finding requirement” has neither been satisfied nor waived. The CMI Plaintiffs counter that the requirement has been waived because the state court default judgment implicitly and necessarily decided that Cantrell had breached his fiduciary duties to the CMI Plaintiffs. However, we do not need to reach this issue. As set forth above, collateral es-toppel does not laintiffs argued that Cantrell was the trustee of a trust created by statute as well as by case law. In its Memorandum Decision, the bankruptcy court rejected the argument that a trust had been created by statute. On appeal, the CMI Plaintiffs apparently have abandoned this argument. Their opening brief relied exclusively on case law to argue that Cantrell was r Court, 62 Cal.App.4th 1546, 1555-56, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 462 (1998) (<HOLDING>); Poor v. Yarnell, 28 Cal.App. 714, 715, 153 P.
holding that plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial on claim of breach of fiduciary duty where underlying claim was a common law negligence action holding that a majority shareholder was not entitled to a juiy trial on breach of fiduciary duty claim because claim sounded in equity holding that breach of fiduciary duty claim was preempted by fehba holding that unless a shareholder can show personal cause of action and personal injury claims for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty belong to the corporation and not the shareholder holding breach of fiduciary duty claim is essentially a negligence or professional malpractice claim