discrimination because he cannot demonstrate that he is disabled. Specifically, BVU asserts that Dose’s physical impairments do not substantially limit any major life activity. Thus, in considering whether Dose can make out a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, the court must first determine whether Dose is “disabled” as defined by the ADA; that is, whether he has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A); see Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 481, 119 S.Ct. 21 is whether Dose’s blood clotting condition substantially limits his ability to breathe. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals had instructed that: A major life activity is substantially limi d 35, 37 (5th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). The court concludes that while Dose’s blood
holding that plaintiffs claim that she was disabled because her major life activity of breathing was substantially limited by her respiratory condition would provide a basis for protection under the ada holding that a lifting restriction did not substantially limit a computer technicians ability to engage in the major life activity of working holding that breathing is a major life activity within the contemplation of the ada holding that several instances of asbestosisrelated shortness of breath did not substantially limit major life activity of breathing holding that plaintiffs severe allergic reactions to peanutladen foods did not substantially limit major life activity of breathing because her ability to breath was otherwise generally unrestricted