where Congress was regulating commercial activity. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 85 S.Ct. 377, 13 L.Ed.2d 290 (1964) (prohibiting refusal of restaurant service to interstate travelers); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 85 S.Ct. 348, 13 L.Ed.2d 258 (1964) (prohibiting refusal of hotel accommodations to interstate travelers); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 88 S.Ct. 2017, 20 L.Ed.2d 1020 (1968) (regulating wages of employees of business engaged in interstate commerce); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 91 S.Ct. 1357, 28 L.Ed.2d 686 (1971) (regulating loan sharking); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, 452 U.S. 264, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981) (regulating coal industry); see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (<HOLDING>). In both Lopez and Morrison, by contrast, the
recognizing these examples are by no means exhaustive but the pattern is clear recognizing that these two factors trigger similar concerns recognizing that independent analysis is  the only means by which the defendant can defend against expert testimony by the state  recognizing these five factors recognizing that under the booker remedial regime  the guidelines are no longer mandatory but are only advisory