Thereafter, they discovered that the lot on which the house was situated had, at some time previously, been a trash dump site. They sued the Stricklings, alleging breach of an implied warranty with respect to the sale of the lot; fraudulent misrepresentation; suppression of a material fact; deceit; negligent development or construction of the lot; and strict liability in tort. The trial judge entered a summary judgment as to all claims, holding that the doctrine of caveat emptor applied to the sale of the lot and, therefore, that the Stricklings were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Rule 56(c), A.R.Civ.P. The Morrises appeal. We affirm. The Morrises argue that the exception to the caveat emptor rule as stated in Cochran v. Keeton, 287 Ala. 439, 252 So.2d 313, 314 (1971) (<HOLDING>), should be extended to situations, such as the
holding that the rule of caveat emptor is no longer valid with regard to the sale of a new residence by the buildervendor to the immediate purchaser holding that where claimant complained of a problem and showed defendant a rusty part the requirement of notice was satisfied for a claim of breach of the warranty of fitness holding that the rule of caveat emptor would no longer be applicable to the sale of a newly constructed house and recognizing an implied warranty of fitness and habitability with regard to such sales holding implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose cannot lie where goods were subject of gift rather than sale recognizing implied warranty against latent defects and of fitness of premises for lease purposes