context, the initial burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the running of the statute of limitations. See Tiberi v. Cigna Corp., 89 F.3d 1423, 1428 (10th Cir.1996). If that initial burden is met, it then becomes the non-moving party’s “burden of proving the existence of facts which, if proven true, would warrant a tolling of the statute[ ] of limitation[s].” Id. Because our jurisdiction in this case is premised upon diversity of citizenship, we apply the familiar rule of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), and look to Oklahoma law to resolve whether claims are barred by the statute of limitations, see Guaranty Trust v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079 (1945) (<HOLDING>). In so doing, we are “required to apply the
recognizing that missouri statutes of limitations are procedural not substantive and merely suspend the remedy without extinguishing the right holding that time limits in title vii are not jurisdictional but are instead like statutes of limitations holding that statutes of limitations are considered substantive matters for purposes of the erie doctrine holding that substantive aspects of claims under federal discrimination statutes and fcra are identical holding such statutes are not analogous statutes of limitation for erisa purposes