to encroach upon the jury’s traditional domain. Villalon, 956 N.E.2d at 704. The court further determined that its juvenile waiver statute did not implicate Apprendi's “core concerns”: [T]he waiver statute does not set forth the elements of an offense, does not provide for a determination of guilt or inno cence, and is not directed to consequences after adjudication of guilt. It does not provide a sentencing enhancement correlated with the State’s proof of a particular fact. Accordingly, we conclude that the statute does not implicate the core concerns of Apprendi. Villalon, 956 N.E.2d at 704. Thus, the court rejected the defendant’s contention that he was entitled to have a jury determine the facts supporting the juvenile court’s waiver of jurisdiction. Villalo 919 (Ct. App. 2003) (<HOLDING>); People v. Beltran, 327 Ill. App. 3d 685,
holding that although the juvenile restitution statute does not expressly require the juvenile court to determine whether the juvenile has the ability to pay the restitution ordered as a condition of probation the policies underlying the adult restitutions command that a trial court make such an inquiry applies with equal force to juvenile courts holding that decision to sentence juvenile as an adult subject to abuse of discretion review holding that statute allowing for transfer of juvenile to adult criminal court does not implicate apprendi because the judges transfer determination does not subject the juvenile to enhanced punishment it subjects the juvenile to the adult criminal justice system holding that apprendi does not apply to juvenile waiver hearings because the applicable statute does not involve guilt or innocence but involves the determination of which system will be appropriate for a juvenile offender recognizing that the question of whether the interest of justice is served by the transfer of a juvenile for adult prosecution is a decision within the broad discretion of the district court