of his habeas petition and, despite its jurisdictional doubts, the district court released Herrera-Castanola on bond pending the resolution of this appeal. We hold that the district court erred in finding that Herrera-Castanola was no longer in custody. A petitioner remains in custody so long as he is subject to “restraints not shared by the public generally that significantly confine and restrain [his] freedom.” Miranda v. Reno, 238 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir.2001) (quoting Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240, 83 S.Ct. 373, 9 L.Ed.2d 285 (1963)). Herrera-Castanola has been subject to continual restraint. Since he filed his habeas petition he has been either physically in custody or released on bail. See Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351, 93 S.Ct. 1571, 36 L.Ed.2d 294 (1973) (<HOLDING>). He did not experience a legally cognizable
holding that prisoner could not file a petition for mandamus challenging the bops determination that he was ineligible to be considered for a reduction in his sentence although bourkes success on this claim would not necessarily result in his being released any earlier it would raise that possibility and thus have a probabilistic impact upon the duration of his custody holding that district court lacked jurisdiction over habeas petition by federal prisoner seeking to challenge ins detainer because detainer is merely a notice and lodging thereof does not constitute custody for habeas purposes holding that a prisoner released on his own recognizance is subject to restraints not shared by the public generally and thus remains in custody for habeas purposes holding that habeas review is  for any alien held in custody pursuant to an order of deportation holding that habeas is the proper vehicle for presenting a claim if but only if the prisoner is seeking to get out of custody in a meaningful sense