orders to continue with the trial, especially in light of the court's having previously admonished him for disrupting the trial. Moore's responsiveness to questions posed by his attorney was neither a withdrawal of his previous requests to proceed pro se or a waiver of his right to self-representation. 531 F.3d at 403-04(distinguishing McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 182-83, 104 S.Ct. at 953). 76 . Stringer, supra, at 56. 77 . 717 S.W.2d at 641-642. 78 . 665 F.2d at 610-11. 79 . 2007 WL 1470275, at *2-5. 80 . Brown, 665 F.2d at 610; Funderburg, 717 S.W.2d at 640-41. 81 . 2007 WL 1470275, at *4-5. Anderson, supra, was similarly distinguished in Alford, 367 S.W.3d at 864. 82 .Courts have held that a defendant waives his or her previously invoked right t 893 F.2d 245, 248-49 (10th Cir. 1989) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 908, 110 S.Ct. 2593,
holding waiver of right to counsel not voluntary and knowing when defendant terminated counsel and requested another attorney but the trial court would allow delay and appointment only upon waiver of speedy trial right holding waiver of right to counsel at sentencing not voluntary when trial court tried to dissuade discharge of counsel defendant believed incompetent for the waiver to be voluntary the trial court must inquire into the reasons for the defendants dissatisfaction with his counsel to ensure that the defendant is not exercising a choice between incompetent or unprepared counsel and appearing pro se holding that in order for a waiver of counsel to be valid the trial court must ensure that the defendants waiver of his right to counsel is done knowingly and intelligently so that the record establishes that the defendants choice is made with eyes open holding that a defendants waiver was invalid where he was required to choose between proceeding with unprepared counsel or no counsel holding waiver of counsel involuntary and stating that choice between incompetent or unprepared counsel and appearing pro se is a dilemma of constitutional magnitude and resulting choice to proceed pro se cannot be voluntary in the constitutional sense when such a dilemma exists