that these defendants maintained unlawful policies. See Picray v. Sealock, 138 F.3d 767, 772 (9th Cir.1998) (“Proof of random acts or isolated events does not satisfy the plaintiffs burden to establish a custom or policy.”). Contrary to Vohra’s contentions, the record shows that the County’s decision not to prosecute Vohra was made two days after his arrest. See Jones v. City of Santa Monica, 382 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir.2004) (stating that probable cause determinations made within 48 hours of arrest are presumptively prompt). The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims after granting summary judgment on the federal claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see also Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 826 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). However, the district court abused its
holding that the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related statelaw claims once it has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction holding that district court had supplemental jurisdiction over claims challenging administrative decision once case was properly removed based on original jurisdiction arising from constitutional claims holding that when original jurisdiction claims are dismissed before trial the district court must decline to exercise jurisdiction over pendent state claims unless there is an affirmative justification for doing so holding that after all federal claims had been dismissed if the district court does decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction these state claims shall be remanded to state court rather than dismissed because this case was originally filed in state court and removed to federal court holding that when all federal claims have been dismissed the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims