court entered judgment in favor of Martyn on these counts, and Vining raised five points on appeal challenging the judgment. We affirm on all of appellant’s points, but reverse based on a consideration of both points regarding damages that Martyn raised on her cross-appeal. As to Martyn’s first point on cross-appeal, we agree that the trial court should have awarded prejudgment interest from the date the theft occurred. See Florida Steel Corp. v. Adaptable Dev., Inc., 503 So.2d 1232 (Fla.1986) (under the “loss theory” applicable in Florida, prejudgment interest is merely another element of compensatory damages and that once a defendant is held liable for a plaintiffs damages “interest should follow as a matter of law”); O’Donnell v. Arcoiries, Inc., 561 So.2d 344 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (<HOLDING>). We are not persuaded by Vining’s argument
holding that prejudgment interest is based on the amount of the judgment not the total amount of damages awarded by the jury because nonsettling defendants have no control over settlement negotiations and should not be forced to pay prejudgment interest on settling defendants parts of a damages award holding that prejudgment interest is in the nature of compensatory damages and therefore should be included in judgment finally obtained holding prayer for general relief does not support award of commonlaw prejudgment interest as element of damages recognizing that prejudgment interest was an element of damages in a civil theft ease holding that prejudgment interest may include compound interest