(“It is clear that Congress intended the FMLA to cover illnesses lasting more than a few days.”). Consistent with the legislative history, the regulations provide that “[a] period of incapacity of more than three consecutive calendar days” may qualify as a serious health condition, depending on the other factors present. 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2)(i) (1996) (emphasis added). Because the terms “serious health condition” and “continuing treatment” are ambiguous, the court must limit its inquiry to “whether the agency’s answer is based upon a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-82, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). “Administrative regulations promulgated in response to expre 28 (M.D.Tenn.1995) (<HOLDING>). As is clear from the legislative history and
holding that when the plaintiffs child was examined only once by a physician and was not required to be absent from day care for more than three days he had no serious medical condition within the meaning of the fmla holding that statute of limitations barred title vii claim where the plaintiff would have been aware of discrimination more than 300 days before eeoc charge filed holding that a plaintiff who was unable to return to work before his fmla leave expired did not allege any denial of an fmla right but noting that ragsdale left open the possibility that employees could recover for notice violations on a casebycase basis if there was actual harm resulting from the violations holding that proof of incapacitation for more than three days was required before plaintiff could qualify for fmla protection holding that more than notice to a defendant is required