disagreed, holding that Doyle barred reference to the defendant’s invocation of any of his Miranda rights, even when he put forward an insanity defense. See e.g., Greenfield v. Wainwright, 741 F.2d 329 (11th Cir.1984), aff'd, 474 U.S. 284, 106 S.Ct. 634, 88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986). The Supreme Court resolved this conflict in Waimvright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 290, 106 S.Ct. 634, 88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986), holding that Doyle barred the use of a defendant’s post-Miranda request for counsel. In a footnote, the Court explained that Doyle not only barred reference to a defendant’s “statement of a desire to remain silent,” but also to his “desire to remain silent until an attorney has been consulted.” Id. at 295 n. 13, 106 S.Ct. 634; see also Jacks v. Duckworth, 857 F.2d 394, 401 (7th Cir. 1988) (<HOLDING>). While Doyle and Waimvright impose a
holding request to lie down and think about what happened  not a clear invocation of the right to silence holding i might want to talk to an attorney to be ambiguous holding that a defendants statement that he did not want to talk about what he did the night before but was willing to talk about lighter subjects was not an unequivocal invocation of his right to remain silent in part because the defendant previously exhibited willingness to talk with police holding that a suspect made an acceptable request for counsel by stating i dont think i want to talk to you anymore without a lawyer holding that doyle applied to statement as regards to what happened this evening i want to talk to my attorney