continuing the interrogation was “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response” from Anderson. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 303, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). And he was right. In the right-to-counsel context, the Supreme Court has countenanced clarifying questions only to ascertain whether a suspect’s ambiguous or equivocal statement is actually an invocation of his Fifth Amendment right. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 461, 114 S.Ct. 2350; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (focusing only on the threshold question of whether the accused “indicate[d] in any manner that he d[id] not wish to be interrogated” when deciding whether police had honored the accused’s Fifth Amendment rights); cf. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Ignoring this principle, the state court
holding that this case concerns the threshold inquiry whether smith invoked his right to counsel in the first instance holding that the threshold inquiry assuming as true the facts alleged by the injured party is whether the officers conduct violated a constitutional right holding that waiver of counsel during pcr review requires a judicial inquiry into whether defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel holding that defendants statements not admissible once he had invoked right to counsel without proof of waiver holding that the relevant inquiry is not whether the court has discretion to facilitate notice but whether this is an appropriate case in which to exercise discretion