“thing” or “item” must have some sort of tangible existence; it must be in the nature of “personal property or chattels.” This part of the test is also consistent with the need to read statutory language strictly and in its usual or common sense. Such a test explains and justifies the Second Circuit’s statement that “[t]o be sure, where no tangible objects were ever taken or transported, a court would be hard pressed to conclude that ‘goods’ had been stolen and transported within the meaning of § 2314.” United States v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389, 393 (2nd Cir. 1966). See also Greenwald, 479 F.2d at 322; In re Vericker, 446 F.2d 244, 248 (2nd Cir. 1971); American Cyanamid Co. v. Sharif, 309 F.2d 790,796 (3rd Cir. 1962); Italiani v. Metro-Goldwyn Mayer, 45 Cal.App.2d 464, 114 P.2d 370 at 372 (<HOLDING>). The second prong of the Seagraves test
holding that the copyright act distinguishes between employees and independent contractors for copyright possession holding that because literary works including compilations and derivative works are within the subject matter of copyright state common law that purported to protect a work for which plaintiffs copyright action was unsuccessful was preempted holding that literary property such as a copyright certainly does not come under the designation of goods and chattels  holding that while the computer program at issue was within the subject matter of copyright the right sought under state law pursuant to a license was not equivalent to the exclusive rights under copyright as such copyright preemption did not apply recognizing that the copyright act was amended in 1976 to include computer programs in the definition of protectable literary works