infliction of emotional distress. As the Sixth Circuit has written: "[A] motion to reconsider an order disposing of a [time toffing post-trial] motion of the kind enumerated in Rule 4(a)[ (4)] does not again terminate the running of the time for appeal,"... unless a grant of the earlier post-trial motion effectively re- suits in a new judgment and the motion to reconsider is filed by the adversely affected party requesting reinstatement of the original judgment. Moody v. Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co., Inc., 915 F.2d 201, 206 (6th Cir.1990) (quoting Dixie Sand and Gravel v. TVA, 631 F.2d 73-74 (5th Cir. Unit B 1980)) (citations omitted). See also Wright v. Preferred Research, Inc., 891 F.2d 886, 889-90 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (same); Acevedo-Villalo-bos, 22 F.3d at 389 (<HOLDING>). Since Dubian’s second motion was, in effect,
holding that the timely filing of a motion to reopen or reconsider with the bia does not toll the time period for seeking appellate court review and that the mere act of filing the motion does not render nonfinal the underlying bia decision holding that appeal from denial of rule 60b motion raised for review only the district courts order of denial and not the underlying judgment itself holding that the filing of an opening brief within the time period for filing a notice of appeal could constitute notice of appeal holding that the appellate court should have construed the notice of appeal from the denial of a motion to vacate the judgment as an attempt to appeal from the underlying judgment holding that a second motion to reconsider served within ten days of the denial of the first motion does not extend the time period for filing a notice of appeal from the underlying judgment