116, 120, 516 S.E.2d 879, 882, disc. review denied, 350 N.C. 832, 539 S.E.2d 288 (1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1161, 145 L. Ed.2d 1072 (2000) (citation omitted). As with contracts, the rule of interpretation for leases is that a word in a lease “should be given its natural and ordinary meaning.” Charlotte Housing Authority v. Fleming, 123 N.C. App. 511, 514, 473 S.E.2d 373, 375 (1996) (citation omitted). In Charlotte Housing Authority, we noted that where a nontechnical word is not defined in a lease, we must interpret the word consistent with its plain dictionary meaning: The word ‘guest’ is not defined in Ms. Fleming’s lease; accordingly, it should be given its natural and ordinary meaning. See, Martin v. Ray Lackey Enterprises, 100 N.C. App. 349, 354, 396 S.E.2d 327, 331 (1990) (<HOLDING>); E.L. Scott Roofing Co. v. State of N.C., 82
holding that the interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law holding erisa plan interpretation is simply one of contract interpretation holding that an arbitrators interpretation of the scope of the issue submitted to him is entitled to the same deference accorded his interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement holding that the rules governing interpretation of a lease are the same as those governing interpretation of a contract holding an administrative interpretation cannot change the meaning of a statute or control the courts interpretation of it