her motion for continuance. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n. 5, 128 S.Ct. 2605, 171 L.Ed.2d 570 (2008) (“Rule 59(e) permits a court to alter or amend a judgment, but it ‘may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.’”) (quoting 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2810.1, at 127-28 (2d ed.1995)); Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir.2004) (“[A Rule 59(e) ] motion is not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal theories, or arguments that could have been offered or raised before the entry of judgment.”). The same holds true for Mitchell’s Rule 60(b) motion. See Gen. Universal Sys. v. Lee, 379 F.3d 131, 157 (5th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, Mitchell’s reliance on Rule
holding that a party may not use a rule 60b motion as an occasion to relitigate its case holding that defenses under rule 60b may be waived holding that a party cannot use a rule 59e motion to relitigate old matters raise argument or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment holding without extended discussion that even if the district court should have construed the petitioners motion under 18 usc  3582c2 as a rule 60b motion the court would nonetheless have had to recharacterize the rule 60b motion as an sshp holding that motion for reconsideration would be construed not as a rule 60b motion but rather as an unauthorized successive motion under  2255 which the district court may have been without jurisdiction to consider