courts have been called upon to determine the nature of vested stock options in the realm of dissolution proceedings. In Seither v. Seither, 779 So.2d 331, 333 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), the Second District, in upholding the trial court’s determination that vested stock options could be considered as income for alimony purposes instead of being treated as assets, noted that section 61.075(5)(a)4., Florida Statutes, broadly defines “marital assets.” See also Brown v. Brown, 591 So.2d 1043, 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (finding no abuse of discretion in trial court’s order that distributed husband’s vested stock options); Langevin v. Langevin, 698 So.2d 601, 602 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Griffing v. Griffing, 722 So.2d 979, 980 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). Thus, because section 61.075(5) .2d 561, 563-64 (1976) (<HOLDING>). But see In re Marriage of Moody, 119
holding that the trial court properly determined that unvested stock options have marital aspect holding that unvested stock options are a form of compensation and constituted marital property that could be distributed through use of a constructive trust holding that unexercised stock options were not marital property holding that unvested stock options subject to the contingency of debtors future employment are property of the bankruptcy estate holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allocating the husbands unvested stock options as marital property