and contrary to the plain language of the TCPA because the effect would be to “set aside, annul, or suspend” the FCC Order and thus a violation of the Hobbs Act. B. Having determined that the district court correctly refused to entertain arguments regarding the validity of the 1992 FCC Order, we turn to whether DCI’s actions violated the TCPA under any FCC order. Mr. Murphy’s argument that prior express consent must be given its plain language meaning fails because it requires rejection of the FCC’s interpretation of prior express consent in FCC orders. Absent a direct appeal to review the 1992 FCC Order’s interpretation of prior express consent, we are bound to follow it. See CE Design, Ltd. v. Prism Bus. Media, Inc., 606 F.3d 443, 450 (7th Cir.2010); cf. Mais, 768 F.3d at 1121 (<HOLDING>). Mr. Murphy’s complaint alleged that he
holding that where the plaintiffs evidence supported a finding that the defendants had applied force to restrain him the jury must determine not only whether the officers were justified in using force at all but if so whether the degree of force actually used was reasonable holding the supreme court was without jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the courts finding of facts conclusions of law and ruling until the court entered the decree that was contemplated by the finding of facts conclusions of law and ruling holding that an unappealed ruling is the law of the case holding the 2008 fcc ruling had the force of law holding force to be an element of pre1994 amendment  111 which may be satisfied by proof of force or threat of force