privacy based on false light in Duhammel, should also be required elements of a claim for invasion of privacy based on publicity given to private life. We therefore find that appellants’ failure to state a cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress is fatal to each of their privacy claims as well. Count III of the appellants’ complaint sets forth the claim of liability for intended consequences. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 870(1977). The principle has not been adopted in Arizona and even in those jurisdictions where it is recognized, it is inapplicable “where plaintiff can have adequate redress by any of the forms of action known and practiced.” 14 C.J.S. Case § 2 at 4 (1939). See, e.g., Cartwright v. Golub Corp., 51 A.D.2d 407, 381 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1976) (<HOLDING>). A review of appellants’ multi-count complaint
holding that where the specific acts alleged are defamatory the only remedy lies in the traditional tort of defamation holding that the burden lies with the plaintiff in a rule 12b motion holding that although the form of relief alone does not govern the categorization of a claim as a tort or other type of action a trial court must consider the nature of the relief sought to determine whether a particular claim lies in tort or could lie in tort holding that economic loss rule precluded the plaintiffs tort claims because they only alleged injuries to the subject of the contract itself holding that the primary obligation for the disclosure of matters which are essentially in the prosecutorial domain lies with the government