was a member of an identifiable group which is distinguishable from “white persons”. Other courts have attempted to ascertain, regardless of any “objective” definition of race and without questioning the existence thereof, whether the discrimination alleged was based upon “racial animus.” In any event, the cases applying this third approach abandon a rigid distinction between race and national origin and attempt to determine the “racial character” of the allegations in a more practical manner. Thus many of the courts in this third category conclude that plaintiffs state a valid claim under section 1981 regardless of whether their claim is characterized as one of national origin, race, alienage or ethnicity. See Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968, 970-72 (10th Cir. 1979) (<HOLDING>); Madrigal v. Certainted Corp., 508 F.Supp.
holding that a plaintiff could not assert a  1981 claim based on gender discrimination holding that plaintiff who alleged discrimination on the basis of his mexicanamerican descent had stated a valid claim under section 1981 holding that title vii precludes a claim under section 1981 for racial discrimination against a federal employee holding by implication that plaintiff a brownskinned person of east indian descent had stated a proper claim under section 1981 holding that texas twoyear statute of limitations applied to section 1981 action for discrimination on the basis of national origin