Appellant’s indefinite teaching contract. Because those four voters constituted a majority of the Board, the requirement in § 168.118(7) was satisfied. Appellant next argues that the Board’s findings of fact and conclusions of law were not properly executed. According to Appellant, the June 28th date on the findings, conclusions and decision means this document represents the view of Board President Riffle alone and does not constitute the Board’s decision. We disagree. The Board was required to issue a written decision that included findings of fact and conclusions of law. See § 168.118(7); § 168.120.2; § 536.090; Hughes v. Board o dings of fact and conclusions of law signed only by the school board’s secretary constituted the decision of the board); Brown, 675 S.W.2d at 139-40 (<HOLDING>). The record contains a copy of the Board’s
holding that boards failure to comply with precise requirement of city ordinance did not render its decision void where transcript of proceedings before board was sufficient to assure meaningful review of boards decision holding that a reviewing court has the power to reject the findings and conclusions of the trial court where the findings are not supported by the evidence holding that the fact that the merit systems protection boards decision differs from the presiding officials does not alter the requirement that we evaluate the boards final decision under the substantial evidence standard holding that an associations president who was not a party before the board of appeals was not entitled to appeal the boards decision granting a zoning application that his association had opposed in the board proceedings holding that the findings of fact conclusions of law and decision signed by the school boards president constituted the decision of the board