in Wilson. The CCA cited no legal authority for the novel precept that confinement not authorized by a convening authority’s action does not prejudice an accused because events preceding the action suggest that at one time the convening authority “did not intend to release Appellant from confinement prior to completion of his adjudged sentence.” A convening authority’s action on the sentence is within “the sole discretion of the convening authority” as a “matter of command prerogative.” Article 60(c)(1), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 860(c)(1); R.C.M. 1107(b)(1). See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 58 M.J. 100, 102 (C.A.A.F.2003) (noting the convening authority’s “substantial discretion” and important role in the sentencing process); United States v. Finster, 51 M.J. 185, 186 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (<HOLDING>). “[WJhen the plain language of the convening
holding that outside of rule 35 there exists no inherent authority for a district court to modify a sentence holding that the convening authority has unfettered discretion to modify the findings and sentence for any reason  without having to state a reason  so long as there is no increase in severity holding that an employee may establish that the legitimate reason for an employment decision offered by an employer is pretextual by showing by a preponderance of the evidence either that the discrim inatory reason was the true reason motivating the employers conduct or that the profferred legitimate reason was false holding that a reason cannot be proved to be a pretext for discrimination  unless it is shown both that the reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason holding that woman has constitutionally protected right to determine for any reason or no reason to terminate her pregnancy