time, and ... that is often the case in prosecutions involving an aiding and abetting theory and in prosecutions involving a conspiracy charge.” Trial Tr. at 7511 (July 22, 2009) (citing O’Malley, Grenig & Lee, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions § 19.07, at 881 (5th ed. 2000)). Case law overwhelmingly supports the principle that an alibi instruction is not appropriate where defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime is not necessary to support conviction. United States v. Thomas, 34 F.3d 44, 50 (2d Cir.1994) (affirming refusal to give alibi instruction where the “evidence fully justified [defendant’s] conviction on the accomplice or conspiracy theory, regardless of whether he was [at the scene of the crime]”); United States v. Agofsky, 20 F.3d 866, 871-71 (8th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Anderson, 654 F.2d 1264,
recognizing aiding and abetting trespass recognizing both aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duties and aiding and abetting conversion recognizing aiding and abetting conversion holding that an alibi instruction would not have been appropriate where the government offered both direct participation and accessory theories explaining that a conviction may be based on aiding and abetting even if defendants offered persuasive alibis holding there was no error in giving an instruction on aiding and abetting when defendant was not charged with aiding and abetting because ajiders and abettors  are chargeable directly as principals