Jean Fiore and the Defendant, Richard O. Hilliker.” Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Mr. Hilliker on that basis. Mr. Hilliker argues on appeal that because there is neither a common plan nor mutual restrictions, the restriction could be enforced by the Fiores only if there was language in the deed itself expressly giving them the right to do so. Additionally, the appellee law firm argues that the “conditions” in Schedule B on which the Fiores rely were personal to Mr. Spivey, and not covenants running with the land. We decline to address these arguments because they were not raised in Mr. Hilliker’s summary judgment motion, nor were they addressed in the trial court’s order. See Rosenberg v. Cape Coral Plumbing, Inc., 920 So.2d 61 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. Bank of Am. Corp., 927 So.2d 1091
holding that the trial court may not grant summary judgment on a ground not raised in the motion holding that trial court did not err in ruling on appellees motion for summary judgment before appellees complied with appellants discovery request when the record reflected that appellant filed a motion to compel three days before the hearing and the record did not reveal any effort on the part of appellant to secure a ruling from the trial court on its motion to compel or object at the trial court hearing the motion for summary judgment prior to ruling on the motion to compel holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion holding that a summary judgment motion must stand or fall on the grounds expressly presented in the motion holding that a trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment