extension of § 525(a)’s protections to all government loan guaranties, not just those of the student loan variety. That Congress chose instead to narrowly amend § 525 to abrogate the specific holding of Goldrich is strong evidence that its failure to mention other kinds of loan guaranties in § 525(c) was intentional. The time-honored max im expressio unius est exclusio alterius (“the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of another”) applies with great force here. In reaching this conclusion, we, like our sister circuits, refuse to venture beyond the confines of the statutory language to broadly construe § 525(a)’s specific “other similar grant” language in reliance on the general “fresh start” policy underlying the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., Watts, 876 F.2d at 1093-94 (<HOLDING>); Toth, 136 F.3d at 479-80 (holding that a
recognizing that identical provisions do not mean that an independent interpretation is not warranted holding that the interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law holding that it is not holding if the language of a deed or other written instrument is clear and unambiguous the intention of the parties is gathered from the instrument it is what the grant or said and not what he intended to say holding that an emergency mortgageassistance loan is not an other similar grant and stating that when an unambiguous statute is interpreted to mean what it says the interpretation is not narrow