brother for the payment he made to the smuggler. Although Garcia-Baez’s testimony was not entirely clear, “the evidence presented [does not] compel a reasonable finder of fact to reach a contrary result.” Singh-Kaur v. INS, 183 F.3d 1147, 1149-50 (9th Cir.1999). Therefore, the IJ’s conclusion that Garcia-Baez knowingly aided and encouraged Armente to illegally enter the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i) was supported by substantial evidence. See Moran v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1089, 1091-92 (9th Cir.2005). Accordingly, Garcia-Baez was not eligible for suspension of deportation because he was statutorily barred from establishing good moral character during the requisite period. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3); see also Khourassany v. INS, 208 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Garcia-Baez challenges the IJ’s
holding bia did not err in determining request for stay of voluntary departure is not an implicit request for a withdrawal of voluntary departure holding that an alien was statutorily ineligible for voluntary departure on the basis of his failure to meet the good moral character component of 8 usc  1254e 1996 in light of his violation of 8 usc  1182a6e holding that because petitioners proceedings commenced after the enactment of iirira petitioner was statutorily ineligible for suspension of deportation holding that where an alien was ineligible for a visa as a matter of law his citizenship was illegally procured and subject to revocation holding motion to reopen seeking adjustment of status constituted a withdrawal of the request for voluntary departure and the adjustment motion was therefore not barred based on failure to depart within the voluntary departure time allowed