in situations where his behavior poses an actual physical threat to the child. B. Travel to an Agreed-Upon Meeting Place McKnight argues that the circuit court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the State was required to prove that he used a computer or electronic device to travel to an agreed-upon meeting place at an agreed-upon meeting time. We disagree and conclude, as the ICA did, that extending the computer-use requirement to the act of traveling would be absurd. Pursuant to established principles of statutory construction, the court will depart from a literal reading of a statute when the plain language results in an “absurd or unjust result” and is “clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the statute.” State v. Park, 55 Haw. 610, 614, 178, 183-84 (2004) (<HOLDING>). Although HRS § 707-756 structurally appears
holding that in construing statute courts must first look to its plain language holding that courts must generally give effect to the plain meaning of a statute because that is the best evidence of the legislatures intent holding that although a statute regarding sentencing for firsttime drug offenders was plain obvious and unambiguous in its terms construing the statute by its plain language would be inconsistent with contrary to and illogical in light of the legislatures intent in enacting the statute holding that an appellate court must give a statute its clear and plain meaning when the statute is unambiguous holding that if the statutory terms are unambiguous a courts review ends and the statute is construed according to the plain meaning of its words