duty,” or (2) because he was engaged in an official act. II. Madison contends that the trial court, by allowing the jury to consider both counts, rather than requiring the State to elect one of the two counts to submit to the jury, violated his right to a unanimous verdict, which is guaranteed by various constitutional provisions, including the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. He argues that because the jury did not specify the count on which it found him guilty, neither he nor this Court can know whether he was convicted by a jury that was unanimous as to a single count. The State contends that its purpose in charging Madison in a two-count indictment was to meet every probable contingency of the evidence. The State argues tha W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (<HOLDING>); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468
holding constitutional arizonas scheme of providing general verdicts for firstdegree murder based on either premeditation or felony murder without requiring jury unanimity holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant holding that reversal of conviction for felony murder was required where jury failed to find the defendant guilty of the underlying felony as essential element of the felony murder offense holding error is not harmless when the accused is convicted of firstdegree murder on a general verdict after a trial in which premeditation and felony murder theories are espoused if the felony underlying the felony murder charge is based on a legally unsupportable theory holding premeditated murder and felony murder are the same crime with various means of commission