when he asked for and accepted voluntary departure under [8 U.S.C. § 1229e(a) ]. In particular, Medina-Morales argues that the BIA impermissibly used contract law principles to deny his motion to reopen, by relying on his “bargain” with the IJ. We do not think that the BIA’s decision created a new evidentiary standard. We have previously held that the BIA announced a new evidentiary standard and thus denied an alien due process when, without notice, it relied exclusively on the alien’s failure to provide “ ‘medical evidence’ or additional declarations” in concluding that his alleged foot injury did not constitute an exceptional circumstance warranting rescission of deportation. Singh v. INS, 213 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir.2000); see also Arrieta v. INS, 117 F.3d 429, 432 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). ' Unlike in Singh and Arrieta, however, the
holding evidence insufficient to overcome presumption of correctness holding that a sworn affidavit that neither the alien nor another responsible party residing at his address received the notice will generally rebut the presumption of delivery created by regular mail recognizing presumption of effective service by regular mail holding that the bia had imposed a new standardof proof by requiring the alien to provide substantial evidence to overcome a presumption of effective mail delivery recognizing presumption and finding that it was overcome