apace notwithstanding an alien’s parole status ‘or possibility of arrest or further imprisonment.’ ” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(4)(A)). The court determined that § 1231(a)(4)(A) implicitly endorsed the proposition that “deportation leaves an existing term of parole intact” because “an alien may be deported and later face incarceration for violating his parole.” Id. Therefore, the court held “that, under federal law, deportation does not automatically extinguish an existing term of parole.” Id. Just as in Carrasco-Mateo, the Oregon court in the instant case did not lose authority over Barrera merely because he was deported. Id. This decision is in accord with other circuit courts that have addressed similar issues. See United States v. Phillips, 413 F.3d 1288, 1292 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Williams, 369 F.3d 250,
holding that deportation did not cut short appellants parole term regardless of appellants subjective beliefs holding that deportation does not extinguish term of parole holding that appellants privacy interests under the us and texas constitutions were not invaded when officer walked up appellants driveway to allow drug dog to sniff appellants garage door holding that parole survives deportation holding officers articulated reasonable suspicion justified appellants contin ued detention to await canine unit when officer suspected appellant of drug trafficking based on appellants prior arrests for drug offenses appellants lie about his prior criminal history and appellants possession of small jewelers bags used in cocaine trafficking