offense level of 30. On appeal, Williams argues that the use of the 36 grams of crystal methamphetamine at sentencing -violated the Fifth Amendment’s grand jury right because these facts were not charged in the indictment. Williams also argues that, pursuant to Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004) and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), he could only be sentenced at his base offense level and not based on facts which were neither found by a jury, stipulated to in a plea agreement, or not the subject of a knowing and intelligent waiver. Because Williams did not raise these arguments before the district court, we review his claims for plain error. See United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 12 1th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Gibson, 434 F.3d 1234, 1250
holding nonconstitutional booker error occurs when the district court applies the guidelines in a mandatory rather than advisory fashion even though the resulting sentence was calculated based solely upon facts admitted by the defendant or found by a jury holding that there was no constitutional booker error because the defendants sentence was enhanced solely based on the 19 kilograms of cocaine found by the jury at trial holding that there is simply no booker error where a defendant was sentenced to the statutory minimum sentence holding that the district courts error in calculating the amount of drugs at issue was harmless because the error had no impact on the defendants sentence holding that booker constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because on remand the district court would have given defendant the same sentence