practice “interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47, 106 S.Ct. 2752. II. As a preliminary matter, we agree with the district court that Plaintiffs’ claim of vote denial is cognizable under Section 2 of the VRA. Felon disenfranchisement is a voting qualification, and Section 2 is clear that any voting qualification that denies citizens the right to vote in a discriminatory manner violates the VRA. 42 U.S.C. § 1973. Indeed, the Supreme Court has made clear that states cannot use felon disenfranchisement as a tool to discriminate on the basis of race, see Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 85 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (<HOLDING>), and Congress specifically amended the VRA to
holding that the state law violated equal protection principles holding that a provision in the alabama constitution violated equal protection even through it was facially neutral because it was motivated by animus holding that where racial bias motivated its original enactment a facially neutral felon disenfranchisement law violated the equal protection clause holding alabamas petty crime and misdemeanor disenfranchisement provisions unconstitutional under equal protection clause based on evidence of discriminatory intent holding that an illinois countys facially neutral twotiered ballot ordering system did not violate the equal protection clause