legal basis for granting the relief sought by the applicant. For example, the contention that an involuntary confession was admitted in evidence against him is a distinct ground for federal collateral relief. But a claim of involuntary confession predicated on alleged psychological coercion does not raise a different “ground” than does one predicated on alleged physical coercion. In other words, identical grounds may often be proved by different factual allegations. So also, identical grounds may often be supported by different legal arguments, or be couched in different language, or vary in immaterial respects. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1077, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963) (citations omitted); see also People v. Scheer, 184 Colo. 15, 19, 518 P.2d 833 (1974) (<HOLDING>). We use this standard to assist our review of
holding that a defendants guilty plea was unconditional where the guilty plea was not in writing and the government did not consent to it being conditional holding that the plaintiff was precluded from raising the issue for the first time on appeal holding that previous crimp 35 attacks on the voluntariness coercion and adequacy of advisement of defendants guilty plea precluded raising a similar attack alleging that defendant did not understand the nature of the charge recognizing incompetent advice from attorney as proper ground for federal habeas attack on voluntariness of guilty plea in state court holding that the defendants guilty plea was valid where the district court carefully questioned the defendant about whether he understood the consequences of his guilty plea