did not adequately discuss the reasons for denying Tarrell and Jarman qualified immunity. See Mem. of Clarification at 2 (Oct. 7, 2002). II. We review a district court’s denial of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity de novo. McCaslin v. Wilkins, 183 F.3d 775, 778 (8th Cir.1999). In so doing, we consider whether, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the facts alleged show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Seiner v. Drenon, 304 F.3d 810, 812 (8th Cir.2002). In this case, if Hernandez’s allegations fail to establish a violation of a clearly established constitutional right, Jarman and Tarrell will be entitled to qualified immunity for their actions. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151,150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (<HOLDING>). We analyze Hernandez’s claims that the
holding that in excessive force cases the threshold question for the court is whether the officers conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right holding that in determining whether a state officer is entitled to qualified immunity for  1983 purposes courts may not consider whether the constitutional right was clearly established before determining first that a constitutional right was violated holding officers conduct must violate a constitutional right holding that the threshold inquiry assuming as true the facts alleged by the injured party is whether the officers conduct violated a constitutional right holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim