and Christopher Patrick Noone have the requisite “personal stake in the outcome of the controversy” for standing purposes. McInnis-Misenor v. Maine Medical Center, 319 F.3d 63, 67-68 (1st Cir.2003) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)). For purposes of Fed. R.Civ.P. 17(b), however, only Joseph Francis Noone IV has the capacity to represent Spud Noone’s estate in this action. See, e.g., Nordberg v. Town of Charlton, 2012 WL 2990763, at *3 (D.Mass. July 19, 2012). But that is not an issue of subject matter jurisdiction. Third, to the extent the Town Defendants also argue that none of the claims survived the death of Spud Noone, the court rejects that assertion as well, at least as to the section 1985 claims. See Pomeroy, 410 F.Supp.2d at 12-14 (<HOLDING>); see also Wagar v. Hasenkrug, 486 F.Supp. 47,
holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 holding that claims under 42 usc  1983 are not personal injury tort claims holding that person in 42 usc  1983 does not include states holding that damage to reputation alone does not trigger due process protections for purposes of 42 usc  1983 holding that pursuant to 42 usc  1988a a  1983 procedural due process claim is an action  of tort  for  damage to the person for purposes of mgl c 228  1 the massachusetts survival statute