successfully challenges his sentence on appeal and the cause is remanded for resentencing, the resentencing is a ‘de novo’ proceeding, at which either side may present evidence anew regarding the appropriate sentence.”). The principle of de novo sentencing often benefits the defendant. See, e.g., Galindez, 955 So.2d at 525 (Cantero, J., specially concurring) (“In fact, because resentencing is de novo, the State was required to produce evidence on sentencing issues even if the State established the fact at the original sentencing.”); Tubwell v. State, 922 So.2d 378, 379 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (“As this resentencing proceeding was de novo, the state was not relieved of its burden to prove the prior offenses.” (citations omitted)); Rich v. State, 814 So.2d 1207, 1208 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (<HOLDING>); Mills v. State, 724 So.2d 173, 174 (Fla. 4th
holding that because resentencing following reversal is a new proceeding the state must introduce evidence that the defendant qualifies for enhanced sentencing even though such evidence was introduced in the previous sentencing hearing holding that at resentencing the state must present evidence on an enhanced sentencing factor despite having done so at the prior sentencing hearing holding that on resentencing following reversal the state was required to introduce evidence to prove the defendant qualified for an enhanced sentence and could not only rely upon evidence introduced at a prior sentencing hearing recognizing that sentencing facts are based on the evidence and testimony presented at sentencing under a preponderance of the evidence standard holding that at a resentencing the state must again prove the basis for an enhanced sentence even though such evidence was produced at the original sentencing