next argues that the standstill agreement initially executed on January 24, and repeatedly extended until March 26, tolled the running of the sixty-day cure period provided in the Distribution Agreement, and that because the parties entered into the initial standstill agreement four days before the end of the cure period, Innomed was entitled to four additional days to cure the breach beyond the expiration of the last standstill agreement on March 26, 2001. We agree with the district court, however, that the language of the standstill agreement unambiguously indicates that the parties agreed simply to postpone the date on which the termination would become effective, rather than to toll the running of the cure period. See Bourne v. Walt Disney Co., 68 F.3d 621, 629 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks and citations
holding that if the contract can be given a definite and certain meaning or interpretation the contract is not ambiguous and will be construed by the court as a matter of law holding that where the language of the contract is unambiguous and conveys a definite meaning the court may decide the meaning of the contract as a matter of law holding that when a contract is unambiguous the court will enforce the plain meaning of the contract as the intention of the parties holding as a general rule of contract law if no other meaning is reasonable the court shall rule as a matter of law that the meaning is established holding that where each side ascribes a different meaning to what the sides claim is the unambiguous language in a contract the contract is ambiguous and summary judgment is improper