The question here is whether the phrase “frequency and persistence of noncompliance” refers only to the plaintiff or also to other debtors. In its reply brief, JRL argues, for the first time, that this phrase applies only to the plaintiff. JRL submitted its first three briefs on this issue — two in support of a pre-trial motion in limine and its opening brief on the instant motion — without citing a case interpreting § 1692k(b)(l), or making the argument that “frequency and persistence of noncompliance” was as to the plaintiff only. See Court’s Doc. Nos. 101 at 7-10; 124 at 2-8; 187 at 4-5. This argument comes too late. A party may not seek a new trial on the basis of a theory not urged before the verdict was rendered. See Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Ciralsky v. C.I.A., 355 F.3d 661, 673
holding that it is wellsettled that although a plaintiff is entitled to full recovery for its damages it is not entitled to a double recovery for the same loss or injury holding that it is not holding inference is warranted when a 67 year old is replaced by a 59 year old holding that reasonable reliance upon the old rule is an important factor supporting prospective application of the new rule holding that it is wellsettled that rule 59 is not a vehicle for relitigating old issues presenting the case under new theories  or otherwise taking a second bite at the apple