refusal to reinstate Lucas to the hiring hall, the Board applied the more deferential O’Neill standard. This was error because a heightened duty of fair dealing applies to a union’s operation of an exclusive hiring hall. B. Although ordinarily we would remand to the Board so that it could reconsider its decision under the correct legal standard, see Perkins v. Marine Terminals Corp., 673 F.2d 1097, 1105 (9th Cir.1982), remand is not necessary in this case. In dismissing Lucas’s complaint, the Board, contrary to the ALJ, found that the evidence supported the Union’s necessity defense. Having made this critical factual determination, it is our responsibility to determine whether the Board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. Compare Todd Pac. Shipyards Corp., 914 F.2d at 1320 (<HOLDING>), with Perkins, 673 F.2d at 1105 (holding that
holding that because pennsylvania law limited a state courts review of a zoning boards decision to the issue whether the boards determinations were supported by substantial evidence the rookerfeldman doctrine did not prevent the plaintiffs from filing a federal action claiming that the zoning board had engaged in disability discrimination following a state courts review of the boards determinations holding that where the board had already made the necessary factual evaluation underlying the legal standard to be applied it then becomes the courts responsibility to conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the boards findings were supported by substantial evidence holding that due process requires that the findings and actions of a disciplinary prison board be supported by some evidence in the record holding that the court should make factual findings from the record evidence as if it were conducting a trial on the record holding the courts scope of review is  limited to determining whether the commissioner applied the correct legal standards and whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the commissioners findings of fact 