of the claims to the accused device. See Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1467, 46 USPQ2d at 1184 (citing Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 338, 14 L.Ed. 717 (1853)). To prove literal infringement, the patentee must show that the accused device contains every limitation in the asserted claims. See id. (citing Dolly, Inc. v. Spalding & Evenflo Cos., 16 F.3d 394, 397, 29 USPQ2d 1767, 1769 (Fed.Cir.1994)). If even one limitation is missing or not met as claimed, there is no literal infringement. See Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 934, 4 USPQ2d at 1751. For literal infringement of a section 112, ¶ 6 limitation, the fact-finder must determine whether the accused device performs an identical function to the one recited in the means-plus-function clause. See Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 934, 4 USPQ2d at 1739 (<HOLDING>). If the identical function is performed, the
holding that if the identical function is not performed literal infringement is not possible holding that contributory trademark infringement requires some predicate act of infringement holding that it is not holding that it is not an appellate courts function to make findings of fact holding that literal copying is not governed by the afc test