judicial review; and (3) the entry of the order must have been fundamentally unfair. We review a collateral attack to a removal order de novo. United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894, 896 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc). The entry of the removal order is fundamentally unfair if “(1) [the immigrant’s] due process rights were violated by defects in his underlying deportation proceeding, and (2) he suffered prejudice as a result of the defects.” United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir.2004) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Ponce fails to meet the third requirement of § 1326(d). Ponce’s due process rights were violated by the IJ’s failure to obtain a valid waiver of his right to counsel. See Tawadrus v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1099, 1103-05 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). The IJ failed to get a knowing waiver because
recognizing that courts will enforce waiver of appeal rights when waiver is knowing and voluntary holding waiver of right to counsel not voluntary and knowing when defendant terminated counsel and requested another attorney but the trial court would allow delay and appointment only upon waiver of speedy trial right holding that under the sixth amendment a criminal defendant may waive his right to counsel if that waiver is knowing intelligent and voluntary holding a waiver of a substantial constitutional right must be a voluntary knowing and intelligent act holding that an ijs failure to obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel from a pro se petitioner is a due process violation