the fact that BAPCPA does not add attorneys to the expanded list of specific payees does not overrule Kline. Attorneys were not mentioned as payees in the pre-BAPCPA statute under which Kline was decided, but the Eighth Circuit ruled that a fee owed to an attorney could nevertheless be a non-dischargeable support debt. For these reasons, this Court will follow the rule established by Kline as binding precedent. But see Tucker v. Oliver, 423 B.R. 378, 381 (W.D.Okla.2010) (asserting that section 101(14A) adds additional groups of persons as payees and is reformatted as four separate requirements, suggesting Congress’ conscious decision to focus on the precise debts within the scope of the provision); Shaver v. Forgette (In re Forgette), 379 B.R. 623, 625-26 (Bankr.W.D.Va.2007)(<HOLDING>); Loe, Warren, Rosenfield, Katcher, Hibbs &
holding that effect of bankruptcy discharge under arizona law is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debtor holding that an entity engaged in collection activity on a defaulted debt acquired from another is a debt collector under the fdcpa even though it may actually be owed the debt holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or holding that debt collectors have no obligation to warn a consumer that her debt may increase over time holding that vehicle debt imposed on debtor by divorce court was debt owed to or recoverable by financing bank not exwife so not a domestic support obligation