in rehabilitation and punishment, rather than the victim’s desire for compensation Id. (quoting Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 107 S.Ct. 353, 93 L.Ed.2d 216 (1986)). Defendant concludes that, since the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals’s statement in Carruth about the purpose of restitution appears to contradict Vetter, the holding of Vetter is no longer valid and the court may not award restitution to U.S. Bank. Defendant’s argument is frivolous and a clear breach of the Plea Agreement. Even if the court were to assume that Carruth abrogates Vetter, it is not a necessary consequence that the court must ignore the plain terms of § 3663A. Vetter analyzed a restitution statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (1988), that plays no part in this case. After the Eighth Ci 047 (9th Cir.2007) (en banc) (<HOLDING>) and United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 126
holding that federal common law of erisa preempts state law in the interpretation of erisa benefit plans holding that erisa does not preempt the plaintiffs claim that the erisa plan administrator is liable for medical malpractice where the plaintiff premised the claim solely on state law and did not invoke the erisa plan holding that erisa completely preempted certain state law claims and finding that erisa preempted an employees common law tort and contract claim when the employee sought benefits under the employers disability policy holding that the mvra supersedes certain provisions in erisa holding that ina expressly supersedes hearing provisions of the apa