capacity were necessary; (3) the fact that Reagan had worked full time at various jobs (sometimes on a full time basis) during the same period in which he claim to be disabled; (4) the fact that the Social Security Administration had found that Reagan was not disabled under the Social Security Act; and (5) the fact that Reagan had worked in several positions which were suitable for his medical condition, were available in the general economy, and were appropriate in terms of his training, education, and recent work experience. Based upon this evidence, the Court cannot say that UNUM’s decision to terminate Reagan’s disability payments was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. See Mers v. Marriott Int’l Group Accidental Death and Dismemberment Plan, 144 F.3d 1014, 1021 (7th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). To the extent that Drs. Kurkjian and Laping
holding that judicial review of an administrative agencys decision is limited solely to whether given the relevant standard and facts the agencys decision was arbitrary illegal capricious or unreasonable holding that when applying an arbitrary and capricious standard of review the courts role is to determine whether the plan administrators decision was completely unreasonable holding that when the agencys decision was based on an erroneous and completely unsupported assumption the decision was arbitrary and capricious holding that a heightened arbitrary and capricious standard of review applied to the decision to deny benefits under the erisa plan holding that a reversal of the plan administrators decision is in order under the most deferential arbitrary and capricious standard when no reasonable grounds exist to support the decision