and Amici claim that a presumptive cap for fee awards in support of a successful fee petition is inconsistent with intervening Supreme Court precedent, namely Commissioner, I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 110 L.Ed.2d 134 (1990). Although this court has reaffirmed the Coulter rule in the twenty-five years since Jean was decided, see, e.g., NEOCH, 695 F.3d at 574 (and cases cited therein); Gonter, 510 F.3d at 620-21, we have not examined whether Jean, which was decided four years after Coulter, calls for a re-examination of its presumptive cap. Although. one panel may not disturb the ruling of a prior panel absent en banc review, see 6th Cir. R. 32.1(b) (“Published panel opinions are binding on later panels.”); Valentine v. Francis, 270 F.3d 1032, 1035 (6th Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>), an intervening Supreme Court decision gives
holding that only intervening law from the supreme court or this court sitting en banc can overrule a prior panel decision holding that en banc review is required to overrule a prior published opinion holding that in the absence of an intervening supreme court decision only the en banc court may overrule a decision by a threejudge panel holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panels published decision recognizing that a later en banc court may overrule an earlier en banc opinion