of two dates between Ms. Jonasson and Kingsboro in 1988. In its view, the evidence was irrelevant and inflammatory. We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion in limine with respect to this evidence. The court believed that the evidence was relevant and ought to be before the jury because it had the task of evaluating the overall relationship of Ms. Jonasson and Kingsboro. Evidence that is relevant to the background of the case is admissible for that purpose. At the very least, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court not to exclude this evidence in a motion in limine; the evidence was at least potentially relevant for the purpose the judge identified. See Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344 (7th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). LCFS did not object during the trial when Ms.
holding that congress intended the courts to apply the civil rights act of 1991 to cases pending at the time of its enactment and to preact conduct still open to challenge after that time holding that the damages and jury trial provisions of the 1991 act apply to conduct occurring prior to the date of enactment holding that conduct prior to passage of the civil rights act of 1991 is admissible to provide context and background holding that section 102 of the civil rights act of 1991 does not apply to preenactment conduct holding that the  1981 amendments contained in  101 of the civil rights act of 1991 do not apply retroactively