at 387 (citation omitted). That language expressly requires a court to investigate a defendant’s ability to pay and imposes costs only “[t]o the S.E.2d 54 (W.Va. 1988), but in that case, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that it was error to impose fines, costs, and attorneys’ fees and to recommend that parole not be considered until all monies were paid, without first considering the defendant’s financial resources and ability to pay. Id. at 59. Haught followed the principle in Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983), in which the United States Supreme Court held that in probation revocation proceedings for failure to pay fines or restitution a court must inquire into the reasons for a defendant’s failure to pay; see also Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotations omitted). As to costs and
holding that a state cannot imposte a fine as a sentence and then automatically convert it into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full recognizing that because a district courts determination of the appropriate fine involves factual issues including the defendants ability to pay the fine imposedthe district courts calculation of the fine is entitled to deference and can be reversed on appeal only for clear error holding in a case where the maximum time of imprisonment was extended because an indigent defendant was unable to pay a fine and court costs that a state may not constitutionally imprison beyond the maximum duration fixed by statute a defendant who is financially unable to pay a fine holding that when a fine is paid there is a full satisfaction of one of the alternative penalties of the law and that the fine cannot be reimbursed in order to punish the defendant instead with imprisonment holding that state may not imprison indigent defendant solely for inability to pay fine