trial court’s original order. However, because of the timely filing of a motion for rehearing, subsequently denied, the mandate did not issue in the original appeal until after the trial court entered its amended order. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the amended order because the defendant’s appeal involving the same rule 3.800(a) motion was pending in this court and the trial court had not sought leave of court to enter an amended order. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.600. As the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter the amended order, it was a nullity. Cf. Tellas v. State, 811 So.2d 756 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). Importantly, if we were to rule on the merits of the trial court’s amended order, our decision would also be a nullity. See Daniels v. State, 712 So.2d 765 (Fla.1998)(<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we vacate the amended order
holding that the district court had jurisdiction to order restitution of award overturned on appeal even in the absence of a remand from the appellate court holding that when the district court dismissed rather than transferred a case not within its jurisdiction and a party appealed that dismissal the circuit court could consider only the propriety of the dismissal on appeal and determining that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction on appeal to consider the merits of the action holding that a district court may award attorneys fees while the merits are on appeal holding that since district court of appeal properly found that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on a 3850 motion during the pendency of a direct appeal the district court of appeal should have vacated the order rather than affirming on the merits holding that the appellate court had jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal on a restraining order and the district court retained jurisdiction to proceed with the trial