may be introduced against a co-conspirator under the exception for admissions or statements of party opponent on the theory that one co-conspirator is the agent of another”) (italics added). 25 . See Fed.R.Evid. 803(3) (providing that a “statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind ... (such as intent [or] plan ...)" is not excluded by the hearsay rule). 26 . In light of this disposition, it is unnecessary for us to reach Boyd’s additional arguments that his convictions fail for lack of proof that he constructively possessed the pistol and that the government’s reliance solely on a certificate-of-no-record to prove lack of a license and registration violated the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause. See Tabaka v. District of Columbia, 976 A.2d 173 (D.C.2009) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). 27 . Walker's challenge is to all of his
holding the rule of griffith v kentucky 479 us 314 107 sct 708 93 led2d 649 1987 does not require retroactive application to convictions challenged on habeas corpus recognizing that references to and descriptions of the jurys verdict as advisory as a recommendation and of the judge as the final sentencing authority are permissible under romano v oklahoma 512 us 1 114 sct 2004 129 led2d 1 1994 holding that procedural errors at sentencing  are routinely subject to harmlessness review  quoting puckett v united states 556 us 129 141 129 sct 1423 173 led2d 266 2009 holding that the rule announced in simmons v south carolina 512 us 154 114 sct 2187 129 led2d 133 1994 doesnt apply retroactively on collateral review holding on the basis of melendezdiaz v massachusetts  us  129 sct 2527 174 led2d 314 2009 that a certificate of norecord is testimonial