the plaintiffs burden on the ultimate issue at trial.” -(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Wright v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 91 F.3d 1105, 1107 (8th Cir.1996) (“We do not require a mathematically precise table equating levels of exposure with levels of harm, but there must be evidence from which a reasonable person could conclude that a defendant’s emission has probably caused a particular plaintiff the kind of harm of which he or she complains.... ”); Henricksen v. ConocoPhillips Co., 605 F.Supp.2d 1142, 1157 (E.D.Wash.2009) (“[I]t is not always necessary for a plaintiff to quantify exposure levels precisely or use the dose-response relationship, provided that whatever methods an expert uses to establish causation are generally accepted d 248, 252-53 (1st Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Although Judge Workman expressed concern that
holding that differential diagnosis rendered expert opinion on causation sufficiently reliable for admission holding that lower court abused its discretion in excluding plaintiffs expert where experts opinion was based on a differential diagnosis rather than epidemiologic evidence holding that an expert opinion on a question of law is inadmissible holding that a reliable differential diagnosis alone may provide a valid foundation for a causation opinion even when no epidemiological studies peerreviewed published studies animal studies or laboratory data are offered in support of the opinion holding that testimony of defense expert on false confessions properly excluded as not sufficiently reliable