affairs. Id. at 152, 508 S.E.2d at 866. Needs urged trial courts to avoid using such language but ultimately upheld the conviction because the circuit court reiterated the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard twenty-six times and the rest of the charge did not contain other disfavored language—particularly the “moral certainty” and “real reason” language found in State v. Manning. See Needs, 333 S.C. at 154-55, 508 S.E.2d at 867-68. In Pradubsri’s case, the circuit court used truth-seeking language almost identical to that challenged in Needs. However, the circuit court referenced the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard at least twenty times during its instruc tions. Further, the instructions did not contain Manning’s disfavored language. See Needs, 333 S.C. at 155, 508 S.E.2d at 867 (<HOLDING>); see also State v. Kirkpatrick, 320 S.C. 38,
holding it was error to include language from geesa but such error was harmless holding that failure to charge jury that state had burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not act in the heat of passion was harmless because the evidence did not support a charge on passionprovocation manslaughter holding that an erroneous charge on sanity was harmless because it was beneficial to appellant holding that although portion of trial courts jury charge was inapplicable any error in providing it was harmless in light of the fact that charge considered as a whole was not likely to confuse or mislead the jury holding a charge was harmless partly because it did not contain  troubling language identified in manning