to those counterclaims, the covenant does not deprive the district court of jurisdiction to determine the disposition of ... the request for attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285." (citing Highway Equip. Co. v. FECO, Ltd., 469 F.3d 1027, 1033 n. 1 (Fed.Cir.2006))). 11 . Thus, although the Court no longer has jurisdiction over UPEK's motion for summary judgment based upon inequitable conduct, it still must consider inequitable conduct in determining UPEK’s motion for attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285. See, e.g., Monsanto, 514 F.3d at 1242 (Fed.Cir.2008) ("[T]he district court’s jurisdiction to rule on attorney fees encompassed the jurisdiction to make findings of inequitable conduct regarding-all four patents.”); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Cal-gene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1380 (Fed.Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); A.B. Chance Co. v. RTE Corp., 854 F.2d 1307,
holding that an unappealed ruling is the law of the case holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in reconsidering a prior interlocutory ruling holding the district court erred by reviewing the evidence and making an evidentiary ruling on secondtier review holding that the district court erred in not making an inequitable conduct determination prior to ruling on the exceptional case issue holding that district court erred in ruling that a particular item of evidence must be admitted in the arbitral proceeding