at 63. Therefore, Plaintiff has stated a claim against these Defendants under the Eighth Amendment. 3. Failure to Exhaust Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to fully administratively exhaust his claims against Schrader, Freeman, and Luciano as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). (See Defs.’ Mem. 12-14.) The PLRA provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [§ ] 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The exhaustion requirement applies to all personal incidents while in prison, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) (<HOLDING>); see also Johnson v. Killian, 680 F.3d 234,
holding exhaustion is required for all inmate suits about prison life whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes holding that an inmate has no right to any particular prison job but prison officials cannot discriminate against him on the basis of his race in work assignments holding that prison conditions are those aspects of prison life affecting the entire prison population holding that a prisoner has no constitutionallybased liberty interest in a particular prison classification  because an inmate is not entitled to a particular degree of liberty in prison holding that removal from house arrest and return to general prison population was a matter of inmate classification