the general rule favors giving new decisions full retroactive effect. Until recently the federal courts had the authority to limit selectively the retroactive effect of new decisions. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-09, 92 S.Ct. 349, 355-56, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971). However, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of retroactivity during its last term and substantially revised its retroactivity jurisprudence. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, — U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 115 L.Ed.2d 481 (1991) {Beam). The application of Beam to Owens provides the central issue in this appeal. Prior to Beam, the law of this Circuit clearly supported giving Owens only limited retroactive application. See Kendrick v. Jefferson County Bd. of Education, 932 F.2d 910, 913 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Kimbrough v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 920 F.2d
holding that there is no rational reason for the retroactive application of 80173 and the prospective application of 833 recognizing that the application of a retroactive amendment is discretionary holding retroactive application holding no retroactive application holding that the application of the chevron oil three part test mitigated against the retroactive application of owens to parties that relied on the six year statute of limitations established in jones i