of the separation of powers doctrine. Several courts and commentators have recognized, however, that this language is meaningless unless read within the context of the court’s discussion of section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Guerrero, 290 F.3d at 1219-20 (“[the Boerne court’s] discussion of the separation of powers doctrine was entirely within the framework of its section 5 analysis — not an independent rationale”); Kikumura, 242 F.3d at 958-59 (“Although the court did mention separation of powers concerns in [Boeme], this language must be read in the context of the entire opinion and the question being considered”); Gregory P. Magarian, How to Apply the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to Federal Law Without Violating the Constitution, 99 Mich. L.Rev. 1903, 1914 (2001) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, the court concludes that
holding that the plain language of the diversity jurisdiction statute permitted a workmens compensation claim to be filed as an original action in federal court even though congress clearly intended to prohibit the removal of such claims congress used language specifically barring removal of such cases from state to federal courts and at the same time left unchanged the old language which just as specifically permits civil suits to be filed in federal courts in cases where there are both diversity of citizenship and the prescribed jurisdictional amount in this situation we must take the intent of congress with regard to the filing of diversity cases in federal district courts to be that which its language clearly sets forth congress could very easily have used language to bar filing of workmens compensation suits by the insurer as well as removal of such suits and it could easily do so still holding that because the due process clause in the federal constitution is applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment the right is also guaranteed to defendants pursuant to the identical provision in article i section 5 of the hawaii constitution recognizing that in boeme justice kennedy forcefully asserted the judicial prerogative to interpret the constitution in language that might be understood to implicate rfras applications to federal as well as state law but also that other language in the opinion indicates that the court situated its judicial supremacy concerns squarely in the context of the fourteenth amendment and state sovereignty holding that to hold the same constitution that specifically recognizes felon disenfranchisement under  2 of the fourteenth amendment but also prohibits disenfranchisement under another amendment would be to interpret the constitution in an inconsistent manner holding that an action cannot be maintained under young in unique circumstances where the suit against the state officer affects an essential attribute of state sovereignty in a manner that the action must be understood as one against the state