because the increased sentence was based on the additional fact-finding that “parole or probation failed to deter defendant from committing further offenses”) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Leach, 325 F.Supp.2d 557, 561 (E.D.Pa.2004) (concluding that “Blakely renders [it] impermissible” for the judge to consider the fact that the defendant was on probation at the time he committed the offense). B. The Trial Court Did not Abuse its Discretion in Sentencing Huber in the Aggravated Range Having concluded that it was proper for the trial court to consider the fact that Huber was on supervision at the time of the offense, we must now consider whether the court abused its discretion in determining that this fact justified aggravation. See Lopez, 113 P.3d at 727 n. 11 (<HOLDING>). Given the proximity in time of the preceding
holding that arizona rule of civil procedure 52a requires the court to find only the ultimate facts not the evidentiary facts upon which the ultimate facts are based holding that denial of amendment is within discretion of trial court holding that a district court has wide discretion to modify an injunction based on changed circumstances or new facts holding the record did not contain enough facts to determine whether the statute was constitutional as applied to the particular facts and circumstances of the case holding that the determination whether relevant facts are extraordinary aggravating circumstances  is a conclusion of law that remains within the discretion of the trial court if it is based on blakelycompliant or blakelyexempt facts