or contrary to, the permit granted. See Rudolph v. Zoning Hearing Board of Cambria Township, 839 A.2d 475, 478-80 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003); see also Randolph Vine Assocs. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of Philadelphia, 132 Pa. Cmwlth. 452, 573 A.2d 255, 259 (1990) (stating that where an applicant deviates from the use approved in an erroneously granted permit, he cannot claim a vested right in that permit) (citing Petrosky). As discussed above, MAJ’s use of the Property was not in compliance with the 2000 Permit, in which it claims a vested right. Moreover, MAJ failed to display good faith or due diligence when it failed to disclose on its permit application the use to which it intended to put the Property. See Township of West Pikeland v. Thornton, 106 Pa.Cmwlth. 560, 527 A.2d 174, 176 (1987) (<HOLDING>). On its application for the 2000 Permit, MAJ
holding that an attached garage is part of the home for payton purposes even when the garage door is open holding that the duty of good faith and commercial reasonableness is used to define the franchisors power to terminate the franchise only when it is not explicitly described in the parties written agreements holding that city may by ordinance require abutting landowner to repair sidewalk but that the abutting landowner is not liable in an action in tort for injuries holding that the defendant did not establish good faith as a matter of law holding that landowner did not act in good faith when he sought a permit for a garage explicitly for the storage of personal property but used it for the storage of commercial equipment in violation of the relevant zoning ordinance