both involve claims of discrimination and retaliation, they neither resulted from nor are they tied to the same MDOC actions. The gravamen of McCoy’s federal complaint is that his 2004 termination and the activities and complaints surrounding that termination, which took place from June 2004 onward, are, despite everything that may have occurred previously, themselves actionable. In essence, the origin of the two claims is simply not the same. Cf. Brownridge, 321 N.W.2d at 799 (“Since both actions arose out of the same discharge from employment, both actions arose out of the same transaction, both actions involved points which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and both involved the same matter in issue.” (alteration and quotation marks omitted)); Young, 471 F.3d at 681 (<HOLDING>); Cemer v. Marathon Oil Co., 583 F.2d 830, 832
recognizing that an agencys decision to terminate an employee is presumed correct holding that although physicians letter requesting an accommodation for disabled employee came after employers decision to terminate employer should have reconsidered the decision to terminate his employment holding that res judicata properly barred claims based on an employers decision to terminate an employee because the termination was not a fresh act of discrimination rather it was the same decision not to allow the employee to return to work that the employee had challenged previously holding that an employers promise to pay a bonus to an employee was not enforceable where the employee was already obligated under a written contract to perform the services in question holding that the employers failure to interact with the employee does not preclude the employee from losing on summary judgment because the employee must still prove that a reasonable accommodation could have been made