immunity and on the authority of Levin). (2)Does the application of the litigation privilege to a cause of action for abuse of process abolish the cause of action? We conclude that the application of the litigation privilege to a cause of action for abuse of process does not eliminate that cause of action. The litigation privilege, by definition, is limited to actions taken during a judicial proceeding and which are related to the judicial proceeding. Levin, 639 So.2d at 608. Therefore, a claimant may still pursue a claim for an abuse of process when the claim is based on actions taken outside of a judicial proceeding or on actions that are taken during a judicial proceeding but which are unrelated to the judicial proceeding. See Olson v. Johnson, 961 So.2d 356 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (<HOLDING>); see also Montejo v. Martin Mem’l Med. Ctr.,
holding that statements made in the course of negotiation were not contracts and such statements were merged into the final written agreement holding that the litigation privilege did not preclude a malicious prosecution claim where the accusatorial statements that led to the plaintiffs arrest were made before the charges against him were filed and were not made during and were unrelated to the judicial proceeding holding that conviction for speeding did not preclude a malicious prosecution claim arising from acquittal on charges of resisting arrest and attempted escape holding that because plaintiffs iied claim is based on the facts that support plaintiffs malicious prosecution claim plaintiffs iied claim did not accrue until the charges against them were dismissed holding that a witness could testify about statements made to him by a police department investigator because the statements were an admission by partyopponent and were thus not excluded by the hearsay rule