committed fraud in inducing the Bank to make this advance, this conduct is not relevant to a damage claim under section 156.406(b), and this conduct would not mean that the Bank paid Dohalick’s fee. Though such conduct might support various claims by the Bank against Dohalick other than a claim under section 156.406(b), the Bank nonsuited and elected not to pursue such claims. The Bank argues that the record contains evidence that Savoy “did not pay Dohalick’s fee from its own funds.” But the evidence cited by the Bank shows that Savoy used proceeds from the Loan to pay Dohalick’s fee. The Bank overlooks the fact that, once it advanced funds under the Loan to Savoy, the funds were Savoy’s funds. See In re Sacramento Real Estate Corp., 201 B.R. 225, 229-30, 233 (Bankr. N.D.I11.1996) (<HOLDING>). Considering the evidence in the light most
holding that the redemption price was based on the amount bid at foreclosure  and not  what the subsequent purchaser paid  for the property holding the bank liable where the bank had almost complete control over the operation of the company during its last three quarters of operation and where withheld taxes were not paid to the irs on instructions from the bank holding debtor could cure after the debtor had previously made payments to the bank holding that debtor not bank paid the propertytax redemption amount even though debtor paid this amount using proceeds of loan from the bank holding debtor could include property because the bank accepted payments directly from the debtor and had previously allowed the debtor to cure default