the IDEA. See Jackson v. District of Columbia, 603 F.Supp.2d 92, 98 (D.D.C.2009) (denying reimbursement for charge described as “create file; made copies; faxed document”). The plaintiffs note that the defendants also refused to reimburse activities that were not obviously clerical, such as “reviewed file and discussed with Samar,” and that they did not explain their reasoning for such refusals. See PL’s Mot., Ex. A; Defs.’ Opp’n, Ex. A; Gray, 779 F.Supp.2d at 74-75 (stating that the defendant did not explain why tasks such as discussing the case with colleagues were considered clerical). These objections are of the “nit-picking” variety that this Circuit discourages. See Nat’l Ass’n of Concerned Veterans, 675 F.2d at 1337-38; see x months before the du 4, at *7 (D.D.C. May 3, 2007) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the court has factored the
holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue holding that a district courts order of dismissal with prejudice was a nullity because the court lacked jurisdiction holding that such a disclaimer is not sufficient to avoid a conflict with the first amendment holding that substantial compliance with notice is sufficient holding that entries such as conference with cocounsel lacked sufficient detail