school in the 1960s; the 1995 assault in his home; the assault in the marketplace; and the motorbike theft — cumulatively amount to past persecution. While we agree that these incidents are troubling, the record does not compel the conclusion that they rise to the level of “persecution.” See Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir.1993) (defining persecution as “threats to life, confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to life or freedom,” and explaining that persecution “does not encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust or even unlawful or unconstitutional”); Wong v. Att’y Gen., 539 F.3d 225, 236 (3d Cir.2008) (observing that “harassment and discrimination do not constitute persecution”); Lie, 396 F.3d at 536 (<HOLDING>). As to future persecution, Hadisaputra makes
holding that two isolated criminal acts perpetrated by unknown assailants against ethnic chinese indonesians which resulted only in the theft of some personal property and a minor injury is not sufficiently severe to be considered persecution holding that isolated criminal attacks do not constitute persecution holding that isolated criminal acts by unknown assailants resulting in theft of personal property and minor injury were not sufficiently severe to constitute persecution holding that harm must be sufficiently severe rising above mere harassment to constitute persecution holding that two isolated criminal acts perpetrated by unknown assailants  are not sufficiently severe to be considered persecution