N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3, would have a significant impact on the Attorney General’s authority. It is not irrational, therefore, for the Legislature to have concluded that a duty to bargain collectively with representatives of the Division’s investigators regarding the terms and conditions of employment would impair the Attorney General’s ability to assure that the Division fulfills its role in the State’s criminal justice system. In particular, the Legislature rationally could have concluded that restrictions on the Attorney General’s authority to assign and to discipline Division investigators would impair her/his ability to police and maintain the effectiveness and integrir ty of the Division’s personnel. Cf. State v. State Troopers Fraternal Ass’n., 134 N.J. 393, 417, 634 A.2d 478 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, in light of the Division’s
holding that the state police is a state agency holding that the disciplinary rules of the code of professional responsibility are not laws of the state of texas for purposes of statute which excludes the admission of evidence obtained in violation of law holding that in reciprocal discipline cases disciplinary procedures in the other state must meet minnesotas due process requirements holding that the extradition procedures are a matter of state law holding that the negotiability of disciplinary review procedures mandated in njsa 3413a53 does not apply to the division of state police because negotiability of such procedures would infringe unacceptably on one of the most important managerial prerogatives of the superintendent of state police