law.”). In advancing this argument, Scott largely relies upon the Eighth Circuit’s decision in United States v. French, 46 F.3d 710, 717 (8th Cir.1995), which held that because South Dakota law defines parole as confinement in the legal custody of the Department of Corrections, a defendant on parole was still serving an undischarged term of imprisonment for purposes of § 5G1.3(b). We cannot conclude that the district court committed plain error, for at least two reasons. First, this Court has never adopted the French rule, and, as Scott acknowledges, the majority of circuits that have addressed the rule have held that as a matter of uniform federal law a sentence is discharged once the defendant is no longer in prison. See United States v. Cruz, 595 F.3d 744, 745 (7th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Prewitt v. United States, 83 F.3d 812, 817
holding that prosecutorial delay that was extreme or sinister could support a departure if the defendant was required to serve a state sentence which could have been concurrent with the federal sentence had the federal prosecution proceeded sooner holding that when a sentencing issue centers upon a courts statutory authority to impose a sentence rather than the courts exercise of discretion in fashioning the sentence the issue raised implicates the legality of the sentence imposed holding that a court may not impose a harsher sentence on a defendant who successfully challenges his sentence on appeal holding that although the defendant was paroled rather than released unconditionally his state sentence was discharged for purposes of deciding whether the federal judge could impose a concurrent sentence holding that the guidelines did not strip the sentencing court of its discretion to impose a concurrent sentence