solely focus on timing; and (4) “the absence of a laches defense would lead to injustice.” Beaty at 923-26. However, the Court of Appeals did give a caveat to its application of laches. It held that although the “best reading of § 523(a)(3)(B) and Rule 4007(b) is that laches is available as a defense” in bankruptcy cases, “those provisions ... direct[ ] bankruptcy courts to be especially solicitous to § 523(a)(3)(B) claimants when laches is invoked, and to refuse to bar an action without a particu larized showing of demonstrable prejudicial delay.” Id. at 926. The Beaty court acknowledged that courts considering “at any time” language in other non-bankruptcy statutes have held that laches is not applicable to such actions. See Marshak v. Treadwell, 240 F.3d 184, 193 n. 2 (3rd Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 420,
holding that the statute of limitations for all of plaintiffs eleven causes of action including those brought under lanham act  43a 15 usc  1125a and lanham act  43c 15 usc  1125c is four years holding that reasonable anticipation standard for the tort of passing off under section 43a of the lanham act remains the law in the third circuit holding that section 43a of the lanham act protects trade dress recognizing that willful blindness is equivalent to actual knowledge under the lanham act holding that a laches defense is precluded under a section of the lanham act providing for cancellation at any time