she did not call an ambulance until 1:07 p.m. — four hours after Ms. Des-muke knew that T.D.S. was seriously ill and she herself believed that an ambulance was needed. Based on these facts, a jury could reasonably conclude that Ms. Des-muke’s delay in calling 911 demonstrated deliberate indifference to T.D.S.’s serious medical needs, and we reverse the district court’s holding on this issue. Although Ms. Colbert has presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment regarding the delay in medical treatment claim, on remand, the district court will need to address whether there is sufficient evidence that Ms. Desmuke’s actions (or inaction) represented the execution of an official policy. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (<HOLDING>). The court did not reach this issue because it
holding that a local government may be held liable for its employees constitutional violation only when the employee is executing the governments policy or custom whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may be fairly said to represent official policy holding that a municipality may only be held liable under  1983 for a policy practice or custom holding that a city may be held liable on account of the unconstitutional conduct of city officials only if the citys policy or custom played a part in the violation holding that a municipality may be sued as a person under 42 usc  1983 when the municipalitys policy or custom whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy inflicts a constitutional injury holding that a municipality cannot be held liable for an official policy or custom if it has been determined that the individual defendants did not violate the plaintiffs constitutional rights