intoxication in the context of temporary insanity as implicitly foreclosing the consideration of lesser forms of intoxication. In other words, we cannot say that it is reasonably likely that the jury, instructed to consider “evidence of temporary insanity caused by intoxication,” would interpret this instruction as meaning that it “could consider evidence of intoxication only if it produces temporary insanity.” This variation on the canon of statutory interpretation expressio unius — mentioning one thing implies the exclusion of another — is particularly inapt where the implication of exclusion flies in the face of an affirmative direction not to exclude consideration of any evidence. Cf. Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 308, 110 S.Ct. 1078, 1084, 108 L.Ed.2d 255 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Although the Court in Boyde explicitly
recognizing the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance as a mitigating factor holding that specific mitigating factor providing for consideration of extreme disturbance substantial impairment or extreme duress did not foreclose jurys consideration of lesser degrees of disturbance impairment or duress because trial court made clear to the jury that list of statutory mitigating factors were merely items it could consider and trial court instructed jury that it could consider any other mitigating matter holding that a sentencer may not refuse to consider as a matter of law any relevant mitigating evidence holding that trial court must consider both statutory and nonstatutory mitigating factors holding that a trial court must not preclude the jury from considering any aspect of the defendants character or circumstances as a mitigating factor