aside the question of the appropriateness of the Rule 35 vehicle, it is indisputable that we are not bound by the title of the motion and that we may consider it as filed under our collateral attack statute, D.C. Code § 23-110 (1981). We interpret that statute by reference to the parallel federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982), and in construing that law the Supreme Court has held that a cognizable claim incorrectly asserted by way of a Rule 35 motion must be considered by the court under the collateral attack statute instead, for “in this area of the law ... ‘adjudication upon the underlying merits of claim is not [to be] hampered by reliance upon the titles petitioners put upon their documents.’ ” Andrews v. United States, 373 U.S. 334, 338, 83 S.Ct. 1236, 1239, 10 L.Ed.2d 383 (1963) (<HOLDING>). Because Allen contends that the consecutive
holding that lower court was obliged to consider motion filed under rule 35 as filed under  2255 rather than reject it holding that motion for reconsideration would be construed not as a rule 60b motion but rather as an unauthorized successive motion under  2255 which the district court may have been without jurisdiction to consider holding that the lower court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because it was filed without proper authority holding that motion filed under fedrcivp 60b properly construed as successive  2255 motion holding that a district court has jurisdiction to consider  a rule 41e motion  filed after criminal proceedings had been completed