is understandable, this concern does not necessarily require a remand, as our holding could be expressly limited to the issues properly before us on appeal. Because I would not allow a party to start over in the trial court with a completely new legal theory after the case has been fully litigated and argued on appeal, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion. I join the remainder of the opinion. 1 . I agree with the remand of the issue regarding software transferred to franchise stores, and further acknowledge that even if the motion for rehearing had not been granted, the State would not be precluded from arguing its new legal theory on remand in connection with software transferred to franchise stores. See Hudson v. Wakefield, 711 S.W.2d 628, 631 (Tex.1986) (<HOLDING>). I join in the remand of that issue only
holding that we will not review the pretrial denial of a motion for summary judgment after a full trial and judgment on the merits holding that party may not appeal summary judgment in favor of opponent when grounds opposing summary judgment asserted on appeal were not raised before trial court holding we will not review a pretrial denial of a motion for summary judgment after a full trial and judgment on the merits holding that summary judgment may be reversed when it is based on an error of law holding that if summary judgment is reversed and remanded parties are not limited to theories asserted in original summary judgment at later trial on merits