counsel who would have to familiarize himself with the Debtors’ affairs at great expense to the Debtors and the estate. II. Conclusions of Law The primary issue before the Court is whether Ewing’s prepetition security interest in virtually all of the Debtors’ assets, taken to secure payment of fees for bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy services, disqualifies him from serving as their counsel in this Chapter 12 case. A secondary issue is whether the Court should authorize compensation to Ewing for postpetition legal services provided to the Debtors. It is undisputed that trustees should be permitted to select their own attorney without interference from others. See In re Magna Prod. Corp., 251 F.2d 423 (2d Cir.1957); Matter of Market Response Group, Inc., 20 B.R. 151 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1982) (<HOLDING>). Trustees do not, however, have unfettered
holding that jurors must not only be fair and impartial they also must appear so in order to maintain the litigants confidence in the basic fairness of the trial holding that only in the rarest cases will the trustee or debtor in possession be deprived of the privilege of selecting qualified counsel since the relationship between them is highly confidential demanding personal faith and confidence in order that they may work together harmoniously holding that there are many transactions between attorney and client that have no element of confidence in them of which  the attorney is competent to testify holding that the attorneyclient privilege always passes to the trustee even if the debtor is an individual holding that the debtor in possession could utilize the strongarm powers of the trustee to avoid an unperfected security interest even though the debtor knew of the interest prior to bankruptcy because the two are distinct entities and the debtor in possessions responsibility is to preserve the estates assets for the benefit of the creditors