allowing an opportunity to amend her pleadings. A plaintiff deserves “a reasonable opportunity to amend” unless the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction. Texas A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 839 (Tex.2007); Harris County v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 639 (Tex.2004); TRST Corpus, Inc. v. Fin. Ctr. Inc., 9 S.W.3d 316, 320 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied). Nevertheless, based on the reasoning above, we conclude that Russell’s pleadings have affirmatively negated any possible theory upon which jurisdiction could be based. Russell’s grounds that are barred by governmental immunity cannot be re-pleaded to avoid immunity because there is no prospective relief available to Russell other than a judgment that would lay the 2d 709, 712 (1945) (<HOLDING>). But in all the cases Russell relies upon for
holding a declaratoryjudgment action was proper to construe compulsory school attendance law and did not implicate governmental immunity holding governmental immunity is no defense to contractual liability holding governmental immunity not implicated and a declaratoryjudgment action proper to seek determination of whether plaintiffs were motor carriers for purposes of tax statute holding section 1010215 does not waive governmental immunity merely because a governmental action falls within the listed governmental functions thus further inquiry under the act is necessary holding governmental immunity was not implicated in a declaratoryjudgment action seeking an interpretation of a competitive bidding statute as applied to the highway commissions policy of requiring all materials furnished under contracts be manufactured in the united states