or mixed motivation analysis). As explained below, that approach is not followed under current Georgia law. 8 (Punctuation omitted.) Minor, 328 Ga. App. at 139 (4). 9 (Punctuation omitted.) Toomer v. State, 292 Ga. 49, 52 (2) (a) (734 SE2d 333) (2012). 10 (Punctuation omitted.) Goldberg v. State, 280 Ga. App. 600, 602 (1) (634 SE2d 419) (2006). 11 (Punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Toomer, 292 Ga. at 54 (2) (b), quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U. S. 765, 768 (115 SCt 1769, 131 LE2d 834) (1995). 12 Jackson v. State, 288 Ga. App. 339, 344 (1) (b) (ii) (654 SE2d 137) (2007), citing Dukes v. State, 273 Ga. 890, 891-892 (2) (548 SE2d 328) (2001); Williams v. State, 271 Ga. 323, 325 (2), n. 3 (519 SE2d 232) (1999). See also Alexander v. State, 273 Ga. 311, 312 (2) (540 SE2d 196) (2001) (<HOLDING>). 13 (Punctuation omitted.) Floyd v. State, 272
holding that  arrest is a technical term possessing a long established history in the common law and it would be inappropriate if jurors arbitrarily applied their personal definitions of arrest holding a court may consider a defendants criminal history even if that history is included in the defendants criminal history category holding that the criminal arrest history even of a jurors family members is a sufficiently raceneutral reason to satisfy the dictates of batson holding the prosecution to a higher burden of proof than the law required is a valid raceneutral reason for excluding a juror holding that age is an acceptable raceneutral reason for striking a prospective juror