under either standard. We first note that revocation of Marston’s supervised release was mandated by § 3583(g) because Marston violated an express condition of supervised release by being convicted of a drug possession crime punishable by more than one year. See § 3588(g). Section 3583(g) does not invoke the sentencing factors of § 3553(a) or the limits imposed by the first clause of § 3583(e). See § 3583(g); United States v. Giddings, 37 F.3d 1091, 1095 (5th Cir.1994) (noting that a court need not consider § 3553(a) when revocation is mandated by § 3583(g)). Marston fails to show that it is “clear or obvious” or “obvious under existing law” that a sentence imposed when revocation is mandatory must be limited by § 3583(e). Cf. United States v. Larison, 432 F.3d 921, 923 (8th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). In addition, Marston asserts that the
holding that the district courts sentencing decision was not constrained by the factors specifically enunciated in 18 usc  3583e where revocation was mandated by  3583g holding that when revocation  is mandatory under 18 usc  3583g the statute does not require consideration of  3553a factors holding that a district courts failure to consider the 18 usc  3553a factors was plain error relying on gall holding that a sentencing court is required by 18 usc  3583g to revoke the defendants term of supervised release  unless defendant could come under the exception in 18 usc  3583d holding that only factors specifically prohibited by the sentencing guidelines cannot form the basis for a downward departure