novo review of legal issues). The only real question, then, is whether we take the BIA at its word when it claims that it reviewed only for clear error, or instead look at its actual mode of analysis in rejecting the IJ’s credibility determinations. We think that under these rare circumstances — where an IJ makes factual credibility determinations which the BIA in turn rejects — Kabba is correct that ,we must consider de novo whether the BIA, in making its own factual findings, actually reviewed the IJ’s decision only for clear error. Common sense as well as the weight of authority requires that we determine whether the BIA applied the correct legal standard, not simply whether it stated the correct legal standard. See, e.g., Ramirez-Peyro v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 637, 641 (8th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); Chen v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration
holding that although the board set forth the appropriate standard of review at the outset of its decision in this case whether the bia properly applied that standard was a question of law holding that appellate court could not review the sufficiency of the evidence  based on a particular legal standard because that standard was not submitted to the jury and no party objected to the charge on this ground or requested that the jury be charged using this standard holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion holding that even though the court does not usually apply the clearly erroneous standard to mixed questions of fact and law this standard is properly applied to the materiality issue holding the manifest error standard of review is the proper standard to be applied to the mixed question of law and fact presented by a determination of whether a defect presents an unreasonable risk of harm