(defining “coercion” as used in Penal Code). 5 . Tex.R. Civ. P. 91. 6 . Id, R. 166a. 7 . Id. R. 91a. 8 . See In re Essex Ins. Co., 450 S.W.3d 524, 528 (Tex.2014) (per curiam) (granting mandamus relief to remedy trial court’s erroneous denial of Rule 91a dismissal motion; reasoning, under Texas Supreme Court's contemporary mandamus standards, that remedy of ordinary appeal after final judgment was "inadequate” because immediate relief "is appropriate to spare the parties and the public the time and money spent on fatally flawed proceedings” (citing In re John G. & Marie Stella Kenedy Mem'l Found., 315 S.W.3d 519, 523 (Tex.2010) (quoting In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex.2004)))). 9 . See, e.g., State ex ret Lykos v. Fine, 330 S.W.3d 904, 919 (Tex.Crim.App.2011) (<HOLDING>); see also id. at 909 (observing that Texas
holding that ricos reference to state law is not meant to incorporate state procedural law holding that new york common law must be applied to determine whether the parties formed an oral settlement agreement and state statutory law must be applied to determine whether the agreement if any is enforceable holding that the trial court did not need to conduct an evidentiary hearing when the dispute could be resolved as a matter of law holding that there is no basis under texas law to conduct a pretrial evidentiary hearing to determine the as applied constitutionality of a state penal law or state criminal procedural statute and that such a challenge must await trial holding that a state statute that affects the governments ultimate liability is to be applied as substantive state law under the ftca