sovereign immunity and vested jurisdiction in this Court over that claim through the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702; see also Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Alaska R.R., 659 F.2d 243, 244 (D.C.Cir.1981) (stating that the Administrative Procedure Act “elimínateles] sovereign immunity defense[s] in all actions for specific, nonmonetary relief against a United States agency or officer acting in an official capacity”). Nonetheless, the Court finds that summary judgment in favor of FMS is warranted on the claim for injunctive relief. A motion to dismiss must be treated as a motion for summary judgment if “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d); see also Yates v. District of Columbia, 324 F.3d 724, 725 (D.C.Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Because both parties have submitted documents
holding that a rule 12b6 motion is only converted to a motion for summary judgment when a court accepts and considers matters outside of the pleadings holding that district courts consideration of matters outside the pleadings converted the defendants rule 12 motion into one for summary judgment holding that the essential inquiry in conversion of a rule 12b6 motion to a rule 56 motion is whether the appellant should reasonably have recognized the possibility that the motion might be converted into one for summary judgment or was taken by surprise and deprived of a reasonable opportunity to meet facts outside the pleadings holding that by considering matters outside of the pleadings the trial court converted a rule 12b6 motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion holding that parsons waived right to compel arbitration by filing a motion for summary judgment based on matters outside of the pleadings