participate in the sex-offender treatment program violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-inerimi-nation. Id. at 792. .The supreme court disagreed and held that delaying Morrow’s supervised release date was not a sufficient “compulsion” to implicate the Fifth Amendment. Id. Fo-cussing on the “nature of the compulsion,” the supreme court concluded: Morrow had a choice between treatment and confinement for a larger portion of his sentence, and that choice does not rise to the level of compulsion necessary in order to constitute a Fifth Amendment violation. Id. (quotation omitted). The court went on to explain an “important distinction” exists between being released from prison earlier than the time ordered in one’s sentence and losing one’s freedom when one is (1996) (<HOLDING>). Thus, we conclude the trial court violated
holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit recognizing that  ejquity will not enjoin a criminal prosecution solely to prevent such a prosecution  recognizing that under texas law governmental immunity embraces two principles immunity from liability and immunity from suit holding civil action cannot be joined to a criminal appeal holding a probationer cannot be forced to incriminate himself without first receiving immunity from criminal prosecution as a result thereof