hearing; and (3) the IJ denied her motion for a continuance must fail. Lin cannot state a colorable due process claim because she has no liberty or property interest at stake. See Aparicio v. Lynch, 824 F.3d 674, 684 (7th Cir. 2016) (cancella tion of removal is “a form of discretionary-relief in which there is no liberty interest at stake”); Nunez-Portillo v. Holder, 768 F.3d 974, 977 (8th Cir. 2014) (alien has no protected liberty interest in cancellation of removal); see also Dekoladenu v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 500, 508 (4th Cir. 2006) (“No property or liberty interest can exist when the relief sought is discretionary.”), abrogated on other grounds by Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 128 S.Ct. 2307, 171 L.Ed.2d 178 (2008); see also Smith v. Ashcroft, 295 F.3d 425, 429-30 (4th Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>). Even if the Lin could assert a due process
holding that eligibility for discretionary relief from a removal order is not a liberty or property interest warranting due process protection recognizing that early release statutes can create a liberty interest protected by due process guarantees  holding that aliens lack of a protected liberty or property interest in the relief he sought  a discretionary waiver of deportation  was a circumstance fatal to his due process claim holding that a state tort claim is a species of property protected by the due process clause recognizing that a parents liberty interest in the custody of a child is subject to due process protection