be vacated and remanded for a new trial. [¶ 41] As the majority states, the use of deadly force is justified when the person reasonably believes it is necessary for self-defense and reasonably believes that the other person is about to use unlawful deadly force against him. 17-A M.R.S. § 108(2)(A)(1) (2010). A person is not justified in using deadly force if he knows that he can retreat with complete safety, “except that the person ... is not required to retreat if the person ... is in the person’s dwelling place and was not the initial aggressor.” Id. § 108(C)(3)(a). It is undisputed that the stabbing took place in Pabon’s home, and the parties agree that the dwelling-place exception to the duty to retreat rule applies in this case. See State v. Laverty, 495 A.2d 831, 833 (Me.1985) (<HOLDING>). Therefore the court’s failure to include this
holding that the penalty is applicable holding that the dwelling place exception to the retreat rule is applicable even if the assailant is lawfully present as in the case of a codweller holding that the constitutional right to be present is satisfied so long as the defendant is given an opportunity to register his opinions with counsel after juror questioning and is present when the exercise of strikes is given formal effect even if the defendant is not present when his lawyer actually exercises the peremptory challenges holding rule applicable to witness recognizing the rule and the exception but holding facts did not support claim to exception