were billing. (Add’l Decl. of Maier at ¶ 3.) He also never made any statements that the unnamed hospitals were misrepresenting their bills or committing fraud, as he had no information in that regard. (Id.) Thus, Maier clearly made no public allegation of fraudulent billing practices by any hospital, including Yale, nor provided any public disclosure of a fraudulent transaction by any specific hospital, including Yale. To use the illustration provided by the Court in Springfield Terminal Ry., his disclosures, at most, were either “X” or “Y”, but not “X + Y” and clearly not “Z.” See United States ex rel. Lindenthal v. General Dynamics Corp., 61 F.3d 1402, 1410 (9th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1104, 116 S.Ct. 1319, 134 L.Ed.2d 472 (1996); see also Waris, 1999 WL 788766, at *5 (<HOLDING>). Significantly, Maier’s statements also did
holding that designation is neither a sentence nor a punishment holding that an fca claim arose out of defendants failure to disclose in its form 2552 cost reports the existence of prohibited transactions with related health care organizations holding that the chief financial officer of a hospital had sufficient access to the allegedly false cost reports resulting from the false invoices to require him to plead at least one example of a false claim with particularity holding that the disclosure of billing invoices and cost reports were neither allegations of fraud nor fraudulent transactions holding that  14501c1 preempted statelaw claims of fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation and money had and received related to billing practices of motor carrier of property