any evidence to suggest any remaining factual issue, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment is correct. We find that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment when Govindasamy failed to provide any evidence supporting his affirmative defenses in support of his opposition to summary judgment. Judgment affirmed. Smith, P. J., and Dillard, J., concur. Decided July 22, 2011 Reconsideration denied August 18, 2011 Elamurughu Govindasamy, pro se. Charles T. Day III, for appellee. 1 (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Wright v. AFLAC, Inc., 283 Ga. App. 890, 891-892 (1) (643 SE2d 233) (2007). 2 Id., citing Burt & Burt &c. v. Dougherty County Tax Assessors, 256 Ga. App. 648 (1) (569 SE2d 557) (2002). See also Salazar v. State, 256 Ga. App. 50, 53 (4) (567 SE2d 706) (2002) (<HOLDING>). 3 As cited above, the appellate record does
holding that a defendant has a right to proceed pro se at trial holding that a district court must review pro se petitions with a lenient eye allowing borderline cases to proceed holding that a defendant proceeding pro se is bound by same rules as party represented by counsel and a court cannot allow pro se litigant lower standard of performance holding that a pro se defendant is not held to a different or more lenient standard merely because he elected to proceed pro se one who knowingly elects to represent himself assumes full responsibility for complying with the substantive and procedural requirements of the law holding defendants pro se motion to reduce sentence was not properly before the trial court when defendant was represented by counsel since defendant may not proceed both by counsel and pro se