allows an award of costs and attorney’s fees from the petitioners to the debtor. Here, Focus also asks us to order the disgorgement of attorney’s fees previously paid out of Focus’ estate to the petitioning creditors’ attorneys. To clear the way for the relief Focus seeks, we would have to return control of the business to Focus, discharge the trustee and dismiss the involuntary petition. See Semel v. Dill (In re Dill), 731 F.2d 629, 632 (9th Cir.1984) (“An award of attorney’s fees under 11 U.S.C. § 303(i) depends upon dismissal of the petition.”). Because we could fashion these equitable remedies, effective relief is available to Focus, and this case is therefore not moot under the first type of mootness. See Spirtos v. Moreno (In re Spirtos), 992 F.2d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Neither are we persuaded that we should
holding that plan participants in a defined benefit pension plan have no claim to the plans surplus assets holding that distributions from an inter vivos trust do not qualify as bequests and  541a5a does not operate to bring such distributions into the bankruptcy estate holding that postconfirmation income that is not necessary to the fulfillment of the plan of reorganization does not become part of the bankruptcy estate holding confirmation vested property in the debtor and therefore properly of the estate was not liable for postconfirmation taxes incurred by debtor holding appeal not moot when court could order debtor to return to the estate postconfirmation distributions of pension plan assets