plaintiff has already received a full remedy and its action is moot is therefore denied. 3. CERCLA Claims Against The Government Defendants a. Release Of A Hazardous Substance CERCLA defines a “release” as “any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment.... ” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22). Courts have construed this definition broadly. See, e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 669 (5th Cir.1989) (“the definition of release should be construed broadly”); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146, 1152 (1st Cir.1989) (“The courts have construed CERCLA’s definition of ‘release’ broadly”); State of New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); City of Tulsa v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 258
holding that all inclusive language  from the beginning of the world to the days present barred all claims arising prior to releases execution recognizing the courts continued holding that visual observation is no search at all holding intent may be inferred from all facts and circumstances holding that direct proof of intent to defraud is unnecessary and that it may be inferred from the act of the parties and from all circumstances holding that leaking tanks and pipelines continued leaching and seepage from earlier spills and leaking drums were all releases