P.2d at 1085 (statement by officer that he would not play interrogation tapes for victim’s mother did not constitute a promise). The trial court found, and we agree, that the officers assured Doody that his statements would not be disclosed to the other suspects because the officers believed Doody’s fear of reprisal affected his willingness to talk. The detectives did not imply that the state would not prosecute Doody if he revealed the information or that the state would not use his statements against him in a subsequent prosecution. See State v. Burr, 126 Ariz. 338, 340, 615 P.2d 635, 637 (1980). Second, Doody fails to establish that he relied on the statements in confessing. See Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. at 165, 800 P.2d at 1273; see also Utah v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221, 227 (Utah 1989) (<HOLDING>). For those reasons, we conclude that the trial
recognizing that under totality of circumstances test a threat or promise does not render confession inadmissible absent reliance holding that agents promise to inform prosecutor of defendants cooperation does not render a subsequent confession involuntary holding reasonable suspicion is based on totality of circumstances holding that admissibility of a confession is governed by determining from the totality of the circumstances whether or not it was made voluntarily holding that the district courts finding that an allegedly coercive threat did not specifically motivate the defendants confession where 1 there was no evidence that the threat was repeated at the police station 2 defendant offered no admissible evidence that the threat was the crucial factor motivating his confession and 3 he confessed immediately after the officer threatened to administer a gun residue test as opposed to confessing immediately after the allegedly coercive threat was made thus the gunresidue test was just as plausible a motivating factor for the confession as was the threat