complaint alleges that Colleton was negligent in its own right. Accordingly, because the Agreement only required CareFirst to provide a defense to Colleton “for claims arising solely on the basis of vicarious liability or ostensible or apparent agen cy,” CareFirst was not required to provide Colleton a defense at the onset of the litigation. We recognize Grant’s attorney “stipulated” during the Grant trial that his only cause of action against Colleton was a vicarious liability claim. However, the record reflects this stipulation was made as part of the settlement agreement. Thus, as of the date of the stipulation, when CareFirst arguably was required to provide a defense to Colleton, Colleton was no longer in need of a defense. See Hartsville, 382 S.C. at 547, 677 S.E.2d at 580 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the settlement agreement
holding that the insurer did not have a duty to defend because the pleadings alleged that the defendants had acted intentionally rather than negligently holding that an insurer can normally dispute coverage even after a court determines there is a duty to defend holding that insurer had a continuing duty to defend holding that an insurer had a duty to defend the insured until it could establish that those claims were not supported by the facts holding that a claim against an insurer for vexatious refusal to pay cannot be maintained where the court finds that the insurer has no duty to defend under the policy