over based on his Hispanic appearance. Cf. Almeida-Amaral, 461 F.3d at 237. Because Santos set out a prima facie case that suppression was warranted because he was pulled over due to his race, the IJ erred in denying his motion without a hearing on suppression. See Matter of Barcenas, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 611. Contrary to the Government’s contention that Santos failed to administratively exhaust his argument that the IJ did not take the allegations in his affidavit as true, we understand his brief before the BIA, in which he argued that “[a]t the very least, the declaration and other evidence were suffi- dent to require that he be permitted to testify in support of his prima facie showing,” to have adequately preserved this argument. See Gill v. INS, 420 F.3d 82, 85-86 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we remand to allow for a hearing
holding that there is nothing for a court to review when an agency has never issued a final and binding judgment that has the force of law holding that once the defendant has submitted to the control of the officer and the process of taking him or her to the police station  has commenced his or her arrest is complete and he or she is in custody for the purposes of the escape statute recognizing that the court has never held that a petitioner is limited to the exact contours of his or her argument to the agency holding that the agency is obligated to offer more explanation when the record suggests strong arguments for the petitioner that the agency has not considered recognizing that the court has rejected the notion that the agency must expressly parse or refute on the record each individual argument or piece of evidence offered by the petitioner internal quotation marks omitted