States, 325 U.S. 91, 92-93, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1944). Although “acts of officers in the ambit of their personal pursuits are plainly excluded,” id., this does not “mean that if officials act for purely personal reasons, they necessarily fail to act ‘under color of law.’ ” United States v. Tarpley, 945 F.2d 806, 809 (5th Cir.1991). Rather, “individuals pursuing private aims and not acting by virtue of state authority are not acting under color of law purely because they are state officers.” Tarpley, 945 F.2d at 809 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original). For example, a police officer’s purely private acts which are not furthered by his state authority, are not acts under color of state law. See, e.g., Delcambre v. Delcambre, 635 F.2d 407, 408 (5th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). In United States v. Causey, 185 F.3d 407, 411
holding that transportation of arrestee to police station is service of police under the ada holding that accused was not in custody when asked to go to the police station and left the station freely holding that a police chief was not acting under color of state law even though he was on duty and at the police station when he assaulted his sisterinlaw over personal arguments about family matters holding that an illegal arrest occurred when the defendant was transported without probable cause from his home to the police station for fingerprinting and that the line is crossed when the police without probable cause or a warrant forcibly remove a person from his home or other place in which he is entitled to be and transport him to the police station where he is detained although briefly for investigative purposes holding that appellants complaint on appeal that the environment was coercive did not change the fact that he was not in custody when he voluntarily went to the police station was told several times he could leave and did leave after the interrogation