305, 2003 WL 22100157, at *7 (observing that “Miller does not provide much guidance in construing the meaning of the test it announces”), when it is patently clear that, regardless of the outcome of that inquiry, plaintiffs claims under the Kentucky Act are conflict preempted under a well-estab lished body of case law that dates back to 1987. B. Plaintiff’s Tortious Interference Claim (Count Three) In plaintiffs response to MetLife’s motion to dismiss, plaintiff concedes that his tortious interference claim is preempted by ERISA. Therefore, MetLife’s motion to dismiss is granted as unopposed insofar as it relates to plaintiffs tortious interference claim. See also, e.g., Sundown Ranch, Inc. v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., No. 3:01-CV-1445, 2008 WL 21281642, at *2 (N.D.Tex. May 29, 2003) (<HOLDING>). C. The Kansas Act (Count Four) The Kansas
holding a tortious interference claim was preempted by erisa because it did not meet the legal standard announced by the supreme court in miller in order for it to regulate insurance within the meaning of erisas savings clause holding that a suicide exclusion regulates insurance and therefore falls within the insurance savings clause holding  502 overpowers erisas savings clause holding florida exemption statute for employee benefit plans was not preempted by erisa due to savings clause holding texas exemption law was not preempted by erisa due to savings clause