e.g., McRoberts Software, Inc. v. Media 100, Inc., 329 F.3d 557, 572-73 (7th Cir.2003) (noting presumption of prejudgment interest for federal law violations and affirming award of such interest on damages for willful copyright infringement); Kleier Advertising, Inc. v. Premier Pontiac, Inc., 921 F.2d 1036, 1040-42 (10th Cir.1990) (noting presumption of prejudgment interest for federal law violations, stating that “it would be ‘anomalous’ to hold that a plaintiff would be entitled to recover profits flowing from infringement but not revenue generated by the use of the profits,” and holding: “we pronounce the rule that prejudgment interest is available to plaintiffs under the Copyright Act.”); see also Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 886 F.2d 1545, 1551-52 (9th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). The theory underlying prejudgment interest is
holding that because the federal arbitration act 9 usc 1 et seq preempts michigans lemon law mcl 2571401 et seq the plaintiffs lemon law claim should have been resolved through binding arbitration holding that the age discrimination in employment act adea 29 usc  621 et seq was not a valid abrogation of the states sovereign immunity holding that denial of vsf benefits to disabled retirees does not violate the ada the rehabilitation act 29 usc  791 et seq or the age discrimination in employment act of 1967 29 usc  621 et seq and that plaintiffs due process and first amendment claims were frivolous holding that the plaintiffs state commonlaw tort claims were preempted by the national motor vehicle safety act 15 usc 1381 et seq holding that prejudgment interest ordinarily should be awarded on damages pursuant to claims under the copyright act of 1909 17 usc  1 et seq 1976 ed superceded by the copyright act of 1976 17 usc  101 et seq