or otherwise defending on the merits does not vitiate the objection. State ex rel. Eli Lilly and Co. v. Shields, 83 So.2d 271 (Fla.1955). The majority opinion’s premise that a defendant’s request for affirmative relief, as opposed to a defense on the merits, inevitably waives an objection to jurisdiction over the defendant’s person, is problematic. The majority concludes that a request for attorney’s fees does not waive an objection to personal jurisdiction, on grounds that a motion for attorney’s fees is “purely defensive action” and does not seek “affirmative relief,” citing Grange Insurance Association v. State, 110 Wash.2d 752, 757 P.2d 933 (1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 49 8 Ill.Dec. 31, 34, 648 N.E.2d 953, 956 (1995); Johnson v. Johnson, 233 Kan. 198, 662 P.2d 1178, 1182 (1983) (<HOLDING>). See Mid-City Inv. Co. v. Young, 238 So.2d
holding that the contract language the courts of texas usa shall have jurisdiction precluded federal jurisdiction by explaining that flederal district courts may be in texas but they are not of texas emphasis in original holding that where the entity was incorporated in texas and the shareholders reside in texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in texas texas law  not arizona law  should be applied holding that a texas court had personal jurisdiction over a kansas resident who after objecting to the texas courts jurisdiction filed a motion for attorneys fees holding that jurisdiction existed over two georgia residents who leased a machine from a texas resident because they 1 solicited and negotiated the lease agreement by two telephone calls to texas 2 sent correspondence and payments by mail to texas 3 paid for the transfer of the machine from texas and 4 caused their insurance agent to contact the texas resident in texas to arrange coverage for the machine holding misrepresentation made by outofstate defendant to texas plaintiff who relied on it in texas satisfied requirement for jurisdiction under longarm statute based on commission of a tort in part in texas