and attempt to commit extortion. 1. Because (a) appellants’ ex parte application was a pretrial motion resulting in excludable time pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, even though later declared moot; and ( ury concerning the mens rea for extortion and the requisite interstate commerce element. See Rodriguez, 360 F.3d at 957; see also United States v. Nelson, 137 F.3d 1094, 1103 (9th Cir.1998) (upholding jury instructions under the Hobbs Act because “defendants need not have known or intended their actions to affect interstate commerce”) (citation omitted). 5. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence the spreadsheet or offshore documents as they were probative of intent and motive. See United States v. Whitman, 771 F.2d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). 6. The district court also
recognizing that the district court has discretion to admit or deny motive evidence holding not an abuse of discretion to deny funds holding other crimes evidence admissible to show motive where motive was put in issue by defense at trial holding it was not an abuse of discretion to deny funds holding that trial court had discretion to admit relevant photographs in penalty phase