argument might have had traction, in certain circumstances, it is at least disfavored today, if not entirely rejected. Today, the concept of patent misuse is cabined first by statute, 35 U.S.C. § 271(d), which essentially eliminates from the field of “patent misuse” claims based on tying and refusals to deal, unless the patent owner has market power, and second by case law. As the Federal Circuit explained in Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860 (Fed.Cir.1997), there are certain practices that court identified as “constituting per se patent misuse,” including “arrangements in which a patentee effectively extends the term of its patent by requiring post-expiration royalties.” Id. at 869; see also Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32, 85 S.Ct. 176, 13 L.Ed.2d 99 (1964) (<HOLDING>). The practices identified in § 271(d), in con
holding that a patentees use of a royalty agreement that projects beyond the expiration date of the patent is unlawful per se  holding that an arbitral award of back pay that continued beyond the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement was perfectly appropriate because the agreement contained no provision restricting back pay to the term of the agreement holding that denial of access per se is noncompensable holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment holding witness competent to testify as to the market value of the royalty under the land that the value of the royalty under the lake would be depreciated and that the spacing rule of the railroad commission is one well per 40 acres