in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances.” Empire points to the language contained under paragraph 1 of this statute and contends the conduct of Litton constitutes, as a matter of law, an acceptance of its offer under the Equipment Sales Agreement. Litton, on the other hand, points to the lead paragraph of this statute and argues that paragraph 6 of the Equipment Sales Agreement, as a matter of law, “otherwise unambiguously indicated” that only home office acceptance shall constitute an acceptance of the contract. In our opinion, both ar ontaining a clause that acceptance can only be made by approval of officers at the home office could be accepted in a manner other than by such written approval. See Pratt-Gilbert Co. v. Renaud, 25 Ariz. 79, 213 P. 400 (1923) (<HOLDING>); Armour & Co. v. Celic, 294 F.2d 432 (2d Cir.
holding that performance may be valid acceptance holding that performance of employment services constituted acceptance of the offer of participation in bonus plan and a binding unilateral contract was thereby formed holding that complete performance of contract constituted acceptance holding that subsequent modifications to a written proposal which constituted a contract upon oral acceptance were not part of the contract because they were done without the knowledge or consent of other party holding that a valid contract requires acceptance of an offer