reflecting “only reasonable hours at a market rate.” Before turning to address Eastern’s arguments, we first discuss the legal framework governing awards of attorneys’ fees under the BLBA. We review for abuse of discretion an award of attorneys’ fees made under the BLBA, whether determined by an ALJ or by the BRB. Kerns v. Consol. Coal Co., 176 F.3d 802, 804 (4th Cir.1999). An ALJ and the BRB are afforded wide latitude in crafting an appropriate award of attorneys’ fees because they are much better situated than an appellate court to make this determination in the first instance. See Westmoreland Coal Co. v. Cox, 602 F.3d 276, 288 (4th Cir.2010) (noting the broad discretion afforded an ALJ in calculating a fee award); Zeigler Coal Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 326 F.3d 894, 902 (7th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). We apply the same
recognizing that time to consider reasonableness of plaintiffs position is at time of initiation of litigation holding that the final determination of witness credibility and the weight to be accorded evidence is reserved to the appellate panel and it is not the task of an appellate court to weigh the evidence as found by the appellate panel recognizing that appellate court is in same position as trial court to assess evidence when all of the proof is contained in the record by deposition holding that applications for attorneys fees must state in detail time spent and the nature of each discrete task before the court can assess the reasonableness of the fees recognizing that an alj is in a much better position than the appellate court to determine the reasonableness of time spent by a lawyer on a particular task in the course of litigation