as well as an action “that does not seek damages directly attributable to conviction or confinement but whose successful prosecution would necessarily imply that the plaintiffs criminal conviction was wrongful.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n. 6, 114 S.Ct. 2364. Poventud’s claim does both: [i] he seeks damages directly attributable to his confinement, and [ii] success on his claim would necessarily imply that his conviction (by guilt damages for torture [would] in no way undercut ] the second, and only existing, conviction and hence [would]. in no way [be] barred by Heck,” Maj. Op. at 65. That is because a claim for torture damages would not necessarily imply the invalidity of the defendant’s conviction. Cf. Jackson v. Suffolk Cnty. Homicide Bureau, 135 F.3d 254, 257 (2d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). However, what the defendant categorically may
holding that a conviction under the registration clause is not properly distinguishable from a conviction for failure to register for purposes of fifth amendment analysis holding that the district court  did not abuse its discretion in denying his petition for reinstatement where membership in good standing in the state bar was required before attorney could be admitted to the federal bar and applicant had not been readmitted to state bar holding that heck did not bar fifth amendment claim for excessive force because a finding that excessive force had in fact been used would not necessarily require invalidation of the conviction holding that the fifth amendment did not apply to tribal government holding that the fifth amendment did not require the suppression of the physical fruits of a miranda violation where the statement was voluntary