complaint was filed after the 180-day statutory period had expired, the district court had no jurisdiction to consider her MHRA claims. Hill strenuously argues that equitable estoppel should apply because someone working for the EEOC misinformed her, leading her to file her complaint too late for purposes of the MHRA. Because the Missouri courts have held that the 180-day filing deadline is jurisdictional, however, the doctrine of equitable estoppel is inapplicable. Hill’s citation to numerous cases applying equitable estoppel and waiver in the ADEA and Title YII contexts is unhelpful, because unlike the MHRA, the filing deadlines for those federal statutes are not jurisdictional. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 392-93, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 1131-32, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Anderson v. Unisys Corp., 47 F.3d 302, 305-06
holding that the filing deadline under title vii is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court but a requirement that like a statute of limitations is subject to waiver estoppel and equitable tolling holding title vii subject to equitable tolling holding that the ninetyday filing requirement is not a jurisdictional prerequisite and is subject to equitable tolling holding that the timely filing of a discrimination charge with the eeoc is not a jurisdictional prerequisite but a requirement that like a statute of limitations is subject to waiver estoppel and equitable tolling holding that the timely filing of a discrimination charge with the equal employment opportunity commission is a requirement like a statute of limitations that is subject to waiver estoppel and equitable tolling