whether the structure Jennings placed on his property constitutes a mobile home or a generic successor as prohibited by the deed restriction. As a result, summary judgment is improper because a fact question exists regarding whether Jennings’s home qualifies as the type of structure that the deed restriction prohibits. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s judgment declaring that Jennings’s home violates the deed restriction against mobile homes and remand the cause for a determination of whether Jennings’s home constitutes a mobile home or a generic successor of a mobile home as prohibited by the deed restriction, giving effect to the liberal construction required for unambiguous deed restrictions. See T Assoc., Inc., 953 S.W.2d 525, 528 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). However, because we have determined that a
holding that property owner could not argue it had no notice of deed restrictions simply because guidelines were unclear when owner acknowledged having copy of such restrictions holding that because the property owner argued only a theory of taking that was no longer a valid theory property owner did not demonstrate his entitlement to relief holding that the current property owner may not assert a public nuisance claim against the former owner holding that property owners who are aware of deed restrictions and accompanying guidelines are considered to be on notice of such restrictions despite believing that guidelines are unclear and inapplicable holding that magistrate judge had jurisdiction to enter default judgment in an in rem forfeiture action even though property owner had not consented to it because 28 usc  636c1 only requires the consent of the parties and the property owner having failed to comply with the applicable filing requirements was not a party