testimony and that counsel’s dual representation amounted to a conflict of interest. Although a petitioner who “shows that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation need not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief,” Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2001) (emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted), Shakir has not shown any actual conflict. Munir did not implicate himself in the alleged drug transaction between Martin and the third party, and thus counsel would not have been putting Munir in harm’s way by calling him as a witness in Shakir’s case. For this reason, the dual representation had no actual impact on the adequacy of counsel’s representation of Shakir. See id. at 173, 122 S.Ct. 1237 (<HOLDING>). Shak-ir also has not established ineffective
recognizing conflict recognizing the conflict holding that the verdict must be sustained if there is any competent evidence to support the verdict holding that the conflict must be so significant it renders verdict unreliable holding that the apparent conflict between two subsections of the tax code renders the facial meaning of the statute ambiguous