1308 (10th Cir.2005). 51 . Smith v. Oklahoma ex rel. Tulsa Cnty. Dist. Atty., 245 Fed.Appx. 807, 817 (10th Cir.2007) (quoting Jaramillo, 427 F.3d at 1311). 52 . Id. 53 . See, e.g., Cole v. Ruidoso Mun. Schs., 43 F.3d 1373, 1381 (10th Cir.1994) (finding later explanation after EEOC complaint was filed probative of pretext). 54 .Twigg v. Hawker Beechcraft Corp., 659 F.3d 987, 1002 (10thCir.2011). 55 . McGowan v. City of Eufala, 472 F.3d 736, 741 (10th Cir.2006). 56 . Hertz v. Luzenac Am., Inc., 370 F.3d 1014, 1015 (10th Cir.2004). 57 . Williams v. W.D. Sports, N.M., Inc., 497 F.3d 1079, 1091 (10th Cir.2007). 58 . Id. (emphasis added). 59 . Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co., 181 F.3d 1171, 1179 (10th Cir.1999); see e.g., Haynes v. Level 3 Commc’ns, LLC, 456 F.3d 1215, 1228 (10th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). 60 . Xia v. Salazar, 503 Fed.Appx. 577, 580
holding that three and onehalf months between the filing of an eeoc charge and the adverse employment action was insufficient by itself to establish causation holding that a three and onehalf month temporal proximity is insufficient to create a jury issue on causation holding that by itself three and onehalf months was insufficient to prove causation holding one and onehalf months establishes causation while three months is too long and does not holding that sufficient evidence of causation existed where adverse employment action occurred less than three months after protected activity