at 634, the Supreme Court made a similar observation about the offending portion of the Violence Against Women Act, noting further that “Lopez makes clear” that such a jurisdictional element would have lent support to the constitutionality of the Act. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613, 120 S.Ct. 1740. The felon-in-possession statute, on the other hand, has a jurisdictional element that has been considered by the Supreme Court in United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 92 S.Ct. 515, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971), and Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 97 S.Ct. 1963, 52 L.Ed.2d 582 (1977), the latter case holding that only a minimal nexus with interstate commerce satisfies the interstate commerce requirement of the felon-in-possession statute (then 18 U.S.C. § 1202). See Lemons, 302 F.3d at 770-71 (<HOLDING>). Wolvin asks us to read the holding of Lopez
recognizing application of the doctrines may involve a fact question for the jury but not finding such a question in the case before it recognizing that the supreme court maintained the trial courts fact finding authority without setting a new standard in booker recognizing that the supreme court in those cases was principally concerned with congressional intent but finding that the constitutional question was not far from the courts mind holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record holding that although not essential to the outcomes of two previous cases the court of appeals should have followed the texas supreme courts statements in those cases