that Chugach was not Del-Jen’s successor in interest because there was no predecessor-successor relationship between Chugach and Del-Jen in the form of a merger or transfer of assets. We conclude that the district court and Chugach are correct. While we agree with Coffman that a determination of successor liability under USERRA requires an analysis under the Leib factors as stated by Congress, such an analysis is unnecessary and improper when no merger or transfer of assets even transpired between the two subject companies. Generally, one of the fundamental requirements for consideration of the imposition of successor liability is a merger or transfer of assets between the predecessor and successor companies. See Kicinski v. Constable Hook Shipyard, 168 F.2d 404, 408-09 (3d Cir.1948) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, indisputably, there was
holding that plaintiffs theory was flawed because there was no sale of a business creating a predecessorsuccessor relation between the two corporations holding there was no evidence to support the existence of any alleged fiduciary duty holding that a nurse practitioners opinion constituted an acceptable medical source where the nurse worked closely under the supervision of the doctor such that the nurse was acting as an agent of the doctor holding where there is no duty to defend there is no duty to indemnify holding that because there was no predecessorsuccessor relationship defendant corporation was under no duty to reemploy nurse returning from military service who had worked for alleged predecessor company