to examine the constitutional source of power of the “act” abrogating immunity, and not the constitutional source of power of the existing statute. If this is' the rule, and § 2000d-7 was enacted pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, then in enacting § 2000d-7, Congress was acting pursuant to a constitutional provision granting Congress the power to abrogate. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59, 116 S.Ct. 1114; Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 452-56, 96 S.Ct. 2666. In spite of the literal language of Seminole Tribe and Fitzpatrick, however, other courts have examined the constitutional source of power of the underlying, existing substantive statute rather than the source of power of the later enacted abrogation provision. See, e.g., Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281, 1282-84 (8th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); see also Franks v. Kentucky School for the
holding that in enacting title vii congress abrogated eleventh amendment immunity holding that title ix was enacted pursuant to  5 of the fourteenth amendment consequently under seminole tribe title ix 42 usc  2000d7 abrogated states eleventh amendment immunity holding the fourteenth amendment partially abrogated eleventh amendment sovereign immunity holding that for title ix enacted pursuant to congress authority under the spending clause the governments enforcement power may only be exercised against the funding recipient holding that although congress expressed its intent to abrogate eleventh amendment immunity in 11 usc  106a it could not do so under seminole tribe