Superior Court's ruling. See Commonwealth v. G. Williams, 586 Pa. 770, 895 A.2d 1261 (2006) (per curiam). 6 . In G. Williams, we also held that the sanctions prescribed by Megan's Law II for an SVP’s non-compliance with the Act’s RNC provisions, which provided a minimum penalty of lifetime probation, qualified as punitive, and were unconstitutional inasmuch as they came into play only upon judicial factfinding by clear and convincing evidence, in violation of Apprendi. We struck and severed those provisions, which have since been recodified and diminished. G. Williams, 832 A.2d at 985-86. Their validity is not presently before us. 7 . Neither court considered whether and to what extent the offending provisions were severable from Megan’s Law II. Cf., e.g., G. Williams, 832 A.2d at 986 (<HOLDING>). Because we reverse the trial courts’ rulings,
holding  1130 to be unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff holding that rule of construction that specific statutory provisions control general ones should not be applied where provisions can be harmonized holding certain penalties that applied to noncompliant svp unconstitutional but determining that those provisions could be severed from the rest of megans law ii holding that a statute that does not provide for notice and a hearing is not unconstitutional because those provisions may be incorporated by implication to prevent a holding of unconstitutionality holding that where administrative complaint contained references to statutory provisions but failed to allege any act or omission in violation of those provisions the complaint did not afford proper notice to the licensee and that therefore disciplinary action could not be predicated on those statutes