assistance of counsel.” United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1433 (10th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). This purpose would not be served by reversing Defendant’s convictions. In this case, Defendant knew that the prosecuti urt to excuse an untimely disclosure for good cause. As the government points out, the district court found that any violation of the fifteen-day rule was “excusable” because Rule 413 only became relevant upon the dismissal of. Count 6, and the government gave notice of its intent to rely on Rule 413 in conjunction with its request to voluntarily dismiss that count. Defendant does not address this point at all, and we find no basis to conclude that the district court abused its discretion in this regard. See United States v. Guidry, 456 F.3d 493, 504 (5th Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we reject Defendant’s contention
holding that the insurer was estopped from asserting coverage defenses when it waited to file a declaratory action until 10 months after it had notice of the claim and several months after it had notice of a potential settlement of the underlying litigation holding that the pretrial order did not adequately disclose a theory because it did not give notice of that theory holding that the government had good cause for not providing pretrial notice because it did not learn of the victims testimony until after the trial had already started holding that the fact that the judge on remand had presided over the defendants first trial and had expressed the opinion that the victims testimony was highly credible did not support recusal for bias holding that the improper admission of hearsay testimony of two witnesses that confirmed but did not elaborate upon the victims testimony would have had only minor impact on the jury because there was little to undermine the victims credibility