exist. The trial court recognized that fact and charged the jury that it could not find both. Defendant argues that by submitting the escape-detection factor, however, the State necessarily affirmed the existence of a motive, thus precluding it from also submitting the depravity factor. In Gerald, supra, the Court stated that [g]iven Bamseur’s intention to include within the reach of the term “depravity’’ only those murders that are entirely without motive, we hold that where, as here, greed, anger, revenge, or other similar motive is present, the depravity aspect of Section (c)(4)(c) [ie., lack of purpose] should not be submitted to the jury. [113 N.J. at 66, 549 A.2d 792.] The Court since has reiterated that part of the Gerald holding in Perry, supra, 124 N.J. at 173-76, 590 A.2d 624 (<HOLDING>), and in State v. McDougald, 120 N.J. 523, 567,
holding other crimes evidence admissible to show motive where motive was put in issue by defense at trial holding that trial court erred in submitting disjunctive charge holding trial court improperly instructed jury in trial for possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute that evidence of defendants similar acts of possession was admissible to show motive where motive was not element of crime charged and defendant did not contest motive holding admissible bad acts of defendant evidencing jealousy as motive for killing another holding that trial court erred in submitting depravity factor because evidence pointed to drug dispute as motive for killing