INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES, Golding, J.M., & MacLeod, C.M., eds. (1998)) (“if the presented information is considered to be irrelevant or only slightly influences the case at hand, then it is much more likely that the juror will be able to disregard the statement.”). See also Kerri L. Pickel, et ah. Jurors' Responses to Unusual Inadmissible Evidence, 36 CRIM. JUSTICE & BEHAVIOR 466 (2009), available at http://kpickel.iweb.bsu.edu/PickelKaram& Warner(2009).pdf (finding that jurors are able to disregard or forget inadmissible evidence when the content of the evidence is neutral or not "especially memorable”). 16 . Nash v. U.S., 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (1932). 17 . Super.Ct.Crim. R. 61(g). 18 . See Super. Ct. Civ. R. 42.1. 19 . See, e.g., Shockley v. State, 565 A.2d 1373, 1380 (Del.1989) (<HOLDING>); State v. Manlove, 1986 WL 14001, *2
holding that the strickland test applies to claims  that counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal holding that state courts acceptance of counsels decision not to consult blood evidence experts was not an unreasonable application of strickland holding that counsels failure to file appeal was not deficient performance under strickland where the petitioner in  2255 action did not direct counsel to file an appeal and acquiesced in counsels decision to pursue as an alternative a reduction in sentence holding that counsels unorthodox choice to waive both opening and closing statements was not constitutionally defective under strickland holding that false statements are constitutionally protected