there; they then used the drug dog to confirm their suspicions. The fact that they later sought Pena’s consent to search the entire house does not change the fact that the drug dog alert informed them that drugs were present inside the house — which was exactly what officers anticipated finding upon obtaining Pena’s consent to search. Consideration of this factor therefore also weighs against a finding of voluntariness. Third, the State contends that the trial court erred in determining that police engaged in “flagrant” misconduct. The State emphasizes that Jardines was not decided until ten months after the search and that the officers’ conduct was legal under prior Texas case law. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. State, 106 S.W.3d 224, 280 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>), overruled by Jardines, 133 S.Ct. at 1417-18.
holding that use of a drugdog to sniff for narcotics outside appellants house was not a search  and that neither the sniff nor its use to obtain a warrant violated the federal or state constitution holding that a dog sniff of the area outside the door of a hotel room is not a search under the fourth amendment or the texas constitution because the dogs sniff does not explore the details of the hotel room and the sniff reveals nothing about the room other than the presence of cocaine in which there is no legitimate privacy interest holding that canine sniff not a search under the fourth amendment holding a dog sniff outside the defendants front door was not a fourth amendment search holding that a dog sniff of a federal express package was a search