would have to examine all of the changed circumstances and guess at the agency’s action. The Legi-Tech decision cannot be construed so as to condone this type of intru sive and certainly imprecise guesswork. In the case at bar, as in Legi-Tech, the Commission took corrective steps to cure the statutory defect. Legi-Tech, 75 F.3d at 708; A.L. Pharma, Inc. v. Shalala, 62 F.3d 1484, 1489 (D.C.Cir.1995) (distinguishing cases in which the agency refused to take corrective action). The FEC, on December 5, 2005, rendered a new decision and affirmed its prior decision to authorize the General Counsel to pursue litigation. This action properly ratified the prior decision for two reasons. First, the FEC’s action constituted a subsequent review of the evidence. See Doolin, 139 F.3d at 213 n. 11 (<HOLDING>). Second, because the FEC’s December 5, 2005
holding that a court is not empowered to substitute its judgement for that of the agency recognizing that we may not substitute our judgment for that of the alj  holding that repeated appropriations of the proceeds of certain fees constituted a ratification of agency policy holding that court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency recognizing a subsequent agency action as a valid ratification and indicating that the court will not substitute our judgment for that of the agency