order transaction” requires the sales transaction to be for consumer goods “not carried by the seller, either in the seller’s showroom or warehouse,” and “ordered from a manufacturer or supplier.” § 14 — 1101(k)(l)(ii), (iii). Accordingly, while the Legislature’s use of the term “includes” in subsection (g)(2) may appear to introduce “special order transaction” as an illustration of a “layaway agreement,” the mutual exclusivity of the respective elements when read in conjunction with each other, introduces an element of ambiguity that requires judicial interpretation of the term “includes” as it is used in subsection (g)(2). Admittedly, the term “includes,” by itself, is not free from ambiguity. See Housing Auth. of Balt. City v. Bennett, 359 Md. 356, 371, 754 A.2d 367, 375 (2000) (<HOLDING>). “Includes” has various shades of meaning, and
holding exclusion was not ambiguous recognizing that the term including is somewhat ambiguous holding that parol evidence is admissible to resolve a contractual term that is ambiguous holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance holding that contract terms were ambiguous where the specific term that appellant argued should control a more general term was itself susceptible of two reasonable interpretations