875 (S.D.N.Y.1994); Steeples v. Time Ins. Co., 139 F.R.D. 688, 693-94 (N.D.Okla.1991); McDonald v. Artcraft Electric Supply Co., 774 F.Supp. 29, 35 (D.D.C.1991); International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of Am. v. Midland Steel Prods. Co., 771 F.Supp. 860, 865 (N.D.Ohio 1991); Vicinanzo v. Brunschwig & Fils, Inc., 739 F.Supp. 882, 885 (S.D.N.Y.1990); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama v. Lewis, 753 F.Supp. 345 (N.D.Ala.1990); Weber v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 751 F.Supp. 21 (D.Conn.1990). 10 . This presupposes that Congress can limit a court’s ability to fashion a relief under a statutorily created cause of action. See Spinelli v. Gaughan, 12 F.3d 853, 858 (9th Cir.1993); cf., McDonald v. Artcraft Electric Supply Co., 774 F.Supp. 29, 35 (D.D.C.1991) (<HOLDING>). The Court agrees with the Ninth Circuit and
holding that there is both a statutory and a constitutional right to a jury trial under erisa because congress lacks constitutional authority to limit right to a jury holding that there is no federal or colorado constitutional right to postconviction counsel but there is a limited statutory right holding that there is no constitutional right to appeal a criminal conviction recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights holding right to testify was federal constitutional right