did not award attorneys’ fees in addition to those earned under the fee agreement. The point, consequently, does not affect the enforceability of the fee contract. See Rasmussen, 329 S.E.2d at 543. 2. Attorney Discharged Before Fulfillment of the Agreement Sweeney also argues that because F & W was discharged before the termination of the case it should not be paid on a contingency basis. Sweeney states that after Brockington left F & W Sweeney discharged the firm in order to continue her attorney-client relationship with Brockington, Hinton, Butters, and Ponsoldt. Because F & W was discharged prior to the realization of the contingency, Sweeney argues that F & W should be relegated to quantum meruit recovery. Myszka v. Henson & Henson, P.C., 170 Ga.App. 878, 318 S.E.2d 672, 673 (1984) (<HOLDING>). See also Zaklama, 906 F.2d at 652 (stating
holding that where plaintiff did not seek to rescind a contract and only sought quantum meruit recovery after a jury had determined an enforceable contract existed plaintiff was limited to recovery under the contract holding that the evidence was insufficient for the statute of limitations to bar recovery of a quantum meruit cause of action holding that aln attorney who is employed under a contingent fee contract and discharged pri or to the occurrence of the contingency is limited to quantum meruit recovery for the reasonable value of the services rendered to the client and may not recover the full amount of the agreed contingent fee holding quantum meruit unavailable to remedy invalid contract holding that a discharged firms recovery is limited to quantum meruit