unambiguous assertion of his right to counsel, and therefore declined to suppress statements made by .the suspect to the police after making that statement. Id. at 462, 114 S.Ct. 2350. The government urges this Court to import the demanding Davis standard for invocation of the right to counsel into the right-to-silence context. Many courts have done just that. E.g., Simmons v. Bowersox, 235 F.3d 1124, 1131 (8th Cir.2001); United States v. Hurst, 228 F.3d 751, 759-60 (6th Cir.2000); United States v. Banks, 78 F.3d 1190, 1197-98 (7th Cir.1996), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Mills v. United States, 519 U.S. 990, 117 S.Ct. 478, 136 L.Ed.2d 373 (1996); Coleman v. Singletary, 30 F.3d 1420, 1424 (11th Cir.1994). This Court is one of them. Bui v. DiPaolo, 985 F.Supp. 219, 227 (D.Mass.1997) (<HOLDING>), aff'd on other grounds, 170 F.3d 232 (1st
holding that a defendants statement that he did not want to talk about what he did the night before but was willing to talk about lighter subjects was not an unequivocal invocation of his right to remain silent in part because the defendant previously exhibited willingness to talk with police holding testimony that defendant had no response to question during police interview was not impermissible comment on his constitutional right to remain silent where defendant had voluntarily waived his miranda rights recognizing that davis was concerned only with the right to counsel and not the right to remain silent holding that a suspects invocation of the right to remain silent must be unequivocal to require that police questioning cease holding that a suspects statements to the police to the effect that his constitution will protect him that the police have nothing along with his negative response to a police question whether he had anything to say about what he was being arrested for followed by his question who said i did this did not amount to a clear invocation of the right to remain silent under davis