this testimony, unrebut-ted by the record, is that the firearm was kept at the stash house to safeguard the drug inventory. 4 . In a single sentence in his brief, the appellant suggests that his putative withdrawal from the conspiracy may have affected the district court’s drug-quantity calculation. Any such suggestion is doubly defaulted. For one thing, the district court used the very drug-quantity calculation proposed at sentencing by the appellant, and the appellant is bound by that calculation. See United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 28 (1st Cir. 2001). For another thing, the appellant's brief is bereft of developed argumentation concerning any drug-quantity issue and, thus, any such claim of error has been abandoned. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990)
holding an attorney does not have a duty to insure or guarantee that the most favorable outcome possible and because no amount of work can guarantee a favorable result attorneys would never know when the work they do is sufficiently more than adequate to be enough to protect not only their clients from error but themselves from liability holding that a party cannot preserve an argument if it presents only a skeletal or undeveloped argument to the trial court recognizing that it is not enough merely to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way leaving the court to do counsels work holding that it is most improbable that a significant change to bankruptcy procedure would have been made without even any mention in the legislative history holding the government waived its argument on appeal that the defendant did not have standing to challenge a search when it failed to raise the argument to the district court