remanded for further proceedings. REVERSED AND REMANDED 1 . In the original petition in the Sullivan Suit, Ms. Sullivan averred that she was represented by a power of attorney appointing Mr. Ban-daries as her attorney in fact and caregiver and granting him "full power and authority and in her name and behalf” to "conduct, man .2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair). But see Marleau v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 333 Or. 82, 37 P.3d 148, 156 (2001)
holding that under south carolina law slander is actionable per se where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under missouri law recognizing that slander per se is actionable without a showing of actual or special damages holding that statement made to plaintiffs neighbors that plaintiff committed adultery was not slander per se because adultery is no longer a crime under oregon law holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under louisiana law