two percipient witnesses questioned denied seeing marijuana. The only remaining peg on which to hang the warrant is Brown’s claim to have smelled marijuana on DeLeon’s property. But there was no finding that Brown was qualified to recognize the odor of growing marijuana, which doubtlessly differs from the odor of cured or burning marijuana. To the extent that the Supreme Court’s dictum in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948), can be any guide, it clearly states that odors can be the basis for probable cause if a magistrate “finds the affi-ant qualified to know the odor, and it is one sufficiently distinctive to identify a forbidden substance.” Id. at 13, 68 S.Ct. at 369 (emphasis added). See also United States v. Pond, 523 F.2d 210, 212 (2d Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1058,
holding that smell alone may justify issuance of a warrant if the affiant is qualified to know the odor and the odor is distinctive holding in the context of vehicular searches that the fact that cm agent familiar with the odor of marijuana smelled such an odor emanating from an automobile  alone was sufficient to constitute probable cause for a subsequent search for marijuana holding that although pcp has no odor because streetlevel pcp is mixed with other substances that have a distinct odor an officers recognition of that odor was sufficient to establish probable cause holding odor of burnt marijuana and drug dogs hit on car were sufficient to justify search holding that because marijuana has a distinct smell the odor of marijuana alone can satisfy the probable cause requirement to search a vehicle or baggage