the Eastern District of Michigan, this factor weighs in favor of transfer. See S. Utah Wilderness All. v. Lewis, 845 F.Supp.2d 231, 236 (D.D.C. 2012). The Court disagrees with the government that Quicken’s failed preemptive suit warrants denial of its motion to transfer. See Gov’t Opp’n at 6. The cases cited by the government in support of this contention, see id. at 6-8, are distinguishable from the facts in this matter, as all but two of those cases involved parallel preemptive suits that were still ongoing at the time the motions to transfer venue were denied; thus, the parties that filed the preemptive suits would have been rewarded for their earlier-filed preemptive suits if their motions for transfer had been granted. See EEOC v. Univ. of Pa., 850 F.2d 969, 976-77 (3d Cir. 1988) (<HOLDING>); Spanx, Inc. v. Times Three Clothier, LLC, No.
holding that the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the district of columbia holding that when majority of class lived in new jersey maryland pennsylvania and virginia the eastern district of pennsylvania was a desirable forum holding that a district court in the eastern district of pennsylvania did not abuse its discretion by failing to dismiss a secondfiled action pursuant to the firstfiled rule given the totality of the circumstances specifically that the timing of the firstfiled action in the district of columbia indicates an attempt to preempt an imminent subpoena enforcement in the eastern district of pennsylvania holding that the district court in setting fees appropriately relied upon prevailing market rates in the eastern district of new york where the case was commenced and litigated holding that it is improper to consider the centralized location of the eastern district of texas when no identified witness resides in the district