and I cannot concur in a refusal to consider the viability of that ground based upon the unnecessary statement in Greene that there are no permissible non-statutory bases for vacating an arbitration award. The “manifest disregard of the law” principle stems from the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U. S. 427, 436 (74 SC 182, 98 LE2d 168) (1953), overruled on other grounds, Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U. S. 477, 485 (III) (109 SC 1917, 104 LE2d 526) (1989), indicating that, although the arbitrator’s erroneous interpretation of the law would not subject an award to reversal, his or her clear disregard of the law would. See also First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 514 U. S. 938, 942 (II) (115 SC 1920, 131 LE2d 985) (1995) (<HOLDING>). Since then, it appears that all of the
holding that an award of arbitration cannot be set aside for mere errors of judgment either as to the law or the facts if the award is within the scope of the submission and the arbitrators are not guilty  of the acts of misconduct set forth in the statute the award operates as a final and conclusive judgment and  however disappointing it may be  the parties must abide by it holding that manifest disregard of the law is one of the very unusual circumstances in which a federal court can set aside an arbitration award recognizing that a trial court can set aside verdict holding that errors of law without accompanying fraud or misconduct not enough to set aside arbitration award holding that the court may set aside agency action only in extremely limited circumstances