104 S.Ct. 2528, their actions do not offend the Due Process Clause. See also Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988) (“[U]nless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.”); United States v. Jobson, 102 F.3d 214, 218 (6th Cir.1996) (noting that the unconstitutionality of a failure to “preserve evidence whose exculpatory value is indeterminate” turns on (1) the government’s “bad faith in failing to preserve the evidence,” (2) whether “the exculpatory value of the evidence was apparent before its destruction” and (3) whether “the nature of the evidence was such that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by (<HOLDING>); United States v. Wright, 260 F.3d 568, 571
holding in a case involving a deaf person arrested for drunk driving that calling a drunk driving arrest a program or activity of the county the essential eligibility requirements of which in this case are weaving in traffic and being intoxicated strikes us as a stretch of the statutory language and of the underlying legislative intent holding that misdemeanor drunk driving by its very nature involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injuiy to another holding that driving records were nontestimonial holding certificates of inspection of a breathalyzer were nontestimonial business records holding that samples of breath taken from a breathalyzer test were only potentially useful to a criminal defendant convicted of drunk driving