in a third the juror was reported as describing eluding as "a very minor violation." No affidavit referred to the penalty as a "slap on the wrist," though the term was used by defense counsel in the motion and in oral argument. We conclude that these discrepancies are immaterial to our analysis, which applies to all of the versions of the juror's statements regarding the severity of, or the penalty for, vehicular eluding. 2 . At the hearing on the motion for a new trial, the prosecution presented two dictionary definitions of "elude" to the trial court, which indicate that eluding involves "skill" or "trickery." If the jury had viewed those definitions, it may have added those concepts as additional elements to be proven, increasing the prosecution's burden. See Wiser, 732 P.2d at 1143
holding that the definition of operating deficits is not ambiguous despite the absence of a definition of the phrase in the contract holding that virginia burglary statute comes within definition of generic burglary holding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a new trial where the jury had taken a dictionary that had not been admitted into evidence into the jury room and had improperly referred to and relied on the dictionarys definition of legal cause that was at variance with the definition of proximate cause holding that the defendant was not prejudiced by the jurys exposure to the dictionary definition of burglary because the definition referenced theft which was not an element the prosecution was required to prove holding due process clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the charged offense and new york law that requires the defendant in a second degree murder prosecution to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance in order to reduce the crime to manslaughter when no element of the charged offense is presumed does not violate the due process clause