is confident that, in determining the sequence in which motions will be considered, North Carolina judges will continue to be mindful of longstanding exceptions to the mootness rule and other factors affecting traditional notions of justice and fair play. See, e.g., Simeon v. Hardin, 339 N.C. 358, 371, 451 S.E.2d 858, 867 (1994) (concluding that even assuming the named plaintiff’s claims were moot, termination of the class representative’s claim did not moot the claims of the unnamed members of the class because the claim was “ ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’ therefore, the plaintiff could continue to represent the interests of the class if the action were certified) (citation omitted); see also Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 52, 114 L. Ed. 2d 49, 60 (1991) (<HOLDING>) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
holding that the mere existence of individualized factual questions with respect to the class representatives claim will not bar class certification recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members recognizing that  some claims are so inherently transitory that the trial court will not have even enough time to rule on a motion for class certification before the proposed representatives individual interest expires  holding that district court has discretion under appropriate circumstances to rule on summary judgment motion before addressing pending class certification motion holding that under wilkerson it was error for district court to deny class action certification motion of named plaintiffs whose claims were resolved after filing motion for class certification but before district court decided motion