a bill of particulars set out the prosecution’s theory for that offense under Additional Charge I as attempted anal sodomy rather than oral sodomy, and the Government contends that the prosecution is bound by that theory. Since no evidence of attempted anal sodomy was introduced, the Government submits that this Court should set aside the one finding of guilty of attempted sodomy under Additional Charge I. Appellant, in his reply brief, has joined in that request. The Government in its brief states: Generally, the Government is limited by a bill of particulars. See e.g., United States v. Haskins, 345 F.2d 111, 114 (6th Cir. 1965); Francis A. Gilligan & Fredric I. Lederer, Court-Martial Procedure § 6-13.00, n17 (2nd ed.1999); cf., United States v. Harris, 25 M.J. 281, 283 (C.M.A.1987) (<HOLDING>). (Gov’t Br. at 10.) On the other hand, the
holding that an offense is factually lesser included if the charging instrument alleges that the means used to commit the crime charged include all of the elements of the alleged lesser included offense recognizing that it is within  our power to direct entry of judgment on a lesser included offense when vacating a greater offense if the commission of the lesser offense can be established from facts that the jury actually found citations omitted holding that when an appellant affirmatively declines a bill of particulars he can not on appeal claim that he was misled when convicted of a lesser included offense holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on trespass as a lesser included offense of breaking and entering because appellant failed to advise the court which of the numerous trespass statutes he considered to be lesser included to the offense charged holding that aggravated battery is a lesser included offense of manslaughter