user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller or lessor is engaged in the business of selling or leasing such product, and (b) the product is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in its condition after it is sold or leased. Id. at 75, 470 P.2d at 243 (emphasis added). The Stewart court explained that it “essentially” adopted the rule in Restatement (Second) of Torts (hereinafter Restatement (Second)) § 402A (1977). Stewart, 52 Haw. at 75, 470 P.2d at 243. We initially note that, notwithstanding its obvious significance in the rule pronounced in Stewart, the issue of substantial change does not apply in every case. With respect to newer products, for example, the issue hardly arises. See, e.g., id., 52 Haw. at 78-79, 470 P.2d at 244-45 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the issue has limited significance
recognizing that a motion for directed verdict should be granted when there is no reasonable evidence upon which a jury could legally predicate a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party holding that the trial court erred in granting the school boards posttrial motion for directed verdict because although the school board timely moved for a directed verdict during trial it did not serve its motion for directed verdict until the eleventh day after the verdict holding that given the relatively unused condition of the car there was sufficient evidence to withstand a directed verdict in favor of the manufacturer and distributor holding that a directed verdict in defendants favor was appropriate where plaintiff s expert was able to state his opinion regarding the cause of plaintiffs injuries only in terms of possibility but not of probability holding that an appellate court viewing the evidence and all inferences of fact in light most favorable to nonmoving party can affirm a directed verdict only where no proper view of the evidence could sustain a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party