prior weapons conviction to support an enhanced sentence for a subsequent weapons conviction, double jeopardy principles precluded the State from introducing evidence on remand to support imposition of the same enhanced sentence). 3 . In Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 68 L.Ed.2d 270 (1981), the Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred a retrial of the penalty phase of a capital case, when the penalty phase was tried before a jury, in a process identical to a trial on criminal liability, The Court reasoned that in that circumstance, the jury’s decision not to impose the death penalty bears the hallmarks of an acquittal. The Mange Court maintained that exception. 4 . Scott asserts that Almendarez-Torres and Monge. are no longer good law be 3 (2008) (<HOLDING>), implicitly overruling State v. Hennings, 100
holding that a sua sponte dismissal of the charges during trial was not an acquittal that barred retrial based on double jeopardy holding based on monge that floridas double jeopardy clause does not preclude granting the state a second opportunity to demonstrate that the defendant meets the criteria for habitualization holding that under monge double jeopardy does not prevent retrial of an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes holding that resentencing hearing in capital case is not barred by double jeopardy when appeals court rejects sole aggravating factor found by sentencer failure of sentencer to find other alleged aggravating factors is not an acquittal of these factors for double jeopardy purposes holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted