Agreement’ after the trial period, provided she was ‘in compliance with this Loan Trial Period and [her] representations ... continue[d] to be true in all material respects.’ ” Id. at 562 (alterations in original). The court recognized that the TPP is contingent on the borrower meeting the conditions of the TPP. But once the conditions of the TPP were met, “it was certainly required to offer some sort of good-faith permanent modification to Wigod consistent with HAMP guidelines.” Id. at 565. Several circuits have adopted the Wigod approach. See, e.g. Corvello v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 728 F.3d 878, 883 (9th Cir. 2013), as amended on reh’g in part (Sept. 23, 2013) (“We believe the reasoning in Wigod is sound.”); Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 717 F.3d 224, 235-36 (1st Cir. 2013) (<HOLDING>); George v. Urban Settlement Servs., 833 F.3d
holding that the prior courts order by its conditional terms allowed subsequent modification by other courts recognizing that if the homeowner complies with the conditions of the tpp the lender breaches the contract by failing to provide a permanent modification agreement by the modification effective date holding that denial of petition for modification of maintenance was proper when the parties agreement prohibited modification of maintenance holding appellants failure to plead affirmative defense of modification precluded trial court from considering evidence of oral modification at summary judgment hearing holding that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award the increased child support retroactive to the date of the petition for modification because the childs increased need for support and the former husbands ability to pay the increased child support existed at the time the former wifes petition for modification was filed