jurisdictional allegations because plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any facts supporting personal jurisdiction under Delaware’s long-arm statute. See Boston Scientific Corp., 647 F.Supp.2d at 363-364. Specifically, plaintiff has not asserted reasonably particular factual allegations indicating that specific jurisdiction under 10 Del. C. § 3104(c)(1)-(3) is proper. See Provident Nat’l Bank, 819 F.2d at 437. While plaintiff insists that defendant’s 51 Delaware clients bring defendant within reach of 10 Del. C. § 3104(c)(1) or (2), plaintiff has failed to show that any part of defendant’s business dealings with these Delaware clients has ever occurred in Delaware or even involves Delaware. See Eurofins Pharma U.S. Holdings v. BioAlliance Pharma SA, 623 F.3d 147, 157 (3d Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Applied Biosystems, Inc., 772 F.Supp. at 1466
holding that county of delaware was not a person for purposes of fca liability holding that the kent county zoning ordinance was not preempted by chapter 90 of the delaware code because they were not inconsistent holding that subsection c2 of the delaware longarm statute requires that service contracts must be for services performed in delaware holding that an attorneys cause for services rendered over a period of time accrued when his services had been completely performed holding that under delawares longarm statute the act of mailing for purposes of subsection c3 is complete when the material is mailed even if the mailed material causes tortious injury within delaware