the lack of coverage under the E & 0 policy for a claim brought by Briar Green directly against an officer like Primo does not arise from Briar Green’s rights under the policy, but rather the officer’s lack of rights against Great American under the policy when he is sued by certain parties. For example, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which, absent the assignment to Travelers, Briar Green could rely on the “Insured v. Insured” exclusion to prevent Great American from assuming Primo’s defense if Great American had chosen to provide one. Because Briar Green was not the possessor of the right to deny coverage, we fail to see how Briar Green could have transferred the lack of insurance coverage as a right incident to its claim against Primo. Cf. Jackson, 883 S.W.2d at 175 (<HOLDING>). Finally, Great American contends for the
holding that the right to drive is not a fundamental right holding that an accused may not complain if the statute of limitations is extended so long as the period of time originally provided therein had not run at the time of such extension because an accused does not acquire any vested right in a statute of limitations until it has operated to bar the prosecution of the offense with which he has been charged holding the fdic as the possessor of the right to a statutorily provided extension of the limitations period could transfer the right incident to the asset to which it relates holding that for an act to be inconsistent with the right to arbitrate and thus constitute a waiver of that right it must repudiate the right of the party who does the act holding that treating a defendants failure to appear as a waiver not only of the right to be present but of the right to have a hearing on the motion was error