(“A state may ... establish a parole system, but it has no duty to do so.”); see also Eskridge v. Casson, 471 F.Supp. 98, 101 (D.Del.1979) (“[N]o prisoner can legitimately claim that the Delaware Parole Statute confers ... a legally enforceable right to be paroled.”). “[Ojnee a state institutes a parole system, all prisoners have a liberty interest flowing directly from the due process clause in not being denied parole for arbitrary or constitutionally impermissible reasons.” See Block v. Potter, 631 F.2d 233, 236 (3d Cir.1980). Hence, plaintiff has a substantive due process right in being treated fairly during the parole process. See Jubilee v. Horn, 975 F.Supp. 761, 764-65 (E.D.Pa.1997), aff'd, 151 F.3d 1025 (3d Cir.1998); accord Bermudez v. Duenas, 936 F.2d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12, 99 S.Ct.
holding that texas parole statutes do not create a protected liberty interest under an older statutory scheme recognizing that nevada statutes do  not confer a legitimate expectation of parole release and therefore do  not create a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest sufficient to invoke due process recognizing that early release statutes can create a liberty interest protected by due process guarantees  recognizing that before due process guarantees are implicated there must be a deprivation by the government of constitutionally protected interest recognizing that a parents liberty interest in the custody of a child is subject to due process protection