Rollin M. Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 108 (3d ed. 1982); Charles E. Torcía, Warton’s Criminal Law § 168 (15th ed. 1994). As with the felony-murder rule in New Mexico, the involuntary-manslaughter statute does not contain any mention of a culpable state of mind or culpable degree of conduct. Under an unmodified and traditional misdemeanor-manslaughter rule and a strict reading of Section 30-2-3(B), the violation of any misdemeanor would be a sufficient predicate for involuntary manslaughter. In felony murder, however, we have held that a strict reading of the “any felony” language of that statute, NMSA1978, § 30-2-1(A)(2) (Repl.Pamp.1994), is inappropriate. E.g., State v. Ortega, 112 N.M. 554, 562-66, 817 P.2d 1196, 1204-08 (1991). To presume conclusively that o , 579 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Busler, 445 Pa. 359, 284 A.2d
holding the state must prove that at the time of the homicide the defendant was engaged in the commission of the felony holding that the state must prove criminal negligence for its homicide by vehicle statute even though the statute specifically states that any traffic violation is sufficient holding that under rico plaintiff must prove an injury because of violation of statute holding that a violation of a rightofway statute is negligence as a matter of law holding that a violation of a statute governing the changing of traffic lanes by motor vehicles is negligence as a matter of law