that a debtor contribute disposable earnings. Therefore, according to Price, equating “ability to pay” with substantial abuse is an impermissible exercise of the court’s equitable powers in violation of the statutory scheme. As neither of these arguments were made to the bankruptcy court, we need not consider them. See Parker v. Comty. First Bank (In re Bakersfield Westar Ambulance, Inc.), 123 F.3d 1243, 1248 (9th Cir.1997). In any event, Price’s argument that the Kelly court assumed individual debtors not engaged in business could not file under chapter 11 assumes the Kelly court would have followed Wamsganz. However, at the time Kelly was decided, authority in this circuit was to the contrary: see Warner v. Universal Guardian Corp. (In re Warner), 30 B.R. 528, 529 (9th Cir. BAP 1983) (<HOLDING>). See also In re Moog, 774 F.2d 1073, 1074
holding that an individual debtor not engaged in business is eligible for chapter 11 holding that individual debtors may use chapter 11 to save the family home from foreclosure holding denial of motion to convert from chapter 11 to chapter 7 is interlocutory holding consumer debtors may be eligible for chapter 11 under certain circumstances holding that a wife with a child from a prior relationship was not entitled to use and possession of the family home