that Leavitt informed Ridgely of this further contact, but Ridgely responded to the worker’s compensation claims that were enclosed with the letter. Def.’s Mot., Ex. 38. Accordingly, a reasonable jury could infer that Ridgely had knowledge of the letter. Addressing the temporal proximity, the plaintiff sent the November 2006 letter two months before Ridgely proposed the plaintiffs termination. Def.’s Reply at 21. This district has varied as to whether two months is sufficient to establish a causal connection. See Edwards v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 456 F.Supp.2d 72, 92 (D.D.C.2006) (concluding that a two-month gap is not sufficient to establish temporal proximity); Baker v. Potter, 294 F.Supp.2d 33, 41 (D.D.C.2003) (same); but see Sewell v. Chao, 532 F.Supp.2d 126, 139 (D.D.C.2008) (<HOLDING>); Buggs v. Powell, 293 F.Supp.2d 135, 149
holding that a two month period might be enough  to prove the causation prong holding that a three to four month period between the protected activity is not enough to show very close temporal proximity holding two days is sufficient to prove causation holding that three sexually suggestive comments over a three month period were not frequent enough nor severe enough to be unreasonable interference with the plaintiffs work environment holding that a 17 month time period between the employees protected speech and his termination could not support an inference of causation