threat, as long as one does so with a corrupt purpose. See United States v. Shotts, 145 F.3d 1289, 1301 (11th Cir.1998) (sustaining a conviction under § 1512(b) where an employer told an employee not to talk to investigators so that she would not be bothered, finding that a jury could reasonably have inferred that the employer was attempting with improper motive to persuade the employee not to talk to investigators); see also United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 126-27 (2d Cir.1998) (sustaining defendant’s conviction of witness tampering based on evidence showing defendant had substantial influence over witness because he was her landlord and her employer, and had paid for an attorney to help her prepare her testimony); United States v. Gabriel, 125 F.3d 89, 102-03 (2d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Morrison, 98 F.3d 619,
holding that witness grand jury testimony was admissible when defendant waived his constitutional right of confrontation by making witness unavailable by threats to his life holding that where witness refused to take the oath and testify his grand jury testimony should not have been admitted because he was not subject to cross examination before the grand jury recognizing that defendants attempt to persuade a witness to make false exculpatory statements is probative of guilty knowledge and intent holding that a defendants false grand jury testimony was insufficient to establish perjury where the defendant was called before the grand jury for the mere purpose of laying the foundation for a perjury prosecution such testimony was immaterial to the grand jurys purpose holding that defendants attempt to mislead a client by providing it with false information was illegal witness tampering because defendant was trying to corruptly persuade or mislead the client with the intent of influencing its potential testimony before the grand jury