penalty would not be administered in an arbitrary or random manner”). Permitting the jury to consider the disparate sentences pursued against equally guilty defendants would also be in keeping with Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), which held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that capital juries not be precluded from considering, as mitigating factors, any aspects of a defendant’s character or of “the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.” Although the Ninth Circuit has held that a trial court does not violate Lockett by failing to permit consideration of co-defendant sentences as a mitigating factor, it did so in a case where the defendant facing the death penalty 4 (<HOLDING>). Where the prosecution has conceded that it
holding that a sentencer must not be precluded from considering  any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers holding that juries may not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor any aspect of a defendants character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers emphasis in original holding that sentencing scheme that permitted a limited range of mitigating evidence was unconstitutional because the eighth and fourteenth amendments require that the sentencer  not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor any aspect of a defendants character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death holding that a trial court must not preclude the jury from considering any aspect of the defendants character or circumstances as a mitigating factor holding that any relevant mitigating evidence concerning a defendants character should not be excluded