his claims address a liability of the bank; they do not diminish or defeat any specific asset of the bank. Young first argues that the D’Oench doctrine does not apply in the instant case because he falls under the “completely innocent borrower” exception that the Ninth Circuit developed in FDIC v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790 (9th Cir.1974). The Meo court held that the D’Oench doctrine did not apply because the borrower at issue was “a completely innocent party.” Id. at 792. Although the Fourth Circuit has not previously addressed the issue, other circuit courts of appeal that have addressed the so-called “innocent borrower exception” since Meo have rejected it because it conflicts with the underlying rationale of the D’Oench doctrine. See, e.g., Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd., 83 F.3d at 1325 (<HOLDING>); Dendinger v. First Nat’l Corp., 16 F.3d 99,
holding that a finding of bad faith is necessary to invoke the spoliation doctrine holding that no complete innocence exception to the doench doctrine exists holding that the doench doctrine applies even when the customer is completely innocent of any bad faith recklessness or negligence holding that the fifth circuit does not recognize an innocent borrower exception to the doench doctrine holding that a bad faith claim is a tort