himself to be a representative of Wellington VA. Merel and G & M argue, however, that they never knew that Wellington VA legally existed and therefore could not have been representing its interests. Under Illinois law an attorney-client relationship can be formed outside of the normal course in two situations. First, such a relationship can be created during an initial meeting based on “ ‘the client’s belief that he is consulting a lawyer in that capacity and his manifested intention to seek professional legal advice.’ ” Herbes v. Graham, 180 Ill.App.3d 692, 699, 129 Ill.Dec. 480, 536 N.E.2d 164 (2d Dist.1989) (quoting Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir.1978)), see also King v. King, 52 Ill.App.3d 749, 10 Ill.Dec. 592, 367 N.E.2d 1358 (1977) (<HOLDING>) (disapproved on other grounds). There is no
holding that because counsel met with clients now exhusband prior to the parties divorce for a mere thirty minutes to discuss his marital difficulties the husbands financial situation and his plans for the future an attorneyclient relationship existed between counsel and the ex husband that precluded counsel from representing the exwife two years later in a support matter against the exhusband even though the exhusband never hired the lawyer holding that in determining whether there exists a valid waiver of the right to counsel in the criminal setting the court may consider a defendants lack of good faith in working with appointed counsel including an unreasonable refusal to cooperate with counsel or an unreasonable request for substitution of appointed counsel and the timeliness of defendants request for new counsel particularly when a defendant makes an untimely request for new counsel  under circumstances which are likely to result in a continuance holding that counsel was not deficient in failing to call a witness where the defendant never provided the witnesss name to counsel and no evidence existed that counsel had any notice of the witnesss identity holding that the defendants prior conviction was not obtained in violation of his right to counsel because he had the opportunity for appointed counsel at public expense holding that waiver by attorney was binding upon the accused when before the state introduced the evidence complained of on appeal counsel for the state in the presence of the accused and his counsel stated the agreement and the evidence of the witness was then read to the jury in the presence of the accused and his counsel without objection