50. The Board granted reopening for the limited purpose of allowing him to seek a waiver of inadmissibility (for the 1990 fraud charges) under former INA § 212(c). A.R. 47. On remand, however, the IJ found that Ogunwomoju’s 2000 conviction was intact (he had only filed a collateral attack of the conviction); accordingly, to prevent his removal, Ogunwomoju would still need both § 212(c) relief as to the fraud charges and cancellation of removal as to his 2000 drug offense, which occurred after the repeal of § 212(c). The IJ observed that this court had foreclosed the possibility of an alien’s obtaining both kinds of relief in a situation such as Ogunwomoju’s. See Rodriguez-Muñoz v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 245, 24 86) (same); see also McAllister v. Atty. Gen’l, 444 F.3d 178, 185 (3d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Thus, we cannot consider Ogunwomoju’s
holding that 120 days notice was satisfied by 30 days work plus 90 days pay holding that the exhaustion requirement of  1252d1 applies only to an alien  challenging a final order of removal and not to  any person  holding that the requirement that an alien appeal a removal order within 30 days is jurisdictional recognizing that an appeal filed within 30 days of the entry of an order awarding attorney fees was timely filed as to the issue of attorney fees holding that an order that finally determines the rights of the parties in a partnership dissolution must be appealed within 30 days