court properly rejected the trustee’s attempt to transform this case into a third party liability case, by arguing that, in their position as partnership creditors, Sollins and Brochendorff should not be charged with the knowledge they possessed as partners with respect to Kauffman’s intended role. On the contrary, the fact that the former managing partners now assert claims against the partnership does not- alter the governing principle that intent controls the apportionment of liabilities among partners. As general partners who were fully aware of the terms of Kauffman’s tenure in the partnership, Sollins and Brochendorff cannot now “place themselves in the shoes of other creditors of the partnerships who had no knowledge of the true state of affairs.” See D.C.Code§ 41-115(a) (<HOLDING>). See also Beckman v. Farmer, 579 A.2d at 627
recognizing partnership by estoppel only with respect to claims by persons who have reasonably relied upon outward representations of partnership recognizing that same principle applies where defendant is general partner of limited partnership which in turn is general partner of limited partnership with contacts with state holding that a charging order is the exclusive mechanism to be used to execute upon a judgment debtors interest in a partnership holding that limited partner does not have standing to sue for injuries to partnership that merely diminish value of that partners interest holding that the information contained in the certificate of limited partnership binds the partnership and the partners with respect to third parties