342, 123 S.Ct. 1471 (stating the second Miller factor as whether the state statute “substantially affeet[s] the risk pooling arrangement between the insurer and the insured).” Thus, although the Court has jettisoned use of the McCarran-Ferguson factors, prior cases addressing this particular factor are logically instructive to a degree. See, e.g. Ellis v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, 394 F.3d 262, 276 (5th Cir.2004) (noting that the Miller analysis did not, for all intents and purposes, significantly alter prior holdings. utilizing the McCarran-Ferguson analysis because the differences between the second Miller factor and the first McCarran-Ferguson factor were less than noteworthy), cert. denied, — U.S. ---, 125 S.Ct. 2941, 162 L.Ed.2d 867 (2005); Kidneigh, 345 F.3d at 1188 (<HOLDING>);, see also Desrosiers v. Hartford Life &
holdings of the court of appeals not specifically reversed by the supreme court retain precedential value holding that unpublished opinions are of persuasive value at best and not precedential holding onejustice opinion has no precedential value holding the courts decision in miller did not eviscerate the precedential value of premiller case law holding that even district court cases decided by panels of three have no precedential value