5125, hardly demonstrates that it is “the clear and manifest purpose of Congress” to preempt state bonding requirements through § 5125, the long-standing presumption against preemption, reinforced by this precedent, would seem to demand that we reject an interpretation that would preempt not only Massachusetts’s rule, but virtually all other state regulation. Nonetheless, the fact that a number of circuits have held that the obstacle test in § 5125 precludes other types of state requirements, albeit requirements that were far more sweeping in scope than the focused rule enacted by Massachusetts, suggests that the plain wording of the statute alone may not clearly bar DOT’s current reading. See, e.g., Chlorine Inst., Inc. v. California Highway Patrol, 29 F.3d 495, 497-98 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Northern States Power Co. v. Prairie Island
holding that the state police is a state agency holding that although defendant transferred property which was contaminated by chemicals in violation of state and federal regulations plaintiffs failed to state a claim for breach of warranty against encumbrances holding a series of state requirements including escort vehicles special communications equipment and selfcontained breathing apparatus before a party may even transport certain chemicals through that state to be preempted holding the state law claims were not preempted holding state law fraud and deceit claims to be preempted