allege a violation of state law. That line of reasoning is derived from Walker, 55 F.Supp.2d 501, which in turn cites Davis, 48 F.3d 134. However, Capps rejected that argument by holding that there was no need for a plaintiff to specifically allege a violation of state law since the VHRA only requires “a written statement by a person ... alleging an act of discrimination prohibited by § 2.1-716 of the Code of Virginia.” 22 VAC 25-10-20. In short, the VHRA does not require a claimant to do anything more than make an allegation of discrimination. See Capps, 67 F.Supp.2d at 593; Flippo, 59 F.Supp.2d at 576-77 (“in Virginia, a written statement of facts lacking any citation to specific state statutes is sufficient to commence proceedings under state law”); Dew, Civ. Action No. 3:99CV353 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, unlike the claimant in Davis, Mr.
holding that eeoc phone calls served to commence the tolling period holding that in light of a worksharing agreement between the state agency and the eeoc a charge of discrimination filed with the state agency was properly filed with the eeoc on the same date holding that plaintiff had exhausted state remedies where eeoc transmitted charge to vchr pursuant to the worksharing agreement and vchr declined to investigate holding that judgment as a matter of law was proper when the plaintiff did not present any evidence that the defendant was motivated by the eeoc complaint knowledge is necessary to establish causation but it is not sufficient holding that the making of a complaint with the eeoc or the vchr setting forth a factual basis for employment discrimina tion is sufficient to commence proceedings under state law