that a legislative amendment which clarifies the original intent of the legislature by a more expansive phrasing is interpretive and must be given retroactive effect. Id. As was the case in Barron and Lau-bie, the 1989 revision to section 1379 of the Guaranty Act was an attempt to overrule prior judicial interpretations of the Guaranty Act by interpretive legislation. By expanding the definition of the term “insurance policy” to specifically exclude cut-through endorsements, the legislature clarified the meaning of existing statutory law while creating no rights or obligations not originally intended by the legislature. The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeals has specifically agreed with this analysis. See Luna v. American Bldg. Sys. Inc., 620 So.2d 465, 468 (La.App. 3d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). The Luna court explained that “an amendment
holding that pm a9962 was not a policy change requiring notice to hospitals but a clarification of existing policy holding that under minnesota law an insurance policy or provision not filed with the commissioner of insurance is unenforceable holding that an arbitration award involving the appellants challenge to the failure of the insurance company to ensure that he had read and understood a signed waiver and to attach the waiver to the insurance policy as contrary to public policy is not reviewable by the courts because there is no challenge to a provision or term of the policy the appellant never claimed that the waiver or policy language itself was contrary to the public policy of this commonwealth holding that the amendment at issue larevstatann  2213798 is an interpretive clarification of the term insurance policy and applies retroactively holding that under georgia law a holder of a master insurance policy is an agent of the insurance company and not the insurer