First Circuit held that “[t]he same [Pearce] presumption may arise when a criminal defendant rejects a plea agreement — and with it the prospect of a more lenient sentence — and elects instead to exercise his constitutional right to a jury trial.” Correia, 364 F.3d at 388 (citing Johnson v. Vose, 927 F.2d 10, 11 (1st Cir.1991)); accord Jones v. Poole, No. 05-cv-0886, 2010 WL 1949599, at *36 (W.D.N.Y. May 13, 2010). “ ‘[T]he evil the [Pearce ] Court sought to prevent’ was not the imposition of ‘enlarged sentences after a new trial’ but ‘vindictiveness of a sentencing judge.’ ” Smith, 490 U.S. at 799, 109 S.Ct. 2201 (quoting Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 138, 106 S.Ct. 976, 89 L.Ed.2d 104 (1986) and citing Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 25, 93 S.Ct. 1977, 36 L.Ed.2d 714 (1973) (<HOLDING>)). Similarly, in appeals on federal cases,
holding that the trial courts apparent consideration of the defendants national origin during sentencing amounted to a due process violation and required resentencing by a different judge holding that the amount of alimony should not be reduced to a mathematical formula because the need for flexibility outweighs the need for relative certainty recognizing need for flexibility and discretion by the secretary in section 13c certifications holding that the pearce presumption was not designed to prevent the imposition of an increased sentence on retrial for some valid reason associated with the need for flexibility and discretion in the sentencing process but was premised on the apparent need to guard against vindictiveness in the resentencing process holding that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award the increased child support retroactive to the date of the petition for modification because the childs increased need for support and the former husbands ability to pay the increased child support existed at the time the former wifes petition for modification was filed