provided regulated parties with a familiar methodology to assist investors with assessing risk, and adequately ensured exposure to credit risk in accordance with the statute. See A.R. at JA2181 (79 Fed. Reg. at 77616). These reasons are tied to the purposes of the statute and the “appropriate operation of’ the relevant financial system, see Judu-lang, 565 U.S. 42,132 S.Ct. at 485, and the Court can “reasonably ... discern[ ]” the path of the agencies’ decisionmaking, State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43,103 S.Ct. 2856 (quoting Bowman, 419 U.S. at 286, 95 S.Ct. 438). The administrative record does not reflect, nor can the plaintiff show, that the agencies failed to explain why fair value considerations were implemented, see Black Oak Energy, LLC v. FERC, 725 F.3d 230, 243-44 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (<HOLDING>), or that the agencies’ considerations for how
holding that the federal energy regulatory commissions orders requiring the regional transmission organization to recoup funds were arbitrary and capricious because the commission failed to explain why recouping funds was warranted holding that even when there is a conflict of evidence before the commission and the evidence was such that the commission could have reasonably reached a contrary decision the commissions decision was not arbitrary and capricious recognizing that federal authority under the fpa extends to the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and that fpa section 206 is among those provisions that grant authority in connection with such interstate transmission opera tions holding that any alteration to agency action can be held arbitrary and capricious if the agency does not satisfactorily explain its reason for the alteration holding it is not arbitrary and capricious to request additional evidence of continuing disability