sufficient support for his allegations so as to trigger the protections discussed in Remmer. It was not enough for Barnes to allege “contact between a juror and her pastor,” Barnes also needed to present a credible allegation that this contact was “about a matter pending before the jury.” Denying the Remmer presumption of prejudice or an evidentiary hearing based on the conclusion that the communication alleged did not call into question the integrity of the verdict, i.e., did not concern the “matter pending before the jury,” fully complies with Remmer. To that end, this Court has previously recognized that it is the petitioner’s initial burden to show prejudicial contact in considering whether Remmer’s presumption of prejudice has been triggered. See Blauvelt, 638 F.3d at 295 (<HOLDING>); Wolfe, 565 F.3d at 162 (holding that “the
recognizing a remmer presumption but noting that sometimes the circumstances are such that the remmer presumption does not even apply holding that a defendant did not waive his right to be present at an ex parte encounter between the judge and juror because he was not present at the time of the communication and therefore had no opportunity to object when the error was committed holding that the remmer presumption did not apply where the communication was innocuous and the defendant had failed to present evidence that the communication was prejudicial holding in a postaedpa habeas case that the remmer presumption did not apply due to the innocuous nature of an intrusion upon a jury implying that the remmer presumption could apply in the habeas context holding that a communication between the judge and juror which is unrelated to the case being tried is not improper and prejudicial