Id. The speedy trial analysis in the present case was triggered by the passage of thirty-six months from the date that Defendant was indicted to the date of the first evidentiary hearing on her motion to dismiss for a speedy trial violation. The court, having determined that this was a complex case, found that the delay exceeded the speedy trial analysis triggering date of eighteen months by an additional eighteen months. See Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 2 (stating that the length of delay necessary to trigger the speedy trial inquiry is eighteen months for complex cases). Stated differently, on February 18, 2011, once eighteen months had passed from the date Defendant was indicted, the delay in bringing her to trial became presumptively prejudicial. See Spearman, 2012-NMCA-023, ¶ 21 (<HOLDING>); Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 21, 23 (same). {20}
holding that the delay is presumptively prejudicial does not necessarily mean the first factor weighs against the state but requires further consideration of the extent of the delay beyond this period holding threeyear delay between indictment and arraignment caused by the serious negligence of the government presumptively prejudicial recognizing that the triggering date preceding a speedy trial analysis is synonymous with a presumptively prejudicial delay holding that a twoyear postindictment delay presumptively prejudicial holding that a delay of 8 months is enough to provoke a speedy trial inquiry