multiple convictions).) We reject the idea that when the legislature specifically defined the conduct which constitutes criminal sexual abuse, and made that conduct a Class A misdemeanor, the legislature intended the aspect of unlawful restraint inherent in every case of sexual abuse by the use of force to swallow up the misdemeanor and convert it to a Class 4 felony. In cases where the conduct goes further than that inherent in sexual abuse, where the restraint is independent of the sexual abuse, there can be a separate conviction of unlawful restraint. (People v. Leonhardt (1988), 173 Ill. App. 3d 314, 322, 527 N.E.2d 562, 567; People v. Sperow (1988), 170 Ill. App. 3d 800, 814, 525 N.E.2d 223, 233; see People v. Kuykendall (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 708, 710, 439 N.E.2d 521, 523 (<HOLDING>); cf. Paulick, 174 Ill. App. 3d at 870-71, 529
holding that declaratory judgments should not be used as a restraint against criminal action holding unlawful restraint an included offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault so conviction on the former was vacated holding that the greater offense is  by definition the same for purposes of double jeopardy as any lesser offense included in it holding that unlawful restraint could not even be an included offense holding that because original interception was not unlawful subsequent use by prosecutor could not be found unlawful