CGL policy. Therefore, “accident” must be given its “natural and commonly accepted meaning.” Gomolka v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 70 Ohio St.2d 166, 167-168, 436 N.E.2d 1347 (1982). {¶ 13} We have defined “accidental” as “unexpected, as well as unintended.” Hybud Equip. Corp. v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co., 64 Ohio St.3d 657, 666, 597 N.E.2d 1096 (1992). In defining the ordinary meaning of “accident” in the context of a CGL policy that, too, did not include a definition of the word, our sister court in Kentucky held, “Inherent in the plain meaning of ‘accident’ is the doctrine of fortuity. Indeed, ‘[t]he fortuity principle is central to the notion of what constitutes insurance * * *.’ ” Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 306 S.W.3d 69, 74 (Ky. , 736 N.E.2d 566 (1st Dist.1999) (<HOLDING>). {¶ 15} In Bogner, the insurance policy at
holding that it is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy spacious as well as clean wellbalanced as well as carefully patrolled holding that courts in ohio as well as the majority of courts in jurisdictions throughout the country have concluded that defective workmanship does not constitute an occurrence in cgl policies footnotes omitted holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts holding appellate courts have jurisdiction over the district courts orders rejecting as a matter of law qualified immunity raised in a motion to dismiss holding appellate courts must consider the trial courts jury charge as a whole