dismissing Strickland’s habeas petition as “second or successive,” Burton, 549 U.S. at 154, 127 S.Ct. 793, and Mathis v. Thaler, 616 F.3d 461, 470 (5th Cir.2010), are not controlling because in those cases the petitioners were attempting to file new claims that were not raised in their first petition. Appellee Thaler maintains the instant application is successive under § 2244 because one of the claims in Strickland’s first habeas application was adjudicated on the merits. He cites Burton for the proposition that because Strickland elected to have the district court decide the merits of his exhausted claim without withdrawing his unexhausted claims, he effectively abandoned his unexhausted claims, and therefore his application is successive. See Burton, 549 U.S. at 154, 127 S.Ct. 793 (<HOLDING>). Strickland contends because Slack controls
holding those with exhausted and unexhausted claims may proceed only with the exhausted claims but doing so risks subjecting later petitions that raise new claims to rigorous procedural obstacles holding that appellate jurisdiction over final orders of removal are limited to claims that have been exhausted before the bia holding that a district court must dismiss habeas petitions containing any claims that have not been exhausted in state court holding that exhaustion requirement is satisfied so long as prisoner exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to new claims asserted in an amended complaint before filing that complaint holding that a district court faced with a mixed petition should dismiss only the unexhausted claims in the habeas petition and stay further proceedings on the remaining portion until the petitioner has exhausted hisher remedies in state court