whether as a witness or a spectator, ordinarily belongs to the unit commander. See R.C.M. 703(e)(1). The discretion to order the production of a military witness during pre-sentencing proceedings belongs to the military judge and is subject to significant regulatory constraints. R.C.M. 1001(e)(1). The exercise of such independent discretion is not properly attributable to appellant as aggravation evidence. See Rust, 41 M.J. at 478. Accordingly, evidence of the administrative burden of the court-martial process is ordinarily not “evidence of significant adverse impact on the mission, discipline, or efficiency of the command directly and immediately resulting from the accused’s offense.” R.C.M. 1001(b)(4). But cf. United States v. Key, 55 M.J. 537, 539 (A.F.Ct.Crim.App.2001) (<HOLDING>). If we were to conclude otherwise, trial
holding removal of appellant and accomplices from duty positions after misuse of authority was admissible as direct result of misconduct holding that review of an original removal decision and a subsequent removal order are distinct holding that the record here fails to establish the first two elements which the court identified as the duty of care and a breach of that duty and as a result a directed verdict  on the issue of liability was warranted holding that the defendants motion to amend their notice of removal was proper due to plaintiffs waived objections to the sufficiency of the notice of removal by failing to seek remand within thirty days of removal holding that notice of removal was defective on its face because it failed to contain a copy of the process as required by the removal statute