that Congress has the power to regulate interstate commerce, which necessarily includes “the power to determine what shall or shall not be deemed in judgment of law an obstruction to navigation.” Wheeling II, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 431. The Wheeling II Court thus established the precept that a forward-looking judgment in equity remains subject to legislative alterations whereas a judgment at law is forever immune to subsequent changes in the law. See Wheeling II, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 431; see also Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 273, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1501, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (“When the intervening statute authorizes or affects the propriety of prospective relief, application of the new provision is not retroactive.”); System Fed’n No. 91, 364 U.S. at 651-52, 81 S.Ct. at 373-74 (<HOLDING>); Daylo v. Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs,
holding that consent decree could not preclude plaintiffs from bringing claims that could not have been brought at time consent decree was filed and to which they were legally and procedurally entitled holding that the district court abused its discretion by failing to revise an injunction to permit labor practice that had been unlawful at the time consent decree was entered but subsequently had been legalized holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint holding trial court abused its discretion by not extending the time for service where the statute of limitations had run and where service had been achieved at the time of the hearing on the motion to dismiss holding that the district court had discretion where plaintiff sought to amend a count that had been dismissed with prejudice