explaining in 2012 that it has “never held that Rule 54(d) creates a presumption ... in favor of the broadest possible reading of the costs enumerated in § 1920. To the contrary,” the Court wrote, it favors a “narrow scope of taxable costs,” which “are limited to relatively minor, incidental expenses.” Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1997, 2006, 182 L.Ed.2d 903 (2012); see also Crawford Fitting, 482 U.S. at 444, 107 S.Ct. 2494 (explaining the Supreme Court’s understanding that Congress “meant to impose rigid controls on cost-shifting in federal courts”). The Court reads these admonitions as instructing it to be wary of awarding costs that may arguably go beyond the scope of § 1920. Accord Fells v. Va. Dep’t of Tramp., 605 F.Supp.2d 740, 743-44 (E.D.Va.2009) (<HOLDING>). Without binding authority on the specific
recognizing the supreme courts precept that district courts may decline to tax costs enumerated in  1920 but cannot award costs not enumerated under  1920 citing crawford fitting 482 us at 44245107 sct 2494 holding that  1920 does not authorize taxing mediation fees as costs holding private process server fees may be taxed under  1920 holding that a party can recover costs under either dnmlrciv 542 or 28 usc  1920 holding that section 1132gls allowance for costs of action empowers courts to award only the types of costs allowed by 28 usc  1920 and only in the amounts allowed by section 1920 itself by 28 usc  1821 or by similar such provisions