not rape or murder the victim. He points out that the rules barring the admission of involuntary confessions at trial are grounded in an individual’s guarantee of due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the accuracy of the facts contained in the statements is irrelevant to the question of admissibility. See Appellant’s Brief at 19 (citing, inter alia, Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236, 62 S.Ct. 280, 86 L.Ed. 166 (1941) (“The aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence whether true or false.”); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) (<HOLDING>)). Appellant notes it is this dichotomy between
holding the double jeopardy clause applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment holding that an exercise by the state of its police power is presumed to be valid when it is challenged under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment holding failure of prosecution to disclose evidence that may be favorable to the accused is a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment holding that even though a statement given by an individual in the grip of schizophrenic hallucinations may be proved to be unreliable unless the statement was the product of police coercion it cannot be deemed involuntary and thus the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not prohibit the statements admission into evidence holding that in employees age discrimination suit against former employer supervisors statement to employee was not hearsay even though the statement was offered for its truth because the statement was an admission by a party opponent