that “[e]ach party shall assume and pay their respective attorney fees and costs incurred” in the divorce action. See In re White, 265 B.R. 547, 560 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.2001) (declining to award attorney fees in section 523(a)(15) action where “ ‘the Decree [did] not contain a provision allowing reasonable expenses incurred in enforcing the Decree’ ” (quoting In re Hammond, 236 B.R. at 769)). ¶ 15 We are convinced that it would have been futile for Seals to have asked for attorney fees in the bankruptcy proceedings. “It is well established that the law does not require litigants to do a futile or vain act.” Beltran v. Allan, 926 P.2d 892, 901 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (Billings, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see also Jenkins v. Equipment Ctr., Inc., 869 P.2d 1000, 1002-03 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the trial court incorrectly
holding that the governments position must have a reasonable basis in both law and fact citations omitted holding in lien case that obligor was excused from making tender where tender would have been an idle ceremony and of no avail quotations and citations omitted holding that in an agreement of sale in which time was of the essence and tender of deeds and of purchase money were expressly waived waiver of time is of the essence of the agreement would not result from a failure to tender because the parties had agreed that neither tender of deed nor tender of purchase money was required to put the other in default holding that the state is not required to tender a nameclearing hearing prior to disclosing the charges or discharging the employee holding that the test for harmless error is whether in the mind of the average juror the prosecutions case would have been significantly less persuasive had the improper evidence been excluded citations and internal quotation marks omitted