product,” and that Dr. Maddox “rendered his opinion without being prepared to discuss the circumstances of any individual’s exposure”). Betz answered the question with a resounding “No.” However, the Betz question simply is not posed by this case. Substantial exposure to many products does not equate to substantial exposure to one or more of Appellants’ products. But that Dr. DuPont was unable to testify to the relative exposure to each product does not preclude submission of the case to a jury regarding the degree of exposure to Appellants’ products. No Pennsylvania court has held that product identification and the nature of a plaintiffs exposure must be established by expert testimony on peril of dismissal. See Weible v. Allied Signal, Inc., 968 A.2d 521, 527 (Pa.Super.2008) (<HOLDING>); Andaloro v. Armstrong World Indust., Inc.,
holding that intent and knowledge can be proved by circumstantial evidence holding that the link between a defendants property and a plaintiffs childhood exposure to lead paint and dust may be established through circumstantial evidence even if expert opinion testimony is not available holding that the nexus between an asbestos product and plaintiff may be established by direct and circumstantial evidence and that testimony by someone with knowledge relating to the plaintiffs workplace exposure to an asbestoscontaining product is admissible holding that a cause of action on the theory of strict liability may be properly pled by alleging 1 the manufacturers relationship to the product in question 2 the unreasonably dangerous condition of the product and 3 the existence of a proximate causal connection between the condition of the product and the plaintiffs injury holding that evidence that would normally be admissible may be excluded if the evidence was a direct or indirect product of an unlawful search