during 1981-82 relating to the skills tested on the SSAT-II and if so, whether that instruction had been sufficient for a student to master the skills”). The use of surveys is, however, far more prevalent in trademark law than in most other areas. See Neal Miller, Facts, Expert Facts, and Statistics, 40 Rutgers L.Rev. 101, 137 (1987). Moreover, contrary to Schering’s contention, the case law does not support a general rule allowing surveys into evidence for all purposes. See, e.g., United States v. Pryba, 900 F.2d 748, 757 (4th Cir.1990) (excluding survey in obscenity case when offered “to demonstrate the community’s attitude, toleration and standards with regard to sexually explicit materials”); American Footwear Corp. v. General Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655, 660 n. 4, 663 (2d Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>); Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Cosprophar, Inc., 828
holding that district courts decision regarding defendants minor role status was not clearly erroneous holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record holding that it was not clearly erroneous for the district court to consider survey evidence even though the survey was imperfect holding district court decision to exclude survey for failure to conduct it under actual marketing conditions not clearly  erroneous holding that district courts rejection of survey offered to show secondary meaning was not clearly erroneous