to grow grass is highly individualized;” and (iii) “[p]laintiff cannot prove a common injury that can be proven by classwide evidence.” (Defs.’ Opp’n at 13-14). These arguments generally represent a misunderstanding of plaintiffs’ two theories of liability in this case—neither of these theories depend on whether an individual was able to grow grass using EZ Seed. Under plaintiffs’ first theory of liability, nobody was able to grow grass using EZ Seed. Plaintiffs will succeed or fail on this theory based on whether they are able to prove EZ Seed is worthless. Defendants’ argument that “the products worked for some individual class members goes to the proof of the merits” of plaintiffs’ claims. Forcellati v. Hyland’s, Inc., 2014 WL 1410264, at *12. Any argument that ch 6559, at *14 (<HOLDING>). Thus, plaintiffs’ theories of liability
recognizing federal common law right of rescission under erisa for false representations to an insurer holding common issues predominate under california law where plaintiffs allege they paid a price premium based on false advertising holding that the issues implicated by  523a6 were actually litigated in a california state intentional tort suit and therefore according the judgment collateral estoppel effect under california law recognizing a hypothetical situation where california law left a party free to sue on a claim in maryland even after the claim was precluded in california because the california statute of limitations had expired holding that the ninth circuit is bound by the california supreme courts interpretation of california law