much smaller amounts of cocaine from Hands (3/é grams every two or three weeks). We do not suggest that a jury may not convict a defendant based upon testimony that is given in exchange for favorable treatment by the prosecution. If a jury finds it credible, testimony such as that heard in this case will be sufficient to support a conviction. When we assess the strength of the government’s case for purposes of harmless error analysis, however, we may take into account factors— such as incentives to lie — that would have affected the jury’s assessment of a witness’s testimony. In Marshall, for example, the government, in a prosecution for possession of crack cocaine, relied primarily on the testimony of a police informant who claimed to have purchased crack from the defen th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). The government’s case against Hands contained
holding that the erroneous admission of dna evidence is never harmless holding a miranda violation was not harmless error when the only other inculpatory evidence was the testimony of a single cooperating witness who claimed to have conspired with the defendant holding that error from the erroneous admission of evidence was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendants guilt holding erroneous admission of evidence not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the only other evidence against defendant was the uncorroborated testimony of a cooperating witness of questionable credibility holding that admission of evidence is harmless if it is cumulative to other legitimately admitted evidence that establishes a defendants guilt beyond a reasonable doubt