of § 2244(d)(1) where a second or subsequent petition is pending in the state court system.”). Chavis filed a first round of state habeas petitions in the Superior Court in 1993, the Court of Appeal in 1994, and the California Supreme Court in 1997. Although AEDPA took effect on April 24, 1996, Chavis is entitled to tolling for the entire first round of state petitions, which he began before AEDPA was enacted. Therefore, the one-year statute of limitations under AEDPA did not begin ru , 297 F.3d at 812. Therefore, Chavis’s petition was not tolled between May 29, 1998 and January 25,1999, a period of 240 days. Tolling recommenced on January 25, 1999, when Chavis properly filed his Superior Court petition and started a second round of state habeas petitions. See Smith, 297 F.3d at 812 (<HOLDING>). The statute was again tolled during the
holding that petitioner was dili gent for equitable tolling purposes where petitioner filed state petition two months after conviction was final and filed federal petition seven days after discovering state had denied petition on the merits holding that third state petition for postconviction relief that was dismissed as an abuse of the writ was properly filed holding that petition was properly filed even though the state court denied it as procedurally barred because the petition was delivered to and accepted by the state court holding that a second or subsequent state petition for postconviction relief filed according to the procedural rules of the state constitutes a properly filed application  without regard to the merits of the petition holding that aedpa statute of limitations was tolled during fourmonth delay between date petitioner delivered state habeas petition to prison officials and date petition was stamped as filed in state court even though oklahoma did not apply prisoner mailbox rule