qualify as a felony drug offense for purposes of 21 U.S.C. § 841. See Dyer, 136 F.3d at 427-28. As Brown notes, we held to the contrary of Hill’s alleged advice in United States v. Mankins, 135 F.3d 946, 949-50 (5th Cir. 1998), and Brown offers no sound reasons as to why he did not raise this argument in his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, which he filed nearly nine months after we decided Mankins. See Dyer, 136 F.3d at 422. Although Brown contends, as the factual underpinning for his second ineffective-assistance claim, that he told Hill he had not participated in the recorded phone conversation that formed the basis of his conviction, his contention is refuted by the factual basis to which he admitted as part of his plea agreement. See United States v. Abreo, 30 F.3d 29, 32 (5th Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>). The district court did not clearly err by
holding that the district court properly declined to consider extrinsic evidence where the plea agreement was unambiguous holding that the interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law holding that an unambiguous plea agreement is entitled to great evidentiary weight recognizing aljs credibility assessment is entitled to great weight and deference holding if the plea agreement was not conditioned on the sentencing guidelines an appellant is not entitled to relief because his sentence is not illegal