citing State v. Dahlgren, 200 Conn. 586, 602-03, 512 A.2d 906, 914-15 (1986); United States v. Aloi, 9 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Urian, 858 F.2d 124 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Goodwin, 470 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1972) (all holding that the trial court is not required to ask potential jurors whether they would draw an adverse inference from a defendant’s election not to testify); see also State v. Johnson, 62 S.W.3d 61, 65 (Mo. App. 2001) (finding that even if the trial court erred in excluding the voir dire question regarding an adverse inference due to defendant’s decision not to testify, “the record does not support a finding of a real probability of prejudice therefrom sufficient to find reversible error”); but see Hayes v. Commonwealth, 175 S.W.3d 574 (Ky. 2005) (<HOLDING>); see also State v. Clement, 2 S.W.3d 156 (Mo.
holding that the failure to hold a faretta hearing is per se reversible error and reversing the defendants conviction vacating his death sentence and remanding for a new trial holding that constructive amendments which are per se reversible under harmless error analysis are also per se reversible under plain error analysis holding a mere warning that termination is possible does not per se constitute adverse employment action holding that it is per se reversible error to prohibit adverse inference questioning of the venire holding the erroneous deprivation of the right to counsel constitutes per se reversible error