purposes would not construe those signs as meant to prohibit their entry. Thus, the troopers did not need a warrant to proceed along the driveway to the Michels’ residence. The Michels raise three other issues in this appeal. However, this appeal comes to us via a Cooksey plea , and none of these other issues was preserved for appeal. The judgement of the superior court is AFFIRMED. 1 . 590 P.2d 884 (Alaska 1979). 2 . 590 P.2d at 887. 3 . State v. Rigoulot, 123 Idaho 267, 846 P.2d 918, 923 (App.1992) (citations omitted). 4 . State v. Gave, 77 Wash.App. 333, 890 P.2d 1088, 1091 (1995). 5 . State v. Gabbard, 129 Or.App. 122, 877 P.2d 1217, 1221 (1994). See also State v. Clark, 124 Idaho 308, 859 P.2d 344, 349 (App.1993). 6 . Compare State v. McIntyre, 123 Or.App. 436, 860 P.2d 299 (1993) (<HOLDING>) with State v. Russo, 68 Or.App. 760, 683 P.2d
recognizing that the intent element is to be gleaned from all the surrounding facts and testimony and not solely from the subjective intent of the original shipper holding that the pretrial order did not adequately disclose a theory because it did not give notice of that theory holding that congress had the power to amend an obligation but any intent to change substantive law in a subsequent appropriation must be clearly manifest holding that manifest intent exists when a particular result is substantially certain to follow from the employees conduct holding that a tall wooden fence and a metal gate blocking a homeowners driveway did not adequately manifest an intent to keep visitors from approaching the front door