not established where defendant failed to identify any lost witnesses or evidence or showed increased risk of such loss due to delay). As mentioned above, a defendant can also demonstrate prejudice without the need to show affirmative proof of prejudice if the delay is excessive. In Hakeem, the Third Circuit opined that a delay of “fourteen and one-half months ... is insufficient to allow an inference of prejudice solely from the length of the delay.” Hakeem, 990 F.2d at 764. Conversely, in Battis, the Third Circuit found that a 45-month delay raised a presumption of prejudice. Battis, 589 F.3d at 682-83. Other courts have held that delays caused by the prosecution which exceed two years are presumptively prejudicial. See United States v. Ingram, 446 F.3d 1332, 1339 (11th Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Erenas-Luna, 560 F.3d 772,
recognizing that the triggering date preceding a speedy trial analysis is synonymous with a presumptively prejudicial delay holding threeyear delay between indictment and arraignment caused by the serious negligence of the government presumptively prejudicial holding that twoyear delay was not reasonable holding that a twoyear postindictment delay presumptively prejudicial holding that the delay is presumptively prejudicial does not necessarily mean the first factor weighs against the state but requires further consideration of the extent of the delay beyond this period