to plead generally at the outset and amend the complaint at the 12(b)(6) stage after discovery would be at odds with the FCA’s procedures for filing a qui tam action and its protections for the government (which is, of course, the real party in interest in a qui tam action). Other courts have repeatedly refused to allow qui tam relators to rely on later discovery to comply with Rule 9(b)’s pleading requirements. See, e.g., Clausen, 290 F.3d at 1313 n. 24. (noting that allowing a plaintiff “to learn the complaint’s bare essentials through discovery ... may needlessly harm a defendants] goodwill and reputation by bringing a suit that is, at best, missing some of its core underpinnings, and, at worst, [contains] baseless allegations used to extract settlements”); Russell, 193 F.3d at 308 (<HOLDING>). The reluctance of courts to permit qui tam
holding a qui tam relator may not present general allegations in lieu of the details of actual false claims in the hope that such details will emerge through subsequent discovery holding that a special relaxing of rule 9b is a qui tam plaintiffs ticket to the discovery process that the statute itself does not contemplate holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law holding that plaintiff could not maintain a qui tam fca action against a municipal entity holding that rule 9b applies to fca