Deportation Order was Fundamentally Unfair Finally, Dorsett must show that his deportation proceedings were fundamentally unfair and that he was prejudiced by this unfairness. Neither section 1326(d), nor Mendoza-Lopez specify what constitutes a “fundamentally unfair” deportation order. See Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 889 n. 17, 107 S.Ct. 2148 (declining to enumerate “what procedural errors are so fundamental that they functionally deprive the alien of judicial review”). While the Immigration Court’s clerical errors alone may not be sufficient to satisfy this “fundamental unfairness” requirement, the Immigration Court’s clerical errors combined with the ineffective assistance of Dorsett’s attorneys more than satisfy this requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 330 F.3d 97, 104 (<HOLDING>). These clerical errors and incompetent
recognizing burden is on alien when alien is removable holding that failure to notify alien of right to contact mexican consul was not fundamentally unfair holding that alien demonstrated deportation proceedings were fundamentally unfair when alien was deprived effective assistance of counsel holding that the ijs failure to inform alien that he was eligible for relief from deportation constitutes a due process violation if alien establishes prejudice holding that nacara suspension of deportation does not apply to an alien placed in exclusion proceedings before the effective date of the law