failing to preserve this meritorious issue. He argues that appellate counsel had no reasonable strategy for failing to pursue the issue on direct appeal, and that, had counsel done so, there is a reasonable probability that this Court would have granted him a new trial. The PCRA court rejected this claim, finding that because trial counsel thoroughly investigated Elliott’s prior bad acts, a continuance was not necessary. The Commo t fails to suggest what purported impeachment evidence trial counsel would have discovered had he been afforded additional time to investigate the prior bad act witnesses. Thus, he has failed to demonstrate any abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying the continuance. See Commonwealth v. Auker, 545 Pa. 521, 681 A.2d 1305, 1316-17 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, appellate counsel cannot be
holding that trial counsel did not abuse its discretion by denying a continuance where appellant failed to specify the evidence which might have been revealed if the continuance had been granted and counsel had been afforded the opportunity to investigate further holding denial of continuance to be an abuse of discretion holding that the trial court abused its discretion in not allowing defendant to withdraw his waiver of jury trial where a lengthy continuance already had been granted holding that the ij did not abuse his discretion in denying request for further continuance where the ij granted previous request holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form