is for parties to accomplish by agreement things they conclude are more to their advantage than what they could accomplish by litigation. ¶ 17. The Administrative Code prevents DPI from imposing a twenty-five percent bond requirement on an MPCP school in the absence of proof that the school is not financially viable. Travis Tech contends that the Administrative Code bond requirement— which it voluntarily accepted in the Agreement— violates state law. Essentially, Travis Tech argues that parties can never stipulate to provisions that abrogate any part of statutory law. We disagree. ¶ 18. Case law has repeatedly held that although a statute permits certain actions, parties may nonetheless stipulate to the contrary. See Rice v. Gruetzmacher, 30 Wis. 2d 222, 227-28, 140 N.W.2d 238 (1966) (<HOLDING>); Spencer v. Spencer, 140 Wis. 2d 447, 451, 410
holding that a claim did not arise under a workers compensation law when it stated a right to relief in tort and sought common law damages distinct from statutory compensation scheme holding that an agencys determination on a workers compensation claim was entitled to deference holding that employers insurer who provided workers compensation benefits to employee but did not consent to employees settlement with thirdparty tortfeasor may maintain an action for payments that become payable in the future holding that thirdparty tortfeasor has right to contribution from employer up to amount of employers workers compensation liability holding that a workers compensation insurer is entitled to share in a thirdparty settlement under the statutory formula unless it stipulates otherwise