harmless — which is within the scope of this section. H.R.Rep. No. 103-835, at 55 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3364 (footnote omitted). In the absence of a “hold harmless” provision, a former spouse who is called upon to pay a claim owed to a creditor but included as a debt that the debtor was supposed to pay will find that debt dischargeable. Belcher v. Owens (In re Owens), 191 B.R. 669, 674 (Bankr.E.D.Ky.1996) (“The absence of ... hold harmless language or any other language ... which could be construed to create a new debt from ... [debtor] to ... [plaintiff], leads to the conclusion that this is not a debt ‘incurred by the debtor in the course of the ... separation agreement.’ ”) (quoting Stegall v. Stegall (In re Stegall), 188 B.R. 597, 598 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1995) (<HOLDING>)); see also Reeder v. Zeigler (In re Zeigler),
holding that a debt is not in connection with a courts order when that order only acknowledges a burden the debtor had already incurred holding that  522f doesnot permit a debtor to avoid a lien granted to the debtors former spouse under a divorce decree that extinguishes all previous interests the parties had in the property and in no event secures more than the spouses former interest holding that fees incurred by debtor were not in the nature of support holding that in the absence of a hold harmless agreement a former spouse has no claim against the debtor to pay a debt listed on the divorce agreement as belonging to the debtor because such a debt is not incurred in connection with the divorce but was incurred in connection with the debtors and former spouses original transaction with the creditor holding that a credit transaction is not a consumer debt when it is incurred with a profit motive