contract that requires specific performance to be completed in a specified period. Therefore, the contract is not reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation. Accordingly, as a matter of law we find the phrase “that is beyond the reasonable control of that party” modifies all the events enumerated by the parties in the force-majeure clause. Consequently, we find that Wells is not entitled to summary judgment based on the force-majeure clause, and we reverse the district court’s ruling on this issue. Although our ruling on the force-maj-eure clause is the law of the case, we will not consider whether Pillsbury is entitled to judgment on this issue because it did not move for summary judgment. See United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 612 N.W.2d 101, 103 (Iowa 2000) (<HOLDING>); see also In re Estate of Campbell, 253 N.W.2d
holding that the decision of the appellate court establishes the law of the case and it must be followed by the trial court on remand holding that a trial court is free to make any order or direction in further progress of the case not inconsistent with the decision of the appellate court as to any question not settled by the appellate decision holding that a ruling of the trial court to which no error has been assigned becomes the law of the case and is not subject to review by the court of appeals holding an appellate decision becomes the law of the case and is controlling on both the trial court and on any further appeals in the same case holding that the law of the case doctrine posits that when a court decides upon a rule of law that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case