at 134. This is the standard set forth in RCW 51.52.112. On appeal, Probst contends that the superior court erred when it found that he must adhere to this standard. He contends that RCW 51.52.112 does not apply in his case. We disagree. ¶17 As an initial matter, it is a “well established rule that where statutes prescribe procedures for the reso lution of a particular type of dispute, state courts have required substantial compliance or satisfaction of the spirit of the procedural requirements before they will exercise jurisdiction over the matter.” James v. Kitsap County, 154 Wn.2d 574, 588, 115 P.3d 286 (2005) (citing Fisher Bros. Corp. v. Des Moines Sewer Dist., 97 Wn.2d 227, 230, 643 P.2d 436 (1982); Banner Realty, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 48 Wn. App. 274, 738 P.2d 279 (1987) (<HOLDING>)). Here, Probst admittedly failed to comply
holding that the superior court had no jurisdiction over the division of marital property when the district court had properly invoked jurisdiction over the property holding that the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related statelaw claims once it has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction holding that a superior court could not exercise its original jurisdiction under article iv section 6 over a challenge to a tax decision where the party failed to strictly or substantially comply with statutory procedural requirements holding a trial court lacks jurisdiction when a party fails to strictly comply with the statutes regarding service holding that because the plaintiffs did not strictly comply with the statutory provisions for sending ante litem notice the trial court had no subj ect matter jurisdiction over the suit punctuation omitted