a showing. Thus, to the extent that Endsley raises issues that fall outside the scope of the COA, we will not consider them here. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); 9th Cir. R. 22-1. The California Court of Appeal determined on direct appeal that the circumstances surrounding Ward’s statements provided the particularized guarantees of trustworthiness necessary to satisfy the Confrontation Clause’s “residual trustworthiness test.” See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 138, 119 S.Ct. 1887, 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999). Upon review of the record, we conclude that the California Court of Appeal’s resolution of this case was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see also United States v. Boone, 229 F.3d 1231, 1234 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Subsequent to Endsley’s conviction becoming
holding prior statement subject to crossexamination when made does not violate confrontation clause holding that hearsay argument for admission of evidence did not preserve confrontation clause challenge on appeal argument could have referred either to rules of evidence or confrontation clause but failed to identify confrontation clause as basis and thus did not put trial court on notice of issue holding that admission of business records does not violate the confrontation clause under roberts holding that admission of statement with references to we or they which did not directly implicate defendant did not violate defendants confrontation rights holding that the admission of a statement against penal interest made by an accomplice to a close friend in a private setting under circumstances suggesting residual trustworthiness did not violate the confrontation clause