of payment; 8) the hired party’s role in hir ing and paying assistants; 9) whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; 10) whether the hiring party is in business; 11) the provision of employee benefits; and 12) the tax treatment of the hired party. Darden, 508 U.S. at 323-24, 112 S.Ct. at 1348-49. Although the Supreme Court did not specifically address the ADEA in Darden, we find no reason to deviate from the common-law test for purposes of determining employee status under the ADEA. See Speen v. Crown Clothing Corp., 102 F.3d 625, 631 (1st Cir.1996) (adopting the common-law test “for determining who qualifies as an ‘employee’ under the ADEA” and disregarding decisions to the contrary in other circuits); Frankel v. Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); but see Mangram v. General Motors Corp., 108
holding that federal agency action in violation of mbta violates the otherwise not in accordance with law provision of the apa recognizing that common law agency principles extend the right to sue a principal that ratifies the illegal act of an agent holding that the determination of whether a counterclaim is compulsory is made as a matter of law holding that the determination of whether an individual is an independent contractor lies in the common law and not under an express provision of the act holding that determination of whether someone is an employee under the adea must be made in accordance with common law agency principles