165 L.Ed.2d 250, 259 n. 3 (2006) (declining to consider whether a search provision in a p E.2d 379, 381 n. 3 (1988) (“The coercive quality of the circumstance in which a defendant seeks to avoid incarceration by obtaining probation on certain conditions makes principles of voluntary waiver and consent generally inapplicable.”); Peterson, 233 N.W.2d at 255 (characterizing a search provision of a probation agreement as a “Bill of Attainder for the period of probation” and holding that “when the waiver [was] conditioned on the surrender of so hallowed a right, the so-called choice amounted] to no choice at all [and] the probationer’s signed acceptance therefore was in legal effect coerced and thus rendered nugatory” (footnote omitted)); State v. Schlosser, 202 N.W.2d 136, 139 (N.D.1972) (<HOLDING>); Tamez v. State, 534 S.W.2d 686, 692
holding a search of a probationers home pursuant to a wisconsin probation regulation was permissible under a special needs theory but not addressing whether the probationer had consented to the search under the regulation holding probationers acceptance of search provision of parole agreement did not constitute freely and voluntarily given consent holding search of probationers computer by probation officers was reasonable even in absence of a search provision when conditions on probationers computer use reduced his expectation of privacy in his computer holding search provision in probation order constitute a reasonable and necessary element of the courts regulation of probationers which did not require the defendants consent holding that a probationers challenge to a condition of his probation was moot in light of the supreme courts reversal of the underlying conviction and the probationers apparent completion of probation 