to be suspect. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980) (noting race as “the principal example” of a “suspect” classification). Where a challenged law burdens a suspect class, courts apply strict scrutiny to determine the constitutional validity of the provision. See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976). Such laws are “presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justification.” Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979). Courts apply an intermediate level of scrutiny to certain quasi-suspect classifications, such as those based upon sex, which “have traditionally been the touchstone for pervasive and often subtle discriminati 9th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). More recently, in Perry, 671 F.3d at 1080 ns.
holding that the state law violated equal protection principles holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection holding that because lawrence declined to address equal protection it did not disturb philips equal protection ruling under the rational basis standard of review holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause