on Hammons’s retaliation claim. Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against any of his employees because she has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). “To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must show: (1) that [she] engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) that [she] suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) that there is some causal relationship between the two events.” Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1566. We assume, without deciding, that Hammons’s December 17, 2002 letter to the Chancellor was a s link when the plaintiff returned to work for 11 days before leaving again, and no problems occurred during those 11 days); Sierminski v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 216 F.3d 945, 951 (11th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Breech v. Ala. Power Co., 962 F.Supp. 1447,
holding that five weeks between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to establish a causal connection holding that more than a year between the protected activity and the discharge is not close enough to support the causal connection requirement holding that a temporal proximity of one month between the plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to establish a causal connection holding that a prima facie case of retaliation requires a causal link between the employees protected activity and the employers adverse employment action holding that a 7month time period between the protected activity and the adverse employment action is too indirect to satisfy the causal connection requirement