claim concerning the mismanagement of the furniture and jewelry departments, we side with defendants on this issue too. Our reasoning is simple. Defendants’ original partial summary-judgment motion asked the judge to reject “the entirety” of the implied-covenant claim as a matter of law. But in its opposition, Old K’s did not suggest that these mismanagement faux pas provided a separate basis for its implied-covenant claim—the pertinent part of its opposition focused only on its idea that the liquidation decision violated the implied covenant. And this omission—as the district judge himself ruled—constitutes waiver of any implied-covenant claim premised on the mismanagement of the furniture and jewelry departments. See Iverson v. City of Boston, 452 F.3d 94, 103 (1st Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>). Ever persistent, Old K’s argues that it
holding that plaintiffs are ordinarily entitled to instructions consonant with their theory of the case where evidentiary support for the theory exists holding that the pretrial order did not adequately disclose a theory because it did not give notice of that theory holding that plaintiffs failure to mentionlet alone adequately to developthe  theory in their opposition to the defendants dispositive motion defeats their belated attempt to advance the theory on appeal holding summary judgment appropriate when the facts in evidence supported another plausible theory not the plaintiffs theory of the case holding that the failure to draw the district courts attention to an applicable legal theory waives pursuit of that theory in this court