a constitutional right to self-representation in civil cases. He also argues that his right to liberty protects him from being compelled to contract with an attorney. We are unaware of any U.S. Constitutional decision that declares citizens to have a right to self-representation in civil proceedings. Yet, arguing against such a right is nearly frivolous. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (pleadings drafted by pro se litigants shall be held to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by attorneys); O’Reilly v. New York Times Co., 692 F.2d 863, 867 (2nd Cir.1982) (self-representation in civil cases is a right of “high standing”); see also McBrearty v. Kentucky Community and Technical College System, 262 S.W.3d 205, 210 (Ky.App.2008) (<HOLDING>); Gall v. Scroggy, 725 S.W.2d 867, 869
recognizing that although pro se litigants are not entitled to greater rights than represented litigants due process principles permit the imposition of a procedural bar only after consideration of the pro se litigants reasonable expectations about what had occurred holding that although a pro se litigants pleadings are construed liberally a pro se litigant must still follow the same rules that govern other litigants including the requirement of constructing and supporting arguments with legal authority holding that pro se litigants must follow the kentucky rules of civil procedure holding that although pro se litigants are entitled to liberal construction of their pleadings pro se litigants must follow procedural rules holding that rule 56f applies to pro se litigants