the risk,” as Loesel asserts, they were nonetheless “human lives placed at substantial risk of harm.” See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.20(A); cf. United States v. Davidson, 409 F.3d 304, 314 (6th Cir.2005) (not applying the enhancement where the defendants tried once to make meth in a remote, locked barn, and the operation did not: involve “an unusually large quantity of hazardous materials”; exist “for an unusually long period of time”; or “actually result[ ] in the disposal of the materials in a way harmful to human life or the environment”). Also, manufacturing occurred in residential areas and in a moving vehicle, placing additional lives at substantial risk. Considering the scope of meth activity, the district court did not err in applying the enhancement. See Pinnow, 469 F.3d at 1157 (<HOLDING>). III. Loesel claims the district court should
holding that under iowa code  7098 the offense of lascivious acts with a child was a crime of violence because it involved a substantial risk that physical force would be used against the child victim in the course of committing the offense holding that the opposing party must show substantial harm holding that because the crime of rape involved a nonconsensual act there was a substantial risk that physical force may be used in committing the offense holding the offense created a substantial risk of harm where the defendant staying in various hotels possessed a substantial quantity of pseudoephedrine enough to manufacture fifty grams of pure meth plus other chemicals and equipment used in the lithium ammonia reduction method holding that a court may issue injunctive relief only when the movant demonstrates four factors substantial likelihood of success on the merits irreparable harm no substantial injury to the other party and furtherance of the public interest