at 124-32 “Deception as to identity,” with § 8.2(n), at 133-41 “Deception as to purpose” (distinguishing between situations “where the consenting ■person is unaware of the fact that the other party is a law enforcement officer or one who has already agreed to act on behalf of a law enforcement agency, [and] that in which some form of deceit or trickery is practiced by a person known to be a federal, state, or local official”). The holding of the First District wipes away the consideration of deception as a relevant voluntariness factor by distinguishing the federal precedent referenced in McCord, and by relying upon a distinguishable decision from the Third District. See Wyche, 906 So.2d at 1144-48 (citing Miami-Dade Police Dep’t v. Martinez, 838 So.2d 672, 673-75 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (<HOLDING>), review dismissed, 851 So.2d 729 (Fla.2003)).
holding consent invalid when given under coercive circumstances in which police misrepresented that they had a warrant to search the home holding cotenants consent to search valid where rodriguez who was asleep inside the house was not asked for his consent if police reasonably believed the consenter possessed common authority over the premises recognizing that consent is an exception to the warrant requirement and that voluntariness of consent depends on the totality of the circumstances holding consent valid under the totality of circumstanceswhere police allegedly misrepresented that they were only looking for weapons not currency and where consenter was not in custody and was not offered the false hope of exoneration with regard to a completely fabricated offense holding that warrantless search of defendants vehicle was legal because defendants consent was voluntary even through he was in police custody at the time of giving consent