sitting by designation) (“[E]ven if [plaintiff] had undertaken the expense and difficulty of overcoming the manufacturing-capacity and inj ury-to-domestic-in-dustry hurdles, these showings only were relevant to instituting a section 337 action. Winning the action would require additional expense and legal effort.”). Furthermore, the Commission’s determinations in ’337 actions have no res judicata effect in an infringement action in district court. Id; see also Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1568 (Fed.Cir.1996) (stating that the ITC’s prior decision cannot have “claim preclusive effect”) (citing Bio-Technology General Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 80 F.3d 1553 (Fed.Cir. 1996); Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 637 (C.D.Ca!.2000) (<HOLDING>)). Defendant contends that “Congress also
holding that the constitutional level of punitive damages is not a finding of fact that must be determined by the jury it may be determined de novo by the court recognizing this rule recognizing any issue of infringement determined by the itc does not bind this court or the parties holding that this court will not consider a theory or issue that was not pleaded or raised in the trial court recognizing that an injunction cannot bind parties who are not before this court