by its plain terms, makes clear that a mark punishable as a counterfeit is one that suggests an erroneous origin and is, to a considerable degree, impossible to distinguish from a legitimate mark. The proximity of the phrase “substantially indistinguishable” to the term “identical” further emphasizes the degree to which a spurious mark must resemble a legitimate mark for it to be considered a counterfeit. Given the unambiguous nature of the statute’s plain language, we conclude that it easily allows an ordinary person to understand what the statute prohibits. Supporting our conclusion is the fact that the only other circuits to have considered vagueness challenges to § 2320 have similarly rejected such arguments. See United States v. McEvoy, 820 F.2d 1170, 1172-73 (11th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Bohai Trading Co.,
holding that  2320 as a whole is not unconstitutionally vague holding that attorney disciplinary rule was unconstitutionally vague as applied holding factor b is not unconstitutionally vague holding that exceptional depravity is unconstitutionally vague holding that essentially equivalent is unconstitutionally vague