counsel admitted to the existence of the pretrial release aggravator (“[T]he other charges . . . were pending[.]”), then rephrased this admission for clarity (“He was on pre-trial release at the time.”). In response, the prosecutor sought to clarify defendant’s admission (“So you stipulate that he was out on bond on those five charges?”), and defense counsel again admitted to the existence of the pretrial release aggravator (“Yes.”). The clarity of this admission is entirely opposite to the ambiguous remarks of defense counsel in Hurt and the complete silence of both defendant and defense counsel considered in Milam and referenced in Revels. Compare Hurt, 361 N.C. at 329, 643 S.E.2d at 918-19, and Revels, 455 F.3d at 450-51 (citing Milam, 443 F.3d at 387), with Devono, 413 F.3d at 805 (<HOLDING>), and Bartram, 407 F.3d at 310 n.1, 314
holding that defendant admitted to the challenged aggravator when defense counsel stated at sentencing we didnt object to the factual basis in the presentence report because frankly we believed that the facts are true that are set forth in there holding that a district court satisfies its obligation to make factual findings when it explicitly adopts the factual findings set forth in the presentence report holding that factual findings set forth in the psi not objected to by a defendant are deemed admitted holding defendants failure to object to the drug quantity assessment in the presentence report at sentencing was a waiver of the issue on appeal holding that the defendants prior conviction referenced in his presentence report could be taken as admitted because he had made no objection to the facts in his report