“necessarily determines the lawfulness of the officers’ actions throughout the whole course of the defendant’s conduct,” so that a subsequent section 1983 excessive force action brought by the defendant “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction.” Id. at 1045 (internal quotation marks omitted). Since Beets, at least two judges in this district have held that a section 148(a)(1) conviction obtained by jury verdict barred a subsequent section 1983 action for excessive force. See Lozano v. City of San Pablo, No. 14-cv-00898-KAW, 2014 WL 4386151, at *6 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 4, 2014) (“The jury verdict in the state court proceedings brings this case squarely in line with Beets.”)', Tarantino v. City of Concord, No. 12-cv-00579-JCS, 2013 WL 3722476, at *3 (N.D.Cal. July 12, 2013) (<HOLDING>). Defendants are wrong that the instant case is
holding that when selfdefense is carried out with excessive force a defendant would be guilty of manslaughter holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim holding that excessive force claims are not subject to exhaustion requirement holding that plaintiffs convictions at trial for assault on a peace officer and violation of section 148a1 barred plaintiffs excessive force claims where the jury made special findings that plaintiff initiated a physical altercation with the officers and did not act in selfdefense holding that where the plaintiffs evidence supported a finding that the defendants had applied force to restrain him the jury must determine not only whether the officers were justified in using force at all but if so whether the degree of force actually used was reasonable