§ 1983, “[e]very person who, under color of [law,] [deprives] ... any citizen ... of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.” In reviewing claims brought under this statute, we use the framework established in McDonnell Douglas. Richardson v. Leeds Police Dep't, 71 F.3d 801, 805-06 (11th Cir.1995). Under this framework, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. The plaintiff may meet his burden using direct or circumstantial evidence. See Hinson v. Clinch County, Ga. Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 821, 827 (11th Cir.2000) (outlining the types of evidence used to prove a Title VII claim); Richardson, 71 F.3d at 805 (<HOLDING>). Direct evidence of discrimination is evidence
holding that the same types of evidence used to prove a title vii claim also may be used to prove a  1983 claim holding that such circumstantial evidence may be used to prove discrimination holding that the government must prove the facts used in sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence holding that a plaintiff may rely on the same evidence to prove both pretext and discrimination holding that circumstantial evidence may be used to prove a wiretap claim including actual interception