a violation of this Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. He maintains that DNA is testimonial because it could reveal personal information and therefore come within the ambit of the Fifth Amendment. The district court rejected the claim, citing numerous federal court decisions holding that DNA samples are not testimonial in nature. On appeal, Wilson has failed to identify a single contrary authority. Most recently, the Ninth Circuit confirmed the unanimous view: “The extraction of DNA doesn’t implicate the privilege against self-incrimination because DNA samples are ‘physical’ evidence, not ‘testimonial’ evidence.” United States v. Zimmerman, 514 F.3d 851, 853 (9th Cir.2007) (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (<HOLDING>)). See also Bean, 214 Fed.Appx. at 571 (same);
holding that evidence is not required to support an an assertion relating to discovery when evidence is unnecessary to decide the matter holding that blood test evidence although an incriminating product of compulsion is neither  testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative act or writing and is therefore not protected by the fifth amendment holding that consent to search obtained after defendant invoked right to remain silent is not a selfincriminating statement because it is neither testimonial nor communicative holding that the nexus between an asbestos product and plaintiff may be established by direct and circumstantial evidence and that testimony by someone with knowledge relating to the plaintiffs workplace exposure to an asbestoscontaining product is admissible holding that dna act violates neither substantive nor procedural due process under the fifth amendment