guilt by association and thus deprived him of a fair trial, especially in light of the exclusion of some of his rebuttal evidence. See United States v. Waters, 627 F.3d 345, 354-56 (9th Cir.2010). Because this case is being sent back for a new trial, we need not reach this issue. It suffices to say that the charge here relates to a false tax return filed on behalf of a tax-exempt organization, and does not allege material support to terrorism. We are confident that the district court will recognize the fine line separating necessary and probative evidence of willful falsity from evidence that would cast Seda in the role of a terrorist based on appeals to fear and guilt by association and thereby unduly prejudice the proceedings. United States v. Elfgeeh, 515 F.3d 100, 127 (2d Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND
holding that direct evidence linking a crime to the particular place to be searched is not required to support a finding of probable cause holding it is fundamental error to convict a defendant of crime not charged and which is not a lesser included offense of the charged crime holding there is no unfair prejudice when the prior act is no more sensational or disturbing than the evidence admitted directly supporting the crimes with which the defendant was charged holding that bankruptcy is no exception to the due process principle that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party to or to which he has not been made a party by service of process internal quotation marks omitted recognizing that evidence linking a defendant to terrorism in a trial in which he is not charged with terrorism is likely to cause undue prejudice