the Wender litigation does not. That Karl was subpoenaed to testify on matters related to her employment is not dispositive. The Supreme Court has reiterated that “[t]he First Amendment protects some expressions related to the speaker’s job.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421, 126 S.Ct. 1951; see also Clairmont, 632 F.3d at 1105. Furthermore, though her employer may have paid her regular salary while she was being deposed, Karl’s testimony in the Wender litigation was the product of a subpoena and cannot fairly be characterized as “commissioned or created” by the City. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422, 126 S.Ct. 1951. The district court did not err in determining that Karl spoke as a private citizen in the Wender litigation and not pursuant to her official job duties. See Clairmont, 632 F.3d at 1105 (<HOLDING>). 3. But-For Causation If the plaintiff
holding on similar facts that the evidence supported a finding that the plaintiffs subpoenaed testimony was spoken as a private citizen holding substantial evidence supported jury finding of abuse of process holding that based upon means similar to or supported by holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record holding that police may approach citizen and ask that he roll down the window as long as the officers do not detain the citizen or create the impression that the citizen may not leave