“mandatory” or “optional.” We need not consider whether the Borough’s characterization of the eruv is accurate. Neither the Supreme Court nor our Court has intimated that only compulsory religious practices fall within the ambit of the Free Exercise Clause. To the contrary, our en banc decision in DeHart said that conduct implicates the Free Exercise Clause if it is motivated by “beliefs which are both sincerely held and religious in nature” without regard to whether it is mandatory. 227 F.3d at 51; cf. id. at 54-55 (rejecting contention that, in the context of prisoners’ free exercise claims, conduct based on “religious commandments” should receive more protection than conduct that is “a positive expression of belief’); see also Levitan v. Ashcroft, 281 F.3d 1313, 1319 (D.C.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Further, if the Borough’s position were
holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant holding that possession of marijuana is not protected by the free exercise clause of the first amendment holding that because a requirement that a religious practice be mandatory to warrant first amendment protection finds no warrant in the cases of the supreme court or of this court catholic prisoners could raise free exercise challenge to rule barring them from consuming small amounts of wine during communion holding that a requirement that a religious practice be mandatory to warrant first amendment protection finds no support in the cases of the supreme court or of this court holding that religious exercise is any exercise of religion whether or not compelled by or central to a system of religious belief and that the use building or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered  religious exercise