Id. at 990. One agent then asked Reilly, “Where is the gun?” to which Reilly replied that it was in a black bag in the bedroom. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Reilly’s motion to suppress. The officer asked about the gun “only after Reilly started to bring his hands to his waistband, a place where weapons are frequently concealed. The officers had no idea whether Reilly was armed or not, and this suspicious move reasonably caused Agent Johnson to fear that Reilly might be reaching for a weapon.” Id. at 993. The Court concluded that “[t]here was an objectively reasonable need on the part of the officers to protect themselves given the volatility of the situation with which they were faced.” Id.; see also Williams, 483 F.3d at 428 (<HOLDING>). Comparing Fox and Reilly to our case leads to
holding that public safety exception applies if and only if two conditions are satisfied 1 that the defendant might have or recently have had a weapon and 2 that someone other than police might gain access to that weapon and inflict harm with it and that while second prong would not apply for instance if the police entered a defendants room handcuffed him and placed him on a chair in the hallway outside his room it might apply if defendant was unrestrained and had turned back into his room to retrieve his identification when questioned by the police holding that police seizure of weapon in plain view even though appellant was handcuffed and under the control of the officers was lawful because there were other occupants in the house who were not handcuffed and who would have had access to the weapon holding that officers had a reasonable belief that defendants father had authority to consent to the search of his sons room and computer because he owned the home and had access to the room and computer at will holding that defendant had reasonable expectation of privacy in a hotel room rented by relatives when he had a key to the room and permission to use the room at will holding that a defendant must have notice that the trial court might sentence him to death