The first common pattern arises where the repossession occurred post-petition but at a time pri- or to the creditor being informed of the filing, either by receipt of notice from the Court or by notice given by the debtor or debtor’s counsel. A repossession in these circumstances is void ab initio, but the creditor is not liable in damages for the act of repossession since there was no actual notice of the pendency of the case. See In re Miller, 10 B.R. 778 (Bankr.D.Md.1981), aff'd., 22 B.R. 479 (D.Md.1982). Although the automatic stay was violated, the violation was without notice of the pendency of the case and thus is not considered “willful.” Some courts described these violations as “technical or inadvertent.” See Commercial Credit Corp. v. Reed, 154 B.R. 471 (E.D.Tex.1993) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, the creditor has an affirmative
holding that the automatic stay barred a suit for injunctive relief to prevent postpetition antitrust violations holding that the denial of a motion to find a violation of the automatic stay was a final order holding that creditor who repossessed vehicle postpetition and returned automobile within twenty hours of receiving notice only committed technical violation of automatic stay holding that creditor who proceeded with foreclosure after receiving actual notice from debtor was liable for violating the automatic stay holding judgment in violation of automatic stay void