Comm’n, 360 Mich. 578, 104 N.W.2d 395, 401-02 (1960); Bird v. State, 154 Miss. 493, 122 So. 539, 540 (1929); In re Oak St., 308 Mo. 494, 273 S.W. 105, 109 (1925); Prescott v. Hayes, 42 N.H. 56, 58-59 (1860); State ex rel. Newman v. Jacobs, 17 Ohio 143, 152-53 (1848); Franks v. Ponca City, 170 Okla. 134, 38 P.2d 912, 913 (1934); Graham v. Sch. Dist. No. 69, 33 Or. 263, 54 P. 185, 187 (1898); Dove v. Kirkland, 92 S.C. 313, 75 S.E. 503, 507 (1912); Roche v. Jones, 87 Va. 484, 12 S.E. 965, 966 (1891); Green Mountain Sch. Dist. No. 103 v. Durkee, 56 Wash.2d 154, 351 P.2d 525, 528 (1960); State ex rel. Schneider v. Darby, 179 Wis. 147, 190 N.W. 994, 998 (1922); Crawford v. City of Sheridan, 392 P.2d 519, 520 (Wyo.1964). But see Omdorff v. Potter, 125 W.Va. 785, 25 S.E.2d 911, 912 (1943) (<HOLDING>). In the final analysis, the practical nature
holding that when a judicial office is created by legislative act or municipal ordinance  the office is regarded as a de facto office until the act or ordinance is declared invalid holding office exempt where the rest of the residence was not recognizing a nonresident who receives the most votes for elected office does not hold the office but not discussing the de facto officer doctrine holding that an employee had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his office even though the papers seized from the office were not the property of the employee recognizing that a prosecutors office is an entity and that information in the possession of one attorney in the office must be attributed to the office as a whole