“distant signal equivalent” by reference to television stations “within whose local service area the cable system is located” is similarly inapplicable to satellite carriers. Id. Finally, the Office concluded that the legislative history is devoid of any indication that Congress considered satellite carriers when enacting the compulsory licensing scheme. Id. at 3291. II. The Copyright Office is a federal agency with authority to promulgate rules concerning the meaning and application of § 111. See SBN, 940 F.2d at 1469 n. 4; Cablevision Sys. Dev. Co. v. Motion Picture Ass’n of America, Inc., 836 F.2d 599, 608-09 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1235, 108 S.Ct. 2901, 101 L.Ed.2d 934 (1988); see also DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 577-78, 76 S.Ct. 974, 978, 100 L.Ed. 1415 (1956) (<HOLDING>). As such, the Office’s regulations must be
holding that a plaintiff may recover damages under both the lanham act and the copyright act provided the copyright damages serve a purpose other than compensation holding that while the computer program at issue was within the subject matter of copyright the right sought under state law pursuant to a license was not equivalent to the exclusive rights under copyright as such copyright preemption did not apply holding that the copyright act distinguishes between employees and independent contractors for copyright possession holding that conversion and unjust enrichment claims were preempted by the copyright act since they were not qualitatively different from a copyright claim because they contained no extra element beyond those necessary to show copyright infringement recognizing that copyright offices interpretation of copyright act should ordinarily receive deference