which, in respects other than those stated in Clause (a), falls short of the standard to which the reasonable man should conform in order to protect himself from harm. The Dormans argue that the evidence does not support the type of contributory negligence described in paragraph (a). However, paragraph (a) is inapplicable to the facts. Rather, we think the evidence here presents a situation that fits squarely into paragraph (b). See Peavler, 557 N.E.2d at 1081 (“It is sufficient if the injury resulting from [plaintiffs] failure to exercise ordinary care is such as was usual and therefore might have been expected.”). Accordingly, we conclude that the ev .2d 81 (U.S.Ill.1978); Mitchell Engineering Co., A Div. of CECO Corp. v. Summit Realty Co., 647 S.W.2d 130, 141-42 (Mo.App.1982) (<HOLDING>); Purgess v. Sharrock, 33 F.3d 134, 143-44 (2nd
holding that it is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself holding that the pleading standard set forth in twombly applies to all civil actions holding that plea in bar may be based only on grounds set forth in statute holding that affidavits must set forth facts admissible in evidence and explain its conclusions holding that summits adoption of the facts set forth in mitchells brief was admissible