is “to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers.” Id. That is particularly true where, as here, conflict-of-interest concerns intersect the Sixth Amendment debate. Trial courts “face the prospect of being ‘whipsawed’ by assertions of error no matter which way they rule,” id. at 161, 108 S.Ct. at 1698—accused on direct appeal of depriving a defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to retained counsel (if the court disqualifies counsel) or challenged on collateral habeas review of violating the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel (if the court refuses to disqualify counsel). See United States v. Williams, 81 F.3d 1321, 1324 (4th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Given these competing constitutional
holding that the determination of whether statements are excited utterances is within the trial courts discretion and its ruling will be reversed only for an abuse of that discretion holding that a rule 11 sanctions award need only be appropriate thereby according broad discretion to the trial court holding that rule 403 determination may be reversed for abuse of discretion only upon showing that trial courts ruling was manifestly unsupported by reason or could not have been result of reasoned decision holding that although trial court has broad discretion to define scope of discovery it can abuse its discretion by acting unreasonably holding that a trial court must have sufficiently broad discretion to rule without fear of being reversed by either pull of the whipsaw