under Donovan, but whose conversations would only be overheard in the background during intercepted wire communications.” Gov’t’s Opp’n ¶ 2. The Court likewise was unable to locate any direct legal authority on this point. Much of the case law concerning background conversations concerns the legality of the use of such conversations if the interception of background conversations was not specifically authorized by the order authorizing the wiretap. E.g., United States v. Baranek, 903 F.2d 1068, 1071-72 (6th Cir.1990) (finding use of information obtained from the interception of background conversations, although not explicitly authorized by the wiretap order, was permissible pursuant to the “plain view” doctrine); United States v. Couser, 732 F.2d 1207, 1209-10 (4th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). However, the plain language of Subsection b —
holding court of appeals role in reviewing issuance of wiretap order is not to make a de novo determination but to decide if facts were minimally adequate to support determination that was made holding that even if the calculation commenced on the date of the first indictment the defendants right to a speedy trial was not violated holding that an in dictment valid on its face is not subject to challenge on the ground that the grand jury acted on the basis of inadequate or incompetent evidence holding that questions concerning the admissibility of hearsay evidence rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and this court will not interfere in the absence of abuse appearing on the face of the record holding the interception of background conversations even if not permitted on the face of the wiretap order was not a basis for suppressing the wiretap