by deed, as in Hanson. In other words, in the state’s view, an acquisition of access to a public highway is simply a way by which the state regulates public highways, and results in a compensable taking only if it results in a total loss of economic value and viable use of the property. Respectfully, the state’s argument confuses the state’s power of eminent domain, through which the state acquires a property owner’s interest, with the state’s regulatory power, through which the state regulates highways for the public safety. In the regulatory context, it is well established that no compensation is due when the government undertakes to regulate an abutting property owner’s access, unless the owner’s loss of use of the property is virtually total. See, e.g., Schrunk, 242 Or at 68-70 (<HOLDING>); Barrett et al. v. Union Bridge Co., 117 Or
holding that a breach of contract action by the department of health for the commonwealth of puerto rico did not qualify as an exercise of police or regulatory power even if related to the departments general regulatory power holding in declaratory judgment proceeding that citys denial of property owners application for access to parking lot from street designated as 24hour bus loading zone was a reasonable exercise of regulatory power and not a taking holding that denial of access to carbon paper and reproduction equipment and denial of facetoface access to other inmates did not deprive an inmate of his right of access to the courts holding that inverse condemnation claim challenging as a regulatory taking the states placement of a guard rail that blocked former access was not ripe for adjudication where owners had failed to apply for permit for alternative approach and it therefore was not possible to assess whether a taking had occurred as a result of a deprivation of all reasonable access holding in an inverse condemnation case that the abutting landowners right of direct access was subservient to the city of portlands proper exercise of its governmental powers for purposes of public safety and convenience and that the elimination of access from the landowners property to the affected street did not constitute a taking