with either the concept of at-will employment or with existing precedent. Indeed, by crafting a right to be free from arbitrary government termination, the majority reaches the anomalous conclusion that “the same element — ‘freedom from arbitrariness ’ — should at once entitle a person to due process and also be a part of the process which is due.” Jeffries v. Turkey Run Con-sol. School Dist., 492 F.2d 1, 4 n. 8 (7th Cir.1974) (Judge Stevens). Moreover, the majority ignores that Singleton was merely discharged from one job — that of policeman — and Singleton has not suggested that he cannot achieve any other employment with the City of Advance or any other city. See Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895-96, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961) (<HOLDING>). At worst, the City’s decision to discharge
holding that where plaintiff remained entirely free to obtain employment either with her employer or another employer her liberty right in following a chosen trade or profession was not implicated holding that a university professor was not denied the right to pursue his choice of career because he remained free to pursue his chosen profession at another university holding that an employee who claims to have been terminated by her employer for having exercised her right to disability benefits raised a cognizable claim under  510 of erisa notwithstanding the fact that she received the benefits from her employer prior to termination holding that because plaintiff chose to leave her employer she did not suffer any tangible employment action holding that an employees private arbitration agreement with her employer precluded her from filing suit against the employer under the adea