De La Garza, 690 S.W.2d 71, 74 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In this case, Burke testified to the financial hardship caused by his injury, but his testimony was limited to the hardship caused by his reduced earning capacity. The following exchange occurred at trial: [Plaintiffs Counsel:] Now, Ronnie, after all of this, how much do you make now working with Bennett? [Burke:] About twenty, about 20,000 and glad to have it. [Plaintiffs Counsel:] Ronnie, you haven’t filed your taxes, have you? [Burke:] No, we haven’t. [Plaintiffs Counsel:] We don’t have your taxes for last year yet. But my point ny that plaintiff did not receive paychecks was not inconsistent with receipt of insurance benefits and did not open the door to collateral source evidence); Mundy, 783 S.W.2d at 745 (<HOLDING>). The trial court therefore did not abuse its
holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing collateral source testimony when plaintiff testified generally about financial hardship caused by injury holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the state to introduce direct evidence of the controlling nature of defendants relationship with the victim holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling based only on affidavits