or terminating an arrest must be within the discretion and judgment of enforcing officers.” Deuser v. Vecera, 139 F.3d 1190, 1195 (8th Cir.1998). Hart’s characterization of nationally recognized protocols for making arrests as mandatory does not make them so. Second, because the Handbook granted S/A Robertson discretion to afford Block some freedom of movement before transporting him to jail, we presume S/A Robertson’s actions were grounded in the sort of policy choice that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield from liability in tort. See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 324, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991) (“When established governmental policy, as expressed or implied by statute, regulation, or agency guidelines, allows a Government h Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Such decisions are quintessential examples of
recognizing a discretionary function exception to that waiver holding a park rangers decision to terminate an arrest falls within the discretionary function exception to the ftca because such decision was the classic example of conduct grounded in policy holding the manner in which federal law enforcement agents investigated a suspect and execut ed an arrest warrant fell within the discretionary function exception to the ftca holding that the discretionary function exception may apply in the absence of a conscious decision  holding that the government cannot waive or forfeit an argument that the discretionary function exception to the federal tort claims act ftca should apply