that a jury would be unlikely to accept an insanity defense. Under these circumstances, Zorbaugh’s decision, unlike the dereliction of the defense attorney in Gray, can be said to be a “strategic choice against pursuing a certain line of investigation,” because Zorbaugh was already in possession of “the facts on which such a decision could be made.” Gray, 878 F.2d at 711. Cf. Jones v. Page, 76 F.3d 831, 843 (7th Cir.1996) (“[i]f it is reasonable in the circumstances not to conduct a particular investigation, [a] lawyer’s failure to do so will not establish ineffective representation”) (quoting Earl v. Israel, 765 F.2d 91, 93 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 951, 106 S.Ct. 350, 88 L.Ed.2d 300 (1985)) (emendations in original); Crisp v. Duckworth, 743 F.2d 580, 583 (7th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1226, 105 S.Ct. 1221,
holding that there is no constitutional duty to do a better investigation and that a decision not to conduct a more thorough investigation does not invade an accuseds rights holding abuse of discretion is the proper standard for reviewing award of attorney fees in patent cases although questions of law may in some cases be relevant recognizing that miranda warnings are unnecessary for the investigation of routine traffic offenses recognizing that there may be unusual cases when an attorney can make a rational decision that investigation is unnecessary holding that motions for summary judgment in patent cases must be considered with unusual caution