policy of encouraging people to take reasonable care for their own safety precludes imposing a duty on the possessor of land to make ordinary steps ‘foolproof.’” Bertrand, 537 N.W.2d at 189. D. Cudney also raises a new argument on appeal. She claims that the Tort Reform Act of 1995 abolished the open and obvious danger doctrine. We need not consider an argument raised for the first time on appeal. GenCorp, Inc. v. American Int’l Underwriters, 178 F.3d 804, 817 (6th Cir.1999). In any event, we note that the Michigan courts have continued to apply the doctrine, see, e.g., Millikin, supra, and we assume that the Michigan Legislature was aware of the doctrine when it promulgated the Tort Reform Act. See Dick v. Dick, 210 Mich.App. 576, 534 N.W.2d 185, 190 (per curiam) (Mich.Ct.App.1995) (<HOLDING>). III. For all the foregoing reasons, the
holding that the courts will not read language into a statute where it would result in an enlargement of the statute by the court so that what was omitted  may be included within its scope recognizing common law privileges holding that the statute in question served to modify prior common law and that the legislature was empowered to make such changes in the common law based on the public interest recognizing obligation to read the language of the statute in light of previously established common law holding that determination of interests conveyed in nineteenthcentury transfers requires a close examination of the conveying instruments read in light of the common law and statutes of vermont then in effect