law. See Grubbs v. General Electric Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699, 705, 92 S.Ct. 1344, 31 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972); Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481, 483, 62 S.Ct. 1168, 86 L.Ed. 1611 (1942). Since § 1445(c) is a matter of federal law, the way a state categorizes a cause of action is not binding on federal courts. Instead, the federal court must be satisfied that, according to federal law, the cause of action actually arises under the state’s workers’ compensation laws. There is a split of authority among the circuits regarding the issue in this case: whether a retaliatory discharge claim premised in part on a state’s workers’ compensation laws is a claim “arising under the workmen’s compensation laws” of the state. Compare Spearman v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 16 F.3d 722 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>), with Reed v. The Heil Co., 206 F.3d 1055
holding that texas cause of action for retaliation does arise under its workers compensation laws holding that missouris cause of action for retaliation does arise under its workers compensation laws holding that  255111 claim does not arise under alabamas workers compensation laws holding that retaliation claim did not arise under states workers compensation laws holding that illinois cause of action for retaliation does not arise under its workers compensation laws