the loss of housing assistance through the federally-subsidizing program Section 8, because of defendants [sic] fraud on the court.” Compl. ¶ 122. However, in contravention to Rule 9(b), Drawsand fails to identify the “the who, what, when, where, and how” of the alleged fraudulent conduct, Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 627 (9th Cir.1997), and fails to “set forth an explanation as to why [a] statement or omission complained of was false and misleading,” In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1548 (9th Cir.1994) (en banc). To the extent that Drawsand is attempting to challenge the adverse ruling in the UD action, such claim is barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005) (<HOLDING>). In addition, Drawsand acknowledges in her
recognizing that the rookerfeldman doctrine bars cases brought by statecourt losers complaining of injuries caused by statecourt judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments holding that rookerfeldman doctrine bars federal determination of claim where the district court must hold that the state court was wrong in order to find in favor of the plaintiff holding rookerfeldman doctrine deprived district court of jurisdiction to review decision of west virginia state bar holding that rookerfeldman bars subject matter jurisdiction where but for the statecourt judgment the plaintiff would have no claim holding rookerfeldman also bars federal claims raised in state court as well as claims that are inextricably intertwined with the statecourt judgment