by P.L. 2003, ch. 673 § TT-5 (effective July 30, 2004), codified at 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2412-A(3) (Supp.2004). 3 . The police may make brief, investigatory stops of people on the basis of " 'specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’ ” State v. Moulton, 1997 ME 228, ¶ 10, 704 A.2d 361, 364 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). Although the State raised the reasonable suspicion standard at the motion hearing, its brief to this Court does not argue that this encounter qualifies as a Terry stop. Issues not briefed to this Court are not preserved. Holland v. Sebunya, 2000 ME 160, ¶ 9 n. 6, 759 A.2d 205, 209. 4 . The State points to the court E.2d 719, 722 (2004) (<HOLDING>); Medley v. State, 630 So.2d 163, 165
holding that factfinder could reasonably conclude that a police officers decisions to issue a citation and warnings to a citizen express ing his political beliefs chilled the political expression of the citizen and his group holding that a private citizen acting as undercover agent is not an accomplice witness so long as he does not bring about the crime holding that police may approach citizen and ask that he roll down the window as long as the officers do not detain the citizen or create the impression that the citizen may not leave holding that appellant was not harmed where defendant never asserted that he was not a us citizen and no evidence in the record suggested he was not a us citizen holding that a limited liability company is a citizen of any state of which a member of the company is a citizen