claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) and federal and state civil rights statutes against various courts and judges, the County of Marin, several county law enforcement officers and deputy district attorneys, his ex-wife, and the attorney who represented her in child custody proceedings. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. After de novo review, Wagh v. Metris Direct, Inc, 363 F.3d 821, 825 (9th Cir.2003), we affirm. The district court properly dismissed Fahy’s RICO claims because, even after two opportunities to amend his complaint, Fahy, a licensed attorney, failed to allege with sufficient particularity a pattern of racketeering activity cognizable under the RICO statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.; Wagh, 363 F.3d at 828 (<HOLDING>). The district court properly dismissed Fahy’s
holding that californias ucl claims are subject to rule 9b pleading standards holding that the fact that federal rule of civil procedure 9b requires a heightened pleading standard for some claims but not for a section 1983 claim against a municipality means that the rules do not require a heightened pleading standard for such a claim holding that heightened pleading standards do not apply to defamation actions holding that heightened pleading standards of fed rcivp 9b apply to fraud elements of rico claim holding that rule 9bs heightened pleading requirement applies to allegations of mail and wire fraud used as predicate acts for a rico claim