reasons did not actually motivate [her] discharge, or (3) that they were insufficient to motivate discharge.” Russell, 537 F.3d at 604 (quoting Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir.1994)). Although the presumption of discrimination drops out of the picture once the defendant meets its burden of production, the trier of fact may still consider the evidence establishing the plaintiffs prima facie case and inferences properly drawn therefrom on the issue of whether the defendant’s explanation is pretextual. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097. Plaintiff has raised a number of arguments in support of her contentio .2006) (noting that temporal proximity cannot alone prove pretext); Skrjanc v. Great Lakes Power Serv. Co., 272 F.3d 309, 317 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Bell v. Prefix, Inc. 321 Fed.Appx. 423, 431
holding that temporal proximity is insufficient in and of itself to establish that the employers nondiscriminatory reason for discharging an employee was in fact pretextual holding that an employee may establish that the legitimate reason for an employment decision offered by an employer is pretextual by showing by a preponderance of the evidence either that the discrim inatory reason was the true reason motivating the employers conduct or that the profferred legitimate reason was false holding that close temporal proximity is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation holding that a three and onehalf month temporal proximity is insufficient to create a jury issue on causation recognizing that an employers decision to eliminate a position is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating a position or employee