omitted.] 338 Ark. at 230-31, 996 S.W.2d at 18-19. Based upon the quoted language, the circuit court found on remand that we ruled in Picado I that appellees’ constitutional challenge did not have to be postponed until one or more of them was arrested and charged with violating the statute. Appellant claims the trial court erred in its law-of-the-case ruling because the issue of justiciability was not squarely addressed or resolved by this court; rather, the Picado I appeal was resolved solely on the issue of the chancery court’s jurisdiction. We agree. The Picado I opinion related solely to the issue of whether the chancery court was the proper court in which appellees should present their claims. Clemmons v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 345 Ark. 330, 47 S.W.3d 227 (2001) (<HOLDING>). In addition, we point out that appellant does
holding that while a decision of the court will not be disturbed because it is law of the case under res judicata the court is not bound by a conclusion stated as obiter dictum holding that a court is not bound by a lower tribunals decision under the law of the case doctrine holding that a sentencing determination will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion by the district court holding that the court is not bound by the law of the case where an earlier decision of the us armed services board of contract appeals was clearly erroneous holding that if a decision below is correct it will not be disturbed on appeal even though the lower court relied upon wrong reasons