looking only to the statutory definitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts underlying those convictions.” Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600, 110 S.Ct. 2143 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Kaplansky, 42 F.3d 320, 322 (6th Cir.1994)(en banc). A narrow exception exists for “cases where a jury ... was actually required to find all the elements of the generic offense.” Shepard v. United States, — U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 1258, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005)(quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143). In this circuit, the exception has been held to apply “where a statute broadly defines a felony.” United States v. Seaton, 45 F.3d 108, 111 (6th Cir.1995)(citing Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143); see also United States v. Sacko, 247 F.3d 21, 23 (1st Cir.2001)(<HOLDING>). A. Facilitation of Aggravated Burglary In
holding that the reference to any court encompasses both state and federal courts recognizing that courts may look beyond the statutory text to determine legislative intent only when the statute is ambiguous holding that when the relevant criminal statute encompasses both violent and nonviolent felonies a sentencing court may go beyond the statutory language holding that evidence of subsequent criminal conduct may be used at sentencing hearing on prior criminal charge and stating that misdeeds occurring up to the time of sentencing whether before the finding of guilty or subsequent are relevant as they go to the defendants history and character  holding that term court encompasses trial by both judge and jury