trial court's May 17, 2011 order expressly incorporated the Family Service Plan and notified "the parents that each of the actions required of them below are necessary to obtain the return of the child.” The trial court, as trier of fact, is presumed to be aware of the orders it had previously entered in the case, and thus it did not need to have their existence proven again. See In re J.J.C., 302 S.W.3d 436, 446 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) ("[A] trial court is presumed to 'judicially know what has previously taken place in the case’ tried before it, and the parties 'are not required to prove facts that the trial court judicially knows.' ”); see also In re C.M.C., No. 14-12-00186-CV, 2012 WL 3871359, at *3 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 30, 2012, no pet. h.) (<HOLDING>). I would also conclude that the evidence was
holding that we cannot properly receive and consider evidence that was not presented to and considered by the trial court holding that trial court has no duty to establish waiver on record holding in response to argument that no evidence was presented during trial proving existence of court orders specifically establishing actions necessary to obtain return of child that this court has consistently held we may presume the trial court took judicial notice of the record without any request being made and without any announcement that it has done so holding that jurys original verdict of guilty without intent and recommend mere was an acquittal such that after it was presented to an officer of the court and the court the trial had ended  and the trial court was without authority to return the jury to its room for any further action holding that appellate court may presume trial court took judicial no tice of its own record and that trial court record in that case supported prejudice element