as to be fundamentally unfair.” Duckett v. Quick, 282 F.3d 844, 847 (D.C.Cir.2002) (citations omitted). As to the specific claims raised in the instant Petition, Respondent argues correctly that the Fourth Amendment’s oath or affirmation clause does not apply to the administrative warrants the USPC is authorized to issue upon a parole officer’s representation that a parole violation has occurred. Resp’t’s Mem. at 4-5 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Garcia-Avalino, 444 F.3d 444, 447 (5th Cir.2006) (concluding that “[g]iven the relaxed constitutional norms that apply in revocation hearings, a warrant for the arrest of a supervised releasee need not comply with the Oath or affirmation clause of the Fourth Amendment.”); United States v. Collazo-Castro, 660 F.3d 516 (1st Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); see generally Bethea v. U.S. Parole Comm’n,
holding that an amendment does not expunge the falsity of an oath holding that proceedings to revoke supervised release  need not comply with the procedural protections constitutionally guaranteed for criminal prosecutions holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release holding that due process clause does not require a federal prisoner to receive credit for time spent on supervised release if release is revoked holding that the fourth amendment does not require a warrant based on an oath or affirmation to revoke an individual on supervised release