were so substantial that it would be fundamentally unfair to allow the government to prohibit or infringe on these rights. Witt, supra, at 320-21. 7 . See West Hartford v. Rechel, 190 Conn. 114, 459 A.2d 1015, 1019 (1983) (noting that a municipality may be estopped from enforcing its zoning regulations when two elements are present: “the party against whom estoppel is claimed must do or say something calculated or intended to induce another party to believe that certain facts exist and to act on that belief; and the other party must change its position in reliance on those facts, thereby incurring some injury”) (quoting Zoning Comm’n v. Lescynski, 188 Conn. 724, 453 A.2d 1144, 1148 (1982)). 8 . See Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. v. Leon County, 796 F.Supp. 1477, 1489 (N.D.Fla.1992) (<HOLDING>); Hollywood Beach Hotel Co. v. City of
holding that the proper measure of compensation in a temporary taking is the rental value that probably could have been obtained holding that a creditor for advances or loans in money made to the owner and applied to the use of a vessel has no privilege allowed him by law because he is not subrogated to the rights of those whose privileged claims have been paid out of the money loaned holding that equitable estoppel may create rights to obtain permits if the owner expends significant sums of money in reliance upon existing zoning and preliminary approvals obtained from the regulatory governmental body even though final approvals have not yet been obtained holding that defendants may be estopped from raising defense of statute of limitations even though equitable estoppel is not listed in fla stat  95051 holding that equitable estoppel may bar a partys assertion of a statute of limitations