request that the court recognize that White had been in detention pri- or to the sentencing and that he should be credited for time served at ACI. The district court, after hearing from the Probation Officer, declined that request because he did not have the authority to credit White for time served. II. The issue is not whether White should receive credit for the time spent at ACI before he was transferred to the custody of the INS, but whether the district court had the power to credit the time. It did not. It is settled law that under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), discretion to credit time served is vested in the Attorney General, through the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), and not in the sentencing court. See United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 331-36, 112 S.Ct. 1351, 117 L.Ed.2d 593 (1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Morales-Madera, 352 F.3d 1,
holding that where a defendant receives a consolidated sentence or consolidated judgment under north carolina law it is one sentence and absent another qualifying sentence the career offender enhancement is inapplicable holding that a federal sentence commences when the attorney general receives the convicted defendant into custody for service of that sentence holding that an issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is rendered moot when a defendant receives an illegal sentence holding that under  3585b the bop has the responsibility of computing the amount of credit a defendant receives after defendant begins serving a sentence holding that a judge who imposes a more severe sentence after the original sentence is successfully attacked must affirmatively state objective reasons for the harsher sentence to ensure that vindictiveness against the defendant plays no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial