his claim (another requirement of Rule 4(a)(6)); and of course Rule 4(a)(6) does not apply to administrative cases, governed as they are by Rule 26(b)’s unforgiving approach. Before the adoption of Rule 4(a)(6) in 1991, several courts of appeals, including ours, sug gested that a district court might be entitled to vacate and reenter its judgment under Rule 60(b) when, despite ■ diligent effort, counsel was unable to ascertain the status of the case. See Spika v. Village of Lombard, 763 F.2d 282 (7th Cir.1985). Compare Wilson v. Atwood Group, 725 F.2d 255, 258 (5th Cir.1984) (en banc), and Mizell v. Attorney General of New York, 586 F.2d 942, 944-45 (2d Cir.1978), with Polylok Corp. v. Manning, 793 F.2d 1318 (D.C.Cir.1986). See also Williams v. Hatcher, 890 F.2d 993, 996 (7th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); DeRango v. United States, 864 F.2d 520, 523
holding that even where defendant was misinformed as to the consequences of unlawful reentry and stated that he returned in reliance on the misrepresentation such a circumstance did not justify a downward departure where defendant made a purposeful decision to engage in felonious conduct holding that counsels efforts did not justify vacatur and reentry holding counsels failure to object to victim impact testimony and evidence was not ineffective assistance of counsel when the trial record was silent as to counsels strategy recognizing that defendant must show 1 that counsels performance was deficient and 2 that counsels errors prejudiced the defense holding that reasoning which would justify the arrest by the search and at the same time justify the search by the arrest  will not do