words be given their fair and ordinary meaning applies to penal as well as non-penal statutes, and giving statutory words their full meaning in the context in which they are used does not violate the rule of lenity.” People v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918, 922 (Colo.1986); see also Alonzo Terry, 791 P.2d at 377 n. 4 (“[C]courts may not apply the rule of lenity to defeat the evident intent of the legislature.”). As explained above, the defendant’s interpretation of these statutes fails to give any meaning to the 1995 enactment of section 18-2-201(4.5). Thus, applying the rules of statutory construction to this case, we believe the defendant’s view of the statutes is contrary to the evident intent of the legislature, and we reject his interpretation. See Alonzo Terry, 791 P.2d at 376-77 (<HOLDING>); District Court, 713 P.2d at 922 (same). Based
holding rule of lenity in the penal context to be a rule of last resort recognizing that the rule of lenity applies only after courts exhaust all other evidence of congressional meaning holding that the rule of lenity applies to sentencing guidelines holding an administrative interpretation cannot change the meaning of a statute or control the courts interpretation of it holding the rule of lenity inapplicable where the defendants interpretation failed to give meaning to each statutory provision