in their official capacities to the extent that she sought prospective injunctive relief. Id. at 671. When the district court ultimately dismissed Heike’s initial suit in its May 3, 2010 Order, the court explicitly stated that it was granting summary judgment to CMU’s officials both “in their individual and their official capacities.” Therefore, Heike’s misrepresentations notwithstanding, the district court’s May 3, 2010 Order granting summary judgment was indeed a judgment in favor of CMU’s officials in their official capacities. Moreover, it does not matter for purposes of claim preclusion that the district court granted summary judgment to CMU’s officials in both their official and individual capacities. See Pittman v. Mich. Corrs. Org., 123 Fed.Appx. 637, 640 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Any judgment for individual defendants in
holding that since damage claims in an article 78 proceeding may only be asserted against individuals in their official capacities the plaintiff could not have recovered damages against the education officials in their individual capacities and therefore cannot be barred by res judicata  holding that a plaintiffs breach of contract claim failed because he could make no showing that the individual defendants acted in their individual capacities when they signed the contract on behalf of the employer housing authority holding that claim preclusion barred a plaintiffs action because the individual defendants who were sued both in their official capacities and as individuals stood in privity with the govern mental entities holding that fca retaliation claim must fail as against defendants sued in their individual capacities because such individuals were not employers holding that neither a state agency nor its officials acting in their official capacities may be sued under section 1983