in the statute, and the phrases “could have an impact on” and “could lead to” as spoken by the trial judge. It was within the trial judge’s discretion to formulate phrasing that explained to defendant the possibilities of deportation or denial of U.S. citizenship. See V.R.Cr.P. 11(c)(7); In re Hall, 143 Vt. 590, 594-95, 469 A.2d 756, 758 (1983). ¶ 10. Here, the trial judge properly identified these two specific consequences. V.R.Cr.P. 11(c)(7). Indeed, he exceeded the statutory minimum by further informing defendant of the possibility of exclusion from the country. This case is therefore unlike those in other states in which trial courts have erred by not sufficiently specifying the possible immigration consequence as required by law. See State v. Sorino, 118 P.3d 645, 651 (Haw. 2005) (<HOLDING>); Machado v. State, 839 A.2d 509, 510, 513
holding that warning that plea might have some effect upon what happens with the immigration service was inadequate because court did not identify specific consequences required by statute holding that right to effective assistance of counsel requires that defendant be advised of immigration consequences of plea holding that warning that this plea may have a bearing on whatever relationship you have with the immigration and naturalization service completely failed to specify consequences of plea as required by statute holding that a defendant must have knowledge of the likely consequences of entering the guilty plea in order for a plea to be voluntary and knowing holding that where us citizenship and immigration services was required to adjudicate naturalization applications it was required by the apa to do so within a reasonable time regardless of whether the immigration and naturalization act specifies a timeframe for action