judgment as a matter of law to the county on both Frank’s quid pro quo harassment claim and retaliation claim. DISCUSSION Frank argues that three issues require reversal and remand. As explained here, we disagree. I. Summary Judgment Properly Entered on § 1983 Claim First, Frank argues the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the county on her § 1983 claim. This Court reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo and uses the same standard as does the district court in evaluating the motion, examining the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, here, Frank. See Duckett v. City of Cedar Park, 950 F.2d 272, 276 (5th Cir.1992). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions o 1101 (S.D.Tex.1997) (<HOLDING>). Frank argues on appeal that her case is
holding that a municipality may be held liable as a person under  1983 holding that a state official can be held individually hable under  1983 for acts taken within the scope of his or her official duties holding that a municipality may only be held liable under  1983 for a policy practice or custom holding county cannot be held liable for conduct of elected official constable under  1983 because he is not final policymaker recognizing that a municipality may be liable under  1983 if the final policymaker takes the unconstitutional action or when a widespread practice exists