that such assignments are proscribed or ought in any way to be limited” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, “allowing the health care provider to use an assignee to recover ERISA benefits does nothing to frustrate the goals or purposes of ERISA.” Tango Transp., 322 F.3d at 893. To the contrary, allowing a provider to assign the right to bring suit may protect plan participants by transferring the burden of bringing suit from healthcare providers who may be unable to collect on denied claims unless they outsource the collection effort to a third party. Accordingly, consistent with decisions of some of our sister circuits, we conclude that Gables has derivative standing as an assignee. See id.; see also Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Yampol, 840 F.2d 421, 427 (7th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Brown v. Sikora & Assocs., Inc., 311
holding that the finding that entities constitute a single enterprise under 29 usc  203r is separate and distinct from whether an entity is an employer under 29 usc  203d holding under 29 usc  216c holding that an interpleader action brought by an insurance company to determine the proper beneficiary under an erisa plan arises under 29 usc  1132a3bii and therefore presents a federal question holding that an insurance company assignee of a fiduciary of an erisa trust has standing to sue under 29 usc  1132a2 holding that even if a thirdparty administrator is not a fiduciary under erisa such an administrator still has standing  pursuant to   1331