to hear fewer than all of such witnesses, that should also be within the court’s discretionary power and a reviewing court should reverse only where there has been a clear abuse of that discretion. See Sims, 21 Ill. 2d at 434 (House, J., specially concurring, joined by Bristow and Klingbiel, JJ.); cf. Brooks, 115 Ill. 2d 510 (where material witness rule restrictively interpreted as requiring the testimony of those present during the alleged misconduct). The trial court was satisfied that the ruling on the motion to suppress was supported by the evidence and saw no need to call Owen, Lacy or the red-haired officer. Considering Owen’s trial testimony that he was present at the 1 a.m. interview and that defendant confessed in detail (see People v. Caballero (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 23, 36 (<HOLDING>)), Spivey’s testimony that defendant said that
holding that reviewing court may consider trial evidence in reviewing denial of motion to suppress holding that evidence of settlement may be considered under rule 408 when reviewing a motion for sanctions holding that in reviewing trial courts ruling on habeas corpus petition reviewing court must defer to all of trial courts implied factual findings supported by record recognizing that we can consider trial evidence in reviewing the denial of a pretrial suppression motion holding that the superior court in reviewing agency action uses the precise scope of review the court of appeals employs in reviewing contested cases