—, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996). The Court declared it had a “well-established practice” of regarding in rem civil forfeiture as a remedial civil sanction, not as punishment. Id. at —, 116 S.Ct. at 2147. It explicitly held that Congress had intended for § 881(a) to be civil, not criminal, in nature: among other things, the statute uses civil enforcement mechanisms and requires no scienter on the part of the property owner. See id. at —, —, 116 S.Ct. at 2147, 2149. Moreover, the Court rejected the contention that the provisions of the forfeiture statute were so punitive in form and effect as to render them criminal “despite Congress’ intent to the contrary.” See id. at —, 116 S.Ct. at 2148. Cf. Bennis v. Michigan, — U.S. —, —, —, 116 S.Ct. 994, 995, 1001, 134 L.Ed.2d 68 (1996) (<HOLDING>) Where the Supreme Court has emphasized the
holding takings clause protections did not apply to an innocent owners interest in a car seized under a state forfeiture statute holding the confrontation clause of the united states constitution does not apply at sentencing under the us sentencing guidelines manual and the procedural protections afforded a convicted defendant at sentencing are traditionally less stringent than the protections afforded a presumptively innocent defendant at trial holding the takings clause inapplicable to the states of its own force holding that cocaine seized pursuant to search of defendants car was not admissible under good faith exception because affidavit did not establish connection between car and criminal activity holding that double jeopardy clause did not apply to forfeiture proceeding before the court