between two districts where the action “might have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1948); see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404 (West Supp.1999), commentary on 1996 amendment of section 1404 at 30; Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 878 (3d Cir.1995). Because the applicability of these statutes turns on whether venue is proper in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the Court must first resolve that issue. This is a declaratory judgment action, and therefore, the statute relevant to the venue inquiry is 28 U.S.C. § 2201. However, neither the 1994 agreements nor that statute contain a special venue provision, and therefore the federal venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) is controlling. See AMP Inc. v. Allied Signal Inc., No. CIV.A.98-4405, 1998 WL 967579, at *1 (E.D.Pa. Nov.18, 1998) (<HOLDING>); Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 903
holding that venue for litigation was proper based on 28 usc  1441 regardless of whether defendant was doing business in the district within the meaning of 28 usc  1391 holding that where jurisdiction was based on 28 usc  2201 venue was determined as per 28 usc  1391 holding that the declaratory judgment act 28 usc  2201 only creates a remedy and is not an independent basis for jurisdiction recognizing that special venue statutes are supplemented by the 28 usc  1391 venue provisions applicable to all civil cases holding that under the fsia personal jurisdiction   depends upon the district court finding subject matter jurisdiction under 28 usc  1330a and proper service under 28 usc  1608