look at the cumulative effect of all errors on the ability of a jury to render a fair and impartial verdict in the context of the case. Donaldson v. State, 416 Md. 467, 496-97, 7 A.3d 84 (2010) (citations and emphasis omitted); see United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11-12, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) (“Inappropriate prosecutorial comments, standing alone, would not justify a reviewing court to reverse a criminal conviction obtained in an otherwise fair proceeding”); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (although there are some rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be harmless, all trial errors implicating the Constitution do not automatically call for reversal); see also Sivells, 196 Md.App. at 288-92, 9 A.3d 123 (<HOLDING>). Beginning with the severity of the remarks,
holding that repeated remarks about need to bring in new blood or young blood by one of the decisionmakers were not stray remarks and may permit inference of discrimination holding that the prosecutors explanation of a defendants subpoena power was a fair reply to defense counsel questioning the absence of testimony from certain witnesses but going a step further to claim uncalled witnesses would bolster the states case exceeded the boundaries of a fair reply holding that reversal was required where prosecutors improper remarks were an attempt to bolster its witnesses in a close case that primarily depended on credibility of those witnesses and where curative instructions were not sufficient to cure the potential prejudice from those remarks holding that counsels decision not to call witnesses was unreasonable because counsels stated reasons for disputing the witnesses credibility were not supported by objective evidence holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial