to qualify as child pornography unprotected by the First Amendment. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756, 764, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982). Morrison further contends that section 76-5a-3 does not meet the requirements of Ferber as it proscribes the possession of material depicting a "partially nude minor for the purpose of causing sexual arousal of any person." (Emphasis added.) However, other courts have upheld statutes that do not necessarily require nudity. See Osborne, 495 U.S. 114 n. 11, 110 S.Ct. 1691 (1990) (upholding Ohio statute that, inter alia, criminalized the possession of depictions of "covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state" (emphasis added and internal quotations omitted)); see also United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 737 (3rd Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Peterson contends, "Whatever the
recognizing that this courts construction of a statute becomes as much apart of the statute as the words of the statute itself and that change is a matter that addresses itself to the general assembly not this court holding that various versions of the statute qualify as an exemption 3 statute holding that a statute must burden a substantial amount of protected speech to be unconstitutionally overbroad holding that the federal child pornography statute on its face contains no nudity or discernability requirement that nonnude visual depictions  can qualify as lascivious exhibitions and that this construction does not render the statute unconstitutionally overbroad holding the improper photography or visual recording statute unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the first amendment