intended that custody, for purposes of A.R.S. § 13-709(B), be equated with incarceration in a jail or prison and not merely with the substantial restraint of freedom which is commensurate with an arrest or detention. 166 Ariz. at 15, 800 P.2d at 2. We conclude, as did the court of appeals in Cereceres, that the legislature intended the words “in custody” to mean actual incarceration in a prison or jail and more than simply a restraint on freedom as onerous as jail or prison would be. Cereceres did not break new ground in reaching this conclusion. Arizona court decisions have consistently interpreted the “in custody” requirement of this statute to mean actual or constructive control of prison or jail authorities. See State v. Ritch, 160 Ariz. 495, 497, 774 P.2d 234, 236 (App.1989) (<HOLDING>); State v. Vasquez, 153 Ariz. 320, 321, 736
holding that ownership or possession or actual control is needed holding defendant who received treatment in a state hospital was not entitled to jail credit for that time holding that a defendant is entitled to credit only when in actual or constructive control of jail or prison officials and that a central conceptual difference exists between incarceration and structured rehabilitation and treatment holding that a defendant is entitled to credit only for periods in which defendant is in actual or constructive control of jail or prison officials holding that a defendant who does not receive concurrent sentences on multiple charges  is not entitled to have his jail time credit pyramided by being given credit on each sentence for the full time he spends in jail awaiting disposition he is only entitled to jail credit on the first of the consecutive sentences quoting daniels v state 491 so2d 543 545 fla1986