as his argument presents a question of law and statutory interpretation, we review this matter de novo. See State v. Getz, 189 Ariz. 561, 563, 944 P.2d 503, 505 (1997). ¶ 14 Following a criminal conviction, the trial court must “require the convicted person to make restitution to the person who is the victim of the crime ... in the full amount of the economic loss.” A.R.S. § 13-603(C). A victim is defined as “a person against whom the criminal offense has been committed.” Ariz. Const, art. II, § 2.1(C); A.R.S. § 13-4401(19). A crime, in turn, is any felony or misdemeanor, AR.S. § 13-105(6), and an offense is conduct punishable by imprisonment or fine under state or local law, A.R.S. § 13-105(23). See State ex rel. Thomas v. Klein, 214 Ariz. 205, ¶ 15, 150 P.3d 778, 782 (App.2007) (<HOLDING>). In other words, only crimes that may be
holding unconstitutional definition of criminal offense in  1344016 insofar as it narrowed definition of victim in effect when victims bill of rights adopted holding that the greater offense is  by definition the same for purposes of double jeopardy as any lesser offense included in it holding that threat as used in the coercion definition as that definition is incorporated into section 3605s witnesstampering prohibition was not unconstitutionally vague because nature of threat was informed by the harms enumerated in the definition in that case hatred contempt and ridicule holding county does not fit statutory definition of victim under restitution statutes holding that the definition of operating deficits is not ambiguous despite the absence of a definition of the phrase in the contract