the Supreme Court has articulated a strict construction, limiting its application to situations “where a party has performed an act which, if properly done, would postpone the deadline for filing his appeal and has received specific assurance by a judicial officer that this act has been properly done.” Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 179, 109 S.Ct. 987, 993, 103 L.Ed.2d 146 (1989) (finding that the district court, while considering the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration on the merits, had affirmatively assured the plaintiffs that the motion was timely under Rule 59(e) and effective to toll the appeal period). This doctrine has never been applied to allow the trial court to extend the filing deadline, and in fact, courts are forbidden to do so. See McCarthy at 1275 (<HOLDING>). However, even if trial courts could extend
recognizing that defendant may waive miranda rights holding that a state may waive its sovereign immunity holding that absent a timely postjudgment motion the trial court has no jurisdiction to alter amend or vacate a final judgment holding that district court did not abuse its discretion where it determined that plaintiffs failed to show good cause to amend complaint after dispositive motion deadline holding that courts may not alter waive or amend the filing deadline