defects in the proceedings below. See, e.g., United States v. Miramon-tez, 995 F.2d 56, 60 (5th Cir.1993); Nelson v. Hargett, 989 F.2d 847, 850 (5th Cir.1993). Nonetheless, in this particular context, where intervening law has established that a defendant’s actions do not constitute a crime and thus that the defendant is actually innocent of the charged offense, application of this rule is misplaced. We have previously permitted attacks on guilty pleas on the basis of intervening decisions modifying the substantive criminal law defining the offense. See, e.g., United States v. Knowles, 29 F.3d 947 (5th Cir.1994) (vacating conviction under Gun Free School Zones Act following circuit decision striking law as unconstitutional); United States v. Presley, 478 F.2d 163 (5th Cir.1973) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Lucia, 423 F.2d 697
holding the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendants motion to withdraw his guilty plea because the defendant did not admit to facts demonstrating the required mental state holding that if a plea agreement is breached the district court may either grant specific performance or allow the defendant to withdraw the plea holding that district court abused discretion in denying motion to withdraw plea based on intervening supreme court decision that may have rendered factual basis of plea insufficient holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to withdraw guilty plea filed three weeks after entering the plea holding that based on the facts presented by the state and the defendants stipulation to the existence of a factual basis for his plea the court properly determined a factual basis for the plea existed