defense in response to the application for attorneys fees. At the time the Secretary raised the defense, the meaning of “final judgment” in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (1982) was still undefined. It was unclear at that time whether fee applications had to be filed within 30 days of an appealable judgment by a District Court or within 30 days of the end of the appellate process. See Massachusetts Union of Public Housing Tenants, Inc. v. Pierce, 755 F.2d 177, 179 (D.C.Cir.1985) (noting conflict in circuits); id. at 180 (noting that Action on Smoking & Health v. CAB, 713 F.2d 795 (D.C.Cir.1983) (per curiam) left issue open). Under these circumstances, we find the Secretary’s position substantially justified. Compare Massachusetts Fair Share v. LEAA, 776 F.2d 1066, 1068-69 (D.C.Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>) with Grace v. Burger, 763 F.2d 457, 459
holding that the governments position must have a reasonable basis in both law and fact citations omitted holding governments position unreasonable where government advanced no legal authority for its position and applicable principle of law was long settled recognizing this principle as a settled rule holding that the directors litigating position was not entitled to chevron deference but did warrant skidmore respect on certain issues where the arguments were persuasive and the agencys manual and practice had for some time consistently advanced a reasonable position recognizing that the government agreed not to take a position