should have granted his motion for discharge under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191 because the state filed its first formal charges more than 175 days after his arrest for the crimes of which he was convicted. He also contends the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss because the statute of limitations had run on all counts. Prosecution for a second or third degree felony “must be commenced within 3 years after it is committed.” § 776.16(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). We reverse and remand with directions that he be discharged. An arrest warrant having issued in Leon County, Mr. Doctor was arrested on November 2, 2005, and booked on sixteen Leon County felonies on November 5, 2005, in Pasco County. See Trainer v. Broome, 666 So.2d 1019, 1020 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (<HOLDING>). A “person is taken into custody ... when the
holding that if evidence exists disclosing that an individual was booked into custody for a specific offense one must presume that the individual was in fact arrested for that offense citing perkins v state 457 so2d 1053 1055 fla 1st dca 1984 holding that that the trial court erred when it determined that firstdegree sexual offense was an aggravated offense holding that state and federal authorities can prosecute an individual for the same offense holding that the application of the enhancement for using a firearm in connection with another felony offense is proper only if there is a clear connection between the firearm that was used in the other offense and the one that was used in the offense of conviction holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a charge on the lesserincluded offense when the evidence showed either the commission of the completed offense as charged or the commission of no offense such that the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser offense