the law.” Lynch v. State, 293 So.2d 44, 45 (Fla.1974). Where there is room for a difference of opinion between reasonable minds as to the proof or facts from which an ultimate fact is sought to be established, or where there is room for such differences as to the inferences which might be drawn from conceded facts, the trial court should submit the case to the jury. Id. “If, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could find the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, sufficient evidence exists to sustain a conviction.” Pagan, 830 So.2d at 803 (citations omitted). The crime of vehicular homici ssive speed alone can constitute reckless conduct. See Pozo v. State, 963 So.2d 831, 833-34 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (<HOLDING>); see also Copertino v. State, 726 So.2d 330,
holding trial court properly denied motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence of malice in second degree murder case resulting from impaired driving based in part on evidence that defendant drove his pickup truck erratically swerved off the road and struck the victims bicycle while he was traveling at a speed of approximately 35 to 40 miles per hour holding that speed alone will not support a conviction but that other factors supported the vehicular homicide conviction where defendant was speeding at 50 to 60 miles per hour in a 30 mile per hour residential area with slowchildren playing sign holding that evidence that defendant was sitting in the drivers seat of the ear which was not running and held keys to trunk in his hand did not rise to the level of actual physical control necessary to support a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol holding that evidence was sufficient to support conviction for vehicular homicide where defendant was driving anywhere from 67 to 90 miles per hour in a residential neighbor hood which alone justified denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal even though the defendant was also playing with his cd driving in rainy conditions and rounding a curve in the road holding that evidence was insufficient to support conviction for vehicular homicide where the defendant was driving 60 miles per hour in a 30 mile per hour zone before the collision and a minimum of 50 miles per hour at the time of impact