the scene and the inferences of risk of danger reasonably drawn from the totality of those specific circumstances. Babb, 133 Idaho at 892, 994 P.2d at 635; Fleenor, 133 Idaho at 555, 989 P.2d at 787. See also State v. Muir, 116 Id h Cir.2007) (concluding that burglary is “a crime normally and reasonably expected to involve a weapon”); Brown v. State, 684 P.2d 874, 879 (Alaska Ct.App.1984) (recognizing that an officer “might well fear that someone suspected of burglary would carry a weapon and resort to violence”); Quevedo v. State, 554 So.2d 620, 620 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (noting that “the mere fact that one, like Quevedo, is reasonably suspected of having committed a burglary in itself justifies a Terry pat-down and frisk for weapons”); State v. Scott, 405 N.W.2d 829, 832 (Iowa 1987) (<HOLDING>); State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah
holding that an officer investigating a burglary especially in a residential area at an early morning hour has reasonable cause to believe a frisk is necessary for officer safety because the suspect might be armed with weapons or tools such as knives and screwdrivers which could be used as weapons holding officer may search vehicle for weapons if officer has reasonable belief based on articulable facts that officer or another may be in danger holding that a police officer may order an individual out of his car and frisk him for weapons if there is a reasonable belief that the individual is armed and dangerous recognizing that an officer must have a reasonable articulable suspicion that the person has been is or is about to be engaged in criminal activity to frisk an individual for weapons and must have probable cause to conduct a further seizure holding that a limited search of the outer clothing of a suspect for weapons is reasonable where the officer has a reasonable articulable basis for believing that the suspect may be armed and presently dangerous