undecided jurors into reaching a verdict by abandoning without reason conscientiously held doubts.” United States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507, 517 (2d Cir.1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 905, 98 S.Ct. 1451, 55 L.Ed.2d 496 (1978). In deciding whether a second modified Allen charge is permissible and appropriate, an individualized determination of coercion is required. Id. (affirming decision to give second modified Allen charge); United States v. Ruggiero, 928 F.2d 1289, 1299-1300 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, Gotti v. United States, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 372, 116 L.Ed.2d 324 (1991) (same); United States v. O’Connor, 580 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir.1978) (same); United States v. Reed, 686 F.2d 651, 653 (8th Cir.1982) (same); but see United States v. Seawell, 550 F.2d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, the second modified
holding that an allen charge was not inherently coercive even though jury was split 111 because the judge did not know the identity of the holdout juror holding second modified allen charge coercive per se unless jury requests it holding that allen charge given by court was coercive and required a new trial holding when giving an allen charge the trial court must avoid coercive deadlines holding such agreements to be per se illegal