2182, 2187, 115 L.Ed.2d 123 (1991) (defendant received sufficient notice when either the PSR indicates that certain facts could justify an upward departure or when the government requests a departure)). In addition, Beatty’s counsel acknowledged that he was aware of the district court’s “inherent power” to depart upward and that he had thought about the departure issue and was prepared to orally address it during the sentencing hearing. (See Sent.Tr. at 4.) Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Beatty’s motion for continuance. See United States v. Voss, 787 F.2d 393, 401-02 (8th Cir.) (standard of review for denial of a motion to continue is abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 888, 107 S.Ct. 286, 93 L.Ed.2d 261 (1986). II (8th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>), with United States v. Werlinger, 894 F.2d
holding that district court may consider defendants underlying conviction under both  2j16a and  4alla  d when sentencing him for failure to appear to serve his sentence holding that resentencing should consider all sentencing arguments and remanding for court to consider defendants argument for downward departure based on postconviction rehabilitation holding that sentencing court is permitted to consider evidence of both uncharged acts and evidence underlying counts on which the defendant has been acquitted holding that the district court may consider evidence of a defendants postsentence rehabilitation and that such evidence may support a downward variance from the federal sentencing guidelines holding that district court may consider defendants underlying conviction under both  2p11a1 and  4alld  e when sentencing him for escape