the reach of § 727(a)(2)(A) only to those transfers of property in which the debtor has a direct proprietary interest.” In re Thurman, 901 F.2d at 841. A second key component of Section 727(a)(2)(A) is the debtor’s intent. “In considering the issue of a debtor’s transfer or concealment of assets with intent to hinder, delay or defraud a creditor, as described in § 727(a)(2)(A), the plaintiff must establish an actual intent to hinder, defraud or delay ....” Glaser v. Glaser (In re Glaser), 49 B.R. 1015, 1019 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985). In other words, “constructive fraudulent intent cannot be the basis for denial of discharge” for purposes of Section 727(a)(2)(A). In re Glaser, 49 B.R. at 1019. See Tese-Milner v. Gordon (In re Gordon), 2015 WL 269800, at *16 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2015) (<HOLDING>). Direct proof of actual intent to defraud is
holding that actual intent to defraud is not necessary to finding of constructive fraud holding that  2314 does not require specific intent to defraud a certain person a general intent to defraud any person who might fall victim to the schemers plan is sufficient holding that although there was evidence the defendant transferred or caused to be transferred more money to the debtor than the debtor transferred to the defendant there was legally sufficient evidence to support the jurys finding of actual fraud under section 24005a1 and b because the badges of fraud showed the debtors intent to hinder delay or defraud creditors holding that the statute requires actual intent to hinder delay or defraud creditors or the trustee constructive intent to defraud does not suffice holding that debtors depositing of funds into spouses separate account did not establish actual intent to hinder delay or defraud creditors for purposes of denial of discharge under chapter 7