Id. 11 47. 21 . See id. ¶ 49. 22 . See id. ¶ 50. 23 . Id. ¶ 58. 24 . See id. ¶ 59. 25 . See id. ¶ 60. 26 . See id. ¶ 62. 27 . See id. 28 . See id. ¶ 331 (2d Cir.2002)); In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 406 F.Supp.2d 433 (S.D.N.Y.2005) ("[OJmission is actionable when the failure to disclose renders a statement misleading.”). 83 . Novak, 216 F.3d at 309 (citation omitted). 84 . Id. (citation omitted). ir.2001) (describing "[i]nsufficient motives” as including "(1) the desire for the corporation to appear profitable and (2) the desire to keep stock prices high to increase officer compensation”) (quotations omitted). 93 . Stevelman v. Alias Res. Inc., 174 F.3d 79, 84-85 (2d Cir.1999). 94 . Kalnit, 264 F.3d at 139. Accord In re Openwave Sys. Sec. Litig., 528 F.Supp.2d 236, 250 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (<HOLDING>); Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726
holding under delaware law that corporate officers owe the same fiduciary duties as directors holding that directors and officers are fiduciaries holding that defendants stock options are concrete and personal because they represent a species of compensation different from the one ordinarily accumulated by corporate officers and directors holding that damages resulting from directors misconduct destroying the value of the corporate stock does not qualify as a direct or personal injuiy to a shareholder and will not support a tort action recognizing privilege for corporate officers directors and shareholders to influence the actions of their corporation