remedy is exclusive”). In other words, Parnar claims are usually raised only in “a ‘narrow class of cases’ where the wrongful discharge action is seen as necessary to effectuate the public policy at stake.” Ross, 76 Hawai'i at 464, 879 P.2d at 1047 (quoting Lapinad v. Pacific Oldsmobile-GMC, Inc., 679 F.Supp. 991, 993 (D.Haw.1988) , abrogated on other grounds by Courtney v. Canyon Television & Appliance Rental Inc., 899 F.2d 845, 851 (9th Cir.1990)). This necessity usually arises only where a statutory or other policy does not itself provide for a remedy to enforce the policy. An exception to this general rule occurs where the legislative body specifically provides that a common law claim exists even though a statutory remedy is also in place. Ross, 76 Hawai'i at 465, 879 P.2d at 1047 (<HOLDING>). Under the HWPA, the Hawaii legislature
holding that the narrowing of the use of parnar claims only applies absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary and citing to hrs  37869 as an example of such legislative intent holding that substantive criminal statute could not be applied retrospectively because there was nothing  in the language or the legislative history that was a clear and unequivocal expression of legislative intent to rebut presumption of prospective application only holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law holding that the title of legislation is relevant to legislative intent holding statutes are not applied retroactively absent clear legislative intent