counts because his attorneys “urged the jury to acquit only on the two death-eligible VICAR murder charges” (Jones brief on appeal at 25) finds no support in the record. We cannot see that counsel’s performance fell below an acceptable professional level or that Jones suffered prejudice as a result of the assistance rendered. We also reject Jones’s contention that traditional Strickland analysis does not apply. The cases cited by Jones, e.g., Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983) (“[T]he accused has the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal-”); Government of Virgin Islands v. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d 1425, 1435 (3d Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1020, 117 S.Ct. 538,
holding classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives holding that a gender classification must serve important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives holding that these  fundamental  decisions relate to the objectives of the representation that a client must make and an attorney must abide by holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client holding an attorney is an agent of the client and therefore cannot conspire with the client