but it rejected his second argument, holding as follows: “[T]he plain language of the statute provides that the $4 assessment is an amount to be surcharged as an additional penalty; it is considered after the imposition of any basic fines provided for by other legislation. Accordingly, in the present case, after the imposition of the $20 fine, an additional penalty of $4 was surcharged and did not reduce or affect the distribution of the $20 fine. Therefore, the circuit court properly assessed both the $20 fine and the $4 additional penalty.” (Emphasis omitted.) People v. Jamison, 365 Ill. App. 3d 778, 780-81 (2006). Defendant filed a petition for leave to appeal to this court, and that petition was pending when this court filed its opinion in People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d 569 (2006) (<HOLDING>). Pursuant to our supervisory authority, we
holding that jail credit may be granted for presentence custodial period spent under a civil commitment order at state security hospital and observing that denying credit for time relating to probationary conditions is not inconsistent with that holding holding that the statutory entitlement to presentence jail credit starts with the initial arrest for a criminal offense holding that the 4 penalty of section 5  9lc9 was a fine for purposes of presentence incarceration credit recognizing that because a district courts determination of the appropriate fine involves factual issues including the defendants ability to pay the fine imposedthe district courts calculation of the fine is entitled to deference and can be reversed on appeal only for clear error holding that the failure to impose a mandatory fine requires that the matter be remanded for imposition of that fine