raping Almand was a private act not accomplished because of “power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible oMy because the wrongdoer [was] clothed with the authority of state law.” West, 487 U.S. at 59, 108 S.Ct. at 2255 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 1043, 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941), reh’g denied, 314 U.S. 707, 62 S.Ct. 51, 86 L.Ed. 565 (1941)); cf. Bennett v. Pippin, 74 F.3d 578, 589 (5th Cir.1996) (concluding rape of criminal suspect by sheriff was under color of state law when rape victim knew sheriff was investigating her case and where sheriff overcame her resistance by intimidation linked to Ms authority: “I can do what I want, I’m the sheriff’), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 68, 136 L.Ed.2d 29 (1996); Dang Vang, 944 F.2d at 479 (<HOLDING>). Considering that Bryant gained entry to the
holding that the defendant failed to demonstrate government acquiescence in part because he never reported alleged gang incidents to the government and therefore could not prove that the government was even aware of a problem holding the government liable to plaintiffs for breach of contract holding that jury could have reasonably concluded from expert testimony showing plaintiffs  as hmong refugees  were in awe of government officials that the defendant used his government position to exert influence and physical control over the plaintiffs holding that government entities are subject to suit under section 1983 when the alleged unconstitutional conduct results from an official government policy or from practices of government officials that are so wellsettled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law holding that jury could have relied upon other evidence besides plaintiffs expert witness testimony that would have supported its verdict