omitted)), cert. granted, 521 U.S. 1117, 117 S.Ct. 2506, 138 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1997), cert. dismissed, 522 U.S. 1010, 118 S.Ct. 595, 139 L.Ed.2d 431 (1997). Under the third factor, the majority properly recognizes that an affirmative action “admissions policy must do no more than is necessary to correct” a racial imbalance and must be “temporary.” Maj. Op. at 842; accord id. at 845. Proclaiming that “[a]n explicit or immediately foreseeable end date has never been required for an affirmative action plan to be valid,” Maj. Op. at 846, however, the majority completely ignores Johnson’s suggestion that even a partial preference should be checked by an explicit sunset provision, by holding that Kamehameha’s absolute preference need not contain a sunset provision at all, see Maj. Op. at 845 (<HOLDING>); id. at 843 (“The goal [of Kamehameha’s
holding that this court may reconsider an erroneous ruling as long as the appeal is current holding that the fair use defense is available only so long as such use does not lead to customer confusion as to the source of the goods or services holding that title vii provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment holding that kamehameha may use race as an exclusive admissions factor so long as is necessary to remedy the current educational effects of past private and governmentsponsored discrimination and of social and economic deprivation holding that a private citizen acting as undercover agent is not an accomplice witness so long as he does not bring about the crime