an action alleging alienation of affection, even when the claim is alleged under the guise of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Quinn v. Walsh 49 Mass.App.Ct. 696, 703 (2000). Thus, where the triggering factor alleged to have caused the intentional infliction of emotional distress upon the plaintiff is an adulterous affair, the courts do not consider such claims as separate or different from one based solely on alienation of affection. Id. at 704. Therefore, such claims cannot be brought as they have no support grounded in law where “(b]y abolishing these common law torts, the Legislature has registered its intent to preclude recovery for emotional distress resulting from adultery.” See Id. at 705; Korper v. Weinstein, 57 Mass.App.Ct. 433, 439 (2003) (<HOLDING>). Although this court is sensitive and
holding that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from a claim for emotional distress damages under the employment discrimination statute recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress holding claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress not shown where consensual sexual relations involved recognizing validity of cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress holding that act did not bar intentional infliction of emotional distress claim