disclosure in any instance would pose the hazard that Congress foresaw.” Am. Jewish Cong. v. Kreps, 574 F.2d 624, 628-29 (D.C.Cir.1978). Therefore, “only explicit nondisclosure statutes that evidence a congressional determination that certain materials ought to be kept in confidence will be sufficient to qualify under the exemption.” Irons and Sears v. Dann, 606 F.2d 1215, 1220 (D.C.Cir.1979). See generally Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Norton, 309 F.3d 26, 37 (D.C.Cir. 2002). In these cases, the DOC relies on several statutes that qualify as Exemption 3 nondisclosure statutes and thus permit its withholding of docume 35 U.S.C. § 122, prohibiting disclosure of patent applications and information pertaining to such applications. See Irons & Sears v. Dann, 606 F.2d 1215 (D.C.Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). Sixth, the DOC properly invokes Federal Rule
holding that rule 6e qualifies as a statute for purposes of exemption 3 holding a debtors claim for loss of consortium to be entitled to an exemption under the oklahoma exemption statute and collecting other bankruptcy decisions recognizing a debtor spouses loss of consortium as the basis for allowing an exemption under federal and various state exemption statutes holding that various versions of the statute qualify as an exemption 3 statute holding that  6103 qualifies as an exemption statute holding that the statute qualifies as an exemption 3 statute