that this statute provides a cause of action to post-abortion health providers as well as to the woman herself for all post-abortion medical expenses incurred as a result of the abortion. 8 . We note that, to a significant extent, Nova's injury was self-inflicted. Although § 1-740 applies only to abortions performed on minors without “parental consent or knowledge,” Nova responded by requiring all minors to obtain in-person parental consent. Under the plain language of § 1-740, a parental knowledge requirement would have avoided prospective civil liability under the statute just as well. It would have also likely reduced Nova's threat of lost patients, at least to some degree. See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 511, 110 S.Ct. 2972, 111 L.Ed.2d 405 (1990) (<HOLDING>). "At some point, standing may be denied
recognizing that consent is an exception to the warrant requirement and that voluntariness of consent depends on the totality of the circumstances holding the statutory notification requirement unenforceable recognizing that a parental consent requirement is more intrusive than a parental notification requirement holding that terry  parental unfitness  standard is more stringent than the dependency best interests standard holding that an xray while more intrusive than a frisk is no more intrusive than a strip search