in advance). We have considered time an important factor in distinguishing between a legitimate investigative stop and a de facto arrest, United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 916 (8th Cir.1994) (en banc), but we recognize that there is “no rigid time limitation on [investigative] stops.” United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985); see also Place, 462 U.S. at 709-10 n. 10, 103 S.Ct. 2637 (“[W]e question the wisdom of a rigid time limitation. Such a limit would undermine the ... important need to allow authorities to graduate then-responses to the demands of any particular situation.”). Accordingly, under the proper circumstances, we have considered delays for dog-sniffs far in excess of 90 minutes reasonable. See Maltais, 403 F.3d at 557-58 (<HOLDING>). Nothing in the record suggests that Fitzer
holding that a threehour delayallowing a drug dog to reach the remote location of the investigation was acceptable because the officers acted with diligence and pursued the quickest and least intrusive means of investigation reasonably available to confirm or dispel their  suspicions that the defendant was engaged in drug trafficking holding that a state conviction is a drug trafficking offense because the trafficked drug is listed in a csa schedule recognizing the connection between guns and drug trafficking holding district courts finding of consent was not clearly erroneous when the defendant consented after officers told him they could get a drug dog even though the defendant knew the dog would alert holding defendant made motive issue in drug conspiracy prosecution by advancing theory he was conducting investigation of drug dealing