wire or oral communication is intercepted, disclosed, or used in violation of statutes, 33 A.L.R.4th 506. 6 . See Evans v. McClain of Georgia, Inc., 131 F.3d 957, 964 n. 2 (11th Cir.1997) ("The form of the complaint is not significant if it alleges facts upon which relief can be granted, even if it fails to categorize correctly the legal theory giving rise to the claim") (internal quotes and cite omitted). 7 . In that respect, [w]ire communications, unlike oral communications, are protected against interception by electronic, mechanical, and other devices regardless of the speaker’s expectation of privacy. Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414, 417 n. 4 (5th Cir.1980) (comparing § 2510(1) with § 2510(2)); see also United States v. Harpel, 493 F.2d 346, 349 (10th Cir.1974) (<HOLDING>). Kinsey v. Case, 1998 WL 704687 at * 1 (10th
holding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth holding that this lack of any reasonable expectation of continued employment suffices to establish the lack of property in the constitutional sense and hence the lack of a viable due process claim recognizing lack of requirement to prove reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to intercepted wire communications holding that society recognizes a reasonable expectation of privacy holding that a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to physical characteristics which he or she routinely exposes to public view