in this case do not present such issues. The recording of IP address information and similar routing data, which reveal the existence of connections between communications devices without disclosing the content of the communications, are precisely analogous to the capture of telephone numbers at issue in Smith. That is why the orders here fit comfortably within the language of a statute drafted with the earlier technology in mind. The substitution of electronic methods of communication for telephone calls does not alone create a reasonable expectation of privacy in the identitie s no expectation of privacy in “subscriber information provided to an internet provider,” such as an IP address (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 336 (6th Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 432
holding that individuals have no expectation of privacy in their license registration or insurance documents and citing outofstate cases that have held that individuals do not have a privacy interest in their registration records holding that prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells holding that telephone users have no expectation of privacy in dialed telephone numbers because they voluntarily expose such information to the service provider holding that computer users do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their bulletin board subscriber information because they have conveyed it to another person holding that users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of stored email