small pieces of the Walkway, or access to the Walkway, built upon it. See Def.-Int. Reply at p. 14 (noting that the second of two issues remaining for the Court to decide, given that the public trust doctrine gov erns a large portion of the land at issue, is “whether the state acted rationally in determining that access across the perpendicular paths and scattered small portions of the Walkway constructed on uplands is ‘reasonably necessary’ to protect that public’s right of access to the remaining 88.7 percent of the Walkway that is situated on tidelands”). Plaintiffs’ taking claims with respect to this small portion of the property at issue are governed by the reasonableness test enunciated in Matthews. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 95 N.J. 306, 326, 471 A.2d 355 (1984) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821, 105 S.Ct. 93, 83
holding that public use of a beach was presumed to have originated by permission and to have continued as a license until some act  of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege holding that in order to exercise its rights under the public trust doctrine the public must be given both access to and use of privatelyowned dry sand areas as reasonably necessary holding that the borough of deals dedication of a portion of a beach for use by its residents only was immaterial given the public trust doctrines requirement that the public be afforded the right to enjoy all dry sand beaches owned by a municipality holding that under the public standing doctrine it is only necessary that the relator shall be a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public