(citing United States v. Ross, 654 F.2d 612, 616 (9th Cir.1981)). The twist in this case comes about because there was no timely motion to stay the mandate; this court did issue its mandate and then denied Pete’s motion to recall the mandate. With the mandate in effect, the district court resumed jurisdiction over the case. See United States v. Ruiz-Alvarez, 211 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir.2000) (“Once a mandate issues, ... jurisdiction over a criminal case automatically revests in the district court.”) (emphasis in original). As a result, the government did not have to, and did not, wait until the Supreme Court denied Pete’s cer-tiorari petition before filing the indictment in the district court. Instead, the indictment was filed while Pete’s certiorari petitio ; Crooks II, 826 F.2d at 5 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Van Brandy, 726 F.2d 548,
holding that a motion to continue a hearing on a postjudgment motion was ineffective to extend the period for the trial court to rule on the motion absent the express consent of the parties holding that the longer appeal period from a judgment controlled over the shorter appeal period in a certiorari proceeding when the two proceedings were consolidated in the district court and the certiorari proceeding was not an independent proceeding holding that even though the trial date had already been set and the motion or proceeding actually caused no delay in the start of the trial the period of pendency of the motion or proceeding was nonetheless excludable holding in a capital case that the defendant waived his argument that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a change of venue where the trial court took the motion under advisement but the defendant failed to seek a ruling on the motion and failed to renew the motion after the jurors had been qualified holding that whether a pretrial motion actually caused or is expected to cause delay of trial is irrelevant to the speedy trial act