there was a constitutional violation and then whether the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged action. Id. at 487 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)). I There is no question that Anderson had a liberty interest in continuing his participation in the temporary release program. See Anderson II, 317 F.3d at 197, 199-200; Friedl v. City of New York, 210 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir.2000) (“Prisoners on work release have a liberty interest in continued participation in such programs.”). As the defendants concede, Anderson cannot be deprived of this liberty interest without due process, which includes notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Friedl, 210 F.3d at 84-85; see also Kim v. Hurston, 182 F.3d 113, 118 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). In Tracy v. Salamack, 572 F.2d 393 (2d
holding that a prisoner cannot be deprived of a protected liberty interest in goodtime credits without procedural due process holding that while participating in a temporary release program inmates who lived at home enjoyed a liberty interest the loss of which imposed a sufficiently serious hardship to require compliance with at least minimal procedural due process holding that prisoner had no liberty interest in remaining in voluntary boot camp program despite fact that completion of program qualifies inmate for early release recognizing that a parents liberty interest in the custody of a child is subject to due process protection recognizing that early release statutes can create a liberty interest protected by due process guarantees 