such an approach. Our long line of precedent demonstrates that despite her massive overhaul, the BETTY LYN II maintained her vessel status during the repair period. Neither the manner of her repair, nor the fact that the needed repairs were so extensive as to temporarily disable her, divested her of her status as a vessel. Indeed our review of the history of maritime liens demonstrates they were designed to encourage repairs on ships in great need. See supra Section III.A. The BETTY LYN II need merely be capable of transportation on water to be a vessel. The law does not require that she be able to self-propel. See Belle of Orleans, 535 F.3d at 1307 (noting the “vessel” had to be towed in for repairs); Miami River Boat Yard, Inc. v. 60’ Houseboat, 390 F.2d 596, 597 (5th Cir.1968) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Templeton, 378 F.3d
holding a contract clause stating that the yard shall in no case be held responsible for the damages resulting from any loss of use or profit of the vessel to be unambiguous holding that a houseboat is a vessel capable of being subject to a maritime lien as the fact that she has no motive power and must  be towed does not deprive her of the status of a vessel holding that an assault on a seaman by his former maritime employer aboard a vessel in navigable waters had the potential to disrupt maritime commerce because it ren dered the seaman unable to fish holding that a party who lends money to be used in the repairs of a vessel or to furnish the vessel with supplies does not have a privilege against the vessel holding that a ship whose powers of selfnavigation were practically irreparable and that was towed to a repair facility to be converted into an artificial reef was a vessel subject to maritime liens because it could be towed and carry a crew and cargo