itself.”); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 19 (1979). Prior to the instant matter, Maryland appellate courts have not considered whether pedophilia is relevant to one’s capacity to form intent under traditional tort principles. Other jurisdictions which have addressed this question, however, have concluded that it is not. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Jenner, 874 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir.1989), rev’g 856 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir.1988) (reversing an earlier Ninth Circuit decision in which the defendant’s pedophilia was found relevant in determining intent; holding that sexual molestation “creates an inference of an intent to injure that may not be overcome by evidence of a subjective lack of intent to harm”); Fire Ins. Exch. v. Abbott, 204 Cal.App.3d 1012, 1029, 251 Cal.Rptr. 620 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Jarvis, 195 Ga.App. 335,
holding that the improper admission of hearsay testimony from two witnesses whose testimony was brief and consistent with the victims testimony did not constitute drumbeat repetition of the victims statements holding in attempted murder case that testimony regarding victims medical prognosis properly admitted holding that medical testimony regarding defendants pedophilia was irrelevant because it was primarily concerned with whether the insureds subjectively intended to injure their victims holding exclusion of testimony from defendants wife at defendants trial was not required under spousal testimony privilege where both spouses participated in unlawful enterprise of transporting illegal aliens and wifes testimony concerned matters prior to their marriage holding the excluded testimony was relevant to whether a signature was that of a deceased party and since a statement regarding the issue was the only testimony that could be given by the witness no offer to prove was necessary because the substance of the evidence was apparent from the context of the question asked