196 Va. at 733, 85 S.E.2d at 255. The common law definition of “assault” as contained in Harper does not encompass this type of intentional conduct, which is intended to be frightening but is performed without a present ability to produce the end if carried out. Because of the limitations of this common law rule, “most modern codes either include physical menacing in the crime of assault or else create a separate crime of ‘menacing’ or ‘threatening’ covering such conduct.” 2 LaFave and Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 7.16(b), at 315 n. 27 (1986). When legislatures statutorily define the crime in this manner “[f]or this type of assault, a present ability to inflict injury is clearly unnecessary.” Id. at 315. See e.g. Williamson v. United States, 445 A.2d 975, 978 (D.C.App.1982) (<HOLDING>); Barrios v. State, 118 Md.App. 384, 702 A.2d
holding that illegal state regulation can be accomplished either by an award of damages or by legislative enactment holding that lack of consent may be established by adequate circumstantial evidence holding that it may not holding that validity of contract may be established by one or more writings signed by party to be charged holding that by statute an assault is established by proving a menacing threat which may or may not be accomplished by a specific intent to injure