and number-barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, there is no time or numerical limitation for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The BIA reasonably found that Zhang’s motion to reopen did not qualify for such an exception. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Zhang failed to establish changed country conditions in China based on her baptism and “continued practice” of Christianity in the United States. See Li Yong Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 129, 130-31 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the BIA reasonably declined to
holding that a change in the law of sentencing does not constitute a new factor holding that a change in personal circumstances in the united states does not constitute a change in country conditions and therefore does not establish an exception to the filing deadline for motions to reopen holding that a change in personal circumstances namely the birth of a child in the united states does not fit under the changed circumstances exception provided by 8 cfr  10032c3ii holding that 8 cfr  10032c3ii applies to changed country conditions in the country of origin or deportation and not changed personal circumstances in the united states holding that petitioners divorce was a purely personal change in circumstances that does not constitute changed conditions or circumstances in jordan