There, the Florida Supreme Court explained that the parties did not argue that a statement noting the plaintiff’s death within a response to the trial court’s case status order was sufficient to constitute a suggestion of death. However, the court then went on to opine that it did “not construe [the] response as a formal suggestion of death as contemplated by ... rule [1.260].” 600 So.2d at 1101 n.4. While not the holding of the case, such language strongly implies that a passing reference to a party’s death in a document that was not filed for the purpose of notifying the litigants of the death is not sufficient to start the ninety-day time period set forth in rule 1.260(a)(1). Federal courts hold similarly. See, e.g., Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 836-37 (10th Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Miller Bros. Constr. Co.,
holding that because a disclaimer relates back to the decedents death the status of parties in the chain of succession are established as of the time of death regardless of when the disclaimer is made holding a wrongful death action may not be maintained for the death of an unborn child holding that the statement i have a gun is a threat of death holding that a death sentence for a conviction for the rape of a child where the crime did not result and was not intended to result in death of the victim was barred by the eighth amendment holding that the ninetyday time period under the federal rule is not triggered unless a formal suggestion of death is made on the record regardless of whether the parties have knowledge of a partys death and that mere reference to a partys death in court proceedings or pleadings is not sufficient to trigger the limitations period for filing a motion for substitution