is odorless. See United States v. Cruz-Roman, 312 F.Supp.2d 1855, 1358 (W.D.Wash.2004) (finding that because cocaine in its pure form is odorless, investigating officers could not have smelled cocaine outside of a hotel room). This fact has led some courts to conclude that a claimed cocaine odor cannot support a probable cause determination. See, eg., id. at 1863. However, although cocaine in its pure form does not produce a detectable odor when heated or burned, because crack cocaine is mixed with other substances that may give off odors when burned, we conclude that an officer's detection of a distinctive odor associated with impure cocaine may be sufficient to support a probable cause determination. Seq, eg., United States v. Benevento, 649 F.Supp. 1379, 1386-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (<HOLDING>), rev'd in part on other grounds by 836 F.2d 60
holding that a reasonable jury could have concluded based on repeated references to the substance as cocaine and testimony from witnesses who had used the substances which they believed to be cocaine that substance was cocaine holding officer had probable cause after detecting an odor associated with cocaine because of officers experience from prior cocaine seizures holding officer developed probable cause for a search based on his immediate perception of an odor associated with methamphetamine production holding that district court did not err in determining that cocaine base was crack cocaine based on chemical analysis identifying cocaine base together with competent lay testimony bridging the evidentiary gap between cocaine base and crack cocaine and refusing to require showing of smokeability ie water solubility or melting point for purposes of establishing crack cocaine under the guidelines since smokeability distinguishes cocaine base from powder cocaine not from crack holding that because of officers experience detection of the smell of cocaine smoke reliably supported a probable cause determination