(1999). A jury must find the existence of at least one statutory aggravating factor before it can even consider proposed non-statutory factors, a prosecutor can only argue those nonstatutory aggravating factors for which the defendant has been given prior notice, a nonstatutory aggravating factor itself must conform with due process jurisprudence, and a district judge is required to screen out any irrelevant and unduly prejudicial information a prosecutor may try to introduce to the jury in order to prove a nonstatutory aggravating factor. Id. at 240. We agree with the Fifth Circuit that these limitations provide intelligible principles which constrain a prosecutor’s discretion such that the delegation is not unconstitutional. United States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 1003 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); See also United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d
recognizing that there is an outer limit to congresss power under the commerce clause recognizing the delegation of authority to the united states attorneys recognizing in the psc context that a legislative delegation of power to a legislative or executive agency permitting an agency to declare what the law is violates floridas separation of powers doctrine holding that the prosecutors authority to define nonstatutory aggravating factors is a constitutional delegation of congresss legislative power recognizing the medicare statutes broad delegation of authority