profitably operated the existing business. Under those circumstances, the court held that the mortgagee bank “should not be entitled to benefit [from the receiver’s services] unless all expenses in connection with the operation of the business under the receivership are paid in full.” Ibid. See also Resolution Trust Corp. v. J.I. Sopher & Co., 927 F.Supp. 753, 756 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (held that court-appointed receiver was required to pay to condominium’s board of managers monthly condominium common charges that had accrued on the property over the last fifteen months of the receivership but not those common charges coming due in the future because receivership is no longer benefiting the mortgagee); Ezriel Equities Assocs. v. 157 E. 72nd St. Assocs., 225 A.D.2A 326, 638 N.Y.S.2A 470, 471 (<HOLDING>), appeal dismissed, 88 N.Y.2d 1064, 651
holding that when defendant made full payment to physician during pendency of action as prayed for in the complaint it necessarily mooted out the action and was the functional equivalent of a plaintiffs verdict or judgment for purposes of fees holding that the plain meaning of  2244d2 is that the statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of any properly filed federal habeas corpus petition holding that personal injury action arising during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings was property of the estate holding that the district of columbia rental housing act protected from eviction the tenant of a defaulting mortgagor who remained in his rental unit after a foreclosure sale holding the receiver properly applied rental income from the property to the payment of common charges during the pendency of the foreclosure action