immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of her motion to reopen. Because the transitional rules apply, Kalaw v. INS, 133 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir.1997), we have jurisdiction pursuant to former 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a). We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen. See Konstantinova v. INS, 195 F.3d 528, 529 (9th Cir.1999). We deny the petition for review. The IJ did not abuse his discretion in denying Matoosian’s motion to reopen based on changed country conditions in Iran where the reports on religious freedom Matoosian submitted concerned events that occurred prior to her merits hearing, and Matoosian failed to demonstrate that evidence of those events was unavailable at the time of that hearing. See INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323, 112 S.Ct. 719, 116 L.Ed.2d 823 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the IJ properly determined that
holding that a motion to reopen seeking only to apply for a form of relief which was unavailable to the movant at the time of the hearing  is subject to the regulatory requirements governing motions to reopen recognizing that failure to offer new previously unavailable evidence establishing a prima facie case for the underlying relief sought is a proper ground on which the bia may deny a motion to reopen recognizing that in an untimely motion to reopen based on changed country conditions the movant must submit previously unavailable evidence demonstrating his prima facie eligibility for relief holding that a motion to reopen may be denied for failure to introduce previously unavailable evidence recognizing that there are at least three independent grounds on which the bia may deny a motion to reopen 1 failure to establish a prima facie case 2 failure to introduce evidence that was material and previously unavailable and 3 a determination that despite the aliens statutory eligibility for relief he or she is not entitled to a favorable exercise of discretion