582 (1982) (noting that Judge Learned Hand considered promissory estoppel to be a “recognized species of consideration,” while Justice Cardozo countervailingly thought it “a substitute for consideration”). Notwithstanding the foregoing colloquy, in which Weavertown seemed to imply a promissory estoppel argument, the trial court did not reach that matter in its opinion, presumably because its finding of adequate consideration made further discussion superfluous. Because we find that the trial court erred in its finding of consideration, we address whether promissory estoppel, which Weavertown briefed, Brief for Appellee at 8-5, provides an alternative basis on which to affirm the trial court’s order. See Keystone Spray Equip., Inc. v. Regis Ins. Co., 767 A.2d 572, 576 (Pa.Super.2001) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 18 This Court has stated the promissory
holding that where the trial court reaches a correct disposition this court can affirm on any basis recognizing this court may affirm for any reason supported by the record holding that the appeals court may affirm the ruling of the district court on any basis which the record supports recognizing that the court of appeals can affirm a grant on summary judgment on any basis made apparent by the record holding that the tipsy coachman doctrine allows an appellate court to affirm a trial court that reaches the right result but for the wrong reasons so long as there is any basis which would support the judgment in the record 