statute authorizing the award of attorney fees in domestic relations cases, as it is currently written and interpreted by our courts, appears to apply only to the parties to the underlying proceeding and does not extend to third-party litigants. See § 40-4-7(A). {21} Husband argues that the district court, in awarding attorney fees against Fidel, could properly consider whether Fidel’s actions caused Husband to incur attorney fees by requiring enforcement through litigation. He relies upon Bustos, 2000-NMCA-040, ¶ 26, 128 N.M. 842, 999 P.2d 1074 (recognizing that a party’s actions that require enforcement through litigation is a factor to be considered in determining whether to award attorney fees under statute), and Herrera v. Herrera, 1999-NMCA-034, ¶ 20, 126 N.M. 705, 974 P.2d 675 (<HOLDING>). Bustos and Heir-era, however, involve
holding that bank was entitled to attorney fees on appeal when agreement did not prohibit such fees holding that wife was entitled to attorney fees when court enforced marital settlement agreement which husband refused to sign thus requiring enforcement through litigation and causing wife to incur attorney fees which would otherwise not have been incurred holding that because the wife failed to present any evidence as to the legal services performed in the trial court the wife was not entitled to a second hearing to establish attorneys fees holding a wife liable for necessary medical expenses incurred by her husband under the doctrine even though the wife did not sign as a guarantor and did not request that her husband be admitted nor anticipate that her husband would be admitted holding that the statute of frauds applies to a sellers wife holding only a dower interest in the property so the wife must sign the purchase agreement as well as the seller husband