Therefore, we will construe Plautz’s ADA claim as a Rehabilitation Act claim. There is no significant difference between the substantive standards of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act as they relate to this case. The Rehabilitation Act expressly provides: “The standards used to determine whether this section has been violated in a complaint alleging nonaffirmative action employment discrimination under this section shall be the standards applied under title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq.) and the provisions of sections 501 through 504, and 510, of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-12204 and 12210), as such sections relate to employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 791(g)(1999). See also Calero-Cerezo, 355 F.3d at 11 (<HOLDING>). Therefore construing the ADA claim as a
holding that the same standards apply to claims under the ada and under the rehabilitation act holding that neither the ada nor the rehabilitation act applies to prison employment holding the ada and the rehabilitation act applicable recognizing standards to determine discrimination are the same under the ra and the ada holding that exemption under the ada does not preclude liability under the rehabilitation act