that Ward’s claim is not moot because she sought • attorney’s fees under the Declaratory Judgments Act. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hallman, 159 S.W.3d 640, 642 (Tex.2005) (citing Camarena v. Tex. Emp’t Comm’n, 754 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tex.1988)); Hansen v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 346 S.W.3d 769, 773-75 (Tex. App) — Dallas 2011, no pet.) (“[A] case under the Declaratory Judgments Act remains a live controversy, even if all requests for substantive declaratory relief become moot during the action’s pendency, as long as a claim for attorneys’ fees under the Act remains pending.”); Labrado v. County of El Paso, 132 S.W.3d 581, 589-591 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.); cf. Devon Energy Prod. Co. v. KCS Resources, LLC, 450 S.W.3d 203, 218-223 (Tex.App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). In Hallman, the supreme court held that a
holding that the opposing party must show substantial harm holding a party could seek fees where trial court lacked jurisdiction over opposing partys declaratory claim from its inception holding that a partys failure to respond to a legally plausible position in an opposing brief allowed the court to assume the point raised by the opposing brief holding the court lacked jurisdiction over claim under  2513 without certificate from district court holding that the court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute