on that point. The Supreme Court, however, has recently clarified our responsibility once we have found a state court error that satisfies § 2254(d)(1): When “the requirement set forth in § 2254(d)(1) is satisfied!, a] federal court must then resolve the [constitutional] claim without the deference AEDPA otherwise requires.” Panetti 127 S.Ct. at 2858; see also Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005) (reviewing the prejudice requirement for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim de novo after identifying a § 2254(d)(1) error in the state court’s evaluation of the performance requirement); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (similar); Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (<HOLDING>); Williams, 529 U.S. at 406, 120 S.Ct. 1495
holding that sentencing error is harmless if the error did not affect the district courts selection of the sentence imposed holding that a federal habeas court performing a harmless error inquiry on collateral review must employ the standard for harmless error articulated in brecht even if the state courts have never reviewed the error on direct appeal holding that the federal habeas courts task is to determine if the state courts decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the supreme court of the united states holding that even if the state courts decision was contrary to supreme court case law that error would justify overturning penrys sentence only if penry could establish that the error was prejudicial under the preaedpa standard for evaluating prejudice holding that even if a trial court errs in a ruling on the admissibility of evidence we will reverse only if the error is inconsistent with substantial justice and that the error was harmless