employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties. At first blush, both the rationale and method of analysis in preemption cases are straightforward: § 301 was intended “to ensure uniform interpretation of collective-bargaining agreements.” Lingle, 486 U.S. at 404, 108 S.Ct. at 1880. Therefore, preemption will be found only if the application of state law “requires the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement.” Id. at 413, 108 S.Ct. at 1885; see also Ackerman v. Western Electric Co., Inc., 860 F.2d 1514, 1517 (9th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). The question, in sum, is whether “the state
holding that if the state law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement the claim is independent for  301 preemption purposes holding that in cases involving claims against fellow employees where the question of section 301 preemption has arisen courts have governed their determinations on the preemption by the necessity of referring to a collective bargaining agreement for resolution of the claim rather than by the individual status of the defendant holding that state court with jurisdiction over  301 claim should have applied federal labor law rather than state contract law holding that the statelaw protecting employees from retaliatory discharge was independent from the cba because the statelaw claim could be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself holding state law claim preempted by  301 of labor management relations act only if application of state law requires interpretation of collective bargaining agreement