a member of a given race is never enough to make out a prima facie ease of racial discrimination, we are equally reluctant to hold that it is always enough. “The bare fact of strikes exercised against persons of a certain race does not necessarily reveal the work of a racially prejudiced mind.” Linscomb, 829 S.W.2d at 166. Thus, while statistical evidence alone may be conclusive in cases where strikes are exercised against a given race disproportionately or in suspiciously large numbers, in cases where the numbers are not so compelling, the trial court may rightly find that the statistics alone do not make out a prima facie ease. Muhammad, 846 S.W.2d at 435 (analyzing Linscomb, 829 S.W.2d at 166); see also Aguilar v. State, 826 S.W.2d 760, 763 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1992, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>). In sum, the proper analysis does not consist
holding that the prosecutors use of four of his five peremptory strikes to remove blacks was sufficient to establish a prima facie case holding that the strike of one hispanic veniremember was insufficient to make out a prima facie case of discrimination where the challenging party failed to show any pattern or any other evidence to the trial court which would raise an inference that the prosecutor used peremptory strikes to remove that veniremember on account of her race holding that a plaintiff had not established a prima facie case of race discrimination because she failed to show valid comparators and presented no other circumstantial evidence of discrimination holding that a petitioner did not make a prima facie showing of illegal discrimination because the petitioner needed to point to more facts than the number of africanamericans struck in order to establish a pattern of strikes supporting an inference of discrimination holding that without more the mere fact that the prosecutor used a high number of strikes to remove women from the venire is insufficient to establish a prima facie case