114 (2d Cir.2000) (new claim does not relate back to dismissed petition), because filing the new claim in a second petition will encounter the severe limitations that AEDPA imposes on the filing of second or successive petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). If his petition contains unexhausted claims that he wishes to pursue, he must return to state court and exhaust these claims. Finally, he must make sure that he has complied with the one-year statute of limitations that AEDPA establishes for filing habeas petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Id. at 378-79. (footnote omitted). The court concluded that although the petitioner had not requested a stay, he should nevertheless have received one. In addition, to address the concern that a petitioner might take an undue amount of time to pu 00), (<HOLDING>); James v. Giles, 221 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th
recognizing collateral attack on void order holding that dismissal is not appropriate when that step could jeopardize the timeliness of a collateral attack holding that a judgment as to the title in a prior litigation was not subject to collateral attack holding that remand was the appropriate remedy when an erroneous step four determination has precluded any analysis under step five holding that where a defendants claim did not amount to a complete denial of counsel it could not form the basis of a collateral attack