there was no time limit imposed on deliberations, and prior to deliberation, jurors were instructed not to surrender their honest convictions. UJI 14-6008 NMRA 2003 and Use Note. Resolution of this issue thus turns on the question of whether the district court’s actions were the equivalent of a “shotgun” instruction. {52} The use of a shotgun instruction is prohibited by our Supreme Court. UJI 14-6030 NMRA 2003 and Use Note; McCarter, 93 N.M. at 711, 604 P.2d at 1245. The primary concern with a shotgun instruction is the potentially coercive effect it has on holdout jurors to abandon their convictions to arrive at a verdict with the majority. See id. (noting the Supreme Court has recognized the instruction as coercive); State v. Travis, 79 N.M. 307, 309, 442 P.2d 797, 799 (Ct.App.1968) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, when a jury communicates with
holding that identical instruction was sufficient to ensure that the jury would not draw improper conclusions from the preservation of their anonymity holding that failure to consider an improper jury instruction would constitute a miscarriage of justice holding that in a criminal trial the trial court must correct or amend an improper instruction if the proper instruction is necessary for the jury to understand the case recognizing that language approved by the court may raise questions if incorporated in a jury instruction in a case with different facts recognizing that use of the then approved shotgun instruction would be improper if it coerced jury into agreement or unduly hastened their consideration