was not sent). We find it significant that Domino’s claim of lack of notice is made within the context of a section 2 — 1401 petition which requires, inter alia, that the petitioner show due diligence in the underlying litigation. Regardless of any possible negligence on the part of its original attorneys in notifying it of their withdrawal, Domino’s was aware of the claim against it and had an independent duty to follow the progress of its case. Nenadic, 75 Ill. App. 3d at 623, 394 N.E.2d at 535; Falcon Manufacturing Co. v. Nationwide Brokers, Inc. (1984), 123 Ill. App. 3d 496, 499-500, 462 N.E.2d 562, 565; Cooper v. United Development Co. (1984), 122 Ill. App. 3d 850, 856-57, 462 N.E.2d 629, 634; see also Stallworth v. Thomas (1980), 83 Ill. App. 3d 747, 751-52, 404 N.E.2d 554, 558 (<HOLDING>). In sum, we hold that the default and damage
holding that the movants assertion that he failed to advise the plea court of counsels alleged deficiencies because he blamed himself for his lack of funds was undermined by the fact that the plea court advised the movant that he had the right to appointed counsel if he could not afford to pay for counsel holding that bankruptcy court was not required to provide debtor with a hearing before dismissing debtors chapter 13 case where debtor received notice that his case was going to be dismissed if he missed another payment holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present holding that notice of judgment was insufficient holding that the defendants assertion that he missed a court date because of a lack of notice was insufficient under former section 72 since he had a duty to follow his case