of 29 U.S.C. Section 1022(a), and is unenforceable against [him].” Id. Chalker also asserts, and correctly so, that the district court failed to address this argument. “Where the SPD [at issue] is silent on a provision that the plan documents include, and plaintiff contends therefore the term cannot apply to him,” “a two-step approach” must be used “to analyze plaintiffs argument.” Tocker v. Philip Morris Co., 470 F.3d 481, 488 (2d Cir.2006). “First, relying on the statutory language of ERISA and its implementing regulations,” the court must “look to see whether ERISA requires the term to be stated in the SPD.” Id. “Second,” the court must “consider whether plaintiff was likely prejudiced by the SPD’s silence on the term or information at issue.” Id.; see Chiles, 95 F.3d at 1519 (<HOLDING>). ERISA’s statutory language provides, in
holding that a payment is under the plan when the debt is provided for in the plan holding an allegation sufficient under rule 9b that the plan and the participants acting on behalf of the plan relied upon and are presumed to have relied upon defendants representations and nondisclosures to their detriment holding that where an spd incorrectly describes plan benefits the claimant must demonstrate in order to secure relief that he significantly relied upon or was possibly prejudiced by the faulty plan description holding that because the spd at issue stated that it is made part of the group policy its terms were sufficient to find that the plan conferred discretion on the plan administrator holding that a plan provision stating that the summary plan description and summaries of material modifications  are hereby incorporated by reference and constitute a part of the plan acted to incorporate into the plan a limitations provision found only in the summary plan description