for the District Court to consider, in the first instance, the specific contours of the kinship category within the context of this case. If on remand the District Court determines that Juror 28 was a close relative of the prosecutor, then the failure to excuse her offended Mitchell’s right to trial by an impartial jury. That error, clear and obvious under existing case law, must be remedied by retrial. This is so because the denial of the defendant’s right to an impartial adjudicator, “ ‘be it judge or jury,’ ” is a structural defect in the trial. Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 876, 109 S. Ct. 2237, 104 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1989) (quoting Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668, 107 S. Ct. 2045, 95 L. Ed. 2d 622 (1987)); see also Szuchon v. Lehman, 273 F.3d 299, 331 (3d Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>); Hughes v. United States, 258 F.3d 453, 458,
holding that the presence of a biased juror in the sentencing phase of a capital case is a structural defect requiring resentencing despite the defendants failure to object holding that crawford does not apply to sentenceselection phase of capital sentencing holding that the hearsay rule is not suspended in the sentencing phase holding that the right applies at capital sentencing in particular holding that the failure to object to a defect in the arbitrator selection process constituted a waiver