every reason to believe that he had complied with the requirement to file with that agency within 300 days.” Id., 225 F.Supp.2d at 489. We further reasoned that “Plaintiff would know that he was protected from exceeding the 300-day statutory period as of the date he learned that a charge number had been assigned to his case.” Id., 225 F.Supp.2d at 490. In Zysk, then, we spoke of the docketing of the charge not as that which rendered the complaint effective, but rather as an indicator to the plaintiff that the charge had in fact been timely filed. Although the assigning of a charge number within the limitations period is a fairly good indicator that an effective charge has been received on time, but see Michelson v. Exxon Research and Eng. Co., 808 F.2d 1005, 1010-11 (3d Cir., 1987) (<HOLDING>) , it is not, and Zysk does not stand for the
holding an intake questionnaire to constitute a charge under the adea upon application of the manifestation of intent test although the eeoc did not consider the questionnaire to be a charge and the aggrieved person subsequently filed a formal charge holding that a general release covered plaintiffs claim even though he had already filed an eeoc charge holding that where the writings on file were insufficient to constitute an effective charge a charge had not been effectively filed despite the fact that the eeoc had assigned the case a charge number holding that failure of eeoc to transmit charge to phrc within limitations period was subject to equitable tolling where plaintiff requested crossfiling in the cover letter attached to the eeoc charge on the first page of the charge itself and on an official form used by the eeoc for requests for dualfiling holding that the felonymurder charge must be submitted to the jury in a capital case where the evidence clearly indicates the appropriateness of the charge