1116 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Miguel, 338 F.3d 995, 1004 (9th Cir. 2003)). ¶17 The Indiana Court of Appeals employed similar reasoning in upholding its state’s analogous juvenile waiver statute. Villalon, 956 N.E.2d at 702-04. The court recognized that, [a]s a practical matter, a child who is alleged to have committed a delinquent act and is not retained in the juvenile justice system but is waived into adult court will (if found guilty) face harsher consequences for his or her conduct. Nonetheless, Ice makes clear that not all judicial fact-finding ultimately resulting in an increased term of incarceration invades the province of the jury. . . . Villalon provides no argument as to how our juvenile waiver statute might be unders , 765 N.E.2d 1071, 262 Ill. Dec. 463 (2002) (<HOLDING>); State v. Jones, 273 Kan. 756, 778, 47 P.3d
holding missouri transfer rule did not violate equal protection holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection holding that transfer was proper remedy for improper venue even though the issue of transfer was not raised until the motion hearing in circuit court holding that the apprendi rule was not implicated because a juvenile transfer proceeding does not involve sentencing or a determination of guilt or innocence holding that the states transfer statute did not violate the apprendi rule because the transfer hearing determines not the minors guilt but the forum in which his guilt may be adjudicated