not object to proceeding pro se or inform the court that he had not been able to obtain counsel. Moreover, the day after the contempt hearing concluded, he had retained counsel who moved the court for his release pending appeal. We conclude that this conduct, taken as a whole, demonstrates that Mr. Montoya voluntarily chose to proceed with the hearing without counsel. In determining whether Mr. Montoya’s waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent, “we look to the record and the entire circumstances of the case, including the defendant’s age and education, the defendant’s previous experience with criminal trials, and the defendant’s background, experience, and conduct.” Taylor, 113 F.3d at 1140; see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (<HOLDING>) (quotation omitted). We have stated that
holding waiver of right to counsel at sentencing not voluntary when trial court tried to dissuade discharge of counsel defendant believed incompetent for the waiver to be voluntary the trial court must inquire into the reasons for the defendants dissatisfaction with his counsel to ensure that the defendant is not exercising a choice between incompetent or unprepared counsel and appearing pro se holding that waiver of counsel during pcr review requires a judicial inquiry into whether defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel holding that waiver of counsel may be valid absent an inquiry by the court where the surrounding facts and circumstances including the defendants background and conduct demonstrate that he actually understood his right to counsel and the difficulties of pro se representation and knowingly and intelligently waived his right internal quotation marks omitted holding that in order for a waiver of counsel to be valid the trial court must ensure that the defendants waiver of his right to counsel is done knowingly and intelligently so that the record establishes that the defendants choice is made with eyes open holding that the prior conviction was valid for calculation of the defendants criminal history because his waiver of the right to counsel was valid