So long as an officer has “arguable probable cause to arrest for any offense, qualified immunity will apply.” Grider v. City of Auburn, Ala., 618 F.3d 1240, 1257 (11th Cir.2010). An individual engages in disorderly conduct when he “[w]ithout provocation, uses to or of another person in such other person’s presence, opprobrious or abusive words which by their very utterance tend to incite to an immediate breach of the peace ... that is, words commonly called ‘fighting words.’ ” Ga.Code Ann. § 16 — 11— 39(a)(3) (2012). States cannot apply criminal penalties to protected speech, and Georgia has accordingly tailored its disorderly conduct statute to punish only unprotected fighting words. See e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521-22, 92 S.Ct. 1103, 1106, 31 L.Ed.2d 408 (1972) (<HOLDING>). In defining fighting words in the context of
holding that under chaplinsky any statute punishing or regulating the use of abusive language must be limited to fighting words holding a georgia statute that criminalized using opprobrious words or abusive language tending to cause a breach of peace unconstitutional because first amendment protections forbid the states to punish the use of words or language not within narrowly limited classes of speech  holding unconstitutionally broad a statute prohibiting the use of opprobrious language toward or with reference to any member of the city police while in the actual performance of his duty holding that instructions are sufficient which substantially follow the language of the statute or use equivalent language holding unconstitutional a statute barring the use of opprobrious words or abusive language tending to cause a breach of the peace