to assume or reject executory contracts; at the end of that 60-day period, all executory contracts not assumed by the trustee are deemed rejected. This automatic rejection “constitutes a breach of such contract ... immediately before the date of the filing of the petition.” 11 U.S.C. § 365(g). The provisions of the Agreement, therefore, are deemed not to have been in effect on the valuation date of June 14,1993. The debtor’s bankruptcy petition (Exhibit 12) indicates that he did not schedule the Agreement as an executory contract. The debtor’s failure to schedule the Agreement does not toll the running of the 60-day period, see, e.g., Cheadle v. Appleatchee Riders Ass’n (In re Lovitt), 757 F.2d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 849, 106 S.Ct. 145, 88 L.Ed.2d 120 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Carrico v. Tompkins (In re Tompkins), 95 B.R.
recognizing section 365 as the exclusive remedy in the context of executory contracts holding that the court was not bound by the parties agreement that contracts were unambiguous and holding that contracts were ambiguous holding that the convention and us implementing statutes do not recognize an exception for seaman employment contracts and concluding that such contracts are commercial for purposes of same holding that under the bankruptcy act trustee has an affir mative duty to investigate for unscheduled executory contracts and that the statutory presumption of rejection of such contracts not assumed within 60 days is conclusive holding that at will contracts of employment are subject to tortious interference with contracts claims