an "accident” within the meaning of the clerk’s homeowners’ liability policy, even though the clerk did not intend to cause harm to the woman, because the injury of which the woman complained' — the invasion of her privacy — could be reasonably anticipated from the clerk’s conduct); Baldwin v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 750 S.W.2d 919, 921 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1988, reh’g denied) (denying plaintiff’s claim for damage incurred when his insurer refused to defend him in a suit brought by the state for alleged repeated and intentional highway size and weight violations). 18 .416 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. 1967). 19 . Id. at 400; accord Cowan, 945 S.W.2d at 828 (affirming the continuing validity of Or-kin 's holding). 20 . See, e.g., Lafarge Corp. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 61 F.3d 389, 395 (5th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Hartford Cas. Co. v. Cruse, 938 F.2d 601,
holding that unintended damage to a pipeline caused by the defective coating supplied by insureds subsidiary was caused by an occurrence within the meaning of the liability policy holding that there was no coverage because there was no occurrence within the meaning of the policy because defective workmanship does not constitute an accident or an occurrence under a commercial general liability policy holding that an insurer was obligated to pay for damages and a loss in value to a water treatment plant caused by the insureds defective product holding that a landowner who lost a strip of property to a highway widening project could not recover losses caused by concurrent placement of a median strip because when less than the entire property is taken compensation for damage to the remainder can be awarded only if such damage is caused by the taking and cjonstruction of the median not the taking caused the alleged damage holding that delay caused by or consented to by a defendant is not unreasonable