was actually mistaken because the gun was in fact real. The district court therefore improperly included in its jury instructions the use of Newsom’s other acts as “proof of motive, ... identity, [and] absence of mistake.” As for the permissible use of “intent,” however, the instruction was proper. The charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm generally does not require proof of intent. See United States v. Jobson, 102 F.3d 214, 221 (6th Cir.1996) (“Defendant’s intent was also not in issue because the gun possession charge does not require proof of specific intent.”). But the particular theory upon which the government bases its case against Newsom — that of constructive possession — does require specific intent. See United States v. Hadley, 431 F.3d 484, 507 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>) (citation and quotation marks omitted)
holding that proof that the person has dominion over the premises where the firearm is located is sufficient to establish constructive possession citation omitted holding that constructive possession exists where one knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over an object either directly or through others holding that an instruction requiring the jury to find that the defendant had the power and intention to exercise dominion and control over the cocaine was adequate to convey the principle that mere presence or proximity is not sufficient holding evidence establishing the intent of the defendants to distribute drugs also permits the inference they intended to exercise dominion over them to demonstrate constructive possession holding that the defendants dominion control and knowledge may be inferred if he had exclusive possession of the premises on which the object was found emphasis added