prosecutors in their prosecutorial decisions and the official discharge of their duties.” Price, 706 A.2d at 936 (citing United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985)). Deference is due to prosecutors because of the prescribed discretion they possess to enforce the laws of the state, which calls for more than the rote indictment of every offense. See Jefferson v. State, 472 A.2d 1200, 1204 (R.I.1984); State v. Rollins, 116 R.I. 528, 533, 359 A.2d 315, 318 (1976). A municipal administrator enforcing a municipal regulation, however, performs a function distinct from that of a prosecutor prosecuting under a criminal statute. See State v. Russell, 671 A.2d 1222, 1223 (R.I.1996) (<HOLDING>). This distinction requires us to look beyond
holding that plea agreement with drug enforcement agency agent not enforceable when agent was not authorized by united states attorney to enter agreement holding that discharge of a police officer for the choice to enter into a relationship with the wife of his superior officer on the force was rational holding that a municipal police officer did not possess the discretion to enter into a nonprosecution agreement with a criminal defendant absent consent from the attorney general holding that a defendant could enter into a plea agreement which called for the defendant to receive the death penally holding that police departments failure to discipline an officer can create municipal liability particularly when plaintiffs injuries result from conduct similar to that alleged in prior complaints against the officer