with his turn onto Griffin Road instead of moving backward. However, the only evidence regarding appellant’s ability to move back came from appellant himself, who testified that moving backward was impossible in that situation. Even if there were evidence to the contrary, at least it is an issue of material fact. In addition, appellant’s decision was “set in motion” by the placement of the pipes and was therefore not independent of the alleged negligent act. Id.; see also Longa v. Eskimo Freeze, Inc., 468 So.2d 468, 469 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) (reversing a directed verdict for defendant because plaintiffs awareness of a dangerous condition and how he negotiated the condition was a comparative negligence question for the jury); Fernandez v. Flores, 467 So.2d 364, 365 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (<HOLDING>). Freedom relies on Metropolitan Dade County v.
holding that an insureds personal belief that he was not liable for an accident provided no basis for submitting the question of the reasonableness of his delay in notification to a jury when the insured knew the day after the accident that it had been claimed that the cable he had installed had caused the accident holding that party that failed to object to instruction that jury not answer a question based on its answer to the prior question waived that partys right to have the jury make findings as to the subsequent question holding that summary judgment on plaintiffs res ipsa loquitur theory was precluded both because there existed genuine issues of material fact as to the cause of the accident and whether or not one of the defendants had exclusive control over the instrumentality of the accident holding that whether a driver operated his vehicle on an improved shoulder in safety as per section 54a depends upon whether he acted reasonably under the common law holding a jury question existed as to whether vehicles parked on a road shoulder obstructed a drivers view and contributed to an accident