inconsistent with the Commission’s regulations are preempted. 47 U.S.C. § 276(c). That fact does not absolutely preclude us from identifying a broader scope of implied preemption within § 276, but we see no cause for doing so here. Although we discern in § 276 a clear intent to create a comprehensive federal plan for payphone regulation, Congress left it to the Commission to decide how to structure the regulations and enforcement mechanisms. Congress did not express a preference for absolute national uniformity or exclusive federal enforcement, leaving those decisions to the Commission and expressly allowing for the operation of state law if consistent with the Commission's chosen plan. Cf. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664, 675, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). Thus, in keeping with
holding railroad rate exempt from state regulation holding that an express provision preempting all state laws relating to railroad safety was broad and would preempt state claims that cover the same subject matter holding flsa did not preempt state law fraud claim holding that a provision preempting inconsistent state laws was simply a recognition that congress did not intend to fully occupy the field holding that state judges were not necessary parties to action challenging constitutionality of state laws relating to detention of juveniles