does not expressly indicate the trial court’s reason for granting remittitur, this court may refer to the language in the memorandum to interpret and explain the court’s decision. II. Remittitur As noted above, the trial court’s memorandum indicates that remittitur of punitive damages was allowed because the appellant would be “adequately compensated” despite the reduction in punitive damages. This reason for granting remittitur is unsound. The purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate a party but is, rather, “to both punish and deter according to the gravity of the act * * Melina v. Chaplin, 327 N.W.2d 19, 20, n. 1 (Minn.1982). See also Nye v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 588 F.2d 1189 (8th Cir.1978) and E.H. Boerth Co. v. Lad Properties, 82 F.R.D. 635 (D.Minn.1979) (<HOLDING>). Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry &
holding that punitive damages are not allowed under the flsa holding that punitive damages are not duplicative since they are designed to punish rather than to compensate recognizing that punitive damages should be awarded only in the most egregious cases and are not intended to compensate plaintiffs but to punish the wrongdoer and deter both the wrongdoer and others from future harmful conduct holding that generally punitive damages are not available for a breach of contract holding that punitive damages are not fines