requires more than showing some metaphysical doubt-— there must be an issue for trial.” Meyers v. M/V Eugenio C, 919 F.2d 1070, 1072 (5th Cir.1990). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; E.E.O.C. v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 100 F.3d at 1180; Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d at 654; Cormier v. Pennzoil, 969 F.2d 155 and Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 913 (5th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832, 113 S.Ct. 98, 121 L.Ed.2d 59 (1992). 45 . Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Chemical Group, Inc., 101 F.3d 1090, 1093 (5th Cir.1996). 46 . See Exxon Corp. v. Baton Rouge Oil, 77 F.3d 850, 853 (5th 25, 29 (5th Cir.1992), (<HOLDING>); Hanks v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line
holding that in summaryjudgment context nonmovant must expressly present to the trial court those issues that would defeat the movants right to a summary judgment and failing to do so may not later assign them as error on appeal holding that trial court may not grant summary judgment by default  when the movants summary judgment proof is legally insufficient holding that on appeal a nonmovant need not have answered or responded to the motion for summary judgment to contend that the movants summaiy judgment proof is insufficient as a matter of law to support summary judgment holding that the parly opposing summary judgment must do more than merely suggest possible error in the movants summary judgment evidence he must submit facts which demonstrate that the movants summary judgment evidence is questionable or that the movants allegations are not properly supported holding that nonmovants failure to except or respond cannot supply by default the grounds for summary judgment or the summary judgment proof necessary to establish the movants right