¶ 4. The jury convicted defendant of DWI, third or subsequent offense. At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge expressed his belief that there had been perjured testimony at the trial. Defendant’s attorney did not respond to this comment. Before imposing sentence, the court noted that defendant had continued to drive while intoxicated despite her previous DWI convictions, and then commented as follows: “In addition, there was clearly perjured testimony at this trial. And perjured testimony doesn’t come about by itself. It comes about because the defendant invited it.” The court imposed a sentence of thirty months to five years, with the expectation that defendant would be placed in a rehabilitative program after one year in jail. The court also imposed the max 342-43 (199 1978) (<HOLDING>). The rationale of Dunnigan that a person who
holding in preguideline decision that it is one thing to say that a defendant may not be penalized for maintaining her innocence and putting the prosecution to its proof and quite another to sanction the fabrication of a defense holding a defendant is entitled to instructions relating to his theory of defense for which there is some foundation in the proof no matter how tenuous that defense may appear to the trial court holding that it may not holding burden of proof is on one asserting an affirmative defense holding that the appropriate sanction was to require the defendant to disclose the nature of the agreement with the witness