of sexual misconduct with more than one victim, and the Smart School obviously acquiesced in order to obtain at least some coverage for sexual misconduct by its employees. Moreover, unlike in the pollution exposure cases, the coverage “trigger” is ascertainable and therefore not illusory. Notably, in Diocese of Joliet, the court acknowledged that “[t]he first encounter rule may apply where the parties agree that all damage occurred at the time of the first sexual encounter.” In this case, the parties were free to define the scope of coverage for sexual misconduct by incorporating the first encounter rule among the insuring provisions and P.J. has supplied no legitimate reason why it should not be enforced as written. See Green v. Life & Health of Am., 704 So.2d 1386, 1391 (Fla.1998) (<HOLDING>); See also Quinerly v. Dundee Corp., 159 Fla.
holding that a sentence not in compliance with the mandatory provisions of a sentencing statute was illegal and appealable holding that under the tgaa procedural questions such as compliance with conditions precedent are left to arbitrators determination holding that assuming compliance with a standard form and the absence of conflict with statute the parties to a contract of insurance are free to incorporate such provisions and conditions as they desire holding that such provisions are valid holding that when a conflict arises between parties to a contract regarding the subject matter of that contract the contractual relationship controls and parties are not permitted to assert actions in tort in an attempt to circumvent the bargain they agreed upon