provide an explanation. On this basis, the IJ concluded that “the circumstantial evidence presented by the Government in this case is simply overwhelming” to the effect that Chrystiawan’s application was fraudulent. While Chrystiawan argues that the IJ’s conclusion was based on “inferential leaps” not “tethered to the evidentiary record,” the IJ’s finding was based on the record developed by the Government during the November 2005 merits hearing. Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 169 (2d Cir.2007). Moreover, these issues are not “minor,” as argued by Chrystiawan in his brief to this Court, rather they are material, because a potentially fraudulent birth certificate casts doubt on Chrystiawan’s identity. See Borovikova v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 435 F.3d 151, 158 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Siewe, 480 F.3d at 170 (relying on the maxim
holding that defamation standing alone is not sufficient to establish a claim for deprivation of a liberty interest citations omitted holding that the accrual of attorneys fees alone is sufficient to establish cause holding the failure to establish identity alone is sufficient grounds to deny asylumrelated relief recognizing that there are at least three independent grounds on which the bia may deny a motion to reopen 1 failure to establish a prima facie case 2 failure to introduce evidence that was material and previously unavailable and 3 a determination that despite the aliens statutory eligibility for relief he or she is not entitled to a favorable exercise of discretion holding that a movants failure to establish a prima facie case for the underlying substantive relief is a proper ground for the bia to deny a motion to reopen