of Plaintiffs’ negligence claims. Further, the complained-of acts that allegedly caused the decedent’s emotional distress and pain and suffering took place prior to his death, and the decedent eould have filed an FHA claim before he died. Even in the “unusual” event where the emotional distress and pain and suffering occurred at a time close to his death, following the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Estate of Gilliam, the Court finds that the operation of Florida’s survival law to preclude recovery for the decedent’s pain and suffering and emotional distress under'the FHA in this case is not inconsistent with the purposes of the FHA, which is remedial in nature. See Walters v. Cowpet Bay W. Condo. Ass’n, No. CV 2012-24, 2012-25, 2013 WL 2988021 at *5-*6 (D.V.I. June 14, 2013) (<HOLDING>).-’ Plaintiffs’ reliance on Ambmster does not
holding that a wide application was required given the legislative intent for the remedial provisions of the act holding that the provisions of the federal fair housing act 42 usca  36013631 1977 which are similar to the provisions in the dade county code are not penal in nature or effect holding that fha claim survives death of a defendant because the provisions are remedial not penal recognizing that because  the drafters of the connecticut penal code relied heavily upon    the penal code of new york  it is appropriate to look to new york statutory and case law for guidance in interpreting connecticut penal code holding that such provisions are valid