in the absence of expressed Congressional intent, we must assume that Congress intended to convey the language’s ordinary meaning. See United States v. Goldberger & Dubin, P. C., 935 F.2d 501, 506 (2d Cir.1991) (“The words of a statute should be given their normal meaning and effect in absence of showing that some other meaning was intended.”); United States v. Stokley, 881 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir.1989) (“In the absence of a contrary indication, the court must assume the drafters of a statute intended to convey the ordinary meaning attached to the language.”). If the plain language of the statute is ambiguous, then a court may look beyond the plain language to the legislative history for guidance. See United States v. Southern Management Corp., 955 F.2d 914, 920 (4th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Observant of this well-established analytical
holding when ordinance language is clear courts must give language its plain meaning recognizing that courts should look to other sources of legislative intent if the statutory language does not convey a clear meaning recognizing that courts may look beyond the statutory text to determine legislative intent only when the statute is ambiguous holding that if statutory language is plain and unambiguous this court will not look beyond the same to divine legislative intent recognizing that legislative history is not used to create ambiguity where statutory language is clear