the language of the LMRA makes plain, public employees are not covered by that statute. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (exempting from the definition of employer “any State or political subdivision thereof’). The point is sufficiently clear so that it has been routinely addressed by summary orders. See Baumgart v. Stony Brook Children’s Serv., P.C., 249 Fed. Appx. 851, 852 (2d Cir.2007) (unpublished); Majeske v. Congress of Conn. Comty. Colls., No. 98-7226, 166 F.3d 1200, 1998 WL 907915, at *2 n. 2 (2d Cir.1998); Smith v. United Fed’n of Teachers, 162 F.3d 1148, 1998 WL 639756, at *1 (2d Cir.1998). The Supreme Court has also taken this view, which we are bound to follow. See N.L.R.B. v. Natural Gas Util. Disk of Hawkins County, Tenn., 402 U.S. 600, 602-03, 91 S.Ct. 1746, 29 L.Ed.2d 206 (1971) (<HOLDING>); see also Police Dep’t of the City of Chicago
holding that the university was not a political subdivision of the state because it had no power to tax or cause taxes to be levied recognizing that a board of elections is not a political subdivision and its members are not county officers holding that a volunteer fire department which was a nonprofit corporation was an agency of a political subdivision for the purposes of the flsa holding that a tennessee public utility district was not an employer under  1522 because it was a political subdivision of tennessee holding that the determination of the boundaries of a political subdivision of the state is a political question solely within the power prerogative and discretion of the legislature and not subject to judicial review