in this cause. In an Order issued November 26, 1996, this Court denied that motion but directed the Clerk to treat that motion for leave to intervene as a separate lawsuit. On December 12, 1996, Gipson filed a motion for joinder of his separate lawsuit and this one. The Magistrate Judge recently denied that request. III. Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment On June 25, 1997, some six days after the defendant filed a timely original answer herein, the plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment in which he took issue with the degree of specificity contained in the defendant’s original answer. “A party is not entitled to a default judgment as a matter of right, even where , 911 F.2d 1167; 1168 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1050, 111 S.Ct. 760, 112 L.Ed.2d 779 (1991), (<HOLDING>); Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1251 (5th
holding that a violation of a state statute regarding the swearing of criminal complaints does not give rise to constitutional liability holding that alleged violations of a state statute did not give rise to federal constitutional claims holding that a state agencys violations of its own internal regulations did not establish a due process violation or otherwise give rise to a constitutional claim holding that a state securities claim which alleged federal mail wire and securities violations as the predicate acts did not arise under federal law and thus did not create federal jurisdiction holding that these regulatory violations do not give rise to a viable fca action