This leads to the second problem with the plurality’s construction of the statute: It assigns the word “claimant” in subsection four a meaning synonymous with “prevailing party,” without explaining why the legislature bothered to substitute the word “claimant” for “prevailing party” prior to the subsection’s passage. See H. Am. to H.B. No. 708 (1996) (deleting “prevailing party” and inserting “claimant”). The legislature may have been varying its diction. However, we decline to interpret the substitution this way, because “where an amendment is made it carries with it the presumption that the Legislature intended the statute thus amended to have a meaning different than theretofore accorded it.” State ex rel. Parsons v. Bunting Tractor Co., 58 Idaho 617, 619, 77 P.2d 464, 466 (1938) (<HOLDING>); see also In re Garrett Transfer & Storage
holding that a states use of the word shall is mandatory language holding that shall generally indicates a mandatory intent unless a convincing argument to the contrary is made holding use of word may generally indicates permissive rather than mandatory intent holding legislatures intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power holding change of word shall to may prior to bills passage indicates legislative intent to make purchases upon bids permissive rather than mandatory