state. We cannot subscribe to such an illogical reading of West. As Judge Motz noted in her concurrence in Holly, West itself rejected the notion that “by adding an additional layer, the government can contract away its constitutional duties.” Id. at 299 n. 1 (Motz, J., concurring in the judgment). Instead, West makes clear that “ ‘[contracting out’ care ‘does not relieve’ the government of its ‘constitutional duty’ to provide adequate care or ‘deprive inmates of the means to vindicate their Eighth Amendment rights.’ ” Id. (quoting West, 487 U.S. at 55-56,108 S.Ct. 2250). Nor do we find convincing the Fourth Circuit’s reliance on Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 117 S.Ct. 2100, 138 L.Ed.2d 540 (1997). See Holly, 434 F.3d at 293. Contrary to the Fourth Circuit’s holding, ir.2000) (<HOLDING>). In Richardson, the Court explained that
holding that private defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity but remanding for a determination of whether they were liable as government actors holding that an officer applying for a warrant without probable cause may be entitled to qualified immunity but is not entitled to absolute immunity holding that such a physician was a state actor under  1983 holding that a private physician contracting with a county psychiatric hospital was liable as a state actor but was not entitled to qualified immunity holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity