Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143, 153, n. 8 (1944) (“‘Holding incommunicado is objectionable because arbitrary— at the mere will and unregulated pleasure of a police officer’ ”); Ward v. Texas, 316 U. S. 547, 555 (1942) (“This Court has set aside convictions based upon confessions extorted from ignorant persons . . . who have been unlawfully held incommunicado without advice of friends or counsel”); Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 240 (1941) (“[Wjhere a prisoner, held incommunicado, is subjected to questioning by officers for long periods, and deprived of the advice of counsel, we shall scrutinize the record with care to determine whether, by the use of his confession, he is deprived of liberty or life through tyrannical or oppressive means”); Wan v. United States, 266 U. S. 1, 11 (1924) (<HOLDING>). To be sure, in many of these cases, the
holding that question of whether a confession was coerced was not to be resolved by considering the truth or falsity of the confession holding of suspect incommunicado contributes to suppression of confession holding that trial judges determination of the admissibility of a confession is based on whether the confession was voluntarily given recognizing that violation of the fourth amendments rule against warrantless arrests in a dwelling generally does not lead to suppression of a postarrest confession holding that prosecutors who soon after arrest of suspect allegedly directed police to coerce confession from suspect were not entitled to absolute immunity because interrogation is ordinarily a police activity