the acquired asset that matters, but the market where the injury occurs: in other words, standing may exist “although the harm did not occur in the same market as the acquisition.” (P. Opp.Br. 51-52.) This may be so; however, plaintiffs cite no analogous case, and this Court is aware of none, that has recognized antitrust standing where the defendant’s horizontal acquisitions took place in a geographic product market in which the plaintiff was not a consumer or an actual or potential competitor. Rather, the consensus of the cases interpreting du Pont is that in order to have standing, a plaintiff must be a participant in some capacity in the market in which the merger occurs. See, e.g., United States v. Marine Bancorporation Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 622, 94 S.Ct. 2856, 41 L.Ed.2d 978 (1974) (<HOLDING>); Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors of
holding merely that to the extent a breaching party claims that the appropriate measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the market price it holds the burden of proving that there is in fact an available market for the goods in issue holding that the relevant inquiry is not whether the court has discretion to facilitate notice but whether this is an appropriate case in which to exercise discretion holding that changes in the baseball card market between 1965 and 1980 foreclosed any argument that a definition of the relevant market by the federal trade commission could preclude relitigation of the market definition issue holding that the relevant geographic market or appropriate section of the country is the area in which the acquired firm is an actual competitor holding that proof of relevant market is essential under  2