of appeals. See supra p. 501. There is thus no room in the dissent’s position for the considerations of “prudence and comity” that the dissent agrees must "shape our decision” as to whether to exercise injunctive power. Dissent at 504. 6 . A rule against simultaneous actions would seem especially unlikely in those circuits given the uncertain contours of the relief available to an aggrieved employee before DOT. While “make-whole,” as well as injunctive, relief is available in federal court, see, e.g., Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 207, 65 S.Ct. 226, 234, 89 L.Ed. 173 (1944) (providing for "usual judicial remedies of injunction and award of damages” in fair representation claims); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 196, 87 S.Ct. 903, 920, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967) (<HOLDING>), we have been unable to ascertain whether (and
holding that back pay may be awarded to the date of judgment holding that punitive damages may be awarded for egregious violations of the lmrda holding that damages and injunctive relief may be awarded in fair representation cases when necessary to make employees whole holding that erisa provides relief only for clearly ascertainable damages with the intent to make plaintiffs whole which precludes recovery for speculative future harm holding that one who makes a representation that is misleading because it is in the nature of a halftruth assumes the obligation to make a full and fair disclosure of the whole truth