not fall within the three discrete categories of § 242(g). See Richardson II, 180 F.3d at 1313-14. However, we explained that, in Richardson I, we had not relied solely on INA § 242(g) but instead had relied on the overall scheme of § 242(b), as well as other significant revisions that had been made to the judicial review of removal cases. See id. at 1314-15 (noting, for example, that new INA § 242(e)(2) provides for habeas review in certain narrow circumstances, which indicates a congressional intent to preclude habeas review in all other circumstances) (citing Richardson I, 162 F.3d at 1357). Thus, in Richardson II we reaffirmed our holding in Richardson I that, under the permanent provisions of IIRIRA, an alien may not seek habeas review of any aspect of his removal. See id. at 1315 (<HOLDING>). 9 . "Judicial review of all questions of law
holding that a suspension with pay does not violate any recognized property interest holding that 120day time limit for post conviction collateral attacks did not violate state suspension clause holding also that iiriras foreclosure of habeas review does not violate the suspension clause holding that dismissing a habeas petition as timebarred under the aedpa does not violate the suspension clause because petitioner had years to file the petition and gave no explanation why he failed to file on time holding that the endorsing requirement does not violate the establishment clause