the stresses of the Coldwater position does not in this case license a reasonable inference that he perceived her to be unable to fill supervisory positions more broadly. See Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1393 (5th Cir.1993) (“An employer’s belief that an employee is unable to perform one task ... does not establish per se that the employer regards the employee as having a substantial limitation on his ability to work in general.”). The summary-judgment record reasonably supports at most an inference that Windly was regarded as unable to perform a relatively narrow range of particularly demanding managerial jobs. That kind of perceived limitation does not rise to the level of a “substantially limiting” (i.e., disabling) condition under the ADA. See Bridges, 92 F.3d at 334 (<HOLDING>); see also Ryan v. Grae & Rybicki, P.C., 135
holding that reproduction is not a major life activity recognizing sleeping as major life activity holding that disqualification from an especially traumatic occupation does not constitute a substantial limitation on the major life activity of working holding that whether depression gives rise to a substantial limitation on a major life activity for purposes of ada depends on its severity holding that a perceived impairment that prevented the plaintiff from successfully applying for a position as a police officer for the city of new york did not constitute a substantial limitation of a major life activity