dismissed. Carlson v. Metz, supra. Such was the case here, and so the Cobbs’ appeal of the order that sustained the demurrer is timely. In determining whether a cause of action has been stated, the petition is to be construed liberally. If as so construed the petition states a cause of action, a demurrer based on the failure to state a cause of action is to be overruled. Carlson v. Metz, supra; S.I. v. Cutler, 246 Neb. 739, 523 N.W.2d 242 (1994). In their appellate brief, the Cobbs state that their second cause of action asserts sufficient facts to state a claim for breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. Neb. U.C.C. § 2-315 (Reissue 1992) provides and defines such an action, and it states: Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to 320 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. National Sea Products, Ltd., 35
holding the implied warranty is implied in all residential leases in california recognizing implied warranty against latent defects and of fitness of premises for lease purposes holding inter alia defendant breached implied warranty of merchantability where an express warranty regarding safety of goods was printed on package and where goods failed to conform to the express warranty holding implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose cannot lie where goods were subject of gift rather than sale holding that the rule of caveat emptor would no longer be applicable to the sale of a newly constructed house and recognizing an implied warranty of fitness and habitability with regard to such sales