matter how impractical or visionary the venture may be” is no defense to a charge of fraud. United States v. Stull, 743 F.2d 439, 446 (6th Cir.1984). At the very least, a rational juror could have found that K. Kennedy’s material misstatements to victims regarding the existence of an inheritance purportedly due his wife were reckless. He had never seen any document evidencing such an inheritance, and he knew that his wife had been sued in the past for making false representations regarding an alleged inheritance. The government met the mail- and wire-fraud statutes’ intent requirements through proof that K. Kennedy was reckless in his disregard for the truth of the statements that he made to victims to obtain their money. See United States v. DeSantis, 134 F.3d 760, 764 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Turner, 22
holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid the securities fraud exception by pleading mail fraud or wire fraud if the conduct giving rise to those offenses also amounts to securities fraud holding that the first element of mail fraud  knowing participation in a scheme to defraud  can extend beyond the specific mailing and that the loss calculation for a mail fraud conviction may include any loss from the fraudulent scheme that the mailing furthered holding that in a criminal mail fraud prosecution under 18 usc  1341 where proof of specific intent is required it may be found from a material misstatement of fact made with reckless disregard for truth holding that the prosecution may establish the intent element of mail fraud by proving that the defendant was reckless holding that to satisfy the element of specific intent to defraud needed to convict for mail fraud the government must show that the defendant knowingly made a material misrepresentation or knowingly omitted a material fact for the purpose of inducing the victim of the fraud to part with property or undertake some action that he would not otherwise do absent the misrepresentation or omission