aware of the Miranda warnings and their “right to remain silent.” Turner, 454 A.2d at 540 (quoting Commonwealth v. Easley, 396 A.2d at 1200-01 n. 5). Similarly, we have interpreted Dravecz to prohibit the use of silence as an implied admission where the silence occurred when in custody or “in the presence of police,” although it did not extend to the use of silence as an implied admission outside the presence of police. Commonwealth v. Coccioletti, 493 Pa. 103, 425 A.2d 387, 392 (1981) (opining that silence in the face of co-participant’s inculpatory declaration was admissible pursuant to the implied admission exception to hearsay rule, given that it occurred outside the presence of police); accord Combs, 205 F.3d at 283 (quoting Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1565 (1st Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>)). Thus, we conclude that the timing of the
holding that if a suspects response to an illegal stop is itself a new distinct crime then the police constitutionally may arrest the suspect for that crime holding it is fundamental error to convict a defendant of crime not charged and which is not a lesser included offense of the charged crime holding that duress is a defense available in new mexico except when the crime charged is a homicide or a crime requiring intent to kill holding the crime of conspiracy is committed or not before the substantive crime begins holding that application of the privilege is not limited to persons in custody or charged with a crime it may also be asserted by a suspect who is questioned during the investigation of a crime