for classification as a Tier II or III sex offender. Because the only determination to be made is whether the offender committed an offense requiring classification as a Tier II or III offender, further procedures would serve no purpose. See People v. Logan, 235 Ill.Dec. 539, 705 N.E.2d at 161. Helman’s attack on the statutory scheme’s lack of procedural protections is really a substantive challenge to the statute itself. In Lanni v. Engler, E.D.Mich., 994 F.Supp. 849, 855 (1998), the Court held that because the sex offender act at issue required all offenders to register and subjected all offenders to limited public disclosure, “a hearing would serve no purpose.” Lanni, 994 F.Supp. at 855; see also People v. Logan, 302 Ill.App.3d 319, 235 Ill.Dec. 539, 705 N.E.2d 152, 161 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, as the Supreme Court has stated:
recognizing the extraordinary value of the vehicle title and registration records for law enforcement holding that the alaska sex offender registration act did not violate the ex post facto clause holding that the public disclosure provision of connecticuts sex offender registration law did not violate the due process clause holding that the postmark on the registration application was the determining factor when a registration is subsequently approved holding that a hearing would serve no purpose because the registration act and notification law subject all sex offenders as defined by the registration act to the registration and notification provisions and law enforcement authorities have no discretion to determine which offenders would be exposed to public dissemination