themselves to be aggrieved by any final agency action either in the implementation of the regulation or in having any offers-in-compromise denied”. Id. at 659. They lacked standing because they posited a “highly speculative and uncertain” injury “based on the Secretary not having written the regulation in the way they believe it should have been written.” Id. Brooks, however, is not controlling and, in any event, distinguishable. First, unlike the plaintiffs in Brooks, this plaintiff has alleged that he applied for a refund and was denied. Am. Compl. ¶ 22. He hasn’t reapplied under the Notice procedure, but the law does not require him to reapply every time the IRS changes its mind or superceding case law appears. See Starkey v. United States, 635 F.Supp. 1007, 1009 (W.D.Ark.1986) (<HOLDING>); Scully v. United States, 108 Ct.Cl. 310, 70
holding that a change in the law of sentencing does not constitute a new factor holding that because plaintiffs claims were presented as a single claim based on the same facts and based on the same alleged damages multiple awards would be duplicative holding under section 7422a that the district court lacked jurisdiction over a taxpayers refund claim because the taxpayer failed to file a refund claim before the statute of limitations had run holding that the injunction did not constitute a claim holding that a second refund claim based on a change in the law does not constitute a different claim and that congress did not intend for taxpayers to file successive claims based on the same facts