that a colorable claim of innocence opens both gateways, it is still insufficient to override the longstanding rule that a freely and voluntarily entered guilty plea bars a collateral attack on the sufficiency of the evidence. Accordingly, we find that the district court did not err in summarily denying Woods’ untimely and successive K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. Woods was not entitled to appointed counsel. As a final note, Woods argues in his brief that the district court needed to appoint him counsel. However, the district court is only required to provide counsel when the motion raises the sort of a substantial question of law or fact that requires a preliminaiy hearing. See Supreme Court Rule 183(i) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 271); Lujan v. State, 270 Kan. 163, 170-71, 14 P.3d 424 (2000) (<HOLDING>). Given that the motion, files, and records
holding that the trial court did not err by failing to hold an oral hearing on a motion to dismiss an appeal because the appellant was afforded a full opportunity to respond to the motion holding that the lower court was not required to hold a hearing on a motion to transfer holding that the function of the trial court on a motion for summary judgment is to determine whether issues of fact exist and not to decide the merits of the issues themselves holding that a motion for a preliminary injunction and a hearing on that motion were insufficient to prevent the plaintiff from dismissing by notice holding that the district court may summarily dismiss the motion or determine that a potentially substantial issue or issues of fact are raised in the motion   and hold a preliminary hearing after appointment of counsel