Copus v. City of Edgerton, 151 F.3d 646, 649 (7th Cir.1998) (probation officers). Benson concedes that the defendants’ actions were sufficiently associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process such that, to the extent immunity should attach, absolute rather than qualified immunity would be appropriate. He contends, however, that “the complete lack of [personal and subject matter jurisdiction] from and after the expiration of [his] parole eliminates the ... absolute immunity with which [the] defendants would otherwise be cloaked.” In support of his contention, he relies on cases establishing that judges who act in the “clear absence of jurisdiction” are not entitled to absolute immunity. See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) (<HOLDING>). A quick review of the case law in this area
holding that a defendant was not entitled to a relief under section 2255 when he asserted that the sentencing judge who was not the trial judge was influenced by the sentence imposed by the trial judge on a codefendant holding that a judge was not entitled to absolute immunity for firing an employee holding that judge who ruled on parents petition requesting that tubal ligation be performed on a minor was entitled to absolute immunity because the court upon which the judge sat was implicitly granted subject matter jurisdiction over such petitions recognizing grounds for mistrial had assistant judge testified in trial upon which he sat holding that the fact that a judge had ruled against the defendant is not a basis for finding the judge prejudiced