“must be construed in its entirety and as a whole,” see Koile v. State, 934 So.2d 1226, 1233 (Fla.2006) (quoting St. Mary’s Hosp., Inc. v. Phillipe, 769 So.2d 961, 967 (Fla.2000)), and in such manner that it does not “render part of [the] statute meaningless.” Id. (quoting Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452, 456 (Fla.1992)). To this end, “sexual intercourse” must be read in the context of not only section 384.24, but also in the context of Chapter 384 as a whole. See Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 986 So.2d at 1265-66; Miele v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 656 So.2d 470, 472 (Fla.1995) (“[T]he context in which a term is used may be referred to in ascertaining the meaning of that term.”); Ceco Corp. v. Goldberg, 219 So.2d 475, 476-77 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969) (<HOLDING>). Chapter 384, of which section 384.24(2) is a
holding that claim construction is a matter of law for the court to determine recognizing that our task as a reviewing court is to afford a logical construction according to the general terms and intentions of the entire  act and that it is axiomatic that we construe the statute as a whole entity  in order to arrive at a construction which avoids illogical results recognizing rule of statutory construction that statutes must be read as a whole and sections which are part of the same general statutory scheme must be construed together and each given effect if it can be done by any reasonable construction recognizing this rule but concluded that the statute in that case was incapable of a narrower construction because there is no logical way to read a specific intent element into the statute as it is currently written holding that if precise issue is not clear in statute reviewing court must not simply impose its own construction but must determine whether agencys construction is permissible