habeas petition to add new claim or theory after one-year federal statute of limitations governing habeas petitions had expired; permitting such amendment would be contrary to very policy of limitations period). See also Pursell II, 749 A.2d at 915-16 (“[W]hile layered claims of counsel’s ineffectiveness may avoid the waiver restrictions in the PCRA, we have repeatedly held that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel do not automatically qualify pursuant to the exceptions to the one-year time limitation provided in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(f)-(iii).”) (collecting cases). In the past, of course, this Court has had to consider the continuing viability of judicial rules that find themselves in separation of powers tension with the governing terms of the PCRA. Albrecht, 720 A.2d at 700 (<HOLDING>). Having noted the tension, however, we will
holding that claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel during penalty phase of capital case is cognizable under the pcra holding that claim alleging counsels ineffectiveness during the plea bargaining process is cognizable under the pcra holding that claim challenging counsels effectiveness for failing to file a petition for allowance of appeal is cognizable under pcra holding that relaxed waiver is no longer viable on pcra appeals because inter alia application of the doctrine of relaxed waiver in a pcra proceeding runs afoul of the very terms of the pcra which excludes waived claims from the class of cognizable pcra claims holding that substantive due process challenge to continued validity of defendants judgment of sentence after a nineyear delay is not cognizable under the pcra