the armbands because of its desire to avoid the controversy associated with the Vietnam War. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 510, 89 S.Ct. 733. School officials also feared that if the armbands were worn, the friends of a high school student in the district who had been killed in the Vietnam War would “be difficult to control” and that disagreeing students would wear armbands of other colors, causing the potential for conflict. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509-10, n. 3, 89 S.Ct. 733. In rejecting the concerns of school officials as a basis for prohibiting sp eld the censorship of speech and expression by school officials when such activity has caused material and substantial disruption or collided with the rights of others. See, e.g., Scott v. Sch. Bd. of Alachua County, 324 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Blackwell, supra, 363 F.2d at 751-54
holding that ban of confederate flags on school grounds was not an unconstitutional restriction of students first amendment rights where racial tensions existed at the school raciallybased fights had occurred in the months leading up to the case and the confederate flag is inappropriate in the school context because it is so associated with racial prejudice that it is likely to provoke feelings of hatred and ill will in others holding unconstitutional a free transfer provision by which students were allowed to transfer solely on a racial basis from the school to which they had been assigned by virtue of redistricting if they were in a racial minority in their new school holding that a school district was not required to move a nurse to a students neighborhood school to comply with the idea holding that where a high school student and the students mother received adequate notice of the charges had sufficient opportunity to prepare for the meeting with school personnel were accorded an orderly hearing and were given a fair and impartial decision no due process violation occurred even though the school failed to provide advance notice that the potential disciplinary actions included a transfer to another school holding that a school district was not liable for sexual molestation of plaintiffs daughter by a teacher even though the acts occurred on school property and during school hours