3d 1989). Security agreements must contain after-acquired property clauses; thus, if the after-acquired property clause is not contained in the security agreement, inclusion in the financing statement does not subject the property to a security interest. Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 665 P.2d 1093 (Idaho 1983) (citing Ronald A. Anderson, Anderson on The Uniform Commercial Code § 9-204:9)). Furthermore, other jurisdictions which have considered the question involved in this action have held that it is the language in the security agreement, not the financing statement, that determines what collateral is subject to a security interest. See Wollenberg v. Phoenix Leasing, Inc., 893 P.2d 4 (Ariz. App. 1994); Central Production Credit v. Hopkins, 810 S.W.2d 108 (Mo. App. 1991) (<HOLDING>); Kurtz, 534 N.E.2d at 1012 (holding that
holding that although a financing statement may be used to assist in the interpretation of the security agreement the financing statement does not create a security interest and cannot extend a security interest beyond what has been unambiguously described in a security agreement holding that the intent to create a security interest in afteracquired property must be ascertained and judged by the language of the security agreement not the financing statement holding that the trustee could not avoid a security interest under section 549 when that security interest was authorized by the bankruptcy court holding courts must look to the law of the state in which the security interest was created to determine if creditor retains a purchase money security interest despite refinancing holding security interest in insurance premiums perfected by creation of security interest