were brought with regard to the 1984 sentencing. After Green's resentencing in 1992, he did not raise these claims about the 1992 proceeding. 8 . This situation is qualitatively different than that presented by § 1419(a)(3). Under § 1419(a)(3), a claim is barred because the state court was not afforded the opportunity to rule on the merits in a timely manner. Unlike § 1419(a)(2), when applying § 1419(a)(3), there is no state court adjudication of a federal law issue that could serve as binding precedent. 9 . It also is not clear that racial discrimination in the selection of a North Carolina grand jury foreperson constitutes a violation of federal constitutional principles to a degree warranting reversal. See Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339, 104 S.Ct. 3093, 82 L.Ed.2d 260 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 99 S.Ct.
holding that a defendants guilty plea   forecloses independent inquiry into the claim of discrimination in the selection of the grand jury holding thirty days in disciplinary segregation does not rise to the level of punishment invoking the due process clause holding that it is error to conduct most of the jury selection process in the absence of the defendant holding that racial discrimination in selection of grand jurors compelled dismissal of indictment holding that discrimination in selection of a federal grand jury foreperson does not rise to level of reversible due process violation because the foreperson serves a ministerial role