it leaves the tailoring of the relief to be granted, if any, to the district court’s sound discretion.” Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 538-39, 113 S.Ct. at 938. 15 . Among other things, the district court carefully instructed the jury that it must give separate consideration to the evidence as to each defendant, that each charge and the evidence pertaining to it should be considered separately, and the fact that the jury may find a particular defendant guilty or not guilty as to one of the offenses char .Ed.2d 752 (1978). 16 . Finally, Schmittzehe and Rushton contend that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in this case because of § 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b). This argument is foreclosed by United States v. Cavin, 39 F.3d 1299, 1305 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). 17 . In cases involving fraud or deceit, the
recognizing conflict holding that fehbas complete preemption provision closely resembles erisas express preemption provision and precedent interpreting the erisa provision thus provides authority for cases involving the fehba provision holding that the preemption provision of the act does not apply to a fraud prosecution because there is no conflict with state insurance regulation holding that in cases of a false conflict of law a court may apply the law of the forum state recognizing the conflict