victim at bay with a gun and the other relieves the victim of his properties, or, as in the instant case, the unarmed assailant has knowledge of the use of the gun and by his actual presence participates in the robbery, the unarmed offender benefits from the use of the other robber’s weapon, adopting derivatively its lethal potential. . . . [T]he possession necessary to justify statutory enhancement may be actual or constructive; it may be exclusive or joint. Constructive or joint possession may occur only where the unarmed participant has knowledge of the other offender’s being armed, and where the unarmed offender has, as here, the ability to exercise control over the firearm. (Citations omitted.) (Emphasis added.) Cf. Walters v. State, 106 Nev. 45, 48-49, 786 P.2d 1202, 1204 (1990) (<HOLDING>), superseded on other grounds by 108 Nev. 186,
holding that the defendants sentence had been improperly enhanced where there was no evidence that the defendant constructively possessed or exercised control over the weapon holding that the defendants sentence for armed burglary in violation of section 810022b was improperly enhanced pursuant to section 775087 because the use of a weapon or a firearm is an essential element of armed burglary holding that although there was evidence of discrimination by the employer based on race there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the employer had constructively discharged the plaintiff holding that the cumulative effect of the evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant constructively possessed the methamphetamine laboratory discovered in a bedroom she shared with a renter holding that because the plaintiff no longer managed others and had other job responsibilities reduced there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that he had been constructively discharged