As a threshold matter, DiPietro contends that Maine does not recognize a cause of action to obtain a domestic judgment on a foreign judgment and that the trial court therefore erred by not dismissing Faith Temple’s complaint. Although DiPietro correctly asserts that there is no statute affirmatively establishing a cause of action to seek a judgment based on a foreign judgment, a review of Maine’s common law history of enforcing foreign judgments reveals that such a .claim exists. Therefore, despite Faith Temple’s failure to articulate a legal basis for its complaint, we must reject DiPietro’s argumen ment” has its genesis in English common law, and was recognized in Massachusetts at the time of the founding of the United States. See Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. (9 Tyng) 462, 466 (1813) (<HOLDING>); Bartlet v. Knight, 1 Mass. (1 Tyng) 401, 404
holding that reporting of historically accurate debt may violate the fcra when the reporting did not include that the debt was discharged in bankruptcy or that the debt was in dispute holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or holding that a debt collectors filing of a lawsuit on a debt that appears to be timebarred  is an unfair and unconscionable means of collecting the debt recognizing that pursuant to statute actions of debt may be brought upon any judgment for debt damages or costs rendered in any court of record of the united states holding that an entity engaged in collection activity on a defaulted debt acquired from another is a debt collector under the fdcpa even though it may actually be owed the debt