fault than Owens-Illinois, which commissioned Saranac Lake Laboratories to test Kaylo and did not share the results with Defendant until 1958. Alternatively, Owens Corning and Owens-Illinois might be equally at fault, yet each could share considerably less than fifty percent of the total fault for Hagan’s illness, given that other asbestos-containing insulation products likely played a role in the illness. Thus, the district court is free to suggest a remittitur which reflects an allocation of less than fifty percent fault to Defendant, if that is what the evidence supports. We note that one federal circuit has called into question the adjustment of a jury’s apportionment of fault by the device of remitti-tur. See Akermanis v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 688 F.2d 898, 902-03 (2nd Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). However, we believe the view of the Seventh
holding that contributory negligence in the sense of mere carelessness or inadvertence is not a defense in strict liability cases holding that plaintiff could not be asked to accept an increase in the contributory negligence percentage and thus a decrease in the judgment as the price of avoiding a new trial holding that in a fela case where the jury found negligence per se the defendant railroad could not challenge the validity of the verdict through postverdict discussions indicating that the jury believed the total award would be reduced by the plaintiffs contributory negligence holding that defendants bear the burden of proving contributory negligence by a preponderance of the evidence holding invalid an instruction regarding intervening cause of act of plaintiff as a defense to strict liability in a case when the former contributory negligence may have been a defense