adult entertainment licenses based upon a provision in the Ordinance that they have not challenged — the prohibition on private booths and rooms. A favorable decision cannot redress Appellants’ alleged injury because the Ordinance required the City to reject Appellants’ license applications and Appellants have not challenged the provision of the Ordinance that mandated that rejection. See, e.g., Maverick Media Grp., Inc. v. Hillsborough Cnty., 528 F.3d 817, 821 (11th Cir.2008) (per curiam) (explaining because “the County could have denied [plaintiffs sign permit] applications under an alternative, unchallenged provision of its sign ordinance,” plaintiffs alleged injury was not redressable by a favorable decision); KH Outdoor, L.L.C. v. Clay Cnty., 482 F.3d 1299, 1303-04 (11th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, on December 20, 2010, the parties
holding that postconviction relief claims which either were raised or could have been raised on direct appeal were properly denied without an evidentiary hearing holding that a plaintiff did not have a redressable injury where its sign permit applications were denied on the basis of one provision in a countys sign ordinance but could have been denied on the basis of some alternate but unchallenged regulation holding that it would be inequitable to allow a town to deny a permit based on a new ordinance after the property owner was denied a permit three times and brought suit to determine the validity of the prior ordinance holding that the basis of liability is negligence and not injury holding certain plaintiffs did not have standing to attack ordinance governing sexually oriented businesses where the record did not reveal that any one of these plaintiffs was subject to the ordinance even though the city attorney conceded at oral argument before the supreme court that one or two of them had had their licenses denied under the ordinance