(S.D.N.Y.1972), in which the district court decided that the defendants implicitly conferred authority on their attorney . to receive process. Opp’n to CARCO’s Mot. at 2-3. In Bosur-gi however, the defendants retained their attorneys for the purpose of asserting a right to a fund, the attainment of which “necessarily required the attorneys to resist the claims to the fund asserted by . other parties.” 343 F.Supp. at 818. Consequently, as the Bosurgi court notes, “receipt of process by the attorney 834 F.Supp. 99, 102 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (noting that “[t]his court has specifically stated that an attorney does not become a client’s agent for service of process simply because she represented the client in an earlier action”); McLaughlin v. Fidelity Sec. Life Ins., 667 A.2d 105, 106 (D.C.1995) (<HOLDING>). 3. The Court Directs the Plaintiff to Perfect
holding that a defendants actual knowledge that an action is pending or that service has been attempted is not the equivalent of service of summons and will not relieve the plaintiff of its burden or vest the court with jurisdiction holding that an attempted service on the partys counsel was insufficient without proof of the counsels actual authority to receive service holding that service is not avoided by service on a partys attorney as service on an attorney is ineffective unless he has been authorized to accept such service recognizing that it is well settled law that an action is commenced by the service of a summons and without valid service of process the trial court has no jurisdiction to act holding that service of subpoena on plaintiffs counsel as opposed to the plaintiff himself renders such service a nullity