§ 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas cor-28 U.S.C. § 2254. 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (footnote omitted). Because a judgment in favor of Reed would “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” id. at 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, and because Reed has not “demonstrate[d] that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated,” id., we conclude that his claim for money damages is likewise not cognizable under § 1983. See also Edwards v. Balisock, 520 U.S. 641, 648, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997) (<HOLDING>). However, where a prisoner “seek[s] injunctive
holding that heck is applicable to  1983 suits premised on alleged violations of prison disciplinary procedures holding that a state university is not a person within the meaning of  1983 and therefore is not subject to suits brought under  1983 holding heck applicable to claims that implicate the validity of civil commitment proceedings holding that the proper procedures for challenging the results of a prison disciplinary hearing are appeal administrative review collateral attack or habeas corpus holding that there is an exhaustion requirement in  1983 suits asserting violations of the medicaid act