Deed of Trust void and that Appellees’ efforts to collect her debt give rise to five causes of action. The district court granted Appel-lees’ motion to dismiss and Christie filed this timely appeal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm. 1. The district court properly dismissed Christie’s claim for declaratory relief. Her arguments in support of such relief all fail because of lack of standing or plausibility. As a borrower, Christie does not have standing under California law to challenge irregularities in the assignment of her Note or Deed of Trust because those instruments are negotiable and her obligations thereunder remain unchanged even if her creditor changes. See Jenkins v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 216 Cal.App.4th 497, 156 Cal.Rptr.8d 912, 927 (2013) (<HOLDING>); see also In re Kirkland, 915 F.2d 1236,
holding that a borrower lacks standing to challenge transfers of her promissory note to which the borrower is not a party holding that when the basis of the earlier suit was that the plaintiff had had defaulted on a promissory note and the claim in the instant action is whether that promissory note was valid the transaction test is met holding that a promissory note is not enforceable against a party who signed the deed of trust but did not sign the promissory note inasmuch as promissory notes and deeds of trust are separate legal documents with unique purposes holding that an assignment of a loan into a securitized trust that was allegedly forged or untimely was merely voidable and therefore the borrower lacked standing to challenge its validity holding that mers may be a beneficiary as nominee for the lender that assignments of the deed of trust between mers members need not be recorded that mers was not liable to the borrower in negligence and that the idaho consumer protection act did not provide a cause of action to the borrower