to the statute itself and then to the ease law interpreting it. See id. at 2256-57; see also Almanza-Arenas v. Lynch, 815 F.3d 469, 479-82 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). If state law fails to answer the question, a court may look to Shepard documents, which may be helpful in determining divisibility. See Mathis, 136 S.Ct. at 2256-57; see also Descamps, 133 S.Ct. at 2284 (citing Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 25-26, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005)). But if the statute, case law and Shepard documents fail to speak plainly as to whether statutory alternatives are elements instead of means, the statute is indivisible and the modified categorical approach has no application. See Mathis, 136 S.Ct. at 2257; see also In re Chairez-Castrejon, 26 I. & N. Dec. 819, 819-20 (BIA 2016) (<HOLDING>). The government does not argue § 475.992(l)(a)
holding descamps and mathis divisibility analysis applies in immigration proceedings nationwide to the same extent that it applies in criminal sentencing proceedings holding that lopez applies to criminal sentencing holding that the right to counsel applies in all critical stages of state and federal criminal proceedings holding  2254 applies to administrative proceedings holding that res judicata applies in deportation proceedings