object, if the claimed error is fundamental in nature.” Charlton v. State, 702 N.E.2d 1045, 1051 (Ind.1998). Our supreme court has recently observed, however, that claims of fundamental error should not be raised during a post-conviction proceeding. Sanders v. State, 765 N.E.2d 591, 592 (Ind.2002). “The fundamental error exception to the contemporaneous objection rule applies to direct appeals. In post-conviction proceedings, complaints that something went awry at trial are generally cognizable only when they show deprivation of the right to effective counsel or issues demonstrably unavailable at the time of trial or direct appeal.” Id. Accordingly, freestanding fundamental error claims in a post-conviction petition may not be raised. See Martin v. State, 760 N.E.2d 597, 599 (Ind.2002) (<HOLDING>). Finally, our supreme court has recognized
holding that postconviction procedures do not provide a petitioner with a superappeal or opportunity to consider freestanding claims that the original trial court committed error and that such claims are available only on direct appeal holding appellate counsel ineffective for failing to argue the trial court committed fundamental error in giving the thenstandard jury instruction for manslaughter by act even though controlling precedent in the district had approved the instruction when the instruction had been found fundamentally erroneous in another district and conflict between the two districts would have allowed defendant to seek relief in the supreme court holding that it was not error for the court to give a substantive new instruction to the jury after deliberations began where the instruction was given in court with the defendant and his counsel present holding that the trial court committed fundamental error by giving the standard jury instruction for attempted manslaughter by act holding that freestanding claim that the trial court committed fundamental error in giving a jury instruction after deliberations had begun was unavailable in postconviction proceedings