the courts, ranging from diminution credits earned to the exercise of discretion by the Parole Commission. Accordingly, we hold today that parole eligibility is not a direct consequence of a plea and thus it follows that a defendant need not be informed of parole ramifications for a guilty plea to be voluntary. This same conclusion has been reached by numerous other courts, and has been implicitly recognized by the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Hill, 474 U.S. at 56, 106 S.Ct. at 369, 88 L.Ed.2d at 208 (“We have never held that the United States Constitution requires the State to furnish a defendant with information about parole eligibility in order for the defendant’s plea of guilty to be voluntary____”); United States v. Sanclemente-Bejarano, 861 F.2d 206, 209 (9th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Brown v. Perini, 718 F.2d 784, 788 (6th
holding that a defendant must have knowledge of the likely consequences of entering the guilty plea in order for a plea to be voluntary and knowing holding that a plea was voluntary and intelligent despite the states failure to supply the defendant with information about his parole eligibility date holding that rule 11 does not require court to ensure that defendant understands consequences of nolo contendere plea on parole eligibility in sexual assault case holding consistent with hill and with every other circuit that has addressed the question that fedrcrimp 11c does not require trial courts to inform a defendant of parole eligibility consequences of a guilty plea holding that the defendants guilty plea was valid where the district court carefully questioned the defendant about whether he understood the consequences of his guilty plea