in open court,” Defendant’s characterization is probably accurate. State v. Tollardo, 2003-NMCA-122, ¶ 10, 134 N.M. 430, 77 P.3d 1023. However, Rule 5-502(A)(l) does not exempt demonstrative evidence from a defendant’s duty to disclose. To the contrary, it expressly applies to forms of evidence that are classically demonstrative, such as “tangible objects.” Id. As such, we reject Defendant’s suggestion that demonstrative evidence is subject to a blanket exemption from the general duty of disclosure. {42} Defendant may rely upon the distinction between the use of demonstrative material as an aid to cross-examination and the designation of such material as “evidence” that is fit for use as a formal exhibit. See State v. Gallegos, 92 N.M. 370, 379, 588 P.2d 1045, 1054 (Ct.App.1978) (<HOLDING>). However, even if we were to assume that the
holding that the prosecution must disclose to the defense all exculpatory evidence known to the state or in its possession holding that the district court erred in requiring the defense to disclose a report which the defense did not intend to introduce into evidence and which was merely designed to aid in the crossexamination of a witness for the state recognizing the defense has a right to comment on the presentence report and may introduce evidence holding that defendants failure to assert the defense in any pretrial motions did not waive defendants limitations defense because the assertion of a limitations defense in the answer preserved defendants right to raise the defense both during the first trial and before the second holding that a defendant was not entitled to the affirmative defense where the evidence did not support his contention that he did not aid in the homicidal act