right to extend loans in its “sole discretion” (Def.’s Ex. E, ¶ 1), TSN expressly waived “demand, presentment, notice, protest, and notice of dishonor” (Def.’s Ex. B), and TSN was obligated to “pay on demand” any balances due under the agreements (Def.’s Ex. B). In light of these express contractual provisions, Presidential may not be held liable merely for slowing the rate at which it advanced money to TSN, reducing the outstanding balance of TSN’s debt, or declining to advance additional funds after February 19, 1993. See Shawmut Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 415 Mass. 482, 614 N.E.2d 668, 669 (1993) (“[G]ood faith is not a necessary component of a holder’s decision to collect the balance due on a demand note.”); Shawmut Bank, N.A. v. Wayman, 34 Mass.App.Ct. 20, 606 N.E.2d 925, 928 (1993) (<HOLDING>). However, TSN’s claims appear less directed
holding where parties had not reached a binding contract the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing did not apply holding that covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not require lender to provide notice concerning loans to individual who expressly waived notice in contract holding that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is limited to performance under a contract recognizing cause of action for implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in atwill employment contract recognizing an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by all parties in the performance of a contract for the sale of real estate