to which appellant could be said to be raising claims sounding in the ineffective assistance of his appellate counsel. Sixth, to the extent that appellant intends to pursue these non-waived claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness, as opposed to waived claims of trial court error or trial counsel ineffectiveness, it is apparent that appellant intends those claims to sound coextensively under both the Federal and Pennsylvania Constitutions. Indeed, in Claim XIX, appellant cites to both (Charles) Pierce and Strickland. In (Charles) Pierce, this Court held that the federal Strickland test was also the proper test to evaluate ineffectiveness claims raised under the Pennsylvania Constitution. 527 A.2d at 976-77. See also Commonwealth v. Kimball, 555 Pa. 299, 724 A.2d 326, 332 (1999) (<HOLDING>). The Third Circuit has likewise recognized
holding petitioner has the burden of proof under the strickland test holding that failure to file for sentencing reconsideration which resulted in waiver of right to appeal discretionary aspects of sentence must be evaluated under pierce standard for ineffectiveness recognizing that test for counsel ineffectiveness under strickland and pierce is identical holding that pennsylvanias test for ineffective assistance of counsel is not contrary to strickland holding that the strickland test applies to claims  that counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal