on the need for national uniformity. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a); Allis-Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at 210-13, 105 S.Ct. 1904. The Sixth Circuit has held that a claim for the denial of benefits under an ERISA plan that is established by a collective bargaining agreement may be brought under either ERISA, the LMRA, or both statutes. Biros v. Spalding-Evenflo Co., Inc., 934 F.2d 740, 742 (6th Cir.1991). Therefore, the defendant’s argument that the plaintiffs ERISA claim is preempted by the LMRA is without merit. The cases cited by the defendant that find LMRA preemption of state law claims and those dealing with hybrid section 301 claims do not provide guidance on this issue because they do not involve claims asserted under ERISA. See DeCoe v. General Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 212 (6th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Jones v. General Motors Corp., 939 F.2d 380
holding claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress not shown where consensual sexual relations involved holding that lmra preempted plaintiffs state law claims against employer for sexual harassment slander tortious interference with economic relations conspiracy and intentional infliction of emotional distress holding plaintiffs state law claims of inter alia tortious interference with contract are preempted by section 301 of lmra holding that act did not bar intentional infliction of emotional distress claim recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress