is “so related to” any claims within the court’s original jurisdiction as to “form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Exercising this jurisdiction is discretionary; the court may decline to hear a supplemental claim in enumerated circumstances, including where it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” Id. § 1367(c). The district court suggested it could not. hear the claim under supplemental jurisdiction because it had already dismissed the related federal-question claims. But the fact that the district court could decline to exercise jurisdiction does not mean there was no jurisdiction. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 349, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Moody v. Great W. Ry. Co., 536 F.3d 1158,
holding that the power of a federal court to hear and to determine statelaw claims in nondiversity cases depends upon the presence of at least one substantial federal claim in the lawsuit  and the district court has considerable authority whether or not to exercise this power in light of such considerations as judicial economy convenience fairness to litigants and eomity  recognizing distinction between sole power and sovereignty recognizing a distinction between the power of a federal court to hear statelaw claims and the discretionary exercise of that power holding that a commission is a body with special and limited power and it can only exercise the power expressly or impliedly granted to it and any reasonable doubt of existence of any power must be resolved against the exercise thereof holding that the power of a federal court to hear and to determine statelaw claims in nondiversity cases depends upon the presence of at least one substantial federal claim in the lawsuit