canons of interpretation. Lockhart, 126 S.Ct. at 703-04. In this case, for example, Section 408 exists to protect the United States’ obligations under NAFTA. Indeed, powerful canons do exist to protect such interests. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32, 102 S.Ct. 1510, 71 L.Ed.2d 715 (1982); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22, 83 S.Ct. 671, 9 L.Ed.2d 547 (1963) (overturning the NLRB’s construction of a statute because Congress did not clearly state that it intended to violate the law of nations); FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142, 80 S.Ct. 543, 4 L.Ed.2d 584 (1960) (Black, J. dissenting) (“Great nations, like great men, should keep their word.”); Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 333 F.3d 228, 237-38 (D.C.Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, because Section 408 is
holding jones act insufficiently clear to abrogate immunity holding that congress could abrogate the eleventh amendment pursuant to the commerce clause holding that in an earlier version of 11 u s c  106 congress had failed to make sufficiently clear its intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity holding that congress must speak with a clear statement if it intends to abrogate an international agreement holding that congress had no power under article i to abrogate state sovereign immunity