prohibiting the crime or so plainly that the nature of the offense charged may be easily understood. Reddick, 348 S.C. at 635, 560 S.E.2d at 443; State v. Ervin, 333 S.C. 351, 355, 510 S.E.2d 220, 222 (Ct.App.1998) overruled on other grounds by Gentry, 363 S.C. 93, 610 S.E.2d 494. 1. Specific Time of Offenses Charged While our supreme court has not created a new rule or standard for addressing this issue, this court has adopted a two-prong test for determining the sufficiency of an indictment involving a purportedly overbroad time period: (1) whether time is a material element of the offense; and (2) whether the time period covered by the indictment occurred prior to the return of the indictment by the grand jury. State v. Nicholson, 366 S.C. 568, 574, 623 S.E.2d 100, 103 (Ct.App.2005) (<HOLDING>); State v. Wingo, 304 S.C. 173, 175, 403 S.E.2d
holding that the confrontation clause is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment holding an indictment alleging commission of seconddegree criminal conduct during periods of june 1 through july 20 1995 july 1 through july 31 1995 and august 1 through august 18 1995 was sufficient as to time holding that the supreme courts interpretation of 18 usc  924c1 in bailey v united states 516 us 137 116 sct 501 133 led2d 472 1995 has retroactive application to cases on collateral review holding the sixth amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment holding the requirement that a person search through multiple statutes then through the administrative code lacks the sufficient definiteness that due process requires for penal statutes