reason for rejecting a well-settled interpretation of that statute. It is not at all unusual for this Court to conclude that the literal text of a criminal statute is broader than the coverage intended by Congress. See, e. g., Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600, 605, 619 (1994); United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 518 U. S. 64, 68-69 (1994) (departing from “most natural grammatical reading” of statute because of “anomalies which result from this construction,” and presumptions with respect to scienter in criminal statutes and avoiding constitutional questions); id., at 81 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that lower court interpretation of statute rejected by the Court was “quite obviously the only grammatical reading”); Williams v. United States, 458 U. S. 279, 286 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U. S. 485, 448
holding that statute prohibiting the making of false statements to a bank was inapplicable to depositing of a bad check because the governments interpretation  would make a surprisingly broad range of unremarkable conduct a violation of federal law holding the carew rule to be inapplicable to claims of insurer bad faith holding an administrative interpretation cannot change the meaning of a statute or control the courts interpretation of it holding that a federal statute prohibiting the export of certain classes of firearms and ammunition was divisible because violation of the statute with regard to firearms would be a removable offense while violation of the statute with regard to ammunition might not be holding that dalessio did not justify removal where the gravamen of plaintiffs complaint was that defendants made materially false statements to them in a manner prohibited by new york law and in violation of duties created by new york law and no construction or interpretation of federal law was required