to the rule prohibiting the inclusion of two crimes in the same count of an indictment. Specifically, we have held that “acts that could be charged as separate counts of an indictment may instead be charged in a single count if those acts could be characterized as part of a single continuing scheme.” United States v. Tutino, 883 F.2d 1125, 1141 (2d Cir.1989). Count I of the original two-count indictment charged the existence of a conspiracy to commit the acts charged in Count II. Taking the conspiracy and substantive counts together, the indictment, as seen prior to trial, could reasonably have been interpreted to charge that the two transactions included in Count II were part of a single continuing scheme and thus were properly included in one count. See Tutino, 883 F.2d at 1141 (<HOLDING>). Only after the court dismissed the conspiracy
holding that evidence of prior drug transactions was admissible under rule 404b to show inter alia intent to enter into the drug conspiracy and knowledge of the conspiracy holding that based on finding that defendants had engaged in drug conspiracy government could properly include two sales of heroin made in furtherance of that conspiracy within one count of indictment and could aggregate amounts of drugs involved in both transactions to meet statutory thresholds for certain mandatory minimum and maximum sentences holding that in a conspiracy case venue lies where the conspiracy agreement was formed or in any jurisdiction where an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed by any of the conspirators holding that defendant was not entitled to buyerseller instruction in drug conspiracy prosecution given evidence that defendant played numerous roles in the conspiracy and that massive amounts of cocaine were involved holding that statements made to keep a coconspirator informed as to the groups drug supply were made in furtherance of the conspiracy