officer to a violent response is immaterial to the application and validity of Code § 18.2-460(C). Martilla, therefore, is distinguishable from the case at hand. For these reasons, we hold that Code § 18.2-460(C) does not reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech and is not facially violative of the First Amendment. III. Wise further contends Code § 18.2-460(0 is unconstitutional as applied to him because his statements, taken in context, do not rise to the level of “fighting words.” The Commonwealth responds that “fighting words” are not necessary for a conviction under the statute and Code § 18.2-460(C) “is clearly and properly applicable” to Wise’s behavior. We agree with the Commonwealth. According to the off -32, 94 S.Ct. 970, 972, 39 L.Ed.2d 214 (1974) (<HOLDING>); Gooding, Warden v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518,
holding a georgia statute that criminalized using opprobrious words or abusive language tending to cause a breach of peace unconstitutional because first amendment protections forbid the states to punish the use of words or language not within narrowly limited classes of speech  holding unconstitutionally broad a statute prohibiting the use of opprobrious language toward or with reference to any member of the city police while in the actual performance of his duty holding that the clause any dispute that shall arise between the parties  with reference to the interpretation of this agreement or their rights with respect to any transaction involved was broad holding that instructions are sufficient which substantially follow the language of the statute or use equivalent language holding unconstitutional a statute barring the use of opprobrious words or abusive language tending to cause a breach of the peace