a habit over the last few years of citing Cromer for this proposition: The proper inquiry ... is whether the declarant intends to bear testimony against the accused. That intent, in turn, may be determined by querying whether a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would anticipate his statement being used against the accused in investigating and prosecuting the crime. 389 F.3d at 675. That may be the appropriate way to define “testimonial” in non-interrogation settings, see Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52, 124 S.Ct. 1354; Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, -U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2531-32, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009), but it is not the way the Court defined “testimonial” hearsay in Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006). See id. at 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (<HOLDING>). The statements at issue in Cromer did not
holding that whether a statement made in response to interrogation is testimonial depends on whether the objective purpose of the interrogation was to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution or to meet an ongoing emergency holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation holding recording of eyewitnesss inculpatory statement made in custodial interrogation testimonial in nature holding that where a second interrogation postmiranda attempted to recreate a first interrogation premiranda statement from the latter was inadmissible holding that the district court did not err in admitting evidence of an allegedly coerced interrogation where the taped interrogation was played for jurors and the defendant crossexamined the witness at length about the interrogation