of employment are actionable under § 1981. Id. Similarly, other courts that have interpreted § 1981(b) overwhelmingly indicate that retaliation claims are actionable under § 1981. See, e.g., Steverson v. Goldstein, 24 F.3d 666, 670 (5th Cir.1994), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 731, 130 L.Ed.2d 634 (1995) (affirming jury’s finding on plaintiffs § 1981 claim of retaliation for his political activities); Butts v. City of New York Dep’t of Hous. Preservation and Dev., 990 F.2d 1397, 1404 (2d Cir.1993) (stating that if § 1981(b) were applied retroactively, plaintiffs allegations of discrimination in promotion and in the terms and conditions of her employment would state a cause of action under § 1981); Campbell v. Grayline Air Shuttle, Inc., 930 F.Supp. 794, 803 (E.D.N.Y.1996) (<HOLDING>); Collins v. Executive Airlines, Inc., 934
holding plaintiff did not exhaust his retaliation claim where his eeoc charge made no mention of retaliation holding that plaintiff states a cause of action under  1981 by alleging that defendant harassed and retaliated against him for filing eeoc claim and otherwise attempting to receive redress for disparate treatment holding that a claim of retaliation for filing eeoc charges is cognizable under  1981 holding that retaliation arising out of first eeoc filing was reasonably related to that filing obviating the need for a second eeoc charge holding that plaintiffs claim of reduction in work hours in retaliation for her filing of eeoc charge states a cause of action under  1981