culverts created a private nuisance for which it is liable without regard to the plaintiffs comparative negligence. We conclude, on the basis of the jurors’ answers to the special questions, that LWSC’s actions did not create an actionable private nuisance and that LWSC was therefore not liable under a private nuisance theory. In Massachusetts, liability for a private nuisance caused by the flow of surface waters from a landowner’s property to that of an adjoining landowner depends on whether the landowner is making a reasonable use of his land. See Tucker v. Badoian, 376 Mass. 907, 916-917 (1978) (Kaplan, J., concurring) (announcing intention to replace rigid and anarchic “common enemy” rule with reasonable use doctrine). See also yon Henneberg v. Generazio, 403 Mass. 519, 522 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Triangle Ctr., Inc. v. Department of Pub.
recognizing doctrine holding that the tucker acts waiver does not extend to statutory claims holding that the tucker acts waiver of sovereign immunity for contract claims does not extend to claims for contracts implied in law holding that the iccta preempted statelaw nuisance claim with regard to railway traffic recognizing that since tucker supra reasonable use doctrine is law of massachusetts with regard to claims of private nuisance resulting from the flow of surface water