aspect of the state statute the defendant violated). And because the act of purchase is not included in § 4B1.2(b), Roye argues that his prior conviction is not a “controlled substance offense.” We agree with Roye that the plain language of § 4B1.2(b) controls this case. As we have explained, our interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines is governed by traditional rules of statutory construction, United States v. Perez, 366 F.3d 1178, 1182 (11th Cir.2004), including the prohibition on rewriting statutes by adding or subtracting words. United States v. One 1990 Beechcraft, 619 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir.2010). Applying that rule here plainly prohibits us from adding the word “purchase” to § 4B 1.2(b). See Salinas v. United States, 547 U.S. 188, 126 S.Ct. 1675, 164 L.Ed.2d 364 (2006) (<HOLDING>); Young v. United States, 936 F.2d 533, 537
holding that possession with intent to distribute and simple possession are the same offense under blockburger holding that a prior conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine is admissible under rule 609 holding that simple possession is not a lesserincluded offense of distribution of a controlled substance holding that the defendants prior drug conviction for simple possession did not constitute a controlled substance offense because the plain language of  4b12b requires that the prior conviction involve possession with intent to distribute holding that prior drug trafficking conviction was admissible to prove intent to distribute