to apply a clearly erroneous or a de novo standard of review to the scope of employment issue in a FTCA claim. The FTCA is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, allowing the federal government to be sued for the actions of “any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment” under circumstances where the United States would be liable if it were a private employer. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) and 2674. Scope of employment is generally determined by the law of the state where the tort occurred. See Brown v. Armstrong, 949 F.2d 1007, 1012 n. 7 (8th Cir.1991) (Brown). However, FTCA claims are strictly limited to a scope of employment analysis, regardless of state law doctrines of respondeat superior and apparent authority. Primeaux II, 181 F.3d at 878 (<HOLDING>). The applicable law in this case is the law of
recognizing common law right to indemnity when a partys liability is vicarious holding that vicarious coconspirator liability need not be charged in the indictment holding that apparent authority as a separate theory of vicarious liability should not be considered in ftca claims holding that a supervisor cannot be held personally liable for the unconstitutional conduct of a subordinate based on vicarious liability holding that the common law principle of vicarious liability applied to the tcpa because absent a clear expression of congressional intent to apply another standard the court must presume that congress intended to apply the traditional standards of vicarious liability with which it is presumed to be familiar