them absolute immunity from suit. Hughes, 948 F.2d at 920. Thus, the threshold question we must resolve is whether appellants’ actions in voting to deny appellees’ development plan were functionally legislative. For the reasons that follow, we conclude they were not. We note initially that the mere fact that the complained-of action occurred by way of a vote does not automatically mean the action is legislative. A number of federal appellate courts have recognized that “[a]l-though a local legislator may vote on an issue, [the act of voting] alone does not necessarily determine that he or she was acting in a legislative capacity.” Brown, 970 F.2d at 437; Crymes v. DeKalb County, Ga., 923 F.2d 1482, 1485 (11th Cir.1991); see also Roberson v. Mullins, 29 F.3d 132, 134 n. 3 (4th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Because we cannot conclude appellants’
holding that a failure to approve an expenditure of money is not necessarily a legislative act holding that the hip is part of the body as opposed to part of the leg and where the effects of the loss of a member extend to other parts of the body and interfere with their efficiency the scheduled allowance for the lost member is not exclusive holding that a local governmental body exceeds its jurisdiction under crcp 106a4 when it exercises discretion it does not have holding that action of city legislative body may be judicially examined in light of its surrounding circumstances prior and subsequent actions of such legislative body and public policy in order to determine good faith of questioned action recognizing that member of local governmental body does not necessarily act in legislative capacity when participation takes form of vote