to cause the U.S. government to overpay (i.e. suffer a direct financial loss to the federal fisc) for equipment to be resold to Saudi Arabia). 61 . Moreover, there is no indication in the legislative history that § 3729(c) was intended to expand the scope of FCA liability to demands for payment from money or property merely in the possession of the United States government. Nor does anything in the legislative history indicate an intent to overrule Cohn. Instead, Congress sought to clarify that the FCA extends to false claims made to states and other grantees of federal funds, overturning certain lower court decisions holding to the contrary. See S.Rep. No. 99-345, at 21 (1986); see also United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp. (Totten II), 380 F.3d 488, 494-97 (D.C.Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Nowhere does the legislative history suggest
holding that standing of a qui tam plaintiff under the false claims act requires an injury to the united states holding that the defendant contractor violated 18 usc  286  a companion statute to the criminal fca  because his claims were false when submitted even though the false claims were ultimately irrelevant to the total amount paid by the government to the contractor holding that congress may even have been unsuccessful in this regard when those false claims are not ultimately presented to the united states holding that apparel cleaners submission of false statements of their receipts a percentage of which were to be paid to the united states did not constitute false claims within the meaning of the federal false claims act recognizing similar problem if fca is applied to claims presented to any federal grantee even if claims are not represented to united states