period specified in the first charge. Recognition of the concept of a “blanket bar” accords Martinez broad protection under constitutional double jeopardy requirements in the event of future prosecutions. In doing so, the State is held to the expansive time period which it specified in the information. In so concluding, we recognize the difficulties inherent in child sexual abuse prosecutions with young victims who cannot particularize dates. When there are multiple assaults, the inability to define a date often becomes even more pronounced. We balance such difficulties against the defendant’s constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy as a result of future prosecutions. See State v. Rankin, 181 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1970), and State v. Healy, 136 Minn. 264, 161 N.W. 590 (1917) (<HOLDING>). To the extent that State v. Quick, supra, can
holding that a statutory time period is not mandatory unless it both expressly requires an agency or public official to act within a particular time period and specifies a consequence for failure to comply with the provisions holding that conviction or acquittal of offense occurring within designated time period will bar subsequent prosecutions on same charge for acts occurring within designated time period holding that the charge was timely when filed within the statute of limitations period even though served after the period holding that an individual could recover for acts occurring outside the statutory time period if at least one act occurred within the time period and the acts were part of the same hostile work environment holding that the court may only consider the discrete acts that occurred within the appropriate time period