Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error.” Id. at 363-64 & n. 6 (quoting Dinitz, supra, 424 U.S. at 609, 96 S.Ct. 1075) (emphasis added). Appellant argued that this language vested the right to move for a mistrial in the defendant personally. Id. at 364 n. 6. The Fifth Circuit rejected this claim. “The statement places control with the defendant rather than the court; it does not differentiate between the defendant and his counsel. It is common practice to refer to a party and his counsel as a single entity carrying the name of the party.” Id. The court held because his counsel moved for a mistrial — even without his consent — appellant’s double jeopardy rights were waived since his “perso tr. 487, 490-91 (1983) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that the decision to move for a
recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel and the right to waive counsel holding that there is no right to counsel beyond the initial direct appeal and thus no right to counsel on discretionary review holding that there is no right to counsel beyond the initial direct appeal and thus no right to counsel in collateral attacks holding that the right to move for a mistrial should and can properly be made by experienced legal minds and is not beyond the control of counsel