she cannot vicariously assert a violation of Woods’s Fourth Amendment rights. See OCGA § 17-5-30 (a) (1) (“A defendant aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the court ... to suppress as evidence anything so obtained on the grounds that . . . [t]he search and seizure without a warrant was illegal.”). This is merely another way of arguing that Lee lacks standing to challenge the search of the safe. See State v. Carter, 299 Ga. App. 3, 5-6 (681 SE2d 688) (2009). But because Lee was staying in the room, she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room and the safe within it, and can assert that she was aggrieved by the search within the meaning of OCGA § 17-5-30 (a) and the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 5. See also Brown v. State, 288 Ga. 404, 407 (2) (703 SE2d 624) (2010) (<HOLDING>). (c) The state argues that the evidence was
holding that consent to search premises includes consent to search washing machine on those premises holding that where a container belonged exclusively to the defendant who lived on particular premises with the owners permission the owner of the premises did not have actual authority to consent to a search of the container holding under state constitution that validity of consent search requires knowledge of right to refuse consent holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises holding that while a lawfully issued warrant to search premises authorizes the officers executing it to search in a reasonable manner whatever spots within the described premises their professional experience indicates may be used as a cache for the items named in the warranty such a warrant does not by its own force permit a search of the persons residents or visitorswho chance to be at the premises at the time the warrant is executed or belongings of a nonresident visitor present on the premises