In addition, Schorp also contends that the trial court’s dismissal pursuant to § 13.01(d) violated her right to a jury trial. See Tex. Const. Art. I, § 15. The right to a jury trial is not an absolute right in civil eases, but is subject to certain procedural rales. Wooten v. Dallas Hunting & Fishing Club, Inc., 427 S.W.2d 344, 346 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1968, no writ). Imposing the requirement to file an expert report and the failure to meet that requirement allows the trial court to dismiss the case. This dismissal is not based on the merits, but merely operates to dismiss the case on a procedural requirement which is directly related to the statute’s purpose of limiting the number of frivolous suits. See Buckholts Indep. School Dist. v. Glaser, 632 S.W.2d 146, 149 (Tex.1982) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, Schorp was denied the
holding that failure of plaintiff to fulfill bonding requirement for challenging school board election did not deny taxpayer right to jury trial on merits recognizing the right to waive a jury trial holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay did not deny defendant a substantial right recognizing taxpayer standing to assert a constitutional challenge to the manner of a judicial election given the special circumstances involved holding that there is no right to a jury trial on a  549 claim reasoning that  549 is designed to preserve estate assets enforcement of which is clearly equitable and involves the adjudication of a public right for which congress may deny the right to a jury trial