the word "initially” is to be given effect. The court wrote: "[T]he crux of defendant’s oral argument was that it is illogical for the Immunity Act to absolutely immunize a public entity’s initial failure to erect a traffic warning device (see 745 ILCS 10/ 3—104 (West 1992); West[, 147 Ill. 2d 1, 588 N.E.2d 1104]), but fail to extend this absolute immunity once the traffic warning device is erected. What defendant and the appellate court failed to recognize, however, is that it is not for the courts to extend this statutory immunity or to fill the perceived interstices of the Immunity Act: that is strictly the province of the General Assembly.” Snyder, 167 Ill. 2d at 477, 657 N.E.2d at 994. See also Jefferson v. City of Chicago, 269 Ill. App. 3d 672, 678, 646 N.E.2d 1305, 1310 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Defendants cite Culver v. Velcor, 247 Ill.
holding that nothing in the pslra has altered that doctrine holding that appeal from a decision of the attorney general denying legal representation was before the appellate division as of right to review the final decision of a state officer holding that there is nothing inherent in the phrase that requires the action working the deprivation to come from the state holding that nothing in the west decision justifies gapinskes excision of the word initially from section 3104 recognizing that the existence of a copy of a decision in a bill file along with numerous references to a decision of the court of appeals in the legislative history indicated that an amendment was made in response to that decision