noted, “ ‘[Removal and preemption are two distinct concepts.’” Dukes, 57 F.3d at 355 (quoting Warner v. Ford Motor Co., 46 F.3d 531, 535 (6th Cir.1995)). The complete preemption doctrine is concerned with a more limited set of state laws, those which fall within the scope of ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme. Thus a state law claim that falls outside the scope of § 1132, even if preempted under § 1144(a), is still governed by the well-pleaded complaint rule and is not removable under the complete preemption doctrine described by the Supreme Court. See Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 64, 107 S.Ct. at 1546-47 (stating that ERISA preemption, without more, does not convert a state law claim into a claim arising under federal law); Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 23-27, 103 S.Ct. at 2853-56 (<HOLDING>); Dukes, 57 F.3d at 355 (noting that state law
holding that because plaintiffs claim was not displaced by  1132a defendants complete preemption argument fails and district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction holding that the economic loss rule does not preclude independent tort claims that fall outside the scope of a breach of contract holding that  514a preemption defense will not justify removal unless claim falls within the scope of erisas civil enforcement provision  502 holding that preemption under  1144a does not permit removal if the plaintiffs claim does not fall within the scope of  1132a holding removal and preemption are distinct concepts erisa preemption does not allow removal unless complete preemption exists