should have recognized that, given that appellate counsel's law partner wrote the article, a potential conflict of interest existed and, upon recognizing as much, discharged their duty to inquire as to whether a conflict of interest existed. See United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 153 (2d Cir.1994) ("When a district court is sufficiently apprised of even the possibility of a conflict of interest, the court first has an 'inquiry' obligation. The court must investigate the facts and details of the attorney's interests to determine whether the attorney in fact suffers from an actual conflict, a potential conflict, or no genuine conflict at all."); id. ("When a possible conflict has been entirely ignored, reversal is automatic.”); Ciak v. United States, 59 F.3d 296, 302 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Even if he had raised that argument, it would
holding that aedpa is not applied retroactively to pending habeas petitions holding that automatic reversal rule applies in habeas petitions holding that in general aedpa applies only to habeas petitions filed after the statutes effective date of april 24 1996 and noting that aedpas special procedures for 28 usc  2254 petitions in capital cases apply also to petitions pending on april 24 1996 holding that second and third state habeas petitions that were dismissed as impermissible successive petitions were properly filed holding that district courts may properly treat rule 60b motions as successive habeas petitions