to almost no scrutiny. I concur to emphasize that in the context of Rule 35(b) it should be the latter. Let me explain. At the time a Rule 35(b) motion is filed, a final sentence order has been entered. Independently of Rule 35(b), the sentencing order itself is subject to appellate review, both as to its constitutionality and its compliance with the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure and the applicable statutory provisions. But, we also describe the stándard of review used to review the final sentencing order as an abuse of discretion. It creates a paradox to foist another “abuse of discretion” standard on a circuit court whose response may very well be “the sentence I impose during trial was appropriate.” See, United States v. DeCologero, 821 F.2d 39, 41 (1st Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); accord, United States v. Smith, 650 F.2d 206,
holding that the federal expert witness compensation rules are in direct conflict with the state rules even when the state rules allow for a greater recovery holding that rule 35c like the preguidelines versions of rule 35 interpreted by our kennedyjordan line of cases authorizes the district court only to correct its sentencing errors holding that on appeal an appellate court does not have the right to weigh the evidence and decide the issue on the basis of its weight the courts duty goes no further than to determine whether the record contains any evidence tending to support the finding holding that the function of the preguidelines rule 35b of the federal rules was merely to allow the district court to decide if on further reflection the sentence seems unduly harsh holding that the function of the trial court on a motion for summary judgment is to determine whether issues of fact exist and not to decide the merits of the issues themselves