to -8, from arguing that plaintiff voluntarily left her employment, despite a contrary finding by the Board of Review on plaintiffs unemployment claim. Id. at 525, 897 A.2d 1003. The Court based its determination on the differences “in the quality and extensiveness of the procedures followed” in administrative unemployment determinations and in Law Division actions. Ibid. In the case before us, plaintiff expressly eschews reliance upon either res judicata or collateral estoppel, recognizing the critical absence of the element of identity of parties or privies. Rather, as noted, relying primarily upon Golian, supra, plaintiff argues that she is entitled to bring before the jury the fact that she had been declared disabled through an SSA uper. 590, 593, 259 A.2d 719 (App.Div.1969) (<HOLDING>), certif. denied, 55 N.J. 444, 262 A.2d 700
recognizing a selfevaluative privilege to railroad companys investigation of an accident in light of the publics stake in the improvement of railroad safety holding negligence per se not applicable to violation of railroad commission regulation holding that reinstatement of the grievant a railroad employee terminated for drug and alcohol use violated the welldefined and dominant public policy against a railroads employment of individuals whose impaired judgment due to the use of drugs or alcohol could seriously threaten public safety and placed the railroad at risk of violating the federal railroad administration regulations holding that in a personal injury action against a railroad a report containing the conclusions of a hearing examiner of the public utilities commission regarding an alleged hazardous railroad crossing was obvious hearsay holding claims that a railroad crossing was extrahazardous that warning devices were inadequate and that the train was not operating at a speed commensurate with the hazardous nature of the crossing were all preempted by federal law