United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 1030, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (interpretation of a statute begins with its language, and, when the statutory language is unambiguous, also ends there). However, because proof of irreparable harm clearly meets the “substantial injury” requirement stated in the statute, if irreparable harm is shown, it weighs in favor of the issuance of a preliminary injunction. See United States v. Cen-Card Agency, 872 F.2d 414 (3d Cir.1989) (Table) (affirming district court’s decision that irreparable harm had been shown and justified, in part, issuance of a preliminary injunction under § 1345, and therefore declining to decide whether irreparable harm is or is not required under the statute); Savran, 755 F.Supp. at 1180 (<HOLDING>). Both Weingold and Savran hold that the
holding that a movant for a preliminary injunction must first demonstrate that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the requested relief recognizing that irreparable harm is the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction holding that even though irreparable harm is not required it had been shown and weighed in favor of issuance of the preliminary injunction holding that the movant had to establish both of the first two factors ie likelihood of success and irreparable harm to receive a preliminary injunction holding that given the fundamental right involved namely the right to be free from unreasonable searches the plaintiff had sufficiently shown likelihood of irreparable harm for preliminary injunction purposes