the class and vacate the consent decree. We need not consider CPS’s arguments, however, because this case is moot. We have no jurisdiction to entertain CPS’s motion, and this appeal is therefore dismissed. II. Discussion A federal court’s jurisdiction is limited to cases that present a live controversy. See U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 2. The consent decree at issue here expired on September 1, 2012; thus, there is no longer a consent decree for us to vacate. Since there is no decree, there is no controversy, and the case is moot. See, e.g., United States v. Brennan, 650 F.3d 65, 91 (2d Cir.2011) (noting that any issues regarding settlement approval were moot because the settlement agreement had already expired under its own terms); Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 749 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Taylor v. United States, 181 F.3d 1017, 1022
holding that the trial judge had the power to incorporate a settlement agreement in a decree following the entry of a decree of divorce holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because the challenged provisions of the decree had expired holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because there was no  consent decree left to be terminated holding that consent decree could not preclude plaintiffs from bringing claims that could not have been brought at time consent decree was filed and to which they were legally and procedurally entitled holding a motion to revise an enrolled divorce decree because of a discrepancy between the separation agreement and the decree filed more than 5 years after entry of the enrolled decree was properly denied