and his access to the records of the other allotments in the area, [Native American # 1] was given an allotment that obviously conflicted with a prior land claim. No matter how much [Native American # 1] or his survivors might have wished to cultivate this land [as required by statute], it would have been virtually impossible because of this conflict. Id. at 1166. For this reason, the court concluded that it would protect the plaintiff’s interests by holding that the plaintiff’s predecessors complied with the statutory requirements necessary to acquire a vested interest in the allotted land. Id. at 1167. Here, a finding in favor of Cabrera is even more compelling because there is evidence that he did, in fact, comply with the requirements of his permit. 54 Cf. Antoine, 710 F.2d at 479 (<HOLDING>). 55 N.M.I. Const, art. Xm, §§ 1-2 (the
holding that under the statute of frauds a description will be insufficient as a matter of law if it is indefinite to the degree that no particular tract of land is identified nevertheless a description which is vague will be sufficient if its precise location may be determined upon competent parol evidence holding that the federal government was liable for a taking of property where california officials acting under the authority of a federal order occupied land holding that if subsequent to the taking and before the trial the ordinance was actually amended to permit the previously forbidden use then that of  itself was weighty evidence of the existence at the time of the taking of the fact that there was a reasonable probability of an imminent change holding that governments conduct constituted a taking where the government erroneously confirmed native american ls selection pursuant to treaty of a tract of land that was previously selected by native american  2 whose possession of the tract prevented native american  1 from complying with statutory requirements for issuance of a patent holding that where both tract to which predecessor had record title and disputed tract were enclosed by single fence even though deed from predecessor to plaintiffs described only tract of record and possession of both tracts was delivered by predecessor to plaintiffs who continued to adversely possess disputed tract there was privity of estate between predecessor and plaintiffs who were entitled to tack their period of adverse possession onto that of predecessor to get full statutory tenyear period