2-3 (Wash. April 18, 1997) (order denying discretionary review). By treating the foregoing passage as preclusive on the issue of whether Dictado’s petition was properly filed, the majority transforms § 2244(d)(2) into a merits-based tolling provision, contrary to the plain meaning of the statute and contrary to the nearly-unanimous judgment of federal courts that have interpreted the provision. See supra note 1. If. a state permits prisoners to file successive petitions or petitions outside the limitations period, and the prisoner complies with the basic procedural requirements for filing such petitions, federal courts should not interfere with that state policy, but should deem the petitions “properly filed.” See Lovasz, 134 F.3d at tions, 36 F.Supp.2d 317, 318-319, 320 (E.D.Va.1999) (<HOLDING>); United States ex rel. Morgan v. Gilmore, 26
holding that automatic reversal rule applies in habeas petitions holding that second and third state habeas petitions that were dismissed as impermissible successive petitions were properly filed holding that aedpa is not applied retroactively to pending habeas petitions holding that in general aedpa applies only to habeas petitions filed after the statutes effective date of april 24 1996 and noting that aedpas special procedures for 28 usc  2254 petitions in capital cases apply also to petitions pending on april 24 1996 holding that district courts may properly treat rule 60b motions as successive habeas petitions