similar to, but intersects with, the [Equal Employment Opportunity Act] provision directly addressed in Irwin.” Nunnally v. Mac-Causland, 996 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1993); see also id. at 3 n. 3 (explaining that the “interdependence of the two statutes is rooted in their histories”). The First Circuit saw “no principled reason for failing to extend Irwin’s rebuttable presumption” to § 7703(b)(2). Id. at 3. Two other circuits have similarly concluded that the period of limitation in § 7703(b)(2) of the CSRA is subject to equitable tolling. See Blaney v. United States, 34 F.3d 509, 512-13 (7th Cir.1994) (stating that “a time limit like the one in § 7703(b)(2) is not jurisdictional,” but providing no analysis); Williams-Scaife v. Dep’t of Def. Dependent Sch., 925 F.2d 346, 348 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Standing alone is the Sixth Circuit, which
holding that irwin overruled all prior ninth circuit cases that denied equitable tolling under statutes and regulations relating to federal employee discrimination suits including one which had denied tolling under  7703b2 holding title vii subject to equitable tolling holding that the 120day filing period is subject to equitable tolling and addressing circumstances warranting equitable tolling holding that  2244d is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases holding that equitable tolling under  2255 would be allowed if at all only for extraordinary circumstances