they involve extra-contractual harm and do not require contract interpretation, but because they depend on the ruling courts’ balancing of equities in determining whether plaintiffs' had stated claims for unjust enrichment. See, e.g., McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. N.Y. State Common Ret. Fund, Inc., 339 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir.2003) (interpreting Delaware law, finding that unjust enrichment claims against defendants who were not parties to a contract were not necessarily precluded in an action based on securities fraud, but holding that the availability of a legal remedy did not warrant piercing the corporate veil to hold shareholders liable in equity, even if they had been unjustly enriched); Kossian v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 254 Cal.App.2d 647, 649-51, 62 Cal.Rptr. 225 (Cal.Ct.App.1967) (<HOLDING>). These cases do not state maxims about when
holding that plaintiff could recover medical fees not actually paid by the insurance company pursuant to an insurance contract holding that plaintiff could recover money mistakenly paid in excess of contract price holding that a plaintiff who had repaired damaged property could recover under a contract made between plaintiff and a nonparty because the defendant insurance company had already been indemnified for the repair and was not entitled to be repaid twice in money and in labor holding that where an express contract was in place between plaintiff and defendant that governed the compensation sought by plaintiff plaintiff may not recover under a theory of unjust enrichment holding that defendant insurance company could not be held liable in negligence to a plaintiff for failure to disclose the insureds medical condition where defendant insurance company had not assumed a professional and expert position with respect to the insureds physical condition