law. These questions are abstractly interesting, but ultimately unimportant in the resolution of this matter. National Association anticipated Chevron’s framing of judicial review of agency statutory interpretation as an inquiry into an agency’s delegated authority and its action within that authority. “Chevron is principally concerned with whether an agency has authority to act under a statute.” Arent v. Skalala, 70 F.3d 610, 615 (D.C.Cir.1995). Chevron analysis “is focused on discerning the boundaries of Congress’ delegation of authority to the agency; and as long as the agency stays within that delegation, it is free to make policy choices in interpreting the statute, and such interpretations are entitled to deference.” Id.; see also Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27, 121 S.Ct. at 2170-71 (<HOLDING>). With these principles in mind, it is evident
holding that administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for chevron deference when it appears that congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority holding regulations entitled to chevron deference holding that chevron deference is due only when the agency acts pursuant to delegated authority holding that chevron deference is due only to a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency holding that a precondition to chevron deference is congressional delegation of administrative authority