Granger was negligent and there is absolutely no evidence whatsoever that Ms. Benavente was negligent in any respect.” This argument is more like one of factual sufficiency than of legal sufficiency, as Benavente in essence argues that the verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex.2001) (“When a party attacks the factual sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue on which she has the burden of proof, she must demonstrate on appeal that the adverse finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.”). In addition, Benavente’s prayer for relief seeks remand, which is the proper remedy for factual insufficiency. Compare Glover v. Tex. Gen. Indem. Co., 619 S.W.2d 400, 401-02 (Tex.1981) (<HOLDING>) with Beach v. Resolution Trust Corp., 821
holding double jeopardy does not bar second trial after granting of new trial for reason other than insufficiency of evidence holding that remand for new trial is remedy for factual insufficiency of evidence holding that insufficiency of indictment is not a basis for habeas relief holding that the insufficiency of factual data necessary for the resolution of a question presented is a reason for declining to grant declaratory relief holding that the appropriate remedy for a trial courts refusal to consider an indigent defendants request for new counsel is to remand for a hearing