the rules contained in SDCL eh. 19-13; thus, the information is not privileged and may be discovered. This rule is in accordance with our holding that, “[t]he facts concerning the existence of a lawyer-client relationship are not privileged evidence.” Catch The Bear, 352 N.W.2d at 645 (citing McCormick’s Handbook of the Law of Evidence 185 (2d ed. 1972)). See Rosegay v. Canter, 187 N.J.Super. 652, 455 A.2d 610, 611-12 (1982) (stating that, “[tjhere is no rational basis to conclude that the patient-psychologist privilege would be superior [to the attorney-client privilege].”). Other courts that have directly faced the question of discovery of patient identities would support this rationale. This is borne out in secondary auth delphia, 155 Misc. 227, 279 N.Y.S. 580, 582 (N.Y.Cty.Ct.1935) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
holding physician in action based on illegal cavity search to standard of a reasonable physician holding that testimony of a physician that a certain individual consulted with him was not privileged recognizing physician assistant as agent of the supervising physician holding that trial court properly refused to permit disclosure of privileged communications in part because use of the privileged information was not essential to the defense holding that the patientphysician privilege does not prevent testimony by a physician as to the fact that he was consulted by a patient on a certain date