collision that occurred when smoke originating from a controlled burn obscured visibility on a highway. In that case, the Supreme Court defined the scope of subsection (6) to encompass both claims regarding the making of policies to provide fire protection services and to claims of negligence arising from “the acts and omissions of state employees and officers executing and implementing those policies.” 280 Ga. at 830. In so ruling, the Supreme Court did not focus on the nature of the agency involved but rather on protecting the State’s policy decisions regarding the method of providing police, law enforcement, or fire protection services, including policies addressing the method of handling limited visibility arising from smoke on a roadway. Id. Compare Davis, 285 Ga. at 207 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, to the extent that the Agreement
holding parratt does not apply where an officer acts pursuant to established procedures holding that when acting pursuant to a valid warrant the police did not violate the fourth amendment by acting outside their jurisdiction in violation of state law holding that subsection 6 did not apply where state patrol officer was not acting pursuant to any policy in causing collision holding that subsection b did not apply because the communications at issue were not being stored by an electronic communication service holding that the absence of privity does not constitute a policy reason for not imposing liability where negligence is a substantial factor in causing the harm alleged