applies: “[T]he expert[] conflrm[ed] ... nearly every detail of the case and of complainant’s behavior as consistent with that of a victim of sexual abuse.... ” Id., 922 N.Y.S.2d 846, 947 N.E.2d at 639 (Lippman, C.J., dissenting). These divergent outcomes reflect national jurisprudence on the issue. Lisa R. Askowitz, Restricting the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecution: Pennsylvania Takes It to the Extreme, 47 U. Miami L. Rev. 201, 205-06 nn. 34-35 (Sept. 1992) (surveying caselaw and recognizing the split in authority). Many other courts have held opinions that a child victim’s behavior or symptoms are “consistent with” child abuse are inadmissible. See Favoccia, 306 Conn. 770, 51 A.3d at 1015-16 & n. 26 (collecting cases); see also id. at 1009 (<HOLDING>); Wheat v. State, 527 A.2d 269, 274-75
holding that expert testimony should be excluded when jury is equally competent to form an opinion about ultimate fact issue or experts testimony is within jurys common knowledge holding that the testimony of an expert witness is admissible when the witness outlines the general characteristics of sexually abused children and then states that the victims symptoms are consistent with those characteristics holding that expert testimony linking a specific complainant to those general characteristics is impermissible vouching and ultimate issue testimony and therefore inadmissible holding that a social workers testimony that a child was sincere constituted impermissible character testimony holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive