to correct the judgment entry pursuant to Criminal Rule 36,” arguing that the trial court had violated his constitutional right to a jury trial “when it effectively ‘amended’ the aggravated-murder verdict form by entering judgment convicting him under division (A), rather than division (B)” of R.C. 2903.01. State v. Bradford, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150207, 2 (May 18, 2016). The trial court denied his motion. On appeal, the First District affirmed and held that while the verdict form was subject to correction under Crim.R. 36, “the trial court, when it entered judgment convicting Bradford under division (A) of the aggravated-murder statute, effectively made that correction” and did not thereby abuse its discretion. Id., citing State v. Davie, 80 Ohio St.3d 311, 686 N.E.2d 245 (1997) (<HOLDING>). Pele K. Bradford, pro se. {¶ 5} “An appeal is
holding that a district court did not err by submitting a special verdict form to the jury this particular verdict form did not specify a standard of proof holding that trial court did not err in declining to accept jurys first verdict when form stated that the jury found the defendant undecided and trial courts interpretation of the verdict form to mean that the jury was either not unanimous or had not decided yet whether defendant was guilty or not guilty was reasonable and thus trial court properly instructed jury to continue deliberating holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in changing the surname of the child where the court made factual findings that the name change would be in the best interest of the child holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in changing the wording in a verdict form after the jury was discharged when the change was not demonstrably prejudicial holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form