presumptions of harm, we have carefully discussed the reasons for taking such an unusual step. See, e.g., State v. Crowley, 766 P.2d 1069, 1071-72 (Utah 1988) (closure of trial to friends and relatives of accused); State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920-22 (Utah 1987) (prosecutor’s failure to disclose materials sought by defense); State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 752-54’ (Utah 1986) (gruesome photographs). Third, in addition to Crawford’s lack of acknowledgement of authority and its weak analytical underpinnings, this court has concluded that its per se rule does not work very well. See 20 Am.Jur.2d Comis § 187 (1965). This conclusion is evidenced by our straining to find that no error has occurred, thus avoiding Crawford ’s mechanical reversal requirement. See, e.g., Wood, 868 P.2d at 80 (<HOLDING>); Bishop, 753 P.2d at 451-55 (same). We think
holding that trial judge did not err in refusing to transfer to another judge defendants motion for substitution of judge for cause where defendant failed to establish even a threshold basis for his substitution motion holding that trial judge did not err in refusing to transfer to another judge defendants motion for substitution of judge for cause where defendants motion was not made in good faith holding the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow a question to prospective jurors on their feelings against recommending probation as punishment in a murder case holding that trial judge did not err in refusing to transfer to another judge defendants motion for substitution of judge for cause where defendants motion lacked specificity holding trial judge was at the very limit of his discretion in refusing to remove prospective jurors for cause