qualified for the position, (3) he was discharged, and (4) the employer replaced him with a person who was not a member of a minority group.” Id. The precise requirements of a prima facie case can vary depending on the context and were “never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.” Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 57 L. Ed. 2d 957, 967 (1978). “Aprima facie case of discrimination may... be made out by showing the discharge of [a minority employee] and the retention of [a majority employee] under apparently similar circumstances.” Gibson, 308 N.C. at 137, 301 S.E.2d at 83. More recently, the United States Supreme Court has evidenced an intent to ease the burden of proving discrimination. Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101, 156 L. Ed. 2d 84, 95 (2003) (<HOLDING>). Making a prima facie case is not the same as
holding that suspension with pay was not adverse employment action holding that termination is an adverse employment action holding that an unrealized risk of future adverse action even if formalized is too ephemeral to constitute an adverse employment action holding that each incident of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision constitutes a separate actionable unlawful employment practice  for which an administrative charge must be filed holding that discrimination is unlawful even if only one of several motives for adverse employment action