by dragging him to the ground and pinning him there because [plaintiffs] posed no danger to the officers, did nothing to provoke them, and there was no severe crime at issue.”). This is especially so with regard to the tasings and the dog bite. See Brooks v. City of Seattle, 661 F.3d 433, 446 (9th Cir.2011) (reasonable juror could find excessive force where officer contact tased plaintiff three times over the course of one minute after plaintiff, who had been pulled over and issued a speeding citation, “actively resisted arrest [by] refusing] to get out of her car when instructed to do so and stiffening] her body and clutching] her steering wheel to frustrate the officers’ efforts to remove her from her car”); Watkins v. City of Oakland, Cal., 145 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Kyles has raised genuine issues of fact
holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim holding officers punch of an inmate was not excessive force holding in case where po lice dog bit plaintiff for approximately fifteen seconds in officers presence that excessive duration of the bite and improper encouragement of a continuation of the attack by officers could constitute excessive force holding that the owner of a dog who bit the plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment when although the dog had previously jumped on the plaintiff in an aggressive manner the dog did not attempt to bite or scratch and the plaintiff conceded that she was unaware of any prior instance when the dog had bitten a person holding that in 1998 the law was clearly established that excessive duration of a police dog bite and improper encouragement of a continuation of the attack by officers could constitute excessive force