the limited jurisdictional allotment afforded it by § 3582(c)(2). That provision applies only “in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), The Commission modified the Guidelines range applicable to Mr. Mata-Rodriguez’s sentence. See U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 782 (2014). However, in determining whether a movant satisfies the baseline eligibility criterion for a sentence modification, “courts must act ‘consistently] with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.’” Washington, 759 F.3d at 1182 (alteration in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)); see also United States v. McGee, 615 F.3d 1287, 1292 (10th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). The key policy here is that § 3582(c)(2)
holding that courts must begin the process by following the commissions instructions in ussg  1b110  to determine the prisoners eligibility for a sentence modification quoting dillon v united states 560 us 817 827 130 sct 2683 177 led2d 271 2010 holding that the rule announced in crawford v washington 541 us 36 124 sct 1354 158 led2d 177 2004 applies retroactively on collateral review holding inter alia that the decision in padilla v kentucky  us  130 sct 1473 176 led2d 284 2010 should not be applied retroactively while certifying the question as one of great public importance holding that proof of prejudice is generally a necessary but not sufficient element of a due process claim and that the due process inquiry must consider the reasons for  the prejudice quoting united states v lovasco 431 us 783 790 97 sct 2044 52 led2d 752 1977 holding that the rule announced in padilla v kentucky 559 us 356 130 sct 1473 176 led2d 284 2010 doesnt apply retroactively on collateral review