2, 2009. See PI. Mem. Opp’n at 10. Since the plaintiff's claims are time-barred using either October 2, 2Ó09 (the date of notice) or November 2, 2009 (the date of termination), and because the District argues for the later date, see D.C.’s Mem. at 17, the Court will use the November' 2, 2009 date for purposes of the statute of limitations analysis. 11 . Additionally, the plaintiff's claims were not tolled during the pendency of the plaintiff's EEOC inquiry. The Supreme Court has held that the statute of limitations continues to run on a claim that requirés no administrative exhaustion even while the plaintiff pursues administrative remedies on a separate claim that requires exhaustion. See Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 465-66, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975) (<HOLDING>); Carter v. District of Columbia, 14 F.Supp.2d
holding that a claim of retaliation for filing eeoc charges is cognizable under  1981 holding that civil rights claims under 42 usc  1981 and 1982 are personal injury tort claims holding that a district court faced with a mixed petition should stay the unexhausted claims pending exhaustion rather than dismiss them without prejudice for the same purpose it is preferable to stay proceedings pending exhaustion holding that postage charges and telecopy charges are not taxable costs holding that civil rights complainants with pending eeoc charges should file their section 1981 claims in court and request a stay until the charges are resolved