coverage based upon representations that it would be done, and the payments be es-crowed,” and that “in reliance upon the representations made by Defendant, Chase [Whiddon] believed that his home was covered.” Whiddon never alludes to the formation of any contract between Whiddon and Chase for the procurement of insurance coverage nor do the facts stated in his petition suggest that any of the elements required to create a binding contract are present. Furthermore, Whiddon’s conclusory statement that “the actions and/or omissions of Defendants described herein above constitute a breach of contract” does not suffice to meet the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a). See Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc. v. Cornerstone Mortgage Co., No. H-09-0672, 2009 WL 2900740, at *5 (S.D.Tex. Aug. 31, 2009) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the court finds that Whiddon has failed
holding that plaintiff stated a claim for breach of contract when it alleged the government failed to purchase insurance for plaintiff as agreed by contract holding that the defendants coun terclaim stating that plaintiff breached the contract failed to meet rule 8a standards holding that plaintiff gas company may not properly withhold payment on any contract independent of contract alleged to have been breached by defendants holding that the complaint did not satisfy the notice pleading requirements of federal rule of civil procedure 8a because the complaint gave the defendants no notice of the specific factual allegations presented for the first time in the plaintiffs opposition to summary judgment recognizing that other courts have applied rule 8b to cases involving multiple defendants but stating that it seems to us that contrary to the jurisprudence in other circuits when a joinder of offenses charged against the same defendant is challenged the literal meaning of the rule 8 requires application of rule 8a irrespective of whether multiple defendants are involved in the case