transferred to other jobs within the company. Cline attempted to remedy this anomaly by looking “at whether an employee met her employer’s legitimate expectations prior to the event(s) that sparked the termination.” Id. (emphasis added). Following this lead, Warch argues that prior to the onset of events that OCIC cites as its reasons for terminating him, he was meeting OCIC’s performance expectations. We find this approach to be unworkable, especially where there is no one “event” that “sparked the termination,” but i 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996). We think the flexibility of the McDonnell Douglas inquiry, when properly applied, already protects plaintiffs from the feared injustice of the Cline hypothetical. See Brinkley v. Harbour Recreation Club, 180 F.3d 598, 611 (4th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted); cf. Moore v. City of
holding that adea and phra claims proceed under the mcdonnell douglas framework holding that the mcdonnell douglas framework should not be applied in a rigid mechanized or ritualistic manner holding that the mcdonnell douglas burdenshifting framework applies to retaliation claims in the same manner as to discrimination claims holding that the mcdonnell douglas framework applies equally to ada and rehabilitation act cases holding that the mcdonnell douglas framework still applies to adea cases postgross