28 (1941). In the second case, United States v. National City Lines, the Court concluded, “In the face of th[e Clayton Act’s] history we cannot say that room was left for judicial discretion to apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens so as to deprive the plaintiff of the choice given by the section.” 334 U.S. 573, 588, 68 S.Ct. 1169, 92 L.Ed. 1584 (1948). Congress subsequently superseded these Supreme Court decisions by enacting the domestic-transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012), which allows a district court to “transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought” for “the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” Id.; see United States v. Nat’l City Lines, Inc., 337 U.S. 78, 69 S.Ct. 955, 93 L.Ed. 1226 (1949) (<HOLDING>); Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 69 S.Ct. 959,
holding that standing to raise a claim under  2a of robinsonpatman act is derived from section 4 of the clayton act holding that since limitations section in internal revenue code allows for suits against a sovereign its requirements are jurisdictional recognizing that  1404a allows for the transfer of clayton act suits holding that courts should look to the standing principles  developed under section 4 of the clayton act for guidance in interpreting section 303s standing requirements id at 406 for a recent discussion of standing under the clayton act see associated general contractors v california state council of carpenters us 103 sct 897 74 led2d 723 1983 holding that transfer to a district in which circuit law likely precluded standing was proper because the language of  1404a refers only to whether venue is proper and not a plaintiffs capacity to sue