because it did not state the necessary facts to support a charge of criminal contempt, it is clear from the record of the hearing that the order to show cause was based on Tsokos’s purchase of the properties. Because the circuit court acted in excess of its jurisdiction, it is not necessary to address this deficiency. It is well-established that “[o]ne may not be held in contempt of court for violation of an order or a provision of a judgment which is not clear and definite so as to make the party aware of its command and direction.” And, “implied or inherent provisions of a final judgment cannot serve as a basis for an order of contempt.” Cooley v. Moody, 884 So.2d 143, 145 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (internal citations omitted). See also Keitel v. Keitel, 716 So.2d 842 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (<HOLDING>). Here, as Tsokos argues in the petition, the
holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence holding that an order authorizing a sale is a final judgment holding that even an order that establishes entitlement to a judgment is not final unless it  actually enters or renders a judgment  or includes specific language of finality necessary for a judgment  to be considered final for purposes of an appeal holding that even though the former husbands visitation rights were implicitly obstructed by the former wifes relocation to new york the final judgment did not contain an express provision prohibiting relocation and implied or inherent provisions of a final judgment cannot serve as the basis for an order of contempt recognizing that a final judgment may provide for a particular standard upon which to modify a final judgment