the patient suffers only emotional distress, these claims will on the surface be indistinguishable from the usual medical malpractice actions. But there is a further — and critical — limiting principle: it must be “especially likely,” Restatement (ThiRd) of Torts, supra, § 46(b), that there would be serious emotional distress, ie., a “deeply emotional response,” Oswald, 453 N.W.2d at 639, in the event that the underlying obligation is breached. If an emotional response of such magnitude is anticipated, a doctor would be expected, as a matter of reasonable care, to take precautions to avoid causing serious emotional distress, just as a doctor would take care to use sterile instruments in order to prevent a serious infection during the course of an operation. See Curtis, 956 P.2d at 963 (<HOLDING>); Larsen, 81 P.3d at 203 (permitting claim for
holding that plaintiff had successfully stated a claim for emotional distress where complaint alleged that defendants were medical professionals who owed a duty to plaintiff to identify and guard against predictable psychological reactions or consequences  including claustrophobic reactions  to an mri procedure holding that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from a claim for emotional distress damages under the employment discrimination statute holding that expert testimony is not required to corroborate a claim for emotional distress holding in a fcra case that plaintiffs may not rely on mere  conclusory statements  rather they must  sufficiently articulate  true demonstrable emotional distress  including the factual context in which the emotional distress arose evidence corroborating the testimony of the plaintiff the nexus between the conduct of the defendant and the emotional distress the degree of such mental distress mitigating circumstances if any physical injuries suffered due to the emotional distress medical attention resulting from the emotional duress psychiatric or psychological treatment and the loss of income if any holding that a plaintiff is required to identify specific acts of individual defendants  for his claim to survive