at all, Childress first had to be convicted — by a jury based upon facts proved beyond a reasonable doubt — of the alleged offense. The trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that “declination would be in the best interest of the juvenile or the public.” RCW 13.40.110(3). No more is necessary. H.O., 119 Wn. App. at 554-55. Childress’s constitutional rights were not thereby violated. ¶20 The remainder of this opinion has no precedential value. It will, therefore, be filed for public record in accordance with the rules governing unpublished opinions. Grosse and Cox., JJ., concur. Review denied at 176 Wn.2d 1002 (2013). 1 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S. Ct. 1045, 16 L. Ed. 2d 84 (1966). 2 See also United States v. Miguel, 338 F.3d 995, 1004 (9th Cir. 2003) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Juvenile, 228 F.3d 987, 990
holding that since drug quantity did not increase the penalty beyond the prescribed statutory maximum apprendi did not require this fact to be determined by the jury holding that apprendi does not apply retroactively holding that apprendi by its own terms does not apply to transfer proceedings because a transfer to adult criminal court does not increase the penalty    beyond the prescribed statutory maximum for those crimes quoting apprendi 530 us at 490 holding that apprendi does not apply where the defendant was sentenced to less than the statutory maximum holding that statute allowing for transfer of juvenile to adult criminal court does not implicate apprendi because the judges transfer determination does not subject the juvenile to enhanced punishment it subjects the juvenile to the adult criminal justice system