abuse implicates substantial risk of physical force, even when unaccompanied by rape, bodily injury, or extreme forms of coercion. To do otherwise would be to perpetrate, deliberately and in contravention of established precedent, the very judicial indifference to gender-based violence that Congress has endeavored to obviate. IV We recognize that there has been' considerable litigation over whether the civil remedy provision of the VAWA is a legitimate exercise of Congressional power under either the Commerce Clause of Article I or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Compare, e.g., Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 169 F.3d 820, 889 (4th Cir.1999) (en banc), petitions for cert. filed, (U.S. June 25, 1999) (No. 99-5), (U.S. June 30, 1999) (No. 99-29) (<HOLDING>) with Ericson v. Syracuse University, 45
holding that congress had exceeded its authority by using its section five power under the fourteenth amendment to enact the statute holding that enactment of the civil remedy provision of the violence against women act of 1994 42 usc  13981 exceeded congresss power under the commerce clause noting that  13981 contained no jurisdictional element holding that 42 usc  13981 exceeds congresss authority under the commerce clause holding that enactment of  13981 exceeded congressional authority under either the commerce clause or section 5 of the fourteenth amendment holding  13981 constitutional under the commerce clause