a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” (emphasis added). This test does not apply, however, where, as here, a defendant is charged with two separate violations of the same statutory provision. The soundness of this point is well-illustrated by a simple hypothetical in which a defendant is charged under the same statute with the murders of Victim A and Victim B. Under Blockburger, which looks only to the statutory elements of the indictments, these would be the same crimes in the abstract. Yet, it is clear that a defendant could be charged for the murder of both victims. See Sanabria, 437 U.S. at 70 n. 24, 98 S.Ct. 2170 (<HOLDING>). In sum, in each of his two trials Powell was
holding that the protection of the double jeopardy clause does not preclude a defendant from being charged under a statute  defining as the criminal offense a discrete act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a distinguishable discrete act that is a separate violation of the statute holding aiding and abetting is not a discrete criminal offense holding that the dismissal of criminal charges for evidentiary insufficiency is an acquittal for purposes of the double jeopardy clause holding that denial of employees request for respirators under the rehabilitation act was a discrete act of discrimination under morgan holding that a proposed termination is the very type of discrete act   identified  as separate actionable unlawful employment practices