(1) the district court’s finding that he had actual or constructive knowledge as early as 1977 that the 1974 constitutional changes had been applied to his sentence or (2) the district court’s finding that he knew or should have known that laws, policies, and practices concerning sentence commutation that had been enacted or adopted between 1992 and 1994 had been applied retroactively to his sentence in 1994 when he sought to have it commuted. Instead, he reiterates his contention that the doctrine of contra non valentum applies to save his claims from a time-bar dismissal. Robinson’s reliance on Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 74, 125 S.Ct. 1242, is misplaced. We have long adhered to the rule that Wilkinson later stated for all federal courts. See Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31 (5th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); see also Serio v. Members, Louisiana State
holding that  1983 was the proper vehicle for a prisoners challenge on due process and ex post facto grounds to parole procedures that were the challenge successful would not automatically entitle him to accelerated release holding that habeas was the sole vehicle for an inmates constitutional challenge to procedures employed by state officials to deprive him of goodtime credits holding that procedures adopted by the state to guide its parole release determinations are not themselves liberty interests entitled to constitutional due process protection holding that habeas petition challenging the state boards decision to defer his scheduled parole release date was rendered moot by prisoners release from custody on parole and subsequent incarceration for violating his parole holding that to establish grounds for reversal an appellant must challenge all grounds on which the trial court ruled against it