thus relieving them from the substantial burden of maintaining a defense through trial of the underlying cases. Accord Kennedy, 283 F.3d at 1110 (“GARA ... creates an explicit statutory right not to stand trial which would be irretrievably lost should [the defendant] be forced to defend itself in a full trial.”). Appellants rely on both the plain language of the GARA statute (“no civil action ... may be brought ...,” GARA § 2(a)), as well as the enactment’s substantial legislative history, in support of its position that Congress intended to foreclose the filing of claims to reduce the litigation costs of aviation manufacturers, and not merely to provide them with an additional defense in product liability litigation. Accord Lyon v. Agusta S.P.A., 252 F.3d 1078, 1089 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Kennedy, 283 F.3d at 1111 (“It is clear that
holding that congress decided that the economic health of the general aviation industry depended on lifting the  possibility of litigation for the indefinite future recognizing the general rule that an appellate court will not address matters that were not raised or decided in the trial court   holding that economic loss rule precludes recovery of economic damages only in the absence of personal injury or property  damage claims holding that constitutional questions will not be decided if case can be decided on other grounds holding that the discretionary function exception to the federal tort claims act precluded tort actions based on the alleged negligence of the federal aviation administration in failing to check certain thing in the process of certificating the aircraft for use in commercial aviation