to support Ms. Jenkins’ conviction. The event that precipitated the March 27 encounter was apparently Ms. Jenkins’ belief (whether or not correct) that Ms. Hunter was responsible for the slashing of the tires of the car that Ms. Jenkins had borrowed from Ms. Bowlding. It is not unreasonable for someone in Ms. Jenkins’ situation to be upset and angry and to want to confront Ms. Hunter about the tires (and, for that matter, about the unpaid debt). Ms. Jenkins had the right to seek to have a conversation with Ms. Hunter^ — even an angry conversation — and we must be careful not to permit a statute that prohibits threats to be applied in a manner that limits First Amendment rights. See generally Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08, 89 S.Ct. 1399, 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). In this case, “open the door” or “come out”
holding that a hypothetical rhetorical threat against the president in the context of a political protest was constitutionally protected holding that imputed political opinion is a protected ground holding that with the commands of the first amendment clearly in mind a comment that the first man i want to get in my sights is lbj was political hyperbole which did not constitute a willful threat against the president holding that what is a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech holding that false statements are constitutionally protected