new trial). Thus, because the sanctions inquiry now urged “would differ only marginally from an inquiry into the merits,” Cunningham v. Hamilton Cnty., 527 U.S. at 206, 119 S.Ct. 1915, the collateral order doctrine does not apply here. Further, although a final order in this case awaits retrial, that circumstance only delays Douglas’s ability to appeal the sanctions order; it does not render that order unreviewable. Whenever and however a final judgment is entered, “an attorney may appeal a decision where the district court imposes a tangible sanction or makes an express finding that a lawyer has committed specific acts of professional misconduct.” Reach v. County of Schenectady, 593 F.3d 218, 226 (2d Cir.2010); see also In re Goldstein, 430 F.3d 106, 111-12 (2d Cir.2005) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Patsy’s Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc.,
holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence holding sanction included in final judgment appealable holding that there can be only one final appealable order holding that the ordering of a rehearing caused the judgment to not be final and appealable holding that a rehearing order was not final or appealable