or an attorney. It also does not require that an arrestee be informed of any right to counsel. Id. Section 804.20 is to be applied in a pragmatic manner, balancing the rights of the arrestee and the goals of the chemical-testing statutes. See, e.g., id. (balancing arrestee’s right to counsel “against the practical consideration that [under section 321J.6] a chemical test is to be administered within two hours of the time of arrest or not at all”); accord State v. Bowers, 661 N.W.2d 536, 542 (Iowa 2003) (stating that an arrestee’s right to contact a family member under section 804.20 is “considerably diluted” when the requested family member is also in custody for criminal conduct carried on jointly with the arres-tee); Bromeland v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 562 N.W.2d 624, 626 (Iowa 1997) (<HOLDING>). In this case, Tubbs was denied the
holding that a suspended attorney should not be permitted to have contact with clients holding attorney general could not contract on behalf of the state to employ an assistant attorney beyond the attorney generals own term holding that an order imposing sanctions against an attorney for one of the parties in a pending case is final and therefore immediately appealable by the attorney holding there is no constitutional right to an attorney much less an effective attorney in state postconviction proceedings holding an arrestee has the right to contact an attorney but not a specific attorney who is unavailable when called