is also true — the same complex legislation that happened to be passed as a unitary whole cannot be considered focused on the breaching of an individual contract solely because one of its provisions is so focused. The en banc Federal Circuit in Winstar made it clear that it was discussing only the relevant provisions of FIRREA, not the entirety of the statute. 64 F.3d 1531, 1548 (Fed.Cir.1995) (en banc) (rejecting government’s argument that FIR-REA was “public and general” on grounds that “the relevant sections of FIRREA are not public and general sovereign acts”), aff'd, 518 U.S. 839, 116 S.Ct. 2432, 135 L.Ed.2d 964 (1996). Other courts dealing with the “sovereign acts” doctrine have made a similar distinction. See Sun Oil Co. v. United States, 215 Ct.Cl. 716, 572 F.2d 786, 817 (1978) (<HOLDING>); Walter Dawgie, 30 Fed.Cl. at 131-32. The
holding that adea class actions are optin actions under  216b not optout actions subject to rule 23 holding that the actions were not actions of public and general applicability but were actions directed principally and primarily at plaintiffs holding that it is well established that whether an employees actions were within the scope of employment is a question of fact and even if some of the actions were unauthorized the question of whether the actions were within the scope of employment is for the jury holding that causes of actions against directors of corporations for breach of fiduciary duty are contract actions holding that if state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions the general or residual statute for personal injury actions should be used for 1983 actions