A (2) (c) (718 SE2d 135) (2011) (physical precedent only) (explaining that expert witness “was allowed to opine that the security measures at the complex were inadequate and deficient”); Birge v. Dollar Gen. Corp., No. 04-2531 BP, 2006 WL 5179319, at *3 (II) (W.D. Tenn. 2006) (excluding proffered expert testimony when witness did not “have any expertise or training that qualifie[d] him to provide expert testimony concerning the deterrent effect of security measures on criminal defendants”); B discretion by excluding the testimony of a witness who was listed as a “may call” witness in pretrial order because appellees “could no longer claim they were surprised by appellants’ decision to call” the witness); see also Foster v. Morrison, 177 Ga. App. 250, 250-51 (2) (339 SE2d 307) (1985) (<HOLDING>); Kamensky v. Stacey, 134 Ga. App. 530, 532 (1)
holding that trial court impliedly ruled on motion for continuance by granting motion for summary judgment when appellant filed motion for continuance two days before summary judgment hearing holding that the defendants motion for discharge was premature and thus properly denied by the trial court holding trial court has jurisdiction to reconsider new trial order as long as case is pending holding that trial court properly denied motions for continuance and mistrial when counsel was notified of new witnesses within five days of trial as specified by pretrial order holding that trial court erred in considering pro se motion for new trial filed when defendant was represented by counsel