and not sufficiently definite to support a cause of action under promissory estoppel,” (2) Kirkland did not rely actually and to her detriment on that statement, and (3) any reliance would have been unreasonable, because the Hospital’s employment manual stipulated that “no member of the management staff has the authority to make any form of contract with you in regard to your hospital employment relationship, including pay and benefits, nor a commitment of continuing employment.” Kirkland, 120 F.Supp.2d at 670-71. Although we believe that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding Cera’s statement and Kirkland’s reliance on that statement, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could not find that Kirkland’s reliance was reasonable. Cf. Mers, 483 N.E.2d at 152, 155 (<HOLDING>). In this case, the Hospital’s manual, of which
holding that the meaning of the employerjs promise and whether the acts flowing from it were reasonable are questions of fact for jury determination where the employee alleged that the employer had promised reinstatement both orally and through provisions in the companys handbook holding that an arbitration agreement in an employee handbook was illusory where the employer expressly reserved a right to unilaterally rescind any provisions of the handbook holding that an employee handbook did not constitute a valid unilateral contract between the employee and employer in the absence of adequate independent consideration holding that where employee gave notice to employer of injury and employer told employee that nothing could be done for him through workmans compensation employer had breached statute and was liable for medical treatment which was reasonable and necessary to restore employee to maximum usefulness holding that the complaint stated a claim under the flsa where it alleged that parties were an employer and employees within meaning of act and that the defendantemployers operation constitutes an enterprise engaged in commerce  within the meaning of  the act