authority for which is specified” in its discussion of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(n). Id. We concluded in Zhao that this misstatement caused the Tenth Circuit to “analyze statutory language that Congress did not adopt,” a mistake we declined and continue to decline to follow. Id. Even if a panel of this court had the authority to revisit our holdings in Manzano-Garcia and Zhao and our interpretation of § 1252(a) (2) (B) (ii), Onyinkwa, and Yerkovich, which it does not, the government has provided us with no new reasons to do so. Therefore, we apply our previous reasoning to the matter at hand and conclude that we have jurisdiction to review the immigration judge’s decision to deny Ahmed’s motion for a continuance. Cf. Zafar v. United States Attorney General, 426 F.3d 1330, 1334 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); Medina-Morales v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 520, 528
holding that  1252a2bii precludes  review of discretionary decisions  in only the specific circumstances specified in the statute itself holding that the term final and conclusive precludes judicial review of army claims decisions holding that section 1252a2bii barred jurisdiction of decisions specified by statute as discretionary but did not bar decisions specified by regulation as discretionary holding that  1252a2bs ban on review of judgments regarding the granting of relief precludes review of only discretionary decisions holding that sjeetion 1252a2bii clearly precludes judicial review of decisions under section 1186ac4 because the statute specifies that those decisions are purely discretionary