[T]hird, whether the practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry. Id, at 743, 105 S.Ct. 2380. These factors are to be used as “guideposts” to “satisfy” the “common-sense view.” UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 374, 119 S.Ct. 1380, 143 L.Ed.2d 462 (1999). The plaintiffs argue that the Physician Assistant Statute meets the first prong of the McCarran-Ferguson criteria because it “effectively shifts the risks associated with the costs of physician assistant services from the insured to the insurer.” The defendant argues, on the other hand, that the Physician Assistant Statute does not spread the risk because it does not mandate benefits or expand the services offered by the terms of the applicable plan or contract. Jefferson Pilot, 14 F.3d at 569-70 (<HOLDING>) The defendant asserts that the Physician
holding that a georgia statute requiring an insurer to give prior notice of cancellation did not fall within the saving clause because the statute had no effect on the initial apportionment of risk ie what medical costs are covered that the parties made upon entering the contract holding that courts must generally give effect to the plain meaning of a statute because that is the best evidence of the legislatures intent holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute holding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes application of the saving statute to save a thra claim against the state in its capacity as an employer because the saving statute does not expressly apply to the state holding that the state statute returns the matter of subrogation to state law  ujnless the statute is excluded from the reach of the saving clause by virtue of the deemer clause