is evidence of intentional and deliberate disregard of a provision in the Rule.” U.S. v. Gerber, 994 F.2d 1556, 1560 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting U.S. v. Loyd, 721 F.2d 331, 333 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam)). First, the Rule 41 violation here was constitutional. True, as the Government points out, the Fourth Amendment does not impose a venue requirement; rather, it requires only that a warrant be (1) signed by a neutral, detached magistrate; (2) supported by probable cause; and (3) sufficiently particular. See Dalia v. U.S., 441 U.S. 238, 255, 99 S.Ct. 1682, 60 L.Ed.2d 177 (1979). But inherent in the notion of a “neutral, detached magistrate” is that the magistrate have authority to issue the warrant. See Shadswick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 352, 92 S.Ct. 2119, 32 L.Ed.2d 783 (1972) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added); U.S. v. Glover, 736 F.3d
holding that party that failed to object to instruction that jury not answer a question based on its answer to the prior question waived that partys right to have the jury make findings as to the subsequent question recognizing the inherent power of the courts to issue warrants holding in answer to the single question of whether power has been lawfully vested that municipal court clerks may issue warrants holding that a policy for purposes of municipal liability may be established by an officials single decision holding appellant could not obtain a new trial so that jury could answer liability question because the charge instructed the jury not to answer the question based on its answer to a prior question and because appellant did not object to this instruction