against Brady, determining that he was barred from relit-igating factual issues the Board had considered. The court did not address the challenges to Brady’s transfer or the College’s “dissent” policy, but entered final judgment in favor of defendants on all claims. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Our review of Brady and Thorn-quest’s first amendment claims is de novo. See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 609 (11th Cir.1991). III. DISCUSSION In § 1983 actions, federal courts must afford the same preclusive effect to unre-viewed state administrative agency factfind-ing to which it would be entitled in the state’s courts, provided the state agency was “acting in a judicial capacity,” and “resolve[d] disputed issues of fact properly before it ty, 902 F.Supp. 1503, 1506 (M.D.Fla.1995) (<HOLDING>); Weaver v. School Bd. of Leon County, 661
holding that a county ordinance imposing an impact fee on new residential construction to be used for new school facilities did not constitute an unauthorized delegation of power from the county to the school board because the fundamental policy decisions were made by the county and the discretion of the school board was sufficiently limited holding that the special relationship exception does not apply to the relationship between a student and a school recognizing employeremployee relationship between board of trustees and tenured guidance counselor holding that intraconspiracy doctrine applied to plaintiffs claims against school board teacher school principal and district superintendent recognizing employeremployee relationship between county school board and teacher