to modify his religious behavior in any way — it involves no action or forbearance on his part, nor [did] it otherwise interfere with any religious act in which he engages. Although the government’s activities with him fluid or tissue sample after the [Bureau of Prisons] takes it may offend Kaemmerling’s religious beliefs, they [could not] be said to hamper his religious exercise because they do not “pressure [him] to modify his behavior and to violate his . beliefs.” Id. at 679 (emphasis added) (quoting Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718, 101 S.Ct. 1425). Because Kaemmerling did not have to “modify his religious behavior,” there was no burden, much less a substantial burden, on the exercise of his religion. Id. (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 696-703, 106 S.Ct. 2147, 90 L.Ed.2d 735 (1986) (<HOLDING>)). When a plaintiff is compelled or pressured
holding that an action is considered adverse if it is capable of deterring a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct holding that theft from the person is not a crime of violence holding that the interference caused by the governments referring to a person using a social security number which the person or her parents believe will  rob the spirit of the person and prevent her from attaining greater spiritual power is not a substantial burden because it does not affirmatively compel appellees by threat of sanctions to refrain from religiously motivated conduct or to engage in conduct that they find objectionable for religious reasons holding a person is not an accomplice if the person knew about the offense and failed to disclose it or helped the accused conceal it holding with no analysis that any person or organization who may be legally liable therefor applies to a person legally liable for injuries caused by an accident   4 when under the facts of the case the only person to whom the clause could have applied was a tortfeasor