intelligent, and voluntary; and (3) timely. United States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d 553, 558 (4th Cir.2000). This prong of Daniels’s Sixth Amendment claim verges on being frivolous. One of Daniels’s two defense lawyers, Mr. Jessup, had moved to withdraw from the trial so that Ms. Day could testify. And if the court had granted the motion, Daniels would still have been represented by his other trial attorney. Indeed, Daniels never indicated to the trial court that he had any desire to represent himself; and a fundamental part of the Faretta doctrine is that the defendant must clearly and unequivocally assert his right to self-representation. See, e.g., Frazier-El, 204 F.3d at 558; Munkus v. Furlong, 170 F.3d 980, 983 (10th Cir.1999); United States v. Allen, 789 F.2d 90, 94 (1st Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); Brown v. Wainwright, 665 F.2d 607, 610 (5th
holding that a defendant in a state criminal trial has an independent constitutional right of selfrepresentation and that he may proceed to represent himself without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so holding that defendant waived his right to selfrepresentation where he told the trial judge before trial that he did not want to represent himself and the public defender acted as counsel for the remainder of trial without objection holding that written waivers referring only in general terms to potential advantages of representation by counsel and potential disadvantages of selfrepresentation did not sufficiently demonstrate awareness of the dangers of selfrepresentation holding defendant waived selfrepresentation right by proceeding with assigned counsel and walking out of faretta hearing holding that right of selfrepresentation did not attach because defendant had made no indication of his desire to proceed without counsel