of the final judgment. However, as the Former Wife correctly argues, the attorney’s , fee award was a post-judgment order that was not overturned by the appeal of the underlying judgment of dissolution. First, this court, and the Florida Supreme Court, would have likely declined to exercise jurisdiction to review the attorney’s fee award because it was not ripe for review when the Former Husband appealed the final judgment. See Carlson v. Carlson, 696 So.2d 1332, 1333 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (citing Ritchie v. Ritchie, 687 So.2d 1358 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)) (concluding that the attorney’s fee issue was not ripe for review, as the amount of fees had not yet been determined); Widom v. Widom, 679 So.2d 74, 75 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (citing Winkelman v. Toll, 632 So.2d 130 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)) (<HOLDING>). Second, neither this court’s decision, nor
holding that although the trial courts failure to determine amount of fees does not render underlying order nonfinal the fee award itself is not reviewable until the amount is determined recognizing discretion of district court in determining a fee award recognizing that an attorneys fee award does not become final and ripe for review until the amount is set holding that when a litigant does not appeal the fee award it becomes final and can be set aside only through a motion for relief holding that an attorneys fees award is not appealable until the amount of the award is set