and after the transfer between the sons. The transfer-of-shares agreement cannot be considered a contract by Joe Sr. to transfer four shares of stock to Joe Jr. because it does not meet the basic requirements for a contract: it states no action or forbearance by Joe Sr. in return for an action or forbearance by Joe Jr. Compare § 7-8-319, Ala. Code 1975, the former “Statute of Frauds” for securities transactions, that, at the time relevant here, required, in a contract for the sale of securities, a writing “signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought ... sufficient to indicate that a contract has been made for sale of a stated quantity of described securities at a defined or stated price.” (Emphasis added.) See DeVito v. Sheeran, 165 N.J. 167, 189, 755 A.2d 1147, 1160 (2000) (<HOLDING>). Although Joe Sr.’s signature on the
holding unconscionable a disclaimer of warranties under the uniform commercial code where there was allocation of commercial risks in a socially or economically unreasonable manner recognizing the purpose of a uniform statewide building code holding that a memorandum referring to the allocation of stock ownership did not satisfy  8319 of the uniform commercial code holding that the uniform commercial code specifically encompassed a software licensing agreement holding that the hospital was fraudulently joined because it did not meet the definition of seller as defined by mississippis product liability statute or under the uniform commercial code