in the eyes of the jury. But, because of the prosecution’s suppression, Kohring did not have the opportunity to cross-examine or impeach Smith as to that account. Taken together, the newly-disclosed information is material and, as a result, the prosecution violated Brady/Giglio. Ill We are left to decide the appropriate remedy. The government clearly should have disclosed a substantial amount of the information in question. However, we do not have sufficient evidence to conclude the prosecution “acted flagrantly, willfully, and in bad faith.” See United States v. Chapman, 524 F.3d 1073, 1085 (9th Cir.2008). As a result, we do not exercise our supervisory authority by dismissing the Superceding Indictment. See id. (citing United States v. Kearns, 5 F.3d 1251, 1255 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>)). Nor are we able to conclude that the
holding negligent misrepresentation sufficient holding that for a plaintiff to recover on claim of negligent hiring the negligent hiring of the employee must have been the proximate cause of the injury at issue holding that even though the governments conduct may have been negligent or even grossly negligent it did not rise to the level of flagrant misconduct recognizing as viable actions in tort negligent hiring and negligent retention holding that section 4149 did not apply to the plaintiffs state law claims of breach of duty to protect foster care children from harm and of negligent supervision negligent entrustment and negligent failure to warn