the Students’ request for a temporary restraining order, such a grant could not serve as an alternative basis for according them prevailing-party status for purposes of granting attorney’s fees. 3. The School District’s Decision Relating to Further Suspensions We are unpersuaded by the Students’ remaining argument that they are prevailing parties because they did not receive further suspensions subsequent to the September 15, 2004 hearing. The record amply supports the School District’s characterization that its decision not to further suspend the Students was voluntary. Thus, because a voluntary change in behavior after the filing of the lawsuit is insufficient to confer prevailing-party status for purposes of granting attorney’s fees, see Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (<HOLDING>), we re ject the Students’ argument as without
recognizing that where first suit is filed in response to notice of a planned lawsuit by the plaintiffs adversary that lawsuit may be dismissed holding that where the violation of the fdcpa was the filing of a lawsuit the statule of limitations begins to run on the date of filing holding that filing a lawsuit in the wrong court is actionable under the tdca holding that a voluntary change in behavior occurring after the filing of the lawsuit does not confer prevailingparty status on the plaintiffs holding that filing an answer  does not invoke the status as a defendant in plaintiffs lawsuit