§ 3553(a)(2)(C), if it does not factor in his historic crimes. Cf. United States v. Lewis, 625 F.3d 1224, 1233 (10th Cir.2010) (affirming the substantive reasonableness of a sentence where the district court’s § 3553(a) analysis considered the defendant’s previous criminal conduct), abrogated on other grounds by Dorsey v. United States, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2321, 2326, 183 L.Ed.2d 250 (2012). If Mr. Baker’s position were correct, it would seemingly be always unreasonable for a sentencing court to consider § 3553(a) factors — suffused, as they are, with matters implicating a defendant’s criminal history — when imposing an upward variance on a defendant designated a career offender under U.S.S.G § 4B1.1. That is not the law. See United States v. Grimes, 702 F.3d 460, 471 (8th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2840, 186
holding upward deviation reasonable where supported by proper factors even though some  3553a factors operated in defendants favor holding harmless any error in departing upward under ussg  4a13 where district court alternatively imposed reasonable sentence as an upward variance holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing an upward variance after finding that the defendants criminal history category of i understated the seriousness of his criminal history holding that an upward variance or departure in the sentence imposed on a career offender based on  3553a factors including criminal history was substantively and procedurally reasonable holding that reduced career offender status was nonetheless based the career offender guidelines