unwillingness to implicate others, including his supplier; his trial counsel's (er roneous) advice that his grand jury testimony could not be used against him if he "voided” the plea agreement and demanded a trial; and his trial counsel’s belief that his opportunity to plead was dependent upon a co-conspiralor entering a plea agreement. 8 . Although the appellant repeatedly identified the source of the narcotics when testifying before the grand jury, he refused to testify against the source once the latter was apprehended. 9 . The circuits are split on the question whether a sentencing court may consider evidence of the defendant’s refusal to implicate co-conspirators to deny an adjustment under Guideline § 3E1.1. Compare, e.g., United States v. Larkin, 171 F.3d 556, 558-59 (7th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 883, 120 S.Ct. 198,
holding that the district courts denial of a reduction for acceptance of responsibility is a factual question and should be accorded great deference and should not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous holding that it was clearly permissible for the district court to condition the reduction for acceptance of responsibility on the defendants willingness to provide information identifying the drug source holding that defendant was not entitled to reduction for acceptance of responsibility where he failed to fully account for the proceeds of his crime and attempted to delay a longscheduled hearing based on an incredible claim of innocence holding that adjustment for acceptance of responsibility is appropriate where the district court rebuffed a defendants attempts to plead guilty holding that denial of reduction for acceptance of responsibility was a penalty which could not be imposed for defendants assertion of fifth amendment privilege