8 . As the majority points out, see ante at 1338-39, a number of other circuits have interpreted section 1985(3) as providing a remedy in federal court for conspiracies arising out of a sex-based animus. None of these circuits, however, has explained whence Congress derives the authority to create such a remedy. 9 . Indeed, such a reading of section 1985(3) would be so far removed from true statutory interpretation as to be nothing more than pure judicial activism, and consequently a violation of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. 10 . Of course, the plain language of the statute also says nothing about discriminatory animus; nevertheless, the Supreme Court has read a discriminatory animus requirement into the statute. See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102, 91 S.Ct. at 1798 (<HOLDING>). This limitation on section 1985(3) — like the
holding that proof of a violation of section 19853 requires a showing of racial or perhaps otherwise classbased invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators action holding that section 1983 action requires a showing of defendants personal participation in alleged constitutional violation holding that a claim under the equal protection section of section 19853 requires proof of classbased animus holding that the employers routine use of racial slurs constitutes direct evidence that racial animus was a motivating factor in the contested disciplinary decisions holding that a supervisors routine use of racial slurs constitutes direct evidence that racial animus was a motivating factor in the contested disciplinary decisions