these consequences as a direct result of his Vermont convictions. We conclude that the appellant is “in custody” for the purposes of 13 V.S.A. § 7131. III. As an alternative ground for dismissal, the trial court held that the doctrine of laches barred the appellant’s claim. This Court has never applied laches to either post-conviction relief or habeas petitions. This Court has previously addressed the merits of post-conviction relief attacks on an eighteen-year-old conviction, Magoon v. Smith, supra, 130 Vt. at 603-04, 298 A.2d at 821, and on a twenty-three-year-old conviction. In re Murray, 131 Vt. 4, 5, 298 A.2d 835, 836 (1972). Furthermore, 13 V.S.A. § 7131 specifically provides that a petition may be filed “at any time.” See In re McNair, — Mont. —, —, 615 P.2d 916, 917 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, we decline to apply the
holding that laches bars relief where second mortgagee failed to seek relief for almost seven months after learning of sheriffs sale holding that identical language in montana postconviction relief statute bars application of laches holding that probation was custody and permitted jurisdiction under postconviction relief statute holding that where defense of laches was not pleaded denial of equitable relief on grounds of laches was error holding statute of limitations for filing petition for postconviction relief not tolled by general savings statute tolling limited to reasons enumerated in state postconviction relief act