concluded that no vested right had attached. Yet MRA asserts that its efforts thus far constitute a vested right because MRA: made a substantial change of position in relation to the land (i.e., it purchased the land after it received zoning and Solid Waste Management Plan approval); it made substantial expenditures (it spent over a million dollars in land acquisition, engineering and legal fees); and it incurred substantial obligations (it proceeded with the engineering development plans for Phases II and III of the State’s permitting process) .... The Examiner rejected MRA’s contention that its previous expenditures should amount to a vested right, pointing to clear Maryland precedent on the issue. See, e.g., Ross v. Montgomery County, 252 Md. 497, 506-07, 250 A.2d 635, 640 (1969) (<HOLDING>); County Council for Montgomery County v.
holding that a right to be released when a joint tortfeasor has been released is a vested right recognizing that remedial statutes may be applied to pending cases because they usually do not affect vested right holding a defendant is not vested with a right to be absent from trial holding that expenditures on architectural planning do not create vested right holding that one million dollars in expenditures and a valid building permit did not create vested right in previous zoning classification of the land at issue