over such proceedings, limited only by the automatic stay, and, if a discharge is granted, by the discharge injunction. In this connection, although the debtor would no doubt be an important witness, it is far from clear that he is a necessary party, since the action, as presently framed, seeks no relief against him, and his only connection to the controversy is that he once owned the property and is the (putative) maker of the deed of trust that was not paid off. But assuming that the debtor is a necessary party, this court has authority to modify the automatic stay to allow him to be made a party, with enforcement of any judgment, to the extent if affects the debtor, to be subject to any plan that may be confirmed. See Robbins v. Robbins (In re Robbins), 964 F.2d 342 (4th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Although the debtor has raised the specter of
holding that relief from stay may be granted to permit litigation to go forward in a nonbankruptcy forum where 1 only issues of state law involved 2 judicial economy will be promoted 3 the litigation will not interfere with the bankruptcy case and 4 the estate can be protected by requiring that any judgment obtained be enforced only through the bankruptcy court holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the purported state law claim for violation of the automatic stay and that any such claim could be brought only in bankruptcy court only holding that an argument not raised before the bankruptcy court will not be considered for the first time on appeal holding that the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over counterclaims asserted by the bankruptcy estate against a creditor where the claim is a state law action independent of the federal bankruptcy law and not necessarily resolvable by a ruling on the creditors proof of claim in the bankruptcy emphasis added holding that the state court may adjudicate the applicability of a bankruptcy injunction to state court litigation