of “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography”); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 486 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that the Second Circuit has “strongly suggested] that the term ‘pornography’ is inherently vague for defendants whose statute of conviction does not define it.” (citing United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.2003)); ' United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384 (2d Cir.2003)); see also United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 74-76 (1st Cir.2009) (vacating a condition of supervised release that banned the “possession of any kind of pornographic material” because the district court did not provide an explanation for this condition, and “no evidence in the record ... justifies the ban”); cf. United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 185-87 (4th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). But see United States v. Boston, 494 F.3d
holding rule 2119f statement must contain factual averments which suggest that sentencing code was compromised merely stating that sentencing court abused its discretion in imposing excessive sentence is inadequate holding district court abused its discretion in admitting state court findings of fact holding that a trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of an expert witness where the testimony would have been relevant to show that the defendant breached a duty of care holding that sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing an unexplained threeyear prohibition on adult pornography where defendant had been convicted of threatening federal officials holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint