the statement by physical or psychological coercion or by improper inducement so that the suspect’s will was overborne.” United States v. Leon Guerrero, 847 F.2d 1363, 1366 (9th Cir.1988). See also Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 30, 97 S.Ct. 202, 50 L.Ed.2d 194 (1976) (per curiam). Beaty primarily argues that his confession was involuntary because he signed a confidentiality agreement, which promised that “all group communication” would be kept confidential. In particular, Beaty claims that Pens v. Bail, 902 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir.1990) (per curiam) presents materially identical circumstances. In Pens, the petitioner was convicted of rape and committed to the custody of a state hospital for “sexual psychopath treatment.” Id. at 1465. The petitioner was required to divulg 7 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Robinson, 439 F.2d 553, 560
holding that payment made in reasonable belief that it was required by an insurance contract was involuntary holding that the defendants statement was involuntary because it was made during a court ordered mental examination and a state statute provided that such statements would remain confidential holding that a statement from a conversation admitted under the stateofmind exception to the hearsay rule was nontestimonial because it was private not made under examination not contained in a formalized document such as an affidavit deposition or prior testimony transcript and not made under circumstances in which an objective person would reasonably believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial holding that the defendants statement was involuntary because federal officer made a direct promise of confidentiality holding that statements made during a compulsory psychological examination are admissible to rebut a defendants diminished capacity defense