be applied to the fictional liability, requiring a deduction for the prepayments and credits. It is. also plausible to read the “Notwithstanding” caveat as recognizing and reinforcing a ■ distinct method of calculating the “indemnification” obligation for the not-yet-completed 2011 taxes due, disregarding the usual method of determining a “loss.”' Indeed, as we have described, section 10.02(a) creates both a tax liability -and thus an indemnification obligation where,none in fact existed because of KOR’s financial circumstances. That explicit' fiction -belies the inevitability of the parties’ intention to.apply a literal concept of “loss” to calculate the 2011- tax indemnification amount; See Mass. Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co. v. Town of Danvers, 411 Mass. 39, 577 N.E.2d 283, 294-95 (1991) (<HOLDING>). To the contrary, while section 10.01 as a
holding that absent unusual circumstances this court must apply the plain meaning of a statute holding that plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive recognizing that plain meaning does not control where context shows that the parties have assigned an unusual meaning to a term holding that court of appeals erred in relying on the plain meaning of a statute when the legislative history clearly indicated another meaning holding that a statute should where possible be construed according to its plain meaning and as a whole giving meaning to all its parts