the BIA abused its discretion in doing so, we must consider whether this discretionary aspect of the BIA’s denial is among the “[d]enials of discretionary relief’ that § 1252(a)(2)(B) withdraws our jurisdiction to review. To that end, we consider separately whether § 1252(a)(2)(B)® or § 1252(a)(2)(B)®) affects our jurisdiction in this case. Throughout our analysis, we are guided by the “strong presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action,” INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001), and the longstanding principle of construing ambiguous deportation and removal provisions in favor of the alien. Id. at 320, 121 S.Ct. 2271; see, e.g., Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482, 119 S.Ct. 936, 142 L.Ed.2d 940 (1999) (<HOLDING>); Montero-Martinez v. Ashcroft, 277 F.3d 1137,
holding that in its review of the irs exercise of discretion the court is limited to a review of the administrative record holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute not of challenge to statute itself holding as much holding the scope of the jurisdictional bar in 8 usc  1252g to be much narrower than the parties assumed and to be limited to review of the three discrete actions listed in that statute holding that the time requirements of the statute are as much a part of the jurisdictional threshold as the mandate to file for a rehearing and that the time limits must be strictly construed and may not be waived by ferc or evaded by the courts