439 (1973); see also Souder v. McGuire, 516 F.2d 820, 823 (3d Cir.1975) (involuntary commitment is a type of “custody” actionable under the habeas statute). Accordingly, the District Court properly dismissed the complaint. To the extent that Matthews is seeking damages for violations of his civil rights, and the claims do not imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence, he properly brought the action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Williams v. Hepting, 844 F.2d 138, 143-44 (3d Cir.1988) (quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 494, 93 S.Ct. 1827) (“[A] damages action by a state prisoner [can] be brought under the Civil Rights Act in federal court without any requirement of prior exhaustion of state remedies”); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364,129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Nonetheless, his amended complaint fails to
holding on facts similar to this case that when evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment is the only evidence underlying a conviction a successful civil challenge would necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction holding that a state prisoner must bring his claim in habeas only if by prevailing he would necessarily prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement holding that that if the success of a  1983 damages claim brought by a prisoner would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence the prisoner may only bring the claim where the conviction or sentence has been invalidated holding that a finding of excessive force in a  1983 action would not necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiffs conviction for resisting arrest recognizing that  1983 action does not accrue until conviction or sentence has been invalidated