the expert Michelle Karshan’s testimony that mentally ill detainees may be singled out for physical abuse because of their bizarre behavior and inability to comply with prison rules, and Dr. Robert Stein’s report stating that, without the necessary treatment for his depression and other medical conditions, and absent humane living conditions in the Haitian prison or detention center, Joseph is likely to “simply curl up in a corner and not say anything at all.” (Pet. Br. at 29.) We conclude that this evidence, although deeply troubling, falls short of demonstrating torture as that term is defined under the law, because it fails to show the requisite specific intent on the part of the Haitian authorities. Pierre, 528 F.3d at 191; cf. Villegas v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 984, 989 (9th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Joseph also claims that he will be tortured
holding that the conditions of the mexican mental health system which were created by officials historical gross negligence and misunderstanding of the nature of psychiatric illness do not amount to torture for cat purposes holding that attorneys mental illness may justify equitable tolling holding that upon applying the doctrine of contra proferentem the insureds organically based illness does not fall within the mental illness limitation as a matter of law holding that attorneys misunderstanding of the period for which a claim remained pending did not warrant equitable tolling holding that a mental illness limitation limiting the maximum payment for care of mental illness or care of nervous conditions of any type or cause is ambiguous because the plan contains no definition or explanation of the term mental illness  and thus construed against the insurance company does not include physically based illnesses