false promise, or misrepresentation in connection with a consumer transaction.” Va.Code Ann. Sec. § 59.1-200. Just as Fannie Mae had not provided any plaintiff with any goods or services, neither has Freddie Mac provided any plaintiff with any goods or services, either directly or indirectly. For this reason alone, plaintiffs cannot state a claim against Freddie Mac under the VCPA. See Siradas v. Chase Lincoln First Bank, Civil Action No. 98-4028, 1999 WL 787658, *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1999) (concluding that Freddie Mac was not subject to the VCPA because it was not a “supplier” to plaintiffs and did not engage in “consumer transactions” within the meaning of the VCPA); see also Murray v. Dryvit Systems, Inc., Civ. No. 01-04-7383, 2002 WL 32072493, *4-5 (Va.Cir.Ct. July 15, 2002) (<HOLDING>). In addition, other courts have concluded that
holding that homeowner plaintiff could not state a claim under the vcpa against manufacturer of the synthetic stucco sold to contractor who built and sold home to plaintiff holding that insurance carrier for defendant contractor was real party in interest as to third party claim against stucco manufacturer when plaintiff homeowners assigned their right to sue for defects in their house to insurance carrier holding that a subcontractors lack of a license under the act does not bar a claim for indemnity or contribution by the contractor in a suit by the homeowner against the contractor because the public policy embodied in the act and berenter is to protect the public not unlicensed contractors holding that a homeowner established holding that a company that cut removed and sold timber from land that secured a debt held by the plaintiff was liable as a matter of law under the gtccs because it had not first obtained the written consent of the plaintiff