court that the fact [a prisoner] is barred by the one-year limitation period from asserting his claims pursuant to § 2255 does not establish that the remedy in § 2255 is ‘inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.’ ”) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)). Mr. Jones’s reliance on Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893 (5th Cir. 2001) is equally unavailing. First, the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Reyes-Requena does not suggest that a claim of actual innocence, standing alone, is sufficient to satisfy § 2255(e)’s savings clause. While Reyes-Requena establishes that the Fifth Circuit’s § 2255(e)’s savings clause test includes an “actual innocence prong,” it also indicates a petitioner must show more than actual innocence in order to proceed under § 2241. 243 F.3d at 904 (<HOLDING>). Second, and more importantly, “this court
holding that an ineffectiveassistanceofcounsel claim may be brought in a collateral proceeding under  2255 whether or not the petitioner could have raised the claim on direct appeal holding  2255es savings clause applies to a claim i that is based on a retroactively applicable supreme court decision which establishes that the petitioner may have been convicted of a nonexistent offense and ii that was foreclosed by circuit law at the time when the claim should have been raised in the petitioners trial appeal or first  2255 motion holding that  2255 is not available to test the legality of matters which should have been raised on appeal quotation omitted holding that a claim including a constitutional claim must have been asserted to the trial court to be raised on appeal holding that a claim not raised before the trial court will not be considered for the first time on appeal