that a remedial statute such as the Bankruptcy Code should be liberally construed.” Ibid. The court further noted that its interpretation of § 1146(a) better accounted for “the practical realities of Chapter 11 reorganization cases” because a debtor may need to transfer assets to induce relevant parties to endorse the proposed confirmation of a plan. Ibid. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that its holding conflicted with the approach taken by the Courts of Appeals for the Third and Fourth Circuits, id., at 1302, which have held that § 1146(a) “does not apply to ... transactions that occur prior to the confirmation of a plan under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.” In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., 335 F.3d 243, 246 (C.A.3 2003); see also In re NVR, LP, 189 F.3d 442, 458 (C.A.4 1999) (<HOLDING>). We granted certiorari, 552 U.S. -, 128 S.Ct.
holding that   544 applies to prepetition transfers only holding that the damages and jury trial provisions of the 1991 act apply to conduct occurring prior to the date of enactment holding that the act applies prospectively to complaints filed after its effective date holding that  1146a applies only to transfers under the plan occurring after the date of confirmation holding that the fsa applies to sentencing proceedings occurring after august 3 2010