could have been the culpable party” and that “the court’s rulings left the defense with no way to suggest an answer to [the] question” of “who else the cocaine could have come from.” III. Prior to trial, appellant moved to suppress physical evidence obtained as a result of the arrest team’s entry into the apartment. He argued, and contends again on appeal, that as the officers did not have a search warrant for the premises and as he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment as a frequent guest, the entry of the arrest team violated the Fourth Amendment. Citing Morton v. United States, 734 A.2d 178 (D.C.1999), the trial court found that Brown had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment as an invited guest of Powell, the owner of the premises. See id. at 182 (<HOLDING>). The court ruled, however, that although the
holding that the driver of a ear owned by his wife who had given him permission to use it had a legitimate expectation of privacy under the fourth amendment holding that rooming house residents had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the front hallway of the house they shared which was not obviously a rooming house open to the general public holding that because social guests of the host generally have a legitimate expectation of privacy  appellant met his burden of showing that he had a protectible interest in the house the police entered in order to seize him holding that defendant staying in abandoned house had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the house despite having a key to the house and the ability to let people in and out of it recognizing record supported determination that defendant lacked expectation of privacy in house