v. Montgomery, 150 F.3d 983, 994 (9th Cir.1998), in which “potential substantial prejudice to [the] defendant’s rights inheres” and in which counsel may help avoid that prejudice, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967). Examples of critical stages include post-indictment police lineups, id., arraignment, Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53, 82 S.Ct. 157, 7 L.Ed.2d 114, (1961), and sentencing, Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977). We have little trouble concluding that Beaty’s confession did not occur during a “critical stage.” The group sessions were not court-ordered and were not designed to acquire information to be used at trial. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981) (<HOLDING>). In short, the sessions were not a “trial-like
holding that the court lacks jurisdiction over sixth amendment claims because the sixth amendment is not moneymandating holding that a defendant who asserts a diminished capacity defense through the testimony of an examining psychiatrist waives his or her fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination as to any statements made to the psychiatrist holding that under the sixth amendment to the united states constitution before imposing an obligation to reimburse the state the court must make a finding that the defendant is or will be able to pay the reimbursement amount ordered holding that a sentencing court may determine the nature of a prior conviction without violating the sixth amendment holding that sixth amendment was violated by admissions made to state psychiatrist because the court ordered the sessions to determine competency