at 393, 102 S.Ct. 1127. AEDPA’s legislative history likewise makes clear that Congress intended to create a statute of limitations for habeas claims, not a jurisdictional bar. See Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 128 F.3d 1283, 1288-89 (9th Cir.1997) (summarizing the relevant legislative history), overruled on other grounds, 163 F.3d 530, 539 (9th Cir.1998) (en banc). Respondent Bissonnette argues that by setting out a variety of specific circumstances that will delay the running of the statute, see § 2244(d)(l)(B)-(D), and by providing that the one-year period is tolled during the pendency of state collateral review, see § 2244(d)(2), Congress implicitly precluded tolling based on other equitable considerations. Cf. Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 351-52, 117 S.Ct. 849 (<HOLDING>). This is a forceful objection, as this court
holding that the general equitable tolling doctrine is read into every statute of limitations holding that equitable tolling of the time to file a notice of appeal is not permitted holding that equitable tolling is not available under a tax statute because inter alia the statute sets forth explicit exceptions to its basic time limits and those very specific exceptions do not include equitable tolling  holding title vii subject to equitable tolling holding that the 120day filing period is subject to equitable tolling and addressing circumstances warranting equitable tolling