760 F.2d at 531 n. 3; Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence § 608(5) (1993). Each of these purposes should be secondary to the overriding purpose of Rule 404(b): admission of evidence probative of a material issue in the case. In the case at bar, the district court followed its “usual practice” of evaluating Rule 404(b) evidence at the end of the government’s ease-in-chief. The district court at that time stated that the issue of intent had not yet been put in issue. In so ruling, the district court overlooked the fact that intent was an element of both of the charged conspiracies, and thus was an issue relevant to the government’s burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt. See Estelle v. McGuire, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 475, 481, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (<HOLDING>). While we hold it would have been preferable
holding that when two underlying offenses are charged in an indictment for capital murder the state need only prove one of the two offenses to support the conviction holding that when defendants plead not guilty the government is required to prove all elements of charged offenses including intent holding that when a defendant charged with conspiracy enters a not guilty plea he makes intent a material issue in the case and imposes a substantial burden on the government thus the government may introduce extrinsic offenses which qualify under 404b to prove defendants state of mind unless defendant takes affirmative steps to remove the issue of intent from the case holding defendant by pleading guilty admits all essential elements of offense charged holding that  facts required  language of article 3709 section one means the evidence legally required to prove the elements of charged offense