statements. Kotz v. Imperial Capital Bank, 319 S.W.3d 54, 56-57 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2010, no pet.). Mere recitals regarding harm are insufficient. See AutoNation, Inc. v. Hatfield, 186 S.W.3d 576, 581 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). Here, the only part of the September 1, 2011 temporary-injunction order that can be construed as setting forth the reasons for its issuance reads as follows: “The Court finds ... Plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury for which he has no legal remedy if this injunction is not granted.” A statement indicating only that a plaintiff will “suffer irreparable injury for which he has no legal remedy” if injunctive relief is not granted does not comply with the specificity requirements of Rule 683. See, e.g., El Tacaso, 356 S.W.3d at 747 (<HOLDING>); Kotz, 319 S.W.3d at 56-57 (holding that an
holding that the relevant inquiry when assessing irreparable injury is whether there is an adequate remedy in the absence of an injunction holding that likelihood of irreparable harm must be based on evidence in the record not unsupported and conclusory statements regarding harm the plaintiff might suffer holding that temporaryinjunction orders simple recitation of conclusory statement that plaintiff will suffer an irreparable injury for which it has no other adequate legal remedy does not satisfy rule 683s requirement that a temporary injunction order specify reasons why plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law holding that trial court erred in granting ex parte temporary injunction prohibiting marketing activities of defendant company because there had been no showing that plaintiff company would likely suffer irreparable harm or lacked an adequate remedy at law holding that a movant for a preliminary injunction must first demonstrate that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the requested relief