meaning of section 1326(d). See DeLeon, 444 F.3d at 50 & n. 7. The appellant nonetheless strives to circumvent this failure by asserting that his waiver was neither knowing nor intelligent and, accordingly, he should be excused from the exhaustion requirement. Several courts have recognized an exception to the exhaustion requirement for cases in which the alien’s waiver of administrative review was not knowing and intel ligent. See, e.g., Richardson v. United States, 558 F.3d 216, 219-20 (3d Cir.2009); United States v. Sosa, 387 F.3d 131, 136 (2d Cir.2004); United States v. Martinez-Rocha, 337 F.3d 566, 569 (6th Cir.2003); United States v. Muro-Inclan, 249 F.3d 1180, 1183 (9th Cir.2001); see also United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 840, 107 S.Ct. 2148, 95 L.Ed.2d 772 (1987) (<HOLDING>). We have reserved judgment on whether to
holding that review of an original removal decision and a subsequent removal order are distinct holding that due to statute defendant cannot collaterally attack prior convictions used to enhance sentence unless in violation of the right to counsel holding that court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to review aliens habeas claims seeking review of expedited removal order including whether expedited removal statute was lawfully applied to alien and whether expedited removal procedures violated his right to due process because language of section 1252e5 clearly precludes review in habeas proceedings of whether alien is actually inadmissible or entitled to any relief from removal holding prior to enactment of section 1326d that a person charged with illegal reentry has a constitutional right to collaterally attack the underlying removal order when a due process violation in a removal proceeding amounts to a complete deprivation of judicial review holding that a habeas petitioner cannot collaterally attack the conviction serving as a predicate for a removal order