argument that Johnson is making here. See Tigner v. Cockrell, 264 F.3d 521, 526-27 (5th Cir.2001) (“We decline Tigner’s invitation to undercut Barefoot, because to do so on collateral review would constitute a new rule in violation of Teague’s non-retroactivity principle”); see also Little v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 855, 862-63 (5th Cir.1998). In addition, the Texas courts have repeatedly found psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness to be admissible. Fuller v. State, 829 S.W.2d 191, 195 n. 1 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (“Indeed, we have even held, without dissent, that objection to Dr. Grigson’s expert testimony on this issue ‘would amount to a futile act.’ ”), overruled on other grounds by Castillo v. State, 913 S.W.2d 529 (1995); Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549, 560-62 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by State v.
holding future dangerousness expert testimony to be admissible holding that under fedrevid 702 expert testimony must be reliable to be admissible holding that an expert witnesss testimony on an ultimate issue was admissible recognizing that the expert did not specifically testify that the defendant was guilty or that as a matter of law the facts satisfied the applicable legal standard holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive holding expert testimony remedies speculation by the court