the D.C. Housing Authority paid to his ex-wife rent that was due to him. Once again, he alleges no federal constitutional or statutory right to those payments, nor any basis for a fiduciary duty owed to him. He makes one additional allegation against the Housing Authority alone: that it retaliated against him for demanding payment by chasing potential tenants away from his building. Construing the complaint very liberally indeed, this may be an allegation that Mr. Quezada’s equal protection rights were violated. He does not suggest that the alleged retaliation was motivated by his membership in any protected class, but even a “class of one” can prevail in certain circumstances. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). There are “two essential elements” to a “
holding that a district of columbia consumer protection statute that authorized representative actions and did not reference class action requirements or mandate class certification was a separate and distinct procedural vehicle from a class action and thus did not constitute a class action under cafa holding that the fourteenth amendment  and therefore also the fifth amendment  gives rise to a cause of action on behalf of a class of one where the plaintiff did not allege membership in a class or group holding that to maintain a class action the existence of the class must be pleaded and the limits of the class must be defined with some specificity recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members holding that the filing of a class action by a class representative without standing tolls the period of limitations with regard to all asserted members of the class and that the amendment of the complaint by the addition of a class member with standing relates back to the original complaint