cross-examination and impeachment.” Farrow, 116 N.H. at 733. After rejecting the proposition that the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), gave the criminal defendant “a right to the blanket use of privileged information,” we held that the defendant’s right is limited to the use of such materials as are found to be essential and reasonably necessary to permit counsel adequately to cross-examine for the purpose of showing unreliability or bias. To prevent abuse and to protect the witnesses from unnecessary embarrassment the trial court should examine with counsel the records and other materials in question and determine what parts, if any, the defendant will be permitted to use. Id. (emphasis added); see State v. Thresher, 122 N.H. 63, 72 (1982) (<HOLDING>); State v. Kupchun, 117 N.H. 412, 415 (1977)
holding that a document which is given to an attorney in the course of seeking legal advice is privileged in the hands of the attorney only if it was privileged in the hands of the client holding that authorization cards are privileged from disclosure to employer holding that communications to the police are conditionally privileged holding that trial court properly refused to permit disclosure of privileged communications in part because use of the privileged information was not essential to the defense holding that accountants worksheets did not contain privileged communications