sentencing decision is that "[t]he State must ensure that the process is neutral and principled so as to guard against bias or caprice in the sentencing decision.”). 26 . Jones, 527 U.S. at 381, 119 S.Ct. 2090. 27 . Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 973, 114 S.Ct. 2630 (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 279, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976)). 28 . Id. at 973-74, 114 S.Ct. 2630. 29 . The victim impact aggravator states that JG’s murder caused her family "extreme emotional suffering, and [her] family has suffered severe and irreparable harm.” The victim vulnerability aggravator states that JG "was particularly vulnerable due to her youth.” The vulnerability aggravator is based on the FDPA section 3592(c)(ll). 30 . Jones, 527 U.S. at 401, 119 S.Ct. 2090 (emphasis in original). 31 . See id. (<HOLDING>). 32 . See id. at 400, 119 S.Ct. 2090 (holding
holding that a victim impact aggravator was not unconstitutionally vague because it directed the jury to consider inter alia the effect of the crime on the victims family holding that the impact upon the victims is relevant to circumstances of the crime holding that the trial court properly excluded evidence that other persons had a motive to kill the victims because inter alia such evidence was speculative holding that the improper admission of hearsay testimony of two witnesses that confirmed but did not elaborate upon the victims testimony would have had only minor impact on the jury because there was little to undermine the victims credibility holding that comment on defendants silence was not reversible error because inter alia it did not have the effect of being probative on guilt or innocence