under similar circumstances. Moreover, Kent directs us to no similar case in which this court has held that the district court abused its discretion by failing to require the government to elect one theory of prosecution. We also conclude that Kent was not prejudiced by the government’s presentation of both firearm-possession theories to the jury. First, the district court clearly instructed the jury that “[t]he indictment in this case charges [Kent Platter] with one criminal offense,” (Jury Instruction # 10), and the jury never saw the multi-plicitous indictment. See Roy, 408 F.3d at 491 (“[M]ultiplicitous indictments may be saved at the trial stage if the district court submits an appropriate instruction to the jury.”); United States v. Moore, 149 F.3d 773, 779 (8th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the jury found Kent guilty under
holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to accept the defendants guilty pleas to two counts of the indictment and stating that even if the trial court erred the error had not prejudiced the defendant because he was found guilty by the jury of the charges to which he intended to plead and the evidence of the other crimes would have been admissible in the trial for the first degree murder charge holding that the amendment of the indictment was permissible under the statutory predecessor to code  192231 because the amendment did not within the meaning of the statute change the nature of the offense charged in the original indictment holdingthat an error in instructing the jury that an offense could be committed by a statutory method not charged in the indictment is cured where  the court provides the jury with the indictment and instructs jurors that the burden of proof rests upon the state to prove every material allegation of the indictment and every essential element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt  citation omitted holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense holding that the defendants were not prejudiced by a potentially multiplicitous indictment because the jury did not see the indictment and consistent with fedrcrimp 7c1 the potentially multiplicitous counts were submitted together on a single verdict form