of the firearm m ially covered the requested charge. Neither can we say that any failure on the part of the district court to give the requested instruction “substantially impaired [Miller’s] ability to present an effective defense.” Palma, 511 F.3d at 1315 (quotation marks omitted). Miller raised the issue of whether he had the intention to take control of the firearm during both his opening and closing statements. Specifically, Miller argued to the jury that he did not intend to take control of the firearm, despite his presence on the premises. He thus conveyed the idea that he was merely present and that this was not enough to support a conviction. In view of this, we cannot say that the district court erred. See United States v. Freyre-Lazaro, 3 F.3d 1496, 1505 (11th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of
holding that trial courts error in failing to sua sponte give instruction was harmless because state did not emphasize this evidence in closing argument and evidence of appellants guilt was otherwise overwhelming holding that the district courts failure to give consideration to the sentencing disparity that would result was another reason the defendants sentence was unreasonable holding that the district courts failure to give the instruction was not error given that the defendants theory was fully explained  in his opening and closing argument holding that it was not error for the court to give a substantive new instruction to the jury after deliberations began where the instruction was given in court with the defendant and his counsel present holding that failure to give a limiting instruction for 404b evidence is not plain error