essentially was in custody when he accompanied the officers to the patrol car. Accordingly, to the extent that Davis has challenged as unreasonable the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals' factual determination that Davis was not in custody when the officers "took [Davis] to a nearby patrol car” Davis, 554 So.2d at 1101, the court rejects Davis' argument. 29 . Davis cites United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980), in support of his argument that "[a]ge and level of education of the individual are relevant” to the Miranda custody determination. (Doc. No. 92 at 20.) At issue in Men-denhall was the voluntariness of the defendant’s consent, not whether a defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 557-58, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (<HOLDING>) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
holding that the government bears the burden of proving voluntary consent under the totality of the circumstances holding that the reasonableness inquiry is based upon the totality of the circumstances in determining whether or not a search was reasonable holding that duress or coercion would invalidate a contract if the coercion comes from the opposing party not the claimants attorney holding that the question whether the defendants consent to accompany the agents was in fact voluntary or was the product of duress or coercion express or implied is to be determined by the totality of all the circumstances holding that to determine whether a statement was voluntary the court must consider the totality of all the surrounding circumstances  both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation and decide  whether a defendants will was overborne by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession