v. Liu, 28 Haw. 145, 148 (1924). Or as the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has put it, the “‘negligent entrustment’ [of an automobile] as a distinct and specific cause of action is not exclusive of, but, rather, is derived from the more general concepts of ownership, operation, and use of a motor vehicle.” Barnstable County Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Lally, 374 Mass. 602, 605-06, 373 N.E.2d 966, 969 (1978). Id. at 340-41, 713 P.2d at 430-31 (some brackets added and some in original) (footnote omitted). In the present case, the ICA held that negligent supervision and neg .1988) (finding “no practical difference” between negligent supervision and negligent entrustment under similar circumstances); Taylor v. American Fire and Cas. Co., 925 P.2d 1279, 1282-83 (Utah Ct.App. 1996) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 936 P.2d 407 (Utah 1997). This
holding that negligent supervision is inseparable from the use of the motor vehicle holding that negligent supervision is inextricably intertwined with the motor vehicle involved in the accident and collecting decisions from fourteen other jurisdictions reaching the same holding holding that the wcabs decision that an employees motor vehicle accident did not cause his injuries precluded a subsequent tort action on the same issue holding that the sensible and popular understanding of what a motor vehicle accident entails necessarily involves the motor vehicle being operated as a motor vehicle  holding that when a jurisdictional issue arises from the same statute that creates the cause of action or in other words is intertwined with the merits of the case such intertwined jurisdictional question may be resolved pursuant to the same standards as a motion to dismiss under fedrcivp 12b6