determination about what likely occurred, but rather to assess the likely impact of the evidence on reasonable jurors.” Id. (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329, 115 S.Ct. 851). “Because a[n actual innocence] claim involves evidence the trial jury did not have before it, the inquiry requires the federal court to assess how reasonable jurors would react to the overall, .newly supplemented record. If new evidence so re quires, this may include consideration of ‘the credibility of the witnesses presented at trial.’ ” Id. (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 330, 115 S.Ct. 851). Reasonable, properly instructed jurors will presume the defendant is innocent and require that guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-64, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, “the [proper] inquiry ... requires
holding that beyond reasonable doubt standard not required in termination cases holding potential prejudice caused by equating reasonable doubt with a substantial doubt mitigated by providing an alternate definition of reasonable doubt as a doubt that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act holding that proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is required by the constitution holding that presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt standard are constitutionally required in criminal cases holding that harmless beyond a reasonable doubt analysis not applicable in habeas cases