Forrester contends that the question of whether ecstasy meets the definition of a Schedule I substance is a factual determination that must be left to the jury. In both Apprendi and Buckland, the judges made improper findings of conduct (sale of a particular drug and engaging in hate speech, respectively) by a preponderance of the evidence. The respective courts held that those findings should have been made by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See Buckland, 289 F.3d at 563; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471, 120 S.Ct. 2348. However, both cases explicitly confirm Congress’s ability to “ramp up the punishment for controlled substance offenders based on the type and amount of illegal substance involved in the crime.” Buck-land, 289 F.3d at 568; see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 495, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, under Buckland and Apprendi, the
recognizing an attorneys right to conduct the clients case with a certain degree of privacy holding that the right to associate with others as a military company is not a privilege of citizens of the united states recognizing congresss ability to choose the degree of culpability  associate with particular factually distinct conduct recognizing even federal constitutional right of association does not apply to the right of one individual to associate with another recognizing authority of legislature to choose officers of municipal corporations