by his work schedule. Avery’s coordination was good, he was cooperative, his speech was good, and his eyes and face appeared normal. Although Skola’s written report indicated a “slight impairment,” this was contradicted by his other observations. And Sheehan, who thought that Avery might have been intoxicated, was neither the arresting officer nor the officer supervising the testing. Thus, his observations are not controlling. Overall, the evidence supports the unchallenged findings. These findings support a conclusion that at the time of the blood test neither the arresting officer nor the officers administering the test had reasonable grounds to believe Avery had been driving while under the influence. Thus, the implied consent statute did not apply. See Rivard, 131 Wn.2d at 76-77 (<HOLDING>). V. Use of Blood Test Because the implied
holding that employee handbook did not give rise to implied contract where it stated that it was not a contract and that employment was terminable at will holding that the implied consent law allows law enforcement officers to obtain blood in circumstances in which a warrant or actual consent may otherwise be required holding that defendants consent was involuntary where defendant consented to search following a warrantless entry and officers explained that absent consent the officers would obtain a warrant holding that the implied consent warning given to the defendant was not misleading or coercive because the validity of the implied consent notice is not contingent upon other administrative aspects of ocga  405671 holding that officers not required to give implied consent warnings where statute did not apply