obsolete.” (Ibid.) Whether or not the Marques court was right to be' persuaded, it was surely right to decline to act. It is not the role of a court to “reconsider" the provision’s underlying “policy .... That task is for Congress”—and for Congress alone. (Kemper v. First Nat. Bank in Newton, supra, 94 Ill.App.3d at p. 172 [418 N.E.2d at p. 821]; see Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1099.) It may be noted that, although, after codification, Congress has often amended the neighbors of section 24, Fifth, and has done so materially (see hist. notes, 12 U.S.C.A. (1989 ed.) foll. § 24, pp. 38-43; hist. notes, 12 U.S.C.A. (1999 supp.) foll. § 24, p. 8), it has never amended the provision itself in any way. 3 Compare In re Sweeney (Bankr. N.D. Ohio) 113 B.R. 359, 364 (<HOLDING>). 4 See Mueller v. First Nat. Bank of the Quad
holding that the bankruptcy reform act of 1978 publ no 95598 92 stat 2549 precluded dismissal of cases pending before enactment of the reform act in order to refile under the act holding that the plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants contacts with the united states as a whole support the exercise of jurisdiction consistent with the constitution and laws of the united states holding to the effect that a court must consider section 24 fifth in conjunction with the antidiscrimination provisions of the bankruptcy reform act of 1978 as amended which are codified at title 11 of the united states code holding to the effect that section 24 fifth has been impliedly amended by title vii holding the broad jurisdictional grant given the bankruptcy courts under the 1978 bankruptcy act unconstitutional