108 S.Ct. at 1846. The reasoning underlying Monessen was that prejudgment interest is a part of damages, which are “inseparably connected with the right of action” under FELA. Id. at 335, 108 S.Ct. at 1842. This holding is consistent with our case law distinguishing prejudgment interest, which is considered to be part of compensatory damages, from costs and disbursements, which do not compensate for injury. See Lienhard v. State, 431 N.W.2d 861, 864-65 (Minn.1988) (distinguishing prejudgment interest, which is “directly proportional to the magnitude of damages sustained by the claimant,” from costs and disbursements, which “are not part of the claim for compensation of personal injury”); see also State ex rel. Burnquist v. Miller Home Dev., 243 Minn. 1, 7, 65 N.W.2d 900, 904 (1954) (<HOLDING>)." Unlike prejudgment interest, an award of
holding that orcp 68 defines costs and disbursements for purposes of dissolution actions holding that moving costs are a proper element of damages holding that costs and disbursements are a procedural element separate from the concept of just compensation under the minnesota constitution holding that investigatory costs are considered costs of response under cercla holding that the workers compensation act does not violate either the united states or minnesota constitution despite employees waiver of the right to a jury trial and providing employers with exemption from commonlaw liabilities