of second-degree burglary. Given the highly deferential AEDPA standard, it is even possible that if Pennsylvania merely had a generic burglary statute that did not differentiate between burglarizing an occupied or unoccupied building, a reasonable application of the “fact of a prior conviction” exception might have permitted the judge to look at facts underlying the prior burglary conviction to determine whether Garrus was convicted of burglarizing an occupied building. See, e.g., United States v. Santiago, 268 F.3d 151, 153, 157 (2d Cir.2001) (finding that Apprendi allows a sentencing judge to find “not only the mere fact of previous convictions but [certain] other related issues as well”); cf. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) (<HOLDING>). However, the sentencing judge in this case
holding that defendants have a federal constitutional right to make a collateral attack on a prior conviction only when that conviction was obtained without the assistance of counsel holding claim that prior conviction was not serious felony under californias sentencing law not cognizable in federal habeas proceeding holding that for sentencing purposes the government does not need to allege a defendants prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact is not an element of the present crime holding that a sentencing court may determine the nature of a prior conviction without violating the sixth amendment holding that under a federal three strikes law the sentencing judge may only find facts that were necessary to the prior conviction