by the presence of the asbestos constitutes no less of an ‘emergency’ because abatement will require an extended amount of time, and has not yet been completed”); Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis v. Carey Canada, Inc., No 3-86-185, 1988 WL 220489, at *3 (D.Minn. Aug. 31, 1988) (“[T]he fact that abatement is as of yet incomplete does not conclusively demonstrate the inapplicability of the [emergency assistance] doctrine.”); see also Caterair Int'l Corp. v. LCL Transit Co., Inc., No. 94 C 1049, 1995 WL 348045, at *7 (N.D.Ill. June 5, 1995) (delay between discovery and removal of contaminated soil presented genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment). But see Corporation of Mercer Univ. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., No. 85-126-3-MAC, 1986 WL 12447, at *9 (M.D.Ga. Mar. 9, 1986) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, T & N’s motion for summary
holding that review of an original removal decision and a subsequent removal order are distinct holding that the court of claims did not have jurisdiction over plaintiffs first amendment claim of improper removal holding that the defendants filing of a notice of removal before being served by plaintiffs did not render removal defective recognizing that georgia did not adopt  115 but even if it did finding that plaintiff did not consider removal of asbestos to be immediately necessary where there was an undisputed delay between plaintiffs discovery of the hazard and beginning of removal holding that any defect in removal procedure must be cured within the 30day removal period or it is fatal to the removal and defendants failure to attach exhibits to the notice of removal within that time required remand