therefor....” 17 Del. C. § 132(c)(4). The General Assembly further granted Del-DOT the power to do “whatever is incidental and germane to the scope of the duties and powers conferred on it by law.” 17 Del. C. § 132(d). Statutes that vest the power of eminent domain in an agency must be strictly construed, however, because, by their operative nature, they subjugate the rights of private property owners to the greater public need. State ex rel. Sharp v. 0.6878 Acres of Land, 105 A.2d 205, 206 (Del.Super.1954). Despite the strict construction we must accord 17 Del. C. § 132, our overriding goal is to determine the intent of the legislature. In this vein, we note that the Superior Court has construed the statute to allow DelDOT to condemn pro N.C.App. 609, 456 S.E.2d 842, 845-46 (1995) (<HOLDING>). The same rationale is applicable here. Were
holding that members of the board of trustees of an elementary school had standing to challenge the actions of the county board of education because they suffered an actual injury when the county board nullified their unanimous vote to reject a candidate for principal of the elementary school holding that a county ordinance imposing an impact fee on new residential construction to be used for new school facilities did not constitute an unauthorized delegation of power from the county to the school board because the fundamental policy decisions were made by the county and the discretion of the school board was sufficiently limited holding that the district court was authorized to remand the proceedings to the board where the board failed to make required findings holding that county board of education was statutorily authorized to condemn land for use as wetlands mitigation as necessary to construction of new athletic facilities holding that while dibc appears to be in the habit of unilaterally condemning land that it does not own the bridge company must be treated as a private entity lacking authority to condemn land