of Gwinnett County); State of Ga. v. Café Erotica, Inc., 269 Ga. 486 (500 SE2d 574) (1998) (addressing the merits of a declaratory judgment action challenging a statute making it a misdemeanor to knowingly admit a person under the age of 21 to premises on which sexually explicit performances take place). Declaratory relief is not available, though, where the criminal conduct has already been completed, where a prosecution is pending, or where there has already been a conviction. See, e.g., Shantha v. Municipal Court of Atlanta, 240 Ga. 280, 281 (240 SE2d 32) (1977) (“Declaratory relief is not the proper remedy for attacking the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance where the alleged criminal activity has already taken place.”); Ross v. State, 238 Ga. 445, 445 (233 SE2d 381) (1977) (<HOLDING>); Pendleton v. City of Atlanta, 236 Ga. 479 (1)
recognizing that  1983 action does not accrue until conviction or sentence has been invalidated holding that once the statute is found to be divisible the court must look to the charging papers and judgment of conviction to determine if the actual crime of which defendant was convicted was a crime of violence but emphasizing that the court is not to examine the particular facts underlying the conviction holding that in order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid a plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal expunged by executive order declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination or called into question by a federal courts issuance of a writ of habeas corpus recognizing that a declaratory action is not maintainable by persons already convicted of crimes who wish to examine or reexamine aspects of the conviction or sentence holding that a claim for damages that would invalidate a conviction or sentence that has not already been invalidated or reversed on direct appeal by executive order by an authorized state tribunal or by a writ of habeas corpus is not cognizable under  1983