of the ‘person’ necessary to bring him into contact with government agents, and the subsequent search for and seizure of the evidence.” United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8, 93 S.Ct. 764, 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973) (citations omitted). As to the first step, “[i]t is clear that a subpoena to appear before a grand jury is not a ‘seizure’ [of the person] in the Fourth Amendment sense, even though that summons may be inconvenient or burdensome.” Id. at 9, 93 S.Ct. 764. As to the second step, respondents do not enjoy a constitutionally protected privacy interest in their fingerprints. See generally Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. at 295, 93 S.Ct. 2000 (characterizing fingerprints as “mere physical characteristics” which are “constantly exposed to the public.”); Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 14, 93 S.Ct. 764 (<HOLDING>); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88
holding that prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells holding that for purposes of federal constitutional law a person does not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to trash discarded outside the home holding that the constitutional protection of an individuals reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her home does not extend to a place of business holding that a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to physical characteristics which he or she routinely exposes to public view recognizing lack of requirement to prove reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to intercepted wire communications