agreed to settle their differences for an exchange of mutual releases. However, (A) Jenkins could have presented this evidence at a pre-hearing conference on September 23, 2003 and at the hearing itself on October 3, 2003 — both of which she boycotted; and (B) the July 14, 2003 e-mail from the Coop’s attorney — which Jenkins contends constituted the settlement “offer” she accepted — referenced only the execution of releases by Jenkins alone, not the execution of mutual releases. See Gram v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.Y. 375, 382, 91 N.E.2d 307, 311 (1950) (“[A]n acceptance must comply with the terms of the offer.”). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jenkins’ Rule 59 motion. See Cathedral Estates, Inc. v. Taft Realty Corp., 228 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir.1955) (<HOLDING>). We have considered Jenkins’ remaining
holding that district court had not abused discretion in denying rule 59 motion because no persuasive reason has been shown why this evidence could not have been presented during the trial nor does it appear that it would have altered the result holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for severance where the allegedly prejudicial evidence would have been admissible in separate trials holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to amend complaint because the proposed amendment would have been futile holding that there is no indication that the district court abused its discretion in denying the discoverysanction motion holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint