the badly injured Rivera to the station house. Once at the station house, Vidal stood by and watched as Rivera was assaulted further. From these facts, a reasonable juror could have concluded that Vidal willfully associated himself with the violation of Rivera’s civil rights and participated in this violation as something he wished to bring about, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 242 and 2. Turning to Count Four, Vidal repeats that the evidence showed only that he failed to intervene while other officers beat Rivera. He suggests that mere inaction is insufficient to merit supervisory liability for a violation of § 242, and that it was not apparent that he was acting unlawfully by failing to intervene. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997) (<HOLDING>). He further argues that his failure to
holding that there is no constitutional right to appeal a criminal conviction holding that criminal liability for deprivation of a constitutional right under  242 requires that the unlawfulness be apparent under preexisting law holding that liability under  1983 can be established by showing that the defendants either personally participated in a deprivation of the plaintiffs rights or caused such a deprivation to occur holding that liability under  1983 requires a causal link to and direct responsibility for the deprivation of rights holding that a claim for municipal liability under  1983 requires inter alia proof of an underlying constitutional violation