of any governmental employee involved, if known; D. A concise statement of the nature and extent of the injury claimed to have been suffered; and E. A statement of the amount of monetary damages claimed. 8 . At common law, persons injured by the consumer of alcohol could not maintain suit against the provider of alcohol under the rationale that the consumption, rather than the provision, of alcohol was the proximate cause of the injuries, Peters v. Saft, 597 A.2d 50, 55 (Me.1991) (Glassman, J., concurring); see also Currier v. McKee, 99 Me. 364, 366, 59 A. 442, 443 (1904) (noting that the Dram Shop Act created a new cause of action, unknown to the common law); Gardner v. Day, 95 Me. 558, 560, 50 A. 892, 893 (1901) (same). But cf. Klingerman v. SOL Corp., 505 A.2d 474, 477 (Me.1986) (<HOLDING>). 9 . The central purpose of the MTCA was to
holding the dram shop act did not bar an action at common law for tortious sale of alcohol beverages holding that since there was no common law cause of action for wrongful death the texas constitutions open courts provision did not bar limiting rights and remedies that were created exclusively by statute holding that an action concerning the application of the omitted spouse statute was an action at law holding that a stateauthorized private sale of an automobile in satisfaction of a mechanics lien which was not permitted at common law to be state action holding that the determination of whether an individual is an independent contractor lies in the common law and not under an express provision of the act