of the terms of the Toxic Tort Revival Act and New York decisional law with respect to the phrase “injury to property” leads this Court to agree with Judge Brieant. The question at the outset is whether a claim for breach of warranty alleging consequential damages to property falls within the term “injury to property” as used in the Revival Act. The term “injury to property” is itself defined under New York law as “an actionable act, whereby the estate of another is lessened, other than a personal injury, or the breach of a contract.” N.Y.Gen.Constr.L. § 25-b (“GCL § 25-b”) (emphasis added). Therefore, if a breach of warranty claim for property damages is to be included within the meaning of the phrase “injur nsulator Co., Inc., 282 A.D. 545, 545, 125 N.Y.S.2d 147, 148 (4th Dep’t 1953) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the decision in Buyers included a
recognizing that breach of contract cause of action accrues at time of the breach recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract recognizing that blessington overruled buyers applying contract statute of limitations to breach of warranty claim holding that sixyear contract statute of limitations did not apply reasoning that an action to recover damages for personal injuries based on breach of warranty is only nominally based on contract holding plaintiff had to commence his breach of implied warranty action under the dtpa within two years because tjhis special statute of limitations denies plaintiffs alternative proposal of entitlement to recover for breach of the common law implied warranty