v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 654, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona (Ring II), 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). However, this Court’s construction of the statute furnishes sufficient guidance to satisfy Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment concerns. State v. Hampton, 213 Ariz. 167, 176 ¶¶ 35-36, 140 P.3d 950, 959 (2006); see also Tucker, 215 Ariz. at 310 ¶ 28,160 P.3d at 189. Therefore, Womble’s argument on facial vagueness fails. ¶ 37 Womble additionally contends that the (F)(6) aggravator is vague as applied because of the “increased role of the jury in the sentencing process and the abandonment of proportionality review.” We have previously rejected this argument. See Hampton, 213 Ariz. at 176 ¶ 36,140 P.3d at 959 (<HOLDING>). ¶38 Womble further argues that even if the
holding that the law presumes that the jury will follow the courts instructions holding that the f6 aggravator may be constitutionally applied if given substance and specificity by jury instructions that follow this courts constructions holding that a jury is presumed to follow a judges instructions holding that a jury is presumed to follow the trial courts instructions recognizing that this court presumes that juries follow district courts instructions