those jurors whose opposition to capital punishment would not allow them to view the proceedings impartially, and who therefore might frustrate the administration of a state’s death penalty scheme.” Id. {16} We hold that the trial court properly removed prospective jurors for cause, when those jurors opposed the death penalty, because the jurors were unable to view the proceedings impartially and perform their duties in accordance with the juror’s oath, not because of their religious opinion or affiliation. See State v. Willoughby, 181 Ariz. 530, 892 P.2d 1319, 1335 (1995) (en banc) (“Although religious beliefs may motivate one’s opinion about the death penalty, the beliefs themselves are not the basis for disqualification.”); Wolf v. Sundquist, 955 S.W.2d 626, 631 (Tenn.Ct.App.1997) (<HOLDING>). “[R]eligious freedom embodies two
holding that in light of the affirmative constitutional mandate to provide impartial juries in criminal cases the state has an important interest in obtaining juries that do not contain members who because of their religious beliefs are unable to follow the law or the trial courts instructions holding that the law presumes that the jury will follow the courts instructions holding that the trial judges misconduct at trial did not prejudice the defendant in light of the courts curative instructions recognizing that this court presumes that juries follow district courts instructions holding that a jury is presumed to follow the trial courts instructions