force to effectuate that arrest. Appellant’s claim, however, is not that the officers used excessive force after he stopped resisting or to stop his resistance; his claim is based solely on his assertions that he did not resist arrest, did nothing wrong, and was attacked by the Appellee officers for no reason. Thus, Appellant’s suit “squarely challenges the factual determination that underlies his conviction for resisting an officer,” and if he prevails, “he will have established that his criminal conviction lacks any basis.” Arnold v. Town of Slaughter, 100 Fed. Appx. 321, 324-25 (5th Cir.2004). This type of excessive force claim is, therefore, the type of claim that is barred by Heck in our circuit. Id.-, see also DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 656-57 (5th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Third, Appellant argues that Heck does not
holding that group pleading did not render complaint infirm where complaint provided fair notice of claims holding that the pretrial order did not adequately disclose a theory because it did not give notice of that theory holding that arrest made with probable cause and without excessive force does not give rise to iied claim holding that a change in the theory of recovery and one prior amendment is not sufficient to deny a motion to amend the complaint where no evidence of bad faith existed holding that heck barred appellants excessive force claim where his complaint maintained that he did not resist arrest and did nothing wrong and provided no alternative pleading or theory of recovery