1252, 1256 (10th Cir.1998) (observing that a warrantless arrest is permissible “if facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge and of which he or she has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to lead a prudent person to believe that the arrestee has committed or is committing an offense”) (quotation omitted and italics omitted). Owens also stated that the Eidsons’ son had “turned [them] in,” Aplt. App. at 359, when in fact, the mother and grandmother of their son’s girlfriend had contacted law enforcement. Owens’ statement may have led the Eidsons to think that resistance to a search would have been futile, as their unlawful conduct had been exposed by someone with direct knowledge of it. See United States v. Escobar, 389 F.3d 781, 786 (8th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). But it appears that Owens was merely stating
holding that because the individual was being illegally detained when he consented to the search of his luggage that  consent was tainted by the illegality holding that a dog sniff of the exterior of luggage in a public airport does not constitute a search under the fourth amendment holding that a canine sniff of luggage does not constitute a search holding three to four hour detention of luggage unreasonable holding that defendants consent to a search of their luggage was undermined by officers misrepresentation that a drug dog had alerted to their luggage