Remmer presumption following third-party communication with a juror, jurors encountered third parties who expressed their view of a party's culpability or appropriate sentence. E.g., Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 676-84 (4th Cir.2002) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing in a § 2254(d)(1) case where the petitioner proffered evidence that a juror’s “strongly pro-death penalty” husband had repeatedly attempted to influence his wife to convict the petitioner and sentence him to death); United States v. Cheek, 94 F.3d 136, 140-44 (4th Cir. 1996) (reversing and remanding for a new trial based on the Remmer presumption based on juror-third party contact the Court characterized as the juror's correct perception that the third party was attempting to bribe him); Stockton, 852 F.2d at 745-46 (<HOLDING>); Stephens v. South Atlantic Canners, Inc., 848
holding that trial court is not required to poll the jurors regarding possible acquittal on death penalty holding statute stating that judge could excuse jurors was violated when jury commissioners excused jurors holding that a criminal defendant can bring a third party challenge to the peremptory striking of jurors based on race whether or not he is of the same race as the jurors who are struck holding that a third partys statement to jurors that he hoped they fried the sonofabitch bore on the exact issue  whether to impose the death penalty  that the jurors were deliberating at that time holding that trial court abused its discretion in failing to make a proper inquiry of jurors andor failing to strike jurors for cause after jurors explicitly expressed bias