the privilege against self incrimination, the right to notice of charges, and the right to confrontation and cross-examination): In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (declaring that the requirement of proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” applies to juvenile cases); and Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975) (declaring that double jeopardy principles apply to juveniles) ], we also note that the Court has not addressed the issue of whether credit for time served for pre-adjudication detention is required as a matter of federal constitutional law. We believe that such an extension is unlikely, (see, footnote 3, infra), especially in light of such cases as McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971) (<HOLDING>), and Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 104 S.Ct.
holding that dischargeability proceedings are inherently equitable in nature and as such parties are not entitled to jury trials holding that juveniles sentenced to indeterminate terms are not entitled to predisposition credit holding juveniles do not have constitutional right to a jury trial but striking down statute that allowed juveniles to receive adult sentence without a jury trial three justices dissented reasoning juveniles should be entitled to a juiy trial under all cases because changes to juvenile justice code treated juveniles like criminals holding that juveniles are not entitled to jury trials holding that by its terms rule 50 applies only to jury trials