at 418. In the aggregate, refracted through our deferential lens, the Board’s inference of animus meets the minimum threshold of reasonableness. The contrary evidence' — -such as Neeman’s friendly relationships with union members, his hiring of a small number of union members in the past, and his comments in the May 1 meeting indicating that employees were free to decide whether to participate in union activities — does not compel a contrary conclusion in this case. Further, the Board does not suggest that, having found an illegal motivation for an adverse action, an employer risks liability for all subsequent adverse decisions as to the same individuals, regardless of how far in the future, with no further showing of animus. Cf. Richardson v. Sugg, 448 F.3d 1046, 1058 (8th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); BE & K Constr., 133 F.3d at 1376 n. 10
recognizing that the seventh circuit consistently has held that isolated comments that are no more than stray remarks in the work place are insufficient to establish that a particular decision was motivated by discriminatory animus holding that the relevant issue is whether the evidence could support a reasonable factfinders conclusion that a discriminatory animus served as the basis for the employers decision holding that an isolated comment is not direct evidence of discrimination even if a plaintiff interpreted it as motivated by a discriminatory animus holding that the relevant time is the time of the employment decision holding in title vii case that the span of time between an employers raciallycharged remarks and the decision to fire the plaintiff is relevant to a determination of whether discriminatory animus motivated the firing