judgment of the district court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the fac appealability on ineffective assistance of counsel, the “cause” Hernandez assigns for his procedural default, suggests that it intended to allow review of the procedural bar. However, even assuming that the district court wished this court to review its procedural bar finding or that we would grant a certificate of appealability on this issue, the correctness of the district court’s central holding — that there was no error, constitutional or otherwise — in the state trial court’s charge on intent is dispositive. The test for finding charge-based constitutional error is a strict one. See Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146, 94 S.Ct. 396, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973) (<HOLDING>). We see no basis for finding a Fourteenth
holding that error in method by which interest from damages award was calculated was an error in substantive law not a clerical or mathematical error holding that a trial court does not commit plain error unless the error is clear under current law holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error holding that constitutional error cannot be premised on error in a charge unless the error violated some right which was guaranteed to the defendant by the fourteenth amendment holding that when defendant properly objects to charge error reversal required unless error was harmless