rule concerning splitting,” there is no similar prohibition. Because Clu-siau dealt with a separate doctrine and was based on different practical considerations, we do not find it controlling here. ¶ 14 Our conclusion in this case comports with the majority of jurisdictions that have addressed the issue. See, e.g., Vincent v. Clean Water Action Project, 939 P.2d 469, 473 (Colo.App.1997) (concluding that judgment in a court of limited jurisdiction “precludes later litigation of the same issues that were or could have been brought”); Orselet v. DeMatteo, 206 Conn. 542, 539 A.2d 95, 99 (1988) (finding claim preclusion prevented a subsequent action for personal injuries when a prior small claims judgment had awarded repair costs); Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 57 P.3d 803, 806 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Bagley v. Hughes A. Bag-ley, Inc., 465 N.W.2d
holding that claims including constitutional claims must be asserted in trial court to be raised on appeal holding that claim preclusion applies to small claims court adjudication and that judicial economy is not served by encouraging resolution of property claims in small claims court and other claims in district court recognizing that without claim preclusion plaintiffs in small claims cases will not feel obligated to present all of their claims or all of their evidence  and they can simply file again  if need be holding that if small claims court judgments do not have claim preclusive effect then small claims courts become a false forum and these policy objectives are not met holding that the public harm requirement applies to fraudulent inducement claims because the fraud claims arise from related contract claims