length, arguably, it did not provide discrete illumination for “malicious,” the second modifier of injury in the section. McAlister v. Slosberg (In re Slosberg), 225 B.R. 9, 16 (Bankr.D.Maine 1998) (describing the Geiger decision as “silent regarding the meaning of ‘malicious,’ although its redefinition of ‘willful’ incorporates much (at first blush some might say all) of what ‘malicious’ once meant in § 523(a)(6)’s context”); see Read & Lundy, Inc. v. Brier (In re Brier), 274 B.R. 37, 43 (Bankr.D.Mass.2002) (quoting heavily from the portions of Slosberg that describe Geiger as “silent” on malicious). While concurring with post-Geiger case law holding that a showing of either intent to injure or proof of the actor’s substantial certainty of the injuri . 284, 285, 1878 WL 10805 (1878) (<HOLDING>); Jackson v. Old Colony St Ry. Co., 206 Mass.
recognizing an innocent possession defense though the defense in that case is more properly considered a justification defense as life and limb were arguably at stake holding that the erroneous omission of a justification defense was harmless where counsel did not invoke the defense during either voir dire or opening statements and where the defense did not appear to be the primary focus of the defensive theory at trial holding that consent is not a defense to the charge of second degree assault where the assault occurred in the context of a prison fight between inmates holding that absent a defense of legitimate justification liability for assault and batter will lie holding claims raised for first time on appeal will not be considered absent exceptional circumstances