(2004). It is true that the rule “renders jurors incompetent to testify regarding arguments, votes, and mental reactions occurring during the deliberations.’’' Doe v. Johnston, 476 N.W.2d 28, 35 (Iowa 1991). However, the rule specifically allows jurors to testify as to whether any juror was subjected to extraneous prejudicial information — such as exposure to the news media accounts of the threat and the trial delay. In the absence of an operative presumption to the contrary, this is the burden the befalls a party claiming prejudice due to the jury’s receipt of extraneous information — the party seeking relief is charged with demonstrating prejudice via evidence admissible under Rule 5.606 (or Federal Rule 606). See, e.g., United States v. Francis, 367 F.3d 805, 828 (8th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Tucker, 137 F.3d 1016, 1030
holding that a motion denying summary judgment will not be reviewed on appeal from a jury verdict where sufficient evidence supports the jurys verdict holding that to impeach a jury verdict the defendant must produce evidence that is both not barred by federal rule 606b and sufficient to prove grounds adequate to overturn the verdict holding that the verdict must be sustained if there is any competent evidence to support the verdict holding that a district court must compare and weigh the opposing evidence and it must set aside the verdict if it determines that the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of firstdegree murder