action by the State to recover the costs of legal assistance. Therefore, the entry of this judgment was a “stage” of the criminal proceeding for which Dudley was entitled to counsel. Our characterization of the cost judgment in Sluyter as a civil liability does not alter our conclusion. See Sluyter, 763 N.W.2d at 582 (stating cost judgment entered against acquitted defendant creates a civil liability). As previously noted, the legislature has injected this matter, which would ordinarily be civil, in a criminal action and provided for counsel throughout the criminal prosecution, ending with judgment on behalf of the State. We think it proper to focus on the legislative intent evidenced by these statutes, rather than on the label attached to the final judgment. See Jones, 964 P.2d at 403 (<HOLDING>). Because the criminal case did not end, by
holding postacquittal proceedings were part of criminal case notwithstanding that they resulted in a reimbursement award that was civil in nature stating legislative intent was more important than labels holding that defendants have a right to counsel in criminal proceedings holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law holding that substantive criminal statute could not be applied retrospectively because there was nothing  in the language or the legislative history that was a clear and unequivocal expression of legislative intent to rebut presumption of prospective application only recognizing a right of access to civil proceedings