(and those convictions have become final) on separate prior occasions ... of — (i) 2 or more serious violent felonies.” 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Depending on the statutory context, a conviction might be deemed final at various times, for example, on the date judgment was imposed or on the date an appellate mandate issued. See Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527, 123 S.Ct. 1072, 155 L.Ed.2d 88 (2003) (recognizing alternative views of “finality”). Whichever view of finality applies to § 3559(c)(1), there can be no doubt that Snype’s prior state convictions here at issue, see infra at 144, were each entered on separate occasions prior to Snype’s federal crime and fairly represent separate convictions. See United States v. Powell, 404 F.3d 678, 682 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Martino, 294 F.3d
holding that for purposes of imposing a mandatory life sentence under 21 usc  841b1a two prior drug convictions should be viewed as separate from one another unless the conduct underlying both convictions was part of a single criminal episode  quoting united states v gray 152 f3d 816 821 8th cir1998 holding a sentence enhancement for two prior convictions must be based on separate criminal episodes holding separate convictions for drug transactions occurring four or five days apart were properly counted as separate convictions holding lopez was inapplicable to the language prior conviction for a felony drug offense in 21 usc  841b1a because felony drug offense was defined in 21 usc  80244 as an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the united states or of a state holding previous convictions can only be used for sentence enhancement purposes under 18 usc  924e1 if the restoration of civil rights regarding such convictions expressly prohibited the possession of firearms