to unanimously conclude that a defendant entered or remained unlawfully in a “building,” and does not have to agree on the specific type of “building,” Washington State second-degree burglary is indivisible under the Descamps second step. As the Washington State definition of second-degree burglary is not a categorical match for “generic” burglary and because the statute is indivisible, second-degree burglary cannot be a predicate “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). 3. Conclusion The Court finds that neither Washington State residential burglary nor second- degree burglary are “crimes of violence” that can be predicate convictions under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2). See, e.g., Mathis v. United States, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 195 L.Ed.2d 604, 2016 WL 3434400 (June 23, 2016) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to habeas
holding that first degree burglary under oregon law is broader than the definition of generic burglary because the statute does not limit burglary to buildings or structures but also includes nonstructures such as booths vehicles boats and aircraft that are regularly or intermittently used as lodgings holding that iowa burglary is not categorical burglary as the elements of iowa burglary law are broader than those of generic burglary holding that possession of burglary tools is an offense separate from burglary holding that virginia burglary statute comes within definition of generic burglary holding that burglary is violent felony