and (iii). Such an interpretation requires the statute to be read in the conjunctive (i.e., “(i) and (ii); or (i) and (in)”). Conversely, the Government argues that the statute must be read as containing three co-equal, dependent clauses. The Government’s interpretation requires the statute to be read in the disjunctive (i.e, “(i), or (ii), or (iii)”). Under a disjunctive reading, proof of any one of the three subsections suffices in a prosecution for trafficking in analogue. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has not addressed this precise issue. In fact, when presented the issue, the Eleventh Circuit chose not to resolve it, finding that the substance at issue satisfied both subparagraphs (i) and (ii). United States v. Fisher, 289 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Only four District Courts and no Courts of
holding factor b is not unconstitutionally vague holding statute unconstitutionally vague as applied to mere possession of money on jail premises holding that attorney disciplinary rule was unconstitutionally vague as applied holding that these congressional pronouncements also confirm bds status as a controlled substance analogue holding that the analogue act was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to classify unlisted substance gbl as an analogue of ghb