the he was “aware of the fact” that Decker’s name was added to an account of Helbling for “convenience only.” Appellant’s Appendix at 33. Despite a general statement that his affidavit was “made on personal knowledge,” there is no showing that he had personal knowledge of the circumstances of the creation of the joint accounts. Id. at 32. Personal knowledge cannot be inferred from the statement, nor is there any showing that Cornell would be competent to testify on the matter. Because affidavits in support of summary judgment must be made on personal knowledge, it is not enough for Cornell to assert that he was “aware of’ alleged facts. Accordingly, Cornell’s affidavit does not satisfy the burden of the Siblings and the Estate in this proceeding. See, e.g., Miller, 701 N.E.2d at 286 (<HOLDING>); Celina, 438 N.E.2d at 1011 (holding that the
holding that the party moving for summary judgment waived its argument that the opposing partys affidavit should not be considered because the moving party never objected to the timeliness of the affidavit to the trial court holding that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court at the summary judgment stage to consider information from an affidavit based on inadmissible hearsay rather than the affiants personal knowledge holding that the failure of an affidavit to be made on personal knowledge or specify how the affiant had personal knowledge of the facts asserted is a defect in substance and need not be objected to at trial to be a ground for reversal holding that the affidavit in question did not satisfy the burden of the party moving for summary judgment where affiants eonclusory statement failed to indicate personal knowledge of the circumstances in question and personal knowledge could not be reasonably inferred from the contents of the affidavit holding that district court properly ignored attorneys affidavit because he did not assert personal knowledge of the transaction