was assisting his codefendant. Finally, the considerable sum of money required to purchase 4.36 grams of co caine was found neither on Patton nor elsewhere in the apartment. Thus, the court’s determination that the intent-to-deliver element was proved beyond a reasonable doubt was not unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory. Indeed, the determination is justified by the evidence. Defendant finally contends that the circuit court erred in sentencing him as a Class X offender because the State proved neither that his prior convictions were for offenses committed after the effective date of the statute, nor that the second offense occurred after the first. However, in light of the recent supreme court decision of People v. Williams (1992), 149 Ill. 2d 467, 484, 487-88, 599 N.E.2d 913 (<HOLDING>), we find no error in the circuit court’s
holding that any fact other than fact of prior convictions which increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt holding that the unified code of corrections places no duty upon the state to prove defendants prior felony convictions beyond a reasonable doubt and that it does not require any more formal proof of defendants prior criminal record than is evidenced by the presentence investigation report holding that proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is required by the constitution holding that factors increasing a defendants sentence beyond the statutory maximum of the crime charged with the exception of prior convictions must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt holding that the nature and occasion of prior offenses are facts inherent in the convictions which government is not required to allege in the indictment or prove beyond a reasonable doubt