proof, the plaintiff must then come forward with evidence that creates an issue of material fact on this element of his case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. This the plaintiff has failed to do. The plaintiff does not dispute the applicability of our precedents to his suit. However, he notes that the interpretation of clause 8 of the NYPE form charter agreement and liability of a time charterer under the LHWCA is the subject of a circuit split. Compare Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Ma-Ju Marine Services, Inc., 830 F.2d 1332, 1340 (5th Cir.1987) (collecting cases holding that time charterers are generally not hable for the negligence of vessel’s crew) with Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd., 651 F.2d 1300, 1306 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 967, 103 S.Ct. 294, 74 L.Ed.2d 278 (1982) (<HOLDING>); see also Fernandez v. Chios Shipping Co.,
holding that clause eight requires time charterer to indemnify shipowner for any damages awarded because of injury to longshoreman holding that clause eight imposes liability on time charterer for injuries to longshoremen holding that indemnification for any claim that arises out of or is incident to performance of a time charter agreement does not apply to liability for a platform crane operators negligence in lowering a worker to the vessels deck holding that a charter party creates no contractual duty towards a longshoreman on the part of a time charterer holding that clause 8 of the nype charter party expressly makes the time charterer hable for the vessels neghgence