statements they allegedly made to Cason about Piper being anti-Semitic and having persecuted Michael because of his Jewish heritage were constitutionally protected statements of opinion. Because we have concluded that this determination was erroneous, we also conclude that he should not have dismissed this claim. Piper submitted sufficient admissible evidence in opposition to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment to warrant jury findings both that the defendants’ conduct was extreme and outrageous and that it had a “severe and traumatic effect upon [Piper’s] emotional tranquility.” See Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 145-146 (1976), quoting from Alcorn v. Ambro Engr., Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 498 (1970). See also Kelly v. General Tel. Co., 136 Cal. App. 3d 278, 287 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Also, as a result of the motion judge’s
holding that it is not enough that the defendant has acted with an intent that is tortious malicious or even criminal or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress the conduct itself must be extreme and outrageous holding that mere insults indignities and threats are not extreme and outrageous acts holding that assistant principals allegedly defective investigation did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct holding that spreading of deliberately false statements that employee in effect committed forgery constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct holding employer discipline and written and verbal criticism of employees job performance not extreme and outrageous