this argument because we can affirm on an alternative ground. 5 . Sanchez argues that this approach has been adopted in other jurisdictions and cites cases in support of his proposition. See Alam v. State, 776 P.2d 345, 348-49 (Alaska Ct.App.1989); State v. Rich, 305 N.W.2d 739, 742 (Iowa 1981); People v. Adams, 389 Mich. 222, 205 N.W.2d 415, 423 (1973). But only Adams seems to explicitly allocate the merger issue to the jury rather than the trial court. 205 N.W.2d at 424. The other cases Sanchez cites simply underscore the idea that, if not construed narrowly, some kidnapping statutes pose a real risk of doubly punishing a defendant who has been charged with both kidnapping and another offense involving some form of detention in its commission. See, e.g., Alam, 776 P.2d at 348-49 (<HOLDING>); Rick, 305 N.W.2d at 745 (holding that the
holding that failure to include right to appeal in statute indicated legislature did not intend to permit appeal from denial of temporary restraining order recognizing the legal concept that when interpreting a statute it is presumed that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result holding that the commission reasonably interpreted the statute as requiring it to assess the condition of the industry as a whole holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language holding that alaskas legislature did not intend its kidnapping statute to be interpreted as broadly as the literal language indicated