restraints also served to prevent the jury from drawing an adverse inference from the presence of the brown paper. Id. at 652, 125 S.Ct. 2007. Nor did we find it a violation of clearly established Supreme Court precedent because “the Michigan courts did not hold that visible shackling, absent the determination of necessity required by Deck, was permissible.” Id. at 654, 125 S.Ct. 2007 (emphasis added). Under this narrow interpretation of Deck, Earhart’s appeal rises or falls on the question of whether the stun belt was visible to the jury. If Earhart’s stun belt was a visible restraint, due process mandates an individualized finding of necessity before the state courts could require Earhart to wear the belt. See Mendoza, 544 F.3d at 654; see also Deck, 544 U.S. at 624, 125 S.Ct. 2007 (<HOLDING>); Holbrook 475 U.S. at 568-69, 106 S.Ct. 1340.
holding that more than notice to a defendant is required holding that an essential interest specific to the defendant is required to physically restrain a defendant during his trial holding all that is required to impose a duty to warn is that the defendant knew or should have known of a specific threat made to harm a specific person holding that defendant was not in custody during search of his residence holding that a trial courts order that defendant not consult with his attorney during an overnight recess during trial violated the sixth amendment