that HHB&T complied with the terms of the escrow agreement. Young, however, alleges that SAFIG orally agreed that the loan proceeds would remain on deposit at HHB&T until SAFIG issued the surety bond. The escrow agreement, which was in the bank’s official records, does not contain or reference the oral agreement, however. Nor does any other document in the bank’s records memorialize the oral agreement. The D’Oench doctrine, therefore, prevents Young from bringing a claim based on the unrecorded oral agreement. Young, however, argues that neither the D’Oench doctrine nor section 1823(e) bars his claims. He contends that the D’Oench doctrine does not apply because he falls under the “innocent borrower exception.” He contends that section 1823(e) does not apply beca (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); In re 604 Columbus Ave. Realty Trust, 968
holding that the fifth circuit does not recognize an innocent borrower exception to the doench doctrine holding that claims that do not diminish or defeat the fdics interest in any specific asset are nevertheless doench barred in light of the established purpose of the doench  doctrine to protect the fdics reliance on the banks records holding that the doench doctrine applies even when the customer is completely innocent of any bad faith recklessness or negligence holding that the doench doctrine protects the fdic even where the fdic does not have an interest in an asset holding that no complete innocence exception to the doench doctrine exists