taxes. However, we conclude that the “erroneous nonrebate refund” case law does not control this case for two reasons: first, the 1995 refund was not “erroneous”; and second, the rationale for treating erroneous nonrebate refunds as nontax liabilities does not apply to the 1995 refund. First, we do not believe that the 1995 refund was “erroneous.” Court-ordered refunds, even if unmerited, are not “erroneous” for the purposes of tax law. Deeming such refunds to be “erroneous” would allow the IRS to circumvent the court’s order: after making the refund, the IRS could immediately recover it by suing the taxpayer under IRC § 7405, which creates a cause of action for the recovery of erroneous refunds. See United States v. Russell Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d 13, 16-18 (2d Cir.1965) (Friendly, J.) (<HOLDING>). This is consistent with the case law, which
holding that a refund is not erroneous and therefore not recoverable by a  7405 suit when it was deliberately made by the irs to satisfy a court order regardless of the merits of that order holding the order of the circuit court did not involve the merits of the action and was therefore interlocutory and not reviewable by the supreme court for lack of finality holding that an order by the trial court remanding the cause to the agency to impose a sanction other than the one imposed by the agency was not a final and appealable order because it did not terminate the litigation between the parties on the merits holding adjudication order based upon a determination on the merits in juvenile court is a final and appealable order holding the collateral order exception does not apply to a pretrial order denying class certification because the order is subject to revision prior to a decision on the merits