of what we determined USF & G’s coverage to be. CU’s concession cements our conclusion that the SIR is nothing more than a deductible contracted between Payless and USF & G. Because the SIR contained in the USF & G policy is not “other insurance” within the meaning of CU’s “other insurance” clause, CU’s policy provides the only insurance coverage for the first $200,000 of Payless’s liability (subject of course to the $10,000 SIR in CU’s own policy). See Cargill, Inc., 889 F.2d at 180 (applying Minnesota law and holding that, up to the higher deductible contained in one of two applicable insurance policies, only one insurance policy provided coverage so that its “other insurance” clause was not triggered); cf. Wallace v. TriState Ins. Co. of Minn., 302 N.W.2d 337, 340-41 (Minn.1980) (<HOLDING>). The district court determined that CU was not
holding assignable to injured party insureds claim against insurer for judgment in excess of policy limits holding that excess coverage in four policies was not triggered until primary insurer satisfied the requirements necessary to trigger the excess insurers coverage and paid the full amount of its limits holding that the excess carrier was liable only for the insureds deductible which was not covered by the primary insurer holding that insurer was liable for amount in excess of policy limits because it breached its duty to defend holding that a rule requiring an excess carrier to drop down upon the insolvency of the primary carrier would impermissibly shift the risk of the primary carrier to the excess carrier and would require insurance companies to scrutinize one anothers financial stability before issuing secondary policies