Mr. Herring. Mr. Keppel then proceeded to Appellant’s residence, and Appellant admitted that he was involved in the incident. N.T. 5/12/99 at 158. At trial, Appellant testified that he did not stop his vehicle after he had hit Mr. Herring because he was angry and was afraid that he would make the situation worse. N.T. 5/12/99 at 191-192. Appellant admitted that he did not provide the necessary information until after he returned home and heard on his police scanner that the police were investigating the hit-and-run incident. N.T. 5/12/99 at 192. Based on these facts, we conclude that the requisites of the statute were not met. The Act requires something more than a driver providing the necessary information only after he learns that his identity might be discovered. Cf. Gosnell, supra (<HOLDING>). In addition to providing the necessary
holding that though there was no express statement that the appellant had committed perjury the clear impact of the specific language in nine sentences was that the appellant lied while under oath which weighed in favor of an actionable statement holding that evidence was insufficient to establish that appellant remained unlawfully on school property because as a minor appellant could not leave school without parental consent holding that where the appellant remained at the scene rendered aid and gave his name to the police the evidence was insufficient to convict him under section 3742 even though the appellant initially lied about his involvement in the accident holding trial court reversibly erred in not permitting appellant to withdraw his plea where court erroneously stated appellant could appeal motion was in fact not dispositive and appellant was entitled to rely on the courts statement holding record insufficient to support inference appellant knew consequences of his plea when record is silent about whether appellant was actually informed that a guilty plea could result in his deportation