within a year of Holloway, Duval contends his petition is timely. Until the decision in Holloway, the First Circuit characterized any assault charge based on boilerplate charging language as a predicate offense for the ACCA, regardless of non-violent variants of assault. See Nason, 269 F.3d at 21; Duval, 496 F.3d at 85. This legal precedent, Duval argues, was a government-created impediment to making the instant motion. § 2255(f)(2). Petitioner cites no case law to suggest that an appellate court’s own legal precedent constitutes a government-created impediment within the meaning of § 2255(f)(2). Indeed, the few courts to address the issue have found that substantive law is not an impediment created by governmental action. See Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1086-89 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); Minter v. Beck, 230 F.3d 663, 665-66 (4th
holding that a state courts determination of its own substantive law in a way that leaves a convict with no meritorious federal claim does not constitute an impediment under 28 usc  2244d1b holding that in diversity cases federal courts are to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law holding that change in state substantive case law does not constitute the removal of an impediment holding that federal courts must apply state substantive law in diversity cases holding that federal courts should apply state substantive law