to apply only to the “criminal process and *** direct actions initiated by government to inflict punishment.” Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 260, 106 L. Ed. 2d 219, 228, 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2912 (1989). Illinois courts have construed article I, section 11, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 to be the Illinois constitutional equivalent of the eighth amendment, and they have similarly limited its application to the criminal process and direct actions initiated by government to inflict punishment. Department of Corrections v. Adams, 278 Ill. App. 3d 803, 809, 663 N.E.2d 1145 (1996). Moreover, Freed held that the suspension of a driver’s license by the Secretary is not considered criminal punishment. Freed, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 956 (<HOLDING>). For this reason, plaintiffs proportionate
holding that suspension of driving privileges is not punishment and does not violate an individuals right not to be subject to double jeopardy or constitute a disproportionate penalty holding that conviction of and punishment for both the underlying predicate offense and continuing criminal enterprise does not violate double jeopardy holding in materially identical circumstances that an administrative license suspension did not constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes holding that the fcas fixedpenaltyplusdoubledamages provisions does not in most cases constitute punishment for the purposes of double jeopardy holding that if double jeopardy clause is not violated because legislature intended double punishment section 7019 is not applicable and merger is not required