emboli had the Heparin been resumed following the amputation surgery. We conclude that this is a fair summary of the causal relationship between Hillery’s failure to meet the appropriate standard of care and the injury, harm, or damages claimed. See Manor Care Health Servs., Inc. v. Ragan, 187 S.W.3d 556, 564 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. granted, judgment vacated w.r.m.) (concluding report adequate concerning causation where report stated that administration of anticoagulant medication was necessary to prevent pulmonary emboli and that as result of failure to administer drugs patient probably suffered pulmonary emboli and consequently died); cf. Shenoy v. Jean, No. 01-10-01116-CV, 2011 WL 6938538, at *7 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 29, 2011, no pet. h.) (mem op.) (<HOLDING>). In his appellate brief, Hillery also argues
holding report inadequate concerning causation because it failed to link decedents preexisting conditions to an increased risk for the injury involved in that claim holding that causation is an essential element in failure to warn claim holding no jurisdiction where appellant argued report was no report because it failed to mention appellant in any substantive way but trial court found report was merely deficient on element of causation as to appellant and granted extension holding that causation section of expert medical report was not eonclusory when read in context of entire report holding that allegation of procedural injury does not affect the issues of injury in fact or causation