restraint in doing just that. 4. Excessive Hours Defendant contends that certain hours spent by Plaintiffs counsel were excessive. Specifically, Defendant asserts that nineteen hours in preparat t part of the case that presents a potential alternative to unnecessary litigation. See Wolk v. Saks Fifth Ave., 728 F.2d 221, 224 (3d Cir.1984) (articulating “[t]he PHRA embodies a discrete, comprehensive administrative procedure, including conciliation and negotiation.”); see also Tlush v. Mfrs. Res. Ctr., Civ. A. No. 02-235, 2002 WL 1748194, *3-5, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13726, at *11-16 (E.D.Pa. July 24, 2002) (discussing importance of administrative remedies for PHRA and ADEA claims). This time (7.6 hours) spent by counsel with his client included the sp., 49 F.3d 939, 942 (3d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). To the extent that these tasks were performed
holding that bia error is harmless when it is highly probable that error did not affect cases outcome holding it is not appropriate to allow the wasteful use of highly skilled and highly priced talent for matters easily delegable to nonprofessionals holding that police officers are not members of highly regulated industry holding that while an informants veracity is highly relevant to the existence of probable cause it is only one part of the larger commonsense determination holding that an error is harmless where it is highly probably that the error did not affect the outcome of the case