Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 34-35, 102 S.Ct. 38, 43-44, 70 L.Ed.2d 23 (1982) (Congress' failure to disapprove regulation is an "indication that Congress does not look unfavorably” upon the FEC's construction of FECA). 7 . Even after the FEC’s issuance of these opinions, Congress has not acted to modify the definition of the term "contribution.” 8 . Sun-Diamond contends that even if Congress intended to prohibit post-election contribution, FECA is void for vagueness. However, because FECA and the FEC opinions and cases that interpret it, provided Sun-Diamond with sufficient notice of the prohibited conduct, the statute is not void for vagueness as it relates to Sun-Diamond’s conduct. See Connally v. Gen'l Construction, Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1925) (<HOLDING>). 9 . See 2 U.S.C. §
holding that ajbsent conclusive evidence of congressional intent as to the penal nature of a statute these factors must be considered in relation to the statute on its face holding that penal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the persons sought to be subjected to their operation holding that a statute must not be given the one of two reasonable interpretations which will render it unconstitutional holding that the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties recognizing that because  the drafters of the connecticut penal code relied heavily upon    the penal code of new york  it is appropriate to look to new york statutory and case law for guidance in interpreting connecticut penal code