The Supreme Court observed that, in determining whether AN-ILCA applied to particular lands, it was required to do more than simply ask whether the United States held title to those lands. We are bound, therefore, to do more than simply ask whether the United States has title to navigable waters. It is our duty to effectuate Congress’s intent by reading the term “title” in the context of the statute as a whole and in light of Congress’s express purpose. Third, even if our duty were to determine the meaning of “title” in isolation, we interpret such undefined terms not as technical terms of art but rather in accordance with their ordinary or natural meaning in the context in which they arise. See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187, 115 S.Ct. 788, 130 L.Ed.2d 682 (1995) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350,
holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance holding that an undefined statutory term should be given its natural ordinary meaning recognizing that undefined words in a statute ordinarily should be interpreted as taking their ordinary contemporary common meaning holding that statutory words must be given their ordinary contemporary meaning holding that in the absence of a statutory definition a term should be accorded its ordinary meaning