to the extent it is considered a joinder, was improper, legally insufficient, and a nullity. Nevertheless, the designation given a pleading is not determinative; rather, the content of the pleading identifies its essential character. See Kelly v. Nix, 329 N.W.2d 287, 290 (Iowa 1983); Schulte v. Mauer, 219 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Iowa 1974). An examination of Neill's so-called joinder reveals that it is in all particulars a petition. It sets forth in separately numbered divisions three claims against Western Inns, including requests for compensatory and punitive damages. We think that before the district court dismissed Neill’s joinder, it should have considered the legal sufficiency of this pleading as a petition. Cf. Iowa Dep’t of Transp. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 534 N.W.2d 457, 459 (Iowa 1995) (<HOLDING>). Such an analysis is consistent with Iowa Rule
holding that the action of denying parole is not an adjudication subject to judicial review holding that because here the statutes in issue provide for judicial review via citizen suit provisions yet do not set forth a standard for that review judicial review is limited to apa review on the administrative record holding that where defendant erroneously filed a request for declaratory relief in criminal action rather than filing an independent action for judicial review we would evaluate sufficiency of pleading as a petition for judicial review holding that a party to an administrative proceeding failed to effectively obtain judicial review where the party filed a response to another partys petition rather than a separate petition holding that if defendant could establish ineffective assistance of counsel in failure to file petition for review in his direct appeal then appropriate remedy would be to allow filing of petition for review out of time