violation of the Act would be substantially reduced if the time that the motions to suppress were under advisement was entirely excludable. Instead of 30 days being excludable, 60 days would have been excludable, thereby reducing the violation of the Act from 59 days to 29 days. In this connection I note that under the Nebraska equivalent of the Act any period of delay involving “the time from filing until final disposition of pretrial motions of the defendant, including motions to suppress evidence” is excluded in computing the 6-month Nebraska speedy trial statutory requirement. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-1207 (Reissue 1985). Under Nebraska law it appears that the entire time a motion is under submission is excludable, not merely 30 days. State v. Brown, 214 Neb. 665, 335 N.W.2d 542 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Thus, there is at least a plausible reason to
holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion holding that a motion to continue a hearing on a postjudgment motion was ineffective to extend the period for the trial court to rule on the motion absent the express consent of the parties holding among other things that there should be excluded from computing the time for trial a period from the filing of a motion on september 18 until finai disposition of the motion by the trial court on its own motion on december 28 that is 102 days holding that the exclusion in rule 48c1 hrpp of periods of delay should be taken from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on or other prompt disposition of the motion citation omitted holding that a second motion to reconsider served within ten days of the denial of the first motion does not extend the time period for filing a notice of appeal from the underlying judgment