(kidnapping), with D.C.Code § 22-2801 (2001) (robbery). See also Hanna v. United States, 666 A.2d 845, 855-56 (D.C.1995) (“Kidnapping requires proof that the victim was seized or detained, which [robbery] does not. [Robbery] requires proof that property of value was taken, which kidnapping does not.”). 4 . Compare D.C.Code § 22-2001 (kidnapping), with D.C.Code § 22-3002 (2001) (first-degree séxual abuse), See also Bryant v. United States, 859 A.2d 1093, 1108 (D.C.2004) ("[Detention is not an element of sexual abuse, and each offense has at least one element that the other does not have, thereby precluding merger.”). 5 . Compare D.C.Code § 22-2001 (kidnapping), with D.C.Code § 22-404 (2001) (simple assault). See also (Michael) Robinson v. United States, 50 A.3d 508, 533 (D.C.2012) (<HOLDING>). 6 . The government and appellant Richardson
holding that merger did not apply because sexual assault was not a lesser included offense of seconddegree kidnapping involving sexual assault holding that when regulations are intended to have different purposes and are not dependent on each other they are not intertwined holding that each element required under the act must be included in the written notice and each element must be sufficiently clear and accurate  holding that assault and kidnapping charges do not merge as they are not the same act for purposes of blockburger  and as each required proof of an element the other did not holding that neglect was not excusable where the defendants did not do all that they were required to do after they received the summons and complaint in that they did not contact a lawyer or make any other arrangements with respect to their defense