217, 306 (1993). While these provisions provide specific exceptions for when testimony can be compelled, they do not guide our analysis of whether the protections of Section 9 apply to pre-arrest silence. Given that the textual distinctions between Section 9 and the Fifth Amendment do not definitively speak to the issue before the Court, we find more persuasive our jurisprudence interpreting the provisions, which also incorporates underlying policy considerations. B. History and Policy Considerations Our precedent regarding the right against self-incrimination has generally developed in parallel or following the dictates of federal precedent interpreting the Fifth Amendment, particularly after the United States Supreme Court’s 1965 decision in Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615, 85 S.Ct. 1229 (<HOLDING>). On most occasions, we have not considered
holding fifth amendment prohibits comment on accuseds silence during police custodial interrogation holding that the fifth amendment in its direct application to the federal government and in its bearing on the states by reason of the fourteenth amendment forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accuseds silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt holding that it is improper for prosecutor to comment on accuseds postarrest silence recognizing that the fifth amendment forbids comment by the prosecution on a defendants failure to testify holding fifth amendment prohibits comment on accuseds testimonial silence