common law. See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 169, 78 S.Ct. 632, 2 L.Ed.2d 672 (1958) (explaining that at English common law, disobedience of a writ under the King’s seal was treated as a contempt), overruled in part on other grounds by Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968). While this Circuit has yet to address this issue, we have cited with approval the Sixth Circuit’s decision that “[t]he crime of bail jumping diminishes the power of a court to control those properly within its jurisdiction and afflicts that court with its detrimental effects.” United States v. Chappell, 854 F.2d 190, 192 (7th Cir.1988) (quoting United States v. Roche, 611 F.2d 1180, 1183 (6th Cir.1980)); see also United States v. Williams, 788 F.2d 1213, 1216 (6th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Garrett directs our attention to decisions in
holding that the summary rejection of a witness as noncredible is prejudicial and the proper administration of justice requires more holding that it is a well established rule that the power to judge a contempt rests exclusively with the court contemned and that no court is authorized to punish a contempt against another court holding that a civil contempt defendant has a right to a jury trial when the act of contempt was not committed in the presence of the court and when the incarceration is in part punitive holding that the extension of judicial immunity to witnesses attorneys and parties  was regarded by us as necessary to the proper administration of justice holding that the primary effect of bail jumping is upon the proper administration of justice in the court which admits one to bail and is akin to a constructive contempt of court  quoting roche 611 f2d at 1183