to be that they continue to maintain a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation because, as a result of (and notwithstanding) their dismissal of their claims with prejudice, “their individual claims are now tied to the outcome of this appeal.” (Kuznyetsov Resp. to West Penn Mot. 12-14). Appellants apparently believe that reversal of the District Courts’ decertification orders on appeal would resurrect their individual claims once again at the district court level. However, this reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of a dismissal with prejudice. The claims that Appellants dismissed with prejudice are gone forever—they are not reviewable by this Court and may not be recaptured at the district court level. See Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518, 522 (7th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>), see also Dannenberg v. Software Tool-works,
holding that where all substantive claims are properly dismissed there is no basis for injunctive relief holding that if the federal claims are dismissed before trial  the state claims should be dismissed as well holding that the notice of appeal filed after the district court entered judgment as to one defendant but before the court dismissed the claims against the other defendants would have become effective when those defendants were later dismissed holding that in the context of the federal tort claims act claims dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds are not dismissed for lack of jurisdiction but for the existence of a defense holding that where a litigant voluntarily dismisses a portion of their claims in order to secure an appeal those dismissed claims are extinguished forever