is a general procedural rule, of applicability to district courts, allowing for relief from judgments. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that the specific language controls over general language. Under this principle, Rule 4(a), and not Rule 60(b)] controls the time within which an appeal must be taken. Also, to allow a party to rely on Rule 60(b) as an alternative to the time constraints of Rule 4(a) would have the substantive effect of nullifying the provisions of Rule 4(a)(5). Competing statutes should not, if at all possible, be interpreted so that the provisions of one will abrogate the provisions of another. West v. Keve, 721 F.2d 91, 96 (3d Cir.1983) (internal citations omitted); see also Dunn v. Cockrell, 302 F.3d 491, 491-93 (5th Cir.2002) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). If we permitted Washington to gain relief
holding only that rule 60b4 motions are not subject to the reasonable time requirement holding that a motion that alleged rule 60b1 grounds could not be treated as a rule 60b6 motion in the absence of allegations of aggravating circumstances recognizing rule holding that when ruling on a motion under rule 60b1 the trial court is not required to make written findings of fact unless a request is made holding that motions under rule 60b1 may not be used to evade the time limits of rule 4a in a case with a procedural posture similar to washingtons