28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1976) for the period prior to October 1, 1982 and 943, 944 (7th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (rejecting without discussion the argument that the FCIA should apply to a November 1981 judgment for interest accruing after the judgment); see also Elias v. Ford Motor Co., 734 F.2d 463, 467 (1st Cir.1984) (applying the state rate under former § 1961 to an April 1982 judgment when the parties agreed that the state rate should be applied); United States v. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., 712 F.2d 938, 940 n. 5 (4th Cir.1983) (observing that “[tjhere is no indication that the statute was intended to have retroactive effect,” but noting that the parties had not raised the issue); United States ex rel. Billows Elec. Supply Co. v. E.J.T. Constr. Co., 557 F.Supp. 514, 516-17 (E.D.Pa.1983) (<HOLDING>), aff'd mem., 729 F.2d 1450 (3d Cir.1984);
holding that the statute does not apply retroactively to claims accruing prior to the effective date holding that the fcia rate should apply to a march 30 1982 judgment against a private party for the entire postjudgment period holding that the fcia does not apply to a july 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment holding that the fcia does not apply to a september 1981 judgment against the united states for interest accruing after the acts effective date holding that the fcia does not apply to a june 1981 judgment against a private party for interest accruing either after the judgment or after the effective date