to an attorney. Using the report, the defense counsel cross-examined Behn-ing: Q. You’ve told us that after arresting Tyrie Ball, you put him in the squad car, too? A. He was placed in the squad car prior to me arresting him. Q. And you made sure you gave him his Miranda warnings, right? A. After arresting him. Yes. Q. And he told you he wanted to talk to his lawyer, didn’t he? A. I believe so. Q. On the scene he told you that, true? A. I believe so. Yes. Q. Did you relate that to officer Si-korski later? A. No, I don’t think so. Following Behning’s testimony and out of the presence of the jury, Ball moved to suppress his incriminating statements to Sikorski. In support of the motion, Ball relied on Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1885, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 387 (1981) (<HOLDING>). The State resisted, contending the motion was
holding that custodial interrogation by police must not occur prior to suspect being informed of his or her right to counsel and against selfincrimination holding that fifth amendment protection against selfincrimination requires police to notify suspect of right to counsel and to cut off interrogation once suspect invokes the right absent counsel further interrogation may not occur unless suspect initiates subsequent conversation if police initiate subsequent interrogation there can be no valid waiver of counsel even though police advise suspect of his or her constitutional rights and suspect acquiesces in the interrogation holding that although interrogation may not continue after a suspect has requested counsel the police legitimately may inquire whether the suspect has changed his mind about speaking to them without an attorney holding that interrogation must cease if the suspect unambiguously asserts his right to counsel holding that the interrogation must cease once the suspect invokes his miranda right to counsel