§ 952(a) and 18 U.S.C.A. § 2. 2 . Compare United States v. Long, 900 F.2d 1270, 1276 (8th Cir.1990) (excluding from speedy trial clock all time from district court’s grant of stay to obtain permission to file an interlocutory appeal through the date “the [appellate court's] mandate was received by the district court”) and Tyler, 878 F.2d at 759 (excluding from speedy trial clock "the 140 days that elapsed between the filing of the mandamus petition and the notification to the district court of the disposition of that petition”) and Speedy Trial Guidelines, infra pp. 1231-1232 (providing that delays due to extraordinary writs are excluded until the ”[d]ate the mandate of the court of appeals is filed in the district court”) with United States v. Felton, 811 F.2d 190, 198 (3d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). 3 . We do not comment on whether the time
holding that the date of sale for an installment contract was the date of contract formation not the date of the last payment due holding that the excludable period for an interlocutory appeal ends upon the date of issuance of the appellate courts mandate and expressly rejecting extending the exclusion until the date the district court receives the mandate holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act holding that where the date of the offense is not an element of the charge  a variance between the indictment date and the proof at trial is not fatal so long as the acts charged were committed within the statute of limitations period and prior to the return date of the indictment holding that the statute does not begin to run until at least a demand has been made upon the government but determining that the facts of that case made it unnecessary to choose between the date of demand and the date of actual payment as the triggering date for the running of the statute of limitations