CURIAM. Pro se plaintiff-appellant Martin Bramson appeals from the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition. After carefully reviewing the parties’ briefs and the record, we affirm. We briefly address Bramson’s arguments. First, Bramson claims that the Federal Bureau of Prisons may not set the timing and amount of his restitution and fine payments through the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (“IFRP”) without submitting any such plan to the sentencing court for its approval. While district courts may not delegate to probation or the Bureau of Prisons designation of the timing and amount of court-ordered payments, see United States v. Merric, 166 F.3d 406, 409 (1st Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>), this case is distinguishable. Contrary to
holding defendant cannot establish prejudice merely by alleging court held probation revocation hearing after defendants period of probation expired holding that district court could not delegate to probation the obligation of scheduling defendants installment payments holding that where defendant admitted to two violations of probation and was sentenced therefor court could not enter second order of revocation and resentence defendant on third charge of violation of probation which was pending at time defendants probation was first revoked holding that probation is not a sentence holding a sentencing court is not required to grant probation