the discharge of student loan debts against a fundamental bankruptcy principle of providing the honest debtor with a “fresh start.” See Kopf[ v. Dept. of Educ.], 245 B.R. [731] at 744 [(Bankr.D.Me.2000)]. Accordingly, the Court does not interpret this hardship standard to require a “certainty of hopelessness,” Wetzel v. New York State Higher Educ. Servc. Corp. (In re Wetzel), 213 B.R. 220, 225 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y.1996). See Kopf, 245 B.R. at 744; Salinas v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. (In re Salinas), 240 B.R. 305, 314 (Bankr.W.D.Wis.1999) (“To suggest that the court’s role as finder of fact is to ascertain the ‘certainty’ of the future is to set an impossible task before those with imperfect vision.”); Ammirati v. Nellie Mae, Inc. (In re Ammirati), 187 B.R. 902, 906 (D.S.C.1995) (<HOLDING>). Conversely, the Court recognizes that undue
holding without any substantive evidence to corroborate the debtors testimony regarding her medical conditions the court must find that the debtor has failed to sustain her burden under the second prong of the brunner test holding that a defendants right to an independent blood alcohol test means the right to a test that is not subject to government manipulation holding that this standard from bram does not state the standard for determining the voluntariness of a confession under current precedent holding that even if the standard for waiver is clear the standard was not met holding that minimal standard of living under brunner test does not equate to povertylevel income