two. The statutory change required uninsured motorist protection in any automobile liability policy issued subsequent to the date the statute took effect. After the statute took effect the McNeals obtained an endorsement adding car number three to their policy. The statutory definition in Georgia of the word "policy" included endorsements, thus, the court held that as to car number three there was uninsured motorist coverage. However, the court stated that “under the constitutional prohibition against impairing the obligation of contracts, the 1964 Act did not and could not affect the pre-existing insurance coverage as to car number one and car number two.” Id. 154 S.E.2d at 416. See also Welb v. Detroit Automobile Inter Insurance Exchange, 29 Mich.App. 235, 185 N.W.2d 147 (1970) (<HOLDING>). SHARP, Judge, dissenting. I dissent in this
holding that a hit and run or unknown driver is deemed to be uninsured for purposes of the uninsured motorist statute holding that an insurer may  assert as defenses the nonnegligence of the uninsured the contributory negligence of the insured and the lack of resulting damage all being matters of substantive law and legal defenses of the uninsured but it does not  succeed  to the rights of the uninsured motorist to interpose the latters procedural defense of statute of limitations holding that an amendment to a policy in existence prior to the effective date of a statute requiring uninsured motorist coverage which substituted insured automobiles did not incorporate the new statute because to do so would be an unconstitutional impairment of the obligation of the contract holding that language requiring insurer to pay all sums which the insured  shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile includes recovery of exemplary damages under uninsured motorist provision of policy holding in a case involving a multiplevehicle policy that a new offer of uninsured motorist coverage was not required for the addition of a new vehicle which was comparable to the renewal or supplementation of an existing policy events that did not trigger the statutory requirement of a new offer the courts holding was based in part upon the principle that an insurance contract is personal to the insured because it insures the risk of loss to the insured and does not attach to specific vehicles