status, an applicant must demonstrate “a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). The incidents to which each petitioner testified do not meet the legal definition of persecution. Although Wijaya faced harassment and discrimination when his church services were disrupted, these incidents did not rise to the level of persecution, which include “threats to life, confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to life or freedom.” Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir.1993). Similarly, the assaults and robberies that both petitioners suffered do not meet this standard. See Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 536 (3d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). There is nothing in the record to suggest
holding that isolated criminal acts by unknown assailants resulting in theft of personal property and minor injury were not sufficiently severe to constitute persecution holding that isolated criminal attacks do not constitute persecution holding that personal disputes do not constitute persecution holding that two isolated criminal acts perpetrated by unknown assailants against ethnic chinese indonesians which resulted only in the theft of some personal property and a minor injury is not sufficiently severe to be considered persecution holding that two isolated criminal acts perpetrated by unknown assailants  are not sufficiently severe to be considered persecution