is quoted in Prince, 1999-NMCA-010, ¶ 12, 126 N.M. 547, 972 P.2d 859, Gonzales, 97 N.M. at 610, 642 P.2d at 213, and State v. Manus, 93 N.M. 95, 100, 597 P.2d 280, 285 (1979), overruled on other grounds by Sells v. State, 98 N.M. 786, 788, 653 P.2d 162, 164 (1982). When analyzing whether an officer’s actions create liability for tort or civil rights claims, the officer’s perspective is usually the central focus. See, e.g., Archuleta v. Lacuesta, 1999— NMCA-113, ¶ 8, 128 N.M. 13, 988 P.2d 883 (stating that the reasonableness of an officer’s use of deadly force is measured “from the perspective of the officer on the scene, with the understanding that officers must often make split-second decisions in difficult situations”); Baum v. Orosco, 106 N.M. 265, 271, 742 P.2d 1, 7 (Ct.App.1987) (<HOLDING>). Here, in contrast, the issue is whether
recognizing the motives of the officer as a critical factor in determining whether a particular instance of excessive force rises to the level of a constitutional violation holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim holding that the risk posed to third parties by the official use of force is not to be considered in determining whether an official used excessive force as against a particular plaintiff holding that the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained recognizing that the critical question is whether any present violation exists