of either statute. Even considering the facts in a light most favorable to his claim, we see that Anders’s panic disorder lasted, at most, from sometime around November 6 until shortly after November 12. After it was diagnosed he testified, “things ... panned out greatly,” and he could do his job “110 percent.” As the Supreme Court ruled in Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, a short-term impairment such as this does not rise to the level of disability as defined by the ADA. See 534 U.S. 184, 195, 122 S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002). Instead, Anders must have demonstrated that the impairment limited a major life activity on a permanent or long-term basis. Id. at 195, 198, 122 S.Ct. 681; see also Ogborn v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, 305 F.3d 763, 767-68 (7th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, Anders’s inability to meet the
holding an eight week bout of depression was not a disability as defined by the ada holding that whether a person has a disability under the ada is an individualized inquiry holding evidence of a 13 permanent partial disability insufficient to establish disability for purposes of ada holding that an employer cannot be held liable under the ada if it had no knowledge of the employees alleged disability holding that epilepsy qualifies as a disability under the ada