the facts and do not recount them here except as necessary to explain our decision. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm. “We review the district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo, the district court’s application of the Guidelines to the facts for abuse of discretion, and the district court’s factual findings for clear error.” United States v. Loew, 593 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court did not err in applying a four-level enhancement pursuant to § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B) of the Guidelines. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B) (2009). The district court properly determined that there was intent to cause bodily injury. See United States v. Dayea, 32 F.3d 1377, 1380 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). The district court’s conclusion that
holding that  2a22b2b requires intent to injure holding that where issue of intent to injure was not necessary or essential issue in previous action it was nevertheless material fact for litigation in coverage action holding that prior battery was admissible to prove defendants intent to injure holding that wrongful intent to injure another may give rise to finding of malice to support verdict of murder holding that the intent to injure exception to the general exclusivity of the workers compensation act does not embodyf  the particular restriction upheld  in mirabile and schatz