would be presumed in the present circumstánces. 5 . Horton has not introduced competent evidence to challenge the state court's finding that defense counsel welcomed the voir procedure for strategic reasons. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (stating that in habeas proceeding state court factual determinations are pre sumptively correct absent contrary showing by clear and convincing evidence). The only arguably contrary information is an affidavit from Horton's habeas counsel containing a summary of his conversations with defense counsel in which defense counsel stated that he should have insisted that the individual voir dire be conducted in public. This affidavit is inadequate to justify disregarding the state court's finding. Cf. United States v. Maguire, 600 F.2d 330, 332 (1st Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Arguably, Horton’s public trial rights
holding no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim for failure to raise as basis for appeal of conviction ineffective assistance of trial counsel where basis for the latter claim was inadequate holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel holding that res judicata does not bar a defendant from raising a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for the first time in a postcollateral proceeding if the defendant was represented by the same counsel at trial and on direct appeal or if an actual conflict of interest enjoined appellate counsel from raising a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal holding that affidavit of appellate counsel summarizing conversations with trial counsel in which trial counsel admitted making errors is hearsay and cannot establish ineffective assistance claim recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel