violated by the acts or omissions of the State, its agencies, officials, or employees, or can otherwise identify fraudulent, malicious, or oppressive acts committed by such official or employee, the court must then determine whether such acts or omissions were within the scope of the public official or employee’s duties, authority, and/or employment. Such determination may or may not turn on disputed issues of material fact. In the event of a genuine dispute of material fact the court may submit for resolution by a jury the issue of whether the State actor was in fact within the scope of his duty, authority, and employment when committing the acts which give rise to the case in accord with our admonitions in Hutchison. See Syl. Pt. 1, in part, Hutchison, 198 W.Va. 139, 479 S.E.2d 649 (<HOLDING>). To the extent that such official or employee
holding that immunity is ripe for summary disposition except where there is a bona fide dispute as to the foundational or historical facts that underlie the immunity determination holding that as a general rule interlocutory trial court orders rejecting defenses of common law sovereign immunity governmental immunity public official immunity statutory immunity or any other type of immunity are not appealable under the maryland collateral order doctrine holding that where defendant claiming qualified immunity relies on facts that are in dispute qualified immunity cannot be granted holding that the award of treble damages while a matter of discretion for the trial court is inappropriate in circumstances where there is a bona fide wage dispute holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit