of evidence; (2) whether there were intervening circumstances; and (3) the gravity, flagrancy, and reason for the police misconduct. United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 548 (4th Cir.1998) (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975)). Our analysis of these factors in this case leads-us to conclude that the taint of Healy’s illegal entrance was purged. First, a considerable period of time— more than seven hours—elapsed between Healy’s entry onto the curtilage and the seizure of evidence related to child pornography. There was also a significant period of time between Healy’s entry and his request for consent to search. Further, Howe’s voluntary consent to the search of his home was an intervening act of free will. See id. at 549 & n. 10 (<HOLDING>). Finally, Healy’s warrantless entrance onto
holding that the fact that defendant granted consent to police to search some items and then refused to give consent to additional searches cannot support a finding of reasonable suspicion holding that intervening misconduct can sever the temporal proximity connection between the protected conduct and the adverse employment holding the connection is an element holding that consent to search did not purge the taint of an unlawful detention when no intervening circumstances sufficiently separated the consent from the unlawful detention holding albeit in dicta that consent to further police interaction is sufficient to sever the connection between an unlawful act and the acquisition of additional evidence