single operational light and that the officer erroneously focused on whether both tag lights were functioning instead of on whether the tag was “clearly legible.” He contends that as long as he had a single operational light and the tag was “clearly legible,” he was not violating the statute and the officer did not have probable cause to stop him. We agree. In Gordon v. State, 901 So.2d 399 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), police officers conducted a traffic stop of Gordon’s car on the mistaken belief that driving with an object hanging from the rearview mi establish that Langello’s car was not equipped as required by law, and it made no attempt to establish that the car was unsafe. Accordingly, the stop was not authorized under section 316.610(1). See Hilton v. State, 961 So.2d 284, 290 (Fla.2007) (<HOLDING>). Because the police did not have probable
holding that the arresting officer did not have probable cause to stop the defendant for obstructing traffic because there was no evidence of intent to impede or hinder traffic where the vehicle was only briefly stopped in the roadway and the officer approaching the vehicle from behind did not have to stop or drive around the defendants vehicle holding that a stop for a cracked windshield is permissible only where an officer reasonably believes that the crack renders the vehicle in an unsafe condition holding that it is permissible for an officer to order the occupants out of a vehicle during a lawful stop holding that a conclusion that reasonable suspicion supported the stop of a vehicle was subsumed within the trial courts ruling that the officer had probable cause for the stop holding that although officers observation and stop of the defendants vehicle occurred outside of the officers geographical jurisdiction the officer still had jurisdiction where the officer was requested by a state trooper to stop the suspects vehicle