sample, which, given advancements in scientific technology, may be “mined” in the future for a host of personal and medical information beyond that contained in his present DNA profile, cannot be justified. Indeed, Dr. Heinig recognized that blood or buccal samples contain genetic information that could conceivably be subject to misuse. She also observed, however, that the Act prescribes strict penalties for misuse of the samples or unauthorized disclosure of such information. These safeguards adequately ensure that any risk to Wilson’s legitimate privacy interests is minimized. See Amerson, 483 F.3d at 85. Further, Wilson’s concerns are purely speculative. The hypothetical possibility of some future abuse does not substantiate a justiciable controversy. See Banks, 490 F.3d at 1191-92 (<HOLDING>); Amerson, 483 F.3d at 86-87 (same); Johnson,
recognizing potential for abuse of dna information despite statutory safeguards but in the absence of evidence of abuse refusing to adjudicate based on speculation holding that dismissal based on forum non conveniens was an abuse of discretion in absence of evidence other than plaintiffs nonresidence in texas holding substantial evidence supported jury finding of abuse of process holding that the fouching for the purposes of abuse language in section 1834014 means touching for the purposes of sexual abuse not abuse in general holding abuse of discretion is established if district court decision was based on an error of law