to recognize a mere breach of contract that has an incidental effect on the plaintiffs business relations with third parties as a wrongful act under a claim of tortious interference. See Volcjak, 124 Md.App. at 512-13, 723 A.2d at 479; K & K Management, Inc., 316 Md. at 162-63, 557 A.2d at 978. Here, Mates bases her claim on the grounds that her removal from the board and subsequent termination was in violation of NAVI’s corporate by-laws. See First Am.Compl. ¶ 29. Assuming arguendo that the corporate bylaws acted as a contract between the board and the corporation, Mates’ claim of tor-tious interference would be based on nothing more than a breach of contract, which Maryland courts have refused to recognize as a basis for this tort. See Volcjak, 124 Md.App. at 513, 723 A.2d at 479 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Mates has failed to a state a
holding that the lmra preempted plaintiffemployees claim under michigan law for tortious interference with contractual relations breach of contract is an essential element of a tortious interference claim and resolution of such claim would require the court to interpret collective bargaining agreement to determine if that agreement had been breached holding that the plaintiff stated a claim for tortious interference holding that where no wrongful conduct by the defendant was alleged ie a breach accompanied by violence intimidation defamation fraud or other tortious conduct other than the breach of its contractual obligation under its bylaws no claim for tortious interference can lie holding no specific jurisdiction where alleged tortious conduct was not related to defendants contacts with texas holding that where both defamation and tortious interference claims are pled and are based on same facts minnesota law requires the application of the actual malice standard to tortious interference claims