limits set by the legislature ‘is a matter for the trial [c]ourt in the exercise of its discretion, which cannot be inquired into upon the appellate level.’ ” Nusspickel v. State, 966 So.2d 441, 444 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (quoting Shellman v. State, 222 So.2d 789, 790 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)). However, an exception exists when the trial court considers constitutionally impermissible factors in imposing a sentence. Peters v. State, 128 So.3d 832, 844 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); Dowling v. State, 829 So.2d 368, 370 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Howard v. State, 820 So.2d 337, 339-40 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). When a trial court relies on constitutionally impermissible factors in sentencing a defendant, it violates the defendant’s due process rights. See, e.g., Doty v. State, 884 So.2d 547, 549 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (<HOLDING>); Epprecht v. State, 488 So.2d 129, 131 (Fla.
holding that the trial court violated the defendants due process rights by relying on conduct of which he had actually been acquitted when imposing a sentence holding that the district court was permitted to find conduct that had been acquitted by the jury when determining the defendants sentence holding that a district court may find acquitted conduct by a preponderance of the evidence holding that a district court may not impose a sentencing enhancement based on conduct of which the jury acquitted the defendant holding the due process rights of one acquitted by insanity are not violated when he or she is committed on a determination of risk of danger to self or the person or property of others by a preponderance of the evidence