taken by the State. In July, 1995, the State moved for a violation of probation hearing pertaining to the third alleged violation of probation. The State acknowledged that a hearing had been held to June, but contended that the third alleged violation was not considered to June and was a serious matter which needed to be resolved. The State offered as justification that “another member of my office was here (at the prior VOP hearing) and didn’t realize the background of this.” The hearing on this alleged violation was held fa October, 1995. The court found Bowling fa violation and, fa January, 1996, entered an order modifying Bowling’s conditions of probation to include increased restitution payments and thirty-nine weekends fa jail. Bowling correctly contends that the court lacke 80) (<HOLDING>); see also McLemore v. State, 638 So.2d 610
holding that upon revocation of probation a court must grant credit for time served on probation and community control towards any newly imposed term of imprisonment and probation so that the total period of control probation and imprisonment does not exceed the statutory maximum holding that under statutes in effect at the time a court may not by revocation and granting a second period of probation extend the total time on probation beyond five years as the statutes do not speak of terms of probation but speak in plain language of the total time which may be spent on probation for a felony holding that probation and suspension of sentence may not be revoked based solely on a violation or criminal offense that was committed before the offender was actually placed on probation holding that probation is not a sentence holding that where defendant admitted to two violations of probation and was sentenced therefor court could not enter second order of revocation and resentence defendant on third charge of violation of probation which was pending at time defendants probation was first revoked