2468, 138 L.Ed.2d 223 (1997); see also Hennon v. Cooper, 109 F.3d 330, 335 (7th Cir.) (“The [AEDPA] commands deference to the state court’s judgment by using the word ‘unreasonable,’ which is stronger than erroneous and may be stronger than clearly erroneous.”), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 118 S.Ct. 72, 139 L.Ed.2d 32 (1997). In addition, my independent examination of Terranova’s grand jury testimony indicates that it enjoyed sufficient indicia of reliability both for the reasons given by the state court judge and because, as the trial court explicitly found, Terranova “confided his fears about being seen testifying before the Grand Jury to the detective and the assigned assistant.” Respondent’s Exhibit B at 16-17. But see United States v. Fiore, 443 F.2d 112, 115 & n. 3 (2d Cir.1971) (<HOLDING>). In any event, as I already have stated, the
recognizing that although no obstruction occurs when an individual lies to fbi agents who might or might not testify before a grand jury it may occur if the agents acted as an arm of the grand jury or indeed that the grand jury had even summoned the testimony of these particular agents holding that where witness refused to take the oath and testify his grand jury testimony should not have been admitted because he was not subject to cross examination before the grand jury holding that a defendants false grand jury testimony was insufficient to establish perjury where the defendant was called before the grand jury for the mere purpose of laying the foundation for a perjury prosecution such testimony was immaterial to the grand jurys purpose holding that right was available in grand jury proceedings holding the trial court erred in ordering the transcription of grand jury proceedings so that it could intervene in the operations of the grand jury