degree of their harm is a jury question. ¶ 8 For these reasons, I find that the trial court erred in granting Appellees’ motion for summary judgment, and so I dissent. 7 . Although neither the Majority nor the trial court addressed the harm prong, if, as a matter of law, Appellants cannot sustain this prong of their abuse of process claim, Appel-lees would nevertheless be entitled to summary judgment, and we could affirm the trial court on that basis. See Shearer v. Naftzinger, 560 Pa. 634, 638, 747 A.2d 859, 861 (2000) (a lower court may be affirmed on any basis). Thus, I am obliged to address it. 8 . Appellees do not dispute that emotional harm is compensable in an abuse of process action, and indeed this Court has so held. See Shiner v. Moriarty, 706 A.2d 1228, 1239 (Pa.Super.1998) (<HOLDING>). Rather, Appellees dispute that Appellants
holding that expert testimony is not required to corroborate a claim for emotional distress holding that a request for funds for expert testimony must show inter alia that the testimony is crucial and is subject to varying expert opinions holding in a fcra case that plaintiffs may not rely on mere  conclusory statements  rather they must  sufficiently articulate  true demonstrable emotional distress  including the factual context in which the emotional distress arose evidence corroborating the testimony of the plaintiff the nexus between the conduct of the defendant and the emotional distress the degree of such mental distress mitigating circumstances if any physical injuries suffered due to the emotional distress medical attention resulting from the emotional duress psychiatric or psychological treatment and the loss of income if any holding that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from a claim for emotional distress damages under the employment discrimination statute holding inter alia that expert testimony was not required to prove damages for emotional distress in an abuse of process claim