80 FERC at 61,945 (1997) (emphasis added). FERC further explained, “[i]n this proceeding, we are faced with a new market institution in which sellers and buyers of electric energy will not contract directly with one another, as has been traditionally done in the industry, but instead will contract with the PX.” Id. (emphasis added). Indeed, FERC understood that, as a consequence of this lack of privity between buyers and sellers, any refunds due as a result of a FERC refund order would be paid to the exchanges, not directly to the underpaid market participants. See San Diego Gas & Elec. v. Sellers of Energy & Ancillary Servs., 102 FERC 61,317, 62,079-80 (2003). These interpretations were echoed by the Ninth Circuit. See S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Lynch, 307 F.3d 794, 800 (9th Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>). VII Finally, appellants argue that it would
recognizing that rates awarded in other cases do not set the prevailing market rateonly the market can do that holding that information and documents that relate to among other things the nonu s manufacture sale and distribution of aspartame may prove relevant to establishing the existence of a global conspiracy to allocate the market for aspartame the ability of market participants to engage in domestic price fixing and the mechanisms employed by market participants in price fixing holding that a plaintiff claiming monopolization is obligated to establish the relevant market because the power to control prices or exclude competition only makes sense with reference to a particular market holding that market participant socal edison is in privity with the california power exchange corporation not with other market participants recognizing implied duty to market