have the right to demand a 12-person jury. Thus, contrary to the State’s argument, Appellant has demonstrated prejudice by counsel’s failure to obtain a mistrial after a juror was removed for misconduct. As explained in the majority opinion, although Appellant was indicted for first-degree murder, the 11-person jury convicted him of the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder. The State has characterized the verdict as a “jury pardon,” asserting no prejudice can be demonstrated because Appellant will only be entitled to a six-person jury if he obtains post-conviction relief and his conviction is vacated. As explained herein, however, the verdict is null and void. Allowing an 11-person verdict in a capital trial invalidated the structure of the t S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101,
holding that conviction for seconddegree murder operates as implied acquittal on firstdegree murder count holding double jeopardy bar on subsequent prosecution did not apply even after defendant had been sentenced when he breached conditions of his guilty plea and refused to testify for a second time at codefendants retrial for murder holding that an indictment for capital murder must contain at least one aggravating factor holding that it was not error to allow the penalty phase jury to hear evidence that the defendants previous conviction of seconddegree murder was obtained pursuant to an indictment for firstdegree murder holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to seconddegree murder and agreed to testify against codefendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for firstdegree murder