But we have already explained why, under Chase, the gap left at common law as to intangibles is not properly viewed as an exemption at all. Further, Howe’s contrary view would virtually moot the inclusion in section 9-28-1 of “any choses in action of the judgment debtor” since in general these were not subject to attachment at common law and, on Howe’s reading, would have been added by the statute as a remedy only to be immediately subtracted by the “except such” proviso. Howe’s approach to section 9-26 — 1(10) was rejected by the Supreme Court, in an analogous context, almost a century ago. Page v. Edmunds, 187 U.S. 596, 23 S.Ct. 200, 47 L.Ed. 318 (1903). Still, one can find more recent decisions looking in both directions. Compare In re Geise, 992 F.2d 651, 658-59 (7th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>), with In re Mitchell, 73 B.R. 93
holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate holding that property not subject to sequestration is not therefore exempt recognizing that exempt property ceases to be property of the estate holding that an addition to an abated property is not exempt holding that because nondischargeable debt based on fraud was not one of the four enumerated exceptions to exempt property the exempt property was not liable for the creditors surviving claim