that a plaintiff must be a member of the general public in order to allege a UCL “unfair” claim against' a non-competitor defendant. As to Rothschild, the second case cited by DIRECTV, the Court there did not have before it the issue currently in question— i.e., whether a plaintiff must be a member of the general public in order to allege a UCL “unfair” claim against a non-competitor defendant. Instead, the issue there was whether the False Claims Act barred the plaintiffs UCL claim. See Rothschild, 83 Cal.App.4th at 494, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 721. Therefore, and based on the foregoing, the Court finds that DIRECTV has not carried its initial burden to show that the UCL “unfair” prong applies only to direct competitors or to the general public. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (<HOLDING>). Indeed, California courts have consistently
holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment holding that the moving party has tjhe burden of showing no genuine issue of material fact exists recognizing that the burden on summary judgment shifts to the nonmoving party once the moving party has met its initial responsibility of showing the absence of a triable issue of fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case holding a party moving for summary judgment on an issue on which it bears the burden of proof at trial must show that it has produced enough evidence to support the findings of fact necessary to win holding that the moving party for summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial