under the First Amendment, nor did Tracey E. Cline possess a qualified immunity to make those untruthful statements with reckless disregard for the truth.” We hold that the trial court properly distinguished between Cline’s statements which were not made with actual malice, and thus were protected by qualified immunity, and those made with actual malice. Cline further contends that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-66 does not survive strict scrutiny under First Amendment analysis, because it restricts constitutionally protected speech. However, as previously noted, Cline’s speech involved actual malice, and was not protected. We note that, in the Spivey case, unprotected speech formed the basis of the removal of Spivey as district attorney. See Spivey, 345 N.C. at 414-15, 480 S.E.2d at 698-99 (<HOLDING>). Cline further contends that a government
holding that when protected speech is inextricable from unprotected speech the court will treat the entire message as protected recognizing the preliminary issue in a first amendment challenge is whether the speech at issue is protected or unprotected holding that speech about financial assistance and handling racial discrimination does not qualify as protected speech holding that pursuant to garcetti plaintiffs speech made in the course of his official duties was unprotected as a matter of law holding that the use of racial invective by spivey constituted unprotected speech