it is clear from a reading of the statute that the sole purpose of New York habeas corpus is to inquire into the cause of imprisonment or restraint, and to determine whether the detention is void. See 64 N.Y.Jur.2d Habeas Corpus § 2 (1987). This conclusion is supported by case law, because New York courts have not allowed in a habeas proceeding the granting of forms of relief other than discharge, bail, or remand. See, e.g., Graham v. State, 25 A.D.2d 693, 267 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1009 (1966) (stating that ha-beas is not available to secure return of property); People ex rel. Tatra v. McNeill, 19 A.D.2d 845, 244 N.Y.S.2d 463, 464 (1963) (disallowing release of petitioner’s funds for independent psychiatrist in habeas petition); Ex parte Derer, 262 A.D. 969, 30 N.Y.S.2d 53, 53 (1941) (<HOLDING>). A review of the statute and case law,
holding conclusory statements in visitation dispute were not adequate to support awarding visitation rights recognizing right of fit parent to prevent visitation by grandparents which right can only be overridden by court based on evidence that the prevention of the visitation would harm the child holding that psychological parent was not entitled to custody or visitation holding that parent has custodial right to prevent visitation with nonparent holding that court in habeas petition has no authority to condition visitation right of parent upon payment for support and maintenance