in Brandon v. County of Richardson, 252 Neb. 839, 566 N.W.2d 776 (1997). In other words, Claypool does not argue that appellees are liable at common law, pursuant to the risk-utility balancing test this court has employed to determine the existence of a duty. See, Knoll v. Board of Regents, 258 Neb. 1, 601 N.W.2d 757 (1999); Popple v. Rose, 254 Neb. 1, 573 N.W.2d 765 (1998). We consider, in turn, each of Claypool’s asserted bases for the creation of the alleged duty. We note that because of our resolution of these issues, we do not reach the question of whether Carlos’ apparent suicide was a new and independent agency that broke the line of causation between his death and any negligence on the part of appellees. See Long v. Omaha & C. B. Street R. Co., 108 Neb. 342, 187 N.W. 930 (1922) (<HOLDING>). See, generally, Logarta v. Gustafson, 998 F.
holding that action for wrongful death may generally not be maintained where death was selfinflicted holding that a failure to include a beneficiary in a wrongful death action is a defect because the wrongful death act restricts plaintiffs to a single action holding a wrongful death action may not be maintained for the death of an unborn child recognizing cause of action for wrongful death holding that plaintiffs failure to prove decedents death was caused by the wrongful acts of the defendant precludes any recovery of wrongful death damages under mississippis wrongful death statute