to the TDCA claims. 6 . Though Wolpoff amended the amount sought in the Original Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award by filing the Supplemental Trial Petition, Eads alleges Wolpoff violated § 1692e(5) when it filed the Original Petition and sought to collect an amount greater than the arbitration award. 7 . Even if Eads had premised Wolpoff's liability upon the state court pleadings, Wolpoff is not entitled to immunity. Federal courts have held that FDCPA and TDCA claims “can be premised on flawed legal proceedings.” Gibson v. Grupo de Ariel, LLC, No. 4:05-CV-415-BE, 2006 WL 42369, *4 (N.D.Tex. Jan.9, 2006) (upholding a claim that the defendant-attorney violated the TDCA by filing a debt collection suit in the wrong court); see also Goldman v. Cohen, 445 F.3d 152, 155 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). 8 . Wolpoff's reliance on Guerrero v. RJM
holding that rawlings  a codefendant in the present action  is not a debt collector within the meaning of the fdcpa holding that an initial communication within the meaning of the fdcpa includes the initiation of a lawsuit holding that where the violation of the fdcpa was the filing of a lawsuit the statule of limitations begins to run on the date of filing holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of  1983 holding that pleadings are initial communication under fdcpa