and Plummer brought the present lawsuit asserting various federal and state constitutional claims. In due course, Quinn filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted in part, but denied as to Plummer’s First Amendment claim and with regards to qualified immunity. It is that denial of qualified immunity that we address in this appeal. “Qualified immunity protects officials from liability for civil damages as long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Gilles v. Repicky, 511 F.3d 239, 243 (2d Cir.2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). This inquiry normally proceeds in two steps. See Pearson v. Callahan, — U.S. —, —, 129 S.Ct. 808, 813, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we first decide whether the
holding that the sequence of the saucier inquiry is not mandatory holding that recklessness even for fiduciaries is no longer sufficient holding that sauciers twostep sequence is not mandatory holding that twostep sequence is no longer an inflexible requirement holding the lilly analysis is not a sequential twostep process but rather one broad inquiry