his disability was a “determining factor” in his termination. At best, there is weak evidence of temporal proximity, because Plaintiff was terminated approximately five months after his cancer diagnosis. However, the passage of five months between Plaintiffs cancer diagnosis and his termination is too attenuated — without more — for Plaintiff to establish that there was a causal connection. See Meiners v. Univ. of Kan., 359 F.3d 1222, 1231 (10th Cir.2004) (internal quotation omitted) (“Unless an adverse action is very closely connected in time to the protected activity, a plaintiff must rely on additional evidence beyond mere temporal proximity to establish causation.... [A] three-month period, standing alone, is insufficient”); Ainsworth, 232 Fed.Appx. at 772, n. 4 (quotation omitted) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, the Court finds that
holding that standing alone even very close temporal proximity cannot operate as a proxy for a plaintiffs evidentiary requirement and is insufficient to carry a plaintiffs burden on the third prong of his prima facie case holding that a three to four month period between the protected activity is not enough to show very close temporal proximity holding that close temporal proximity is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation holding that onemonth temporal proximity was sufficient to establish causation and noting that the prima facie burden in this context is not an onerous one holding that although temporal proximity alone may show causation the proximity must be very close and action taken  20 months later suggests by itself no causality at all