proceedings, not for every litigation-inducing conduct”); Milstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir.2001) (explaining that the question is “whether the prosecutor’s actions are closely associated with the judicial process ”). Thus, in deciding whether to accord a pros immunity for initiating a prosecution); Milstein, 257 F.3d at 1008 (same); Roe v. City & County of San Francisco, 109 F.3d 578, 583-84 (9th Cir.1997) (absolute immunity for decision to prosecute and for professional evaluation of a witness “even if that judgment is harsh, unfair or clouded by personal animus”); id. at 584 (stating that “a prosecutor’s professional evaluation of the evidence assembled by the police is entitled to absolute immunity”); Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203, 1215 (3d Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). A prosecutor is absolutely immune from
holding that a zoning decision pertaining to a specific property is not a legislative act but is rather quasijudicial in nature holding that the decision as to the weight to be afforded to documentary evidence  lies largely within the discretion of the ij holding that to the extent that the securing of information is necessary to a prosecutors decision to initiate a criminal prosecution it is encompassed within the protected quasijudicial immunity afforded to the decision itself holding that a district courts denial of a claim of qualified immunity is an appealable final decision within the meaning of 28 usc  1291 to the extent that it turns on an issue of law recognizing that the question of whether the interest of justice is served by the transfer of a juvenile for adult prosecution is a decision within the broad discretion of the district court