that district courts abused their discretion by imposing sex-related supervised release conditions based solely upon conduct that occurred in the distant past. See United States v. Dougan, 684 F.3d 1030, 1033-37 (10th Cir.2012) (vacating sex offender treatment special conditions of release for defendant convicted of robbing a post office because conditions were insufficiently related to defendant’s seventeen-year-old conviction for aggravated battery and thirtythree-yearold conviction for sexual battery); United States v. Rogers, 468 Fed.Appx. 359, 362-63 (4th Cir.2012) (concluding that imposition of sex offender conditions based upon a twenty-three-year-old forcible rape conviction constituted an abuse of discretion); United States v. Sharp, 469 Fed.Appx. 523, 525-26 (9th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Carter, 463 F.3d 526, 530-32
holding some evidence standard applicable to cdoc decision classifying inmate who had not been convicted of a sexual offense as a sex offender holding evidence was legally insufficient to support conviction for violation of sex offender registration requirement holding that an individual who is required to register as a sex offender is not in custody holding that the defendant could not be sentenced under the patterned sex offender statute if his offense occurred before the statute became effective holding that some of the sex offender conditions imposed on defendant as part of his sentence for possessing a firearm were unreasonable where defendants sole sex offense was over a decade old at the time of sentencing