not a first degree murder case. PCRA Court Order, dated May 24, 2014, at 4. Regardless of whether the PCRA court conflated trial counsel’s opening and closing remarks in its discussion of this claim, we find no error in the court’s ultimate conclusion that Appellant is not entitled to relief. We agree with the Commonwealth that the ineffectiveness claim fails for lack of arguable merit because the challenged closing remarks of trial counsel did not concede that Appellant committed first degree murder. Rather, when read in their entirety, the remarks supported the defense theory that Appellant committed the offense of criminal homicide, but was not culpable of first degree murder because he lacked the specific intent to kill. See Commonwealth v. Reid, - Pa. -, 99 A.3d 470, 507 (2014) (<HOLDING>). Trial counsel’s statement, in context, is as
recognizing that trial courts have discretion in regulating comments to be made in closing arguments holding that when determining the adequacy of a jury charge an appellate court should look to the record and the closing arguments to place the words of the judge in context recognizing that a lawyers comments during closing argument may explain away the alleged prejudicial effect of the opposing parties closing argument comments holding that because closing arguments do not constitute evidence a prosecutors statement did not implicate the confrontation clause holding that to obtain the proper context of a challenged statement made during closing arguments the court must recount in its entirety the portion of the closing argument wherein those statements appear