motion), is that defendants acted as they did because the putative plaintiff class was predominantly white. The fact that defendants “do not dispute” this accusation, ante at 16, only underscores our obligation to subject defendants’ conduct to strict scrutiny, see Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224, 115 S.Ct. at 2111 (“[A]ny person, of whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny.”). The majority reaches a contrary conclusion — that strict scrutiny does not apply— because it regards the facts plaintiffs have pleaded in support of their equal protection claims insufficient to describe a “racial classification.” See ante at 16-17 (<HOLDING>). In reaching its conclusion, the majority
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