and without support,” one of the reasons given by Chief Judge Murphy for the decision, which he authored, in Tandra S. Under the majority view, it is quite possible that many children could be left “fatherless and without support,” at least from their parent. The majority holds that the best interest of the child has no role to play in the decision to modify or set aside a paternity order. Underlying this holding is the majority’s interpretation of § 5-1038(a) to require blood or genetic testing to be ordered pursuant to § 5-1029. I do not quarrel with the proposition that the best interest of the child is not implicated when a blood test is ordered under the latter section. That section, as I have shown, governs the situation when paternity is still an open 3, 642 A.2d 201, 208 (1994) (<HOLDING>). To be sure, this Court must presume that the
recognizing policy and ruling that person who failed to file counterclaim when childs paternity was being determined in earlier litigation should not be allowed to bring later suit to establish that he was childs natural father as this would not be in the childs best interests holding that a parents right to control a childs upbringing is a fundamental liberty interest under the fourteenth amendment holding the foster parents responsible for support where the childs natural parents are unknown and noting that an earlier new york case held that an agreement to adopt did not terminate the natural parents duty of support but that in that earlier case the natural parent was alive and capable of providing for the child holding that natural parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children holding that a childs interest supercedes that of its natural parents