if Transport learned Faireloth could not establish her relation to Judith Kervin, Transport might withdraw its settlement offer. The excluded evidence was unquestionably relevant to the issue of injury. Transport assigned no error to the exclusion of the evidence, however. Its only complaint is that the evidence in the bill of exceptions conclusively established Faircloth’s lack of injury. For two reasons, we cannot adopt Transport’s argument as grounds for vacating the jury’s findings on the common-law claims. First, an appellate court generally may not reverse and render a different judgment based on excluded evidence. J.M. Abott Oil Co. v. San Antonio Brewing Ass’n, 104 Tex. 574, 141 S.W. 517, 517 (1911); see Martin v. Allman, 668 S.W.2d 795, 799 (Tex. App. — Dallas 1984, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Evidence is not conclusive unless it was
holding that implied consent is not established merely one party introduced evidence relevant to an unpleaded issue and the opposing party failed to object holding that a party failed to preserve error by not pursuing a ruling at trial where the courts motion in limine ruling invited the party to attempt to admit the evidence during trial holding that the courts role is to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party and to eschew credibili ty assessments holding that the opposing party must show substantial harm holding that a party is entitled to rely on a favorable ruling and need not rebut evidence tendered by an opposing party in a bill of exceptions