does not directly challenge the reasonable doubt jury instruction given at his trial; rather, Mercer attacks the instruction as a predicate for alleged violations of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. This distinction is controlling as, under well settled federal habeas law, to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Mercer must demonstrate that: “(1) ‘counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) ‘but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” United States v. Aiello, 900 F.2d 528, 532 (2d Cir.1990) (quoting Strickland, supra, at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052). In the instant case, the “reasonable doubt” jury instruction at issue in this case had d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Based on the law at the time of Mercer’s
holding that a sentence is proper as long as it is within the statutory range prescribed for the offense without regard to drug quantity holding no merit to ineffective assistance of counsel claim with regard to sentence imposed where record demonstrated defendants sentence was within range prescribed by relevant sentencing guidelines holding that the defendants sentence was within the guidelines range and therefore presumptively reasonable holding statutory booker error was not harmless where district court imposed sentence in middle of guidelines range and there were no statements in the record reflecting that the court would have imposed the same or greater sentence under advisory guidelines holding that defendant should be resentenced where district court imposed a sentence under an erroneously calculated guidelines range  even where the sentence imposed fell within the correct range