whether the amount of time spent was reasonable. We find this argument to be without merit. The affidavit submitted by Nanney’s counsel presents a detañed accounting of the services provided and states that “attorney fees were calculated on a fixed hourly basis ... at the fixed hourly rate of $90.00 per hour.” If Petersen believed that the fee should have been calculated on a contingency basis, it could have so stated in its motion even -without full knowledge of the arrangement between Nanney and his attorney. In prior cases we have held that potential grounds for an objection to a cost memorandum are waived if they were not included in the stated bases for the motion to disallow costs or fees filed with the trial court. Devine v. Cluff, 110 Idaho 1, 5, 713 P.2d 437, 441 (Ct.App.1985) (<HOLDING>); Camp v. Jiminez, 107 Idaho 878, 883, 693 P.2d
holding that bank was entitled to attorney fees on appeal when agreement did not prohibit such fees holding that chanenge to the amount of attorney fees was not preserved for appeal where appellants objection challenged only the entitlement to fees holding that fees may be awarded for litigating amount of fees only where language of statute supports such conclusion holding attorney lacked standing to challenge amount of attorney fees awarded plaintiffs not parties to the appeal recognizing that the party seeking attorney fees bears the burden of proving entitlement to those fees