about ECRA, and that this failure prevented Dixon and Venture from structuring their transaction to avoid the statute. Under this scenario, if O’Connor had not been negligent, then ECRA would not have applied to the sale. As a result, any counsel fees Dixon incurred responding to Venture’s demands after it became apparent that ECRA had applied to the sale were attributable to O’Connor’s negligence. Though the Superior Court’s dismissal of the Venture suit may have lessened the extent to which Dixon was harmed, it did not change the fact that Dixon was forced to spend money defending an ECRA suit that might have been avoided entirely had O’Connor not (allegedly) committed malpractice. This is enough under New Jersey law. See Grunwald v. Bronkesh, 131 N.J. 483, 621 A.2d 459, 465 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Franzblau Dratch’s tolling argument
holding that the statute of limitations for attorney malpractice may begin to run before the plaintiff knows the full extent of his damages holding that plaintiff must on his or her own initiative prove that the product reached him or her without substantial change holding that a defaulting party admits only to the liability of his or her portion of the damages and therefore what must be determined after the entry of default is the dollar amount of the damages suffered by the injured party and the portion of those damages to be awarded against the defaulting party based upon the extent of its percentage of negligence holding that for a legal malpractice claim to accrue a plaintiff need not know the precise extent of his or her damages or even have suffered all of the damages attributable to his or her attorneys negligence holding that statute of limitations for malpractice begins to run when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the alleged malpractice