presented expert testimony describing the value to consumers of disclosing dollar differential between modes and their interest equivalents. This evidence is sufficient to support a presumption that the undisclosed matter would be important to the reasonable insured. Thus, in eases involving primarily a failure to disclose, it is unnecessary to provide positive proof of reliance, or, in Kemper’s formulation, that it “mattered.” Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54, 92 S.Ct. 1456, 31 L.Ed.2d 741 (1972) (applying federal securities statute); In re Great S. Life Ins. Co. Sales Practices Litig., 192 F.R.D. at 220; Steiner v. Southmark Corp., 734 F.Supp. 269, 272 (N.D.Tex. 1990); Rael v. Am. Estate Life Ins. Co., 79 N.M. 379, 382, 444 P.2d 290, 293 (1968) (<HOLDING>); Cope, 696 N.E.2d at 1008. C. Conflict of Laws
holding that in light of evidence that the insurer would have denied coverage even if it had received suit papers on a timely basis the insurer could not show prejudice holding that court of appeals was without jurisdiction to modify judgment against insurer because judgment against insurer became final when it failed to appeal holding that an insurer can deny benefits based on late notice by the insured only when the insurer is prejudiced by the delay holding that materiality of medical information withheld from insurer could be presumed material to insurer holding that insured may recover attorneys fees from insurer where insurer acts in bad faith