2683, 2692, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010), the Supreme Court held that Booker is inapplicable to § 3582(c)(2) proceedings. Likewise, Williams’s reliance on United States v. Grant, 567 F.3d 776 (6th Cir.2009), is misguided because Grant involved a request for a sentence reduction under Fed. R.Crim.P. 35(b), not § 3582(c). Finally, Williams argues that his sentence was “based on” the crack guidelines because his plea agreement stated the amount of crack involved in his offense and his presentence report referenced the crack guidelines. This argument also lacks merit. Neither a reference to the amount of crack involved nor a reference to the crack guidelines alters the fact that Williams was sentenced pursuant to a mandatory minimum. Cf. United States v. Perdue, 572 F.3d 288, 290 (6th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Williams’s sentence was “based
holding that the career offender guideline could not directly apply when there was an unsentenced conviction but allowing the district court on remand to consider departing from the guidelines in order to sentence a defendant whose conduct delayed his convictions as if the career offender provision applied holding that a district court resentencing a defendant based on the retroactive change in the crack cocaine guidelines pursuant to  3582c2 lacks authority to sentence a defendant below the newly calculated guidelines range and need not hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue holding that arithmetical error that resulted in an increase to a defendants base offense level pursuant to the sentencing guidelines affected his substantial rights even though the resulting sentence was within the range for the correct offense level holding that the defendants sentence was based on the career offender guidelines despite the fact that the district court calculated an offense level pursuant to the crack guidelines holding that reduced career offender status was nonetheless based the career offender guidelines