that “[n]ot all exceptional treatment is persecution.” Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338, 1355 (11th Cir.2000). We explained that persecution is an “extreme concept, requiring more than a few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation, and that mere harassment does not amount to persecution.” Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1231 (quotations and alteration omitted). When assessing whether a petitioner has established past persecution, we consider the cumulative impact of the mistreatment he suffered. Mejia v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 498 F.3d 1253, 1258 (11th Cir.2007). We have held that “employment discrimination which stops short of depriving an individual of a means of earning a living does not constitute persecution.” Barre-to-Claro v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 275 F.3d 1334, 1340 (11th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, a petitioner’s termination from
holding that removal of job responsibility did not constitute an adverse employment action because there was no change in the plaintiffs job position grade pay or benefits holding that a change in job duties was not an adverse employment action where the new job duties did not constitute qualitatively inferior work requiring any less skill or knowledge holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment holding that a prima facie case for discrimination requires the plaintiff to show that 1 he belongs to the protected age group 2 his job performance was satisfactory 3 adverse employment action was taken against him  in 4  circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination  holding that although petitioner suffered employment discrimination lost his job as a taxi driver and was forced to take menial work he was not persecuted