It would be impossible for service providers to screen each of their millions of postings for possible problems.” Id. Congress considered the weight of the speech interests implicated and chose to immunize providers of interactive computer services to avoid any restrictive effect. Id. This does not mean, however, that the party who actually posts the defamatory message can escape liability. Id. But Congress made a policy choice not to deter harmful online speech through the separate route of imposing tort liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for other parties’ potentially injurious messages. Id. at 330-31. Other courts have adopted this broad reading of the protections afforded by Section 230(c). See, e.g., Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418-19 (5th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d
holding that the information is not protected by attorneyclient privilege holding that all claims submitted by defendant were false because they were acquired by kickback holding that operator of social media website was protected by section 230 from suit by minors who were sexually assaulted by men they met on the site holding that webbased service provider was protected by section 230 from claim by user who claimed he received a computer virus from third party and endured derogatory comments directed at him by other users recognizing that oregon criminal statutes were aimed at practices of luring and grooming that expose minors to sexually explicit materials in the hopes of lowering their inhibitions against engaging in sexual conduct but finding the statutes unconstitutional because they reach a significant amount of material that is not obscene as to minors