injuries to both elbows in an accident in which defendants played no part, he was directed to put on a jumpsuit and wear a "black box” mechanical restraint device on his wrists, and was not provided with assistance to feed or bathe himself — all of which caused him pain and discomfort, but no residual injuries. 5 . Bivens was not charged with a crime, thus, suppression of the evidence at a criminal trial was not available as a deterrent against such police conduct. 6 . Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, only the United States could be sued, not the individual federal agents. 7 . The Supreme Court has also declined to imply a Bivens cause of action in new circumstances not directly related to the existence of alternative state remedies. See Maleslco, 534 U.S. at 74, 122 S.Ct. 515 (<HOLDING>); Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 562, 127 S.Ct. 2588
holding that connecticut courts look to the identity or instrumentality test to determine whether one corporate entity can properly be held responsible for the obligations of another corporate entity holding that fmla does not impose individual liability holding mere status as a director does not create liability where the actions complained of were taken by individual managerial employees of a corporate entity holding that a corporate entity must be represented by licensed counsel holding that bivens liability does not extend to a corporate entity because the deterrence rationale applies only to individual actors