its own reasons, we review both decisions.” Kataria v. INS, 232 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir.2000). Petitioners’ primary contention is that the IJ deprived them of due process by prejudging the case and preventing them from fully developing the record. Petitioners, however, did not raise a due process argument before the BIA. Because the due process claims made here are in the nature of procedural errors that the BIA could have remedied, they are subject to the exhaustion requirement. Because these claims were not exhausted before the BIA, we lack jurisdiction to review them. Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir.2004). On this record, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility finding, see Lopez-Reyes v. INS, 79 F.3d 908, 911 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>), and that petitioners did not suffer past
holding that substantial evidence supports an adverse credibility finding if it is supported by specific cogent reasons holding that we review adverse credibility determinations for substantial evidence holding an ijs credibility findings are entitled to deference if supported by specific cogent reasons holding that explicit credibility finding must be more than passing remark of disbelief and must be supported by specific cogent reasons holding that an ijs credibility determinations enjoy highly deferential review when supported by specific cogent reasons that bear a legitimate nexus to the findings