statement of the law was incorrect. The magistrate judge also found, relying upon Cook v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice Planning Dep't, 37 F.3d 166, 168-169 (5th Cir.1994), that the Board could not consider unadjudicated offenses in parole hearings. Johnson II, 910 F.Supp. at 1229 n. 73. Cook, however, dealt with the particular circumstance of prior convictions which this Court had previously set aside on the basis of federal constitutional violations, and stands only for the unremarkable rule that when a conviction has been thus judicially nullified a prisoner may obtain an order enjoining use of the voided conviction in a parole hearing, and might even be seen essentially as a federal court enforcing its own prior order. See Bloodgood v. Garraghty, 783 F.2d 470 (4th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Francischine, 512 F.2d 827,
holding that there was no legal right to court review of parole board decision because there is no legal right to release on parole holding that the claims of two state prisoners challenging the validity of state procedures for determining parole eligibility were properly brought under  1983 and did not have to be brought in a habeas proceeding holding parole board has no duty to examine validity of prisoners convictions recognizing that it is well established that where a state provides a discretionary parole regime prisoners do not have a liberty or property interest in parole holding that it is well settled that the pennsylvania board of probation and parole has exclusive authority to determine parole when the offender is sentenced to a maximum term of imprisonment of two or more years