unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant has a prior meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Id. Crawford was concerned only with testimonial statements. The Crawford court expressly stated that “[w]here nontestimo-nial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law” and to “exempt[ ] such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether.” Id. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. The Crawford Court held that “at a minimum” “testimonial statements” included “prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial” and police interrogations, but left for another day “an d.2d 930 (2008); Pflieger v. State, 952 So.2d 1251, 1253-54 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (<HOLDING>); Card v. State, 927 So.2d 200, 203 (Fla. 5th
holding that for purposes of the aggravated assault statute if the instrument used is a firearm as defined by section 7900016 then that instrument is a deadly weapon as a matter of law  regardless of whether it is loaded or capable of being fired and holding that for purposes of the aggravated assault statute if the instrument is not a firearm then courts are to apply an objective test and look to the nature and actual use of the instrument and not to the subjective fear of the victim or intent of the perpetrator in determining whether the instrument is a deadly weapon holding that annual inspection report on breath test instrument is not testimonial as it is not prepared during the investigation of a particular crime and is intended for the nontestimonial purpose of making sure the machine is working properly holding if the language of a deed or other written instrument is clear and unambiguous the intention of the parties is gathered from the instrument it is what the grant or said and not what he intended to say holding that certified records of maintenance are nontestimonial and are not prepared for any particular defendant holding that it is not