individually, to her late husband’s claims; she cannot be an heir to her own claims”). There is no provision in the agreement stating that Garcia, on behalf of her children, was agreeing to submit the children’s claims to arbitration. Garcia did not sign the agreement on behalf of the children or as representative of the children. Accordingly, the children are not bound by the express terms of the agreement. See Fleetwood Enter., Inc., 280 F.3d at 1074; see also Fortune v. Killebrew, 86 Tex. 172, 175, 23 S.W. 976, 977 (1893) (“But [the children] did not sign; and, as we have seen, their father having an adverse interest, had no authority to sign [the arbitration agreement] for them as their guardian.”); Snow v. Walker, 42 Tex. 154, 156, 1875 WL 7396, 1874 Tex. LEXIS 288, *4-*5 (1874) (<HOLDING>). Relators argue that Garcia exercised her
holding that mothers agreement to arbitrate matters concerning an estate in which the mother and her minor children had a common interest did not estop the minors from asserting claim to the estate holding that an agreement between a mother and father to waive payment of child support and arrearages in exchange for fathers consent to the adoption of the minor children by the mothers husband was invalid because it violated public policy holding birth mothers samesex partner was a presumed mother    because she received the children into her home and openly held them out as her natural children holding that for estate tax purposes property is to be valued as it exists in the hands of the estate holding that a legal malpractice claim arising from errors by an attorney in rendering estateplanning services is properly brought by the personal representative of the estate when excess estate taxes are paid by the estate in contravention of the decedents intended estate plan