has committed an act in furtherance of the conspiracy. We see no reason why a constructive presence should not be assigned to conspirators as well as to other criminals; and we certainly cannot assent to the proposition that it is not competent for Congress to define what shall constitute the offense of conspiracy or when it shall be considered complete, and do with it as with other crimes which are commenced in one place and continued in another. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 363-64, 32 S.Ct. 793, 56 L.Ed. 1114 (1912); see also United States v. Ochoa, 229 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir.2000) (stating the traditional rule that a conspiracy charge may be tried in any district in which an overt act of conspiracy occurred); United States v. Dabbs, 134 F.3d 1071, 1078 (11th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); U.S. v. Bascope-Zurita, 68 F.3d 1057, 1062
holding criminal conspiracy is sustained where the commonwealth establishes the defendant entered into an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful act with another person with a shared criminal intent and an overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy a coconspirator may commit the overt act and conspirators are liable for acts of the coconspirators committed in furtherance of the conspiracy holding that venue for a conspiracy prosecution was proper in a district where an overt act took place although defendant had never been there and the conspiracy was not formed there holding that in a conspiracy case venue lies where the conspiracy agreement was formed or in any jurisdiction where an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed by any of the conspirators holding that venue is proper in any district where any act in furtherance of the conspiracy took place holding that a prosecution for a criminal conspiracy may be brought in the county where the unlawful combination is formed or in any county where the overt act is committed by any of the conspirators in furtherance of the unlawful confederacy