unfortunately now wasted. Nor will lesser sanctions restore the credibility of Plaintiffs as witnesses regarding the true cause of the fire. Plaintiffs’ repeated lies under oath about their meth use (10th Cir.1969) (stating that a driver’s intoxicated state could be relevant to whether a defect in the vehicle was actually the cause of an fire); Harris v. Kubota Tractor Corp., No. CIV.04-2490, 2006 WL 2734460, at *3 (W.D.La. Sept. 22, 2006) (“Evidence of [the plaintiffs] use of cocaine and marijuana during the week of his accident is relevant because it may, in the mind of the jury, tend to establish that [the plaintiff] was impaired at the time of the accident, an issue in this case.”); Evans v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. CIV.A. V-03-09, 2005 WL 3844071, at *5 (S.D.Tex. Sept. 2, 2005) (<HOLDING>); Hansen v. Gen. Motors Corp., 915 F.Supp. 118,
holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting highly probative and relevant evidence of other crimes holding that trial court erred in excluding from evidence the application for social security benefits that the plaintiff made eight months prior to the accident at issue in which he described in detail his inability to work which was probative in establishing the plaintiffs condition prior to the accident and stating that since the plaintiff was denied social security benefits  there was no collateral source holding that evidence of a plaintiff being under the influence of marijuana and prescription drugs was highly probative of the plaintiffs ability to react perceive and reason at the time of an accident recognizing that factors such as physical and mental condition of the maker of the instrument at the time of its execution including age any weakness or infirmity are probative evidence of undue influence holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of a witness that was not highly probative