The issues we are asked to consider are whether Mr. Warlick had a fiduciary duty owed to the other stockholders and whether he breached this duty, and, whether Mr. War-lick has a basis to claim appellants are equitably estopped from attacking his premium received for his stock. South Carolina has long followed the general rule that corporate stock is personal property which the owner may “dispose of ... as he sees fit.” Alderman v. Alderman, 178 S. C. 9, 43, 181 S. E. 897, 911 (1935); accord,, e.g., McLeod v. Sandy Island Corp., 265 S. C. 1, 7, 216 S. E. (2d) 746, 748 (1975). Concomitantly, when selling stock, stockholders must “necessarily act for themselves, and not as trustees for other stockholders.” Swinney v. Keebler Co., 480 F. (2d) 573, 577 (4th Cir. 1973) (citation omitted) (<HOLDING>). This general rule applies as well to majority
recognizing south carolina as a jurisdiction where service on statutory agent is exclusive holding that under south carolina law slander is actionable per se where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery holding jury charge is proper if as a whole it is free from error and reflects the current and correct law of south carolina holding that a foreign subsidiary that is not registered to do business in north carolina has no place of business employees or bank accounts in north carolina does not design manufacture or advertise its products in north carolina and does not solicit business in north carolina cannot be subject to personal jurisdiction in north carolina even if some of the companys products do enter north carolina through the stream of commerce recognizing south carolina as the governing law and finding no south carolina cases directly on point the court referred to applicable law from other jurisdictions