(Mo. banc 2013) for a scholarly discussion of the ex post facto clause and of the constitutionally significant distinction between ex post facto laws and retrospective laws. 3 . Apparently, DOC procedure D5-4.1 at III. E.3.b, Procedures, Offender Evaluation provides that: "An offender who is involved in an appeal process ... will be viewed as not accepting responsibility and will not be allowed to graduate from phase 1.” The Appellants have not challenged this procedure, and thus do not challenge that Reynolds failed to satisfactorily complete MoSOP based on application of this procedure. 4 . Proceedings challenging conditional release extensions and parole determinations are civil proceedings, not criminal proceedings. See, e.g., McCoy v. State, 456 S.W.3d 887, 896 (Mo.App.W.D. 2015) (<HOLDING>); Spencer v. State, 334 S.W.3d 559, 574 n. 12
holding that postconviction motion under rule 2907d to set aside guilty plea is a civil proceeding though filed in a criminal case holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to withdraw guilty plea filed three weeks after entering the plea holding that postconviction proceeding is a civil suit holding that trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider defendants motion to withdraw guilty plea filed beyond term of court in which defendant was sentenced holding that postconviction court could not deny a refilled rule 3850 motion as untimely when postconviction court did not set a filing deadline in dismissing defendants first rule 3850 motion without prejudice to refiling