and persistent. These characteristics differentiate it from “peculiar” circumstances, such as environmental conditions or physical obstructions, which may, on occasion, be found to proximately cause a particular injury and relieve litigants of liability. In light of the supreme court’s recent decisions expressing reservations about the use of such instructions, we choose not to expand the doctrine of unavoidable accident as McCurdy suggests. See Reinhart, 906 S.W.2d at 473. With the exception of its “darkness” argument, McCurdy does not refer us to, nor have we been able to locate, any evidence in the record supporting the submission of the unavoidable accident instruction. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in so instructing the jury. See Hill, 849 S.W.2d at 803 (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, we conclude that the
holding that the trial court reversibly erred when it altered an essential element of the crime charged and broadened the language of the indictment by instructing the jury on the general definition of enterprise for rico conspiracy holding that trial court erred in instructing the jury on unavoidable accident when no evidence supported its submission holding that the trial court committed fundamental error in not instructing the jury on the knowledge element of the offense of resisting an officer without violence when that element was in dispute at trial holding that trial court erred by instructing jury regarding sudden emergency holding that the trial court committed reversible error in instructing the jury on a principals theory because there was no evidence that the appellant acted in concert with anyone in committing the charged offenses