inmate who violates an institutional rule and provides a list of seven punishments. Mann points out that revocation of a suspended sentence is not included in the list of punishments under SDCL 24-15A-4, and therefore, in Mann’s view, the Board did not have authority to revoke an inmate’s suspended time for a violation of institutional rules. Moreover, Mann further notes that he was already punished for violating the institutional rules because, for each major rule violation, he was sanctioned to the Special Housing Unit. [¶ 17.] But, the Board’s authority to revoke the suspended sentence does not derive from SDCL 24-15A-4; rather, it derives from SDCL 23A-27-18.4. Furthermore, in Austad, we upheld an agreement similar to the one that Mann signed. 2006 S.D. 65, ¶ 25, 719 N.W.2d at 769 (<HOLDING>). Mann acknowledged when he signed the
holding that the board maintains discretion to revoke an inmates suspended sentence if the inmate commits offenses that demonstrate he is unworthy of the suspension holding that a suspended lawyer remains subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the court for acts committed while suspended holding that the good behavior requirement of a suspended sentence defined the period of suspension holding the state did not meet its burden of proving defendant operated a motor vehicle while suspended where the only evidence of actual notice of suspension was that dot mailed defendant the notice of suspension holding that code sections dealing with suspended sentences are to be liberally construed and that revocation of a suspended sentence lies within the trial courts sound discretion