therefore, jeopardy did not attach to the verdict, and Appellant will be entitled to demand a 12-person jury on retrial if he is tried again for first-degree murder. The trial court found that Appellant would not have waived his right to a mistrial after a juror was removed following deliberations, and the State does not contest this fact. Appellant has proven that he would have terminated the trial before a verdict could have been rendered. Appellant and the State are now returned to status quo ante, and the State may seek to try Appellant for the capital crime of first-degree murder. Thus, no jeopardy attached to the proceeding or the verdict finding Appellant guilty of second-degree murder. See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (<HOLDING>); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S.
holding that if defendant moved for or consented to mistrial retrial of defendant was not barred on double jeopardy grounds holding that since the mistrial met the manifest necessity requirement of our cases  the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment  did not bar retrial under a valid indictment holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted holding that where the evidence offered by the state and admitted by the trial court  whether erroneously or not  would have been sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict the double jeopardy clause does not preclude retrial holding that when jury acquitted defendant on greater offense but deadlocked on lesserincluded offenses double jeopardy did not bar retrial of the lesers