death sentence when the offense of kidnapping with bodily injury was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of the capital felonies of murder and armed robbery. Id. at 726. In this case, Sears was indicted for kidnapping Ms. Wilbur and inflicting bodily injury upon her by striking her with brass knuckles, and stabbing her to death with a knife. There is no basis for Sears’ contention that the stabbing could not constitute part of the bodily injury in the kidnapping charge. As a matter of law, bodily injury does not have to be inflicted at the same moment as the initial abduction. Potts, 261 Ga. at 720 (victim seized in one county and bodily injury inflicted in another). See also Pryor, 238 Ga. at 701-702; cf. Diamond v. State, 267 Ga. 249, 250 (477 SE2d 562) (1996) (<HOLDING>). The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that
holding that virginia burglary statute comes within definition of generic burglary holding that possession of burglary tools is an offense separate from burglary holding that iowa burglary is not categorical burglary as the elements of iowa burglary law are broader than those of generic burglary holding that direct evidence of defendants dna found at the scene was direct evidence merely of a circumstance that suggested his participation in the burglary and theft but was not direct evidence of his participation in the burglary holding that defendant was still in the commission of a burglary despite its technical completion when she caused the death of three persons during a police chase that began at the scene of the burglary