testified that he was competent to opine about such blood spatter patterns based on his training as a crime scene analyst, and attorney Smith testified that he did not make an additional objection because it was not necessary for Richards to be an expert to testify as he did. Ultimately, the postconviction court determined that Everett failed to show that attorney Smith was deficient. We agree. To the extent that Everett claims that attorney Smith was deficient for not making a subsequent objection about Richards’ qualifications, such argument is without merit. At the time of Everett’s trial in 2002, Florida district courts had held that a party was not required to reassert his objection after it had been overruled. See, e.g., Howard v. State, 616 So.2d 484, 485 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (<HOLDING>); Thomas v. State, 599 So.2d 158, 159-60 n. 1
holding it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude testimony holding that trial court did not err in refusing to allow defendant to introduce evidence of witnesss pending indictment when witnesss testimony regarding defendants participation in murder was virtually identical to witnesss written statement which was sworn to on day of murder and prior to offense for which witness was indicted holding that where defendant sought to exclude evidence prior to trial and again just prior to witnesss testimony at issue it was not necessary for defendant to object to testimony when it was actually put before jury holding that witnesss prior grand jury testimony was inconsistent with his claimed loss of memory at trial holding that employer waived issue on appeal of whether employees testimony was unduly prejudicial by failing to object when testimony was offered at trial