record will be open to the public for inspection after redaction by this Court. REVERSED. FINNEY, C.J., and TOAL, WALLER and BURNETT, JJ., concur. 1 . Juror testimony regarding internal misconduct is generally inadmissible to impeach a verdict except when necessary to ensure fundamental fairness. State v. Hunter, 320 S.C. 85, 463 S.E.2d 314 (1995); see also Rule 606(b), SCRE effective September 3, 1995. Based on our review of the record, we concur in Judge Macaulay's ruling that the proffered evidence was inadmissible. 2 . The Court speculated that a legitimate privacy interest may be implicated, for instance, by voir dire questioning regarding rape of the juror or a family member. 464 U.S. at 512, 104 S.Ct. at 825. 3 . But see United States v. Edwards, 823 F.2d 111 (5th Cir.1987)
holding that although the presumption of correctness applies to the ultimate classification decision  the presumption carries no force as to questions of law holding a defendant seeking a new trial on the basis of juror misconduct has the initial burden to prove thatajuror or jurors did in fact commit the alleged misconduct holding that docket sheets enjoy a presumption of openness under the first amendment holding no presumption of openness applies to midtrial hearings into juror misconduct because of the disruptive effect on the ongoing trial holding that trial courts denial of motion for new trial based on juror misconduct was justified where there was no evidence presented at hearing on motion that juror had knowingly concealed relevant litigation experience during voir dire and identity of juror as county court litigant was not demonstrated