or splotches of colors” by ISTS inspectors. Relators contend that because enforcement of the ordinance hinges on the inspector’s subjective state of mind, the rules and ordinance “invite arbitrary enforcement.” But these conclusory statements are insufficient to satisfy relators’ heavy burden of demonstrating that the rules fail to provide adequate standards for enforcement, and the rules are not rendered unconstitutionally vague simply because one expert testified that the interpretation of whether soil mottling constitutes redoximorphic features is “inexact and subjective.” Nor do relators adequately show that the rules are so indefinite that persons of ordinary intelligence must guess at their meaning. See, e.g., State v. Normándole Props., Inc., 420 N.W.2d 259, 262 (Minn.App.1988) (<HOLDING>), review denied (Minn. May 4, 1988). Therefore,
holding that even when legislature only sought to clarify a statutory ambiguity by defining a term the amendment applied prospectively because the clarified intent was not clearly expressed in original version of the statute holding unconstitutional the statute defining the crime of contributing to the delinquency of a minor holding that when the legislature enacts a statute it is presumed that the legislature is aware of existing statutes holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language holding that the statute defining hazardous waste was not unconstitutional merely because the legislature could have defined hazardous waste more precisely