complaint could reset the ninety-day deadline prescribed by Local Rule 23.1(B), a plaintiff could easily circumvent the timeliness concerns of Fed. R.Civ.P. 23(c)(1)(A) by invoking its right to file an amended complaint at any time as a matter of course before a responsive pleading is served under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). Because an amended complaint could conceivably be filed several months or, even years, after the commencement of the action so long as a responsive pleading has not yet been served, such a result would subvert the interests of diligence required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(1)(A). Local Rule 23.1(B) was written to further the interests of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(1)(A), not to hamper them. See, e.g., Joseph N. Main P.C. v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 168 F.R.D. 573, 577 (N.D.Tex.1996) (<HOLDING>). In addition, this Court is unaware of a local
holding that under wilkerson it was error for district court to deny class action certification motion of named plaintiffs whose claims were resolved after filing motion for class certification but before district court decided motion holding under local rule identical to nd fla local rule 231b inasmuch as both rules refer to a complaint that ninetyday period began running on date of removal to federal court and not on date of filing an amended complaint in federal court striking class allegations because motion for class certification was untimely holding that district court has discretion under appropriate circumstances to rule on summary judgment motion before addressing pending class certification motion holding that the filing of a class action by a class representative without standing tolls the period of limitations with regard to all asserted members of the class and that the amendment of the complaint by the addition of a class member with standing relates back to the original complaint holding that the march of time began for the period in which to file a rule 59e motion on the date the court entered an order that was immediately appealable