district court’s statement that Carrera’s “criminal history up to [the commission of the 1997 offense] was violent.” The presentence investigation report (PSR) for the 1997 offense reported a prior criminal conviction of aggravated assault. See PSR, p. 8. There was no abuse of discretion in the sentencing court’s consideration of that criminal history or the violent nature of the car-jacking offense in determining the length of the revocation sentence. In imposing a consecutive sentence, the district court correctly stated that it was following the policy (rather than mandate) of the Sentencing Commission. See Sent. Tr., p. 13. There is no suggestion that the court misinterpreted the guidelines to require a consecutive sentence. Cf. United States v. Crudup, 375 F.3d 5, 8 (1st Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Carrera objected at the revocation sentencing
holding in assault and involun tary manslaughter case that district court has discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences based on finding of whether multiple counts involved the same harm holding that the federal constitutional right to a jury trial does not apply to decisions to impose consecutive sentences holding that the guidelines did not strip the sentencing court of its discretion to impose a concurrent sentence holding in agreement with fourth fifth seventh eighth ninth and eleventh circuits that courts general sentencing discretion under 18 usc  3584 authorizes district courts revoking supervised release to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences holding that 2003 amendment to ussg  5g13 worked a substantive change to that guideline by eneouraging district courts to impose consecutive sentences while at the same time permitting them  in the exercise of their sound discretion  to make the federal sentence concurrent