visited on direct examination, the door has been opened to explore further into these convictions on cross-examination. In Gilliam v. State, 270 Ind. 71, 383 N.E.2d 297 (1978), we explained that the need for such cross-examination manifests itself when the "accused or a defense witness has made a deceptively incomplete disclosure of his criminal record.” Id. at 301. We find nothing deceptive about Moody’s disclosure that he had been adjudicated a delinquent. His reference to being "locked up" stemmed from attempting to explain why he could not accurately recall the events of that evening. Such a "tangential reference” to a criminal history does not confer upon the cross-examiner exploration rights into the details of that criminal history. Green v. State, 451 N.E.2d 41, 43 (Ind.1983)
holding that a parole condition which restricted a parolees access to the internet unless he had prior approval of his parole officer was reasonably related to reintegrating the parolee into his community and protecting the general public and did not violate parolees first amendment rights holding that the trial courts error in not allowing defendant to testify on direct examination as to nature and circumstances of prior convictions was not harmless error where credibility of the defendant was critical to the deliberations of the jury holding parolee consented to search of his email based on the parole agreement holding that where a defendant attempts to explain his actions and reveals his parolee status on direct examination the specific reason for his parole could not have been enlightening to the jury and therefore was not relevant holding that parole status alone is insufficient to justify search of a parolee