of the deceased’s criminal record to be introduced or argued during trial. We are mindful of the potential dangers such evidence presents. In this case, however, the court itself recognized in its jury instructions that there existed a genuine factual dispute as to whether the [defendant] or the deceased was the aggressor. Under such circumstances, we conclude the court abused its discretion when it flatly prohibited [the defendant] from arguing to the jury, or otherwise eliciting evidence of, the criminal history of the deceased. We cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that such an abuse did not contribute to the jury’s verdict. Id. at 513-15, 666 P.2d at 602-03 (citations, footnote, and some brackets omitted). See also State v. Estrada, 69 Haw. 204, 215, 738 P.2d 812, 821 (1987) (<HOLDING>); State v. Adam, 97 Hawai'i 413, 418, 38 P.3d
holding that there was ample room for the jury to find a snug fit between the defendants acts and the enterprise a city police department since the defendants illegal activities were clearly helped along by the authority vested in him as a police officer and by the reactions  which a police officer uniquely has the ability to engender in others by virtue of his position recognizing affirmative duty of a police officer to prevent the violation of constitutional rights by another officer holding that defendants status as police officer did not obviate the requirement of miranda holding police officer is a public official holding that prior bad acts of a police officer which indicate a propensity for violence aggression or abuse of police powers  were highly relevant to the defendants selfdefense claims