a new, previously nonexistent report’ as to [the healthcare defendant],” the court held the plaintiffs were ineligible for an extension. Id. at 369. Estevis involved an appeal from an order denying the health care defendant’s motion to dismiss. 294 S.W.3d at 268-69. The defendant argued that the expert report did not support the plaintiffs direct liability theory because the report did not identify the defendant by name or state how the defendant had breached the standard of care. Id. at 269-71. On that basis, the court found that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss as to the plaintiffs direct liability theory. Id.; see also Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch v. Railsback, 259 S.W.3d 860, 864 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). None of the cases on which Dr. Morris relies
holding that expert report failed to implicate defendant in context of plaintiffs direct liability theory and thus trial court had no discretion to grant extension but only to dismiss holding where plan language can be interpreted both to grant discretion and not to grant discretion plan does not unambiguously grant discretion holding no jurisdiction when trial court granted extension even though appellants argued expert report was so woefully deficient on necessary elements so as to constitute no report and report was missing experts curriculum vitae holding that causation section of expert medical report was not eonclusory when read in context of entire report holding no jurisdiction where appellant argued report was no report because it failed to mention appellant in any substantive way but trial court found report was merely deficient on element of causation as to appellant and granted extension