self-incrimination because the prosecutor might have moved to set aside Harley’s plea on the basis of false testimony and to file charges against him fo crime apart from perjury Harley might reasonably be charged with in a future prosecution. The State refers only to capital murder, which in this case would be precluded by the prior conviction for the lesser included offense of first degree murder. As to the risk of prosecution for perjury, we are likewise skeptical. A witness may not invoke the privilege against self-incrimination to prevent himself from imminent commission of peijury. Although the reverse is possible, i.e., a witness may claim the privilege to prevent himself from revealing a previous peijury, see, e.g., United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 632 (5th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>), the State fails to detail such circumstances
recognizing privilege holding that where a witness who testifies under oath and is subject to crossexamination in a prior state court proceeding explicitly refuses to answer the same questions at trial the refusal to answer is inconsistent with his prior testimony recognizing that informing the jury that testifying witness has agreed to cooperate with the government is a doubleedged sword as the existence of such agreement may suggest either that the witness will testify in accordance with the governments wishes regardless of the truth or that the witness will not he under threat of revocation of the agreement should the witness commit perjury recognizing that a witness may claim the privilege if his new testimony might suggest that he had perjured himself in testifying on the same subject at a prior proceeding holding that a witness may invoke the privilege against selfincrimination at trial despite testifying previously before a grand jury in the same case