stringently applied to prevent unjust discrimination, which was Congress's paramount purpose in authorizing the commission to set them. Id. at 163. The Court reasoned that because the filed rate was the legal rate, it could not be discriminatory. Id. at 164. Furthermore, the right defined by the tariff could not be varied or enlarged either by contract or by tort. Id. at 163. ¶ 11. The Supreme Court also reasoned that an injury implied the violation of a legal right and because the "instrument by which Keogh is alleged to have been damaged are rates approved by the Commission" he was not claiming an injury that implicated the viola tion of a legal right. Id. at 161. Stated another way, legal rights are established by the commission's set rates, which are reasonable as a matter 1 (1981) (<HOLDING>); Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 (1944)
holding that injury caused by criminal fleeing after stealing gas from gas station was not foreseeable result of stations policy of not requiring customers to prepay for gas holding that although the ngpa authorizes certain price ceilings for natural gas it is the gas sales contract not federal law that creates the right to receive any price at all holding that a natural gas producer could not sue a buyer of natural gas for breach of contract damages because to do so would cause the court to impose a rate other than that established by the federal agency recognizing the need for natural gas supply as a substantial public interest holding that an agencys policy shift reallocating the burden of proof from natural gas importers to parties opposing importation was based on a reasonable interpretation of the natural gas act