just” — the year of Mr. Kellogg’s probable death. This is not materially different from the usual life expectancy analysis performed by jurors, which permits them to consider competent evidence of life-threatening conditions. See, e.g., Hall ex rel. Hall v. Rodricks, 340 N.J.Super. 264, 274-76, 774 A.2d 551 (App.Div.2001). Without impinging upon the creativity and imagination of counsel, we could expect the parties to offer expert opinions in the fields of medicine and economics to illuminate life expectancy and mortality issues. Cf. R. 1:13-5 (providing that the table of mortal ity and life expectancy in the Rules’ Appendix “shall be admissible in evidence as prima facie proof of the facts therein contained”); see also Marendino v. Spitz, 121 N.J.L. 556, 558, 3 A.2d 601 (E. & A.1938) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, accounting-related opinions
recognizing cause of action for wrongful death recognizing the utility of mortality tables but not requiring their use in the estimation of life expectancy in wrongful death actions holding unconstitutional a state wrongful death statute which denied illegitimate children the right to recover for the wrongful death of their mother recognizing that substantive issue of liability may be litigated in the same action for wrongful death and survival actions holding that plaintiffs failure to prove decedents death was caused by the wrongful acts of the defendant precludes any recovery of wrongful death damages under mississippis wrongful death statute