benefits in the amount of his provable loss on the dwelling. We are compelled to reach that result regardless of the fact that Stauter quitclaimed her interest in the property to plaintiff before the fire. It is well settled that a policy’s standard mortgage clause constitutes a separate and distinct contract between a mortgagee and an insurance company for payment on the mortgage. Marketos v American Employers Ins Co, 240 Mich App 684, 692-693; 612 NW2d 848 (2000), citing Cole, supra at 55. Thus, even in cases where the mortgagee or land contract vendor has become the fee owner of the insured property through foreclosure or default on the land contract, the mortgagee or vendor is generally held to be entitled to coverage under a policy’s standard mortgage clause. Cole, supra at 55-56 (<HOLDING>); Capital Mortgage Corp v Michigan Basic
holding that a judgment lien does not at tach to a vendors interest in an executory land contract holding vendors right to receive payment under a land sale contract was personal property and a security interest representing that personal property right constituted realty paper and was subject to article 9 holding that the land contract vendor was entitled to fire insurance benefits when the fire occurred after a judgment for possession was obtained by the vendor pursuant to summary forfeiture proceedings holding that a judgment lien attaches to a vendors interest in an executory land contract holding that the land contract vendors were entitled to insurance benefits when before the fire that damaged the subject property the vendors obtained a judgment of forfeiture based on the vendees default on the land contract