guilty beyond a reasonable doubt do not so circumscribe a sentencing court). It is “well established that a sentencing judge may take into account facts introduced at trial relating to other charges, even ones of which the defendant has been acquitted.” United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 117 S.Ct. 633, 136 L.Ed.2d 554 (1997) (per curiam) (quoted source omitted, emphasis added); see also State v. Marhal, 172 Wis.2d 491, 501-503, 493 N.W.2d 758 (Ct.App.1992) (“Information upon which a trial court bases a sentencing decision, as opposed to a finding of guilt, need not, of course, be established beyond a reasonable doubt.” Thus, “a sentencing court may consider conduct for which the defendant has been acquitted.”); State v. Bobbitt, 178 Wis.2d 11, 16-18, 503 N.W.2d 11 (Ct.App.1993) (<HOLDING>). (Answer Ex. E ¶ 53-54 (internal citations
recognizing rule recognizing continued validity of rule barring adjudication of a foreign tax suit recognizing the validity of the product rale recognizing validity of state antidiscrimination provisions recognizing validity of rule stated in marhal