attack Count IV by asserting that Plaintiffs fail to allege facts sufficient to meet the first, second, and fourth elements of the state-created danger test. ECF No. 11, at 7-13. Because the Court agrees that the Complaint does not allege facts sufficient to meet those prongs of the state-created danger test, Plaintiffs may not proceed on that theory. Beginning with the fourth element, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs have failed to point to any affirmative act by the State which created a danger to Mr. Benedict or rendered him more vulnerable to danger. ECF No. 11, at 10. In other words, Defendants claim the Complaint is premised upon “inactions and omissions,” id., which our Court of Appeals has held insufficient to establish the fourth factor, see Phillips, 515 F.3d at 236 (<HOLDING>). The Third Circuit has cautioned that “the
holding that allegations of tampering went to the weight of the evidence rather than to its admissibility holding that commonlaw actions to augment the size of the estate involving disputed facts to be determined by a jury are not core holding that  362k claims are core holding that when allegations at their core are omissions not commissions  inactions rather than actions the fourth prong cannot be met holding that municipal police officers are immune from personal liability for decisions acts or omissions that are 1 made within the scope of their official duties while in the course of their employment 2 discretionary rather than ministerial and 3 not made in a wanton or reckless manner