conduct, you, mqst find him not guilty unless you also find that he persuaded, induced, or enticed her to engage in such conduct, and she would not otherwise have done so. Dhingra’s argument collapses because he misconstrues the nature of liability under § 2422(b); his proposed jury instruction reflects this mistake. In effect, Dhin-gra claims that entrapment by the victim ameliorates any inducement on his part. Again, this reading of the statute mistakenly changes the focus from the defendant to the victim. The victim’s willingness to engage in sexual activity is irrelevant, in much the same way that a minor’s consent to sexual activity does not mitigate the offense of statutory rape or child molesta tion. Cf. United States v. Rashkovski, 301 F.3d 1133, 1136-37 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). So long as a defendant’s actions constitute
holding that the mere fact that the fda does not require a warning on a product label does not necessarily create a conflict recognizing that the pregnant womans ability to assert her own rights is beset with obstacles including her desire to protect her privacy recognizing that  2422a liability does not require a defendant to create out of whole cloth a womans desire to travel to engage in prostitution holding that a womans consent to be transported for prostitution does not amount to a conspiracy with her transporter to violate the mann act holding a condominium association had no duty to a woman who had committed suicide after the association removed the womans dog because while the association knew the dog was essential to the womans will to live the association had no authority to prevent the womans suicide