the Code’s requirements for interrogating children. The purpose provision of the Code and its vague references to enforcement are not sufficiently clear to support a conclusion that the Code contemplated the remedy of dismissal. {20} Therefore, by reading the plain language of the Children’s Code, we conclude that neither the substantive provisions nor the purposes of the Code provide the chil dren’s court with the power to dismiss a delinquency petition under the circumstances of this ease. See Andrews, 1997-NMCA-017, ¶ 5, 123 N.M. 95, 934 P.2d 289 (stating that legislative intent is discerned through the plain meaning of the words of a statute). Dismissal is an extreme remedy, reserved for extraordinary circumstances. Cf. Mathis v. State, 112 N.M. 744, 747, 819 P.2d 1302, 1305 (1991) (<HOLDING>). We believe that the legislature would have
holding that dismissal with prejudice is warranted where case delayed for more than a few months holding that dismissal for failure to comply with discovery orders is on the merits holding summary judgment was not warranted because material facts were in dispute holding that dismissal for discovery violations was an extreme remedy but warranted under the facts of the case holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law