officers) engaged in repeated acts of abuse in several episodes that resulted in the death of an innocent man. Id. at 171. These events tended to prove a disposition to disregard human life and safety so prevalent as to be police policy or custom. Id. Courts that have subsequently evaluated Grandstaff have been reluctant to extend that court’s application of Monell liability in the absence of extraordinary and egregious circumstances. See, e.g., Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 797-98 (5th Cir.1998) (refusing to find “extraordinary factual circumstances” in support of claim that police department enforced a “code of silence” where officer shot plaintiff from behind while pursuing him); Young v. Eslinger, No. 6:04-cv-1830-Orl-31KRS, 2006 WL 2854997, at *4 (M.D.Fla. Sept.29, 2006) (<HOLDING>); Daniel v. City of Tampa, Fla, No.
holding twoandahalf hour search of car and persons at traffic stop allegedly made without probable cause was not such egregious wrongdoing that official policy could be inferred holding that a dog sniff of the outside of a car subsequent to a valid traffic stop did not constitute a search holding that there was sufficient probable cause to search a defendants residence after evidence of drug dealing was found in his car during a traffic stop that was conducted when the defendant was coming from his residence and noting that under such circumstances a practical commonsense conclusion could be made that the drugs and money had been at the defendants residence a short time before the stop holding this framework applies whether the traffic stop is based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion holding that a traffic stop is reasonable under the fourth amendment when police have probable cause to believe a traffic infraction has occurred