victim while in perpetration of a robbery, and thus Appel-lee’s second-degree murder conviction could not stand. Commonwealth v. Miller, 988 A.2d 725 (Pa.Super.2009) (Table). The Commonwealth filed a petition for allowance of appeal with this Court, which we granted on the following issue: Does an acquittal of the felony upon which a second-degree murder charge is predicated necessitate reversal of the jury’s second-degree murder conviction? Commonwealth v. Miller, 607 Pa. 305, 5 A.3d 814 (2010). , The question before us implicates the general issue of inconsistent verdicts, which, under longstanding federal and state law, are allowed to stand so long as the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. See Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393, 52 S.Ct. 189, 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 58, 105
holding that cjonsistency in the verdict is not necessary and refusing to allow inconsistent verdicts to be upset by speculation or inquiry into the possibility of compromise or mistake on the part of the jury holding that trial judge should have granted new trial rather than judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the judge could not know in what order the jury reached its inconsistent verdicts holding that mere speculation is insufficient to support a jury verdict holding that the principles applicable to inconsistent verdicts against one defendant are applicable to inconsistent verdicts between codefendants holding jury verdict not inconsistent where jury unanimously determined that plaintiff failed to prove two elements necessary to recovery despite jurys failure to answer other questions on the special verdict form