risk of slipping on the wet floating steps was any less obvious to Kalter than to Cardenas, especially in light of the fact that Kalter had walked on stone with Cardenas the previous day and noted that the stone was “slippery at times.” (Kalter Dep. 64:15-18.) Plaintiffs also cite case law holding that “although the obviousness of a danger may obviate the duty to warn of its existence, if it is foreseeable that the danger may cause injury despite the fact that it is obvious (e.g. when necessity requires persons to encounter it), there may be a duty to remedy the danger, and the breach of that duty may in turn form the basis for liability.” (Pls.’ Opp’n 12), citing Martinez v. Chippewa Entrps., Inc., 121 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1184, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 152 (Cal.Ct.App.2004) (emphasis in original) (<HOLDING>) While a landowner may be required to remedy a
holding that trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on obvious danger where plaintiff slipped on water covering defendant landowners driveway holding that the trial court erred by granting the defendants motion to dismiss holding that court should have ruled on certification even after granting summary judgment for the defendant holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment holding that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to county on monell claim where plaintiff presented no evidence that similar conduct occurred in the past