v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 592, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (citation omitted); see also Elstad, 470 U.S. at 817, 105 S.Ct. 1285 (noting that Miranda ensures a suspect’s unwarned answers may be excluded from the government’s case-in-chief). Mohammed also asserts that what he said during interrogation was used against him indirectly. The government’s ability to rely on his statements for impeachment purposes, so his argument goes, made him hesitant to testify in his own defense. But this argument has no constitutional weight. Statements taken in violation of Miranda are admissible as impeachment evidence unless they are, in very fact, involuntary. See, e.g., Elstad, 470 U.S. at 307, 105 S.Ct. 1285; Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975) (<HOLDING>). And whatever one might conclude about the
holding that the admissibility of expert testimony was governed by state law holding that admissibility of a confession is governed by determining from the totality of the circumstances whether or not it was made voluntarily holding that parole officers advisement to defendant to cooperate did not vitiate the voluntariness of his statements holding that unwarned statements are admissible for impeachment purposes unless an officers conduct amounted to an abuse in which case admissibility is governed by the traditional standards for evaluating voluntariness and trustworthiness holding in a successor liability case that questions of traditional tort law unrelated to the contract were properly governed under forum law