not be expected to endure it. Finally, this Court has also held that mere termination of employment will not support an emotional distress claim, but if “the manner of termination evinces circumstances of oppressive conduct and abuse of a position of authority vis-a-vis plaintiff, it may provide grounds for the tort action.” Crump v. P & C Food Markets, Inc., 154 Vt. 284, 296, 576 A.2d 441, 448 (1990); see also Goosens v. AT&T Corp., No. EP-00-CA-002-DB, 2000 WL 33348222, at *3 (W.D.Tex. April 3, 2000) (simply terminating an employee without more cannot amount to IIED). Dulude’s allegations, taken as true, fail to demonstrate that FAHC’s actions during the actual grievance procedure and termination process were extreme and outrageous. See Crump, 154 Vt. at 296-97, 576 A.2d at 449 (<HOLDING>). This Court has held that absent at least one
holding that a complaint filed within three years of an accident complied with the michigan court rules and was not barred by the statute of limitations even though service was made more than three years after the accident holding that there was sufficient evidence to go to a jury on an iied claim when an employee with eighteen years of service was summarily fired after being falsely accused of theft kept in a three hour meeting with no opportunity to leave or eat lunch and badgered to sign a confession holding that there was no question that the full and fair opportunity element was met where there was no indication that such an opportunity was unavailable holding that a confession was voluntary despite the fact that an officer falsely told the defendant that physical evidence connected him to the crime holding that the jury should determine whether an employee eating lunch in a hospital cafeteria was within the course and scope of employment where factual disputes arose as to whether he was eating lunch in a place required or encouraged by his employer whether other employees regularly ate there and whether the employee had a choice in where to eat lunch