a limited right in the secured creditor to the sale proceeds of the licenses. Id. at 380. Her decision not to recognize even such a circumscribed right, therefore, was based upon an implicit assumption — and in the bankruptcy court’s view, an erroneous one — that broadcasting licenses do not qualify as property of the estate. Id. We decline to adopt the rationale of Ridgely for two reasons. First, contrary to Ridgely’s interpretation, Judge Crabb did not reject the notion that a broadcasting license may fall within the broad range of assets that qualify as property of the estate. Indeed, she expressly assumed that it did constitute property of the estate. See 138 B.R. at 576 (citing In re Fugazy Express, Inc., 114 B.R. 865 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1990), aff'd, 124 B.R. 426 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (<HOLDING>), appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction,
holding that a professionals license is a protected property interest holding that a debtors interest in a tenancy by the entirety is property of the bankruptcy estate under section 541 because of debtors undivided present interests in the use possession income and right of survivorship of the property holding that funds held in escrow are property of the estate only to the extent of the debtors independent right to that property holding that the debtors interest in a broadcasting license constitutes property of the estate holding that a broadcasting license was property of the estate but not subject to a security interest