is a “person” under RCRA, see Def.’s Post-Hearing Mem. at 10, but ar gues that it has not contributed to the “storage” or “disposal of’ solid or hazardous waste, nor the “handling,” “treatment,” or “transportation” of such waste, as defined by RCRA, and, even if it had, such conduct did not cause an imminent and substantial endangerment to the environment. See Def.’s Post-Hearing Mem. at 10,16-19. C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Before turning to the merits, there are two issues the Court has sua sponte considered in assessing its subject matter jurisdiction. See Da Silva v. Kinsho Int’l Corp., 229 F.3d 358, 365 (2d Cir.2000) (“the trial court ... ha[s] an obligation to make [its] own independent determination that subject matter jurisdiction exists”). First, in'regard to “stand t. 2130 (<HOLDING>). Other courts have specifically recognized
holding that a reasonably certain threat of imminent harm to a protected species is sufficient for issuance of an injunction under section 9 of the esa holdingthat endangered species act claim at issue was capable of repetition where parties have been through the same controversy many times even though previous lawsuits were about different species holding in suit under endangered species act that the desire to use or observe an animal species even for purely esthetic purposes is undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of standing holding that effect of suit rather than the purpose for which it was brought is controlling for purposes of the fifth factor holding that defendants stock options are concrete and personal because they represent a species of compensation different from the one ordinarily accumulated by corporate officers and directors