other acts evidence to show “knowledge” or lack of “knowledge” was limited. The potential of the proffered other acts evidence for unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, and considerations of undue delay substantially outweighed the probative value of the preferred evidence. Had the evidence been admitted, there would have been mini-trials about Dr. Callahan’s prior surgeries on Haar, Uhing, Nohr, and Meng. Despite these cases being defended by the same law firm, Dr. Callahan’s counsel stated that they were not prepared for such mini-trials. Such mini-trials would risk dis tracting the jury with competing evidence on allegations by other patients against Dr. Callahan. In addition, admission of the other acts evidence could have opened the door App.2002) (<HOLDING>); Persichini v. William Beaumont Hosp., 238
holding that plaintiffs claim that medical providers did not comply with baker act was not subject to medical malpractice statutes ajlthough a medical diagnosis is necessary in order to involuntarily commit a patient the process of complying with the statute does not require medical skill or judgment holding that the proper standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence holding that evidence of prior similar acts was not proof of medical malpractice or whether the doctor lacked the proper degree of knowledge or skill holding that parents claims of outrage and negligent handling of a body were not subject to the medical malpractice statutes because hospital personnel did not engage in any medical skill or judgment in the disposition of the childs remains holding that the trial court did not err in disallowing evidence of alleged previous act of medical malpractice against defendant noting that the general rule in a suit for negligence is that evidence of similar acts or omissions on other and different occasions is not admissible