health facility to allow the district court to consider, with the benefit of argument from both Dugan and the government, whether the condition is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. Dugan had no prior notice that the condition might be imposed because it first was suggested in the government’s sentencing letter, submitted to the district court a day before the hearing and not copied to Dugan, who was proceeding pro se. On remand, the district court must determine whether the substantial limit on Dugan’s freedom of movement is “reasonably related” to the government’s interest in deterring future violations of the FACE Act and in protecting the patients and staff of reproductive health facilities. See United States v. Bird, 124 F.3d 667, 684 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Turner, 44 F.3d 900, 903
holding that the warrant application at issue did not specifically mention the presence of criminal activity at defendants residence but that the executing officers reasonably relied on the warrant holding that in determining whether a prior conviction is a violent felony a court generally must look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense holding that it was appropriate for the trial court to find that lack of a prior criminal record was not a mitigating factor in light of the violent nature of the crime committed holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a condition of supervised release that the defendant stay at least 1000 feet away from abortion clinics where the defendant committed a prior violent face act offense and had a history of prior  criminal activity at or near both abortion clinics and at the residence of an abortion provider holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing an upward variance after finding that the defendants criminal history category of i understated the seriousness of his criminal history