and performance begun). The Performance Contract was effective on May 31, 1996, and was signed by the parties in early June of that year. Anderson admitted during his deposition that he was aware of the Performance Contract long before the contract was entered into. Despite this knowledge, Anderson did not object at any of the public meetings held on the subject, and did not file his lawsuit until several months after Trane had begun its performance of the contract. Anderson never requested a preliminary injunction, and did not even request a permanent injunction until he amended his complaint in October 1996. The trial court denied Anderson’s request for a permanent injunction, and the trial court’s order was not superseded by Anderson’s appeal. See Masonry Arts, 628 So.2d at 335 (<HOLDING>). Trane has now completed the installation of
holding that a similar denial was not superseded because the appellant did not seek a stay of the trial courts order holding that because trial courts order did not dispose of the defendants counterclaim that order was not a final judgment that would support an appeal holding that appeal from denial of rule 60b motion raised for review only the district courts order of denial and not the underlying judgment itself holding that although appellant filed a proposed jury charge appellant did not preserve error because trial court did not endorse proposed charge and appellant did not call trial courts attention to the portions of the proposed charge that were complained about on appeal holding that res judicata did not apply where a trial courts order was not a final judgment