to exhaust his available administrative remedies with respect to the claims alleged against them. The district court ruled against Pinder on the merits of the claims against those defendants rather than by first addressing and ruling upon the non-exhaustion affirmative defenses which they had in fact raised, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) and our holdings in, e.g., Porter v. Sturm, 781 F.3d 448, 451 (8th Cir. 2015), and Chelette v. Harris, 229 F.3d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 2000). See also Benjamin v. Ward County, 632 Fed.Appx. 301 (8th Cir. 2016) Accordingly, circuit precedent requires us to vacate that portion of the district court’s judgment and remand the case for a ruling on those individually claimed defenses. Cf. Lyon v. Vande Krol, 305 F.3d 806, 806-09 (8th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). The dismissal without prejudice of the claims
holding that 42 usc  1997ea requires prisoners to exhaust a process and not a remedy holding that dismissal under 42 usc  1997ea was required even though case had gone to trial as inmate had failed to exhaust administrative remedies holding that plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies by failing to include issue in case brief holding that 42 usc  1997ea requires dismissal without prejudice where a prisoner has not exhausted administrative remedies prior to filing suit holding that inmate plaintiff satisfied  1997ea where he attempted to exhaust all available administrative remedies but was prevented from doing so by prison personnel