374, 380, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005). “To be unreasonable, the decision must not only be incorrect, but so incorrect that it lies outside of the range of reasonable conclusions.” Jones v. Wallace, 525 F.3d 500, 503 (7th Cir.2008). In analyzing the reasonableness of the state court’s decision on a factual matter, we assume that the state court’s factual determinations are correct unless the defendant rebuts them with clear and convincing evidence. Mack v. McCann, 530 F.3d 523, 533 (7th Cir.2008); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Crockett’s appeal implicates both the legal and factual components of AEDPA. He argues that: (1) the Illinois Appellate Court erred in concluding that the trial judge did not commit constitutional error when it failed to S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 529,
holding that a defendant was entitled to counsel at a postindictment lineup holding that lineup was admissible even where the defendant stood out because of a facial scar and a filed down tooth holding that the same waiver standard applies when assessing whether a defendant has waived his sixth amendment right to counsel during a postindictment interrogation as when assessing whether a defendant has waived his fifth amendment right to counsel preindictment holding that a criminal defendant has a sixth amendment right to counsel at trial holding that at resentencing the district court was entitled to assume that the waiver was still in effect and was not required to again advise defendant of his right to counsel where defendant had waived counsel at the plea stage