summary judgment in favor of Albemarle when it “ignored the First Court’s findings that Albemarle breached its representations and warranties.” As discussed above, MEMC misstates the opinion in the prior appeal. Therefore, the trial court did not err by rendering summary judgment for Albemarle on this ground. MEMC also contends that trial court erred because it stated the award of attorney’s fees for breach of contract under section 38.001 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code is discretionary. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 38.001(8) (Vernon 2008). Section 38.001 provides for attorney’s fees for a prevailing party in a breach of contract case. See id.; see also Hassell Constr. Co. v. Stature Commercial Co., 162 S.W.3d 664, 668 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Because we conclude the trial court properly
holding that an award of attorneys fees under supreme court rule 38 precursor to rule 222 did not preempt an award of attorneys fees to which one is otherwise entitled and thus appellant could seek an award of attorneys fees pursuant to section 1577300 which permits an award of fees for a party prevailing in an action against a state agency holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees holding fees mandatory under predecessor statute of  38001 holding award of attorneys fees to party prevailing on contract claim is mandatory under section 38001 if there is proof of the reasonableness of the fees holding that a party may recover attorneys fees under section 38001 only if the party prevails on a cause of action for which attorneys fees are available and recovers damages