record whether Plaintiff received a response to this request or received any medical treatment. Plaintiff alleges that he has not. Based on the foregoing, the court finds that there are genuine issues of material fact and that it cannot conclude as a matter of law that Defendant Shuckrow was not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiffs medical needs. Accordingly, Defendants’s Motion for Summary Judgment on this basis should be denied. As for Defendants Banks and Jackson, Plaintiff alleges that they were made aware of his need for medical attention through the ARP process, but that they failed to do anything. As noted above, it is well-settled that Section 1983 does not “create supervisory or respondeat superior liability.” Oliver, 276 F.3d at 742 & n. 6; see also Thompkins, 828 F.2 00) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the only basis for Plaintiffs medical
holding that the failure of the nondoctor defendantswarden and health services administratorto intervene in the medical treatment of an inmate was not objectively unreasonable even if it were wrongful holding that the due process clause permits the state to involuntarily treat a prison inmate who is seriously mentally ill if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmates medical interest holding that the due process clause permits the state to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmates medical interest holding that the term medical as used in the hearsay exception regarding statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment includes emotional and mental health as well as physical health holding that copyright owners claim was not so objectively unreasonable as to justify an award