counsel’s contemplated course of action on his behalf. However satisfactory telephonic appearance and written correspondence may be in other proceedings, or where one’s client it not mute, it is beyond peradventure that petitioner’s counsel here was precluded from representing his client in any meaningful sense of the term. While longer continuances might have solved the preparation problem here, the short continuances granted by the IJ were categorically insufficient. As the Supreme Court has emphasized, “a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay can render the right to defend with counsel an empty formality .... ” Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 849-50, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964), quoted in Rios-Berrios, 776 F.2d at 862 (<HOLDING>); see also Baires, 856 F.2d at 91 (noting that
holding denial of continuance to be an abuse of discretion holding that while reviewing courts usually defer to discretion of trial judge in granting or denying a continuance grant of two short continuances where alien requested time to find a lawyer is an abuse of discretion holding that the decision whether to grant a continuance lies in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion holding that the decision whether to grant a continuance lies in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not bedisturbed absent an abuse of discretion