inference that the defendants engage in those activities or “may be present—whether officially or unofficially—in and around the Chagos Archipelago.” Pis.’ Reply to Brown & Root Opp’n at 4. Likewise, assuming ar-guendo that certain former board members were fully aware of the plaintiffs’ removal from Chagos, that knowledge or awareness is not sufficient to infer that they (and by extension, the defendants) engaged in some kind of a conspiracy to remove the plaintiffs. Id. at 5. As a result, the plaintiffs’ optimistic conclusion that these facts “create!] a reasonable basis for Plaintiffs’ conspiracy and continuing involvement theories” is a classic example of a conclusory allegation unsupported by factual data. Pis.’ Reply to Brown & Root Opp’n at 4; accord Byrd, 174 F.3d at 248 n. 8 (<HOLDING>); Exxon Corp., 40 F.3d at 1487-88 (viewing the
holding that allegations against nondiverse defendants must be factual not conclusory because conclusory allegations do not state a claim holding that a conclusory opinion may be rejected holding party opposing summary judgment does not show genuine issue for trial by replacing conclusory allegations of the complaint or answer with conclusory allegations of an affidavit holding that the plaintiffs allegations that there may well be agency knowledge or documents that could aid his case was plainly conclusory holding that a court need not accept as true conclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint