interrogation unless the suspect has been first advised of his or her constitutional rights. See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Although Miranda warnings are required only when a suspect interviewed by the police is “in custody,” Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 322, 114 S.Ct. 1526; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, Alvarado asserts that he easily passes the Supreme Court’s test for a custody determination, which is whether, under the totality of circumstances, “a reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Thompson, 516 U.S. at 112, 116 S.Ct. 457; see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Ninth Circuit case law has further elaborated
holding that the relevant inquiry is not whether the court has discretion to facilitate notice but whether this is an appropriate case in which to exercise discretion holding that the relevant time of inquiry is the date of the filing of the complaint holding that the relevant dispositive inquiry  is whether it would be clear to a reasonable state official that his conduct was unlawful holding that the only relevant inquiry to determine whether a suspect was in custody is how a reasonable man in the suspects position would have understood his situation holding that it is only by looking at how similarly situated entities acted in a similar situation that a factfinder may determine what was commercially reasonable