precedent, including those created by statute. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 54; Hadley, 738 S.W.2d at 742. Tire-Tech specifically denied that notice of breach was ever provided by Boeran. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 54 (requiring specific denial). Boeran was, therefore, required to prove at trial that notice had been given. None of the parties requested a jury question on notice for breach of an express warranty, nor did any party object to the absence of this question. Under Rule 279, however, the notice requirement could be deemed found by the court if factually sufficient evidence of notice was presented at trial. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 279. Furthermore, statutory notice requirements can be the subject of a deemed finding. See U.S. Fire v. Ramos, 863 S.W.2d 534, 537-38 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1993, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). However, we cannot deem an omitted element to
holding statutory notice requirement of workers compensation statute was not an independent ground of recovery thus the notice element could be the subject of a deemed finding holding that actual notice fulfills a notice requirement that an applicable federal regulation be conspicuously posted because actual notice is the best notice holding that plaintiff complied with plain language of the notice requirement when notice was mailed within statutory period although it was not received until after holding that the irs has notice of plaintiffs alternate ground of recovery because it had considered and evaluated the applicability of the code provision under which the plaintiff sought recovery holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner