bars any claims for violations occurring before December 24, 2006, two years before the Complaint was filed. AFSA’s Motion to Dismiss the § 1030(a)(2) claim will be granted. It is undisputed that AFSA itself never went beyond the areas that StateScape authorized AFSA to access. Rather, StateScape alleges that AFSA was “without authorization” because it breached its contract with StateScape in which it agreed to provide access to StateScape’s services only to AFSA members. In its opposition to AFSA’s Motion to Dismiss, StateScape relies on case law holding that employees who use their employers’ computers to pass information to competitors act “without authorization.” See, e.g., Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F.Supp.2d 1121, 1125 (E.D.Wash.2000) (<HOLDING>). These cases, however, are distinguishable
holding that even when employee was driving employers vehicle employee was not acting within the scope of his employment absent evidence that he had undertaken a special mission at his employers direction holding that when an employee is injured by his employers tortious conduct his employer owes him damages and compensation under the act holding that an employee who by virtue of his employment was authorized to access his employers computers became without authorization when he became an agent for the defendant one of his employers competitors to whom he sent emails containing his employers trade secrets and other proprietary information holding that issues of fact precluded summary judgment on the question of whether an employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment for purposes of insurance coverage when the employee was simply sitting in his vehicle in his employers parking lot waiting for the business to open at the time the accident occurred recognizing a legitimate need to protect an employee from disclosing an employers trade secrets or other confidential information to a competitor