differs. This is contrary to the TAA’s plain language as well as its mandate — that we construe it “to effect its purpose and make uniform the construction of other states’ law applicable to an arbitration.” Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code § 171.003 (emphasis added); see also Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.028 (“A uniform act included in a code shall be construed to effect its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states that enact it.”). Texas, not federal, law governs this case, and that law is clear: a party may not appeal an order that grants rehearing. V. Section 171.098(a)(5) is uniformly interpreted to prohibit appeals when a rehearing is granted. The concurrence also argues that “subsection (5) allows an appeal when a re ., P.A., 34 Kan.App.2d 340, 118 P.3d 704, 706-08 (2005) (<HOLDING>); Crack Team, 128 S.W.3d at 583 (holding that
holding that a rehearing order is interlocutory and not appealable holding that there can be only one final appealable order holding that a rehearing order was not final or appealable holding order granting a new trial is not a final appealable order because it does not terminate the action or any of the claims or parties in the action holding that the ordering of a rehearing caused the judgment to not be final and appealable