justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. Mr. Looper asserts that the failure to file a timely answer was due to “excusable neglect” as that term is used in the rule. As discussed more fully earlier in this opinion, motions to set aside default judgments are addressed to the trial court’s discretion, and we will not reverse absent an abuse of discretion. See Nelson, 826 S.W.2d at 485; see also Patterson, 665 S.W.2d at 100. Tennessee courts generally hold that an attorney’s negligence, without more, does not constitute excusable neglect. See Terminix Int’l Co., L.P. v. Tapley, No. 02A01-9701-CH-00028, 1997 WL 437222 at * 3 (Tenn.Ct.App. Aug.4, 1997) (no Tenn. R.App. P. 11 filed); see also Barber & McMurry, Inc. v. Top-Flite Dev. Corp., 720 S.W.2d 469, 471 (Tenn.Ct.App.1986) (<HOLDING>); Munday v. Brown, 617 S.W.2d 897, 900
holding that a default judgment was not void because the bankruptcy court that entered the judgment had proper jurisdiction over the party seeking relief holding that party obtaining a default judgment is only entitled to the relief prayed for in complaint holding that trial court must make entry of default prior to entry of default judgment and court may not make entry of default when there is no default in law or in fact holding that a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment precluded default judgment holding that an attorneys preoccupation with other business is not grounds for relief from a default judgment