penalties on a defendant for the same underlying conduct. III. Increased Sentence on Resentenc-ing Weingarten raises a number of additional challenges to his new sentence, all predicated on the notion that, even though his original sentence and new sentence both amounted to an effective sentence of thirty years’ imprisonment, the new sen tence should nevertheless be treated as an increased sentence. The government does not dispute that Weingarten’s new sentence should be treated as more severe. Under the “remainder aggregate” analysis outlined in United States v. Markus, when reviewing a sentence imposed on remand after one or more counts have been reversed, we compare the defendant’s new sentence to his previous sentence without the vacated count(s). 603 F.2d 409, 413 (2d Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Vontsteen, 950 F.2d
recognizing with approval the practice following vacatur of some counts of conviction on appeal of increasing the defendants sentence on remaining counts to yield an aggregate sentence equal to the original aggregate imposed holding that it was not reversible error to continue polling the remaining jurors on all counts when the disputed count was later dismissed recognizing constitutional right to be present when sentence is imposed holding that to compare severity of sentences the proper procedure is first to disregard the sentence originally imposed on the dismissed count and then compare the total remaining sentence imposed on the remaining counts with the petitioners present position holding that states appeal of trial courts dismissal of first count in a four count indictment under cj  12302cl was not ripe until final judgment on the remaining counts pled in the guilty plea and noting that upon imposition of the sentences on the remaining counts the situation  was ripe for the state to appeal or to perfect its earlier attempt to appeal