§ 1915(e)(2)). We affirm. The district court properly dismissed Griffin’s request because Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g) does not apply to property subject to forfeiture. See United States v. Fitzen, 80 F.3d 387, 389 (9th Cir. 1996) (motion for return of property may be defeated by demonstrating that the property is subject to forfeiture). Contrary to Griffin’s contentions, Griffin cannot bring his request under 5 U.S.C. §§ 702 and 704, or 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491 and 1495. The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise its equitable jurisdiction because the forfeiture was part of Griffin’s conviction and sentence, and Griffin had adequate remedies at law. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 853(a)(1), (2); Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 39-41, 116 S.Ct. 356, 133 L.Ed.2d 271 (1995) (<HOLDING>); Ramsden v. United States, 2 F.3d 322, 324
holding that a criminal prosecution and criminal forfeiture proceeding constituted an alternate remedy and permitting award to relator holding that civil settlements have no bearing on decisions of criminal punishment and imposition of a restitution order is a form of punishment and part of a criminal sentence recognizing the continued interest of a criminal defendant in frozen property prior to forfeiture holding that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over a criminal forfeiture action where a state court in a related state court forfeiture proceeding had in personam jurisdiction over the same currency subject to forfeiture recognizing criminal forfeiture as an aspect of punishment