might have arisen from his father’s actions in response to the MIP ticket and did not seek to influence the resolution of any public questions arising from any such controversy; the only actions Wade took after the MIP ticket that related in any way to such “controversy” were actions to defend himself in court at the trial on the ticket and to petition for, and receive, an expunction. However, Wade’s use of judicial processes did not “thrust” him to the “forefront” or “inject” him into the “vortex” of “a public controversy” or “public issue” in order to “influence the resolution” of “public questions,” nor did it constitute a “voluntary engagement” in activities that involved the risk of increased exposure and injury to reputation. See Firestone, 424 U.S. at 454-55, 96 S.Ct. 965-66 (<HOLDING>). Appellants invite us to create a new category
holding that use of judicial process to litigate divorce did not make plaintiff a public figure and noting that such action was no more voluntary than that of defendant called upon to defend his interest in court holding that more than notice to a defendant is required holding that former state transportation department employee who brought allegations of departmental corruption to public attention was public figure recognizing the prejudice of an extension to a defendant who would be required to litigate events that occurred more than eight years earlier holding that the petitioner who was denied further appellate review by the supreme judicial court had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his fourth amendment claim in the state trial court and appeals court and thus stone precluded federal habeas relief