problem discussed in the Bell memorandum, seems to us to raise a strong inference that the crack on the accident helicopter was likewise not visible prior to the crash. In the face of these materials, McSwain’s affidavit offers no explanation of how he formed the opinion that the crack on the accident spar differed from those subsequently discovered on the rest of the Fort Rucker fleet. McSwain not only fails to identify the specific facts upon which his opinion was based, but also manifests no awareness of the pattern found in the other helicopters. We thus feel compelled to liken this case to those in which an expert’s failure to explain the basis for an important inference mandates exclusion of his or her opinion. See Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1202 (11th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). To find McSwain’s opinion reliable, a
holding that the general principles of rule 702 recognized by the daubert decision are applicable to other species of expert testimony holding finding of reliability not clearly erroneous despite lack of prior description holding expert opinion to fall short of what daubert requires when finding of reliability would require several scientifically unsupported leaps of faith  holding that the basic gatekeeping obligation of daubert applies to all expert testimony holding that federal rules of evidence require trial courts to hold hearingsreferred to as daubert hearingsto determine reliability of scientific expert testimony before admission at trial