support for Brentwood’s position that the recruiting rule is a content-based regulation designed by TSSAA out of fear of what prospective students would learn about the athletic programs at independent secondary schools. If TSSAA had been motivated by a fear of the impact that information regarding athletic programs would have on students, it would presumably have banned recruiting and communications altogether. This it did not do. Finally, we reject Brentwood’s contention that the recruiting rule is unconstitutional because it controls who can speak for Brentwood. The recruiting rule is not an unconstitutional regulation that “dic-tat[es] ... the speakers who may address a public issue.” First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti 435 U.S. 765, 784-85, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Although the rule emphasizes that coaches and
holding that a state statute prohibiting expenditures by banks and business corporations for the purpose of influencing the vote on any question other than one materially affecting the business interests of the corporation unconstitutionally infringed on their first amendment rights holding that a florida statute requiring a foreign corporation to obtain a certificate of authority prior to transacting business in the state was preempted as it applied to national banks holding that the actual amount of capital employed in the state by a foreign corporation was to be based on the property of the corporation that was within the state and that was used in business transacted within the state holding that where first amendment freedoms are not infringed by the statute a vagueness claim must be evaluated as the statute is applied to the facts of the case holding that an iowa statute requiring a foreign corporation to hold a certificate of authority to transact business in the state was preempted by the nba as the statute pertained to national banks because it infringed on the powers provided to national banks by the nba