interim rate application and bypassed the hearing requirements of Section 62-6-4(D) when it determined that ANs 16, 17, and 18 failed to meet the Commission’s Rule 27 pleading burden for interim rates. The Commission later denied Tri-State’s motion for a rehearing of the interim rate case, stating that “[tjhis Docket is closed.” The Commission, by its own words, made a final determination that the case for Tri-State’s interim rates would not be heard because Tri-State’s advice notices did not satisfy the burden imposed by the Commission’s regulations. It is also the repetitive nature of issues such as those in this case that compels us to deny the motion to dismiss this appeal based on mootness. See Cobb v. State Canvassing Bd., 2006-NMSC-034, ¶¶ 23, 29-31, 140 N.M. 77, 140 P.3d 498 (<HOLDING>); Howell v. Heim, 1994-NMSC-103, ¶ 7, 118 N.M.
holding that a party may not invoke the capable of repetition yet evading review exception where its failure to obtain prompt relief has prevented judicial review recognizing a mootness exception for abortion litigation because pregnancy  truly could be capable of repetition yet evading review  holding that we have no difficulty concluding that challenge to expired fiveyear npdes permit was capable of repetition yet evading review holding that we may review moot cases that either 1 present issues of substantial public interest or 2 are capable of repetition yet evade review holding ease not moot when challenged administrative order expired because icc proceedings are continuing and their consideration ought not be defeated by short term orders capable of repetition yet evading review