Co. v. District Council of Painters No. 16, 803 F.2d 1050, 1051 (9th Cir.1986), and of note 5 of John S. Griffith Construction v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, 785 F.2d 706, 712 (9th Cir.1986), they are not to the contrary. Jon and Mesa Verde note a narrow exception to the rule we describe in the text. They permit a district court to decide in the first instance whether an employer has effectively repudiated a section 8(f) prehire agreement. The employer's right to repudiate is created by, and set forth specifically in, a federal statute rather than, as here, in the collective bargaining agreement itself or in a body of common or other law applicable generally to contract matters. See Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd, 461 U.S. 260, 269, 103 S.Ct. 1753, 1758, 75 L.Ed.2d 830 (1983) (<HOLDING>) (quoting NLRB v. Local Union No. 103,
holding that agreements other than fullfledged collective bargaining agreements may be contracts within the meaning of  301 holding such agreements to be per se illegal recognizing employers right to repudiate as means of promotfing congress intention  that prehire agreements were to be arrived at voluntarily holding that one must voluntarily and intelligently waive the right to counsel holding that for an act to be inconsistent with the right to arbitrate and thus constitute a waiver of that right it must repudiate the right of the party who does the act