focuses on the fact that, in testifying about the prejudice she suffered, Defendant referenced “the indictment” rather than “the delay” as the cause of her stress. Viewed in context, it is clear that Defendant’s references to the indictment as the cause of her medical and employment adversities were references to the lack of resolution of the charges against her. The semantic distinction made by the State does not warrant further consideration. The State also focuses on the fact that Defendant’s suffering began or existed well before the date of presumptive ontinued inability to find work, and the public humiliation that she suffered as a result of the pending indictment are forms of prejudice that the speedy trial right is intended to curtail. See Spearman, 2012-NMSC-023, ¶¶ 37-38 (<HOLDING>). Thus, the court appropriately considered
holding that a statute must be construed so that no part of the statute is rendered surplusage or superfluous internal quotation marks and citation omitted holding that the maximum possible sentence provided by law for conviction of the offense charged is the most important consequence of the plea internal quotation marks omitted recognizing that an unincarcerated defendant is still disadvantaged by restraints on her liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety suspicion and often hostility and further recognizing that loss of employment especially being unable to work in ones    profession is a consequence of delay that a reviewing court cannot ignore internal quotation marks and citation omitted recognizing that absent illegality we do not weigh the wisdom of any particular employment decision internal quotation marks and citation omitted recognizing that the declaratory judgment act is only procedural and does not create substantive rights internal quotation marks and citations omitted