interest could justify nonretroactive application of Miller. As discussed above, the only countervailing interest in this case is finality, and it is of slight importance here. It is not sufficient to justify nonretroactivity in spite of the resulting unfair consequences. ¶80 Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, this Court serves as “the primary protector[] of the rights of criminal defendants.” Kills on Top, 279 Mont. at 420, 928 P.2d at 204 (quoting Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 391, 106 S. Ct. 689, 699 (1986)). Accordingly, when analyzing Eighth Amendment protections, we have stated that “[c]onventional notions of finality of litigation have no place where life or liberty is at stake and infringement of constitutional rights is alleged.” Kills on Top, 279 Mont. at 400, 928 P.2d at 192 (<HOLDING>); see also State v. Southwick, 2007 MT 257, ¶
holding that res judicata applies in deportation proceedings holding that the doctrine of res judicata applies to deportation proceedings holding res judicata does not preclude consideration of constitutional questions in postconviction proceedings which by their nature depended upon facts not found in record holding that res judicata does not bar reconsideration of the constitutionality of a petitioners death sentence during postconviction relief proceedings holding that lear does not abrogate general principles of res judicata or the res judicata effect of a consent decree regarding patent validity