intent.’ ” McClellan v. Cablevision of Connecticut, Inc., 149 F.3d 161, 164 (2d Cir.1998) (quoting DiLaura v. Power Auth. of N.Y., 982 F.2d 73, 77-78 (2d Cir.1992)) (considering whether 47 U.S.C. § 531(e) provided a private cause of action for cable programmers.). In Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 817 F.2d 222 (2d Cir.1987), the Second Circuit stated that “our analysis ... applies equally to a suit claiming an implied right of action to enforce section 2210(a) [re-codified as section 47107(a) ]. Indeed, the district court decision ... which this court affirmed, concluded that section 2210(a) does not provide a private right of action.” Id. at 225, n. 4; see also Sound Aircraft Services v. Town of East Hampton, 192 F.3d 329 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, the United States Court- of
holding that although section 47107a mandates that the secretary of transportation may approve grants to federally funded airports only upon written assurance that the airport operator will comply with nondiscrimination provisions we have previously held that no private right of action existed under similar provisions on remand we invite the district court to reconsider in light of the foregoing its decision that 49 usc  47101a provides sound with a federal right that may be the basis for its  1983 claim holding that no private right of action exists under any of the provisions of the airport and airway improvement act holding that no private right of action exists holding that we have consistently held that a private cause of action will not be found where the legislature has expressly provided for enforcement of a statute holding that the rehabilitation act does not create a private right of action against the secretary of transportation where the apa provides an adequate remedy