“injury.” Courts have thus required that injury be the intended outcome, or at least be the substantially certain outcome, of the act in order for this standard to be met. See, e.g. In re Trammell, 388 B.R. 182, 187 (Bankr.E.D.Va.2008). Here, however, “willful” modifies the word “misconduct.” An act constitutes “willful misconduct” if the actor commits an intentional act or omission that is wrongful, regard less whether injury was intended. See Allen C. Goolsby, Goolsby On Virginia Corporations § 10.1 at 229 (4th ed. 2011) (“In the case of willful misconduct the perpetrator not only must have intentionally acted or failed to act, but also must have done so knowing that what he or she was doing was wrong.”); Branch v. Virginia Employment Com., 219 Va. 609, 612, 249 S.E.2d 180 (1978) (<HOLDING>); Ogburn v. Southside Gin, Inc., 1997 WL
holding that when an employee is injured by his employers tortious conduct his employer owes him damages and compensation under the act holding that an official has defrauded the public of his services if he secretly makes an official decision based on his own personal interests rather than the best interests of his constituents holding that the lack of a confidentiality agreement does not necessarily defeat an argument that information is a trade secret because where an employee acquires during the course of his employment a special technique or process developed by his employer he is under a duty not to use it to the detriment of his employer holding an employee is an agent of his employer where the employer assumes the right to control time manner and method of work holding that an employee is guilty of misconduct connected with his work when he deliberately violates a company rule reasonably designed to protect the legitimate business interests of his employer or when his acts or omissions are of such a nature or so recurrent as to manifest a willful disregard of those interests and the duties and obligations he owes his employer