(Utah 1989) (per curiam) (“Unambiguous language in [a] statute may not be interpreted to contradict its plain meaning.”). In construing a statute, we assume that “each term in the statute was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable.” Savage Indus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 811 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991). “Only when we find ambiguity in the statute’s plain language need we seek guidance from the legislative history and relevant policy considerations.” World Peace Movement of Am. v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994); see also Schurtz, 814 P.2d at 1112 (“We first look to the statute’s plain language. Only if we find some ambiguity need we look further.”); Brinkerhoff, 779 P.2d at 686 (<HOLDING>). While the Code defines the terms “issuer” and
holding that a court can look beyond the statutory language when plain meaning would compel an odd result recognizing that courts can look beyond an unambiguous statute and consult legislative history to divine its meaning if the literal application of the statutory language produces an outcome that is demonstrably at odds with clearly expressed congressional intent to the contrary or if the literal application of the statutory language results in an outcome that can truly be characterized as absurd ie that is so gross as to shock the general moral or common sense  recognizing that courts should look to other sources of legislative intent if the statutory language does not convey a clear meaning holding that if statutory language is plain and unambiguous this court will not look beyond the same to divine legislative intent recognizing that courts may look beyond the statutory text to determine legislative intent only when the statute is ambiguous