.” (Emphasis added). The defendant is not seeking a waiver of a court rule, however, but of a statute of limitation. RAP 18.8(a) does not allow the court to waive or alter statutes. RCW 10.73.090 imposes a constitutionally valid “time limit” as a means of controlling the flow of postconviction collateral relief petitions. This court recently reiterated its observation that collateral relief “ ‘undermines the principles of finality of litigation, degrades the prominence of the trial, and sometimes costs society the right to punish admitted offenders. . . I ” In re Personal Restraint of Cook, 114 Wn.2d 802, 809, 792 P.2d 506 (1990) (quoting In re Personal Restraint of Hews, 99 Wn.2d 80, 86, 660 P.2d 263 (1983)); In re Personal Restraint of Well, 133 Wn.2d 433, 441-42, 946 P.2d 750 (1997) (<HOLDING>). In order to file a second personal restraint
holding that petition was properly filed even though the state court denied it as procedurally barred because the petition was delivered to and accepted by the state court holding that the 1996 personal restraint petition of an individual committed in 1980 pursuant to an insanity plea was procedurally barred because it was filed after the oneyear time bar set forth in rcw 1073090 and because the grounds for relief did not fall within the exceptions to the limitation period holding that plea in bar may be based only on grounds set forth in statute holding that oneyear limitations period set forth in  2255 is not a jurisdictional bar and is thus subject to equitable tolling holding that a similar claim in a rule 32 petition was procedurally barred because it was raised at trial and because it was raised on direct appeal