he would have requested, and the trial court would have granted, a mistrial. In this situation, then, “the denial of a significant procedural right ... is sufficient to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland.” Ramsey, 323 F.Supp.2d at 39. Because the trial court has already made the requisite findings entitling Middleton to relief, we REVERSE and REMAND for a new trial. DAVIS, J., concurs, and THOMAS, J., concurs with opinion. THOMAS, J., concurring. I concur in the majority opinion, but write to explain that while we cannot determine whether Appellant will again be tried for first-degree murder, the possibility is not foreclosed by the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. If Appellant is tried for first-degree murder, he wil , 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (<HOLDING>). The Florida Supreme Court noted in State v.
holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to seconddegree murder and agreed to testify against codefendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for firstdegree murder holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law but conviction was later reversed neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty holding on habeas corpus that claims regarding sentencing phase jury charges in a death penalty case are never barred by procedural default holding that if a trial court has rejected death as a possible sentence double jeopardy bars the state from seeking the death penalty at resentencing even where rejection of the death sentence was based on a legal error holding that the defendants due process rights to notice were violated when a judge imposed a capital sentence even though the state took the position that it would not seek the death penalty