Assuming, without in any way deciding, that N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a) is a divisible statute, additional questions of North Carolina law must be resolved before defendant’s eligibility to seek the termination of his obligation to continue to register as a sex offender can be determined. Although this Court has held that proof that a touching occurred is not necessary for a finding of guilt for purposes of N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a) (1), see State v. Hartness, 326 N.C. 561, 567, 391 S.E.2d 177, 180 (stating that N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(l) does not require “the State [to] prove that a touching occurred”), and while the Court of Appeals has held that proof of a touching is not necessary for a finding of guilt under N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(2), see Hammett, 182 N.C. App. at 323, 642 S.E.2d at 459 (<HOLDING>); State v. Every, 157 N.C. App. 200, 207, 578
holding that taking indecent liberties with a child is not a lesser included offense of statutory rape given the differing age elements holding that an indictment like that returned against defendant in this case did not suffice to permit a court to determine for purposes of the modified categorical approach that the defendant was convicted of the offense made punishable by ncgs  142021a2 holding that the state felony offense of taking indecent liberties with a child categorically constituted a crime of violence for purposes of the career offender sentencing guidelines holding military offense of indecent acts with a child must be done in presence of victim holding that the defendant did not need to have physically touched the victim in order to be convicted of taking indecent liberties with a child in violation of ncgs  142021a2