right.” Appellant is not seeking to get the property back “as a benefit of survivorship over” his late father and Appellee. This observation, however, raises the possible alternative basis for the trial court’s finding. The court’s order states that Appellant’s quitclaim deed operated to “convey all of his interest” in the townhouse; thus, he is not entitled to any portion of the property that would otherwise pass to him as a beneficiary of his father’s estate. Any right Appellant has to take an interest in the property as a beneficiary did not, however, exist at the time Appellant executed the quitclaim deed. A quitclaim deed conveys only that interest in a property held by the grantor at the time of the conveyance. See, e.g., Blitch v. Sapp, 142 Fla. 166, 194 So. 328, 330 (1940) (<HOLDING>). In other words, “[t]he possibility that a
holding that a beneficiary under a deed of trust was entitled to reformation of the grantors deed holding that when a grantor delivered a deed to one of the cograntees therein telling her to keep it in a box and to deliver it to the proper parties at his death the title passed at that time irrespective of the place where the deed was kept recognizing that the right to seek reformation of a deed is limited to the original parties to the deed and their successors in title holding a quitclaim deed yields only such interest in land as the grantor had at the time of the making of such deed holding that because the purchase price typically is not included in the deed this term of the contract of sale is not merged with the deed