district court on the issue of the statute of limitations normally will not be set aside by an appellate court unless clearly wrong. Gordon v. Connell, 249 Neb. 769, 545 N.W.2d 722 (1996); Lindsay Mfg. Co. v. Universal Surety Co., supra. If the facts in a case are undisputed, the issue as to when the professional negligence statute of limitations began to run is a question of law. Weaver v. Cheung, 254 Neb. 349, 576 N.W.2d 773 (1998). A limitation period may begin to run even though the nature and extent of the damages are not known. Witherspoon v. Sides Constr. Co., supra. It is not necessary that a plaintiff have knowledge of the exact nature or source of the problem, but only that a problem exists. Lindsay Mfg. Co. v. Universal Surety Co., supra. See, also, Gordon v. Connell, supra (<HOLDING>). We have explained that “[i]n the context of
holding that the statute of limitations for attorney malpractice may begin to run before the plaintiff knows the full extent of his damages holding that one need not know full extent of ones damages before limitation period begins to run as statute of limitations can be triggered at some time before full extent of damages is sustained holding that the statute of limitations period begins to run when the allegedly discriminatory pension plan is applied to the plaintiffs and leaving determination of the actual date the statute begins to run on each claim to the district court holding that limitation period begins to run at the time of the breach holding in the professional malpractice context that the guiding principle is that the statute of limitations commences to run when one is actually damaged as a result of the alleged malpractice and that the commencement of the statute will not be put off until one learns the full extent of his damages internal quotation marks omitted