persuaded. We have construed 17 U.S.C. § 101 to afford protection to design elements of clothing only when those elements, individually or together, are separable — “physically or conceptually” — from the garment itself. Chosun Int’l, Inc. v. Chrisha Creations, Ltd., 413 F.3d 324, 328 (2d Cir.2005). Physical separability can be shown where one or more decorative elements “can actually be removed from the original item and separately sold, -without adversely impacting the article’s functionality.” Id. at 329. That is plainly not the case here. Jovani has not alleged, nor could it possibly allege, that the design elements for which it seeks protection could be removed from the dress in question and separately sold. Cf. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 203, 74 S.Ct. 460, 98 L.Ed. 630 (1954) (<HOLDING>); Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl,
recognizing that statuette serving as lamp base could be removed and sold separately recognizing that trade creditors might be separately classified at treated better in order to ensure the debtor can maintain future operations recognizing that the venire may be separately sworn holding that adul terated juice product is damaged notwithstanding that it could be sold under different labeling recognizing that a partial new trial may be granted if the issue of damages is so distinct and independent  that it can be separately tried