1002-03, 1022-24. Consistent with this perspective, absent a statute allowing for survival, a deceased claimant’s personal injury claim could not be asserted by heirs or an estate. See McClure v. Johnson, 50 Ariz. 76, 81, 69 P.2d 573, 575 (1937). Many courts concluded that whether a claim would survive the claimant’s death should also determine whether it could be assigned during the claimant’s life and applied this test to both personal injury and other claims. See, e.g., Comegys v. Vasse, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 193, 213, 7 L.Ed. 108 (1828) (dicta noting that “mere personal torts, which die with the party, and do not survive to his personal representatives, are not capable of passing by assignment.”); United Verde Extension Mining Co. v. Ralston, 37 Ariz. 554, 559-60, 296 P. 262, 264 (1931) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 10 This “survivability” test did not itself
holding that termite damage does not fall within the meaning of property damage in the policy because the alleged misrepresentations did not cause the damage the termites did holding assignable to injured party insureds claim against insurer for judgment in excess of policy limits holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred the claims in the case were still ripe for review holding that claims for property damage would survive and thus were assignable holding that a similar exclusion denies coverage for property damage to the particular part of the real property that is the subject of the insureds work at the time of the damage if the damage arises out of those operations