interpretation question now before us. [ 35 As with all such questions, our job is to discern and give effect to the General Assembly's intent. Nowak v. Suthers, 2014 CO 14, 120, 320 P.3d 340, 344. That intent, according to the majority, is clear from the old revocation statute's plain language: "[It] simply does not address the legality of the initial contact." Maj. op. 117. By requiring "probable cause," the majority reasons that the General Assembly intended to refer only to the "quantum and quality" of evidence necessary to sustain revocation. Id. at T 14. 136 Yet that interpretation is new. For years, divisions of the court of appeals agreed that the statute's "probable cause" requirement implied a lawful stop. Seq, e.g., Peterson v. Tipton, 833 P.2d 830, 831 (Colo.App.1992) (<HOLDING>); see also Baldwin v. Huber, 223 P.3d 150, 152
holding that a conclusion that reasonable suspicion supported the stop of a vehicle was subsumed within the trial courts ruling that the officer had probable cause for the stop holding that the initial stop by officer was based on reasonable suspicion that defendant was impersonating a police officer although another officer arrested defendant for privacy act violation holding that a police officer may stop a driver where the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion regarding the commission of a civil traffic violation holding that absent probable cause to arrest a police officer may approach an individual to conduct a brief investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal conduct is afoot holding that a police officer may not direct a driver to submit to aleohol testing absent probable cause and by implication reasonable suspicion for the initial stop