that the burglary occur in a dwelling.” Wenner, 351 F.3d at 973. Taylor sets forth a categorical approach, which “generally requires the trial court to look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense.” 495 U.S. at 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143. Using that approach, Rodriguez’s California first degree burglary conviction does not constitute generic burglary because California Penal Code Sections 459 and 460 do not require “unlawful or unprivileged entry” for a burglary conviction. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599, 110 S.Ct. 2143 (“A few States’ burglary statutes, however, define burglary more broadly, e.g., by eliminating the requirement that the entry be unlawful.”); see also People v. Frye, 18 Cal.4th 894, 954, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183 (Cal. 1998) (<HOLDING>). Where, as here, the state burglary statute is
holding that in california one may be convicted of burglary even if he enters with consent holding a defendant may not be convicted of more than one count of dissemination of matter harmful to minors based on one occurrence even if there was more than one victim holding that iowa burglary is not categorical burglary as the elements of iowa burglary law are broader than those of generic burglary holding that a california burglary conviction was burglary under a modifiedcategorical approach because velascomedina pled guilty where the indictment alleged unlawful entry holding that possession of burglary tools is an offense separate from burglary