court did not rely on Snowden’s unusual return visit to the McDonald’s as a basis for its determination of reasonable suspicion. Instead, Agent Radican testified that the agents based their decision to approach the Pontiac on “the fact that the vehicle had gone past the undercover car, that the intended target had said he was there waiting for him and wanted him to come out of the store, and at the time that this had all happened that that vehicle had just arrived there.” The agents’ decision to stop Snowden was therefore largely due to the coincidence of what turned out to be Snowden’s exceptionally poor.timing. Regardless of how the facts unfolded, they are still sufficient to have given rise to a reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Askew, 403 F.3d 496, 499 (7th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); but see Johnson, 383 F.3d at 543-44 (holding
holding that reasonable suspicion existed where suspect described location of his vehicle over phone to undercover officer recognizing that police officer may stop a suspect if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot holding that notwithstanding the officers testimony that he had no suspicion of criminality the officer was aware of facts that would give rise to reasonable suspicion in the mind of a reasonable officer holding that stop of appellant was supported by reasonable articulable suspicion where anonymous 911 caller said that she had seen suspect pull gun out of his pocket 911 caller described suspect and suspects location responding officer located appellant near stated location appellant matched description and no one else in vicinity matched description holding that an officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop even when his suspicion that a law has been violated is based on a reasonable mistake of law