pedestrian struck by an automobile, where the proof is sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that under the circumstances of the injury the conduct of the driver of the machine was so reckless, wanton, and willful, as to show an utter disregard for the safety of pedestrians, a conviction for manslaughter will be warranted; but an injury caused by mere negligence, not amounting to a reckless, willful and wanton disregard of consequences, cannot be made the basis of a criminal action. Id. at 428, 70 P.2d at 757. Similarly, in State v. Sisneros, we held that the involuntary manslaughter statute “contemplates criminal negligence.” 42 N.M. 500, 510, 82 P.2d 274, 280 (1938). The defendant in Sisneros had accidentally killed two men as they were pumping air into the tire of a ) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 157 Mass. 551, 32
holding that the general assembly intended to preserve the common law requirement of recklessness in  involuntary manslaughter because only then is the legislative scheme of sanctions commensurate to culpability carried forward recognizing the power of the general assembly to enact statutes bearing on the introduction of evidence holding to read words and concepts into our statutes that the general assembly did not write shows disrespect both for the general assembly and the common law which the legislature has the power expressly to displace holding that the general assembly intended to provide the tax collecting authorities with alternative methods for collecting taxes holding that when selfdefense is carried out with excessive force a defendant would be guilty of manslaughter