and equal use of the premises being searched.”). 23 . Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n. 7, 94 S.Ct. 988; Maxwell, 73 S.W.3d at 281. 24 . Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n. 7, 94 S.Ct. 988. See also United States v. Rith, 164 F.3d 1323, 1330 (10th Cir.1999), cert. denied 528 U.S. 827, 120 S.Ct. 78, 145 L.Ed.2d 66 (1999) (noting that "control for most purposes” is a normative inquiry which depends on the relationship between the consenting third party and the appellant; where the relationship is of the kind that creates a presumption of control, as does the parent-child relationship, and the presumption is not rebutted, the third party has authority to consent, even if the third party had not been using the room). 25 . See United States v. McAlpine, 919 F.2d 1461 (10th Cir.1990) (noting that lo 1995) (<HOLDING>); Willard, v. State, 682 S.W.2d 686
holding that officers had a reasonable belief that defendants father had authority to consent to the search of his sons room and computer because he owned the home and had access to the room and computer at will holding that defendants mother had common authority over defendants room in her house even though defendant paid rent and installed a lock in his room where he sought her permission to install the lock and gave her the only other key to the room holding that as owner of the residence the grandfather had actual authority to consent to a search of the defendants bedroom because there was no evidence that grandfather lacked authority to enter defendants room and because defendants bedroom did not have a lock or anything restricting access to the room the court found that the grandfather shared common authority over the bedroom holding that defendant had reasonable expectation of privacy in a hotel room rented by relatives when he had a key to the room and permission to use the room at will holding that while a mother could consent to a search of her sons room she did not have authority to consent to a search of a locked footlocker within the room