158 LE2d 225) (2004) (memorandum of Scalia, J.) (“But while friendship is a ground for recusal of a Justice where the personal fortune or the personal freedom of the friend is at issue, it has traditionally not been a ground for recusal where official action is at issue.. . .”). (c) Finally, Gude’s motion to recuse alleged that “District Attorney Paul Howard gave financial and/or other support to the campaign to elect Judge Adams.” Although a trial judge should recuse himself or herself from presiding over a case involving a party who has previously made an exceptionally-large campaign contribution, we hold that recusal is not required simply because the judge previously received any campaign contribution from a party. See Patterson v. Butler, 187 Ga. App. 740 (371 SE2d 268) (1988) (<HOLDING>). Compare Caperton v. A. T Massey Coal Co., 556
holding that trial court did not err holding that the trial judge did not err by denying a motion to recuse that alleged in part that a defendant had previously worked on the judges election campaigns holding that where appellant moved to recuse trial judge from deciding the motion for new trial the judge of the administrative district was required to designate a judge to hear the recusal motion holding that action of judge assigned to hear a motion to recuse in signing an order denying the motion was not a proceeding required to be carried out from in the county seat holding that trial judge did not err in refusing to transfer to another judge defendants motion for substitution of judge for cause where defendants motion was not made in good faith