services. Here, for example, if Loveland’s services are not subject to being segregated, Love-land could still hold M.F.’s parents responsible for amounts not paid by the State (■i.e., approximately $12,500) for services that the parents had no ability (especially in hindsight) to decline as part of the “stay put” placement at Loveland. The court can easily envision scenarios where parents and a disabled student would be put in an untenable situation of having to decide whether to continue at a bilateral placement (and still incur significant and potentially prohibitive expenses — such as the $12,500 at issue here — for extra services), or to accept an inappropriate public placement, but at no cost. This would be contrary to the purpose of the IDEA. See, e.g., Clovis, 903 F.2d at 641 (<HOLDING>). Ultimately, however, making this decision
recognizing that the supreme court refused to give the stay put provisions a reading that would force parents to  act at their peril in keeping a child in their chosen placement after a successful administrative ruling holding that the evidence did not support a finding that the parents intentionally abandoned their child recognizing that at common law a parents liability to support his child terminated at the parents death the terms of the support order could not be enforced against his estate unless provisions allowing for such enforcement were included in the order holding that parents may not voluntarily terminate their rights in a child to avoid child support payments or contract away a child support obligation recognizing fundamental right of parents to care for their children