we to extend the statute to prenatal conduct that affects a fetus in a manner apparent after birth— conduct that would be defined solely in terms of its impact on the victim—the boundaries of proscribed conduct that would subject a pregnant woman to prosecution under W.Va. Code § 61-8D-4a would become impermissi-bly broad and ill-defined. “Many types of prenatal conduct can harm a fetus, causing physical or mental abnormalities in a newborn. For example, medical researchers have stated that smoking during pregnancy may cause, among other problems, low birth weight, which is a major factor in infant mortality.” Reinesto v. Superior Ct. of Ariz., 182 Ariz. 190, 193, 894 P.2d 733, 736 (Ct.App.1995). The court in Reinesto found that numerous prenatal activities could harm a fe 50 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Reyes v. Superior Ct. of San Bernardino
holding that possession of listed chemical with intent to manufacture controlled substance is controlled substance offense holding a pregnant woman who uses cocaine is not criminally liable for delivery of a controlled substance despite the possibility the drug may transfer to her infant postpartum via the umbilical cord holding that quantity of the controlled substance does not have to be measurable to support a conviction for possession of such controlled substance particularly when the immeasurable amount of the substance is found on an implement used to consume the substance holding that a reasonable jury could have concluded based on repeated references to the substance as cocaine and testimony from witnesses who had used the substances which they believed to be cocaine that substance was cocaine holding that mens rea required for possession of a controlled substance is knowledge that defendant possessed a controlled substance