the Spence requirements are too stringent, at least as applied across the board to any and all challenges to asserted racial discrimination in jury selection). Finally, I support the remand for additional proceedings concerning Appellee’s claim under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). I would merely note that it is an unsettled matter whether such a claim is subject to the jurisdictional and procedural requirements of the PCRA, or is more appropriately suited to treatment under habeas corpus principles. Personally, I favor the latter under standing, particularly since the United States Supreme Court has couched the Atkins principle in terms identical to those pertaining under Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986) (<HOLDING>). See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321, 122 S.Ct. at
holding that the eighth amendment to the united states constitution prohibits the execution of mentally retarded individuals holding that the eighth amendment prohibits the state from inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane holding that the eighth amendment prohibits states from inflicting the death penalty upon a defendant who is insane holding that the eighth amendment prohibits execution of persons whose mental illness prevents them from comprehending the reasons for the penalty and its implications holding that the execution of mentally retarded criminals violates the eighth amendment