a statute of conviction alone govern the scope of punishment that may be imposed at sentencing. Huerta-Pimental argues that, because § 1326 does not expressly provide for the inclusion of supervised release, see 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (providing that after conviction “such alien shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, imprisoned ... or both”), including it as part of a sentence pursuant to § 3583(a) amounts to additional punishment beyond the maximum authorized by the statute of conviction. This assumption is incorrect. Section 3583, one of several statutes that together govern the federal criminal sentencing structure, authorizes the imposition of supervised release upon conviction of a qualifying offense. See United States v. Montenegro-Rojo, 908 F.2d 425, 431-32 (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, it is well settled that supervised
holding  3583a itself authorizes a term of supervised release in addition to a maximum term of imprisonment authorized by the statute of conviction holding that failure to explain the effect of a term of supervised release was harmless error where term of imprisonment combined with maximum imprisonment for violation of supervised release was still less than statutory maximum holding that term of supervised release was not automatically terminated when defendant was deported from united states and thus defendants subsequent commission of another offense illegal reentry after deportation prior to expiration of term of supervised release violated condition of supervised release that defendant commit no new offenses holding that a statute requiring a threeyear term of supervised release did not eviscerate the district courts discretion to adjust the term of supervised release pursuant to  3583e holding term of supervised release tolled while defendant was in state custody