limited by either, the state constitution or the legislature itself. Robbins v. Rapid City, 71 S.D. 171, 176, 23 N.W.2d 144, 147 (1946) (citation omitted). Municipalities are precluded from engaging in ultra vires acts for which there is no antecedent legislative authority. Ericksen v. City of Sioux Falls, 70 S.D. 40, 53, 14 N.W.2d 89, 95 (1944). [¶ 28.] “Our Court has a history of not interfering with municipal governments unless their actions are palpably arbitrary, unreasonable,, or beyond their authority.” City of Marion v. Schoenwald, 2001 SD 95, ¶ 7, 631 N.W.2d 213, 216 (citations omitted). We have on several occasions upheld a municipality’s incidental acts exercised in the course of its express authority. See Snow Land, Inc. v. City of Brookings, 282 N.W.2d 607, 608 (S.D.1979) (<HOLDING>); City of Vermillion v. Hugener, 75 S.D. 106,
holding opinion testimony of sales should have been excluded because opinion not based on comparable sales holding that the fact that defendants sales in forum were less than 5 percent of its total sales volume was irrelevant so long as its sales were part of a regular course of dealing and were not isolated or exceptional events holding municipalitys express authority to prohibit all sunday liquor sales under sdcl 35630 included implied authority to also ban lowpoint beer sunday sales despite states proscription under sdcl 35481 which prohibited sales of lowpoint beer sales on sunday between certain hours holding property lien for nonpayment of sales tax was beyond boroughs authority to collect sales tax holding that exercising general jurisdiction over defendant was improper where its actual sales in florida were a small percentage of the total sales and therefore these sales were de minimis 