factual differences from Beezley and the typical no asset case where the unscheduled creditor has either a judgment, a liquidated money claim or is a party to a consumer transaction with the debtor. Rather here, observes Wolfe, the debtor and the creditor were previously married, divorced, and the “claim” which the debtor is attempting to discharge is an indemnification agreement for a joint mortgage obligation incorporated into a Judgment of Divorce. According to Wolfe, the relationship of the parties, the nature of the underlying debt at issue and the debtor’s breach of the Property Settlement Agreement cry out for the “equitable approach” adopted by other courts and not the strictly mechanical approach of Beezley. See, e.g., Stark v. St. Mary’s Hospital, 717 F.2d 322 (7th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); Robinson v. Mann, 339 F.2d 547 (5th Cir.1964)
holding that the mortgaging or conveying of exempt property to a creditor is not against the public policy of the state of michigan and that that the bankrupt had the power to convey to a creditor his existing exemptions resulting in the exempt property not being property of the debtor or the debtors bankruptcy estate holding in a noasset bankruptcy case a debtor may reopen the estate to add an omitted creditor where there is no evidence of fraud or intentional design holding that an anticipated tax refund was property of the bankruptcy estate as of the date the bankruptcy case was filed holding that the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over counterclaims asserted by the bankruptcy estate against a creditor where the claim is a state law action independent of the federal bankruptcy law and not necessarily resolvable by a ruling on the creditors proof of claim in the bankruptcy emphasis added holding that creditor did not have actual knowledge of the bankruptcy filing where the debtor informed creditor of the possibility that a bankruptcy case would be filed