noted an inconsistency between Liu’s testimony and her written application regarding whether her husband was detained and beaten for confronting family planning officials after her second abortion. In the same vein, the IJ pointed out that Liu’s and her husband’s testimony differed with respect to who had informed the authorities of Liu’s second pregnancy. Liu asserts in her brief to this Court that these inconsistencies cannot support an adverse credibility determination because they are minor or immaterial. However, because the provisions of the REAL ID Act govern Liu’s July 2005 asylum application, the inconsistencies relied upon by the IJ need not have involved the heart of Liu’s asylum claim. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii); see Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 166-67 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the IJ properly relied on these
holding that an ij made an explicit credibility when the ij found testimony not credible based on several enumerated inconsistencies holding that an adverse credibility determination under the real id act must take into account the totality of the circumstances and all relevant factors holding that this courts previous holding in secaidarosales v ins 331 f3d 297 308 2d cir2003  that an ij could not base an adverse credibility determination on inconsistencies and omissions that were collateral or ancillary to an applicants claim had been abrogated by the amendments to the statutory standard imposed by the real id act holding an ij must to address a petitioners explanation for inconsistencies to rely upon them as the basis for an adverse credibility finding holding that after the real id act the ij must still provide specific examples of a petitioners demean or that would support this basis for an adverse credibility determination