statute’s language, “assault which inflicts grievous bodily injury,” and hence outside the scope of the disqualification statute. We shall consider each of these arguments in turn. II First, does it make a critical difference that the “intimidation” statute under which Lynch was convicted aims not at “assault which inflicts grievous bodily injury,” but rather (as its title says) at “deprivation of rights by violence”? We do not think that this difference is significant. For one thing, the simple fact that the “intimidation” statute does not use the words “assault which inflicts grievous bodily injury” or their direct equivalent cannot, in and of itself, make a difference, for Congress could not have meant to include on its “disqualification” list only convictions under sta a.1969) (<HOLDING>). The “intimi dation" statute's language, "use
holding that a conviction for simple assault under pennsylvania law does not qualify under 18 usc  16b by way of 11 usc  1101a43 as an aggravated felony holding conviction of labor leader for accepting illegal payments from employers under 29 usc  186 to be bribery under  504 holding conviction for willful misapplication of bank funds under 18 usc  656 1982 to be grand larceny under  504 holding that because the bank had no duty to report defendants structured transactions these transactions did not constitute material facts within the meaning of 18 usc  1001 consequently defendant may not be held criminally liable under 18 usc  2b for causing the bank to fail to disclose a material fact holding that good faith is a defense to the willful filing of false statements under 18 usc  1001