genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Kaucher v. Cty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 422-23 (3d Cir. 2006). Excessive Force Claim In response to Martin’s excessive force claim, Davis raised the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust. See Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense that must be pled and proven by the defendant.”). The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires a prisoner to exhaust all administrative remedies available within a prison’s grievance system prior to filing a § 1983 action concerning prison conditions. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see also Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) (<HOLDING>). The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is
holding that plras exhaustion requirement is an affirmative defense that can be waived or forfeited by defendants holding that the plras exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong holding that exhaustion requirement applies to excessive force claims holding that the plras exhaustion requirement applies to the grievance procedures set forth in an inmate handbook holding that excessive force claims are not subject to exhaustion requirement