the public “at its peril to anticipate a judicial pronouncement that public standards of morality have changed.” Balthazar v. Superior Ct. of Comm. of Mass., 428 F.Supp. 425 (D.C.1977). It cannot be said that references to similar statutes and judicial determinations in other jurisdictions make it fairly ascertainable that the Massachusetts statute was applicable to petitioner’s conduct. In Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638 (Alaska 1969), the language “unnatural carnal copulation” was held to be too vague as applied to homosexual anal intercourse. State v. Sharpe, 1 Ohio App.2d 425, 205 N.E.2d 113 (1965), held “unnatural sex act” vague as applied to sodomy. Such statutes have also been applied to widely dissimilar forms of conduct. See, e. g., Jellum v. Cupp, 475 F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 1973) (<HOLDING>); Koa Gora v. Territory of Hawaii, 152 F.2d 933
holding that attorney disciplinary rule was unconstitutionally vague as applied holding statute unconstitutionally vague as applied to mere possession of money on jail premises holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment holding appellant waived his challenge to statute as vague as applied because he did not specifically object at trial holding unnatural conduct contrary to the course of nature vague as applied to forcing a woman to the ground and urinating on her