the remand order in CV-29. And as the district court’s order in CV 29 was not itself a § 1477(c) remand order, § 1447(d) does not preclude this court from reviewing the district court’s legal determination that it had no authority to review the remand order. ii) Certification Plaintiffs also contend that federal court jurisdiction in this case was divested when the district court clerk sent a certified copy of the April 1999 remand order to the Michigan state court. In dicta, we have recognized that such certification generally divests federal courts of jurisdiction. See Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc., 184 F.3d 527, 531 (6th Cir.1999). Several other circuits have explicitly adopted this divestment principle. See, e.g., In re Lowe, 102 F.3d 731, 732, 735 (4th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Trans Penn Wax Corp. v. McCandless, 50 F.3d
holding that mere entry of a remand order divests a federal court of jurisdiction even where no certified copy of the order was mailed to a state court holding that the state court is revested with jurisdiction when a federal district court executes the remand order and mails a certified copy of the order to the state court holding that the mailing of a certified copy of a remand order to a state court divests federal jurisdiction holding that filing of appeal to federal circuit divests this court of jurisdiction to consider motion to stay court order pending appeal holding that certification of a remand order divests federal court jurisdiction