“he was very sincere, very forthright” and she did not see “a demeanor” that would impact his ability to “be fair and impartial.” That the military judge unambiguously based her findings on her personal examination of witness demeanor brings the decision in line with this Court’s precedents. We have held that “mere declarations of impar tiality [on behalf of potential members], are not sufficient by themselves to insure legal propriety.” United States v. Harris, 13 M.J. 288, 292 (C.M.A.1982). However, “[w]e ... recognize that the military judge is in the best position to judge the sincerity and truthfulness of the challenged member’s responses on voir dire.” Youngblood, 47 M.J. at 341 (citing United States v. Daulton, 45 M.J. 212, 217 (C.A.A.F.1996)); see also, Miles, 58 M.J. at 194-95 (<HOLDING>). This Court has frequently addressed the
holding first amendment claim requires actual protected conduct holding that an adverse credibility determination is overturned only if each proffered reason for the determination fails recognizing that statutes mandating recusal for actual bias have constitutional bases unlike those that require recusal for a mere appearance of bias or prejudice holding when one identified ground for an adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of petitioners claim of persecution the court is bound to accept the ijs adverse credibility determination holding that a challenge for cause for actual bias  essentially requires a determination  of credibility