oral argument"); Bennett v. State, 302 Ark. 179, 789 S.W.2d 436, 438 (1990) (concluding that statute, which read: " ‘When the evidence is concluded, the court shall, on motion of either party, instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case,’ " was "so clear that it did not need interpretation” (citation omitted)); Little v. State, 230 Ga.App. 803, 498 S.E.2d 284, 287 (1998) (noting that in light of statute that provided that "the trial court shall instruct the jury in the law after the closing arguments are completed,” preliminary instructions could not "serve as a substitute for a complete juiy charge, as the statute requires, after the evidence is closed and arguments concluded” (quotations and citations omitted)); State v. Comen, 50 Ohio St.3d 206, 553 N.E.2d 640, 644 (1990) (<HOLDING>); State v. Nelson, 587 N.W.2d 439, 444
holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the withdrawal of the juiy trial waiver holding that the trial court must give due consideration to the applicable law and facts holding that if jury instructions viewed as a whole fairly state the applicable law to the jury the failure to give particular instructions will not be error holding that a jury is presumed to follow the trial courts instructions holding under ohio rules of criminal procedure that although trial court may give juiy preliminaiy instructions ajfter arguments are completed the trial court must fully and completely give the jury all instructions which are relevant and necessary for the juiy to weigh the evidence and discharge its duty as fact finder