case, the bankruptcy court determined, and the district court agreed, that Hilton was the initial transferee. On appeal, Hilton makes two arguments to the contrary. First, Hilton contends that Arlynn, not Hilton, was the initial transferee because Arlynn controlled Video Depot and directed that the funds be transfe .), 73 B.R. 52, 54 (D.D.C.1987) (concluding that principal of corporation was initial transferee when principal arranged for corporation’s purchase of cashier’s check to satisfy financial obligations independent of corporation); Still v. American Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Jorges Carpet Mills, Inc.), 50 B.R. 84, 85 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1985) (same); see also Robinson v. Home Savings of America (In re Concord Senior Housing Foundation), 94 B.R. 180, 183 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1988) (<HOLDING>). Hilton urges us to reject the rule set forth
holding that because the recipient of funds had a contractual obligation to immediately transfer them he was not an initial transferee under  550 even though the funds were eventually used to purchase stock in his name holding that principal who caused debtor to issue cashiers check to satisfy personal obligation was not initial transferee holding that a trustee may settle with an initial transferee and still pursue recovery against a subsequent transferee but notwithstanding the trustee will still be required to prove that the transfers  were fraudulent and improper in connection with its suit against the subsequent transferee because the trustees settlement with the initial transferee did not involve any determination on the merits as to the initial transfers and in this way the subsequent transferee will be afforded its due process rights to contest the avoidability of these initial transfers holding that agent of corporation who used corporate funds to secure personal loan was initial transferee holding a party to be an initial transferee because she was given legal title to the funds