sitting on the loading dock. The Trustee’s attempt to equate the assessment with a transportation, delivery or other charge is not persuasive. As the Supreme Court noted in F.W. Fitch Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 582, 584-85, 65 S.Ct. 409, 89 L.Ed. 472 (1945), those exceptions were intended to cover costs that are not necessarily a component of the f.o.b. (“free on board”) selling price. Transportation, delivery, insurance, and installation costs are not necessarily part of the selling price as the product is sitting on the manufacturer’s dock and are excluded if properly established. Id. at 586, 65 S.Ct. 409. The phrase “other charge” is limited “to expenses similar in character to those incurred for transportation, delivery, insurance and installation.” Id. at 584-85, 65 S.Ct. 409 (<HOLDING>). Of critical import, the Court, noting the
holding that advertising and selling expenses incurred by a manufacturer clearly fall within the class of charges which congress intended to be included in the tax base as they enter into the composition of the wholesale selling price holding that the plaintiffs did not fall within the zone of interests protected by the tcpa because they attempted to use the statute in a way not intended or contemplated by congress and because their damages are not of the vexatious and intrusive nuisance nature sought to be redressed by congress in enacting the tcpa holding that third party must fall within a class clearly intended to be benefitted by the contract holding that a plaintiff must fall within a class clearly intended to be a beneficiary thereby recognizing that wjithout the class action mechanism corporations selling smallvalue items for which it is unlikely that consumers would keep receipts are free to engage in false advertising overcharging and a variety of other wrongs without consequence