is ultimately paid back out of the insured’s pocket. In other words, the insurer meets the prompt prong of “prompt payment,” but not the payment prong. For me, promptness, standing alone, is not a justification for extracting later reimbursement out of the insured’s funds. To the extent that Knox and David suggest otherwise, I would disapprove them. To be sure, if the damages sustained by Fernandez had been less than the million-dollar policy of the tortfeasor, Nationwide would have been entitled to PIP reimbursement out of the remaining proceeds. In those circumstances, as between Nationwide and Proformance, the Legislature plainly intended the latter to be responsible to the former. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Licensed Beverage Ins. Exch., 146 N.J. 1, 14, 679 A.2d 620 (1996) (<HOLDING>). But that is a far cry from the suggestion
holding that under the sixth amendment to the united states constitution before imposing an obligation to reimburse the state the court must make a finding that the defendant is or will be able to pay the reimbursement amount ordered holding reimbursement statute ensures that pip costs  will be borne by  the individuals responsible for the injury who in good conscience ought to pay them  quoting aetna ins co v gilchrist bros inc 85 nj 550 568 n 2 428 a2d 1254 1981 sullivan j dissenting recognizing that a workers compensation insurer is responsible for covering any injury caused by the treatment of an industrial injury holding that the expenses of depositions taken merely for discovery purposes should be borne by the party taking them holding that where petitioners did not simply challenge the validity of their orders of removal but had questioned whether the statute grants the ins authority to remove them to a country that cannot accept them the court of appeals retains jurisdiction