be admissible as evidence in a civil action for the recovery of a stolen vehicle, or in any other civil action arising out of the theft of a motor vehicle. NMSA 1978, § 66-7-353 (1978). {12} The purpose of Section 66-7-353 is to protect the welfare and safety of the public by requiring owners of cars to take reasonable measures “to prevent acts which could lead to an automobile inadvertently moving without intention that it should,” Bouldin v. Sategna, 71 N.M. 329, 332, 378 P.2d 370, 372 (1963), and we believe that the provision, by requiring that one in possession of an automobile take reasonable measures to avoid leaving the keys in the ignition, implicitly contains a policy to deter theft. See Richardson v. Carnegie Library Rest., Inc., 107 N.M. 688, 701, 763 P.2d 1153, 1166 (1988) (<HOLDING>), limited on other grounds by Trujillo v. City
holding that the scope of a government employees first amendment rights depends on the balance between the interests of the employee as a citizen in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the state as an employer in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees holding public safety exception to miranda warning requirement did not apply where there was no evidence gun had been left in public place recognizing that preventing the theft of automobiles left unlocked and unattended with the keys in the ignition would be conducive to promoting public safety holding that even without  expert testimony the grand jurors common knowledge of the nature of fire would have allowed them to conclude that a fire spreads and becomes more dangerous the longer it is left unattended holding that an automobiles title history was admissible under the public records exception