claim for a number of reasons, including if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see also Smith v. City of Enid ex rel. Enid City Comm’n, 149 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir.1998) (“When all federal claims have been dismissed, the court may, and usually should, decline to exercise jurisdiction over any remaining state claims”). Mr. Bryner, however, argues not just that a district court that has declined jurisdiction over a claim should dismiss that claim without prejudice, but that, in this case, the district court was required to dismiss his state-law claim without prejudice after it dismissed the federal-law claims for lack of jurisdiction. See D.L. v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 497, 392 F.3d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); with Herman Family Revocable Trust v. Teddy
holding that younger abstention was appropriate while the case works its way through the state appellate process holding before huffman was decided that younger abstention was inapplicable to an eminent domain proceeding holding that because the federal plaintiffs claims were essentially derivative of the state defendants younger abstention applied holding that younger abstention is jurisdictional holding that to avoid younger abstention plaintiffs must demonstrate that state law bars the effective consideration of their federal claims