that naturally follow from the relationship are inherently in the natural parents. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 578 (quoting In re Knott, 138 Tenn. 349, 355, 197 S.W. 1097, 1098 (1917)). A parent has a right to “childrearing autonomy” unless and until a showing is made of “a substantial danger of harm to the child.” Id. at 579. It is readily apparent to us that “childrearing autonomy” encompasses control of a 2 1/2-year-old child’s access to the telephone, including to whom the child speaks and when the child speaks and under what conditions the child speaks. We are also inclined to agree with the trial court that as to a 2 1/2-year-old, this right is “unrestricted.” We are not, by this opinion, painting a bright line as to age. See Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 744-45 (Tenn.1987)(<HOLDING>). Since 2 1/2 is obviously an age at which a
holding that adea plaintiff had failed to make a prima facie case of age discrimination when he was replaced by someone only two years younger and within the protected age group and there was no other evidence of age discriminatory motive recognizing varying degrees of maturity and that normally a child under age seven has no capacity to consent holding that against her will in the rape statute means without her consent and that the fact that the victim was under the age of consent was sufficient to establish that element recognizing the boards seven criteria holding there is no consent as a matter of law where the consent was given under coercion