voluntariness ruling at that time has obvious benefits. The evidence that was developed on the issue is fresh in the minds of counsel and the court, the issue is fully ripe for decision, and a ruling at that time makes clear to both parties before trial the extent to which, if at all, the State may use the defendant’s statement at trial. 5 . See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 2650, 110 L.Ed.2d 528, 552 (1990). Note also the exceptions to Miranda that the Supreme Court announced in Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296, 110 S.Ct. 2394, 2397, 110 L.Ed.2d 243, 251 (1990) (conversations between suspects and undercover agents admissible in the absence of Miranda warnings) and New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 2631, 81 L.Ed.2d 550, 557 (1984) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Detective Barba’s legally incorrect
holding public safety exception to miranda warning requirement did not apply where there was no evidence gun had been left in public place holding that miranda warnings were not required for suspect testifying at inquest when suspects lawyer had previously advised him of his privilege against selfincrimination holding that miranda warnings do not have to be given in the exact form stated in the miranda opinion as long as an effective equivalent is given holding that although defendants voluntarily given initial statement was inadmissible because of miranda violation subsequent statement made after careful miranda warnings were given and waiver was obtained was admissible recognizing a public safety exception to the requirement that miranda warnings be given in order to use a suspects statement as evidence against him at trial