of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286 (1965); see also Butler, 158 S.E.2d at 122. An example illustrates the doctrine’s application. If the statutory speed limit on a road is 35 m.p.h. and the defendant drives 40 m.p.h., causing him to collide with the plaintiff pedestrian and to injure her, the plaintiff may establish the breach element of her negligence claim by pointing to the violation of the speed limit. The defendant is barred from putting on evidence, specific to his situation, that driving at 40 mph. on that particular road was reasonable because the “violation of the statute constitutes conclusive evidence of negligence.” Osborne v. McMasters, 40 Minn. 103, 41 N.W. 543, 544 (1889); see also Butler, 158 S.E.2d at 123-24 (<HOLDING>). The negligence per se doctrine, however, is
holding that motherowner of home in which attack occurred was not hable for attack by dog owned by sontenant where there was no evidence that she exercised dominion and control over the dog holding district courts finding of consent was not clearly erroneous when the defendant consented after officers told him they could get a drug dog even though the defendant knew the dog would alert holding that a fiftynine minute detention to wait for a drug dog was reasonable where the officer requested the dog immediately after developing reasonable suspicion holding that an ordinance prohibiting dogs to go at large on any public street supplied the standard for determining whether the dog owner was negligent in letting a dog go unleashed holding that a dog sniff during a legitimate traffic stop does not constitute a search because there is no expectation of privacy in contraband and a dog sniff does not violate any privacy interest