account number. Most of the remaining information consists of descriptive data about the individual claims to which the vouchers pertain. The vouchers also contain the names and social security numbers of the individual payees. They do not, however, contain the appellant’s name or social security number. Therefore, they are not records about the appellant, and their release did not violate his Privacy Act rights. Moreover, because the DFAS spreadsheet and the Automated Miscellaneous Vouchers are not about the appellant, he lacks standing to oppose their release. Rights under the Privacy Act are personal to the subject of the record. They cannot be asserted derivatively by third parties, including a criminal defendant. See, e.g., Word v. United States, 604 F.2d 1127, 1129 (8th Cir.l979)(<HOLDING>). We conclude that the appellant’s third
holding that the exclusionary rule is available only to the person whose constitutional rights were violated in the gathering of challenged evidence the remedy for violation of the privacy act is vested by statute in the individual whose records were improperly released not in a third party criminal defendant against whom the records are used holding that in the absence of an adequate state remedy one whose constitutional rights are violated has a direct claim against the state under the state constitution holding that constitutional right of privacy does not apply to medical records recognizing a constitutional right of privacy in mental health records holding that  510 provides a remedy for employees whose pension rights have vested and whose  injury is the lost opportunity to accrue additional benefits