F.2d 832, 835 (2d Cir.1983) (noting duress defense “raises broad philosophical issues concerning the nature of voluntary action for purposes of criminal responsibility and the appropriate conditions for holding a person morally blameworthy”; further noting disagreement among state jurisdictions regarding the relation of mens rea and duress). We consider this exposition of the defense compelling and one that we will adopt in this appeal. {13} We also note that we have not uncovered any extrajurisdictional support for Lucero or the State’s argument in this appeal. Even State v 107 (1983) (necessity is a defense to DWI); State v. Olson, 79 Or.App. 302, 719 P.2d 55, 57 (1986) (choice of evils defense available to DUI defendant); State v. Riedl, 15 Kan.App.2d 326, 807 P.2d 697, 699 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Also, see generally Michael J. Yaworsky,
holding that compulsion is a defense to absolute liability traffic offenses holding governmental immunity is no defense to contractual liability recognizing that substantial change is a defense to a products liability claim holding absolute immunity protects prosecutor from liability for failing to give defense counsel materially exculpatory evidence recognizing that miranda warnings are unnecessary for the investigation of routine traffic offenses