his prima facie case. We read the BIA’s reference to affidavits somewhat differently: not as requiring affidavits from firsthand sources per se, but rather as listing the lack of personal affidavits as among the evidentiary gaps that make Sutuj’s prima facie showing deficient in this case. We note that, although the petitioner’s argument fails because it is not supported by the record, it is not legally unsound. We have considered— and in some cases upheld—numerous asylum applications and motions to reopen that relied exclusively on an applicant's affidavit and documentary evidence. See, e.g., Escobar, 698 F.3d at 39 (reviewing a motion to reopen supported by “personal knowledge” of violence and reports by the State Department and human rights organizations); Smith, 627 F.3d at 434 (<HOLDING>); Mendez-Barrera, 602 F.3d at 24 (reviewing an
holding that the bia did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to reopen supported by allegedly unavailable evidence regarding changed country conditions where there had been a previous adverse credibility finding in the underlying asylum hearing holding that 8 cfr  10032c3ii applies to changed country conditions in the country of origin or deportation and not changed personal circumstances in the united states holding that the bia does not err by denying a motion to reopen without an opposition from the government holding that bia erred in denying a motion to reopen due to changed country circumstances supported by reports from human rights organizations the united states government and the press holding that bia abused its discretion in denying motion to reopen