her Fifth Amendment rights by forcing her to take a breath test and by questioning her in custody without advising her of her light against self-incrimination. However, Johnson makes, no mention of this claim (much less offer any argument to support it) in her brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss. As a result, the court considers this claim waived. See Flanigan’s Enterprises v. Fulton County, 242 F.3d 976, 987 n. 16 (11th Cir.2001). The court notes, however, that, even were the argument not waived, Supreme Court precedent bars Johnson’s claim because McGowin’s failure to advise her of her rights prior to requiring the breath test and to questioning her cannot be the basis of a § 1983 claim. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 772, 123 S.Ct. 1994,155 L.Ed.2d 984 (2003) (<HOLDING>). 4. Supervisory Liability and Failure to
holding that because the fifth amendment protects against the use of coerced statements at trial not mere compulsion a violation of the requirements set forth in miranda v arizona 384 us 436 86 sct 1602 16 led2d 694 1966 did not give rise to a  1983 claim holding that police must consider the age of a juvenile suspect when determining whether the juvenile is in custody for purposes of miranda warnings see miranda v arizona 384 us 436 86 sct 1602 16 led2d 694 1966 holding miranda violation does not invalidate consent to search as fifth amendment only protects testimonial and communicative evidence recognizing miranda v arizona 384 us 436 468 86 sct 1602 1624 16 led2d 694 1966 holding that the admission of a statement obtained in violation of miranda v arizona 384 us 436 86 sct 1602 16 led2d 694 1966 resulted in harmless error because the defendant repeated the substance of the statement in a later admissible statement