statute to the common-law concept most likely intended by the legislature to be embodied in the statute. See Gilbert v. United States, 370 U.S. 650, 655, 82 S.Ct. 1399, 1402, 8 L.Ed.2d 750 (1962) (“[I]n the absence of anything to the contrary it is fair to assume that [the legislative body] used that word in the statute in its common law sense.”). 12. As the Court of Appeals set forth, Yarborough, 120 N.M. at 672, 905 P.2d at 212, this Court was first presented’ with this question in State v. Harris, 41 N.M. 426, 70 P.2d 757 (1987). The defendant in Harris was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, and argued that his conviction was proper only if he had driven his truck recklessly. Id. at 427-28, 70 P.2d at 757. We stated that in the case of an accidental death of 862, 863 (1893) (<HOLDING>); People v. Datema, 448 Mich. 585, 533 N.W.2d
holding city could not enforce through administrative adjudication a city ordinance limiting vehicle weight holding that misdemeanor violation of carrying an unlicensed firearm was sufficient without a showing of recklessness or negligence for an involuntary manslaughter conviction holding that allegations that the city arbitrarily applied a zoning ordinance were insufficient to state a substantive due process claim and stating in dicta that the decision would be the same even if the city had knowingly enforced the invalid zoning ordinance in bad faith a badfaith violation of state law remains only a violation of state law holding that violation of city ordinance does not constitute negligence per se holding that recklessness not merely the violation of a city ordinance must be shown for assault with a firearm conviction