§ 12111(8). Stated differently, an employee can only sue under the Rehabilitation Act “if he or she can perform the essential functions of the position with reasonable accommodation.” Breen v. Dep’t of Transp., 282 F.3d 839, 841 (D.C.Cir.2002) (emphasis added) (citing Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 529 (D.C.Cir.1994)). Because the enforcement standards of the Rehabilitation Act are the same as in the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), case law analyzing disability benefits under the ADA applies with equal force to the Rehabilitation Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 791(g) (stating that the “standards used to determine whether [the Rehabilitation Act] has been violated ... shall be the standards applied under the [ADA]”); Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1288 (D.C.Cir.1998) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). In Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems
holding that the mcdonnell douglas framework applies equally to ada and rehabilitation act cases holding that mcdonnell douglas framework which is used in title vii cases applies to ada cases when only circumstantial evidence of discrimination is offered holding that the mcdonnell douglas burdenshifting framework applies to retaliation claims in the same manner as to discrimination claims holding the ada and the rehabilitation act applicable holding that the mcdonnell douglas framework still applies to adea cases postgross