have been fully ascertained and considered.” (emphasis added); see also 25 U.S.C. § 1404(2) (requiring the Secretary to submit to Congress “a statement of the extent to which such plan reflects the desire of the Indian tribe or individuals which are entitled to such funds”) (emphasis added). Nevertheless, plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenors rely on Short v. United States, 12 Cl.Ct. 36 (1987), in arguing that the Distribution Act does not apply. See Pls.’ Supplemental Br. at 2. Plaintiffs contend that Short “held that 25 [U.S.C.] § 1401 did not apply because the judgment was issued in favor of individual Indian class beneficiaries.” Pis.’ Supplemental Br. at 3. Shor terest in the lands and funds resulting from the Appropriations Acts. See, e.g., Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, 120 F.Supp. at 204 (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, the court finds that
holding that a company that cut and removed timber from land that secured a debt held by the plaintiff was liable as a matter of law under an earlier version of the gtccs because it had not first obtained the written consent of the plaintiff holding that the burden is on the plaintiff holding that where an express contract was in place between plaintiff and defendant that governed the compensation sought by plaintiff plaintiff may not recover under a theory of unjust enrichment holding that individuals representing the plaintiff clan constituted an identifiable group where land  was claimed by the plaintiff clan as a whole holding that the government may be an identifiable victim