counter-argument fails to persuade. They argue that their convictions are not “final,” meaning that Great American must pay until the cases are resolved in a final adjudication. At the time they filed their briefs, they argued that “final” meant that “the judgment of conviction was rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari elapsed or [was] ... denied.” Ayers Reply Br., p. 4 (quoting Tehan v. United, States, 382 U.S. 406, 409 n. 3, 86 S.Ct. 459, 15 L.Ed.2d 453 (1966)). Even by the Principals’ own definition, the convictions of Ayers, Faulkenberry, and Dierker are now final. The Sixth Circuit has affirmed their convictions for securities fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy, a n, No. PCA 87-30080-WS, 1987 WL 49657, at *1 (N.D.Fla. July 5, 1987) (<HOLDING>); Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Triumph Capital
holding that the judgment or other final adjudication language of a dishonesty exclusion was satisfied by a criminal conviction holding that an adjudication on summary judgment is an adjudication on the merits holding that to establish a conviction for immigration purposes a court must accept a guilty plea or jury verdict make an adjudication and impose a sentence holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence holding that guilty plea to crime of fraud satisfied judgment or final adjudication language of dishonesty exclusion