recognition that the plan was infested with error.... [W]henever the district court must revise one aspect of the sentencing scheme, it is permitted by Rule 35 to revise the rest.”). Following this authority, it is apparent that after the district court here discovered its clear error and decided to resen-tence under Rule 35(a), it was free to impose a different, albeit lawful and reasonable sentence on Floyd, even if it increased the punishment. While it is true that the Due Process Clause prohibits a vindictive increase in a sentence, this is not a concern in the present case, where there is no claim or evidence of vindictiveness and where the district court corrected its own clear error sua sponte. See Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 116-17, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, the sentence imposed on
holding that recusal was justified if not mandated where the district judge could not bring himself to do what the law required in imposing a sentence in accordance with the sentencing guidelines holding that the imposition of a harsher sentence after trial than what had been offered by the state pretrial does not create a presumption of vindictiveness holding that likelihood of vindictiveness does not exist where the court imposing the increased sentence has not been required to do so by another court holding that a court of appeals may only do so when an appeal has been raised by an existing party to the case holding that no court has the authority to substitute a different sentence for that which is required by law