orders from the narrow constraints imposed by § 1447(d), holding that review is available by mandamus when remand is explicitly based upon grounds other than those specified in § 1447(c). Thermtron’s progeny, however, has construed this exception very narrowly. See, e.g., Merrimack, 587 F.2d at 647. Rather than extend this exception to any situation where a trial court, in the remand order, neither specifically recited the actual language of § 1447(c) verbatim nor mentioned the statute itself, “ Therm-tron announced only a narrow rule that was intended to be limited to the extreme facts of that case, in which a district judge stated openly that he was relying on a non-§ 1447(c) ground for remand.” Id. See also Soley v. First Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 923 F.2d 406, 409 (5th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Thus, even if the trial court neither states
holding that the fourth circuit has jurisdiction to review a district courts sua sponte remand order even when that remand order is styled as a remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if the order was in fact based on the procedural insufficiency of the notice of removal holding that a remand order entered by a magistrate judge was beyond his statutory authority and concluding that review was proper because the court of appeals was not reviewing the merits of the remand order itself holding that an appellate court can review a district courts decision to remand when that decision rests upon a ground not authorized by statute holding that while the remand order was confusing we conclude that our decision in merrimack precludes review of the remand order because the district court did not clearly and affirmatively state that it relied on a non1447c ground holding remand order reviewable because crowded docket not ground for remand under  1447c