the evidence was more than ample to convict him of both conspiracies had they been separately charged. In his brief, Herrera essentially concedes this point. And, under either or both conspiracies Herrera could have been convicted of the same offenses, since the conspiracies with both Nye and Jimenez separately involved combined weights over 50 grams of methamphetamine. Herrera’s argument is actually one of variance, in that the evidence presented at trial proved that he was a part of two conspiracies, rather than the one conspiracy with which he was charged. A variance “warrants reversal only if it affects the substantial rights of the parties.” Id. at 1081 (internal quotations omitted); see also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82-83, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 135,
holding that the conviction should be affirmed despite the existence of two conspiracies where the indictment charged only one because this variance did not prejudice the defendant holding that the conviction should be upheld because there was no prejudice to the defendant even though the defendant had been charged with one conspiracy and the proof at trial showed two separate conspiracies holding that the jury would have no problem separating the actions of the individual defendants where there were only four defendants and two separate conspiracies holding that there was no prejudice when evidence complained of would have been admissible against defendant in separate trial holding that res judicata barred conspiracy claim against defendant even though defendant had not been a party to the prior action because the civil conspiracy claim should have been adjudicated in a prior action and defendant as an alleged participant in the conspiracy would have been indispensable party to that adjudication