Inc., 234 B.R. 8 (D.Conn.1997) ... the Court held that, pursuant to § 541(a)(7), a Fair Debt Collection Act cause of action arising out of dunning letters received by the debtor after the bankruptcy petition was filed constituted property of the estate. See Correll, 234 B.R. at 10. Other courts have reached similar conclusions based on § 541(a)(7). See Polvay [v. B.O. Acquisitions Inc.], 1997 WL 188127, at *2 (“Causes of action arising after the debtor files for bankruptcy generally become part of the estate.”); Stanley v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 156 B.R. 25 (W.D.Va.1993) (debtor did not have standing to maintain cause of action for interference of contractual relations which arose pri- or to the discharge of his estate); In re Griseuk, 165 B.R. 956, 957-59 (Bankr.M.D.Fl[Fla].1994) (<HOLDING>); DeLarco v. DeWitt, 136 A.D.2d 406, 408, 527
holding the receiver properly applied rental income from the property to the payment of common charges during the pendency of the foreclosure action holding that an anticipated tax refund was property of the bankruptcy estate as of the date the bankruptcy case was filed holding that despite a lack of any formal notice tulsa requirement was satisfied by a showing that because the creditor was also the executor of the estate the creditor had actual notice of the pendency of the estate proceedings holding that bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction to control disposition of chapter 13 debtors property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate unless the property is related to the bankruptcy proceedings of the code holding that personal injury action arising during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings was property of the estate