the conclusion that a compromise and release may be effectuated after the death of a claimant in some circumstances, particularly when counsel for the employer as here enters into a stipulation acknowledging on behalf of the employer that an agreement had been reached. Reading Section 449 to prevent the execution of a compromise and release agreement after a claimant’s death directly conflicts with the section’s provision for execution by signature of the claimant’s “widow or widower.” I cannot agree that Section 449 is intended to allow an employer to simply change its mind and refuse to honor an agreement which it has admitted to having entered in a written stipulation. Compare Rissmiller v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Warminster Township), 768 A.2d 1212 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2001) (<HOLDING>). Section 449 is intended to ensure that
holding that a settlement agreement in which the parties failed to agree upon the terms of a release was unenforceable holding that the parties agreement was superseded by a subsequent agreement that stated that it comprises the entire agreement and supersedes all prior understandings and representations oral or written between the parties holding that a written mutual release memorializing a compromise and settlement may be rescinded for fraud in its procurement holding that a release between two parties cannot bind a thirdparty who was a stranger to the release holding that an oral compromise and release agreement was unenforceable where there was no written stipulation between the parties