is an element of § 1503 that must be alleged in the indictment. To the contrary, as the government contends, the nexus requirement must only be proved at trial. Specifically, to prove that Spadoni and Triumph had the specific intent to obstruct the grand jury, the government must offer evidence of conduct “that, in [Spadoni’s] mind, has the ‘natural and probable effect’ of obstructing or interfering with [the grand jury].” See Schwarz, 283 F.3d at 109 (citing Aguilar, 5 nd the case law construing it is clear, there is no need, as Spadoni suggests, to resort to the comments that Senator Lott and Senator Hatch made in proposing an amendment to the witness tampering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1512. Cf. Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 110, 103 S.Ct. 986, 74 L.Ed.2d 845 (1983) (<HOLDING>). There is also no need to apply the rule of
holding that if statutory language is plain and unambiguous this court will not look beyond the same to divine legislative intent holding that where statutory language is unambiguous it is to be regarded as conclusive unless there is clearlyexpressed legislative intent to the contrary recognizing that legislative history is not used to create ambiguity where statutory language is clear holding analogous circumstances conclusive  of legislative intent holding that statutory language is conclusive in absence of clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary 