faith.” But this finding is also not grounded in substantial record evidence under our case law. Golkar’s sworn testimony at the hearing offered a coherent, detailed and consistent account of his gradual attraction to Christianity, his personal conversion experience, and his baptism at a Tehran church. The IJ’s decision did not call into question, or even mention, this testimony. Rather, the IJ based his adverse credibility finding solely on inconsistent statements contained in the Assessment to Refer. The Assessment to Refer, however, does not constitute substantial evidence to support an adverse credibility finding, because it suffers from the same defects in reliability as the Assessment to Refer rejected in Singh v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir.2005). See id. at 1087-90 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, none of the “indicia of
holding that the asylum officers assessment to refer was not sufficient evidence of what singh said to permit evaluation of an asserted conflict with singhs later testimony where the assessment to refer inter alia did not contain any record of the questions and answers at the asylum interview or other detailed contemporary chronological notes of the interview but only a short conclusory summary  essentially an opinion holding that we lack jurisdiction when a petitioner fails to argue before the bia that there is no evidence he was under oath during the asylum interview holding that where asylum officer testifies regarding accuracy of interviewing procedures inconsistencies between petitioners asylum interview testimony and merits hearing testimony form sufficient basis to uphold adverse credibility determination holding that an order granting the media the right to interview a defendant in a capital murder case was unreviewable upon appeal in the criminal trial and therefore immediately appealable as a collateral order because the review on appeal would have been too late to cure any damage to the defendant from what was said in the interview holding that an adverse credibility finding can be based on materially different asylum claims in an airport interview and petitioners subsequent testimony before the ij