invalidation is “ ‘strong medicine’ to be employed cautiously and ‘only as a last resort,’ ” id. at 939 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2916, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973); Marco Lounge, Inc. v. City of Federal Heights, 625 P.2d 982, 985 (Colo.1981)), and that “when dealing with a statute challenged as overbroad, state courts are free to construe the statute to avoid constitutional problems when it is subject to a limiting construction.” Id. at 940 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 n. 24, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3361 n. 24, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982)). Our previous cases demonstrate a willingness to adopt a limiting construction whenever possible in order to save a statute from facial invalidation. See, e.g., People v. Fagerholm, 768 P.2d 689 (Colo. 1989) (<HOLDING>); City of Englewood v. Hammes, 671 P.2d 947
holding that postconviction proceeding is a civil suit holding  616d030 did not preclude the plaintiff from bringing a tortious discharge action for filing a workers compensation claim because the statutory scheme applies only to the administration of the act holding that the legislative scheme necessarily implied a fiveyear grace period for bringing postconviction challenges holding that the threeday grace period in fed rcivp 6e does not apply to motions for a new trial under fedrcivp 59 in part because the time period for filing those motions begins to run from entry of judgment holding invalid as a taking a fiveyear amortization period applied to building with estimated remaining economic life of 20 years