in the order suggests that the district court independently evaluated the validity of the settlement agreement or passed upon the propriety of the City’s development decision. Cf. State ex rel. Martinez v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 120 N.M. 118, 122, 898 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Ct. App.1995) (observing that it would be “unfair to presume prior determination of an issue from the mere fact of settlement when the contrary may more likely be true”). We regard this seemingly technical distinction as something of substantive import. {13} As an approval of no more than a stipulation to dismiss because of a settlement agreement, the district court order does not represent an adjudication of rights that is entitled to preclusive effect. Cf. Sanchez v. Saylor, 2000-NMCA-099, ¶¶ 24-25,129 N.M. 742, 13 P.3d 960 (<HOLDING>). In other words, the nature of Wal-Mart’s suit
holding that a bankruptcy courts approval of sale did not bar a subsequent action for conversion because the matter under consideration was not actually litigated in the bankruptcy proceedings the action for conversion did not constitute an impermissible collateral attack on a federal judgment holding complaint was not based on a conversion claim but was a declaratory judgment action thus not governed by conversion statute of limitations holding that facts as they existed on the date of the original bankruptcy petition not on the date of conversion from chapter 13 to chapter 7 bankruptcy applied holding that the 1994 amendment to  348 of the bankruptcy code should control in preamendment ongoing cases and that the debtors tort causes of action that accrued while the case was proceeding under chapter 13 did not become property of the estate or subject to the bankruptcy proceedings upon conversion of the case to chapter 7 proceedings recognizing bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over such a collateral attack