faulty workmanship itself.” Thus, I find the definition in Act No. 26 is indistinguishable from those espoused by this Court in L-J, Newman, and Crossmann. Because Act No. 26 merely clarifies rather than changes existing law, it does not operate retrospectively even though it is applied to transactions predating its enactment. Thus, I conclude the retroactive application of the Act does not render it unconstitutional as a retrospective law. See Segars v. Gomez, 360 F.Supp. 50, 53 (D.S.C.1972) (discussing retroactivity and recognizing that the General Assembly “may ratify and validate any past act which it could originally have authorized provided it still has the power to authorize it, and its authorization does not impair vested rights”); Moore v. Stills, 307 S.W.3d 71, 81 (Ky.2010) (<HOLDING>). b. Existing Contracts Even if Act No. 26 is
holding that the 1991 mixedmotive amendments do not apply to  1981 based on an independent analysis of the amendments and  1981 recognizing that statutory amendments that clarify existing law or codify judicial precedent do not come within the rule against retroactive legislation as such amendments do not impair rights a party possessed when he or she acted or give past conduct or transactions new substantive legal consequences holding that similar doj guidelines not mandated by statute or the constitution do not confer substantive rights on any party holding that issues that do not apply to retroactive guidelines amendments are not cognizable under  3582c2 holding that rules of evidence do not permit an expert to give opinion or state legal conclusions regarding a question of law