general understanding of the doctrine of constructive termination.” Id. at 1258. Drawing on the analogous doctrine, the Court noted that “[t]o recover for constructive discharge,... an employee generally is required to quit his or her job.” Id. at 1258. The Court further explained that in both instances, the legal relationship has ended. See id. at 1258-59. Based on this dicta, the plaintiff contends that a cause of action for constructive discharge accrues when the legal relationship ends. We are not persuaded. Though of first impression in New Hampshire, several other jurisdictions have addressed this legal issue. See, e.g., Daniels v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 773 A.2d 718, 721-22 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (collecting cases); Clark v. State, 754 N.Y.S.2d 814, 817 (App. Div. 2003) (<HOLDING>); UTMB v. Hohman, 6 S.W.3d 767, 774 (Tex. App.
holding that defendant interfered with plaintiffs right when the employer forced her to choose between resignation and working without leave holding employee resigned and was not constructively discharged because there was no evidence that employer deliberately created working conditions that led to her resignation holding that the statute of limitations accrued when the minors father was appointed his guardian and not when the minor became comatose holding that employee who resigned left voluntarily where employer accepted resignation told employee not to come to work anymore and paid employee through end of notice period holding claim accrued when employee tendered letter of resignation not when resignation became effective