Because the resentencing is de novo, we have held that both parties may present new evidence bearing on the sentence. For example, in State v. Collins, 985 So.2d 985, 994 (Fla.2008), we held “that when a habitual offender sentence is reversed because of insufficient evidence, on remand for resentencing the State may again attempt to prove that the defendant meets the criteria for such sentencing.” See Mann v. State, 453 So.2d 784, 786 (Fla.1984) (rejecting appellant’s argument that the state was not permitted to present new evidence at his resentencing and stating that “[o]ur remand directed a new sentencing proceeding, not just a reweighing” at which “both sides may, if they choose, present additional evidence”); see also Rich v. State, 814 So.2d 1207, 1208 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (<HOLDING>). The trial court has discretion at
holding that at a resentencing the state must again prove the basis for an enhanced sentence even though such evidence was produced at the original sentencing holding that at resentencing the state must present evidence on an enhanced sentencing factor despite having done so at the prior sentencing hearing holding that because resentencing following reversal is a new proceeding the state must introduce evidence that the defendant qualifies for enhanced sentencing even though such evidence was introduced in the previous sentencing hearing holding that on resentencing following reversal the state was required to introduce evidence to prove the defendant qualified for an enhanced sentence and could not only rely upon evidence introduced at a prior sentencing hearing recognizing that sentencing facts are based on the evidence and testimony presented at sentencing under a preponderance of the evidence standard