the aid of the attorney general’s office. With nothing to indicate that the Naranjos’ trial attorney could not have independently ascertained or verified the proper service procedures, we conclude that their reliance on the advice of a deputy attorney general was not reasonable, and does not constitute good cause. 3. Prejudice The Naranjos point out that they are prejudiced by the dismissal of their action because the claim is now barred by the statute of limitations, while IDOC would have suffered no prejudice from the late service. Our Supreme Court has made it clear, however, that neither a lack of prejudice to the defendant nor the running of the statute of limitations demonstrates good cause for noncompliance with I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2). Campbell, 144 Idaho at 257, 159 P.3d at 894 (<HOLDING>); Martin, 133 Idaho at 375-76, 987 P.2d at
holding that lack of good faith is a valid basis to dismiss a chapter 7 case for cause under section 707a holding that an assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice holding neither a lack of prejudice to the defendant nor the running of the statute of limitations constitutes good cause holding lack of prejudice to the defendant is not good cause holding in a case where it was not clear whether the plaintiff suffered prejudice from the lack of notice that a plaintiff could not obtain reinstatement based on lack of notice