granting the motion on that particular basis. See USCR 25.1. (b) Gude’s motion to recuse also alleged that “Judge Adams had been an employee prosecutor of District Attorney Paul Howard,” that Judge Adams owed a debt of gratitude to Paul Howard for her prior employment, and that Paul Howard was the prosecutor who had filed the motion to recuse Judge Arrington. We hold that these allegations, if assumed true, would not require Judge Adams’s recusal and, therefore, that Judge Adams did not commit reversible error by not granting Gude’s motion to recuse based on this allegation. See id. (addressing the trial judge’s previous employment by the prosecutor). See also, e.g., Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 541 U. S. 913, 916 (II) (A) (124 SC . S. 868 (129 SC 2252, 173 LE2d 1208) (2009) (<HOLDING>). Because Gude’s motion to recuse Judge Adams
holding that the defendants due process rights were violated by refusal to allow him to contact counsel after he was given misleading information on consequences of refusal to take bloodalcohol test holding that a state trial court judges failure to instruct on a lesser included offense is not a federal constitutional matter holding a military judge need not recuse himself solely on the basis of prior judicial exposure   holding under extreme facts which included the fact of an exceptionallylarge campaign contribution that constitutional due process was violated by a trial judges refusal to recuse himself holding defendants right to counsel not violated despite district court denying pretrial request by the defendant to discharge his attorney where request was made on eve of trial and was openly part of attempt to have the district judge recuse himself and delay trial