Her responses are distinguishable from those cases in which this Court has found error in the denial of cause challenges to jurors who repeatedly expressed a lack of impartiality or inability to follow the law. See Matarranz, 133 So.3d at 477-81, 485-88 (juror repeatedly indicated that she harbored a bias against criminal defendants because she,had previously been the victim of a burglary); Kop-sho, 959 So.2d at 170-72 (juror believed that defendant should testify on his own behalf and expressed disagreement with the right to silence); Overton v. State, 801 So.2d 877, 890-93 (Fla. 2001) (finding error in denying cause challenge to one juror who emphatically believed that the defendant’s failure to testify indicated guilt); see also Welch v. State, 189 So.3d 296, 301 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (<HOLDING>). Unlike the jurors in Matarranz, Kopsho,
holding that jurors who expressed personal biases but stated they could be fair did not require dismissal holding that trial court abused its discretion in failing to make a proper inquiry of jurors andor failing to strike jurors for cause after jurors explicitly expressed bias holding that even if venue was improper the case should have been transferred not dismissed holding that jurors who expressed residual doubt about the defendants right to silence should have been dismissed for cause holding that the trial court should have dismissed the employees breach of contract claim