serving as attorney general, judge’s name appeared on brief as counsel for the State in petitioner’s appeal to the supreme court— since judge’s function was merely “pro for-ma” and, thus, he had no actual participation in, or knowledge of, the prior appeal). This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge “cannot impartially hear a case”); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (<HOLDING>); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or
holding a prosecutorial office as distinguished from actually working on a concrete piece of litigation does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge holding that an employee had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his office even though the papers seized from the office were not the property of the employee holding that trial judge was not required to rule on motion to disqualify which was never served on judge as required by florida rule of judicial administration 2330c recognizing that a prosecutors office is an entity and that information in the possession of one attorney in the office must be attributed to the office as a whole holding that party who had sought disqualification of the judge who heard his cause only from the assignment judge and not the judge himself could not appropriately raise recusal issue on appeal