not every employer that claimed an inability to pay was required to disclose supporting evidence. See Truitt, 351 U.S. at 153-54, 76 S.Ct. 753. The Court did not hold that oral claims of inability to pay made during bargaining would never trigger the Company’s duty to disclose, but that is what the Board seems to imply. The Supreme Court was clear that any claimed inability to pay followed by a refusal to substantiate that inability “may support a finding of a failure to bargain in good faith.” Id. at 153, 76 S.Ct. 753 (emphasis added). Here, the Board ignored the obvious fact that Tan proclaimed the Company’s inability to pay for increased benefits. Ferro asked, “So are you saying you cannot afford the Union’s proposals?” In response, Tan replied, “No, I 4 N.L.R.B. 763, 769 (1994) (<HOLDING>). We therefore hold that substantial evidence
holding that a county had no duty to bargain with a union of its employees holding that president of company who breached fiduciary duty in purchasing stock was properly required to pay damages rather than transfer shares back to company holding that company was not required to provide data or analysis on subgroups of patients in clinical trial even if subgroup information was material and the company had made public statements about topline results holding that where company made statements constituting inability to pay orally at bargaining sessions company had duty to show its books to the union holding that exclusiveremedy provision applied to both temporary staffing company and client company