constitutional right to a jury trial. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 198, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968). Although the Supreme Court has not expressly defined what constitutes a “serious contempt,” the Court has repeatedly held that a jury trial is not required if the contempt is punished by confinement of six months or less. See Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 496, 94 S.Ct. 2697, 41 L.Ed.2d 897 (1974); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 379-80, 86 S.Ct. 1523, 16 L.Ed.2d 629 (1966); cf. Bloom, 391 U.S. at 211, 88 S.Ct. 1477 (concluding that a contempt punished by a two-year term of imprisonment is a “serious offense” to which the right to trial by jury applies); Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 837-38, 114 S.Ct. 2552, 129 L.Ed.2d 642 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, in this State “[t]he general rule
holding that a postjudgment contempt sanction for refusal to obey orders whether it is characterized as a civil or a criminal sanction is immediately appealable as a final order under  1291 holding that monetary sanction was not supportable as a compensatory civil contempt sanction because there was no proof of the amount of loss holding that a flat unconditional fine for 50 was a criminal sanction because the contemnor had no subsequent opportunity to reduce or avoid the fine through compliance holding that a fiftytwo million dollar fine could not be imposed as a sanction for criminal contempt except through a jury trial holding that 25 surcharge added to fees that otherwise would be compensatory was a criminal contempt sanction even though it was payable to the adverse party and not to the court reversing order for sanctions because court did not follow procedural requirements for criminal contempt