don’t think [Daughter] would have the right to use deadly force. Deadly force is a greater degree of foi’ce than is justified.” Petitioner would not have been justified in using force that neither Martin nor Daughter were justified in using, “as the defense applies only when the third person being defended could himself or herself legitimately employ force.” Pavao, 81 Hawai'i at 147, 913 P.2d at 558. Because under the circumstances as Petitioner believed them to be, a reasonable person would not believe that Martin or Daughter would be justified in using deadly force, Petitioner was not justified in using deadly force, purportedly in their defense. Hence, Petitioner was not prejudiced by the error in clause (a) of paragraph 7 in Jury Instruction No. 65 with respect to Mark II. See id. (<HOLDING>). Although “a defendant is entitled to an
holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record holding that where the plaintiffs evidence supported a finding that the defendants had applied force to restrain him the jury must determine not only whether the officers were justified in using force at all but if so whether the degree of force actually used was reasonable holding that a finding of fact is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole if it would have been possible for a reasonable jury to reach the boards conclusion holding that because the defendant could not have reasonably believed that the third person would have been justified in using force the trial courts finding of guilt was supported by substantial evidence holding that a person is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave