for which he was qualified in other departments; and (3) the Piping Department did not appear to have any open positions at the time he was terminated. (Dunn Dep., Doc. No. 24, Ex. C, 223, 236.) Later in her deposition, Dunn admitted that it is not clear whether a position existed in Piping at the time of Plaintiffs termination, although there may have been a position that was filled by someone else. (Dunn. Dep., Doc. No. 24, Ex. C, 145^6.) These inconsistencies create an issue of material fact over the true reason for which Plaintiff was terminated. An explanation is false or unworthy of credence if it is not the real reason for the adverse employment action. See Sandstad v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 309 F.3d 893, 899 (5th Cir.2002); Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 578 (5th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Where an employer offers different
holding that a reasonable jury could find pretext for a termination where the plaintiff stated that her work was satisfactory and there was no indication that the plaintiffs statement was either incredible or fanciful holding that employers report to state employment agency providing a reason for termination that was different than employers proffered reason did not create a genuine and material issue of fact as to pretext particularly when evidence showed the inaccurate reporting benefitted employee holding that plaintiff can show pretext by demonstrating that an employers proffered reason for an adverse employment action has no basis in fact holding that a jury could find employers proffered reason for termination pretext when plaintiff presented evidence that she had not violated company policy or was authorized to deviate from stated policy and employer never discussed alleged violations with her holding that to determine whether the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee the court examines if there is evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the employers stated reason for the firing is pretext