sound because of changed conditions, and that more good than harm would result from a departure from precedent.' " (quoting Pratt & Whitney Can., Inc. v. Sheehan, 852 P.2d 1173, 1175-76 (Alaska 1993))). 11 . See AS 47.30.1765 (providing that a "respondent has the right to an appeal from an order of involuntary commitment"). 12 . We therefore do not address the dissenting opinion's discussion of the statute. 13 . In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill.2d 345, 331 IIl.Dec. 1, 910 N.E.2d 74, 84 (2009) (citing In re Splett, 143 Ill.2d 225, 157 Ill.Dec. 419, 572 N.E.2d 883, 885 (1991)); State v. Lodge, 608 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex.1980); State v. J.S., 174 Vt. 619, 817 A.2d 53, 55-56 (2002). 14 . Alfred H.H., 331 Ill.Dec. 1, 910 N.E.2d at 84. 15 . Id. ("[A] reversal [of commitment order] could provi ) (<HOLDING>); E.J. v. State, 471 P.2d 367, 368-70 (Alaska
holding drivers license revocation was not moot because collateral consequences of revocation may be substantial including higher insurance rates and adverse employment consequences holding that revocation of parole does not create collateral consequences sufficient to extend standing beyond expiration of sentence and rejecting as moot a challenge to an allegedly erroneous parole revocation holding expired domestic violence restraining order not moot because of collateral legal consequences such as consideration in custody determination and nonlegal collateral consequences such as reputational harm holding that the collateral consequences of a parole revocation were insufficient to create a case or controversy after the petitioner was released holding revocation of appellants medical license not barred by previous acquittal on charge of criminal abortion even though criminal charge was basis of license revocation proceeding