credibility determination of the jury, and overturn a verdict only when the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from which the jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Szarwark, 168 F.3d 993, 995 (7th Cir.1999) (quoting United States v. Moore, 115 F.3d 1348, 1363 (7th Cir.1997)). 1. Conspiracy Count 1 charged Smallwood with conspiring with Generally to distribute crack cocaine between April and September of 1996. In order to establish such a conspiracy, the government was required to prove the existence of “an agreement to commit a crime other than the crime that consists of the sale itself.” United States v. Lechuga, 994 F.2d 346, 347 (7th Cir.1993) (en banc). Evidence of a buyer-seller relationship is insufficient. See id., at 349 (<HOLDING>). Smallwood contends that the government’s
holding that a seller could enforce an arbitration provision against a buyer even though only the buyer had signed the provision holding that so long as the seller did not have an agreement with the buyer during the term of the listing agreement it was free to delay selling until after the listing agreement had expired even where the delay was for the purpose of escaping the payment of a commission holding that conspiracy instruction accurately stated the law and properly emphasized the necessity of finding a conspiratorial agreement even though the instruction omitted defendants requested statement that an agreement between a buyer and seller of illegal drugs does not constitute conspiracy holding that while a simple buy and sell transaction is not sufficient for proof of a conspiracy repeated transactions for large quantities are sufficient to support an inference that the buyer and seller were engaged in a conspiracy holding that an agreement on the one side to sell and on the other to buy does not constitute a conspiracy even if the buyer intends to resell the drugs so long as the buyer and seller do not have an agreement to further distribute the drugs