into voting to convict the defendant related to the juror’s decision-making process and therefore inhered in the verdict). ¶15 Finally, we note that the Gay rule is consistent with the rule in other jurisdictions. Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b)(1) provides that except for certain exceptions not relevant here, “[d]uring an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment. The court may not receive a juror’s affidavit or evidence of a juror’s statement on these matters.” See also United States v. Lakhani, 480 F.3d 171, 184-85 (3d Cir. 2007) (<HOLDING>). ¶16 Here, the juror presented no facts
holding that the trial court erred in granting the school boards posttrial motion for directed verdict because although the school board timely moved for a directed verdict during trial it did not serve its motion for directed verdict until the eleventh day after the verdict holding that one jurors exposure to extraneous information concerning prior criminal acts of the defendant which she did not disclose to the other jurors before they rendered a verdict did not merit a new trial holding that jurors posttrial statements that she was coerced into rendering a verdict with which she did not agree could not be considered by the trial court in reviewing a motion for a new trial holding that a posttrial motion is not required after a grant of a directed verdict holding that a plaintiff can show that she is qualified by presenting credible evidence that she continued to possess the objective qualifications she held when she was hired