Chase, 149 F.Supp.3d at 210 (“The relaxed causation standard provided by the [DOL] is precisely the sort of ‘legitimate policy choice! ]’ that Chevron empowers a properly delegated agency to make.” (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866, 104 S.Ct. 2778) (alteration in Chase)). We cannot say this approach is arbitrary, and there is nothing to show that it is inconsistent with the teachings of Gross or Nassar. See Hunter v. Valley View Local Sch., 579 F.3d 688, 692 (6th Cir. 2009) (observing that “[t]he phrase ‘a negative factor’ envisions that the challenged employment decision might also rest on other, permissible factors,” and thus “continuing] to find Price Waterhouse’s burden-shifting framework applicable to FMLA retaliation claims” after Gross); see also Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1122-25 (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, we hold that the DOL’s use
holding that employers oral denial of plaintiffs request for fmla leave showed interference holding that  825220c is a reasonable interpretation of the statutes prohibition on interference with and restraint of employees rights under the fmla  2615a1  and that the labor departments conclusion that employer use of the taking of fmla leave as a negative factor in employment actions  violates  the act is  a reasonable one holding that an employee who did not present evidence that she could have returned to work prior to the expiration of her fmla leave allowance was not entitled to additional leave merely because her employer had not properly provided her with notice that the leave was designated as fmla leave holding that both the cfra and the fmla require the employee to provide notice to the employer of the employees intent to take leave holding that to prevail on a claim under  2615a1 a plaintiff need only prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her taking of fmlaprotected leave constituted a negative factor in the decision to terminate her