on the grounds that it would constitute the obligation of funds not yet appropriated.” Cal.-Pac. Utils. Co. v. United States, 194 Ct.Cl. 703, 715 (1971). In Chase v. United States, for example, the plaintiff sought damages under a building lease entered into with the Postmaster General. 155 U.S. 489, 490, 15 S.Ct. 174, 39 L.Ed. 234 (1894). The Supreme Court held the Postmaster General was authorized to enter into contracts on behalf of the United States only if “authorized by law, or ... under an appropriation adequate to its fulfil[l]ment.” Id. at 502, 15 S.Ct. 174. Because “[t]here is no claim that the lease in question was made under any appropriation whatever, ... the only inquiry is whether the contract of lease was ‘authorized by law,’ within the meaning of the [ADA].” Id. (<HOLDING>). The inquiry at the Court of Federal Claims
holding that tort law and the law of punitive damages are not controlled by the contract choice of law provision holding that state liability only accrues as expressly authorized by law holding the contract was not authorized by law recognizing that under georgia law attorneys fees are allowed where authorized by statute or contract holding that where the state has entered into a contract fairly authorized by the powers granted by general law the defense of sovereign immunity will not protect the state from an action arising from the states breach of that contract