this issue agree that moving for summary judgment qualifies as “otherwise defending]” for purposes of Rule 55(a) and precludes the entry of default from becoming effective. See Rashidi, 818 F.Supp. at 1356 (“[A] summary judgment motion [that] speaks to the merits of the case and demonstrates a concerted effort and an undeniable desire to contest the action is sufficient to fall within the ambit of ‘otherwise defend’ for purposes of Fed.R.Civ.P. 55.”); Lexington Fayette Cnty. Food and Bev. Ass’n v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t, 131 S.W.3d 745, 756-57 (Ky.2004) (finding that the defendant “otherwise defended” the action whether its motion “was considered a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment”); Klock v. Town of Cascade, 284 Mont. 167, 943 P.2d 1262, 1266 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Equable Ascent Fin. v. Christian, 196 Ohio
holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that a motion for summary judgment was not opposed holding that a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment precluded default judgment holding that a motion for summary judgment constitutes otherwise defending under rule 55 holding that trial court impliedly ruled on motion for continuance by granting motion for summary judgment when appellant filed motion for continuance two days before summary judgment hearing holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that motion for summary judgment was not opposed