does not violate the Equal Terms Provision if it is narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest. Other circuits, by contrast, require that a comparator be “similarly situated” to the plaintiff religious assembly or institution with regard to the regulation at issue or to its purpose. For instance, the Third Circuit restricts comparison to “secular assemblies or institutions that are similarly situated [to the religious assembly] as to the regulatory purpose.” Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 266 (3d Cir.2007). The Second Circuit compares the plaintiff religious assembly to a nonreligious assembly “similarly situated for all functional intents and purposes of the regulation.” Elijah Grp., Inc. v. C p. 581 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (<HOLDING>). Ill Do TOL Christian Schools and the
holding the standard of proof in summary judgment rulings is the same as it would be at trial holding that where defendants assertion depends on proof to be offered at trial summary judgment is inappropriate holding that an unsworn letter is not proper summary judgment proof holding that trial court may not grant summary judgment by default  when the movants summary judgment proof is legally insufficient holding summary judgment inappropriate to resolve an essentially procedural conflict