or GAAS, nor does he offer alternative evidence that his valuation of the License Designs, and characterization of tooling and prototype costs, were proper under those standards. In sum, the SEC’s conclusion that Ponce violated Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by certifying that AAC’s statements complied with GAAP and that his audit was conducted according to GAAS, in light of the evidence of serious departures contained in the record, is supported by substantial evidence. Both the valuation of the License Designs and the capitalization of research and development costs portrayed an overall picture of AAC as having greater assets and financial stability than in reality it did. This, in the final analysis, is dispositive. See SEC v. C.R. Richmond & Co., 565 F.2d 1101, 1106-07 (9th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, there is substantial evidence
holding that estoppel was a question of fact holding that a false representation of a material matter of fact is a necessary element of a rescission claim holding no issue of material fact as to whether defendant was volunteer because he received no compensation holding that both lanham act false advertising claim and a false advertising claim made under section 349 or section 350 require a showing that the advertisement was false or misleading holding that the overall effect of advertisements was misleading in violation of section 10b despite fact that no single statement of material fact was false