States v. Long, 900 F.2d 1270, 1275 n. 4 (8th Cir.1990) (same). The defendants, however, neglect to put this dicta into its proper context — Justice Blackmun added in the next sentence that “the [Speedy Trial] Act nowhere refers to a superseding indictment, and seems to assume that dismissal of the first indictment will precede issuance of the second. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(d)(1) and 3161(h)(6).” 474 U.S. at 237, 106 S.Ct. 555 (emphasis added). The point of Black-mun’s distinction was simply that he believed that these Speedy Trial Act provisions did not apply to the situation the court faced in that case, not that criminal defendants are entitled to a “get out of jail free” card when indictments captioned as “superseding” indictments are issued after dismissals of or 5 (D.Kan.1992) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, in one of the only reported cases
holding that district court has discretion when deciding to convert a defendants motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment holding that a motion to continue a hearing on a postjudgment motion was ineffective to extend the period for the trial court to rule on the motion absent the express consent of the parties holding that when a court has given a party a full and fair opportunity to litigate a motion to suppress and then  has decided the motion on the merits the party may be estopped from bringing the same motion in subsequent litigation holding that upon the request of the losing party on a motion to suppress evidence the trial court shall state its essential findings holding that the trial court did not err by failing to hold an oral hearing on a motion to dismiss an appeal because the appellant was afforded a full opportunity to respond to the motion