Court considered “whether a tribe qualifies as a claimant — a ‘person within the jurisdiction’ of the United States—under § 1983.” 538 U.S. 701, 709, 123 S.Ct. 1887, 155 L.Ed.2d 933 (2003) (emphasis omitted). The Court reviewed how it had treated this question in other statutory contexts and explained that whether a sovereign entity is “a ‘person’ who may maintain a particular claim for relief depends not upon a bare analysis of the word ‘person,’ but on the legislative environment in which the word appears.” Id. at 711, 123 S.Ct. 1887 (2003) (quotations and citations omitted). That is, whether a sovereign entity may be considered a “person” depends on the specific rights that it is asserting. See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov’t of India, 434 U.S. 308, 98 S.Ct. 584, 54 L.Ed.2d 563 (1978) (<HOLDING>); Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 62 S.Ct. 972,
holding that a state as a purchaser of asphalt was a person when suing under the sherman act for restraint of trade holding that in a  1981 case it not controlling that  a black person is suing a black person holding that by the introduction and admission of the delawares as part of the cherokee nation they became a part of the people of such nation and bound in common with the cherokees by the political power of the nation holding that a foreign nation as a purchaser of antibiotics was a person when suing pharmaceutical manufacturers for violating antitrust laws holding that as a matter of law the embassy of a sovereign nation is a foreign state