could properly look beyond an ambiguous assault statute to charging documents, the terms of the plea agreement, or some comparable judicial record to determine on a case-by-case basis whether an assault conviction qualifies as a crime of violence under § 2L1.2(b)(l v.Code § 9A.36.021(l)(a) except the term “recklessly” is omitted. See supra, n. 4. When asked to state what he did in his own words, Defendant made the following admission: “On 6/12/011 assaulted Ms. How-land which caused substantial bodily harm in Mason County.” These admissions show Defendant intended to both assault his victim and use physical force against her, thus bringing his state conviction within the parameters of § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii). Compare United States v. Ortega-Estrada, 207 Fed.Appx. 903, 906 (10th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). While Defendant’s admissions are almost
holding that defendants unprovoked assault demonstrated his intent to engage in deliberate violence against the plaintiff holding defendants admission that he threatened his victim and cut her with a knife contained in his statement of defendant on plea of guilty filed in washington state court conclusively demonstrated his second degree assault conviction qualified as a crime of violence holding that although defendant is not entitled to appeal from his guilty plea as a matter of right his arguments challenging the factual basis for his guilty plea are reviewable pursuant to a petition for writ of certiorari holding that a reference to the violent crime sentencing statute in the second degree assault statute required automatic imposition of violent crime sentencing for a defendant convicted of second degree assault holding that variance between indictment alleging that defendant threw a knife at the victim and proof that the knife fell out of the defendants hand as he was stabbing the victim was not fatal to conviction for aggravated assault