aggravating circumstance, and did not address the merits of those claims. Id. at 2-5. In Godfrey, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional an aggravating-circumstances jury instruction that permitted the jury to impose the death penalty if it found the murder “ ‘was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim.’ ” Godfrey, 446 U.S. 420, 428-29, 100 S.Ct. 1759 (quoting state statute). The Supreme Court explained that the instruction resulted in “standardless and unchanneled imposition of death sentences in the uncontrolled discretion of a basically uninstructed jury.” Id. at 429, 100 S.Ct. 1759; see also Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 363-64, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Plainly, under Godfrey, the instruction at
holding that a limit ing instruction which defined the terms heinous atrocious or cruel in equally vague language was not constitutionally sufficient holding the same nevada aggravating circumstance unconstitutionally vague under godfrey holding unconstitutionally vague under the reasoning of godfrey an aggravatingcircumstances instruction directing jurors to determine whether the murder was especially heinous atrocious and cruel holding that heinous atrocious or cruel is unconstitutionally vague language holding that oklahomas especially heinous atrocious or cruel aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally vague