class’s claims, its interests are not antagonistic to the class, and its chosen counsel are qualified and competent. The Court also notes that the members of the aptly-named Pension Fund Group are public institutional investors, which comports with the PSLRA’s expressed preference for such lead plaintiffs. The PSLRA’s legislative history explains as follows: “[t]he pension funds accounting for $4.5 trillion or nearly half of the institutional assets, in many cases the beneficiaries of pension funds — small investors — have the greatest stake in the outcome of the lawsuit.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at 34 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730-34; see also In re Vicuron Pharm. Sec. Litig., NO. CIV. A.04-2627, 225 F.R.D. 508, 511, 2004 WL 2983940, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Oct.7, 2004) (<HOLDING>); see also In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA
holding on motion for preliminary injunction that balance of hardships tipped in favor of public holding that where the issue is one of arbitrability the federal presumption in favor of arbitration shifts to favor a court determination holding that one candidates status as a pension fund tipped the scales in favor of its appointment as lead plaintiff holding that an employees protected interest in a pension vested before he or she became eligible to collect the pension holding that the employers insidious pattern of seeking to tip the scales in its favor during employment disputes justified a decision to declare the entire agreement unenforceable