dissection. Appellant did not tell the agents he did not want to talk with them. Appellant stated, “I ain’t got nothing else to say man.” This statement is ambiguous because it is unclear whether appellant lacked additional information or the desire to share it. Unlike Day, in which the defendant’s statement implicitly referenced a recent Miranda warning, appellant’s alleged invocation of his right to silence occurred long after receiving the Miranda warning. As the district court observed, appellant was “incessantly cooperative” with the agents throughout the interview. Unlike Day’s refusal to say anything to his interrogators, appellant’s behavior indicated that he had no reservations about talking with the agents. See also State v. Jobe, 486 N.W.2d 407, 416 (Minn.1992) (<HOLDING>). Based on the totality of circumstances
holding that a defendants statement that he did not want to talk about what he did the night before but was willing to talk about lighter subjects was not an unequivocal invocation of his right to remain silent in part because the defendant previously exhibited willingness to talk with police holding that officers failure to talk to asserted alibi witnesses did not constitute a violation of the defendants constitutional rights holding that a suspects statements to the police to the effect that his constitution will protect him that the police have nothing along with his negative response to a police question whether he had anything to say about what he was being arrested for followed by his question who said i did this did not amount to a clear invocation of the right to remain silent under davis holding that doyle applied to statement as regards to what happened this evening i want to talk to my attorney holding i might want to talk to an attorney to be ambiguous