counts. Again, the motion was denied. The jury convicted appellant on all charges, and the trial court imposed sentence. Preservation Appellant’s motions for judgment of acquittal did not specifically set forth the ground argued on this appeal — namely, that the confinement of three-year-old Victoria Linn did not constitute a kidnapping since it was merely incidental to the robbery. See Reed v. State, 603 So.2d 69 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)(explaining that only those grounds raised in a motion for judgment of acquittal are reviewable on appeal). A motion for judgment of acquittal which does no more than generally allege that the State has failed to establish a prima facie case is insufficient to preserve the instant issue for appeal. See Johnson v. State, 478 So.2d 886, 886 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)(<HOLDING>); Gibbs v. State, 693 So.2d 66 (Fla. 4th DCA
holding that a general motion for judgment of acquittal which asserted without explanation or argument that the state had failed to prove a prima facie case of the crime charged in the indictment was insufficient to preserve for appeal the specific argument that the state had failed to prove the age of the victim to support a conviction for sexual battery of a child under the age of eleven holding that a defendants general objection that the city of mobile failed to make out a prima facie case was sufficient to preserve for appellate review the issue of the citys failure to prove the ordinance holding that the offense of sexual battery requires the state prove the victims lack of consent regardless of the victims age and charge the jury on the same holding that trial court erred in denying motion for judgment of acquittal when state failed to prove venue holding that adea plaintiff had failed to make a prima facie case of age discrimination when he was replaced by someone only two years younger and within the protected age group and there was no other evidence of age discriminatory motive