an “aggravated felony” under § 2L1.2 as long as it satisfies the definition of “aggravated felony” in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). In relying on Saenz-Mendoza, defendants fail to recognize that Saenz-Mendoza interpreted the “aggravated felony” enhancement in § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C), not the “crime of violence” enhancement in § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). Because these cases involve only the “crime of violence” enhancement, the interpretation of which is governed by different application notes, Saenz-Mendoza is not instructive on this issue. The definition of “felony” for purposes of § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii) includes any offense punishable by more than one year of imprisonment, irrespective of the actual sentence imposed. See United States v. Hernandez-Castillo, 449 F.3d 1127, 1130-31 (10th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); ef. United States v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1278,
holding that a defendant who received a suspended sentence of 157 days in jail was convicted of an offense punishable by more than oneyear of incarceration because california law provided for a sentence of up to three years imprisonment holding a sentence is not limited to period of incarceration holding that alien smuggling offenses punishable by up to five years imprisonment each were a serious offense for speedy trial act purposes holding that crimes of bank fraud punishable by up to five years imprisonment each were a serious offense for speedy trial act purposes holding that a sentence structured with three years incarceration suspended and eight years of sex offender probation was a true split sentence