single source — in this case, the defendants’ used car operation with the CarMax mark. Proof of “secondary meaning” is required for the protection of marks perceived by the public to be “personal names.” See 2 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks & Unfair Competition § 13.2 (4th ed.1998). The District Court held that proof of secondary meaning was necessary because CarMax was a personal name since it was “constructed from the names of Philip Artz’s children.” We disagree. In In re Standard Elektrik Lorenz Aktiengesellschaft, 54 C.C.P.A. 1043, 371 F.2d 870, 873 (1967), the Court held that a composite mark consisting of two personal names is not necessarily a personal name as well. This rule was later elaborated in In re Hutchinson Technology, Inc., 852 F.2d 552, 554 (Fed.Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). No evidence was offered during trial that the
holding that the issue presented by a composite mark consisting of personal names is what the purchasing publie would think when confronted with the mark as a whole holding limited use of a mark did not constitute prior use in commerce sufficient to establish rights in the mark holding that mark had not acquired secondary meaning even with advertisements costing 4400000 over five years because it did not lead consumers to associate plaintiffs mark with its products holding that the essential wrong of trademark infringement the appropriation of the good will of anothers established mark may be effectively accomplished by advertising matter associating that others distinguishing mark with the product of defendant holding that 350 million dollars expended in advertising the mark three billion units bearing the mark having been sold and the units bearing the mark having been sold in all fifty states and throughout the work supported a finding that hot wheels was famous