the patient of course may waive the protection.” Id. at 15 n. 14, 116 S.Ct. 1923. It is immediately clear that a distinction is to be made between Defendants’ interrogatory and them RFPs. Defendants’ interrogatory asks Ms. Stallworth to identify any medical providers who examined or treated her; it does not ask her to divulge any “confidential communications” between her and her medical providers. Thus, the psychotherapist-patient privilege does not apply to Defendants’ interrogatory. Defendants’ RFPs, however, seek the medical records related to those examinations or treatments; these certainly contain the “confidential communications” protected by the privilege. Thus, the psychotherapist-patient privilege applies to Defendants’ RFPs. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 18, 116 S.Ct. 1923 (<HOLDING>). But has she waived the privilege by bringing
holding that the information is not protected by attorneyclient privilege holding that communications between the university of colorados counsel and former employees of the university concerning activities during their period of employment may be protected by the attorneyclient privilege under the rationale presented in upjohn but holding that the university waived the privilege by disclosing the documents holding that the conversations between a patient and her psychotherapist and the notes taken during their counseling sessions are protected by the privilege holding that the language of an executed consent form took precedence over the alleged prior conversations between the patient and the physician holding a psychotherapist had no duty for the suicide of a patient in a noncustodial setting