merely implements the Secretary of Education’s understanding of (and thus is coextensive with) the requirements of the Establishment Clause. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 23; see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Witters v. Dept. of Services for Blind, O. T. 1985, No. 84-1070, p. 21, n. 11 (“These regulations are based on the Department’s interpretation of constitutional requirements”). This interpretation seems persuasive to us. The only authority cited by the Secretary for issuance of the regulation is his general rulemaking power. See 34 CFR § 76.532 (1992) (citing 20 U. S. C. §§ 1221e-3(a)(1), 2831(a), and 2974(b)). Though the Fourth Circuit placed a different interpretation on §76.532 in Goodall v. Stafford County School Board, 930 F. 2d 363, 369 (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 502 U. S. 864 (1991), that
holding that the establishment clause does not bar local school district from providing a publiclyemployed interpreter for a deaf student in a parochial school holding that a school district owed the highest degree of care to a student on a school bus such that the district could be liable for the sexual abuse of the student by the school bus driver holding high school which allowed student secular noncurricular activities to meet on school property was required to provide equal access to a christian student group holding that no special relationship existed between the school and student holding that the regulation prohibits the provision of an interpreter to a student in a sectarian school