so obviously unimportant to a reasonable investor that reasonable minds could not differ on the question of their importance.” Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d at 1067. The ' circumstances under which Shuch was discharged from his prior employment were clearly material under this liberal definition of materiality. The complaints allege that Shuch was terminated from his prior employment for professional dishonesty, and that, as a general partner of Colonial, he continued the same course of dishonest conduct. See Gold Complaint at ¶¶ 100-101. Since these allegations bear directly on Shuch’s fitness to promote and manage the limited partnerships, it is beyond question that a reasonable investor would have consid ered them material. Cf. United States v. Matthews, 787 F.2d 38, 48 (2d Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). However, materiality alone is insufficient to
holding that in the context of federal immigration law the amount of loss to the victim of fraud or deceit does not refer to an element of the fraud or deceit but rather refers to the particular circumstances in which an offender committed fraud or deceit holding that independent directors can be entrusted with the decision to sue other directors on behalf of the corporation recognizing that selfdealing by the directors or dishonesty or deceit which inures to the direct personal benefit of the directors is material for purposes of section 14a of the 1934 act holding that where the policy names only the directors or officers as insured the proceeds are not property of the estate holding that courts should not substitute their judgment for that of the directors of a corporation 