1978, § 41-4-17 (Repl.Pamp.1989) (“The Tort Claims Act shall be the exclusive remedy....”). Although we acknowledge that legislative silence is at best a tenuous guide to legislative intent, see Torrance County Mental Health Program, Inc. v. New Mexico Health & Envtl. Dep’t, 113 N.M. 593, 598, 830 P.2d 145, 150 (1992), the fact remains that there is no language in the Human Rights Act stating that its remedies are intended to be exclusive. Absent such language, we decline to infer a legislative intent to preempt tort claims unless such intent is clearly demonstrated by the comprehensiveness of the administrative scheme and the completeness of the remedy it affords. Cf. Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 424, 107 S.Ct. 766, 771, 93 L.Ed.2d 781 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Although the Human Rights Act provides an
holding that the brooke amendment to the housing act provided a cause of action under  1983 holding that 42 usc  1983 does not provide a remedy for flsa violations holding that administrative scheme in brooke amendment to housing act does not provide exclusive remedy precluding claim under 42 usc  1983 because court was unconvinced  that defendant has overcome its burden of showing that the remedial devices provided in the housing act are sufficiently comprehensive  to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under  1983  quoting middlesex county sewerage auth v national sea clammers assn 453 us 1 20 101 sct 2615 2626 69 led2d 435 1981 holding that treble damages under the housing and rent act are remedial in nature holding that there is no enforceable private right where the statute itself creates a remedial scheme that is sufficiently comprehensive  to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under  1983