By contrast, courts can bar future suits as a sanction to punish a refusal to pay past court costs and sanctions even if the litigant is indigent. The district court here did not impose a filing bar as a sanction against Gay but invoked only its power to order a bond for costs. The court erred when it ordered Gay to post a bond it knew he could not afford. The district court correctly reasoned that its authority to award costs to a prevailing party implies a power to require the posting of a bond reasonably calculated to cover those costs, even though no statute or rule expressly authorizes such an order. See Anderson v. Steers, Sullivan, McNamar & Rogers, 998 F.2d 495, 496 (7th Cir.1993) (affirming dismissal); Pedraza v. United Guaranty Corp., 313 F.3d 1323, 1335-36 (11th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Simulnet East Assocs. v. Ramada Hotel
holding the court has the inherent authority to enter an order of confidentiality recognizing district courts inherent authority to dismiss with prejudice for abuse of judicial process recognizing a courts inherent authority to initiate a criminal contempt proceeding for disobedience of its order holding that order vacating award and ordering rehearing is analogous to order granting new trial recognizing inherent authority but vacating order not supported by necessary findings