rule, however, “is not to be applied where to do so would conflict with the implied or expressed intent of Congress[.]” Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427, 105 S.Ct. 2084, 2089, 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985). We are satisfied that the requisite legislative intent, although imperfectly expressed, is fairly implied here. It is implausible that Congress would have placed on the prosecution the often impossible burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a defendant knew the youth he enticed was under eighteen. The objective of protecting juveniles as a class strongly indicates that Congress meant to impose on the drug dealer the burden of inquiry and the risk of misjudgment. Cf. United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 678-79, 684, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 1260-61, 1263, 43 L.Ed.2d 541 (1975) (<HOLDING>); People v. Olsen, 36 Cal.3d 638, 644 n. 10,
recognizing that federal habeas statutes require petitioner to be in custody when petition filed holding that just because a claim implicates a federal issue or involves construction of federal law does not necessarily give rise to a federal question and confer removal jurisdiction on a federal court recognizing that pleadings filed in federal court while the federal court has jurisdiction become part of the state court record on remand holding that assaultonfederalofficer statute does not require proof that defendant knew officers federal status court relied in part on statutes design to protect federal officials as a class holding that the federal register notice requirements do not apply to federal criminal statutes