Cir.1987) (stating that this circuit “recognize[s] ‘pendent party’ jurisdiction where the main claim is a federal-question rather than diversity claim”); Moore v. Marketplace Restaurant, Inc., 754 F.2d 1336, 1359-60, 1361 (7th Cir.1985) (Judges Posner and Gibson holding that pendent party jurisdiction is proper); and Bernstein v. Lind-Waldock & Co., 738 F.2d 179, 187 (7th Cir.1984). But see U.S. General, Inc. v. City of Joliet, 598 F.2d 1050, 1055 (7th Cir.1979) (no abuse of discretion for district court to dismiss pendent party claim, citing Aldinger); Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 611 (7th Cir.1973) (claim based upon diversity could not sustain pendent party jurisdiction); and Marcano v. Northwestern Chrysler-Plymouth Sales, Inc., 550 F.Supp. 595, 604-05 (N.D.Ill.1982) (<HOLDING>). The question of pendent party jurisdiction
holding that even where primary claim is a federal question pendent party jurisdiction is not a recognized basis of jurisdiction in the seventh circuit holding that the district court should not have exercised pendent party jurisdiction over the husbands loss of consortium claim and therefore the jurys verdict in his favor had to be reversed holding that the all writs act does not provide an independent basis for supplemental federal jurisdiction in situations where federal jurisdiction is otherwise wholly lacking holding that exercise of jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law claims was proper on the basis of supplemental jurisdiction even though the plaintiffs had erroneously claimed diversity jurisdiction because a legitimate federal question was also presented and the state law claims formed part of the same case or controversy as the federal claim holding that there is no federal question jurisdiction where a claim is so insubstantial as to be completely devoid of merit