explicitly include or exclude Native American tribes. In Miccosukee, the Eleventh Circuit found that Title III of the ADA applied to a public re denied a tribe’s motion to dismiss a Title III ADA claim brought against the Native American tribe arising from a for-profit, public restaurant, hotel, and night club the tribe owned and operated. Cher-Ae, 2002 WL 33942761, at *3. The Cher-Ae court, like the Miccosukee court, concluded that the ADA, as a generally applicable statute, applied to the tribe; and further that the tribal ownership and operation of an interstate for-profit commercial enterprise, employing non-Native American employees, falls beyond the limits of a tribal exemption or immunity. Id. at *3-5. Cf. Giedosh v. Little Wound School Bd., Inc., 995 F.Supp. 1052 (D.S.D.1997) (<HOLDING>). Thus, absent an explicit exemption, courts
holding that as a matter of federal law an indian tribe is subject to suit only where congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity holding that a statechartered corporation partially owned by an indian tribe was not a tribal agency holding that petitioners status as school board members does not permit them to step into the shoes of the school board and invoke its right to appeal holding that the term indian tribe under the ada is broad enough to encompass a school board a nonprofit state corporation where the tribe used the board to manage a tribal school holding that an indian tribe is subject to suit only where congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity