from the hostile work environment complaint. ¶29. Thus, assuming that Hall voluntarily entered into the Agreement, nothing in the language of the Agreement, as discussed above, provides the trial court with a basis for finding that, as a matter of law, the Agreement unambiguously permitted Hall’s claims in this case. Rather, on remand, the trial court must consider whether the Agreement unambiguously precluded all or part of Hall’s remaining retaliation claim or whether the language of the Agreement is ambiguous as to its preclusive effect on all or part of that claim in light of the circumstances surrounding the making of the Agreement, thereby requiring the court to instruct a new jury to that effect. See Isbrandtsen v. N. Branch Corp., 150 Vt. 575, 579, 556 A.2d 81, 84 (1988) (<HOLDING>); see also Tilley v. Green Mt. Power Corp., 156
holding that the court may consider collateral evidence of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the agreement in determining whether the language of the agreement is unclear and if the evidence presented is so plain that no reasonable person could hold any way but one then the court may interpret the meaning as a matter of law holding that trial court may consider circumstances surrounding making of agreement in determining whether agreement is ambiguous and noting that ambiguity exists when language of agreement in and of itself supports reasonable interpretation distinct from reasonable interpretation reached when language is read in light of surrounding circumstances holding that when relevant contract language is ambiguous interpretation is turned over to the factfinder holding that courts may consider extrinsic evidence including the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract in order to determine whether a contractual ambiguity exists holding that in determining whether a seizure has occurred a court must consider if in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was not free to leave