or his involvement with the federal investigation. The explanation for his dismissal in no way bears upon Martin’s immorality or dishonesty. This claim is ripe for dismissal. D. State-Law Counts Defendants have been granted summary judgment as to all federal claims asserted in this matter. The only remaining theories of recovery are premised on Kentucky law. The Court finds that it does not have pendent jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 to address the remaining state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“[t]he district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection ... if ... the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction”); Taylor v. First of Am. Bank-Wayne, 973 F.2d 1284, 1287-88 (6th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Hankins v. The Gap, Inc., 84 F.3d 797, 802-03
holding that because no class was certified at the time the individual claims were dismissed the class action was properly dismissed holding that after all federal claims had been dismissed if the district court does decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction these state claims shall be remanded to state court rather than dismissed because this case was originally filed in state court and removed to federal court holding that in the context of the federal tort claims act claims dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds are not dismissed for lack of jurisdiction but for the existence of a defense holding that if the federal claims are dismissed before trial  the state claims should be dismissed as well holding that when all federal claims have been dismissed the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims