or “that in the event even if they found there was a struggle, if they found the moment he fired a gun there was no more deadly physical force, threat, toward Brown or his partner, that they must find for [the plaintiff]”, (Tr. 2597). The burden in this case was on the Plaintiff to show by a preponderance of evidence that Brown’s use of deadly force against Rasanen constituted excessive force under the law. If the Plaintiff could not convincingly disprove Brown’s version of events; prove that Brown’s account constituted excessive force; or prove a more likely account of the shooting that would not justify the use of deadly force, then, all scenarios being equal, the jury could reasonably render a verdict for the Defendant. See United States v. Gigante, 94 F.3d 53, 55 (2d Cir. 1996) (<HOLDING>); see, e.g., Public Adm’r of Queens County v.
holding that the standard of proof for dischargeability actions is the preponderance of the evidence standard holding that the preponderance of the evidence standard dictates that that when the evidence on an issue is evenly balanced the party with the burden of proof loses holding that the proper standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence holding that the standard of proof in revocation proceedings is a preponderance of the evidence holding that when congress is silent on the issue of the burden of proof applicable to a common law affirmative defense that does not negate an element of the offense we presume congress intended the defendant to bear the burden of proof of the defense by a preponderance of the evidence