premiums for that Employee.” Id. at 1842. The phrase “agrees in writing,” LINA argues, empowers LINA to decide whether to insure Bowers, and then whether to grant the WOP benefit. This reading of the Life Policy language entirely ignores the context of the phrase. In both instances, the sentences address when a benefit begins, not whether a benefit applies at all. The use of the phrase “in writing” does no more than further emphasize this point. The instances in which a legal consequence is conditioned on the delivery of written notice are legion. To argue that a provision regarding the delivery of written notice implicitly grants discretion contradicts both common sense and basic contract interpretation principles. See Jacobs v. Pickands Mather & Co., 933 F.2d 652, 657 (8th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>) (quotations omitted). As such, this language
holding that the interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law holding that the rules governing interpretation of a lease are the same as those governing interpretation of a contract holding erisa plan interpretation is simply one of contract interpretation holding that federal common law of erisa preempts state law in the interpretation of erisa benefit plans holding an administrative interpretation cannot change the meaning of a statute or control the courts interpretation of it