contract, Kellogg Caribbean was an indispensable party. In the case under review, the original and amended complaints alleged only state-law claims, observed that DCC was a Delaware corporation and Rivera a Puerto Rican resident, and thus properly invoked the district court’s diversity jurisdiction. However, intervenors Coachman and Olympic Mills, were, like DCC, Delaware corporations, and entered as (nondiverse) party defendants. Because the parties, on appeal at least, do not assign error to the intervention of Coachman and Olympic Mills per se, we proceed directly to the Rule 19(b) analysis to determine whether that intervention divested the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Kellogg, 440 F.3d at 547; cf. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ditmore, 729 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). 2. Indispensability. This task requires us to
recognizing rule holding that an individual union member could not be deemed to be adequately represented by the secretary of labor for purposes of his right to intervene under fedrcivpr 24a holding under prior rule regarding joinder that royalty owners under the other lease contracts in a unitized block are necessary parties to suit under prior version of rule 39 recognizing the right to intervene in cases like this holding that a necessary party under rule 19a would be entitled a priori to intervene as of right under rule 24a