Hall argues that the amended judgment’s use of the term ‘‘dismissed’’ means that CFTC was awarded no relief. We disagree with this interpretation, which contradicts the district court's indisputable intention to award CFTC relief, and find that the amended judgment incorporates the relief provided in the summary judgment order. 2 . Hall did preserve a general argument that the magistrate judge's interpretation of § 4.14(a)(9) violated his free speech rights; to the extent he asserts this argument on appeal, we find that it is meritless because the magistrate judge's finding that Hall did not qualify for this exemption was based on Hall’s conduct in performing trades on his clients’ accounts rather than on his speech. See Willis v. Town of Marshall, 426 F.3d 251, 257 (4th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). 3 . We note that Hall’s argument below
holding that where the first amendment does not protect a certain activity there can be no first amendment right of association to engage in that activity holding first amendment claim requires actual protected conduct holding first amendment does not protect nonexpressive conduct holding that the first amendment does not protect true threats against the president holding that the first amendment does not protect obscenity or pornography produced with actual children