attempting to locate him had told Taylor’s ex-wife that there was a warrant for his arrest, he asserts there was no evidence that he knew of the warrant. Therefore, the district court’s finding that he knew of the indictment was clearly erroneous, and the presumption of prejudice required dismissal of the indictment. “[Wjhether a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated is a mixed question of law and fact. Questions of law are reviewed de novo, and findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.” United States v. Ingram, 446 F.3d 1332, 1336 (11th Cir.2006) (quotation omitted). A rial lengthens, negligence may weigh heavily against the government. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 657-58, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 2694, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992) (<HOLDING>). A defendant has no duty to bring himself to
holding threeyear delay between indictment and arraignment caused by the serious negligence of the government presumptively prejudicial holding that the defendants failure to assert his right to a speedy trial until one year after his arrest weighed heavily against him under this barker factor holding that a twoyear delay weighed heavily against the government when the arresting officer knew where the defendant lived and worked and made only weak efforts to contact the defendant holding that a defendant was properly required to demonstrate prejudice where only two of the first three barker factors weighed heavily against the government holding that a sixyear delay caused by negligence weighed heavily against the government