These cases, and others often cited toward the same end, may not really recognize a mandatory inference (or presumption) of bad faith upon the existence of a debt-and-asset structure of certain characteristics. The court in Phoenix Piccadilly, for instance, made much of the debtor’s deliberate choice to venue the case in a judicial district far from the location of its asset and the business places of its creditors. 849 F.2d at 1395. See also In re Mill Place Ltd. Partnership, 94 B.R. 139, 141-142 (Bankr.D.Minn.1988). In any event, Phoenix Piccadilly is not binding precedent in this Circuit. Further, though it recently had an opportunity to adopt such a per se approach, the Eighth Circuit did not. See In re Lumber Exchange Bldg. Ltd. Partnership, 968 F.2d 647, 650 (8th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Under the general structure and specific
recognizing the distinction between the reorganized debtor and the converted debtor and holding an asset which was not property of the original chapter 11 estate does not become property of the converted chapter 7 estate holding that a bankruptcy courts decision to convert or dismiss a chapter 11 case is a matter within its discretion holding that a bankruptcy court is given wide discretion to convert a chapter 11 case to chapter 7 for cause and an order for conversion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion holding that since property of the chapter 7 estate relates back to what was property of the bankruptcy estate when the chapter 13 was commenced and since the debtor still has the vehicle in his possession the present equity in the vehicle does not belong to the chapter 7 trustee or to unsecured creditors of this estate holding that bankruptcy courts implicit conclusion that debtor real estate partnership did not belong in chapter 11 because its ease was substantially a single liability case was not an abuse of discretion