policy which required all patrons to order a drink if they wished to remain in the club); Taylor v. Bar MT LLC, Civ. A. No. H-09-481, 2009 WL 5195982 (S.D.Tex. Dec.22, 2009) (discussing only a 42 U.S.C. § 2000a claim, not the Plaintiff’s other 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim, arising from allegations that the dress code at Bar MT was a pretext for racial discrimination); Mazloum v. District of Columbia Police Dep’t, 522 F.Supp.2d 24 (D.D.C.2007); 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (discussing the "full and equal benefit” clause of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (rather the "make and enforce contracts” clause), which does not necessarily implicate contractual rights). 6 . Excepting the Sixth Circuit decision in Watson v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, supra. 7 . See also Perry v. Burger King 924 F.Supp. 548, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (<HOLDING>); Jones v. City of Boston, 738 F.Supp. 604
holding that retaliation claims are not cognizable under 42 usc  1981 holding in a title vii case but relying on  1981 cases that the issue is not the plaintiffs physical characteristics but whether he was discriminated against by other africanamericans because he was born black holding that plaintiff stated a valid liberty interest claim where he contended that based on industry custom he was foreclosed from working at any savings and loan in the state where he had been denied a de facto license holding that a prisoner stated a valid equal protection claim when he alleged he was denied a work assignment because of his sexual orientation holding that the plaintiff had stated a claim under 42 usc  1981 when he alleged that he was prohibited from using the restroom at a burger king after ordering and eating a meal because he was black