3 Andrews contends, however, that his waiver was not knowing and intelligent, because he was still drunk when he spoke to federal agents following his arrest for DUI, and therefore the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress. When reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, premised on an alleged violation of Miranda, we “must give credence to the credibility choices and findings of fact of the district court unless clearly erroneous.” United States v. Raymer, 876 F.2d 383, 386 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 870, 110 S.Ct. 198, 107 L.Ed.2d 152 (1989). The determination that a defendant’s Miranda waiver was knowing and intelligent is a finding of fact which we review for clear error. See United States v. Willis, 525 F.2d 657, 659 (5th Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>). We will not find a district court’s factual
holding a waiver of a substantial constitutional right must be a voluntary knowing and intelligent act holding that defendants waiver was knowing and intelligent even when police withheld information from defendant that his attorney sought to consult with him recognizing requirement of knowing intelligent waiver holding that a defendants waiver of the right to testify must be knowing informed and intelligent holding that district courts findings were not clearly erroneous where there was  sufficient evidence  that the defendants waiver of his rights was knowing and intelligent