specifically intended to promote the mail fraud scheme. Finally, Bohn contends that his money laundering convictions are subject to dismissal because there was no evidence that he intended to aid IDM in concealing the source of the funds. The money laundering counts charge Bohn with violating two subsections of the money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A) and § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i). Subsection (a)(2)(A) requires proof of intent to promote the carrying on of unlawful activity, while subsection (a)(2)(B)® requires proof of knowledge that the transportation was designed to conceal the proceeds of the unlawful activity. Although the government indicted on both subsections, it was only required to prove one or the other. See United States v. Hixon, 987 F.2d 1261, 1265 (6th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Westine, No. 92-3664, 1994
holding that the government did not have to prove that the defendant knew that his acts violated the clean water act but merely that he was aware of the conduct that resulted in the permits violation holding that under rico plaintiff must prove an injury because of violation of statute holding that government may prove facts outside the overt acts alleged in the indictment holding that when an indictment charges several acts conjunctively under a statute which subjects several alternative acts to the same punishment the government need only prove violation of one of the alleged acts to prove violation of the statute holding that when an indictment charges several acts in the conjunctive  the verdict stands if the evidence is sufficient with respect to any one of the acts charged