above, was subsequently rejected by the New York Court of Appeals in Snyder, Snyder did not purport to deal with Askey’s views of the availability of damages or of equitable relief in the form of medical monitoring. Nor are we aware of any other New York Court of Appeals case that has addressed this issue. Following Askey, New York intermediate appellate courts and trial-level courts have continued to rule that plaintiffs who have been tortiously exposed to toxic substances and can show that they have a rational'basis for their fear of developing cancer may be allowed to recover the cost of medical monitoring as an element of reasonably anticipated consequential damages. See, e.g., Osarczuk v. Associated Universities, Inc., 36 A.D.3d 872, 877, 830 N.Y.S.2d 711, 715 (2d Dep’t 2007) (<HOLDING>). As indicated in Part II.A.2. above, the “
holding that negligence does not violate the due process clause but reserving the question whether gross negligence does holding that ordinary negligence and gross negligence are not separate causes of action holding medical monitoring and other injunctive relief available as remedies for claims of negligence and gross negligence in causing exposure to hazardous nonnuclear chemicals and substances holding that cjulpable negligence is negligence of a gross and flagrant character which evinces a reckless disregard for the safety of others holding that the preclusion of tort remedies for only economic loss extended to negligence claims