are matters solely for the fact finder who has the opportunity to see and hear that evidence as it is presented.”). Furthermore, the commissioner merely considered Joynes’ “forays” with another woman, as well as Payne’s past role as the primary nurturer and care-giver for the children. He did not rely solely on these factors in reaching his determination. In fact, he specifically stated that he did not rely on Joynes’ activities with another woman in reaching his decision. Thus, the commissioner’s consideration of these factors is not error; rather, it merely demonstrates his resolve in carefully considering the voluminous amount of evidence presented and its relationship to the best interests of these children. See Brown v. Brown, 30 Va.App. 532, 538, 518 S.E.2d 336, 338 (1999) (<HOLDING>). Joynes additionally argues that the
holding that the finder of fact is given broad discretion in determining what promotes the childrens best interests recognizing broad equitable power of probate court to act in best interests of persons in its jurisdiction holding that a superior court properly considered the childrens need for permanency a crucial need for young children in evaluating the best interests of the child in a termination proceeding holding that evidence of the fathers conduct in stabbing the childrens mother alleged to endanger the childrens physical and emotional wellbeing is pertinent to and entwined in the issue of the childrens best interest holding that department employee opinions were relevant and admissible as they could aid the magistrate in determining facts surrounding the care of the children and what would be in their best interests