fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is to the party, not to his lawyer, but it is common to make the award directly to the lawyer where, as in this case, the lawyer’s contractual entitlement is uncontested ” (emphasis in original)). Moreover, several courts have expressed the view that denying civil rights attorneys a direct payment of fee awards is consistent with Section 1988’s purpose of attracting competent attorneys to represent civil rights plaintiffs, since competent counsel can protect their interest in a fee award by simply providing a clear allocation in a retainer agreement. See, e.g., Gilbrook, 177 F.3d at 874; Flannery v. Prentice, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 95, 100 (Cal.Ct.App.1999)(citing federal decisions). Cf. generally Hamilton v. Ford Motor Co., 636 F.2d 745, 748 (D.C.Cir.1980)(<HOLDING>); United States ex rel. John Doe I v.
holding provision in attorneys fee contract requiring client that terminated contract to immediately pay attorney fee equal to present value of attorneys interest in case was inconsistent with public policy and unconscionable holding that aln attorney who is employed under a contingent fee contract and discharged pri or to the occurrence of the contingency is limited to quantum meruit recovery for the reasonable value of the services rendered to the client and may not recover the full amount of the agreed contingent fee holding that attorneys representing plaintiffs in federal antidiscrimination cases should be permitted to obtain the amount established by their contingent fee agreement or the courtawarded fees whichever is greater citing sargeant v sharp 579 f2d 645 649 1st cir1978 holding that the court shall consider only the qualification  of those parties that will be themselves liable for fees if courtawarded fees are denied holding that public policy considerations require that the burden be placed on the attorney to provide for allocation of courtawarded attorneys fees in the contingent fee agreement