528 (providing that a prosecutor is not supposed to participate in a prosecution “if such participation may result in a personal, financial, or political conflict of interest, or the appearance thereof’); or alternatively (2) because the alleged conflict should have been disclosed pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Both of these claims miss the mark. First, the prosecutor was not required to recuse himself under § 528. The prosecutor’s wife had no involvement in Mr. Barbarosh’s defense and did not even work in the firm’s criminal defense practice group. Beyond that, she was only employed as an at-will, part-time attorney and was paid an hourly wage. See United States ex rel. Weinberger v. Equifax, Inc., 557 F.2d 456, 463-64 (5th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Reagan, 725 F.3d
holding that where appellant moved to recuse trial judge from deciding the motion for new trial the judge of the administrative district was required to designate a judge to hear the recusal motion holding that it was immaterial for conflict of interest purposes whether one attorney or two attorneys in the same firm represented the witness and the defendant holding defendants right to counsel not violated despite district court denying pretrial request by the defendant to discharge his attorney where request was made on eve of trial and was openly part of attempt to have the district judge recuse himself and delay trial holding that district judges failure to recuse was harmless error where the underlying question was patently clear and so there was no need to vacate the district courts decision and to remand to another district court judge to make the same clear determination holding that a district court judge was not required to recuse himself where the judges son was an attorney with the firm representing one of the parties because the sons salary interest as an associate is too remote to give rise to any arguable conflict