gave Ms. O'Tool a raise and made it retroactive to the date when she would otherwise have received it. The court has previously rejected analogous arguments and, for the same reasons, does so here. See Kennedy v. General Motors Corp., 226 F.Supp.2d 1257 (D.Kan.2002) (rejecting defendant's argument that disciplinary suspensions were not adverse employment actions where they were ultimately cleared from record and defendant agreed to pay plaintiff for all lost time); Reese v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 31 F.Supp.2d 908, 914-15 (D.Kan.1998) (rejecting defendant's argument that plaintiff’s loss-of-seniority claim was rendered moot where plaintiff's seniority was restored through the grievance process); see also Roberts v. Roadway Express, Inc., 149 F.3d 1098, 1104 (10th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). 8 . Defendants also contend in their papers,
holding that it is well established that whether an employees actions were within the scope of employment is a question of fact and even if some of the actions were unauthorized the question of whether the actions were within the scope of employment is for the jury recognizing retaliation involving promotion as adverse employment actions under the first amendment recognizing that a set of actions may constitute an adverse employment action when considered collectively even though some actions do not rise to the level of an adverse employment action individually holding that adverse employment actions include poor evaluations recognizing that employment actions can be adverse even if such actions are subsequently withdrawn