no applicable county ordinance, order, or rule regulating noise exists. Appellants, in their fourth issue, argue that “Texas recently signed into law the Gun Range Protection Act, which prohibits [the homeowners] from suing High Noon for injunc- tive relief or abatement of a nuisance relating to the discharge of firearms.” Appellants’ second, third, and fourth issues are in fact unresolved contested issues in the underlying case. The state of the law on these matters, and how the law applies to the particular facts of this case, is unclear, especially at the temporary injunction stage of the proceedings. These issues are best left to be determined at a full trial on the merits. See Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs. v. Holmes, 294 S.W.3d 828, 333-34 (Tex.App.-Austin 2009, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>) (citing In re Newton, 146 S.W.3d at 651; City
holding that trial court did not commit reversible error when it submitted admissibility of evidence question to jury because the trial court had independently decided the question holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants motion for mistrial where the trial court sustained defendants objections to a question by the prosecutor containing improper information and instructed the jury to disregard the question holding that trial court does not abuse discretion in issuing temporary injunction when question of whether challenged activity constitutes illegal conduct is the central question of the suit and should be determined with a full trial on the merits holding in part that the trial court abused its discretion in granting a temporary injunction in the absence of a showing that the plaintiff did not have an adequate remedy at law holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting such a temporary injunction