does not compel suppression of physical evidence obtained as a result of a statement taken in violation of Miranda. Thus, it inexorably follows that a statement taken in violation of Edwards, a “second layer of [judicial] prophylaxis,” McNeil, 501 U.S. at 176, 111 S.Ct. 2204, compels the same result. See United States v. Cannon, 981 F.2d 785, 789 (5th Cir.1993) (noting that the derivative evidence doctrine is not triggered by an Edwards violation) (citations omitted). Although the plurality in Patane specifically held that a Miranda violation does not implicate the “fruits doctrine” of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), and its progeny, our superior court has addressed this matter within the context of the Edwards rule. See Roa, 24 M.J. at 301 (<HOLDING>) (Everett, C.J., concurring in the result); see
holding that actual competition is only one factor to be considered in imposing ubit holding that the availability of the icrp is but one factor to be considered in determining undue hardship but it is not determinative holding that in the absence of an edwards violation the amount of time between interrogation and a defendants statement is only one measure of  voluntariness holding that the sixth amendment generally permits interrogation of a represented person only 1 if it was the defendant and not the government who initiated the interrogation and 2 if the defendant voluntarily waived his right to counsel holding that edwards protection only extends to interrogation and that denial of counsel is only one factor to be considered in determining whether  consent was voluntarily given but it is not a decisive fact