Clause. Id. at 530. As Hill recognizes, “[t]his holding appears to foreclose much of the defendant’s arguments.” (Appellant’s Br. at 9.) Consistent with our precedent, United States v. Speakman, 330 F.3d 1080, 1082 n. 6 (8th Cir.2003), we hold that the enactment of § 922(g)(1) was not beyond the scope of congressional authority- Hill’s claim that the indictment was defective because it did not allege a substantial affect on interstate commerce also fails. The statute in question requires proof that Hill, a felon, possessed a gun “in or affecting commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The indictment tracks this language, and we fail to see how an indictment under § 922(g)(1) that tracks the statutory elements is defective. See United States v. Gresham, 118 F.3d 258, 264-65 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). We thus affirm Hill’s conviction for being a
holding that an indictment that is substantially in the language of the code is sufficient inform and substance holding that an indictment under  922g1 was not required to allege a substantial effect on interstate commerce an indictment which tracked the statutory language was sufficient holding initial indictment which was subsequently found to be invalid tolled the thirtyday period and superseding indictment alleging different charges based on same fraudulent acts as earlier indictment was therefore timely holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense holding that an indictment phrased in the statutory language was sufficient to satisfy ors 1325507