trial court not to accept the State’s argument.” Id. at 330, 643 S.E.2d at 918. We therefore held that the mere acknowledgment that an aggravator might apply was not sufficiently definite and certain to constitute an admission for Blakely purposes, but cautioned that such admissions “may take a variety of forms.” Id. Revels also addressed this issue, observing that “verbalizations necessarily fall along a spectrum” by which their certainty and clarity should be considered as potential Blakely admissions. 455 F.3d at 450. There the Court cited its decision in United States v. Milam for the proposition that the “silence” of both defendant and defense counsel would not constitute an admission for Blakely purposes. Revels, 455 F.3d at 450-51 (citing Milam, 443 F.3d 382, 387 (4th Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>)). The Court observed, however,- that
holding that we would not review a claim of error regarding the admission of evidence when the defendant stipulated to its admission at trial holding that when defense counsel withdrew an objection to admission of evidence the defendant waived his right to a review of the courts ruling on appeal holding that no blakelycompliant admission occurred when both the defendant and defense counsel stood silent as the trial court made its finding on the aggravator holding that prejudice existed when an attorney was both the trial counsel and a necessary witness holding counsel will be held ineffective if he made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the sixth amendment and such performance prejudiced the defense