of wrongdoing is required, the probationer does not have sufficient notice of the admission requirement for the probationer’s refusal to admit sexual misconduct to be a willful violation. Sex offender treatment programs will always have program-specific requirements not embodied by the generic language of the probation condition requiring “successful completion” of the program. Bennett and Diaz rob the trial court of its discretion to make fact-specific determinations as to whether a probationer had notice of those program-specific requirements. Without discretion, courts would have to specifically delineate, in each probation order, the program to which an offender is being sent and that program’s internal requirements—an approach we have implicitly rejected. Lawson, 969 So.2d at 235 (<HOLDING>). Thus, we disapprove Bennett, Bell, and Diaz.
holding that effect must be given if possible to every clause and word of a statute holding that probation orders need not include every possible restriction so long as a reasonable person is put on notice of what conduct will subject him or her to revocation and that ajlthough the conditions should be clearly set out and must mean what they say every detail need not be spelled out and the language should be interpreted in its common ordinary usage holding that the nonmovant need not be given the benefit of every inference but only of every reasonable inference holding if the language of a deed or other written instrument is clear and unambiguous the intention of the parties is gathered from the instrument it is what the grant or said and not what he intended to say holding that plaintiff need not rebut every possible alteration or modification but only those that the defendant has produced