Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 551, 116 S.Ct. 1529, 134 L.Ed.2d 758 (1996)). Even where a party demonstrates these three elements, standing may be denied if the interest the complainant seeks to protect is not within the “zone of interests” protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional provision the party is relying upon. The concepts of injury and zone of interest are thus intertwined. {41} Cases in New Mexico are clear that injury — whether actual or threatened— is not enough by itself to confer standing. To be accorded standing on a particular issue the party must show that the statute or constitutional provision relied on reaches or provides protection against the injury. See Key v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 121 N.M. 764, 772-774, 918 P.2d 350, 358-60 (1996) (<HOLDING>). {42} In light of these principles, we focus
holding that an incidental beneficiary does not have standing to sue for breach of a contract holding that a motor vehicle dealer did not have standing to sue a manufacturer for allegedly unreasonably withholding consent to transfer dealership franchise because the statute the dealer relied on for relief was not intended to provide protection against the loss of an opportunity to acquire an additional franchise holding plaintiffs reference to and attachment of franchise agreement excerpts in opposition to defendants motion did not convert motion to dismiss to motion for summary judgment because plaintiff did not introduce support for arguments beyond the allegations in the complaint holding that employers have standing to sue holding that plaintiffs did not have standing because they did not sue the party with the clear ability to act