Fatal Claim Petition, denying each of Snizaski’s allegations. The WCJ conducted a hearing on September 16, 1996, at which Rox Coal asserted as an affirmative defense that Snizaski was ineligible for fatal claim benefits because Decedent’s death resulted from his violation of the law. Rox Coal relied upon the police report from the accident, submitted by Snizaski, which indicated that Decedent had been guilty of the following violations of the Vehicle Code: (1) careless driving; (2) driving at an unsafe speed; (3) driving on the wrong side of the road; and (4) failure to use a restraint system. Rox Coal relied on section 301(a) of the Act, which provides in relevant part as follows: Every employer shall be liable for compensation for personal injury to, o 7 Pa. 172, 146 A. 543 (1929) (<HOLDING>). Rox Coal’s company car policy provided that
holding that the employee was not entitled to compensation because he committed an act in direct hostility to and in defiance of the positive orders of the employer holding that the debtors knowing act of failing to obtain workers compensation insurance so that the employer owed an employee a debt after the employee suffered a workplace injury was not the sort of willful and malicious injury required for nondischargeability under  523a6 because it cannot not be said that the employer intended for the employee to suffer a fall or that there was an unbroken chain of events leading from the employers intentional act to the employees physical injury holding that glc 152 15 provides that the only party immune from suit under the statute is the direct employer a special employer is not immune because the special employer is not liable for the payment of workers compensation and there was no agreement between the direct employer and the special employer that the special employer would be liable for the payment of such compensation holding that an employer is accountable to a discharged employee for unpaid compensation if the employee was terminated in bad faith and the compensation is clearly connected to work already performed holding that whether the tortious act was committed during the time the employee was on duty and whether the tortious act was committed while the employee was on the employers premises were both factors weighing in favor of finding the activity within the scope of employment