you just leave me alone about that s[h]it, I already told you I did.” (Emphasis added.) At oral argument, appellant claimed that we should not consider these statements when deciding whether appellant’s alleged invocation was ambiguous because a valid invocation of the right to silence would render any subsequent statements a violation of appellant’s constitutional rights. Because we find that appellant’s invocation was ambiguous independent of any subsequent dialogue, we need not address the propriety of considering statements made after an alleged invocation of the right to silence. 8 . Although not raised by the parties, there is an argument that appellant's question did not rise to the level of even an equivocal invocation of his right to counsel. See, e.g., Risk, 598 N.W.2d at 649 (<HOLDING>). But because we conclude that the BCA agent
holding that statement i think i should call my lawyer was an unequivocal request for counsel holding that the defendant did not invoke his right to counsel because his statement i wanna call my lawyer when read in context did not represent a request to terminate the interrogation until his counsel was present holding that the right to have counsel present means the right to have counsel physically present during the interrogation not merely the right to consult an attorney by telephone holding that a defendant who is subject to custodial interrogation must be advised in clear and unequivocal language of his constitutional right to remain silent and his right to a lawyer holding that a suspects request for counsel to advise him on whether he should consent to a police search pursuant to the indiana constitution did not invoke his miranda right to counsel during a subsequent custodial interrogation