we refer to the constitutionally and/or statutorily anchored Pennsylvania policies solely as “public allowance of appeal was to determine whether sexual harassment constitutes sex discrimination under Pennsylvania law, Employer has not addressed this issue in his brief, and therefore has waived any argument on this point. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Therefore, for purposes of this opinion, we assume that sexual harassment constitutes a form of sex discrimination under Pennsylvania law, consistent with the Pennsylvania Human Relation Commission's guidelines. See PHRC Sexual Harassment Guidelines, 11 Pa. Bull. 522 (Jan. 31, 1981) ("Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of the [PHRA]”). See also Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Specifically, employer is defined, in
holding that under federal law without question when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinates sex that supervisor discriminates on the basis of sex holding that allegations of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation necessarily state a claim of discrimination on the basis of sex recognizing that a plaintiff can demonstrate that samesex harassment is because of sex by showing that the conduct was motivated by the coworkers sexual desire for persons of the same sex holding that conduct that a jury finds to be based on sex and not motivated by nondiscriminatory reasons cannot later be found by a district court to lack an intent to discriminate on the basis of sex holding that transsexuals are not a protected class under title vii in response to the plaintiffs argument that because a persons identity as a transsexual is directly connected to the sex organs she possesses discrimination on this basis must constitute discrimination because of sex