was inconsistent with his interview at the Asylum Office. That interview was not a part of the record and thus cannot support the IJ’s ruling. See Singh v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir.2005) (rejecting an IJ’s reliance on an interview at the Asylum Office that was not in the record). Second, the IJ erred when she found Singh’s testimony was inconsistent with his declaration because his testimony “totally failed to indicate that the police suspected he was involved with terrorists.” The record clearly demonstrates that Singh testified that he was persecuted in part because the police believed he was connected to terrorists. Third, the IJ erred when she found Singh’s testimony implausible in light of the country conditions. See Shah v. INS, 220 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Fourth, the IJ erred by giving no weight to
holding that mere speculation is insufficient to support a jury verdict holding a finding of fact by the commission may not be based upon surmise conjecture or speculation but must be founded on evidence of sufficient substance to afford a reasonable basis for it holding that a general assertion about conditions of peace in india was insufficient to support a negative credibility finding because it was a blanket statement without individualized analysis and it was based on conjecture and speculation holding that speculation and conjecture cannot support an adverse credibility finding holding that mere conjecture or speculation is insufficient under a preponderance standard