at the beginning of both the discretionary and disposition clauses. We therefore cannot commingle the textually distinct provisions of the two clauses. See Overseas Educ. Ass’n v. FLRA, 876 F.2d 960, 975 (D.C.Cir.1989) (Buckley, J., concurring) (“This court has no authority to engraft restrictions onto the statute that its drafters did not choose to use, and that the members voting it into law never had the chance to consider.”). Our conclusion is further buttressed by the structure of the statute. The “discretion” requirement — which is repeated twice in the discretionary clause' — is conspicuously omitted altogether from the disposition clause. Instead, in order to qualify as a “fiduciary” with respect to a plan’s “assets,” a person must simply exercise “any authority or r.1997) (<HOLDING>); IT Corp. v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 107 F.3d
holding that a court may not enter an injunction freezing assets in action for damages where there is no equitable interest in frozen assets holding that primary shareholders failure to ensure that company employee and employer premiums were paid to erisa plan did not constitute exercise of authority an act of omission fails to satisfy the requirement that the individual exercise discretionary authority over plan assets holding that insurance premiums deducted from employees paychecks and commingled with corporate assets were plan assets in accordance with department of labor regulations see 29 cfr  25103102a and therefore that president of employer corporation acted as a fiduciary when he failed to separate those assets for payment to the funds and instead used them to pay company creditors holding that the employer created an erisa plan when it 1 paid for the employees insurance 2 contracted with the insurance company for coverage and eligibility requirements and 3 collected and remitted the employees dependents premiums recognizing that insolvent corporations officers are directors and may have fiduciary duty to existing creditors not to dissipate corporate assets