is afforded a cause of action under § 905(b). The parties have narrowed this issue considerably by stipulating to many of the elements of the statute, specifically that: Guilles is covered by the LHWCA for purposes of entitlement to compensation benefits; Guilles did not engage in stevedoring, shipbuilding, repairing or breaking services; and Guilles suffered an injury within the meaning of the Act. The parties have also stipulated that Guilles is not a crew member subject to the Jones Act but is instead covered by the LHWCA. We accept, as the district court did, the stipulations of the parties, and see no reason to consider whether Guilles is a Jones Act seaman. We note that there is no question that Guilles is covered under the LHWCA. See Perini, 459 U.S. at 324, 103 S.Ct. at 650 (<HOLDING>). What is left for us to determine is whether
holding that the land under navigable waters was not granted by the constitution to the united states but was reserved to the states respectively and that new states have the same rights jurisdiction and sovereignty over the soil under navigable water as the original states holding that a worker injured on actual navigable waters in the course of employment is covered under the lhwca holding that federal maritime law and not state law applies to all actions for wrongful death in navigable state waters holding that wetlands adjacent to navigable waters are included in the term territorial waters holding that platform workers death caused by an explosion on a platform bore no significant relation to maritime law even though the death occurred while the worker was located on a vessel in navigable waters