allege possession; it cites to Barnes v. Webster, 220 Md. 473, 154 A.2d 918 (1959) and Wathen v. Brown, 48 Md.App. 655, 429 A.2d 292 (1981), both of which dealt with demurrers to a complaint and neither of which involve motions for summary judgment. Appellant appears to argue that judgment in favor of appellees was improper because appellees failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted-an issue that was, perhaps, more appropriately litigated through the procedural vehicle of a motion to dismiss. See Md. Rule 2-322(b). Nonetheless, because we have before us only the trial court's grant of summary judgment, we shall address this issue using the standards applicable to appellate review of summary judgment motions. See Davis v. DiPino, 337 Md. 642, 643, 655 A.2d 401 (1995) (<HOLDING>). 18 . We further explained that, although
holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that motion for summary judgment was not opposed holding that the trial court may not grant summary judgment on a ground not raised in the motion holding that a trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment holding summary judgment may only be entered for one who has filed a motion asking that relief and only after notice and hearing on that motion holding that an appellate court should not undertake to review whether a plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted when the only motion filed and the only motion on appeal was the trial courts grant of summary judgment