difficult to see how Ms. Steele can be deemed an “anonymous” caller: she provided her name, location, and occupation to the police. The ample information in the hands of the dispatcher regarding Ms. Steele’s identity is constructively imputed to Officer Hall because Florida courts apply the “fellow officer rule,” which operates to impute the knowledge of one officer in the chain of investigation to another. See Berry v. State, 493 So.2d 1098 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)(an officer receiving a radio transmission to detain a certain individual has authority to stop the person described; the legiti macy of the stop will depend on whether the reporting officer had sufficient grounds to order the person detained); see also United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985)(<HOLDING>). The second reason why Ms. Steele was not
holding that an officer can stop an individual if the officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity is underfoot holding that absent probable cause to arrest a police officer may approach an individual to conduct a brief investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal conduct is afoot recognizing that police officer may stop a suspect if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot holding that a police officer may stop a driver where the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion regarding the commission of a civil traffic violation holding that when a police communique has been issued on the basis of articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion any authorized officer may make an investigatory stop on the basis of that bulletin even though the officer making the stop is not aware of the underlying facts