sense given that the Remmer presumption flows from the narrow exception to the common law prohibition — now expressed in the rules of evidence — against soliciting juror testimony to impeach the verdict. See Robinson, 438 F.3d at 359-61 (discussing these principles); Stockton v. Virginia, 852 F.2d 740, 743-44 (4th Cir.1988) (same). Whatever Remmer’s scope, then, it must be understood as part of a limited exception to the normal rules governing the finality of the verdict and prohibiting courts from entertaining post-judgment evidence to impeach the jury’s verdict. As the majority opinion correctly recognizes, not every third-party contact impli cates Remmer’s presumption of prejudice. Supra Maj. Op. at 244-46. See, e.g., United States v. Blauvelt, 638 F.3d 281, 294-95 (4th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); Wolfe v. Johnson, 565 F.3d 140, 162 (4th
holding on direct review that thirdparty contact between a juror and prosecutor unaffiliated with the case during the course of the trial was inadvertent and innocuous and thus did not trigger remmers presumption even though the juror mentioned her jury service and expressed newfound respect for the prosecutors job holding that though judge did not question juror individually note from juror to judge requesting private meeting to ask legal question did not suggest juror would not base verdict on evidence holding that a communication between the judge and juror which is unrelated to the case being tried is not improper and prejudicial holding that trial courts denial of motion for new trial based on juror misconduct was justified where there was no evidence presented at hearing on motion that juror had knowingly concealed relevant litigation experience during voir dire and identity of juror as county court litigant was not demonstrated holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when the trial judge questioned the juror extensively enough to satisfy itself that the juror was not biased emphasis added