in dismissing him from the EPHD program. For an equal protection claim to survive a motion for summary judgment premised on qualified immunity, the plaintiff “must demonstrate that the governmental official was motivated by intentional discrimination on the basis of race.” Felton v. Polles, 2000 WL 33968259, at **2-3 (S.D.Miss. Jan.14, 2000) (citations omitted); Tate v. Waller, 2006 WL 3103005, *3 (S.D.Miss.2006). The qualified immunity analysis is thus essentially a merits analysis: When an official’s intent or the reasons for his or her actions are an essential element of the underlying violation, we have treated factual disputes over intent just like any other factual dispute that can justify a denial of qualified immunity. See Tompkins v. Vickers, 26 F.3d 603, 607-10 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); see also Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch.
holding that the first amendment right of access applies to a summary judgment motion in a civil case holding that the existence of probable cause for an arrest is a complete defense to a first amendment retaliation claim under the doctrine of qualified immunity holding that the existence of genuine issues of material facts render not appealable a pretrial denial of summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity holding that the existence of a retaliatory motive was a factual issue that precluded summary judgment on qualified immunity in a first amendment case in which a teacher claimed that he had been transferred in retaliation for criticizing the school superintendent holding that the court lacked appellate jurisdiction over a partial summary judgment on liability in a qualified immunity case