The bids include the costs of post-remediation testing and the costs of storing Pierce’s personal property for two to three months. Pro-Tech contends Pierce’s 17.46(b) claim constitutes nothing more than a breach-of-contract claim. The determination of whether a breach of contract rises to the level of a misrepresentation sufficient to trigger the DTPA is a fact-driven inquiry. Chilton Ins. v. Pate & Pate Enter., Inc., 930 S.W.2d 877, 890 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied). Whether the facts, once ascertained, constitute a DTPA misrepresentation is a question of law. Id. Here, Pierce did not show she was harmed by Pro-Tech’s representations, but only showed harm caused by Pro-Tech’s failure to perform. See Crawford v. Ace Sign, Inc., 917 S.W.2d 12, 14-15 (Tex.1996) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Pierce contends Pro-Tech never intended to
holding that there is no requirement that plaintiffs show that defendants waste caused environmental harm holding that to come under the act the harm must be caused by a failure of something a worker is using to support himself holding that a a representative plaintiff acts as fiduciary for the others requiring the representative to act in the best interest of class holding no dtpa violation when statements of yellow pages representative did not cause any harm but instead failure to run advertisement actually caused plaintiffs lost profits holding that although the defendantattorney did not disclose to the plaintiff his failure to file a claim in a timely manner the limitations period on the legal malpractice claim began to run when the plaintiff could reasonably discern that he suffered some harm caused by the defendants conduct