with the requirements of Matter of Lazada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (BIA 1988), for filing a motion to reopen on the basis of IAC. 2 . The portions of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23 relevant to our decision mirror former 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(c)(3), which was repealed in 1996, but applies in the instant case under IIRAIRA's transitional rules. 3 . The dissent attempts to fill in the gap between the sole reason the IJ gave for denying equitable estoppel — that Rivera did not indicate any delay in receiving notice of the prior IJ decision denying his first motion to reopen — and the legal standard that the IJ should have applied — whether Rivera exercised due diligence. When we review a BIA decision, however, we must consider only the reasoning in the agency’s final decision. See Azanor, 364 F.3d at 1021 (<HOLDING>). Thus, the dissent’s detailed analysis of due
holding that we must decide whether to grant or deny the petition for review based on the boards reasoning rather than our own independent analysis emphasis added holding that the grant of review did not extend to and therefore we do not decide  whether privette  would preclude an employee of an independent contractor from seeking tort recovery from workplace injuries under the theory of section 414 holding that the only question on a rule 35a motion is whether the sentence imposed was illegal on its face  emphasis added holding that the boards statement of reasons or bases must be adequate to enable a claimant to understand the precise basis for the boards decision as well as to facilitate review in this court holding that the district court should grant a motion for a new trial when the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence or will result in a miscarriage of justice emphasis added