different circumstances, constitute deficient representation. Under other circumstances, it might be reasonable trial strategy for counsel to indicate sympathy for a prosecution witness, elicit forensic evidence the state had not sought to present, or adopt a tough stance with one’s client. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (“No particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel ... ”). In cases in which we have found such actions or omissions were not deficient, however, the circumstances revealed that those actions or omissions were part of identifiably reasonable trial strategies calculated to benefit the defendant in some way. See, e.g., Hale v. Gibson, 227 F.3d at 1323 (<HOLDING>); Fowler v. Ward, 200 F.3d 1302, 1310-11 (10th
holding that reconsideration may not be based on evidence and legal arguments that could have been presented at the time of the challenged decision holding that any error that court may have made in admitting inadmissible evidence was harmless because government presented overwhelming evidence establishing defendants guilt holding that though the government may have failed to disclose exculpatory testimony in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendants involvement in narcotics sales there was no reasonable probability that a defense based upon that testimony would have been successful holding that performance of counsel whose first involvement with the case came on the morning of trial constituted ineffective assistance holding counsel made reasonable strategic decision to concede some involvement by defendant given the overwhelming evidence presented at trial and focused on the extent of his involvement and whether others could have been involved