in some cases....”). The right of access to the courts, if it has constitutional grounding, probably stems from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 367-68, 116 S.Ct. 2174 (Thomas, J., concurring); Wolff, 418 U.S. at 576, 94 S.Ct. 2963; cf. Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1284 (6th Cir.1997) (commenting that “the constitutional source of the right of access to the courts is somewhat nebulous”). A liberal reading of Boswell’s complaint uncovers another claim, however — that of a First Amendment violation of the sort prohibited by this court’s Muhammad opinion. See Muhammad, 35 F.3d at 1085 (“[T]he conduct that is challenged in the present case ... burdens Plaintiffs First Amendment rights.”); see also Kensu, 87 F.3d at 174 (<HOLDING>). But cf. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 575, 94 S.Ct. 2963
recognizing first amendment retaliation right recognizing a first amendment right to receive mail subject to uniform policies of opening mail to ensure prison security recognizing in first amendment jurisprudence the right to receive information and ideas holding that prisoners do have a right  albeit a limited one  to send and receive mail recognizing prisoners first amendment right to eom plain to prison officials about discrimination