and such redeterminations, while significant, has proven “too short for any particular plaintiff to seek meaningful injunctive relief on her or his own behalf.” PI. Supp. Mem. at 2. By the time any particular plaintiff files suit, the issue is briefed, and a hearing is held, she will, in all likelihood, be released from custody by an IJ (who is not bound by DHS policy). See id. Plaintiffs argue that “[a] preliminary injunction would thus only be effective to prevent the irreparable harm that DHS’s No-Release Policy inflicts on other asylum-seeking families.” Id. To achieve meaningful relief with respect to DHS’s allegedly unlawful policy, accordingly, they sensibly ask this Court to provisionally certify a class. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 401, 95 S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975) (<HOLDING>); Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S.
holding that it is error to certify class when named class representatives are not members of the class they purport to represent holding that after a class is certified the controversy may exist  between a named defendant and a member of the class represented by the named plaintiff even though the claim of the named plaintiff has become moot holding that a rule 23 named plaintiffs acceptance of a settlement offer as to his individual claims mooted his interest in the denial of class certification holding that tolling does not apply to additional defendants who were not named in the class action holding that a class action is not mooted by the intervening resolution of the controversy as to the named plaintiffs