that guides the court’s inquiry”). Courts must determine legislative intent from the plain meaning of the statute. State v. Dugan, 685 So.2d 1210, 1212 (Fla.1996). As to this statute, the legislature’s expressed intent is that “[sjections 376.30-376.319 ... shall be liberally construed to effect the purposes set forth under ss. 376.30-376.319 and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended.” § 376.315, Fla. Stat. (2002). We therefore interpret the statute with that directive in mind. A statute creates a new cause of action if it provides a remedy unavailable under the common law. See Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. v. McRoberts, 111 Fla. 278, 149 So. 631, 632 (1933); see also Gunpowder Horse Stables, Inc. v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 108 Md.App. 612, 673 A.2d 721, 728 (Spec.App.1996) (<HOLDING>). Under the common law, a landowner whose land
holding that the statute at issue created a new cause of action because the burden of proof needed under the statute was less rigorous than the common law burden holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant holding that the burden is on the plaintiff recognizing burden holding that when congress is silent on the issue of the burden of proof applicable to a common law affirmative defense that does not negate an element of the offense we presume congress intended the defendant to bear the burden of proof of the defense by a preponderance of the evidence