the speech was on a matter of public concern; (3) whether the government’s interests, as employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public service are sufficient to outweigh the plaintiffs free speech interests; (4) whether the protected speech was a motivating factor in the adverse employment action; and (5) whether the defendant would have reached the same employment decision in the absence of the protected conduct. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “The first three elements are issues of law for the court to decide, while the last two are factual issues typically decided by the jury.” Id. The parties agree that Denton’s testimony at the arbitration hearing was not part of his official duties and was therefore protected speech. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (<HOLDING>). “At the second step, we determine whether the
holding that under the first amendment speech can be pursuant to a public employees official job duties even though it is not required by or included in the employees job description or in response to a request by the employer holding that the plaintiffs first amendment retaliation claims are deficient because in each case the incidents upon which plaintiffs base their pleadings concerned personal grievances expressed as employees generally relating to their official duties work schedules working conditions or employer administrative policies and internal operations rather than to any matters of public concern raised by plaintiffs as private citizens holding that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties the employees are not speaking as citizens for first amendment purposes and the constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline holding that probation department employees are not county employees holding that the first amendment does not prohibit managerial discipline based on an employees expressions made pursuant to official responsibilities