decision to exclude defendant-doctor’s alternative causation evidence). While the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the defendant’s negligence more likely than not caused the injury, that burden does not “logically compel[] the conclusion that the defendant [] is precluded from offering evidence of possible explanations other than his own ... negligence.” Id. (emphasis in original). As the court notes in Haas: “Probabilities are provoked by possibilities .... In a logical sense, the probabilities may be deduced only from an analysis of all the possibilities.” Id. (emphasis added). The defendant’s ability to present alternate causes is of paramount importance in allowing for an adequate defense. See, e.g., Guinn v. AstraZeneca Pharm. LP, 602 F.3d 1245, 1253 (11th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). These principles are in keeping with both
holding at summary judgment that the plaintiff had to show a reasonable jury could find the defendants allegedly anticompetitive conduct was a material cause of plaintiffs injury holding that a plaintiffs experts differential diagnosis must at least consider other factors that could have been the sole cause of the plaintiffs injury holding that a plaintiffs belief that a product could fail in the future is not without more a legal injury sufficient to support plaintiffs claim holding misrepresentation must at least be partial cause of plaintiffs injury holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue a permanent nuisance action for injury to property because none of the plaintiffs were the owners of the land when the cause of action accrued with the first injury