goods “[a]re fit for the ordinary purposes for which [they] are used.” Haw.Rev.Stat. § 490:2-314(2)(c); Ontai, 66 Haw. at 250, 659 P.2d at 744. In a breach of implied warranty of merchantability claim, the plaintiff must show that “(1) the seller is a merchant of such goods; and (2) the product was defective or unfit for the ordinary purpose for which it is used.” Nielsen v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 92 Hawai’i 180, 190, 989 P.2d 264, 274 (Haw. Ct.App.1999). The Court begins its discussion by addressing the custom product exception advanced by Defendant. Relying on out of state/circuit eases, Defendant contends that the implied warranty of merchantability did not attach because the feed was a custom product. Price Bros. Co. v. Philadelphia, Gear Corp., 649 F.2d 416, 424 (6th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>); Norcold, Inc. v. Gateway Supply Co., 154 Ohio
holding that no warranty of merchantability could arise from a sale of components to be installed in a highly complex piece of machinery because the components had never been used in machinery of that type and the machinery itself was new and had never been operated under such circumstances no usual standards for determining ordinary performance could be determined holding that granting of summary judgment was proper as to breach of implied warranty of merchantability claim because the product at issue was a newly created component made especially for the plaintiff and  no average or usual standards for determining ordinary performance or quality for the components eould be determined because the parts had never previously been manufactured holding that the trial court committed no error in sustaining objection to plaintiffs testimony that the water had been there for some time because the plaintiff had no personal knowledge of how long the puddle had been there holding that evidence of a defendants prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt holding that an implied warranty of merchantability does not create a labeling requirement different from or in addition to those mandated by fifra because the implied warranty of merchantability arises from the sale itself not from a state labeling regulation citation omitted