Cir.1994) (A “defendant’s right to compulsory process does not include the right to compel a witness to waive his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination.”). Finally, Warfield claims that if Davis had exercised his Fifth Amendment rights, the district court could have granted Davis “judicial” immunity or compelled the government to offer Davis use immunity. This argument also fails. We have not heretofore recognized the concept of “judicial” immunity, see Robaina, 39 F.3d at 863, and decline to do so here. Additionally, use immunity can only be granted when it is formally requested by the Attorney General, id., and the district court is without power to compel the government to grant a witness immunity. Doddington, 822 F.2d at 821. See also Robaina, 39 F.3d at 863 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we reject Warfield’s claims that
holding that the district courts refusal to grant a downward departure was discretionary and not because it believed it lacked the authority to depart where the court assessed the facts of the case and concluded that the departure requested does not seem  to have a basis holding that district court correctly concluded that it could not order the government to grant use immunity holding that pursuant to the collateral order doctrine and 28 usc  1291 a state may appeal from a district court order denying it eleventh amendment immunity holding that we may not review a district courts refusal to grant a downward departure unless the court mistakenly believed that it lacked the authority to grant such a departure holding that as a general rule interlocutory trial court orders rejecting defenses of common law sovereign immunity governmental immunity public official immunity statutory immunity or any other type of immunity are not appealable under the maryland collateral order doctrine