66, 365 P.3d 845 (2016) (“California courts have held that a trustor who agreed under the terms of the deed of trust that MERS, as the lender’s nominee, has the authority to exercise all of the rights and interests of the lender ... is precluded from maintaining a cause of action based on the allegation that MERS has no authority to exercise those rights.”). The allegation that the original lender had its business charter revoked prior to the challenged assignment does not affect MERS’s ability to act as beneficiary under the deed of trust. To the extent that Brown challenges the validity of the purported securitization of her loan, she lacks standing to raise such a challenge. See, e.g., Saterbak v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 245 Cal.App.4th 808, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 790, 796 (2016) (<HOLDING>). We reject as without merit Brown’s contention
holding that an assignment of a loan into a securitized trust that was allegedly forged or untimely was merely voidable and therefore the borrower lacked standing to challenge its validity holding that a borrower lacks standing to challenge transfers of her promissory note to which the borrower is not a party holding that a passenger who lacked a property or possessory interest in the automobile or property seized lacked standing to challenge a search of the car holding plaintiff did not have standing to challenge the validity of an assignment from mers to bac because she was not a party to the assignment and the assignment did not affect her underlying obligation to make timely payments holding that passengers lacked any reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore had no standing to challenge the search of the vehicle