was simply unable “to imagine a more direct and palpable case of cruelty to a wife by a husband.” McMahen v. McMahen, 186 Pa. 485, 40 A. 795, 797 (1898). There are many similar decisions from other states. See, e.g., Holden v, Holden, 63 Idaho 70, 116 P.2d 1003, 1005 (1941) (“If [the husband) knowingly communicated [gonorrhea] to [his wife], that would constitute cruelty.”); Carbajal v. Fernandez, 130 La. 812, 58 So. 581, 581 (1912) (stating that “all the courts agree” that knowing transmission of an STD to a spouse “constitutes cruel treatment”); Holthoefer v. Holthoefer, 11 N.W. 150, 150 (Mich.1882) (stating that knowing transmission of an STD by a spouse constitutes “extreme cruelty” and grounds for divorce); Darling v. Darling, 181 Mo.App. 211, 167 S.W. 1166, 1166 (1914) (<HOLDING>); Cook v. Cook, 32 N.J. Eq. 475 (NJ.Ct.Ch.1880)
holding that wife had standing to seek disinterment where death of husband occurred prior to entry of decree of divorce holding that counsel fees awarded to debtors wife in a divorce action were nondisehargeable under  523a5 holding that knowing communication of gonorrhea to a wife was grounds for divorce holding that the apparent denial of the husbands request for an order compelling the wife to deliver to him the personal property he had been awarded in their divorce judgment did not constitute a modification of the original divorce judgment holding that a defendant must demonstrate a knowing waiver