certain circumstances, which should be examined on a case-by-case basis. The court found, however, that in the instant case, the proffered testimony touches “on areas of common knowledge.” Rec. vol. VIII at 680. Thus, it concluded that the testimony would not assist the trier of fact. The defendant urges us to adopt the Third Circuit’s approach in United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380 (3rd Cir.1991). In Stevens, the defendant sought to introduce expert testimony concerning eyewitness identification. Id. at 1384. Both of the eyewitnesses to the crime “proclaimed that they were exceedingly confident in their identifications of [the defendant].” Id. at 1400. The expert would have testified about the lack of correlation between confidence and accuracy in eyewitness id (6th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Mr. Smith argues that not only did
holding exclusion of expert eyewitness identification testimony harmless error where governments case included three separate eyewitnesses and a palm print that discredited the defendants alibi holding exclusion was harmless error holding admissible expert testimony concerning factors that may impair eyewitness identification and rejecting that concerning a particular eyewitness credibility and the statistical probability of eyewitness misidentification holding the error harmless due to eyewitness corroboration of the victims testimony holding no abuse of discretion to exclude expert eyewitness identification testimony where governments case relied on more than eyewitness identification