that “arrange[s] for disposal or treatment ... of hazardous substances” is strictly liable for the clean-up costs. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3). 3 . In addition, CERCLA imposes liability on persons who "arranged for disposal or treatment ... of hazardous substances,” and persons who accepted "hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3), (4). 4 . See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3). 5 . Henceforth, CERCLA apportionment in the Ninth Circuit will be governed — not by a test that allows a landowner to avoid joint and several liability only with “perfect information” that portions of the contamination are "in no respect traceable” to its land — but by a "reasonable basis” test under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A(l)(b). See Panel Op. at 938 (<HOLDING>). 6 .For the same result, albeit with a
holding that the statute incorporated all the rights and obligations of the contract emphasis added holding that the only question on a rule 35a motion is whether the sentence imposed was illegal on its face  emphasis added holding a landowner can establish divisibility by demonstrating a reasonable basis for concluding that a certain proportion of the contamination did not originate on its facility emphasis added holding that the prosecution must present sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that defendant committed a crime emphasis added holding that demonstrating incompetence to be executed requires a showing that the petitioner does not understand and is incapable of understanding  his impending fate  emphasis added