are 365 or 366 days.”); see generally 86 C.J.S. Time § 11 (2006) (“If a period of time is to be measured in years, the additional day which occurs during leap year and the day preceding are to be reckoned as one day.”); E.L. Strobin, What 12-Month Period Constitutes “Year" or “Calendar Year” As Used in Public Enactment, Contract, or Other Written Instrument, 5 A.L.R.3d 584, § 5 (1966) (citing opinions construing the term “year” or “calendar year” to mean “a period of 12 months commencing at a fixed or designated month which terminated with the day of the corresponding month in the next succeeding year thereafter, rather than a period commencing January 1st and terminating the succeeding December 31”). But see Yeinsip v. Lufthansa Ger. Airlines, 725 F.Supp. 113, 115 (D.Puerto Rico 1989) (<HOLDING>). We conclude the district court erred in
holding that a fiveyear limitation period for a crime completed on february 15 1986 expired on february 151991 holding that one year limitations period in insurance policy was reasonable and therefore enforceable to shorten the fifteen year statute of limitations for breach of contract holding that for purposes of oneyear statute of limitations where accident occurred on february 1 1988 a leap year the determination of whether this action is time barred shall be made on the basis of considering a year having 366 days and concluding action filed on february 1 1989 was timely holding that a minor who initiated an action through her next friend within the applicable oneyear limitations period seeking damages for injuries sustained in an automobile accident was permitted to amend her action to add another defendant even after that oneyear period expired because her right to maintain an action would continue for one year after she reached the age of majority holding that a private antitrust action for injury sounds in tort and is subject to a three year statute of limitations