case, we must conclude that the District Court was not required to notify Bellamy of its intent to impose a sentence that exceeded the range recommended in § 7B1.4. Although notice would be required if this case involved a departure from an actual guideline range for purposes of initial sentencing under Chapter 5 of the Guidelines Manual, Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 138, 111 S.Ct. 2182, 115 L.Ed.2d 123 (1991), this is not such a departure. Unlike the ranges called for by Chapter 5, the ranges listed in Chapter 7 are not binding on the District Court. Accordingly, we conclude that a decision to exceed that range cannot be equated to an “upward departure,” and will not invoke the same procedural protections that would accompany such a departure. Cf. Blackston, 940 F.2d at 894 (<HOLDING>). As Bellamy himself acknowledges, other courts
holding that only general rather than specific reasons must be stated when a court strays from the chapter 7 range holding that no notice is necessary when a court exceeds a range recommended by chapter 7 holding that where the guideline range is higher than the statutory maximum sentence the court should depart from the lowest range that could support the statutory maximum holding denial of motion to convert from chapter 11 to chapter 7 is interlocutory holding that explicit credibility finding must be more than passing remark of disbelief and must be supported by specific cogent reasons