his duty of good faith to A&P. The district court also properly determined Gillis’ conduct could not be sanctioned under a fair reading of the lease provisions. Throughout the proceedings, Gillis has argued that the arbitrary period of ten days set out in the default notice was to begin the date he mailed the letter (August 31, 2000) and not on the date A&P received the letter (September 5, 2000). This position means, however, that Gillis only allowed A&P six days from receiving notice to cure its default before he cancelled the lease. Al riate, federal jurisdiction was proper because the alternative standard applied to the facts of this case leads to the same result. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976) (<HOLDING>). 3 . A party may be joined as an involuntary
holding that a state defendant waives sovereign immunity when it removes a state court case to federal court thereby deliberately invoking the federal courts subject matter jurisdiction holding that federal courts have a virtually unflagging obligation to exercise their subject matter jurisdiction despite the pendency of state court proceedings holding that article iii courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction and remanding the matter to state court holding that the federal claims which arose from state court criminal contempt proceedings were inextricably intertwined with the state court action and thus the federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims pursuant to the rookerfeldman doctrine