dismiss. See Riley, supra, 61 N.J. at 228, 294 A.2d 7 (“[A] court should be slow to hold that a suit may not proceed as a class action.”). Plaintiffs suggest the “circumstances in Riley, where premature dismissal was reversed, are identical, if not less egregious than, those in this case.” Although we agree courts must liberally view class allegations and allow reasonable inferences to be gleaned from the complaint’s allegations and search for a possible basis for class relief so as to avoid premature dismissals, Carter-Reed, supra, 203 N.J. at 505-06, 518, 4 A.3d 561 we do not abide a view that precludes dismissal, following the required analysis, when a court determines alleged claims do not properly lend themselves to class certification. See Riley, supra, 61 N.J. at 225, 294 A.2d 7 (<HOLDING>). In Riley, the Court examined the pre-trial
holding that district court in making class certification decision should avoid focusing on merits of underlying class action holding that a district of columbia consumer protection statute that authorized representative actions and did not reference class action requirements or mandate class certification was a separate and distinct procedural vehicle from a class action and thus did not constitute a class action under cafa holding that it is elementary that in order to maintain a class action the class sought to be represented must be adequately defined and clearly ascertainable holding a class action should lie unless it is clearly infeasible holding that the right of all putative members of a proposed class in an action filed pursuant to kansass class action rule of civil procedure to file a separate action is preserved pending the determination of whether the initial case shall be maintained as a class action