the transaction is important, “the words of an integrated agreement remain the most important evidence of intention”). In such a case, Taylor would be in the unenviable position of arguing that “X” in fact does not mean “X.” This, however, is not the case. It is true that bad faith has its genesis in contract. See Rawlings v. Apodaca, 151 Ariz. 149, 153-54, 726 P.2d 565, 569-70 (1986). Our cases show, however, that the precise legal character of a bad faith claim may depend on the context of the discussion. See, e.g., Deese v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 172 Ariz. 504, 509, 838 P.2d 1265, 1270 (1992) (noting that a breach of an express covenant is not “a necessary prerequisite” for a bad faith claim); Sparks v. Republic Nat. Life Ins. Co., 132 Ariz. 529, 544, 647 P.2d 1127, 1142 (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1070, 103 S.Ct. 490,
holding that a bad faith claim arises out of contract for attorney fee statute holding that a party cannot claim damages for breach of contract unless he has shown his full compliance with the contract and is not acting in bad faith holding title company liable for bad faith holding that a bad faith claim is a tort holding that without a demonstration of bad faith on the part of the attorney in question sanctions pursuant to this statute are inappropriate