the military is “final and conclusive”) (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3721(k)). In addition, the trial court noted that the MPCECA is not a money-mandating statute; thus, the MPCECA does not create a substantive right that would allow the Court of Federal Claims to exercise jurisdiction under the Tucker Act. Flowers, 75 Fed.Cl. at 635 (stating that the Secretary’s authority under the MPCECA is discretionary because he “may,” but need not, settle claims) (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3721(b)(1)). On appeal, Flowers does not address these major defects in his claim. Nor does he dispute the fact that he received a $4,425 settlement for his household goods. That settlement is “final and conclusive” under 31 U.S.C. § 3721(k) and is not subject to judicial review. Shull v. United States, 228 Ct.Cl. 750 (1981) (<HOLDING>). We therefore affirm the grant of summary
holding that the supreme court has final appellate review of agency decisions holding that the term final and conclusive precludes judicial review of army claims decisions holding that sjeetion 1252a2bii clearly precludes judicial review of decisions under section 1186ac4 because the statute specifies that those decisions are purely discretionary holding that this courts review of board decisions is limited to final orders or final decisions holding that  1252a2bs ban on review of judgments regarding the granting of relief precludes review of only discretionary decisions