when it reaches a “substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct,” or when it “is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.” United States v. Dischner, 974 F.2d 1502, 1510-11 & n. 5 (9th Cir.1992) (quoting Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 494-95, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1191, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982)); see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1859 n. 8, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983). “The fact that the statute might reach first amendment activities is not sufficient; the statute must reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected activity.” Dischner, 974 F.2d at 1511-12 & n. 7 (quoting Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. at 1859 n. 8); see also Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467, 111 S.Ct. 1919, 1929, 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Courts that have reviewed bribery statutes
holding amendment to statute of limitations was a procedural amendment to be applied retroactively in a medical malpractice case holding that where first amendment freedoms are not infringed by the statute a vagueness claim must be evaluated as the statute is applied to the facts of the case holding the record did not contain enough facts to determine whether the statute was constitutional as applied to the particular facts and circumstances of the case holding a contribution restriction for minors was invalid because the statute was not closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of first amendment freedoms recognizing in criminal case exception to standing rules where statute involving first amendment freedoms is challenged on vagueness grounds