created from a design defect.” Id. ¶ 11. We are unwilling to insert Van Duyne into the Romero analysis as a pre-adoption home “design defect” that continued post-adoption as a dangerous condition, as Plaintiff suggests. Further, unlike in Cobos, Plaintiff has not shown that CYFD had any obligation or right to inspect, approve, disapprove, or otherwise control, operate, or maintain any aspect of the adoptive home. {30} We see no reasonable basis, and Plaintiff has provided us with no persuasive argument, much less authority, to broaden the waiver in Section 41-4-6 to apply to the post-adoption knowledge and negligent failure to disclose or the urging of adoptive parents to take their adopted son back into their home after a CYFD evaluation. See Espinoza, 120 N.M. at 683, 905 P.2d at 721 (<HOLDING>); cf. Whitley v. N.M. Children, Youth &
recognizing torts of negligent hiring supervision and retention holding that section 4149 did not apply to the plaintiffs state law claims of breach of duty to protect foster care children from harm and of negligent supervision negligent entrustment and negligent failure to warn holding that immunity is not waived for injury or death caused by negligent supervision holding that section 41  16 does not grant a waiver for claims of negligent supervision holding that negligent supervision is inseparable from the use of the motor vehicle