(upholding damages award on plaintiffs FTCA claim and vacating the Bivens jury verdict'based on FTCA judgment bar); Ting v. United States, 927 F.2d 1504, 1513 n. 10 (9th Cir.1991)(“[A] plaintiff may maintain both an FTCA and a Bivens action, [but] he may not receive double recovery.”); Sanchez v. Rowe, 870 F.2d 291, 292 (5th Cir. 1989) (upholding the district court’s decision forcing the plaintiff to choose between Bivens and FTCA award). That is not the concern here since the plaintiff did not prevail on his Bivens claim. Rather, the ' question is " whether the plaintiffs failure to prevail on the FTCA claim renders his new trial motion moot and any evidentiary or procedural error he cites harmless. Other courts have so held. See, e.g., Unus v. Kane, 565 F.3d 103, 122 (4th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); Manning v. United States, 546 F.3d 430, 434
holding bivens action moot after entry of judgment in favor of government on ftca claim pursuant to ftca judgment bar holding that failure to move for judgment after verdict entitled party only to a new trial not a judgment in its favor holding that a grant of summary judgment in favor of one party creates a final judgment allowing appellate review of denial of opposing partys summary judgment motion holding that in the interest of judicial economy considering appeal from order denying posttrial motions and ordering entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff even though judgment was not actually entered recognizing that when a cause of action is reduced to a judgment the cause of action is merged into the judgment and thereafter only an action on the judgment exists