when acting on his client’s behalf.” Id. (citing Penalber v. Blount, 550 So.2d 577, 581 (La.1989)). Unlike in the Preis case and as noted elsewhere in this opinion, the underlying suit in this case was not a marital dispute between two contentious spouses in which the attorneys were maligning each other. 8 . In McFarland, the court collected the cases from other jurisdictions supporting the proposition that an accusation of adultery is defam atory per se. McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that "words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication” are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (<HOLDING>); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79
holding that under south carolina law slander is actionable per se where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery recognizing south carolina as the governing law and finding no south carolina cases directly on point the court referred to applicable law from other jurisdictions holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under missouri law recognizing that slander per se is actionable without a showing of actual or special damages holding that statement made to plaintiffs neighbors that plaintiff committed adultery was not slander per se because adultery is no longer a crime under oregon law