inquiry into standing is separate from the merits inquiry, and it requires the court to assume the merits of the plaintiffs case. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500-01, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) (finding that “standing in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiffs contention that particular conduct is illegal” and holding that when deciding standing, “courts must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint”); see also Amador Cnty. v. Salazar, 640 F.3d 373, 378 (D.C.Cir.2011) (same). In Indian heirship cases “ft]he first element [of Lujan ] is satisfied if the plaintiffs in this action were the persons deprived of an interest in real property or if they are entitled to represent persons deprived of an interest in real property.” Wilkinson, 440 F.3d at 977 (<HOLDING>); see also Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 711,
holding that a suit for compensatory and punitive damages against various probate judges for conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of property during the probate proceedings was not barred by the probate exception or rookerfeldman abstention doctrine holding that probate exception does not apply where plaintiffs assert claims for breach of fiduciary duty seek in personam jurisdiction over defendants and do not seek to probate or annul a will holding that texass probate statute does not affect whether the probate exception to federal jurisdiction applies to a case holding that the determination by the probate court in the summary proceeding provided for by section 211516 revised code that assets should be included in an estate makes the question of title res judicata as between all parties to the proceeding but the judgment of the probate court may be attacked in a subsequent action by other interested persons who were not parties to the proceeding in probate court holding indian heirs had standing to bring claims that bia improperly permitted leasing of indian trust land in the fort berthold reservation during probate and prior to the final probate order