capacity. The SEC has not suggested otherwise in this case. “When an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce repose.” United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422, 86 S.Ct. 1545, 1560, 16 L.Ed.2d 642 (1966) (superseded by statute on other grounds); see also Astoria Federal Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 107, 111 S.Ct. 2166, 2169, 115 L.Ed.2d 96 (1991) (noting the presumption in favor of the Utah Constr. & Mining rule, absent contrary congressional intent); University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 797, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 3225, 92 L.Ed.2d 635 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 83
holding that illinois federal court erred in giving preclusive effect to minnesota state courts dismissal of action on statute of limitations grounds based on minnesotas treatment of statutes of limitations as procedural in nature and without preclusive effect holding in a res judicata case that fjederal law determines the preclusive effect of a prior federal judgment holding that the factual findings of federal agencies functioning in an appropriately judicial capacity enjoy preclusive effect in federal courts holding that to determine collateral estoppel effect of a federal civil rights action fjederal law governs the preclusive effect of a claim arising under federal law holding that the federal circuit should not accord less deference to factual findings of the patent and trademark office than courts accord to the findings of other agencies under the administrative procedure act