it is not claimed to be, unusually complex. The need may also be the witness’s, a witness, for example, whose own testimony will be based on the testimony of others. United States v. Lussier, 929 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court did not sequester the IRS agent who testified as to the amount of tax due as a summation of testimony by other witnesses). An expert witness, of course, may base his or her opinions on “facts or data ... made known to the expert at ... the hearing.” KRE 703(a). If an opinion expert’s only way to learn the facts material to his or her opinion is to hear the trial testimony of other witnesses, then a trial court abuses its discretion by sequestering that expert. Malek v. Federal Ins. Co., 994 F.2d 49 (2nd Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>); Seschillie, 310 F.3d at 1208 (holding that
holding trial court properly permitted party to use undesignated expert to rebut a material and unanticipated change in testimony of the opposing partys expert holding that fire expert should not have been sequestered where opposing expert testified to facts and theories not revealed prior to trial holding expert testimony was based on reasonable medical probability where there were multiple possible causes and expert testified that one cause was more probable than the others holding that using the opinions of an expert that were not testified to during trial which were irrelevant and solely used to destroy the credibility of the expert was not admissible holding that trial counsels performance was not deficient for failing to give a mental health expert additional information because the expert testified at the evidentiary hearing that the collateral data would not have changed his testimony