regularly met by United States bankruptcy judges.” We do not agree with the Court of Federal Claims that section 5.01 provided Mr. Scholl with a firm right to be reappointed unless “he had failed to perform according to high standards.” As in effect in 2000, section 5.01 simply provided circuit courts with guidance in the process for the reappointment of incumbent bankruptcy judges. There is nothing in the language of section 5.01 that indicates the provision was intended to provide incumbent bankruptcy judges with the benefit of a firm right to reappointment. Indeed, one of our sister circuits has recognized under similar circumstances that there is no firm right to reappointment. See Schwartz v. Mayor’s Comm. on the Judiciary of the City of N.Y., 816 F.2d 54, 55-57 (2d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); see also McMenemy v. City of Rochester, 241
recognizing that a defendants right to be heard in criminal proceedings prior to sentencing is constitutionally protected holding that a new york city family court judge had no constitutionally protected property right to reappointment after her tenyear term expired and the mayor decided not to reappoint her and explaining that the fact that many or even most incumbent judges have been reappointed cannot operate to raise appellants subjective expectation to a constitutionally protected right  appellant has failed entirely to demonstrate any mu tually explicit understanding sufficient to establish a property right citing perry 408 us at 601 92 sct 2694 bd of regents of state colls v roth 408 us 564 577 92 sct 2701 33 led2d 548 1972 recognizing that the first amendment limits the ability of a public employer to leverage the employment relationship to restrict incidentally or intentionally the liberties employees enjoy in their capacities as private citizens citing perry v sindermann 408 us 593 597 92 sct 2694 33 led2d 570 1972 holding that woman has constitutionally protected right to determine for any reason or no reason to terminate her pregnancy holding that georgias revised death 4356 penalty sentencing scheme differed from that ruled unconstitutional in furman v georgia 408 us 238 92 sct 2726 33 led2d 346 1972 because it focused the jurys attention on the particularized nature of the crime and the particularized characteristics of the individual defendant