the amount of a[n] [indirect] plaintiffs damages attributable to the violation, as distinct from other, independent factors”; (2) the “complicated rules” courts would be forced to adopt to “apportion[ ] damages among plaintiffs removed at different levels of injury from the violative acts, to obviate the risk of multiple recoveries”; and (3) the existence of a “directly injured victim[ ]” who “can generally be counted on to vindicate the law” and serve the law’s “general interest in deterring injurious conduct.” Id. at 269,112 S.Ct. 1311. Holmes follows a course marked by a long line of Supreme Court cases denying antitrust standing to plaintiffs who suffer derivative or “passed-on” injuries. See, e.g., Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 729, 97 S.Ct. 2061, 52 L.Ed.2d 707 (1977) (<HOLDING>); Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at
holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue holding that an activity which is exempt from the antitrust laws cannot form the basis of an antitrust investigation holding that employers have standing to sue holding that an indirect purchaser lacked standing under the antitrust laws to sue for overcharges passed on to them by intermediaries holding that a union lacked standing to sue for injuries passed on to it by intermediaries