P.2d 177. A proponent cannot meet this burden by simply denying a discriminatory motive or professing good faith. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Rather, a proponent must proffer justifications that are: (1) neutral; (2) related to the particular case to be tried; (3) reasonably specific and clear; and (4) legitimate. See id. at 98 n. 20, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (“[T]he prosecutor must give a ‘clear and reasonably spec 4, 630, 111 S.Ct. 2077, 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (1991) (extending the Batson rule to the use of peremptory challenges by private litigants in civil cases); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992) (applying Batson to criminal defendants’ use of peremptory challenges); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 146, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 17 Throughout its Batson jurisprudence, the
holding that the equal protection clause also prohibits discrimination in jury selection on the basis of gender holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause holding intentional gender discrimination in public employment by persons acting under color of state law violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and is actionable under section 1983 holding race and gender discrimination claim barred recognizing that potential jurors as well as litigants have a right based in the equal protection clause to nondiscriminatory jury selection procedures