errors that “undermin[e] the fairness of a criminal proceeding as a whole ... require[ ] reversal without regard to the mistake’s effect on the proceeding.” See United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004). The statutory error asserted here is not so fundamental. Additionally, there is no “strong support” in the operable statute to suggest an “implied repeal” of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52, which requires us to disregard errors that do not affect substantial rights. See Zedner v. United States, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 1976, 1989, 164 L.Ed.2d 749 (2006). In support of his argument that the error here is structural, Fields cites a line of Fourth Circuit cases. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 544 F.2d 1215, 1218 (4th Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>). This line of cases is inap-posite. They all
holding that the existence of a written contract gives rise to the presumption that the parties have reduced their prior agreements to writing holding that an attorneys conflict of interest gives rise to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the sixth amendment and establishes prejudice per se holding that failure to appoint a second expert to examine the defendants mental competency to stand trial is not fundamental error holding that failure to appoint second counsel under section 3005 gives rise to an irrebuttable presumption of prejudice recognizing irrebuttable presumption as synonymous with conclusive presumption which is a presumption that cannot be overcome by any additional evidence or argument because it is accepted as irrefutable proof that establishes a fact beyond dispute