the claim in constitutional terms will not immunize it from dismissal pursuant to the exhaustion requirement. The D.C. Circuit has held that “when an alleged constitutional violation ‘is intertwined with a statutory one, and [the legislature] has provided the machinery for the resolution of the latter,’ the plaintiff must exhaust [her] administrative remedies before a district court may hear [her] case.” King, 961 F.2d at 243. Here, because the statutory and constitutional claims are “premised on the same facts” and “the administrative process [is] fully capable of granting full relief,” exhaustion is required. Id. (citing Andrade v. Lauer, 729 F.2d 1475, 1493 (D.C.Cir.1984)); see also Marine Mammal Conservancy, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture, 134 F.3d 409, 413-14 (D.C.Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). The plaintiffs’ due process claims are
holding that there would be no exception to american rule on attorney fees for legal malpractice claims holding that rumors are nondiscriminatory due to the very nature of such gossip holding that the plaintiff would be very much mistaken in believing that there is some brightline rule allowing litigants to bypass administrative processes simply because one or all of their claims are constitutional in nature recognizing that without claim preclusion plaintiffs in small claims cases will not feel obligated to present all of their claims or all of their evidence  and they can simply file again  if need be recognizing that impleader under rule 14a is available only against persons who are or may be liable to defendant for part or all of plaintiffs claim it cannot be used as a way of combining all controversies having a common relationship in one action