assumed the validity of § 1003.23(b)(1), just as it assumed the validity of § 1003.2(d). This is entirely unremarkable, as neither regulation was challenged before the Court. See Dada, 128 S.Ct. at 2320 ("This regulation, however, has not been challenged in these proceedings, and we do not consider it here.”). Moreover, the majority places undue reliance on the BIA’s decision in Matter of Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I & N Dec. 646, 655-56 & n. 7 (2008). This court owes no deference to an agency’s interpretation of a Supreme Court decision. Nor do we defer to an agency's interpretation of an unambiguous statute. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2 r.2005);(same); Lopez v. INS, 184 F.3d 1097, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (same). But see Anin v. Reno, 188 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). 12 . The majority also notes in passing that
holding that time limit for filing petition for review is mandatory and jurisdictional holding that the 180day filing deadline applicable to motions to reopen from removal orders filed in absentia is not jurisdictional holding that the 180day filing deadline is jurisdictional and mandatory recognizing that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional holding that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional