Court’s recognition in New York State Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 8 n.2,. 108 S.Ct. 2225, that state courts may "issue advisory opinions or ... determine matters that would not satisfy the more stringent requirement in the federal courts that an actual 'case' or ‘controversy’ be presented for resolution”). 34 . Willden, 768 P.2d at 455, 458-59. 35 . 276 Va. 443, 454, 666 S.E.2d 303, 308 (2008). 36 . Id. at 455, 666 S.E.2d at 309. 37 . Id. 38 . Id. at 456-57, 666 S.E.2d at 310 (quoting Oral Arg. Tr., Virginia v. Hicks, No. 02-371, at 5 (Apr. 30, 2003)) (bracketed material and emphasis inlaynes). 39 . Id. at 458, 666 S.E.2d at 310-11. 40 . Id. at 457, 666 S.E.2d at 310 (emphasis in Jaynes ). 41 , Id. 42 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 438, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000) (<HOLDING>); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33, 83
holding that the state court could not procedurally bar a claim through retroactive application of a rule that did not exist at the time the rule would have applied to the petitioners case holding that if a state case explicitly states that the state standard is more favorable to the defendant than the federal standard the federal claim is considered adjudicated below when the state standard is applied holding that first and foremost of the factors supporting the conclusion that miranda is a constitutional decision is that the case applied the rule to prosecutions arising in state courts holding that courts should consider a number of factors including the type and complexity of the case and whether the indigent is capable of adequately presenting the case holding that exclusionary rule to be applied as a matter of state law is no broader than the federal rule