to the State and beneficial to the accused." Nettles, 565 N.E.2d at 1066-1067, 1069. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in refusing to give his tendered instruction. Id. at 1068. The Indiana Supreme Court found "nothing in [the] record to justify the conclusion that the police engaged in any willful conduct in destroying evidence." Id. at 1069. The Indiana Supreme Court also held that "negligent handling of evidence will not be grounds for reversal unless it can be demonstrated that police acted deliberately" and conelud- ed that the trial court was correct in refusing to give the tendered instruction. Id. Here, the dura from the left side is potentially useful evidence because it had not been tested but could have been subjected to tests. See id. at 1067 (<HOLDING>). Ray does not argue that the State acted in
holding that film negatives and master recordings were tangible personal property even though they were valued in part for their intellectual content because they were also physically useful in the manufacturing process holding in securities fraud case that defendants who were the subject of criminal investigation were not bound to predict the likelihood that they would be indicted but were required to disclose material facts that would potentially endanger the companys future financial performance holding the state law claims were not preempted holding that repeated remarks about need to bring in new blood or young blood by one of the decisionmakers were not stray remarks and may permit inference of discrimination holding that blood samples that were not preserved by the state were potentially useful evidence