scheme, an Oklahoma capital sentencing jury's finding of any particular aggravating circumstance does not of itself "convict” a defendant and require the death penalty, and its failure to find any particular aggravating circumstance does not "acquit” a defendant and preclude the death penalty. 20 . The dissent acknowledges that Hogan can prevail only if this Court declines to follow Poland. 21 . The dissent misconstrues our holdings in Crawford v. State, 1992 OK CR 62, 840 P.2d 627, 640-41, Cheney v. State, 1995 OK CR 72, 909 P.2d 74, and Perry v. State, 1995 OK CR 20, 893 P.2d 521, 533-37, and misunderstands the Satta-zahn distinction between a jury’s non-finding of an aggravating circumstance and an acquittal on the merits of murder plus aggravating circumstances th 556 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Hogan’s aggravators were tried to a jury, not
holding that if the existence of any fact increases the maximum punishment that may be imposed on a defendant that fact constitutes an element that must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt holding that if the imposition of the death penalty depends on the existence of aggravating factors a jury must find those factors beyond a reasonable doubt holding that under the sixth amendment any fact which increases the penalty for a crime  eg by triggering a mandatory minimum sentence must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt holding that sixth amendment requires that a jury not a judge find the existence of any aggravating circumstance and that they be found beyond a reasonable doubt holding that a sentencing judge sitting without a jury may not find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty