factor for single conspiracy is “whether the conspirators share a common goal, such as the possession and distribution of narcotics for profit”); United States v. Lee, 743 F.2d 1240, 1250 (8th Cir.1984) (“The essence of a drug conspiracy is agreement by two or more persons to violate narcotics law.”). Fourth, appellant argues that, in response to a jury query as to the standard of proof for one count, the district court erred by merely affirming that the standard was reasonable doubt, rather than re-instructing the jury that all elements of all counts must be found beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the court’s initial jury instructions and its response to the query were entirely accurate, we see no abuse of discretion. See United States v. Laing, 889 F.2d 281, 290 (D.C.Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Fifth, appellant argues that the district
holding that if jury instructions viewed as a whole fairly state the applicable law to the jury the failure to give particular instructions will not be error holding that a jury is presumed to follow the trial courts instructions holding that courts accurate response to jury query limited to answering the query was not an abuse of discretion even though the court did not repeat its earlier accurate jury instructions holding that the ninth circuit erred because the state appellate courts conclusion that one incorrect statement in jury instructions did not render the instructions likely to mislead the jury was not unreasonable holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in giving jury instructions that taken together fairly and adequately conveyed the issues to the jury