of Cty. Comm’rs, 4 F.3d 848, 854 (10th Cir.1993). To hold otherwise, we explained, would allow police “to seize evidence of criminal activity without a warrant when the officer has a particularized suspicion regarding that evidence.” Id. Mocek similarly cites United States v. Pearl, 944 F.Supp. 51, 52-54 (D.Me.1996), in which the court granted a criminal defendant’s motion to suppress where an officer stopped him without reasonable suspicion and later fabricated evidence to justify the stop. Winters and Pearl are inapposite. In those cases police clearly lacked probable cause and devised a subterfuge for avoiding the requirement altogether. But it was not clear that Officer Dilley lacked probable cause, and he did not use any artifice to circumvent the law. Moreover, it is b Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Mocek further argues his arrest was
holding the right to record police activity on public property was not clearly established holding that clearly established law is construed as supreme court or tenth circuit decisions on point or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts holding in 1982 that the right was clearly established by at least 1979 holding it was not clearly established that police violated the first amendment by destroying recordings of police activity at roadside sobriety checkpoints holding there was no clearly established right to videotape police officers during a traffic stop