aware of judicial interpretations given to sections of an old law incorporated into a new one, and (c) familiar with previous interpretations of specific statutory language. Id. at 25 (citations omitted); see also Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581, 98 S.Ct. 866, 870, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978). At the time Congress enacted § 879, the interpretation of the phrase “knowingly and wilfully” in § 871 that had been articulated in Roy and its progeny was widely accepted in the federal courts. The fact that Congress chose to adopt this and other substantially identical language in enacting § 879, which addresses a concern parallel to that engaged by § 871, bespeaks an intention to import the established general intent interpretation of § 871 into the new statute. Cf. Bonanno, 879 F.2d at 21-27 (<HOLDING>). We accordingly conclude that § 879 requires
holding that pleadings under the rico act are to be liberally construed holding that united states cannot sue for treble damages under rico reasoning that it could not do so under similar language of clayton act on which rico was modelled holding that plaintiffs cannot claim that a conspiracy to violate rico existed if they do not adequately plead a substantive violation of rico recognizing that to facilitate and strengthen enforcement congress created rico with a private right of action for treble damages holding that a plaintiff may receive both treble damages under rico and state law punitive damages for the same course of conduct