same proceedings. As a result, there is an abundance of decisional law from the pre-Malloy period construing the Indiana right to be free from self-incrimination. Not surprisingly, Indiana self-incrimination doctrine emerged as virtually identical to the federal constitutional right. Many Indiana decisions, based on independent state grounds, in fact preceded and presaged similar rulings from the Supreme Court of the United States. In other instances, judicial development of the Indiana and Fifth Amendment rights to be free from self-incrimination occurred similarly but independently, in some circumstances reaching identical conclusions without reference to relevant authority from the other jurisdiction. Compare Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 12 S.Ct. 195, 35 L.Ed. 1110 (1892) (<HOLDING>) with Comer, 157 Ind. at 613, 62 N.E. at 453
holding that a defendants false grand jury testimony was insufficient to establish perjury where the defendant was called before the grand jury for the mere purpose of laying the foundation for a perjury prosecution such testimony was immaterial to the grand jurys purpose holding the trial court erred in ordering the transcription of grand jury proceedings so that it could intervene in the operations of the grand jury holding that where witness refused to take the oath and testify his grand jury testimony should not have been admitted because he was not subject to cross examination before the grand jury holding no right to crossexamine in grand jury proceedings holding that right was available in grand jury proceedings