as to unknown defendants by the filing of a “John Doe” petition, it could have included such a provision in the statute. See Laid-law Waste Sys. (Dallas), Inc. v. City of Wilmer, 904 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex.1995) (stating that when the Legislature has employed a term or phrase in one section of a statute and excluded it in another, it is presumed the Legislature had a reason for excluding it, and the term should not be implied where it has been excluded); see also Moran v. City of Houston, 58 S.W.3d 159, 162-63 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). 2. In Deciding If Limitations Has Tolled, A “John Doe” Petition Should Be TReated The Same As A Petition Involving A Misidentification. Further, alt C.App. 772, 403 S.E.2d 568, 571 (1991), affd, 330 N.C. 610, 411 S.E.2d 610 (1992) (<HOLDING>). In sum, Riston’s “John Doe” petition did not
holding that the statute of limitations for  1983 claims is the most closely analogous state limitations period for general personal injury claims recognizing purpose of limitations would be thwarted by allowing a plaintiff to preserve claims against john doe defendants for some unlimited period of time or until the plaintiff determines their true identities holding that the limitations period should be tolled until the plaintiff became aware of the facts necessary to support a charge of discrimination holding that the statute of limitations did not commence  despite the filing of a prior complaint against another physician  until the defendants deposition made the plaintiff aware of the defendants involvement in the decedents death where the plaintiff failed to discover the defendants involvement because of the defendants misstatement concealment or fraud holding that where a plaintiff is unaware of the identity of alleged defendants plaintiff should be given an opportunity through discovery to identify the unknown defendants unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the identities or that the complaint would be dismissed on other grounds