the second sentence precludes review of the Attorney General’s decision to deem [the petitioner] ineligible for release under § 1226(c)(2) (or any other source of authority to grant bail).” Parra v. Perryman, 172 F.3d 954, 956 (7th Cir.1999). Thus, section 236(e) plainly divests this Court of the authority to review discretionary decisions by the Attorney General under section 1226(a) and (b) regarding arrest, detention, release, bond, or parole. That same section 236(e) also divests the Court of authority to review the decision of an immigration judge under section 236(c) regarding detention, release or the grant, revocation or denial of bond or parole. See Edwards v. Blackman, 48 F.Supp.2d 477, 478 (M.D.Pa. 1999); but see Vanegas Aguilar v. Lewis, 50 F.Supp.2d 539 (E.D.Va. 1999) (<HOLDING>). Assuming arguendo that the Court did have
holding that section 236e does not strip the court of jurisdiction to consider the merits of petitioners habeas corpus petition holding that the pendency of a petitioners federal habeas corpus petition does not divest a trial court of jurisdiction to address a pcra petition holding that managing conservator while in texas to seek return of child by writ of habeas corpus may not be served with civil process and is subject to jurisdiction of court in which habeas corpus is pending and only for purpose of prosecuting writ of habeas corpus holding that the federal habeas corpus court could reach the merits of a due process claim even though there was no contemporaneous objection in state court trial where the state habeas corpus court reached the merits rather than rely on the procedural default defense holding that a federal district court has jurisdiction to stay an execution prior to the filing of a formal habeas corpus petition