Amendment rights of association.” Am. Compl. ¶ 3.5. Assuming arguendo that Plaintiffs have standing to bring a suit on behalf of their patrons— which the Court highly doubts — Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the statute violates their patrons’ First Amendment right to “association for social purposes.” See Reply at 6. First, it is doubtful that patrons who are unable to frequent Plaintiffs’ commercial establishments will suffer any First Amendment harm. As the Supreme Court, in City of Dallas v. Stanglin, stated, “[i]t is clear beyond cavil that dance-hall patrons, who may number 1,000 on any given night, are not engaged in the sort of ‘intimate human relationships’ referred to in Roberts.” 490 U.S. at 24, 109 S.Ct. 1591; see also Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621, 104 S.Ct. 3244 (<HOLDING>). Second, Plaintiffs have failed to articulate
holding that rico claims were personal and plaintiffs were therefore entitled to sue on their own because their injuries were distinct from the injuries to creditors in general resulting from the diversion of corporate assets holding that carrier was entitled to summary judgment on claim regarding false statements that claimants were not entitled to coverage because the claim was limited to complaints about delays claim handling and disputes regarding entitlement to benefits holding that local jaycees chapters which were neither small nor selective and whose activity central to the formation and maintenance of the association involves the participation of strangers were not entitled to constitutional protection regarding their decision to exclude women holding that plaintiff was not entitled to rely on a defendants jurydemand where the defendant had neither a constitutional nor a statutory right to make such a demand holding that where the first amendment does not protect a certain activity there can be no first amendment right of association to engage in that activity