991 P.2d at 252. Because the common fund doctrine is a rule of equity, however, it will not be applied if a statute precludes apportionment of attorneys’ fees. Id. ¶ 8 Section 12-962 does not permit the apportionment of attorneys’ fees and costs under Wang’s circumstances. The State’s reimbursement claim for the reasonable value of the medical care and treatment under § 12-962(A) is limited to the amount of money that the injured person has “received” in settlement of the tort claim that gave rise to the need for medical care and treatment. A.R.S. § 12-962(B)(3). Wang’s attorneys’ fees and costs were not “received” for purposes of § 12-962(B)(3) because they were deducted from the settlement before any funds were disbursed to him. See Cox, 222 Ariz. at 279, ¶¶ 36-37, 213 P.3d at 716 (<HOLDING>); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1140 (5th ed.
holding that bank was entitled to attorney fees on appeal when agreement did not prohibit such fees holding that the entirety of litigation settlement proceeds was taxable income to client not net after payment of attorney fees holding that lexis fees are not taxable as costs but reserving ruling on whether such fees are recoverable as attorneys fees holding that while it undoubtedly is true that evidence as to settlement negotiations is inadmissible at trial to determine the issue of liability after a divorce and alimony case has been settled by agreement except as to attorney fees the effort needed by counsel to reach such settlement is a matter which can be considered in determining the amount of attorney fees to be awarded holding that money received in settlement refers to the injured persons net recovery after paying attorney fees and costs a client does not receive attorneys fees under the statute because a lawyer has a claim to such fees as soon as a settlement agreement is reached