at 10 (citing Sanders v. City of Union Springs, 207 Fed.Appx. 960, 966 (11th Cir.2006); Byrd v. Clark, 783 F.2d 1002, 1007 (11th Cir.1986)). Plaintiffs have not, however, demonstrated that the law was “clearly established” that a law enforcement officer can be held liable under § 1983 for failing to prevent another officer’s unlawful search. “A Government official’s conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, ‘[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficie e a duty to intervene in unlawful searches when they are in a position to do so, it cannot be said that the Canine Handlers and Alma Officers violated clearly established law by failing to intervene in these particular circumstance. See, e.g., Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). The facts alleged in this case are distinct
holding that a police officer was not liable for use of excessive force since  951 requirements were satisfied holding that an officer could be held liable for failing to intervene in preventing an unlawful strip search holding that while case law generally indicates that an officer can be held liable for failing to intervene in another officers use of excessive force the absence of authority from the supreme court or the eleventh circuit dealing with similar circumstances supported granting qualified immunity to a defendant holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force