writ denied); see also Attorney General of Tex. v. Redding, 60 S.W.3d 891, 893 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001) (noting that defendant’s right to rely on statute of limitations vests when limitations period expires); Baker Hughes, Inc. v. Keco R. & D., Inc., 12 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex.1999) (same). Choice-of-law rules are alterable The majority suggests that chapter 149 disrupted Satterfield’s settled expectations in this case. It did not. Satterfield lacked any immediate entitlement or legally enforceable right to impose successor liability on Crown. Her successor-liability remedy depended entirely on the application of New York law through choice-of-law rules and those rules may be altered by statute in the same manner as other Texas law. See Owens Corning v. Carter, 997 S.W.2d 560, 574 (Tex.1999) (<HOLDING>); see also Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
recognizing appellate courts must not make fact findings recognizing that police officers may use reasonable force to make a lawful arrest holding that bpps may not engage in legal assistance make inquiries or answer legal questions recognizing that courts may make reasoned adjustments in legal system holding that a municipal sewer system is liable for the acts of a third party that discharged hazardous waste into the system