candidates after discussing and sharing their impressions with each other, Def.’s Statement ¶¶ 22, 23; PL’s Statement ¶¶ 22, 23. As discussed above, the general use of a panel to conduct a round of preliminary interview as well as Arquette’s non-participation fell squarely within the FDIC guidelines. See FDIC Guidelines at 2. And although the plaintiff insists that the “obvious explanation” for Arquette’s choice not to interview all thirteen candidates herself is that she “wanted to remove [herself] from picking and choosing among a diverse and unfiltered pool of candidates,” PL’s Opp’n at 36, narrowing the pool of candidates through the use of a preliminary round of interviews hardly suggests a discriminatory motive, see Pollard v. Quest Diagnostics, 610 F.Supp.2d 1, 22 (D.D.C.2009) (<HOLDING>). Given the strength of the defendant’s
recognizing that stray remarks are insufficient to raise an inference of discrimination and concluding that a comment by the decisionmaker that he selected a candidate for a promotion because the candidate was a bright intelligent knowledgeable young man was a stray remark that did not raise an inference of age discrimination holding that the mere fact that two caucasian candidates were referred to second level interviews without more was insufficient to raise an inference of discrimination because the plaintiff must have shown the employer acted because of his membership in a protected class holding that evidence of overt discrimination coupled with a showing that the employer had falsely stated that an outside consultant had made the termination decision were adequate to raise an inference of illegal age discrimination holding plaintiff failed to raise inference of discrimination where only evidence plaintiff adduced was fact that decisionmaker was different race holding that the trial courts in camera interviews were within its discretion because the defendant had waived his right to be present during the juror interviews