alter the terms and conditions of [her] employment....” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 106, 115. These assertions are insufficient to show significant harm. Because plaintiff has not alleged that she suffered the significant harm necessary for the Court to find her employer’s actions “materially adverse,” the Court will dismiss Counts I and II. 2. Count V: Paid suspension was not materially adverse Plaintiff claims next that she was suspended with pay on March 16 in reprisal for her earlier protected activities. However, like Counts I and II, Count V fails to allege that any harm was associated with this action. Paid suspension alone is not enough to rise to the level of materially adverse unless it causes some further harm or hardship. Compare Greer v. Paulson, 505 F.3d 1306, 1317-18 (D.C.Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>), with Harper v. Potter, 456 F.Supp.2d 25, 29
holding that suspension with pay was not adverse employment action holding that investigatory suspension with pay was not adverse employment action holding that suspension with back pay was still materially adverse because plaintiff presented evidence of a demonstrable effect involving objectively tangible harm which included personal bankruptcy two real estate foreclosures and negative marks on her employment record holding that a suspension with pay may constitute materially adverse action for the purposes of retaliation claims depending on the facts of the case holding that initial paid suspension of two weeks periodically extended to total 19 months while an internal investigation was conducted is not an adverse action because plaintiff cannot show objectively tangible harm resulting from paid leave