construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature.” Hawkins v. Bruno Yacht Sales, Inc., 353 S.C. 31, 39, 577 S.E.2d 202, 207 (2003). The words of the statute must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resorting to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statute’s operation. Hitachi Data Sys. Corp. v. Leatherman, 309 S.C. 174, 178, 420 S.E.2d 843, 846 (1992). “The construction of a statute by the agency charged with its administration will be accorded the most respectful consideration and will not be overruled absent compelling reasons.” Brown v. South Carolina Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control, 348 S.C. 507, 515, 560 S.E.2d 410, 414 (2002); see Nucor Steel v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 310 S.C. 539, 543, 426 S.E.2d 319, 321 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, “[t]he language of a tax
recognizing that where an agency is charged with the execution of a statute the agencys interpretation should not be overruled without cogent reason holding that deference to an agency interpretation is not appropriate where a statute is administered by more than one agency holding that when a court is asked to construe an ambiguous statute it must defer to the interpretation set out in a regulation promulgated by the agency charged with administering the statute so long as the agencys interpretation is reasonable recognizing that deference to an agencys interpretation of the written law is appropriate only when that interpretation is within the written laws language holding that where multiple agencies are charged with administering a statute a single agencys interpretation is generally not entitled to chevron deference but concluding that there would be no comparable concern if all three agencies charged with administering the statute in question pressed the same interpretation before this court