her conduct suggests that she may pose a substantial threat of reoffending if set free.”). This also raises another important distinction between this case and White. The White court focused on the non-violent nature of White’s crime as a reason for a lessened governmental interest. See id. (“Not every serious crime is equally serious. The nature of White’s crimes lessens the government’s interest in prosecuting her because her alleged crimes were nonviolent offenses.”). While we recognize Nieklas’s crime involved sending threatening letters and faxes, which Nicklas may argue are non-violent acts, we note this court has previously held the crime of mailing threatening communications to be a crime of violence. See, e.g., United States v. Left Hand Bull, 901 F.2d 647, 649 (8th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Assuming, without deciding, that the White
holding mailing a threatening letter was a crime of violence for the purposes of ussg  4b11 holding that robbery is a crime of violence for purposes of habitualoffender sentencing holding that a guilty plea for which the defendant received a deferred adjudication counted as a conviction under federal law for purposes of ussg  4b11 holding that  215 is categorically a crime of violence for purposes of ussg  2l12 holding morevstat  569055 qualifies as a crime of violence for purposes of ussg  4b12a