not been resolved.” Id. at 325, 87 S.Ct. 1072. Neely emphasizes the need usually to defer to the trial judge’s perspective on new trial matters. See id. The Supreme Court more recently characterized Neely as “reiterating] the value of the district court’s input, [and] cautioning the courts of appeals to be ‘ “constantly alert” to “the trial judge’s first-hand knowledge of witnesses, testimony, and issues.” ’ ” Unitherm Food Sys., Inc., 126 S.Ct. at 986 n. 3 (quoting Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 443, 120 S.Ct. 1011, 145 L.Ed.2d 958 (2000) (quoting Neely, 386 U.S. at 325, 87 S.Ct. 1072)). The trial judge’s first-hand knowledge is directly at stake in Jones’ new trial motion, and the majority should have deferred to the trial court here. See Iacurci, 387 U.S. at 88, 87 S.Ct. 1423 (<HOLDING>). This panel is not at liberty to adopt a rule
holding trial courts error in overruling objection to prosecutors misstatement of law of intoxication that differed from definition in charge was harmless when there was evidence supporting the jurys verdict and it was presumed the jury followed the instructions in the charge holding that the trial court can and should grant a new trial if the manifest weight of the evidence is contrary to the verdict holding that after court dismissed case at plaintiffs request notwithstanding the fact that jury had deliberated upon the case and indicated that it had reached a verdict there was no case pending in court on which a verdict could be predicated and the information which the judge got from an inspection of the petition handed to him by the foreman of the jury was information which he received as an individual and not as a judge of the court and further holding that despite violation of defendants right to receive the verdict that was purportedly reached the writing incorporated in the bill of exceptions as a verdict of the jury was in law no verdict because it was not received in court and published as required by law and was instead entirely extraneous and extrajudicial holding that the appellants appeal of the jurys verdict was a material breach of the no appeals provision in the parties settlement agreement holding that where the meaning of the jurys verdict was not clear in light of the trial courts jury instructions the court of appeals erred in directing entry of judgment for respondent the case should have been remanded to the trial judge who was in the best position to pass upon the question of a new trial in light of the evidence his charge to the jury and the jurys verdict