indictments, as defendants argue. Cf. United States v. Duque, 62 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir.1995) (rejecting contention that because of Rojas-Contreras dicta, second indictment issued before dismissal of first indictment must be a “superseding” indictment). More importantly, the Seventh Circuit, in discussing the same Speedy Trial Act provisions at issue in Rojas-Contreras, referred to an indictment returned after dismissal of an original indictment as a “superseding” indictment: “[SJubseetion 3161(h)(6) controls a situation where there is an interval between the time the original indictment is dismissed ... and the superseding indictment is returned.” United States v. Horton, 676 F.2d 1165, 1170 (7th Cir.1982) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Menzer, 29 F (9th Cir.1970) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Yung, 786 F.Supp. 1561,
holding that even though a hearing to suppress allegedly illegally seized evidence occurred under a superseded indictment the defendant may not relitigate the motion to suppress after reindictment holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that defendant had waived the opportunity for a suppression hearing on his confession by first moving to suppress the confession orally at the start of trial when no motion to suppress was filed no hearing requested and no objection to the admission of the statements was made holding that the state is not allowed to suppress evidence but it need not collect evidence for the defendant holding that it is clear that hearsay evidence is admissible in a hearing on a motion to suppress holding that similar agreement allowed the defendant to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress