introduced letters from PMG apparently setting forth appellant’s deficient attendance record. The trial court cannot rely on this hearsay evidence alone to support a revocation of probation. See Glenn v. State, 568 So.2d 513 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (reversing order revoking probation which relied solely on facts of which testifying witness had no personal knowledge). However, we must also consider the non-hearsay testimony of appellant which relates to the first three scheduled appointments with PMG. See Corona v. State, 642 So.2d 667 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (considering non-hearsay admission of probationer that he made no attempt to comply with condition of probationer’s noneom-pliance is the result of an arrest for an unrelated offense. See Drayton v. State, 490 So.2d 229 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (<HOLDING>); Frazier v. State, 587 So.2d 660 (Fla. 3d DCA
holding that there was no willful or deliberate violation of probation where probationer was absent from meeting of sex offender program due to inept and negligent conduct holding that failure to file a monthly report was not deliberate violation of probation where probationer was incarcerated holding that it was a deprivation of due process to find that a probationer had violated probation by failing to immediately report that he had received a traffic citation where such reporting was not required as a term of the probation holding that failure to report to probation office as instructed was not willful violation of probation where probationer was imprisoned at time of scheduled appointment holding that probation cannot be revoked solely for violation of conditions requiring payment without evidence that probationer is able to pay