“ ‘not a strictly mechanical exercise.’ ” Esposito v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 590 F.3d 72, 77 (1st Cir.2009). The somewhat similar circumstances in Esposito, which necessitated a reversal of the district court’s preclusion order provide guidance. Here, as in Esposito, Cunningham’s need for Collins’ testimony is great. Without it, there is no evidence that the water damage was “sudden” within the meaning of the policy. Cunningham bears the underlying burden of showing that the accident falls within the scope of coverage. See New Fed Mortg. Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 543 F.3d 7, 11 (1st Cir.2008). Consequently, summary judgment in Acadia’s favor more than likely results absent the inclusion of the affidavit in the summary judgment record. See Id. at 78 (<HOLDING>); see also Cruz-Vazquez v. Mennonite General
holding that an expert witnesss testimony on an ultimate issue was admissible recognizing that the expert did not specifically testify that the defendant was guilty or that as a matter of law the facts satisfied the applicable legal standard holding that the plaintiff was entitled to recover reasonable expert fees for a rehabilitation expert and economist holding that an expert that had provided consulting services to the defendant relating to the litigation was not precluded from serving as an expert for the plaintiff recognizing that the need for the expert was so great that the decision to preclude the expert effectively amounted to dismissal of case holding that expert testimony is unnecessary where the case is not a case in which lay jurors would be unable to grasp the issues without expert assistance