Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1052, 109 S.Ct. 1967, 104 L.Ed.2d 435 (1989), we held that "a determination by a district court as to whether an act, or belief, or ... an expectation, is 'reasonable' is a conclusion of law subject to plenary review.” Fair enough. But the language quoted from Pau-lino, which concerned the "automobile exception” to the Fourth Amendment, refers only to the question of whether one can ever have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an automobile. And both of the cases on which Paulino relies distinguish between a broad legal question, such as whether in general an expectation of privacy in automobiles exists, and narrower questions regarding particular factual determinations by district courts. See United States v. Shakur, 817 F.2d 189, 196 (2d Cir.) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
holding that the state must establish that a legal situs of the offense was in delaware and that the reviewing court is required to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the existence of territorial jurisdiction beyond a reasonable doubt holding that while a district court determination about whether an act is reasonable usually is considered to be a legal conclusion that djetermining the weight to be accorded to each factor in reaching the ultimate finding as to the existence of conditions is the special province of the trier of fact  holding that the courts conclusion that transfer was appropriate is to be accorded great deference holding that the weight and credibility to be given to the opinions of expert witnesses is uniquely within the province of the fact finder  in this instance the trial court citation omitted holding that a statutory presumption is a rule of law requiring a trier of fact to reach a particular conclusion in the absence of evidence to the contrary