distribute cocaine, LSD, and mushrooms could not later assert that he only knew about cocaine). We decline to follow the reasoning of Tolson and Eaves, being persuaded that the better reasoning limits the effect of a guilty plea to an admission of the facts essential to the validity of the conviction. The appropriate course is not, as the government argues, for the defendant to “delete this [overt] act from the guilty plea,” but rather, for the government at the plea colloquy to seek an explicit admission of any unlawful conduct which it seeks to attribute to the defendant. Having failed to do so, the government must follow the normal procedure of proving relevant conduct at sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence. Cf. United States v. Gilliam, 987 F.2d 1009, 1014 (4th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Because the government did not prove, and the
holding that an inference of intent to distribute was not warranted from the possession of one ounce of cocaine holding that a plea to an indictment charging a 28member conspiracy involving possession with intent to distribute or distribution of 30 kilograms of cocaine did not relieve the government of proving at sentencing the amount attributable to the defendant holding similar evidence sufficient to sustain a jury verdict of possession with intent to distribute cocaine holding no unfair prejudice from admission of conviction for possession of 50 to 200 pounds of marijuana with intent to distribute as evidence of intent to distribute cocaine holding that simple possession of cocaine is not lesser included offense of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute