at any time inconsistent with the declarant’s hearsay statement is admissible, regardless of whether or not the declarant has been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain it. The defendant argues however that he should not be subjected to impeachment through his prior felonies just because he cross-examines a witness about his statement. The defendant relies on Foster v. State, 182 So.3d 3 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015), in support of his position. There, the Second District held the defendant was entitled to have the jury hear the remainder of his statement without placing his credibility in issue. We agree that the defendant’s position is supported by Foster. But, Foster runs contrary to section 90.806(1) and our prec edent. See, e.g., Kelly v. State, 857 So.2d 949, 949 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (<HOLDING>). The defendant’s position is also contrary to
holding that the prosecution must disclose to the defense all exculpatory evidence known to the state or in its possession holding that favorable evidence encompasses both exculpatory and impeachment evidence and articulating the materiality standard holding that the trial court had properly granted prices motion for new trial because while the state properly introduced identification testimony from a police officer who was not a witness to the offense it improperly elicited testimony that the witness was in fact a police officer who knew the defendant from working in his neighborhood holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendants credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt holding that the court properly allowed the state to admit the defendants convictions as impeachment evidence once the defendant elicited exculpatory statements through the interrogating officer