known they were violating a clearly established right. Defendants could have reasonably believed that the duties of an administrative assistant were not merely technical, as in Barnes. Billingsley was the sole intermediary between O’Mara and his constituents. She received calls from citizens, transmitted the information to O’Mara, and communicated his response to them. She also performed a broad range of duties that dealt with sensitive issues ranging from proposed legislation to county development projects. It was thus reasonable for O’Mara, holding as he did a legislative position, to demand personal political loyalty from the one staffer — Billings-ley — -who acted as a conduit of information to and from O’Mara’s constituents. See Hudson v. Burke, 913 F.2d 427, 432-33 (7th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Granted, the relationship between
holding that persecution was on account of political opinion because petitioners prosecutorial investigation into acts of political corruption was by its very nature political holding that independent contractor claiming termination of contract because of political affiliation not protected by first amendment holding that legislative aides could be terminated on account of political affiliation when they investigated and reported facts that provided input on sensitive governmental issues holding that independent contractor claiming loss of and denial of contracts because of political affiliation was not protected by first amendment holding that independent contractor claiming denial of public contract because of political affiliation was not protected by first amendment