reasons which do not appear in the record on appeal, Crabtree did not testify in the trial of this matter. Crabtree’s actions, however, indicate rather clearly that Crab-tree himself knew that he did not have authority to modify the revised Consignment Agreement. It was Crabtree himself who informed Christie on March 13, 1987, that Orchard was the true owner of the painting and the “proper party to authorize the sale and receive the proceeds therefrom.” In this letter, Crabtree also insisted that the original Consignment Agreement be modified to re- fleet Orchard as the seller and the party to receive the sale proceeds. Based on this information, Christie submitted a revised Consignment Agreement reflecting these changes. And, consistent with Crabtree’s statement that P.2d 242 (1936) (<HOLDING>). In the setting described above, Crabtree
holding that a principal is bound by a contract entered into by the principals agent on her behalf if the agent had authority to bind the principal holding that when an agent has limited authority and informs the third party of this limitation the principal is not bound by the agents actions that exceed that authority holding that the insurer is not bound by acts of the agent which are beyond the scope of his authority when the insured has notice of the limitations upon an agents authority or when the circumstances are sufficient to suggest that an inquiry should be made as to such limitations holding that a principal is not hable for the actions of an agent when these actions exceed the agents authority and the thirdparty has knowledge that the agent does not have the authority asserted recognizing that a principal may limit the authority of its agent and such limitation will be binding on a third party who is aware of the limitation