with when an EA must be integrated into the calculus.”); but see 40 C.F.R. § 1501.3 (“Agencies may prepare an environmental assessment at any time in order to assist agency planning and decisionmaking.”). Plaintiffs contend that such posthoc rationalization of pre-determined action renders the agency’s conduct arbitrary and capricious because it does not meet the requirement that the agency take a “hard look” at the problem before making a decision not to undertake an EIS. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 348, 109 S.Ct. 1835, 104 L.Ed.2d 351 (1989); Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d at 1413. Defendants respond that, because the 714, 718-19 (9th Cir.1988) (contracts awarded prior to preparation of EA); Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); Fund for Animals v. Glickman, Civil Action
holding that a person who cut and removed timber pursuant to the direction of the person in possession of the property but without the written consent of the company holding legal title to the land could be held liable under the gtccs holding that a person who cut and removed timber from a golf course was liable to the owners of the course as a matter of law under the gtccs regardless how the person subsequently disposed of the timber ie by using selling or discarding it holding that building a road in order to facilitate timber sales and subsequently preparing an eaeis to evaluate the impact of timber sales swings the balance decidedly in favor of timber sales and was therefore impermissible under nepa holding that a company that cut and removed timber from land that secured a debt held by the plaintiff was liable as a matter of law under an earlier version of the gtccs because it had not first obtained the written consent of the plaintiff holding that a company that cut removed and sold timber from land that secured a debt held by the plaintiff was liable as a matter of law under the gtccs because it had not first obtained the written consent of the plaintiff