ient facts that, if proven true, would entitle him to prospective injunctive relief in the trial court. We therefore overrule McCraw’s first issue. 3. Characterization of the SORP as a Criminal Statute In his third issue, McCraw argues that “[a] declaratory judgment is not available to determine the status, rights or other legal relationships arising under a penal statute.” Civil courts generally do not “have jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement of, or issue a declaratory judgment determining the constitutionality of, [penal statutes].” State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941, 942 (Tex. 1994). However, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has expressly found that Texas’s sex offender registration laws are “civil and remedial, and not criminal or punitive.” Rodriguez, 93 S.W.3d at 68, 77-79 (<HOLDING>), This finding regarding the nature of sex
holding that there is no distinction having any first amendment significance between criminal libel and civil libel or criminal fraud and civil fraud for libelous or fraudulent speech both have no first amendment protection in either the civil or criminal context recognizing the alaska legislatures strong statement of purpose in enacting as 1880 and its avowed determination to protect the civil rights of all alaska citizens holding that the texas legislatures intent in enacting the sorp was civil and thatthe 1997 amendments were not so punitive in purpose or effectas to transform whatwas clearly intended as a civil regulation into a criminal penalty holding that the interpretation of statutory language should be consistent with the legislatures purpose and intent holding that  523a7 applies both to civil and criminal penalties if the particular penalty serves some punitive or rehabilitative governmental aim rather than a purely compensatory purpose