By prohibiting government from imposing any substantial burden on an inmate’s religious exercise unless the burden is justified by a compelling, and not just a legitimate, governmental interest, RLUIPA accords greater protection to an inmate than the Free Exercise Clause of both the Idaho and federal constitutions. See Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir.2007); Guru Nanak Sikh Society of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, 326 F.Supp.2d 1140, 1162 (E.D.Cal.2003), affirmed by 456 F.3d 978, (9th Cir.2006) (deciding that because petitioners’ claims succeed under RLUIPA, there was no need to consider whether they succeed under the lower level of scrutiny). See also Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441, 452 n. 1, 94 S.Ct. 656, 663, n. 1, 38 L.Ed.2d 635, 644, n. 1 (1974) (<HOLDING>). Thus, where we have addressed Hyde’s claims
holding that constitutional questions will not be decided if case can be decided on other grounds holding that representation issues are matters relegated to the board representation issues may not be decided by contract and thus may not be decided by an arbitrator holding that issues decided by an intervening supreme court case need not be identical to be controlling holding that constitutional issues need not be decided where narrower grounds exist for according relief holding that it is inappropriate to reach constitutional issues when a case can be decided on other grounds