off, his research was not continued. According to Franz, these positions were ones that were not experiencing much progress, or that were not considered to be as relevant as other specialties to the agency’s expanding mission. As Franz put it, they were not areas “in which we’re going to make a big difference for the soldier.” In terminating appellants, Franz asserted he aimed to ensure that the technical skills possessed by the USAMRIID employees after the RIF would match the changing nature of the threats to which the agency was designed to respond— namely, biological war and terrorism. Such a strategic business decision constitutes a legally sufficient justification for appellants’ termination. See, e.g., Schuster v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 327 F.3d 569, 571, 572, 574-75 (7th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); EEOC v. Texas Instruments Inc., 100 F.3d
holding that postconfirmation jurisdiction was proper in light of plan provision retaining such jurisdiction recognizing as a legitimate reason for a discharge an effort to address adverse financial conditions where management determined that retaining one employee was more integral to the success of the venture than retaining the plaintiff holding that the standard for permanent injunction is the same as that for preliminary injunction with the one exception being that the plaintiff must show actual success on the merits rather than likelihood of success holding that the district court erred in retaining jurisdiction over pendent state law claims raising novel issues of state law on the basis of judicial economy holding that where one employee involved in fight was more harshly disciplined than the other plaintiff was not similarly situated because he had been more aggressive than the other employee