would run counter to the purpose of the invited error doctrine. See Logan, 200 Ariz. at 566, ¶ 15, 30 P.3d at 633. Without limiting the scope of the doctrine, in our view 6, 1109 (1960) (refusing to consider as grounds of error instructions requested by defendant); Sisson v. State, 16 Ariz. 170, 175, 141 P. 713, 714-15 (1914) (declining to reverse conviction based on erroneous jury instruction requested by defendant, and noting that the policy of reversing eases when error occurred at defendant’s invitation “would, indeed, be unwise, for it must readily occur to any one [sic] that the pursuit of such a course could not be fraught otherwise than with most mischievous consequences in the administration of the law”); State v. Tassler, 159 Ariz. 183, 185, 765 P.2d 1007, 1009 (App.1988) (<HOLDING>); State v. Islas, 132 Ariz. 590, 592, 647 P.2d
holding that the requested instruction was not required under rule 4325c because even assuming that the requested instruction was a correct statement of law the trial judge exercised his discretion properly holding that it was not error for the court to give a substantive new instruction to the jury after deliberations began where the instruction was given in court with the defendant and his counsel present holding that issue of inadequate jury instruction was waived because the instruction given was the one expressly requested by defense counsel holding that pattern jury instruction was inadequate because it did not encompass the valid defense asserted by the defendant holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given