But jurisdiction is an issue distinct from and logically prior to the merits of a claim, and the Supreme Court has held that "the nonexistence of a cause of action [i]s no proper basis for a jurisdictional dismissal.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 96, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (discussing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946)). Furthermore, this uncertainty in our jurisprudence has been flagged by several district courts, see, e.g., In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 904 F.Supp.2d 310, 315 (E.D.N.Y.2012); Boyd v. AWB Ltd., 544 F.Supp.2d 236, 243 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y.2008), and we see no good reason to allow it to persist. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austrl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 254, 130 S.Ct. 2869, 177 L.Ed.2d 535 (2010) (<HOLDING>). 4 . The FTAIA is also codified in similar
holding that claims under  10b of the securities exchange act of 1934 were arbitrable under a predispute arbitration agreement holding of wilko equally applicable to cases arising under the securities exchange act of 1934 holding that claims under the securities act of 1934 and the rico statutes are arbitrable holding that the lower courts erred in finding that the question of the extraterritorial reach of  10b of the securities and exchange act of 1934 was jurisdictional even though nothing in the analysis of the courts below turned on this mistake holding that an implicit congressional intent to impose  aiding and abetting liability could not plausibly be inferred from the statutory silence in  10b of the securities exchange act of 1934