the factors of “functional integration, centralization of management, and economies of scale” as highly relevant in deciding this matter. Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 438, 100 S.Ct. at 1232. Accord F.W. Woolworth Company v. Taxation and Revenue Department of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 354, 364, 102 S.Ct. 3128, 3135, 73 L.Ed.2d 819 (1982); see also Exxon Corporation v. Department of Revenue of Wisconsin, 447 U.S. 207, 224-25, 100 S.Ct. 2109, 2120-2 a unitary operation decreases with a decrease in the flow. For instance, a parent’s purchase of a minimal amount of a subsidiary’s output indicates that the parent’s interest in the subsidiary is merely for investment purposes. ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Taxation Commission, 458 U.S. 307, 322-23, 102 S.Ct. 3103, 3112-13, 73 L.Ed.2d 787 (1982) (<HOLDING>). See also Woolworth, 458 U.S. at 371, 102
holding that under north carolina law a corporate parent cannot be held liable for the acts of its subsidiary unless the corporate structure is a sham holding stay would not extend to separate legal entities such as corporate affiliates partners in debtor partnerships or to codefendants in pending litigation recognizing separate corporate identity of parent despite evidence that parent was alterego of its subsidiary and was being sued for acts of its subsidiary holding that two citicorp affiliates were not debt collectors under fdcpa because they were corporate affiliates of creditors parent corporation holding the de minimis flow of products between the parent and its foreign affiliates ranging from 01 to 6 indicated a lack of corporate unity