to stop it from exercising otherwise constitutional personal jurisdiction over Fortress. B. PetEdge’s Other Claims The complaint also alleges claims for trademark infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham Act and multiple state laws. Because the Court finds that it has specific personal jurisdiction over Fortress as to PetEdge’s patent-infringement claim, it need not address the parties’ arguments regarding the other claims. See, e.g., Home Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Century Bank, 695 F.Supp. 1343, 1345 (D.Mass.1988) (“In a multi-count complaint, if a court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant with respect to one count, it has personal jurisdiction with respect to all counts.”); Amtrol, Inc. v. Vent-Rite Valve Corp., 646 F.Supp. 1168, 1175 (D.Mass.1986) (<HOLDING>). C. PetEdge’s Motion to Strike Because the
holding that a court may exercise pendant personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant with respect to state law claims that arise out of a nucleus of operative facts common to a federal antitrust claim holding that when all federal claims have been dismissed the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims holding that a defendant who elected to avail itself of the benefit of a state courts jurisdiction by filing a prior suit against the same party waives its personal jurisdiction defense in all actions related to the claim and arising out of the same nucleus of operative facts for which it originally invoked the courts jurisdiction holding that the court of federal claims had pendant jurisdiction over a state law contract claim that was part of the same case as a claim over which the court of federal claims had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 usc  1498b holding the federal tort claims act did not permit exercise of pendant jurisdiction over additional parties as to which no basis for federal jurisdiction existed