‘questions or allusions which suggest that a driver has or has not been charged with a traffic violation’ are considered sufficiently prejudicial to require a new trial.” Golden v. Tipton, 723 So.2d 871, 871 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (quoting Moore v. Taylor Concrete & Supply Co., 553 So.2d 787, 790 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)). For instance, in Golden, we concluded that the appellant was entitled to a new trial because the trial court denied a motion for mistrial made after the appellee implied in response to a question from his lawyer that the appellant had received a traffic citation as a result of the collision between the two parties. See 723 So.2d at 871. We held that the trial court abused its discretion, notwithstanding its instruction to the jury to disregard the te 4th DCA 1998) (<HOLDING>); Budget Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Jana, 600
holding that the trial court reversibly erred in denying the appellants motion for mistrial following the investigating officers affirmative response to the appellees counsels question of whether any traffic citations had been issued as a result of the parties collision holding that the trial court reversibly erred in denying the appellants motion for mistrial given the appellees testimony that we dont have no ticket for that accident notwithstanding the fact that the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the comment holding that the trial court reversibly erred in denying the appellants motion for mistrial following the appellees negative response to his attorneys question of whether he had been cited for a traffic violation following the parties accident and concluding that the question and answer were highly improper and prejudicial and that the harm was hot cured by the trial courts instruction to the jury holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants motion for mistrial where the trial court sustained defendants objections to a question by the prosecutor containing improper information and instructed the jury to disregard the question holding that there was no abuse of discretion in denying mistrial based on a comment that the defendant was in prison where the comment provided the jury with little detail