position that injustice can be avoided only by specific enforcement. Restatement (2d) of Contracts § 129 (1981). Even were plaintiffs to show that an agreement to convey had been reached, they could not show “that acts of [theirs], done in reliance on the agreement, known to the defendant, so altered the relations of the parties as to prevent restoration to their former condition.” Nichols v. Nichols, 139 Vt. 273, 427 A.2d 374, 377 (1981) (quoting Towsley, 254 A.2d at 442). Plaintiffs’ deposit was returned to them three weeks after they tendered it, and plaintiffs’ cleaning the room in the wedge does not amount to the level of possession or improvements that would justify specific performance of a contract to convey. See In re Estate of Gorton, 167 Vt. 357, 706 A.2d 947, 950-51 (1997) (<HOLDING>). Because plaintiffs have not shown a
holding that possession coupled with substantial repairs and capital improvements to home over a period of months could justify specific performance of oral contract to convey real property holding that trespass requires only proof of interference with right of possession of real property holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property holding part performance of an oral agreement necessary to take the oral agreement out of the statute of frauds must be consistent only  with the existence of the alleged oral contract holding that immunity from suit precluded claim for breach of contract for sale of county property and request for specific performance of contract