The identified constitutional concern with defendant’s construction of § 16913(d) is further aggravated by the fact that it presumes that Congress, without providing any meaningful guidance, delegated to the Attorney General, the very officer charged with executive power to enforce the criminal laws, the legislative power unilaterally to pronounce the scope of a law with crimi nal consequences. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 139, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (“Legislative power, as distinguished from executive power, is the authority to make laws, but not to enforce them or appoint the agents charged with the duty of such enforcement. The latter are executive functions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. at 391 n. 17, 109 S.Ct. 647 (<HOLDING>). This I expect is why the Supreme Court has
holding that unless that power is restricted by the principal an agent under a california statutory healthcare power of attorney has the power to execute applicable admission forms including arbitration agreements recognizing a distinction between the power of a federal court to hear statelaw claims and the discretionary exercise of that power holding that the power to terminate a contract atwill subsumes the power to modify its terms recognizing that uniting power to prosecute and power to sentence in executive would raise constitutional concerns recognizing that administrative agencies lack to power to consider or determine constitutional issues