act sufficient to satisfy the state-created danger test. As discussed above, the Plaintiffs have not produced any evidence on which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that an SCPD policymaker announced a policy or deliberately acquiesced to a custom of delegating law enforcement power to liquor licensee personnel. The Plaintiffs have presented evidence of a series of events in which SCPD officers, upon arriving at the scene of a confrontation between individuals and liquor licensee personnel, handcuffed the individuals while taking no direct action against the bar employees. Even if this course of conduct could be taken to establish an affirmative act, we are skeptical that it could satisfy either the causation or mens rea elements of the state-created danger test. See id. at 281 (<HOLDING>). The District Court properly dismissed the
holding that such a physician was a state actor under  1983 holding that amtrak was a state actor holding that state action occurs when inter alia the party charged with the deprivation is a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor holding that a state agency created under state law was a state actor holding that the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly direct and that a state actor acted with a degree of culpability that shocks the conscience