“[t]he language of the lead-in clause ... by definition negates the efficient proximate cause doctrine.” Id. Similarly, in Lower Chesapeake Associates v. Valley Forge Insurance Co., 260 Va. 77, 532 S.E.2d 325 (2000), the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld a concurrent causation clause where the damage to certain docks in a marina was the result, at least in part or in combination, of one or more excluded causes. The Court held that there was no coverage for the loss because “[u]nder the plain terms of Section B(l), coverage is excluded under the policy if a loss is caused ‘directly or indirectly by one of the enumerated causes or events, ‘regardless of any other cause or event that contributes concurrently or in any sequence’ to the loss.” Id. at 331; see also Paulson, 756 P.2d at 764 (<HOLDING>). In TNT Speed & Sport Center, Inc. v. American
holding that article x  2 of the california constitution dictates the basic principles defining water rights that no one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water and that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and beneficially holding that the damage to a home resulting from the entrance of hail a covered loss and water into the basement of the house after a severe storm was not covered by the policy because the concurrent causation clause excluded water damage holding that a similar exclusion denies coverage for property damage to the particular part of the real property that is the subject of the insureds work at the time of the damage if the damage arises out of those operations holding that termite damage does not fall within the meaning of property damage in the policy because the alleged misrepresentations did not cause the damage the termites did holding that insurer owed homeowners full amount of policy when they suffered a total loss in not insignificant part as the result of windstorm damage although an excluded peril water contributed to the damage