grounds, 488 U.S. 807, 102 L. Ed. 2d 18] (1988). A second type includes killings less violent but “conscienceless, pitiless, or unnecessarily torturous to the victim,” State v. Brown, 315 N.C. 40, 65, 337 S.E.2d 808, 826-27 (1985)[, cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164, 90 L. Ed. 2d 733 (1986), overruled on other grounds by State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988)], including those which leave the victim in her “last moments aware of but helpless to prevent impending death,” State v (1994). Additionally, the evidence shows that the victim was conscious and in great pain for at least fifteen minutes after the shooting, thereby permitting the inference that he was also aware of, but helpless to prevent, impending death after the shooting. See Brown, 315 N.C. at 67, 337 S.E.2d at 828 (<HOLDING>). Finally, the killing demonstrates an unusual
holding that evidence that the victim was conscious for fifteen minutes after being shot six times supports a finding that the victim suffered great physical pain prior to death holding that evidence the defendant knew the victim supported a finding that the murder was committed to avoid arrest holding that evidence of assault on victim that was subsequent to the arson for which defendant was tried was admissible to show defendants bent of mind toward violence directed at the victim holding that where the dying victim remained conscious for fifteen minutes the evidence was sufficient to show that the victim knew that he was dying but was helpless to prevent it holding that before a defendant is entitled to introduce evidence of the victims character for violence there must be sufficient evidence to support a finding that the victim was the first aggressor and that once the defendant testified that he was attacked and cut by the victim without provocation before using the victims utility tool to stab the victim the defendant was clearly entitled to question the victim about past acts of violence reflected in court documents from the state of oregon