See Guo v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1194, 1200, 1202 (9th Cir.2004) (“[Ujnclear [or vague] testimony may not serve as substantial evidence for an adverse credibility finding when an applicant is not given the chance to attempt to clarify his or her testimony.”). The BIA also concluded that Frumusachi was not credible becausé it was implausible that Frumusachi could obtain a certificate of good standing from the police in order to leave Moldova at the same time he alleges that the police were arresting and beating him. Again the BIA’s determination is not supported by substantial evidence. First, the BIA’s decision is based on impermissible speculation on how the government in Moldova operates. See Earn v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 876, 887-88 (9th Cir.2004) (superseded by statute on other grounds) (<HOLDING>). Second, Frumusachi was not clearly •
holding that any alleged inconsistencies in dates that reveal nothing about a petitioners credibility cannot form the basis of an adverse credibility finding holding that personal conjecture about the manner in which indian passport officials carry out their duties could not support an adverse credibility finding holding that speculation and conjecture cannot support an adverse credibility finding holding that history of dishonesty can support an adverse credibility finding holding that the ijs beliefs that the indian government would not issue a misspelled passport and the petitioner would have learned the name of her smuggling agent during their journey were speculative and insufficient to support an adverse credibility determination