fact.”); Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1285 (same); see also Nichols v. S. Ill. Unwersity-Edwardsville, 510 F.3d 772, 784 (7th Cir.2007) (concluding that the “subjective beliefs” of African-American plaintiffs “that they were as qualified or even more qualified” for a position upgrade than the non-African-Americans the employer selected did not create a genuine dispute as to this issue, and thus the plaintiffs failed to create a prima facie case of race discrimination). That a non-African-American was ultimately selected for the position and thus treated more favorably than Plaintiff is not, by itself, suggestive of discrimination absent some evidence that Plaintiff and the person selected were similarly situated in material respects. See Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 755 (9th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Leong, 347 F.3d at 1124 (upholding grant of
recognizing in a title vii case that for the fourth element of the prima facie case the individuals seeking relief must demonstrate at the least that they are similarly situated to those employees allegedly receiving more favorable treatment in all material respects recognizing that there are at least three independent grounds on which the bia may deny a motion to reopen 1 failure to establish a prima facie case 2 failure to introduce evidence that was material and previously unavailable and 3 a determination that despite the aliens statutory eligibility for relief he or she is not entitled to a favorable exercise of discretion holding that more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the race classification is required to make a prima facie race discrimination case holding that in title vii disparate treatment case in order for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case the plaintiff must proffer evidence among other things that she performed her job according to her employers legitimate expectations if the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case the presumption shifts the burden to the employer to produce a legitimate nondiseriminatory reason for its actions holding that fourth element of a prima facie case is satisfied when the employees who were more favorably treated were situated similarly to the plaintiff