Fadeyi v. Planned Parenthood Association of Lubbock, Inc., 160 F.3d 1048, 1052 (5th Cir.1998); LaRocca v. Precision Motorcars, Inc., 45 F.Supp.2d 762, 774-77 (D.Neb.1999); O’Neal v. Ferguson Construction Co., 35 F.Supp.2d 832, 837-38 (D.N.M.1999); Williams v. United Dairy Farmers, 20 F.Supp.2d 1193, 1201-02 (S.D.Ohio 1998); Lane v. Ogden Entertainment, Inc., 13 F.Supp.2d 1261, 1272 (M.D.Ala.1998). Those courts that have held that at-will employees cannot establish the necessary contractual relationship to invoke the provisions of Section 1981 have relied upon the governing state law to form their conclusions that no contract existed. Henry v. Trammell Crow SE, Inc., 34 F.Supp.2d 629, 634 (W.D.Tenn.1998); see, e.g., Wilmer v. Tennessee Eastman Co., 919 F.2d 1160 (6th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). The Sixth Circuit, however, has not concluded
holding that an atwill employee may not recover for discriminatory discharge under section 1981 because the atwill relationship was not sufficiently contractual under tennessee law holding that atwill employees have no contractual relationship with their employers to support a cause of action under section 1981 holding that an atwill employee may bring a cause of action under section 1981 holding that an atwill employee may sue under  1981 for racially discriminatory termination holding that an atwill employment relationship is contractual and may serve as a predicate contract for a  1981 claim