to repudiate burdensome contracts. 3 . In support of their argument regarding impairment of existing rights, the Crafts also assert that FIRREA treats all contracts alike whether lease agreements or otherwise in establishing damages allowed for repudiation. This assertion is plainly incorrect. FIRREA clearly distinguishes damages available for repudiated lease contracts from those available in the non-lease context. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(3) (non-lease provisions) with §§ 1821(e)(4) & (5) (lease provisions); see also McMillian v. FDIC, 81 F.3d 1041, 1048 (11th Cir.1996). 4 . Prior to submission of this case, the FDIC abandoned its § 1823(e) argument based on this Circuit’s decision in Resolution Trust Corp. v. Midwest Federal Savings Bank of Minot, 4 F.3d 1490, 1500 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Thus, we decline to address whether § 1823(e)
holding that the state may charge a defendant with only one count of disseminating obscenity for each separate transaction even though several obscene magazines were disseminated during each transaction holding that a previous decision assuming a malpractice action was a commercial transaction for the purpose of awarding attorney fees was not binding because the court in that case was not asked  to decide whether a malpractice action involving a commercial transaction falls within the parameters of the statute holding that interpretation of contemporaneity requirement must be informed by the realities of each commercial transaction recognizing step transaction doctrine whereby courts must consider all steps of transaction in light of entire transaction so that substance of transaction will control over form of each step holding lease of property was a commercial transaction where the property was for commercial ranching but a residence was maintained on the property