the statutorily prescribed thirty days.” Sansone v. Morton Machine Works, Inc., 188 F.Supp.2d 182, 184 (D.R.I.2002) (collecting cases and finding that “overwhelming weight of authority requir[es] that each defendant independently notify the court of its consent”). Plaintiff argues that the ease must be remanded to state court regardless of Searle’s lack of consent. Under the so-called “first-served defendant rule,” a later-served defendant has no ability to remove the case to federal court if the thirty-day period has run with respect to an earlier-served defendant. See Getty Oil Corp., 841 F.2d at 1262-63 (“In cases involving multiple defendants, the thirty-day period begins to run as soon as the first defendant is served .... ”); Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478, 482 (5th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Defendants urge the Court to adopt the
holding that government has right to remove unreasonable obstructions to navigation and may order removal of bridge holding that mayors power  to remove is for cause after an opportunity to be heard and observing that not allowing a hearing would render the safeguard  a hollow device and a sham because a removal could actually be made at the will of the removing power emphasis added holding that the unfairness of allowing defendants to remove after litigating for years in state court outweighs any unfairness in depriving laterserved defendant of opportunity to remove holding that under state law the police commissioners are not authorized to remove police officers at will but for good and sufficient cause and after due hearing emphasis added holding that wjaiver of the right to remove must be clear and unequivocal  and that standard was not met by an agreement in which defendants consented to filing of suit in state court but which did not address removal