351, the knowing exposure of private property to the public is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. Thus, in approving searches of VIN's, courts have emphasized that the VIN was in plain view on an exterior part of the vehicle or on the dashboard. E.g., Brown, at 426 (dashboard); Zemke, at 112-13 (exterior of motorcycle); Colon, at 725 (dashboard); Tate v. State, 544 P.2d 531, 536 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975) (exterior of camper); see generally 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 2.5(d), at 357-58 (1978). A different question is presented when the VIN is hidden from public view on some interior portion of the vehicle, and it is necessary to enter the vehicle in order to view it. See, e.g., People v. Brooks, 405 Mich. 225, 244, 274 N.W.2d 430 (1979) (<HOLDING>); 1 W. LaFave, at 358-61. In cases involving
holding that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in a vin on a visible exterior portion of a vehicle and recognizing that a different fourth amendment question would have been presented if the vin had been on an interior portion of the vehicle holding that an officer may not extend the scope of a detention where the vin is readable from the outside of a vehicle the vin matches the vin listed on the registration and there are no signs the plate has been tampered with  holding that once a vehicle has been lawfully stopped an officer may order the driver out of the vehicle without violating the fourth amendment holding that passengers lacked any reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore had no standing to challenge the search of the vehicle holding that as part of an undoubtedly justified traffic stop officers checking for the vin in order to run a search is sufficiently unintrusive to be constitutionally permissible in light of the lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vin