the state may contract with a private party to perform a function does not [necessarily] transform the private party into a state actor .... ”), aff'd 512 Fed.Appx. 88 (2d Cir.2013). Notwithstanding the importance of public education, courts have consistently held that “education is not considered to be exclusively the prerogative of the State.” Hamlin, 377 F.Supp.2d at 386; see also Powe, 407 F.2d at 80 (“Education has never been a state monopoly in this country .... ”); accord Logiodice v. Tr. of Me. Centr. Inst., 296 F.3d 22, 26-27 (1st Cir.2002) (“Obviously, education is not and never has been a function reserved to the state .... [Schooling ... is regularly and widely performed by private entities ....”); Robert S. v. Stetson Sch., Inc., 256 F.3d 159, 162, 165-66 (3d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Because Plaintiff has failed to plausibly
holding that a students private school tuition should be reimbursed where parent did not unilaterally place student in private school because the school district tacitly consented to the private school attendance before proposing a different placement recognizing that virtually all of the studies show  that relatively few juvenile sex offenders are charged with a subsequent sex crime and sexual recidivism of juvenile sexual offenders posttreatment was very rare holding that the death penalty was categorically prohibited for juvenile offenders holding the trial court violated the separation of powers doctrine when it ordered the department of corrections to pay for a convicted sex offenders treatment program holding that a private school specializing in treatment and education of juvenile sex offenders was not providing a function that is traditionally the exclusive province of the state