id. at 692, and " ‘[t]he required showing of severity or seriousness of the harassing conduct varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct.’ " Lehmann, 626 A.2d at 455 (quoting Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878). 15 . Because certain factors may or may not be relevant in any given case, our conclusion is necessarily limited to the facts of this case. Moreover, we do not suggest that the New Jersey Supreme Court would only look to the ABA Model Charge and Title VII caselaw when fashioning a set of factors to guide the jury in its deliberations. 16 . Because we conclude that the ACPD remains liable under the LAD, we need not consider whether the district court’s charge misstated the law under Title VII. 17 . See also Distasio v. Perkin Elmer Corp., 157 F.3d 55 (2d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Young v. Bayer Corp., 123 F.3d 672, 675 (7th
holding that the plaintiff had to provide direct or circumstantial evidence that the supervisors who took the adverse action against the plaintiff knew about the protected activity prior to taking that action holding that a plaintiff has not demonstrated that the employers reason for terminating him was pretextual if the employer reasonably believed the complaint of sexual harassment lodged against the plaintiff and acted on it in good faith holding that the plaintiff must establish that a supervisors harassment was within the scope of his employment and that the employer failed to respond adequately and effectively when it learned of the harassment holding that if a direct supervisor who had the responsibility to stop harassment knew of and failed to act against it the plaintiff has no further obligation to bring it to the employers attention holding that employer includes supervisor with some authority to address the harassment problem in organization with strong chain of command where supervisor could direct offender to cease and discipline if offender failed to comply