oral promise extrinsic to an integrated contract that would purport to contradict or modify the express terms of the written contract. See Wells v. Uvex Winter Optical, Inc., 635 A.2d 1188, 1192 (R.I.1994). The estate proffered the annual report as an admission, statement, or verbal act — but not as an integrated contract whose terms were now being challenged. Thus, the parol-evidence cases cited by the estate are entirely inapposite to the issue before us. Compare Supreme Woodworking Co. v. Zuckerberg, 82 R.I. 247, 107 A.2d 287 (1954) (applying rule to written purchase-order agreement); D.W. Flint Motor Sales, Inc. v. Crofton, 54 R.I. 160, 171 A. 236 (1934) (applying rule to a bilateral written contract); Dennis v. Joslin Manufacturing Co., 19 R.I. 666, 36 A. 129 (1896) (<HOLDING>). In any event the estate made no objection on
holding on the particular facts before the court that parol evidence of a dividend declaration was inadmissible because of its potential to result in disparate rights between similarly situated stockholders holding the record did not contain enough facts to determine whether the statute was constitutional as applied to the particular facts and circumstances of the case holding that the trial courts damages award was against the manifest weight of the evidence because it was based upon inadmissible evidence holding defendant failed to rebut statutory presumption where evidence was not particular to the facts and circumstances of the case holding exwifes claim regarding admission of parol evidence was not preserved for appeal because she failed to object to the evidence or to having an evidentiary hearing