Comments accompanying our current version of the UCC have specified that closely-held stock is to be considered a security under the UCC. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 47-8-103, Comments to Official Text, n. 2 (Supp.1998). 23 . See Unif. Commercial Code, 1A U.L.A. 1 (Supp.1999). 24 . The alleged agreement in this case is governed by Tenn.Code Ann. § 47-8-319 as it existed in the 1992 Replacement volume. However the statute has not been amended since appearing in that volume, and our analysis also applies to the current version of the statute, found in the 1996 Replacement volume. 25 . See Bunch v. Macawber Engineering, Inc., No. 91-1374 (D.W.Penn.). 26 . See Tenn.Code Ann. § 47-8-319(d) (1992 Repl. & 1996 Repl.). 27 . Cf. Keigan v. Goode, 28 Mass.App.Ct. 775, 556 N.E.2d 118, 119-20 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Oakley v. Little, 49 N.C.App. 650, 272 S.E.2d
holding that where one party had received a written agreement and conformed his conduct to that agreement for an extended period of time but failed to sign the agreement he was equitably estopped from denying the validity of the agreement holding that it was error for the court to enter a modified agreement which materially altered the agreement reached by the parties holding part performance of an oral agreement necessary to take the oral agreement out of the statute of frauds must be consistent only  with the existence of the alleged oral contract holding that the judicial admission exception did not apply to prove the existence of an oral agreement for the sale of stock where the defendant offered his deposition testimony acknowledging that the parties agreed to have a document transferring the stocks drafted by an attorney because the defendants references to the agreement were in terms of a tentative or incomplete agreement and because any admission of such a contract would necessarily have to include a statement of the price and quantity terms holding in a suit to establish the existence of an oral agreement for the sale of stock that the judicial admission exception was not satisfied by the plaintiffs deposition testimony acknowledging that before negotiations had broken down the parties had reached an agreement with regard to price and quantity of stock and had drafted a document reflecting the agreement