weapon he selected was a firearm. We, therefore, reject Burks’ arguments. The judgment of the superior court is VACATED and this case is REMANDED to enable the trial court to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law with regard to Burks’ motion to suppress his confession. 1 . If the trial court suppresses Burks' confession on remand, he will be entitled to a new trial. A new trial would moot this issue. The same sentencing issue has arisen in a number of cases, however, persuading us to address it at this time rather than defer its consideration until the trial court resolves the confession issue. 2 . Burks appears to reason that it is impossible to cause death without using something capable of causing death. See Wettanen v. State, 656 P.2d 1213, 1218 (Alaska App.1983) (<HOLDING>). 3 . We will retain jurisdiction. Upon
holding that the evidence was insufficient to support a deadlyweapon finding because a motor vehicle is not a deadly weapon per se and there was no testimony in the record that defendant operated his vehicle in a manner that was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury holding section 107a17bs plain language does not require that the actor actually intend death or serious bodily injury an object is a deadly weapon if the actor intends a use of the object in which it would be capable of causing death or serious bodily injury holding that a woman possessed immunity from criminal prosecution for causing injury or death to her fetus holding that feet whether or not shod may constitute dangerous instrument statutorily defined as anything which  is capable of causing death or serious physical injury as 1181900b11 holding that although defendants vehicle was not used with deadly effect it was a deadly weapon because it was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury if not for an oncoming drivers evasive maneuver