is duly commenced within the limitations period and then dismissed for “any matter of form,” the plaintiff is entitled to “commence a new action for the same cause within one year after the dismissal.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 32. The savings statute applies, inter alia, to an action originally filed and dismissed in a court of another state or in a federal district court. See Boutiette v. Dickinson, 54 Mass.App.Ct. 817, 768 N.E.2d 562, 563-64 (2002); Liberace v. Conway, 31 Mass.App.Ct. 40, 574 N.E.2d 1010, 1012 (1991). We have no doubt that, for purposes of this savings statute, dismissals for want of personal jurisdiction are appropriately classified as dismissals arising out of matters of form. Cf. Ciampa v. Beverly Airport Comm’n, 38 Mass.App.Ct. 974, 650 N.E.2d 816, 817 (1995) (<HOLDING>). After all, as the Supreme Judicial Court of
holding that where the language of the contract is unambiguous and conveys a definite meaning the court may decide the meaning of the contract as a matter of law holding as a general rule of contract law if no other meaning is reasonable the court shall rule as a matter of law that the meaning is established recognizing that dismissal of claim for a failure to comply with the statutory prerequisites for maintaining an action for professional negligence  is akin to a dismissal for insufficient service of process or lack of subject matter jurisdiction and does not serve as an adjudication of the merits holding that dismissal for bringing an action in the wrong court is a matter of form within the meaning of  32 holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of  1983