threat and because Ms. Stiger ordered her to attend a “Respect in the Workplace” training session, Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 99 at re sufficient to surmount summary judgment, Ms. Toomer’s own deposition testimony contradicts her assertions elsewhere that she withdrew her complaint concerning her co-worker’s harassment because Ms. Stiger threatened her. See Dec. 2, 2013 Toomer Dep., ECF No. 68-1 at 80:1-82:4 (Ms. Toomer explaining that “what made [her] withdraw the complaint” was a conversation with another supervisor regarding her co-worker’s youth and immaturity and the need for Ms. Toomer to give that co-worker a second chance). Such contradictory testimony belies the conclusion' that there is a triable issue of fact here. See Pina v. Children’s Place, 740 F.3d 785, 799 (1st Cir. 2014) (<HOLDING>); Washington, Marlboro & Annapolis Motor Lines
holding that summary judgment was appropriate where plaintiffs admissions in her deposition undermined her claims holding that a plaintiffs selfserving deposition testimony was not enough for her fdcpa claim to survive summary judgment but that a consumer survey may have been sufficient holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment holding that in connection with crossmotions for summary judgment the substance of the plaintiffs motion and her silence in response to the defendants characterization of her claims as being based on violations of specified statutory provisions established abandonment of claims based on other statutory provisions set forth in her complaint holding that admission of one defendants deposition was proper where she was present at the deposition even though she was represented at the time by the same counsel as her codefendants