requirement. Averitt concludes from this limited indication of purpose that the statute was originally intended to cover only bonds issued under Title 6 of the U.S. Code, which has since been repealed. Averitt does not point, to any authoritative source, however, to support this theory or its contention that we should construe “any bond authorized by the law of the United States” to exclude injunction bonds. This Circuit has not yet had occasion to decide whether an injunction bond is the type of bond contemplated by Section 1352. At least two other circuits, however, have implicitly held that parties aggrieved by a wrongfully issued injunction may sue to recover on an injunction bond under Section 1352. See Buddy Systems, Inc. v. Exer-Genie, Inc., 545 F.2d 1164, 1166 (9th Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>); Atomic Oil Co. v. Bardahl Oil Co., 419 F.2d
holding that the trial court committed no error in sustaining objection to plaintiffs testimony that the water had been there for some time because the plaintiff had no personal knowledge of how long the puddle had been there holding that there was no federal subject matter jurisdiction under the private cause of action provision of the act holding that no substantial and continuing change in circumstances had occurred where there was no evidence of an adverse effect on the child even though the mother has moved six times since her marriage was dissolved holding that there was no jurisdiction under section 1352 but only because the bond had been dissolved recognizing that only void judgments are subject to collateral attack and that a judgment is void only when court had no jurisdiction of the parties or property no jurisdiction of the subject matter no jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment or no capacity to act