We thus consider only whether the district court erred in finding that Plaintiffs due process claim was without legal merit. The Supreme Court has held that a prisoner’s due process rights will not generally be implicated by disciplinary actions that do not “impose[] atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995). Here, the disciplinary sanctions at issue consisted of a sixty-day denial of commissary and telephone privileges. Cases from this and other circuits indicate that this denial is not sufficiently severe to create a protected liberty interest. See, e.g., Blum v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 98-1055, 1999 WL 638232, at *3 (10th Cir. Aug. 23, 1999) (<HOLDING>); Villarreal v. Harrison, No. 99-1268, 1999 WL
holding that liberty interests implicating the due process clause are generally limited to freedom from restraint which  imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life holding that a prisoner has no constitutionallybased liberty interest in a particular prison classification  because an inmate is not entitled to a particular degree of liberty in prison holding that ninetyday confinement without store privileges radio and phone calls did not differ in significant degree and duration from ordinary incidents of prison life to create a protected liberty interest recognizing a liberty interest in reasonably safe conditions of confinement holding that inmates protected liberty interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the due process clause of its own force nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life