however, courts have required the successful claimant to bear at least some of those costs. See, e.g., United States v. One 1970 Buick Riviera, 374 F.Supp. 277 (D.Minn.1973) (dividing the costs incurred in keeping a seized automobile between the government and the successful litigant). It appears to us that either decision depends, as the court below recognized, on the equities implicated by the facts of a particular case. It also appears that the district court carefully and competently weighed the equities in this case before assessing costs against Griffin. On the peculiar facts before us, therefore, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in apportioning costs between the two parties. As Judge Steger pointe Currency, 799 F.2d 1357, 1364 n. 8 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); Bramble v. Richardson, 498 F.2d 968 (10th
holding that parole guidelines are subject to the ex post facto clause holding that the ex post facto clause did not apply because the civil contempt citation was not punitive holding that because of its civil nature section 881 is not subject to the ex post facto clause holding that the ex post facto clause  has no application to deportation holding that the supreme courts ex post facto precedents do not clearly establish that amended section 29336 violates the ex post facto clause