discretion, Garcia v. INS, 222 F.3d 1208, 1209 (9th Cir.2000), we deny the petition for review. The BIA properly held that Singh’s motion to reopen was untimely because Singh filed it more than five months after the final administrative decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (generally requiring that a motion to reopen be filed within 90 days after a final decision is rendered). Moreover, as the BIA mailed its April 11, 2003 decision to the last address provided by Singh’s counsel, Singh’s claim that he did not have sufficient notice of the decision fails. See Farhoud v. INS, 122 F.3d 794, 796 (9th Cir.1997) (finding notice sent by regular mail to last address provided by alien satisfies requirements of constitutional due process); Urbina-Osejo v. INS, 124 F.3d 1314, 1317 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). We do not reach Singh’s claim of ineffective
holding on habeas review that counsels failure to object to improper argument at trial did not prejudice petitioner where other evidence supported a guilty verdict and the jury was told closing argument was not evidence holding notice of impending tax sale of property was not reasonably calculated to reach property owner when notice sent via certified letter by state was returned unclaimed and state did not take additional reasonable steps to ensure notice was provided holding that the court cannot conclude that failure of service resulted from defendants rejection of delivery where letters sent to defendant were returned stating unclaimed and not at this address holding that where notice was sent via constitutionally adequate method petitioner must present substantial and probative evidence that there was improper delivery or that nondelivery was not due to the petitioners failure to provide an address holding that petitioners reliance on a case which concluded that a defendants right to a fair trial was violated was insufficient to place court on notice that petitioner was advancing a constitutional due process claim because the decision was based on state law