could have hoped that I.W.’s incarceration would make her hostile toward the prosecution and cause her to slant her testimony in his favor. But this argument assumes that Raphael’s attorney had a sufficiently accurate view of the scope of the error and deliberately chose to waive any objection. In Noffke v. State, we held that, although defense counsel had failed to object to an instruction given to the jury during its deliberations and outside the defendant’s presence, we would reach the issue on appeal because there was “nothing in the record to show that [the defendant’s] trial counsel had any knowledge ... of the fact that the trial judge had given the jury this supplemental instruction.” He f Anchorage, 736 P.2d 349, 352 (Alaska 1987) (not . 202, 50 L.Ed.2d 194 (1976) 1971) (<HOLDING>). 15 . Cf. E.L.L. v. State, 572 P.2d 786, 789
holding it was within the chancellors  discretion to find that though the husband was in contempt the contempt was not willful holding that when the contempt is committed in the presence of the court the court may dispense with usual due process requirements and immediately and summarily adjudge the case holding that incarceration for civil contempt cannot be imposed absent a finding by the trial court that the eontemnor has the present ability to purge himself of contempt holding that a civil contempt defendant has a right to a jury trial when the act of contempt was not committed in the presence of the court and when the incarceration is in part punitive holding corporation and its president in criminal contempt because previous order of civil contempt had not been purged