Brace’s order to stop. However, by making such an assertion, defendant concedes that the State offered Meredith’s testimony to show why defendant acted in the manner that he did — specifically, that after Brace initially ordered him to stop, he ran and continued to run despite Brace’s additional orders to stop. As Gonzales explained, such evidence is an exception to the hearsay rule. Gonzales, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 954, 884 N.E.2d at 239. However, even if the State had not offered this statement to show why defendant acted in the manner that he did, its admission would still have been proper. The command “Stop” is not subject to the credibility problems that the hearsay rule was designed to prevent. See, for example, In re Keith C., 378 Ill. App. 3d 252, 265, 880 N.E.2d 1157, 1170 (2007) (<HOLDING>). However, no “truth of the matter asserted” is
holding that the admission of testimonial statements against a defendant is unconstitutional when the declarant does not appear at trial unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for crossexamination holding that the district court did not err in relying on hearsay evidence where the government offered reasons why its hearsay evidence had indicia of reliability and the court considered the reliability of the evidence in deciding the weight to give the hearsay evidence holding that it was permissible for the state to test the credibility of appellants trial testimony by crossexamination holding that the primary rationale for the exclusion of hearsay testimony is the inability of the opposition to test the testimonys reliability through crossexamination of the outofcourt declarant holding that when declarant is unavailable outofcourt statements that are testimonial are inadmissible even if they meet an exception to the hearsay rules