that [the claimant] filed her DIC claim after” — not before — the Veterans Court’s decision interpreting § 1318 as permitting hypothetical entitlement claims). As in Rodriguez and Tarver, we will use the three-part test from Princess Cruises to determine whether § 3.10(f)(3) should be given retroactive effect to bar Ms. Kernea’s hypothetical entitlement claim under § 1311(a)(2). l The first Princess Cruises factor is “the nature and extent of the change in the law.” Princess Cruises, 397 F.3d at 1364 (internal quotation marks omitted). Ms. Kernea contends that at the time she filed her claim in 2003, the VA’s long-standing regulations, as we interpreted them in our 2000 opinion in Hix v. Gober, permitted hypothetical entitlement claims under § 1311(a)(2). See Hix, 225 F.3d at 1380-81 (<HOLDING>); see also Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates,
holding that per 38 cfr  3303b medical evidence of nexus is not required for benefits if the veteran demonstrates continuity of symptoms between his present disability and service holding vagenerated documents to be in the possession of the secretary and the board at the time of the board decision and thus constructively part of the record of proceedings as mandated by 38 usc  7252b holding that 38 cfr  201106 as then worded was dispositive of the interpretation of 38 usc  1311 and required de novo determination of the veterans disability upon the entirety of the record including any new evidence presented by the surviving spouse holding that a court of veterans appeals decision interpreting 38 usc  8713 overruling the secretarys prior interpretation and remanding back to the board was a final and appealable decision holding that where the board did not mail decision in accordance with the provisions of 38 usc  7104e the period within which to appeal to the court of appeals for veterans claims did not commence to run