ANN. § 344.040 (Banks-Baldwin 1997) all follow the Title VII framework set forth by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Gafford v. General Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 166 (6th Cir.1993) (order of proof for claim brought under Kentucky’s anti-discrimination laws follows federal law); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 896-97 (1st Cir.1988) (case law developed under Title VII applies to both § 1983 (the Equal Protection Clause) and Title IX claims). This circuit has previously held that a finding of liability under the Equal'Pay Act requires a similar finding of liability under Title VII where both claims present the same conduct and evidence. See Korte v. Diemer, 909 F.2d 954, 959 (6th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Applying this principle to the present case,
recognizing that a plaintiff can demonstrate that samesex harassment is because of sex by showing that the conduct was motivated by the coworkers sexual desire for persons of the same sex holding that under federal law without question when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinates sex that supervisor discriminates on the basis of sex holding that allegations of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation necessarily state a claim of discrimination on the basis of sex holding that conduct that a jury finds to be based on sex and not motivated by nondiscriminatory reasons cannot later be found by a district court to lack an intent to discriminate on the basis of sex holding discrimination based on pregnancy was not sex discrimination