order restitution under the broader powers of probation after conviction, “the court may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation on the conditions that the court considers proper.” § 6-221. We previously commended the use of restitution as a condition of probation: “[a] court which orders restitution does a certain solomonic justice for the aggrieved victim who is entitled to requittal of that unlawfully taken or reparation for injury criminally inflicted; thus, restitution as a probationary tool has an understandable appeal.” Coles v. State, 290 Md. 296, 305, 429 A.2d 1029, 1033 (1981). Yet, the broad power to order conditions of probation under § 6-221 is not boundless. See, e.g., Bailey v. State, 355 Md. 287, 299, 734 A.2d 684, 690 (1999) (<HOLDING>); Sheppard v. State, 344 Md. 143, 154, 685 A.2d
holding improper a probation order under  641a of article 27 forbidding a defendant from driving even if the maryland transit authority which had specific regulatory power over drivers license suspensions under the transportation article gives the defendant a license holding warrantless search of probationers home by probation officers based on reasonable suspicion was constitutionally permissible when conditions of probation required probationer to submit to home visits but not searches holding that probation is not a sentence holding that probation order under  641a of article 27 was an illegal sentence when it ordered restitution to be paid by a defendant to a victim of an alleged crime for which the defendant was not convicted holding that home detention as a condi tion of probation under  641a of article 27 is improper without explicit statutory authorization