will become moot; and 2) there is a reasonable expectation that the complaining party will be subjected to the same action again.” Id. at 217. A student about to enter seventh grade at Junior High East who objected to the monument (or that student’s parent) would have about two years to litigate the case before exiting the school after eighth grade. This is likely “ ‘too short to complete litigation and appellate review of a case of this complexity.’ ” Id. (quoting Brody, 957 F.2d at 1113). Yet, while the present controversy might “evade review,” it is not “capable of repetition” with respect to Doe 4. She is no longer a student at Junior High East, and there is nothing in the record to suggest that she will ever again encounter the monument on a frequent and regular basis. See id. (<HOLDING>). Nor is there anything in the record to
holding that whether a person should be considered again for possible employment is an inherently subjective question for the employer as is the employers opinions of its employees holding that at a resentencing the state must again prove the basis for an enhanced sentence even though such evidence was produced at the original sentencing holding that action was not capable of repetition because there was no reasonable expectation that plaintiff would be subjected to the same action again since she graduated and will never again return  as a student holding that a plaintiff bringing a retaliation claim under title vii must establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing that she engaged in a protected activity that she was subjected to an adverse employment action by her employer and that there was a causal link between the two holding that at resentencing the district court was entitled to assume that the waiver was still in effect and was not required to again advise defendant of his right to counsel where defendant had waived counsel at the plea stage