the district court’s instruction to the jury, that New York law as to a gratuitous licensee might have operated as a bar to recovery, was in error, and that the admiralty rule as to damages should have applied. Notably, it stated that prejudicial error would have occurred “if the maritime law imposed upon the shipowner a standard of care higher than” that which existed under New York law. 358 U.S. at 629, 79 S.Ct. at 409. Thus,- state law is not permitted to significantly change the maritime law applicable in such cases. The inferior federal courts in numbers of cases have also refused to apply state laws to actions governed by federal maritime tort law where to do so would alter the rights and liabilities of the parties. See, e.g., Preston v. Frantz, 11 F.3d 357, 358 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>), cert. dismissed, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 31, 129
holding that wrongful death actions asserted under admiralty jurisdiction lie under general maritime law for death caused by violation of maritime duties and are not limited to standards of liability created by state law holding that general maritime law preempts state law holding that application of connecticut wrongfuldeath law is precluded by general federal maritime wrongfuldeath law holding that the general rule of maritime law that parties bear their own costs coupled with the need for uniformity in federal maritime law precludes the application of state attorneys fee statutes such as texas civ prac  remcode  38001 to maritime contract disputes recognizing products liability concepts as part of general maritime law