to the facts of this case. Division orders are binding until terminated. See id. § 91.402(g) (providing that division orders are binding for the time and to the extent that they have been acted on and made the basis of settlements and payments, and, from the time that notice is given that settlements will not be made on the basis provided in them, they cease to be binding, and that division orders are terminable by either party on 30 days written notice); see also Cabot Corp. v. Brown, 754 S.W.2d 104, 107-08 (Tex.1987); Gavenda v. Strata Energy, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex.1986); Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 618 S.W.2d 240, 25 r, 345 S.W.3d 462, 470 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2011, pet. denied); Sun Operating P’ship v. Oatman, 911 S.W.2d 749, 756 (Tex.App.San Antonio 1995, writ denied) (<HOLDING>); see also Bailey v. Shell W. E & P, Inc., 555
holding that the damage for tenancy at sufferance during the holdover period was the monthly rent under the lease versus the apartments fair market value because the lease contained a provision requiring lease payments beyond the lease term holding that the lessors interest in the leased property was subject to liens because it was perfectly obvious that the parties knew that the improvements at issue were the pith of the lease and that except for them the lease would not have been executed and because the improvements were essential to the purpose of the lease holding that lease was ratified when lessors executed division orders showing lower royalties and accepted royalty payments thereon holding that reconsideration of the correctness of property division was barred on appeal from the judgment enforcing that division holding that the lower court failed to account for payments made in connection with the marital home including mortgage payments