between life and death,” and “[t]he appearance of the offender during the penalty phase in shackles ... almost inevitably implies to a jury ... that court authorities consider the offender a danger to the community,” a factor that is “nearly always ... relevant” in death-penalty determinations. Id. at 632-33, 125 S.Ct. 2007. Deck also reiterates a second important proposition — namely, that the visible shackling of a defendant before the jury is “inherently prejudicial.” Deck, 544 U.S. at 635, 125 S.Ct. 2007. Generally speaking, a criminal defendant who attacks a verdict against him must show not only that an error occurred at trial, but also that the error was prejudicial to his defense. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (<HOLDING>). To overcome that hurdle, “[t]he defendant
recognizing that the burden of persuasion for a showing of prejudice was on the defendant holding that an assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice holding that no heightened showing is required holding that a showing of prejudice is generally required in the context of an ineffectiveassistance claim holding that generally an unsworn statement by counsel is not evidence in the context of a batson hearing