or supervise another participant in the criminal scheme. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, comment, (n.2). In contrast, the sentencing court has the discretion to depart upward from the otherwise applicable sentencing range if the defendant “did not organize, lead, manage, or supervise another participant, but who nevertheless exercised management responsibility over the property, assets, or activities of a criminal organization.” Id. The probation officer’s recommendation that the court enhance Harness’s offense level because he had management responsibility over the assets of the victim was error, because these facts support only a discretionary decision to depart, not a mandatory enhancement under section 3B1.1(e). See, e.g., United States v. Bapack, 129 F.3d 1320, 1324 & n. 6 (D.C.Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Gort-DiDonato, 109 F.3d 318,
recognizing that enhancement required only when defendant exerts control over another participant whereas upward departure may be appropriate if defendant controls only assets or activities of the criminal enterprise holding that to establish a prima facie case of control person liability a plaintiff must establish that the alleged control person actually participated in ie exercised control over the operations of the primary violator in general internal quotations omitted holding over holding authority to control limits duty to control recognizing that enhancement requires control over a participant in the scheme not only control over the scheme itself