the information to the “best of its ability.” Def. Br. 25. Alternatively, Commerce claims that this argument is beyond the scope of this proceeding since it is not an issue raised by the Plaintiff. “[IJntervenor is limited to the field of litigation open to the original parties, and cannot enlarge the issues tendered by or arising out of plaintiffs bill.” Torrington Co. v. United States, 14 CIT 56, 57, 731 F.Supp. 1073, 1075 (1990) (citing Chandler & Price Co. v. Brandtjen & Kluge, 296 U.S. 53, 56, 56 S.Ct. 6, 80 L.Ed. 39 (1935)) (granting plaintiffs motion to strike defendant-intervenor’s affirmative defenses because they raised issue of standing not contested by plaintiff and defendant); see also Grupo Indus. Camesa v. United States, 18 CIT 107, 108 (1994) (not reported in F.Supp.) (<HOLDING>). Russel’s claim that Commerce failed to
holding that even though plaintiffs claim was barred by the cgia because it sounded in tort attorney fees were not appropriate where it was a contract claim that was pleaded and thus a contract claim that was dismissed holding that the court may consider an article not attached to the complaint in determining whether to dismiss the complaint because the article was integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint and because the plaintiffs did not challenge its authenticity holding that as a matter of law claim stated in amended complaint did not relate back to original complaint holding that the plaintiffs second complaint did not relate back to her first complaint because her second complaint was not an amendment to her first complaint but rather a separate filing holding that plaintiffintervenors argument was separate from plaintiffs claim because plaintiff did not challenge pertinent statute as unconstitutional even though complaint alleged that itcs determination was not in accordance with law in a number of respects including the following