redacted from the certificate the words “violent felony offense” as well as the sentence imposed. The nature of Vonneida’s prior offense could thus be inferred only to a limited extent from the district court taking judicial notice of the 1989 definition of first degree sexual abuse. Under these circumstances, we cannot say the district court abused its broad discretion, see United States v. Miller, 626 F.3d 682, 687-88 (2d Cir.2010), in deciding to admit this one limited piece of propensity evidence, among the many more inflammatory options available. Furthermore, under Rule 414, Vonneida’s propensity to commit child molestation was probative of his intent that a minor engage in criminal sexual activity, which was centrally disputed in this case. We similarly dismiss (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). III. Sentencing Finally, Vonneida asserts
holding that defendant could stipulate to prior dwi convictions holding that double jeopardy precludes dual convictions for felon in possession of a firearm and felon in possession of separate ammunition because section 790231 florida statutes prohibits possession of  any firearm ammunition or electric weapon or device emphasis in original holding district court lacked discretion to permit defendant to stipulate to prior conviction in prosecution for being a felon in possession of a firearm holding that a defendants prior conviction for possession of a controlled substance and felon in possession of a firearm helped support probable cause to search his motel room for evidence of burglary holding alford plea admissible in prosecution for felon in possession of firearm