to remove obstructions.” To find otherwise is to conclude that the legislature’s action in amending the statute was a superfluous act. {¶26} We are persuaded that the legislature’s action in amending R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) was not whimsy but a deliberate effort to limit political subdivisions’ liability for injuries and deaths on their roadways. {¶ 27} As we noted in Harp v. Cleveland Hts. (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 506, 509, 721 N.E.2d 1020, fn. 1, the General Assembly had attempted previously to make the same amendment to R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) as part of one of its tort-liability-limitation measures, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350, 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3867, 3987, effective January 27, 1997. See State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 458, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (<HOLDING>). Indeed, we presume that at the time it
holding that jurisdiction must be resolved before applying the act of state doctrine because that doctrine is a substantive rule of law recognizing doctrine holding that because attorney violated several rules of professional conduct the attorney also violated rule 84a holding that rule was not violated where officer stated he made a report but was unable to find it because there was no report to tender to counsel holding that amsub hb no 350 was unconstitutional because it violated the separationofpowers doctrine and the singlesubject rule