115 (Tex.1998); Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline v. Benton, 980 S.W.2d 425, 441 (Tex.1998). HIGGINSON, Circuit Judge, specially concurring: I write separately to make two further observations. First, the plaintiffs contend that the Ordinance is preempted by Congress’s exclusive occupancy of the fields of removal, harboring, and registration. In my view, the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision authored by Justice Brennan in DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 96 S.Ct. 933, 47 L.Ed.2d 43 (1976), forecloses this argument. The Ordinance regulates the ability of non-citizens to obtain rental housing, and Congress has not determined that the housing of non-citizens falls within its exclusive authority. See Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1968, 1985, 179 L.Ed.2d 1031 (2011) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt.
holding that the preemption provision of the act does not apply to a fraud prosecution because there is no conflict with state insurance regulation holding that ijmplied preemption analysis does not justify a freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state statute is in tension with federal objectives  holding removal and preemption are distinct concepts erisa preemption does not allow removal unless complete preemption exists holding that judicial analysis of the preemption under  1144 cannot help a federal court determine whether it has subjectmatter jurisdiction holding that tension in supreme court cases can be resolved by reading complete preemption as a term of art  a description of the specific situation in which a federal law not only preempts a state law to some degree but also substitutes a federal cause of action for the state cause of action thereby manifesting congresss intent to permit removal