instruction may have referred to ignorance of the Hobbs Act itself, but given the absence of any instruction on the defendant’s subjective intent with respect to the element of wrongfulness, the jury may have concluded that it could find Sturm guilty of attempted extortion even if it found credible his claim that he sincerely believed that he was legally entitled to a fee for helping WCIS locate the logbooks. We hold that the instruction which permitted such a conclusion is erroneous. It is not clear whether the defendant made an adequate objection to this instruction on this ground at trial. Rule 30 requires a party to “stat[e] distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds for his objection.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 30; see United States v. Glenn, 828 F.2d 855, 862 (1st Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Harrigan, 586 F.2d 860, 864
holding that claims based on grounds not objected to at trial cannot be considered on appeal holding that the defendant objected to the evidence on only one ground thus he failed to preserve the additional grounds presented on appeal holding that defendant must have clearly objected at trial to the matter he is raising on appeal holding that appellate court could not consider objection to testimony when defendant objected at trial on different grounds holding party may not argue one ground at trial and another on appeal where appellant did not object to testimony at trial on the grounds raised on appeal that it was improper character evidence but objected only on the basis of relevancy issue was not preserved for review