Next, we consider the trial court’s admission of evidence of the child’s rib fractures. We again view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. The record shows that appellant as well as his wife and mother had the opportunity to cause the rib fractures. The evidence of the rib fractures, when considered together with the evidence that appellant caused the fractures, was probative on the issue of malice. Evidence that appellant maliciously caused the rib fractures tended to prove that the child’s shaking death at the hand of appellant was not an isolated incident, but, rather, was one of a series of forceful shakings, supporting a finding that the shaking death was committed with malice. Cf. Smart v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 168, 170, 246 S.E.2d 892, 893 (1978) (<HOLDING>). In Smart, the Commonwealth “merely showed
holding that the trial court properly excluded evidence relating to a purported additional suspect where the evidence was speculative and had little or no probative value holding that the trial court properly failed to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication and manslaughter where there was no evidence that the appellant was intoxicated at the time of the offense although there was evidence that the appellant had been drinking beer on the day of the offense where there was no evidence concerning the quantity of beer he had consumed holding that if no evidence was presented to support the prevailing party there is no evidence upon which to apply the substantial evidence test and therefore the capricious disregard standard applies holding that where the commonwealth presented no evidence linking appellant to injuries such evidence had no probative value to the commonwealths theory of the case recognizing the probative value of objective and reliable hearsay evidence