days after the filing of such an indictment. The Act itself places broad discretion in the District Court to grant a continuance when necessary to allow further preparation.” Id.; see also id. at 240-41, 106 S.Ct. 555 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[A] continuance should be granted where there is a meaningful possibility that a superseding indictment will require an alteration or adjustment in the planned defense.”). Thus, under the Speedy Trial Act, a defendant’s remedy when a superseding indictment adds charges that require further trial preparation is to seek a continuance, and not, as Defendant argues, an outright dismissal of the new charges or vacatur of the convictions arising from those new charges. See United States v. Smith, 24 F.3d 1230, 1234-35 (10th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); United States v. McKinnell, 888 F.2d 669,
holding that when initial indictment was filed within the thirtyday period a superseding indictment filed outside the thirtyday window which did not change the original charges did not violate the speedy trial act holding that there was no violation of defendants speedy trial act rights where the district court granted a continuance due to a superseding indictment returned five days before trial which added new charges based on recently acquired information holding initial indictment which was subsequently found to be invalid tolled the thirtyday period and superseding indictment alleging different charges based on same fraudulent acts as earlier indictment was therefore timely holding that the dismissal of an indictment before trial and institution of a superseding indictment does not trigger double jeopardy holding that the proper remedy if the superseding indictment operates to prejudice a defendant is a continuance