involves additional consideration or sentencing discretion, not if the act to be done is ministerial in nature, such as striking an improper portion of the sentence.” Jordan v. State, 143 So.3d 335, 339 (Fla.2014) (emphasis in. original) (quoting Mullins v. State, 997 So.2d 443, 445 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)). In Jordan, like here, the trial court originally attempted to give the defendant the maximum penalty allowed at law. Id. at 336. The Florida Supreme Court noted that “although Jordan’s origi nal sentence of life imprisonment appears to demonstrate the trial judge’s intent to sentence Jordan to the maximum allowable punishment, the judge was not obligated to maintain that same intent at resentencing.” Id. at 340. See also Frison v. State, 76 So.3d 1103, 1104-05 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (<HOLDING>). In this case, like Jordan and Frison, the
holding that williams fiftyyear sentence is not a de facto life sentence in violation of graham holding that graham which prohibited the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide does not apply to a lengthy termofyears sentence that might constitute a de facto life sentence holding that resentencing a juvenile after his life sentence was overturned pursuant to graham v florida 560 us 48 130 sct 2011 176 led2d 825 2010 was not a ministerial task but still involved discretion on the part of the trial court holding that the imposition of a life sentence on a juvenile does not violate the holding of roper holding that the 2010 amendment was a clarification