that weaving within one’s lane for substantial distances creates reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence, the court held that “pronounced weaving within a lane provides an officer with reasonable cause to stop a vehicle on suspicion of driving under the influence where such weaving continues for a substantial distance.” Id. at 778 (emphasis added). Here, Estrada-Nava and Colin did not demonstrate “pronounced weaving” of up to two feet in either direction, or weave for a “substantial distance.” In fact, the only “suspicious” behavior Carmichael observed was Estrada-Nava and Colin’s car touching the right fog line and the center yellow line each for 10 seconds, after legitimate lane changes. This is hardly “pronounced weaving.” See State v. Caron, 534 A.2d 978, 979 (Me.1987) (<HOLDING>); State v. Bello, 871 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah
holding that an officers reasonable mistake of law can give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a traffic stop under the fourth amendment holding that there was not reasonable suspicion to justify a stop because a vehicles one time straddling of the center line of an undivided highway is a common occurrence holding that observations of a driver swerving from the outside lane straddling the center line and then swerving back to the outside lane gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the driver was driving under the influence holding that notwithstanding the officers testimony that he had no suspicion of criminality the officer was aware of facts that would give rise to reasonable suspicion in the mind of a reasonable officer holding that single brief straddling of the center line of the undivided highway with no oncoming traffic in sight and no vehicles passing on the left  did not give rise to an objectively reasonable suspicion of intoxication or fatigue