in a state prosecution, but it cannot reprosecute him for the agreement he made with the Outfit to engage in that pattern of conduct just because it finds evidence of ever more heinous actions in support of that agreement. It is worth noting that if the earlier charge had been a substantive one accusing Calabrese of extortion, and the new indictment charged him with the substantive offense of murder, the situation would be entirely different: those are two different offenses. Indeed, the government might this time around have been able to prosecute one or both of these defendants for conspiracy to commit murder for the purpose of gaining entrance to or maintaining a position in an enterprise engaged in racketeering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a). See Basciano, 599 F.3d at 198-99 (<HOLDING>). But that is not the choice that it made. The
holding that a conspiracy to violate section 1959 is not the same offense as a conspiracy to violate section 1962 holding that two conspiracies existed where the members of the second conspiracy did not know about the first conspiracy did not benefit from the first conspiracy and were connected with the first conspiracy only through a middleman holding that a person alleging a conspiracy to violate constitutional rights must do more than simply aver that a conspiracy existed holding that the prior conspiracy to which honken had pleaded guilty was not the same as the conspiracy underlying the capital offenses holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges