fee.” (Emphasis added.) This is a fundamental distinction as a denial of fees under a discretionary rule cannot eliminate a statutory mandate. Thus, we hold that this Court’s summary denial of Austin’s request for attorney’s fees under Rule 222 was not dispositive of his right to seek statutory fees in the circuit court. Moreover, this conclusion is consistent with our jurisprudence interpreting Rule 222 wherein our appellate courts have found that a decision under this rule does not preempt an award of attorney’s fees to which one is otherwise entitled, i.e., statutorily authorized. See Taylor v. Medenica, 332 S.C. 324, 504 S.E.2d 590 (1998) (awarding Respondents a $1,000 attorneys’ fee and $81.66 for costs as allowed by Rule 222 and holding that Respondents co E.2d 793 (2004) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we find the Court’s denial of
recognizing in a partition action that whether respondents were entitled to appellate attorneys fees pursuant to section 1561110 was a determination for the circuit court holding trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to physicians in absence of any evidence of attorneys fees holding that a public administrator was not entitled to attorneys fees in a claim against the estate of a former guardian where the case was not one where attorneys fees were authorized and there was no evidence to support the award holding that an award of attorneys fees under supreme court rule 38 precursor to rule 222 did not preempt an award of attorneys fees to which one is otherwise entitled and thus appellant could seek an award of attorneys fees pursuant to section 1577300 which permits an award of fees for a party prevailing in an action against a state agency holding that appellate court should reverse and remand issue of attorneys fees where damages are reduced on appeal in a manner that could affect the determination of reasonable and necessary attorneys fees