with little actual experience studying blasts from coal mining operations was qualified to testify as an expert); see also Fed.R.Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note (2000 amends.) (explaining that “[njothing in [the 2000] amendment [was] intended to suggest that experience alone ... may not provide a sufficient foundation for expert testimony”). Even if a witness is qualified as an expert regarding a particular issue, the process used by the witness in forming his expert opinion must be sufficiently reliable under Daubert and its progeny. See Quiet Tech. DC-8, Inc. v. Hureh-Dubois UK Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333, 1342 (11th Cir.2003) (stating that “one may be considered an expert but still offer unreliable testimony”); cf. McCorvey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 298 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). The Eleventh Circuit in Frazier quoted the
holding that daubert does not create a new framework for analyzing proffered expert testimony based upon technical or other specialized knowledge  holding that once an expert has passed rule 702s threshold of admissibility lingering questions or controversy concerning the quality of the experts conclusions go to the weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility holding that rulings on admissibility of evidence are within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of that discretion holding that experts causation opinion based on statements made by plaintiff was not inherently unreliable holding that rulings on admissibility under daubert inherently require the trial court to conduct an exacting analysis of the proffered experts methodology