and voluntary waiver of Miranda rights, those statements are “irrebuttably presumed involuntary” and must be suppressed. United States v. Mashburn, 406 F.3d 303, 306 (4th Cir.2005) (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985)). This case requires further delineation of the line between questions relating to the processing of an arrest that are biographical and questions of an investigatory nature. The latter, but not the former, constitute “interrogation” and implicate the Fifth Amendment and the attendant Miranda warning requirement. Compare Avery, 717 F.2d at 1024 (question was part of a “routine procedure to secure biographical data” and thus not interrogation), and United States v. King, 165 F.3d 29, 1998 WL 708707 (6th Cir.1998) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>), with United States v. Soto, 953 F.2d 263 (6th
holding that defendants inculpatory statements were not the product of interrogation where a detective could not have known his words would elicit an incriminating response holding that a defendants response to a question about his address was not protected by miranda notwithstanding the fact that pohce made use of the statement because it was not intended to elicit incriminating statements holding that a comment made by one police officer to another in the presence of the accused expressing concern that handicapped children might come across a shotgun is not a statement designed to elicit an incriminating response holding that examining defendants luggage for contraband in front of her was not the type of activity that was likely to elicit an incriminating response  citation omitted holding that although defendants voluntarily given initial statement was inadmissible because of miranda violation subsequent statement made after careful miranda warnings were given and waiver was obtained was admissible