is a bar to recovery. A. Admissibility of Post-Trial Submissions Plaintiffs numerous post-trial exhibits, including the Dongan Grant and the Caleb Ward Deed, were submitted as part of Plaintiffs Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and his Memorandum of Law in Reply to Defendants’ Opposition. i. Applicable Standard Defendants argue that this submission was a violation of Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 52, which limits proposed post-trial findings of fact and conclusions of law to discussion of evidence submitted at trial. See United States v. Forness, 125 F.2d 928, 942 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom City of Salamanca v. United States, 316 U.S. 694, 62 S.Ct. 1293, 86 L.Ed. 1764 (1942); United States v. Local 1804-1, Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 831 F.Supp. 167, 169 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (<HOLDING>). Defendants argue that Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 59
holding no abuse of discretion when the moving party failed to make an offer of proof by showing what the witness would testify to if present holding that motion to dismiss should not  be granted unless the moving party has established that there is no material issue of fact to resolve and that it is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law holding that a court may deny leave to amend when the moving party had the opportunity to amend earlier but waited after judgment to do so holding that a party who realizes with the acuity of hindsight that he failed to present his strongest case at trial is not entitled to a second opportunity by moving to amend a finding of fact or a conclusion of law holding that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to grant leave to the moving party to amend their complaint before final summary judgment was entered