CSI loan. A bank can exercise its common-law right of setoff when: (1) there is mutuality of obligation between the bank and its customer; (2) the funds against which a setoff is exercised belong to the customer; (3) the money to be set off has been deposited into a general — as opposed to a special, reserve, or trust— account; and (4) the debt owed by the customer to the bank is mature. E.g., Firstar Eagan Bank, N.A. v. Marquette Bank Minneapolis, N.A., 466 N.W.2d 8, 12 (Minn.Ct.App.1991). Here, there was mutuality of obligation because the bank owed Brier the money attributable to the CD and Brier had guaranteed the CSI loan personally — a loan that was in default when the bank set off the CD against the balance due on the loan. See In re Foutz, 271 F.Supp. 847, 849-50 (W.D.Va.1967) (<HOLDING>). In addition, Brier indisputably owned the CD,
holding that bank had right to set off funds in a customers account against debt that the bank customer had incurred as a surety or guarantor holding a bank officer who informed a third party that it would be safe to extend 8000 credit to bank customer although customer did not have an open account at the bank could be held liable for the material misrepresentation holding that a bank customer did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in records maintained by the bank holding that debt from debtor to bank in the form of chargebacks to the debtors account for credit card transaction rescissions was prepetition debt even though customers rescinded transactions postpetition and the bank therefore chargedback postpetition because a customers right to rescind and thereby the banks right to chargeback accrued at the time the customer made a purchase even though such customer exercised his right to rescind postpetition recognizing that a bank customer may have a tort claim against a bank for the wrongful dishonor of a check