functioning of one’s immune system is a major life activity”). We agree that cancer can—and generally will—be a qualifying disability under the ADA. Nevertheless, “[t]he determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity requires an individualized assessment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(iv). Athough the ADAAA makes the individualized assessment “particularly simple and straightforward” for diseases like cancer, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii), an individualized assessment must still take place. To undertake that individualized assessment, courts have required some evidence of the plaintiffs substantial limitation—even when the limitation seems self-evident in context. Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566, 119 S.Ct. 2162, 144 L.Ed.2d 518 (1999) (<HOLDING>); see also Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 602 F.3d
holding evidence of a 13 permanent partial disability insufficient to establish disability for purposes of ada holding that whether a person has a disability under the ada is an individualized inquiry holding without applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel that the plaintiff who made sworn statements of total disability in a social security disability application and then testified at her deposition that she was not totally disabled failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of the ada recognizing that although the terms medical condition under the nmhra and disability under the ada may be interchangeable in some cases they may not be the same in others holding that although visionimpaired individuals may not have an onerous burden in demonstrating disability and ordinarily will meet the ada s definition of disability they must still offer evidence of limitation in terms of their own experience