prejudice ... would strip [the defendants] of an absolute defense. [Mrs. Smith] cannot prove her medical malpractice claims without expert medical proof.” But Mrs. Smith contends that Dr. Markowitz’s exclusion did not dictate a result for the defendants because at the time she “still had the option of filing a motion for late disclosure of an expert.” Mrs. Smith reasons that the possibility she might file (and the district court might grant) a motion to extend the expert-disclosure deadline rendered the above defense less than absolute. Notwithstanding Mrs. Smith’s hypothetical avenue for relief, the substantive law applied to the facts of her case at the time of denial dictated a result for the defendants. See Phillips v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R., 874 F.2d 984, 987-88 (5th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). As matters stood, Mrs. Smith lacked an expert
holding plaintiff could withdraw admissions despite pending motion by defendants for summary judgment holding that transfer was proper remedy for improper venue even though the issue of transfer was not raised until the motion hearing in circuit court holding that the lower court was not required to hold a hearing on a motion to transfer recognizing familiarity with governing law as reason to grant motion to transfer holding that statuteoflimitations defense was absolute despite possibility that court might grant plaintiffs pending motion to transfer