Texas. There was no metes and bounds description of the 3.0152-acre tract attached to the Right of First Refusal. In his motion for summary judgment, Reiland argued that the Right of First Refusal was deficient as a matter of law because “(1) there is nothing in the description that would allow an individual to identify the three-acre tract with reasonable certainty, and (2) the document wholly fails to define the size, shape or boundaries of the land to which it relates.” We agree. Much like in Matney v. Odom, 147 Tex. 26, 210 S.W.2d 980 (1948), the primary question in this case is whether the description of the 3.0152 acres set out in the Right of First Refusal meets the requirements of the statute of frauds. If the requirement was not met, PTP was not entitled to enfor , 266 (1886) (<HOLDING>)); see also Harlan v. Vetter, 732 S.W.2d 390,
holding that description was sufficiently detailed holding a county and a road district had standing to sue state highway commission and county tax collector based on their interest in and control over the public roads of the county holding insufficient a description that included acreage survey county and abstract number recognizing county officers as  those whose general authority and jurisdiction are confined within the limits of the county in which they are appointed who are appointed in and for a particular county and whose duties apply only to that county and through whom the county performs its usual political functions  holding that both saline county and grant county had jurisdiction to try the appellant for murder where the actual killing occurred in one county but the acts requisite to the consummation of the murder and the subsequent disposal of the body occurred in the other county