by “heighten[ing] the duties of those in control of particular industries, trades, properties or activities that affect public health, safety or welfare,” regardless of the actor's intent. Id. at 250-56, 72 S.Ct. at 243-46. 7 . Gilmour rejected a First Amendment challenge to an Iowa state child pornography statute that is nearly identical to § 2251(a). 117 F.3d at 372. 8 . The only item that had traveled in interstate or foreign commerce in this case was the China-manufactured cell phone he used to take the images, but Ruggiero does not appear to contend that § 2251(a) is unconstitutional as applied to him for lack of a sufficient nexus to foreign commerce. If he does, we reject that contention. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9, 17, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 2201, 2205, 162 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Forrest, 429 F.3d
holding that individual coverage is established if a substantial part of an employees activities related to goods whose movement in the channels of interstate commerce was established by the test we have described he is covered by the flsa holding that congress may regulate purely local intrastate activities if they are part of an economic class of activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce holding that housing discrimination has a substantial effect on interstate commerce recognizing that congress had the power to regulate boxcars that traveled exclusively intrastate because of their inherent mobility and connection to interstate commerce it is no objection to such an exertion of commerce clause power that the dangers intended to be avoided arise in whole or in part out of matters connected with intrastate commerce holding that commerce clause authorizes congress to punish any particular criminal action even without proof of a relation to interstate commerce when the activity is part of a class of activities determined by congress to affect interstate commerce