from the face of the judgment itself.” United States v. Spell, 44 F.3d 936, 939-40 (11th Cir.1995); United States v. Young, 527 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir.2008) (same); United States v. Owens, 447 F.3d 1345, 1347 (11th Cir.2006) (same). Accordingly, we have permitted district courts to find additional facts when the crime for which the defendant was convicted encompasses both conduct that constitutes a crime of violence and conduct that does not constitute a crime of violence. See e.g., United States v. Aguilar-Ortiz, 450 F.3d 1271, 1276 (11th Cir.2006) (finding prior state judgment of conviction ambiguous because the Court was unable to say as a categorical matter that all convictions under it qualified as a “drug trafficking offense” under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(B)); Spell, 44 F.3d at 939 (<HOLDING>); see also Greer, 440 F.3d at 1273 (noting that
holding that once the statute is found to be divisible the court must look to the charging papers and judgment of conviction to determine if the actual crime of which defendant was convicted was a crime of violence but emphasizing that the court is not to examine the particular facts underlying the conviction holding that a prior state judgment of conviction for burglary was ambiguous because it encompassed some conduct which constituted a crime of violence and some which did not holding that burglary of commercial building is crime of violence under guidelines holding that the withdrawal of an unrelated factual objection to a prior conviction did not waive the defendants right to plainerror review of his claim that this same conviction was not for a crime of violence under  2l12 holding that the police have an automatic right to conduct a protective search of a burglary suspect because burglary is a crime for which an offender would likely be armed