seems equally true. The Second Circuit’s decision in Tenenb-aum illustrates this: if a caseworker knows facts that would cause a person of reasonable caution to believe that a child was being abused or neglected (i.e., there is probable cause), then it is also the case that this caseworker has reason to believe that the child is in immediate danger (i.e., exigent circumstances are present). See Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 602-03, 605. From this, it further follows that there is no practical difference between emergency circumstances—the standard used to evaluate plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim on the plaintiff children’s removal—and probable cause/exigent circumstances—the standard used to evaluate the plaintiff children’s Fourth Amendment claim. See Southerland, I, 680 F.3d at 161 (<HOLDING>); see also Tenenb-aum, 193 F.3d at 605;
holding that the defendants motion to amend their notice of removal was proper due to plaintiffs waived objections to the sufficiency of the notice of removal by failing to seek remand within thirty days of removal holding that removal proceedings are in the nature of process and defects in the removal procedures are waivable holding that the existence of emergency circumstances sufficient to justify removal of the southerland children in a manner comporting with their due process rights would also certainly suffice to justify their removal in a manner comporting with their fourth amendment rights barring unreasonable seizure holding that any defect in removal procedure must be cured within the 30day removal period or it is fatal to the removal and defendants failure to attach exhibits to the notice of removal within that time required remand holding that there should be a sua sponte remand for want of removal jurisdiction where the premise for removal of the state court proceeding was the state courts alleged violation of fourteenth amendment due process rights