fired him because City officials thought Kaplan was permanently disabled by rheumatoid arthritis. But rheumatoid arthritis did not prevent Kap-lan from fully recovering from his work-sustained injury. Eventually, he did recover. Because Kaplan was allegedly fired based on a misdiagnosis, Kaplan seeks relief under the ADA as an individual who was “regarded as” having a disability, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(3), not as someone who is actually disabled. Whether “regarded as” plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable accommodation under the ADA is an issue of first impression for this circuit. Some circuits have considered the issue and concluded that “regarded as” plaintiffs are not entitled to reasonable accommodations under the ADA. See Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916-17 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467
holding that an employers awareness of plaintiffs past medical problems does not establish that it regarded her as disabled holding that an employers awareness of an employees impairment without more is insufficient to demonstrate that the employer regarded the employee as disabled holding that regarded as disabled plaintiffs are not entitled to reasonable accommodation holding that employees requests for accommodation were not protected activity because the evidence did not show that he had a reasonable good faith belief that he was disabled or perceived as disabled holding that the disabled individual bears the initial burden of proposing an accommodation and showing that that accommodation is objectively reasonable and that the defendant was entitled to prevail because the plaintiffs proposed accommodation of remaining on unpaid medical leave until another customer service or receptionist position opened up was not a reasonable accommodation under the ada