1998))). I 14 In light of Dennis's inadequate briefing, we decline to disturb the district court's finding of reasonable suspicion. We note that the factors employed by the district court are generally the types of factors that this and other courts have relied on to analyze reasonable suspicion, and that the district court's finding does not appear unreasonable on its face. Cases examining combinations of arguably innocuous cireum-stances have come down both ways on the issue of reasonable suspicion. Compare, eg., State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 141-43 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (upholding finding of reasonable suspicion based on "past criminal activity, nervousness, anger, and traveling back from a known drug community"), with State v. Alvey, 2007 UT App 161, ¶¶ 2-7, 577 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (<HOLDING>). While a careful analysis of these and similar
holding that a level two detention was illegal where defendant with known eriminal history was discovered walking in circles in bank parking lot at 280 am holding that the presence requirement of the carjacking statute was satisfied when keys were taken from a bank employee whose car was parked in a parking lot outside the bank holding that an injury occurring in a parking lot which was leased but not controlled by an employer was compensable because the employer instructed its employees to park in that lot holding that the police officer had reasonable suspicion when he saw a vehicle moving with its lights off in the parking lot of a closed business in a rural area at 300 am holding that claimant was entitled to workers compensation because he was injured in a parking lot which was leased by his employer