basis for its decision to reseat the juror. The Supreme Court made clear in Miller-El that deference to the trial court’s findings on credibility is crucial because a reviewing court, analyzing only the transcript of the voir dire, is “not as well positioned as the trial court is to make credibility determinations.” 537 U.S. at 339, 123 S.Ct. 1029. The court in the instant case discredited defense counsel’s facially neutral explanation for the strike of the juror, believing instead that the strike was race-based. We ought not and therefore do not second-guess the trial court’s assessment of defense counsel’s credibility on that point.' It follows that the court’s decision to reseat the previously stricken juror was not error. See Jones v. State, 343 Md. 584, 605, 683 A.2d 520 (1996) (<HOLDING>). III. Appellants argue that the trial court
holding that under mayfield the exercise of discretion based on a mistaken premise of law can be a failure to properly exercise discretion holding that the district courts denial of a downward departure was an exercise of discretion and therefore not reviewable holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion holding that it was a proper exercise of the courts discretion to reseat jurors stricken in violation of batson holding that where the plaintiffs copyright infringement claim was without a reasonable legal basis an award of attorneys fees to the defendants was a proper exercise of judicial discretion