questions — indeed, we would be forced to do so without guiding state precedents — because even assuming that the officers violated a state statute by making an arrest outside their jurisdiction, it is clear that Pasiewicz’s second premise is faulty. A violation of a state statute is not a per se violation of the federal Constitution. The federal government is not the enforcer of state law. Kraushaar v. Flanigan, 45 F.3d 1040, 1048 (7th Cir.1995); Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1217 (7th Cir.1988) (“[T]o treat a violation -of state law as a violation of the Constitution is to make the federal government the enforcer of state law.”). We have applied this principle consistently in the context of state laws governing criminal process, see, e.g., Sheik-Abdi, 37 F.3d at 1249 (<HOLDING>); McKinney, 726 F.2d at 1188 (“If police
holding that a state agencys violations of its own internal regulations did not establish a due process violation or otherwise give rise to a constitutional claim holding that failure to record an assignment does not give rise to a cause of action holding that alleged violations of a state statute did not give rise to federal constitutional claims holding that a violation of a state statute regarding the swearing of criminal complaints does not give rise to constitutional liability holding that puffing does not give rise to fraud liability under mississippi law