the owner’s motor vehicle or, if a resident of this state, while not an occupant of a self-propelled vehicle, if the injury is caused by physical contact with such motor vehicle.... This requirement has remained unchanged since its enactment in 1971. See Ch. 71-252, § 7, Laws of Fla. The issue in this case revolves around the definition of “resident” as used in this statute. The relevance of Mr. Maldonado’s alien status can only be assessed once one determines the elements needed to establish residency. In general, a person is a resident if he or she lives in a place and has no present intention of “removing themselves therefrom,” i.e., leaving. Kiplinger v. Kiplinger, 147 Fla. 243, 2 So.2d 870, 873 (1941); see also Cruickshank v. Cruickshank, 420 So.2d 914, 915 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (<HOLDING>). “Any place of abode or dwelling place
recognizing there can be concurrent proximate causes of accident holding that although the bankruptcy court is the preferred forum because of its greater expertise state courts have concurrent jurisdiction holding that federal jurisdiction over rico claims is concurrent and not exclusive holding that federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over  1983 claims holding that test for residency is physical presence in state and concurrent intent to remain