appeal as having been improvidently granted, as the facts of the instant case would not allow this Court to reach the issue upon which we granted review. 5 . As a general matter, under prevailing Pennsylvania law, if the evidence supports more than one potential, cognizable offense as the object of the conspiracy, the trial court would be required to impose a sentence only for the lowest of them. See Commonwealth v. Riley, 811 A.2d 610, 619-20 (Pa.Super.2002). 6 . Compare the offense of third-degree murder with the offense of voluntary manslaughter, which "involves the specific intent to kill but, by reason of passion and provocation, contains no legal malice.” Pitts, 486 Pa. at 219, 404 A.2d at 1308. 7 . But see Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (<HOLDING>); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(g) (“the term ‘crime of
holding that the defendants conduct in directing his brother to bring him a loaded rifle and in thereafter firing the rifle in the direction of the complainant revealed a conscious disregard of a great risk that defendant might have inflicted death or serious bodily harm upon complainant and as such amounted to a conspiracy between the defendant and his brother to engage in activity that manifested such malice as to constitute a criminal conspiracy to commit thirddegree murder holding criminal conspiracy is sustained where the commonwealth establishes the defendant entered into an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful act with another person with a shared criminal intent and an overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy a coconspirator may commit the overt act and conspirators are liable for acts of the coconspirators committed in furtherance of the conspiracy holding that once a defendant becomes associated with a conspiracy he is responsible for all of the acts of the conspiracy even those which occurred before or after his association with the conspiracy holding that res judicata barred conspiracy claim against defendant even though defendant had not been a party to the prior action because the civil conspiracy claim should have been adjudicated in a prior action and defendant as an alleged participant in the conspiracy would have been indispensable party to that adjudication holding that the sentencing court erred in failing to make a factual determination as to the amount of drugs attributable to the defendant after his participation in the charged conspiracy