age of the aborted fetus. Further, it does not specify which statute in conjunction with § 18-606 the state was prosecuting McCormack under. 3 . See e.g., Alaska Stat. § 11.41.289(liability for "assault of an unborn child” does not apply to actions "committed by a pregnant woman against herself and her own unborn child”); Ark.Code Ann. §§ 5-61-101(c), 5-61-102(c) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed to allow the charging or conviction of a woman with any criminal offense in the death of her own unborn child in útero”); Fla. Stat. § 782.36("A patient receiving a partial-birth-abortion procedure may not be prosecuted under this act.”); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/9— 1.2(b)(criminal liability for intentional homicide of an unborn child does not apply to “the pregnant 610, 611 (1998) (<HOLDING>); State v. Barnett, 249 Or. 226, 437 P.2d 821,
holding that when mississippi adopted a statute modeled after a georgia enactment decisions of the georgia courts did not bind mississippi courts in interpretation of the statute holding that the georgia criminal abortion statute does not criminalize a pregnant womans actions in securing an abortion regardless of the means used holding that a felony of criminal recklessness was not a crime of violence under  16b because it does not require any purposeful conduct and does not necessarily create a risk that force may be used as a means to an end during the commission of the offense holding unconstitutional the provision in a georgia abortion statute limiting abortions to georgia residents holding ordinance restricting availability of abortion unconstitutional