minority holds that there is no per se prohibition of simultaneous filings. See, e.g., Davis v. Mather (In re Davis), 239 B.R. 573, 575 n. 2 (10th Cir. BAP 1999); Grimes v. United States (In re Grimes), 117 B.R. 531, 533-36 (9th Cir. BAP 1990); Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Saylors (In re Saylors), 869 F.2d 1434, 1437-38 (11th Cir.1989). In general, the minority takes the position that “a debtor who has been granted a discharge under one chapter under Title 11 may file a subsequent petition under another chapter even though the first case remains open.” Grimes, 117 B.R. at 536. They interpret Atkins “as stating that two cases which seek to discharge the same debt cannot be pending simultaneously.” Transamerica Credit Corp. v. Bullock (In re Bullock), 206 B.R. 389, 393 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1997) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis in original). In Atkins the debtor
holding that the eleventh amendment does not bar a bankruptcy court from issuing a money judgment against a state under the bankruptcy code holding that defamation action is not a proceeding arising in a bankruptcy case holding that atkins does not bar a simultaneous bankruptcy filing where a discharge already issued in the first proceeding holding that under the established law that bankruptcy courts could not discharge criminal judgments holding that bankruptcy court may issue proposed findings and conclusions in a core proceeding over which the bankruptcy court does not have constitutional authority