economic harm. As the BIA noted, evidence in the record indicated that the severity of any fine would be significantly mitigated by Yang’s ability to pay it in installments. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (“The Board may review questions of law ... de novo”). Accordingly, the BIA did not err in concluding that Yang failed to show a well-founded fear of economic persecution. Furthermore, although Yang continues to maintain, contrary to the IJ’s finding, that she risks sterilization upon her return to China, the record does not compel that conclusion. II. Motion to Reopen The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Yang’s motion to reopen based on her failure to establish prima facie eligibility for relief. See INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir.2005)
recognizing that in an untimely motion to reopen based on changed country conditions the movant must submit previously unavailable evidence demonstrating his prima facie eligibility for relief recognizing that failure to offer evidence establishing a prima facie case for the underlying substantive relief sought is a proper ground for denying a motion to reopen holding that a movants failure to establish a prima facie case for the underlying substantive relief is a proper ground for the bia to deny a motion to reopen holding that the bia may deny a motion to reopen on the ground that the movant has not established prima facie eligibility for the underlying relief sought recognizing that failure to offer new previously unavailable evidence establishing a prima facie case for the underlying relief sought is a proper ground on which the bia may deny a motion to reopen