would have been found. Dissenting Op. at 307-08. But we cannot conduct “our own independent inquiry into whether the state court was correct as a de novo matter.” Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 665, 124 S.Ct. 2140. And the dissent’s contention that “Congress enacted a broad preemption clause in § 453(a),” Dissenting Op. at 308, is directly contradicted by the Michigan Court of Appeals’ citation to Thorn-burgh, in which the Fifth Circuit concluded that the FECA’s preemption clause has been given “narrow preemptive effect.” Thornburgh, 39 F.3d at 1280. The dissent’s apparent disagreement with Thorn-burgh’s interpretation of the FECA’s preemption clause is precisely the type of fair-minded disagreement that precludes a grant of habeas relief. See Knowles, 556 U.S. at 123, 129 S.Ct. 1411 (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted). In
holding that the appropriate inquiry under aedpa is not whether a federal court believes a state courts determination  was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonablea substantially higher threshold holding that determination of whether an official was acting on behalf of the state or the local government is determined by state law holding that the relevant inquiry is not whether the court has discretion to facilitate notice but whether this is an appropriate case in which to exercise discretion recognizing that the necessary inquiry  is not whether there was a warrant or whether there was time to get one but whether there was probable cause for the arrest holding that courts may decline to make a constitutional determination at the first stage of the qualified immunity inquiry where that determination would be based on an interpretation of uncertain state law