officials in their officials capacities because Section 1983 “does not apply to federal officials acting under color of federal law”). Therefore, the proper avenue for relief against the CSOSA officials is under Bivens. Defendants argue that absolute immunity bars Ford’s claims against the USPC and CSOSA Defendants because the decisions that Ford challenges are all part of CSOSA and USPC’s exercise of quasi-judicial power. “Courts have extended absolute immunity to a wide range of persons playing a role in the judicial process.” Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249, 1252 (D.C.Cir.1994) (collecting cases). Indeed, courts have held that quasi-judicial absolute immunity applies to members of a parole board and to parole officers. See Pate v. United States, 277 F.Supp.2d 1, 10-11 (D.D.C.2003) (<HOLDING>); see also Reynolds El v. Husk, 273 F.Supp.2d
holding that there is no constitutional right to representation by counsel at a parole revocation holding parole officer could extract consent from parolees sister prior to parolees release holding that the members of the dc parole board were entitled to absolute immunity against the claim that they violated the parolees constitutional rights when they failed to provide him with a timely parole revocation hearing holding that a parole condition which restricted a parolees access to the internet unless he had prior approval of his parole officer was reasonably related to reintegrating the parolee into his community and protecting the general public and did not violate parolees first amendment rights holding parole board members to be absolutely immune from charge that they conspired to revoke inmates parole based on charges they knew to be false