that the evidence of the prior convictions was insufficient, but sought to prove the allegations on remand. Id. The Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude a second opportunity to prove that the defendant had a prior conviction that would trigger a sentence enhancement. Id. at 734, 118 S.Ct. 2246. The Court distinguished between an acquittal and a sentence: We have held that where an appeals court overturns a conviction on the ground that the prosecution proffered insufficient evidence of guilt, that finding is comparable to an acquittal, and the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a second trial. Where a similar failure of proof occurs in a sentencing proceeding, however, the analogy is inapt. The pronouncement of sentence simply does not “have the qu (<HOLDING>); see also Walker, 33 Fla. L. Weekly at D44, —
holding that imposition of a habitual offender sentence on remand after the trial courts pronouncement of a nonhabitual sentence in the original proceeding does not violate double jeopardy holding that double jeopardy clause does not prohibit imposition of death sentence in alabama despite life sentence in georgia in murdertrial arising from same homicide holding that a trial courts changing of the written sentence to conform with the oral pronouncement of sentence is ministerial holding that the imposition of a life sentence on a juvenile does not violate the holding of roper holding that under the 1991 version of the habitual offender statute defendant could not receive habitual offender sentence for life felony