in a civil contempt proceeding must afford the contemnor an opportunity to purge or the contempt will be considered criminal in nature). Of course, the absence of a purge provision would likely be harmless if the former husband did not timely exercise the option provided by the contempt order to instruct Appellant to re-enroll the child in the Jacksonville school. 1 . We do not address the other sanction in the order — that Appellant "contribute to the Former Husband’s attorney's fees and costs in bringing this action” — because that issue is not yet ripe for appellate review since the trial court did not determine the amount of the award. See Winkelman v. Toll, 632 So.2d 130 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); see also Dep't of Children & Families v. Monroe, 744 So.2d 1163, 1164 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>). 2 . In response to the trial court's question
holding that an order that determines only the right to attorneys fees without setting the amount is a nonappealable nonfinal order holding that an attorneys fees award is not appealable until the amount of the award is set holding that court of appeals erred by rendering judgment for full amount of attorneys fees sought after reversing 0 fee award because jury awarded less in damages than amount sought and therefore uncontroverted attorney testimony on amount of attorneys fees did not establish amount of reasonable and necessary fees as a matter of law holding that although the trial courts failure to determine amount of fees does not render underlying order nonfinal the fee award itself is not reviewable until the amount is determined recognizing that an attorneys fee award does not become final and ripe for review until the amount is set