dangerousness is nowhere mentioned in the list of sixteen statutory aggravating factors for homicide. See FDPA, 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c) (1994 and Supp. II 1996). Second, given the broad language of the FDPA as to the allowance of nonstatutory aggravating factors, there is no reason under the FDPA why future dangerousness cannot be presented to the jury. See id. § 3592(c) (“the jury ... may consider whether any other aggravating factor for which notice has been given exists”). Furthermore, we have little doubt that future dangerousness to society and to prison officials and other inmates during incarceration is relevant to the jury’s final determination of whether a death sentence should be imposed. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1002-03, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Holder’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s
holding that a state may consider and rely upon a defendants future dangerousness in its decision to seek a death sentence holding that when a state asserts future dangerousness as grounds for imposing a death sentence due process requires that a defendant be entitled to inform the jury that he is parole ineligible holding unconstitutional defendants sentence of death based upon the holding in roper supra and remanding for the montgomery circuit court to set aside the defendants death sentence and to sentence him to the only other sentence available  life in the penitentiary without the possibility of parole holding that where the capital defendants future dangerousness is at issue and state law prohibits the defendants release on parole due process requires that the sentencing jury be informed that the defendant is parole ineligible holding state court improperly refused to admit evidence of defendants adaptation to prison because it was clearly relevant to future dangerousness