385 S.C. at 192, 684 S.E.2d at 543. Here, however, the legislature has rewritten and expanded the traditional definition of occurrence to also mandate the inclusion of faulty workmanship: Commercial general liability insurance policies shall contain or be deemed to contain a definition of “occurrence” that includes: (2) property damage or bodily injury resulting from faulty workmanship, exclusive of the faulty workmanship itself. S.C.Code Ann. § 38-61-70 (emphasis added). While we hold that it is within the legislature’s power to statutorily define the meaning of “occurrence,” it violates the Contract Clause to apply this new definition retroactively as it substantially impairs pre-existing contracts by materially changing their terms. Hodges, 341 S.C. at 94, 533 S.E.2d at 585-86 (<HOLDING>); Henry v. Alexander, 186 S.C. 17, 194 S.E. 649
holding that an attorney approval clause in a contract for the sale of real estate was a part of that contract and would have to be satisfied for the underlying contract to be enforceable holding that parties can stipulate that they were both parties to a contract and thus the real parties in interest even when one party did not sign the contract holding that where contract silent court may supply reasonable term to fulfill parties expectations holding that contract terms themselves will be controlling when they establish the parties common meaning so that a reasonable person in the position of either party would have no expectations inconsistent with the contract language holding for purposes of contract clause analysis a statute can be said to impair a contract when it alters the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties