IX. Id. at 656-58. In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 911 F.2d 617, 622 (11th Cir.1990), rev'd on other grounds, 503 U.S. 60, 112 S.Ct. 1028, 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992), we had also said — in dicta — that Title VII principles did not apply to Title IX cases; and this point was not discussed nor declared to be error on review in the Supreme Court. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 65 n.4, 112 S.Ct. at 1032 n. 4. We note that our analysis of Title IX is generally consistent with that of Title VI — a statutory scheme frequently considered when interpreting Title IX. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 693-94, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 1956-57, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1996); Davis, 120 F.3d at 1399; see generally Nelson v. Almont Community Schools, 931 F.Supp. 1345, 1354 (E.D.Mich.1996) (<HOLDING>). By the way, we are aware that the Supreme
recognizing that standards of liability under title vi are different from traditional agency principles or the general standards of liability under title vii recognizing that claims arising under the ihra are analyzed under the same standards as title vii claims holding that title vii and adea causation standards are different holding that there is no individual liability under title vii holding that a plaintiff can sue for retaliation under title vi