is on the evidence required to prove "domestic abuse," and raises an issue not previously decided: What constitutes domestic abuse resulting from physical harm for purposes of the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act? As relevant to this case, "domestic abuse" is defined as "any act of physical harm ... which is committed by an adult ... against another adult ... who are or were in a dating relationship." 22 0.8.2011 § 60.1(1). "A victim of domestic abuse.... may seek relief undér the provisions of the Protection from Domes-tie Abuse Act." 22 0.8. Supp. 2018 § 60.2. A. Evidence Necessary to Prove Physical Harm ¶ 10 Berry argues that this Court has previously declined to define "physical harm" as that term is used in the Act. See Marquette v. Marquette, 1984 OK CIV APP 25, 686 P.2d 990 (<HOLDING>). Berry's reliance on Marquette is misplaced
holding that for an initial civil commitment the state has the burden of proof recognizing that the preponderance of the evidence is the quantum of proof in civil cases recognizing that the beyondareasonabledoubt standard of proof is appropriate in criminal cases due to the gravity of the private interests affected and the severe societal loss that occurs when an individual is erroneously subject to criminal punishment holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant holding the act is civil not eriminal in nature and refusing to adopt the beyondareasonabledoubt burden of proof applicable in criminal cases