under this Section is appeal-able in accordance with paragraph (A)(1) of Section 8 — 111.” 775 ILCS 5/7 — 101.1(A) (West 1996). It does not say that all orders entered under this section are final orders. Additionally, we note that the terms “final administrative decision” and “final order” are not defined in either the Administrative Review Law or the Act. See 735 ILCS 5/3 — 101 et seq. (West 1996); 775 ILCS 5/8 — 111 (West 1996). Because little guidance can be found in the relevant statutory sections, we believe jurisdiction hinges upon whether the order entered by the chief legal counsel was in substance a “final order,” or whether it was an interlocutory order not subject to judicial review. See Davis v. Human Rights Comm’n, 286 Ill. App. 3d 508, 514-15, 676 N.E.2d 315 (1997) (<HOLDING>); see also 775 ILCS 5/8 — 111(A)(1) (West 1996)
holding that where a temporary order is later made permanent the permanent order may be challenged holding that court lacked jurisdiction on appeal from injunction because the order was simply an interpretation of an earlier order holding that an order was interlocutory in nature despite the trial courts certification of the order as a final appealable judgment holding an order that was interlocutory in form to be final in substance where the force and effect of the order was tantamount to a permanent injunction depriving complainant of a recognized property right holding preliminary injunction improper where it exceeded the relief sought and granted the same relief which would have been given in a final order of permanent injunction