similarly relieved the state of its constitutional burden to prove all elements of the offense beyond a rea that he never was at the scene of the crime and that Adams’ testimony was unreliable. This defense was rejected by the jury and, under the challenged instructions, the verdict represents a finding that Willard had knowledge of the gunman’s unlawful purpose and that he was present at the robbery and aided, promoted, encouraged or instigated it. In our view, the jury could not have found these elements of the crime without also finding that Willard had the intent of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the crime. Failure to instruct on the need for specific intent was, thus, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf Rose v. Clark, — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Although Willard did raise the issue of
holding blakely errors are subject to harmless error analysis holding trial errors are subject to a harmless error analysis holding that harmless error analysis applies to sandstrom mandatory presumption errors holding that instructional errors that are trial errors are subject to harmless error analysis holding that confronta tion clause errors were subject to harmless error analysis