erroneously deprived of their fundamental rights. See United States v. Laurent, 861 F. Supp. 2d 71, 108 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751); United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 874 (9th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692-93 (7th Cir. 2010); Arzherger, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 602-03. “Absent any individualized determination, there is simply no way of knowing whether the deprivation of liberty is warranted or wholly erroneous.” Smedley, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 975. ¶54 The mandatory restrictions of RCW 9.41.040(2)(a)(iv) create the irrebuttable presumption that the safety of the community cannot be reasonably assured absent the restrictions on arrestees of certain crimes. Cf. United States v. Polouizzi, 697 F. Supp. 2d 381, 390, 391 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (<HOLDING>). This presumption, akin to the presumption
holding that a 50 percent error rate would constitute a substantial risk of erroneous deprivation holding that defamation standing alone is not sufficient to establish a claim for deprivation of a liberty interest citations omitted holding that a prior hearing is not required where the potential length or severity of the deprivation does not indicate a likelihood of serious loss and where the procedures  are sufficiently reliable to minimize the risk of erroneous determination holding that the adam walsh amendments in categorically preventing an individualized determination of risk provide   near certainty of erroneous deprivation of defendants liberty interest holding that the government interest in preventing crime is compelling