only exposure to media reports, rather than formation of opinions, or because other responses from these potential jurors during general voir dire adequately demonstrated that no opinions had been formed. ¶ 17. The court carefully considered defendant’s requests and properly exercised its discretion. We emphasize that defendant makes no claim that any of the jurors who remained on the panel should have been dismissed for cause; it is only the procedure he challenges. Denial of permission for individual voir dire on the issue of exposure to pretrial publicity was within the judge’s discretion and reversible only under “extraordinary circumstances.” Woodmansee v. Stoneman, 133 Vt. 449, 456, 344 A.2d 26, 30 (1975); see also State v. Calloway, 157 Vt. 217, 218-20, 596 A.2d 368, 370 (1991) (<HOLDING>). No extraordinary circumstances are shown here
holding that the trial court in a sexual assault case erred by refusing to allow evidence of prior testimony by the complainant in an unrelated rape prosecution holding the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow a question to prospective jurors on their feelings against recommending probation as punishment in a murder case holding trial court did not err by refusing to allow counsel to question potential jurors on personal exposure to sexual assault and instead asking all jurors a general question about fairness and impartiality in a sexual assault case holding that merger did not apply because sexual assault was not a lesser included offense of seconddegree kidnapping involving sexual assault holding that the trial court did not err by allowing the prosecution to question prospective jurors regarding their ability to announce a death sentence in an appropriate case