of Rule 41(d) would not usually demand suppression, but that here it did: “ ‘[TJechnicaF violations of Rule 41(d) require suppression only if there was a ‘deliberate disregard of the rule’ or if the defendant was prejudiced. . . . Suppression is justified here because the violation was deliberate.” Gantt, 194 F.3d at 994 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir. 1992)). See also United States v. Johnson, 660 F.2d 749, 753 (9th Cir. 1981) (“prejudice” in this context means the search would otherwise not have occurred or would have been less intrusive absent the error), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 912 (1982). Aase also argues that the Gantt holding is based on the Fourth Amendment and requires suppression here. But th 307, 79 P.3d 478 (2003) (<HOLDING>). United States v. Gantt, 194 F.3d 987 (9th
holding that search of defendants purse which he carried was authorized by a warrant to search his person holding that a consent to search that is given only after an official falsely asserts possession of a search warrant is unconstitutional holding that search of shoulder bag was not authorized by search warrant for apartment holding that search was unconstitutional and declining to apply prejudice standard where judge reportedly approved search telephonically but no written warrant was ever issued holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises