to eighteen months past the completion of construction. As we have seen, the project is now in limbo and may last much longer. Collateral estoppel applies only when the same issues decided in the past action arise again in the present context, see Southern Pacific R.R. v. U.S., 168 U.S. 1, 48, 18 S.Ct. 18, 27, 42 L.Ed. 355 (1897), so that when significant new facts grow out of a continuing course of conduct the issues in a successive suit may fail to constitute the same “issue” so as to merit preclusive effect. See Brogsdale v. Barry, 926 F.2d 1184, 1188 (D.C.Cir.1991) (finding that a 1975 determination that unconstitutional crowding existed at a jail could not be dispositive of the conditions existing in 1983); Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 501 F.Supp. 485, 513 (D.C.Pa.1980) (<HOLDING>); 6 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller &
holding that changes in the baseball card market between 1965 and 1980 foreclosed any argument that a definition of the relevant market by the federal trade commission could preclude relitigation of the market definition issue recognizing implied duty to market holding that proof of relevant market is essential under  2 recognizing that rates awarded in other cases do not set the prevailing market rateonly the market can do that holding merely that to the extent a breaching party claims that the appropriate measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the market price it holds the burden of proving that there is in fact an available market for the goods in issue