range of inferences that a juror might reasonably draw’ from their use.” Hellum, 28 F.3d at 908 (quoting Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 569, 106 S.Ct. 1340). Thus, courts across the country have approved of the use of metal detectors. See, e.g., State v. Aguilar, 352 N.W.2d 395, 396 (Minn.1984) (authorizing the use of metal detectors and searches of people entering the courtroom). This type of security measure is a part of our daily experience and cannot be deemed prejudicial. Smith also argues that he was prejudiced when his defense attorneys were “wanded” in front of the jury. However, where the jurors in Smith’s trial were themselves being searched and wanded, they would not be surprised or prejudiced to see the defense attorneys subjected to similar measures. See Aguilar, 352 N.W.2d at 397 (<HOLDING>). Smith further argues that the jury was
holding that the defendant was not prejudiced when the jurors saw him being searched where the jurors themselves had been frisked holding that the district court should have engaged in a more detailed inquiry when pretrial publicity was vast a third of potential jurors had an opinion about the guilt of the defendant and all jurors selected had been exposed to pretrial publicity holding that the defendant was not prejudiced when an ill juror after deliberations began left the other jurors accompanied by the trial judge to see a physician holding statute stating that judge could excuse jurors was violated when jury commissioners excused jurors holding that trial court abused its discretion in failing to make a proper inquiry of jurors andor failing to strike jurors for cause after jurors explicitly expressed bias