white female). Ramon contends that Arbaney and Lakey were given preferential treatment because they were allowed to remain on the job for up to six months, thereby permitting them to become eligible for voluntary retirement. She further contends that Couch was not fired at all. Ramon, however, was not allowed to retire or remain on the job. Ramon argues that this circumstantial evidence satisfies her initial burden on summary judgment under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). To satisfy that burden, she must proffer evidence that a similarly situated employee from outside the protected class was not subjected to the adverse employment action. Abarca v. Metro. Transit Auth., 404 F.3d 938, 941 *4 (MichApp. Feb.15, 2002) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>). Ramon next contends that the conduct of
holding that employee who violated a different policy of the store than plaintiff was not similarly situated holding that the fact that employees mention or ask about retirement is not evidence of age discrimination and therefore not finding sufficient evidence of discriminatory animus on the part of a supervisor who frequently asked plaintiff about his retirement plans holding that younger employee not similarly situated to older employee who committed similar infraction and was allowed to remain on job for a few extra months and obtain retirement eligibility holding that plaintiff was not similarly situated to another employee who also engaged in protected activity for purposes of plaintiffs retaliation claim holding that plaintiff who was not of retirement age and comparator who was of retirement age were not similarly situated where comparator was allowed to voluntarily retire while plaintiff was terminated