lack of enumeration is dispositive. Expanding on the “otherwise” clause, the application notes explain that “[o]ther offenses are included where ... the conduct set forth (i.e., expressly charged) in the count of which the defendant was convicted ..., by its nature, presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” Id. Against this backdrop, the lens of judicial inquiry narrows to a determination of whether larceny from the person is a category of crime that, by its nature, presents a substantial risk of personal injury even though its statutorily defined elements do not include the use or threat of force. Appellant contends that because the crime potentially embraces a broad range of non-violent conduct, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dimond, 57 Mass. 235, 236-38 (1849) (<HOLDING>), larceny from the person cannot be shoehorned
holding that in certain circumstances fraud can be prosecuted under the statute recognizing that in certain circumstances inquiry notice may be determined as a matter of law holding that a dismissal in the interest of justice can be a favorable termination under certain circumstances recognizing that there can be compelling circumstances in which a trial court can determine that neither party prevailed in a contract case holding consumer debtors may be eligible for chapter 11 under certain circumstances