with this court by November 18, 2002 (60 days after September 19, 2002). They did not file their petitions for review until January 2004. The residual issue is whether the further delay — from November 2002 to January 2004 — was based upon reasonable grounds. We hold that it was not. Although a delay resulting from the exhaustion of applicable administrative remedies may be a reasonable ground for delay, see Reder, 116 F.3d at 1263, an attempt to exhaust the wrong remedy is not. That is, a delay stemming from the filing of a petition or complaint with the wrong court is not, in general, a reasonable ground for delay. See Sierra Club, 885 F.2d at 593. A delay is even less excusable when the FAA advised the petitioner of the correct remedies or procedures to follow, see id. at 593-94 (<HOLDING>), and when the petitioner’s procedural missteps
holding that the appeals court may affirm the ruling of the district court on any basis which the record supports holding that no reasonable grounds for delay existed when the petitioner filed a complaint in the district court despite the faas advice to file in the court of appeals holding that where the issue of sanctions was not before the court of appeals when the appeal was filed the district court retained jurisdiction holding that because the state failed to properly file the complaint the district court lacked jurisdiction to proceed to trial holding that the court had discretion to allow substitution of plaintiffs to satisfy diversity jurisdiction requirements in order to give the court jurisdiction where no jurisdiction existed when the complaint was filed