physical force requirement would therefore not apply. Thus, Defendant’s 2005 conviction for gross sexual imposition under Ohio Rev.Code § 2907.05(A)(1) was for an offense that had as an element “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force” and was therefore a crime of violence as defined in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). This result is consistent with the inclusion of “forcible sex offenses” in the enumeration of “crimes of violence” in the application notes to the definition section relevant to the Career Offender Guideline. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 cmt., n.l. This Court has relied in the past on the enumeration of offenses in the application notes to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 when reviewing career offender sentence enhancements. See United States v. Wood, 209 F.3d 847, 851 (6th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Relying on Wynn, 579 F.3d 567, Defendant
holding that violence is synonymous with force in affirming armed robbery conviction holding that bank robbery by force and violence or intimidation under 18 usc  2113a is a crime of violence holding that robbery is a crime of violence for purposes of habitualoffender sentencing holding conviction for robbery under alabama statute a crime of violence both because the statute involved physical force and because robbery was one of the enumerated offenses in comment note 1 to ussg  4b12 holding that where the states definition of robbery has on its face the element of use or threatened use of physical force a robbery conviction is properly used as a predicate under acca