degree when he possesses a machine-gun or loaded firearm with intent to use the same unlawfully against another.” N.Y. Penal Law § 265.03 (McKinney 1989). Thus, the “essential elements” of Lynch’s crime of conviction are “knowing and unlawful possession” of a loaded weapon and “the intent to use it unlawfully against another.” People v. Jamerson, 99 A.D.2d 816, 472 N.Y.S.2d 148, 151 (N.Y.App.Div.1984). The question before this Court, then, is whether a conviction under § 265.03 based on a guilty plea constitutes a violent felony under the ACCA. Other courts have squarely held that similar offenses for unlawful possession of a weapon constitute violent felonies because they fall under the ACCA’s residual provision. See, e.g., United States v. Mathews, 453 F.3d 830, 837 (7th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Childs, 403 F.3d 970, 971
holding that escape is categorically a violent felony under the acca holding that failure to stop for a blue light is a violent felony under armed career criminal statute because it involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another holding that possession of a weapon by a felon with intent to use the same unlawfully against another is categorically a violent felony under the residual clause of the acca because it involves a very significant probability of physical injury to a victim holding massachusetts conviction for larceny from the person constitutes violent felony under the residual clause of the acca holding that california residential burglary is categorically a crime of violence under the residual clause of ussg  4b12a2 which requires the criminal conduct to present a serious potential risk of physical injury to another