monitor their users’ activities on their servers. But, the Circuits that have addressed the question uniformly reject the government agent theorem. See United States v. Cameron, 699 F.3d 621, 638 (1st Cir. 2012) (“[I]f Yahoo! chose to implement a policy of searching for child pornography, it presumably did so for its own interests.”); United States v. Stevenson, 727 F.3d 826, 831 (8th Cir. 2013) (“AOL’s decision on its own initiative to ferret out child pornography does not convert the company into an agent or instrument of the government for Fourth Amendment purposes.... AOL’s voluntary efforts to achieve a goal that it shares with law enforcement do not, by themselves, transform the company into a government agent.”); United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 366 (4th Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>). But defendant argues that Sony acted as a
holding that absent consent or exigent circumstances law enforcement officers cannot legally search for the subject of an arrest warrant in the home of a third party without first obtaining a search warrant holding that the sca violates the fourth amendment to the extent that it allows government agents to obtain the contents of emails without a warrant holding that aols scanning of email communications for child pornography did not trigger the fourth amendments warrant requirement because no law enforcement officer or agency asked the provider to search or scan the defendants emails holding that an arrest warrant  without a search warrant  does not permit law enforcement authorities to enter a third partys home to legally search for the subject of the arrest warrant holding that in the absence of consent or exigent circumstances a law enforcement officer must procure a search warrant before searehing for the subject of an arrest warrant in the home of a third party