misconduct as well- Barnes, Judge, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. I - am well aware of the highly-questionable conduct engaged in by members of the LaPorte County Prosecutor’s Office and law enforcement community on more than one occasion, having authored this court’s opinions in both Larkin I and Taylor. However, I cannot conclude that Larkin’s speedy trial rights under Criminal Rute'4( s has narrowed the definition of appellate-“jurisdiction.” See, e.g., In re D.J. v. Indiana Dep’t of Corr., 68 N.E.3d 574, 579 (Ind. 2017); In re Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d 965, 970 (Ind. 2014). It is possible that a trial court’s actions while an appeal is pending may not raise a “jurisdictional” problem and such actions may not be “void.” See K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 541 (Ind. 2006) (<HOLDING>). However, I still believe such actions are at
holding that judgments entered by a court having subject matter and personal jurisdiction are not void holding that judgments rendered by courts not having authority to enter such are not subject to collateral attack because judges entering those judgments were de facto officers holding that unlike subject matter jurisdiction personal jurisdiction may be waived holding that the improper appointment of a judge to a case deprived the court of jurisdiction to rule on any motions pending before that judge the orders entered by that judge were entered without jurisdiction of the court and were thus void recognizing that only void judgments are subject to collateral attack and that a judgment is void only when court had no jurisdiction of the parties or property no jurisdiction of the subject matter no jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment or no capacity to act