on this issue establishes both the standard of care and a breach of that standard, summary judgment was nevertheless proper because Melton failed to present evidence of a causal link between Feldman’s selection criteria and Melton’s injuries. We agree. When Dr. Gaddy was asked whether it would ever be proper for a physician to base the selection of a particular medical device on how much the physician liked the manufacturer’s sales representative, he answered, “I never use that [as a criterion].” This testimony is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact because it only shows Dr. Feldman departed from Dr. Gaddy’s personal standard of care; it does not show Dr. Feldman departed from the generally accepted standard of care. See Guinan, 383 S.C. at 57, 677 S.E.2d at 37-38 (<HOLDING>). When Dr. Venegas was asked the same question,
holding that defendant did not preserve state constitutional challenge to experts testimony at punishment hearing because defendant relied exclusively on federal cases in arguing for exclusion of experts testimony holding that even if an experts testimony arguably embraced the ultimate issue such testimony is permissible as long as the experts testimony assists rather than supplants the jurys judgment holding experts testimony was insufficient to survive summary judgment because the testimony at most showed the defendant deviated from the experts personal standard of care rather than the generally accepted standard of care holding that an experts personal preference does not establish a national standard of care recognizing that a defendant physicians own practice was at least some evidence of the standard of care and concluding that the case was properly submitted to the jury notwithstanding the plaintiffs failure to call an independent expert on the standard of care