the consideration of specific facts within agency expertise that have not yet been developed, we disagree. Where a party’s claim turns entirely on an inherently judicial question, there is no need for the development of additional facts and therefore the primary-jurisdiction doctrine does not apply. Texas Dep’t of Ins. v. Reconveyance Servs., Inc., 240 S.W.3d 418, 483 (Tex. App.-Austin UDJA claim was inherently judicial in nature, where Juliff sought declaration regarding only the constitutionality of the statute and did not seek determination regarding whether statute applied to its particular permit application, which had not yet been granted or denied by agency), and City of Waco v. Texas Natural Res. Conseivation Corwm’n, 83 S.W.3d 169, 177 (TexApp.-Austin 2002, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>), 'with, Atmos Energy, 127 S.W.3d at 857
holding that the absence of a stenographic record of an arbitration did not preclude review where the claimant alleged that a clause was contrary to public policy a pure question of law holding that a state agency created under state law was a state actor holding that citys enforcement of the entire state penal code would not constitute a city policy because the city was required to follow state law holding that claim construction is an issue of law for the court not a question of fact for the jury holding that claim involved pure question of law where city sought declaration that agencys new permitissuing process violated state law despite fact that agency had not yet issued any particular permit under policy