v. Horn, 120 F.3d 400, 411 (3d Cir.1997). The court must then consider the challenged language in the context of the jury charge as a whole. Francis, 471 U.S. at 309, 318-19, 105 S.Ct. 1965; Smith, 120 F.3d at 411. The ultimate question is “ ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (quoting Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990)); Smith, 120 F.3d at 411. Nonetheless, even if a jury instruction is found to violate due process, a district court should grant a new trial only if the error is not harmless. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (<HOLDING>); Smith, 120 F.3d at 417-18 (applying the
holding that the omission of an element is subject to harmless error analysis recognizing that where the error involved defies analysis by harmless error standards or the data is insufficient to conduct a meaningful harmless error analysis then the error will not be proven harmless beyond a reasonable doubt holding that harmless error analysis applies to jury instructions that violate the principle of gaudin holding trial errors are subject to a harmless error analysis holding that failure to submit an element of the offense to the jury is subject to harmless error analysis