dispute, but it is not a material one. See Maryland Rule 2-501(a). Petitioner’s contract construction argument is that Erie’s failure to use a “sexual molestation” exclusion in the policies issued to Kowalski reflects an intent to provide coverage for sexual molestation. Such an inference requires as its predicate the notion that a “sexual molestation” exception—if such conduct were already prohibited under a general provision excluding all intentional torts—would be impermissibly redundant. This inference does not flow logically. As the Court of Special Appeals noted in this case, “liability insurance policies often contain both broad exclusions and specific exclusions that overlap.” Pettit, 117 Md.App. at 221, 699 A.2d at 555; see also Sparks, 63 Md.App. at 743, 493 A.2d at 1112 (<HOLDING>). Many factors underlie the commercial reality
holding that an automobile dealers liability insurer was not liable for any damage allegedly caused by the negligence of the dealer and sustained in an accident involving an automobile purchased from the dealer or to defend the dealer in the negligence action where the injury occurred outside of the policy period and occurrence was defined in the policy as an accident including injurious exposure to conditions which results during the policy period in bodily injury or property damages   holding that public policy favors the exclusion of intentional acts as contained in the mjua policy holding that there was no coverage because there was no occurrence within the meaning of the policy because defective workmanship does not constitute an accident or an occurrence under a commercial general liability policy holding that the plain meaning of the uim policy language was clear and not contrary to public policy holding that an intended damages exclusion was in pari materia with language in the policy defining an occurrence under the policy as an accident