was per se ineffective. The court, however, based its decision on the resignation, reasoning that the submission of a resignation with charges pending caused an immediate transfer of the attorney to inactive status. Notably, it reasoned that the suspension alone did not amount to per se ineffectiveness, because “admission of an attorney to the bar establishes that the State deems him competent to undertake the practice of law before all our courts, in all types of actions.” ... An attorney who is professionally competent does not become any less competent upon the filing of an order . . . suspending the attorney from practice. (Citation omitted.) Id. at 697, 822 P.2d at 1320-21, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 173-74. See, also, People v. Hinkley, 193 Cal. App. 3d 383, 238 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Ex Parte Williams, 870 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. App.
holding that criminal defense counsels failure to file notice of appeal when requested to do so is per se ineffective assistance recognizing defense attorneys have duty to inform clients of plea agreements proffered by state and failure to do so constitutes ineffective assistance holding attorneys suspension during proceedings did not result in per se ineffective assistance of counsel distinguishing case from those in which laypersons masquerade as attorneys holding criminal defendant received per se ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorneys practice had been taken over by state bar and court pursuant to statute which allowed takeover after determination that attorney was incompetent to represent clients holding that an attorneys conflict of interest gives rise to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the sixth amendment and establishes prejudice per se