Plaintiffs procedural and substance Due Process clause rights guaranteed by the 14th Amendment.” The gravamen of Smith’s § 1983 complaint, then, is that Defendants’ violated his eonstitu-tional rights by denying the statutory DNA testing. Thus, the “source of the injury” in this case is the state trial court order that denied Smith access to DNA testing. That is, by complaining that the state trial court wrongfully denied him the DNA evidence because rejection of his petition was improper — but not complaining that the statute itself is flawed — Smith is “complaining of an injury caused by the state-court judgment and seeking review and rejection of that judgment,” which is clearly barred by Rooker-Feldman. Exxon, 544 U.S. at 291, 125 S.Ct. 1517. See also Carter, 524 F.3d at 799 (<HOLDING>)-, cf. id. at 798-99 (holding that the district
holding that the district court properly dismissed the plaintiffs asapplied challenge to the constitutionality of the tennessee collateral review statutes under rookerfeldman holding that the alc may not rule upon a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a regulation or statute but may rule upon an asapplied challenge holding that even if the plaintiffs independent claim was inextricably linked to the state court decision preclusion law was the correct solution to challenge the federal claim not rookerfeldman  holding that rookerfeldman did not bar the plaintiffs federal action where a pennsylvania state court had previously dismissed the plaintiffs petition for review of an agencys decision for failure to comply with the pennsylvania rules of appellate procedure since the extent of the plaintiffs compliance with those rules had no bearing on the merits of the plaintiffs constitutional claims holding rookerfeldman inapplicable where the district court could and did find that the plaintiffs constitutional claims had merit without also finding that the state court erred