which prevents summary judgment. We conclude the trial court erroneously resolved fact issues against the insurers on the issues of Grace’s "expectations, possible material misrepresentations by Grace, and the reasonableness of the settlement agreement. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the schools and Grace. Because we conclude the schools and Grace are not entitled to summary judgment, we also reverse the trial court’s award of attorney fees. The award lacks both substantive merit and statutory or contractual support. See Lanoue v. Fireman’s Fund Am. Ins. Cos., 278 N.W.2d 49, 54 (Minn.1979) (attorney fees allowed only when authorized by statute or provided for in contract); Morrison v. Swenson, 274 Minn. 127, 138, 142 N.W.2d 640, 647 (1966) (<HOLDING>). The insurers further argue the trial court
recognizing general rule recognizing that rule 120a is a limited exception to general texas rule that appearance for any purpose subjects defendant to courts jurisdiction recognizing exception recognizing exception to exhaustion requirement where the union wrongfully refuses to process the employees grievance thus violating its duty of fair representation recognizing limited exception to general rule when insurer wrongfully refuses to defend its insured