look for corroborative testimony and that he would expect to hear from both sides, but Thies stressed that he would ultimately base his decision “upon the evidence presented.” Thies also expressed the importance of juror impartiality. Moreover, when Thies’ responses are read in context and in their entirety, it is clear that Thies’ use of words such as “I think,” “I would try,” and “not necessarily,” do not establish that he was equivocal. Instead, a thorough reading of his record responses suggests that Thies used such terms when reasoning through his answers. However, even assuming that Thies’ words tended to show equivocation, we conclude that the trial court did not commit manifest error in determining that Thies could render an impartial decision. See, e.g., Busby, 894 So.2d at 96 (<HOLDING>). Again, we emphasize that the trial judge was
holding that an employee gives his employer sufficient notice that he is requesting leave for an fmlaqualifying condition when he gives the employer enough information for the employer to reasonably conclude that an event described in 29 usc  2612a1 has occurred holding that a juror need not be excused for cause merely because he gives equivocal re sponses holding that trial counsel acted unreasonably in using a peremptory strike on a juror who had already been excused for cause holding that citys policy need not be unconstitutional per se but need only cause a constitutional violation holding that it was error to deny cause challenge because although juror stated he could follow courts instructions his other responses were sufficiently equivocal to cast doubt