by the record, are left to the sound discretion of the district court. Given the evidence presented to the district court, we do not find an abuse of discretion in determining that Jacob, Burns was in a market composed of firms prosecuting ERISA collection actions. We also reject Moriarty’s final objection, that the district court erred by reducing the attorney’s fees because James “prevailed” on the “claims” of when James became Home’s owner. While the fee order’s language is imprecise, the district court did not abuse its discretion. At the time of this order, Moriarty had been awarded judgment on Claim II for approximately $2,400. This award means that Moriarty was still the prevailing party on Claim II, see Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 112, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) (<HOLDING>) and was entitled to reasonable fees under 29
holding failure to raise issue of improper measure of damages in trial court waived review of complaints that proper measure of damages was not submitted to jury and that plaintiff failed to present evidence on the proper measure holding that successful party is one who is the ultimate prevailing party in the litigation holding that a sentence four remand under 42 usc  405g is a final appealable decision and that a party who wins a remand under sentence four is a prevailing party for purposes of the eaja holding that a plaintiff who wins any measure of damages is a prevailing party for the purposes of feeshifting statutes holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees