the general enactment, Nagel is authorized to seek habeas relief because he is being detained involuntarily in a mental health facility, but the dispositive inquiry here is whether, as an insanity acquittee, he is entitled to pursue that remedy without first seeking discharge in accordance with the specific statute. As to that question, seemingly the weight of authority is to the effect that, where a person has been adjudged insane and committed to an institution, and thereafter seeks to be discharged upon the ground that his sanity has been restored, he can not invoke the writ of habeas corpus without showing that he has exhausted specific statutory remedies, where such are provided. Richardson v. Hall, supra at 606. See also Jackson v. Lowry, 170 Ga. 755, 756-757 (154 SE 228) (1930) (<HOLDING>). Compare Kennedy v. Meara, 127 Ga. 68 (56 SE
holding that so long as  the ordinary established procedure  is available to a detainee  the orderly procedure    should not be interfered with by a writ of habeas corpus cits    holding that a writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to review the weight of evidence   holding that a writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to review the weight of evidence  holding that managing conservator while in texas to seek return of child by writ of habeas corpus may not be served with civil process and is subject to jurisdiction of court in which habeas corpus is pending and only for purpose of prosecuting writ of habeas corpus holding that threeyear statute of limitations was not an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus