must disagree with the District Court on this point because, as noted above, the presence or absence of property rights under state law is not dispositive of the question whether a person has a property interest protected by substantive due process. We reach the same conclusion concerning the question whether the defendants’ alleged campaign of harassment against the plaintiffs would “shock the contemporary conscience.” Again, the state court found only that Desi’s was a common nuisance under state law and that the defendants were justified in believing Desi’s to be such. It does not follow from the state court’s findings that the defendants’ alleged act of singling out Desi’s for harsher treatment with the goal of driving African-Americans and Latinos out of W 0, 312 (6th Cir. 1996) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Rooker-Feldman does not apply to
holding that question of whether former employer was entitled to preliminary injunction ordering former employees to comply with noncompetition provisions of employment agreements was moot since the noncompetition restriction expired by time of appeal holding that where a noncompetition clause in a contract had expired by its own terms the plaintiffs appeal from the district courts denial of the plaintiffs request for a preliminary injunction enforcing the clause was moot holding that plaintiffs were not entitled to a preliminary injunction holding that where a district courts preliminary injunction preventing the appellant from terminating its agreement with the defendant had expired the appellants appeal of the district courts decision to grant that injunction was moot holding plaintiffs appeal of the denial of a preliminary injunction moot where defendants directive no longer in effect