What he claimed was that it wasn’t property of the estate.” The Court need not reach the issue of whether listing the wrong statute as a basis for an exemption on Schedule “C” is a fatal to the claim. The Debtor was correct that Fed.R.Bank.P. 4003 applies. However, it offers little comfort to him because the Debtor’s counsel waived such defense. Upon filing the Amendment to the Schedules on April 19,2002, the Debt- or’s counsel reopened the issue, at least as to the trust property, and triggered the tolling of a new 30 day period within which the Chapter 7 Trustee was permitted to object. In re Bell, 225 F.3d 203 (2d Cir.2000) cf. Matter of Kazi, 985 F.2d 318, 323 (7th Cir.1993) [limits application to items actually amended] citing to In re Payton, 73 B.R. 31 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1987) (<HOLDING>); In re Payton, 73 B.R. 31 (holding that filing
holding that filing of any amendment does not reopen the time period for asserting an objection trustee could object only to actual amendments to the list holding that the timely filing of a motion to reopen or reconsider with the bia does not toll the time period for seeking appellate court review and that the mere act of filing the motion does not render nonfinal the underlying bia decision holding trustee has waived the right to bring a preference objection holding trustee has not waived the right to bring a preference objection holding that the filing of an opening brief within the time period for filing a notice of appeal could constitute notice of appeal