child reaches the age of majority — his parents’ Fourteenth Amendment right to his companionship is extinguished. Russ, 414 F.3d at 791. But that is not the argument Mehserle makes as to Grant’s relationship with his father. See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Wu, 626 F.3d 483, 487-88 (9th Cir.2010) (recalling previous admonishments that we decline to address arguments not made distinctly in an appellant’s opening brief). Moreover, in past cases, we have recognized a parent’s right to a child’s companionship without regard to the child’s age. See Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744, 748 & n. 1 (9th Cir.1986) (recognizing, at least in passing, parents’ right to the companionship and society of their deceased 22-year-old son); see, e.g., Lee, 250 F.3d at 685-86 (<HOLDING>); Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1419
holding a mother on appeal must successfully challenge a trial courts finding that there was no substantial and continuing change of circumstances of the children or mother before she can succeed on her claim that the trial court erred in overruling her motion to modify custody holding that a mother successfully stated a violation of the fourteenth amendment by alleging that the los angeles police department recklessly deprived her of the companionship of her mentally disabled adult son holding that a parentchild relationship between two independent adults does not invoke constitutional companionship interests and noting in dicta that even if it were to hold that right existed mere negligence does not implicate the due process clause and the mother had not alleged that the officer who shot her adult son acted with more than negligence concerning her rights holding that debtor who was separated from her husband and who testified that she would only return to the marital home if her husband vacated the house or died or if she was required to care for him or her adult son there or if the couple reconciled was an abandonment of the marital home as her homestead holding that mother did not waive the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction by failing to raise it in her first responsive pleading ie her answer to dhrs  petition to terminate her parental rights because the mother sought leave to amend her answer to include the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction  dhr did not object to that motion and  the juvenile court allowed the mother to amend her answer