at issue, it was revocable at the pleasure of the grantor); Oliver v. Hook, 47 Md. 301, 311 (1877) (“[A] user [that] has been by sufferance and permission only ... [is] but a license, revocable at pleasure, and ... confer[s] no right in the way. It simply relieve[s] the [party] from being a trespasser ....” (citation omitted)); Goss v. C.A.N. Wildlife Trust, Inc., 157 Md.App. 447, 457, 852 A.2d 996, 1002 (2004) (stating that “a license is merely a personal privilege to do some particular act ... on [another’s] land without possessing any estate or interest therein, while an easement is an interest in land that grants the right to use that land for a specific purpose” (internal quotations omitted)); State ex rel. Shorett v. Blue Ridge Club, 22 Wash.2d 487, 156 P.2d 667, 671 (1945) (<HOLDING>). In conclusion, based on the record before us,
holding that public use of a beach was presumed to have originated by permission and to have continued as a license until some act  of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege holding that a beach bordering on puget sound used extensively for public recreation was completely wild open vacant unoccupied and in its natural state and therefore public use was presumed to have originated by permission until some act  of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege holding that the public use exception was not applicable because the injury to the tenants employee occurred in an area of the leased premises that was not open to the public but was used only by employees holding that the use of a corset spring device was public although the use was by its nature not visible to the general public holding that because public use of a beach was permissive the public was a licensee and as such could be excluded from the whole area at any time by the title owner