while clearly a cause of the plaintiffs harm, do not create liability because of the intervention of independent judicial review, a superseding cause. We conclude that where, as here, the judicial officer is provided with the appropriate facts to adjudicate the proceeding but fails to proper ly apply the governing law and procedures, such error must be held to be a superseding cause, breaking the chain of causation for purposes of § 1983 and Bivens liability. Cf. Sheppard v. E.W. Scripps Co., 421 F.2d 555, 558 (6th Cir.1970) (concluding that any deprivation of a criminal defendant’s rights in a high profile murder case was a result of the manner in which the judge conducted the trial, thus breaking the chain of causation); Whittington v. Johnston, 201 F.2d 810, 811-12 (5th Cir.1953) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, we reject Egervary’s argument that
holding that a predeprivation opportunity to be heard satisfies the due process clause recognizing that the essential requisites of procedural due process are notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard holding that an opportunity to be heard by a contracting officer the very person deciding whether the plaintiff is a responsible contractor satisfies due process holding that attorneydefendants role in instituting commitment proceedings was not the proximate cause of the due process violation suffered by the plaintiff where the presiding judge elected not to provide the plaintiff with notice and an opportunity to be heard holding that procedural due process requires adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard