affirm the judgment below in its entirety. A. First, Ihnken argues that the evidence presented by the parties in connection with their respective pretrial motions demonstrated that he was deprived of adequate process before Defendants revoked his permit and abruptly ended the festival. For this reason, Ihnken contends that the district court erred in denying his request for summary judgment on his procedural due process claims and instead allowing these claims to proceed to trial. But, Ihnken may not challenge this aspect of the judgment below because the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not subject to appeal after a full trial and final judgment on the merits of a given claim. See Chesapeake Paper Prods. Co. v. Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp., 51 F.3d 1229, 1237 (4th Cir. 1995) (<HOLDING>); see also Varghese v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc.,
holding that pure issue of law is preserved by motion for summary judgment and is reviewable after final judgment holding that a grant of summary judgment in favor of one party creates a final judgment allowing appellate review of denial of opposing partys summary judgment motion holding that we will not review under any standard the pretrial denial of a motion for summary judgment after a full trial and final judgment on the merits holding that denial of motion for summary judgment is interlocutory even though trial judge had stated that there was no just reason for delay because denial of motion for summary judgment was not a final determination of defendants rights and the appeal did not affect defendants substantial rights holding that the courts denial of either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is not reviewable 