legislature is aware of judicial construction of a statute, and from its failure to amend a particular statutory provision, we may presume it acquiesces in that construction.”). Therefore, the legislature’s failure to amend N.D.C.C. § 19-03.1-22.2 “ ‘is evidence the court’s interpretation is in accordance with the legislative intent.’ ” Ro-denburg, at ¶ 26 (quoting Clarys v. Ford Motor Co., 1999 ND 72, ¶ 16, 592 N.W.2d 573). [¶ 21] Our decision in Geiser comports with a majority of jurisdictions. A majority of states have held that a viable fetus is not a child for purposes of criminal prosecution of a mother who ingests a controlled substance during pregnancy. See Geiser, 2009 ND 36, 763 N.W.2d 469; see also Reinesto v. Superior Ct. of Ariz., 182 Ariz. 190, 894 P.2d 733 (Ct.App.1995) (<HOLDING>); Reyes v. Superior Ct. of San Bernardino
holding a mother may not be held criminally liable under a reckless endangerment statute for the effect that prenatal ingestion of a controlled substance may have on her child pre or postbirth holding that mother could not be prosecuted under child abuse statute for prenatal use of heroin holding reckless injury and attempted firstdegree intentional homicide statutes were not applicable to a mother who consumed excessive amounts of alcohol causing injury to her child postpartum holding a mother was not criminally liable for knowingly causing injury to a child under circumstances likely to produce death or serious physical injury after the mothers prebirth ingestion of heroin caused her child to suffer heroin withdrawal symptoms postpartum holding a mother not criminally liable for child endangerment for ingesting heroin while pregnant