its view that these procedural mechanisms are essentially different. See Symczyk, 133 S.Ct. at 1529. What remains unclear, however, is whether the fact that individuals have already opted into Appellants’ actions by filing written consents with the District Courts following conditional certification would permit Appellants to retain a justiciable interest in the litigation based on their representative capacities. We need not decide whether it may, however, because we believe that the unique fact pattern here—namely, Appellants’ voluntary dismissal of their claims with prejudice—has not only extinguished Appellants’ individual claims, but also any residual representational interest that they may have once had. Ruppert v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 705 F.3d 839, 844 (8th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>); Rhodes v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 636
holding that in the rule 23 class action context named plaintiff may appeal a denial of class certification even if his or her individual claims had been satisfied through the entry of judgment holding that a rule 23 named plaintiffs acceptance of a settlement offer as to his individual claims mooted his interest in the denial of class certification holding that the district court did not err in dismissing the named plaintiffs claims on summary judgment before reaching the issue of class certification holding that tolling applies to a subsequent class action when the prior denial of class certification was based solely on rule 23 deficiencies of the putative representative holding that a class action is not mooted by the intervening resolution of the controversy as to the named plaintiffs