record. By her own candid admission, Young disclosed plaintiffs pregnancy to Sarah, plaintiff’s sister, because Sarah was both plaintiff’s sister and Young’s friend. Young assumed, albeit incorrectly, that plaintiff had already related the information to Sarah. Young was in no way motivated to serve the hospital. As the dissent correctly reasoned, “nothing in the record supports an inference that Young was attempting to benefit or serve her employer when she divulged plaintiff’s medical records. In fact, such disclosure was in direct contravention to the confidentiality agreements and did nothing to further the business of Illini Hospital.” 363 Ill. App. 3d at 925 (Turner, P.J., dissenting). We agree and so hold. See, e.g., Hentges v. Thomford, 569 N.W.2d 424, 427-29 (Minn. App. 1997) (<HOLDING>). Although summary judgment is generally
holding that employeeminister was not motivated by purpose to serve employercongregation when he accidentally shot parishioner during deer hunting holding that a fleeing suspect in a car was seized only when an officer actually shot him not when several officers previously shot his vehicles tires in an effort to stop him holding that the erroneous admission of a hearsay statement that identified the defendant as the shooter was harmless where the defendant never contested that he shot the gun but claimed only that he shot in selfdefense holding that scope of employment was an issue for the jury where a chicago police officer was off duty but within the city limits when he shot the plaintiff holding that a police officers words during an assault make clear that he was motivated by a protected ground