"terms of the statute on which the removal is based invites inquiry into the facts of the underlying conviction”); Soliman v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 276, 285-86 (4th Cir.2005) (using modified categorical analysis because statute of conviction did not contain all the elements of generic theft, specifically the taking of property, to determine that a conviction under Virginia's credit card fraud statute was not an aggravated felony); United States v. Armstead, 467 F.3d 943, 947-48 (6th Cir.2006) (“If the statutory definition embraces both violent and non-violent crimes or is otherwise ambiguous, the court ... may look to [various documents] to determine whether the violent or non-violent aspect of the statute was violated.” (emphasis added)); Ali v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 737, 743 (7th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Eke v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 372, 379-81 (7th
holding that factors increasing a defendants sentence beyond the statutory maximum of the crime charged with the exception of prior convictions must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt holding that once the statute is found to be divisible the court must look to the charging papers and judgment of conviction to determine if the actual crime of which defendant was convicted was a crime of violence but emphasizing that the court is not to examine the particular facts underlying the conviction holding that when deciding how to classify convictions under criteria that go beyond the criminal charge  such as the amount of the victims loss or whether the crime is oneof moral turpitude  the agency may consider evidence beyond the charging papers or judgment of conviction holding that proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is required by the constitution holding that a crime involving the willful commission of a base or depraved act is a crime involving moral turpitude whether or not the statute requires proof of evil intent