statute is not ‘ambiguous’ for purposes of lenity merely because there is a division of judicial authority over its proper construction.” Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 64-65, 115 S.Ct. 2021, 132 L.Ed.2d 46 (1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Nevertheless, insofar as the reasoning of other circuits may reveal that SORNA is susceptible to “more than one accepted meaning,” the question of whether SORNA applies to a pre-SORNA sex offender whose interstate travel took place prior to the promulgation of the Interim Rule is, at best, ambiguous. “The rule of lenity requires ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in favor of the defendants subjected to them.” United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514, 128 S.Ct. 2020, 170 L.Ed.2d 912 (2008). See also Cain, 583 F.3d at 417 (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks and citations
holding that in order to establish liability under the ada the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant was an employer within the meaning of the statute holding with respect to sorna that insofar as ambiguity clouds the meaning of a criminal statute the tie must go to the defendant holding the same with respect to an apartment holding that the legal effect of a contract must be determined from words of entire contract and court may not violate the clear meaning to create ambiguity holding that where the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting to the rules of interpretation