affect [ ] . . . Tung Fong’s ability to enter into [subcontracting] transactions.” Pl.’s Reply Brief at 8. Quite apart from the issue of the legality of the calculation of the “all others” rate in this case, a party granted its own dumping margin generally lacks standing to challenge the “all others” rate. See Torrington Co. v. United States, 21 CIT 251, 263, 960 F. Supp. 339, 349 (1997); Fag Italia S.p.a. v. United States, 20 CIT 1377, 1384-85, 948 F. Supp. 67, 73 (1996). Tung Fong advances no compelling reason why that principle should not apply with equal force here. Tung Fong’s argument that it may, in the future, enter into subcontracts with companies subject to the “all others” rate is simply too speculative. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Thus, because there is no showing that Tung
holding that environmental groups that might someday return to a contested habitat did not meet the actual or imminent standard required for injury in fact holding that inmates must demonstrate an actual injury holding that allegation of procedural injury does not affect the issues of injury in fact or causation holding that plaintiffs vague desire to return is insufficient to satisfy the requirement of imminent injury recognizing that the government not the relator must have suffered the injury in fact required for article iii standing