medical examiner must furnish “full description of the effects of disability upon the person’s ordinary activity”). The Court holds that medical evidence is required to support this criterion of a 40% disability rating — regulation of activities. The next question for the Court is whether there is a plausible basis for the Board’s findings that “there is no medical evidence that the veteran’s activities are restricted” and, therefore, a higher initial disability rating of 40% is not warranted under DC 7913. R. at 8; see Johnston v. Brown, 10 Vet.App. 80, 84 (1997) (applying established caselaw that degree of disability under the rating code is a finding of fact subject to the “clearly erroneous” standard of review by this Court); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 49, 53 (1990) (<HOLDING>). This question turns on whether there is
holding that if a reasonable fact finder could make a particular finding on the administrative record then the finding is supported by substantial evidence holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination under title vii was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record holding that when court applies the clearly erroneous standard court may not reverse boards finding of fact if after court reviews the record in its entirety the finding is supported by a plausible basis holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record holding that a finding of fact is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole if it would have been possible for a reasonable jury to reach the boards conclusion