responsibility for care and support of the child. Certainly, filing a voluntary paternity suit is always against a party’s pecuniary interests. Ramon’s argument suggests, however, that the award of attorney fees is punitive in nature. Section 11.18 clearly provides that in family law situations, fees may be awarded as costs. Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 11.18(a) (Vernon 1986). The awarding of fees as costs is based not on a punitive rationale but rather on a “best interests” rationale. See Tropoli, 740 S.W.2d at 565. Here, the trial court found that the awarding of attorney fees to Lisa was in the best interests of Mallory. The “best interest” of the children in this state is within the public policy of this state. See Drexel v. McCutcheon, 604 S.W.2d 430, 435 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1980, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Ramon’s second point of error is overruled.
holding that an award of attorneys fees under supreme court rule 38 precursor to rule 222 did not preempt an award of attorneys fees to which one is otherwise entitled and thus appellant could seek an award of attorneys fees pursuant to section 1577300 which permits an award of fees for a party prevailing in an action against a state agency holding that attorneys fees were nondischargeable as maintenance even though award was in favor of attorneys not spouse because it was rendered in light of the financial resources of the parties holding that an award of attorney fees for services rendered at the instance of the custodial parent in defending an action for change of custody may be allowed even though the defense was unsuccessful and even though it was claimed that such an award violated public policy holding that the ridings at whitpain does not require a reduction in an attorney fee award for an unsuccessful complaint but simply concluded that a trial court was justified in reducing the award if the record supported such a decision holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny an award of attorneys fees to the wife