appellant]”). Because Mr. Grant challenged the arbi-trability of Ms. Rotolante’s claims at the outset of the arbitration proceedings, his motion to vacate was not subject to the three-month statute of limitations under 9 U.S.C. § 12. See Solvay Pharm., Inc. v. Duramed Pharm., Inc., 442 F.3d 471, 478 n. 6 (6th Cir.2006) (noting that challenge to arbitrability may manifest itself as attack on arbitration award under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) or as motion resisting petition to compel arbitration under 9 U.S.C § 4 when challenge occurs after arbitration, but “[w]hen the challenge occurs prior to the arbitration, there is no question that the issue is one of arbitrability, for no award yet exists to be challenged”); see also Lucey v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 305 Fed.Appx. 875 (3d Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); Lukens Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers of
holding that an arbitration clause was not unconscionable because it did not unreasonably favor the defendants holding that contractors failure to file motion to vacate arbitrators decision did not waive challenge to written arbitration clause as unconscionable where contractor raised objection to arbitration and validity of provision holding an entire arbitration clause is void and arbitration cannot be compelled where contract contained unconscionable clause and has a nonseverability clause holding that the party did not waive its right to enforce the arbitration clause holding that a later concession to strike an unconscionable term does not change the fact that the arbitration agreement as written is unconscionable and contrary to public policy