despite the fact that Bill did not owe her anything at the time of the divorce, he had bound himself to a contract to pay her a portion of his military retirement. Parol evidence was not necessary for the trial court’s determination. But, we also agree with Clarissa’s contention that the common understanding .of “accrued” is not “vested.” She claims that it is commonly understood that retirement accrues, or adds up, as time goes forward, and that is a reasonable and honest interpretation. We further agree that Bill’s interpretation would render the paragraph meaningless. If Bill’s interpretation had prevailed, the paragraph would have simply stated that Clarissa would not receive any of Bill’s military-retirement pay. See Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Davison, 250 Ark. 35, 463 S.W.2d 652 (1971) (<HOLDING>). We also agree with Clarissa’s reasoning that
holding that a contract should be read to give reasonable meaning to all provisions of that contract holding that if the contract can be given a definite and certain meaning or interpretation the contract is not ambiguous and will be construed by the court as a matter of law holding that contracts should be interpreted to give effect to all provisions holding that construction that neutralizes any provision of a contract should not be adopted if the contract can be construed to give effect to all provisions recognizing that a contract is to be construed to give reasonable effect to each of its provisions