answer this question, a court must engage in “a more particularized, and hence more relevant” inquiry. Id. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). “The relevant, dispositive inquiry is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151. “This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful; but it is to say that in the light of preexisting law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (internal citations omitted). See also Robles, 302 F.3d at 271 (<HOLDING>). Lastly, the qualified immunity analysis is
holding that it was reasonable that counsel would not anticipate that the prosecution would attempt to offer inadmissible polygraph evidence holding that a reasonable officer could not have been expected to anticipate that ten to fifteen minutes of unauthorized detention would amount to a greater than de minimis injury holding that the prison litigation reform act requires a prior showing of physical injury that need not be significant but must be more than de minimis  holding that fiveday suspension was not a de minimis deprivation holding that to demonstrate retaliation complainedof action must be more than de minimis 