68 L.Ed.2d 101 (1981). Without any clear indication that Congress intended to confer a cause of action upon Plaintiffs, we are loathe, based upon the imprecise standard of “giving priority,” to tell the State h ute “giving priority” to the legions of political subdivisions affected by federal mineral development. In other words, § 191 provides no manageable substantive standards for us to apply in determining what portion of the lease royalties properly belong to Plaintiffs. Congress must speak much more clearly if it intends for us to navigate the path Plaintiffs suggest we follow. That Congress enacted a scheme, namely § 195, to remedy FMLA violations reinforces our conclusion that Congress did not intend to create the cause of action Plaintiffs’ assert. See Boswell, 361 F.3d at 1269 (<HOLDING>). “[I]t is an elemental canon of statutory
recognizing that the declaratory judgment act is only procedural and does not create substantive rights internal quotation marks and citations omitted recognizing rule recognizing this method of submission recognizing this method recognizing the express provision of one method of enforcing a substantive rule suggests that congress intended to preclude others internal quotations omitted