Milligan and served as an intermediary between Koropchak and Milligan. Moreover, despite their apparent discouragement of Milligan’s complaint, Kinsel’s and Koropchak’s responses were otherwise reasonable and effective. Regardless of what he said at his meeting with the Milligans, Kinsel set the investigative machinery in motion before the meeting by referring Milligan’s allegations to Koropchak, the official with disciplinary authority over Meyers. Kinsel also arranged for Milligan to work exclusively in the second floor stockroom, away from Meyers’ office on the first floor. For as ineffective because it did not prevent all contact between him and Meyers. This argument fails because SIU was not required to completely insulate Milligan from Meyers. See Sutherland, 632 F.3d at 995 (<HOLDING>); Roby, 579 F.3d at 786 (same); Berry, 260 F.3d
holding that even when employee was driving employers vehicle employee was not acting within the scope of his employment absent evidence that he had undertaken a special mission at his employers direction holding that res judicata properly barred claims based on an employers decision to terminate an employee because the termination was not a fresh act of discrimination rather it was the same decision not to allow the employee to return to work that the employee had challenged previously holding employee had cause of action against city when nonemployee alderman sexually harassed employee holding employee had cause of action against her employers when nonemployee harassed her and employers failed to take corrective action holding that the employers response was reasonable even where the harassed employee periodically had to work in the harassers general vicinity