with federal law,” for example, “when it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements, or when state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’ ” Id at 1332 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941)). Here, the EPPs’ claims sound in unfair competition in violation of state consumer protection statutes and state antitrust laws, as well as unjust enrichment. In line with the Federal Circuit, and because the Warner Chilcott Defendants do not suggest Congress intended to preempt these areas of state law, the Court concludes that there is no field preemption of state consumer protection, unjust enrichment, or antitrust laws. See id. at 1333 (<HOLDING>); ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. at 101, 109 S.Ct.
holding that in the field preemption context the hardship is the process itself holding that in light of the presumption against preemption there is no field preemption of state unfair competition claims that rely on a substantial question of federal patent law because congress has not expressed its clear and manifest intention to preempt that area of law holding that  502a operated to preempt state law claims despite the fact that the law in question may have been exempt from  514a preemption as a law regulating insurance holding that where a conflict between state and federal law is alleged it must be reasonable to conclude that congress would have intended to preclude the state law in question since it would make little sense to preempt state law in order to serve the purposes underlying federal legislation if congress itself would not require or admit of preemption of state authority recognizing presumption against preemption presumption is properly applied to state law design defect claims against manufacturer of pacemaker fda premarket approval of device did not require preemption