166a(c), we do not consider the arguments. Pipkin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 383 S.W.3d 655, 663 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied). We therefore need not address whether collateral estoppel applies despite a party’s dissatisfaction with his counsel’s performance or the court’s evi-dentiary rulings in the prior lawsuit. 20 . Thus, we need not address whether Primo may ultimately recover such damages. 21 . Great American does not address the application of the one satisfaction rule to a situation where, as here, the trial court's judgment in the previous case reduced the damages found by the trier of fact based on the plaintiff's rejection of a settlement offer covered by Chapter 42 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Cf. First Title Co. of Waco, 860 S.W.2d at 78 (<HOLDING>). Because we hold Great American has not
holding that issues of discriminatory intent and actual motivation are questions of fact for the trier of fact holding that a district court cannot order restitution in amounts that will result in the payment to the victim of an amount greater than the victims loss holding prejudgment interest is to be determined on the entire amount of compensatory damages and then reduced by the amount of interest which would have accrued at present value on the settlement amount determined before trial holding that there must be sufficient competent evidence from which the trier of fact could estimate the amount of damages with a reasonable degree of certainty holding onesatisfaction rule bars litigants from recovering an amount greater than the trier of fact has determined would fully compensate for the injury