N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387 (stating that one of the versions of our six-month rule was “implemented ... in response to Barker [v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972),]” in which the United States Supreme Court laid out the test for evaluating a potential speedy trial violation under the Sixth Amendment). In metropolitan court, if the State is unable to commence trial within 182 days, it can petition the court for extensions of time for up to thirty days total under Rule 7-5 06 (C)(5). See Rule 7-506(C)(5) (allowing the court to grant extensions under “exceptional circumstances”). But to re-file a dismissed case just prior to the expiration of the 182-day period with the hope or intention of gaining an additional 182 days does not comport with the spirit oftherule. See Savedra, 2010-NMSC-025, ¶ 5 (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we
holding that compliance with rule 3 is both a mandatory and jurisdictional prerequisite to appeal internal quotation marks omitted recognizing that absent illegality we do not weigh the wisdom of any particular employment decision internal quotation marks and citation omitted holding that apprendi error is harmless if the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the result would have been the same absent the error internal quotation marks and citation omitted holding that a statute must be construed so that no part of the statute is rendered surplusage or superfluous internal quotation marks and citation omitted holding that strategic refiling in district court violatefd the spirit of the sixmonth rule internal quotation marks and citation omitted