1249 (8th Cir.1993) (citing Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453, 92 S.Ct. 1653), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1035, 114 S.Ct. 1549, 128 L.Ed.2d 199 (1994), the immunity agreement itself governs the scope of the immunity involved. When a defendant enters an informal immunity agreement with the government rather than asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege against being compelled to incriminate himself, “the scope of ’informal immunity is governed by the terms of the immunity agreement.” United States v. Luloff, 15 F.3d 763, 766 (8th Cir.1994). This is true because an immunity agreement is likened to a contract between the government and the defendant, a concept universally recognized by courts faced with enforcing such agreements. See id.; United States v. Crawford, 20 F.3d 933, 935 (8th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Conway, 81 F.3d 15, 17 (1st
holding that immunity agreements are analogous to plea agreements and are enforced under principles of contract law within the constitutional safeguards of due process holding that agreements other than fullfledged collective bargaining agreements may be contracts within the meaning of  301 holding that arbitration clauses as contractual agreements must be enforced to their terms holding that property settlement agreements may be specifically enforced holding that the rules of contract law are applicable to plea agreements