existing statutory mechanism”). To remedy violations of Apprendi and Blakely, we would be entirely justified in adopting a procedure for the empanel-ling of new juries on resentencing. Nor would we be the first court to do so. See Aragon v. Wilkinson, 209 Ariz. 61, 97 P.3d 886, 891 (Ct.App.2004) (stating that “although the statutory sentencing scheme does not currently provide for convening a jury trial during the sentencing phase of a non-capital case, nothing in our rules or statutes prohibits the court from doing so” and that on remand to resolve any Ap-prendi or Blakely problem, the trial court “may utilize its inherent authority to convene a jury trial on the existence of facts that may support imposition of an aggravated sentence”); Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679, 684-85 (Ind.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 545, 163
holding that appellant properly preserved booker claim by citing blakely in his written objections to the psi and reminding the court at sentencing of his blakely objection holding that to meet blakely requirements a jury may be convened to consider sentencing factors holding blakely not retroactive holding that there is no distinction in the right to jury trial between sentencing factors and elements holding that blakely does not apply to the federal sentencing guidelines