with the witnesse .2d 383 (2006); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 28 n. 15, 93 S.Ct. 1977, 36 L.Ed.2d 714 (1973) (explaining that "the institution of jury sentencing is unlike judicial sentencing in a number of fundamental ways”); Mark Silver-stein, Confrontation at Capital Sentencing Hearings: Illinois Violates the Federal Constitution by Pennitting Juries to Sentence Defendants to Death on the Basis of Ordinarily Inadmissible Hearsay, 22 Loy. U. Chi L.J. 65, 74, 122 (1990) (hereinafter “Confrontation at Capital Sentencing Hearings ”) (arguing that Williams"discussed only judicial sentencing” and that the Supreme Court “has never indicated that it would extend Williams ... to a sentencing jury”); cf. United States v. Cardenas, 9 F.3d 1139, 1154-56 (5th Cir.1993) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). A distinction between judge and jury when it
holding that in reviewing confrontation clause challenge appellate courts must first determine whether the confrontation clause is implicated holding that any confrontation right is found in the fourteenth amendments due process clause not the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment recognizing that the confrontation clause may provide greater rights in cases tried before juries than in bench trials holding that the confrontation clause applies only to trials and not to sentencing hearings holding that the confrontation clause applies equally to sentencing proceedings tried to a jury