to further his own goals and sexual gratification; (5) divulged confidences to Linda; and (6) disregarded "all indicia of the transference and countertransference phenomena which normally occurs in the course of psychotherapy.” We note, initially, that each of these allegations is based, in part, on an underlying allegation of fraud. The trial judge has permitted the plaintiff to replead a separate fraud count, the allegations of which essentially duplicate the ones above. Fraud is a distinct cause of action in Illinois. To that extent, we do not believe the allegations of fraud are germane to a count alleging professional negligence, be it that of a psychotherapist or a cleric. Cf. Williams v. Chicago Osteopathic Health Systems, 274 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 1048, 654 N.E.2d 613 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we address the count for
recognizing that even when a prisoner files suit under section 1983 alleging medical malpractice against prison medical officials medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner recognizing differing elements and standard of proof between medical malpractice and fraud holding that plaintiffs could not sue attorneys for legal malpractice so long as underlying medical malpractice action out of which legal malpractice claim arose was still pending on appeal holding that the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof applicable in fraud actions does not apply to the proof of misrepresentations under ors 743612 holding the provisions of a comprehensive medical malpractice act unconstitutional