BY THE MGCRA Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred in concluding that her common-law claims are preempted by the MGCRA. Plaintiff argues that the preemption doctrine only applies when a law enacted by a superior authority precludes a law enacted by an inferior authority. Plaintiff maintains that the preemption doctrine does not apply to this case because state statutes cannot preempt common-law causes of action. We agree with plaintiff that the preemption doctrine is traditionally applied when a federal law takes precedence over a state law. Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v de la Cuesta, 458 US 141, 152-153; 102 S Ct 3014; 73 L Ed 2d 664 (1982); see also, e.g., Abela v Gen Motors Corp, 257 Mich App 513,525; 669 NW2d 271 (2003), aff d 469 Mich 603; 677 NW2d 325 (2004) (<HOLDING>); Martinez v Ford Motor Co, 224 Mich App 247;
holding that because the federal arbitration act 9 usc 1 et seq preempts michigans lemon law mcl 2571401 et seq the plaintiffs lemon law claim should have been resolved through binding arbitration holding that the age discrimination in employment act adea 29 usc  621 et seq was not a valid abrogation of the states sovereign immunity holding that prejudgment interest ordinarily should be awarded on damages pursuant to claims under the copyright act of 1909 17 usc  1 et seq 1976 ed superceded by the copyright act of 1976 17 usc  101 et seq holding that denial of vsf benefits to disabled retirees does not violate the ada the rehabilitation act 29 usc  791 et seq or the age discrimination in employment act of 1967 29 usc  621 et seq and that plaintiffs due process and first amendment claims were frivolous holding that the plaintiffs state commonlaw tort claims were preempted by the national motor vehicle safety act 15 usc 1381 et seq