party claiming fraud is relieved from the judgment, i.e., the judgment is set aside. See Ind. Trial Rule 60(B)(3) (“On motion and upon such terms as are just the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from an entry of default, final order, or final judgment, including a judgment by default, for ... fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party.”). The district court correctly determined that requesting the recovery of her home is tantamount to a request to vacate the state court’s judgment of foreclosure, the form in which Taylor’s complaint in state court was in fact styled, and that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred granting that relief. See Facio v. Jones, 929 F.2d 541, 543 (10th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Both of Taylor’s claimed federal statutory
holding that a plaintiffs federal action seeking to vacate a state court judgment was a de facto appeal and thus barred under the rookerfeldman doctrine holding that rookerfeldman doctrine bars federal jurisdiction when a plaintiffs suit in federal district court is at least in part a forbidden de facto appeal of a state court judgment and an  issue in that federal suit is inextricably intertwined with an issue resolved by the state court judicial decision from which the forbidden de facto appeal is taken holding that challenge to state proceeding was barred by younger even if it was not barred by rookerfeldman holding that the federal claims which arose from state court criminal contempt proceedings were inextricably intertwined with the state court action and thus the federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims pursuant to the rookerfeldman doctrine holding that rookerfeldman doctrine barred plaintiffs claim because alleged legal injuries arose from the state courts purportedly erroneous judgment and the relief sought would require the district court to determine that the state courts decision was wrong and thus void