argument, the trial court appropriately allowed the Pratts time to respond to the issue with their own memorandum. Thus, the Pratts were not blind-sided or otherwise prejudiced by the trial court’s decision to consider the Defendants’ judicial privilege argument. ¶ 14 We also conclude that the trial court’s decision to strike the Pratts’ memorandum as unauthorized after it was filed one month too late also falls within the trial court’s broad discretion to manage the case before it. See Adams v. Portage Irrigation, Reservoir & Power Co., 95 Utah 1, 72 P.2d 648, 651 (1937). Cf. Barnard v. Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243, 249 (Utah 1993) (noting that trial courts have the power to impose sanctions to control the proceedings before them); Johnson v. Peck, 90 Utah 544, 63 P.2d 251, 253-54 (1936) (<HOLDING>). While the Pratts claim they are prejudiced by
holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the withdrawal of the juiy trial waiver holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the incomplete and late submission of expert reports was not harmless holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give a mere inspection instruction in a firearm possession case holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing amendments to pleadings because they came too late holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding violation was willful and substantial