and seizure issue in the habeas court did not itself constitute an impermissible second prosecution: the ha-beas proceeding is not initiated by the State, and can in no way be likened to a second attempt to convict the petitioner for a single offense. Finally, relitigation of the search and seizure issue could not subject Pinkney to any additional jeopardy. Had the habeas court affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision that search of Pink-ney’s car was unconstitutional, Pinkney would have been left in no worse a position than if the issue had not been relitigated. However, because he lost on that issue, he will remain in custody under the jury’s original verdict of conviction, a permissible result under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Cf. Wilson, 420 U.S. at 344-45, 95 S.Ct. at 1022-23 (<HOLDING>). We therefore conclude that no double jeopardy
holding where a defendant successfully challenges a conviction on appeal jeopardy does not terminate holding that where a conviction is reversed after trial the double jeopardy clause does not bar a government appeal that if successful would only reinstate the conviction and would not subject defendant to a second trial holding that where juror did not disclose that she had an interest in the conviction of the defendant probable prejudice is shown and the conviction must be reversed holding that the government may appeal a postverdict ruling without violating double jeopardy where the appeal does not result in a new trial holding double jeopardy does not bar second trial after granting of new trial for reason other than insufficiency of evidence