in the sense of having all restraints on his liberty removed, he was “released outright” as to the charges involved in this case. Only because he had been incarcerated on prior felony charges and had not yet served out his sentences was Defendant returned to custody. He was not “held to answer” on the charges in this ease, but rather, was held to continue his prior sentences. This constitutes “outright release” for the instant offenses since he was not indicted until July 2 and August 14,1997. It would be anomalous indeed to hold that an escapee must be released from detention, unless he is immediately indicted for the offenses surrounding his escape, in order to try him for these offenses. Such an outcome would necessitate the filing of charges before the prosecut ka Ct.App.1990) (<HOLDING>); see also Bailey v. Anchorage, 955 P.2d 947
holding that notwithstanding an agreement the state still must have reasonable grounds for investigating whether a parolee has violated the terms of parole or committed a crime holding that parole status alone is insufficient to justify search of a parolee holding that arrest of a parolee for parole violation does not trigger the speedy trial period for the underlying offense holding that the defendants arrest for parole violations did not trigger the running of the speedy trial clock on murder charges even though the murder charge arose from the same conduct as the parole violations holding parolee consented to search of his email based on the parole agreement