belongs to it and therefore the transfer should be void. The defendants argue against this Count, as well as Counts II, IV and V, that if the 2000 Wellington/First Bank loan was bona fide, meaning that Nizan entered into the second mortgage knowingly and willfully, then the debtor would not have any equitable interest in the distribution of income from or proceeds of the sale of the Poydras building; all the equity Counts of the Complaint, they argue, would fail as a matter of law. What the defendants seem to forget in this argument, just as they did during the trial, is that the debtor and Nizan are two separate entities under the Code and Nizan’s knowledge can not be imputed to the debtor. 11 U.S.C § 544(a), see e.g. In re Greenbelt Coop. Inc., 124 B.R. 465, 471 (Bankr.D.Md.1991) (<HOLDING>) (Id.). Therefore, Nizan’s personal knowledge
holding that the interest of the public  especially the debtor and creditors  could limit compensation to a debtors counsel holding that property a debtor holds only in trust for another is not an interest of the debtor in property under 11 usc  547b which authorizes the trustee to avoid certain preferential payments to creditors made before bankruptcy holding that a creditors security was preserved notwithstanding the bankruptcy of the debtor holding debtor could include property because the bank accepted payments directly from the debtor and had previously allowed the debtor to cure default holding that the debtor in possession could utilize the strongarm powers of the trustee to avoid an unperfected security interest even though the debtor knew of the interest prior to bankruptcy because the two are distinct entities and the debtor in possessions responsibility is to preserve the estates assets for the benefit of the creditors