Diamond Auto Glass, 165 F.3d 1015, 1017-18 (4th Cir.1999). Section 1981. governs only contractual relationships. Here, the plaintiff has not alleged the existence of an express, formal employment contract between himself and the defendant. Instead, the plaintiff was an at-will employee under Nebraska law subject to termination at any time, whenever and for whatever cause an employer chose. Myers v. Nebraska Equal Opp. Comm., 255 Neb. 156, 16B, 582 N.W.2d 362, 368 (1998). Consequently, the defendant contends that no underlying contract exists for the plaintiff to base his section 1981 claims. I disagree. While district courts addressing this issue are split on whether an at-will employee may maintain a section 1981 claim, compare Hawkins v. Pepsico, Inc., 10 F.Supp.2d 548 (M.D.N.C.1998) (<HOLDING>) with O’Neal v. Ferguson Const. Co., 35
holding that an atwill employee may not recover for discriminatory discharge under section 1981 because the atwill relationship was not sufficiently contractual under tennessee law holding that an atwill employment relationship is contractual and may serve as a predicate contract for a  1981 claim holding that an atwill employee may sue under  1981 for racially discriminatory termination holding that atwill employees have no contractual relationship with their employers to support a cause of action under section 1981 holding that an atwill employee may bring a cause of action under section 1981