remedies against them); Mitchell-Carr v. McLendon, 1999-NMSC-025, ¶ 10, 127 N.M. 282, 980 P.2d 65 (citing Luboyeski). As Plaintiff suggests, the potential for individual liability for discrimination claims is rooted in the language of the NMHRA itself, which forbids “any person” from supporting a discriminatory practice. Section 28—1—7(i); see N.M.S.A.1978, § 28-1-2(A) (1993) (including within its definition of “person” for purposes of the NMHRA, “one or more individuals”). 2001-NMSC-015, ¶ 12, 130 N.M. 238, 22 P.3d 1188. Second, the language of “serious medical condition” in the NMHRA, N.M.S.A.1978, § 28-1-7, may be broader in scope than the term disability in the ADA. See Clayton v. Pioneer Bank, No. 07-0680, 2008 WL 5787472, at **17-18 (D.N.M. Dec. 31, 2008) (Browning, J.)(<HOLDING>). LAW REGARDING ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY The
holding that an employer cannot be held liable under the ada if it had no knowledge of the employees alleged disability holding that the same standards apply to claims under the ada and under the rehabilitation act holding that although visionimpaired individuals may not have an onerous burden in demonstrating disability and ordinarily will meet the ada s definition of disability they must still offer evidence of limitation in terms of their own experience holding abuse of discretion is the proper standard for reviewing award of attorney fees in patent cases although questions of law may in some cases be relevant recognizing that although the terms medical condition under the nmhra and disability under the ada may be interchangeable in some cases they may not be the same in others