Dist. Court, 713 P.2d at 921. The plain language of this statute provides that if a person requests a blood test, "then the test shall be of his or her blood"; but if the driver requests that his blood not be drawn, then "a specimen of such person's breath shall be obtained and tested." § 42-4-1801(7)(a)[II)(A) (emphasis added). There is a presumption that the word "shall" when used in a statute is mandatory. See Dist. Court, 713 P.2d at 921. That presumption applies even in the negative-to wit: the driver "shall not be permitted to change such ° election." § 42-4-1301(7)(a)(II)(B) (emphasis added); see also Dike v. People, 30 P.3d 197 (Colo.2001) (finding the express consent law does not allow a driver to change his election of a test); People v. Shinaut, 940 P.2d 380 (Colo.1997) (<HOLDING>); Lahey v. Dep't of Revenue, 881 P.2d 458
holding defendants selection of blood test irrevocable but erroneous accommodation did not justify suppression holding that a defendants right to an independent blood alcohol test means the right to a test that is not subject to government manipulation holding presumption of paternity that applies to intact family prevented an order by the court for a blood test or the use of privately obtained blood test to rebut the presumption of legitimacy holding blood test taken for independent medical purpose is not same as blood test taken pursuant to section 3755a holding that the dissipation of alcohol from a persons blood stream constitutes a sufficient exigency to justify a warrantless blood draw