Congress limited section 1823(e) to claims that impair the FDIC’s interest in a specific asset. Regardless of any limitation on section 1823(e), several circuit courts of appeals have specifically held that the common-law D’Oench doctrine is not so limited. These courts have held that D’Oench bars claims relating to specific assets and also bars claims relating to liabilities of a bank under FDIC receivership. See, e.g., Inn at Saratoga Assocs. v. FDIC, 60 F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir.1995).(rejecting the argument that the D’Oench doctrine is limited by an “asset” requirement because such a requirement “would undercut an important purpose of that doctrine — allowing the FDIC to rely on a bank’s records when insuring the bank”); Brookside Assocs. v. Rifkin, 49 F.3d 490, 496 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); OPS Shopping Ctr., Inc., 992 F.2d at 308-10
holding that the doench doctrine protects the fdic even where the fdic does not have an interest in an asset holding that section 1823e is narrower than the doench doctrine and that section 1823e applies only to cases involving a specific asset holding that  1823e applies only when the fdics interest in a specific asset would be impaired by the alleged secret agreement holding that the commonlaw doench doctrine applies to bar suit even when the rtc does not acquire a specific asset whose value is affected by the alleged secret agreement holding that regardless of whether a specific asset is involved doench applies to claims or defenses that relate to ordinary banking transactions