justified.” (citing 26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B))); see also Schlicher v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2501, 2503 (1997) (amendments to I.R.C. Section 7430 shifted the burden to the Government to establish whether its position was substantially justified in proceedings commenced after July 30,1996). I.R.C. Section 7430 does not define “substantially justified,” however, federal appellate courts have interpreted this phrase in considering fee requests under the EAJA. See Sharp v. United States, 20 F.3d 1153, 1154 (Fed.Cir.1994). In the context of an award of attorney fees under the EAJA, the United States Supreme Court has defined “substantially justified” to mean “justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565, 108 S.Ct. 2541 (<HOLDING>); see also Huffman v. Commissioner, 978 F.2d
holding that the governments position must be justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person and have a reasonable basis in both law and fact citations omitted holding that medical expenses must be proven to be both reasonable and necessary holding that a sale must be both fair and reasonable in price and made in good faith holding that for the administrative position of the government to be substantially justified it must have a reasonable basis both in law and fact holding that congress did not want the substantially justified standard to be read to raise a presumption that the government position was not substantially justified simply because it lost the case citations omitted