the rule' are that evidence of that kind is often speculative, usúally no opportunity is offered for cross-examination of the persons said to have made the offers; and collateral inquiries are injected into the case which may tend to confuse the main issue.”). Further, as suggested by the rationale set forth in Sharp, an offer-ee’s testimony regarding such, an offer may also be inadmissible on hearsay grounds.' See Emmco Ins. Co. v. Wallenius Caribbean Line, S.A., 492 F.2d 508, 511 & n. 3 (5th Cir.1974); see also University Computing Co., 504 F.2d at 546 (noting that the rule of Sharp has been consistently applied where “the offers came from third parties, frequently unidentified, and were merely hearsay”); Keener v. Sizzler Family Steak Houses, 597 F.2d 453, 458 (5th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). The Government contends that Warren’s
holding that district court erred by fixing fair market value of restaurant franchise for purposes of awarding damages for breach of contract based on hearsay offer to purchase franchise holding that fair market value was proper measure of damages for stock brokers breach of margin agreement caused by sale of plaintiffs shares without authorization noting that generally speaking fair market value is proper measure of damages for breach of contract relating to sale of goods which have an ascertamable value on the market holding that trial court erred by dismissing breach of contract claim because appellee made promises to perform specific acts in contract the breach of which would give rise to a breach of contract action holding damage award resulting from a breach of an agreement to purchase securities is the difference between the contract price and the fair market value of the asset at the time of the breach holding that the continued use of licensed trademark after termination of franchise agreement constituted trademark infringement and breach of contract