separate from damages, and he did not object to proceeding to trial in his yellow prison jumpsuit and leg shackles after he mistakenly sent his civilian clothes to the county jail instead of to the federal courthouse. Thus Dodd cannot argue those issues now. See Provident Sav. Bank v. Popovich, 71 F.3d 696, 699-700 (7th Cir.1995) (explaining that pro se litigants are subject to same waiver rules as counseled parties). As to the questions properly before us, we turn first to Dodd’s argument that the district court erred in admitting the testimony of Croymans and Kelsheimer. Dodd objected generally to Croymans’s testimony but failed to object at all to Kelsheimer’s, so we confine our review to Croymans’s testimony. See Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir.1999) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). The decision to admit testimony must stand
holding that appellate courts determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction based on a review of all of the evidence admitted at trial holding that a claimed violation of the right to a public trial must be preserved for review by a timely objection at trial holding that an objection raised in a motion to suppress evidence preserves the issue for appeal despite the lack of further objection at trial holding that lack of objection at trial precludes appellate review of allegedly misused evidence holding party must make timely and specific objection at trial to preserve issue for appellate review