could not have been convicted under subsection (a) (1), for at the time of his crime, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53-21 (1996) did not contain subparts (a) and (b). See Note 2, supra. 10 . Although the IJ did not cite specifically to subsection (b) of § 16, it is apparent from his reference to violence as "inherent” in the crime of risk of injury to a minor that he was relying on subsection (b). Additionally, as discussed below, the Connecticut Supreme Court has held that physical force is not a required element of the offense of risk of injury to a minor under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53-21. See State v. Rivera, 260 Conn. 486, 492, 798 A.2d 958 (2002). Thus, it would not constitute a "crime of violence” under the definition in § 16(a). See also In re Sweetser, 22 I. & N. Dec. 709 (BIA 1999)(en banc)(<HOLDING>). 11 . In Taylor, the Supreme Court addressed
holding that sexual assault of a child qualified as crime of violence under 18 usc  16 holding that an aliens conviction for criminally negligent child abuse under colorado law for leaving a child unattended in abathtub did not constitute a crime of violence holding that an aliens psas conviction was not a crime of violence under 18 usc  16a that would render the alien removable as an aggravated felon holding that a conviction under colorevstat  186401 for criminally negligent child abuse was not a crime of violence under 18 usc  16a because physical force was not an element of that crime holding that kidnapping is a crime of violence which necessarily involves the threatened use of physical force under 18 usc  924