which was adopted after the eleventh amendment and which explicitly limits states' rights. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 453-56, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 2670-71, 49 L.Ed.2d 614, 620-21 (1976). Section 1983 was enacted primarily pursuant to Congress’s powers under the fourteenth amendment. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 423, 93 S.Ct. 602, 605, 34 L.Ed.2d 613, 619 (1973). 8 . Then-Justice Rehnquist, author of the majority opinion in Quern, previously opposed an expansive reading of § 1983. See, e.g., Monell, 436 U.S. at 714-24, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2047-53, 56 L.Ed.2d 650-57 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 9 , Justice Brennan has been a leading advocate of an expansive reading of § 1983. See, e.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980) (Brennan, J.) (<HOLDING>); Monell, 436 U.S. at 658, 98 S.Ct. at 2018, 56
holding that collateral estoppel applies to  1983 claims holding that alleged violations of a state statute did not give rise to federal constitutional claims holding that 1983 authorizes suits to redress violations by state officials of rights created by federal statutes as well as the federal constitution holding that  1983 applies to violations of any federal statute not just equal rights legislation holding that in california the oneyear statute applies to a  1983 action