a collective-bargaining agreement, even if pled as a state law cause of action to enforce a contract, are removable to federal court. Id. In addition to claims under § 301 of the LMRA, the Supreme Court has determined that Congress intended the complete-preemption doctrine to apply to state law causes of action that fit within the scope of ERISA’s civil-enforcement provisions. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 66, 107 S.Ct. 1542. In Metropolitan Life, the Court explicated: [T]he legislative history consistently sets out [Congress’s] clear intention to make § 502(a)(1)(B) suits brought by participants or beneficiaries federal questions for the purposes of federal court jurisdiction in like manner as § 301 of [the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U. , 1314 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Sofo v. Pan-American Life Ins. Co., 13 F.3d
holding that erisa preempts the texas dtpa because plaintiff relied on state law to advance his complaint that his benefits under the plan were terminated holding that because an erisa plan is not a participant beneficiary or fiduciary subject matter jurisdiction did not exist under  502e of erisa over a suit brought by such a plan holding that a plan participant or beneficiary may not recover extracontractual damages in an erisa suit for breach of fiduciary duty under  502a2 and 409a only the plan may recover damages in such cases holding that erisa does not preempt the plaintiffs claim that the erisa plan administrator is liable for medical malpractice where the plaintiff premised the claim solely on state law and did not invoke the erisa plan holding that removal was proper because state law claim alleging that plan fiduciary was demoted and terminated for refusing to violate erisa fell within  502a2  3