under the Massachusetts Wiretap Act, or that the MITS call “detailing” practices were clearly prohibited under the Gilday injunction. 1. Monitoring and Recording We begin by noting that the Gilday injunction prohibits only “interceptions” under the applicable statutes and not call monitoring, recording, or “detailing” per se. The term “interception,” as used in the Massachusetts Wiretap Act, “means to secretly hear, secretly record, or aid another to secretly hear or secretly record, the contents of any wire or oral communication through the use of any intercepting device____” Mass. Gen. L. ch. 272, § 99(B)(4) (emphasis added). The Massachusetts courts have interpreted this “secrecy” requirement literally. See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 370 Mass. 502, 349 N.E.2d 337, 339-40 (1976) (<HOLDING>); see also District Attorney v. New England
holding that the requirements for establishing a rehabilitation act violation are similar to those for establishing an ada violation holding that a controversy that is a labor dispute within the meaning of the massachusetts act is not taken outside the scope of that act merely because it also involves breaches of an employment contract holding that secrecy is essential to establishing a violation of massachusetts wiretap act holding that massachusetts is a title theory state holding a violation of the travel act