the witness’ subjective motivations. Without an opportunity to observe the witness’ demeanor, we are ill-suited to determine deliberate deception in the first instance. See id. (explaining how the reasonably made findings of the trial court as to the witness’ veracity for truth must be permitted to stand). That is why, for example, our settled practice in attorney discipline cases is to use an attorney’s deliberate deception as an aggravating factor only when the PCC has already determined the lawyer lied. See, e.g., Cohen’s Case, 143 N.H. 169, 171-72 (1998) (disbarring attorney based upon referee’s finding that the attorney had repeatedly engaged in dishonest conduct, including, among other things, falsely answering bar counsel’s interrogatory); Astles’ Case, 134 N.H. 602, 605 (1991) (<HOLDING>). In none of our cases have we, in the first
holding that the district court lacks personal jurisdiction over a habeas petition when the state official having custody is not named as respondent holding that an immigration judges failure to advise the respondent of the availability of free legal services and to ascertain that the respondent has received a list of such programs invalidates a subsequently entered removal order holding that the trial court erred in unilaterally modifying pastdue and future childsupport payments where the only petition before the court was a petition for citation alleging that the respondent was in arrears in his child support holding that aggravation was warranted where respondent admitted and the referee found that the respondent had lied in correspondence to the pcc holding that since the basis for the respondents order of removal and the denial of relief no longer exists the respondent has presented exceptional circumstances justifying reopening