prohibit police from obtaining a blood sample in a lawful manner onee a driver refuses to consent to a chemical test. If we interpreted the implied consent statutes to hold that a person, who operates a vehicle while intoxicated and is involved in an accident resulting in death or serious bodily injury, could merely refuse to consent to a chemical test and only be faced with the sanction of losing his license and infraction and that his refusal precluded police from obtaining a blood sample by means of I.C. § 9-30-6-6(g), that interpretation would be an absurdity and would encourage drunk drivers involved in fatal accidents to deny consent in order to face minimal criminal and civil penalties rather than the class C felony intended by the legislature. See Livingston, 753 N.E.2d at 575 (<HOLDING>); Brown, 774 N.E.2d at 1007. In summary, the
holding that courts are without power to construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend modify or limit its express terms holding that we are to apply the legislative intent underlying a statute and to construe the statute in such a way as to prevent absurdity recognizing that the absurdity of the result is a factor to consider when interpreting a statute holding that if an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems and where an alternative interpretation of the statute is fairly possible we are obligated to construe the statute to avoid such problems holding that the language of the statute and the courts duty to apply the statute as written requires the court to interpret the statute to apply when the prisoner is sentenced without regard to the institution where the prisoner is incarcerated after the sentencing