court retains jurisdiction in matters regarding parole when each component sentence imposed has a maximum of less than two years but the aggregate maximum consecutive sentence imposed is two years or more. The answer to this question today, as it has been each time this issue has come before this Court, is emphatically no. In addressing this very question in Commonwealth v. Evola, 421 Pa.Super. 595, 618 A.2d 969 (1992), allocatur denied, 535 Pa. 666, 634 A.2d 1114 (1993), and more recently in Commonwealth v. Hams, supra, we have clearly stated that the Parole Board has exclusive authority over parole matters when the aggregate maximum sentence equals or exceeds two years. Harris, 423 Pa.Super. at 197-99, 620 A.2d at 1179; see also Evola, 421 Pa.Super. at 599 n. 3, 618 A.2d at 971 n. 3 (<HOLDING>); McDermott, 377 Pa.Super. at 631, 547 A.2d at
holding that the court of common pleas had no authority to grant early parole when defendants aggregate sentence for imposed consecutive sentences is two or more years holding that courts are duty bound to correct sentences violating the trial courts statutory authority to issue consecutive sentences under indiana code section 355012 holding that a california state courts affirmance of two consecutive 25 years to life sentences for petty theft was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law recognizing with approval the practice following vacatur of some counts of conviction on appeal of increasing the defendants sentence on remaining counts to yield an aggregate sentence equal to the original aggregate imposed holding that the federal constitutional right to a jury trial does not apply to decisions to impose consecutive sentences