a wrongdoer is nevertheless responsible for its own attorney’s fees. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Fedders Air Conditioning, USA Inc., 821 F.Supp. 50, 56 (D.Mass.1993). Haley’s position has a modicum of support to the extent that depriving it of indemnification elevates formality above substance because the same claim brought under a different procedural posture might be indemnifiable. For instance, had Haley been impleaded not as a direct defendant but rather as a third-party defendant in a claim brought by defendant Tnemec, alleging, for example, that Haley made negligent misrepresentations to Tnemec which then caused it to provide improper materials to Caldwell, Haley would arguably be entitled to indemnification. Cf. O’Gee v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 570 F.2d 1084, 1090 (2d Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). That theoretical possibility is, however,
holding that a party which would have been indemnified if sued as a crossclaimant should be indemnified when brought into the case as a thirdparty defendant holding that a subrogation claim required the parties to try the case as a casewithinacase to determine if the insured would have been liable to thirdparty plaintiff holding that res judicata barred conspiracy claim against defendant even though defendant had not been a party to the prior action because the civil conspiracy claim should have been adjudicated in a prior action and defendant as an alleged participant in the conspiracy would have been indispensable party to that adjudication holding that the district court erred in summarily dismissing a  1983 complaint that should have been brought as a habeas petition holding that under the eaja a prevailing party with an unconditional right to be indemnified for his legal expenses by a solvent third party had not incurred attorneys fees