CCA and Hickson, point out that Peña does not plead that her being placed in segregation was unrelated to any penal interest of CCA or Hickson, she alleges that CCA and Hickson placed her in segregation “because she reported Defendant Greffet’s rape and/or Carlos Vallejos’ assault.” Complaint ¶ 78, at 13. Peña in paragraph 78 thus states the constitutionally protected activity for which she alleges CCA Defendants retaliated against her: exercising her free speech rights by reporting Greffet’s rape and Vallejos’ use of excessive force. Regardless whether either of the factual assertions within her statements is true, exercising her First Amendment right in reporting them, even if false, is protected. See United States v. Alvarez, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2547, 183 L.Ed.2d 574 (2012) (<HOLDING>)(“The Government has not demonstrated that
holding that false statements are constitutionally protected holding that defendant could be charged for making false statements to treasury officials under the tax evasion statute or the statute prohibiting false statements to government officials holding that statements given after miranda warnings are admissible even when the arrest that preceded the statements was constitutionally deficient holding parental rights are constitutionally protected fundamental interest holding that an attorney who made false representations to a court did not violate okla rpc 33 because that rule addresses professional misconduct as an advocate for making false statements to a tribunal not false statements by a lawyer as a witness