ruling that TDPRS could call her as a witness. Even assuming TDPRS had violated the Rule, the trial court still had discretion to allow her testimony after considering all the circumstances. See Drilex Sys., Inc., 1 S.W.3d at 117 (stating that if the Rule is violated, the trial court may, taking into consideration all of the circumstances, allow the testimony of the potential witness). Also, Kristin fails to demonstrate how admission of Wheeler’s testimony probably resulted in an improper judgment. In fact, the record reflects sufficient evidence beyond Wheeler’s testimony on which the jury could have concluded that termination of Kristin’s parental rights was in the best interest of K.M.B. See Garza v. Cole, 753 S.W.2d 245, 247 (Tex.App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref d n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). We therefore conclude that the trial court
holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining expert witness was qualified to testify holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding hearsay evidence and evidence that violated the best evidence rule in deciding a summary judgment motion holding that trial court did not err in ruling on appellees motion for summary judgment before appellees complied with appellants discovery request when the record reflected that appellant filed a motion to compel three days before the hearing and the record did not reveal any effort on the part of appellant to secure a ruling from the trial court on its motion to compel or object at the trial court hearing the motion for summary judgment prior to ruling on the motion to compel holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by letting a video technician who violated the rule testify when the record reflected sufficient evidence on which the jury could have found for appellees holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to accept the defendants guilty pleas to two counts of the indictment and stating that even if the trial court erred the error had not prejudiced the defendant because he was found guilty by the jury of the charges to which he intended to plead and the evidence of the other crimes would have been admissible in the trial for the first degree murder charge