demeanor.”). The State’s first issue is overruled. 2. Standing In its second issue, the State contends that appellee has no standing to challenge the search. See Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 59 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (“Any defendant seeking to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment must first show that he personally had a reasonable expectation of privacy that the government invaded.”). The State argues that appellee has no standing to challenge the legality of the search because she was merely a passenger in the vehicle. See United States v. Spotted Elk, 548 F.3d 641, 657 (8th Cir.2008) (“The general rule is that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in an automobile belonging to another.”); Hughes v. State, 24 S.W.3d 833, 838 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (<HOLDING>). This contention is insupportable given that:
holding that a passenger who lacked a property or possessory interest in the automobile or property seized lacked standing to challenge a search of the car holding no jurisdiction where appellant argued report was no report because it failed to mention appellant in any substantive way but trial court found report was merely deficient on element of causation as to appellant and granted extension holding trial court reversibly erred in not permitting appellant to withdraw his plea where court erroneously stated appellant could appeal motion was in fact not dispositive and appellant was entitled to rely on the courts statement holding appellant suffered no infringement of any right ensuring freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures where appellant claims no possessory interest in the vehicle itself or in those items seized from within it holding that petitioners who asserted neither a property interest nor a possessory interest in property searched or seized were not entitled to assert a constitutional challenge to the search