with many general rules, this general rule is subject to a reasonableness limitation. See United States v. Brown, 736 F.2d 807, 809 (1st Cir.1984). We already have held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rodriguez-Matos’s motion to separate her trial from Zuñiga’s. See supra Part 111(D)(3). Thus, the question reduces to whether it was reasonable for the district court to exclude from Rodriguez-Matos’s speedy trial calculation those days attributable to the unavailability of Zuñiga’s counsel. We are not unsympathetic to the appellant’s position; eighteen months is a considerable period of delay. But that delay is not, in and of itself, sufficient to establish a Speedy Trial Act transgression. See United States v. Muñoz-Amado, 182 F.3d 57, 62 (1st Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). And here, the delay was not unreasonable.
holding the defendant did not demonstrate a denial of his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial where even though the delay was substantial and the defendant was detained pretrial for three years the fault for the delay was shared and the defendant continued to request continuances following his assertion for the right to a speedy trial holding that a nineteenmonth delay standing alone was not sufficient to constitute a speedy trial violation holding that a 19month delay between indictment and trial did not violate the constitutional right to a speedy trial holding that delay resulting from prior incompetence to stand trial does not violate speedy trial guarantee holding that a delay of 8 months is enough to provoke a speedy trial inquiry