because they will only return to HYCF if they violate the law. They cite Lyons and its progeny for the proposition that “standing is inappropriate where the future injury could be inflicted only in the event of future illegal conduct by the plaintiff.” Armstrong, 275 F.3d at 865 (citing Lyons, 461 U.S. at 108, 103 S.Ct. 1660). The Ninth Circuit, however, has distinguished Lyons when the conduct that may trigger a future violation is not unlawful. In Armstrong, parolees had standing to challenge the conditions at parole revocation hearings because parolees could be subjected to unconstitutional conditions at the hearings on the mere suspicion that they had violated their parole. Armstrong, 275 F.3d at 866; see also Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). The plaintiffs in this case need not engage
holding an officers reasonablesuspicion determination could rely on border patrol agents representations of events that occurred before the officer arrived holding that a passenger has standing to challenge a stops constitutionality because the passenger is seized from the moment a car is stopped holding that representation by state officials that they have no present plan to enforce a statute does not divest plaintiffs of standing to challenge the statute because the states position could well change holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue holding that plaintiffs had standing to challenge stops by the united states border patrol because plaintiffs could be stopped without engaging in illegal conduct