screening. Fleming alleges two errors in the district court’s handling of this issue. First, Fleming argues that the district court erred in finding no intent to defraud, because the goal of referring applicants to Chavez would have been to defraud the Internal Revenue Service. According to Fleming, her properties’ owners were eligible for tax credits under 26 U.S.C. § 42 if their tenants met certain income-related criteria, and Quinn was telling Fleming to encourage tenants to falsify such compliance by obtaining inauthentic social securi ty numbers, and thereby defrauding the IRS. Even if Quinn directed Fleming to break federal law, that will not support a wrongful discharge claim under Kentucky law. See Shrout v. The TFE Grp., 161 S.W.3d 351, 355 (Ky.Ct.App.2005) (citation omitted) (<HOLDING>); Clark v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, Inc., 489
recognizing cause of action for wrongful discharge recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy holding that the test for preclusion of a common law wrongful discharge claim is disjunctive holding that a violation of federal regulations cannot support a wrongful discharge claim under kentucky law recognizing tort of wrongful discharge