be automatically applied to the criminal law context (see e. g. O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976)), the defense recognized in Bivens does not in any case aid defendants here. The Bivens defense is applicable in an official law enforcement context where the complex law of probable cause must be applied to widely differing congeries of facts; by contrast, the law governing search and seizure without a warrant or Presidential/Attomey General approval is clear and plainly applied to prohibit the conduct Barker and Martinez engaged in. See also Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975), on remand, Strickland v. Inlow, 519 F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1975) (<HOLDING>). Barker and Martinez had a similar
holding a school board member in a 42 usc  1983 1970 action to a standard of conduct based on knowledge of the basic unquestioned constitutional rights of his charges holding that a state prisoner may not challenge the constitutionality of his conviction in a suit for damages under 42 usc  1983 holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 holding that the state law of collateral estoppel applies in civil rights actions brought under 42 usc  1983 holding that person in 42 usc  1983 does not include states