the party requesting judicial assistance does not have to prove receptivity to show that they are not attempting to circumvent foreign proof-gathering mechanisms. See, e.g., In re Chevron, 762 F.Supp.2d 242, 252 (D.Mass.2010). If anything, this factor weighs against judicial assistance when the opposing party shows that the foreign tribunal actively opposes the discovery. Compare In re Clerici, 481 F.3d at 1335 (finding that “there is nothing in the record to suggest that the district court should have declined to grant the § 1782 application based on the nature of the foreign tribunal or the character of proceedings in Panama, or that the Panamanian Court’s request is merely an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering mechanisms”) and In re Chevron Corp., 762 F.Supp.2d at 250 (<HOLDING>), with In re Microsoft, 428 F.Supp.2d at 194
holding that attorneys fees were nondischargeable as maintenance even though award was in favor of attorneys not spouse because it was rendered in light of the financial resources of the parties holding that when considering civil rights against abusive discovery and state constitutional right to privacy court must carefully weigh privacy rights of nonparties against factors including the real needs of the litigant who seeks discovery and court abuses its discretion when it fails to require a less intrusive method of discovery such as conducting a deposition without production of records holding that reversible error was committed when the court could not determine that the instruction given by the trial justice was sufficient to remove the taint of the statement and such doubt was to be resolved in favor of the defendant holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law holding the intel factors weigh in favor of granting 1782 application even though it was not entirely clear that the ecuadorian criminal court was receptive to such discovery assistance 