terminate- the Consent Decree. See Cody, 304 F.3d at 777 (“We hold that the class’s effort to prolong the efficacy of the remedial ■decree was time spent ‘enforcing’ that decree, and is fully compensable. Whether a plaintiff is pressing a contempt motion or defending against a motion to vacate, in both cases the point is to give effect to an existing, remedy, suggesting that the two circumstances should be treated alike.”). In addition, the ACLU enforced Defendants’ obligations related to overcrowding in the Consent Decree by facilitating the use of various experts on overcrowding, who proposed reforms that Defendants implemented, and by negotiating the 2004 Stipulations,- in which Defendants agreed that unconstitutional overcrowding remained an ongoing issue. See Cody, 304 F.3d at 777 (<HOLDING>).. Accordingly, I find that the ACLU’s work
holding that the trial judge had the power to incorporate a settlement agreement in a decree following the entry of a decree of divorce holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because there was no  consent decree left to be terminated holding that work securing a settlement agreement that sets forth specific responses to constitutional violations that were acknowledged in the previous consent decree is compensable under the plra as work incurred in enforcing the decree holding that consent decree could not preclude plaintiffs from bringing claims that could not have been brought at time consent decree was filed and to which they were legally and procedurally entitled holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because the challenged provisions of the decree had expired