would have so plainly created reasonable doubt that a conclusion to the contrary would be objectively unreasonable. The Appellate Division could have reasonably concluded that the foregoing chain of inferences in Jimenez’s materiality argument is simply too tenuous and that even with the heroin evidence admitted, the jury would still have discounted the testimony supporting Jimenez’s theory. We do not find that conclusion objectively unreasonable. Because the state court’s decision was silent and because we hold that it was not objectively unreasonable to deem the heroin evidence constitutionally immaterial, we need not apply § 2254(d)(1) to the second element of Jimenez’s claim, which asks whether the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence was arbitrary. See Sellan, 261 F.3d at 317 (<HOLDING>). Federal law renders Jimenez ineligible for a
holding that copyright owners claim was not so objectively unreasonable as to justify an award holding that the maryland court of appeals application of stricklands governing legal principles was objectively unreasonable holding that the essential element for determining whether or not a claim was a misrepresentation claim within the meaning of section 2680h was reliance by the plaintiff upon the false information holding that the state courts rejection of the petitioners ineffective assistance of counsel claim was an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence before the state court holding that  2254ds unreasonable application clause was not met upon finding that the state courts silent adjudication of one element of the petitioners claim was objectively reasonable without determining whether its silent resolution of the second element was unreasonable