9-3-71, the medical malpractice statute, because both statutes have a two-year time limitation and under either statute, the Langleys’ claims are time barred. We agree with the Langleys, however, that their complaint can be liberally construed to encompass all three of these asserted allegations of negligence. First, the most obvious cause of action stems from Shannon’s alleged negligence for failure to diagnose the kitten as rabid at the first office visit. Second, the disputed facts indicate that Shannon may have been negligent because she recognized the danger that the kitten may have been exposed to the rabies virus and needed to be either euthanized or quarantined, but failed to communicate the same to the Langleys. Oliver v. Sutton, 246 Ga. App. 436, 438-439 (540 SE2d 645) (2000) (<HOLDING>). Third, the disputed facts indicate that
holding that ordinary negligence and gross negligence are not separate causes of action holding violation of the rules of professional conduct does not create a legal duty on the part of the lawyer nor constitute negligence per se although it may be used as some evidence of negligence holding that knowing but failing to communicate a correct diagnosis may constitute a separate act of negligence holding that there was no evidence in the record to support appellants contention that the doctor committed a separate act of negligence by continuing to prescribe reglan and that the doctors alleged failure to correct any previous negligence does not constitute additional acts of negligence punctuation omitted holding that there was no evidence in the record to support appellants contention that the doctor committed a separate act of negligence by continuing to prescribe coumadin and that the doctors alleged failure to correct any previous negligence does not constitute additional acts of negligence