of the decree is ambiguous, “a court may consider extrinsic evidence to ascertain the parties’ intent, including the circumstances surrounding the formation of the decree.” United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 275 F.3d 168, 175 (2d Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). In its October 23, 2012 order, the district court held that the RO “unquestionably has the power to remove elected officials” under Paragraph 5(b) of the Stipulation. United States v. Dist. Council of N.Y.C., No. 90-cv-5722, 2012 WL 5236577, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2012). In so holding, the district court relied on its prior decision construing the Stipulation. See id. at *6-*7 (citing United States v. Dist. Council of N.Y.C., No. 90-CV-5722, 2010 WL 5297747, at *8-*9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.21, 2010) (“Willoughby ”) (<HOLDING>)). Reviewing the Stipulation de novo, we note
holding that the parties stipulation of dismissal with prejudice was a final judgment holding that a defendants strategic stipulation to certain facts of the crime was not the functional equivalent of a guilty plea where the defendants stipulation did not establish guilt holding that the ro had been granted broad power to eradicate corruption  within the union and that under paragraph 5biii of the stipulation had been specifically authorized to issue a veto if a persons conduct is inconsistent with the objectives of the stipulation holding that a defendants stipulation to the facts establishing guilt was the functional equivalent of guilty plea holding that insurer had no duly to indemnify insured in view of the parties stipulation of fact