(daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte) (“Since the legislation is not retroactive, it would have absolutely no effect on the 75 class actions already filed against Merck in the wake of the Vioxx withdrawal.”). The Pritchett court found that the legislative history of the act and public policy supported its determination that the filing a notice of removal does not commence a new action under CAFA. Athough parties have been unsuccessful in arguing that pending cases are “commenced” when they are removed to federal court, some courts have determined that certain amendments to complaints could cause a pre-CAFA case to fall within CAFA’s sphere. See Knudsen v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 435 F.3d 755 (7th Cir.2006). But see Plubell v. Merck & Co., 434 F.3d 1070 (8th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). In Knudsen v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 435
holding that amended pleading did not commence a new action for the purposes of cafa because the claims were exactly the same in both pleadings and the replacement representative was a member of the putative class in the original pleading holding that the claims of the class representative and class members must be based on the same legal or remedial theory holding that a district of columbia consumer protection statute that authorized representative actions and did not reference class action requirements or mandate class certification was a separate and distinct procedural vehicle from a class action and thus did not constitute a class action under cafa holding that in class action the claim or defense of the representative party must be typical of the claim or defense of each member of the class holding that the filing of a class action by a class representative without standing tolls the period of limitations with regard to all asserted members of the class and that the amendment of the complaint by the addition of a class member with standing relates back to the original complaint