inquiry into the existence of a protected, state-created liberty interest in avoiding restrictive conditions of confinement is not the language of regulations regarding those conditions but the nature of those conditions themselves ‘in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’ ” Id. at 223, 125 S.Ct. 2384 (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995)). Therefore, in order to constitute a violation of a state-created liberty interest, the hardship imposed on the prisoner must be atypical and significant in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Chappell v. Mandeville, 706 F.3d 1052, 1064 (9th Cir.2013). None of the penalties imposed on Dennison implicate liberty interests. See May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 445 (9th
holding that the inmate had no cognizable due process claim because he had no liberty interest in being free from disciplinary segregation holding that placement in disciplinary segregation does not implicate a liberty interest because it falls within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a sentence recognizing that the ninth circuit explicitly has found that administrative segregation falls within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a sentence holding that placing a prisoner in disciplinary confinement clearly effects liberty interest holding that 117 days in administrative segregation due to lack of bed space did not implicate a statecreated liberty interest