to reopen its case, counsel used the divorce decree, rather than a transcript, to question J.F.’s mother about her denials of any abuse during the family court proceeding. Considering the numerous other grounds upon which to attack her credibility, counsel did not “believe that this was that strong of a defensive point.” As “the sole fact-finder and judge” of the credibility and weight of each piece of evidence, whether presented “during live testimony” or “in affidavits,” the trial court is “within its right to disbelieve” any of the “assertions upon which [the] appellant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are based,” so long as the basis for that disbelief is supported by at least one “reasonable view of the record.” Riley v. State, 378 S.W.3d 453, 459 (Tex.Crim.App.2012) (<HOLDING>); Charles v. State, 146 S.W.3d 204, 208, 212
holding that a defendant must demonstrate that he would not have pled guilty but for the error holding circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction to accept a guilty plea where defendant was not indicted for the charge to which he pled guilty but signed a sentencing sheet which established defendant was notified of the charge to which he pled guilty recognizing that a reversal for ineffective assistance would be in order if the defendant had pled guilty solely in reliance upon his counsels erroneous advice that he would be eligible for parole in onethird the time he received for sentence holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to accept the defendants guilty pleas to two counts of the indictment and stating that even if the trial court erred the error had not prejudiced the defendant because he was found guilty by the jury of the charges to which he intended to plead and the evidence of the other crimes would have been admissible in the trial for the first degree murder charge holding trial court had broad discretion to disbelieve defendants claim he would not have pled guilty but for counsels error