length of service, and sexual singularity, it is plausible that discovery could reveal facts further substantiating the reasonableness of Tasciyan’s belief that her employer discriminatorily failed to promote her. Defendants argue that the Tasciyan’s firing lacked sufficient temporal proximity to her complaint of discrimination to warrant the inference of causation. The Court disagrees. Taken as true, Tasciyan’s factual contentions demonstrate that her employer fired her two to two-and-a half months after she complained about perceived discrimination. Although this length of time is not insignificant, the Court declines to hold that two to two-and-a-half months is insufficient as a matter of law to prove causation. See Williams v. Cerberonics, Inc., 871 F.2d 452, 457 (4th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). The Court’s disposition is particularly
holding that proof that an employer fired an employee three months after the employee filed a charge of discrimination sufficed to state a prima facie case of causation holding that three and onehalf months between the filing of an eeoc charge and the adverse employment action was insufficient by itself to establish causation holding prima facie case established where employer fired fiftytwo year old accountant pursuant to rif but retained one younger employee in similar position holding that the employers discharge of the plaintiff four months after the plaintiff filed a discrimination claim is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge holding to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination a plaintiff must show he 1