in the face of a justifiable request for delay’ violates the right to the assistance of counsel.” Morris, 461 U.S. at 11, 103 S.Ct. 1610 (quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964)); see also United States v. Scopo, 861 F.2d 339, 342-44 (2nd Cir.1988) (finding no abuse of discretion and no Sixth Amendment violation in denying a motion to continue). When counsel seeks a continuance because of a scheduling conflict, the court cannot arbitrarily deny the motion when the effect is to deny the defendant’s limited right to counsel of choice. See Morris, 461 U.S. at 11, 103 S.Ct. 1610; see also Rasmussen, 881 F.2d at 401 & 402 (citing Morris, 461 U.S. at 11-12, 103 S.Ct. 1610 and Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589, 84 S.Ct. 841); Hughey, 147 F.3d at 426-33 (<HOLDING>); Neal v. State of Texas, 870 F.2d 312, 316
holding that a motion to continue a hearing on a postjudgment motion was ineffective to extend the period for the trial court to rule on the motion absent the express consent of the parties holding that the district courts denial of a motion to continue based on defense counsels scheduling conflict was not arbitrary holding that appeal from denial of rule 60b motion raised for review only the district courts order of denial and not the underlying judgment itself recognizing the conflict holding that the district courts denial of motion to continue even though it required counsel to withdraw due to a scheduling conflict protected the adversarial process and the defendants substantial rights