must be punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 1 year or involve dishonesty or false statement; and that the trial judge must determine, in his discretion, that the danger of unfair prejudice by use of the evidence of conviction does not substantially outweigh its probative value. The defendant urges that Montgomery permits the use of felonies or infamous crimes for impeachment purposes, but was not intended to al low the admission of misdemeanor convictions. This contention is- supported by cases in other districts in this State which appear to assume without discussion that even under Montgomery only felonies or infamous crimes are admissible. See People v. Partee (1974), 17 Ill.App.3d 166, 308 N.E.2d 18, and People v. Cassman (1973), 10 Ill.App.3d 301, 293 N.E.2d 710 (<HOLDING>), and People v. Cox (1972), 8 Ill.App.3d 1033,
holding that where defendant stipulates to prior felony conviction evidence of the nature of the prior crime is irrelevant and should be excluded holding that larceny being a felony is an infamous crime holding that conviction of dueling was not an infamous crime under former state constitutional provision disenfranchising persons convicted of an infamous crime but concluding that the right to hold public office was separate from the right of suffrage holding that manslaughter was an infamous crime under a divorce statute because it was a felony holding without discussion of montgomery that a defendant can only be impeached by evidence of a conviction of a prior felony or infamous crime