interest.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 24-5(b) (2003). This Court must give the language of a statute its plain and ordinary meaning where the words chosen by the legislature to comprise the law are clear and unambiguous. See Hyler v. GTE Products Co., 333 N.C. 258, 262, 425 S.E.2d 698, 701 (1993). In construing the statutes in pari materia, the entire amount of compensatory damages bears interest, rather than the “compensatory portion minus settlements.” Brown, 349 N.C. at 523-24, 507 S.E.2d at 896. Dr. Kim argues that costs and pre-judgment interest should be apportioned pro rata, however, the plain meaning of the statute does not support this. It is clear that pre-judgment interest is to be awarded before a set-off is given for the settlement amount. See Brown, 349 N.C. 520, 507 S.E.2d 894 (<HOLDING>) . It would be contrary to the plain meaning of
holding that because the complaint does not seek a specific amount of money converted from a particular account but rather an award of compensatory damages in an amount to be determined at trial it fails to state a claim for conversion under new york law holding despite not finding undue hardship that it would be equitable to reduce the amount of nondischargeable liability by the amount of the accrued interest recognizing that federal removal jurisdiction is determined by the amount of damages a plaintiff seeks holding that prejudgment interest is based on the amount of the judgment not the total amount of damages awarded by the jury because nonsettling defendants have no control over settlement negotiations and should not be forced to pay prejudgment interest on settling defendants parts of a damages award holding prejudgment interest is to be determined on the entire amount of compensatory damages and then reduced by the amount of interest which would have accrued at present value on the settlement amount determined before trial