attorney and seek reduction of the criminal charges pending against her. Based on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence, defense counsel could have lost credibility with the jury by arguing Rodriguez’ innocence in the guilt phase. Given Rodriguez’ three prior convictions, a guilty verdict on any of the several charged offenses relating to the abduction, rape, and murder of Lorraine Martelli would have resulted in a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. See § 16-13-103, 8 C.R.S. (1984 Supp.). Accordingly, trial counsel might reasonably have concluded that, in light of the evidence of guilt presented, they could not save Rodriguez from a life sentence and focused instead on precluding the imposition of a death sentence. See Romero v. Lynaugh, 884 F.2d 871, 877 (5th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1012, 110 S.Ct. 1311,
holding that counsels decision not to argue the absurd or burden the jury with the obvious did not amount to ineffective assistance holding that counsels failure to move to suppress the defendants confession constituted ineffective assistance because it was obvious that the confession would have been suppressed holding counsels decision to open after the states caseinchief did not amount to a constitutional violation holding counsels decision not to raise an issue unsupported by thenexisting precedent did not constitute ineffective assistance holding that trial counsels decision to submit evidence to the jury that his confession was coerced rather than submitting the evidence to the judge in a motion to suppress was a matter of trial strategy and thus did not constitute ineffective assistance