confront and cross-examine witnesses, (e) a “neutral and detached” hearing body, and (f) a written statement identifying the evidence relied upon and the reasons for revoking supervision. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488-89, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2604, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). Moreover, we have extended the “protections granted those facin ourt’s failure to inform him that it could impose consecutive sentences constituted plain error. First, Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 does not apply to revocation of supervised release proceedings. See Johns, 625 F.2d at 1176. Second, no binding case law addresses whether Boykin’s requirement that a plea be entered knowingly and voluntarily applies in the context of revoking supervised release. See United States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Finally, the hearings before the magistrate
recognizing that no federal circuit has addressed the issue holding that we will not consider an argument of plain error where the defendant has neither mentioned the plainerror standard nor made any attempt to show how he can satisfy that standard holding that admission of the defendants prearrest silence before the defendant testified was not plain error because neither the minnesota supreme court nor the federal courts have conclusively resolved the issue holding that plain error standard not satisfied stating that defendant has pointed to no supreme court or tenth circuit decisions directly addressing the guidelines issue he raises nor do we know of any holding that there can be no plain error where neither we nor the supreme court has addressed an issue