any constitutional violation. Public officials are generally granted qualified immunity from lawsuits based on reasonable discretionary acts taken in carrying out their official duties. Because of the need to protect constitutional rights while also avoiding a chilling effect on the conduct of these officers, qualified immunity balances “[t]he public interest in deterrence of unlawful conduct and in compensation of victims,” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), with the public interest in having officials act “with independence and without fear of consequences,” id. (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967)); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (<HOLDING>). “[Wjhether an individual official protected
holding officials in their individual capacities may  be able to assert personal immunity defenses including qualified immunity that are not available in officialcapacity suits holding suits against state officials for prospective injunctive relief are permissible because they are in effect suits against the officials in their individual capacities holding suits against state officials for monetary damages impermissible where the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state rather than against the officer in his individual capacity recognizing that permitting damages suits against government officials can entail substantial social costs including the risk that fear of personal monetary liability and harassing litigation will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties holding that officials in their individual capacities may  be able to assert personal immunity defenses including qualified immunity that are not available in officialcapacity suits