Section 3—106 was not intended to immunize the District from any and all tort claims. Rexroad v. City of Springfield, 207 Ill. 2d 33, 796 N.E.2d 1040 (2003) (despite legislature’s rationale for providing immunity in section 3—106, court declined to expand immunity to non-recreational pathways on school property that provided access to recreational property); Larson v. City of Chicago, 142 Ill. App. 3d 81, 87, 491 N.E.2d 165, 168 (1986) (reasoning that section 3—106 was not intended to address every injury involving public recreational property); John v. City of Macomb, 232 Ill. App. 3d 877, 881, 596 N.E.2d 1254, 1257 (1992) (pointing out that despite statutory amendment, Larson court’s observation still held true). See also Milligan v. City of Laguna Beach; 670 P.2d 1121 (Cal. 1983) (<HOLDING>); Bany v. Borough of Haworth, 632 A.2d 535
holding section 1010215 does not waive governmental immunity merely because a governmental action falls within the listed governmental functions thus further inquiry under the act is necessary holding that legislative purpose for new jersey governmental tort immunity statute encouraging public agencies to open unimproved lands to public use was not thwarted when immunity was not applied to injuries caused by dead tree collapsing onto adjacent public road or private residential property holding a landowner not liable for an accident on a country road caused by a tree which fell from the landowners property holding that california governmental tort immunity statute would apply if decayed eucalyptus tree limb fell on user of governmental property and would not apply to injuries caused to nonusers on adjacent property holding governmental immunity is no defense to contractual liability