done so. See Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir.1980). The first question, therefore is whether compliance with the time limits of Rules 4007(c) and 4004(a) is a prerequisite to the bankruptcy court’s jur isdiction to hear a dischargeability action or an objection to discharge. Some courts have held that the deadline fixed by these rules is jurisdictional and therefore cannot be waived. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. B-K of Kansas, Inc., 73 B.R. 671, 674 (D.Kan.1987); In re Booth, 103 B.R. 800, 802 (Bankr.S.D.Miss. 1989); In re Kirsch, 65 B.R. 297 (Bankr.N. D.I11.1986). Other cases, however, have found that these deadlines were subject to waiver or equitable tolling, thereby implying that the rules were not jurisdictional. See In re Mufti, 61 B.R. 514 (Bankr.C.D. Cal.1986) (<HOLDING>); In re Clay, 64 B.R. 313 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1986)
holding that the limitations period should be tolled until the plaintiff became aware of the facts necessary to support a charge of discrimination holding that the statute of limitations can be tolled where the government fraudulently or deliberately conceals material facts relevant to a plaintiffs claim so that the plaintiff was unaware of their existence and could not have discovered the basis of his claim holding that the limitations period is not tolled while a federal habeas petition is pending holding that the limitations period is likewise not tolled during the pendency of a certiorari petition to the supreme court holding that the limitations period of rule 4004a may be tolled where the grounds for objection to discharge have been fraudulently concealed