reversal are rare, this is such a case. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, including in the landmark Fulminante ease, that harmless error analysis is not appropriate in cases that “contain a ‘defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.’ ” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991)). According to the Court, nothing “could be more important than the opportunity finally to marshal the evidence for each side before submission of the case to judgment.” Herring, 422 U.S. at 862, 95 S.Ct. 2550; see also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 n. 25, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (<HOLDING>). The majority upholds harmless error review by
recognizing structural error where counsel was  prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding holding the absence of defense counsel during jury reinstruction to be a deprivation of counsel during a critical stage under clearly established federal law holding that the filing of a motion for a new trial is a critical stage of the prosecution and that an indigent defendant is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel at that stage holding that sentencing is a critical stage of criminal proceedings and the offer of counsel must be renewed at each critical stage where the defendant appears without counsel recognizing that brooks protects against denial of counsel at a critical stage of his trial