at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is ... one of identification made after perceiving the person.” The defendants argue that the Rule does not contemplate identifications of this nature but, rather, pertains to the selection of defendants from lineups or photo spreads. They also contend that testimony regarding when and where Joseph saw the defendants did not qualify as an identification. The government responds that an identification without the when and where would be nonsensical. It also argues that the Rule was designed to en th Cir. 1986) (stating that FBI Agent testimony regarding prior statements of witness who recanted at trial was admissible); United States v. Jarrad, 754 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1985) (<HOLDING>). Certainly the purpose of the Rule seems to be
holding that agents testimony as to witnesss identification was not hearsay holding that fbi agents testimony regarding witnesss pri or identification was admissible where nothing in the record suggested that the declarant was unavailable for reexamination after the agents testimony holding that a witnesss testimony or an exhibit may not explicitly and directly contain an opinion as to a trial witnesss credibility holding that a trial witnesss testimony as to the credibility of another witness was prejudicial error holding that the admission of a report was not hearsay because it was not offered to prove its truth but to impeach the veracity of the witnesss direct testimony