informing him that his benefits payments would be offset. Omegbu’s arguments are somewhat difficult to parse, but he appears chiefly to be challenging the adequacy of notice by claiming that “simple notice by letter, and then offset ... is not sufficient process.” Regardless, by sending notice by mail to his last known address, the defendants complied with the constitutional requirements that they provide notice reasonably calculated to apprise Omegbu of the offset, and to provide him an opportunity to present his objections. See Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168-70, 122 S.Ct. 694, 151 L.Ed.2d 597 (2002); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 318, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950); cf. Setlech v. United States, 816 F.Supp. 161, 166-67 (E.D.N.Y.1993) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 17 F.3d 390 (2d Cir.1993). Moreover,
holding that mailing a letter to the last known address satisfied notice requirements in similar offset statute 31 usc  3720a holding that alien need not receive actual notice for due process requirements to be satisfied holding that mailing of titleregistration forms satisfied mailing requirement because they contributed to success of the scheme holding that the inss mailing a hearing notice to an aliens last known address but not to his attorney violated the aliens due process rights because the alien reasonably relied on statutory and regulatory language not relevant here that suggested his counsel would receive copies of all such notices holding that due process is satisfied where notice is mailed to the wrong address if the appellant received actual notice