of the accident, nor did he order any blood tests to be performed. 3 . Noticeably absent from the majority opinion is any discussion concerning appellee’s subjective expectation of privacy. Because the majority focuses solely on society’s objective view, I presume that the majority found appellee possessed a subjective expectation of privacy. 4 . See Pollard v. State, 439 N.E.2d 177, 183 (Ind.Ct.App.1982) (admitting evidence of blood tests results because: (1) no physician/patient privilege, (2) police had probable cause, and (3) no state action in obtaining the blood); People v. Perlos, 436 Mich. 305, 462 N.W.2d 310, 316 (1990) (determining no reasonable expectation of privacy in medical records involving DWI inves tigation); State v. Copeland, 680 S.W.2d 327, 330 (Mo.App.1984) (<HOLDING>); State v. Dyal, 97 N.J. 229, 478 A.2d 390, 391
holding defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in blood sample drawn by hospital holding blood sample does not constitute compelled testimony holding that a hospital employee caught on video in the mailroom of the hospital enjoyed no legitimate expectation of privacy holding that society recognizes a reasonable expectation of privacy holding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth