was originally approved). The only authority cited by the Secretary — Rouse—does not support his point of view. He asserts that Rouse drew a distinction between orders issued prior to the enactment of the PLRA and those issued subsequent thereto. That is incorrect. Rouse drew a distinction between “existing federal court orders” and those “not yet obtained.” 129 F.3d at 654. That distinction contradicts the position that the Secretary advocates in this appeal. Accordingly, we hold that the procedure limned in 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b) applies to any existing prospective relief, regardless of when that relief was first ordered. See Miller, 530 U.S. at 333, 120 S.Ct. 2246 (stating that section 3626(b) applies to “existing injunctions”); Harvey v. Schoen, 245 F.3d 718, 720 (8th Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>); see also Rouse, 129 F.3d at 654 (suggesting
holding that the eleventh amendment applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case holding that prospective relief made in the absence of the required findings is immediately terminable regardless of when ordered holding exhaustion is required regardless of the relief offered through administrative procedures holding that a proper determination of the questions of law  cannot be made in the absence of suitable findings