the jury only that § 841(b)(1)(C) requires “that death resulted from the use of [the] heroin.” J.A. 481, 486-87. Alvarado expressly objected both to the court’s denial of his proposed instructions and to the court’s decision to “use[ ] the statutory language only” in instructing the jury on this matter. J.A. 487. Whether or not the former objection was sufficient to preserve the issue, see Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 387, 119 S.Ct. 2090, 144 L.Ed.2d 370 (1999), in my.view, the latter objection, which Alvarado raised before the jury retired, effectively preserved for appeal the issue of whether the “results, from” instruction was adequate, notwithstanding Alvarado’s failure to object when the court later declined to elaborate on the meaning of the statutory language. See id. (<HOLDING>); Fed. R.Crim.P. 30(d), 51(b). In analogous
recognizing that a party that objects to a jury instruction before the jury retires may challenge the instruction on appeal recognizing that upon request the trial court may provide a limiting instruction to the jury holding good faith jury instruction is not necessary when the court has given an adequate specific intent instruction holding that a trial judge is obliged to give a correct jury instruction notwithstanding that request for instruction was technically erroneous if the evidence generates the subject matter of the jury instruction holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given