omitted). “Even then, whether to grant the requested relief is a matter for the district court’s sound discretion.” Id. (quotation and alteration omitted). In order for an appellant to demonstrate that the court abused its discretion in denying relief under Rule 60(b), the appellant must show a justification “so compelling” that it requires that the district court vacate its order. Id. A habeas petitioner does not have a constitutional right to counsel. Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 892 (11th Cir.2003) (held in the context of a habeas proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2254). As a result, a petitioner cannot claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2566, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Assuming that it is true that Cherniak
holding that successive motions for postconviction relief are procedurally barred holding that the defendants habeas claim was procedurally barred because it could have been or was raised in his postconviction motion holding that a  2254 petitioner cannot demonstrate cause for procedurally defaulting his claims by relying on postconviction counsels error holding that to prevail on a claim that an immigration hearing was procedurally insufficient the petitioner must demonstrate prejudice holding that state postconviction delays do not give rise to independent due process claims that are cognizable under  2254