of the court’s discretion, ... we do not lightly assume that Congress has intended to depart from established principles” of courts’ exercising equitable discretion. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 310-13, 102 S.Ct. at 1802-04. Moreover, the comprehensiveness of this equitable jurisdiction is not to be denied or limited in the absence of a clear and valid legislative command. ‘Unless a statute in so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the court’s jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied.’ Id. at 313, 102 S.Ct. at 1804 (quoting Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398, 66 S.Ct. 1086, 1089, 90 L.Ed. 1332 (1946)); accord Flynn v. United States By and Through Eggers, 786 F.2d 586, 591 (3d Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). In sum, “[t]he grant of jurisdiction to
holding that the common law principle of vicarious liability applied to the tcpa because absent a clear expression of congressional intent to apply another standard the court must presume that congress intended to apply the traditional standards of vicarious liability with which it is presumed to be familiar holding that where congressional intent is clear a court must give effect to such intent holding that when the language of a statute is clear courts should not substitute their judgment for that of congress and should enforce the statute according to its terms holding that iiriras permanent rules lack the clear statement of the congressional intent necessary to eliminate habeas review holding that absent a clear congressional statement courts should not infer that congress intended to alter equity practices