of different actors. Boul-ton claimed that because his post-transfer supervisor was aware of his “tainted” status when he joined her division, she must have formed “preconceived notions” about him which led to his continuing discriminatory treatment. But “ ‘[t]he determinative question is whether .., [the employee with discriminatory] animus was a cause of the [alleged discrimination by another employee],’ ” Blackman, 694 A.2d at 871 (quoting Wilson v. Stroh Cos., 952 F.2d 942, 946 (6th Cir.1992)), and as the motions judge stated, there was no evidence of a “causal link” other than “speculation.” That speculation was not enough to forestall summary judgment for IIE on Boul-ton’s claims of sexual orientation discrimination continuing into the filing period. See Musa, 644 A.2d at 1002 (<HOLDING>). 8. Breach of Contract. Boulton claimed that
recognizing that nonmoving party must present affirmative evidence  to defeat summary judgment holding that a nonmoving party cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment by relying on conclusory statements holding that the nonmoving party must show how additional discovery will defeat the summary judgment motion ie create a genuine dispute as to a material fact and that the nonmoving party must show that he has diligently pursued discovery of the evidence in question holding that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact holding that mere speculation does not satisfy the nonmoving partys burden of establishing a dispute of material fact sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment