that his brother lived in a “residence with a large number of subjects residing in a residence designed for one family” does not suggest that the officers knew or should have known that the house was a multi-unit dwelling. The facts in this case are plainly distinguishable from the facts in Liston v. County of Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 975 (9th Cir.1997), wherein we denied qualified immunity to officers because the plaintiffs there made a sufficient showing of “deliberate or reckless dishonesty” on the part of the affiant for a disputed search warrant. Under the circumstances, Defendants reasonably could have believed at the time the warrant was issued that there was probable cause to search the entire premises. Cf. United States v. Williams, 917 F.2d 1088, 1091-92 (8th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we hold as a matter of law that
holding that an officer applying for a warrant without probable cause may be entitled to qualified immunity but is not entitled to absolute immunity holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity holding that officers were entitled to qualified immunity because they did not know the residence for which they obtained a warrant actually contained multiple units holding that officers were entitled to qualified immunity where defendant officers could have reasonably believed that they were given sufficient third party consent to search holding that defendant officers were entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law where they relied upon consent of property owner to perform search