safety of others or themselves, they do not also need probable cause. See Fisher, 558 U.S. at 47, 130 S.Ct. 546 (stating that the “emergency aid exception,” from Stuart, “requires only an objectively reasonable basis for believing that a person within the house is in need of immediate aid” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting Stuart, 547 U.S. at 406, 126 S.Ct. 19(43 and Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392, 98 S.Ct. 2408)); Stuart, 547 U.S. at 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943 (“The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.” (quoting Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392, 98 S.Ct. 2408)); Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989) (<HOLDING>). See generally, e.g., Roberts, 824 F.3d 1145
recognizing that where authorized party consents to search neither a warrant nor probable cause is necessary recognizing principle holding that designation is neither a sentence nor a punishment holding neither a lack of prejudice to the defendant nor the running of the statute of limitations constitutes good cause recognizing the longstanding principle that neither a warrant nor probable cause nor indeed any measure of individualized suspicion is an indispensable component of reasonableness in every circumstance