29, ¶ 21, 137 P.3d 787). Defendant also explains that the "'evidentiary threshold at [the preliminary hearing] is relatively low'" and "'a showing of "probable cause" entails only the presentation of "evidence sufficient to support a reasonable belief that the defendant committed the charged crime."'" (Alteration in original) (quoting State v, Ramirez, 2012 UT 59, 19, 289 P.3d 444). And Defendant reminds us se is true. It is true that some courts have considered changes in a defendant's motive to cross-examine and court-imposed limitations on eross-examination as factors relevant to determining whether a defendant had a full opportunity to cross-examine a witness during a preliminary hearing, Seq, eg., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1481, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (<HOLDING>); State v. Henderson, 2006-NMCA-059, 119, 189
holding that by cutting off all questioning about an event that the state conceded had taken place and that a jury might reasonably have found furnished the witness a motive for favoring the prosecution in his testimony the courts ruling violated the defendants rights secured by the confrontation clause holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness holding that any confrontation right is found in the fourteenth amendments due process clause not the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment holding that the defendants due process rights were violated when the trial judge singled out the only defense witness and indicated to that witness that he expected the witness to he and would personally ensure that the witness was prosecuted for perjury and thereby effectively drove that witness off the stand holding that the admission of prior testimony that had been subjected to crossexamination violated the confrontation clause because the state did not prove that the witness was unavailable