may be restrained pre-indictment and pre-trial so that they may be preserved for forfeiture in the event of a conviction. Movants’ final argument is that restraint of these funds deprives A of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel because A and his family intend to use the Bowman account funds to finance A’s defense. The Supreme Court rejected this argument in United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 109 S.Ct. 2657, 105 L.Ed.2d 512 (1989), where it held that pretrial restraint of forfeitable assets does not abridge the Sixth Amendment right to counsel if there is a finding of probable cause to believe the funds will be subject to forfeiture upon conviction. See id. at 615, 109 S.Ct. 2657; see also Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 109 S.Ct. 2667, 105 L.Ed.2d 528 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Billman, 915 F.2d at 922 (holding that
holding that various fifth and sixth amendment protections apply to juvenile proceedings holding that rule 606b does not violate the sixth amendment holding that forfeiture of funds to be used for legal fees does not violate the fifth or sixth amendment holding that both fourth amendment warrant and probable cause and fifth amendment due process requirements apply to civil forfeiture proceedings holding that the court lacks jurisdiction over sixth amendment claims because the sixth amendment is not moneymandating