strength, the majority tells us, “is no less a [constitutional] violation than any other invidious method.” Maj. Op. at 871. But the use of different voting mechanisms has little to do with the type of “invidious discrimination” that the Equal Protection Clause was designed to prevent. That is why I believe that many of the broad statements in the majority opinion, although eloquent, are ultimately hollow. E.g., Maj. Op. at 879-80 (“Violations of the Equal Protection Clause are no less deserving of protection because they are accomplished with a modern machine than with outdated prejudices.”). However unpleasant the prospect, human error remains a part of the democratic process, and no constitutional rule is going to change that fact. See Powell v. Power, 436 F.2d 84, 88 (2d Cir.1970) (<HOLDING>). What does have more potential to reduce the
holding that neither the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment nor article i  2 of the constitution guarantee against errors in the administration of an election holding the exclusion did not violate the equal protection clause of the wyoming constitution or the fourteenth amendment to the united states constitution holding that neither the due process clause nor the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment require the appointment of counsel on a petition for discretionary review to a state supreme court holding that due process and equal protection clauses of fourteenth amendment are not confined to protection of citizens rather they apply to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction holding that the due process clause contained in the colorado constitution encompasses a guarantee of equal protection