basketball team from Chicago,’ but it’s far simpler (and more likely to be understood) to refer to the Chicago Bulls.” Id. at 306. Similarly, one might refer to “the English princess who died in a car crash in 1997,” but it fs far simpler (and more likely to be understood) to refer to “Princess Diana.” We therefore hold that Princess Diana’s person is not readily identifiable without use of her name. There is no substitute for Franklin Mint’s use of Princess Diana’s likeness on its Diana-related products. Nor is there a substitute for Franklin Mint’s use of Princess Diana’s likeness in its advertisements for these products. For example, one might explain — as Franklin Mint in fact did — that the “Diana, The People’s Princess Doll” is “[d]ressed in the st pp.2d 1120, 1142 (C.D.Cal.1998) (<HOLDING>). Where, as in the present case, the
holding that the repeated use of the words barbie and ken are reasonably necessary for the purposes of parody in a song lampooning the lifestyle associated with these dolls holding that statutory terms should be construed with reference to their associated words and phrases holding that an ambiguous term may be given more precise content by the neighboring words with which it is associated recognizing that the court must give meaning to all the words in the claims holding that a jury could find an intent to discriminate from evidence of use of code words such as all of you and one of them the words themselves are only relevant for what they reveal  the intent of the speaker