considered as having been rendered when the court has pronounced the decree which finally determines the rights of the parties and nothing remains to be done but for the clerk to record the entry of the judgment. The judgment itself is not what may be entered, but is that which is considered and delivered by the court. Even if the judgment may be proven only by the record, yet it derives its force, not from its entry on the record, but from its rendition by the court. See also Tiedman v. Tiedman, 400 Mich. 571, 255 N.W.2d 632, 635 (1977) (stating, in dicta, that a judgment of divorce may be made effective immediately by a judge’s oral statement that includes all the pertinent terms of the divorce); McClure v. H.K Porter Co., 174 Mich.App. 499, 436 N.W.2d 677, 679-80 (1988) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Norton Shores v. Carr, 59 Mich.App. 561, 229
holding that the trial courts written order was not the entry of a sentence sufficient to support a determination that a judgment of conviction was entered holding that the trial courts oral pronouncement must conform to the written judgment holding that a trial courts oral ruling was clearly meant to have immediate effect and not to be effective only when written and entered holding that when the courts oral statements in the plea colloquy conflict with the written agreement the courts oral statements control holding that oral declarations of mistrial which discharge the jury are unlike other oral decisions by the trial court which are not binding and are subject to change until a final written order or judgment is entered