not intoxicated as defined in the charge because the evidence of intoxication hinged on Sgt. Coleman’s testimony alone, and so th ow the charge immediately after the last exchange between the State and the defense concerning the definition of intoxication, and Orsag fails to direct us to any evidence that the jury disregarded the court’s charge. The mere assertion that the jury “could” have been influenced does not rise to the level of evidence rebutting the presumption that the jury followed the charge. Therefore, we conclude that the State’s misstatement of the law to the jury, if any, did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence in finding Orsag guilty. See Tex.R.App. P. 44.2(b); Herrera v. State, 11 S.W.3d 412, 415-16 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref d) (<HOLDING>). We overrule Orsag’s third issue. V In his
holding trial courts error in overruling objection to prosecutors misstatement of law of intoxication that differed from definition in charge was harmless when there was evidence supporting the jurys verdict and it was presumed the jury followed the instructions in the charge holding that although portion of trial courts jury charge was inapplicable any error in providing it was harmless in light of the fact that charge considered as a whole was not likely to confuse or mislead the jury holding that where the meaning of the jurys verdict was not clear in light of the trial courts jury instructions the court of appeals erred in directing entry of judgment for respondent the case should have been remanded to the trial judge who was in the best position to pass upon the question of a new trial in light of the evidence his charge to the jury and the jurys verdict holding that a jury is presumed to follow the trial courts instructions holding that the trial courts definition of normal use was harmless error