letter to appellant, redefining his sales territory and specifying the manner in which he would be paid his future commissions. In its third letter dated May 27, 1997, appellee acknowledged its earlier commitment to appellant “to make no changes for one year.” However, appellee then proceeded, unilaterally, to terminate appellant’s status as an “installing dealer,” thereby reducing the amount of commissions he would receive on future sales. Although the writings in evidence do not expressly state the beginning and ending dates of a particular one-year period, we find there is legally sufficient evidence, albeit circumstantial, from which a jury could make that determination. See Templeton v. Nocona Hills Owners Assn., Inc., 555 S.W.2d 534, 539 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1977, no writ) (<HOLDING>). For example, if a jury, after hearing all the
holding that interest does not begin to accrue until the date of judgment not the date of verdict holding that employment was at will despite a reference to events in the employment listing that could be used as a termination date holding that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that an oral agreement existed and that it was not modified holding that evidence was sufficient for jury to determine date employment was to begin holding there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the defendant did not intend to perform when the promise was made