would, if true, show that the experience profoundly affected her and made her future impartiality reasonably suspect. The source of this prejudice is personal and unrelated to petitioner’s case and trial counsel’s conduct therein. See, e.g., Lamendola v. Grossman, 439 So.2d 960 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). Though we previously concluded that any hostility arising from the events of the judicial nominating process did not warrant disqualification, the judge allegedly opened the door and displayed the depth of such hostility by failing to remain silent despite the passage of time. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that a reasonably prudent person would be in fear of not receiving fair and impartial judicial review of the pending matters. See Livingston v. State, 441 So.2d 1083, 1087 (Fla.1983) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, the petition for writ of
holding that the issue is not whether officer subjectively feared suspect but whether a reasonably prudent person would justifiably believe that his safety or that of others was in danger recognizing requirement that state personnel board be a fair and impartial tribunal holding that jurors must not only be fair and impartial they also must appear so in order to maintain the litigants confidence in the basic fairness of the trial holding that a defendants claim that a jury was not impartial must focus on the jurors who ultimately sat recognizing that the focus must be on whether the facts alleged would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial