Shipp told all contractors at the site that Oncor had transformers located on the property and that these transformers “were to be left alone and treated as energ energized electrical transformer was not contemporaneous with Murillo’s injury, it is insufficient to create liability for general negligence. Without evidence of contemporaneous conduct, Murillo’s claim against Oncor is “a nonfeasance theory, based on [Oncor’s] failure to take measures to .make the property safe,” and not an activity “based on affirmative, contemporaneous conduct by [Oncor] that caused the injury.” See Del Lago Partners, 307 S.W.3d at 776. Texas courts have consistently considered similar circumstances under a premises-liability theory. See, e.g., Shell Chem. Co. v. Lamb, 493 S.W.2d 742, 748 (Tex.1973) (<HOLDING>); Shell Oil Co. v. Songer, 710 S.W.2d 615,
holding that where contract between contractor and subcontractor allowed subcontractor to recover if contractor recovered contractor was not barred from bringing suit on behalf of subcontractor holding that a clause making payment by the owner an express condition precedent to payment by the general contractor to the subcontractor was enforceable holding that premises owner had no duty to warn electrical subcontractor of potential for electric shock from condition which subcontractor was hired to repair holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution holding that the owner could maintain a 93a claim against the subcontractor where there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the owner was the thirdparty beneficiary of the contract between the general contractor and the subcontractor