524, 526-27, 93 S.Ct. 848, 35 L.Ed.2d 46 (1973); Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 314-15, 51 S.Ct. 470, 75 L.Ed. 1054 (1931). Even then, the inquiry in non-death-penalty cases need not be made in every state court case in which the races of the victim and the defendant are different. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 597-98, 96 S.Ct. 1017, 47 L.Ed.2d 258 (1976); see generally 5 LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure § 22.3(a), at 293 (2d ed. 1999) (“[T]he Court has as yet declined to extend the [Ham ] doctrine to matters other than racial prejudice.”). Death penalty cases present special concerns about what voir dire may be constitutionally required, and there are special voir dire rules in such cases. See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 90 L.Ed.2d 27 (1986) (<HOLDING>); see also Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719,
holding no violation of substantial rights occurred during voir dire where record did not show that defendant was denied fair and impartial trial holding a defendants due process rights were violated where he was compelled to wear prison clothing during jury voir dire holding that the jurors failure to remember particular facts inquired about on voir dire and the jurors misunderstanding of voir dire questions do not constitute probable prejudice holding that due process clause entitled deathpenaltyeligible defendant to voir dire questioning on racial bias where defendant was accused of interracial crime holding that defendants have a right to be present at voir dire