immunity on the § 1983 false arrest claims. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 820, 102 S.Ct. 2727 (remanding to district court for consideration of a qualified immunity issue because “[t]he trial court is more familiar with the record so far developed and also is better situated to make any such further findings as may be necessary”). On remand, the district court must determine whether the three officers’ actions in arresting Mr. Pitt “violate[d] clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Id. at 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727. B. Malicious Prosecution Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Plaintiffs also sought relief for malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that the defendants deprived plaintiffs of their cons 2 (3d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, N.C., 85
holding that in a mali cious prosecution action under the fourth amendment the constitutional violation is the deprivation of liberty accompanying the prosecution holding that for a state actor to violate the fourth amendment by initiating a malicious prosecution against someone the criminal charges at issue must have imposed some deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of a seizure citation omitted holding that a  1983 due process claim that essentially contests the fairness of the plaintiffs prosecution  is  similar to his malicious prosecution claim and claims resembling malicious prosecution do not accrue until the prosecution has terminated in the plaintiffs favor  holding that the fourth amendment right implicated in a malicious prosecution action is the right to be free of unreasonable seizure of the person recognizing that an alleged deprivation of the right to be free from prosecution without probable cause might be judged under the fourth amendment