that while representing himself, Williams displayed a certain amount of intelligence, articulateness, and understanding of legal concepts, and concluded that Williams’ behavior at trial, while sometimes peculiar or erratic, did not meet the substantial evidence standard. There was no evidence before the trial court before or during the trial regarding a history of mental illness, nor was the court presented, at that time, with any expert evaluation of Williams’ mental status. Under these circumstances, and in contrast to situations in which this court has ordered an evidentiary hearing on procedural competency claims, the state court of appeal’s determination was not unreasonable. See Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir.2000); Compare Pate, 383 U.S. at 378-85, 86 S.Ct. 836 (<HOLDING>); Torres, 223 F.3d at 1109-10 (holding that a
holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive holding that the admission in evidence of a certifying document from the secretary of state that its history records indicated that notice of suspension was sent by regular mail to the defendant did not violate the confrontation clause holding that whether a defendant is insane because of the long and continued use of intoxicants is not within the ordinary understanding of jurors and that in the absence of expert testimony a defendant would not be entitled to an instruction based on drank holding that a defendant does not have the right to a jury trial where a plea of ngri is entered and the prosecution concedes that the defendant was insane at the time of the offense holding that a hearing was required where trial court was presented with evidence of a long history of disturbed behavior of a severe blow to the head by a brick at childhood medical records indicating a history of mental illness and expert testimony that the defendant was insane