v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 401, 407-08, 100 S.E.2d 4 (1957)). Likewise in this case, the presence of signs barring unauthorized admittance is sufficient to establish that the access road is not “open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel.” Va.Code § 46.2-100. 395 F.3d at 521 (emphasis as in the Fourth Circuit opinion). The court also rejected a government argument that taxis, buses, delivery trucks, and people in search of directions such as defendant Smith also used the road, and that such use brought it within the definition of “highway.” The court said: Because the general public is not permitted on the access road, it is not “open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel.” Va.Code § 46.2-100. See also Flinchum, 24 Va.App. at 737, 485 S.E.2d 630 (<HOLDING>). Id. D. The Virginia Cases There are at least
holding road was still a public highway although fifty years had passed since the road was used by the public holding that a road not open to the public at all times was not a highway holding that case law had made clear that masturbating in car on public road was sufficiently open holding the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances holding that a bia road was a tribal road by considering the nature of the rightofway at issue and finding that although the tribe had relinquished certain gatekeeping rights by allowing public use of the road and collaborating with the bia in maintaining it the tribe had maintained other significant gatekeeping rights because the rightofway was not granted to the state and the road did not form any part of the states highway system