114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994). In the end, this requirement scuttles the appellants’ claim. It is perfectly clear that the Due Process Clause cannot serve to ground the appellants’ federal malicious prosecution claim. No procedural due process claim can flourish in this soil because Massachusetts provides an adequate remedy for malicious prosecution. See Roche, 81 F.3d at 256 (citing, inter alia, Beecy v. Pucciarelli, 387 Mass. 589, 441 N.E.2d 1035, 1038-39 (1982)). Similarly, a plurality of the Supreme Court has concluded that “substantive due process may not furnish the constitutional peg on which to hang” a federal malicious prosecution tort. Albright, 510 U.S. at 271 n. 4, 114 S.Ct. 807. We have followed the Court’s lead in this respect, see, e.g., Roche, 81 F.3d at 256 (<HOLDING>), and we hew to that line today. The Fourth
holding that section 1983 claims alleging due process violations stemming from malicious prosecution are unavailable when a state malicious prosecution action exists holding that the fourth amendment right implicated in a malicious prosecution action is the right to be free of unreasonable seizure of the person holding that there is no substantive due process right under the fourteenth amendment to be free from malicious prosecution holding that there is no due process right to appellate review holding the same for malicious prosecution