speech can ... pose a sufficiently significant threat to the fairness of jury trials to justify curtailing the would-be speakers’ constitutional interests.” 980 S.W.2d at 432; accord Haeberle v. Tex. Int’l Airlines, 739 F.2d 1019, 1021-22 (5th Cir.1984). The fairness of jury trials is threatened by contact with jurors, particularly harassing contact, because citizens who are aware of abusive communications with other jurors will be discouraged from jury service or their impartiality as jurors may be compromised by the fear of retaliation. Benton, 980 S.W.2d at 433-34. It has been held, therefore, that states’ legitimate interest in protecting the jury system justifies forbidding juror harassment. Id. at 432-33 (citing cases); cf. United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 907, 918 (5th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Radonjich, 1 F.3d 117, 120
holding that a defendants claim that a jury was not impartial must focus on the jurors who ultimately sat holding right of accused to trial by impartial jury justified postverdict protection of jurors from harassment and did not violate first amendment holding that a defendant could not establish stricklands prejudice prong because any erroneous exclusion of an impartial juror was harmless because we have every reason to believe the replacement was also an impartial juror the defendant does not dispute that he was convicted and sentenced by an impartial jury and he presents no reason to think that a jury composed of a slightly different set of impartial jurors would have reached a different verdict holding death qualification of jury prior to guilt phase of bifurcated capital trial did not violate defendants sixth amendment right to impartial jury representative of fair crosssection of the community holding that the regular association during trial between the jury and two deputy sheriffs who testified at trial undermined the defendants right to a fair trial by an impartial jury