we have continuously held that the date of the injury is the triggering event for the 180-day period. The statute dearly says, “after the injury,” not “after the discovery of the injury.” Purdy v. Fleming, 2002 SD 156, ¶ 14, 655 N.W.2d 424, 430 (emphasis added). See also Peterson ex rel Peterson v. Burns, 2001 SD 126, ¶ 39, 635 N.W.2d 556, 570 (stating that SDCL 3-21-2 is an example of a notice statute in which a plaintiff must give 180 days notice after the time of the injury); In re Kindle, 509 N.W.2d 278, 280 (S.D.1993) (stating that “[u]nder South Dakota law, no action for damages may be maintained against a public entity or official unless written notice of the injury is given to that entity within 180 days of the injury”); Finch v. City of Tea, 443 N.W.2d 632, 635 (S.D.1989) (<HOLDING>). [¶ 16.] The date of Ty’s funeral was October
holding evidence that suppliers employees were trained to complete the finance lease documents and were authorized by the finance lessor to negotiate a finance lease was sufficient to defeat a motion for directed verdict holding that notice of tort claim to mayor or city finance officer is mandatory holding that a negligence claim is not a personal injury tort claim holding that the statute is mandatory holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city