or agreement that is made by the person or corporation and establishes a price, rate, rule, regulation, or condition of service.” Tex. Util. Code § 121.153. We presume that the Legislature’s exclusion of such language in PURA chapter 35 was purposeful. See Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 540 (Tex.1981). Taking into account subsequent legislative action in PURA chapter 40, which we address below, we cannot accept the Commission’s interpretation of legislative intent. Finally, the Commission and Bryan argue that the State’s police power to regulate industries such as electric utilities that are affected with a public interest prevails over private contract rights. See Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 634-35 (Tex.1996) (<HOLDING>); see also Midland Realty Co. v. Kansas City
holding that subject to its enabling legislation and pursuant to its police power a borough has the authority to enact laws that it perceives necessary to protect the public health safety and general welfare so long as the goal sought to be achieved is legitimate and the means used to achieve that goal are reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive recognizing that an exercise of the police power necessary to safeguard the public safety and welfare can justify impairment of contractual rights and obligations holding that a commission is a body with special and limited power and it can only exercise the power expressly or impliedly granted to it and any reasonable doubt of existence of any power must be resolved against the exercise thereof holding that courts must accommodate the contracts clause with the inherent police power of the state to safeguard the vital interests of its people recognizing a distinction between the power of a federal court to hear statelaw claims and the discretionary exercise of that power