that any increased repression of Falun Gong practitioners continued after the 2008 Olympics and into 2009. See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir.2007) (“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”)(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008) (reviewing the BIA’s factual findings regarding changed country conditions under the substantial evidence standard). Finally, given the BIA’s explicit references to the documentation submitted with the motion to reopen, a reasonable fact-finder would not be compelled to conclude that the BIA ignored any of Huang’s evidence. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 336 n. 17 (2d Cir.2006)(<HOLDING>)(internal quotation marks omitted).
holding that the court should make factual findings from the record evidence as if it were conducting a trial on the record holding that this court does not require the ij to engage in robotic incantations to show that the ij examined each piece of evidence in the record as long as the ij takes into account significant factual assertions offered by a petitioner holding that any inherent power to remand to the bia for the consideration of additional evidence should not be exercised where i the basis for the remand is an instruction to consider documentary evidence that was not in the record before the bia and ii the agency regulations set forth procedures to reopen a case before the bia for the taking of additional evidence holding that the bia is not required to expressly parse or refute on the record each individual argument or piece of evidence offered by the petitioner as long as it has given reasoned consideration to the petition and made adequate findings holding that an administrator need not address each piece of evidence