it up” does not tend to show that Justin in fact had a pornography problem. Second, evidence of an interest in pornography does not make an interest in child pornography more or less probable and thus fails to corroborate the existence of a fact of consequence — that is, Justin’s having downloaded child pornography onto Campana’s computer. Though the Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit have recognized that the standard for relevancy is “liberal,” such relevance does not exist when the proposed evidence, if true, is of no consequence to the trial. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993); Churchwell v. Bluegrass Marine, Inc., 444 F.3d 898, 905 (6th Cir.2006); see also United States v. Wagner, 382 F.3d 598, 616 (6th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Where, as here, the district court prevented
holding that the race of the prosecutor is irrelevant holding that upon remand if the trial court determined that the testimony in a newly discovered evidence claim was reliable the trial court must review that new evidence as well as brady claims that were previously rejected in a prior postconviction motion because the evidence was equally accessible to the defense and there was no reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different had the evidence been disclosed holding that evidence was irrelevant when it concerned facts that if true were of no consequence to the defendants trial holding if a party has access to information that would have led to the true facts that party has no right to rely on a prior false representation holding that evidence of five prior antitrust actions brought against the defendants was irrelevant on issue of defendants motive to conspire and noting that simply because the defendants were named in past antitrust cases involving similar allegations does not make it more probable that the defendants had a motive to carry out their conspiracy