offer, but since the Rules of Evidence don’t apply I don’t specifically receive exhibits.” 2 R. 34. It is true that “the rules of evidence normally applicable in criminal trials do not operate with full force at hearings before the judge to determine the admissibility of evidence.” United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172-73, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974) (discussing Fed.R.Evid. 104(a) & 1101(d)(1)). But this principle is based on the assumption that more evidence should be included in a pretrial hearing because the judge, unlike a jury, can give the evidence “such weight as his judgment and experience counsel.” Id. at 172, 175, 94 S.Ct. 988 (reversing the district court’s exclusion of hearsay evidence); see also United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1270-71 (10th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). Insofar as suppression hearings are not
holding the required knowledge under the reasonable suspicion standard is that a school administrators search of each student must forecast a moderate chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing holding only reasonable suspicion is required to conduct a field sobriety test holding that an officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop even when his suspicion that a law has been violated is based on a reasonable mistake of law holding that refusal to consent to search cannot support a finding of reasonable suspicion holding that the excluded evidence required a finding of reasonable suspicion