the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office,’ and ‘[a]s such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.’ Id. at 431 (quoting Will v. Michigan Dep’t. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (citations omitted)). There is, however, a substantial caveat to this general rule emanating from Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908): “A state and its officers are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment protection ... where a plaintiff seeks only prospective, injunctive relief.” Id. 51 F.3d at 430 n. 1; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664-68, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). But see, e.g., Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146, 113 S.Ct. 684, 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, “[w]here the action is one for
holding that the cwa does not include a remedial scheme sufficient to preclude an ex parte young action recognizing the ex parte young  exception is narrow it applies only to prospective relief and does not permit judgments against state officers declaring that they violated federal law in the past holding that ex parte young exception to states sovereign immunity applies only where violation of federal law is ongoing not where federal law was violated only in the past holding that coeur dalene exception to ex parte young applies only if the plaintiffs action implicates special sovereignty interests and the relief sought is the functional equivalent to a form of legal relief against the state that would otherwise be barred by the eleventh amendment citation and internal quotations omitted holding that title ii ada suits and rehabilitation act suits for prospective injunctive relief may be brought under ex parte young against state officers in their official capacities