1998 as marital property. No evidence was presented to the commissioner establishing the amount or percentage of the contribution that could be attributable to the post-separation period of the parties. Therefore, his recommendation in this regard was not plainly wrong. Next, we find no error in the commissioner’s determination that a portion of the bonus received by Joynes in 1998 was marital property. As the commissioner noted, although Joynes was required to be employed by his employer at the end of 1998, one month after the parties’ separation, in order to receive the bonus, the bonus represented compensation for Joynes’ labor during the entire year of 1998, and, thus, was property acquired prior to the separation. See Luczkovich v. Luczkovich, 26 Va.App. 702, 496 S.E.2d 157 (1998) (<HOLDING>). We also find no error in the commissioner’s
holding that it was not an abuse of discretion to award a spouse all of the divisible property attributable to his postseparation payments which reduced marital debt holding that severance pay policy was part of employment contract holding that severance pay received postseparation was not marital property as the condition to receive the pay was related to the sale of the corporation not to husbands work during his marriage holding that a plan providing severance pay for reduction in work force simply did not contemplate the effect of a sale of a business on the availability of severance pay holding that money invested in voluntary investment plan during marriage was marital property because it was property acquired during marriage