evidence rather than a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Mezas de Jesus, 217 F.3d 638, 642 (9th Cir.2000) (requiring proof of sentencing factor by clear and convincing evidence when factor has “extremely disproportionate effect on sentence relative to the offense of conviction”) (quotations omitted). We disagree. We have consistently upheld the use of the preponderance standard at sentencing to calculate a defendant’s base offense level for drug offenses. See, e.g., United States v. Harrison-Philpot, 978 F.2d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir.1992); United States v. Sanchez, 967 F.2d 1383, 1384-85 (9th Cir. 1992). Indeed, we do not regard the increase in Vasquez’s offense level due to his additional drug activity as an “enhancement.” See Harrison-Philpot, 978 F.2d at 1523 (<HOLDING>). Thus, the district court did not err in
holding that having signed the judgment of conviction the judge thereafter had no authority to increase a legal sentence holding that a sixfold increase in sentence involved no enhancement of sentence because harrisonphilpot was charged and convicted of conspiracy the extent of the conspiracy caused the tremendous increase in her sentence holding in the ineffectiveassistanceofcounsel context that any increase in a defendants sentence is prejudicial holding that district court was not empowered to increase sentence by amending judgment to include a fine of 100 not even the suspension of payment of the fine changed the fact that the sentence was illegally increased holding that a federal sentence commences when the attorney general receives the convicted defendant into custody for service of that sentence