paragraph J of the initial Declaration allowed for “transient vacation rental, including vacation rental[.]” Based on the definition of hotel in MCC § 19.04.040 as “a transient vacation rental, other than a bed and breakfast home containing lodging or dwelling units,” paragraph J of the 1988 Declaration and the 1991 amendment of that paragraph, see supra, providing for “transient vacation rentals,” and the declarations of Kurokawa and Hart, no genuine issue of material fact existed that the Resort was a hotel as defined by the MCC. VII. Plaintiff argues that the declarations of Kurokawa and Hart were inadmissible under HRCP Rule 56(e). HRCP Rule 56(e) states in relevant part that “affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be adm Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, Kurokawa and Hart could attest
holding it immaterial that one charged with willfully selling unregistered securities had no actual knowledge that he was violating the law because he was presumed to have and is chargeable with knowledge of the laws under which he was undertaking to do business holding that there are many transactions between attorney and client that have no element of confidence in them of which  the attorney is competent to testify holding that it was error to allow a police officer who was admitted as a lay witness after a prosecution motion to admit him as an expert was denied for lack of timeliness to give testimony as to a matter about which he had no personal knowledge holding that because attorney negotiated and handled legal transactions it was reasonable to as sume that he had personal knowledge of nonpayment holding that district court properly ignored attorneys affidavit because he did not assert personal knowledge of the transaction