clause is limited to legal impossibility because “Florida law construes force majeure clauses to exclude only those delays that are excusable under the doctrine of impossibility.” To support that contention, Paradigm cites Florida Power Corp. v. City of Tallahassee, 154 Fla. 638, 18 So.2d 671, 675 (1944), but that decision does not shoulder the proposition. In Florida Power the delay was caused by a hurricane — an act of God. Id. The court was concerned with only that kind of delay. That does not mean the court was narrowing the force majeure clause at issue (and all force majeure clauses in all Florida contracts) to cover only acts of God. It appears to us that force majeure clauses broader than the scope of impossibility are enforceable under Florida law. See Devco, 518 So.2d at 923 (<HOLDING>); St. Joe Paper Co. v. State Dep’t of Envtl.
holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim holding that exhaustion requirement applies to excessive force claims holding that the use of excessive force does not constitute a prison condition in the ordinary sense of the term holding that excessive force claims are to be treated under the fourth amendment holding that excessive rain excused delay under the contracts force majeure clause as a condition outside of the sellers control