dual standards for the “based on sex” showing required in male and female same-sex harassment cases and concluding that courts may look to cases that involve male same-sex harassment to determine whether a female, same-sex harassment plaintiff has made the showing required to create a jury question upon the “because of sex” requirement). iii. Robertson’s “same-sex harassment” allegations Robertson contends, the defendants apparently ultimately concede, and I specifically conclude that Robertson’s factual allegations in her Petition are more than sufficient to give facial plausibility to her claim that Stephan was motivated by same-sex desire. See Richter, 686 F.3d at 850 (stating the “plausibility” standard for stating a claim upon which relief can be granted); Smith, 622 F.3d at 907 (<HOLDING>). The pertinent allegations of same-sex desire
holding that conduct that a jury finds to be based on sex and not motivated by nondiscriminatory reasons cannot later be found by a district court to lack an intent to discriminate on the basis of sex recognizing that a plaintiff can demonstrate that samesex harassment is because of sex by showing that the conduct was motivated by the coworkers sexual desire for persons of the same sex holding that a charge that alleged discrimination on the basis of sex did not support a complaint for hostile environment sexual harassment holding that a plaintiff claiming sexual harassment must always prove that the conduct at issue  actually constituted discrimination  because of  sex  emphasis added holding that samesex sexual harassment claims are not actionable under title vii