actions and the adverse effect on speech.” Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir.2005). Tabor’s speech did not amount to fighting words, so that speech was protected. There is a clear causal connection between that protected speech and the arrest because Tabor testified that he arrested Merenda “because he used profanity not just only in my presence but everyone else’s presence.” It is clearly established that it is a violation of the First Amendment to arrest an individual based on his protected speech. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521-22, 92 S.Ct. 1103, 1106, 31 L.Ed.2d 408 (1972) (“The constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech forbid the States to punish the use of words or language not within ‘narrowly limited classes of speech.’ ”); Bennett, 423 F.3d at 1255 (<HOLDING>) (quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the
holding that an individual is immune from antitrust liability for exercising first amendment right to petition the government holding that not all adverse action taken against a public employee in retaliation for exercising first amendment rights is sufficient to support a cause of action under  1983 holding that retaliatory discharge is a clearly established first amendment violation recognizing first amendment retaliation right holding that it is clearly established that retaliation against private citizens for exercising their first amendment rights is actionable