the other states cited by the Inter-Tel Technologies court that specified a procedural mechanism to initiate piercing the corporate veil and that would differentiate the circumstances in those states from those at issue in Michigan. In light of the foregoing, we hold that plaintiffs were entitled to bring a new action in an attempt to enforce the prior Kasper judgment against Persha. While we continue to recognize that piercing the corporate veil is merely a remedy to be applied in certain limited circumstances, the concern that there be a separate cause of action to support this type of equitable relief does not arise when, as in this case, there already exists a judgment based on one or more causes of action. See Union Guardian Trust Co v Rood, 308 Mich 168, 172; 13 NW2d 248 (1944) (<HOLDING>). In other words, a party certainly needs to
recognizing that when a cause of action is reduced to a judgment the cause of action is merged into the judgment and thereafter only an action on the judgment exists recognizing the cause of action holding that dismissal is proper for a derivative cause of action but not for a direct cause of action recognizing cause of action holding the court cannot find intent where the consent judgment fails to mention the cause of action