interest under the first prong of the Mathews test, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, would carry slightly more gravity assuming her Second Amendment rights were implicated than they would otherwise, but the difference would be marginal — the Court takes Hightower’s interest in self-defense seriously regardless of whether it is seen as “constitutionalized” or “extra-constitutional,” see Section IV. B.ii above — and the final two prongs of the Court’s Mathews analysis, as well as the ultimate outcome of that analysis, would remain the same. As to the substantive due process claim, the presence of a valid Second Amendment claim would preclude the Court from engaging in a substantive due process analysis. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395,
holding that the constitutional rights in a termination proceeding  are derived from the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the united states constitution and not the sixth amendment holding that when a prisoners deliberate indifference claim is covered by the eighth amendment the substantive due process claims are duplicative and thus the substantive due process claims should be dismissed holding that where a particular amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior that amendment not the more generalized notion of substantive due process must be the guide for analyzing these claims  holding in five separate opinions that  1983 claim based on persons arrest cannot be brought under substantive due process where more specific constitutional provision  fourth amendment  applies holding that a substantive due process challenge is unavailable where there is an explicit textual source of constitutional protection