collateral estoppel precluded the appellant from relitigating the question of whether his breath test results were legally obtained. Bowen, (12, 245 P.3d at 831. Taking that into account, we note, as did the Bowen court, that "courts have addressed the applicability of collateral estoppel under other cireumstances involving criminal and administrative cases." Id., 11 n. 3, 245 P.3d. at 881. See Huelsman v. Kansas Dep't of Revenue, 267 Kan. 456, 980 P.2d 1022, 1025-27 (1999) (suppression of evidence in DUI prosecution based on lack of probable cause did not collaterally estop state from arguing in license suspension proceeding that officer had "reasonable grounds" to request a breath test pursuant to the implied consent law); State v. Young, 3 Neb.App. 539, 530 N.W.2d 269, 278-77 (1995) (<HOLDING>); In re Mehrer, 273 N.W.2d 194, 194, 197
recognizing the doctrine of collateral estoppel in agency proceedings holding revocation of appellants medical license not barred by previous acquittal on charge of criminal abortion even though criminal charge was basis of license revocation proceeding holding that collateral estoppel does not require a criminal court to accept as binding an administrative proceedings license revocation determination holding that probation revocation proceedings are clearly not criminal proceedings recognizing the clear separation between criminal proceedings involving operatingwhileintoxicated prosecutions and administrative proceedings such as the revocation of a motor vehicle license