147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), because it effectively “increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum” without the factors used to calculate the amount of restitution having been found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Bear-den is not clear, however, which “statutory maximum” h ne of up to $250,000, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3571. His actual fine was set at $4,000. See J.A. at 42 (Judgment). Thus, even if the restitution order were to be considered as a fine for the specific offense of which Bearden was convicted, the restitution imposed did not exceed the relevant statutory maximum. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Bearden’s conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED. 1 . Accord Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 937, 111 S.Ct. 2661, 115 L.Ed.2d 808 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 875-76,
holding that only a district judge in the charging district and not a magistrate judge in that district may review the release order of a magistrate judge in the arresting district holding that district courts delegation of voir dire to magistrate judge is inconsistent with 28 usc  636b3 where defendant does not consent holding that voir dire of jury may be delegated to magistrate judge where defendant consents to the delegation because the district court retains the ultimate decision on empaneling the jury holding that defense counsel may decide whether to consent to voir dire proceedings before a federal magistrate holding that defendants have a right to be present at voir dire