of death. See Jones v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t of Corrs., 812 F.3d 923, 941 (11th Cir. 2016) (Jordan, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“‘[A] prisoner under a death sentence remains a living person, and consequently has an interest in his life’ that is protected by the Due Process Clause and which entitles him to ‘some minimal procedural safeguards.' ” (quoting Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 288-89, 118 S.Ct. 1244, 1253-54, 140 L.Ed.2d 387 (1998) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment))). Indeed, this must be the case given that a death row prisoner’s Eighth Amendment right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment exists until his life is taken. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447, 10 S.Ct. 930, 933, 34 L.Ed. 519 (1890) (<HOLDING>); McGehee v. Hutchinson, No. 17-00179, slip op.
holding that the eighth amendment protects prisoners only from deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs holding that the eleventh amendment protects a state from suit by its own citizens holding that the eighth amendment prohibits states from inflicting the death penalty upon a defendant who is insane recognizing that the eighth amendment protects individuals from a lingering death holding that the eighth amendment to the united states constitution prohibits the execution of mentally retarded individuals