v. Mukasey, 522 F.3d 250, 255 n. 5 (2d Cir.2008) (noting that some removability provisions may “invite[ ] inquiry into the facts underlying the conviction at issue” (quoting Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 162 (3d Cir.2004))). To the contrary, even the Third Circuit decision on which he heavily relies explicitly declined to restrict its inquiry to the statute of conviction. See Parra-Rojas v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 747 F.3d 164, 168-69 (3d Cir.2014). We need not reach this issue, however, in light of Petitioner’s sworn testimony at his plea allocution admitting to conduct satisfying the smuggling bar. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3) (delineating offenses, including smuggling, “for which such person was convicted or of which he admits the commission” (emphasis added)); Chambers, 494 F.3d at 279 (<HOLDING>). Because the record supports the agency’s
recognizing difference in elements between offense of actual entry and attempted entry holding that a found in indictment need not allege all of the elements of entry holding that petitioners conduct satisfied the elements of section 1182a6e where she arranged transportation for an aliens attempted illegal entry and purposefully deceived customs officials holding that specific intent is an element of attempted illegal reentry holding that officers request for defendants name during an illegal entry constituted exploitation of the illegal entry under hall