State is not included in that description. The State contends that the legal principle applied in Lomax v. Comptroller, 323 Md. 419, 593 A.2d 1099 (1991), applies to our analysis of the CPA. We agree. In Lomax, this Court applied the general principle that, when construing a statute whose language is written in general terms that are reasonably susceptible to being construed as applicable to the conduct of both governmental and private parties, the rule of construction to be applied is to exclude the government from the statute’s operation unless the Legislature provides particular indication in the language that it intended to include the State in its sweep. Lomax, 323 Md. at 421-22, 593 A.2d at 1100; see also Glascock v. Baltimore County, 321 Md. 118, 121, 581 A.2d 822, 824 (1990) (<HOLDING>); City of Baltimore v. State, 281 Md. 217, 223,
recognizing that philadelphia as a home rule city derives its power generally to govern itself and to enact zoning regulations from the home rule act 53 ps  13101 but that to the extent that provisions of the zoning enabling act 53 ps  14752 are not inconsistent with philadelphias zoning regulations they remain in force holding that because no clear implication could be derived from the language of the statute that the state should be bound by the local zoning ordinances the state was not bound holding that agency is bound by its regulations holding that the legislature did not intend the state to be bound by local zoning regulations when constructing a communications tower because the legislature neither named the state nor manifested an intention that it be bound by the provisions of the enabling act which granted zoning authority to the city holding that in the limited circumstances when local zoning authorities actions prohibit personal wireless service the act preempts local zoning law