drugs, the time during which the conspiracy was operative and the statute allegedly violated, even if it fails to allege or prove any specific overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.” United States v. Tavelman, 650 F.2d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir.1981) (internal quotation marks omitted). Forrester contends that the indictment is insufficient because it fails to specify a beginning date for the conspiracy, thereby possibly subjecting him to double jeopardy. However, although an indictment cannot be completely open-ended, see United States v. Cecil, 608 F.2d 1294, 1296-97 (9th Cir.1979), an indictment that specifies an end date is sufficient to apprise defendants of the charges and enable them to prepare a defense, see United States v. Rohrer, 708 F.2d 429, 435 n. 7 (9th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). In addition, uncertainty regarding a
holding that a person alleging a conspiracy to violate constitutional rights must do more than simply aver that a conspiracy existed holding initial indictment which was subsequently found to be invalid tolled the thirtyday period and superseding indictment alleging different charges based on same fraudulent acts as earlier indictment was therefore timely holding that an indictment alleging that the conspiracy extended until at least 1980 was sufficient holding that an indictment for capital murder must contain at least one aggravating factor holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense