a defect in his administrative proceedings that deprived him of judicial review. See ante at 95 - 96. I cannot, however, join in their conclusion that such a deprivation of judicial review was practically effected by IJ and BIA errors in telling Lopez that he was ineligible for discretionary relief from deportation under former INA § 212(c), see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c). See ante at 96-100. To the extent the majority reads United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61 (2d Cir.2004), to compel this conclusion, I must respectfully dissent. In Copeland, this court reiterated that “[t]he availability of habeas review is sometimes deemed to constitute an opportunity for judicial review.” United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d at 68 (citing United States v. Gonzalez-Roque, 301 F.3d 39, 49-50 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>)). At the same time, however, the court
holding alien not denied judicial review because habeas was available holding that there was adequate opportunity when state court judicial review of an administrative proceeding was available holding that habeas proceedings do not embrace review of the exercise of discretion in criminal alien cases holding that a texas prisoner who had not exhausted his clearly available administrative remedies was properly denied habeas relief in the district court holding that habeas review is  for any alien held in custody pursuant to an order of deportation