entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. Crossett was also walking from a parking area which was designated for employee parking toward her place of employment when she suffered her injury. JPMA could assert the same type of control over the parking area, as the employer could in Pierson, based on their lease agreement. Since Crossett was not taking an unreasonable path between her car and her office, she is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits for her injury. Schroeder, 628 S.W.2d at 902. We note that other jurisdictions also hold that a worker traveling between a parking lot not owned by his employer and his place of employment may be compensated for an injury occurring on the trip. See Woodruff World Travel, Inc. v. Industrial Comm’n, 38 Colo.App. 92, 554 P.2d 705 (1976) (<HOLDING>); P.B. Bell & Assocs. v. Industrial Comm’n of
holding that the trial courts authority to initiate workers compensation benefits before the final adjudication was not divested by the legislature and was consistent with the stated purpose of the workers compensation act holding that claimant was entitled to workers compensation because he was injured in a parking lot which was leased by his employer holding that an agencys determination on a workers compensation claim was entitled to deference holding that injury in a parking lot did not occur on a covered situs holding that an injury occurring in a parking lot which was leased but not controlled by an employer was compensable because the employer instructed its employees to park in that lot