Even if one assumes that the language in the order makes it a “prepare” order, as the Estate argues, it is clear that the nurse did not do that. The Estate argued that the doctor had some further duty to question the nurse and anesthesiologist as to whether the antibiotic had actually been given. But the attending doctor does not administer the antibiotic, as all the hospital’s personnel knew; the anesthesiologist does. She had already told the nurse through her standing order to have it ready “for infusion at the time of cord clamping.” This Court has previously recognized that the operating doctor is not “the captain of the ship” to the extent that he or she is responsible for the duties of other operating room personnel. See Nazar v. Branham, 291 S.W.3d 599, 607-08 (Ky.2009) (<HOLDING>). While it may be true that the doctor could
holding that a city could not be held vicariously liable for the act of a magistrate who was immune from liability holding that absent facts that showed that an agency relationship existed a surgeon may not be presumed to be a principal and therefore was not vicariously liable for the negligent acts of the nurses in the operating room holding that agency relationship existed where principal paid plaintiff directly and written agreement stated agent was signing on behalf of principal holding that while an agents knowledge is imputed to the principal due to the identity of interests that is presumed when an agent acts within the scope of an agency relation this rule does not operate in the converse and the agent cannot be imputed with the information which its principal has failed to give it holding that public entities may be held vicariously hable for the negligent acts of their individual employees