defendant is on parole rather than to the acts constituting a violation of parole for purposes of 'the same transactions or occurrences’ clause in guideline § 5G1.3.” United States v. Chasmer, 952 F.2d 50, 52 (3d Cir.1991) (cit ing United States v. Nottingham, 898 F.2d 390, 393 (3d Cir.1990), limited on other grounds, United States v. Higgins, 128 F.3d 138, 141 (3d Cir.1997)). If we were to analyze the issue, we would certainly consider the fact that the guideline language in both Nottingham 8 L.Ed.2d 1011 (2001), United States v. Alexander, 100 F.3d 24, 26-27 (5th Cir.1996) (same), United States v. Gondek, 65 F.3d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir.1995) (same), and United States v. Bernard, 48 F.3d 427, 430-32 (9th Cir.1995) (same), with United States v. Tisdale, 248 F.3d 964, 976-80 (10th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>), and United States v. Maria, 186 F.3d 65,
holding unconstitutional the mandatory application of the federal sentencing guidelines holding that because a mortgage provides the security for the repayment of the note the person having standing to foreclose a note secured by a mortgage may be either the holder of the note or a nonholder in possession of the note who has the rights of a holder holding that application note 6 is not mandatory holding that the statute is mandatory holding that applica tion note 6s language is mandatory