subsequently entered an order purporting to deny Cooner’s motion. Cooner purports to appeal from that order. The Board has moved to dismiss the appeal. The Board is essentially the “trial court” of the disbarment proceedings. Assuming that the Board had the authority to hear a postjudgment motion to alter, amend, or vacate its order of disbarment, see Rule 3(b), Ala. R. Disc. P., and Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., it would not have the authority to consider a postjudgment motion filed more than 30 days after it entered its final decision. See generally George v. Sims, 888 So.2d 1224, 1227 (Ala.2004) (“Generally, a trial court has no jurisdiction to modify or amend a final order more than 30 days after the judgment has been entered .... ”); Cornelius v. Green, 477 So.2d 1363, 1365 (Ala.1985) (<HOLDING>); Dickerson v. Dickerson, 885 So.2d 160, 166
recognizing that a final judgment may provide for a particular standard upon which to modify a final judgment holding that the trial court had no jurisdiction to modify its final order more than 30 days after its final judgment holding that the court lacks jurisdiction where a complaint was filed more than 30 days after the filing of the summons holding that trial court has no power to allow party to amend motion for new trial more than thirty days after trial court signed the final judgment and that denial of amended motion for new trial filed more than thirty days after judgment preserved nothing for appellate review holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence