and representations,” that it was proceeding under a “traceable proceeds” theory. Id. The court found, however, that “[t]he Government’s last-minute change of tactic, although advanced prior to the issuance of the Court’s Opinion, was too late.... ” Id. It followed, therefore, that the government’s new theory could not “in fairness be regarded as an appropriate ground for reconsideration of th[e] Court’s prior decision.” Id. In affirming the lower court’s finding of waiver, the Second Circuit stated: Under these circumstances, we believe that the court acted within its discretion in finding that the government raised the “traceable proceeds” theory too late to be considered by the court. Ruiz v. Commissioner of Dep’t of Transp. of the City of New York, 858 F.2d 898, 902 (2d Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Our review of the record satisfied us that
holding that because a claim was never raised in the district court this court would not consider it for the first time on appeal holding that district court has discretion when deciding to convert a defendants motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion holding that the court has discretion to hear or to remand legal arguments raised for the first time on appeal holding that the district court has discretion to reject a claim raised on a motion for reargument