on the part of Compton and sought no affirmative relief from Compton. The second reason why Compton was not a necessary party to the ORS 279.067 action is that ODOT had awarded no contract at the time of trial. Compton had no existing contractual right to protect. The third reason why Compton was not a necessary party to the action relates to the first two. Compton lacked a direct interest in the outcome of the controversy brought by Steelman-Duff. Compton did have an interest in the indirect effects of the outcome of the litigation between Steelman-Duff and ODOT. However, Compton’s interest in the indirect effects of the outcome of the litigation is not the same as an interest in the controversy itself. See Wright v. Hazen Investments, Inc., 293 Or 259, 261-64, 648 P2d 360 (1982) (<HOLDING>). For a party to be a “necessary” party to a
holding that the fair and adequate representation requirement was not satisfied because of litigation between plaintiff and defendant the antagonism between the parties and the lack of support plaintiff garnered in its claim holding that standing under  1491b1 is limited to interested parties holding that a lessor and a sublessor were interested but not necessary parties in litigation between the plaintiff and a sublessee holding that directing a tort at texas does not establish specific personal jurisdiction because it focus on relationship between plaintiff forum and litigation rather than defendant forum and litigation holding res judicata did not bar current litigation when prior litigation between the parties involved one breach of obligation under a joint venture agreement and instant litigation was based upon a different cause of action from a subsequent interference with the same agreement