evidence on liability, and is not basis for entry of default); Cluett v. Krystyniak, 532 So.2d 739, 739 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (trial court erred in entering default judgment where the pleadings set forth disputed issues regarding liability and there was no evidence before court prior to its determination of liability); Ortiz-v. Nicolaides, 196 So.2d 186, 187 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967) (trial court abused its discretion in entering default against defendant as to liability upon failure of defendant or counsel to appear at trial). Moreover, the entry of this final default judgment was an abuse of discretion where FCA received no prior notice of Watkins’ ore terms application for default pursuant to Rule 1.500(h), Fla. R. Civ. P. See Maranto v. Dearborn, 687 So.2d 940, 941 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (<HOLDING>). Rule 1.500(b) makes clear that if a defendant
holding that the trial court was without authority to set aside entry of default on motion to set aside default judgment holding that any default entered in violation of the due process notice requirement of rule 1500  fla r civ p must be set aside without any regard as to whether a meritorious defense is presented or excusable neglect is established recognizing default judgment must generally be set aside without further showing if defendant never received service of process holding that to obtain relief under rule 60b1 on grounds of excusable neglect the movant must also demonstrate prima facie evidence of a meritorious defense holding that misplacing the notice of an appealable order was not excusable neglect