to the Big Sky Property File. See Aple’s Supp. App at 185; 238. Moreover, as an escrow agent governed by Utah law, Avis & Archibald was obligated to follow Mr. Ogden’s instructions concerning the disposition of the funds. See Utah Stat. Ann. § 31A-23-307(3)(a) and (b) (stating that funds deposited with the agent “are not subject to any debt of the agent” and “may only be used to fulfil the terms of the individual escrow under which the funds were accepted”). This testimony, which is not challenged by Big Sky in this appeal, demonstrates that Avis & Archibald did not have “full dominion and control over [the funds received from Mr. Ogden] for [its] own account”. Rupp, 95 F.3d at 942 (quoting Richardson, 164 B.R. at 127) (emphasis added). Am.), 922 F.2d 544, 548-49 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). In arguing that Avis & Archibald possessed
holding a party to be an initial transferee because she was given legal title to the funds holding that an order to disgorge funds was final even though the order did not distribute the funds holding that agent of corporation who used corporate funds to secure personal loan was initial transferee holding that because the recipient of funds had a contractual obligation to immediately transfer them he was not an initial transferee under  550 even though the funds were eventually used to purchase stock in his name holding that ncaa was not an indirect recipient of federal funds even though it received dues from schools that received federal funds