[probation] restrictions.’” Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874-75, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 3169, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972)). Indeed, in Griffin, the Supreme Court specifically found that [i]n some cases—especially those involving drugs or illegal weapons—the probation agency must be able to act based upon a lesser degree of certainty than the Fourth Amendment would otherwise require in order to intervene before a probationer does damage to himself or society.... To allow adequate play for such factors, we think it reasonable to permit information provided by a police officer, whether or not on the basis of firsthand knowledge, to support a probationer search. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 879-80, 107 S.Ct. 3164 (<HOLDING>). In Pennsylvania, “for a search to be
holding that a search of the plaintiffs residence was reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment where an informant provided information to the beloit police department that there were or might be guns in the plaintiffs apartment holding that a dog that was destroyed by the police department was obviously  seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment holding that a dog sniff outside the defendants door in his apartment building was not a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment so long as the police were lawfully present in the hallway when the search occurred holding unanimously that a warrantless search of a probationers apartment that was supported by reasonable suspicion and authorized as a condition of his probation was reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment holding that a police department is not a person within the meaning of section 1983