at *4 (D.D.C. March 20, 1992) (citations omitted). There is no such potential in this case. HIAA’s argument that if it is not permitted to file its supplemental complaint in this case and the Clark case is dismissed, that it would then be unable to assert its claims for indemnification against Goddard without having to initiate another case that it would then have to seek to consolidate with this action, is unavailing. Rather, if HIAA impleads Goddard as a third-party defendant in the Clark case, then, even if the current claims in that underlying lawsuit were dismissed, HIAA’s claims against Goddard would remain alive in Clark because diversity or supplemental jurisdiction would still exist. See, e.g., Ametex Fabrics, Inc. v. Just in Materials, Inc., 140 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Thus, even if HIAA is successful in obtaining
holding that district court properly exercised supplemental jurisdiction over thirdparty claims after main copyright action had been settled holding that the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related statelaw claims once it has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction holding that district court had supplemental jurisdiction over claims challenging administrative decision once case was properly removed based on original jurisdiction arising from constitutional claims holding that the district court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant when the site of a copyright owners alleged injury is the location of the copyright owner holding that when all federal claims have been dismissed the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims