The use of the words "no contact" in the defendant's probation condition, then, is reasonably understood to impose an obligation on the defendant to avoid encountering or engaging children in any way; to refrain from attendance at places where proximity to, and thus an encounter with, children is likely; and promptly to remove himself from such proximity if an encounter arises unexpectedly. The condition is not, as the defendant suggests, simply a requirement not to touch or speak to a child. "No contact" obviously includes such conduct, but also requires the defendant to avoid even the opportunity for such touching or direct communication. Id. Further, other courts have reached results similar to Kendrick. See Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 63 Mass.App.Ct. 131, 823 N.E.2d 808, 810 (2005) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 446 Mass. 61, 841 N.E.2d 1240 (2006),
holding that a violation of a probationary no contact condition may be proved by acts in which the probationer by deliberate design intentionally and inconsistently with the no contact provision positions  himself in a place wherein he knew or reasonably should have known that a protected person would be present holding that defendant who sets in motion series of events that he knew or should have known would cause others to deprive plaintiff of rights may be liable under  1983 holding that the destruction of documents which the party knew or should have known would be relevant to a pending or potential lawsuit is sanctionable holding that the district court erred because it applied the enhancement without taking into account whether the defendant knew or should have known possession would be unlawful holding that a cause of action accrues when the claimant knew or reasonably should have known of the wrong