As an initial matter, the Court agrees that the language of the claim plainly describes the combination of TDF and FTC as a co-formulation, rather than a product for co-administration. It would be nonsensical to interpret the claim otherwise, for why would the claim describe the combination of TDF and FTC with a binder, lubricant, and disintegrant were it only discussing two separate products for co-administration? ('397 patent, col. 32:4-13). Similarly, why would the inventors care so much about degradation between the active pharmaceutical ingredients in TDF and FTC were they simply together in the same package, rather than in the same fixed dose formulation? ('264 patent, col. 30:46-52). See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314 (citing Brown v. 3M, 265 F.3d 1349, 1352 (Fed.Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>)). That being said, the claims themselves fail
recognizing that the court must give meaning to all the words in the claims recognizing that claim meaning will sometimes be readily apparent even to lay judges and that claim construction in such cases involves little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words recognizing that we must give meaning to all the words in the claims holding that a statute is not vague where the words themselves  possess a common and generally accepted meaning holding that proximate cause is legal concept with particular meaning in law and is not in category of words or phrases commonly known and understood by lay public thus it was error not to give instruction defining it