that D.C.Code § 11-721(d) requires. But that poses a problem, for absent express statutory authorization, “no rule of court can enlarge or restrict jurisdiction. Nor can a rule abrogate or modify the substantive law.” Washington-Southern Navigation Co. v. Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat Co., 263 U.S. 629, 635, 44 S.Ct. 220, 68 L.Ed. 480 (1924); accord, In re G.C.S., 360 A.2d 498, 500 (D.C.1976). Adhering to these principles, this court has annulled Superior Court rules that were contrary to governing statutory or other law. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 566 A.2d 719, 728 (D.C.1989) (invalidating child support guideline that altered substantive law; “a Superior Court rule ... cannot curtail substantive rights.”); Flemming v. United States, 546 A.2d 1001, 1004-06 (D.C.1988) (<HOLDING>); Haynes v. District of Columbia, 503 A.2d
holding part of superior court criminal rule 23b invalid because it conflicted with dccode provision guaranteeing twelveperson juries absent stipulation by the parties tjhere is no counterpart to 18 usc  3771 in the district of columbia code that would allow superior court rules to nullify or take precedence over district of columbia statutes holding that district court lacked power to decide personal jurisdiction issue already decided by district of columbia superior court holding that the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the district of columbia holding that federal district court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction to review the decision of a district of columbia high court determining application of a local rule to the case before it holding that the plaintiff has a good faith basis to believe a putative defendant may be a district of columbia resident if a geolocation service places his her ip address within the district of columbia or within a city located within 30 miles of the district of columbia