Treacy’s brief wants the MCPDA to pay him. But I do not believe we can ignore, just because of counsel’s motivation, that Treacy’s brief did, in fact, argue Treacy was denied his constitutional right to trial counsel at public expense. The record indicates Treacy attended at least two of the three hearings held by the trial court regarding who was responsible for paying his attorney fees. This suggests Treacy cared about whether MCPDA would be responsible for those costs. As well he should have — if MCPDA does not pay for Treacy’s trial counsel, then those fees presumably become Trea-cy’s responsibility. From that, F would infer Treacy has sufficient interest to remain the Appellant in this proceeding. See, e.g., KeyBank Nat. Ass’n v. Michael, 737 N.E.2d 834, 851 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (<HOLDING>). Based on Treacy’s involvement in this
holding that where a security agreement contained collateral other than collateral for which creditor advanced funds to debtor since it secured antecedent debts as well as new debt and the agreement provided that the security interest secured payment and performance of the debtors present and future debts to the creditor the creditor did not have a pmsi and the debtors could avoid the creditors lien on collateral claimed as exempt holding a secured creditor has standing to appeal a ruling that impacted its financial interest in collateral holding that prevailing party has no standing to appeal recognizing that a secured creditor is not unjustly enriched by receiving collateral that has increased in value without expense to the second creditor holding that property seized by a creditor prior to debtors bankruptcy was property of the estate even though creditor  the irs  held a secured interest  a tax lien  in the property