treatment of his subordinates and of customers (see Def.’s Ex. 9 (Newbill’s letter detailing reasons for proposed demotion and involuntary detail of Rountree)) would have led to Rountree’s involuntary detail. See George, 407 F.3d at 410 (“ ‘at the summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial’ ”) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505). Further, because Newbill initiated and provided the framework for the termination proceeding (see Def.’s Ex. 14 (New-bill’s 1/16/03 removal proposal)), a jury could reasonably conclude that a retaliatory animus also played a role in plaintiffs removal. See Porter v. Natsios, 414 F.3d 13, 18 (D.C.Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). See also Griffin v. Wash. Convention Ctr.,
holding that the timely filing of an eeoc charge pursuant to  706 of title vii 42 usc  2000e5 did not toll the statute of limitations for an action brought on the same facts under 42 usc  1981 holding that title vii retaliation claims require proof that the desire to retaliate was the butfor cause of the challenged employment action holding that direct evidence of discrimination is not required to prove discrimination in mixed motive cases under title vii holding that pursuant to 42 usc  2000e2 and 2000e5 a plaintiff may in a mixed motives case establish a title vii violation without proving that an impermissible consideration was the sole or butfor motive for the employment action holding that title vii plaintiff must show that retaliatory motive played a part in the adverse employment action