government also argues that, even if New Hampshire law operates this way (i.e., the way the New Hampshire Supreme Court has said it does), then "that would constitute a 'legal fiction’ that could not take the matter out of the federal principle that relation back cannot apply to federal tax liens.” But that argument is unavailing here because (1) the government failed to make it in its summary judgment objection, see Platten, 437 F.3d at 139, and (2) the sole case cited in support, Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 120 S.Ct. 474, 145 L.Ed.2d 466 (1999), does not stand for the proposition that a state-law "legal fiction” — a term the decision uses once and does not define — has no effect on the priority of federal tax liens, as the government seems to suggest. Id. at 52, 120 S.Ct. 474 (<HOLDING>) (bracketing by the Court
holding that state property tax liens are not entitled to the states statutory interest rate as a matter of law rather the appropriate rate of interest is determined by the equities of each case holding that the right to disclaim property under state law does not defeat a federal tax lien because the taxpayer exercised control over the disposition of the property holding that the nature of the taxpayers legal interest in the subject property is determined by reference to state law holding that any property in which the taxpayer has any right title or interest is subject to foreclosure proceeding including property in which others claim an interest so long as all persons having liens or claiming any interest in the property are joined as parties to the suit holding that a taxpayers interest as an heir to his mothers estate constituted property or a right to property to which  federal tax liens attached  despite his exercise of the prerogative state law accorded him to disclaim the interest retroactively