to excuse the untimely filing of his motion to reopen. See Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 487 F.3d 270, 274 (2d Cir.2006). Moreover, although Zhisong argues that “the landscape of the law applicable to [his motion to reopen] has sufficiently shifted,” and that “China’s application of its birth policies has shifted,” he submitted no evidence of changed country conditions with his motion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (stating that “[a] motion to reopen proceedings ... shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material”). The BIA also did not abuse its discretion in finding that Zhisong was not prejudiced by the IJ’s failure to address his argument that he had adjusted his status to that of a lawful permanent resident. See Garcia-Villeda v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 141, 149 (2d Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). The BIA properly found that Zhisong failed to
recognizing that in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel a movant must show that he was prejudiced by his counsels performance holding petitioner must demonstrate error and substantial prejudice to prevail on a due process claim holding that an alien must show error and substantial prejudice in order to prevail on a due process claim holding petitioner must show prejudice to prevail on due process claim holding that an alien must establish that he was prejudiced by the alleged error in order to prevail on a due process claim