the terms are susceptible of more than one meaning.’ ” National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 445 F.Supp.2d 37, 41 (D.D.C.2006) (quoting Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 2003 WL 24045159, at *5 (D.D.C. May 20, 2003)), af'd, 249 Fed.Appx. 832 (D.C.Cir.2007). In the instant case, defendants argue that the term “first policy” in subsection 2(b) is ambiguous because it is unclear if the phrase “prior to the inception date of the first policy issued by [Capitol Insurance] if continuously renewed” refers to the 2004-2005 policy or the 2007-2008 policy. (Defs.’ Opp’n at 24-25; Compl, Ex. A.) Faced with that ambiguity, defendants argue that “first policy” should be favorably construed as referring to the 2004-2005 Policy. See Columbia Cas. Co., 633 F.Supp. at 700 (<HOLDING>). Defendants then argue that because the “first
holding ambiguities are strictly construed against the insurer as drafter holding that ambiguities in insurance contracts should be favorably construed to the insured holding that an exclusionary clause in an insurance contract that lends itself to different interpretations is ambiguous and must be construed in a manner most favorably to the insured holding that an insurance contract should be construed as a reasonable person in the position of the insured would have understood it and that if the language used in the policy is reasonably susceptible to different constructions it must be given the construction most favorable to the insured holding that consent decrees and orders should be construed as contracts