limit Section 74.351(a) imposes on a health liability claimant. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant a new trial with respect to dismissal of her claims. We overrule Awoniyi’s second point of error. Attorney’s-Fee AwaRD to the Hospital In her third point of error, Awoniyi contends the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees to the hospital because she timely served her expert report on the hospital. As discussed above, Awoniyi’s expert report was not served timely. Where an expert report is not served timely, Section 74.351 imposes a duty on the trial court, upon a health care provider’s motion, to dismiss the claims and to award reasonable attorney’s fees to the health care provider. See Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 20-21 (Tex.1998) (<HOLDING>). The trial court thus did not err in awarding
holding that the term shall is mandatory for purposes of statutory construction when the statute is unambiguous holding that attorneys fee statute using shall language is not discretionary holding that a statute shall not be given retroactive effect unless such construction is required by explicit language or by necessary implication holding that a states use of the word shall is mandatory language holding provision in attorneys fee contract requiring client that terminated contract to immediately pay attorney fee equal to present value of attorneys interest in case was inconsistent with public policy and unconscionable