fire. Marley clearly was pursuing his own goals and was not in any way subject to control by Enterprise when he started the fire. Furthermore, it would be bizarre to hold that inasmuch as Enterprise was in the “business” of putting out fires, Marley furthered Enterprise’s functions by providing it with an opportunity to fight a fire. In this ease the defendants did not abuse their authority and Marley was a private actor when he caused the harm. 51 F.3d at 1151. Where the defendant’s state-derived authority places the defendant in a position of power over the plaintiff, however, and the defendant uses that power to improperly facilitate and commit the alleged unconstitutional conduct, the act is performed under color of state law. See Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d at 1304-05 (<HOLDING>); Whitney v. State of New Mexico, 113 F.3d
holding that claims against a city police chief in his official capacity were really claims against the city holding that citys enforcement of the entire state penal code would not constitute a city policy because the city was required to follow state law holding that a city manager was the final policymaker for purposes of section 1983 liability because of provisions in the norfolk city code requiring that all orders rules and regulations applicable to the entire police department must be approved by the city manager other than some police standard operating procedures holding that a jurys finding that a city had delegated its final policymaking authority in the area of law enforcement to a city police chief was supported by the evidence and warranted imposing liability upon the city holding that city managers act of raping a woman that worked for him at the city was done under color of state law reasoning that he intervened with the citys police chief who had offered to give the plaintiff a ride home thus invokeing his authority as city manager to create the opportunity to be alone with the plaintiff to take her home and then to rape her