the notice provided was sufficient, see Eubanks, 385 F.3d at 898 & n. 1, or possibly misleading, see Eastman, 493 F.3d at 1158-59; Barger, 348 F.3d at 1296, and this determination must be made by the district court in the first instance. Finally, we note that even if the district court should conclude that this is an appropriate case for applying judicial estoppel, Matthews would not be preclud ed from pursuing her claims for injunctive relief. See Barger, 348 F.3d at 1297; Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1288-89 (11th Cir.2002). Matthews seeks reinstatement to her position with the Postal Service, a claim which was of no value to her bankruptcy estate and was of “no consequence to the trustee or the creditors.” Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1289; see Barger, 348 F.3d at 1297 (<HOLDING>). Consequently, any failure to disclose the
holding that the filed rate doctrine barred request for damages but did not preclude request for injunction and civil penalties holding that debtors request for reinstatement was not barred by judicial estoppel recognizing same judicial estoppel principle under kansas law holding that federal law applies because judicial estoppel relates to protection of the integrity of the federal judicial process holding that estoppel was a question of fact