vague standard. See, e.g., id. (describing the "reasonable belief” standard as one that "appears to be roughly comparable to the reasonable ‘ar-ticulable suspicion’ standard applied by the Supreme Court” in “stop and frisk” cases, and directing that "doubtful cases [should] be resolved in the defendant’s favor_”) (emphasis added). 12 . See, e.g., Test, supra, 420 U.S. at 30, 95 S.Ct. 749 (recognizing that without discovery, "a party almost invariably would be unable to determine whether he has a potentially meritorious jury challenge."); United States v. Royal, 100 F.3d 1019, 1025 (1st Cir.1996) (‘‘[A] litigant need only allege that he is preparing a motion to challenge the jury selection process.”). 13 . See, e.g., United States v. Davenport, 824 F.2d 1511, 1514-15 (7th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); United States v. McLernon, 746 F.2d 1098,
holding district court could not declare jury advisory in action triable of right by a jury and even if no right to jury trial existed in case it would be abuse of discretion to declare jury advisory after both sides rested but before jury was instructed recognizing the right to waive a jury trial holding death qualification of jury prior to guilt phase of bifurcated capital trial did not violate defendants sixth amendment right to impartial jury representative of fair crosssection of the community holding that district court could not decide after jury returned verdict to treat jury verdict as advisory on issue not triable of right by jury but which was tried by consent of parties to nonadvisory jury holding that defendant had unqualified right to the jury list but not the jury qualification questionnaires without some demonstration of necessity