erred in denying his motion to sever Count Three. The joinder of multiple offenses is proper under Fed. R.Crim.P. 8(a) if the offenses are: (1) of the same or similar character; (2) based demanding burden of demonstrating a strong showing he was prejudiced by the joinder. While Davis correctly avers that his defense was more difficult because the counts were joined, this alone is insufficient to establish prejudice. See United States v. Goldman, 750 F.2d 1221, 1225 (4th Cir.1984). Rather, any possibility of prejudice was reduced since the evidence of each crime would have been admissible in the trial of the other if the counts had been severed. See United States v. Cole, 857 F.2d 971, 974 (4th Cir. 1988) (<HOLDING>) (internal citation omitted). Because joinder
holding that there was no prejudice when evidence complained of would have been admissible against defendant in separate trial holding that even in separate trial other crimes evidence would not have been admissible and identification testimony would have been admissible holding that under the crimes code conspiracy and the completed substantive offense are separate crimes holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for severance where the allegedly prejudicial evidence would have been admissible in separate trials holding that when evidence of the crimes would be mutually admissible for legitimate purposes in separate trials for each offense the possibility of prejudice requiring severance is greatly diminished