quotation marks omitted). As with other Plaintiffs, Sears neither invoked nor threatened to invoke the arbitration provision of Moses’s credit card agreement, and any ruling made here on the arbitration provision would constitute an advisory opinion. The Plaintiffs also maintain on appeal that a district court “should refuse to entertain a declaratory judgment only for good cause.” Br. of Appellants 27 (citing Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Quarles, 92 F.2d 321, 324 (4th Cir.1987)). The lack of standing is sufficient good cause, however; it is the “threshold question in every federal case, determining the power of the court to entertain the suit.” Warth v. Seldin, ns on the ripeness doctrine. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1019-20, 104 S.Ct. 2862, 81 L.Ed.2d 815 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Bd. of Trade v. Commodity Futures Trading
recognizing that in reviewing ruling on motion to compel arbitration we first determine whether party seeking arbitration established existence of arbitration agreement recognizing lack of ripeness on whether arbitration will provide reasonable compensation where plaintiff did not allege or establish that it had been injured by actual arbitration under the statute holding that where the arbitration agreement was silent on feesplitting and the costs imposed upon the plaintiff by the aaa were not prohibitive the plaintiff had presented little evidence to indicate that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive and the fees and costs of arbitration did not render the arbitration scheme unconscionable holding that the plaintiff did not establish a waiver where the defendants answer had put the plaintiff on notice of an arbitration defense holding that in ruling on a motion to compel arbitration a court must consider 1 whether the parties have entered into a valid arbitration agreement 2 whether an arbitrable issue exists and 3 whether the right to arbitration has been waived