implies the invalidity of his conviction or sentence to establish that the conviction or sentence was already invalidated. Id. at 1139-40. Here, Mr. Johnson was never “in custody” in connection with his misdemeanor conviction for unlawfully possessing a firearm in a vehicle. Mr. Johnson paid the imposed $100 fine, and it is undisputed that the deferred twelve-month sen tence, which required him to not commit further hunting violations and to appear for a review hearing, has expired. Mr. Johnson’s freedom was never significantly confined or restrained. Compare Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 83 S.Ct. 373, 9 L.Ed.2d 285 (1963) (finding that conditions imposed on a parolee were sufficient to constitute “in custody”), with Henry v. Lungren, 164 F.3d 1240, 1241-42 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); see also Dremann v. Francis, 828 F.2d 6, 7
holding that even though the offense was not of a sexual nature requiring the defendant to register as a sex offender following his conviction for false imprisonment of a minor was rationally related to the government interest in protecting the public and did not violate the defendants right to due process or equal protection under the law holding that sex offender registration and notification do not constitute punishment holding that the imposition of a life sentence for failure to register as a sex offender constituted cruel and unusual punishment because the sentence was so harsh in comparison to the crime holding that an individual who is required to register as a sex offender is not in custody holding that although the defendant in that case was convicted after the effective date of the new statute  1137118 he nevertheless was required to register as a sex offender because  113716 was in effect at the time he was charged