positions are based not on chicanery, but only on inadvertence or mistake, judicial estoppel does not apply.” Johnson v. Oregon Dep’t of Human Resources Rehab. Div., 141 F.3d 1361, 1369 (9th Cir.1998). When determining whether to consider the reopening or modification of a bankruptcy proceeding as a means of curing a scheduling omission, many courts also consider whether the circumstances of the case indicate bad faith or the absence thereof on the part of the debtor-plaintiff in making the omission and subsequent amendment. See, e.g., Cannata v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 798 F.Supp.2d 1165, 1172-1174 (D.Nev.2011); Froshiesar, 2004 WL 2360529, at *7-10, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21463, at *23-31; see also White v. Wyndham Vacation Ownership, Inc., 617 F.3d 472, 477 (6th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>) (discussing Eubanks v. CBSK Financial Group,
holding that a bad faith claim is a tort recognizing that the sixth circuit has folded the absence of bad faith in under the inadvertence prong made the determination of whether there was evidence of a motive or intention to conceal the potential claim critical to a finding of bad faith and has held that in a particular case numerous attempts by the plaintiffs to cure an initial omission provided evidence that the omission was inadvertent not intentional holding that future benefits are available upon a finding of bad faith because repudiation is a legal conclusion which the trial court reaches after the fact finder makes its determinations about whether there was a breach and whether the breach was in bad faith holding that improper motive is element of bad faith holding that the district court should consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the patentee acted in subjective bad faith and should consider whether circumstantial evidence would support an inference of bad faith