any proceeding for which indemnification could be required under Section 145(c). The advancement right picks up this possibility through Section 6.01, which incorporates Section 145(c) by providing for indemnification “to the fullest extent authorized by the Delaware General Corporation Law.” See Zaman v. Amedeo Holdings, Inc., 2008 WL 2168397, at *16 (Del.Ch. May 28, 2008) (interpreting “fullest extent” bylaw provision to encompass mandatory indemnification under Section 145(c)); Cochran v. Stifel Fin. Corp., 2000 WL 1847676, at *8 (Del.Ch. Dec. 13, 2000) (interpreting “fullest extent” contract provision to encompass mandatory indemnification under Section 145(c)), aff'd in pertinent part, 809 A.2d 555 (Del.2002); Dunlap v. Sunbeam Corp., 1999 WL 1261339, at *5 (Del.Ch. July 9, 1999) (<HOLDING>). Under this plain and unambiguous provision,
holding that application note 6 is not mandatory holding that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional holding that advancements were required under mandatory provision so long as mandatory indemnification under section 145c remained a possibility holding that the statute is mandatory holding that relief under  3730h is mandatory