should not control the jury’s verdict as to any other offense charged. The district court also instructed the juiy that the mere fact that Defendants Sehmittzehe, Rushton, and Krenning operated and managed Sovereign Insurance together, and associated with others employed there, and discussed common aims and interests with others, did not necessarily establish proof of a conspiracy. Moreover, we note, without expressing any approval, that at the specific request of Schmitt-zehe, the district court also instructed the jury that it could not consider against Sehmittzehe, Bishop, or Cavin any of the evidence of the $10,000 payment to the Commissioner of Insurance, or the alleged stock purchase from the other shareholders. Cf. United States v. Netterville, 553 F.2d 903, 912 (5th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009, 98 S.Ct. 719, 54
holding that in a conspiracy case venue lies where the conspiracy agreement was formed or in any jurisdiction where an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed by any of the conspirators holding that once a defendant becomes associated with a conspiracy he is responsible for all of the acts of the conspiracy even those which occurred before or after his association with the conspiracy holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges holding that a conspiracy claim must contain supportive factual allegations describing the general composition of the conspiracy some or all of its broad objectives and the defendants general role in the conspiracy holding that two conspiracies existed where the members of the second conspiracy did not know about the first conspiracy did not benefit from the first conspiracy and were connected with the first conspiracy only through a middleman