though it was later reinstated, rises to the level of an adverse employment action. White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 802 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc), cert. granted in part, - U.S.-, 126 S.Ct. 797, — L.Ed.2d-(2005). The White court emphasized that the adverse-employment-action element was designed to filter out discrimination cases that caused “merely inconvenience” or a “bruised ego.” We concluded that not having any income for one month goes beyond inconvenience. Id (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In this case, the postponement of one-day’s pay for one pay period had only a negligible impact on Plautz’s income and does not rise to the level of an adverse employment action. See Rhodes v. Illinois Dept. of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 505 (7th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the events listed above do not
holding that suspension with pay was not adverse employment action holding that investigatory suspension with pay was not adverse employment action holding that because plaintiff chose to leave her employer she did not suffer any tangible employment action holding that termination is an adverse employment action holding that a plaintiff in a sex discrimination suit did not suffer an adverse employment action where her employer withheld one days pay and it was not reinstated