non custodial parent constitutes an act of domestic violence as to their child.”). Here, the minor child heard Hibbard threaten to kill Buchan, and the child saw Hibbard shoot his father in the neck. Therefore, there was evidence that Buchan’s son had reasonable cause to believe that he was in imminent danger of becoming a victim of domestic violence. Hibbard presented no evidence at either the hearing on the original injunction or the hearing on the motion to dissolve the injunction regarding whether his stepson had reasonable cause to believe that he was in danger of becoming a domestic violence victim. Further, it was improper for the circuit court to dissolve the injunction without allowing Buchan’s son an opportunity to testify. Bond v. Bond, 917 So.2d 268, 271 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (<HOLDING>); York v. McCarron, 842 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1st DCA
holding that the circuit court erred in terminating a hearing on a domestic violence injunction without allowing the petitioner the opportunity to present evidence that facts met the requirements of section 74128 holding that trial court erred by not allowing the plaintiff to introduce evidence of prior dealings with the defendant holding that where trial court erred in applying established law to the facts of the case it must be reversed and remanded for a new hearing to give the trial court an opportunity to address the issue holding that the appellants claim that the circuit court erred in failing to make specific findings of fact as to all claims in the appellants rule 32 petition was not preserved for review because the appellant did not first present the claim to the circuit court holding that where a district courts preliminary injunction preventing the appellant from terminating its agreement with the defendant had expired the appellants appeal of the district courts decision to grant that injunction was moot