93 (2d Cir.2003), however, squarely forecloses this argument. In Rankine, we reasoned that “it is choosing ‘to forgo fighting the conviction of a qualifying crime and enter a plea’ that leads to an expectation of relief from removal. The petitioners here assumed no similarly heightened expectation from their decision to go to trial.” Id. at 100 (quoting St. Cyr v. INS, 229 F.3d 406, 419 (2d Cir.2000)). Aliens who decide to go to trial, we held, do not rely on the availability of 212(c) relief, but rather upon “their claim of innocence .... Their reliance, therefore, was on ... ‘familiar criminal justice considerations’ and the application of the criminal laws rather than on the availability of § 212(c) relief.” Id. at 102. See also Swaby v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 156, 161-62 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Petitioner makes an interesting, but
holding that an alien may not escape rankines rule by attesting that he relied on the availability of 212c relief in rejecting a plea agreement and deciding to go to trial holding that iirira and aedpa are not applicable to criminal alien who entered a guilty plea at a time when alien was eligible for  212c relief holding that iiriras repeal of ina  212c was not impermissibly retroactive because unlike st cyr the petitioner chose to proceed to trial instead of agreeing to a plea and therefore did not detrimentally rely on the availability of  212c relief holding that a lawful permanent resident alien is entitled to seek relief under ina  212c recognizing that an alien is ineligible for relief under  212c if he was not actually admissible at the time he received an adjustment of status