[the child’s] placement. [The therapist] noted her understanding that the district court would be making a decision on permanency issues. Thus, [the therapist] clearly prepared the ... letter in anticipation of litigation, and the district court abused its discretion in admitting the letter.” 662 N.W.2d at 161. Likewise, we conclude that Rule 803(6) was not a basis for admitting the Court Report in this case. Much of the information in the report (which, for the most part, spans a 10-year period, with some information extending as far back as 30 years to the mother’s childhood) was not timely recorded. Rule 803(6) states that a business record will be admissible only if it is made “at or near the time” of the events it reports. See United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 760 (D.C.Cir.1979)(<HOLDING>). The title of Cowart’s report, “Court Report
holding that the exception to the general rule applied even though the court did not specifically rule the evidence was inadmissible because the ruling was definitive and reached the ultimate issue of admissibility holding that computer data compiled in the ordinary course of business and presented in computer printouts prepared for trial is admissible under rule 8036 holding that the victims statement was inadmissible when made two to three hours after victim was allegedly raped because the victims testimony supported the conclusion that her statement was made with conscious reflection holding that because the record in the case had not been developed sufficiently to determine whether a childs statement was admissible under the tender years exception a new trial was warranted holding that a bankdeposit record prepared two years after the deposit was allegedly made was inadmissible under the businessrecords exception of rule 8036 fedrevid