the prosecutors believed section 775.15(15)(a), Florida Statutes (2006) — which permits a prosecution for certain offenses within one year after the date on which the identity of the accused is established, or should have been established by the exercise of due diligence, through the analysis of DNA — authorized the prosecution of Mr. Dixon more than ten years after the charged offense. The problem, however, is that this statute had not been enacted when the statute of limitations for this sexual battery offense otherwise expired. The State now concedes that this action could have been dismissed and Mr. Dixon discharged of this crime if the statute of limitations had been raised by his attorney as Mr. Dixon requested. See generally Lawson v. State, 51 So.3d 1287 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (<HOLDING>). The State does not concede error in this case
holding statute that extended statute of limitations for certain criminal sexual conduct could not be applied retroactively to a prosecution commenced after the limitations statute in effect at the time of the alleged offense had expired holding that subsections 7751515  16 did not apply where threeyear statute of limitations expired on january 25 2006 and thus prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations holding that threeyear statute of limitations was not an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus holding that the plaintiffs claims under  22a452 were barred by the statute of limitations but declining to decide which statute to apply holding that trial court erred by granting a directed verdict on statute of limitations defense and remanding for a new trial on the statute of limitations only