abstraction, therefore, never produces reversible error in the court’s charge because it has no effect on the jury’s ability fairly and accurately to implement the commands of the application paragraph or paragraphs.” Ramirez, 967 S.W.2d at 922 (citing Plata, 926 S.W.2d at 302). The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that if a jury charge improperly “ ‘singles out a specific type of evidence and tells the jury that it may infer an element of the crime’ from that evidence,” then there is error. Kirsch, 357 S.W.3d at 651 (citing Brown v. State, 122 S.W.3d 794, 800-01 (Tex.Crirm.App.2003)). However, our sister courts have found that even when there is error due to improper definitions, the error is frequently harmless. See Crenshaw v. State, 378 S.W.3d 460, 466 (Tex.Crim.App.2012) (<HOLDING>); Baggett v. State, 367 S.W.3d 525
holding that courts may not find a per se sixth amendment violation where the defendant was unable to present relevant evidence holding that the trial courts definition of normal use was harmless error holding the erroneous deprivation of the right to counsel constitutes per se reversible error holding that the statutory definition of responsibly connected provided a per se rule holding that the trial courts inclusion of per se definition of intoxication did not expand the allegations against the defendant and was not error