ascertained without an inquiry into the privacy of the jury’s deliberations. But public policy forbids such inquiries. To permit it would encourage tampering with jurymen after their discharge, would furnish to corrupt litigants a means of destroying the effect of a verdict contrary to their interests, and would weaken the public regard for this ancient method of ascertaining the truth of disputed allegations of fact. But few verdicts are reached in which some juryman does not yield in some degree his opinions and convictions to the opinions and convictions of others. And when he does so, even in criminal cases, it is to the interest of the public that he be not permitted thereafter to gainsay his act. Gay, 82 Wash. at 439; see also State v. Aker, 54 Wash. 342, 345, 103 P. 420 (1909) (<HOLDING>). ¶13 Reynoldson argues that courts recently
holding that rule 606b precludes a party seeking a new trial from using one jurors affidavit of what another juror said in deliberations to demonstrate the other jurors dishonesty during voir dire holding that discussion among jurors of their agreement to the defendants guilt during trial and before deliberation was not such misconduct as can be shown by the affidavit of a juror holding that trial courts denial of motion for new trial based on juror misconduct was justified where there was no evidence presented at hearing on motion that juror had knowingly concealed relevant litigation experience during voir dire and identity of juror as county court litigant was not demonstrated holding that prejudice was not shown where there was overwhelming evidence of guilt holding a defendant seeking a new trial on the basis of juror misconduct has the initial burden to prove thatajuror or jurors did in fact commit the alleged misconduct