view in the car. The agents knew that Cruz had not carried a purse to the transaction, suggesting that one of the purses and possibly one or more of the phones belonged to Cruz. Further, an agent testified that one of the bags was open and contained “a white envelope with what looked to be a large sum of money kind of like sitting in there.” When asked by agents what she was doing in the car, Pascual responded that she was waiting for her cousin “Hazel,” which the agents confirmed was the name of the woman who had just been apprehended taking delivery of the drugs. Given the cumulative effect of this information, the agents clearly had probable cause to believe that evidence of narcotics offenses would be found in the car. See United States v. Gagnon, 373 F.3d 230, 240 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Second, Pascual argues that the scope of the
holding that a jury could reasonably infer defendant and his brother engaged in victims murder with deliberation where victims hands and feet were bound expert testimony was that victims injuries were inflicted when he was alive defendants gloves were discarded in victims trailer and defendant and his brother burned the trailer in an attempt to conceal the evidence holding that the suspect was effectively arrested when police surrounded his trailer with their weapons drawn and ordered him through a bullhorn to leave the trailer and drop to his knees holding that automobile exception applied to search of defendants tractor trailer where confidential informant who was detained at border with a trailer full of marijuana told agents that he was driving to meet the defendant to exchange trailers and defendant subsequently arrived at the location described at the time described in a tractor with an empty trailer that matched informants description holding that because defendant only emerged under circumstances of extreme coercion the arrest occurred while he was still inside his trailer holding that an anonymous tip that described a suspects appearance and location and alleged that he was carrying a concealed weapon was insufficiently corroborated by the officers observation of the appellant who matched the description hanging out at the indicated location