that the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense and should not be considered by the Court on a motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs further contend that in Merck & Co., Inc. v. Merck, 559 U.S. 633, 130 S.Ct. 1784, 176 L.Ed.2d 582 (2010), the Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations for securities plaintiffs only begins to run once plaintiffs are on notice of the facts constituting each element of the alleged § [10(b) ] violation. Plaintiffs maintain that since scienter is one element of a § 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 claim, before limitations could begin to run plaintiffs had to be on notice of specific facts evidencing Defendants’ scienter of the alleged misstatements. They cite City of Pontiac General Employees’ Retirement System v. MBIA, Inc., 637 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). The Second Circuit remanded the suit to the
holding that under merck a fact is not deemed discovered until a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have sufficient information about that fact to adequately plead it in a complaint ie until he can plead that fact with sufficient detail and particularity to survive a 12b6 motion to dismiss holding a plaintiff must plead sufficient factual allegations to establish that a plausible contract exists but need not plead every detail of the contract holding that defendant failed to plead sufficient facts and instructing the trial court to dismiss the plaintiff from the case holding that plaintiff failed to plead fraud with sufficient particularity but stating that party may be entitled to lenient application of rule 9b where information is in possession of corporate defendant holding that a title vii plaintiff need not plead the elements of a mcdonnell douglas prima facie case to survive a motion to dismiss