it is a factor to consider in determining whether to extend such time. Petrucelli, 46 F.3d at 1306 (emphasis added); De Tie v. Orange County, 152 F.3d 1109, 1112 n. 5 (9th Cir.1998). Finally, the Court has considered that plaintiff has actually served defendants. The defendants were served on May 13, 1998, approximately 90 days beyond the 120 day period. Thus, the Court is not faced with service of process to be effected on a future date or an open-ended extension of time for service of process. The 90 day period is not an unreasonably extensive or expansive period of time — especially when affording plaintiff the 90 day extension will provide her an opportunity to litigate the merits of this action, a desirable goal. See, e.g. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 915, 113 S.Ct. 321,
holding that the family court is required to consider all relevant factors in determining alimony holding that the district court is not free to consider the potential for issue reduction when determining whether a putative intervener has a protectable interest in the merits of the action holding that the court in determining whether to dismiss an action due to plaintiffs failure to diligently prosecute should consider several factors including the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits holding that the court cannot examine the underlying merits of the claims in determining whether to certify a class holding that the district court should consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the patentee acted in subjective bad faith and should consider whether circumstantial evidence would support an inference of bad faith