alleged any facts demonstrating that it suffered such harm. Although Lime Wire’s attempt to obtain hashes from counter-defendants suggests that it intended eventually to obtain licenses from them, nothing in Lime Wire’s pleading indicates that it has, in fact, sought (or imminently will seek) such licenses from counter-defendants. Accordingly, Lime Wire cannot claim that it has suffered injury-in-fact as a result of counter-defendants’ wholesale price-fixing scheme. Lime Wire’s allegation that counter-defendants, though their joint ventures, concertedly fixed prices for digital music licenses at the retail level (id. ¶¶ 37-38) similarly fails to state antitrust injury. Although such vertical price-fixing arrangements may in some circumstances be unlawful, see Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2722 (<HOLDING>) (citing State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22,
holding vertical price restraints subject to the rule of reason holding nonprice vertical restrictions are analyzed under the rule of reason holding vertical price restraints are judged according to the rule of reason holding that vertical minimum pricefixing agreements like vertical maximum pricefixing agreements should be evaluated under the traditional rule of reason holding that a maximum vertical price maintenance scheme is not per se illegal