Because these hardship determinations are made in the same manner under practically identical standards and because De La Vega holds that the cancellation-of-removal hardship determination is discretionary, we join the Fourth Circuit in holding that the § 1182(i)(l) hardship determination is discretionary as well. We therefore lack jurisdiction to review this judgment. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)®. Finally, we hold that § 106(a)(1)(A)(iii) of the REAL ID Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), does not affect our conclusion because the instant petition, in challenging the BIA’s discretionary extreme-hardship determination, does not raise any “constitutional claims or questions of law” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). See Xiao Ji Chen v. DOJ, 434 F.3d 144, 153-54 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, we lack
holding that the real id act gave us jurisdiction to review a criminal aliens petition for review of an order of removal raising a question of law holding that adverse credibility determinations under the real id act must take into consideration the individual circumstances of the applicant holding that the real id act does not restore jurisdiction over discretionary determinations holding that the real id act leaves this court deprived of jurisdiction to review discretionary and factual determinations holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review the bias discretionary determinations concerning whether to grant cancellation of removal and that sjection 106 of the real id act does not override the jurisdictiondenying provision of 8 usc  1252a2b unless the petitioner raises a constitutional claim   or question  of law within the meaning of 8 usc  1252a2d