trans. denied. Section 35-37-4-6 applies to juvenile proceedings. D.G.B. v. State, 833 N.E.2d 519, 524-25 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). L.H. first argues that the case can be “easily and appropriately resolved” by holding that the requirements of the child hearsay statute were not met because A.H. did not testify at a “trial” as required by section 35-37-4-6(e)(2)(A) because there was no trial. Brief of Appellant at 6. L.H. contends that the juvenile court’s judgment should be reversed on this basis. However, the ramification of the requirements of the child hearsay statute not being met is that the hearsay should not be admitted at trial. Reversal would not necessarily be required if other evidence is sufficient to support the adjudication. See Carpenter v. State, 786 N.E.2d 696, 704 (Ind.2003) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, because the issue of whether there
holding that the district court did not err in relying on hearsay evidence where the government offered reasons why its hearsay evidence had indicia of reliability and the court considered the reliability of the evidence in deciding the weight to give the hearsay evidence holding that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting child hearsay because it failed to exhibit sufficient indications of reliability but noting that it is not every error that warrants reversal of a judgment of conviction and examining whether there was sufficient evidence outside of the hearsay to support the conviction holding that admission of hearsay constituted harmless error when there was more than sufficient other evidence in the record to support the verdict holding that a plain error that is fatal to a conviction is sufficient to warrant reversal holding that the trial courts written order was not the entry of a sentence sufficient to support a determination that a judgment of conviction was entered