permanent resettlement, and thus may ... not be able to make the prima facie showing of firm resettlement under § 208.15 in that manner.” 242 F.3d at 486-87 (noting that we faced such a situation in Cheo). In the event that direct evidence is unobtainable, “the IJ or BIA may find it necessary to rely on non-offer-based factors, such as the length of an alien’s stay in a third country, the alien’s intent to remain in the country, and the extent of the social and economic ties developed by the alien, as circumstantial evidence of the existence of a government-issued offer.” Id. at 487. Such factors may serve as a surrogate for direct evidence of a formal offer “if they rise to a sufficient level of clarity and force.” Id. Again, the Seventh Circuit is in accord. Diallo, 381 F.3d at 694 (<HOLDING>). Opting for a “totality of the circumstances”
recognizing that the necessary inquiry  is not whether there was a warrant or whether there was time to get one but whether there was probable cause for the arrest recognizing that such circumstances may exist but holding that the ij erred as he neither considered whether there was an offer at all nor suggested that he was using nonofferbased factors as a surrogate recognizing further that the court need not  and could not  resolve all of the circumstances in which such factors would entitle an employer to judgment as a matter of law recognizing that at a bond hearing there is no limit to the discretionary factors that may be considered  in determining whether to detain an alien pending a decision on  removal holding that appellant was not harmed where defendant never asserted that he was not a us citizen and no evidence in the record suggested he was not a us citizen