e.g, Uninsured Employer’s Fund v. Kramer, 32 Va. App. 77, 82, 526 S.E.2d 304, 306 (2000); Craddock Moving & Storage Co., 16 Va. App. at 3, 427 S.E.2d at 430. The Act also does not apply to independent contractors. Accord Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Gill, 224 Va. 92, 97, 294 S.E.2d 840, 843 (1982) (citing Stover v. Ratliff, 221 Va. 509, 511, 272 S.E.2d 40, 42 (1980)). Whether a putative employee is to be more appropriately classified as an independent contractor, and thus falling outside of the protections afforded employees under the Act, is a common law determination involving several facts and inquiries, most important of which is determining who holds the power and discretion to control the methods and means of the work to be accomplished. See, e.g., id. at 97, 294 S.E.2d at 843 (<HOLDING>); Intermodal Servs. Inc. v. Smith, 234 Va. 596,
holding that the courts determination of whether an officer had probable cause for an arrest is an independent and objective determination and an officers own subjective reason for the arrest is irrelevant holding that determination of whether someone is an employee under the adea must be made in accordance with common law agency principles holding that the determination of whether an individual is an independent contractor lies in the common law and not under an express provision of the act recognizing the general rule that a property owner is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor holding that under the mwa the question of whether an employee was an independent contractor or an employee was a question of statutory interpretation