proved sudden passion as a matter of law, because that prong only applies in the absence of any evidence to support the jury’s finding. See id. at 389. We hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s negative finding of sudden passion. See Smith, 355 S.W.3d at 147. We overrule Moncivais’s first issue. C. Factual Sufficiency In his second issue, Moncivais contends the evidence is factually insufficient to support the jury’s negative finding on the sudden passion issue. 1. Standard of Review We apply the factual sufficiency standard announced in Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 154-55 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), to review an issue on which the defendant has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 482 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (<HOLDING>); see Cleveland, 177 S.W.3d at 390-91 (applying
holding that meraz standard is suitable for sufficiency reviews regarding affirmative defenses because burden of proof on defendant is preponderance of evidence holding that the standard of proof in revocation proceedings is a preponderance of the evidence holding that the standard of proof for dischargeability actions is the preponderance of the evidence standard holding that the proper standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence holding that standard for revocation of probation is preponderance of the evidence