injury or that a state official be threatened with a deadly weapon, either one of which places his conviction squarely within the ambit of section 4B 1.2(a)(2). See United States v. Jernigan, 257 F.3d 865, 866 (8th Cir.2001) (rejecting argument that negligent homicide was not a crime of violence because defendant was less culpable than if he committed manslaughter). Banks’s second enhancing felony was a conviction for sexual assault on a child. Banks argues that since the crime can be committed by mere sexual contact with a minor, it is not necessarily a crime of violence. Sexual contact between parties of “differing physical and emotional maturity carries ‘a substantial risk that physical force ... may be used in the course of committing the offense.’ ” Alas-Castro, 184 F.3d at 813 (<HOLDING>). The statute Banks was convicted under is
holding a crime committed under a nebraska statute criminalizing sexual contact between an adult and a minor a felony crime of violence for sentencing purposes holding that unlawful imprisonment of a minor or incompetent adult is not a crime of violence under  16b because the crime can be accomplished with the victims acquiescence holding the crime of conspiracy is committed or not before the substantive crime begins holding that use of interstate commerce channel to entice minor into sexual contact is a crime of violence holding that robbery is a crime of violence for purposes of habitualoffender sentencing