that the rules regarding such matters are discretionary with the selling authority, subject only to a requirement of reasonableness. See Ex parte Keller, 185 S.C. 283, 289, 296, 194 S.E. 15, 21 (1937) (interpreting the phrase “immediately after the sale” in a judicial sale order referencing a required 3% good faith deposit to mean either “immediately following [the] bid, or within a reasonable time thereafter on that day”) (emphasis added); Harrington v. Blackston, 311 S.C. 459, 464-65, 429 S.E.2d 826, 830 (Ct.App.1993) (“Except to the extent controlled by statute, the terms of a judicial sale are within the discretion of the court ordering the sale.”). Reasonableness, in turn, depends on the circumstances of each sale. See Ex parte Floyd, 145 S.C. 364, 367, 142 S.E. 805, 807 (1928) (<HOLDING>); Brown v. Barnwell Mfg. Co., 46 S.C. 415, 422,
holding that even where the terms of a judicial sale order specified 500 be deposited on the bid before 4 oclock pm on the day of the sale the time for paying the deposit could be extended in the masters discretion where warranted by the facts and circumstances including the parties waiver of any time requirement holding that the debtors right to cure ended when the sheriff accepted the bid at the foreclosure auction even though the order confirming the sale had not been entered at the time of the bankruptcy filing holding that subsequent to a judicial sale the report of the sale must be made to and ratified by the court before a deed for the property is given by the trustee to the purchaser holding that the relevant time is the time of the employment decision holding chapter 13 plan funded by sale of property was not feasible where the debtor had not stated the time period or terms of the sale and no provision was made for failure to sell the property