McLendon resists this conclusion, contending that the testimony regarding ammunition was the only evidence that differed between the second and third trials, and that it therefore must be regarded as having been the decisive factor. But as we have cautioned in the past, the fact that a case previously ended in a mistrial is not sufficient to establish that the case was close. See United States v. Williams, 212 F.3d 1305, 1311 n. 10 (D.C.Cir.2000); United States v. Bowie, 142 F.3d 1301, 1307-08 (D.C.Cir.1998). In sum, even if we were to regard the investigator’s mention of ammunition as unfairly prejudicial, the extent of that prejudice was insignificant in light of the court’s curative instructions and the weight of the admissible evidence. Ill For the foregoing reaso C.Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d
holding that juries may infer an intent to distribute narcotics from the presence of firearms holding that evidence that defendants had participated in several prior drug transactions was properly admitted to establish defendants intent to distribute narcotics recognizing firearms as common tools of the drug trade recognizing the absence of drug paraphernalia suggestive of personal use as evidence of an intent to distribute holding that guns were properly admitted to  prove intent to distribute drugs because it has uniformly been recognized that substantial dealers in narcotics possess firearms and that such weapons are as much tools of the trade as more commonly recognized drug paraphernalia