by “resolving” Dispute I by passage of the 1999 Act. The separation-of-powers doctrine provides: “In the government of this state, except in the instances in this Constitution hereinafter expressly directed or permitted, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them; to the end that it may be a government of laws and not of men.” Ala. Const, of 1901, Art. Ill, § 43. The Daphne plaintiffs argue that the power to render a judgment that resolves a case belongs only .to the judicial branch of government. See Ex parte Jenkins, 723 So.2d 649, 656 (Ala.1998) (<HOLDING>). The Daphne plaintiffs cite the preamble to
recognizing that the application of a retroactive amendment is discretionary holding that the retroactive application of a statute to change the reopening provisions of paternity judgments finalized before the statute was enacted violated the separationofpowers doctrine holding no retroactive application holding retroactive application holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute