70 F.3d 1158, 1161 (10th Cir.1995). The majority errs, however, in concluding that “in this case, the government only challenges the district court’s legal determination that the methamphetamine was the ‘fruit’ of Mr. DeLuca’s illegal detention.” Id. (emphasis added). While the only issue presented to us is indeed whether the drugs seized were “fruit” of the officer’s illegal conduct, the district court’s determination of that matter is not a legal one. As this court has previously recognized, because taint analysis is “fact-intensive, we review the district court’s finding under a clearly erroneous standard.” United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1563 (10th Cir.1993) (citations omitted); see also Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Thus, whether Mr. DeLuca met his burden of
holding that only relevant factors must be considered holding that each defendants actions in a  1983 case must be considered individually recognizing that a 11 evidence must be relevant to be admissible holding that each element required under the act must be included in the written notice and each element must be sufficiently clear and accurate  holding that whether illegally seized evidence is sufficiently purged of its taint to be admissible must be answered on the facts of each case and listing factors to be considered