v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 131, 61 S.Ct. 164, 85 L.Ed. 84 (1940). Cf. Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 552 n. 2, 87 S.Ct. 643, 17 L.Ed.2d 599 (1967). 103 . 380 U.S. at 208-209, 85 S.Ct. at 829, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 73 S.Ct. 397, 97 L.Ed. 469 (1953) where the Supreme Court intimated that rebuttal testimony that the clerk selected names on the basis of “good moral character” and those “qualified to serve as jurors” would be unavailing when a prima facie case was based on a 31 percent disparity between Negro population and the jury box composition in Vance County. 104 . 380 U.S. at 227, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed. 759. 105 . For cases involving the less educated, see United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 571 (1st Cir. 1970) (<HOLDING>); United States v. DiTommaso, 405 F.2d 385, 388
holding prima facie case met by evidence that 836 of jury pools had high school diplomas while only 432 of population over 25 did and proof that 181 of pool had college degrees as compared with 5 of population holding that although a jury instruction that included the phrase prima facie case and referred to defendants burden of production created a distinct risk of confusing the jury in certain instances it would be appropriate to instruct the jury on the elements of a prima facie case holding plaintiffs ultimate burden of proof can be met by combining proof submitted in its prima facie case with evidence that defendants proffered reasons for its acts were false holding the plaintiff satisfies the burden of a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence holding that the mathematical disparity between 197 of africanamericans in the population and 47 of africanamericans on grand jury lists was adequate for a prima facie case under an equal protection analysis