Nor would achieving the projected savings early in the biennium mean that the DOC should have stopped applying HB 406 retroactively since there is no language in HB 406 to indicate that the General Assembly did not intend for that legislation to apply retroactively for its entire effective lifetime. 57 . Baker, 204 S.W.3d at 597. 58 . See, e.g., Lewis v. Jackson Energy Co-op. Corp., 189 S.W.3d 87, 92-93 (Ky.2005) (using grammatical structure of statute as interpretive aid). 59 . Milner v. Gibson, 249 Ky. 594, 61 S.W.2d 273, 277 (1933). 60 . In 2009, the General Assembly amended KRS 439.354(1) to provide, with some exceptions, parolees are to be given final discharges after reaching their minimum expiration dates. 61 .See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Paisley, 201 5.W.3d 34, 36-37 (Ky.2006) (<HOLDING>). 62 . Hoskins, 150 S.W.3d at 10. 63 .
holding that a trial court had no discretion to enter a writ of replevin after finding that the statutory requirements for issuing the writ had been met even though the statute provided that a circuit court may issue a writ of replevin reasoning that based on the context may implied an imperative obligation holding that demonstration of error does not necessarily entitle petitioners to a writ unless the standards for granting a writ have been met holding that common pleas erred in setting aside the writ of execution on the basis that the union erroneously filed a writ of execution instead of filing a writ of mandamus holding that to grant a writ of mandamus a court in the exercise of its discretion must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances holding writ was discharged because relator failed to serve writ within the 33 days prescribed by law