it sought to delegate zoning power to civic associations. See id. ¶ 289. Waterfront did not seek damages in connection with Count XV and, in any event, damages would not have been a proper remedy for that facial attack, for the reasons stated in the following paragraphs. 8 . Moreover, in Lighthouse the plaintiff had actually applied for and was denied a permit under the later-repealed ordinance. See Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 259. The compensation permitted in that case was therefore connected to a specific application of the ordinance to the plaintiff. It is thus not clear that Lighthouse actually permitted a damages claim to go forward in connection with a facial challenge, as opposed to an as-applied challenge. See Tanner Adver. Grp. v. Fayette Cnty., 451 F.3d 777, 786 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). 9 . The Eleventh Circuit has held that a
holding that a plaintiff had standing to attack an entire ordinance including portions of the ordinance not applied to the plaintiff holding that plaintiff could not request damages for a facial challenge to a zoning ordinance under the first amendment because the provision had not yet harmed the plaintiff holding that damages were not available to a plaintiff who challenged an ordinance under a due process theory because the plaintiff had not sought a permit and therefore any claim for damages was purely speculative holding that religious corporation which owned property had standing to challenge zoning ordinance holding that the plaintiffs due process challenge to a city ordinance was barred because it was inextricably intertwined with a statecourt ruling that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the ordinance