to federal court.” Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 413 F.3d at 907 (stating that § 1144(a) provides an affirmative defense against claims not completely preempted by ERISA). However, it would be grossly inaccurate to suggest that removal is foreclosed. Rather, if the claim falls under § 1132, it is completely preempted by federal law and thus removable. Neumann, 376 F.3d at 779-80. Plaintiff interprets the Court’s order to implement a two-part test, by which establishing preemption under § 1144 is an absolute prerequisite for complete preemption under § 1132. This, however, is incorrect. Finding a claim completely preempted under § 1132 is not dependent upon first finding express preemption under § 1144. See Harris v. Deaconess Health Servs. Corp., 61 F.Supp.2d 889, 893 (E.D.Mo.1999) (<HOLDING>). Nonetheless, preemption under both sections
holding that standing is component of subjectmatter jurisdiction and subjectmatter jurisdiction is essential to courts authority to hear case holding that a district court had jurisdiction to impose rule 11 sanctions regardless of the existence of subjectmatter jurisdiction holding that standing is component of subjectmatter jurisdiction holding that judicial analysis of the preemption under  1144 cannot help a federal court determine whether it has subjectmatter jurisdiction holding that the apa does not afford an implied grant of subjectmatter jurisdiction permitting federal judicial review of agency action