that are "similar” to known child pornography&emdash;and requires an AOL employee to screen the file manually&emdash;IDFP only finds exact matches, making it possible to send "an automatic report to [NCMEC]” without human review. Phillips Decl. ¶¶ 7, 11. In essence, IDFP is a mechanism for flagging images and videos that have already been transmitted through AOL, which means that the file is already known to be illicit. To challenge the constitutionality of AOL's IDFP hashing program, DiTomasso must claim an expectation of privacy not in the content of his email, but rather in the "hash number” of an attached file. Whether he can do so is unclear: the constitutional status of digital metadata is currently in flux. Compare ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F.Supp.2d 724, 749-53 (S.D.N.Y.2013) (<HOLDING>), with Klayman v. Obama, 957 F.Supp.2d 1, 32
holding that the constitutional protection of an individuals reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her home does not extend to a place of business holding that prisoners have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their prison cells holding under smith that individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in telephony metadata holding that individuals have no expectation of privacy in their license registration or insurance documents and citing outofstate cases that have held that individuals do not have a privacy interest in their registration records holding that prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells