was a restraint on Bennett’s liberty to which Bennett complied by moving away from the kitchen where the officers with guns drawn were located, and towards the back of the Be-dard residence. Assuming that the pointing of firearms at Bennett amounted to a seizure of his person, see U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (listing “the display of a weapon by an officer” as an example of a circumstance that may indicate a seizure by means of a “show of authority”), we need not decide whether such seizure was carried out with a reasonable amount of force for purposes of the Fourth Amendment because we find that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity under the third prong of the Saucier analysis. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (<HOLDING>). Based on “those objective facts known to (or
holding that exhaustion requirement applies to excessive force claims holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim holding that excessive force claims are not subject to exhaustion requirement holding that excessive force claims are to be treated under the fourth amendment