at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052). There is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was not deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Regarding the prosecutor’s statements concerning Dailey’s presumption of innocence, we agree with the trial court that when read in context, the comments appear to be a statement by the prosecutor of her belie f seven instances of prosecuto-rial misconduct undermined the validity of the trial to the extent that a guilty verdict could not have been reached without the assistance of these errors. Because these claims of prosecutorial misconduct are all premised on facts in the record, they could have and should have been raised on direct appeal. The claims are therefore proee-durally barred. See Spencer v. State, 842 So.2d 52, 60-61 (Fla.2003) (<HOLDING>). 2. Giglio /Newly Discovered Evidence Claim
holding that the failure to identify and distinguish which claims of prosecutorial misconduct have been previously litigated and which were waived permits rejection of the underlying claims of prosecutorial misconduct which in turn eviscerates the cognizable layered claims holding that habeas proceedings are not available to test the legality of matters which should have been raised on direct appeal holding that postconviction relief claims which either were raised or could have been raised on direct appeal were properly denied without an evidentiary hearing holding that claims alleging prosecutorial misconduct which were based on facts in the record could have and should have been raised on direct appeal and were thus not cognizable in postconviction proceedings holding that nonconstitutional claims that could have been raised on direct appeal may not be asserted in a collateral proceeding