to argue its position and did so. The district court did not err. See Chaney Bldg. Co. v. City of Tucson, 148 Ariz. 571, 573, 716 P.2d 28, 30 (Sup.Ct. 1986); see also FDIC v. Daily (In re Daily), 47 F.3d 365, 368 (9th Cir.1995) (citing United States v. Gottheiner (In re Gottheiner), 703 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir.1983)). Likewise, the district court did not err when it held that the state court’s determination of the lease’s validity was essential to its decision. The state court of appeals stated that the lease was valid because that was a necessary predicate to the decision which it was affirming. First Bank’s argument that the issue was not essential fails. See Gilbert v. Ben-Asher, 900 F.2d 1407, 1410 (9th Cir.1990); cf. Garc Ariz. 519, 524, 747 P.2d 1218, 1223 (Sup.Ct.1987) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); Baird v. Pace, 156 Ariz. 418, 422, 752 P.2d
holding professional malpractice claim not contractual holding breach of fiduciary duty claim is essentially a negligence or professional malpractice claim holding that plaintiffs could not sue attorneys for legal malpractice so long as underlying medical malpractice action out of which legal malpractice claim arose was still pending on appeal recognizing contributory negligence as a defense to professional malpractice claims holding that erisa does not preempt professional malpractice claims