such as “a conspiracy,” “possession,” “knowing” and “willful.” J.A. 1421-1434. The judge also instructed the jury that if he did not “define any particular words, [the jury was to] assign to them their ordinary, everyday meanings.” J.A. 1421. The jury then returned a verdict of guilty on Count One of the Indictment. J.A. 1441^14. We assume, without deciding, that reading the indictment to the jury, accompanied by the above explanation, constituted insufficient jury instructions. We also assume that defendants’ substantial rights were affected. However, in light of the evidence introduced at trial establishing proximity, J.A. 868-73, we exercise our discretion and decline to notice the error. Cf. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 470, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (<HOLDING>). C. Wall, convicted of both Counts One and
holding under a plain error analysis that a failure to charge the jury with an essential element did not warrant reversal of the conviction where the evidence supporting that element was overwhelming holding that failure to instruct on an essential element was harmless error because the element was so clearly established holding that the failure to charge an essential element of a crime in the indictment is an error which should be noted by an appellate court sua sponte as plain error holding that the omission of an element from jury in structions was not plain error where the underlying fact supporting the element was undisputed based on the uncontradicted testimony of a government witness holding that failure to submit an element of the offense to the jury is subject to harmless error analysis