regulatory and dictionary definitions of “nominal”). The plaintiff asserts that the Secretary’s approval of the Maine HMP exceeds the Secretary’s statutory authority in violation of the APA. See Compl. ¶¶ 7, 59. Additionally, the plaintiff argues that the Secretary abused his discretion in approving “nominal” copayments that exceed the Secretary’s own regulatory definition of what constitutes a “nominal” copayment. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C); Compl. ¶¶ 4-5, 23, 55-58; PL’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 28. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that it was an abuse of discretion for the Secretary to approve the HMP because it includes unlawfully high copayments. See PL’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 28 (quoting Union of Concerned Scientists v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 711 F.2d 370, 381 (D.C.Cir.1983)) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the defendants argue that the
recognizing that deference to an agencys interpretation of the written law is appropriate only when that interpretation is within the written laws language holding that when an agencys interpretation of its own rules flies in the face of the language of the rules themselves it is owed no deference holding that deference is owed to an agencys interpretation of its own categorical exclusion regulations so long as that interpretation is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation holding that deference is owed to state agencys interpretation of state law holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference