se coercive, despite any Miranda violation. Third, the trial court did not commit prejudicial error when it allowed a police detective to testify as to his belief that a jar in defendant’s apartment contained methamphetamine precursor. Fourth, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant’s Motion for a Mistrial. Next, because defendant neither objected to the jury instructions given nor provided a curative instruction concerning alleged hearsay testimony, we conclude the trial court did not commit reversible error when it failed to give a curative instruction. Finally, because defenda .Ed.2d 84 (1985); People v. Beaver, 725 P.2d 96, 99 (Colo. Ct.App.1986) (same); People v. Alvarado, 268 Ill. App.3d 459, 206 Ill.Dec. 15, 644 N.E.2d 783, 786-89 (1994) (<HOLDING>), appeal denied, 161 Ill.2d 530, 208 Ill.Dec.
holding that the fifth amendment did not require the suppression of the physical fruits of a miranda violation where the statement was voluntary holding miranda decision does not apply retroactively holding that a consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of miranda  holding miranda violation does not vitiate voluntary consent holding miranda violation does not invalidate consent to search as fifth amendment only protects testimonial and communicative evidence