court found “[b]e-cause it is possible to resolve the issues on the pleadings, and the record established conclusively that [Duran-Salazar] is not entitled to relief, I find that an evidentiary hearing is not necessary.” Id. at 2. In particular, the court found no prejudice in that “there is no possibility that the testimony would have effected the outcome of the trial because the substance of that testimony was in fact plainly before the jury.” Id. at 33-34. In reviewing the sufficiency of § 2255 motion, we do not need to accept as true allegations that are “unsupported by specifics [or] wholly incredible in the face of the record.” United States v. Estrada, 849 F.2d 1304, 1307 (10th Cir.1988) (quotation marks omitted); see also Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 57 (1st Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>) (quotation marks omitted). Even if we overlook
holding that a court need not accept as true conclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint holding that where the defendant was in default the district court correctly accepted the fact allegations of the complaint as true holding that if a district court dismisses a  2255 claim without holding an evidentiary hearing we take as true the sworn allegations of fact set forth in the petition unless those allegations are merely conclusory contradicted by the record or inherently incredible holding that for the purposes of deciding a motion to dismiss courts take allegations as true unless contradicted by  documentary evidence  from the exhibits attached to the complaint holding that allegations against nondiverse defendants must be factual not conclusory because conclusory allegations do not state a claim