actual knowledge of a known risk. Wegscheider, 289 N.W.2d at 170; Coenen v. Buckman Bldg. Corp., 278 Minn. 193, 153 N.W.2d 329, 338 (1967) (“[Wjhere it merely appears that [the plaintiff] should or could have discovered the danger, the defense is contributory negligence and not assumption of the risk.”), quoted in Beckman v. V.J.M. Enters., Inc., 269 N.W.2d 37, 39 (Minn.1978); Snilsberg v. Lake Washington Club, 614 N.W.2d 738, 746 (Minn.Ct.App.2000) (“Application of the doctrine requires actual, rather than constructive, knowledge.”) (citing Parr v. Hamnes, 303 Minn. 333, 228 N.W.2d 234, 237-38 (1975)). Primary as sumption of risk does not apply when a defendant’s conduct has enlarged or obscured the risk to the plaintiff. Kaiser v. N. States Power Co., 353 N.W.2d 899, 904-05 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Rusciano, 445 N.W.2d at 273 (person standing
holding prison official is deliberately indifferent if he knew that prisoner faced a substantial risk of harm and disregarded that risk holding that duty to protect from criminal acts does not arise in the absence of a foreseeable risk of harm holding that landowner was not shielded from liability where his misconduct materially enhanced the risk or created a new risk of harm beyond that assumed by firefighters as incidental to fighting fires holding that a party who can show a significant risk of irreparable harm has demonstrated that the harm is not speculative holding that regardless of the risk of discriminatory enforcement a court may not hold that this risk invalidates the statute in a preenforcement facial attack