§ 507(a)(7)(E), even though the Bankruptcy Code itself provides no definition of ‘excise,’ ‘tax,’ or ‘excise tax.’ ” Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. at 220, 116 S.Ct. 2106. Even when the definition appears in a single statute, our sister circuits have also held that definitions limited to one section should not be applied to another section. Thus, for example, the Fourth Circuit held that, where Congress limited the definition of “investigative or law enforcement officer” to 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), “[t]o apply the § 2680(h) definition beyond that subsection would make meaningless the limitation that Congress placed on the definition.” Andrews v. United States, 441 F.3d 220, 226 (4th Cir.2006); see also U.S. Postal Serv. v. Amada, 200 F.3d 647, 650-51 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that § 1337 is not designed to
holding that the categorical approach applies to the identical definition of crime of violence in 18 usc  16 holding that the definition of operating deficits is not ambiguous despite the absence of a definition of the phrase in the contract holding that the definition of supplier under the ocspa is substantially broader than the definition of debt collector under the fdcpa holding that for purposes of 18 usc  924e involuntary manslaughter in ohio is a violent felony the definition of which is identical for all relevant purposes to the definition of crime of violence in  4b12a holding that where the definition of lottery is expressly limited to 18 usc  1307b the definition cannot be applied to a related civil statute