of Mr. Johnson’s case when the Supreme Court is about to answer the very question he has raised. III. We are aware of this Court’s recent suggestion that “this Court necessarily must apply § 2244(b)(2) under a tight time limit in all cases, since the statute expressly requires us to resolve this application within 30 days, no matter the case.” In re Henry, 757 F.3d 1151, 1157 n. 9 (11th Cir.2014). Anything Henry said about § 2244(b)(3)(D) is dicta because it was not necessary to decide the issues then before the Court. See United States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246, 1253 n. 10 (11th Cir.2009) (“As our cases frequently have observed, dicta is defined as those portions of an opinion that are not necessary to deciding the case then before us.” (quotation omitted)) 969, 138 L.Ed.2d 351 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 117
holding that the rule announced in simmons v south carolina 512 us 154 114 sct 2187 129 led2d 133 1994 doesnt apply retroactively on collateral review holding that the rule announced in padilla v kentucky 559 us 356 130 sct 1473 176 led2d 284 2010 doesnt apply retroactively on collateral review holding that the rule announced in mills v maryland 486 us 367 108 sct 1860 100 led2d 384 1988 doesnt apply retroactively on collateral review recognizing that references to and descriptions of the jurys verdict as advisory as a recommendation and of the judge as the final sentencing authority are permissible under romano v oklahoma 512 us 1 114 sct 2004 129 led2d 1 1994 holding that the rule announced in ring v arizona 536 us 584 122 sct 2428 153 led2d 556 2002 doesnt apply retroactively on collateral review