scheme because the harm visited upon the SIPC was merely derivative of an injury to two broker-dealers, who not only could have sued Holmes but did sue him. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 271-73, 112 S.Ct. 1311; id. at 274 (“We hold not that RICO cannot serve to right the conspirators’ wrongs, but merely that the non-purchasing customers, or SIPC in their stead, are not the proper plaintiffs.”). “[A] plaintiff who complaints] of harm flowing merely from the misfortunes visited upon a third person by the defendant’s acts,” the Court reasoned, “generally ... stand[s] at too remote a distance to recover.” Id. at 268-69, 112 S.Ct. 1311. The Court then offered three administrative justifications for this “directness” requirement: (1) the “difficulty]” in “ascertaining , 103 S.Ct. 897 (<HOLDING>). This Court has hewed to the same path before
holding that an indirect purchaser lacked standing under the antitrust laws to sue for overcharges passed on to them by intermediaries holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue holding that a plaintiff who did not have a direct contractual relationship with the defendant and who suffered injuries derivative of those realized by intermediate parties lacked standing to sue under rico holding that employers have standing to sue holding that a union lacked standing to sue for injuries passed on to it by intermediaries