to initiate an adversary proceeding. As dictated by these Rules, Lawler should have filed a Complaint, paid the appropriate filing fee and secured the issuance of a Summons; he took none of these steps. See, Fuerst v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 5 B.R. 47 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1980) (objection to Discharge dismissed because although the pleading was denominated a complaint, no filing fee was paid and no summons sent); In re Ennis, 50 B.R. 119 (Bankr.Nev.1985) (request for an injunction is an adversary proceeding). As pled by Lawler, the allegations of professional malpractice were solely a defense to the claim filed by Guild. Agger v. Seaboard Allied Milling Cory. (In re Cushman Bakery), 526 F.2d 23, 35 (1st Cir.1975) cert. denied 425 U.S. 937, 96 S.Ct. 1670, 48 L.Ed.2d 178 (1976) (<HOLDING>) When Guild withdrew its claim, Lawler received
holding that a trustees objection to the allowance of a claim is manifestly not the institution of a proceeding that will entitle the trustee to recover on behalf of the estate holding that a trustee in a proceeding under chapter x of the bankruptcy act did not have standing to assert on behalf of the holders of debentures issued by the bankrupt in reorganization various negligence claims against an indenture trustee holding claimant waived right to jury trial on claims brought against it on behalf of bankruptcy estate when it submitted its proof of claim against the estate and subjected itself to the equitable powers of the bankruptcy court holding that the bankruptcy code endows the bankruptcy trustee with the exclusive right to sue on behalf of the estate holding that trustee and personnel liability policy only covered the trustees and not the school itself