(8) at all; with respect to subsection (3), it states only that it “requires the motion to be made within a reasonable time,” a requirement that did not appear in former ORS 419B.420. Nor was the issue discussed during the legislature’s consideration of the bill. 7 Compare Stevenson v. U. S. National Bank, 296 Or 495, 677 P2d 696 (1984), in which the Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s authority, under ORCP 71A and C, to set aside the judgment and reenter a substantially similar one 30 days later, where the trial court mistakenly entered the judgment when the matter was still under advisement and there was nothing to indicate that the court’s sole purpose in doing so was to extend the time for appeal. See also Amvesco, Inc. v. Key Title Co., 69 Or App 740, 745, 687 P2d 1121 (1984) (<HOLDING>). 8 Although the statute also precludes the
holding that a judgment is subject to collateral attack where  the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction with respect to the power of the court to render the particular judgment or decree as where the court  exceeds the powers conferred on it by constitutional or statutory provisions holding that the trial court in entering judgment affirming an earlier judgment for an award of attorney fees after having discovered that it mistakenly entered the earlier judgment before the expiration of time for the filing of objections had the inherent power under orcp 71 cs modification authority to change the effective date of the judgment without vacating or setting aside the judgment holding that filing of an answer up to the time of signing of judgment renders the judgment an absolute nullity holding that the requirement to serve a motion for attorney fees or costs within thirty days after filing of judgment applies even where the final judgment reserves jurisdiction to award same holding that a second judgment controls over an earlier judgment entered in the same case