513 U.S. at 281); see also Southland, 465 U.S. at 16; Garmo, 101 Wn.2d at 590, or by “rely[ing] on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate.” Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9 (emphasis added). ¶12 We engage in de novo review of a trial court’s decision to grant a motion to compel or deny arbitration. Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931, 936 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U. of Seattle, 111 Wn.2d 903, 766 P.2d 1099 (1989); Bruce v. N.W. Metal Prods. Co., 79 Wn. App. 505, 513, 903 P.2d 506 (1995) (“Under Washington law, a disability discrimination claim arises out of statute, the WLAD, and is not preempted by any contractual or CBA [collective bargaining agreement] requirements or remedies.”); Ervin v. Columbia Distrib., Inc., 84 Wn. App. 882, 891, 930 P.2d 947 (1997) (<HOLDING>). The United States Supreme Court, however, has
recognizing in a case involving analogous provisions of the labor management relations act of 1947 29 usc  185 that a majority of courts in other jurisdictions agree with solomon and citing the 1st 2nd 6th 7th 8th 9th and dc circuits holding that  301 of the labor management relations act of 1947 29 usc  185 does not preempt claims brought under washingtons minimum wage act chapter 4946 rcw holding that former employees state law claim of fraud brought against his former employer was preempted by labor management relations act holding a state court tort action for retaliatory discharge removable because it arose under  301 of the labor management relations act rather than illinois state law holding state law claim preempted by  301 of labor management relations act only if application of state law requires interpretation of collective bargaining agreement