that Cigna knew or should have known that the claims were covered. Simply put, an insurer cannot know claims are covered when they are not. So, from the above recitation and the record before us, we see that both Killion and the court interjected into the case the issue of Killion’s statutory right to back surgery. And, as presented in the jury charge at least through question one, Cig-na’s liability to Killion was contingent upon the jury determining that he was entitled to treatment (ie. back surgery) under the Workers’ Compensation Act. This posed a problem, however, because the power to determine whether Kil-lion was entitled to compensation benefits in the form of back surgery lay solely with the TWCC, subject to judicial review. Sa 7 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1976, writ refd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). That Killion may have to first incur the
holding that the parties choiceoflaw agreement as relating to workers compensation was appropriately avoided where it offended state public policy as reflected in express provisions of the pennsylvania workers compensation act holding that the provisions of the workers compensation act must be satisfied or the action is not maintainable in the courts holding that provisions of section 40115102 are applicable to the determination of the status of truck drivers as employees or independent contractors under the workers compensation act and discussing legislative history indicating intent to apply these provisions both to workers compensation and unemployment compensation matters holding that the exclusivity of workers compensation is an affirmative statutory defense which must be timely raised or it is waived holding that the trial courts authority to initiate workers compensation benefits before the final adjudication was not divested by the legislature and was consistent with the stated purpose of the workers compensation act