the district court erred in failing to credit the defendant with time served on a state term of imprisonment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b). Because Scott did not raise this issue below, we review this claim for plain error. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d at 208. Section 5G1.3(b) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides: If subsection (a) does not apply, and a term of imprisonment resulted from another offense that is relevant conduct to the instant offense of conviction ... and that was the basis for increase in the offense level for the instant offense under Chapter Two (Offense Conduct) or .1998) (per curiam) (“For U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 purposes, an undischarged term of probation is not an ‘undischarged term of imprisonment.’ ”); see also United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1165 (6th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Second, even if we were to look to state law
holding that a defendant does not receive credit against the maximum revocation prison term for time previously spent on home detention holding that where the defendants sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum and the district court applies the guidelines as advisory the district court does not err by enhancing the defendants sentence based on facts not charged in the indictment or admitted by him holding a sentence is not based on the guidelines unless the plea agreement itself expressly uses a guidelines sentencing range to establish the term of imprisonment holding that the application of the guidelines in effect at sentencing rather than at the time of defendants conduct does not violate the ex post facto clause even if the current guidelines suggest a harsher sentence because the guidelines are only advisory not binding holding that the district court erred by treating the defendants time spent in home detention as a sentence of imprisonment under  4a11 a of the sentencing guidelines