408 U.S. at 95, 92 S.Ct. at 2290 (citations omitted). See also First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-86, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 1420-21, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978). While the Supreme Court has recently noted that the First Amendment does not prohibit underinclusiveness per se, see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2545, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992), it has consistently applied two principles in examining the underinclusiveness of a restriction on speech. First, the Court has held that a restriction on speech may not single out a class of speakers on the basis of criteria that are wholly unrelated to the interest sought to be advanced. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., — U.S. -, -, -, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 1509, 1517, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 109
holding removal of commercial newsracks in order to promote safety and aesthetics in violation of first amendment because noncommercial newsracks posing identical problems remained unregulated holding that the court of claims did not have jurisdiction over plaintiffs first amendment claim of improper removal holding portions of the coercion of public servant or voter statute unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the first amendment and in violation of the separation of powers holding canine sniff of commercial truck parked at weigh station during a routine safety inspection was not a violation of the fourth amendment holding that review of an original removal decision and a subsequent removal order are distinct