they were appointed “to hear damage claims brought under” § 1605A, in accordance with the requirements of § 1605A(e)(l). To hold otherwise would improperly eliminate the retroactive effect expressly provided for in the NDAA. There is thus no need to “resort to speculation or judicial default rules” when the NDAA creates “a clear mechanism by which cases that were previously decided or pending under § 1605(a)(7) may be brought within the reach of the revised terrorism exception § 1605A,” In re Terrorism Litig., 659 F.Supp.2d at 111, and the Court will not undermine the intent of Congress' — expressed in § 1083(c)(2) — to fashion a distinction between provisions of § 1605A that is in plain conflict with the statutory text. See Brown v. Secretary of Army, 78 F.3d 645, 648 (D.C.Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). For these same reasons, the government’s
holding that remand is appropriate in part where the court determines that further evidence is necessary to develop the facts of the case fully holding where congressional command of retroactivity can be found in relevant statutory text no further inquiry is necessary holding that district court has no jurisdiction to take further action where there was no remand order holding that a lawyer is a necessary witness where the lawyers testimony is relevant to disputed material questions of fact and where there is no other evidence available to prove those facts holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated