competitive harm. See Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d at 992 (“The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index cannot guarantee litigation victories;”). It offered additional evidence to strengthen its grima facie case, to which the court now turns. 1. Unilateral Effects — National Customer Market The FTC advanced a “unilateral effects” theory to argue that the merger would harm competition in both the national and local broadline distribution markets. In this section, the court considers the evidence of unilateral effects in the national customer market and subsequently turns to the evidence regarding local customer markets. Courts have recognized that a merger that eliminates head-to-head competition between close competitors can result in a substantial lessening of competition. See Heinz, 246 F.3d at 717-19 (<HOLDING>); Swedish Match, 131 F.Supp.2d at 169 (finding
holding that antitrust violations are unfair methods of competition under the ftc act holding that elimination of cotapetition between second and thirdlargest jarred baby food manufacturers would weaken competition holding that though we do not have exclusive jurisdiction over unfair competition claims our own circuit law nonetheless determines when inequitable conduct also constitutes unfair competition holding that for a plaintiff to establish secondaryline competitive injury resulting from price discrimination injuring competition among the discriminating sellers customers the plaintiff must show actual competition with that sellers customers holding that a state common law claim seeking to require automobile manufacturers to install airbags would frustrate the purposes of the federal safety standard regulations adopted under the federal motor vehicle safety act which did not require manufacturers to do so and therefore was preempted by conflict