or similar indicium recognizing the corporation’s controlling position. Johnson, 78 T.C. at 891 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). [¶ 12] In Johnson, the taxpayer was a professional basketball player who had contracted to provide his services to a corporation. Id. at 883-84. The Tax Court assumed, for the sake of argument, that the contract gave the corporation a right to control the taxpayer’s services, and thus determined that the first prong was satisfied. Id. at 891-92. The Tax Court, however, concluded that the taxpayer could not meet the second prong of the test because the basketball team he played for “refused to sign any contract or agreement with any person or entity other than [the taxpayer].” Id. at 893; but see Sargent v. Comm’r, 929 F.2d 1252, 1258-61 (8th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). [¶ 18] In this case, the court applied the
holding that professional hockey players personal service corporations were the taxable entities when the players entered into bona fide arms lengths employment agreements with their respective corporations and the team paid the corporations rather than the players holding that mandatory arbitration agreements in the employment context fall under the faa holding that the critical issue is not ownership in the first instance but rather the parties respective control over the disposal of hazardous substances holding that if the contract involves the exercise of the municipal corporations business or proprietary powers it is binding on successor bodies if at the time the contract was entered into it was fair and reasonable and necessary or advantageous to the municipality holding that the statements by the court went well beyond a mere rejection of the agreements and explanation for it they suggested at the very least the agreements that would be acceptable