defendants in districts with which the corporate defendants do not have significant contacts. Id.; cf. Gogolin & Stelter v. Karri’s Auto Imports, Inc., 886 F.2d 100, 103 n. 5 (5th Cir.) (noting that § 1391(c) has been amended, but refusing to decide the effect of the change in a case filed prior to the amendment’s effective date), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1031, 110 S.Ct. 1480, 108 L.Ed.2d 617 (1990). According to this restrictive interpretation, venue is only proper in a district where the corporate defendant has significant contacts sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction, were the district its own state. See Barrineau, 940 F.Supp. at 154 (citing Pacas v. Showell Farms, Inc., 83 F.3d 415 (4th Cir.1996)); Rich v. Southern Gulf Operators, 879 F.Supp. 49, 51 n. 2 (E.D.Tex.1995) (<HOLDING>). The court agrees that 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), as
holding that venue is proper in any judicial district in which the corporation is doing business holding venue proper where proper when the action was commenced holding that venue in the district identified in  9 was mandatory holding that venue is proper in any district where any act in furtherance of the conspiracy took place holding that if a modification petition is filed in a county where venue is appropriate it is improper to transfer the venue to another county merely because venue also would have been proper in the other county however once an enforcement proceeding is undertaken in an appropriate venue venue is improper in a different county over a subsequently filed petition to modify the decree which was the subject of the enforcement proceedings