the language of the statute that limits its reach to acts of violence perpetrated by members of one religious group against members of another. While hate crimes are often committed by members of one religious (or racial or ethnic) group against another, history is replete with examples of internecine violence. By the Defendants’ logic, a violent assault by a Catholic on a Protestant, or a Sunni Muslim on a Shiite Muslim, or an Orthodox Jew on a non-Orthodox Jew, would not be prohibited by this statute. There is no logical reason why such acts of violence should be excepted from the reach of the Hate Crimes Prevention Act, and, in the absence of any language suggesting such a limitation, the Court is not going to create such an exception. See Doe v. Boland, 680 F.Bd 491 (6th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). D. Religious Freedom Restoration Act Finally,
holding invalid warrant did not create probable cause for arrest recognizing the rule and the exception but holding facts did not support claim to exception holding that the court of appeals correctly stated the public policy exception but erroneously concluded that the exception did not apply holding that a court cannot not infer imply or create a statutory exception where congress did not explicitly make one recognizing exception