visitation for stepparents who stood in loco parentis to their stepchildren, even if the relationship lasted less than two years, provided the court determined visitation to be in the child’s best interests. Id. at 791. The district court noted, however, that the stepfather in Simmons was married to the custodial parent, rather than to the noncustodial parent, and concluded that Barbara had provided “insufficient proof’ that she stood in loco parentis to the children, which appears to be a determination of fact. Other states have held that, as a general matter, the determination of in loco parentis status is a fact question. See, e.g., Drawbaugh v. Drawbaugh, 436 Pa.Super. 57, 647 A.2d 240, 241 (1994); cf. London Guar. & Acc. Co. v. Smith, 242 Minn. 211, 217, 64 N.W.2d 781, 785 (1954) (<HOLDING>). The issue, however, also involves a question
holding that intent of parties to choice of law must be given effect holding that parol evidence is admissible to determine intent of parties holding in loco parentis status to be casespecific inquiry based primarily on intent of parties holding that extrinsic evidence admissible to determine intent of parties holding parties to an exculpatory clause where the parties intent is clear