capacity, cannot establish standing as an aggrieved party for the first time on appeal. Still, the dissent contends that “Bren has standing to bring this appeal as she is aggrieved by Judge Hughes’ refusal to recuse himself.” Op. at 991. But, again, while Bren may be aggrieved, that fact is insufficient in itself to confer standing on her where, as here, she no longer occupies a fiduciary capacity and has not intervened in her individual capacity. Standing is a necessary predicate and a threshold issue that preempts the question of whether the trial judge should have disqualified himself. Further, standing is not immutable. It is well established that a person with standing can lose it. See, e.g., United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Griffin, 541 N.E.2d 553, 555-56 (Ind.Ct.App.1989) (<HOLDING>). Thus, we respectfully disagree with the
holding that plaintiffs tennessee voters had a plain direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes and therefore had standing to maintain the action holding that shareholders had standing to bring derivative suit against the government but not direct suit due to lack of privity holding that derivative actions do not require the support of a majority of shareholders or even all of the minority shareholders holding that in a merger shareholders are effectively purchasing shares in a new corporation while losing their status as shareholders in the previous corporation holding that shareholders had failed to maintain their status as shareholders by selling their shares after they had filed their complaint and therefore had lost standing to maintain a derivative suit