compulsory process clause of the sixth amendment forbids the exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence solely as a sanction to enforce discovery rules or orders against criminal defendants." United States v. Davis, 639 F.2d 239, 243 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981). Other courts have eschewed such an absolute rule in favor of a case-by-case balancing test, weighing the defendant’s interest in presenting the evidence against the state interest in enforcing the particular discovery rule through exclusion of the evidence. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Enoch v. Hartigan, 768 F.2d 161 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1053, 106 S.Ct. 1281, 89 L.Ed.2d 588 (1986); Fendler v. Goldsmith, 728 F.2d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir.1984) (citing cases). See also Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 838, 105 S.Ct. 137, 83
holding that exclusion of testimony as collateral and of speculative relevance did not violate defendants sixth and fourteenth amendment rights holding the sixth amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment holding admission of preliminary hearing testimony did not violate the sixth amendment where defendants motive during crossexamination was the same as at trial holding that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the sixth amendment right to counsel holding sixth amendment witness interference claim fails without showing of relevance and materiality