official policymaker of employment policy at the BPW. See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988) (noting that ability to make municipal decisions is necessarily the power to make final decisions); Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481-84, 106 S.Ct. 1292 (same); Meyers v. City of Cincinnati, 14 F.3d 1115, 1118 (“If the decision to punish [plaintiff] for exercising his constitutional rights was made by the ‘government’s authorized decisionmakers’ the City is responsible.”). Moraw ments involved purely private matters and should not be considered protected speech, the Court concludes that these comments are most accurately described as concerning public matters in which Plaintiff also had a private interest. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 148, 103 S.Ct. 1684 (<HOLDING>); Chappel v. Montgomery County Fire Protection
holding that a defendant must demonstrate that it would have taken the adverse action absent the protected speech and not simply that it justifiably could have holding that public speech motivated by personal displeasure with policies was not covered by the first amendment holding that even though speech was motivated by personal grievances it would still be protected conduct if it dealt with public concerns holding that speech addressing a private interest within a letter containing matters of public interest was protected and noting that we have emphasized that speech of public importance is only transformed into a matter of private concern when it is motivated solely by the speakers personal interests quotations omitted holding that after the district court determined that the plaintiffs speech was protected the court was required to inform the jury of its ruling that knapps speech was constitutionally protected