Ford Motor Credit Company, filed this suit against appellees Mells for writ of possession of an automobile. The appellant alleges in the complaint that it sold this automobile to the appellees under a retail installment contract, of which the appellees are in default. The appellant seeks to exercise its option under the contract to accelerate the unpaid principal balance. The appellees filed a counterclaim alleging, inter alia, that the appellant violated TILA and Regulation Z by failing to state in the contract the terms of the acceleration clause. The parties’ contract does state that in the event of voluntary prepayment there shall be a rebate of the unearned portion of the finance charge computed under the “sum of the digits” method af Cir. 1978), clarified 576 F2d 1156 (1978) (<HOLDING>). In Milhollin, the United States District
holding that the existence of the acceleration clause is required to be disclosed except when the creditor is under a legal obligation to treat acceleration and voluntary prepayment alike for rebate purposes holding lender loses right to a premium when it elects to accelerate the debt and declining to allow lender to avoid the consequences of its choice of acceleration holding that when a creditor is oversecured solvency is not required for the creditor to be entitled to postpetition interest and fees and granting contractual default interest to the oversecured creditor of approximately 24 holding that the equal protection clause is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike recognizing that when a creditor does not receive adequate notice the creditor is not bound by the confirmation order