and of itself, denies a defendant effective representation. See, e.g., Ex parte Grayson, 479 So.2d 76, 79-80 (Ala.1985); Bui v. State, 717 So.2d 6, 15 (Ala.Crim.App.1997). Boyd alleged no facts in his petition to support his claim that the compensation scheme in § 15-12-21, Ala. Code 1975, resulted in deficient performance by his trial counsel or affected the outcome of his trial. Therefore, he failed to state a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In addition, the circuit court correctly determined that this claim was procedurally barred pursuant to Rule 32.2(a)(4), Ala. R.Crim. P., because it was raised and addressed on direct appeal. See McGahee v. State, 885 So.2d 191, 207 (Ala.Crim.App.2003) (<HOLDING>). In his appellate brief, in arguing in support
holding that the caldwell claim is procedurally barred because it could have been raised on direct appeal but was not holding that a similar claim in a rule 32 petition was procedurally barred because it was raised at trial and because it was raised on direct appeal holding that a caldwell claim is procedurally barred if it is not raised on direct appeal holding that a habeas claim is procedurally barred where it was already raised on direct appeal and decided on the merits by this court holding that an appellant cannot raise an issue on appeal from the denial of a rule 32 petition which was not raised in the rule 32 petition