in a democratic society.’ ” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3324, 82 L.Ed.2d 556, 569 (1984) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205, 45 L.Ed.2d 343, 354 (1975)). We have frequently described our test for standing by identifying two elements. A plaintiff “ ‘must (1) have a specific personal or legal interest in the litigation and (2) be injuriously affected.’ ” Alons, 698 N.W.2d at 864 (quoting Citizens for Responsible Choices v. City of Shenandoah, 686 5) (citing federal test for standing with approval). In fact, our doctrine on standing parallels the federal doctrine, even though standing under federal law is fundamentally derived from constitutional strictures not directly found in the Iowa Constitution. See Alons, 698 N.W.2d at 867, 869 (<HOLDING>). Most all jurisdictions around the country
recognizing the power of federal courts to decide cases is restricted by the cases and controversies clause of article iii holding that the eleventh amendment bars con gress from using its power under the indian commerce clause of article i to expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts under article iii recognizing that the federal litigant has a personal right subject to exceptions in certain classes of cases to demand article iii adjudication of a civil suit recognizing power of district courts to control movement of cases from filing to final disposition holding that the requirements of article iii are consistent with the establishment by congress of nonarticle iii courts to enforce federal criminal laws in clause 17 federal enclaves