to restrain the defendants from opening up a public road and trespassing on his land, which was located in Piatt County. Our supreme court found that the plaintiffs action affected real estate and, therefore, was required to be brought in the county where the land was situated. Swigart, 277 Ill. at 285; see also Munger v. Crowe, 219 Ill. 12 (1905) (stating that, although the effect of an injunction would be primarily upon the persons enjoined, the practical and ultimate effect would be upon the real estate). Generally, with respect to nuisance actions, an action to enjoin or abate a nuisance is local in nature and must be brought where the nuisance exists. Annotation, Venue of Suit to Enjoin Nuisance, 1 A.L.R.2d 481 (1949); see also Illinois v. City of St. Louis, 10 Ill. 351 (1848) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, plaintiffs filed an
holding that the grant county prosecutor had a statutory duty to be legal advisor to the county clerk even though she was not embroiled in litigation in which the county was the real party in interest holding venue proper where proper when the action was commenced holding that suit against county sheriff in his official capacity was suit against county holding that the nuisance action was properly brought in the county where the nuisance was being created and stating that the subject of the suit was local and that a local action must be commenced in the county of its locality unless authorized by statute to be commenced elsewhere holding that both saline county and grant county had jurisdiction to try the appellant for murder where the actual killing occurred in one county but the acts requisite to the consummation of the murder and the subsequent disposal of the body occurred in the other county