Peay, Ky., 411 S.W.2d 473 (1967); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Rice, n rule, stating the rule was limited to criminal cases. After the court’s ruling, Goodman used his three peremptory challenges to strike two black jurors and one white. A third black juror was seated to hear the case. It appears that after the conclusion of the case and before submission (there having been seated thirteen jurors), the single black juror was removed from the panel by lot, thus leaving the decision in the hands of twelve white jurors. To create the issue presented for our conside 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (19716) (recognizing prospective application of a new rule where, inter alia, inequities might arise from retroactive application); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966) (<HOLDING>); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct.
holding that reasonable reliance upon the old rule is an important factor supporting prospective application of the new rule holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to proceedings other than criminal trials holding a court may apply a new rule in the criminal case before it but return to the old rule as to all other cases arising on facts predating the pronouncement holding that a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases  pending on direct review  with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a clear break with the past holding that when the supreme court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all events regardless of whether such events predate or postdate our announcement of the rule