evidence might raise a reasonable doubt, defense counsel went further and improperly insinuated that the State was lying in order to conceal DNA evidence that could exonerate Jennings. The defense pressed this argument in its closing argument by referring to the arresting officer’s testimo ny as “stupid,” “poppycock,” and “a lie.” Nevertheless, as the trial court properly found, it was still improper for the State to reply with its suggestion that the absence of DNA evidence at trial that “could possibly implicate” Jennings was due to his action in insisting on an early trial date. The State argues the prosecutor’s comments were not error, but rather a fair reply to defense counsel’s improper remarks in closing argument, citing to Broge v. State, 288 So.2d 280, 281 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974) (<HOLDING>). The fair reply doctrine, however, has limits.
holding that in light of defendants attack on credibility of states witnesses prosecutor did not commit misconduct during closing argument when he implied states witnesses were credible holding that review by certiorari was available to remedy a trial court order that improperly struck two of the states witnesses as a sanction for the states failure to disclose the address of one of the witnesses in discovery holding a prosecutors comments indicating his personal belief in the states witnesses was a fair reply to defense counsels attack on the veracity of the states witnesses holding that the prosecutors explanation of a defendants subpoena power was a fair reply to defense counsel questioning the absence of testimony from certain witnesses but going a step further to claim uncalled witnesses would bolster the states case exceeded the boundaries of a fair reply holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial