who uses a dangerous weapon, if you find such existed, is presumed to have intended the natural consequence in the use of a dangerous weapon without regard to the harm or grievous injury or death that it would inflict upon the person against whom it is directed. In that situation it would be sufficient to constitute malice aforethought.” This statement is almost identical to a statement which the Sandstrom court found to be constitutionally defective because it shifted the burden of proving of an element of the crime, namely intent, from the prosecution to the defense. Respondent makes four arguments in support of dismissal of this claim: 1) that it is procedurally barred, 2) that it is barred by the doctrine of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (<HOLDING>), 3) that the trial judge’s faulty language was
recognizing the objection requirement for new state constitutional rules applied retroactively holding the batson rule was not to be applied retroactively to a state conviction on federal habeas review holding that aedpa is not applied retroactively to pending habeas petitions holding that new rules of criminal procedural are generally not retroactive holding generally that new rules of law should not be applied retroactively in habeas corpus cases