inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” Barnes v. Wright, 449 F.3d 709, 717 (6th Cir.2006) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The First Amendment permits “restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, which are ‘of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.’ ” Thus, for example ... fighting words — “those personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction” — are generally pro-scribable under the First Amendment. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358-59, 123 S.Ct. 1536, 155 L.Ed.2d 535 (2003) (citations omitted) (<HOLDING>). D Section 750.337 of Michigan Compiled Laws,
recognizing first amendment retaliation right holding that plaintiffs have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the presence of a cross in a city park even though the cross was neither erected nor financially maintained by the government holding that first amendment protections apply to compelled speech as well as restrictions on speech holding that the burning of an american flag is conduct sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to implicate the first amendment holding that the first amendment permits virginia to outlaw cross burnings done with the intent to intimidate because burning a cross is a particularly virulent form of intimidation and speech or symbolic acts to intimidate lack first amendment protection