district court similarly dismissed Plaintiffs’ reinstatement claim due to impossibility. Plaintiffs admit “[i]t was an artifact of this case proceeding years beyond possible reinstatement that left backpay and restoration of benefits as the only remedies.” (Aple’s Br. at 24 (emphasis added)). Notwithstanding the unfortunate delays inherent in modern litigation, see Ford Motor Co., 458 U.S. at 221, 102 S.Ct. 3057, the fact remains in this case “the only remedy sought is a request for compensatory damages representing baek-pay[J” Terry, 494 U.S. at 570, 110 S.Ct. 1339. Consequently, the facts necessary to support the incidental to or intertwined with exception are “clearly absent from the case.” Id. at 571, 110 S.Ct. 1339; see also Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 977 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs also attempt to “re-classify”
holding because the district court refused to grant plaintiff reinstatement or any other injunctive relief the damage award was neither incidental to nor intertwined with any other relief holding that injunctive relief was unwarranted when the jurys award already included prospective relief holding that a court may award injunctive relief against a state officer holding that a request for injunctive relief was merely incidental to a prayer for damages where it was designed to facilitate and ensure the satisfaction of any monetary relief the court might award holding that neither injunctive nor declaratory relief is available to private litigants under the fdcpa