the matter as a “disbarment” proceeding in its motion for summary judgment. Further, the October 19, 2001 order granting summary judgment did not determine whether disbarment was the appropriate remedy for Wightman-Cervantes’ violations of the disciplinary rules. That issue was scheduled for a separate hearing, which the judgment of disbarment reflects occurred on January 11, 2002. Wightman-Cervantes has made no claim that he did not have fair notice of the January 11, 2002 hearing. Wightman-Cervantes does not appear to have moved for a continuance of the summary judgment hearing, nor did he prosecute his appeal therefrom. In light of all of those circumstances, we hold that he was not deprived of due process under the applicable federal standard. See Smith, 123 F.Supp.2d at 357 (<HOLDING>). IV We turn next to Wightman-Cervantes’
holding that due process rights were not violated when alien claimed a lack of actual notice but his attorney received notice holding basic elements of due process are notice and a right to be heard holding that procedural due process requires adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard holding that attorney received due process where circuit court afforded attorney notice and opportunity to be heard before suspending him and later disbarring him holding that where appellant was put on notice of disciplinary charges against him and was afforded opportunity to respond to boards recommendation demands of due process were satisfied