expression is not limited to speech that could be construed as discrimination on the basis of union membership. Rather, it broadly protects “any views or opinions on the subject of employer-employee relations.” TenmCode Ann. § 49-5-606(a)(5). This language, particularly “any views” and “the subject of employer-employee relations,” comprehends a range of expression much broader than opinions on the desirability of unionism or union membership. And even though most cases dealing with employer expression, including those cited by the district court, involve comments on the merits of impending unionization in the employer’s company, case law upholding the employer’s right to expression is not limited to this circumstance. See Fla. Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 735, 751-53 (5th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>); NLRB v. Monroe Tube Co., 545 F.2d 1320,
holding judges letter to the editor advocating against gay rights constituted speech fully protected by the first amendment holding that letter that was copied to the schools board of directors was written pursuant to her duties and was not protected speech holding that  8e protected an employers speech undertaken to correct any misunderstandings informing employees that their signed union cards were not confidential and that the employer retained the right to discharge or discipline employees for cause holding that company letter to employees advising them of their right to ask for an opportunity to obtain legal counsel before speaking with a nlrb agent following a failed union election was protected speech under the first amendment and  8c holding that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties the employees are not speaking as citizens for first amendment purposes and the constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline