party to a suit for injunction to enforce the act “shall have the right to prosecute an appeal from the order of judgment of the Court.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 121V2, par. 137.11(E).) As the right is not conditioned on filing a motion to vacate, defendants would have this court hold that Rule 307(b) does not preclude review. Defendants’ argument must be rejected because it is the supreme court — not the legislature — which is empowered to make rules for interlocutory appeals to the appellate court. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, sec. 6.) We decline to adopt an unconstitutional interpretation of section 11(E) and hold it to be consistent with Rule 307(b). (See People v. Phipps (1979), 79 Ill. App. 3d 532, 398 N.E.2d 650, rev’d on other grounds (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 87, 413 N.E.2d 1277 (<HOLDING>).) No motion to vacate was filed in this case,
holding that in a redistricting case the legislature has the initial responsibility to act but in the event the legislature fails to act the responsibility shifts to the state judiciary holding that the trial court exceeded its power in ordering the department of mental retardation and developmental disabilities to provide daycare services when those services were being eliminated because of staff reductions because ordering the department to implement specific facilities and programs is beyond the judicial function and exceeds the power of the courts holding that in a redistricting case the legislature has the initial responsibility to act but in the event the legislature fails to act the responsibili ty shifts to the state judiciary holding section 10b of the mental health and developmental disabilities confidentiality act unconstitutional as an attempt by the legislature to usurp the power of the judiciary recognizing the subpoena power of the judiciary