that DAI invoked the judicial process when its affiliates brought the 1988 federal action and the bankruptcy action. The franchisees second argument is that DATs affiliates acted as an agents for DAI in filing the bankruptcy proceeding so that DAI could stay Sims’s arbitration proceeding. The franchisees contend that the district court correctly concluded that DAI invoked the judicial process through its affiliates, insisting that the affiliates were DAI’s alter egos or at least its agents. This argument brings up an issue we addressed in Lawrence, and which the Second Circuit has addressed in greater detail since — whether a party can invoke the judicial process if it litigates a non-arbitrable claim against a parly with whom it has arbitrable claims. Lawrence, 833 F.2d at 1165 (<HOLDING>); Distajo II, 107 F.3d at 132-33 (“only prior
holding that the current franchisees who had an interest in the continued viability of the franchiser had an inherent conflict with former franchisees whose only interest was in the maximization of damages holding that because a county is not a person for purposes of a section 1983 claim it cannot be sued where the remedy sought is monetary damages holding that franchisor who sued franchisees had not invoked the judicial process for purposes of a subsequent dispute holding that the current franchisees who had an interest in the continued viability of the franchiser had an inherent conflict with former franchisees whose interest was only in the maximization of damages holding state is person for purposes of judicial recusal statute