v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co, 398 F. Supp. 1082, 1084-1085 (D. Md. 1975), aff’d, 567 F.2d 268 (4th Cir. 1977) (no due process violation because presumption of inclusion of adopted children is rule of evidence and evidentiary rules are procedural and may be applied retroactively); First Nat’l Bank v. King, 165 Ill. 2d 533, 542-543 (1995) (same); Peele v. Finch, 284 N.C. 375, 382 (1973) (no due process violation because biological beneficiaries held contingent, rather than vested, interests); Prince v. Nugent, 93 R.I. 149, 164-165 (1961) (no constitutional violation because biological beneficiary’s rights were not vested and presumption is evidentiary rule with prospective application at time instrument is construed). But see McClain v. Taylor, 904 P.2d 1316, 1319 (Colo. 1995) (<HOLDING>); Thomas v. Trust Co. Bank, 247 Ga. 693, 693
recognizing that some states it should be noted have adopted a hybrid approach holding that a report relied upon by agency in determining whether or not to award a grant had not been adopted as there is no indication in the record that in funding the  grant the agency expressly adopted the reasoning of the report holding that wills should be construed by the law as it existed when the testator died thereby excluding adopted children as beneficiaries unless the will indicates an intent to include adopted children holding that construction that neutralizes any provision of a contract should not be adopted if the contract can be construed to give effect to all provisions holding that while some courts have adopted the intent to silence requirement we see no reason why the forfeiture doctrine should be limited to such cases