through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by [the officer’s] experience and training. The only requirement is a minimal level of objective justification, something more than an “unparticular-ized suspicion or hunch.” Id., 337 N.C. at 441-42, 446 S.E.2d at 70 (quoting U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 10 (1989)) (other citations omitted). The juvenile argues that the facts of this case are analogous to those in Fleming. In Fleming, our Court held that a stop and frisk was unjustified where an officer relied solely on the fact that a defendant was standing in an open area between two apartment buildings shortly after midnight and chose to walk away from a group of officers. Fleming, 106 N.C. App. at 171, 415 S.E.2d at 785. From those E.2d 387, 388 (1993) (<HOLDING>); State v. Cornelius, 104 N.C. App. 583,
holding that evidence was insufficient to prove a conspiracy where the evidence did not show that individuals who sold drugs to the defendant knew that the drugs were meant to be resold holding that a wellfounded fear requires petitioner to show more than a generalized or random possibility of persecution holding that more than notice to a defendant is required holding that notwithstanding the officers testimony that he had no suspicion of criminality the officer was aware of facts that would give rise to reasonable suspicion in the mind of a reasonable officer holding that an officer responding to a call that individuals were dealing drugs had more than a generalized suspicion