facts alleged in the complaint must be taken as true before deciding whether there is reasonable cause to believe that a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct has occurred. This is no different than the standard imposed in either a criminal or a civil context for motions to dismiss the initiating pleading. See N.M. Life Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Quinn & Co., 111 N.M. 750, 753, 809 P.2d 1278, 1281 (1991) (“A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, we must accept as true all well-pleaded facts and question only whether the plaintiff might prevail under any state of facts provable under the claim.”); State v. Wasson, 1998-NMCA-087, ¶ 5, 125 N.M. 656, 964 P.2d 820 (<HOLDING>). {11} To the extent that Respondent contends
recognizing that when considering pretrial motions attacking the sufficiency of an indictment or information the factual allegations in the states pleadings are taken as true holding that when a respondent fails to challenge factual allegations contained in a petition for the writ of mandamus the appellate court accepts as true the factual statements in the petition recognizing that the partys factual complaint if taken as true affirmatively established that the other tribunal had no jurisdiction holding that when deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings the court must construe the material allegations in the complaint in favor of the nonmoving party as true holding that where the plaintiff is pro se the court must consider as evidence in his opposition to summary judgment all of plaintiffs contentions offered in motions and pleadings where such contentions are based on personal knowledge and set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence and where plaintiff attested under penalty of perjury that the contents of the motions or pleadings are true and correct