behavior” stipulation in Mobile County as follows: “[Wjhen stipulating on a good behavior, if you violate the agreement you’ve entered into ..., it’s as if you’ve been found guilty and [the court simply] impose[s] sentence.” (R. 10.) The circuit court agreed with the prosecutor’s description. Id. Thus, when Clark failed to comply with the terms of the “good behavior” agreement, his stipulation was “itself a conviction [and] nothing remain[ed] but to give judgment and determine punishment.” Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969)(eiting Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223, 47 S.Ct. 582, 71 L.Ed. 1009 (1927)). See also Ex parte Howard, 710 So.2d 460, 465 (Ala.1997) (same); see also State v. Alien, 220 Ariz. 430, 207 P.3d 683, 687 (Ct.App.2008) (<HOLDING>). But cf. Perkins v. State, 808 So.2d 1041,
holding that based on the facts presented by the state and the defendants stipulation to the existence of a factual basis for his plea the court properly determined a factual basis for the plea existed holding that the defendants guilty plea was valid where the district court carefully questioned the defendant about whether he understood the consequences of his guilty plea holding that a defendants stipulation to the facts establishing guilt was the functional equivalent of guilty plea holding that entering a guilty plea is an admission of guilt and a waiver of the right to jury trial holding that a defendants guilty plea was unconditional where the guilty plea was not in writing and the government did not consent to it being conditional