between “requests for preventive relief prior to trial and post-trial remedies to prevent repetition of statements judicially determined to be defamatory.” Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 40 Cal.4th 1141, 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 320, 333, 156 P.3d 339, 350 (2007). In the latter situation, courts repeatedly have concluded that, once a judge or jury has made a final determination that the speech at issue is defamatory, an injunction prohibiting the defendant from repeating the defamatory speech does not constitute a prohibited prior restraint on speech. See Auburn Police Union, 8 F.3d at 903-04 (upholding statute authorizing enforcement through injunctive relief of a prohibition against solicitation, explaining that an injunction issued un Co., Inc., 352 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn.1984) (<HOLDING>); O’Brien v. Univ. Cmty. Tenants Union, Inc.,
holding injunction limited to material found either libelous or disparaging after a full jury trial was pot unconstitutional and could stand holding that the injunction did not constitute a claim holding unconstitutional injunction barring dissemination of allegedly libelous letter holding that trial court did not err in declining to accept jurys first verdict when form stated that the jury found the defendant undecided and trial courts interpretation of the verdict form to mean that the jury was either not unanimous or had not decided yet whether defendant was guilty or not guilty was reasonable and thus trial court properly instructed jury to continue deliberating holding that injunction of scandalous newspaper was unconstitutional