corporate hierarchy, such that his statements or conduct could be deemed indicative of a companywide policy or practice of race discrimination. Compare Ercegovich, 154 F.3d at 357 (noting that the alleged statements in that case were made by “the most senior managers”). Rather, it is clear that Newman’s authority does not extend beyond the employees at the Wheelersburg location. Finally, I have already noted the absence of a direct nexus, whether temporal or otherwise, between Newman’s allegedly discriminatory conduct and statements — most or all of which were roughly contemporaneous with Johnson’s transfer to Wheel-ersburg in January of 1995 — and Noyes’ discharge decision nearly two years later. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 196 F.3d 655, 662-63 (6th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Despite all this, the majority holds that the
holding that alleged reference to national origin by nondecisionmaker six months prior to plaintiffs termination was the kind of isolated stray remark insufficient without more to raise an inference of discrimination and defeat summary judgment holding plaintiffs supervisor subject to suit holding that an isolated remark made by the plaintiffs supervisor lacked a sufficient nexus to the plaintiffs termination several months later holding that an isolated derogatory remark did not create an inference of discrimination holding managers discriminatory remark indicative of age bias where buttressed by other evidence of discrimination and thus remark was not an isolated comment