contingencies that might arise.” ’ Fearson v. State, 662 So.2d 1225, 1226 (Ala.Cr.App. 1995) (quoting Minnifield v. State, 439 So.2d 190, 192 (Ala.Cr.App.1983) (‘[w]e do not consider that ineligibility to earn CIT [Correctional Incentive Time] is a direct consequence of a guilty plea as to which a defendant must be advised before entering a plea’)); Oyekoya v. State, 558 So.2d 990, 991 (Ala.Cr.App.1989) (“‘[W]e hold that potential deportation is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea. Accordingly, we find no error in the sentencing court’s failure to inform Romero-Vilca in the Rule 11 Colloquy of his possible deportation.” ’) (quoting United States v. Romero-Vilca, 850 F.2d 177, 179 (3d Cir.1988)); Minnifield v. State, 439 So.2d 190, 192 (Ala.Cr.App.1983).” Danzey, 703 So.2d at 1020 (<HOLDING>). Although this court recognized just a few
holding that potential civil commitment under a state statute was a collateral consequence of pleading guilty holding that the sanction of deportation is a collateral not direct consequence of a guilty plea holding that the court had no duty to warn defendants about the possibility of deportation as a collateral consequence of conviction holding that being subjected to dna testing was a collateral consequence of conviction having no bearing on defendants sentence so that he was not entitled to be informed of dna testing before pleading guilty holding that enhancement of sentence after violation of probation was collateral rather than direct consequence of plea