statute). We construe rules in their entirety, not piecemeal. Cf. Vector Mktg. Corp., 156 N.H. at 783. While decisions of the federal courts may be helpful in interpreting analogous New Hampshire rules of evidence, we are the final interpreter of our rules. N.H. R! EV. 102. The defendant argues that a conviction for receiving stolen property is always suitable for cross-examination under Rule 609(a)(2) because theft is always a crime of dishonesty. We disagree. We have never addressed the admissibility of receiving stolen property under Rule 609(a)(2). While courts in several states do hold that theft, analogous to receiving stolen property, is per se dishonest and thus admissible under their state rules of evidence, see, e.g., State v. McKinsey, 810 P.2d 907, 909 (Wash. 1991) (<HOLDING>); Com. v. Ellis, 549 A.2d 1323, 1334 (Pa.
holding receiving stolen property is crimen falsi holding that receiving stolen property is not automatically a crime of dishonesty for purposes of rule 609a2 holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment holding such agreements to be per se illegal holding receiving stolen property is per se dishonest