S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). Whether an encounter is consensual depends on the officers’ objective behavior. Waldon, 206 F.3d at 603. The officers’ subjective beliefs are irrelevant, unless communicated to the defendant. Id.; see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (stating that “subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause, Fourth Amendment analysis”). The district court correctly ruled that the initial encounter — when the officers approached and asked Mitchell if he heard shots and if he had a gun — was a consensual encounter. There was no “physical force or show of authority.” See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); see also Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (<HOLDING>); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553, 100 S.Ct. 1870
holding that where no factual dispute is raised no hearing is required holding no remand required where no fundamental rights are implicated holding no irreparable harm and thus no jurisdiction where no existing employeeemployer relationship holding that no seizure occurred where officers boarded bus and began questioning passengers gave passengers no reason to believe that they required an answer and tjhere was no application of force no intimidating movement no overwhelming show of force no brandishing of weapons no blocking of exits no threat no command not even an authoritative tone of voice holding that a plaintiff had no injury in fact and consequently no standing when it had no enforceable contract right against the defendant