the disclosure statement alongside the plan to determine whether the trustee has standing. Although no court of appeals has addressed whether the disclosure statement may be consulted for purposes of standing, courts routinely consult the disclosure statement in deciding whether res judicata and judicial estoppel apply. See, e.g., Browning Mfg. v. Mims (In re Coastal Plains, Inc.), 179 F.3d 197, 208 (5th Cir.1999) (explaining that claims must be revealed in plan and disclosure statement or trustee may be judicially estopped from pursuing them); Browning v. Levy, 283 F.3d 761, 774 (6th Cir.2002) (considering whether the disclosure statement properly preserved claims or whether res judicata and judicial estoppel should be applied); In re Kelley, 199 B.R. 698, 704 (9th Cir. BAP 1996) (<HOLDING>). In addition, several lower courts have held
holding the court cannot find intent where the consent judgment fails to mention the cause of action holding appeal not moot when court could order debtor to return to the estate postconfirmation distributions of pension plan assets holding that if the debtor fails to mention the cause of action in either his schedules disclosure statement or plan then he will be precluded from asserting it postconfirmation holding that a plan provision purporting to provide jurisdiction over any and all actions involving the debtor postconfirmation was invalid as beyond the scope of the bankruptcy code holding confirmation vested property in the debtor and therefore properly of the estate was not liable for postconfirmation taxes incurred by debtor