the higher their fees, is analogous to the argument previously rejected that an executive has a motive to commit fraud merely because his compensation is tied to stock price. Consequently, the Court finds that this alone cannot provide the requisite motive. Likewise Appaloosa and Tepper’s contention that “[t]he James River [DJefen-dants were motivated to conceal the mis-pricings to avoid termination of their various sponsorship and management agreements with the funds,” (Opp. at 10, citing TPC ¶ 43) and the desire to “continue to market and sell the funds’ shares through June 1998 [when they would receive professional fees]” (Opp. at 10, citing TPC ¶ 34) fails to adequately establish a motive to commit fraud. See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1130 (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>), citing Ferber v. Travelers Corp., 785 F.Supp.
holding that to grant a new trial the error must be more than harmless holding that the plaintiff must have more than a unilateral expectation the plaintiff must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to the benefit holding that a plaintiff must do more than merely charge that executives aim to prolong the benefits of the positions they hold holding that the act must be interpreted so as to charge the united states with that portion of the expenses attributable to its unjustifiable positions footnote omitted holding that more than notice to a defendant is required