the crack cocaine pipe in plain view and recognized it as drug paraphernalia, he had probable caus$ to arrest Mr. Hrezo. Although we readily understand the officer’s decision to turn on his take-down lights for personal safety, we must hold that the contact with Mr. Hrezo was a stop and' not a consensual encounter. A consensual encounter is transformed into an investigatory stop if a reasonable person would not feel free to leave. See Popple v. State, ice found in Mr. Hrezo’s car were the fruit of an unlawful stop. Therefore we reverse Mr. Hrezo’s judgments and sentences because the trial court should have granted the dispositive motion to suppress. Reversed and remanded. PARKER, A.C.J., and SALCINES, J., concur. 1 . See also State v. Donahue, 251 Conn. 636, 742 A.2d 775, 780 (1999) (<HOLDING>); Hammons v. State, 327 Ark. 520, 940 S.W.2d
holding automobile exception applied to shotgun seized from trunk of vehicle parked at defendants home holding that parked police vehicle could not constitute other traffic holding that defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a locked vehicle owned and operated by a third party but parked on defendant homeowners driveway where the evidence seized was the subject of the unlawful enterprise in which defendant participated holding defendant was seized at moment officers pulled up behind parked vehicle and switched on flashing lights holding on direct review that defendant was not in custody when he was interviewed by law enforcement officers in a parked police vehicle which was unmarked and unlocked