right of religious exercise in the land use context. We recognize that the loss of First Amendment rights constitutes irreparable harm. Christian Legal Soc’y, 453 F.3d at 867 (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976)). But the intersection between RLUIPA and the First Amendment is only partial, because RLUIPA extends the Free Exercise clause jurisprudence to the land use context. For instance, RLUIPA’s Equal Terms provision applies to laws that do not necessarily impose a substantial burden on religious practices; but such laws do not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, even if they have incidental effects on a religion. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531-32, 113 S.Ct. 2217; see also Civil Liberties for Urban Believers, 342 F.3d at 766 (<HOLDING>). Since we cannot presume that RLUIPA and First
holding that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion by stating that it did not have the ability to present the transcript to the jury holding that plaintiffs did not have standing because they did not sue the party with the clear ability to act holding that the departments reasoning that de ceccos failure to provide complete and accurate information in a timely manner and its failure to clarify inconsistencies in its submissions to the record demonstrate that de ceceo has failed to cooperate to the best of its ability in this investigation was not an additional finding that de ceceo had failed to act to the best of its ability but rather was a restatement of the facts available finding holding that whatever obstacles the zoning ordinance presented to the churchs ability to locate did not regulate or interfere with its ability to adhere to the central tenets of its members religious beliefs holding the district court did not err in denying the defendants rule 60b3 motion where the defendant had an opportunity to cure any prejudice because the plaintiffs failure to disclose evidence did not interfere with the defendants ability to proceed