benefit by ensuring that the agency obtains the most advantageous contract available. Thus, a district court may not overturn a procurement decision “unless the aggrieved bidder demonstrates that there was no rational basis for the agency’s decision.” Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Brown, 600 F.2d 429, 434 (3d Cir. 1979); see also R.A. Glancy & Sons, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 180 F.3d 553, 557 (3d Cir. 1999); Coco Bros. Inc. v. Pierce, 741 F.2d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 1984) (recognizing that discretion to award in-junctive relief in procurement cases “is restricted to circumstances where the gov ernmental agency’s action is illegal or irrational”). However, if the agency provides a rational basis for its action, our inquiry comes to an end. See Princeton Combustion, 674 F.2d at 1022 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we turn now to DRPA’s arguments
holding a bid award may be set aside if either 1 the procurement officials decision lacked a rational basis or 2 if the procurement procedure involved a violation of regulation or procedure holding that a bid award may be set aside if either 1 the procurement officials decision lacked a rational basis or 2 the procurement procedure involved a violation of regulation or procedure holding that as a matter of law where the procurement decision was rational a reviewing court may not award injunctive relief despite the presence of procedural irregularities in the procurement process holding that the definition of procurement under the tucker act is broader than the definition of procurement contract in the fgcaa such that an agency can engage in a procurement process for the purposes of the tucker act even though it is using a cooperative agreement instead of a procurement contract to memorialize the parties agreement holding that in bid protest cases  a bid award may be set aside if either 1 the procurement officials decision lacked a rational basis or 2 the procurement procedure involved a violation of regulation or procedure 