supplied). This significant textual change does not suggest that courts should interpret OPA’s claims provision as having the same scope as CERCLA’s. On the contrary, the change in the text, combined-with evidence that Congress was aware of CERC-LA when it enacted OPA, suggests that Congress intended the change in OPA’s language to have substantive consequences and purposely rejected the CERCLA approach limiting the presentation requirement to those claims asserted against the Fund. See Brown, — U.S. at-, 115 S.Ct. at 556; NRA, — U.S. at-, 115 S.Ct. at 541-42. Appellants’ invocation of the doctrine of reading statutes in pari materia is misplaced. While it is true that similar statutes should be read consistently, see, e.g., Morales, 504 U.S. at 384 26 F.2d 1096, 1097 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Second, the doctrine of reading statutes in
holding notice provision in rcra and clean water act are virtually identical and citizens notice to violators under either act must strictly comply with statutory notice requirements holding that the limitation act does not apply to claims brought under the clean water act holding that rcras notice provision is a condition precedent to all claims holding that clean water acts notice provision is a condition precedent to all claims holding that adequate notice is a mandatory precondition of a clean water act citizen suit