organizations are included as defendants in the complaint; T.R. 75(A)(5). Regardless of whether Franklin County is a preferred venue, its status as such is trumped by Trial Rule 76(A), which states explicitly that a motion requesting a change of venue “shall be granted only upon a ’ showing that the county where suit is pending is a party.” That is clearly the case here. Accordingly, the trial court was required to grant the City’s motion and erred in failing to do so. See Scott v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 833 N.E.2d 1094, 1101 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (“According to the plain reading of Trial Rule 76, a change of venue occurs when the county is a party to the action.”); see also Bd. of Comm’rs of LaPorte Cnty. v. Great Lakes Transfer, LLC, 888 N.E.2d 784, 790 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) (<HOLDING>). [5] The City also claims that the case should
holding that if a modification petition is filed in a county where venue is appropriate it is improper to transfer the venue to another county merely because venue also would have been proper in the other county however once an enforcement proceeding is undertaken in an appropriate venue venue is improper in a different county over a subsequently filed petition to modify the decree which was the subject of the enforcement proceedings holding that the defendant waived the issue of change of venue where the trial court denied the motion for a change of venue without prejudice stating that it was willing to reconsider the motion at any time during the jury selection process but the defendant never renewed the motion for a change of venue holding that tr 76a required that the trial court grant the motion for change of venue from laporte county where laporte county was a party to the action despite the fact that it was also a preferred venue holding that motion to transfer also must show either that county where action is pending is improper or that venue is mandatory in another county holding that venue was improper in the county of death because no other event occurred there