stop must be based on probable cause as contrasted with reasonable suspicion. The trial court in Whren made its decision based on a probable cause standard, and the Supreme Court reviewed it in that context. Id. at 819, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (“Here the District Court found that the officers had probable cause to believe that petitioners had violated the traffic code. That rendered the stop reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. ...”). ¶ 11 Indeed, cases both before and after Whren have applied a “reasonable suspicion” standard to traffic stops. Arizona v. Johnson, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 781, 784, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009) (permitting a traffic stop “when the police officer reasonably suspects” a traffic violation); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Choudhry, 461 F.3d 1097,
holding that a seventyfive minute terry stop was reasonable holding that reasonable suspicion is required to prolong a traffic stop after the purpose for which the investigatory stop was instituted has been accomplished holding that for a terry stop to be considered valid from its inception the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which taken together with rational inferences from those facts reasonably warrant that intrusion  quoting terry 392 us at 21 88 sct at 1880 holding that the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a socalled terry stop terry v ohio 392 us 1 88 sct 1868 20 led2d 889 1968 and applying a reasonable suspicion standard holding that information of criminal activity given by a known reliable informant is enough to sustain a terry stop