is before us. Thus, while the Oil Companies might have standing in the district court to challenge the adequacy of the appellants ’ notices, there was no standing for the Oil Companies to assert claims against the putative class. The fact that the appellants have counterclaimed with a class action is inapposite. This is not a case in which the district court ruled on the merits of claims affecting the entire class (including the appellants) before reaching the issue of class certification. Rather, the district court’s ruli (5th Cir.1983) (determining that the habeas petitioner had no standing to challenge the warrantless entry of police at someone else’s home, but reviewing other jus-ticiable controversies in the case). 7 . See, e.g., Floyd v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 529, 534 (5th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); see also 7B Charles Alan Wright et al.,
holding that where named plaintiff was employee of class counsel district court did not abuse its discretion by denying class certification holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment holding that the district court did not err in dismissing the named plaintiffs claims on summary judgment before reaching the issue of class certification holding that district court has discretion under appropriate circumstances to rule on summary judgment motion before addressing pending class certification motion holding that under wilkerson it was error for district court to deny class action certification motion of named plaintiffs whose claims were resolved after filing motion for class certification but before district court decided motion