F.Supp.2d 342, 349 (D.Conn.2005). Therefore, the court shall analyze Tucker’s Title VII and CFEPA retaliation claims together. 2 . There is no dispute that Tucker’s termination constitutes an adverse employment action. Therefore, the court need only discuss the other three elements of Tucker’s prima facie case. 3 . Even Tucker's memorandum of law is muddled when making the distinction between these two clauses. 4 . The parties do not discuss whether a CHRO action constitutes "an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under Title VII, and it is not clear to the court what the specifics were of Pecoraro's CHRO complaint. The court notes, however, that a CHRO action, although proceeding before a state, not federal, agency, can nevertheless be brought pursuant to bo p. 61, 64 (D.Ohio 1977)
holding that an employee could not establish pretext when the employer in good faith believed that the employee engaged in misconduct regardless whether the employee in fact engaged in the misconduct holding that whether an employee decides to assist the charging party or refuses to assist the  employer the employer may not retaliate against the employee because this decision of the employee constitutes participation in an investigation or proceeding under title vii holding that employee may claim contract created based on employer promise of severance pay to employee holding in an americans with disability act retaliation action that ujnless an employer knows that an employee is engaging in protected activity it cannot retaliate against that employee because of the protected conduct holding that supervisory employee is not an employer under the terms of cfepa and because the employer is liable for the employees actions a plaintiff may not maintain an action against the employee individually under conngenstat  46a60