Id. at 782-83. The pattern requirement was given broader treatment in United States v. Stofsky, 409 F.Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y.1973), wherein the Court construed § 1962(c) and § 1961 in pari materia with the definition of “pattern of criminal conduct” stated in 18 U.S.C. § 3575, supra. Concluding that § 3575(e) “may be used to cast light on the word ‘pattern’ as used in § 1961,” the Stofsky Court stated: This Court therefore construes the word “pattern” as including a requirement that the racketeering acts must have been connected with each other by some common scheme, plan or motive so as to constitute a pattern and not simply a series of disconnected acts. For other examples of the treatment this issue has been given, see, e. g., United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d 436, 442 (5th Cir. 1976) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Fineman, 434 F.Supp. 189,
holding that a two month period might be enough  to prove the causation prong holding that a five month delay was unreasonable holding that several rigged card games which occurred over a 19 month period constituted a pattern holding that two acts of mail fraud within five months constituted a pattern holding over