7261. The Court reviews the Secretary’s interpretation of law de novo. See Hatch, supra. After reviewing the Secretary’s analysis of the rating schedule with regard to tinnitus, the Court concludes that he failed to take account of a basic canon of construction, specifically, to look to the plain text of the regulation. “The basic principles that apply to construing statutes apply equally to construing regulations. ‘The starting point in interpreting a statute is its language.’ ” Otero-Castro, supra (quoting Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 409, 113 S.Ct. 2151, 124 L.Ed.2d 368 (1993)) (internal citations omitted). Here, the Secretary’s interpre tation cannot stand because it conflicts with the plain meaning of the regulation. See DeLuca v. Brown, 8 Vet.App 202, 207 (1995) (<HOLDING>) (citing Combee v. Principi, 4 Vet.App 78, 91
holding that bias interpretation of immigration law is entitled to deference except where the interpretation is clearly contrary to the plain and sensible meaning of the statute holding that a secretarys interpretation of a departments regulation is controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation holding interpretation may not be inconsistent with regulation holding that where a regulation could not fairly be read to have spoken at all on an issue an agencys proposed interpretation of the regulation as it pertained to that issue was not a reasonable interpretation of the regulation holding that interpretation of regulation by va that conflicted with plain meaning of regulation not entitled to deference