for custody of their child can be considered a debt to that child. The fact that the debt is payable to a third party (here, Falk & Siemer) does not prevent classification of that debt as being owed to Maddigan’s child. Our case law clearly establishes that debts in the nature of support need not be payable directly to one of the parties listed in § 523(a)(5) in order to be nondischargeable. See Spong, 661 F.2d at 10-11; In re Peters, 124 B.R. 433, 435 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1991) (citing cases). A separate question is whether Maddi-gan’s obligation for legal fees incurred by the nonspouse mother of his child can be considered a debt to his child within the meaning of § 523(a)(5). We have previously held that the legal fees of an attorney appointed to represent the interests of a child in a (<HOLDING>). The facts of Peters are admittedly
holding that debts for a guardian ad litem and a psychologist were nondischargeable under  523a5 because the emphasis is to be placed on the determination of whether a debt is in the nature of support rather than on the identity of the payee holding that attorneys fees incurred in a custody action were nondischargeable under  523a5 holding that legal fees for a childs guardian ad litem in a custody proceeding were clearly for the ehilds benefit and support and as such were nondischargeable under  523a5 holding that guardian ad litem and psychologist fees incurred in child custody proceedings and ordered to be paid directly to the guardian ad litem and psychologist were nondischargeable under  523a5 holding the district court properly allowed guardian ad litem fees to be taxed as costs