’ a two month window in which Plaintiffs counsel could have filed suit, I will exclude the prejudgment interest for an approximately two year period of time from January, 1999 to January, 2001. I will, however, grant prejudgment interest covering the time between January 1997 to January 1999 and January 2001 to July 2002, totaling $14,706.00. B. Negative Tax Consequences Plaintiff requests damages to compensate him for the negative tax impact of receiving the backpay award in a lump sum rather than over time as if he had remained employed with CCH. The Third Circuit has never specifically addressed the issue of whether damages should be awarded to compensate for the negative tax consequences from an ADEA backpay award. See Gelof v. Papineau, 829 F.2d 452, 455 n. 2 (3d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); see also Becker v. ARGO Chem. Co., 15
holding that question regarding district courts decision on summary judgment was moot in light of jury verdict negating another element of the claim holding that the issue of defendants actual knowledge should not be resolved on summary judgment but should be left to the trier of fact holding that where the meaning of the jurys verdict was not clear in light of the trial courts jury instructions the court of appeals erred in directing entry of judgment for respondent the case should have been remanded to the trial judge who was in the best position to pass upon the question of a new trial in light of the evidence his charge to the jury and the jurys verdict holding that when an attorney fee award is made under a statute that does not define reasonable the award should be determined in light of all cetreumstances emphasis added holding in light of defendants concession that the judgment should properly include the negative tax impact of a lump sum payment as an element of damages we do not address the question of whether such an award should be made in all backpay cases