these cases support her argument that wrongful death actions fall within the purview of section 13 — 214(a). We find the cases cited by plaintiff of little precedential value. In none of the cases cited by plaintiff was the reviewing court asked to decide whether the construction statute of repose governed over the Act’s two-year statute of limitations. In fact, none of these cases cite to or mention the Act’s two-year limitations period. We are also unpersuaded by plaintiffs reliance on cases comparing the limitations period in section 13 — 214(a) of the Code with the limitations period found in other statutory provisions of the Code. None of those cases addressed the role of the Act’s limitations period. See, e.g., Hernon v. E.W. Corrigan Construction Co., 149 Ill. 2d 190, 196 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Tatara, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 1038 (same);
holding that the limitations period in section 13  214a takes precedence over the limitations period for personal injuries found in section 13  202 of the code holding that limitations period in section 13  214a of the code applies over limitations period for contribution actions found in section 13  204 of the code because former provision is more specific holding that placement of a contractual limitations period in a section entitled claims was reasonable holding that the then twoyear statute of limitations for constructionrelated actions found in section 13  214a of the code applies over the fiveyear statute of limitations period for certain actions found in section 13  205 of the code holding that statute of limitations for contribution actions found in section 13  204 of the code applies over limitations period for malpractice actions found in section 13  212 of the code where the plaintiffs complaint was based solely on contribution act ill rev stat 1985 ch 70 par 301 et seq section 13  204 is more specific than section 13  212