seized under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) for their use or intended use to facilitate drug transactions. Consequently, the Government’s claim for forfeiture pursuant to 21 Ú.S.C. § 881(a)(4) is time-barred. The parties differ, however, on whether the expedited procedures in section 888(c) apply to conveyances seized under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) as proceeds traceable to drug trafficking. The few courts addressing this issue have come to differing conclusions on the applicability of section 888(c) to section -881(a)(6). See, e.g., United States v. Indoor Cultivation Equip., 55 F.3d 1311, 1314-16 (7th Cir.1995) (strictly construing section 888(c) to apply to vehicles purchased with proceeds of drug transactions); United States v. A 1966 Ford Mustang, 945 F.Supp. 149, 151-52 (S.D.Ohio 1996) (<HOLDING>). The Eleventh Circuit has yet to address this
holding that section 888e applies only to vehicles seized under section 881a4 holding that section 4a12 is a broadly applicable section of the guidelines holding that analysis under section 1301g is not the same as the analysis under section 1301f and that the existence of accident or mistake is irrelevant because appellants moved for relief only under section 1301f holding that the rule applies for purposes of habeas corpus under section 2254 holding that section 1823e is narrower than the doench doctrine and that section 1823e applies only to cases involving a specific asset