confronted with the witnesses against him,” and includes the right to cross-examine those witnesses. U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; see Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987). At the time the Appellate Division issued its opinion, Confrontation Clause jurisprudence permitted testimonial hearsay to be admitted against a defendant, provided it bore sufficient “indicia of reliability.” See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). Furthermore, clearly established Supreme Court law guided lower courts as to when and how confessions of co-conspirators could be introduced at trial in a manner that did not offend the Confrontation Clause. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 136-37, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) (<HOLDING>); see also Richardson, 481 U.S. at 203 & 211,
holding harmless the admission of a nontestifying codefendants confession in violation of the confrontation clause when there was extensive evidence of the defendants guilt including the defendants allegedly coerced confession and an eyewitness who testified that he was absolutely certain that the defendant committed the crime holding that the admission of a pretrial confession of a nontestifying codefendant that incriminates the defendant violates that defendants right to confront witnesses even if a limiting instruction is given holding that admission of a postal inspectors testimony about an oral confession by a defendants codefendant violated the defendants sixth amendment right to crossexamine his codefendant who was unavailable because the codefendant asserted his right not to testify holding that a defendants sixth amendment confrontation clause rights are violated when a court admits into evidence an incriminating statement given by a nontestifying codefendant holding that the clause was not violated by a redacted confession with a proper limiting instruction