his burden of showing that he has asserted either his factual or legal innocence. The other relevant factors also weigh against Hasson. As for prejudice to the government, it would be required to prepare for an unanticipated trial. In a case such as this, which the court designated as complex under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(ii), the prejudice to the government is more obvious because trial preparation would entail considerable effort. Hasson also delayed the filing of his withdrawal motion until just days before sentencing, having waited almost four months after entering his guilty plea. See Carr, 80 F.3d at 420 (reasoning that a three-month delay in filing a motion to withdraw a plea weighs against the defendant); United States v. Vidakovich, 911 F.2d 435, 439-40 (10th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). The fourth and seventh factors, which
holding that the delay is presumptively prejudicial does not necessarily mean the first factor weighs against the state but requires further consideration of the extent of the delay beyond this period holding that a fivemonth delay did not render information stale recognizing that a fivemonth delay weighs against the defendant holding that a fivemonth delay in filing a motion to disqualify did not bar the motion where there was a reasonable explanation for the delay holding a fivemonth delay in searching a computer did not invalidate the search because there was no showing that the delay caused a lapse in probable cause that it created prejudice to the defendant or that officers acted in bad faith