to the requested clarifications, their attorney noted that the only lien the Shermans were aware of was from a health-insurance provider. 3 See OCGA § 13-6-11 (“The expenses of litigation generally shall not be allowed as a part of the damages; but where the plaintiff has specially pleaded and has made prayer therefor and where the defendant has acted in bad faith, has been stubbornly litigious, or has caused the plaintiff unnecessary trouble and expense, the jury may allow them. ng that binding agreement was reached when communications demonstrated an unequivocal acceptance of demand terms and “contained no language conditioning acceptance upon execution of the particular release form . . . provided with” acceptance letter); Smith v. Hall, 311 Ga. App. 99, 102 (714 SE2d 742) (2011) (<HOLDING>). Compare McReynolds v. Krebs, 290 Ga. 850,
holding that release discharges only persons named in or sufficiently described by terms of release holding that a release between two parties cannot bind a thirdparty who was a stranger to the release holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release holding that a release of unknown claims has no effect in the absence of evidence apart from the words of the release holding that a binding contract was formed when plaintiff was invited to tailor limitedliability release to fit his needs no suggestion was made that release constituted a counteroffer or that plaintiff was required to execute the specific release as a condition of settlement and communications clearly contemplated that plaintiff would change portions that were unacceptable