Harris labeled his petition as one for writ of error coram nobis, all of his allegations pertain to ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with pleas entere e decisions of the Third District, the Court finds that Petitioner’s claim does not even raise a claim of “affirmative misadvice” on the part of his attorney. At best, Petitioner asserts that the court and his counsel, at the time of the plea, failed to inform him of the consequences that his 1988 and 1991 state con victions could have in the future under a completely different federal scheme. As courts and attorneys cannot speculate about all the possible acts that defendants may commit in the future or their recidivism, Petitioner’s claim is denied. See Collier, 796 So.2d at 630. See also Major, 790 So.2d at 551-552 (<HOLDING>) WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED with
holding that where a statute provides for an enhanced penalty based on a defendants prior conviction the fact of conviction is a sentencing factor to be determined by the court rather than a jury holding that the determination whether a crime is a necessarily included lesser offense of another crime is made by examining the elements of the crimes that must be proved in order to sustain a conviction holding that as a matter of common sense a defendant is already under a legal duty not to go out and commit more crimes in the future regardless of whether the penalty is ordinary or enhanced neither the court nor counsel is required to advise a defendant what penalty he can expect to receive for crimes not yet committed the defendant can avoid further sentencing consequences enhanced or otherwise by refraining from committing new crimes future sentence enhancement for a later crime is not a direct consequence of a plea at all but is instead contingent first on the defendants voluntary decision to commit another crime second on whether the new crime is one capable of having enhanced sentencing and third on the prosecutors discretionary decision whether to seek enhancement future sentence enhancement is plainly a collateral consequence not a direct consequence of the defendants plea in the earlier case holding that firstdegree murder is one crime although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways holding that where a furlough and an enhanced sentence for failure to appear in court at a later time are part of the plea agreement a court is justified in imposing the enhanced sentence after the defendant fails to appear in court without giving him an opportunity to withdrawhis plea