the movant shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party.” See Ruby v. Springfield R-12 Public School Dist., 76 F.3d 909, 911 n. 6 (8th Cir.1996). Accordingly, all facts set forth in the Court's statement of facts will be taken from defendant Webco's motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 63) and defendant’s suggestions in support (Doc. No. 64) unless otherwise specified. 2 . The Court recognizes there is no consensus in this circuit as to whether a presumption of a palpable conflict of interest applies when the entity both funds and administers the plan. The Eighth Circuit recognized the lack of consensus in Kecso, 480 F.3d at 853, fn. 1. Compare Tillery v. Hoffman Enclosures, Inc., 280 F.3d 1192, 1197 (8 th Cir.2002)(<HOLDING>), Schatz v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 220 F.3d
holding that prejudice is only presumed if there is proof of an actual conflict of interest holding that when the insurer is also the plan administrator we have recognized something akin to a rebuttable presumption of a palpable conflict of interest holding that where an employee is fatally injured in an unexplained assault there is a rebuttable presumption that the employees death arose out of the employment holding that a structural conflict of interest exists when an insurer acts as both the plan administrator and the funding source holding that when an entity both funds and administers the plan there is a rebuttable presumption that a palpable conflict of interest exists