if she wants the trustee to be bound. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 17 (1959). Thus, the basis for express trusts is the written manifestation of the settlor’s intent, and the Statute of Frauds operates. The basis for implied trusts — indeed, their most evident difference from express trusts — is the absence of any expressed words evincing the intent of the would-be settlor to create a trust for the would-be beneficiary. The existence of such words obviates a claim for a resulting trust (where the settlor designated one person as the beneficiary but, the claimant argues, meant for someone else to be the beneficiary) or a constructive trust (where the settlor designated one person but, the claimant argues, equity demands a different beneficiary). See Hertz, supra, 374 A.2d at 873 (<HOLDING>); see also Starzec v. Kida, 183 Conn. 41, 438
holding that intent and knowledge can be proved by circumstantial evidence holding that the operative facts of a constructive trust can be proved by parol holding that the statute of limitations cannot bar appellants claim that a constructive trust should be imposed  because a constructive trust is an equitable remedy and therefore not subject to the statute holding that under california law a constructive trust may be sought only by the equitable owner of the trust res not by a creditor of the equitable owner recognizing constructive trust as appropriate equitable remedy