§§ 422-424 (1990). Based on the record before me, I find it unnecessary to classify Finley as either a licensee or an invitee. Finley's action is based on allegations that Ms. Patterson was under a duty to warn him that a criminal act was about to be committed by a third party. The duty discussed in Saccuzzo, supra, and in a well-established line of Alabama cases dealing with a premises owner’s liability for the criminal acts of a third party, is applicable in this case regardless of whether Finley is classified as an invitee or as a licensee. See, e.g., Moye v. A.G. Gaston Motels, Inc., 499 So.2d 1368 (Ala.1986) (involving the more typical situation where the injured person is an invitee on the premises); and Prentiss v. Evergreen Presbyterian Church, 644 So.2d 475 (Ala.1994) (<HOLDING>). At this point I note that I also find
recognizing the general rule that a premises owner owes a licensee not only a duty to abstain from willfully or wantonly injuring the licensee but also a duty to avoid negligently injuring the licensee after the premises owner discovers that the licensee is in danger holding a premises owner is a general contractor for purposes of the statutory employer provision holding that a premises owner can discharge its duty by making the property safe or by warning holding that premises owner owed higher duty of reasonable care to visitor instead of lower duty to licensee where owners affirmative conduct of running with a pan of hot grease created a risk to a visiting child holding that ship owners have a duty of exercising reasonable care to protect passengers regardless of status as invitee or licensee