evidence was inadmissible hearsay. Under article 38.22, section 6, a defendant is entitled “to offer evidence before the jury as to the voluntariness of a confession despite the judge’s earlier findings thereon to the contrary.” Vanderbilt, 563 S.W.2d at 596-97 (quoting Ross v. State, 504 S.W.2d 862, 864 (Tex.Crim.App.1974)); see also Tex.Code CRIM. PROC. Ann. art. 38.22, § 6. Thus, although appellant is correct in arguing that article 38.22 authorizes him to submit evidence to the jury pertaining to the voluntariness of his statement, the testimony appellant intended to elicit from Officer Razo was inadmissible hearsay, and the trial court did not err in excluding its admission. See Tex.R. Evid. 802; see also Davis v. State, 970 S.W.2d 758, 760-61 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, even if the trial court had erred,
holding that evidence of customer inquiries is admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule holding that appellants own statement when offered by appellant was selfserving and not admissible under the declarationagainstpenalinterest exception to the hearsay rule holding that victims statements were hearsay admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule and constitutionally permissible under ohio v roberts citations omitted holding that where the proffered hearsay statement of the victim pertained to a memory of the previous days events and was offered solely for the purpose of proving such events such statement was not admissible under rule 8033 holding that as a general rule a defendant cannot create exculpatory evidence by introducing selfserving hearsay statements made by the defendant to another