not consider alternatives other than revoking his probation. Therefore, we question whether this argument is properly before this court. See K.W.J., supra. Moreover, “[ajlthough Rule 27.6(d), Ala. R.Crim. P., provides that a trial court may ‘revoke, modify, or continue probation’ if it finds that a probationer has violated the terms and conditions of his probation, whether revocation and imposition of the original sentence or some other disposition is appropriate is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. Absent a clear abuse of discretion, a reviewing court will not disturb a trial court’s conclusions in a probation-revocation proceeding, including the determination whether to revoke, modify, or continue the probation. See, e.g., Ex parte J.J.D., So.2d 240 (Ala.2000) (<HOLDING>); and Moore v. State, 432 So.2d 552, 553
holding that the admission or exclusion of evidence is within discretion of the trial court and that such determinations will not be disturbed on appeal absent clear abuse of discretion holding that a sentence that falls within statutory limits is presumptively valid and will not be reversed absent a showing of improper procedure or abuse of discretion holding that a trial courts order in a probationrevocation proceeding will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion holding that the determination of whether statements are excited utterances is within the trial courts discretion and its ruling will be reversed only for an abuse of that discretion holding that rulings on admissibility of evidence are within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of that discretion