government is not required to show how [a defendant] acquired the firearm, just that he had possession of one. Even if he held a gun only to inspect it, [the defendant] would be guilty under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).”); United States v. Lane, 267 F.3d 715, 718 (7th Cir.2001) (“Physical control over a gun is remarkably easy to effect.”). The report adds nothing to the issue in dispute — that Gillaum had possession of the handgun. Evidence that corroborates a portion of a defendant’s story that is not directly relevant to the crime charged does not justify a finding of materiality under Brady. Duest v. Singletary, 967 F.2d 472, 479 (11th Cir.1992), vacated on other grounds, 507 U.S. 1048, 113 S.Ct. 1940, 123 L.Ed.2d 647 (1993); see also Lingle v. Iowa, 195 F.3d 1023, 1026 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Booz, 451 F.2d 719, 725 (3d
holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse holding that a jury instruction listing additional modes of sexual penetration than those listed in the information did not impermissibly amend the charge of sexual assault becausein part the added modes of sexual penetration did not change the applicable statute sentence or level of offense holding that the clergy sexual conduct statute requires general intent and does not impose strict liability because the act of sexual penetration must be intentional holding that medical report was not material for brady purposes where report at best showed lack of vaginal penetration of sexual abuse victim penetration was not necessary for conviction of sexual abuse of a minor under iowa law holding that penetration of anus and penetration of sexual organ although found in same subsection of section 22021a1b are separate offenses