and admitted evidence in deciding whether the district court abused its discretion in precluding an -alternative perpetrator defense). a. S.H. Trial testimony reveals S.H. visited the home Meisel shared with Thomas, Thomas regularly slept during the day, and Meisel left his computer on with a slots program running. Given this extremely limited evidence, we have no doubt the district court acted within its discretion in refusing to admit the evidence for the purpose of arguing S.H. is the person who committed the child pornography crimes set out in the indictment. If mere proximity and potential access were sufficient to argue an alternative perpetrator committed the crime, this court can hardly envision a criminal trial that would not involve such a defense. But see id. at 1220-22 (<HOLDING>). b. W.R. Evidence implicating W.R. as the
holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting testimony to only one witness where additional witnesses would have provided the same testimony holding that the trial court must apply the provisions of the statute and specifically determine whether the perpetrator of domestic abuse had rebutted the presumption against an award of joint custody holding unconstitutional a state evidentiary rule automatically excluding alternative perpetrator evidence when the prosecution case was strong holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting alternative perpetrator evidence where the record demonstrated the supposed alternative perpetrator was near the victim no more than ten minutes before the crime holding that if the trial court would have had no discretion to deny summary judgment on an alternative ground the appellate court can on that alternative ground sustain the order granting summary judgment