the comment in order to avoid drawing undue attention to it. See, e.g., Quinones v. Miller, 2003 WL 21276429, at *50 n. 78 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2003) (citing Buehl v. Vaughn, 166 F.3d 163, 176 (3d Cir.) (agreeing with state court’s conclusion that “[b]ecause the [objectionable] statements were fleeting, ... ‘trial counsel may have wished to avoid emphasizing what might have gone relatively unnoticed by the jury.’ ”), cert. dismissed, 527 U.S. 1050, 119 S.Ct. 2418, 144 L.Ed.2d 815 (1999); United States v. Grunberger, 431 F.2d 1062, 1069 (2d Cir.1970) (“[I]t is understandable that a defense counsel may wish to avoid underscoring a prejudicial remark in the minds of the jury by drawing attention to it [through an objection].”); United States v. Corcoran, 855 F.Supp. 1359, 1371 (E.D.N.Y.1994) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 100 F.3d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
holding that where defendant sought to exclude evidence prior to trial and again just prior to witnesss testimony at issue it was not necessary for defendant to object to testimony when it was actually put before jury holding that trial counsel made a reasonable tactical decision not to object to damaging testimony as it would merely serve to highlight the testimony holding that defense counsels failure to object to testimony did not warrant a new trial because there was no prejudice from admission of the testimony holding plaintiffs waived their right to appellate review of the admission of an experts testimony by failing to object to it at trial holding that counsel may well have made a reasonable tactical choice to not object to arguably inadmissible testimony