marks omitted)). Here, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that Gray’s actions in asking a group of fellow customers to quiet down was not a normal and foreseeable consequence of Denny’s failure to act on her request that an employee do so. Indeed, if Gray’s version of events is credited, then her conduct evokes the precise risk contemplated by the scope of Denny’s duty of care. See Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 315, 434 N.Y.S.2d 166, 169, 414 N.E.2d 666 (1980) (“An intervening act may not serve as a superseding cause, and relieve an actor of responsibility, where the risk of the intervening act occurring is the very same risk which renders the actor negligent.”); see also McKinnon v. Bell Sec., 268 A.D.2d 220, 221, 700 N.Y.S.2d 469, 471 (1st Dep’t 2000) (<HOLDING>). Thus, a fact question arises as to whether
holding that the defendant did not establish good faith as a matter of law holding as a matter of law that natural condition present was open and obvious to all who would encounter it holding it not unforeseeable as matter of law that plaintiff would approach suspect after security guard inexplicably released him holding that it may be decided as a matter of law holding that arkansas would not adopt the approach of reliance to resolve this case