albeit mistakenly, as a defendant; • when appellant was named as a defendant in the first amended petition, Rivera cited the address where appellant could be sewed with process, which, as we have discussed, never occurred; • even after appellant signed the docket control order and was named in the first amended petition, the court sent separate notices regarding entry of the docket control order and the date of the pre-trial conference, to “Jaco, Gerald Randall,” but not to appellant; although this action may have been an oversight on the clerk’s part, it could have indicated to appellant, who resided at the same address as his son, that appellant was yet not a party; • appellant was not represented by an attorney; see Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Tex.2005) (per cu-riam) (<HOLDING>); see also Ashworth, 274 S.W.3d at 332-33
holding that a pro se litigant who is an attorney is not entitled to fees under  1988 holding defendants pro se motion to reduce sentence was not properly before the trial court when defendant was represented by counsel since defendant may not proceed both by counsel and pro se holding a court can restrict future pro se pleadings if it first provides a pro se litigant notice and an opportunity to respond holding that a defendant proceeding pro se is bound by same rules as party represented by counsel and a court cannot allow pro se litigant lower standard of performance recognizing that although pro se litigant is generally held to same standards as party represented by attorney a court may consider pro se status when deciding whether partys conduct was result of conscious indifference because this determination turns on his state of mind