found in a trial court’s substantial discretion in determining whether to admit evidence. When assessing the admissibility of polygraph evidence, a trial court should be aware that there are no scenarios in which the potential for prejudice would not exist. See Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d at 244 (stating that prejudicial effects of polygraph evidence substantially outweigh the probative value of admitting such evidence); People v. Jackson, 202 Ill. 2d 361, 373, 781 N.E.2d 278 (2002) (finding that, even in a bench trial, it is plain error for trial court to allow the State to introduce polygraph evidence in anticipation of defendant presenting evidence that would open the door to admission of this otherwise inadmissible evidence); People v. Yarbrough, 93 Ill. 2d 421, 427, 444 N.E.2d 493 (1982) (<HOLDING>). The danger of prejudice is so substantial
holding that evidence that a polygraph test was offered to or refused by a defendant was not admissible recognizing that evidence that defendant refused to comply with the court order to provide a voice exemplar is admissible holding that denial of an independent chemical test after defendant refused to submit to a policeadministered test did not violate due process holding that an employee was wrongfully discharged for refusing to submit to a polygraph test holding admissibility of polygraph evidence should be resolved under fedrevid 403 balancing test but reliability of polygraph test may be included to determine how probative particular polygraph test is