unfairness.” Smithey, 203 Va. at 148, 122 S.E.2d at 877. In determining whether a jury award is excessive, “courts will also look at the ratio of economic to non-economic damages.” Hatfield, 46 Va. Cir. at 497 (citing Bassett Furn. Indus., Inc., 216 Va. at 913, 224 S.E.2d at 333). The remedy for an excessive verdict is either to set it aside and award a new trial, or to put the successful party upon terms to release the excess or else submit to a new trial; but neither course of action is warranted if the verdict merely appears to be large and more than the trial judge would have awarded. See Campbell v. Hankins, 217 Va. 800, 801-02, 232 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1977); Hogg v. Plant, 145 Va. 175, 181, 133 S.E. 759, 761 (1926); see also Davenport v. Aldrich, 207 Va. 271, 148 S.E.2d 768 (1966) (<HOLDING>). In considering remittitur, the record must
holding that after court dismissed case at plaintiffs request notwithstanding the fact that jury had deliberated upon the case and indicated that it had reached a verdict there was no case pending in court on which a verdict could be predicated and the information which the judge got from an inspection of the petition handed to him by the foreman of the jury was information which he received as an individual and not as a judge of the court and further holding that despite violation of defendants right to receive the verdict that was purportedly reached the writing incorporated in the bill of exceptions as a verdict of the jury was in law no verdict because it was not received in court and published as required by law and was instead entirely extraneous and extrajudicial holding that a trial judge cannot usurp the function of the jury as triers of fact if the amount awarded by their verdict is supported by sufficient evidence and is reached by a fair and impartial jury holding that under aspinwall when the trial court submits to the jury a good count  one that is supported by the evidence  and a bad count  one that is not supported by the evidence  and the jury returns a general verdict this court cannot presume that the verdict was returned on the good count in such a case a judgment entered upon the verdict must be reversed holding that the regular association during trial between the jury and two deputy sheriffs who testified at trial undermined the defendants right to a fair trial by an impartial jury holding that a defendant could not establish stricklands prejudice prong because any erroneous exclusion of an impartial juror was harmless because we have every reason to believe the replacement was also an impartial juror the defendant does not dispute that he was convicted and sentenced by an impartial jury and he presents no reason to think that a jury composed of a slightly different set of impartial jurors would have reached a different verdict