chapter” was intended. Because the Tort Claims Act is the only, albeit limited, avenue for common-law recovery against the government, all tort theories alleged against a governmental unit, whether it is sued alone or together with its employees, are assumed to be “under [the Tort Claims Act]” for purposes of section 101.106. Id. at 658-59 (citations omitted). The First Court of Appeals, which originally construed section 101.106(f) to require the employee to prove a waiver of immunity, has now applied the supreme court’s language in Garcia to eliminate that requirement. Compare Williams v. Nealon, 199 S.W.3d 462, 466 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. filed) (requiring proof of a waiver), ivith Kelemen v. Elliott, 260 S.W.3d 518, 524 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); cf. Castro v. McNabb, — S.W.3d -, -
holding that contracts for an indefinite period are excluded from the statutes coverage holding that section 101106 applied to intentional torts even though these are excluded from the tort claims acts coverage holding that garcia applies to section 101106 but holding that a declaratory judgment action is not brought under the texas tort claims act holding that liability insurer had duty to defend insured against complaint that alleged intentional tort and negligence in the alternative even when policy excluded coverage for intentional torts holding that homeowners policy precluded coverage for injuries resulting from intentional acts