homeowners’ association is clearly given a conditional right to repurchase. But, as evidenced by section 16 of the purchase agreement, that right is not exclusive: “Seller” M.V.P. has its own conditional right to repurchase. Accordingly, the Matts’ first assignment of error is not well taken. {¶ 25} The Matts’ second and third assignments of error both deal with whether the Matts timely and sufficiently complied with the requirement that they commence construction of their home within 60 months of the filing of their deed. For purposes of clarity and convenience, the two assignments of error will be considered together. {¶ 26} The right to repurchase in this case is a condition subsequent. See Bruner-Goodhue-Cooke-Cranz Agency Co. v. Smith (1927), 25 Ohio App. 21, at 29, 157 N.E. 407 (<HOLDING>); see, also, Trailsend Land Co. v. Virginia
holding that a condition subsequent presupposes an existing obligation that is to be defeated or forfeited if the condition is not fulfilled recognizing that before a special condition of probation may be imposed there must be an oral pronouncement of the condition at sentencing holding that right to payment does not accrue until condition precedent has been fulfilled holding that an insureds compliance with a condition precedent is not tested by the presence or absence of prejudice to the insurer but only by whether the condition has been fulfilled by the insured under all the circumstances holding repudiation where defendant refused to perform unless plaintiffs fulfilled new condition not required by contract