not demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction that the reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the old one.” Id. (emphasis in original). It is enough that new policy is “permissible under the statute, that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better.” Id. (emphasis in original). Thus, the order against the Wil-mina is not arbitrary and capricious merely because the agency has not issued one like it before. The question is whether the order is permissible under the statute, whether there are good reasons for it, and whether the agency reasonably finds the new approach to be superior. The Court has already ruled that the part.of the order imposing an ECP with audits is permissible under the applicable statutes. Wilmina, 934 F.Supp.2d at 9-10 (<HOLDING>). So the relevant question is “whether there
recognizing the inherent power of the court to coerce compliance with its orders holding that chapter 37 of title 46 gives the coast guard broad authority to issue and revoke certificates of compliance  based on its assessment of whether the vessels are in compliance with environmental requirements and mandates the agency to revoke a certificate when it determines a vessel is out of compliance holding that strict compliance is not required holding that section 105a facilitates compliance with the bankruptcy code and the bankruptcy courts orders and compliance is one of the central goals of civil contempt sanctions holding that substantial compliance with notice is sufficient