an award at summary judgment. The Shermans are correct. Our Supreme Court has held that attorney fees cannot be awarded by a trial court pursuant to OCGA § 13-6-11 at the summary-judgment stage of proceedings because the very language of the statute “prevents a trial court from ever determining that a claimant is entitled to attorney fees as a matter of law.” Indeed, it is well established that “because both the liability for and amount of attorney fees pursuant to OCGA § 13-6-11 are solely for the jury’s determination, a trial court is not authorized to grant summary judgment in favor of a claimant therefor.” And although a trial court is permitted to grant such fees when it sits as a trier of fact, “it is not a trier of fact on a motion for summary judgment.” Accord E2d 337) (2011) (<HOLDING>); Anderson, 295 Ga. App. at 855 (1) (holding
holding that purported acceptance was a counteroffer when it conditioned settlement upon satisfaction of liens holding that purported acceptance was a counteroffer when proposed release contained terms that directly contradicted the demand and letter required execution and return of the release before draft of policy limits could be removed from trust holding that purported acceptance was a counteroffer when response required additional act of resolving all liens holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release holding that purported acceptance letter was a counteroffer when it conditioned settlement upon additional act of resolving medical liens that were not mentioned in offer