was denied. Because attorney fees are separately recoverable under the ICPA, Idaho Code § 48-608(4), Plaintiffs’ attorney fees incurred in connection with this adversary proceeding should not be considered an “ascertainable loss.” Hedrick v. Spear, 138 Or.App. 53, 907 P.2d 1123, 1125 (1995). However, Plaintiffs’ attorney fees incurred in connection with Joshua’s bankruptcy filing and conservatorship proceeding, doctor fees incurred to determine his competence, and Wiggins’ loss of access to his annuity payments, and his loss on the car transaction, are all tangible out-of-pocket expenses which are capable of being discovered, observed, or established, and constitute ascertainable losses for purposes of the ICPA. See, e.g., Simms v. Candela, 45 Conn.Supp. 267, 711 A.2d 778, 781 (1998) (<HOLDING>). While the precise amount of the losses
holding that claims that relate to actual competence of the medical practitioner are not recognized under states consumer protection act but claims implicating entrepreneurial aspects of practice of medicine may be sufficient holding that medical expenses were within meaning of ascertainable loss under that states consumer protection statute holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid holding that statute allows admissibility of evidence by affidavit to prove reasonableness and necessity of medical expenses holding that hamp violations can predicate claim under analogous massachusetts consumer protection statute