law — we have already resolved the conflict — but rather to prevent what we perceive as a single unjust ruling. The people of Florida have not charged us with that narrower responsibility. We should resist the temptation to undertake it, even if we can find a pretext for doing so. III. Conclusion For these reasons, I would discharge review as improvidently granted. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to review and quash the decision below. WELLS and BELL, JJ., concur. 1 . I also note that the district court's opinion in Goldberg cited Martinez v. Florida Power & Light Co., 785 So.2d 1251 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001), and mentioned that the case was pending in this Court. Thus, we had independent jurisdiction to review the case under Jollie v. State, 405 So.2d 418, 420 (Fla.1981) (<HOLDING>). 2 . When we have based our jurisdiction on
holding that the court does not have jurisdiction to review per curiam decisions of the district courts of appeal that merely affirm with citations to cases not pending review in this court holding that district court opinion which cites controlling authority that is pending review in florida supreme court allows supreme court to exercise jurisdiction holding that a district court opinion which cites as controlling authority a decision that is either pending review in or has been reversed by this court continues to constitute prima facie express conflict and allows this court to exercise its jurisdiction holding that this court has inherent as well as express statutory authority to punish for contempt holding that this court lacked preliminary authority to review the district courts jurisdiction because there was no immediately appealable order before the court