id. § 515.312 (“The term ‘interest’ when used with respect to property shall mean an interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect.”); see also Asia Pulp, 609 F.3d at 120 n. 9 (“Regulations that accompany the IEEPA often specifically define the terms ‘property’ and ‘interest’ in property....”); Consarc Corp. v. Iraqi Ministry, 27 F.3d 695, 701 (D.C.Cir.1994) (“We think that OFAC may choose and apply its own definition of property interest, subject to deferential judicial review ... The [OFAC] regulations define ‘property’ and ‘property interest’ to include ‘letters of credit, ‘bank accounts and deposits’, and any ‘present, future or contingent’ interests therein.” (citing 31 C.F.R. § 575.201)); Bank of N.Y. v. Norilsk Nickel, 14 A.D.3d 140, 789 N.Y.S.2d 95, 100 (1st Dep’t 2004) (<HOLDING>). The CACR definitions are plainly intended to
holding that scope of property subject to forfeiture is defined by the instrument creating an interest in the property holding that an agreement that defined the parties respective rights in the property of the other and waived each spouses right in the others property either before or after death was a marriage contract recognizing that ofac blocking regulations defined property very broadly to include debts indebtedness and obligations  and defined an interest in property equally expansively citation omitted holding that person as defined in njsa 112 does not include the state based on the fact that 1 the definition of person indicates that such term includes the state when it is used to designate the owner of property which may be the subject of an offense and 2 state and municipality are separately defined in njsa 112 holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property