residents according the 1990 U.S. census. Accordingly, Sharper contends the “one-person, one-vote” principal “has been codified into state law.” (Doc. 199, p. 5.) Thus, his claims should not be dismissed on this basis. It is well established that the “one-person, one-vote” principle of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the judiciary. Wells v. Edwards, 347 F.Supp. 453 (M.D.La.1972), aff'd, 409 U.S. 1095, 93 S.Ct. 904, 34 L.Ed.2d 679 (1973). However, vote dilution and “one-person, one-vote” claims are distinct. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 402-03, 111 S.Ct. 2354, 115 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 954 (4th Cir.1992); see also Voter Info. Project, Inc. v. City of Baton Rouge, 612 F.2d 208, 210-12 (5th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, Wells does not require this Court
recognizing distinction between claims grounded in oneperson onevote and vote dilution in a rule 12b6 challenge to an atlarge method of electing state and city judges recognizing distinction between smith and mcdonnell recognizing distinction between two types of waiver recognizing this distinction recognizing distinction between tolling and estoppel