failed, however, to provide any reasoning for why it had “no trouble” reaching this conclusion. Instead, the court simply asserted: The State’s interest in protecting privacy is directly advanced when the State no longer allows access to the names and addresses of those charged with misdemeanor traffic violations and [Driving Under the Influence]. Further, refusing access to such information reasonably directly advances the State’s interest in lessening the danger of overreaching by solicitors where potential solicitation recipients may be particularly vulnerable. Id. We agree with the district court’s decision not to follow Lanphere. As the Ninth Circuit recently observed: “Lanphere fails to take into account the Supreme Court’s decision in Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 767, 113 S.Ct. 1792 (<HOLDING>), and is in conflict with Coors Brewing, 514
holding that the third prong of centralhudson requires the challenged regulation to advance the state interests in a direct and material way not merely a direct or reasonably1 direct way holding that the complete denial of counsel on direct appeal requires a finding of prejudice holding claims must be raised on direct appeal or waived holding that circumstantial evidence was sufficient to show that a method step was carried out by the direct infringer even in the absence of direct evidence for direct infringer holding that direct evidence of defendants dna found at the scene was direct evidence merely of a circumstance that suggested his participation in the burglary and theft but was not direct evidence of his participation in the burglary