appellant to press this claim with MHLC prior to bringing a legal action would serve little purpose. We conclude appellant’s cause of action under § 510 arose (and the limitations clock began running) when MHLC allegedly “discharge^] ... [appellant] ... for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which [appellant] may become entitled under the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1140. Limiting the district court’s ruling to only appellant’s § 510 claim for injunc-tive relief, we agree that the “most analogous claim for relief under New York law is a claim for employment discrimination which is barred after three years under N.Y. C.P.R. § 214(2).” District Court’s Order at 1; see also Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 448 N.E.2d 86, 58 N.Y.2d 293 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Thus, we agree with the district court that
holding that the bankruptcy codes threeyear lookback period which prescribes a period in which certain rights may be enforced is subject to equitable tolling holding that the limitation period for commencing a judicial action for unlawful discrimination in employment is the threeyear period of nycivpracl  r  2142 holding that limitation period begins to run at the time of the breach recognizing an exception to the limitation period where the unlawful employment practice manifests itself over time rather than as a series of discrete acts holding that discrimination is unlawful even if only one of several motives for adverse employment action