boats, and shipments of goods.”). Congress can regulate such in-strumentalities “even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities,” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624, and this concept completely deflates the Plaintiffs’ argument that the Graves Amendment does not appropriately regulate the instrumentalities of interstate commerce because its preemptive effect is not limited solely to instances where the leased vehicle leaves the state. Congress could appropriately recognize that motor vehicles are routinely leased in one state and used for transportation to another, and it would be almost impossible to separate intrastate motor traffic from interstate motor traffic. See, e.g. Southern R. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 27, 32 S.Ct. 2, 56 L.Ed. 72 (1911) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, this case itself demonstrates how
holding that commerce clause authorizes congress to punish any particular criminal action even without proof of a relation to interstate commerce when the activity is part of a class of activities determined by congress to affect interstate commerce recognizing that congress had the power to regulate boxcars that traveled exclusively intrastate because of their inherent mobility and connection to interstate commerce it is no objection to such an exertion of commerce clause power that the dangers intended to be avoided arise in whole or in part out of matters connected with intrastate commerce holding that congress may regulate purely local intrastate activities if they are part of an economic class of activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce holding it is within congresss authority to regulate all intrastate possession of child pornography not just that which has traveled in interstate commerce or has been produced using materials that have traveled in interstate commerce applying gonzales v raich 545 us 1 125 sct 2195 162 led2d 1 2005 recognizing power of states to engage in some regulation of interstate commerce