a general intent crime.” Gonyea, 140 F.3d at 654 (Citations omitted.) Id. at 808-09. By the same token, the additional, specific intent requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) differentiates that statute from 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1). Not only does § 115(a)(1)(B) require the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant threatened certain action against a government official but also that the defendant made such a threat for the specific purpose of interfering with the performance of official duties or of retaliating for the performance of such duties. Indeed, we have assumed the requirement of specific intent in numerous opinions, both published and unpublished, involving § 115 prosecutions. See, e.g., United States v. Snelenberger, 24 F.3d 799, 803 (6th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds in United States
holding that the only intent necessary to convict a defendant under 18 usc  1513b for retaliating against a witness victim or informant was an intent to retaliate internal quotation marks omitted recognizing that to be in violation of 18 usc  115a1b the defendant must act with the intent to retaliate against a government employee on account of the performance of his or her official duties  holding that the defendant is not entitled to be sentenced by the judge who took his plea when the judge made no promise to sentence him holding that the second part of 18 usc  115a1b requires that a threat be made with the intent to retaliate against the judge after the judge has acted holding that the fact that a judge had ruled against the defendant is not a basis for finding the judge prejudiced