under former Rule 35(a) as to those counts. Id. We find no error, however, in the dismissal of Haynes’ motion with respect to four of the six sentences Haynes claims are illegal. We note that the current sentencing provisions of § 841(b)(1), including the relevant statutory máximums and provisions for terms of supervised release, apply to drug trafficking offenses committed after October 27, 1986. See Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 409, 111 S.Ct. 840, 112 L.Ed.2d 919 (1991). As a result, the only sentences that could be illegal as Haynes contends are his sentences for Counts 3 and 5. Hence, Haynes has not demonstrated reversible error as to the dismissal of his motion as to Counts 22, 30, 31, and 33. See United States v. Lofton, 233 F.3d 313, 317 n. 4 (4th Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
holding we may affirm on any grounds supported by the record even those not relied upon by the district court recognizing that appellate court may affirm result on reasons different from those on which lower court relied holding that an appellate court may affirm the result reached by a district court on alternative grounds recognizing that this court may affirm summary judgment on grounds other than those relied upon by the motion justice holding that this court may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground appearing in the record regardless of whether the circuit court relied on it