met the various tests delineated by Illinois courts for a joint and mutual will. The executrix contends that the will escapes the anti-alienation requirement under Illinois law, falling within the exception, because the second paragraph of the will bequeaths all property to the surviving spouse “absolutely.” This language, according to the surviving spouse, negates any restriction on the use of personal property. This overlooks the third sentence of the will which provides that at the death of the survivor all personal and real property is to go to the Grimeses’ four children, and the Illinois courts have refused to construe the term “absolute” as defeating the distribution plan of the bequest to the children. Helms v. Darmstatter, 34 Ill.2d 295, 301-302, 215 N.E.2d 245, 247 (1966) (<HOLDING>); Rauch v. Rauch, 112 Ill.App.3d 198, 201-202,
holding that the considerations underlying absolute prosecutorial immunity at common law dictate the same absolute immunity under  1983 recognizing the disposition of property for charitable purposes  can be in the form of an absolute transfer subject to conditions holding that the word absolute did not permit the survivor to ignore the disposition to a family member rather the survivor only had an absolute right to the entire corpus for life and at death the property passes in accordance with the terms of the will recognizing an absolute privilege for police records in a habeas corpus action holding that the burden is on the defendants to establish the existence of absolute legislative immunity