under the FDCPA. Repossession agents and agencies, whose only role in the debt collection process are the enforcement of security interests, generally fall outside of the ambit of the FDCPA, except for the provisions of § 1692f(6). See, e.g., Wilson v. Draper & Goldberg, P.L.L.C., 443 F.3d 373, 378 (4th Cir.2006); Montgomery, 346 F.3d at 699; Jordan v. Kent Recovery Serv., Inc., 731 F.Supp. 652, 656 (D.Del.1990). In the case at bar, Eley has not alleged any violation of § 1692f(6), in particular subsection (A). Eley did not allege that Evans, Bryan, or Bad Boys Towing were enforcing a security interest, to which there was no present right to possess the collateral. See supra note 8; see also Purkett v. Key Bank USA, N.A., No. 01-C-162, 2001 WL 503050, at *2 (N.D.Ill. May 10, 2001) (<HOLDING>). As a result, Eley has not stated a claim
holding a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the constitution and laws of the united states to state a claim under  1983 holding that plaintiff must present such evidence holding that to prevail on a  1983 claim a plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law in other words that there was state action holding that material prejudice was not present under the facts however an agency of the state was not a party to the action holding that plaintiff must allege repossession agency was enforcing a security interest and did not have a present right to possess the collateral in order to state a claim under  1692f 6a