then the trial court erred in allowing prejudgment interest to accrue on that sum at 10% per annum “[bjecause no prejudgment interest statute applies to this case.” Assuming arguendo that their argument was true, then the answer to the problem is found in their own brief. They acknowledge that the prejudgment interest scheme established under § 304.101 et seq. of the Texas Finance Code applied if no other statute did. See Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 530-31 (Tex.1998) (dealing with Texas Revised Civil Statute art. 5069-1.05, § 6(a), the predecessor to § 304.101 et seq. of the Texas Finance Code). And, at the time of judgment, see Natural Gas Clearinghouse v. Midgard Energy, Co., 113 S.W.3d 400, 414 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2003, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>), prejudgment interest accrued at the rate of
holding that once a rate is filed with the appropriate agency except for review of the agencys orders the courts can assume no right to a different rate on that ground that in its opinion it is the only or the more reasonable rate holding that the applicable rate is that in existence at the time of judgment holding that in order to qualify as newly discovered evidence the evidence must have been in existence and hidden at the time of judgment holding that the penalty is applicable holding that the proper rate for prejudgment interest is the rate fixed by the parties in a contract