imposition of the death penalty, and noting that sentencing decisions "involve ... human judgments ... that build discretion, equity, and flexibility into a legal system” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 128 . Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 129 . Id. 130 . See 11 Del. C. § 4209(d); see also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 537, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (ruling that where the imposition of capital punishment requires unanimity among jurors, prejudice exists if “there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror” would have come out in favor of life). 131 . See 68 Del. Laws ch. 189, §§ 1-6 (1991) (discussed in State v. Cohen, 604 A.2d 846 (Del.1992)). 132 . See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Brice v. State, 815 A.2d 314 (Del.2003)
holding that in order to sustain death sentence as a matter of fundamental fairness the jury must find that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors and this balance must be found beyond a reasonable doubt holding that the penaltyphase juryneed not find that aggravating factors sufficiently outweighed mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt holding that failure to charge that jury must find aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt violates fundamental fairness and requires reversal of death sentence holding that if the imposition of the death penalty depends on the existence of aggravating factors a jury must find those factors beyond a reasonable doubt holding that sixth amendment requires that a jury not a judge find the existence of any aggravating circumstance and that they be found beyond a reasonable doubt