motions). The Second Circuit has not yet announced a specific standard for exercising the district court’s discretion in ruling on such a motion. The Second Circuit has, however, stated that: “[o]nly ‘reasonably genuine surprise’ on the part of the appellant, Moylan v. Siciliano, 292 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir.1961), combined with an assertion of the nature of the additional evidence, Berns v. Pan Am. World Airways, 667 F.2d 826, 829 (9th Cir.1982), would give us sufficient reason to remand for the taking of additional evidence.” Air et Chaleur, S.A. v. Janeway, 757 F.2d 489, 495 (2d Cir.1985); see also Matthew Bender & Co., 158 F.3d at 679 (upholding district court’s decision to permit party to re-open a hearing where (1) additional evidence was material, (2) opposing part (S.D.N.Y.1994) (<HOLDING>). I shall consider the issue of Plaintiff’s
holding that the rules of procedure are structured to provide the nonmovant with substantially more time for filing affidavits than the moving party because the nonmoving party should have an opportunity to examine and reply to the moving partys papers before the court considers them holding that an appellate court is not required to search the appellate record with no guidance from the briefing party to determine if the record supports the partys argument holding that the party moving for summary judgment waived its argument that the opposing partys affidavit should not be considered because the moving party never objected to the timeliness of the affidavit to the trial court holding that when appraising a partys motion to reopen the record posttrial the court must consider 1 whether or not the moving partys failure to submit evidence was the result of its own lack of diligence 2 the extent to which reopening the record might prejudice the nonmovant and 3 where the interests of justice lie holding the moving party must meet its burden by showing  that is pointing out to the trial court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving partys case