of force by Klaetsch. We fail to see how three incidents over the span of nearly five years can constitute frequent, widespread, or rampant abuse. See Brown, 906 F.2d at 671. Moreover, our caselaw indicates that the force employed in the three incidents would constitute de minimis force rather than excessive force. To be clear, we do not condone the actions — should they be true — taken by Klaetsch during the arrest and detention of Hawk. Yet Klaetsch is not the party sought to be held liable here. The question before us is whether Simpson turned a blind eye to rampant and widespread abuse. From the record before us, we cannot say that he did. Accordingly, the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Simpson on Count VI is due to be affirmed. We 1th Cir.1997) (per curiam)
holding that district court properlydiscounted four calls as de minimis holding that to demonstrate retaliation complainedof action must be more than de minimis  holding that slamming plaintiff against a wall and kicking his legs apart constituted de minimis holding that fiveday suspension was not a de minimis deprivation holding that a robbery of 40 to 50 satisfied the de minimis standard