the property was neither owned by the City nor under the “exclusive control and possession” of the City. Thus, KCPD’s acts or omissions, even if chargeable to the City (a point in contention we need not resolve), are protected by sovereign immunity. As evidenced by the verdict director tendered by Randel to the jury, the acts or omissions are in the nature of a failure to warn, acts that cannot waive sovereign immunity with respect to a dangerous condition on property unless it can be established, as a threshold matter, that the property was owned by the City or exclusively controlled and possessed by the City as to rise to the level of an ownership interest supplanting the ownership interest of the Commission in the property. State ex rel. Div. of Motor Carrier, 91 S.W.3d at 616 (<HOLDING>). Because Randel’s evidence did not establish
holding that property of a public entity includes having exclusive control and possession of  property holding that a public entitys property refers to the public entity that owns the property where a dangerous condition exists holding that the crucial distinction that rendered the public entity liable for a private actors inaccessibility was that the public entity had contracted with the private actor for it to provide aid benefits or services to beneficiaries of the public entitys redevelopment program holding that if property is not property1 of the public entity then the public entity cannot be subject to suit under the dangerous condition waiver holding that ijnjuries caused by the condition of a public entitys property  clearly refers to ownership of a property interest which allows a public entity to control the property