Briggs is not substantially different from that in Brooks, quoted above. Compare Briggs, 666 N.W.2d at 578-80, with Brooks, 604 N.W.2d at 349-50. Briggs suggests that “sufficient sureties” means a “defendant was given the right to be bailed, subject to the state’s analysis of a surety’s sufficiency to provide adequate recompense if the prisoner did not show for his judicial proceedings.” 666 N.W.2d at 582. As explained above, this is a dubious proposition. ¶24 Perhaps more problematically for the State, the Briggs court “[ultimately” believed that “the core purpose of the clause was to guarantee a bailable individual access to a surety of some form.” Id. at 581. It concluded that a cash-only bail “ cash bail violates Minnesota’s sufficient sureties clause); Golden, 546 So. 2d at 502-03 (<HOLDING>). Nonetheless, the discussion in these cases is
holding that the statute as applied violates the commerce clause holding that rluipa violates establishment clause holding allcash bail violates louisianas sufficient sureties clause holding that  16913a violates the commerce clause holding an allcash bail violated ohios sufficient sureties clause