finding that would give the previous conviction a greater enhancement effect amounts to a second prosecution for that offense. The prohibition against double jeopardy protects against successive prosecutions or multiple punishments for the same offense. Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 727-28, 118 S.Ct. 2246, 141 L.Ed.2d 615 (1998). However, double jeopardy does not apply to noncapital sentencing enhancements because an enhanced sentence imposed on a persistent offender is not a new jeopardy or an additional penalty for the earlier offense. Id. at 728. Therefore, double jeopardy does not prevent the State from having “a second opportunity to present its proof of the prior ... conviction” in a noncapital sentencing proceeding. Bell v. State, 994 S.W.2d 173, 175 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (<HOLDING>). In this ease, because the use of appellee’s
holding that although double jeopardy prohibited subsequent prosecution for offenses charged in counts dismissed by a nolle prosequi entered without the consent of the accused after jeopardy has attached it had no application in the context of the same prosecution which continues on other counts holding that double jeopardy clause does not prohibit imposition of death sentence in alabama despite life sentence in georgia in murdertrial arising from same homicide holding that double jeopardy does not prohibit dual convictions for possession and sale of the same quantum cocaine holding that double jeopardy does not prohibit state in subsequent prosecution from offering proof that appellant was the person convicted in a prior conviction holding that double jeopardy clause is violated when a defendant punished in a criminal prosecution is penalized by a subsequent punitive civil sanction