rather than a procedural matter. Therefore a plaintiff must affirmatively plead facts indicating the action has been timely brought.” Hagert v. Glickman, Lurie, Eiger & Co., 520 F.Supp. 1028, 1033 (D.Minn.1981) (internal citation omitted); see also Southwest Investments I v. Midland Energy Co., Inc., 596 FiSupp. 219, 222 (E.D.Mo.1984); McMerty v. Burtness, 72 F.R.D. 450, 453 (D.Minn.1976); Ingenito v. Bermec Corp., 376 F.Supp. 1154, 1173 (S.D.N.Y.1974); Bryant v. Uland, 327 F.Supp. 439, 446 (S.D.Tex.1971). The Court cannot accept those courts’ reasoning because Rule 8(a) makes no distinction between pleading requirements for “substantive” and “procedural” elements; Rule 8(a) only requires “fair notice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); Wood-field v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354, 362 (5th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 518 (7th
holding that the application of the fair use doctrine at the pleading stage is appropriate holding that group pleading did not render complaint infirm where complaint provided fair notice of claims holding the employees complaints must give adequate notice to the employer that the employee is complaining of conduct prohibited by title vii holding that courts look to substance of plea for relief to determine nature of pleading not merely title of pleading holding that a pleading may give proper fair notice even where only the title of the theory is pled