the police power, therefore differs from the exercise of the right of eminent domain, which involves the appropriation of private property to public use, and requires, in its lawful exercise, pecuniary compensation for the loss inflicted on the owner. It is well settled that the state, or its agents, in the exercise of its police power can extend this power only to such measures as are reasonable under all the circumstances. The means adopted must bear some real and substantial relation or be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of a legitimate object falling within the scope of the police power, and the law or regulation must tend toward the preservation of public welfare, health, safety, or morals. See also, Phillips Petro. Co. v. Corporation Comm’n, 1956 OK 313, 312 P.2d 916 (<HOLDING>); and Mattoon v. City of Norman, 1980 OK 137,
holding that a statute that prohibited producers and refiners from directly operating retail service stations did not constitute a taking because they were not deprived of all beneficial uses of their property holding that californias mandatory iota program does not involve a taking of property without just compensation as prohibited by the fifth amendment to the united states constitution holding that a termination of a government contract does not constitute a taking of the plaintiffs property without just compensation or without due process of law holding that a statute requiring a natural gas producer to make gas available to pump water for agriculture irrigation at a price fixed by the corporation commission is not a regulation under the police power but a taking of the producers property without due process of law and an appropriation of the producers property without just compensation holding that the state is obligated to pay property owners when it regulates private property under its police power in such a manner that the regulation effectively deprives the owner of the economically viable use of that property