to include Garcia in the 20.11 RIF, (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 23; Sinclair Deck ¶ 1), because in her opinion Garcia was not performing well, did not demonstrate potential for long-term success, and her belief that Garcia’s role was not needed, (Sinclair Decl. ¶ 3), lends additional support for Gold’s decision to include Garcia in the 2013 RIF. In addition, Barclays’ argument that Garcia’s race and sex played no role in Gold’s decision is bolstered by the undisputed fact that Gold made the decision to hire Garcia. See Grady v. Affiliated Cent., Inc., 130 F.3d 553, 560 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that same actor inference—where “the person who made the decision to fire was the same person who made the decision to hire”—strongly suggests “invidious discrimination was unlikely”); Schnabel, 232 F.3d at 91 (<HOLDING>); Anderson v. Hertz Corp., 507 F.Supp.2d 320,
holding that a complaint filed within three years of an accident complied with the michigan court rules and was not barred by the statute of limitations even though service was made more than three years after the accident holding that the fourth prong of a prima facie age discrimination case was satisfied where plaintiff was replaced by two individuals  one who was four years younger than plaintiff and the other who was ten years younger holding that new york statute of limitations for  1983 actions was three years holding that three denied promotions over the course of three years where the decisions were made by three different selection officials and involved different qualifications were not sufficiently related to constitute a continuing violation holding same actor inference was highly relevant where manager who hired plaintiff fired him three years later