activities based on the expectation of less severe repercussions. Id. at 531 n. 21, 120 S.Ct. 1620. Thus, in at least one context, namely, crimes implicating the fourth Calder category, the high Court has condemned the reliance interest argument advanced by the Commonwealth—rejecting the notion that protection of an individual’s reliance interests is the sole aim of the Ex Post Facto Clause—and suggested that such an argument would be equally unavailing in the context of the third Calder category at issue herein. Additionally, the Commonwealth cites no case law which would support limiting the ex post facto prohibition to intentional crimes; to the contrary, other courts have found ex post facto violations in circumstances involving unintentional crimes. See, e.g., Masino, supra (<HOLDING>); State v. Bunn, 50 Haw. 351, 440 P.2d 528
holding that the date of sale for an installment contract was the date of contract formation not the date of the last payment due holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act holding that the relevant time of inquiry is the date of the filing of the complaint holding the date of the criminal negligence by contractors who failed to properly encase underground gas pipes in concrete resulting in leakage and an accumulation of gas which caused an explosion that killed several people not the date of the consequences of such negligence was the relevant date of the unintentional crime for purposes of an ex post facto analysis holding that the date of death is relevant date of inquiry for the applicability of section 541a5a