truthful. Assuming for the sake of argument that the defendant’s contention is correct, we nevertheless observe that the trial court found in the four factors noted above ample particularized guarantees of trustworthiness of Bryar’s statements to Trottier and Bollerud, and we conclude that this finding was not clearly erroneous. See Cook, 135 N.H. at 662, 610 A.2d at 805. For this reason, we hold that the admission of Bryar’s statements incriminating the defendant did not violate the defendant’s right of confrontation under part I, article 15 of the State Constitution. Because part I, article 15 affords this defendant at least as much protection from an unconstitutional admission of hearsay as the sixth amendment, cf. White v. Illinois, — U.S. —, — n.8, 112 S. Ct. 736, 742 n.8 (1992) (<HOLDING>), we need not embark on an independent federal
holding that no independent inquiry into reliability is required when the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception like that for coconspirators under rule 801d2e internal quotation marks omitted holding that statements within a firmly rooted hearsay exception do not violate the confrontation clause holding that rule 8034 hearsay exception is firmly rooted for sixth amendment purposes holding codefendants confession incriminating defendant was not within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule under roberts standard holding that the exception is not firmly rooted