this non-alienation provision “would be sufficient alone to require a finding of preemption,” the Court held that “the term ‘other legal process’ ... encompasses the imposition of a constructive trust upon annuity benefits. Dugan at 10, 539 S.E.2d at 726. Therefore, as in Ridgway, there was an anti-alienation provision that explicitly prevented the former spouse from using any legal process in an attempt to reach the militaiy retiree’s SBP benefits. Third, the Court found that: “[T]he consequences of enforcing the conflicting state law principles sufficiently injures the objectives of the SBP so that federal law preempts the authority of state law” ... [t]o award [the former spouse] the survivor’s benefits she seeks would seriously conflict with and eff p. 2d 469, 471 (D. Md. 1998) (<HOLDING>); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Bell, 924 F.
holding that the asserted right of the insureds child based on his agreement with his mother during their divorce to name the child as his fegli beneficiary was preempted by feglia holding that feglia preempted a state divorce decree which ordered the insured to maintain his fegli policy for the benefit of his children from his first marriage holding that to the extent that california community property law gave the insureds former spouses or his daughter an interest in his fegli benefits it conflicted with feglias order of precedence holding that a husband unlawfully attempted to name a beneficiary other than his daughter who was the irrevocable beneficiary pursuant to a separation agreement in a divorce decree holding that feglia preempted a divorce decree that ordered the insured to designate his children as beneficiaries on his fegli policy