time to her. When this largesse was denied, she had to take leave without pay while she recovered from surgery from October 5, 1999 through mid-January 2000. Finally, the Department changed course and allowed fellow officers to donate sick time. Perch alleges that she told her MCAD caseworker about the Department’s conduct regarding her cancer, but she did not amend her charge in writing. On February 5, 2001 the MCAD notified the Department that it had found probable cause regarding Perch’s CFS-related charge of discrimination, and sent a “fact sheet” summarizing its investigation. This fact sheet did not make reference to Perch’s cancer-related claims. In March 2001, the MCAD held an unsuccessful Conciliation with Perch and the Police Department, and then issued a Right to ss.1999) (<HOLDING>); Tunnicliff v. Motel 6, 178 F.R.D. 8, 9
holding that plaintiff could not sue for racial discrimination beeause her race is nowhere mentioned in the mcad complaint for disability discrimination holding official immunity is available in claims of discrimination if plaintiff fails to establish his treatment by defendants was so at variance with what would reasonably be anticipated absent racial discrimination that racial discrimination is the probable explanation holding disability discrimination claim barred holding that racial discrimination is not a personal injury tort holding that the plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to gender discrimination and retaliation claims where she had only asserted discrimination based on race and disability in her eeoc complaint