imposed tioo previous moratoria. See id. at 1465-67. Notably, the court there did not suggest that either of the first two moratoria were improper. This court is aware that other district courts have issued orders pursuant to the TCA forestalling the effect even of first-time moratoria. See, e.g., Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Town of Farmington, No. 3:97 CV 863(GLG), 1997 WL 631104 (D.Conn. Oct.6 1997). In the end, however, “each situation must be independently examined” and this court finds that the moratorium in this case simply was not unreasonable. Virginia Metronet, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 984 F.Supp. 966, 976-77 (E.D.Va.1998) (finding fourteen-month delay not per se unreasonable under TCA); Illinois RSA No. 3, Inc. v. County of Peoria, 963 F.Supp. 732, 746 (C.D.Ill.1997) (<HOLDING>). B. Discrimination The TCA prohibits
holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment holding sixmonth delay in rendering final decision not per se unreasonable holding such agreements to be per se illegal holding that violation of state law was not a per se constitutional violation holding that strip search incident to arrest was not per se unreasonable but holding that search was performed in an unreasonable manner when conducted in view of the public