to focus on this discrepancy alone, and ignore other factors that loomed large in the decisional calculus. In exchange for his guilty plea, Alvarado-Casas received three acceptance-of-responsibility points, which lowered his Guidelines range from 262-327 months to 188-235 months,’ a decrease of six to seven years at both ends.’ Moreover, as part of the plea agreement, the government agreed to dismiss twelve substantive counts of aggravated alien transporting, each of which carried a sentencing exposure of twenty years of imprisonment. Thus, even if Alvarado-Casas were prepared to go to trial, it is not reasonably probable that he would have declined the plea deal and exposed himself to a higher potential Guidelines range and maximum sentence. See Caraballo-Rodriguez, 480 F.3d at 76 (<HOLDING>). Our conclusion is buttressed by
holding that the defendants guilty plea was valid where the district court carefully questioned the defendant about whether he understood the consequences of his guilty plea holding that even if the district court erred in accepting defendants guilty plea without a factual basis there was no reasonable probability that but for the alleged error the defendant would not have pleaded guilty in light of the extremely favorable plea deal that was structured to find a significantly less serious offense to which he could plead holding that a defendant must show reasonable probability that but for the error he would not have entered the plea holding in the context of a plea that the strickland prejudice prong requires a defendant to demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial holding that right to challenge factual basis is waived by guilty plea