indicates that she was terminated for reasons other than the restructuring. We are not persuaded by this argument. Corporate restructuring can be complicated and stretch out over long periods of time. A thirty-day period is certainly not a delay that would arouse suspicion of the Bank’s purpose in terminating Bell. 4. Finally, Bell questions the appropriateness of the Bank’s business reasons for restructuring. However, the law is clear that “discrimination laws [are not] vehicles for judicial second-guessing of business decisions.” Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 372 (5th Cir.1997). Further, Bell has presented no evidence that the restructuring was in fact motivated by racial discrimination. See Armendariz v. Pinkerton Tobacco Co., 58 F.3d 144, 151 n. 7 (5th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); see also Denies v. Tex. Dept, of Protective
holding that inconsistency in employers reasons for the termination is an indication of pretext holding that establishing the employers reason as misguided is insufficient rather the employee at all times has the burden of proving  that those reasons were a pretext for unlawful discrimination holding that a reason cannot be proved to be a pretext for discrimination  unless it is shown both that the reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason holding that the defendant has the burden of proving a fair and just reason for withdrawal of a guilty plea holding that the burden of proving that the employee did not make reasonable efforts is on the defendant