the owner has no duty to warn an invitee”). But, if the obviousness is not sufficiently great, “the possessor is not relieved of the duty of reasonable care which he owes to the invitee for his protection.” Id. “This duty may require him to warn the invitee, or to take other reasonable steps to protect him, against the known or obvious condition.” Id. The facts in Peterson did not require consideration of whether a possessor has a duty to reasonably anticipate that an invitee may be distracted when he encounters the known or obvious condition. Id. at 497-98, 144 N.W.2d at 558. But other Minnesota cases establish that the potential for distraction should factor into the reasonable-care analysis. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Cambridge-Radisson Co., 235 Minn. 20, 23, 49 N.W.2d 1, 3 (1951) (<HOLDING>); Ober v. The Golden Rule, 146 Minn. 347, 348,
holding that sufficient evidence supported jurys finding of negligence when invitee had tripped on frame in department store because she was distracted by displayed goods holding that jury returning verdict 45 minutes after informed would be sequestered in hotel was not coerced into verdict holding that it would not be unreasonable to find condition in hotel lunchroom unsafe because invitee would be distracted recognizing that the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures  would disappear if it were left to depend upon the unfettered discretion of an employee of the hotel holding that no closure occurred where judge locked doors to ensure jury would not be distracted