We believe defendant’s focus on the statute’s “on or about” language, rather than on the permissive and non-exclusive nature of the statute, is misguided. Under traditional rules of statutory construction, “ ‘a statutory term should be interpreted and applied according to its usually accepted meaning, where the ordinary meaning of the term results in an application that is neither unreasonably confused, inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction of the express purpose of the statute. lding statute providing “obligee may enforce his right of support against the obligor [is] permissive and not mandatory and does not foreclose the right of a person to enforce the duty of support set forth in the act by any other means provided by law”); State v. Suarez, 793 P.2d 934, 937 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that section 77-7-9 merely sets
holding statute allowing court to excuse jurors from jury duty and defining court as a judge was violated when clerk excused jurors without obtaining court approval of the excuses granted holding statute stating that judge could excuse jurors was violated when jury commissioners excused jurors holding that it was constitutional error requiring reversal when among other things the law clerk convened court by directing court reporter to read back testimony to jury in absence of judge holding statute providing  court may require the clerk of the court to summon a sufficient number of trial jurors selected at random by the court from the qualified jury wheel  is couched in permissive terms and although court may direct the clerk  to summon jurors at random from the jury wheel the statute does not require it to do so holding in the context of a case involving the availability for public inspection of criminal docket books that files in the possession of the clerk of the criminal court of the city of new york are public records which may be fully examined by any person unless the papers have been sealed from public scrutiny by the court or by the terms of a statute