on all but one o g to object to remarks in a prosecutor’s closing argument is cognizable in a motion for postconviction relief. See Eure v. State, 764 So.2d 798, 801 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Ross v. State, 726 So.2d 317, 318 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). Moreover, it is improper argument for the prosecutor to suggest that the only way to believe the accused’s version of events is to disbelieve a witness’s testimony. See Clewis v. State, 605 So.2d 974 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. Because the attachments to the trial court’s order fail to refute Perry’s claim regarding trial counsel’s failure to object to improper closing argument, we reverse for an evidentiary hearing. See Goswick v. State, 658 So.2d 1215 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (<HOLDING>). Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
holding that the prejudice prong of strickland was not met in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the prosecutors misstatement of law where the trial court properly instructed the jury holding that reversal required where trial court did not attach portions of the transcripts to refute claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to object to improper closing argument holding trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to improper argument about defendants exercise of his right to a jury trial and stating that the prosecution cannot use the defendants exercise of specific fundamental constitutional guarantees against him at trial holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel holding that failure to object to admissible evidence was not ineffective assistance of counsel