we reverse the judgment of the Worker's Compensation Board. However, issues still remain as to whether Milledge's other medical problems including the amputation of her leg were causally connected to the ankle injury. Accordingly, on this issue we remand this cause to Worker's Compensation Board for further proceedings. Judgment reversed and cause remanded. SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, SULLIVAN and BOEHM, JJ., concur. 1 . "[Mleaning by 'neutral' neither personal to the claimant nor distinctly associated with the employment." Larson, supra, § 3.05, at 3-6. 2 . See, e.g., Circle K v. Indus. Comm'n of Ariz., 165 Ariz. 91, 796 P.2d 893, 898 (1990) (expressly adopting the positional-risk doctrine); Little Rock Convention & Visitors Bureau v. Pack, 60 Ark.App. 82, 959 S.W.2d 415, 419 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Horodyskyj v. Karanian, 32 P.3d 470, 477
holding that the debtors knowing act of failing to obtain workers compensation insurance so that the employer owed an employee a debt after the employee suffered a workplace injury was not the sort of willful and malicious injury required for nondischargeability under  523a6 because it cannot not be said that the employer intended for the employee to suffer a fall or that there was an unbroken chain of events leading from the employers intentional act to the employees physical injury holding that if an employee reasonably refuses to perform a required act the employee is still eligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits holding that an injury is not within the scope of employment after the employee has left work unless the injury was caused by the employers negligence recognizing that a workers compensation insurer is responsible for covering any injury caused by the treatment of an industrial injury holding that when an employee suffers an injury from an unexplained fall while the employee is on the job and performing the duties of his employment that injury is eligible for compensation under the workers compensation act