at common law against a charge of non-sexual assault, nor did this court find any such case. Taken to its logical conclusion, appellant’s argument that consent should be a defense to assault where there is significant bodily injury would render non-prosecutable acts that are an affront to the public peace and order, such as a loan shark lending money on the condition that non-payment authorizes a beating or gang members who agree to settle old scores by a shootout. The absurd realities of recognizing consent as a defense to assault with significant bodily injúry are not farfetched. For example, in Brown, 364 A.2d at 28, the defendant was charged with assault after “severely beating [the victim] with his hands and other objects” after the victim had “indulged in some spiri 8) (en banc) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted and
holding that consent to participate in the initiation into a prison gang is not a defense to the charge of battery holding that active participation in a criminal street gang means that there is a relationship between the defendant and the gang that is more than nominal passive inactive or purely technical and that defendant must devote all or a substantial part of his time and efforts to the gang recognizing that a conviction under  292133 requires that the arrest be lawful holding that murder committed by minor gang members was not foreseeable result of sale of alcohol to gang members holding that victims consent to ritualistic beating as a part of the gang initiation is not relevant because the acts amounted to a reckless infliction of bodily injury and thus did not constitute a lawful act committed by lawful means and affirmed the conviction of manslaughter