that she disapproved of what she reasonably believed to be unlawful retaliation. B. Form and Context To the extent that Thomas’ conduct was expressive, the message was communicated to her immediate supervisor, Miller, and other court employees. She did not, however, attempt to inform the general public about the allegedly retaliatory practices. That Thomas chose to convey her views privately rather than publicly is not determinative of whether her expression is entitled to protection. See Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16, 99 S.Ct. 693, 58 L.Ed.2d 619 (1979). Because content is the most important factor, we have concluded that speech about a matter of public concern may be protected even when made in a private context. See, e.g., Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1174 (<HOLDING>); Ulrich, 308 F.3d at 979 (“[T]he public
holding that when protected speech is inextricable from unprotected speech the court will treat the entire message as protected holding that a written offer accepted by parol may constitute a sufficient memorandum of the contract provided the person making the offer is the party to be charged holding that a memorandum given to the employees supervisors was protected speech when the memorandum alleged criminal wrongdo ing holding that after the district court determined that the plaintiffs speech was protected the court was required to inform the jury of its ruling that knapps speech was constitutionally protected holding the separate document rule violated when the alleged judgment was included with the memorandum and order of the court