citizens if the wrong decision is made”). In sum, we are aware of no basis for expanding district court jurisdiction beyond the limits se F.2d 1093, 1099 (D.C.Cir.1970) (“[W]hen administrative inaction has precisely the same impact on the rights of the parties as denial of relief, an agency cannot preclude judicial review by casting its decision in the form of inaction rather than in the form of an order denying relief.”). We are nonetheless persuaded by the contrary view that the word “denial” connotes more than a mere refusal to act. See Saccacio, 211 F.3d at 104 (“It may be that [the plaintiff] has not been afforded the ultimate relief for which he applied, but it is simply not the case that his application for relief has been denied by the agency.”); Owen, 122 F.3d at 1354 (<HOLDING>); Burtch, 120 F.3d at 1090 (“In the context of
holding that a claimants failure to lose weight does not constitute a refusal to follow the treatment holding refusal to sign hospital waiver of liability form is not a refusal under section 1547 holding that a refusal to sign an implied consent form is not a refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test for purposes of section 1547 holding that atfs refusal to act on application did not constitute denial holding that the injunction did not constitute a claim