claim did not accrue until the moment of execution. McNair deemed such a time-of-harm accrual principle to have no application “where the ultimate injury is reasonably likely and wholly foreseeable.” 515 F.3d at 1174. The court went on to explain, “It is clear a capital litigant may file suit and obtain injunctive relief long before he is executed.” Id. After detailed analysis of various alternative dates, the McNair panel concluded that the appropriate accrual date for a method-of-execution challenge was the date that Alabama’s execution protocol became applicable to the plaintiff because by that time “the facts which would support a cause of action should have been apparent to any person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.” Id. at 1177; see also Crowe, 528 F.3d at 1293 (<HOLDING>). A similar conclusion was reached in Lovett v.
holding that methodofexecution challenge accrued for limitations period when after direct review of his convictions had been completed crowe became subject to the method of lethal injection that he chal lenges holding that the plaintiff was required to arbitrate his claim which accrued before he became bound by the arbitration rules of the new york stock exchange because he was fully aware of the existing claim at the time he became a member of the exchange and became bound by its arbitration rules holding that the statute of limitations accrued when the minors father was appointed his guardian and not when the minor became comatose holding that a conviction became final when the ninetyday period to seek direct review from the  supreme court by way of certiorari expired holding that an attorneys cause for services rendered over a period of time accrued when his services had been completely performed