to punish Ms. Giron’s disobedience of her orders. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 35-3-9 (1978); N.M. R. Magis. Ct. RCP Rule 2-110(A)(l) & (3). Thus, when the judge ordered Ms. Giron in court to come back and act as an interpreter, and then in the clerk’s office again ordered her to return to the courtroom to perform her services, she possessed jurisdiction in both situations to punish Ms. Giron’s refusal with contempt. See, e.g., Crooks, 913 F.2d at 701 (rejecting contention that power to sanction for contempt is valid only when the contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence of the court or the judge at chambers and, instead, determining the term “court” refers “to the person of the judge, acting in his official capacity, wherever he may be”). See, e.g., Dean, 547 F.2d at 231 (<HOLDING>). We also reject Ms. Giron’s contention
holding that because the circuit court did not have subjectmatter jurisdiction over the unlawfuldetainer action the district courts unauthorized transfer of the action could not transfer jurisdiction over that action to the circuit court holding over holding that the district court retained jurisdiction to resolve a dispute over an injunction bond even where the underlying dispute had itself been dismissed for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction holding judge who issued contempt citation over attorney who made statements outside courtroom immediately after trial and while court was out of session retained subjectmatter jurisdiction over criminal action holding a district court lost subjectmatter jurisdiction over the merits of the case when it issued an order of dismissal without prejudice