witness. Majority Opinion ¶¶24, 35-36. This reasoning overlooks the fact that when Rule 804(b)(6) was adopted in 1997, the defendant intended by his misconduct to prevent the witness from testifying in virtually every case in which the constitutional waiver doctrine was recognized. See, e.g., United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 909-12 (D.C.Cir.1997) (involving the murder of a potential witness that the defendant suspected was working with the police); Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1278 (concluding that a defendant waives his constitutional confrontation rights by murdering a potential witness to prevent the witness from testifying); United States v. Thai 29 F.3d 785, 814-15 (2d Cir.1994) (involving murder of potential witness); United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1992) (<HOLDING>); Rouco, 765 F.2d at 985, 995 (involving murder
holding that defendant waived his confrontation rights by threatening witness not to testify holding that testimonial hearsay statements of a witness who does not appear at trial are inadmissible under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment unless the witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the witness holding that the defendant forfeited his confrontation rights where he kept the police from finding his wife so she could not testify but not addressing the intent requirement holding that the confrontation clause bars admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless the witness was unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity for crossexamination holding that witness grand jury testimony was admissible when defendant waived his constitutional right of confrontation by making witness unavailable by threats to his life