upon his fundamental right to vote. To prevail on a claim under § 1983, Wilkins needs to show that he was deprived of a federal constitutional or federal statutory right. See Galen v. Cnty. of L.A., 477 F.3d 652, 662 (9th Cir.2007). But Wilkins was convicted of a felony in 1999 and thus California could (and did, for some time) deny him the right to vote without violating the Equal Protection Clause. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56, 94 S.Ct. 2655, 41 L.Ed.2d 551 (1974). California has reenfranchised Wilkins because he completed his sentence and any parole, see Cal. Const, art. II, § 4; Cal. Elec.Code § 2101, but we have previously held that such re-enfranchisement is a statutory benefit conferred by the state, see Harvey v. Brewer, 605 F.3d 1067, 1079 (9th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). We thus conclude that Wilkins’s claim
holding that a states decision to reenfranchise convicted felons is a statutory benefit  not a fundamental right recognizing that a criminal defendants right to a fair trial is fundamental holding that the right to vote is fundamental holding that the right to drive is not a fundamental right holding right to be fundamental