As an appellate court, we decline to review a cold transcript and draw our own factual inferences about the tone of voice, volume, and circumstances of Sgt. Norman’s statement. See Lewisohn v. State, 433 A.2d 351, 354 (Me.1981). Because the trial court reasonably could have found that Sgt. Norman’s comment constituted an order, we affirm the suppression order. The entry is: Judgment affirmed. 1 . Title 29 M.R.S.A. § 2411(1) was repealed and replaced by P.L. 2003, ch. 452 §§ Q-77 to Q-83 (effective July 1, 2004), codified at 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2411(1-A) (Supp.2004). 2 . Title 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2412-A(1) was repealed and replaced by P.L. 2003, ch. 452 §§ Q-84 to Q-85 (effective July 1, 2004), codified at 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2412-A(1-A) (Supp.2004). Title 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2412-A(3) was am pp.1993)
holding that police officers are entitled to conduct an investigatory stop of a motorist if they have reasonable suspicion that the motorist has committed a traffic violation holding that because the law in this area is unclear an officer who shot a fleeing motorist was not unreasonable in believing that a potential threat to third parties would justify shooting the motorist holding that the fourth amendment was not implicated when an officer asked for passengers identification to see if he could drive a vehicle because the driver had a suspended license holding that where police officers had stopped a vehicle because they suspected that the motorist was intoxicated irrespective of whether the deputies were justified in detaining the motorist after he showed no signs of intoxication and even if they had not after approaching the motorist observed conditions raising a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot they were entitled to ask the motorist for permission to search his vehicle holding that officer did not seize motorist when he tapped on window and asked driver to roll it down