In exchange for a favorable plea, Edens apparently could have provided valuable testimony undermining Lemons’ defense. Edens had witnessed the conspiratorial conversation that took place between Lemons and Rider and arguably could have testified that Lemons was not forced to participate in the robbery, contrary to Lemons’ claim. It appears that Edens was the least culpable defendant in this case and his observations regarding his more culpable codefendant Lemons might have been offered in exchange for a plea agreement with the government. No such effort was made on Edens’ behalf because such an arrangement would have been in direct conflict with Lemons’ defense. See Baty v. Balkcom, 661 F.2d 391, 397 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1011, 102 S.Ct. 2307, 73 L.Ed.2d 1308 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Edens contends that Schultz failed
recognizing a potential conflict when defense counsel is currently representing in another matter either the victim of the crime or a prosecution witness holding that it was immaterial for conflict of interest purposes whether one attorney or two attorneys in the same firm represented the witness and the defendant holding the existence of a possible conflict required remand for a determination of whether an actual conflict of interest existed and holding a new trial would be required if an actual conflict existed holding that defense counsel suffered from an actual conflict of interest in representing two codefendants because had the attorney not been facing a conflict of interest he might have been able to negotiate a plea agreement on one defendants behalf in return for becoming a prosecution witness against the eodefendant recognizing the conflict