to [the Neils] consistent with HAMP guidelines.” Wigod, 673 F.3d at 565. All this persuades me that there are genuine disputes of material fact regarding both whether the Neils made misrepresentations or otherwise failed to meet the conditions of the TPP, and the timing of when the relevant determinations occurred, and thus the district court should have denied summary judgment for Wells Fargo on this record. See Bolone v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 858 F.Supp.2d 825, 833 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (considering whether the plaintiff failed to comply with the terms of the TPP by not submitting proof of income documents and finding that a genuine dispute of fact existed in light of conflicting evidence). See also Nash v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 943 F.Supp.2d 640, 647 (E.D. Va. 2013) (<HOLDING>). I would vacate the judgment on the Neils’
holding the question of necessity is one of mixed law and fact and accordingly one for the fact finder in the ordinary case recognizing that under district of columbia law  what the parties deem to be the material elements of their agreement  either set forth in or absent from those documents is largely a question of fact for the jury  and concluding in that case that whether an enforceable oral contract was created and was subsequently breached is a question of fact for the jury to decide not this court holding that the issue of proximate causation involves application of law to fact which should be left to the fact finder subject to limited review holding it is a question of fact holding that the facts asserted that a breach of contract may have occurred under virginia law based on a tpp agreement but concluding the question is best left to the finder of fact