concedes that the Tribe is immune from suit. But he contends that this immunity does not extend automatically to the Gold Country Casino. He urges that the district court be required to apply a three-part test to determine whether the Casino is “analogous to a governmental agency or operating in a governmental capacity as an arm of the tribe.” Allen argues in the alternative that, if the Casino is immune, it waived its immunity by referring to federal law in its employment materials. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b). See, e.g., Decker v. Advantage Fund, Ltd., 362 F.3d 593, 595-96 (9th Cir.2004). We also review de novo questions of sovereign immunity and subject matter jurisdiction. Orff 384, 388-89, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 773 (2001) (<HOLDING>); Trudgeon v. Fantasy Springs Casino, 71
holding that state did not have jurisdiction over tribe where tribe paid into workers compensation program but had not waived sovereign immunity holding that a casino that functioned as an arm of the tribe enjoyed tribal immunity holding that an official of an indian tribe should be stripped of his authority and corresponding immunity to act on behalf of his tribe whenever he exercises a power his tribe was powerless to convey to him recognizing sovereign immunity of forprofit corporation formed by a tribe to operate the tribes casino holding that offreservation casino owned and operated by tribe was arm of the tribe and therefore was entitled to sovereign immunity