[1975] insanity statute made no reference to the burden of proof,” so the burden of proof was “governed by common law”). The Michigan Supreme Court thus continued the common-law method of shifting the burden of proof that was established well before the insanity defense was codified. See People v. Savoie, 419 Mich. 118, 349 N.W.2d 139, 143 (1984) (citing cases as early as 1868 for the burden-shifting framework of the insanity defense). Under this burden-shifting framework, “[a] criminal defendant is presumptively sane. However, once there is any evidence introduced of insanity, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to est igan Court of Appeals held in 2000 that the insanity-defense statute as amended continued to apply to the diminished-capacity defense. Mette, 621 N.W.2d at 719 (<HOLDING>); see also Carpenter, 627 N.W.2d at 282 (“[T]he
holding that the trial court correctly instructed the jury that the use of physical force to overcome victims resistance was necessary for offense to amount to robbery holding that the district court correctly instructed the jury that there had to be a substantial similarity between the indictment and the proof in order to find the defendant guilty holding that the district court correctly declined to instruct the jury that the government was required to prove as an element of the offense that the defendant did not intend to establish a life with his wife holding that the trial judge correctly instructed the jury that in resolving whether the crime occurred in tennessee they must be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence introduced on that issue holding that the trial court correctly instructed the jury that the defendant had to establish by evidence that outweighed the evidence against him that he lacked the capacity to form specific intent