section.” See Tex, Util. Code § 54.204(d). The Legislature thus expressly afforded the Commission broad authority to enforce Subsection (c), which establishes that an MOU “may not charge any entity ... a pole attachment rate ... that exceeds.the fee [it] would be permitted to charge under rules adopted by the [FCC] under 47 U.S.C. Section 224(e) if [the MOU’s] rates were regulated under federal law and the rules of the FCC.” Id. § 54.204(c). “[W]hen the Legislature expressly confers a power on an agency, it also impliedly intends that the agency have whatever powers are reasonably necessary to fulfill its express duties.” CPS Board I, 53 S.W.3d at 316; see also Texas Bldg. Owners & Managers Ass’n v. Public Util. Comm’n of Tex., 110 S.W.3d 524, 532 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). CPS Energy argues that the power granted by
holding that section 502 is an exclusive grant of jurisdiction holding grant of authority to an agency to adopt rules necessary to carry out this chapter clearly vested in the agency authority to interpret a statute holding that legislatures giving commission jurisdiction to enforce this section was both grant of express authority and implied grant of powers reasonably necessary to fulfill its duties holding that states grant of general corporate powers to hospital authorities does not include permission to use those powers anticompetitively holding where plan language can be interpreted both to grant discretion and not to grant discretion plan does not unambiguously grant discretion