(3) the extent to which plaintiffs performed a discrete line-job that was integral to [the putative employer’s] process of production; (4) whether responsibility under the contracts [between the direct and putative employers] could pass from one [entity] to another without material changes; (5) the degree to which the [putative employers or its] agents supervised plaintiffs’ work; and (6) whether plaintiffs worked exclusively or predominately for the [putative employer]. Id. at 72. The Second Circuit has not announced a definitive set of factors to establish functional control, recognizing that there will be “different sets of relevant factors based on the factual challenges posed by particular cases.” Barfield v. New York City Health and Hospitals, 537 F.3d 132, 142-43 (2d Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>). Yale argues that it did not exercise
holding that the court of appeals erred in declining to apply supreme court precedent even though the reasoning of that precedent had been eroded by subsequent decisions recognizing that the supreme court has consistently applied an analysis keyed to economic realities  holding that previous precedent statefs no rigid rule for the identification of an flsa employer  but provides a nonexclusive and overlapping set of factors to ensure that the economic realities test mandated by the supreme court is sufficiently comprehensive and flexible to give proper effect to the broad language of the flsa holding that we must give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of a statutes language holding that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous no need exists for the court to examine the legislative histo ry and the court must give effect to the plain meaning of the statute