Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983) (punitive damages under § 1983 available only “when the defendant’s conduct ... involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others”). Indeed, the law of this case is that the evidence was insufficient to support such a finding. See Mandel v. Boston Phoenix, Inc., 456 F.3d 198, 210 (1st Cir.2006). Although the amended complaint sought punitive damages, the district court held that there was no basis in the evidence to instruct the jury on the issue. Further, plaintiff did not object to the lack of jury instructions on punitive damages, and he does not challenge the omission of such instructions on appeal. Moreover, on the evidence it is clear that Jones was not “plainly incom .1999) (<HOLDING>); Warlick v. Cross, 969 F.2d 303, 310 (7th
holding that even if court erred in directing verdict for employer on plaintiffs state law retaliation claim it was harmless given the jurys finding for employer on identical federal law retaliation claim holding that officials are entitled to qualified immunity unless at the time of the dismissal it was clearly established that employees in the particular positions at issue in light of the responsibilities inherent in those positions were constitutionally protected from patronage dismissal  holding that plaintiffs complaint stated a claim for a constitutional deprivation but that the contours of the right at issue were not clearly established and that official was therefore entitled to qualified immunity holding that transit authority director was entitled to immunity despite jury verdict for plaintiffs because law was not clearly established at the time that plaintiffs activities were constitutionally protected from employer retaliation holding that prison clerks were entitled to immunity despite jury verdict against them because it was not clearly established at the time that mail from the courts was protected legal mail