for sanctions. 11 . A fee-shifting provision is distinguishable from a sanction. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 52-53, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (distinguishing fee-shifting rules from sanctions by stating that fee-shifting rules "embody a substantive policy, such as a statute which permits a prevailing party in certain classes of litigation to recover fees,” whereas sanctions are not outcome dependent). But, even fee-shifting is not necessarily the automatic consequence of loss. See, e.g., Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412 (West 2012) (permitting fee shifting only where the government fails to prove that its position was not "substantially justified”); Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978) (<HOLDING>); but see Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award
holding trial courts finding that claim was frivolous insufficient to meet statutory requirement that claim constitutes harassment is groundless and not made in good faith holding that courts may award prevailing title vii defendant attorney fees upon a finding that the plaintiffs action was frivolous unreasonable or without foundation even though not brought in subjective bad faith and fees also may be awarded if plaintiff continued to litigate after its action clearly became frivolous unreasonable or without foundation holding a district court may in its discretion award attorneys fees upon a finding that plaintiffs action was frivolous unreasonable or without foundation even though not brought in subjective bad faith holding that attorney fees must be awarded where plaintiffs section 1983 claim was unreasonable and groundless holding that for a defendant to recoup attorneys fees under  706k of title vii a court must find that the plaintiff litigated his or her claim beyond the point where it became frivolous unreasonable or groundless or where plaintiff acted in bad faith