stay that applied in the Debt- or's or Gerova's bankruptcy cases. Thus, it was not deciding the extent of the Debtor’s current rights in the property, and not deciding whether there is a cause of action against subsequent transferees under fraudulent transfer law. (Oral Arg. Tr., at 26:11-23, 30:7-15.) 6 . The Bankruptcy Court also rejected the attempt to characterize the Gerova transfer as a “conversion.” (Id. at 26:1-10.) 7 . This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal because the Bankruptcy Court Order was a final order that resolved the discrete issue of whether the Foreclosure Order violated the automatic stay, and the Bankruptcy Court has not indicated that it contemplates further proceedings on this issue. See, e.g., In re Quigley Co., Inc., 676 F.3d 45, 51 (2d Cir. 2012) (<HOLDING>); Sharf v. BC Liquidating, LLC, No. 14-cv-7320,
holding that bankruptcy court order that a stay applied to a particular party was a final order and noting that bankruptcy court orders lifting or denying relief from an automatic stay are final for purposes of appeal holding that an appeal challenging a bankruptcy court order lifting the automatic stay became moot when the underlying bankruptcy case was dismissed holding that a bankruptcy order is not final unless it 1 holding that a bankruptcy court order denying a trustees claim to immunity was final and appealable under the collateral order doctrine holding that the denial of a motion to find a violation of the automatic stay was a final order