qualify for the exemption based on her claimed position as 100% stockholder of OHC. (Doc. # 1-3 at 11) (citing In re Duque, 33 B.R. 201 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1983)). According to Steffen, she never asserted the exemption based on her stockholder status, because OHLP “was 100% owned by the [1995] revocable trust.” (Doc. # 16 at 21.) Thus, Steffen asserts that her ownership interest arises from her status as sole beneficiary of the 1995 Trust, which was 99% limited partner of OHLP and owned all of the stock in OHLP’s general partner, OHC. (Id. at 8 n. 2, 25.) Steffen cites to several cases holding that the trustee and beneficiary of a revocable trust can claim property held in the name of the trust as exempt homestead. (Id. at 23). See e.g. In re Edwards, 356 B.R. 807, 811 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2006) (<HOLDING>); In re Alexander, 346 B.R. 546, 551
holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate holding that debtor as grantor and trustee of a trust that held legal title to the property held a sufficient equitable interest in the property to claim it as exempt homestead where she resided on the property prepetition with the intent to maintain it as her primary residence holding that the property held by the revocable trust in which the trustee was the beneficiary and the property was his permanent residence was a constitutionally protected homestead property holding that a wife could claim a homestead exemption even though she only had a beneficiary interest in the property held in trust holding that the legal title holders to real property held it in constructive trust for the equitable title holder who was entitled to the real property based on an earlier contract