limitations period, where suit was not filed until after the amended statute became effective). Thus, the Legislature may not retroactively extinguish or eliminate accrued and pending causes of action, either by procedural changes such as shortening statutes of limitation, or by substantive changes, such as creating new affirmative defenses. See, e.g., DeCordova v. City of Galveston, 4 Tex. 470, 480 (Tex.1849) (“[I]f a statute of limitations applied to existing causes barred all remedy or did not afford a reasonable period for their prosecution ... such legislation would be retrospective within the intent of the prohibition, and would therefore be wholly inoperative.”); Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. R.J. Reagan Co., 577 S.W.2d 341, 345-46 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). The dissent argues that the Statute does not
holding that the state may waive the affirmative defense of procedural default by failing to assert it holding a plaintiff cannot assert a violation of the ecoa as an affirmative defense holding the recoupment doctrine could allow a spouse to assert an ecoa affirmative defense against a creditor even after the statute of limitations had run holding that defendant does not waive an affirmative defense if defendant raises it at a pragmatically sufficient time such as summary judgment and the defendants failure raise the affirmative defense in its answer did not cause the plaintiff prejudice holding that defendant could not assert statutory affirmative defense enacted three years after claim accrued because such would affect vested rights and substantive law