turn to Count VII, where Hawk seeks to hold the City liable under § 1983 ratification theory. To do so, Hawk must show a “persistent failure to take disciplinary action against officers” who use excessive force, which “can give rise to the inference that a municipality has ratified conduct, thereby establishing a ‘custom’ within the meaning of Monell [v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) ].” Fundiller v. City of Cooper City, 111 F.2d 1436, 1443 (11th Cir.1985). The problem with Hawk’s argument, as noted above, is that he cannot point to a widespread practice of excessive force to begin with. Without that, his contention that the City deliberately ignored an unconstitutional custom or policy has been cut off at the knees. See ir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Jones v. City of Dothan, 121 F.3d 1456, 1458
holding force to be an element of pre1994 amendment  111 which may be satisfied by proof of force or threat of force holding that where an officer threw an arrestee against a van kneed him in the back pushed his head into the side of a van and searched his groin area in an uncomfortable manner such force was de minimis force holding that the protective sweep of a van was lawful where officers stopped the van on reasonable suspicion that the driver had just committed an armed bank robbery and officers could not see inside the van to determine whether other occupants posed a danger to them holding circumstances supporting reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop of occupants of a van included that the van was located near the vicinity where officers had reports earlier that evening of breakins involving a van holding that state trooper used excessive force under section 1983 in making arrest where trooper vented anger by striking arrestee on head arms and ribs and by kicking arrestee in groin while he was lying on his stomach