court’s estimation Giles had not shown good cause to modify the scheduling order, it did not apply “ ‘the more liberal standard of Rule 15(a)’ to the decision to grant or deny leave.” Crostley, 717 F.3d at 419. In the alternative, however, the district court concluded that Giles’ § 1983 claim failed on the merits because the record did not contain evidence that there was discriminatory intent behind any of his employer’s actions. Giles timely appealed. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(a)(1)(A), 6(a)(1). II. Jurisdiction was proper in the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Giles’ untimely filing of his original Title VII action does not create a jurisdictional bar to suit. See Harris v. Boyd Tunica, Inc., 628 F.3d 237, 239 (5th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)
holding that the ninetyday filing requirement is not a jurisdictional prerequisite and is subject to equitable tolling holding that the filing deadline under title vii is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court but a requirement that like a statute of limitations is subject to waiver estoppel and equitable tolling holding that the timely filing of a discrimination charge with the eeoc is not a jurisdictional prerequisite but a requirement that like a statute of limitations is subject to waiver estoppel and equitable tolling holding that the 120day filing period is subject to equitable tolling and addressing circumstances warranting equitable tolling holding that  242bc3as time bar is not jurisdictional and thus subject to equitable tolling