in the application of Ring is a matter of procedure, not of substantive definition regarding death-penalty eligibility. After all, in the habeas context, Apprendi and Ring regularly have been held to announce a new rule of criminal procedure, not a new rule of substantive law. See United States v. Brown, 305 F.3d 304, 308-09 (5th Cir.2002); Cannon v. Midlin, 297 F.3d 989, 994 (10th Cir.2002); United States v. Warden, 286 F.3d 1059, 1063 (8th Cir.2002); United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664, 668 (9th Cir. 2002); McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1257 n. 16 (11th Cir.2001); see also Sepulveda v. United States, 330 F.3d 55, 59 (1st Cir.2003) (treating Apprendi as having announced a rule of criminal procedure); United States v. McAllister, 272 F.3d 228, 232 (4th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). To cinch matters, the Jones Court made
holding that apprendi announced a rule of criminal procedure forecloses  argument that ring announced a substantive rule holding in the context of a constitutional challenge to 21 usc  841 that apprendi announced a procedural rule holding that apprendi did not render  841 unconstitutional holding the language of apprendi dictates that rule is procedural holding the constitutional rule announced in apprendi does not prohibit a district court from finding by a preponderance of the evidence facts relevant to the application of the guidelines