to him in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. Caraway’s argument is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Fuller, 627 F.3d 499 (2d Cir.2010), where “we h[e]ld that SORNA applied upon its enactment to all sex offenders regardless of when convicted,” id. at 507. Because Caraway’s “travel and failure to register occurred after SORNA’s enactment and [its] effective date ... there is no ex post facto problem.” Id. at 508 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Caraway’s argument therefore fails. We have reviewed Caraway’s remaining arguments, including his constitutional challenges to SORNA contained in his supplemental pro se brief, and find them to be without merit under our case law. See United States v. Guzman, 591 F.3d 83, 89-91 (2d Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Venturella, 391 F.3d 120,
holding  13981 constitutional under the commerce clause holding that commerce clause did not provide congress with authority to enact civil remedy provision of violence against women act inasmuch as provision was not regulation of activity that substantially affected interstate commerce holding that the statute as applied violates the commerce clause holding that sornas registration requirements and criminal enforcement provision are proper under the commerce clause recognizing the extraordinary value of the vehicle title and registration records for law enforcement