of the crime at issue, we conclude that to deny Appellant the right to call Ms. Day to the stand effectively denied to him the right to fully present a defense. Weighing the harm of introducing Ms. Day’s potential silence to the jury versus the harm of denying to Appellant any potential benefit from that anticipated silence, compels us to conclude that Appellant was unfairly prejudiced by the trial court’s refusal to call Ms. Day to the stand. As a result of this refusal to permit Appellant the benefit of his right to compel witnesses in his favor, Appellant was wrongly denied the benefit of either Ms. Day’s testimony or any inference from her refusal to testify in light of her complete immunity from prosecution. See State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700, 709, 478 S.E.2d 550, 559 (1996) (<HOLDING>); see also Harman, 165 W.Va. at 499, 270 S.E.2d
holding that exclusionary rule only requires exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights and that exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of statutory rights is not necessarily required recognizing that we are obligated to reverse where the improper exclusion of evidence places the underlying fairness of the entire trial in doubt or where the exclusion affects the substantial rights of the defendant holding exclusion inapplicable because under the facts alleged in the underlying suit the insured could receive personal profits and be legally entitled to retain them and distinguishing cases where there was sufficient evidence in the underlying complaint to show the profits received were illegal or undeserved within the meaning of the exclusion holding second sentence of a nearly identical exclusion did not limit the scope of the exclusion holding no abuse of discretion in trial courts exclusion of evidence where evidence was cumulative