“to put back in good condition after damage, decay, etc.; mend, fix”). Thus, the classic cases involved, for example, repairs by a railroad company to existing tracks on which an accident had occurred. See Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway, 21 L.T.R. (n.s.) at 263. Over time, however, the subsequent repairs rule was not so closely limited, and “[a]t common law, the courts analyzed many different remedial actions under the rubric of ‘repairs.’” Leonard Packel and Anne Bowen Poulin, Pennsylvania Evidence § 407-1, at 242 (West 1999). Accordingly, courts began to describe the doctrine as the “subsequent remedial measures rule,” to reflect its broader application to, for example, post-accident warnings, safety precautions and changes in procedure. See, e.g., Baron, 202 Pa. at 282, 51 A. at 979 (<HOLDING>). See generally 63 Am.Jur.2d Products Liability
holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive holding harmless the improper admission of a social workers hearsay testimony concerning a childs report of sexual abuse where the credibility of the childs testimony was supported by other witnesses holding the doctrine applicable to bar the admission of evidence including testimony concerning the implementation of postaccident changes in procedure holding that any error in the exclusion of evidence is cured by the subsequent admission of the evidence holding that the admission of testimony concerning the presence of a gun in the family home may have been inadmissible but the evidence was miniscule sic in relation to the overwhelming amount of evidence properly before the jury such that any error was harmless and the district court properly denied a motion for mistrial