crime of which he was convicted and sometimes as the basis for a collateral estoppel which conclusively establishes his commission of the crime. See State v. Gonzalez, 75 N.J. 181, 186, 380 A.2d 1128 (1977); Prudential Property & Casualty, Ins. Co. v. Kollar, 243 N.J.Super. 150, 578 A.2d 1238 (App.Div.1990); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Schmitt, 238 N.J.Super. 619, 632-633, 570 A.2d 488 (App.Div. 1990). Compare Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co., 56 N.J. 383, 396-397, 267 A.2d 7 (1970) (stating that a criminal judgment is evidentiary, not necessarily conclusive) and Garden State Fire & Casualty Co. v. Keefe, 172 N.J.Super. 53, 56-57, 410 A.2d 718 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 84 N.J. 389, 420 A.2d 317 (1980) (same) with Allstate Ins. Co. v. Schmitt, 238 N.J.Super. 619, 633, 570 A.2d 488 (App.Div.1990) (<HOLDING>) and New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Brower, 161
holding that collateral estoppel applies only where the antecedent judgment was a final judgment recognizing the doctrine of collateral estoppel in agency proceedings holding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies when an issue of ultimate fact has necessarily been determined by a valid final judgment holding that estoppel was a question of fact holding that a fact established by a criminal judgment was to be given conclusive effect under collateral estoppel doctrine