circumstances” approach, which adopts the position that an injury is malicious if the debtor fails to act in subjective good faith.). 9 . Actually, Mr. Trantham seemingly suggests that his prepetition acts and conduct that gave rise to the patent infringement judgment were more akin to a traditional, willful breach of (implied) contract or a breach of a statutory property right rather than a "willful and malicious injury” to the person or property of Monsanto. 10 . Compare In re Klayminc, 37 B.R. 728 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1984)(the debtors’ continued infringement of plaintiff’s trademark after the entry of a federal injunction constituted "willful and malicious” injury which rendered the plaintiff's claim nondischargeable). 11 . See 11 U.S.C. § 707(a); In re Zick, 931 F.2d 1124 (6th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). 12 . By analogy, it is noted that in NLRB v.
holding lack of prejudice to the defendant is not good cause holding that the list contained in 11usc  707a is not exhaustive such that bad faith may constitute cause for dismissal in a chapter 7 bankruptcy holding that bad faith includes lack of good faith in investigating the facts of a complaint holding that lack of good faith is a valid basis to dismiss a chapter 7 case for cause under section 707a holding that although courts have inherent power to dismiss bad faith litigant  707a does not provide basis for dismissal on grounds of bad faith filing