were criminal because (a) they were payable to the court rather than to the complaining party; (b) they were not conditioned on compliance with a court order; (c) they were not tailored to compensate the complaining party; and (d) they were imposed for punitive purposes); Buffington v. Baltimore Cnty., Md., 913 F.2d 113, 133 (4th Cir.1990) (vacating sanctions imposed by trial court as “civil contempt” for violation of discovery obligations; observing that fines were ordered payable to the court, rather than to the complaining party; concluding that the fines were a form of criminal contempt, which could not be imposed without compliance with due process procedures required for criminal contempt proceedings); Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1438, 1442-44 (10th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). The bottom line is that resolution of
holding that the failure to appear in court pursuant to a court order can constitute direct criminal contempt holding that a contempt order labeled by the district court as civil was actually a criminal contempt because the order was retroactive seeking to penalize previous violations and was punitive serving no compensatory purpose holding that 25 surcharge added to fees that otherwise would be compensatory was a criminal contempt sanction even though it was payable to the adverse party and not to the court reversing order for sanctions because court did not follow procedural requirements for criminal contempt holding evidence insufficient to show direct contempt and no basis for indirect contempt because of failure to meet procedural requirements holding that the district court committed reversible error by imposing criminal sanctions in a civil proceeding which did not afford the contemnor the procedural protections the constitution requires for the imposition of criminal contempt sanctions