in the plug of chewing tobacco, or the collision of railway trains trying to run on the same track, where the inference of negligence is so clear that no reasonable man could fail to accept it; and in such cases, if the defendant offers no explanation, a verdict should be directed for the plaintiff. In other words, the procedural effect of a res ipsa case is the matter of the strength of the inference to be drawn, which will vary with the circumstances of the case. William L. PROSSER, ToRts 212 (2d. ed. 1955). See, e.g.', William L. Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 Cal. L.Rev. 183 (1949) (“where the facts bespeak negligence beyond dispute a verdict should be tracting Co., 9 A.D.2d 691, 191 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1959) (same); Sullivan v. Crabtree, 258 S.W.2d 782 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1953) (<HOLDING>). The only fact that was in dispute during
recognizing that in exceptional cases the inference may be so strong as to require a directed verdict for plaintiff holding that the trial court erred in granting the school boards posttrial motion for directed verdict because although the school board timely moved for a directed verdict during trial it did not serve its motion for directed verdict until the eleventh day after the verdict recognizing that a motion for directed verdict should be granted when there is no reasonable evidence upon which a jury could legally predicate a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party holding that directed verdict does not violate seventh amendment holding that a motion for directed verdict should be granted if there is no evidence on which a jury could legally base a verdict for damages against the moving party