a person for investigative purposes’ if he ‘has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot.’ ” Provet, 405 S.C. at 108, 747 S.E.2d at 457 (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989)). “Violation of motor vehicle codes provides an officer reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop.” Id. (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977)). “A traffic stop supported by reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation remains valid until the purpose of the traffic stop has been completed.” Id. (citing Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333, 129 S.Ct. 781, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009)); see Rodriguez v. United States, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1616, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015) (<HOLDING>). However, “[o]nce the underlying basis for the
holding that an officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop even when his suspicion that a law has been violated is based on a reasonable mistake of law holding this framework applies whether the traffic stop is based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion holding that even a de minimis extension of a traffic stop is unconstitutional absent reasonable suspicion holding that the delay of approximately two minutes that occurred prior to the police officer developing reasonable suspicion to further investigate the defendants identity was de minimis and did not unreasonably extend the duration of the traffic stop holding that a traffic stop is valid under the fourth amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring