claim because the constitutional mandate is “self-executing.” See United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257, 100 S.Ct. 1127, 63 L.Ed.2d 373 (1980); Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1371 (Fed.Cir.1991). Therefore, ask the plaintiffs, if Congress lacks the constitutional power to take private property without paying for it, how can it suddenly get the power after six years or any other designated period of elapsed time? The correct answer, we are told, must be that an eminent-domain taking cannot be foreclosed except by a judicial proceeding on the merits. There are several flaws in plaintiffs’ argument. First is that the premise on which it is based is wrong. Second is the absence of any law in support of the theory — plaintiffs do not favor us with any Cir.1996) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); Brown v. United States, 73 F.3d 1100
holding that the plaintiff could not complain that it was unable to comply with the trial courts order to respect the defendants easement because of its lease with a third party where plaintiff had entered into lease knowing that property was subject to an easement holding in case where railroad grant was an easement and not a right of way that title vested in abutting landowner once railroad abandoned land holding that an easement agreement and an unrecorded easement plan created an easement holding that governments lease of former railroad easement to state for conversion to trail was a taking holding that plaintiff was entitled to compensation for governments taking of option to renew a lease