for a failure to act. 47 U.S.C.'§ 332(c)(7)(B)(v). 6 . The plain meaning of the language "final action” also is not ambiguous because to give the term "final action” any other meaning would create varying and inconsistent limitations periods in § 704(a). Parties could contend any number of actions, such as the oral pronouncement of the decision, was the "final action.” Creating such a lack of uniformity in the application of the 30-day statute of limitations is a result contrary to the language of the statute. 7 .In addition, even when an appeal is filed after the court announces a decision, but before the entry of the judgment, it is treated as being filed on the date of entry. Fed. R.App. P. 4(b)(2); see also Virgo v. Riviera Beach Assocs., Ltd., 30 F.3d 1350, 1356-57 (11th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). 8 . The TCA also fails to define what is
holding premature notice of appeal was treated as entered on date of entry of final judgment holding that a premature notice of appeal from an interlocutory summary judgment was deemed effective when the trial court granted a severance and rendered the summary judgment final holding that a notice of appeal is timely when filed before final judgment is entered by the district court holding that there was appellate jurisdiction under principle that a premature notice of appeal from a nonfinal order may ripen into a valid notice of appeal if a final judgment has been entered by the time the appeal is heard and the appellee suffers no prejudice holding that a notice of appeal that referred only to the final judgment was sufficient to support review of earlier orders including an order involved in an unsuccessful attempt to take a premature appeal