immediate action, deferred action, or no action at all. They have to make myriad judgments about how the potential for future criminal activity fits the agency’s mission and enforcement priorities. Indeed, agents may disagree among themselves about the significance or credibility of information they receive. None of the answers to these questions are dictated by the Attorney General’s Guidelines. The Guidelines provide no criteria for determining what is “credible information” or what constitutes “serious criminal activity.” Courts have consistently held that where, as here, a government agent’s performance of an obligation requires that agent to make judgment calls, the discretionary function exception applies. See, e.g., Conrad v. United States, 447 F.3d 760, 765-66 (9th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Ochran v. United States, 117 F.3d 495, 500-01
holding that a fivemonth delay in filing a motion to disqualify did not bar the motion where there was a reasonable explanation for the delay holding that a twoday delay was insufficient to establish deliberate indifference and citing cases where no deliberate indifference was found after a sixteenday delay a sixday delay and a threemonth delay holding that where a criminal procedural rule provided that the government must take the defendant without unnecessary delay  before a judge the exercise of judgment was re quired in determining how much delay is necessary holding that one minute delay between the initial stop of the defendant and the officers question regarding whether the defendant had any illegal substances and his request to search the defendants car was sufficiently contemporaneous with the issuance of the citation such that there was no appreciable delay and certainly no unreasonable delay holding that when determining whether a delay in prosecution violates a defendants right to a speedy trial courts must consider the length of the delay the reason for the delay whether the defendant asserted his rights and the resulting prejudice to the defendant