and sent notice letters in March 2010 and May 2011, and then filed suit in early 2012. (Opp’n 8 (citing notice letters, Rowland Deck Exs. 18 and 20).) Defendant has not shown an absence of genuine dispute that Plaintiff knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known before 2010 that Defendant was selling products that utilized Plaintiffs patents beyond those that Defendant licensed in 2004. That is particularly so since Defendant could have taken, but chose not to take, a license to either the '426 or '067 Patent in 2004. Plaintiffs evidence, which must be credited on summary judgment, shows that it believed that Defendant was operating within the parameters of the license. See Gasser Chair Co. v. Infanti Chair Mfg. Corp., 60 F.3d 770, 774 (Fed.Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Nor has Defendant shown the absence of a
holding that patentees testimony of his belief that the defendant would comply with a 1979 agreement supported the reasonable inference that patentee had no reason to sue until at least 1986 when patentee saw evidence of infringement holding that evidence that the infringer was not the principal or the sole cause of the patentees lost sales does not rebut the presumption of irreparable harm holding that the court correctly denied a mistrial when the statement that the witness saw the defendant when the defendant was signing in as a condition of bail was brief and added nothing to the governments case holding that a reasonable inference need not be the sole possible inference holding that once a defendant established prior art anticipating the asserted claims the burden was on the patentee to come forward with evidence to the contrary