for the sole purpose of checking driver licenses. We find that the later provision of § 55-50-804 controls under the facts of the present case. See State v. James Herbie Hinkle, Jr., No. 80-89-III, Davidson County (Tenn.Crim. App. filed December 9, 1980, in Nashville). Based upon these provisions, Deputy Johnson’s actions were proper and the resulting knowledge that the defendant was driving on a revoked license is properly admissible. The defendant contends that if the motion to suppress is overturned on appeal, officers would be permitted to randomly stop drivers to determine whether their registration was valid. However, this argument has no merit under the facts of this case because the stop was neither random nor arbitrary. Further, it is we .Ct. 1391, 1401, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)
holding that owners and officers of automobile dealership who were neither consumers nor competitors in automobile market lacked standing to bring antitrust action against automobile manufacturer holding that a canine sniff of an automobile need not be justified by reasonable articulable suspicion of drug activity holding the drivers refusal to consent to search of automobile did not give rise to reasonable suspicion that vehicle contained narcotics holding that except in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered  stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his drivers license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the fourth amendment holding that asking a detained motorist whether he would consent to a search of his automobile for contraband even after he had produced a valid drivers license did not necessarily make the traffic stop unreasonable in scope or duration