the defendant’s motion to suppress his statement on Fourth Amendment grounds. According to Captain Long, witnesses at the bar had observed the defendant threatening to kill the victim and burn his house down approximately one to two hours before the fire occurred that claimed the victim’s life. Moreover, the defendant failed to appear for his interview as he had agreed. Thus, the officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant and take him into custody before he made his statement at the department. Because probable cause existed for the defendant’s arrest, the exclusionary rule does not require that his subsequent statement made while in lawful custody be suppressed. See id., 495 U.S. at 19, 110 S.Ct. at 1644; see also State v. Huddleston, 924 S.W.2d 666, 672 n. 8 (Tenn.1996) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, although we have determined that
holding that because code  19260 a procedural statute did not expressly provide a right of suppression of evidence a violation of that provision did not require application of the exclusionary rule in the absence of a constitutional violation holding of suspect incommunicado contributes to suppression of confession holding that under elstad the first question that must be answered when determining whether a subsequent confession is tainted by an earlier confession is whether the initial confession was obtained in violation of the defendants fifth amendment rights  ie whether it was involuntary  or whether the confession was voluntary but obtained in technical violation of miranda  recognizing that violation of the fourth amendments rule against warrantless arrests in a dwelling generally does not lead to suppression of a postarrest confession holding that the fourth amendment remedy sought is suppression