ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional act. Id.; accord Weiner v. San Diego County, 210 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir.2000). Here, plaintiff now alleges that defendant Paulson acted as an official policymaker for the county. SAC ¶ 10. With respect to defendant Paulson’s decision to refer plaintiff for criminal prosecution, this argument fails. See Pitts v. County of Kern, 17 Cal.4th 340, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 823, 949 P.2d 920 (1998) (district attorneys are arms of the State of California rather than the county in their capacity as prosecutors). But with respect to defendant Paul-son’s decision to pursue the temporary restraining order, Paulson was not acting in his capacity as a prosecutor. See City of Los Angeles v. Animal Defense League, 135 Cal.App.4th 606, 619, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 632 (2006) (<HOLDING>). The county argues that defendant Paulson is
holding that public meeting did not satisfy public participation requirement because public did not receive adequate notice holding that city did not act in its capacity as public prosecutor when filing workplace violence petitions holding that city was engaged in a proprietary capacity in operation of a sanitary landfill in part because city was receiving revenues over and beyond incidental income holding that bank could not bring counterclaim in its capacity as trustee holding that claims against a city police chief in his official capacity were really claims against the city