maximum, appeals challenging the legality of restitution orders are similarly outside the scope of a defendant’s otherwise valid appeal waiver.” Id. at 1147. In this case, the statutory source of the district court’s authority to impose restitution is the MVRA, which required the district court to order restitution for (1) those who are “directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of an offense for which restitution may be ordered” and (2) “in the case of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity, any person directly harmed by the defendant’s criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A(a)(2) (West 2000); cf. United States v. Davenport, 445 F.3d 366, 373 (4th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Cohen does not dispute that his offenses are
holding that restitution is proper for victims losses that are directly caused by appellants conduct for which he was convicted holding the mvra prohibits the court from examining the defendants ability to pay restitution holding that the relevant question in imposing restitution under the mvra is whether the loss is caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction holding that the ex post facto clause prohibited retroactive application of the mvra because before the mvra became effective the victim and witness protection act authorized but did not compel district courts to order restitution holding that court cannot order restitution under the mvra to persons who are not victims of the offenses for which the defendant was convicted