nor the transcripts, including the docket sheets, suggest that the State obtained written waivers. The State points out that both judgments contain the following recital: “A jury having been waived the trial proceeded before the Court.” These recitals, however, do not state that the waivers were written and do not specify that appellant personally waived her right to a jury trial. The recitals may merely reflect counsel’s remark to the trial court, “We intended to try both cases before the Court, in the spirit of judicial economy.” Under these circumstances, we conclude that the recitals are insufficient to raise the presumption that there was a waiver meeting the requirements of article 1.13(a). Id.; cf. Breazeale v. State, 683 S.W.2d 446, 449-50 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (op. on reh’g) (<HOLDING>). Because the Clerk of the County Courts
recognizing that courts will indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver of the constitutional right to trial by a jury holding that jury waiver stating that it was made knowingly and voluntarily raised presumption of same and that burden was on party challenging enforceability of jury waiver to present evidence overcoming presumption recognizing presumption holding presumption of regularity raised by recital in person and in writing in open court having waived his right of trial by jury but presumption would not rise from recital no jury having been demanded citing samudio 648 sw2d at 314 holding rico claim could have been raised in state court because of presumption of concurrent jurisdiction but not addressing whether statutes language and legislative history rebuts the presumption