litigation is potentially disruptive to military operations and creates difficulty in maintaining discipline. Id. at 732; accord Henninger v. United States, 473 F.2d 814, 815-16 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 819, 94 S.Ct. 43, 38 L.Ed.2d 51 (1973). It is clear that a court using its equitable powers to compel superior officers to disobey regulations at the instance of a subordinate is a serious threat to military discipline. A court, however, is justified in using its power to compel military personnel to disobey regulations which the court has determined are repugnant to the Constitution or to statutory authority. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973); cf. Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 78 S.Ct. 433, 2 L.Ed.2d 503 (1958) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). That is not the case here. Although Watkins’
holding that the court has no authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of an action to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action holding expressly that this court properly held that such decision by secretary is mandatory holding that a court may review a decision of the secretary of the army to determine whether he acted in excess of his statutory authority holding that in order to determine whether disqualification of plaintiffs attorney is appropriate because of a previous attorneyclient relationship he had with the defendant the court must determine whether confidential information was passed from client to attorney holding that an appellate court may review the entire record to determine whether hearsay statements are sufficiently reliable