presumption as he would before the Office of Unemployment Compensation. Raphael v. Okyiri, 740 A.2d 935, 945-46 (D.C.1999); see Jadallah v. District of Columbia Dept. of Emp’t Servs., 476 A.2d 671, 675 (D.C.1984) (“Not every act for which an employee may be dismissed from work will provide a basis for disqualification from unemployment compensation benefits because of misconduct.”). Moreover, in terms of incentives, while an employer faces merely a potential increase in its contribution to the unemployment compensation fund before the Office of Unemployment Compensation, see Morris, supra, 975 A.2d at 182 n. 5, an employer faces a potential reinstatement and back pay order before the OEA should the employee prevail. District of Columbia v. Thompson, 593 A.2d 621, 635 & n. 25 (D.C.1991) (<HOLDING>). These differences weigh heavily against
recognizing that the court has construed broadly the grant of jurisdiction in section 201 recognizing a distinction between the power of a federal court to hear statelaw claims and the discretionary exercise of that power recognizing that the court has the power to grant leave upon certain conditions recognizing the oeas power to grant relief very broadly including the power to order reinstatement and back pay holding that unless that power is restricted by the principal an agent under a california statutory healthcare power of attorney has the power to execute applicable admission forms including arbitration agreements