does not provide any structure. The limitation is drafted as a function to be performed rather than definite structure or materials. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6; Chiuminatta, 145 F.3d at 1307, 46 USPQ2d at 1755. La Gard asserts that a “lever moving element” is a known structure in the lock art, but the district court determined otherwise. While true that “[m]any devices take their names from the functions they perform,” Greenberg, 91 F.3d at 1580, 39 USPQ2d at 1786, the “substantially non-resilient lever moving element” of claim 3 is not one of them. The district court determined that a “lever moving element” had not been shown to have a generally understood structural meaning in the art. See Mas-Hamilton, 21 F.Supp.2d at 730-31. We agree. See Green-berg, at 1583, 39 USPQ2d at 1786, (<HOLDING>)- La Gard has not directed this court to any
holding that what is a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech holding that a claim was not indefinite for using the term selector because it was a standard component and its structure was well known in the art holding that when a term is defined in the statute it need not be further alleged in the indictment holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance holding that what is important is not simply that the element at issue is defined in terms of what it does but that the term as the name for a structure has a reasonably well understood meaning in the art