has an interest” under the language of § 506(a), and therefore no portion of the lien may be voided under § 506(d); 2) allowing such lien avoidance inequitably gives debtors more in Chapter 7 than in reorganization chapters; and 3) allowing such lien avoidance under § 506(d) would render redundant 11 U.S.C. § 722, which allows for redemption of personal property but not real property. Id. at 589-90. Other courts adopting the minority view include In re Lange, 120 B.R. 132, 135 (9th Cir.BAP 1990) (listing above reasons and adopting reasoning of Dewsnup); In re Mammoser, 115 B.R. 758, 759-60 (Bankr.W.D.N.Y.1990) (rejecting reasoning of Gaglia and holding that § 506(d) is not an avoiding power, but rather an implementing provision); In re Shrum, 98 B.R. 995, 1002 (Bankr.W.D.Okla.1989) (<HOLDING>); In re Maitland, 61 B.R. 130, 132-35
holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate holding that abandoned or exempt property is no longer part of the estate and therefore  506d is not available to void the undersecured portion of a lien holding that property not subject to sequestration is not therefore exempt holding that because property was no longer property of the estate the court could not order turnover recognizing that exempt property ceases to be property of the estate