Byrd was sentenced in September 1992 for an offense committed in March 1992, this amended language governs his sentencing. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, comment, (n.6), (backg’d.) (Nov.1991). Thus, because' the pertinent language relied on by Jones I has been deleted and new language added, Byrd is incorrect that our decision in Jones I controls this appeal. Byrd next contends that the amended language should be interpreted to provide district courts with discretion to entertain constitutional challenges to prior convictions that will be relied upon to enhance a defendant’s sentence. The courts of appeals that have addressed the meaning of the amended Application Note and Background Commentary have taken differing approaches. Compare United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 805 (2d Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 104, 121
holding that district court may enhance sentence based on fact of prior convictions under  924e regardless of whether admitted by defendant or found by jury holding that due to statute defendant cannot collaterally attack prior convictions used to enhance sentence unless in violation of the right to counsel holding that prior felony drug convictions that fall within the conspiracy period may be used to enhance the defendants sentence if the conspiracy continued after his earlier convictions were final holding amended language gives district courts discretion to permit collateral attack on prior convictions used to enhance sentence holding that commission did not intend amended language to provide discretion to district courts to entertain challenges to prior convictions at sentencing