to limit the official’s discretion and, thereby, create a liberty interest. Accordingly, Gavin's complaint is not dismissed for lack of a cognizable constitutional right. B. SUPERVISORY LIABILITY Nevertheless, Gavin fails to allege enough facts to state a § 1983 cause of action. In order to hold a supervisory official liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the supervisory official participated in or was directly responsible for an unconstitu tional act. Moore v. State of Ind., 999 F.2d 1125, 1129 (7th Cir.1993); Rascon v. Hardiman, 803 F.2d 269, 273-74 (7th Cir.1986). For liability to attach to prison supervisors under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the personal knowledge or involvement of those superiors. Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1523 (7th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992
holding that a adjuster can only incur independent liability when his conduct constitutes gross negligence malice or reckless disregard for the rights of the insured holding that liability in a  1983 action must be predicated on personal involvement not on the basis of respondeat superior holding that personal liability will only be imposed on a superior for his reckless disregard of a deputys known dangerous propensities holding prison official must have acted with reckless disregard for the inmates safety recognizing respondeat superior liability