conduct of attorneys appearing before” us, United States v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198,1201 (3d Cir.1980); see also, e.g., James v. Teleflex, Inc., 1999 WL 98559, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Feb. 24, 1999) (“To further the courts’ interests in protecting the integrity of their judgments, maintaining public confidence in the integrity of the bar, eliminating conflicts of interest, and protecting confidential communications between attorneys and their clients, a court has the power to disqualify counsel from representing a particular client”). We should disqualify a lawyer only if we determine “that disqualification is an appropriate means of enforcing [an] applicable disciplinary rule,” Brennan v. Independence Blue Cross, 949 F.Supp. 305, 307 (E.D.Pa.1996) (internal quotation omitted); see also id. (<HOLDING>). Carroll’s representation of MBPA is thus
holding that a duty not to cause injury to another by ones negligent act is too broad to serve as a basis for permitting indemnity of an employer to a third party holding that a choice of law provision in a lease did not serve as a basis for jurisdiction holding that a student has a right to counsel in a university disciplinary hearing where there is a pending criminal charge for the same incident but noting that the attorneys role at the disciplinary hearing is limited to safeguarding the students rights at the criminal proceeding and not to affecting the outcome of the disciplinary hearing holding that we should consider the ends that the disciplinary rule is designed to serve and any countervailing policies such as permitting a litigant to retain the counsel of his choice and enabling attorneys to practice without excessive restrictions holding that duty not to cause injury to another by ones negligent act is too broad to serve as a basis for permitting indemnity