clear choice whether to submit to testing or refuse consent. See Neville, 459 U.S. at 555 n. 2, 103 S.Ct. 916. ¶ 30 In sum, we hold that the State failed to carry its burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Valenzuela freely and voluntarily consented to providing samples of his blood and breath. By advising Valenzuela after he was arrested and detained that Arizona law required him to submit to testing, the officer invoked lawful authority to compel consent. Because nothing in the suppression hearing record dispels the coercive implication of the officer’s repeated admonition, the trial court erred by finding that Valenzuela had voluntarily consented to the search and then denying the motion to suppress the test results on that basis. Cf. Medicine, 865 N.W.2d at 500 ¶ 17 (<HOLDING>). C. Good-faith exception to the exclusionary
holding that independent of the implied consent law the fourth amendment requires an arrestees consent to be voluntary to justify a warrantless blood draw holding consent to blood draw involuntary when among other circumstances it was given after officer informed arrestee that south dakota law provides that drivers automatically consent to blood draws holding that the implied consent law allows law enforcement officers to obtain blood in circumstances in which a warrant or actual consent may otherwise be required holding that on the basis of the totality of the evidence when viewed objectively we conclude that a reasonable persons consent to this blood draw would have contemplated the potentiality of the results being used for criminal investigative or prosecutorial purposes thus officer agostino validly obtained from appellee his consent for the blood alcohol test holding that the implied consent statutes are irrelevant when the defendant gives actual consent to a blood or breath test