to an exception of its own for “real property ... used or expected to be used as the principal dwelling of the consumer____” 12 C.F.R. § 226.3(b)(l)(i)(A). The exemption is therefore quite narrow. Furthermore, Core-Logic’s databases also tracks the “land use” for any particular mortgage transaction, which should allow the parties to filter out those loans made for business-related purposes. (Gordon Decl. Ex. 4, at 59-61.) Indeed, Defendants’ own review of 296 Tower City closing files revealed only twenty-six loans “that could have been used for a business purpose.” (Duvall Decl. ¶¶ 18, 22.) It therefore does not appear to the Court that determining the purpose of the class members’ loans would be “unmanageable.” See Robinson v. Fountainhead Title Grp., 252 F.R.D. 275, 294 (D.Md.2008) (<HOLDING>). If necessary, the purpose of class members’
holding that determining whether a loan was federally related under respa did not preclude class certification holding that putative class members are not parties to an action prior to class certification holding that tolling applies to a subsequent class action when class certification was granted in a prior case holding that where named plaintiff was employee of class counsel district court did not abuse its discretion by denying class certification holding affirmative defense of mitigation did not preclude class certification