enforceability of an agreement between a husband and wife with regard to the disposition of frozen preembryos, which are human ova that have been fertilized by sperm but not yet implanted in the uterus, but, in doing so, expressly did not address whether the frozen preembryos qualified as the couple's "joint property.” Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40, 44 n.7, 54 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied); cf. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) (refusing to characterize married couple’s interest in preembryos as property interest under general property law). Other jurisdictions have held that sperm, which has yet to be combined with an ovum to enter the preembryo stage, is property. See In re Estate of Kievernagel, 166 Cal.App.4th 1024, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 311, 316 (2008) (<HOLDING>); Hecht v. Superior Court, 16 Cal.App.4th 836,
holding that the ninth circuit is bound by the california supreme courts interpretation of california law recognizing that under california law violating section 23140 is equivalent to driving a vehicle while under the influence of drugs or alcohol in violation of the california vehicle code holding that a california habeas petition is timely if filed within a reasonable time holding that sperm is property within california probate code recognizing that california has a valid interest in protecting a california company from copyright infringement