complained about pornographic graffiti in a restroom before Aguilar was employed at ASARCO. The circumscribed nature of the evidence limited any potential prejudice to ASARCO. Moreover, as the plaintiffs contend, and my analysis of ASARCO’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, above, indicates, the “other graffiti” evidence was not the only evidence relevant to punitive damages. See, e.g., Schudel v. General Electric Co., 120 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir.1997) (requiring a new trial where inadmissible evidence was the only evidence on the issue of causation), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1094, 118 S.Ct. 1560, 1561, 140 L.Ed.2d 792 (1998), abrogated on other grounds, Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 120 S.Ct. 1011, 145 L.Ed.2d 958 (2000); Powell v. Levit, 640 F.2d 239, 241 (9th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). ASARCO is not entitled to a new trial on the
holding that the standard was met when two actions were related to the same assets and were based upon almost identical breaches of fiduciary duty recognizing that no prejudice results where the evidence erroneously admitted was merely cumulative and an appellate court will not reverse for harmless error in the admission of evidence holding that when evidence was erroneously admitted such error was harmless when the evidence was insignificant and cumulative holding that the rule 61 prejudice standard was met where the erroneously admitted evidence of the plaintiffs juvenile and adult felony offenses was clearly prejudicial because the case turned almost entirely on relative credibility of the partywitnesses holding that even if the standard for waiver is clear the standard was not met