or a new indictment. See, e.g., Rojas-Contreras, Hoslett, Long. However, defendants fail to present any .reason why the semantics of naming an indictment as “new” or “superseding” has any o dants also argue' that they are entitled to new detention and/or bond hearings. Again, even if the court called the second indictment the “new” indictment instead of the “superseding” indictment, which the court does not believe is the required course of action, that would not entitle the defendants to the relief they seek. As the government correctly notes, the defendants are collaterally estopped (or prohibited by the “law of the case” doctrine) from relitigating these issues absent new information not previously before the court. See United States v. Rosenberger, 872 F.2d 240, 242 (8th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); Smith v. United States, 406 A.2d 1262,
holding that a plaintiffs  1983 claim accrued on the date of the alleged illegal search and seizure holding that evidence resulting from an unconstitutional search or seizure must be suppressed holding that a ruling on preindictment motion that search and seizure were legal collaterally estopped defendant from later moving to suppress evidence claiming that search and seizure were illegal holding that the admission of evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure is subject to a harmlesserror analysis holding that evidence obtained by improper search or seizure is inadmissible