records. The trial court held: “[I]n light of Dr. Krop’s postconviction testimony, there is not a reasonable probability that Dr. Krop’s diagnosis would have been different; it was the same with only one minor addition — a learning disability, a nonstatutory mitigator.” We find no error in the trial court’s determination that Gaskin has not suffered prejudice from counsel’s alleged deficient performance. As the trial court noted, because Dr. Krop testified at the eviden-tiary hearing that his diagnosis of Gaskin would have changed little if counsel had given him Gaskin’s school records, Gaskin has not met his burden of showing that but for counsel’s alleged deficiency, the result of the penalty phase would have been different. See Breedlove v. State, 692 So.2d 874, 877 (Fla.1997) (<HOLDING>); see also Brown v. State, 755 So.2d 616, 636
holding that even if attorney had secured defense witnesses  2255 relief was not warranted where the evidence against defendant at trial was so overwhelming that no reasonable probability exists that the result of the proceeding would have been different holding that party asserting plain error must show a reasonable probability that but for the error claimed the result of the proceeding would have been different holding that in order to show prejudice defendant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different holding that to establish prejudice there must be a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different holding that because the psychologists testified that their opinions would remain unchanged even considering the additional information there was not a reasonable probability that the result of the penalty phase would have been different