and then only if the evidence rendered the trial “fundamentally unfair.” Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009). The admission of inculpatory evidence violated due process only if there were no permissible inferences the jury could have drawn from the nable in denying Petitioner’s claim that admission of Pratti’s hearsay statements deprived Petitioner of due process and a fair trial. Petitioner alleges that the hearsay statements were “not reliable” and “extremely damaging.” (Pet. at 49.) Absent clearly established federal law recognizing that the admission of irrelevant or prejudicial evidence violates due process, the court of appeal could not have been unreasonable under AEDPA. See Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125-26, 128 S.Ct. 743, 169 L.Ed.2d 583 (2008) (<HOLDING>); Holley, 568 F.3d at 1101. In any event, even
holding this court can issue habeas writ only if state courts application of supreme court precedent is objectively unreasonable holding that a state court cannot be said to have unreasonably applied clearly established federal law under  2254d1 when there are no holdings from the supreme court addressing the issue raised by the petitioner holding that where the supreme court has expressly left an open question circuit precedent is immaterial and there is no clearly established law for the state court to have unreasonably applied holding state court could not have unreasonably applied clearly established federal law given the lack of holdings from the supreme court regarding the potentially prejudicial effect of spectators courtroom conduct holding that state court could not have unreasonably applied federal law if no clear supreme court precedent existed