have been admissible, merely because appellant chose to testify. We note the State’s argument that appellant’s motion should be summarily denied because his story is so “dubious” that there is no reasonable probability that any reasonable jury would have acquitted, based on his testimony. We decline to decide whether appellant’s story is reasonable or to speculate as to whether a jury would have found his testimony believable. We believe that the trial court should initially make that determination, but only after the issue of whether or not the advice was erroneous has been resolved. We also recognize that some cases have held that no prejudice need be shown when the defendant’s right to testify has been abridged in any way. See Gill v. State, 632 So.2d 660, 662 (Fla 2d DCA 1994) (<HOLDING>). Contra State v. Oisorio, 657 So.2d 4 (Fla. 3d
holding that where the defendant claims that he was deprived of the right to testify by reason of ineffective assistance of trial counsel the defendant need not also satisfy the second prong of strickland v washington 466 us 668 687 104 sct 2052 2064 80 led2d 674 693 1984 specifically that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense holding that to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel a defendant must demonstrate that counsel was constitutionally deficient and as a result defendant was prejudiced holding that where the defendant claims he was deprived of the right to testify by reason of ineffective assistance of trial counsel both prongs of the strickland test must be satisfied in order to obtain postconviction relief holding that the prejudice prong of strickland was not met in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the prosecutors misstatement of law where the trial court properly instructed the jury holding that the ninth circuit erred in granting habeas relief because the state courts decision was not an unreasonable application of strickland v washington 466 us 668 104 sct 2052 80 led2d 674 1984