a criminal provision because it uses the word “fine.” While use of the word “fine” is probative, it is not determinative. 36A C.J.S. Fines § 2, at 206 (2003) (“[T]he terms ‘fine’ and ‘penalty’ are often used synonymously, and there is authority that the term ‘fíne’ is broad enough to include penalties for the violation of law which are recoverable in civil actions even though such violation is made neither a misdemeanor nor a felony.” (Footnotes omitted.)); see also State ex rel. Howell County v. W. Plains Tel. Co., 232 Mo. 579, 135 S.W. 20, 21-22 (1911) (finding that a statute was not criminal, even though the statute used the word “fine,” because it contained many other characteristics more consistent with civil penalties); State v. Johnson, 1 Or.App. 363, 462 P.2d 687, 689-90 (1969) (<HOLDING>). Ultimately, when determining for the first
holding that a statute was not criminal even though it imposed a fine on any political candidate who belatedly filed a statement of campaign contributions holding that court not required to find ability to pay before imposing criminal fine holding that the state must prove criminal negligence for its homicide by vehicle statute even though the statute specifically states that any traffic violation is sufficient holding that the failure to impose a mandatory fine requires that the matter be remanded for imposition of that fine holding that where the language of the statute required the imposition of both confinement of which a portion could not be suspended and a fine the court had the ability to impose a fine and then suspend it