recurrent problem of unexplained and inordinate post-trial delay in the review of courts-martial.” Final Brief at 10. Article 66, UCMJ, expressly limits the Courts of Criminal Appeals’ exercise of this unique sentencing power to matters in the “entire record” before them. This limitation on the sentence approval powers under Article 66, UCMJ, is consistent with the intent of Congress to provide each individual military accused “a specially suited sentence.” See United States v. Stene, 7 USCMA 277, 281, 22 CMR 67, 71 (1956). Clearly, its exercise as a judicial tool to remedy unevidenced problems in the military justice system at large is inconsistent with this statutory purpose and “ultra vires.” See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505-07, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Finally, I am aware that a majority of this
holding that in order to conclude that federal constitutional error is harmless court must find that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt holding an issue must be raised to and ruled upon by the trial court in order to be preserved for review holding that the interests preserved by the doctrine of harmless error cannot be lightly and casually ig nored in order to chastise what court viewed as prosecutorial overreaching holding that a court may not disregard the doctrine of harmless error simply in order to chastise what the court views as prosecutorial overreaching  quoting united states v hasting 461 us 499 507 103 sct 1974 76 led2d 96 1983 holding that the point on appeal and the objection in the trial court must be the same in order for it to be preserved for appeal