for life in the current version of the Manual for Courts-Martial). Such punishment increasing circumstances enjoy a long history and are well within the authority of the President to prescribe in the exercise of his powers under Articles 18, 36, and 56, UCMJ. Cf. United States v. Loving, 41 MJ. 213 (1994), aff'd,-U.S.-, 116 S.Ct. 1737, 135 L.Ed.2d 36 (1996). For practical purposes, they are often treated like elements. The distinction may be important for some purposes, however, such as multiplicity analysis. See United States v. Weymouth, 43 M.J. 329 (1995); United States v. Teters, 37 M.J. 370 (C.M.A.1993), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 1091, 114 S.Ct. 919, 127 L.Ed.2d 213 (1994). But cf. United States v. Oatney, 45 M.J. 185, 188-189, slip op. at 9-12 (U.S. Armed Forces 30 Sep. 1996)(<HOLDING>). In any event, in this case the issue is not,
holding that the determination of whether a counterclaim is compulsory is made as a matter of law holding that when parties consent in writing to the courts determination of custody they are consenting and agreeing to that determination satisfying the statutory requirement of a joint application recognizing that the legislature is free to define statutory elements as it wishes holding that the appropriate inquiry under aedpa is not whether a federal court believes a state courts determination  was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonablea substantially higher threshold holding suggests that whether elements are statutory or not is immaterial to multiplicity determination