its holding in Engle III that “individualized issues such as legal causation” would be litigated, rather than presumed, in progeny trials. Engle III, 945 So.2d at 1268. Next, the Florida Supreme Court examined whether the defendants were given an opportunity to be heard. The Court answered that question with a resounding “yes”—with respect to conduct: As illustrated by hundreds of witnesses, thousands of documents and exhibits, and tens of thousands of pages of testimony, the Engle defendants had notice and the opportunity to defend against all theories of liability for each of the class’s claims in the year-long Phase I trial. And, as we held in Engle, the Phase I jury’s verdict fully settled all arguments regarding the Engle defendants’ conduct. See Waggoner, 835 F.Supp.2d at 1273-74 (<HOLDING>). Douglas III, 110 So.3d at 431. The Court also
holding that the trial court must examine the entire course of criminal conduct in determining possession holding that putative class representatives had standing to represent the class even when they owned stock for only part of lengthy class period because they alleged a common course of conduct to defraud over that entire period including the period during which they owned stock recognizing the phase i trial was conducted for the explicit purpose of determining issues related to the engle defendants conduct which were common to the entire class meaning they had every reason to litigate each potential theory of liability to the fullest extent possible recognizing that in determining numerosity courts must consider the geographical dispersion of the class the ease with which class members may be identified the nature of the action and the size of each plaintiffs claim holding that because the defendant has the right to litigate the issue of each class members consent the trial court did not improperly exercise its discretion in finding that these issues would predominate over common questions