his grand jury testimony with respect to Rasanen’s position when he approached him by saying there is a difference between leaning forward and coming forward. (Tr. 1433-34.) Brown attributed most of the inconsistencies and lack of detail to the fact that the incident happened “all at once” and “in a matter of seconds”. (Tr. 1378, 1380, 1383, 1394, 1429.) The Court agrees with the Plaintiff that, despite Brown’s attempt to parse words and avoid providing detail, Brown’s trial testimony was inconsistent in several aspects from his previous statements. However, it is clearly and expressly the province of the jury, and not the judge, to assess a witness’s credibility when confronted with a prior inconsistent statement. See Kassim v. City of Schenectady, 415 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>) (citing Fed. R.Evid. 607, 613). Furthermore,
holding that the jury is the judge of the weight and credibility given to witness testimony holding that where a party has made a prior statement inconsistent with the one the party seeks to advance at trial a question of credibility arises which is for the jury not the judge to assess holding a party failed to preserve an objection to the jury instructions where the party objected prior to the court instructing the jury but not after recognizing that although the question of the credibility of witnesses is one for the jury alone such rule does not mean that the jury is at liberty under the guise of passing upon the credibility of a witness to disregard his testimony when from no reasonable point of view is it open to doubt holding that the burden of showing that a harm will result from disclosure is on the party that seeks nondisclosure rather than on the party that seeks access