either as to compensatory damages only or as to all damages other than backpay only, aside from any effect her acceptance of payment might have on her ability to sue, an issue discussed in the next paragraph. This may be so, but it is not strong enough counsel to overcome our reading of the complaint. 13 . In addition, the district court implicitly held that the VA’s performance of the injunc-tive remedy renders Massingill unable to sue. We disagree, for the same reasons that payment of money does not preclude Massingill’s suit and the additional reason that, if the VA could preclude suit simply by performing the injunctive remedy, it could render all potential plaintiffs unable to sue simply by performing right away. 14 . See St. John v. Potter, 299 F.Supp.2d 125, 129 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (<HOLDING>); Legard v. England, 240 F.Supp.2d 538, 545-46
holding that plaintiffs claim of reduction in work hours in retaliation for her filing of eeoc charge states a cause of action under  1981 holding that retaliation arising out of first eeoc filing was reasonably related to that filing obviating the need for a second eeoc charge holding that plaintiffs acceptance of checks representing entire eeoc award precluded him from filing suit holding that a claim of retaliation for filing eeoc charges is cognizable under  1981 holding acceptance of settlement estopped plaintiff from subsequent suit