desire for economic domination underlies many brutal crimes against women save the present statute? See United States General Accounting Office, Health, Education, and Human Services Division, Domestic Violence: Prevalence and Implications for Employment Among Welfare Recipients 7-8 (Nov. 1998); Brief for Equal Rights Advocates et al. as Amicus Curiae 10-12. The line becomes yet harder to draw given the need for exceptions. The Court itself would permit Congress to aggregate, hence regulate, “noneconomic” activity taking place at economic establishments. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241 (1964) (upholding civil rights laws forbidding discrimination at local motels); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S. 294 (1964) (same for restaurants); Lopez, supra, at 559 (<HOLDING>); ante, at 610 (same). And it would permit
recognizing congressional power to aggregate hence forbid noneconomically motivated discrimination at public accommodations holding it essential to the constitutionality of a mill act that the statute should require the use to be public in fact in other words that it should contain provisions entitling the public to accommodations holding that the states allegation that the congressional act at issue that went beyond the power of congress and impinged on that of the state  did not suffice as a basis for invoking an exercise of judicial power holding 18 usc  922o a valid exercise of congressional power under commerce clause recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public