the lease had expired or was terminated before the commencement of the case. 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(2). Although the plaintiff previously leased the Fort Ritchie property, PenMar evicted the plaintiff from the property in April 2001. Am. Compl. ¶ 53. That eviction terminated the plaintiffs interest in the property. Robinson v. Chicago Housing Auth., 54 F.3d 316, 318-19 (7th Cir.1995) (stating that any method that fully severs the rights of the tenant in the property renders the lease expired). Only after PenMar evicted the plaintiff did the plaintiff file for bankruptcy in May 2002. Id. ¶ 151. Because the plaintiffs interest in the property terminated prior to the plaintiffs filing for bankruptcy, the automatic stay provision does not apply. In re Pettit, 217 F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). The plaintiff also argues that it is entitled
holding that the bankruptcy court relinquishes jurisdiction over estate property when it grants relief from the automatic stay holding that bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction to control disposition of chapter 13 debtors property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate unless the property is related to the bankruptcy proceedings of the code holding that if property is not part of the individuals estate at the time he files a bankruptcy petition no automatic stay provision applies to the property holding that the automatic stay terminates as to the debtor personally and as to his nonestate property but that the stay persists as to property of the bankruptcy estate holding that once the automatic stay is lifted the property ceases to be property of the estate and there is no longer any power of abandonment