regulation of which plaintiff himself is the object, “there is ordinarily little question that the [defendant’s] action or inaction has caused the injury.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 555, 112 S.Ct. at 2130. A second factor in deciding whether there is an imminent threat of harm to the plaintiff is the plaintiffs level of certainty that he will engage in conduct that will subject him to injury. See id at 563-64, 112 S.Ct. at 2138. When the plaintiff has been able to state with some certainty an intent to engage in allegedly expected conduct at a relatively specific time in the future, courts have found a sufficiently imminent threat of harm to meet the first element in the Lujan test. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 212, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2105, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995) (<HOLDING>); Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1301-02
holding that at will contracts of employment are subject to tortious interference with contracts claims holding that a contracts clause violation may support a  1983 claim holding that the court was not bound by the parties agreement that contracts were unambiguous and holding that contracts were ambiguous holding that plaintiffs statement that it bid on every guardrail project in colorado combined with affidavits showing that there had been fourteen guardrail contracts up for bid between 1983 and 1990 created a sufficient certainty that plaintiff would bid on contracts in the future to support standing holding that a business owners testimony was insufficient to establish lost profits where he was not able to specify which contracts they lost how many they lost how much profit they would have had from the contracts or who would have awarded them contracts and explaining that the plaintiffs could have supported their lost profits with testimony that they had lost out on specific contracts but failed to do so