acted jointly with the intent to defraud either the banking examiners or the FDIC which, as discussed below, is not the case here. Yarbrow v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (In re Yarbrow), 150 B.R. 233, 239 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1993). Additionally, the better-line of reasoning on this issue does not relieve the Board from proving reliance. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Smith (In re Smith), 133 B.R. 800, 810 (N.D. Tex. 1991) (declining to apply the doctrine to excuse the FDIC as receiver from proving reliance under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A)); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Rotman (In re Rotman), 133 B.R. 843 (S.D. Tex. 1991) (concluding that issues of dischargeability under § 523(a)(2)(B) are beyond the scope of the doctrine); see also Resolution Trust Corp. v. Hilton, 182 B.R. 483 (S.D. Miss. 1995) (<HOLDING>). The Board must, therefore, prove that St.
holding debtor could cure after the debtor had previously made payments to the bank holding that since motor vehicle contract between the debtor and fifth third bank was a lease and not a security agreement the debtor was required to treat fifth third banks claim in his chapter 13 plan as a lease and not as a secured debt which meant that the debtor could not obligate fifth third bank to finance the purchase of his vehicle holding that a copy of an agreement executed by an insolvent bank found in the draft documents of the banks attorney did not satisfy section 1823es requirements because it was not an official record of the failed bank holding debtor could include property because the bank accepted payments directly from the debtor and had previously allowed the debtor to cure default holding that doench duhme cannot be used to satisfy the  523a2b reliance requirement absent evidence of collusion or an agreement between the debtor and the bank