states that spouses who had remarried on or before age 57 and before the enactment of the Public Law “would have one year to apply for the reinstatement of these benefits,” 149 Cong. Reo. S15,133-01 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2003) (statement of Rep. Specter), and (2) a congressional cost-benefit analysis that considered only the cost associated with surviving spouses who reapplied for reinstatement of benefits within a one-year period, H.R. Rep. NO. 108-211, at 2315-16, 2332 (July 15, 2003). Standing alone, these legislative references are reason for pause, but they do not stand alone. We start with the axiom that legislative history is not legislation and cannot trump the plain meaning of the legislation. See Van Wersch v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 197 F.3d 1144, 1152 (Fed.Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah
holding that congress had clearly expressed through the structure and legislative history of  erisa an intention that the federal remedy  displace state causes of action holding that statutory language is conclusive in absence of clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary  recognizing that a court may turn to legislative history when literal statutory language is unclear holding that congressional intent as clearly expressed in legislative history cannot trump the irrefutably plain statutory language that emerged when congress actually took pen to paper holding that neither the language nor the legislative history of the fcpa indicates the congressional intent to create a private right of action