Id. at 1193. As Reina-Rodriguez II, on collateral review, retroactively applied a rule holding that a certain offense was no longer an ACCA “crime of violence” to a corresponding Sentencing Guidelines provision, the Court must apply the same reasoning to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). Following Welch, Johnson is a substantive rule retroactive to cases on collateral review. See Welch, 136 S.Ct. at 1265. Under binding Ninth Circuit precedent, a substantive, retroactive rule narrowing the definition of “crime of violence” under ACCA is retroactive to identical Sentencing Guidelines provisions, regardless of how the Teague framework might operate when applied independently in the Sentencing Guidelines context. See In re Hubbard, 825 F.3d 225, 2016 WL 3181417, at *6 (4th Cir. June 8, 2016) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the Court is bound to conclude
holding that the act is retroactive holding that johnson is retroactive to the sentencing guidelines as the government has cited no case to support the proposition that a rule can be substantive in one context but procedural in another holding johnson announced a new substantive rule and prior supreme court holdings make it retroactive holding the supreme court has not held in a case or a combination of cases that the rule in johnson is retroactive to cases on collateral review and therefore it has not made johnson retroactive holding that the earlier guidelines control when retroactive application of the guidelines in effect at sentencing would result in more severe penalties