reasoning, it would seem to invalidate as involuntary many plea bargains. Doesn’t the State have the same “disproportionate bargaining power” when it has caught a criminal red-handed and offers him or her the opportunity to avoid many years in prison through a plea bargain? Again, I could understand (although I would disagree with) the notion that the right to be free from suspicionless searches of a home, motel, or car is so important that it cannot be waived in advance by a prisoner. Arguably, Ochoa foreshadowed such a result. A straightforward Schneckloth analysis might also support the majority’s conclusion. But the majority’s ill-conceived venture into contract law, I fear, will only lead to more uncertainty and undesirable consequen Ct. 3164, 3172, 97 L.Ed.2d 709, 721-22 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Unfortunately, the majority plays a bit of
holding warrantless search of probationers home by probation officers based on reasonable suspicion was constitutionally permissible when conditions of probation required probationer to submit to home visits but not searches holding a search of a probationers home pursuant to a wisconsin probation regulation was permissible under a special needs theory but not addressing whether the probationer had consented to the search under the regulation holding that it is sufficient grounds to revoke a probation if only one condition of the probation is broken holding that the special needs of wisconsins probation system justified a warrantless search of a probationer by probation officers pursuant to a wisconsin regulation that allowed probation searches based on reasonable grounds holding that probation is not a sentence