the Americans with Disabilities Act, were not taken into account; (2) he was not given notice that an 1-60 such as the one he submitted would result in disciplinary action; and (3) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Wheeler argues that the district court erred in determining that his claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), because he was sentenced under Tex. Gov’t Code § 508.149 and thus could not recover good-time credits. Regardless whether Wheeler’s claims were barred under Heck, the district court did not err in dismissing his claims because he did not have a liberty interest in any of the rights of which he was deprived at the hearing. See Malchi v. Thaler, 211 F.3d 953, 958-59 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 508 (5th
holding that thirtyday commissary and cell restrictions did not implicate due process concerns holding that mere negligence does not implicate the right to due process holding that punitive conditions of pretrial confinement implicate due process holding that 30day commissary and cell restrictions did not implicate the due process clause holding that 30day loss of cell and commissary privileges does not implicate due process concerns