the district judge’s independent review of the magistrate judge’s recommendation. But w ced, the efficient administration of justice is. Third, Hall asserts we should at least exercise plain error review of his issues. Hall refers to the Supreme Court’s directive in Thomas that default may be excused by a court of appeals “in the interests of justice,” 474 U.S. at 155, 106 S.Ct. 466, arguing the exception should be equated with plain error. Hall asserts other circuits have done so, but he does not mention this circuit’s precedent, e.g., United States v. Penny, 60 F.3d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir.1995) (“When a right is waived, it is not renewable, even for plain error.”) (citing Olano, 507 U.S. at 732-33, 113 S.Ct. 1770); Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., 797 F.2d 538, 539 (7th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). Nor does Hall explain why
holding that failure to object timely to a magistrates report operates as a waiver of any further judicial review of the magistrates decision holding that a magistrate judge acting pursuant to   636b1  has no authority to issue a dispositive ruling on a motion to certify a district court order for interlocutory appeal under 28 usc  1292b  2000  holding that a partys failure to raise objections to the report and recommendation waives the partys right to review in the district court holding the failure to file objections to a magistrates report issued pursuant to 28 usc  636b1 waives the right to appeal all issues both factual and legal holding defendants failure to object timely waives its right to challenge expert report