its first refusal right are largely irrelevant. The SHI conduct characterized by Fleming as admis sions occurred prior to the conduct which indicated Fleming’s intent not to agree on the same terms as contained in the Bruno’s agreement. ‘ Thus SHI’s conduct cannot properly be construed as an admission of the validity of Fleming’s exercise of its right. Moreover, Fleming overlooks the fact that, even if both Fleming and Seessel believed that a new contract had been executed in compliance with Fleming’s first refusal right, Bruno's could bring an independent action seeking the court’s determination as to whether the first refusal right had in fact been executed according to the terms of the contract. See Jones v. White Sulphur Springs Farm, Inc., 605 S.W.2d 38, 40 (Ky.Ct.App.1980) (<HOLDING>) (citing Coastal Bay Golf Club, Inc. v.
holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant recognizing that generally a nonparty to an arbitration agreement does not have standing to invoke the agreement but considering whether the nonparty could force arbitration because it was a third party beneficiary of the contract a successor in interest to the contracting party or an agent of the contracting party holding that a third party contracting to purchase property subject to first refusal rights has a legal right to demand that the option be exercised in a proper manner holding that a third party holding legal title to property is a necessary party in an action for equitable distribution holding the family court has jurisdiction to join third parties when property is alleged to be marital but is owned by a third party