v. Ferguson, 111 S.W.3d 589, 598 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied). B. Whether Valentina’s petition has a basis in law and fact In her petition, Valentina conceded that she signed the settlement agreement and that the agreement granted McCulloch the ability to sell the homestead. Even a liberal construction of the petition demonstrates that Valentina’s request to enjoin the sale of her homestead has no basis in law or in fact because the petition acknowledges that she signed an agreement permitting the sale, and it does not ask the court to revoke that agreement. Therefore, a rule of law (waiver) bars Valentina’s cause of action to enjoin the sale, and the facts pleaded refute that cause of action. See, e.g., In re Essex Ins. Co., 450 S.W.3d 524, 527 (Tex.2014) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Dailey v. Thorpe, 445 S.W.3d 785, 789-90
holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint holding that trial court abused its discretion by denying a motion for rule 11 sanctions without adequate explanation holding trial court abused discretion in denying rule 91a motion where cause of action barred by legal rale holding that bia abused its discretion in denying motion to reopen holding that district court abused its discretion by denying plaintiffs motion to file fourth amended complaint