thus further shortening the time he had to research and write his petition. Cf. Garrick, 162 Fed. Appx. at 124-25 (“[T]he record shows no allegation that he was misled or tricked, or that anything (or anyone) actually ‘stood in his way.’ ” (emphasis added) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005))); Bonilla, 2001 WL 253605, at *2 (“The one year period cannot be ‘tolled’ further while a potential petitioner seeks forms from the court (at least absent unusual circumstances, not present here).” (emphasis added)). Further, petitioner was diligent in pursuing his rights. Petitioner tried to obtain habeas forms immediately after receiving the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s denial of allocatur in his PCRA action. Cf. Rios, 2008 WL 2952352, at *8 (<HOLDING>). Unlike the petitioners in Garrick and similar
holding that the petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling where he filed his habeas petition more than two months late holding that petitioner was dili gent for equitable tolling purposes where petitioner filed state petition two months after conviction was final and filed federal petition seven days after discovering state had denied petition on the merits holding that a petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling where he waited six months to file a federal petition after any state misconduct ended holding that equitable tolling did not apply in part because petitioner waited three months after his pcra appeal was denied before attempting to secure the habeas forms holding that we lacked jurisdiction to review the veterans courts determination that equitable tolling did not apply in the case before it