or the courts. B. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(b) Section 78c(b), on which the District Court also relied, gives the SEC authority to define technical, trade, accounting, and other terms only with respect to “matters within [its] jurisdiction [].” The whole point of the bank exclusion clauses in the definitions of “broker” and “dealer” is to place banks outside the broker-dealer juris diction of the SEC and leave them to the jurisdiction of banking regulators alone. The SEC cannot use its definitional authority to expand its own jurisdiction and to invade the jurisdiction of other agencies, including the Board of Governors. Such use of § 78c(b) would not be “consistent [ ] with the provisions and purposes of this chapter.” Cf. FAIC Securities, Inc. v. United States, 768 F.2d 352, 362 (D.C.Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the very language of § 78c(b) reminds
holding that jurisdiction to hear a motion for new trial was granted by statute and could be exercised solely in accordance with the terms of the statute holding grant of authority to an agency to adopt rules necessary to carry out this chapter clearly vested in the agency authority to interpret a statute holding that legislatures giving commission jurisdiction to enforce this section was both grant of express authority and implied grant of powers reasonably necessary to fulfill its duties holding court of common pleas lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant injunction against agency with statewide authority holding that a similar grant of definitional authority to the fdic did not allow the agency to expand its jurisdiction by redefining terms already defined by statute