defer to 8 C.F.R. § 336.9(d)’s interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c) as imposing a jurisdictional limitation on judicial review. We previously rejected the attempt of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA”) to restrict its own jurisdiction in light of Arbaugh and its progeny. Pruidze v. Holder, 632 F.3d 234, 238 (6th Cir.2011). There we held that the Attorney General's interpretation of a regulation — an interpretation that restricted the BIA's jurisdiction to hear an alien's motion to reopen removal proceedings if the alien was abroad' — "cannot clear the first step of Chevron because the [Supreme] Court has drawn a line between mandatory rules and claim-processing rules on the one side and jurisdictional ones on the other.” Id. at 240; see Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (<HOLDING>). We noted that Congress granted the BIA power
recognizing the preliminary issue in a first amendment challenge is whether the speech at issue is protected or unprotected holding that a court must first determine whether the intent of congress is clear or instead the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue holding with respect to another part of the plra that the court must determine the prisoners status on the date the suit or appeal is brought rather than at some other time holding that to violate a specific intent statute the defendant must act with the purpose of violating the law holding that where congressional intent is clear a court must give effect to such intent