litigation and did not act inconsistently with its right to arbitrate. In fact, all of Safety's pleadings filed with the trial court were based upon asserting its right to arbitrate. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred by concluding that Safety waived its right to arbitrate. Seq, e.g., MPACT, 802 N.E.2d at 910-911 (finding no waiver because the party acted consistently with its right to arbitrate); Kilkenny v. Mitchell Hurst Jacobs & Dick, 733 N.E.2d 984, 987 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (stating that "[this is clearly not a case where a request for arbitration was plead in the initial complaint and then not again asserted until discovery was complete or an unfavorable result on the individual claims was imminent"), reh'g denied, trans. denied; Mid-America, 719 N.E.2d at 1270-1271 (<HOLDING>); Underwriting Members of Lloyds of London v.
holding that the clause in the agreement allowing either party to seek injunctive relief until the arbitration award is rendered did not override the applicability of the  analysis which examines whether a party by its participation in litigation has waived its right to invoke arbitration holding that party did not waive right to trial by jury by requesting directed verdict holding that the party demanding arbitration had waived its right to arbitrate by filing eight months earlier a complaint against the other party to the arbitration agreement holding that the party did not waive its right to enforce the arbitration clause recognizing the right to waive a jury trial