Significantly, however, plaintiff also applied for and received disability benefits milar offsets of FELA awards in cases filed across the United States. Yet, in this case, CSXT failed to request a special verdict form that would reveal the bases for the jury’s calculation of damages and specifically consented to tendering the general verdict form to the jury. See Dist. Ct. Docket No. 82. 7 . CSXT cites a number of cases from other jurisdictions, which it argues support the proposition that a setoff may be appropriate despite a jury's general verdict. Because these cases either offer no rationale for their holdings or involve a factual stipulation of some kind, we do not find them persuasive. See, e.g., Stanislawski v. Upper River Servs., Inc., 6 F.3d 537, 541 n. 8 (8th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>), Clark v. Burlington N., Inc., 726 F.2d 448,
holding that a plaintiff could recover actual damages under the tcpa for loss of credit if the plaintiff submitted sufficient proof of the amount damages requested holding that the seventh amendment does require that the jury also be allowed to determine the amount of any punitive damages awarded holding that the defendant was entitled to a credit equaling the full amount of the settlement when the plaintiff conceded that the agreement did not indicate whether it covered punitive damages holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment recognizing that the plaintiff conceded that the jury presumably awarded the full amount of cure he requested