a continuance for the purpose, inter alia, of deposing witnesses. Defense counsel also filed a motion to suppress identification testimony, indicating some knowledge of what one or more of the state’s witnesses would say. In addition, Forest has not offered either the District Court or this Court any specifics as to what information his counsel failed to discover from the state’s witnesses, see Schone v. Purkett, 15 F.3d 785, 789-90 (8th Cir.1994) (stating that prisoner, to demonstrate Strickland prejudice, must point to arguments or evidence counsel could have discovered that would have affected decision to plead guilty), nor has he explained how this information would have aided him in resisting the state’s charges, see Iron Wing v. United States, 34 F.3d 662, 665 (8th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). We therefore conclude that Forest has failed
holding that to demonstrate deficient performance a petitioner must show counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed a defendant by the sixth amendment holding that right to appeal claim of ineffective assistance of counsel alleging that counsel failed to convey plea negotiations timely and adequately inform of consequences of pleading guilty to jury for sentencing waived because plea of guilty to jury was independent of and not supported by alleged ineffective assistance of counsel claims holding that counsels motion was not sufficient where counsel alleged only that counsel and appellants positions had become adverse holding that at resentencing the district court was entitled to assume that the waiver was still in effect and was not required to again advise defendant of his right to counsel where defendant had waived counsel at the plea stage holding that even if counsel had performed as petitioner alleged counsel should have governments case was still as strong and guilty plea was prudent course