of third persons (see, e.g., Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 67 Ill. 2d 348 (1977)), there is strong public policy in Illinois that states that “the law will not treat a fetus as an entity which is entirely separate from its mother.” Stallman, 125 Ill. 2d at 277. El-Amin notes that the court expressly refused to subject to state scrutiny “all the decisions a woman must make in attempting to carry a pregnancy to term,” which would infringe on the woman’s privacy and bodily autonomy. Stallman, 125 Ill. 2d at 278. Instead, the Stallman court specifically held that it would be a legal fiction “to treat the fetus as a separate legal person with rights hostile to and assertable against its mother.” Stallman, 125 Ill. 2d at 278. See also In re Baby Boy Doe, 260 Ill. App. 3d 392 (1994) (<HOLDING>). The most recent expression of this court on
holding that constitutional right of privacy does not apply to medical records recognizing state constitutional right of individual privacy that    may be asserted to prevent unwanted infringements of bodily integrity holding that a students right to bodily integrity under the fourteenth amendment encompasses a students right to be free from sexual assaults by his or her teachers holding that a womans competent choice to refuse medical treatment as invasive as a caesarian section must be honored even in circumstances where the choice might be harmful to the fetus and that the right to privacy was conceptually linked to the right to bodily integrity recognizing that the right to be free of stateoccasioned damage to a persons bodily integrity is protected by the fourteenth amendment guarantee of due process