aside the order of the circuit court. The sole issue in this appeal centers upon whether Waterman’s petition of nomination for the Office of Judge of the 30th Judicial Circuit, 9th Division, is fatally defective under KRS 118A.060(2) and (3). A thorough analysis of the applicable statute is thus required. Subsection (2) of KRS 118A.060 states in part: at least two registered voters to sign the petition and also intended that the failure to do so would be fatal. The reasoning behind such a mandatory provision is to ensure that the voters who sign a petition are eligible to vote for that candidate. However, we believe the provision requiring the voters to be sworn before an officer authorized to administer an oath to be merely directory. See Skaggs v. Fyffe, 266 Ky. 337, 98 S.W.2d 884 (<HOLDING>). Indeed, such provision of subsection (2) was
recognizing the rule of statutory interpretation that laws are to be liberally construed so as to reach a substantially correct result and the court should to every reasonable extent interpret such provisions as directory rather than mandatory holding that pleadings under the rico act are to be liberally construed holding that coas should be construed liberally holding that the workers compensation act is to be liberally construed and reasonable doubts as to construction are to be resolved in favor of coverage holding that only if provisions in an insurance contract are open to more than one interpretation should it be construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured