been presented, no witnesses had testified, and in fact, the jury had not even been sworn. 27 . Wyche renewed this objection for a fourth time in a subsequent motion for new trial, which the trial court denied on December 1, 2003. 28 . Cases that do not follow the general predictive parameters of the intrinsic-versus-extrinsic framework are either distinguishable based on the totality of circumstances or, in my opinion, were incorrectly decided. See, e.g., United States v. Andrews, 746 F.2d 247, 247-48 (5th Cir.1984) (defendant, felon-in-possession, volunteered his status as a gun owner before the police ever mentioned to him that he was a suspect in a fabricated burglary investigation; further, defendant was not in custody)', People v. Zamora, 940 P.2d 939, 941-44 (Colo.Ct.App.1996) (<HOLDING>). However, at a minimum, Zamora is
holding that defendants consent to search his person while on board an interstate bus was voluntary even though the police did not tell the defendant of his right to refuse consent holding consent not voluntary where police threatened to arrest defendants girlfriend if he refused to sign consent form holding  incorrectly in my opinion  that consent was voluntary where police used extrinsic fabrication to gain admittance to defendants apartment holding that warrantless search of defendants vehicle was legal because defendants consent was voluntary even through he was in police custody at the time of giving consent holding that defendants voluntary consent to search his apartment dissipated taint of prior illegal search