depends on the plaintiffs knowledge of incidents; instead, they go to the motive behind the harassment, which may help the jury interpret otherwise ambiguous acts, and to the employer’s liability. This kind of evidence is particularly important given the ACPD’s main defenses at trial, which were that the incidents of abuse Hurley suffered were trivial horseplay to which both men and women were subjected and that its written sexual harassment policy was sufficient to insulate -it from liability. Contrary to the ACPD’s position, it is implausible in the extreme that Hurley was somehow immune from the pervasive sexism at the ACPD, as it was described by both female and male officers. See Hurley, 933 F.Supp. at 411; see also Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632 (3d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). The challenged evidence creates a basis for
recognizing that derogatory comments may serve as circumstantial evidence of discrimination but the plaintiff must still show some nexus between the statements and the defendants decision to terminate the employee holding that motive is circumstantial evidence of intent recognizing that a jury is permitted to infer an intent to deceive from circumstantial evidence holding that conclusory and generalized allegations of racial bias such as there was a racially biased attitude by management towards minority black employees were properly struck by the district court holding that employees remarks and racially derogatory notes sent by unidentified people were circumstantial evidence that management permitted an atmosphere of prejudice to infect the workplace