of contract claim. (Doc. 259-11, Deola Depo. II, 71:16-73:25.) This is generally called a Damron agreement. See Damron v. Sledge, 105 Ariz. 151, 460 P.2d 997 (1969). There is nothing inherently wrong with a Damron agreement, whereby, if, after the insurer fails to defend or otherwise breaches the insurance contract, the insured confesses judgment in a specific amount and assigns to plaintiff its first-party bad faith and contract claims against the insurance company, all in exchange for plaintiffs covenant not to execute upon the insured’s assets. Of course, the Damron settlement agreement must be reasonable in amount and not otherwise fraudulent, collusive, or against public policy. See, e.g., Tidyman’s Management Services, Inc. v. Davis, 376 Mont. 80, 330 P.3d 1139, 1154 (Mont.2014) (<HOLDING>). However, a Damron agreement must be preceded
holding a court may eonsider settlement negotiations for the purpose of deciding a reasonable attorney fee award holding a settlement privilege exists as to thirdparty discovery of settlement negotiations holding that while it undoubtedly is true that evidence as to settlement negotiations is inadmissible at trial to determine the issue of liability after a divorce and alimony case has been settled by agreement except as to attorney fees the effort needed by counsel to reach such settlement is a matter which can be considered in determining the amount of attorney fees to be awarded recognizing the opportunity for mischief in settlement negotiations where the insurer has declined involvement  which may be checked by judicial review of whether the settlement amount stipulated to is reasonable holding that an insurer acted in bad faith by failing to keep the insured informed of settlement negotiations