the gross disproportionality principle, the precise contours of which are unclear, applicable only in the ‘exceedingly rare’ and ‘extreme’ case.” Andrade, — U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1173, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003) (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983); and Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980)). The Court concluded in Andrade that two consecutive 25-years-to-life sentences with the possibility of parole, imposed under California’s three-strikes law on the basis of two petty theft convictions, did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 1175; see also Ewing v. California, — U.S.-, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003) (<HOLDING>). On the basis of Andrade and Ewing, we
holding that a sentence of 25 years to life imposed for felony grand theft under californias threestrikes law did not violate the eighth amendment holding that 25 years to life sentence under the california three strikes law did not violate the eighth amendments prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment holding that the fifteen year minimum sentence imposed under section 924e does not violate the eighth amendment holding that a california state courts affirmance of two consecutive 25 years to life sentences for petty theft was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law holding in a five to four decision that a twentyfive year minimum sentence for stealing three golf clubs pursuant to californias threestrikes law did not violate the eighth amendment and that any criticism for the statute is properly directed at the legislature