appellant as a career offender given his pattern of committing property crimes. DECISION Instructing the jury that “you do not have a reasonable doubt if your doubt is based upon speculation * * * ” diluted the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, violating appellant’s right to due process, and requiring a new trial. Reversed and remanded. 1 . Appellant testified that he saw “chips on the floor. I know what that kind of crime was * * The reference is to pieces of the steering column that had been broken to facilitate starting the car without a key. 2 . The district court appropriately recognized that appellant could only be convicted of one of the crimes charged because the facts used to prove each crime were identical. See State v. Banks, 358 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn.App. 1984)
holding that a defendant may be convicted of theft twice on the basis of intentional possession at one time of stolen property if the property forming the basis of the one conviction was stolen at different times and places from different owners than the property forming the basis of the second conviction holding that a conviction for receiving stolen property based on possession must be vacated because it involved the same act constituting theft based on retaining property holding receiving stolen property is per se dishonest holding proof of possession of stolen goods is sufficient evidence to sustain conviction for theft holding that the trial court may not depart downward based on the quantity of money stolen in a theft case based on the reasoning in atwaters