thereafter advanced developmentally.” (Appellant’s Br. 29 (citation omitted).) Bernstein’s declaration simply does not support that contention. It neither says explicitly nor even intimates obliquely that Each at any time, either before or during her years at Hose’s house, suffered from incapacity, as we restrictively understood that term in Miller. See 463 F.3d at 275 (noting that Henry Miller’s “profound mental retardation prevented him from any awareness of his injury or its cause” (emphasis supplied)). Indeed, even Each’s troubled state before she began living with Hose and her subsequent prolonged subservience to him is a far cry from the total mental disability of plaintiffs in other accrual-delay cases. E.g., Washington v. United States, 769 F.2d 1436, 1438-39 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); Clifford by Clifford v. United States, 738
holding that the cause of action accrued on the date of sale holding that the employee was acting within the course of her employment when she died while returning from the workrelated session because her death occurred on a public highway which was brought within the scope of her employment by her employers requirement that she attend training at the state police academy holding that the statute of limitations accrued when the minors father was appointed his guardian and not when the minor became comatose holding that a federal cause of action accrues when the plaintiff is aware or should be aware of the existence of and source of the injury not when the potential claimant knows or should know that the injury constitutes a legal wrong holding that a claim accrued when a comatose patient died not when she fell into a yearslong coma because the plaintiff was never aware of her injury or its cause