II where the Administrator is to have discretion. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1281(g)(4), 1283(e), 1288(g) (Supp. II 1972). The 1977 Amendments also frequently used the “is authorized” language to give discretionary power. See U.S.C.A. §§ 12810), 1282(a)(3), 1284(b)(6), 1285(g)(1), 1285(g)(2) (Supp. 1978). In addition, the 1977 Amendments use the term “may” in several sections where discretion is to be employed. See 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1281(h), 1283(a), 1284(b)(3), 1284(b)(5), 1285(g)(2), 1285(h) (Supp.1978). The fact that in the 1977 Amendments Congress distinguished “shall” from “may” shows that in Subchapter II of the Act, Congress used “shall” in its everyday sense, as imposing a mandatory duty on the Administrator. See Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 95 S.Ct. 839, 43 L.Ed.2d 1 (1975) (<HOLDING>). This conclusion is reinforced by the
holding that the use of the word shall in the extradition clause and the extradition act creates a mandatory duty holding the word individuals is not the equivalent of the dictionary acts use of the word persons holding that a states use of the word shall is mandatory language holding that the use of the word shall in  1285a of subchapter ii of the act imposes a mandatory duty on the administrator to allot all the amounts authorized to be appropriated holding that the word may in the declaratory judgment act does not mean shall 