a colloquy to assess the petitioner’s intentions and whether he understands the consequences of the waiver. See, e.g., Demosthenes, 495 U.S. at 732-33, 110 S.Ct. 2223 (concluding that a state court waiver was valid only after that court questioned the petitioner under oath and concluded specifically that the waiver was intelligently executed); Dennis, 378 F.3d at 884 (accepting a state court waiver as valid because that court “engaged in a comprehensive colloquy” with the petitioner during which “[t]he court had [petitioner] re-read his initial habeas petition ... and the court reviewed with [petitioner] the assignments of error alleged in the petition” and the petitioner in court “asserted his desire to give up his right to pursue each of these claims”); Fahy, 516 F.3d at 183-85 (<HOLDING>); see also St. Pierre v. Cowan, 217 F.3d 939,
holding that the defendant played games with the court system to such an extent that she forfeited her right to counsel thereby rendering unnecessary the colloquy required for a waiver of counsel holding that signed waivers and police testimony describing the procedure used to obtain the waivers were sufficient to find a voluntary waiver of rights holding that even though the state court did engage in a colloquy with the petitioner that colloquy was insufficient to establish that the waiver was knowing and voluntary because the state court had refused to permit petitioners counsel to ask him questions that would probe the waivers validity holding that the court must determine whether the employees consent to the settlement agreement was knowing and voluntary holding that record did not establish knowing waiver