do not criminalize what Weichert and Merriam did in this case. See ante at 399-400, 677 A.2d at 171-172. Whether this is correct or not is not particularly relevant here. Certainly, the fact that a clear mandate of public policy is not incorporated in legislation making its violation a crime does not render it any less a clear mandate of public policy. Many cases of this nature, indeed most, involve a clear mandate of public policy the violation of which is not criminalized. See, e.g., Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189, 192, 536 A.2d 237 (1988) (observing that discharge of employee for requesting information relevant to suspected gender-based employment discrimination would be actionable under Pierce)-, Lally v. Copygraphics, 85 N.J. 668, 670-71, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981) (<HOLDING>). The Legislature’s decision not to criminalize
recognizing cause of action for retaliatory demotion for asserting workers compensation rights recognizing the cause of action recognizing a tort action when employee was dismissed for filing a workers compensation claim recognizing cause of action recognizing cause of action under pierce for retaliate ry firing of employee who filed workers compensation action even though specific statutory remedy was available