consider the test results in its decision entering judgment that appellant was not the father of Casey Jo. R.C. 3111.10 provides in part: “In an action brought under sections 3111.01 to 3111.19 of the Revised Code, evidence relating to paternity may include: a * * * “(C) Genetic test results, weighted in accordance with evidence, if available, of the statistical probability of the alleged father’s paternity; “(D) Medical evidence relating to the alleged father’s paternity of the child based on tests performed by experts. * * * ” This statute, in concert with R.C. 3111.09(D), permits the trial court to consider medical and genetic evidence regarding the paternity of the child. See, also, Owens v. Bell (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 46, 6 OBR 65, 451 N.E.2d 241, parts one and two of the syllabus (<HOLDING>). Under R.C. 3111.09(D), a court is required to
holding that even in separate trial other crimes evidence would not have been admissible and identification testimony would have been admissible holding that 1982 statutory amendment allowing certain blood test results to be used as affirmative evidence of paternity was procedural in nature did not affect parties substantive rights and therefore applied retrospectively to paternity action filed in 1981 recognizing that a 11 evidence must be relevant to be admissible holding that although a putative father had standing to bring a paternity action the action could not proceed and the blood tests could not be ordered unless the trial court determined that the paternity action would serve the best interest of the child holding that hla tests constitute relevant and admissi ble evidence to establish paternity and such results would be admissible even in the absence of rc 311109 and 311110