that the district court applied the wrong standard and improperly considered evidence outside the pleadings, effectively converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment without notice. These errors were compounded, she claims, when the court failed to reconsider despite later-produced evidence in support of MCT’s negligence. We can understand why Ms. Dahlberg might be confused by the district court’s dismissal. But even if the district court’s ruling was confusing, it does not follow that Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal was improper. Because our review is de novo, Bixler v. Foster, 596 F.3d 751, 756 (10th Cir.2010), our only concern on appeal is with the sufficiency of the complaint. See GFF Corp. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 130 F.3d 1381, 1384 (10th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Even if we were to disagree with the district
holding that by considering matters outside of the pleadings the trial court converted a rule 12b6 motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion holding that district court has discretion when deciding to convert a defendants motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment holding that where a court considering a rule 12b6 motion relies on matters outside the pleading the motion must be treated as a rule 56 motion for summary judgment holding that a rule 12b6 motion to dismiss should be treated as a motion for summary judgment when plaintiffs counsel relied upon facts outside the four corners of the complaint during oral argument of the motion recognizing that failing to convert a rule 12b6 motion to a motion for summary judgment will not constitute reversible error if the dismissal can be justified without considering the outside materials