several cases of Sixth Amendment structural error that involved defining moments, such as counsel’s lost opportunity to make a statement, see Herring, 422 U.S. at 865, 95 S.Ct. at 2556-57; the defendant’s inability to converse with counsel during a recess, see Geders, 425 U.S. at 91, 96 S.Ct. at 1336-37; and deprivation of the defendant’s right to consult with counsel to determine when to testify at trial, see Brooks, 406 U.S. at 612-13, 92 S.Ct. at 1895. Those cases did not involve the denial of counsel during a “discrete and separately identifiable” phase of erimi- nal proceedings; they involved the denial of counsel “at a critical stage of ... trial.” See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659, 104 S.Ct. at 2047 (emphasis added). Accord Gregg v. United States, 754 A.2d 265, 268-71 (D.C. App.2000) (<HOLDING>). III. Certainly, the Majority and I have
holding cronic not applicable where counsel conceded his clients guilt to protect his own credibility and avoid conviction on other charges holding that the cronic presumption should apply where counsel was absent for two days during which the probability of his guilt increased during the governments presentation of evidence against his coconspirators holding that where defense counsel is absent for even a portion of voir dire reversal under cronic is required in the absence of a waiver holding that the word waiver is not required to waive a right even when a statute requires clear and unmistakable evidence of waiver holding that collateral review of the validity of a jury waiver in the absence of a rule 23a writing is not available absent any indication the defendant was prejudiced by the technical error