previously served the warrant, that department must have known that it was outdated.” 325 Md. at 219, 600 A.2d at 117. The policy basis for our decision is simple: imputing the knowledge of any evidence held by one prosecutor to another prosecutor within the same office will, potentially, avoid problems of intentional shielding of information and the existence of artificially created circumstances in which prosecutors can “plausibly deny” having had access to any exculpatory evidence. As noted in Swanson, regarding a prosecutor’s disclosure of exculpatory evidence during a trial as opposed to diligently investigating and disclosing such evidence to defense counsel prior to trial, “If a prosecutor’s response, T told you as soon as I knew,’ is accepted to permit police withholding of 03) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has articulated, instead,
holding that prosecutors are held to even higher standards of conduct than other attorneys due to their unique role as both advocate and minister of justice recognizing that an employer had a dual role as administrator of plan and as employer and only the role of administrator was held to a fiduciary standard holding that state prosecutors agreements with defendant not binding on federal prosecutors holding that a district attorneys duty to preserve exculpatory evidence would arise from his role as an officer of the court charged to do justice an act or an omission concerning such a duty cannot be construed as only administrative or investigative it too is necessarily related to the prosecutors preparation to prosecute holding that when prosecutors who after conviction of criminal defendant acting solely as investigators acquired and withheld exculpatory evidence after their role in the prosecution had ended are not entitled to any more immunity than the defendant police officers