See Barnett, 415 F.3d at 692 (“Nothing is more common than an individual’s consenting to a search that would otherwise violate the Fourth Amendment, thinking that he will be better off than he would be by standing on his rights.”). Thus, we primarily focus on parolee cases. More direct to the issue we must decide, our review of those cases that enforce consent provisions of a parole agreement largely undervalue the rights of parolees, rendering them inapposite for a helpful and tight analysis under Iowa law. See Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 287-91. For example, many of these cases simply follow Samson. See, e.g., Wilson, 319 Ill.Dec. 353, 885 N.E.2d at 1042 (applying Samson to a parole agreement with different language than the language at issue in Samson ); Turner, 297 S.W.3d at 166 (<HOLDING>). Like Samson, Wilson is not a true consent
holding parole officer could extract consent from parolees sister prior to parolees release holding the specialneeds test remains the proper framework for analyzing the constitutionality of a dnaindexing statute when applied to probationers whose privacy interests are not as diminished as those of parolees holding that a parole condition which restricted a parolees access to the internet unless he had prior approval of his parole officer was reasonably related to reintegrating the parolee into his community and protecting the general public and did not violate parolees first amendment rights holding requirement that a prisoner agree to search condition of parole is reasonable in light of the parolees significantly diminished privacy interests holding warrantless search of common areas of parolees apartment which he shared with his mother was lawful even though parolees mother may not have consented to the search