misleading, for at least two reasons. First, Article XVII, § 3(2) was simply a transitory provision, designed to insure the continued validity of actions taken during the period of martial law, before the passage of the 1973 Constitution. See Pelaez Aff., ¶ 22. More importantly, however, the “acts” referred to in the passage quoted above, are not mere physical acts, but rather legislative acts or official acts of office. Thus, in Luneta v. Special Military Commission No. 1, 102 SCRA 56, 65-66 (1981), the Supreme Court held that, at most, Article XVII, § 3(2) could encompass “official and formal pronouncements of the President on public occasions of importance,” and more likely would require formal promulgation, and not mere oral statements. See also Tanada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985) (<HOLDING>); cf. Aquino v. Entile, supra, 59 SCRA at 376.
holding that legislative consent to suit must be by clear and unambiguous language in either a statute or by other express legislative permission holding government must comply with the requirements of section 853pl to obtain a personal money judgment holding that substantive changes made by administrative agencies in regulations are required to comply with certain notice and comment requirements which include publication of a notice of proposed rulemaking in the federal register an opportunity for interested persons to comment on that notice and after consideration of these comments publication of the final rule with a general statement of its basis and purpose citing 5 usc  553b c holding that to be constitutionally valid and binding marcos legislative issuances must comply with certain minimum publication requirements deducible from traditional constitutional principles holding the failure to comply with the act does not bar defendant from raising a constitutional challenge to jury selection procedures