while Ordonez-Garay’s direct appeal to the BIA was still pending, we must apply the rule announced in Bona in this case. See Alvarenga-Villalobos v. Ashcroft, 271 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir.2001). Accordingly, the IJ’s decision was based on an understandable, but erroneous, view of the law and thus constituted an abuse of discretion. See In re Arden, 176 F.3d 1226, 1228 (9th Cir.1999). In her oral decision, the IJ also stated that she could not grant Ordonez-Garay’s motion for a continuance because of a directive from “headquarters” mandating that all cases pending since January 1, 2002, (including Ordonez-Garay’s) be completed by June 30, 2005. A motion for a continuance, however, cannot be denied solely on the basis of expediency. See Baires v. INS, 856 F.2d 89, 91 (9th Cir. 1988) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589,
holding the ij abused his discretion in denying petitioners motion for a continuance and change of venue to the city in which petitioners counsel and witnesses were located stating a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay can render the aliens statutory rights merely an empty formality  holding that the district court abused its discretion by denying the habeas petitioners motion to conduct dna testing which was unavailable at trial holding that the ij did not abuse his discretion in denying request for further continuance where the ij granted previous request holding that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing because the petitioners allegations were not implausible and a final determination of the merits of petitioners claim would be best served by greater development of the facts many of which the government disputes holding that criminal aliens argument that the ij abused its discretion by not granting her a continuance does not present a constitutional claim or issue of law that this court has jurisdiction to consider