production standards are unenforceable and “should not be used as grounds for terminating his contract.” (Barnhart’s Opening Br. at 18.) New York Life contends, on the other hand, that Barn-hart’s contract was terminated in accordance with provision 9. We conclude that under Washington law any attempted modification is meaningless in light of the express contract provision that either party can terminate the contract with or without cause. Were we to adopt Barn-hart’s argument, we would have to conclude that the greater power, to terminate without cause, does not include the lesser, to modify the terms of the contract. The law in Washington does not support this conclusion. See Mayflower Air-Conditioners, Inc. v. West Coast Heating Supply, Inc., 54 Wash.2d 211, 339 P.2d 89, 91 (1959) (<HOLDING>); Mall Tool Co. v. Far West Equip. Co., 45
holding that the power to terminate a contract atwill subsumes the power to modify its terms holding that the recognition power is not limited to a determination of the government to be recognized but rather includes the power to take actions without which the power of recognition might be thwarted recognizing a distinction between the power of a federal court to hear statelaw claims and the discretionary exercise of that power holding that unless that power is restricted by the principal an agent under a california statutory healthcare power of attorney has the power to execute applicable admission forms including arbitration agreements holding that the inherent power of the district court includes the power  to santion attorneys for  violations of court orders or other conduct which interferes with the courts power to manage its calendar and the courtroom  