required a college to use some of the land it owned to provide parking spaces in conjunction with the construction of a library did not unlawfully limit “the use of [the] land for. . . educational purpose[s]” under G. L. c. 40A, § 2). 5 The plaintiffs reliance on Samson v. San-Land Dev. Corp., 17 Mass. App. Ct. 977 (1984), and Stampfl v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Norwood, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 354 (1992), in support of his position that the Wakefield front-to-back amendment should be held to be a de facto use regulation, is misplaced. In both Samson and Stampfl, this court found that the amendments in question in fact resulted in strict use regulation, and the land affected was therefore protected during the statutory three-year freeze period. See Samson v. San-Land Dev. Corp., supra at 979 (<HOLDING>); Stampfl v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Norwood,
recognizing general proposition that if land is artificially submerged for the statutory period necessary to change ownership of the land title to the submerged land is passed to the state in trust for the public holding that the amendment was inapplicable to the plaintiffs land during the freeze period because it effectively rezoned the land to prohibit multifamily housing completely holding that a cause of action for damages to property resulting from a permanent nuisance accrues to the owner of the land at the time the injury begins to affect the land and mere transfer of the land by deed does not transfer the claim for damages holding that even though the complaint sought money damages and land was actually recovered the attorneys lien attached to the land holding that land sales contracts were not securities because they involved no investment in an enterprise even if land was bought on expectation that development of the area would increase the value of the land