(9th Cir.1983) {en banc); United States v. Buckner, 717 F.2d 297, 299-300 (6th Cir.1983). But see United States v. Weems, 322 F.3d 18, 23 n. 3 (1st Cir.2003) (assuming, without deciding, that arrestee may object to police entry into third party’s home without a search warrant). We need not here decide whether to adopt this reasoning because, even if we were to do so, Snype might still be entitled to a taint inquiry. This is because an apparent gap in the hearing record does not permit us to conclude that either Payton or exigency supports the initial entry. Both theories require proof of a common fact to support entry into Bean’s home without a search warrant: a reasonable basis for believing that Snype was then on the premises. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 603, 100 S.Ct. 1371 (<HOLDING>); see, e.g., United States v. MacDonald, 916
recognizing that for fourth amendment purposes an arrest warrant supported by probable cause carries with it limited authority to enter a dwelling in which a suspect lives when there is reason to believe that the suspect is within holding that arrest warrant can support entry into suspects residence when there is reason to believe the suspect is within holding that arrest warrant permits police to enter residence of person named therein to make arrest holding that absent exigent circumstances the fourth amendment prohibits warrantless nonconsensual entry into a suspects home in order to make a felony arrest  notwithstanding the existence of probable cause to arrest holding that an arrest warrant can authorize entry into a dwelling only where the officials executing the warrant have reasonable or probable cause to believe the person named in the warrant is within