708, 726 n. 3 (7th Cir.2001). I need not resolve this conflict, however, because the result here would be the same under either standard. 11 . The record does not reflect how the police found out about Mr. Dixon. Ms. Levin testified that he was at the police station and had given a statement before Mr. Hinton confessed, R. at 260, 262, but the only other reference to Mr. Dixon at trial was in Mr. Hinton’s confession. If Mr. Hinton's statements, even before his confession, were the source of information about Mr. Dixon, and if those statements were coerced, any evidence from Mr. Dixon might be inadmissible as "fruit of the poisonous tree.” See United States v. Ienco, 182 F.3d 517, 526 (7th Cir.1999) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963)) (<HOLDING>). However, Mr. Hinton has never argued that Mr.
holding admissible certain evidence which would not have been obtained but for violations of constitutional requirements recognizing private damage action for fourth amendment violations by federal officers holding that parole boards do not have to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment holding that the government may not introduce evidence obtained through violations of the fourth amendment holding that state law is immaterial for fourth amendment search analysis and refusing to suppress evidence obtained illegally under state law after warrantless arrest because the arrest rules that the officers violated were those of state law alone and as we have just concluded it is not the province of the fourth amendment to enforce state law that amendment does not require the exclusion of evidence obtained from a constitutionally permissible arrest