with any facts showing specific work performed with respect to any of these matters. As previously noted, the other evidence in the record shows he was hired only to represent McLeggan in the sale of the house. Fry’s statement regarding his alleged representation of McLeggan is conclu-sory. Mere conclusory statements do not constitute effective summary judgment proof and need not be given the same presumptive force as allegations of fact. See Delgado v. Methodist Hosp., 936 S.W.2d 479, 483 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ). The affidavit must set forth facts, not conclusions. See Cuellar v. City of San Antonio, 821 S.W.2d 250, 252 (Tex.App.— San Antonio 1991, writ denied); Smith v. Christley, 684 S.W.2d 158, 161 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, Fry’s affidavit does not raise a
holding that conclusorily assigning error without providing supporting argument is insufficient to raise issue holding that random mention of an issue without elaboration or supporting authority is insufficient to raise issue for appellate courts consideration recognizing that the plaintiffs mere assertions that the defendant had a discriminatory intent were inadequate without substantial factual evidence to raise an issue to preclude summary judgment holding that mere conclusion of affiant without some supporting facts are insufficient to raise fact issue necessary to preclude summary judgment holding that the mere pleading of affirmative defenses are insufficient to repel summary judgment