by the defendant “were too indefinite, vague, and general to be considered as anything more than expressions of expectation or probability and therefore are not actionable as fraudulent[.]” Id. at 332-33. Thus, Comcast’s general contention is that the same inadequacy in Mrs. McKenzie’s contract claim ultimately thwarts her fraud claim as well. The current situation, however, is distinguishable from Goldstein because that case also relied on the experience of the parties. Id. at 333. The court explained that because both parties were attorneys, they knew that the representations made were too vague to be relied upon. Id. (“This situation was not one in which one party was a sophisticated business entity and the other an inexperienced consumer.”); cf. Dunnaville, 21 F.Supp.2d at 534-35 (<HOLDING>). In contrast, Mrs. McKenzie is not an
holding that promissory estoppel is applicable only in the absence of an enforceable contract holding in the context of a promissory estoppel claim that reasonable businessmen could not have relied on a statement that they had a deal when so many terms of the transaction were up in the air holding that the absence of a binding agreement does not defeat a promissory estoppel claim holding that unenforceable promises cannot form the basis for a claim of promissory estoppel holding that when the basis of the earlier suit was that the plaintiff had had defaulted on a promissory note and the claim in the instant action is whether that promissory note was valid the transaction test is met