did not apply. However, we have never interpreted “under this chapter” to only encompass tort claims for which the Tort Claims Act waives immunity. To the contrary, in Newman v. Obersteller, 960 S.W.2d 621, 622-23 (Tex.1997), we held that former section 101.106’s limiting phrase “under this chapter” operated to bar an intentional tort claim against an employee after a final judgment on a claim involving the same subject matter had been rendered against the governmental unit, even though the Act by its terms expressly excluded intentional torts from the scope of the Act’s immunity waiver. Although these cases construed the prior version of section 101.106, there is nothing in the amended version that would indicate a narrower application of the phrase “under th l Paso 2009, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). What Reedy and the First Court of Appeals do
holding section 101106f cannot be used by employees to obtain dismissal of common law intentional tort claims because those claims could not have been brought under the texas tort claims act holding that garcia applies to section 101106 but holding that a declaratory judgment action is not brought under the texas tort claims act holding that this language applies to tort claims brought under the federal tort claims act  against a contractor who has a selfdetermination contract holding that section 101106 applied to intentional torts even though these are excluded from the tort claims acts coverage holding that an action challenging the validity of a will may not be brought under ohios declaratory judgment act