a sergeant entered the house with her. 2 . Harris testified that he opened the door for the police: "I saw them coming, so I just opened the door.” However, Officer Shepard testified that she knocked on the door and that after no one answered she entered the house through the door, which was unlocked. 3 . We decline to reach the question whether the warrantless entry and the search by the police officers were justified by exigent circumstances. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978)(rejecting a "murder scene exception” created by the Supreme Court of Arizona to the requirement of obtaining a warrant). See also Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 22, 105 S.Ct. 409, 83 L.Ed.2d 246 (1984)(applying Mincey); Ex parte Usrey, 527 So.2d 732 (Ala.1987) (<HOLDING>); A.A.G. v. State, 668 So.2d 122, 128
holding no liability existed under the circumstances holding that once the scene was secure exigent circumstances no longer existed and the police were required to obtain a search warrant holding that exigent circumstances were created by dissipation of bloodalcohol content in time needed to obtain a warrant holding that exigent circumstances were present because evidence of bloodalcohol content could disappear during the time necessary to obtain a warrant recognizing that  exigent circumstances do not excuse the failure to secure a warrant when those circumstances are created by government officials who unreasonably and deliberately delay or avoid obtaining the warrant