precise facts of Bruton, involving a facially incriminating confession, we found that accommodation inadequate---- [T]he calculus changes when confessions that do not name the defendant are at issue____ We hold that the Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of a nontestifying codefendant’s confession with the proper limiting instruction when, as here, the confession is redacted to eliminate not only the defendant’s name, but any reference to his or her existence. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 211, 107 S.Ct. at 1709. According to the Richardson Court, when faced with a statement which, like the statement at issue, is not “facially incriminating,” but is potentially incriminating by inference, a jury instruction may well be successful in dissuading the jury fro 5 (D.C.Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1009, 112 S.Ct. 1773,
holding that the fact that a redacted statement may have inferentially incriminated   the defendant when read in context with other evidence does not create a bruton violation holding that when all references to the defendant in a eodefendants statement are replaced with indefinite pronouns or other general terms the confrontation clause is not violated by the redacted statements admission if when viewed together with other evidence the statement does not create an inevitable association with the defendant and a proper limiting instruction is given holding that the clause was not violated by a redacted confession with a proper limiting instruction holding that where a defendants name is replaced with a neutral pronoun as long as identification of the defendant is clear or inculpatory only by reference to evidence other than the redacted confession and a limiting instruction is given to the jury there is no bruton violation holding that admission of statement with references to we or they which did not directly implicate defendant did not violate defendants confrontation rights