of statements made at the time by the parties, does support a conclusion the supervisors changed Meyers’s duties because of her speech. The only issue remaining, then, is whether the reassignment from ongoing cases to intake was an adverse action. Acts short of termination may constitute adverse employment actions, however, not everything that makes an employee unhappy is actionable. Montandon v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 116 F.3d 355, 359 (8th Cir.1997). Loss of status and prestige alone do not rise to the level of an adverse employment action. Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir. 1997). To be actionable, the employment action must be “a material change in the terms or conditions of her employment.” Id.; Fisher v. Pharmacia & Upjohn, 225 F.3d 915, 919 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). The magistrate judge found Meyers’s
holding that transfer involving no reduction in pay and only a minor change in working conditions does not rise to the level of a material adverse employment action holding a transfer or reassignment may rise to the level of an adverse employment condition if it is a significant change in working conditions holding that a written warning may be an adverse employment action for purposes of a fmla claim only if it effects a significant change in the plaintiffs employment status holding that a change in work schedule and request that an employee perform two additional tasks did not rise to the level of an adverse employment action recognizing that a set of actions may constitute an adverse employment action when considered collectively even though some actions do not rise to the level of an adverse employment action individually