Second, even assuming that the final order of removal remained in place, the fact that Rumierz obtained a vacatur after the order tells us nothing about whether the record evidence shows that the vacatur meets the Pickering standard. This argument relates to the majority’s burden allocation analysis, not the Pickering analysis. Here, as in Pinho, the record evidence shows that the stipulated va-catur meets the Pickering standard, even assuming arguendo that Rumierz has the burden. Thus, as the Third Circuit’s reasoning in Pinho demonstrates, the factors relied upon by the majority here — the lack of an adjudication on the merits, uncertainty over the validity of the petitioner’s claims of error in his conviction, and the possibility that the State’s Attorney wa 78, 1379-80 (BIA 2000) (<HOLDING>) with Matter of Roldan-Santoyo, 22 I. & N. Dec.
holding that a divorce granted at a foreign consulate in new york was not valid for immigration purposes because it did not comply with new york law holding that a conviction vacated pursuant to article 440 of the new york criminal procedure law which is neither an expungement statute nor a rehabilitative statute did not constitute a conviction for immigration purposes holding that a conviction vacated under ohio revised code  2943031 for the trial courts failure to advise the alien defendant of the possible immigration consequences of a guilty plea is no longer a valid conviction for immigration purposes holding that a conviction vacated by operation of a state rehabilitative statute still constitutes a conviction for immigration purposes holding that an adjudication under new yorks youthful offender statute does not operate as an expungement of the defendants conviction and the conviction may be considered in calculating criminal history