not violate Glenn’s Fourth Amendment rights. See Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993 (“Permission to search [may be] obtained from a third party who possesses] common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.”). However, I must part company with the majority with respect to whether the grandfather’s consent to the search of Ms home also vested the officers with the authority to open and search Glenn’s backpack. See Randolph, 126 S.Ct. at 1522 (noting, for example, that, “when it comes to searching through bureau drawers, there will be instances in wMch even a person clearly belonging on the premises as an occupant may lack any perceived authority to consent”); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 725, 104 S.Ct. Cir. 1977) (<HOLDING>); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248,
holding that a mother had apparent authority to consent to a search of her adult sons bedroom including a closed vinyl bag found in the bedroom holding that a defendants sister could consent to a search of only the common areas of their shared house and her own bedroom and explicitly stating that the sister could not consent to search the defendants bedroom because the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her own bedroom holding that appellants father had authority to consent to search of defendants bedroom where house defendant lived in was owned by his parents room was not locked and defen dants family was not denied access to bedroom holding that child cannot consent to search of parents bedroom holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom shared by herself and the man she lived with including the closet