9 (1st Cir.2002), the court did not even consider the possibility that Buckhannon might be limited splely to the contexts of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Fair Housing Amendments Act. Instead, the court simply noted that the plaintiff had “relied on the so-called catalyst theory to support this claim [for attorneys’ fees.] The Supreme Court thwarted that initiative when it recently consigned the catalyst theory to the scrap heap.” Id. at 30 (internal citations omitted). Other courts have similarly held Buckhannon applicable to a variety of statutes authorizing attorneys’ fees for “prevailing parties” or for parties who have “substantially prevailed.” See, e.g., Oil, Chem. and Atomic Workers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Department of Energy, 288 F.3d 452, 455 (D.C.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Perez-Arellano v. Smith, 279 F.3d 791, 794
holding that buckhannon applies to the attorneys fees provision of the idea holding buckhannon applicable to the fair credit reporting act 15 usc  1681 et seq which authorizes attorneys fees for prevailing parties holding buckhannon applicable to the equal access to justice act 28 usc  2412 et seq which authorizes attorneys fees for prevailing parties holding buckhannon applicable to the freedom of information act 5 usc  552 et seq which provides attorneys fees for complainants who have substantially prevailed holding that a plaintiff who prevailed on a 42 usc  1983 claim was entitled to an award of attorneys fees incurred on appeal