addition to a change in law, the circumstances might be sufficiently extraordinary to warrant relief under Rule 60(b)(6). See Ritter v. Smith, 811 F.2d 1398, 1402 (11th Cir.1987); 12 Moore et al., § 60.48[5][b]. However, if the judgment in question has been executed, and thus its effects are no longer prospective, modification of the judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) ordinarily will be unavailable. See id. at 1401-02. For example, in Hall v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 364 F.2d 495, 496 (4th Cir.1966), the Fourth Circuit denied habeas corpus relief under Rule 60(b)(6) and refused to reopen a judgment despite a supervening change in law mainly because the prisoner had already been re tried. See Ritter, 811 F.2d at 1402; cf. EEOC v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 557 F.Supp. 1112 (D.Md.1983) (<HOLDING>). In contrast, where a change in law affects a
holding that the decision of the appellate court establishes the law of the case and it must be followed by the trial court on remand holding that appellate court will not remand a case to the district court for a violation of rule 50 if the district courts rationale is apparent from the record holding in a case still open on direct review that the district court following reversal and remand from the appellate court may consider intervening supreme court decisional law in its consideration of the case holding that the court had appellate jurisdiction to review the merits of the case because only the collateral issue of attorneys fees remained to be decided on remand to the bankruptcy court holding that even a remand by the supreme court for reconsideration in light of an intervening court opinion does not require the court to consider an argument raised for the first time in a petition for certiorari