to the strip and the Railroad conveyed the land to Bayfield County in accordance with these statutes, we conclude the Maulers hold no present or reversionary legal interest in the land. And since the Maulers do not own the land, they cannot prevail on their takings claim. The Maulers argue that 43 U.S.C. §§ 912, 913 and 16 U.S.C. § 1248(c) do not apply to the former railroad corridor and the land is not subject to reversion to the United States because it is not a “right of way” within the meaning of the statutes. Instead, the Maulers invoke a state common law precedent which they read as automatically vesting title to the strip in them as adjoining landowners upon its abandonment by the Railroad. See Pollnow v. State Dept. of Natural Resources, 88 Wis.2d 350, 276 N.W.2d 738 (1979) (<HOLDING>). The Maulers’ argument fails for two reasons.
holding that governments lease of former railroad easement to state for conversion to trail was a taking holding that a subsequent abandonment of a public rightofway over such a road has no effect on a private easement owned by an abutting landowner holding that railroad right of way under the act of march 3 1875 ch 152 18 stat 482 vested upon actual construction of the road holding in case where railroad grant was an easement and not a right of way that title vested in abutting landowner once railroad abandoned land holding that city may by ordinance require abutting landowner to repair sidewalk but that the abutting landowner is not liable in an action in tort for injuries