conduct a de novo review of the portions of the report to which objections are made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 91 (3d Cir. 1992). III. ANALYSIS Section 636 does not expressly authorize a Magistrate Judge to determine post-judgment matters. The plain language of section 636(b)(1)(A) only authorizes a Magistrate Judge to hear and determine nondispositive pretrial matters, subject to review by the district court for clear or legal error. Thus, a magistrate’s determination of a post-judgment appealable matter that forecloses a defense or disposes of a claim exceeds his authority under the statute. See, e.g., Colo. Bldg. Constr. Trades Council v. B.B. Andersen Constr. Co., Inc., 879 F.2d 809, 811 (10th Cir. 1989) (<HOLDING>). This is particularly true where the
holding that only a district judge in the charging district and not a magistrate judge in that district may review the release order of a magistrate judge in the arresting district holding that when the trial court signed an order dismissing the plaintiffs complaint but refused to enter a final judgment on that order the order refusing to enter judgment was appealable under former ors 190102a holding that without designation by the district court and consent of the parties under section 636c the magistrate judge was not authorized to enter a final appealable postjudgment order holding that a rehearing order was not final or appealable holding that magistrate judge could without consent of parties hold a pretrial hearing and issue a report and recommendation based on the findings made