caused the collision after he elected to drive while impaired by alcohol. It was Mr. Wiredu’s decision to drive while impaired by alcohol that “amounted to a disregard of the consequences which might ensue to others,” which ultimately constituted the criminal negligence necessary to support a second-degree assault conviction. See id. If, as the State contends, Mr. Wiredu committed a second-degree assault by negligently causing the collision, every individual involved in a negligent car accident would face prosecution for second-degree assault. We find, therefore, that the two offenses arose out of the same conduct, i.e., Mr. Wiredu’s decision to drive while impaired by alcohol and negligently causing a car accident that injured Mr. Poleto. See Quansah, 207 Md.App. at 653, 53 A.3d 492 (<HOLDING>); Walker, 53 Md.App. at 201-02, 452 A.2d 1234
holding that evidence of the same rather unusual name that the former conviction was in same county and city as the present case where evidence showed defendant lived and that the character of offenses was the same was sufficient to establish identity holding that a seconddegree assault conviction arose out of the same criminal conduct as a violation of a peace order conviction where the defendant visited his former lovers residence in violation of a peace order and then physically assaulted her holding that the defendants homeinvasion robbery conviction violated double jeopardy because it arose from the same incident as the defendants burglary with an assault or battery conviction recognizing legislature knows difference between prosecution and conviction by noting former jeopardy provisions of code  192294 provide that if the same act be a violation of two or more statutes  conviction under one of such statutes  shall be a bar to a prosecution or proceeding under the other or others and holding that if the legislature had intended that the statutory bar apply to  felony cases tried in the circuit court after the resolution in district court of misdemeanor charges arising out of the same act it would have provided that a conviction for a criminal offense arising out of one act would bar a later conviction for another offense arising out of the same act holding that where the court records in the present case and the records in a previous conviction reflected the same name and date of birth as well as a signature and the defendant did not object that he was not the same person as had been previously convicted the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction