two principal problems with this claim. First, rather than exhibiting indifference, the wording of the CPWL statute plainly prohibits the carrying of concealed weapons. See note 8, supra. Second, except in limited circumstances not present here, an appellant may not challenge a statute by arguing that it could not be constitutionally applied to other defendants, differently situated. See Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609-10, 124 S.Ct. 1941, 158 L.Ed.2d 891 (2004) (“Facial challenges of this sort are especially to be discouraged” because they “call for relaxing familiar requirements of standing, to allow a determination that the law would be unconstitutionally applied to different parties and different circumstances from those at hand.”); see, e.g., id. at 609, 124 S.Ct. 1941 (<HOLDING>); German v. United States, 525 A.2d 596, 604-05
holding that there can be no implied contractual term at variance with an express term of a contract holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance recognizing that facial attacks alleging overbreadth do not necessarily use that term holding that use of the term enhancement also a pr ebooker term did not require reversal where district court properly considered the guidelines to be advisory holding that isolated criminal attacks do not constitute persecution