actions. The continuing violation doctrine, however, applies to Waggoner’s harassment claim. Fahnestock alleges that Wag-goner’s weekly harassment began before the limitations period and continued until he resigned four months after the limitations period began running. Because there is no evidence that the harassment reached a state of permanence before the limitations period, we consider Waggoner’s pre-limitations-period actions to determine liability on her harassment claim. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (applying the continuing violation doctrine to hostile work environment claim differently than to discrimination and retaliation claims involving discrete acts); Richards, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 87, 29 P.3d at 184-85 (<HOLDING>). 2. Fahnestock has proffered insufficient
holding that noneconomic injury resulting from a hostile environment based on discriminatory sexual harassment is actionable under title vii recognizing that harassment often lacks the permanence that discriminatory actions have recognizing that missouri courts have often held that regulations may establish the appropriate standard of care in a negligence case holding that harassment of women working alongside plaintiff was relevant to question of creation of environment viola tive of title vii  although vinson was a sexual harassment case the principles underlying a hostile environment theory are equally applicable in sexual harassment and racial harassment cases holding that a defendants notice of prior harassment against victims other than the plaintiff can give rise to title ix liability so long as the defendant possessed enough knowledge of the harassment that it could reasonably have responded with remedial measures to address the kind of harassment upon which the plaintiffs legal claim is based