v. Ramey, 177 Ga. App. 512, 513 (1) (339 SE2d 735) (1986) (“When a verdict has been received by the clerk of the court, and read at the direction of the judge, it has been published.”); Haughton v. Judsen, 116 Ga. App. 308, 311 (2) (157 SE2d 297) (1967) (“The record indicates that when the jury had reached a consensus and returned to the box the judge inquired of them whether they had reached verdicts in the cases; one of them replied that they had and the judge then directed the clerk to receive and publish the verdicts. Thereupon the clerk took the petitions on which the verdicts had been written and read the verdicts in open court. This constitutes a publication.”). 27 Groves, 162 Ga. at 162. 28 Id. 29 Cf. Blueford v. Arkansas,_U. S._,_(II) (A) (132 SCt 2044, 182 LE2d 937) (2012) (<HOLDING>); State v. Lane, 218 Ga. App. 126, 126-27 (460
holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to seconddegree murder and agreed to testify against codefendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for firstdegree murder holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed firstdegree murder not on the theory by which it reached the verdict holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of firstdegree murder holding that trial court erred in granting plea in bar as to murder when prior to receipt and publication of fact that jury could not reach a verdict on murder count jury had indicated in notes to the trial court that it had acquitted defendant of murder and holding that there was no verdict until it was received and published in open court holding that despite forepersons earlier representations to the court that the jury was unanimous on acquittals for capital and firstdegree murder but hung as to lesser charges defendant was not entitled to double jeopardy because upon returning from further deliberations the foreperson stated only that they were unable to reach a verdict and gave no indication whether it was still the case that all 12 jurors believed the defendant not guilty of capital or firstdegree murder that 9 of them believed he was guilty of manslaughter or that a vote had not been taken on negligent homicide and noting that it was therefore possible for the defendants jury to revisit the offenses of capital and firstdegree murder notwithstanding its earlier votes and thus the forepersons report prior to the end of deliberations lacked the finality necessary to amount to an acquittal on those offenses quite apart from any requirement that a formal verdict be returned or judgment entered