64 F.3d 110, 118-19 (3d Cir.1995) (affirming denial of § 2254 habeas relief from state court custodial sentence on revocation of probation, holding that petitioner failed to show prejudice from counsel's failure to advise of such potential collateral consequences before he entered guilty plea on original offense). See also district court decisions cited in note 10, infra. 12 . We note that at least two of our brethren in the district courts within the Third Circuit have followed the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit in Thomas, holding that alleged failure of defense counsel to advise of the significant possibility of career offender status would not meet the first prong deficiency standard under Strickland. See Nwachia v. United States, 891 F.Supp. 189, 196-99 (D.NJ.1995) (Barry, J.) (<HOLDING>) (relying on Thomas, 27 F.3d at 321 and also
holding that a prior conviction in a georgia state court was appropriately used to qualify the defendant as a career offender because he failed to prove he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel holding that the prejudice prong of strickland was not met in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the prosecutors misstatement of law where the trial court properly instructed the jury holding that a defendant whose sentence is based on his status as a career offender under  4b11 is not entitled to  3582c2 relief because amendments 706 and 713 do not lower the applicable guideline range for a career offender holding that reduced career offender status was nonetheless based the career offender guidelines holding in  2255 action that first prong of strickland was not met by claim that defense counsel erroneously estimated likely sentence and failed to inform defendant that he might be classified as career offender