only on Lewis and Hildebrand, but also on “their respective heirs, successors, executors, personal representatives, and assigns,” as well. Thus, to accept the argument advanced by Lewis would render federal courts forever without jurisdiction to hear tiny contractual dispute arising out of any of the rights established or granted in the Separation Agreement, a nonsensical result which finds no support in the law. Also noteworthy is the fact that the Final Decree of Divorce in this case only "ratified, affirmed and incorporated” the Separation Agreement, and expressly stated that the Separation Agreement was “not merged” into the decree. As recognized in Doherty v. Doherty, 9 Va.App. 97, 383 S.E.2d 759, 760 (1989), "[w]here the circumstances are such that the agreem . 79, 82 (D.Md.1978) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). 19 . See also Fidelity,
recognizing that the corporation is always deemed to be an indispensable party in a shareholder derivative action holding that dismissal is proper for a derivative cause of action but not for a direct cause of action holding a shareholders derivative action even where the only relief allowed is a recovery of damages is nevertheless a suit in equity and not an action at law recognizing that in a derivative action the corporation for whose benefit suit is brought is a necessary party to the action recognizing that a corporation is properly aligned as a defendant in a shareholder derivative suit when the corporation is in antagonistic hands