correctly point out, “do not meet the specificity requirement of Federal Rule 56.” Posadas de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Radin, 856 F.2d 399, 401 (1st Cir.1988); see also, e.g., Cordero-Soto v. Island Fin., Inc., 418 F.3d 114, 120 (1st Cir.2005). This is especially true here because Rivera’s affidavit conveniently omits defining these “geographical and topographical areas.” But even putting those flaws aside, Rivera’s opinion, which of course represents Flo-vac’s opinion, is insufficient as a matter of law to establish a proposed relevant product market. See Flegel v. Christian Hosp., 4 F.3d 682, 690 n. 7 (8th Cir.1993) (“The plaintiffs’ perspective on the market has no bearing.”); accord Winter Hill Frozen Foods & Servs., Inc. v. Haagen-Dazs Co., 691 F.Supp. 539, 546 n. 12 (D.Mass.1988) (<HOLDING>), Second, and in a clear attempt to provide
holding that facts alleged in an employees affidavit were insufficient to raise an issue of fact for the purposes of defeating a summary judgment where the affidavit contradicted the employees earlier deposition statements holding that officers possession of affidavit at searched premises without leaving a copy with the occupant was insufficient to allow for consideration of the affidavit in evaluating the constitutionality of the warrant holding the plaintiffs general claim that both parties market their products over the internet was insufficient to establish that they used similar marketing channels holding in dicta that affidavit of plaintiffs principal was insufficient to establish a distinct market for super premium ice cream holding that interested partys affidavit opposed to motion for summary judgment and governments deposition to explore facts asserted in affidavit do not constitute distinct proceedings