of his letter. See Second Retyped Indictment ¶¶ 17-26 (App. 144-48). McCoy’s testimony to the same effect at her 1998 criminal trial was the principal ground for the presentence report’s conclusion, adopted by the sentencing judge, that McCoy had likewise committed perjury at that trial and therefore deserved the two-point enhancement for obstruction of justice. Since the jury reached its conclusion based on a standard more stringent than “clear and convincing” evidence — i.e., evidence beyond a reasonable doubt — and since the district court was entitled to rely upon the jury’s verdict at sentencing, the court’s opportunity to observe the testimony is irrelevant and the defendant’s complaint necessarily fails. See United States v. Montague, 40 F.3d 1251, 1256 n. 4 (D.C.Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). At oral argument, McCoy conceded the force of
holding that on a review of the sufficiency of the evidence the court determines whether any rational trier of fact could have found all the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt holding that beyond reasonable doubt standard not required in termination cases holding that  3c11 enhancements are proper where juries have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant lied and could not have convicted otherwise quoting united states v thompson 962 f2d 1069 1071 dccir1992 holding that a petitioner is entitled to habeas relief if no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt holding that a petitioner is entitled to habeas corpus relief if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt