an affiant-witness was “necessary to vindicate [Powe’s] right of access to the courts.” Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 395. That is especially true since Powe’s mother has already obtained and used Bridges’s affidavit in her lawsuit, suggesting that she suffered no injury through the alleged retaliation against Bridges. See Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727, 740 (7th Cir.1999) (commenting that a prison physician who gave a deposition in a prisoner lawsuit could not show “that his termination interfered with other prisoners’ access to the courts by confining their ability to gather evidence in support of their cases”). Accordingly, Bridges’s participation in the Powe litigation was not sufficiently connected to Powe’s rights to allow Bridges to assert a denial of access claim. See id. at 739-40 (<HOLDING>). The district court properly dismissed
holding that prisoners have a constitutional right to meaningful access to courts and examining the facility as a whole to determine whether such access was sufficient holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party holding that although prison inmates have a first amendment right to access to the courts prison officials may regulate law library access including reasonable time place and manner of access taking into account the administrative needs of the institution holding that the prison physician lacked standing to raise the prisoners rights of access to the courts recognizing right of prisoners to seek relief under 42 usc  1983 for denial of access to the courts