of litigation in that it addresses a legal issue only and is not associated with a medical office visit—contains an opinion that, although Claimant needs treatment, Claimant’s current symptoms were not related to her compensable injury. This medical opinion is in direct conflict with that expressed by Dr. Meli on November 16, 2009, in his office note and DWC-25, both of which state that Claimant’s industrial accident remains the MCC of the need for the recommended treatment. Moreover, the document in question—a doctor’s letter— is hearsay not within the exceptions set out in sections 90.803(4) or (6), Florida Statutes (2011). ITT/Palm Coast Utils., CIGNA v. Douglas, 696 So.2d 390 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (citing Scotty’s, Inc. v. Sarandrea, 645 So.2d 121, 123 n. 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (<HOLDING>)). Under these facts, the JCC erred in
holding that hearsay within a police report was inadmissible holding that any reliance by the parole board on inadmissible hearsay did not violate due process holding doctors letter is inadmissible hearsay holding that an affidavit  consisting entirely of inadmissible hearsay is not sufficient to survive summary judgment holding that statements in affidavits based solely on hearsay are inadmissible as summary judgment evidence