to the present tense, it is doubtful that this change prejudiced defendant when defendant’s response to Mr. Falvey’s question is examined in context. First, it appears that defendant’s use of the past tense was a slip of the tongue because he was responding to a question asked of him in the present tense. In addition, he began his response with the word “currently.” Moreover, defendant’s lawyer, in his cross-examination of Lieutenant Commander Donald Ray Opedal, elicited testimony to the effect that defendant represented at the August 9, 1985 meeting that he was unemployed. Finally, the Court instructed the jurors that the arguments of counsel were not evidence and that their recollection of the evidence controlled. See, e.g., United States v. Ashworth, 836 F.2d 260, 267 (6th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Sarmiento, 744 F.2d 755, 762
holding that there was no abuse of discretion in denying mistrial based on a comment that the defendant was in prison where the comment provided the jury with little detail holding prejudicial effect of prosecutors comment not rendered harmless by courts general instruction that the arguments of counsel are not evidence holding that an attorneys arguments are not evidence holding that comment by prosecutor in closing argument that defense counsel did not produce evidence of the defendants innocence was not a comment on the defendants failure to testify holding that district court acted within its discretion in denying motion for mistrial when prosecutor commented on matter not in evidence in closing argument because comment was not sufficiently prejudicial when taken together with the courts later jury instruction that the jurys recollection of the evidence controlled and that the attorneys arguments were not evidence 