from the requirement that an injury must be concrete and particularized. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 816, 821, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997) (in action by members of Congress to challenge the Line Item Veto Act, “loss of political power” — as opposed to loss of a private right — was not a concrete injury, and any institutional injury to Congress arising from the Act was not particularized to' any individual plaintiff). An apparent exception to the general rule against legislative standing arises when the legislators are suing on a vote-nullification theory and allege that if their votes had been given effect, those votes would have been sufficient to defeat or enact a specific legisla tive action. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438, 59 S.Ct. 972, 83 L.Ed. 1385 (1939) (<HOLDING>); see also Baird v. Norton, 266 F.3d 408, 410
holding that where fortymember kansas state senate had deadlocked twentytotwenty in voting on a proposed constitutional amendment the twenty senators who had voted against the amendment had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the lieutenant governors tiebreaking vote in favor of the amendment because the lieutenant governors vote effectively nullified the plaintiffs votes and the plaintiffs votes would have been sufficient to prevent ratification of the amendment holding the sixth amendment right to a jury trial applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment holding that the constitutional rights in a termination proceeding  are derived from the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the united states constitution and not the sixth amendment holding the sixth amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment holding that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the sixth amendment right to counsel