other evidentiary hearing — on diligence — that Schad’s efforts to develop the record in state court were reasonable. Maj. op. at 1043-44. I note that it does so without regard to the district court’s extensive and reasoned holding in the alternative that, even considering the newly developed information, Schad was nevertheless not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his ineffectiveness claim. It also does so without regard to the state court’s ruling that denied Schad’s ineffectiveness claim on the merits. And it does so without reference to AEDPA, Strickland, or the double deference owed to state court adjudications under Knowles v. Mirzayance, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1411, 1420, 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009). See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007) (<HOLDING>). In my view, it is inappropriate to order an
holding that there is no need for an evidentiary hearing when the petitioners habeas submissions demonstrate that the petitioner is conclusively entitled to relief in such circumstances an evidentiary hearing would be a waste of judicial resources holding that a court considering a request for an evidentiary hearing must take into account the deferential standards of  2254d and a hearing is not required if the record refutes the applicants factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief holding that an evidentiary hearing is not required if there are no factual issues in dispute holding that an evidentiary hearing is necessary only if the party requesting the hearing raises a significant disputed factual issue holding that under preaedpa law a habeas petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing so long as his allegations if true and if not contravened by the existing factual record would entitle him to habeas relief