from the present ease because, in Sinyard, the defendant did not claim that his sentence was a violation of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, but, rather, claimed only that his sentence was not authorized by the applicable statute. Id.; see also State v. Trujillo, 2002-NMSC-005, ¶ 64, 131 N.M. 709, 42 P.3d 814 (distinguishing Sinyard on this basis). In Trujillo, we expressly held that a sentence authorized by statute, but claimed to be cruel and unusual punishment under the state and federal constitutions, does not implicate the jurisdiction of the sentencing court and, therefore, may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Trujillo, 2002-NMSC-005, ¶64 n. 4, 131 N.M. 709, 42 P.3d 814; see also State v. Burdex, 100 N.M. 197, 201, 668 P.2d 313, 317 (Ct.App.1983) (<HOLDING>). Because Defendant’s sentence was authorized
holding the constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment may be waived holding that standing is a jurisdictional issue that can be raised for the first time on appeal holding that a cruel and unusual punishment claim is not jurisdictional and therefore may not be raised for the first time on appeal holding that what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is a question of law holding cruel and unusual punishment complaint not preserved