1145, 1151 (C.D.Cal.1999) (“The language of Section 3621(e)(2)(B) has not been amended since Downey was decided and it remains plain and clear; the BOP may not use a sentence enhancement to conclude that a prisoner has not been convicted of a nonviolent offense.”); Kilpatrick v. Houston, 36 F.Supp.2d 1328, 1330 (N.D.Fla.1999) (BOP regulation that automatically excludes from eligibility any prisoner whose offense “involved the carrying, possession, or use of a firearm” is invalid). Guido v. Booker, 37 F.Supp.2d 1289, 1300-1302 (D.Kan. 1999) (“This Court is compelled by the rationale in Fristoe to find that the BOP has improperly denied early release to petitioner under P.S. 5162.04 on the sole basis of sentence enhancements.”); Hicks v. Brooks, 28 F.Supp.2d 1268, 1273 (D.Colo.1998) (<HOLDING>); Gavis v. Crabtree, 28 F.Supp.2d 1264, 1267
holding that sentencing enhancements and sentencing departures are not synonymous and that a waiver for upward departures imposed by the court does not permit the challenging of sentence enhancements holding that the newly amended  15188 allows a trial judge to suspend a sentence imposed upon application of the schoolhousing enhancements despite the prohibition against probation in  13a12250 and 13a12270 holding that court cannot order restitution under the mvra to persons who are not victims of the offenses for which the defendant was convicted holding that when the relevant criminal statute encompasses both violent and nonviolent felonies a sentencing court may go beyond the statutory language holding that the revised regulation allows the bop to categorically exclude prisoners who are convicted of nonviolent offenses based upon sentence enhancements in violation of the unambiguous statutory language