118, 124 (V.I. 2009). Therefore, this Court’s general practice of not considering a moot appeal on the merits is not jurisdictional, but an exercise of judicial restraint that, as with other judicially-created doctrines, is subject to waiver. See Nini v. Mercer County Cmty. Coll., 202 N.J. 98, 995 A.2d 1094, 1105 (N.J. 2010) (explaining that, because New Jersey constitution does not limit New Jersey Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to actual cases and controversies, requiremen 2006) (allowing appeal from finding of child neglect, even though full custody later restored, because neglect finding “could have adverse consequences” in future custody proceedings and “may detrimentally impact societal and interpersonal relationships”); Smith v. Smith, 145 N.C. App. 434, 549 S.E.2d 912, 914 (2001) (<HOLDING>); Wilder v. Perna, 174 Ohio App. 3d 586, 883
holding that  once the sentence imposed for a conviction has completely expired the collateral consequences of that conviction are not themselves sufficient to render an individual in custody for the purposes of a habeas attack upon it holding appeal from abuse prevention order not moot due to orders expiration because of collateral consequences including effect in future proceedings and stigma holding expired domestic violence restraining order not moot because of collateral legal consequences such as consideration in custody determination and nonlegal collateral consequences such as reputational harm holding drivers license revocation was not moot because collateral consequences of revocation may be substantial including higher insurance rates and adverse employment consequences holding that an attorney is required to advise a defendant of the direct consequences of a plea and will not be found ineffective for failing to advise of collateral consequences of the plea