in behalf of, or (ii) subject to the direct or indirect control of any party to the transaction other than the person by whom the compensation is paid. Although the Robinson-Patman Act has frequently been the subject of enforcement actions by the Federal Trade Commission, see, e.g., FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 168-69, 80 S.Ct. 1158, 4 L.Ed.2d 1124 (1960); Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC, 96 F.2d 687, 690-92 (2d Cir.1938), it does not itself provide a private right of action for treble damages. Such a right is granted only by § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a), which authorizes private suits by “any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws.” Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. of Am., 637 F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>); see also J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler
holding that to have standing to bring a  2a robinsonpatman claim a private plaintiff must make some showing of actual injury attributable to something the antitrust laws were designed to prevent recognizing that  1404a allows for the transfer of clayton act suits holding that standing to raise a claim under  2a of robinsonpatman act is derived from section 4 of the clayton act holding that competitive injury is an element of a  2a claim holding that courts should look to the standing principles  developed under section 4 of the clayton act for guidance in interpreting section 303s standing requirements id at 406 for a recent discussion of standing under the clayton act see associated general contractors v california state council of carpenters us 103 sct 897 74 led2d 723 1983