ordinary rules of grammar, is unambiguous, a court may engage in no further statutory construction and must apply its plain meaning. State by Beaulieu v. RSJ, Inc., 552 N.W.2d 695, 701 (Minn.1996). “[T]he word includes is usually a term of enlargement, and not of limitation.” Janssen v. Janssen, 331 N.W.2d 752, 756 (Minn.1983) (quotation omitted). Therefore, transportation to and from services including “special education and related services defined in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act” is unambiguously not limited to those instances when transportation is required under the IDEA. Generally, courts have upheld state educational requirements that go beyond those delineated in the IDEA. See, e.g., CJN by SKN v. Minneapolis Public Schools, 323 F.3d 630, 639 (8th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Town of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 736
holding that when state educational benefits exceed minimum federal standards the state standards are enforceable through the idea holding that safety standards regarding the safe design and use of trampolines including astm standards were admissible on the issue of the defendants negligence even though the defendants were unaware of the standards recognizing that standards of liability under title vi are different from traditional agency principles or the general standards of liability under title vii holding that permit must translate state water quality standards into endofpipe effluent limitations necessary to achieve those standards holding that states may enforce their own laws for disabled children and are not limited to the minimum standards of the federal law