of the motion for summary judgment was appropriate. See id. at 1090 (“[T]he bankruptcy court was mistaken in its belief ... that the Florida DOR’s and Virginia DSS’s post-discharge efforts to collect unpaid interest on Diaz’s child-support obligation could constitute violations of the discharge injunction.”). We lack jurisdiction to review the bankruptcy court’s decision to abstain from deciding whether Mr. Ghee owes child-support interest pursuant to his divorce decree and state law, and, if so, the amount he owes. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d) (“Any decision to abstain or not to abstain made under subsection (c) ... is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise by the court of appeals under section 158(d), 1291, or 1292 of this title.... ”); In re Harrell, 754 F.2d 902, 907 (11th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). See also Stern v. Marshall, — U.S. — , 131
holding that a bankruptcy courts inquiry is properly limited to determining whether the obligation at issue is a support obligation as opposed to a property settlement and rejecting the debtors attempt to expand the dischargeability issue into an assessment of the ongoing financial circumstances of the parties to a marital dispute holding that bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction to control disposition of chapter 13 debtors property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate unless the property is related to the bankruptcy proceedings of the code holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party holding property settlement to be contractual obligation from date of final judgment of divorce