discretion intrinsic to the factfinding task and essential to its proper performance.” Id. 2 . These principles recognize that an appellate court is "not permitted to reweigh the evidence,” Nusbaum v. Berlin, 273 Va. 385, 408, 641 S.E.2d 494, 507 (2007), or "to substitute its own judgment for that of the finder of fact, even if the appellate court might have reached a different conclusion,” Commonwealth v. Presley, 256 Va. 465, 466, 507 S.E.2d 72, 72 (1998). A factfinder’s resolution of conflicting facts, as well as competing inferences, receives "the highest degree of appellate deference.” Thomas v. Commonwealth, 48 Va.App. 605, 608, 633 S.E.2d 229, 231 (2006). 3 . See also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2108, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (<HOLDING>); Covil v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 692, 696, 604
holding that suppression by prosecutor of evidence favorable to an accused violates due process where evidence is material to either guilt or punishment holding that testimony given by a defendant in support of a motion to suppress cannot be admitted as evidence of his guilt at trial holding that suppression by government of evidence favorable to accused upon request violates due process when evidence is material to guilt recognizing general principle of evidence law that the factfinder is entitled to consider a partys dishonesty about a material fact as affirmative evidence of guilt  quoting wright 505 us at 296 112 sct at 2492 holding that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment