“the [IDEA]’s preference for mainstreaming was aimed at preventing schools from segregating handicapped students from the general student body” and that “the school district ha[d] presented no evidence that the [IDEA’S preference for mainstreaming] was meant to restrict parental options when the public schools fail to comply with the requirements of the [IDEA] (emphasis in original)), the district court’s consideration of Lindamood-Bell’s restrictive nature was proper because it considered the restrictive nature only as a factor in determining whether the placement was appropriate under the IDEA, not as a dispositive requirement. M.S., No. 1:05cv1476, 2007 WL 1378545, at *16, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33735, at *49; see also M.S ex rel. S.S. v. Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 96, 105 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). C. Validity of 2005-2006 IEP Finally, we
recognizing that parents seeking an alternative placement may not be subject to the same mainstreaming requirements as a school board but concluding that the ideas mainstreaming requirement remains a consideration that bears upon a parents choice of an alternative placement and may be considered by the hearing officer in determining whether the placement was appropriate holding that protective placement statute unconstitutionally deprived individuals of an automatic periodic reexamination of the need for continued protective placement holding that a private alternative placement need not meet the criteria of a fape holding that personal jurisdiction can be premised on the placement of a product into the stream of commerce holding that placement of a contractual limitations period in a section entitled claims was reasonable