118 S.Ct. 1051, 140 L.Ed.2d 114 (1998) (concluding that police officers who testified before a grand and petit jury were not absolutely immune for their testimony if they functioned as complaining witnesses and the allegedly false testimony was necessary to show “the full range of occasions on which [the defendants'] falsehoods were uttered''); Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d 1435, 1447 (6th Cir.1997) (denying Briscoe immunity for a “complaining witness who set the wheels of government in motion by instigating a legal action”); Curtis v. Bembenek, 48 F.3d 281 (7th Cir.1995) (recognizing that a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution may be brought against a police officer based on testimony given in adversarial pre-trail proceedings); Enlow v. Tishomingo County, 962 F.2d 501 (5th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Anthony v. Baker, 955 F.2d 1395 (10th
holding that disputed issues of fact as to whether officer who allegedly gave false testimony before a grand jury could be considered a complaining witness prevented summary judgment holding that where witness refused to take the oath and testify his grand jury testimony should not have been admitted because he was not subject to cross examination before the grand jury holding that under california law tjestifying before a grand jury charged with investigating corruption is one part of an officers job and therefore any speech huppert gave during his grand jury testimony was pursuant to his duties as a police officer holding that absolute immunity does not extend to a complaining witness who initiated a baseless prosecution by giving false testimony at either a grand jury proceeding or preliminary hearing holding that summary judgment was improper where genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether prison officials prevented inmate from filing grievances