sources of its hearsay, this member of the Court sees no reason to deprive them of these opportunities for the sheer sake of expediency. Finally, the Court is far from convinced that it should defer questions of admissibility until all of the government’s evidence has been considered on the theory that “the reliability of a particular piece of evidence will generally depend on how it fits within the evidence as a whole.” Gov’t’s Mem. at 3. This suggested approach is a direct inversion of what takes place in any other kind of adjudicative process, where factual findings are made on the basis of admissible evidence, not the other way around. See Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 622, 113 S.Ct. 2264, 124 L.Ed.2d 539 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Ultimately, attempting to determine the
holding that the proper standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence holding that the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence remains with the movant holding that there must be sufficient competent evidence from which the trier of fact could estimate the amount of damages with a reasonable degree of certainty holding that the district court determines the amount of loss under the preponderance of the evidence standard holding that with respect to the preponderance of the evidence standard before any such burden can be satisfied in the first instance the factfinder must evaluate the raw evidence finding it to be sufficiently reliable and sufficiently probative to demonstrate the truth of the asserted proposition with the requisite degree of certainty