Perlman v. Swiss Bank Corp. Comprehensive Disability Protection Plan, 979 F.Supp. 726, 729 (N.D.Ill. 1997). In the face of this overwhelming authority, Reagan “reluctantly agrees” that the applicable standard of review in the case sub judice is arbitrary and capricious. Therefore, arbitrary and capricious is the standard of review which the Court will apply. As for the scope of review, that issue goes hajid-in-hand with the previous one. Bollenbacher v. Helena Chem. Co., 926 F.Supp. 781, 788 (N.D.Ind.1996). The Court believes that it has the authority to consider evidence not presented to the plan administrator only if it is applying a de novo standard of review, and even then, it should do so sparingly. See Casey v. Uddeholm Corp., 32 F.3d 1094, 1099 n. 4 (7th Cir.1994) (citing cases) (<HOLDING>); see also Ramsey, 77 F.3d at 204 (holding that
holding that although the court has the authority to review facts not before the plan administrator the court should use that authority sparingly holding that the governments attorney had the implicit authority to bind the government although the contracting officer had the express authority holding that this court lacked preliminary authority to review the district courts jurisdiction because there was no immediately appealable order before the court holding that because no plan document granted discretion to the plan administrator and because the fiduciaries had not expressly delegated their discretionary authority to the plan administrator the district court properly employed the de novo standard of review holding that one who is named in documents as plan administrator signs documents as plan administrator and assumes discretionary authority in the administration of the pension plan is a fiduciary