for Andrea’s wrongful death. However, the anti-stacking statute makes no exception for wrongful death damages. Further, it is immaterial that “separate premiums had been charged to and paid by different insureds for each of the separate UM policies.” Op. at p. 744. Of course, it is frequently the case that there are separate polices, separate premiums and separate insureds under policies providing UM coverage, yet the anti-stacking statute clearly applies anyway. | o,Further, it is immaterial that the parents are divorced. Op. at p. 744. The anti-stacking statute does not depend on the marital status of the claimants, but focuses instead on the UM coverage available to the insured, Andrea. As one commentator has stated: Decisions have correctly foc o.2d 818 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1988) (<HOLDING>); Schwankhart v. Louisiana Dept. of Transp. and
holding that divorced parent could not stack their separate um policies for the wrongful death of their son because the insured referred to in the antistacking statute is the person who suffers bodily injury or bodily injury which results in death holding that specific intent is not element of assault resulting in serious bodily injury holding that the fatal injury to a murder victim may be considered as satisfying the bodily injury component of the capital felony of kidnapping with bodily injury holding that the married parents of their deceased son could not stack two separate um policies under which they and their son were each insureds because the antistacking statute reference to the insured contemplates the person who suffers the bodily injury or bodily injury resulting in death holding that where policies exclude coverage for injuries that are intended or expected the exclusion is applicable if the insured acts with the intent or expectation that bodily injury will result even though the bodily injury that does result is different either in character or magnitude from the injury that was intended