Fabiano ’§ interpretation of Tuttle. Id. The Pembaur majority preempted that interpretation in a broader sense by unambiguously holding that a “policy” for purposes of municipal liability may stem from a single incident of misconduct. Id. at 481, 106 S.Ct. 1292. The Supreme Court revisited .this issue in Board of the County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. at 404, 117 S.Ct. 1382. Elaborating on its decision in Pembaur, the Supreme Court noted that it is not enough for an imposition of municipal liability 37, 45 (1st Cir.1992) (citing Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481-84, 106 S.Ct. 1292 to hold that a single decision can be a policy for purposes of municipal liability); Bowen v. City of Manchester, 966 F.2d 13, 18 (1st Cir.1992) (same); Small v. City of Belfast, 796 F.2d 544, 553 (1st Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); but see Bordanaro, 871 F.2d at 1156-57
holding that a policy for purposes of municipal liability may be established by an officials single decision holding that city managers single unconstitutional action was sufficient for the imposition of municipal liability holding that under praprotnik a town charters directive that city managers personnel decisions be based on merit and fitness did not preclude city managers final policymaking authority where no other town officials were empowered to enforce that provision holding a city liable for the unconstitutional firing of two clerks by a municipal judge when it was clear the city had delegated to him final administrative authority over employment matters holding that discrimination against a municipal employee could trigger municipal liability under  1983 through official policy or custom