because the use of a firearm is an essential element of the crime. Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813, 815 (Fla.1991); Dozier v. State, 677 So.2d 1352, 1353 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). However, because the jury made special findings that Jacobs had discharged a firearm during the commission of the aggravated battery and caused great bodily harm, we hold that the trial court properly imposed a minimum sentence pursuant to section 775.087(2)(a)(3). Even though the aggravated battery conviction must properly be classified as a second-degree felony, subsection (2)(a)(3) directs that “the convicted person shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years and not more than a term of imprisonment of life in prison.” See Inmon v. State, 932 So.2d 518, 520 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly we reverse in part, affirm in
holding that when no statutory exception applies  the district court lacks the authority to impose a sentence less than the statutory mandatory minimum holding where the statutory minimum sentence exceeds the guidelines sentence a substantialassistance downward departure begins at the mandatory minimum sentence holding that even where evidence regarding the use of a firearm is unrebutted to impose mandatory minimum sentence a jury must make that finding holding that even if the minimum mandatory exceeds the statutory maximum the court must impose the minimum mandatory holding that a district court commits reversible error when it sentences a defendant to less than the statutory minimum where no exception to the mandatory minimum applies