argue otherwise. Furthermore, Bishop does not point to any congressional intent that the statute should apply retroactively, and we discern none on our own. Thus, we hold that the ADA does not apply retroactively. Bishop offers two innovative, but ultimately unsuccessful, arguments to avoid the reach of Landgraf and Rivers. First, she points out that the precise question at issue in Landgraf and Rivers was whether the Civil Rights Act of 1991 should apply to eases pending at the time of its enactment. See Landgraf, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1489; Rivers, — U.S. at-, 114 S.Ct. at 1514. Bishop, on the other hand, did not bring suit until after Section 107 of the ADA became effective. Second, Bishop argues that much of defendants’ conduct took place after the enactment of the AD at 1520 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). Therefore, it is the time
holding that congress intended the courts to apply the civil rights act of 1991 to cases pending at the time of its enactment and to preact conduct still open to challenge after that time holding that the  1981 amendments contained in  101 of the civil rights act of 1991 do not apply retroactively holding that conduct prior to passage of the civil rights act of 1991 is admissible to provide context and background holding that the damages and jury trial provisions of the 1991 act apply to conduct occurring prior to the date of enactment holding that section 102 of the civil rights act of 1991 does not apply to preenactment conduct