determinative, the existence of a Swedish statutory scheme for the Mission’s employees weighs in support of the conclusion that the plaintiffs employment was intertwined with the governmental function of the Mission. See Kato, 360 F.3d at 109; Hijazi, 689 F.Supp.2d at 671. This is true even though the plaintiff may not have been a civil servant under Swedish law because “[o]ther countries are free to structure employment relationships in ways that do not mimic civil service protections now common to the United States and many European states, without thereby sacrificing the immunity conferred by the FSIA, as long as the sovereign, by extending the employment, is engaging in ‘governmental’ rather than ‘commercial’ activity.” Kato, 360 F.3d at 113; cf. El-Hadad, 496 F.3d at 664 & n.2 (<HOLDING>). Under Kato, the plaintiffs employment was
holding that the employment of some noncivil servants can properly be characterized as noncommercial holding that having to report to the police being subject to regular questioning and surveillance and having difficulty finding employment can reasonably be characterized as mere harassment holding that nonconsensual oversecured creditor shall receive the statutory rate of interest unless it can be characterized as a penalty holding that a nonjury juvenile adjudication that  afforded all constitutionallyrequired procedural safeguards can properly be characterized as a prior conviction for apprendi purposes holding that an ex post facto claim can only be successful if the law can be characterized as punishment in the constitutional sense