do not believe that a federal probation officer acts on behalf of the prosecution.”) Investigating a probationer’s alleged noncompliance with the terms of his probation is certainly a regular duty of a probation officer. Therefore, absent evidence that Polk stepped outside his neutral role as a federal probation officer, we question the dissent's assumption that Polk acted as an agent of the police. Second, even assuming that Polk was acting on behalf of the police when he met with Howard, an argument rejected by both the federal magistrate judge, (J.A. at 213), and the district court, (J.A. at 301-02), the1 dissent offers no factual support for its conclusion that Polk "interrogated” Howard. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 299, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1688-89, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980) (<HOLDING>). In fact, as discussed at n. 2 & n. 10, supra,
holding that under the fifth amendment once an accused person in custody has expressed his or her desire to deal with the police only through counsel that person is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available  unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police holding that voluntary statements to police initiated by witness are not interrogation and therefore are nontestimonial recognizing that not all statements obtained by the police after a person has been taken into custody are to be considered the product of interrogation recognizing that police and the courts will continue occasionally to have difficulty deciding exactly when a suspect has been taken into custody holding that miranda does not apply to statements of the defendant which are voluntary and unsolicited and not the product of custodial interrogation