about what a presentence investigation report would have recommended would, if proven, warrant relief. In fact, Taylor’s factual assertion that he was sentenced beyond that which was or would have been recommended is indistinguishable from the similarly unpersuasive assertion in Lindsey that the trial court imposed a sentence nine times longer than that recommended by the State. 996 S.W.2d at 579. We are not persuaded, therefore, that Taylor’s Motion alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that the trial court actually considered his judicial challenges in imposing the maximum sentence. In short, Taylor has not alleged facts that would, if proven, establish that retaliation was a “determinative factor” in the trial court’s imposition of sentence. See Morrow, 21 S.W.3d at 823-24 (<HOLDING>). Even were we to conclude that Taylor’s Motion
holding that the state courts determination that the petitioner could not show prejudice because he did not allege that the witness was available to testify was a reasonable application of federal law to the facts of the case holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial holding petitioners failure to present any witnesses or submit the trial record into evidence at hearing led to conclusion that petitioner did not meet his burden of proof for postconviction relief holding that an evidentiary hearing was not required on a postconviction motion because the movant did not allege facts sufficient to establish each of the necessary elements of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on an allegation of failure to investigate and call witnesses holding that where movant alleged the names of uncalled witnesses and them anticipated testimony which would have been relevant mitigation evidence in the penalty phase but did not allege that trial counsel knew of the witnesses or that the witnesses were available to testify at trial the movant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his postconviction relief motion because he did not allege facts sufficient to satisfy the standard applicable to his claim