by the Board’s decision to grant Judd an extension of time to appeal the ALJ’s order. We consider each of these arguments in turn. I. Substantial Evidence Commercial claims the Board’s findings of fact are not supported by “substantial evidence,” as required by Utah Code Am. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1989). Commercial argues that the Board cannot reverse the ALJ’s findings of fact without stating specifically and in detail the reasons for doing so. We disagree. “While it is the ALJ who initially hears the evidence, the Commission is the ultimate fact finder.” Chase v. Industrial Comm’n, 872 P.2d 475, 479 (Utah App.1994) (citing Virgin v. Board of Revieiv of Indies. Comm’n, 803 P.2d 1284, 1287 (Utah App.1990)); see also U.S. Steel Corp. v. Industrial Comm’n, 607 P.2d 807, 810-11 (Utah 1980) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Professor Arthur Larson, in his
holding that industrial commission is ultimate fact finder holding the question of necessity is one of mixed law and fact and accordingly one for the fact finder in the ordinary case holding that the issue of proximate causation involves application of law to fact which should be left to the fact finder subject to limited review holding that the trial court could not award a refund of restitution where the defendants payments had gone to the states industrial commission over which the court lacked personal jurisdiction holding that a finder of fact may not arbitrarily disregard uncontradicted evidence