is supported by substantial evidence. The IJ also reasonably relied on the absence of evidence of country conditions to corroborate Haidar’s individualized claim of past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. See Diallo, 232 F.3d at 288 (stating that corroboration “typically includes both evidence of general country conditions and evidence that substantiates the applicant’s particular claims”). With respect to the country conditions evidence Haidar did submit, the IJ did not err in finding that such evidence did little to corroborate her specific claims of past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution because the articles merely detailed general conditions of unrest in the Ivory Coast. See Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 314 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we find no error in the IJ’s
holding that absent a pattern of persecution linked to the applicant persecution of family members is insufficient to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution holding that the asylum standard for past persecution or wellfounded fear of future persecution is lower than the clear probability standard to show eligibility for withholding of removal holding that such a report provided substantial evidence to support the conclusion that petitioner failed to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of future persecution holding that general crime conditions are not a stated ground for a wellfounded fear of future persecution holding that absent past persecution an alien can demonstrate eligibility for asylum based on a wellfounded fear of future persecution by demonstrating that he or she subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable