of a receiver acting within the scope of his authority as receiver give rise to ‘actual and necessary costs’ of a Chapter XI arrangement.” Id. at 485, 88 S.Ct. at 1767. Following this broader interpretation of § 503(b), the Ninth Circuit found that “the use of a form of the word ‘include’ is significant, and generally thought to imply that terms listed immediately afterwards are an inexhaustive list of examples, rather than a bounded set of applicable items.” In re Mark Anthony Constr., Inc., 886 F.2d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir.1989) (citations omitted). The opinion in Reading not only survived the later enactment of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, but has been expanded by lower courts. See Matter of Copeland, 991 F.2d at 239 (citing to Yorke v. NLRB, 709 F.2d 1138, 1143 (7th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>) and In re Charlesbank Laundry, Inc., 755 F.2d
holding that an injured party in an underlying tort action was not a necessary party in an action by an insurer for declaratory judgment of nonliability where the injured person had not obtained judgment against the insured holding in an employees action to recover for injury sustained during work against the employer and other defendants did not state an intentional tort claim against contractor holding that an estate administration begins and the probate court obtains jurisdiction over the administration when the court issues letters of administration holding that those injured during the trustees administration of an estate are entitled to an administrative priority regardless of whether their injury was caused by a tort or other wrongdoing holding single coexecutors release of mortgage debt paid to estate was valid and binding on estate because acts of any coexecutor in respect to the administration of the effects of the estate are deemed to be the acts of all as where one releases a debt or settles an account of a person with the deceased or surrenders a term or sells the goods and chattels of the estate his act binds the others characterizing conversion of decedents personal property into cash as act in due course of administration of estate