v. Henderson, 482 F.2d 1101, 1110 (5th Cir.1973); United States v. Frontero, 452 F.2d 406, 415 (5th Cir.1971). As we noted in Frontero, Carrying [this] argument to its logical conclusion, the court, before accepting a guilty plea, would be required to inform a defendant of his right to a speedy and public trial, his right to an impartial jury, his right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses, his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, his right to have excluded from the trial any evidence illegally seized, and many more. We do not read Rule 11 as requiring this; nor do we feel that due process requires this [of the states]. Id.; cf. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 369, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (<HOLDING>). The record indicates that Holloway’s plea was
holding that a guilty plea must be both knowing and voluntary and must be a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action available to a defendant holding defendant did not show required prejudice from counsels alleged failure to advise him about eligibility for parole under the sentence agreed to in the plea bargain holding that a plea was voluntary and intelligent despite the states failure to supply the defendant with information about his parole eligibility date holding that due process requires state courts to make an affirmative showing that a guilty plea is intelligent and voluntary holding that record did not show voluntary or intelligent waiver