(3d Cir.1970); Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d 369 (8th Cir.1943). While the federal courts of appeals have not reached a consensus about how the theory of respondeat superior applies specifically in RICO cases brought under § 1962(c), the Third, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have all found that where, as here, the defendant corporation is not the Enterprise itself, the corporation is liable for the acts of its officers. Cox v. Administrator United States Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1405 (11th Cir.1994) (citing Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co., 824 F.2d 1349, 1361-62 (3rd Cir.1987)) (finding that “theories of respondeat superior ... are not out of place” where the defendants named are not the section 1962(c) enterprise); Davis v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 367, 379 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has held that
holding that the acts of a corporate officer done in his or her official capacity are acts of the corporation holding that the principal is liable for an agents acts committed within the scope of the agents employment holding that a corporation is held responsible for acts not within the agents corporate powers strictly construed but which the agent has assumed to perform for the corporation when employing the corporate powers actually authorized and in such eases there need be no written authority under seal or vote of the corporation in order to constitute the agency or to authorize the act holding that no  prohibition  prevents the imposition of liability vicariously on corporate persons on account of the acts of their agents particularly where the corporation benefitted by those acts holding president and vicepresident of real estate corporation accountable for discriminatory acts of their agents whether or not the officers directed or authorized the particular discriminatory acts that occurred