have read the Supreme Court’s discretionary function cases as denying protection to actions that are unauthorized because they are unconstitutional, proscribed by statute, or exceed the scope of an official’s authority.” Thames Shipyard & Repair Co. v. United States, 350 F.3d 247, 254-55 (1st Cir.2003) (col lecting cases). However, we have not resolved whether the discretionary function exception extends to actions that are otherwise outside the scope of an official’s actual federal authority, and we need not do so here. Nor do we address whether Desrosiers had implied federal authority to participate in the arrest to the limited extent of swearing out the criminal complaint, receiving the arrest warrant, and assisting Wing in the execution of that warrant. See, e.g., id. at 260 (<HOLDING>). Assuming, arguendo, that the USPS is not
holding that the discretionary function exception applied where the coast guard had implied statutory authority to order the evacuation of a sinking ship holding that the coast guards forcible evacuation of a sinking sea vessel constituted a seizure of the persons therein holding that the discretionary function does not apply where the decisionmaker lacks authority holding that the discretionary function exception may apply in the absence of a conscious decision  recognizing a discretionary function exception to that waiver