to effectuate the State’s interests in rehabilitation and punishment, even where restitution is forwarded to the victim, and may be calculated by reference to the amount of harm the offender caused. Id. at 51-53, 107 S.Ct. 353. Ultimately, the Court held that “523(a)(7) preserves from discharge any condition a state criminal court imposes as part of a criminal sentence.” Id. at 50,107 S.Ct. 353. Relying on Kelly, courts have found other obligations related to criminal proceedings nondischargeable under § 523(a)(7). See, e.g., Thompson v. Virginia (In re Thompson), 16 F.3d 576 (4th Cir.1994) (concluding that assessment of prosecution costs under state law as part of a criminal sentence was nondischargeable); Warfel v. City of Saratoga (In re Warfel), 268 B.R. 205 (9th Cir.BAP2001) (<HOLDING>); Huntley v. Vessey (In re Vessey), 03.1
holding that civil settlements have no bearing on decisions of criminal punishment and imposition of a restitution order is a form of punishment and part of a criminal sentence holding that because the restitution was ordered as part of a state criminal prosecution it was excepted from discharge in bankruptcy holding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the sentence originally imposed by imposing an additional term of fifteen years suspended sentence holding civil restitution judgment that was originally imposed as part of a criminal sentence nondisehargeable holding that resentencing is not required if court concludes the sentence would have been essentially the same as originally imposed