When determining a party’s ability to pay and a party’s need for attorney’s fees and costs, the general rule is that the trial court may only consider the “financial resources of the parties and not the financial assistance of family or Mends.” Bromante v. Bromante, 577 So.2d 662, 663 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); see also Bedell v. Bedell, 583 So.2d 1005 (Fla.1991); Thilem v. Thilem, 662 So.2d 1314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Sol v. Sol, 656 So.2d 206 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Shiveley v. Shiveley, 635 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). An exception to this general rule is that income can be imputed based on gifts if the gifts are continuing and ongoing, not sporadic, and where the evidence shows that the gifts will continue in the future. Vorcheimer v. Vorcheimer, 780 So.2d 1018, 1019 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)(<HOLDING>); Ordini v. Ordini, 701 So.2d 663, 666 (Fla.
holding that a parent corporations contacts may not be imputed to its subsidiary holding that mere delay in payment for a while would not be a material breach holding that income should not be imputed absent evidence that the payment would continue in the future holding that the insurer is allowed to continue its investigation beyond the time that payment is due under the policy if reasonably necessary holding that it was not essential to an action by a supplier on a payment bond under the miller act that a demand be made on the general contractor for payment  although there was evidence in the case from which it could be found that the materialman looked to the general contractor for payment  since the statute does not require a demand for payment but merely requires written notice of the claim