for the Government’s position. The operative question here — whether Nash’s conviction was an adult conviction — was simply not addressed in Orlando-Mena. Admittedly, the court did take a somewhat more holistic approach to analyzing the nature of the conviction, which, at least in part, considered the nature of the sentence. This is consistent with Second Circuit precedent. See United States v. Cuello, 357 F.3d 162, 168-69 (2d Cir.2004) (considering the “substance” of the prior youthful offender adjudication for the purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 and concluding it constituted an “adult conviction” because “defendant was indisputably tried and convicted in an adult forum, and [ ] defendant served his sentence in an adult prison”); United States v. Driskell, 277 F.3d 150, 154 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). To the extent these cases suggest the nature
holding that a defendant cannot collaterally challenge a prior conviction used to calculate criminal history points holding that an adjudication under new yorks youthful offender statute does not operate as an expungement of the defendants conviction and the conviction may be considered in calculating criminal history holding that district courts should look to the substance of the past conviction when determining whether a youthful offender conviction should be considered an adult conviction for the pur poses of including criminal history points under ussg  4a11 and 4a12 holding that an aggravated misdemeanor conviction under section 7191 is a felony for purposes of assessing criminal history points under ussg  4a12c holding that in determining whether a prior conviction is a violent felony a court generally must look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense