death because “[tjhere must be some line of demarcation” between conduct sufficient to satisfy a conviction fox-bank robbery and conduct that would warrant the threat-of-death enhancement. The assertion is that reading § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) to encompass the statement “I have a gun” would cause the enhancement to be applied to “every conceivable circumstance” covered by § 2113(a), thereby making it part of the base offense level. This argument is unavailing for a number of reasons. First, it fails to account for the fact that § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) applies to various robbery, extortion, and blackmail offenses and not simply the bank-robbery offense for which Jennings was indicted. See U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1. Even if Jennings’s offense conduct was determined to be coterminous with the enhance h Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). It takes no stretch of the imagination to
holding that evidence of threats or intimidation of a witness is admissible under rule 404b to show consciousness of guilt holding that defendants act of threatening bank customers who otherwise simply watched defendants rob the bank constituted aggravated menacing rather than robbery holding that incidents of harassment and unfulfilled threats of injury are not persecution absent physical harm holding that defendant concealed fact of his crime of child molesting where daughters never disclosed molestation to authorities because of defendants threats of bodily harm and death holding that bank robbery by intimidation can be committed without express threats of bodily harm threatening body motions or the physical possibility of concealed weapons