490 (citing Maxwell v. State, 73 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex.Crim.App.2002)). Maxwell, in stating that "the validity of an alleged consent to search is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances [,]” overextends the Supreme Court case it relies on for the proposition. Maxwell, 73 S.W.3d at 281 (citing Robinette, 519 U.S. at 40, 117 S.Ct. 417). In Robinette, the Supreme Court held only that the voluntariness of consent given is a question of pure fact, and consent must be voluntary to be valid. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 40, 117 S.Ct. 417. 13 . See e.g., Riordan v. State, 905 S.W.2d 765, 770-73 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, no pet.); Corea v. State, 52 S.W.3d 311, 316-18 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d). 14 . See United States v. Hudson, 405 F.3d 425, 431 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Rith, 164 F.3d 1323, 1328
holding that the question of whether police had a reasonable basis for finding that a third party had authority to consent to search is a question of law holding that the question of whether the police had reasonable suspicion and probable cause to make a warrantless search should be reviewed de novo holding that the question whether a party has agreed to submit an issue to arbitration is a question of law requiring de novo review holding that the determination of whether there was joint access and control for actual authority is a fact question reviewed under the plainerror standard but a determination of whether the government reasonably relied on a third partys consent is a question of law to be reviewed de novo holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant