this issue is not before the Court, the Court makes no ruling on it. 6 . Plaintiff’s reliance on the Mathews test presupposes that the life interest he asserts is subsumed within the sphere of the liberty interests the test normally serves to protect. The Court assumes that Plaintiff is correct. However, there were divisions on the Su preme Court when it last spoke about whether and to what extent a death sentenced inmate retains a life interest protected by due process. Compare Ohio Adult Parole Authority, 523 U.S. at 281, 118 S.Ct. 1244 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by three justices) (concluding that whatever residual life interest remains after a death sentence is limited to protection from summary execution), with id. at 288-89, 118 S.Ct. 1244 (O’Connor, J., joined by three justices)
recognizing a broader ethical duty of confidentiality holding unconstitutional defendants sentence of death based upon the holding in roper supra and remanding for the montgomery circuit court to set aside the defendants death sentence and to sentence him to the only other sentence available  life in the penitentiary without the possibility of parole holding that if a trial court has rejected death as a possible sentence double jeopardy bars the state from seeking the death penalty at resentencing even where rejection of the death sentence was based on a legal error holding that this court has jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals in cases involving a sentence of life imprisonment or death recognizing a broader life interest after a death sentence