those facts, but a prior commitment may be.’’ Las Cruces Prof'l Fire Fighters, 1997-NMCA-031, ¶ 24 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, although some instances of prejudgment may present no instance of bias, evidence of a prejudgment certainly augurs strongly in its favor. {67} This idea of prejudgment as the line between administrative bias and impartiality explains our holdings in both Reid and Las Cruces Professional Fire Fighters. In Reid, the board member’s admitted statement of prejudgment required recusal. Whereas, in Las Cruces Professional Fire Fighters, the board member’s prior affiliation with the union was inadequate to create a bias. See In re Comm’n Investigation v. N.M. State Corp. Comm'n, 1999-NMSC-016, ¶ 42, 127 N.M. 254, 980 P.2d 37 (<HOLDING>); Phelps Dodge Tyrone, Inc. v. N.M. Water
holding that prejudgment constitutes cause for recusal holding that the recusal statute should not be construed so broadly as to become effectively presumptive or to require recusal based on unsubstantiated suggestions of personal bias or prejudice holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation recognizing that statutes mandating recusal for actual bias have constitutional bases unlike those that require recusal for a mere appearance of bias or prejudice holding that each alleged defamatory statement constitutes a distinct cause of action