doubt. First, although Mr. Smith and Mr. Jones provided a fact-based narrative of their conversations with the defendants and their trip from El Paso to Albuquerque, their testimony ultimately was not essential to the Government’s case. The other evidence presented by the Government — which included video and audio surveillance as well as agent testimony — was enough to secure a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Brown, 482 F.2d 1226, 1229 (8th Cir.1973) (affirming cross-examination limitations in part because “even if the credibility of the witness was [further] impugned, the Government’s case in chief did not rest upon the credibility of this witness alone”); cf. Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 238, 109 S.Ct. 480, 102 L.Ed.2d 513 (1988) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Second, much of Mr. Smith and Mr. Jones’s
holding that a confrontation clause violation constituted harmless error holding that testimony at trial in violation of defendants constitutional confrontation right was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the testimony was cumulative holding that the sixth amendment confrontation clause violation in that case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore did not require the conviction to be overturned holding that confrontation clause violation was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in part because it concerned the limitation of crossexamination of the prosecutions key witness holding confrontation clause violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and thus upholding firstdegree murder conviction