to be no published decision by a Pennsylvania state appellate court addressing whether a party may stipulate to choice of law. Courts in other jurisdictions have enforced parties’ explicit and implicit choice of law stipulations. See e.g., Tehran-Berkeley Civil & Envtl. Eng’rs v. Tippetts-Abbett-McCarthy-Stratton, 888 F.2d 239, 242 (2d Cir.1989) (applying New York law because parties’ briefs relied on New York law and “implied consent to use a forum’s law is sufficient to establish choice of law”); City of Clinton, Ill. v. Moffit, 812 F.2d 341, 342 (7th Cir. 1987) (“Litigants can, by stipulation, formal or informal, agree on the substantive law to be applied to their case, within broad limits not exceeded here.”); Cates v. Morgan Portable Bldg. Co., 780 F.2d 683, 687 (7th Cir. 1985) (<HOLDING>); Mellon Bank v. Aetna Bus. Credit Inc., 619
holding that intent of parties to choice of law must be given effect holding that the implied consent to new york law manifest in the parties briefs was sufficient to establish choice of law holding that parties implicitly stipulated to choice of law holding that party waived an objection to choice of law holding that under texas choice of law principles contractual choice of law provisions are generally upheld