United States v. Sharp, 778 F.2d 1182, 1187 (6th Cir.1985). Further, “[m]ere conjecture or supposition about the possible relevancy of the informant’s testimony is insufficient to warrant disclosure.” Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 62, 77 S.Ct. 623 (citation omitted). A defendant must provide some evidence that disclosure of the informant’s identity would assist in his defense before disclosure will be warranted. Id.; see also, e.g., Moore, 954 F.2d at 381 (affirming district court’s refusal to compel disclosure of informant where defendant “advanced no more than a simple statement that [informant’s] testimony might assist in his defense,” stating that “[a]n informant must be disclosed only upon a showing by the defendant that disclosure is essential to a fair trial”); Sharp, 778 F.2d at 1187 (<HOLDING>). The district court was within its discretion
holding a trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to require disclosure of an informants name holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure  contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a new trial based on a 250000 award for a mental distress claim holding that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering temporary alimony that exceeded the husbands ability to pay holding that trial court abused its discretion in ordering disclosure of informants identity based solely on defense counsels unsworn representations that disclosure would be relevant and helpful to his defense