decision that, generally, cannot and will not “serve as the basis for an ineffective assistance claim.” Indeed, a strategy that “presents alternative defense theories — all of which are better for the defendant than the prosecut 2d 645) (2006); see White, 315 Ga. App. at 63 (7) (noting that it is not enough for the defendant to show that she would have a better chance of acquittal at a separate trial or that the evidence against a co-defendant is stronger, rather the defendant must show clearly that a joint trial prejudiced her defense, resulting in a denial of due process). 33 State v. Austin, 297 Ga. App. 478, 478 (677 SE2d 706) (2009) (punctuation omitted); accord Ham, 303 Ga. App. at 237 (1) (b); see Green ee also Alvelo v. State, 290 Ga. 609, 614 (5) (724 SE2d 377) (2012) (<HOLDING>); Wheeler v. State, 327 Ga. App. 313, 318 (3)
holding that ocga  17858 b requires an appellate court to revie w for plain error an alleged juryinstruction error to which no objection was raised at trial holding that the failure to charge an essential element of a crime in the indictment is an error which should be noted by an appellate court sua sponte as plain error holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error holding that claims of rule 32h notice error are reviewed for plain error in the absence of an objection holding that omission was not plain error