immigration document under § 1546(a) to constitute a continuing offense, it easily could have stated so. See Toussie, 397 U.S. at 120, 90 S.Ct. 858 (noting that congressional silence on whether a crime is a continuing offense supports the conclusion that it is not). In addition, unlike other statutes that have been held to proscribe a continuing offense, § 1546(a) does not include language which would indicate that the offense involves ongoing conduct. See Toussie, 397 U.S. at 120, 90 S.Ct. 858 (“Unlike other instances in which this Court has held that a particular statute describes a continuing offense, there is no language in this Act that clearly contemplates a prolonged course of conduct.”); see, e.g., United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405, 408-09, 78 S.Ct. 875, 2 L.Ed.2d 873 (1958) (<HOLDING>). Citing the principle that each term in a
holding that the phrase resident alien means an alien lawfully residing in the united states holding that because a  1326 violation constitutes a continuing offense venue may lie in any district in which the continuing conduct occurred holding that the plaintiff should have brought her lawsuit in the court of federal claims because she advanced a contract claim against the united states in excess of 10000 recognizing that the plain language of  1326a establishes that a previously deported alien who illegally enters and remains in the united states can violate the statute at three different points in time namely when the alien 1 enters 2 attempts to enter or 3 is at any time found in the united states holding that punishment of any alien crewman who willfully remains in the united states in excess of the number of days allowed is a continuing offense