injury is defined as an injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful.” Sports Racing Servs., Inc. v. Sports Car Club of Am., Inc., 131 F.3d 874, 882 (10th Cir.1997). “Antitrust injury” is not enumerated as an element of any of the Sherman Act claims discussed above, yet it is a necessary element of any antitrust claim. See NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, 525 U.S. 128, 135, 119 S.Ct. 493, 142 L.Ed.2d 510 (1998) (a plaintiff in a § 1 claim must show harm to the competitive process); Full Draw Prods. v. Easton Sports, Inc., 182 F.3d 745, 750 (10th Cir.1999) (claim under the Clayton Act requires that the plaintiff show an antitrust injury); Rural Tele. Serv. Co., Inc. v. Feist, 957 F.2d 765, 768 (10th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Cigna here argues that the ASCs’ antitrust
holding that prejudice or injury is a necessary element of standing holding that a plaintiff must show antitrust injury in order to bring an antitrust lawsuit holding that there must be a causal connection between the alleged antitrust violation and the antitrust injury for there to be antitrust standing holding district court erred by incorporating issue of anticompetitive market effect into its standing analysis confusing antitrust injury with an element of a claim under section 1 of the sherman act and stating district courts approach may have been result of the similar antitrust injury label applied to injury component of antitrust standing analysis and to marketplace harm element under section 1 holding that an antitrust injury is a necessary element of a  2 claim