degree of arbitrariness may be necessary to any sentencing scheme, and this is no less true when sentencing ranges are largely determined by artificially constructed Federal Sentencing Guidelines ranges. However, that practical reality does not minimize or negate the very real issues of unfairness and the potential for sentencing manipulation in these kinds of cases. 15 . Kindle, 698 F.3d at 416 (Posner, J., dissenting) (criticizing the’ fact that the defendant in that stash-house case was imprisoned for 27 years — and proposing that a sentence of 5 years was "more than adequate,” in part because, as a result of the sting, "taxpayers w[ould] be supporting [the defendant] at considerable expense for the next quarter century”). 16 . United States v. Caban, 173 F.3d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1999) (<HOLDING>). 17 . It is also the government's initial
recognizing the defendants argument as one paralleling sentence manipulation but concluding that the status of the doctrine at the time was unclear holding that sentence factor manipulation applies to statutory minimums as well as to the guidelines recognizing the collateral order doctrine for the first time holding that a defendants sentence is controlled by the law in effect at the time he committed the offense recognizing doctrine