refused to allow the cross-examination. It is conceivable that he found that Michigan’s statute requiring advance notice of such evidence was violated. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520j(2) (requiring 10 days notice of intent to offer evidence of other sexual conduct of victim in criminal sexual conduct case). However, the Supreme Court has held that Michigan’s notice-and-hearing requirement is not unconstitutional per se, and it “serves legitimate state interests in protecting against surprise, harassment, and undue delay. Failure to comply with this requirement may in some cases justify even the severe sanction of preclusion.” Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 153, 111 S.Ct. 1743, 114 L.Ed.2d 205 (1991); see also Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (<HOLDING>). The statute may be unconstitutional as
holding that the sixth amendment does not prohibit the preclusion of otherwise admissible evidence as a sanction for the violation of a reciprocaldiscovery rule holding the sixth amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment recognizing that courts have discretion to exclude evidence as a sanction for violation of a discovery order holding that rule 606b does not violate the sixth amendment holding that the court lacks jurisdiction over sixth amendment claims because the sixth amendment is not moneymandating