specific to that particular housing authority’s grievance procedure. For example, in New York City Housing Authority v. Simmons, the court held that the tenant could assert succession rights in a summary holdover proceeding in civil court commenced by the housing authority, despite the fact that she had defaulted by failing to appear at the administrative hearing, because the housing authority’s grievance procedure mons, Yonkers, and Schwartz, the language in the IHA’s grievance procedure is identical to the language in § 966.57(c). Thus, in New York state courts, in would appear that § 966.57(c) operates to provide public housing tenants with judicial review in an Article 78 proceeding, as opposed to a trial de novo in the summary-proceeding. See Yonkers, 2006 WL 3437868, at *1 (<HOLDING>). As a result, the Court finds that the
holding that whether a statute has been properly construed is a question of law subject to de novo review holding that de novo review applies when the underlying tax liability is properly at issue holding that the couit did not need to rule on whether  96657c required the housing court to provide tor a trial de novo following an administrative hearing because as in yonkers the housing authoritys grievance procedures also omitted the words any and majx have as found in the federal regulations and therefore a right to a trial de novo was granted by the housing authority in its grievance procedures holding that the proper review for the trial courts application of the law is de novo holding that  96657c is not to create any rights to a trial de novo of the issue of whether the tenancy was properly terminated but merely to preserve the tenants right to judicial review of the administrative determination in a cplr article 78 proceeding