3 . We have consistently held that the statutory ''[time] period provided for administrative appeals under [§ 51-111(b)] is jurisdictional, and failure to file within the period prescribed divests the agency of jurisdiction to hear the appeal.” Chatterjee v. Mid Atl. Reg'l Council of Carpenters, 946 A.2d 352, 354 (D.C.2008) (quoting Calhoun v. Wackenhut Servs., 904 A.2d 343, 345 (D.C.2006)). Savage-Bey argues that this holding has been called into question by doctrinal developments in recent Supreme Court decisions, including Henderson v. Shinseki, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1197, 179 L.Ed.2d 159 (2011) (clarifying the distinction between claims-processing rules and jurisdictional limits), and John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 128 S.Ct. 750, 169 L.Ed.2d 591 (2008) (<HOLDING>). Because we conclude in any event that the
holding that the general equitable tolling doctrine is read into every statute of limitations holding that  242bc3as time bar is not jurisdictional and thus subject to equitable tolling holding title vii subject to equitable tolling recognizing that limitations periods fall into two categories claimsprocessing rules that are subject to equitable tolling and jurisdictional limits that cannot be extended for equitable reasons holding that the 120day filing period is subject to equitable tolling and addressing circumstances warranting equitable tolling