Count Twelve.) 6 . The Court notes that Gilbert's argument that he would be prejudiced by his inability to examine Troutman at a joint trial is without merit. The mere possibility of a co-defendant’s exculpatory testimony is an insufficient reason for severance. United States v. Studley, 892 F.2d 518, 525 (7th Cir.1989). A "mere possibility” of Troutman's testimony, however, is all Gilbert has presented as Trout-man may exercise her Fifth Amendment right not to testify even if Gilbert were tried separately. In addition, contrary to Gilbert’s argument (R. 109, Gilbert Reply at 25), he would not be allowed to ask the jury to draw inferences from Troutman's refusal to answer questions even if he were tried separately. See United States v. Mabrook, 301 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir.2002)
holding that we have never found that it is permissible for a jury to make an inference from the invocation of a witnesss assertion of the fifth amendment holding that trial court may draw adverse inference from habeas petitioners silence as result of fifth amendment invocation during deposition holding that the statement ill take the fifth was an assertion of the fifth amendment privilege holding that juveniles request for parent is invocation of fifth amendment rights holding adverse inference permissible in the face of defendants repeated invocation of fifth amendment privilege in discovery responses