a statutory power of attorney did not give her the ability to practice law without a license. The doctrine of judicial estoppel binds Shell to her previous acknowledgment that a power of attorney is not a proxy for a law license. See Estate of Burford v. Burford, 935 P.2d 943, 947 (Colo.1997) (explaining judicial estoppel). Judicial estoppel is “an equitable doctrine by which courts require parties to maintain a consistency of positions,” thereby “preventing the parties from deliberately shifting positions to suit the exigencies of the moment.” Id. Under this doctrine, Shell cannot contradict her acknowledgment in her 2001 Stipulation that statutory powers of attorney do not allow her to practice law. See Leonia Bank v. Kouri, 3 A.D.3d 213, 772 N.Y.S.2d 251, 255-56 (N.Y.App.Div.2004) (<HOLDING>); see also Hall v. GE Plastic Pac. PTE Ltd.,
holding judicial estoppel inapplicable where record revealed no legal pleadings signed by the claimant under oath asserting a position contrary to the one asserted in the instant case holding that stipulation precluded litigant from asserting contrary position in subsequent case holding that the plaintiff was precluded from asserting her failure to promote claim as a continuing violation holding appeal waiver in conditional guilty plea agreement precluded defendant from asserting new argument on appeal in support of suppression motion recognizing principle that as between common parties a position taken in an earlier judicial proceeding estops a litigant from adopting an inconsistent position in a later proceeding