to Truth in Lending the position of the appellee is even less tenable since § 130 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a), now permits a party to recover both actual damages and an amount equal to twice the finance charge. It is difficult to see how the latter amount could be anything but a statutory penalty. Id. at 732. Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, this language does not control the case before us. The issue in Newton was whether a debt that had been extinguished in bankruptcy could be asserted by the lender as a counterclaim in a subsequent TILA suit brought by the debtor. In holding that it could not, we declined to distinguish the “statutory penalty” imposed by the TILA from the penalty at issue in McCollum v. Hamilton National Bank, 303 U.S. 245, 58 S.Ct. 568, 82 L.Ed. 819 (1938) (<HOLDING>). It is crucial to observe, however, that our
holding that plaintiff could not recover medical bills that were discharged in bankruptcy holding that court sitting in bankruptcy may allow a taxpayer to use overpayment of taxes as offset of debt to the irs but only if that offset request is timely holding that a debt discharged in bankruptcy could not be used to offset a statutorily imposed penalty against a national bank for changing usurious interest holding successor national bank liable for punitive damages judgment against bank that merged into successor national bank holding that a bail bond surety debt was not an allowable debt in bankruptcy because it is a penalty