discussion of the merits led him to believe his petition was timely, and would therefore toll the AEDPA statute of limitations. However, the Washington State Court of Appeals expressly told Wal-dron-Ramsey that his PRP was time-barred, and the Washington State Supreme Court did not hold otherwise. Rather, the Washington State Supreme Court Commissioner’s discussion of the Faretta claim is most logically read in the alternative — the claim was untimely, but even if not, there was no merit to the claim. Waldron-Ramsey was not justified in assuming that his petition was timely an n-Ram-sey’s alleged confusion; thus, unlike the petitioner in Harris who relied on Dictado, Waldron-Ramsey could rely on no precedent to support his reading at the relevant time. See Harris, 515 F.3d at 1055-56 (<HOLDING>). Neither Waldron-Ramsey’s alleged confusion
holding that direct reliance was not shown where plaintiffs relied on third partys actions which were in turn undertaken in reliance on alleged misrepresentation by defendant holding that a petitioners reliance on dictado justified equitable tolling holding that whether a plaintiffs reliance on defendants misrepresentations was justified is a question of fact precluding summary judgment holding that whether the plaintiffs reliance on a negligent misrepresentation is justified generally raises a question of fact holding that a creditors reliance under  523a2a need only be subjectively justified and not objectively reasonable