child, nor is there any substantial risk that the defendant would use physical force against the child. See State v. Schriver, 207 Conn. 456, 467, 542 A.2d 686 (1988). Thus, convictions under the “deliberate indifference” prong of § 53-21(1) would not fall within the ambit of “crimes of violence.” These are not crimes that “by [their] nature, involve[] a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 16(b); see also Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d at 207 (noting that there are many crimes of gross negligence or reckless endangerment that involve a substantial risk of injury but do not involve the use of force, such as leaving an infant alone near a pool); In re Sweetser, 22 I. & N. Dec. 709 (<HOLDING>). Less clear, however, is whether a conviction
holding that a conviction for a lascivious act with a child in violation of iowa code  7098 was a crime of violence holding that a conviction under colorevstat  186401 for criminally negligent child abuse was not a crime of violence under 18 usc  16a because physical force was not an element of that crime holding that mother may not be prosecuted criminally for child endangerment for prenatal substance abuse holding that an aliens conviction for criminally negligent child abuse under colorado law for leaving a child unattended in abathtub did not constitute a crime of violence holding an unborn child is not a child for purposes of criminal prosecution of mistreatment of a child