1991) (“[ajbsent some reason to conclude otherwise ... ‘the court’ referred to the second time ... should be the same one referred .to the first time—a ‘court of competent jurisdiction’ ”); see also Renz v. Grey Advert., Inc., 135 F.3d 217, 222 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Placing the article ‘the’ in front of a word connotes the singularity of the word, modified.,... In contrast, the-use of the indefinite, article ‘a’ implies that the modified noun is but one of several of that kind.”). In addition, as the district court explained, permitting a second court to dissolve a restraining notice issued out of the first court would injure the rights of creditors and threaten, the first court’s injunc-tive power. See Nardone v. Long Island Tr. Co., 40 A.D.2d 697, 336 N.Y.S.2d 325, 327 (2d Dep’t 1972) (<HOLDING>); see also Sumitomo Shoji New York, Inc. v.
recognizing that a stay contained in anex parte order did not serve to suspend the effectiveness of the restraining notice otherwise any judgment debtor could obtain such an order without notice to the court that a restraining notice had been served or to the judgment creditor and recover his property theretofore properly made the subject of the restraining notice holding that notice of judgment was insufficient holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner holding that because the order lacked an independent basis it was an abuse of discretion to issue the mutual restraining order holding temporary restraining order void because court waived bond