1710 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). The important criterion in a vagueness analysis of an aggravating circumstance is narrowing: “A capital sentencing scheme must, in short, provide a meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.” Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980) (quotation marks omitted; alteration in original). Our analysis is relatively simple in this case. Even though the aggravator at issue was phrased as “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or depravity of mind,” the jury held more narrowly that “the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel and h Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1120, 115 S.Ct. 923,
holding that intentional acts exclusion applies to intentional act of child molestation holding that intentional torture suffices recognizing a tort for the intentional spoliation of evidence holding that no intentional police misrepresentation occurred holding that liability insurer had duty to defend insured against complaint that alleged intentional tort and negligence in the alternative even when policy excluded coverage for intentional torts