with debtor information and CPA drafted and sent letters directing debtors to send their payments and all other communications directly to TCI. The court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), holding that plaintiff had stated a claim under § 1692a(6) by alleging that “TCI is merely renting or borrowing CPA’s name and letterhead to assist in its own debt collection activities.” Id. at *4. The court finds that plaintiff sufficiently alleges that defendant is operating as the debt collector when GCS mails the initial letter. The letter states that the debtor’s file “will be referred” for collection, indicating that it has not yet been referred to any collection agency. See, e.g., Maguire v. Citicorp Retail Services, Inc., 147 F.3d 232, 237 (2d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the evidence reveals that GCS never
holding that the use of the phrase will be reported in a letter supports an inference that since the account may be reported to a collection agency the ostensible debt collector debtor assistance is not such an agency though the court noted that the unsophisticated consumer might just as easily draw the opposite inference holding that the notice requirement applies only to the first debt collector that communicates with the consumer holding that an entity engaged in collection activity on a defaulted debt acquired from another is a debt collector under the fdcpa even though it may actually be owed the debt holding that the fdcpa did not apply to a collection agency retained by a hospital seeking medicaid reimbursement because the underlying debt was not in default even though the agency identified itself as a debtcollector holding that a creditor could be liable for the misrepresentations in a letter mailed by a collection agency hired to send the letter