the act after persuasion, they are two clearly separate and different intents and the Congress has made a clear choice to criminalize persuasion and the attempt to persuade, not the performance of the sexual acts themselves. Hence, a conviction under the statute only requires a finding that the defendant had an intent to persuade or to attempt to persuade. Id. at 639. The other circuits to have addressed the issue of what intent is required under § 2422(b) are in accord. Lee, 603 F.3d at 914 (a conviction for attempted enticement under § 2422(b) requires proof “that the defendant intended to cause assent on the part of the minor, not that he acted with the specific intent to engage in sexual activity” (quotation omitted)); United States v. Dwinells, 508 F.3d 63, 71 (1st Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 202 (2d
holding  2422b does not require an intent that the criminal sexual activity be consummated recognizing that a misrepresentation need not be driven by an improper motive and does not require an intent to commit fraud holding that the clergy sexual conduct statute requires general intent and does not impose strict liability because the act of sexual penetration must be intentional holding that attempted sexual abuse is a specific intent crime holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse