the general principle that a conspiracy to commit a crime and the substantive crime that is the object of the conspiracy are separate and distinct offenses and conviction and punishment may be had for each offense. See Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law § 6.5(h), at 612 (3d ed.2000) (stating that, at common law, “it is now possible for a defendant to be convicted and punished for both the conspiracy and the substantive offense”); Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 11, 74 S.Ct. 358, 364, 98 L.Ed. 435 (1954) (“It is settled law in this country that the commission of a substantive offense and a conspiracy to commit it are separate and distinct crimes, and a plea of double jeopardy is no defense to a conviction for both.”); Boyd v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 346, 351, 374 S.E.2d 301, 303 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Appellant contends, nonetheless, that,
holding that notwithstanding code  182231s application to successive trials conviction of both the completed substantive offense and the underlying conspiracy are permitted in virginia provided the convictions occurred as here in a single trial holding that a second offense was subsequent for purposes of hrs  71212004 inasmuch as it was  subsequent in terms of both commission and ascertainment of guilt notwithstanding that the two convictions had occurred simultaneously in the course of the same proceeding holding that separate sentences may be imposed for a violation of section 36bd and the predicate offense where both convictions were the result of the same act so long as the charges are brought in a single trial holding that conspiracy to commit a particular substantive offense cannot exist without at least the degree of criminal intent necessary for the substantive offense itself internal quotation marks omitted holding that under the crimes code conspiracy and the completed substantive offense are separate crimes