authorizing the use of force. Stewart’s complaint fails to meet this requirement. The adminisrators’ alleged policy of spraying prisoners with pepper spray for refusing to follow directions falls within the wide-ranging zone of deference accorded to prison officials in shaping “prophylactic or preventive measures intended to reduce the incidence of ... breaches of prison discipline.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 322, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986). Likewise, allegations that the administrators authorized corrections officers to dispense pepper spray across entire pod areas whenever an individual prisoner acts in a disruptive manner, and that they authorized the use of an “Israeli fogger” device, both fail to show that excessive force was used. Cf. Gomez, 298 F.3d at 903-04 (<HOLDING>). Deliberate Indifference. The district court
holding that excessive force claims are not subject to exhaustion requirement holding that two bursts of pepper spray to stop fighting in a cell was not considered excessive force and did not violate prisoners eighth amendment rights holding that the use of pepper spray on nonviolent protestors was excessive force holding that bystander prisoners who were exposed to pepper spray when prison officials dispensed spray across their pod area to break up a fight were not subjected to excessive force holding that otherwise acceptable use of pepper spray became excessive when arrestee was offering no further active resistance