offer was “based on mistakes of law and fact” and counsel “arguably would have violated his duty of candor toward the tribunal had he presented the flawed plea deal to the trial court” — was a determination of state law binding on this Court and, furthermore, was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. See id.; see also Lafler v. Cooper, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1384, 182 L.Ed.2d 398 (2012). Similarly, the state court’s conclusion that Davenport suffered no prejudice because the Department of Corrections might have caught the error and the prosecution or trial court might have withdrawn or rejected the plea agreement on remand was not objectively unreasonable. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. ** This disposition is not
holding that to satisfy the prejudice prong a petitioner must establish that but for counsels errors there is a reasonable probabil ity the result of the proceeding would have been different holding that to establish prejudice there must be a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different holding that to show prejudice in a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors the result of the proceeding would have been different holding that to establish stricklandpierce prejudice in the appellate representation context the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the direct appeal proceeding would have been different but for counsels deficient performance holding that ineffective assistance of counsel occurs when there is deficient performance and prejudice which is a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different