to support a termination for default. Although not cited, we assume that USPS is claiming that Rodeo violated the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1988). In any event, USPS attempts to prove its assertion that Rodeo falsified progress-payment requests by pointing to the notice from IFIC that it had received claims on its payment bond. We conclude that it would be inappropriate to decide this issue by inference, especially when the mandate of J.D. Hedin is that the government justify a default termination with solid evidence. See J.D. Hedin, 187 Ct.Cl. at 57, 408 F.2d at 431. Third, USPS argues that Rodeo abandoned the project by failing to perform any substantial work after June 1988. See Universal Fiberglass Corp. v. United States, 210 Ct.Cl. 206, 215, 537 F.2d 393, 397 (1976) (<HOLDING>). USPS contends that the fact that the estimate
holding that where owner and contractor frequently discussed progress of construction project and advancement of money by owner to contractor and contractor misappropriated some of the money debt was not excepted from discharge under bankruptcy code  523a2 because owner did not show that contractor had intent not to perform when the agreement was made holding that the government can terminate a contractor for failure to make progress holding that bankruptcy trustee for contractor could not avoid prepetition payment of funds from contractor to subcontractors holding that the surety was not released to the extent of improper ly paid funds because the contractor had applied the released funds to progress on the contract holding that the government could not charge contractor excess cost of relet contract where government caused a delay in contract performance in which contractor was to use his own equipment original contractors costs increased and government refused to allow original contractor to perform at cost but allowed new contractor to use government equipment and paid new contractor a different rate