of statutory construction. To discern this intent, the Court looks ‘primarily to the plain text of the relevant statute, and when the text is unambiguous, our inquiry is at an end.”) (citation omitted). Because we find that the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “sexual intercourse” as used in section 384.24(2) includes more than an act where a male’s penis is placed inside a female’s vagina, we need not, as did our sister court in L.A.P., look to case law defining this term as used in other statutes. While reference to case law and other statutes is a permissible means of determining the plain and ordinary meaning of words of common usage, we believe doing so in this case thwarts the legislative intent behind this law. See Paul, 112 So.3d at 1195 (quoting Burris, 875 So.2d at 410) (<HOLDING>). In reaching this determination, we are guided
holding that the terms of a forfeiture statute must be strictly construed and as a result the words of a statute must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resorting to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statutes operation holding that we must give the words in statutes their plain and ordinary meaning recognizing that where the statutory language is not ambiguous  the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute must be given effect recognizing that the statutes plain and ordinary meaning must control unless this leads to an unreasonable result or a result clearly contrary to legislative intent holding that we must give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of a statutes language