allegedly hostile nature of Ortiz befoi'e and throughout trial, which Troy maintains was apparent when Ortiz testified during the penalty-phase, similarly fails to establish Ham-blin’s actual bias. Because the record refutes any claim of actual bias that would have prevented juror Hamblin from serving as an impartial juror, Troy is not entitled to relief. With regard to Troy’s allegations of other juror misconduct, we conclude that Troy is procedurally barred from raising a claim that the jury was repeatedly compromised in this case. “[A]ny substantive claim pertaining to juror misconduct is procedurally barred as it could have and should have been raised on direct appeal.” Elledge v. State, 911 So.2d 57, 77 n. 27 (Fla.2005); see also Knight v. State, 923 So.2d 387, 391 n. 6 (Fla.2005) (<HOLDING>). A defendant may not attempt to circumvent the
holding a defendant seeking a new trial on the basis of juror misconduct has the initial burden to prove thatajuror or jurors did in fact commit the alleged misconduct holding that the defendants habeas claim was procedurally barred because it could have been or was raised in his postconviction motion holding as procedurally barred an initial postconviction claim alleging juror misconduct holding prosecutorial misconduct claim barred by procedural default holding that successive motions for postconviction relief are procedurally barred