and discharge all claims included in the Action and any and all claims that Plaintiffs now have or could hereafter assert against any of the Released Parties of any nature whatsoever. Aplee. SuppApp. at 3. The plain language precludes the First Amendment retaliatory-prosecution claims at issue here, as Ser geant Anderson is an employee covered by the release, and the release precludes Action-related claims as well as “any and all claims under any other federal, state or local statute, ordinance, or law.” Id. In addition, Mr. Mata has offered no evidence tending to show any ambiguity in this language. In particular, he has offered no evidence showing that he did not intend for the release to be as broad as it is. See Mark V, Inc. v. Mellekas, 114 N.M. 778, 845 P.2d 1282 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, Mr. Mata asserted in a deposition
holding that extrinsic evidence is permissible to interpret an ambiguous contract holding that court may not use extrinsic evidence unless contract language is ambiguous holding that a court may consider extrinsic evidence to determine whether a contract is ambiguous holding that extrinsic evidence of the parties course of conduct may be considered where the contract language is ambiguous holding that courts may consider extrinsic evidence including the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract in order to determine whether a contractual ambiguity exists