See Huntington Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of Huntington, 689 F.2d 391, 395 n. 4 (2d Cir.1982). The Supreme Court’s fair housing decisions which involve standing issues instruct that a particular plaintiffs standing greatly depends upon which law is used as the predicate for suit. In this case, plaintiffs proceed under a myriad of different statutes. Most of plaintiffs’ efforts at redress, however, emanate from Title VTII’s Fair Housing Act provisions and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1982. These two statutes do not share the lowest common denominator for admission into federal court warranted by Article III of the United States Constitution. Compare Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209, 93 S.Ct. 364, 366, 34 L.Ed.2d 415 (1972) (<HOLDING>) with Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 512-14, 95
holding title viii standing as broad as is permitted by article iii of the constitution and extends to indirect victims of defendants housing discrimination holding that article iii standing is not a prerequisite to intervention holding that title viis term a person claiming to be aggrieved demonstrated congressional intent to confer standing to the fullest extent permitted by article iii holding that because article iii standing is jurisdictional it must be decided before other legal issues holding that article iii standing is necessary for intervention