determined that Porter was competent to waive his right to counsel. For example, the court noted during Porter's No vember 30, 1987 competency hearing, "I will probably go through the Faretti [sic] inquiry at least one more time even though we've done it several times in the past.” 4 . The Supreme Court has since held that the standard for determining a defendant’s competence to waive the right to counsel is not higher than the standard for determining competence to stand trial. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 391, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 2682, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993). 5 . Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(h) (indicating that mitigating circumstances include "any other factors in the defendant’s background that would mitigate against imposition of the death penalty”). 6 . See Fla Stat. § 921.141(6)(b) (<HOLDING>). 7 . See Fla. Stat. § 921.141 (6)(f)
holding that the trial court correctly refused to give the jury a peremptory instruction on the f2 mitigating circumstance when an expert testified about inconsistent diagnoses of the defendant thereby making evidence of the defendants mental or emotional disturbance    not uncontroverted holding that evidence of impaired mental functioning is inherently mitigating and that a defendant is not required to demonstrate a nexus between his mental capacity and the crime committed holding that specific mitigating factor providing for consideration of extreme disturbance substantial impairment or extreme duress did not foreclose jurys consideration of lesser degrees of disturbance impairment or duress because trial court made clear to the jury that list of statutory mitigating factors were merely items it could consider and trial court instructed jury that it could consider any other mitigating matter holding that a trial court must not preclude the jury from considering any aspect of the defendants character or circumstances as a mitigating factor recognizing the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance as a mitigating factor