as “appointive officers,” plaintiff did not have a liberty or property interest in his employment that implicated procedural due process. See Armer v. City of Salem, 861 F.2d 514, 515-16 (8th Cir.1988); State ex rel. Lupo v. City of Wentzville, 886 S.W.2d 727, 730-31 (Mo.Ct.App.1994). Last, to the extent that plaintiff is alleging that his right to privacy or association was violated because the conversations of plaintiffs wife and daughter were recorded, the uncontroverted evidence establishes that the conversations were taped by George, who was not employed by the city and was not acting at the direction of anyone. Therefore, plaintiffs claim must fail. See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705, 706-07 (8th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S.Ct. 723, 107 L.Ed.2d 743 (1990) (<HOLDING>); State v. King, 873 S.W.2d 905, 909
holding that telephone conversations and meetings were overt acts in furtherance of a drug conspiracy holding that telephone users have no expectation of privacy in dialed telephone numbers because they voluntarily expose such information to the service provider holding that an individuals reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of email communications is not vitiated by an understanding that the thirdparty service provider will maintain independent access to them noting that electronic communication is as important to fourth amendment principles today as protecting telephone conversations has been in the past holding that individuals could not maintain action against private citizens and law enforcement officers who intercepted individuals cordless telephone conversations as users of cordless telephone did not have justifiable expectation of privacy for their conversations holding that individuals have no expectation of privacy in their license registration or insurance documents and citing outofstate cases that have held that individuals do not have a privacy interest in their registration records