bring to bear a factor of “reasonableness.” See Lattany, 982 F.2d at 868 (“[Ojpen-ended continuances to serve the ends of justice are not prohibited if they are reasonable in length.”); Rush, 738 F.2d at 508 (“It may well be that some sort of reasonableness limitation is appropriate to prevent continuances from delaying trials unfairly and circumventing the dismissal sanctions in the Speedy Trial Act____”). Santiago argues that, when viewed in the totality of the circumstances, including the previous delays, the 219 day delay was clearly unreasonable. Much of that delay, he contends, was attributable to government foot-dragging and, therefore, lacked an element of defendant’s involvement that has led us to exclude open-ended continuances in the past. See Lattany, 982 F.2d at 883 (<HOLDING>). Santiago maintains that the docket entries
holding that when determining whether a delay in prosecution violates a defendants right to a speedy trial courts must consider the length of the delay the reason for the delay whether the defendant asserted his rights and the resulting prejudice to the defendant holding that a five month delay was unreasonable holding that in a case involving serious charges a trial judge acted arbitrarily in denying a continuance where there was no evidence of a scheme to delay the trial no showing of inconvenience to the witnesses opposing counsel or the court and the length of the requested delay was not unreasonable holding that a 13 month delay was unreasonable holding that the length of a continuance was not unreasonable because of defendants part in extending the delay