3 . Because the search was authorized by the automobile exception, we do not need to address Pascual’s argument that certain aspects of the search were not justified by the search incident to arrest exception. While the district court did discuss Gant at the status conference, it ultimately held that "there was probable cause to conduct the search” of the vehicle pursuant to the separate and conceptually distinct automobile exception, and therefore the limitations placed on searches incident to arrest do not apply. See Gant, 556 U.S. at 347, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (noting that the "scope of the search authorized [by the auto mobile exception] is broader” than that authorized in searches incident to arrest). 4 . See United States v. Gaines, 457 F.3d 23 S.Ct. 1619, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976)
holding defendant assumed risk that third party would consent to search of storage locker where defendant instructed third party to rent locker under third partys name and allowed third party to keep possession of lease papers and to occasionally retain the keys holding that a note to a third party where the defendant never requested that the message be conveyed to the intended target was an attempt to keep the target from cooperating with the government and justified application of  3c11 holding that fourth amendment did not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to government authorities holding that plaintiffaffiant did not have personal knowledge of statements made to him by a third party holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant