Clauses. See Bach v. Pataki, 408 F.3d 75, 89 (2005) (" 'A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exist[s] under which the Act would be valid.’ ”) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987)). 7 . Plaintiffs do not allege that the additional restrictions on debt collection practices set out in Title 6, Chapter 5 of the Rules of the City of New York, see tit. 6, ch. 5 §§ 5-76, 5-77, 5-78, are in direct conflict with state law, and so the Court has no occasion to address them. 8 . Federal regulation of attorneys is not so precluded. See Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 299, 115 S.Ct. 1489, 131 L.Ed.2d 395 (1995) (<HOLDING>); see also infra pp. 472-73. 9 . Similarly, New
holding the fdcpa applies to attorneys who regularly engage in consumer debt collection activity even when that activity consists of litigation holding that where the first amendment does not protect a certain activity there can be no first amendment right of association to engage in that activity holding that debt under the fdcpa is limited to liability arising out of consensual consumer transactions and not tortious activity holding that fdcpa applies to attorneys who regularly engage in consumer debt collection activities holding that an entity engaged in collection activity on a defaulted debt acquired from another is a debt collector under the fdcpa even though it may actually be owed the debt