is complied with or not.”); see also The T.J. Hooper v. N. Barge Corp., 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir.1932) (“[I]n most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is never its measure.”). However, when a defendant has departed from rules of its own making governing the conduct of its employees, a plaintiff may thereby demonstrate breach of an appropriate standard of care. Thropp v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 650 F.2d 817, 820 (6th Cir.1980) (“When a defendant has disregarded rules that it has established to govern the conduct of its own employees, evidence of those rules may be used against the defendant to establish the correct standard of care.”); Babcock v. Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co., 83 Ill. App.3d 919, 38 Ill.Dec. 841, 404 N.E.2d 265, 275 (1979) (<HOLDING>); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on
holding that standard of care need not be listed separately in report when same standard applies to each health care provider holding defendants rules which constitute guidelines for the operation of its trains can be used as evidence of defendants standard of care holding violation of the rules of professional conduct does not create a legal duty on the part of the lawyer nor constitute negligence per se although it may be used as some evidence of negligence holding disciplinary rules can provide guidelines relevant to a disqualification determination recognizing that a defendant physicians own practice was at least some evidence of the standard of care and concluding that the case was properly submitted to the jury notwithstanding the plaintiffs failure to call an independent expert on the standard of care