cannot either. See United States v. Novak, 476 F.3d 1041, 1063 (9th Cir.2007) (en banc) (noting that, “because the government’s right is to step into the defendant’s shoes, it will not be able unilaterally to cash out a retirement plan when ERISA requires that lump sum payments be made payable only with spousal consent”). And many retirement accounts—very likely t provision. It provides that a restitution judgment may be enforced against all of the defendant’s property “Notwithstanding any other Federal law,” 18 U.S.C. § 3613(a), and while it lists exceptions— including the CCPA’s 25 percent cap on the garnishment of disposable earnings— ERISA’s anti-alienation provision is not among them. ERISA thus is no obstacle to the requested turnover order. See Novak, 476 F.3d at 1046-7 (<HOLDING>); cf. United States v. Hosking, 567 F.3d 329,
holding that erisas antialienation statute precluded imposition of a constructive trust on pension benefits owed to an individual convicted of embezzlement holding that a proper waiver of interest by a nonpartieipant in a plan is not preempted by erisas antialienation provisions holding that the scfra provision allowing the state to redirect prisoners pension checks to prison account violated erisas antialienation provision and was therefore preempted by erisa holding that the mvra overrides erisas antialienation provision holding that fehbas complete preemption provision closely resembles erisas express preemption provision and precedent interpreting the erisa provision thus provides authority for cases involving the fehba provision