583 A.2d 1037 (1991); Brooks v. State, 104 Md.App. 203, 211, 655 A.2d 1311, cert. denied, 339 Md. 641, 664 A.2d 885 (1995). Here, the court fully instructed the jury on what constitutes a conspiracy; the court was not required to explain to the jury what does not constitute a conspiracy. To be sure, discrete portions of the evidence, when divorced from the larger evidentiary context, do reflect some “single buyer-seller transactions.” Yet it strains credulity to suggest that the requested buyer-seller instruction is fairly generated under the facts of this case. The federal courts of appeal have held that defendants are not entitled to the buyer-seller instruction in circumstances like those in the present case. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Medina, 279 F.3d 105, 120 (1st Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied sub nom. Perez-Colon v. United
holding the large quantity of drugs sufficient evidence of intent to distribute holding that the sale of drugs in small quantities is inadequate without additional evidence to support a finding of conspiracy to distribute drugs to others because the seller could reasonably believe that such purchases are intended for the buyers personal use holding that while a simple buy and sell transaction is not sufficient for proof of a conspiracy repeated transactions for large quantities are sufficient to support an inference that the buyer and seller were engaged in a conspiracy holding that trial court did not err in refusing to give instruction that mere buyerseller relationship in single transaction does not alone support a conspiracy conviction where there was evidence of advanced planning among the alleged conspirators to deal in wholesale quantities of drugs obviously not intended for personal use holding that the evidence did not plausibly support a buyerseller instruction because overwhelming evidence showed that defendants agreed to import drugs with the intent to distribute them and engaged in repeated transactions of large quantities of narcotic drugs for resale