Court has taught us to do, a court may avoid speculation as to whether an appellant should or should not have known that the time for appeal had begun to run.” 770 F.2d at 230 (footnote omitted). Following this direction, we hold that because a judgment concluding Johnson’s § 2255 proceeding has not been set forth on a separate document, an effective judgment has not yet been entered in his case. . iv Our conclusion that a qualifying Rule 58 judgment has not yet been entered means that Johnson’s time to appeal from the denial of his § ■ 2255 motion has not yet begun to run, much less run out. For that reason, not only was Johnson’s FRAP 4(a)(6) motion to reopen the time for appeal not untimely, it was not necessary. See Pack v. Burns Int’l Sec. Serv., 130 F.3d 1071, 1072 (D.C.Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the district court’s August 4,
holding that the time to file an appeal never began to run because the clerk failed to enter a separate judgment as required by rule 58 holding that the same principles of commonsense  that led the court  to conclude that the technical requirements for a notice of appeal were not mandatory where the notice did not mislead or prejudice the appellee demonstrate that parties to an appeal may waive the separatejudgment requirement of rule 58 holding that because the district courts order failed to comply with rule 58 appellants notice of appeal cannot be considered late holding that the district courts denial of a petition to intervene was harmless error because the merits of the appellants claim were eventually considered on appeal holding that when a notice of appeal specified one district court order while failing to reference another an appeal from the unmentioned order cannot be considered