even a single act of NWP by which it held Mr. Brink out as an agent authorized to modify the CBA, Plaintiff has failed to establish the lack of a genuine issue regarding the existence of apparent authority. Despite Plaintiffs failure to show as a matter of law that Brink acted with apparent authority, NWP may still be bound to the Standard Clause under the agency principle of ratification. Accordingly, Mr. Brink’s actions, even his unauthorized acts, will have binding effect if NWP knew of, and accepted, the benefits of Mr. Brink’s actions without taking steps to disavow them. See Restatement, (Second) Agency, § 98 (A receipt of benefits may constitute an affirmance by which a ratification is established); see also Yarnall v. Yorkshire Worsted Mills, 370 Pa. 93, 87 A.2d 192, 193 (1952) (<HOLDING>); Presbyterian Board of Relief for Disabled
holding that under illinois law silence can constitute acceptance under the terms of the restatement of contracts holding that under  98 of restatement principal elected to ratify unauthorized act by accepting benefits of agreement with full knowledge of its terms and was therefore bound to terms of agreement holding federal court is not bound by terms of plea agreement between defendant and state authorities holding that when a court accepts a fixed plea agreement it is bound by the agreements terms holding that both the state and the defendant are bound to the terms of a plea agreement under santobello