dismissing its time-barred claims will not simply postpone a new suit from being brought. Sully does not claim the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in failing to extend the statute of limitations, nor does it seek the “equitable” remedy the majority provides. Rather, Sully only claims that it satisfies the Benavidez test. For the reasons explained above, it does not. Sully elected to intervene after OneCap was dismissed. Sully did not seek an extension of the statute of limitations to as sert its own claims, nor did it seek to be substituted for OneCap before its dismissal. It is not the province of this Court, at this stage, to introduce a remedy that in hindsight appears better for the appellants as a matter of equity. See, e.g., In Re Bernal, 207 F.3d 595 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); see also, F.D.I.C. v. Deglau, 207 F.3d 153,
holding that rendition is remedy for no evidence holding that the fourth amendment remedy sought is suppression holding that retroactive award of benefits proper remedy where district court made finding that claimant was disabled holding that where noteholder improperly sought intervention after default where the proper remedy was substitution pursuant to fed r bankrp 7025 court had no remedy for the noteholder holding that the remedy in a prison conditions case must remedy actual injuries that have been identified by the court and suffered by the plaintiffs