her interpretation to MSP’s current statutory language, i.e., the language as amended by MMA. Indeed, Brown conceded at oral argument that this new language plainly entitles Medicare to reimbursement of any payment it makes for medical services if a primary plan later pays for those medical services as part of a settlement agreement — regardless of whether that primary plan could have been expected to pay promptly when medical services were provided. Nonetheless, Brown contends that the enactment of MMA does not defeat her argument. She maintains that MMA constituted a substantive change in the law, and that we cannot, consistent with due process, retroactively apply this changed law to her. Cf. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994) (<HOLDING>). The Secretary, on the other hand, asserts
holding that lack of notice of charges in disciplinary proceedings violates the due process clause recognizing that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care custody and control of their children recognizing that the due process clause protects the interests in fair notice and repose that may be compromised by retroactive legisla tion holding that the due process clause protects only those liberty interests created by the state holding that the due process clause protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment