delisted sections of those water bodies, Cantwell says that the mercury problem is not being resolved by Florida or the federal government, further diminishing her enjoyment of the wa ters. The harm that these individuals claim to have suffered — the pollution of waterbod-ies that they use and whose integrity the Clean Water Act is intended to protect — -is of a type the courts have recognized as an “injury in fact.” See, e.g., Alaska Ctr. for the Env’t v. Browner, 20 F.3d 981, 984-986 (9th Cir.1994) (concluding plaintiffs had standing under Clean Water Act to challenge the EPA’s failure to establish maximum pollutant levels for waterbodies in the state of Alaska); see also Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Amer. Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221, 230, 106 S.Ct. 2860, 2866, 92 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Biodiversity Legal Found, v. Badgley, 309
holding that plaintiffs had established an injury in fact because the challenged activity directly affected their recreational aesthetic and economic interests holding that plaintiffs alleged a sufficient injury in fact in that their members whalewatching and studying would be adversely affected by continued whale harvesting and this type of injury was within zone of interests protected by statute holding that allegation of procedural injury does not affect the issues of injury in fact or causation holding that a plaintiffs claim of injury stemming from alleged procedural harm is insufficient to ground standing where the harm is uncoupled from any injury in fact or tied only to an undifferentiated injury common to all members of the public holding that to have standing a plaintiff must establish an injury in fact a casual connection between the injury and that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision