defer to the agency’s conclusion. See id. In light of the agency’s permissible adverse credibility finding, it did not err in denying Yangzom’s applications for relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006); Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 523 (2d Cir.2006). Finally, we note that the BIA’s alternative finding that Yangzom failed to establish that her asylum application was timely filed constituted impermissible appellate factfinding. See 8 C.F.R § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv); Padmore v. Holder, 609 F.3d 62, 67 (2d Cir.2010). However, remand would be futile as the agency’s adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence and is dis-positive of Yangzom’s claims. See Cao He Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 428 F.3d 391, 401-02 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for
holding that remand is unnecessary when it is clear that the same decision would have been reached in the absence of the errors holding there was not plain error because a different result probably would not have been reached absent the trial courts alleged error holding that conviction will not be reversed unless there is a reasonable likelihood that but for attorneys errors the result of the proceeding would have been different holding that where issues were not considered by the bia remand is appropriate holding remand not required where there is no realistic possibility that absent the errors the ij or bia would have reached a different conclusion