corollary to the power to recognize a sovereign in the first place. For instance, recognizing an established sovereign’s former colony as a new, independent sovereign seems a straightforward exercise of what even Zivotofsky would concede to be the recognition power. But such recognition necessarily entails a boundary determination — the colony, once formally recognized as part of one sovereign’s territory, is effectively recognized as belonging to another. Indeed, precedent binding on this court confirms that the recognition power includes authority to determine territorial boundaries. See, e.g., Baker, 369 U.S. at 212, 82 S.Ct. 691 (“[T]he judiciary ordinarily follows the executive as to which nation has sovereignty over disputed territory----”); Pink, 315 U.S. at 229-30, 62 S.Ct. 552 (<HOLDING>); Williams, 38 U.S. at 420 (“[Wjhen the
holding that merss power to act as the agent of any valid note holder includes the power to assign recognizing a distinction between the power of a federal court to hear statelaw claims and the discretionary exercise of that power holding that the inherent power of the district court includes the power  to santion attorneys for  violations of court orders or other conduct which interferes with the courts power to manage its calendar and the courtroom   holding that the recognition power is not limited to a determination of the government to be recognized but rather includes the power to take actions without which the power of recognition might be thwarted holding that a commission is a body with special and limited power and it can only exercise the power expressly or impliedly granted to it and any reasonable doubt of existence of any power must be resolved against the exercise thereof