such a search is the kind of work Medeiros was hired to perform are plausible, even if unlikely, based upon these allegations. See Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.2011) (explaining that factual allegations must be accepted as true, even if those allegations are “seemingly incredible”). This view of the allegations also plausibly suggests that Medeiros was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to serve his employer. Even if Medeiros’ view of the “secret” and “undercover” elements of his job, including searching for a wire, was overzealous or misguided, it is at least plausible that his conduct may have been motivated in part by a desire to protect the “secret” and “undercover” nature of his work. See, e.g., Meyer v. Runyon, 869 F.Supp. 70, 80 (D.Mass.1994) (<HOLDING>). “It does not matter that [Medeiros] may have
holding that the challenged item was within the scope of the search because it reasonably fell within the expressed object of the search even though it turned out to be the defendants personal property holding that it is well established that whether an employees actions were within the scope of employment is a question of fact and even if some of the actions were unauthorized the question of whether the actions were within the scope of employment is for the jury holding as a matter of law that an offduty government agent was not acting within the scope of his employment when he was driving home intoxicated after completing his tour of duty because on no basis would the court conclude that drinking and driving after work hours fell within the scope of the dea agents employment   holding that state had waived argument because it could have been raised in an earlier appeal but was not and because it fell outside the scope of remand holding that conduct fell within the scope of employment even if it may have been overzealous or one sided