inference may be drawn only when there is independent evidence of the fact about which the party refuses’ to testify.” Id. June Fujinaga’s testimony was necessary to determine whether June had a legitimate claim to the funds at issue. June Fujinaga was the only person in possession of the information regarding the legitimacy of June’s claim to the funds; however, she refused to testify regarding that issue; depriving the SEC of its opportunity to obtain evidence on that question. Additionally, there was independent evidence of June’s receipt of illicit funds. The district court thus did not abuse its discretion in drawing an adverse inference from June Fujinaga’s assertion of her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See SEC v. Colello, 139 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 1998) (<HOLDING>). 3. Once the SEC carried its burden under
holding that in order to determine whether disqualification of plaintiffs attorney is appropriate because of a previous attorneyclient relationship he had with the defendant the court must determine whether confidential information was passed from client to attorney recognizing that the decision of whether to give a jury instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in drawing an adverse inference where the relief defendant refused to give information necessary to determine whether he still possessed any of the funds or whether he had a legitimate claim to them recognizing that an appellate court reviews a trial courts decision whether or not to grant equitable relief only for an abuse of discretion holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its ruling whether to proceed with a declaratory judgment action