circumstances unless it finds, on the face of the record, clear and convincing evidence that one of five enumerated exceptions applies. See D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(f)(2); In re Spann, 711 A.2d 1262, 1263 (D.C.1998); accord In re Bielec, 755 A.2d 1018, 1022 n. 3 (D.C.2000) (“In Spann, we articulated that this court has ‘independent authority to impose different discipline if it finds ‘on the face of the record ... by clear and convincing evidence’ that an exception applies.’”). The fifth of these exceptions provides orney has a right to fair notice of the charges against her). It follows that reciprocal discipline based on an attorney’s resignation must be based only on those allegations of which the attorney had fair notice at the time of resignation. Cf. In re Bielec, 755 A.2d at 1024 (<HOLDING>). Schoeneman had no such notice of the charges
holding that in reciprocal discipline cases disciplinary procedures in the other state must meet minnesotas due process requirements holding that due process requirements may be satisfied if a defendant receives actual notice of the charges against him even if the indictment or information is deficient concluding that defective indictment did not violate defendants sixth amendment right because defendant was made fully aware of charges and potential punishment during guilty plea proceedings holding that vague and ambiguous charges in another jurisdiction cannot form the basis for reciprocal discipline in a manner consistent with due process requirements even if the attorney consented to that discipline holding a plaintiff cannot state a due process claim for defendants failure to follow statutory procedural requirements because a plaintiff cannot have a protect property interest in the procedure itself holding that the due process requirements of jurisdiction in michigan had been met for a dispute involving property in tennessee