arises from the events of May 31, 2007. Jones alleges that he was served and ate part of a tamale pie without having been- notified of its pork contents. Nopp declares, however, that he did not order cooks to add pork to the tamale pie and that the tamale pie did not contain pork. Jones’s evidence is not sufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether the tamale pie contained pork and or whether Nopp ordered cooks to add pork to the dish. The unsworn statements of the inmate cook who told Jones that Nopp had -directed the cook to mix pork in with the meat used in the tamale pie are hearsay, see Fed.R.Evid. 801(c), and cannot properly be considered in opposition to a summary judgment motion. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4); Block v. City of Los Angeles, 253 F.3d 410, 419 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Raymond Mayes, another inmate kitchen worker,
holding that hearsay in affidavit which would be inadmissible in evidence at trial could not be considered on motion for summary judgment holding that a court may not consider hearsay contained in an affidavit when ruling on a summary judgment motion holding that the affidavit in question did not satisfy the burden of the party moving for summary judgment where affiants eonclusory statement failed to indicate personal knowledge of the circumstances in question and personal knowledge could not be reasonably inferred from the contents of the affidavit holding that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court at the summary judgment stage to consider information from an affidavit based on inadmissible hearsay rather than the affiants personal knowledge holding that an affidavit  consisting entirely of inadmissible hearsay is not sufficient to survive summary judgment