relevant information regarding conditions in the country of deportation. Matter of G-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 367-68 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3)); see also Mostafa, 395 F.3d at 625. Wright argues that the BIA erred in determining that he has not demonstrated his entitlement to relief under the Convention Against Torture. Before we may address Wright’s claim for relief, however, we must first ascertain whether his claim is reviewable at all. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 strips courts of “jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed” a wide variety of listed predicate offenses. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C); see also Ventura-Reyes v. Lynch, 797 F.3d 348, 356-58 (6th Cir. 2015) (<HOLDING>). Wright concedes that he is removable because
holding that the jurisdictional bar applies as long as an alien is removable regardless of whether the predicate offense was the reason for removal holding that a conviction and sentence for a predicate offense that is entered after the commission of the current offense does not qualify as a prior felony within the meaning of the sexual predator statute recognizing burden is on alien when alien is removable holding that the requirement that an alien appeal a removal order within 30 days is jurisdictional holding that a domestic relationship must exist as part of the facts giving rise to the predicate offense but it need not be an element of the prior offense