125 S.Ct. 1561, 161 L.Ed.2d 563 (2005). The homestead exemption is not, however, the exclusive remedy for a debtor facing the loss of his or her residence. An alternative remedy is for the debtor to seek abandonment by the trustee under 11 U.S.C. § 554(b) if the property is “of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate.” If Jahn could extinguish the abandonment remedy by simply tendering the homestead exemption, then he could effectively nullify 11 U.S.C. § 554(b). Such an argument overlooks relevant caselaw and the text of the abandonment statute. Jahn’s second argument is that the Burkes lacked Article III standing to proceed on their motion to compel abandonment. To ha uest for the abandonment of another’s property. See In re Miller, 302 B.R. 705, 711 (10th Cir. B.A.P. 2003) (<HOLDING>). In such a case, the debtor has suffered no
holding that the debtor had no standing to compel the trustee to abandon production equipment and other property that concededly belonged to third parties holding that in chapter 7 context the debtors had no power to transfer the property without the approval of the trustee holding that a trustee lacked standing to sue a third party for damages incurred by debenture holders of the corporate debtor holding that claims for alleged legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty against attorneys that represented the chapter 11 debtor in possession belonged to the bankruptcy estate and upon conversion of the case to chapter 7 such claims belonged to the chapter 7 trustee as successor to the debtor in possession holding that for purpose of the means test debtor can deduct mortgage payment even though debtor will abandon property