§ 18-2-201(4.5) (emphasis added). The import of being a “crime of violence for purposes of [section 16-11-309]” is clearly that such conspiracies should receive mandatory violent crime sentencing. See § 18-2- 201(4.5). Section 16-ll-309(l)(a) states that “[a]ny person convicted of a crime of violence shall be sentenced ... to a term of incarceration of at least the midpoint in the presumptive range.” § 16-ll-309(l)(a). Finally, we note that Terry’s contention that section 18-2-201(4.5) is simply a “cross-reference” to section 16-11-309 is without merit. In support of his contention, Terry points out that the court of appeals had previously held that only attempted or completed crimes fell within the ambit of section 16-11-309. See People v. Flores, 757 P.2d 159, 160 (Colo.App.1988) (<HOLDING>). Although this observation is correct, Terry’s
holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges holding that two conspiracies existed where the members of the second conspiracy did not know about the first conspiracy did not benefit from the first conspiracy and were connected with the first conspiracy only through a middleman holding that because the general assembly did not expressly include conspiracy among those offenses defined as crimes of violence we conclude that one convicted of conspiracy may not be sentenced pursuant to  1611309la holding that the prior conspiracy to which honken had pleaded guilty was not the same as the conspiracy underlying the capital offenses holding that once a defendant becomes associated with a conspiracy he is responsible for all of the acts of the conspiracy even those which occurred before or after his association with the conspiracy