against the throat of an innocent bystander to facilitate cooperation with a robbery demand is not ‘use’ of a dangerous weapon for purposes of section 2B3.1(b)(2).”) (emphasis added); United States v. Johnson, 931 F.2d 238, 240 (3d Cir.1991) (“[W]hen a defendant did not simply point or wave about a firearm, but actually leveled the gun at the head of the victim at close range and verbalized a threat to discharge the weapon, the conduct is properly classified as ‘otherwise using’ a firearm.”) (emphasis added); see also United States v. De La Rosa, 911 F.2d 985, 993 (5th Cir.1990) (finding that brandishing of firearm combined with use of threats “operates to bring this conduct within the orbit of ‘otherwise used.’ ”). But see United States v. Matthews, 20 F.3d 538, 554 (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Here, in addition to the fact that both of
holding that fact that robbers issued explicit threats while brandishing and pointing their firearms menacingly was not sufficient to constitute otherwise use of the firearm holding defendants minimum sentence could not be increased for brandishing a firearm where based on jury instructions jury convicted defendant of the lesser offense of carrying rather than brandishing the firearm holding that  use certainly includes brandishing  a firearm quotation marks omitted holding that to enhance a sentence because of the defendants use of a firearm the jury must find the defendant guilty of a crime involving a firearm or otherwise specifically find that a firearm was used holding that to apply the firearm enhancement the firearm need only reflect the context of the defendants possession and the defendants ability to use the firearm to promote the controlled substance offense