trial in response to the defendant’s C.R.C.P. 12(b) motion. Specifically, Robinson contends that because she framed her action in contract and it was the contract claims that were dismissed, section 13-17-201 does not warrant the grant of attorney fees to the Lottery. She relies on two court of appeals’ cases that have adopted an interpretation of section 13-17-201 that supports her argument. See Kennedy v. King Soopers Inc., 148 P.3d 385, 388 (Colo.App.2006) (noting that for the purpose of section 13-17-201, courts must rely on plaintiffs characterization of the claims in the complaint and should not consider what should or might have been pleaded); Sweeney v. United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc., 119 P.3d 538, 541 (Colo.App.2005), cert. denied, 2005 WL 2181649 (Colo. Sept.12, 2005) (<HOLDING>). We have not yet considered this issue and
holding that the plaintiffs breach of contract claim was properly a statutory claim under the personnel management act holding that the trial court should have dismissed the employees breach of contract claim holding that even though plaintiffs claim was barred by the cgia because it sounded in tort attorney fees were not appropriate where it was a contract claim that was pleaded and thus a contract claim that was dismissed holding that a breach of contract claim against one defendant related back to interference with contract claim against that defendant and breach of contract claim against second defendant because it was based on same set of operative facts holding that when a creditor files a proof of claim the bankruptcy court has core jurisdiction to determine that claim even if it was a prepetition contract claim arising under state law