to correct certain “errata.” See 11/19/02 Letter from Melvyn I. Weiss to the Court. On December 6, 2002, I granted the applications in an oral decision. I write now to fully set forth the reasoning supporting that decision. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiffs’ motions are granted in their entirety. 1. LEGAL STANDARD Whether to permit a plaintiff to amend her pleadings is a matter within the Court’s “sound discretion.” Grand Light & Supply Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 771 F.2d 672, 680 (2d Cir.1985). See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). That discretion encompasses both whether to permit substantive amendments of plaintiffs’ claims and allegations, as well as whether to permit the joinder of additional plaintiffs. See Mackensworth v. S.S. American Merchant, 28 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Aquilio v. Manaker, Nos. 90-CV-45, 91-CV-93,
holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint holding that dismissal with leave to amend is not a final order holding district court did not abuse its discretion in not granting plaintiffs leave to amend complaint for a third time holding that district court properly treated plaintiffs notice of joinder as a motion for leave to amend under fedrcivp 15 holding the district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff who is represented by counsel never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court