demonstrating that the Slayton rule is not regularly or consistently applied in this particular context. See Walton v. Angelone, 321 F.3d 442 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 2626, 156 L.Ed.2d 642 (2003); Chapman v. Angelone, 187 F.3d 628, 1999 WL 511062 (4th Cir.1999) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision); Gardner v. Warden, 222 Va. 491, 281 S.E.2d 876 (1981). As Reid notes, all of these cases involved claims that a guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary, and in none of them did the Virginia Supreme Court bar the claim under Slayton. Nevertheless, these cases do not establish the inadequacy of Slayton. In Walton, the challenge to the guilty plea was defaulted on the basis of the procedural rule found in Anderson v. Warden, 222 Va. 511, 281 S.E.2d 885, 888 (1981) (<HOLDING>). See Walton, 321 F.3d at 451 & n. 6. We are
holding that in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary a defendant is bound by statements made under oath during his plea colloquy holding that absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary a defendant is bound by his representations made during a plea colloquy holding that the defendant was entitled to have his plea accepted absent a sound reason for rejecting the plea holding that a defendant is bound by representations made during a guilty plea absent a valid reason for controverting those statements holding that representations made by the defendant during a plea hearing carry a strong presumption of verity