(7th Cir.2000). In reaching this conclusion, we determined that “the disparate-impact and mandatory accommodation rules found in the ADA” far exceeded the constitutional protections provided by the Equal Protection Clause. Erickson, 207 F.3d at 951; see also Stevens, 210 F.3d at 738. Furthermore, we concluded that these provisions could not be sustained as “reasonable prophylactic legislation.” Erickson, 207 F.3d at 951-52; see also Stevens, 210 F.3d at 740-41. Underlying this holding was our understanding that Congress could not subject disability discrimination, which receives only rational basis review under the Constitution, see Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 442-46, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985), to more searching scrutiny. See Erickson, 207 F.3d at 951 (<HOLDING>). In light of these principles drawn from prior
holding plaintiffs had stated a claim for intentional discrimination under the ada and  504 holding that the ada exceeds the  5 power  at least to the extent it extends beyond remedies for irrational discrimination recognizing that chapter 216s prohibition on disability discrimination is the statelaw counterpart to the ada and that in considering a disability discrimination claim brought under iowa code chapter 216 we look to the ada and cases interpreting its language we also consider the underlying federal regulations established by the equal employment opportunity commission hereinafter eeoc the agency responsible for enforcing the ada holding that the statements by the court went well beyond a mere rejection of the agreements and explanation for it they suggested at the very least the agreements that would be acceptable recognizing standards to determine discrimination are the same under the ra and the ada