the defendant, are not to be counted. Also, sentences resulting from convictions that a defendant shows to have been previously ruled constitutionally invalid are not to be counted. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, comment, (n.6) (Nov.1990) (emphasis added). In addition, the Commission added Background Commentary to § 4A1.2 that provided, “The Commission leaves for court determination the issue of whether a defendant may collaterally attack at sentencing a prior conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, comment (backg’d.). .2d 63 (1992); United States v. Canales, 960 F.2d 1311, 1315 (5th Cir.1992) (same); United States v. Hoffman, 982 F.2d 187, 190 (6th Cir.1992) (same) and United States v. Brown, 991 F.2d 1162, 1166 (3d Cir.1993) (same) with United States v. Vea-Gonzales, 986 F.2d 321, 327 (9th Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Roman, 989 F.2d 1117, 1119
holding that defendants sixth amendment right to trial by a jury was not violated by district courts reliance on his prior convictions for purposes of sentencing under the acca even though convictions were neither charged in indictment nor admitted holding that defendants sixth amendment right to trial by a jury was not violated by district courts reliance on his prior convictions for purposes of sentencing as career offender holding that commission did not intend amended language to provide discretion to district courts to entertain challenges to prior convictions at sentencing holding amended language gives district courts discretion to permit collateral attack on prior convictions used to enhance sentence holding that defendants sixth amendment right to trial by a jury was not violated by district courts reliance on his prior convictions for purposes of sentencing under the armed career criminal act