because the outcome would have been different absent counsel’s deficient performance.” Kissick, 69 F.3d at 1055. We adopted the Seventh and Fifth Circuits’ conclusions that a defendant must not only allege prejudice of being erroneously sentenced under a higher guideline, but must also demonstrate that the error produced “a large” or “significant” effect on the sentence. See id. at 1055-56 (citing Durrive v. United States, 4 F.3d 548, 551 (7th Cir.1993) (relying on Lockhart to conclude that attorney error must produce a “large effect on the sentence” and holding that minimum twelve-month reduction was insufficient to establish prejudice), abrogated by Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 121 S.Ct. 696, 148 L.Ed.2d 604 (2001); and Spriggs v. Collins, 993 F.2d 85, 88 (5th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>), abrogated by Glover v. United States, 531
holding that in order to show prejudice defendant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different holding that to show prejudice in a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors the result of the proceeding would have been different holding that defendant must show reasonable probability that but for counsels errors the sentence would have been significantly less harsh holding that to establish prejudice there must be a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different holding that to succeed on an ineffective assistance claim a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different