Ahmad appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging federal and state claims arising out of foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal on the basis of the applicable statute of limitations, and for an abuse of discretion its decision whether to apply equitable tolling. Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2006). We affirm. The district court properly dismissed Ahmad’s Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) claim as time-barred because Ahmad did not file his action within one year of the alleged violation. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (an action for damages must be brought within one year of the alleged violation); King v. California, 784 F.2d 910, 914-15 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). The district court did not abuse its
holding fiveyear limitation period in 28 usc  2462 runs from date of predicate violation not from date of administrative assessment of sanction holding that the thirty day removal period runs from the date of fdics plea in intervention and notice of substitution holding that oneyear period runs from the discovery of the transfer holding that the limitations period in section 1640e runs from the date of consummation of the transaction and rejecting a continuing violation theory holding limitations period for filing petition for postconviction relief runs from date of final judgment not from date of subsequent order revoking appeal bond