their final motion to sever. This motion provided new, somewhat more expansive declarations from Mr. Shields and Mr. Temple-man. For the most part, each declaration identified specific inculpatory statements that Mr. Cluff and Mr. Hoskins attributed at trial to Mr. Wardell and Mr. Pursley. Mr. Shields and Mr. Templeman then agreed to testify, upon severance, that neither Mr. Wardell nor Mr. Pursley made any such statements on the day of the assault. Again, the district court denied this motion. We perceive no abuse of discretion in either decision. As an initial matter, Mr. Pursley’s last two motions were filed after the commencement of trial. A Rule 14 motion to sever must be raised before trial. Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(3)(D); United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1239 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Thus, both were untimely. Even if they had
holding suit filed ninetyone days after notice untimely holding that trial court has no power to allow party to amend motion for new trial more than thirty days after trial court signed the final judgment and that denial of amended motion for new trial filed more than thirty days after judgment preserved nothing for appellate review holding that request for rule 26 costs filed nine months after original application for taxation of costs not untimely holding that severance motion to permit exculpatory testimony of codefendant filed nine days after start of trial was untimely holding  1330a motion untimely when filed over 180 days from confirmation