that the evidence was purely speculative as to whether Ms. Patterson could have warned Officer Finley of the danger posed by Marquette. On appeal, Finley argues that the directed verdict was improper, contending that Ms. Patterson, as the premises owner, had a duty to warn him, as a police officer, of the danger posed by Marquette. Finley argues that Ms. Patterson’s duty was created by what he considers to be a special relationship that existed or special circumstances surrounding Marquette’s shooting of Finley. For the directed verdict to be proper, Finley must have failed to present substantial evi dence of facts giving rise to a duty on the part of Ms. Patterson to protect him. See Teague v. Adams, 638 So.2d 836, 837 (Ala. 1994); Rule 50(a), Ala.R.Civ.P. The general rule i 21 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Carson v. Headrick, 900 S.W.2d 685
holding that although jury found officer not to have had probable cause for arrest officer was entitled to immunity because law was not clearly established as to circumstances in which officer found himself holding in addressing crime of obstructing an officer in serving or attempting to serve or execute a legal process or order that it is not enough that the accused should know that the person attempting to make the arrest is an arresting officer it must also appear that he knew that the officer was attempting to execute a lawful process or order holding tavern owner not liable for injuries sustained when intoxicated patron assaulted a police officer holding officer who was shot by employee of a hotel while he was attempting to make an arrest was unable to recover for injuries from hotel owner holding proprietor of a tavern was not liable to officer who sustained injuries caused by a patron while the officer was attempting to make an arrest