Rather, it appears only as an exhibit attached to Sensing’s "Motion for Sanctions on Account of Defendant's Spoilation of Evidence.” Nor is it apparent' whether the letter was properly authenticated as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). As such, it is unclear whether the letter itself was part of the “summary judgment record” before the district court. Nevertheless, we need not decide thi inition of "handicap” under Chapter 15 IB and "disability” under the ADA are virtually identical, and the SJC regularly applies ADA precedent to the interpretation of cases under the Massachusetts statute. See, e.g., Russell, 772 N.E.2d at 1062 n. 6; Labonte, 678 N.E.2d at 855 n. 5. Following the SJC’s example, we do the same. 16 . See also Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 88 (1st Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); Blackie v. State of Me., 75 F.3d 716, 725
holding that adverse employment actions include poor evaluations recognizing that employment actions can be adverse even if such actions are subsequently withdrawn holding that retaliatory discharge demotion or other adverse employment claims state a cause of action under  1981 holding that lesser actions than discharge refusal to hire refusal to promote demotion reduction in pay and reprimand may also be considered adverse employment actions in the first amendment retaliation context holding that adverse employment effects include but are not limited to such discrete actions as discharge demotion or reduction in pay