decision to forego a mental health defense because it was not entirely persuasive, was subject to serious cross-examination, and would expose the jury to the defendant’s other crimes. 70 F.3d at 1037. The Supreme Court recently affirmed this type of reasoning in Wong v. Belmontes, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 383, — L.Ed.2d - (2009), where it strongly suggested that counsel’s decision to forego a defense because it would prompt the introduction of damaging evidence was not deficient. Id. at 385-86. Here, there were numerous reasons justifying counsel’s decision not to present a mental health defense and instead to rely on reasonable doubt and argue a self-defense theory. First, a mental health defense was unlikely to persuade a jury. Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 610-11 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). A mental health defense would have presented
holding that defendants answer sufficiently encapsulated the elements of an affirmative defense to have put plaintiff on notice that defendant intended to rely on it holding that defense counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for presenting a diminished capacity defense as opposed to a defense of legal insanity holding that counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to pursue a particular mitigating factor where despite a reasonable investigation by counsel counsel was not put on notice of any such mitigating evidence holding that the plaintiff did not establish a waiver where the defendants answer had put the plaintiff on notice of an arbitration defense holding counsel need not put on an unpersuasive defense