F.2d 1412, 1415 (9th Cir.1988). Our understanding of what Rule 60(b)(1) requires in the default judgment context is consistent with the Supreme Court’s recent clarification of the concept of “excusable neglect” generally. That concept, the Supreme Court has made clear, is a general equitable one, not necessarily reserved for extraordinary circumstances, and takes account of factors such as “prejudice, the length of the delay and impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith.” Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunsunck Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993); see Briones v. Riviera Hotel & Casino, 116 F.3d 379, 381 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); cf. Bateman v. United States Postal Service,
holding that when ruling on a motion under rule 60b1 the trial court is not required to make written findings of fact unless a request is made holding that a motion that alleged rule 60b1 grounds could not be treated as a rule 60b6 motion in the absence of allegations of aggravating circumstances holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorneys fees because plaintiffs rule 54d2 motion was untimely and they had failed to show excusable neglect that would justify extending the time they had to file such a motion holding that the pioneer investment excusable neglect standard applies to rule 60b1 holding that it is an abuse of the courts discretion to consider an untimely filing in the absence of a motion to enlarge demonstrating excusable neglect