and “any and all pending disputes.” (emphasis added). The agreement, therefore, precludes only those of Farese’s claims that arose out of the defendants’ conduct that occurred prior to the agreement. This raises the question of what date marks the cut-off for conduct protected from suit by Farese by the preclusive effect of the agreement. The state court entered an order approving and enforcing the settlement agreement on July 8, 1999. The state court case was not dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the agreement, however, until December 3, 1999. Not until that time did the settlement agreement take on the weight of a court judgment and the collateral estoppel effects of the agreement begin running. See I.A. Durbin, Inc. v. Jefferson Nat. Bank, 793 F.2d 1541, 1549 (11th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). It also makes sense to use December 3, 1999
holding that the debtor has the burden of showing that collateral estoppel applies holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence holding that collateral estoppel applies only where the antecedent judgment was a final judgment holding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies when an issue of ultimate fact has necessarily been determined by a valid final judgment holding that collateral estoppel applies to  1983 claims