the Millers, for a home. Herman’s separate purchase of the windows was incidental to that transaction — it did not stand alone. Although Miller technically paid for the windows by supplying Herman with the funds, and may have influenced (or dictated, as Miller asserted at oral argument) Herman’s decision to purchase Pella-manufactured windows, when he received the windows they were “integrated into the structure of a dwelling” and could not be “practically distinguished from realty.” 16 C.F.R. § 700.1(e). Miller contracted for the windows in connection with the construction of a new home, not in connection with the “improvement, repair, or modification” of an existing home as contemplated by subsection 700.1(e). See Muchisky v. Frederic Roofing Co., 838 S.W.2d 74, 78 (Mo.Ct.App.1992) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, we agree with the appellees that 16
holding that the question of whether an existing constitutional right is infringed is strictly a question of law holding a common question in a consumer class action brought under the gbl is whether a products manufacturer defrauded purchasers by making a specific claim on the products label holding that the corresponding structure is a controller holding that it is not holding that the shingles used to reroof an existing home were consumer products and noting that it appears that as to products which are becoming a part of realty the distinction drawn is whether the product is being added to an already existing structure or whether it is being utilized to create the structure