fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case upon a finding that the plaintiffs action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though riot brought in subjective bad faith.” Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978); see also Weisberg v. Riverside Tp. Bd. of Educ., 272 Fed.Appx. 170, 173 (3d Cir.2008). Several courts, including the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, have noted that the term “action,” as referenced in the aforementioned standard for awarding attorney’s fees to defendants, refers to the underlying lawsuit itself; it does not refer to individual actions or conduct committed during the pendency of a lawsuit. See e.g. Barnes Found, v. Lower Merlon, 242 F.3d 151, 162-165 (3d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Knight v. Drye, Civ. A. No. 07-3097, 2009 WL
holding that summary judgment was improperly granted where record did not disclose that the plaintiff would be unable to produce supporting evidence at trial holding that misrepresentation was essential to plaintiffs claim recognizing the right of a defendant to comment upon the failure of the state to produce evidence holding that when summary judgment was properly granted to several defendants because of complete failure to produce any evidence as to essential component of plaintiffs case the action was faetually groundless justifying attorneys fee award to prevailing defendant holding that it was permissible for prosecutor to comment on the general failure of the defense to produce any evidence