on cross-examination does not violate the Confrontation Clause unless it limits relevant testimony and prejudices the defendant, and denies the jury sufficient information to appraise the biases and motivations of the witness.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Walizer’s anticipated line of questioning would not have elicited from Godwin any admissible testimony about other law enforcement agencies’ assessments of God-win’s investigation, the issue Walizer argues the district court unconstitutionally prevented him from exploring. Second, given the length, scope, and explicit nature of Walizer’s communication with Aleda, specifically his graphic descriptions of his desired sexual contact with her, the detailed nature of his planning (e.g. , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (<HOLDING>). We therefore vacate Walizer’s conviction on
holding that due process clause of fourteenth amendment protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime for which he is charged holding that conviction of a crime requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime holding that other than the fact of a prior conviction any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt holding that the due process clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged holding that the due process clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged