carefully than white customers. But the incidents Sharp describes relate to individuals not involved in this litigation, occurred more than two years after Jones’s arrest, and are not probative of J.C. Penney’s policies or patterns with respect to prosecution of customers caught in apparent shoplifting. Jones does not present any arrest records, data, statistical evidence, or other information from which any pattern of racially disparate enforcement of loss prevention policies could be inferred. The conclusion that Jones could not prevail on her claims that the officers lacked probable cause for her arrest or that they discriminated against her based on her race required dismissal of her state and federal claims of abuse of process, see Cook v. Sheldon, 41 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>), her claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, see Phillip
holding regular use of process cannot constitute abuse of process holding that the plaintiff bears the burden to show that the defendant acted with intent to deceive holding that accident does not include intentional act if insured acted with intent to harm and noting that intentional acts exclusion applies if insured acted with specific intent to harm holding that to establish a claim for abuse of process a claimant must demonstrate  an act in the use of the process not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceedings holding that a claim for abuse of process requires a plaintiff to show that the defendants acted with intent to do harm without excuse or justification  in order to obtain a collateral objective that is outside the legitimate ends of the process