the State’s argument fails. This is not a situation in which the petitioner concedes that he was aware of the facts supporting his claim before the conclusion of state review, thus clearly barring a second or successive state posteonviction application. See Gray, 518 U.S. at 162, 116 S.Ct. 2074; Slutzker, 393 F.3d at 380. Nor is it a case where, despite the petitioner’s assertion that state law would allow a second or successive petition because of newly discovered facts, the record on habeas review clearly shows that the petitioner was aware of the factual predicate for his claim all along. See Morse v. Trippet, 37 Fed.Appx. 96, 103-04 (6th Cir. 2002). Instead, in Banks’ case, the basis for applying the procedural bar is less clear. See Toulson v. Beyer, 987 F.2d 984 (3d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). The exhibits to Banks’ petition are
holding that where a conflict between state and federal law is alleged it must be reasonable to conclude that congress would have intended to preclude the state law in question since it would make little sense to preempt state law in order to serve the purposes underlying federal legislation if congress itself would not require or admit of preemption of state authority holding that second and third state habeas petitions that were dismissed as impermissible successive petitions were properly filed holding state rule barring review of postconviction petitioners claims where petitioner failed to provide supporting documentation is adequate procedural ground on which to bar federal habeas review holding that a state procedural default will not bar consideration of a federal claim on habeas review unless the last state court rendering a judgment clearly and expressly stated that its judgment rested on a state procedural bar holding that it would be inappropriate to predict whether state law would foreclose state postconviction review of the petitioners habeas claim where the state permitted second or successive state petitions when the procedural bar would result in fundamental injustice