(finding that the passage of more than two months defeats any retaliatory nexus); Ponticelli v. Zurich Am. Ins. Grp., 16 F.Supp.2d 414, 436 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (finding that a “two-and-a-half month” interval “is hardly the close proximity of time ... for allowing a plaintiff to establish the ‘causal connection’ element” (citation omitted)); see also Hollander v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80, 85-86 (2d Cir.1990) (three and a half months insufficient); Yarde v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 360 F.Supp.2d 552, 562 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (“Three months is on the outer edge of what courts in this circuit recognize as sufficiently proximate to . Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 446-47 (2d Cir.1999), abrogated on other grounds by Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the court should consider a time lapse
holding that discovery was appropriately tailored as it limited the request to information within a six year time period relating to one specific contract and the deposition of a person most knowledgeable holding that a one month delay is acceptable holding that the mere possibility of an upward departure beyond one year qualifies a kansas offense as one punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year holding abusive acts within one month of receipt of deposition notices may be retaliation for initiation of lawsuit approximately one year earlier holding that only one trier of fact should be used for the trial of what is essentially one lawsuit to settle one claim split conceptually into separate parts because of historical developments