minors from the physician-patient privileges established under sections 154C.5 and 228.2. Accordingly, Pini cannot disclose the children’s mental health records unless authorized to do so by law. Susan argues the Code authorizes a parent, as a legal representative of the child, to consent to the release of the child’s mental health records. Id. §§ 154C.5(3), 228.3(1). We agree with her that sections 154C.5(3) and 228.3(1) normally allow a parent to consent to the release of his or her child’s mental health records. Susan then argues section 598.41(l)(e) gives her an absolute right to obtain her children’s records. Susan may even find some support for her position in one of our court of appeals’ decisions. See Leaf v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 460 N.W.2d 892, 894 (Iowa Ct.App.1990) (<HOLDING>). We disagree. Susan fails to appreciate that
holding that every citizen has a constitutional right of privacy in his or her medical records recognizing common law right of access to judicial documents holding a noncustodial parent has a right to access his childs medical records because section 598411 merely codified existing common law holding that where interference with visitation becomes so pervasive as to harm the childs close relationship with the noncustodial parent there can be a conclusion drawn that the actions of the custodial parent show a disregard for the best interests of the child warranting a change of custody holding that constitutional right of privacy does not apply to medical records