act of sexual violence or child molestation as well as an illness, abnormality or disorder that makes him dangerous to others. The evidence available to support Youngs’s conviction on Count One likely satisfies the first element, but the future satisfaction of the second element is far from certain at this time. Because the possibility of civil commitment mil only arise at the end of Youngs’s twenty-year prison sentence and then will occur only if the Government meets its high burden under the Act, civil commitment is not definite, immediate, and automatic, and is therefore not a “direct” consequence of a guilty plea as defined by this Court. Other circuits have come to the same conclusion regarding similar civil commitment statutes. Steele v. Murphy, 365 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); George v. Black, 732 F.2d 108, 110-11 (8th
holding that potential civil commitment under a state statute was a collateral consequence of pleading guilty holding that the possibility that a sex offender could face civil commitment under a state statute was a collateral consequence because civil commitment does not flow automatically from the plea holding that for an initial civil commitment the state has the burden of proof holding that the sanction of deportation is a collateral not direct consequence of a guilty plea holding that an opinion of a potential danger to others is not sufficient to support a commitment under this standard