in detail in Part III.A, neither the Original nor the First Amended Complaints stated a claim for compensation discrimination. Therefore the statute of limitation was not tolled for that claim as it would have been for the promotion discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation claims properly raised. IV Plaintiffs have also challenged the district court’s order decertifying the compensation discrimination class. To the extent Plaintiffs are challenging the district court’s decision to decertify the post-2000 compensation discrimination class, the district court did not abuse its discretion because the named Plaintiffs concede that they do not have standing with regard to the post-2000 claim. See Lierboe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 350 F.3d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). To the extent Plaintiffs are challenging the
holding that after a class is certified the controversy may exist  between a named defendant and a member of the class represented by the named plaintiff even though the claim of the named plaintiff has become moot holding that a district of columbia consumer protection statute that authorized representative actions and did not reference class action requirements or mandate class certification was a separate and distinct procedural vehicle from a class action and thus did not constitute a class action under cafa holding that putative class members are not parties to an action prior to class certification holding that named plaintiff who did not have a viable claim against defendant could not serve as a class representative and vacating class certification accordingly holding that where named plaintiff was employee of class counsel district court did not abuse its discretion by denying class certification