with the evidence but whether the absence of the evidence undermines confidence in the verdict”). ¶20 Woods is particularly instructive because it confirms our application of the same prejudice standard under Strickland and in the Brady context in which the Strickland standard “finds its roots.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. So does In re Personal Restraint of Rice, 118 Wn.2d 876, 828 P.2d 1086 (1992), upon which the State heavily relies. Contrary to the State’s description of Rice, it is simply one of many cases in which this court employed the “reasonable probability” prejudice standard in resolving an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a personal restraint petition. See Rice, 118 Wn.2d at 890; see also In re Pers. Restraint of Dalluge, 152 Wn.2d 772, 100 P.3d 279 (2004) (<HOLDING>), In re Pers. Restraint of Brett, 142 Wn.2d
holding petitioner demonstrates actual and substantial prejudice by proving a claim under strickland holding petitioner must demonstrate error and substantial prejudice to prevail on a due process claim holding that in defining the reasonable probability language in strickland with more precision substantial possibility describes the prejudice standard in strickland holding petitioner has the burden of proof under the strickland test holding that any reduction in sentence constitutes substantial prejudice for purposes of strickland analysis