not credible when articulating how his court-appointed attorney was deficient. Absent clear and convincing evidence that Rhodes was in fact credible, we must defer to the trial court’s credibility determination. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). We find that Rhodes has not satisfied his burden of rebutting the trial court’s credibility determination, and we therefore conclude that the trial court’s Marsden rulings were not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). After the trial court denied his third Marsden motion, Rhodes elected to proceed pro per. We hold that Rhodes’s waiver of his right to counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (<HOLDING>). The trial court repeatedly warned Rhodes of
holding a waiver of a substantial constitutional right must be a voluntary knowing and intelligent act recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel and the right to waive counsel holding that under the sixth amendment a criminal defendant may waive his right to counsel if that waiver is knowing intelligent and voluntary recognizing requirement of knowing intelligent waiver holding that a criminal defendant has a sixth amendment right to counsel at trial