the legislature’s intent. Id. at 280. Rather, statutory construction “must be sensible and in harmony with the statute’s purpose.” Id. Here, the text of the statute plainly includes automobile accident insurance as a collateral source that must reduce the award when the claimant receives payments prior to the verdict. Respondent’s argument — that UIM coverage does not constitute “automobile accident insurance” unless expressly provided — would strain the text far beyond its plain meaning. Respondent also raises several policy arguments in support of the district court’s interpretation. Because the plain language of the collateral-source statute encompasses UIM payments made prior to the verdict, we have no occasion to look beyond the text of the statute. See Wynkoop, 574 N.W.2d at 425 (<HOLDING>). It is the role of the legislature, not this
recognizing that courts may look beyond the statutory text to determine legislative intent only when the statute is ambiguous recognizing that courts should look to other sources of legislative intent if the statutory language does not convey a clear meaning recognizing longstanding precedents that permit resort to legislative history only when necessary to interpret ambiguous statutory text holding that we may consult legislative history as an aid to the interpretation of ambiguous text holding that if statutory language is plain and unambiguous this court will not look beyond the same to divine legislative intent