judge is not a final order). Accordingly, whatever might be true in other circumstances as to the appealability upon its entry of an order making a priority determination, the Trust could not have appealed as of right from the August 26, 1999 order until after the entry of the order in Adversary Nos. 99-0231 and 99-0524 concluding the adversary proceedings on January 31, 2000, as the August 26, 1999 order did not conclude Adversary No. 99-0231. See In re Professional Ins. Mgmt., 285 F.3d 268, 281 (3d Cir.2002) (“[A] bankruptcy court order ending a separate adversary proceeding is appealable as a final order even though that order does not conclude the entire bankruptcy case.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); In re Durability, Inc., 893 F.2d 264, 266 (10th Cir.1990) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); In re Compton Corp., 889 F.2d 1104, 1106
holding that an order was interlocutory in nature despite the trial courts certification of the order as a final appealable judgment holding that partial summary judgment is not a final appealable judgment when it did not settle completely any of the matters in controversy or adjudicate completely the rights and liabilities of the parties holding that a bankruptcy courts partial summary judgment order that established the priority of one creditor relative to another but did not completely resolve the particular adversary proceeding was interlocutory in nature and therefore not directly appealable holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable holding that a rehearing order is interlocutory and not appealable