acting like an insurer and subject to the danger that it will, like an insurer acting in bad faith, place its own economic interest ahead of the interests of the policyholder.”). There is no reasoned explanation for why this disincentive should not apply with equal force to an administrator in Federal’s position who so visibly wears an insurer’s hat. B. Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations Federal next attacks, on the basis of “legal impossibility,” the allegation that it intentionally and wrongfully interfered with the insurance contract between Fleet and FFG. Federal explains that, when an agent acts within the scope of its authority, the agent and its principal are considered the “same entity.” Cf. DeBreceni v. Graf Bros. Leasing, Inc., 828 F.2d 877, 879 (1st Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Because it is well-settled that a party
holding that a corporate officer signing a contract in his corporate capacity is generally not liable for damages under the contract holding that no  prohibition  prevents the imposition of liability vicariously on corporate persons on account of the acts of their agents particularly where the corporation benefitted by those acts holding that punitive damages are not recoverable against a state official sued in his or her official capacity holding that the acts of a corporate officer done in his or her official capacity are acts of the corporation holding that a corporate officer acting in his or her official capacity could not tortiously interfere with a corporate contract because corporations act only through their officers and agents