this court has also held that it will not interpret a statute to yield an absurd result that is contrary to legislative intent. See City of Maumelle v. Jeffrey Sand. Co., 353 Ark. 686, 120 S.W.3d 55 (2003). The General Assembly’s intent was made quite clear by the emergency clause in Act 782 of 1985 — the Act applies to all judgments. Thus, the statutory interpretation in Carroll Elec, yielded an absurd result which was clearly contrary to legislative intent in that the Carroll Elec, holding resulted in no statutory postjudgment interest rate for judgments other than contract judgments. To continue to rely on that opinion’s analysis in interpreting the statute would continue to yield an untenable result. See, e.g., Nelson v. Timberline Int’l, Inc.,. 332 Ark. 165, 964 S.W.2d 357 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Because the circuit court found that the rate
holding stare decisis does not preclude the court from abolishing the classification scheme holding that pursuant to statute unemployment benefits must be offset against workers compensation payments holding that the exclusivity of workers compensation is an affirmative statutory defense which must be timely raised or it is waived holding that the provisions of the workers compensation act must be satisfied or the action is not maintainable in the courts holding that while stare decisis is a guiding principle prior interpretations of workers compensation statute must be overruled because the interpretations were wrong