to be true by the first jury. When a jury acquits a person of one offense but finds the person guilty of a lesser-included offense, and the verdict is overturned or a new trial granted for a reason other than insufficiency of the evidence, double-jeopardy principles do not bar a second prosecution for the lesser-included offense. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957), cited in Stine v. State, 935 S.W.2d 443, 445 (Tex. App.-Waco 1996, pet. refd) (first verdict overturned on appeal for jurisdictional er ror); Konchar v. State, 938 S.W.2d 500, 502 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1996, no pet.) (new trial granted based on procedural error); see also Ex parte Queen, 877 S.W.2d 752, 754-55 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (citing Lofton v. State, 111 S.W.2d 96 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989) (<HOLDING>)). Because the homicide offenses were either
holding that remand for new trial is remedy for factual insufficiency of evidence holding that the double jeopardy clause precludes a second trial once the reviewing court has found the evidence legally insufficient holding double jeopardy does not bar second trial after granting of new trial for reason other than insufficiency of evidence holding that where a conviction is reversed after trial the double jeopardy clause does not bar a government appeal that if successful would only reinstate the conviction and would not subject defendant to a second trial holding that the dismissal of criminal charges for evidentiary insufficiency is an acquittal for purposes of the double jeopardy clause