that Kohler’s decision to terminate his benefits was arbitrary and capricious. The Eighth Circuit has recognized that the payment of benefits does not operate “forever as an estoppel so that an insurer can never change its mind; but unless information available to an insurer alters in some significant way, the previous payment of benefits is a circumstance that must weigh against the propriety of an insurer’s decision to discontinue those payments.” McOsker v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 279 F.3d 586, 589 (8th Cir.2002). McOsker refers only to the “information available” to the insurer — it does not require that the plaintiffs underlying medical condition improve or alter in some significant way. Id.; see also Ellis v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Bos., 394 F.3d 262, 274 (5th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Muniz v. Amec Constr. Mgmt, Inc., 623 F.3d
holding that erisa permits suits to recover benefits only against the plan as an entity and thus the beneficiary had erred by suing her exhusbands employer and plan administrator when proper party would have been the benefits plan itself holding that circuit court could assess attorneys fees against contemptuous employer for violating order to pay medical benefits but the fees would be separate and additional to the medical benefits awarded and not based on a percentage of those benefits but on the reasonable amounts incurred by employee in enforcing order holding that a denial of benefits will not be reviewed de novo where the language of an erisa plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan holding that when a plan fiduciary initially determines that a covered employee is eligible for benefits and later determines that the employee is not  eligible for those benefits by virtue of additional medical information received the plan fiduciary is not required to obtain proof that a substantial change in the ltd recipients medical condition occurred after the initial determination of eligibility and noting that a contrary holding would basically prohibit a plan fiduciary from ever terminating benefits if it later discovered evidence that the erisa plaintiff was not disabled at the time of the initial grant of benefits and that such a rule would have a chilling effect on the prompt ness of granting initial benefits in the first place holding that state agencys voluntary reinstatement of benefits after agency had previously announced that recipients no longer met the eligibility requirements for those benefits did not moot suit challenging the termination of the benefits when agency remained free to reassess the recipients needs and cancel their benefits at any time