26(b)(1) (describing the permissible scope of discovery in extremely broad terms); cf. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331, 70 S.Ct. 724, 94 L.Ed. 884 (1950) (noting the long-recognized public interest in truthseeking). A reporter may be protected from having to comply with a disclosure request, however, when it would impair his ability to gather news, thereby weakening “a vital source of public information.” See, e.g., Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 711 n. 39 (D.C.Cir.1981) (finding a “reporter’s privilege,” as “[t]he Supreme Court [has] explicitly acknowledged the existence of First Amendment protection for news gathering”) (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972)); see also In re Behar, 779 F.Supp. 273, 275 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (<HOLDING>). The party asserting the reporter’s privilege
recognizing that the reporters privilege applies to both confidential and nonconfidential disclosures from the source to the reporter holding that privilege applies in similar factual circumstances recognizing privilege recognizing qualified privilege for confidential presidential communications recognizing a qualified privilege for confidential sources in a libel suit