of his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution could be admitted against him at trial on the question of his guilt or innocence. See id. at 382, 389-390. Given that the defendant would be obliged either to give up a valid Fourth Amendment claim, or effectively waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the Court found it “intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another.” Id. at 394. Accordingly, the Court held that “when a defendant testifies in support of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, his testimony may not thereafter be admitted against him at trial on the issue of guilt unless he makes no objection.” Id. See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 425 Mass. 633, 637 (1997) (<HOLDING>). Here, although the rights asserted by a
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