claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel (his "Trial Counsel” claim) (as well as for his failure to raise his Wainwright and Batson claims on direct appeal), which in turns acts as "cause” for his procedural default of those claims not raised at trial. However, it is not clear that Williams could have raised his Trial Counsel claim on direct appeal. One of Williams’s two attorneys on direct appeal also represented him in the trial court (J.A. at 16), and the parties have not addressed whether, under these circumstances, Ohio law would have permitted Williams to raise his Trial Counsel claim on direct appeal and, if so, whether his counsel could have been expected to raise the Trial Counsel claim on direct appeal. Cf. State v. Lentz, 70 Ohio St.3d 527, 639 N.E.2d 784, 785 (1994) (<HOLDING>); State v. Cole, 2 Ohio St.3d 112, 443 N.E.2d
holding no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim for failure to raise as basis for appeal of conviction ineffective assistance of trial counsel where basis for the latter claim was inadequate holding that defendants claim for ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest was not cognizable on direct appeal holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record holding that res judicata does not bar a defendant from raising a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for the first time in a postcollateral proceeding if the defendant was represented by the same counsel at trial and on direct appeal or if an actual conflict of interest enjoined appellate counsel from raising a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel