be one that arises from an actual environment of commingled functions.” Id. at 281-82, 648 A.2d at 307 (emphasis in original). The focus must be “the nature of the process actually provided.” Id. at 282, 648 A.2d at 307 (emphasis in original). “In the absence of any actual commingling, ... due process guarantees are being adequately protected.” Id. at 283, 648 A.2d at 308. Since our Supreme Court’s decisions in Lyness and Stone, however, this Court has distinguished cases involving independent administrative agencies, acting as regulators, from eases involving school boards acting as employers. See Harmon v. Mifflin Cnty. Sch. Dist., 651 A.2d 681 (Pa.Cmwlth.1994); see also Behm v. Wilmington Area Sch. Dist., 996 A.2d 60 (Pa.Cmwlth.2010), appeal denied, — Pa. —, 23 A.3d 1057 (2011) (<HOLDING>). In Harmon, we spoke of a “continuum” of due
holding that the ind trial rules do not apply to actions before the board holding that lyness does not apply to residency proceedings before school board holding that petitioners status as school board members does not permit them to step into the shoes of the school board and invoke its right to appeal holding injunction requiring elections board to apply proper residency standard in future was unnecessary and inappropriate where board was already obligated to follow the law and there was nothing in the record to suggest that it would not do so holding that the confrontation clause did not apply to proceedings before a draft board because such proceedings are not stages in a criminal prosecution