policy differs slightly from the Prodigy policy in that XL’s policy requires only that notice of a claim be given “as soon as practicable” and does not contain a clear-cut reporting deadline. See id. at 379 n. 7 (discussing difference between standard “claims-made” and “claims-made-and-reported” policies). However, the same reasons for requiring the insurer to demonstrate prejudice ap ply: FIC gave notice of the claim within the policy’s scope of coverage, i.e., before XL could “close its books” on the policy. Because XL was not denied the benefit of the elaims-made nature of its policy, it could not deny coverage based on FIC’s immaterial breach of the policy’s prompt-notice provision. See id. at 377; see also PAJ, Inc. v. The Hanover Ins. Co., 243 S.W.3d 630, 631 (Tex.2008) (<HOLDING>); Hernandez v. Gulf Group Lloyds, 875 S.W.2d
holding that when the insurer takes the position that the policy does not cover the complaint the insurer must 1 defend the suit under a reservation of rights or 2 seek a declaratory judgment that there is no coverage if the insurer fails to take either of these actions it will be estopped from later raising policy defenses to coverage holding insureds firstoccurring immaterial breach of them insurance policy did not excuse insurer from its obligation to perform under the contract holding that an immaterial breach does not deprive the insurer of the benefit of the bargain and thus cannot relieve the insurer of the contractual coverage obligation holding that when the insured brings an action for a declaration of coverage and prevails absent a bad faith denial of coverage by the insurer attorneys fees incurred by the insured in the prosecution of that action are not incurred at the request of the insurer holding that if an insurer denies coverage based on an assertion that the underlying claim is excluded from coverage there is a presumption that the insurer did not suffer prejudice because prompt notice would have merely resulted in an earlier denial of coverage