to sign an affidavit or invoked the Fifth Amendment. (Transcript of January 19, 1996 hearing, p. 9). 3 . Petitioner argues that the Texas Penal Code, § 39.06, cannot apply to this case because there is no suggestion that the grand jurors who spoke to Lenhart did so for personal gain or with intent to harm another. Respondent contends that the grand jurors who spoke with Lenhart may have violated section 39.06 because they may have been motivated by an intent to harm the reputation of Leal or one of their fellow grand jurors. (Lenhart Reply Brief at 1). Lenhart argues that such a construction of section 39.06 would effectively make section 39.06 a criminal libel statute, violating the First Amendment. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67, 85 S.Ct. 209, 212, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964) (<HOLDING>). Petitioner also argues that Article 20.02(b)
holding that the district court committed reversible error by imposing criminal sanctions in a civil proceeding which did not afford the contemnor the procedural protections the constitution requires for the imposition of criminal contempt sanctions holding that dispute with regard to parties intent prohibits summary judgment holding that the first amendment prohibits criminal sanctions for true statements made with an intent to inflict harm holding that it is not enough that the defendant has acted with an intent that is tortious malicious or even criminal or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress the conduct itself must be extreme and outrageous holding that a defendant charged with kidnapping with the intent to inflict bodily harm upon or terrorize the victim is not entitled to a faison instruction