4590i, § 13.01(h) (requiring that an agreement for extending time be signed by the parties); also Tex.R. Civ. P. 11. Even assuming that mistaken belief existed at some point, the correspondence sent by Bell’s attorneys clearly attempted to negate that belief. Schorp’s attorney was adequately warned by correspondence on August 14 wherein Bell’s attorneys warned Schorp that the expert report did not meet the requirements under § 13.01. This notice came 26 days prior to the running of the 180-day deadline. While Schorp’s attorney testified that he attempted to procure an expert after the first letter, no attempt was made by him to go to the trial court or seek a discretionary extension for good cause. See Tex.Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590i, § 13.01(f); also Roberts, 988 S.W.2d at 402 (<HOLDING>). While nothing in the statute would have
holding that an extension of time in which to serve process may be granted despite the absence of good cause recognizing that subject matter jurisdiction can be questioned at any time and with respect to any claim holding that nothing in  1301f mandates that a plaintiff can only seek an extension for good cause before the 180 day deadline but can be sought at any time holding that the bankruptcy court could not extend a deadline for filing a notice of appeal beyond the 20 day extension period allowed by the bankruptcy rules holding that a public employee who can be discharged only for cause is entitled to at least some informal due process before he can be terminated