are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.” Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 857, 120 S.Ct. 1904, 146 L.Ed.2d 902 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, we do not view the language of § 1341 as susceptible to the construction advanced by Appellants, at least not without considerable strain; nor do we discern a “grave and doubtful constitutional question[ ]” to arise from the construction we have settled on. Id. We are similarly unpersuaded by Appellants’ suggestion that Congress’s decision to protect private and interstate commercial carriers, in addition to the United States Postal Service, from being utilized to further fraudulent schemes where the use itself is intrastate, runs afoul of the respected federal-state balance. See e.g., id. at 858, 120 S.Ct. 1904 (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted); United
holding that a change of venue has no affect on the applicable state law and that change of venue is but a change of courtrooms holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute holding that a statutory amendment characterized by the state as a clarification could not be applied retroactively because the statute as written at the time of the crime was unclear and retroactive application of the statute as amended would result in an increased period of incarceration holding that arson of an owneroccupied residence not used for any commercial purpose does not qualify as property used in commerce and is not subject to federal prosecution under federal arson statute holding that application of federal arson statute to a private home would federalize a typically state crime and thereby significantly change  the federalstate balance in the prosecution of crimes