the defendants say, reliance on that promise was objectively unreasonable. This argument erects, and then attacks, a straw man. As said, the plaintiffs complaint alleges that the defendants falsely implied that SNESL had the capacity to achieve near-term accreditation. This is a meaningful distinction. It is one thing for an actor to demur when asked to guarantee a third party’s actions. It is quite another for an actor to mislead a person into believing that the actor itself possesses means and abilities fully within its control. Given this distinction, the defendants’ reliance on the disclaimer is misplaced: inasmuch as the disclaimer does not cover the alleged misrepresentations, it cannot defeat them. See Hitachi Credit Am. Corp. v. Signet Bank, 166 F.3d 614, 630-631 (4th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). It is, of course, arguable that the proof at
holding that an intervenor lacked standing to challenge a settlement agreement between the plaintiff and the united states on the grounds that one of the plaintiffs claims was fraudulent because the intervenors were not parties to the settlement and suffered no personal harm from it notwithstanding the potential that its tax dollars went to pay the allegedly fraudulent claim holding that a contracting party may recover for fraud notwithstanding specific disclaimers that do not cover the allegedly fraudulent contractinducing representations holding that a party may ratify a settlement agreement induced by fraud retain the proceeds and sue to recover fraud damages holding fraudulent representations to the fda could not sustain statelaw claims holding that the plaintiffs mere failure to execute on a judgment the only allegedly fraudulent act is not fraudulent concealment