237-38, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968)). The Court found that Spencer’s purported injuries in fact—that parole revocation could be used against him in future parole proceedings, to increase his sentence in future sentencing proceedings, to impeach him should he appear as a witness or litigant in a future judicial proceeding, or as a defendant in a future criminal proceeding—were insufficient to establish a collateral consequence, and therefore dismissed his appeal as moot. Id. at 14-18, 118 S.Ct. 978. Although Spencer addressed collateral consequence in the realm of parole revocations, this Court has held that the same rule applies to a wide range of similar circumstances, including the revocation of supervised release. See United States v. Kissinger, 309 F.3d 179 (3d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). The potentially adverse treatment asserted by
holding that there is no significant conceptual difference between the revocation of probation or parole and the revocation of supervised release holding the district courts revocation of defendants term of supervised release did not end the courts jurisdiction over defendants release holding that reasonableness review applies to a sentence imposed upon a revocation of supervised release holding that the petitioners attempted distinction between parole and probation hearings does not affect this courts mootness determination because spencer applies to the revocation of supervised release holding that neither rule 11 nor the protections of boykin apply to probation revocation hearings and observing that less process is due in prison disciplinary proceedings than in probation revocation hearings