the sentence was correctly imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 3553. GWF’s and Ripps’ submitted Anders briefs are thus “for all practical purposes worthless.” Burnett, 989 F.2d at 105. Had GWF and Ripps been appointed by the court, we would remove them and order the appointment of new counsel. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(c); Burnett, 989 F.2d at 105. However, they are retained counsel, and we believe that they should not be relieved unless appellants so desire. We direct the Clerk to inform Estrella and Baraga in writing, with a copy of this opinion, of their right to continue to retain GWF and Ripps respectively as their counsel, to proceed pro se, or to retain new counsel, or, if they cannot afford new counsel, to have one appointed by the court pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. Cf. Zuluaga, 981 F.2d at 75 (<HOLDING>). Estrella and Baraga have been notified of
recognizing a defendants right to dismiss retained counsel in favor of appointed counsel holding that the defendants prior conviction was not obtained in violation of his right to counsel because he had the opportunity for appointed counsel at public expense recognizing that the statutory right to counsel in parental termination cases requires that the appointed counsel provide effective assistance holding in situation of appointed counsel that if nonfrivolous issues may exist new counsel must be appointed holding that in determining whether there exists a valid waiver of the right to counsel in the criminal setting the court may consider a defendants lack of good faith in working with appointed counsel including an unreasonable refusal to cooperate with counsel or an unreasonable request for substitution of appointed counsel and the timeliness of defendants request for new counsel particularly when a defendant makes an untimely request for new counsel  under circumstances which are likely to result in a continuance