and allowing them to respond to Kuljis’s claims would not cause undue delay or injury to Kuljis. They averred that they were ready for trial, that they would reimburse Kuljis for all reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the “default” judgment, and that they were willing to refund the security deposit immediately, subject to its being accepted by Kuljis and his attorney. ■ On appeal, the Nguyens argue that they have established that their collective failure to respond adequately to Kuljis’s motions for summary judgment was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference, but the result of accident or mistake. See Wheeler, 157 S.W.3d at 442-44; Carpenter, 98 S.W.3d at 685; see also Imkie v. Methodist Hosp., 326 S.W.3d 339, 346 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). The majority agrees that Tho and Giang
holding that pro se litigant who appeared in court under belief that her appearance was all that was needed to respond to summary judgment established that her failure to respond or ask for extension of time were mistakes based on misunderstanding of law and satisfied wheeler test holding that district court did not err in summarily granting defendants motion for summary judgment pursuant to local rule where pro se plaintiff failed to respond to motion after district court had warned plaintiff that it would deem his failure to respond a consent to granting of motion holding that a pro se party must be advised of consequences of failing to respond to a dispositive motion including an explanation that the failure to respond  may result in the district court granting the motion and dismissing the case holding that upon a demon stration of abuse a court can restrict future pro se pleadings if it first provides a pro se litigant reasonable notice and an opportunity to respond holding a court can restrict future pro se pleadings if it first provides a pro se litigant notice and an opportunity to respond