human characteristics would no doubt be endless and the case law addressing them would be voluminous. We conclude that the APD’s findings merely reflect a disagreement with the ALJ’s assessment of the evidence, not a finding on a factual matter infused with policy considerations. Such a disagreement cannot form the basis to reverse an ALJ’s factual determinations. See Heifetz, 475 So.2d at 1281. Furthermore, the APD’s order did not focus on anything that Bridlewood (through Tomlinson) did leading up to the sexual battery. Rather, the APD focused on Tomlinson’s post-incident conduct. But that conduct was not the basis for the administrative complaint, and the APD cannot impose discipline for violations not charged. See Cottrill v. Dep’t of Ins., 685 So.2d 1371, 1372 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (<HOLDING>). The APD’s final order was predicated on its
holding that specific statutory provisions take priority over general statutory provisions holding that complaint alleging that creditors failed to comply with the notice provisions contained in the security deed stated a claim for breach of contract holding that where administrative complaint contained references to statutory provisions but failed to allege any act or omission in violation of those provisions the complaint did not afford proper notice to the licensee and that therefore disciplinary action could not be predicated on those statutes holding that even though a bond contained provisions not required by statute it must be considered statutory and not common law because the bond did not expand the payment provisions beyond those stated in statute recognizing that one of those conditions for a district judge to grant leave to amend the complaint may properly be that claims contained in the original complaint but not included in the amended complaint be considered dismissed with prejudice 