851 N.W.2d 598, 603 (Minn.2014) (quoting T.A. Schifsky & Sons, Inc. v. Bahr Constr., LLC, 773 N.W.2d 783, 787 n. 3 (Minn.2009)) (declining to adopt the “plausibility” standard from Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), in the context of a motion to dismiss brought under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e)). In Ramey, for instance, we held that, in cases involving prosecutorial misconduct, the State bears the burden of persuasion to disprove an effect on a defendant’s substantial rights under the plain-error standard, even though the approach we adopted was inconsistent with Supreme Court case law. 721 N.W.2d at 301-02; see also id. at 303 (Anderson, Paul, J., concurring) (<HOLDING>). There is no reason we cannot adopt our own
holding that the defendant necessarily bears the burden of satisfying the third prong of the plain error test recognizing that the majoritys holding represented a sharp and radical departure  a 180 turn  from our courts and the united states supreme courts jurisprudence as to the burden of persuasion on the third prong of the plain error test holding that our courts are bound by the united states supreme courts interpretation of the federal constitution recognizing that the burden of persuasion for a showing of prejudice was on the defendant holding the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate the error satisfies each prong of the plain error test