Howard’s due process claims lack merit. In the first instance, Howard admitted the prohibited conduct. Secondly, an “inmate does not have a constitutional right to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testify against him, although prison officials have the discretion to grant that right in appropriate cases.” Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 371, 527 S.E.2d at 751 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell 418 U.S. 539, 563-72, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974)). We note that any defenses Appellant may have had to his conviction, including a sustainable Johnson claim, could have been raised and reviewed pursuant to the internal prison grievance process. Accordingly, we reject Appellant’s contention that he was convicted without due process of law. See Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 373, 527 S.E.2d at 752 (<HOLDING>). IV. Conclusion Because the plain language of
holding that in reciprocal discipline cases disciplinary procedures in the other state must meet minnesotas due process requirements holding that the fact that the members of the grievance committee and the disciplinary counsel are appointed by the supreme court is not enough by itself to establish a per se violation of due process holding that the conditions delineated in canon 3c1a alone would not be sufficient basis for imposing a constitutional requirement under the due process clause holding that scdcs disciplinary and grievance procedures are consistent with constitutional standards delineated in wolff v mcdonnell 418 us 539 94 sct 2963 41 led2d 935 1974 which established the minimum constitutional requirements for procedural due process when an inmate is disciplined for serious misconduct holding that an inmate stated a claim under the due process clause when guards had placed her in a cell with a dangerous inmate