term of imprisonment in a correctional institution shall be eligible for release on parole upon completion of one-half Q/¿) of his determinate term or at the expiration of twenty (20) years, whichever comes first.” I.C. § 11-1-1-9.1 (Burns 1980 Supp.) (Acts 1974, P.L. 43, § 2) (repealed 1980, Acts 1979, P.L. 120, § 22, current version at § 11-13-3-2). Under the statute, those inmates serving determinate sentences were for the first time eligible for parole. Id.; Romine v. State, 431 N.E.2d 780, 783 (Ind.1982). Consequently, it became the more specific statute delineating parole eligibility by encompassing both those inmates serving determinate and those serving indeterminate sentences. Therefore, it became the controlling statute. See Ezzell, 246 Ind. at 271, 205 N.E.2d at 146 (<HOLDING>). However, as a life sentence is neither
holding that specific statutory provisions take priority over general statutory provisions holding that statutory notice provisions for notice of default and opportunity to cure were waived by provisions of note as to one obligor though provisions applied to coobligor who used property as residence holding that rule of construction that specific statutory provisions control general ones should not be applied where provisions can be harmonized holding that a specific statutory provision prevails over a more general one holding that public policy must be evidenced by constitutional or statutory provisions