are civil rather than criminal); Moore v. Moore, 222 Tenn. 1, 3, 431 S.W.2d 754, 755 (1968) (describing a proceeding for a suit for writ of error coram nobis as a “new action”); Dobie v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 762, 769, 96 S.E.2d 747, 752 (1957) (explaining that a writ of error coram nobis “is in the nature of a civil action”); but cf. People v. Paiva, 31 Cal.2d 503, 505, 506, 190 P.2d 604, 606, 608 (1948) (noting that although proceedings on a writ of error coram nobis are civil in nature, they are part of the original criminal case, not a new adversarial suit). Some courts have held that although the coram nobis proceeding is collateral to the underlying criminal matter, it is not an independent civil action. See generally Dwyer v. State, 151 Me. 382, 393, 120 A.2d 276, 283 (1956) (<HOLDING>); State v. Endsley, 214 Or. 537, 541-42, 331
holding that precise amount of loss for restitution purposes must be legally determined in the underlying criminal proceeding holding that as a matter of due process an indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding is entitled to psychiatric assistance when his mental capacity is at issue holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding holding that any condition a state criminal court imposes as part of a criminal sentence is not dischargeable in bankruptcy holding that a proceeding on a writ of error coram nobis is part of the underlying criminal matter