her own choosing,” Complaint ¶ 144-, at 36, but this statement alone is insufficient to maintain an expressive-association claim, because there is no “generalized [First Amendment] right of ‘social association,’ ” City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 25, 109 S.Ct. 1591. To establish First Amendment protection over her expressive association' claim, A.M. must allege that the Individual DOH Defendants prevented her from associating with others for expressive purposes. Boy Scouts 907, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215 (1982) (upholding a right to organize a boycott); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 426, 98 S.Ct. 1893, 56 L.Ed.2d 417 (1978) (upholding the ACLU’s right to solicit prospective litigants); Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emp., 441 U.S. 463, 464, 99 S.Ct. 1826, 60 L.Ed.2d 360 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 622, 104
recognizing a public employees first amendment right to address matters of legitimate public concern recognizing private right of action recognizing a right to contribution recognizing the right to counsel on appeal recognizing employees right to unionize