their reliance on Brown seems misplaced because the Ninth Circuit’s opinion does not mention the nonjusticiability or nondiscrimination strands. The Supreme Court moreover has rejected the notion that agencies must “meaningfully review” rates under the filed rate doctrine. In Square D, the petitioners argued that the doctrine should not bar their antitrust claim because the ICC did not conduct a hearing before approving the disputed rates. Square D Co., 476 U.S. at 417 n. 19, 106 S.Ct. 1922. The Court, however, clarified that Keogh is not limited to situations where rates “ ‘had been investigated and approved by the ICC,’ ” but applied “ ‘whenever tariffs have been filed.’ ” Id. (quoting Square D Co., 760 F.2d at 1351); see also Montana-Dakota Utils. Co., 341 U.S. at 251, 71 S.Ct. 692 (<HOLDING>). Similarly, other courts of appeals have held
holding that under the filed rate doctrine a question regarding reasonable rates should be addressed to the department of insurance and that the rate plaintiff was charged is conclusively presumed reasonable under the filed rate doctrine holding that the petitioner can claim no rate as a legal right  other than the filed rate whether fixed or merely accepted by the agency commission holding that the proper rate for prejudgment interest is the rate fixed by the parties in a contract holding that once a rate is filed with the appropriate agency except for review of the agencys orders the courts can assume no right to a different rate on that ground that in its opinion it is the only or the more reasonable rate holding that with respect to the eaja the local or national market rate for legal services cannot be a special factor used to increase the rate beyond the statutory rate