as to Lucent’s infringement claims. However, even New-bridge acknowledges that they did not rely on these opinions because they were “unwilling to waive attorney-client and work product protection.” (D.I. 648 at 8, n. 4). Indeed, because of Newbridge’s decision not to rely on these opinions, the Court cannot evaluate whether they were from competent legal counsel or whether they expressed favorable or unfavorable opinions. As the Federal Circuit recognized, “[W]hen an infringer refuses to produce an exculpatory opinion of counsel in response to a charge of willful infringement, an inference may be drawn that either no opinion was obtained or, if an opinion was obtained, it was unfavorable.” Electro Medical Sys., S.A. v. Cooper Life Sciences, Inc., 34 F.3d 1048, 1056-1057 (Fed.Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Newbridge also attempts to place the burden
holding that trial court may draw adverse inference from habeas petitioners silence as result of fifth amendment invocation during deposition holding that there was no basis for adverse inference instruction for failure to produce emails until five days before trial holding that district court was free to draw adverse inference against infringer when infringer refused to produce counsels opinion based on attorney client privilege holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client holding that when an attorney represents multiple clients and a dispute between the attorney and one client later occurs there is a waiver of the privilege but only by the client asserting the liability