... and every intendment is then indulged in support of the sufficiency.” United States v. Davila, 461 F.3d 298, 308 (2d Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(3)(B). We review this argument for plain error. See United States v. Glick, 142 F.3d 520, 523 (2d Cir.1998). There was no plain error here. In fact, Acosta’s argument is contrary to the well-established law of our Circuit. In United States v. McClean, 528 F.2d 1250 (2d Cir.1976), for example, we held that police officers acted under color of law when they stole and extorted proceeds of narcotics sales from targets of their investigations in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus in violation of § 242. Id. at 1252, 1256; see also United States v. Giordano, 442 F.3d 30, 43 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>) (citing McClean, 528 F.2d at 1255).
holding that the official charged with responsibility to act must be an official within the doj with the authority to act in the circumstances holding that where a public official takes discretionary action that the official knows will directly benefit a financial interest that the official has concealed in violation of a state criminal law that official has deprived the public of his honest services under  1346 holding that a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the officials office holding that the question of whether a municipal official is a policymaking official is a matter of state law to be decided by the court holding that the color of law element may be satisfied by the fact that an official gains access to the victim in the course of official duty