the scientific community.”). The vast majority of the federal courts have held that qualitative and differential diagnoses, as were conducted by the Plaintiffs experts in this instance, are valid means of determining causation. See, e.g., Hardyman, 243 F.3d at 261 (recognizing differential diagnosis as “an acceptable method of determining causation”); Westberry, 178 F.3d at 266 (“A reliable differential diagnosis provides a valid basis for an expert opinion on causation.”); Heller, 167 F.3d at 157 (allowing the admission of expert testimony based on a differential diagnosis and rejecting the view that medical experts must “always rely on published studies indicating the exposure necessary to cause a particular illness”); Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 161 F.3d 1226, 1228-30 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Baker v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 156
holding that trial court abused its discretion by excluding expert opinion on causation where the expert relied upon scientific and clinical studies of the connection between collagen and autoimmune disorders as well as an examination of the plaintiff and her medical history holding trial court acted within its discretion in excluding expert testimony holding that a trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of an expert witness where the testimony would have been relevant to show that the defendant breached a duty of care holding that the trial court had erred by excluding the expert testimony of a doctor holding that lower court abused its discretion in excluding plaintiffs expert where experts opinion was based on a differential diagnosis rather than epidemiologic evidence