of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever. Laws that in terms impose sanctions on speech or writing beyond the needs of remedying such injuries, whether statutory or common law, are restraints and restrictions forbidden by section 8. See Deras v. Myers, 272 Or 47, 535 P2d 541 (1975). Given the interrelation of our two explicit sections on freedom of speech and press and the right to a remedy for injury to reputation, a statute that matches financial compensation for unintentional defamation to demonstrable injuries measurable in money arguably exhausts the scope of that remedy under article I, section 8. In any event, it satisfies article I, section 10.” 281 Or at 224-25. See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra, 418 US at 348-50 (<HOLDING>). Wheeler and Davidson relate specifically to
holding that under  1983 violations of constitutional rights are actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury holding that a 32 to 1 ratio of compensation to actual damages is not punitive holding that under the first amendment where there is no proof of actual malice damages are limited to actual injury which excludes punitive damages but is not limited to outofpocket loss holding that recovery is limited to actual compensatory damages holding without discussion of the punitive damages issue that judgment for embezzlement which included actual and punitive damages was nondischargeable