cancellation of removal because he was not convicted of an aggravated felony. Whether Blanco Marte’s stalking convictions qualify as an aggravated felony is a legal question which we have jurisdiction to review. See Jeune v. Att’y Gen., 476 F.3d 199, 201 (3d Cir.2007). Even if such a challenge was successful, however, we lack jurisdiction to review the alternative determination that Blanco Marte did not deserve cancellation of removal as an exercise of discretion. See Mendez-Moranchel v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 176, 178 (3d Cir. 2003). Furthermore, although we may consider whether the Board, in exercising its discretion, violated a rule of law or a provision of the Constitution, Blanco Marte has not raised any such allegations. See Chen v. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 329 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Blanco Marte also claims that he “received an
holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion holding abuse of discretion is established if district court decision was based on an error of law holding that summary judgment may be reversed when it is based on an error of law holding that a petition raises a question of law when it alleges a factfinding which is flawed by an error of law or an abuse of discretion that is based on a legally erroneous standard holding that a question of law is not implicated when the petition for review essentially disputes the correctness of an ijs factfinding or the wisdom of his exercise of discretion