16(b)(2) would not preclude its discovery, for we understand this provision only to state the limits of discovery under the authority of Rule 16, not the limits of the court’s potential discovery powers. See Middleton v. United States, 401 A.2d 109, 116-20 (D.C.1979) (noting that while "any venture beyond the[ ] limited principles [of the Jencks Act and Rule 16 discovery] must be subjected to close scrutiny,” more extensive disclosure may be sustained ”[i]n proper circumstances” under the court’s “‘inherent powers' over the discovery process"). Furthermore, to the extent that our ruling here authorizes discovery during trial, Rule 16 is irrelevant, for it applies only to pretrial discovery. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 234-35, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 2168-69, 45 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975) (<HOLDING>); Waldron v. United States, 370 A.2d 1372, 1373
holding a defendant is liable as a control person if the defendant had the power to control the general affairs of the entity primarily liable at the time the entity violated the securities laws but declining to decide whether power to control means simply abstract power to control or actual exercise of the power to control internal quotations omitted holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law recognizing trial courts decision on discovery issues implies a finding that requested discovery was not reasonably available holding that fedrcrimp 16 does not control courts discovery power once trial has begun recognizing that court has inherent power to control the judicial business before it