of inoculations and pesticides implicates other military decisions such as whether to risk alerting the enemy about war preparations and whether to give a warning that might be harmful to cohesion, particularly when the decision had already been made to use the drugs. This decision falls equally at the core of the discretionary function exception. As the Seventh Circuit has noted, the decision to warn is “replete with choices” and requires “ascertaining the need for a warning and its cost,” “determining the group to be alerted, as well as the content and procedure of such notice,” and ultimately, “balanc[ingl safety with economic concerns.” Maas v. United States, 94 F.3d 291, 297 (7th Cir.1996); see also Williams, 50 F.3d at 310; In re Agent Orange, 818 F.2d 194, 200-01 (2d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). But see Dube v. Pittsburgh Corning, 870 F.2d
holding that a failure to warn is a discretionary function and that ftjhe very paucity of proof concerning the possible deleterious effects of agent orange made the decision whether to issue a nationwide health warning even more clearly an exercise of discretion holding that an agent acting outside his delegated authority is not protected by the discretionary function exception holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion holding that the defendant pharmacist had undertaken a duty to accurately warn of a drugs side effects with respect to the warning actually given but not a duty to warn of all possible side effects of the medication holding that the discretionary function exception may apply in the absence of a conscious decision 