to delay the admission of 404(b) evidence until after the defense rests because it places the trial court in the best position to determine whether the issue sought to be proved by the extrinsic act evidence is really in dispute, and if so, to assess its probative worth and possible prejudicial effect.” United States v. Estabrook, 774 F.2d 284, 289 (8th Cir. 1985); accord United States v. Colon, 880 F.2d 650, 660 (2d Cir.1989). But where, as here, “it is obvious that an appropriate consequential fact will be in issue, the trial court does not err by admitting other-crimes evidence as part of the government’s case-in-chief.” 2 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 404.23L3] (2d ed.2008) (collecting cases); see, e.g., United States v. Morales-Quinones, 812 F.2d 604, 611-12 (10th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). 2 . The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
holding that district court did not err in admitting defendants prior conviction during governments caseinchief to rebut defendants expected defense announced in opening statements that he was not involved in the offense holding that defendants failure to assert the defense in any pretrial motions did not waive defendants limitations defense because the assertion of a limitations defense in the answer preserved defendants right to raise the defense both during the first trial and before the second holding that the trial judge did not err by admitting copies of the indictments as part of the defendants record of conviction  holding that trial court did not err holding district court did not err in admitting reports that were merely cumulative of evidence already in the record