the Government’s motion to dismiss. He asserted that he did not seek compensation for tortious acts or omissions of military personnel, but for the “vaccine manufacture’s [sic] tortious conduct, conduct that, absent the [Swine Flu] Act, would give rise to a claim assertable directly against the manufacturer.” Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 2, reprinted in App. 38. Mr. Richardson claimed that the vaccine manufacturer would be hable under local law absent the Swine Flu Act, because it “produced a defective vaccine.” See id. at 3, reprinted in App. 39. Mr. Richardson denied basing his claim on “any military order” and instead argued that his claim was based on the defective or negligent manufacturing of the vaccine. See id. at 3-4, reprinted in App. 39-40 (citing Hunt, 636 F.2d at 599 (<HOLDING>)). Mr. Richardson also disputed the
holding that the limitation act does not apply to claims brought under the oil pollution act holding that the learned intermediary doctrine did not apply where dispensing agencies of a polio vaccine were not necessarily doctors making individualized judgments holding that the limitation act does not apply to claims brought under the clean water act holding that the doctrine does not apply in such circumstancesi holding that the feres doctrine does not apply to swine flu act claims alleging injury from negligently or defectively manufactured vaccine