of whether a party seeking to intervene must have Article III standing. Because Treesdale is not on point and Rauscher directly addresses standing in a similar factual setting, Rauscher will guide our analysis. 5 . Easter also argues that his inclusion by AAIC in the lawsuit is determinative of his standing to appeal. We disagree. In Rauscher, we reasoned that the fact that Kemper brought a declaratory judgment action against the injured parties "in hopes of attaining a binding judgment against both its insured and the injured parties” was persuasive evidence that an “actual controversy” existed between them, and, therefore, that the injured parties had standing to defend the action. 807 F.2d at 353-54; see also Truck Ins. Exch. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 951 F.2d 787, 789 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Makover, 654 F.2d 1120,
holding that the injured party had standing to appeal the declaratory judgment in favor of the insurance company and noting that it was decisive to the holding that dairyland named the injured appellants in its declaratory judgment action holding that an insurer which insures a tortfeasor under a liability policy has no obligation of good faith and fair dealing to an injured third party even where the injured third party also carries a separate policy with the insurer holding that there is an actual controversy between an insurer and the party injured by the insured holding that an injured party in an underlying tort action was not a necessary party in an action by an insurer for declaratory judgment of nonliability where the injured person had not obtained judgment against the insured holding that an insurer who brought a declaratory judgment action and out of an abundance of caution named the injured party as an additional defendant 1 must have thought the injured party had some potential interest in the insurance policy and 2 had tacitly conceded the injured partys standing to appeal by not contesting the appeal on the ground of lack of standing