peculiar positions as state actors, leaving a discrete plaintiff vulnerable to foreseeable injury.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). We, as well as other appellate courts, have held that the state-created danger theory is a viable mechanism for establishing a constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1208; see also Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 572 (10th Cir.1995); Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1125 (7th Cir.1993); Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 99 (2d Cir.1993); Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir.1990). We are aware of no court of appeals which has recognized the constitutional validity of the state-created danger theory in the context of an immigration case. But see Builes v. Nye, 239 F.Supp.2d 518 (M.D.Pa.2003) (<HOLDING>). We decline to do so here, and hold that the
holding it improper to deny cat relief based on adverse credibility finding where objective documentary evidence establishes likelihood of torture holding that despite petitioners inability to establish habeas relief under cat because evidence did not support finding that colombian government would acquiesce to torture by drug cartel  petitioner was entitled to relief under statecreated danger exception holding that errors in state law cannot support federal habeas relief holding that a negative credibility finding for the purposes of an asylum claim does not preclude relief under cat where documented country conditions corroborate a claim of torture holding petitioner not entitled to habeas relief on claim state court improperly used petitioners prior federal offense to enhance punishment