to simply dismiss the appeal: it retains jurisdiction to vacate the district court’s judgment and remand with direction to dismiss as moot. See Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Pac. Trading Cards, Inc., 150 F.3d 149, 151 (2d Cir.1998). Whether we vacate the district court’s judgment or simply dismiss the appeal, leaving the district court’s judgment intact, depends on the equities of the case; the appellant has no automatic right to vacatur. See U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18, 25, 115 S.Ct. 386, 130 L.Ed.2d 233 (1994); Tunick v. Safir, 209 F.3d 67, 73 & n. 8 (2d Cir.2000). In the ordinary run of cases, however, courts have been liberal in granting vacatur. See United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 39 & n. 2, 71 S.Ct. 104, 95 L.Ed. 36 (1950) (<HOLDING>); Associated Gen. Contractors v. New Haven, 41
holding that the established practice  is to reverse or vacate the judgment below and remand with a direction to dismiss and collecting cases holding that a remand should be limited to cases in which further action must be taken by the district court or in which the appellate court has no way open to it to affirm or reverse the district courts action under review holding that the courts denial of either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is not reviewable  holding that a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment precluded default judgment holding that the proper remedy in all cases where the trial court errs in failing to hold a neil inquiry is to reverse and remand for a new trial