above, the record before us makes clear that Wooten’s primary motivation in agreeing to plead nolo contendere was to avoid the addition of any jail time to his existing 40-year sentence. Assuming, arguendo, that Wooten’s trial counsel was ineffective in each of the ways Wooten claims, it is clear that neither the failure to file pre-trial motions, the failure to inform Wooten of certain plea offers and negotiations, nor a false promise of credit for time served, would have diminished to any meaningful degree the attractiveness of the deal Wooten was offered and accepted. And while in some cases the failure to inform a defendant correctly of his sentencing exposure at trial may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, see, e.g., Magana v. Hofbauer, 263 F.3d 542, 550 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>), in this case the prospect of even the two
holding that a finding of accommodation is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard of review instead of under a de novo standard holding that claims that law enforcement officials used excessive force in making an arrest are properly analyzed under the fourth amendments objective reasonableness standard holding that the reasonableness standard applies to the final sentence not to each individual decision made during the sentencing process holding that the defense counsels erroneous advice concerning sentence exposure fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms recognizing limited thirdparty rights in the context of an attorneyclient professional relationship where the plaintiff was the intended beneficiary of the prevailing standard of care