Trial Act entitles criminal defendants to adequate time for preparing a defense, but that right may not be used as a two-edged sword in this fashion.” Id.; see also Kington, 875 F.2d at 1108 (endorsing “the sensible maxim that defendants ought not to be able to claim relief on the basis of delays which they themselves deliberately caused”); United States v. Mentz, 840 F.2d 315, 331 (6th Cir.1988) (concluding that delay caused by defendant’s plea vacillation stopped speedy trial clock because otherwise defendant “would have successfully worked both sides of the street lulling the court and prosecution into a false sense of security only to turn around later and use the ... leisurely pace of the case as grounds for dismissal”); United States v. Pringle, 751 F.2d 419, 434 (1st Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); cf. United States v. Willis, 958 F.2d 60, 64
holding the defendant did not demonstrate a denial of his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial where even though the delay was substantial and the defendant was detained pretrial for three years the fault for the delay was shared and the defendant continued to request continuances following his assertion for the right to a speedy trial holding that delay created by defendant in mistakenly agreeing to a waiver of his speedy trial rights is excludable holding that when determining whether a delay in prosecution violates a defendants right to a speedy trial courts must consider the length of the delay the reason for the delay whether the defendant asserted his rights and the resulting prejudice to the defendant holding that a delay of 8 months is enough to provoke a speedy trial inquiry holding waiver of right to counsel not voluntary and knowing when defendant terminated counsel and requested another attorney but the trial court would allow delay and appointment only upon waiver of speedy trial right