decide whether a pattern-or-practice claim is outside the scope of the charge because the record supports Mr. Jones’s contention that he seeks to introduce evidence of UPS’s allegedly discriminatory policy as proof that UPS was motivated by a discriminatory and retaliatory intent when it refused to return him to work. In other words, he attempts to prove his claim of individualized disability discrimination by proving that UPS routinely applies a 100%-healed policy that discriminates against disabled individuals. Evidence of such a policy is potentially relevant not only to the allegedly unlawful motivation behind UPS’s refusal to return Mr. Jones to work, but also to a determination of whether UPS regarded him as disabled. See Henderson v. Ardco, Inc., 247 F.3d 645, 653 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Although the evidence Mr. Jones asserts as
holding that credibility determinations should not be resolved at the summary judgment stage holding that evidence in an inadmissible form may be considered at the summary judgment stage as long as the evidence is submitted in an admissible form at trial holding that unverified complaints cannot be considered as evidence at the summary judgment stage holding that evidence of an employers 100healed policy was relevant to the issue of perceived disability at the summary judgment stage holding that at the summary judgment stage there must be sufficient evidence on which the jury could find for the plaintiff