2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004). If we were to apply federal preemption principles in the manner urged by Dewald, we would in effect “create a new rule” because the scope of FECA preemption would be transformed from an open question into a settled principle. This result would be particularly troubling considering the number of other federal courts that have concluded that the FECA does not preempt various state laws. See Janvey v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., Inc., 712 F.3d 185, 200-01 (5th Cir.2013) (collecting cases from the Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits in concluding that the FECA does not preempt a receiver’s attempts under Texas law to recoup fraudulently obtained political contributions); see also Karl Rove & Co. v. Thornburgh, 39 F.3d 1273, 1280-81 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Because no Supreme Court case has held that
holding that the feca does not preempt a state law addressing the financial liability of candidates for the debts of their principal campaign committees holding section 10 of faa is procedural and does not preempt state common law holding that fehba does not completely preempt state law holding flsa did not preempt state law fraud claim holding that faa does not preempt state law when determining date of perfection