1549 (9th Cir.1992), treats Dague as an "outright rejection” of contingency as a factor to be considered in setting a lodestar. 3 . The special master queried Mr. Licata as follows: THE COURT: Would you agree with me, Mr. Licata, that there is an element of risk to a plaintiff’s practice where not every client who walks in the door represents a fee versus relative no risk in the defense, insurance defense practice; does that make sense? Tr. I at 125. 4 . See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14 (defining Table injury). 5 . $175.00 is the lower end of the rate range to which Mr. McGowan testified for insurance defense attorneys. 6 . For example, Mr. Lipman emphasized that Daubert hearings, see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-95, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) (<HOLDING>), are conducted "routinely” and are "de
holding that trial courts are gatekeepers in determining fitness of scientific expert testimony for admissibility at trial holding expert opinion to fall short of what daubert requires when finding of reliability would require several scientifically unsupported leaps of faith  holding that under daubert and state law principles the trial court is mandated to order a pretrial or status conference to discuss and simplify any daubert issues or if those issues are still not resolved to hold a pretrial daubert hearing holding that the basic gatekeeping obligation of daubert applies to all expert testimony holding that federal rules of evidence require trial courts to hold hearingsreferred to as daubert hearingsto determine reliability of scientific expert testimony before admission at trial