of the estate whenever that transfer occurs outside the debtor’s ordinary course of business. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1). On the other hand, when a chapter 11 debtor in possession continues to operate its business, as permitted by section 1108, no court authorization is necessary for the debtor to enter transactions that fall within the ordinary course of its business. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1). 1. Authorized by the Court Demag asserts that some of the post-petition transfers were authorized by the Court because they were paid pursuant to the First Agreement. The Court authorized Vision to assume the First Agreement; therefore, payments made pursuant to that Agreement were authorized by the Court. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Dakota Bank & Trust Co. (In re Knudson), 943 F.2d 877, 878 (8th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Musika v. Arbutus Shopping Ctr. Ltd. P’ship
holding that although a financing statement may be used to assist in the interpretation of the security agreement the financing statement does not create a security interest and cannot extend a security interest beyond what has been unambiguously described in a security agreement holding security interest in insurance premiums perfected by creation of security interest holding courts must look to the law of the state in which the security interest was created to determine if creditor retains a purchase money security interest despite refinancing holding that the trustee could not avoid a security interest under section 549 when that security interest was authorized by the bankruptcy court holding that under virginia law a banks security interest which secured a loan made to refinance preexisting debt was a nonpossessory nonpurchasemoney security interest