incidents he complained of. Because it is not clear from the “face of the complaint” that Mr. Morris’ complaint was time-barred, the action should not have been dismissed based on a statute of limitations bar. See La Grasta v. First Union Securities, Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir.2004) (“a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissed on statute of limitations grounds is appropriate only if it is ‘apparent from the face of the complaint’ that the claim is time-barred”) (citation omitted). Second, although Mr. Morris failed to provide the names of the various individuals working at the prison who pepper-sprayed and beat him, we have allowed the initial use of an unnamed defendant where discovery would likely uncover that defendant’s identity. See Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 740 (11th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1215-16 (11th
holding that this court must determine by independent review the actual grounds upon which the remand was based holding that the jury must determine whether the partys conduct was reasonable under the cireumstances holding that remand was required on the basis that the alj ignored the remand order and disregarded the appeals councils explicit directives to use a ve to help determine whether the plaintiff could perform his past relevant work holding that remand to the district court was necessary to determine whether the unnamed prison guarddefendant could be located with reasonable effort holding that district court has discretion to determine whether it could reasonably be said that an emergency exists