That is not the court’s proper role. In reviewing the arbitrator’s construction of the phrase “immoral conduct,” the issue is not what we believe to be moral or immoral conduct in the philosophical sense. The issue before the arbitrator was whether Dixon’s conduct rose to the level of “immoral conduct” as that term is used in the CBA. The arbitrator evidently concluded that Dixon’s fabrication, though it demonstrated “poor judgment,” did not rise to the level of “immoral conduct” within the meaning of this offense. An arbitrator has discretion to decide whether particular conduct constitutes a dischargeable offense within the meaning of a CBA, as the First Circuit aptly explained in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Local 27, United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 864 F.2d 940 (1st Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). The CBA in Georgian-Pacific provided that
holding that where the arbitrator found that an employee committed an offense listed as a ground for discharge he lacked discretion to order the employees reinstatement holding that an atwill employee may have a cause of action for wrongful discharge when the reason for a discharge was the employees exercise of a right conferred by a wellestablished legislative enactment holding that trial court did not have jurisdiction to order reinstatement of previously dismissed action and thus reinstatement order was void and of no effect and previous order of dismissal was still in effect holding that courts should order reinstatement under the adea whenever it is an appropriate remedy because reinstatement best serves congress purpose in enacting the adea and an award of front pay is always somewhat speculative holding that where the immediate cause or motivating factor of a discharge is the employees assertion of statutory rights the discharge is discriminatory under section 215a3 whether or not grounds for other discharge exist