Rutherford, 54 F.3d at 376-77). Moore attempts to distinguish Farns-worth on the basis that the offense at issue in that case was labeled “vehicular manslaughter” and therefore, as a version of manslaughter, was already specifically enumerated as a crime of violence in the commentary to USSG § 4B1.2. See USSG § 4B1.2, cmt. n. 1 (listing “manslaughter” as an example of a “crime of violence”). However, this is foreclosed by the lan guage in Farnsworth expressly declining to reach this issue. 92 F.3d at 1009 (“[W]e do not reach the government’s argument that all vehicular manslaughter is ‘manslaughter/ and therefore a crime of violence, for purposes of the Commentary to § 4B1.2.”) Famsivorth clearly holds that “eaus[ing] death by driving while under the influence of drugs or a r.2003) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Torres-Ruiz, 387 F.3d 1179,
holding dwi intoxicated operation of a motor vehicle in a public place is clearly not a crime of violence under 18 usc  16b holding that corpus delicti of dwi is that someone drove or operated motor vehicle in public place while intoxicated holding that sexual assault of a child qualified as crime of violence under 18 usc  16 holding a felony conviction for driving while intoxicated dwi may be a crime of violence holding that indianas operating while intoxicated statute which states that a person who operates a vehicle while intoxicated commits a class a misdemeanor is not limited to operation of motor vehicles on public highways