a triable issue.’ ” Culver v. Gorman & Co., 416 F.3d 540, 546 (7th Cir.2005) (quoting Stone v. City of Indianapolis Pub. Utils. Div., 281 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir.2002)). The reason is obvious: “[s]uspicious timing may be just that — suspicious—and a suspicion is not enough to get past a motion for summary judgment.” Loudermilk v. Best Pallet Co., 636 F.3d 312, 315 (7th Cir.2011) (citation omitted). Accordingly, for a suspicious-timing argument alone to give rise to an inference of causation, the plaintiff must demonstrate that “an adverse employment action follows close on the heels of protected expression, and the plaintiff [must] show that the person who decided to impose the adverse action knew of the protected conduct.” Lalvani v. Cook Cnty., 269 F.3d 785, 23, 427 (7th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); McClendon v. Ind. Sugars Inc., 108 F.3d 789,
holding that allegations that employees supervisors yelled at her told her she was a poor manager and gave her poor evaluations chastised her in front of customers and once required her to work with an injured back were insufficient to state title vii claim holding that a two to threeday time period between the employees complaint and his discharge was sufficient holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment holding that a oneday time period between the employees complaint and her supervisors recommendation to fire her was sufficient holding that the plaintiffs second complaint did not relate back to her first complaint because her second complaint was not an amendment to her first complaint but rather a separate filing