agree with the pluraJiiy that “ ‘ “the ‘fact that is of consequence’ is the reasonable possibility of a zoning modification, as that possibility might have been perceived by a market participant on condemnation day.” ’ ” Ante at 139 n 32 (emphasis in the original). Where the plurality and I differ is with regard to whether evidence of a posttaking rezoning makes it “more probable” that a “reasonable possibility” of rezoning existed at the time of the taking. I agree with the plurality that the fact that the property was subsequently rezoned does not necessarily mean that a “reasonable possibility” of a rezoning existed at the time of the taking. However, the fact that the property was subsequently rezoned makes it “more probable” that a “reasonable possibility” of 203 NW2d 897 (1973) (<HOLDING>); Texas Electric Service Co v Graves, 488 SW2d
holding that ajctual amendment of the zoning law subsequent to the taking may be weighty evidence of such a prospect holding that upon remand if the trial court determined that the testimony in a newly discovered evidence claim was reliable the trial court must review that new evidence as well as brady claims that were previously rejected in a prior postconviction motion because the evidence was equally accessible to the defense and there was no reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different had the evidence been disclosed holding that the type of evidence which has been admitted as material as tending to prove a reasonable probability of change includes    the actual amendment of the ordinance subsequent to the taking holding that if subsequent to the taking and before the trial the ordinance was actually amended to permit the previously forbidden use then that of  itself was weighty evidence of the existence at the time of the taking of the fact that there was a reasonable probability of an imminent change holding reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome