to us after a full jury trial and not after summary judgment. Defendant had ample opportunity to support its position that Chandler was fired for taking a drug overdose, and not for taking leave. The jury concluded otherwise. We see nothing in the record that would permit us simply to assume the jury made a legally infirm factual inference. Therefore, we decline to find Maddox persuasive. In Brohm, the plaintiff suffered from sleep apnea and was fired from his position as an anesthesiologist for sleeping on the job. Unlike the present case, the plaintiff in Brohm never requested FMLA-qualifying medical leave, and it was on that basis that summary judgment was entered for the defendant. 149 F.3d at 523. Finally, we refuse to accord any persuasive value to Doe. See 1999 WL 50860 at 2 (<HOLDING>). That case went unreported in the Ninth
holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the jurys conclusion that west retaliated against arban for taking leave under the fmla holding that a superi or court judge who fired his bailiff for taking leave for cocaine addiction had fired him for illegal conduct and not for taking leave holding that accused was not in custody when told he was not under arrest and was free to leave and did in fact freely leave the interview holding that taking an individual who was not suspected of any crime to a police station and into an interview room and detaining her for approximately four hours where it was made clear she was not free to leave violated the fourth amendment holding that an employee who did not present evidence that she could have returned to work prior to the expiration of her fmla leave allowance was not entitled to additional leave merely because her employer had not properly provided her with notice that the leave was designated as fmla leave