§ 602(a). In our prior opinion, as defendant points out, we held this contract was not a procurement within the meaning of the Brooks Act. Mktg. & Mgmt. Info., Inc., 57 Fed.Cl. at 674. As plaintiff points out, however, § 602(a)(4) also makes the act applicable to contracts for the disposal of personal property. Defendant conceded at oral argument that intangible property of the type at issue could be considered “personal property.” We agree. “Personal property” is “[a]ny movable or intangible thing that is subject to ownership and not classified as real property.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1233 (7th ed.1999). Commissary data is clearly personal property of the United States. See City of Burbank v. United States, 47 Fed.Cl. 261 (2000), rev’d on other grounds, 273 F.3d 1370 (Fed.Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Defendant’s primary argument is that the
holding that the circuit courts statutory power in a divorce suit did not inherently extend to the disposal of the personal property of a party holding that a company registered with the new york department of state is found for purposes of rule b holding that the regulation of wholesale energy transactions that are fundamentally interstate from beginning to end may come only from the exercise of the power vested in congress recognizing that the government may seek a personal judgment specific property or substitute property recognizing that electric power sold by the department of energy was personal property for purposes of the cda