by section 50.2 and refusal to take the test calls forth all the consequences of section 50.4 in any event. The purpose of section 50.4 must, then, extend beyond this.” 209 N.J.Super. at 488 (Fritz, P.J. A.D., dissenting). We note also that if actual operation is deemed necessary for a refusal conviction, the nature of a refusal hearing will be distorted. A breathalyzer refusal hearing has always been treated as a civil matter; the standard of proof in such a proceeding is a preponderance of evidence. N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.-4a. The Wright majority, however, has elevated this by requiring “actual operation,” which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, a standard that is traditionally associated with criminal and quasi-criminal case. See State v. Grant, supra, 196 N.J.Super. at 481 (<HOLDING>). Such a result will have the unwelcome effect
holding that the standard of proof in revocation proceedings is a preponderance of the evidence holding that the government must prove the facts used in sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence holding that the proper standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence holding that the standard of proof for dischargeability actions is the preponderance of the evidence standard recognizing the anomaly of requiring the state to prove a second drunk driving conviction beyond a reasonable doubt in the context of a refusal hearing where the preponderance of the evidence standard was applicable