of any provision of [the Species Act] or regulation issued under the authority thereof”, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A), Congress thereby “eliminate[d] the prudential limitations by legislation.” Defenders at 1039. See also, National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, 400 F.Supp. 705, 710 (S.D.Miss.1975), rev’d on other grounds, 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979, 97 S.Ct. 489, 50 L.Ed.2d 587 (1976) . By way of contrast, the District of Columbia Circuit has applied the prudential standing test to suits brought under the Species Act on several occasions. See, e.g., Humane Society of the United States v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45, 61 (D.C.Cir.1988); National Audubon Society v. Hester, 801 F.2d 405, 407 n. 2 (D.C.Cir.1986); but see, Competitive Enterprise Institute, 901 F.2d at 118 (<HOLDING>). Likewise, the Eighth Circuit in Defenders and
holding that article iii constitutional standing must be addressed before considering lanham act prudential standing holding that a provision of the energy policy and conservation act of 1975 that allowed suit by any person who may be adversely affected by certain standards demonstrated a congressional intent to eliminate prudential standing limitations holding that title viis term a person claiming to be aggrieved demonstrated congressional intent to confer standing to the fullest extent permitted by article iii holding that iiriras permanent rules lack the clear statement of the congressional intent necessary to eliminate habeas review holding that congress may dispense with prudential standing requirements