in a thirty-year prison term. We note also the conclusion of some cases that vagueness in matters pertaining to the sentencing proceeding may not result in fourteenth amendment violations as readily as vagueness in the definition of the elements of a crime. State v. Payton, 361 So.2d 866, 871 (La.1978). It is clear to us, however, that functionally, the aggravating factors in the Act are indistinguishable, for this purpose, from the elements of a crime. For example, no more or less than premeditation under our prior law, proof of an aggravating factor could mark the difference between imprisonment and death. There is no reason for requiring definiteness in the former but not in the latter. See Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 438, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 1857, 68 L.Ed.2d 270, 278 (1981) (<HOLDING>). But see Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447,
holding double jeopardy clause applicable to civil penalties under the false claims act holding that double jeopardy clause did not apply to forfeiture proceeding before the court holding double jeopardy clause applicable to capital sentencing proceeding because of procedural similarities to trial of guilt holding that a delinquency proceeding places a juvenile in jeopardy for purposes of the double jeopardy clause holding the double jeopardy clause applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment