EAJA applicant must show that it obtained an enforceable judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree that materially altered the legal relationship between the parties, or the equivalent of either of those. This approach is consistent with the approach taken by the majority of the circuits that have considered the issue. See, e.g., Roberson v. Giuliani, 346 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir.2003) (“We therefore join the majority of courts to have considered the issue since Buckhannon in concluding that judicial action other than a judgment on the merits or a consent decree can support an award of attorney’s fees, so long as such action carries with it sufficient judicial imprimatur.” (footnote and citation omitted)); Truesdell v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 290 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 281 (4th
holding that prevailing party status may be conferred by interim judicial relief that alters the parties legal relationship holding that a court may only enforce a settlement agreement if it constitutes an enforceable contract holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees recognizing that a private settlement without judicial imprimatur is insufficient to convey prevailing party status holding that an order characterized as a stipulated settlement conferred prevailing party status because it used mandatory language bore the judges signature and was judicially enforceable