of the “discovery rule” to cases beyond those where the defendant actively sought to prevent the discovery of the malfeasance, we did not eradicate the rule’s additional objective of benefitting those individuals who were unaware of their injuries due to no fault of their own. The counter-vailing consideration of whether the prospective plaintiff “knew or should have known” through the exercise of reasonable diligence of his injury has always been closely intertwined with the “discovery rule.” See Harrison v. Seltzer, 165 W.Va. 366, 371, 268 S.E.2d 312, 314 (1980) (stating that inquiry is “whether the injured plaintiff was aware of the malpractice or, by the exercise of reasonable care, should have discovered it”); Syl. Pt. 2, Hill v. Clarke, 161 W.Va. 258, 241 S.E.2d 572 (1978) (<HOLDING>). This critical element of the “discovery rule”
holding that the statute of limitations for attorney malpractice may begin to run before the plaintiff knows the full extent of his damages holding that the statute of limitations begins to run on the date the alleged malpractice is discovered holding that  1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury holding that statute of limitations for malpractice begins to run when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the alleged malpractice holding that a  1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury