procedurally defaulted. Absent cause and prejudice or a miscarriage of justice, a federal habeas court may not review constitutional claims when a state court has declined to consider their merits on the basis of an adequate and independent state procedural rule. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989). The procedural rule at issue here is N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1419(a)(3) (2005), which provides that a claim is defaulted if the petitioner could have raised it in a previous appeal but failed to do so. The MAR court determined that the facts underlying Wilkinson’s Sixth Amendment claim were presented on the face of the trial record, and thus the claim could have been raised on direct appeal, see State v. Fair, 354 N.C. 131, 557 S.E.2d 500, 525 (2001) (<HOLDING>). Wilkinson does not dispute the general
holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record holding that to the extent defendants claim is one of ineffective assistance of counsel it is not cognizable on direct appeal and rule 2915 is the exclusive procedure by which a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be advanced holding ineffective assistance of counsel claims may be decided on direct appeal where the district court has developed a record on the ineffectiveness issue holding that defendants claim for ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest was not cognizable on direct appeal holding that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must be raised on direct appeal when the facts supporting the claim are presented on the face of the record