Able knew or should have known that Arata had a propensity for causing automobile collisions while driving under the influence of alcohol, and thus, should have prevented Arata from consuming beer on its premises. The record does not indicate any such knowledge or that Arata had any previous collisions or drunk driving arrests.” Id. at 105. While Costa clearly speaks to the importance of the knowledge component, the Michigan Supreme Court in Millross framed the issue specifically to include a showing of an employer’s knowledge that the employee “could not be entrusted with the responsibility imposed by the employer,” thus adding a component that the employer have affirmatively directed the employee’s conduct that results in harm to a plaintiff. See Weinstein, supra at *9 (Edmunds, J.) (<HOLDING>). b. Interpreting and Applying Millross
recognizing that duty to warn of dangerous conditions could be based on constructive knowledge of that condition as well as actual knowledge holding that the defendant did not deprive the plaintiff of a property interest in his continued employment because the plaintiff voluntarily resigned when he refused to report to work after being transferred to a new position holding that a plaintiff had an employment interest until the date his appointment terminated holding in an employment discrimination case that the continued employment of the plaintiffs rival in a position previously held by the plaintiff did not constitute a systemic violation recognizing that plaintiff must establish that siemens directed him as a condition of his continued employment to drive to an appointment during the work day with knowledge of mr wellingers intoxication