inferable from the letter or purpose of the underlying agreement.' ” (q 371 F.3d at 102; see also Kanawha-Gauley Coal & Coke Co. v. Pittston Minerals Group, Inc., 501 Fed.Appx. 247, 254-55, Nos. 11-1835, 12-1037, 2012 WL 6622708, at *6 (4th Cir. Dec. 20, 2012) (per curiam) (unpublished); Jack Henry & Assocs., Inc. v. BSC, Inc., 487 Fed.Appx. 246, 260 (6th Cir.2012). 22 . Tricon offers ITT Diversified Credit Corp. v. Lift & Equipment Service, Inc. (In re Lift & Equipment Service, Inc.), 816 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir.), modified on reh'g, 819 F.2d 546 (5th Cir.1987), as a possible instance in which this court applied the contractual rate of interest postjudgment even though the contract did not specify ''postjudgment interest.” We did not, , Inc., 858 F.Supp.2d 1206, 1210 (D.Colo.2012) (<HOLDING>); Reisberg & Pauley, supra note 23, at 28 (“In
holding that award and rate of prejudgment interest are within trial courts discretion holding that an attorneys fees award is not appealable until the amount of the award is set holding that arbitration award of postaward interest at 8 accruing from the 31st day after service of this award  until final payment of the award  was insufficient to displace federal rate holding that interim award was final and confirmable where award required immediate payment and did not bear on subsequent arbitration proceedings holding that the state circuit court did not have the authority to award prejudgment interest for matters occurring prior to arbitration award