703 A.2d 1267 (“ ‘[When] an individual in custody requests an attorney, interrogation must cease until an attorney is present, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.’ ”) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted); Raras, 140 Md.App. at 153-54, 780 A.2d 322. We see no reason to distinguish between the right to counsel and the right to remain silent on the issue presented in the instant case, namely, whether appellant’s right to remain silent was violated when appellant invoked his right to remain silent, reinitiated conversation with police, and the police resumed questioning appellant. Our sister jurisdictions have come to the same conclusion on this issue. See, e.g., Morgan v. State, 275 Ga. 222, 564 S.E.2d 192, 195 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Cruz v. State, 715 So.2d 1117, 1118
holding that the trial court did not err in admitting the suspects statements to police where the suspect himself initiated his statement after previously expressing a different desire thereby clearly evincing his intent not to remain silent  holding that trial court did not err holding that because defendant initiated conversation leading to statement trial court did not err in admitting statement holding that a suspects statements to the police to the effect that his constitution will protect him that the police have nothing along with his negative response to a police question whether he had anything to say about what he was being arrested for followed by his question who said i did this did not amount to a clear invocation of the right to remain silent under davis holding that police may continue questioning a suspect until he unambiguously invokes his right to remain silent