to employment decisionmaking.”). 3. We also affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Waggoner and Paychex on Fahnestock’s retaliation claim. In her complaint to Wag-goner, Fahnestock compared herself only to “other reps with similar seniority levels.” This didn’t sufficiently convey her concern that Waggoner was discriminating against her because of her sex. See Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal.4th 1028, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 436, 116 P.3d 1123, 1134 (2005). While Fahnestock did express her concerns about sex-based discrimination to HR and John Hickman, there is no evidence that the decision-makers behind the allegedly adverse employment actions even knew about these complaints, let alone decided to retaliate because of them. See id., 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 436, 116 P.3d at 1130 (<HOLDING>). 4. Fahnestock’s harassment claim also doesn’t
holding that a plaintiff bringing a retaliation claim under title vii must establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing that she engaged in a protected activity that she was subjected to an adverse employment action by her employer and that there was a causal link between the two holding that a temporal link between protected activity and an adverse employment action may in some cases be sufficient to create an inference of retaliation holding that a prima facie case of retaliation requires a causal link between the employees protected activity and the employers adverse employment action holding that a plaintiff can establish a causal link by showing that the employers decision  was based in part on knowledge of the employees protected activity holding that an intervening act of misconduct by the plaintiff can break the causal link between the protected conduct and the adverse employment action