of fees charged.” We do not find this aspect of Plaintiffs argument persuasive either, since all of the “unreasonable fee” claims that Plaintiff has lodged against MIS survived Defendants’ dismissal motions. As a result, the “aggregate reasonableness” of those fees will be determined by a single jury, with any subsequent claims against First American relating to these fees still requiring a fee-by-fee determination of the nature that we have outlined above. Simply put, Plaintiff has not demonstrated the existence of a substantial right to have the fee-based claims that she has asserted against First American litigated in the same proceeding in which MIS’s liability for the charging of those fees is addressed. Long v. Giles, 123 N.C. App. 150, 152-53, 472 S.E.2d 374, 375-76 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Plaintiff has not established that
holding when constitutional claims are premised on the notion that the united states has some contractual obligation to the plaintiff that it has failed to satisfy the claims are contractually based and must be heard in the court of federal claims holding that no substantial right is affected when a plaintiffs claims based on derivative liability are litigated separately from the claims that the plaintiff has asserted based on a direct liability theory because no possibility of inconsistent verdicts exists holding that general verdicts failed to reveal whether defendant was convicted on accomplice liability theory and that evidence supported accomplice liability theory holding that no private right of action exists holding that claims based on asserted violations of the lad and  1983 are not subject to the new jersey tort claims act