back condition, he would have found her disabled. As discussed above, however, it was not the ALJ’s duty to develop the record in such a manner. Because the ALJ’s determination that Mayes was not disabled was supported by substantial evidence, and because the ALJ applied the correct legal standard, we affirm the ALJ’s disability determination, as well as the district court’s affirmance of that determination. III. REMAND REQUEST BASED ON NEW EVIDENCE. A. Standard of Review. Mayes requests a remand of her case to the ALJ for consideration of the herniated disc diagnosis. There has been some confusion about what standard applies to this court’s review of a district court’s ruling on a request to remand a case to an ALJ for consideration of new evidence. See Har-man, 211 F.3d at 1176 n. 5 (<HOLDING>). We now clarify the standard. In 1990, the
recognizing abuse of discretion rather than de novo standard of review recognizing that different panels of the ninth circuit have applied an abuse of discretion standard and a de novo standard in reviewing district court remand decisions holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion recognizing that the standard of review for issues of statutory interpretation and construction is de novo recognizing de novo standard of review