during custodial interrogation, the accused “is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. at 1885. Thus, the police “ ‘may not reinterrogate an accused in custody if he has clearly asserted [this] right to counsel.’ ” Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 680, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 2097, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988) (emphasis added) (quoting Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485,101 S.Ct. at 1885). However, nothing e of counsel during custodial interrogation on a limited basis that still permits some police questioning. See Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 525-26, 107 S.Ct. 828, 830, 93 L.Ed.2d 920 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Further, a suspect may also validly choose to
holding that a suspect may invoke his miranda right to counsel only with respect to written statements while still permitting verbal statements without qualification holding that the interrogation must cease once the suspect invokes his miranda right to counsel holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendants credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt holding that once a suspect has invoked his right to counsel police may still legitimately inquire whether the suspect has changed his mind about speaking to them without an attorney holding that statements given after miranda warnings are admissible even when the arrest that preceded the statements was constitutionally deficient