in a treatment program, but he remained eligible for thirty days of good-conduct credit, assuming a thirty-day month, notwithstanding his unsatisfactory participation. Under the new statute, his failure to satisfactorily participate renders him ineligible to earn any reduction in his sentence, even if he has no disciplinary infractions. We are convinced this difference is a substantive change in the formula used to calculate a reduction in sentence because, as in Weaver, it “retroactively decreased] the amount of [earned]-time awarded for an inmate’s good behavior.” Lynce, 519 U.S. at 441, 117 S.Ct. at 896, 137 L.Ed.2d at 72 (characterizing issue in Weaver). Therefore, application of the amended statute to Propp violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. See Stansbury, 960 P.2d at 236 (<HOLDING>). For the same reasons, we reject the State’s
holding similar statutory amendment was retrospective when applied to inmate who committed his crime before amendments enactment holding that the ex post facto clause  has no application to deportation holding similar statutory amendment violated ex post facto clause when applied to inmate who committed his crime before enactment of amendment holding that the supreme courts ex post facto precedents do not clearly establish that amended section 29336 violates the ex post facto clause holding that parole guidelines are subject to the ex post facto clause