of this case there is no substantive difference between the old rule and the new rule, which provides that two prior sentences count separately if the offenses were separated by an intervening arrest. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2). Thus, Huggins cannot be distinguished based merely on a nonpertinent change to the text of the applicable rule. The relevant distinction is that the defendant in Huggins received two separate sentences for his two prior offenses, notwithstanding the fact that the offenses were “consolidated for sentencing.” The prior offenses in Huggins occurred in 1987, six years before North Carolina enacted the consolidated sentence provision. See N.C. Gen. Ann. Laws 1993, c. 538, § 1, eff. Oct. 1, 1994; see also State v. Branch, 134 N.C.App. 637, 518 S.E.2d 213, 215 (1999) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Huggins is inapposite because it does
holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act holding retroactive application of the act to prosecution that was pending before the effective date of the act was precluded because the act is prospective holding that although probation statute was repealed by sentencing reform act old provision continued to apply to offenses which occurred before effective date of act nov 1 1987 holding that the commission on remand can set the effective date of a rate to be the effective date of the original commission activity holding that as a matter of law offenses that were committed prior to 1 october 1994 the effective date of the structured sentencing act cannot be consolidated for judgment under the act