considering whether a “specific element” is present in the statute underlying the prior conviction); United States v. Weis, 487 F.3d 1148, 1151 (8th Cir.2007) (explaining that contrary to the § 2252(b)(1) enhancement, other sentencing enhancement provisions, such as 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B), require a prior offense to include a specific element in order to qualify as a predicate offense, which limits the court to reviewing the record of conviction only to determine the elements of the convicted offense). Rather, in applying the § 2252(b)(1) enhancement, we consider whether the conduct criminalized by the statute “relat[es] to” sexual abuse of a minor even though it may not specifically include acts of sexual abuse or require the victim to be a minor. See Weis, 487 F.3d at 1151-52 (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks and citations
recognizing the two distinct generic definitions of sexual abuse of a minor and holding that a statute contains the element of abuse under the medinavilla definition if it applies to sexual conduct with children younger than fourteen years holding that attempted sexual abuse is a specific intent crime holding that the new york misdemeanor offense of sexual abuse of a minor constitutes an aggravated felony under ina  101a43asexual abuse of a minor holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse holding that although there were six occurrences under the general liability policy there was only one sexual abuse occurrence where sexual abuse occurrence was defined as a single act or multiple continuous sporadic or related acts of sexual molestation or abuse caused by one perpetrator