have been, effectively, a sentence of life without parole. Knowing this, Coe argues, the jury might have seen a life sentence as a more serious punishment, and therefore sufficient in lieu of a death sentence. The sole grounding of the district court’s rejection of this claim was that the claim was based on a “new rule” under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). We agree that Teague would foreclose this claim if the procedural bar did not, since Coe relies on a case, Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994), that was decided well after Coe’s conviction became final in 1984, and was not sufficiently dictated by prior precedent. See O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 117 S.Ct. 1969, 1977-79, 138 L.Ed.2d 351 (1997) (<HOLDING>). Coe’s claim fails anyway. There is no reason
holding that retroactivity is assumed unless a new rule is announced holding that simmons announced a new rule and retrospective application of the rule was barred by teague holding that a decision to limit a new rule of criminal constitutional law to prospective application can be based on a balancing of the purpose of the new rule the reliance placed on the previous view of the law and the effect on the administration of justice of a retrospective application holding that apprendi announced a rule of criminal procedure forecloses  argument that ring announced a substantive rule recognizing rule articulated in simmons