the Court were to conclude that the term “disbursements” was ambiguous, such that it was proper to consider the legislative history, the Court would conclude that the legislative history supports a broad definition of “disbursements” which is not limited to a debtor’s “legal obligations.” Indeed, Congress considered and rejected basing fees on “a debtor’s liabilities,” a term which includes “anything for which a person is legally bound or obligated.” See Webster’s New World Dictionary a In non-accounting jargon, an expense is a disbursement. Therefore, we conclude that section 1930(a)(6) requires a determination of whose expense is being paid by the disbursement of cash, regardless of who actually writes the check or when it is posted on the Debtors’ accounting records.” Id. at 47-48 (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The
holding that while it is unconstitutional to imprison someone for failure to pay a debt it is constitutional to imprison someone for failure to pay a fine the term debt is to be understood as an obligation arising otherwise than from the sentence of a court for the breach of the public peace or commission of a crime holding that by using the term liability which must refer to the duty or legal responsibility to pay money on a tort claim the legislature intended the otca limits to include attorney fees and costs recognizing that an insurers obligation to pay for prenotification legal expenses is concomitant with its right to control the defense and that a contrary result would require the insurer to pay for those defense costs which it had no opportunity to control holding that it is plain error for a trial court to require a defendant to pay courtappointed attorney fees in the absence of legally sufficient evidence that defendant has the ability to pay the amount imposed recognizing that the term disbursements extends beyond the entity with the legal obligation to pay a debt and may include the one who benefitted by the expense but was not legally obligated to pay it