constituting an unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption, citing to Dean v. McWherter, 70 F.3d 43 (6th Cir.1995). In that case, the Court of Appeals opined that an irrebuttable presumption “can only violate due process if it operates to deprive convicted sex offenders of a protected interest.” Id. at 46. The court, therefore, held that a Tennessee statute declaring sex offenders mentally ill did not create an unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption because reputation, under federal constitutional law, is not in and of itself protected under the due process clause unless it is linked to another deprivation of life, liberty, or property, such as involuntary commitment to a mental hospital. Id. at 45 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976) (<HOLDING>)). While an accurate description of federal
holding the right to marry is a central part of the liberty protected by the due process clause holding that damage to reputation alone does not trigger due process protections for purposes of 42 usc  1983 holding that reputation is not protected under the federal due process clause in the absence of a more tangible injury creating the socalled stigmaplus line of federal cases concerning reputation holding that a state tort claim is a species of property protected by the due process clause holding a judgment in the absence of notice violates due process rights