investor’s account, realizing profits from some trades). Expanding the definition to include Ms. Rotolante under the facts of this ease would upset the reasonable expectations of FINRA members. Herbert J. Sims & Co. v. Roven, 548 F.Supp.2d 759, 764 (N.D.Cal.2008); see Wachovia, 661 F.3d at 171 (stating that word “customer” must “be construed in a manner consistent with the ‘reasonable expectations’ of FINRA members”). Even if Ms. Rotolante was a customer, her claim would still not be arbitrable because the dispute did not arise out of Mr. Grant’s business activities. While Mr. Grant certainly acted in some capacity as Ms. Rotolante’s financial advisor, it was not in the course of his business activities regulated by FINRA. See, e.g., Eppinger v. Sealy, 25 So.3d 69 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (<HOLDING>). The connection between Ms. Rotolante and Mr.
holding that the underlying action arose out of insureds exercise of his personal and political rights and not out of business pursuits and thus the policy exclusion for claims arising out of business pursuits did not apply because the exception to the exclusion for nonbusiness pursuits was applicable holding that tort claims were arbitrable because they arose out of and were related to contract holding that appellee was bound by the arbitration clause contained in an agreement signed by its assignor when all of appellees claims arose out of and were directly related to the agreement holding that claims of breach of fiduciary duty negligence and fraud were subject to arbitration in light of broad arbitration clause which called for arbitration of any controversy  arising out of or relating to this agreement breach thereof or any aecounts   holding that employees claims against firm were not subject to mandatory arbitration because they did not arise out of business activities of either employee or firm but instead arose out of divorce agreement