also seems to concede that plain error applies to his competency challenge. But we nevertheless decline the Government’s invitation and instead conclude that Banks’s arguments are unpersuasive under any standard. 2 . It is unclear whether Banks is challenging the procedural or substantive reasonableness of his sentence or both. Like the government, we will address both issues. The government interprets Banks’s brief to also include an independent sentencing argument concerning the additional term of supervised release. But Banks makes no such argument, and we therefore will not reach it. 3 . We note that a defendant charged with violating a condition of supervised release has limited due process rights. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Manuel, 732 F.3d
holding that revocation of parole does not impinge upon absolute liberty but only on the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions holding defendant does not waive fourth amendment protection by signing parole agreement but the search condition does confirm right of parole officer to conduct reasonable searches within scope of parole mission holding that an important part of due process in the context of parole revocation is a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole holding that revocation of parole does not create collateral consequences sufficient to extend standing beyond expiration of sentence and rejecting as moot a challenge to an allegedly erroneous parole revocation recognizing that it is well established that where a state provides a discretionary parole regime prisoners do not have a liberty or property interest in parole