system. The plaintiff alleged that this fireplace system had caused a fire which had caused property damage in plaintiff's condominium complex. The defendant argued in a special plea that plaintiff’s claim was time-barred by § 8.01-250. The trial court granted defendant’s plea in a final order from which the plaintiff appealed. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia noted that, in granting the defendant’s special plea, the trial court had neglected to conduct the "factual determination” of whether the fire-place systems constituted "machinery or equipment” or "ordinary building materials.” Heatilator, Inc., 389 S.E.2d at 306. Because the trial court record was silent as to the machinery or equipment versus ordinary building materials inquiry, the case was remanded. Id. at 307 (<HOLDING>). Rodgers correctly notes that in Heatilator,
recognizing that the court must give meaning to all the words in the claims holding that the sentencing court erred in failing to make a factual determination as to the amount of drugs attributable to the defendant after his participation in the charged conspiracy holding that the trial court erred by dismissing the plaintiffs defamation claim holding that the district court erred in not making an inequitable conduct determination prior to ruling on the exceptional case issue holding that trial court erred in holding plaintiffs claims timebarred without first making the dispositive factual determination whether the heatilator systems were machinery or equipment within the meaning of code  801250