972 F.2d at 1374. Thus, to satisfy this fourth element, Plaintiff must also allege facts to establish “a direct causal relationship between the affirmative act of the state and plaintiffs harm.” Kaucher, 455 F.3d at 432 (explaining that “the fourth element is satisfied where the state’s action was the ‘but for cause’ of the danger faced by the plaintiff.”). However, the Third Circuit Court has repeatedly rejected state-created danger claims brought against public school districts for violence committed against students, even where school officials were alleged to have known of the dangerous conditions within the school that ultimately resulted in injury to the plaintiff, on the ground that the school did not affirmatively act to create the danger. See e.g., Morrow, 719 F.3d at 178-179 (<HOLDING>); Brown, 456 Fed.Appx. at 89-90, (holding that
holding that juveniles use of the f word in dispute with principal and another student over whether student had stolen her money did not constitute fighting words holding that claimant committed willful misconduct when she did not return to work at the end of her leave and did not comply with her employers notification policy holding that a school district owed the highest degree of care to a student on a school bus such that the district could be liable for the sexual abuse of the student by the school bus driver holding that the plaintiffs failure to wear a helmet did not constitute negligence holding that schools failure to expel harassing student and permitting her to return following suspension and board plaintiffs bus did not constitute requisite affirmative act for  statecreated danger