districts with general harm to creditors. 4 . We reject the argument that the bankruptcy court's framework is somehow consistent with our prior opinion in S.I. Acquisitions. There, we held that an alter ego action is property of the estate under Texas law, and thus, can be brought by the trustee on behalf of all similarly-situated creditors. See id., 817 F.2d at 1153-54. We neither held nor implied that a cause of action belongs to the estate simply because it could be brought by many creditors, as opposed to only one. Interpreting S.I. Acquisitions to stand for this latter proposition would violate the well-established rule that trustees have no standing to bring personal claims of creditors. See Caplin, 406 U.S. at 433-34, 92 S.Ct. at 1688. 5 . See MortgageAmerica, 714 F.2d at 1275 (<HOLDING>). 6 . For example, paragraph XIII alleges that
holding that the principal of a corporate debtor does not become a transferee by the mere act of causing the debtor to make a fraudulent transfer holding that the debtor lacked standing to bring a claim against the internal revenue service for the improper assessment of a tax deficiency because the cause of action was the property of the estate and had not been abandoned to the debtor holding that because an action under the texas fraudulent transfers act is essentially one for property that properly belongs to the debtor the cause of action belongs to the debtor holding debtor could include property because the bank accepted payments directly from the debtor and had previously allowed the debtor to cure default holding that a fraudulent transfer claim against a corporate debtors control person belongs to the corporate debtor not to specific creditors