also supported our conclusion there was sufficient attorney-client communication. See id. In the present case, Huston was free on bond and he concedes that he and Toran spoke “numerous times” prior to trial. It is apparent that there had not been a breakdown in communication between the two. Moreover, the pre-trial record also supports the conclusion that there was no attorney-client breakdown because it shows that Toran had read the police report and was seeking witnesses to support Huston’s case. See Brown, 79 F.3d at 1507. Further, Huston and Toran had over eighteen hours before the start of the trial to discuss the case and Huston never complained about his ability to communicate with Toran during that time or at any point subsequent to it. See Bjorkman, 270 F.3d at 501 (<HOLDING>). The record reveals that Toran vigorously
holding that in determining whether there exists a valid waiver of the right to counsel in the criminal setting the court may consider a defendants lack of good faith in working with appointed counsel including an unreasonable refusal to cooperate with counsel or an unreasonable request for substitution of appointed counsel and the timeliness of defendants request for new counsel particularly when a defendant makes an untimely request for new counsel  under circumstances which are likely to result in a continuance holding that the appropriate remedy for a trial courts refusal to consider an indigent defendants request for new counsel is to remand for a hearing holding that denial of untimely request was not abuse of discretion holding that no complaint after a thirtyfive minute recess supported denial of request for new counsel holding that a denial of a request for pro bono counsel is not reversible unless the plaintiff shows prejudice