actions that will interfere with a debtor’s bankruptcy case. See In re Western Real Estate Fund, Inc., 922 F.2d 592, 601 (10th Cir.1990) (per curiam) (noting that “a temporary stay prohibiting a creditor’s suit against a nondebtor ... may be permissible”). We have repeatedly emphasized, however, that a bankruptcy court may not exercise its “broad equitable powers” under § 105(a) “ ‘in a manner that is inconsistent with the other, more specific provisions of the [Bankruptcy] Code.’ ” In re Frieouf, 938 F.2d 1099, 1103 n. 4 (10th Cir.1991) (quoting In re Western Real Estate Fund, Inc., 922 F.2d at 601). In other words, a bankruptcy court’s exercise of its authority under § 105(a) may not contravene or disregard the plain language of a statute. See, e.g., In re Alderete, 412 F.3d at 1207 (<HOLDING>); In re Tuttle, 291 F.3d 1238, 1245 (10th
holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or recognizing civil contempt power under  105a holding that the bankruptcy court lacked the power under  105a to grant the partial discharge of student loan debt when the debtor did not show undue hardship as required by statute holding that effect of bankruptcy discharge under arizona law is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debtor recognizing that although the fourth circuit has not yet addressed the issue partial discharge may be granted to the extent that it would be an undue hardship for the debtor to have to pay that portion of the loan that is to be discharged