dredging up facts to cast doubt on Tate's most recent conviction, even though those facts are utterly irrelevant to this appeal concerning prison conditions, and despite the fact that the conviction was upheld by the Mississippi Supreme Court and on habeas corpus review (only a challenge to the length of Tate’s three-strikes-law sentence remains). The majority's cherry-picking of irrelevant but sympathetic facts merely gives the impression — not unwarranted — that its opinion is motivated more by misplaced sympathy for a criminal than by careful legal analysis. 2 . Even the most complex and im th Cir.2005) ("The lawyer’s affidavit, being hearsay, is no evidence at all.”); Albright v. FDIC, 1994 WL 109047 at *4, 1994 U.S.App. LEXIS 6206, at *16-*17 (1st Cir. Apr. 1, 1994) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>); Suit v. Ellis, 282 F.2d 145, 147 n. 2 (5th
holding that district court properly ignored attorneys affidavit because he did not assert personal knowledge of the transaction holding that oath requirement regarding attorneys testimony was waived when no objection was raised in circumstances that clearly indicated that attorney was tendering evidence on the record based on personal knowledge on the sole contested issue holding that the affidavit in question did not satisfy the burden of the party moving for summary judgment where affiants eonclusory statement failed to indicate personal knowledge of the circumstances in question and personal knowledge could not be reasonably inferred from the contents of the affidavit holding that attorneys affidavit was not competent evidence of his clients agreement or communications with the defendants because it was not based on personal knowledge holding that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court at the summary judgment stage to consider information from an affidavit based on inadmissible hearsay rather than the affiants personal knowledge