section 1291 until there has been a decision by the district court that “ ‘ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.’ ” Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 108 S.Ct. 1945, 1949, 100 L.Ed.2d 517 (1988) (citation omitted). This general rule would suggest that the district court’s stay order is not an appeal-able final order because it stays rather than terminates the suit. In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983), however, the Supreme Court held that, notwithstanding this general rule, a district court stay order grounded on the pendency of similar litigation in state court may be ap-pealable under section 1291. See 460 U.S. at 8-10, 103 S.Ct. at 932-34 (<HOLDING>). The Court concluded that the stay in that
holding final for section 1291 purposes a stay under doctrine of colorado river water conservation district v united states 424 us 800 96 sct 1236 47 led2d 483 1976 holding that existence of outstanding claims for attorneys fees do not affect determination whether district court entered a final decision for purposes of 28 usc  1291 holding that order denying motion to dismiss a bankruptcy petition is final under 28 usc  1291 holding states are not persons for the purposes of section 1983 holding that a district court order denying a motion to stay or dismiss because of the pendency of similar litigation in state court is not immediately appealable under section 1291 or section 1292a1