is whether subsection 10(d), like subsection 10(c) creates a statutory right to information deprivation of which causes plaintiffs a specific, concrete, actual and imminent injury. The court concludes that it does not. Subsection 10(c) of the ESA creates an explicit statutory right to information. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(c) (“Information received by the Secretary as a part of any application shall be available to the public as a matter of public record at every stage of the proceeding.”). Subsection 10(d), by contrast, requires the Secretary to make certain findings. See id. § 1539(d) (“The Secretary may grant exceptions ... onl l the alleged violation does is set back their organization’s abstract social interests or frustrate its objectives. See Nat’l Taxpayers Union, 68 F.3d at 1433 (<HOLDING>). For very similar reasons to those that
holding that standing existed holding that frustration of an organizations objectives is the type of abstract concern that does not impart standing holding that no standing exists to litigate an abstract dispute over the commissions reasoning holding that one class of plaintiffs lacked standing where damage theory was speculative abstract and impractical holding that the lack of shareholder standing under texas law does not implicate constitutional standing