within the contemplation of the Jones Act if the structure “is in actual navigation or transit” at the time an injury occurred. Di-Giovanni, 959 F.2d at 1123. The facts of this ease, however, do not bring the appellant within the contours of this exception. First and foremost, the appellant’s status as a seaman depends upon the movement vel non of the SUPER SCOOP, not the incidental positioning of an appurtenant scow. The determinative factor in this equation is that the appellant was assigned permanently to (i.e., was part of the crew of) the SUPER SCOOP, not Scow No. 4. See Bennett, 510 F.2d at 116— 17. And by his own admission, the SUPER SCOOP was not in motion when the accident occurred. Thus, the fact that'the scow was being moved is irrelevant. See DiGiovanni, 959 F.2d at 1124 (<HOLDING>). The DiGiovanni exception does not obtain. In
holding claimant was simply not engaged in a transaction oriented to the use of the covered auto at the time of the accident holding that a simulation of an accident did not meet the fit requirement because the conditions of the simulation were far different from those existing at the time of the accident holding that the allterrain vehicle being operated by michael pirrung was on an insured location at the time of his fatal accident holding that the plaintiffs location on the supply barge at the time of the accident did not alter his status holding that probable cause was clearly present justifying the taking of a blood sample without the defendants consent when it was established that the defendant was involved in an automobile accident and the police noticed liquor on his breath at the scene of the accident and at the hospital