felony convictions are counted separately under the provisions of § 4Al.l(a), (b), or (c). U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. The government states that the possible ambiguity arises because the second part of this definition refers to “sentences,” rather than “convictions.” At sentencing, the government cited to United States v. Jones, 908 F.2d 365 (8th Cir.1990), where the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found the career offender guideline was ambiguous and could not directly apply when there were unsentenced, but otherwise qualifying prior convictions. The Eighth Circuit, however, concluded it was appropriate to depart upward to sentence the defendant with unsentenced convictions as if he were a career offender. See also United States v. Bassil, 932 F.2d 342, 347 (4th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). In its judgment here, the District Court
holding that the career offender guideline could not directly apply when there was an unsentenced conviction but allowing the district court on remand to consider departing from the guidelines in order to sentence a defendant whose conduct delayed his convictions as if the career offender provision applied holding that sentences imposed under the career offender guideline are not eligible for remand under kimbrough and taylor because a sentence under the career offender guideline raises no kimbrough problem holding that a defendant whose sentence is based on his status as a career offender under  4b11 is not entitled to  3582c2 relief because amendments 706 and 713 do not lower the applicable guideline range for a career offender holding that a district court is entitled to disagree with the career offender guideline holding that reduced career offender status was nonetheless based the career offender guidelines