resolved by a court pursuant to a motion for summary judgment.” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nixon, 453 Pa.Super. 70, 682 A.2d 1310, 1313 (1996) (quoting Frain v. Keystone Ins. Co., 433 Pa.Super. 462, 640 A2d 1352, 1354 (1994)). This is especially true “[wjhen the language is clear and unambiguous,” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nixon, 453 Pa.Super. 70, 682 A.2d 1310, 1313 (1996). When, however, the language of the policy is ambiguous, the inquiry may be one for the trier of fact; indeed, in the case of an ambiguous provision, the court must “focus its attention on the reasonable expectations of the insured.” Id. (quoting Everett Cash Mut. Ins. Co. v. Krawitz, 430 Pa.Super. 25, 633 A2d 215 (1993)); see also Loomer v. M.R.T. Flying Service, Inc., 384 Pa.Super. 244, 558 A.2d 103, 105 (1989) (<HOLDING>). In other words, if the “regular use”
holding that the term any insured was ambiguous in light of a severability clause and construing the contract against the insurer finding coverage holding that contracts should be interpreted to give effect to all provisions holding that statutes should not be interpreted so as to render any of its provisions nugatory holding ambiguous provisions are to be interpreted so as to provide maximum coverage to the insured holding a personal profit exclusion applicable to an insured corporation where the purpose of the exclusion was to exclude coverage when the insured received profits to which the insured was not legally entitled