it would have imposed a different sentence”). First, the district court did not err when it used U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 to calculate Herrera’s sentence. See United States v. Myers, 993 F.2d 713 (9th Cir.1993) (upholding use of § 2D1.1 rather than § 2D1.1 for a § 841(a) conspiracy to manufacture conviction). Second, there was ample evidence in the records to support the district-court’s finding that Herrera oversaw the preparation, purchase and diversion of large quantities of pseudoephedrine through both JDI and G&H. See United States v. Ponce, 51 F.3d 820, 827 (9th Cir.1995) (affirming a four-point enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 where defendant oversaw procurement and distribution of large quantities of cocaine); see also United States v. Basinger, 60 F.3d 1400, 1410 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Third, the district court properly relied on
recognizing that a defendant may appeal a district courts refusal to depart downward if the sentence was imposed in violation of law because the district court misconstrued its authority to depart holding that a circuit court has no jurisdiction to review a district courts discretionary decision not to depart downward from the guidelines but would have jurisdiction if the district court based its decision on the belief that it did not have the authority to depart holding harmless any error in district courts drug quantity determination where undisputed quantity of drugs was enough to place defendant at the base offense level calculated by the district court holding that where the indictment charged drug quantity but drug quantity was not submitted to the jury the district court erred in using drug quantity to increase the penalty beyond the twentyyear maximum of  841b1c holding that where the district court was able to estimate drug quantity there is no reason to depart from 2d11