of Debt.” Instead, the RTC realleged and incorporated by reference the allegations of its Fourth Amended Complaint in the conspiracy action, explaining that “the details of the fraudulent scheme by which the Debtor obtained money or credit from the Plaintiff are set forth in the Plaintiff's Fourth Amended Complaint.” 20 . To support this theory of nondischargeability, the RTC cited the only apparent authority for it: MacDonald v. Buck (In re Buck), 75 B.R. 417, 420-21 (Bankr.N.D.Cal.1987). As we hold that the RTC’s reliance on this theory was foreclosed by the jury’s earlier factual determination that Carpenter did not conspire to defraud the RTC, we express no opinion as to its merits or applicability to the facts of this case. 21 . See, e.g., In re Davis, 3 F.3d at 116 (<HOLDING>); Nelson v. Tsamasfyros (In re Tsamasfyros),
holding that statecourt consent judgment containing findings of fraud precluded relitigation of same issue in dischargeability proceeding holding that because relitigation of issue was barred by collateral estoppel res judicata determination of finality of judgment dismissed for lack of standing was not relevant holding that resolution of issue underlying statecourt fraud judgment precluded relitigation of same issue in nondischargeability proceeding holding that statecourt breach of fiduciary duty judgment precluded relitigation of same issue in dischargeability proceeding holding that a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction only precludes the relitigation of the issue of whether the first tribunal had jurisdiction