successful motions for mistrial. See United States v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912, 916 (2d Cir.1992). The Second Circuit warned, however, that any such expansion of Kennedy would have to be narrow, as prosecutors design every action to prejudice the defendant. Id. Any such expansion, the court theorized, would be appropriate “only where the misconduct of the prosecutor is undertaken, not simply to prevent an acquittal, but to prevent an acquittal that the prosecutor believed at the time was likely to occur in the absence of his misconduct.” Id. Several subsequent cases have referenced the reasoning in Wallach. None, however, concluded that the relevant pros-ecutorial misconduct was sufficiently egregious to bar a retrial. See, e.g., United States v. Gary, 74 F.3d 304, 315 (1st Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Pavloyianis, 996 F.2d 1467,
holding that alleged prosecutorial misconduct must be evaluated in light of the prosecutors argument and the entire record and if a review of the record convinces the court that the jury would have convicted defendant even if it were not exposed to the alleged improper prosecutorial comments then no actual prejudice occurred holding that no deliberate prosecutorial misconduct existed after the first trial ended in a hung jury holding trial court has inherent authority to terminate prosecution after mistrials when probability of another hung jury is great holding no liability existed under the circumstances holding that no right to a jury trial existed after one of the plaintiffs claims was dismissed leaving only an equitable claim