with vagueness in the sense that the term “requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard,” whose satisfaction may vary depending upon whom you ask. See, e.g., Coates, 402 U.S. at 614, 91, S.Ct. 1686. Rather, a statute is unconstitutionally vague if, applying the rules for interpreting legal texts, its meaning “spe-cifie[s]” “no standard of conduct ... at all.” Id.; see also Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 n.7, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982) (setting forth the distinction articulated in Coates as describing what “the complainant must prove” “to sustain ... a challenge” on vagueness grounds); Int’l Harvester Co. of Am. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221, 34 S.Ct. 853, 58 L.Ed. 1284 (1914) (<HOLDING>). “As a general matter,” the vagueness doctrine
holding that va code  182603 is not void for vagueness holding a law is void for vagueness when it offers no standard of conduct that was possible to know emphasis added recognizing that general rule applies only to statutes that implicate  no constitutionally protected conduct emphasis added holding that an application is  pending from the time it is first filed  emphasis added holding residual clause of acca void for vagueness