in the first instance.” Id. at *2. It noted that “even an ‘obvious’ preemption defense does not, in most cases, create removal jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 66, 107 S.Ct. 1542). Similarly, several lower courts have remanded actions pled under state law where PMPA preemption could be asserted as a defense. In an action similar to the one before this court, a district court in Maryland remanded an action in which service station franchisees pled state court claims against the franchisor, seeking damages and reformation of the franchise agreement rent provisions. See J.H.W. Sr., Inc. v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 921 F.Supp. 1436 (D.Md.1996). The court found that allowing the state claims to proceed in state court did not preclude reliance o N.D.N.Y. June 20, 2005) (<HOLDING>); Serianni v. Gulf Oil Corp., 662 F.Supp. 1020
holding that the plaintiffs state law claims were preempted by pmpa because they sought to impose standards more stringent than the pmpa regarding the termination or nonrenewal of his franchise holding that pmpa preempted new york statutory law governing the termination or nonrenewal of franchises but did not preempt state contract claim which did not involve the termination of the franchise relationship holding that pmpa preempted state statute regarding the ter initiation and nonrenewal of franchises and state commonlaw claim holding that fraud claim concerning nonrenewal of franchise agreement was preempted by pmpa holding state law claim premised on implied duty of good faith was preempted by the pmpa because it concerned the termination of a petroleum franchise