beach boundary area between property owners’ dry land and submerged land owned by the State of Florida, the Supreme Court applied state law to determine what rights the owners had in littoral property and avulsions before deciding whether a taking had occurred. Id. at -, 130 S.Ct. at 2611, 177 L.Ed.2d at 206. Likewise, in Karam, supra, 308 N.J.Super. at 235, 705 A.2d 1221, the question of whether the State’s regulation of riparian land constituted a taking was examined in light of the interest that was vested in the property owner by state law. 248, 252, 258 A.2d 33 (App.Div.1969) (noting that “[t]he law recognizes a ‘non[-]compensable interference with private highway access’ ”); State, by Comm’r of Transp. v. Charles Inv. Corp., 143 N.J.Super. 541, 544, 363 A.2d 944 (Law Div.1976) (<HOLDING>), affd o.b., 151 N.J.Super. 14, 376 A.2d 534
holding access to property by navigable lake was per se bar to finding of necessity holding such agreements to be per se illegal holding that denial of access per se is noncompensable holding that retention of some access rights  does not preclude a per se taking holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment