a permanent chassis and designed to be used as a dwelling with or without a ‘permanent foundation when connected to the required utilities, and includes the plumbing, heating, air-conditioning, and electrical systems. Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5221f § 3(u) (Vernon 1987) (emphasis added). This section shall not affect the validity of any deed restriction that is otherwise valid. Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5221f § 4A (Vernon 1987) (emphasis added); Dempsey, 737 S.W.2d at 592-93. Dempsey held that, in light of the foregoing, the defendant failed to convince the court that manufactured homes cannot still be “mobile” homes within meaning of restrictive covenants because: 1) section 3(s) explicitly states that “mobile homes” may be referred to as “m v.App.—Austin 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(<HOLDING>). Wilmoth, Demsey, and the cases they rely on
holding operable semi truck cab used by professional driver as homestead despite statutes description of dwelling as a building condominium mobile home house trailer or cooperative holding that the antimodification provision of 11 usc  1322b is applicable to a mobile home irrespective of whether the home is attached to the real property on which it sits holding that an assembler of a mobile home is deemed to be a manufacturer of a finished product that is the mobile home for purposes of determining the applicability of the affirmative causalrelation defense under the aemld holding as matter of law that mobile home with wheels removed placed on blocks and hooked to lights and water is trailer within scope of covenant proscribing trailers used as temporary or permanent residences holding as a matter of law that an offduty government agent was not acting within the scope of his employment when he was driving home intoxicated after completing his tour of duty because on no basis would the court conclude that drinking and driving after work hours fell within the scope of the dea agents employment  