on his behavior in prison, and Fene-lon did not. present any evidence that he was likely to exhibit such non-compliant behavior, other than to testify that he was diagnosed with depression and had experienced suicidal tendencies. Fenelon has therefore failed to identify any colorable constitutional or legal questions concerning the agency’s denial of CAT relief. See Hui Lin Huang v. Holder, 677 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 2012). III. Motion to Remand Finally, Fenelon does not raise a constitutional claim or question of law concerning the BIA’s denial of his motion to remand. See Li Yong Cao v. Dep’t of Justice, 421 F.3d 149, 157 (2d Cir. 2005) (A motion to remand based on new evidence is subject to the same standards as motions to reopen.); Durant v. I.N.S., 393 F.3d 113, 114 (2d Cir. 2004) (<HOLDING>). We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to
holding that discretionary denials of motions to reopen are reviewed only for abuse of that discretion holding that bia denials of motions to reopen or reconsider are reviewed for abuse of discretion holding that a motion to reopen seeking only to apply for a form of relief which was unavailable to the movant at the time of the hearing  is subject to the regulatory requirements governing motions to reopen holding that kucana compelled the conclusion that appellate courts have jurisdiction to review denials of motions for a continuance holding that the criminal jurisdiction bar applies to the denials of motions to reopen