A. Promissory Estoppel Jury question number 38 inquired about RCC’s promise to develop and build the hospital, but that topic is expressly covered by the Partnership Agreement. Dr. Cravens argues that sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding because CNDH paid $1.5 million in rent to the Partnership and because Willmar contributed the $4.8 million Property to the Partnership, but the rent matter is expressly covered by the Lease Agreement between CNDH and the Partnership, and the Property contribution is • expressly covered by both the Contribution Agreement and the Partnership Agreement; Dr. Cravens obtained a favorable' jury finding on his breaeh-of-contract claim but elected not to recover under that theory. As explained below, w 46 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2004, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Dr. Cravens points to no evidence in
holding that a party may recover attorneys fees under section 38001 only if the party prevails on a cause of action for which attorneys fees are available and recovers damages holding party not entitled to recover attorneys fees without also recoveringdamages for breach of contract in part because attorney fees are in the nature of costs not damages holding that lexis fees are not taxable as costs but reserving ruling on whether such fees are recoverable as attorneys fees holding attorney fees not allowable as costs holding that although attorneys fees are usually not recoverable unless permitted by statute or contract contractual or statutory authorization was not necessary in a malpractice claim to recover attorneys fees and costs as damages