outside the usual course of medical practice. See 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a). Given this legal duty, it does not strain the imagination to think that some pharmacists might know and be qualified to speak about what it means for a prescription to be consistent or inconsistent with the usual course of medical practice. Indeed, even Mr. Lovern himself offered testimony on exactly these lines, and he certainly doesn’t suggest his own testimony was inadmissible. This is not to say that all pharmacists are necessarily qualified to testify about the usual course of medical practice. But it is to say, contrary to Mr. Lovern’s view, that pharmacists are not categorically incapable of offering such testimony. See also United States v. Perry, 940 F.2d 664 (6th Cir.1991) (per curiam) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>). Neither was it an abuse of discretion for the
holding that under fedrevid 702 expert testimony must be reliable to be admissible holding that pharmacists testimony as to unusual activities at pharmacy in csa prosecution are precisely within the realm of permissible expert testimony allowable under fed revid 702 holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive holding that federal rule of evidence 702 superceded the frye standard of admissibility of scientific evidence and that under rule 702 the district court had to determine that proffered expert testimony was both reliable and relevant holding that the general principles of rule 702 recognized by the daubert decision are applicable to other species of expert testimony