or even every valid governmental purpose, is an appropriate reason for breaching grand jury secrecy.” Id. at 480, 103 S.Ct. 3164. It goes without saying that the district court’s inherent authority does not include the power to contravene or circumvent an “express grant of or limitation on the ... court’s power contained in a rule or statute.” Dietz v. Bouldin, — U.S.-, 136 S.Ct. 1885, 1892, 195 L.Ed.2d 161 (2016); see also Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 426, 116 S.Ct. 1460, 134 L.Ed.2d 613 (1996) (“Whatever the scope of [the court’s] ‘inherent power,’ ,,. it does not include the power to develop rules that circumvent or conflict with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.”); Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254, 108 S.Ct. 2369, 101 L.Ed.2d 228 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Rule 6(e) is an express limitation on the
holding that the substantial rights inquiry of federal rule of criminal procedure 52b mirrors rule 52as harmless error inquiry except that the burden in the former falls on the defendant to show prejudice holding that a district court cannot invoke its inherent authority to circumvent the harmlesserror inquiry required by rule 52a of the federal rules of criminal procedure holding that a shotgun pleading is in no sense the short and plain statement of a claim required by rule 8 of the federal rules of civil procedure holding that rule 33 of the federal rules of criminal procedure is an inflexible claimprocessing rule that may be waived if not raised recognizing the inherent common law authority of courts to promulgate rules of practice and procedure