allegations are correct, then it can be determined from the face of the record that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum for the offense and is patently illegal. Crotts is therefore entitled to have his motion decided on its merits. Crotts alleges that, in 1989, he was convicted of burglary of a dwelling, a second-degree felony, and given a guidelines sentence of sixty-six months’ prison followed by eighteen months’ probation. According to Crotts’s motion, his original sentence was not a habitual offender sentence. After being released from prison, Crotts violated his probation and, in 1991, he was sentenced to twenty years’ prison as a habitual felony offender for that violation. If these facts are true, Crotts’s habitual offender sentence is illegal. See King, 681 So.2d at 1140 (<HOLDING>). Although Crotts was sentenced before the
recognizing that shull does not apply to habitual offender sentencing and stating that this was not a case where the judge relied upon a reason for departure that was later declared invalid but rather one in which the judge considered his sentence to be one to which the guidelines did not apply holding that under the 1991 version of the habitual offender statute defendant could not receive habitual offender sentence for life felony holding that a defendant sentenced as an habitual offender who later successfully challenges one of his predicate offenses may have his habitual offender status and sentencing enhancement vacated through postconviction relief or a motion to correct erroneous sentence holding that under habitual felony offender statute a sentence includes the sanction of probation holding that where original sentencing judge imposed a guidelines sentence defendant could not be sentenced as a habitual offender upon violation of probation