interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is sitting,” Id § 2518(3). “[I]nter-cept” is defined as “the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.” Id. § 2510(4). We join the other courts of appeals that have addressed this issue in adopting the “listening post” theory that under Title III either the interception of or the communications themselves must have been within the judge’s territorial jurisdiction. See United States v. Cano-Flores, 796 F.3d 83, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert, denied, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 1688, 194 L.Ed.2d 790 (2016) (adopting the “listening post” theory and reas 2d Cir. 1992) (<HOLDING>). We need not determine whether a conversation
holding that a secretive interception has occurred unless both parties to the call had actual knowledge of the intrusion holding that it seems clear that when the contents of a  communication are captured or redirected in any way an interception occurs at that time but also since the definition of interception includes the aural acquisition of the contents of the communication the interception must also be considered to occur where the redirected contents are first heard holding that the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest includes the contents of a cell phone found on the arrestees person holding that as to each predicate act the plaintiff must allege the time place and contents of the misrepresentations holding that the contents of a notebook were not protected speech based in part on the fact that appellant made no effort to communicate the contents of the notebook to the public