an officer of a corporation owning the majority of stock in a corporation that owned the corporation that served as general partner of the partnership which owned the project, but rather was an agent of Phillips or the corporation that Phillips worked for. As such, as a matter of law, Phillips and Cashwell are not “persons” under section 1715z-4a as “any officer, director, or partner of an entity owning the project.” Second, the court interprets “any owner” in the phrase “any ... assignee, successor in interest, or agent of any owner” to mean owner of a project, and not owner of the owner of a project, consistent with the other use in subsection 1715z-4a(a)(2) of “owns a project,” “owns the project,” and “owning the project.” See United States v. Dauray, 215 F.3d 257, 262 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). There is no dispute that Phillips and
holding that statutory terms should be construed with reference to their associated words and phrases holding that the phrases in connection with and associated with are synonymous with the terms with respect to with reference to and relating to which mean connected by reason of an established or discoverable relation holding that legal duties imposed on railroads by the common law fall within the scope of these broad phrases holding that the meaning of doubtful terms or phrases may be determined by reference to their relationship with other associated words or phrases noscitur a sociis holding that proximate cause is legal concept with particular meaning in law and is not in category of words or phrases commonly known and understood by lay public thus it was error not to give instruction defining it