jurisdiction before the November 7, 2007 hearing. The Agreed Order indicated that each party agreed to the terms of the order “to the extent permitted by law” and that the trial court "finds that it has jurisdiction of this case and of all the parties.” 4 . The Agreed Order dismissed S.L.'s petition with prejudice. 5 .Subsequent temporary orders entered by the trial court stated that J.W.L. "filed an answer and although duly and properly notified, did not physically appear at the hearing and wholly made default.” Nothing in the record before this court suggests that at the time of the hearing J.W.L. had filed any "answer” to Grandparents’ pleadings other than . See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72-73, 120 S.Ct. at 2063-64. 13 . See Lewelling v. Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d 164, 168 n. 8 (Tex.1990) (<HOLDING>). 14 . M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 549 (emphasis
holding that a respondent in a termination of parental rights proceeding may not file a counterclaim recognizing this substantial interest in context of termination of parental rights holding that although samesex partner may have been able to prove her status as a de facto parent such status was not sufficient to establish parental rights to custody and visitation over the objection of the biological mother recognizing that while proceeding is not technically termination of parental rights action it may have such effect where mother without adequate transportation lives some distance from son and existence of visitation rights likely will be insufficient to allow her to have a substantial role in her childs upbringing holding that termination of fathers parental rights should be reversed since it was done to facilitate childs adoption and would prejudice rights of child and mother to receive support from father