to his or her immediate supervisor or pursuant to a clear duty to report imposed by law or employer policy, he or she is speaking as an employee and not as a citizen.” 489 F.Supp.2d at 219 (citing Spiegla v. Hull, 481 F.3d 961 (7th Cir.2007); Casey v. West Las Vegas Indep. Sch. Dist., 473 F.3d 1323 (10th Cir.2007); Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528 (9th Cir.2006); and Mills v. City of Evansville, 452 F.3d 646 (7th Cir.2006)). Other cases read Garcetti even more broadly. See, e.g., Bivens v. Trent, 591 F.3d 555, 560 (7th Cir.2010) (“[U]nder Garcetti it is clear that the complaints about lead contamination that Bivens made directly up the chain of command to his supervisors are not protected by the First Amendment.”); Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 693 (5th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). The Second Circuit did not address Judge
holding that a transfer of job duties can constitute an adverse employment action holding that a change in job duties was not an adverse employment action where the new job duties did not constitute qualitatively inferior work requiring any less skill or knowledge holding that garcetti barred claims involving speech not necessarily required by the plaintiffs job duties but nevertheless  related to his job duties holding that under the first amendment speech can be pursuant to a public employees official job duties even though it is not required by or included in the employees job description or in response to a request by the employer holding that pursuant to garcetti plaintiffs speech made in the course of his official duties was unprotected as a matter of law