Accordingly, the court found that it was “without authority” to consider the plaintiffs’ claims for those damages. Id. at 581. Here, as in Mitchell II and Anderson, some of the damages plaintiff seeks are not “included within the legislation” plaintiff invokes. See Mitchell II, 664 F.2d at 274. Although money-mandating, 1603(a) mandates only “a restricted degree of compensation” — namely “a grant ... to reimburse” the cost of certain “energy property.” The amount of that grant is to be equal to “the applicable percentage basis of such property.” There is no provision, explicit or implicit, for any kind of consequential damages. In short, § 1603(a) cannot “fairly be interpreted” as mandating consequential damages. LCM Energy Solutions v. United States, 107 Fed.Cl. 770, 773-74 (2012) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff does not argue otherwise, but
holding that consequential damages are not to be considered holding that foreseeable consequential damages are to be considered in valuing loss holding that provision barring recovery of consequential damages did not necessarily bar all loss of use damages but damages for loss of use of money were consequential holding that plaintiffs consequential damages were too speculative because no evidence connected damages to defendants breach of contract holding that  1603a cannot be fairly interpreted as mandating consequential damages