pay award.”) III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the FMLA regulations requiring employers to provide individualized notice to employees when the employers designate a period of leave as FMLA leave are valid as enforced in this case, that Strain waived his right to appeal the jury’s conclusion that Strain’s failure to comply with the regulations caused Downey prejudice, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Downey two years of front pay. Therefore, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. AFFIRMED. 1 . It is not clear why Downey's balance was fifty-two hours (subtracting the charged 424 hours from the FMLA allowance of 480 hours would appear to leave a balance of fifty-six hours), but the parties stipulated to 0, 1205 (D.Kan.2003) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Strain’s argument that he is not
holding that an employee who did not present evidence that she could have returned to work prior to the expiration of her fmla leave allowance was not entitled to additional leave merely because her employer had not properly provided her with notice that the leave was designated as fmla leave holding that employers oral denial of plaintiffs request for fmla leave showed interference holding that a plaintiff who was unable to return to work before his fmla leave expired did not allege any denial of an fmla right but noting that ragsdale left open the possibility that employees could recover for notice violations on a casebycase basis if there was actual harm resulting from the violations holding that the employees reference to his mental condition did not constitute the requisite notice of an intent to invoke fmla leave holding that employee who exceeded fmla leave was subject to immediate discharge on the very first workday that he was both absent from work and no longer protected by the fmla