subsequently released on personal recognizance without incarceration could not claim that such custody is creditable toward a later imposed sentence. "Official detention,” as other circuits have determined, means that an individual must be subject to a judicial detention order. For the reasons discussed hereinafter in this opinion, "official detention” is legally distinct from "official release” in court order or form, purpose, and sentence credit effect. 6 . See United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1119 (3d Cir.1990) ("[A] federal sentence does not begin to run until the defendant is delivered to the place where the sentence is to be served.”), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 915, 916, 111 S.Ct. 2009, 2010, 2011, 114 L.Ed.2d 98 (1991); Pinaud v. James, 851 F.2d 27, 30 (2d Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). 7 . The liberty restrictions placed on the
holding that a federal sentence commences when the attorney general receives the convicted defendant into custody for service of that sentence holding that where a defendant receives a consolidated sentence or consolidated judgment under north carolina law it is one sentence and absent another qualifying sentence the career offender enhancement is inapplicable holding that a judge who imposes a more severe sentence after the original sentence is successfully attacked must affirmatively state objective reasons for the harsher sentence to ensure that vindictiveness against the defendant plays no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial holding that a sentence imposed for a violation of supervised release will be upheld where 1 the district court considered the applicable policy statements 2 the sentence is within the statutory maximum and 3 the sentence is reasonable holding that an issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is rendered moot when a defendant receives an illegal sentence