scheme, and therefore should not have been listed together in the same count. But Palazzo is incorrect. As noted, “our task [in this inquiry] ... [is] to assess whether the indictment itself can be read to charge only one violation in each count.” Mauskar, 557 F.3d at 225. In this case, each invoice (and thus, each of charges 28-40) constituted a separate execution of her scheme (which was to defraud Medicare); the line items on a given invoice were merely means by which Palazzo executed that scheme. “That an indictment alleges more than one means by which [a defendant] sought to accomplish [an execution of a] scheme does not render it duplicitous.’ ” Mauskar, 557 F.3d at 225 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Owens v. United States, 221 F.2d 351, 354 (5th Cir.1955) (<HOLDING>). In United States v. Adler, 623 F.2d 1287 (8th
holding that the plaintiffs had relied on illinois law because they could have filed in a different forum having a different statute of limitations holding that the legislature intends different meanings when it uses different terms in a statute holding that the term individual in the torture victim protection act meant natural person but reiterating that courts should respect congress decision to use different terms to describe different categories of people or things citation omitted holding that the defrauding of different people over an extended period of time using different means and representations may constitute but one scheme holding that an arbitrator was not bound by an earlier award involving a different contract and different union