preclude a Bivens action for Pollard and similarly situated prisoners, the liability of federal officials for constitutional violations would no longer be governed by uniform rules. The substance, procedural requirements, and remedies of state tort law— especially with regard to causes of action for negligence and medical malpractice— vary widely from state to state. For example, assuming Pollard were to bring a claim for medical malpractice under California law, the cap on his non-economic damages would be $250,000. See Cal. Civ. Code § 3333.2. But, under Oregon law (where Pollard was transferred in the midst of this litigation), Pollard’s medical malpractice claim would not be subject to the state’s non-economic damages cap. See Lakin v. Senco Prods., 329 Or. 62, 987 P.2d 463 (1999) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, the statute of limitations for
holding that chapter 95 precludes commonlaw negligence claims holding that the existence of a cap on noneconomic damages was not of sufficient importance to override the principle of lex loci delicti holding that jury not required to award noneconomic damages merely because it has awarded economic damages holding that the combination of the statutory cap and a high threshold for culpability for punitive damages in a title vii case confined a punitive damages award within the cap to a level tolerated by due process holding that noneconomic damages cap mandated by orrevstat  317101 is unconstitutional as applied to commonlaw negligence claims