the Court held that an agreement to arbitrate issues which came within the 1933 Securities Act is invalid and unenforceable against an investor. Thus, the securities broker/dealer in Wilko was precluded from compelling the investor to submit the dispute to arbitration. As in the present case, the investor in Wilko alleged that defendant violated federal securities laws and corresponding state laws. Wilko, however, arose under only the 1933 Securities Act. Going even further, several courts have applied Wilko to claims arising under the 1934 Exchange Act. Surman v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 733 F.2d 59 (8th Cir.1984) (Wilko applies to claims brought under 1934 Act and regulations promulgated thereunder), Mansback v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). See also Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
holding that claims under  10b of the securities exchange act of 1934 were arbitrable under a predispute arbitration agreement holding that claims under the securities act of 1934 and the rico statutes are arbitrable holding that an implicit congressional intent to impose  aiding and abetting liability could not plausibly be inferred from the statutory silence in  10b of the securities exchange act of 1934 holding wilko inapplicable to the securities exchange act of 1934 and stating in wilko the court held that a predispute agreement could not be enforced to compel arbitration of a claim arising under  122 of the securities act 15 u s c  772 emphasis supplied holding of wilko equally applicable to cases arising under the securities exchange act of 1934