recognize that the WPA’s exclusive remedy does not directly control the result here, given that Plaintiff does not directly allege a WPA violation. That is, Plaintiff alleges that she was discharged in retaliation for reporting violations of law to her superiors, and such reporting does not fall ■within the ambit of the WPA. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.362 (prohibiting discharge for reporting violations of law to a “public body”). Nevertheless, her argument that a common law cause of action lies rests on the reasoning in Watassek, which in turn premised a pre-1981 common law cause of action on the subsequent passage of the WPA, rather than on case law. Watassek is neither controlling nor persuasive. We find more persuasive Covell v. Spengler, 141 Mich.App. 76, 366 N.W.2d 76, 79-80 (1985) (<HOLDING>), as well as Shuttleworth v. Riverside
holding that no commonlaw cause of action for a discharge in retaliation for reporting violations existed before passage of the wpa which thereafter became the exclusive remedy for an employee whose employment is terminated in retaliation for reporting an employers violation of the law holding that a union employee protected by a collective bargaining agreement was in no different position than an atwill employee and could similarly maintain an action for wrongful discharge for reporting workplace safety violations recognizing the difference between statutory cause of action for retaliation and common law tort of retaliatory discharge recognizing that indiana courts do not extend the wrongful discharge exception to the employmentatwill doctrine to employees whose employment is terminated for whistleblowing or reporting their employers misdeeds holding employee has cause of action for retaliatory discharge in contravention of public policy where employee was fired for reporting fellow employees alleged criminal activities to local law enforcement