the agreement must use the word ‘copyright,’ ” Op. at 931-32, and that such a writing “can use terminology such as ‘all assets’ that clearly includes copyrights,” id. at 931-32. The cases cited by the majority indeed stand for the proposition that use of the word “copyright” is not always necessary, but it is somewhat notable that in none of the cases did the written agreement merely say “all assets” without reference to “rights,” “intangible” property, or the underlying tangible property to which the intangible right attached. In all but one of the cited cases finding a transfer, the written agreement expressly conferred “all rights” in a specific piece of property, which the courts construed to include copyrights. See S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); Shugrue v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 977 F.Supp.
holding misuse of copyright because of limitations imposed on licensing agreement holding that while the computer program at issue was within the subject matter of copyright the right sought under state law pursuant to a license was not equivalent to the exclusive rights under copyright as such copyright preemption did not apply holding that copyright protection of computer programs extend beyond the programs literal code to their structure sequence and organization holding that an agreement in which a company retained all rights of ownership in a specific series of programs included the copyright recognizing that the copyright act was amended in 1976 to include computer programs in the definition of protectable literary works