an unconstitutional use-of-force policy, summary judgment was proper because Martinez has failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the Oregon Department of Corrections’ policy is “so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 915 (9th Cir.2001) (finding a similar policy to be constitutional). However, at this stage in the proceedings, a genuine dispute of material fact precludes granting summary judgment for Fletcher on the grounds of qualified immunity. See Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police, 952 F.2d 321, 325 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). The evidence submitted by the parties creates
holding that officers were entitled to qualified immunity where defendant officers could have reasonably believed that they were given sufficient third party consent to search holding that defendants claiming qualified immunity to  1983 action were entitled to summary judgment where factual disputes were not material holding that deadly force was unreasonable where the suspect possessed a gun but was not pointing it at the officers and was not facing the officers when they shot holding that officers were not entitled to qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage where there was a triable dispute as to whether they were reasonable in shooting a suspect who was not facing or pointing his gun at them holding that deadly force was unreasonable where according to the plaintiffs version of facts the decedent possessed a gun but was not pointing it at the officers and was not facing the officers when they shot him