an inference that the litigant is not interested in the state cause of action per se, but is instead attempting to circumvent the effects of the federal question judgment. In this limited instance, removal is allowed. 900 F.2d at 1417 (emphasis added). 73 .Carpenter, 44 F.3d at 371. 74 . See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 75 . See Kramer v. Smith Barney, 80 F.3d 1080, 1086 & 1083 n. 1 (5th Cir.1996) (observing that if plaintiff's state law fiduciary duty claims relating to ERISA governed pension accounts were removable under complete preemption theory, plaintiff's other related, non-ERISA, state law claims were removable as supplemental claims under § 1367). 76 . See Louisiana Nat. Bank of Baton Rouge v. O'Brien, 439 So.2d 552, 556-58 (La.Ct.App. 1st Cir.1983), writ denied, 443 So.2d 590 (La.1983) (<HOLDING>). 1 . Carpenter v. Wichita Falls Independent
holding that note marked in rem gave maker no liability at all beyond property itself and that creditor was unable to maintain any action against maker to reach any of makers other assets holding that even after a debt has been assumed a creditor can look to the maker for the collection of its note and the enforcement of its lien upon the assuming partys failure to pay recognizing that factors such as physical and mental condition of the maker of the instrument at the time of its execution including age any weakness or infirmity are probative evidence of undue influence holding that a bank is required to notify the maker of a promissory note by some affirmative act upon exercise of its option to accelerate the maturity date of the note holding that there was no basis for liability of government agency once individual decision maker was released by jury verdict