because she would not have been a “prevailing party ‘in [a] civil action.’ ” (Id. at 2165). Consequently, if it were ultimately determined in Melkonyan that the remand was pursuant to the sixth sentence, new law pertaining to fourth sentence remands would be irrelevant. Similarly, if it were determined that the remand was pursuant to an order for voluntary dismissal, there would be no issue there as to timeliness. Therefore, in any event, the new law regarding fourth-sentence remands will not be applied to the litigants in Melkonyan. Accordingly, this Court is not bound by the decision in Beam and can freely apply a Chevron analysis to the Melkonyan decision. Other district courts in the Third Circuit have reached the same conclusion. (Rollins v. Sullivan, 784 F.Supp. 253 (E.D.Pa.1992) (<HOLDING>); Santiago v. Sullivan, 783 F.Supp. 223
holding that the term include but need not be limited to does not preclude the application of the ejusdem generis principle holding that the exceptional circumstances test does not apply to declaratory judgment actions holding that the melkonyan court did not apply the rule that it announced with respect to sentence four remands therefore beam does not preclude application of chevron test holding to that effect with respect to rule 64 holding that when the state court uses the wrong legal standard the rule of deference does not apply