(1) The district court did not abuse its discretion in conducting voir dire on the effect of pre-trial publicity. See United States v. Dischner, 974 F.2d 1502, 1522-23 (9th Cir.1992), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Morales, 108 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc). The court’s inquiry revealed that a limited number of jurors had been exposed to the publicity, and that few had formed opinions about the guilt of defendants. Cf. Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627, 635-39 (9th Cir.1968) (<HOLDING>). The voir dire was adequate to ensure a
holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the defendants motions to dismiss jurors for cause when they all proclaimed that they could be impartial even though one juror admitted to a leaning towards a guilty verdict based upon pretrial publicity holding that notwithstanding that the case generated massive pretrial publicity a motion to change venue was not improperly denied as such pretrial publicity was not presumptively prejudicial because it consisted of straight news stories relating cold hard facts  holding that even where there is inflammatory pretrial publicity an adequate coolingoff period between the publication of such material and the trial which in crews was six to eight months together with the trial courts exercise of its discretion to evaluate bias and impartiality during voir dire sufficiently supported the trial courts conclusion that pretrial publicity did not prevent the capital defendant from receiving a fair trial by an impartial jury recognizing that the relatively small population of the trial venue is a factor in assessing pretrial publicity but holding that the record pointed to a community able to supply a sufficient pool of unbiased potential jurors holding that the district court should have engaged in a more detailed inquiry when pretrial publicity was vast a third of potential jurors had an opinion about the guilt of the defendant and all jurors selected had been exposed to pretrial publicity