postings and e-mails complaining about the care her mentally handicapped son was receiving were not made pursuant to an official proceeding, nor could they be construed as a request for an official investigation or proceeding, and were therefore not entitled to anti-SLAPP protection). 18 OCGA § 9-11-11.1 (b); see also generally Adventure Outdoors, Inc. v. Bloomberg, 307 Ga. App. 356, 360 (2) (705 SE2d 241) (2010) (extending OCGA § 9-11-11.1 protection to speech designed to inform the public about gun dealers alleged to be violating federal laws). 19 See OCGA § 9-11-11.1 (a). Cf. Citizens for Ethics in Gov’t, LLC v. Atlanta Dev. Auth., 303 Ga. App. 724 (694 SE2d 680) (2010) (illustrating a clear abuse of the judicial process). 20 See generally Atlanta Humane Soc’y, 278 Ga. at 454 (1) (<HOLDING>); see also Lovett, 300 Ga. App. at 801;
holding that courts apply the procedural law of the forum and the substantive law of the jurisdiction originating the claim recognizing that ocga  911111 embodies both a procedural and substantive component holding that standard of review is a matter of procedural rather than substantive law holding that the relevant time of inquiry is the date of the filing of the complaint holding that ocga  911111 offers substantive protection beyond the procedural consideration related to the timing of the filing of the verification