finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.’ ” United States v. Henson, 945 F.2d 430, 437 (1st Cir.1991) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. at 2193). The first factor, the length of the delay, was identified by the Supreme Court as: to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance. Nevertheless, because of the imprecision of the right to speedy trial, the length of delay that will provoke such an inquiry is necessarily dependent up four month period was long enough to be presumptively prejudicial); King, 909 F.Supp. at 372 (<HOLDING>). Still, we hold that the cumulative effect of
holding that a thirtyone month delay could be outweighed by other indicia of reliability holding that a five month delay was unreasonable holding that a 13 month delay was unreasonable holding that a thirtyone month delay was sufficient to trigger the barker test holding that a six month delay was unreasonable