process. See Iowa Const. art. I, §§ 9, 10. In order to justify a different result under our state constitution, then, there must be some principled basis for distinguishing at least one of these two provisions from the federal law as enunciated in Nichols. We find no persuasive reason to disagree with Nichols on the facts and arguments presented in this case, and therefore we decline to interpret the Iowa Constitution to afford more protection than the federal constitution with respect to the use of prior uncounseled misdemeanor convictions. We begin by pointing out that the state right-to-counsel and due-process provisions are textually similar to their federal counterparts. Compare U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV, with Iowa Const. art. I, §§ 9, 10. But see RACI II, 675 N.W.2d at 5 n. 2 (<HOLDING>). For this reason, past construction of the
holding that lsacc art 160 prior to its amendment in 1979 was unconstitutional as a violation of the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions recognizing significant differences in text of state and federal equal protection clauses holding that the state law violated equal protection principles holding that the due process and equal protection clauses do not trigger tucker act jurisdiction in the courts holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection