trial court in denying C.M.’s motion. C.M. also argues that the trial court appointed Dr. Day as a “court witness” although the trial court knew that Dr. Day had been hired by the Roberts family and accordingly owed them a duty of loyalty and confidentiality. She asserts that the trial court should have appointed an independent expert witness to examine C.M., pursuant to rule 8.095(c)(1) of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, which provides for the appointment of expert witnesses when a child is believed to be incompetent or insane. However, C.M. failed to preserve this bias argument for appellate review by failing to object below to the trial court’s selection of Dr. Day. See Marrero v. Goldsmith, 448 So.2d 543 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), quashed on other grounds, 486 So.2d 530 (Fla.1986)(<HOLDING>). Lastly, C.M. contends that there was
holding that appellants failure to challenge the trial courts appointment of an allegedly biased expert witness precluded appellant from raising the issue on appeal holding that failure to include an issue in statement of issues did not bar the appellant from raising the issue in its opening brief holding that appellants failure to obtain a ruling at the trial level even on a constitutional issue precluded review on appeal holding that the plaintiff was precluded from raising the issue for the first time on appeal holding that the failure to file a proper motion to dismiss raising a constitutional challenge to a criminal statute waives the issue on appeal