at Plaintiffs’ counsel’s firm, or reflects a prime enhancement. Thus, we remand for the district court to determine whether the $300 hourly rate represents Plaintiffs’ counsel’s firm’s September 1999 rates or includes a prime enhancement to account for any delay. If the rate does not reflect either of these requirements, then the court must adjust the fee award accordingly. With respect to the eight-month delay from September 1999 until May 2000, while Plaintiffs’ motion to amend the September 1999 order was pending, the district court may, in its discretion, compensate for this delay. In making its determination, the district court should consider the length of the delay as well as the amount of the fee award involved. See Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 502-03 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). IV. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we
holding that mere delay in payment for a while would not be a material breach holding that a public administrator was not entitled to attorneys fees in a claim against the estate of a former guardian where the case was not one where attorneys fees were authorized and there was no evidence to support the award holding that a 103day delay in payment did not amount to bad faith because the carrier gave a reasonable explanation for the delay in payment it was continuing its investigation holding that seventeenmonth delay in abandoning premises is not within a reasonable time as a matter of law holding that the plaintiffs counsel were not entitled to compensation for a seventeenmonth delay in the payment of approximately 11500 in attorneys fees in one matter and a fourteenmonth delay in the payment of approximately 8000 in fees in another matter because the delay itself was not very long and the amount of fees not very high