caused injury in Florida and thus occurred there because Mosseri’s trademark infringing goods were not only accessible on the website, but were sold to Florida customers through that website. This satisfies § 48.193(l)(a)(2)’s requirements for specific personal jurisdiction over Mosseri. B. Mosseri’s Corporate Shield Defense On appeal, Mosseri argues for the first time that he is not subject to personal jurisdiction in Florida because any websites sales and infringement acts by him were made on behalf of his corporation, JEM Marketing. First, Mosseri did not raise this corporate shield argument in his Rule 60(b)(4) motion to vacate or during the district court’s evidentiary hearing. Thus, we consider this argument waived. See Miller v. King, 449 F.3d 1149, 1150 n. 1 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Narey v. Dean, 32 F.3d 1521, 1526-27 (11th
holding that an issue raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered by this court holding that because a claim was never raised in the district court this court would not consider it for the first time on appeal holding that an issue not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal holding that court will not consider issue raised for first time on appeal holding that subject to limited exceptions this court will not consider issues not presented to the district court but raised for the first time on appeal