endorsed hereon.” 13 . For example, we agree with the dissent that a corporate merger is not the only way to create a successor to the interest of Briar Green. Under the Thompson definition and the language of the policy, it could be argued that either a person or an entity that acquires the subset of Briar Green's rights and obligations relevant to the matter at hand is a successor to the interest of Briar Green. We need not decide this question here, however, because there is no evidence in the record that Travelers acquired any of Briar Green's obligations to Primo. 14 . See also Holland v. Williams Mountain Coal Co., 256 F.3d 819, 821-22 (D.C.Cir.2001) (concluding that party acquiring property of a firm does not become the seller’s successor in interest); Sitaram, 152 S.W.3d at 826 (<HOLDING>). 15 . The court referred to the purchasers of
holding that the use of excessive force does not constitute a prison condition in the ordinary sense of the term holding term successor does not contemplate acquisition by ordinary purchase from another corporation holding that a hearing does not contemplate an oral presentation unless required by express language or context holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance holding that statutory authority to modify does not contemplate fundamental changes