(2000), a person commits first degree murder if “[ijntending or knowing that the person’s conduct will cause death, the person causes the death of another with premeditation.” A person commits conspiracy if, “with the intent to promote or aid the commission of an offense, such person agrees with one or more persons that at least one of them or another person will engage in conduct constituting the offense and one of the parties commits an overt act in furtherance of the offense, except that an overt act shall not be required if the object of the conspiracy was to commit any felony upon the person of another.” A.R.S. § 13-1003. At the time of Petitioner’s trial (December 2000-January 2001), first degree murder under A.R.S. § 13-1105 was considered a “specif .W.2d 787, 788-89 (Mich.1992) (<HOLDING>). The Arizona Court of Appeals relied on
holding that conditional intent sufficient to satisfy specific intent mens rea in federal car jacking statute holding that a mens rea of unlawfully in the indictment was sufficient because the indictment referenced the applicable statute which required a reckless mens rea holding that where both firstdegree and felony murder were possible bases for a murder conviction a jury instruction that suggested the jury could rely on felony murder as the predicate offense for a conviction for conspiracy to commit murder was improper because under arizona law a conviction for conspiracy to commit firstdegree murder requires a specific intent to kill holding that conditional intent sufficient to satisfy specific intent mens rea for solicitation to commit murder offense holding that conditional intent sufficient to satisfy specific intent mens rea in federal carjacking statute