debtors from retaining collateral is based on the plain language of the statute, the burden to persuade us to adopt a different reading is “exceptionally heavy.” Hartford Underwriters, 530 U.S. at 9, 120 S.Ct. 1942. We next consider whether any extratextual indicators, such as legislative history and policy, would cause us to depart from our conclusion. There is not a hint in the legislative history that Congress intended to prevent the Prices from retaining collateral as the Prices have done. Such a significant alteration in the substantive rights of debtors is not only doubtful in light of the plain language of the provision, but would have, we believe, occasioned some mention in the pages of the Congressional Record. See Timbers of Inwood, 484 U.S. at 380, 108 S.Ct. 626 (<HOLDING>). To the contrary, what little legislative
holding a court may consider a defendants criminal history even if that history is included in the defendants criminal history category holding that legislative history cannot supply a clear statement holding that based on the statutes purpose and its legislative history the legislature would have included specific language regarding drug rehabilitation if it had meant to include it holding that even where there are  contrary indications in the statutes legislative history we do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear holding that it is most improbable that a significant change to bankruptcy procedure would have been made without even any mention in the legislative history