necessitating reference to and interpretation of the CBA, the claim at issue here is “minor” in nature. We disagree. There is no doubt that Title VII rights, which the CBA never expressly references, “exist independent of the collective bargaining agreement.” Hawaiian Airlines, — U.S. at-, 114 S.Ct. at 2239. Because Title VII and the RLA, as applied to this railway agreement, each provide a mechanism for resolving a claim of religious discrimination does not mean that the Title VII rights are “created or defined” by the CBA. Id. — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2250. Thus, whether Felt has a meritorious Title VII claim cannot be “conclusively resolved” merely by consulting the CBA. The RLA does not preclude litigation of Title VII rights. Cf. Buell, 480 U.S. at 564-65, 107 S.Ct. at 1414-16 (<HOLDING>); Bates v. LIRR, 997 F.2d 1028, 1030 (2d Cir.),
holding in the only supreme court case to deal with rla preclusion that the rla did not preclude suit under fela for workplace injury even though injury was caused by conduct that may have been subject to arbitration under the rla holding variance between the specific injury alleged in the indictment and the evidence at trial was not fatal where it was only necessary to allege under nc gen stat  143184a that the defendant caused serious injury and the actual injury alleged was surplusage holding that because fact of injury was a distinct question from quantum of injury common proof could establish classwide injury even though amount of damage to each plaintiff was uncertain holding that an injury is not within the scope of employment after the employee has left work unless the injury was caused by the employers negligence holding that to have standing a plaintiff must establish an injury in fact a casual connection between the injury and that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision