defendant failed to take reasonable care or that the harm that occurred was foreseeable. Id. at 708-09. The court adhered to that reasoning in Chartrand v. Coos Bay Tavern, 298 Or 689, 696 P2d 513 (1985), when it recognized that the plaintiff could proceed on both a common-law negligence theory and on a theory that the defendant had violated a statute prohibiting service of alcoholic beverages to a visibly intoxicated patron. The court explained: “Thus, a plaintiff protected by such a statute need not resort to any concepts of negligence. Negligence is irrelevant. The sole question is whether the defendant engaged in acts prohibited by the statute and whether the violation of the statute resulted in injury.” Id. at 696; see also Davis v. Campbell, 327 Or 584, 592, 965 P2d 1017 (1998) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted); Gattman v. Favro, 306 Or
holding that the commonlaw standard for negligence says nothing about whether the legislature intended that legal standard to apply to a statutory claim under the rlta holding that the standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence is the same as the standard for denying a motion for a directed verdict holding that the standard of proof for dischargeability actions is the preponderance of the evidence standard holding that even if the standard for waiver is clear the standard was not met holding that the standard for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as the standard for a motion to dismiss