entirety of paragraph (c)(4)(iii) superfluous. As the Sixth Circuit explained in Michigan Department of Community Health, accepting Fayetteville’s position would require the Court to interpret the regulation contrary to the statute it implemented. 496 Fed.Appx. at 539 (“In the face of the inability to enact the [PPS] in the time frame directed by Congress, the Agency based reimbursements after the BBA caps expired in 2002 on the amount of the previous year’s reimbursement, which is, as explained above, compelled by the statute.”); see also United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 873, 97 S.Ct. 2150, 53 L.Ed.2d 48 (1977) (“regulations, in order to be valid must be consistent with the statute under which they are promulgated”); United States v. Quinn, 401 F.Supp.2d 80, 93 (D.D.C.2005) (<HOLDING>). Paragraph (iii) had a specific purpose—
holding that where a regulation could not fairly be read to have spoken at all on an issue an agencys proposed interpretation of the regulation as it pertained to that issue was not a reasonable interpretation of the regulation holding that because the property owner argued only a theory of taking that was no longer a valid theory property owner did not demonstrate his entitlement to relief holding that the challenge to a university regulation was moot because the regulation had been substantially amended holding that pma process is not specific regulation because the requirements are not contained in formal regulation holding that a regulation implementing a statute that was no longer valid did not have a legislative foundation