v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994), Justice Rehnquist, writing for the plurality, held that a plaintiffs claim for malicious prosecution arising out of an arrest and incarceration based on a warrant unsupported by probable cause did not trigger the plaintiffs substantive due process rights, rather, the plaintiffs constitutional claim, if any, implicated only the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 274, 114 S.Ct. 807. In Torres v. McLaughlin, 163 F.3d 169 (3d Cir.1998), the Third Circuit read Justice Rehnquist’s plurality opinion narrowly, concluding that the Fourth Amendment only protects individuals from malicious criminal prosecutions from the time of the arrest until the time of pre-trial detention. See Torres v. McLaughlin, 163 F.3d 169, 174 (3d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Consistent with this narrow reading of
holding that in  1983 claims for malicious prosecution the fourth amendment applies to those actions which occur between arrest and pretrial detention holding a fourth amendment terry detention is not a custodial arrest and the use of handcuffs does not automatically convert a temporary detention into a fourth amendment arrest holding that the limits of fourth amendment protection relate to the boundary between arrest and pretrial detention holding the same for malicious prosecution holding that the statute applies also to malicious prosecution actions