Rather, suppression is required only if the jurisdictional requirement is one of “those statutory requirements that directly and substantially implements] the congressional intention to limit the use of intercept procedures to those situations clearly calling for the employment of this extraordinary investigative device.” United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 527, 94 S.Ct. 1820, 40 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974); see United States v. Radcliff, 331 F.3d 1153, 1162 (10th Cir. 2003) (extending this rule to suppression for facial insufficiency under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)(ii)). Applying this test, we conclude that suppression is not required for the district court’s authorization of wiretaps beyond the court’s territorial jurisdiction. See Adams v. Lankford, 788 F.2d 1493, 1500 (11th Cir. 1986) (<HOLDING>). But see United States v. Glover, 736 F.3d
holding that thirtyday commissary and cell restrictions did not implicate due process concerns holding unconstitutional 18 usc  922q as beyond congresss commerce clause power holding that because code  19260 a procedural statute did not expressly provide a right of suppression of evidence a violation of that provision did not require application of the exclusionary rule in the absence of a constitutional violation holding that authorization of a wiretap order beyond the territorial restrictions in 18 usc  25183 does not require suppression because the statutory violation would not implicate congresss core concerns underlying title iii holding suppression not available remedy for violation of 18 usc  1321 et seq