used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893. Several courts have rejected Fifth Amendment Due Process challenges to the DNA sampling of convicted felons. The Ninth Circuit held in Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir.1995), that, “the extraction of blood from an individual in a simple, medically acceptable manner, despite the individual’s lack of an opportunity' to object to the procedure, does not implicate the Due Process Clause.” Id., at 1563. See also, United States v. Hugs, 384 F.3d 762, 768-69 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. Quander, 370 F.Supp.2d 79, 89-93
holding the condition of supervised release that requires dna testing under the act is not unconstitutionally vague and therefore meets procedural dueprocess requirements holding that a claim seeking dna testing is cognizable under section 1983 holding that retroactively applying new version of dna act authorizing collection of defendants dna as a condition of supervised release did not constitute a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum holding that term of supervised release was not automatically terminated when defendant was deported from united states and thus defendants subsequent commission of another offense illegal reentry after deportation prior to expiration of term of supervised release violated condition of supervised release that defendant commit no new offenses holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release