driving was a summary offense which carried a maximum sentence of not more than ten days imprisonment. Hence, the former serves as a disqualifying conviction under Section 922(g) of the Gun Control Act, whereas the latter does not. The PSP challenges the validity of the trial court’s partial expungement order and places heavy emphasis on the fact that it was not notified of, nor was it a party to, Rush’s expungement proceedings before the trial court. At the same time, the PSP concedes that even if it had been given proper notice, it was without standing to object to Rush’s petition for partial expungement before the trial court. See Pennsylvania State Police v. Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County, 150 Pa.Cmwlth. 338, 615 A.2d 946 (1992), affirmed, 533 Pa. 324, 623 A.2d 814 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, our Pennsylvania Supreme Court
holding that where defendant failed to object to facts in psi relating to prior conviction the failure to object constituted an admission holding that a claimant without an interest in a particular specific asset lacks standing to initiate ancillary proceeding holding that the psp lacks standing to object to an expungement request holding that an entity that serves the disabled lacks standing under the ada holding that owner of a chattel seized during an illegal search of a car owned by a third party has standing to object to the seizure but no standing to object to the search