of the appellate statutes on the basis of fundamental fairness and have granted the district courts the ability to implement such actions.” Howard asserts that the trial court’s ruling allowing him to file a second direct appeal was authorized under the decisions in Kargus v. State, 284 Kan. 908, 169 P.3d 307 (2007); Brown v. State, 278 Kan. 481, 101 P.3d 1201 (2004); Ortiz, 230 Kan. 733; and In re T.M.C., 26 Kan. App. 2d 297, 988 P.2d 241 (1999). Nevertheless, the language pointed to by Howard in those cases involves situations where an attorney’s deficient conduct denied a defendant’s or a K.S.A. 60-1507 movant’s right to an appeal or prevented our Supreme Court from considering a timely petition for review. See K.S.A. 22-3602(a); K.S.A. 20-3018(b); see also Kargus, 284 Kan. at 929 (<HOLDING>); Brown, 278 Kan. at 484-86 (holding that
holding that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel could not be resolved on the facts appearing in the record and that under such circumstances the defendants remedy is to file a petition for habeas corpus holding that to demonstrate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel petition must establish that the alleged error was prejudicial in fact holding that the time limit for filing a petition for review of a final order of deportation is jurisdictional holding that time limit for filing petition for review is mandatory and jurisdictional holding that if defendant could establish ineffective assistance of counsel in failure to file petition for review in his direct appeal then appropriate remedy would be to allow filing of petition for review out of time