of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir.2003). Shelley alleged at least the first four listed elements of a malicious prosecution claim, if the inference that the criminal proceedings on the terroristic threat charges ended favorably is considered in conjunction with the allegations that Wilson and Brock acted maliciously to institute the criminal proceedings without probable cause. However, Shelley did not sufficiently allege a deprivation of liberty. Shelley stated that he had to attend a two-day trial on the charges of making terroristic threats, stalking, and harassment, but attendance at trial is not a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. See DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599, 603 (3d Cir. 2005). See also Torres v. McLauglin, 163 F.3d 169, 174 (3d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, he was in court for his trial on
holding that the limits of fourth amendment protection relate to the boundary between arrest and pretrial detention holding that in  1983 claims for malicious prosecution the fourth amendment applies to those actions which occur between arrest and pretrial detention holding that pretrial detention resulting from legal process unsupported by probable cause violates the fourth amendment holding that fourth amendment claims are not cognizable on habeas review because the fourth amendment exclusionary rule does not relate to the accuracy of the factfinding process holding a fourth amendment terry detention is not a custodial arrest and the use of handcuffs does not automatically convert a temporary detention into a fourth amendment arrest