as the proposed instruction put it, that the defendant must have had the “ability to maintain control over it or reduce it to his physical possession” — for instance, by having “ownership, dominion or control over the premises ... in which the [firearm] was concealed.” We see no meaningful difference between the two, and Miller urges none. Likewise, the district court’s instruction that the defendant must have had an “intention to take control” of the firearm necessarily includes the idea that the defendant must have had “knowledge of the thing.” Further, the requirement that there be an “intention to take control” precludes a finding of guilt based on “[m]ere presence” or the mere “awareness of [the firearm’s] location.” See United States v. Rojas, 537 F.2d 216, 220 (5th Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the district court’s instruction
holding that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that an oral agreement existed and that it was not modified holding that constructive possession exists where one knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over an object either directly or through others holding that an instruction requiring the jury to find that the defendant had the power and intention to exercise dominion and control over the cocaine was adequate to convey the principle that mere presence or proximity is not sufficient holding a defendant is liable as a control person if the defendant had the power to control the general affairs of the entity primarily liable at the time the entity violated the securities laws but declining to decide whether power to control means simply abstract power to control or actual exercise of the power to control internal quotations omitted recognizing that knowledge and dominion and control are separate elements and stating that it is conceivable that an accused might be well aware of the presence of the substance but have no ability to maintain control over it