for discrimination merely by violating another law or statute. We hold that a discriminatory decision made in violation of the Open Meetings Act can serve as the basis for a discrimination suit even though the decision is later declared void for violating the Open Meetings Act. Our next inquiry is whether colon cancer can constitute a handicap. Although the handicap discrimination statute does not contain a definition of handicap, the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”) defines handicap as: (I) A physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one (1) or more of such person’s major life activities; or (ii) A record of having such an impairment; or (in) Being regarded as having such an impairment. Tenn.Code Ann. § 4-21-102(9); see Cecil v. Gibson, 820 S.W.2d 361 (Tenn.App.1991) (<HOLDING>). The THRA’s definition of handicap includes
holding that in the absence of a statutory definition a term should be accorded its ordinary meaning holding that where the definition of lottery is expressly limited to 18 usc  1307b the definition cannot be applied to a related civil statute holding that such circumstantial evidence may be used to prove discrimination holding that the definition of operating deficits is not ambiguous despite the absence of a definition of the phrase in the contract holding that since the handicap discrimination statute embodies rights contained in the thra the thra definition of handicap should be used