parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case. Under the circumstances of this case, we review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions “for the sake of completeness.” See Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir.2008). The applicable standards of review are well-established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Salimatou Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir.2008). By failing to raise any argument in his brief, Xu waives any challenge to the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 541 n. 1, 545 n. 7 (2d Cir.2005). The IJ’s adverse credibility determination alone was dispositive of Xu’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. See Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d
holding that to qualify for asylum the fear of future persecution must be based on reasonably specific information showing a real threat to individual persecution not mere assertions of fear of possible persecution or speculative conclusions quoting mapouya 487 f3d at 412 holding that to show an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution an applicant must establish that he would be singled out for persecution or that there was a pattern or practice of persecution of similarlysituated individuals holding that to establish asylum eligibility based on future persecution an applicant must show that he or she subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable holding that absent a pattern of persecution linked to the applicant persecution of family members is insufficient to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution holding that the asylum standard for past persecution or wellfounded fear of future persecution is lower than the clear probability standard to show eligibility for withholding of removal