on behalf of’ MBC. The record also discloses that the contract makes no reference to MBC and was signed by Mullís as “Contractor.” The record further discloses that payments were made to Mullís, not MBC, and that the payments were deposited into Mullis’s personal account, not into MBC’s account in a separate bank. This evidence supports the trial court’s findings and its ultimate conclusion that Mullís was individually liable for any damages suffered by the Brennans. If Mullís wanted to act as agent for MBC and bind the corporation to the contract, he should have signed the contract in his corporate capacity. This would have had the effect of insulating him from liability. See Winkler v. V.G. Reed & Sons, Inc., 619 N.E.2d 597, 599 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), aff'd, 638 N.E.2d 1228 (Ind.1994) (<HOLDING>). Mullís, without any citation to authority,
holding that the general corporate laws are incorporated into the corporate charter holding defendants personally liable for alleged conversion even when acting in corporate capacity holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to discovery to determine whether the defendant intended to be bound in his personal andor corporate capacity where the agreement contained certain personal guarantees by the defendant but where the defendant signed the agreement only in a corporate capacity with no signature blocks provided for signing in a personally capacity holding that a corporate officer signing a contract in his corporate capacity is generally not liable for damages under the contract holding that a corporate officer acting in his or her official capacity could not tortiously interfere with a corporate contract because corporations act only through their officers and agents