restated the standard of ordinary care and, therefore, the trial court’s submission of a broad form negligence question was proper. Smith, 774 S.W.2d at 415. The Knighten court distinguished Smith by seizing on the absence of the term “using ordinary care,” which appeared in the instruction at issue in Smith. Knighten, 946 S.W.2d at 641. The instruction at issue in Knighten tracked the language of section 61(a), and included the statutory language “exercising due regard.” Knighten, 946 S.W.2d at 641. The Knighten court held that a standard of care requiring “due regard” imposes a duty less than “ordinary care,” and, therefore, the instruction did not merely restate the duty that exists at common law. Id. (citing City of El Paso v. Kolster, 931 S.W.2d 365, 369 (Tex.App. — El Paso 1996) (<HOLDING>), rev’d on other grounds, 972 S.W.2d 58, 59-60
holding that although compliance with administrative safety regulations did not establish due care it was evidence of due care holding that standard of care need not be listed separately in report when same standard applies to each health care provider holding employers to an ordinary prudence standard of care holding that due regard describes a standard between ordinary care and recklessness holding that under either theory the duty is the same ordinary care