statute does authorize tribal-state agreements; however, the scope of the statute is confined to “agreements ... with respect to law enforcement.” Id. § 29-8-3. It-is true that the compacts have some provisions regarding law enforcement, but this fact does not bring all of the terms within the scope of the Mutual Aid Act. The authority of an executive acting pursuant to a legislative grant of authority is limited to the express or implied terms of that grant. See Worthington v. Fauver, 88 N.J. 183, 440 A.2d 1128, 1140 (1982). Cf. Rivas v. Board of Cosmetologists, 101 N.M. 592, 593, 686 P.2d 934, 935 (1984) (an executive agency cannot promulgate a regulation that is beyond the scope of its statutory authority); State ex rel. Lee v. Hartman, 69 N.M. 419, 426, 367 P.2d 918, 923 (1961) (<HOLDING>). The Mutual Aid Act does not in any way
holding that a delegation of authority by the legislature must be express and provide clear statutory standards to guide the delegee holding that a statutory right is a creature of the legislature and does not exist where the legislature has not acted recognizing the delegation of authority to the united states attorneys holding the fundamental touchstone is that the will or intent of the legislature must be a pole star to guide us recognizing the medicare statutes broad delegation of authority