inadmissible under the residual hearsay rule to show what Zyrtec representatives were literally saying on three independent grounds: (i) the surveys had insufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness; (ii) they were not more probative to show what was said in the detailings than any other evidence that Schering could procure through reasonable efforts; and (iii) the general purposes of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the interests of justice would not be best served by admitting the surveys. Schering argues that in reaching each of these conclusions, the district court abused its discretion by relying on an erroneous per se rule against the use of out-of-court memory statements to prove the facts remembered. See generally Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 287, 102 S.Ct. 1781 (<HOLDING>); Charette, 159 F.3d at 755 (holding that clear
holding that the lower court is the factfinding body and that its findings of fact will not be set aside on appellate review unless they are clearly erroneous holding that this court will only set aside district courts factual findings when they are clearly erroneous holding that the trial court was without authority to set aside entry of default on motion to set aside default judgment holding that a factual finding may be set aside if it rests on an erroneous view of the law holding that judgments restfing on an erroneous view of the law may be set aside on that basis