law claims.”). IV. CONCLUSION Because we find that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over Pintando’s state-law claims, we VACATE the summary judgment order and REMAND the case to be dismissed without prejudice. 1 . This issue has been addressed in an unpublished case. Riley v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., 222 Fed.Appx. 897 (11th Cir.2007) (unpublished). 2 . Cases removed from state to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) are treated differently. In those cases, the district court must look at the case at the time of removal to determine whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction. Later changes to the pleadings do not impact the court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. See Poore v. American-Amicable Life Ins. Co. of Tex., 218 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Behlen v. Merrill Lynch, Phoenix Inv.
holding that the district court erred in not determining whether the amount in controversy necessary to create diversity jurisdiction was met at the time of removal holding that where a state statute provides for the award of attorneys fees those fees can be considered as part of the amount in controversy for the purpose of determining federal diversity jurisdiction holding that in order for a defendant to remove a case to federal court based upon diversity jurisdiction there must be complete diversity of citizenship both at the time that the case is commenced and at the time that the notice of removal is filed holding that the burden is on defendant as the party invoking removal jurisdiction to establish the existence of a sufficient amount in controversy holding that postremoval affidavits can be considered in determining the amount in controversy if jurisdiction is ambiguous at the time of removal