interfere with her ability to perform basic work-related activities — but she did not do so. Therefore, the ALJ did not err by relying on Allison’s report, based on Dr. Yu’s diagnosis, and omitting explicit reference to Dr. Yu’s report. Second, the ALJ did not err in crediting the opinion of a non-examining, non-treating doctor over three examining physicians where the ALJ gave specific and legitimate reasons for doing so. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir.1996). Substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s decision to give less weight to the three examining physicians’ reports where all of them noted Deck’s “symptoms would improve if she was actively engaged in treatment and not abusing substances.” Cf. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the ALJ did not err by giving more
holding that a bad faith claim must be met through the clear and convincing evidence standard holding an alj can meet the clear and convincing standard for rejecting medical opinions by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence stating his interpretation thereof and making findings holding that despite the lack of a statutory requirement that severe child abuse be shown by clear and convincing evidence due to the consequences of such a finding the clear and convincing standard must be applied holding that the presumption of validity  and its concomitant clear and convincing evidence standard  does not apply to section 101 claims the court reasoned because no evidence outside the pleadings is considered in deciding a motion to dismiss  it makes little sense to apply a clear and convincing standard  a burden of proof  to such motions citation omitted holding that findings of fact are conclusive if supported by clear and convincing competent evidence even where the evidence might support contrary findings