consider whether the appellee unions also have standing to sue.”). 28 . 176 S.W.3d at 772. 29 . Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997) ("The standing inquiry focuses on whether the plaintiff is the proper party to bring this suit, although that inquiry often turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted.”’) (citations omitted). 30 . W. Orange-Cove I, 107 S.W.3d at 584. 31 . Love v. City of Dallas, 120 Tex. 351, 40 S.W.2d 20, 27 (1931) (citation omitted). 32 . As standing to assert a constitutional violation of Article VII is a question of first impression, "we may look to the similar federal standing requirements for guidance.” Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W.3d 297, 305 (Tex.2001); Texas Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444. 33 . Brown, 53 S.W.3d at 305-06 (<HOLDING>). 34 . See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 430-31, 118
holding factor b is not unconstitutionally vague holding councilmans complaint was vague and generalized not personal and particularized holding  241 and 3631 not vague holding that term unreasonable noise was not vague holding facta was not vague and ambiguous and that defendants conduct was willful