pain, and that the trauma was consistent with a history of sexual abuse but could also be consistent with a number of other non-criminal causes. The mother’s hearsay testimony was the sole evidence identifying appellant as the perpetrator. The social worker’s testimony was cumulative to the mother’s regarding identity, but nonetheless, it significantly bolstered the mother’s testimony and it added the report of a threat to punish JB if she revealed the abuse. The social worker was purportedly an uninterested witness, so her testimony was particularly important. While the social worker’s testimonial hearsay might not have contributed to the verdict, we cannot conclude with any certainty that it did not, which is the test for “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Compare Sparkman, supra (<HOLDING>). Because appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to
holding that it was error to admit a videotaped interview of an alleged child victim of sexual abuse because the defendant was deprived of the right to crossexamine the child holding that videotaped interview between child and investigator was admissible holding that admission of evidence is harmless if it is cumulative to other legitimately admitted evidence that establishes a defendants guilt beyond a reasonable doubt holding that a videotaped interview between the child and an investigator was admissible holding that even if videotaped interview of child violated sparkmans constitutional right to confront this witness the evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where appellant admitted engaging in inappropriate sexual conduct with child among other evidence of direct accusation of criminal sexual conduct