convicted on mere suspicion or mere conjecture .... So if the jury views the evidence in the case as reasonably permitting either of two conclusions, one of innocence, and the other of guilt, then of course the jury should adopt the conclusion of innocence. (J.A. at 3774.) Both instructions informed the jury that where two reasonable conclusions exist — innocence or guilt — the jury may not convict the defendant. Thus, Defendant’s proposed instruction would not have added any value to the jury charge. Moreover, the instruction proposed by Defendant was itself erroneous. First, the proposed instruction’s undue focus on circumstantial evidence improperly implies that the circumstantial evidence is weaker than direct evidence. See United States v. Prince, 214 F.3d 740, 746 (6th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, the proposed instruction
holding review of sufficiency of evidence of juvenile adjudication is same as reviewing substantial evidence to support a criminal conviction holding circumstantial evidence has equivalent standing to direct evidence in criminal prosecution holding that when reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence all evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the government holding that direct and circumstantial evidence are to be given the same weight when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence holding that summary judgment is appropriate when no issue of material fact exists and the court is reviewing administrative record for sufficiency of evidence