district court for leave to amend her complaint, which the district court denied “as moot” on June 5, 1997. Smith filed timely appeals from these orders, which we have consolidated. III. DISCUSSION A. SHERMAN ACT CLAIM Count I of Smith’s complaint alleges that the NCAA, in promulgating and enforcing the Postbaccalaureate Bylaw, violated section 1 of the Sherman Act because the bylaw unreasonably restrains trade and has an adverse anticompetitive effect. As we have indicated, the district court dismissed this claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, holding that “the actions of the NCAA in refusing to waive the Postbaecalaureate Bylaw and allow the Plaintiff to participate in intercollegiate athletics is not the type of action 111, 1115-18 (E.D.Pa.1979) (<HOLDING>). The question which we now face is different;
holding that a plaintiff must show antitrust injury in order to bring an antitrust lawsuit holding that an antitrust injury is a necessary element of a  2 claim holding that there must be a causal connection between the alleged antitrust violation and the antitrust injury for there to be antitrust standing holding that an employee of an alleged antitrust violator was injured in his business or property holding that an activity which is exempt from the antitrust laws cannot form the basis of an antitrust investigation