hearing, both because it referenced conduct not charged, proven, or admitted prior to sentencing and because the standard at sentencing was a lower “preponderance of the evidence” standard. Id. at 791. The government, however, admitted to the fact that the restitution order was based on acts other than the offense of conviction. Id. at 789-90. Here, Ragoonath initially challenges the characterization of her conviction as categorically an aggravated felony and the retroactive application of the necessary loss amount for a fraud and deceit conviction to qualify as an aggravated felony. We have already addressed both issues, and the claims are without merit. Moore, 251 F.3d at 923; Maldonado, 664 F.3d at 1378-79; see also Chambers v. Thompson, 150 F.3d 1324, 1326 (11th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Ragoonath also argues that DHS failed to
holding that we must follow a prior binding precedent unless and until it is overruled by this court en banc or by the supreme court quotation marks omitted holding that only intervening law from the supreme court or this court sitting en banc can overrule a prior panel decision holding that we are bound by prior panel opinions until they are overruled or abrogated by the supreme court or this court sitting en banc holding that one panel of this court is bound by the precedent of an earlier panel absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision of the supreme court holding ajbsent en banc reconsideration we are bound by prior decisions of this circuit