laundering that took place outside of the Western District. For venue purposes, the overt act need not be the whole crime, but merely an act (including, in a proper case, an act of a non-conspirator caused by a previous act or contact by a conspirator) in furtherance of the conspiracy. See note 4 supra and accompanying text. Appellants’ reliance on United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1, 118 S.Ct. 1772, 141 L.Ed.2d 1 (1998), is misplaced, for there the Court was careful to point out that “[njotably, the counts at issue do not charge Cabrales with conspiracy; they do not link her to, or assert her responsibility for, acts done by others.” Id. at 1776 (emphasis added). Cabrales also specifically distinguished Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 32 S.Ct. 793, 56 L.Ed. 1114 (1912) (<HOLDING>), on the ground that it was a conspiracy
holding that venue for a conspiracy prosecution was proper in a district where an overt act took place although defendant had never been there and the conspiracy was not formed there holding that proof of an overt act is not required in a  846 conspiracy holding that venue is proper in any district where any act in furtherance of the conspiracy took place holding that in a conspiracy case venue lies where the conspiracy agreement was formed or in any jurisdiction where an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed by any of the conspirators holding criminal conspiracy is sustained where the commonwealth establishes the defendant entered into an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful act with another person with a shared criminal intent and an overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy a coconspirator may commit the overt act and conspirators are liable for acts of the coconspirators committed in furtherance of the conspiracy