(III) (B). 25 Jones v. State, 318 Ga. App. 26, 36 (5) (733 SE2d 72) (2012); see Kidwell v. State, 264 Ga. 427, 432 (10) (444 SE2d 789) (1994) (“Since the grant or denial of a motion to sever is left in the discretion of the trial court, its ruling will only be reversed for an abuse of discretion . . . .”) (punctuation omitted). 26 Jones, 318 Ga. App. at 36 (5) (punctuation omitted); accord McClendon v. State, 299 Ga. 611, 615 (3) (791 SE2d 69) (2016). 27 Jones, 318 Ga. App. at 36 (5) (punctuation omitted); see Kidwell, 264 Ga. at 432 (10) (“The burden is on the defendant requesting the severance to ‘make a clear showing of prejudice_’ ”) (punctuation omitted). 28 Jones, 318 Ga. App. at 36 (5) (punctuation omitted); see Kidwell, 264 Ga. at 432 (10). 29 See McClendon, 299 Ga. at 615 (3) (<HOLDING>); Jones, 318 Ga. App. at 36 (5) (holding that
holding that trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion to sever because codefendants defenses were not antagonistic holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to amend complaint because the proposed amendment would have been futile holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to continue trial three months where although trial was complex and records were voluminous court had already granted two prior continuances and continuance of three weeks was sufficient to prepare for trial holding that trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion to sever because trial of three defendants would not create confusion