indeed, it says nothing whatever about judicial power.” Honig, 484 U.S. at 327, 108 S.Ct. at 606 (internal citation omitted). Accordingly, a court may choose between granting injunc-tive relief favoring the status quo under section 1415(j) (amending section 1415(e)(3)(A)) or changing a child's placement and the financial responsibility for such a placement under section 1415(i)(2)(B)(iii) (amending section 1415(e)(2)), See Stacey G. v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 695 F.2d 949, 955 n. 5 (5th Cir.1983) (stating that the stay put provision “does not place a statutory bar to the district court’s grant of equitable relief that may result in a change of funding of the child’s placement, or a modification of the placement”); Doe v. Brookline Sch. Comm., 722 F.2d 910, 918 (1st Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). C. Hearing Officer’s Authority In this case,
holding that use of the preliminary injunction equitable factors would dilute the statutory framework under the stay put provision holding that the explicit status quo provisions together with   2 first form an integrated harmonious scheme for preserving the status quo from the beginning of the major dispute through the final 30day coolingoff period holding that the stay put provision establishes a strong preference but not a statutory duty for maintenance of the status quo holding that a federal action to enforce the stay put provision is not itself a pending proceeding under  1415 that triggers stay put holding that where a proposed project does not alter the status quo then it does not have a significant impact