with this conclusion. In addition, even if we were to agree with Pinney Dock’s assumption that the ICC has necessarily taken “the pro-competition policies of the antitrust laws” into account when calculating its rates, we fail to see how that justifies a conclusion that a competitor may not sue under the Sherman Act based on an allegation that the rates which were adopted were adopted in part because of an antitrust violation on the part of the defendant. Cf. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 372, 93 S.Ct. 1022, 1027, 35 L.Ed.2d 359 (1973) (“Activities which come under the jurisdiction of a regulatory agency nevertheless may be subject to scrutiny under the antitrust laws.”); City of Long Beach v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 872 F.2d 1401, 1408 (9th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>), as amended on denial of reh’g, 886 F.2d 246
holding that existence of federal price controls did not absolve companies of antitrust liability because if the price ceilings were based on prices set artificially low as a result of an unlawful conspiracy liability should still exist holding contract for sale of water which did not specify price was unenforceable because price of water was essence of contract holding that the absence of a market price is no barrier to valuation for purposes of assessing tax liability holding that the measure of damages for the breach of a contract of sale where no fraud is shown is the difference between the contract price and the market price of the goods on the date of the breach holding that although the ngpa authorizes certain price ceilings for natural gas it is the gas sales contract not federal law that creates the right to receive any price at all