in the statute that would limit or guide a prosecution for indecent, immoral, obscene, vulgar, or insulting language. Allowing a prosecution where one utters “insulting” language could possibly subject a vast percentage of the populace to a misdemeanor conviction. Id. at 258-59 (emphasis added) (citations, internal quotations, and omissions removed). The court went on to state that, “[the statute], as currently drafted, impinges on First Amendment freedoms.... [It is] unquestionable that [the statute], as drafted, reaches constitutionally protected speech, and it operates to inhibit the exercise of First Amendment rights.” Id. at 259. Thus, it is clear that probable cause for Leonard’s arrest is not supported by § 750.337. See Sandul v. Larion, 119 F.3d 1250, 1256 (6th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Michigan’s courts have not commented so
holding that after the district court determined that the plaintiffs speech was protected the court was required to inform the jury of its ruling that knapps speech was constitutionally protected holding that protected speech cannot serve as the basis for a violation of city ordinances at issue recognizing the preliminary issue in a first amendment challenge is whether the speech at issue is protected or unprotected holding that a city could not use past conduct to enjoin future protected speech holding that when protected speech is inextricable from unprotected speech the court will treat the entire message as protected