the probationer. The cases, therefore, did not clearly establish such a right in 1993. We also emphasize that the district court and the magistrate judge each considered the same Tenth Circuit authority cited by the plaintiff in her opposition to the motion to dismiss. The magistrate judge, after analyzing Mangels, Eastwood, and Lankford, concluded that a reasonable probation officer “would not hav etardation, 867 F.2d 461, 463-64 (8th Cir.1989); Woods v. White, 689 F.Supp. 874, 877 (W.D.Wis.1988) (“Casual unjustified dissemination of confidential medical information [regarding a prison inmate] to non-medical staff and other prisoners can scarcely be said to belong to the sphere of defendants’ discretionary function.”); Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F.Supp. 376, 382-85 (D.N.J.1990) (<HOLDING>); Doe v. City of Cleveland, 788 F.Supp. 979,
holding the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the actions of the federal government holding that fourth amendment seizure continues throughout the time the person remains in the custody of the arresting officers holding that the constitutional rights in a termination proceeding  are derived from the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the united states constitution and not the sixth amendment holding that the disclosure by arresting officers to a neighbor that the husband and father of the plaintiffs had aids violated the fourteenth amendment rights of his wife and children holding that the fourteenth amendment does not secure to persons the right to prevent disclosure of their arrest