Family Servs. v. I.B., 891 So.2d 1168, 1171 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). By law, persons accepting drivers’ licenses in the state are deemed to consent to testing of their blood alcohol content. § 316.1932(l)(a)l.a., Fla. Stat. (2010). The “underlying purpose of the implied consent law ... ‘is to ensure reliable scientific evidence for use in future court proceedings and to protect the health of those persons being tested....’” State v. Miles, 775 So.2d 950, 953 (Fla.2000) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Bender, 382 So.2d at 699). Furthermore, compliance with the FDLE regulations gives rise to various statutory presumptions for use in court proceedings. When a regulation fails to meet the purposes of the implied consent program, however, the, statutory presumptions do not apply. See id. at 953-55 (<HOLDING>). Appellant argues that Rule 8.012 is invalid
holding that the implied consent statutes are irrelevant when the defendant gives actual consent to a blood or breath test holding that independent of the implied consent law the fourth amendment requires an arrestees consent to be voluntary to justify a warrantless blood draw holding driver has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he had complied with the implied consent law and that the peace officers had not satisfied the procedural requirements thereof where licensee claimed his consent to blood test was invalid and that he was incapable of consenting holding that failure to require proper preservation of blood samples rendered a prior version of rule 8102 inadequate and inconsistent with the purpose of the implied consent law as it relates to ensuring the reliability of test results as such the state was not entitled to the presumptions of impairment associated with the implied consent statutory scheme holding that the implied consent law allows law enforcement officers to obtain blood in circumstances in which a warrant or actual consent may otherwise be required