False Claims Act claims against this Defendant.” Furthermore, the government was concerned that “a dismissal “with prejudice’ could be interpreted to include the Government and not just the Relator for claim-preclusion purposes.” On November 20, 2001, despite the government’s arguments, the district court entered the consent order as drafted by Lampers’ attorney and approved by Smith. The district court did not issue an opinion. The government timely appealed. Although the government declined to intervene in the action against Lampers, no party disputes that the government has standing to appeal the district court’s final judgment dismissing the case with prejudice over the government’s objection. See Searcy v. Philips Electronics North America Corp., 117 F.3d 154, 158 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); see also Health Possibilities, 207 F.3d at
holding that the government has standing to appeal a district courts dismissal of an fca qui tam action over the governments objection even though the government did not formally intervene in the action holding that private individuals can assert the federal governments interests in a qui tam suit because they have their own pecuniary interest as partial assignees of the governments pecuniary claim holding that an unnamed plaintiff that did not intervene nonetheless had standing to appeal a class action settlement holding an unnamed class member who did not intervene in the action lacked standing to appeal district courts order awarding attorneys fees holding that the district court did not err in instructing the jury not to draw any adverse inferences from the governments failure to call a witness because the witness did not have a relationship with the government such that one would expect him to give testimony in favor of the government