U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 49, at *41; Riggs II, 163 F.3d at 1369; Riggs III, 2001 WL 47274, at 17-18, 2001 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 20, at *64-66. Second, the root principles at work here — the principle that courts must be consistent with one another and the principle that governmental entities may in some circumstances be treated as private when taking on a private role or function— have a venerable lineage. See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 611, 614, 112 S.Ct. 2160, 119 L.Ed.2d 394 (1992) (putting a distinction between a government’s exercises of uniquely sovereign power and ordinary private power at the heart of foreign sovereign immunity); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695, 96 S.Ct. 1854, 48 L.Ed.2d 301 (1976) (plurality opinion) (<HOLDING>); Bank of the U.S. v. Planters’ Bank of Co., 22
recognizing the substantial body of case law discussing distinction between preliminary and postliminary activities on the one hand and principle activities of employment on the other recognizing a traditional distinction between the public and governmental acts of sovereign states on the one hand and their private and commercial acts on the other holding not only does cincinnatis categorical ban on commercial newsracks place too much importance on the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech but in this case the distinction bears no relationship whatsoever to the particular interests that the city has asserted recognizing distinction between tolling and estoppel recognizing the liens on the one hand and representing that the tax claim had been released on the other