accords with the statutory language and structure as a whole. To be an “arranger,” one must “arrange[] for disposal or treatment, or arrange[] with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances .... ” § 9607(a)(3). CERCLA’s definition of “disposal,” in turn, includes “the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or constituent thereof may enter the environment or be ... discharged into any waters, including ground waters.” § 6903(3) (referred to by § 9601(29)). That “disposal” includes such unintentional processes as “leaking” indicates that “disposal” need not be purposeful. See Carson Harbor Vill., 270 F.3d at 880 (<HOLDING>). Thus, an entity can be an arranger even if it
holding that compliance with rule 3 is both a mandatory and jurisdictional prerequisite to appeal internal quotation marks omitted holding that sufficient evidence of loss causation exists when the content of the alleged misstatements or omissions caused the financial harm actually suffered by the plaintiffs internal quotation marks omitted citing and quoting suez equity investors lp v torontodominion bank 250 f3d 87 96 2d cir2001 holding that leaking may not require affirmative  conduct internal quotation marks omitted quoting and adopting interpretation of united states v cdmg realty co 96 f3d 706 714 3d cir1996 recognizing that the declaratory judgment act is only procedural and does not create substantive rights internal quotation marks and citations omitted recognizing that a court may not apply the modified categorical approach if the statute proscribes only conduct that involves moral turpitude internal quotation marks omitted