circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated. See also In re Grosh, 415 N.W.2d 824 (S.D.1987). In that ease, the trial court’s modification of its initial oral sentence did not, on its face, increase the length of the sentence; however, this court held that the elimination of a work release provision over five months after sentencing was an “impermissible augmentation of sentence.” Id. at 828. Moreover, whether a sentence has been increased is not a matter of degree- — even “technical” increases warrant the vacating of written judgments which do not comply with the oral sentence. See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 171 F.2d 567, 569 (1st Cir.1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 926, 69 S.Ct. 647, 93 L.Ed. 1088 (1949) (<HOLDING>); Bartone, supra (enhancement of sentence by
holding that district court was not empowered to increase sentence by amending judgment to include a fine of 100 not even the suspension of payment of the fine changed the fact that the sentence was illegally increased recognizing that because a district courts determination of the appropriate fine involves factual issues including the defendants ability to pay the fine imposedthe district courts calculation of the fine is entitled to deference and can be reversed on appeal only for clear error holding that when a fine is paid there is a full satisfaction of one of the alternative penalties of the law and that the fine cannot be reimbursed in order to punish the defendant instead with imprisonment holding that where the language of the statute required the imposition of both confinement of which a portion could not be suspended and a fine the court had the ability to impose a fine and then suspend it holding that the failure to impose a mandatory fine requires that the matter be remanded for imposition of that fine