physiological, or euphoric effect in a human being, Judge Town impliedly rejected Oughterson’s argument that twelve milligrams of cocaine residue constituted an un-useable amount in concluding, to the contrary, that it was “a substantial amount.” Reviewing Viernes before entering his written order, Judge Town further impliedly determined that Viernes did not alter his conclusion that Oughterson’s possession of twelve milligrams of cocaine residue did not constitute a de minimis infraction. Thus, inasmuch as the parties’ arguments tracked the considerations at issue in Viernes and the record clearly reflects that Judge Town considered Viernes before entering his order denying Oughterson’s motion to dismiss, Viernes could not provide Oughterson with a basis 6, 590-92 (1974) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, as we noted on the record presented
holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants motion to dismiss on de minimis grounds where his expert witness testimony was inadmissible holding in part that the trial court abused its discretion in granting a temporary injunction in the absence of a showing that the plaintiff did not have an adequate remedy at law holding that trial court abused its discretion in denying defendants de minimis motion because defendant established that his conduct in connection with benevolently assisting a runaway did not alter the custodial relationship with which prosecution accused him of interfering holding that where there is evidence sufficient to sustain finding of trial court that prejudicial error was contained in record there is no basis for stating that trial court abused discretion in granting new trial holding that trial court abused its discretion in granting defendants de minimis motion because there was no evidence showing that their conduct was in fact an innocent technical infraction not actually causing or threatening any harm or evil sought to be prevented by the statute that they were accused of violating