whom Hamed declined to exercise a peremptory challenge—affected any of his substantial rights. See id. at 353. Hamed has identified no evidence in the record that he suffered prejudice as a result of the District Court’s decision to replace Juror No. 58 with an alternate juror. See United States v. Purdy, 144 F.3d 241, 247 (2d Cir.1998). Moreover, there is no evidence that this decision was the result of any impermissible motive— such as an attempt to influence jury deliberations—or, indeed, anything other than the District Court’s reliance upon a clerical error. While the District Court here erred in failing to follow strictly the procedures provided in Rule 24, we conclude that such error was harmless in this case. Cf. United States v. Brewer, 199 F.3d 1283, 1286-87 (11th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Love, 134 F.3d 595, 601-03
holding a new trial required when juror is replaced by an alternate during jury deliberations holding exclusion was harmless error holding that a lottery system for selecting alternate jurors immediately prior to deliberations was harmless error holding that improper exercise of peremptory challenge by state during selection of alternate jurors was subject to harmless error analysis because with the benefit of hindsight we can determine whether the defendant suffered any harm as a result of the trial courts error holding that the trial courts error in not allowing defendant to testify on direct examination as to nature and circumstances of prior convictions was not harmless error where credibility of the defendant was critical to the deliberations of the jury