of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result. Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(b) (2001). This interpretation is also consistent with interpretations of similar statutes. Delaware, Missouri, and New York appear to be the only states with child-endangerment statutes that employ the “knowingly acts” language. The courts of these states have interpreted the statutes as requiring the prosecution to prove that the defendant at least knew the facts and circumstances that created the risk. See State v. Lynch, No. 9911009756, 2000 WL 33115707, at *3 (Del.Super.Ct. Oct. 13, 2000) (unpublished opinion) (stating that the State must show that defendant “knowingly endangered” the child’s welfare); State v. Mullins, 140 S.W.3d 64, 72 (Mo.Ct.App.2004) (<HOLDING>); People v. Pelt, 157 Misc.2d 90, 596 N.Y.S.2d
holding that under missouris statute the prosecution must prove that the defendant knew her acts put the child in a position of substantial risk holding that the government did not have to prove that the defendant knew that his acts violated the clean water act but merely that he was aware of the conduct that resulted in the permits violation holding that the government must prove the defendant knew of the features of the firearm that brought it within the scope of the act holding that under iowa code  7098 the offense of lascivious acts with a child was a crime of violence because it involved a substantial risk that physical force would be used against the child victim in the course of committing the offense holding that when an indictment charges several acts conjunctively under a statute which subjects several alternative acts to the same punishment the government need only prove violation of one of the alleged acts to prove violation of the statute