the defendants exported them intact for reuse in monitors. And he did so without providing any explanation of what constitutes “processing” or how it impacts the original intended purpose requirement. Cf. United States v. Schneider, 704 F.3d 1287, 1294 (10th Cir.2013) (noting that while an expert may refer to the law in expressing an opinion, testimony raises concerns “when an expert uses a specialized legal term and usurps the jury’s function”); McIver, 470 F.3d at 552 (expert testimony’s overreliance on terms that “have a separate, distinct and specialized meaning in the law different from that present in the vernacular” risks crossing the line into unhelpful and inadmissible testimony (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, the district court erred, by permitting Mr th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Because the defendants claim Mr. Smith’s
holding that the probative value of contested evidence far outweighed any danger of unfair prejudice where any potential unfair prejudice was cured by a limiting jury instruction recognizing that a limiting instruction has the potential to cure any prejudice from the erroneous admission of evidence holding improper admission of extrinsic evidence may be cured by adequate limiting instruction holding that written instructions did not cure erroneous oral instruction holding potential for unfair prejudice related to evidentiary issue dispelled by the circuit courts limiting instruction to the jury