any statutory or constitutional contention that the agency does not, or cannot, decide, see Thunder Basin Coal, 510 U. S., at 215, and n. 20; Haitian Refugee Center, supra, at 494; Ringer, 466 U. S., at 617; Salfi, supra, at 762, including, where necessary, the authority to develop an evidentiary record. Proceeding through the agency in this way provides the agency the opportunity to reconsider its policies, interpretations, and regulations in light of those challenges. Nor need it waste time, for the agency can waive many of the procedural steps set forth in § 405(g), see Salfi, supra, at 767, and a court can deem them waived in certain circumstances, see Eldridge, 424 U. S., at 330-331, even though the agency technically holds no “hearing” on the claim. See Salfi, supra, at 763-767 (<HOLDING>); Eldridge, supra, at 331-332, and n. 11
holding that the findings of reviewing physicians constituted substantial evidence in support of the secretarys decision to deny benefits holding that secretarys decision not to challenge the sufficiency of the appellees exhaustion was in effect a determination that the agency had rendered a final decision within the meaning of  405g holding that if a person wishes to challenge a mere procedural violation in the adoption of a regulation or other agency action the challenge must be brought within six years of the decision and that similarly if the person wishes to bring a policybased facial challenge to the governments decision that too must be brought within six years of the decision holding that a court of veterans appeals decision interpreting 38 usc  8713 overruling the secretarys prior interpretation and remanding back to the board was a final and appealable decision holding an agency decision is not final during the time the agency considers a petition for review