albeit not the one urged by the State. The statute expressly states that the court may not grant a further reduction in excess of “one-half of the remaining mandatory minimum sentence.” Iowa Code § 901.10(2). If, as the State suggests, it is the prosecutor who decides the maximum level of the reduction, it seems more logical that any limitations on the extent of the reduction would be placed on the prosecutor, not the court. Moreover, the fact that the legislature expressly limited the court’s discretion indicates that it gave consideration to the breadth of the court’s power. The legislature could also have expressly limited any reduction by the court to an amount that did not exceed the prosecutor’s request, but it did not do so. See State v. Ayers, 590 N.W.2d 25, 31 (Iowa 1999) (<HOLDING>); Adams, 554 N.W.2d at 689 (“legislative intent
holding that the guidelines did not strip the sentencing court of its discretion to impose a concurrent sentence recognizing that sentencing facts are based on the evidence and testimony presented at sentencing under a preponderance of the evidence standard recognizing that sentencing judges have the discretion to reject any sentencing guideline but no judge is required to do so holding it was reasonable trial strategy for counsel to have determined that sentencing by the court was preferable to sentencing by a jury holding that sentencing court had discretion under sentencing statute noting that the legislature has demonstrated its ability to use restrictive language when it desires to do so