at *3 (Tex.App.-San Antonio, January 19, 2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (citation omitted). In this case, perhaps there were such facts, possibly in the testimony that was struck from the record or in the testimony that might have been elicited from Pugh, had he been called to testify, but these circumstances are not in the record before us. We concur in the sentiments of our sister court expressed in In re J.J.K., that "we are reluctant to deny court-ordered treatment for anyone who is ill. However, within Lthe record] before us, we do not find the State proved its case by clear and convincing evidence as it is required to do.” Nos. 14-03-00379-CV, 14-03-00380-CV, 2003 WL 22996950, at *5 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>). CORRECTED DISSENTING OPINION EVELYN V. KEYES,
holding the wifes testimony that husbands release would cause psychological harm to other family members was insufficient to support commitment courts finding that husband would cause serious bodily harm to another person holding that an opinion of a potential danger to others is not sufficient to support a commitment under this standard holding that bare psychiatric expert opinion of potential danger to others insufficient to support commitment holding that evidence that patient who had a history of not taking medication and who murdered husband during a period when she was off of her medication and delusional tends to confirm the likelihood of serious harm to patient or others holding that evidence that appellant suffered severe delusions became so agitated at the hospital that she had to be physically restrained knocked door off hinges in hospital and engaged in verbal altercations with others was insufficient to support commitment determining that there was no evidence of overt acts that would tend to confirm that appellant would cause serious harm to self or others