felt compelled, at the very least, to guess why the prosecutor behaved as he did. But the Batson framework was designed to avoid such “needless and imperfect speculation,” by asking prosecutors to perform the “simple” task of placing race-neutral reasons for peremptory strikes on the record. Johnson, 545 U.S. at 172, 125 S.Ct. 2410. As a result, this Court must conclude that the Appellate Division applied Batson and its progeny in an unreasonable manner. The Court appreciates the gravity of this holding, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s admonition that AEDPA creates a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings.” Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181, 131 S.Ct. 1388. Even in the Batson context, however, AEDPA deference has its limits. See, e.g., Jones, 555 F.3d at 101 (<HOLDING>). Enforcing those limits is the only way to
holding that new york courts unreasonably applied batson holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership holding that outofstate defendants transmittal into new york of ceaseanddesist letter to new york plaintiff for purported trademark infringement was insufficient to create jurisdiction over defendant in a new york declaratory judgment action holding that new york law applies to this matter