that Whitney had exclusive possession of the car is some evidence from which it might ordinarily be inferred that he was aware of the cocaine and marijuana in the car. However, in this case, the drugs were hidden in a secret compartment. In such cases, we are hesitant to rely solely on control of the vehicle as evidence of intent. We find the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Richardson, 848 F.2d 509 (5th Cir.1988) instructive. There, the court held that in hidden compartment cases, knowledge may not be inferred solely from the defendant’s control of the vehicle in which the contraband is hidden. To establish intent, the court required additional evidence that demonstrates guilty knowledge. Id. at 513; see also United States v. Resio-Trejo, 45 F.3d 907, 911 (5th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Thus, we conclude that additional evidence of
holding that when drugs are hidden knowledge of their presence generally cannot be inferred solely from defendants control over the vehicle holding that where drugs are found in the presence and plain view of the owner or resident occupant of a home dominion and control maybe inferred holding that if the site where the contraband is found is in joint rather than exclusive possession a defendants knowledge of the contrabands presence and his ability to control it cannot be inferred merely from the defendants proximity to the contraband holding that personal bias cannot be inferred from an adverse ruling holding evidence was insufficient to link defendant to drugs in borrowed vehicle when the drugs were not in plain view the defendant disavowed knowledge that drugs were hidden in floorboard of car and a person antagonistic toward defendants husband had access to the car before she borrowed it