thus a duty that would exist independent of the master-servant relationship, the petition will not survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action for negligence.” Id. at 217. We further noted that “the parameters of a co-employee’s common law duties to fellow employees for workplace injuries may be influenced by a 2012 amendment to section 287.120.1 of the Act.” Id. at 217 n. 17. That amendment, which was enacted in response to Robinson, “legislatively afford[ed] immunity to co-employees unless a fellow employee is injured as : a result of the co-employee’s ‘affirmative negligent act that purposefully and dangerously caused or increased the risk of injury.’ ” Id. (quoting § 287.120.1); see also Shaw v. Mega. Indus. Corp., 406 S.W.3d 466, 474 n. 5 (Mo. App.W.D.2013) (<HOLDING>). The accident that gave rise to the Ker-shaws’
holding that statute would be applied retroactively when to do so would better effect the remedial intentions of the legislature in enacting it recognizing that the legislature has the sole power of enacting law recognizing that the legislature responded to the robinson decision by enacting  amendments to  2871201 in 2012 holding that in order for there to be state debt in the constitutional sense one legislature in effect must obligate a future legislature to appropriate funds to discharge the debt created by the first legislature holding that by enacting the more specific homicide by vehicle statute the legislature intended to preempt the subject matter of unintended homicides resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle