sense tells us that PCU was not performing any sort of public function when it entered into a mortgage contract with Grapentine or when it subsequently exercised the power of sale contemplated in the parties’ agreement. Nonetheless, Grapentine attempts to counter this point by arguing that legislation authorizing non-judicial foreclosures and sales in itself constitutes state action. The Supreme Court, unfortunately for Grapentine, has squarely rejected the argument that mere legislative authorization of a creditor’s private power of sale with respect to a debt owed constitutes a delegation of a traditional government function. Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 162-64, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978); see also Apao v. Bank of N.Y., 324 F.3d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). We see no reason to depart from this logic
recognizing in the psc context that a legislative delegation of power to a legislative or executive agency permitting an agency to declare what the law is violates floridas separation of powers doctrine recognizing flagg brotherss holding that legislative approval of a private selfhelp remedy was not the delegation of a public function recognizing the delegation of authority to the united states attorneys recognizing the medicare statutes broad delegation of authority recognizing private right of action