court. Furthermore, it is difficult to believe that even without a proper objection, the district court failed to recognize the patent unfairness in allowing Khan to provide testimony that bolstered Hayat’s inculpatory out-of-court statements (such as Khan’s testimony that he had no reason to disbelieve Hayat and, despite calling Hayat a liar, he never believed Hayat actually lied to him), while preventing the defense from eliciting testimony that would have undercut the strength of these out-of-court statements, undermined Khan’s credibility, and supported the defense theory that Hayat was a storyteller and a braggart, who — despite making outlandish claims to Khan — had no involvement with extremist Islam or terrorism. See United States v. Benveniste, 564 F.2d 335, 342 (9th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). As the Second Circuit has noted, “[w]hen a
holding exculpatory statements by a third party should have been admitted in the punishment phase notwithstanding the hearsay rule holding that police officers testimony indicating he developed the defendant as a suspect after speaking with a nontestifying witness implied that the witness made accusatory statements against defendant and therefore was inadmissible hearsay holding that the rejection of the exculpatory hearsay testimony of a government witness was in error particularly in view that accusatory hearsay was admitted holding that a hearsay error was harmless where the essential elements of the testimony were elsewhere properly admitted in evidence holding that a violation of the hearsay rule was harmless