(Tex.1992). On motion for rehearing, the court of appeals in this case concluded that Lavan was distinguishable because there the State joined the presumed father and sought to disestablish his presumed paternity of the child in one pleading, whereas here, Valadez had neither joined the presumed father nor challenged the presumption of paternity under Chapter 12. Based on this distinction, the court of appeals denied appellant’s motion for rehearing, notwithstanding our writing in Lavan. 843 S.W.2d at 66-67. We disagree with the holding of the court of appeals. Our opinion in Lavan made clear that a Chapter 12 claim denying a presumed father’s paternity of a child could be raised in the same suit raising a Chapter 13 claim that another man is the biolog ing, 513 S.W.2d 6, 10 (Tex.1974) (<HOLDING>). We therefore grant the writ of error and,
holding that a trial court entered judgment on the pleadings where the decision did not depend on any document outside the pleadings holding that the standard for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as the standard for a motion to dismiss holding that protective features of special exception procedure should not be circumvented by a motion for summary judgment on the pleadings where plaintiffs pleadings fail to state a cause of action holding that pleadings cannot be regarded as summary judgment evidence holding that whether pleadings fail to state a cause of action may not be resolved by summary judgment