offer of 30 years in prison. On December 2, 2002, when appellant’s case was scheduled to go to trial, appellant pleaded guilty because, according to appellant’s affidavit: “I was not dressed for trial and Mr. Duer told me that I could have my trial, I could take the 30 years or I could plead to a pre-sentence investigation. I decided to plead to the pre-sentence investigation.” The State’s attorney and appellant’s trial attorney both stated that they did not recall that any 20-year prison offer by the State had ever been made, and both recalled that, after appellant rejected the 15-year plea-bargain offer on October 4, 2002, the only plea-bargain offer made was an offer of 40 years in prison, to run concurrently. Appellant’s trial attorn .App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>); see also Ramirez v. State, 89 S.W.3d 222,
holding that ramirez waived right to appeal because no nexus between failure to disclose medical evidence that allegedly violated brady and appellants plea of guilty holding that a brady violation is waived by guilty plea holding that brink waived right to appeal complaint that trial court erred by substituting his trial counsel because brink pleaded guilty two and a half months after substitutionofeounselruling and appellant showed no direct nexus between substitutionofcounselruling and appellants plea of guilty holding that right to challenge factual basis is waived by guilty plea holding that appellants plea of guilty was not rendered independently of trial courts ruling on motion to reveal identity of confidential informant and that error was thus not waived by plea of guilty because informants testimony was relevant to and needed for defense to prosecution