concluded that Shar-farz failed to prove that Goguen intended to cause injury as required by § 523(a)(6). See 11 U.S.C.§ 523(a)(6). 4 . Goguen also moved for reconsideration of the bankruptcy court determination, which was denied. He did not appeal the denial of reconsideration. 5 . Ordinarily, a separate written judgment is required in a dischargeability action as evidence of the final determination. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 58(a), Fed. R. Bankr.P. 7058 and 9021. The bankruptcy court did not enter a separate judgment in this case. However, the order denying reconsideration evidences its intent not to address any further matters in the case. Moreover, Goguen has not raised the absence of a separate judgment. See Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 98 S.Ct. 1117, 55 L.Ed.2d 357(1978) (<HOLDING>); de Jesus-Mangual v. Rodriguez, 383 F.3d 1, 5
holding that instances of prosecutorial misconduct are waived if not objected to at trial recognizing that a party opposing a claim may choose the forum in the absence of objection holding that when the lower court has clearly evidenced its intent and the opposing party has not objected to the absence of a separate judgment the requirements of rule 58 are waived holding that the party moving for summary judgment waived its argument that the opposing partys affidavit should not be considered because the moving party never objected to the timeliness of the affidavit to the trial court recognizing that the burden on summary judgment shifts to the nonmoving party once the moving party has met its initial responsibility of showing the absence of a triable issue of fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case