first preliminary objection. II. Sovereign Immunity In the second preliminary objection, the Secretary argues that Commonwealth officials are immune from claims seeking affirmative or mandatory injunctive relief. We disagree. “Actions in mandamus are not subject to the defense of sovereign immunity.” Maute v. Frank, 441 Pa.Super. 401, 657 A.2d 985, 986 (1995) (citing Madden v. Jeffes, 85 Pa.Cmwlth. 414, 482 A.2d 1162 (1984)). Indeed, this court has stated that the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not bar suits that seek to compel state officials to carry out their duties in a lawful manner. Milestone Materials, Inc. v. Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, 730 A.2d 1034 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999); see also City of Philadelphia v. Shapp, 44 Pa.Cmwlth. 303, 403 A.2d 1043 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we overrule the Secretary’s
holding that department of transportation did not have control of motorists drivers license because although the department of transportation may have had a duty to recall the motorists license this authority to revoke does not involve physical possession or actual control sufficient to bring the license within the ambit of the personal property exception to sovereign immunity holding that sovereign immunity does not bar a mandamus action against the governor and the department of transportation to compel their performanee in accordance with constitutional and legislative mandates holding that sovereign immunity bars dchra claim against the department of commerce holding that a writ of mandamus could not be issued to compel legislative officers to adjourn or attempt to adjourn the legislature or to obtain an adjournment from the governor holding that sovereign immunity prevents mandamus action to compel state officers to levy a tax to pay bondholders