discloses no published opinion in which we have directly addressed this doctrine, it has been recognized in binding precedent and applied by numerous sister circuits. See, e.g., Te Kuei Liu v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 645 F.2d 279, 285 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981) (explaining that actions of American consul in Winnipeg, Canada, where alien’s relative visa petition had been forwarded, were not “within the ambit of our review”); Centeno v. Shultz, 817 F.2d 1212, 1214 (5th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (citing Te Kuei Liu for proposition that “decisions of United States consuls on visa matters are nonreviewable by the courts”); Saavedra, 197 F.3d at 1159 (defining doctrine of consular nonreviewability); Doan v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 160 F.3d 508, 509 (8th Cir. 1998) (<HOLDING>); Li Hing of Hong Kong, Inc. v. Levin, 800 F.2d
holding that decision of ins district director who was functional equivalent of a consular official in denying visarelated waiver was not subject to judicial review because there was no clear statutory grant of authority holding that judicial review is available over the determination of whether extreme hardship exists though no jurisdiction exists to review the ultimate decision of whether to grant a waiver under  1186ac4a holding that the action of denying parole is not an adjudication subject to judicial review holding that the director of the office of domestic relations was a judicial agency pursuant to the rtkl because the director was administrative staff of the unified judicial system as defined in the judicial code 42 pacs  102 holding that there was adequate opportunity when state court judicial review of an administrative proceeding was available