of a pleading that does not introduce any new issue does not revive a previously waived right to demand a jury trial. 5 MooRE, supra, ¶ 38.41, at 38-387. Thus, the question is whether the amendment of Yancey’s complaint to permit evidence of the February 1990 agreement raised a new “issue” within the meaning of Rule 38(b). The Rules do not provide a definition of the term, “issue.” Nonetheless, it is clear that if a case is an equitable one being tried to the court and a Rule 15(b) amendment is permitted over objection, then the objecting party is entitled to demand a jury trial only if the amendment has injected a new legal issue that could not have been reasonably anticipated. 5 MooRE, supra, ¶ 38.41, at 38-394; compare Harris v. Richards Mfg. Co., 675 F.2d 811, 815 (6th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>) with Gulbenkian v. Gulbenkian, 147 F.2d 173,
holding that where plaintiff sought only equitable relief up through the end of trial and only added claim for legal relief posttrial defendant was entitled to demand jury once legal claim was asserted holding preference claim legal in nature where relief sought was for a definite sum of money holding that equitable relief is only appropriate where legal remedies are inadequate holding that claims for equitable relief under  502a3 are only available when a plaintiff has no other relief under erisa holding that a jury trial was not required when the money demand although specific was incidental and ancillary to the equitable relief requested and would ripen only if equitable relief were granted