coerce or harass Barton into vacating the premises prior to December 21, 1991. MTB believed in good faith that Barton owed it rent when it served the three-day notice to pay rent or quit. Further, in a letter dated November 26, 1991, MTB stated its acceptance of Barton’s intent to vacate the premises and purportedly withdrew its notice. By that date, however, Barton had substantially moved its inventory to another location. We therefore agree with the trial court that there was no constructive eviction as a matter of law. DAVIS and JACKSON, JJ., concur. 1 . Barton contends that other courts have held a constructive eviction occurs when a lessor wrongfully serves a notice to quit upon a tenant who thereafter vacates. See Dobbins v. Paul, 71 N.C.App. 113, 321 S.E.2d 537, 540 (1984) (<HOLDING>); see also Ruotal Corp., N.W., Inc. v. Ottati,
holding mere notice to quit followed by peaceful vacation of the premises is not sufficient to constitute a claim of constructive eviction holding that wjhen a wrongful demand or notice to quit or vacate leased premises is made by a lessor or landlord and is followed by immediate surrender of possession by the lessee or tenant a constructive eviction has been accomplished holding notice to quit is evidence that tenant did not leave voluntarily but absent showing of malice action for constructive eviction may not stand where there has been no physical interference with leased premises holding that abandonment requires that tenant vacate the leased premises holding threat by lessor to resort to legal process when made in good faith is not intentional conduct supporting finding of constructive eviction