that money order with Debtor’s filings and mailed it to the Court. Summerrain’s handling of Debtor’s filing fee in this manner violates Section 110(g)(1). The fact that Summerrain did not personally accept a check from Debtor but instead authorized an employee of Independant Paralegal Associates to do so does not change this conclusion because Summer-rain admits she personally placed the money order, along -with Debtor’s filings, in the mail. Moreover, the acts of Independant Paralegal Associates’ employees are imputable to the partnership and to Summer-rain, as general partner. See Gomez, 259 B.R. at 384 (finding acts of an employee of corporate petition preparer imputable to corporation); Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Group, Inc., 763 F.Supp. 1552, 1560 (D.Colo.1991) (<HOLDING>)- Summer-rain’s argument that she relied on
holding counsel and appellants jointly liable under  1927 and rule 38 holding that under the texas uniform partnership act the government was entitled to collect the  tax liability indisputably a partnership debt from any one of the general partners holding that general partners must notify limited partners of partnership opportunity to purchase adjacent property but not addressing whether  9404 requires affirmative consent of partners after such notice recognizing wellestablished colorado rule that partners are jointly and severally liable for the wrongs of the partnership holding that under california law partners are personally liable for the debts and liabilities of the partnership including its tax liability