law of allied-offense sentencing while Craycraft’s appeal was pending. See Johnson, 942 N.E.2d at 1069. This intervening cause dispelled any hint of vindictiveness: On remand, the trial court had “no personal stake” in the prior sentence and “no motivation to engage in self-vindication” because it was not reversed for committing error. See Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 27, 93 S.Ct. 1977. And surely, the court was not “asked to do over what it thought it had already done correctly’ because at the original sentencing hearing it followed then-existing law to a tee. See Colten, 407 U.S. at 117, 92 S.Ct. 1953. This was not an unreasonable application of the Court’s precedents, as fairmind-ed jurists could have reached the same result. See United States v. Singletary, 458 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); cf. Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559,
holding that when a habeas petitioner in a criminal case can show that there has been an intervening change of law relitigation of an issue decided adversely on direct appeal is not barred holding that an intervening change in law  can itself justify an increased sentence on remand thereby precluding application of the pearce presumption holding that a  2255 hearing is permitted on an issue previously addressed on direct appeal when there has been an intervening change in the law holding that application of the doctrine of law of the case is discretionary and that a district court abuses its discretion in applying the law of the case doctrine only if 1 the first decision was clearly erroneous 2 an intervening change in the law occurred 3 the evidence on remand was substantially different 4 other changed circumstances exist or 5 a manifest injustice would otherwise result holding that court must remand to the agency to determine whether intervening change in policy applied retrospectively rather than modifying agencys order to incorporate the change