the defendant of her rights, she interrupted and said, “I’m going to stop talking.” Mayes, 8 S.W.3d at 356. Despite this pronouncement, the officer continued with his comments and questions. About four minutes later, Mayes again declared, “I’m going to shut up. I’m not going to say another goddamned thing.” The detectives neither paused nor ended the proceeding. Rather, they continued as if uninterrupted, and finally persuaded Mayes to tell the story which they had been waiting to hear. Id. Here, the officers stopped the recording once Appellant declared that he wanted to stop, but they admittedly did not terminate the interview. While the officers parsed words as to whether Appellant was “interrogated” at that point, the form the statements took is irrelevant. Mayes, 8 S.W.3d at 360 (<HOLDING>). We conclude that the trial court erred in
holding that it is well established that whether an employees actions were within the scope of employment is a question of fact and even if some of the actions were unauthorized the question of whether the actions were within the scope of employment is for the jury holding that officers were entitled to rely on the judicial officers finding of probable cause in issuing the search warrant unless they knowingly made false statements to obtain the warrant and that a challenge to the adequacy of the officers investigation does not rise to level of clearly established constitutional violation holding that regardless of whether the officers uttered declaratory rather than interrogatory statements the officers were pressing the defendant for information about the crime and their actions constituted interrogation holding that the only statements not disclosed were the probation officers recommendations which did not constitute factual information as contemplated by the statute holding that compliance with an officers orders is a material fact when deciding whether the officers use of force was reasonable