33, 48 (2d Cir.2006) (interpreting the word “cause” in an insurance contract governed by New York law and stating that “[i]n a case where a covered and [non-covered] peril combine to cause a covered loss, courts typically apply the efficient proximate cause rule — meaning, that the insured is entitled to coverage only if the covered peril is the predominant cause of the loss or damage” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Siegel v. Chubb Corp., 33 A.D.3d 565, 825 N.Y.S.2d 441, 442 (1st Dep’t 2006). We should expect that if parties wish to override the settled principle that concurrent operation of a non-listed peril will not necessarily defeat coverage, they will be reasonably clear about it. See Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989, 1007 (2d Cir.1974) (<HOLDING>). These parties were not. Second, Lexington
holding that a physicians negligence need only be a proximate cause not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury holding that negligence must be the proximate cause of injury holding that the burden is on the petitioner for the writ of habeas corpus to show that the exclusion applies and that the extraordinary circumstances alleged rather than a lack of diligence on his part were the proximate cause of the untimeliness recognizing that limitations on the scope of a defendants liability may be analyzed under the rubric of proximate cause recognizing that the efficient proximate cause rule is adumbrated by the maxim contra proferentem if the insurer desires to have more remote causes determine the scope of exclusion he may draft language to effectuate that desire