in the law; and (4) the fear of burdening the administration of justice by disturbing decisions reached under the overruled precedent. 389 A.2d at 789. Analyzing these criteria, the court held in Mendes that the new rule should be given only “partial retroactive effect, i.e., [it] will apply to the instant parties as well as prospective application.” Id. at 792. B. Beam and Harper. Mendes v. Johnson was decided twenty years ago. In the intervening years, the Supreme Court has discarded its previous approach to retroactivity — the very approach on which this court based its decision in Mendes. In 1987, Linkletter v. Walker, the principal authority upon which Mendes was based, was explicitly overruled. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322-23, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (<HOLDING>). The Court explained in Griffith that the task
holding that all newly declared rules must be applied retroactively to all criminal eases pending on direct review holding that batson does apply retroactively to cases pending on direct review holding that a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases  pending on direct review  with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a clear break with the past holding that a new rule for conducting criminal prosecutions should be applied to all cases pending on direct review or not yet final holding newly announced rules of constitutional criminal procedure must apply retroactively to all cases state or federal pending on direct review or not yet final with no exception