determines first what constitutes “adequate compensation,” “reasonable care,” or “customary or ordinary payments.” Such determinations require evidence which consists of similar factual situations which can be compared to the case at hand. If the case at hand falls outside the bounds permitted in the comparison cases, that result is deemed “excessive,” “negligent,” or “extraordinary.” Absent a definition from Congress, “we interpret the words using their ‘ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning[s].’ ” United States v. Migi, 329 F.3d at 1088. As is suggested in the district court’s order, the statute’s qualifying term “extraordinary” necessarily implies proof that the payments deviate from the ordinary. See Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1215 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). A reasonable interpretation of the common
holding that the trial court properly added a party defendant to conform to the evidence presented at the trial holding that counsels success was not extraordinary in light of the evidence presented at trial and the noncomplexity of the case holding that the trial judges misconduct at trial did not prejudice the defendant in light of the courts curative instructions holding that where the meaning of the jurys verdict was not clear in light of the trial courts jury instructions the court of appeals erred in directing entry of judgment for respondent the case should have been remanded to the trial judge who was in the best position to pass upon the question of a new trial in light of the evidence his charge to the jury and the jurys verdict recognizing that the value of brady evidence must be evaluated in light of the other evidence admitted at trial