affirmatively chose an appeal at the administrative level could frustrate Title VII’s goal of encouraging discrimination complaints to be resolved at the administrative level. See id. Courts have recognized the importance of the exhaustion requirement in similar, though not identical, circumstances, such as where plaintiffs had withdrawn or failed to pursue their complaints at the initial administrative step. “Allowing a plaintiff to abandon the administrative remedies he has initiated would tend to frustrate the ability of the agency to deal with complaints. All participants would know that at any moment an impatient complainant could take his claim to court and abort the administrative proceedings.” Gagnon v. Potter, No. 3:05-CV-324RM, 2006 WL 2051730, at *3 (N.D.Ind. July 19, 2006) (<HOLDING>); see also Mackay v. USPS, 607 F.Supp. 271, 276
holding that a plaintiff who pled in her complaint that her law firm actively misled her in support of her request for application of the discovery rule had sufficiently pled the application of the doctrine holding that the plaintiffs second complaint did not relate back to her first complaint because her second complaint was not an amendment to her first complaint but rather a separate filing holding that plaintiff was not allowed to voluntarily withdraw her complaint after electing to have her complaint heard before an administrative law judge holding that a district court had sufficient reason to reject the plaintiffs belated attempt to amend her complaint fifteen months after the commencement of her action and nine months after the initial amendment to her complaint holding that plaintiffs motion to amend her complaint to add her husband as a defendant did not relate back because her failure to sue her husband was not due to misnomer or mistake involving the identity of the proper party but because the law at the time of the complaint did not allow one spouse to sue another in tort