on the facts of each case. In this case, our determination that the failure to give the Hampton charge is not plain error also supports our holding that the failure to give the Kociolek charge, in isolation, or in combination with the failure to give the Hampton charge, did not have the capacity to bring about an unjust result. VII. Finally, the State argues that in view of the trial court’s general and comprehensive credibility instructions to the jury concerning its role in assessing credibility, specific credibility instructions regarding a defendant’s statements are not necessary for a fair trial. We disagree. General jury instructions may not always sufficiently impart to a jury its responsibilities and limitations. See State v. Wilson, 128 N.J. 233, 240, 607 A.2d 1289 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Two Appellate Division opinions address the
holding that failure of trial court to instruct jury that state must prove beyond reasonable doubt killing was not committed in heat of passion required reversal of murder conviction even though there was general charge that state was required to prove each element of offenses beyond reasonable doubt holding that the state must prove juvenile delinquency beyond a reasonable doubt holding state must prove voluntariness of confession beyond a reasonable doubt holding that failure to charge jury that state had burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not act in the heat of passion was harmless because the evidence did not support a charge on passionprovocation manslaughter holding that proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is required by the constitution