first clause inoperative. If N.J.S.A 39:4-88(b) prohibits nothing more than a lane change conducted unsafely as described in the statute’s second clause, then the Legislature’s language in the first clause would have no meaning. When construing a statute, “ ‘[l]egislative language must not, if reasonably avoidable, be found to be inoperative, superfluous or meaningless.’ ” Franklin Tower One, L.L.C. v. N.M., 157 N.J. 602, 613, 725 A.2d 1104 (1999) (quoting In re Sussex Cnty. Mun. Utils. Auth 5 (2001) (construing Md.Code Ann., Transp., § 21-309 to describe one offense); State v. Lafferty, 291 Mont. 157, 967 P.2d 363, 366 (1998) (construing Mont.Code Ann. § 61-8-328 to prohibit only unsafe lane changes into other traffic lanes); State v. McBroom, 179 Or.App. 120, 39 P.3d 226, 229 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Hernandez v. State, 983 S.W.2d 867, 870-72
recognizing that a statute should be read as comprehensive whole holding that related provisions should be read together holding that two clauses of orrevstat ann  811370 should be read together holding that limitations from the specification should not be read into the claims holding that government contracts must be read as if they included clauses required by law