prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In this case, the district court held a hearing that focused on the second Strickland factor, by wading into the hypothetical merits of the would-be motion to suppress. It did not, however, address the first factor and even specifically noted on the record that the hearing was not “a 2255 hearing,” meaning it was not intended to fully address the merits of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Typically, we do not address ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal because the trial court record often does not contain the attorney’s rationale for the challenged action or inaction. See United States v. McCarty, 628 F.3d 284, 295-96 (6th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). In this case, only Mullikin testified at the
holding that we review ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal only in the unusual cases where the record is sufficiently developed or the legal representation is so obviously inadequate that it denies a defendant his sixth amendment right to counsel holding that the record on direct appeal was insufficiently developed to permit the appellate court to assess the merits of the claim holding exception to the waiver rule exists when the issue presented is purely one of law and either does not depend on the factual record developed below or the pertinent record has been fully developed holding that when the appellate record consists largely of unsubstantiated allegations without affidavits from defense counsel or the defendant it is not adequately developed holding that we review ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal only in the unusual cases where the record is suffi ciently developed or the legal representation is so obviously inadequate that it denies a defendant his sixth amendment right to counsel