the ALJ’s judgment. Now acting pro se, Greathouse appeals from the magistrate judge’s decision. His appellate arguments do not, however, cause us to second-guess the reasoned and thorough opinion of the magistrate judge. Notably absent is any attack on the ALJ’s conclusion that Greathouse could perform the jobs the VE said he could. That conclusion is the central fact in this case; we will reverse an ALJ’s disability determination only if it is based on a misapprehension of the law or is not supported by “substantial evidence,” and a VE’s opinion that a claimant could perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy constitutes substantial evidence if it is grounded in a fair reading of the record evidence. See, e.g., Sims v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 424, 432 (7th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Donahue v. Barnhart, 279 F.3d 441, 444,
holding that before terminating benefits the plan should have obtained a vocational experts opinion to determine if claimant is presently capable in light of his physical impairment to perform any occupation  and observing that claimant met his burden when he proved his disability initially holding that vocational experts testimony that there were jobs claimant could perform constituted substantial evidence holding that an alj is entitled to rely on vocational experts testimony that is based on assumptions that are supported by evidence in the record holding that vocational expert testimony in response to a hypothetical can constitute substantial evidence of residual functional capacity holding that the alj did not consider the vocational experts testimony on crossexamination and failed to articulate a basis for rejecting this evidence which was a basis for remand