Id. at 1084. In other words, the scope of an R.S. 2477 right of way is limited by the established usage of the route as of the date of repeal of the statute. That did not mean, however, that the road had to be maintained in precisely the same condition it was in on October 21, 1976; rather, it could be improved “as necessary to meet the exigencies of increased travel,” so long as this was done “in the light of traditional uses to which the right-of-way was put” as of repeal of the statute in 1976. Id. at 1083. The Hodel court also noted that “Utah adheres to the general rule that the owners of the dominant and servient estates ‘must exercise [their] rights so as not unreasonably to interfere with the other.’ ” Id. (quoting Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. M 1518 (10th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Relying on Hodel as well as common law
holding that the litigation privilege was not reserved for common law tort actions but applied across the board  to commonlaw causes of action those initiated pursuant to a statute or of some other origin holding that  1338a jurisdiction inures when a complaint establishes that federal patent law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiffs right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law in that patent law is a necessary element of one of the wellpleaded claims holding patent policy incorporated by reference into patent agreement holding that the grant of exclusive use to one unit owner of a common area is sufficient to change the relative interest of the unit owners in that common area holding that the owner of a patent or common law easement across national forest lands had to apply for a special use permit