“governmental unit.” If, on the other hand, “governmental unit” can be read to mean “State,” then both DRS and DSS would be encompassed within the definition and § 106(c) would apply. DSS argues that the definition’s inclusion of both the “State” and, separately, an “agency” thereof reveals Congress’s recognition that an agency “can and will act only for itself,” and that, by extension, one agency’s waiver will not strip other agencies of the same state of their immunity in a particular case. Further, DSS argues, a construction of the statute that conflates “agency” with “State” and effectively merges the former into the latter renders the reference to “agency” in 11 U.S.C. § 101(27) useless surplusage. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
holding principle of statutory construction is to give effect to every clause and word of a statute holding courts must give effect to every provision and word in a statute and avoid any interpretation that may render statutory terms meaningless or superfluous holding that courts must give effect to every word when interpreting a statute holding that a court must interpret the words of a statute according to their common meaning in a way that gives effect to every word clause and sentence internal quotations omitted holding that effect must be given if possible to every clause and word of a statute