“discontinue service to any customer on reasonable notice of nonpayment of bills,” the utility terminated the plaintiffs service. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 346, 95 S.Ct. 449. The plaintiff sued the utility, claiming that the utility had terminated her power without affording her notice and a hearing and had thus violated the Due Process Clause. The plaintiff contended that the defendant’s monopoly in the market for electrical power rendered the defendant a state actor. The Court rejected this argument, stating that the defendant’s state-created monopoly was “not determinative in considering whether [the defendant’s] termination of service to [the plaintiff] was ‘state action.’ ” Id. at 351-52, 95 S.Ct. 449; see also Crissman v. Dover Downs Entm’t., 289 F.3d 231, 247 (3d Cir.2002) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). The state’s grant of a monopoly to the
holding that an action naming a state entity as a defendant did not constitute an action against the state because the state entity was sued in its capacity as receiver holding that even though a state racing regulation commission had granted a racetrack a sixmonth monopoly in the market for harness racing the acts of the entity operating the racetrack were not attributable to the state holding that a school was not a state actor even though it had to comply with many state regulations to be eligible for state funding and almost all of its students had been referred to it by the state holding that a public corporation in that case a commission created to provide information about the tva is an entity separate from the state and its acts are not acts of the state  within the meaning of the state constitutions prohibition against the state creating new debts holding that there was no state action where the decisions to discharge the petitioners were not compelled or even influenced by any state regulation