v. BTC, 907 F.2d 1101, 1105 (11th Cir.1990). However, the federal policy expressed in the D’Oench decision “applies in virtually all cases where a federal depository institution regulatory agency is confronted with an agreement not documented in the institution’s records.” OPS Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. FDIC, 992 F.2d 306, 308 (11th Cir.1993) (quoting Baumann, 934 F.2d at 1510). Courts therefore applied the federal common law D’Oench doctrine to protect certain entities not covered by the language of § 1823(e)(1)—including, for example, the FDIC as receiver, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (“FSLIC”), and transferees of assets (such as bridge banks) from banking regulatory agencies. See, e.g., FSLIC v. Two Rivers Assocs., Inc., 880 F.2d 1267, 1274, 1276-77 (11th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); Newton v. Uniwest Fin. Corp., 967 F.2d 340,
holding that no complete innocence exception to the doench doctrine exists holding that claims that do not diminish or defeat the fdics interest in any specific asset are nevertheless doench barred in light of the established purpose of the doench  doctrine to protect the fdics reliance on the banks records holding that the fifth circuit does not recognize an innocent borrower exception to the doench doctrine holding that the doench doctrine protects the fdic even where the fdic does not have an interest in an asset holding that the federal common law doench doctrine protects the fslic and the fdic in both receiver and corporate capacities