Dickerson, 101 F.3d at 1163 (citation omitted), Cyranek was faced with a rapidly escalating situation, and his decision to use deadly force in the face of a severe threat to himself and the public was reasonable. See Untalan, 430 F.3d at 315-16 (finding police officer’s use of deadly force reasonable where only a “few seconds” passed between when assailant lost control of knife and when officer shot assailant); see also Troupe v. Sarasota County, 419 F.3d 1160, 1168 (11th Cir.2005) (finding that 3-5 seconds was a short enough time for the use of deadly force to stop someone who previously endangered police and bystanders even if, in hindsight, the facts show that members of the.S.W.A.T. Team could have escaped unharmed); Robinson v. Arrugueta, 415 F.3d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d 1275, 1282 (11th
holding that an officers decision to shoot within a reaction time of 272 seconds was reasonable even if hindsight showed that the officer could have escaped unharmed holding that collateral crime evidence that defendant was an escaped convict was presumptively harmful holding that in deciding whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity it is not only the evidence of clearly established law that is for the court but also whether a reasonable officer could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful in light of the information the officer had holding collateral crime evidence that defendant was an escaped convict was presumptively harmful holding collateral crime evidence that defendant was an escaped convict not relevant