as true and credible the officers’ testimony at the hearing. We believe, however, that the court of appeals has misconstrued the legal significance of the facts as thus construed. Actual Authority On the basis of the testimony elicited during the suppression hearing, the trial court could have found, in support of its ultimate ruling, (1) that Reed was the exclusive owner of the house, (2) that the officers knew that Reed did not “live” or sleep in the room that the appellant inhabited, and (3) that Reed opened the door to the appellant’s bedroom for the officers to search it. The trial court could also have chosen to disbelieve the testimony of the appellant’s girlfriend that Reed was excluded from entering the room without express permission. That Reed did not sle .2d 347, 349 (1981) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. O’Neal, 287 Pa. Super. 238,
holding that a lessee of a home could not consent to a search of a bedroom that was used exclusively by a temporary gratuitous guest because the guest had an expectation of privacy in the bedroom holding that child cannot consent to search of parents bedroom holding that a mother had apparent authority to consent to a search of her adult sons bedroom including a closed vinyl bag found in the bedroom holding that as owner of the residence the grandfather had actual authority to consent to a search of the defendants bedroom because there was no evidence that grandfather lacked authority to enter defendants room and because defendants bedroom did not have a lock or anything restricting access to the room the court found that the grandfather shared common authority over the bedroom holding that a defendants sister could consent to a search of only the common areas of their shared house and her own bedroom and explicitly stating that the sister could not consent to search the defendants bedroom because the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her own bedroom