they were voluntary and spontaneous. The Government is wrong as a matter of law. See United States v. Farley, 607 F.3d 1294, 1326 (11th Cir.2010) (noting voluntariness is a question of law). An Edwards violation carries a “presumption of involuntariness,” Shatzer, 130 S.Ct. at 1220, that is not instantaneously ameliorated when police end an interrogation. Un der this Court’s precedent, a defendant’s statement made several hours after she requests counsel may be uncoerced and voluntary, see United States v. Valdez, 880 F.2d 1280, 1238-34 (11th Cir.1989), but a statement made “no more than a few minutes” after an Edwards violation does not meet the legal standard for voluntariness, see Gomez, 927 F.2d at 1536, 1538-39; cf. Henderson v. Singletary, 968 F.2d 1070, 1074 (11th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). This case is remarkably similar to our
recognizing that the ultimate question of the voluntariness of consent is one of law holding that in the absence of an edwards violation the amount of time between interrogation and a defendants statement is only one measure of  voluntariness holding failure to raise issue of improper measure of damages in trial court waived review of complaints that proper measure of damages was not submitted to jury and that plaintiff failed to present evidence on the proper measure holding that the measure of damages of converted property is the market value at the time of conversion holding that edwards protection only extends to interrogation and that denial of counsel is only one factor to be considered in determining whether  consent was voluntarily given but it is not a decisive fact