Furthermore, “[wjhere, as here, the BIA’s order indicates that it may have engaged in de novo review of the IJ’s decision but does not provide any legal analysis, we review the IJ’s oral decision as a guide to what lay behind the BIA’s conclusions.” Bromfield v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir.2008) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the IJ recognized and applied the Frentescu factors. Torres’s reliance on In re Y-L- is also without merit. In re Y-L- applies to controlled substances offenses, not child pornography offenses; the Y-L- factors therefore do not apply here. See Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 276. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction Torres’s claim that the IJ or the BIA misapplied or mis-weighed the Frentescu factors. See Pechenkov, 705 F.3d at 447-48 (<HOLDING>). The weighing of these factors is a
holding that rule 27 is not appropriate where the petitioner seeks discovery of unknown information that the petitioner hopes will assist it in the future when the petitioner applies for judicial relief holding that because the petitioner failed in the petition to set forth facts known to petitioner or state that petitioner has no knowledge of facts regarding the name and address of any judicially appointed guardian or person or agency awarded custody of the child by a court and failed to attach the existing custody order to the petition it was facially defective and did not confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the trial court holding that the state courts determination that the petitioner could not show prejudice because he did not allege that the witness was available to testify was a reasonable application of federal law to the facts of the case holding that the state court ruling was objectively unreasonable where prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence that the petitioner murdered a known drug dealer although the state established that the petitioner planned to rob drug dealers for drugs or money the victim was a known drug dealer who kept drugs in his freezer and that freezer was open and empty after the homicide the petitioner and the victim had engaged in drug transactions in the past the petitioner had a motive because he had seen the victim make a pass at the petitioners girlfriend and the petitioner had possessed and once purchased the murder weapon and a similar gun was seen in his home two weeks before the murder evidence placing the petitioner at the scene was conspicuously absent leaving only a reasonable speculation that the petitioner was present holding that where petitioner claimed only that the ij incorrectly assessed the  facts the petitioner had not raised a constitutional or legal question in relation to the particularly serious crime determination and instead had simply asked for a reweighing of the factors involved in that discretionary determination