she “often” had “[djeficieneies of [e]oneentration, [persistence or [p]aee, resulting in [fjailure to [cjomplete [tjasks in a[t]imely [mjanner.” App. Vol. II, at 33. Ms. Nixon contends that, in his RFC assessment, the ALJ should have included these nonexertional limitations imposed by Ms. Nixon’s mental impairment and that his RFC is, therefore, deficient and not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree. The ALJ’s RFC assessment included the limitation that it was impossible for Ms. Nixon to perform tasks requiring understanding, remembering, or carrying out more than simple instructions. These limitations in the ALJ’s RFC assessment adequately account for Ms. Nixon’s deficiencies in concentration, persistence, and pace. See Howard v. Massanari, 255 F.3d 577, 582 (8th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). We conclude the ALJ’s assessment of her RFC
holding that words which expressly refer to adequate legal description provide nucleus of description that is legally sufficient for statute of frauds holding that description of claimant as capable of doing simple repetitive jobs adequately accounted for deficiencies of concentration persistence or pace holding that a written description analysis occurs as of the filing date sought holding that description was sufficiently detailed holding in the context of a conveyance that it is only when a description is manifestly too meager imperfect or uncertain to serve as adequate means of identification that the court can adjudge the description insufficient as a matter of law punctuation omitted