in order for the disallowed claim to be reopened. The evidence submitted since September 1990 consists of the May 1990 VA diagnosis of “dysthymic disorder” (R. at 604), which constitutes competent medical evidence of a current disorder — one of the requisite elements of a claim for service connection — and is newly presented evidence that is not cumulative of evidence presented before that decision. It is therefore “new”. However, on its face, that evidence is not probative of the issue at hand, the element relating to a nexus between the veteran’s service and his current depressive condition, the absence of which was a basis for the last (September 1990) final disallowance of this claim. See Struck, Blackburn, and Cox, all supra; see also Heuer v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 379, 386-87 (1995) (<HOLDING>); Caluza, 7 Vet.App. at 506 (requisite elements
holding that if no evidence was presented to support the prevailing party there is no evidence upon which to apply the substantial evidence test and therefore the capricious disregard standard applies holding that evidence submitted for a motion to reopen must be material and state new facts that rebut the underlying finding holding that new evidence is evidence not previously of record and not merely cumulative of other evidence holding that the defendants evidence did not qualify as newly discovered evidence holding that there was no new and material evidence to reopen claim where newly presented evidence was not accompanied by any medical evidence indicating a nexus to service