States District Court for the Northern District of Florida and no transfer of jurisdiction had been effected. See 18 U.S.C. § 3605 (authorizing a court to exercise jurisdiction over a person on supervised release if such jurisdiction has been transferred by the sentencing court). With respect to the contention that the incident report would affect his custody classification if his supervised release were revoked, Watkins must satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III, § 2 of the Constitution. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998). To do so, Watkins must show that the disciplinary action has or will cause him to suffer adverse consequences. See id. at 7-8, 118 S.Ct. 978; Bailey v. Southerland, 821 F.2d 277, 278-79 (5th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). His contention here is the type of
holding that a federal prisoners appeal from the denial of a  2241 petition seeking the expungement of disciplinary reports and restoration of good time credit was moot because the court could not provide him with relief after he was released and the prisoner did not allege that he would be subject to future adverse consequences because of the incident report holding that because the petitioner had already filed a rule 371 petition he was barred from submitting a subsequent petition under that rule and his petition was subject to dismissal on that basis regardless of the label he placed on it holding that an appeal was not moot because the amendment to the ordinance at bar did not give the petitioner the relief sought so that the petitioners claim and injury remain viable holding that the state courts determination that the petitioner could not show prejudice because he did not allege that the witness was available to testify was a reasonable application of federal law to the facts of the case holding that an appeal was not equitably moot because the person who was issued the money was a party and was aware when the payment was made that the award would be appealed