hired the manufacturer “to supervise the installation because it wanted [the manufacturer] to bear the ultimate responsibility for the proper installation” of its own equipment. Id. The dual role of supervising and assisting the construction amounted to constructing an improvement. Id. (citing Reames, 949 S.W.2d at 763). The reasoning of Reames and Fuentes is not applicable here. In both cases, the defendants did not physically “hammer the nails and turn the screws,” but they had “ultimate responsibility” for the construction, and their liability stemmed from their responsibility for that work. See Reames, 949 S.W.2d at 763; Fuentes, 63 S.W.3d at 521-22; see also Jackson v. Coldspring Terrace Prop. Owners Ass’n., 939 S.W.2d 762, 768-69 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). The same is not true here. The evidence does
recognizing that this courts construction of a statute becomes as much apart of the statute as the words of the statute itself and that change is a matter that addresses itself to the general assembly not this court holding that statute of repose barred claims against successorininterest of licensor of entity that constructed pool because its potential liability could only vicariously result from its predecessorininterest putting out itself as the manufacturer of a defective construction of the pool holding wrongful death action barred by 10year construction statute of repose holding that provision has the characteristics of a statute of repose holding that statute was one of repose because it embodies the most distinctive characteristic of a statute of repose the barring of the right to bring an action rather than the remedy prescribed