the judicial proceedings were effected by the district court’s ruling. Instead, Miller argues that the district court was obligated to award nominal damages, régardless of the timeliness of the request, once the jury found that Albright and Cobb violated his constitutional rights. In support of his position, Miller cites Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) (“[T]he denial of procedural due process is actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury.”); Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 112, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) (“[A] court [must] award nominal damages when a plaintiff establishes a violation of his right to procedural due process but cannot prove actual injury.”); and Risdal v. Halford, 209 F.3d 1071, 1072-73 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). These cases, however, do not address whether
holding that plaintiff waived the right to nominal damages in an excessive force case because nominal damages were not requested until after the verdict holding that the right to nominal damages was waived in a breach of duty action when plaintiff failed to raise the issue of nominal damages until after the verdict holding that nominal damages award was appropriate where the evidence supporting the damages was speculative holding that when a jury finds section 1988 liability but fails to award damages nominal damages are available to plaintiff holding that the first amendment right to free speech is absolute and an award of nominal damages is required even if the defendant fails to object to the nominal damages instruction