conclusions); 5 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 18.4(c) (3d ed.2007). The State urges this Court to follow the holding in Jenkins v. United States, 394 F.3d 407, 413 (6th Cir.2005), where the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined that the IAD was not applicable to a sentenced prisoner who was transferred on several occasions from a county jail to federal court for pretrial proceedings and then back to the county jail. Relying on its holding in Taylor, 173 F.3d at 541, the court ruled that a prisoner begins serving a term of imprisonment when he or she is “transferred to the ‘state facility to which [the , No. 1:08CR00024-6, 2008 WL 4319734, at *1 (W.D.Va. Sept. 12, 2008); Escalanti v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 385, 799 P.2d 5, 9 (Ct.App.1990) (<HOLDING>); People v. Walton, 167 P.3d 163, 166
recognizing distinction between tolling and estoppel recognizing distinction between two types of waiver recognizing this distinction holding that inmates in arizona jails and prisons cannot be treated differently based on a distinction between the rehabilitative programs available in the two types of institutions holding that the types of remedial and rehabilitative services to be required under icwa depend on the facts of the case