(1) they engaged in constitutionally protected speech because they spoke as citizens on a matter of public concern; (2) they suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the speech was a motivating factor in the adverse employment decision.” Skehan v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 465 F.3d 96, 106 (2d Cir.2006), overruled on other grounds as recognized in Appel v. Spiridon, 531 F.3d 138, 139-40 (2d Cir.2008) (per curiam,) (internal quotation marks omitted). We agree with the district court’s well-reasoned opinion that Zembiec has not alleged “enough facts” to state a “plausible” claim that any protected speech by Zembiec was a motivating factor in any adverse employment action taken against him. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (<HOLDING>); accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129
holding that checheles second claim for relief for additional shortswing trades that she might discover during the course of the action failed to allege facts sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level  citing twombly 550 us at 555 127 sct 1955 holding that a complaint must contain only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face holding that dismissal pursuant to rule 12b6 is appropriate if the plaintiff is unable to articulate enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face holding that a complaint must plead enough facts to raise a right to relief above the speculative level and state a plausible claim holding that a complaint must contain enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face