house.” This is sufficient to connect West to the conspiracy of which Chapman was a part. See United States v. Misher, 99 F.3d 664, 668 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that an individual’s “presence and association with other members of the conspiracy, when supported by other evidence, may be used to support the finding of a conspiracy”). Therefore, even, if the jury believed that only West knew about the guns, they had ample evidence that West was a co-conspirator of Chapman’s. West’s testimony would not likely have resulted in Chapman’s acquittal. Giv-. en these shortcomings of Chapman’s motion for a new trial, the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on Chapman’s motion. See United States v. Brewer, 60 F.3d 1142, 1145-46 (5th Cir. 1995) (<HOLDING>). B. Boyer Boyer argues that the district court
holding that affidavit from a new witness was not newly discovered evidence because trial counsel knew of the existence of the witness before trial trial counsel with due diligence could have discovered the evidence holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence where the evidence would serve only to impeach  testimony holding defendant not entitled toa hearing on his motion for a new trial where he failed to prove that his new evidence  was in fact newly discovered and that its recent discovery was in no way attributable to a previous lack of diligence holding that to justify a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence 1 the evidence must have been discovered after trial 2 the failure to discover this evidence must not be attributable to a lack of due diligence on the part of the movant 3 the evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching 4 the evidence must be material and 5 the evidence must be likely to produce an acquittal if a new trial is granted holding that to obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence the defendant must allege facts from which the court may infer diligence on the part of the defendant