flight alone is not obstruction if the officer lacked a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity necessary to support an investigatory detention. See also Slydell v. State, 792 So.2d 667, 676 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (Farmer, J., concurring) (“The answer to the question whether the state proved a prima facie case of obstructing an officer without violence will be found in the cases interpreting our state statute [on obstruction], not in Wardlow.”) Because the deputy lacked a reasonable suspicion to believe that E.A.B. was engaged in criminal activity, the deputy was not lawfully executing a legal duty when he ordered E.A.B. to stop. Therefore, E.A.B. could not be guilty of obstruction when he fled in defiance of the deputy’s order. See, e.g., J.A. v. State, 679 So.2d 843 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we reverse the delinquency
holding defendants nervousness in part presented officer with reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity holding that when officer lacks wellfounded articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify an investigatory detention defendants flight does not constitute obstruction without violence holding that reasonable suspicion justifies an investigatory detention holding that officers may consistent with the fourth amendment conduct a brief investigatory stop when they have a reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot holding that an officer can stop an individual if the officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity is underfoot