court about Buividas’s availability for trial, Sunkett’s objection might reasonably be taken as objection to a violation of N.J. RPC 3.3(a)(1). The Rules of Professional Conduct can supply a clear mandate of public policy under CEPA. See Weiss v. Carpenter, Bennett, & Morrissey, 143 N.J. 420, 442, 672 A.2d 1132, 1144 (1996)(citing Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 72, 417 A.2d 505, 512 (1980)). While there is no direct evidence that Sunkett in fact believed that an ethical violation was taking place at the time he objected, a reasonable jury could infer as much from his long career as a practicing attorney, and his presumed familiarity with the Rules of Professional Conduct. Cf. Regan v. City of New Brunswick, 305 N.J.Super. 342, 356, 702 A.2d 523, 530 (App.Div.1997) (<HOLDING>). Thus, given the remaining factors I discussed
holding that section 1983 actions based on violation of the fourth amendment may not rest on violation of state law holding officer could testify based on his training and experience that a defendants actions were consistent with selling cocaine holding that court could properly infer that veteran officer believed there was a violation of the law based on his long experience with law enforcement holding there was no evidence a reasonably prudent employee in similar circumstances would have believed facts reported by plaintiff were a violation of law holding that in deciding whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity it is not only the evidence of clearly established law that is for the court but also whether a reasonable officer could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful in light of the information the officer had