tender in the present case. The next step in my analysis is Mr. Frazier’s challenge to the denial of class certification. Crystal Ford’s Motion to Deny Class Certification was granted primarily on the ground that the mootness of Mr. Frazier’s individual claim required the dismissal of the class claims. Courts are split as to whether a motion to certify a class is sufficient to prevent the entire action from becoming moot when the named representative’s claims become moot or whether actual certification of a class is necessary, although the latter, in my estimation, clearly provides the better foundation for identifying class members and their interests. See, e.g., Wheatley v. Board of Education of Township High School District 205, 99 Ill.2d 481, 77 Ill.Dec. 115, 459 N.E.2d 1364 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Hayman v. Autohaus on Edens, Inc., 315
holding that if the federal claims are dismissed before trial  the state claims should be dismissed as well holding that because no class was certified at the time tender rendered moot haymans claims dismissal of the entire suit was warranted holding that a fraud class action cannot be certified when individual reliance will be an issue holding that because no class was certified at the time the individual claims were dismissed the class action was properly dismissed holding the court was not required to decide the issue of whether the district court properly certified a rule 23b2 class because the court already concluded that the district court appropriately certified the class under rule 23b3 citing authority for the proposition that a court need only find that a class action may be maintained under any of the three subdivisions