dire to identify unqualified jurors.” Id. (citations omitted). Thus, the trial judge’s discretion to restrict questioning is nonetheless “ ‘subject to the essential demands of fairness.’ ” Id. (quoting Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 310, 51 S.Ct. 470, 75 L.Ed. 1054 (1931)). See also Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 425-26, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 114 L.Ed.2d 493 (1991) (stating that “[t]o be constitutionally compelled ... it is not enough that such questions be helpful. Rather the trial court’s failure to ask these questions must render the defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair”). For example, the Supreme Court has required voir dire on the issue of racial prejudice in situations of extreme racial tension, see Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 93 S.Ct. 848, 35 L.Ed.2d 46 (1973) (<HOLDING>); and interracial violence, see Turner v.
holding that because the defendant failed to make any objection at the close of voir dire he waived his batson claim holding that defendants have a right to be present at voir dire holding that voir dire on race was constitutionally required where defendant a civil rights activist claimed that he had been framed because of his race holding no violation of substantial rights occurred during voir dire where record did not show that defendant was denied fair and impartial trial holding a defendants due process rights were violated where he was compelled to wear prison clothing during jury voir dire