of which were found by the jury), claiming that because they do not entail physical contact, the misdemeanor provision does not apply. The government contends that “assault” is a term of art encompassing the physical contact rule, so that those “assaults” with physical contact are felonies while those without are not. But “assault” is used twice in § 111. First, “assault” in § 111(a)(1) is a verb proscribing conduct. Second, in the punishment clause of § 111(a), “assault” (“simple assault” actually) is a noun denoting a crime punishable as a misdemeanor. Prior to the 1994 amendment, the first incarnation of “assault” in § 111(a)(1), in addition to the words cited by the government, likewise did not entail physical contact. See United States v. Mathis, 579 F.2d 415, 418 (7th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). Because all violations of the statute,
holding force to be an element of pre1994 amendment  111 which may be satisfied by proof of force or threat of force holding that under  521 the coercive force applied against a plaintiff must result in an interference with a separate constitutional or statutory right and it is not sufficient that the right interfered with is the right to be free of the force or threat of force that was applied holding that the decision of a police officer to preserve public safety and order through use of commands backed by threat of force or actual use of physical force is a matter of discretion holding that where the plaintiffs evidence supported a finding that the defendants had applied force to restrain him the jury must determine not only whether the officers were justified in using force at all but if so whether the degree of force actually used was reasonable recognizing that an arrest requires either physical force  or where physical force is absent submission to the assertion of authority