34 Wis. 2d at 294). However, we concluded that, when a defendant offers other acts evidence which is relevant, as Muckerheide argues here, the court may exclude such relevant evidence under the Whitty/Sullivan approach, if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the dangers set forth in Wis. Stat. § 904.03. Id. at 310-11. ¶ 32. The third step of the Sullivan analytical framework requires a court to weigh the probative value of the other acts evidence to determine if it is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Wis. Stat. § 904.03; Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 789. See also Scheidell, 227 Wis. 2d at 310-11 (<HOLDING>). Since we hold that the other acts evidence
holding that the probity of the evidence must be balanced against the considerations contained in  90403 holding that in determining whether to impose a duty the following factors must be balanced 1 the relationship between the parties 2 the reasonable foreseeability of harm to the person injured and 3 public policy concerns holding that to justify a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence 1 the evidence must have been discovered after trial 2 the failure to discover this evidence must not be attributable to a lack of due diligence on the part of the movant 3 the evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching 4 the evidence must be material and 5 the evidence must be likely to produce an acquittal if a new trial is granted recognizing that in parental termination proceedings the fundamental liberty interest of parents must be balanced with societys interest in protecting the welfare of children holding that to consider whether to apply a spoliation sanction the evidence must be relevant to an issue in the case and the party who destroyed the evidence must be under a duty to preserve the evidence