the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”); Ga. Const, art. 1, § 1, ¶ XIII (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation particularly describing the place or places to be searched and the person or things to be seized.”). 20 See Rodriguez, 295 Ga. 362. 21 Id. at 369 (2) (b). 22 Id. 23 Id. (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U. S. 675, 686 (II) (B) (105 SCt 1568, 84 LE2d 605) (1985)). 24 Bodiford, 328 Ga. App. at 261 (1). 25 Id. at 261-62 (1). 26 Id. at 262 (1). 27 See supra footnote 16. 28 See Rodriguez v. United States,_U. S._,_(II) (135 SCt 1609, 191 LE2d 492) (2015) (<HOLDING>). 29 As previously discussed, many of Sherod’s
holding that a traffic stop is reasonable under the fourth amendment when police have probable cause to believe a traffic infraction has occurred holding that a dog sniff during a legitimate traffic stop does not constitute a search because there is no expectation of privacy in contraband and a dog sniff does not violate any privacy interest holding that a dog sniff of the outside of a car subsequent to a valid traffic stop did not constitute a search holding that a uthority for the seizure ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are  or reasonably should have been  completed and remanding to lower court for consideration of whether detention for dog sniff was supported by individualized suspicion recognizing that once a justifiable stop is made the scope of the officers investigation may be broadened beyond the purpose for which the person was stopped only if additional particularized and objective suspicions come to light although additional suspicion is not required tpperform a dog sniff suspicion is required for any additional seizure that the dog sniff caused