and that “[p]risons are a place for punishment.” Even though his initial proposal was never in fact acted on by the legislature, we consider his comments as part of the background. Analysis of the Ex Post Facto Clause claim involves a two-part inquiry. The first asks whether the denial of the right to vote is a civil, regulatory measure within the meaning of the caselaw, or whether it is punitive. “[W]here unpleasant consequences are brought to bear upon an individual for prior conduct,” the central question “is whether the legislative aim was to punish that individual for past activity, or whether the restriction of the individual comes about as a relevant incident to a regulation of a present situation.” De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160, 80 S.Ct. 1146, 4 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1960) (<HOLDING>). Only a punitive measure can violate the Ex
holding that retroactive application of mvra does not violate the ex post facto clause because restitution is not a criminal punishment holding that the ex post facto clause  has no application to deportation holding that parole guidelines are subject to the ex post facto clause holding that state statutory bans against employment of convicted felons in certain jobs did not impose punishment under ex post facto clause holding that the supreme courts ex post facto precedents do not clearly establish that amended section 29336 violates the ex post facto clause