supervisors or the Calhoun County jail of the injury or to follow the city’s policy of reporting all officer-caused injuries. Instead of believing Watkins’s lies, then, Mrs. Watkins argues that the officers determined to punish Watkins by making him suffer for them. There are thus two closely related factual disputes regarding what the officers did after they had made the crucial inference of a substantial risk to Watkins’s health: (1) whether the officers actually believed Watkins’s lies or instead disbelieved them and intended to punish Watkins for lying to them, and (2) whether the officers acted reasonably after having perceived that there was a risk to Watkins’s health. These disputes of material fact preclude summary judgment. Cf. Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493, 508 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Thus, I believe that the district court erred
holding that the issue of defendants actual knowledge should not be resolved on summary judgment but should be left to the trier of fact holding that the reasonableness of a defendants efforts in discharging a duty of care is a question for the trier of fact when the record does not permit summary judgment holding that the issue of proximate causation involves application of law to fact which should be left to the fact finder subject to limited review holding that credibility determinations should not be resolved at the summary judgment stage holding that where parties did not respond to an issue in summary judgment motion parties relinquished any claim on the issue and conceded that summary judgment should be entered against them