(no disability where employee required hourly breaks while standing or walking); Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dep’t, 158 F.3d 635, 644 (2d Cir.1998) (inability to stand for “any period of time” not a disability). The same analysis applies with equal force here, as Gretillat’s limitations are similar to those at issue in- Wood. Although Gretillat’s inability to walk long distances and stand for more than one hour at a time certainly inconvenience her life, they are moderate, not severe restrictions. Factually, Gretillat’s limitations are less severe than those of the plaintiff in Wood: there is no evidence Gretillat uses a cane or experiences numbness. This holds true regardless of whether Gretillat’s limitations are judged individually or together. See Nuzum, 432 F.3d at 845 (<HOLDING>). It is important to note that, like the
holding that as to the scope of court review substantial evidence is a stringent limitation recognizing the basic statutory mandate that disability benefits  are to be awarded only in cases of disability by reason of any some medically determinable physical or mental impairment  but then concluding that the ad must determine the truthfulness of allegations of subjective pain recognizing that a substantial limitation of a constellation of  basic motor functions could suffice to prove a disability recognizing that employer has notice of limitation when disability manifests itself to the extent that it would be reasonable to infer that her employer actually knew of the disability holding that a oneyear limitation provision was unreasonable and thus unenforceable because it conflicted with the motor vehicle reparations acts twoyear limitation period