of the partnership, and the assets and liabilities of’ it and “declar[e] and determin[e] the rights and obligations of the parties in such regard.” More importantly, by making the request, the Farnsworths imbued the trial court with the discretion to award attorney’s fees in any manner it deemed “equitable and just.” Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 37.009 (Vernon 1997). That did not mean the trial court was restricted to simply awarding them fees. On the contrary, the blanket of authority arising from the demand for declaratory relief and granted under § 37.009 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code encompassed the discretion to award fees to any party, including the Deavers. First Nat. Bank v. J.E. Mitchell Co., 727 S.W.2d 360, 363 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1987, writ ref'd. n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). So, to the extent that the Deavers incurred
holding that fees may be awarded for litigating amount of fees only where language of statute supports such conclusion holding that fees may be awarded to any litigant involved in the declaratory action in a manner deemed equitable and just by the trial court holding trial court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded attorneys fees because the declaratory relief action addressed validity of note and was not used as a mere ploy to recover attorneys fees holding that where the question to be resolved in the declaratory judgment action will be decided in a pending action it is inappropriate to grant a declaratory judgment holding that a party does not need a net recovery to be awarded attorneys fees all that is required is that the party prevail on a just claim