be challenged by a rule 3.850 motion filed in 2002. However, this court in Snipes v. State, 843 So.2d 1043, 1044 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), has recently held that the two-year time limitation of rule 3.850(b) cannot begin to run until the direct appeal process has concluded. We note that the Snipes opinion was not available to the trial court when it made its rulings in this case. For Skeens, since his conviction was affirmed by his initial direct appeal (Skeens I) and he did not appeal the sentence imposed after his second direct appeal (Skeens II), the direct appeal process ended and his judgment and sentence became final on December 13, 2000, when the time expired for the filing of a direct appeal from his second resentencing. See McGee v. State, 684 So.2d 241, 242 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Skeens had until December 13,
holding that there was no right to appeal an order denying a motion for correction of judgment which was filed after delays for applying for new trial and appeal expired holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence holding that jurisdiction to entertain a motion to withdraw a guilty plea pursuant to icr 33c expires when the judgment of conviction becomes final ie when an appeal is concluded or in the absence of an appeal when the time for appeal has expired holding that a judgment and sentence become final when direct review proceedings are concluded and jurisdiction returns to the trial court to entertain motions for postconviction relief holding that a judgment and sentence which are not appealed become final when the thirtyday period for taking an appeal has expired