regulation of them. 3. Responsibility Under and Violation of Pennsylvania Law Dr. Klavan’s final argument is his most creative and complicated. He argues that, under Pennsylvania’s Advance Directive for Health Care Act, 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5401 et seq. (West Supp.1999), the defendants were charged with the affirmative responsibility of ensuring compliance with patients’ AMDs. When defendants refused to honor his AMD, and did not seek a court order permitting them to treat Dr. Klavan, they effectively usurped his decision-making power, so the argu ment goes, and “stepped into the shoes of the state.” Pl.’s Br. at 14. However, we find that private action which allegedly violates a state law cannot, by that violation, create “state action.” Cf. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941, 102 S.Ct. 2744 (<HOLDING>); Denchy v. Education and Training Consultants,
holding that provisions of the uipa can be utilized to describe conduct constituting bad faith holding that the involvement of the police in executing the courtordered search without more does not convert the private defendants abuse of state law into conduct attributable to the state for purposes of  1983 liability and because yanaki and moss allege nothing more than private misuse of state laws their compliant fails to satisfy the first part of the color of law test holding that a creditors joint participation with the state in a prejudgment attachment transformed the creditor into a state actor for the debtors  1983 claims challenging the validity of the state statutes but not for the creditors alleged misuse of the statutes because that conduct could not be attributed to the state holding that the state police is a state agency holding that private misuse of a state statute does not describe conduct that can be attributed to the state