by an objective standard. Lieb, 788 F.2d 151, 157 (3d Cir.1986). One view of an “improper purpose” is any purpose other than one to vindicate substantive or procedural rights or to put claims of a right to a proper test. GREGORY P. Joseph, Sanctions, 13(B)(2) at p. 216. But simplifying and isolating the “purpose” of certain litigation tactics is not always helpful. See Sussman v. Bank of Israel, 56 F.3d 450, 459 (2d Cir.1995) (reversing sanctions imposed pursuant to Rule 11 and the court’s inherent power for the filing of a complaint “with a view to exerting pressure on defendant through the generation of adverse and economically disadvantageous publicity” where complaint did not lack foundation in law or fact); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Blasdell, 154 F.R.D. 675, 682 (D.Ariz.1993) (<HOLDING>). As indicated earlier, an objective basis for
holding that a defendant is in custody and miranda applies even when the purpose of defendants detention is unrelated to the purpose of the interrogation holding that even when there is a legitimate government purpose the discrimination must bear at least some rational relationship to that purpose holding that rule 11 sanctions are not appropriate when a motion is filed in part for a legitimate purpose even when the motion includes certain evidence which is assertedly presented for an improper purpose holding that a motion for rule 11 sanctions is dispositive holding that sanctions under rule 11 are unavailable unless the motion for sanctions is served on the opposing party for the full twentyone day safe harbor period before it is filed with or presented to the court