found that there were legitimate reasons for a school's anti-nepotism policy, the dissent overlooks the court's language marking as unconstitutional a public employer’s adverse employment action based only on a protected right. Here, we have just that. Unlike the case in Montgomery, we are not deciding this case on the merits; in viewing the facts in favor of Barrett, he was denied employment only because he was exercising his right to educate his son in a manner of his choice. 4 . In its opinion, the district court cited precedent from the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits to support the proposition that dictating where an employee of the school district can send his child to school infringes on the familial rights of that teacher. See Fyfe v. Curlee, 902 F.2d 401, 403 (5th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Stough v. Crenshaw County Bd. of Educ., 744
holding that court may order reimbursement of private school expenses incurred by parents of handicapped child in successful challenge to iep brought under eha predecessor to idea stating that it is beyond cavil that appropriate relief would include a prospective injunction directing the school official to develop and implement at public expense an iep placing the child in a private school and affirming reimbursement award against petitioner local school district  holding that a students private school tuition should be reimbursed where parent did not unilaterally place student in private school because the school district tacitly consented to the private school attendance before proposing a different placement holding that retaliation against a school employee who placed her child in private school violates rights protected under the first amendment and the penumbra of familial privacy rights recognized by the supreme court holding that private possession of child pornography is not protected by the first amendment holding that search of middle school student violated her fourth amendment rights