were adjudicated with the debts established in a foreclosure decree. Cf. Malooly, 119 N.M. at 747-50, 895 P.2d at 269-72 (deciding not to decide the issue of whether a mortgagee who is the purchaser at a foreclosure sale can redeem from herself). Further, as suggested by Justice Minzner in Malooly, we are not foreclosed from considering what the practicing bar has recognized or assumed as to a particular redemption practice. Id. at 747, 895 P.2d at 269. That practice, we think, is exemplified in Springer Corp., in which an omitted junior mortgagee foreclosed its mortgage and was held to have a right to redeem from the senior mortgagee who had purchased the property at a sale following foreclosure of the senior mortgage. See 80 N.M. at 210, 458 P.2d at 3, 154 A. 537, 539 (1931) (<HOLDING>); cf. W. Bank v. Fluid Assets Dev. Corp., 111
holding that a mortgagee could enforce mortgage covenants requiring the mortgagors to keep the property free of encumbrances even after it foreclosed by advertisement and purchased the property for the full amount of the mortgage debt because the mortgage covenants concerned title to the mortgaged property rather than repayment of the debt holding that subsequent to a judicial sale the report of the sale must be made to and ratified by the court before a deed for the property is given by the trustee to the purchaser holding that the redemption price was based on the amount bid at foreclosure  and not  what the subsequent purchaser paid  for the property holding that the sale vested in the purchaser a legal right to the property free of incumbrances imposed upon it subsequent to the mortgage foreclosed provided that the holders of such incumbrances are made parties to the foreclosure holding that in contrast to foreclosure of a mortgage secured by personal property foreclosure of real property under a deed of trust need hot be at a commercially reasonable sale and the failure to conduct a commercially reasonable foreclosure sale of real property is not actionable