drugs does. See id. Although “prisoners do not shed all constitutional rights at the prison gate, ... lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying or penal system.” Id. at 485, 115 S.Ct. at 2301 (citations, quotation marks, and alteration omitted). Under certain circumstances, administrative segregation is a necessary limitation of privileges and rights that incarceration demands. The extended duration of Al-Amin’s confinement in administrative segregation does distinguish the facts of his case from some other disciplinary or administrative segregation situations in which it was held that no liberty interest existed. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486, 115 S.Ct. at 2301 (<HOLDING>); Rodgers v. Singletary, 142 F.3d 1252 (11th
holding that an inmates mandamus petition challenging a disciplinary report imposing 15 days disciplinary confinement was a collateral criminal proceeding because the disciplinary confinement limited petitioners ability to earn gain time holding that the plaintiffs disciplinary segregated confinement for thirty days did not present the type of atypical significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest holding that 30day segregated confinement in hawaii penitentiary did not present such atypical hardship so as to create liberty interest holding that 30day disciplinary confinement did not present the type of atypical significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest and further stating that the chance that a finding of misconduct will alter the balance in consideration of parole is simply too attenuated to invoke the procedural guarantees of the due process clause holding that placing a prisoner in disciplinary confinement clearly effects liberty interest