in realty, no matter what the purpose. Under this interpretation, it becomes irrelevant whether the land contract is characterized as personalty or realty for other purposes under state law. The Alsups submit a narrow interpretation of Section 55-9-104(j) excluding only transactions that Article 9 does not purport to cover under any circumstances (transfers not intended to create a security interest and real property transactions) wo eal estate lease when used as collateral did not fall within the scope of Article 9); Swanson v. Union State Bank (In re Hoeppner), 49 B.R. 124, 127-29 (Bankr.E.D.Wis.1985) (applying Wisconsin law, held assignment of vendor’s interest in real estate contract was not subject to Article 9); Rucker v. State Exch. Bank, 355 So.2d 171 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978) (<HOLDING>). But see, e.g., Frearson v. Win-gold (In re
holding that even if the individual who signed the mortgage assignment lacked the authority to do so the assignment would still be binding on mers because he purported to be authorized holding that foreclosure of prior mortgage extinguished second mortgage holding plaintiff did not have standing to challenge the validity of an assignment from mers to bac because she was not a party to the assignment and the assignment did not affect her underlying obligation to make timely payments holding article 9 inapplicable to an assignment of a mortgage on real estate holding assignment of a mortgage was not subject to article 9