forcible sexual abuse fits within the definition of an offense “that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used.” 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). Our initial step in that determination is to ascertain the appropriate level of generality at which we assess “substantial risk.” Specifically, we must determine whether we consider, for purposes of assessing substantial risk under § 16(b), only the offense as defined by state law, or whether we can take into account the particular conduct alleged. A We conclude that the language of 18 U.S.C. § 16 and our precedents require that the crime of violence analysis be conducted at the level of the statutory definition. See United States v. Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d 377, 379 (10th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>) (citing United States v. Rodriguez, 979 F.2d
holding that a court must only look to the statutory definition not the underlying circumstances of the crime to determine whether a given offense is by its nature a crime of violence for purposes of 18 usc  16 holding that courts should look to the statutory definition of the crime charged rather than the actual facts of the individuals prior conviction to determine whether the crime qualifies as a violent felony under the acca holding that the categorical approach applies to the identical definition of crime of violence in 18 usc  16 holding that once the statute is found to be divisible the court must look to the charging papers and judgment of conviction to determine if the actual crime of which defendant was convicted was a crime of violence but emphasizing that the court is not to examine the particular facts underlying the conviction holding that sexual assault of a child qualified as crime of violence under 18 usc  16