it is clear that “any law pertaining to intellectual property” at least refers to the three traditional forms of intellectual property: copyright, patent, and trademark. See Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443, 1448 (11th Cir.1998) (stating that the three principal forms of intellectual property are copyright, patent, and trademark). Thus, federal district courts have held that § 230(e)(2) unambiguously precludes applying the CDA to immunize interactive service providers from trademark claims. See Ford Motor Co. v. GreatDomains.com, Inc., 60 U.S.P.Q. 2D 1446 (E.D.Mich.2001) (construing § 230(e)(2) to preclude application of CDA immunity to claims based on the violation of federal trademark laws); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F.Supp.2d 409, 413 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (<HOLDING>). Almeida contends that the CDA does not
recognizing nominative fair use as an affirmative defense to trademark infringement holding that the continued use of licensed trademark after termination of franchise agreement constituted trademark infringement and breach of contract holding that contributory trademark infringement requires some predicate act of infringement recognizing that immunizing trademark infringement claims would limit laws pertaining to intellectual property holding that although the underlying action is one for trademark infringement the infringement occurred as a result of the underlying defendants use of the trademark in their advertising