children and her involvement cord does not compellingly suggest that the BIA failed to consider any material evidence. See id. at 337 n. 17 (presuming that the agency “has taken into account all of the evidence before [it], unless the record compellingly suggests otherwise”). Rather, the BIA properly declined to credit the letters Lin submitted based on the Immigration Judge’s underlying adverse credibility determination. See Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 143, 146-49 (2d Cir.2007). Moreover, because Lin failed to establish changed country conditions in China sufficient to excuse the untimely filing of her motion to reopen, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion to file a successive asylum application. See Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143, 152 (2d Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for
holding that we do not have jurisdiction to consider the underlying final order upon petition for review of a motion to reopen where the petitioner did not earlier seek review of that underlying final order holding petition seeking review of motion to reopen deportation hearing in the absence of new evidence as without merit under  1927 since petitioner was not entitled to reopen except on showing of significant new evidence holding that it was within the discretion of the bia to deny a motion to reopen because it was not accompanied by an asylum application holding that a properly filed motion to reopen is a prerequisite to the filing of a new asylum application when the petitioner is under a final removal order holding that because the ij denied an asylum application as untimely we lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction to review the final order of removal as it pertained to the asylum claim