discussed in a footnote at the end of this opinion. 4 .King’s § 2254 petition at best hinted at this claim. It is not separately enumerated. There is only a single sentence, deeply embedded in his Espinosa claim, that "[o]n direct appeal, the Florida Supreme Court gave no consideration to the impact of these invalid aggravating factor[s] on the jury’s weighing. An adequate harmless error analysis was not conducted. See Sochor; Espinosa." (R.l-1 ¶ 13, at 23.) Understandably, the district court did not detect or address so well-hidden a claim. Because we hold that the claim was procedurally barred under state law, in any event, we need not decide whether the claim was properly presented in federal court. 5 . Possibly unnecessarily. See Mills v. Singletary, 606 So.2d 622, 623 (Fla.1992) (<HOLDING>). 6 . 457 So.2d 481 (Fla.1984). 7 . The court
holding defendant was not barred from raising sentencing issue in rule 3850 motion by virtue of prior rule 3850 motion which did not raise any sentencing issues holding that defendants 3850 motion for postconviction relief was procedurally barred as successive where the defendants current rule 3850 motion is one that could have or should have been raised in his first rule 3850 motion holding a failuretoreweigh claim barred in part for failure to present it in rule 3850 motion holding that rule 3850 motion was not time barred where the order did not place any time limitation on when the defendant would refile his rule 3850 motion holding that an involuntary plea claim is cognizable in a rule 3850 motion