multiple punishments are authorized in this case, the list of nonexclusive factors set out by this Court in Ex parte Ervin v. State, 991 S.W.2d 804, 814 (Tex.Crim.App.1999), should be considered. Addressing the gravamen-of-the-offense factor in Ervin, the State asserts that the focus of the indecency with a child statute is the prohibited conduct, which shows that the Legislature intended for the State to be able to punish a criminal defendant multiple times. To support its argument, the State cites three related cases. See Gonzales, 304 S.W.3d at 848 (“[I]f the focus of the offense is the conduct — that is, the offense is a ‘nature of conduct’ crime— then different types of conduct are considered to be different offenses.”); Pizzo v. State, 235 S.W.3d 711, 717 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (<HOLDING>); see also Vick v. State, 991 S.W.2d 830,
holding that indecency with a child by contact is lesserincluded offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child because even though the latter offense did not include intent as an express element lascivious intent was implicitly included holding indecency instructions sufficient to determine indecent acts with a child holding that employees deferred adjudication for indecency with child could make sexual assault of customer foreseeable when sales were made in customers homes holding in a juryunanimity case that indecency with a child by contact is a conductoriented offense holding extraneous acts of touching of complainant and her friend were admissible in indecency with a child prosecution because defendants charged conduct was as consistent with accident as with a specific lascivious intent