approval of the court, compromise any controversy arising in the administration of the estate upon such terms as he may deem for the best interest of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 50 (1976). In light of its relationship to Section 27, former Rule 919 was widely construed as mandatory: it conditioned the trustee’s compromise or settlement on court approval. See In re W. T. Grant Co., 4 B.R. 53, 69 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980) (“The authority of a trustee to compromise and settle controversies relating to the administration of a bankrupt estate is proscribed only by the requirement that the compromise be ‘with the approval of the court.’ ” (emphasis added) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 50 and citing former Bankruptcy Rule 919(a))); see also, e.g., In re Lloyd, Carr & Co., 617 F.2d 882, 885 (1st Cir. 1980) (<HOLDING>). The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 9019(a)
holding that voting agreement that did not comply with certain notice requirements of the act was enforceable because all of the shareholders knew of the agreement and participated in the transaction in question holding that the plaintiffs motion for extension of time to file appeal qualified as a notice of appeal because it met the requirements of rule 4 of the federal rules of appellate procedure holding that requirements of apprendi were not met where facts on which sentence enhancement was based were not charged and submitted to the jury holding that an agreement was not enforceable as a section 27 compromise because the notice requirements of rule 919a  were not met holding that an arbitration agreement that was invalid due to unconscionability was not enforceable