until the statute of limitations had run) would continue to have a significant chilling effect on the defendant’s exercise of its First Amendment rights. At that point, the plaintiff would have accomplished all the wrongdoing that triggers the defendant’s eligibility for attorney’s fees, but the defendant would be cheated of redress. Coltrain v. Shewalter, 66 Cal.App.4th 94, 106-07, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 600 (1998), as modified (Sept. 4, 1998). Thus, consistent with the courts of the Ninth Circuit and of this state, the Court will consider the merits of Attorney Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion, in spite of Plaintiffs voluntary dismissal, for the limited purpose of determining whether Attorney Defendants are “prevailing defendants” under the statute. See, e.g., id. at 107, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 600 (<HOLDING>); Moore v. Liu, 69 Cal.App.4th 745, 751, 81
holding that a defendant is the prevailing party within the meaning of statutory provisions awarding attorneys fees to the prevailing party even when the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the action holding that where the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses an alleged slapp suit while a special motion to strike is pending the trial court has discretion to determine whether the defendant is the prevailing party for purposes of attorneys fees under code of civil procedure section 42516 subdivision c holding that a defendant who is voluntarily dismissed with or without prejudice after filing a section 42516 motion to strike is nevertheless entitled to have the merits of such motion heard as a predicate to a determination of the defendants motion for attorneys fees and costs under subdivision c of that section holding award of attorneys fees to party prevailing on contract claim is mandatory under section 38001 if there is proof of the reasonableness of the fees holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees