is limited to determining whether the [agency] action was arbitrary, capricious, or in bad faith, or unsupported by substantial evidence, or contrary to law, regulation, or mandatory published procedure of a substantive nature by which plaintiff has been seriously prejudiced.” Clayton v. United States, 225 Ct.Cl. 593, 593 (1980) (emphasis added). In disputes concerning military decisions, the plaintiff must “overcome the strong, but re-buttable, presumption that administrators of the military, like other public officers, discharge them duties correctly, lawfully, and in good faith.” Doe v. United States, 132 F.3d 1430, 1434 (Fed.Cir.1997) (quoting Sanders v. United States, 594 F.2d 804, 813 (Ct.Cl.1979)). This presumption, however, is not insurmountable. See Doe, 132 F.3d at 1437 (<HOLDING>); see also Conn v. United States, 376 F.2d 878,
holding that the plaintiff overcame the arbitrary and capricious standard in a military discharge case where the relevant administrative board considered hearsay evidence without allowing the plaintiff rebuttal holding that judicial review of an administrative agencys decision is limited solely to whether given the relevant standard and facts the agencys decision was arbitrary illegal capricious or unreasonable holding that a court is to factor an insurers dual role into its review under the arbitrary and capricious standard though the standard remains arbitrary and capri cious holding that under the arbitrary and capricious standard this court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment holding that a heightened arbitrary and capricious standard of review applied to the decision to deny benefits under the erisa plan