traditional aims of punishment, retribution and deterrence; (5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it; and (7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99, 118 S.Ct. 488. Courts must consider these factors “in relation to the statute on its face,” and “only the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.” Id. Kansas courts, in interpreting the state legislature’s intentions, have repeatedly held the assessment of taxes pursuant to the Act is civil in nature. See State v. Matson, 14 Kan.App.2d 632, 798 P.2d 488 (1990) (<HOLDING>); see also State v. Berberich, 248 Kan. 854,
holding that the debtor lacked standing to bring a claim against the internal revenue service for the improper assessment of a tax deficiency because the cause of action was the property of the estate and had not been abandoned to the debtor holding that the essential purpose of use tax is the recoupment of lost sales tax revenue holding that revenue rule did not bar prosecution of a money laundering scheme to defraud the canadian government of tax revenue holding the act constituted a civil penalty because one of its objectives was revenue collection and because assessment of the tax did not necessarily depend on the illegal nature of the sale or possession of marijuana holding that a new tax assessment formula enacted after the beginning of the period of assessment but applied to the entire tax year was a clear instance of a statute acting prospectively on facts or conditions in existence prior to its enactment