file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In order for the county to be liable under § 1983, Frank must show, among other things, either the unconstitutional action of policymakers or an unconstitutional policy or custom. See Johnson v. Moore, 958 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir.1992). The district court correctly determined that Frank failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether any official policy or custom governed the alleged conduct and whether Chambers was the final policy maker. See Rhode v. Denson, 776 F.2d 107 (5th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); see also Drain v. Galveston County, 979
holding that suit against county sheriff in his official capacity was suit against county holding elected constable not the final policymaker and therefore unconstitutional acts of elected county official not chargeable against the county holding county clerk sued in official capacity was entitled to the immunity the county enjoyed holding that both saline county and grant county had jurisdiction to try the appellant for murder where the actual killing occurred in one county but the acts requisite to the consummation of the murder and the subsequent disposal of the body occurred in the other county holding that an order redistricting a county was merely prospective as to qualifications of county commissioners and did not affect the right to office of those previously elected