trial court or challenge Judge Carlson for cause. Wylie has not shown how he was prejudiced by any conversations between Judge Cranston’s secretary and Judge Carlson. We find no plain error. SENTENCING ISSUES Wylie contends that a separate conviction for failure to stop, AS 28.35.050, failure to assist, AS 28.35.060, and failure to contact the authorities, AS 28.35.080, violate double jeopardy because the felony offense of failure to assist is a lesser-in-eluded offense of the misdemeanor failure to stop and failure to contact the authorities. The Supreme Court of Alaska has characterized these statutes as an interlocking scheme, not greater or lesser offenses. Convictions for both offenses would not appear to violate double jeopardy. See Drahosh v. State, 442 P.2d 44, 49 (Alaska 1968) (<HOLDING>). In Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69,
recognizing that an indemnity provision and an agreement to provide insurance are separate and distinct obligations holding that drug type and quantity do not constitute formal elements of separate and distinct offenses under section 84ibl holding unanimity requirement not violated when charge stated two separate counts with two separate and distinct offenses in each case holding that leaving the scene and failing to render assistance are separate and distinct offenses holding that a similar statute created separate offenses