registrations in the field must therefore be narrowly interpreted. Jet Tours v. Mark Travel Corp., 1999 WL 20927, 1999 TTAB LEXIS 14, *10 (1999); see Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 58 C.C.P.A. 735, 432 F.2d 1400 (CCPA 1970). SNT also noted that Central’s STEALTH mark is not famous as a matter of law. See S Indus, v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 991 F.Supp. 1012, 1021 (N.D.Ill. 1998) . SNT argued that, under these circumstances, no claim of likelihood of confusion between Central’s STEALTH mark and the challenged STEALTHVIEW mark could be supported. Accordingly, SNT asserted that Central could not be damaged by SNT’s registration of STEALTHVIEW and therefore lacked standing to oppose under 15 U.S.C. § 1063(a). See Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 1095 (Fed.Cir. 1999) (<HOLDING>). SNT’s allegations and arguments were properly
holding that an opposer must have a reasonable basis for his belief of damage holding that the test for good faith is the actual belief of the party and not the reasonableness of that belief holding that a party must at least have a subjective belief that litigation was a real possibility and that belief must have been objectively reasonable holding that a plaintiff must show his belief was objectively reasonable in light of the facts and record presented holding that for the administrative position of the government to be substantially justified it must have a reasonable basis both in law and fact