of burglary by itself was excluded as a crime of violence was dictum, and that “the crime of burglary has always been and continues to be viewed as a crime involving the use or threat of violence to the person.” Id. at 15, 549 A.2d at 559. The principal reason offered for this holding was the observation that “[e]very ... burglar knows when he attempts to commit his crime that he is inviting dangerous resistance.... It is this threat of violence to persons that has prompted the Legislature into expanding the definition of burglary to include all those entries without privilege into places where people might be present.” Id. at 14, 549 A.2d at 559. This Court’s subsequent holdings have consistently followed Rolan. See Commonwealth v. Collins, 549 Pa. 593, 606, 702 A.2d 540, 546 (1997)(<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Bracey, 541 Pa. 322, 349 n.
holding that the defendants juvenile convictions for burglary were crimes of violence for purposes of the section 9711d9 aggravating circumstance holding jury verdict unanimous where jury was charged with alternative aggravating circumstance of burglary involving two different victims holding that burglary of commercial building is crime of violence under guidelines holding that all convictions under wisconsin sexual assault statute were not per se convictions for crimes of violence holding that the double jeopardy clause was not violated by two convictions arising from the same criminal episode because the crimes of attempted burglary and possession of burglary tools each had an element the other did not and were thus separate crimes