statements were improperly entered into evidence. The statements the IJ relied upon were based in large part on personal knowledge. Even accepting the petitioner’s argument that some of the statements amounted to hearsay, hearsay is admissible in removal proceedings, so this argument does not require further discussion. See Ogbolumani v. Napolitano, 557 F.3d 729, 734 (7th Cir.2009). She also disputes credibility determinations the IJ made in favor of the government’s witnesses, even though specific reasons were given for making such determinations and many were supported by documentary evidence in the record. Since we defer to credibility determinations made below, this argument similarly merits no further discussion. See Shmyhelskyy v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 474, 479 (7th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); Capric v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1075, 1086 (7th
holding that cjredibility determinations the weighing of the evidence and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are  not functions of a judge  ruling on a motion for summary judgment   holding that credibility determinations are reviewed only for substantial evidence holding that cjredibility determinations are questions of fact and should only be overturned in extraordinary circumstances holding that credibility determinations are for the jury holding that issues of discriminatory intent and actual motivation are questions of fact for the trier of fact