time of the full or partial satisfaction of the penalty or costs. On the other hand, the respondent contends that the “judgment” contemplated by the rule does not require a final judgment, but only a judgment for costs. Having determined, supra, that “judgment,” as used in Rule 37 to determine when a trial de novo can be taken, means a final judgment where sentence is imposed, it is axiomatic that the waiver envisioned by Rule 37.71(b) would not occur unless the right to a trial de novo had already accrued, or in other words, final judgment of conviction had already been entered at the time of full or partial satisfaction of the penalty or costs. This is so in that to hold otherwise would violate due process in the case of a SIS. See State v. Gollaher, 905 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Mo.App.1995) (<HOLDING>). In the case of a SIS, where by definition no
holding that to declare a denial of due process we must find a denial of fundamental fairness holding that denial of amendment is within discretion of trial court holding that the denial of counsel to a father at a shelter hearing constituted a denial of due process renewable by certiorari holding that a denial of due process warrants mandamus relief holding that the denial of due process in a particular case is subject to harmless error analysis