530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), that was in his original § 2255 motion; (2) the criminal judgment was void because it violated the Due Process Clause and the Ex Post Facto Clause and thus resulted in an illegal sentence; and (3) if the district court could not hear his claims, then the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s. (AEDPA) limitations on second or successive § 2255 motions were unconstitutional. The district court held that the first two claims actually were substantive attacks on the criminal judgment, and therefore they were unauthorized second or successive § 2255 claims. It dismissed them for lack of jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (limiting second or successive motions); In re Cline, 531 F.3d 1249, 1251 (10th Cir.2008) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). In contrast, the district court held that the
holding premagwood that where a first  2255 motion was granted so movant could file a direct appeal the second  2255 motion was not a successive motion under aedpa holding that district court has no jurisdiction to decide unauthorized second or successive  2255 claims recognizing that   2241 is not available under the inadequateorineffectiveremedy escape hatch of  2255 merely because the court of appeals refuses to certify a second or successive motion under the gatekeeping provisions of  2255 holding that a district court lacks jurisdiction to review a second or successive  2255 motion where the movant failed to obtain authorization to file the motion from this court holding that motion for reconsideration would be construed not as a rule 60b motion but rather as an unauthorized successive motion under  2255 which the district court may have been without jurisdiction to consider