We reject that argument for two reasons. First, Mangum fails to adequately develop it. See Ariz. R.Crim. P. 31.13(c)(1)(vi), 17 A.R.S. Second, the one case Mangum cites, State v. Ault, 150 Ariz. 459, 724 P.2d 545 (1986), is inapposite, and pertinent Arizona case law refutes his position. See State v. Casey, 205 Ariz. 359, ¶ 11, 71 P.3d 351, 354 (2003) ("The federal and state due process clauses contain nearly identical language and protect the same interests.”); State v. Kaiser, 204 Ariz. 514, n. 2, 65 P.3d 463, 465 n. 2 (App.2003). 2 . This case does not involve a defendant who attempted to collaterally attack the validity of a prior conviction alleged for sentence enhancement or other purposes. See State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 157 Ariz. 71, 75, 754 P.2d 1346, 1350 (1988) (<HOLDING>); cf. United States v. Herrell, 588 F.2d 711,
holding that the burden is on the defendant when the validity of the warrant is challenged holding that where the record shows defendant was represented by counsel and the conviction is valid on its face the defendant is precluded from attempting to undermine the validity of that conviction by collateral attack holding that being deported after a conviction for an aggravated felony is all that is required and it is irrelevant whether the conviction is valid at the time of sentencing holding the petitioners challenge of his conviction is not rendered moot by the expiration of the underlying sentence because collateral consequences flowing from the conviction give the petitioner a substantial stake in the judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence imposed on him holding that defendants have a federal constitutional right to make a collateral attack on a prior conviction only when that conviction was obtained without the assistance of counsel