suggestive.”); Greenwood, supra note 4, 659 A.2d at 828 (“[I]f the identification procedures are not unduly suggestive, the details of those procedures are admissible and no reliability finding is necessary”). In short: if no undue suggestivity, no suppression—period—without regard to reliability. To the extent that rulings on sugges-tivity and reliability are factual, we are bound by the trial court’s findings if they are supported by the evidence and accord with the law. See Stewart v. United States, 490 A.2d 619, 623 (D.C.1985). On the other hand, because suggestivity and reliability ultimately determine the issue of admissibility—a question of law—they are both better characterized as mixed questions of fact and law. Cf. Funchess v. United States, 677 A.2d 1019, 1020 (D.C.1996) (<HOLDING>). Here, of course, the trial court failed to
holding the question of necessity is one of mixed law and fact and accordingly one for the fact finder in the ordinary case holding that an error pertaining to a mixed question of law and fact under state law is not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding holding that joint employment determination was a complex mixed question of law and fact properly determined by jury holding that probable cause determination presents a mixed question of law and fact holding the manifest error standard of review is the proper standard to be applied to the mixed question of law and fact presented by a determination of whether a defect presents an unreasonable risk of harm