claim does not exist.”) The Court agrees. 5 . Defendants filed a motion to transfer to the District Court for the Southern District of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which this Court denied. (Dkt. No. 4.) 6 . Citing D.C.Code § 31-4314, Capitol Specialty also argues it could abrogate the policy based on defendants’ false representation in the Warranty and Application, even if this misrepresentation was unintentional. D.C.Code § 31-4314 provides that a false statement on an insurance application does not bar the right to recovery unless "such false statement was made with intent to deceive or unless it materially affect[s] either the acceptance of the risk or the hazard assumed by the company.” D.C.Code § 31-4314 (2011); See Ross v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 420 B.R. 43 (D.C.2009) (<HOLDING>); Burlington Ins. Co. v. Okie Dokie Inc., 398
holding that regardless of the subjective belief of the insured the record established a basis to believe that the insured had committed an act that could give rise to a claim under the policy holding that the plaintiffs asserted legal basis for coverage is irrelevant to the determination of whether the insurance policy provides coverage and instead looking to the facts underlying the claim for coverage holding this statute did not bar insurers denial of coverage for legal malpractice claim because the insured prior to inception date of policy had reason to believe that an act or omission might reasonably be expected to be the basis of a claim holding a law firms failure to file a timely answer resulting in a default judgment could reasonably be expected to form the basis for a malpractice claim holding that an amendment to a policy in existence prior to the effective date of a statute requiring uninsured motorist coverage which substituted insured automobiles did not incorporate the new statute because to do so would be an unconstitutional impairment of the obligation of the contract