offense or altered his or her appearance before trial, id. at 775, and whether the witness knew the defendant over time and in a variety of circumstances, such that the witness’s lay identification testimony offered to the jury “a perspective it could not acquire in its limited exposure” to the defendant, Allen, 787 F.2d at 936. The absence of any single factor will not render testimony inadmissible because cross-examination exists to highlight potential weaknesses in lay opinion testimony. See, e.g., Jackman, 48 F.3d at 5. Also, the governing standard under Federal Rule of Evidence 701(b) assesses whether the lay witness identification testimony is potentially “helpful to ... the determination of a fact in issue,” in the totality of the circumstances, see Pierce, 136 F.3d at 774-75 (<HOLDING>), and this assessment does not hinge on the
holding that the admissibility of lay witness identification testimony turns on a number of factors holding that a forensic accountant is an expert witness not a lay witness holding that reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony holding that the admissibility of expert testimony was governed by state law holding that lay witness opinion as to guilt of defendant inadmissible