contrast, eliminates the underlying legal right; it “precludes a right of action after a specified time ... rather than establishing a time period within which the action must be brought measured from the point in time when the cause of action accrued.” Univ. of Miami v. Bogorff, 583 So.2d 1000, 1003 (Fla.1991); see also Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So.2d 415, 421 (Fla.1992) (explaining that a statute of repose “eliminate^ a cause of action”). Only a statute of repose functions “to extinguish valid causes of action.” Nehme v. Smithkline Beecham Clinical Labs N.M. 436, 912 P.2d 828, 830 (1996) (“[T]he UFTA-operates in.the same manner as other statutes of repose that extinguishes a cause of action ... rather than simply blocking the remedy.”); Nathan v. Whittington, 408 S.W.3d 870, 874 (Tex.2013) (<HOLDING>). Notwithstanding this statutory text, the
holding that statute was one of repose because it embodies the most distinctive characteristic of a statute of repose the barring of the right to bring an action rather than the remedy prescribed holding that a 30day limitations provision is substantively unconscionable holding that provision has the characteristics of a statute of repose holding that provision is a statute of repose and noting that the word extinguished is emphasized because of its substantive effect holding that provision is a statute of repose because by its own terms the provision does not just procedurally bar an untimely claim it substantively extinguishes the cause of action