that the plaintiff suffered a “ ‘concrete and particularized’ ” injury. Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). Here, to the extent Bodman has suffered or will suffer any harm as a result of this tax scheme, this harm is shared by all taxpayers in the State. In ATC, we unanimously closed the door to a litigant asserting standing simply by virtue of his status as a taxpayer for this reason. There, we explained that “[t]he injury to ATC ... as a taxpayer is common to all property owners in Charleston County. This feature of commonality defeats the constitutional requirement of a concrete and particularized injury.” Id. at 198, 669 S.E.2d at 340-41 (citing Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (<HOLDING>)). We reaffirm this principle today and hold
holding that an entity that serves the disabled lacks standing under the ada holding that in a proceeding to recover taxes from a nonbankrupt taxpayer the taxpayer has the burden of proving that his taxes complied with the internal revenue code holding that it is well established that a taxpayer has no right to insist upon the same erroneous treatment afforded a similarly situated taxpayer in the past holding that a taxpayer lacks standing when he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally recognizing associational standing when members would have standing in own right