that we review de novo.’ ”) (quoting United States v. Garcia-Zambrano, 530 F.3d 1249, 1254 (10th Cir. 2008)); United States v. Spears, 673 F.3d 598, 605 (7th Cir. 2012) (same). This move away from deference to the magistrate’s determination has its roots in cases in which the affiant provided false or misleading information in violation of Franks v. Delaware. See, e.g., United States v. Namer, 680 F.2d 1088, 1095 n.12 (5th Cir. 1982) (rejecting the presumption of deference when warrant affidavit included reckless and material misrepresentations). Without explicitly endorsing a de novo review of purged warrants, this Court has extended this no-more-deference rule to situations in which the affidavit was based upon illegally obtained information. See, e.g., McClintock, 444 S.W.3d at 19 (<HOLDING>); Castillo v. State, 818 S.W.2d 803, 805 (Tex.
recognizing that district courts finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause based on the totality of the circumstances is ordinarily accorded deference holding that a determination of probable cause does not bar a state law malicious prosecution claim where the claim is based on the police officers supplying false information to establish probable cause holding that there is no probable cause when an officer makes a stop based on a mistake of law holding that the commissions no probable cause determination was decisive holding that no deference is required when magistrates probable cause determination was based in part on illegal drugdog alert