and notes that Deutsche Bank does not argue that Allstate took steps to verify that she could repay the loan. At the outset, it is plain that a complaint must be brought under the law in effect when the wrong that is complained of occurred. See, e.g., Velasquez v. HSBC Mortg. Servs., 2009 WL 2338852, at *4 (D.Nev. July 24, 2009) (dismissing unfair lending claim “because the home loan relating to the Property is not subject to NRS Chapter 598D as in effect at the time of the financing”). Inasmuch as Ridley entered into the loan and mortgage in May 2006, her claims, if any, arise under Section 598D.100(l)(b) as it was in effect on that date — -that is, the pre-amendment version of the Unfair Lending Practices Act. See Larson v. Homecomings Fin., 680 F.Supp.2d 1230, 1237 (D.Nev.2009) (<HOLDING>); Duncan v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 2010
holding that the court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute holding that the united states court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute holding that the statute plainly exempted  all employees who were covered by the flsa before january 1 2007 recognizing that as of july 11 1994 contempt proceedings arising from civil actions are no longer governed by rule 333 ala rcrim p and instead are governed by rule 70a holding that claims arising from a june 2007 loan were governed by the preamendment statute