which CERCLA is concerned. The private good requires no such incentives for pursuit. Traditional state law remedies are available. In sharp contrast, the plaintiffs’ claims here implicate their private well-being. It is worth noting that, in fifteen years of CERCLA litigation, only one court has even entertained a mass tort lawsuit under CERCLA, see Romeo v. General Chemical Corp., 1994 WL 519685 (N.D.Cal.1994); and even that court found the plaintiffs’ federal claims legally ungrounded. Id. at *5 (dismissing CERCLA suit for lack of any cognizable response costs). The reason is clear: the statute provides a remedy for a specific class of problems — the prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites. See Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 359-60, 106 S.Ct. 1103, 1108, 89 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Carroll v. Litton Systems, Inc., 1990 WL
holding that immunity unavailable to private parties responsible for invoking state replevin garnishment or attachment statute holding that arranger liability claim requires proof that defendant arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances owned or possessed by defendant holding that potentially liable party could avoid all liability by proving its released hazardous substances did not contribute to response costs holding superfund money unavailable to compensate private parties for economic harms that result from discharges of hazardous substances holding that economic loss rule barred claim for breach of fiduciary duty where plaintiffs claim arose solely as a result of the existence of a contract between the parties