misled into believing that the product is endorsed by the Food and Drug Administration for use or in consumers being misled about the harmfulness of the product because of such regulation, inspection, approval, or compliance. Pub.L. No. 111-31, § 2(46). This finding notwithstanding, an exercise of statutory interpretation yields the conclusion that § 331(tt)(4) is not intended to encompass non-commercial speech. In § 331(tt)(4), the phrase “through the media,” which is the only phrase that could conceivably encompass non-commercial speech, follows directly after the terms “label or labeling” and immediately precedes the term “[through] advertising.” Each of these terms is modified by the phrase “directed to consumers with respect to a tobacco product.” See Stevens, 130 S.Ct. at 1588 (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted). The only
holding that contract terms were ambiguous where the specific term that appellant argued should control a more general term was itself susceptible of two reasonable interpretations recognizing that the term including is somewhat ambiguous holding that an ambiguous term may be given more precise content by the neighboring words with which it is associated holding that statutory terms should be construed with reference to their associated words and phrases holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance