this duty, Meisel suffered a catastrophic loss to all his belongings, his home and effects, all amounting to damages to be proven at the time of trial. Compl. at ¶¶ 43-45. Defendant argues that Anderson was an agent of Allstate at all times and was acting within the scope of his employment and is not personally liable for his actions. Plaintiff argues that Anderson was not an employee or agent of Allstate and is liable. The Ninth Circuit has held that it is “well established that, unless an agent or employee acts as a dual agent (a circumstance not present in this case), she cannot be held liable as a defendant unless she acts for her own personal advantage.” Mercado v. Allstate Ins. Co., 340 F.3d 824, 826 (9th Cir.2003); Lippert v. Bailey, 241 Cal.App.2d, 376, 50 Cal.Rptr. 478 (1966) (<HOLDING>). The court in Mercado stated that an employee
holding that while an agents knowledge is imputed to the principal due to the identity of interests that is presumed when an agent acts within the scope of an agency relation this rule does not operate in the converse and the agent cannot be imputed with the information which its principal has failed to give it holding that even if an insurance broker is the agent of the insurance company for purposes of soliciting and procuring the policy that would not necessarily make the broker the agent of the insurance company for the purpose of receiving notice of suits and claims holding that both agent and principal will be liable when the agent acts within the scope of his employment but for his own purposes holding that statements of a company vice president were admissible against the principal owner of the company under fedrevid 801d2d as an admission made by the partys agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment holding that liability to the insured for acts or contracts of an insurance agent within the scope of his agency with a full disclosure of the principal rests on the company