discrimination.” Id. Based on these findings, the district court concluded that the District had not violated the Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment equal protéction rights since it had not acted with any discriminatory purpose or intent. Id. at 1367. We have explained previously that “[b]e-cause the issue is a factual one, this Court can reverse a district court’s finding of intentional discrimination only if the finding is clearly erroneous, is based on clearly erroneous subsidiary findings of fact, or is based on an erroneous view of the law.” Barber v. Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers & Helpers, 778 F.2d 750, 754 (11th Cir.1985) (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287-90, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 622-23, 102
holding that the issue of discriminatory intent in a race discrimination case is a factual question for the trier of fact whose findings are reviewed only for clear error holding that findings of fact are reviewed for clear error holding that factual findings in sentencing context are reviewed for clear error holding that district courts factual findings for purposes of obstruction enhancement are reviewed for clear error holding that findings of fact from a bench trial are reviewed for clear error