Forest cited in its reasoning on the point—Regents of the University of Minnesota v. Chief Industries, Inc., 106 F.3d 1409 (8th Cir.1997)— actually concluded that the University of Minnesota was a “merchant” in its purchase of a grain dryer and thus does not stand for the proposition that an entity must have specialized knowledge in the particular good involved in order to be considered a merchant, only that such knowledge is sufficient to be classified as a merchant. Id. at 1411-12. The Minnesota Forest restrictive reading of “merchant” is at odds not only with the language of UCC section 2-104(1), but also with cases that find entities to be merchants based on familiarity with business practices. See, e.g., K & M Joint Venture v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 669 F.2d 1106, 1115 (6th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>); Columbus Trade Exch., Inc. v. AMCA Int’l
holding that with respect to tortious interference recognized standards of business ethics and business customs and practices are pertinent holding that experienced contractor familiar with business practices is merchant with respect to buying certain equipment despite lack of special knowledge of that equipment holding that the government could not charge contractor excess cost of relet contract where government caused a delay in contract performance in which contractor was to use his own equipment original contractors costs increased and government refused to allow original contractor to perform at cost but allowed new contractor to use government equipment and paid new contractor a different rate holding that a general contractors right to forbid the work from being performed in a dangerous manner and the fact that he would have stopped the work and required protective equipment had he seen the employee of the independent contractor not using such equipment merely showed the possibility of control not actual control holding description all personal property sufficient to cover equipment