that the circumstantial evidence presented by the Government was more than sufficient to show that Clem opened the files at issue and, thus, that his violation of the statute was knowing. II. Clem next argues that the admission of the pornographic pictures by the Government violated his rights to due process and equal protection. Specifically, he asserts that the pictures presented by the Government were larger and clearer than how he received them and that this admission was fundamentally unfair. The Supreme Court has held that a defendant’s due process rights are not violated by the admission of relevant evidence. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 70, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991); see also Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 353-54, 110 S.Ct. 668, 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Clem essentially complains that he was not
holding that use of a coerced confession in criminal trial would be fundamentally unfair holding that admission of relevant evidence generally not due process violation warranting habeas relief holding that admission of evidence must be fundamentally unfair to constitute a due process violation holding that admission of evidence showing murder victim was pregnant though prejudicial did not render sentencing fundamentally unfair holding that the mere fact that relevant evidence is shocking to the sensibilities does not make the admission of that evidence a violation of due process