failure to lodge a proper objection. While the holding did not cite Rule 5:25, it fell within the ambit of that rule. The statement relied upon by the Commonwealth addressed the applicability of the ends of justice exception to the operation of the rule. 20 Va.App. at 215, 456 S.E.2d at 134. This “ends of justice analysis” under Rule 5:25 is not the same as a harmless error analysis. See Brown v. Commonwealth, 8 Va.App. 126, 131, 380 S.E.2d 8, 10 (1989) (explaining that the “ends of justice” exception is only applied “where the error has resulted in manifest injustice”). Indeed, neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has ever engaged in a harmless error analysis concerning an error of this nature. See e.g., Medici v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 223, 226-27, 532 S.E.2d 28, 30 (2000) (<HOLDING>). Because this issue falls squarely within our
holding that where the defense peremptorily challenged a prospective juror and the prosecutor merely stated that she would challenge that strike the states objection was sufficient to allow inquiry into whether the juror was being challenged for nonracial reasons where the trial court clearly understood that the objection was that the challenge had been exercised because of the prospective jurors race holding that the judges entry into the jury room constituted reversible error holding that the trial judges failure to strike for cause a prospective juror whose husbands murderer was represented by medicis counsels employer was reversible error holding that the failure to strike potentially biased juror was not iac where decision was based on trial strategy holding wrongful granting of states challenge for cause reversible error