to which such participant may become entitled under the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1140. The Court held that it had “no doubt that [plaintiffs] claim [was] prototypical of the kind Congress intended to cover under § 510,” which “[b]y its terms ... protects plan participants from termination motivated by an employer’s desire to prevent a pension from vesting.” Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 143, 111 S.Ct. 478. In other cases involving conflict preemption, courts have looked to whether the existence of an ERISA-covered plan was merely incidental to a plaintiffs claims — thus rendering conflict preemption inapplicable — or, instead, whether the plan and the rights it created were the sole basis for plaintiffs cause of action. See Wood v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 207 F.3d 674, 676 (3d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Harris v. Mich. Consol. Gas Co., 117
holding that a claim that unlawful termination resulted in loss of benefits is not preempted by erisa holding that retirement benefits are accrued benefits under erisa holding that plaintiffs discrimination claim brought under new jerseys antidiscrimination statute was completely preempted by erisa where depriving plaintiff of his retirement benefits was the motivating purpose for and not merely a consequence of his termination holding that an employees claim for breach of a letter agreement was preempted by erisa where the agreement did not specify the amount or other terms of the employees retirement benefits and the court would have to refer to the employers erisagoverned retirement plan to determine the employees retirement benefits and calculate the damages claimed holding that erisa completely preempted certain state law claims and finding that erisa preempted an employees common law tort and contract claim when the employee sought benefits under the employers disability policy