of a well-recognized rule that a party may not amend its removal notice more than thirty days after removal to assert a new ground for removal. In Blakeley v. United Cable System, 105 F.Supp.2d 574 (S.D.Miss.2000), this court addressed the rule upon which plaintiff relies. The court first noted that “[wjithin the thirty-day period (for removal) prescribed by § 1446(b), a defendant may freely amend its notice of removal,” id. at 578, and observed further that in the view of the majority of courts, at least in more recent times, a defendant may still be allowed to amend its removal petition even after expiration of this thirty-day period in order to cure defective allegations of jurisdiction, id. (citing D.J. McDuffie, Inc. v. Old Reliable Fire Ins. Co., 608 F.2d 145, 146 (5th Cir.1979)) (<HOLDING>). The court explained: The authorization for
holding that the failure to join all the defendants in a removal petition is not a jurisdictional defect holding that amendment of removal petition was properly allowed to correct jurisdictional allegations in removal petition which were defective or faulty due to defendants failure to specifically allege the citizenship of the parties at the time the suit was brought and at the time the removal petition was filed missing allegation was not a fatal omission which could not be cured by amendment holding that plaintiffs failure to allege citizenship of first defendant did not constitute good cause for second defendants failure to timely join in removal petition holding that removal was proper where the petitioning defendant stated that all parties agreed in its notice of removal and the petition was followed by the supplemental consent signed by each of the parties but filed outside the 30 day period holding that any defect in removal procedure must be cured within the 30day removal period or it is fatal to the removal and defendants failure to attach exhibits to the notice of removal within that time required remand