check made out to plaintiff. These materials show that defendant terminated plaintiffs employment effective October 2, 2009, and that upon termination plaintiff was given 30 days’ severance pay — characterized by the Letter of October 2, 2009, and the Declaration of Deborah Y. Pedroso as pay “in lieu of’ notice. Whether pay “in lieu of’ notice satisfies the requirement of “notic L.Ed.2d 153 (1992); see also Richard A. Lord, 19 Williston on Contracts § 54:48 (4th ed. 2011) (“In general, where a contract of ordinary employment stipulates for ... a certain period of notice, the employment may be cancelled on shorter notice, or with none at all, upon payment of the wages or salary for the period of notice.”) (emphasis added); cf. Allen v. Sybase, Inc., 468 F.3d 642, 646-47 (10th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). These authorities contain no discussion, but
holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner holding that actual notice fulfills a notice requirement that an applicable federal regulation be conspicuously posted because actual notice is the best notice holding that the worker adjustment and retraining notification act imposes a notice requirement in case of a mass layoff thereby imposing on an employer the obligation to provide either statutory notice or sixty days back pay in lieu of notice to relevant employees holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city holding notice provision in rcra and clean water act are virtually identical and citizens notice to violators under either act must strictly comply with statutory notice requirements