a legacy is deemed specific, courts prefer to construe a bequest as general or demonstrative. Chalkwater v. Dolly, 108 Md.App. 539, 672 A.2d 673, 676 (1996). Appellant argues that the testator’s intent must be ignored in determining whether a specific bequest is adeemed. Appellant correctly notes that this is the rule in the majority of states. In re Estate of Hume, 984 S.W.2d 602, 604-05 (Tenn.1999). But this rule applies only after a court determines that a bequest is specific. Id. (concluding that the specific bequest was adeemed). The theory behind ademption by extinction is that when a testator makes a specific bequest, he or she intends the bequest to fail when the designated asset is no longer part of the estate. Wasserman v. Cohen, 414 Mass. 172, 606 N.E.2d 901, 902-03 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, a testator’s intent is relevant in
holding that as matter of law plaintiff did not show present donative intent because donor intended for property to remain his until his death recognizing that the government may seek a personal judgment specific property or substitute property holding that as matter of law present donative intent not shown because donor intended for property to remain his until his death holding that the doctrine of ademption seeks to give effect to a testators probable intent by presuming he intended to extinguish a specific gift of property when he disposed of that property prior to his death holding that where congressional intent is clear a court must give effect to such intent