commence until 1,335 days after his arrest and 830 days after his arraignment. As an initial matter, the State argues that Myers’s speedy-trial claims are procedurally barred because he did not pursue the issue to a ruling by the trial court. This argument is incorrect. The United States Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a defendant can waive the right to a speedy trial forever by failing to timely assert it. Barker, 407 U.S. at 528, 92 S.Ct. 2182. As this Court held in Brengettcy v. State, 794 So.2d 987, 994 (Miss.2001), “While failure or delay in raising a speedy trial claim may cost a defendant points in the Barker analysis, there is no procedural bar solely for failing to properly pursue the claim in open court.” See also Flores v. State, 574 So.2d 1314, 1323 (Miss.1990) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we do not find Myers’s
holding that officers knocking the plaintiff to the ground rolling him over and pinning him with their knees on his neck back and legs so he could be handcuffed did not constitute excessive force and noting that the plaintiffs offer to return to custody after his escape attempt did not eliminate the need for force holding that defendants failure to consistently badger the prosecution to bring him to trial did not eliminate his speedytrial claim holding that the defendants failure to assert his right to a speedy trial until one year after his arrest weighed heavily against him under this barker factor holding trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to improper argument about defendants exercise of his right to a jury trial and stating that the prosecution cannot use the defendants exercise of specific fundamental constitutional guarantees against him at trial holding that a  1983 due process claim that essentially contests the fairness of the plaintiffs prosecution  is  similar to his malicious prosecution claim and claims resembling malicious prosecution do not accrue until the prosecution has terminated in the plaintiffs favor 