procedural safeguards akin to the institutional safeguards that constrain appellate courts. Article V, § 8(b) provides that the Governor, in making his decision, is limited to “the same factors which the parole authority is required to consider.” See In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal.4th 616, 128 Cal. Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174, 207 (2003) (“[T]he Governor’s decision must be based upon the same factors that restrict the Board in rendering its parole decision.”). Section 8(b) also subjects the Governor’s review “to procedures provided by statute,” and the relevant statute, California Penal Code § 3041.2, limits the Governor’s review of parole decisions to “materials provided by the parole authority.” Cal.Penal Code § 3041.2(a); see In re Gray, 151 Cal.App.4th 379, 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 724, 739 (2007) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, § 3041.2 requires the Governor,
holding that the governor erred in considering evidence that was not before the board holding that the trial court erred in considering the intent of the parties when the document creating the easement was unambiguous holding that the governor had no power to make the appointment of officer of the school commissioner for cecil county without the consent of the senate when the office was not vacant because the legislature which had created and therefore controlled the office had not delegated that power to the governor holding that at summary judgment hearing trial court erred by considering theory not raised in the pleadings holding that legislation governing classification of employees in the governors office did not confer certain authority on the governor and lacking this power the governor could not change the legislative will through a set of regulations