November 9, 1994 indictment that under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(e)(1) started the speedy trial clock, and the beginning of the exclusion period on November 30,1994; and 71 days between the granting of the motion to dismiss the initial indictment on March 14, 1995 and this hearing on May 24, 1995. Assuming, arguendo, that the current delay is 92 days and, therefore, is beyond the 70 day period sanctioned by the statute, section 3161(h)(7) nevertheless allows for “a reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined for trial with a codefendant as to whom the time for trial has not run and no motion for severance has been granted.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7). The court does not believe the current 12 day delay is unreasonable. See, e.g., United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346 (D.C.Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Obviously, if the delay continues
holding that delays of 115 days and 101 days were both substantial holding delay of 51 days to be unreasonable holding that a trial date 101 days after an initial arraignment but only 55 days after a second arraignment was not an unreasonable delay under  3161h7 holding that eight months and ten days of delay was not an unreasonable period of delay to attribute to a codefendant under  3161h7 holding a four month delay to be reasonable under  3161h7