application. See, e.g,, Lalla v. Calamar, N.V., 08-0952, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir 2/11/09), 5 So.3d 927, 931. Here we find it appropriate to exercise our supervisory jurisdiction because, as we explain in Part V-A, post, there are no genuine issues of material fact, and our review will terminate the action at least as to ohe of the parties. Cf. Whitney Nat. Bank v. Rockwell, 94-3049, p. 6 (La.10/16/95), 661 So.2d 1325, 1329 n. 3 (“when (1) there is no dispute of material fact, (2) the ruling of the trial court appears incorrect, and (3) a reversal would terminate the litigation as to at least one party, the intermediate court should review the merits of the application for supervisory writs”); cf. also Herlitz Const. Co., Inc. v. Hotel Investors of New Iberia, Inc., 396 So.2d 878 (La.1981) (<HOLDING>). The primary con sideration of these Herlitz
recognizing that in those cases where the jurisdictional facts are intertwined with the facts central to the merits of the dispute it is the better view that  the entire factual dispute is appropriately resolved only by a proceeding on the merits citations omitted holding judicial efficiency and fundamental fairness to the litigants dictates that the merits of the application for supervisory writs should be decided when the judgment is arguably incorrect a reversal will terminate the litigation and there is no factual dispute to be resolved holding that where no factual dispute is raised no hearing is required holding that because there was no factual dispute between the parties the presumption of correctness is not relevant holding that the trial court did not need to conduct an evidentiary hearing when the dispute could be resolved as a matter of law