definition of legal insanity and is subject to the same procedural requirements” (collecting cases)). The Michigan Supreme Court acknowledged this history in Carpenter: The [Michigan] Court of Appeals^] decision in Mangiapane was then followed by a series of decisions continuing to address diminished capacity defense as a form of the statutory insanity defense. See, e.g., People v. Denton, 138 Mich.App. 568, 360 N.W.2d 245 (1984); People v. Anderson, 166 Mich.App. 455, 421 N.W.2d 200 (1988). Carpenter, 627 N.W.2d at 282; see also People v. Lipps, 167 Mich.App. 99, 421 N.W.2d 586, 589-90 (1988) (“Conditions which are recognized as defenses to [a specific intent] crime include intoxication, insanity and diminished capacity”); People v. Paris, 166 Mich.App. 276, 420 N.W.2d 184, 186 (1988) (<HOLDING>); People v. Kvam, 160 Mich.App. 189, 408 N.W.2d
holding that the prosecutor does not have general discovery rights because michigan law requires a defendant to disclose only a defense of insanity or diminished capacity citing mcl  76820a holding that insanity is a complete defense to the criminal charge holding that a defendants insanity due to voluntary intoxication is not a defense holding that diminished capacity is a defense only to specific intent crimes holding that defense counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for presenting a diminished capacity defense as opposed to a defense of legal insanity