will “vary from case to case, depending on how intoxicated the driver is, how far he drives, how fast he drives, and how many other drivers and pedestrians are sharing the road with him”) (quotation omitted) (opinion of Rogers, J.); Eckelberry v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co., 469 F.3d 340, 345, 347 (4th Cir.2006) (rejecting such a per se rule); Cozzie v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 140 F.3d 1104, 1106, 1110 (7th Cir.1998) (affirming denial of AD & D benefits where insured died while driving drunk, but expressly not suggesting that insurer “could sustain a determination that all deaths that are causally related to the ingestion of alcohol ... could reasonably be construed as not accidental”); Danouvong ex rel. Estate of Danouvong v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 659 F.Supp.2d 318, 326-27 (D.Conn.2009) (<HOLDING>). MetLife’s assertion, in its decision denying
holding plan administrators denial of benefits was arbitrary and capricious because the administrator in effect applied a per se rule treating all drunk driving deaths as nonaccidental holding that under erisa a plan administrators decision to deny an employee longterm disability benefits is arbitrary and capricious if the administrator ignores favorable evidence  and selectively reviews the evidence it does consider holding that a heightened arbitrary and capricious standard of review applied to the decision to deny benefits under the erisa plan holding that when applying an arbitrary and capricious standard of review the courts role is to determine whether the plan administrators decision was completely unreasonable holding court must review de novo companys denial of benefits unless benefit plan gives administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to construe terms of plan in which case courts review a benefits denial under an arbitrary and capricious standard