Id. The first district found that, when viewed in context, the comment did not constitute improper bolstering. Id. Instead, as in this case, “the prosecutor’s isolated comment simply urged the jury to find the victim honest and straightforward ‘on the state of the evidence’ before it.” Id. The prosecutor’s argument in this case was not infected with the expression of personal belief that we found improper in State v. Ramos, 579 So.2d 360 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). There, the prosecutor argued to the jury: “And Susan [witness] testified, I believe she testified totally truthfully to you.” Id. at 362 (emphasis added). Unlike the prosecutor in Ramos, the prosecutor in this case did not argue credibility by injecting into the case her personal belief in Dingle’s credibility. We close by noting (<HOLDING>). Code of silence testimony may properly be the
holding that the improper admission of hearsay testimony from two witnesses whose testimony was brief and consistent with the victims testimony did not constitute drumbeat repetition of the victims statements holding that the lead detectives testimony that it is not unusual for victims or witnesses of crimes to be reluctant to cooperate with police did not improperly vouch for the truthfulness of victims testimony holding that the circuit court properly allowed the victims schoolteacher to testify as to the victims general reputation for truthfulness holding that the improper admission of hearsay testimony of two witnesses that confirmed but did not elaborate upon the victims testimony would have had only minor impact on the jury because there was little to undermine the victims credibility holding the error harmless due to eyewitness corroboration of the victims testimony