Court of subject matter jurisdiction”); Diffenderfer, 656 F.Supp.2d at 139 (Plaintiff “failed to comply with MMPA’s notice requirement, and is thus legally barred from proceeding against the Pharmacy Defendants in this case”); see also Davis v. Grant Park Nursing Home LP, 639 F.Supp.2d 60, 72 (D.D.C.2009) (Plaintiff cannot avoid MMPA’s notice requirement “ ‘merely by filing a diversity action in federal court’ ”) (citing Bledsoe v. Crowley, 849 F.2d 639, 643 (D.C.Cir.1988)). By applying § 16-2802 in diversity cases, these courts held that the notice requirement of the MMPA is a substantive rule of law for Erie purposes. See Coleman, 734 F.Supp.2d at 62; Diffenderfer, 656 F.Supp.2d at 139, Davis, 639 F.Supp.2d at 72; Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938) (<HOLDING>). Since the language of the FTCA is unambiguous
holding that federal courts should apply state substantive law holding that federal courts sitting in diversity shall apply state substantive law holding that federal courts must apply state substantive law in diversity cases holding that in a diversity action a federal court must apply the law of the forum state holding in the conflict of laws context that district courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction must apply the substantive law of the forum state