were not being met, she did so in an official capacity, not as a private citizen on a matter of public interest.”); Nadolecki, 2016 WL 4768823, at *7 (“Further, even if [the plaintiffs] communications were not made through official channels, or up the chain of command, courts have dismissed similar claims so long as the teachers were talking about the educational needs of the students they teach.”); Winder v. Erste, 566 F.3d 209, 215 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“ In orn-eases applying Garcetti we have consistently held that a public employee speaks without First Amendment protection when he reports conduct that interferes with his job responsibilities, even if the report is made outside his chain of command.”); see also Platt v. Inc. Vill. of Southampton, 391 Fed.Appx. 62, 64 (2d Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, the Court concludes, as a
holding police officer is a public official holding that a police officer speaking to a public official about his concerns over public safety issues is speaking in his capacity  as a police officer and not as a citizen holding that issues of prison security public safety and official corruption are matters of public concern holding that police officer who vocalized safety concerns about accidental discharges of firearms spoke pursuant to his job duties as a public employee holding that the plaintiffs speech was not constitutionally protected because it was made in his official capacity and there was simply no evidence that he was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern