the statutory maximum for first-degree robbery. Of course, we have also recognized the inverse of “excessive sentence” cases — where a court imposes sentence below that which is prescribed by statute. See Vasquez, supra. Minimums and máximums, however, are not the only benchmarks. Indeed, merger/double jeopardy cases concern legality of sentencing, even when the sentence at issue falls within prescribed minimum and maximum sentences. See Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 604 Pa. 34, 985 A.2d 830 (2009). Consistent, then, with this Court’s jurisprudence in this area of the law throughout the years, legality of sentence issues occur generally either: (1) when a trial court’s traditional authority to use discretion in the act of sentencing is somehow affected, see e.g. In re M.W., 725 A.2d at 731 (<HOLDING>); and/or (2) when the sentence imposed is
holding that when a sentencing issue centers upon a courts statutory authority to impose a sentence rather than the courts exercise of discretion in fashioning the sentence the issue raised implicates the legality of the sentence imposed holding that the sentence entered by the circuit court was illegal because the court had no authority to impose a sentence that exceeded the punishment fixed by the jury holding that a sentence imposed for a violation of supervised release will be upheld where 1 the district court considered the applicable policy statements 2 the sentence is within the statutory maximum and 3 the sentence is reasonable holding that when no statutory exception applies  the district court lacks the authority to impose a sentence less than the statutory mandatory minimum recognizing that if a guidelines error did not affect the district courts selection of the sentence imposed the sentence should be affirmed