Collinson, 895 F.2d at 998 (Phillips, J., concurring). The first two prongs of this inquiry are pure questions of law for the court to decide. See id. (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 637-43, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3038-40, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 535 n. 12, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2820 n. 12, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). The third prong is an application of Harlow’s objective standard, which sometimes requires courts to make factual determinations concerning a defendant’s conduct and its circumstances, but ultimately it, too, devolves into a matter of law for the court. See Collinson, 895 F.2d at 998 (Phillips, J., concurring); Creighton, 483 U.S. at 646 n. 6, 107 S.Ct. at 3042 n. 6. Id. at 1157. See also Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 826-28 (3d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Where a defendant asserts a qualified
holding that if official has violated clearly established law he is entitled to qualified immunity only if reasonable official could have believed conduct was lawful holding that in determining whether a state officer is entitled to qualified immunity for  1983 purposes courts may not consider whether the constitutional right was clearly established before determining first that a constitutional right was violated holding that second element of qualified immunity test is whether the law violated was clearly established holding that in deciding whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity it is not only the evidence of clearly established law that is for the court but also whether a reasonable officer could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful in light of the information the officer had holding that although jury found officer not to have had probable cause for arrest officer was entitled to immunity because law was not clearly established as to circumstances in which officer found himself