a particular corporate origin). It is important for district courts to recognize surveys of this type because their qualification for a traditional hearsay exception obviates the need to examine methodology before overruling a hearsay objection. Regardless of the basis cited for admitting these surveys, errors in methodology thus properly go only to the weight of the evidence—subject, of course, to Rule 403’s more general prohibition against evidence that is less probative than prejudicial or confusing. See, e.g., Grotrian, 523 F.2d at 1341 (finding, in the context of a survey offered to show actual confusion, that while courts cite different bases for admitting survey evidence, “[t]he more relevant issue [is] the weight to be given to the surveys”); see also Starter, 170 F.3d at 297 (<HOLDING>). The “modern view” urged by Schering is thus
holding that the probative value of evidence that defendant had recently been released from prison offered to show identity opportunity and motive outweighed its prejudicial effect in bank robbery prosecution holding that any probative value of bolstered testimony is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice confusion of issues or misleading the jury quoting  90403 fla stat holding that even several isolated incidents of actual confusion are insufficient to support a finding of likelihood of confusion holding 3040 confusion between leggs and leg looks provided significant degree of actual confusion holding that survey evidence offered to show actual confusion was properly excludable under rule 403 when it was so flawed that its probative value was outweighed by the risk of prejudice or confusion