Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974)). 52 . See K.S.A. §§ 75-4352-4353. 53 . The Court notes that Loggins’ claim fails even under this precedent. See Lujan v. United States, 209 F.2d 190, 192 (10th Cir.1953) (stating "the trial court is necessarily accorded a wide discretion in determining the fitness of the person called, and the exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on review in the absence of some evidence from which prejudice can be inferred”). Loggins has not shown any evidence from which prejudice can be inferred as there was another impartial sworn interpreter checking for accuracy and Loggins used the testimony to his benefit during trial. 54 .See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 127 S.Ct. 649, 654, 166 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006) (<HOLDING>). 55 . Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 740
holding that state court could not have unreasonably applied federal law if no clear supreme court precedent existed holding that the ninth circuit improperly granted habeas relief because the state courts decision that it was not inherently prejudicial when court spectators wore buttons depicting the murder victim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law holding that a state court cannot be said to have unreasonably applied clearly established federal law under  2254d1 when there are no holdings from the supreme court addressing the issue raised by the petitioner holding state court could not have unreasonably applied clearly established federal law given the lack of holdings from the supreme court regarding the potentially prejudicial effect of spectators courtroom conduct holding that where the supreme court has expressly left an open question circuit precedent is immaterial and there is no clearly established law for the state court to have unreasonably applied