alien defendant could be expected to think he was not suffering a penalty when he was rendered deportable and then deprived of any eligibility to seek a waiver of deportation. II. The Supreme Court, however, has long held that deportation is not a punishment, but rather a mere administrative action: A deportation proceeding is a purely civil action to determine eligibility to remain in this country, not to punish_ The deportation hearing looks prospectively to the respondent’s right to remain in this country in the future. Past conduct is relevant only insofar as it may shed light on the respondent’s right to remain. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038, 104 S.Ct. at 3483. Therefore, deportation laws are not subject to the Ex Post Facto Clause. See Galvan, 347 U.S. at 531, 74 S.Ct. at 743 (<HOLDING>); Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 594, 72 S.Ct. at 521
holding that parole guidelines are subject to the ex post facto clause holding that the ex post facto clause does not apply to deportation orders because deportation however severe its consequences has been consistently classified as a civil rather than a criminal procedure holding that the supreme courts ex post facto precedents do not clearly establish that amended section 29336 violates the ex post facto clause holding retroactive application of idra would violate the ex post facto clause holding that the ex post facto clause  has no application to deportation