an extension of time being granted “after the expiration of the specified period ... where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect,” Rule 9006(b)(3) renders that standard inapplicable to a motion to extend the period specified by Rule 4007(c). See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 389 n. 4, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993) (“The time-computation and time-extension provisions of Rule 9006 ... are generally applicable to any time requirement found elsewhere in the rules unless expressly excepted. Subsections (b)(2) and (b)(3) of Rule 9006 enumerate those time requirements excluded from the operation of the ‘excusable neglect’ standard.”) (emphasis added); see also In re Prego Cruz, 323 B.R. 827, 831 (B.A.P. 1st Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). The District Court did not err in holding
holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or holding that a bankruptcy court may not extend the 30day objection period holding that effect of bankruptcy discharge under arizona law is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debtor holding that rule 4007c precludes the bankruptcy court from granting latefiled motions to extend the period in which a party can object to a debtors discharge of a debt holding that bankruptcy discharge eliminates only a debtors personal liability and not the debt itself and that a bankruptcy trustee stands in the shoes of the debtor and can bring a legal malpractice claim as trustee