law, as if the claim was non-core. The Court does not read Arkison to re-write the statute such that Stem claims are no longer statutorily core under 157(b)(2)— something the Stem court itself explicitly did not do. See Stern, 181 S.Ct. at 2605. For these reasons, the Court holds that this action is core as a counterclaim against the UBS proof of claim, and the Court therefore has core jurisdiction over the action as a matter “arising in” the bankruptcy proceeding. Accordingly, the Court need not address any of RFC’s al-tentative bases for establishing core jurisdiction. Further, because the action is core, mandatory abstention principles do not apply. See 28 U.S.C. 1334(c); see also Shipley Garcia Enters., LLC v. Cureton, No. 12-cv-0089, 2012 WL 3249544, at *10 (S.D.Tex. Aug. 7, 2012) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the only remaining issue is
holding that after stem bankruptcy judges have the authority to enter interlocutory orders in noncore proceedings and in core proceedings as to which the bankruptcy court may not enter final orders or judgment consistent with article iii absent consent holding that certain claims could not be a class issue in part because the complaint did not mention the claims holding bankruptcy courts cannot enter final judgment on fraudulent transfer claims holding that mandatory abstention does not apply to stem claims because although stem determined that a bankruptcy court may not constitutionally enter final judgment on certain counterclaims under  157b2c it did not rewrite the statute and reclassify those claims as related to proceedings under  157c1 or 1334c holding that stem does not change bankruptcy courts authority to decide fundamental core procedures of bankruptcy court