are distinguishable on their facts, I am not convinced we should distinguish them. In the first instance, I am uncomfortable with a State court determining what “undermine[s] the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves,” the test prescribed, as the majority notes, by the United States Supreme Court in Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223, 79 S.Ct, 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (1959). Because of the relationship of the federal government to the Indian tribes, see Article 1, § 8 of the United States Constitution (“Congress shall have power ... [t]o regulate commerce ... with the Indian tribes”) and decisions such as Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 764, 105 S.Ct., 2399, 85 L.Ed.2d 753 (1985) (<HOLDING>) it seems to me to be presumptuous for the
holding that indian tribes lack tribal jurisdiction over crimes committed by nonmember indians within the tribes reservation holding the constitution vests the federal government with exclusive authority over relations with indian tribes holding that congress which regulated the introduction of alcoholic beverages in indian country could validly delegate to indian tribes its authority to regulate that subject matter because indian tribes themselves possessed independent authority over the subject matter holding that an indian tribes exercise of criminal jurisdiction over nonindians is inconsistent with the domesticdependent status of the tribes and that tribes may not assume such jurisdiction without congressional authorization holding that federal legislation with respect to indian tribes  is not based upon impermissible racial classifications and noting that article i  8 of the constitution gives congress the power to regulate commerce  with the indian tribes