are not required to agree unanimously on which acts of abuse were committed for purposes of domestic abuse murder. The three kidnapping purposes available to the jury to prove that Berry was murdered while being kidnapped are not so inherently distinct as to violate due process. The three underlying purposes of committing great bodily harm, committing murder, or facilitating flight after third-degree assault are no more divergent than the predicate acts that may make up domestic abuse murder. The legislature also chose to punish kidnapping similarly, regardless of which purpose is found underlying the commission of the crime. MinmStat. § 609.25, subd. 2 (2004). While the legislature’s determination of penalties is not dispositive, it lends credence to assigning similar blamew .1991) (<HOLDING>), rev. denied, (Minn. Nov. 26, 1991). The
holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory holding that jury does not need to unanimously agree on the statutory circumstance that warrants firstdegree sexual assault but rather that the victim either sustained a personal injury or had fear of harm holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed firstdegree murder not on the theory by which it reached the verdict holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of firstdegree murder recognizing that even a nonunanimous recommendation of death by the jury proved that the jury including the jurors who voted against the recommendation of death had unanimously found the existence of a proffered aggravating circumstance even though the circumstance was not included within the definition of the particular capitalmurder offense charged in the indictment because the trial court had specifically instructed the jury that it could not proceed to a vote on whether to impose the death penalty unless it had already unanimously agreed that an aggravating circumstance existed