McIntyre did not even attempt to seek more time raises an inference that he did not feel unduly rushed in entering the plea agreement. When considered as a whole, the factors set forth in Haygood indicate that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying McIntyre’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. His motion was filed more than seven weeks after his change of plea, McIntyre had extensive experience with the criminal-justice system and had in fact pled guilty before, he had a reasonably high level of education, and he had significant time to understand the charges he was facing. Under these circumstances, McIntyre is unable to show that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion. See Pressman v. Franklin Nat’l Bank, 384 F.3d 182, 187 (6th Cir. 2004) (<HOLDING>). C. McIntyre’s waiver of his right to appeal
recognizing that we review a trial courts jury instruc tions for abuse of discretion and that a district court abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law internal quotation marks omitted holding that the district court should be reversed for abusing its discretion only if we are firmly convinced of a mistake that affects substantial rights citation and internal quotation marks omitted recognizing that absent illegality we do not weigh the wisdom of any particular employment decision internal quotation marks and citation omitted holding that apprendi error is harmless if the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the result would have been the same absent the error internal quotation marks and citation omitted recognizing that the declaratory judgment act is only procedural and does not create substantive rights internal quotation marks and citations omitted