have dismissed the appeal.” Id. at 95, 635 A.2d 86. We held “that the circuit court erred when it entertained the appeal from the Board because the Organizations did not have standing to appeal and Sipes could not intervene after the running of the thirty day period for taking an appeal.” Id. at 85, 685 A.2d 86. Further, we distinguished, specifically, other cases in which a party was permitted to intervene where either the current party on the side upon which the party sought to intervene had standing, see Department of State Planning v. Mayor of Hagerstown, 288 Md. 9, 12-18, 415 A.2d 296 (1980), or where the intervenor, herself, had standing and could have brought the petition or suit on his or her own. See Benning v. Allstate Ins. Co., 90 Md.App. 592, 598-99, 602 A.2d 233 (1992) (<HOLDING>). This case, however, presented even greater
holding that a wouldbe intervenor was not entitled to intervene on the basis of rule 5212a1 where she failed to show that any missouri statute conferred upon her an unconditional right to intervene holding that a minor who initiated an action through her next friend within the applicable oneyear limitations period seeking damages for injuries sustained in an automobile accident was permitted to amend her action to add another defendant even after that oneyear period expired because her right to maintain an action would continue for one year after she reached the age of majority holding that a partys status as an intervenor at trial was insufficient alone to confer standing to appeal absent the defendants participation because the intervenor failed independently to satisfy the requirements of article iii holding that the improper denial of motion to intervene did not require a new trial where proposed intervenor was permitted to participate in the argument on the appeal from the order granting summary judgment and its contentions were duly considered holding that a motion to intervene was permitted even though the intervenor filed her motion eighteen days before trial where the intervenor herself could have brought an independent action to seek the same relief as she was within the twoyear statute of limitations commencing on the date of her automobile accident