jurors during voir dire whether they would be able to serve impartially despite the outburst. No juror said that the outburst would prejudice their decision, and there is no indication on the record that the outburst “so affected the jury’s ability to consider the totality of the evidence fairly that it tainted the verdict.” Id. at 981 (citations omitted). Equally important, the district court’s fair, matter-of-fact explanation of the circumstances of McCormac’s earlier out burst and his careful inquiry into the jurors’ ability to remain impartial were sufficient to cure any prejudicial effects, because juries are presumed to heed cautionary instructions by the court. See United States v. Randall, 162 F.3d 557, 559 (9th Cir.1998); Lii v. United States, 198 F.2d 109, 111 (9th Cir.1952) (<HOLDING>). Were we to adopt a contrary rule and find
recognizing that a party that objects to a jury instruction before the jury retires may challenge the instruction on appeal holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendants request for severance because the district court nullified any prejudicial error when it repeatedly admonished the jury throughout the trial to consider the evidence only against the defendant to whom it related and at the end of trial gave the jury instructions that admonished the jury to consider separately each offense and evidence in support of each offense holding that a jury is presumed to follow the trial courts instructions holding that a jury is presumed to heed the district courts instruction to disregard the fact that the defendants were held in contempt and admonished before the jury holding that improper statement was rendered harmless because the district court sustained the defendants objection  and admonished the jury to disregard the statement