“in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply it.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54, 91 S.Ct. 746 (quoting Buck, 313 U.S. at 402, 61 S.Ct. 962). But that is not the case here. The unauthorized name restriction certainly would be constitutional if applied only to the deceptive use of names in solicitations (indeed, 9 M.R.S.A. § 5014 treats a violation of the Act as a violation of Maine’s Unfair Trade Practices Act). As for the licensing component of the Maine Act, contrary to Christian Action Network’s argument, the statutory provision that the State “may deny” a license for certain enumerated statutory reasons, 9 M.R.S.A. § 5017, is not facially unconstitutional. See Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 325, 122 S.Ct. 775, 151 L.Ed.2d 783 (2002) (<HOLDING>). At oral argument, Christian Action Network’s
holding that the plaintiffs right to political speech is fully in accord with the publics interest in free speech and association holding use of word may generally indicates permissive rather than mandatory intent recognizing that code is speech holding that may deny is a permissive construction that furthers rather than constricts free speech holding that adverse inference rule is permissive