this case derived, in part, from his inability to engage in his normal activities due to the fear that the ICD would discharge unexpectedly. However, this “injury” is ostensibly shared, in varying degrees, by everyone who has an ICD implanted in his or her, even a properly functioning one. Consequently, even if Dr. Feldman had informed Melton of the potential defect in a timely manner and replaced the ICD with a properly functioning one, the possibility of an unexpected discharge would still loom, thereby leaving Melton in much the same state in which he now finds himself. Therefore, a jury could not have reasonably inferred a causal connection between Dr. Feldman’s failure to inform and Melton’s alleged injuries. See Green v. Lilliewood, 272 S.C. 186, 191, 249 S.E.2d 910, 912 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Melton failed to create a
holding that an agreement may be inferred entirely from circumstantial evidence holding when both expert testimony and circumstantial evidence of a physicians culpability are presented the inquiry is whether there was sufficient competent evidence from which the jury may have inferred a causal connection holding that the evidence that the defendant violated a probation condition was not competent and substantial because the state presented only hearsay evidence holding that fraud may be inferred from circumstantial evidence holding that employers intent may be inferred through circumstantial evidence