defendant, he should not be treated differently from a media defendant. To support his argument, Jesus relies on a dissenting opinion written by Justice Brennan in the United States Supreme Court. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 28 n. 2, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 2708 n. 2, 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Regardless of the merits of Justice Brennan’s argument in his dissent, we are bound to follow the majority decisions of the United States Supreme Court on questions of federal constitutional law. Ex Parte Twedell, 158 Tex. 214, 309 S.W.2d 834, 844 (1958). The United States Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between media and non-media defendants. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776-77, 106 S.Ct. 1558, 1564, 89 L.Ed.2d 783 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
holding that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity where the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that speech was public concern holding that in a defamation case against a media defendant for speech of public concern there is a constitutional requirement that the plaintiff bear the burden of showing falsity as well as fault before recovering damages holding commonlaw presumption that defamatory speech is false cannot stand when plaintiff sues media defendant for speech of public concern holding that when a person reports cases of possible patient abuse that speech is a matter of public concern recognizing that code is speech