on whether the unborn child was born alive or died in útero. Therefore, we hold that Geiser is controlling. Section 19-03.1-22.2, N.D.C.C., endangerment of a child, does not apply to acts committed on an unborn child, regardless if the child is subsequently born alive or dies in utero. [¶ 20] When a question of interpretation arises as to whether conduct is criminal or not, we construe the statute in the light most favorable to the defendant. State v. Laib, 2002 ND 95, ¶ 15, 644 N.W.2d 878. Furthermore, we presume the legislature, having had an opportunity to state otherwise, acquiesces to our construction and interpretation of N.D.C.C. § 19-03.1-22.2. See Rodenburg v. Fargo-Moorhead Y.M.C.A., 2001 ND 139, ¶ 26, 632 N.W.2d 407 (“We presume t 75 Cal.App.3d 214, 141 Cal.Rptr. 912 (1977) (<HOLDING>); State v. Gethers, 585 So.2d 1140 (Fla.Ct.App.
holding a mother was not criminally liable for knowingly causing injury to a child under circumstances likely to produce death or serious physical injury after the mothers prebirth ingestion of heroin caused her child to suffer heroin withdrawal symptoms postpartum holding a mother may not be held criminally liable under a reckless endangerment statute for the effect that prenatal ingestion of a controlled substance may have on her child pre or postbirth holding that mother could not be prosecuted under child abuse statute for prenatal use of heroin holding that mother may not be prosecuted criminally for child endangerment for prenatal substance abuse holding a mother not criminally liable for child endangerment for ingesting heroin while pregnant