facilities primarily used by children. As the United States argued during the sentencing hearing, Bergendahl would not be prohibited from working in a casino but would certainly be prohibited from working in its child-care facility. None of the examples Bergendahl cited would be prohibited by the condition’s current language. Further, numerous circuit courts have upheld similar language in the context of loitering restrictions. E.g., United States v. Shultz, 733 F.3d 616, 621 (6th Cir. 2013) (“Nor did the district court commit reversible error in prohibiting Shultz from going near any place where children normally congregate or any business that caters to or targets child customers.” (internal brackets and ellipses omitted)); United States v. Malenya, 736 F.3d 554, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 167 (5th
holding that wills should be construed by the law as it existed when the testator died thereby excluding adopted children as beneficiaries unless the will indicates an intent to include adopted children recognizing mutual duty of each parent to provide children with support and education suitable to the childrens circumstances recognizing that because the state has cognizable interests in the safety of children in its jurisdiction neglectful parents may be separated from their children holding that a condition preventing the defendant from entering into any area where children frequently congregate  cannot reasonably and should not be read to proscribe  entering areas such as theaters or shopping malls unless those venues are for example a childrens theater or a mall catering specifically to children holding wife unreasonably exposed neighbors children to danger because she invited the children over in spite of knowing her husband had molested children in the past