states to provide worker compensation protection to maritime workers. See, e.g., Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 44 S.Ct. 302, 68 L.Ed. 646 (1924); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 40 S.Ct. 438, 64 L.Ed. 834 (1920); Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 37 S.Ct. 524, 61 L.Ed. 1086 (1917). The Act created a worker compensation Scheme that provided coverage to injured employees with out regard to employer liability, see 33 U.S.C. § 904, but that also was apparently intended to be an exclusive remedy, see 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (1988) (stating that “[t]he liability of an employer prescribed in section 904 of this title shall be exclusive”). But see Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 530-31, 103 S.Ct. 2541, 2546, 76 L.Ed.2d 768 (1983) (<HOLDING>). In 1972, Congress substantially amended the
holding that an employer who commits an intentional tort against his employee cannot claim that the act was accidental so that workers compensation is the employees exclusive remedy holding that title vii did not provide exclusive remedy for sex discrimination in public employment claim could also be brought under equal protection clause holding that glc 152 15 provides that the only party immune from suit under the statute is the direct employer a special employer is not immune because the special employer is not liable for the payment of workers compensation and there was no agreement between the direct employer and the special employer that the special employer would be liable for the payment of such compensation holding that under 1972 amendments  904 worker compensation is not exclusive remedy under lhwca where employer also happens to be vesselowner holding that once the workers compensation act provides a remedy it is exclusive and the employee has no right to bring an action in commonlaw negligence against his employer