the Zapata approach, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 156D, § 7.44, cmt. 2 (West 2010), but nothing in our opinion in Hasan relied on any unique facets of Massachusetts law in determining the appropriate standard of review, see Hasan, 729 F.2d at 374. Therefore, because Hasan does not cabin itself to special litigation committee motions under Massachusetts law, or to special litigation committee motions explicitly brought under Rule 56, it further supports reviewing de novo the district court’s decision in this case. Additionally, consistent with the Erie doctrine, federal law governs the standard of review of a summary judgment motion in a diversity case. Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 165-66 (6th Cir.1993); but see K & T Enters., Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 97 F.3d 171, 176 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Because reviewing a summary judgment motion
holding that the standard of review for the denial of rule 11 sanctions is governed by the law of the regional circuit holding that state law provides the standard of review for a denial of a rule 50 motion in a diversity case holding in the context of a diversity case that the evidentiary effect accorded the violation of a safety rule is a matter of state law holding that the standard of review for the denial of a motion for reconsideration is governed by the law of the regional circuit holding that review of the denial of a motion to compel arbitration is under the de novo standard