violator statute was “a discreet, separate, and independent habitual offender statute” and the enhancement of the defendant’s sentence under that statute was not subject to further enhancement under the general habitual offender statute. Id. at 153-54. After careful consideration of Ind.Code 35-47-2-23 and the above precedent, we do not believe that Thomas’s Class C felony conviction was a sentence enhancement as that term is contemplated in the habitual offender statutes. Rather, carrying a handgun without a license as a Class C felony is a separate and distinct crime from the misdemeanor crime of carrying a handgun without a li cense. Under the facts before us, Thomas’s crime is a Class C felony because he had been convicted of a felony within the preceding 15 years d.Ct.App.1997) (<HOLDING>). We therefore affirm the trial court in all
holding that a prior nonarizona conviction to be used as a prior felony conviction under the statute must both be for an offense that would constitute a felony in arizona and be classified as a felony in the other jurisdiction holding that defendants habitual traffic violator conviction could also serve as a predicate felony conviction under the general habitual offender statute holding that felony conviction for which imposition of sentence was stayed could be counted as prior felony conviction under sentencing guidelines holding that to constitute a prior conviction for purposes of the habitual felony offender act the defendant must have been adjudicated guilty before the present crime was committed holding that defendants auto theft conviction could serve to support his conviction for auto theft as a class c felony and as a prior unrelated felony conviction under the habitual offender statute