has jurisdiction to review an interlocutory denial of qualified immunity only to the extent that it ‘turns on an issue of law.' ” (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530, 105 S.Ct. at 2817-18)). In Mitchell, the Court held that a district court’s order denying a defendant’s motion for summary judgment was an immediately appeal-able collateral order under Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949), where (1) the defendant was a public official asserting a defense of immunity, and (2) the issue appealed concerned whether or not certain given facts showed a violation of clearly established law. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 528, 105 S.Ct. at 2816-17. 7 . Johnson v. Jones, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995). 8 . Id. at-, 115 S.Ct. at 2156 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). 9 . Id. at -, 115 S.Ct. at
holding that a defendant entitled to invoke a qualified immunity defense may not appeal a district courts summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a genuine issue of fact for trial holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity holding in the context of the assertion of a qualified immunity defense that a trial courts summary judgment order that merely determines that the pretrial record sets forth a genuine issue of fact for trial does not meet the requirements of the federal collateral order doctrine holding that a portion of a district courts summary judgment order that determines which facts a party may or may not be able to prove at trial is not appealable holding that the existence of genuine issues of material facts render not appealable a pretrial denial of summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity