pretrial motions filed with the court, and the documents exchanged by the parties, Woods knew that at least on the planned day of trial, October 13, 2003, that some witnesses were S. Ct. 757, 102 L. Ed. 2d 927 (1989) (same); Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508, 104 S. Ct. 2543, 81 L. Ed. 2d 437 (1984) (same), overruled in part on other grounds by Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 173 L. Ed. 2d 266 (2009); United States v. Grigsby, 633 Fed. Appx. 696, 697 (10th Cir.) (unpublished opinion) (noting that to the extent the defendant asserted evidence would prove he did not commit the charged crime, his knowing guilty plea foreclosed any collateral attack on the conviction), cert. denied 136 S. Ct. 2031 (2016); Crow v. United States, 397 F.2d 284, 285 (10th Cir. 1968) (<HOLDING>); Clark v. State, 92 Idaho 827, 833, 452 P.2d
holding that guilty plea admits all elements of offense holding defendant by pleading guilty admits all essential elements of offense charged holding that plea of guilty admits all facts well pleaded and sentence imposed and is not subject to collateral attack on ground that as factual matter accused was not guilty of the offense charged holding that right to challenge factual basis is waived by guilty plea holding that a plea of guilty is an admission of all material facts alleged in the charge including those facts that serve as factual predicates to subject matter jurisdiction