injunction “had a[n] ... external effect’ — postponing conveyance of Fort Rit-chie until the Secretary complies with the relevant regulations — that likewise represents ‘a substantial part of what plaintiff asked the court for in the first place.’ ” Id. at 966 (quoting Grano v. Barry, 783 F.2d 1104, 1110 (D.C.Cir.1986)). Likewise, in this case, the Eighth Circuit’s decision finding a breach of trust obligations by the Secretary and the preliminary injunctions issued by this Court, postponed distribution of the Judgment Fund until the Secretary complied with the procedural requirements of allowing Plaintiffs to apply for their share of the Judgment Fund. In their complaint, Plaintiffs asked for this precise relief. See Watson v. County of Riverside, 300 F.3d 1092, 1095-96 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Based upon the discussion above, the Court
holding that interim awards of attorneys fees are inappropriate where the only relief obtained is a preliminary injunction which may be subsequently overturned on the merits holding that a plaintiff who obtained a preliminary injunction was a prevailing party because he obtained significant courtordered relief that accomplished one of the main purposes of his lawsuit holding the prevailing party inquiry does not turn on the magnitude of the relief obtained in response to the question whether a nominal damages award is the sort of technical insignificant victory that cannot confer prevailing party status holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees holding that the prevailing party inquiry does not turn on the magnitude of the relief obtained