§ 707-711(1)(a) (1993), it was within the inherent power of the first circuit court (the court) to grant or to deny the motion of Defendant-Respondent Shawn Reilly (Defendant) for a DANC plea. In this case, it is aptly noted that the Hawai'i Penal Code defines three types of bodily injury in HRS § 707-700 (1993 & Supp.2002). HRS § 853-4(2) (Supp.2002) specifically prohibits the court from granting a deferred plea when “bodily injury” or “serious bodily injury” results from an assault. However, HRS § 853-1(2) is silent as to an assault involving “substantial bodily injury.” In such a case, I conclude that the trial court’s inherent power to grant or deny a motion for DAG plea or DANC plea is applicable as to HRS § 853-4(2). See State v. Keahi, 66 Haw. 364, 365, 662 P.2d 212, 213 (1983) (<HOLDING>); State v. Buchanan, 59 Haw. 562, 584 P.2d 126
holding that plea of guilty or nolo contendere is not rendered involuntary because it is a product of plea bargaining an accepted plea bargain must be recorded and court may accept a bargained plea to a lesser offense reasonably related to a charged offense recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals holding that rule 11 does not require court to ensure that defendant understands consequences of nolo contendere plea on parole eligibility in sexual assault case holding that conviction based on plea of nolo contendere bars subsequent  1983 claim because even though such a plea does not involve admission of guilt it does communicate acceptance of conviction and sentence holding that the trial court had inherent power to grant or deny acceptance of a deferred acceptance of nolo contendere plea