of supervised release, which the court denied. In so doing, the court clarified for Bolivar the difference between parole, which he remained subject to under former § 4164, and special parole, which had been incorrectly imposed on remand from Bolivar’s direct appeal but since corrected to a term of supervised release. The court explained that under former § 4164 Bolivar remained subject to the jurisdiction of the Parole Commission until April 2007, i.e. 180 days before the end of the 20-year prison term imposed for one of the 1987 drug offenses. Only then, the court concluded, would his term of supervised release begin. Bolivar then filed the motion that led to this appeal, entitled “Motion For Revocation Of Supervised Release Term Or In The Alternative A Nun d 113, 118 (2d Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>). Under the applicable version of Fed. R. of
holding that deportation does not extinguish term of supervised release holding that deportation did not cut short appellants parole term regardless of appellants subjective beliefs holding defendant does not waive fourth amendment protection by signing parole agreement but the search condition does confirm right of parole officer to conduct reasonable searches within scope of parole mission holding that deportation does not extinguish term of parole holding that parole survives deportation