enumerated under § 3583(e). But, as the sentencing transcript demonstrates, the district court repeatedly stated that it was Miller’s lack of “respect for the law” that warranted the sixty-month imprisonment term. Thus, the court clearly considered § 3553(a)(2)(A) and in doing so, that court erred. Despite this mistake, the district court’s error was not plainly unreasonable. When the district court sentenced Miller, our circuit’s law on this question was unclear and therefore, that court’s consideration of § 3553(a)(2)(A) was not an obvious error. See United States v. Combs, No. 10-10175, 2010 WL 4872252 (5th Cir. Nov. 30, 2010) (stating that we had not determined whether § 3583(e) precludes consideration of § 3553(a)(2)(A)); United States v. Salinas, 480 F.3d 750, 759 (5th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). IV Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district
holding that a condition banning possession of pornography did not constitute plain error because the current law concerning this issue is unsettled holding that an error is plain if it is clear or obvious holding that when our circuits law is unsettled and other federal circuits have reached divergent conclusions the claimed error could not be clear or obvious under the second prong of the plain error test holding that defendant could not show district courts alleged error in considering  3553a2a when imposing a revocation sentence was clear or obvious under plain error review holding that because of unsettled case law district courts error was not obvious and therefore not plain