Owens’ repeated forgetfulness and his wondrous recollection of a never-before-mentioned incriminating conversation. Crumpler could have—and indeed appears to have—exposed Owens’ duplicitous motivations for providing testimony without depending on the fact that Owens once fancied himself the “smartest man in the world” be revealed in open court. See, e.g., Tr. vol. 13, 123-25, 134-35, 138-40. Compare Tr. vol. 13, 123 (“A [Owens:] I don’t know what a perjury conviction is.”), with 134 (“Q [Counsel:] But you drew the line at perjury? A [Owens:] I did.”) and 135 (“A [Owens:] I came to the conclusion that to keep the house of cards together, I would have to commit perjury. And that was a line that I was not willing to cross.”). See United States v. King, 713 F.2d 627, 630 (11th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Not only was Crumpler’s proposed line of
holding that the constitutional right to crossexamination must be satisfied first before the court can exercise its discretion in limiting the scope or extent of crossexamination recognizing that criminal defendants right to testify is subject to crossexamination holding that confrontation clause violation was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in part because it concerned the limitation of crossexamination of the prosecutions key witness recognizing that extensive crossexamination of the witness alone is not enough if the crossexamination permitted did not include questions on the issue constitutionally required holding that limitation on scope and breadth of crossexamination did not significantly curtail effectiveness of witness crossexamination because crossexamination was lengthy and extensive