to endorse the principle that a local governing body cannot bind its successor with regard to the appointment or removal of a public officer. In any event, we do not view the language of section 4-9-620 as dearly authorizing the “definite term” to extend beyond the terms of the outgoing council members. Therefore, it does not fall within Newman’s exception to the prohibition against binding successor governing bodies. See Cowart II, 324 S.C. at 241, 478 S.E.2d at 838 (“Newman allows an exception, however, where the enabling legislation dearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond its members’ own terms.” (emphasis added)); see also 16 Jade St., LLC v. R. Design Const. Co., 398 S.C. 338, 343, 728 S.E.2d 448, 450 (2012), reh’g granted (May 7, 2012) (<HOLDING>); Doe v. Marion, 361 S.C. 463, 473, 605 S.E.2d
holding that if a statute is in derogation of a common law right it must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent holding that a statute enacted in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed   holding that sjection 76879 and rule 1442 are strictly construed because they are in derogation of the common law rule that each party pay their own fees  holding  2513 to be jurisdictional and therefore must be strictly construed holding that in presence of any doubt a penal statute is to be strictly construed