thereafter Tomey filed the Complaint commencing this adversary proceeding. While the bankruptcy court in Burse primarily relied on Rule 11 as the basis for requiring the plaintiff/creditor to pay the debtor’s attorney’s fees, the court also awarded fees under § 523(d) finding plain-tiffs position to be “substantially unjusti-fied.” Other courts have viewed a pro se plaintiffs flawed nondischargeability com-plaint more leniently. In Colabianchi v. Thomas (In re Thom-as), 258 B.R. 167 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001), the bankruptcy court rejected the debtors’ request for fees under § 523(d) after judgment was entered against the land-lord/creditor. The court described the plaintiff as a small businessman “with ra-tional, albeit ultimately unfounded, hopes of excepting t (Bankr. D. Mont. 2001) (<HOLDING>). Considering that a court is directed to apply
holding that parties are bound by admissions in pleadings holding that admissions by debtor established that landlords case was substantially justified holding that for the administrative position of the government to be substantially justified it must have a reasonable basis both in law and fact holding that congress did not want the substantially justified standard to be read to raise a presumption that the government position was not substantially justified simply because it lost the case citations omitted holding that admissions purportedly made by an accused by way of his agents or attorneys in pleadings from a civil case are not admissible in a criminal case unless shown to have been authorized by him