issue in this case is so close, it is necessary to determine whether three of the four dates discussed above — namely, the two final judgment dates and the date Petitioner filed his Co-ram Nobis Petition — count toward the limitations period. With regard to filing dates, the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit both appear to consider the date on which a post-trial collateral challenge is filed to be excluded from the limitations period. See Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 9, 121 S.Ct. 361, 148 L.Ed.2d 213 (2000) (“If ... an application is erroneously accepted by the clerk of a court ... it will be pending, but not properly filed ” (first emphasis added)); Bennett v. Artuz, 199 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir.1999), aff'd sub nom. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 121 S.Ct. 361, 148 L.Ed.2d 213 (2000) (<HOLDING>); see also Fernandez v. Artuz, 402 F.3d 111,
holding that notice of appeal did not divest the district court of jurisdiction at the time it was filed because a motion for reconsideration was pending holding that it is not holding that the statute incorporated all the rights and obligations of the contract emphasis added holding that an application is  pending from the time it is first filed  emphasis added holding a law is void for vagueness when it offers no standard of conduct that was possible to know emphasis added