duties for the court, district judges would have to devote a 'substantial' portion of their time to various procedural matters rather than to trying cases.”). 4 . See, e.g., Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 469-70, 94 S.Ct. 2842, 41 L.Ed.2d 879 (1974) (finding that the Federal Magistrates Act did not authorize magistrates to hold habeas corpus evidentiary hearings and explaining that "although the Act gives district judges broad authority to assign a wide range of duties to magistrates, Congress carefully circumscribed the permissible scope of assignment to only 'such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States’" (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b))); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 681, 683, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424.(1980) (<HOLDING>); Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 871-72,
holding that failure to review the evidence presented to the magistrate and failure even to have a transcript filed with the district court  was reversible error holding that the district courts order refusing to exercise jurisdiction and remanding to the magistrate court for trial was sufficiently final for purposes of appeal and then determining that the remand was in error holding that district judges failure to recuse was harmless error where the underlying question was patently clear and so there was no need to vacate the district courts decision and to remand to another district court judge to make the same clear determination holding that the district courts referral of a motion to suppress to a magistrate did not violate article iii so long as the ultimate decision is made by the district court and explaining that congress was alert to art ill values concerning the vesting of decisionmaking power in magistrates accordingly congress made clear that the district court has plenary discretion whether to authorize a magistrate to hold an evidentiary hearing and that the magistrate acts subsidiary to and only in aid of the district court thereafter the entire process takes place under the district courts total control and jurisdiction holding that only a district judge in the charging district and not a magistrate judge in that district may review the release order of a magistrate judge in the arresting district