money. Arguably, as the district court determined, the $75,799.55 in checks that were stolen, but not charged off, should also be considered as part of the “loss” under § 2B3.1(b)(7), even though neither the merchants, nor the bank, nor the courier suffered any actual loss. See United States v. Weaver, 1992 WL 138345, at *8 (4th Cir. June 22, 1992) (unpublished) (“While we do not agree that an instrument’s face value will always necessarily provide a reasonable indicator of the loss incurred by the theft of that instrument, if the instrument is authentic, the face value is generally a sufficient measure to establish a presumption in the government’s favor for the purpose of valuing the loss under the sentencing guidelines.”); cf. United States v. Parker, 903 F.2d 91, 105 (2d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Bolden argues that it is “common sense” that
holding that defendants state court conviction for possessing a stolen car was severable from federal offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm even though firearm was found in cars trunk at time of defendants arrest for state stolen vehicle charge holding recovery of stolen guns from trunk of accuseds car was insufficient corroboration of testimony of accomplice who lived with accused and used his car holding that the value of property taken includes cash that was stolen but not transferred from stolen car to getaway car because property removed from its rightful owner is properly considered taken even if it is immediately thereafter recovered holding that the property owners testimony alone placed the value of the stolen property above the amount necessary to constitute grand larceny holding that exclusive possession of recently stolen goods warrants the inference that he stole all of the property for which the defendant is accused of taking provided all the property was stolen at the same time emphasis added