have”). Yet, the mere presence of a lawyer does not satisfy the Sixth Amendment’s mandate; ultimately, “the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.” McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970). The fact that “a person who happens to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused ... is not enough to satisfy the constitutional command.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309, 93 S.Ct. 2568, 37 L.Ed.2d 619 (1973) (noting that the “core purpose of the counsel guarantee was to assure ‘Assistance’ at trial”); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31-32, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446, 60 S.Ct. 321, 84 L.Ed. 377 (1940) (<HOLDING>). Inasmuch as an effective attorney is required
holding that burden of clear and convincing proof cannot be satisfied by mere conjecture or speculation recognizing that the constitutions guarantee of assistance of counsel cannot be satisfied by mere formal appointment of an attorney recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel holding that the sixth amendments guarantee of the assistance of counsel is made obligatory upon the states by the fourteenth amendment