have violated the duty to inform at any point the alien becomes eligible for relief under a post-removal interpretation of the law. He supports this argument with citations to cases involving direct review of removal orders. See, e.g., Pelayo-Garcia v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2009). We disagree. First, such an interpretation would require the IJ to inform an alien about relief for which the alien is apparently in eligible during the hearing. It would also require an IJ to give an alien the “opportunity to make application” for relief that was not available “during the hearing.” See § 1240.11(a)(2). This interpretation is plainly illogical and inconsistent with the unambiguous language of § 1240.11(a)(2). See also United States v. Garza-Sanchez, 217 F.3d 806, 810 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Because the IJ does not violate §
holding that a precursor of  124011a2 did not require the ij to inform the alien  of potential constitutional challenges to the immigration laws because such challenges were not mentioned in the regulatory text holding that where the appellants listed challenges in the statement of issues but failed to brief them the challenges were waived holding that we review constitutional challenges de novo holding that courts should exercise judicial restraint and decide asapplied challenges before facial challenges holding that challenges to an arrest warrant are not jurisdictional