each case” and decide whether an officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting a violation of the law. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (citations omitted). Applying this test to the facts at hand, we are satisfied that the District Court did not err in upholding the validity of the search. Agent Wolfe did not act on “hunch” alone. He observed that Wing-field wore an empty cell phone clip on his belt, and verified that Wingfield’s parole prohibited him from carrying a portable phone. Based on these facts we find that Agent Wolfe reasonably suspected that Wingfield possessed a cell phone in violation of his parole. Accordingly, the resulting detention and search met constitutional requirements. See Hill, 967 F.2d at 909 (<HOLDING>). Put another way, we find it reasonable to
holding officer may search vehicle for weapons if officer has reasonable belief based on articulable facts that officer or another may be in danger holding that when an officer has reasonable suspicion that a probationer who is already subject to a search condition pursuant to his probation agreement is engaged in criminal activity then there is enough likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring that an intrusion on the probationers  privacy interests is reasonable holding that it is reasonable to allow a parole officer to conduct a search whenever he reasonably believes that is necessary to perform his duties as long as the search is based on specific facts holding defendant does not waive fourth amendment protection by signing parole agreement but the search condition does confirm right of parole officer to conduct reasonable searches within scope of parole mission holding parolee consented to search of his email based on the parole agreement