remedies provided in sections 400.022 and 400.023, Florida Statutes (2003). Shotts, 86 So.3d at 474; Gessa, 86 So.3d at 493. In the instant case, the arbitration agreement did not limit any specific statutory remedies created by the Legislature. Instead, Irving contends that the arbitration agreement violated public policy (and is substantively unconscionable) because requiring a party to equally pay for an arbitrator “can easily frustrate the remedial purpose of chapter 400 by denying access to arbitration for the indigent plaintiff.” However, Irving did not provide any evidence to show that the costs of arbitration were so prohibitive as to prevent any resident of Pompano Rehab from pursuing statutory remedies. See FI-Tampa, LLC v. Kelly-Hall, 135 So.3d 563, 568 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (<HOLDING>); Hardin, 122 So.3d at 922 (holding that
holding that arbitration agreement signed three days after patients admission to facility and that required cost sharing did not violate public policy even though the particular litigant could not afford to arbitrate her claims holding that proposed invalidation of the entire arbitration agreement even if the court were convinced that the plaintiff could not afford to pay for the arbitration proceedings was unnecessarily radical because the court could instead simply nullify the fee provisions of the arbitration agreement and force the defendant employer to bear the expense of arbitration holding that arbitration agreement requiring litigant to pay onehalf of arbitration costs failed to provide an accessible forum in which litigant could resolve his statutory rights holding in motion to compel arbitration that personal jurisdiction is not created merely by a partys agreement to arbitrate in a particular forum holding unconscionable an arbitration agreement requiring employees to arbitrate claims against the employer but not requiring the employer to arbitrate claims against the employees