AGPI/Lynxus in the press releases, the two companies were new, small and related to each other. Such characteristics would tend to undermine the investor’s impression of the solidity of the new contracts and would imply instead that IPax-ess had embarked on a speculative venture. The omission of those facts was material to a reasonable investor’s appreciation of the implications of the deals for IPaxess’s bottom line. Finally, while the defendants characterize some of the statements in these two releases as “forward-looking” and subject to the PSLRA’s safe harbor provision because of the releases’ cautionary language, they acknowledge that the facts concerning the contracts are not forward-looking predictions. See Griffin v. GK Intelligent Systems, Inc., 87 F.Supp.2d 684 (S.D.Tex.1999) (<HOLDING>). Our analysis is independent of the statements
holding that the defendants announcement that it had entered into a threeyear agreement from which it expected to realize 12 million in revenues referred to thenpresent factual conditions and thus did not fall within the safeharbor provision of the pslra holding that congress intended for complaints under the pslra to stand or fall based on the actual knowledge of the plaintiffs rather than information produced by the defendants after the action has been filed holding that a provision of the constitution is to be construed in the sense in which it was understood by the framers and the people at the time of its adoption but that if new products or circumstances that did not exist at the time the constitutional provision was enacted fall within the meaning of the provision the constitutional provision applies to them holding that defendants testimony that he did not see a provision in the agreement because the plaintiffcounterparty failed to direct him to the provision was insufficient as a matter of law to establish fraud and defendant was therefore bound to the terms of the provision holding that it is not