Ohio legislation was unconstitutionally retroactive when applied to cases pending before the legislation’s effective date. See Ackison v. Anchor Packing Co., Lawrence No. 05CA46, 2006 WL 3861073, at *9, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 7047, at *26-27 (Ohio Ct.App.2006), review granted, 113 Ohio St.3d 1465, 864 N.E.2d 652 (2007); Wagner v. Anchor Packing Co., Lawrence No. 05CA47, 2006 WL 3861077, at *4, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 7050, at *11-12 (Ohio Ct.App.2006) (same, but noting that legislation itself is not unconstitutionally retroactive because it gives courts discretion to decide on a case-by-case basis whether application to claims pending prior to the statute’s effective date would be unconstitutionally retroactive); cf. Wilson v. AC & S, Inc., 169 Ohio App.3d 720, 864 N.E.2d 682, 695 (2006) (<HOLDING>), appeal dism’d, 113 Ohio St.3d 1457, 864
holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue a permanent nuisance action for injury to property because none of the plaintiffs were the owners of the land when the cause of action accrued with the first injury holding that a plaintiffs claims arise under the statute that provides the federal cause of action he or she alleges holding that cause of action for asbestosis accrues upon discovery of disease not at time of exposure to asbestos holding under facts presented that new statute could be applied to plaintiffs case because she was still able to pursue cause of action for injury caused by husbands exposure to asbestos holding that new statute which required proof that asbestos exposure was substantial contributing factor to claimants medical condition could be applied to pending cases and did not abrogate claimants vested right because she was still able to pursue her cause of action and recover for injury caused by her husbands exposure to asbestos statute merely affected methods and procedure by which that action was recognized protected and enforced not the cause of action itself