here. [Defendants] said we could have called McNeil, we could have called Collins, we could have called Tweaky Milspaw, we could have called Judy Berlin—another week of trial. [Defendants] probably could have called Lisa Miles (phonetic) and Lisa Miles’[s] whole family to put them on at least on Fish’s [McCoy] case— Wilson, at 653, 814 A.2d 1. Defense counsel objected again and that objection was also overruled. Id. On appeal, the defendants renewed their argument that the prosecutor’s comments shifted the burden of production of evidence from the State to the defense. Wilson, at 654, 814 A.2d 1. We disagreed and held that “the State’s closing argument did not shift the burden of persuasion” to the defendants, pointing out that “[t]he case was not a close one and the evide 545 (1976)(<HOLDING>). Moreover, like Wilson, this was not a close
holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty holding that the prosecutor was entitled to respond to defense counsels remarks about celebrated criminals that received life sentences rather than the death penalty holding that the trial judge properly restricted defense counsels references to the bible in support of his argument that the death penalty is morally wrong recognizing that although there were no limits placed on the defense counsels preparation it was surely reasonable for the defense to assume that there was no reason to present argument or evidence directed at whether the death penalty was either appropriate or permissible where the prosecution never argued for the application of the death penalty holding that although court should inform jury about defendants prior sentences the court should instruct the jury that it should not consider prior sentences in its decision to impose a life or death sentence because they are not statutory aggravating or mitigating factors