danger claim, Plaintiff must allege facts showing: (1) that Defendant exercised its authority and (2) took an affirmative action; and (3) that the action taken created a danger to Plaintiff or rendered Plaintiff more vulnerable to danger than had Defendant not acted at all. See Ye, 484 F.3d at 639. “[I]t is [the] misuse of state authority, rather than a failure to use it, that can violate the Due Process Clause.” Bright, 443 F.3d at 282. In other words, “[l]iability under the state-created danger theory is predicated upon the states’ affirmative acts which work to the plaintiffs’ detriments in terms of exposure to danger.” D.R hool’s failure to expel or appropriately punish a violent student does not constitute a sufficient affirmative act for state-created danger); D.R., 972 F.2d 1364 (<HOLDING>). To further expound, in Morrow, 719 F.3d 160,
holding that a schools excess policy was primary over a students homeowners policy for injuries to the student during physical education class holding that transfer rule denying eligibility to students transferring from public to private schools did not violate the students rights to due process or equal protection of the laws as provided by the fourteenth amendment holding that schools have no duty under the due process clause to protect students from assaults by other students even where the school knew or should have known of the danger presented holding that sexual molestation of students by teacher is presumed to result in physical injury holding that schools failure to adequately address and remediate known physical and sexual misconduct by students did not constitute an affirmative act for statecreated danger