McKas-kle does not require that a criminal must “speak for himself,” as the majority appears to characterize that case. See Majority Opinion at 743. Instead, McKaskle imposes its limits on the “unsolicited participation” of standby counsel. 465 U.S. at 178, 104 S.Ct. 944 (emphasis added). This rule suggests that standby counsel may not usurp the role of the pro se defendant who otherwise wants to participate directly in some stage of the proceedings. McKas-kle does not prohibit a criminal defendant from delegating certain tasks to standby counsel. See id. (“[T]he objectives underlying the right to proceed pro se may be undermined by unsolicited and excessively intrusive participation by standby counsel.”) (emphasis added). Cf. United States v. Mills, 895 F.2d 897, 903 (2d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). I part company with the majority’s rationale
holding that a defendant has a right to proceed pro se at trial holding defendants pro se motion to reduce sentence was not properly before the trial court when defendant was represented by counsel since defendant may not proceed both by counsel and pro se holding that district court could consistent with faretta require that standby counsel screen pro se defendants motions to facilitate the orderly functioning of the proceedings after the unassisted defendant deluged the district court with nearly 100 long and frivolous motions recognizing that faretta right was not eroded where pro se defendant conceded that standby counsel took no action that was not authorized by mills or adopted any strategy or position that was not initiated by mills holding that a defendant proceeding pro se is bound by same rules as party represented by counsel and a court cannot allow pro se litigant lower standard of performance