our disciplinary orders; but, more critically, it may not “uphold the force and effect” of our disciplinary orders in a manner contrary to its statutory duties. Cf. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Com., Ins. Dep’t, 536 Pa. 105, 638 A.2d 194, 200 (1994) (noting that an administrative agency may exercise only those powers conferred by the legislature). While this Court’s role in governing the practice of law is exclusive, in Harkness II, a majority of this Court reversed the Commonwealth Court’s conclusion that representation before the Board constituted the practice of law, and no one has questioned the constitutionality of Section 774 vis-a-vis this exclusive authority. See Piunti v. Com., Dep’t of Labor & Indus., Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 933 A.2d 135, 137-39 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Section 774 controls, and this Court’s
recognizing the inherent common law authority of courts to promulgate rules of practice and procedure recognizing right of this court to regulate and discipline members of the bar holding in light of this courts decision in harkness ii that section 774 was not an unconstitutional infringement on this courts exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law holding that state court could regulate the practice of law in federal courts located in the state recognizing a split of authority on this issue