983(e)(l)(A)-(B). Congress has stated that “[a] motion filed under this subsection shall be the exclusive remedy for seeking to set aside a declaration of forfeiture under a civil forfeiture statute.” 18. U.S.C. § 983(e)(5). B. The district court was correct to dismiss Matthews and Owens’s complaint. Motions under Rule 12(b)(6) object to the “formal sufficiency of the statement of the claim for relief.” 5B C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356, p. 354 (3d ed. 2004). Matthews and Owens’s § 983(e) claim was meritless, even on their best day, because it was missing an essential ingredient: lack of notice. The relevant CAFRA provision reads: (e) Motion To Set Aside Forfeiture.— (1) Any person entitled to written notice in any nonjudicial c 6th Cir.2011) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). It is similarly clear that Matthews and Owens
holding sufficient notice by certified mail to both home address and place of immurement holding that property owner was not entitled to relief under cafra because he was given sufficient notice of the administrative forfeiture proceeding through certified mail holding that notice of administrative forfeiture sent to prisoner did not require actual notice to the property owner only notice reasonably calculated to apprise a party of the pendency of the action holding in a civil forfeiture case under inter alia 18 usc  545 that cafra applies to the two forfeiture statutes invoked by the government that are found in title 18 holding that property owner was not entitled to relief under cafra because he received notice and failed to properly file a claim