was no attempt to manipulate the bid to affect the right of first refusal or the exercise price would be inappropriate. 35 . For example, because there was a 21,157 subscriber shortfall at the time of the APAs’ closing, the subscriber adjustment resulted in an $80.6 million (21,157 times $3,810) reduction in the closing amount paid by Time Warner and Comcast. But this adjustment neither affected Time Warner's and Comcast’s offer of $3,810 per subscriber nor reduced the amount actually paid by Time Warner and Com ompanies, Inc., 806 F.2d 1227, 1232 (4th Cir.1986) (in bulk purchase ca ckage deal case that “[w]hat [the rights holder] did bargain for was the right to buy the leasehold at the price offered by a third party.”); Gyurkey v. Babler, 103 Idaho 663, 651 P.2d 928, 932-33 (1982) (<HOLDING>); see also USA Cable v. World Wrestling Fed’n
holding that the claims to a statutory benefit had not yet vested when the legislature eliminated the benefit holding that even under the uccas opposed to the dtpa herecourt is to make a highly factspecific inquiry into the circumstances of the bargain such as the commercial atmosphere in which the agreement was made the alternatives available to the parties at the time and their ability to bargain any illegality or public policy concerns and the agreements oppressive or shocking nature when determining unconseionability holding in a package deal case that the preemptor  is   entitled  to the benefit of the total bargain as it related to the burdened lot recognizing that a municipality cannot bargain away duties it owes to the public holding that trial court acted within its authority in rejecting a plea bargain in a capital case