range, though advisory, is presumed reasonable,” United States v. Shafer, 438 F.3d 1225, 1227 (8th Cir.2006). Nevertheless, because the sentencing guidelines are advisory, “the [district] court has a range of choice, and ... its decision will not be disturbed as long as it stays within that range and is not' influenced by any mistake of law.” Haack, 403 F.3d at 1004 (quoting Kern v. TXO Prod. Corp., 738 F.2d 968, 970 (8th Cir.1984)). Critically, the “range of choice is limited.” Id. “[T]he farther the district court varies from the presumptively reasonable guidelines range, the more compelling the justification based on the § 3553(a) factors must be.” United States v. McMannus, 436 F.3d 871, 874 (8th Cir.2006); see also United States v. Dalton, 404 F.3d 1029, 1033 (8th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). A district court abuses its sentencing
holding that equitable tolling under  2255 would be allowed if at all only for extraordinary circumstances holding that an accounting is an extraordinary remedy holding in review of a downward departure that an extraordinary reduction must be supported by extraordinary circumstances holding that an injunction is an extraordinary remedy recognizing that postoffense rehabilitative efforts while normally not grounds for departure may support departure in extraordinary circumstances and noting that the totality of the circumstances may justify a departure where a single circumstance is not alone sufficient