the determination of the trial court be reinstated. The central issue is not the rigid classification of the informant as an ordinary citizen or a paid informant but, rather, whether the information, taken in its totality, and interpreted not by technical legal rules but by factual and practical commonsense considerations, would lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe that the person stopped had committed an offense. (People v. Tisler (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 226, 236-37.) Thus it matters not by what name the informant is labelled; we look rather to the informant’s reliability as only one of the factors to be considered in the totality of the circumstances approach. Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d at 238; see also Massachusetts v. Upton (1984), 466 U.S. 727, 80 L. Ed. 2d 721, 104 S. Ct. 2085 (<HOLDING>). In the past, trial courts’ reliance on
holding that court must examine totality of circumstances to determine whether substantial evidence supports issuance of search warrant holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant holding that the reasonableness inquiry is based upon the totality of the circumstances in determining whether or not a search was reasonable holding that a totality of circumstances standard was proper for determining probable cause for issuance of a search warrant based on information from an informant holding that an officers account of a controlled buy made by an informant was by itself sufficient to es tablish probable cause for issuance of a search warrant