51 (1999). 6 . Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 51(c) (2005). 7 . The act making the change was passed on May 28, 1999, but it provided that it was to “take effect January 1, 2000, but only if the constitutional amendment ... is approved by the voters.” 8 . Tex. Prop.Code Ann. § 41.002(a),(d) (Vernon 2002). 9 . The Jays do not challenge this conclusion on appeal. 10 . As noted above, both on December 15, 1999 and January 1, 2000, Tex. Prop.Code Ann. § 41.002(d) had the same language applying the statutory definition in § 41.002(a) to homesteads "whenever created.” That is, the January 1, 2000 statutory amendment did not alter the retroactivity section of the statute. But on December 15, 1999, the statutory definition was the old definition. 11 . See Linch v. Broad, 70 Tex. 92, 93-95, 6 S .1985) (<HOLDING>). 14 . Wessely Energy Corp. v. Jennings, 736
recognizing distinction between cases before 1983 amendment to constitution and 1984 codification of tex propcode  41001c where there was no retroactivity and cases after the amendment and codification of there which specifically provided retroactivity holding that there is no distinction in the right to jury trial between sentencing factors and elements recognizing distinction between tolling and estoppel recognizing distinction between illegal voter cases and irregular ballot cases holding there is no meaningful distinction between due course and due process