condition. Two days of the first leave and all of the subsequent leaves were reported as “sick days” rather than FMLA leave pursuant to 29 C.F.R. 825.207(a). After each of her leaves, plaintiff was allowed to return to her position as bus driver for the District and no further requests for leave were made thereafter. Plaintiff has not produced any evidence that she was denied any benefit to which she was entitled or that she was planning to make a further request for leave from the District. Furthermore, while she was disciplined and subsequently fired, allegedly for exercising her rights under the FMLA, courts in this circuit have consistently held that these types of claims constitute retaliation and not interference. See Potenza v. City of New York, 365 F.3d 165 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); LeClair v. Berkshire Union Free School
holding that interference and retaliation are two separate theories that can be advanced under the fmla and that termination is evidence of retaliation recognizing both retaliation and interference claims under  1140 holding that a plaintiff can prove illegal retaliation under   1981 in the same manner as he establishes retaliation under title vii holding that the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate retaliation for activities that occurred two years prior to the termination holding that discrimination and retaliation claims are considered distinct types of claims that must be raised independently if the retaliation occurred prior to the filing of the administrative charge