scholarship, and research at the core of fair use). Tenenbaum’s file sharing may well fall somewhere in the middle. He is not the prototypical commercial infringer, yet his use was hardly “educational.” Downloading new music may have been eye-opening for him personally, but it surely did not carry any public benefit of the kind contemplated by Section 107. Under the circumstances, the Court will not label Tenenbaum’s use “commercial,” despite the plaintiffs’ urging. So far as purpose is concerned, there is a meaningful difference between personal file sharing and a business strategy that exploits copyrighted works for profit. These activities have different goals and dimensions; they should not be reduced to a single category in this analysis. But see Napster, 239 F.3d at 1015 (<HOLDING>). But the label is not critical to the “fair
holding that direct copying of plaintiffs metatags and html code constituted trademark infringement holding that copying all or substantial portions of microcode was not fair use holding companies contributorily liable for copyright infringement for facilitating users transmissions of unauthorized digital copies of copyrighted works holding that the plaintiffs allowance of customers to create derivative works for noncommercial purposes did not impliedly license commercial competition holding that repeated and exploitative copying of copyrighted works even without direct economic benefit is sufficient for a court to find commercial use