of this litigation, under the district court injunction as clarified and implemented by the Memorandum Order, any disenrollment date does not matter, as the Disenrollment Order is inoperative. As to the Band’s legal interest in maintaining sovereign control over membership issues, granting the relief requested in claims one through three—vacatur of the BIA’s Order—would not undermine authority the Tribe would otherwise exercise. The Tribe itself has delegated its authority over enrollment to the BIA. See Const, of Band, art. Ill, § 2. The Altos do not seek to alter the Band’s rights vis-a-vis enrollment decisions. Any attempt to do so in the Band’s absence would clearly be impermissible. See Pit River Home & Agric. Coop. Ass’n v. United States, 30 F.3d 1088, 1099 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Confederated Tribes, 928 F.2d at 1498-99
holding that a tribal council was a necessary party in a suit challenging the councils designation by the secretary of interior as the beneficiary of reservation property holding that discretionary action of secretary of the interior in ratifying and approving amendments to a tribal constitution and bylaws was not subject to judicial review holding that neither the tribe or its tribal court was necessary to the determination of the tribal courts jurisdiction given that the district courts judgment would be binding on the absent party and they did not have a legally protected interest at issue noting that the tribe was not a party to a relevant agreement or treaty with any party to the suit holding that a tribal housing authority established by tribal council pursuant to its powers of selfgovernment was a tribal agency rather than a separate corporate entity created by the tribe holding that beneficiaries of judgment fund constituted an identifiable group where beneficiary class was defined by statute and rolls prepared by the secretary of interior