which governs “where the APA applies,” 509 U.S. at 154, 113 S.Ct. 2539, are dispositive. The Court will not require plaintiff to exhaust all avenues of administrative review of a final agency decision where Congress and the military have not imposed such a requirement. This holding is in harmony with the weight of posXr-Darby case law finding that there is no “military exception” to Darby. See, e.g., Ostrow v. Sec’y of Air Force, 48 F.3d 562 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Crane v. Sec’y of Army, 92 F.Supp.2d 155, 161 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (collecting cases and observing that, “[ajlmost without exception, federal courts throughout this country have also declined to create a military exception to the Court’s decision in Darby”). But see Saad v. Dalton, 846 F.Supp. 889, 891 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (<HOLDING>). Though the government argues that Jones
holding that judicial review of decisions of military correction boards is review of the administrative record conducted under the administrative procedure act holding that plaintiff may not pursue judicial review before petitioning the bcnr for relief and distinguishing darby because review of military personnel  is a unique context with specialized rules limiting judicial review holding that because here the statutes in issue provide for judicial review via citizen suit provisions yet do not set forth a standard for that review judicial review is limited to apa review on the administrative record holding that under the apa exhaustion is a prerequisite to judicial review when expressly required by statute or when an agency rule requires appeal before review so long as the administrative action is made inoperative pending that review holding that where defendant erroneously filed a request for declaratory relief in criminal action rather than filing an independent action for judicial review we would evaluate sufficiency of pleading as a petition for judicial review