or its consequences in place. Similarly where, as here, the last reasoned opinion on the claim explicitly imposes a procedural default, we will presume that a later decision rejecting the claim did not silently disregard that bar and consider the merits. — U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 2594 (first emphasis in original). We are not persuaded that the state trial court’s summary rejection of the motion to set aside the verdict constituted the sort of “reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim” that will suffice to raise a presumption that a subsequent silent affir- manee does not rest on procedural default. The trial judge gave no indication that he was reckoning with the requirements 552 N.E.2d 877 (N.Y.1990); People v. Harris, 151 A.D.2d 961, 542 N.Y.S.2d 411, 411 (N.Y.App.Div.1989) (<HOLDING>); People v. Ortiz, 69 A.D.2d 825, 825, 414
holding batson claim untimely because it was not made before the jury or the last juror including the alternates is sworn but remanding for new trial in interests of justice holding batson challenge untimely because objection made after all jurors were sworn holding the interests of justice would not be served by remanding for new trial on the offense of seconddegree murder holding that a batson challenge is not timely if the jury has been sworn and the venire dismissed and observing that sjeveral jurisdictions have closely analyzed batsons language and concluded that the us supreme court envisioned that a batson challenge must be made before the jury is sworn while citing numerous state decisions barring batson objections after the jury is sworn and the venire is dismissed holding on rehearing that the interests of justice would be better served by remanding for new trial on the offenses of seconddegree murder and voluntary manslaughter