Mr. Warren incurred attorney fees that were legitimate and reasonable during the pendency of his underlying appeal, he is entitled to reimbursement of those fees and may properly recover them through a pro se EAJA application. See Phillips, supra. The Secretary also urges this Court to deny the EAJA application because, although it contains an itemized statement of hours Mr. Stanley expended, it is not “certified by any attorney of record.” Secretary’s Response to Warren EAJA App. at 5. The EAJA statute, however, contains no such certification requirement. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (requiring “an itemized statement from any attorney ... stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were computed”); but see Shaw v. Gober, 10 Vet.App. 498, 500 (1997) (<HOLDING>), overruled by Carpenter v. Principi, 15
holding that the eaja application satisfied the eaja content requirements because it contained among other things an itemized statement of the fees sought  supported by an affidavit from the appellants counsel holding that a cause of action based on eaja will be deemed to have survived the death of the aggrieved party and  the personal representative of the deceased partys estate or any other appropriate person may be substituted as the prevailing party to whom payment of an eaja award may be made holding that the buckhannon rule governs an application for fees under the eaja holding that the prosecution of an equitable adjustment claim before a contracting officer was not a civil action within the meaning of the eaja holding that payment of eaja fees directly to the attorney also is consistent with the broad purpose for enacting the eaja  if the commissioners narrow position was adopted there would be a substantial risk that counsel for a successful plaintiff might not be paid which would have a chilling effect on the willingness of attorneys to represent indigent claimants in social security cases thus thwarting the primary purpose the eaja was enacted