Parker, 101 F.3d 527, 528 (7th Cir.1996)). And “any issue that could have been raised on appeal but was not is waived and, therefore, not remanded.” Id. (citing Husband, 312 F.3d at 250-251); see also United States v. Morris, 259 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir.2001) (“[PJarties cannot use the accident of remand as an opportunity to reopen waived issues.”). The remand order we issued instructed the district court to consider the “limited issue” of the “wiggle room Kimbrough provides” for departure from the then-existing sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine. Ross, 375 Fed.Appx. at 596. We also highlighted, in a footnote, that our decision in United States v. Millbrook, 553 F.3d 1057 (7th Cir.2009), was overruled by United States v. Corner, 598 F.3d 411 (7th Cir.2010) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). The district court correctly followed our
holding that the career offender guideline could not directly apply when there was an unsentenced conviction but allowing the district court on remand to consider departing from the guidelines in order to sentence a defendant whose conduct delayed his convictions as if the career offender provision applied holding that reduced career offender status was nonetheless based the career offender guidelines holding that a defendant whose sentence is based on his status as a career offender under  4b11 is not entitled to  3582c2 relief because amendments 706 and 713 do not lower the applicable guideline range for a career offender holding that sentences imposed under the career offender guideline are not eligible for remand under kimbrough and taylor because a sentence under the career offender guideline raises no kimbrough problem holding that a district court is entitled to disagree with the career offender guideline