not only sufficient to sustain an affirmative answer to the second special issue, but is frequently the primary, or the only, reason for a jury’s affirmative answer. I recognize the viciousness of Flores’s crime. I also recognize the jury’s statutory right to impose death as an appropriate punishment. However, what separates the executioner from the murderer is the legal process by which the state ascertains and condemns those guilty of heinous crimes. If that process is flawed because it allows evidence without any scientific validity to push the jury toward condemning the accused, the legitimacy of our legal process is threatened. The Supreme Court has made clear that the constitutionality of a state’s capital sentencing scheme is dependent on the individ 20, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 370, 113
holding that the trier of fact must be allowed to consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence holding that counsel was not ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence at sentencing because the trial record clearly indicated that the sentencing judge was aware of many of the mitigators that counsel was presenting to this court on appeal holding that the sentencing structure allowed the jury to give mitigating effect to petitioners prison record holding that the sentencing procedure was inadequate in failing to allow jury to give mitigating effect to defendants mental retardation and abusive background holding that the key under pewy i  is that the jury be able to consider and give effect to a defendants mitigating evidence in imposing sentence