accident insurance” as a collateral source. Id. Respondent argues that UIM benefits are akin to payments from the tortfeasor’s liability insurance, which do not constitute collateral sources. Respondent relies on Do, a case in which the supreme court held that “a payment made by a tortfeasor’s automobile insurer is not a collateral source” under section 548.251. 779 N.W.2d at 855. The supreme court observed that the ordinary meaning of “collateral source” refers to a source “wholly independent of’ and unconnected with the tortfeasor, and held that payments made to an injured claimant by the tortfeasor’s liability insurer constitute a direct rather than a collateral source because they derive directly from the tortfeasor’s insurance. See id. at 859-60; see also Dean, 535 N.W.2d at 345 (<HOLDING>). As a result, they do not constitute
holding that violence that does not stem from particularized animosity but rather from a financial incentive does not constitute persecution holding hospital could not enforce ben directly against tortfeasors insurer because patient had no right to directly sue insurer holding that an insurer can be estopped from denying coverage for failure to make payments where that insurer has established a course of conduct of accepting late payments holding that payments from a tortfeasors insurer are not from a collateral source because they stem directly from the tortfeasor holding that recovery from the tortfeasors insurer is a condition precedent to a claim for uim benefits