it has privity of contract”). Limited exceptions are recognized for plaintiffs who “stand[] in the shoes” of a party with privity. First Hartford Corp. Pension Plan & Trust v. United States, 194 F.3d 1279, 1289 (Fed.Cir.1999). Included in the list of recognized exceptions are intended thud-party beneficiaries of the contract, Glass v. United States, 258 F.3d 1349, 1354 (Fed.Cir.2001); subcontractors in certain circumstances, E.R. Mitchell Constr. Co. v. Danzig, 175 F.3d 1369, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir.1999); and sureties, Balboa Ins. Co. v. United States, 775 F.2d 1158, 1160-63 (Fed.Cir.1985). Investors who lack privity of contract with the United States have not been recognized as an exception to the rule. S. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. United States, 422 F.3d 1319, 1332 (Fed.Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Defendant argues that Helen Arakaki was not a
holding that investors of savings and loan company who lacked privity of contract with the united states could not base standing to sue on their investment alone or even on their role initiating and negotiating the acquisition of a failing thrift on behalf of the association holding that a motor carriers association has standing to sue on behalf of its members for department of transportations alleged abuses of agency authority holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue holding that standing to sue under a contract requires plaintiff to be in privity or be an intended thirdparty beneficiary holding that for the government to be sued on a contract pursuant to the tucker act there must be privity of contract between the plaintiff and the united states