arrests are improper considerations in sentencing. However, we see no significant difference between prior arrests and subsequent arrests for sentencing purposes, particularly where charges are still pending from the prior or subsequent arrest at the time of sentencing. In both circumstances, the sentencing court will have to ensure the relevance and reliability of information presented regarding the alleged criminal activity and allow the defendant an opportunity to explain or rebut those charges. Further, if the defendant has been acquitted of charges stemming from a prior or subsequent arrest, the trial court is prohibited from considering the arrest. See Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740-41, 68 S.Ct. 1252, 92 L.Ed. 1690 (1948); Doty, 884 So.2d at 549; Eppre 5th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>); Miller v. State, 709 N.E.2d 48, 49
holding that consideration of pending or dismissed charges during sentencing results in a denial of the defendants due process rights holding sentencing courts may consider evidence of conduct or charges of which a defendant was acquitted holding that the sentencing judge could consider the defendants subsequent arrest even though the charges were dismissed during sentencing holding that the district court could constitutionally consider the acquitted conduct in rico sentencing recognizing that sentencing judges have the discretion to reject any sentencing guideline but no judge is required to do so