as a prohibited basis for discrimination. Congressman Smith proposed the amendment to “do some good for the minority sex” by ensuring that women receive “as high compensation for their work as do the majority sex.” 110 Cong.Rec. 2577 (1964). Congressman Celler opposed the amendment, arguing that the bill was already “all-embra ncy Discrimination Act, which amended Title VII in 1978, the Court in Newport News reasoned that even though “congressional discussion focused on the needs of female members of the work force ... [tjhis does not create a ‘negative inference’ limiting the scope of the Act to the specific problem that motivated its enactment.” Id. at 679, 103 S.Ct. at 2629; cf. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280, 96 S.Ct. 2574, 2579, 49 L.Ed.2d 493 (1976) (<HOLDING>). In 1986, the Supreme Court expanded the scope
holding that racial discrimination is not a personal injury tort holding that title vii precludes a claim under section 1981 for racial discrimination against a federal employee holding that racial discrimination is a personal injury tort holding that section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in private employment against whites as well as nonwhites holding that title vii proscribes racial discrimination against whites upon the same standards as racial discrimination against nonwhites