inspection, and is generally under the protection of the physician-patient privilege.” (Citations omitted.)). Accordingly, the admissibility of the blood test ultimately turns on whether Demaray waived the privilege. See Iowa Code § 622.10(1) (“The prohibition does not apply to cases where the person in whose favor the prohibition is made waived the rights conferred. ...”). The physician-patient privilege may be waived by the defendant’s disclosure or consent to disclosure of the -privileged information. 1 McCormick on Evidence § 103, at 413; see Eldrenkamp, 541 N.W.2d at 881 (“If a patient consents to withdrawal of a blood sample for testing of its alcoholic content, the physician-patient privilege is waived.” (Citations omitted.)); State v. Dist. Ct., 218 N.W.2d 641, 644 (Iowa 1974) (<HOLDING>); State v. Gonzales, 121 N.M. 421, 912 P.2d
holding defendants consent to have blood tested under procedure specified in implied consent statute waived physicianpatient privilege as against admission of the test results into evidence in any subsequent trial stating the physicianpatient privilege was not designed nor will it be extended to act as a shield behind which the patient may take refuge after flunking a chapter 321b blood alcohol test to which he voluntarily assented holding that the implied consent statutes are irrelevant when the defendant gives actual consent to a blood or breath test holding that the implied consent law allows law enforcement officers to obtain blood in circumstances in which a warrant or actual consent may otherwise be required holding that a defendants right to an independent blood alcohol test means the right to a test that is not subject to government manipulation holding that under the oregon constitution when a person consents to have their blood drawn and tested for specified substances the scope of that consent limits the scope of the states power to test the blood without a warrant