this section in a factual situation similar to this. Klett, 965 F.2d at 591. On the face of this statute, there is nothing to suggest that Congress intended to waive sovereign immunity. The statute does not address the issue and does not provide explicit, unequivocal language allowing the government to be sued. See King, 395 U.S. at 4, 89 S.Ct. at 1502. According to Supreme Court precedent, such a waiver must not be implied. Id. The Supreme Court has never ruled on whether this statute constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity. The cases interpreting this statute have consistently held that it should be narrowly construed as a limitation on lower federal court power to issue summary contempt orders. See, e.g., Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 76 S.Ct. 456, 100 L.Ed. 474 (1956) (<HOLDING>); In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 66 S.Ct. 78, 90
holding that a lawyer is not the kind of officer who can be tried summarily for contempt under this statute recognizing that this courts construction of a statute becomes as much apart of the statute as the words of the statute itself and that change is a matter that addresses itself to the general assembly not this court holding that in certain circumstances fraud can be prosecuted under the statute holding that a public employee who can be discharged only for cause is entitled to at least some informal due process before he can be terminated holding that the federal officer removal statute is not narrow or limited 