both sections and unnecessarily requires resolution of a “conflict” between sections 502 and 503. II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Pursuant to the above analysis, I mak tions, Inc. (In re CM Holdings, Inc.), 264 B.R. 141, 159 (Bankr.D.Del.2000) (Walsh, C.J.) ("[AJttempts to apply the coercive effect of § 502(d) in an effort to dislodge preference payments by disallowing otherwise legitimate administrative expenses payments under § 503 subverts the priority scheme in bankruptcy to no practical effect.”), with Microage, Inc. v. Viewsonic Corp. (In re Microage, Inc.), 291 B.R. 503, 508 (9th Cir. BAP 2002) ("[Section] 502(d) may be raised in response to the allowance of an administrative claim.”); Tidwell v. Atlanta Gas Light Co. (In re Georgia Steel, Inc.), 38 B.R. 829, 839-40 (Bankr.M.D.Ga.1984) (<HOLDING>). 2 . Those subsections provide: (e)(2) A claim
holding that  50167c permits the transfer of title to real property if it is necessary to insure payment of alimony holding that a guar anty was not a transfer in the context of section 502d holding that property seized by a creditor prior to debtors bankruptcy was property of the estate even though creditor  the irs  held a secured interest  a tax lien  in the property holding that  502d applies to prevent payment of any part of administrative expenses due creditor until preferential property transfer is recovered holding that a plaintiff who has not sustained any damage as the result of a transfer of property cannot seek to set that transfer aside as fraudulent