That conduct constituted a separate and distinct statutory offense from the alleged penetration of the child’s sexual organ by appellee’s sexual organ, despite the fact both are violations of a single statute. Vick, 991 S.W.2d at 833 (emphasis supplied). Thus, we determined that there was no difficulty in concluding that the Legislature authorized two punishments when the accused violated different subsections of the same statute, in the same transaction, because the gravamen of the statute was to proscribe certain specific types of conduct (i.e., the nature of the appellee’s conduct). Id. We reached this conclusion because the level of detail in the statute reflected the Legislature’s intent that discreet acts constitute separate offenses. Id. at 849; see also Haight, 137 S.W.3d at 51 (<HOLDING>). Turning to this case, the gravamen of the
holding that the legislature can define separate offenses within the same statutory subsection even if the acts are in close temporal proximity holding that three phrases contained within the same subsection of the indecencywithaehild statute defined three separate offenses for juryunanimity purposes when separated in the disjunctive recognizing that the legislature is free to define statutory elements as it wishes holding that multiple sentences for offenses under 18 usc  924c are appropriate when multiple separate acts of firearm use have occurred even if they are related to the same underlying offense holding that when the legislature intends to punish separate acts even ones in close temporal proximity the blockburger test does not apply because the precondition for employing that test that the two offenses involve the same conduct is absent