period for purposes of Plaintiff's federal Title VII retaliation claim, which is discussed at section III.B.l. infra. 16 . Louisiana's Employment Discrimination statute is analyzed under the same standards as Title VII. See Nichols v. Lewis Grocer, 138 F.3d 563, 566-67 (5th Cir.1998); Deloach v. Delchamps, Inc., 897 F.2d 815, 818 (5th Cir.1990); Devillier v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 709 So.2d 277, 280 (La.Ct.App.1998). 17 . Only three of the remaining events asserted by the Plaintiff in support of her sex discrimination claim are within the definition of adverse employment action, namely, (1) the August 1999 leave rescheduling, (2) disparate treatment with regard to Greg Stephens’ pay, and (3) the November 1999 termination. See Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781-82 (5th Cir.1995)(<HOLDING>). Therefore, for the remainder of this ruling,
holding that such a theory is viable under title vii holding that title vii was only meant to address ultimate employment decisions such as hiring granting leave discharging promoting and compensating holding that a claim for discrimination in private employment is not preempted by title vii holding that title vii does not address samesex harassment recognizing title vii does not provide the exclusive remedy for all employment discrimination claims even if the title vii and section 1983 claim factually overlap