Plaintiffs satisfied those standards — the questions to which we now turn. A. The Supreme Court long has required that a plaintiff seeking relief under the Equal Protection Clause to establish that a challenged official action can “be traced to a ... discriminatory purpose.” Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976). The discriminatory purpose or intent requirement extends to Equal Protection challenges to redistricting plans, in particular, including partisan gerrymandering challenges. See, e.g., Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 127, 106 S.Ct. 2797 (plurality op.); id. at 161, 106 S.Ct. 2797 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617, 102 S.Ct. 3272, 73 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1982); see also Cooper, 137 S.Ct. at 1463 (<HOLDING>). ■ To establish a discriminatory purpose or
holding that to establish a prima facie equal pay act claim the plaintiff must show that the jobs being compared are substantially equal holding to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination a plaintiff must show he 1 holding that the equal protection clause forbids the prosecution from challenging potential jurors solely on the basis of race or assumptions drawn from their race holding that to establish a racial gerrymandering claim under the equal protection clause a plaintiff must show that race was the predominant factor motivating the legislatures decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause