that is presumptively constitutional). The only case of which I am aware construing DeFillippo and denying qualified immunity is Carey v. Nevada Gaming Control Board, 279 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2002). But in that case “two Ninth Circuit cases [were] directly on point” because they had declared parallel statutes of other States — permitting an arrest for refusing to identify oneself — unconstitutional. Id. at 881. That of course does not remotely describe today’s case. Nor does Sandul v. Larion, 119 F.3d 1250 (6th Cir.1997), offer any refuge to Leonard. It dealt not with the question whether an officer could be denied qualified immunity for failing to predict a judicial ruling declaring a statute unconstitutional but with whether the statute covered the plaintiffs conduct. See id. at 1256 (<HOLDING>). In the end, Leonard not only asks us to take
holding that an arrest to retrieve car keys where ownership of the car was in dispute was not supported by probable cause holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same holding that shouting epithets from a moving car did not provide probable cause to arrest the plaintiff under a disorderlyconduct statute holding invalid warrant did not create probable cause for arrest holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment