and prevailing mood of the legislative body with respect to the type of criminal conduct involved.”). It is apparent that this language was included in the statute to help in avoiding application of the statute to such situations as, but not limited to, protected political and religious leafleting, commercial solicitations, and other types of informational leaflets or contacts such as store openings and community action programs. This language is of the same tenor as used by other jurisdictions that have stalking and harassment statutes that contain the phrase, or some variation of, “does not include constitutionally protected activity.” Those jurisdictions have not determined that such a phrase is unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., Bouters v. Florida, 659 So.2d 235 (Fla.1995) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 894, 116 S.Ct. 245,
holding floridas stalking statute which contained the language constitutionally protected activity is not included in the course of conduct definition and constitutional protected activity includes picketing or other organized protests was not impermissibly vague holding that a plaintiffs retaliation claim is cognizable even in the absence of protected activity as long as his employer perceived him to be engaged in such activity holding that a sixmonth gap between the protected activity and the employees termination was insufficient to infer that the protected activity was a contributing factor holding that the fact that employer had knowledge of the employees protected activity was not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation where the timing of the discharge was not proximate to the protected activity holding that false statements are constitutionally protected