(g), which provides that “[attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation awarded under this Code section in a prior action between the same parties shall be treated as court costs with regard to the filing of any subsequent action.” Whether a litigant is subject to imposition of costs for the filing of a subsequent action as provided in subsection (g) should not turn on whether the litigant is able to refile a lawsuit more quickly than the original court is able to rule on a pending motion. Moreover, our holding comports with the Supreme Court of Georgia’s stated preference for presenting the question of a party’s entitlement to attorney fees and expenses “while the trial court’s memory of events is still fresh.” Fairburn Banking Co. v. Gafford, 263 Ga. 792, 794 (439 SE2d 482) (1994) (<HOLDING>). Decided March 10, 2006. Marc B. Hershovitz,
holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal after an untimely filing of a notice of appeal recognizing that the trial court is not precluded from enforcing its judgment even though an appeal is pending holding that the district court was not divested of subject matter jurisdiction upon the dismissal of the plaintiffs federal claims holding that district court erred in determining that jury verdict of noninfringement divested district court of jurisdiction to hear unenforceability counterclaim holding that a trial court is not divested of its jurisdiction to hear an ocga  91514 motion pending appeal of the judgment below