the judgment-occurred on March 21, 2000. Kouabo did not sue on his FDCPA claim until March 10, 2003, nearly three years later. His FDCPA claim is, accordingly, time-barred. Defendant’s Motions for Summary Judgment will be GRANTED as to this claim. The Court turns to Kouabo’s MCDCA claim. Section 14-202 of the MCDCA states that “[i]n collecting or attempting to collect alleged debt, a collector may not... (8) claim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a right with knowledge that the right does not exist.” Md.Code Ann., Comm. Law § 14-202(8) [Emphasis Added]. This has been held to mean that a party may not attempt to enforce a right with actual knowledge or with reckless disregard as to the falsity of the existence of the right. Spencer v. Hendersen-Webb, Inc., 81 F.Supp.2d 582 (D.Md.1999) (<HOLDING>). Is there evidence that Chevy Chase or the
recognizing that duty to warn of dangerous conditions could be based on constructive knowledge of that condition as well as actual knowledge holding that the knowledge required by  14202 of the mcdca refers to actual knowledge or reckless disregard as to the falsity of the information or the existence of the right holding that the knowledge requisite to knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as distinguished from knowledge of the law holding that knowledge possessed by officials of the united states may be highly relevant such knowledge may show that the defendant did not submit its claim in deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard of the truth recognizing that a defendant acts with reckless disregard when he displays a high degree of awareness of  probable falsity