access ... to the offender's conviction record, which includes the fact of the conviction along with identifying information.” Id., 829 P.2d at 1222 (citations omitted). 10 . "It is our purpose to consider whether the existing law affords a principle which can properly be invoked to protect the privacy of the individual; and, if it does, what the nature and extent of such protection is.” Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandéis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv.L.Rev. 193, 197 (1890) (suggesting that an individual has the "right to be let alone”). See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S.Ct. 564, 572, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (Brandeis, J„ dissenting), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) 5 S.Ct. 1707, 1714-15, 14 L.Ed.2d 484 (1965) (<HOLDING>). 12 . This category would include death,
recognizing the importance of historical analysis in determining whether legislation is punitive recognizing that the due process clause prohibits grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor because such punitive damages serve the same purposes as criminal penalties recognizing that the bill of attainder prohibits punitive legislation recognizing a presumption against retroactive legislation holding that retroactive aspects of legislation must satisfy due process a burden met simply by showing that the retroactive application of the legislation is itself justified by a rational legislative purpose