granting Hartford’s motion for summary judgment, the November 8, 2001 order disposes of all extant claims. Further, the trial court orally expressed its intent that the November 8, 2001 order be final for purposes of appeal. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court disposed of all claims, rendering its judgment final and appealable. Unpaid Attorneys’ Fees In its first point of error, Vansteen complains the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for Hartford. Specifically, Vansteen asserts it may sue Hartford for attorneys’ fees owed, but not yet paid, to Feldman for its representation of Vansteen in the Skarbovik litigation, and that the cau ciable controversy as to whether Hartford was liable in that amount. See Waco Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gibson, 22 S.W.3d 849, 852 (Tex.2000) (<HOLDING>). In its brief, Hartford urges the trial judge
holding that a plaintiff meets the injuryinfact requirement for standing if he faces a credible threat of harm and that harm is both real and immediate not conjectural or hypothetical holding that an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice pursued under either a contract or trespass theory is proof of actual loss rather than breach of a professional duty causing only nominal damages speculative harm or the threat of future harm holding declaratory relief is inappropriate where the constitutional injury has already occurred and there is no threat of future harm recognizing that a case is ripe for determination if injury has occurred or is likely to occur the threat of harm must be direct and immediate rather than conjectural hypothetical or remote holding that the threat of irreparable harm must be immediate