office during normal business hours. Rev. Breen Decl. ¶¶ 22-24. This creates a genuine issue of material fact. See Walsh v. United Parcel Serv., 201 F.3d 718, 726 (6th Cir.2000) (noting that employer’s allowance of medical leave to other employees created genuine issue of fact as to whether grant of leave to plaintiff would have constituted reasonable accommodation); Swanks v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 179 F.3d 929, 934 (D.C.Cir.1999) (observing that an employer “ ‘may not obtain summary judgment by declaring it has a policy when [the employee] may have evidence that [the employer] follows the policy ... selectively’ ” (quoting Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir.1998)) (brackets in original)); Woodman v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1330, 1346 (10th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Carr v. Reno, cited by the defendant, is not
holding that because the employee had engaged in similar religious conduct on prior occasions employer had notice of the conflict holding in a similar factual situation that the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction because it had no actual or constructive possession of the letters of credit involved holding that the employer must offer a medical leave of absence in order to satisfy the requirement of providing a reasonable accommodation holding that plaintiff demonstrated factual dispute by providing evidence that employer had granted another employee the requested accommodation in a similar situation holding that an employer is not liable where it takes reasonable steps to provide an accommodation and the employee is responsible for a breakdown in the process of identifying a reasonable accommodation