less arbitrary and more equal sentences.” State v. Roth, supra, 95 N.J. at 345; see also State v. O’Connor, supra, 105 N.J. at 408-410 (discussing the specific procedures that a sentencing court must follow in order to comply with the statutory scheme). Our review of these policies leads us to conclude that a term of imprisonment as a condition of probation is permissible where the presumption of non-imprisonment governs a defendant’s sentence. In reaching this result, we reject defendant’s contention that the term imprisonment as used in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1e means any imprisonment, and that the presumption against incarceration therefore bars imposition of a split sentence. See State v. Hess, supra, 198 N.J.Super. at 327-28; see also State v. Jones, 197 N.J.Super. 604, 609 (App.Div.1984) (<HOLDING>). In our view, a sentence of imprisonment under
holding  3583a itself authorizes a term of supervised release in addition to a maximum term of imprisonment authorized by the statute of conviction holding that failure to explain the effect of a term of supervised release was harmless error where term of imprisonment combined with maximum imprisonment for violation of supervised release was still less than statutory maximum holding that   3584a allows the district judge to specify the sequence of service of terms of imprisonment only when sentences are imposed at the same time or the other sentence is an undischarged term of imprisonment to which the defendant is already subject  holding that the term imprisonment    means any imprisonment in a case involving the presumption of incarceration of njsa 2c441d holding that a term of imprisonment begins at the time a prisoner is sentenced