services, which the Court finds could result in the dilution of the Plaintiffs marks, depending on what discovery reveals with respect to (1) whether the Defendant’s use has impacted the selling power of the James Van Praagh and the Van Praagh Trademark and (2) the quality of the services offered by the Plaintiff while using the James Van Praagh Trademark and the Van Praagh Trademark as compared to those offered by the Defendant while using similar marks. The Court declines to further expound upon the dilution factor at this time, as to do so would require raising questions of fact, which would be inappropriate for this Court to address while resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Perkins School for the Blind v. Maxi-Aids, Inc., 274 F.Supp.2d 319, 326 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the Defendant’s motion to dismiss
holding where reasonable difference of opinion as to whether the defendants act was the or a proximate cause of the injury the matter is for the jury to decide holding that the question of whether police had a reasonable basis for finding that a third party had authority to consent to search is a question of law holding that claim construction is an issue of law for the court not a question of fact for the jury recognizing that under district of columbia law  what the parties deem to be the material elements of their agreement  either set forth in or absent from those documents is largely a question of fact for the jury  and concluding in that case that whether an enforceable oral contract was created and was subsequently breached is a question of fact for the jury to decide not this court holding that the question of whether the defendants selling of the plaintiffs product using a different warranty may mislead or deceive a reasonable consumer probably is a question for the jury not for this court decide on a rule 12b6 motion to dismiss