Though the issues in this subsection are not dispositive, we address them because they could recur at trial or on appeal in this or related cases involving the Act in its present or future form. ¶ 10 Leon argues that his initial screening was defective because he did not have counsel present. Miranda’s procedural safeguards, however, only apply to official conduct likely to elicit an incriminating response. See State v. Smith, 193 Ariz. 452, 457, ¶ 18, 974 P.2d 431, 436 (1999). Leon was initially screened in order to evaluate him for possible civil commitment and treatment, not to gather incriminating information for a criminal prosecution. His privilege against self-incrimination was therefore inapplicable. See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 375, 106 S.Ct. 2988, 92 L.Ed.2d 296 (1986)(<HOLDING>). Furthermore, he signed a consent form
holding that dna act violates neither substantive nor procedural due process under the fifth amendment holding that neither the fifth amendment nor due process requires application of privilege against selfincrimination in sexually dangerous persons proceedings holding that proceedings under the illinois sexually dangerous persons act were not criminal for purposes of fifth amendments prohibition of compulsory selfincrimination holding that defendants exercise of right to testify in own behalf waives his fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination holding that juveniles request to call parent is assertion of fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination