injury. As the State has conceded, the appellant’s prior convictions do not qualify him to be designated as a sexual’ predator. The appellant’s kidnapping conviction does not qualify him for designation as a sexual predator because the victim was not a minor. See § 775.21(4)(a)1.a., Fla. Stat. (2010); Maceo v. State, 870 So.2d 852 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (conviction for life felony of armed kidnapping did not qualify him for classification as sexual predator where victim was not a minor). Additionally, the appellant’s three convictions for violating section 794.011(5), Florida Statutes (2010), do not qualify as they are second-degree felonies and he does not have any prior enumerated convictions. See § 775,21(4)(a)1.b., Fla. Stat. (2010); Lupianez v. State, 909 So.2d 600 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we reverse the denial of the
holding that when a criminal court still has jurisdiction over a defendant whose criminal record mandates the court to classify him as a sexual predator the criminal court may designate the defendant as a sexual predator even though the designation was overlooked at sentencing many years earlier holding that a conviction and sentence for a predicate offense that is entered after the commission of the current offense does not qualify as a prior felony within the meaning of the sexual predator statute holding that defendants auto theft conviction could serve to support his conviction for auto theft as a class c felony and as a prior unrelated felony conviction under the habitual offender statute holding that an offender who violates section 7940115 must have a prior enumerated conviction to qualify as a sexual predator holding that to constitute a prior conviction for purposes of the habitual felony offender act the defendant must have been adjudicated guilty before the present crime was committed