longer than two years before suit was commenced and do not fall into the “continuing violation” category of claims for whi d 516, 520 (6th Cir.1997) (“In determining when the cause of action accrues in section 1983 actions, [courts] have looked to what event should have alerted the typical lay persons to protect his or her rights.”). According to the plaintiffs, the Ohio ramp was not rebuilt for two reasons: (1) ODOT refused to rebuild the ramp; and (2) ODOT never responded to Barack’s requests to build a new ramp himself. As stated above, although the precise timing is not clear from the record, it is clear that Barack would have been on notice during the early 1990s that ODOT did not intend to rebuild the ramp. Moreover, Barack realistically was on notice that ODOT did n ir.1989) (<HOLDING>). The plaintiffs’ amended Claims One, Two,
holding that the statute of limitations for  1983 claims is the most closely analogous state limitations period for general personal injury claims holding that  1522 is the most analogous limitations period for  1983 actions holding ohio revcode  230509d is the appropriate statute of limitations in  1983 actions holding that the limitations period for  1983 actions arising in ohio is the twoyear period found in ohio rev code  230510 and that the limitations period starts to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action  holding that the analogous ohio statute is orc  230510a which provides a limitations period of 2 years