as final or interlocutory determines whether the trial judge may later change the substance of the judgment on his own order,” that "[fjinal judgments may not be changed by trial judges except under very limited circumstances,” and citing La. C.C.P. Art. 1951); see also Winstead v. Ed’s Live Catfish & Seafood, Inc., 554 So.2d 1237, 1241 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989) (finding La, C.C.P. Art. 1951 inapplicable to a ruling on the applicability of this statute since it was not a final judgment under La.C.C.P. 1841); McCrea v. Mobil Oil Corp., 95-0537, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/28/95), 662 So.2d 143, 147 (finding La. C.C.P. Art. 1951 inapplicable to a ruling on a venue exception, which was an interlocutory judgment); State v. Shaddinger, 97-439, pp. 8-9 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/28/97), 702 So.2d 965, 969 (<HOLDING>). 10 . As we noted in Mid City Holdings: “ 'A
holding that a second judgment controls over an earlier judgment entered in the same case holding that judgment which ordered simultaneous paternity testing of both the defendant and his brother was interlocutory in that it did not determine the merits of the paternity case and thus was not governed by la cc p art 1951 such that a second judge could amend the judgment holding that res judicata did not bar relitigation of paternity but only because the plaintiff had not been a party to or in privity with a party to the uncontested divorce judgment holding that ajbsent fraud on the court the trial court did not have jurisdiction to set aside the 1982 judgment of paternity more than one year after its rendition holding that it was not error for successor trial judge to direct a judgment for defendant based on the statute of limitations where initial judge had denied a motion for summary judgment on the same issue