substantial to one in close management. Id. As such, the deprivation of those two hours constituted an atypical and significant hardship warranting due process protection. Id. While the various courts of appeal continue to differ in their approach to determining what constitutes an “atypical and significant hardship” and where to look to determine the baseline of the “ordinary incidents of prison life,” what is evident is that the ultimate determination of whether a liberty interest is implicated requires a fact intensive inquiry. At least at the pleading stage, it appears that courts in this Circuit endeavor to determine whether the deprivation alleged is atypical and significant when compared with the conditions experienced by the general population. See Magluta, 375 F.3d at 1282-83 (<HOLDING>); Bass, 170 F.3d at 1318 (a deprivation of two
holding that a statecreated liberty interest in ones classification may exist where classification imposes atypical and significant hardship holding that allegations of solitary confinement in a tight space for over 500 days was sufficient to state an atypical and significant hardship when compared to the expectations of a pretrial detainee holding that 30day segregated confinement in hawaii penitentiary did not present such atypical hardship so as to create liberty interest holding that liberty interests implicating the due process clause are generally limited to freedom from restraint which  imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life holding that the plaintiffs disciplinary segregated confinement for thirty days did not present the type of atypical significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest