which had long before been enjoyed by the public.” Graham, 383 U.S., at 5, 86 S. Ct. 684, 15 L. Ed. 2d 545. The statute generally prohibited the Crown from granting such exclusive rights, 21 Jam. 1, ch. 3, § 1 (1623), in 4 Statutes of the Realm 1213, but it contained exceptions that, inter alia, permitted grants of exclusive rights to the “working or makinge of any manner of new Manufactures,” § 6. Pursuant to that provision, patents issued for the “mode, method, or way of manufacturing,” F. Campin, Law of Patents for Inventions 11 (1869) (emphasis deleted), and English courts construed the phrase “working or makinge of any manner of new Manufactures” to encompass manufacturing processes, see, e.g., Boulton v. Bull, 2 H. Bl. 463, 471, 492, 126 Eng. Rep. 651, 655, 666 (C. P. 1795) (<HOLDING>). Thus, English courts upheld James Watt’s
holding that sponsoring applicants for pro hac vice admission to practice law is not a core component of the fundamental right to practice law holding out admission to practice law when not admitted to practice holding that historical practice is important when courts interpret the constitution even when the nature or longevity of that practice is subject to dispute and even when that practice began after the founding era holding that under the supremacy clause a state court could not enforce a prohibition on the unauthorized practice of law against an individual who was permitted to practice law under the rules of a federal court located in the states jurisdiction holding that the term manufacture applied not only to things made but to the practice of making to principles carried into practice in a new manner to new results of principles carried into practice