would violate RCW 9A.40.090(1) only if they constituted “orders.” They would not constitute luring because there is no invitation or enticement. 5 Courts in other jurisdictions specifically have held that enticement and luring statutes are not overbroad because of the statute’s mens rea requirements. See, e.g., Bailey, 228 F.3d at 639 (concluding that statute proscribing knowing efforts to persuade minors to engage in illegal sexual activity did not violate First Amendment); State v. Ebert, 2011-NMC-098, 150 N.M. 576, 263 P.3d 918, 922 (concluding that statute criminalizing child solicitation by electronic communication device was not constitutionally overbroad as “[tailoring [was] primarily accomplished through the “knowingly’ scienter requirement”); Green, 724 S.E.2d at 668-69 (<HOLDING>). 6 Justice Owens disagreed in her dissent in
holding that it was appropriate for the trial court to find that lack of a prior criminal record was not a mitigating factor in light of the violent nature of the crime committed holding that classifying the defendant as a sexually oriented offender after he was convicted of kidnapping minors without a sexual purpose violated the defendants right to substantive due process where the statutory definition of sexual offender included one who had committed certain criminal offenses against a minor regardless of sexual intent holding the online solicitation statute was not narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest and there were more narrow means of achieving the states interest in protecting minors recognizing that criminal solicitation statute was narrowly tailored because it targeted only those who knowingly targeted minors for the purpose of engaging in sexual activity or a violent crime holding that there is no first amendment right to knowingly attempt to entice minors to engage in illegal sexual acts