at the hearing in connection with his Title VII retaliation claim. Accordingly, although these incidents are in the record, the Court will not consider these incidents. See Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 672 (10th Cir.1998)(''The district court has discretion to go. beyond the referenced portions of these materials, but is not required to do so. If the rule were otherwise, the workload of the district courts would be insurmountable and summary judgment would rarely be granted.”) (citation omitted). The reason that neither party discusses them is that they do not appear sufficiently adverse to constitute an adverse action for the purposes of establishing a prima facie case of Title VII retaliation. See Sanchez v. Denver Pub. Schs., 164 F.3d 527, 532 (10th Cir.1998)(<HOLDING>)(quotation omitted). 17 . Even if the Court
holding that title vii plaintiff must show that retaliatory motive played a part in the adverse employment action holding that a transfer of job duties can constitute an adverse employment action holding that in the context of title vii the alleged action must be more than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities to be an adverse employment action holding that a verbal threat of being fired is not an adverse employment action for purposes of title vii holding that termination is an adverse employment action