and convictions, which has been treated as an appeal in both cases. Initially, influenced by the negotiated plea, his attorney filed an Anders brief, and the State concurred that no issue was arguable in the case. This court, however, was concerned with Mr. Dixon’s position on the statute of limitations and, thus, ordered supplemental briefing. It now appears that, in charging Mr. r agree that Mr. Dixon should be discharged of this offense. On the other hand, it has offered no ready explanation as to why he would knowingly plead to an offense that was barred by the statute of limitations. The State recognizes that nothing in the record establishes a knowing and intelligent waiver of Mr. Dixon’s right to raise this defense. See generally Tucker v. State, 459 So.2d 306, 309 (Fla. 1984) (<HOLDING>). Despite our concerns, we recognize that Mr.
holding prelitigation waiver of jury trial must be made knowingly and voluntarily and courts will indulge in every reasonable presumption against a waiver of that right holding that the defendants guilty plea was entered into knowingly voluntarily and intelligently holding that jury waiver stating that it was made knowingly and voluntarily raised presumption of same and that burden was on party challenging enforceability of jury waiver to present evidence overcoming presumption holding that in order for a waiver of counsel to be valid the trial court must ensure that the defendants waiver of his right to counsel is done knowingly and intelligently so that the record establishes that the defendants choice is made with eyes open holding defendant was not entitled to jury instructions on lesserincluded offenses because his request did not constitute a waiver of the statute of limitations on those offenses such a waiver must be knowingly intelligently and voluntarily made