appellant, lacking any proprietary interest in the house, or even any possessory right other than by the grace of his grandfather, assumed the risk that his grandfather might permit the search of any area of the house that he might reasonab xplaining that where defendant and landlord maintain a “family style” living arrangement with shared access to defendant’s living quarters, landlord is deemed to have actual authority to consent to a search of defendant’s living quarters); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968) (noting that defendant accepted that his grandmother, as joint tenant of their home and as owner of the rifle in question, had authority to consent to a search of their home); People v. Goforth, 222 Mich. App. 306, 564 N.W.2d 526 (1997) (<HOLDING>). 34 .See e.g., Broughton v. State, 570 So.2d
holding that twentyyearold appellants mother had authority to consent to a search of sons bedroom where appellant had agreed to pay 10 per week as rent he had not instructed mother to stay out of his room and mother infrequently entered appellants room to pick up after him holding that while a mother could consent to a search of her sons room she did not have authority to consent to a search of a locked footlocker within the room holding that a mother had apparent authority to consent to a search of her adult sons bedroom including a closed vinyl bag found in the bedroom holding that although son was eighteen years old and paid rent mother could consent to search of sons bedroom where nothing suggested mother lacked access to room holding that appellants mother had the authority to consent to search of defendants bedroom defendant lived with parents rentfree for four years mother owned the house appellants bedroom door was open mother knocked whenever appellants door was locked and there were no restrictions placed on mothers right to enter bedroom