requirement may be satisfied post-trial, like in Remmer, or during trial. See Ladd v. South Carolina, 415 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir.1969) (explaining that by conducting an “adversary proceeding ... in open court during the state trial,” the trial judge did “precisely that taught by Remmer”). Accordingly, it is clearly established federal law for purposes of our review under AEDPA that a defendant is entitled to a hearing when he or she presents a credible allegation of communications or contact between a third party and a juror concerning the matter pending before the jury. 2. Of course, not every allegation of an unauthorized communication between a juror and a third party will trigger the Remmer presumption and its corresponding hearing requirement. See Haley, 802 F.2d at 1537 n. 9 (<HOLDING>). To be sure, “due process does not require a
holding that the remmer presumption did not apply where the communication was innocuous and the defendant had failed to present evidence that the communication was prejudicial recognizing that certain kinds of extrajudicial contacts may amount to nothing more than innocuous interventions that simply could not justify a presumption of prejudicial effect recognizing the general rule of avoiding excessive posttrial inquiry into actions of counsel at trial in order to avoid any chilling effect on attorneys willingness to serve and stating that nothing would encourage a proliferation of ineffectiveness of counsel claims more than to permit an accused to establish the prejudice prong of strickland on a showing of nothing more than speculation that he had been prejudiced by his counsels performance recognizing presumption recognizing this presumption