require the same proof and level of preparation as those in Premier’s first amended answer. The Sellers’ proposed counterclaims seek much greater and varied damages than Premier’s counterclaims. In addition, the facts underpinning Premier’s counterclaims are distinct from those needed to sustain the Sellers’ proposed counterclaims. To allow the Sellers’ amendments now would unfairly obligate the Buyers to defend against these belated counterclaims, causing them to incur significant additional expenses by extending an already protracted discovery period. Given that the trial of this matter is less than two months away, to allow the proposed amendments at this late stage would impose undue hardship on the Buyers. See, e.g., Serrano Medina v. United States, 709 F.2d 104 (1st Cir. 1983) (<HOLDING>); DeBry v. Transamerica Corp., 601 F.2d 480
holding that erroneous admission of improper and prejudicial evidence did not require reversal because the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty against the defendant even without the prejudicial testimony holding that where a plaintiff is unaware of the identity of alleged defendants plaintiff should be given an opportunity through discovery to identify the unknown defendants unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the identities or that the complaint would be dismissed on other grounds holding that it was within the trial courts discretion to refuse any additional discovery and that the courts refusal to allow additional discovery was not an abuse of discretion holding that entry of summary judgment while a motion for additional discovery was pending should be construed as an implicit denial of the motion for additional discovery holding that an eleventhhour amendment that would require extensive additional discovery would be prejudicial to the defendants