commitment as part of the price it had agreed to pay for EAC’s Contracts and Slips. Even a cursory reading of the 1993 letter reveals that HRSI’s use of the phrase “incentive structure” did not refer to the payment of merchant and insurance participation as a general matter. Clearly, “incentive structure” referred specifically to the multi-tiered system outlined in the letter, according to which participation percentages would increase proportionately with total credit volume. Id. at 3030. To the extent that the district court relied on extrinsic evidence — i.e., “the circumstances surrounding [the contract’s] making — to reach the conclusion that the contract was unambiguous as to duration, such reliance was consistent with Colorado law.” See, e.g., KN Energy, 698 P.2d at 776-77 (<HOLDING>). In this case, the summary judgment record
holding that trial court may consider circumstances surrounding making of agreement in determining whether agreement is ambiguous and noting that ambiguity exists when language of agreement in and of itself supports reasonable interpretation distinct from reasonable interpretation reached when language is read in light of surrounding circumstances holding that extrinsic evidence admissible to determine intent of parties holding that a court may consider extrinsic evidence to determine whether a contract is ambiguous holding that courts may consider extrinsic evidence including the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract in order to determine whether a contractual ambiguity exists holding that to determine whether a statement was voluntary the court must consider the totality of all the surrounding circumstances  both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation and decide  whether a defendants will was overborne by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession