The Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 SMU L.Rev. 297, 301-03 (1995). Indeed, the Court upheld Chaplinsky’s conviction only after concluding that his personal epithets (calling an officer a “God damned racketeer” and a “damned Fascist”) were “likely to provoke the average person to retaliation.” Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574, 62 S.Ct. 766. ¶ 16 Subsequent cases have not singled out profanity or verbal abuse as unprotected classes of speech. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971) (overturning conviction for disturbing the peace by wearing a jacket bearing the words “Fuck the Draft” in the corridors of a courthouse; expressions of particularized ideas, even through vulgar and offensive words, are protected); Gooding, 405 U.S. at 520, 92 S.Ct. 1103 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added and citations omitted);
holding that a prisoners right to hie grievances is constitutionally protected under the first and fourteenth amendments holding that it is not holding that the right of access to government information or sources of information within the governments control is not mandated by the first or fourteenth amendments holding that peaceful picketing is protected through the first and fourteenth amendments on the basis of five supreme court decisions examining the question holding that georgia statute punishing spoken words could survive constitutional scrutiny only if  it is not susceptible of application to speech although vulgar or offensive that is protected by the first and fourteenth amendments