— those prospective jurors were not as “bad” as juror Bauknecht. Otherwise, defendant would also have first challenged them for cause. If defendant believed that a fair trial required juror Bauknecht to be excluded, he should have removed him from the second panel of prospective jurors with one of his remaining peremptory challenges. After all, this record clearly shows that defense counsel understood both the availability of defendant’s peremptory challenges and how to use them. These circumstances compel the conclusion that defendant’s decision not to peremptorily remove juror Bauknecht was an affirmative acquiescence to Bauknecht’s jury service, which thereby constitutes a waiver of this issue on appeal. See People v. Hill, 353 Ill. App. 3d 961, 966-67, 819 N.E.2d 1285, 1290 (2004) (<HOLDING>). A possible explanation for defense counsel’s
holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted holding that the defendants acquiescence to a mistrial constituted implicit consent precluding a later claim of double jeopardy holding that if defendant moved for or consented to mistrial retrial of defendant was not barred on double jeopardy grounds holding that a prosecution for the same offense was barred by double jeopardy where a mistrial was declared without manifest necessity holding that defense counsel validly waived a double jeopardy claim by assenting to a mistrial when defendant was not consulted or present