pertaining to absolute immunity, see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982), and good faith immunity. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). Additionally, as with their counterparts in the judiciary and the legislature, public officials in the executive branch are entitled to a testimonial privilege. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974) (recognizing the existence of executive privilege but holding that it is not absolute, in that it cannot be asserted to shield evidence of a crime); Cheney v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 124 S.Ct. 2576, 159 L.Ed.2d 459 (2004); Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Brooke, 573 So.2d 363 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (<HOLDING>). It is clear from these authorities that the
holding that a draft of a proposed letter from an area director of a government agency to a municipal administrative agency was properly excluded because it did not represent an agency finding holding that the head of a state administrative agency was protected by executive privilege and could not be forced to appear in court and answer questions about funding of the agency holding that the state police is a state agency holding that because the scope of review of agency matters is confined to the administrative record discovery in the form of depositions from agency officials was improper and irrelevant holding that an agency head may delegate authority to assert the privilege when carefully undertaken