of action are community or separate property. Our resolution of that query is guided by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Douglas v. Delp, 987 S.W.2d 879 (Tex.1999). It too involved a claim of legal malpractice. There we were told that “when different kinds of damages are claimed in a single cause of action, we look to the nature of each injury when classifying those' damages as community or separate property.” ■Id. at 883. The nature of the injury or damage suffered by Barnhill is best exemplified by the averment describing her injury within her live pleading. She complains of “lost valuable rights and interests in community property and seeks compensation for those losses.” (Emphasis added). She does not seek recovery for some type of bodily injury such as pain and suffering. See id. (<HOLDING>). She wants to be paid for the value of a
holding that claims for pain and suffering are the separate property of a spouse recognizing as separate from pain and suffering holding that plaintiffs made a sufficient claim for damages for predeath pain and suffering by decedent holding that pain and suffering does not survive the death of the injured recognizing as an element of pain and suffering