offender proceeding. The State does not allege the appointment of counsel would have created any delay. No continuance would have been necessary because standby counsel was familiar with the case. Lastly, Koehler had failed miserably as defense counsel during the battery trial and there was no reason to believe he would have fared any better during the habitual proceeding." Id. at 199. The Court further observed that "(It would be illogical to bar all opportunity for reasserting one's right to counsel onee a defendant realizes his mistake in proceeding pro se." Id. In the case at bar, we first note that there is no indication in the record that the trial court considered the Koehler factors. This alone supports reversal. See Dowell v. State, 557 N.E.2d 1063, 1068 (Ind.Ct.App.1990) (<HOLDING>), trans. denied, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 861,
holding that trial court erred in denying defendants request to allow standby counsel to conduct voir dire where there was no indication that the trial court considered the koehler factors or that granting the request would have disrupted or delayed the trial holding that bia abused its discretion in denying motion to reopen holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint holding that trial court abused its discretion in summarily denying defendants request to have standby counsel conduct his closing argument holding that the bia abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen when it failed to consider the argument before it