was inadequate, it was incumbent on counsel to notify the court of any inadequacies. Because counsel was ready to proceed,' we can clearly state- that any Richardson violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the standard of State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla.1986). In addition, appellant claims that the trial court committed fundamental er ror in allowing the first investigator to testify as an expert in crush analysis and speed when the qualifications of the officer to so testify were not placed in evidence. The defense never- argued below that the investigator was not qualified to render an opinion on crush or speed change, and instead argued a' discovery violation. The issue therefore was not preserved. See Anderson v. State, 863 So.2d 169, 181 (Fla.2003) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, not only was the investigator’s
holding party may not argue one ground at trial and another on appeal where appellant did not object to testimony at trial on the grounds raised on appeal that it was improper character evidence but objected only on the basis of relevancy issue was not preserved for review holding that the failure to object at trial customarily means that a party has not preserved the claim on appeal holding that an issue is preserved for appeal where the issue was sufficiently raised for the court to rule on it   holding that where specific grounds for an objection are stated at trial all other grounds are waived and will not be considered for the first time on appeal holding that a claim was not preserved for review where the defense failed to object on the specific grounds advanced on appeal