for negligence.” Id. at 819, 121 S.Ct. 1927. Therefore, the court does not face a situation where the federal maritime law is silent as to an issue and a state statute provides an applicable rule but, rather, the court faces the situation where the federal law clearly provides a maritime avenue for recovery, under Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock, which a state statute, if applied, would bar. That is, if the court were to apply the Tennessee Recreational Use Statute, the plaintiff and counter-plaintiffs would be barred from pursuing federal maritime causes of action for negligence. Under the Supreme Court’s regime established in Moragne and Yamaha, this is precisely the situation in which a state law should not be applied. See also Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615, 617-18 (4th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>); St. Hilaire Moye v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 973,
holding that the general rule of maritime law that parties bear their own costs coupled with the need for uniformity in federal maritime law precludes the application of state attorneys fee statutes such as texas civ prac  remcode  38001 to maritime contract disputes holding that a state law cannot be applied where its application would defeat an otherwise meritorious maritime cause of action recognizing cause of action holding that while the fourteenth amendment is directed against state action and not private action the state action requirement is met in a civil action where state law is applied whether by statute or common law holding that general maritime law preempts state law