for the vindication of rights under a federal statute which contains its own administrative remedies, exhaustion of those remedies, if they are adequate, is required.” Although it would appear to be a more efficient allocation of resources if there was a FERPA exhaustion requirement, this court can not infer such a requirement from the statute. As the Ryans court recognized, and as Patsy specifically holds {supra page 1256), the touchstone of a federal statutory exhaustion requirement is Congressional intent. 542 F.Supp. at 850. See also Alacare v. Baggiano, 785 F.2d 963, 967 (11th Cir.1986) (evidence of Congressional intent to impose exhaustion requirement must be clear); Wright v. Roanoke Redev. & Housing Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423-29, 107 S.Ct. 766, 770-73, 93 L.Ed.2d 781 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Although FERPA directs the establishment of
holding that there was no federal subject matter jurisdiction under the private cause of action provision of the act holding that we have consistently held that a private cause of action will not be found where the legislature has expressly provided for enforcement of a statute holding that private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by congress courts may not create a cause of action absent statutory intent holding that where congressional intent is clear a court must give effect to such intent holding that section 1983based private cause of action under federal statute will be allowed notwithstanding welldeveloped administrative agency enforcement mechanism where no evidence of congressional intent to provide otherwise