should be upheld. The court recognizes that “the right the official is alleged to have violated must have been ‘clearly established’ in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). The Anderson court went on to point out, however, that “[t]his is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful.” Id., citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 535, n. 12, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2820 n. 12, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985); contra Juarbe-Angueira v. Arias, 831 F.2d 11, 13 (1st Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>) quoting Mendez-Palou v. Rohena-Betancourt, 813
holding that transit authority director was entitled to immunity despite jury verdict for plaintiffs because law was not clearly established at the time that plaintiffs activities were constitutionally protected from employer retaliation recognizing that qualified immunity shields officials unless the plaintiff demonstrates the defendant violated a constitutional right that was clearly established holding that officials are entitled to qualified immunity unless at the time of the dismissal it was clearly established that employees in the particular positions at issue in light of the responsibilities inherent in those positions were constitutionally protected from patronage dismissal  holding that plaintiffs complaint stated a claim for a constitutional deprivation but that the contours of the right at issue were not clearly established and that official was therefore entitled to qualified immunity holding that a plaintiff who seeks damages for violation of constitutional or statutory rights may overcome the defendant officials qualified immunity only by showing that those rights were clearly established at the time of the conductat issue