suggests that not all aspects of the testing process are testimonial and therefore subject to a defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause, the examples differ from the question of whether the data that underlies an expert’s opinion is testimonial. Therefore, the decision does not directly answer our question. Nevertheless, applying the tests utilized in Melendez-Diaz, we conclude the population frequency data and the statistical programs used to make that data meaningful are nontestimonial. We first note that DNA itself is physical evidence and is nontestimonial. Wilson v. Collins, 517 F.3d 421, 431 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Zimmerman, 514 F.3d 851, 855 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908, 86 S. Ct. 1826 (1966) (<HOLDING>). Placing this physical evidence in a database
holding that dna act violates neither substantive nor procedural due process under the fifth amendment holding that blood test evidence although an incriminating product of compulsion is neither testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative act or writing and is therefore not protected by the fifth amendment holding that the nexus between an asbestos product and plaintiff may be established by direct and circumstantial evidence and that testimony by someone with knowledge relating to the plaintiffs workplace exposure to an asbestoscontaining product is admissible holding that consent to search obtained after defendant invoked right to remain silent is not a selfincriminating statement because it is neither testimonial nor communicative holding that evidence is not required to support an an assertion relating to discovery when evidence is unnecessary to decide the matter