states themselves to liability. See Will, 491 U.S. at 68-69, 109 S.Ct. 2304. The bottom line is that appellees have not pointed to anything in the legislative history of the 1863 Act, or in the events leading up to it, indicating that Congress actually contemplated imposing liability on the states. Because the enacting Congress’ intent is, to be charitable, rather opaque, appellees turn our attention to the 1986 amendments to the False Claims Act and to a related statute also passed in 1986. The provision of the 1986 amendments that changed 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) from imposing liability on “[a] person not a member of an armed force of the United States” to “[a]ny person” did not, however, substantively expand the meaning of defendant persons under the Act. See Stevens, 162 F.3d at 206-07 (<HOLDING>); Graber, 8 F.Supp.2d at 354-55. It is true
recognizing a cause of action for conspiracy to deprive a class of persons of their fundamental rights under the laws of the united states holding that foreign states are not persons entitled to rights under the due process clause holding that a plaintiffs lack of knowledge regarding the number of affected persons does not bar class certification when defendant has the means to identify those persons at will holding states are not persons for the purposes of section 1983 holding that states are persons but conceding that this change was not envisioned as broadening the class of persons who could be held liable under the act