it cannot be liable under § 1692a(6) because it did not pretend to be GCS and send its own letters under GCS’s name, but hired GCS to send letters under GCS’s name. Defendant relies on the interpretation of § 1692a(6) in Villarreal v. Snow, 1996 WL 473386, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Aug.19, 1996) (denying a motion to reconsider), which held that “a creditor does not fall within the ‘used a name other than its own’ exception unless the creditor actually pretends to be someone else or uses a pseudonym or alias.” Defendant admits, however, that § 1692a(6) also applies to a creditor who hires a debt collection agency to send letters but does not otherwise involve the agency in the debt collection process. See Fratto v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 1996 WL 554549, at *7-8 (N.D.Ill. Sept.25, 1996) (<HOLDING>); see also Arellano v. Etan Industries, Inc.,
holding that  1823e does not apply to a claim relating to a letter of credit a letter of credit is a liability not an asset holding that even if the trial court erred in excluding a letter from evidence that fell within an exception to the hearsay rule the error was harmless where admission of the letter would not have had a substantial effect on a partys rights holding that a letter to an opposing party was a paper for purposes of frcp rule 11 where the attorney writing the letter sent a copy to the presiding judge in the case holding no enforceable contract where letter specified it was a letter of interest only and is subject to the negotiation and execution of a definitive agreement  holding that a creditor could be liable for the misrepresentations in a letter mailed by a collection agency hired to send the letter