the same for a hearing and may thereafter be ruled upon by the court.” First, the wife claims that the letter from her attorney did not constitute express consent to an extension of the 90-day period. Citing Bmun v. Brown, 808 So.2d 40 (Ala.Civ.App.2001), the wife argues that her attorney consented only to extend the date for a hearing on the husband’s motions and not to extend the time for the court to rule. Brown is inapt. In that case, the document that was alleged to have constituted a waiver of the requirement that a post-judgment motion, if not ruled on within 90 days, be denied, “reflected only one party’s express consent to an extension of the time for ruling on the [postjudgment] motion.” 808 So.2d at 41. See also Harrison v. Alabama Power Co., 371 So.2d 19, 20-21 (Ala.l979)(<HOLDING>); Personnel Bd. for Mobile County v. Bronstein,
holding that because consent is not a statement and a request for consent is not an interrogation giving consent to search is a neutral fact which has no tendency to show that the suspect is guilty of any crime recognizing that consent is an exception to the warrant requirement and that voluntariness of consent depends on the totality of the circumstances holding that consent or assent to a continuance of a hearing does not satisfy the requirement that the record show the parties express consent to an extension of the 90day period holding there is no consent as a matter of law where the consent was given under coercion holding that a search exceeded the scope of the initial oral consent and was not validated by a subsequent written consent an allegedly consensual seizure must stand or fall on the basis of the consent preexisting the seizure