5000 the conclusion that Wimbish’s breath alcohol content was .22 grams per 210 liters of breath. Wimbish blew into the machine, the machine analyzed his breath and reported the results of its analysis. The machine was the sole source of the test results. Thus the result of the breath test was merely data produced by a machine, not a statement produced by a witness. See United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir.2008) (“[D]ata are not ‘statements’ in any useful sense. Nor is a machine a ‘witness against’ anyone.”); United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir.2007) (“ ‘[Statements’ made by machines are not out-of-court statements made by declarants that are subject to the Confrontation Clause.”); Caldwell v. State, 230 Ga.App. 46, 495 S.E.2d 308, 310 (1997) (<HOLDING>); State v. Van Sickle, 120 Idaho 99, 813 P.2d
holding that allegations that injuries were caused by misuse of ekg machine did not fall within waiver provisions of ttca because plaintiff had not made affirmative allegation that ekg machine was incorrectly used or that its results were erroneous and reasoning that misuse of information produced by ekg machine caused injuries rather than device itself holding that state trade secret law could not protect vending machine mechanism where machine was sold to third party holding that a machine that allegedly eliminated lumps from womens breasts was governed by the ffdca even though the fda did not require the use of such a machine holding that certifications of a breathtest machine are nontestimonial because they are not prepared for any specific defendant or any specific litigation holding that printouts from a breath test machine are not hearsay but rather the mechanicallygenerated reports automatically created by the machine they do not constitute outofcourt statements by any person or the conclusion of a third party not before the court   internal citations omitted