section 362(a), in enumerating which actions are stayed, differentiates between the debtor, property of the debtor, and property of the estate. In specifying the duration of the automatic stay, paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 362(c) distinguish between acts against property of the estate (the stay continues so long as property remains property of the estate) and all other acts (the stay continues until the case is closed or dismissed or until a discharge is granted or denied). The language “with respect to the debtor” in 11 U.S.C. section 362(c)(3)(A) has therefore been an occasion for some bankruptcy courts to “differentiate between the debtor, property of the debtor, and property of the estate”. See, e.g., Jumpp v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 356 Bankr. 789, 794 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>). Other courts do not see those distinctions
holding that the automatic stay did not bar the filing of a proof of claim where the debtor actively litigated a separate action during the pending bankruptcy proceeding because to permit the automatic stay provision to be used as a trump card played after an unfavorable result was reached  would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the automatic stay holding that the automatic stay terminates as to the debtor personally and as to his nonestate property but that the stay persists as to property of the bankruptcy estate holding that if property is not part of the individuals estate at the time he files a bankruptcy petition no automatic stay provision applies to the property holding that the bankruptcy court relinquishes jurisdiction over estate property when it grants relief from the automatic stay holding that although the automatic stay only applies to proceedings against the debtor  counterclaims seeking affirmative relief against a debtor implicate the automatic stay