NW2d 369 (1998) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Riparian rights do not attach to land that abuts an artificial watercourse—i.e., “waterways that owe their origin to acts of man, such as canals, drainage and irrigation ditches, aqueducts, flumes, and the like.” Thompson, 379 Mich at 679 (opinion by T. M. KAVANAGH, J.), citing 4 Restatement Torts, § 841, p 321. Stated another way, “it is clear under Michigan law that no riparian rights arise from an artificial body of water.” Persell v Wertz, 287 Mich App 576, 579; 791 NW2d 494 (2010). As Justice KAVANAGH noted in Thompson, this rule is followed by many of our sister states, and ultimately has its origins in the most ancient property right: the right to exclude. See Ruggles v Dandison, 284 Mich 338, 340-341; 279 NW 851 (1938) (<HOLDING>). More recent cases have focused on the
holding that a shorebreaking wave was a natural condition even if caused by manmade improvements to the beach holding so where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had colluded to claim falsely that the plaintiffs physician had informed the claims adjuster that the plaintiff had been released to work and where the plaintiff was later discharged from employment and denied workers compensation benefits holding that the ada plaintiff was unable to perform essential functions of job when the plaintiffs psychotherapist had told the employer that the plaintiff was unable to work in any position when the plaintiff did not disagree with that point and when the plaintiff in response to a request for admission conceded that she was no longer able to work holding that the plaintiff could not show surprise when the plaintiff had received the additional terms from the defendant prior to the agreement holding that the plaintiff had no riparian rights in a natural lake when the plaintiffs access to the lake was provided by a manmade channel and that the defendant was entitled to exclude the plaintiff from the lake by installing a fence