from raising his Batson claim within sixty days thereafter. Appellee’s attempt to circumvent the statutory language by asserting that the factual predicate of his claim is actually the PCRA court’s ruling in Spence is specious. A PCRA petitioner cannot avoid the one-year time bar by tailoring the factual predicate of the claim pled in his PCRA petition in a way that unmistakably misrepresents the actual nature of the claim raised. See Commonwealth v. Fisher, 582 Pa. 276, 870 A.2d 864, 870 (2005) (rejecting PCRA petitioner’s attempt to invoke Section 9545(b)(1)(ii)’s exception to the time-bar based on the date of issuance of a study on FBI methodologies because the facts underlying the study were previously available); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 580 Pa. 594, 863 A.2d 423, 426-27 (2004) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Whitney, 572 Pa. 468, 817
holding that cr 6002 allows appeals based upon claims of error that were unknown and could not have been known to the moving party by exercise of reasonable diligence and in time to have been otherwise presented to the court holding that contractor could not show that it reasonably relied upon alleged misrepresentation holding that inquiry notice triggers an investors duty to exercise reasonable diligence and that the  statute of limitations period begins to run once the investor in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the facts underlying the alleged fraud recognizing an exception to the twoyear time bar imposed on rule 3850 claims when the claim asserted is based on facts that were unknown to the movant and could not have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence holding that section 9545b1h was not satisfied where pcra petitioner relied upon an affidavit containing facts that could have been previously ascertained upon the exercise of due diligence