processing of the appeal is a fact issue for determination in the trial court, and in making that determination the trial court exercises a broad legal discretion [that] is subject to appellate scrutiny only for abuse.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). 7 See Propst, 288 Ga. at 863. 8 Crenshaw v. Ga. Underwriting Ass’n, 202 Ga. App. 610, 611 (1) (414 SE2d 915) (1992). 9 As we have previously noted, a delay in paying costs of more than 30 days is prima facie unreasonable and inexcusable; however, this is a rebuttable inference. See, e.g., Morrell v. W. Servs., LLC, 291 Ga. App. 369, 372 (1) (662 SE2d 215) (2008); McCorvey Dev., Inc. v. D.G. Jenkins Dev. Corp., 260 Ga. App. 276, 277 (581 SE2d 308) (2003); see also Langdale Co. v. Langdale, 295 Ga. App. 372, 374 (671 SE2d 863) (2008) (<HOLDING>); Dye v. U. S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 273 Ga. App.
holding that delay caused by or consented to by a defendant is not unreasonable holding that a party failed to present any evidence to rebut inference that delay was unreasonable and inexcusable holding that evidence that a partys delay in paying costs was caused by a miscommunication was not sufficient to rebut inference holding that the trial court made sufficient findings of fact to support its dismissal of an appeal when the order set forth the circumstances surrounding the appealing partys 16month delay in paying court costs and the appellee had moved to dismiss the appeal based on an inexcusable delay caused by the appellants failure to pay costs holding that a partys explanation that the delay in paying costs was caused by a desire to avoid seeking public assistance in payment did not rebut inference