the adverse credibility determination because it relates to “an example of the very persecution from which [Kola] sought asylum.” Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 446 F.3d 289, 295 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 166 n. 3 (“An inconsistency and an omission are ... functionally equivalent”). While the IJ was mistaken in finding that Kola had backtracked from this testimony (the IJ relied on testimony regarding the previous day’s activities), this limited error does not require a remand: the other findings, particularly the inconsistencies regarding the beating and medical care, make clear that the result would not have changed absent the error. See Cao He Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 428 F.3d 391, 401-02 (2d Cir. 2005) (<HOLDING>). As the IJ found, Kola’s lack of corroborating
holding that in the absence of demonstrated prejudice remand is unnecessary holding that remand is unnecessary when it is clear that the same decision would have been reached in the absence of the errors holding remand not required where there is no realistic possibility that absent the errors the ij or bia would have reached a different conclusion holding remand unnecessary where outcome is clear as a matter of law holding when it is not clear that the sentencing judge would have imposed the same sentence if a lower sentencing range would have been available remand is required