decisions implicitly acknowledge the contrary rule, that where specific intent is at issue, abandonment as a defense is available if “[o]ne ... [has] take[n] the property of another honestly but mistakenly believing ... that it is no one’s property.... In any such event, he lacks the intent to steal required for larceny, even though his mistaken but honest belief was unreasonable.” Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive CRIMINAL 'Law § 19.5(a) at 88-89 (2d ed. 2003) (“Claim of Right”). See also Richardson v. United States, 403 F.2d 574, 576 (D.C.Cir.1968) (“[S]pecifie intent depends upon a state of mind, not upon a legal fact” such as actual entitlement to property) (citing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952)); In re Mitrano, 952 A.2d 901, 905 (D.C.2008) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis in original). The question remains,
holding that the state courts affirmance of two consecutive 25yearstolife sentences for petty theft was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law recognizing that an unreasonable but honestly held belief would preclude a finding of theft recognizing that suppression is not warranted if officers had an erroneous but reasonable belief of authority to consent recognizing that prejudgment interest was an element of damages in a civil theft ease holding that the test for good faith is the actual belief of the party and not the reasonableness of that belief