of the hearsay exceptions covered statements that by their nature were not testimonial — for example, business records or statements in furtherance of a conspiracy.” Id. at 56, 124 S.Ct. 1354; see also id. at 76, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he Court’s analysis of ‘testimony’ excludes at least some hearsay exceptions, such as business records and official records.”). Garth stipulated at trial that the tax returns were business records to avoid the “need to bring in a business records witness[ ].” She makes no attempt, in her brief, to argue that the tax returns were testimonial. And, in fact, the returns were not prepared for litigation, as is expected of testimonial evidence. See United States v. Torres-Villalobos, 487 F.3d 607, 613 (8th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>) Consequently, the admission of tax returns did
holding that certified records of maintenance are nontestimonial and are not prepared for any particular defendant holding that not all of claims file was prepared in anticipation of litigation and noting that the majority of cases that have dealt with the issue of whether investigative materials prepared by insurance claims adjusters is workproduct prepared in anticipation of litigation have held that since insurance companies have a routine duty to investigate accidents such materials are not prepared in anticipation of litigation holding that gradecrossing accident reports prepared by a railroad were not business records because they were not prepared for the systematic conduct of the enterprise as a railroad business rather the reports are calculated for use essentially in the court not in the business their primary utility is in litigating not in railroading holding that warrants of deportation were properly characterized as nontestimonial official records that were prepared independent of this litigation and were not prepared to prove facts for use in future criminal prosecutions holding that driving records were nontestimonial