agreement, the agreement was approved in court, and an agreed judgment was rendered by the trial court which contained the following language: The court having heard evidence thereon, is of the opinion that the liability of Defendant as well as the extent of alleged injury are indefinite, uncertain and incapable of being satisfactorily established. ... 782 S.W.2d at 939. In her subsequent suit against the insurers for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, the court held that collateral estoppel barred the suit because the issue whether the insurer had a reasonable basis for denying or delaying payment of benefits had been decided in the prior suit. Id. at 941. See also Coleman v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 786 S.W.2d 445, 448 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). Price only addresses the doctrine of
holding that the opinions or reasons given by the judge in the judgment to the effect that the insurers liability is uncertain indefinite and incapable of being satisfactorily established are not part of the judgment and that absent actual litigation of this issue in the prior proceeding collateral estoppel would not preclude insured from bringing subsequent bad faith claim holding that a judgment as to the title in a prior litigation was not subject to collateral attack holding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars readjudication of issues when 1 the prior suit resulted in judgment on the merits 2 identical issues are involved 3 the issue was actually litigated 4 the issue was actually determined and 5 the determination was necessary to the resulting judgment holding that a civil claim is barred by collateral estoppel even though the prior adjudication was in criminal proceedings and the parties are not the same because the matters were actually litigated and decided in the prior trial holding that a fact established by a criminal judgment was to be given conclusive effect under collateral estoppel doctrine