Baird v. S. Ry. Co., 179 Tenn. 366, 166 S.W.2d 617, 619 (1942) (where the deed conveyed a fee); Buhl, 840 S.W.2d at 907 (where the deed limited the purpose of the easement); Noble, 1988 WL 60482, at *1 (where the deed conveyed “a right-of-way on which to construct and operate [the railroad’s] said railroad”); Smoky Mountain R.R. Co. v. Paine Oil Co., 496 S.W.2d 904, 907 (Tenn.Ct.App.1973) (where the deed expressly conveyed a right-of-way for railroad purposes); Bell, 39 S.W.2d at 1029 (where the deed conveyed a fee). The language of the granting deed must be the primary guide for the court in construing the scope of the easement. See Henry, 1927 WL 2123, at *2; River City Resort v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., No. E1999-02567-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 8539, at *2 (Tenn.Ct.App. May 21, 2001) (<HOLDING>); Regen v. E. Fork Farms, LP, No.
holding that limitation of liability clause was unambiguous holding that duration of limitation is a factor in determining whether limitation is significant recognizing that a principal may limit the authority of its agent and such limitation will be binding on a third party who is aware of the limitation holding that an appellate court must give a statute its clear and plain meaning when the statute is unambiguous holding that if easement language is clear and unambiguous and does not limit its duration then the court cannot impose such a limitation