approach should be distinguished from the mechanical approach to calculating a debtor’s projected disposable income, which was rejected by the Supreme Court in favor of a forward-looking approach in circumstances “where changes in the debtor’s income or expenses are known or virtually certain at the time of confirmation.” Lanning, 130 S.Ct. at 2478; Baud, 634 F.3d at 337-38 (distinguishing the interpretation of a debtor’s applicable commitment period from the calculation of a debtor’s projected disposable income, the latter of which was addressed by the Supreme Court in Lan-ning ). Adopting a hybrid approach in Alexander, this court held that the term “applicable commitment period” does not apply to debtors with zero or negative projected disposable income. 344 B.R. at 750-51 (<HOLDING>); Musselman, 394 B.R. at 814 (affirming, after
holding that projected disposable income for an abovemedian income debtor would not include a deduction for contractual payments on undersecured debt that the debtor would not actually be required to pay because the plan bifurcated the claim or surrendered the collateral holding that projected disposable income for abovemedian debtors is disposable income as defined by  1325b holding that the statement of current monthly income was the presumptive amount of projected disposable income but presumption could be rebutted by the debt or upon a showing of substantial change of circumstances holding that a debtors disposable income as calculated under 11 usc  1325b2 is not the same as a debtors projected disposable income but that it can be used as the presumptive projected disposable income recognizing the applicable commitment period requirement as temporal but only applicable to a debtor with projected disposable income