[of a statute increasing time between parole hearings] in his case would result in a significant risk of a longer period of incarceration.”); Pindle v. Poteat, 360 F.Supp.2d 17, 20 (D.D.C.2003) (addressing an ex post facto challenge of the same 1999 guidelines in this case and stating that the issue was whether these guidelines resulted in an “increase in the time in which petitioner is likely to spend in custody”). The answer to this question in Glascoe’s case makes it unnecessary for us to evaluate the government’s argument that the parole procedures under attack in this case are simply discretionary guidelines, unlike statutes or the “rules” addressed in Garner, and not within the ambit of the Ex Post Facto Clause. See Warren v. Baskerville, 233 F.3d 204, 208 (4th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Pindle, 360 F.Supp.2d at 20 (collecting
holding that parole guidelines are subject to the ex post facto clause holding postgccraer that a change in administrative parole policy revoking previously earned good time credits was not subject to the ex post facto clause holding that a change in parole policies without altering the underlying substantive standards does not violate the ex post facto clause holding change in ultimate parole decisionmaker from board to governor does not violate ex post facto clause holding that the federal parole guidelines at issue were not laws within meaning of ex post facto clause