possession, custody and control may be left with or surrendered to the heir or devisee presumptively entitled thereto.” As a result of the fact that Defendant Jimmie Locklear was in possession of the manufactured home both before and after his appointment as collector of Mertice Locklear’s estate in 2012 and the fact that, in the absence of a determination that the manufactured home needs to be sold in order to pay the debts of the estate, the property will pass to him under Mertice Locklear’s will, Defendants clearly have a sufficiently “strong connection” to the property to afford them standing to maintain their claims under the North Carolina Debt Collection Act. As a result, based upon our reading of the relevant statutory language and the logic of Redmond, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 698 (<HOLDING>), which we find to be persuasive, we hold that
holding that an entity engaged in collection activity on a defaulted debt acquired from another is a debt collector under the fdcpa even though it may actually be owed the debt holding that plaintiffs allegation that debt collectors attempted to collect on a debt to a condominium association notwithstanding their knowledge that plaintiff did not really owe that debt to the condominium was sufficient to state a claim under the fdutpa holding that the act extends to claims by individuals against whom a debt collector has made purposeful targeted and directed attempts to collect a debt alleged to be owed by the plaintiffs holding that the defendant debt collector was the equivalent of the party to whom the plaintiff had provided her cell phone number for purposes of the tcpa holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or