should be deducted from the total time charged, because the work appears to have been directed to the cases against defendants as to whom the plaintiff did not prevail. This deduction leaves a total of 132.5 as the reasonable number of hours to be used in the lodestar calculation. Multiplying this number times a fee rate of $125 produces a fee of $16,562.50. There remains the question posed by Farrar v. Hobby, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992). This Supreme Court decision, which was published after both the Supreme Court’s opinion in Hague and this Court’s opinion in Gomez, established that counsel’s entitlement to fees under § 1988 does not necessarily follow from the fact that plaintiff prevailed as to some part of its claims. Farrar, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 574-75 (<HOLDING>). In this Court’s experience, cases brought to
holding nominal damages sufficient to establish prevailing party status but affirming denial of attorneys fees on ground that award of nominal damages does not usually entitle a prevailing party to fees under 28 usc  1988 holding that the most critical factor in the analysis of a reasonable fee is the degree of success obtained holding that the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained holding that the most critical factor is the degree of success obtained holding that status as a prevailing party does not by itself entitle a plaintiff to attorneys fees rather the most critical factor in determining a fee awards reasonableness is the degree of success obtained emphasis added