this suit ... was a necessary incident to the attorney’s effort to establish [the defendants’ claim].” Id. Unlike Bosurgi, however, the plaintiffs allegations provide no “basis for an inference” that CARCO conferred authority on Steele to receive service. Cf. Santos v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 902 F.2d 1092,1094 (2d Cir.1990) (noting that service on defendant State Farm’s attorneys was improper where the plaintiff offered “no basis for an inference that State Farm had authorized its attorneys to accept service of process”). Accordingly, the court determines that the plaintiff has not shown that Steel was an agent of CARCO for service and that the plaintiffs service on CARCO was therefore deficient. United States v. Ziegler Bolt and Parts Co., Ill F.3d 878, 881 (Fed.Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); J. and L. Parking Corp. Inc. v. United
holding that even where an attorney exercises broad powers to represent a client in litigation these powers of representation alone do not create a specific authority to receive service recognizing a state agencys powers are limited to 1 recognizing separation of powers doctrine holding that states grant of general corporate powers to hospital authorities does not include permission to use those powers anticompetitively holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client