judgment motion by mail does not implicate Rule 6(e), because Martin’s deadline depended on the date that Akzo filed its summary judgment motion with the court. To the extent that Martin views his error as excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1), he is mistaken. Martin’s ignorance of local rules or misconstruction of their applicability does not constitute excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1). Bohlin Co. v. Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350, 357 (5th Cir.1993) (“Gross carelessness, ignorance of the rules, or ignorance of the law are insufficient bases for 60(b)(1) relief.”). In addition, Martin’s misinterpretation of the Rule 6(e) does not constitute the type of excusable neglect required to reopen a case under Rule 60(b)(1). Midwest Employers Casualty Co. v. Williams, 161 F.3d 877 (5th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Because Martin’s misinterpretation of Local
holding that the misinterpretation of rule 6e did not rise to the level of excusable neglect where the plaintiffappellee believed he had three additional days to file a motion for a new trial because the courts judgment was served by mail holding that misplacing the notice of an appealable order was not excusable neglect holding that trial court has no power to allow party to amend motion for new trial more than thirty days after trial court signed the final judgment and that denial of amended motion for new trial filed more than thirty days after judgment preserved nothing for appellate review holding that a second motion to reconsider served within ten days of the denial of the first motion does not extend the time period for filing a notice of appeal from the underlying judgment holding that jurisdiction in the district court was terminated by the trial courts order to close the case and that dss was required to file a new petition alleging neglect