not suggest that the instruction is an incorrect statement of the required causal relationship or that it would mislead the jury. Instead, the trial judge ruled, and the Commonwealth argues, that the instruction is improper because it is redundant and that Hall offered the instruction to “underscore[ ] the theory of [his] case.” Hall’s theory of the case, however, was that the jury should be instructed upon “such language ... [as was] in keeping with the law.” Jeffress, 127 Va. at 714, 104 S.E. at 399. None of the instructions told the jury the Commonwealth had to prove a causal connection between Hall’s inebriation and the death of Holmes. As the majority opinion notes, Pollard “correctly” held that Code § 18.2-36.1 requires proof of causation. See 20 Va.App. at 99, 455 S.E.2d at 286 (<HOLDING>). “It is elementary that a jury must be
holding that the language of the statute clearly requires  proof of a causal connection between the drivers intoxication and the death of another person holding that eight months between charges and dismissal created inference of causal connection holding that  1109a requires causal connection between breach and loss holding that to show a causal connection the plaintiff must demonstrate a relationship between the misconduct and the plaintiffs injury holding that there must be a causal connection between the advertising activity and the injury alleged in the underlying complaint