of Omaha for that particular post. In sum, Vincent’s testimony about a third party’s statement does not suffice to survive summary judgment. As discussed above, Vincent’s burden at this stage was not onerous. Vincent had only to set forth facts adequate to permit an inference of discrimination in order to survive summary judgment. Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1562. Vincent, however, provided the Court with nothing more than unsupported, uncorroborated allegations. It is undisputed that a nonmovant may not rely on mere allegations to avoid entry of summary judgment. Moses v. American Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446, 447 (11th Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 117 S.Ct. 964, 136 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997); see also Carter v. Three Springs Residential Treatment, 132 F.3d 635, 642 n. 6 (11th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). The Court will briefly address Vincent’s
holding that eonclusory and generalized allegations of racial bias such as there was a racially biased attitude by management towards minority black employees were properly struck by the district court holding that a reasonable jury could conclude that there was a racially hostile work environment when plaintiff was subjected to several statements involving racial epithets and a nude black doll was hung from a noose in his locker holding that unequivocal examples of racial animus included instances when plaintiff was instructed to keep his black ass off the phone and was called a black son of a bitch and a black motherfucker holding there was no constitutional presumption of juror bias where counsel asked the district court to make an inquiry into potential prejudice because the defendant was black and the prospective jurors were white holding unconstitutional a free transfer provision by which students were allowed to transfer solely on a racial basis from the school to which they had been assigned by virtue of redistricting if they were in a racial minority in their new school