legislative amendment in holding erroneous trial court’s charge regarding weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors in capital case). The evidence of legislative intention provided by the 1985 amendment, in addition to constitutional considerations and our own assessment of the policy interests involved, fortifies our conclusion that Czackor requires that juries in capital cases be informed of, and free to exercise, their statutory option to return a final, non-unanimous verdict resulting in imprisonment if, after a reasonable period of deliberations, they are unable to agree. We come now to the issue of remedy. Clearly, coercive and misleading supplemental instructions such as were given in this case constitute reversible error. See, e.g., Rose v. State, 425 So.2d 521, 525 (Fla.) (<HOLDING>), cert. den., 461 U.S. 909, 103 S.Ct. 1883, 76
holding that trial court commits reversible error in giving allentype charge during penalty phase of capital trial holding that for habeas relief to be granted based on constitutional error in capital penalty phase error must have had substantial and injurious effect on the jurys verdict in the penalty phase holding that trial courts jury charge did not amount to reversible error given that plaintiff failed to show she was prejudiced by inapplicable portion of trial courts charge holding that trial court had discretion to admit relevant photographs in penalty phase holding that claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel during penalty phase of capital case is cognizable under the pcra