right to be considered for executive clemency because the Governor allegedly had decided in November that he would not commute Wainwright’s death sentence. Contrary to Wainwright’s assertion, on December'9, in declining to recuse himself from deciding Wainwright’s fate, the Governor wrote Wainwright’s attorney that he would decide the case “fairly and impartially as [he was] obligated to do.” Plaintiff’s Complaint Exhibit 3, Wainwright v. Huckabee, No. LR-C-97-12 (E.D.Ark. Jan. 6, 1997). The district court consolidated the lawsuits and dismissed them with prejudice. Wainwright v. Brownlee, No. LR-C-97-11 (E.D.Ark. Jan. 7, 1997). Wainwright appeals. Under the established law of this circuit, Wainwright’s civil rights claims fail. See Whitmore v. Gaines, 24 F.3d 1032, 1034 (8th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Pickens v. Tucker, 851 F.Supp. 363, 365
holding that mere negligence does not implicate the right to due process holding that rcw 1040200 does not create a constitutional right to be advised of immigration consequences therefore failure to comply with statute does not create constitutional harm holding that doctrine does not violate due process holding that the federal constitutional right to a jury trial does not apply to decisions to impose consecutive sentences holding arkansas statute does not impose standards constraining discretion about granting clemency and thus does not create a constitutional right and invoke the due process clause