means by which the county may enter into lease agreements without conducting a public auction. Viewed in historical perspective, the unanimity exception simply created yet another option for a county to forego § 11— 256’s public auction requirement rather than, as contended by Johnson, a means of superimposing a public auction requirement on leases authorized by § 11-932. ¶ 15 Construing all the relevant statutes together, we believe that the intent of the legislature, when it enacted the earlier version of § 11-932 in 1939, was to promote and facilitate the development of public parks by excepting such leases from the public auction requirement in § 11-256. See Ruth Fisher Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Buckeye Union High Sch. Dist., 202 Ariz. 107, 112, ¶ 21, 41 P.3d 645, 650 (App.2002) (<HOLDING>). Although the relevant statutes have been
holding that a general statute is superseded by a more recent specific statute only if the two statutes are in conflict holding that specific statutes create exceptions to general statutes therefore if a provision of a specific statute is inconsistent with one in a general statute on the same subject the specific statute controls holding that where there is a conflict between statutes the more recent statute is controlling and a specific provision prevails over a general provision relating to the same subject matter recognizing the principle that gives precedence to the terms of the more specific statute where a general statute and a specific statute speak to the same concern recognizing that a specific statute controls over a general one