bankruptcy petition was filed. According to the live pleadings, Buffington suffered damages proximately caused by the alleged negligence because, in August 2007, a restraining order was entered forbidding him from entering the premises to his business warehouse or operating his business and an injunction was granted allowing the trustee to take possession of and ultimately sell the business’s assets. Presuming for the sake of argument that Buffington’s claim is a viable one, Sharp alleges that Buffington’s damages occurred only after the bankruptcy petition was filed. See In re Swift, 129 F.3d 792, 800 (5th Cir.1997) (providing that no damage was suffered until a creditor objected to an exemption after debtor filed for bankruptcy); In re Swift, 198 B.R. 927, 931 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1996) (<HOLDING>). See also Goggin v. Grimes, 969 S.W.2d 135,
holding that the right of action accrued upon failure to perform contract holding that the cause of action accrued on the date of sale holding that the payments accrued holding that the plaintiffs cause of action accrued on the date of the repealer statute not on the date the wrong occurred despite the federal courts ruling as to the statutes unconstitutionality holding the negligence claim accrued postpetition because the action on which it was based occurred postpetition