internally inconsistent, as well as his demeanor on the witness stand. The court concluded that the United States’ levy on the automobiles was justified because TAFF was the alter ego of Towe. Alternatively, the court determined that TAFF was the nominee of Towe and that the alleged conveyance of the cars was fraudulent under Montana’s Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. The district court reserved judgment on whether Towe had effected a valid transfer of the cars to TAFF because such a finding was not “critical to the outcome in this matter.” II. Ordinarily, courts are called upon to apply the alter ego doctrine in eases where a party seeks to hold an individual liable for a business entity’s debts. See Drilcon, Inc. v. Roil Energy Corp., Inc., 280 Mont. 166, 749 P.2d 1058, 1064 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Here, the United States used a “reverse
holding shareholder liable for his corporations contractual obligations using an alter ego theory of liability holding that corporate officer and majority shareholder could be held liable for acting in a manner that served his interests at the expense of the other shareholders because his interests and the corporations were not necessarily aligned holding that plaintiff an officer and shareholder of a corporation with signatory authority over the corporations checking account was not a customer of the bank and could not file suit for wrongful dishonor of the corporations checks holding that a subsidiary is not an alter ego of its parent even when the corporations are closely tied through stock ownership shared officers financing arrangements and the like holding guarantors of a family trust liable for the trusts debts under an alter ego theory