the suspensions, which had expired and therefore could not be challenged on the basis of reputational injury, “[t]he dispute over the public reprimand ... remained] alive.” Id. at 56. The reprimand constituted an “official characterization” of the appellee as having engaged in “a pattern of abusive behavior” that was “prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts,” and therefore inflicted direct injury to his reputation. Id. at 57. Consequently, we held that if the appellant prevailed on the merits, “it would be within our power to declare unlawful the defendants’ issuance of stigmatizing reports and thereby to relieve [the appellant] of much of the resulting injury.” Id.; cf. Sullivan v. Comm. on Admissions, 395 F.2d 954, 956 (D.C.Cir.1967) (<HOLDING>). As these cases demonstrate, reputational
holding that the district court had discretion where plaintiff sought to amend a count that had been dismissed with prejudice holding that appraisal district had standing based on its interest in the validity of the statute that it is charged with implementing holding that the fourth circuit had jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a south carolina district courts order denying a motion to compel arbitration even though the district court also transferred the case to a georgia district court holding that district courts dismissal of state law claims was proper where the district court had properly dismissed all of the federal questions that gave it original jurisdiction holding that an attorney charged with misconduct had standing on the basis of reputational injury to appeal those portions of the district courts opinion that reflected unfavorably on the attorneys professional conduct even though the district court had otherwise dismissed the charges