or her appointment is a de facto officer whose acts are legally valid and binding on the public and on third persons if done within the scope and by the apparent authority of his or her office, even though the judge’s actual authority suffers from a procedural defect. See, e.g., Am.Jur.2d Judges § 242 (1994) (stating that the de facto judge doctrine has been uniformly applied throughout the country to prevent collateral attacks based on a procedural defect in the judge’s authority); People v. Bowen, 231 Cal.App.3d 783, 283 Cal.Rptr. 35, 39 (1991) (applying the doctrine to preclude a criminal defendant from collaterally attacking the superior court judge’s authority to try him where the judge did not meet county residency requirement); Humel v. Hoogendorn, 5 Alaska 25, 25 (Alaska 1914) (<HOLDING>). We perceive no compelling reason to deviate
holding that a defendant was not entitled to a relief under section 2255 when he asserted that the sentencing judge who was not the trial judge was influenced by the sentence imposed by the trial judge on a codefendant holding that private individuals who conspired with judge could be sued even though judge could not holding that party who had sought disqualification of the judge who heard his cause only from the assignment judge and not the judge himself could not appropriately raise recusal issue on appeal recognizing that judge who continued to function after end of term was a de facto judge whose actions could not be collaterally attacked holding that where a judge pro tempore is in actual possession of the office and discharging its duties he or she acts under color of title and is a judge de facto