rather than merely voidable, thereby conferring standing on private parties to collaterally attack the decision outside of a quo warranto proceeding. See, e.g., Lum v. City of Bowie, 18 S.W. 142, 144 (Tex.1891) (“The proceedings by means of which it was attempted to annex the land of appellants were, we think, void, and not mere irregularities, and the rule is familiar that void acts may be questioned collaterally.”); City of Galena Park v. City of Houston, 183 S.W.2d 162, 164-65 (Tex.Civ.App.-Galveston 1989, writ ref'd) (when attempted incorporation was collaterally attacked as “wholly invalid and void,” contestant could proceed “without the joinder of the State under a writ of quo warranto”) (citing City of Port Arthur v. Gaskin, 107 S.W.2d 610 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1937, no writ) (<HOLDING>), and Hunt v. Atkinson, 12 S.W.2d 142 (Tex.
holding that a third party holding legal title to property is a necessary party in an action for equitable distribution holding that while the fourteenth amendment is directed against state action and not private action the state action requirement is met in a civil action where state law is applied whether by statute or common law recognizing that allegation of state action is a necessary element of a  1983 claim recognizing that in a derivative action the corporation for whose benefit suit is brought is a necessary party to the action holding that state is necessary party only when action is merely voidable