not consider whether the headaches and spasm she suffered qualify as "physical injuries” under the Act. It also need not decide whether plaintiff's allegations describe a "severe emotional injury,” Buell, 480 U.S. at 566 n. 13, 107 S.Ct. 1410, as the Second Circuit has explained that it "do[es] not read Buell as necessarily mandating that the court determine whether the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injury is 'severe.' ” Puthe v. Exxon Shipping Co., 2 F.3d 480, 483 (2d Cir.1993). 15 . See, e.g., Quinn, 159 F.3d at 763-64 (finding insufficient evidence of hostile work environment where a co-employee "brush[ed] against [the plaintiff’s] breasts with papers he was carrying”); Salvatore v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, No. 98 Civ. 2450, 1999 WL 796172, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1999) (<HOLDING>); Gregg v. New York State Dep’t of Taxation &
holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment holding that plaintiffs allegations related to denial of overtime were discrete acts timebarred and not individually actionable holding that conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive where a supervisor allegedly touched plaintiffs hand and thigh lifted her dress hem repeatedly asked her to lunch told her that she was beautiful stared at her and called her home on numerous occasions at night and asked about personal matters holding that some gaap allegations were soft information because the allegations in plaintiffs complaint focused on defendants beliefs about accounting numbers not on the actual data they reported holding that allegations that plaintiffs supervisor brushed up against her on some occasions  were not actionable