the mandates of Section 1791 when it sent the “Important Notice” to the insured. The insured does not deny that she received the “Important Notice” form from Harleysville, but argues that she neither signed nor returned the “Important Notice” to Harleysville. Pennland contends that the insured’s receipt of the statutory “Important Notice,” her payment of the renewal premiums and her signature on the coverage selection form operate as a conclusive presumption that she actually knew and understood that her UM/UIM coverage limit was $35,-000.00 instead of $100,000.00. We agree that when Harleysville provided the insured with the “Important Notice” form, a conclusive presumption that the insured had notice of the UM/UIM limits and coverages available was established. See Emig, supra (<HOLDING>). However, under Section 1734, it is necessary
holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city holding that upon receipt of the important notice a conclusive presumption of notice was established holding that denial of receipt of notice of trial did not rebut presumption of trial courts certificate of mailing of notice requiring an evidentiary hearing holding that the invocation of a presumption of notice requires the agency to prove that the notice was properly addressed