390, 656 P.2d 1251 (Ariz.Ct.App.1982); Snibbe v. Superior Court, 224 Cal.App.4th. 184, 168 Cal.Rptr.3d 548 (2014); Fischer v. Hartford Hosp., 31 Conn.. L. Rptr. 291 (Conn.Super.Ct.2002); State ex rel. Wilfong v. Schaeperkoetter, 933 S.W.2d 407 (Mo.1-996) (en banc). Therefore, these decisions are incongruous with this Court’s firmly established rules of statutory construction: “The intent of a statute is determined from what [its author] said, rather than what the courts think it should have said, and the court must confine itself to the language used.” Peters v. Great W. Bank, Inc., 2015 S.D. 4, ¶ 7, 859 N.W.2d 618, 621 (emphasis added) (quoting City of Rapid City v. Estes, 2011 S.D. 75, ¶ 12, 805 N.W.2d 714, 718); Hannon v. Weber, 2001 S.D. 146, ¶ 8, 638 N.W.2d 48, 50 (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). [¶22.] The rule of the foregoing decisions
holding that when the legislature enacts a statute it is presumed that the legislature is aware of existing statutes recognizing similar analysis applies to discrimination and retaliation claims holding that the legislature imposed a requirement implicitly rather than by means of statutory language expressly stating the requirement holding requirement of plaintext analysis applies equally to all statutes whether authored by the legislature or this court holding title vii analysis applies in ada case