provisional sentence of hospitalization “to the maximum term authorized by law for the offense for which the defendant was found guilty.” § 4244(d) (emphasis added). We begin by recognizing that the relevant “law” in sentencing is the Sentencing Guidelines. As the Supreme Court recently observed, “the mandate to apply the Guidelines is itself statutory.” United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 297, 112 S.Ct. 1329, 1334, 117 L.Ed.2d 559 (1992). Thus, § 4244(d) requires that the provisional sentence be the maximum term authorized by the Sentencing Guidelines for the relevant offense. The highest possible sentence that can be imposed under the Sentencing Guidelines is the statutory maximum. Cf. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374-75, 109 S.Ct. 647, 655-56, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989) (<HOLDING>). As a result, the maximum term authorized by
recognizing that congress has the power to completely divest the courts of their sentencing discretion and that congress granted broad authority to the sentencing commission guided by specific goals and principles holding that the sentencing judge could consider the defendants subsequent arrest even though the charges were dismissed during sentencing recognizing the limited appellate review of sentences imposed under the initial voluntary sentencing standards recognizing that sentencing facts are based on the evidence and testimony presented at sentencing under a preponderance of the evidence standard recognizing that congress instructed the sentencing commission that the sentencing ranges could not include sentences in excess of the statutory maxima