favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Johnson was not just associated with coconspirators or merely present in an area where a drug transaction occurred, but instead was a knowing and voluntary participant in a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. See Reeves, 742 F.3d at 497; Hansen, 262 F.3d at 1236. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying Johnson’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to the sufficiency of the evidence for her conspiracy conviction. B. Blanchard and Johnson argue that their mere presence in the back seat of a car that contained contraband was insufficient to support a conviction for the substantive offense of possession with intent to distribute. See United States v. Stanley, 24 F.3d 1314, 1319-20 (11th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). The government, they assert, did not present
holding that something more than mere presence in the car in which drugs are found is required to sustain a conviction for the substantive offense of possession with intent to distribute holding that evidence of a 10yearold drug conviction was properly admitted to show intent in a prosecution for possession with intent to distribute holding that the presence of firearms may go toward proving that a defendant possessed drugs with the intent to distribute holding similar evidence sufficient to sustain a jury verdict of possession with intent to distribute cocaine holding that possession with intent to distribute and simple possession are the same offense under blockburger