the prosecution a post-conviction obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence, citing District Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial District v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 68-69, 129 S.Ct. 2308, 174 L.Ed.2d 38 (2009). Gavitt has not challenged this part of the ruling. Finally, the district court construed Count II as challenging the adequacy of defendants Fatchett’s and Kalman’s pretrial fire investigation, i.e., their failure to consider and eliminate all possible accidental causes of the house fire before investigating for arson. The district' court held that such a claim does not make out a violation of a clearly established constitutional right and held that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. The court relied on Yancey v. Carroll Cty., Ky., 876 F.2d 1238, 1245 (6th Cir. 1989) (<HOLDING>); and Buchanan v. Metz, 6 F.Supp.3d 730, 757-59
holding that officers were entitled to qualified immunity where defendant officers could have reasonably believed that they were given sufficient third party consent to search holding officers engaged in search entitled to immunity holding that officers were entitled to rely on the judicial officers finding of probable cause in issuing the search warrant unless they knowingly made false statements to obtain the warrant and that a challenge to the adequacy of the officers investigation does not rise to level of clearly established constitutional violation holding that defendants consent was involuntary where defendant consented to search following a warrantless entry and officers explained that absent consent the officers would obtain a warrant holding that if the application for a warrant contains probable cause apart from the improper information then the warrant is lawful and the independent source doctrine applies providing that the officers were not prompted to obtain the warrant by what they observed during the initial entry