2009 filing well outside the limitations period. The fact that Mr. Gobert filed an Application for Post Conviction Relief/Appeal Out of Time in July 2009 does not change this result. First, although the filing of a state motion for post-conviction relief tolls the § 2244(d)(1)(A) limitations period, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), no tolling occurred here because Mr. Gobert’s state motion for post-conviction relief was filed after the § 2241(d)(1)(A) limitations period had already expired. Fisher v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1135, 1142-43 (10th Cir. 2001). Second, because the Oklahoma courts denied Mr. Gobert’s request to appeal out of time, these proceedings do not count toward the direct review process for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A). See Orange v. Calbone, 318 F.3d 1167, 1170-71 (10th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Nor do we find a basis for equitable tolling.
holding that the plaintiffs motion for extension of time to file appeal qualified as a notice of appeal because it met the requirements of rule 4 of the federal rules of appellate procedure holding that an issue not raised on direct appeal of sentence is barred by the law of the case from presentation in a subsequent appeal holding that equitable tolling of the time to file a notice of appeal is not permitted holding that because ohio law required ineffectiveassistanceofcounsel claims be raised in an application to reopen the direct appeal of the criminal case such claims were part of the direct appeal entitling defendant to the assistance of counsel holding that the granting of an application to file an appeal out of time is considered part of the direct appeal process under oklahoma law