post-appeal Rule 83 motion for a new trial and by failing to recuse herself. Berger had no federal right to the assistance of counsel in his Rule 33 motion. Thus, whether he should receive appointed counsel was left to the discretion of the district court. In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion by considering the complexity of Berger’s appeal and then refusing to grant appointed counsel. As for his recusal claim, we find that Berger failed to allege sufficient facts to support this claim. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 1 . The record does not contain a copy of the transcript of the Rule 33 evidentiary hearing; however, a copy is attached to Berger's Brief at pages A-15 to A-29. 2 . See generally Kitchen, 227 F.3d at 1018 (<HOLDING>) (citation
holding that expert tests conducted by petitioner postconviction based upon evidence available to the defense at trial did not constitute new evidence within the meaning of rule 33 holding that a notice of appeal filed in an adversary proceeding could not appeal the main proceeding holding that counsel should have been appointed in the preappeal rule 33 motion at issue because in a rule 33 proceeding a defendant must face an adversary proceeding that  like a trial  is governed by intricate rules that to a layperson would be hopelessly forbidding an unrepresented defendant  is unable to protect the vital interests at stake holding that a state agency proceeding did not constitute an action in a court of the united states or a state within the meaning of 33 usc  1365b1 holding that while an original bankruptcy proceeding where the state is not named as a defendant is not a suit an adversary proceeding directly against the state would be