of jointly undertaken activity. The defendants’ argument fails because neither the Sentencing Commission’s 1992 revisions to § 1B1.3 nor our interpretation of § 1B1.3 in Ortiz constitutes intervening controlling authority that is “clearly irreconcilable” with Banuelos. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Revisions to the Guidelines do not themselves constitute intervening controlling authority, because the Guidelines do not affect our interpretation of a statute such as § 841. “While in some cases the sentencing guidelines may be instructive in interpreting a federal statute, nothing in the guidelines requires us to apply guideline definitions in construing a federal sentencing statute.” United States v. Liquori, 5 F.3d 435, 438 (9th Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, Banuelos itself followed Becerra’s
holding where the statutory minimum sentence exceeds the guidelines sentence a substantialassistance downward departure begins at the mandatory minimum sentence holding that purported calculation error in mandatory minimum was harmless because challenged sentence was 60 months longer than presumed minimum and was imposed according to guidelines without reference to statutory minimum holding that the guidelines definition of consolidated offenses was not applicable to a statutory minimum sentence imposed under 841 holding that consolidated sen tence or consolidated judgment under north carolina law is single sentence for guidelines purposes holding that a sentence below a statutory minimum based on the filing of a substantial assistance motion did not eliminate the otherwise applicable mandatory minimum for purposes of sentence modification under  3582c2