that there is no duty to protect the public from assaults by third parties, and cases such as White, in which this rule was applied to employers, the court must conclude that this case falls within the third category of “fair warning” analysis described above and even if the Individual Defendants violated the constitution, they were not given fair warning that their conduct was violative of the constitution. Further, the Title VII precedent governing harassment by third parties which creates a hostile work environment would not have given the Individual Defendants fair warning that their failure to prevent a physical attack by a non-employee violated Freddie Golthy Jr.’s constitutional rights. See Snider v. Jefferson State Community College, 344 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2003) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, even if there were a
recognizing that a plaintiff can demonstrate that samesex harassment is because of sex by showing that the conduct was motivated by the coworkers sexual desire for persons of the same sex holding that although same sex sexual harassment was known to be cognizable under title vii at the time of the events in question because it had not been ruled unconstitutional at that time qualified immunity was appropriate holding that harassment of women working alongside plaintiff was relevant to question of creation of environment viola tive of title vii  although vinson was a sexual harassment case the principles underlying a hostile environment theory are equally applicable in sexual harassment and racial harassment cases holding that samesex sexual harassment claims are not actionable under title vii holding that sexual harassment need not take the form of sexual advances or other explicitly sexual conduct in order to be actionable under title vii