investments from more than one hundred people, the Kamans did not present evidence at trial that any of the investors — with the single exception of Mary Valmont — ever contacted Jackson Hewitt to inquire about its purported “backing” of Prewett’s investment schemes. The Kamans certainly did not. In fact, the undisputed evidence showed that until Prewett’s arrest in October 2006, Jackson Hewitt had no knowledge that Prewett was soliciting investments in real estate joint ventures and representing that Jackson Hewitt was involved. Jackson Hewitt did not learn about Prewett’s fraud until long after the Kamans had made their investments. Thus the Kamans failed to prove that Jackson Hewitt had knowingly permitted Prewett and JHIS to solicit their investments based on A.2d 840, 849 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Frederick, 615 S.W.2d 323,
holding that chevron deference is due only to a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency holding that the customer of a chevron dealer could not maintain an action against the franchisor on an apparent agency theory when the customer knew that the station was independently owned and operated holding that in an action by a customer of a mobil dealer against the franchisor on an apparent agency theory the trial court improperly excluded a letter showing that the customer believed that the service station was owned by an individual not the franchisor holding that a railroad operated and owned by the federal government was immune from antitrust liability holding that chevron deference is due only when the agency acts pursuant to delegated authority and the agency action has the force of law