The new evidence accompanying Reyes-Garcia’s motion did not reveal a reasonable likelihood that he would succeed in demonstrating the requisite exceptional and extremely unusual hardship in reopened proceedings. See Garcia v. Holder, 621 F.3d 906, 912-13 (9th Cir.2010)-(stating that prima facie eligibility “is established when ‘the evidence reveals a reasonable likelihood that the statutory requirements for relief have been satisfied,’ ” and holding that, where hardship evidence “might ... warrant reopening,” the BIA does “not abuse its discretion by concluding otherwise” (citation omitted)). In reaching this conclusion, the BIA did not err by not noting the government’s lack of opposition to Reyes-Garcia’s motion to reopen. See Limsico v. INS, 951 F.2d 210, 213 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). We are not persuaded the BIA’s
holding that the bia abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen when it failed to consider the argument before it holding that bia abused its discretion in denying motion to reopen holding the bia did not err in denying aliens motion to stay voluntary departure period pending determination on the motion to reopen holding that the bia does not err by denying a motion to reopen without an opposition from the government holding that bia did not err in denying motion to reopen that was filed after expiration of aliens voluntary departure period because alien had failed to depart