appellant could only be guilty of conspiracy to commit a crime if he intended that crime to be accomplished. Logic dictates, however, and this Court has recognized that it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act.” 833 A.2d at 796 (citing Commonwealth v. Spells, 417 Pa.Super. 233, 612 A.2d 458, 461 n. 5 (1992) (“[a]n attempt to commit murder can only constitute an attempt to commit murder of the first degree, because both second and third degree murder are unintended results of a specific intent to commit a felony or serious bodily harm, not to kill”)). See also Commonwealth v. Barnyak, 432 Pa.Super. 483, 639 A.2d 40, 45 n. 5 (1994) (noting that there is no crime of attempted third-degree murder); Commonwealth v. Griffin, 310 Pa.Super. 39, 456 A.2d 171, 177 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Although this Court has not yet spoken to
holding that because statutory variants of an underlying crime are not elements of an attempt to commit the underlying crime jurors are not required to unanimously find which specific statutory variant the defendant intended to commit it is sufficient that they unanimously conclude that the defendant intended to commit any of the applicable statutory variants holding that an individual cannot attempt to commit murder of the second or third degree because the crime of attempt is a specific intent crime and an attempt to commit second or third degree murder would require proof that the individual intended to perpetrate an unintentional killing which is logically impossible holding that a conviction for conspiracy to commit firstdegree depravedmind murder could not stand under current case law because conspiracy requires both intent to agree and intent to commit the offense which is the object of the conspiracy and depravedmind murder is an unintentional killing resulting from highly reckless behavior holding that firstdegree murder is one crime although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways holding different rule applicable for conviction of second degree murder