added); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Daniel, 150 Tex. 513, 243 S.W.2d 154, 157 (1951) (stating that “a contract is ambiguous only when the application of pertinent rules of interpretation to the face of the instrument leaves it genuinely uncertain which one of two or more meanings is the proper meaning”) (emphasis added). What is clear is that intent is the benchmark for judicial interpretation of deeds. “Because ‘once a dispute arises over meaning, it can hardly be expected that the parties will agree on what meaning was intended,’ courts use canons of construction to help ascertain the parties’ intent.” French v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 896 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Tex.1995) (quoting Southland Royalty Co. v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 378 S.W.2d 50, 59 (Tex.1964) (Calvert, C.J., concurring) (<HOLDING>)); see also Buffalo Ranch Co., 727 S.W.2d at
holding an administrative interpretation cannot change the meaning of a statute or control the courts interpretation of it holding that bop interpretation of  922g1 as a crime of violence is permissible construction of  3621e2b and limiting the holding of johnson to the interpretation of sentencing guidelines recognizing that courts have built up a system of rules of interpretation and construction to arrive at meaning ignoring testimony of subjective intent recognizing that the standard of review for issues of statutory interpretation and construction is de novo recognizing that our task as a reviewing court is to afford a logical construction according to the general terms and intentions of the entire  act and that it is axiomatic that we construe the statute as a whole entity  in order to arrive at a construction which avoids illogical results