Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 1413, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977). For citizens who are not in the custody of the slate, however, this right does not include the right to state protection from private violence. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Services, 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989). The "state created danger” cases based upon this right to personal security do not recognize a right that is implicated here because they do not involve situations where the risk created is justified by the state’s pursuit of a legitimate public interest. See, e.g., Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir.1989). 26 . Compare Tony L. v. Childers, 71 F.3d 1182 (6th Cir.1995), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 1834, 134 L.Ed.2d 938 (1996) (<HOLDING>). 27 . While it is clear that deprivation of a
recognizing that warrantless arrests with probable cause do not give rise to  1983 claims holding that state statutes which merely establish procedures and do not mandate any particular substantive result do not give rise to a statecreated liberty interest holding that texas parole statutes do not create a protected liberty interest under an older statutory scheme recognizing that nevada statutes do  not confer a legitimate expectation of parole release and therefore do  not create a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest sufficient to invoke due process holding that a prison grievance procedure is not a substantive right and does not give rise to a protected liberty interest requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the fourteenth amendment