4(k)(2) as a basis for jurisdiction. This omission is not decisive, for it is clear that “[fjederal courts are entitled to apply the proper body of law, whether the parties name it or not.” ISI Int’l, 256 F.3d at 551-52 (citing Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 111 S.Ct. 1711, 114 L.Ed.2d 152 (1991), and finding jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2) though the parties did not raise rule 4(k)(2) at the district court or appellate level). GMAC has consistently argued that jurisdiction would be proper in the Virginia courts, which is in apparent contradiction with a claim of personal jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2). Yet, personal jurisdiction claims may be properly analyzed in the alternative under 4(k)(l)(A) and 4(k)(2). See Dee-K Enterprises, 982 F.Supp. at 1144 n. 10 (<HOLDING>). Thus, neither GMAC’s failure to assert
holding that the massachusetts longarm statute provides for jurisdiction over a nonresident personal representative when the decedent had sufficient contacts with the forum such that the decedent would have been subject to personal jurisdiction had he lived holding that no basis existed for personal jurisdiction after reviewing the plaintiffs alleged contacts pursuant to the territorys longarm statute and rule 4k2 holding that rule 4k2 provides an alternative basis for jurisdiction to the extent that plaintiffs allegations do not support jurisdiction under the virginia longarm statute recognizing that personal jurisdiction of federal courts of course may be grounded in state longarm or other jurisdiction statutes in civil rico cases holding that the jones act provides an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction