that the information [it] supplied does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact required to be stated herein or necessary to make the statements herein ... not misleading.” Id. (emphasis added). Reading this provision in the light most favorable Plaintiffs, the Town attested to two things: (1) that its own contributions to the Official Statements were not misleading, and (2) that it did not omit any fact that was necessary to prevent other provisions in the Official Statements — i.e. “the statements herein ” — from misleading investors. By making this assertion, the Town may have placed its “imprimatur” on each of the statements contained in the Official Statements. See In re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 95 F.3d 922, 935 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotations omitted). Of the
holding that whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary or was the product of duress or coercion express or implied is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances holding that plaintiffs express contract with the surety company precludes an implied contract with defendant holding that a district court satisfies its obligation to make factual findings when it explicitly adopts the factual findings set forth in the presentence report holding that a defendant places its imprimatur express or implied on unreasonably disclosed thirdparty forecasts when it adopts or sufficiently entangles itself with the  forecasts holding that the other source of law might be a moneymandating constitutional provision statute or regulation that has been violated or an express or implied contract with the united states