a void judgment.” The effect of the court’s proclamation is the granting of a post-judgment mistrial, which the State argues is a “functional impossibility.” “Although nowhere expressly provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure, an order of mistrial ordinarily occurs before completion of the trial and the rendition of judgment.” Rodriguez v. State, 852 S.W.2d 516, 518 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). This Court has previously held that where a trial court orders a post-verdict mistrial, it is “functionally indistinguishable” from the granting of a motion for new trial because it “returns the case to the posture in which it had been before trial.” State v. Garza, 774 S.W.2d 724, 726 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1989, pet. ref'd); see also State v. Evans, 843 S.W.2d 576, 577 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (<HOLDING>). In the instant case, not only had the jury
holding order granting motion to withdraw plea to be the functional equivalent of an order granting a new trial because like a postverdict mistrial it returns case to posture it had been before trial holding that an order granting a new trial in a civil action is appealable holding order granting a new trial is not a final appealable order because it does not terminate the action or any of the claims or parties in the action holding that an order vacating an arbitration award and directing a rehearing is the functional equivalent of an order granting a new trial holding that order to vacate award and order new arbitration is the functional equivalent of an order granting a new trial  and therefore not subject to direct appellate review quoting stothandske 14 sw3d at 814