the Government), II (Knowingly Making False Statements or Records to the Government), and TV (violation of False Claims Act Anti-Retaliation Provision). II. Smith first argues that the district court erred when it dismissed Counts I and II with prejudice. The district court grounded its dismissal of those counts primarily upon the “very serious matter” of the “violation of the statutory seal.” J.A. 488. Smith’s attorney undoubtedly violated the False Claims Act’s seal requirement by publicly discussing the complaint. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Holder, 673 F.3d 245, 254 (4th Cir.2011) (recognizing that “the seal provisions [prevent] the relator ... from publicly discussing the filing of the qui tam complaint”); U.S. ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 67 F.3d 242, 244 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). The real dispute here centers on whether the
holding that a prior suit and a subsequent suit between the same parties did not involve the same claim because the evidence necessary to sustain the subsequent suit was insufficient to entitle the plaintiff to relief in the prior suit holding that plaintiff clearly violated the seal provision  by making statements to a newspaper about the existence and nature of her qui tam suit holding that various law enforcement personnel and judges were victims of the crime of making false statements to a government agency for purposes of  3a12a where the defendant made false statements about the officials to the irs causing the irs to investigate the officials certainly had the effect of making these individuals the defendants victims holding that the court had jurisdiction to hear the suit under the citizen suit provision of the caa holding that the plaintiff had standing because the defendant violated her privacy by making unsolicited automated calls to her cell phone