ruling was erroneous, Petitioner is not entitled to relief unless the violation rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. Redman v. Dugger, 866 F.2d 387, 390 (11th Cir.1989). The Redman case defined fundamental unfairness as that where the evidence is “material in the sense of crucial, critical [and a] highly significant factor.” Id. See also Bundy v. Dugger, 850 F.2d 1402, 1422 (11th Cir.1988). In certain instances, defense testimony or evidence should be admitted even though the testimony or evidence is otherwise inadmissible. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967) (recognizing the “right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts”); Chambers v. Mississippi 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (<HOLDING>); Boykins v. Wainwright, 737 F.2d 1539, 1544
holding that where the case is technically not closed and the ends of justice may best be served by the admission of crucial evidence it is an abuse of the trial courts discretion to deny the introduction of such evidence holding that speedy trial act requires that an ends of justice continuance be specifically limited in time holding that where constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice holding that the case should be reopened where the cause has not proceeded so far that the ends of justice would be defeated or the orderly process of the court disturbed holding that an ends of justice continuance may be appropriate where the case is unusual or complex