a district court’s original grant or denial of a 'stay put' order or 'stay put’ injunction. No case cited deals with appellate review of a district court's refusal to enjoin a preexisting 'stay put' order. See Zvi D. v. Ambach, 694 F.2d 904, 906 (2d Cir.1982) (stating that [§ 1415(j) ] 'substitutes an absolute rule in favor of the status quo for the court's discretionary consideration of the factors of irreparable harm and either a likelihood of success on the merits or a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships'); see also Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 864 (3d Cir.1996) (quoting Zvi D. and adopting the reasoning of the Second Circuit); Bd. of Educ. of Cmty. High Sch. Dist. No. 218, Cook County v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 545, 550 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>).” Johnson, 287 F.3d at 1180. 13 . An IFSP
holding that the stay put provision establishes a strong preference but not a statutory duty for maintenance of the status quo holding that a federal action to enforce the stay put provision is not itself a pending proceeding under  1415 that triggers stay put holding that when the district court applies the wrong preliminary injunction standard this court may review the record to determine whether the injunction is justified holding that use of the preliminary injunction equitable factors would dilute the statutory framework under the stay put provision holding that plaintiffs were not entitled to a preliminary injunction