set standards for when dismissal is appropriate” and that, as a result, some circuits had established conditions to constrain a district court’s discretion to dismiss a case for failure to abide by a procedural rule. Id. We nevertheless declined to adopt any definitive standard in Lynch, however, because we found that the petitioner’s failure to file a timely record and designation on appeal was governed by the “excusable neglect” standard of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9006(b)(1) (“Rule 9006”), which governs the enlargement of time for deadlines in bankruptcy proceedings. See id. We, thus, left open the possibility “that dismissal would be an unwarranted sanction for some errors, and hence, impermissible under Rule 8001(a).” Id.; see also In re Tampa Chain Co., 835 F.2d at 55 (<HOLDING>). While we have declined to determine what
holding that a trial court does not lose jurisdiction in a matter by ordering its dismissal before jeopardy has attached unless there is an abuse of discretion in vacating the order of dismissal and reinstating the case for trial holding in a case where a class was certified that there was an absence of collusion since the dismissal based on a string of adverse decisions which had drained the case of legal merit made the dismissal the functional equivalent of an involuntary dismissal holding that whether dismissal or transfer is appropriate lies within the sound discretion of the district court holding that the relevant inquiry is not whether the court has discretion to facilitate notice but whether this is an appropriate case in which to exercise discretion holding that in considering dismissal of an appeal the court should exercise discretion to determine whether dismissal is appropriate in the circumstances presented by the case