make the point that an illegitimate purpose can often be achieved without any further act beyond the obtaining of the process. Although our cases are not uniform in this respect, some support this point of view. Without turning on any additional act of misuse, a number of cases find that initiating process alone can at times be so coercive and promoting of ulterior advantage that it supports an abuse of process claim. See Malone v. Belcher, 216 Mass. 209, 210-211 (1913) (allowing an abuse of process claim where an “attachment was made for the ostensible purpose of collecting a commission,” but a jury could find that the real object was to prevent the conveyance of the property to another and to secure it for the party suing for the commission); Reardon v. Sadd, 262 Mass. 345 (1928) (<HOLDING>); Jacoby v. Spector, 292 Mass. 366, 369 (1935)
holding that arguable probable cause provides an objectively reasonable justification for issuing process and thus gives rise to qualified immunity against an abuse of process claim no less than against a false arrest claim recognizing an abuse of process claim for an attachment that a jury could find was intended to coerce a factory owner to settle a claim against her on a debt that the claimant knew was incurred by a different party holding that insured cannot bring an action against its insurer for bad faith failure to settle a claim in the absence of an excess verdict holding the insurer liable for failing to settle the claim when time was of the essence holding that to establish a claim for abuse of process a claimant must demonstrate  an act in the use of the process not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceedings