relevant legal knowledge and gave Allen advice that was, in fact, correct. The attorney’s second letter to Allen therefore provides no basis for the application of equitable tolling. 3. Length of Allen’s delay in filing her habeas petition Allen also claims that she is entitled to equitable tolling because the seven-month delay between the conclusion of the state postconviction proceedings and the time she filed her habeas petition was reasonable. But this court has declined to apply equitable tolling where the delay was far less than seven months. See, e.g., Cook v. Stegall, 295 F.3d 517, 518 (6th Cir.2002) (concluding that equitable tolling was not appropriate where the petitioner filed his habeas petition one month late); Dunlap v. United States, 250 F.3d 1001, 1010 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). In light of Cook and Dunlap, the length of
holding that the petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling where he filed his habeas petition more than two months late holding that petitioner was dili gent for equitable tolling purposes where petitioner filed state petition two months after conviction was final and filed federal petition seven days after discovering state had denied petition on the merits holding that a petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling where he waited six months to file a federal petition after any state misconduct ended holding equitable tolling was not justified where attorney filed a habeas petition five days late because he sent it by ordinary mail holding that petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling where former counsel actively deceived petitioner over several months into believing he was diligently pursuing petitioners legal remedies when in fact he was not