under a lease agreement which the appellant purportedly executed on behalf of a professional association. Although the named professional association utilized by the appellant on the lease agreement was not a duly incorporated entity, the appellant maintained that the parties understood that it was merely an abbreviated name for appellant’s duly incorporated entity. The appellee, however, counters that at all times, its lease agreement was with the appellant solely as an individual and that in any event, where the appellant knowingly executed a contract on behalf of a non-incorporated entity, the appellant was individually liable as a matter of law. See § 607.0204, Fla.Stat. (1993); Royal Dev. and Management Corp. v. Guardian 50/50 Fund V, Ltd., 583 So.2d 403, 405, (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (<HOLDING>). Contrary to the appellee’s assertion, our
holding that corporation and sole owner of corporation were separate legal entities and corporation was not party to contract signed by owner in individual capacity holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation holding that employee of one familyowned corporation who was assigned to terminate a contract of another corporation owned by the same family could not as a matter of law be held liable for tortious interference with the contract holding that a plaintiffs breach of contract claim failed because he could make no showing that the individual defendants acted in their individual capacities when they signed the contract on behalf of the employer housing authority holding individual who signed contract on behalf of a corporation is individually liable where he knew corporation was not incorporated at the time the contract was executed