bench conference that Frantz was “fixated” on the issue. After the judge suggested to Lamb that he would grant Frantz’s request to admit the transcript of the 911 call, Frantz withdrew the request; the record before us does not explain why. Still, Frantz’s change of position does not diminish the importance of any decision about the call tape or transcript. Admitted or not, the content of the 911 call — on tape or as transcribed — maintained its potential strategic relevance, as the very request from the jury to hear the tape indicated. As a result, we conclude that, to the extent that the chambers conference involved a decision about whether to admit the 911 tape, participation in it was central to Frantz’s Faretta right to control his defense. See generally McDermott, 64 F.3d at 1454 (<HOLDING>); Oses v. Massachusetts, 961 F.2d 985, 986 (1st
holding that a defendants faretta rights were violated by his exclusion from bench conferences addressing issues including admissibility of testimony and other evidence holding that an objection based on relevancy was specific enough to alert the trial court that the testimony was improper under the rule addressing the admissibility of prior misdemeanor offenses holding that defendants were entitled to official immunity and not addressing the merits holding that exclusionary rule only requires exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights and that exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of statutory rights is not necessarily required holding that the admissibility of expert testimony was governed by state law