that he had changed his mind and wanted to go to trial. England made this decision despite being informed that his trial counsel could not adequately prepare for either the guilt or penalty phases without a continuance and despite the trial court’s repeated admonitions that England should listen to his attorney. After recognizing that it could “stand on ceremony” and find that England had waived his right to a speedy trial because he had signed the motion for continuance, the trial court declined to do so, concluding that it was England’s right to a speedy trial if he wanted one, which he clearly did, despite being informed of the risks. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by giving England the speedy trial he requested. See Curtis v. State, 685 So.2d 1234, 1235-36 (Fla.1996) (<HOLDING>); see also Charlot v. State, 85 So.3d 1176,
holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defense counsels request for a continuance where the informed and knowing defendant remained resolute in his desire for a prompt trial even though his counsel represented that he would be ill prepared holding that trial counsel did not abuse its discretion by denying a continuance where appellant failed to specify the evidence which might have been revealed if the continuance had been granted and counsel had been afforded the opportunity to investigate further holding that the ij did not abuse his discretion in denying request for further continuance where the ij granted previous request holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants motion for a continuance when record showed that contrary to defendants contention state did not fail to comply with discovery duties and that defendant failed to show that denial resulted in harm to his case holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form