it is therefore appropriate to look to cases construing Title VII as a source of authority for interpreting the ADEA’s anti-retaliation clause.” Fox v. Eagle, 510 F.3d at 591. 4 . Even if Dekarske were able to establish a causal connection, this would only call into play the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework. For the same reasons discussed above with regard to Dekarske’s ADEA discrimination claim, Dekarske fails to carry his burden of establishing pretext and has produced insufficient evidence on which a reasonable jury could reject FedEx’s legitimate business reason and conclude that the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of Dekarske’s termination. See University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2521, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013)
holding that title vii retaliation claims must be proved according to traditional principles of butfor causation which requires proof that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer holding that title vii retaliation claims require proof that the desire to retaliate was the butfor cause of the challenged employment action holding that the court finds more persuasive the decisions of the circuit courts which reject reading a thirdparty retaliation cause of action into title vii but ultimately finding that the participation prong of title vii is potentially broad enough to encompass retaliation against third parties in the circumstances alleged in the instant case recognizing that title vii protects individuals from retaliation regardless of the merit of their complaints so long as they can show a good faith reasonable belief that the challenged practices violate title vii holding that title vii provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment