in this rationale. While liability (apart from coverage) for negligent entrustment is not conditioned upon the entrustor’s ownership or use of the vehicle, negligent use by the one to whom it is entrusted is essential to recovery. It is the concurrence of these dual elements — negligent entrustment by the owner or custodian of the instrumentality plus its negligent use by the entrus-tee — that is missing in the rationale of those cases upholding coverage. Taken literally, this line of reasoning — that negligent entrustment of the vehicle, and not its use, is the basis of insured’s alleged liability — the injured party could recover absent any showing that the incompetent to whom the vehicle is entrusted caused the injury by his negligent use of the vehicle. As w 06, 89 P.3d 573 (2004) (<HOLDING>); GRE Insurance Group v. Reed, 1999 WL 548498,
holding that assignment of insureds rights to coverage for property damage under automobile insurance policy to automobile repairer was invalid because of antiassignment provision holding automobile exclusion in general liability policy did not apply because plaintiffs claim of negligent supervision and training was a separate and distinct theory of recovery from the use of an automobile holding joinder of two defendants was proper where plaintiffs filed a products liability claim against general motors and a negligent roadway design claim against a local government for injuries caused by an automobile accident holding that household exclusion clauses in policies of automobile liability insurance are contrary to public policy holding claim for injuries arising out of use of truck and not from negligent supervision excluded from coverage by auto exclusion in commercial general liability policy no claim that language in policy was ambiguous or unclear