of any lawful judgment, order or process of the court” is contemptible, regardless of whether the actions disrupt the proceedings. Id. § 78-32-1(5). ¶4 Utah Code section 78-32-3 does not require that the contemptible actions interrupt or block the proceedings in order to be punished summarily. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-3. Rather, it only requires that the “contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence of the court, or judge at chambers.” Id. Even though the juvenile court waited until the end of the certification hearing to issue the contempt order, Weis-kopfs contemptible actions took place in the court's presence; therefore, it properly exercised its summary contempt powers. See, e.g., Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 11, 72 S.Ct. 451, 96 L.Ed. 717 (1952) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 5 Weiskopf also asserts that his due
holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present holding that defendant waived his right to selfrepresentation where he told the trial judge before trial that he did not want to represent himself and the public defender acted as counsel for the remainder of trial without objection holding that if a judge believes the exigencies of the trial require that he defer judgment until its completion he may do so without extinguishing his summary contempt power holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment holding that the commissioner has an obligation to refuse to grant a patent if he believes that doing so would be contrary to law