an action for conversion is that the actual owner is left without the ability to control its rightfully owned property.”). Money — such as the overpayments for cable television services Plaintiffs allege they paid due to Comcast’s conduct, as distinguished from what is usually considered chattel, i.e., tangible personal property, — “can be the subject of a claim for conversion if the money is a specifically an identifiable lot of money that the moving party defendants were obligated to keep intact or deliver,” there is no legally cognizable claim in Massachusetts for conversion because the claim does not “concern personal property.” Sweeney, 2006 WL 936688, at *8; see also Murphy v. Wachovia Bank of Del., N.A., No. MICV200802070F, 2012 WL 1326642, at *5 (Mass.Super.Ct. Jan. 23, 2012) (<HOLDING>) (citing Grand Pac. Fin. Corp. v. Brauer, 57
holding that defendant was entitled to summary judgment on conversion claim because the claim seeks merely to recover an allegedly unpaid debt and does not seek to recover money from a discrete identifiable fund holding that an entity engaged in collection activity on a defaulted debt acquired from another is a debt collector under the fdcpa even though it may actually be owed the debt holding that conversion theory of recovery does not extend to money owed on a debt or to general damages holding that vehicle debt imposed on debtor by divorce court was debt owed to or recoverable by financing bank not exwife so not a domestic support obligation holding that contract debt  was not subject to an act in tort for conversion