statute. See, e.g., Colombo v. Stevenson, 150 N.C.App. 163, 563 S.E.2d 591, 592-94 (2002) (concluding that language that residue included “all lapsed legacies and devises, or other gifts made by this will which fail for any reason” was sufficiently clear language to express testatrix’s intent that North Carolina’s anti-lapse statute did not apply to legacies and devises which had lapsed); Estate of Salisbury, 76 Cal.App.3d 635, 143 Cal.Rptr. 81, 82-84 (1978) (concluding that language stating that “the residue of my estate, real and personal, wheresoever situate, including all failed and lapsed gifts” was a sufficiently clear expression of testatrix’s intent to render that California’s anti-lapse statute inapplicable); In re Neydorff, 193 A.D. 531, 184 N.Y.S. 551, 554 (N.Y.App.Div.1920) (<HOLDING>); In re Phelps’ Estate, 147 Iowa 323, 126 N.W.
holding that new yorks reckless conduct statute establishes a crime involving moral turpitude holding new yorks disclosure law unconstitutionally overbroad holding that the nyshrl does not waive the new yorks eleventh amendment immunity to suit in federal court holding that jurisdiction to hear a motion for new trial was granted by statute and could be exercised solely in accordance with the terms of the statute holding that in case in which testator granted the residue to specified person including lapsed legacies the legacies to testators predeceased brother and sister did not fall within new yorks antilapse statute