inability to perform in the lower-level positions is not related. It was not the discharge from the dryer-feeder position that constituted the unfair labor practice, but rather the termination of the employees’ Laidlaw rights by removing them from the recall list and refusing to reinstate them to their former or substantially equivalent positions. Had the Board ordered reinstatement to the dryer-feeder position, § 160(c) would effectively prohibit such reinstatement. Because Webb did not have “cause” to terminate the three employees from the recall list and their right to eventual reinstatement to their pre-strike position or its substantial equivalent, the Board can order reinstatement as a remedy for that violation of Sections 8(a)(1) and (3). Woodlawn Hospital, 596 F.2d at 1344 (<HOLDING>). IV. In sum, we uphold the determination of
holding that there can be no violation of  1986 without a predicate violation of  1985 holding that no monell claim can lie where a court finds no constitutional violation recognizing that where the board properly finds a violation of the act it can order reinstatement under its remedial powers granted by  160c although finding no violation of the act here holding no violation of the travel act holding a violation of the travel act