capacity); Needham v. Legge, 70 Va. Cir. 337, 339 (Va.Cir.Ct.2006) (finding that the parties’ failure to include the word “trustee” on the signature line of a deed of trust was not dispositive because the granting clause made it clear that the signatories were acting in their capacities as trustees). An agreement may be considered ambiguous where certain portions of the agreement conflict with, or fail to corroborate, the information contained in the signature block. See, e.g., Whitmore, 2000 WL 828285 *3, 2000 U.S.App. LEXIS 14670 *10 (finding a contract to be ambiguous where “[t]he parties dispute whether [the court] should give effect to the opening paragraph or the lack of a signature”); Kellam v. Berkshire-Hudson Capital XI, LLC, No. 06-178, 2006 WL 2403417 (E.D.Va. Aug. 18, 2006) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, the Retainer Agreement
holding that when a contract names the parties a signature by a defendant not named creates an ambiguity and parol testimony  should be admitted to explain the capacity in which the defendant signed holding collective bargaining agreement imposed personal liability on signing officer under the facts of that case despite absence of separate signature of the officer in his personal capacity holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to discovery to determine whether the defendant intended to be bound in his personal andor corporate capacity where the agreement contained certain personal guarantees by the defendant but where the defendant signed the agreement only in a corporate capacity with no signature blocks provided for signing in a personally capacity holding that a corporate officer signing a contract in his corporate capacity is generally not liable for damages under the contract holding defendants personally liable for alleged conversion even when acting in corporate capacity