In addition, Plaintiff had an opportunity to appeal his termination to the state courts of Ohio pursuant to § 3319.16 by seeking review first in the Court of Common Pleas, and then in the Ohio appellate courts, if necessary. See Ohio Rev.Code § 3319.16. Thus, the termination hearing was judicial in nature and satisfies the first prong of the Nelson preclusion test. Although under Ohio law it is unclear whether § 3319.16 termination hearings are entitled to preclusive effect, Ohio law is settled that state administrative proceedings are entitled to preclusive effect when conducted in a judicial nature, i.e., affording the parties an ample opportunity to litigate the issues involved in the proceeding. See Grava v. Parkman Township, 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 381, 653 N.E.2d 226 (1995) (<HOLDING>). There is nothing in the statutory language of
holding that res judicata did not preclude the subsequent filing of an action which was a permissive claim in a prior action holding that where no member of present plaintiff class had cause of action at time prior judgment was entered claim cannot be barred by res judicata holding that dismissal of eeocs action for failure to comply with administrative procedures act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles holding that subsequent action barred by res judicata where party had full and fair opportunity to present case before zoning board holding second action barred by res judicata because plaintiff asserted identical claims and jurisdictional grounds as the first action