the District had no grounds to file termination charges against him. Instead, Olmsted posits that the District has a statutory duty to report teachers that are under investigation. Assuming this statutory duty, Olmsted infers that the District had no basis to file any charges against him because it did not report him to the Board of Teaching. But the District presented evidence that it did not make a report every time a teacher was suspended, so the absence of a report neither proves nor disproves the validity of any charges under investigation at time of his resignation. Olmsted has not pointed to any record evidence that would support his claim that the District unlawfully threatened him. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Even if Olmsted could demonstrate that the
holding that at the summary judgment stage there must be sufficient evidence on which the jury could find for the plaintiff holding that the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence is insufficient to create a dispute of fact that is genuine holding that on a motion for summary judgment the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiffs position will be insufficient and there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff holding that hearsay in affidavit which would be inadmissible in evidence at trial could not be considered on motion for summary judgment holding that where the new york times clear and convincing evidence requirement applies the summary judgment inquiry will be whether the evidence presented is such that a jury applying that evidentiary standard could reasonably find for either plaintiff or defendant