plain error, see United States v. McGhee, 869 F.3d 703, 705 (8th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (stating that unobjected-to procedural sentencing errors are forfeited and thus reviewed only for plain error); United States v. Davis, 825 F.3d 359, 363 (8th Cir. 2016) (discussing plain-error review); U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(2) (defining Grade B violation); see also 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) (defining crime of escape and penalties); United States v. Goad, 788 F.3d 873, 876 (8th Cir. 2015) (concluding that defendant’s unauthorized departure from his residential reentry facility constituted an escape within the meaning of § 751). We next conclude that the district court did not impose revocation sentences that exceeded the statutory maximum. See United States v. Lewis, 519 F.3d 822, 824-25 (8th Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Walker, 513 F.3d 891, 893
holding that there is no significant conceptual difference between the revocation of probation or parole and the revocation of supervised release holding that  5g12 did not limit the district courts authority to impose consecutive terms of imprisonment upon revocation of supervised release since the policy statements in chapter 7 governed revocation sentences recognizing that statutory maximums of  3583e3 apply in the aggregate and that where a defendant had previously been sentenced to oneyear and oneday imprisonment upon revocation of his supervised release the district court could sentence the defendant to only 364 days of imprisonment upon rerevocation of his supervised release holding that 18 usc  3583e3 requirement to aggregate revocation prison sentences changed with the april 30 2003 addition of the phrase on any such revocation where the original offense of conviction was committed thereafter the plain language of  3583e3 permits sentencing without considering or aggregating the prison terms for prior revocations holding that prison term following revocation of probation is a modification and part of the actual sentence imposed for the original offense