a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant, or to some comparable judicial record of this information. Id. at 26, 125 S.Ct. 1254. In reaching this conclusion, a majority of the Supreme Court observed that a less formalistic approach would cast doubt on the constitutionality of the ACCA, because it would implicate the protections of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, i.e., “the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee a jury standing between a defendant and the power of the state, and they guarantee a jury’s finding of any disputed fact essential to increase the ceiling of a potential sentence,” Id. See id. at 28, 125 S.Ct. 1254 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)(<HOLDING>). Justice O’Connor authored a dissent in
holding that the law presumes that the jury will follow the courts instructions holding that a jury is presumed to follow the trial courts instructions holding that if jury instructions viewed as a whole fairly state the applicable law to the jury the failure to give particular instructions will not be error holding that the ninth circuit erred because the state appellate courts conclusion that one incorrect statement in jury instructions did not render the instructions likely to mislead the jury was not unreasonable holding that permitting sentencing courts to look beyond charging papers jury instructions and plea agreements  would give rise to constitutional error