(citations omitted) (“[F]ederal courts are the final arbi ters of federal law, and the question of tribal court jurisdiction is a federal question.”), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 943, 111 S.Ct. 1404, 113 L.Ed.2d 459 (1991); see National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 852, 105 S.Ct. at 2451-52. Second, it is not necessary to join the tribal court as a party to Pease’s suit for the simple reason that tribal judges, like state judges, are expected to comply with binding pronouncements of the federal courts. See, e.g., In re Justices of Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 695 F.2d 17, 23 (1st Cir.1982) (citations omitted) (“it is ordinarily presumed that judges will comply with a declaration of a statute’s unconstitutionality without further compulsion”); James v. Jones, 148 F.R.D. 196, 203 (W.D.Ky.1993) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the district court provided
holding that the state attorney generals duty to support the constitutionality of challenged state statutes and his duty to defend actions in which the state is interested do not constitute enforcement of the statute in question holding all members of beneficial society bound by state decree in class action including citizens of the state in which federal action seeking to enforce state decree was brought who were not parties to the state suit holding that state judges were not necessary parties to action challenging constitutionality of state laws relating to detention of juveniles recognizing that allegation of state action is a necessary element of a  1983 claim holding that an express provision preempting all state laws relating to railroad safety was broad and would preempt state claims that cover the same subject matter