preparation fee that can only be determined by reference to the Purchase Agreement. Even if we ignore Leroy’s allegations relating to the vehicle preparation fee, however, we remain unpersuaded by Leroy’s assertion that the crux of her claim — the payment of a documentary fee in excess of $50 — does not implicate the Purchase Agreement. While Leroy arranged to get financing for the documentary fee as part of the total cost of her car purchase through the RIC, she did not contract in the RIC to pay the documentary fee. The Purchase Agreement, not the RIC, contained Leroy’s agreement to pay AutoNation the documentary fee, as well as the vehicle preparation fee — both of which were itemized in the Purchase Agreement. On these facts, the arbitration clause co -San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we hold that Leroy’s claims are
holding that broad arbitration provision encompassed statutory and tort claims not based on the formation negotiation terms or performance of contract holding that an arbitration agreement is separable from the underlying agreement holding that a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of an arbitration agreement and show that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement holding that claims of breach of fiduciary duty negligence and fraud were subject to arbitration in light of broad arbitration clause which called for arbitration of any controversy  arising out of or relating to this agreement breach thereof or any aecounts   holding that broad arbitration provision in 1993 partnership agreement encompassed claims arising out of 1999 agreement to assign partnership interest