but also the usefulness of the public land title information infrastructure”); Christopher L. Peterson, Two Faces: Demystifying the Mortgage Electronic Registration System’s Land Title Theory, 53 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. Ill, 120, 125-27 (2011) (criticizing the “incoherence of MERS’s legal position” regarding MERS’s status with respect to mortgages registered in the MERS System, which is “exacerbated by a corporate structure that is so unorthodox as to be considered arguably fraudulent,” and criticizing the unreliability of the MERS database); David P. Weber, The Magic of the Mortgage Electronic Registration System: It Is and It Isn’t, 85 Am. Bankr.LJ. 239, 239-40, 264 (2011) (describing MERS’s “imperfect implementation and lack of transparency”); 303 P.3d 301, 304-OS (2013) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); Bain v. Metro. Mortg. Grp., Inc., 175 Wash.2d
holding that mers was not the beneficiary of a deed of trust under the oregon trust deed act absent conveyance to mers of the beneficial right to repayment and that mers could not hold or transfer legal title to the deed as the lenders nominee holding that because mers receives no payments on the debt it is not the beneficiary even though it is so designated in the deed of trust holding that mers may be a beneficiary as nominee for the lender that assignments of the deed of trust between mers members need not be recorded that mers was not liable to the borrower in negligence and that the idaho consumer protection act did not provide a cause of action to the borrower holding that mers is an ineligible beneficiary within the terms of the washington deed of trust act if it never held the promissory note or other debt instrument secured by the deed of trust and that characterizing mers as the beneficiary has the capacity to deceive and may give rise to an action under the consumer protection act holding that mers lacked standing to foreclose as the lenders nominee