more is required than simply the notion that a collision is likely to happen there if someone does not follow the rules. Certainly, a roadway may be negligently designed in such a way as to be dangerous when the condition itself significantly aggravates the common dangers of vehicle operation which would already be present. Jemes v. Highway Comm’n, 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. banc 1977); Linton v. Missouri Hwy. & Transp. Comm’n, 980 S.W.2d 4 (Mo.App.1998). Even a downed stop sign might create a dangerous condition where, for instance, the cross street might be designed without a stop sign or other control and, given other factors such as visibility, the downed stop sign could cause the intersection to be a dangerous condition. See Donahue v. City of St. Louis, 758 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. banc 1988) (<HOLDING>). The court in Logan v. Phillips, 896 S.W.2d 38
holding that courts look to substance of plea for relief to determine nature of pleading not merely title of pleading recognizing by citing several cases that diametric opposing lines of case law authority exist with one line suggesting that information need not allege each element of offense charged because notice pleading is sufficient distinguishing pleading elements from pleading facts holding claim of downed stop sign sufficient for pleading purposes holding a pleading will not be sufficient to state a claim under the civil rights act if the allegations are mere conclusions holding that financial gain from compensation for professional services is not a sufficient motive for purposes of pleading scienter