Court, we are governed by the terms of AEDPA, which provides, among others, that we may grant a writ of habeas corpus only if (1) the state decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2) the state decision was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The district court concluded that Maharaj failed to meet this exacting standard. We agree. The phrase “clearly established Federal law,” as used in § 2254(d)(1), encompasses only the holdings of the Supreme Court of the United States. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (<HOLDING>). As we have previously explained, § 2254(d)(1)
holding that where the supreme court has expressly left an open question circuit precedent is immaterial and there is no clearly established law for the state court to have unreasonably applied holding that the language of  2254d1 expressly restricts the source of clearly established law to the supreme courts jurisprudence holding that a state court cannot be said to have unreasonably applied clearly established federal law under  2254d1 when there are no holdings from the supreme court addressing the issue raised by the petitioner holding that the federal habeas courts task is to determine if the state courts decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the supreme court of the united states holding that clearly established law is construed as supreme court or tenth circuit decisions on point or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts