purported to instruct the jury consistently with the trial court’s jury instruction. He informed the jury that under the court’s definition, intact CRTs exported for use in new moni tors are waste because they cannot be used for their original intended purpose without processing. In short, Mr. Smith told the jury that the court’s Waste Instruction required it to convict the defendants based on their admission that they exported CRTs for reuse in new monitors, because such reuse required processing, but he did not provide the jury with sufficient information to independently assess the basis of that opinion. Although the district court gave a limiting instruction, we are left with grave doubt that the prejudicial impact of Mr. Smith’s testimony was cured. See Specht, 853 F.2d at 808-09 (<HOLDING>).' In sum, Mr. Smith’s testimony was highly
holding the admission of expert testimony that exceeded the bounds of rule 704 was prejudicial despite the fact that the court gave the jury a limiting instruction similar to the instruction in this case holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive recognizing that upon request the trial court may provide a limiting instruction to the jury holding good faith jury instruction unnecessary when court gave adequate specific intent instruction holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given