representations in the proposal it relied on, nor does it specify the time, place, and manner in which the representations in this proposal were presented to the plaintiffs.”). Plaintiffs’ allegations that they were willfully misled therefore fail to make out a claim for common law fraud. Plaintiffs’ allegations that Shadle “authorized” Terrell to make specific representations regarding their bonuses and that Shadle “approved” parallel terms in their employment contracts are similarly insufficient to make out a claim for fraud. While more specific than Plaintiffs’ allegations that Defendants “misled” them, these allegations are still not sufficiently specific under Rule 9(b) because they do not provide any explanation as to why these statements were fraudulent. Plotkin, 407 F.3d at 696 (<HOLDING>). Indeed, Plaintiffs plead no facts to show
holding that plaintiff explained why statements were fraudulent where the complaint alleged that defendants statements requested port fees and customs taxes  but no such fees or taxes were due holding that statements made prior to signing of lease with integration clause were not actionable in fraudulent misrepresentation holding analysts statements insufficient to satisfy particularity requirements because plaintiffs failed to identify with specificity the statements made by a particular defendant or describe how those statements were false or misleading holding that statements at issue were protected expressions of opinion because they lacked specificity and precision and the factual implications concerning such statements were unclear holding that a plaintiff must plead with specificity as to the statements or omissions considered to be fraudulent the speaker when and why the statements were made and an explanation of why they were fraudulent