interrogation was proper (and his confession admissible) unless he subsequently advised the agents that he was invoking his right to an attorney. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458-59, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994); see generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The test of whether one has invoked the right to counsel is objective, Davis, 512 U.S. at 458-59, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (1987) (citing Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 529, 107 S.Ct. 828, 93 L.Ed.2d 920 (1987)), requiring the suspect to “articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the stat 0th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Zamora, 222 F.3d 756, 766
holding that accuseds request for counsel was equivocal when he read the statement on the miranda waiver form i do not want a lawyer at this time immediately said yes i do then read the remainder of the form aloud and signed the waiver of rights holding that a defendants statement that he did not want to talk about what he did the night before but was willing to talk about lighter subjects was not an unequivocal invocation of his right to remain silent in part because the defendant previously exhibited willingness to talk with police holding suspects contradictory answers on miranda waiver form that he would answer questions without an attorney and that he wanted to talk to a lawyer to be ambiguous holding maybe i should talk to a lawyer to be ambiguous holding i might want to talk to an attorney to be ambiguous