its holding, and with the scope of the remand. First, I am decidedly in disagreement with the majority’s recognition of authority by the Coast Guard to forcefully remove the master of a vessel from his ship, thus preventing him from continuing efforts to save it. With due respect, there is no authority in law, practice, or maritime tradition that validates such action by the Coast Guard, nor am I aware of the government’s having claimed such extraordinary powers before the inception of this case. Because the Coast Guard lacked the authority to remove the NORTHERN VOYAGER’s master from his vessel against his will, the discretionary function exception relied upon by the government is inapposite. See Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 181, 76 S.Ct. 745, 100 L.Ed. 1065 (1956) (<HOLDING>); Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. United
holding that discretionary function can derive only from properly delegated authority holding that the discretionary function does not apply where the decisionmaker lacks authority holding that an agent acting outside his delegated authority is not protected by the discretionary function exception recognizing a discretionary function exception to that waiver holding that the discretionary function exception may apply in the absence of a conscious decision 