to Cadle, junior unavoidable hens, like the tax hen in this case, should not be included in the computation of the impairment. Using this approach, the junior tax lien should have been removed from the impairment calculation, and no amount of Cadle’s judicial hen would be avoided. In In re Kolich, 328 F.3d 406 (8th Cir. 2003), the Eighth Circuit considered whether hens junior to the judicial hen in question should be included in the calculation under § 522(f)(2)(A). The court pointed out that subsection 522(f)(2)(A)(ii) states the computation of the impairment shah include “all other hens on the property.” The Eighth Circuit interpreted the term “all other hens on the property” to include junior hens. 328 F.3d at 410; see also In re Smith, 315 B.R. 636, 641 (Bankr.D.Mass.2004) (<HOLDING>). Cadle contests the Eighth Circuit’s
holding  522f2 does not distinguish between senior hens and junior hens between those having greater and lesser priority under state law holding federal law does not prevent a state from choosing between prospective operation of its decision and that of relation backward holding that under texas law the mere representation of a party in a lawsuit does not establish privity between an attorney and his or her client holding that it was permissible to distinguish between hospital and clinic providers of psychiatric services and private psychiatrists holding that the fair and adequate representation requirement was not satisfied because of litigation between plaintiff and defendant the antagonism between the parties and the lack of support plaintiff garnered in its claim