III 1994). AirTouch argues that the CUP denial “frustrates the establishment of a nationwide cellular service network as intended by the Communications Act and the FCC rules ... because it effectively prohibits, unreasonably restricts and improperly interferes with the installation of a cellular communication facility....” (Complaint at ¶ 48.) In support of its argument it cites two cases: 360 Communications Co. v. Bd. of Supervisors of Albembarle Co., 50 F.Supp.2d 551 (W.D.Va.1999) and Paging Inc. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals for County of Montgomery, 957 F.Supp. 805 (W.D.Va.1997). However, both of these cases find preemption only because local zoning authorities acted in such a way as to violate provisions of the Telecommunications Act. See 360 Communications Co., 50 F.Supp.2d at 562 (<HOLDING>); Paging, Inc., 957 F.Supp. at 808 (noting that
holding that in the limited circumstances when local zoning authorities actions prohibit personal wireless service the act preempts local zoning law holding a state agency is subject to local zoning restrictions absent legislative direction to the contrary holding that a zoning commission was capable of being sued directly under section 1983 because zjoning commissions function legislatively when adopting zoning regulations and holding public hearings for the adjudication of individual petitions for zoning redress holding that the legislature did not intend the state to be bound by local zoning regulations when constructing a communications tower because the legislature neither named the state nor manifested an intention that it be bound by the provisions of the enabling act which granted zoning authority to the city holding that where a zoning board had no authority under state law to take certain actions with respect to a protected property interest a trier of fact could conclude that there was no rational basis for the towns zoning boards actions and that as a result the zoning board violated appellants rights to substantive due process