effectively prevented him from meaningfully engaging with counsel because he feared he would be stunned if he moved. Powell claims that the drugs and stun belt affected the penalty phase of the trial, as at least two jurors stated in affidavits that they believed Powell had a “hard,” “expressionless,” “arrogant,” “remorseless,” and “cold” appearance during his trial. H.A. at 2784-86. The Supreme Court of Virginia found these claims procedurally defaulted during state habeas proceedings and rejected Powell’s contention that ineffective assistance of counsel excused the default. Powell, 2005 WL 2980756, at *13. That court noted first that there is no evidence that any juror saw Powell wearing the stun belt. Id. Cf. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953 (2005) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). Nor, the court observed, did
holding that given their prejudicial effect due process does not permit the use of visible restraints if the trial court has not taken account of the circumstances of the particular case holding that the denial of due process in a particular case is subject to harmless error analysis holding that due process requires a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case holding that doctrine does not violate due process holding defendant failed to rebut statutory presumption where evidence was not particular to the facts and circumstances of the case