The BIA’s adoption of the IJ’s adverse credibility determination can be reviewed without considering the lack of credible corroborating documents. Indeed, in the very case cited by the majority, Ahmed v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183, 1190-91 (9th Cir.2007), we expressly held that where the BIA’s phrasing suggests one standard of review and its analysis of the issue-or lack of analysis-suggests another standard, we look to the IJ’s decision to inform our review. In this case, the IJ’s adverse credibility determination rested on the discrepancy about whether the Petitioner was hit in the face or in the stomach. Because this discrepancy goes to the heart of the Petitioner’s claim, it supports the adverse credibility determination. See Dhital v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). For these reasons, I would
holding when one identified ground for an adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of petitioners claim of persecution the court is bound to accept the ijs adverse credibility determination holding that substantial evidence supports an adverse credibility finding if it is supported by specific cogent reasons holding that a single inconsistency concerning the nature of the applicants mistreatment  afforded substantial evidence to support the adverse credibility finding holding that an adverse credibility determination must be supported by a true inconsistency holding that substantial evidence supports an adverse credibility determination when there is an inconsistency concerning events central to his version of why he was persecuted and fled iran