plea agreement,] I wish to withdraw my plea and change my plea to not guilty.” Also, any alleged prejudice suffered as a result of Ledezma’s change of heart was eliminated by his subsequent motion to withdraw the motion to withdraw guilty pleas. In order to connect his attorney’s performance with the revocation of the March plea agreement, Ledezma argues that the apparently unintentional motion to withdraw guilty pleas caused the Government to file the motion to revoke the March plea agreement. A review of the record demonstrates otherwise. The motion to revoke cited Ledezma’s refusal both to stipulate to career offender status and to cooperate fully with law enforcement as the reasons for revoking the March plea agreement. See United States v. Brown, 801 F.2d 352, 354 (8th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Further, Ledezma’s repeated statements that
holding federal court is not bound by terms of plea agreement between defendant and state authorities holding plaintiff not required to perform its residual contract obligations after defendants material breach holding that the government was bound by an agreement it treated as binding although it preceded the formal plea agreement holding that the court had no jurisdiction over an alleged breach of a plea agreement holding that the government is no longer bound by its obligations under a plea agreement when a defendant commits a material breach