obligations is circumscribed by statute and ordinances.” Kirkland v. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Disk No. Re-1J, 464 F.3d 1182, 1190 (10th Cir.2006). Such restrictions are incorporated into any contract the government entity makes. Id. Thus, any party contracting with a government entity is charged with constructive knowledge of those restrictions and cannot claim justifiable reliance on statements to the contrary. Id.; see also Keeling v. City of Grand Junction, 689 P.2d 679, 680 (Colo.Ct.App.1984) (imparting constructive knowledge that a city council could only act pursuant to the authority granted to it by the city’s charter). We have applied this rule in a case concerning a school district policy requiring school board approval of certain expenditures. See Kirkland, 464 F.3d at 1190-91 (<HOLDING>). Because the Academy’s charter clearly states
holding that because no clear implication could be derived from the language of the statute that the state should be bound by the local zoning ordinances the state was not bound holding school district strictly hable for sexual harassment by its employees holding that a school district owed the highest degree of care to a student on a school bus such that the district could be liable for the sexual abuse of the student by the school bus driver holding that the school district could not be bound by an administrators promise to buyout an employees salary holding that a promise to make a loan is not covered by  1823e because a promise is not an asset