do not apply to suits against the State or other governmental entities unless the statute waiving sovereign immunity expressly permits their application.. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Williamson Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 405 S.W.3d 41, 46 (Tenn.2013) (concluding that the 120-day extension provided by Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c) does not apply to extend the time within which medical malpractice actions may be brought against governmental entities under the GTLA); Lynn v. City of Jackson, 63 S.W.3d 382, 337 (Tenn.2001) (refusing to apply the saving statute to extend the one-year GTLA statute of limitations for filing a claim against a municipality because the GTLA did not incorporate the saving statute); Webster v. Tenn. Bd. of Regents, 902 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Tenn.Ct. App.1995) (<HOLDING>); cf. Doyle v. Frost, 49 S.W.3d 853, 859 (Tenn.
recognizing that while the lack of an express statute granting sovereign immunity precludes such immunity as a matter of law the entity in question could still be determined to be acting as an agency of the state under the facts and circumstances of a particular relationship holding that a georgia statute requiring an insurer to give prior notice of cancellation did not fall within the saving clause because the statute had no effect on the initial apportionment of risk ie what medical costs are covered that the parties made upon entering the contract holding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred a claim for money damages against the librarian of congress in his official capacity because immunity had not been waived and the exceptions to immunity did not apply holding that the state statute returns the matter of subrogation to state law  ujnless the statute is excluded from the reach of the saving clause by virtue of the deemer clause holding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes application of the saving statute to save a thra claim against the state in its capacity as an employer because the saving statute does not expressly apply to the state