of procedure are concerned a party has no more right, in a criminal than in a civil action, to insist that his case shall be disposed of under the law in force when the act to be investigated is charged to have taken place.” Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 596-97, 21 S.Ct. 730, 733, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (citation omitted). Applying these ex post facto principles to this case, we hold that Pilcher has not demonstrated that the statute affected his substantive rights, and we further hold that it is not an ex post facto law as applied in this case. In so holding, we note that courts of other jurisdictions, when confronted with similar ex post facto arguments regarding rape shield statutes, have reached the same result. See Turley v. State, 356 So.2d 1238, 1243-44 (Ala.App.1978) (<HOLDING>); People v. Dorff, 77 Ill.App.3d 882, 885-86,
holding that application of the rape shield law to a case in which the underlying events occurred prior to the enactment of the rape shield law was not a violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws holding ex post facto clause barred application of mvra to defendant whose criminal conduct occurred before the effective date of the statute holding that a rape shield statute was not ex post facto when it barred evidence of a prior sexual relationship that was admissible before enactment of the statute holding application of successor statute regarding registration of sexual predator was regulatory and not an ex post facto violation holding similar statutory amendment violated ex post facto clause when applied to inmate who committed his crime before enactment of amendment