record evidence, and whether the court abused its discretion or committed an error of law. See Denes v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm’n, 547 Pa. 152, 156, 689 A.2d 219, 222 (1997). Presently, PennDOT vigorously attacks the Commonwealth Court’s refusal to attach significance to the fact that the curbing was never installed on the Stafford Straightaway, and therefore, Landowner’s (and his patrons’) direct access to Landowner’s property was never impeded. On this point, PennDOT invokes a line of decisions establishing that a cause of action for consequential damages in the eminent domain context does not arise until the public improvement causing the asserted harm is actually constructed. See, e.g., Pane v. Department of Highways, 422 Pa. 489, 497-500, 222 A.2d 913, 917-18 (1966) (<HOLDING>); In re Construction of Legislative Route 115,
recognizing that publicly targeting a property for condemnation resulting in economic damage to the owner generally does not give rise to an inverse condemnation cause of action unless there is some direct restriction on use of the property recognizing no right to damages if landowner retains reasonable access to property after a condemnation holding that a cause of action relative to an asserted de facto condemnation did not arise until physical restrictions to access were effected since until such time the claim was speculative and remote as no compensable injury had occurred thus the mere filing of a highway plan showing a change of grade that would interfere with access did not give rise to a condemnation claim holding that landowner was entitled to compensation because the condemnation destroyed all reasonable access to remainder property holding that depreciation in land value caused by a material change in a highway grade which made access to the property difficult is compensable