207(e)(2) because plaintiffs did not incur these expenses while actually in transit. Id. But this is a hyper-literal interpretation of the term “traveling” and plaintiffs provide no applicable authority for such an interpretation. Ample authority, including federal regulations, case law, and Department of Labor (DOL) guidance, support the interpretation that “traveling” is not limited to the moments actually in transit, but include time spent “away from home” on an employer’s business. See, e.g„ 29 C.F.R. § 778.217(b) (providing examples of reimbursement of expenses that were not part of the regular rate, including “living expenses away from home”); Acton v. City of Columbia, Mo., No. 03-4159-CV-NKL, 2004 WL 2152297, at *6-7 (W.D.Mo. Sept. 10, 2004), aff'd, 436 F.3d 969 (8th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); U.S. Wage and Hour Division, Dep’t of Labor,
holding attorney fees may be allowed for expenses incurred for default holding that recovery for medical expenses incurred as result of accident depends on proof of necessity and reasonableness holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid holding that payment for meal expenses firefighters incurred while away from home during a 24hour shift were properly excludable under  207e2 holding that appellate attorneys fees were incurred during the divorce proceedings and were awardable by the trial judge