is solvent, post-petition interest is paid to creditors prior to any money being returned to the debtor. I construe Section 1301 to embody another exception to the general rule. Courts have had little difficulty in differentiating between "claim” and “allowed clam” in other areas, including dischargeability of post-petition interest on student loans, post-petition interest on tax claims, and in the context of attorney’s fees. For example, in discussing the collection of post-petition interest on student loans, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the 9th Circuit stated that because Congress specifically chose to use the term "allowed claims” in specific Code provisions, by not using that term in 1328(a)(2) it did not intend to restrict the exceptions to disc 721 F.2d 1052 (6th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); In re Austin, 110 B.R. 430
holding that the automatic stay would be modified so that a credit union could seek payment of postpetition interest from the codebtor holding that the otherwise harmless violation of the automatic stay did not suffice to deprive the irs of the postpetition interest setoff to which  it would have been entitled had it first sought a lifting of the stay from the bankruptcy court holding that a postpetition claim under section 1305 is a liability that arises postpetition and relates only to postpetition activity holding that a banks claim of irreparable harm through delay of postpetition interest payments was insufficient to lift the automatic stay under the provisions of section 1301 as the debtor proposed to pay 100 of the plan including postpetition interest holding that the automatic stay barred a suit for injunctive relief to prevent postpetition antitrust violations