vol. IV, at 18. Exhibits 27 and 28 contained substances found in an upstairs bedroom which officers testified appeared to be cocaine base. Id. vol. IV, at 19-21, vol. V, at 161-62. In summary, the government’s chemist randomly selected and analyzed approximately forty-three grams of seized substances, all of which tested positive for the presence of cocaine base. Testimony indicated that the untested substances appeared to be cocaine base. We decline to adopt Miller’s view that a sample from each location must be tested to establish that at least fifty grams of cocaine base were involved. In addition to our reliance on Brett, we note that “[pjroof of the existence of a controlled substance need not be by direct evidence.” United States v. Meeks, 857 F.2d 1201, 1204 (8th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). The random testing and the officers’
holding that a reasonable jury could have concluded based on repeated references to the substance as cocaine and testimony from witnesses who had used the substances which they believed to be cocaine that substance was cocaine recognizing that evidence regarding the high price the defendant had paid for the substance in question was relevant to show the substance was cocaine recognizing that identity of a substance as cocaine may be proved by circumstantial evidence holding that in prosecution for possession of a controlled substance cocaine possession of cutting reagents used to dilute cocaine and heroin was not other crimes evidence because possession of these substances is legal holding that district court did not err in determining that cocaine base was crack cocaine based on chemical analysis identifying cocaine base together with competent lay testimony bridging the evidentiary gap between cocaine base and crack cocaine and refusing to require showing of smokeability ie water solubility or melting point for purposes of establishing crack cocaine under the guidelines since smokeability distinguishes cocaine base from powder cocaine not from crack