is not granted,” but does not “disallow every appeal when a rehearing is granted.” 307 S.W.3d at 275. Instead, the concurrence crafts an exception for a vaca- tur with rehearing that “amounts to a denial of confirmation.” Id. at 275. This interpretation sidesteps the statute’s plain language, further eviscerating subsection (5)’s policy that disallows an appeal when an order, which grants a rehearing, is interlocutory. Even the court of appeals in this case rejected such an argument, conceding that “[ujnder the plain language of the statute, a party can appeal the denial of an application to confirm an arbitration award, but cannot appeal an order which vacates an award and directs a rehearing.” 209 S.W.3d at 893. Furthermore, the concurrence’s argument contradicts e Ct.App.1965) (<HOLDING>); Max Rieke & Bros., Inc. v. Van Deurzen &
holding that an appeal from an order vacating an award while directing a rehearing is an appeal improvidently taken holding that order vacating award and ordering rehearing is analogous to order granting new trial holding an appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion to compel arbitration holding that an order vacating an arbitration award and directing a rehearing is the functional equivalent of an order granting a new trial holding that pennsylvanias equivalent of 171098a5 implies that an appeal cannot be taken from an order vacating an arbitration award and directing a rehearing