normal contract principles. Chrysler emphasizes that the Cudas are the parties against whom the agreement is sought to be enforced and that the Cudas’ abandonment application was responsible for the settlement not being approved. We conclude, however, that the Cudas did no more than they were legally entitled to do as the real parties in interest. See 11 U.S.C. § 554(b) (authorizing party in interest to request a court order of abandonment of a particular property). Additionally, we note that the Bankruptcy Court and the District Court recognized their status as the real parties in interest in approving the abandonment. We do not believe the Cudas can be penalized for taking actions expressly sanctioned by the Code and the appropriate courts. See In re Martin, 91 F.3d 389 (3d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Thus, we decline to hold that the Cudas’
holding that a debtor could not relitigate the claim that the trustee breached his fiduciary duty because the bankruptcy court had already held that the trustees actions were not improper holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt holding that court enforcement of a settlement agreement is not state action for constitutional purposes holding that a federal habeas court may grant specific performance of a plea agreement in the face of evidence that the state has breached the terms of such an agreement holding that trustee could not have breached settlement agreement pending court approval by engaging in behavior violative of the agreement since bankruptcy court formally endorsed trustees course of action