and to show that Aranda knowingly and purposefully participated in this conspiracy .... to establish a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.”); United States v. Evans, 8th Cir., 697 F.2d 240, 248 n. 8 (1983) ("Contrary to Evans’ assertion the government is entitled to put this evidence on in anticipation of a defense of lack of intent.”); Foy v. State, Tex. Crim.App., 593 S.W.2d 707, 709 (1980) ("[W]e hold that evidence of prior extraneous offenses committed against the victim of the offense charged, and indicating the existence of ill will or hostility toward the victim, is admissible as part of the State's case in chief as circumstantial evidence of the existence of a motive for committing the offense charged.”); Thompson v. United States, D.C. Ct.App., 546 A.2d 414, 423-24 & n. 16 (1988) (<HOLDING>). 16 . See Getz, 538 A.2d at 732. 17 . Id. at
holding that the government may not be permitted to introduce other crimes evidence in its case in chief to prove intent unless the defense disputes intent during opening statements holding that when a defendant charged with conspiracy enters a not guilty plea he makes intent a material issue in the case and imposes a substantial burden on the government thus the government may introduce extrinsic offenses which qualify under 404b to prove defendants state of mind unless defendant takes affirmative steps to remove the issue of intent from the case holding that the rule 404b evidence admitted to prove intent was clearly relevant because intent was at issue in the trial holding intoxication is only a defense to specific intent crimes and not general intent crimes holding that diminished capacity is a defense only to specific intent crimes