both conclusions. First, the three witnesses’ failure to hear the “Cleveland Police” announcements does not refute the detectives’ testimony that they in fact made several such announcements; it establishes only that the witnesses didn’t hear the announcements. In other words, the discrepancy doesn’t actually raise a genuine dispute of fact. Indeed, even though, as the district court observed, the conditions were such that Melvin Chappel (6th Cir.2001) (applying temporally segmented analysis to possibly erroneous actions taken by officers and finding error that preceded shooting segment to be immaterial); Boyd, 215 F.3d at 599 (applying segmented analysis to excessive force claim in determining which facts were material); Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1161-62 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Notwithstanding this case law, the district
holding that evidence of recklessness by one officer in events leading up to shooting was immaterial in evaluating objective reasonableness of shooting officers decision to use deadly force in the situation he faced at time of shooting recognizing that time to consider reasonableness of plaintiffs position is at time of initiation of litigation holding that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure holding the time frame is crucial and evaluating reasonableness of officers use of deadly force at the time of the seizure irrespective of their prior unreasonable conduct in creating the circumstances holding the use of deadly force standing alone does not constitute a seizure and absent an actual physical restraint or physical seizure the alleged unreasonableness of the officers conduct cannot serve as a basis for a  1983 cause of action