agreement. That is not the law. The validity of the settlement agreement in this case is governed by federal law. See Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co., 65 F.3d 562, 570-71 (7th Cir.1995). Because of the unique nature of the attorney-client relationship, and consistent with the public policy favoring settlements, federal law presumes that an attorney-of-record who enters into a settlement agreement, purportedly on behalf of a client, has authority to do so. See, e.g., Anderson v. Flexel, 47 F.3d 243, 249 (7th Cir.1995) (“we [] recognize the existence of the longstanding legal presumption that an attorney has the authority to act on behalf of the person he represents.”); Greater Kansas City Laborers Pension Fund v. Paramount Indus., 829 F.2d 644, 646 (8th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); Edwards v. Born, Inc., 792 F.2d 387, 390 (3d
holding that a rebuttable presumption in favor of the action of an administrative agency and the burden of proof is upon one challenging its action holding that the burden is on the plaintiff holding that burden of proof is on party challenging attorneyofrecords authority to settle case holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant holding that traditional allocation of burden of proof to the party challenging the decisions applies to decisions under the tca