a jailhouse witness to the stand who testified that while in a holding cell, he heard Mr. Shearod say that he had “killed the cracker,” referring to the white victim. The State later distanced itself from this testimony in closing argument as it became highly likely that it was false. However, in arguing against the motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of all the evidence, the State correctly maintained that it was within the jury’s province to pass upon this witness’s credibility. Nonetheless, we are compelled to note that without this testimony — and without other testimony that we discuss below— the State would likely fail to establish a prima facie case sufficient to withstand a motion for judgment of acquittal. Cf. Walker v. State, 273 So.2d 137, 138 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973) (<HOLDING>); Hines v. State, 227 So.2d 334, 336 (Fla. 1st
holding that where testimony is inherently improbable the court may choose to disregard it recognizing that although the question of the credibility of witnesses is one for the jury alone such rule does not mean that the jury is at liberty under the guise of passing upon the credibility of a witness to disregard his testimony when from no reasonable point of view is it open to doubt holding that the testimony of the complaining witness although argumentative inconclusive conflicting and appearing in certain instances to be unbelievable does not by itself warrant reversal because the jury is at liberty to believe what they choose and disbelieve what they choose but reversing for a new trial because of additional errors holding that a superior court justice may not choose between conflicting inferences at summary judgment stage holding that trier of fact may believe one witness disbelieve others and resolve inconsistencies in the testimony of any witness