to each spouse” in dividing the marital property. In accordance with section 503(d)(3), Paul’s accumulation of disability benefits, as nonmarital property set aside to him, was a proper factor for the trial court to consider in the division of the marital property. See Hapaniewski, 107 Ill. App. 3d at 853. We also do not believe that the trial court’s consideration of Paul’s accumulated disability benefits ran afoul of the anti-attachment provisions of section 5301(a)(1). Those anti-attachment provisions speak to the “payment of benefits due or to become due” to a veteran. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5301(a)(1) (West Supp. 2004). In other words, the federal statute prohibits the assignment or attachment of present or anticipated disability benefit payments. See generally Crook, 211 Ill. 2d at 449-50 (<HOLDING>). Indeed, all of the cases discussing the
holding trial court had no authority to award portion of the marital property to wifes children from another marriage even though money they received by way of social security benefits were commingled with the marital estate and used in part for the aequisition of marital property holding that use of social security benefits satisfied child support obligation holding that offset for social security retirement benefits does not include federal disability benefits and stating that there was no legislative intent to embody the entire subchapter of the social security act dealing with both disability benefits and old age benefits holding that a trial judge should not consider a spouses anticipated social security benefits as a factor in distributing the marital assets holding that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination of social security disability benefits