and his request for adjustment of status, we are reluctant to “rule on the merits of an issue that the BIA has not itself addressed.” Ray, 439 F.3d at 591. To remedy an otherwise intractable injustice, we grant Granados-Oseguera’s petition for review, and remand this case to the BIA to reconsider Granados-Osegu-era’s motion to reopen in light of his IAC claim. PETITION GRANTED, in part; DISMISSED, in part; DENIED, in part. 1 . Granados-Oseguera also challenges the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's decision without opinion and the IJ’s hardship determination. We are without jurisdiction to consider either of these issues as Petitioner did not petition for review within 30 days of the BIA’s affir-mance. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1); see Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1258 (9th Cir. 1996) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, we have upheld the BIA's
holding that the filing of a motion for reconsideration does not toll the period for seeking judicial review of the underlying order holding that we do not have jurisdiction to consider the underlying final order upon petition for review of a motion to reopen where the petitioner did not earlier seek review of that underlying final order holding that such an order is not sufficiently final to be suitable for appellate review holding that the time limit for filing a petition for review of a final order of deportation is jurisdictional holding that an order which purports to become final upon the happening of an event specified in the order is not a final order and the happening of the event does not operate to render the order final