of fundamental individual and civil rights. But “punishment” must be labeled what it is, and imposed only in compliance with the time-honored constitutional guarantees that legitimate the exercise of that practice. Central among these guarantees is the prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto laws. As Article 120 inflicts a greater punishment upon convicted felons than the law annexed to their crimes when committed, see Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798), I would invalidate its retroactive application. Thus, I would reverse the decision of the district court as to the ex post facto claim, and order that judgment be entered for plaintiffs. For the reasons herein stated, I respectfully dissent. 25 . Compare Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 353 F.3d 1287
holding that teague applies only to procedural rules and not to decisions of the supreme court deciding the meaning of criminal statutes holding such statutes are not analogous statutes of limitation for erisa purposes holding that  2 of the vra applies to felon disenfranchisement statutes holding that the law of the state of incorporation applies holding that the statutes abrogated the common law