action under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, see Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923); Dist. of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). She also dismissed the summary-judgment motions as moot. This appeal followed. For the following reasons we affirm the district court’s dismissal, but on res judicata, rather than Rooker-Feldman, grounds. II. Analysis In Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982), the Supreme Court held that full faith and credit, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, applies to state-court judgments entered in proceedings to review a state administrative agency. But cf. Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 796, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 92 L.Ed.2d 635 (1986) (<HOLDING>). A judgment of a state court sitting in an
holding that illinois federal court erred in giving preclusive effect to minnesota state courts dismissal of action on statute of limitations grounds based on minnesotas treatment of statutes of limitations as procedural in nature and without preclusive effect holding that unreviewed state administrative proceedings do not have preclusive effect on title vii claim holding that full faith and credit is inapplicable to endow unreviewed administrative proceedings preclusive effect in title vii cases recognizing that nypd disciplinary hearings can have preclusive effect but ultimately holding that collateral estoppel did not apply due to issues specific to the administrative proceedings in that case holding that a title vii plaintiff could not hold coworkers liable in their individual capacities under title vii