the Days’ appeal is dismissed for lack of a final, appealable order. So ordered. Wolff, P.J., and Glasser, J., concur. George M. Glasser, J., retired, of the Sixth Appellate District, sitting by assignment. 1 . Appellate courts differ as to their application of the savings statute, R.C. 2305.19, in situations such as here, where they find that a dismissal without prejudice is not a final appealable order. See Stafford, Cuyahoga App. No. 72825, 1998 WL 289383, at *2 (refiling a claim under R.C. 2305.19 within one year of the trial court’s order renders harmless any error the court may have committed in dismissing the plaintiff’s claim without prejudice); but, see, Van-American Ins. Co. v. Schiappa (Apr. 29, 1999), Jefferson App. Nos. 97-JE-42 and 97-JE-46, 1999 WL 260904, at *4
holding that the period of limitations starts to run anew on the date the notice of dismissal is filed in the court holding that the statute of limitations begins to run on the date the alleged malpractice is discovered holding that the date on which the plaintiff learned of the defendants denial of tenure not the date on which the plaintiff became unemployed was when the statute of limitations began to run holding that the saving provisions of rc 230519 commence to run on the date of the appellate courts order of dismissal holding that plaintiffs were entitled to vacate final order of dismissal as void when they did not receive the motion for dismissal or notice of the hearing on the order until after the dismissal was entered