Services, Inc. v. IARW Ins. Co., 759 F.2d 829, 830 (11th Cir.1985) (“In construing an insurance policy to determine the intention of the parties, the court must consider the instrument in its entirety. If possible, the court must adopt a construction which will give effect to the total instrument and its provisions.”); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 756 So.2d 29, 34 (Fla.2000) (noting that “we must read [the limitation on liability] clause in connection with the entire policy, including the liability coverage provisions and the policy declarations.”). Furthermore, courts interpreting identical crime insurance policies issued by Federal have held that they are not, as PBSJ contends, occurrence policies. See, e.g. J.I. Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 920 F.2d 118, 120 (1st Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); JEP Mgmt., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 2006 WL
holding that the plain meaning of the uim policy language was clear and not contrary to public policy holding that an insurance company that does not deliver a policy to a certificate holder is estopped from asserting exclusions contained in the policy but not revealed in the certificate holding that policy limits are not a defense to coverage and that policy limits define the amount of coverage holding that the ordinary meaning of federal employee theft policy which contained identical exclusions is that no coverage exists unless written notice is given within the period prescribed by the policy the instant provisions clearly reveal a claims made type policy recognizing we must give insurance policy language its ordinary and generally accepted meaning unless the policy shows that the words used are intended to impart a technical or different meaning