acts of domestic violence."). 24 . For example, one commentator suggests that rather than empowering a domestic violence victim, mutual protective orders restrict, condemn, and isolate the victim. Sandra S. Park, Note, Working Towards Freedom From Abuse: Recognizing a "Public Policy" Exception to Employment-at-Will for Domestic Violence Victims, 59 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 121, 148 (2003). 25 . See Fred G. Zundel & Patrick D. Costello, Domestic Violence Trends & Topics, 52 ApvocatE (Idaho), Jan. 2009, 23, 23. 26 . 144 P.3d at 459. 27 . Id. at 454, 459. 28 . Id. at 459. 29 . Cooper, 144 P.3d at 459 (quoting Siggelkow, 731 P.2d at 61). 30 . Id. 31 . Id. 32 . Id. 33 . AS 18.66.100(a); see also AS 18.66.990(3) (defining domestic violence). 34 . See Cooper, 144 P.3d at 459. 35 . See id. (<HOLDING>). Although a domestic violence protective order
holding that an order compelling arbitration in an independent proceeding is appealable as a final order because in that context the order compelling arbitration resolves the sole issue before the court holding that because the order lacked an independent basis it was an abuse of discretion to issue the mutual restraining order recognizing that a stay contained in anex parte order did not serve to suspend the effectiveness of the restraining notice otherwise any judgment debtor could obtain such an order without notice to the court that a restraining notice had been served or to the judgment creditor and recover his property theretofore properly made the subject of the restraining notice holding temporary restraining order void because court waived bond holding that court lacked jurisdiction on appeal from injunction because the order was simply an interpretation of an earlier order