that they relied upon the federal trust responsibility as “complementary authority” for the decision to implement the FARs. Doc. 169, Ex. A at 1. Federal Defendants specifically reserved their position on whether the trust responsibility might provide an independent basis for such an action “in some other case.” Id. In light of the above conclusion that the 1955 Act does not provide authority for the FARs, Federal Defendants’ refusal to invoke the trust responsibility as an independent basis for the action renders the action without legal support. The Yurok point to cases in which courts have accepted post hoc rationalizations for agency action. Doc. 134 at 6 (citing Mass. Tr. of E. Gas and Fuel Assocs. v. United States, 377 U.S. 235, 247-48, 84 S.Ct. 1236, 12 L.Ed.2d 268 (1964) (<HOLDING>); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 766
holding that even though an administrative bodys stated basis of authority was in error it maintained the requisite authority such that the error would have no bearing on the substance of the decision and remand was not appropri ate holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error holding that error is considered harmless if it is established beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or alternatively stated that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction holding that district court error was not clear error because no prior ninth circuit authority prohibited the course taken by the district court holding that the harmless error test places a burden on the state to prove that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or alternatively stated that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction