was a crime of domestic violence is not limited by the evidentiary requirements established in Taylor and Shepard. This is an issue of first impression in this circuit. Other circuits reaching this issue have split on the result. Compare Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666, 668-71 (7th Cir.2003) (agreeing with the BIA’s interpretation) with Tokatly v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 613, 619-24 (9th Cir.2004) (disagreeing with the BIA’s interpretation). After reviewing the record, we conclude that we need not reach the question of statutory interpretation because Cesar admitted to the facts necessary to show that the victim of his assault conviction was a person protected under the domestic violence laws of the state of Florida. See United States v. Bennett, 472 F.3d 825, 832-34 (llth Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Here, Cesar admitted that (1) his victim was
holding defendants failure to object to the drug quantity assessment in the presentence report at sentencing was a waiver of the issue on appeal holding that under the evidentiary strictures of shepard where a defendant admitted  by not objecting to the presentence investigation report and by statements at his sentencing hearing  that his robbery convictions were for residential robberies the sentencing court could rely on these admissions in determining whether the robberies were violent felonies holding that the defendants prior conviction referenced in his presentence report could be taken as admitted because he had made no objection to the facts in his report holding that a court is not under a duty to conduct a fullblown evidentiary hearing in each instance where information in a presentence report is challenged at federal sentencing nor does the convicted defendant have an absolute right to demand that kind of hearing holding that defendants sixth amendment right to trial by a jury was not violated by district courts reliance on his prior convictions for purposes of sentencing under the acca even though convictions were neither charged in indictment nor admitted