(emphasis added). As such, the issue before the Court is whether Plaintiff has plausibly pled that the dismissal of the criminal case reflects Plaintiffs innocence. “[A] dismissal without prejudice ‘renders the proceedings a nullity and leave[s] the parties as if the action had never been brought.’ ” Thoubboron v. Ford Motor Company, 809 A.2d 1204, 1210 (D.C. 2002) (quoting Bonneville Assocs. Ltd. v. Barram, 165 F.3d 1360, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citations omitted)). However, some courts addressing the issue have considered whether a plaintiff has identified facts surrounding the dismissal without prejudice that, if proven, would demonstrate that the termination of the criminal case tended to show the plaintiffs innocence. See Blakeney v. O’Donnell, 117 F.Supp.3d 6, 20 (D.D.C. 2015) (<HOLDING>). See also Thorp v. District of Columbia, 142
holding that for the purposes of a malicious prosecution action a favorable termination must be one indicating that the accused is innocenta disposition that does not indicate the plaintiffs innocence is not considered a favorable termination  holding that the court could plausibly infer from the dismissal coupled with the allegations of the plaintiffs false arrest that the termination of the plaintiffs prosecution tended to indicate his innocence at the motion to dismiss stage holding that the numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of the persons primarily responsible for plaintiffs termination when coupled with the timing of plaintiffs termination and the conflicting reasons given by defendants agents for the termination might well persuade a jury that defendant fired the plaintiff in retaliation for  the letter sent by her attorney to defendants general counsel holding that a dismissal in the interest of justice was a favorable termination for the purposes of a malicious prosecution action where the courts reasons for dismissing the criminal charges were not inconsistent with the innocence of the accused holding that the filing of a motion for a new trial is a critical stage of the prosecution and that an indigent defendant is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel at that stage