481 U.S. 770, 776, 107 S.Ct. 2113, 95 L.Ed.2d 724 (1987); In re: Wymer, 5 B.R. at 806. Because these factors were imported from the standard for deciding preliminary injunctions or staying them pending appeal, district courts in this circuit have not agreed on how to apply the discretionary stay factors when deciding whether to stay a final bankruptcy court order pending appeal. Compare Rose Townsend Trust v. Johnston (In re: Johntson), No. 06-80040, 2007 WL 2684736, 2007 Bankr.LEXIS 3092 (Bankr.E.D.Wash. Sept. 7, 2007) (requiring movant to show under first factor that he is “likely to succeed” on the merits, rather than merely presenting a “substantial case”) and Silicon Valley Bank v. Pon (In re: Pon), No. C-93-2745, 1994 U.S Dist. LEXIS 2559 at *6 (N.D.Cal. Feb. 25, 1994) (<HOLDING>) with Lynch v. Ca. Pub. Util. Comm’n, No.
holding that the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence remains with the movant holding that the proper standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence holding that standard for revocation of probation is preponderance of the evidence holding that the four factors are conjunctive and movant will not win a stay unless each factor is established by a preponderance of the evidence holding that criminal conduct of which defendant is acquitted may be used as sentencing factor if proved by preponderance of the evidence