still come to the correct conclusion. Looking at those prior cases, there is nothing about erroneous self-defense jury instructions, in whatever form, automatically putting them in the group of cases where we reviewed the error as compared to the group where we did not. ¶24 In addition to not having precedential support, the statement in LeFaber has since created a logically problematic situation for appellate courts. Given other jury instruction errors are not automatically of a constitutional magnitude or presumptively prejudicial, the trial court could provide an erroneous instruction on the definition of an element of a crime and not have the error reviewed by an appellate court because it is not of a constitutional magni tude or actually prejudicial. See Scott, 110 Wn.2d at 691-92 (<HOLDING>). On the other hand, pursuant to LeFaber,
holding that it was prejudicial error to fail to give such a cautionary instruction even where the defendant did not object at trial to the lack of such an instruction when the accomplice testimony was uncorroborated holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given holding that district courts incomplete 404b limiting instruction did not warrant reversal because district court told defense counsel what limiting instruction it would give and defense counsel did not object or request a more specific instruction holding an incomplete instruction of the definition of knowledge in an instruction on accomplice liability for burglary did not amount to a manifest error affecting a constitutional right holding that the failure to object to an instruction constitutes a waiver of error