is necessarily tentative, given the lack of extensive briefing on this question. But it cannot be dismissed as unnecessary-certainly not by the majority, which has resolved the question I am addressing (albeit implicitly and for the sake of argument) while declining to order further briefing on it. Thus, the discussion set forth here is a response to both Winward's insistence that an "egregious injustice" exception exists and the majority's invocation and implicit adoption of that exception. My point is simply that if we accept the propriety of the court's decision to evaluate and apply an extra-statutory exception, it would have to be under the constitution, and Winward's case would fail on its merits under that framework. 12 . See Delaney v. Matesanz, 264 F.3d 7, 12 (1st Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Zuniga, 772 A.2d 1028,
holding that  106a  b offend the eleventh amendment holding that aedpasthe federal analogue to utahs pcraoneyear limitation does not offend the federal suspension clause and citing eleventh second fifth and tenth circuit court cases in accord holding that the second amendment imposes a limitation on only federal not state legislative efforts holding that state defendant waived eleventh amendment immunity to a federal claim by removing to federal court holding the language of  5518e insufficient as a waiver of eleventh amendment immunity to federal claims in federal court