suffer from even more serious flaws. Most notably, as the defendants point out, these theories are based on the faulty premise that the plaintiffs may act as a “vicarious avenger” of the general public’s right to be protected against potentially false advertisements. Cf. Serbin, 11 F.3d at 1175 (rejecting this approach) (quoting Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 902 F.2d 222, 230 (3d Cir.1990)). However, for the very reason that the Lanham Act does not confer standing upon consumers, see id. at 1174 (citing Colligan, 442 F.2d at 693), this court should not interpret the statute as allowing a litigant to seek redress for diffuse injuries purportedly spread across the public at large. Cf. Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 963 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Thus, while the court recognizes the
holding that there is no cause of action in california for unjust enrichment holding that a claim based on the plaintiffs allegation that it conferred a benefit on the defendant by revealing a market which the defendant later exploited without compensating the plaintiff fails to state a claim under wisconsins unjust enrichment law recognizing that an award of 24 million which amounted to ten percent of the defendants profits conferred a windfall upon the plaintiff which bore no relationship to that partys arguably unjust enrichment holding that where a prior agreement fixed the salary of the plaintiff plaintiff could not seek to recover for his services on a theory of unjust enrichment holding that erisa does not permit a plaintiff to assert an independent federal common law cause of action such as unjust enrichment to enforce the terms of an erisa plan thus to the extent plaintiffs third cause of action for unjust enrichment is brought pursuant to a federal common law right it must be dismissed