at 235. 133 . See, e.g., id. at 228-31; Franklin, 147 F.Supp.2d at 47. 134 . Karvelas, 360 F.3d at 228-29. 135 . Id. at 229 (quoting Boston & Maine Corp. v. Hampton, 987 F.2d 855, 866 (1st Cir.1993)). 136 . See id. at 231. 137 . Id. 138 . See id. at 231 n. 14 (stating that the court has not yet adopted a "complex scheme” exception to the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b)). 139 . See id. 140 . Id. (citing Yuhasz v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 341 F.3d 559, 564 (6th Cir.2003) (“[A] plaintiff should not be able to avoid the specificity requirements of Rule 9(b) by relying upon the complexity of the edifice which he created.” (citation and quotation marks omitted))). 141 . Id. at 231. 142 . 147 F.Supp.2d 39 (D.Mass.2001). 143 .Id. at 49. 144 . See Karvelas, 360 F.3d at 232 & n. 14 (<HOLDING>). 145 . See id. at 234. 146 . See id. 147 . See
holding that a special relaxing of rule 9b is a qui tam plaintiffs ticket to the discovery process that the statute itself does not contemplate holding that plaintiff could not maintain a qui tam fca action against a municipal entity holding a complaints general allegations lacking any details or facts setting out the who what when where and how of the allegedly fraudulent conductwere insufficient to satisfy rule 9b internal quotation marks omitted holding that a qui tam relator may not present general allegations in lieu of details of actual false claims in the hope that such details will emerge through subsequent discovery holding that specific details about time place and substance of the fraud satisfy rule 9b