the provision giving Zurich discretion to settle claims within the deductible. Methodist argues it did not seek to exercise discretion but only insisted that Zurich act reasonably. However, if Zurich had adjusted a claim knowing that, after the fact, it may be required to account to Methodist for the reasonableness of its decisions, Methodist would have indirectly influenced handling and settlement of the claim. Finally, we reject Methodist’s suggestion it should have recourse because Zurich bore no risk when handling Methodist’s funds. To the contrary, along with its discretion in handling claims, Zurich, as insurance carrier, was the party who faced potential liability to the employee with respect to claims-handling. See Aranda v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 748 S.W.2d 210, 211-12 (Tex.1988) (<HOLDING>). Methodist certainly does not admit it was
holding that carrier was entitled to intervene as of right where the states workers compensation law permitted subrogation of a compensation carrier recognizing duty to deal in good faith in workers compensation setting holding that the duty of good faith and fair dealing is a contractual duty recognizing workers compensation insurance carrier owes employee duty of good faith and fair dealing in processing compensation claims holding that claims for the breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing against workers compensation insurance carrier did not  arise under the state workers compensation statutes but are at most related to those statutes and thus do not come within the ambit of the nonremovability provision of  1445c good faith and fair dealing claims were created by texas common law not by the compensation statute