presented are troubling, I agree with the majority that Appellee knew or should have known of the central facts underlying his claims pertaining to racial discrimination in his jury selection more than sixty days prior to the filing of his present post-conviction petition, and, for such reason, our jurisdiction is presently foreclosed under the Post Conviction Relief Act. With regard to the majority’s adherence to the requirements of Commonwealth v. Spence, 534 Pa. 233, 246-7, 627 A.2d 1176, 1182-83 (1993), left to my own devices I would eliminate the Spence requirements as such and review unpreserved, post-conviction claims of racial discrimination in jury selection under the standards otherwise set forth in Commonwealth v. Uderra, 580 Pa. 492, 513, 862 A.2d 74, 87 (2004) (<HOLDING>). See id. at 513 n. 12, 862 A.2d at 86 n. 12
holding that an employees attempt to prove actual discrimination requires more substantial evidence than a prima facie case because evidence of pretext and discrimination is viewed in light of the employers justification holding that a plaintiff may rely on the same evidence to prove both pretext and discrimination holding that a prima facie case is subject to independent review holding that in relation to claims deriving from the absence of an appropriate objection at trial a postconviction petitioner may not rely on the prima facie case under batson but rather must prove actual purposeful discrimination holding to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination a plaintiff must show he 1