policy of the Act — achieving uniformity of cigarette labeling. See 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp.1999) (stating that one policy of the act is to avoid “diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations with respect to any relationship between health and smoking.”) Plaintiff attempts to distinguish her claims from those in Cipollone by arguing that her claims would not impose a duty with respect to “advertising or promotion.” This argument is unpersuasive. Each of the strict liability and negligence allegations enumerated in footnote six would impose liability for failing to disclose information in addition to that required by the Labeling Act. For this reason, the claims are preempted. See Allgood v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 80 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Plaintiffs strict liability and
holding that a failure to warn was not a policy judgment holding that all claims premised upon a failure to warn after 1969 are preempted holding that fifra preempts state law failure to warn claims holding that the plaintiffs causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an erisa plan holding that defense may only be raised in context of negligent failure to warn claims