First Circuit has similarly stated that, One of the principles of statutory interpretation is that a ‘settled construction of an important federal statute should not be disturbed unless and until Congress so decides.’ Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 74, 110 S.Ct. 945, 108 L.Ed.2d 47 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring). We recognize that ‘considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory construction, where Congress is free to change [the courts’] interpretation of its legislation.’ Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736, 97 S.Ct. 2061, 52 L.Ed.2d 707 (1977). Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, United States Dep’t of Labor, 136 F.3d 34, 42 (1st Cir.1998); see also United States v. Lindia, 82 F.3d 1154, 1162 (1st Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); see generally, United States v. Hudson, 970
holding that district courts calculation of drug quantity under guidelines for purposes of sentencing did not violate stare decisis under neal because such calculation did not conflict with any controlling sentencing precedent holding that the district court properly considered the moisture content in the calculation of the weight of the marijuana for sentencing purposes holding that the district court normally should begin with a guidelines calculation holding that a sentencing courts drugquantity calculation can exceed the jurys drugquantity calculation  by over fifty times  so long as the sentence imposed does not exceed the maximum allowed by the jurys calculation and the sentencing courts calculation was supported by sufficient evidence holding that where defendant objected in the district court only to the loss calculation and not specifically to the calculation of restitution the issue of restitution was not properly presented  to the district court