are distinct constitutional inquiries, and have instead converted inverse condemnation into a species of due process claim. See, e.g., Dept. of Transp. v. City of Atlanta, 260 Ga. 699, 704 (398 SE2d 567) (1990) (“Substantive due process protects property owners from the arbitrary and capricious exercise of the power of eminent domain.”). In addressing claims of inverse condemnation, our prior cases from time to time have veered into an articulation of two different, theories of “takings.” The first, and most natural, formulation is the taking of property by eminent domain for public use, whether through regulation or condemnation. “The clearest sort of taking occurs when the government encroaches upon or occupies private land for its own proposed use.” Palazzolo, 533 U. S. at 617 (<HOLDING>). The second, more troublesome theory is that a
recognizing both retaliation and interference claims under  1140 holding officers request to see both drivers and passengers licenses and questioning of both as to destination and purpose of trip not unreasonable recognizing both physical and regulatory invasions holding that sex offender registration statute is civil and nonpunitive and recognizing that ejnsuring public safety is  a fundamental regulatory goal holding that testimony was both speculative and conclusory