This reasoning has been followed in construing the Federal Arbitration Act. See Smith Barney Shearson, Inc., 838 F.Supp. at 1158. The Amarillo Court of Appeals found the TGAA, like the Federal act, distinguishes substantive from procedural arbitrability. See City of Lubbock, 940 S.W.2d at 127. Therefore, because the TGAA does not require or authorize the trial court to address questions of procedural arbitrability, the trial court need only decide two issues: (1) whether there is an agreement to arbitrate, and (2) whether the dispute comes within the scope of the arbitration agreement. See id. Similarly, this court has previously decided procedural issues are for the arbitrator’s determination. See Kline v. O’Quinn, 874 S.W.2d 776, 782 (Tex.App.Houston [14 th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). We conclude, therefore, that whether Valero
holding that upon vacating an arbitration award the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator holding that because the parties agreed to arbitrate and both placed the issue before the arbitrator the issue of consolidation was for the arbitrator holding that questions of procedure are for the arbitrator not the courts holding that the trial court not the arbitrator must decide a challenge to an arbitration provision based on public policy holding that while the determination of the scope of an arbitration agreement is for the court the enforcement of pleading requirements before the arbitrator is a procedural matter for the arbitrator