that the social history is not. Accordingly, the social history is not discoverable. The court also concludes that the letter is not protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege because it was disclosed to a third party, and Officer Draper could not have had a reasonable expectation of privacy as to the letter. Accordingly, the court concludes that the letter is discoverable. Conversely, Officer Draper has a reasonable expectation of privacy as to the PTSD interview. Unlike the letter, the PTSD interview was not disclosed to the Ogden City Police Department. Accordingly, the court concludes that the psychotherapist-patient privilege applies to the PTSD interview, and therefore, it is not subject to discovery. See e.g., Caver v. City of Trenton, 192 F.R.D. 154, 162 (D.N.J.2000) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. District of Columbia, No. CIV. A.
holding that the psychotherapistpatient privilege applied to mandatory postshooting evaluation where no confidential information was disclosed by the psychologist to the police chief but only a yes or no as to whether the officer was fit to return to duty holding that the psychotherapistpatient privilege applied where an officer was required to undergo a psychological evaluation after killing a suspect and the psychotherapist merely opined whether the officer was fit to return to duty holding that an exception to the general rule applied when counsel asked the court whether its ruling was the final order of the court and the court responded yes holding the chief of police was an atwill employee because the parties agreed that the chief of police was an appointed officer and the citys charter stated that officers shall be appointed and may be removed by the mayor with consent of the council holding that statements made only to supervisor and chief by police officer were matters of public concern