2, 1997, within one and one-half hours of each other would count as two separate convictions. However, Bradley, would lead one to believe that these two crimes would count as separate transactions, making this Appellant’s fourth strike. Moreover, even if we were to consider the two February crimes to be one previous transaction, the 1996 criminal event is clearly separate and Appellant would be on his third strike. 2 . A secondary problem with the case sub judi-ce is that the penalty is facially harsh. A twenty-five year mandatory minimum for a seemingly minor offense of burglary of $76.00 and a brassiere is extreme. However, no challenge is before us concerning the constitutionality of the punishment. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003) (<HOLDING>) (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 100
holding that the four year sentence imposed by the district court was appropriate as it was comparable to the five year sentence for perjury or obstruction of justice holding fifteen year hfo mandatory minimum sentences on the three robbery convictions were required to run concurrently with the twentyfive year nonhfo mandatory minimum on the murder sentence holding in a five to four decision that a twentyfive year minimum sentence for stealing three golf clubs pursuant to californias threestrikes law did not violate the eighth amendment and that any criticism for the statute is properly directed at the legislature holding that a sentence of 25 years to life imposed for felony grand theft under californias threestrikes law did not violate the eighth amendment holding that the fifteen year minimum sentence imposed under section 924e does not violate the eighth amendment