a contract or statute, trial courts do not have inherent authority to require a losing party to pay the prevailing party’s fees.”). Although both the Builders’ answer and motion requested attorneys’ fees, neither pleading stated a statutory or contractual basis for the attorneys’ fees request. The Polanskys’ only claim was a breach-of-contract claim. In their petition, they sought attorneys’ fees under chapter 38 of the civil practices and remedies code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 38.001(8) (West 2008) (establishing that person may recover re , 910 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, pet. denied) (“Section 38.001 does not provide for attorney’s fees in the pure defense of a claim.”); Energen Resources MAQ, Inc. v. Dalbosco, 23 S.W.3d 551, 558 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, even if it had been asserted,
holding that attorneys could not recover fees in excess of amount billed holding defendant could not recover attorneys fees under predecessor to statute 38001 when defendant did not present contract claim holding defendant that did not present its own claim under chapter 38 could not recover attorneys fees holding that chapter 38 permits an insured to recover attorney fees from the insurer holding trial court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded attorneys fees because the declaratory relief action addressed validity of note and was not used as a mere ploy to recover attorneys fees