laundering statute should not be interpreted to criminalize the very same conduct already criminalized by the drug laws. Id. at 485-86. We are not bound by Heaps. In this circuit we have held that the cashing of checks fraudulently obtained was sufficient evidence of an intent to promote the underlying fraudulent scheme. United States v. Reed, 167 F.3d 984, 992 (6th Cir.1999) (citing United States v. Haun, 90 F.3d 1096, 1100 (6th Cir.1996)). As we observed in Reed, there are two lines of cases regarding the evidence necessary to show intent to launder money, and this circuit has followed the line of cases holding that even where the underlying crime has been completed, “transferring or cash ing a check promotes the prior unlawful activity and satisfies the requirement h Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Because Bohn was indicted on both the
holding that an allegation as to the time of the offense is not an essential element of the offense charged in the indictment and within reasonable time limits proof of any date before the return of the indictment and within the statute of limitations is sufficient holding that where an indictment charges violations of both  1956a1a and  1956a1b the statute only requires proof on one or the other holding that for purposes of 18 usc  924c1 the law is well established that where an indictment charges in the conjunctive several means of violating a statute a conviction may be obtained on proof of only one of the means  holding that where the date of the offense is not an element of the charge  a variance between the indictment date and the proof at trial is not fatal so long as the acts charged were committed within the statute of limitations period and prior to the return date of the indictment holding that variation between an indictment and proof to a jury is not material where the allegations and proof substantially correspond