the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The Fourth Circuit has made it clear, however, that removal statutes must be construed strictly against removal and that the burden of establishing the propriety of removal rests with the removing party. Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir.1994). “If federal jurisdiction is doubtful, remand is necessary.” Watson v. Charleston Housing Auth., 1999 WL 1455084 at *1 (S.D.W.Va.)(citing Mulcahey, 29 F.3d at 151). On several occasions, this Court has held that “[i]t is well-settled that ‘all defendants must join in the petition for removal.’ ” Price v. Messer, 872 F.Supp. 317, 321 (S.D.W.Va.1995)(internal citations omitted)(<HOLDING>); see also Dorsey v. Borg-Warner Auto., Inc.,
holding that the failure to join all the defendants in a removal petition is not a jurisdictional defect holding that plaintiffs failure to allege citizenship of first defendant did not constitute good cause for second defendants failure to timely join in removal petition holding that a party fraudulently joined to defeat removal need not join in removal petition holding that affidavit submitted to the court after the plaintiffs motion to remand was sufficient to cure the defect in the removal petition holding that the failure of all defendant to join in the petition for removal mandated remand to state court