of the words. Id. at 805. We likewise held in Surf Club v. Tatem Surf Club, Inc., 151 Fla. 406, 10 So.2d 554 (1942), that SURF CLUB cannot be protected under the common law. We observed that SURF is either generic, geographic, or descriptive; “geographic names are considered common property and may not in ordinary circumstances be appropriated.” Id. at 410, 10 So.2d at 556. We noted, in commenting on the words SURF CLUB: “These [are] generic words ... plaintiff did not have the pre-emptive right to employ them.” Id. at 412, 10 So.2d at 557. Applying Addison, Shupe, and Totem to the instant case, we conclude that the name FIRST SOUTHERN BANK is not entitled to protection without proof of having acquired a secondary meaning. See Quality Courts United v. Jones, 59 So.2d 20, 21 (Fla. 1952) (<HOLDING>). We have answered the certified question based
recognizing that the court must give meaning to all the words in the claims holding that an emblem bearing the words quality court had acquired a secondary meaning as a result of an extensive advertising campaign including distribution of one million guide books to travelers therefore competitors use of the word quality in the term quality motor court was enjoined holding that copying is only evidence of secondary meaning if the defendants intent in copying is to confuse consumers and pass off his product as the plaintiffs in that situation the defendants belief that plaintiffs trade dress has acquired secondary meaning  so that his copying will indeed facilitate his passing off  is some evidence that the trade dress actually has acquired secondary meaning holding that inconsistent advertising of an alleged protected trademark for five years did not establish secondary meaning holding that a state was embraced within the meaning of the word person  where the word person was defined as meaning and including a partnership association company or corporation as well as a natural person