“The fundámental fairness guaranteed by the Due Process Clause does not require courts to set aside decisions of prison administrators that have some basis in fact. Revocation of good time credits is not comparable to a criminal conviction, and neither the amount of evidence necessary to support such a conviction, nor any other standard greater than some evidence applies in this context.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 456, 105 S.Ct. at 2774 (internal citations omitted). Because we hold that Officer Goolsby’s identification of Hudson provides “some evidence” of the prison disciplinary board’s guilty finding, we do not need to examine the two other pieces of evidence. AFFIRMED. 1 . The Texas statute governing good-time credits was revised in 1998, and the language of the new section is clearly des (<HOLDING>); Madison v. Parker, 104 F.3d 765, 768 (5th
recognizing that it is well established that where a state provides a discretionary parole regime prisoners do not have a liberty or property interest in parole recognizing that nevada statutes do  not confer a legitimate expectation of parole release and therefore do  not create a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest sufficient to invoke due process holding that texas parole statutes do not create a protected liberty interest under an older statutory scheme recognizing that early release statutes can create a liberty interest protected by due process guarantees  holding that there is no protected liberty interest in the restoration of goodtime credits forfeited for disciplinary infractions under an older statutory scheme