one. See, e.g., Carson, 486 F.3d at 620. However, after Begay we must make a second inquiry: whether the state offense is “roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed,” to the enumerated offenses that appear at the beginning of the residual clause — burglary of a dwelling, arson, extortion, and crimes involving the use of explosives. Begay, 553 U.S. at 143, 128 S.Ct. 1581; United States v. Alderman, 601 F.3d 949, 952 (9th Cir.2010); accord United States v. Smith, 544 F.3d 781, 784 (7th Cir.2008) (noting that after Begay “a finding that the offense poses a serious risk of physical injury to another is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition” for the offense to fall within the scope of the residual clause); United States v. Roseboro, 551 F.3d 226, 233 (4th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>), abrogated on other grounds by United States
holding that driving while under the influence of intoxicants presents at the very least a serious potential risk that the driver will cause physical injury to another person holding that vehicular manslaughter qualifies as a violent felony under section 924e2bii in that it involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another  holding that begay rejected that circuits earlier approach under which an offense presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another if the offense conduct had the potential for serious physical injury to another holding that failure to stop for a blue light is a violent felony under armed career criminal statute because it involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another holding that kidnapping involves a serious potential risk of physical injury to the kidnapped person