for a majority shareholder to. deceive a fellow insider, which in turn may make it more difficult for an insider to prove the overall injustice or unfairness necessary to pursue an alter-ego claim. See, e.g., Harper v. Delaware Valley Broadcasters, Inc., 743 F.Supp. 1076, 1085-86 (D.Del.1990) (relying in part on plaintiffs inside knowledge to reject unfairness element of alter-ego claim under Delaware law), aff'd, 932 F.2d 959 (3d Cir.1991). But each case will turn on its specific facts. Particularly in the context of small, closely held corporations, a corporate insider may stand to lose more than an outside creditor from a majority shareholder’s fraudulent abuse of the corporation’s limited liability. Cf. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505, 514-16 (1975) (<HOLDING>); but see Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366,
holding minority shareholders to be forced sellers for the purpose of 10b because corporation forced shareholders to sell their shares for cash or else realize no value from the stock holding that in a merger shareholders are effectively purchasing shares in a new corporation while losing their status as shareholders in the previous corporation holding that the trustee could not bring a claim against sole shareholders of bankrupt corporation where shareholders had not looted or otherwise injured the corporation recognizing special dangers and creating protections under massachusetts common law for minority shareholders in closely held corporation holding that derivative actions do not require the support of a majority of shareholders or even all of the minority shareholders