by an attorney or a party is not “well grounded in fact” nor “warranted by existing law” nor asserts “a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law[.]” The Rule also allows for sanctions when the submission to the court was for “any improper purpose, such as to harass, embarrass, or cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.” The court “shall impose upon the person who signed [the pleading, motion, or other paper], a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the other party or parties the amount of reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion or other paper, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.” The issue of whether a pro se attorney li .1994) (<HOLDING>); Pickholtz v. Rainbow Technologies, Inc., 284
holding that california rule modeled almost word for word on rule 11 of the federal rules of civil procedure does not allow a pro se attorney litigant to recover sanctions in the form of an award of attorneys fees holding that a pro se litigant who is an attorney is not entitled to fees under  1988 holding that new jersey rule patterned on fed r civ p 11 precludes a pro se attorney litigant from receiving attorneys fees because such fees are not actually incurred holding that under rule 13 of the texas rules of civil procedure which precludes bringing a groundless suit for purposes of harassment a pro se attorney litigant is not entitled to attorneys fees because an attorneyclient relationship was the predicate for that particular sanction holding attorneys fees not available to pro se attorney litigant in a federal freedom of information act action