the sensible conclusion that they conspired to distribute methamphetamine? The majority relies on United States v. Moe, 781 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir.2015), to imply that a conspiracy to distribute requires evidence of “a prolonged and actively pursued course” or “a shared stake in the [other] buyer’s illegal venture.” Majority Disposition at 422. But Moe actually emphasizes that “[distinguishing between a conspiracy and a buyer-seller relationship requires a fact-intensive and context-dependent inquiry” that does not turn on specific factors or bright-line rules. 781 F.3d- at 1125. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to support its collective judgment, a rational jury could find that the evidence presented demonstrated more than a buyer-seller relationship. See id. at 1125-26 (<HOLDING>). We should affirm Gill’s conviction for
holding that under the arbitrary and capricious standard this court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment recognizing that factors such as mutual trust and whether the transactions were standardized were also relevant to distinguish conspirators from buyerssellers holding that factors as a whole were not duplicative holding that only relevant factors must be considered recognizing same factors