is supported by an examination of Plaintiffs brief and expert reports, which do not allege that the fire was caused by any defect in the electricity, but rather by PSE & G’s failure to promptly discontinue electrical service to the building. Because this conduct relates to the maintenance of the electrical service, and not a defect inherent in the product, it does not qualify as “harm caused by a product” and is therefore not cognizable under the NJPLA. See Potwora v. Grip, 319 N.J.Super. 386, 725 A.2d 697, 704 (1999)(concluding that when an injury does not result from a defective product, but rather from a service, the NJPLA is inapplicable because the plaintiffs claim is “not ‘for harm caused by a product’ within the meaning of the Act”); see also Ridenour, 707 A.2d at 1097 (<HOLDING>). A similar result was reached in Thomas v.
holding that ordinary negligence and gross negligence are not separate causes of action holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law holding that claims of improper maintenance and installation are governed by negligence law not the njpla holding that the admissibility of expert testimony was governed by state law holding that the contours of the demand requirement founded on federal statute are governed by that law