at 167, 733 N.E.2d at 842. Plaintiff argues that because the court in Jimenez v. City of Chicago “held that a reasonable jury could infer and therefore find the the [sic] defendants acted with malice because of the lack of investigation based on witness testimony” we should similarly find that Zima acted with malice in this case. (Resp. at 15.) The facts in Jimenez, however, are highly distinguishable from this case. In Jimenez, a witness told the police, against his own interests, that the plaintiff did not shoot the victim; the police received a tape-recording wherein another individual admitted to committing the murder; and defendant officers pressured two witnesses to change their stories and implicate plaintiff. Jimenez v. City of Chi, 830 F.Supp.2d 432, 451 (N.D.Ill.2011) (<HOLDING>). Unlike Jimenez, in this case there is indeed
holding that issues of discriminatory intent and actual motivation are questions of fact for the trier of fact holding defendants proffer of a false reason for employment action sufficient basis for trier of fact to find that such action was motivated by an improper discriminatory intent holding that a reasonable trier of fact could find that the defendants acted with malice holding that summary judgment is appropriate wjhere the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party holding that there must be sufficient competent evidence from which the trier of fact could estimate the amount of damages with a reasonable degree of certainty