TSSAA. TSSAA argues, however, that the First Amendment protection afforded by Um-behr and Pickering applies only when the content of a contractor’s or employee’s speech involves a “matter of public concern.” Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 685, 116 S.Ct. 2342; see also Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574, 88 S.Ct. 1731. It claims that the recruiting rule does not implicate a matter of public concern, and is therefore unworthy of First Amendment scrutiny. But TSSAA cannot have it both ways. As set forth in Part II.F. below, TSSAA will have to establish that the recruiting rule embodies substantial governmental interests as a necessary element of the rule’s enforceability. These substantial interests will by definition implicate a “matter of public concern.” See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573, 88 S.Ct. 1731 (<HOLDING>). We therefore conclude that Brentwood has not
holding that the board of education violated a school teachers first amendment rights by dismissing him because he had criticized the board in a letter to the local newspaper recognizing the importance of public welfare and conservation of water in administering its public waters holding that issues involving the local board of education were matters of public importance holding that issues of prison security public safety and official corruption are matters of public concern recognizing the importance of the employers knowledge of the disability