by geographic location, or by any other discrete criteria. See, e.g., Tawes, 340 S.W.3d at 428 (addressing sufficiency of idéntification of individual as a member of a group in joint operating agreement in order to qualify for third-party beneficiary status); Brown, 52 S.W.3d at 170 (addressing sufficiency of identification of individual in decree in order to qualify for third-party beneficiary status). We have not located, and Appellants have not cited, any case supporting the proposition that persons who in a contract are unnamed, unidentified by address or by property description, and are unidentifiable by membership in a specifically defined, discrete, limited group can be intended by the contracting parties to be beneficiaries of that contract. Compare Stine, 80 S.W.3d at 588 (<HOLDING>), with Brown, 52 S.W.3d at 170 (holding
holding decrees failure to identify attorney by name was insufficient to confer thirdparty beneficiary status on him concerning decrees allocation of the payment of his fees holding that the thirdparty beneficiary theory did not apply recognizing common law cause of action as thirdparty beneficiary holding that courts considering government contracts must take a more narrow view of thirdparty beneficiary status  and apply a more stringent test to determine whether a third party qualifies for beneficiary status holding decrees identification of person by name was sufficiently specific for purposes of thirdparty beneficiary status