to reinstate the license or permit to drive.” Section 577.04.1.5. The director, thus, has the burden of proof at the hearing. Rain v. Director of Revenue, 46 S.W.3d 584, 587 (Mo.App.2001). Hinnah, 77 S.W.3d at 619-20 (italics in original) (footnote omitted). The Director is correct in his assertion that the trial court erroneously declared and applied the law. In its judgment, the court stated: “Upon the evidence offered, adjudged and adduced the Court finds the expressed reason for the [tjrooper’s stop of [Jones’s] motor vehicle to be insufficient and the [o]fficer lacked reasonable suspicion therefor.” The trial court’s reliance on whether Trooper Creasey had a reasonable suspicion for the initial stop is misplaced. See Riche v. Dir. of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 336 (Mo. banc 1999) (<HOLDING>); Brown v. Dir. of Revenue, 85 S.W.3d 1, 4 n. 4
holding that exclusionary rule does apply to civil forfeiture proceedings holding that the probable cause requirement for the initial stop and the exclusionary rule do not apply in section 302505 proceedings holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to proceedings other than criminal trials holding that the exclusionary rule generally does not apply to immigration proceedings holding that exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture proceedings