to constitute “an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” or to be “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Thus, a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner. In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. It is only such indifference that can offend “evolving standards of decency” in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, at 106-07, 97 S.Ct. at 292-93; see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (<HOLDING>). The Court further observed that the question
holding that an inmate stated a cause of action under the eighth amendment by alleging that prison officials had with deliberate indifference exposed him to levels of ets that posed an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health holding that a prison official may be held liable under the eighth amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it holding that in order to state a violation of the eighth amendment an inmate must demonstrate that prison officials showed deliberate indifference to serious medical needs holding that prison officials will not be found liable under the eighth amendment unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health holding that an inmate has a first amendment right to file grievances against prison officials