by reasonable business necessity.” Fragante, 888 F.2d at 598. In order to prevail in a Title VII action, Plaintiff must establish (i) that there existed at the place of employment a “pattern or practice” of disparate treatment and, (ii) that such disparate treatment was “racially premised.” Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335, 97 S.Ct. at 1854. It follows from the discussion above, that Plaintiff has met neither of these requirements. Hostile Environment Even if Plaintiff herself was never the object of racial harassment, she might nevertheless have a Title VII claim if she were forced to work in an atmosphere in which such harassment was pervasive. See, e.g., Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 146 (D.C.Cir.1985), aff'd, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2404-405, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (<HOLDING>). The phrase “terms, conditions or privileges
holding that a charge that alleged discrimination on the basis of sex did not support a complaint for hostile environment sexual harassment holding that noneconomic injury resulting from a hostile environment based on discriminatory sexual harassment is actionable under title vii holding that eeoc charge filed by plaintiff more than 180 days after alleged incident of sexual harassment was timely where alleged sexual harassment violation continued as hostile work environment through time of plaintiffs termination holding that the allegations of plaintiffs coemployees of sexual harassment by manager were irrelevant to plaintiffs hostile work environment claim absent evidence that plaintiff was contemporaneously aware of the alleged harassment holding that harassment of women working alongside plaintiff was relevant to question of creation of environment viola tive of title vii  although vinson was a sexual harassment case the principles underlying a hostile environment theory are equally applicable in sexual harassment and racial harassment cases