relevance to the juiy.”); but see Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 832 F.2d 194, 200 (1st Cir.l987)("[T]he district court was correct in using the [McDonnell Douglas ] framework in the instructions to the jury” because “[i]t is a straightforward way of explaining how to consider whether there is intentional discrimination”); abrogated on other grounds by Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 27 (1st Cir.1999); Lynch v. Belden & Co., Inc., 882 F.2d 262, 269 (7th Cir.1989)("[I]t was proper for the district court to instruct the jury as to the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine formula for evaluating indirect evidence.... [Such an instruction] accurately informed the jury of the parties’ burdens ...” (footnote omitted)); Faulkner v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 3 F.3d 1419, 1425 & n. 3 (10th Cirl993) (<HOLDING>). Id. at 540 n. 6. 7 . For example, requested
holding that in reviewing a jury instruction this court must review the entire instruction and look at all the evidence on the record to determine whether there was error and whether that error prejudiced the complaining party holding that in a criminal trial the trial court must correct or amend an improper instruction if the proper instruction is necessary for the jury to understand the case holding that there was no error in a jury instruction that incorporated the entire mcdonnell douglas formulation because it set forth the proper allocation of proof and directed the jury that age must be the determinative factor in the failure to hire holding that the district courts failure to instruct the jury as to the proper standard of proof constituted plain error holding that although it is proper to instruct the jury that it may consider whether the factual predicates necessary to establish the prima facie case have been shown it is error to instruct the jury on the mcdonnell douglas burden shifting scheme