Amendment. It is true that the first factor, length of the delay, favors Zedner, see United States v. New Buffalo Amusement Corp., 600 F.2d 368, 377 (2d Cir.1979) (54-month delay “is unquestionably substantial”), but the second factor, the reasons for the delay, weighs heavily against him. Most of the delay between indictment and trial was caused by Zedner’s own requests for delay, his attempts to subpoena prominent persons and fictitious entities, the need to determine his competency to stand trial, Zedner’s incompetency for a time, and two interlocutory appeals taken by him. See United States v. Vasquez, 918 F.2d 329, 338 (2d Cir.1990) (citing defendant’s various pretrial motions as reason weighing against defendant); see also United States v. Mills, 434 F.2d 266, 271 (8th Cir.1970) (<HOLDING>). The third factor, whether and how the
holding the statutory burden is on the defendant to prove he is incompetent to stand trial holding that delays encountered in bringing a defendant to trial who claims to be incompetent or who is temporarily incompetent ordinarily do not infringe upon his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial and citing inter alia united states v davis 365 f2d 251 6th cir1966 johnson v united states 333 f2d 371 374 10th cir1964 holding that claim that counsel was ineffective for allowing defendant to proceed while incompetent was facially insufficient where defendant did not allege he actually was incompetent to proceed to trial or insane at the time of his offense holding that the due process clause prohibits the trial of a person who is incompetent holding the sixth amendment right to a jury trial applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment