from an [aircraft] while in flight, whether done intentionally or unintentionally.” Green v. Zimmerman, 269 S.C. 535, 238 S.E.2d 323, 324 (1977) (emphasis added). Normally, the Court’s analysis would end there. Erickson, however, makes an argument that § 305 is not as straightforward as it may seem. Erickson points out that § 305 applies only for injuries to persons and property on the ground, to the exclusion of those persons participating in the flight, i.e., pilots and passengers. Erickson also points out this statutory policy is entirely consistent with the common law bar on participants seeking to assert absolute liability under the law of ultrahazar-dous activities. See, e.g., Whitlock v. Duke Univ, D.N.C., 637 F.Supp. 1463, 1475 (1986), aff'd, 4th Cir., 829 F.2d 1340 (1987) (<HOLDING>). While one is tempted to seize with relief
holding that diver participating in decompression experiments could not assert absolute liability claim under law of ultrahazardous activities holding that compulsion is a defense to absolute liability traffic offenses holding that the prosecutors activities in preparing and filing an information and motion for an arrest warrant were protected by absolute immunity holding that njeither the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is absolute and congress may prohibit federal employees from participating in political activities in view of its interest in maintaining a nonpartisan work force holding that the considerations underlying absolute prosecutorial immunity at common law dictate the same absolute immunity under  1983