post-conviction procedures, they must comport with fundamental fairness. While we do not disagree with this assertion, Finley does not support Petitioner’s argument. Rather, the Court in Finley rejected the argument that when a State chooses to offer the assistance of counsel to those seeking collateral relief from convictions, the Federal Constitution dictates the exact form such assistance must assume. Id. at 559, 107 S.Ct. 1990 (“In Pennsylvania, the State has made a valid choice to give prisoners the assistance of counsel without requiring the full panoply of procedural protections that the Constitution requires be given to defendants who are in a fundamentally different position — at trial and on first appeal as of right.”). See also Osborne, 557 U.S. at 68-69, 129 S.Ct. 2308 (<HOLDING>). In reaching this conclusion we are mindful of
holding that when the state offers collateral review due process does not dictate the exact form of such review holding that review of counsel ineffectiveness claims should be deferred until collateral review holding that apprendi does not apply on collateral review holding that there is no due process right to appellate review holding that the other collateral review provision of  2244d2 encompasses federal review