v. State, 144 Ga. App. 406 (1) (240 SE2d 919) (1977). “[E]ven competent proof of an offense not involving moral turpitude, or incompetent proof of an offense involving moral turpitude, such as a mere indictment or a charge or an arrest or a trial and acquittal, are not legal methods of impeachment. [Cits.]” Whitley v. State, 188 Ga. 177, 179 (5) (3 SE2d 588) (1939). Accord Strickland v. State, 166 Ga. App. 702 (305 SE2d 434) (1983). “Our Supreme Court has declared that crimes involving moral turpitude are ‘restricted to the gravest offenses, consisting of felonies, infamous crimes, and those that are malum in se and disclose a depraved mind. (Cit).’ [Cits.]” Seaboard &c. R. Co. v. West, 155 Ga. App. 391, 393 (271 SE2d 36) (1980). Accord Hall v. Hall, 261 Ga. 188 (402 SE2d 726) (1991) (<HOLDING>). While the state contends, without benefit of
recognizing that two prior first offense dui convictions were sufficient predicate for third offense dui conviction holding that a charge of first offense dui is constitutionally petty and no right to jury trial attaches holding that dui is not such an offense holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a charge on the lesserincluded offense when the evidence showed either the commission of the completed offense as charged or the commission of no offense such that the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser offense holding that that the trial court erred when it determined that firstdegree sexual offense was an aggravated offense