course of business. Lumbermens next argues that Ma-tush was not qualified to attest to the data entered into the database because he did not input each piece of data that underlies the summaries. However, there is no dispute that Matush, as a Republic Western claims manager, was qualified to testify about the business practices and procedures for inputting the underlying data. It is not necessary for each individual who entered a record of payment into the database to testify as to the accuracy of each piece of data entered. See United States v. Smith, 609 F.2d 1294, 1302 (9th Cir.1979) (“The witness must only be in a position to attest to [the evidence’s] authenticity”) (citation and internal quotations omitted); see also Thanongsinh v. Bd. of Educ., 462 F.3d 762, 777 (7th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 803.08[4]
holding that the qualified witness need only be familiar with the companys recordkeeping practices holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining expert witness was qualified to testify holding that the trial courts admonition of a witness even though detailed and strongly stated did not coerce the witness because the court did not threaten or badger the witness and the court provided the witness with her own counsel to ensure that the decision was voluntary holding that the defendants due process rights were violated when the trial judge singled out the only defense witness and indicated to that witness that he expected the witness to he and would personally ensure that the witness was prosecuted for perjury and thereby effectively drove that witness off the stand holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness