to,” when Seaton demanded the money. Callahan, however, testified that she did not recall "ever telling him no.” Given that we review conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we assume as true Callahan’s testimony on this point. 2 . This standard comes from Code § 8.01-680 — the basis for our appellate review of factfinding in civil and criminal cases as well as bench and jury trials. The standard remains the same for our sufficiency review of criminal cases, see, e.g., Crowder, 41 Va.App. at 663, 588 S.E.2d at 387; Hoambrecker v. City of Lynchburg, 13 Va.App. 511, 514, 412 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1992), as it does for the Virginia Supreme Court’s sufficiency review of civil cases, see, e.g., Norfolk & W.R. Co. v. Spencer, 104 Va. 657, 664, 52 S.E. 310, 313 (1905) (<HOLDING>); Andrews v. Ring, 266 Va. 311, 322, 585 S.E.2d
recognizing that a motion for directed verdict should be granted when there is no reasonable evidence upon which a jury could legally predicate a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party holding that after court dismissed case at plaintiffs request notwithstanding the fact that jury had deliberated upon the case and indicated that it had reached a verdict there was no case pending in court on which a verdict could be predicated and the information which the judge got from an inspection of the petition handed to him by the foreman of the jury was information which he received as an individual and not as a judge of the court and further holding that despite violation of defendants right to receive the verdict that was purportedly reached the writing incorporated in the bill of exceptions as a verdict of the jury was in law no verdict because it was not received in court and published as required by law and was instead entirely extraneous and extrajudicial holding that under aspinwall when the trial court submits to the jury a good count  one that is supported by the evidence  and a bad count  one that is not supported by the evidence  and the jury returns a general verdict this court cannot presume that the verdict was returned on the good count in such a case a judgment entered upon the verdict must be reversed holding that where the meaning of the jurys verdict was not clear in light of the trial courts jury instructions the court of appeals erred in directing entry of judgment for respondent the case should have been remanded to the trial judge who was in the best position to pass upon the question of a new trial in light of the evidence his charge to the jury and the jurys verdict holding that it is impossible to say that reasonable men might not differ in their judgment upon the question  and therefore this court would not be warranted in disturbing the verdict of the jury