support the CAB’s finding that neither party expected or intended that the charitable donation by NHIS constituted payment for Jenks’ security services. The determination of the parties’ intent is a question of fact and we must deem it prima facie lawful and reasonable unless we are satisfied by a clear preponderance of the evidence that it is unjust or unreasonable. See RSA 541:13. Accordingly, on this record, we defer to the CAB findings on the parties’ intent. The CAB’s focus on the parties’ intent in order to determine whether any payment occurred for purposes of establishing a contract of hire is consistent with legal analyses adopted in other jurisdictions under similar factual circumstances. See, e.g., Hoste v. Shanty Creek Management, Inc., 592 N.W.2d 360, 365-68 (Mich. 1999) (<HOLDING>); Board of Ed. of City of Chicago v. Industrial
holding that when plaintiffs bring a facial challenge to a law it must be established that there are no set of circumstances under which the law would be valid holding that payment must be intended as wages and be substantial consideration such that a reasonable person would be induced to give up the right to bring a tort claim against the employer holding that glc 152 15 provides that the only party immune from suit under the statute is the direct employer a special employer is not immune because the special employer is not liable for the payment of workers compensation and there was no agreement between the direct employer and the special employer that the special employer would be liable for the payment of such compensation holding that a plaintiff cannot assert a statutory claim for wages under the labor law if he has no enforceable contractual right to those wages holding that the employee must at least provide his employer with enough information for the employer to be put on notice that the fmla is a consideration