and were accurate when Pardo originally made them. While predictive statements are typically not actionable, “a defendant does not place itself beyond the reach of the securities laws merely by disclosing information that is predictive in nature ... whether liability is imposed depends on whether the predictive statement was false when it was made.” Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 166 (5th Cir.1994); Isquith v. Middle South Utilities Inc., 847 F.2d 186, 204 (5th Cir.1988). Here, there is evidence suggesting that Pardo intentionally refused to disclose to LPHI investors that he knew large numbers of active LEs were long. That being the case, there is a genuine question as to whether the CEO “spoke the full truth.” See Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 249 (5th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). To the extent that Defendants argue that the
holding that although parents have a fundamental right to the care and custody of their children they have no fundamental right to allocate support to their children as they see fit holding that company officials engaged in fraud by omitting known risks to their business plan although they recognized that signs of such dangers they privately predicted had already materialized holding that projections of company officials were admissible where such officials set out at length the bases from which they derived their figures and consequently the opposing party was able to crossexamine them vigorously holding that section 1983 plaintiffs presented nothing but conjecture when they alleged that city officials must have known that officer was lying holding that statements not protected where the defendants had no basis for their optimistic statements and already knew allegedly that certain risks had become reality