expertise to a primarily factual determination, we accord judicial deference to the Commission’s determination of whether the statutory exigency standard has been met. This deference is well supported by our case law. See, e.g., In re Review of 2005 Annual Automatic Adjustment of Charges for All Elec. & Gas Utils., 768 N.W.2d at 119 (deferring to the Commission’s denial of a variance under natural gas regulatory scheme based on the Commission’s technical knowledge and expertise); Minn. Ctr. for Envtl. Advocacy, 644 N.W.2d at 464 (deferring to the agency’s factual determination whether the statutory standard of “significant environmental effects” was met with regard to timber harvesting project); Cable Commc’ns Bd. v. Nor-West Cable Commc’ns P’ship, 356 N.W.2d 658, 668 (Minn.1984) (<HOLDING>); Quinn Distrib. Co. v. Quast Transfer, Inc.,
holding that we show  deference to an agencys conclusions in the area of its expertise holding that agencys construction of statute it was charged with enforcing was entitled to deference because it was reasonable in line with the statutes meaning and related to its expertise holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference holding that we consider an agencys expertise or special knowledge when  application of the regulation is primarily factual and necessarily requires application of the agencys technical knowledge and expertise to the facts presented citation omitted internal quotation marks omitted holding that an rld manufacturer was unlikely to succeed on its challenge to the fdas reliance on animal studies to establish the bioequivalency of a proposed generic because courts are bound to show deference to the agencys factfinding in this area of its technical expertise