KADA complied with state and federal standards for outpatient alcohol treatment services. The open question, therefore, is not before us. It is interesting, however, that O’Bannon distinguished, in dicta, cases involving “the direct relationship between a public employer and its employees” — where protected property interests exist — from cases “concerning the right of an employee who loses his job as a result of government action directed against a third party.” O’Bannon, 447 U.S. at 788-89 n. 21, 100 S.Ct. at 2477 n. 21. Merritt’s case clearly falls into the latter group. I would hold, therefore, that the right of noninterference with contracts is not an interest protected by the due process clauses. See also Rutledge v. Arizona Board of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1353 (9th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>) (Rutledge), affd sub nom. Kush v. Rutledge,
holding that a twoday suspension with pay does not deprive plaintiff of measurable property interest holding that a verbal assault although tortious does not deprive a plaintiff of a protected interest holding that the plaintiff stated a claim for tortious interference holding that sjtanding alone simple verbal harassment does not  deprive a prisoner of a protected liberty interest but noting that racially derogatory language  can be quite important evidence of a constitutional violation holding ifrp does not deprive inmates of constitutional rights to due process