(2001). Analysis of the second factor, however, is more complex. At any stage in a commitment proceeding, a respondent is at serious risk of his liberty being erroneously deprived. Consequently, he must be provided the essential protections available at a criminal trial, i.e., the right to a jury, representation by counsel and proof of sexual dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Olmstead, 32 Ill. 2d 306, 205 N.E.2d 625 (1965); People v. Pembrock, 62 Ill. 2d 317, 342 N.E.2d 28 (1976). These protections are equally available at a recovery proceeding. See Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d 318, 752 N.E.2d 1055. Under notions of due process, we find that these rights include the right to an independent psychiatric examination. Cf. People v. Knuckles, 165 Ill. 2d 125, 650 N.E.2d 974 (1995) (<HOLDING>); People v. Botruff, 331 Ill. App. 3d 486
holding that due process entitled indigent defendant to psychiatrist to present insanity defense and crossexamine state psychiatrists because of the tremendous reliance jurors place on psychiatric testimony where there is often no single accurate psychiatric conclusion on legal insanity holding that a prisoner is entitled to due process prior to being transferred to a mental hospital holding that as a matter of due process an indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding is entitled to psychiatric assistance when his mental capacity is at issue holding that due process entitled indigent defendant to psychiatrist to present defense of lack of capacity to form specific intent and to crossexamine governments psychiatrist on this point holding that mental capacity may be considered on issue of victims intent