does not compel the conclusion that Talamantes Valverde is unable or unwilling to return to Mexico “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); Jukic v. INS, 40 F.3d 747, 749 (5th Cir.1994); see Wang, 569 F.3d at 537. Although Talamantes Valverde asserts that his membership in a family constitutes “a particular social group” for purposes of asylum, the IJ and the BIA implicitly found that the alleged persecution was based on economic disputes over land ownership and therefore was not on account of Talamantes Valverde’s membership in “a particular social group.” See Ontunez-Tursios v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 341, 348, 352-53 (5th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Cf. Castillo-Enriquez v. Holder, 690 F.3d
holding that an alien cannot claim asylum based on persecution that is personally motivated holding that alien did not show land ownership dispute was motivated by any protected ground holding that deportable alien status is not a ground for departing downward holding that a police officers words during an assault make clear that he was motivated by a protected ground holding that imputed political opinion is a protected ground