evidence suggesting that each of the hotel stays involved the same individual, (e.g., the perpetrator gave the same fictitious address and/or fictitious telephone number; tips on credit card vouchers were in such amounts that the totals rounded off to even dollar amounts, the perpetrator departed prior to the scheduled end of his stay without checking out). “Evidence of this kind may be sufficient alone to establish a perpetrator’s identity. See United States v. Milhollan, 599 F.2d 518, 524-25 (3d Cir.1979) (finding similar modus operandi evidence probative of identity); 2 Jack B. Wein-stein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence ¶ 404[16] (1992) (discussing "signature” evidence in context of Fed.R.Evid. 404(b)).” See also Featherstone v. Estelle, 948 F.2d 1497 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Evidence of individual modus operandi may be
holding that admission of testimony which denominated appellants modus operandi in previously uncharged and charged crimes was not clearly erroneous holding that rule 404b evidence is probative of intent only when the prior acts were part of the same scheme or involved a similar modus operandi as the present offense holding that prior con victions are not related simply because the crimes used the same modus operandi were part of a crime spree or shared the same motive holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive holding other crimes evidence was properly admitted to establish modus operandi when the defendant attacked older women as they exited their garages in the same area of chicago