2000). The court recognized that the FLSA’s “statutory language clearly places limits on the range of retaliation proscribed by the act.” Specifically, in interpreting the “testimony” clause of the FLSA’s retaliation provision, the Fourth Circuit held that the FLSA “prohibits retaliation for testimony given or about to be given but not for an employee’s voicing of a position on working conditions in opposition to an employer.” Id. (emphasis added). Although the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the retaliation in that case—which followed an employee’s statement to the company president that, if he were deposed in a lawsuit, he would not testify to the president’s suggested version of events—was “morally unacceptable,” the court concluded that a faithful interpretati 1 (11th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 125 (8th
holding without discussion of the verbalwritten distinction that employees voicing of concern was protected activity holding without discussion of the verbalwritten distinction that defendants mistaken belief that plaintiff had made apparently oral complaints to supervisors was grounds for suit holding without discussion of the verbalwritten distinction that plaintiffs oral complaints were protected activity holding that written but not oral internal complaints are protected based on the inclusion of the verb filed holding that informal complaints to superiors about discrimination constitute protected activity