is no dispute that Tang’s March 2009 motion to reopen was untimely and numerically barred because the BIA entered a final administrative order in September 2003 and she had previously filed a motion to reopen in July 2006. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although Tang contends that the time and number limitations do not apply to her motion to reopen as it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality” and the evidence she submitted “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h), her arguments are unavailing. As an initial matter, there is no indication that the BIA ignored any material evidence she submitted. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); se ed to establish changed country conditions
recognizing that the court has never held that a petitioner is limited to the exact contours of his or her argument to the agency holding the eeoc is not required to provide documentation of individual attempts to conciliate on behalf of each potential claimant internal quotation marks omitted holding that the weight afforded to an applicants evidence in immigration proceedings lies largely within the discretion of the agency internal quotation marks omitted recognizing that this court has rejected the notion that the agency must expressly parse or refute on the record each individual argument or piece of evidence offered by the petitioner internal quotation marks omitted holding that a foreign entity without property or presence in this country has no constitutional rights under the due process clause or otherwise internal quotation marks omitted