on a peer-to-peer file sharing network” and “knowingly allowed others access to his Ares Shared Folder.” Viewing the instructions as a whole, we cannot conclude the district court abused its discretion in refusing to give the jury Meisel’s proposed identification instruction. Although it is certainly possible Meisel’s proposed theory-of-defense instruction could have given the jury a “clearer understanding of the issues,” the district coui’t’s jury instructions were not erroneous or inadequate as given. See Bowling, 619 F.3d at 1183-84. And although this'court, if it were deciding the issue in the first instance, might well have instructed the jury consistent with Meisel’s theory-of-defense instruction, the governing standard of review is a deferential one; See Jordan, 485 F.3d at 1218 (<HOLDING>). The , district court did not abuse its
holding that under the arbitrary and capricious standard this court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment holding that under the abuseofdiscretion standard this court will reverse only if the district courts decision is arbitrary capricious or whimsical or results in a manifestly unreasonable judgment quotation omitted holding court of appeals should review district courts determination regarding punitive damages under abuseofdiscretion standard holding that under chevron step two courts may not disturb an agency rule unless it is arbitrary or capricious in substance or manifestly contrary to the statute internal quotations omitted holding that when applying an arbitrary and capricious standard of review the courts role is to determine whether the plan administrators decision was completely unreasonable