criminal culpability rather than recognizing duress as an excuse [that] negates the culpability factor required for the offense.” Skinazi, supra, at 1040 (footnote omitted); see also Gardner, supra, at 741. {12} We consider these observations well-founded. A defendant pleading duress is not attempting to disprove a requisite mental state. See United States v. Johnson, 956 F.2d 894, 897 (9th Cir.1992) (noting that defense of duress “assumes that the defendant has voluntarily performed the criminal act”). Defendants in that context are instead attempting to show that they ought to be excused from criminal liability because of the circumstances surrounding their intentional act. See United States v. Bailey, 585 F.2d 1087, 1111 (D.C.Cir.1978) (Wilkey, J., diss 953 P.2d 685, 688-89 (1998) (<HOLDING>). In summary, we determine the breadth of
holding that defendants habitual traffic violator conviction could also serve as a predicate felony conviction under the general habitual offender statute holding that defense of compulsion was not available to defendant a habitual violator where he illegally drove his vehicle after cause of compulsion had passed holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in not allowing defendant to present evidence of his subjective belief regarding his status as habitual offender because his belief was irrelevant to offense of driving as habitual offender holding that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle solely because the vehicle drove onto a lot after hours and then left in a hurry holding state can obtain dui conviction by proving circumstantially that defendant drove while intoxicated to place where he relinquished actual physical control of vehicle