entity falls into an exception, recognized under general equitable or contract law, that would allow such enforcement. See Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 526-28 (5th Cir.2000); cf. Lyn-Jay Int’l, 888 S.W.2d at 531, 532; Pepe Int’l Dev. Co., 915 S.W.2d at 930-31. One such exception is that, as with any contract, an assignee, such as a successor-in-interest, can be bound to the terms of an arbitration agreement signed by its assignor, such as a predecessor-in-interest, depending on the assignment’s terms. See Capitan Enters., Inc. v. Jackson, 903 S.W.2d 772, 775 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1994, writ denied) (generally, party assuming contractual liability is liable to same extent as party from which it assumed contract); cf. In re Koch Indus., 49 S.W.3d at 447 (<HOLDING>). It is undisputed that none of the Auto Nation
holding companies holding nonsignatory defendants who were sued separately from signatory defendants on same claims could enforce arbitration agreement under this equitable exception further nonsignatory defendants were undisputedly agents or servants of signatory defendants holding nonsignatory defendant companies affiliated with signatory defendant company could enforce arbitration agreement against signatory plaintiff when same operative facts were involved holding that an exception to the rule that a nonsignatory cannot invoke arbitration exists when under agency or related principals the relationship between the nonsignatory and a signatory is sufficiently close that the only way to avoid eviscerating the arbitration agreement is to allow the nonsignatory to compel arbitration holding trial court must decide whether to compel arbitration of personal injury claim of party who was not signatory to arbitration agreement