that voluntary manslaughter is not necessarily a crime involving moral turpitude, citing In re Strick, 43 Cal.3d 644, 238 Cal.Rptr. 397, 405, 738 P.2d 743, 750 (1987), and In re Nevill, 39 Cal.3d 729, 217 Cal.Rptr. 841, 704 P.2d 1332 (1985)); People v. Thomas, 206 Cal.App.3d 689, 254 Cal.Rptr. 15, 19 (1988) (in considering impeachment with conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, court discussed, but did not decide, question of whether “imperfect self-defense” should call into doubt whether voluntary manslaughter necessarily involves moral turpitude); State v. Morgan, 541 S.W.2d 385, 390 (Tenn.1976) (concluding that voluntary manslaughter was not “infamous crime” under Tennessee statute ■ allowing use of “infamous crimes,” to be used to im 543, 1991 WL 94403, *5 (Cal.Bar Ct.1991) (<HOLDING>); In re Strick, 43 Cal.3d 644, 238 Cal.Rptr.
holding that involuntary manslaughter defined either as reckless or negligent was not a crime of moral turpitude because itwas based on unintentional conduct in contrast to those crimes involving some form of evil intent it is not an offense that is mala in se and thus does not fall within the definition of crimes involving moral turpitude holding that missouris reckless conduct statute establishes a crime involving moral turpitude holding that robbery under california law categorically qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude and noting precedent in this and other circuits that theft crimes are crimes involving moral turpitude holding that assault with a deadly weapon was not a crime involving moral turpitude recognizing involuntary manslaughter as an offense that does not in and of itself constitute a crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of attorney disbarment