that is essential to an effective democracy. Ultimately, Georgia’s potential harm amounts to expenditures of time and money that will be incurred in performing UOCAVA remedial tasks, as well as the inconvenience that Georgia election officials might experience. In weighing the threatened injury to UOCAVA voters against the hardships that Georgia might suffer if the requested injunction were granted, the Court finds that the potential deprivation of the ability to vote, the most basic of American citizens’ rights, outweighs the cost and the inconvenience that might be suffered by Georgia as a result of its present runoff election scheme, which does not comply with the forty-five day transmittal requirements of UOCAVA. See United States v. Alabama, 857 F.Supp.2d 1236,1242 (M.D.Ala.2012) (<HOLDING>). d. No Disservice to the Public Interest
holding that the potential harm caused to uocava voters far outweighed the burden placed upon the state because of the states legally mandated obligation to provide uocava voters the ability to vote holding that the right to vote is fundamental holding that a law that merely affects voting without actually denying the right to vote or depriving voters of equal representation is usually not subject to strict scrutiny holding that electors should have the fullest opportunity to vote for candidates of any political party and any restrictions that are destructive of freedom of choice by voters will not be upheld holding that the burden is upon the state under the applicable federal rules of evidence