Act. Tex. Crv. PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 37.001 (Vernon 1986). We will first address the City’s claims under the Declaratory Judgment Act. The City argues that, because it is seeking a declaration that the hearing examiner exceeded his jurisdiction in ordering Wood-ruff’s reinstatement, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act. Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.001 (Vernon 1986). Specifically, the City contends the Declaratory Judgment Act gives the trial court jurisdiction to determine whether an administrative agency has exceeded its statutorily conferred powers. See Gulf States Util. Co. v. Coalition of Cities for Affordable Util. Rates, 883 S.W.2d 739, 743 (Tex.App.—Austin 1994), rev’d on other grounds, 947 S.W.2d 887 (Tex.1997) (<HOLDING>). Woodruff first responds that the City did not
holding that the designation of the rod as final agency action under the apa is generally recognized recognizing a state agencys powers are limited to 1 holding an action taken by an administrative agency in excess of its statutory powers is the well recognized exception to the general rule that an agencys final order  is immune from collateral attack holding that an administrative agency is not subject to a contempt proceeding for failure to comply with an order recognizing general rule that when an administrative agencys order is appealed to a court agencys power and authority over the matter is suspended because courts jurisdiction over subject matter must be complete and not interfered with or frustrated by concurrent action of administrative agency