the Second Circuit has emphasized that “[although evidence of one stray comment by itself is usually not sufficient proof to show age discrimination, that stray comment may ‘bear a more ominous significance’ when considered within the totality of the evidence.” Carlton, 202 F.3d at 136 (quoting Danzer, 151 F.3d at 56); see also Schreiber, 324 F.Supp.2d at 522-23. “Even ‘stray remarks in the workplace by persons who are' not involved in the pertinent decision making process ... may suffice to present a prima facie case,’ provided those remarks evidence invidious discrimination.” Belgrave v. City of New York, No. 95 Civ. 1507, 1999 WL 692034, at *29 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 1999) (quoting Ostrowski, 968 F.2d at 182); see also Malarkey v. Texaco, Inc., 983 F.2d 1204, 1210 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Warren v. Halstead Indus., Inc., 802 F.2d
holding that statements made by nondecisionmakers were properly received because they showed the pervasive corporate hostility towards plaintiff and supported her claim that she did not receive a promotion due to her employers retaliatory animus holding that a plaintiff could not show that she engaged in protected activity because she did not present evidence that she informed her employer that her complaints were based on race or age discrimination holding that a plaintiff could not proceed on her procedural due process claim brought under  1983 because she did not show that she had exhausted her state law remedies or alleged that those remedies were inadequate holding that the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of age discrimination based upon a showing that she was a member of the protected group she was qualified and capable of doing her job she was discharged and that her manager called her old woman thus evincing agebased animus sufficient to demonstrate discriminatory intent holding that plaintiff failed to establish that her transfer to another department was retaliatory as opposed to her employers attempt to diffuse a personality conflict