was closely scrutinized, she was left off of out-of-office emails, she was referred to executive coaching, she was pushed for inputs on her development plan, and she was placed on a CAP. Novotny asserts that her supervisor, Roberts, did not take any of these actions against her male counterparts. As these alleged actions do not qualify as adverse employment actions, Novotny failed to state a claim for pretermination activities. In Hollins v. Atlantic Co., 188 F.3d 652 (6th Cir.1999), this Court explained a materially adverse employment action as follows: Id. at 662 (citation omitted). We have consistently held that de minimis employment actions are not materially adverse and, thus, not actionable. See, e.g., Jacklyn v. Schering Plough Healthcare Prod., 176 F.3d 921, 930 (6th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., 97 F.3d 876, 885
holding that potentially indefinite suspension of employee from work without pay could constitute materially adverse employment action even where employer awards full backpay for the entire period and that reassignment of responsibilities could constitute materially adverse employment action even absent demotion holding that counseling sessions and written criticisms of employees work performance did not fall within the types of materially adverse employment actions holding that allegations that employee was yelled at for complaining about his discriminatory treatment and criticized  were not materially adverse actions holding that a denial of transfer was not an adverse employment action where the plaintiff asserted only that the transfer would allow him to work closer to home holding that neither requiring plaintiff to work at home while she was recovering from outpatient surgery nor rejecting computer expenses that previously had been approved were materially adverse employment actions