a vested right is not affected. As a result, the Supreme Court has held that this provision is generally not implicated by statutes of repose that cut off latent claims before they manifest. Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp., 308 N.C. 419, 440, 302 S.E.2d 868 (1983). Yet the North Carolina Supreme Court has stated that a statute of repose may still be unconstitutional under the open court provision if it “had a time period so short that it would effectively abolish all potential claims.” Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp., 308 N.C. 419, 444 n. 7, 302 S.E.2d 868 (1983). In Lamb, the plaintiff sued an architect after falling through a glass window. The court held that a statute of repose barring claims against architects and builders arising out of defects in propert rp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) (<HOLDING>); Kennedy v. Cumberland Eng’g Co., 471 A.2d
holding the delays of more than six years did not amount to the denial of access to the courts holding that the cause of action accrued on the date of sale holding that statute barring plaintiffs suit against manufacturer brought more than 12 years after date of sale as applied unconstitutionally denied plaintiffs access to courts holding statute barring all product liability suits if action is filed more than six years after date of first sale for use or consumption or ten years after date of manufacture unconstitutional as violating open courts provision holding that the date of sale for an installment contract was the date of contract formation not the date of the last payment due