concealed her “knowledge” of the case. Williams offers no rationale for Eddleman’s alleged prevarication, and it appears most probable that Eddleman either deemed the “gossip” unresponsive to the court’s question, as the Ohio appellate courts supposed, or misapprehended the question. The Ohio Supreme Court’s opinion thus reasonably supports the trial court’s determination not to have Eddleman questioned further. Moreover, even if Eddleman had deliberately concealed prior knowledge of the case, this conduct would not have given rise to a presumption of bias on her part. As discussed earlier, a court may, but need not, presume bias if a juror deliberately conceals material information on voir dire. Zerka, 49 F.3d at 1186; see also Fuller v. Bowersox, 202 F.3d 1053, 1056 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Langford, 990 F.2d 65, 69
recognizing probable cause as complete defense to a claim of malicious prosecution in new york internal quotation marks and brackets omitted holding that trial court retains wide latitude and considerable discretion to limit crossexamination internal quotation marks omitted holding that compliance with rule 3 is both a mandatory and jurisdictional prerequisite to appeal internal quotation marks omitted holding that a jurors apparent dishonesty is not a sufficient predicate to obtaining a new trial internal quotation marks and punctuation omitted recognizing that the declaratory judgment act is only procedural and does not create substantive rights internal quotation marks and citations omitted