on the job.” Gillespie v. Washington, 395 A.2d 18, 20 (D.C.1978) (citing Black Indus., Inc. v. EMCO Helicopters, Inc., 19 Wash.App. 697, 577 P.2d 610 (1978), and Maltman v. Sauer, 84 Wash.2d 975, 530 P.2d 254 (1975) (en banc)). The policy behind this rule is that “the professional rescuer is held to have assumed the risks attending his [or her] work. 'Those dangers which are inherent in professional rescue activity, and therefore foreseeable, are willingly submitted to by the professional rescuer when he [or she] accepts the position and the remuneration inextricably connected therewith.' ” Id. (quoting Maltman, supra, 530 P.2d at 257; citing Spencer v. B.P. John Furniture Corp., 255 Or. 359, 467 P.2d 429 (1970)). See also Young v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 569 A.2d 1173, 1175 (D.C.1990) (<HOLDING>). It is an open question in this jurisdiction,
holding that the worsening test was met where a fateful error of a coast guard message center lulled a wouldbe rescuer into believing a fishing vessel was safe holding that where the employment of the injured employees was the occasion of the injury the injuries arose out of employment holding that defendants were not prejudiced by amendments to an employment discrimination claim because the original claim gave notice of the nature of the case recognizing that an injury arises out of the employment relationship if it can be traced to the nature of employment or the workplace environment holding that professional rescuer assumes the inherently risky nature of the employment