factor were improper, the trial court properly informed the jury that “[a]ny evidence of actions taken by the defendant to conceal the murder itself cannot be used to prove this aggravating factor.” See supra Part XI.C. Furthermore, the trial court correctly defined the elements of each of the charged aggravating factors and informed the jury it was not bound by any conclusions that it reached in the guilt phase. The court’s instructions, when viewed against the background of the prosecutor’s summation, sufficiently informed the jury of the evidence concerning the aggravating factors. The photographs of the crime scene and of the victim’s body were properly submitted to the penalty-phase jury as relevant to the c(4)(c) inquiry. See Moore, supra, 122 N.J. at 469, 585 A.2d 864 (<HOLDING>); Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 182, 548 A.2d 887
holding that mental health evidence could be mitigating at the penalty phase even though it is insufficient to establish a legal defense to conviction in the guilty phase holding that for habeas relief to be granted based on constitutional error in capital penalty phase error must have had substantial and injurious effect on the jurys verdict in the penalty phase recognizing trial courts discretion in weighing the allegedlyimproper prejudicial aspects of photographs of victims against the photographs probative value holding that trial court had discretion to admit relevant photographs in penalty phase holding the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting several photographs of a murder victims body