by defense counsel’s presentation of prior personality and psychological problems of both April and Mrs. Durden without any substantiating evidence that religion, personality, living environment, genetic condition or personal family matters had any causal link to April’s and Mrs. Durden’s injury claims. ¶42 Again, the trial court’s findings are supported by the record, and because the trial judge is in the best position to determine the prejudicial effect of an attorney’s conduct, Buhr, 268 Mont. at 255, 886 P.2d at 400, we conclude that the court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in granting Durdens’ motion for new trial. Indeed, the District Court’s ruling was in accord with our recent decisions in Newville v. State, Dept. of Family Services (1994), 267 Mont. 237, 883 P.2d 793 (<HOLDING>), and in Werre v. David (1996), 275 Mont. 376,
holding that the trial court committed reversible error in allowing argument and questions regarding a variety of factors including genetic factors which could contribute to the plaintiffs injury when no medical evidence was presented to make the causal connection more probable than not holding that to show a causal connection the plaintiff must demonstrate a relationship between the misconduct and the plaintiffs injury holding that a district court is entitled to give more weight to the seriousness of the offense than to other factors recognizing same factors holding that more than a year between the protected activity and the discharge is not close enough to support the causal connection requirement