documents after service of process had been effected. The Eighth Circuit’s decision relied on the Supreme Court’s mandate that when “a legislative body ‘includes particular language in one section of the a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that [the legislative body] acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.’ ” See id. at 174 (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983)). One decision by the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has followed the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of Article 10(a). See Paul Eggear v. Shibusawa Warehouse Company, No. 00-CV-4636, 2001 WL 267881, at *5-6, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2868, at *16-17 (E.D.Pa. March 19, 2001) (<HOLDING>). But see McCarron, 2001 WL 632927, at *1-2,
holding that ricos nationwide service of process provision did not authorize service outside the united states holding that equitable estoppel did not apply because boyd was not affirmatively misled by a postal service official holding that article 10a did not permit service of process through postal channels on japanese company in japan holding that mailboxes although paid for by the customer are an essential part of the postal service for purposes of forum analysis holding that service is not avoided by service on a partys attorney as service on an attorney is ineffective unless he has been authorized to accept such service