Iverson, 648 F.2d at 738 (“[N]o violation of due process results from prosecuto-rial nondisclosure if defense counsel both knows of the information and is able to make use of it but'still chooses, for tactical reasons, not to do so.”). On the other hand, the evidence that was available to Doe only indicated- that Jones had cooperated with the government, and perhaps that he had an agreement to do so. It did not disclose, at least not explicitly, the terms of any such agreement and whether they gave Jones a mo tive to plant the guns in Doe’s house. The latter would not have been the equivalent of what the defense already knew and, depending on the other facts in the case, may or may not have been material for Brady purposes. See United States v. Smith, 77 F.3d 511, 512-13 (D.C.Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Cuffie, 80 F.3d at 517-18 (“[T]he fact that
holding that the defendants due process rights were violated when the trial judge singled out the only defense witness and indicated to that witness that he expected the witness to he and would personally ensure that the witness was prosecuted for perjury and thereby effectively drove that witness off the stand holding that summary convictions of crimes involving dishonesty could be used to impeach the credibility of a witness holding that defendants claiming qualified immunity to  1983 action were entitled to summary judgment where factual disputes were not material holding that although aspects of witness plea agreement were known to defense undisclosed elements were material to defendants ability to impeach holding that counsels failure to impeach a witness by showing bias was ineffective assistance