24, 1996’ when the AEDPA was enacted, Appellant advances no reason why this case constitutes an exception to the general rule which requires the amendments to apply to petitions filed after April 24, 1996.”); Coe v. Bell, 209 F.3d 815, 823 (6th Cir.2000); Trice v. Ward, 196 F.3d 1151, 1158-59 (10th Cir.1999); Mueller v. Angelone, 181 F.3d 557, 571 (4th Cir.1999). Williams has not demonstrated that his case merits a different result, given his failure to identify “any new legal consequences that, had he known of them in advance, might have in any way affected his conduct before filing his habeas petition,” Mueller, 181 F.3d at 572, and his failure to show that he had acquired any vested rights in pre-AEDPA standards of review. Compare In re Hanserd, 123 F.3d 922, 931 (6th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). II. The Trial Court’s Refusal to Investigate
holding that a district court lacks jurisdiction to review a second or successive  2255 motion where the movant failed to obtain authorization to file the motion from this court holding that motion for reconsideration would be construed not as a rule 60b motion but rather as an unauthorized successive motion under  2255 which the district court may have been without jurisdiction to consider holding that motion filed under fedrcivp 60b properly construed as successive  2255 motion holding that the application of revised  2255 which would have barred the petitioner who had filed his first  2255 motion prior to aedpas enactment from filing a second  2255 motion would have had retroactive effect because the petitioner might well have waited to file that initial motion had he foreseen aedpas revision of  2255 holding premagwood that where a first  2255 motion was granted so movant could file a direct appeal the second  2255 motion was not a successive motion under aedpa