is one of two possible grounds for denying the same deduction and the ground explicitly chosen is not overvaluation. Id. at 352. The court in Bemont Investments further observed that every circuit court to have addressed the issue, except the Ninth Circuit in Gainer, has rejected Todd’s reasoning. Id. at 353-55 (citing Fid. Int’l Currency Advisor A Fund, LLC v. United States, 661 F.3d 667, 673-74 (1st Cir.2011); Merino, 196 F.3d at 158; Zfass v. Comm’r, 118 F.3d 184, 191 (4th Cir.1997); Illes v. Comm’r, 982 F.2d 163, 167 (6th Cir.1992); Gilman v. Comm’r, 933 F.2d 143, 151 (2d Cir.1991); Massengill v. Comm’r, 876 F.2d 616, 619-20 (8th Cir.1989)). Even the Ninth Circuit has recognized that Gainer might have been incorrectly decided. Keller v. Comm’r, 556 F.3d 1056, 1060-61 (9th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). We, too, part with the Todd and Gainer
recognizing the ninth circuits aberrant behavior spectrum recognizing limitations existence in other circuits holding that the ninth circuit is constrained by gainer which rested in large part on todd but recognizing the sensible method of many other circuits holding that the enactment of the one central reason standard invalidates the ninth circuits prior at least in part analysis recognizing that the rule as expressed in most circuits including merino is a sensible method of resolving overvaluation cases because it cuts off at the pass what might seem to be an anomalous result  allowing a party to avoid tax penalties by engaging in behavior one might suppose would implicate more tax penalties not fewer but acknowledging that nonetheless in this circuit we are constrained by gainer 