merits. See, e.g., Tefft v. Seward, 689 F.2d 637, 639 (6th Cir.1982) (“The thrust of Rule 15 is to reinforce the principle that cases should be tried on their merits rather than the technicalities of pleadings.”). And, in furtherance of this principle, we have, on rare occasion, allowed Rule 15 amendments after judgment is entered. Nevertheless, it does not appear that we have ever allowed an amendment to a § 2255 motion after the § 2255 motion is denied. We need not determine whether the allowance of such an amendment is permissible here because the motion to amend is futile and would be barred even if it were timely. Oleson’s proposed amendment is subject to the § 2255 one-year statute of limitations affirmative defense. See Dunlap v. United States, 250 F.3d 1001, 1004 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Oleson’s July 24, 2000 amendment is not
holding that the oneyear bar contained in  2255 acts as an affirmative defense and not a jurisdictional bar holding bjecause immunity from liability constitutes an affirmative defense not a jurisdictional bar only immunity from suit is properly before us today holding that oneyear limitations period set forth in  2255 is not a jurisdictional bar and is thus subject to equitable tolling holding state is required to raise procedural bar as affirmative defense or it is waived holding that the district court  did not abuse its discretion in denying his petition for reinstatement where membership in good standing in the state bar was required before attorney could be admitted to the federal bar and applicant had not been readmitted to state bar