supersedeas application be transferred to the Court of Appeals. Brian A. Hobbs, Leighton R. Berry, Jr., for appellee. 9 Thus, the 1983 Constitution has been interpreted in Thornton and elsewhere to provide this Court with jurisdiction over pre-conviction appeals in death penalty cases, rather than over only appeals from capital felony convictions as under the prior constitutions — but not to provide jurisdiction, either before or after conviction, over murder cases in which the death penalty can no longer be imposed. See Weatherbed v. State, 271 Ga. 736, 739-741 (524 SE2d 452) (1999) (Benham, C. J., concurring specially). However, despite Thornton’s summary holding to the contrary and the cases that follow that holding see, e.g., Rhyne v. State, 264 Ga. 176, 176 (442SE2d 742) (1994) (<HOLDING>), the “[a]ll cases in which a sentence of death
holding that a statute providing for interlocutory appeals to be heard in the court where appellate jurisdiction may be vested by law means that this court has appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals in cases where the sentence of life imprisonment or death may be imposed holding that this court has jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals in cases involving a sentence of life imprisonment or death holding that although not essential to the outcomes of two previous cases the court of appeals should have followed the texas supreme courts statements in those cases holding that the court of appeals has jurisdiction over murder cases under the constitution even if thornton directs such cases to be transferred to the supreme court holding that claims under 11 usc  362h must be brought in the bankruptcy court rather than in the district court which only has appellate jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases