remarks improperly described the role assigned to the jury by local law as required by Caldwell. Only two of the prosecutor’s statements are potentially serious violations of Caldwell. The first statement was made by the prosecutor who, when addressing the jury, stated that the jurors could not “recommend the death penalty unless [they] first decide that an aggravating factor exists.” J.A. at 5113-14 (italics added). Bowling alleges that the jury’s responsibility for the death penalty was unconstitutionally lessened by the use of the word “recommend.” We have held, however, that this statement does not misstate local law because Kentucky statutes also use the word “recommend.” See Ky. Rev.Code Ann. § 532.025(l)(b); Kordenbrock v. Scroggy, 919 F.2d 1091, 1101 (6th Cir.1990) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). As a result, this statement was not made in
holding that because the amount of the debtors obligation to the government exceeded the amount of their income tax refund the refund did not become property of the estate and could not be exempted holding that prosecutor had violated caldwell by emphasizing that the trial judge could disregard the jurys recommendation of death even though no state judge had in fact ever done so holding that although a close call a lawnmower was an appliance under the common use of that word and therefore exempt under as a household appliance under minnesota law holding as meritless a claim that the standard jury instructions which refer to the jury as advisory and refer to jurys verdict as a recommendation violate caldwell holding that under dugger the use of the word recommend under kentucky law did not misstate the jurys role and therefore could not amount to a caldwell violation