in granting summary judgment to the plaintiff, the court wrongly “inferred gender discrimination” without an appropriate legal or evidentiary footing, as the plaintiff failed to offer any “direct evidence of gender discrimination.” Id. at 10-11 (emphasis omitted). The defendant has, however, again d o v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 447 F.3d 843, 851 (D.C.Cir.2006) (observing that the Circuit has “expressly rejected as immaterial a requirement that the plaintiff be [treated differently from] an individual outside [his] protected class”); George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 412-13 (D.C.Cir.2005) (concluding that the district court erred in requiring the plaintiff to show that he “was treated differently than similarly situated employees”); Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 146 (D.C.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Ignoring these authorities, the defendant
holding that a plaintiff in a discrimination case need not demonstrate that she was replaced by a person outside her protected class in order to carry her burden of establishing a prima facie case holding that a plaintiff who could not demonstrate every element of the mcdonnell douglas test could nonetheless demonstrate a prima facie case holding that plaintiffs alleging discriminatory treatment are not required to plead facts establishing a prima facie case under mcdonnell douglas corp v green 411 us 792 93 sct 1817 36 led2d 668 1973 because its burdenshifting framework does not apply in every discrimination case holding that a plaintiff in a discrimination case need not demonstrate that she was replaced by a person outside her protected class in order to carry her burden of establishing a prima facie case under mcdonnell douglas corp v green 411 us 792 93 sct 1817 36 led2d 668 1973  holding that the burdenshifting test established by mcdonnell douglas v green 411 us 792 93 sct 1817 36 led2d 668 1973 does not apply at the pleading stage