judgment or order while an appeal of that particular judgment or order is pending before the appellate court, nor may a trial court initiate proceedings that require a ruling on the exact matter being appealed. (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Id. at 448 (1). And because the pending appeal in Brown addressed only the validity of the first, quashed indictment, we held that the issuance of a separate, second indictment “had no effect on the issue of whether the First Indictment was valid, and the trial court thus had jurisdiction to consider the Second Indictment.” Id. at 449 (1). Consequently, we found the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to quash on jurisdictional grounds. Id. at 447 (1). See also Roberts v. State, 279 Ga. App. 434, 435 (631 SE2d 480) (2006) (<HOLDING>). Decided November 5, 2013 Kenneth W. Mauldin,
holding that a second motion to reconsider served within ten days of the denial of the first motion does not extend the time period for filing a notice of appeal from the underlying judgment holding that appeal from denial of rule 60b motion raised for review only the district courts order of denial and not the underlying judgment itself holding state had ability to bring a second indictment against defendant although appeal pending on denial of defendants motion for acquittal holding that similar agreement allowed the defendant to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress holding that denial of motion for summary judgment is interlocutory even though trial judge had stated that there was no just reason for delay because denial of motion for summary judgment was not a final determination of defendants rights and the appeal did not affect defendants substantial rights