suppressing particular ideas of computer programmers and everything to do with functionality.”); Corley, 273 F.3d at 454. Thus, to the extent that the DMCA targets computer code, Congress sought to ban the code not because of what the code says, but rather because of what the code does. Defendant contends that these authorities are wrongly decided and that it is impossible to regulate the “functional” aspects of computer code without necessarily regulating the content of the expressive aspects of the code. Divorcing the func tion from the message, however, is precisely what the courts have done in other contexts, for example, in determining what portions of code are protectable by copyright and what uses of that same code are permitted as fair uses. See Connectix, 203 F.3d at 602-03 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the court concludes that
recognizing that computer programs pose unique problems in copyright context because they are both expressive and functional utilitarian articles copyright protects only the expression and fair use allows incidental copying for the purpose of reverse engineering code to determine its unprotected functional aspects holding that copyright protection of computer programs extend beyond the programs literal code to their structure sequence and organization holding that while the computer program at issue was within the subject matter of copyright the right sought under state law pursuant to a license was not equivalent to the exclusive rights under copyright as such copyright preemption did not apply holding that a plaintiff may recover damages under both the lanham act and the copyright act provided the copyright damages serve a purpose other than compensation holding misappropriation claim grounded solely in the copying of a plaintiffs protected expression was preempted by  301 of copyright act