decides which interpretation to believe. Id. Furthermore, “[t]he Supreme Court has admonished that we not examine evidence in a piecemeal fashion, but consider it in cumulative context.” Burgos, 94 F.3d at 863 (citations omitted). “The focus of appellate review, therefore, ... is on the complete picture, viewed in context and in the light most favorable to the Government, that all of the evidence portrayed.” Id. Davis first contends that there was not substantial evidence to support the conclusion that the victim’s car was taken from his person or presence. The presence requirement of the carjacking statute can be satisfied when the victim was inside a building and the stolen vehicle was parked outside the building. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 271 F.3d 472, 486 (3d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Moore, 198 F.3d 793, 797
holding that the presence requirement of the carjacking statute was satisfied when the victims were attacked and beaten inside their house and keys to a van parked outside the house were taken holding that the sound of a television on the inside of the house and the presence of a car in the driveway were sufficient to form the basis of the reasonable belief that the suspect was in the home holding that defendant staying in abandoned house had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the house despite having a key to the house and the ability to let people in and out of it holding that the evidence was sufficient to preclude inference where he tried to enter the house drunk and was staying at the neighboring house holding that the protective sweep of a van was lawful where officers stopped the van on reasonable suspicion that the driver had just committed an armed bank robbery and officers could not see inside the van to determine whether other occupants posed a danger to them