in part and dismiss in part the petition for review. Contrary to Rosas-Quiroz’s contention, the agency applied and referenced the correct legal standard outlined in Matter of Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244, 247 (BIA 1982) in making • its particularly serious crime determination, see Anaya-Ortiz v. Holder, 594 F.3d 673, 679-80 (9th Cir.2010) (discussing proper standard), and did not apply the presumption set forth in Matter of Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270 (A.G. 2002). Because Rosas-Quiroz does not dispute that he is removable for an aggra vated felony, the court lacks jurisdiction to review the agency’s dispositive discretionary determination that his conviction is for a particularly serious crime that renders him ineligible for withholding of removal. See Pechenkov, 705 F.3d at 447-49 (<HOLDING>). Rosas-Quiroz’s claim that his removal without
holding that 8 usc  1252a2c barred review of the agencys finding that petitioners aggravated felony conviction was a particularly serious crime where petitioner sought only a reweighing of the factors involved in that discretionary determination holding that a felony conviction in new york state court for possession of cocaine constituted an aggravated felony where the conviction would have also been punishable under the controlled substance act even though the crime would have only constituted a misdemeanor under federal law holding that a second state court conviction for simple possession of narcotics is an aggravated felony as defined in 8 usc  1101a43 holding that particularly serious crimes must be aggravated felonies holding that being deported after a conviction for an aggravated felony is all that is required and it is irrelevant whether the conviction is valid at the time of sentencing