can be given full effect by the jury in deciding whether the defendant acted deliberately. See Kelly v. Lynaugh, 862 F.2d 1126, 1133 (5th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 925, 109 S.Ct. 3263, 106 L.Ed.2d 608 (1989). Any question which Penry may have raised about the continued vitality of this holding in Kelly has been resolved by the court’s en banc decision in Graham. Under the rationale in Graham, voluntary intoxication is not the kind of “uniquely severe permanent handicap[] with which the defendant was burdened through no fault of his own” that requires a special instruction to ensure that the mitigating effect of such evidence finds expression in the jury’s sentencing decision. See 950 F.2d at 1029; see also Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976) (<HOLDING>). In sum, we think that the court’s decision in
holding the government did not violate its plea agreement with a defendant because in addition to specifically retaining the right to comment at the sentencing hearing concerning defendants conduct and background the prosecuting attorney had a duty to bring all relevant information about defendant to the courts attention at the time of sentencing holding that an issue not presented to the trial court will not be considered on appeal holding that defendant has the burden of establishing eligibility for the safetyvalve provision which clearly requires an affirmative act by the defendant truthfully disclosing all the information he possesses that concerns his offense or related offenses holding that the texas sentencing scheme clearly assures that all possible relevant information about the defendant will be adduced facts presented at trial related that defendant was 22 years of age had been drinking beer all afternoon on the day of the offense recognizing that sentencing facts are based on the evidence and testimony presented at sentencing under a preponderance of the evidence standard