area of successor liability — especially since state law will in many other instances determine whom the EPA may or may not look to for compensation. See, e.g., Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co., 817 F.2d 1448, 1451 (9th Cir.1987)(California law determines capacity of a dissolved corporation to be sued); Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1458-60 (state law determines validity of' contractual releases of CERCLA liability). If state law varied widely on the issue of successor liability, perhaps the need for a uniform federal rule would be more apparent. This is not the case, however, as “the law in the fifty states on corporate dissolution and successor liability is largely uniform.” Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1249 (6th Cir.1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (<HOLDING>). The argued “need” for uniformity thus stems
holding that state law determines successor liability under cercla holding that  successor liability is not a tort it is an equitable tool used to transfer liability from a predecessor to a successor  quotation omitted holding that apportionment of cercla liability is  a matter of federal common law holding  substantial continuity is untenable as a basis for successor liability under cercla holding that state law governs application of successor liability to cercla defendants