we think there should be every presumption that it was such in fact.’ ” In re Navis Realty, Inc., supra, 193 B.R. 1011. In evaluating this issue, the court appreciates the view that although a legislative body may label a pecuniary charge as being interest, the charge may nevertheless be so excessively onerous either in a general sense or within the meaning of 12 U.S.C. § 1825 (b) (3) that the legislative designation must be rejected and the charge must be viewed as a penalty. The charge imposed under § 12-146, however, is not so grossly outside the “ ‘range fixed as compensation for the use of money by private agreement’ ” that the court should disregard the General Assembly’s characterization of the rate as being an interest charge. Id.; accord In re Liuzzo, supra, 204 B.R. 239-40 (<HOLDING>). In summary, based on the plain language of §
holding petitioner could not deduct real estate taxes imposed on property he did not own because these taxes were not imposed on him holding that 18 percent interest on delinquent real property taxes under florida law is not in nature of penalty holding that for purposes of former bankruptcy statute 11 usc  57j charge imposed on delinquent taxes is for interest and not penalty holding that florida courts would apply florida law to contracts insuring real property located within the state holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property