that these allegations in the underlying complaint are “entirely different issues” from its own allegations in the declaratory complaint. Pl.’s Resp., Dkt. 42-1, at 5. Thus, there is no impediment to resolving the question of whether Sealtite installed a hot torch membrane roof system, as the answer to that question is not material to whether Sealtite is liable in the underlying litigation. Atlantic is therefore entitled to present extrinsic evidence to establish this fact. See, e.g., Pekin Ins. Co., 237 Ill. 2d at 467, 341 Ill.Dec. 497, 930 N.E.2d at 1023 (considering extrinsic evidence to determine whether any potential for insurance coverage existed, but avoiding any resolution of actual underlying liability); Envirodyne; 122 Ill.App.3d at 307-08, 77 Ill. Dec. 848, 461 N.E.2d at 476 (<HOLDING>); Millers Mut. Ins. Ass’n of Ill. v. Ainsworth
holding that determination that work was performed as a consulting engineer did not affect underlying determination of negligence and so could be established through extrinsic evidence holding that sufficiency of the evidence review should be independent of the jurys determination that evidence on another count was insufficient holding that consulting engineer was not liable for workplace injury where it was not contractually responsible for safety precautions and did not exercise actual control of the work site holding that extrinsic evidence admissible to determine intent of parties holding that court may not use extrinsic evidence unless contract language is ambiguous