in this case. First, it clearly appears on this record that both the Land Department and Waddell relied on the Land Department’s classification of the property as commercial pursuant to the requirements of the Arizona exchange statutes. Waddell admits in his affidavit that he knew at the time of the sale that the property was used as a farm and Arizona law set acreage limitations on the sale of agricultural property. The Land Department assumed the constitutionality of the exchange statutes, which were not declared unconstitutional until Fain, almost five years after the sale. Based on these statutes, the Land Department did not see any need to reclassify the property as commercial subject to an interim, special use as agriculture. See Havasu Heights, 158 Ariz. at 552, 764 P.2d at 37 (<HOLDING>). Because both parties relied on the commercial
holding where exempt organization was in possession of real property under land contract obligating organization to pay the purchase price and use land for exempt purpose the association was the owner of the land within the meaning of the statute holding that in action by property owner to recover land taken by eminent domain current titleholder to land might be necessary party if district court were to restore land to plaintiff holding land for speculation is a legitimate commercial use grazing on land so classified subject to a special use permit holding that animal husbandry operations were included in the definition of farm even if the animals do not touch the ground graze on the land or feed from crops grown on the land and holding that land used to support buildings used in the production of agricultural products is a productive use of the land holding that a petitioner in a judicial review from the land use board of appeals had constitutional standing because the land use decision would affect her use and enjoyment of a nearby estuary that she used for passive recreation