motion for clarification and to issue an order responding to Mr. Lilly’s inquiry. When Mr. Lilly was sentenced in 1993, the criminal code authorized the district court to impose an obligation of restitution as a condition of Mr. Lilly’s supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (1993) (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 3563, which sets forth conditions for probation, and authorizing the district court to impose a number of conditions listed in § 3563, including restitution, as a condition of a defendant’s supervised release); see also U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5El.l(a)(2) (1992) (requiring the sentencing court to include a restitution requirement as a condition of a defendant’s supervised release). Moreover, under § 3583, district courts retained the authority to terminat Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). As the text of § 3583 demonstrates, a
holding the district courts revocation of defendants term of supervised release did not end the courts jurisdiction over defendants release holding that even if the district court lacked jurisdiction to correct a defendants sentence under fedrcrimp 35c  3583e2 authorized the court to modify the conditions of a defendants supervised release holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release holding that  3583e2 allows a district court to modify the conditions of supervised release without extending the term of that release holding that a statute requiring a threeyear term of supervised release did not eviscerate the district courts discretion to adjust the term of supervised release pursuant to  3583e