such as the privilege against self-incrimination and the attorney-client privilege. Jane, quoting People v. Ianniello, 21 N.Y.2d 418, 288 N.Y.S.2d 462, 235 N.E.2d 439, 443 (1968), notes that “ ‘[f]aced with a confusing variety of rules concerning the existence and scope of his privileges, a witness should not be required to make these choices unaided by his lawyer.’ ” See also People v. Smays, 156 Mise.2d 621, 594 N.Y.S.2d 101, 105 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1993) (discussing Ianniello). Jane argues confidentiality concerns regarding the presence of her counsel during her testimony are misplaced. Jane asserts her counsel will be bound by the same confidentiality requirements as others who attend the hearing. See Op. of the Justices to the Governor, 373 Mass. 915, 371 N.E.2d 422, 424-25 (1977) (<HOLDING>). Jane also notes her counsel would be bound by
holding that usual rule 6e secrecy protecting identity of witnesses did not apply to the president because it was already widely known that he had testified in front of the grand jury holding that governments weak interest in preserving grand jury secrecy did not warrant in camera submission where party seeking access to submission would learn of submission contents as soon as he was called as a grand jury witness holding the presence of counsel for a witness did not violate grand jury secrecy recognizing the importance of grand jury secrecy holding that where witness refused to take the oath and testify his grand jury testimony should not have been admitted because he was not subject to cross examination before the grand jury