is to penalize for the commission of an offense against the law.” One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700, 85 S. Ct. 1246, 14 L. Ed. 2d 170 (1965). ¶22 Our Supreme Court has characterized professional disciplinary proceedings involving the revocation of licenses as quasi-criminal for the purpose of determining whether due process protections apply to such proceedings. Nguyen v. Med. Quality Assur. Comm’n, 144 Wn.2d 516, 527-29, 29 P.3d 689 (2001); Wash. Med. Disciplinary Bd. v. Johnston, 99 Wn.2d 466, 474, 663 P.2d 457 (1983); In re Revocation of License of Kindschi, 52 Wn.2d 8, 10-11, 319 P.2d 824 (1958). However, the full protections enjoyed by criminal defendants are not necessarily available in such quasi-criminal proceedings. See Nguyen, 144 Wn.2d at 527-28 (<HOLDING>); cf. Rowe v. Dep’t of Licensing, 88 Wn. App.
holding that proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is required by the constitution recognizing that the department is required to present clear and convincing evidence to support termination of a parents parental rights holding that beyond reasonable doubt standard not required in termination cases holding that the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof applicable in fraud actions does not apply to the proof of misrepresentations under ors 743612 holding that clear and convincing evidence rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required to impose sanctions in disciplinary proceedings