which the Sherman Act was meant to be applied.” See Srmth, 978 F.Supp. at 218'. Smith argues that the district court erred in limiting the application of the Sherman Act to the NCAA’s commercial and business activities. We disagree. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides, in relevant part, that “[ejvery contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” 15 U.S.C. § 1. Although the section literally prohibits “every” contract, section 1 does not preclude all restraints on trade, but only those that are unreasonable. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 73, 102 S.Ct. 2540, 2545, 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982) (<HOLDING>); see also McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F.Supp.
holding that injury to broker through loss of commission was not antitrust injury holding that a plaintiff must show antitrust injury in order to bring an antitrust lawsuit holding that a subscriber to a health plan who had employed the services of a psychologist alleged a redressable antitrust injury holding that an antitrust injury is a necessary element of a  2 claim holding that there must be a causal connection between the alleged antitrust violation and the antitrust injury for there to be antitrust standing