coerced resignation. Thus, we move to the question whether Nivette presented sufficient evidence that age discrimination was a determinative factor in the decision not to renew her teaching contract. C. Discriminatory motive/pretext. Nivette was not required to show that the District hired an individual who was not in her protected class in order to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. See Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1231. But because Halverson subsequently hired an individual who was the same age as Nivette, once the District came forward with a nondiseriminatory reason for not rehiring Nivette, Nivette could not rest on her prima facie showing alone to get the age-discrimination question to a jury. See Munoz v. St. Mary-Corwin Hosp., 221 F.3d 1160, 1166 (10th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). “The critical prima facie inquiry in all
holding that adea plaintiff had failed to make a prima facie case of age discrimination when he was replaced by someone only two years younger and within the protected age group and there was no other evidence of age discriminatory motive holding that the fourth prong of a prima facie age discrimination case was satisfied where plaintiff was replaced by two individuals  one who was four years younger than plaintiff and the other who was ten years younger holding that replacement by someone outside the protected group is required to make a prima facie age discrimination case holding that to make out the fourth element of a prima facie case of sex discrimination plaintiff must prove that males remained in similar positions and similarly for age discrimination that she was otherwise discharged because of her age holding that if the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of age discrimination the employer must show that the discharge was based on reasonable factors other than age  and if the employer meets that burden the plaintiff must show that age was a determining factor in the discharge