Gilpin, Jr., her grandson. Ms. Thornton then sued for declaratory and other relief. In the summary judgment under review, the trial court found that Mr. Clemons intended the deed to convey a life estate to himself and his wife, as tenants by the entireties, with, upon the death of the survivor of them, the remainder over to Joyce M. Thornton. This construction takes into account the language of the deed as a whole, and is the only plausible reading of the instrument considered in its entirety. See Bronstein v. Bronstein, 83 So.2d 699, 701 (Fla.1955) (“[I]f a contrary intention does appear in the deed then the fee simple character of the title conveyed is limited and controlled by the expressed contrary intention of the grantor.”); Sanderson v. Sanderson, 70 So.2d 364, 366 (Fla.1954) (<HOLDING>); Loveland v. CSX Transp., Inc., 622 So.2d
holding that construction that neutralizes any provision of a contract should not be adopted if the contract can be construed to give effect to all provisions holding courts may not consider any single provision taken in isolation as controlling but must consider all provisions in context of entire instrument holding that in construing an instrument any apparently conflicting expressions should be reconciled if possible so as to give full effect to all provisions contained in the instrument holding that statutes must be read so as to give effect to all statutory language holding that contracts should be interpreted to give effect to all provisions