that the court of appeals’ reliance on ProMax was misplaced. In the case before us, Wilshire’s only request for attorney fees was based on those awardable under section 38-9-7(5) at the summary lien proceeding. That request was denied. The district court reserved the right to consider awarding attorney fees only if such requests were made at further proceedings. This reservation, contingent upon the occurrence of an uncertain event, was insufficient to leave the attorney fees issue pending. ¶28 The ProMax rule is inapplicable to cases where, as in this case, a court makes an outright denial of a request for attorney fees. For the attorney fees issue to be pending, there must be something left for the district court to decide. Cf. State v. Mullins, 2005 UT 43, ¶ 10, 116 P.3d 374 (<HOLDING>). As a result, we hold that the court of
holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to withdraw guilty plea filed three weeks after entering the plea holding the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendants motion to withdraw his guilty plea because the defendant did not admit to facts demonstrating the required mental state holding that defendant was entitled to withdraw guilty plea upon habeas corpus proceedings where he pled guilty in exchange for an illegal sentence holding that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea was not pending because nothing was left for the court to decide holding that trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider defendants motion to withdraw guilty plea filed beyond term of court in which defendant was sentenced