of what is sufficient to demonstrate intent to communicate. For instance, in Sidner v. State, 304 Ga.App. 373, 696 S.E.2d 398, 399 (2010), the defendant called 911 threating to “take products [sic] into [his] own hands” and “go out and kick somebody’s fucking ass” if the police did not respond to his fireworks complaint. The Court of Appeals concluded that this did not amount to a-terroristic threat because—despite the fact that the threat was made to law enforcement—it was not against law enforcement, it did not identify a particular victim, it appeared to be designed simply to get the pólice to respond to the scene, and there was no evidence that the defendant intended the threat to be communicated. Id. at 400. Accord Stephens v. State, 271 Ga.App. 509, 610 S.E.2d 143, 143-44 (2005) (<HOLDING>); Koldewey v. State, 310 Ga.App. 788, 714
holding that a hospital employee could not be convicted of terroristic threats after he told one of his supervisors that he wanted a transfer because he felt like killing another supervisor and wrote a letter to human resources to that effect because he went out of his way to avoid contact with the supervisor he disliked and clearly did not intend for the letter to be delivered to her holding there was enough evidence to find the defendant abandoned his child when he claimed to have knowledge of cpss involvement he admitted that for periods of two years and six months he did not attempt any contact with his child and from the date he canceled a home study until the petition was filed he did not attempt to contact the child or cps or provide support even when he was out of jail holding that defendant was not resident of his mothers household even though his drivers license listed his mothers address and he received mail there because he expressed a belief that his residence was in a different location than his mothers home he rented and occupied his own residence and he testified that he was only living with his mother after expiration of his lease until he could find another place to live holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present