argues that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to consider these two related statutory aggravating circumstances, which this Court has referred to as “mutually supporting aggravating circumstances.” The trial court did not err by submitting both of these statutory aggravating circumstances to the jury, and, even under this Court’s rule that one of them should be set aside on appeal, Martin’s two death sentences remain unaffected t limits under these procedural circumstances of our special review of a jury’s decision to impose a death sentence, we have reviewed the sentencing phase instructions at issue here and conclude for the reasons set forth below that none of them was improper. See Division 6 (d) above. See also Head v. Ferrell, 274 Ga. 399, 403 (IV) (554 SE2d 155) (2001) (<HOLDING>); Tucker v. Kemp, 256 Ga. 571, 573-574 (351
holding on habeas corpus that claims regarding sentencing phase jury charges in a death penalty case are never barred by procedural default holding prosecutorial misconduct claim barred by procedural default holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law but conviction was later reversed neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty holding that consideration of a claim in a petition for habeas corpus can be barred by failure to comply with state procedural rules holding that for habeas relief to be granted based on constitutional error in capital penalty phase error must have had substantial and injurious effect on the jurys verdict in the penalty phase