Thus, just as in Diaz-Lizaraza, the 404(b) evidence in Delgado was necessary to dispel the defendant’s “innocent explanation for his presence.” The other cases cited by the Government are similarly inapposite. See, e.g., United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314, 1330 (11th Cir.1997) (“The trial judge admitted the evidence for the limited purpose of establishing ... intent ... which he found had been put in issue by [the defendant’s] not guilty plea and by his defense that he was merely present at the scene of the drug activity in order to give his brother ... a ride.”); United States v. Pollock, 926 F.2d 1044 (11th Cir.1991) (theory of the defense: defendant did not know there was cocaine in his rented car); United States v. Cardenas, 895 F.2d 1338, 1342-44 & nn.3-4 (11th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hicks, 798 F.2d 446, 447-48,
holding that the rule 404b evidence admitted to prove intent was clearly relevant because intent was at issue in the trial holding evidence of virtually identical offense was relevant to show intent among other things in trial of charged offense holding that extrinsic offense evidence was admissible to prove intent where the prosecutor stated that she anticipated the defendant would deny his intent to be involved in the charged offense and defense counsel did not even mention that he would refrain from contesting the intent issue holding extraneous acts relevant to show intent in charged offense holding that extrinsic evidence admissible to determine intent of parties