n. 2, 82 S.Ct. 1294, 1296 n. 2, 8 L.Ed.2d 794 (1962). Moses H. Cone held alternatively that such an order is appealable, even if non-final, under the collateral order doctrine. 460 U.S. at 11-13, 103 S.Ct. at 934-35. III. The propriety of the district court’s granting of the stay in this declaratory judgment action is governed by Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, 62 S.Ct. 1173, 86 L.Ed. 1620 (1942), and the Moses H. Cone /Colorado River factors, which set out a more stringent test for federal abstention, do not apply. Rowan Companies, Inc. v. Griffin, 876 F.2d 26, 28-29 (5th Cir.1989); Mission Insurance Co. v. Puritan Fashions, Corp., 706 F.2d 599, 601 n. 1 (5th Cir.1983). See also, Continental Casualty Co. v. Robsac Industries, 947 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1991) (<HOLDING>). Under Rowan and Mission, the district court’s
holding that the district court could not stay erisa and 1934 act claims under colorado river holding that the declaratory judgment act is remedial only and the party seeking declaratory relief must have an underlying cause of action holding that the declaratory judgment act is a procedural device holding that colorado river abstention test is inapplicable where the declaratory judgment act is involved holding that colorado river ab stention is inapplicable to actions requesting declaratory relief