of specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition”). The next contour of the right involves the “special relationship” and parallel between involuntary dependence on state-licensed foster care and other similar situations. As discussed supra, the First Circuit has not had occasion to address this specific question. This Court relies on the numerous cases from other Circuits, combined with First Circuit principles from Germany, 868 F.2d at 15 and Monahan, 961 F.2d at 991-92, to hold that in 1996, an objectively reasonable DCYF official should have understood the existence of a special relationship between DCYF and minor children once the state takes legal custody and places them in a foster home. See Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714, 720-21 (1st Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Alas, there is a third and final layer to the
recognizing that foster parents do not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in a continued relationship with their foster child holding the foster parent did not possess a liberty interest in her relationship with the foster child recognizing special relationship in  1983 cases and citing second circuit doe foster care case holding same and citing cases recognizing the existence of the special relationship