invocation, rather than the adequacy of the detective's subsequent advisement; Sessoms does not challenge the propriety of the warnings. Nonetheless, that the detectives actively undermined Sessoms’s understanding of his right only further indicates that their failure to provide him with counsel upon his initial request was deliberate, strategic, and unlawful. 6 . This reasoning runs directly afoul of Alvarez v. Gomez, 185 F.3d 995, 998 (9th Cir.1999), where we construed the suspect's statements ("[c]an I get an attorney right now, man?”, "[y]ou can have an attorney right now?”, and "[w]ell like right now you got one?”) to be unambiguous requests for counsel rather than clarifying questions regarding the right to counsel. Accord Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1070-72 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Although Alvarez does not serve as "clearly
holding that police may continue questioning a suspect until he unambiguously invokes his right to remain silent holding suspect must unambiguously request counsel before applying rule established in edwards that police questioning must cease once suspect requests counsel during interview holding that a suspect must unambiguously request counsel holding that request for counsel was not unequivocal when suspect wrote i need a lawyer on the blackboard among several of other statements while alone in the interview room then responded to officers clarifying questions that he did not want a lawyer holding that the state courts conclusion that a suspect did not unambiguously request counsel was not unreasonable when during a postmiranda interview the suspect stated i think i would like to talk to a lawyer after which the police stopped questioning him left the room and did not resume questioning until the suspect explicitly said he did not want a lawyer and wanted to continue talking