L.Ed.2d 737 (1984) (similar); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349, 107 S.Ct. 1160, 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987) (legislators); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14, 115 S.Ct. 1185, 131 L.Ed.2d 34 (1995) (court employees). Beyond the fact that the present case involves a war-rantless entry, see United States v. Curzi, 867 F.2d 36, 44 (1st Cir.1989) (observing that “this court has not recognized a good-faith exception in respect to warrantless searches”), not one of these recognized exceptions involves a police officer’s reasonable reliance on the mistake of police personnel. The weight of authority holds that such an exception would subvert the prime objective of the exclusionary rule: the deterrence of police misconduct. See, e.g., United States v. Herrera, 444 F.3d 1238, 1249-54 (10th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 914, 104 S.Ct.
holding that with respect to the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule article 1 section 11 of the wisconsin constitution affords additional protection than that which is afforded by the fourth amendment holding the bad faith rationale inapplicable given that the defendants acted in good faith in appealing the case and in raising defenses to the plaintiffs claims recognizing good faith exception to fourth amendment exclusionary rule holding that the good faith exception is inapplicable when the mistake resulting in the fourth amendment violation is that of the officer conducting the seizure and search rather than a neutral third party not engaged in the competitive endeavor of ferreting out crime  recognizing that police officers judgment is necessarily colored by their primary involvement in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime  and holding that good faith on part of the arresting officer is not enough to support a finding of reasonable suspicion