petition would operate to toll or stay the running of the redemption period under § 362 or § 108 and, if the redemption period were not so tolled, whether the application for and issuance of a tax deed would violate the automatic stay. Those courts uniformly held that the redemption period was not tolled, that upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition the right of redemption became property of the estate, and that the tax deed proceeding was not subject to the automatic stay since it was not “a proceeding to collect, harass or foreclose, but rather to provide for the tax certificate holder to obtain clear title to the property in question.” That holding is binding upon and was adopted by this Court in its ruling in In re Thompson, No. 89 B 17031, Order dated November 15, 1989 (<HOLDING>). These courts did not, however, address the
holding that the delivery of the deed following a foreclosure sale was a ministerial act that was not prohibited by the automatic stay holding that the automatic stay did not bar the filing of a proof of claim where the debtor actively litigated a separate action during the pending bankruptcy proceeding because to permit the automatic stay provision to be used as a trump card played after an unfavorable result was reached  would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the automatic stay holding that the application for a tax deed upon expiration of the redemption period did not violate the automatic stay holding only one publication of notice of expiration of redemption period was required when county purchased lots at tax sale holding that the trial court erred in denying a tax purchasers application for a tax deed where the original owner of the property did not tender the required sum until three days after the period of redemption had expired