other circuits which indicate that the failure to provide such notice is reversible error, as the parties may have engaged in a different trial strategy had they known of the jury's advisory capacity. See Thompson v. Parkes, 963 F.2d 885, 888 (6th Cir.1992) (examining the plain language of the rule and policy considerations of trial tactics and concluding "the rule requires that the court’s initiative in ordering a trial to an advisory jury must occur, and the parties be made aware of it, before the case is submitted”); Bereda v. Pickering Creek Indus. Park, Inc., 865 F.2d 49, 53 (3d Cir.1989) (requiring a district court to "notify both sides of a jury's advisory status no later than the time at which the jury selection has begun”); Pradier v. Elespuru, 641 F.2d 808, 811 (9th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>); cf. Merex A.G. v. Fairchild Weston Sys.,
recognizing that there are frequently significant tactical differences in presenting a case to a court as opposed to a jury the parties are entitled to know at the outset of the trial whether the decision will be made by the judge or the jury recognizing the right to waive a jury trial recognizing that a district attorney must have reasonable latitude in fairly presenting a case to the jury and that the trial judge must have reasonable discretion in deciding whether the bounds of propriety have been exceeded holding that where the meaning of the jurys verdict was not clear in light of the trial courts jury instructions the court of appeals erred in directing entry of judgment for respondent the case should have been remanded to the trial judge who was in the best position to pass upon the question of a new trial in light of the evidence his charge to the jury and the jurys verdict holding that the trial judge rather than the jury makes the determination of whether the defendant violated the implied consent law