released from jail at the time the informations were filed against him, and nothing in our Watkins opinion suggested that he was represented by counsel, that he knew informations had been filed, that he pleaded to the charges or that he was on notice of the arraignment date. Here, on the other hand, Martinez was being held in jail when the information was filed, and he had an attorney acting on his behalf. Martinez’s counsel filed a written plea of not guilty and either appeared at the arraignment on Martinez’s behalf or waived formal arraignment. Even if Martinez did not personally know that the information had been filed, arraignment conducted and pretrial scheduled, his counsel did. Martinez’s attorney’s knowledge is imputed to him. State v. Grooms, 389 So.2d 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (<HOLDING>). Thus, as Martinez’s motion to dismiss
holding that a defendant is not entitled to relief from default judgment because notice to an attorney of filing of motions and orders is constructive notice to the client even when the client did not have actual notice holding that when counsel was present when a trial date was announced and received written notice of the date even though the client did not receive notice the attorneys knowledge was imputed to the client holding that an attorneys filing a notice of appearance on behalf of his or her client constitute a waiver of service of process by the client holding that limitations period begins to run on date notice was received at claimants residence even if claimant did not receive it until a later date holding that an attorneys unexplained and willful conduct was imputed to his client and that his neglect was not so extraordinary as to justify vacating the default judgment entered against the client