omitted). Therefore, the district court applied the correct legal standards to the facts of this case. 5 . We recognize that this conclusion differs from that reached by the Third Circuit in a similar case. See Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 60-62 (3d Cir.1994). 6 . Plaintiffs informed the district court that they intended for the court to integrate the first stipulation, filed on May 19, 1995, into the complaint. See Appellees’ Supp.App. at 13. We have treated the stipulation as supplementing the facts in the complaint. We did not, however, rely on the updated status of the children in the second stipulation, entered by court order in May 1996, when that status would have the effect of mooting a claim from the complaint. See Reed v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 779, 786 (10th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). 7 . We recognize that, when deciding a motion
holding purposeful action of defendants in giving plaintiffs what they seek may not make moot plaintiffs claim in a class action recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members holding that a class action may continue even though the claim of the named plaintiff has become moot holding that absent plaintiffs were not bound by a rule 23blb2 class action for money damages because the original class action court did not have personal jurisdiction over the plaintiffs and did not provide them with an optout right holding that the plaintiffs complaint failed to state a claim for purposeful and unlawful discrimination