was pending on, AEDPA’s effective date. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997); United States v. Skandier, 125 F.3d 178 (3d Cir.1997). “Because the District Court relied entirely upon the state court record and did not hold an evidentiary hearing, our review [of the District Court’s decision] is plenary.” Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941, 947 (3d Cir.1998) (citing Johnson v. Rosemeyer, 117 F.3d 104, 109 (3d Cir.1997)). Like the District Court, we must presume all state court factual findings tó be correct, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), but we “exercise plenary review over state court conclusions on mixed questions of law and fact and pure issues of law.” Hassine, 160 F.3d at 947; see Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 105, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985)(<HOLDING>); Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 597, 102 S.Ct.
holding that the finding of intent to discriminate is a factual determination subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review holding that the jones act provides an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction holding that subject matter questions may be but are not necessarily decided before questions of personal jurisdiction holding that petitions for confirmation or vacatur must show how the ultimate disposition of the matter by the federal court necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law holding that while subsidiary factual questions are subject to  2254ds presumption the ultimate legal question of confessions constitutional voluntariness is a matter for independent federal determination