to achieve prevailing-party status, a party must receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim rising to the level of an enforceable judgment on the merits or court-ordered consent decree that materially alters the parties’ legal relationship. Vaughn v. Principi, 336 F.3d 1351, 1356-57 (Fed.Cir.2003) (citing Buchhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001)). “Minimal relief resembling ‘an interlocutory ruling that reverses dismissal for failure to state a claim’ or a ‘reversal of directed verdict’ will not satisfy statutory requirements to achieve prevailing party status.” Id. at 1357 (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605, 121 S.Ct. 1835); Akers v. Nicholson, 409 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed.Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); Halpern v. Principi, 384 F.3d 1297, 1306
holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees holding that a remand due to an intervening court decision did not render the appellant a prevailing party for eaja purposes holding that a cause of action based on eaja will be deemed to have survived the death of the aggrieved party and  the personal representative of the deceased partys estate or any other appropriate person may be substituted as the prevailing party to whom payment of an eaja award may be made holding that a mere statement that the appellant is a prevailing party satisfies eligibility requirement for jurisdictional purposes holding that a sentence four remand under 42 usc  405g is a final appealable decision and that a party who wins a remand under sentence four is a prevailing party for purposes of the eaja