by declaring such activities as “mining,” “production,” “manufacturing,” and union membership to be outside the definition of “commerce” and by limiting application of the effects test to “direct” rather than “indirect” commercial consequences. See, e. g., United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1 (1895) (narrowly construing the Sherman Antitrust Act in light of the distinction between “commerce” and “manufacture”); In re Heff, 197 U. S. 488, 505-506 (1905) (stating that Congress could not regulate the intrastate sale of liquor); The Employers’ Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463, 495-496 (1908) (invalidating law governing tort liability for common carriers operating in interstate commerce because the effects on commerce were indirect); Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161 (1908) (<HOLDING>); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1918)
recognizing that union members interests are adequately represented by the union holding that a religious foundation is an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the fair labor standards act holding that labor union membership fell outside commerce holding that application of fair labor standards act flsa to transportation employees employed by local government does not contravene the commerce clause because labor conditions of those employees affect interstate commerce holding that a law forbidding solicitation of union membership without obtaining an organizers card infringed on the right of speech and assembly to inform people of the advantages of union membership and persuade them to join a specific union