carrying out, and remembering simple instructions; use of judgment; responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations; and dealing with changes in a routine work setting.” Morgan v. Astrue, 11-CV-1009, 2014 WL 318184, at *9 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2014) (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521(b), 416.921(b)). “[T]he severity prong is intended as a de minimis standard to screen out only those claimants with ‘slight’ limitations that ‘do not significantly limit any basic work activity.’ ” Vicari v. Astrue, 1:05-cv-4967-ENV-WP, 2009 WL 331242, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2009) (quoting Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 158, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987) (O’Connor,' J., concurring, joined by Stevens, J.)); see also Dixon v. Shalala, 54 F.3d 1019, 1030 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Of importance, courts in the Second Circuit
holding that fiveday suspension was not a de minimis deprivation holding that the severity regulation is valid only if applied to screen out de minimis claims holding that a robbery of 40 to 50 satisfied the de minimis standard holding that district court properlydiscounted four calls as de minimis holding that to demonstrate retaliation complainedof action must be more than de minimis 