distinguishes this ease from those in which the defendant’s own consent prolonged a traffic stop. See Williams, 359 F.3d at 1020 (after a valid traffic stop at the Sugar Tree exit, defendant “consented to a search of his vehicle ... [which] revealed 593 pounds of marijuana”); Martinez, 358 F.3d at 1007 (”[d]efendant voluntarily consented to search of his motor vehicle after valid Sugar Tree traffic stop which revealed 17 kilograms of cocaine); United States v. Hornbecker, 316 F.3d 40, 45 (1st Cir.2003) (after initial traffic stop, defendant “was twice told that he was free to go but consented to stay and comply with the troopers’ various requests,” including a search of his vehicle which revealed 400 pounds of marijuana); Chhien, 266 F.3d at 8 (a “consensual pat-down s Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>) with United States v. Bouffard, 917 F.2d 673,
holding that the defendant failed to demonstrate legitimate expectation of privacy where he could not show that he had the owners permission to use the car or demonstrate prior use or control of the car holding that the driver of a car who had permission to use the car had standing to challenge its search holding that the driver of a borrowed car had the requisite legitimate expectation of privacy to support standing for fourth amendment purposes holding that the driver of a ear owned by his wife who had given him permission to use it had a legitimate expectation of privacy under the fourth amendment holding that even a driver not listed as an authorized driver for a rental car could nevertheless have an expectation of privacy if given permission to use the car by an authorized driver