as significantly restricted in his ability to perform a class or broad range of jobs.” Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (citing Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 322 (5th Cir.1997) and Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329, 332 (5th Cir.1996)). Garrett has offered no evidence that Autozone regarded him to be so limited. Garrett’s own testimony demonstrates that he was treated in the same manner as he was before he informed Autozone that he had been diagnosed with lupus. See Garrett’s Dep. pp 170-174, 200, 202. Because Garrett did not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was regarded as disabled by his employer, Autozone is entitled to summary judgment. See Deas v. River West, L.P., 152 F.3d 471, 480 (5th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Southwestern Bell, 136 F.3d at 1052; Sherrod,
holding that an administrative agency or a state courts finding that an employer had just cause to terminate a plaintiff is not preclusive with regard to the plaintiffs discrimination claim against the employer holding that an employer did not regard the plaintiff as disabled holding that an employer did not regard an employee with an impaired ankle as disabled where it encouraged her to work in a position that required walking holding that employer did not regard plaintiff as disabled where it repeatedly attempted to return him to work holding that an employer did not regard the employee as disabled because it called the employee back from disability leave to work on a special project