for forcible sexual abuse "makes sense only in the unusual case,” because ordinarily "it is 'difficult to conceive [how] the government could establish force beyond a reasonable doubt yet the [defendant] could prove consent by a preponderance of the evidence' ”) (quoting Gaynorv. United States, 16 A.3d 944, 948 (D.C.2011)). 41 . See, e.g., Tippett v. Daly, 10 A.3d 1123, 1127 (D.C.2010) (en banc). 42 . See also Gamble v. United States, 30 A.3d 161, 167 (D.C.2011) ("[I]nvalid provisions are to be severed unless it is evident that without those provisions, the legislature would not have enacted the remaining provisions.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 43 . See Gay Rights Coal, of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 16 (D.C.1987) (en banc) (plurality opinion) (<HOLDING>). 44 . Barlow v. United States, 32 U.S. (7
holding that the words and provisions of a statute must be construed in a harmonious way holding that a statute cannot be construed in a manner that would lead to an absurd or unreasonable result holding that ordinarily a statute must be construed in a manner which protects its constitutionality holding that a statute enacted in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed   holding agreed judgments are construed in same manner as contract