with the constitutionalizing of government procedures suggests that the ultimate additional costs in terms of money and administrative burden would not be insubstantial.” Id. Moreover, additional procedural safeguards are unjustified if they are not accompanied by a reduction in erroneous deprivations: the Government’s interest, and hence that of the public, in conserving scarce fiscal and administrative resources is a factor that must be weighed. At some point the benefit of an additional safeguard to the individual affected by the administrative action and to society in terms of increased assurance that the action is just, may be outweighed by the cost. Id. at 348, 96 S.Ct. 893; see also Sterling v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 513 A.2d 253, 255 (D.C.1986) (<HOLDING>). In weighing the third Mathews factor, our
holding that consistent with due process telephone hearings may be conducted to resolve interstate unemployment compensation claims because abolition of such hearings would not materially reduce the risk of erroneous deprivations and such hearings are a reasonable means of conserving fiscal and administrative resources recognizing that the federal rules of evidence do not apply to sentencing hearings holding hearsay admissible in revocation hearings holding that the confrontation clause applies only to trials and not to sentencing hearings holding that neither rule 11 nor the protections of boykin apply to probation revocation hearings and observing that less process is due in prison disciplinary proceedings than in probation revocation hearings