sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (internal citations omitted). In Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 222, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 162 L.Ed.2d 174 (2005), the Supreme Court recognized that Sandin abrogated Hewitt’s “methodology of parsing the language of particular regulations.” Thus, “[a]fter Sandin, it is clear that the touchstone of the inqu ) (observing that prisoners have no constitutional right to visitation privileges and that restrictions of those privileges do not implicate any due process concerns); Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 579-580 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Further, the requirements that a prisoner’s
holding that loss of visitation and commissary privileges inter alia did not deprive the prisoner of a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest holding that grandparent has no protected liberty interest in the visitation of a child of whom she once had custody holding inter alia that common law claims were preempted holding claim is not cognizable holding that a prisoners loss of privileges for thirty days was not a property right that would constitute a violation of his constitutionally protected liberty interest