question, evidence of a general type long considered by sentencing authorities.” Id. at 824, 111 S.Ct. 2597. {37} Clark urges this Court to continue to follow Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987), despite the fact that the Supreme Court overruled Booth in Payne, 501 U.S. at 830, 111 S.Ct. 2597. Although we were bound by Booth’s restriction on victim impact evidence in Clark, 108 N.M. at 298-300, 772 P.2d at 332-34, we agree with Clark that the decision to admit or restrict this type of evidence now rests with the states, because the Supreme Court in Payne concluded that such evidence, brief and narrowly presented, does not violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment 3 L.Ed.2d 215 (1999); State v. Bernard, 608 So.2d 966, 971 (La.1992) (<HOLDING>); People v. Edwards, 54 Cal.3d 787, 1
holding that the effects of the victims deaths upon the families is part of the circumstances of the crime and is properly presented to the jury at the penalty phase holding that a victim impact aggravator was not unconstitutionally vague because it directed the jury to consider inter alia the effect of the crime on the victims family holding that the improper admission of hearsay testimony of two witnesses that confirmed but did not elaborate upon the victims testimony would have had only minor impact on the jury because there was little to undermine the victims credibility holding that the impact upon the victims is relevant to circumstances of the crime holding counsel must only provide relevant facts of the crime