[W]here a demand or some other act is required of a plaintiff as a condition precedent to his right to sue, “the demand must be made in a reasonable time, and this time, unless there be some special circumstances shown, will be fixed in analogy to the statute of limitations.” 117 So.2d at 502 (quoting Smith v. Middle States Util. Co., 228 Iowa 686, 293 N.W. 59, 64 (1940)). In DeSouza, the Fourth District applied the rationale of Stouden-mire to several oral interest-free loans with no terms for repayment. 708 So.2d at 993-94. The Fourth Distr (Mo.Ct.App.1995) (“The obligations here were akin to demand notes. Such notes are payable on the date of execution and no demand is necessary to start the statute of limitations running.”); Belcher v. Kirkwood, 238 Va. 430, 383 S.E.2d 729 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Richardson v. Schaub, 796 P.2d 1304
holding that a lender was barred from recovering repayment for loans made more than three years before filing suit where obligations without agreed repayment dates were deemed payable on demand and where the statute of limitations applicable to oral contracts was three years holding that new york statute of limitations for  1983 actions was three years holding that the statute of limitations for an attorneys fees action under  1415e4b is three years holding new mexico statute of limitations for filing a  1983 action is three years holding that a complaint filed within three years of an accident complied with the michigan court rules and was not barred by the statute of limitations even though service was made more than three years after the accident