of the trial, the prosecution elicited testimony from a government investigator who had called to question the defendant. There is no indication in the case that the defendant’s arrest was imminent at the time of his conversation with the investigator. The investigator testified that the defendant refused to answer his questions and said that he “ ‘should talk to [my] lawyer.’ ” Id. We found no error in the trial court’s decision to admit this statement into evidence. Id. Here, unlike in LaCourse, defendant’s arrest was imminent. In fact, the purported reason for the officer’s telephone call was to tell defendant that the police were on their way to his home to arrest him and to instruct him on how to surrender safely. Thus, although both cases technically involve pre-arr App. 1993) (<HOLDING>); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 495 S.E.2d 522, 529
holding that admission of testimony during prosecutions case in chief implicating defendants decision to remain silent is impermissible under federal constitution holding that because the due process clause in the federal constitution is applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment the right is also guaranteed to defendants pursuant to the identical provision in article i section 5 of the hawaii constitution holding that chief of police was entitled to immunity for demoting police officer pending appeal of hearing officers decision to contrary because although statute made hearing officers decision final and binding statute nowhere addressed enforceability of decision pending appeal thus chief of polices action was discretionary recognizing that old chief was based entirely on the federal rules of evidence rather than the constitution holding that first and foremost of the factors supporting the conclusion that miranda is a constitutional decision is that the case applied the rule to prosecutions arising in state courts