is singular, and the sentence in which it is used contains no language that would expand the singular to plural. The parties did not use the word “a beneficiary” or “one of the beneficiaries” so as to show that Defendant had reserved the right to name more than one beneficiary. The clear and unequivocal meaning of the language is that Defendant was to name the parties’ son as the singular, thus only, beneficiary of his group life insurance policy. Id. at *2. Upon review, the Eighth Di d 1494, 1496-1497 (11th Cir.1986) (concluding that a divorce decree which required the insured to name his children as “irrevocable beneficiaries” of an insurance policy nullified the insured’s attempt to name another beneficiary); Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Spain, 556 F.2d 747, 749 (5th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>); Principal Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Kamey, 5
holding that feglia preempted a state divorce decree which ordered the insured to maintain his fegli policy for the benefit of his children from his first marriage holding that a husband unlawfully attempted to name a beneficiary other than his daughter who was the irrevocable beneficiary pursuant to a separation agreement in a divorce decree recognizing that a divorce decree which obligated the divorcing husband to name the children of his first marriage as the irrevocable beneficiaries of an insurance policy precluded him from naming his new wife as a beneficiary entitled to a portion of the insurance benefits recognizing that a property settlement and divorce decree which provided for a certain party to be named the irrevocable beneficiary of a life insurance policy was valid and enforceable against anyone subsequently named as a beneficiary holding that feglia preempted a divorce decree that ordered the insured to designate his children as beneficiaries on his fegli policy