“assault could have been prevented if there was a Corrections officer properly overseeing the tier.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 5.) But, although Plaintiff avers that the corrections staff were generally aware of Wallace’s disciplinary violations, Plaintiff pleads no facts to suggest that Doe 1 had any subjective awareness that his absence posed a substantial risk of serious harm. So his claim against Doe 1 alleges only negligence, not deliberate indifference. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (defining deliberate indifference as requiring a subjective awareness, rather than the objective test of reasonableness under the negligence standard). And mere negligence does not support an Eighth Amendment claim. Hayes, 84 F.3d at 620; Johnson v. Smith, 354 Fed.Appx. 516, 516 (2d Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is
holding that mere knowledge of a defect is not sufficient to amount to an eighth amendment claim defendant must also draw the inference that a substantial risk of serious harm exists holding that in order to state a violation of the eighth amendment an inmate must demonstrate that prison officials showed deliberate indifference to serious medical needs holding that the mere fact that rocco and kaplan were associated is not sufficient to support an inference by the jury that one imparted knowledge to the other holding that a prison official may be held liable under the eighth amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it holding that deliberate indifference to a serious medical need establishes an eighth amendment violation