requirement that a registrant intending to reside at a temporary residence for more than seven days report the name and address of such residence and the dates the lodging will be used, see Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 28.725(l)(e), .728(l)(e), does not, as Plaintiffs contend, make out-of-state travel impossible. It merely requires more advanced planning and less spontaneity on the part of a traveling registrant. In Moore, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality of a similar temporary residency reporting provision in Florida’s sex offender registry statute, finding that any burden imposed on a registrant’s right to travel was not unreasonable in view of the state’s interest behind the requirement. See 410 F.3d at 1348-49; see also Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 709-14 (8th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); Doe v. Nebraska, 734 F.Supp.2d 882, 929
holding that inperson reporting requirements in nebraska sex of fender registry statute did not create an actual barrier to travel holding that inperson reporting requirements in iowa sex offender registry statute did not infringe on right to interstate travel holding that age requirements under youthful offender statute did not implicate a fundamental right holding that an individual who is required to register as a sex offender is not in custody holding that sex offender registration statute did not infringe on the appellants fundamental right to marry and carry on relationships because it did not directly regulate the family relationship even though it had the result of preventing appellant from living with his mother or wife since they did not reside at a compliant address