of the rescue doctrine— there is no enforceable duty to rescue another individual. The only difference is that where the potential rescuer is the government, the argument for imposing such a duty to an individual is stronger because it is the government’s job to provide protection to the community at large. Our public duty cases stand for the proposition that notwithstanding this difference, the existence of an obligation to protect "everyone" will not be treated as a duty to any particular individual. That is as far as our precedents have gone. See note 6, infra. For the reasons stated below in the text of this opinion, I do not think that we should now go further. 6 . Compare Warner, supra, note 4, 580 A.2d at 130-31, and Hines v. District of Columbia, 580 A.2d 133, 136-37 (D.C.1990) (<HOLDING>), with Johnson v. District of Columbia, 580
holding that the district court must find a total failure to respond to the discovery requested holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state holding that the public duty doctrine applied to bar claim against city for negligence in housing inspections holding that public duty doctrine barred suit against district for failure of ambulance service to respond promptly to calls for help holding in case where claim was that the decedent would have survived his stroke if an ambulance had been sent when first summoned that the public duty doctrine barred a suit alleging negligent and inept failure to dispatch an ambulance