on her assertion that the State advocated a factual theory of her involvement in Cave’s dismemberment during her trial that was inconsistent with its theory during the Pitonyak trial. Citing excerpts from the closing arguments at each trial, Hall argues that during the Pitonyak trial “the State argued that it was Pitonyak’s idea to mutilate the body and the evidence showed appellant did not participate,” while “the theory and argument were exactly opposite” in her trial. In her first point of error, Hall argues that this claimed inconsistency violated her due process rights. See Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1056-59 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 523 U.S. 538, 118 S.Ct. 1489, 140 L.Ed.2d 728 (1998); see also Smith v. Groose, 205 F.3d 1045, 1052 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). In her second point of error, Hall similarly
holding that deprivation of property must conform to due process principles holding that circuit rule that prosecutions use of contradictory theories violates due process would fall within teagues watershed exception holding that use of inherently factually contradictory theories violates the principles of due process holding that the knowing use of false testimony to obtain a conviction violates due process holding a judgment in the absence of notice violates due process rights