& Accepted Masons, 56 Tex.Civ.App. 306, 121 S.W. 178, 179 (Dallas 1909, no writ). Our court’s first use of section eight to safeguard speech came in Ex parte Tucker, 110 Tex. 335, 220 S.W. 75, 76 (1920), where habeas relief was accorded to one held in contempt for violating an injunction by making “slanderous epithets to the female telephone operators” during a labor dispute. In thereafter refusing to enjoin publication of an alleged libelous article, the court in Strange v. Biggers, 252 S.W. 826 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1923, no writ), declared that freedom of speech will necessarily end when supervision by a court of equity of the expressions and sentiments of the individual is allowed to begin. See also Pirmantgen v. Feminelli, 745 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1988, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Consistent with this jurisprudence and the
holding that injunction of scandalous newspaper was unconstitutional holding that the injunction did not constitute a claim holding unconstitutional injunction barring dissemination of allegedly libelous letter holding injunction limited to material found either libelous or disparaging after a full jury trial was pot unconstitutional and could stand holding unconstitutional a statute barring the use of opprobrious words or abusive language tending to cause a breach of the peace