and Paroles, 677 So.2d 1261 (Ala.Crim.App.1996); and Sloan v. Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles, 647 So.2d 85 (Ala.Crim.App.1994). Because the initial decision to grant or deny parole is completely within the discretion of the Board, such a decision should not be reviewable by state comets. See Braxton v. Josey, 567 F.Supp. 1479, 1480 (D.Md.1983) (noting that review was appropriate in federal court because “Maryland does not provide for judicial review of decisions to deny parole”). Compare Quintero v. Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, 329 Or. 319, 986 P.2d 575, 579 (1999) (noting that state statute “provides that ‘any decision relating to a release date’ is not subject to judicial review”). Cf. Esensoy v. Board of Pardons and Paroles, 793 So.2d 774, 778 (Ala.2000) (<HOLDING>); Kirk v. State, 536 So.2d 118, 119
holding that judicial review of the boards denial of a request for remission of a fine or forfeiture is limited to those situations where the board has failed to consider a request that it exercise its discretion or where there is justification for the courts exercising its equitable jurisdiction holding that denial of untimely request was not abuse of discretion holding that third party seeking to be reimbursed for costs incurred in responding to discovery request had standing to appeal because its interests were directly represented by its own counsel in the trial court it was effectively bound by the trial courts final order of dismissal the other party would have had the right to appeal the trial courts ruling if it had granted the request for reimbursement and the third party had no other legal remedy to contest the trial courts denial of its request holding that in its review of the irs exercise of discretion the court is limited to a review of the administrative record holding that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion in merely stating that the request could not be granted because there was no transcript at this point