role in the corporation. Lollo, 35 F.3d at 35. Plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, the district court properly focused its analysis on the Lollo factors and, after a bench trial, concluded, in light of those factors, that the high degree of intention — which goes beyond the mere presence of a personal liability clause in the signed agreement — was not met. We see no reason to reverse the district court. We note further that the New York Court of Appeals has observed that “where individual responsibility is demanded the nearly universal practice is that the officer signs twice — once as an officer and again as an individual.” Salzman, 10 N.Y.2d at 67, 217 N.Y.S.2d 55, 176 N.E.2d 74. We have never held that two signatures are required. See Lotto, 35 F.3d at 35 (<HOLDING>). But we think that the appearance of only one
holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to discovery to determine whether the defendant intended to be bound in his personal andor corporate capacity where the agreement contained certain personal guarantees by the defendant but where the defendant signed the agreement only in a corporate capacity with no signature blocks provided for signing in a personally capacity holding officer may search vehicle for weapons if officer has reasonable belief based on articulable facts that officer or another may be in danger holding collective bargaining agreement imposed personal liability on signing officer under the facts of that case despite absence of separate signature of the officer in his personal capacity holding officer liable for deprivation of constitutional rights despite argument that officer although present was not in control of the situation holding that a corporate officer signing a contract in his corporate capacity is generally not liable for damages under the contract