a claim that falls within the scope of the contract must be arbitrated upon demand. In other words, the clause reflects that arbitration does not require the mutual consent of both insurer and insured. Therefore, we find in accordance with the policy language, arbitration became compulsory at the request of either party. We, therefore, reverse the Order denying Appellant’s petition to compel arbitration. ¶ 12 Turning to Appellant’s remaining issues we find they are not properly before this Court at this time. The only appeal-able matter before this Court concerns Appellant’s petition to compel arbitration, and, as such, our review is confined to the narrow issue of whether the petition was properly denied. See Shadduck v. Christopher J. Kaclik, Inc., 713 A.2d 635 (Pa.Super.1998), (<HOLDING>); see also Messa v. State Farm Ins. Co., 433
holding that review of the denial of a motion to compel arbitration is under the de novo standard holding that where appellants preliminary objections both in nature of demurrer and in nature of motion to compel arbitration were denied appellate review is limited to that portion of the courts order which denied the motion to compel arbitration the other issues are not ripe for review holding that trial court properly denied motion to compel arbitration of claims for fraud and unfair and deceptive trade practices because arbitration clause in agreement only applied to indemnification claims and there were no other arbitration clauses in agreement holding that claims were subject to arbitration and converting the motion to compel into a motion to dismiss for improper venue because the contract mandated arbitration in california holding that once the party seeking to compel arbitration establishes the existence of an arbitration agreement and that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement the trial court must compel arbitration