or absurd result.”). Lastly, Cluley argues that the State improperly relied on an exhibit that was not introduced into evidence before the District Court. He refers to a letter from a representative of the testing equipment’s manufacturer concerning the acceptable testing parameters for the equipment in question. In its brief, the state explained that it only had marked this exhibit for identification purposes at the suppression hearing. Because the letter merely corroborated the testimony of DOH’s tester, the state’s reference to this document has no bearing on the outcome of our review. In any event, the rules of evidence do not apply at suppression hearings. See Rules 101(B)(1) and 104(a)(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence; State v. Pena-Lora, 710 A.2d 1262, 1264 (R.I.1998) (<HOLDING>). Conclusion For these reasons,.we grant the
recognizing that the federal rules of evidence do not apply to sentencing hearings holding that the rules of evidence normally applicable in criminal trials do not operate with full force at hearings before the judge to determine the admissibility of evidence there is therefore much to be said for the proposition that in proceedings where the judge himself is considering the admissibility of evidence the exclusionary rules aside from rules of privilege should not be applicable and the judge should receive the evidence and give it such weight as his judgment and experience counsel holding that the burden is upon the state under the applicable federal rules of evidence holding that the rules of evidence do not apply when a court is deciding upon preliminary questions dealing with the admissibility of evidence under rule 104 except for questions of privilege holding that federal evidentiary rules control on questions of admissibility of expert medical witness testimony even in diversity cases