as possible. Any delay in the proceedings of the officers, upon whom the duty is devolved of collecting the taxes, may derange the operations of government, and thereby cause serious detriment to the public”). 24 See Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U. S. 68, 74 (1976); Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620, 625 (1946); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S., at 300-301. 25 See 81 Cong. Rec. 1416 (1937) (remarks of Sen. Bone); S. Rep. No. 1035, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1937). The Court also relied on the legislative history of the Johnson Act of 1934, 28 U. S. C. § 1342 (prohibiting federal-court interference with orders issued by state administrative agencies to public utilities), on which the Tax Injunction Act was modeled. 26 See also 450 U. S., at 51 . 481, 488 (1913) (<HOLDING>); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman,
holding that federal courts will not enjoin the collection of unconstitutional state taxes where the taxpayer has a plain adequate and complete remedy at law holding that the illegality or unconstitutionality of a state or municipal tax or imposition is not of itself a ground for equitable relief in the courts of the united states in such a case the aggrieved party is left to his remedy at law when that remedy is as complete practicable and efficient as the remedy in equity holding that in the absence of an adequate state remedy one whose constitutional rights are violated has a direct claim against the state under the state constitution holding that the same considerations which have led federal courts of equity to refuse to enjoin the collection of state taxes save in exceptional cases require a like restraint in the use of the declaratory judgment procedure holding that injunction seeker must demonstrate no adequate remedy at law