v. Wilkes, 662 F.3d 524, 538 (9th Cir.2011). We conclude that the prosecutor’s arguments were based on common knowledge or were reasonable inferences from facts and testimony in evidence. See United States v. Braey, 67 F.3d 1421, 1431 (9th Cir.1995). Moreover, the prosecutor did not suggest that the testimony of government witnesses was supported by outside information. See United States v. Wright, 625 F.3d 583, 610 (9th Cir.2010) (describing improper vouching). II. Benuto argues that the prosecutor’s comments regarding his silence or inability to answer questions was improper and that the district court erred in admitting the comments because they were more prejudicial than probative. We disagree. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, — U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2259-60, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) (<HOLDING>). We review the district court’s evidentia-ry
holding that police may continue questioning a suspect until he unambiguously invokes his right to remain silent holding that a suspect who wants to invoke his or her right to remain silent must do so unambiguously holding that during police interrogation right to remain silent must be invoked unambiguously holding that a suspects invocation of the right to remain silent must be unequivocal to require that police questioning cease holding that an accused must unambiguously invoke the right to remain silent