Act (“PLRA”) provides: “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2006). The United States Supreme Court and the Third Circuit repeatedly have held that this provision means what it says. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) (“[W]e hold that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.”); Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 227, 230 (3d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65 (3d Cir.2000)
holding that the plras exhaustion requirement contains a procedural default component recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different holding in addition that  1997eas exhaustion requirement includes a procedural default component holding that section 1252d effects a statutory exhaustion requirement which accordingly precludes any common law exceptions for procedural default holding that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim alleged to be cause for the procedural default of other claims is itself an independent claim subject to the procedural requirements of exhaustion