we hold that the jury was authorized to conclude that the appellant had acted maliciously and without probable cause in prosecuting him for shoplifting. See generally OCGA § 51-7-40. 3. The appellant further contends that it was immune from liability pursuant to OCGA § 51-7-60 (1), which provides that the owner or operator of a mercantile establishment cannot be held liable for damages for false arrest or false imprisonment “where it is established by competent evidence . . . [t]hat the plaintiff had so conducted himself or behaved in such manner as to cause a man of reasonable prudence to believe . . . at or immediately prior to the time of the detention or arrest [he] was committing the offense of shoplifting. . . .” Cf. Turner v. Bogle, 115 Ga. App. 710, 713 (155 SE2d 667) (1967) (<HOLDING>). This contention is also without merit. “The
holding that the statute applies also to malicious prosecution actions holding that in  1983 claims for malicious prosecution the fourth amendment applies to those actions which occur between arrest and pretrial detention holding the same for malicious prosecution holding that section 1983 claims alleging due process violations stemming from malicious prosecution are unavailable when a state malicious prosecution action exists holding that malicious prosecution claim accrues when underlying prosecution is terminated