by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. The Supreme Court later held in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), that "the duty to disclose such evidence is applicable even though there has been no request by the accused.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) (citing Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107, 96 S.Ct. 2392). 4 . Hurst also makes a passing reference in his brief to a Giglio claim in relation to Smith’s trial testimony. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) (<HOLDING>). We find this claim to be without merit
holding that a prosecutor accused of knowingly presenting false testimony at trial is protected by absolute immunity holding that a conviction violated due process because the prosecutor knowingly refused to disclose crucial exculpatory evidence to the defendant holding that prosecutor cannot obtain conviction with the aid of false testimony where the prosecutor knows such testimony is false holding that a person violates the bank fraud statute when he knowingly executes a scheme to obtain money from a financial institution by means of false or fraudulent representations if a defendant knowingly provided materially false information in order to induce the loan the crime is complete and it is irrelevant whether or not he intended to repay or was capable of repaying it holding that the prosecutor is prohibited from knowingly presenting or failing to correct false and material evidence against the defendant