material in Hicks). 27 . 467 U.S. at 958-59, 104 S.Ct. 2839 (citations omitted). See also Sabri, 541 U.S. at 610, 124 S.Ct. 1941 (citing "Monaghan, Over-breadth, 1981 S.Ct. Rev. 1, 24 (observing that overbreadth is a function of substantive First Amendment law)”). 28 . 458 U.S. 747, , 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978) (citations omitted) (reaffirming general standing principles but stating that "this Court’s long history of insistence that Fourth Amendment rights are personal in nature has already answered many of these traditional standing inquiries, and we think that definition of those rights is more properly placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than within that of standing”) (citations omitted); State v. Klima, 934 S.W.2d 109, 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (<HOLDING>). 44 . See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91,
holding courts are powerless to rule on fourth amendment rights which do not belong to the parties before them and that a defendant cannot convincingly argue surprise in such circumstances because he carries the burden of proving the extent of his fourth amendment rights from the outset holding that the site of the injury does not invariably determine choice of law when the most substantial relationships of the parties and the dominant interest of the forum require application of another states law holding that when regulations are intended to have different purposes and are not dependent on each other they are not intertwined holding that fourth amendment claims are not cognizable on habeas review because the fourth amendment exclusionary rule does not relate to the accuracy of the factfinding process recognizing that the application of fourth amendment rights are personal in nature and are invariably intertwined with the concept of standing