issue in any given case need not have a substantial effect upon interstate commerce. Congress is free to act — and the government to apply the law — so long as the regulated activity, in the aggregate, could reasonably be thought to substantially affect .interstate commerce. Id. The Robinson court found that the defendant’s as-applied challenge to the Hobbs Act collapsed in the face of the aggregatio .2000) (finding that a USFWS regulation limiting the taking of red wolves on private land pursuant to its authority under the ESA is within the reach of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause). Also, the Supreme Court decided another case that further defined the outer limits of the commerce clause, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000) (<HOLDING>). In light of National Association of Home
holding that commerce clause did not provide congress with authority to enact civil remedy provision of violence against women act inasmuch as provision was not regulation of activity that substantially affected interstate commerce recognizing power of states to engage in some regulation of interstate commerce holding that commerce clause authorizes congress to punish any particular criminal action even without proof of a relation to interstate commerce when the activity is part of a class of activities determined by congress to affect interstate commerce holding that the commerce clause does not provide congress with authority to enact a federal civil remedy for victims of gendermotivat ed violence because the crime was noneconomic contained no jurisdictional element and the aggregate impact of such crime was based on an attenuated effect upon interstate commerce holding that enactment of the civil remedy provision of the violence against women act of 1994 42 usc  13981 exceeded congresss power under the commerce clause noting that  13981 contained no jurisdictional element