we find that there is a reasonable interpretation of the statutes involved that avoids an inconsistency and gives effect to both statutes. Plaintiffs cause of action is based on the Act. As such, the only limitations period applicable to her claim is the two-year statute of limitations period found in section 2 of the Act. Thus, plaintiff had two years from the date of her husband’s death to file a wrongful death action provided that plaintiffs decedent had a claim that was not time-barred at the time of his death. For purposes of determining whether plaintiffs decedent had a claim that was time-barred at the time of his death, we use the limitations period found in section 13 — 214(a), which applies to construction d 621, 628 (1989), aff’d on other grounds, 146 Ill. 2d 477 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff also finds support for her position
holding that statute of limitations for contribution actions found in section 13  204 of the code applies over limitations period for malpractice actions found in section 13  212 of the code where the plaintiffs complaint was based solely on contribution act ill rev stat 1985 ch 70 par 301 et seq section 13  204 is more specific than section 13  212 holding that the limitations period in section 13  214a takes precedence over the limitations period for personal injuries found in section 13  202 of the code holding that limitations period in section 13  214a of the code applies over limitations period for contribution actions found in section 13  204 of the code because former provision is more specific holding that the then twoyear statute of limitations for constructionrelated actions found in section 13  214a of the code applies over the fiveyear statute of limitations period for certain actions found in section 13  205 of the code holding merck applies to section 13 of the securities act