lands be managed so as to protect “scenic, ... ecological, [and] environmental ... values”). In addition, we see no evidence of intent to foreclose judicial review. The Commission’s rules contemplate participation in proceedings before the Commission by persons whose interests in the property at issue “would likely be more significantly, distinctively, or uniquely affected in character or kind by the proposed zoning action than those of other persons in the general public,” 11 DCMR § 3022.3(f)(5) (2011). Moreover, in contested cases the D.C. Administrative Procedure Act authorizes any person “adversely affected or aggrieved” by an agency order to seek judicial review. See D.C.Code § 2-510(a) (2001-2012); Capitol Hill Restoration Soc. v. Zoning Comm’n, 287 A.2d 101, 105 (D.C.1972) (<HOLDING>). We therefore conclude that WELAG has both
holding that the presumption of agency discretion recognized in chaney has a long history and contrary to the plaintiffs assertion is not limited to cases brought under the apa holding that district courts lack jurisdiction to review denied applications when deportation proceedings are pending holding that judicial review under apa standards is alone sufficient to preclude a bivens action holding that proceedings approving pud applications are contested cases under dc apa holding that dc circuit has no jurisdiction to determine remedies under standard contract