terms thereof. See United States v. Mukai, 26 F.3d 953, 955 (9th Cir.1994) (noting that “[t]he rules contain no provision for the district court to modify a [C-type] plea agreement”). Consequently, the court cannot vary the agreed-upon sentence unless the terms of the plea agreement explicitly authorize it to do so. See Peveler, 359 F.3d at 378-79. In the absence of such a provision, the court is bound to impose (and leave undisturbed) the agreed-upon sentence. See Sanchez, 562 F.3d at 281 n. 7; id. at 282-83 (Rendell, J., concurring); Peveler, 359 F.3d at 378-79. This result is consistent with the established view that plea agreements are for the most part governed by principles of contract law. In this case, no principle of contract law would have justified th 641, 648 (7th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). This court has indicated that, in rare
holding that principle of mutual mistake does not apply to permit modification of plea agreement holding that where judgment and sentence for nonexistent crime had to be vacated upon remand the state shall have the option of withdrawing from the entire plea agreement since the plea agreement was based on a material mistake of law which works to the benefit of the defendant holding that mutual mistake as to essential element of plea agreement can invalidate entire agreement holding employer statements of policy can give rise to contractual rights without evidence of mutual agreement holding that where the parties fail to reach an agreement as to the character nature or type of release to be used an essential element of the agreement is not established