degree of each defendant’s participation as well as other factors including rehabilitative potential and background). It would appear from the scant record before the Court that the trial judge agreed with the prosecution over the defense that because of the aggravating factors in Brown’s case, it was proper to give him a greater sentence than his co-defendant. More importantly, there is nothing in the record that supports a conclusion that the trial court was not impartial or that it applied any improper considerations that would amount to an abuse of discretion. A trial court’s sentence within statutory limits is presumptively valid. See Gov’t of the V.I. v. Martinez, 42 V.I. 146, 149 (D.V.I. App. Div. 1999). See also Jung v. State, 32 Wis. 2d 541, 145 N.W. 2d 684, 688 (Wis. 1967) (<HOLDING>). Further, a defendant does not have a
holding that a defendant who stipulated his drug amounts prior to sentencing waived his right to appeal on the issue of the drug amounts holding that if there is a legal basis for departure the trial court must then determine whether it should depart ie whether departure is indeed the best sentencing option for the defendant in the pending case and that this decision is a judgment call within the sound discretion of the court and will be sustained on review absent an abuse of discretion holding that the presumption is that the trial court acted reasonably in sentencing and that the defendant must show some unreasonable or unjustifiable basis in the record that amounts to an abuse of discretion holding that in order to aid the appellate review of whether an abuse of discretion has occurred at sentencing the trial court is required to articulate on the record reasons for imposing a particular sentence holding that where the record is insufficient to show that the alleged error occurred the presumption that the trial court acted without error must prevail