by convincing the jury that [the plaintiff] would have been terminated in the absence of First Amendment protected activity. See Mt. Healthy [City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle], 429 U.S. [274,] at 287, 97 S.Ct. [568,] at 576 [(1977)]; Tindal [v. Montgomery County Comm’n], 32 F.3d [1535,] at 1540 [(11th Cir.1994)]; Bryson [v. City of Way cross], 888 F.2d [1562,] at 1565 [(11th Cir.1989)]. Nevertheless, if [the plaintiff] produced enough evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that a retaliatory animus substantially motivated his termination, [the defendants] could only rebut this showing by convincing the jury, not the court, that a legitimate reason justified the decision. See Pullman-Standard [v. Swint], 456 U.S. [273,] at 289-90, 102 S.Ct. [1781,] at 1790-91 [(1982)] (<HOLDING>); Bell v. Birmingham Linen Service, 715 F.2d
holding defendants proffer of a false reason for employment action sufficient basis for trier of fact to find that such action was motivated by an improper discriminatory intent holding that matters of statutory construction are questions of law for the court to decide rather than issues of fact holding that the issue of discriminatory intent in a race discrimination case is a factual question for the trier of fact whose findings are reviewed only for clear error holding that issues of discriminatory intent and actual motivation are questions of fact for the trier of fact holding issues of fact in dispute are solely for the jury