this firm will initiate an action in small claims court to collect the debt.” Id. The combined effect of these passages, in Reiner’s view, is to convey the idea that the consumer’s debt must be paid within thirty days, regardless of whether the consumer disputes the debt in question. Pl. Mem. at 5 (citing Savino v. Computer Credit, Inc., 164 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir.1998)). Reiner responds by asserting that, even if its statement regarding the time to cure a default was ambiguous, it cured any such ambiguity by including a statement in the letter that, “YOU MAY DISPUTE THE VALIDITY OF THE DEBT ... IN WRITING WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS OF RECEIPT OF THIS LETTER ... OTHERWISE, THE DEBT WILL BE ASSUMED TO BE VALID.” Pl.Ex. 5; see also McStay v. I.C. System, Inc., 308 F.3d 188, 191 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). The court finds that the language in Reiner’s
holding that one spouse may be entitled to a portion of the equity in home purchased with nonmarital funds holding that exempt portion of a lump sum personal injury settlement is not included in disposable income but nonexempt portion is so included holding citys plea to the jurisdiction in rule 202 proceeding properly denied because district court had jurisdiction over portion of claim under investigation even if city and governmental agency had exclusive jurisdiction over another portion of claim holding that clear language in one portion of a later may cause ambiguity in another portion to dissipate holding no error occurred in excluding portion of statement offered by defendant because the rejected portion of the conversation in no manner explains or modifies that portion of the conversation which came into evidence