2458, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978). Unless all three requirements are met, jurisdiction is not available under the collateral order doctrine. Gulfstream, 485 U.S. at 276, 108 S.Ct. at 1136-37. The trial court’s denial of the proposed consent decree does not satisfy either the first or sécond prongs. A To first satisfy the Cohen doctrine, the trial court’s denial of the consent decree must conclusively determine the parties’ ability to settle their claims. Orders that are “inherently tentative” are contrasted with those expected to be the final word on the subject addressed. See Gulfstream, 485 U.S. at 277-78, 108 S.Ct. at 1137-38 (rejecting collateral order review of a denial of a motion to stay as inherently tentative); Coopers & bybrand, 437 U.S. at 469 & n. 11, 98 S.Ct. at 2458 & n. 11 (<HOLDING>). Inherently tentative orders are those “to
holding that mothers failure to appeal prior contempt order precluded her challenge to prior order in appeal from later order entered based upon prior contempt order holding that order denying representation to class of future claimants in bankruptcy proceeding is equivalent to denial of request to intervene and order denying right to intervene is appealable final order holding that a district court order denying anonymity to the parties is a collateral order holding the collateral order exception does not apply to a pretrial order denying class certification because the order is subject to revision prior to a decision on the merits holding that a bankruptcy court order denying a trustees claim to immunity was final and appealable under the collateral order doctrine