court had not resolved, on the merits, whether LaConsay and Wetzel were entitled to recover litigation expenses in the condemnation action. Upon dismissal of their October 2006 appeals, LaConsay and Wetzel properly returned to the probate court for a ruling on their still pending motions for litigation expenses. The probate court subsequently ruled upon those pending motions, awarding litigation expenses to LaConsay and Wetzel. Langley appealed that award to the circuit court, and LaConsay and Wet-zel cross-appealed; those second appeals were timely and properly filed. See § 18-1A-283, AIa.Code 1975 (allowing parties to a condemnation action in the probate court 30 days in which to appeal to the circuit court for a de novo trial). See also Holman v. Bane, 698 So.2d 117, 120 (Ala.1997) (<HOLDING>); and Paulk v. McCarty, 855 So.2d 1123
recognizing that an appeal filed within 30 days of the entry of an order awarding attorney fees was timely filed as to the issue of attorney fees holding because an award of attorney fees is discretionary court may consider attorney fees in relation to the underlying equities in the case holding that correct way to perfect claim for attorney fees under  285 is through compliance with fedrcivp 54d2b which requires motions for attorney fees to be filed no later than 14 days after entry of judgment holding that bank was entitled to attorney fees on appeal when agreement did not prohibit such fees holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal because it was filed before the final order awarding attorneys fees