so the prohibition against warrantless searches does not apply, see United States v. Johnson, 495 F.3d 536, 541 (7th Cir.2007). Finally, Perez’s first counsel, Forbes, made the reasonable strategic decision not to pursue a motion to suppress — regardless of its underlying merit — because doing so would have undermined the plea agreement being negotiated at that time with the government. Thus, Perez cannot show that trial counsels’ failure to file a motion to suppress prejudiced him or that their performance was in any way deficient. Perez next argues that his second trial counsel, Diamond-Falk, provided ineffective assistance because he misapprehended Perez’s Fifth Amendment right not to testify. See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 325, 119 S.Ct. 1307, 143 L.Ed.2d 424 (1999) (<HOLDING>). Because Diamond-Falk conceded that he
holding that juveniles request to call parent is assertion of fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination holding that a brady violation is waived by guilty plea holding that defendants exercise of right to testify in own behalf waives his fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination holding that fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination is not waived by entry of guilty plea but is relinquished after sentencing is complete holding that waiver of privilege against selfincrimination is proceeding specific