a similar intent in promulgating Rule 603. Third, the language of Rule 603 stands in stark contrast to that found in the cases cited by the Hartmanns. See supra at 512. In Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 693 F.2d 1023 (11th Cir.1982), for example, a party failed to comply with the requirement that “[arbitration ... be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrued by service upon the other of a written demand for arbitration.” Id. at 1026. This language is redolent of a statute of limitations. The court therefore held, quite reasonably we think, that this requirement was procedural in nature and that its application should be decided by the arbitrator. Id. at 1027-28; see also Conticommodity Services Inc. v. Philipp & Lion, 613 F.2d 1222, 1226 (2d Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, we are satisfied
holding that upon vacating an arbitration award the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator holding that while the determination of the scope of an arbitration agreement is for the court the enforcement of pleading requirements before the arbitrator is a procedural matter for the arbitrator holding that a clause requiring arbitration of any controversy or claim that shall arise out of this agreement or the breach thereof was sufficiently broad to cover a 1934 securities act claim involving fraudulent misrepresentation holding that whether in federal or state court a challenge to the validity of the contract as a whole and not specifically to the arbitration clause within it must go to the arbitrator and not the court holding that a provision requiring that a party desiring to initiate an arbitration proceeding within one year of the date of the transaction or event which gave rise to the claim or grievance shall file  a concise statement of claim or controversy raised a procedural issue within the province of the arbitrator