in Maryland and though she had resided in Maryland, she always claimed Texas as her residence. Karen’s counsel called Gregory to testify and established that Gregory had once been a Fort Worth resident, once owned a home in Fort Worth, attended T.C.U., and voted in Fort Worth in the past. We find that Gregory failed to proffer evidence to support the public and private factors necessary to justify the trial court’s declining jurisdiction based on common law forum non conveniens. A trial court abuses its discretion when there is no evidence to support its ruling. See Loftin v. Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tex.1989); D.N.S. v. Schattman, 937 S.W.2d 151, 155 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1997, orig. proceeding); Van Winkle-Hooker Co. v. Rice, 448 S.W.2d 824, 828 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1969, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Thus, we sustain issues one and two. We find
holding abuse of discretion is established if district court decision was based on an error of law holding in a case where a class was certified that there was an absence of collusion since the dismissal based on a string of adverse decisions which had drained the case of legal merit made the dismissal the functional equivalent of an involuntary dismissal recognizing potential for abuse of dna information despite statutory safeguards but in the absence of evidence of abuse refusing to adjudicate based on speculation holding that dismissal based on forum non conveniens was an abuse of discretion in absence of evidence other than plaintiffs nonresidence in texas holding that the dismissal of a frivolous action reviewed for abuse of discretion