Clauses of both the Iowa and Federal Constitutions because paragraph P of the parole agreement constituted involuntary consent. The State argued the search was reasonable because Baldón consented to the searches by signing the parole agreement. It asserted Baldón was still serv 0) (avoiding consent issue by relying on the special needs doctrine to justify a parolee search); People v. Wilson, 228 Ill.2d 35, 319 Ill.Dec. 353, 885 N.E.2d 1033, 1042 (2008) (adopting Samson instead of analyzing the parole agreement’s search condition under a consent framework); State v. Heaton, 812 N.W.2d 904, 908 (Minn.Ct.App.2012) (“By agreeing to [the search] condition of parole, appellant diminished his reasonable expectation of privacy.”); Himmage v. State, 88 Nev. 296, 496 P.2d 763, 765-66 (1972) (<HOLDING>); People v. Huntley, 43 N.Y.2d 175, 401
recognizing repayment of damages to society as remedial holding that imposing supervised release condition that defendant report to his probation officer upon reentry into the united states is not plain error holding parolee voluntarily agreed to consentsearch provision as a condition of release into society holding defendant agreed to submit to searches as a condition of probation recognizing loss of society damages as remedy available under general maritime law