We need not determine whether and how that doctrine applies to this case at this time because we hold that Trenz’s local-action-doctrine challenge falls outside the scope of the interlocutory appeal authorized under section 51.014(a)(7) — the only basis for interlocutory appeal invoked by Trenz in this appeal. To the extent that Trenz invokes the local action doctrine as a challenge to personal jurisdiction, we have held Trenz waived his objection to personal jurisdiction in this action. Moreover, parties must raise objections to personal jurisdiction before the trial court in order to preserve them for appeal, and Trenz did not raise his local-aetion-doetrine challenge before the trial court. See State v. C.J.F., 183 S.W.3d 841, 852 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>) (citing Tex.R.App. P. 33.1); Reynolds v.
holding that issues not raised before the trial court cannot be raised on appeal holding that an issue not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal holding that a claim not raised before the trial court will not be considered for the first time on appeal holding that issues not raised in the trial court may not be raised later on appeal holding that personaljurisdiction challenges not raised in trial court may not be raised for first time on appeal