passage of the regulatory act”). See also United States v. Etheridge, 932 F.2d 318, 321-23 (4th Cir.1991) (assuming no violation of the ex post facto clause regarding the defendant’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)) (concluding no violation of the ex post facto clause when the district court enhanced the defendant’s sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) because the temporal focus is the date of the present offense, not the date of the prior felony convictions); United States v. Jordan, 870 F.2d 1310, 1314-15 (7th Cir.1989) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1), the predecessor to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and the enhancement provision added to 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1), the predecessor to 18 U.S.C. § 924) (stating the defendant is being punished because he violated 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1)) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Patterson, 820 F.2d 1524,
holding no violation of ex post facto clause because enhancement provision increases the punishment for being a felon in possession of a firearm that traveled in or affected interstate commerce and it does not affect the punishment previously meted out to the defendant for the  crimes he committed prior to the effective date of the statute holding the use of a 1951 felony conviction as a predicate for a violation of 18 usc  922g1 did not violate the ex post facto clause because the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm was not committed until after the effective date of the statute under which he was convicted holding 18 usc  922g9 penalizes the possession of a firearm after its effective date and therefore does not constitute a violation of the ex post facto clause holding that retroactive application of mvra does not violate the ex post facto clause because restitution is not a criminal punishment holding no ex post facto violation because enhancement provision was already on the books when the defendant committed the 1985 firearm offense