they fail to analyze the language of the statute itself, the court finds does not find the cases instructive much less persuasive. The court does, however, find persuasive the Gutierrez court’s reliance on other provisions of the TCPA in support of this reading. Specifically, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(C) provides that the FCC may exempt calls to a cellular telephone service that are not charged to the called party from the requirements of § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). If § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) did not include “calls to a telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service that are not charged to the called party,” the exemption would be meaningless. See Gutierrez, 2011 WL 579238 at *6; see also Smith v. Microsoft Corp., No. 11-cv-1958-JLS, 2012 WL 2975712 (S.D.Cal. July 20, 2012) (slip op.) (<HOLDING>). Based on the court’s reading of the statute,
recognizing that the government not the relator must have suffered the injury in fact required for article iii standing recognizing that while in a diversity case a federal court may not address the plaintiffs claim unless the plaintiff has standing to sue under state law the plaintiff must also meet article iii standing requirements holding that article iii standing is necessary for intervention holding that article iii standing is not a prerequisite to intervention holding that the tcpa does not limit its protection to instances in which the plaintiff is charged within the context of article iii standing