the offense is punishable by death if certain proof is introduced at trial. When an accused is charged, as here, with transporting a kidnapped victim across state lines, he is charged and will be tried for an offense which may be punished by death. Although the imposition of that penalty will depend on whether sufficient proof of harm is introduced during the trial, that circumstance does not alter the fact that the offense itself is one which may be punished by death and thus must be prosecuted by indictment.” Id. at 8. (Emphasis original.) The West Virginia Supreme Court has reached the same result in construing a similar state kidnapping statute. Pyles v. Boles, 148 W. Va. 465, 135 S.E. 2d 692, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 864 (1964); but see State v. Sewell, 342 So. 2d 156 (La. 1977) (<HOLDING>). Our determination that G.S. 14-39 creates a
holding that leaving the scene and failing to render assistance are separate and distinct offenses recognizing similar duties holding that a similar statute created separate offenses holding unanimity requirement not violated when charge stated two separate counts with two separate and distinct offenses in each case holding that a statute that created a counselorclient privilege should not be retroactively applied to records created prior to the statute because of the presumption against retroactivity