for relief or cause of action not otherwise existing under this title ... or nonbankruptcy law”— precludes any holding that “creates” a claim for the debtor. Taken together, USDA contends that if Supreme Beefs claim did not exist outside of bankruptcy because it does not meet the FTCA’s substantive requirements, then it cannot be brought as a counterclaim under § 106(c). We reject USDA’s argument. First, assuming, arguendo, that the underlying substantive law is the touchstone for a § 106(c) analysis, the FTCA’s substantive requirements are not the only avenues for relief. Indeed, this Court has held that the federal government waives its immunity even to some recoupments that are not specifically authorized by statute. See Frederick v. United States, 386 F.2d 481, 488 (5th Cir.1967) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added); see also First Nat. Bank v.
recognizing that immunity may be waived holding that the tucker act effects a waiver of sovereign immunity and observing that the existence of consent to be sued is a prerequisite for jurisdiction holding that the waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear and unequivocal holding that sovereign immunity may be waived as to a recoup ment noting that the waiver can be by statutory consent to be sued or by the institution of the particular action holding that a governments consent to be sued must be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign