planning and procuring leases are both expensive and time-consuming for providers). Thus, the Town’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to count II. The motion of Célico for summary judgment as to this count is DENIED. B. Count III: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Because I have sustained the Board’s decision to deny the special permit and have concluded that the rejection of Cell-co’s application for that special permit does not constitute an effective prohibition, there is no TCA violation. Accordingly, there can be no § 1983 claim, because no federal right has been infringed. Moreover, there is disagreement among the courts as to whether § 1983 is preempted by the enforcement scheme of the TCA itself. Compare Nat'l Telecomm. Advisors, Inc. v. City of Chicopee, 16 F.Supp.2d 117 (D.Mass.1998) (<HOLDING>); with Sprint Spectrum v. Town of Easton, 982
holding that a tca claim may not be asserted under  1983 holding that a contracts clause violation may support a  1983 claim holding that a claim including a constitutional claim must have been asserted to the trial court to be raised on appeal holding state is not a proper defendant under  1983 recognizing such a claim under  1983