proposed class. See East Texas Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403, 97 S.Ct. 1891, 52 L.Ed.2d 453 (1977) (discussing membership in a proposed class); Reid v. White Motor Corp., 886 F.2d 1462, 1471 (6th Cir.1989) (“A class representative must be part of the class and ‘possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as class members.’”) (citations omitted). While class definitions obviously are tailored to the specifics of every ease, important elements of defining a class include: (1) specifying a particular group that was harmed during a particular time frame, in a particular location, in a particular way; and (2) facilitating a court’s ability to ascertain its membership in some objective manner. Crosby v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 796 F.2d 576, 580 (1st Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); see Rodriguez v. Berrybrook Farms, Inc., 672
recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members holding that putative class members are not parties to an action prior to class certification holding that a class could not be certified because the definition made class members impossible to identify prior to individualized factfinding and litigation and thereby failed to satisfy one of the basic requirements for a class action under rule 23 holding that rule 23b2 calls for injunction as to all class members or to none of them and does not authorize class certification when each class member would be entitled to an individualized award of monetary damages holding that a district of columbia consumer protection statute that authorized representative actions and did not reference class action requirements or mandate class certification was a separate and distinct procedural vehicle from a class action and thus did not constitute a class action under cafa