former OCGA § 24-9-67.1, cases decided under the former statute offer useful guidance when analyzing the current version of the statute.” Dempsey v. Gwinnett Hosp. Sys., 330 Ga. App. 469, 471 (1) (a) n.3 (765 SE2d 525) (2014) (punctuation omitted). 22 HNTB Ga., Inc. v. Hamilton-King, 287 Ga. 641, 646 (2) (697 SE2d 770) (2010) (punctuation omitted). 23 Id. at 642 (1) (punctuation omitted); accord Moore v. Cottrell, Inc., 334 Ga. App. 791, 793 (1) (780 SE2d 442) (2015); see also Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U. S. 137, 152 (II) (119 SCt 1167, 143 LE2d 238) (1999). 24 HNTB Ga., Inc., 287 Ga. at 642 (1) (punctuation, omitted); accord Moore, 334 Ga. App. at 793 (1). See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U. S. 579, 597 (IV) (113 SCt 2786, 125 LE2d 469) (1993) (<HOLDING>). 25 HNTB Ga., Inc., 287 Ga. at 642 (1)
holding that the trial judge is assigned the task of ensuring that an experts testimony both rests on reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand holding depends on the policy language at hand holding that while a foundation for an inference of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be based on the testimony of an expert witness the experts testimony must establish that the occurrence indicates the probability of negligence holding the experts opinion testimony lacked a proper foundation when there was no physical evidence of sexual abuse and the experts admitted that their conclusions were based solely on the childrens statements that they had been abused holding that psychologists testimony on the reliability of eyewitness testimony was both relevant and reliable and thus should have been admitted