to regulate and control the practice of law. This includes appointing disciplinary counsel, creating the board to carry out this Court’s disciplinary powers, and subpoenaing witnesses and materials in investigations related to attorney misconduct. Next, respondent claims that the appointment of disciplinary counsel as a “special prosecutor” and use of the subpoena power are exercises of the executive power and violate the separation of powers doctrine, and he also maintains that the General Assembly has not delegated the subpoena power to the Supreme Court. We can find no legitimate basis for respondent’s assertion that the subpoena power is an executive power or that it must be delegated to the judiciary by the General Assembly. See, e.g., State v. Guido, 698 A.2d 729, 734 (R.I.1997) (<HOLDING>); Bartlett v. Danti, 503 A.2d 515, 517 (R.L
holding section 10b of the mental health and developmental disabilities confidentiality act unconstitutional as an attempt by the legislature to usurp the power of the judiciary holding that the subpoena power of a court cannot be more extensive than its jurisdiction holding that the contempt power is a traditional inherent power of the judiciary  rooted in considerations of institutional selfdefense holding that implicit in the arbitrators power to subpoena relevant documents at hearing is the power to order prehearing discovery recognizing the subpoena power of the judiciary