or acquaintances are not the memorialized type of statements that Crawford addressed. Id., ¶ 53. Moreover, we determined that the witness's girlfriend was not a governmental agent, and there was no reason to believe the declarant expected his girlfriend to report to the police what he told her. Id. Here, Julie confided in Wojt and DeFazio about the declining situation in the Jensen household and her statements are wholly consistent with the statements of a person in fear for her life. As one court put it, "when a declarant speaks with her neighbor across the backyard fence, she has much less of an expectation that the government will make prosecuto-rial use of those statements." State v. Mizenko, 127 P.3d 458, (Mont. 2006); see also Compan v. People, 121 P.3d 876, 880-81 (Colo. 2005) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 33. In essence, we conclude that Julie's
holding that the victims statements to a 911 operator while the perpetrator was in the home were nontestimonial because their primary purpose was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency holding that victims statement to an acquaintance made after an assault were nontestimonial holding that driving records were nontestimonial holding that a statement from a conversation admitted under the stateofmind exception to the hearsay rule was nontestimonial because it was private not made under examination not contained in a formalized document such as an affidavit deposition or prior testimony transcript and not made under circumstances in which an objective person would reasonably believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial holding that the victims statement was inadmissible when made two to three hours after victim was allegedly raped because the victims testimony supported the conclusion that her statement was made with conscious reflection