prisoner] like everyone else ... and that [the prisoner] was ‘not O.J. Simpson or Johnnie Cochran.’ ” Id. at 1083. The court reasoned that the foregoing state ments were “racially tinged” and, therefore, sufficient to “convince a reasonable trier of fact by a preponderance of the evidence that the decision not to allow live witness testimony was racially motivated.” Id. Buck’s alleged statement is far more “racially tinged” than those at issue in Serrano. It is direct evidence of racial hostility and, taken together with circumstantial evidence that EFM was treated less favorably than other groups, creates a genuine issue of material fact as to Buck’s motives. See Serrano, 345 F.3d at 1082-83; cf. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, -, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 2154, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003) (<HOLDING>); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530
holding that employers intent may be inferred through circumstantial evidence recognizing that circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to demonstrate a defendants guilt holding that motive is circumstantial evidence of intent holding that circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to support a cocaine conspiracy conviction holding that circumstantial evidence alone may establish discriminatory intent