sentence and that of her co-conspirators was unwarranted, and asserts this point of error for two reasons: “(1) to preserve the issue in the event the Supreme Court decides that under facts similar to those in this case the disparity is not warranted; and (2) ... because of the timing of her arrest and her inclusion in the case as a defendant, she was not presented with any opportunity to provide substantial assistance and therefore was not similarly situated to the co-conspirators who testified against her.” Perez was sentenced to 292 months’ imprisonment, while her co-conspirators (other than Fonceca) were sentenced to significantly lower sentences due to their assistance to the government in prosecuting this case. We rejected an argument similar to Perez’s in Duhon, 440 F.3d at 720 (<HOLDING>). Duhon noted that district courts should
holding it was reasonable trial strategy for counsel to have determined that sentencing by the court was preferable to sentencing by a jury holding that sentencing disparity produced by substantial assistance departures was intended by congress and is thus not a proper sentencing consideration under section 3553a6 holding that the district courts failure to give consideration to the sentencing disparity that would result was another reason the defendants sentence was unreasonable holding that sentencing enhancements and sentencing departures are not synonymous and that a waiver for upward departures imposed by the court does not permit the challenging of sentence enhancements holding that sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine is constitutional