review, we assume, for the purpose of our analysis, that Plaintiffs have satisfied the first three prongs of the Walton test. 5 . Although we recognize that negligent construction will also suffice to waive the state's immunity under the fourth prong of the Walton test, Springer, 13 P.3d at 800, neither Ms. Hawkins nor the Medinas alleged negligent construction of Highway 6 as a basis for waiver of the state's immunity under the CGIA, and we therefore do not consider it further. 6 . For example, the state's duty of maintenance does not require it to eliminate the risk attributable to the changing use of a highway because this risk is not attributable to the road but to external sources such as an increase in traffic. Cf. Karr v. City & County of Denver, 677 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Colo.1984) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, because the injury attributable
holding that the crucial distinction that rendered the public entity liable for a private actors inaccessibility was that the public entity had contracted with the private actor for it to provide aid benefits or services to beneficiaries of the public entitys redevelopment program holding that land dedicated for a public street may not be leased to a private entity for private use holding that if property is not property1 of the public entity then the public entity cannot be subject to suit under the dangerous condition waiver holding that the public entity was not required to modify or improve intersection based on changing use holding that the use of a corset spring device was public although the use was by its nature not visible to the general public