to settle, which was conditioned on her acceptance of the offer. The evidence did not reflect a commitment by Texas Farm Bureau to pay Davis $12,000 or otherwise evidence a definite, unconditional promise. Thus, Davis offered no evidence of an “actual promise,” an essential element for any promissory-estoppel claim. Second, Davis offered no evidence of foreseeability. Until Davis accepted the offer, Texas Farm Bureau was free to withdraw it. See Brown v. Haywood, No. 07-02-0424-CV, 2004 WL 757962, at *4 (Tex.App. — Amarillo Apr. 8, 2004, pet. denied) (mem.op.). Thus, until Davis accepted the offer, it was not foreseeable to Texas Farm Bureau that Davis would rely on it. See, e.g., Henderson v. Tex. Commerce Bank-Midland, N.A., 837 S.W.2d 778, 782 (Tex.App. — El Paso 1992, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Davis offered no evidence that she
holding debtor could include property because the bank accepted payments directly from the debtor and had previously allowed the debtor to cure default holding debtor could cure after the debtor had previously made payments to the bank holding that debtor not bank paid the propertytax redemption amount even though debtor paid this amount using proceeds of loan from the bank holding that with respect to promissoryestoppel claim debtor failed to offer evidence that bank could foresee that debtor would rely on preliminary negotiations without meeting all conditions on loan holding debtor could cure default partly because the bank held a recourse loan and therefore could recover against the original borrower personally