in part because there was no evidence of any conduct by the insurer that generated an expectation of coverage by the insured). Focusing, then, on the policy itself, we think an ordinary layperson would not misunderstand the coverage provided, and limited, by these policy provisions. See Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Chubb Custom Ins. Co., 780 N.W.2d 735, 743 (Iowa 2010) (rejecting reasonable expectations ar lusions would never be enforceable because by definition exclusions limit the coverage that would otherwise be provided by the insuring clause. Goodwin’s abstract understanding that any use of the rental vehicle by him would be covered by the policy does not give rise to reasonable expectations of coverage. See Essex Ins. Co. v. Fieldhouse, Inc., 506 N.W.2d 772, 777 (Iowa 1993) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, as a matter of law, Goodwin is not
holding insureds general assertion that it expected a liability policy to cover such negligent acts as insured was alleged to have committed would not support application of reasonable expectations doctrine holding that estoppel doctrine could not support an effort to force insurer to pay under a credit disability policy where insured was not gainfully employed at time of application in contravention of policy provision holding that under pennsylvania law the reasonable expectations of an insured may overcome unambiguous policy language only when the insured is a noncommercial entity holding that liability insurance policy that expressly excluded coverage for the insureds intentional acts did not cover punitive damages award assessed against the insured and stating in dictum that public policy forbids insurance coverage for punitive damages holding insurer did not have to cover insured for a breach of contract because it was not an accident