routes, and services ‘in only a “tenuous, remote, or peripheral ... manner.” ’ ” Dan’s City, 133 S.Ct. at 1778 (quoting Rowe, 552 U.S. at 371, 128 S.Ct. 989 (quoting Morales, 504 U.S. at 390, 112 S.Ct. 2031)). The question here is whether a common law rule requiring Amtrak to remove electrical facilities attached to a public bridge is “related to ... routes,” and whether the City seeks to apply that rule “to Amtrak in connection with rail passenger transportation” within the meaning of the Rail Passenger Service Act. 49 U.S.C. § 24301(g). The Supreme Court has said that one thing is “related to” another if it affects (or has the potential to affect) the other thing in a way that is “significant” rather than “tenuous, remote, or peripheral.” See Rowe, 552 U.S. at 370, 128 S.Ct. 989 (<HOLDING>); Morales, 504 U.S. at 389, 112 S.Ct. 2031
holding removal and preemption are distinct concepts erisa preemption does not allow removal unless complete preemption exists holding that a state statute that affects the governments ultimate liability is to be applied as substantive state law under the ftca holding that preemption may occur when a state law indirectly affects routes holding the economic effects that  claims might have on erisa plans are not sufficient for preemption to occur holding that a party did not waive its preemption defense where its answer did not specifically mention preemption but contained a broader defense that was capable of encompassing preemption