(9th Cir.1995). Finally, we dispose of appellees’ argument that Henderson v. Terhune, 379 F.3d 709 (9th Cir.2004), precludes a RLUIPA claim when the complaint cites only the First Amendment. There, we “expressed] no opinion about whether” the challenged regulation violated RLUIPA because the inmate “brought his claim under the First Amendment, not the RLUI-PA.” Id. at 715 n. 1. Appellees’ reliance on Henderson is misplaced, because at no point did the plaintiff there even assert a RLUIPA claim. See id. at 711-12. Here, Alvarez specifically raised his RLUIPA theory in his post-complaint filings, thereby apprising appellees before summary judgment that he was claiming relief under both the First Amendment and RLUIPA. See Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1292-94 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Appellees had notice of and the opportunity
holding that plaintiffs could not proceed with different theory of liability after close of discovery when defendant would be prejudiced by inability to develop newly relevant evidence and defenses holding only defenses that would be valid in rendering state can be relied upon by courts of another state holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law holding that the plaintiffs had relied on illinois law because they could have filed in a different forum having a different statute of limitations holding that only justification defenses would be recognized