provision in that statute). DOT’s interpretation also runs afoul of another established canon of statutory construction: the established presumption against preemption in matters of traditional state control. The Supreme Court itself has demanded that courts “be reluctant to find pre-emption” in these matters, dictating that “pre-emption will not lie unless it is ‘the clear and manifest purpose of Congress,’ ” as evidenced by the text and structure of the statute at issue. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664, 113 S.Ct. 1732,1737, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1162, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947)). As the text and structure of HMTA, including wakanton Sioux Indian Community, 991 F.2d 458, 461-62 (8th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Harmon, 951 F.2d at 1580-82 (declaring
holding that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to interpret a tribal constitution or tribal laws holding that a tribal housing authority established by tribal council pursuant to its powers of selfgovernment was a tribal agency rather than a separate corporate entity created by the tribe holding that disputes involving questions of interpretation of a tribal constitution and tribal law is not within the jurisdiction of the district court holding that a nonmember who files a civil claim in an indian tribal court consents to tribal jurisdiction holding a tribal scheme requiring every party who wished merely to transport radioactive waste across tribal land to obtain a separate license to be preempted