(3) the possibility the defense will be impaired. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182. The most serious of these interests is the last one because the inability of the defense to prepare its case — due to the death or disappearance of a witness, for example — cuts to the heart of the fairness inherent in the system. Id. Reaves’ speedy trial clock began to run when he was apprehended in May of 2007 and ran at least until his first trial in August of 2010, nearly thirty-nine months later. This length of time is presumptively prejudicial and triggers the remaining Barker inquiry. See Pittman, 373 S.C. at 551, 647 S.E.2d at 156 (finding delay of three years and two months was sufficient to trigger analysis of other factors); State v. Waites, 270 S.C. 104, 108, 240 S.E.2d 651, 653 (1978) (<HOLDING>). The State asserts that the lengthy delay was
holding delay of two years and four months lengthy enough to warrant review of other factors holding that a 15month delay of which four months were unexplained was reasonable in a felony prosecution holding only two months of four year and eight month delay attributable to commonwealth where defendant fled and concealed his whereabouts for four years and six months holding that an eight and onehalf month delay was enough to warrant further inquiry holding that dismissal was required where overall length of prosecution was 16 months state was responsible for 13 months of delay and six months of that delay was due to simple neglect