shall be performed.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.570(c); see also Wilson v. Sandstrom, 317 So.2d 732, 736 (Fla.1975) (“A mandatory temporary injunction may be issued requiring specific performance of a contract.”). If it had appeared to the Steins that Paradigm was not moving quickly enough to complete construction within two years, they could have obtained an injunction to force it to do so. Failure to comply with the injunction requiring it to finish construction within two years would have subjected Paradigm to civil and criminal contempt penalties. Roth v. Roth, 973 So.2d 580, 592 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (recognizing that a party may be held in contempt “for failing to perform a specific act” required by a specific performance judgment); Riley v. Riley, 509 So.2d 1366, 1367-70 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (<HOLDING>); Firestone v. Ferguson, 372 So.2d 490, 492
holding that a judgment that requires the performance of an act is enforceable by civil and criminal contempt penalties emphasis omitted holding corporation and its president in criminal contempt because previous order of civil contempt had not been purged holding that constitutional due process in civil contempt proceedings requires notice and a hearing but not the right to counsel holding the mcarn exception requirefs that the acts complained of warrant the imposition of criminal penalties as opposed to mere civil penalties holding that a civil contempt defendant has a right to a jury trial when the act of contempt was not committed in the presence of the court and when the incarceration is in part punitive