that appeal not be “moot” or “academic” is “a matter of judicial restraint” that court possesses discretion to waive). 2 Although Marissa appeared at the May 22,2007 hearing pro se, the record indicates that she was represented by counsel throughout the Superior Court proceedings and that counsel filed several documents on her behalf, including her initial petition for divorce. 3 We note that Anival’s letter does not bear a Superior Court date stamp and was apparently not docketed upon receipt by the court and, consequently, the Superior Court cannot verify the letter’s actual date of receipt. However, as stated in our September 9,2009 Order, Anival maintained that he timely mailed his letter to the family judge and, given that the Superior Court has chosen to deem his let , 891 (1999) (<HOLDING>); In re A.K., 360 N.C. 449, 628 S.E.2d 753, 759
holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it modified a protective order after settlement to permit public access to pretrial materials in spite of a protective order to the contrary which it viewed as having had been initially justified recognizing a public employees first amendment right to address matters of legitimate public concern recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public holding that the legislature did not intend the basis for a continuous protective order be limited to the four enumerated findings but also to include a finding of a history of domestic violence holding expiration of the protective order does not automatically render the matter moot because of heightened public awareness and sensitivity to the existence of domestic violence as well as legitimate public contempt for abusers and enhanced technology for information dissemination