the same position with the same terms and conditions, but with Sundays and Tuesdays off, instead of Sundays and Mondays. As a general matter, a schedule change does not constitute the type of materially adverse action required to maintain a claim of employment discrimination. See, e.g., Griffin v. Potter, 356 F.3d 824, 829 (7th Cir.2004); Ruhling v. Tribune Co., No. CV 04-2430, 2007 WL 28283, at *10, (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2007) (“[A] schedule change standing alone does not constitute an adverse employment action.”). It is at least arguable, however, that the schedule change at issue here — which effectively eliminated plaintiffs two-day weekend — rises to the level of an adverse employment action. But see Williams v. Potter, No. 3:03 CV 1640, 2007 WL 247716, at * 4 (D.Conn. Jan. 29, 2007) (<HOLDING>). Even assuming, however, plaintiff could make
holding that the police officer had reasonable suspicion when he saw a vehicle moving with its lights off in the parking lot of a closed business in a rural area at 300 am holding that transfer involving no reduction in pay and only a minor change in working conditions does not rise to the level of a material adverse employment action holding a transfer or reassignment may rise to the level of an adverse employment condition if it is a significant change in working conditions holding that change in schedule  from working 600 am to 230 pm with sundays and mondays off to working 730 am to 400 pm with sundays and tuesdays off  did not constitute adverse employment action holding that a change in work schedule and request that an employee perform two additional tasks did not rise to the level of an adverse employment action