North Carolina state courts did not unreasonably apply Remmer. D. Analyzing Remmer’s applicability to the case at bar requires first looking to what the Supreme Court set forth as the component parts of its rule, that being: “In a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or tampering, directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptive prejudicial” except under circumstances not relevant here. 347 U.S. at 229, 74 S.Ct. 450 (emphasis added). Read in the context of the Supreme Court’s actual holding, Remmer ’s broad reference to “any private communication, contact, or tampering” is immediately constricted by the narrowing clause “about the matter pending before the jury.” This limitation m 09) (<HOLDING>). In applying Remmer in previous cases, this
holding that the state violated a statute by allowing the presence of nonwitness police officers during grand jury proceedings but concluding that because those officers were not present during deliberations the indictments were not void holding in a postaedpa habeas case that the remmer presumption did not apply due to the innocuous nature of an intrusion upon a jury implying that the remmer presumption could apply in the habeas context holding that juror interviews were not permissible where the alleged jury misconduct of premature deliberations constituted internal influence holding in  2254d context that the state court did not unreasonably apply remmer in concluding wolfe failed to show that a jurors numerous telephone conversations during the course of jury deliberations constituted an impermissible external jury influence recognizing a remmer presumption but noting that sometimes the circumstances are such that the remmer presumption does not even apply