decision. Under the circumstances of this case, we review both the BIA’s and IJ’s opinions. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009). 1. Asylum and Withholding of Removal We identify no error in the agency’s conclusion that, even when considered cumulatively, the past harms Mulyono alleged did not rise to the level of persecution. See Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 340-41 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that harm must be sufficiently severe and rise above “mere harassment” to be deemed persecution); Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 79-80 (2d Cir.2005); see also Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 535-36 (3d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); Gormley v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th
holding that threats standing alone generally do not constitute past persecution holding that personal disputes do not constitute persecution holding that isolated criminal attacks do not constitute persecution holding that isolated criminal acts by unknown assailants resulting in theft of personal property and minor injury were not sufficiently severe to constitute persecution holding that two isolated criminal acts perpetrated by unknown assailants  are not sufficiently severe to be considered persecution