that he must now unlearn before he can advance. Consistent with Congress’s stated aim of “ensur[ing] that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are protected,” see 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(B), we therefore join our sister circuits and hold that compensatory education awards fit comfortably within the “broad discretion” of courts fashioning and enforcing IDEA remedies, see Carter, 510 U.S. at 15-16, 114 S.Ct. 361. That said, we part company with the Reids regarding how such awards are calculated. They urge us to adopt a presumption that each hour without FAPE entitles the student to one hour of compensatory instruction, a standard apparently embraced by several courts. See, e.g., M.C. v. Cent. Reg’l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 391-92, 396-97 (3d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Westendorp, 35 F.Supp.2d at 1137 (holding
holding that when a school district  knows or should know that a disabled childs educational program is deficient yet fails to correct the problem the child is entitled to compensatory education for a period equal to the period of deprivation but excluding the time reasonably required for the school district to rectify the problem holding that a school district was not required to make dramatic changes to its program in order for a child to attend his neighborhood school holding that the limitations period for  1983 actions arising in ohio is the twoyear period found in ohio rev code  230510 and that the limitations period starts to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action  holding that a school district was not required to move a nurse to a students neighborhood school to comply with the idea holding that a school district owed the highest degree of care to a student on a school bus such that the district could be liable for the sexual abuse of the student by the school bus driver