thirty-four years of age. Although the judge indicated in his findings that he considered the duration of the marriage in determining that permanent alimony was warranted, the court failed to fully articulate why a relatively short marital life required an award of permanent alimony rather than an award of rehabilitative alimony. This is particularly important in cases in which the alimony recipient is of a relatively young age. A younger divorcee has a better opportunity to obtain employment than does an older individual who had been married and out of the work force for many years. See Capodanno v. Capodanno, 58 N.J. 113,119-120, 275 A.2d 441 (1971); Skribner v. Skribner, 153 N.J.Super. 374, 376, 379 A.2d 1044 (Ch.Div.1977). Cf. Lynn v. Lynn, 91 N.J. 510, 517-518, 453 A.2d 539 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Our criticism should not be construed as
holding that first husband had no knowledge of his exwifes second marriage until four days before the second marriage was annulled so he was not inconvenienced and alimony was reinstated holding that for 9year marriage where wife was 29years old and able to be selfsufficient rehabilitative alimony should have been awarded reversing permanent periodic alimony as inappropriate holding that length of marriage and the proper amount or duration of alimony do not correlate in any mathematical formula holding that the law to be applied in determining the validity of  an outofstate marriage is the law of the state in which the marriage occurred recognizing that basis for deportation was aliens misrepresentation about his marriage not the validity of his marriage