such that it makes it more likely that an offender, later possessing a gun, will use that gun deliberately to harm a victim.” Id. at 144-45, 128 S.Ct. 1581 (internal quotation marks omitted). Crews ignores the obvious fact that “knowingly causing] physical injury to another by means of a deadly or dangerous weapon,” Or.Rev.Stat. § 163.175(1)(b), likewise involves conduct associated with such future danger. See Begay, 553 U.S. at 146, 128 S.Ct. 1581 (assessing “a crime’s relevance to the possibility of future danger with a gun”). Our recent decision in Coronado does not compel a different conclusion here. There, we addressed whether, in light of Begay, a conviction under California Penal Code § 246.3 for discharging a firearm with gross negligence was a crime of violence un h Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). In sum, because a violation of subsection
holding fleeing police officers in a vehicle was a violent felony under the acca holding that burglary is violent felony holding that vehicular flight from police officer after order to stop is violent felony under residual clause holding that to the extent a south carolina violation for failing to stop for a blue light required only negligent conduct it is not a violent felony under begay holding that under indiana law fleeing an officer in a vehicle constitutes a violent felony under begay because the flight must be done knowingly or intentionally 