subject to appellant’s visitation rights. Appellant argues on appeal that appellee failed to prove there was a material change in circumstances that would warrant a change of custody. In support of this argument, appellant points out that (1) there was never any proof of any physical abuse toward A.J., and (2) the abuse inflicted upon A.J.’s infant brother “was not material” because he was later returned to appellant’s home. Regardless of whether there was any proof of physical abuse toward A.J., the fact that her five-week-old brother had sustained serious physical injuries while he and A.J. were in appellant’s care certainly constitutes a material change in circumstances which affected the welfare of both children. See Hollinger v. Hollinger, 65 Ark. App. 110, 986 S.W.2d 105 (1999) (<HOLDING>). The fact that the infant was later returned
holding that custody should not be changed unless conditions have altered since the decree was rendered or material facts existed at the time of the decree but were unknown to the court and then only for the welfare of the child holding that a lower court is bound by the decree of the appellate court and can only enter a judgment or decree in strict compliance with the appellate courts mandate holding that if the market value of an asset can be ascertained the decree should account for the change in value between the date of the decree and the timely execution of the distribution plan in the decree the distribution based on value at the distribution date holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because the challenged provisions of the decree had expired holding that the court could award child support without a showing of changed circumstances where the original divorce decree awarded child support to be set after a specified time upon petition to the court