petitioner had ruled out alternative causes for his alleged vaccine injury. The special master did not apply the law correctly in this instance. The binding precedent of de Bazan, 539 F.3d at 1352 n. 3, Walther, 485 F.3d at 1151, and Pafford, 451 F.3d at 1357-59, permits a petitioner to rule out alternative causes as a supplement to other evidence that goes to the three Althen prongs. Here, the court has no finding of the special master as to whether or not petitioner successfully ruled out alternative causes for Jessie’s illness, and it cannot determine whether such a finding would have aided petitioner in meeting his burden to establish a prima facie case. Because the special master’s legal analysis was deficient in this respect, remand is required. See Walther, 485 F.3d at 1151 (<HOLDING>) (citation and footnote omitted). The court
holding the plaintiff satisfies the burden of a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence holding that a prima facie case is subject to independent review holding that although a jury instruction that included the phrase prima facie case and referred to defendants burden of production created a distinct risk of confusing the jury in certain instances it would be appropriate to instruct the jury on the elements of a prima facie case holding that the question of causation in a prima facie case of retaliation brought under general statutes  46a60 is factual in nature and thereby subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review holding that a petitioner is certainly permitted to use evidence eliminating other potential causes to help carry the burden on causation and may find it necessary to do so when the other evidence on causation is insufficient to make out a prima facie case and in such instances clearly the special master must evaluate what evidence a claimant presents as part of determining whether the claimant makes a prima facie case