widely refused to apply conflict preemption to bar an ongoing state process, and have instead relied upon field preemption when it is appropriate. 16 . See also Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295, 116 S.Ct. 763, 769, 133 L.Ed.2d 709 (1996) (“Absent ... compelling evidence bearing on Congress’ original intent, our system demands that we adhere to our prior interpretations of statutes.”); Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 131, 110 S.Ct. 2759, 2768, 111 L.Ed.2d 94 (1990) (“Once we have determined a statute's clear meaning, we adhere to that determination under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we judge an agency’s later interpretation of the statute against our prior determination of the statute’s meaning.’’). 17 . See also Freehold, 44 F.3d at 1189 (<HOLDING>); Middle South Energy, Inc. v. Arkansas Pub.
holding that a field preemption claim was ripe because the plaintiff did not challenge the states ultimate substantive decision but rather its authority to conduct proceedings holding that in light of the presumption against preemption there is no field preemption of state unfair competition claims that rely on a substantial question of federal patent law because congress has not expressed its clear and manifest intention to preempt that area of law holding that a party did not waive its preemption defense where its answer did not specifically mention preemption but contained a broader defense that was capable of encompassing preemption holding that plaintiffs lacked standing because the case was not ripe for adjudication holding that in the field preemption context the hardship is the process itself