address an argument despite its abandonment on appeal, we ordinarily will not do so ‘unless manifest injustice otherwise would result.’ ” (quoting Anderson v. Branen, 27 F.3d 29, 30 (2d Cir.1994))). Here, no “manifest injustice” results from the denial of Turma-laj’s petition, as the relevant regulation provides that “[a] motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). As the plain language of the regulation provides, failure to comply with the requirement is a ground for denial of the motion. See Zhen Nan Lin v. Dep’t of Justice, 459 F.3d 255, 262 (2d Cir.2006); see also Lin Xing Jiang v. Holder, 639 F.3d 751, 757 (7th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). Because no manifest injustice results, and
holding that bia abused its discretion in denying motion to reopen holding it was not an abuse of discretion to deny funds holding that the bia abused its discretion when it denied petitioners motion to reopen by failing to consider evidence of country conditions holding that it was within the discretion of the bia to deny a motion to reopen because it was not accompanied by an asylum application holding that the bia abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen when it failed to consider the argument before it