has not been unnecessary delay in filing an information or complaint. The defendants could present evidence of prejudice. [¶34] I disagree with Justice Kaps-ner’s analysis and application of the four factor balancing test in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) to the present case. This Court has never addressed what test should be applied to a right to a “speedy” indictment, information or complaint post arrest. I am of the opinion that the district court should hold a hearing after notice to the parties and make its own findings. I also am of the opinion that “a court’s power to dismiss under Rule 48(b) is more expansive than a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. See 28B Moore’s Federal Practice § 648.03[3] at 648-18 (3d ed.1997) (<HOLDING>).” Snellman, 1998 ND 200, ¶ 11, 586 N.W.2d 494;
holding that a twoday delay was insufficient to establish deliberate indifference and citing cases where no deliberate indifference was found after a sixteenday delay a sixday delay and a threemonth delay holding that delay in prescription was not eighth amendment violation because delay was inadvertent and quickly rectified recognizing rule 48b allows courts to dismiss cases for prosecutorial delay even though the delay does not amount to a constitutional violation holding that when determining whether a delay in prosecution violates a defendants right to a speedy trial courts must consider the length of the delay the reason for the delay whether the defendant asserted his rights and the resulting prejudice to the defendant holding that prescription delay was not violation because plaintiff could not establish detrimental effect of delay in treatment