of expert evidence on the subject.... The rule in Arizona will continue to be that in the usual case we will support the trial court’s discretionary ruling on admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness identification. Nor do we invite opinion testimony in even the most extraordinary case on the likelihood that a particular witness is correct or mistaken in identification or that eyewitness identification in general has a certain percentage of accuracy or inaccuracy. 135 Ariz. at 297, 660 P.2d at 1224 (emphasis supplied). If those words were not clear enough, we explicitly state at this time that trial courts should not admit direct expert testimony that quantifies the probabilities of the credibility of another witness. Cf. State v. Buell, 22 Ohio St.3d 124, 489 N.E.2d 795 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Thus, even where expert testimony on
holding that a specific instruction was unnecessary because eyewitness was crossexamined and the eyewitness testimony was discussed in defense counsels opening statement holding the error harmless due to eyewitness corroboration of the victims testimony holding admissible expert testimony concerning factors that may impair eyewitness identification and rejecting that concerning a particular eyewitness credibility and the statistical probability of eyewitness misidentification holding that the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury to consider certain additional factors in evaluating the validity of eyewitness identification testimony holding no abuse of discretion to exclude expert eyewitness identification testimony where governments case relied on more than eyewitness identification