of the Customs official on the protest form”; quoting Sony Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 26 CIT 286, 287, 2002 WL 312774 (2002) for the proposition that " ‘[t]he test for determining the validity and scope of a protest is objective and independent of a Customs official’s subjective reaction to it' "); Ammex, 27 CIT at 1682, 1685, 288 F.Supp.2d at 1380, 1382 (rejecting plaintiff’s claim that “the parties' prior communications” and " 'surrounding circumstances' could help to ascertain the content” of protest); Power-One Inc. v. United States, 23 CIT 959, 964, 83 F.Supp.2d 1300, 1305 (1999) (stating that "[t]he test for determining if a submission is a protest is objective and independent of a Customs official's subjective reaction to it”); Washington Int’l Ins. Co., 16 CIT at 602-04 (<HOLDING>); Mattel, 72 Cust.Ct. at 266, 377 F.Supp. at
holding that rookerfeldman did not bar the plaintiffs federal action where a pennsylvania state court had previously dismissed the plaintiffs petition for review of an agencys decision for failure to comply with the pennsylvania rules of appellate procedure since the extent of the plaintiffs compliance with those rules had no bearing on the merits of the plaintiffs constitutional claims holding that plaintiffs knowledge was not based upon the public disclosures because plaintiffs knowledge was independent of those disclosures holding plaintiffs did not have actual knowledge of pfizers breach until they learned during the mullins trial in 1995 that pfizer anticipated the offering of the 1991 vso as early as the spring of 1990 and therefore it arguably misrepresented present facts when responding to plaintiffs inquiries reasoning we do not hold today that erisa plaintiffs cannot bring an action until they receive information that would not normally be obtained only after conducting discovery nor are we saying that the plaintiffs in this case could not in good faith have commenced an action upon learning of the 1991 vso rather we conclude only that the district court erred in holding that as a matter of law plaintiffs are barred from filing their action under erisas threeyear actual knowledge statute of limitations holding that cafas requirement of 100 or more plaintiffs refers only to actual named plaintiffs holding that plaintiffs fatally deficient protest cannot be resuscitated by plaintiffs conjecture that customs had actual knowledge of plaintiffs claimed classification