the vulnerability of an individual to danger does not, under DeShaney, give rise to a due process violation. Id. at 430-31. The law flowing from these cases applies squarely to the § 1983 claim in the case at bar. To synthesize the two defects noted above, it can be remarked that in order for Kennerly to be able to maintain her cause of action, the allegations would have to suggest, expressly or inferentially, that the County took an affirmative act, placing the life of Byron Kennerly, specifically, in danger. The allegations would have to permit the inference to be drawn that the County’s affirmative act was directed toward Byron Kennerly, specifically; not toward the public, and not toward Peter Atakpu’s neighbors as a group. See, e.g., Davis v. Brady, 143 F.3d 1021 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093, 119 S.Ct. 851,
holding that where both liability and damages depend on individual factual determinations claims may only be determined on individual basis holding that where officers order an individual under threat of arrest into the car of her obviously inebriated boyfriend and shortly thereafter she is killed when her boyfriend wrecks his car on an interstate highway a  1983 claim can be pursued against the state on a statecreateddanger theory of liability holding that individual liability under  1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation holding that a civil rights plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under fmla against individual individual is not employer subject to liability under the act holding that where officers release an inebriated individual from custody on a dark busy highway against his will and the individual is subsequently struck by a car a  1983 claim can be pursued against the state on a statecreateddanger theory of liability