(quoting Davis v. Merrill, 133 Va. 69, 78, 112 S.E. 628 (1922)). It follows that when, as here, an FBI employee, consistent with the FBI’s Policy on Harassment, reports an incident of sexual harassment, the employee is acting within the scope of her employment. In sum, the facts and circumstances of this case point convincingly to the conclusion that Schoeneman was acting within the scope of her FBI employment when she complained to FBI officials about alleged workplace sexual harassment. Also pertinent to the scope of employment calculus is that the allegedly false reports of harassment were made at the FBI’s facilities while Schoeneman was on duty. See Gulf Underwriters Ins. Co. v. KSI Services, Inc., 416 F.Supp.2d 417, 420-21 (E.D.Va.2006) aff'd, 233 Fed.Appx. 239 (4th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Given that reporting workplace sexual
holding that the inquiry into whether an employee was acting within the scope of his employment depends on the respondeat superior law of the state in which the tort occurred holding that whether the tortious act was committed during the time the employee was on duty and whether the tortious act was committed while the employee was on the employers premises were both factors weighing in favor of finding the activity within the scope of employment holding that inter alia employees criminal conviction for alleged tortious act demonstrated employee was not acting in scope of his employment holding that issues of fact precluded summary judgment on the question of whether an employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment for purposes of insurance coverage when the employee was simply sitting in his vehicle in his employers parking lot waiting for the business to open at the time the accident occurred holding that the doctrine of respondeat superior in maryland allows an employer to be held vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of its employee when that employee was acting within the scope of the employment relationship citations omitted