does not testify). The United States Courts of Appeals are split. The First, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have ruled that the federal constitution prohibits the prosecution from making substantive use of a defendant’s pre-arrest, pr e-Miranda silence. See Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 1991); Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1568 (1st Cir. 1989); United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1018 (7th Cir. 1987). The Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, however, have ruled to the contrary. See United States v. Oplinger, 150 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Zanabria, 74 F.3d 590, 593 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir. 1991). ¶ 14. Ou ) (<HOLDING>); State v. Boston, 663 S.E.2d 886, 896 (N.C.
holding racebased use of peremptory strikes against jurors unconstitutional holding that the amendment was a use regulation which was in effect a condition on the use of property in the affected zone holding that the use of extraverdict enhancements in an advisory guidelines system is not unconstitutional quotation omitted holding that use of prearrest silence in the caseinchief  is unconstitutional holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants