to Heisman’s room, it was nevertheless an area set aside for his own private use. [The co-tenant] had only been in the room once and then with Heisman’s permission. As a practical matter, Keterson did not have access or control of Heisman’s room for any purpose.” Id. (emphasis in original). Cases which have upheld a third party’s consent have all found that the consenter’s access to the premises was equal to or greater than that of the person asserting a privacy interest. In United States v. Guzman, 852 F.2d 1117 (9th Cir.1988), for instance, we held that a wife who leased her husband’s apartment, sometimes stayed there, possessed a key, and stored clothes and makeup there had the authority to consent to a search of the apartment. In Guzman, we specifically stated that the r.1986) (<HOLDING>). There is, however, no reported federal
holding evidence that mother allowed child to remain in home in which there was violent conduct as evidenced by fathers physical abuse of mother during her pregnancy was legally sufficient to support termination holding that the sound of a television on the inside of the house and the presence of a car in the driveway were sufficient to form the basis of the reasonable belief that the suspect was in the home holding that babysitter living in home connected via ramp to defendants home had no authority to consent to search of defendants home holding that the defendants mother validly consented to a search of a motor home parked in the driveway of her house when the motor home was connected by an electrical cord to her house the mother was observed entering the motor home repeatedly and the mother apparently had supervisory authority over two teenage girls who were inside the motor home because it was reasonable to conclude that the mother had common authority over the motor home sufficient to give valid consent holding that the sensible and popular understanding of what a motor vehicle accident entails necessarily involves the motor vehicle being operated as a motor vehicle 