(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965)). In support of this claim, Godfred-son fails to allege any facts beyond those supporting his charge of discrimination under the ADEA. But an employee’s termination, even if based upon discrimination, does not rise to the level of “extreme and outrageous conduct” without proof of something more. If such were not true, then every discrimination claim would simultaneously become a cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Baab v. AMR Services Corp., 811 F.Supp. 1246, 1269 (N.D.Ohio 1993) (“[T]o say that Ohio courts narrowly define ‘extreme and outrageous conduct’ would be something of an understatement.”); Bryans v. English Nanny and Governess Sch., Inc., 117 Ohio App.3d 303, 690 N.E.2d 582, 592 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Godfredson’s testimony that Bo-okmyer had
holding that claims in an employment setting are viable only when the employers conduct is so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community holding that schools failure to inform plaintiffs parents or the police or to conduct its own investigation in response to learning that plaintiff had been raped at school was insufficiently extreme and outrageous holding plaintiffs allegations forming the basis of a claim for outrageous conduct must exceed those which would state a colorable claim of discrimination holding that regarded as claim was reasonably related to claim of discrimination on the basis of disability holding that even if the plaintiffstudent proved her claim of discrimination on the basis of disability the schools conduct was not so extreme or outrageous as to be intolerable in a civilized community