fact-findings in the Agreed Judgment are unsupported by legally or factually sufficient evidence in the record. We decline to entertain these arguments. While Appellants are correct that by filing an answer, they disputed the operative facts at issue and thereby placed the onus on the plaintiff to affirmatively prove the case laid out in its pleadings, see Bradley Motors, Inc. v. Mackey, 878 S.W.2d 140, 141 (Tex.1994), by consenting to the Agreed Judgment under the terms of the Agreed Order and failing to convey withdrawal of consent, Appellants essentially stipulated to the fact-findings contained in the Agreed Judgment and waived their ability to challenge those fact-findings for legal and factual sufficiency. See Baw v. Baw, 949 S.W.2d 764, 766 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, no writ) (<HOLDING>); Pope v. Powers, 91 S.W.2d 873, 874-75
holding that the trial courts written order was not the entry of a sentence sufficient to support a determination that a judgment of conviction was entered holding evidence was not newly discovered because the underlying facts were well within the partys knowledge prior to the district courts entry of judgment holding that partys consent to the trial courts entry of judgment waives any error except for jurisdiction error contained in the judgment   holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error holding that where the final judgment provided relief that was not requested  its entry constituted reversible error