also appeals the district court’s dismissal of the complaint and denial of his motion for recusal and resignation of Judge Pannell. We find that removal was timely, that we have jurisdiction over the ease, and that the district court did not err when it denied the motion for recusal or dismissed the case. I. We first note that for the purposes of appeal, we treat an order dismissing a case without prejudice for failure to comply with a court order as an adjudication on the merits. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 286, 81 S.Ct. 534, 545, 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961) (stating that a Rule 41(b) dismissal by the court sua sponte for failure to comply with an order should be considered an adjudication on the merits); Robinson v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 673 F.2d 1247, 1249 (11th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). The district court dismissed this case
holding that even though the complaint was dismissed without prejudice as a sanction for misconduct and even though the order of dismissal was therefore not an adjudication on the merits the defendants were nevertheless properly considered the prevailing party for purposes of attorneys fees holding that a dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is an adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicata recognizing that one of those conditions for a district judge to grant leave to amend the complaint may properly be that claims contained in the original complaint but not included in the amended complaint be considered dismissed with prejudice  holding that a plaintiff is not required to file an amended complaint when his complaint is involuntarily dismissed without prejudice and that for the purposes of appeal such a dismissal is a rule 41b adjudication on the merits holding that dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim should generally be without prejudice but if the plaintiff has been given an opportunity amend his complaint and fails to do so the dismissal may be with prejudice