attenuated way. As explained, the VCA burdens the quantity of political speech only indirectly, and certainly no more than other contribution limits to which reduced scrutiny has consistently applied. See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 387, 120 S.Ct. 897 (applying a reduced level of exacting scrutiny to limits on contributions by political action committees); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-38, 96 S.Ct. 612 (applying less stringent exacting scrutiny to several forms of contribution limits). Nor is it true, as the Unions contend, that this level of scrutiny applies only to contributions made directly to a candidate or political party and not to contributions intended to influence elections generally. See Cal. Med. Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 197-98, 101 S.Ct. 2712, 69 L.Ed.2d 567 (1981) (plurality opinion) (<HOLDING>). 9 . We recognize that Utah municipal and
holding that it violated the first amendment to prohibit announcement of views on disputed legal and political issues by candidates for judicial election holding compelled contributions in beef promotion violated first amendment holding that limits on contributions to political committees which advocate the views and candidacies of a number of candidates induce no greater first amendment scrutiny than limits on contributions to an individual candidate holding that a complete ban on contributions to federal candidates by corporations may consistent with the first amendment be applied to nonprofit advocacy corporations holding that there is no difference between financial contributions to reduce the mortgage principal and those to improve the property itself and that both types of active contributions entitle the marital estate to a proportionate return on its investment