66, 71 (5th Cir.1975) (citing Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967)). However, we have held in this Circuit that the right to be present at one’s sentencing “does not translate into a right to be present whenever judicial action modifying a sentence is taken.” United States v. Jackson, 923 F.2d 1494, 1496 (11th Cir.1991). We have already determined that the court’s Rule 36 order in Portillo’s case did not amount to a resentencing wherein the sentence was substantially changed. As we held in Jackson, where “the entire sentencing package has not been set aside, a correction of an illegal sentence does not constitute a resentencing requiring the presence of the defendant, so long as the modification does not make the sentence more onerous.” Id., 923 F.2d at 1497 (<HOLDING>) . Furthermore, Rule 43 provides exceptions for
holding that the district court did not violate the defendants right to due process when it departed upward to life imprisonment pursuant to  5k221 because his sentence was within the maximum set forth in the united states code for the offense of conviction holding that even if the district court lacked jurisdiction to correct a defendants sentence under fedrcrimp 35c  3583e2 authorized the court to modify the conditions of a defendants supervised release holding that outside of rule 35 there exists no inherent authority for a district court to modify a sentence holding that rule 36 may not be used by the district court to fundamentally alter the defendants sentence from three to five years imprisonment in an attempt to conform the sentence to the intention of the parties as reflected in the plea agreement which provided that the prisoner would serve exactly five years holding that the defendant did not need to be present under rule 43 when the district court modified his sentence from forty to thirty years imprisonment pursuant to the former fedrcrimp 35 1987