only “trade practice” relating t it’s complete innocence exception “is based on an outdated understanding of the D’Oench doctrine.” FSLIC v. Gordy, 928 F.2d 1558, 1567 n. 14 (11th Cir.1991). Such an exception runs contrary to the doctrine’s broad purpose of preventing private parties from enforcing • claims against the FDIC based upon agreements not found in the bank’s records. The need for bank examiners to rely on a bank’s records in evaluating the bank’s fiscal soundness remains unaffected by whether or not the customer 6 (7th Cir.1994) (“Section 1823(e) requires an identifiable ‘asset’ which is acquired by the bank and then transferred to the regulatory agency, and to which the unenforceable agreements must relate.”); Murphy v. FDIC, 38 F.3d 1490, 1500-01 (9th Cir.1994) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). However, since we hold that the D’Oench
holding that  1823e does not apply to a claim relating to a letter of credit a letter of credit is a liability not an asset recognizing statutory credit holding that agency demand letters are not suits holding that because the fcra does not require the disclosure in a firm offer of credit of amount of credit and interest rates courts should not imply such additional disclosure requirements explaining that the import of cole was that a firm offer of credit must have economic value rather than which terms must be included holding that section 1823e applies only to assets and does not apply to claims regarding letters of credit because letters of credit are liabilities rather than assets