Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20-23, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1472-1474, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980) (Federal Tort Claims Act not “sufficient protector” of constitutional rights to preclude “Bivens” remedy for constitutional violation); Meyerson v. Arizona, 507 F.Supp. 859, 864 (D.Ariz.1981) (“§ 1983 cannot be used to circumvent the remedial provisions of the Revenue Sharing Act”). Accordingly, the Court in Middlesex County Sewerage concluded that the express comprehensive remedial schemes of two separate statutes both foreclosed implied private actions and supplanted remedies available under section 1983. 453 U.S. at 21, 101 S.Ct. at 2627. The second exception to a 1983 action for a purely statutory violation is based, at least in part, on the explicit languag n, 664 F.2d 1210, 1217 (4th Cir. 1981) (<HOLDING>). The Court again recognized this exception to
holding that claim brought under section 1983 of the civil rights act constituted a personal injury tort claim because section 1983 confers a general remedy for injuries to personal rights holding housing statutes create no rights in tenants for purposes of section 1983 holding that the states personal injury statutes of limitation should be applied for claims under section 1983 holding that congress intended to create enforceable rights in participating section 8 tenants to the same extent as it did in enacting the statute implicated in wright holding states are not persons for the purposes of section 1983