Defendants knew she was a minor, or (2) Defendants recklessly disregarded the fact she was a minor, or (8) Defendants had a reasonable opportunity to observe her. Accordingly, the superseding indictment which only charged reasonable opportunity to observe the victim was sufficient and the district court erred by dismissing it. B. The Conspiracy Charge Defendants argue our interpretation of § 1591(c) does not resolve whether the district court erred by dismissing the conspiracy counts. Relying on a ease from the Seventh Circuit, they assert they could not have agreed to commit the crime of child sex trafficking without knowing the victim was a minor at the time they entered into any agreement to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1591. See United States v. Salgado, 519 F.3d 411, 415 (7th Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>). This argument confuses the conduct charged in
holding the crime of conspiracy is committed or not before the substantive crime begins holding that because it is axiomatic that the defendants could have been prosecuted for conspiracy without ever having committed a substantive crime they could be charged with felony conspiracy and misdemeanors holding that if a crime is broadly defined the court can look beyond the elements of the crime holding that counsel did not admit the defendant was guilty of a crime when counsel noted that if the evidence established the commission of any crime that crime was voluntary manslaughter not murder holding that before the accessory to a crime can be convicted as such it must be shown that the crime has been committed by the principal