had been firmly established at common law” and that “American courts likely recognized the same broad principle of absolute judicial immunity from civil suits” (citations omitted)); see also Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646, 649 (1872) (stating that the doctrine of judicial immunity “has been the settled doctrine of the English courts for many centuries, and has never been denied, that we are aware of, in the courts of this country”). Thus, “judges always have been accorded complete immunity for their judicial acts within the jurisdiction of courts of justice, even when their conduct is corrupt, or malicious and intended to do injury.” Prosser § 132, at 987 (citing Bradley, 80 U.S. at 347-48, 20 L.Ed. at 649-50); Hiss v. State, 24 Md. 556, 560-61 (1866) (<HOLDING>). The purpose of affording this broad immunity
recognizing that a prosecutors office is an entity and that information in the possession of one attorney in the office must be attributed to the office as a whole holding that it is error to conduct most of the jury selection process in the absence of the defendant holding that it was not error for successor trial judge to direct a judgment for defendant based on the statute of limitations where initial judge had denied a motion for summary judgment on the same issue holding that the rules of evidence normally applicable in criminal trials do not operate with full force at hearings before the judge to determine the admissibility of evidence there is therefore much to be said for the proposition that in proceedings where the judge himself is considering the admissibility of evidence the exclusionary rules aside from rules of privilege should not be applicable and the judge should receive the evidence and give it such weight as his judgment and experience counsel holding that it is one of the most ancient fundamental and cherished maxims of the common law that a judge should not be liable civilly or criminally for error in judgment in the discharge of his office