the government argues that the assault is admissible to prove specific intent because it shows that Clay could develop the intent to cause serious bodily harm to innocent strangers who resist his demands. Considering both the case law and the purposes of Rule 404(b), this sweeps too broadly and risks eroding the Rule’s very purpose. It perches perilously close to proving specific intent by showing propensity, as it suggests that a person who engages in bad behavior toward another is likely to do so again. The two offenses at issue — assault and carjacking — are too unrelated and too far apart in time to be probative of whether Clay had the specific intent to do harm to White; they merely show the criminal character of Clay. See United States v. Bell, 516 F.3d 432, 443 (6th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). While a prior act may be relevant in other
holding other crimes evidence was properly admitted to establish modus operandi when the defendant attacked older women as they exited their garages in the same area of chicago holding that rule 404b evidence is probative of intent only when the prior acts were part of the same scheme or involved a similar modus operandi as the present offense holding that the rule 404b evidence admitted to prove intent was clearly relevant because intent was at issue in the trial holding that prior con victions are not related simply because the crimes used the same modus operandi were part of a crime spree or shared the same motive holding that admission of rule 404b evidence was proper