employees. For example, Bateman complains that the FDIC employees failed to exercise due care when they told him that the FDIC had a “bona fide intention” of selling the Note to him. He also alleges negligence by Leal in representing to Bateman that Leal would present the agreements to the CRC and that CRC approval would be forthcoming. He further claims that he suffered damages due to his reliance on these representations. A claim based on such allegations amounts to an assertion of “negligent misrepresentation” (as it is entitled in the proposed amendment). See Neal, 460 U.S. at 296, 103 S.Ct. 1089 (“[T]he essence of an action for misrepresentation ... is the communication of information on which the recipient relies.”); Jimenez-Nieves v. United States, 682 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Bateman cannot transform his
holding that breach of contract claim related back to misrepresentation claim because operative facts upon which the breach of contract claim was based were contained in the misrepresentation counts of the original complaint holding that the furnishing of misleading information cannot support a claim for negligent misrepresentation the information must be false holding that misrepresentation was essential to plaintiffs claim holding that the essential element for determining whether or not a claim was a misrepresentation claim within the meaning of section 2680h was reliance by the plaintiff upon the false information holding that reasonable reliance is not an element of the defense