under the habitual offender statutes. However, the cases cited by the dissent all involve prior felony convictions that were vacated on appeal or in post-conviction relief proceedings. Such cases would not fall within the rule we announce in this opinion, and we do not find them dispositive under these circumstances. BROWN, Judge dissenting. I respectfully dissent from the majority's conclusion that the trial court lacked the ability to suspend Gardiner's sentence below the minimum sentence. I do not find the Model Penal Code or Hutcherson v. State, 441 N.E.2d 962 (Ind.1982), cited by the majority, to be determinative or persuasive here. In fact, Indiana courts have allowed similar relief under the habitual offender statutes. See, eg., Coble v. State, 500 N.E.2d 1221, 1223 (Ind.1986) (<HOLDING>); Olinger v. State, 494 N.E.2d 310, 311
holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in not allowing defendant to present evidence of his subjective belief regarding his status as habitual offender because his belief was irrelevant to offense of driving as habitual offender holding that a defendant sentenced as an habitual offender who later successfully challenges one of his predicate offenses may have his habitual offender status and sentencing enhancement vacated through postconviction relief or a motion to correct erroneous sentence holding that where original sentencing judge imposed a guidelines sentence defendant could not be sentenced as a habitual offender upon violation of probation holding that under the 1991 version of the habitual offender statute defendant could not receive habitual offender sentence for life felony holding that predicate crimes for which defendant received probation and adjudication could be considered for purposes of habitual offender enhancement