conduct allegedly undertaken by King, and it was reasonably foreseeable that an adverse action would be taken against King as a result of her Memo. That Harry read Wells’s Memo and continued with the request for a transfer does not mean stronger action was not reasonably foreseeable. The dissent commits a second error by focusing on the motive of Harry, the initial recipient of Wells’s Memo, as breaking the causal chain. The dissent finds it absolutely crucial that King concedes that Harry had no retaliatory intent, but cites no case or law for the proposition that the causal chain is broken when a retaliator uses ignorant third parties to effectuate the retaliation. Indeed, as we discussed above in Section III.B., supra, the law is precisely the opposite. See Powers, 501 F.3d at 609 (<HOLDING>); Paige, 614 F.3d at 281-82 (holding proximate
holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant holding that a physicians negligence need only be a proximate cause not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury holding proximate causation still exists even if an intervening third party is the immediate trigger for the plaintiffs injury holding that discovery requests directed at nonimmune party did not infringe on the sovereign immunity of a third party even if the third party retained a colorable claim of immunity holding that negligence must be the proximate cause of injury