meaning of the language is plain, we apply that meaning. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶ 45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. "Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or special definitional meaning." Id. Our analysis of statutory language also may be aided by considering prior decisions examining the relevant statutory provisions. See DeHart v. Wis. Mut. Ins. Co., 2007 WI 91, ¶ 15, 302 Wis. 2d 564, 734 N.W.2d 394. ¶ 24. Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(4) was enacted in response to our decision in Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 39, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962). See Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 532, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976) (<HOLDING>). In Holytz, 17 Wis. 2d at 39, we abrogated the
recognizing that what is now  893804 is the codification of holytz holding that communication was initiated by the question well what is going to happen to me now holding that what is a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech recognizing the supreme courts articulation of the new test and stating that the sole question now is whether there is clear evidence that congress intended to provide such a remedy holding that what is important is not simply that the element at issue is defined in terms of what it does but that the term as the name for a structure has a reasonably well understood meaning in the art