to the contrary.” Bradley, at 711, 94 S.Ct. at 2016. Fourteen years later, in Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 109 S.Ct. 468, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988), the Court announced that “retroactivity is not favored in the law. Thus, congressional enactments ... will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this result.” Bowen, at 208, 109 S.Ct. at 471. The district courts which have considered the retroactivity of the 1991 act have reached their conclusions according to whether their Circuit prefers the Bowen or the Bradley line of cases. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has applied both the Bradley and the Bowen decisions to the question of retroactivity. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Wright, 942 F.2d 1089 (7th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Orrego v. 833 West Buena Joint Venture, 943
holding that bradley governs whether a statute is to be applied prospectively or retroactively holding that new rule applied purely prospectively primarily because of reliance factor holding amendment to statute of limitations was a procedural amendment to be applied retroactively in a medical malpractice case holding that aedpa is not applied retroactively to pending habeas petitions holding the batson rule was not to be applied retroactively to a state conviction on federal habeas review