involve a use of the land for a nonpark purpose. We fail to see how parkland is harmed when continued to be used for a park purpose. Parkland exists to be used for park purposes, and, of course, there are many varieties of park uses. Chapter 26 does not categorize or prioritize these different park uses, and nothing in the statute evidences an intent to favor one type of park use over another. We agree with the trial court’s interpretation of Chapter 26, and hold that Chapter 26 does not apply where the proposed change in the use of public land is from one park use to another park use and that the City of Fort Worth was not obligated to comply with the notice and hearing and finding provisions of Chapter 26 in connection with the construction of the Diorama and the implement 78 (1928) (<HOLDING>); and Williams v. Gallatin, 229 N.Y. 248, 128
holding that park services decision not to repave a particular section of road was within discretionary function exception because this section was thirtythird on a maintenance priority list of eighty sections of park road and determining the appropriate course of action would require balancing factors such as beach drives overall purpose the allocation of funds among significant project demands the safety of drivers and other park visitors and the inconvenience of repairs as compared to the risk of safety hazards holding that despite moving mobile homes onto the property a mobile home park was not in operation since regulations required permits to operate such a park and the property owner had not applied for such permits holding that a municipal corporation was forbidden to construct an auditorium in a park as such construction would practically destroy the lot as a park and convert its use into a public square holding that a universityowned land used as a park was open to the public for purposes of section 602n holding that a civic center building or recreational building on property dedicated to the city as park property was inconsistent with its use as a park