of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). A commonsense reading of this statement strongly suggests that the statute includes a requirement of intentional discrimination. See Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1007 (10th Cir.1996) (“It would be a stretch to read the phrase ‘because of such individual’s age’ to prohibit incidental and unintentional discrimination that resulted because of employment decisions which were made for reasons other than age.”) (emphasis in original). However, Title VII contains parallel language, and the Supreme Court concluded almost three decades ago that such language encompassed a theory of liability based on disparate impact. See Chiggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971) (<HOLDING>). The question, then, is whether the ADEA,
holding that a claim for discrimination in private employment is not preempted by title vii holding that employment practices which are neutral in form but which result in discriminatory effects are prohibited unless justified by business necessity holding that title vii proscribes racial discrimination against whites upon the same standards as racial discrimination against nonwhites holding that title vii proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in operation holding that discriminatory employment practices are cognizable under title ix