nature of a motion to reopen the proceedings, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. First, Yu failed to provide any support for her claim that the service agency she employed acted fraudulently in filing her brief on appeal to the BIA. Second, as the BIA correctly explained, the arguments raised in Yu’s brief on appeal were not the sole bases for the IJ’s adverse credibility finding. Yu failed to offer any new evidence to refute the IJ’s finding that she was not credible. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.”); Kaur v. Board of Immigration Appeals, 413 F.3d 232, 234 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for
holding that there was no new and material evidence to reopen claim where newly presented evidence was not accompanied by any medical evidence indicating a nexus to service holding petition seeking review of motion to reopen deportation hearing in the absence of new evidence as without merit under  1927 since petitioner was not entitled to reopen except on showing of significant new evidence holding that material submitted by appellant that is cumulative of evidence previously of record is not new holding that evidence submitted for a motion to reopen must be material and state new facts that rebut the underlying finding holding that appeals council must consider evidence submitted with a request for review if it is a new b material and c related to the period on or before the date of the aljs decision