that Major Anderson submitted to the Board, he apparently believed that he could waive any return to active duty and still be compensated. A.R. 66 (“I do not wish to be placed back on active duty, but instead compensated for the full monetary equivalence of that promotion.”). Aside from this mistaken interpretation of law, Major Anderson has made no argument or showing that his request to the Board was anything other than informed and carefully contemplated. His mistaken interpretation of the law does not obviate the fact that Major Anderson apparently undertook a careful consideration of his career and circumstances prior to filing his appeal with the Board and making his request to be left in the Reserves. See Turnage v. Dep’t. of Agriculture, 230 Ct.Cl. 799, 1982 WL 25186 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Cf. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 774,
holding that jury waiver stating that it was made knowingly and voluntarily raised presumption of same and that burden was on party challenging enforceability of jury waiver to present evidence overcoming presumption holding that an appeal waiver is valid when it is entered into knowingly and voluntarily holding that an express waiver of the right to a hearing before an administrative board was a tactical decision made knowingly and voluntarily despite the plaintiffs misinterpretation of the applicable law and regulations holding prelitigation waiver of jury trial must be made knowingly and voluntarily and courts will indulge in every reasonable presumption against a waiver of that right recognizing initial burden of presenting prima facie evidence that jury waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made is on party seeking to enforce provision