DCA 1999) (quoting Gibbs v. Gibbs, 686 So.2d 639, 641 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)). Furthermore, the Straney case relied upon by the dissent is distinguishable. That case involved an order that changed a custody order’s time-sharing arrangement to give one of the parties more time with the child, not a change in custody. As noted in Boykin, the test for proving entitlement to custody modification has two prongs: 1) whether there is a substantial and material change of circumstances; and 2) whether the child’s welfare will be promoted by a change in custody. The party seeking custody modification must overcome the “extraordinary burden of proving both elements.” 843 So.2d at 320. It is therefore incumbent on the trial court to apply this extraordinary burden test. See Hastings, 875 So.2d at 779 (<HOLDING>). The court here failed to do so. Our review of
holding that trial court abused its discretion by denying a motion for rule 11 sanctions without adequate explanation holding trial court abused its discretion by refusing to conduct hearing and render decision on motion holding trial court abused discretion by assessing sanctions without supporting evidence holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in dismissing the case without allowing appellants an opportunity to amend holding trial court abused its discretion by modifying custody without applying extraordinary burden test