act beyond mere possession of a firearm seems to be required to remove the firearm offense from the realm of nonviolent crimes. 9 . I note that other courts have considered the issue presented in this case and upheld the BOP's designation of § 922(g)(1) as a “crime of violence.” See, e.g., Paydon v. Hawk, 960 F.Supp. 867, 870-71 (D.N.J.1997) (applying more deferential standard of review and holding because "the Third Circuit has not decided whether possession of a weapon by a felon is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3) ... a determination by the BOP that a violation of § 922(g)(1) is a crime of violence under § 924(c) is not contrary to any ‘well-established’ law in this Circuit.") (internal quotations omitted); Davis v. Beeler, 966 F.Supp. 483, 490 (E.D.Ky.1997) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, none of these courts had
holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion holding that in the absence of binding precedent in this circuit holding that a  922g offense is not a crime of violence the bops action challenged herein cannot constitute an abuse of its discretion holding that theft from the person is not a crime of violence holding that a sentencing judge retains discretion to examine the underlying facts of a case in deciding whether an offense is a crime of violence under section 4b12 holding that a court must only look to the statutory definition not the underlying circumstances of the crime to determine whether a given offense is by its nature a crime of violence for purposes of 18 usc  16