fraud or negligent misrepresentation regarding those same requirements. Correctly applied to this case, the gist of the action doctrine prevents such a paradox from occurring. Finally, the District Court dismissed the Bishop’s good faith claim because the court concluded that under Pennsylvania law “the implied covenant of good faith ... cannot modify or override express contractual terms.” We agree with this conclusion. See Witmer v. Exxon Corp., 434 A.2d 1222, 1226-27 (Pa.1981). To the extent that the Bishops are arguing that an implied covenant of good faith overrides contractual terms, such an override has not been recognized by the Pennsylvania courts except in the context of franchise terminations. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Razumic, 480 Pa. 366, 390 A.2d 736, 742 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the unconscionable actions that
holding state law claim premised on implied duty of good faith was preempted by the pmpa because it concerned the termination of a petroleum franchise holding that the duty of good faith and commercial reasonableness is used to define the franchisors power to terminate the franchise only when it is not explicitly described in the parties written agreements holding that the duty of good faith and fair dealing is a contractual duty holding that franchisors have a duty to act in good faith and with commercial reasonableness when terminating franchise agreements holding that under michigan franchise investment law franchisees failure to comply with lawful provisions in franchise agreements by failing to pay royalties and advertising fees and failing to file monthly sales reports constituted good cause for franchisors termination of agreements where franchisor gave notice of termination in writing and franchisees made no effort to cure