laws. See Brief for the United States as Amicus at 12, JOBLOVE v. BARR LABS., INC., No. 06-830, 2007 WL 1511527 (U.S. May 23, 2007). Many academic commentators share the United States’s view. Most courts, by contrast, including this Court, Joblove v. Barr Labs. Inc, (In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.), 466 F.3d 187, 216 (2d Cir.2006) (“Tamoxifen ”), have held that the right to enter into reverse exclusionary payment agreements falls within the terms of the exclusionary grant conferred by the branded manufacturer’s patent. See In re Ciprofloxacin Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d at 1833; Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1076 (11th Cir.2005). But see La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. (In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig.), 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust
holding that to be preempted as a per se illegal hybrid restraint a regulation must involve a delegation of market power to private parties that is per se illegal because otherwise the hybrid restraint could not be attacked as facially invalid holding such agreements to be per se illegal holding that a maximum vertical price maintenance scheme is not per se illegal holding that such any and all language is per se unconstitutional for lack of particularity holding that the per se rule does not apply to a vertical agreement between a buyer and supplier and noting that precedent limits the per se rule in the boycott context to cases involving horizontal agreements among direct competitors