or outrageous conduct by an officer is not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment if it does not involve a seizure.” (alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)), and Carter v. Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328, 1332 (7th Cir.1992) (“[P]re-seizure conduct is not subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny”), with Sledd v. Lindsay, 102 F.3d 282, 288 (7th Cir.1996) (noting that if an officer fails to identify himself the normal rules governing the use of deadly force are modified, and discussing the Sixth Circuit’s determination that an officer violates the Fourth Amendment if he “unreasonably create[s an] encounter that [leads] to a use of force” by “entering a private residence late at night with no indication of identity”), and Estate of Starks v. Enyart, 5 F.3d 230, 234 (7th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); see also Aaron Kimber, Note, Righteous
holding that an officer cannot use deadly force unless a suspect poses an imminent threat of serious physical harm holding that an officer violates the fourth amendment if he unreasonably creates an encounter in which an individual would be unable to react in order to avoid presenting a deadly threat to the officer holding the use of deadly force is constitutionally permissible only if the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm either to the officer or to others holding that an arrest made by an officer outside his jurisdiction does not violate the fourth amendment holding that the encounter between an officer and the defendant did not rise to the level of a terry stop until the defendant gave the officer his license and the officer informed the defendant that he was going to be given a patdown