the law of the case, and the parties are bound thereby. 5 . Although it does not expressly say so, the mandate in Smith I plainly ordered a retrial on punitive damages against a specific party: B & W. Punitive damages may only be awarded against the defendant the jury has found liable for compensatory damages in the first stage of a bifurcated trial, and here, that defendant was plainly B & W. Given that the court of appeals remanded the case for a retrial of punitive damages on a specific claim against a specific defendant, the circuit court could not, on remand, conduct a trial involving issues beyond punitive damages, or in which punitive damages were awarded against another party, or on a different legal basis. See, e.g., Denny v. Guyton, 331 Mo. 1115, 57 S.W.2d 415, 417-21 (1932) (<HOLDING>). 6 . The Smiths also attempted to present
holding that where supreme court in prior appeal reversed and remanded for such further proceedings as may be necessary to determine the issue of accounting only trial court on remand could not consider defendants new defenses to joint venture and fraud claims determined in first trial holding that court will not consider issue raised for first time on appeal holding that where trial court erred in applying established law to the facts of the case it must be reversed and remanded for a new hearing to give the trial court an opportunity to address the issue holding that mandate did not preclude the trial court from considering unconscionability argument on remand because that issue had not been decided by the trial court nor considered by this court in the first appeal holding the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal where the circuit court had the power to remand the agency decision for further proceedings