remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the defendant had intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. Id. at 717, 103 S.Ct. 1478. As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, the principle announced in Aikens applies with equal force in the Bat-son context. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359, 111 S.Ct. 1859 (“the same principle applies under Batson.”)-, see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 n. 18, 96 n. 19, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (importing Aikens and Title VII analysis into jury selection context). The primary purpose of the Batson doctrine is to prevent invidious discrimination in jury selection and in resulting jury verdicts, and thus the crux of the issue in Batson claims, as in Title VII cases, is whether a discriminatory motive exists. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks and citation
recognizing that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate holding that a defendants exercise of peremptory challenges  is not denied or impaired when the defendant chooses to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause holding that defendant waived his objection to the prosecutors use of her peremptory challenges by failing to make a contemporaneous objection during jury selection holding that genderbased peremptory challenges also violate the fourteenth amendment holding that peremptory challenges may not be exercised in a discriminatory manner