to issue the claimed command. The district court properly held that the predetermined event must be a condition chosen in advance, but there is nothing in the claims or the specification that requires the predetermined event to be finite or non-random. If the condition determined in advance is an entirely random occurrence, it is no less an event. Bally is incorrect that this construction reads “predetermined” out of the claim. If the “predetermined event’’ is not “chosen in advance,” the claim limitation is not met. Although the specification does include examples of nonrandom conditions, this is not sufficient to redefine the term predetermined event to have anything other than its plain and ordinary meaning. CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the term “predetermined” retains its
holding that in the absence of a statutory definition a term should be accorded its ordinary meaning holding that words in the claims are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning unless a patentee clearly sets forth a different definition in the specification or file history holding that words in claims are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning unless the patentee clearly sets forth a different in the specification or file history holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance holding that to act as its own lexicographer a patentee must clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term other than its plain and ordinary meaning