AEGIS Cruiser Program, a position which was being phased out when Schenk was hired, see Record on Appeal, vol. 2, at 89, Schenk cannot even be termed McCann’s successor. 11 . For example, as a third option, Litton asked McCann if he would consider a transfer to its Canadian division, see Record on Appeal, vol. 3, at 237, where he had previously worked for a short time in 1978. See id. at 133. 12 . The other evidence offered by McCann—e.g., the preferential treatment of Schenk—speak, not to the issue of constructive discharge, but to the issue of whether McCann was discriminated against. Even assuming, arguendo, that McCann was discriminated against, the doctrine of constructive discharge requires that McCann show acts beyond that of the discrimination itself. See Jett, 798 F.2d at 755
holding that an attorneys negligence alone does not qualify for such relief holding vague charge of discrimination in an internal letter or memorandum is insufficient to constitute opposition to an unlawful employment practice holding that a patent alone does not confer market power necessary to show unlawful tying holding that poor evaluations alone do not constitute an adverse employment action holding that unlawful discrimination  alone cannot constitute such an aggravated situation that a reasonable employee would feel forced to resign