of the anchor. If the damages “arose out of the defective and unsafe condition” of the anchor, Jaenty’s claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Jaenty argues that its injuries arose out of “negligent construction activities” rather than the defective and unsafe condition of the anchor and thus Jaenty’s claims should not be subject to the two-year statute of limitations. We address this issue in two ways: (1) whether the condition of the anchor was “defective and unsafe,” and (2) whether Jaenty’s alleged injuries “arose out of the condition” of the anchor. We have previously said that whether an injury arises out of a defective and unsafe condition “turns on the individual facts alleged in the complaint.” Gribel v. Andersen Corp., 489 N.W.2d 521, 523 (Minn.1992) (<HOLDING>). Here, the complaint alleged that the anchor
holding that issues decided by an intervening supreme court case need not be identical to be controlling holding that to be defective and unsafe an improvement need not be a risk to human health holding that citys policy need not be unconstitutional per se but need only cause a constitutional violation holding that a remedy for unsafe conditions need not await a tragic event holding that after alleyne v united states it is wellestablished that sentencing factors need not be charged in an indictment and need only be proved to the sentencing judge by a preponderance of the evidence