permitting us to infer a plausible connection among the private party defendants and a governmental agency or official such that them private actions would constitute “state action.” See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982); Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638 (3d Cir.1995) (“A private action is not converted into one under color of state law merely by some tenuous connection to state action”). In addition, the single-sentence conclusory allegations of a conspiracy contained in the Amended Complaint are insufficient to allege a plausible conspiracy among the defendants to deprive the Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights under § 1983. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949; see also Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 185 (3d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). We agree with the District Court’s conclusion
holding that massachusetts statute did not create a sufficiently close nexus between private hospital and the state to warrant labeling private actors state actors holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability holding that a state agency created under state law was a state actor holding that establishing the existence of an understanding among private parties and state actors for  1983 conspiracy purposes is really nothing more than another way to show state action by alleging a private partys connection to a state actor holding that a private actors conduct was not state action just because the government failed to supervise that partys conduct