any other fact, knowledge of it should have put NCB on notice of a bondable loss — one caused by employee dishonesty or forgery, counterfeit or alteration. The record contains no evidence that the default should have put NCB on notice of employee dishonesty or forgery, counterfeit or alteration. Realizing the loan was in or near default was not discovery. NCB did not discover the loss in February 2007. Second, Cincinnati argues that NCB discovered the loss at closing. It claims Brittain knew about the forgery at closing and his knowledge was imputed to NCB. Both parties agree that if Brittain was complicit in the forgery, any alleged knowledge of the forgery could not be imputed to NCB under agency principles. See Witcher v. JSD Props., LLC, 286 Ga. 717, 690 S.E.2d 855, 857-58 (2010) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Hodgson v. Hart, 165 Ga. 882, 142
holding that travel by an agent of defrauded corporation is imputed to the victim holding that where an agent is guilty of independent fraud for his benefit knowledge of the fraud is not imputed to the principal holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid the securities fraud exception by pleading mail fraud or wire fraud if the conduct giving rise to those offenses also amounts to securities fraud holding that while an agents knowledge is imputed to the principal due to the identity of interests that is presumed when an agent acts within the scope of an agency relation this rule does not operate in the converse and the agent cannot be imputed with the information which its principal has failed to give it holding that a principal is not hable for the actions of an agent when these actions exceed the agents authority and the thirdparty has knowledge that the agent does not have the authority asserted