seats to as many patrons as would normally request such seats on an ordinary occasion. Bellezzo, 851 P.2d at 852; Rudnick, 202 Cal.Rptr. at 901; Akins, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 646, 424 N.E.2d at 533. The Lawsons have failed to demonstrate any breach of this duty. In fact, they do not address this issue. They did not request screened seating when they purchased their tickets, nor did they request to change seats after arriving in the unscreened grandstand area. Rather, the Lawsons chose to sit in an area that would accommodate their group. Because the Lawsons do not raise an issue of material fact concerning defendants’ duty to provide a reasonable number of screened seats, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment. See Massey v. Utah Power & Light, 609 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1980) (<HOLDING>); see also Clapman, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 516, 468
holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that a motion for summary judgment was not opposed holding that an affidavit denying what is established by ones own evidence  does not preclude summary judgment holding that unsupported allegations or denials are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for purposes of summary judgment holding a single conversation to be sufficient evidence of dissolution to preclude summary judgment holding that unsupported contentions do not preclude summary judgment