12, February 13, and (Monday) February 16. Each time, she said only that she was “ill” and “wouldn’t be in today.” It was not until February 17 that she left a copy of her ER discharge with someone at Hyre (assuming for now that this might have been adequate notice). We can find no meaningful difference between the facts of this case and those of Aubuchon, discussed above. Just as the plaintiff in Aubuchon had an obligation to tell his employer that his wife was having pregnancy complications in order to make his employer aware that he needed FMLA leave, Stevenson had an obligation to tell Hyre something more than that she was out sick for a day — something that might have been explained by a mundane 24-hour upset stomach. See Burnett v. LFW Inc., 472 F.3d 471, 479 (7th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Stevenson contends that Hyre’s letter to
holding conjecture that additional investigation might have yielded valuable information is insufficient to establish prejudice for ineffective assistance claim holding that calling in sick while providing no additional information is insufficient for the fmla holding that general allegations of a need for additional discovery will not suffice the person presenting such a claim must show what discovery has been obtained why it is inadequate and the what additional information he expects to obtain from additional discovery holding that an additional remedy does not constitute an additional requirement holding that entry of summary judgment while a motion for additional discovery was pending should be construed as an implicit denial of the motion for additional discovery