U.S. at 625-28, 103 S.Ct. 2591). This presumption implies that [i]t is not enough to show that various government entities or officials represent a majority of the shareholders or constitute a majority of the board of directors of the applicable agency or instrumentality; in other words, mere involvement by the state in the affairs of an agency or instrumentality does not answer the question whether the agency or instrumentality is controlled by the state for purposes of FSIA. Id. The Supreme Court has nevertheless held that “where a corporate entity is so extensively controlled by its owner that a relationship of principal and agent is created, ... one may be held liable for the actions of the other.” BANCEC, 462 U.S. at 629, 103 S.Ct. 2591; see also Foremost-McKesson, 905 F.2d at 440 (<HOLDING>). In addition, the Supreme Court has “long
holding that where daytoday operations were within sole control of the franchisee no agency relationship existed with franchisor holding that a corporate entity must be represented by licensed counsel holding that a district court must consider whether a foreign state so dominated the operations of the corporate entity that a principalagent relationship existed holding that because the corporate parent and subsidiary defendants before it observed all of the corporate formalities necessary to maintain corporate separateness notwithstanding the parents active involvement in the subsidiaries operations the evidence did not establish that the entities were alter egos of one another holding that connecticut courts look to the identity or instrumentality test to determine whether one corporate entity can properly be held responsible for the obligations of another corporate entity