the improper operation of such vehicles, prescribing penalties for those offenses, and repealing by implication all acts and parts of acts inconsistent therewith.” 78 Idaho 553, 557, 309 P.2d 211, 214 (1957). Similarly, the Supreme Court of Oregon held that their “interpretation of the statutes ... leads ... to the conclusion that the negligent homicide statute in carving out of the manslaughter statute the crime of homicide resulting from grossly negligent conduct in the operation of a motor vehicle, carved out gross negligence in all of its gradations from the lowest to the highest form of unintentional culpable conduct including willful and wanton conduct.” State v. Wilcox, 216 Or. 110, 337 P.2d 797, 803 (1959); see also Blackwell v. State, 34 Md.App. 547, 369 A.2d 153, 158 (1977) (<HOLDING>); State v. Collins, 55 Wash.2d 469, 348 P.2d
holding that victims injuries did not arise out of the use of a motor vehicle when the victim received injuries from a gun fired in the vehicle holding that the statutory definition of motor vehicle is not controlling holding that the sensible and popular understanding of what a motor vehicle accident entails necessarily involves the motor vehicle being operated as a motor vehicle  holding that by enacting the more specific homicide by vehicle statute the legislature intended to preempt the subject matter of unintended homicides resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle holding that plaintiff who slipped and fell on ice while securing cars on his employers motor vehicle carrier preparing to travel was very close to the vehicle and engaged in a task related to the vehicle and therefore was an occupier of a motor vehicle