the intent to kill, the district court may wish to use a jury instruction that employs the elements of first degree murder in UJI 14-201 but deletes all references to “deliberate.” {17} Finally, we note that the State chose not to pursue a theory of attempted first degree felony murder at trial after Defendant was indicted on open counts of attempted first degree murder and the jury was sworn. Thus, the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the State from retrying Defendant on this alternative theory, see Johnson, 103 N.M. at 369-70, 707 P.2d at 1179-80, and we need not reach the issue of whether Defendant could be charged with the crime of attempted first degree felony murder under the circumstances of this case. Cf. State v. Price, 104 N.M. 703, 704-06, 726 P.2d 857, 858-60 (Ct.App.1986) (<HOLDING>). But cf. State v. Ortega, 112 N.M. 554,
holding that the crime of attempted first degree felony murder does not exist holding that attempted felony murder was abolished holding that there is no crime of attempted felony murder in florida holding that a conviction of first degree felony murder based on the predicate felony of robbery does not establish the pecuniary gain aggravator set forth in  13703f5 with respect to the murder holding that the crime of attempted felony murder no longer existed in florida