Evans was deprived of due process? (5) Can the trial court use its contempt power to enforce the June 30, 2003 order even though that order is void because the trial court lacked authority to enter it? (6) Can the trial court use its contempt power to enforce the June 30, 2003 order even though Evans established that he has complied with that order to the extent that he can? (7) Can the trial court use its contempt power to enforce the June 30, 2003 order even though that order is vague and ambiguous? III. STANDARD OP REVIEW We review the trial court’s interpretation of applicable statutes de novo. See Johnson v. City of Fort Worth, 774 S.W.2d 653, 655-56 (Tex.1989). In construing a statute, our objective is to determine and give effec c. 282, 518 N.E.2d 1262, 1265 (Ill.Ct.App.1988) (<HOLDING>). The Bexar County Parties assert that, under
holding nonparty agency had standing to appeal order committing to agencys custody an individual found incompetent to stand trial for capital murder agency asserted trial court lacked authority to issue commitment order holding nonparty department of mental health had standing to appeal commitment order regarding person found not guilty by reason of insanity because department had direct interest that was affected by commitment order and because employees of the department conceivably could be held in contempt of court for failing to comply with the order holding that probation department employees are not county employees holding that because the department of revenue is subordinate to the board of tax review in the decision making process the department is not an adversely affected or aggrieved party having standing to petition for judicial review of the boards order reversing a decision of the department holding that mothers failure to appeal prior contempt order precluded her challenge to prior order in appeal from later order entered based upon prior contempt order