later agreed to stipulate to the witness’s testimony. After taking the motion for a continuance under advisement, the trial court granted the State’s request for a continuance and reset the trial for May 14, 2001, resulting in a delay of 56 days. Hill did not further object to the May 14, 2001 trial date. As we noted above, once a trial date is set outside the seventy-day deadline, a defendant must object and move for discharge. Here, although Hill requested a discharge pursuant to Ind. Criminal Rule 4, the trial court had not yet even granted the State’s motion for a continuance and he was not otherwise eligible for discharge as we have held with regard to the seven-day continuance to March 19. Thus, his motion was premature. See, e.g., Bell v. State, 610 N.E.2d 229, 232 (Ind.1993) (<HOLDING>), reh’g denied, superceded by rule on other
holding that the defendants motion for discharge was premature and thus properly denied by the trial court holding that the trial court erred by granting the defendants motion to dismiss holding that where the trial court implicitly denied the defendants motion to suppress but neither expressly denied the motion nor explained its ruling claim of error could not be reviewed holding the trial court properly denied the defendants motion to suppress where the totality of the circumstances supported a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot holding that the trial court properly denied a fathers motion for attorney fees where there was no misconduct by the mother