that could be used to increase payment to the creditors. Even if, as the Harstads claim, they gave notice of such claims by indicating in their disclosure statement that the availability of such claims was being investigated, the creditors are entitled to know if the debtors intend to pursue the preferenpes in post-confirmation actions. Compliance with § 1123(b)(3) gives notice of that intent. Only then are creditors in a position to seek a share of any such recoveries, contingent though they may be, and to have the mechanics of the preference-sharing spelled out in the plan. Creditors are in no position to do so if they are not on notice that the debtor retains the power to pursue recovery. See Amarex, Inc. v. Marathon Oil Co. (In re Amarex), 74 B.R. 378, 381 (Bankr.W.D.Okla. 1987) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 88 B.R. 362 (W.D.Okla.1988). We are
holding the retention requirement of  1123b3 was satisfied where disclosure statement and plan said preference claims with actions begun before confirmation were passed to postconfirmation successor in interest holding confirmation vested property in the debtor and therefore properly of the estate was not liable for postconfirmation taxes incurred by debtor recognizing the validity of exclusive jurisdiction retention provisions in a plan holding that provision in chapter 13 plan discharging postpetition interest on a student loan is binding on creditor under theory of res judicata where objection was not raised prior to plan confirmation and confirmation order was not appealed holding that if the debtor fails to mention the cause of action in either his schedules disclosure statement or plan then he will be precluded from asserting it postconfirmation