to serve as an impartial juror. And Herndon suggests it is error to fail to obtain a juror’s personal assurance of impartiality when the juror is exposed to an unauthorized outside communication. 156 F.3d at 637 (observing that the trial “judge not only failed to adequately investigate the allegation of juror partiality, but the juror never personally assured the court of his impartiality”). The majority concludes the transcripts of the court’s in camera interviews with the jurors “gave Taylor the required opportunity to establish juror bias.” Maj. Op. 350. Had the court questioned Juror One regarding her ability to remain impartial, I might agree. In any event, our precedents require a meaningful opportunity to prove actual bias in an evidentiary hearing. See Corrado, 227 F.3d at 536 (<HOLDING>); Herndon, 156 F.3d at 637 (holding that “the
holding trial court abused its discretion by refusing to conduct hearing and render decision on motion holding that the emergence of a credible claim of extraneous influence on a jury imposed a duty on the district court to conduct a remmer hearing despite the fact that the defendants had not expressly requested such a hearing below holding that district court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an adequate evidentiary hearing into the allegations of extraneous influences on the jury pursuant to the holding in remmer  and remanding for a hearing at which the defendant should be accorded the opportunity to question the jurors individually and under qath holding that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing because the petitioners allegations were not implausible and a final determination of the merits of petitioners claim would be best served by greater development of the facts many of which the government disputes holding that the  district court did not give the plaintiffs an adequate opportunity to be heard where it failed to conduct an in limine hearing and denied oral argument on the evidentiary issues