Co. of Am., 820 F.3d 132, 136 (5th Cir. 2016). 3 . Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 4 . See In re Deepwater Horizon, 643 Fed.Appx. 377, 381 (5th Cir. 2016) (unpublished). 5 . 26 U.S.C. § 167(a) allows corporations such as Crystal to reduce their taxable income a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear, and obsolescence of property used in the trade or business. 6 . Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806, 119 S.Ct. 1597, 143 L.Ed.2d 966 (1999); see also S.W.S. Erectors, Inc. v. Infax, Inc., 72 F.3d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 1996) (same). 7 . Because Victor Tran’s affidavit does not raise a genuine dispute of material fact pursuant to Cleveland, we need not address the district court’s reliance on Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (<HOLDING>), and Bartucci v. Jackson, No. 04-2977, 2006 WL
holding that on summary judgment a court should not adopt a version of the facts blatantly contradicted by the record holding that when opposing parties tell two different stories one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record so that no reasonable jury could believe it a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment holding that the court may disregard an affidavit submitted solely for the purpose of opposing a motion for summary judgment when that affidavit is directly contradicted by deposition testimony and the nonmovant does not explain the discrepancies holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion holding that when a video recording of an alleged excessive force incident contradicts the nonmoving partys version of the incident to the extent that no reasonable jury could believe it a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment