§ 812.13(2)(a) did not qualify as a crime of moral turpitude because it did not match the elements of the federal definition of robbery. We also see no indicatipn that the BIA improperly relied on the underlying facts of Jaimes-Lopez’s conduct in its decision. Thus, the BIA did not err in its analysis. B. We also agree with the BIA’s ultimate determination that Jaimes-Lopez’s conviction under § 812.13(2)(a) categorically qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude. For this reason, we need not, and do not, decide whether the Florida statute is divisible or indivisible. See Gelin, 837 F.3d at 1243. The federal circuit courts have long considered theft offenses, including robbery, to involve moral turpitude. See Mendoza v. Holder, 623 F.3d 1299, 1303-04 & nn. 8, 9 (9th Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>); Soetarto v. INS, 516 F.2d 778, 780 (7th Cir.
recognizing the longstanding rule that crimes that have fraud as an element are categorically crimes involving moral turpitude and a court may not apply the modified categorical approach if the statute proscribes only conduct that involves moral turpitude holding that robbery under california law categorically qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude and noting precedent in this and other circuits that theft crimes are crimes involving moral turpitude holding that missouris reckless conduct statute establishes a crime involving moral turpitude holding that assault with a deadly weapon was not a crime involving moral turpitude holding that involuntary manslaughter defined either as reckless or negligent was not a crime of moral turpitude because itwas based on unintentional conduct in contrast to those crimes involving some form of evil intent it is not an offense that is mala in se and thus does not fall within the definition of crimes involving moral turpitude