a group of persons similarly situated to Cerón on account of his membership in a particular social group. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2)(i). Although Cerón raised his pattern or practice argument in his initial October 2013 brief filed pro se, Cer-ón has not shown that the BIA did, or was required to, consider that brief. After Cer-ón filed his October 2013 brief, the BIA remanded the case to the IJ who issued a supplemental decision. The BIA then issued another briefing schedule and Cerón filed a pro se brief in December 2013, and another brief in April 2014 through counsel. Neither the December 2013 brief nor the April 2014 brief sufficiently asserted a pattern or practice of persecution of a group of persons. See Tall v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, Ceron’s December 2013 pro se brief
holding that petitioner did not exhaust his due process claim that he was denied a full and fair hearing by arguing that due process was violated on the ground that the ij admitted uncertified evidence holding that a petitioner must show prejudice in order to prevail on a claim that he or she was denied a full and fair hearing in violation of due process holding that there is no due process violation where the ijs finding was not arbitrary and the alien was not denied a full and fair opportunity to present his claims holding that an alien is entitled to the fifth amendment guarantee of due process which is satisfied by a full and fair hearing holding that the petitioners due process claim that he was denied a full and fair hearing because the immigration judge was biased was the kind of procedural error that required exhaustion