engage in sexual acts, a prosecutor may charge that behavior as both luring and attempted sexual conduct with a minor, as happened in this case. See A.R.S. §§ 13-1001(A)(2), 13-1405(A), 13-3554. Indeed, the same evidence was marshalled to convict Farnsworth of both offenses. In describing the offense of luring, the legislature implicitly acknowledged that the crime might involve someone posing as a child under fifteen. See § 13-3554(A), (B) (“having reason to know that the other person is a minor” sufficient mental state for offense; no defense that actual person lured was not a minor). Yet it also expressly excluded DCAC enhancement when the target was not an actual minor under the age of fifteen. See § 13—3554(C); State v. Regenold, 227 Ariz. 224, ¶ 4, 255 P.3d 1028, 1030 (App. 2011) (<HOLDING>); State v. Villegas, 227 Ariz. 344, ¶ 3, 258
holding plain language compelled that reading holding when ordinance language is clear courts must give language its plain meaning holding that in construing statute courts must first look to its plain language holding that a plain reading of section 1367 overrules zahn holding that general statement of intent does not override plain language of statute