more dubious of her accusation that Simmons was the man who threatened and tried to rape her, especially since in her initial report Cobaugh did not suggest that she would be able to identify her attacker. Most importantly, the inconsistencies in both Cobaugh’s and Pletcher’s stories, revealed on cross-examination, meant that the jurors were well-primed to hear that these two witnesses had good reason to come up with testimony helpful to the prosecution. Without the evidence suppressed by the prosecution, however, the defense could not credibly proffer such a theory. Had this information been available to the defense before trial, it could have much more effectively attacked the Commonwealth’s case on not just one, but two critical fronts. Cf. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 444-45, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (<HOLDING>). Overall, the picture of what Simmons’s trial
holding evidence not to be material within the meaning of brady when the evidence did not eliminate the defendant as the perpetrator holding witnesss prior inconsistent statement about whether he was an eyewitness was evidence favorable to the defendant establishing brady violations first requirement holding it was not error to admit incourt identifications for the first time without notice to defendant since witnesses had not made pretrial identifications and counsel had the opportunity to crossexamine the witnesses holding that nondisclosure of evidence undermining eyewitness identifications of the defendant by what the state identified as its two best witnesses was material under brady holding that the prosecutors nondisclosure of material evidence affecting a witnesss credibility which goes uncorrected falls within the requirements of brady