right on prior, unrelated occasions and had indicated that he understood them. In addition to being given Miranda warnings four times earlier that morning and actually invoking his right to counsel after one of the warnings (which is strong evidence that Allen understood his rights), Allen was reminded of his request for counsel and given another explanation of his Fifth Amendment rights just prior to his confession. Moreover, Allen even set up the ground rules for his confession. We therefore conclude that Allen’s waiver of his right to counsel was valid because it was knowing and intelligent, voluntarily given, and initiated by Allen, and therefore the district court did not err in denying Allen’s motion to suppress the confession. See Holman v. Kemna, 212 F.3d 413, 418-21 (8th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 587, 148
holding that under the sixth amendment a criminal defendant may waive his right to counsel if that waiver is knowing intelligent and voluntary holding that a confession of judgment provision is not per se unconstitutional and may be valid where the confession was voluntary knowing and intelligently made holding that district courts findings were not clearly erroneous where there was  sufficient evidence  that the defendants waiver of his rights was knowing and intelligent holding a waiver of a substantial constitutional right must be a voluntary knowing and intelligent act holding ultimately that there was no edwards violation and that the waiver of counsel was valid because holman did not confess until the next day and the totality of the circumstances showed that the confession was voluntary and knowing and intelligent