objectively reasonable factual basis for the statements made by the attorney. - The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts engaged in an illuminating discussion of this issue when it addressed the “question of the standard to be applied in disciplinary proceedings where an attorney invokes the First Amendment protection of free speech when defending against charges that he impugned the integrity of a judge, without basis, during a pending case.” Cobb, 838 N.E.2d at 1211. The Cobb court noted that at least three states have held that an actual malice standard, such as that utilized in a defamation action regarding a public official, should be employed in the attorney discipline setting. Id.; see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-81, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964) (<HOLDING>). The Cobb court further explained, however,
holding in defamation context that first amendment protects speech regarding a public official unless made with actual malice holding a school principal seeking recovery for defamation has the burden of showing actual malice holding under federal law that public figure claiming iied based on defamatory nature of speech must prove actual malice holding that first amendment protects public employees right to communicate privately or publicly with his employer holding public school principals criticized for their official conduct are public officials for purposes of defamation law