the likelihood and probability of infection following treatment. As in Arnold, Kamel’s claims regarding failure to disclose risks and to receive informed consent do not fall within the waiver provision of the TTCA. See id. at 469 (“Failure to receive informed consent [does] not waive immunity under the TTCA.” (citing Miller, 51 S.W.3d at 589)). Likewise, Kamel’s claims of negligent supervision, failure to perform the necessary medical treatment, and failure to use acceptable practices to limit infection are claims for errors in medical judgment or general medical negligence and do not involve the use of tangible property. Therefore, those claims do not fall within the waiver in section 101.021(2). See id.; see also Hall v. Provost, 232 S.W.3d 926, 928 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Kamel contends that the doctors’ use
holding that errors in medical judgment do not provide waiver of immunity under ttca holding that general medical malpractice claims do fall with waiver provision of ttca holding that a north carolina rule requiring an expert certification in a medical malpractice case applied in a federal tort claims act case sounding in medical malpractice brought in federal court holding that where the basis of state claims for medical malpractice relates to the administration of plan benefits those claims fall squarely within the scope of erisa holding that plaintiffs could not sue attorneys for legal malpractice so long as underlying medical malpractice action out of which legal malpractice claim arose was still pending on appeal