described as the “irreducible constitutional minimum.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Its essence is injury; Article III standing requires that “(1) the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court; and (3) it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by 687 S.W.2d 130, 132-133 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Turchi’s Capacity to Sue If Turehi’s alleged
recognizing action for tortious interference with prospective advantage holding that the plaintiff stated a claim for tortious interference holding that recovery is allowed when as a result of defendants breach of contract or tortious activity the plaintiff is required to either defend itself or bring an action against a third party holding that majority shareholder who guaranteed debt was not a third party beneficiary and thus lack standing to bring action for tortious interference of corporations contract with defendant holding that for the purposes of standing to bring an action to recover on a contract privity is established by proving the defendant was a party to an enforceable contract with either the plaintiff or a party who assigned its cause of action to the plaintiff