go to the jury based on evidence showing the defendant was on notice of harm, including prior similar acts, prior business decisions, advice from risk assessors, and legislative recognition. 131 Wn.2d at 50-51, 51 n.10. In McLeod, we rejected the notion that foreseeability requires evidence of a specific type of prior incident as “unjustifiably restrict [ive].” 42 Wn 58 (2001). ¶55 Requiring evidence of prior similar acts as a prerequisite to suit would disserve the social interests of tort law. Courts have recognized that requiring such proof would give businesses “one free assault” and remove any incentive to take reasonable precautions against otherwise foreseeable criminal harm to invitees. See, e.g., Jane Doe v. Grosvenor Ctr. Assocs., 104 Haw. 500, 92 P.3d 1010, 1021 (2004) (<HOLDING>); Bass v. Gopal, Inc., 395 S.C. 129, 716 S.E.2d
holding reasonable suspicion is based on totality of circumstances holding a trial courts bestinterest determination is a subjective assessment based on the totality of circumstances holding foreseeability is based on the totality of the circumstances not on a mechanical prior similar incidents rule holding that the reasonableness inquiry is based upon the totality of the circumstances in determining whether or not a search was reasonable holding that 8 incidents of assault theft robbery or burglary on the premises and 80 similar incidents within a 2bloek area within the prior 3 years did not constitute special circumstances giving rise to a duty to protect