which we would consider the act of disobeying a court order or directive to be advocative,” and “we are loath to grant a prosecutor absolute immunity for such disobedience,” Odd, 538 F.3d at 214, particularly where the order allegedly violated leaves the prosecutor with little more than “a ministerial function to perform,” Reid v. State of N.H., 56 F.3d 332, 336-38 (1st Cir.1995). Here, the PCRA court ordered Warman to produce “[t]he entire Pensylvania State Police investigation file” for its review.' App. 80. Munchinski alleges that Warman failed to do so. Insofar as the PCRA court’s order did not require Warman to exercise any discretion to- determine if an item was covered by the order, the order did not require the exercise of a prosecuto-rial function. Cf. Reid, 56 F.3d at 336-38 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, War-man is not entitled to
recognizing that withholding of exculpatory evidence by police is imputed to the prosecution holding that prosecutors were absolutely immune for withholding exculpatory evidence in violation of a court order because the order was issued in response to a defense motion for any exculpatory evi dence and thus required the prosecutors to make judgments holding that a prosecutors decision whether or not to give defense counsel evidence alleged to be materially exculpatory which was either discovered after the  1983 plaintiffs arrest but before his conviction or while the prosecutor was still functioning as an advocate for the state in posttrial motions and preparations for appeal is clearly part of the presentation of the states case and therefore a prosecutor is absolutely immune from liability for failure to turn over evidence holding that the government is not required to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury holding that prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for their knowing or inadvertent failure to disclose materially exculpatory evidence