First, the terms “indecent act” and “indecent purpose” require no further definition because they are terms that are well within the knowledge of the average person. Additionally, to the extent that Wheeler is reasserting his contention that the trial court erred in charging the jury on the full statutory definition of enticing a child for indecent purposes rather than narrowing the definition to match the allegations in the indictment, as we held in Division 3, supra, the trial court’s instruction to the jury that the State was required to prove the offense as charged in the indictment cured any potential problems with the enticing-a-child-for-indecent-purposes charge and did not constitute plain error. Judgment affirmed. Doyle, P. J., and Miller, J., con (642 SE2d 361) (2007) (<HOLDING>). 8 Daniel, 296 Ga. App. at 522 (6). 9 Smith v.
holding that jurors who expressed personal biases but stated they could be fair did not require dismissal holding that jurors who expressed residual doubt about the defendants right to silence should have been dismissed for cause holding that one jurors exposure to extraneous information concerning prior criminal acts of the defendant which she did not disclose to the other jurors before they rendered a verdict did not merit a new trial holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike for cause two potential jurors who had heard andor read about the case but indicated that they could render a fair and impartial verdict based on the evidence presented holding that trial court abused its discretion in failing to make a proper inquiry of jurors andor failing to strike jurors for cause after jurors explicitly expressed bias