constitutes speech on a matter of public concern); Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 199, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61, 341 N.E.2d 569 (1975) (under New York law, speech “arguably within the sphere of legitimate public concern” is constitutionally privileged unless the plaintiff proves that the publisher acted in a “grossly irresponsible manner”). Similarly, New York law places a heavy burden on the plaintiff to prove that the disparaging statements are not opinion, which is granted absolute protection. See Celle v. Filipino Reporter Enters. Inc., 209 F.3d 163, 179 (2d Cir.2000) (under New York law, burden of proving that statement is not protected opinion rests with plaintiff); Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 248-50, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906, 567 N.E.2d 1270 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Because the burden of proof in New York is so
holding that imaginative expression and rhetorical hyperbole are pure opinion subject to new york constitutional protection holding that expressions of pure opinion receive absolute protection under the new york constitution holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york holding that outofstate defendants transmittal into new york of ceaseanddesist letter to new york plaintiff for purported trademark infringement was insufficient to create jurisdiction over defendant in a new york declaratory judgment action