why we should rest on the example of the uninformed visitor to conclude that § 22-2511 is unconstitutional. Continuing with my discussion of why the circumstances here are unlike those in Lambert, I reject my colleagues’ suggestion that the PMVCF statute punishes conduct that would not be blameworthy in the average member of the community. The District of Columbia has long had some of the most restrictive gun laws in the nation; as a result, the public policy against carrying firearms on the streets of the District of Columbia is well-known to our populace. At the same time, it is common knowledge that gun violence has ravaged our city, and common knowledge that firearms are dangerous in our urban environment, certainly at least as dangerous as pit bulls. Cf. McNeely, 874 A.2d at 384 (<HOLDING>). Further, an individual’s voluntary entry into
holding that when an employee is injured by his employers tortious conduct his employer owes him damages and compensation under the act holding that husbands knowledge of his obligation of support and his subsequent election to enter employment that would substantially reduce his income and make it impossible to meet his obligations would not justify reduction in support holding that given the wellknown dangerous proclivities of the breed the owners knowledge that his dogs were pit bulls should have moved him to inquire into his heightened obligations under the act holding that dog owners were entitled to summary judgment either under the premisesliability or dangerousanimalliability theories when the dog that bit the plaintiff had never previously attacked or bitten a human and the owners had no superior knowledge of the dogs propensity to bite holding that one who brings action under a dogbite statute is not required to establish dogs past conduct or owners knowledge thereof