interests ... are not limited by a few rigid, technical forms,” Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972), the Due Process Clause’s “procedural component does not protect everything that might be described as a benefit.” Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 749, 125 S.Ct. 2796, 162 L.Ed.2d 658 (2005) (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701). State law, contract, or a promise implied from circumstances, are generally sufficient to create a property interest protected by due process. See e.g., Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 538-39, 105 S.Ct. 1487 (finding that a state statute, permitting employee dismissal only for cause, created a property interest in continued employment); see also Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 742 (6th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Ramsey v. Bd. of Educ., 844 F.2d 1268, 1272
holding that a collective bargaining agreement between school board and teachers union established a teachers legitimate claim of entitlement to their positions at elementary school holding that a reprimand letter sent in response to a teachers union representation of a fellow employees grievance infringed on the teachers right of free association holding that the board of education violated a school teachers first amendment rights by dismissing him because he had criticized the board in a letter to the local newspaper holding that members of the board of trustees of an elementary school had standing to challenge the actions of the county board of education because they suffered an actual injury when the county board nullified their unanimous vote to reject a candidate for principal of the elementary school holding that the district was not liable under respondeat superior for a teachers sexual assault of a student even though it occurred on school grounds and during school hours because the criminal misconduct was not within the scope of the teachers employment