is statutory surplus-age under any analysis. In making that assertion, the majority opinion conflates the definition of "persons” in the mass action provision with "claimants” and "members of a purported class” in the general public exception. See Russell v. Law Enforcement Assistance Admin., 637 F.2d 354, 356 (5th Cir.1981) (recognizing the “well settled rule of statutory construction that where different language is used in the same connection in different parts of a statute it is presumed that the Legislature intended a different meaning and effect,” and holding that a “claimant” under one provision was not an "applicant or grantee” within the meaning of another provision (citation omitted)); cf. Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 1702, 1707-08, 182 L.Ed.2d 720 (2012)
recognizing that the legislature would not generally use a different meaning for the same word in a legislative provision unless a different purpose was intended holding that the term individual in the torture victim protection act meant natural person but reiterating that courts should respect congress decision to use different terms to describe different categories of people or things citation omitted holding that the legislature intends different meanings when it uses different terms in a statute holding that the plaintiffs had relied on illinois law because they could have filed in a different forum having a different statute of limitations holding that the defrauding of different people over an extended period of time using different means and representations may constitute but one scheme