and second, after discerning a conflict between the first-layer excess policy and an already-bootstrapped interpretation of the primary policy. Tennessee law precludes this multi-step method of construction. See Allmand v. Pavletic, 292 S.W.3d 618, 631 (Tenn.2009) (“[T]he better rule in all cases is to read the whole instrument and give effect to every part if possible, and thereby reach its true meaning, and not resort to artificial or arbitrary rules until the former rule is exhausted.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 203 Tenn. 636, 315 S.W.2d 239, 243 (1958) (“[T]he rule of ambiguity and construction against the insurer does not permit a court to create an ambiguity where none exists.”); Crouch v. Shepard, 44 Tenn. 383, 388 (1867) (<HOLDING>). We derive nothing from examining how the
holding that in interpreting a contract the actual purpose and intent of the parties must be derived recognizing strictness of maryland rule in a diversity case holding that case law interpreting rule 11 may be use to interpret rule 9011 recognizing rule holding that the rule of interpreting contract more strongly against the party using it is a rule of strictness and rigor and not to be resorted to but when other rules of exposition fail