because the court had not entered the deadly weapon finding in the judgment, under the specific facts the probationary sentence was not void. However, Hooks involved a bench trial, and therefore the judge was the trier of fact. Moreover, Hooks relied on Ex parte Lucke, 742 S.W.2d 818 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no pet), in reaching its conclusion that article 42.12, section 3g(a)(2) did not bar probation for the appellant because the trial court had not entered an affirmative finding in the judgment. Lucke also involved a case of a plea before the court, and held that “the trial court, as trier of fact, simply declined to enter the additional affirmative finding in the judgment.” Lucke at 820; see also Johnson v. State, 233 S.W.3d 420, (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2007, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>). Finally, the Hooks court cited Poe with
holding trial court failed to make a finding of fact but rather made a finding of the ultimate question of law  that the defendants plea was not knowingly and intelligently made holding that where trial court is trier of fact and has made an affirmative deadly weapon finding it retains discretion to enter finding in judgment holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding violation was willful and substantial recognizing that the supreme court has indicated that affirmative misconduct is a prerequisite to a finding of estoppel against the united states holding that the trial judge retains the discretion to exclude dna evidence if errors in the laboratory procedures render it so unreliable that it would not be helpful to the trier of fact but that trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting that evidence