H.D.’s initial removal from respondent’s custody and respondent’s entry of the consent order granting guardianship to petitioners, we conclude that the requirements set forth by N.C. G admission of hearsay “was highly prejudicial.” This general argument is not sufficient to establish that the admission of the alleged hearsay evidence prejudiced him. Further, the court’s findings and conclusions here are supported by evidence other than the evidence challenged as hearsay. Respondent’s own testimony, and that of respondent’s father, contained competent evidence to support the findings that grounds existed for termination pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-llll(a)(2). See In re McMillon, 143 N.C. App. 402, 411, 546 S.E.2d 169, 175, disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 218, 554 S.E.2d 341 (2001) (<HOLDING>). Further, there is a presumption in a bench
holding that in a bench trial it is presumed that the judge as trier of fact is able to distinguish between competent and incompetent evidence and consider only that evidence which is admissible holding that while remand is appropriate where the record may contain substantial competent evidence to support findings as to the rowe factors reversal is required where the record is devoid of any evidence to support the award of attorneys fees holding that findings of fact are conclusive if supported by clear and convincing competent evidence even where the evidence might support contrary findings holding that where there is competent evidence to support the courts findings the admission of incompetent evidence is not prejudicial holding that the trial courts classification of property will not be disturbed as long as there is competent evidence to support that determination