moved for summary judgment arguing that it was an arbiter under the contract and that it could not be liable to NL for negligence. Texas law permits parties to appoint an expert to act as an arbiter in reviewing engineering or construction designs before they are carried out. The language of article 4.3.Í.1 is similar to the language of other arbiter provisions and clearly expresses the parties’ intent to name Holditch as an arbiter. Compare City of San Antonio v. McKenzie Constr. Co., 136 Tex. 315, 325, 150 S.W.2d 989, 995 (1941); Hooks v. Cook, 345 S.W.2d 592, 592-93 (Tex.Civ. App.—Houston 1961, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Uvalde Rock Asphalt Co. v. Fantham, 210 S.W.2d 646, 648 (Tex.Civ.App.—Galveston 1948, no writ) with Black v. Acers, 178 S.W.2d 152, 154-55 (Tex.Civ.App.1943, writ ref’d) (<HOLDING>). NL argues that article 4.3.Í.1 is ambiguous
holding that parties to contract intend every clause to have some effect holding that exhaustion is not required because the structure of the federal statute shows that congress did not intend to incorporate varying state exhaustion requirements into federal law as a prerequisite to federal district court review holding that agreement as to form and content did not constitute agreed judgment holding that parties who agreed that a house was to meet requirements of the federal housing administration did not intend to appoint the fha as an arbiter holding that a federal court may refuse to exercise continuing jurisdiction even though the parties have agreed to it parties cannot confer jurisdiction by stipulation or consent