the in banc court in the normal course. C. In his affidavit in support of Gallop’s motion for disqualification, William Veale — one of Gallop’s counsel of record— “demand[sj” not only that the panel, but “any other members of the bench of this Circuit who share their feelings[,j be recused.” Motion to Disqualify (Veale Aff. ¶ 2). We know of no precedent for recusing unnamed judges based on a prejudice, the only evidence of which is manifested in a decision adverse to an attorney’s (or a party’s) interests. Cf. In re Nettles, 394 F.3d 1001, 1003 (7th Cir.2005) (recusing all district and circuit judges where the defendant acted on a threat to destroy the federal courthouse in which those judges worked by means of a truck bomb). But see Tapia-Ortiz v. Winter, 185 F.3d 8, 10 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Veale certainly points to none. Indeed,
recognizing that under the rule of necessity where all judges would be disqualified in a suit brought against every district and circuit court judge in the circuit none are disqualified holding that the rule preventing one judge of a district court from overruling a decision by another judge of the same court except under exceptional circumstances should be followed in the third circuit recognizing circuit split holding that a transfer order issued by a district court in another circuit is reviewable only in the circuit of the transferor district court holding that an order or judgment issued by a disqualified judge is void but not because the court lacked jurisdiction