of questioning that would not trigger Mrs. Jaeger’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment, although defense counsel declined. On those facts, we find no substantial interference with Mrs. Jaeger’s decision whether to testify, let alone any coercion or intimidation. See United States v. Harlin, 539 F.2d 679, 680-81 (9th Cir.1976) (concluding that the trial judge’s warning given to the co-defendant’s counsel, “ ‘I assume you have advised her of the penalties of perjury ... and that if it appears that a defendant is lying, the Court can take that into account, too,’ ” was “neither coercive, threatening, grossly improper nor prejudicial”). Other circuit courts, considering similar facts, have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. George, 363 F.3d 666, 670-71 (7th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Blanche, 149 F.3d 763,
holding that a judges lengthy perjury warnings to a defense witness effectively drove the witness off the stand thereby denying the defendant his due process right to present his defense holding that warnings given to a witness by the trial court and the prosecutor concerning the possibility that testifying could place the witness in jeopardy of revocation of his plea agreement and charges of perjury or false statement did not violate the defendants due process rights because the warnings merely corroborated in a straightforward and nonthreatening manner the information given by the witness attorney holding that the trial courts admonition of a witness even though detailed and strongly stated did not coerce the witness because the court did not threaten or badger the witness and the court provided the witness with her own counsel to ensure that the decision was voluntary holding that the defendants due process rights were violated when the trial judge singled out the only defense witness and indicated to that witness that he expected the witness to he and would personally ensure that the witness was prosecuted for perjury and thereby effectively drove that witness off the stand recognizing that informing the jury that testifying witness has agreed to cooperate with the government is a doubleedged sword as the existence of such agreement may suggest either that the witness will testify in accordance with the governments wishes regardless of the truth or that the witness will not he under threat of revocation of the agreement should the witness commit perjury