any violation short of litigation. However, there is nothing in the ESA that remotely suggests that a potential ESA plaintiff must refrain from commencing suit to pursue other non-ESA claims before the 60-day period expires. Indeed, despite incorporating notice requirements into numerous environmental statutes, see Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 23 n. 1, 110 S.Ct. 304, Congress has thus far declined to include such a pre-filing requirement in NEPA and NFMA. Were we to read Section 11 (g)(2)(A)(i) as encompassing claims under NEPA and NFMA, we would be imposing a de facto notice requirement for cases that also potentially raise ESA issues where Congress has explicitly declined to do so. This we decline to do. See Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 251, 46 S.Ct. 248, 70 L.Ed. 566 (1926) (<HOLDING>). Thus, although Alliance gave notice of its
holding that the courts will not read language into a statute where it would result in an enlargement of the statute by the court so that what was omitted  may be included within its scope holding that the court has an affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting within the scope of its jurisdictional authority holding that the inquiry into whether an employee was acting within the scope of his employment depends on the respondeat superior law of the state in which the tort occurred holding that the language if the merits were reached the result would be the same is a contrarytofact holding not an alternative holding emphasis in original holding issues within scope of administrative hearing are within the reviewing courts purview