prong of Paragraph 1491(b)(1). See RAMCOR Servs. Group, Inc. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1286, 1289 (Fed.Cir.1999) (“§ 1491(b) ... does not require an objection to the actual contract procurement.... As long as a statute has a connection to a procurement proposal, an alleged violation suffices to supply jurisdiction.”); Angelica Textile Servs., 95 Fed.Cl. at 215 (“The phrase ‘in connection with’ is very sweeping in scope.” “[A] procurement ‘includes all stages of the process of acquiring property or services, beginning with the process for determining a need for property or services and ending with the contract completion and closeout.’” (quoting RAMCOR, 185 F.3d at 1289 (first quote); 41 U.S.C. § 403(2) (second quote))); OTI America, Inc. v. United States, 68 Fed.Cl. 108, 117 (2005) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, this court finds that it has
holding that the broad language of subsection 1491b demonstrated congresss expressed intent that the subsection encompass the entire procurement process holding that the language of the arbitration clause   any controversy or claim arising out of     was broad enough to encompass the plaintiffs claim alleging fraud in the inducement of the contract recognizing that subpart iia of the dol regulation overlaps with subsection i of the statutory definition holding that when the specification clearly disavows a feature that feature is outside the reach of the claim language even if the language might otherwise be broad enough to encompass the feature in question holding that statutory language is conclusive in absence of clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary 