or directly solicit business here. After considering the facts set out above, the trial court denied CTE’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. CTE filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with this court, which we denied. As noted, after the Court issued its decision in Nicastro, it granted CTE’s petition for certiorari, vacated our order, and remanded the case to us for further consideration in light of Nicastro. On remand, the parties have briefed the question whether, in light of the decision in Nicastro, Oregon may assert personal jurisdiction over CTE. We turn to that question. The dispute in this case is narrow. CTE does not contend that Oregon’s long-arm statute does not reach its conduct. Cf. North Pacific v. Guarisco, 293 Or 341, 351-52, 356, 647 P2d 920 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Rather, CTE recognizes that ORCP 4 L provides
holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute holding that although plaintiffs met their burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over their claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress under nc gen stat  17544 the longarm statute did not confer personal jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims for wrongful death and property damage recognizing that personal jurisdiction of federal courts of course may be grounded in state longarm or other jurisdiction statutes in civil rico cases holding that oregon courts lacked personal jurisdiction over outofstate defendants to adjudicate a cause of action that did not fall within the reach of the thenapplicable longarm statute holding that the massachusetts longarm statute provides for jurisdiction over a nonresident personal representative when the decedent had sufficient contacts with the forum such that the decedent would have been subject to personal jurisdiction had he lived