to REL, case law demonstrates that his failure to do so does not constitute breach of a fiduciary duty within the meaning of section 523(a)(4). REL’s argument is, therefore, unavailing. At the outset, we note that exceptions to discharge have been narrowly construed in order to give effect to the underlying purpose of the Bankruptcy Code, which is to grant relief and a fresh start to overburdened debtors. See Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 35 S.Ct. 287, 59 L.Ed. 717 (1915); In re Vickers, 577 F.2d 683 (10th Cir.1978); Davison-Paxon Co. v. Caldwell, 115 F.2d 189 (5th Cir.1940). The term “fiduciary capacity” has, therefore, been narrowly construed, limiting the scope of the exception relating to breach of a fiduciary duty. See Chapman v. Forsyth, 2 How. (43 U.S.) 202, 11 L.Ed. 236 (1844) (<HOLDING>). In Chapman, the Court construed a similar
holding that a factor who retains the money of his principal is not a fiduciary within the meaning of the bankruptcy laws holding that money damages do not qualify as equitable relief within the meaning of  1132a3 holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of  1983 holding that bankruptcy jurisdiction is not within section 5 of the fourteenth amendment holding that an agent owes a fiduciary duty to his principal