dissent that the “course of the proceedings” exception to our pleading rules does not apply when the alleged notice arises during the course of a discovery deposition. Certainly, the breadth of discovery under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1) and 32(d)(3)(A) allows questions designed to elicit admissible evidence, which at trial might be deemed irrelevant. The breadth of discovery, however, does not lead logically to Judge Griffin’s conclusion that questions posed by plaintiffs counsel during depositions cannot put defendants on notice regarding a claim not specifically alleged in the complaint. This conclusion ignores the fact that the proceedings referred to in Cummings themselves involved a deposition. 418 F.3d at 681; see also Torry v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 399 F.3d 876, 879 (7th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). The transcript of Spies’s deposition
holding that a delay of more than four years caused largely by the state making pretrial appeals was reasonable under the circumstances holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law holding that magistrate judge could without consent of parties hold a pretrial hearing and issue a report and recommendation based on the findings made holding that a claim not alleged in the complaint was pretried by implied consent of the parties  during four years of discovery and other pretrial maneuverings holding delay of two years and four months lengthy enough to warrant review of other factors