courts commit “constitutional error without any showing of prejudice” when they prevent defense counsel “from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding.” See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 n. 25, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696-98, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002). Bourne contends that communication between the jury and the judge in this case was a critical stage, citing this Circuit’s holding in French v. Jones, 332 F.3d 430 (6th Cir.2003), for support. There, the court held that a trial court’s delivery, without counsel, of supplemental jury instructions was a critical stage and per se harmful. Id. at 434, 436; cf. Shields v. United States, 273 U.S. 583, 587-89, 47 S.Ct. 478, 71 L.Ed. 787 (1927) (<HOLDING>). Bourne contends the ex parte communication
holding new trial required after judges ex parte communication with jury in response to jury question during deliberations because there was no way of reaching a conclusion about what transpired other than by adopting the judges recollection holding that the judges entry into the jury room constituted reversible error holding that judges ex parte communication telling a jury it needed to reach a verdict was reversible error without any discussion of harmlessness recognizing the hazards of ex parte communication with a deliberating jury holding that a defendant did not waive his right to be present at an ex parte encounter between the judge and juror because he was not present at the time of the communication and therefore had no opportunity to object when the error was committed