of being an accessory before the fact on a felony indictment charging the defendant as a principal and that such a conviction does not violate “the notification requirements of due process.” It follows, there fore, that the Commonwealth is entitled, under Code § 19.2-286, to an accessory-before-the-fact instruction on a felony indictment even when the defendant is not charged in the indictment with being an accessory before the fact to the felony. This conclusion is also compelled by the plain language of Code § 18.2-18, which provides, in pertinent part, that “every accessory before the fact may be indicted, tried, convicted and punished in all respects as if a principal in the first degree.” (Emphasis added.) See Hyman v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 891, 892-98, 147 S.E.2d 156, 157 (1966) (<HOLDING>); Sutton v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 654, 668-69,
holding that the amendment of the indictment was permissible under the statutory predecessor to code  192231 because the amendment did not within the meaning of the statute change the nature of the offense charged in the original indictment holding that an indictment that is substantially in the language of the code is sufficient inform and substance holding that there was no jurisdictional defect when the language of the charging document tracked the statutory language even though the facts proffered at the plea hearing were insufficient to establish that the defendant committed the crime recognizing that where the statutory language is not ambiguous  the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute must be given effect holding that pursuant to the same perfectly plain language of the statutory predecessor of code  18218 the defendant could properly be convicted as an accessory before the fact on an indictment charging statutory burglary