until such time as the point of arrest or accusation has been reached,’ ” and held that a particular defendant’s Miranda rights had not been violated because the point of arrest or accusation had not been reached. We later held that “Loo did not announce a ‘new’ rule.” State v. Ketchum, 97 Hawai'i 107, 123 n. 26, 34 P.3d 1006, 1022 n. 26 (2001). Fourth, judicial decisions that merely engage in statutory interpretation do not typically create new rules. See, e.g., Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 611 U.S. 298, 312-13, 114 S.Ct. 1610, 128 L.Ed.2d 274 (1994) (“A judicial construction of a statute is an authoritative statement of what the statute meant before as well as after the decision of the case giving rise to that construction.”); Garcia v. State, 125 Hawai'i 429, 263 P.3d 709 (2010) (<HOLDING>). In sum, there are four categories of cases
holding that insofar as state v tauiliili merely interpreted a statute it was not a departure from precedent but rather confirmed the law as it existed prior to that decision holding that it is not holding that state court could not have unreasonably applied federal law if no clear supreme court precedent existed holding that the court of appeals in applying state law on appeal of a diversity action must apply law of the state as it existed at the time of its decision rather than as it stood at the time the case was decided in district court holding the boards cursory departure from precedent rendered its decision arbitrary and capricious