as a whole. Houston Expl. Co., 352 S.W.3d at 469-70 (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 214(c) (Am. Law Inst. 1979)). Evidence of circumstances can be used to inform the contract text and render it capable of only one meaning. Kachina, 471 S.W.3d at 450. Analysis BSR contends that, because there was no stated qualifier regarding the consent-to-assignment provision, the agreement was silent as to the type of consent COG would give. In furtherance of that theory, BSR introduced evidence, in contradiction of industry custom and usage requiring consent to be reasonably granted, that COG unreasonably withheld consent for Raptor to assume the farmout agreement from BSR. See Energen Res. MAQ, Inc., v. Dalbosco, 23 S.W.3d 551, 557 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). COG argues that consideration of the
holding that evidence of a defendants invocation of the right to remain silent ordinarily is not admissible at the defendants criminal trial holding that evidence of custom and usage is admissible to add to a contract that is silent on a particular matter holding that parol evidence is admissible to show that an individual who signed a contract but is not named in the body is a party to the contract holding that trade usage and custom can be applied to an undefined contract term recognizing that courts will not add terms to a contract about which the contract is silent