this apportionment. In support of its claim, Philadelphia Indemnity cites three cases, all of which are inapplicable because they involve the question of apportionment between negligent parties and criminals who are deemed intentional tortfeasors. See Stellas v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 702 So.2d 232 (Fla.1997); Merrill Crossings Assocs. v. McDonald, 705 So.2d 560 (Fla.1997); Slawson v. Fast Food Enters., 671 So.2d 255 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). In these cases, this Court and the Florida Supreme Court clarified that, when a negligence claim involves an intentional tort, the intentional tortfeasor should not be listed on the verdict form. In particular, the courts stressed that liability should not be apportioned between a negligent party and a criminal. See Stellas, 702 So.2d at 233-34 (<HOLDING>); Merrill Crossings, 705 So.2d at 562-63 (same
holding that attacker who smashed car window and stole purse should not be listed on verdict form holding that a verdict form specifying the jurys mitigation findings is not required holding that a motion for directed verdict should be granted if there is no evidence on which a jury could legally base a verdict for damages against the moving party holding that a district court did not err by submitting a special verdict form to the jury this particular verdict form did not specify a standard of proof holding that a defendant in a medical malpractice case who acquiesced to a general verdict form despite several theories of breach could not then challenge the verdict on the basis that jurors may have relied on a theory not supported by sufficient evidence