extends to this ease. In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d at 792; Miller, 621 F.2d at 726; Campbell v. Klevenhagen, 760 F.Supp. 1206 (S.D.Tex.1991). Respondent asserts that he has met all three requirements necessary to overcome the privilege. Petitioner denies that any of the requirements are met on the record before this court. Petitioner asserts that this court must balance the state’s legitimate interest in protecting grand jury secrecy against the important First Amendment right at issue here, taking into consideration the nature of the speech and the nature of the interests sought to be protected by secrecy. This provides the context for the application of the qualified privilege. See Douglas Oil Co. of California v. Petrol Stops, Etc., 441 U.S. 211, 99 S.Ct. 1667, 60 L.Ed.2d 156 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Stern v. State ex rel. Ansel, 869 S.W.2d 614,
recognizing the importance of grand jury secrecy recognizing the importance of the employers knowledge of the disability holding the trial court erred in ordering the transcription of grand jury proceedings so that it could intervene in the operations of the grand jury holding that right was available in grand jury proceedings holding the presence of counsel for a witness did not violate grand jury secrecy