characterized Title III as “preempting] the field in wiretap,” and has held that state courts must adhere closely to the limitations on the use of intercepted communications articulated in Title III. Pulawski v. Blais, 506 A.2d 76, 77 (R.1.1986). Other state courts have -taken a more flexible approach. Most prominently, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has held that a state wiretapping statute is not preempted by Title III so long as it is “substantially similar in design and effect to the Federal enactment.” Commonwealth v. Vitello, 367 Mass. 224, 327 N.E.2d 819, 835 (1975). Arizona courts have relied on Vitello in determining whether state wiretap provisions are “sufficiently compatible” with Title III. See State v. Politte, 136 Ariz. 117, 664 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 1982) (<HOLDING>). In United States v. Smith, 726 F.2d 852 (1st
holding provisions in ariz rev stat  133010 were not preempted because they were sufficiently compatible with the federal statute or  the statute as a whole would ensure sufficient compliance with the federal standards and further holding any divergent provisions were ministerial or reporting requirements which would not lead to preemption even if different than the federal law holding the state law claims were not preempted holding that neither mere participation in a federal program nor provision requiring compliance with federal law is sufficient to establish that the state consented to be sued in federal court holding that the aafes was an agency under the apa where by statute its contracts were considered contracts with the federal government and any judgments against it were paid out of the federal treasury holding that a sentence not in compliance with the mandatory provisions of a sentencing statute was illegal and appealable