judgment be ALLOWED. 2 See Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Summary Judgment footnote 1 (“Plaintiffs Opposition”). 3 Welch also argues that the statement is defamatory per se because it adversely reflects on his abilities in his profession. The court does not analyze this issue but doubts the statement constitutes defamation per se because the statement is not particularly harmful to Welch’s abilities as an engineer. See Bander v. Metropolitan Life, 313 Mass. 337, 346 (1943). Even if it were considered defamation per se, Welch would still have to prove the other elements of a prima facie defamation case, see Commonwealth v. Pratt, 208 Mass. 553, 558-59 (1912), which he cannot do. 4 See also, Underwood v. Digital Equipment Corp., Inc., 576 F.Sup. 213, 217 (D.Mass 1983) (<HOLDING>). 5 Norvold stated in his deposition that, “in
holding that whether a person should be considered again for possible employment is an inherently subjective question for the employer as is the employers opinions of its employees recognizing that an employer is liable for an employees action if the employer knew or should have known about an employees acts of harassment and fails to take appropriate remedial action holding that it is well established that whether an employees actions were within the scope of employment is a question of fact and even if some of the actions were unauthorized the question of whether the actions were within the scope of employment is for the jury holding that the ultimate question is whether the employees right to speak is outweighed by the public employers interest in the effective operation of the workplace holding that former employees subjective belief that he suffered an adverse employment action as a result of discrimination without more is not enough to survive former employers summary judgment motion