exclusive control. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143, 99 S.Ct. at 430, 58 L.Ed.2d at 402 (noting that “[o]ne of the main rights attaching to property is the right to exclude others ... and one who ... controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of this right to exclude.”). As noted, the special power to exclude is not the same as the right to exclude. Most importantly with respect to control, even though Whiting maintained a lock on the bedroom door, he could have been removed by the City at any time. See Gilmore, 104 P.3d at 1055 (finding that defendant had no expectation of privacy in bedroom, despite the fact that he kept the door locked and the home owner did not have the key or any right to access the bedroom); Davis, 119 S.W.3d at 367-68 (<HOLDING>). With respect to rightful possession or lawful
holding that rooming house residents had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the front hallway of the house they shared which was not obviously a rooming house open to the general public holding that defendant staying in abandoned house had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the house despite having a key to the house and the ability to let people in and out of it holding that the evidence was sufficient to preclude inference where he tried to enter the house drunk and was staying at the neighboring house holding that squatter had no standing to challenge search of abandoned house where he was staying recognizing record supported determination that defendant lacked expectation of privacy in house