we embark upon our analysis of the Keystone’s Commerce Clause claim as contained in Count I of the amended complaint. The Board Defendants assert that Count I does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted because, inter alia, Commerce Clause claims cannot be based upon a finding of fact or an analysis of an agency or court. However, as stated above, a reasonable person could read Count I as basing the Commerce Clause claim on the PGCB’s application of the Gaming Act to Keystone. Such “as applied” claims have routinely been deemed cognizable. See Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 111 S.Ct. 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 884 (1991) (rejecting the “as applied” claim on the merits); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 545, 69 S.Ct. 657, 93 L.Ed. 865 (1949) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). Consequently, we decline the
holding that statute which prohibited gun possession near a school zone exceeded congresss authority under the commerce clause because the statute did not regulate activity that had a substantial effect on interstate commerce holding that  16913a violates the commerce clause holding that the statute as applied violates the commerce clause holding  13981 constitutional under the commerce clause holding rational basis as standard for commerce clause inquiries