We review the evidence presented by a no-evidence motion for summary judgment and response “in the light most favorable to the party against whom the summary judgment was rendered, crediting evidence favorable to that party if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.” Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex.2006). As discussed above, Gonzalez was a “motor carrier” under the Texas Regulations if he “controlled], operate[d], or direct[ed]” the operation of the truck. Tex. Transp. Code § 643.001(6). In analyzing whether a defendant is a motor carrier, we focus on the specific transaction at issue. See Camp v. TNT Logistics Corp., 553 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir.2009); Harris v. Velichkov, 860 F.Supp.2d 970, 979 (D.Neb.2012) (<HOLDING>). In Martinez, Hays controlled the work-site
holding that carrier was entitled to intervene as of right where the states workers compensation law permitted subrogation of a compensation carrier recognizing a breachofduty action by an employee against a workers compensation carrier even though the carrier issued its policy to the employer holding that a rule requiring an excess carrier to drop down upon the insolvency of the primary carrier would impermissibly shift the risk of the primary carrier to the excess carrier and would require insurance companies to scrutinize one anothers financial stability before issuing secondary policies holding that fedexs authority to operate as a motor carrier was irrelevant in determining whether fedex actually acted as a motor carrier holding the only lawful interstate common arrangement or through ticketing  is an arrangement between a motor carrier and the air carrier