As mentioned, Richardson does not challenge the legality of the initial stop. An investigative detention must be temporary, and the questioning must last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 770-71 (Tex.Crim.App.2002); Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). Once an officer concludes the investigation of the conduct that initiated the stop, continued detention of a person is permitted for the purpose of issuing a citation. Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 65 n. 43 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (citing United States v. Wellman, 185 F.3d 651, 656 (6th Cir.1999)); see Coleman v. State, 188 S.W.3d 708, 719 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2005, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 999, 127 S.Ct. 502,
holding that purpose of stop was complete upon the issuance of the citation holding that reasonable suspicion is required to prolong a traffic stop after the purpose for which the investigatory stop was instituted has been accomplished holding that if an agent does not develop reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before the justifying purpose of a checkpoint stop has been accomplished he may not prolong the stop holding complete prohibition on use of crime or accident reports for purpose of soliciting clients too broad a means of effectuating the intended purpose of the law holding that although the investigation of the traffic offense that served as the basis for the stop was complete when the officer issued the citation the officers continued detention of the appellant thereafter for a canine search was lawful because during the investigation of the traffic offense the officer had developed a reasonable suspicion that the appellant had committed a drugrelated offense