first year of the plan, it specifically explained the $450,000 aggregate limit to the Diocese before the beginning of the second year of the plan, and the Diocese chose not to purchase additional coverage. The contract between the Diocese and Gallagher was for a three-year term and provided for adjustments to premiums, the service fee, and the loss fund for the second and third annual periods. The “renewal proposals” Gallagher provided to the Diocese for the second year presented such adjustments. In agreeing to a change in terms-, parties may intend to make a new and separate contract rather than modify an existing contract. See Ketteringham v. Eureka Homestead Soc’y, 140 La. 176, 72 So. 916, 917 (1916). However, we do not see the changes made pursuant to the renewa La.Ct.App.1993) (<HOLDING>). Modifications may, however, be effected by
holding that defendant did not breach oral agreement because among other things the plaintiff had not established that the term in question was part of the oral contract holding that subsequent modifications to a written proposal which constituted a contract upon oral acceptance were not part of the contract because they were done without the knowledge or consent of other party holding that party to contract could not with knowledge of the fraud which had been practiced upon him take any benefit under the contract or change the condition of the property  and then repudiate the contract because the taking of a benefit is an election to ratify it holding that complete performance of contract constituted acceptance holding that the arbitration agreement in a written contract did not apply to a dispute arising from a subsequent oral agreement which did not incorporate the arbitration clause from the written contract