1 (1977), in which it reversed the Fifth Circuit’s vacation of a district court’s remand order where the district court “had employed erroneous principles in concluding that it was without jurisdiction.” Id. Despite the apparent broad scope of § 1447(d)’s bar on appellate review, the Court emphasized in Thermtron that § 1447(d) must be read together with § 1447(c) and “that only remand orders issued under § 1447(c) and invoking the grounds specified therein,” are immune from appellate review under § 1447(d). 423 U.S. at 345-46, 96 S.Ct. at 590. Specifically, the Court held that § 1447(d) does not bar appellate review where a case has been properly removed to the district court and the remand order is issued on grounds not referable to § 1447(c). Id. at 343-45, 96 S.Ct. at 589-90 (<HOLDING>). Following Thermtron, substantial
holding that the fourth circuit has jurisdiction to review a district courts sua sponte remand order even when that remand order is styled as a remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if the order was in fact based on the procedural insufficiency of the notice of removal holding remand order reviewable because crowded docket not ground for remand under  1447c holding that under 28 usc  1447c and d federal jurisdiction terminates once a section 1447c remand order has been mailed to the state court holding that remand order based on forum selection clause is reviewable on appeal holding remand based on forum selection clause not within  1447c