a debt.’ ” Id. Thus, although the Massey defendants’ practice involved their regularly conducting non-judicial foreclosures to enforce their clients’ security interest in mortgaged property, defendants were not acting as general “debt collectors,” unless they also took other actions, beyond those necessary to foreclose under the deed of trust, were regularly taken in an effort to collect a debt. In contrast to non-judicial foreclosures, which are intended only to enforce the lender’s security interest and not to collect the underlying debt, a typical judicial foreclosure usually does involve seeking a personal judgment against the debtor for a deficiency and hence would likely amount to debt collection. See McDaniel v. South & Assocs., P.C., 325 F.Supp.2d 1210, 1216-1218 (D.Kan.2004) (<HOLDING>). In his affidavit, Massey acknowledges that
holding that the defendants actions in filing judicial foreclosure proceeding against mortgagor amounted to debt collection activity under the fdcpa and distinguishing decisions involving pursuit of nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings under a deed of trust from those in which a defendant has pursued judicial foreclosure proceedings which included seeking judgment on a note  by filing a lawsuit in state court holding that where the violation of the fdcpa was the filing of a lawsuit the statule of limitations begins to run on the date of filing holding that law firm executing nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding was enforcing a security interest rather than collecting a debt and hence fell outside the ambit of the fdcpa except for the provisions of section 1692f6 holding that pursuit of a parallel state court lawsuit involving claims and parties common to the federal action does not justify the district courts intervention in state court proceedings holding that an entity engaged in collection activity on a defaulted debt acquired from another is a debt collector under the fdcpa even though it may actually be owed the debt