and citation omitted). Relating a warning theory in terms of “warranty” or “fraud” does not avoid the implications of an adequate warning. See, e.g., In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 955 F.Supp. 700, 709 (E.D.Tex.1997) (granting summary judgment on all claims because “[t]he gravamen of all of Plaintiffs’ causes of action ... is that Wyeth failed to adequately warn of or disclose the severity of Norplant’s side effects”), aff'd 165 F.3d 374 (5th Cir.1999); Ames, 431 F.Supp.2d at 567-68 (D.Md.2006) (granting summary judgment based on proximate cause and stating defective design, marketing defect, breach of implied warranty, and negligence claims can be “reduce[d] down” to failure to warn claims); Jack v. Glaxo Wellcome Inc., 239 F.Supp.2d 1308, 1320-22 (N.D.Ga.2002) (<HOLDING>). In addition, all of Plaintiffs’ additional
holding that the hospital was fraudulently joined because hospitals are not sellers of medical devices and therefore there was no basis in illinois law to support the plaintiffs claims for strict liability and breach of implied warranty against the hospital holding that a commercial buyer of defective goods cannot maintain a strict liability or negligence suit for economic loss to the product as the remedy is a breach of warranty suit under the ucc holding warranty liability and strict liability were both shown by proof a product was defective holding the learned intermediary doctrine as adopted by georgia courts insulated a defendant from liability for negligence strict liability and breach of implied warranty claims recognizing strict product liability actions