provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) barred Sawyer from appealing IFP because he failed to show that he was in imminent danger of serious physical injury and (2) that the appeal was not taken in good faith under § 1915(a)(3) “for the reasons stated in” the district court’s prior orders that dismissed all of Sawyer’s claims for failure to comply with court orders and that denied relief from the judgment. Sawyer’s IFP motion addresses the first finding but not the second. Although this court liberally construes pro se briefs, “even pro se litigants must brief arguments in order to preserve them.” Mages v. Bishop, 541 F.3d 582, 584 (5th Cir.2008). Sawyer has “effectively abandoned” the necessary showing for leave to appeal IFP. Id.; see Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 n. 21 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Sawyer has failed to identify
holding that such a decision was within the trial courts discretion holding that the trial court erred in granting the school boards posttrial motion for directed verdict because although the school board timely moved for a directed verdict during trial it did not serve its motion for directed verdict until the eleventh day after the verdict holding that the trial court is required to provide reasons for its decision prior to appeal holding that an ifp motion must be directed solely to the trial courts reasons for the certification decision holding that a party must have made a directed verdict motion at trial on the specific issue which is the basis of the jnov