phase.” Id. at 387 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Rather, both sides are entitled to produce additional evidence. See Mann v. State, 453 So.2d 784, 786 (Fla.1984) (explaining that at a de novo resentencing “both sides may, if they choose, present additional evidence”). In fact, because resentencing is de novo, the State was required to produce evidence on sentencing issues even if the State established the fact at the original sentencing. This was required whether or not the defendant disputed the issues in the prior sentencing proceeding. See, e.g., Tubwell v. State, 922 So.2d 378, 379 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (stating that because resentencing is de novo, “the state was not relieved of its burden to prove the prior offenses”); Rich v. State, 814 So.2d 1207, 1208 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (<HOLDING>); Baldwin v. State, 700 So.2d 95, 96 (Fla. 2d
holding that at resentencing the state must present evidence on an enhanced sentencing factor despite having done so at the prior sentencing hearing holding that even though the defendant did not challenge his prior convictions at the original sentencing lawofthecase principles do not insulate the state from proving them at resentencing holding that at a resentencing the state must again prove the basis for an enhanced sentence even though such evidence was produced at the original sentencing holding that on resentencing following reversal the state was required to introduce evidence to prove the defendant qualified for an enhanced sentence and could not only rely upon evidence introduced at a prior sentencing hearing holding that because resentencing following reversal is a new proceeding the state must introduce evidence that the defendant qualifies for enhanced sentencing even though such evidence was introduced in the previous sentencing hearing