v. Calvert, 452 S.W.2d 580, 583 (Mo.Ct.App.1970); Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Chumbley, 394 S.W.2d 418, 422 (Mo.Ct.App.1965). 44 . Ga.Code Ann. § 44-13-100(a)(l 1)(D) and (E) (2002). 45 . Or.Rev.Stat § 23.160(l)(k) and (1) (2001). 46 . Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2329.66(A)(12)(c) and (d) (West 2002). 47 . Ca. Civ. Pro § 704.140 (West 2003). 48 . Minn.Stat. § 550.37.1(22) (West 2002). 49 . Tenn.Code Ann. § 26-2-111(2)(B) and (C) and (3) (2002). 50 . Compare with In re Brooks, 227 B.R. 891, 894 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1998) (in which this Court found that, "to the extent Mr. or Mrs. Brooks have a valid cause of action against the Brooks Defendants, all or part of the proceeds of any judgment in their favor is exempt”) (emphasis added). 51 . See In re Searcy, 193 B.R. 895, 896-97 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1996)
holding that personal injury settlement proceeds are disposable income to the extent that they are not reasonably necessary for the support of the debtors holding that in the context of a settlement contract the defrauded party may either 1 rescind the settlement or 2 ratify the settlement retain the proceeds and institute an action to recover fraud damages holding that debtors could not exempt under  522d1 proceeds from the prepetition sale of their home holding in the absence of definitive state authority under missouri law a cause of action is not exempt unless immune from all types of judicial process holding that proceeds of a personal injury settlement are not exempt under missouri law