field of boat moorings, and the DNR has done so. The local ordinance directly affects the same subject matter—boat moorings. Yet, the state law expressly provides concurrent jurisdiction to local governments to legislate in the field; boat mooring was regulated locally prior to the enactment of the State Boat Act, see Md. Acts of 1960, ch. 69, § 8(c) (explaining that the Act expressly preempts existing local laws), and local laws existed governing that subject matter; the DNR has recognized the authority of the local governments to act in the field; and the system of state and local regulation has coexisted without chaos or confusion for over 20 years. These factors make plain that the General Assembly did not intend that the st Co., 450 U.S. 311, 101 S.Ct. 1124, 67 L.Ed.2d 258 (1981)(<HOLDING>). In this case, we conclude that the amendment
holding that the government can satisfy the hobbs act interstate commerce requirement by showing that the robbery resulted in the closure of a business engaged in interstate commerce holding that by operating a railroad in interstate commerce after the passage of federal employee liabilitys act alabama must be taken  to have consented to suit holding that a state common law claim against a railroad for failure to provide adequate services after the railroad abandoned a line was preempted by frustration of purpose conflict with the interstate commerce act which delegated to the interstate commerce commissioner the authority to regulate abandomnent of lines by earners and broad discretion in determining whether abandonment should be permitted holding that commerce clause authorizes congress to punish any particular criminal action even without proof of a relation to interstate commerce when the activity is part of a class of activities determined by congress to affect interstate commerce recognizing that  the interstate nexus requirement is satisfied by proof of a probable or potential impact on interstate commerce