such acts.” Gray v. Poole, 243 F.3d 572, 577 (D.C.Cir.2001); see Myers, 810 F.2d at 1452; see also Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 692-94 (10th Cir.1990); Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 397 n. 11 (4th Cir.1990); Walden v. Wishengrad, 745 F.2d 149, 152 (2d Cir.1984). Accordingly, the court concludes that the County defendants are entitled to assert prosecutorial immunity from plaintiff Sophapmysay’s lawsuit. Therefore, this portion of the County defendants’ motion for summary judgment is also granted. III. CONCLUSION The court initially concludes that the uncontested facts of this case do not support a claim that defendants affirmatively acted to create or increase the danger to Ammy. The court further .Ed.2d 56 (1986); Meeker v. Kercher, 782 F.2d 153, 154 (10th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Thus, defendant Driebilbus's motion for
holding that guardian ad litems extensive advice to plaintiffs attorney and daily involvement in case exceeded formal role of guardian ad litem holding that courtappointed guardian ad litem for child in child custody dispute did not act under color of state law holding that guardian ad litem and psychologist fees incurred in child custody proceedings and ordered to be paid directly to the guardian ad litem and psychologist were nondischargeable under  523a5 holding that guardian ad litem representing a minor in a state proceeding on a petition alleging abuse was not acting under color of state law holding the district court properly allowed guardian ad litem fees to be taxed as costs