show circumstances that would be sufficient to permit a rational finder of fact to infer that the defendant’s employment decision was more likely than not based in whole or in part on discrimination.” Stern v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 131 F.3d 305, 312 (2d Cir. 1997); see Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 811, 124 S.Ct. 53, 157 L.Ed.2d 24 (2003) (“[T]he question [on summary judgment'is] ... whether the evidence, taken as a whole, supports a sufficient rational inference of discrimination. To get to the jury, it is not enough to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must also believe the plaintiffs explanation of intentional discrimination.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 90-91 (2d Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>). “Though the plaintiffs ultimate burden- may
holding summary judgment appropriate where plaintiff failed to establish product identification holding that the trial court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of defendant and denied plaintiffs motion for summary judgment where plaintiff failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that defendant breached its duty to act in good faith holding that the nonmoving party must present specific evidence from which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in its favor holding summary judgment in favor of defendant was appropriate where plaintiff failed to present evidence upon which a reasonable jury could conclude that age was a determinative factor in adverse employment action holding that summary judgment in favor of the defendant was appropriate because the plaintiff failed to designate evidence that demonstrates that the defendant abused the qualified privilege