in both ordinances are constitutional and severable, and thus would be independently enforceable regardless of any other constitutional issues in either of them. Whether one portion of an ordinance is severable from another is a question of state law. See Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 187, 139, 116 S.Ct. 2068, 135 L.Ed.2d 443 (1996); City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp., 260 F.3d 1160, 1180 (9th Cir.2001). The California Supreme Court has held that there are three criteria for severability under California law: the provision must be grammatically, functionally, and volitionally separable. Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 48 Cal.3d 805, 821, 258 Cal. Rptr. 161, 771 P.2d 1247 (1989). See also Santa Barbara Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.3d 315, 330, 118 Cal.Rptr. 637, 530 P.2d 605 (1975) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis in original). “The final
recognizing that where the statutory language is not ambiguous  the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute must be given effect holding that an arbitration clause is valid despite an accompanying limitation on liability because the latter is severable in the event it is found unconscionable holding that severability is possible and proper where the language of the statute is mechanically severable that is where the valid and invalid parts can be separated by paragraph sentence clause phrase or even single words holding that the possibility of a mistaken understanding of the phrase preponderance of the evidence on the part of the jury is too remote to constitute plain error when counsel gave the jury an accurate explanation of the legal meaning of the phrase in his closing argument and that meaning is consistent with the common understanding of the words in the phrase holding that a phrase should be interpreted consistent with the context of the statute in which it is contained