involving discretionary relief, extreme hardship is not a definable term of fixed and inflexible meaning, and the elements to establish extreme hardship are dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case.” (emphases added)); Okpa v. INS, 266 F.3d 313, 317 (4th Cir.2001) (“The question of whether an alien can show extreme hardship [under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)(1) ] is committed to the Attorney General’s discretion by statute.”). Because such “discretionary and factual de terminations” fall outside the scope of the jurisdiction-restoring provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), see Xiao Ji Chen, 434 F.3d at 154, our review of Zhang’s claim remains precluded by the jurisdictional bar established at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). See Elysee v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 221, 223-24 (1st Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, for the reasons stated here and
recognizing that the bia must defer to the factual findings of the ij unless they are clearly erroneous holding substantial evidence supported the denial of cat relief where the petitioners cat claim was based on the same testimony the ij found not credible and the petitioner pointed to no other evidence that the ij should have considered holding that a petitioners argument that the ij and the bia applied an incorrect legal standard by focusing on the present circumstances of the petitioners children rather than on the future hardships they would face upon his remov al raised a reviewable legal question but finding that the record established that the ij and the bia properly addressed those hardships holding that we could not review an aliens colorable due process claim that an ij was not impartial because the alien raised the claim for the first time on appeal holding that the petitioners claim inter alia that the ij completely disregarded relevant hardships did not raise even a colorable constitutional claim or question of law because the petitioner merely attacked  the factual findings made and the balancing of factors engaged in by the ij