ten years, until October 1993, to file his claim in state court, well beyond both the three-year and six-year limitations periods cited above. Moreover, even if Pani’s claim were not barred by the statute of limitations, it is extremely doubtful that there would be subject matter jurisdiction to consider such a complaint in light of the express limitations Congress placed on judicial review of agency determinations of Medicare “Part B” claims filed before 1987. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(h), 405(g), 1395ff(b), and 1395ii; Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 614-15, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984) (interpreting § 405(h) to bar judicial review of any claim that is “inextricably intertwined” with benefits determinations under the Medicare Act); Erika, 456 U.S. at 206-08, 102 S.Ct. 1650 (<HOLDING>); Kuritzky v. Blue Shield, 850 F.2d 126, 127 n.
holding on the basis of the highly discretionary nature of the decisions hud must make in the course of administering loans it has insured or taken by assignment that judicial review of huds decision to foreclose should be deferential holding that precisely drawn provisions of  1395ff evinced congresss deliberate intention to foreclose judicial review of medicare part b claims holding that additional records submitted to the appeals council are part of the administrative record for judicial review holding rookerfeldman doctrine inapplicable to claims that do not require review of a judicial decision in a particular case holding that because here the statutes in issue provide for judicial review via citizen suit provisions yet do not set forth a standard for that review judicial review is limited to apa review on the administrative record