In determining whether a defendant may be prosecuted and punished for multiple offenses arising from a si Rptr. 782 (1967) (upholding multiple punishment of a defendant for offenses of unlawful possession of burglar’s tools and unlawful possession of a firearm even though both offenses arose from the same occurrence); and People v. Robertson, 67 Mich.App. 603, 242 N.W.2d 24 (1976) (upholding multiple punishment of a defendant for the offenses of possession of marijuana and possession of a stolen gun where there was no unified purpose in relationship between the two offenses, only mere temporal happenstance). Affirmed. 1 . The United States Supreme Court recently dealt with the problem in a more limited way in Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978) (<HOLDING>). For a discussion of the limited nature of the
recognizing ability of one or more joint tortfeasors to settle on behalf of themselves and another joint tortfeasor and then pursue that joint tortfeasor for its share of the settlement payment holding specifical ly that whenever a trial court improperly requires joint representation over a timely objection by defense counsel that joint representation carries with it a risk of conflict of interest reversal is automatic holding that the defendant was deprived of his sixth amendment right to counsel where appointed counsels representation presented a conflict of interest holding that the rights conferred to a joint account holder by massachusetts statutes and case law in fact give a joint account holder legal title in a joint account holding that because the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to separate counsel in light of the courts unambiguous advisement that joint representation could present a very substantial conflict so far as his defense is concerned the defendant was precluded from claiming ineffective assistance of counsel due to the conflict of interest that ultimately developed