“but an incident to the debt.” Eaton, No. 11-1382, slip op. at 4 (quoting Perry v. Oliver, 317 Mass. 538, 541, 59 N.E.2d 192 (1945)); see General Ice Cream Corp. v. Stern, 291 Mass. 86, 89, 195 N.E. 890 (1935) (“The debt is the principal thing and the mortgage is incident only.”); Maglione v. BancBoston Mortg. Corp., 29 Mass.App.Ct. 88, 90, 557 N.E.2d 756 (1990) (“Although a mortgage vests [legal] title [in the mortgagee], that title is defeasible and is an off-shoot of the underlying debt.”). A mortgage, by virtue of being a security interest only, “is of no value as property” when detached from the debt that it is intended to secure. Eaton, No. 11-1382, slip op. at 4 (quoting Sanger v. Bancroft, 78 Mass. 365, 367 (1859)); see Kinney v. Stevens, 207 Mass. 368, 370, 93 N.E. 586 (1911) (<HOLDING>). Contrary to the suggestion of the bankruptcy
holding that foreclosure of prior mortgage extinguished second mortgage holding that the note and the mortgage must coexist to give the mortgage validity holding that a mortgage or modification of a mortgage is not a good or a service under the dtpa holding court could consider a mortgage agreement not attached to the complaint in ruling on motion to dismiss because the complaint refers to the mortgage numerous times the mortgage is attached to this motion and is central to plaintiffs claims holding that because a mortgage provides the security for the repayment of the note the person having standing to foreclose a note secured by a mortgage may be either the holder of the note or a nonholder in possession of the note who has the rights of a holder