is unfair because he pleaded guilty believing that it would not be viewed as a conviction. Even if we assume that Asagwara did not suffer a conviction until IIRIRA, we cannot conclude that Congress’s express retroactive alteration of “conviction” is so unfair that it either “shocks the conscience or interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (describing substantive due process analysis) (quotations and citations omitted). Indeed, Congress’s ability to retroactively expand the class of aliens subject to deportation for criminal activity was recognized long before Asagwara entered his plea. See, e.g., Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694, 77 S.Ct. 1025, 1 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1957) (<HOLDING>); cf. Kuhali v. Reno, 266 F.3d 93, 111 (2d
holding that it was indisputable  that congress in enacting the ina was legislating retrospectively as it may do to cover offenses that were not previously grounds for deportation footnote omitted holding that it is not holding that it may not holding that because congress did not specifically state that deportation terminates supervised release it remains intact even after an aliens deportation holding that no deportation order may be entered unless it is found by clear unequivocal and convincing evidence that the facts alleged as grounds for deportation are true