v. Foutty & Foutty, LLP, No. 1:07-cv-0274-DFH-TAB, 2007 WL 2413026, *4 (S.D.Ind. Aug. 21, 2007) (in determining whether party is “debtor collector,” focus “is not on the events of the particular transaction but on the principal purpose of the defendant’s business and/or the defendant’s regular activities”) (citing Kaltenbach). In the case at bar, the evidence does not support plaintiffs allegation that the Massey defendants were “debt collectors” under the § 1962a(6) general definition. Plaintiff does not argue that the “principal purpose” of Shapiro & Massey is the collection of debts, but he does contend that the law firm, and Gary Massey, regularly collect or attempt to collect debts, and hence qualify as debt collectors. See Garrett v. Derbes, 110 F.3d 317, 318 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). However, an affidavit by Gary Massey
holding that fdcpa applies to attorneys who regularly engage in consumer debt collection activities holding that a person may regularly render debt collection services even if these services are not a principal purpose of his business holding the fdcpa applies to attorneys who regularly engage in consumer debt collection activity even when that activity consists of litigation recognizing distinction between general debt collection and enforcement of a security interest and observing that by the plain language of  1692a6   a person whose business has the principal purpose of enforcing security interests but who does not otherwise satisfy the definition of a debt collector is subject only to  1692f6 recognizing that generally services that benefit debtor are services that facilitate completion of a case