the plaintiffs had, in a timely manner, performed what was required of them to initiate proceedings. Once they had initiated the proceedings by tendering their complaints, the time bar was no longer applicable; whatever needed to follow in completing the process of “filing” the pleadings at the clerk’s office was no longer subject to the time bar. In the present case, Spotville initiated his proceedings properly by tendering to prison officials for mailing his habeas petition and application for IFP status, pursuant to the pre-AEDPA statutes, approximately nine months before the AEDPA went into effect. The decision regarding his IFP status, and any necessary subsequent action (the payment of the fee), did not change the set of rules pursuant to which Spotville tendered his petitio 82) (<HOLDING>). Our holding in Grissom v. Scott, 934 F.2d 656
holding that a court should not dismiss a complaint pursuant to rule 12b6 for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief  holding that a complaint will not be dismissed unless it appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim recognizing the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief holding that a pro se complaint  should not be dismissed unless it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief holding that dismissal is proper only if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief