federal courts intervene in the matter. The argument is unavailing, however, where the pending question is whether the Board’s proceedings constitute an effort by the state to impose its regulatory authority in a field preempted by Congress. See Association of Int’l Auto. Mfrs., Inc. v. Commissioner, Massachusetts Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 208 F.3d 1, 2000 WL 298563, at *3 (1st Cir. March 27, 2000)(finding that the court’s initial invocation of the primary jurisdiction doctrine was unwise where “the ultimate legal determination of whether the Massachusetts regulations are preempted by the [federal Clean Air Act] is a question of federal preemption law for the courts alone to decide”); Volkswagen de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Labor Relations Bd., 454 F.2d 38, 41 (1st Cir.1972)(<HOLDING>). The state defendants also move to dismiss
holding that the plaintiff must exhaust her administrative remedies and it does not matter that the plaintiff was using state law as the vehicle to press her assertion holding that plaintiff was not required to exhaust its administrative remedies before the puerto rico labor relations board before invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts to determine whether the boards assertion of jurisdiction was proper recognizing the general rule that parties must exhaust prescribed administrative remedies before seeking relief from federal courts  holding that plaintiff could not present his erisa estoppel claim to the district court because he did not properly exhaust it before the administrative review board holding that federal prisoners need not exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court