own terms, § 1981 “explicitly applies to ‘all persons ’ ” and not simply groups of individuals, McDonald, 427 U.S. at 287, 96 S.Ct. 2574 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)), the majority’s holding that § 1981 protects groups instead of “all persons ” contradicts the statute’s plain meaning. Indeed, as the Supreme Court has made clear, “[§ ] 1981, at a minimum, reaches discrimination against an individual because he or she is genetically part of an ethnically and phy-siognomically distinctive sub-grouping of homo sapiens,” Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji 481 U.S. 604, 613, 107 S.Ct. 2022, 95 L.Ed.2d 582 (1987) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted), and not simply, as the majority holds, racial groups qua racial groups. See Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); accord Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440,
holding that individual employees are not liable under title vii holding that there is no individual liability under title vii holding that a tortfeasor is required to pay the expenses of over treatment or unnecessary medical treatment unless such treatment was incurred by the victim in bad faith  holding individual defendants are not an employer within meaning of title vii holding that under title vii the ultimate issue is the reason for the individual plaintiffs treatment not the relative treatment of different groups within the workplace