denied, 347 U.S. 928, 74 S.Ct. 531, 98 L.Ed. 1080 (1954); Ex parte Samber, 13 N.J.Super. 410, 412-13, 80 A.2d 487 (Law Div.1951) (courts have inherent power to suspend sentences for a reasonable length of time); Gehrmann v. Osborne, 79 N.J. Eq. 430, 445-46, 82 A. 424 (Ch.1911) (court has common law power to suspend sentence). Illustrative of instances where the Legislature has precluded the courts from exercising their inherent common law power to impose suspended sentences are the cases dealing with mandatory minimum terms. See State v. Des Marets, 92 N.J. 62, 80-81, 455 A.2d 1074 (1983) (discussing minimum mandatory imprisonment under the Graves Act reflects the legislative intent to expressly preclude suspended sentence); State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 174-75, 199 A.2d 809 (1964) (<HOLDING>). The State argues that the 1973 repeal of
holding where the statutory minimum sentence exceeds the guidelines sentence a substantialassistance downward departure begins at the mandatory minimum sentence holding the minimum mandatory threemonth custodial sentence for second offenders under former dwi provisions of njsa 39450 reflects the intention to prohibit suspended sentences holding that even if the minimum mandatory exceeds the statutory maximum the court must impose the minimum mandatory holding the revised mandatory minimum sentences in the fair sentencing act applied to preaet offenders sentenced after august 3 2010 holding that a district court commits reversible error when it sentences a defendant to less than the statutory minimum where no exception to the mandatory minimum applies