that is, if the District were seeking to apply'the cap to hours worked before the effective date of the statute, we might find the omission more compelling. But the District advances no such argument, and we join the Eighth Circuit in holding that retroactivity concerns are not implicated when the statute is applied to work performed after April 26, 1996, the date of passage of the PLRA. See Williams v. Brimeyer, 122 F.3d 1093, 1094 (8th Cir.1997). When it is applied to work performed after the effective date of the Act, the PLRA raises none of the retroactivity concerns that require the analysis used by the district court because the statute creates present and future effects on present and future conduct, and has no effect on past conduct. Compare Jensen, 94 F.3d at 1203 (<HOLDING>) with Williams, 122 F.3d at 1094 (holding that
holding that 42 usc  1997e does not apply to claims pending at the time of passage of the plra holding that work securing a settlement agreement that sets forth specific responses to constitutional violations that were acknowledged in the previous consent decree is compensable under the plra as work incurred in enforcing the decree holding that congress intended the courts to apply the civil rights act of 1991 to cases pending at the time of its enactment and to preact conduct still open to challenge after that time holding that the plra only applies to plaintiffs who are incarcerated at the time an action is commenced holding that the plra did not apply to preact work