disproportionate for a particular defendant’s crime.” First, we compare the gravity of the offense and the severity of the sentence. And if the threshold comparison leads to an inference of gross disproportionality, this Court will then “compare the defendant’s sentence with the sentences received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.” In this respect, our Supreme Court has emphasized that “it is the rare case in which the threshold inference of gross disproportionality will be met and a rarer case still in which that threshold inference stands after further scrutiny.” Additionally, a sentence which is not otherwise cruel and unusual “does not become so simply because it is (3) (680 SE2d 616) (2009) (<HOLDING>); Green v. State, 193 Ga. App. 894, 896 (2)
holding that life sentence imposed for kidnapping with bodily injury was not cruel and unusual even if victims injuries were minor holding that a life sentence pursuant to  841 blaiii was not a cruel and unusual punishment holding that life sentence imposed for kidnapping with bodily injury of 14yearold victim was not cruel and unusual punishment even though bodily injury was slight given circumstances attendant upon offense holding that the imposition of a true life sentence on a minor convicted of felony murder was cruel and unusual based on the specific circumstances surrounding the offense holding that an effective life sentence of fortyfive years for seconddegree forgery was excessive and that a life sentence was cruel and unusual in violation of the eighth amendment