“that the defense known as diminished capacity comes within th[e] codified definition of legal insanity” and that, in asserting the diminished-capacity defense, the defendant must follow the same procedures as outlined for the insanity defense in the statute. Mangiapane, 271 N.W.2d at 249. Thus, despite the new statutory framework, the court continued to recognize diminished capacity as a legitimate defense. See People v. Mette, 243 Mich.App. 318, 621 N.W.2d 713, 719 (2000) (observing that “[t]his court has consistently held that the defense of diminished capacity comes within the codifie 1, 74 (1987) (explaining that “[t]he diminished capacity defense is merely one aspect of whether a defendant has the requisite intent”); People v. Jones, 151 Mich.App. 1, 390 N.W.2d 189, 191 (1986) (<HOLDING>). When Lancaster committed his crimes in 1993,
recognizing that the defendant bears the burden of establishing that plain error was prejudicial holding that once evidence of diminished capacity is introduced by a defendant the prosecution bears the burden of establishing the defendants normal capacity  holding that a defendant bears the burden of establishing affirmative defenses under the wprkers compensation statute holding that appellant bears burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence holding defendant bears burden of establishing affirmative defense of official immunity