drive it off.” Id. The bankruptcy court found, based on Ms. Coleman’s testimony, that the home had not been permanently attached to the land and therefore was not real estate under Missouri law. Coleman at 911. Because the court’s finding is supported by the record, we do not disturb it. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the bankruptcy court is affirmed. 1 . The Honorable Arthur B. Federman, United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Western District of Missouri. 2 . E.g., In re Davis, 386 B.R. 182 (6th Cir. BAP 2008); In re Shepherd, 381 B.R. 675 (E.D.Tenn.2008); In re Lara, No. 07-60188, 2008 WL 961892 (Bankr.S.D.Tex. Apr. 8, 2008); Kinder v. Vanderbilt Mortg. and Fin., No. 1:07-cv-564, 2008 WL 2230694 (S.D.Ohio May 28, 2008); In re Williamson, 387 B.R. 914 (Ba 008) (<HOLDING>); In re Fells, No. 07-80559, 2007 WL 3120113
holding that the antimodification provision of 11 usc  1322b is applicable to a mobile home irrespective of whether the home is attached to the real property on which it sits holding that the definition of debtors principal residence in 11 usc  10113aa does not operate to extend the antimodification provision of 11 usc  1322b to structures that are not real property holding that the definition of debtors principal residence in 11 usc  10113aa protects holder of secured claim in a mobile home that is debtors principal residence from modification under 11 usc  1322b holding that because the definition of debtors principal residence in 11 usc  10113a includes incidental property a secured interest in incidental property cannot be modified under 11 usc  1322b holding that a lien on the debtors mobile home which was the debt ors principal residence as defined by 11 usc  10113aa was not subject to modi fication under 11 usc  1322b