of N.J.S.A 34:19 — 2(b), but we also conclude that the seventh Pukowsky factor (“the manner of termination of the work relationship”) also has some bearing on a worker’s inclusion within CEPA’s definition of “employee.” In this sense, we conclude that the level of “control and direction” required by CEPA includes a consideration of whether the employer had the ability to terminate the worker’s relationship in a manner similar to the termination of an at-will employee. In this case, it is not disputed that plaintiffs contract allowed PRUPAC to terminate him for any or no reason on sixty days’ notice; in that regard, his relationship with PRUPAC was hardly different from that of an at-will employee. See LePore v. National Tool and Mfg. Co., 115 N.J. 226, 227, 557 A.2d 1371 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we hold that our courts are
holding that an employee could maintain a claim for constructive discharge in violation of virginias public policy exception to the employment atwill doctrine holding that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union holding that an atwill employee may have a cause of action for wrongful discharge when the reason for a discharge was the employees exercise of a right conferred by a wellestablished legislative enactment holding that a union employee protected by a collective bargaining agreement was in no different position than an atwill employee and could similarly maintain an action for wrongful discharge for reporting workplace safety violations holding that absent a law or collective bargaining agreement a municipal employee is an employee atwill