as the California Legislature may well have recognized when it specifically provided that a prosecutor may move to dismiss or strike a prior felony conviction “in the furtherance of justice.” Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 667(f)(2) (West 1999). In this case, the statutory safeguard failed, and the state court was left to ensure that the Eighth Amendment prohibition on grossly disproportionate sentences was met. If Andrade’s sentence is not grossly disproportionate, the principle has no meaning. The California court’s holding was an unreasonable application of clearly established precedent. 1 This point is independent of the fact, recognized by the Court, ante, at 68, that it remains open to Andrade to appeal his sentence under People v. Garcia, 20 Cal. 4th 490, 976 P. 2d 831 (1999) (<HOLDING>). 2 Implicit in the distinction between future
holding that the statute is mandatory holding that a defendant is subject to a mandatory consecutive sentence for a  924c conviction and is not spared from that sentence by virtue of receiving a higher mandatory minimum on a different count of conviction holding that under a federal three strikes law the sentencing judge may only find facts that were necessary to the prior conviction holding that such a decision was within the trial courts discretion holding trial court may dismiss strikes on a countbycount basis such discretion is consistent with mandatory consecutive sentencing provision