to whom they have access[,]" conditions of probation that "reduce the potential for access to children are reasonable." Smith, 779 N.E.2d at 117 (citing Carswell, 721 N.E.2d at 1259). Finally, contrary to Bratcher's argument, neither condition imposes a complete prohibition on his use of the internet or social networking websites. Condition 21 simply requires him to acquire the approval of his probation officer, and condition 23 specifically applies to websites "frequented by children." Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing probation conditions 21 and 28. See, eg., Patton, 990 N.E.2d at 515-16 (upholding sex offender's probation condition that prohibited him from accessing websites frequented by children); McVey, 863 N.E.2d at 450 (<HOLDING>); Smith, 779 N.E.2d at 118 (holding that the
holding that the defendants probation condition that restricted his contact with minors was a protective measure for children and would assist the defendant in his rehabilitation holding that a parole condition which restricted a parolees access to the internet unless he had prior approval of his parole officer was reasonably related to reintegrating the parolee into his community and protecting the general public and did not violate parolees first amendment rights holding that probation is not a sentence holding that upon revocation of probation a court must grant credit for time served on probation and community control towards any newly imposed term of imprisonment and probation so that the total period of control probation and imprisonment does not exceed the statutory maximum holding that the defendantchild molesters probation conditionwhich restricted his internet access unless he had prior approval of his probation officerwas reasonably related to his reintegration into the community and to protecting the public