in determining whether an encounter is consensual include the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon, some physical touching of one’s person, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating compliance with the officer’s request is compelled). Lastly, we note that McKinnon has not made an argument for resentencing based on United States v. Booker, — U.S. --, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), and his plea agreement presumably explains why. See JA 28 (“I have been advised that I will be sentenced ... pursuant to guidelines established by the United States Sentencing Commission.”); JA 36 (“[T]he defendant knowingly waives the right to appeal the sentence imposed pursuant to this agreement.”); see also United States v. Bradley, 400 F.3d 459 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, we
holding that prebooker plea agreements remain binding after booker holding that state prosecutors agreements with defendant not binding on federal prosecutors holding that plea agreements executed pursuant to fedrcrimp 11c1c are binding on the district court holding that immunity agreements are analogous to plea agreements and are enforced under principles of contract law within the constitutional safeguards of due process holding that the rules of contract law are applicable to plea agreements