trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490; see, also, Strickler v. Greene (1999), 527 U.S. 263, 289-290, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286. {¶ 28} Assuming arguendo that the prosecution “suppressed” the evidence LaMar complains of within the meaning of Brady we find no due process violation. On the record before us, we find no reasonable probability of a different trial outcome had the defense received the full statements. Many of the statements identified LaMar as a participant in the murders. And statements identifying other inmates as participants did not exculpate LaMar because each victim had been attacked by multiple assailants. Cf. State v. Waddy (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 433, 588 N.E.2d 819 (<HOLDING>). Finally, with respect to murders in cellblock
holding that an appellants due process rights were not violated when he did not receive brady material before his transfer hearing because he will be able to make effective use of any brady material at trial holding impeachment evidence falls within the brady rule holding that collateral crime evidence used to identify defendant as perpetrator was improperly admitted where the facts did not have some special character and were not so unusual as to point to the defendant holding evidence not to be material within the meaning of brady when the evidence did not eliminate the defendant as the perpetrator recognizing that the value of brady evidence must be evaluated in light of the other evidence admitted at trial