an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care, negligence in diagnosis or treatment, or medical malpractice. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06, 97 S.Ct. 285. Where an inmate receives medical treatment but desires different modes of treatment, the care provided does not amount to deliberate indifference. Hamm v. DeKalb Cty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1985). A difference in medical opinion does not establish deliberate indifference. Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1989). Whether governmental actors should have employed “additional diagnostic techniques or forms of treatment” is a “classic-example of a matter for medical judgment” and, therefore, is not an appropriate basis for liability under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107, 97 S.Ct. 285 (<HOLDING>). Generally, a district court must sua sponte
holding that because the warden and medical treatment director lacked medical expertise they cannot be liable for the medical staffs diagnostic decision not to refer plaintiff to a doctor to treat his shoulder injury holding that whether to order an xray or additional diagnostic treatment is a matter for medical judgment holding that statements in medical records given for the primary purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment are nontestimonial holding that where an adversary proceeding continues the order  is no more a final decision than an order denying summary judgment or denying a request for additional discovery the litigation proceeds and the issue will be reviewed if it turns out to make a difference to an order that is independently appealable holding that a tortfeasor is required to pay the expenses of over treatment or unnecessary medical treatment unless such treatment was incurred by the victim in bad faith 