* * *.”); accord Lynch, supra, 85 N.J. at 71, 424 A.2d 1169 (stating that in some medical-malpractice cases “fault is not implicit in injury”). Although litigants are not noted for an ability dispassionately to appraise both s .Y.S.2d 831 (1968) (applying continuous-representation rule as adaptation of continuous-treatment rule); Wilson v. Econom, 56 Misc.2d 272, 288 N.Y.S.2d 381 (Sup.Ct.1968) (same). In the medical-malpractice context we stated that “it would be inequitable for a physician who has given * * * assurances [of progress towards recovery] to claim that a patient, in relying upon them and not suspecting their falsity or inaccuracy, failed to exercise the ‘reasonable diligence and intelligence’ required by the discovery rule.” Lynch, supra, 85 N.J. at 75, 424 A.2d 1169 (<HOLDING>) The reasoning in Lynch is equally applicable
holding testimony of a treating physician is not subject to discovery procedures under the iowa rule governing discovery of experts be cause the treating physicians mental impressions and opinions were not acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial holding that treating physicians testimony was properly discounted when it was inconsistent with physicians own treatment reports and the record as a whole and appeared to be based on patients subjective complaints holding that treating physicians continued reassurances that a patients pain was part of the healing process prevented discovery holding that where the alj had already  obtained and considered reports from treating physicians the alj had before him a complete medical history and the evidence received from the treating physicians was adequate for him to make a determination as to disability holding that remand was not required and that the aljs failure to mention treating physicians opinion was harmless error because the alj adopted the treating physicians recommendations