decisions cited in Morsani. See 790 So.2d at 1080 n. 22. For example, we cited Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir.1980). In that case, the court described equitable estoppel as arising “where the parties recognize the basis for suit, but the wrongdoer prevails upon the other to forego enforcing his right until the statutory time has lapsed.” Id. at 1043 n. 7. Therefore, although given its unique facts, the result in S.A.P. deviated from the uniform law of equitable estoppel, the foundations of that opinion were deeply rooted in, and in fact appeared to respect, that uniform law. In S.AP. we simply created an exception to the doctrine for childhood sexual abuse, as we have done in other areas. Compare Hearndon v. Graham, 767 So.2d 1179, 1186 (Fla.2000) (<HOLDING>), with Davis v. Monahan, 832 So.2d 708, 712
recognizing that heamdon only created an exception to the statutory limitations on the delayed discovery doctrine and citing the unique and sinister nature of childhood sexual abuse to hold that heamdon is limited to the specific facts in that case holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse recognizing doctrine holding that the delayed discovery doctrine applies in situations involving childhood sexual abuse accompanied by traumatic amnesia recognizing the two distinct generic definitions of sexual abuse of a minor and holding that a statute contains the element of abuse under the medinavilla definition if it applies to sexual conduct with children younger than fourteen years