not itself justify a generalized charge that the ordinance itself is vague, given the guidance afforded by the court decisions in the area. Id. at 1272-73. We find no reason to depart from our previous holding. In sum, we reject National’s First Amendment claims on the merits. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the district court granting summary judgment to Raleigh. AFFIRMED. 1 . A detailed description of this ordinance appears in this Court's opinion in Major Media of the Southeast, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269, 1270-72 (4th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1102, 107 S.Ct. 1334, 94 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987). 2 . In concluding that G.S.N.C. § 1-52(2) provides the applicable limitations period, the parties rely on past decisions of this Court. See Bireline, 567 F.2d at 263 (<HOLDING>); Cox, 529 F.2d at 49 (same). More recently,
holding that the statute of limitations for  1983 claims is the most closely analogous state limitations period for general personal injury claims holding that the virginia disabilities act constitutes the most analogous state statute of limitations for claims brought under the ada holding that kentuckys one year statute of limitations period applies to  1983 actions holding that a twoyear statute of limitations period applies to all  1983 actions brought in pennsylvania holding that  1522 is the most analogous limitations period for  1983 actions