assure that material testimony in a criminal case is presented at the trial. The majority argues that the arrest of a material witness and the continued detention of a material witness cannot be governed under different standards. They maintain, “It logically follows that if the basis for the arrest of a material witness is eliminated, there can be no basis for a continued detention.” But why? The two fact-specific cases cited by the majority do not support their broader proposition. In reality, it happens all the time that a person is arrested for one criminal charge but is then detained because of a different criminal charge even though the original grounds for arrest turned out on further investigation to be unsupported. See, e.g., State v. Bradford, 620 N.W.2d 503, 508 (Iowa 2000) (<HOLDING>). “Catch and release” is not required here. The
holding that reference to termination based on race in charge did not reasonably relate to unmentioned racial harassment holding that defendant was arrested  when the police officer took physical custody of him by grabbing his arm and returned him to the hotel for detention there holding that a charge that alleged discrimination on the basis of sex did not support a complaint for hostile environment sexual harassment holding that the initial stop by officer was based on reasonable suspicion that defendant was impersonating a police officer although another officer arrested defendant for privacy act violation holding police properly arrested defendant for harassment and noting propriety of subsequent detention based on different charge