conclude that defendant has waived reliance on this condition. Under Pennsylvania law, a waiver of legal rights can arise by “a clear unequivocal, and decisive act of the party claimed to have waived its rights, with knowledge of such right and evident purpose to surrender it.” Keenan v. Scott Township Auth., 151 Pa.Cmwlth. 225, 616 A.2d 751 (1992). See also, Evcco Leasing Corp. v. Ace Trucking Co., 828 F.2d 188 (3d Cir.1987). Waiver may be effected by a party’s words or conduct. When waiver is implied from conduct, it applies in those situations that would support equitable estoppel. Penn Mutual Life Ins. v. Bank of New England, 756 F.Supp. 856 (E.D.Pa.1991); Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, 409 Pa. 357, 186 A.2d 399 (1962). See also Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 588 F.Supp. 1513 (D.D.C.1984) (<HOLDING>). Thus for an implied waiver to be operative,
recognizing difference between tolling and equitable estoppel holding that equitable estoppel is applicable to a suit under the miller act while not citing soda recognizing equitable estoppel under the magnusonmoss act to hold that plaintiffs who had not presented their vehicles to dealers as required by the warranty were not barred recognizing cause of action for equitable estoppel under erisa holding that warranty claim accrued at tender where 180 day warranty on computer not a warranty for future performance as it involved a remedy only