the burden shifts to the employer to produce a non-discriminatory reason for its action; if the employer meets this burden, the burden shifts back to the employee to demonstrate that the proffered reason is pretextual. Id. at 785. Like the district court, we focus our attention on the “similarly situated” prong. A similarly situated employee need not be “identical,” but the plaintiff must show that the other employee “dealt with the same supervisor, [was] subject to the same standards, and had engaged in similar conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances as would distinguish [his] conduct or the employer’s treatment of [him].” Gates v. Caterpillar, Inc., 513 F.3d 680, 690 (7th Cir.2008); Crawford v. Ind. Harbor Belt RR. Co., 461 F.3d 844, 846 (7th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). The district court found that Am-rhein did
holding that employee who violated a different policy of the store than plaintiff was not similarly situated holding that plaintiff was not similarly situated to another employee who also engaged in protected activity for purposes of plaintiffs retaliation claim holding that potential class members are similarly situated to the named plaintiffs if they are similarly situated with respect to their job requirements and pay provisions recognizing in a title vii case that for the fourth element of the prima facie case the individuals seeking relief must demonstrate at the least that they are similarly situated to those employees allegedly receiving more favorable treatment in all material respects holding that a similarly situated employee is one who is comparable to plaintiff in all material respects