that a complaint had been made against them and, according to plaintiffs, Ponte’s allegations named Viehbacher. (CAC ¶ 53). The knowledge of Viehbacher, the CEO of the company, would be imputed to. Sanofi. In essence, plaintiffs would draw the inference that Viehbacher had knowledge of an illegal marketing scheme because, by reason of his position and the operation of three corporate policies, he could obtain access to any allegations concerning, or investigation of, such a scheme, assuming it existed. However, “[w]here plaintiffs contend defendants had access to contrary facts [i.e., facts contrary to public disclosures], they must specifically identify the reports or statements containing this information.” Novak, 216 F.3d at 309; see also Teamsters Local 445, 531 F.3d at 196 (<HOLDING>); San Leandro, 75 F.3d at 812 (“Plaintiffs’
holding that where knowledgeable insiders did not sell stock at a time that would have taken advantage of allegedly fraudulent statements there was not a strong inference of scienter holding that plaintiffs must specifically allege defendants knowledge of facts or access to information contradicting their public statements holding analysts statements insufficient to satisfy particularity requirements because plaintiffs failed to identify with specificity the statements made by a particular defendant or describe how those statements were false or misleading holding that the objective truth or falsity of reports concerning a witness were not subject to further proof because such truth or falsity was a collateral matter holding that there was no inference of scienter based on defendants knowledge of facts or failure to monitor information because plaintiffs did not specifically identified any reports or statements that existed or would have come to light in a reasonable investigation that would have demonstrated the falsity of the allegedly misleading statements