that the three-day extension provided under Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(e) and referenced in Local Rule 6.1 applies only to time periods in which “a party must or may act within a prescribed period after service.” And since the thirty-day time period for filing a bill of costs is a period that begins to run “after the entry of judgment,” N.D. Ga. R. 54.1 (emphasis added), the three-day extension is unavailable. In other words, she says, since judgments are not subject to “service,” Fed. R.Civ.P. 6(e) and (accordingly) Local Rule 6.1 do not apply. Pope’s interpretation of these rules seems reasonable to us, and it may even be the interpretation we would follow were we to decide the issue in the first instance. See, e.g., Cavaliere v. Allstate Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 1111, 1113-14 (11th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). The problem with her argument, however, is
holding that the oneyear period begins to run after the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari has expired holding that rule 6e is inapplicable where the time for filing begins to run on the date of mailing holding that the threeday grace period in fed rcivp 6e does not apply to motions for a new trial under fedrcivp 59 in part because the time period for filing those motions begins to run from entry of judgment holding that limitation period begins to run at the time of the breach holding that although the defendant filed a number of motions because the original trial date never changed as a result of those motions no delay could be attributed to the motions