(11th Cir. 1982). Probationers, howev er, have a diminished expectation of privacy and are subject to limitations to which ordinary citizens are free, such as home visits by probation officers. Id. at 1367-68. We have not addressed the question of whether a probation condition so completely diminished a probationer’s reasonable expectation of privacy that a search without reasonable suspicion would satisfy the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment in the criminal context. We and the Supreme Court have held that the Fourth Amendment is not violated when a probationer’s home is searched based on only reasonable suspicion, absent consent and absent a warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 114, 121-22, 122 S.Ct. 587, 589, 592-93, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Yuknavich, 419 F.3d 1302,
holding search of probationers computer by probation officers was reasonable even in absence of a search provision when conditions on probationers computer use reduced his expectation of privacy in his computer holding warrantless search of probationers home by probation officers based on reasonable suspicion was constitutionally permissible when conditions of probation required probationer to submit to home visits but not searches holding warrantless search of probationers home by law enforcement officer for investigatory purposes was reasonable when conditions of probation included a search term and search was supported by reasonable suspicion holding that the warrantless search of knights supported by reasonable suspicion and authorized by a condition of probation was reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment holding unanimously that a warrantless search of a probationers apartment that was supported by reasonable suspicion and authorized as a condition of his probation was reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment