to Mr. Webb, who merely transcribed the incorrect information on the application. Mrs. Jarvis knew that the information was wrong and because she failed to correct the misrepresentations, she should be barred from receiving the benefits of her deception. In support of their version of the facts Mr. Webb and Modern Woodmen cite to W.Va.Code, 33-6-7 [1957] and a line of cases holding that fraudulent or material misrepresentations will render a policy void. See Powell v. Time Ins. Co., 181 W.Va. 289, 382 S.E.2d 342, 348 (1989) (discussing the statute and overruling cases following “the common law concept of warranties with regard to statements by an insured in an application for insurance”); Christian v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 144 W.Va. 746, 753, 110 S.E.2d 845, 849-50 (1959) (<HOLDING>); Lengyel v. Lint, 167 W.Va. 272, 280 S.E.2d 66
holding the agency relationship ceases on execution and delivery of the policy to the insured holding that the policy language expected or intended by an insured person is unambiguous and requires a subjective intent on behalf of the insured holding that where the insurer retains an attorney to represent the insured pursuant to an insurance policy the attorney acts in the capacity of an independent contractor for the insured holding that an arbitration award involving the appellants challenge to the failure of the insurance company to ensure that he had read and understood a signed waiver and to attach the waiver to the insurance policy as contrary to public policy is not reviewable by the courts because there is no challenge to a provision or term of the policy the appellant never claimed that the waiver or policy language itself was contrary to the public policy of this commonwealth holding fjraud on the part of the insured in the procurement of the policy  is sufficient to defeat a recovery in an action on such policy