2010 WL 877569, at *3; Hart, 1999 WL 225956, at *2). The court reasoned that because Samshi Homes acknowledged that the documents filed by De Leon were in the form of mechanics liens, the documents were instruments “provided by the ... laws of this state” and were “therefore not presumed to be fraudulent under section 51.901(c)(2)(A).” Id. The court concluded, “Samshi Homes[’s] complaints based on section 53.054 are therefore beyond the scope of the current proceedings.” Id. at 668. The court further concluded that “Sam-shi Homes’ substantive evidentiary claims — that it, rather than Kama, owned the subject properties and that Kama never entered into an agreement with De Leon — are also beyond the scope of the section 51.903 proceedings.” Id. (citing Becker, 2010 WL 877569, at *3 (<HOLDING>)). Although it is factually distinct from the
holding that the declaratory judgment act is remedial only and the party seeking declaratory relief must have an underlying cause of action holding that an injured party in an underlying tort action was not a necessary party in an action by an insurer for declaratory judgment of nonliability where the injured person had not obtained judgment against the insured holding that movant converted his motion for judicial review into an action seeking declaratory judgment by requesting rulings on underlying rights of the parties holding that a motion for a summary judgment is an appropriate means of seeking an adjudication on the merits holding that where the question to be resolved in the declaratory judgment action will be decided in a pending action it is inappropriate to grant a declaratory judgment