Because we found these provisions to be non-punitive, we held that the full panoply of due process protections that attach where punishment is in the offing, see Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), are not constitutionally required. Therefore, we found no constitutional flaw with the prescribed SVP assessment procedure, which requires only that the prosecution demonstrate to the court (rather than a jury) by clear and convincing evidence (rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt) that the offender suffers a “mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offense.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9792; see G. Williams, 832 A.2d at 984; of. Commonwealth v. Killinger, 585 Pa. 92, 888 A.2d 592 (2005)(<HOLDING>). In G. Williams, however, this Court expressed
holding that statutory notice provisions for notice of default and opportunity to cure were waived by provisions of note as to one obligor though provisions applied to coobligor who used property as residence holding that mandatory minimums do not implicate apprendi holding that the registration and community notification provisions applicable to nonsvp offenders also do not implicate apprendi because those provisions attach automatically upon conviction of a predicate offense and require no judicial factfinding by a diminished standard of proof holding that the hearing provisions of the ina supersede the provisions of the apa holding that congress incorporation of jury provisions of the fair labor standards act into the age discrimination in employment act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions