was pending. We are left with a situation in which the putatively excludable period quite obviously did not preclude the government from proceeding to file the indictment, raising the question whether the delay in doing so “resulted] from” the pendency of the certiorari petition. Whether the time period used in pursuing an interlocutory appeal is automatically excludable under § 3161(h)(1)(E), even if the appeal did not actually cause any delay, is an open issue in this court, but just barely so. Applying parallel “delay resulting from” language, we have held that pretrial motions, excludable under § 3161(h)(1)(F) of the STA, need not actually cause any delay for the time during which the motions are pending to be ex-cludable. See United States v. Vo, 413 F.3d 1010, 1015 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>) (quotation marks and internal citations
holding that the plaintiff had standing even though automatic stay had terminated and his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot because he also sought actual damages for violation of the automatic stay holding that pretrial detention credited against ultimate sentence triggers tolling recognizing that a district courts decision to defer hearing a motion until trial does not render the intervening time nonexcludable under  3161h1f holding that a defendant is not entitled to automatic discharge upon the expiration of speedy trial even though he was not provided actual notice that the charges were refiled holding that a pretrial motion triggers an automatic exclusion under  3161h1f even though no actual delay results