and state law. In challenging summary judgment on his retaliation claims, McCauley again makes only perfunctory arguments. He baldly asserts that “[tjhere can be no argument” that his 2009 complaints to Thomas did not qualify as protected activity. Aplt. Opening Br. at 24. Further, he points out that to engage in a protected activity, he was not required to use discrimination “buzz words.” Id. But McCauley fails to address the district court’s multiple rationales for rejecting his retaliation claim, including its conclusion that while McCau-ley may have expressed opposition to Thomas undermining his supervisory authority and showing favoritism to a certain female employee, McCauley did not complain about gender discrimination. See Neal v. Roche, 349 F.3d 1246, 1251-52 (10th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). As to causation, McCauley simply summarizes
holding that title vii does not include a continuing violation doctrine holding title vii does not proscribe cronyism and personal favoritism so long as not discriminatory holding that title vii proscribe racial discrimination in private employment against whites on the same terms as racial discrimination against nonwhites recognizing that title vii protects individuals from retaliation regardless of the merit of their complaints so long as they can show a good faith reasonable belief that the challenged practices violate title vii holding that the doctrine of qualified immunity does not protect a government official who is sued in an official capacity under title vii because title vii does not impose personal liability