or 3:00, something like that. Q. Okay. Could you be mistaken about that? A. Yeah, I could be, but I’m starting to kind of wonder if that isn’t the time that the trooper didn’t get there. . . . Because he was pretty late. Karen R. Baker, Judge, concurring in part; dissenting in part. I agree that the trial judge erred in granting summary judgment on Hisaw’s personal policies and join in the majority’s decision to reverse on this issue. However, I disagree with the majority’s ultimate conclusion that Hisaw’s injuries arose out of the operation, maintenance, or use of the underinsured vehicle. That is a question for the trier of fact, and it is inappropriate for this court to resolve that issue as a matter of law. See Elam v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 346 Ark. 291, 57 S.W.3d 165 (2001) (<HOLDING>). The initial determination of the existence of
holding the question of whether insurance companys requests were reasonable under policy language was a fact question holding that extrinsic evidence of the parties course of conduct may be considered where the contract language is ambiguous holding that where the parties go beyond the contract and submit disputed extrinsic evidence to support their interpretations of an insurance policy a question of fact is presented holding it is a question of fact holding that extrinsic evidence admissible to determine intent of parties