in a sentencing statute does not define its character.”). Likewise, the constitutionally-mandated minimum standard of proof that the government must satisfy in order to impose constraints upon an individual’s liberty interests beyond those that flow solely from the criminal conviction is ascertained by reference, inter alia, to the nature of the affected liberty interests and the manner in which they are constrained, see Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 576 Pa. 101, 109, 838 A.2d 710, 714-15 (2003), rather than to the statutory placement and labeling of the provisions through which the additional constraints are imposed. Indeed, we ought particularly to guard against resort to formal considerations where, as here, additional prison time rests in the balance. Cf. id., 838 A.2d at 715 (<HOLDING>). More convincing, in my view, is the
holding the act is civil not eriminal in nature and refusing to adopt the beyondareasonabledoubt burden of proof applicable in criminal cases recognizing criminal forfeiture as an aspect of punishment recognizing that the beyondareasonabledoubt standard of proof is appropriate in criminal cases due to the gravity of the private interests affected and the severe societal loss that occurs when an individual is erroneously subject to criminal punishment holding that the right to confront and to crossexamine is not absolute and may in appropriate cases bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process holding that civil settlements have no bearing on decisions of criminal punishment and imposition of a restitution order is a form of punishment and part of a criminal sentence