to a legitimate governmental purpose, see Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-21, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993). However, when an age-based classification affects fundamental rights, a court must review the classification with “the most exacting scrutiny.” See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461, 108 S.Ct. 1910, 100 L.Ed.2d 465 (1988) (unanimous decision); see also Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 666, 110 S.Ct. 1391, 108 L.Ed.2d 652 (1990). The Charlottesville curfew ordinance does implicate fundamental rights. Cf. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) (loitering statute implicates First Amendment liberties and “consti tutional light to freedom of movement”); Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 944-45 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Normally, this would require the City to
holding that amendment to bankruptcy act was unconstitutional because it infringed upon state sovereignty holding right to be fundamental holding parental rights are constitutionally protected fundamental interest holding that curfew infringed minors fundamental rights holding that rights under vienna convention are not the equivalent of fundamental rights such as the right to counsel