U.S.C. § 203, is silent as to personal jurisdiction. The Court thus first turns to state law to determine if personal jurisdiction exists over Consorcio. If a state law basis for jurisdiction exists, a court must next determine if “sufficient minimum contacts exist to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Walter v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 181 F.3d 1198, 1203 (11th Cir.1999). While Consorcio is correct in asserting that its mere agreement to Miami as the arbitral situs is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction under Florida’s general long-arm statute, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 48.193, see Johns v. Taramita, Inc., 132 F.Supp.2d 1021 (S.D.Fla.2001) (<HOLDING>), its participation in the arbitration created
holding in motion to compel arbitration that personal jurisdiction is not created merely by a partys agreement to arbitrate in a particular forum holding trial court must decide whether to compel arbitration of personal injury claim of party who was not signatory to arbitration agreement holding that motion to dismiss which conspicuously omitted any reference to an arbitration agreement was not the proper method to stay litigation and compel arbitration as it was not a motion showing an agreement to arbitrate under section 15673 holding that once the party seeking to compel arbitration establishes the existence of an arbitration agreement and that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement the trial court must compel arbitration recognizing that in reviewing ruling on motion to compel arbitration we first determine whether party seeking arbitration established existence of arbitration agreement