not conduct any testing of Flee-nor. 9 . Judge Cudahy dissented and would have ordered an evidentiary hearing and the appointment of a neuropsychologist because Burris had not had a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the state courts. 116 F.3d at 262 & n. 2. See also Burris v. Parke, 130 F.3d 782 (7th Cir.1997) (by 2-1 vote, denying last minute effort to stop execution). In this case Fleenor has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate these issues in the state courts, so the issue that divided the Burris panel in the last stages of the case is not presented. 10 . An argument for mercy based solely on sweeping abstractions and appeals to religious beliefs may not amount to effective representation. See, e.g., Hall v. Washington, 106 F.3d 742, 749-50 (7th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Flee-nor’s lawyers focused their argument as
holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel holding that defendant failed to show that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to adequately investigate the case because record demonstrated that counsel did in fact prepare for trial and interview witnesses holding that trial counsel was not ineffective for declining to present mitigation evidence regarding appellants psychological problems and drug use when appellant failed to disclose any information about those problems prior to trial holding counsels performance was ineffective where counsel failed to present any evidence in mitigation and offered a rambling and incoherent argument that cannot even charitably be called a plea for mercy holding counsel was ineffective where counsel failed to contact defendant in preparing for sentencing hearing failed to present mitigation witnesses and failed in closing argument to offer any reason other than blatant disregard of illinois law for sparing halls life