also argues that the defective warrant effectively means that he was never validly “deported” for § 1326 purposes. We readily dismiss this claim, however, because it is well settled that the lawfulness of a prior deportation is not a required element of a § 1326 violation. In United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 107 S.Ct. 2148, 95 L.Ed.2d 772 (1987), the Supreme Court squarely rejected the view “that a deportation is an element of the offense defined by § 1326 only if it is ‘lawful,’ ” id. at 834, 107 S.Ct. 2148, given that “[t]he text and background of § 1326 ... indicate no congressional intent to sanction challenges to deportation orders in proceedings under § 1326.” Id. at 837, 107 S.Ct. 2148; see also United States v. Alvarado-Delgado, 98 F.3d 492 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Only if the claimed illegality of the
holding statute permitting increased sentence based on prior conviction is penalty provision not element of offense holding that a domestic relationship must exist as part of the facts giving rise to the predicate offense but it need not be an element of the prior offense holding that attorneys admission to an element of the offense in the petitioners presence at a deportation hearing was binding on the petitioners holding that there is some mental state requirement for the third material element of  1326 holding that the lawfulness of a prior deportation is not a required element of a  1326 offense