in the seller’s title that had prevented a voluntary sale); Keyes Co. v. Florida Nursing Corp., 340 So.2d 1254 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (acknowledging the rule that condemnation does not equate to a sale but concluding that, despite condemnation, a factual issue remained about whether the owner frustrated the sale to avoid a commission). A recurring theme of these cases is that when property is condemned, the owner is not a willing seller. See, e.g., Preston, 16 Cal.Rptr. at 243-44. Like Wilson, cases adopting its three-part test also involved condemnations thrust upon the owner. See, e.g., Lundstrom, Inc. v. Nikkei Concerns, Inc., 52 Wash.App. 250, 758 P.2d 561, 563 (1988) (involving the initiation of condemnation proceedings against a non-consenting property o 568 P.2d 1339, 1341 (1977) (<HOLDING>). Under Florida law, the parties’ subsequent
holding that sufficient evidence existed of an enforceable oral commission agreement between a broker and a cobroker and sustaining the verdict holding that whether a contract has been modified by subsequent oral agreement or course of dealing is a question of fact for the jury holding that it was error for the court to enter a modified agreement which materially altered the agreement reached by the parties holding part performance of an oral agreement necessary to take the oral agreement out of the statute of frauds must be consistent only  with the existence of the alleged oral contract holding that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that an oral agreement existed and that it was not modified