is liable under section 522(i), 542, 543, 550, or 553 of this title. Section 502(d) requires a court to disallow an entity’s claim against the bankruptcy estate if the estate is entitled to recover property from that entity, such as because of a voidable preference, but that entity has failed to first transfer this property back to the bankruptcy estate. See, e.g., Campbell v. United States (In re Davis), 889 F.2d 658, 662 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 933, 110 S.Ct. 2175, 109 L.Ed.2d 504 (1990). USL argues that the timeliness of its preference claim is irrelevant for the purposes of § 502(d), and that MARAD cannot benefit from its alleged preference and still make other claims against USL. Compare In re Mid Atlantic Fund, Inc., 60 B.R. 604, 610-11 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1986) (<HOLDING>) with In re Marketing Assocs. of Am., Inc., 122
holding that twoyear delay was not reasonable holding that a oneyear limitation provision was unreasonable and thus unenforceable because it conflicted with the motor vehicle reparations acts twoyear limitation period holding that a compulsory counterclaim was barred by pennsylvanias twoyear statute of limitations notwithstanding that the plaintiff filed his complaint late in the twoyear limitations period holding that twoyear limitation period did not prevent trustee from relying defensively on  502d holding that where conversion occurred on september 4 1935 twoyear limitation period expired on and with september 4 1937