else. And because the Government will argue for the death penalty based in part on Wilson’s alleged future dangerousness, this court must give Wilson “fair opportunity to present argument as to the adequacy of the information to establish the existence” of that aggravating factor. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c). United States v. Wilson, 493 F.Supp.2d 491, 508 (E.D.N.Y.2007). The Wilson court, however, prohibited testimony about any specific institutions as unduly speculative. Id. The evidence would be especially important in rebuttal because the FDPA and Constitution both require Defendant have a fair opportunity to rebut the government’s evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977); Davis v. Coyle, 475 F.3d 761, 771 (6th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); see also Johnson, supra, 223 F.3d at 674-75.
holding that a state may consider and rely upon a defendants future dangerousness in its decision to seek a death sentence holding state court improperly refused to admit evidence of defendants adaptation to prison because it was clearly relevant to future dangerousness holding that trial court had discretion to admit relevant photographs in penalty phase holding that a jury does not invade the province of the board when it determines the probability of a capital defendants future dangerousness recognizing that the district court has discretion to admit or deny motive evidence