of burglary. Indeed, we have considered several cases in which defendants pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to charging papers materially indistinguishable from those used to charge Velasco-Medina, and in each case we held that their convictions fit Taylor’s generic definition. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 47 F.3d 993, 995 (9th Cir.1995); United States v. Dunn, 946 F.2d 615, 620 (9th Cir.1991); United States v. O’Neal, 937 F.2d 1369, 1373-74 (9th Cir.1991), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Sahakian, 965 F.2d 740 (9th Cir.1992). See also Franklin, 235 F.3d at 1170 (noting that document charging that Franklin “did willfully and unlawfully enter ... with the intent to commit larceny” satisfied Taylor). Cf. United States v. Parker, 5 F.3d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). The Information alone, however, cannot
holding that an information charging defendant with offense of burglary that alleged that the defendant had committed an assault was not defective for failing to further allege specific facts that constituted assault holding that a california burglary conviction was burglary under a modifiedcate gorical approach because velascomedina pled guilty where the indictment alleged unlawful entry recognizing different charging alternatives available under burglary statute holding that information charging burglary did not satisfy taylor because of failure to allege unlawful or unprivileged entry holding that a california burglary conviction was burglary under a modifiedcategorical approach because velascomedina pled guilty where the indictment alleged unlawful entry