4 . See Armstrong v. Turner Indus., Inc., 141 F.3d 554, 563-64 & n. 25 (5th Cir.1998) (noting, in denying standing for failure to allege any probability of future injury, that "[t]he requirement articulated in Lyons is cited with relative frequency in cases denying injunctive relief”). 5 . See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (citations omitted). 6 . See Greer's Reply, App. at 462, ¶ 11. The words "Motion,” "Response,” and "Reply,” unless otherwise designated in these footnotes, refer to the Motions for Summary Judgment. 7 . See id. at 460, ¶ 2; 462, ¶ 12. 8 . See id. at 462, ¶ 12. 9 . See District’s Motion, App. at 292-93, ¶ 18; 270. 10 . Accord Access Now, Inc. v. S. Fla. Stadium Corp., 161 F.Supp.2d 1357, 1365 (S.D.Fla. 2001) (<HOLDING>). 11 . See District's Motion to Exclude, Ex. 2
holding that defendant was not resident of his mothers household even though his drivers license listed his mothers address and he received mail there because he expressed a belief that his residence was in a different location than his mothers home he rented and occupied his own residence and he testified that he was only living with his mother after expiration of his lease until he could find another place to live holding fact that candidate left personal property at prior residence supported his continuing residency at that place notwithstanding his living in different city holding that a wheelchairbound individuals previous two attendances at events at a stadium combined with his continued residence in the area supported his contention that he would likely patronize the stadium in the future and was therefore sufficient to confer standing to pursue his ada claims holding that there was sufficient probable cause to search a defendants residence after evidence of drug dealing was found in his car during a traffic stop that was conducted when the defendant was coming from his residence and noting that under such circumstances a practical commonsense conclusion could be made that the drugs and money had been at the defendants residence a short time before the stop holding that evidence of the same name the fact that the previous conviction occurred in precinct of defendants residence and that although the defendant testified he did not deny that he was the person described in the record of the previous conviction was sufficient to establish identity