it is "premised on the theory that the [Djistrict !C]ourt misapplied the Guidelines.” United States v. Shaw, 313 F.3d 219, 222-23 (4th Cir.2002); see United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 212 (3d Cir.2008). 5 . Erwin contended at oral argument that there was no breach because he merely waived the right to file an appeal as opposed to promised not to file an appeal. See, e.g., Oral Arg. Tr. 4:08-5:23, 7:46-8:25 (3d Cir. May 20, 2014); see also Erwin Supplemental Br. 1 n. 1. Erwin has not proffered any principled basis for drawing this distinction, and common sense dictates that there is none. A "waiver” is defined as "the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of , 106 F.3d 427 (Table) (Fed.Cir.1997); Maslow v. Vanguri, 168 Md.App. 298, 896 A.2d 408, 423 (Md.Ct. Spec.App.2006) (<HOLDING>). 7 . Of the 2,920 convictions in the district
holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party holding that a motion denying summary judgment will not be reviewed on appeal from a jury verdict where sufficient evidence supports the jurys verdict holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement holding that the appellants appeal of the jurys verdict was a material breach of the no appeals provision in the parties settlement agreement holding that where the meaning of the jurys verdict was not clear in light of the trial courts jury instructions the court of appeals erred in directing entry of judgment for respondent the case should have been remanded to the trial judge who was in the best position to pass upon the question of a new trial in light of the evidence his charge to the jury and the jurys verdict