accepted by creditors that extended credit to the debtor pre-petition. See, e.g., In re James A. Phillips, Inc., 29 B.R. 391, 394 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (concluding that “ordinariness” is a creditor’s expectation of transactions a debtor is likely to undertake in the ordinary course of business). Vision argues that the transactions are not ordinary because creditors would not have expected to be subjected to the risks inherent in . S.D.N.Y.1995) (“Compromises may not be made in bankruptcy absent notice and a hearing and a court order.... The Memorandum purported to settle significant disputes between the Union and Leslie Fay without notice to anyone. Thus, for this reason, too, the Memorandum is unenforceable.”). But see, Pineo v. Turner (In re Turner), 274 B.R. 675, 681 (Bankr. W.D.Pa.2002) (<HOLDING>). See also, Valued v. Glickman, Berkovitz,
holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement holding that even though an agreement was approved by the family court it retained its character as an agreement for purposes of legal analysis holding that an unapproved settlement agreement is binding on the parties even though not yet approved by the court holding that because the alleged settlement was never approved by the court under rule 9019 the settlement agreement was unenforceable holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt