acts. Id. at 963. The Lawson court stated that a "critical distinction” of Pylant from the facts before it in Lawson was that in Pylant, there was "not a factual background of consensual sexual discussion, conduct and relations.” Id. And in Lawson, it was "from that background ... that the issue of [the insured’s] intent ar[ose].” Id. 17 . There is no consensus as the applicable standard, and the Mississippi Supreme Court has not addressed the issue. However, numerous courts have logically concluded that a negligence standard should apply. See Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir.1984) (opining that Texas courts would apply the negligence standard of liability to false light privacy actions by private plaintiffs); Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245, 249 (5th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); West v. Media General Convergence, Inc., 53
holding when defamatory statement involved issue of public concern that private individual was required to prove actual malice to recover presumed or punitive damages against media defendant holding that defendant who placed private figure in a false light was not entitled to heightened protection of actual malice standard and could instead be found liable on showing of negligence holding plaintiff failed to present evidence of actual malice because defendants explanation of the mistaken statement shows negligence but no more than that holding under federal law that public figure claiming iied based on defamatory nature of speech must prove actual malice holding failure to investigate before publishing is not sufficient to prove actual malice