offense and informs the defendant of the charges against him so that he can prepare his defense and be protected against double jeopardy. See United States v. Jackson, 327 F.3d 273, 290 (4th Cir.2003). Here, the indictment adequately alleged the elements of a conspiracy under § 371. See id.; United States v. Ellis, 121 F.3d 908, 922 (4th Cir.1997) (providing elements). Moreover, the uncontroverted evidence at trial was clearly sufficient to prove that Hemby-Brown conspired to defraud financial institutions that were FDIC-insured. For example, several vehicles were purchased by using information provided by Hemby-Brown to obtain financing from Wachovia Bank, First Citizen’s Bank, and Chase Manhattan Bank, all FDIC-insured. See United States v. Janati, 374 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). We therefore affirm Hemby-Brown’s conviction.
holding that when an indictment charges several acts conjunctively under a statute which subjects several alternative acts to the same punishment the government need only prove violation of one of the alleged acts to prove violation of the statute holding that the government must prove the facts used in sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence holding that government may prove facts outside the overt acts alleged in the indictment holding that the striking similarity between the acts alleged in the indictment and the prior incidents rendered incidents that occurred fifteen years prior to the acts alleged in the indictment relevant and admissible under rule 404b holding that when an indictment alleges nonessential facts the government need not prove them in order to sustain a conviction