81 S.Ct. 1579, 6 L.Ed.2d 859 (1961). So it is with “harangue” and “oration” in this statute. The prohibitions surrounding “harangue” and “oration” demonstrate concern with disruptions of the Supreme Court’s order and decorum. These prohibitions include the use of “firearmfs],” “firework[s],” “explosive[s]” and “set[ting] fire to a combustible.” See 40 U.S.C. § 6134. After the “combustible” clause, the statute’s language shifts to “make a harangue or oration,” and “utter loud, threatening, or abusive language.” Id. These sundry prohibitions are not merely various noises — they all tend to disrupt the Court’s operations. That concern should illuminate the construction of “harangue” and “oration.” See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) (<HOLDING>). By keeping this concern in mind, the use of
holding that a court should consider a defendants anticompetitive conduct as a whole rather than considering each aspect in isolation holding that the phrase relates to should be interpreted to limit the breadth of erisa holding that a statutes words even when marked by flexibility and reasonable breadth rather than meticulous specificity are clear based on what the ordinance as a whole prohibits holding an ordinance invalid to the extent that it permits what a statute restricts holding preempted municipal housing ordinance that would effectively remove persons from the city based on a snapshot of their current immigration status rather than based on a federal order of removal