of costs.” McDonald v. Union Carbide Corp., 734 F.2d 182, 184 (5th Cir. 1984). Even assuming that Griffin qualifies as a prevailing party, we find no abuse of discretion here. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that gen erally, “costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d). This provision creates “a strong presumption that the prevailing party will be awarded costs.” Schwarz v. Folloder, 767 F.2d 125, 131 (5th Cir.1985) (citing Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 352, 101 S.Ct. 1146, 1150, 67 L.Ed.2d 287 (1981)). The presumption, however, is not irrebutable. For example, the rule itself confers upon the district court the discretion not to award costs to a prevailing party. Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d); see Folloder, 767 F.2d at 131-32 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, it explicitly cautions that an
holding that the party seeking to vacate the award has the burden of providing the court with the evidence to support its arguments recognizing that a court can exercise its discretion not to award costs to a prevailing party as long as the court states its reasons for refusing to permit the award recognizing discretion of district court in determining a fee award holding that district court abused its discretion in refusing to include in its attorneys fees award the depositionrelated travel expenses incurred by prevailing plaintiffs counsel in an adea case holding parties agreement provided clear contractual justification for the award of costs and expenses including attorneys fees to the prevailing party