equal, the Court must follow the Georgia courts’ interpretations of Georgia law. See Silverberg v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 710 F.2d 678, 690 (11th Cir.1988); see also CSX Transp., Inc. v. Trism Specialized Carriers, Inc., 182 F.3d 788, 790 (11th Cir.1999) (following the Georgia Court of Appeals where, as here, the Georgia Supreme Court has not declared the relevant state law). But all else is not equal. After a close review of the Georgia Bank opinion, the Court holds Georgia Bank does not interpret Insuring Agreement E. It interprets only Insuring Agreement D, which has a stricter standard of loss causation. Its holding is inapplicable here, where only Insuring Agreement E is at issue. Cf. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Duckworth, 648 F.3d 1216, 1224 (11th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). Only Manitowoc interpreted Insuring Agreement
holding federal courts are bound to follow intermediate state appellate court decisions unless there is persuasive evidence that the states highest court would rule otherwise holding federal courts should follow state court decisions that are based on facts essentially indistinguishable from the facts at hand holding that arizona rule of civil procedure 52a requires the court to find only the ultimate facts not the evidentiary facts upon which the ultimate facts are based holding that state courts in construing and interpreting state law are not bound by the decisions of federal courts recognizing that decisions of lower federal courts interpreting federal law are not binding on state courts