the length of delay begins from the time of the re-indictment.” In contrast, defendant argues that we should consider “the delay between the original indictment and the day of trial.” In State v. Vasquez, 336 Or 598, 610, 88 P3d 271 (2004), the Supreme Court reasoned that “an official action that is sufficient, standing alone, to commence a prosecution starts the running of the ‘without delay’ clock” under Article I, section 10. In light of that general principle, either argument made by the parties is tenable. However, for the reasons explained below, whether the clock starts running on the grand jury’s return of the first indictment or the grand jury’s return of the second indictment makes no difference to the analysis. See, e.g., State v. Dykast, 300 Or 368, 373, 712 P2d 79 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Thus, we must consider whether the delay is
holding that a subsequent indictment does not restart the thirtyday speedy trial clock but rather tolled it when the original indictment was dismissed the thirtyday period again continued to run it did not begin anew the second indictment was then filed before the thirtyday period expired therefore the filing of the second indictment even though filed after thirty days following defendants arrest did not violate his rights under the speedy trial act holding that even if the calculation commenced on the date of the first indictment the defendants right to a speedy trial was not violated holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act holding that where the date of the offense is not an element of the charge  a variance between the indictment date and the proof at trial is not fatal so long as the acts charged were committed within the statute of limitations period and prior to the return date of the indictment holding that a 19month delay between indictment and trial did not violate the constitutional right to a speedy trial