means that Congress intended that limitations should be determined either by reference to a six-year period, or alternatively by reference to a measure established by agreement between the taxpayer and the government—in the case at bar, the time established in the waiver agreement. Thus when the alternative measure was established by the waiver agreement, the six-year statutory limitation period became functus officio and ceased to have any relevance in the determination of the timeliness of the government’s action. The district court, therefore, erred when it looked to the six-year limitation period after that period had become functus officio as a result of the waiver agreement. Id. at 197-98. See also Knutzen v. Eben Ezer Lutheran Housing Center, 815 F.2d 1343, 1349 (10th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). The 1990 amendments can be read as consistent
holding that generally or is a disjunctive that indicates congress intended exclusive alternatives unless the context or congressional intent intends otherwise holding that shall generally indicates a mandatory intent unless a convincing argument to the contrary is made holding that neither the language nor the legislative history of the fcpa indicates the congressional intent to create a private right of action holding use of word may generally indicates permissive rather than mandatory intent holding that where congressional intent is clear a court must give effect to such intent