was presented that J.A.R. would receive more appropriate treatment in a moderate-risk placement than in a low-risk placement. See K.M. v. State, 891 So.2d 619, 620-21 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (rejecting trial court’s reasoning that a high-risk placement was more appropriate because the juvenile “was a risk to public safety” where the Department had recommended moderate-risk placement and there was “no evidence that a moderate-risk placement would be insufficient to keep [the juvenile] under control”). The prosecutor’s assertion that a low-risk residential placement could not provide programs to address J.A.R.’s needs did not constitute evidence on which the trial court could rely in the absence of a stipulation by J.A.R.’s counsel. See State v. Brugman, 588 So.2d 279, 279 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (<HOLDING>); Leon Shaffer Golnick Adver., Inc. v. Cedar,
holding that an attorneys unsworn statement does not establish a fact in absence of a stipulation and does not constitute competent evidence holding that unsworn pleadings do not constitute proper summary judgment evidence holding that hearsay statement did not constitute competent evidence and thus could not be considered in opposition to motion for summary judgment holding that probation does not constitute a sentence holding that generally an unsworn statement by counsel is not evidence in the context of a batson hearing