confidence and trust, and the placing of reliance by one upon the judgment and advice of the other.” Weltzin, 633 N.W.2d at 294 (citations omitted). Plaintiffs concede that this is the general rule but argue for the court to recognize a duty of care based upon the monitoring and reporting requirements under the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5318 (as amended by the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (“Patriot Act”), Pub.L. 107-56, § 326). Plaintiffs cite no decision by an Iowa court, or any other court, recognizing such a duty arising from that Act. Rather, courts have uniformly rejected such an argument. Marlin v. Moody Nat’l Bank, N.A., No. 04-4443, 2006 WL 2382325, at *7 (S.D.Tex. Aug. 16, 2006) (<HOLDING>); Aiken v. Interglobal Mergers and
holding that the rehabilitation act does not create a private right of action against the secretary of education acting in his role as an administrator recognizing private right of action holding that the rehabilitation act does not create a private right of action against the secretary of transportation where the apa provides an adequate remedy holding that section 4625bc does not create a private right of action for money damages holding that under the bank secrecy act banks do not become guarantors of the integrity of the deals of their customers it does not create a private right of action and therefore does not establish a standard of care