is therefore inadmissible. See Fed. R.Evid. 701 (lay opinion testimony inadmissible except in narrow circumstances not applicable here); see also Shorette v. Rite Aid of Maine, Inc., 155 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir.1998) (inadmissible lay opinion testimony cannot forestall summary judgment). Even if Lash’s testimony were admissible, her conclusion was unsupported: Lash conceded at deposition that she did not purport to opine on the cause of Harriman’s injuries. The district court was thus free to disregard that aspect of her testimony. See, e.g., Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 25-26 (1st Cir.2005) (“A nisi prius court need not give weight to opinion evidence that is unsupported by an adequate foundation.”); see also Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 583 (1st Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). That leaves Harrimaris memory. The only thing
holding that mere speculation does not satisfy the nonmoving partys burden of establishing a dispute of material fact sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment holding speculation insufficient to avoid summary judgment holding that a nonmovant cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment merely  on the basis of conjecture or surmise holding that recusal is not required on the basis of unsupported irrational or highly tenuous speculation recognizing that tenuous assertions strung together by strands of speculation and surmise cannot defeat summary judgment