procedures in place to ensure the randomness of a trial court’s sua sponte shuffle, and so such a shuffle, while not prohibited, could raise a concern about tampering with the process. HOLCOMB, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which PRICE and JOHNSON, JJ., joined. I respectfully dissent. In my view, the majority interprets and applies the judicially created harmless error rule in a way that effectively repeals the legislatively granted right to a jury shuffle, a right belonging to both the State and the defendant. In so doing, the majority exceeds the authority the Legislature gave this Court to promulgate rules of appellate procedure. In addition, I am concerned about the Court’s recent treatment of statutory rights. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346 (Tex.Crim.App., 2002)(<HOLDING>); Ex parte Graves, 70 S.W.3d 103
holding that there is both a statutory and a constitutional right to a jury trial under erisa because congress lacks constitutional authority to limit right to a jury holding that the constitutional right to a sixmember jury may be waived by a knowing and intelligent waiver holding that written jury waivers alone cannot validly waive a defendants right to a jury trial holding that a trial courts refusal to withdraw a jury waiver ordinarily does not implicate the federal constitutional right to a jury trial holding that denial of a defendants statutory right to a written jury waiver is harmless if the preprinted judgment form recites that the defendant waived a jury