claim is fact-intensive and better suited for the summary-judgment or trial stage. See, e.g., Alvarado, 492 F.3d at 613; Williams, 149 Fed.Appx. at 269-70. IV. Because Thompson plausibly alleges an adverse employment action, we REVERSE the district court’s judgment and REMAND for further proceedings. 1 . As our court clarified in Alvarado, "[a]I-though Click, Forsyth, [and] Sharp ... all involved claims of First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, rather than claims of discrimination under Title VII, they are nevertheless relevant because the definition of 'adverse employment action' under § 1983, like Title VII’s definition of 'adverse employment action,' includes demotions.” Alvarado, 492 F.3d at 613 n. 6. 2 . Compare Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1197 (D.C.Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>), and Morales-Vallellanes v. Potter, 605 F.3d
holding that a change in job duties was not an adverse employment action where the new job duties did not constitute qualitatively inferior work requiring any less skill or knowledge holding that removal of job responsibility did not constitute an adverse employment action because there was no change in the plaintiffs job position grade pay or benefits holding that garcetti barred claims involving speech not necessarily required by the plaintiffs job duties but nevertheless  related to his job duties holding that change in work schedule and assigning less desirable job duties did not constitute a tangible employment action holding that a transfer of job duties can constitute an adverse employment action