decision.” If the legislature wanted to define “final order” or “final administrative decision,” it could have done so. Moreover, if the legislature intended to equate the term “administrative decision” with “final order” or “final administrative decision,” it could have done that as well. The legislature chose to do neither. Accordingly, we are not bound by the Department’s unsupported claim that a “final order” is an administrative decision as that term is defined in section 3 — 101 of the Administrative Review Law. 735 ILCS 5/3 — 101 (West 1996). We are persuaded by the Commission’s position that a “final order” was not rendered in this case because the default order did not terminate the proceedings before the administrative agency. See Kvidera, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 382 (<HOLDING>); see also Mitrenga v. Martin, 110 Ill. App. 3d
holding that an order by the trial court remanding the cause to the agency to impose a sanction other than the one imposed by the agency was not a final and appealable order because it did not terminate the litigation between the parties on the merits holding order granting a new trial is not a final appealable order because it does not terminate the action or any of the claims or parties in the action holding that an order remanding an arbitration award is not a final appealable order when the order does not also vacate the arbitration award holding that an order denying a  522f motion is final because it ends the litigation on the merits holding adjudication order based upon a determination on the merits in juvenile court is a final and appealable order