from California to Florida. Importantly, there is no suggestion that Janet deliberately tried to manipulate the legal system. Her diligence in seeking to set aside the default judgment reveals no disrespect for the courts. Rather, like Falk, this is a case where a party unfamiliar with the legal system defaulted at a time of extreme personal difficulty; indeed, the circumstances here were, if anything, more exigent than in Falk. Under all the circumstances, we consider Janet’s conduct to be excusable. 2. Meritorious Defenses: Turning to the meritorious defense factor, we conclude that Janet has a potentially meritorious defense. A defendant seeking to vacate a default judgment must present specific facts that would constitute a defense. See Madsen v. Bumb, 419 F.2d 4, 6 (9th Cir.1969) (<HOLDING>). But the burden on a party seeking to vacate a
holding that district court did not abuse its discretion by entering default judgment without first holding evidentiary hearing where there was no uncertainty about the amounts at issue the pleadings contained specific dollar figures and the court requested and received affidavits in support of the default judgment holding that trial court must make entry of default prior to entry of default judgment and court may not make entry of default when there is no default in law or in fact holding that district court had not erred in declining to vacate default judgment when defendant offered mere general denial without facts to support it recognizing that the rule appears to be general that where the information specifies the charge and no defense is offered and a default is taken the order of suspension may not require a finding of fact to support it holding that the trial court was without authority to set aside entry of default on motion to set aside default judgment