subject to ITAR control. (Compl. ¶ 28). 2 . Defendants are correct that the Corley court did not overrule the decision in Vartuli. However,, the Corley court itself distinguished the decision in Vartuli as limited, because it was based on the manner in which the code at issue was marketed. That is, the defendants themselves marketed the software as intended to be used "mechanically” and "without the intercession of the mind or the will of the recipient.” Corley, 273 F.3d at 449 (quoting Vartuli, 228 F.3d at 111). Plaintiffs here have not so marketed or described the files at issue. 3 . The Ninth Circuit has also rejected a First Amendment challenge to the AECA’s predecessor, the Mutual Security Act of 1954. See United States v. Edler Indus., Inc., 579 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). 4 . No party addressed whether a corporation
holding statute and regulations not overbroad in controlling conduct of assisting foreign enterprises to obtain military equipment and related technical expertise and licensing provisions of statute not an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech holding unconstitutional a statute that prohibits speech that in any manner  interrupts an officer holding that washingtons harassment statute was unconstitutionally overbroad because it covered constitutionally protected speech holding that a statute must burden a substantial amount of protected speech to be unconstitutionally overbroad holding that a regulation was not a prior restraint because it did not authorize suppression of speech in advance of its expression