or opinion that will prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror. ... Determining whether a prospective juror can render a fair verdict lies peculiarly within a trial judge’s province. ... The trial judge’s resolution of such questions is entitled, even on direct appeal, to special deference. Id. at 323 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The District Court here made an assessment of the situation as required by Murray. We see nothing in the record here to indicate that the District Court should have concluded that the juror in question was incapable of “rendering a fair verdict,” or that it was obligated to question the juror in order to make that determination. See id.; see also United States v. Hursh, 217 F.3d 761, 768-69 (9th Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we find that the District
holding that it was permissible to ask whether a juror would consider death sentence if juror determined aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances holding that trial courts denial of motion for new trial based on juror misconduct was justified where there was no evidence presented at hearing on motion that juror had knowingly concealed relevant litigation experience during voir dire and identity of juror as county court litigant was not demonstrated holding that though judge did not question juror individually note from juror to judge requesting private meeting to ask legal question did not suggest juror would not base verdict on evidence holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when the trial judge questioned the juror extensively enough to satisfy itself that the juror was not biased emphasis added holding that a court must allow the defendant to ask in voir dire whether a potential juror would automatically impose the death penalty and suggesting that such a juror should be disqualified for cause