1974). He has not done so in his brief, and the record does not reveal any “infringement on [his] ability ... to defend the charges.” Pace v. United States, 705 A.2d 673, 678 (D.C.1998). Correcting the 2003 charge to describe D.W.’s contact with R.T.’s “breasts” instead of her “buttocks” was not “tantamount to charging a new offense,” In re W.K, 323 A.2d at 445, because both acts constitute “sexual contact” under the second-degree child sexual abuse statute. And D.W. does not suggest how his defense — which was that R.T.’s account of D.W. touching her breast was “just not credible” since she did not tell her parents about the incident — would have been different if he had known earlier that the charge was that he touched her breast rather than her buttocks. See W.K, 328 A.2d at 445 (<HOLDING>). VI. Finally, D.W. challenges the sufficiency
holding that amendment to change the name of the victim listed in juvenile petition was not tantamount to charging a new offense and did not prejudice respondent since his defense was an alibi holding that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim for counsels failure to present the preindictment delay issue was without merit because there was no actual prejudice to the supposed alibi defense as the now unavailable witnesses would not have provided the defendant with an alibi for the time when the murder could have occurred holding that the claim with regard to the failure to present an alibi was insufficiently pled because the motion did not describe how the alibi witness would have supported the alibi with exculpatory evidence citing jacobs v state 880 so2d 548 fla2004 holding the harmed victim need not be the victim of the offense of conviction holding that lack of notice regarding the classification of the disability did not prejudice the respondent