final order holding that the issue of whether the attorney general was entitled to qualified immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine holding that denial of counsel in section 1983 action is not immediately appealable