the sentencing decision is properly channeled. McCleskey v. Kem.p, 481 U.S. 279, 307 n. 28, 313, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 1775 n. 28, 1778, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987). As noted above, Pennsylvania’s death penalty statute appropriately limits the discretion involved in both seeking and imposing the death penalty, setting forth objective criteria in the form of aggravating circumstances that are completely unrelated to the socioeconomic status of the defendant. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d). Moreover, Crews does not demonstrate or, for that matter allege, how prosecutorial discretion was abused in the selection of cases in which the death penalty was sought. Hence, his claim in this regard lacks a necessary foundation and is, therefore, merit-less. See Hardcastle, 519 Pa. at 258, 546 A.2d at 1111 (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. DeHart, 512 Pa. 235, 261-62,
recognizing that although there were no limits placed on the defense counsels preparation it was surely reasonable for the defense to assume that there was no reason to present argument or evidence directed at whether the death penalty was either appropriate or permissible where the prosecution never argued for the application of the death penalty holding that the equal protection clause also prohibits discrimination in jury selection on the basis of gender holding that absent some showing that prosecutorial discretion was abused in the selection of cases in which the death penalty was sought there is no basis for either a claim under the eighth amendment or a claim under the equal protection clause holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause holding that an equal protection claim was no more than a first amendment claim dressed in equal protection clothing and was thus subsumed by and coextensive with the first amendment claim