motion. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). The Act automatically excludes “delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D). Herbst argues that the court should not exclude the time period resulting from his appeal of the magistrate judge’s detention order because the appeal did not cause a delay in the criminal trial. The Supreme Court has recently held that a section 3161(h)(1)(D) exclusion remains applicable “irrespective of whether it actually causes, or is expected to cause, delay in starting a trial.” United States v. Tinklenberg, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2007, 2011, 179 L.Ed.2d 1080 (2011), see also United States v. Hohn, 8 F.3d 1301, 1305 (8th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the district court properly excluded 30
holding an excludable period under  2912074a commences on the day immediately after the filing of a defendants pretrial motion holding that time granted for preparing pretrial motions is not automatically excludable under  3161h1 but is excludable only after the district court enters appropriate findings under  3161h7a holding that motion challenging pretrial detention was excludable under act holding that juvenile pretrial detention implicates due process rights holding   2241 is the proper avenue by which to challenge pretrial detention