the defect “was justified,” the court was “not willing to punish Dow Brands for what [was], after all, a technicality that [did not] go to the heart of jurisdiction”); Eltman v. Pioneer Communications of America, Inc., 151 F.R.D. 311, 316 (N.D.Ill.1993) (even though the removal petition was “defective as a result of [defendant’s] failure to join in,” the defendant’s “formal consent, untimely as it was, cure[d] the defect”); Glover v. W.R. Grace & Co., Inc., 773 F.Supp. 964, 965 (E.D.Tex.1991) (denying motion to remand on ground that consent was four days late); Hernandez v. Six Flags Magic Mountain, Inc., 688 F.Supp. 560, 562 (C.D.Cal.1988) (denying motion to remand on ground that consent was one day late). Sicinski v. Reliance Funding Corp., 461 F.Supp. 649, 652 (S.D.N.Y.1978) (<HOLDING>). Barring extraordinary circumstances, this
holding that the failure of all defendant to join in the petition for removal mandated remand to state court holding that any defect in removal procedure must be cured within the 30day removal period or it is fatal to the removal and defendants failure to attach exhibits to the notice of removal within that time required remand holding that the defendants motion to amend their notice of removal was proper due to plaintiffs waived objections to the sufficiency of the notice of removal by failing to seek remand within thirty days of removal holding that affidavit submitted to the court after the plaintiffs motion to remand was sufficient to cure the defect in the removal petition holding that the failure to join all the defendants in a removal petition is not a jurisdictional defect