the inference of express malice,” the privilege has been abused and “protection withdrawn” (id.). Nearly a century later in Park Knoll Assoc. v. Schmidt, 59 N.Y.2d 205, 464 N.Y.S.2d 424, 451 N.E.2d 182 (1983), this Court held that relevant statements made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings are afforded absolute protection so that those discharging a public function may speak freely to zealously represent their clients without fear of reprisal or financial hazard (see id. at 209, 464 N.Y.S.2d 424, 451 N.E.2d 182). The privilege attaches to such statements irrespective of an attorney’s motive for making them (see Wiener v. Weintraub, 22 N.Y.2d 330, 331, 292 N.Y.S.2d 667, 239 N.E.2d 540 [1968]). Texas law is similar. See, e.g., James v. Brown, 637 S.W.2d 914, 916-17 (Tex. 1982)(<HOLDING>). In addition, TBG fails to state a claim to
holding that a choice of law provision in a lease did not serve as a basis for jurisdiction holding that the defendants failure to timely serve a notice of appeal and docketing statement did not prejudice the plaintiff and therefore would not serve as a basis to dismiss the appeal holding that if the dismissal was merely a formal means of securing a negotiated settlement it cannot serve as the basis for a malicious prosecution action holding that protected speech cannot serve as the basis for a violation of city ordinances at issue holding that communications during a judicial proceeding cannot serve as the basis for a civil action for libel or slander