any homestead interest which could prevent foreclosure of the RTC’s lien. See infra. Because Guadalupe and Viola’s homestead claim fails on its merits, we affirm the judgment of the district court, and we need not decide the issue of estoppel. The Oliva-rezes rely heavily on In re Patterson, 918 F.2d 540 (5th Cir.1990), In re Rubarts, 896 F.2d 107 (5th Cir.1990), In re Niland, 825 F.2d 801 (5th Cir.1987), and In re Howard, 65 B.R. 498 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1986), all of which deal primarily with the issue of when a party is estopped from claiming a homestead exemption. Because we do not reach the issue of estoppel, we do not address the Olivarezes’ arguments premised on Patterson, Rubarts, Niland, and Howard. 3 . The Olivarezes do not chal 765, 767-68 (Tex.Comm’n App. 1923, judgm't adopted) (<HOLDING>); Nash v. Conatser, 410 S.W.2d 512, 521-22
holding that defendants adult son who was living on defendants property had equal control over use of premises and had authority to consent to a search holding that homestead exemption was unavailable even though claimants were  living on the land and claiming it as homestead with the permission or acquiescence of the owner for they could have no homestead right or interest in land to which they had no title holding that police chiefs son who alleged that he was denied an interview for a position because his father had criticized the local officials did not have standing to assert the first amendment rights of his father holding that a son could be bound by a contract that he signed even though his fathers name and not his appeared in the body holding that son had no homestead interest in property even though he resided upon it with his fathers consent because son had neither title nor a present right to possess land nor right to demand partition from father who was his cotenant