prescription exception in the definition of the offense. Nor do we believe that the “except as otherwise provided” language is so “incorporated with the language describing and defining the offense” that all other potential exceptions or exemptions become elements of the offense. In light of the Segovia decision, and the subsequent enactment of I.C. § 37-2745, we deem it clear the Legislature intended that absence of an “exemption or exception,” such as a “valid prescription” or other “authority” to deliver, shall not be an element of the crime of possession or delivery of a controlled substance. Rather, the existence of a valid prescription or other “exemption or exception” must be placed in issue by the accused. Compare, e.g., State v. Huggins, 105 Idaho 43, 665 P.2d 1053 (1983) (<HOLDING>). This leaves the instruction as given. We
holding that the crime of rape is a lesser included offense of the crime of felony murder in the perpetration of rape and that since the latter crime included all of the elements of the former consecutive sentences were therefore improper recognizing a privacy interest in the intimacies of the marital relationship holding that evidence of uncharged incest with the same victim is admissible to illustrate the relationship existing between the defendant and the victim holding that mistake as to the age of the victim is no defense to statutory rape holding that elements of rape do not include proof of the absence of a marital relationship between the accused and the victim