harm became inevitable. Arguably, after the June suspension notice, Wright’s payment strategy was merely reckless. However, the same may not be said concerning the August suspension and notice, and certainly may not be said concerning the November suspension. By his willful failure to pay, Wright on each occasion caused his employees to be effectively without insurance and courted the spectre of termination. Wright’s actions not only were deliberate and intentional, they were knowingly wrongful, done without just cause or excuse, and substantially certain to cause harm. See Stelluti 94 F.3d at 87. Even absent personal hatred, spite, or ill-will towards Baldwin employees, Wright’s acts were both willful and malicious. Id.; Cf. In re Ussery, 179 B.R. 737, 739-40 (Bankr. S.D.Ga.1995) (<HOLDING>). Like the appellant in Stelluti, though
holding that legal injury occurred for purposes of negligence action against insurance agent when insurance company rejected the claim holding that notice and a hearing were required before the commissioner of insurance could require an insurance company to change its definition of at fault in order to secure approval of an increase in insurance rates holding failure to carry auto insurance required by state law inflicted willful and malicious injury holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law holding that failure to report a change in federal taxable income as required by state law excepted state tax liability from discharge