court made at sentencing, judges explicitly signaled their “substantial difficulty” setting aside previous views. See, e.g., United States v. Quach, 302 F.3d 1096, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2002) (reassigning where the judge stated he would have denied a sentencing motion that was not brought initially, but could be filed on remand); Benvin v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Nev. (In re Benvin), 791 F.3d 1096, 1104 (9th Cir. 2015) (reassigning where the court improperly inserted itself into plea negotiations and had “expressed explicit views on the appropriate terms” of an eventual agreement). By contrast, nothing in the record here suggests that this district judge will be unable to follow this court’s mandate on remand. See United States v. Johnson, 812 F.3d 757, 765 (9th Cir. 2016) (<HOLDING>). All of the judge’s comments which form the
holding that supervisors reactions to comments did not constitute direct evidence of age discrimination where comments were made six months prior to plaintiffs discharge and were unconnected to the discharge decision holding that in order to raise prejudicial comments of trial court on appeal defendant must object to comments when made and move for a mistrial holding that a requested reassignment was not reasonable because it would violate the seniority rights of other employees holding that trial judges admonition of the jury to disregard prosecutors comments on the defendants failure to testify did not cure the error holding sentencing comments about defendants credibility did not justify reassignment