civil suit). There is no indication that Tennessee courts have ever recognized DDS’s capacity to be sued in its own right. Because the court finds that DDS is not an entity independent from DHS, there is no need to separately apply the Ernst factors to DDS. B. Whether Congress has validly abrogated the DHS’s sovereign immunity The plaintiff argues that the court should find that DDS’s sovereign immunity has been “abrogated” with respect to all claims against DDS because DDS “administers the Social Security Disability Program and [is] primarily federally funded.” (Docket No. 10 at 1.) This argument is perhaps better understood as an argument for constructive consent to suit. See generally Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184, 192, 84 S.Ct. 1207, 12 L.Ed.2d 233 (1964) (<HOLDING>); but see College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
holding that a state common law claim against a railroad for failure to provide adequate services after the railroad abandoned a line was preempted by frustration of purpose conflict with the interstate commerce act which delegated to the interstate commerce commissioner the authority to regulate abandomnent of lines by earners and broad discretion in determining whether abandonment should be permitted holding that commerce clause authorizes congress to punish any particular criminal action even without proof of a relation to interstate commerce when the activity is part of a class of activities determined by congress to affect interstate commerce holding that by operating a railroad in interstate commerce after the passage of federal employee liabilitys act alabama must be taken  to have consented to suit holding after lopez that the interstate nexus element of the hobbs act still requires the government to show only a minimal connection to interstate commerce holding that the government can satisfy the hobbs act interstate commerce requirement by showing that the robbery resulted in the closure of a business engaged in interstate commerce