classified as jewelry, at a higher duty rate, or pearls. Relying on the plain language of the statute, the Court found that the pearls had to be classified as pearls in their natural state, not strung or set. See id. at 424. Once again, the Court used the analysis in Merritt that “when the article imported is not the article described as dutiable at a specified rate, it does not become dutiable under the description because it has been manufactured or prepared for the express purpose of being imported at a lower rate.” Id. at 415 (citing Merritt, 104 U.S. at 704; Seeberger, 139 U.S. 608, 611). On repeated occasions the United States Court of Customs Appeals and its successor courts have applied the Merritt principle. See United States v. Hannevig, 10 Ct. Cust. App. 124, 128 (1920) (<HOLDING>); United States v. International Forwarding
holding that item made from asbestos yarn wire and mixture of other materials used for the sole purpose of making brake linings was properly classified as manufacture of yarn rather than as part of automobile because individual brake lining parts to be made from material were not identified or otherwise fixed with certainty and instead had to be individually cut to custom fit each brake shoe made holding that engine parts later used to make engines were properly classified as parts holding that alabama could tax the sales of repair parts to county governments in florida when the transactions were conducted entirely within alabama holding that imported butane cartridges were properly classified as parts of cigarette lighters because these speciallydesigned cartridges were necessary for the operation of the lighter holding that a variable annuity is properly classified as a security