estoppel in sustaining Respondent’s motion to suppress; however, the doctrine has no application to the instant matter because Respondent has not previously been tried and acquitted for this same offense. It has long been held that ”[c]ollat-eral estoppel ... does not even begin to come into play unless the defendant has been acquitted in the first trial.” State v. Moton, 476 S.W.2d 785, 790 (Mo.1972). "In a criminal context, [collateral estoppel] means that once the state has tried the defendant for a criminal act and defendant has been acquitted, he cannot later be tried for an offense which contains an element necessarily determined in favor of defendant in the prior case.” State v. White, 931 S.W.2d 825, 828-29 (Mo.App.1996). 7 . See State v. Smith, 134 S.W.3d 35, 39 (Mo. App.2003)
holding that defendants consent was involuntary where defendant consented to search following a warrantless entry and officers explained that absent consent the officers would obtain a warrant holding that absent consent or exigent circumstances law enforcement officers cannot legally search for the subject of an arrest warrant in the home of a third party without first obtaining a search warrant holding that the implied consent law allows law enforcement officers to obtain blood in circumstances in which a warrant or actual consent may otherwise be required holding that independent of the implied consent law the fourth amendment requires an arrestees consent to be voluntary to justify a warrantless blood draw holding that the implied consent statutes are irrelevant when the defendant gives actual consent to a blood or breath test