Id. at *2. See also Stanford Hosp. & Clinics v. NLRB, 325 F.3d 334, 343 (D.C.Cir.2003) (noting that employees’ statutorily protected rights to solicitation extend to solicitation of nonemployees). The Board rejected Guardsmark’s contention that the last sentence is limited by the “[w]hile on duty” phrase appearing in the rule’s first sentence, explaining that even though the phrase “arguably limits [the rulej’s prohibition on lodging complaints with employees outside the chain of command to working time only[,] .... its prohibition on discussing terms of employment with customers is not similarly time-limited. It is absolute .... ” Guardsmark, 344 N.L.R.B. No. 97 at *2. Guardsmark argues that instead of reading the rule as a whole, as Martin Luther requires, 343 N.L.R.B. No. 75, at *1 (<HOLDING>), the Board “treated the phrase ‘while on duty’
holding that a court should consider a defendants anticompetitive conduct as a whole rather than considering each aspect in isolation holding that procedural requirements of  3321b1 do not derogate the obligation of the board to seek out all issues which are reasonably raised from a liberal reading of the documents or oral testimony submitted prior to the board decision holding that plaintiff had standing to sue a board even though board was far from sole participant in the application of the challenged statute holding that the board must refrain from reading particular phrases in isolation   holding that where the record suggests that the negative experiences of a petitioner and her family exist in isolation from each other a finding of persecution is not warranted