consent to such an intrusive police procedure is constitutionally valid only when the third party has “joint access or control for most purposes ” over the quarters to be searched. Illinois v. Rodriguez, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 2797-98, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990) (emphasis added); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n. 7, 94 S.Ct. 988, 993 n. 7, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974). There is no question that the first two facts — lease status and general access to the common portions of the property — constitute a legally insufficient basis upon which to authorize a warrantless search of Mr. Kelley’s private living quarters. See, e.g., United States v. Heisman, 503 F.2d 1284, 1288 (8th Cir.1974); see also Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 616-17, 81 S.Ct. 776, 779-80, 5 L.Ed.2d 828 (1961) (<HOLDING>). Our court previously has stated explicitly
holding that police officers warrantless search of rented home with consent of landlord but not tenant violated tenants fourth amendment rights holding that a landlord could not validly consent to the search of a house he had rented to another holding that a landlord cannot validly consent to a search of a tenants apartment despite ownership and legal authority to enter the premises holding that consent to search premises includes consent to search washing machine on those premises holding landlord and tenants obligations mutually dependent