case turned not on the type of injuries involved, but'whether those injuries occurred “by accident.” Judge Springmann found that they did and there fore Neal’s common law negligence claims were barred the WCA. But again, in the present case, the determinative issue — and the one on which the parties focus their arguments — is the nature of the Reibers’ alleged injuries and whether'they invoke the WCA in the first place. The Court agrees with the Reibers that they do not. As another district court has explained, “[t]he Act does not bar claims for which the plaintiff does not seek relief for physical injury, disability or impairment.” Neal v. Rock-Tenn Co., 2005 WL 1939955, at *10 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 20, 2005) (citing McCreary v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 132 F.3d 1159, 1166 (7th Cir. 1997) (<HOLDING>)). The Court in Neal concluded that “it is
recognizing torts of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress holding that act did not bar intentional infliction of emotional distress claim recognizing validity of cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress holding that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from a claim for emotional distress damages under the employment discrimination statute holding that intentional infliction of emotional distress is a personal injury tort