Proctor sent the letter to Barker on behalf of him (Hendricks), the actual client. This point is not persuasive. Under our standard of review, we must defer to the trial court’s implied finding that Proc tor engaged Barker as a client because that finding is supported by the evidence. And if Proctor served as an intermediary—or “broker” as the trial court described it—between Barker and Hendricks, both of them being clients, then Proctor could not represent either client in litigation that was the subject of the in-termediation. See Tex. Disciplinary R. Profl Conduct 1.07(c). Accordingly, the disqualification order was not improper in the intermediary scenario. See Moore v. Altra Energy Techs., Inc., 295 S.W.3d 404, 406-07 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). In another point, Hendricks argues that
holding that letters from insureds attorney to accounting firm not privileged under the law of the state with the most significant relationship to the communication and compelling production holding that direct proof of intent to defraud is unnecessary and that it may be inferred from the act of the parties and from all circumstances holding that the mediators law firm was disqualified from representing one of the parties from the mediation holding an attorney who carries on representation of an existing case after a law firm dissolves does so on the firms behalf and any income derived from the case belongs to the dissolved firm holding that plaintiff may be entitled to prevailing party status where the mediation agreement entered into by the parties was read into the record before a hearing officer