P. Dep. at 11-15. In her position at the bank, Plaintiff worked with contracts for bank and credit cards, and was thus familiar with the assessment of risks and benefits required before entering into an agreement. As to the second factor, she knew of the agreement from May 11, 2009, then received it on June 3, 2009. Baltimore Aff. ¶¶ 5, 8. She signed it the next day, although the document said that she had 45 days to sign and return it to Defendant. Russo Aff., Ex. C; see Johnston v. Carnegie Corp. of N.Y., 2011 WL 1118662, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2011) (adopting report and recommendation finding 21 days to consider an agreement was supportive of the contract’s validity under the second Bormann factor); Lambertson v. Kerry Ingredients, Inc., 50 F.Supp.2d 163, 169 (E.D.N.Y.1999) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs rapid turnaround of the severance
holding that a binding contract was formed when plaintiff was invited to tailor limitedliability release to fit his needs no suggestion was made that release constituted a counteroffer or that plaintiff was required to execute the specific release as a condition of settlement and communications clearly contemplated that plaintiff would change portions that were unacceptable holding that for purposes of revoking supervised release the applicable guidelines are those in effect at the time of the supervised release violations rather than those in effect at the time of initial offense holding that due process clause does not require a federal prisoner to receive credit for time spent on supervised release if release is revoked holding that release did not bar plaintiffs claim because plaintiff had no ground to suspect that act complained of had taken place when giving release holding that 24 hours is sufficient time for a plaintiff to review release