the Board with her notice of appeal and does not comport with the precedent of Fay. IV. Substantial Compliance ¶13 Last, Krawiec contends that the superior court erred in dismissing her appeal because she substantially complied with the service requirements of RCW 51.52.110. Again, we disagree. ¶14 “Substantial compliance is generally defined as actual compliance with the ‘substance essential to every reasonable objective’ of a statute.” Hernandez, 107 Wn. App. at 196 (quoting Cont’l Sports Corp. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 128 Wn.2d 594, 602, 910 P.2d 1284 (1996)). The doctrine of substantial compliance, though, does not save the failure to comply with statutory time limits, such as the 30-day filing and service requirements of RCW 51.52.110. See, e.g., Petta, 68 Wn. App. at 409-10 (<HOLDING>); see also Humphrey Indus., Ltd. v. Clay St.
holding that strict compliance is not required holding that the defendants failure to timely serve a notice of appeal and docketing statement did not prejudice the plaintiff and therefore would not serve as a basis to dismiss the appeal holding that where a party has insisted on strict compliance with the contracts terms the doctrine of substantial performance does not apply holding that failure to serve required party under rcw 5152110 was not substantial compliance holding that substantial compliance with notice is sufficient