court’s dismissal of the charges with prejudice. {17} To the contrary, in the City’s written response to Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the City specifically argued that the district court did not need to review the legal issue of the propriety of the municipal court’s dismissal of the charges with prejudice, and it made no arguments regarding whether the dismissal was improper under a de novo standard of review. Without taking any additional evidence or holding a hearing, the district court simply entered a ruling and denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss. In its order, the district court did not address the propriety of the lower court’s dismissal with prejudice or whether a second trial de novo was appropriate. See State v. Lizzol, 2007-NMSC-024, ¶ 24, 141 N.M. 705, 160 P.3d 886 (<HOLDING>). The district court only stated that it was
holding that the government could appeal a criminal sentence without violating the double jeopardy clause when congress expressly authorized such an appeal holding that a sua sponte dismissal of the charges during trial was not an acquittal that barred retrial based on double jeopardy holding that the trial courts dismissal of the charges after jeopardy had attached based on the prosecution witnesses failure to appear was not an acquittal and therefore double jeopardy did not prevent the court from reconsidering its decision and reinstating the charges recognizing the specific need for an appropriate double jeopardy review when an appeal is taken by the state from a lower courts dismissal of the criminal charges holding that the dismissal of criminal charges for evidentiary insufficiency is an acquittal for purposes of the double jeopardy clause