may in a given case impermissibly infringe upon a defendant’s rights to confrontation and compulsory process.”). In considering whether the exclusion of the evidence violated Oatts’s right of confrontation, we examine both the “effec l embarrassment of public knowledge of a previous molestation and that the elimination of the risk of embarrassment furthers the state’s interest in encouraging children to report cases of, molestation so that the perpetrators can be prosecuted). We now turn to the effect of the precluded evidence on Oatts’s Sixth Amendment rights. When considering the effect of the precluded evidence on Oatts’s Sixth Amendment rights, we initially determine the relevance of the evidence. See Borosh v. State, 166 Ind.App. 378, 383, 336 N.E.2d 409, 412 (Ind.Ct.App.1975) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added); Gilbert v. State, 426 N.E.2d
holding that because the line of questioning was not relevant to the credibility of the witness and sought information about which the witness had no knowledge it was not a constitutional violation to sustain the objection holding that testimonial hearsay statements of a witness who does not appear at trial are inadmissible under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment unless the witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the witness holding that waiver by attorney was binding upon the accused when before the state introduced the evidence complained of on appeal counsel for the state in the presence of the accused and his counsel stated the agreement and the evidence of the witness was then read to the jury in the presence of the accused and his counsel without objection holding that credibility determinations are reviewed only for substantial evidence holding that only a total denial of access to relevant and substantial evidence bearing upon the credibility of a crucial witness against the accused presents a constitutional issue under the sixth amendment