97 S. Ct. 2319, 53 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1977)). Both historical and contemporary practice are probative of whether such rules are fundamental. Id. at 446-48. If the rule is not ranked as fundamental, the court must then determine “whether the rule transgresses any recognized principle of ‘fundamental fairness’ in operation.” Id. at 448 (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352, 110 S. Ct. 668, 107 L. Ed. 2d 708 (1990)). ¶11 As a starting point, we must precisely identify Hurst’s claim of error and determine, as a matter of statutory construction, the meaning and effect of the statutory scheme. Provisions addressing defendants who are not competent to stand trial are set forth in chapter 10.77 RCW. Cf. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171, 95 S. Ct. 896, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1975) (<HOLDING>). In brief, if the court finds that a criminal
holding that the due process clause prohibits states from requiring defendants to prove their incompetency by clear and convincing evidence holding that the due process clause prohibits the trial of a person who is incompetent holding that washingtons statute tolls the statute of limitations for a legally incompetent person notwithstanding the appointment of a guardian this is so because the right to the tolling statute vests in the incompetent person not in the guardian from this premise it follows that the guardians subsequent actions on the incompetent persons behalf should have no additional effect upon the statute of limitations unless they result in res judicata holding the double jeopardy clause applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment holding the statutory burden is on the defendant to prove he is incompetent to stand trial