be considered thus indicate that the court limited its decision to the § 3553(a) factors enumerated in § 3583(e). LeBoeuf has not shown any error under the first prong of the plain error test. Moreover, even assuming, arguendo, that the district court improperly considered the punishment factor of § 3553(a)(2)(A), LeBoeuf cannot meet the second prong of plain error review because the error was not clear or obvious. At the time of the district court proceedings, our own circuit law as to whether the court could consider § 3553(a)(2)(A) when imposing a revocation sentence was unsettled, see, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 369 Fed.Appx. 608, 608 (5th Cir.2010) (declining to decide the issue), and there was a split among our sister circuits. Compare, e.g., Miqbel, 444 F.3d at 1182 (<HOLDING>) with United States v. Lewis, 498 F.3d 393,
holding that reasonableness review applies to a sentence imposed upon a revocation of supervised release holding that standard for revocation of probation is preponderance of the evidence holding that reliance on  3553a2a for a revocation sentence is improper holding that reasonable reliance is not an element of the defense holding that the maximum revocation sentence is the top of the guidelines range