§ 330(e) (Supp.1995). The complaint is devoid of any indication that Colejon’s contract with the U.S. Navy is in excess of $100,000, so as to be able to determine whether the C.W.H.S.S.A. would apply. Even if it applied to plaintiffs, we then would not have original jurisdiction to entertain their claims. On the other hand, the complaint is also lacking the specific nature of the services performed by Coiejon’s employees in the base or whether they are engaged in interstate commerce, so as to allow us to assume that the Fair Labor Standards Act (“F.L.S.A.”) would be the statute under which plaintiffs causes of action would arise. Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & Assoc., 358 U.S. 207, 79 S.Ct. 260, 3 L.Ed.2d 243 (1959). See, Nolla, Galib & Co. v. Superior Court, 93 D.P.R. 646, 648 (1966) (<HOLDING>); Wirtz v. B.B. Saxon Company, Inc., 365 F.2d
holding that maintenance workers in a building that did produce goods for interstate commerce were covered under the flsa holding that the district court lacked the authority to compel arbitration  because the faa is inapplicable to employees who are engaged in interstate commerce holding that application of fair labor standards act flsa to transportation employees employed by local government does not contravene the commerce clause because labor conditions of those employees affect interstate commerce holding that the government can satisfy the hobbs act interstate commerce requirement by showing that the robbery resulted in the closure of a business engaged in interstate commerce holding that the flsa applies to the employees of a us navy contractor because they were considered engaged in interstate commerce