him that he could refuse consent and because Boggs threat to “wait for a couple hours for a search warrant” was improper coercion. Police officers, however, need not inform someone of the right to refuse consent, United States v. Navarro, 90 F.3d 1245, 1257 (7th Cir.1996), and they may express their intention to obtain a warrant so long as it is a genuine intention and not merely a “pretext to induce submission,” United States v. Scheets, 188 F.3d 829, 840 (7th Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In further support of his contention that he was coerced, Smith identifies several reasons to explain that he did not feel free to refuse the officer’s request and leave the scene. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Only two of these merit any discussion.
holding that an encounter was consensual where the defendant was comfortable during the encounter chose not to leave and acquiesced to the officers request to answer questions holding that whether an encounter is consensual hinges on whether a reasonable person would have felt free to disregard the police and go about his business holding that in determining whether a seizure has occurred a court must consider if in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was not free to leave holding that an encounter is a seizure if in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave holding that a person is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave