of it.” And, moments later, he asked a clarifying question of Waterfield, whether Mathews was well “within his rights not to proceed with the interview and ... to request a lawyer,” to which Waterfield answered, “Yes.” Reference to a defendant’s invocation of his right to silence and his right to counsel implicates the “integrity of the grand jury proceedings,” Commonwealth v. Freeman, supra, and justifies further inquiry. There is no doubt that Waterfield’s testimony regarding Mathews’s silence and his request for counsel was improper. See Commonwealth v. Callagy, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 85, 88-89 (1992) (noting “strong disapproval of [testimony] informing a grand jury that a suspect elected to exercise his right to remain silent”). Cf. Commonwealth v. Teixera, 396 Mass. 746, 752 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Our analysis does not, however, end there. As
holding that evidence of a defendants invocation of the right to remain silent ordinarily is not admissible at the defendants criminal trial holding that contemporaneous objections were required to preserve for appeal improper comments on defendants right to remain silent recognizing that davis was concerned only with the right to counsel and not the right to remain silent holding that in context of criminal trial defendants right to remain silent cannot be compromised by prosecutorial comments that cast aspersions on its exercise holding that an accused must unambiguously invoke the right to remain silent