of premises described as a one-story frame house and a detached garage at a stated address. The officers executing the warrant not only searched the house and garage but also searched a tool shed in the backyard and an automobile in the driveway, and seized items from soil and rock in the backyard. The court noted that “the better practice would be to specify clearly in the warrant whether the entire premises or only some building on or portions of the premises are subject to search.” 827 F.2d at 1115. It held, however, that the search was not limited by the absence of specific reference in the warrant to each and every building on the “premises.” Id. A number of state courts have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Barton v. State, 161 Ga.App. 591, 592, 288 S.E.2d 914 (1982) (<HOLDING>); People v. Muniz, 198 Colo. 194, 198-99, 597
holding that a warrantless search of garbage located within the curtilage of the defendants home violated his fourth amendment rights holding that search of shoulder bag was not authorized by search warrant for apartment holding that search of defendants purse which he carried was authorized by a warrant to search his person holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises holding that a search warrant authorizing the search of premises located at a certain address authorized the search of the entire curtilage including a shed located about 20 feet behind the defendants house even though the shed was not specifically described