of technical tax rules such as the alternative minimum tax.”); Kenseth v. Commissioner, 2000 WL 669977, 2000 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 32, at *18, 114 T.C. No. 26 (2000) ("This controversy is driven by the substantial difference in the amount of tax burden that may result from the parties’ approaches. The difference, of course, is a consequence of the plain language of sections 56, 67, and 68, so the characterization of the attorney’s fees as excludable or deductible becomes critical.”). (Footnote omitted.) 8 . See Estate of Clarks v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 857 (6th Cir.2000) ("We follow Cotnam concluding that the majority in Cotnam correctly distinguished Lucas v. Earl”). 9 . See O’Brien v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 707, 712, 1962 WL 1147 (1962), aff’d, 319 F.2d 532 (3rd Cir.1963) (<HOLDING>). 10 . See Coady v. Commissioner, 213 F.3d
holding that contingent attorney fees are gross income to taxpayer under the familiar principles of lucas v earl holding that public policy considerations require that the burden be placed on the attorney to provide for allocation of courtawarded attorneys fees in the contingent fee agreement holding that taxpayer incurs attorney fees if he assumes either 1 a noncontingent obligation to repay the fees advanced on his behalf at some later time or 2 a contingent obligation to repay the fees in the event of their eventual recovery holding because an award of attorney fees is discretionary court may consider attorney fees in relation to the underlying equities in the case holding that contingent fees are an asset of the partnership in which the estate of a deceased partner is entitled to participate