Bahl would be unable “to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct.” Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108. Moreover, without some explicit standards specifying when Bahl “frequents” an establishment, the condition is subject to ad hoc and arbitrary enforcement. ¶54 Moreover, the terms “sexually explicit” and “erotic” are also vague. A person of ordinary intelligence would understand the phrase “ ‘sexually explicit’ ” to refer to an unequivocal expression of sexual content and the word “erotic” as material to arouse sexual desire. Yet whether material is unequivocally sexual or arouses sexual desire is tremendously subjective; there are more objects of sexual arousal than can ever be dreamt of in the philosophy of this condition. See McVey v. State, 863 N.E.2d 434, 447 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (<HOLDING>); Smith v. State, 779 N.E.2d 111, 118 (Ind. Ct.
holding factor b is not unconstitutionally vague holding statute unconstitutionally vague as applied to mere possession of money on jail premises holding that essentially equivalent is unconstitutionally vague holding postrelease condition prohibiting the possession of sexually explicit materials to be unconstitutionally vague holding that attorney disciplinary rule was unconstitutionally vague as applied