is not a separate action to renew the judgment, the specific time period in N.D.C.C. § 28-20-21 cannot be tolled under N.D.C.C. § 28-01-32 based on a judgment debtor’s absence from the state. We therefore conclude N.D.C.C. § 28-01-32 does not apply to toll the time period in which F/S Manufacturing had to renew its judgment by affidavit. B [¶ 13] Although F/S Manufacturing asserts Kensmoe waived any issues “regarding [whether] her bankruptcy toll[ed] the statute of limitations,” the district court’s order, which Kensmoe has directly challenged, explicitly adopted the Georgia state court’s conclusion that “the statute of limitations on the underlying North Dakota judgment ... was tolled during the pendency of [Kensmoe’s] two bankruptcy procee 329 F.3d 948, 952-54 (8th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>), and criticized by In re Ingeniero, No.
holding the court lacked jurisdiction where the defendant failed to file a notice of appeal on the attorneys fee issue because a supplemental notice of appeal is required for us to have jurisdiction over an attorneys fees issue that becomes final subsequent to the initial notice of appeal holding 11 usc  108b2 applied to extend unexpired 60day period to file notice of appeal to 60 days after order for relief but that appeal was untimely holding 57 days notice before deadline to file a complaint under  523 was sufficient notice when creditor had actual notice of filing holding that the 30day deadline to file a notice of appeal with the bia was not jurisdictional holding  108c2 applied to extend the deadline to file a notice of appeal in state court until at least 30 days after notice of the stays termination or expiration