have been reversed by the appellate court.” Shull, 515 So.2d at 750; see also Pope v. State, 561 So.2d 554, 556 (Fla.1990) (“[WJhen an appellate court reverses a departure sentence because there were no written reasons, the court must remand for resentencing with no possibility of departure from the guidelines.”); Patten v. State, 531 So.2d 203, 205 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (interpreting Shull to prohibit enunciation of new reasons for a departure sentence after the original reasons given have been reversed on appeal). Collins argues that the situation here is similar to departure sentencing. As noted above, in those situations, when the reasons supporting a departure sentence are found invalid on appeal, the trial court may not impose a departure sentence on remand. This l DCA 1990) (<HOLDING>). In addition, unlike departure sentencing,
holding that to constitute a prior conviction for purposes of the habitual felony offender act the defendant must have been adjudicated guilty before the present crime was committed holding that under the 1991 version of the habitual offender statute defendant could not receive habitual offender sentence for life felony recognizing that whitehead was decided before section 775084 was amended so that once the defendant meets the definition of a habitual felony offender the trial court is no longer required to provide written reasons for imposing a sentence in excess of the guidelines recognizing that the amendment to section 775084 superseded whitehead and a habitual offender sentence in excess of the guidelines even in the absence of stated reasons for departure is now valid holding that under habitual felony offender statute a sentence includes the sanction of probation