and too much like the findings subject to [Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999) ] and Apprendi, to say that Almendarez-Torres clearly authorizes a judge to resolve the dispute.” Shepard, 544 U.S. at-, 125 S.Ct. at 1262. However, after the Supreme Court decided Shepard, we held, under plain-error review, that a district court’s application of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) did not violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. Camacho-Ibarquen, 410 F.3d at 1315-16. In a footnote, we noted that Almendarez-Torres must be followed because, while Shepard “may arguably cast doubt on the future prospects of Almendarez-Torres’s holding regarding prior convictions, the Supreme Court has not explicitly overruled Almenda F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Thus, no constitutional error, plain or
holding that if a jury is to be provided the defendant at capital sentencing regardless of whether the sixth amendment requires it the jury must stand impartial and indifferent to the extent commanded by the sixth amendment holding that almendareztorres rejected the argument that the fact of a prior conviction must be found by a jury holding that the defendants argument that the sixth amendment requires that a jury not a judge must determine whether his prior conviction is within the category of offenses specified in  2l12b1avii was without merit holding that a sentencing court may determine the nature of a prior conviction without violating the sixth amendment holding that the fact of a prior conviction for sentencing purposes need not be proved to a jury or admitted by defendant to satisfy the sixth amendment