with respondent and applied the “cause and prejudice” test to determine whether Collier’s failure to follow the applicable state procedural rules precluded his claim. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-87, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 2506, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977) (applying the rule from Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 96 S.Ct. 1708, 48 L.Ed.2d 149 (1976), which established that petitioners who raise claims in federal habeas corpus petitions that are barred by state doctrines of procedural waiver must establish “cause” and “prejudice” for their failure to raise the claims in state court). The court held that Collier had demonstrated sufficient cause by the fact that he was represented on his first state habeas petition by trial counsel. See Stephens v. Kemp, 846 F.2d 642, 651 (11th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). The court then evaluated Collier’s claim on
holding that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel could not be resolved by the facts in the record and must be pursued in an action for habeas corpus holding that petitioner who did not raise the methamphetaminetype issue at sentencing or on direct appeal was barred from raising that issue for the first time in  2255 motion and that petitioner did not satisfy either the performance prong or prejudice prong of ineffective assistance of counsel standard holding that a habeas corpus petitioner who did not raise an ineffective assistance claim in his first state habeas petition satisfied the cause prong of the cause and prejudice test when counsel on the first state habeas petition was also trial counsel whose performance was allegedly inadequate holding that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel could not be resolved on the facts appearing in the record and that under such circumstances the defendants remedy is to file a petition for habeas corpus holding that active jurisdiction arose when the petitioner was detained for purposes of habeas corpus when the petition was filed