the undisputed facts of this case, that such inability had no effect on his capacity to intend the consequences of his actions. Salter freely admitted that he shot the decedent for the specific purpose of killing him, and the record reveals without dispute that at the time of the shooting he was leading a relatively normal day-to-day life, which included holding a job, maintaining a checking account, keeping his automobiles in working order, paying bills, and raising three children. Under such circumstances, there is no basis whatever for a conclusion that his ability to intend the consequences of the shooting was undermined by his purported inability to appreciate the rightness or wrongness of his conduct. Accord Stein v. Mass. Bay Ins. Co., 172 Ga. App. 811, 813 (324 SE2d 510) (1984) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, we hold that the trial
holding that evi dence establishing lack of criminal intent does not necessarily demonstrate in a civil case that the act is not intentional holding that mere fact that clerk assigned defendants case a civil docket number did not demonstrate that the district court failed to treat the case as a criminal matter holding that a criminal statute does not provide a corresponding civil cause of action holding that accident does not include intentional act if insured acted with intent to harm and noting that intentional acts exclusion applies if insured acted with specific intent to harm holding that the governments lack of direct evidence as to defendants knowledge does not demonstrate that its case was baseless