disposition” of the charge. N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-3(a). “[F]or good cause shown in open court, [with] the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court” of the jurisdiction in which the charge was lodged “may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.” Ibid. The express purpose of the IAD is to provide relief from the uncertainties caused by detainers based on outstanding indictments, information, or complaints, “which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation.” N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-1; accord Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 720, 105 S.Ct. 3401, 3403, 87 L.Ed.2d 516, 521 (1985). However, by its very terms, the IAD only applies when a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner. N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-3(a); see Schneider v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 530, 533-34 (Ky.Ct.App.1999) (<HOLDING>); Theis v. State, 30 P.3d 1140, 1145-46
holding that the 180day statutory limit in the iad is tolled starting from the time that a defendant is not represented by counsel until new counsel is either appointed or retained when the defendant has not waived his right to counsel because during this period a defendant is unable to stand trial in accordance with the iad citation omitted holding that because the stated purpose of the iad is to prevent interference with a prisoners rehabilitative environment there is no reason for the iad to apply to a prisoner until he or she is assigned to the institution where the sentence will be served holding that the language of the statute and the courts duty to apply the statute as written requires the court to interpret the statute to apply when the prisoner is sentenced without regard to the institution where the prisoner is incarcerated after the sentencing holding that iad is not applicable until a state lodges a detainer in the jurisdiction where the prisoner is incarcerated holding the iad was not applicable to a prisoner who had been sentenced but was incarcerated in a local jail or holding facility while awaiting transfer to the assigned penal institution