that Schrader’s default judgment was not dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). The bankruptcy court found that the punitive damage award, standing alone, precluded relitigation of § 523(a)(6)’s “willful and malicious” intent requirements because the punitive damage award was based on a California state trial court’s finding of “malice in fact.” Between the time of the bankruptcy court’s decision and the BAP’s review of this bankruptcy appeal, Plyam v. Precision Development, LLC (In re Plyam), 530 B.R. 456 (9th Cir. BAP 2015) was decided, which called into question the bankruptcy court’s reasoning. In re Plyam held that a California state court punitive damage award, standing alone, does not preclude relitigation of § 523(a)(6)’s “willful” intent requirement. 530 B.R. at 463-65 (<HOLDING>). Applying In re Plyam to this bankruptcy
holding that a states law is materially different from california law if application of the other states law leads to a different result holding that the faa did not preempt california law permitting court to stay arbitration pending resolution of related litigation where parties had selected california law in a standard choice of law provision recognizing a hypothetical situation where california law left a party free to sue on a claim in maryland even after the claim was precluded in california because the california statute of limitations had expired holding that the ninth circuit is bound by the california supreme courts interpretation of california law holding that under california law the general definition of malice in fact encompasses less reprehensible states of mind than  523a6s willful intent requirement