concluding “the clarity of the exclusions in question” supported the conclusion “a reasonable person could not have understood coverage would exist”). Goodwin does not identify in his affidavit any way in which he misunderstood the policy exclusion. He merely quotes the insuring clause from the policy and then states that he “expect[ed] that this language means just what it says.” But insurance policy provisions are not interpreted in isolation. See Thomas, 749 N.W.2d at 682; Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co. v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 494 N.W.2d 690, 692 (Iowa 1993), called into doubt on other grounds by Corrigan, 697 N.W.2d at 113 n. 1. The insuring clause must be read in conjunction with the policy exclusions. Cf. Harlan v. Valley Ins. Co., 128 Or.App. 128, 875 P.2d 471, 472-73 (1994) (<HOLDING>). If the policy is not considered as a whole,
holding that a person is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave holding in determining whether driver was insured under terms of policy exclusion of person using vehicle without a reasonable belief person was entitled to do so must be considered holding that to be convicted under dwi statute a person must be driving or in actual physical control of the vehicle but motion of the vehicle is not necessary holding that a lookout is not using a vehicle entitled to liability coverage under an insurance policy holding that unlicensed driver who was driving vehicle with permission of owners permittee could reasonably believe that permittee had authority to permit him to drive vehicle and thus driv er was entitled to liability coverage notwithstanding auto policy exclusion for any person using a vehicle without a reasonable belief that person is entitled to do so driver could have reasonable belief that he was entitled to use vehicle even though he was unlicensed where he was doing so at specific request of permittee and actual owner never instructed driver not to drive vehicle nor instructed permittee not to allow others to drive vehicle