fact that the encumbered property was sold to the Bank at a foreclosure sale on November 28, 1983, directly pursuant to the foreclosure judgments entered by the Illinois circuit court. Because the Henrys’ RICO claims could impair the rights established in the state court mortgage foreclosure proceedings, we hold that they are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Our result is unaffected by the fact that the Henrys may not have been able to bring their RICO claims in the state court proceedings. No federal Court of Appeals has considered whether jurisdiction over RICO claims is exclusively federal. See County of Cook v. Midcon Corp., 773 F.2d 892, 905 n. 4 (7th Cir.1985) (suggesting, but not holding, that jurisdiction is concurrent); Karel v. Kroner, 635 F.Supp. 725 (N.D.Ill.1986) (<HOLDING>). Even assuming, however, that the federal
holding that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over rico claims and that plaintiffs federal rico claim was barred by res judicata since he failed to bring his rico claim along with his state fraud claims in prior state court action holding that plaintiff had standing to bring a rico conspiracy claim despite his inability to bring a substantive rico claim holding that federal jurisdiction over rico claims is concurrent and not exclusive holding that plaintiffs cannot claim that a conspiracy to violate rico existed if they do not adequately plead a substantive violation of rico holding that federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over  1983 claims