implies the existence of all necessary and appropriate remedies.” Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 69, 112 S.Ct. 1028, 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992) (citation omitted). As such, the Supreme Court has interpreted other anti-discrimination statutes to include an implied right to be free from retaliation. See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 90 S.Ct. 400, 24 L.Ed.2d 386 (1969) (finding that 42 U.S.C. § 1982 prohibited retaliation even though the text of § 1982 does not mention retaliation), Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972) (finding that retaliation is actionable despite the lack of an express bar on retaliation in the statutory language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983). The D.C. Circuit interpreted the Supr .3d 1333 (11th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has interpreted Title IX
recognizing that most other courts apply title vii principles to title ix cases but refusing to apply title viis knew or should have known standard to a title ix claim holding that title vii principles govern retaliation claims arising under title ix and assuming that teachers have standing to raise retaliation claims under title ix based upon complaints raised on behalf of their students holding that a claim for damages exists in an action to enforce title ix holding that the elements of a hostile environment claim under title vii equally apply under title ix holding that a claim for retaliation does not lie under title ix