Taylor. Our colleague in dissent criticizes the district court’s reliance on the stipulation because the fact that defense counsel agreed to it in open court as the necessary factual basis does not demonstrate that Hernandez-Hernandez necessarily admitted to all the facts in the 995 motion. Dissent at 810-12. The dissent notes that “[a]t his change of plea hearing, Hernandez never acknowledged the truth of the allegations set out in footnote 2.... The judge never personally addressed him to ask whether those things were true. Nor did the judge ask him what he had done.” Dissent at 15149. Relying on the fact th 3, 1356 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that defendant was bound by his attorney’s admission during closing argument); Rodriguez-Gonzalez v. INS, 640 F.2d 1139, 1141 (9th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). The purpose of the Taylor approach “is to
holding that attorneys admission to an element of the offense in the petitioners presence at a deportation hearing was binding on the petitioners holding that the mechanical failure of the petitioners car on the way to the hearing did not constitute exceptional circumstances where petitioners returned home instead of finding transportation to the hearing and made only a cursory effort to contact the court holding that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing because the petitioners allegations were not implausible and a final determination of the merits of petitioners claim would be best served by greater development of the facts many of which the government disputes holding that the state court unreasonably credited the officer when the petitioners attorney provided accurate corroboration of the petitioners version of the postarrest interview holding that the denial of petitioners appeal to the bia would have put a reasonable person in the petitioners position on notice that something was wrong with his attorneys preparation for the removal hearing