being suits for infringement. Congress could have easily specified the phrase “sued for infringement” to require being sued for infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271 or otherwise excluded § 1498 suits from the definition of “sued for infringement,” but it did not do so. We may not rewrite the statute on Congress’s behalf. See United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453, 108 S.Ct. 668, 98 L.Ed.2d 830 (1988) (“[I]t can be strongly presumed that Congress will specifically address language'on the statute books that it wishes to change.”). And adopting Return Mail’s preferred construction of § 18(a)(1)(B) as limited to infringement under § 271 would impose additional conditions not present in the statute’s text. See Norfolk Dredging Co. v. United States, 375 F.3d 1106, 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (<HOLDING>). Precedent counsels against us doing so. Under
holding that courts ordinarily should resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face holding that courts must avoid adding conditions to the applicability of a statute that do not appear in the provisions text holding that courts should avoid constructions that would render statutory text superfluous recognizing that when interpreting a statute a courts inquiry begins with the text recognizing that courts may look beyond the statutory text to determine legislative intent only when the statute is ambiguous