of this case and, therefore, prohibits Peters’s testimony from being considered, we disagree. Unlike the situation in Durbin, the interpreter, Andrade, testified and was subject to cross-examination in this case. The record also contains some evidence that Andrade was fluent in Spanish. Further sion of translated testimony in appropriate circumstances assuring its reliability, on the theory that the interpreter serves as an agent of, or a language conduit for, the declarant. See, e.g., United States v. Cordero, 18 F.3d 1248, 1252 (5th Cir.1994) (stating that except in unusual circumstances, an interpreter is no more than a language conduit and therefore his translation does not create an additional level of hearsay); United States v. Da Silva, 725 F.2d 828, 831 (2d Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); People v. Gutierrez, 916 P.2d 598, 600-01
holding that dependent upon the circumstances of the case a defendants deportability could be viewed as either a mitigating or an aggravating factor holding that translator may in some circumstances be viewed as an agent of defendant thus translation attributable to defendant as her own admission holding that expert testimony of irs agent regarding tax liability did not usurp the function of the jury as agent did not give her opinion about the guilt of the defendant holding that plaintiffs evidence showing that defendant refused to allow her to work as flight attendant because of her weight failed to demonstrate that defendant perceived her as substantially limited in any major life activity holding that both agent and principal will be liable when the agent acts within the scope of his employment but for his own purposes