Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach: "If Congress has done so [expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach], of course, there is no need to resort to judicial default rules. When, however, the statute contains no such express command, the court must determine whether the new statute would have retroactive effect.... If the statute would operate retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such a result.” Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (1994); see also Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 37, 126 S.Ct. 2422, 165 L.Ed.2d 323 (2006) (quoting United States v. St. Louis, San Francisco & Tex. Ry. Co., 270 U.S. 1, 3, 46 S.Ct. 182, 70 L.Ed. 435 (1926)) (<HOLDING>); Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.022 (West 2005)
holding that proof of an explicit agreement is not required holding that attorneys fee statute using shall language is not discretionary holding that courts will only find a waiver of sovereign immunity  by the most express language or by such overwhelming implication from the text as will leave no room for any other reasonable construction holding that a statute shall not be given retroactive effect unless such construction is required by explicit language or by necessary implication holding same as to an easement by implication