(and, indeed, Kaiser did not agree to settle with Brown for more than a year after providing her medical services), the adoption of Brown’s interpretation of MSP would mean that Brown was not required to reimburse Medicare out of her settlement proceeds for the payments Medicare made for Brown’s, care. , The district court rejected this argument and instead concluded that the prompt payment language in MSP simply controls when Medicare may withhold payment in the first instance, not when it may seek reimbursement. See Brown, 252 F.Supp.2d at 319-20. At the time the parties filed their initial briefs in this case, the courts were divided on' whether Brown’s was an appropriate interpretation of MSP. Compare United States v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 345 F.3d 866, 885-93 (11th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added), with Goetzmann, 337 F.3d at
holding that under msp any payment that medicare does make is secondary and is subject to reimbursement from sources of primary coverage under the statute regardless of whether those sources can be expected to pay promptly holding that the msp preempted a state law that required insurers to offer coordination of benefits at reduced premiums when the insured had other health and accident coverage making medicare the primary payer in direct conflict with the msp holding that an objective standard to determine whether the injury was intended or expected would be inconsistent with insurance coverage for damage resulting from ordinary negligence holding that the statute of limitations defense does not deprive court of subject matter jurisdiction to the extent the statute of limitations may be considered in any sense a jurisdictional impediment it is one which can be waived holding that statutory silence on the subject of secondary liability means there is none and section 2333a  does not mention aiders and abettors or other secondary actors