Second, even if the Government’s spin on § 14.9 is taken to be true that it “expand [s] the rights of an FTCA claimant,” (Government Reply Memo, at p. 1) (emphasis in original), this would be an impermissible expansion of jurisdiction provided for in the FTCA, an equally fatal blow to the Government. Without express delegation, § 14.9(b) cannot act to confer a broader waiver of sovereign immunity than set forth in the statute. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 215-16, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 2967-68, 77 L.Ed.2d 580 (1983); Mitzelfelt v. Department of Air Force, 903 F.2d 1293, 1296 (10th Cir.1990) (stating that “administrative regulations cannot waive the federal government’s sovereign immunity”). See also Amwest Surety Ins. Co. v. United States, 28 F.3d 690 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). If the Government’s construction of § 14.9 is
recognizing the delegation of authority to the united states attorneys recognizing federal constitutional claim against the united states holding that agency regulations cannot be applied retroactively unless congress has so authorized the administrative agency and the language of the regulations require it holding that for the government to be sued on a contract pursuant to the tucker act there must be privity of contract between the plaintiff and the united states recognizing that an agency cannot impose additional conditions on the united states consent to be sued unless congress expressly delegates this authority