clinic or alternatively undergo euthanasia, and that she was also negligent for “failing to warn” the Langleys about the hazard of being exposed to a potentially rabid animal, which was continuous until they received an appropriate warning with respect to the hazard. The Langleys thus argue that the case is one of ordinary negligence governed by OCGA § 9-3-33 and that statute of limitation was tolled until Shannon notified them that the kitten had contracted rabies. As an initial matter, we need not decide whether this case is governed by OCGA § 9-3-33, the personal injury statute, or OCGA may have negligently “failed to warn” the Langleys of the risk associated with caring for a potentially rabid animal. See McNew v. Decatur Veterinary Hosp., 85 Ga. App. 54 (68 SE2d 221) (1951) (<HOLDING>). The limitation period for a claim of
holding that if jury instructions viewed as a whole fairly state the applicable law to the jury the failure to give particular instructions will not be error holding that when a possessor knows that a dangerous condition frequently reoccurs plaintiffs had a right to go to the jury on the issue of defendants negligence even where plaintiffs could not show how long the condition remained on the stairs recognizing that duty to warn of dangerous conditions could be based on constructive knowledge of that condition as well as actual knowledge recognizing that failing to warn the caretaker of the dangerous condition of a potentially rabid animal and give proper confinement instructions can constitute negligence holding that engineering firm whose work was dictated by and complied with contractual specifications had no duty to warn of dangerous condition on premises