fair determination of guilt or innocence because the informant could testify regarding information about the house itself. Nevertheless, appellant does not provide supporting argument as to why information about the house itself would be necessary for a fair determination of guilt or innocence. We observe that in appellant’s motion for disclosure of the confidential informant, appellant argued that the informant can “testify that [appellant] had no ownership or control over the premises .... ” However, this allegation is nothing more than mere conjecture and speculation and, thus, is insufficient to merit an in camera hearing, much less require the trial court to order disclosure of the informant’s identity. See Patterson v. State, 138 S.W.3d 643, 648-49 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that appellant failed to meet his
holding that the plaintiff had failed to prove the defendants reasons for not hiring the plaintiff were pretext because the plaintiff failed to submit any evidence other than her own subjective testimony that she was more qualified for the job than the selectee holding that a violation of a defendants constitutional right to compulsory process requires at a minimum some plausible showing of how the excluded testimony would have been both material and favorable to his defense holding that the defendant did not require advance notice where he could not show how he was prejudiced by late notice or how he could have been helped by additional notice holding that defendants argument that the informant could have identified other occupants of residence who could have been responsible for the contraband was nothing more than mere conjecture or supposition unsupported by any evidence and thus defendant failed to make a plausible showing of how the informants testimony was important holding that there was sufficient probable cause to search a defendants residence after evidence of drug dealing was found in his car during a traffic stop that was conducted when the defendant was coming from his residence and noting that under such circumstances a practical commonsense conclusion could be made that the drugs and money had been at the defendants residence a short time before the stop