the special condition, resulting in our application of the plain error review, and the district court provided an express general statement of its reasoning for imposition of such a special condition. As to the other circuit court cases on which Mr. Larson relies, they are not only nonprecedential but distinguishable given the defendants, unlike Mr. Larson, did not withdraw their objections to the special conditions imposed so that the review was for an abuse of discretion, and the district courts, in imposing those special conditions, unlike here, failed to provide a general or otherwise adequate explanation or finding for the special condition imposed, and/or the record did not support imposition of such a condition. See United States v. Cope, 527 F.3d 944, 948-49, 955 (9th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Weber, 451 F.3d 552, 557-58,
holding that more than notice to a defendant is required holding development of medically informed records and ontherecord medicallygrounded findings are required where defendant objected to special condition of compelled medication for which he did not receive notice holding that factual findings set forth in the psi not objected to by a defendant are deemed admitted holding that party timely objected to appointment of special master and did not waive its right to object when it objected to appointment several days before it participated in proceedings before special master holding that administration of antipsychotic drugs was not shocking to the conscience where plaintiff did not allege that he objected to the medication