offense, ie., whether there was an improper grant of a mistrial by the trial court. In State v. Woodson, supra, this Court set out the parameters to consider where a mistrial may affect an individual’s double jeopardy rights, when we said: “The double jeopardy prohibition against retrial for the same offense attaches in a jury trial when the jury is empaneled and sworn. See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 467, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 1072, 35 L.Ed.2d 425, 433 (1973); Blondes v. State, 273 Md. 435, 444, 330 A.2d 169, 173 (1975). Thus, after jeopardy attaches, retrial is barred if a mistrial is declared without the defendant’s consent unless there is a showing of ‘manifest necessity’ to declare the mistrial. See United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580, 6 L.Ed. 165, 165 (1824) (<HOLDING>). Although there is no clear test to determine
holding that once the defendant is before the court the court will not inquire into the circumstances surrounding his presence there holding that the trial court was not authorized to dismiss misdemeanor charges without the states consent on the basis that the state had refused to consent to fishers waiver of a jury trial holding that adverse credibility determinations under the real id act must take into consideration the individual circumstances of the applicant holding that a trial court may discharge a jury without the defendants consent whenever taking all the circumstances into consideration there is a manifest necessity for the act holding that the trial court can and should grant a new trial if the manifest weight of the evidence is contrary to the verdict