of the Tennessee collateral review statutes). Even if Smith’s civil rights claim presents an independent basis for the exercise of federal court review, it fails for several reasons. First, the Supreme Court held in Osborne that there is no freestanding substantive due process right to DNA testing. Osborne, 129 S.Ct. at 2322. Second, any procedural due process claim is also untenable because Michigan’s statutory scheme is more comprehensive than the state procedures sanctioned by the Osborne Court. Cf. id. at 2320 (“We see nothing inadequate about the procedures Alaska has provided to vindicate its state right to postcon (noting that judicial immunity protects the judicial function by affording absolute immunity); Pusey v. City of Youngstown, 11 F.3d 652, 657-58 (6th Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>). We recognize that the Second Circuit has
holding that a prosecutors preparation and filing of an information and a motion for an arrest warrant are protected by absolute immunity holding that prosecutors have absolute immunity holding that a prosecutors filing of an arrest warrant and charging documents are protected by absolute immunity holding that state prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity for the initiation and pursuit of a criminal prosecution holding that the considerations underlying absolute prosecutorial immunity at common law dictate the same absolute immunity under  1983