we examine the evidence in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth and grant it, as verdict winner, all reasonable inferences therefrom. Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 591 Pa. 1, 16, 915 A.2d 1122, 1130 (2007). The evidence, so viewed, will be deemed sufficient to sustain a conviction if it establishes each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Wright, 599 Pa. 270, 290, 961 A.2d 119,130 (2008). In interpreting Section 2910, as with any statute, our standard of review is de novo. Commonwealth v. McClintic, 589 Pa. 465, 472, 909 A.2d 1241, 1245 (2006). Consequently, we are not bound by the lower court’s conclusions regarding the proper meaning of the applicable provisions of this statute. See Commonwealth v. Kyle, 582 Pa. 624, 632, 874 A.2d 12, 17 (2005) (<HOLDING>). Our interpretation is guided by the polestar
holding that on review of a motion to suppress the appellate court is to give deference to a trial courts factual findings but legal conclusions are reviewed de novo holding that where the issue before the court is legal as opposed to factual an appellate court need not give deference to a trial courts decision holding that the grant of an injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion but without deference to the legal conclusions of the trial court holding that our court owes no duty of deference to the legal conclusions of lower courts regarding an issue of statutory construction holding that a trial courts statutory interpretation is given no deference on review