of the opposite sex, the burden shifts to the employer to offer a gender neutral justification for that wage differential. See id. at 196, 94 S.Ct. 2223; Fallon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1211 (7th Cir.1989). Because a 'prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act requires only an initial showing of a wage differential between the sexes, the Act’s remedial provisions do not perfectly mirror the Constitution’s prohibition on gender discrimination. Under the Equal Pay Act, an employer is potentially subject to liability without a showing of discriminatory intent. See Stopka v. Alliance of Am. Insurers, 141 F.3d 681, 685 (7th Cir.1998) (“The E[qual] P[ay] A[ct] does not require proof of discriminatory intent.”); see also Berry v. Board of Supervisors of LSU, 715 F.2d 971, 975 (5th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). In contrast, in order to make out a claim of
holding that a transgender individual stated a claim forsexdiscrimination under the equal credit opportunity act holding that the mere allegation that a female professor was paid less than a male colleague for equal work stated a claim under the equal pay act holding that judges comments to jury during equal pay act trial were harmless error holding that to establish a prima facie equal pay act claim the plaintiff must show that the jobs being compared are substantially equal holding that although women may have been willing to work for lower wages than men and market forces therefore dictated that an employer could pay women less than men reliance on such a market force theory nevertheless became illegal once congress enacted into law the principle of equal pay for equal work