Further, the Court has made clear that such preemptive intent may properly be communicated in amicus briefs, Geier, 529 U.S. at 883, 120 S.Ct. 1913, as well as in “regulations, preambles, interpretive statements and responses to comments.” Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 718, 105 S.Ct. 2371. In recent years, each time the Supreme Court has confronted the question of whether the FDCA preempts state law, it has deferred to the FDA’s preemption position. See Geier, 529 U.S. at 883, 120 S.Ct. 1913 (noting that the Court “placets] some weight upon [the federal agency’s interpretation of the regulation’s] objectives and its conclusion ... that a tort suit ... would stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of those objectives”); Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 496, 116 S.Ct. 2240 (<HOLDING>); Buckman, 531 U.S. at 353, 121 S.Ct. 1012 (in
holding the state law claims were not preempted holding that express warranty claims that could only arise out of fda approval are preempted holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law holding that state law claims involving fdca section 510k medical devices which are subjected to a relatively cursory approval process were not preempted because the fda had taken the position that its regulations only preempted claims involving section 360ec devises which go through a rigorous premarket approval process holding that state claims for fraudulent submissions to the fda were preempted