the statutory scheme will thereby by effectuated”); Yollin v. Holland Am. Cruises, Inc., 97 A.D.2d 720, 468 N.Y.S.2d 873, 875 (N.Y.App.Div.1983) (citing American Pipe and holding that “the timely commencement of the action by plaintiff ... satisfied the purpose of the contractual limitation period as to all persons who might subsequently participate in the suit as members of a class”); Bergquist v. Int’l Realty, Ltd., 272 Or. 416, 537 P.2d 553, 561 (1975) (adopting the rule set forth in American Pipe); Mun. Auth. of Westmoreland County v. Moffat, 670 A.2d 747, 749 (Pa.Cmwlth.Ct.1996) (citing American Pipe and concluding that limitations was tolled “during the pendency of the class action”); Bara v. Major Funding Corp. Liquidating Trust, 876 S.W.2d 469, 472-73 (Tex.Ct.App.1994) (<HOLDING>); Am. Tierra Corp. v. City of W. Jordan, 840
holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state holding that where state attorney general files suit on behalf of a specified group of individuals that suit qualifies as a de facto class action and the statute of limitations is tolled during the period in which the individuals are participants in the attorney generals suit holding that a prior suit and a subsequent suit between the same parties did not involve the same claim because the evidence necessary to sustain the subsequent suit was insufficient to entitle the plaintiff to relief in the prior suit holding attorney general could not contract on behalf of the state to employ an assistant attorney beyond the attorney generals own term holding that under florida law for the purposes of collateral estoppel an attorney is in privity with his or her client in a previous suit when the opposing party in that action brings a subsequent suit against the attorney based in the same facts