Vachon was the true owner should have been known to him and/or his counsel, and certainly was a matter of public record. See Thurlough v. Dresser, 98 Me. 161, 163-64, 56 A. 654 (1903) (“The mere record of a valid mortgage gives constructive notice to all. All are presumed to know its contents, for any one interested can obtain knowledge by examining the record.”). 8 . We are not persuaded by Oceanic’s assertion, on appeal, that the sale notice was not sent by registered mail. Oceanic failed to deny — and therefore admitted — this fact in its opposition to Sloan's Cove's motion for summary judgment. See M.R.' Civ. P. 56(h)(4). 9 . Courts in other jurisdictions have decided differently. See, e.g., Pentad Joint Venture v. First Nat’l Bank of La Grange, 797 S.W.2d 92, 97 (Tex.App.1990) (<HOLDING>); see also Pemstein v. Stimpson, 36
holding that a failure to comply with the foreclosure statutes invalidates a foreclosure sale holding that in contrast to foreclosure of a mortgage secured by personal property foreclosure of real property under a deed of trust need hot be at a commercially reasonable sale and the failure to conduct a commercially reasonable foreclosure sale of real property is not actionable holding that buyer who purchased property at foreclosure sale took title free from easement granted after deed of trust holding that after a judgment entry grants a decree of foreclosure and order of sale the foreclosure action cannot be dismissed as the judgment is final holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property