F.3d 510, 512-13 (8th Cir.1996). 5 . Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (1994) (authorizing courts to "revoke a term of supervised release, and require the person to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release without credit for time previously serviced on postrelease supervision”), with 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (1997) (authorizing courts to "revoke a term of supervised release, and require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in such term of supervised release without credit for time previously served on postrelease supervision”) (emphasis added). The latter version of § 3583(e)(3) applies to Xinidakis because he was convicted in 1999. See Johnson, 529 U.S. at 701, 120 S.Ct. 1795 (<HOLDING>). 6 . The issue confronting Johnson, whether §
recognizing that the significance of a criminal history in sentencing varies based on the gravity nature and number of prior offenses as they relate to the current offense holding that a trial court errs by failing to limit the definitions of the culpable mental states as they relate to the conduct elements involved in the particular offense holding that statutory appeal bonds relate to the jurisdiction of the court holding the mcarn exception requirefs that the acts complained of warrant the imposition of criminal penalties as opposed to mere civil penalties holding that postrevocation penalties relate to the original offense