and that the error was not fundamental. In Cagle v. State, 821 So.2d 443 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), in which the State conceded error on appeal, this court clearly stated: A trial court may conduct probation revocation proceedings in an informal manner and it may question witnesses, but it may not assume the role of the prosecutor. Edwards v. State, 807 So.2d 762, 763 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). Doing so deprives the defendant of the fair and impartial tribunal which is the cornerstone of due process. See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 100 S.Ct. 1610, 64 L.Ed.2d 182 (1980). Such conduct amounts to fundamental error that may be raised for the first time on appeal. See Sparks v. State, 740 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). Id. at 444; see also Lyles v. State, 742 So.2d 842 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, the trial court assumed
holding that the trial courts failure to dismiss the action to quiet title was error because the plaintiff was not in possession of the land in question but the error was not fatal to the claim because the superior court could sua sponte amend the pleadings to include an action in ejectment holding lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction is fundamental error that this court may properly raise and recognize sua sponte holding that in admitting evidence the failure of the trial court to give a limiting instruction sua sponte is not reversible error holding that trial court committed fundamental error where it gave the appearance of partiality by taking sua sponte action which benefitted the state ie reopening the probation revocation hearing and ordering the probationer to submit to fingerprinting holding that a claim is considered exhausted by arizonas fundamental error review if it was explicitly noted in the briefs presented to the state appellate court or the state court mentions it is considering the claim sua sponte