in Harris County, Texas.” Because this term was applied to Appellant, we are of the opinion that he has standing to assert an overbreadth challenge. We are well aware of the recent decision of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Andrews v. State, 652 S.W.2d 370 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) which upheld the validity of § 43.21(a)(4), thereby resolving a conflict among several Courts of Appeals. See, e.g., Hoyle v. State, 650 S.W.2d 97 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.], 1982); Shelton v. State, 640 S.W.2d 649 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1982); Tyree v. State, 638 S.W.2d 245 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1982) (all holding § 43.21(a)(4) is not overly broad). Contra Stonelake v. State, 638 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1982); Andrews v. State, 639 S.W.2d 4 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1982) (<HOLDING>). With all due respect to our brethen, we have
holding that the use of the written form is mandatory and that failure to use the written form as mandated is reversible error holding  4321a4 is overbroad as written holding that  172545hs written notice requirement is mandatory recognizing that deference to an agencys interpretation of the written law is appropriate only when that interpretation is within the written laws language holding that a judgment is construed like other written documents and that the intent of the court is determined by viewing the document as a whole