when the intent of Congress is unclear and the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-3, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984); Mugalli v. Ashcroft, 258 F.3d 52, 55 (2d Cir.2001); Sutherland v. Reno, 228 F.3d 171, 174 (2d Cir.2000). In contrast to situations where the agency is interpreting a statute it is charged with administering, we owe no deference to the BIA’s interpretation of state or federal criminal laws, because the BIA is not charged with administering those laws. See Sutherland, 228 F.3d at 174. Thus, we review the BIA’s interpretation of state criminal statutes de novo. Id. (citing Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d 253, 262 (2d Cir.2000)); see also Sui v. INS, 250 F.3d 105, 112-13 (2d Cir.2001)(<HOLDING>). DISCUSSION An alien may be deported if, while
holding that a court of appeals should review de novo a district courts determination of state law holding that bias interpretation of immigration law is entitled to deference except where the interpretation is clearly contrary to the plain and sensible meaning of the statute holding statutory interpretation is subject to de novo review holding that the ninth circuit erred by failing to defer to the bias reasonable interpretation of the ina holding that a court should afford deference to the bias interpretation if reasonable of the phrase aggravated felony set forth in the ina but the court should review de novo the bias determination of whether the elements of a statelaw conviction met that interpretation