to prove the allegation against Odessa. Cf. V.R.E. 408 (providing that offers to compromise claim are “not admissible to prove liability for ... the claim,” and that settlement offers need not be excluded “if the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness” or negating “a contention of undue delay”). Instead, the State offered the settlement letter in response to Odessa’s motion to recuse the members of the Board. More specifically, the State offered the letter to demonstrate the circumstances that led to Goggins’ conversation with the Board members and to “confirm and corroborate” Goggins’ testimony. The evidence was clearly relevant, and the Board did not err in admitting it. See Quirion v. Forcier, 161 Vt. 15, 21, 632 A.2d 365, 369 (1993) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 15. We similarly reject Odessa’s assertion
recognizing that the district court is afforded broad discretion in ruling on motions for relief from judgment holding that the moving party bears a heavy burden of proving the facts required for disqualification holding that rulings on admissibility of evidence are within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of that discretion recognizing that trial court has broad discretion in ruling on admissibility of evidence and party claiming abuse of that discretion bears a heavy burden holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling based only on affidavits