it is possible that those persons the legislature intended to protect from unlawful discrimination under the chapter could themselves be liable for unlawful retaliation. However, an employee who otherwise enjoys the protection of the statute is not, for that reason, shielded from liability for retaliatory conduct prohibited by the statute. Cf. Martin v. Irwin Indus. Tool Co., 862 F. Supp. 2d 37, 38, 38-40 (D. Mass. 2012) (rejecting co-worker defendant’s argument that retaliation provision in Massachusetts’ anti-discrimination law applied only to “employers and those ‘persons’ who exercise similar degrees of authority” and finding that statutory language allowed for a co-employee to be held liable); Beaupre v. Cliff Smith & Associates, 738 N.E.2d 753, 764, 764-67 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (<HOLDING>). Finally, we note that, if the legislature
holding plain language of act provides cause of action only against participating hospitals holding that although a statute regarding sentencing for firsttime drug offenders was plain obvious and unambiguous in its terms construing the statute by its plain language would be inconsistent with contrary to and illogical in light of the legislatures intent in enacting the statute holding that in construing statute courts must first look to its plain language recognizing that plain language of retaliation provision in massachusetts antidiscrimination statute provides on its face for individual personal liability and upholding jury verdict against employee under statute recognizing validity of state antidiscrimination provisions