the fact that Coleman testified on his own behalf, denied committing the crime, and was found guilty anyway. See, e.g., United States v. Vazquez, 53 F.3d 1216, 1225 (11th Cir. 1995) (“when a defendant takes the stand in a criminal case and exposes his demean- or to the jury, the jury may make adverse determinations about his credibility and reject his explanation as a complete fabrication.”). Finally, because Coleman must prove a reasonable probability of a different outcome, and the best that can be said about the outburst is that it may or may not have impacted the jury and may or may not have affected the outcome, Coleman cannot carry his burden of proof and persuasion under the prejudice prong of Strickland. Cf. United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1299-1301 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). The evidence does not demonstrate that the
holding that to succeed on an ineffective assistance claim a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different holding that to succeed under plain error review of a sixth amendment right to a jury violation at sentencing a defendant must show a reasonable probability citing strickland of a different outcome and where the effect of the error was uncertain the defendant failed to meet that burden holding that a defendant must show reasonable probability that but for the error he would not have entered the plea recognizing under plain error review that the burden to show that substantial rights have been prejudiced is on the party that failed to raise the issue below and for an error to have affected substantial rights the error must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings holding that party asserting plain error must show a reasonable probability that but for the error claimed the result of the proceeding would have been different