all usable lanes of traffic — to violate the Ordinance. Nothing in the Ordinance’s language supports such an interpretation, though such an interpretation is possible under the plain language of the Ordinance. See Albuquerque, N.M., Rev. Ordinances § 8-2-1-33 (prohibiting the placing of a vehicle in a manner that “obstruct[s] the free use of [a] public way”). The functional repercussions of Defendant’s interpretation, however, lead to an absurd result. We can easily see that obstructing the only lane of traffic save those reserved for oncoming traffic or turns is possible. Without deciding the matter, the single lane of through traffic is, in our view of this case, capable of being obstructed by a single vehicle. See May v. Baklini, 1973-NMCA-043, ¶ 14, 85 N.M. 150, 509 P.2d 1345 (<HOLDING>). Though May is distinguishable from this case
holding that no one factor is determinative and the weakness of one factor may be overborne by the strength of the others holding that obstruction can occur in one lane irrespective of the availability of others holding that the availability of the icrp is but one factor to be considered in determining undue hardship but it is not determinative holding that the power to produce a change in a given legal relation may exist irrespective of the consent or knowledge either of the one subject to it or of the one holding it holding that no one factor is determinative and the weakness of  one factor may be overborne by the strength of the others