disorders in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association.” Notwithstanding the American Psychiatric Association’s listing alcohol and drug abuse as mental disorders, this Court has consistently held that voluntary intoxication is not a mental disturbance for purposes of the (f)(2) mitigating circumstance. See, e.g., Geddie, 345 N.C. at 103, 478 S.E.2d at 161-62. As discussed above the evidence in this case did not establish a mental or emotional disturbance supporting submission of the (f)(2) mitigator. On this record the trial court did not err by failing to submit the (f)(2) mitigating circumstance and submitting instead the (f)(6) mitigating circumstance for the jury’s consideration. See State v. Syriani, 333 N.C. 350, 395, 428 S.E.2d 118, 142-43 (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 948, 126 L. Ed. 2d 341
holding that if the site where the contraband is found is in joint rather than exclusive possession a defendants knowledge of the contrabands presence and his ability to control it cannot be inferred merely from the defendants proximity to the contraband holding that a general statement about how the defendant wanted to introduce evidence of medical or mental impairment to show that the defendant lacked the proper mental state was an insufficient offer  there must be some meat of the actual evidence holding that f6 applies where there is evidence of some mental disorder to the degree that it affected the defendants ability to understand and control his actions holding that evidence of witnesss acquittal by reason of mental illness was properly excluded partly because no showing was made that mental disorder affected witnesss credibility recognizing that knowledge and dominion and control are separate elements and stating that it is conceivable that an accused might be well aware of the presence of the substance but have no ability to maintain control over it