order denying its motion to quash a § 1782 subpoena. The Ninth Circuit addressed an analogous situation when it concluded that it “ha[d] appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s order denying the motion for a protective order” on a § 1782 subpoena. Id. at 567. Similarly, the Second Circuit has held that denials of motions to vacate § 1782 orders and denials of motions to quash subpoenas issued pursuant to such orders are immediately appealable. See In re Aldunate, 3 F.3d 54, 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1993) (“The [discovery targets] moved to vacate the district court’s [§ 1782] order and quash the subpoenas.... We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.”); In re Letters Rogatory Issued by Dir. of Inspection of Gov’t of India, 385 F.2d 1017, 1018 (2d Cir. 1967) (<HOLDING>). Unlike Credit Suisse, which appealed only the
holding that untimeliness is sufficient grounds for denying a motion to quash holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable holding that an order denying a motion to vacate a  1782 order and denying a motion to quash the subpoena was immediately appealable holding that a denial of a motion to quash a grand jury subpoena is not final and therefore not appealable holding that denial of motion to vacate discovery order and to quash subpoena issued pursuant to 28 usc  1782 constitutes final appealable decision