for relief. See Timson, 518 F.3d at 874. However, Rosa generally challenges the dismissal of his case for failure to state a claim, and his second amended complaint was the operative complaint before the district court when it dismissed his case. See Krinsk, 654 F.3d at 1202. Thus, construing Rosa’s brief liberally, we conclude that he has sufficiently challenged the dismissal of his second amended complaint. See Timson, 518 F.3d at 874. Further, the appellees suggest that Rosa is barred from challenging the magistrate’s order that instructed him to file an amended complaint. However, because the magistrate’s order was not the final judgment in the case, it appears that we may review Rosa’s arguments regarding the order. See Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 930-31 (11th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, although Rosa complied with the
holding that the final judgment was entered without jurisdiction while a nonfinal appeal was still pending holding that when reviewing a final judgment we generally also have jurisdiction to review all prior nonfinal orders and rulings which produced the judgment recognizing that both final and nonfinal orders may be the subject of motions for reconsideration holding that a notice of appeal that specifies the final judgment brings up for review all of the previous rulings and orders that led up to that final judgment recognizing that nonfinal orders may be revised at any time before a final judgment is entered