(stating “LBJ ... FOR MERRILL LYNCH INV MGRS ...”) revealed Merrill’s involvement in the alleged transactions related to the Initials LBJ, Enron did not need to wait until Merrill’s disclosure in Merrill’s motion for summary judgment. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. Instead, Enron could have taken the initiative to contact Merrill regarding the Initials LBJ. If any of those efforts were unsuccessful, Enron could still have sought the Court’s involvement within the statute of limitations. Based upon what Enron knew, especially regarding the information it had in its possession, and what steps it could have taken to verify the accuracy of Lehman’s Statement, Enron’s reliance on Lehman’s Statement was not reasonable. See Stuart Silver Assocs., 245 A.D.2d at 98-99, 665 N.Y.S.2d 415 (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). Further, regardless of
holding that the ordinary concept of use as applied in determining the existence of a nonconforming use must yield to the realities of the business in question and the nature of its operations holding that party claiming zoning estoppel must exercise due diligence to ascertain the truth and not only lack knowledge of the true state of things but also had no convenient means of acquiring that knowledge holding that based upon means similar to or supported by holding that where a party has the means to discover the true nature of the transaction by the exercise of ordinary intelligence and fails to make use of those means he cannot claim justifiable reliance on defendants misrepresentations  holding that for purposes of 18 usc  924c1 the law is well established that where an indictment charges in the conjunctive several means of violating a statute a conviction may be obtained on proof of only one of the means 