person would be liable to the claimant. . . . Thus, the general rule is that “[t]he government remains immune ... for governmental functions for which no private analog exists.” LaShay, 160 Vt. at 68, 625 A.2d at 229. As we explained in Denis Bail Bonds, Inc. v. State, 159 Vt. 481, 485-86, 622 A.2d 495, 498 (1993), “this approach serves to prevent the government’s waiver of sovereign immunity from encompassing purely ‘governmental’ functions.” The statutory goal is to “‘waive immunity from recognized causes of action and . . . not to visit Government -with novel and unprecedented liabilities.’” Id. at 486, 622 A.2d at 498 (quoting Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 142 (1950)); see also LaFond v. Department of Soc. & Rehabilitation Servs., 167 Vt. 407, 409, 708 A.2d 919, 920 (1998) (<HOLDING>). The court here concluded that Noble’s suit
holding that there is no first amendment or common law right of access to documents which played no role in a judicial decision holding that absence of private analog to states licensing and regulation of daycare facilities barred negligence action holding that licensing and inspection of daycare facilities are inherently governmental functions which find no private analog or duty of care in our common law recognizing that our statute represents a substantial departure from the common law where landowners owed licensees a duty of care regardless of whether they had actual or constructive knowledge of dangers holding that common law review of a licensing decision was sufficient