informed of the charges against him. Even accepting Schell’s version of events as true, and considering that his claim is predicated not on a willful use of excessive force, but on negligence in effecting an arrest, we conclude that Guth was operating in the course and scope of his employment when effecting the arrest of Schell. To the extent Schell was injured by negligent conduct of Guth during the process of that arrest, Guth is entitled to sovereign immunity unless Schell’s negligence claim falls within one of the exceptions to sovereign immunity for negligence claims set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b). We cannot fathom any of the exceptions applying in this situation. See Clark v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 691 A.2d 988, 992 (Pa.Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 550 Pa. 686, 704 A.2d 640 (1997) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION We have carefully examined the
recognizing that police officers may use reasonable force to make a lawful arrest holding that sovereign immunity barred claim for compensatory sanctions against the government holding sovereign immunity barred negligence claim relating to use of force by septa police officers holding that plaintiffs claim was not barred by sovereign immunity because he sought specific relief against a government official holding inverse condemnation action not barred by sovereign immunity