had been told, namely, he asked to have Mother present. He also refused to consent to the gun powder residue test. When Defendant was next in custody (the afternoon of October 28), he was given a second juvenile Miranda warning. Again, he asserted he understood his rights and declined to request a lawyer or the presence of Mother. He asked, however, that any questioning be done exclusively by Sgt. Rainey, and his request was honored to the extent possible. Defendant’s invocation of his rights, refusal to consent to the gunpowder residue test, and his assertion of control over the interview process belies his claim that he did not “truly understand what was at stake” and did not know he could invoke his rights and refuse to speak. See, e.g., State v. Ouk, 616 N.W.2d 180, 185 (Minn.1994) (<HOLDING>); State v. Toste, 198 Conn. 573, 504 A.2d 1036
holding that because the employee had engaged in similar religious conduct on prior occasions employer had notice of the conflict holding that irrespective of the suspects limited reasoning ability and iq of 73 evidence that the suspect had held various parttime jobs had been living on his own possessed a drivers license and had prior experience with law enforcement was probative of competence to waive miranda rights holding admissible suspects statement to police after being informed that he had been identified in a lineup which the court assumed without deciding was interrogation for purposes of the appeal because the statements were voluntarily made without any coercion and came after the suspect was given and validly waived his miranda rights holding that a 15yearold was of suitable intelligence and maturity to validly waive miranda rights specifically focusing on the fact that the juvenile had been advised of his rights on three prior occasions and had once asked for an attorney holding that smith who was 15 years old could waive his miranda rights and his right to have an attorney or parent present during questioning by police