Courts interpreting § 111(d) have accorded it a sweeping breadth. See Conyers v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd,., 388 F.3d 1380, 1382 (Fed.Cir.2004) (concluding that the ATSA § 111(d) “notwithstanding” clause “renders inapplicable general federal statutes that otherwise would apply to the Under Secretary’s power to ‘employ, appoint, discipline, terminate, and fix the compensation terms, and conditions of employment of Federal service’ for screener positions”); Tucker, 322 F.Supp.2d at 743 (concluding same); see also AFGE v. FLRA, 46 F.3d 73, 76 (D.C.Cir.1995) (collecting cases where the statutory phrase “notwithstanding any other provision of law” was found to vest broad discretion in a federal agency); cf. Nabozny v. NCS Pearson, Inc., 270 F.Supp.2d 1201, 1204 (D.Nev.2003) (Hunt, J.) (<HOLDING>). Springs argues that if § 111(d) does in fact
holding that a provision making all payments to subcontractor by  contractor expressly contingent upon payment for the work by contractor from owner is a payifpaid clause under texas law holding that a proper party must have responsibility to administer or to enforce the law holding that private contractor failed to demonstrate that claims against it required reexamination of a military decision holding that the atsa contains no civil remedies to enforce the veterans preference provision in a case brought against a private contractor engaged by tsa to administer screening tests to applicants for employment as airport security screeners holding that there was no federal subject matter jurisdiction under the private cause of action provision of the act