to testify was well within the bounds of the court’s discretion. We are likewise unpersuaded by Valiav-icharska’s related argument that the court erroneously curtailed her cross-examination of Sergeant Jewell. Valiavicharska’s counsel was allowed to ask Sergeant Jewell a broad range of questions about the escalating conflict between the police and demonstrators during the protest, and the court did not unfairly constrain the scope of cross-examination. To the extent the magistrate judge limited Valiavicharska’s cross-examination of Sergeant Jewell at all, she did so only to prevent unduly prejudicial, cumulative, and otherwise irrelevant testimony. Imposing these reasonable limitations was not an abuse of discretion. See Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 332-33 (9th Cir.1992) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. ** This disposition is not
recognizing that trial courts have great latitude and considerable discretion to determine necessary and proper jury instructions holding that trial court retains wide latitude and considerable discretion to limit crossexamination internal quotation marks omitted recognizing district courts wide latitude in imposing supervised release conditions recognizing that we review a trial courts jury instruc tions for abuse of discretion and that a district court abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law internal quotation marks omitted holding that compliance with rule 3 is both a mandatory and jurisdictional prerequisite to appeal internal quotation marks omitted