in the abstract of judgment here may fairly be read as a summary of Ramirez-Villalpando’s specific offense, not merely a recitation of the title of the statute. Second, in later decisions we have clarified that Navidad-Marcos held that the court “erred in relying only on the abstract of judgment in determining that [a] prior offense [satisfies the elements of a given generic crime] under the modified categorical approach.” United States v. Narvaez-Gomez, 489 F.3d 970, 977 (9th Cir.2007) (emphasis added). We have permitted reliance on an abstract of judgment in combination with a charging document to establish that the defendant pled guilty to a generic crime under the modified cate gorical approach. See, e.g., United States v. Velasco-Medina, 305 F.3d 839, 852-53 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). See also Penuliar v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 603,
holding that virginia burglary statute comes within definition of generic burglary holding that an indictment is sufficient as long as it fully and clearly sets out the crime and the elements of the offense even if the evidence consists of proof of other means of committing the same crime holding that the abstract of judgment coupled with the information furnished sufficient proof that the defendant was convicted of all the elements of the generic crime of burglary holding that iowa burglary is not categorical burglary as the elements of iowa burglary law are broader than those of generic burglary holding that the abstract of judgment may not sufficiently establish that the defendant pled guilty to a specific crime when the only other document provided was the charge which simply contained the generic broad statutory language