argued they were doing the best they could to produce documents in the control of a non-party. Defendants appear to have abandoned this argument, at least in this precise form. See January 9, 1986 brief at 3, noting that “the time for arguing these positions has long passed.” Even if not abandoned, the argument has no merit. As already noted, the material sought by plaintiff was, despite the legal existence of other entities, in the effective control of defendants. Therefore, this “technical” defense (see defendants’ December 5 brief at 6) is no excuse. Defendants also failed to appear for their properly-scheduled deposition on October 16. That total failure to respond justifies a sanction under Rule 37(d). See Fox v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 718 F.2d 251, 254 (7th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Defendants again argue (or at least their
recognizing trial courts decision on discovery issues implies a finding that requested discovery was not reasonably available holding that the district court must find a total failure to respond to the discovery requested holding that district court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion to extend discovery where no effort was made to explain why the requested discovery could not have taken place within the original discovery period holding that a pro se party must be advised of consequences of failing to respond to a dispositive motion including an explanation that the failure to respond  may result in the district court granting the motion and dismissing the case holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law