The second exception is for procedural rules that are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” id. (citation omitted), or “watershed rules of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.” Tyler, 533 U.S. at 665, 121 S.Ct. 2478 (quoting Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478, 113 S.Ct. 892, 122 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993)). The Supreme Court has not made the new rule announced in Apprendi retroactive. See Forbes v. United States, 262 F.3d 143, 145 (2d Cir.2001) (per curiam). Moreover, Courts in the Southern District of New York have largely held that the Apprendi holding does not fit either of the two exceptions set forth in Teague, and therefore is hot retroactively applicable on collateral review. See Raulston, 2002 WL 826810, at *4 (<HOLDING>); Fiumara v. United States, 198 F.Supp.2d 427,
holding that apprendi does not apply retroactively in florida postconviction proceedings to cases that were final on direct review at the time of the apprendi decision holding that the apprendi decision is not applicable on collateral review holding that apprendi does not apply on collateral review holding that apprendi does not apply retroactively holding that alleyne does not apply to cases on collateral review