contracts. We hold that Act No. 26 substantially impairs the contractual relationship by mandating that all CGL policies be legislatively amended to include a new statutory definition of occurrence and by applying this mandate retroactively. While the dissent believes the new provision merely clarifies existing law, we find the statute fundamentally changes the definition of occurrence. In Newman, this Court suggested “that a CGL policy may provide coverage where faulty workmanship causes third party bodily injury or damage to other property besides the defective work product” leaving open the possibility there may be instances where coverage might not be provided. 385 S.C. at 193, 684 S.E.2d at 544 (emphasis added); see also Crossmann, 395 S.C. at 50 n. 6, 717 S.E.2d at 594 n. 6 (<HOLDING>). In doing so, Newman examined the interaction
holding that our use of the subjunctive in mentioning an argument in passing suggests that we knew that we were not addressing and that we could not address that argument holding we elect to adhere to our precedent in newman  holding that we must first determine our jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits of the appeal holding that tgiven that our burden in reviewing and correcting the error is minimal and that sentencing defendant according to the law serves the ends of justice we elect to exercise our discretion to correct the error here recognizing that we may not substitute our judgment for that of the alj 