of the government’s key witness, Officer Russell, in two ways. First, the prosecutor directly vouched for Officer Russell’s testimony by st ell’s testimony by suggesting to the jury that the officer was credible because the prosecutor and the court were monitoring the truthfulness of his testimony and had the power to penalize the officer if he lied. The prosecutor told the jurors that for them to believe Officer Russell lied in his testimony they also would have to believe he “lied to this judge” and “lied to me and I’m prosecuting this case.” The prosecutor argued that if the officer lied in his testimony he would “risk losing his job, risk losing his pension, risk losing his livelihood.” This, too, was improper vouching. See United States v. Combs, 379 F.3d 564, 575 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Here, the improper vouching was not objected
holding that both agent and principal will be liable when the agent acts within the scope of his employment but for his own purposes holding that it was improper vouching when the prosecutor plainly implied that she knew agent bailey would be fired for committing perjury and that she believed no reasonable agent in his shoes would take such a risk holding that the employer was not the insurers agent holding that a plaintiff can show that she is qualified by presenting credible evidence that she continued to possess the objective qualifications she held when she was hired holding where defense counsel argued that the prosecution had not presented the testimony of a law enforcement agent because it would have been favorable to the accused the prosecutor properly argued in rebuttal that clark could have called the agent as a witness on his own