for Taylor to argue that the specific language in the agreement, releasing all “contractual” matters, was reasonably susceptible to his interpretation. See Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co., 41 Cal.3d 903, 226 Cal.Rptr. 558, 563, 718 P.2d 920, 925 (1986) (noting parol evidence must be capable of persuading a reasonable person that the language meant something other than its ordinary meaning); General Motors Corp. v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.App. 4th 435, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 622, 625-27 (Ct.App.1993) (applying plain language in a release because there was no competent evidence suggesting that the parties intended something different); Restatement § 212 cmt. b (noting that alth L.Ed.2d 632 (1982); Noble v. National Am. Life Ins. Co., 128 Ariz. 188, 190, 624 P.2d 866, 868 (1981) (<HOLDING>). Despite the contractual origin of an
holding title company liable for bad faith holding that a bad faith claim is a tort recognizing the intentional tort of bad faith in firstparty insurance actions holding that broad language releasing all claims whether in contract tort or otherwise necessarily included a bad faith claim holding that improper motive is element of bad faith