generally unreviewable. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985). “‘[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.’ ” Id. (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978)); see United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996) (same); In re Sealed Case, 131 F.3d 208, 214 (D.C.Cir.1997) (“In the ordinary case, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, at the very core of the executive function, has long been held presumptively unre in, 103 F.3d 151, 153 (D.C.Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Of course, if the Mine Act provided a
holding that the nlrb general counsels decision to issue an unfair labor practice complaint is unreviewable because inter alia review would invade the realm of prosecutorial discretion holding that federal district courts have jurisdiction over violations of collective bargaining contracts even if such violations are also unfair labor practices subject to nlrb jurisdiction holding that congress referred claims under the labormanagement reporting and disclosures act not to the nlrb but to the federal courts even when the conduct at issue is also an arguably unfair labor practice holding that the faas action in this case was  analogous to an exercise of prosecutorial discretion  and noting that when prosecutorial discretion is at issue the matter is presumptively committed to agency discretion by law recognizing nlrb authority  to take measures designed to recreate the conditions and relationships that would have been had there been no unfair labor practice 