at the plaintiffs expense.” Id. at 6, 93 S.Ct. 1943. The common benefit exception is inapplicable to this case. The plaintiffs ask this court to shift their fees to the defendants; the common benefit doctrine, however, serves to shift fees and expenses from the plaintiffs individually to the benefitting class as a whole. To award attorneys’ fees under this theory “is not to saddle the unsuccessful party with the expenses but to impose them on the class that has bene-fitted from them.” Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396-97, 90 S.Ct. 616, 24 L.Ed.2d 593 (1970); see also id. at 397, 90 S.Ct. 616 (reimbursing the plaintiffs for attorneys’ fees from the corporate treasury, thus spreading the costs across the benefitting shareholders); Hall, 412 U.S. at 8-9, 93 S.Ct. 1943 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the plaintiffs have not met their
recognizing that union members interests are adequately represented by the union holding that a rico action by union members was properly dismissed where any financial improprieties occurred with union funds and directly injured solely the union recognizing union members vital concern in preserving jobs for union members holding that the plaintiffs acted on behalf of all union members and reimbursing the attorneys fees from the union treasury such that all union members in effect equally contributed to the costs of litigation holding union members state law claims for defamation against union preempted