step when interpreting a statute is, of course, analyzing its text. It is significant that the language of section 300aa-32 conferring jurisdiction on federal appellate courts is permissive in nature—parties may file a petition for review of regulations promulgated under the Vaccine Act in the courts of appeals within 60 days of their enactment. The statutory language does not explicitly require a party to challenge reg ulations under the Vaccine Act within such time period and in such a forum. Therefore, we cannot say that Congress clearly intended to limit judicial review to the 60-day period. The language in section 300aa-32 thus differs from the mandatory language found in some other statutory review clauses. See Eagle-Picher Industries v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 911 (D.C.Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, we recognize that there are
holding that issues not raised in the trial court may not be raised later on appeal holding that issue not raised in first appeal cannot be attacked in later appeal holding that a statutory provision of cercla clearly foreclosing later judicial review of matters that could have been raised in the ninety day statutory period bars a later challenge holding that claims raised in later litigation were barred because they could have been fully litigated in chapter 11 reorganization process holding that the court may not under the guise of statutory construction rewrite a statutory provision