See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(c)(l)(iv) (providing that “[t]he verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating circumstance specified in subsection (d) and no mitigating circumstance or if the jury unanimously finds one or more aggravating circumstances which outweigh any mitigating circumstances”). Thus, the trial court followed precisely the prescribed statutory scheme by impaneling one jury for both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial, and by permitting the Commonwealth to present Appellant’s pri- or murder conviction as an aggravating circumstance. Moreover, as noted, the trial court was well within its discretion when it precluded discussion of Appellant’s prior murder during voir dire. See Commonwealth v. Paolello, 665 A.2d at 451 (<HOLDING>). Finally, and significantly, the trial court’s
holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by precluding defense counsel from questioning jurors during voir dire regarding their opinions and involvement with alcohol where the manner of the victims death included a forced lethal consumption of alcohol holding that trial court did not abuse discretion in removing juror who failed to disclose her ill feelings toward the state attorneys office during voir dire holding that the jurors failure to remember particular facts inquired about on voir dire and the jurors misunderstanding of voir dire questions do not constitute probable prejudice holding no violation of substantial rights occurred during voir dire where record did not show that defendant was denied fair and impartial trial holding that the extent to which parties may examine prospective jurors on voir dire lies within the trial judges discretion