counterclaim. See, e.g., Wassail v. DeCaro, 91 F.3d 443, 445 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating that the plaintiff agreed to drop claims where the defendant agreed to drop counterclaim); Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell, 727 F.2d 1145, 1149 (D.C.Cir.1984) (noting that the plaintiffs agreed to dismiss claims where the defendants agreed to dismiss counterclaims). The economies argument ultimately devolves into an argument about the manageability of the counterclaims in the context of the class action, a concern addressed both by Rule 13 and by Rule 23. Rule 13 (i), through its reference to Rule 42(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides that, to further convenience and to avoid prejudice, a court may order separate trials of the counterclaims. See FDIC v. Selaiden Builders, Inc., 973 F.2d 1249, 1253 (5th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1051, 113 S.Ct. 1944,
holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling based only on affidavits holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in changing the surname of the child where the court made factual findings that the name change would be in the best interest of the child holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the withdrawal of the juiy trial waiver holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a new trial based on a 250000 award for a mental distress claim holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering a separate trial for the counterclaims where the convenience of the parties would be served