tolling is appropriate, the plaintiffs’ amended claims are all barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The plaintiffs’ theory of taking is that a taking occurred because the economic value of the bridge was destroyed. The economic value of the bridge was destroyed because the Ohio ramp was not rebuilt, thus effectively closing the bridge. See Proposed Amended Complaint HIT 19-20 (“Such closure prevented any use of the Bridge and substantially reduced or destroyed the fair market value of the residue of the Bridge, and constitutes a taking....”). Under the plaintiffs’ theory, then, the relevant time that plaintiffs would be “on notice” of the taking is the time they were on notice that they would not be receiving a new ramp. See Ruff v. Runyon, 258 F.3d 498, 500 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Kuhnle Bros., Inc. v. County of Geauga, 103
holding that the statute of limitations period begins to run when the allegedly discriminatory pension plan is applied to the plaintiffs and leaving determination of the actual date the statute begins to run on each claim to the district court holding that the statute of limitations begins to run under federal law when plaintiffs knew or should have known of the injury which forms the basis of their claims holding that under the ada discovery of the original act of discrimination not future confirmation of the injury or determination that the injury is unlawful is when the statute of limitations begins to run holding that fcra statute of limitations begins to run when a consumer discovers the facts giving rise to his claims holding that the statute of limitations begins to run on the date the alleged malpractice is discovered