of review applies to Ms. Gutierrez's argument under Smith that the government’s justification for maintaining secrecy at trial was insufficient under the Confrontation Clause. See El-Mezain, 664 F.3d at 491, 493 (reviewing Confrontation Clause challenge to cross-examination restrictions regarding pseudonymous testimony de novo but concluding the district court's "decision to preclude disclosure of the witnesses’ names was not an abuse of discretion” because of “the danger to [their] personal safety”); see also Ramos-Cruz, 667 F.3d at 501 ("After a review of the sealed affidavits and the sealed transcript of the ex parte hearing, we cannot say that this decision was an abuse of discretion.”); Watson, 599 F.2d at 1157 (same); United States v. Alston, 460 F.2d 48, 53 (5th Cir.1972) (<HOLDING>). 20 . "FARC” stands for "Fuerzas Armadas
holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the withdrawal of the juiy trial waiver holding that the judge did not abuse his discretion but applied an incorrect standard holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to require disclosure of witness address because personal safety exception applied noting that defendant knew victims prior address thereby limiting value of victims most current address holding that an aliens mistaken belief that he no longer needed to keep his address current was not an exceptional circumstance because it was not beyond his control that his address on file was inaccurate holding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by crediting the government witnesss hesitation to divulge his address and refusing to require the submission of the agents home address