basis for Means’ claim that the automobile accident caused his symptoms. We further conclude the determination whether Means suffered from a condition of “chronic pain syndrome” and whether his symptoms had their genesis in a psychological cause were areas within the expertise of the neuropsychologist. Any flaws in Dr. Waid’s analysis would go to the weight and credibility of his testimony, not its admissibility, and this expert testimony would supply specialized knowledge that would aid the jury in determining a fact in issue. See Rule 702, SCRE (providing a qualified expert may testify when “scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact ... to determine a fact in issue”); Huntoon v. TCI Cablevision of Colo., Inc., 969 P.2d 681 (Colo.1998) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); Sanchez v. Derby, 230 Neb. 782, 433 N.W.2d
holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting neuropsychologist testimony which explained the use of a battery of tests to determine the impact of an injurious event on an individuals ability to carry out everyday activities and identified the causation of the plaintiffs organic brain injury holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting gangrelated evidence holding that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion by stating that it did not have the ability to present the transcript to the jury holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting highly probative and relevant evidence of other crimes