Standish, 2008 ME 23, ¶ 7, 940 A.2d 1097. Under its umbrella are two applications: issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, and claim preclusion. Guardianship of Jewel M., 2010 ME 80, ¶ 39, 2 A.3d 301. Here, Pearson contends that Wendell should have been collaterally estopped from presenting evidence about fac December 2014, none of the prior orders constituted a final judgment. Although the March 2013 order was originally issued as a final judgment on the grant of the divorce itself , and on parental rights and responsibilities, the nature and effect of that order changed in March 2014 when, with the parties’agreement, the court vacated the judgment and correctly recharacterized it, and all subsequent orders, as interim orders. See Gulesian v. Gulesian, 377 A.2d 119, 120 (Me.1977) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the doctrine of collateral
holding that because trial courts order did not dispose of the defendants counterclaim that order was not a final judgment that would support an appeal holding property settlement to be contractual obligation from date of final judgment of divorce holding that an order not denominated a judgment is not final for purposes of appeal holding that an order authorizing a sale is a final judgment holding that an order pending divorce is not a final judgment that creates a right of appeal