insured’s “alcohol intoxication was itself an ‘intentionally self-inflicted in jury’ that ‘contributed to’ his injuries and death”; holding, instead, that that argument was “based on an unreasonable interpretation of the plan” because “[t]he most natural reading of the exclusion for injuries contributed to by ‘intentionally self-inflicted injury, suicide, or attempted suicide’ does not include injuries that were unintended by the participant, but which were contributed to by alcohol intoxication”); Harrell, 401 F.Supp.2d at 805, 808-13 (rejecting as arbitrary and capricious administrator’s application of exclusion for “intentionally self-inflicted injury” to car crash occurring while insured had a BAC of .17); see also Santaella v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 123 F.3d 456, 465 (7th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). As the Eighth Circuit has noted, “[o]ne
holding that regardless of the subjective belief of the insured the record established a basis to believe that the insured had committed an act that could give rise to a claim under the policy holding that because court had determined that insured died from an accidental overdose of prescription medication plan administrator could not rely upon the intentionally inflicted selfinjury exclusion further noting that the record in that case would not support any determination other than that the insured simply made a fatal mistake holding that despite assurances from the insurance company that the insured could file the pol after femas deadline the insured could not collect because the insured was responsible for timely filing holding that the use of the phrase any insured rather than the insured the same language used in the employers liability exclusion here meant that the exclusion was not limited to injuries sustained by the employees or contractors of one insured party holding a personal profit exclusion applicable to an insured corporation where the purpose of the exclusion was to exclude coverage when the insured received profits to which the insured was not legally entitled