Daniel M. Pina, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the defendants in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging he was denied due process while being held in administrative segregation. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Balint v. Carson City, Nev., 180 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc). We affirm. The district court properly concluded that, to the extent Pina demonstrated a liberty interest, his segregation from other prisoners and the definition of active gang member, were rationally related to prison safety. See Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu, 124 F.3d 1150, 1162 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). The district court also properly concluded
holding that if status is not a fundamental right and that  1915g is rationally related to the legitimate end of deterring frivolous lawsuits holding substantive due process not violated when licensing decisions are based on scheme rationally related to a governmental interest holding that a state action that neither utilizes suspect classifications nor implicates fundamental rights will violate substantive due process rights only where it is shown that the action is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose holding that the particular method is not rationally related to legitimate government interest if it is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable holding that juvenile pretrial detention implicates due process rights