not prohibit the “substitution of a collateral remedy which is neither inadequate nor ineffective to test the legality of a person’s detention.” Swain, 430 U.S. at 381, 97 S.Ct. 1224 (emphasis added); cf. Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 977 (10th Cir.1998) (“Whether [AEDPA’s] one-year limitation period violates the Suspension Clause depends upon whether the limitation period renders the habeas remedy ‘inadequate or ineffective’ to test the legality of detention.” (quoting Swain, 430 U.S. at 381, 97 S.Ct. 1224)). And at least as a matter of statutory interpretation — i.e., interpreting the “ineffective or inadequate” language in § 2255(e) — we have held that § 2255’s remedy is neither inadequate nor ineffective to test the legality of Mr. Abernathy’s detention. See Prost, 636 F.3d at 580 (<HOLDING>). Thus, for purposes of the Suspension Clause,
holding that an arbitrators interpretation of the scope of the issue submitted to him is entitled to the same deference accorded his interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement holding that the defendant is precluded from bringing his ncmiosbased statutory interpretation argument under prost holding that the application of revised  2255 which would have barred the petitioner who had filed his first  2255 motion prior to aedpas enactment from filing a second  2255 motion would have had retroactive effect because the petitioner might well have waited to file that initial motion had he foreseen aedpas revision of  2255 holding premagwood that where a first  2255 motion was granted so movant could file a direct appeal the second  2255 motion was not a successive motion under aedpa holding that the petitioners initial  2255 motion offered him an adequate and effective means for testing his statutory interpretation argument