court, first on January 4, 2011, (see id. ¶ 44), and then on January 9, 2013, (see Defs.’ Mem. Ex. I), “Defendants] continued their retaliatory actions against Plaintiff[,]” (Compl. ¶ 80). In addition to these facts, Plaintiff alleges that the “[m]otives for Defendants] to reject Plaintiffs applications [were] to retaliate [against] Plaintiff for seeking his rights provided by the [FLSA].” (Id. ¶ 78.) To begin, Plaintiffs allegation regarding Defendants’ retaliatory “motives,” on its own, is wholly conclusory and is no more than a “the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” that the Court need not credit in the context of Defen dants’ Motion To Dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937; see also Shah v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, 523 Fed.Appx. 828, 831 (2d Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>); Jackson v. Cnty. of Rockland, 450 Fed.Appx.
holding that plaintiff had no jurisdiction in federal court because she failed to allege a state law claim but declining to discuss pleading requirement to set forth charge of discrimination holding that the pleading standard set forth in twombly applies to all civil actions holding that the complaint did not satisfy the notice pleading requirements of federal rule of civil procedure 8a because the complaint gave the defendants no notice of the specific factual allegations presented for the first time in the plaintiffs opposition to summary judgment holding that pleading was insufficient where the plaintiff failed to among other things set forth the dates of any fraudulent statements holding that because a complaint pleadfed no facts from which the court could plausibly infer that the defendants refusal to rehire the plaintiff resulted from any  retaliatory motive the plaintiffs claim did not meet the pleading standard set forth in twombly 