will fill in gaps where parties’ reasonable expectations are clear, but they cannot impose performance where it is not clear the parties had a meeting of the minds.”), reh’g denied (Sept. 29, 2014); Renaissance Alaska, 263 P.3d at 40 (“[T]he threshold inquiry in determining whether a case is an appropriate one for gap-filling is whether, in fact, there is an essential term or circumstance for which the parties failed to plan.” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)); Casey v. Semco Energy, Inc., 92 P.3d 379, 386 (Alaska 2004) (rejecting an argument “that the superior court should have read hew terms into the agreement in order to fill contractual gaps because we find that there were no contractual gaps to fill”); accord Davis v. Dykman, 938 P.2d 1002, 1007 (Alaska 1997) (<HOLDING>); cf. Vermont Teddy Bear Co. v. 538 Madison
holding that courts may fill gaps in contracts to ensure fairness where the reasonable expectations of the parties are clear holding that at will contracts of employment are subject to tortious interference with contracts claims holding that the court was not bound by the parties agreement that contracts were unambiguous and holding that contracts were ambiguous holding that a contracts clause violation may support a  1983 claim holding payment in kind contracts are proceeds