Watson’s truthfulness just minutes beforehand, we conclude that the appearance of bias demonstrated in this case was sufficient to doubt the Family Court judge’s ability to weigh the truthfulness of the two contending antagonists’ testimony impartially. Other than Weber, there are no other Delaware cases directly addressing this issue. However, Baker v. State, 906 A.2d 139 (Del.2006), suggests that it was inappropriate for the Family Court judge to hear Watson’s second case. In Baker, we held that in a “he said, she said” rape and sexual abuse case, it is impermissible for a prosecutor to ask the defendant an unfounded question that permits the jury to draw an impermissible eonduct-fromcharacter interference that is entirely unjustified. Id. at 153. The rationale underlying our d (<HOLDING>). However, here the stigma surrounding the
holding that the defendant demonstrated actual bias where the murder victim had made allegations concerning the trial court prior to her death the trial court had a personal interest in protecting his name and the countys judiclary and the trial court made rulings calculated to remove any mention of himself or implication of his alleged wrongdoing from the defendants defense holding that a trial judge has discretion to exclude evidence of pending charges and that where the defendant was given a full opportunity outside the presence of the jury to develop a foundation for bias but failed to do so the trial judge did not abuse its discretion holding that a defendant was not entitled to a relief under section 2255 when he asserted that the sentencing judge who was not the trial judge was influenced by the sentence imposed by the trial judge on a codefendant holding that the bias envisioned by canon 3c1 is not created merely because the trial judge has learned facts or made adverse rulings during the course of a trial holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the appellants motion for change of judge where the appellant failed to demonstrate actual bias