F.3d 490, 510 (D.C.Cir.1996) (noting that a co-defendant can “free ride” on the objection of another only if trial judge makes it clear that such a practice will be followed). Appellants’ objections to the process are essentially twofold: first, that the jurors were in effect “volunteers,” and second, that the court’s hardship excusáis were invalid because they failed to fit the criteria of 28 U.S.C. § 1866(c)(1). Although the statute does not in terms bar a jury of volunteers, courts have held that such a jury fails to satisfy the Act’s goals of random selection and of exclusion only on objective grounds. See United States v. Branscome, 682 F.2d 484 (4th Cir.1982); United States v. Kennedy, 548 F.2d 608, 611 (5th Cir.1977). But see Coleman v. Risley, 839 F.2d 434, 449 (9th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). We assume that a truly voluntary jury would
holding that pennsylvania national guard members could be used for civilian law enforcement because they were not in federal service at the time holding that the challenged practices were not consumeroriented under  349 because they were directed only at prospective insurance agents holding that prospective jurors randomly asked if they could serve at a particular time were not volunteers holding if plaintiff does not serve report as to particular defendant trial court must dismiss that defendant from suit holding officers did not have a realistic opportunity to intervene because they were not present at the time of the shooting