Hall fails to support the dissent’s position. In that case, there was no specific statute granting the availability of habeas relief. Here, OCGA § 37-3-148 (a) provides that habeas relief is available “at any time” to detainees such as Nagel. Because the statutory scheme demonstrates the legislature’s intent that the availability of the writ of habeas corpus not be restricted, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Sears, Carley, and Thompson, JJ, who dissent. 1 See Nagel v. State, 264 Ga. 150 (442 SE2d 446) (1994) (affirming the denial of relief). 2 Nagel v. Osborne, 164 F3d 582 (11th Cir. 1999). 3 Richardson v. Hall, 199 Ga. 602, 606 (34 SE2d 888) (1945). 4 Morton v. Bell, 264 Ga. 832, 833 (452 SE2d 103) (1995) (<HOLDING>). 5 See OCGA § 9-14-1 et seq. 6 Ga. Laws 1980,
holding that for purposes of statutory construction expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other recognizing principles of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of smother and expressum facit cessare taciturn if some things are expressly mentioned the inference is stronger that those omitted were intended to be excluded recognizing timehonored precept of expressio unius est exclusio alterius   the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another holding that maxim of expression of one implies exclusion of another is aid to determine legislative intent recognizing rule of statutory construction that statutes must be read as a whole and sections which are part of the same general statutory scheme must be construed together and each given effect if it can be done by any reasonable construction