that these acts occurred “over a period of time,” namely three months. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, comment., n.1(f), incorporated by reference in § 2F1.1(b)(2), comment., n.2. Accordingly, the two-point increase for more than minimal planning is proper unless “it is clear that each [act] was purely opportune.” Id. (emphasis added). Here, that is not at all clear; to the contrary, each act appears to have been a calculated step in McCoy’s fraudulent pursuit of the Adams National loan. McCoy concedes that her first act, submitting a false financial statement with her initial loan application, was not purely opportune. Reply Br. at 2. McCoy initiated the application and had ample time to contemplate the financial data she included therein. See United States v. Lutz, 154 F.3d 581, 590 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Nor was McCoy’s second act, submitting the
holding that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded a violation of the fcra based on extraneous information where it was alleged that the document included broad language regarding disclosure of the information the accuracy of the information the consequences of providing a false statement and the effect of a photocopy holding that apparel cleaners submission of false statements of their receipts a percentage of which were to be paid to the united states did not constitute false claims within the meaning of the federal false claims act holding that the submission of false information with regard to loan applications was not the result of spur of the moment conduct holding that rule 9b was not satisfied where the relator was a doctor who did not allege firsthand knowledge of the hospitals submission of false claims holding that the submission of false documents to irs violated  1505