noted with respect to Plaintiffs prima facie case, he has not put forth any evidence that he was treated less favorably than similarly situated younger employers, nor pointed to an adequate comparator to show that he was discriminated against because of his age. Cf. Maddow v. Procter & Gamble Co., 107 F.3d 846, 852 (11th Cir.1997) (“Evidence offered in the prima facie case may be sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding pretext.”). Plaintiffs conclusory allegations as to his job performance, as well as his perception that younger employees were given more hours and more favorable application of the “first out” policy, without more, fail to support a finding of pretext. See, e.g., Carter v. Three Springs Residential Treatment, 132 F.3d 635, 642 n. 6 (11th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). As stated by the Eleventh Circuit, “provided
holding unconstitutional a free transfer provision by which students were allowed to transfer solely on a racial basis from the school to which they had been assigned by virtue of redistricting if they were in a racial minority in their new school holding that conclusory and generalized allegations of racial bias such as there was a racially biased attitude by management towards minority black employees were properly struck by the district court holding that unequivocal examples of racial animus included instances when plaintiff was instructed to keep his black ass off the phone and was called a black son of a bitch and a black motherfucker holding that a reasonable jury could conclude that there was a racially hostile work environment when plaintiff was subjected to several statements involving racial epithets and a nude black doll was hung from a noose in his locker holding there was no constitutional presumption of juror bias where counsel asked the district court to make an inquiry into potential prejudice because the defendant was black and the prospective jurors were white