because Sten-nes was no longer free to leave to avoid answering the officer’s questions. See Popple v. State, 626 So.2d 185, 187-88 (Fla.1993); Young v. State, 803 So.2d 880, 882 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). As the fifth district has written, “positioning a patrol car to obstruct the path of [a] vehicle once it is stopped elevates the encounter to an investigatory stop.” Young, 803 So.2d at 882 (citing Griffin v. State, 800 So.2d 345, 347 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)) (stating “when [the officers] drove their vehicle behind the appellant’s car, effectively preventing his exit, [the appellant] could not leave. Therefore, the police effected a stop unsupported by either reasonable suspicion or probable cause.”) (citations omitted); see Richardson v. State, 291 So.2d 253, 255 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974) (<HOLDING>); see also L.J.S. v. State, 905 So.2d 222, 225
holding that although officers observation and stop of the defendants vehicle occurred outside of the officers geographical jurisdiction the officer still had jurisdiction where the officer was requested by a state trooper to stop the suspects vehicle holding automobile exeeption did not apply to warrantless search of vehicle where vehicle was not readily mobile because the vehicle was legally parked in parking lot occupants of vehicle were seated on a bench in the playground near the parking lot police officers surrounded the vehicle and the driver of the vehicle was handcuffed for safety purposes holding a stop was effected where officers vehicle blocked defendants vehicle from proceeding holding that the stop of defendants vehicle was unlawful where officers stopped the vehicle to check the license and registration but had observed no suspicious activity holding that officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct a vehicle stop where official license and registration records reflected that the vehicle was registered to a driver with a revoked license