731, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198-199, 125 S.Ct. 596, 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004). This inquiry involves evaluating whether a reasonably competent public official would have known that his actions were prohibited by the law at the time he engaged in the conduct in question. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151. The standard is one of objective reasonableness. We find that the plain language of the statute and the case law gave clear notice to Defendants that releasing the informa tion in question violated federal law. The words of the DPPA alone are “specific enough to establish clearly the law applicable to particular conduct and circumstances and to overcome qualified immunity.” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1350 (11th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the case law defining the reach of
holding that statutory language alone even in the total absence of case law can be sufficient to provide fair notice holding statutory violation sufficient cause recognizing that circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to demonstrate a defendants guilt holding that an error can be plain even in the absence of binding case law where it violates an absolutely clear legal norm holding that a plaintiff can seek statutory damages even in the absence of actual damages