were to begin making specific sentencing recommendations that were routinely followed, it would naturally invite defense counsel to argue that cooperating witnesses were now being furnished with an even greater incentive to say whatever they believed necessary to obtain the most lenient recommendation. Such considerations no doubt explain, at least in part, the policy on the part of the United States Attorneys not to recommend specific sentences. While we appreciate the desire of Judge Platt for a specific recommendation, if he feels that he is unable to make an informed judgment on sentences for cooperating defendants without a specific recommendation, then we believe the proper course is to recuse himself from such cases. See United States v. Snyder, 235 F.3d 42, 46 (1st Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). We conclude by emphasizing that we are not
holding that recusal was justified if not mandated where the district judge could not bring himself to do what the law required in imposing a sentence in accordance with the sentencing guidelines holding that where appellant moved to recuse trial judge from deciding the motion for new trial the judge of the administrative district was required to designate a judge to hear the recusal motion holding that sentencing court could consider whether the applicable guidelines were outdated and disproportionate but that imposing sentence based on the guidelines did not render sentence substantively unreasonable holding recusal not required holding that party who had sought disqualification of the judge who heard his cause only from the assignment judge and not the judge himself could not appropriately raise recusal issue on appeal