violated and that they have suffered injury as a result of the violation. See Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1110 (11th Cir.2001). In Byrne, the Eleventh Circuit stated that the fraud statutes have been: “interpreted by the Supreme Court and lower courts to include a proximate cause requirement — the plaintiffs injury must have been proximately caused by the commission of predicate acts”.... This court’s restrictive view of the proximate cause requirement means that a plaintiff has standing to sue only if his injury flowed directly from the commission of the predicate acts As such, a plaintiff lacks standing to'assert, as the basis for mail fraud, misrepresentations directed toward another person or entity. Id. at 1110 (emphasis added) (citation's omitted); see also id. at 1111, 1112 (<HOLDING>); Sikes v. Teleline, Inc., 281 F.3d 1350,
holding that sales puffery cannot constitute mail fraud to support rico claim holding direct misrepresentations were not required for mail fraud conviction holding that a principal does not have an action against his agent for indemnification based on the agents misrepresentations because the principal was not blameless in the misrepresentations made to the third parties holding that plaintiff lacked standing to assert rico claim for mail fraud based on misrepresentations made to third parties holding that a litigant may not claim standing to assert the rights of a third party