no evidence that Georgia’s “general” K-12 local schools offer “a year round program with multi-age, student-centered classrooms featuring pedagogy that is based on constructivist and multiple intelligence learning” like CCAT. Why is that curriculum not sufficiently different to qualify as “special”? Again, the majority does not say. If a “special school” is to be compared to the ordinary local school and must only differ to some extent, then the Charter Schools Commission could create all sorts of commission charter schools that should satisfy constitutional scrutiny, even if the three charter schools at issue in this case are not “different” enough to satisfy the majority. If that is the case, the majority errs in striking down the 2008 Act on its face. See Blevins, 288 Ga. at 118 (<HOLDING>). In the normal course of constitutional
recognizing that a plaintiff may be able to establish that the statute is unconstitutional by showing that the statute lacks any plainly legitimate sweep  citation omitted holding that facially valid indictment may not be challenged on the ground that it is based on inadequate evidence holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute holding that person challenging statute as facially vague must show that the challenged law is unconstitutional in every possible application holding that a statute may be facially challenged only  by establishing that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid ie that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications or at least that the statute lacks a plainly legitimate sweep 