facilitates collusion by limiting the distributors’ ability to obtain better prices, it does so in most cases for no more than 60 days. See Hovenkamp § 10.8b at 384-85 (Although “[ejxclusive dealing may facilitate collusion by denying buyers an opportunity to force sellers to bid against each other,” if the “contracts must be re-bid frequently, most of the benefits of exclusive dealing will be retained, but the competitive threat will be greatly diminished.”). Nor are we persuaded that a jury could reasonably infer probable injury to competition even in this highly concentrated market where the undisputed evidence shows increasing output, decreasing prices, and significantly fluctuating market shares among the major manufacturers. Cf. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 237, 113 S.Ct. at 2595 (<HOLDING>). We conclude that, even construed in the light
recognizing that a curative instruction may make it highly unlikely that improper comments misled the jury holding that standing to raise a claim under  2a of robinsonpatman act is derived from section 4 of the clayton act holding that since the defendant is no longer selling to plaintiffs as is its right there is no danger that it will sell to them on discriminatory terms in violation of 15 usc  13 1982 and accordingly no basis for a robinsonpatman injunction holding that under robinsonpatman act jury may not infer conscious parallelism or supraeompetitive pricing even in highly concentrated industry where output is expanding and prices are increasing holding that the courts determination that the plaintiff failed to make a showing of antitrust injury adequate to allow treble damages does not provide a basis to dismiss plaintiffs robinsonpatman act claim insofar as it seeks injunctive relief