§ 1291, and we affirm. Barajona-Avila contends that the sentence is substantively unreasonable because it is based on a 16-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b) which lacks any empirical basis, and is grossly disproportionate to sentencing enhancements for more serious offenses. He further contends that the sentence is substantively unreasonable in light of his individual circumstances. The sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3558(a) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, particularly given Barajona-Avila’s multiple prior deportations and criminal history. See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc); United States v. Ramirez-Garcia, 269 F.3d 945, 947 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. ** This disposition is not
holding that defendants sixth amendment right to trial by a jury was not violated by district courts reliance on his prior convictions for purposes of sentencing under the acca even though convictions were neither charged in indictment nor admitted holding that ussg  2l12b properly implements congress intent to enhance the penalties for aliens with prior convictions in order to deter others  by increasing the sentencing range for aliens with prior convictions  holding that when a defendant admits prior convictions at a habitual offender hearing he waives any complaints about the validity of the prior convictions holding that prior felony drug convictions that fall within the conspiracy period may be used to enhance the defendants sentence if the conspiracy continued after his earlier convictions were final holding that due to statute defendant cannot collaterally attack prior convictions used to enhance sentence unless in violation of the right to counsel