instances” where New York courts have recognized a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the employment context, the claims have alleged not merely sexual harassment, but “more significantly, battery.” Gerzog v. London Fog Corp., 907 F.Supp. 590, 604 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (citing Foster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 609 F.Supp. 1191, 1198 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (Leisure, J.) (finding conduct sufficiently outrageous where employer forced plaintiff into an ongoing sexual relationship); O’Reilly v. Executone, Inc., 121 A.D.2d 772, 503 N.Y.S.2d 185, 186 (3d Dep’t 1986) (affirming denial of motion to dismiss where plaintiff had been subjected to physical sexual contact, jokes, pornography, and erotica); Collins v. Willcox, Inc., 158 Misc.2d 54, 600 N.Y.S.2d 884, 885-86 (Sup. Ct.1992) (<HOLDING>)); see also Salvatore, 1999 WL 796172, at *2-*3
holding employer liable for hostile environment sexual harassment where supervisor capitalized upon his authority over plaintiffs employment to force plaintiff to endure prolonged violent and demeaning sexual relationship holding that a pattern of behavior that continually put plaintiff in embarrassing humiliating and demeaning positions that included sexual harassment and battery might well rise to the level of outrageous holding that assistant principals allegedly defective investigation did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct holding that the defendant could be convicted of sexual battery a lesser crime not included in the offense for which he was indicted where the defendant requested that sexual battery be submitted to the jury holding that battery is an inherently included offense of aggravated battery