reasoning of these cases. Moreover, we believe that declaratory relief is also moot when the challenged acts have already “irretrievably occurred.” Accordingly, we apply the teachings of N.J. Tpk. Auth., that the claim for injunctive relief had become “academic by reason of these changed circumstances .... ” Id. at 27. Here, as in N.J. Tpk. Auth., the challenged action awarding the contracts has already occurred, and the work required by them has already been performed. There is no longer a “ ‘subject matter upon which the judgment of the court can operate’ to make a substantive determination on the merits.” Id. at 30 (quoting Ex parte Baez, 177 U.S. 378, 390, 20 S.Ct. 673, 44 L.Ed. 813 (1900)); see also Jersey Cent. Power and Light Co. v. State of N.J., 772 F.2d 35, 36 (3d Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). II. For Appellants to be prevailing parties
holding that a first amendment challenge to an expired restraining order which had enjoined a rally was not moot holding that plaintiffs who sought injunctive relief under 42 usc  1983 could get same relief in a state court mandamus action holding that a challenge to a mining plan was moot where the action sought to be enjoined hadbeen completed holding that a court may award injunctive relief against a state officer holding that injunctive claim was rendered meaningless since the state action sought to be enjoined has irretrievably occurred