or otherwise rendered practically incapable of maritime transport.” 543 U.S. at 496, 125 S.Ct. at 1128. The Court stated that in determining whether a watercraft constitutes a “vessel” under § 3, “[t]he question remains in all cases whether the watercraft’s use ‘as a means of transportation on water’ is a practical possibility or merely a theoretical one.” Id. (citation omitted). The district court relied on Stewart for the proposition that a watercraft taken out of navigation is no longer a vessel. Stewart does mention that a ship’s navigational status is “relevant” to whether it is practically capable of transportation on water. 543 U.S. at 496, 125 S.Ct. at 1128. The Court does not, however, require that a ship be “in navigation” to be considered a “vessel” for purposes of 1 U 3 (<HOLDING>). In fact, it is instructive that, in addition
holding that an assault on a seaman by his former maritime employer aboard a vessel in navigable waters had the potential to disrupt maritime commerce because it ren dered the seaman unable to fish holding that a ship whose powers of selfnavigation were practically irreparable and that was towed to a repair facility to be converted into an artificial reef was a vessel subject to maritime liens because it could be towed and carry a crew and cargo recognizing equitable powers necessary and appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title holding that a houseboat is a vessel capable of being subject to a maritime lien as the fact that she has no motive power and must  be towed does not deprive her of the status of a vessel holding that a party who lends money to be used in the repairs of a vessel or to furnish the vessel with supplies does not have a privilege against the vessel