concessions because it is a right of transcendent value to the society as a whole, not just to the individual teacher negotiating the contract. Similarly, the conditions or restrictions which may be placed on such speech as conditions of employment are also of concern to society as a whole, and may properly be determined, unlike the case with drug testing, not by reference to the agreement of the parties, but in light of the values of safeguarding robust speech in the marketplace generally, and in the academic setting in particular. Preemption, therefore is not required in all cases of MCRA claims for interference with speech, because it is not a right that necessarily depends upon the agreement of the parties. See Paradis v. United Technologies, 672 F.Supp. 67, 70 (D.Conn.1987) (<HOLDING>). See also Barron v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 704
recognizing retaliatory discharge claim where employer prevented employees exercise of workers compensation rights because of employees intention to file claim holding that claim under connecticut law for employer discrimination based upon the employees exercise of privacy and free speech rights not preempted recognizing that free exercise claims implicating other constitutional protections such as free speech could qualify for strict scrutiny review to the extent the plaintiff could make out a colorable claim that it was denied an exemption from the school districts nondiscrimination claim based on religion or content of speech holding that campaign money laundering was in furtherance of political speech but an invalid exercise of free speech rights because it was illegal holding that claim of breach of fiduciary duty can be resolved under connecticut law