9.007(c) “does not stay, supersede or otherwise inhibit the finality of the [divorce] decree, absent a supersedeas bond.” English, 44 S.W.3d at 106. Put another way, “neither the parties[’] [compliance] nor the ministerial act of execution of the judgment are proscribed.” Id.; accord In re Fischer-Stoker, 174 S.W.3d at 272; see Tex.R. Civ. P. 621 (“The judgments of the district, county, and justice courts shall be enforced by execution or other appropriate process.”); Tex.R. Civ. P. 622 (“An execution is a process of the court from which it is issued.”). Prohibited orders “assisting] in the implementation of’ the decree’s property division encompass orders to enforce the property division that go beyond the ministerial act of execution. See In re Fischer-Stoker, 174 S.W.3d at 272 (<HOLDING>). A turnover order is a species of
holding that substance of motion to extend time was a section 1301f motion rather than a section 1301g motion and that trial court did not abuse discretion in denying the section 1301f motion holding that plaintiffs who sought injunctive relief under 42 usc  1983 could get same relief in a state court mandamus action holding iiriras preclusion of application for relief constitutes a new disability and is impermissibly retroactive holding that postdecree contempt motion impermissibly sought kind of enforcement relief that section 9007c prohibited holding that the eleventh amendment applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought