the Bill of Rights, and of the First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation — and then-ideas from suppression — at the hand of an intolerant society.” McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 356, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 131 L.Ed.2d 426 (1995) (citation omitted). It is perhaps because of this essential value that our free speech tradition has hesitated to allow a government to exclude speech from the marketplace of ideas merely because that speech does not disclose its source. See id. at 342-43, 115 S.Ct. 1511. But compelled disclosure is not a direct prohibition on speech. Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 130 S.Ct. 2811, 2818, 177 L.Ed.2d 493 (2010); see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 366, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010) (<HOLDING>). Striking a balance between those two points,
holding that apprendi error is harmless if the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the result would have been the same absent the error internal quotation marks and citation omitted holding that a statute must be construed so that no part of the statute is rendered surplusage or superfluous internal quotation marks and citation omitted recognizing that absent illegality we do not weigh the wisdom of any particular employment decision internal quotation marks and citation omitted holding that disclosure requirements may burden the ability to speak but they  do not prevent anyone from speaking citation and internal quotation marks omitted holding that the state has a compelling interest in protecting the citizens of minnesota from those who pose a severe threat to their health and safety citation omitted internal quotation marks omitted