for Selecting the ICD Respondents contend even assuming, arguendo, the expert testim owever, he stated, “Definitely not, definitely not.” Instead, Dr. Venegas testified it would be proper for a physician considering a medical device or drug to evaluate it based on “[t]he benefits outweighing the risks, the appropriateness of the situation ... the various side effects, risks, alternatives.” Arguably, this testimony constitutes evidence of both the generally accepted standard of care and a breach thereof. Ultimately, however, we need not decide whether the expert testimony establishes the standard of care or breach because Melton presented no evidence showing that Dr. Feldman’s selection criteria was the proximate cause of his injuries. See David, 367 S.C. at 248, 626 S.E.2d at 4 (<HOLDING>). See also Tumblin v. Ball-Incon Glass
holding that negligence must be the proximate cause of injury holding that the plaintiff must show that there was a lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution holding a person commits aggravated dui when his or her driving under the influence was a proximate cause of the injuries  citation not the sole and immediate cause of the victims injuries emphasis omitted holding the plaintiff must show that the defendants departure from such generally recognized practices and procedures was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs alleged injuries and damages holding that a physicians negligence need only be a proximate cause not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury