When the presence or absence of a cause of action depends on how statutory language is interpreted (as the plaintiffs’ FHA claim does), the absence of a valid statutory cause of action does not preclude jurisdiction unless the claim is frivolous or a transparent attempt to manufacture federal-court jurisdiction where none existed. See Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, -, 122 S.Ct. 1753, 1758-59, 152 L.Ed.2d 871 (2002); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-85, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946). Because the plaintiffs' FHA claim is neither, we have jurisdiction to consider it. See Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware County, 983 F.2d 1277, 1280-84 (3d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). 14 . Citing Ebler v. City of Newark, 54 N.J.
recognizing that the district court did not reach the merits holding that district courts determination that defendant did not make unavailable or deny housing under  3604f was a judgment on the merits rather than a jurisdictional decision because the plaintiffs claim though ultimately unsuccessful was not frivolous holding that an independent jurisdictional basis is not required in this case because intervenors do not seek to litigate a claim on the merits holding that a dismissal based on a jurisdictional statute of limitations does not constitute a judgmerit on the merits because a judgment on the merits can only be rendered after a court has jurisdiction holding that the tax was not direct even though the government imposed it on the estate rather than the recipient