complaints according to the relief sought in deciding real-party-in-interest issues, “[m]ost have rejected [that approach] and viewed the complaint as a whole,” and noting that “Illinois law appears to be in accord, with the latter view” (citing People ex rel. Hartigan v. Lann, 225 Ill.App.3d 236, 167 Ill. Dec. 252, 587 N.E.2d 521 (1992)); Abbott Labs., 341 F.Supp.2d at 1062 (rejecting defendant’s argument that the court should split the State’s complaint into two categories — claims made on behalf of private entities and claims made on behalf of the State- — and instead holding that “most courts analyze real party in interest questions by examining the state’s interest in a lawsuit as a whole”)); Illinois ex rel. Scott v. Hunt Int’l Resources Corp., 481 F.Supp. 71, 74 (N.D.Ill.1979) (<HOLDING>). Under that approach, viewing a State’s
recognizing that authorized representative may be general or only for a certain claim holding that a a representative plaintiff acts as fiduciary for the others requiring the representative to act in the best interest of class holding that the amount of a commission to be awarded to the personal representative requires the exercise of judicial discretion and judgment by the clerk who has original jurisdiction in the matter holding that the organizational plaintiff has representative standing to assert ada violations only in so far as the named member has standing holding that a court should look past a named party that does not have a pecuniary interest in the case to unnamed parties only in cases that involve the collusive naming of a representative    to create jurisdiction    on the other hand the good faith naming of a representative that defeats federal jurisdiction has long been allowed citations omitted