that was both willful and malicious. See In re Holmes, No. 11-AP-00391TOM, 2012 WL 2359909, at *3 (Bankr.N.D.Ala. June 21, 2012) (citations omitted). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has recently stated that, for a willful injury, proof of ‘willfulness’ requires ‘a showing of an intentional or deliberate act, which is not done merely in reckless disregard of the rights of another.’ In re Walker, 48 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir.1995) (quoting In re Ikner, 883 F.2d 986, 991 (11th Cir.1989)). ‘[A] debtor is responsible for a ‘willful’ injury when he or she commits an intentional act the purpose of which is to cause injury or which is substantially certain to cause injury.’ Id. at 1165; see also Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61-62, 118 S.Ct. 974, 140 L.Ed.2d 90 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Recklessly or negligently inflicted injuries
holding that the debtors knowing act of failing to obtain workers compensation insurance so that the employer owed an employee a debt after the employee suffered a workplace injury was not the sort of willful and malicious injury required for nondischargeability under  523a6 because it cannot not be said that the employer intended for the employee to suffer a fall or that there was an unbroken chain of events leading from the employers intentional act to the employees physical injury holding that  523a6 requires the actor to intend the injury not just the act that leads to the injury holding section 107a17bs plain language does not require that the actor actually intend death or serious bodily injury an object is a deadly weapon if the actor intends a use of the object in which it would be capable of causing death or serious bodily injury holding that the word willful in a6 modifies the word injury indicating that nondischargeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury holding that a mere deliberate or intentional act that causes injury is not sufficient to establish willfulness in the context of 11 usc  523a6