affairs.” Klein, 438 F.Supp. at 487. We find the Klein court’s reasoning to be flawed. In Hayes, the Second Circuit categorized convictions for impeachment purposes into three categories; convictions which on their face involve dishonesty, convictions which on their face do not involve dishonesty, and convictions in “the uncei'tain middle category.” Hayes, 553 F.2d at 827. For convictions in this middle category, “a prosecutor ... must demonstrate to the court ‘that a prior conviction rested on facts warranting the dishonesty or false statement description.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, the Second Circuit explicitly encouraged prosecutors to look beyond the face of a conviction, a practice that the Florida Supreme Court has rejected. State v. Page, 449 So.2d 813, 816 (Fla.1984)(<HOLDING>). However, the Second Circuit found that it was
holding that petit theft is per se a crime involving dishonesty or false statement under section 906101 and disapproving of the practice of conducting a trial within a trial to determine whether an affirmative misstatement or misrepresentation of fact was involved in the commission of the crime the conviction of which is sought to be introduced for impeachment purposes holding that a crime involving the willful commission of a base or depraved act is a crime involving moral turpitude whether or not the statute requires proof of evil intent holding that theft from the person is not a crime of violence holding that an infamous crime under the arkansas constitution is a crime involving elements of deceit and dishonesty holding that when considered in light of circumstances employers statement that employee was short was clearly defamatory and actionable per se because it alleged the commission of a crime namely theft