and palpable, regardless of whether other women working in the same hostile environment would also have claims for relief. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197. The fact that the injury to Leibovitz from working in a hostile environment may have been an indirect result of the harassment of other women does not necessarily preclude Article III standing. See id. at 504-05, 95 S.Ct. 2197 (“When a governmental prohibition or restriction imposed on one party causes specific harm to a third party ... the indirectness of the injury does not necessarily deprive the person harmed of standing to vindicate his rights.”). Finally, this injury, if proved, is remediable through a damage award. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis omitted). The district court was
holding that samcscx sexual harassment claims are actionable under title vii recognizing that a claim of hostile environment sex discrimination is actionable under title vii holding that noneconomic injury resulting from a hostile environment based on discriminatory sexual harassment is actionable under title vii holding that samesex sexual harassment claims are not actionable under title vii holding that title vii does not protect employees from harassment based on sexual orientation