of the ‘activity giving rise to the incident’ shows a ‘substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity.’ ” Id. (citing Sisson, 497 U.S. at 363-65, 110 S.Ct. 2892). Both the plaintiff and Mr. Szollo-sy dispute the defendants/third-party plaintiffs’ claim that this Court has admiralty jurisdiction over the instant case. First, Mr. Szollosy contends that the defendants/third-party plaintiffs may not invoke admiralty jurisdiction because neither the plaintiff nor the defendants/third-party plaintiffs have affirmatively inserted a statement in their complaints identifying the claim as an admiralty or maritime claim. However, the Court finds such a pleading requirement unnecessary. See, e.g., Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 410-411, 74 S.Ct. 202, 98 L.Ed. 143 (1953) (<HOLDING>); Preston v. Frantz, 11 F.3d 357, 358-59 (2d
holding that a federal court in diversity jurisdiction must apply state substantive law holding that courts apply substantive admiralty law to claims that sound in admiralty regardless of whether the complaint invokes diversity or admiralty jurisdiction holding that federal courts must apply state substantive law in diversity cases holding that in diversity cases federal courts are to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law holding that substantive admiralty law applies though suit was filed in federal court under diversity jurisdiction