a new context (as suggested by Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 159 L. Ed. 2d 442 (2004), announced June 24, 2004), one thing is certain — Blakely requires alterations to Washington’s 20-year-old sentencing process. Before this country’s highest court issued its opinion in Blakely, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), chapter 9.94ARCW, permitted a judge to impose a sentence above the standard range guideline on the basis of facts neither admitted by the defendant nor found by the jury. The Blakely Court held: “ ‘Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” 124 S. Ct. at 2536 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (<HOLDING>)). This “sea change” in the law was not caused
holding that there is no sixth amendment error when the sentence does not exceed the maximum authorized by facts the defendant admitted holding statutory maximum for prior conviction is the potential maximum sentence defined by the applicable state criminal statute not the maximum sentence which could have been imposed against the particular defendant  according to the states sentencing guidelines holding that if sentence does not exceed maximum authorized by facts admitted by defendant or found by jury there is no sixth amendment violation holding a sentence 110 the length of the 20year statutory maximum sentence was reasonable holding unconstitutional a state statute which authorized a 20year sentence despite the usual 10year maximum if the judge found the crime to have been a hatecrime