cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1047, 118 S.Ct. 1362, 140 L.Ed.2d 511 (1998); a “painter of nature scenes” selling his paintings, White v. City of Sparks, 500 F.3d 953, 954 (9th Cir.2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1005, 128 S.Ct. 2062, 170 L.Ed.2d 795 (2008); and vendors of shea butter and incense, see Hunt v. City of Los Angeles, 638 F.3d 703, 708 (9th Cir.2011). The cases cited above have come to different conclusions as to the constitutionality of the various statutes they considered, as applied to the particular vendors in each case. But, the courts generally shared a common methodology. Initially, they looked to whether the plaintiffs sale of the particular type of merchandise at issue constituted protected expression under the First Amendment. Compare, e.g., White, 500 F.3d at 956 (<HOLDING>) with Hunt, 638 F.3d at 716-17 (holding that
holding that the sale of a painted portrait was incidental to the provision of an artists creative services holding that the first amendment protects the right to criticize a grand jury investigation holding that artists graffitipainted clothing items serve a predominantly expressive purpose and their sale is consequently protected under the first amendment holding that the plaintiffs failure to set forth a time frame in which his protected activity and the adverse action took place precluded an inference of a causal relationship between them and warranted dismissal of his first amendment retaliation claim holding that the first amendment protects an artists original paintings and that plaintiffs sale of his paintings did not remove them from the ambit of protected expression