122 Ill.App.3d 301, 304-05, 77 Ill.Dec. 848, 461 N.E.2d 471, 474 (Ill.App.Ct.1983).(quoted by Pekin Ins. Co., 237 Ill.2d at 461, 341 Ill.Dec. 497, 930 N.E.2d at 1020). Further, the policy itself expressly allows Atlantic to make a “determination regarding a defense obligation ... on evidence or information extrinsic to any complaint or pleading presented to us.” Insurance Endorsements, Dkt. 1-2C, at 8. Atlantic therefore maintains that it is entitled to pursue a declaratory judgment action regarding its duty to defend, even if based on extrinsic evidence. Sealtite correctly argues that Atlantic may not seek a determination in the declaratory judgment action of an issue that is material to resolution of the underlying lawsuit. See Md. Cas. Co., 64 Ill.2d at 196-97, 355 N.E.2d at 29-30 (<HOLDING>). But here, the question of whether Sealtite
recognizing that the trial court abuses its discretion when it commits an error of law in reaching a discretionary decision holding a court abuses its discretion when it commits an error of law holding that a court abuses its discretion by making clear errors of judgment holding that the trial court in a declaratory judgment action abuses its discretion when it determines any of the ultimate facts upon which recovery is predicated in the underlying case holding that in a declaratory judgment action it is the character of the impending action not the plaintiffs defense that determines whether there is federal question jurisdiction