or on the text of § 3501(a), but on the appellate courts’ supervisory authority. Our holding in Renteria is based on the persuasive authority of Powe, as well as our precedent in Gonzalez, which does not directly address whether a hearing may be required without a motion by the defendant. Renteria, 625 F.2d at 1283. Therefore, we need not decide the question whether the hearing requirement of § 3501(a) was abrogated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Dickerson because we are bound by our precedent in Renteria. In sum, when the evidence clearly reflects a question of the voluntariness of a confession, the trial court must raise the issue on its own motion. This rule is consistent with rules stated in other circuits. See N. Mar. I. v. Mendiola, 976 F.2d 475, 483-84 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by George v.
holding that argument was not preserved where defendant did not file a pretrial motion to suppress and did not object or make a motion to exclude the evidence until his motion to dismiss at the close of all of the evidence holding that a jackson v denno hearing is required where there is evidence in the record tending to show involuntariness despite defendants failure to make a pretrial motion to suppress or object on voluntariness grounds holding that the trial court need not hold a voluntariness hearing where the defendant did not object and no evidence presented raised the issue holding that hearsay is admissible in an evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress evidence citing lara holding that it is clear that hearsay evidence is admissible in a hearing on a motion to suppress