or re-sentence because Rivera-Sanchez was convicted of only one crime. See Lynch v. United States, 364 F.2d 313,J 314 (9th Cir.1966) (affirming a conviction where the defendant was indicted and convicted of one count of bank robbery pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and (d) because the indictment was in one count and “[a]ny reference in the indictment and judgment to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and (d) does not constitute two separate and distinct offenses.”) (citing Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 305-06, 81 S.Ct. 653, 5 L.Ed.2d 670 (1961)). Furthermore, Rivera-Sanchez’s sentence already reflects that the punishment was for a violation of § 1326(a) as enhanced by § 1326(b)(2). Accordingly, we reject Rivera-Sanchez’s suggestion that we vacate the judgment and remand for Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). We hold that the proper procedure under these
holding the district court did not clearly err in applying the enhancement where guns were found on the same premises from which the defendant trafficked drugs and were readily accessible to the defendant holding that evidence of the same rather unusual name that the former conviction was in same county and city as the present case where evidence showed defendant lived and that the character of offenses was the same was sufficient to establish identity holding that it was a clerical error readily correctable under frcrim p 36 where the judgment of conviction named a different subsection than that for which the defendant was charged and tried but where the penalties under those subsections were the same holding the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that it may find the defendant guilty of conspiracy if the jury found the defendant agreed with at least one other person where the indictment charged the defendant with conspiring with a single named individual and the evidence tended to show the defendant may have conspired with a number of persons not just the named coconspirator to commit an unlawful act holding that the court made a clerical error or was just guilty of creating ambiguous verbiage where it sentenced the defendant to parole under counts four and five instead of one and three and concluding that the answer is for the order to be corrected not vacated