the NYS FCA) and an “alternate action” (under the NYC FCA), and that he is entitled to receive a percentage of the proceeds. The Court denies Khurana’s motion because he is not entitled to share in an alternate civil remedy or an alternate action absent a valid qui tain claim. At the outset, the Court is skeptical that the DPA and SAIC Settlement constitute an “alternate civil proceeding” under the NYS FCA or an'“alternate action” under the NYC FCA. Assuming that the con tours of the state and city “alternate” provisions mirror those of the federal FCA’s “alternate remedy” provision, lower courts appear divided on the question of whether a proceeding with criminal dimensions constitutes an “alternative remedy.” Compare United States v. Kurlander, 24 F.Supp.3d 417, 424 (D.N.J. 2014) (<HOLDING>); United States v. WellCare Health Plans, Inc.,
holding that a federal district court may decide whether an activity is an unfair labor practice under the nlra when the matter is raised as a defense to a claim under an independent federal remedy over which the federal district courts do have jurisdiction holding under the circumstances that a criminal proceeding does not qualify as an alternate remedy under the federal fca holding that adequate alternative state remedy must provide the possibility of relief under the circumstances holding that a period of paid leave does not qualify as a suspension holding that conduct designated as a felony under state law but as only a misdemeanor under the controlled substances act does not qualify as an aggravated felony