we conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for Officer Hargis on Kane’s claim. IV For the reasons set forth, we affirm both the district court’s denial of summary judgment on the excessive force claim and its grants of summary judgment on the denial of medical treatment and malicious prosecution claims. AFFIRMED. 1 . Kane also contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Officer Hargis on her section 1983 claim that his prosecution of her for destroying state property was malicious and violated her right to due process. This contention has no merit. Because Kane was originally convicted in this prosecution, the prosecution was not even malicious under Virginia law, Morrison v. Jones, 551 F.2d 939, 940 (4th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>); Cramer v. Crutchfield, 648 F.2d 943, 946 (4th
holding that a necessary element for malicious prosecution under virginia law is lack of probable cause holding the same for malicious prosecution holding that a determination of probable cause does not bar a state law malicious prosecution claim where the claim is based on the police officers supplying false information to establish probable cause holding that the plaintiff must show that there was a lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution recognizing tennessee law requires the absence of probable cause to maintain a malicious prosecution claim