— a device to compel respect for the [constitutional] guarantee by removing an incentive to disregard it. It is calculated to prevent; not to repair. The postulate is an enforcement official indifferent to basic rights. Id. at 513, 141 A.2d 46 (emphasis added). Even after Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), by which the federal adoption of the exclusionary rule as a remedial device to vindicate the fourth amendment guaranty against unreasonable searches became applicable to states under the fourteenth amendment, we consistently recognized that the exclusionary rule served the primary purpose of deterrence. Moreover, we initially held that the rule should be applied only to redress culpable police misconduct. See State v. Gerardo, 53 N.J. 261, 267 (1969) (<HOLDING>); State v. Zito, 54 N.J. 206, 211 (1969)
holding that state law is immaterial for fourth amendment search analysis and refusing to suppress evidence obtained illegally under state law after warrantless arrest because the arrest rules that the officers violated were those of state law alone and as we have just concluded it is not the province of the fourth amendment to enforce state law that amendment does not require the exclusion of evidence obtained from a constitutionally permissible arrest holding that it is not holding that exclusion of evidence is not mandated by the fourth amendment since important as it is in our society it does not call for imposition of judicial sanctions where enforcing officers have followed the law with such punctilious regard as they have here holding that it is clear that ebys misrepresentation claim as it is presented here is a contractual one holding that the observation of evidence in plain view is not a search for purposes of the fourth amendment and does not require a warrant