that “the question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation”). The Supreme Court has admonished that “[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 396-97, 109 S.Ct. 1865. Finally, in judging the reasonableness of the officers’ actions, we assess only the reasonableness of their actions vis-a-vis the dogs; we do not consider potential harm to third parties. Cf. Howerton v. Fletcher, 213 F.3d 171, 175 (4th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). The task of this court is to put itself into
holding that the question of whether a municipal official is a policymaking official is a matter of state law to be decided by the court holding that a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the officials office holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim holding that excessive force by a school official should be analyzed under the fourth amendment holding that the risk posed to third parties by the official use of force is not to be considered in determining whether an official used excessive force as against a particular plaintiff