media coverage. Strong measures were ‘necessary to overcome the realistic likelihood of prejudice from pretrial publicity.’ Williams I, supra, 93 N.J. at 67 n. 13, 459 A.2d 641.” Ante at 145, 716 A.2d at 469. The pretrial publicity in this case was in a different class from that experienced by the defendants in Koedatich I, supra, 112 N.J. at 272-73, 548 A.2d 939 (concluding presumption of prejudice did not arise because there was lack of evidence of community hostility against defendant, neither defendant nor- victim was prominent in the community, the victim was not public servant, defendant was not outsider, the articles did not assume defendant’s guilt, and there was two-year lapse between most intense publicity and trial) and Biegenwald II, supra, 106 N.J. at 35, 524 A.2d 130 (<HOLDING>). Many of the articles in this case
holding that the trial court did not exceed its discretion in striking the amended complaint where the plaintiffs had learned of the facts underlying the new allegations six months before they attempted to amend holding that even where there is inflammatory pretrial publicity an adequate coolingoff period between the publication of such material and the trial which in crews was six to eight months together with the trial courts exercise of its discretion to evaluate bias and impartiality during voir dire sufficiently supported the trial courts conclusion that pretrial publicity did not prevent the capital defendant from receiving a fair trial by an impartial jury holding request made two months before trial timely holding that a change of venue was not warranted due to publicity surrounding an unrelated murder with common features because the defendant failed to establish any specific prejudice against him as a result of the publicity holding no presumption of prejudice arose because the publicity had been concentrated six months before trial