venerable requirement that a cross-appellant file a notice of cross-appeal. See Smeaton v. Smeaton, 6 as (presumably) a purveyor of ideas: The record shows it was a book purchaser; not a book publisher. Part of the constitutional difficulty with section 212.06(9) is the uncertainty it creates about just which ideas a book must express, in order for its purchase to escape the tax. See generally State v. Ashcraft, 378 So.2d 284, 285 (Fla.1979) (noting that “overbreadth of a law may have a chilling effect on the exercise of first amendment freedoms”). Given the pall this uncertainty casts, pursuing tax refunds book by book in individual cases would not afford an adequate remedy for the constitutional harm. See Metro. Dade County v. Dep’t of Commerce, 365 So.2d 432, 433 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (<HOLDING>); State ex rel. Dep’t of Gen. Servs. v. Willis,
holding declaratory relief available in circuit court against an administrative agency where a partys constitutional rights are endangered holding that the judicial immunity available to federal officers extends to section 1983 actions for declaratory and injunctive relief holding that exhaustion is required even where the relief sought is not available in the administrative process holding that the declaratory judgment act is remedial only and the party seeking declaratory relief must have an underlying cause of action holding that neither injunctive nor declaratory relief is available to private litigants under the fdcpa