¶ 19(b) (emphasis added). In other words, the provision describes circumstances in which Papa John’s may lawfully terminate at its election. Although Defendants did receive three notices of material violations of the agreement within a year under subsection (vii), Papa John’s apparently never mailed a termination notice. Here, Papa John’s had not provided actual notice of termination as the provision requires and thus has not made the required contractual election. The cases cited by Papa John’s concern circumstances in which the franchise agreements were lawfully terminated, and the franchisee continued to use the registered trademark or copyright post-termination without the franchisor’s consent. See U.S. Structures, Inc. v. J.P. Structures, Inc., 130 F.3d 1185, 1190 (6th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Hawkins Pro-Cuts, Inc. v. DJT Hair, Inc.,
holding that proof of unauthorized use of an original trademark by one whose license to use the trademark had been terminated is sufficient to establish the likelihood of confusion prong holding that the defendants reference to the plaintiffs trademark in the metatags of the defendants web page was a violation of trademark law holding that trademark infringement under michigan common law is governed by the likelihood of confusion standard holding that although the underlying action is one for trademark infringement the infringement occurred as a result of the underlying defendants use of the trademark in their advertising holding that the continued use of licensed trademark after termination of franchise agreement constituted trademark infringement and breach of contract