practice.” Rather, the employer has acted because it believed that the employee made false and malicious allegations, and thus did not believe that the employee was engaged . in protected “opposition.” Of course, if the employer has no good reason to conclude that the employee’s allegations were knowingly false and malicious, then there will be a genuine issue as to whether the employer’s stated reason for termination is a pretext for unlawful retaliation for protected activity. But whether a judge or jury might later disagree with the employer’s good faith conclusion about falsity is not dispositive, because whether the employer discriminated unlawfully depends on the employer’s beliefs and motivation. See Kipp v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 280 F.3d 893, 897 (8th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation omitted); Scroggins v.
holding that a verbal threat of being fired is not an adverse employment action for purposes of title vii holding that title vii plaintiff must show that retaliatory motive played a part in the adverse employment action holding in the title vii context that the plaintiff must show that the individual who took adverse action against him know of the employees plaintiffs protected activity recognizing that protected conduct closely followed by adverse action may justify an inference of retaliatory motive holding that termination is an adverse employment action