buyer’s duties to abide by the terms of the sales contract executed by the parties. Here, TIA points to no collateral fraudulent promise ...”) (citations omitted); see also Town of Haverstraw v. Columbia Electric Corp., 237 F.Supp.2d 452, 456 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (explaining that a fraud claim is viable where a plaintiff is induced to enter a contract based on extraneous representations but not where the misrepresentation is merely the promise to perform under a contract). LCO’s argument premised on Rule 8’s alternative pleading allowance is also unavailing. A fraud claim does not exist under New York law when the claim is premised solely upon the allegation that a party made false statements of intent to perform under an agreement. See Druyan v. Jagger, 508 F.Supp.2d 228, 240 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (<HOLDING>); Soft Classic S.A. de C.V. v. Hurowitz, 444
holding that a fraud claim premised on thirdparty reliance raises a cognizable claim under new york law holding that the most analogous claim for relief under new york law is a claim for employment discrimination holding that allegations of intent or concealment that merely relate to defendants performance of contractual obligations do not state a claim for fraud under new york law holding that under new york law a dismissal for failure to comply with discovery obligations is not a judgment on the merits and does not bar a subsequent suit involving the same parties and issues holding that new york law applies to this matter