from the state and federal courts. To say that the language from which these principles are drawn is too vague and general to enforce ignores the immense body of law. While that law did not exist when the constitutional provisions were written, we believe that this growth and development was intended by the drafters. In this way, we find Article 4 no more broad or general than Article 7, which we held as self-executing in Town Highway No. 20. ¶ 52. In support of our reasoning, we note that other state courts that have considered the question generally have found that the due process provisions of their state constitutions are enforceable by appropriate court action even without implementing legislation. See, e.g., Katzberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 58 P.3d 339, 342-43 (Cal. 2002) (<HOLDING>); In re Wretlind, 32 N.W.2d 161, 167 (Minn.
recognizing that when other branches of government are remiss in their constitutional duties the judiciary must act holding that although state is not required to operate welfare program it must do so in accordance with the due process clause recognizing that standing doctrine is fundamentally rooted in respect for the separation of powers of the independent branches of government holding that due process clause is selfexecuting because it is clear that    even without any effectuating legislation all branches of government are required to comply with its terms holding that an exercise by the state of its police power is presumed to be valid when it is challenged under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment