and Cotton, we find that the purported error here does not satisfy Olano’s fourth prong. In Johnson and Cotton, the Supreme Court found that violations of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments did not overcome the “threat ... to the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings” that would result from reversing convictions supported by overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted evidence. Id. (internal citations omitted). Any error in this case derives not from a constitutional violation, but from a statutory transgression. See Federal Trade Comm’n v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 702, 68 S.Ct. 793, 92 L.Ed. 1010 (1948) (“[M]ost matters relating to judicial disqualification [do] not rise to a constitutional level.”); Walberg v. Israel, 766 F.2d 1071, 1076-77 (7th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). In light of Johnson and Cotton’s refusal to
holding the bias analysis insufficient to support its decisions holding that a challenge for cause for actual bias  essentially requires a determination  of credibility holding that the recusal statute should not be construed so broadly as to become effectively presumptive or to require recusal based on unsubstantiated suggestions of personal bias or prejudice recognizing that statutes mandating recusal for actual bias have constitutional bases unlike those that require recusal for a mere appearance of bias or prejudice holding that prejudgment constitutes cause for recusal