and DuPont in the other TMJ cases then pending before it. The court entered these judgments as final judgments in accordance with Rule 54(b) and also ordered that judgment be entered for Dow Chemical and DuPont in any tag-along TMJ cases that later might be transferred to it. When Kocher’s suit subsequently was transferred to the District of Minnesota, the District Court granted summary judgment for Dow Chemical and DuPont pursuant to these orders. We hold that the judgments for Dow Chemical and DuPont in this case satisfy Rule 54(b) because they were based on the 54(b) orders in the prior TMJ cases and thus unquestionably were intended to be final for purposes of appeal. We therefore have jurisdiction over this appeal. See United States v. Glenn, 585 F.2d 366, 367 n. 2 (8th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>); Kelly v. Lee’s Old Fashioned Hamburgers,
holding that a commissioner acts as an instrumentality to inform and assist the court only the court has authority to make final orders or judgments holding that an order not denominated a judgment is not final for purposes of appeal holding that order could be appealed because ajlthough the district court did not make an express finding there is no doubt that the district court intended its orders to be final judgments for purposes of appeal holding that ajlthough ocga  5648 c sets forth the conditions upon which the trial court may dismiss an appeal for delay it does not by its terms require the court to make a formal recitation of those conditions in its order and affirming a trial courts dismissal order which found that the delay was unreasonable but had no express finding that the delay was inexcusable punctuation omitted holding a judgment of a district court does not become final by appeal within the meaning of the statute providing for registration of such judgments in another district until the case has been disposed of by appeal