before the election, has standing to pursue this case. Because Goode has standing and his coplaintiff, Mclnnish, alleges the same claims as Goode, I need not address whether Mclnnish also has standing. See Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151, 160, 102 S.Ct. 205, 70 L.Ed.2d 309 (1981) (“Because we find [one plaintiff] has standing, we do not consider the standing of the other plaintiffs.”); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264 & n. 9, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977) (noting that “[bjecause of. the presence of [one] plaintiff [who has demonstrated standing], we need not consider whether the other individual and corporate plaintiffs have standing to maintain the suit”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 12, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (<HOLDING>). 3. Timeliness “ ‘Objections relating to
recognizing the constitutionality of at least some amount of political gerrymandering holding that case was justiciable when at least some of the appellants have a sufficient personal stake  in its adjudication holding that the term in fact within the context of the exclusion here should be read to require either a final adjudication including a judicial adjudication or at a minimum at least some evidentiary proof holding that convictions under  111 require at least some form of assault holding that a victims outofcourt identification was sufficient to support adjudication