Court has explained, where an employee’s claim is “based on rights arising out of a statute designed to provide minimum substantive guarantees to individual workers,” the policy considerations underlying the LMRA simply do not apply. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 411-412, 108 S.Ct. 1877. As a result, Section 301 does not preempt a claim where the employee is vindicating a non-neg h Cir.1999) (“The right to be free from retaliatory discharge ... exists ... independently of the CBA. The right originates in the statute which Texas has enacted to protect employees seeking compensation for work-related injuries. It does not depend on any right or duty originating in the CBA.”) (emphasis in original); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Maryland Com’n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1400-02 (4th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Ramirez v. Fox Television Station, Inc., 998
holding that an employees retaliation claim was not preempted by section 301 because he was exercising his rights under the states antidiscrimination laws and the terms of the cba were at most relevant background for the employees termination holding that plaintiffs state law claim against a nonsignatory to the cba was preempted by  301 holding that plaintiffs had standing to bring section 301 lawsuit to enforce seniority rights under cba holding that both plaintiffs discrimination and retaliation claims were beyond the preemptive scope of section 301 because they involved purely factual questions and asserted rights independent of the cba holding that plaintiffs negligence claim was preempted by section 301 because employers duty to provide a safe workplace was expressly created by the cba