mulch fires on the premises generally. Defendant thus had the obligation to exercise reasonable care to ensure that the fire, or any potential fire created by the dangerous condition, did not spread to the building. There was evidence here that the mulch was up • against the building’s siding and next to the gas meter. Inspector DiFranco testified that the proximity to the gas line caused the fire to spread more quickly. A reasonable jury could have found, based on this evidence and their common knowledge, that it was more likely than not that the proximity of the mulch to the building, which included the gas line, was a cause of the fire spreading and ultimately engulfing the entire building. See Deerfoot Farms, Inc. v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 327 Mass. 51, 54, 96 N.E.2d 872 (1951) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Gates v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 255
holding that the relationship between fire insurance regulation and rating fire loss fire prevention and fire investigation is rational and reasonable holding that the fact that the fire was communicated to other property may reasonably be inferred from common knowledge of the operation of the established laws of nature in the familiar forms of combustion  and the effects of wind on fire  holding where the defendants conduct in setting a fire was a proximate cause of a fire fighters death the death occurred in course of and in furtherance of the arson holding that damage to building and personal property as a result of fire negligently caused by defendant was to be measured by reasonable cash market value of the property at the time it was destroyed by the fire or if it was not totally destroyed by the diminution in its fair market value before and after the fire holding that even without  expert testimony the grand jurors common knowledge of the nature of fire would have allowed them to conclude that a fire spreads and becomes more dangerous the longer it is left unattended