in this opinion. I Termination of Parental Rights The trial justice granted DCYF’s TPR petition under § 15 — 7—7(a)(2)(i) and (a)(3). As required by § 15-7-7(a) and (b)(1), and as we previously have held, these statutory bases for a TPR decree require not only that the child-placement agency prove each basis alleged for termination by clear and convincing evidence, but also that any ground for a TPR decree has continued to exist “notwithstanding the reasonable efforts which shall be made by the agency prior to the filing of the petition to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship so that the child can return safely to the family.” Section 15-7 — 7(b)(1) (imposing such a requirement statutorily for § 15 — 7—7(a)(2)(i)); see also In re Joseph S., 788 A.2d 475, 477-78 (R.I.2002) (<HOLDING>). After such an evidentiary showing and an
recognizing that the department is required to present clear and convincing evidence to support termination of a parents parental rights holding that trial court erred in granting petition for termination of parental rights based on noncompliance with case plan when case plan was not filed and approved by the court until seven months after petition for termination was filed holding that the department is required pursuant to  1577a3 to make reasonable efforts to strengthen the parental relationship until a termination petition is fried pursuant to  1577b2 holding that in parental termination proceedings the parent is entitled to effective assistance of counsel holding that prevailing party to contract dispute may recover attorneys fees either pursuant to contract or pursuant to statute