offender sentence on remand.”). We now resolve the conflict. II. ANALYSIS Before addressing the conflict issue, we must note the issues we do not resolve. The State has conceded that the evidence at sentencing was insufficient to sentence Collins as a habitual felony offender. Thus, the sufficiency of the evidence is not before us. Likewise, in Bover, we held that when the defense fails to object to the sufficiency of the evidence, the State may present additional evidence of habitual felony offender status. See Bover, 797 So.2d at 1251. Therefore, we do not decide that issue, either. Finally, we do not here eon-sider the effect on resentencing proceedings of two recent United States Supreme Court cases: Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 491, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (<HOLDING>), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303,
holding that the statutory maximum for apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant and without any additional findings by the court holding facts elevating a sentence beyond the statutory maximum must be found by a jury holding that any fact other than that of a prior conviction that increases criminal penalties above the statutory maximum must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and found by a jury holding that all facts that would enhance the defendants sentence above the statutory maximum must be found by a jury recognizing a claim that the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum