employees attended the aerobics class, which lasted forty minutes, no witness testified that any employee other than McGill took more than the allotted lunch hour to return to work. McGill’s argument that others were treated more favorably than she reduces to an argument that others “must” have taken off more than just the lunch hour. For this, plaintiff relies on testimony by Frederick Jenney, one of her attorney supervisors, who stated that “it could take an hour-and-a-half’ for someone “to take an aerobics class and get showered and everything in the middle of the day.” J.A. at 763. But Jenney’s speculation that it “could” take an hour-and-a-half is not evidence that it “did” take anyone — other than plaintiff — that long. See Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 458-59 (D.C.Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Al-Zubaidi v. M.A. Ijaz, 917 F.2d 1347, 1348
holding speculation insufficient to avoid summary judgment holding that pure speculation  is insufficient to satisfy movants burden holding that trial court may not grant summary judgment by default  when the movants summary judgment proof is legally insufficient holding that mere speculation is insufficient to support a jury verdict holding that notice of judgment was insufficient