must have an interest apart from the fact of the tradition itself.”); Golinski, 824 F.Supp.2d at 998 (“[T]he argument that the definition of marriage should remain the same for the definition’s sake is a circular argument, not a rational justification.”). Notably, the rationale provided by Defendants as legitimate interests to support Section 32 (procreation, childrearing, and perhaps tradition), is the same rationale that has been uniformly rejected by district courts in the most recent same-sex marriage cases. See, e.g., Bostic, 970 F.Supp.2d at 475, 2014 WL 561978, at *15 (noting that “tradition alone cannot justify denying same-sex couples the right to marry any more than it could justify Virginia’s ban on interracial marriage.”); Bourke, - F.Supp.2d at -, 2014 WL 556729, at *7 (<HOLDING>); Bishop, 962 F.Supp.2d at 1291-92, 2014 WL
holding that parole status alone is insufficient to justify search of a parolee holding that contributory trademark infringement requires some predicate act of infringement holding that prior salary alone without consideration of skill or experience cannot justify pay disparities holding that tradition cannot alone justify the infringement on individual liberties holding that willful copyright infringement alone was enough to establish purposeful availment