assistance of counsel because Roark failed to file a motion to suppress Hollon’s confession. Hollon asserts that the confession would have been suppressed because, at the time of the confession, Hollon was mentally incompetent and was therefore unable to understand his Miranda warnings. When considering whether an attorney’s failure to file or pursue a motion to suppress constitutes incompetent performance, the Court is required to examine the probability of success of such a motion in order to determine whether counsel’s decision against pressing the motion was within the wide range of permissible discretion and sound trial strategy. Huck v. State, 124 Idaho 155, 158, 857 P.2d 634, 637 (Ct.App. 1993). See also Carter v. State, 108 Idaho 788, 794-95, 702 P.2d 826, 832-33 (1985) (<HOLDING>); State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 967 P.2d 702
holding that under elstad the first question that must be answered when determining whether a subsequent confession is tainted by an earlier confession is whether the initial confession was obtained in violation of the defendants fifth amendment rights  ie whether it was involuntary  or whether the confession was voluntary but obtained in technical violation of miranda  holding that trial judges determination of the admissibility of a confession is based on whether the confession was voluntarily given holding that counsels failure to move to suppress the defendants confession constituted ineffective assistance because it was obvious that the confession would have been suppressed holding that trial counsels decision to submit evidence to the jury that his confession was coerced rather than submitting the evidence to the judge in a motion to suppress was a matter of trial strategy and thus did not constitute ineffective assistance holding that counsels total failure to conduct pretrial discovery constituted ineffective assistance