term “mainly for the purposes of specific deterrence.” Appellant’s Br. at 10. The argument that defiant recidivism should somehow mitigate a sentence below the Guidelines range borders on the absurd. In any event, “[t]he particular weight to be afforded aggravating and mitigating factors is a matter firmly committed to the discretion of the sentencing judge,” United States v. Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d at 289 (internal quotation marks omitted), and thus “we do not consider what weight we would ourselves have given a particular factor,” but rather “whether the factor, as explained by the district court, can bear the weight assigned it under the totality of circumstances in the case,” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d at 191; see United States v. Perez-Frias, 636 F.3d 39, 42-43 (2d Cir. 2011) (<HOLDING>). In light of the district court’s finding here
holding that a district court did not commit reversible error because it attached great weight to one factor recognizing generally if the ultimate sentence is reasonable and the sentencing judge did not commit procedural error in imposing that sentence we will not second guess the weight or lack thereof that the judge accorded to a given factor or to a specific argument made pursuant to that factor internal quotation marks and alteration omitted recognizing that procedural sentencing error is harmless if the resulting sentence is not longer thanthat to which the defendant would otherwise be subject alterations and internal quotation marks omitted recognizing that the weight to be afforded any given argument made pursuant to one of the section 3553a factors is a matter firmly committed to the discretion of the sentencing judge holding that the jury is the judge of the weight and credibility given to witness testimony