the IIRIRA’s transitional rules). In other words, “where a final order of removal is shielded from judicial review” by a provision in § 1252(a)(2), “so, too, is [the BIA’s] refusal to reopen that order.” Patel, 334 F.3d at 1262. Applying this principle to the case at hand, it is clear that § 1252 deprives this court of jurisdiction over the BIA’s denial of Assaad’s motion to reopen. In its final order of removal, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s finding that Assaad is not entitled to a good-faith marriage waiver of his re-movability under § 1186a(c)(4)(B). There is no question that, had Assaad directly petitioned this court for review of the BIA’s final order, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) would have barred our jurisdiction over his appeal. See Urena-Tavarez v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 154, 160 (3d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, because this court would not have
holding that sjeetion 1252a2bii clearly precludes judicial review of decisions under section 1186ac4 because the statute specifies that those decisions are purely discretionary holding that  1252a2bii precludes  review of discretionary decisions  in only the specific circumstances specified in the statute itself holding that section 1252a2bii barred jurisdiction of decisions specified by statute as discretionary but did not bar decisions specified by regulation as discretionary holding that the term final and conclusive precludes judicial review of army claims decisions holding that  1252a2bs ban on review of judgments regarding the granting of relief precludes review of only discretionary decisions