we conclude that § 1158(a)(3) does not apply in this case. Quite simply, we are not reviewing a “determination,” but the failure to make a determination. Thus, we hold that when, as occurred here, a petitioner alleges that his failure to file a timely asylum application was due to extraordinary circumstances and both the IJ and the BIA fail to determine whether the extraordinary-circumstances exception should apply, we have jurisdiction to review the failure to make a determination. B. We next consider whether it was error for the IJ not to determine whether Viktor’s late filing was due to extraordinary circumstances. We think it goes without saying that IJs and the BIA are not free to ignore arguments raised by a petitioner. See Chen v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 611, 620 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Immigration judges, although given
holding that where the plaintiff discovered the injury on the very datedefendant informed her of her discharge the discovery rule offered no relief in relation to the timeliness of the filing of her discriminatory discharge claim holding that a fouryearolds statement to a child services caseworker that her father caused her brothers injury was nontestimonial holding that the ij erred by failing to consider an explanation offered by the petitioner for her brothers failure to appear and testify on her behalf holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment holding that a plaintiff elected to stand on her complaint by repeatedly asserting the validity of her averments and by failing to seek leave to amend following dismissal