against AMP and ACB. Huertas has failed to state a claim under the NJCFA because his complaint is not based on AMP or ACB’s marketing or sale of merchandise or services to him. See Del Tufo v. Nat’l Republican Senatorial Comm., 248 N.J.Super. 684, 591 A.2d 1040, 1042 (Ch.Div.1991) (“[T]he reach of the [NJCFA] is intended to encompass only consumer oriented commercial transactions involving the marketing and sale of merchandise or services.”); see also J & R Ice Cream Corp. v. Cal. Smoothie Licensing Corp., 31 F.3d 1259, 1272-73 (3d Cir. 1994). Instead, he seeks to recover for ACB’s transfer of his debt to third parties and AMP’s attempts to collect the account — actions that do not fall within the NJCFA. Cf. Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Mills, 567 F.Supp.2d 719, 723-24 (D.N.J. 2008) (<HOLDING>). Huertas’s CFA claims also fail because the
holding that even if the trial court erred in excluding a letter from evidence that fell within an exception to the hearsay rule the error was harmless where admission of the letter would not have had a substantial effect on a partys rights holding that letter from attorney fraudulently accusing plaintiff of violating defendants exclusive licensing rights was not actionable under the njcfa because letter did not involve a sale of merchandise holding that plaintiff had standing where the beneficiary of a letter of credit had assigned to plaintiff its cause of action for wrongful dishonor of the letter of credit holding that  1823e does not apply to a claim relating to a letter of credit a letter of credit is a liability not an asset holding no enforceable contract where letter specified it was a letter of interest only and is subject to the negotiation and execution of a definitive agreement 