began screaming and creating a commotion after the first meeting, but we accept Taing’s version of the facts as true. Taing did not rule out that she might have raised her voice. 3 . The parties’ briefs to the district court did not point to any medical evidence in the record describing exactly what happened to Taing. 4 . Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985); Cramer v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 806, 151 L.Ed.2d 692 (2002). 5 . See id. at 691. 6 . Commodore v. Univ. Mech. Contractors, Inc., 120 Wash.2d 120, 839 P.2d 314, 321 (1992) (citations and internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). 7 . Galvez v. Kuhn, 933 F.2d 773, 777 (9th Cir. 1991) (<HOLDING>); Perugini v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 935 F.2d
holding that racially abusive language and conduct could not arguably be sanctioned by the cba holding that uncharged conduct may be considered at sentencing when that conduct is proven by a preponderance of the evidence holding that the appropriate remedy on vacatur is to remand the case for further arbitration proceedings consistent with the cba holding that severe and pervasive conduct is so permeated with discriminatory intimidation ridicule and insult that it alters the conditions of the victims employment and creates an abusive working environment holding that extrinsic evidence of the parties course of conduct may be considered where the contract language is ambiguous