attack a claim of prejudice resulting from erroneous juiy instzuctions, where thei'e was "no substantial likelihood the erroneous . .. instructions prejudiced [the defendant’s] chances with the jury”). 13 . This formulation derives from the third prong of the plain error standard, which requires that the error "affec[t] substantial rights.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (quoting Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b)). The fourth prong of that standard requires that the error also "seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770; see Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997). Although the Supreme Court has not been explicit on 527 U.S. 1, 8-9, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (<HOLDING>). 16 . Cf. Neder, 527 U.S. at 19, 119 S.Ct.
holding that the denial of due process in a particular case is subject to harmless error analysis holding that failure to submit an element of the offense to the jury is subject to harmless error analysis holding trial errors are subject to a harmless error analysis holding that the omission of an element is subject to harmless error analysis holding that the omission of an element is not a structural error subject to automatic reversal but rather  where objected to  is subject to harmless error analysis