verdict form that Alleyne had ‘[u]sed or carried a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence,’ but did not indicate a finding that the firearm was ‘[bjrandished.’ ” Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2156. The trial court, however, applied the mandatory minimum based on its own finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had brandished the weapon. Id. Thus, the error in Alleyne was confined to sentencing, where the district court made a finding on an aggravating element that was presented to and rejected by the jury. In essence, the trial judge sentenced Alleyne for “a separate, aggravated offense,” id. at 2162, that the jury had itself decided not to find beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 328-29, 90 S.Ct. 1757, 26 L.Ed.2d 300 (1970) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the Supreme Court vacated
holding that court of appealss remedy on remand from reversal for harmful charge error based on failure to meet second step of rousseau lesserincludedoffense test was to remand for a retrial for the lesser offense  because the jurys verdict that the appellant was guilty of the lesserincluded offense  operates as an acquittal of the greater offense  to which jeopardy had attached this prevents a retrial for the greater offense but not for the lesser offense holding that where jury was instructed on both a greater offense and lesserincluded offense and the jury convicted on the lesserincluded offense the double jeopardy provision prohibited retrial on the greater offense holding that when jury acquitted defendant on greater offense but deadlocked on lesserincluded offenses double jeopardy did not bar retrial of the lesers holding that when the jury acquitted the defendant on the greater offense but deadlocked on the lesserincluded offenses double jeopardy did not bar retrial of the lessers holding double jeopardy prohibition not applicable where jury unable to agree on greater charge but convicts on lesserincluded offense because no implied acquittal occurred on greater offense