exculpatory agreement does not release defendants from liability for gross negligence. These cases are inapposite because New Hampshire law does not distinguish causes of action based on ordinary and gross negligence. . . . The plaintiff advances no reasons for abandoning this rule and we decline to create an exception to allow him to pursue his claims of gross negligence.” (Citation omitted.) Barnes v. New Hampshire Karting Assn., Inc., supra, 128 N.H. 108-109; but see Ratti v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 758 A.2d 695, 705 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2000) (declining to reach issue of whether agreement that released liability for gross negligence would violate public policy where agreement in question stated only “negligence”); Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 18-19, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962) (<HOLDING>). The great weight of these numerous and highly
holding that dawson proscribes gross negligence holding that ordinary negligence and gross negligence are not separate causes of action holding that negligence does not violate the due process clause but reserving the question whether gross negligence does recognizing the applicability of choice of law clauses in contracts recognizing potential problems that wisconsins abolition of gross negligence might raise in area of exculpatory clauses