disciplinary proceeding were not a matter of public record, but instead were part of his “employment history” which could not be released under New York’s Freedom of Information Law, Public Officers Law, art. 6, (“FOIL”). See Hanig v. State Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 79 N.Y.2d 106, 109-10, 580 N.Y.S.2d 715, 588 N.E.2d 750 (1992) (citing exemption under Public Officers Law § 89(2)(b)(i) for “disclosure of employment, medical or credit histories”). As noted by the district court, however, New York courts have found that the disposition of misconduct charges does not constitute part of an employee’s “employment history” as that phrase is used in New York’s FOIL. See, e.g., LaRocca v. Board of Educ. of Jericho Union Free Sch. Dist., 220 A.D.2d 424, 632 N.Y.S.2d 576, 578-79 (2d Dep’t 1995) (<HOLDING>). Thus, we agree with the district court that
holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt holding that settlement agreement which disposed of misconduct charges brought under  3020a did not constitute an employment history for foil purposes holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement holding that additional charges were barred in an employment discrimination case when the additional charges did not reflect the essence of the other charges holding that court enforcement of a settlement agreement is not state action for constitutional purposes