curiam). At least where some corroborative evidence of guilt exists for a charged crime, a defendant’s testimony denying guilt may help to establish elements of the crime. United States v. Brown, 53 F.3d 312, 314-15 (11th Cir.1995). This proposition applies with special force to subjective elements, such as intent or knowledge. Id. at 315. The jury was entitled to conclude Scanes knowingly possessed the drugs, because he was driving the car in which a large quantity of valuable drugs was found. See Leonard, 138 F.3d at 909; Quilca-Carpio, 118 F.3d at 722. Scanes’s knowledge could also have been inferred based on Deputy Eckdahl’s testimony that Scanes appeared extremely nervous during the traffic stop, which the jury could construe as consciousness of guilt. See Leonard, 138 F.3d at 909 (<HOLDING>). Scanes argues expert testimony was required
holding that fraud may be inferred from circumstantial evidence holding that defendants knowledge of and intent to participate in a criminal conspiracy may be established through circumstantial evidence including acts that exhibit a consciousness of guilt holding defendants false exculpatory statements admissible to show consciousness of guilt recognizing while presence is not enough consciousness of guilt may be inferred based on a defendants behavior holding that evidence of threats or intimidation of a witness is admissible under rule 404b to show consciousness of guilt