of personal property situated in New York. For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs ex ■parte application for a writ of attachment and motion for entry (Dkt.3) are DENIED. It is so ORDERED. 1 . See, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Rodenberg, 622 F.Supp. 286, 288 (D.Md.1985) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that a federal court sitting in Maryland may "apply Maryland’s attachment procedures extraterritorially to accomplish the objectives of Rule 64”; interpreting Maryland's attachment statute as authorizing attachment only within the territorial limits of the state); Saltzman v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 274 N.Y.S. 806, 807 (Sup.Ct.1934) (German resident "had no property on which a levy could be made within this jurisdiction”); Stricklin v. Hodgen, 172 S.C. 37, 172 S.E. 770, 772 (1934) (<HOLDING>); see also, e.g., Allstate Sales and Leasing
holding that funds of the defendant  which the attachment sought to reach had been forwarded by telegraphic transmission beyond the limits of this state to a point in florida before the attempted execution of the attachment warrant vacating attachment holding that it is a violation of the fourth amendment for police to bring members of the media or other third parties into a home during the execution of a warrant when the presence of third parties in the home was not in aid of the execution of the warrant holding valid conditions for execution of the warrant which are constitutionally satisfactory stated in the affidavit that solicits the warrant and accepted by the issuing magistrate holding that a release of such claims or other matters arising from the beginning of time to the date of execution of this agreement did not protect the defendant from liability arising from unconstitutional conduct that occurred after the agreements execution holding defendant had requisite contacts under section 481932 florida statutes where it solicited consulting and other services from a florida corporation in which a substantial amount of the services sought by defendant were performed in florida