obligated to dismiss pendent state law claims, in the usual case in which the federal-law claim is dismissed before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine — judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity— will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. In such a case, state-law claims should be dismissed. Camegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n. 5, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988); citing Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-727, 86 S.Ct. 1130; see Mercado-García v. Ponce Federal Bank, 979 F.2d 890, 896 (1st Cir.1992); Rivera v. Murphy, 979 F.2d 259, 264 (1st Cir.1992); Figueroa Ruiz v. Alegría, 896 F.2d 645 (1st Cir.1990). Cf. Vega v. Kodak Caribbean, 3 F.3d 476, 478 (1st Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Upon review of the facts before us, the
holding that when original jurisdiction claims are dismissed before trial the district court must decline to exercise jurisdiction over pendent state claims unless there is an affirmative justification for doing so holding that the district court was not divested of subject matter jurisdiction upon the dismissal of the plaintiffs federal claims holding that when the district court disposed of the adea claims the pendent claims became subject to dismissal for want of subject matter jurisdiction holding that a federal court may adjudicate claims for which there is no independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction if the nonjurisdictional claims are related to other claims for which the does have jurisdiction holding that claims under the adea and the nyshrl are subject to the same analysis