environment during these separate periods of time.” Id. In contrast, neither Byars nor the Coca-Cola Defendants sought summary judgment on the issue of Byars’ entitlement to benefits under the “any occupation” definition. Thus, the district court granted summary judgment to the Coca-Cola Defendants on a claim for which they had not sought summary judgment. Although a court may sua sponte grant summary judgment on a claim not presented in a summary judgment motion, the court is required to give notice to the parties that it intends to address the claim on summary judgment. Here, the district court provided no notice that it intended to rule on the “any occupation” definition of disability. This was error. See Imaging Bus. Machs., LLC v. BancTec, Inc., 459 F.3d 1186, 1191 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Massey v. Cong. Life Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 1414,
holding that district courts sua sponte grant of summary judgment to nonmoving party is an accepted method of expediting litigation holding that in admitting evidence the failure of the trial court to give a limiting instruction sua sponte is not reversible error holding that a court may sua sponte take judicial notice of its docket holding that a court can raise the issue of res judicata sua sponte in order to affirm a grant of summary judgment holding that sua sponte grant of summary judgment without notice to the parties constitutes reversible error