and affidavits, when unsupported by any evidence, are not necessarily sufficient to preclude summary judgment. See Exxon Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 663 F.2d 120, 128 (D.C.Cir.1980) (purely speculative issues of fact need not be preserved for trial); Pignons S.A. de Meca-nique de Precision v. Polaroid Corp., 657 F.2d 482 (1st Cir.1981) (“factual dispute is ... genuine if manifested by ‘substantial’ evidence going beyond allegations of the complaint”). 5 . This is the type of assertion without supporting justification that we must consign to the category of conclusory statements that will not defeat a grant of summary judgment. See, e.g., Aladdin Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 603 F.2d 1107, 1117 (5th Cir.1979); see also Habib v. Ray-theon Co., 616 F.2d 1204, 1211 (D.C.Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Appellants point to no evidence that
holding the conflict in expert declarations created a genuine issue of materi al fact that made summary judgment inappropriate holding such statements created genuine issue of fact only because matters involved were by nature shrouded in secrecy holding the requirement that an attorney take a secrecy oath was redundant in light of an order requiring secrecy holding nonmoving partys affidavit created genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of an employment relationship holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment