position and whether the party would receive “an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped.” Id. at 751, 121 S.Ct. 1808. The doctrine is designed to prevent “intentional self-contradiction” and is improperly applied “when the former position was the result of inadvertence or mistake.” Lampi Corp. v. Am. Power Prod., 228 F.3d 1365, 1377 (Fed.Cir.2000). Thus, the court does no disservice to the important purposes underlying holding parties to judicial admissions by acknowledging that a response to an injunctive action is an evolving position, and the facts and legal positions should be taken in view of the emerging facts as they become known to the litigating parties. See SanDisk Corp. v. Memorex Prod., Inc., 415 F.3d 1278, 1291 (Fed.Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). It is also necessary to note that the
holding that courts should avoid constructions that would render statutory text superfluous holding that a transferee federal court should apply its interpretations of federal law not the constructions of federal law of the transferor circuit holding that courts should not use doctrine of judicial estoppel to prevent evolution of arguments but should permit preliminary constructions made without full development of the record or issues to remain open to revision holding that the issue of defendants actual knowledge should not be resolved on summary judgment but should be left to the trier of fact holding courts should apply statutory constructions that make practical sense and do not frustrate legislative intent