issue in this appeal. 2 . As discussed supra, appellant’s counsel was incorrect in stating that the trial court denied Jones’s motion. As noted, Jones’s motion was withdrawn prior to a ruling by the trial court. Nonetheless, appellant’s counsel's confusion on this point is perhaps understandable given that the trial court opined on how it would have ruled on Jones’s motion. 3 . I do not think that the trial court was suggesting that impeachment materials were outside the scope of Brady requirements. To the extent that the judge’s remark might be interpreted as such, obviously that is incorrect. See Youngblood v. West Virginia, - U.S. -, -, 126 S.Ct. 2188, 2190, 165 L.Ed.2d 269, 272-73 (2006) (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3380, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (<HOLDING>)). 4 . Md. Rule 4-264 provides as follows: “On
holding that fourteenth amendment only applies to state action holding that the fourteenth amendment only applies to state action holding that brady applies to impeachment evidence holding that the preponderance of the evidence standard applies to  523 claims holding that  1447c applies to counsel