does not amount to reversible error. See United States v. Nissen, 666 F.3d 486, 491 (8th Cir.2012) (“ ‘[T]here is no requirement that the district court recite every § 3553(a) factor’ during sentencing.” (quoting United States v. Mees, 640 F.3d 849, 855 (8th Cir.2011))); United States v. Blackmon, 662 F.3d 981, 988 (8th Cir.2011) (“[District courts are not required to make ‘robotic incantations that each statutory factor has been considered.’ ” (quoting United States v. Lamoreaux, 422 F.3d 750, 756 (8th Cir.2005))). Similarly, the court was not required to robotically recite every other sentencing-related argument that Ruiz-Salazar raised, including his arguments about his alleged lack of access to a Fast-Track program. See United States v. Longarica, 699 F.3d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Straw, 616 F.3d 737, 743
holding that the district court had no right to apply the statute of limitations sua sponte because it had been waived holding that a defendants arguments about his lack of access to a fasttrack program did not require the district court to acknowledge sua sponte that it would have discretion to take this factor into account in deciding whether to vary a sentence downward holding that a district court has the discretion to raise a  2254 timeliness consideration sua sponte holding that the district court cannot be faulted for failing sua sponte to also address whether the defendants deportable status would affect the severity of his sentence holding that a court may sua sponte take judicial notice of its docket