any person with a physiological disorder affecting the reproductive system. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(b)(1); McWright, 982 F.2d at 227. Finally, plaintiff cites Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F.Supp. 1310 (E.D.Pa.1994). Doe found that reproduction was a major life activity under the ADA for a person infected with HIV by relying on Congress’ use of the broad terms of “life” and “major life activities.” Doe, 862 F.Supp. at 1320. Although the terms “life” and “major life activities” are broad, the EEOC regulations on this provision of the ADA, as discussed earlier, necessitate a finding that “procreation” and “caring for others” are not “major life activities” under the statute. See Department of Treasury, I.R.S. v. FLRA, 494 U.S. 922, 931-33, 110 S.Ct. 1623, 1629, 108 L.Ed.2d 914 (1990) (<HOLDING>). The EEOC’s interpretation indicates that
holding that when an agency is charged with administering a statute part of the authority it receives is the power to give reasonable content to the statutes textual ambiguities holding that where multiple agencies are charged with administering a statute a single agencys interpretation is generally not entitled to chevron deference but concluding that there would be no comparable concern if all three agencies charged with administering the statute in question pressed the same interpretation before this court holding that even in considering a purely legal issue a court should grant great deference to reasonable interpretation of statutes by agencies charged with administering those statutes holding that when a court is asked to construe an ambiguous statute it must defer to the interpretation set out in a regulation promulgated by the agency charged with administering the statute so long as the agencys interpretation is reasonable holding no physical attachment one to the other is necessaryf it is the textual relationship that is significant