Lederman, Michael Levin, Hannah Levin and Irving Carpman. Reversed and remanded as to appellant, Jacques Aghion. WELLS, C.J., concurs. 1 . We reject the other points Aghion raises on appeal as having no merit. 2 . We decline to address whether Aghion, in fact, did receive notice of trial as this is a matter to be determined at an evidentiary hearing by the trial court. See Richardson v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 941 So.2d 435 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); Scott v. Johnson, 386 So.2d 67 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (<HOLDING>). SHEPHERD, J., concurring in part, and
holding that appellants specific factual denial of receipt was sufficient evidence to defeat the presumption of receipt raised by a docket entry showing mailing holding that denial of receipt of notice of trial did not rebut presumption of trial courts certificate of mailing of notice requiring an evidentiary hearing holding that upon receipt of the important notice a conclusive presumption of notice was established holding that mailing a copy of a notice of appeal that was filed in the trial court to the city law director does not constitute filing the notice of appeal with the city board of zoning appeals holding that claimants statement that she did not recall receiving the notice of indebtedness did not constitute clear evidence to rebut the presumption that notice was properly sent