in real estate brokerage agreements. Nowhere in the decision did we purport to overrule the over thirty years of precedent based on Central Idaho Agency. Although we relied on the standard set forth in Idaho Code section 9-503 in reaching our decision, the applicability of section 9-508 was not raised before the Court. The plaintiff-appellant in Garner did not assert section 9-508 was the controlling statute or even cite the provision in its briefs. Instead, it relied on sections 9-503 and 54-2050. Because we were not asked in Garner to determine whether section 9-508 and Central Idaho Agency remained applicable after the enactment of section 54-2050, our decision not to rely on those authorities is not binding. See Fuller v. Wolters, 119 Idaho 415, 425, 807 P.2d 633, 643 (1991) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by Blimka v. My
holding that plaintiffs could not sue attorneys for legal malpractice so long as underlying medical malpractice action out of which legal malpractice claim arose was still pending on appeal holding that the defendant was only permitted to recover attorney fees as an item of special damages with respect to the underlying action in which the defendant was sued and was not permitted to recover attorney fees incurred in the malpractice portion of the case as damages holding that a previous decision assuming a malpractice action was a commercial transaction for the purpose of awarding attorney fees was not binding because the court in that case was not asked  to decide whether a malpractice action involving a commercial transaction falls within the parameters of the statute holding lease of property was a commercial transaction where the property was for commercial ranching but a residence was maintained on the property holding sale of property was commercial transaction where the land was for both a family retreat and for logging