Id. It therefore held that where the record does not support the amount of restitution ordered, and the proper amount cannot be determined from the record, article 44.29(b) requires that the case be remanded for a new trial on the issue of punishment. Id. (citing Garza v. State, 841 S.W.2d 19, 23 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992, no pet.)). In a dissenting opinion, Justice Hudson concluded that the enactment of article 44.29(b) did not impact the analysis in Cartwright, and that the appeal should be abated and the cause remanded to the trial court only for a proper determination of restitution. Id., slip op. at 2, 1999 WL 548218 (Hudson, J., dissenting). We granted both the State’s and Appellant’s Petitions for Discretionary Review to determine whether the Court of Appeals er Crim.App.1971) (<HOLDING>). Where restitution is a lawful condition of
holding that a youth detention facility was a jail for purposes of statute requiring credit for time served in jail while awaiting trial holding trial court lacked authority to impose electronic monitoring condition and deleting the provision as a condition of applicants deferred adjudication probation holding that a court has no power to impose jail time as a condition of a deferred sentence holding that trial judge was not authorized to impose jail time as condition of probation and deleting the 90 day jail penalty holding that the evidence was insufficient to prove the offense of supplying contraband to a jail because the defendant was not in possession of the drugs when he was taken to jail where the arresting officer entered the jail with the drugs