Act); Lloyd v. Housing Auth. of City of Kirksville, 58 F.3d 398, 399-400 (8th Cir.1995) (same); Cason v. Rochester Hous. Auth., 748 F.Supp. 1002 (W.D.N.Y.1990) (same). The Gormans further arg-ue that they should be exempt from the Rehabilitation Act because they are exempt under the FHA and Connecticut’s Fair Housing Act (due to their status as owners in residence in their two-family dwelling ) and the ADA (because their dwelling is not considered a place of public accommodation ). They cite to no statutory authority or ease law supporting their claim that the FHA and ADA exemptions apply to the Rehabilitation Act, and we will not strain to infer such an exemption where Congress has not chosen to articulate one. See Johnson v. New York Hosp., 897 F.Supp. 83, 86 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (<HOLDING>), aff'd on other grounds, 96 F.3d 33 (2d
holding the ada and the rehabilitation act applicable holding that exemption under the ada does not preclude liability under the rehabilitation act holding that neither the ada nor the rehabilitation act applies to prison employment holding act qualifies as exemption statute under exemption 3 holding that the same standards apply to claims under the ada and under the rehabilitation act