and the sentencing court denied the motion without comment or explanation. Thereafter, Mr. Blandin was sentenced to seventeen years in prison. Mr. Blandin’s appellate attorney did not challenge the sentencing court’s denial of the ineffective assistance of co he fact that his appellate attorney did not raise the ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal. Presumably, Mr. Blandin’s appellate attorney relied on Florida law which, with few exceptions, requires claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to be litigated in postconviction proceedings. See Bruno v. State, 807 So.2d 55, 63 (Fla.2001) (“A defendant thus has little choice: As a rule, he or she can only raise an ineffectiveness claim via a rule 3.850 motion.”); Williams v. State, 438 So.2d 781, 786 (Fla.1983) (<HOLDING>). We cannot conclude that Mr. Blandin’s
holding no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim for failure to raise as basis for appeal of conviction ineffective assistance of trial counsel where basis for the latter claim was inadequate holding williams improperly attempted to raise the question of ineffective assistance of counsel in an amended motion for a new trial in so doing williams failed to provide the trial court with sworn allegations necessary to prevent unfounded complaints in motions for postconviction relief holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel holding ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failure to object to prosecutors comments cognizable in postconviction motion since court unable to review on appeal because trial counsel failed to preserve error recognizing that the defendant whose trial counsel represented him on motion for new trial had no opportunity to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim prior to appeal and remanding the case for a hearing solely on this issue