Jan. 5, 2011); Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., Inc., 686 F.Supp.2d 942, 945-46 (E.D.Mo.2010); Illinois v. SDS W. Corp., 640 F.Supp.2d 1047, 1052 (C.D.Ill.2009). But see West Virginia ex rel. McGraw v. Comcast Corp., 705 F.Supp.2d 441, 449-50 (E.D.Penn.2010) (concluding that Caldwell's framework is consistent with CAFA’s goals). 5 . I have previously expressed that I generally eschew the use of legislative history to determine a statute's intent. See, e.g., Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, Tex., 675 F.3d 802, 829 n. 4 (5th Cir.2012) reh'g en banc granted, 688 F.3d 801 (5th Cir.2012). 6 . I note some commentary consistent with this concern. See Dwight R. Carswell, Comment, CAFA and Parens Patriae Actions, 78 U. Chi. L.Rev. 345, 370 (2011) (<HOLDING>). 7 . The majority opinion also suggests that
holding that an action against an officer was not an action against the state because the relief sought would not take away any property of the state or fasten a lien on it or interfere with the disposition of funds in the treasury holding that prospective injunctive relief is appropriate in a federal civil rights action only if a reasonable likelihood exists the plaintiff will again be subjected to the unconstitutional actions recognizing that civil rights lawsuits are private only in form recognizing that state agencies which are independent of the state are citizens of the state recognizing that lawsuits that seek only injunctive relief or money that will go to the state treasury rather than to state citizens are not mass actions as defined by cafa thus it does not make sense to argue that these are the only lawsuits that will fall within the mass action exception