with respect to his allegation that the State failed to prove a material element of the menacing charge. Wildman also concedes that the issues of joinder and his consecutive sentences are subject to procedural default because he did not raise them on direct appeal or in his state court post-conviction proceedings. Wildman, however, argues his procedural default of the joinder issue should be excused because his appellate counsel’s failure to raise that issue amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. As previously set forth, however, Wildman’s appellate counsel’s action of not appealing the join-der issue does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 577 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 845, 120 S.Ct. 117, 145 L.Ed.2d 99 (1999) (<HOLDING>). Wildman also seeks to excuse his procedural
recognizing that in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel a movant must show that he was prejudiced by his counsels performance holding that ineffective assistance of counsel constitutes cause for procedural default only if counsels performance was constitutionally ineffective recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record holding that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim alleged to be cause for the procedural default of other claims is itself an independent claim subject to the procedural requirements of exhaustion