the postcard. As a factual matter, whether Mitchell proves that Hood made defamatory statements in the postcard does not govern Hood’s claims against Judge Anderson-Trahan. Hood’s claims against Judge Anderson-Trahan for putting Hood’s name on the postcard may succeed or fail in a scenario where Mitchell’s claims against Hood succeed or a scenario where Mitchell’s claims against Hood fail. Judge Anderson-Trahan is no more or less liable to Hood based upon Hood’s liability to Mitchell. Furthermore, Hood has not asserted that his claims against Judge Anderson-Trahan are derivative of Mitchell’s claims against Hood. Hood does not seek damages from Judge Anderson-Trahan contingent upon his liability on Mitchell’s claims. In fact, Hood specifically alleges that he has been harmed by Jud 0) (<HOLDING>) (alteration in original). Because we decide
holding that dismissal pursuant to federal rule of civil procedure 56 did not violate the seventh amendment holding that discovery under the federal rules of civil procedure is broad in scope and freely permitted holding that californias antislapp statute is applicable in federal court holding that maines antislapp statute could be applied in the district court because federal rules of civil procedure 12 and 56 are not so broad as to attempt  to answer the same question as the statute holding that the district of columbias antislapp law could not be applied in federal court in a diversity case because it conflicted with federal rules of civil procedure 12 and 56