to challenge, for both truth and significance, facts of which the BIA takes administrative notice when its reliance on those facts is dispositive, as was the case here. See Rivera-Cruz v. INS, 948 F.2d 962, 968 (5th Cir.1991) (“It is a fundamental proposition of administrative law that interested parties must have an effective chance to respond to crucial facts.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588, 596 (7th Cir.1991) (“We believe the due process clause of the fifth amendment requires that petitioners be allowed an opportunity to rebut officially noticed facts, particularly when ... those facts are crucial to — indeed dis-positive of — the outcome of the administrative proceeding.”); Castillo-Villagra v. INS, 972 F.2d 1017, 1029 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); de la Llanar-Castellon, 16 F.3d at 1099
holding that the bia violated the fifth amendments due process clause in taking notice of the change of government without providing the petitioners an opportunity to rebut the noticed facts holding municipalities  are not persons within the meaning of the due process clause of the fifth or fourteenth amendments holding that a termination of a government contract does not constitute a taking of the plaintiffs property without just compensation or without due process of law holding that availability of motions to reopen satisfies the due process requirement that petitioners be allowed to rebut facts of which the bia takes administrative notice holding that the due process clause of the fifth amendment requires that petitioners be allowed an opportunity to rebut officially noticed facts particularly when  those facts are crucial to  the outcome of the administrative proceeding