not entitled to the benefit of a presumption of prejudice. Ordinarily, we would vacate and remand for a determination of whether Reed nonetheless established actual prejudice under Pierce’s three-prong test for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. However, as previously noted, the Superior Court in Reed I, in addition to finding Reed’s evi-dentiary claim waived, further determined that evidence of Reed’s prior bad acts was, in fact, admissible, and this determination is binding on the Superior Court on remand under the doctrine of law of the case. As a result, Reed will be unable, as a matter of law, to establish that he suffered actual prejudice based on trial counsel’s filing of a deficient appellate brief. See Commonwealth v. Collins, 585 Pa. 45, 61, 888 A.2d 564, 573 (2005) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, under the circumstances of the
holding that the fact that an ineffectiveness claim is raised and adjudicated on direct appeal will not procedurally bar an ineffectiveness claim in a proceeding under 28 usc  2255 where new reasons are advanced in support of that claim holding ineffectiveness cannot be raised for first time on appeal holding that ineffectiveness claims raised in a pcra petition are distinct from those claims raised on direct appeal and must be reviewed under the threeprong test of pierce but recognizing that in many instances the claim may ultimately fail on the arguable merit or prejudice prong for the reasons discussed on direct appeal holding claims must be raised on direct appeal or waived holding that derivative ineffectiveness claims are distinct sixth amendment claims albeit they may fail on the arguable merit or prejudice prong for the reasons discussed on direct appeal