decisions concerning the three issues will create the risk of generating multiple appeals. We conclude that in the interest of effective judicial administration this court should address the issues — all three or few- - er than that — to the extent necessary for a determinative declaratory judgment to is sue. We, therefore, certify the following questions to the Supreme Court of Florida: (1) Under Florida law does the intentional acts exclusion of the policy in question apply in the circumstances alleged in the state court complaint? (2) Are the inju , 1050-51 (Fla.1989) (per curiam) (relying on Landis to approve court of appeals conclusion that intentional act of child molestation is not an accident); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Spreen, 343 So.2d 649, 650-52 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1977) (<HOLDING>); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Schmitt, 238
holding that the plaintiff bears the burden to show that the defendant acted with intent to deceive holding that the use of the phrase any insured rather than the insured the same language used in the employers liability exclusion here meant that the exclusion was not limited to injuries sustained by the employees or contractors of one insured party holding that accident does not include intentional act if insured acted with intent to harm and noting that intentional acts exclusion applies if insured acted with specific intent to harm holding specific intent to harm may be inferred from the circumstances and that finding is a matter for the jury holding a personal profit exclusion applicable to an insured corporation where the purpose of the exclusion was to exclude coverage when the insured received profits to which the insured was not legally entitled