(1994). Furthermore, the parties were in a married state during 1984 through 1990, the years upon which the size of the “quota shares” is based. See 50 C.F.R. § 676.20(b) (1994). Nevertheless, while Greg concedes that IFQs may be considered marital property, he argues that the “marital character” of the IFQs should not be determined simply based upon whether the parties were married during the qualifying years. Greg’s rationale is that his participation as a commercial fisher is lifelong, extending before his marriage to Betty Jo, and that Betty Jo reaped the benefits of his fishing while the parties were married such that the IFQs do not represent “any sort of marital gain or loss.” Greg’s IFQ eligibility is based not upon his “lifelong participation” in the halibut an 31, 37 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Unlike workers’ compensation benefits, or
holding that money invested in voluntary investment plan during marriage was marital property because it was property acquired during marriage holding that post dissolution costofliving increases are marital property as they stemmed from employment during the marriage holding that an increase in the value of nonmarital property attributable to the efforts of one or both spouses during marriage is marital property holding that an agreement that defined the parties respective rights in the property of the other and waived each spouses right in the others property either before or after death was a marriage contract holding that whether a spouses employment termination benefit is separate or marital property is determined by whether the right to payment accrued during marriage