as to an adult, however, may not be for a child because a juvenile is less likely to be able to “determine what is in their own best interest.” JV-500210, 111 Ariz. at 5, 864 P.2d at 562. For that reason, unlike an adult, a juvenile may not reject probation and elect incarceration. Id. ¶ 38 Recently, this court decided State v. Tousignant, 202 Ariz. 270, 43 P.3d 218 (App. 2002). There, we addressed the issue of whether a defendant who violated his probation under Proposition 200 could opt to reject further probation. Id. at 3, 43 P.3d at 218. The Tousignant court held that he could not because A.R.S. § 13-901.01(E) (2001) mandates probation, and incarceration is not an option. Id. at 4, 43 P.3d at 220; see also In re Fernando C., 195 Ariz. 233, 234, ¶ 5, 986 P.2d 901, 902 (App.1999) (<HOLDING>). In so holding, this court overturned the
recognizing the juvenile courts broad discretion in fashioning orders specifically tailored to address each juveniles particular treatment and rehabilitative needs in order to effectuate the purposes and goals underlying the juvenile court system holding that proposition 200 does not apply to juveniles because its goals are redundant with that of the juvenile court system holding juveniles statement inadmissible when after being placed in custody police took juvenile to police station and held juvenile in area where adult suspects were held instead of taking juvenile to a juvenile processing office or any of the places listed as an alternative in section 5202 and placing juvenile in specifically designated office for juveniles holding that apprendi does not apply to juvenile waiver hearings because the applicable statute does not involve guilt or innocence but involves the determination of which system will be appropriate for a juvenile offender recognizing juveniles right to counsel in certain juvenile proceedings