agent who had witnessed his removal in April 2010. Rojas argues that the district court clearly erred in finding that this part of his trial strategy weighed against acceptance of responsibility. According to Rojas, the April 2010 removal was not an element of the § 1326(a) offense, but merely a sentencing factor under § 1326(b), and therefore the cross-examination did not constitute a frivolous challenge to relevant conduct. We disagree. In order to convict Rojas under § 1326(a), the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Rojas was removed from the United States. The government was entitled to prove this element of the offense by establishing that Rojas was removed in April 2010. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 186, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997) (<HOLDING>). Under the Guidelines, it was appropriate for
recognizing general rule recognizing this as the general rule holding that as a general rule the prosecution is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference holding that the law of the case doctrine is not a fixed rule that prevents a federal court from determining the question of its own subject matter jurisdiction in a given case