favor of the Department of Veterans Affairs in her Title VII action alleging gender discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 754 (9th Cir.2006), and we affirm. The district court properly granted summary judgment to the defendant on Brooks’s discrimination and retaliation claims because Brooks did not raise a triable issue of fact concerning pretext. See Dominguez-Curry v. Nevada Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d 1027, 1037 (9th Cir.2005) (explaining that a plaintiff “must produce sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason is merely a pretext for discrimination.”); see also Moran, 447 F.3d at 759 (<HOLDING>); Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d
holding that unauthenticated documents cannot be considered at summary judgment holding that evidence in an inadmissible form may be considered at the summary judgment stage as long as the evidence is submitted in an admissible form at trial holding that unverified pleadings do not constitute competent summary judgment evidence holding that at the summary judgment stage there must be sufficient evidence on which the jury could find for the plaintiff holding that unverified complaints cannot be considered as evidence at the summary judgment stage