financial needs. See, e.g., In re Nolan, Civ. No. 10-2589, 2010 WL 3926870, *4, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105172, *12 (D.Minn. Oct. 1, 2010) (stressing that “financial disparity between parties ... is not present here”); In re Lopez, 405 B.R. 382, 385 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.2009) (noting that state court order expressly stated it was “not based upon the respective wages or ability of the parties to pay”) (emphasis removed); In re Brossoit, No. 07-42589-EDJ-7, 2009 WL 4269439, *3, 2009 Bankr.LEXIS 4617, *9 (Bankr.N.D.Cal. Nov. 25, 2009) (finding no indication that fees award was in the nature of support because “the record herein does not include any detailed information regarding the respective incomes or financial positions of’ the couple); see also In re Rios, 901 F.2d 71, 72 (7th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). In this instance, the state courts’ lengthy
holding that appellate attorneys fees were incurred during the divorce proceedings and were awardable by the trial judge holding that fees incurred by debtor were not in the nature of support holding confirmation vested property in the debtor and therefore properly of the estate was not liable for postconfirmation taxes incurred by debtor holding that attorneys fees incurred in a custody action were nondischargeable under  523a5 holding that by choosing the words any actual expenses including attorneys fees incurred congress did not intend to remove the discretion of the district court to award fees in cases such as contingent fee or pro bono cases where the client has not actually incurred the obligation to pay her attorneys fees