of claims “for purposes of distribution” once the composition of the estate has been determined. Under the appellants’ view, § 510(b) properly applies only where defrauded investors cannot trace a res upon which to impose a constructive trust. Further, they argue that the rationale of the Slain/Kripke view fails here, because no creditor relied on the “equity cushion” provided by the June 1982 purchasers, and because those purchasers got no benefit from their investment, since the SEC halted trading and the cases against FTC were filed almost immediately thereafter. It appears that no reported opinion addresses the precise question presented here. But cf In re U.S. Financial Inc., 648 F.2d 515, 517-21 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970, 101 S.Ct. 2046, 68 L.Ed.2d 348 (1981) (<HOLDING>). We need not resolve it now. We merely hold
holding that a district court properly dismissed as barred by res judicata an independent action for rescission of a prior judgment on the basis of fraud where the plaintiff failed to mount a viable direct attack on the earlier judgment holding that any claim that was raised or could have been raised on direct appeal is barred from review on post conviction under the doctrine of res judicata holding that under pri or law but using slainkripke analysis absolutepriority rule defeated claim for rescission and reclamation even though res could be traced holding that federal rules of res judicata and collateral estoppel determine preclusive effect of prior federal ftca judgments even though liability is based on state law holding that under federal law the dismissal of a claim as timebarred is adjudication of merits for purposes of res judicata