the vessel in safe condition, the present case poses two issues. The first issue is whether the ramp is part of the William F’s “equipment and appliances.” Howlett, 512 U.S. at 98,114 S.Ct. 2057. The second issue is whether there is a genuine issue of material fact whether Traylor Brothers acted reasonably in fulfilling its turnover duty. In rejecting Scheuring’s LHWCA claim, the district court analogized the ramp to a dock or pier. Scheuring v. Traylor Bros., No. CV 03-06613-RZ, slip op. at 9 (C.D.Cal. Aug. 25, 2004). In opposition, the plaintiff asks us to view the ramp as a gangway. This distinction is critical since a gangway constitutes an appliance of a vessel but a dock or pier does not. See Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 207, 92 S.Ct. 418, 30 L.Ed.2d 383 (1971) (<HOLDING>); see also Romero Reyes v. Marine Enterprises,
holding that a complaint that asserts both admiralty jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction is not an adequate 9h designation to trigger admiralty procedures holding that courts apply substantive admiralty law to claims that sound in admiralty regardless of whether the complaint invokes diversity or admiralty jurisdiction holding that probation department was arm of the state and that dividing the responsibilities into  districts is merely an administrative tool for handling a statewide state program holding that a gangway is the dividing line between admiralty and state jurisdiction holding that admiralty jurisdiction extends to maritime insurance contracts