of Rule 59. Cf. Reeves, 119 Ariz. at 164, 579 P.2d at 1387 (“We do not believe Rule 59(m) was intended to limit the discretion of a judge to order a new trial,”); see also Bilby, 87 Ariz. at 374, 351 P.2d 647 (concluding that failure to comply with Rule 59(m) does not require that the new trial motion be denied with prejudice and that the verdict and judgment be reinstated because “[s]uch a result is entirely unwarranted by the terms and purpose of the Rule”). Second, we reject the notion that § 12-613’s “fair and just” damages provision mandates greater deference to juries in wrongful death cases than in personal injury actions. The standard for remittitur is the same in wrongful death and personal injury cases. See, e.g., Alires v. S. Pac. Co., 100 Ariz. 6, 14, 409 P.2d 714 (1966) (<HOLDING>); cf. Begay v. City of Tucson, 148 Ariz. 505,
holding that the trial court did not exceed its judicial discretion in finding that the damages ordered by the jury were excessive and ordering remittitur in a wrongful death action holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding violation was willful and substantial holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering a separate trial for the counterclaims where the convenience of the parties would be served holding in modification suit in which no enforcement was ordered that trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering father to pay mothers attorneys fees as child support under the necessaries rule holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a new trial based on a 250000 award for a mental distress claim