an alternative explanation of how the law enforcement defendants obtained the name “Luis,” the Mejias point to the fact that S/A Raffa obtained a business card from Complete Diagnostic on November 19, 1993 that bore the name “Luis.” Based on this fact and the lack of documentary evidence of the Airborne computer entry, a reasonable juror could infer that there never was a call to Airborne from “Luis,” in which case probable cause was certainly lacking when defendants began to make arrangements for their second attempt at a controlled delivery on November 29,1993. Moreover, even if there was such a call, a reasonable juror could find that subse quent events dissipated any probable cause that it may have created with respect to Mr. Mejia and, hence, Mrs. Mejia. See Lowth, 82 F.3d at 571 (<HOLDING>). Assuming, as the court must, that Mr. Mejia’s
holding that probable cause may dissipate if the groundless nature of the charges becomes apparent by the discovery of some intervening fact citing callan v state 73 ny2d 731 535 nys2d 590 532 ne2d 96 1988 holding that the incriminating nature of an item was immediately apparent where the police officers had probable cause to believe that it contained evidence of a crime holding that the district court did not err in concluding that the incriminating nature of a gun was apparent when officers were responding to charges that the defendants were holding aliens against their will holding that mere delay in pulling a defendant over for a traffic violation does not dissipate probable cause to arrest holding that a state courts finding that the prosecutor did not have probable cause to go forward with the charges did not necessarily mean that probable cause to make the initial arrest was lacking