subtract them for disciplinary reasons “upon recommendation of the institution’s disciplinary committee, following due process, and upon approval of the warden or superintendent.” 57 O.S.1991, § 138; see also OP-060211(rV)(C)(2)(c) (attached as Ex. E to Aplee’s Br.) (mandating that “[o]nly credit lost through the disciplinary process or court sanction” be posted in the “credits lost through the disciplinary process” column on an inmate’s credit record card). The cases on which the DOC relies in support of its view that there is no liberty interest in good-time credits that have been “mistakenly” granted are distinguishable because in each case, the inmates had no right to the credits in the first place as a matter of law. See, e.g., Stephens v. Thomas, 19 F.3d 498, 501 (10th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). In contrast, the award of good-time credits
holding that a prisoner who challenged prison procedures used to deny him goodtime credits and not actual denial of those credits stated a cognizable claim under  1983 holding that habeas was the sole vehicle for an inmates constitutional challenge to procedures employed by state officials to deprive him of goodtime credits holding that inmates serving life terms were not entitled to goodtime credits because state statute expressly foreclosed the granting of goodtime credits to such inmates holding that depriving inmates of statecreated right to goodtime credits in prison disciplinary proceedings requires due process holding that a prisoner cannot be deprived of a protected liberty interest in goodtime credits without procedural due process