court denied Blum’s petition for writ of mandamus and found it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider his request for injunctive relief. This appeal followed. Analysis Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss the Appeal Appellees contend this Court should dismiss this appeal because Blum’s petition for injunctive relief is now moot. The mootness doctrine limits courts to deciding cases in which an actual controversy exists. FDIC v. Nueces County, 886 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Tex.1994). Appellees argue that because “ballots have already been printed and mailed, early voting by mail ballot is underway, and early voting by personal appearance has already begun,” Blum’s request for injunctive relief is moot. See Shaw v. Miller, 394 S.W.2d 701, 703 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>); see also Davis v. Oaks, 507 S.W.2d 328 (Tex.
holding that dismissal is proper for a derivative cause of action but not for a direct cause of action recognizing the cause of action holding that under the rule against splitting a cause of action a new claim for damages is not barred if the underlying cause of action had not accrued at the time of filing the previous lawsuit holding a cause of action is moot if it cannot be disposed of prior to the time for printing of ballots and the commencement of absentee voting recognizing cause of action