(Iowa 2001) (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219, 93 S.Ct. at 2043-44, 36 L.Ed.2d at 858). Under this exception, the reasonableness requirement of the Search and Seizure Clause is satisfied when an individual consents to a search. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 358 n. 22, 88 S.Ct. at 515 n. 22, 19 L.Ed.2d at 586 n. 22. The consent establishes a waiver of rights under the Search and Seizure Clause. Thus, the question before us narrows to whether the parole agreement in this case establishes consent. The nature of con W.2d 329, 330 (1991) (“A probationer ... has given his consent in return for more lenient treatment.” (quoting People v. Peterson, 62 Mich.App. 258, 233 N.W.2d 250, 257 (1975) (Danhof, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part))); State v. Anderson, 733 N.W.2d 128, 139 (Minn.2007) (<HOLDING>); State v. Morgan, 206 Neb. 818, 295 N.W.2d
holding that the warrantless search of knights supported by reasonable suspicion and authorized by a condition of probation was reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment recognizing that before a special condition of probation may be imposed there must be an oral pronouncement of the condition at sentencing holding acceptance of probation subject to a search condition  significantly diminished andersons reasonable expectation of privacy  quoting knights 534 us at 11920 122 sct at 591 151 led2d at 504 holding requirement that a prisoner agree to search condition of parole is reasonable in light of the parolees significantly diminished privacy interests holding condition of probation requiring probationer to consent at any time to a warrantless search by a law enforcement officer was unconstitutional