call for additional bioequivalency testing was based on nothing more than conjecture and was not supported by the scientific literature. Id. at 9-13. The Circuit has noted that the FDA’s “evaluations of scientific data within its area of expertise ... [are] entitled to a ‘high level of deference.’ ” Serono, 158 F.3d at 1320; Int’l Fabricare Inst. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 972 F.2d 384, 389 (D.C.Cir.1992) (observing that the rationale for deference is “particularly strong” when an agency evaluates scientific evidence within its technical expertise); see also Zeneca, Inc. v. Shalala, 213 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir.2000); Henley v. Food & Drug Admin., 77 F.3d 616, 621 (2d Cir.1996) (noting that the FDA is entitled to deference insofar as it “possesses the requis . 212, 217-18 (D.D.C.1996) (<HOLDING>); Somerset Pharm., Inc. v. Shalala, 973 F.Supp.
holding that there is no indication in the legislative history or the language of  6330 that congress intended for taxpayers to have the right to subpoena witnesses or documents at a collection due process hearing holding that even where there are  contrary indications in the statutes legislative history we do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear holding that the plaintiff demonstrated no likelihood of success in its challenge to the fdas reliance on in vitro testing to establish bioequivalence because there is nothing in the legislative history to the hatchwaxman amendments to indicate that congress intended to restrict fdas historical discretion to decide how that requirement would be met holding that the legislative history under the act indicates that liquidated damages are intended to be punitive in nature holding that substantive criminal statute could not be applied retrospectively because there was nothing  in the language or the legislative history that was a clear and unequivocal expression of legislative intent to rebut presumption of prospective application only