claims based on a theory of disparate impact. Id. at 240, 125 S.Ct. 1536. That decision also cautions that “the scope of disparate-impact liability under [the] ADEA is narrower than under Title VII.” Id. The Court reasoned that “age, unlike race or other classifications protected by Title VII, not uncommonly has relevance to an individual’s capacity to engage in certain types of employment.” Id. Moreover, the Court referred to amendments to Title VII contained in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 1071, which expanded the availability of disparate-impact liability in the Title VII context, and effectively overruled the Supreme Court’s narrow construction of Title VII as set forth in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 653, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Because those amendments did not change the
holding that a plaintiff must demonstrate that it is the application of a specific or particular employment practice that has created the disparate impact under attack holding that disparate impact claims are not cognizable under the adea holding that disparate impact analysis may be applied to subjective employment practices in employment discrimination actions holding that there is no disparate impact claim under the adea holding that disparate impact analysis is inapplicable to suit challenging hiring practice that based employee compensation on market rates rather than comparable worth despite demonstrable disparate result and concluding that that analysis is confined to cases that challenge specific clearly delineated employment practice at a single point in the job selection process