was either not to be believed in his identification of petitioner or at least very carefully considered in that light. Serious damage to the strength of the State’s case would have been a real possibility had petitioner been allowed to pursue this line of inquiry. In this setting we conclude that the right of confrontation is paramount to the State’s policy of protecting a juvenile offender. Whatever temporary embarrassment might result to Green or his family by disclosure of his juvenile record ... is outweighed by petitioner’s right to probe into the influence of possible bias in the testimony of a crucial identification witness. Davis, 415 U.S. at 317-19, 94 S.Ct. at 1110-12, 39 L.Ed.2d 347. See Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 109 S.Ct. 480, 102 L.Ed.2d 513 (1988) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679,
holding that trial courts refusal to allow defendant to impeach victims testimony by crossexamining victim about possible motive to lie deprived defendant of his right to confrontation holding that before a defendant is entitled to introduce evidence of the victims character for violence there must be sufficient evidence to support a finding that the victim was the first aggressor and that once the defendant testified that he was attacked and cut by the victim without provocation before using the victims utility tool to stab the victim the defendant was clearly entitled to question the victim about past acts of violence reflected in court documents from the state of oregon holding that a proffer of evidence to established a witnesss bias and motive to lie did not preserve a confrontation clause argument because a defendant must specifically articulate that the confrontation clause demands admission of proffered evidence to preserve error on this ground holding that a trial courts refusal to allow the defendant to attend the jury view was not prejudicial holding that a defendant forfeited his confrontation clause claim by failing to properly preserve it at trial