procedures that created a substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. [Id. at 634-35.] While Williams is distinguishable from the instant case in that the trial court there failed to inform the jury of the consequences of a unanimous verdict even in its original charge, this distinction is not of constitutional significance. Part of the constitutional concern is with the clarity of the court’s instructions. See People v. Durre, 690 P.2d 165, 173 (Colo.1984) (en banc) (“[T]he certainty essential to a jury verdict directly resulting in death can only be achieved when the jurors are clearly instructed concerning the effect of their verdicts on the ultimate question of life imprisonment or death.”); Whalen v. State, 492 A.2d 552, 562 (Del.1985) (<HOLDING>). For the reasons previously set forth at
holding that trial courts instruction implying that the jury had to be unanimous in imposing a sentence of life imprisonment violated defendants constitutional rights because this instruction could have been clearerand should have been holding new trial should not have been granted because jury was properly instructed holding appellate counsel ineffective for failing to argue the trial court committed fundamental error in giving the thenstandard jury instruction for manslaughter by act even though controlling precedent in the district had approved the instruction when the instruction had been found fundamentally erroneous in another district and conflict between the two districts would have allowed defendant to seek relief in the supreme court holding that a trial judge is obliged to give a correct jury instruction notwithstanding that request for instruction was technically erroneous if the evidence generates the subject matter of the jury instruction holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given