had conversations with him, in which they agreed to pay him a share of the fees as compensation for work performed in Massachusetts. He also says that Scruggs firm members came to Boston to receive his advice, although Scruggs denies this. Combined with Patrick’s physical presence in Massachusetts to negotiate the agreement which ultimately gave rise to this litigation, and the ongoing relationship between the Motley defendants and Day-nard — properly attributed to the Scruggs defendants — we can properly say that the Scruggs defendants “engaged in ... purposeful activity related to the forum that would make the exercise of jurisdiction fair, just, or reasonable,” Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 329, 100 S.Ct. 571, 62 L.Ed.2d 516 (1980). See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (<HOLDING>). Patrick’s action alone is probably sufficient
holding that prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences along with the terms of the contract and the parties actual course of dealing must be evaluated to determine whether the defendant purposefully established minimum contacts recognizing that course of dealing may establish limitation of damages as part of parties bargain in fact but finding record was devoid of any evidence to establish a prior course of dealing between parties holding that the trial court erred by imposing a duty of good faith on seattlefirst in relation to a course of dealing when that course of dealing conflicted with the express terms of the contract holding that when nonresident defendant has purposefully established minimum contacts texas courts exercise of personal jurisdiction will not comport with fair play and substantial justice only in rare cases holding that sufficient minimum contacts exist when nonresident defendant purposefully directed action toward texas