which a district court may depart below statutory mínimums and did not include such language in subsection (a), it should be presumed that Congress intended not to disturb statutory mínimums through application of the § 3553(a) factors. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983) (“[Wjhere Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)). Moreover, through the statutory minimum set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(A)(iv), Congress “otherwise specifically provided” that the § 3553(a) factors do not control. See Samas, 561 F.3d at 111 (<HOLDING>); Castaing-Sosa, 530 F.3d at 1361-62 (same).
holding that  3553a did not permit courts to sentence below the statutory minimums in 21 usc  841b holding that the courts statement that the sentence was sufficient and a greater sentence is not necessary did not contradict the requirements of  3553a holding that district court did not have authority to depart any further below the statutory minimum after granting the  3553e motion and therefore need not consider the  3553a factors holding that the sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum holding that sentence factor manipulation applies to statutory minimums as well as to the guidelines