underlying proceeding, he “will not be permitted to prove that newly discovered evidence has shown his conviction to be unjust or even that the conviction was obtained by fraud or perjury." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 658 comment c (1977). 12 . This authority is codified at Va.Code § 53.1-229. 13 . For cases in which the Supreme Court of Virginia decided questions regarding pardons without reference to the reason for the pardon, see Prichard v. Battle, 178 Va. 455, 17 S.E.2d 393, 397 (1941) (finding pardon of motor vehicle offense does not restore driver's license revoked upon conviction); Puryear v. Commonwealth, 83 Va. 51, 58, 1 S.E. 512 (1887) (upholding jury’s verdict in case where juror with felony convic tion had been pardoned); Edwards v. Commonwealth, 78 Va. 39, 44 (1883) (<HOLDING>); Ball v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. (8 Leigh) 726,
holding that the plaintiffs action was ripe where the plaintiff who had received a pardon for three felony drug convictions in georgia and had his firearm rights expressly restored by the pardon asked the court to determine whether a tennessee criminal statute prohibiting anyone convicted of a felony drug offense from possessing a firearm applied to him in light of a tennessee attorney generals opinion stating that the criminal statute applied to pardoned felony drug offenders holding that an indictment charging one offense during the commission of another crime need not allege the elements of the latter offense holding that pardon relieves the recipient upon subsequent conviction of another crime of the additional punishment provided by statute for a second offense holding that the determination whether a crime is a necessarily included lesser offense of another crime is made by examining the elements of the crimes that must be proved in order to sustain a conviction holding the death penalty excessive punishment for the crime of rape