also weighs in favor of awarding attorney’s fees. Finally, this litigation served a clear public purpose. Unlike the plaintiff in Farrar, Plaintiffs never sought any extravagant or personal financial benefit. Instead, Plaintiffs wished only to vindicate our collective First Amendment rights. See Shaw v. Hunt, 154 F.3d 161, 167 (4th Cir.1998) (“[Rjecovery under § 1988 is meant to reward those who have undertaken successfully to fulfill the role of a private attorney general.”). While the settlement and receipt of nominal damages did little for Plaintiffs personally, their victory undoubtedly signaled to the MTA the importance of ensuring that its regulations do not intrude upon our most basic constitutional and democratic rights. See Lippoldt v. Cole, 468 F.3d 1204, 1224 (10th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court’s decision not to grant
holding that where plaintiff sought recovery of fees against multiple defendants evidence of unsegregated fees was more than a scintilla of evidence to support fee award what a reasonable attorneys fee would be for the entire case indicates what the segregated amount  should be holding that the statute of limitations did not commence  despite the filing of a prior complaint against another physician  until the defendants deposition made the plaintiff aware of the defendants involvement in the decedents death where the plaintiff failed to discover the defendants involvement because of the defendants misstatement concealment or fraud recognizing discretion of district court in determining a fee award holding that the countys permit fee violated the first amendment holding that a fee award was justified because the ruling against the defendants would encourage the defendants to comply with the first amendment going forward