of common law claims in large part because the “opinion in Cole is limited at vital points to statutory rights.” 257 F.3d at 824-26. In LaPrade v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., 246 F.3d 702 (D.C. Cir. 2001), the Circuit Court, in the course of upholding an arbitration award requiring an employee “to pay a portion of the forum fees for arbitration of her statutory and non-statutory claims against her former employer,” 246 F.3d at 704, indicated that non-federal statutory claims were beyond the purview of Cole’s per se rule. See id. at 708; see also Nelson, 215 F.Supp.2d at 156-57. And even when a plaintiff has asserted federal statutory claims, courts in this jurisdiction, post-Green Tree, have been reluctant to apply Cole’s per se rule. See, e.g., Shatteen, 113 F.Supp.3d at 182 & n.3 (<HOLDING>); Toledano, 501 F.Supp.2d at 148 (recognizing
recognizing the shaky ground on which coles per se rule now rests and refusing to apply it in the context of an employees claim under the family medical leave act of 1993 holding that the per se rule does not apply to a vertical agreement between a buyer and supplier and noting that precedent limits the per se rule in the boycott context to cases involving horizontal agreements among direct competitors holding that constructive amendments which are per se reversible under harmless error analysis are also per se reversible under plain error analysis holding only that a particular ancillary restraint did not constitute a per se violation of the sherman act and remanding for a determination  of the case under a rule of reason analysis holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment