‘requirements’ as used in § 360k encompasses state common law claims."), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 67, - L.Ed.2d - (1995); Gile v. Optical Radiation Corp., 22 F.3d 540, 542 (3d Cir.) (relying upon Cipollone), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 429, 130 L.Ed.2d 342 (1994); Feldt v. Mentor Corp., 61 F.3d 431, 433 n. 2 (5th Cir.1995); Reeves v. AcroMed Corp., 44 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 2251, 132 L.Ed.2d 258 (1995); Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1420-21 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 86, 126 L.Ed.2d 54 (1993); Martello v. Ciba Vision Corp., 42 F.3d 1167, 1168 (8th Cir.1994), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 2614, 132 L.Ed.2d 857 (1995); National Bank of Commerce v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 38 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Anguiano v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 44
holding that congress use of requirement evinced an intent for broad preemption of state tort laws holding that in light of the presumption against preemption there is no field preemption of state unfair competition claims that rely on a substantial question of federal patent law because congress has not expressed its clear and manifest intention to preempt that area of law holding removal and preemption are distinct concepts erisa preemption does not allow removal unless complete preemption exists recognizing that congress desired a broad definition of a claim  holding that the ada preemption clause expresses a broad preemptive purpose