854, the Court has never elevated this judicial preference to a per se rule mandating warrants for all arrests irrespective of the existence of probable cause. See, e.g., Watson, 423 U.S. at 417, 96 S.Ct. 820 (stating that “ ‘such a requirement would constitute an intolerable handicap for legitimate law enforcement’ ” (citation omitted)). Indeed, in Gerstein, the court noted that it “has never invalidated an arrest supported by probable cause solely because the officers failed to secure a warrant,” 420 U.S. at 113, 95 S.Ct. 854, and in the intervening years since Ger-stein it has strayed from this principle only once, when it imposed a warrant requirement for arrests made in a suspect’s home. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-86, 589-90, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, in Payton the Court justified its
holding the fourth amendment prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspects home in order to make a routine felony arrest holding that absent exigent circumstances an arrest within the home can only be effectuated with a warrant probable cause is insufficient holding that in die absence of exigent circumstances the mere existence of probable cause does not justify a nonconsensual entry by police into a home without an arrest or search warrant holding that absent exigent circumstances the fourth amendment prohibits warrantless nonconsensual entry into a suspects home in order to make a felony arrest  notwithstanding the existence of probable cause to arrest holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment