See id. In the instant case, the District Court imposed civil rather than criminal contempt on Yashinsky because the order compensated the plaintiff for its costs and attorney fees and imposed the daily fine in order to coerce Yashinsky into complying with the subpoena. A court can use its contempt power to punish a party, but using contempt to punish is criminal rather than civil contempt. See id. at 827-28, 114 S.Ct. 2552 (citing Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441, 31 S.Ct. 492, 55 L.Ed. 797 (1911)). Civil contempt cannot be converted into criminal contempt at a later stage because an individual charged with criminal contempt is entitled to the full procedural protections afforded a defendant in any other criminal proceeding. See id. at 826, 833, 114 S.Ct. 2552 (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, Yashinsky is not required
holding the confrontation clause of the united states constitution does not apply at sentencing under the us sentencing guidelines manual and the procedural protections afforded a convicted defendant at sentencing are traditionally less stringent than the protections afforded a presumptively innocent defendant at trial holding that where criminal contempt charged has in it the element of personal criticism or attack upon the judge and where delay would not be impracticable a different judge should preside over the criminal contempt trial holding that constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants through the sixth amendment apply in nonsummary criminal contempt prosecutions just as they do in other criminal prosecutions holding that an individual charged with criminal contempt is entitled to the full procedural protections afforded the defendant in any other criminal proceeding holding that the district court committed reversible error by imposing criminal sanctions in a civil proceeding which did not afford the contemnor the procedural protections the constitution requires for the imposition of criminal contempt sanctions