court summarily denied one claim and summarily dismissed the remaining claims as facially insufficient. The order stated that Brigham could amend the facially insufficient claims. The order did not specify a deadline within which to file the amended motion. Approximately a year later, Brigham, through counsel, filed his amended motion. The postconviction court dismissed Brigham’s amended motion as untimely because it was filed more than two years after his judgment and sentence became final. However, because the postconviction court’s February 1, 2005, order gave leave to amend and did not place a deadline on when Brigham could refile his motion, the court erred in dismissing the amended rule 3.850 motion as untimely. See Jumper v. State, 903 So.2d 264, 265-66 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (<HOLDING>); see also Mendes v. State, 770 So.2d 202 (Fla.
holding that defendants 3850 motion for postconviction relief was procedurally barred as successive where the defendants current rule 3850 motion is one that could have or should have been raised in his first rule 3850 motion holding that claims raised on direct appeal are procedurally barred from consideration in a rule 3850 motion holding defendant was not barred from raising sentencing issue in rule 3850 motion by virtue of prior rule 3850 motion which did not raise any sentencing issues holding that an involuntary plea claim is cognizable in a rule 3850 motion holding that rule 3850 motion was not time barred where the order did not place any time limitation on when the defendant would refile his rule 3850 motion