Examining School Interrogations and the Miranda Warning, 59 Mercer L.Rev. 731, 734 (2008)). Here, the juvenile waiver statute was not applicable because K.F. was not subjected to an interrogation when she spoke with Mother. Although K.F. was at the police station at the time she spoke to Mother, her statement to Mother was not the result of an interrogation. The evidence in the record reveals that K.F. was in a room with Mother only when she admitted to Mother that she was at Mother’s house on the night of the burglary. Also, there is no evidence that Mother was acting as an agent of the police. Because K.F. was not subjected to an interrogation, the juvenile waiver statute was not applicable to exclude KF.’s statement to Mother from evidence. See, e.g., S.G., 956 N.E.2d at 676 (<HOLDING>); P.M., 861 N.E.2d at 714 (holding that
holding that a principal is bound by a contract entered into by the principals agent on her behalf if the agent had authority to bind the principal holding that defendant was not an agent because alleged principal did not control means by which the defendants accomplished their duties holding that agency relationship existed where principal paid plaintiff directly and written agreement stated agent was signing on behalf of principal holding that questioning of a juvenile by a principal in presence of a police officer did not constitute an interrogation because principal was sole questioner and was not acting as an agent for police holding that an agent owes a fiduciary duty to his principal