Respondents reversed their position at oral argument) that once subsection four applies, subsection one no longer governs. The parties do dispute the meaning of the word “claimant” in subsection four. Under the plurality’s view, as Chief Justice Eismann points out in the Gillihan II dissent, the word “claimant” in subsection four must be synonymous with the idea of “prevailing party.” This is because, in order for the word “claimant” in subsection four to refer to either the defendant or plaintiff, it must also signify that such a defendant or plaintiff has prevailed in the personal injury action, since losing parties do not recover attorney fees under Idaho law. See Gillihan II at 271, 92 P.3d at 521 (Eismann, J., concurring in disse 53 Idaho 200, 201, 23 P.2d 739, 740 (1933) (<HOLDING>); In re Segregation of School Dist. No. 58 from
holding elimination of provisions prior to passage of bill requiring a certificate of convenience and necessity indicates legislature intentionally omitted such provisions holding that statutory notice provisions for notice of default and opportunity to cure were waived by provisions of note as to one obligor though provisions applied to coobligor who used property as residence holding that the hearing provisions of the ina supersede the provisions of the apa holding predecessor statute unconstitutional specifically because of vicariousliability provisions elimination of intent requirement holding that such provisions are valid