the same ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ language, and the construction of either statute informs the application of the other”). See also Carpenter, 108 S.Ct. at 320 n. 6 (stating that “[t]he mail and wire fraud statutes share the same language in relevant part, and accordingly we apply the same analysis to both sets of offenses here”); United States v. Evans, 844 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.1988) (referring to the wire and mail fraud counts collectively as the “federal fraud” counts, because both statutes share the same relevant language, and applying the same post-McNally intangible rights argument to both); United States v. Eckhardt, 843 F.2d 989 (7th Cir.1988) (applying Gimbel); United States v. Santa-Manzano, 842 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1988); United States v. Covino, 837 F.2d 65, 71 (2d Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Cooke, 833 F.2d 109, 110
holding that rule 9bs heightened pleading requirement applies to allegations of mail and wire fraud used as predicate acts for a rico claim holding that in the context of mail and wire fraud a plaintiff must have justifiably relied to his detriment on the defendants material misrepresentations holding that plaintiffs allegation that defendant engaged in multiple instances of mail and wire fraud did not allege pattern of racketeering activity with sufficient particularity holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid the securities fraud exception by pleading mail fraud or wire fraud if the conduct giving rise to those offenses also amounts to securities fraud holding that wire and mail fraud statutes are construed identically