272 N.J.Super. 606, 620, 640 A.2d 1161 (App.Div.1994), certif. denied, 138 N.J. 267, 649 A.2d 1287 (1994). The “value judgment” as to “whether the plaintiff adequately has established the existence of a clear mandate of public policy is an issue of law____that must be made by the court, and not by the jury.” Mehlman, supra, 153 N.J. at 187, 707 A.2d 1000. There is, in addition, an obvious parallel to criminal cases which involve charges of possessing a weapon for an unlawful purpose. In such instances, a jury is not qualified to say without guidance which purposes for possessing a weapon are unlawful and which are not. Therefore, a jury instruction on a charge of possession of a weapon for an u 8); Young v. Schering Corp., 275 N.J.Super. 221, 235-37, 645 A.2d 1238 (App.Div.1994) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 141 N.J. 16, 660 A.2d 1153 (1995);
holding cepa claim to have been properly dismissed because employees general invocation of federal labor and tax law was inadequate basis for reasonable belief in illegal activity holding cepa claim to have been properly dismissed because the challenged conduct was contrary to employees principles or sense of company priorities but was not illegal or wrongful holding that the trial court should have dismissed the employees breach of contract claim holding that a negligent retention claim was properly dismissed when there was no underlying tort upon which it could have been based holding cepa claim to have been properly dis missed because the court found that the disclosure involves nothing more than a policy dispute