and the employer’s job requirements.” Brown v. Polk County, 61 F.3d 650, 654 (8th Cir.1995) (en banc) (quoting Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1439 (9th Cir.1993)). Knowledge that an employee has strong religious beliefs does not place an employer on notice that she might engage in any religious activity, no matter how unusual. Chalmers concedes that she did not know of any other employee who had ever written distressing or judgmental letters to co-workers before, and that nothing her co-workers had said or done indicated that such letters were acceptable. Accordingly, any knowledge Tulon may have possessed regarding Chalmers’ beliefs could not reasonably have put it on notice that she would write and send accusatory letters to co-workers’ homes. Cf. Brown, 61 F.3d at 654 (<HOLDING>). Chalmers also contends that the letters
holding that the employer had not demonstrated the employee was discharged for gross misconduct because the conduct was an isolated incident and the employer did not try to show that its staffing ability had suffered serious  or indeed any consequences as a result of the employees conduct holding that an employee could not establish pretext when the employer in good faith believed that the employee engaged in misconduct regardless whether the employee in fact engaged in the misconduct holding that because the employee had engaged in similar religious conduct on prior occasions employer had notice of the conflict holding that where employee was aware of dissolution abatement of claims provision applied even in absence of written notice because employee had actual notice holding that where employee gave notice to employer of injury and employer told employee that nothing could be done for him through workmans compensation employer had breached statute and was liable for medical treatment which was reasonable and necessary to restore employee to maximum usefulness