the 5th of February during leap year, it would end on the 5th of March, although twenty-nine days elapse. If it begins on the 5th of June, it would end on the 5th of July, although thirty days had elapsed. Id. at 565-66 (citing Gardner v. Universal Life & Accident Ins. Co., 164 S.W.2d 582, 583 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1942, writ dism’d w.o.j.); McKinney v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. 387, 66 S.W. 769, 770 (1902)). Thus, under Pitcock, a calendar month runs from the date of the event to the same , 777 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ) (noting that where appellant’s cause of action accrued on May 29, 1976, application of two-year limitations period meant appellant’s cause of action was barred on May 29,1978); Seibert v. Sally, 238 S.W.2d 266, 267 (Tex.Civ.App.—Galveston 1951, no writ) (<HOLDING>); Ellis v. Heidnck, 154 S.W.2d 293, 294
holding that where promissory note was dated september 261945 suit filed on september 26 1949 was filed within applicable fouryear limitations period holding that the promissory note was a negotiable instrument as opposed to a contract for the purposes of determining the applicable statute of limitations holding that when the basis of the earlier suit was that the plaintiff had had defaulted on a promissory note and the claim in the instant action is whether that promissory note was valid the transaction test is met holding that limitations provision of section 1821d14 of firrea is applicable to suit on note brought by fdics assignee preempts state fouryear limitations period and extends limitation period to six years holding that the charge was timely when filed within the statute of limitations period even though served after the period