liberty; it has a far greater bearing on future administrative or judicial decisions than denial of early eligibility, especially since the latter denial may reflect a judgment on the seriousness of the underlying crime rather than about rehabilitative progress or suitability for parole.” Id. at 704. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 612, 615 (1987); Commonwealth v. Smith, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 324, 325 n.l (1995) (where we noted that, as of the date of appeal, “the defendant had completed all but one month of the sentence. A decision now cannot affect this sentence, but we do not know that its result may not affect the commencement date of later from-and-after sentences”). Compare Commonwealth v. Christian, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 477, 479-480 (1999), S.C., 429 Mass. 1022 (1999) (<HOLDING>). Contrast Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624,
recognizing application of the doctrines may involve a fact question for the jury but not finding such a question in the case before it recognizing the general rule that a rule 12f motion is decided on the pleadings but treating the motion as for summary judgment because the record had been developed by the parties as undisputed facts holding that the appellant developed his argument sufficiently to raise the issue for appellate review holding that where a witness had been convicted seventeen years earlier but had been given probation and had not been confined the date of the conviction controlled recognizing in a probation revocation case that a revocation in a persons record may have future administrative or judicial consequences but deciding to pretermit a mootness question on the grounds that it had not been developed in the argument and the defendant had diligently pursued his claims