to the child is exacerbated by their cireulation"); United States v. Sherman, 268 F.3d 539, 545 (7th Cir.2001) (even a "passive consumer who merely receives or possesses the images directly contributes to this continuing victimization."). Moreover, "the recipient may be considered to be invading the privacy of the children depicted, directly victimizing these children." United States v. Norris, 159 F.3d at 930. Each time Brown viewed and/or disseminated an image of child pornography, he violated each child's "individual interest in avoiding the disclosure of personal matters." United States v. Sherman, 268 F.3d at 546. Finally, it seems clear that the child pornography industry would not exist but for patrons such as Brown. See United States v. Boos, 127 F.3d 1207, 1210 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Tillmon, 195 F.3d 640, 644
holding that although the father did not have physical custody of his children at the time they were removed the children were nonetheless effectively removed from both their parents when they were removed from the physical custody of the mother and placed in another home pursuant to the dispositional decree holding that the transferee provided sufficient evidence that its transfer comported with industry standards the transferee proved that probably eight to ten percent of its accounts were on a similar pay schedule as the debtors and that working with delinquent customers as long as some type of payment was forthcoming was common industry practice holding that police lawfully entered defendants residence to assist children after defendant admitted that the children were not his and that he had been arrested for indecency with a child previously recognizing that children were  injured both physically and psychologically as a result of the defendants patronage of the porn industry holding that the plaintiffs liability to the defendant was absolved as a result of the bankruptcy order and the defendants were barred from collecting debts from property of the plaintiffs