court’s January 29, 1991, decision from the bench. On January 29, 1991, the bankruptcy court explained that the IRS was not enjoined from proceeding lawfully to enforce debtor’s outstanding tax liabilities not paid under her plan. See Tr. at 8 (Jan. 29, 1991). By enjoining the IRS from proceeding against debt- or, the bankruptcy court intended only to prevent future violations of the automatic stay in this bankruptcy proceeding. Id. (stating that a “clean lifetime letter” was not intended but that “[t]he sort of thing that has transpired again and again shall not continue”). 13 . Accord Small Business Admin. v. Rinehart, 887 F.2d 165, 169-70 (8th Cir.1989); Inslaw, 113 B.R. at 810; In re Lile, 103 B.R. 830, 835 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.1989); see also In re Gustafson, 934 F.2d 216 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); cf. In re Pearson, 917 F.2d 1215, 1216 (9th
holding that the plaintiffs  5629 action against the defendant for alleged fraudulent transfers was subject to the automatic stay provision 11 usc  362a recognizing fdcpa claim for violation of bankruptcy codes automatic stay provision 11 usc  362 which explicitly provides private cause of action holding that a state is immune by virtue of 11 usc  106c from money damages for violating the automatic stay provision of 11 usc  362a holding that debtor did not prove that defendant creditors violated automatic stay under 11 usc  362a with respect to their actions in a state court lawsuit because the creditors actions involved a counterclaim that debtor asserted and were in response to that counterclaim holding rule 11 sanction proceeding was exempt from automatic stay