Cir.1989) (noting that “the ‘in relation to’ language was calculated to avoid convictions for ‘inadvertently carrying a firearm in an unrelated crime’ ” (quoting United States v. Ramos, 861 F.2d 228, 231 (9th Cir.1988))); United States v. Brown, 915 F.2d 219, 226 (6th Cir.1990) (noting that courts should not determine whether a defendant “used” a firearm by focussing solely on the defendant’s intentions but should “examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime”). The only major difference between this case and Beverly or Coburn is that Blankenship had already been arrested at a different location by the time the officers searched the room. This distinction is legally insignificant. See United States v. Hadfield, 918 F.2d 987, 996-98 (1st Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, we find that the strand of
holding that the defendant was entitled to a new trial where the only witnesses to a drug transaction other than the defendant were an fbi agent and a cl holding that the tax was not direct even though the government imposed it on the estate rather than the recipient holding that evidence was sufficient to support a conviction under section 924c1 even though the weapons were located at a storage facility rather than at the site of the anticipated drug transaction holding merely that the evidence was sufficient to support the award of attorneys fees holding that evidence of prior drug sales was sufficiently similar to the crimes charged  to be probative of the fact that the defendant was not merely an innocent driver who was involved in the drug transaction by accident