Construction § 44.16, at 529 (4th ed. 1986) (citing cases). “[T]he general federal rule is that courts do not rewrite statutes to create constitutionality.” Eubanks v. Wilkinson, 937 F.2d 1118, 1122 (6th Cir.1991); see generally id. at 1124-25 (canvassing relevant caselaw of the Supreme Court). Though severability may be achieved “by striking out or disregarding words that are in the [challenged] section,” it may not be achieved “by inserting [words] that are not now there.” United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 214, 221, 23 L.Ed. 563 (1875). Inserting into a statute words that Congress did not enact “would be to make a new law, not to enforce an old one,” which “is no part of our [judicial] duty.” Id.; see also Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 82, 98, 25 L.Ed. 550 (1879) (<HOLDING>). Although the Supreme Court cases discussed
recognizing we must give insurance policy language its ordinary and generally accepted meaning unless the policy shows that the words used are intended to impart a technical or different meaning recognizing that the court must give meaning to all the words in the claims holding that it is not within the judicial province to give the words used by congress a narrower meaning than they were manifestly intended to bear in order that crimes may be punished which are not described in language that brings them within the constitutional power of that body recognizing that we must give meaning to all the words in the claims holding that courts give the words of a statute their ordinary contemporary common meaning absent an indication congress intended them to bear some different import