supervisors could not have retaliated against him unless they had knowledge of his protected activity. To survive summary judgment, however, Jones needn’t provide direct evidence that his supervisors knew of his protected activity; he need only offer circumstantial evidence that could reasonably support an inference that they did. And we have repeatedly recognized that the precise kind of evidence Jones has offered — that “the employer had knowledge of the employee’s protected activity, and the adverse personnel action took place shortly after that activity” — is “adequate to permit an inference of retaliatory motive,” at least at the prima facie stage. Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 903 (D.C.Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted, emphasis added); see also id. (<HOLDING>); Rochan v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1220
holding that a oneday time period between the employees complaint and her supervisors recommendation to fire her was sufficient recognizing temporal proximity when employee traded correspondence with unidentified senior agency personnel around the time that her supervisors allegedly retaliated against her holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment holding that allegations that employees supervisors yelled at her told her she was a poor manager and gave her poor evaluations chastised her in front of customers and once required her to work with an injured back were insufficient to state title vii claim recognizing temporal proximity as important factor