the civil rules to RCW 71.09.090(2)). But the majority turns its back on authority to deprive Young the protections contained in the civil rules for this “civil proceeding.” ¶30 Even were this novel application appropriate here, the majority is incorrect when it states, “CR 37(b)(2)(D) conflicts with the statutory contempt authority granted under chapter 7.21 RCW.” Majority at 693. As we have repeatedly held, “[a]pparent conflicts between a court rule and a statutory provision should be harmonized and both given effect, if possible.” State v. Thomas, 121 Wn.2d 504, 511, 851 P.2d 673 (1993) (citing se the SVP statute is civil, the accused has no protection against ex post facto punishments, double jeopardy, and self-incrimination); In re Det. of Stout, 159 Wn.2d 357, 150 P.3d 86 (2007) (<HOLDING>); In re Det. of Petersen, 138 Wn.2d 70, 980
holding because the svp statute is civil the accused has no right to confront witnesses holding that an accused may not complain if the statute of limitations is extended so long as the period of time originally provided therein had not run at the time of such extension because an accused does not acquire any vested right in a statute of limitations until it has operated to bar the prosecution of the offense with which he has been charged holding because the svp is civil the accused has no constitutional right to counsel holding that an accused who has invoked the right to counsel is not subject to further interrogation unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police holding that if the reason the victim cannot testify at trial is that the accused murdered her then the accused should be deemed to have forfeited the confrontation right even though the act with which the accused is charged is the same as the one by which he allegedly rendered the witness unavailable