have not before explicitly considered — is whether we have jurisdiction to determine whether these jurisdictional facts are present. Drakes argues, and the government concedes, that we have jurisdiction to determine our jurisdiction under § 1252(a)(2)(C). We agree, thus joining all of our sister circuits which have considered the issue. See, e.g., Tapia Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216, 1220-21 (10th Cir.2001); Mahadeo v. Reno, 226 F.3d 3, 9 (1st Cir.2000): Bell v. Reno, 218 F.3d 86, 89-90 (2d Cir.2000); Lewis v. INS, 194 F.3d 539, 542 (4th Cir.1999); Santos v. Reno, 228 F.3d 591, 597 n. 11 (5th Cir.2000); Diakite v. INS, 179 F.3d 553, 554 (7th Cir.1999) (per curiam); Flores-Miramontes v. INS, 212 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir.2000); see also Lettman v. Reno, 168 F.3d 463, 465 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>), rev’d on other grounds, 207 F.3d 1368 (11th
holding that the transitional rules preclude direct judicial review of the bias discretionary determination of extreme hardship in suspension of deportation cases holding that district courts retain jurisdiction after iirira to decide habeas corpus challenges involving pure questions of law holding that the court of appeals has jurisdiction to decide its jurisdiction under the transitional rules of the iirira holding that a defendant that invokes the jurisdiction of a court as a plaintiff waives its personal jurisdiction defense in all actions related to the claim for which it invoked the courts jurisdiction holding that where the issue of sanctions was not before the court of appeals when the appeal was filed the district court retained jurisdiction