clear that it is using the term ‘contract’ metaphorically, to illuminate certain aspects of the relationship formed between a State and the federal government in a program such as Medicaid. It does not say that Medicaid is only a contract.” Westside Mothers, 289 F.3d at 858; see also Barnes v. Gorman, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 2097, 2102 n. 2, - L.Ed.2d - (2002) (“We do not imply, for example, that suits under Spending Clause legislation are suits in contract, or that contract-law principles apply to all issues that they raise.”). The Directors urge us to apply the same misinterpretation of Pennhurst and Blessing. The Sixth Circuit refused to make the logical leap that the Directors urge, from describing such programs as “like contracts” to treating such Ct. 1932, 32 L.Ed.2d 352 (1972) (<HOLDING>); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 285, 92
recognizing that the supremacy clause does not of its own force create rights recognizing that the supremacy clause is not a source of any federal rights holding a california regulation that conflicted with the social security act invalid under the supremacy clause holding the provisions of a new york welfare program that conflicted with federal regulations under the social security act invalid under the supremacy clause holding the illinois statute at issue in templeton invalid under the supremacy clause