is a participant or beneficiary within the meaning of section 1132. A first reading of the statutory language might suggest that dismissal of Lee was inappropriate. In Menhorn v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738 F.2d 1496, 1503 (9th Cir.1984), however, we concluded that a plain reading of the statutes is not sufficient. Menhom held that section 1144 limits the application of section 1132. Thus, even if a plaintiff is a “participant or beneficiary” of a plan, no federal subject matter jurisdiction exists unless the acts critical to the action occurred after January 1, 1975. We note that other circuits have criticized Menhom. See, e.g., Jameson v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation Pension Plan, 765 F.2d 49, 52 (3d Cir.1985); see also Reiherzer v. Shannon, 581 F.2d 1266, 1271-72 (7th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>); but see Quinn v. Country Club Soda Co., 639
holding that the damages and jury trial provisions of the 1991 act apply to conduct occurring prior to the date of enactment holding that the due process clause confers a right to direct a childs education holding that the date of death is relevant date of inquiry for the applicability of section 541a5a holding that section 1132 confers jurisdiction from date of enactment holding that claim brought under section 1983 of the civil rights act constituted a personal injury tort claim because section 1983 confers a general remedy for injuries to personal rights