wheels rest on the marking line.” We disagree, and conclude that based on the “totality of the circumstances,” Carmichael lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion to stop Estrada-Nava and Colin for lane straddling. As the district court pointed out, neither section 21658(a) nor California case law specifies what is meant by “drive as nearly as practical entirely within a single lane.” It therefore is unclear under California law whether a car’s wheels must cross over a line for there to be a violation of lane straddling. Courts in other states, however, that have interpreted statutes similar to, if not the same as, section 21658(a) have held that touching the line is not enough to constitute lane straddling. See, e.g., United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973, 978 (10th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Guevara-Martinez, 2000 WL
holding that one isolated incident of partially weaving into emergency lane does not constitute a traffic violation in tennessee holding that an isolated incident of a vehicle crossing into the emergency lane of a roadway does not violate state statutes requirement that vehicles remain entirely in a single lane as nearly as practical holding that a uhaul trucks similar one time entry into the emergency lane failed to constitute a violation of a statute nearly identical to the statute at issue holding officers observations of a vehicle crossing the center double yellow line of a twolane highway four times by less than one half of her car  once causing a vehicle in the oncoming lane of traffic to shift right within his lane but without the need for drastic evasive action  and crossing the fog line four times over a distance of at least 16 miles established probable cause for a traffic stop holding that observations of a driver swerving from the outside lane straddling the center line and then swerving back to the outside lane gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the driver was driving under the influence