he argues that SEPTA was required to offer him an assistant conductor position while he re-qualified as a conductor. A. The Effect of the August 1 Agreement. Doyle seeks to import from Pennsylvania law the principle that legal rights can be waived only through a “clear and unequivocal” statement. Building on that principle, he argues that the August 1 agreement did not clearly and unequivocally waive his right to sue to enforce the arbitration award because the agreement did not contain the words “waiver,” “release,” or “settlement.” We do not agree that Pennsylvania principles of contract interpretation apply to this Railway Labor Act case. In the labor contex Inc., 110 F.3d 245, 249 (4th Cir.1997) (same); Stallcop v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 820 F.2d 1044, 1048-49 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Thus, we interpret the August 1 agreement
holding that a complaint for interference with a collective bargaining agreement against a nonparty to that agreement is not actionable under  301a of the lmra holding that a debtorinpossession could reject a collective bargaining agreement holding that oral agreement made in connection with reinstatement should be treated as part of collective bargaining agreement holding part performance of an oral agreement necessary to take the oral agreement out of the statute of frauds must be consistent only  with the existence of the alleged oral contract holding that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union