state authorities which address the issue draw no distinction between guarantors and debtors with regard to waiver of commercial reasonableness. See, e.g., May v. Women’s Bank, 807 P.2d 1145, 1147 (Colo.1991); Branan v. Equico Lessors, Inc., 255 Ga. 718, 342 S.E.2d 671, 674 (1986); Bank of Hawaii v. Davis Radio Sales & Service, Inc., 6 Haw.App. 469, 727 P.2d 419, 429 (1986); McEntire v. Indiana Nat'l Bank, 471 N.E.2d 1216, 1224-25 (Ind.Ct.App.1984); Dakota Bank & Trust Co. v. Grinde, 422 N.W.2d 813, 816-18 (N.D.1988); Marine Midland Bank v. CMR Industries, Inc., 159 A.D.2d 94, 559 N.Y.S.2d 892, 900 (2d Dept.1990); Marine Midland Bank v. Kristin Int'l Ltd., 141 A.D.2d 259, 534 N.Y.S.2d 612, 613 (4th Dept.1988); contra First City v. Vitale, 123 A.D.2d 207, 510 N.Y.S.2d 766, 767 (1987) (<HOLDING>). 3 . See Mercantile Bank & Trust v. Cunov, 749
holding that defendants failure to assert the defense in any pretrial motions did not waive defendants limitations defense because the assertion of a limitations defense in the answer preserved defendants right to raise the defense both during the first trial and before the second holding that trial court must make entry of default prior to entry of default judgment and court may not make entry of default when there is no default in law or in fact holding that the state may waive the affirmative defense of procedural default by failing to assert it recognizing general rule that a party may waive the defense of res judicata holding that guarantors can waive the defense before default