The First Circuit has held that “ ‘stray workplace remarks’ ... normally are insufficient, standing alone, to establish either pretext or the requisite discriminatory animus.” Gonzalez v. El Dia, Inc., 304 F.3d 63, 69 (1st Cir.2002); see also Williams v. Raytheon Co., 220 F.3d 16, 18 (1st Cir.2000) (rejecting age and gender claims where supervisor told colleagues that the company was run by “old, white men,” that she intended to change the corporate culture, and would favor the hiring of women and younger people); Shorette v. Rite Aid of Maine, 155 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir.1998) (asking the plaintiff “how old he was and when he planned to retire” was “a textbook example of an isolated remark which demonstrates nothing”); Pearson v. City of Manhattan, 33 F.Supp.2d 1306, 1315 (D.Kan.1999) (<HOLDING>); Martin v. Ryder Distribution Res., Inc., 811
holding that the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of age discrimination based upon a showing that she was a member of the protected group she was qualified and capable of doing her job she was discharged and that her manager called her old woman thus evincing agebased animus sufficient to demonstrate discriminatory intent holding that a plaintiffs lack of knowledge regarding the number of affected persons does not bar class certification when defendant has the means to identify those persons at will holding that local ordinance prohibiting the sale of beer or wine to persons less than 21 years of age was not preempted by state statute prohibiting the furnishing of any alcoholic beverages to persons under 21 holding that phrase old ways is not evidence of adea agebased animus as such terms apply more to a persons state of mind than to a persons age holding states are not persons for the purposes of section 1983