Cir. 2000) (stating the this Court has not yet decided whether dismissals under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) are reviewed de novo or for abuse of discretion). We need not reach this question here, however, since the outcome of this appeal would be the same under either standard. 3 . We note that we can say that Plonka’s § 1983 suit is not barred the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion. Under New York law, the form of relief being sought is an element of the litigant’s claim, and because damages would not have been available to Plonka in the earlier New York state criminal proceeding against him, claim preclusion does not bar his present suit for damages. See Leather, 180 F.3d at 424-25; Parker v. Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co., Inc., 93 N.Y.2d 343, 690 N.Y.S.2d 478, 712 N.E.2d 647 (1999) (<HOLDING>). 4 . In view of the remand, and the fact that
holding claim preclusion did not foreclose plaintiffs second action even though it arose out of the same lease agreement as that of a prior action holding that all claims arising from the same employment relationship constitute the same transaction or series of transactions for claim preclusion purposes holding that prior adjudication barred a claim that arose out of the same transactions and that could have been raised in prior suit holding that a  1983 claim for damages was not prohibited by claim preclusion because the plaintiff could not have sought damages in his prior article 78 proceeding arising out of the same facts holding that damages were not available to a plaintiff who challenged an ordinance under a due process theory because the plaintiff had not sought a permit and therefore any claim for damages was purely speculative