claim under the Lanham Act for misuse of the registration symbol, the district court in fact found that the counterclaimant in that case lacked standing to pursue its claim because it had not sufficiently alleged that it had suffered a competitive business injury. See id. at 757. That the district court dismissed the false advertising claim on narrower grounds does not amount to support for SPI’s theory. 25 . This conclusion is reinforced by the Second Circuit’s observation that “Section 43(a) is intended to reach false advertising violations, not false registration claims.” La So-ciete Anonyme des Parfums le Galion v. Jean Patou, Inc., 495 F.2d 1265, 1270 n. 6 (2d Cir. 1974); see also Pernod Ricard USA LLC v. Bacardi U.S.A., Inc., 505 F.Supp.2d 245, 250, 255-56 (D.Del.2007) (<HOLDING>). 26 . One of plaintiff's witnesses testified
holding that defendants statement that it owned the rights to a trademark did not give rise to a false advertising claim under the lanham act holding in a false advertising case under the lanham act that a proposed disclaimer would not suffice to cure the misleadingness of an advertising claim holding that both lanham act false advertising claim and a false advertising claim made under section 349 or section 350 require a showing that the advertisement was false or misleading holding that a plaintiff in a lanham act trademark violation action must demonstrate that the defendants violation tended to deceive consumers holding that while under a false association claim parties need not be direct competitors under a false advertising claim they do