and care. . ” [Id. at 667; footnotes omitted.] Thus, in the District of Columbia, courts usually require that a child be domiciled or temporarily present within the jurisdiction before custody can be determined. An exception to this rule may be found where both parents of the child are parties before the court in divorce litigation, but our divorce laws require a certain nexus of the parties to the District of Columbia. See D.C.Code 1967, § 16-902. Even in such divorce litigation it is necessary that both parties appear before the court and participate in the proceedings. Oxley v. Oxley, 81 U.S.C.App.D.C. 346, 347, 159 F.2d 10, 11 (1946). Cf. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533-534, 73 S.Ct. 840, 97 L.Ed. 1221 (1953). But see Kraft v. Kraft, D.C.Mun.App., 155 A.2d 910, 913 (1959) (<HOLDING>). The decree of the Polish Supreme Court did
recognizing the validity of a maryland judgment holding that domicile actual residency in the jurisdiction and notice of the divorce suit are sufficient enough to establish personal jurisdiction over an absent party thereby providing a basis for a collateral custody determination holding that the burden is on the party seeking to exercise jurisdiction by clearly alleging facts sufficient to establish jurisdiction holding that personal jurisdiction is not required to make an outofstate parent a party to custody action where the state court has subject matter jurisdiction under the uniform child custody jurisdiction act holding that personal jurisdiction over a party is proper if the party has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum recognizing bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over such a collateral attack