8 F.3d 847, 850 (D.C.Cir.1993) (per curiam) (noting that individual squarely met the subject requirement where IC told him he was a subject). Although DOJ and the IC agree that Mullins plainly qualifies as a subject, they assert that her subject status ended on May 20, 1994, when IC diGenova notified her attorney by letter that he did not intend to seek charges against Mullins and that, based on the information currently available to him, he did not expect Mullins’ status to change during the remainder of the investigation. Mullins argues that this did not end her subject status since IC diGenova’s letter contained the express qualification that based on current information he did not expect her status to change during the remainder of the investigation. See Cave, 57 F.3d at 1120 (<HOLDING>); Shultz, 8 F.3d at 850 (holding that subject
holding that a partys need for grand jury materials varies in proportion to the degree of access he has to other sources of the information he seeks holding that although plaintiff claimed that googles two top executives did have direct unique and personal knowledge of the facts at issue it made sense to require plaintiff to seek the information from other sources first holding that grant of use immunity did not end caves subject status because the ic could have obtained information from other sources if he chose to prosecute cave holding that the right of access to government information or sources of information within the governments control is not mandated by the first or fourteenth amendments holding that district court correctly concluded that it could not order the government to grant use immunity