a tort-like remedy. See United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 240-42, 112 S.Ct. 1867, 119 L.Ed.2d 34 (1992) (contrasting Title VTI’s focus on redressing “legal injuries of an economic character” with 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which permits victims of some forms of employment discrimination to obtain tort-like damages); Duse v. IBM Corp., 252 F.3d 151, 160-61 (2d Cir.2001) (discussing Burke). “[Djamages in tort eases are designed to provide compensation for the injury caused to plaintiff by defendant’s breach of duty.” Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, a plaintiff who seeks compensatory damages must prove that the defendant’s breach of duty caused him actual injury. Id. at 308, 106 S.Ct. 2537 (<HOLDING>). Consistent with these principles, the Second
holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 holding that principles of comity bar challenges to state tax law which seek money damages under 42 usc  1983 holding that a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 usc  1983 holding that claims under 42 usc  1983 are not personal injury tort claims holding that principles of tort damages on which  42 usc  1983 is grounded require plaintiff to prove actual injury