no occasion to consider the issue presented here: Whether knowingly causing physical injury to another by means of a deadly or dangerous weapon satisfies Be-gay’s “purposeful” requirement. Rather, in those contexts, we considered whether crimes committed with gross negligence or recklessness were sufficiently purposeful and concluded they were not. Id. at 710; Femandez-Ruiz, 466 F.3d at 1129-30. Today we reaffirm that more than recklessness or gross negligence is required, and more specifically hold that Begay can be satisfied by knowing conduct. In addition, we note that every circuit to have addressed the issue has held that Begay’s “purposeful conduct” requirement is satisfied where the underlying state offense requires the defendant to act knowingly. See Johnson, 587 F.3d at 211 (<HOLDING>); Wilson, 568 F.3d at 674 (“We conclude that
holding that a state election law is preempted only to the extent that it conflicts with federal law holding to the effect that section 341 fifth as impliedly amended by title vii preempts state law to the extent but only to the extent that it conflicts holding that to the extent simple assault under pennsylvania law is committed intentionally or knowingly it is by definition purposeful holding that a debtors attorney is not liable to creditors for mishandling a bankruptcy except to the extent that his conduct was fraudulent or otherwise intentionally wrongful holding outside of the context of title vii or the adea that section 24 fifth preempts state law to the extent but only to the extent that it conflicts