in both evaluations, and in having both reports provided to the trial court. Under these circumstances, Foster will not be heard to complain about his trial counsel’s performance. Additionally, at the sentencing hearing, Foster’s counsel attempted to portray Foster’s insistence on participating in the evaluations and having them submitted to the court in a positive light, speaking to Foster’s openness and willingness to cooperate with the court. The district court did not err in rejecting this claim. CONCLUSION Foster’s contentions that the district court erred in rejecting his claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel are without merit. Therefore, we affirm the order of the district court denying Foster’s post-conviction petition. 1 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (<HOLDING>). The term “Batson challenge” is often used
holding that a defendants exercise of peremptory challenges  is not denied or impaired when the defendant chooses to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause holding that batson applies to a prosecutors use of peremptory challenges regardless of whether the stricken juror is of the same race as the defendant holding that it is impermissible to use a peremptory challenge to exclude a potential juror based on race holding that it was not iac to decline to use peremptory strike on a potential juror whose statements hinted at possible bias against defendant where counsel strategically used peremptory strikes against jurors who might have been more likely to convict holding that a criminal defendant can bring a third party challenge to the peremptory striking of jurors based on race whether or not he is of the same race as the jurors who are struck