of § 924(c) and simply remanded the cases for resentencing for the “firearm” offense. Id. at 809-10, 814. We conclude that, under these circumstances, the panel erred in holding that the defect in the § 924(c) count in the indictments was not subject to plain error review pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). See id. at 806-07. We have previously held that a defendant’s claim that he has been convicted of a crime other than one charged in the indictment is subject to plain error review if asserted for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Writers & Research, Inc., 113 F.3d 8, 12-13 (2d Cir.1997). Similarly, we have applied plain error review when an error might have resulted in an improper sentence. See United States v. Martinez-Rios, 143 F.3d 662, 675-76 (2d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). We see no reason for applying another rule to
holding that arithmetical error that resulted in an increase to a defendants base offense level pursuant to the sentencing guidelines affected his substantial rights even though the resulting sentence was within the range for the correct offense level holding that an arithmetical error that increased a defendants base offense level pursuant to the sentencing guidelines affected his substantial rights recognizing under plain error review that the burden to show that substantial rights have been prejudiced is on the party that failed to raise the issue below and for an error to have affected substantial rights the error must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings holding that the sentencing courts conclusion that there was simply no way to avoid the base offense level did not indicate mandatory application of the guidelines holding that the defendants sentence was based on the career offender guidelines despite the fact that the district court calculated an offense level pursuant to the crack guidelines