his prison’s law library ... is subpar ... [he] must ... demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim.”). And as there does not appear to be any other allegation in the record of untimely filings, the District Court was right to find his allegations insufficient. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Moreover, an adequate prison law library is but one of many acceptable ways to satisfy Diaz’s right to access the courts. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 831, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). The right can be satisfied instead, for example, by appointing Diaz an attorney. See Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1042 (3d Cir.1988); see also Degrate v. Godwin, 84 F.3d 768, 768-69 (5th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). And, as Diaz himself admitted, he did have
holding that the state does not have to provide access to a law library to defendants in criminal trials who wish to represent themselves and waive their right to counsel holding that during a postriot lockdown refusal of access to main law library is constitutional as long as access to basic law library for initial legal research is permitted holding that although prison inmates have a first amendment right to access to the courts prison officials may regulate law library access including reasonable time place and manner of access taking into account the administrative needs of the institution holding that prisoner did not have right to access law library because he had courtappointed counsel holding that the total denial of all access to the law library for seven months violated the plaintiffs constitutional right of access to the courts