does not have standing to maintain this action with respect to the alleged violations of Chapter 26, because, as conceded by appellant, such standing is not specifically granted by statute, and because the appellant has not shown that he has been damaged or injured as a result of the City’s actions other than as a member of the general public. In so holding, we are guided by the following decisions. Scott, 405 S.W.2d 55; Bolton v. Sparks, 362 S.W.2d 946, 951 (Tex.1962) (private individual cannot maintain a suit to enjoin alleged violation of a penal ordinance unless the activity complained of results in damages to such person, peculiar to him, and not common to the public in general); Tuck v. Texas Power & Light Co., 543 S.W.2d 214, 215 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>); Marshall v. City of Lubbock, 520 S.W.2d 553,
holding that the proper rate for prejudgment interest is the rate fixed by the parties in a contract holding that a resident seeking to annul an ordinance of a home rule city providing for an electric rate increase had no justiciable interest in the controversy and stating that to have standing he must have a justiciable interest distinguishable from the public in general holding that when an oversecured creditor seeks interest on its claim courts apply the interest rate provided for in the contract holding the question of standing is distinct from the question of proof and once the plaintiffs alleged an interest peculiar to themselves and distinguishable from the public generally they were entitled to a factual hearing holding despite contrary authority that husband debtor with a mere possessoiy interest was not entitled to claim a homestead exemption and stating it is a fundamental tenet of the law of exemptions that the debtor must have an ownership interest in the property before an exemption may be claimed a long line of illinois cases has required that a debtor have title or some ownership interest in property in order to claim a homestead exemption other courts deciding the issue under the federal exemption scheme have held that the key word is interest and that an interest in real property up to a specified amount implies a monetary interest more than just one spouses right to reside with the other