provides no basis for believing the court itself understood its finding to be one of constitutional fact or even of constitutional significance. The trial court’s order, therefore, cannot provide the foundation for Judge Mack’s constitutional argument that “recognition” means endorsement of the sort absolutely forbidden by the Constitution. (3) Turning to the constitutional question itself, I agree with Judge Mack that regulations literally compelling someone to speak moral or ideological statements are directly and extremely intrusive upon the individu al’s freedom of belief and expression; probably no countervailing state interest could render such compulsions constitutional. See West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943) (<HOLDING>); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 81 S.Ct.
holding that where the plaintiffs evidence supported a finding that the defendants had applied force to restrain him the jury must determine not only whether the officers were justified in using force at all but if so whether the degree of force actually used was reasonable holding force to be an element of pre1994 amendment  111 which may be satisfied by proof of force or threat of force holding the takings clause inapplicable to the states of its own force holding states cannot force schoolchildren to say pledge of allegiance to flag holding unconstitutional as applied a statute that punished words that cast contempt on the flag of the united states