moral values and which the common sense of society would regard as immodest, immoral, and improper.” Sutherland, 228 F.3d at 176 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 20 . In prosecutions brought under § 53-21 in which the victim was legally able to consent (because the defendant was less than two years older than the victim, who was at least thirteen years of age), the Courts have read into the statute a defense of consent. Thus in State v. Weiner, 61 Conn.App. at 749 n. 6, 767 A.2d 1220, involving sexual contact between a fourteen-year-old and a defendant less than two years older than the victim, the Court upheld the trial court’s instruction that consent by the victim was a defense to risk of injury. See also State v. Perruccio, 192 Conn. 154, 165-66, 471 A.2d 632 (1984)(<HOLDING>). 21 . Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1 (1990)
holding that the victim impact and victim vulnerability aggravators were not overbroad and explaining that though the concepts of victim impact and victim vulnerability may well be relevant in every case evidence of victim vulnerability and victim impact in a particular case is inherently individualized holding that a defendant must show that the victim had previously been exposed to a sexual act and that the prior sexual act was sufficiently similar to the present sexual act to give the victim the experience and ability to contrive or imagine the molestation charge holding that a defendant less than two years older than the fifteenyearold victim could not be convicted under  5321 if the victim consented to the sexual contact holding the harmed victim need not be the victim of the offense of conviction holding that uncharged sexual acts committed upon the same victim are admissible to show the conduct of the defendant toward the victim and to corroborate the evidence of the offense charged in the indictment