why Andrews could not rely on Monick’s testimony (regardless of whether Monick’s testimony was substantively true or false). Monick’s testimony established not that the truck was actually traveling 56 mph, but that it had to reach 56 mph for improperly stacked totes to tip. If Andrews’ eyewitnesses said the truck was going 35 mph, no expert testimony could support Andrews’ load-shift theory. With that the district court denied Andrews’ second Rule 59(e) motion as successive and untimely. The order denying Andrews’ second Rule 59(e) motion was entered on July 12, 2004, so Andrews still had two days to timely file a notice of appeal (thirty days from June 14 is July 14). See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A); FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a); see also Charles v. Daley, 799 F.2d 343, 347-48 (7th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Andrews did not appeal until July 19, 2004.
holding that an argument raised for the first time in a rule 59e motion is waived on appeal holding that successive new trial or jnov motions do not toll the time for serving the notice of appeal holding that successive rule 59e motions unlike timely filed ones do not toll the time for appealing holding that a motion filed as a rule 59e was not a motion to alter or amend the judgment and did not toll the time to file an appeal because the motion for costs was wholly collateral to thejudgment on the merits holding that successive posttrial motions do not toll the time for appeal