we are concerned. We are concerned rather with what courts have referred to as “statutory standing.” Standing in this sense has to do with “‘whether a statute creating a private right of action authorizes a particular plaintiff to avail herself of that right of action.’ ” Small v. Federal National Mortgage Association, 286 Va. 119, 747 S.E.2d 817 (2013) (quoting CGM, LLC v. Bell-South Telecomm., Inc., 664 F.3d 46, 52 (4th Cir.2011)). The question is whether the plaintiff is among the class of persons authorized by the statute to bring suit, and as such “statutory standing” is not a jurisdictional question, but is essentially a matter of statutory construction. We so held, in effect, although without using the phrase “statutory standing,” in Harrison v. Leach, 323 S.W.3d 702 (Ky.2010) (<HOLDING>). And we applied the concept, although again
holding that a district court has the authority to raise the aedpa statute of limitations on its own motion holding unconstitutional a statute authorizing courts to recognize grandparents as having the same standing as parents for evaluating what custody arrangements are in the best interest of the child where the child actually resided with the grandparents in a stable relationship holding that a fiduciary corporation was a purchaser within the meaning of  12a2 and was entitled to bring suit on its own behalf or on behalf of its clients holding that where father who killed his wife had relinquished his children for adoption prior to his conviction the maternal grandparents of the children who had legal custody at the time of the adoption had standing to petition to unseal the adoption records this court vacated the orphans courts order that held the grandparents lacked standing and directed that on remand the orphans court determine whether the grandparents had shown cause under section 2905a to unseal the records holding that grandparents standing to bring suit under a custody statute was not a jurisdictional question that the court of appeals could raise on its own motion