at 278-80. 16 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471-72; Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 435 (2000); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309, 310, (1985) ("Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be suppressed . . .." This is true even though "[t]he failure of police to administer Miranda warnings does not mean that the statements received have actually been coerced, but only that courts will presume [that] the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination has not been intelligently exercised."). 17 Confinement might increase a suspect's anxiety and make him more likely to seek discourse with others and more susceptible to talking. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 6.7(c), at 877 (4th ed. 2015). 18 Cunningham, 144 Wis. 2d at 282. 19 See Innis, 446 U.S. at 302 n.8 (<HOLDING>). 20 I would not introduce the idea of a
recognizing the motives of the officer as a critical factor in determining whether a particular instance of excessive force rises to the level of a constitutional violation recognizing that the burden of persuasion for a showing of prejudice was on the defendant holding that an officers diligent pursuit of an investigation during the detention is a factor in determining the reasonableness of an investigatory stop holding that a third partys history of violence at least insofar as it was known to the defendant plays an important role in determining whether the harm was reasonably foreseeable recognizing that an officers knowledge concerning the unusual susceptibility of a defendant to a particular form of persuasion might be an important factor in determining whether the officer should have known that his words or actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response