228.342 to serve as the limited and exclusive definition for “strict necessity,” it could easily have accomplished this intent through use of the unequivocal phrase “shall mean” or “shall be defined for purposes of this statute to mean.” We conclude that the legislature did not intend the second sentence of section 228.342 to limit the concept of “strict necessity.” Specifically, we conclude that the legislature did not intend the second sentence of section 228.342 to be applied to deprive property with a demonstrated lack of access the establishment of a private road merely because the owner cannot prove that he intends, and is able, to put the property to a specific lawful use. This conclusion is supported by the legislative history of section 228.342. See Kieffer, 590 S.W.2d at 918 (<HOLDING>). Prior to the 1991 enactment of section
holding that courts may consider extrinsic evidence including the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract in order to determine whether a contractual ambiguity exists recognizing that legislative history is not used to create ambiguity where statutory language is clear holding a court may consider a defendants criminal history even if that history is included in the defendants criminal history category holding that where an ambiguity exists in fact or by construction it is proper to consider the history of the legislation holding that claim construction is an issue of law for the court not a question of fact for the jury