and non-involvement are not mutually antagonistic; the jury could consistently believe one, both, or neither of the defenses, and acceptance of one did not spell doom for the other defendant. Cochran, 955 F.2d at 1121; United States v. Guerrero, 938 F.2d 725, 728 (7th Cir.1991). Since the defenses were not antagonistic, Roman has no hope of showing that they were so prejudicial as to require severance, and the district court did not err in denying his request. Roman’s second argument is that even if the defenses were not antagonistic, Dimas conducted his defense in such a way as to prejudice him and deny him a fair trial. While a codefendant’s defense tactics might in rare cases unduly prejudice a defendant, see United States v. Ziperstein, 601 F.2d 281, 286 (7th Cir.1979) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Johnson, 478 F.2d 1129 (5th
holding that it was improper when prosecutor posed questions to defense counsel that could have been read as posed only to the defendant and whose answers could only have been provided by the defendant recognizing the possibility that a defendant could have been prejudiced by the actual conduct of a codefendants defense recognizing the possibility but denying relief holding that defense counsel suffered from an actual conflict of interest in representing two codefendants because had the attorney not been facing a conflict of interest he might have been able to negotiate a plea agreement on one defendants behalf in return for becoming a prosecution witness against the eodefendant recognizing that defendant must show 1 that counsels performance was deficient and 2 that counsels errors prejudiced the defense