in determining whether the acts constitute a substantial step toward commission of the crime, particularly when the intended crime is an attempt-type physical assault. Anzalone; see also 2 Wayne R. La-Fave and Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 7.16(a), at 313 (1986) (stat ing that “assault of the attempted-battery type is committed only when the defendant gets near to committing a battery.”). IV. We recognize that the line between a preparatory step and a substantial step toward the commission of the crime is often difficult to draw. A common thread through the case law and the commentary that discuss where that line should be drawn is that each case must be decided on its own facts. See United States v. Choat, 7 C.M.A. 187, 21 C.M.R. 313, 317, 1956 WL 4584 (1956) (<HOLDING>); Rollin N. Perkins and Ronald R. Boyce,
holding that an indictment charging one offense during the commission of another crime need not allege the elements of the latter offense holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a charge on the lesserincluded offense when the evidence showed either the commission of the completed offense as charged or the commission of no offense such that the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser offense holding that the distinction between a preparatory step and a substantial step constituting a direct movement toward commission of the intended offense is one of fact not law recognizing distinction between tolling and estoppel holding that state may not subject children and their parents to an additional step not required by the eha