agreement documents, which were outside the scope of her complaint, without treating State Chemical's motion as a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. However, State Chemical’s motion was not based on Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 12(c), which might have triggered this requirement, but rather was made pursuant to the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 4. Also, although Soto claims she put material facts into dispute, "a party cannot avoid compelled arbitration by generally denying the facts upon which the right to arbitration rests; the party must identify specific evidence in the record demonstrating a material factual dispute for trial.” Tinder v. Pinkerton Sec., 305 F.3d 728, 735 (7th Cir.2002). Soto's only evidence, her unsworn declaration, did not raise a genuine issue of material fact. Cf. id. 736 (<HOLDING>). 3 . The Arthur Young decision did not specify
recognizing that in reviewing ruling on motion to compel arbitration we first determine whether party seeking arbitration established existence of arbitration agreement holding that employees affidavit that she never saw arbitration program documents did not raise triable issue of fact as to existence of agreement to arbitrate that would preclude compelled arbitration holding that once the party seeking to compel arbitration establishes the existence of an arbitration agreement and that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement the trial court must compel arbitration holding that a party who has not expressly or implicitly agreed to be bound by an arbitration agreement cannot be compelled to arbitrate holding that a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of an arbitration agreement and show that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement