duties as an attorney. Id. Speech made pursuant to an attorney’s obligation as an attorney under the Rules of Professional Conduct does not, alone, transform that speech into speech made pursuant to his official employment duties. In sum, Brown has adequately alleged that she spoke on matters of public concern and her speech was made outside of her official duties. Accordingly, for the purposes of the motion to dismiss, Brown has established that her speech was protected by the First Amendment. 2. Refusal to be Compelled to Make False Statements The Second Circuit has been quick to identify the difference between an employee’s affirmative speech—typically in the form of a complaint—and an employee’s refusal to be compelled to speak in a certain manner. Ross, 693 F.3d at 307-08 (<HOLDING>); see also Jackler, 658 F.3d at 238. Both
holding that two instances of misconduct do not indicate a persistent and widespread pattern of misconduct that amounts to a city custom or policy of overlooking police misconduct holding that a refusal to make false statements that no misconduct occurred is a very different circumstance  than an affirmative statement of misconduct holding that a failure to advise even when the defendant has an affirmative obligation to do so is not the same as engaging in affirmative misconduct  holding that an attorney who made false representations to a court did not violate okla rpc 33 because that rule addresses professional misconduct as an advocate for making false statements to a tribunal not false statements by a lawyer as a witness recognizing that the court sanctions more harshly for cumulative misconduct than for isolated misconduct