confidence in the fairness and correctness of the appellate result.’ ” Pierce, 121 So.3d at 1093 (quoting Lopez v. State, 68 So.3d 332, 333 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011)). “[T]he law at the time of the appeal applies when determining whether appellate counsel was ineffective.” Granberry v. State, 919 So.2d 699, 701 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). Numerous cases have held appellate counsel ineffective for failing to raise favorable cases decided by other jurisdictions during the pendency of an appeal. See, e.g., Dill v. State, 79 So.3d 849, 852 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) (“This court has found ineffective assistance of appellate counsel where appellate counsel failed to raise the Florida Supreme Court’s April 2010, Montgmnery decision while the petitioner’s direct appeal was pending.”); Lopez, 68 So.3d at 333-35 (<HOLDING>); Shabazz v. State, 955 So.2d 57, 58 (Fla. 1st
holding that unless an erroneous instruction was unlikely to have changed the result of the trial a reviewing court cannot say that giving the instruction was harmless error holding that erroneous manslaughter instruction that defendant intentionally caused the death of the victim did not constitute fundamental error certifying question  if a jury returns a verdict finding a defendant guilty of seconddegree murder in a case where the evidence does not support a theory of culpable negligence does a trial court commit fundamental error by giving a flawed manslaughter by act instruction when it also gives an instruction on manslaughter by culpable negligence holding appellate counsel ineffective for failing to argue the trial court committed fundamental error in giving the thenstandard jury instruction for manslaughter by act even though controlling precedent in the district had approved the instruction when the instruction had been found fundamentally erroneous in another district and conflict between the two districts would have allowed defendant to seek relief in the supreme court holding that the trial court committed fundamental error by giving the standard jury instruction for attempted manslaughter by act holding that it was not error for the court to give a substantive new instruction to the jury after deliberations began where the instruction was given in court with the defendant and his counsel present