was a motivating factor for DISD’s adverse employment actions. See, e.g., Seaman v. CSPH, Inc., 179 F.3d 297, 300 (5th Cir.1999). “ ‘Direct evidence is evidence that, if believed, proves the fact of discriminatory animus without inference or presumption.’ ” West v. Nabors Drilling USA, Inc., 330 F.3d 379, 384 n. 3 (5th Cir.2003) (quoting Sandstad v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 309 F.3d 893, 897 (5th Cir.2002)) (age discrimination case). “If an inference is required for the evidence to be probative as to [defendant’s] discriminatory animus in firing [plaintiff], the evidence is circumstantial, not direct.” Sandstad, 309 F.3d at 897-98. When a plaintiff does not present direct evidence of discrimination, the court applies the modified McDonnell Douglas approach. Seaman, 179 F.3d at 300 (<HOLDING>). As modified, the McDonnell Douglas framework
holding that the mcdonnell douglas framework still applies to adea cases postgross holding that in title vii cases the mixedmotives theory of discrimination is available in cases with circumstantial evidence of discrimination holding that the mcdonnell douglas framework applies equally to ada and rehabilitation act cases holding that in title vii cases the mixedmotive theory of discrimination is available in cases with circumstantial evidence of discrimination holding that mcdonnell douglas framework which is used in title vii cases applies to ada cases when only circumstantial evidence of discrimination is offered