delay in necessary medical care, amounting in effect to a form of punishment, is actionable. Id. at *8; see also Archer v. Dutcher, 733 F.2d 14, 16-17 (2d Cir.1984). Moreover, deprivations of medical care that cause or perpetuate pain are sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim. Brock v. Wright, 315 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir.2003); Thomas v. Tisch, No. 08-CV-0400, 2009 WL 701009, *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2009). The second prong of the Eighth Amendment analysis requires Plaintiff to show that Defendants were subjectively aware of an excessive risk to inmate health and safety, and that Defendants conscious ly disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to ensure a safe environment. Hayes, 84 F.3d at 620; see also Rangolan v. County of Nassau, 217 F.3d 77, 79 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). A. Doe 1 Plaintiff claims that Doe 1 “was not
holding that a twoday delay was insufficient to establish deliberate indifference and citing cases where no deliberate indifference was found after a sixteenday delay a sixday delay and a threemonth delay holding that disagreement with a doctors judgment does not support a claim of deliberate indifference holding that a sentence of incarceration would constitute deliberate indifference to defendants medical needs holding no deliberate indifference when a failure to take reasonable measures was due to defendants mistake holding that a difference of medical opinion was insufficient as a matter of law to establish deliberate indifference