de novo on all issues bearing on the proper sentence.” Teffeteller v. State, 495 So.2d 744, 745 (Fla.1986). In noncapital cases, too, we have concluded that “resentencing entitles the defendant to a de novo sentencing hearing with the full array of due process rights.” Trotter v. State, 825 So.2d 362, 367-68 (Fla.2002); see also Galindez v. State, 955 So.2d 517, 525 (Fla.2007) (Cantero, J., specially concurring) (“We have consistently held that resentencing proceedings must be a ‘clean slate,’ meaning that the defendant’s vacated sentence becomes a ‘nullity’ and his ‘resentencing should proceed de novo on all issues bearing on the proper sentence.’ ” (citation omitted)); Walker, 988 So.2d at 8 (Altenbernd, J., concurring specially) (“Generally, courts have held that once a def A 1998) (<HOLDING>); Baldwin v. State, 700 So.2d 95, 96 (Fla. 2d
holding that at resentencing the state must present evidence on an enhanced sentencing factor despite having done so at the prior sentencing hearing holding that the state had the burden of proving the defendants two prior convictions in order to obtain the felony dui conviction holding that at a resentencing the state must again prove the basis for an enhanced sentence even though such evidence was produced at the original sentencing holding that even though the defendant did not challenge his prior convictions at the original sentencing lawofthecase principles do not insulate the state from proving them at resentencing holding that at resentencing on violation of probation trial court may revise guidelines scoresheet to reflect prior convictions mistakenly omitted from the original through no fault of the defendant