holding that the Secretary’s decision whether or not to certify a particular arrangement as “fair and equitable” under section 13(c) of the UMTA is “committed to agency discretion” within the meaning of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2), and is not, therefore, reviewable by the courts. See Local Division 732, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, 667 F.2d 1327, 1343 (11th Cir.1982); Kendler v. Wirtz, 388 F.2d 381, 383-84 (3d Cir.1968); City of Macon v. Marshall, 439 F.Supp. 1209, 1223 (M.D.Ga. 1977). But see Amalgamated Transit Union v. Donovan, 582 F.Supp. 522, 528-29 (D.D.C.1984) (certification reviewable, but review is limited to abuse of discretion). Cf. Local Division 589, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Massachusetts, 666 F.2d 618, 634 (1st Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1117, 102 S.Ct. 2928,
holding that the pearce presumption was not designed to prevent the imposition of an increased sentence on retrial for some valid reason associated with the need for flexibility and discretion in the sentencing process but was premised on the apparent need to guard against vindictiveness in the resentencing process recognizing the need for judicial economy in family issues as well as  the need to avoid fundamental unfairness holding that where the statute in question required that the measure of fair market value shall be as determined by the secretary  the court cannot substitute its own discretion for properly exercised administrative discretion holding that the amount of alimony should not be reduced to a mathematical formula because the need for flexibility outweighs the need for relative certainty recognizing need for flexibility and discretion by the secretary in section 13c certifications