an instruction, a jury may well assume it cannot find in the plaintiffs favor without direct evidence of discrimination. Townsend, 294 F.3d at 1241. Thus, we hold a pretext instruction “is required where, as here, a rational finder of fact could reasonably find the defendant’s explanation false and could ‘infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose.’ ” Id. (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147, 120 S.Ct. at 2108, 147 L.Ed.2d at 120). Raining Rose argues even if a pretext instruction should have been given, DeBoom was not prejudiced because she failed to present substantial evidence to support her claims for either sex or pregnancy discrimination. See Kanida v. Gulf Coast Med. Pers. LP, 363 F.3d 568, 577-78 (5th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). However, once the defendant offers legitimate
holding the exclusion of cumulative evidence was not prejudicial error holding that a trial courts refusal to allow the defendant to attend the jury view was not prejudicial holding that failure to give a limiting instruction for 404b evidence is not plain error holding that it was prejudicial error to fail to give such a cautionary instruction even where the defendant did not object at trial to the lack of such an instruction when the accomplice testimony was uncorroborated holding refusal to give pretext instruction was error but not prejudicial