also Ovalle, 136 F.3d at 1100-01; Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991)). The rare “third-party standing” exception to this requirement allows federal courts to hear cases in which a plaintiff can “show that (1) it has suffered an injury in fact; (2) it has a close relationship to the third party; and (3) there is some hindrance to the third party’s ability to pro of “the independent action of some third party not before the court,” the plaintiff generally lacks standing to seek its redress. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976); see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130; Shearson v. Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 592 (6th Cir. 2013); Ammex, Inc. v. United States, 367 F.3d 530, 533 (6th Cir. 2004) (<HOLDING>). Neither is injury caused by market conditions
holding that the legal incidence of the kansas fuel tax falls on the distributor holding that a faa certificate was not dispositive as to whether an airline operated on an established line for purposes of the excise tax exemption holding that a retailer lacked standing to challenge a federal excise tax assessed against a thirdparty fuel supplier even where the retailer was required by contract to pay the supplier an amount equal to the excise tax upfront at the time of purchase since the alleged injury  in the form of increased fuel costs was not occasionedby the government holding that constitutional challenge to controlled substance excise tax must pursue administrative routes followed by appeal in tax court holding that the legal incidence of the kansas fuel tax falls on distributors not retailers