it would be clear to a reasonable police officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151. Thus, “[t]he qualified immunity standard ‘gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’ ” Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 203 (3d Cir.2005) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991)). Here, the individual defendants found themselves between two competing obligations: the need to respect Bernard’s constitutional right to decline medical treatment, see White, 897 F.2d at 112 and supra note 6, and the obligation to be responsive to his medical needs, see Natale, 318 F.3d at 582. See also Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (<HOLDING>). Their conduct cannot, therefore, be
holding that in excessive force cases the threshold question for the court is whether the officers conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right holding that in deciding whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity it is not only the evidence of clearly established law that is for the court but also whether a reasonable officer could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful in light of the information the officer had holding that determination of whether right is clearly established must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case holding the right to record police activity on public property was not clearly established holding that second element of qualified immunity test is whether the law violated was clearly established