themselves provided appellant notice that “[b]e-cause of the nature of the offenses for which [he] was convicted, the trial court was authorized to cumulate the sentences whether or not the offenses arose out of the same criminal episode.” See Millslagle, 150 S.W.3d at 785; see also Tex.Code Crim. PROC. Ann. art. 42.08; Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 3.03(b). As to appellant’s Apprendi-Blakely-Ring complaint, “[t]he federal appellate courts have uniformly rejected the contention that Apprendi is violated when a trial court orders the cumulation of sentences which individually lie within the statutory range of punishment but for which the cumulative total exceeds the prescribed statutory maximum for any single offense.” Marrow v. State, 169 S.W.3d 328, 330 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, pet. filed) (<HOLDING>); see, e.g., U.S. v. Davis, 329 F.3d 1250,
holding that appellants two eightyear consecutive sentences for rape because they were each within the tenyear statutory range for a single offense did not violate apprendi holding that separate sentences for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and with intent to rob were barred holding that no apprendi violation shown when trial court cumulated sentences for aggravated sexual assault and indecency with a child when appellant did not dispute that sentence for each count was within statutory range holding that employees deferred adjudication for indecency with child could make sexual assault of customer foreseeable when sales were made in customers homes holding that indecency with a child by contact is lesserincluded offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child because even though the latter offense did not include intent as an express element lascivious intent was implicitly included