of post-conviction review. If the PCRA's time bar is constitutional (as I believe it is for reasons explained below), our judicial power is constrained to the interpretation and application of the statute. We have no common-law power to regulate in the face of a comprehensive statute, and certainly no authority to revive repealed legislation. 150 That conclusion is not at all undermined by the fact that the post-conviction habeas right is protected by the constitution. Constitutionally guaranteed rights are not impervious to regulation. And as we have recently emphasized, the power to regulate constitutional claims unquestionably encom passes the right to subject them to time bars. See FundAmentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Horne, 2012 UT 66, ¶ 52, 289 P.3d 502 (<HOLDING>) That proposition is well settled. It is
holding that counterclaims for defamation and tortious interference constituted distinct affirmative claims for relief not claims for recoupment and thus were timebarred under indiana trial rule 13j1 holding that even constitutional claims can be timebarred holding that both section 122 and rule 10b5 claims are timebarred by section 13 holding that claims including constitutional claims must be asserted in trial court to be raised on appeal holding that an ex post facto claim can only be successful if the law can be characterized as punishment in the constitutional sense