it requires the defendant to “know the facts that make [her] conduct illegal.” Ndikum, 815 N.W.2d at 818 (quoting Staples, 511 U.S. at 605, 114 S.Ct. 1793). Specifically, for assault-harm, a defendant must intend the act. that makes her conduct a battery;' in .other words, she must intentionally apply force to another person without his consent. See II.B., infra. If, instead, we required the intent to commit a battery, a defendant would not only need to know the facts that make her conduct illegal, but would also need to know that her conduct breaks the law. It is well settled, however, that' a mistake of law is generally -not a defense to a general-intent crime. State v. Jacobson, 697 N.W.2d 610, 615 (Minn. 2005); see also State v. Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d 293, 301 n.2, 303 (Minn. 2015) (<HOLDING>). The evidence is sufficient to establish that
holding that the clergy sexual conduct statute requires general intent and does not impose strict liability because the act of sexual penetration must be intentional holding that a jury instruction listing additional modes of sexual penetration than those listed in the information did not impermissibly amend the charge of sexual assault becausein part the added modes of sexual penetration did not change the applicable statute sentence or level of offense holding that sexual harassment need not take the form of sexual advances or other explicitly sexual conduct in order to be actionable under title vii holding that medical report was not material for brady purposes where report at best showed lack of vaginal penetration of sexual abuse victim penetration was not necessary for conviction of sexual abuse of a minor under iowa law holding that the illinois statutory definitions of sexual penetration and sexual conduct cover clearly distinct conduct and that therefore the statute was not unconstitutionally vague