of the federal constitutions. See U.S. Const, amend. V; Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. See generally Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 77 S.Ct. 1064, 1 L.Ed.2d 1356 (1957), overruled in part on other grounds, Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978). Until Reed was decided, when a jury, instructed that it could convict for conduct that did not constitute an offense (or constituted some lesser offense), returned a general verdict, the conviction amounted to fundamental error, notwithstanding the existence of alternative, legitimate theories of guilt the evidence could support. See Mosely v. State, 682 So.2d 605, 607 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Arline v. State, 550 So.2d 1180, 1181 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); see also Horn v. State, 677 So.2d 320, 323 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (<HOLDING>). The United States Supreme Court has held “the
holding that reversal of conviction for felony murder was required where jury failed to find the defendant guilty of the underlying felony as essential element of the felony murder offense holding that first and seconddegree intentional murder verdicts are consistent with a felony murder verdict because lack of intent is not an element of seconddegree felony murder holding that to apply the firearm enhancement the firearm need only reflect the context of the defendants possession and the defendants ability to use the firearm to promote the controlled substance offense holding enhancement on a general verdict for felony murder impermissible on account of possession of a firearm because possession of a firearm was an essential element of one but not all of the predicate felonies the state relied on to prove felony murder holding error is not harmless when the accused is convicted of firstdegree murder on a general verdict after a trial in which premeditation and felony murder theories are espoused if the felony underlying the felony murder charge is based on a legally unsupportable theory