of case law about the voluntariness of confessions in order to evaluate the meaning of voluntariness in the context of a consent to search). “The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent [to search] under the Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness — what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?” Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 111 S.Ct. 1801,114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183-89, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990)). “[W]hile [the courts] have enumerated a number of (non-exclusive) factors that may bear on the issue of volun-tariness, the absence of official coercion is a sine qua non of effective consent, as it is ax . 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996) (<HOLDING>). On the other hand, the United States Supreme
holding officers request for consent in the squad car without informing pals he was free to leave or warning him regarding his right to refuse consent was coercive holding that a detained defendants consent to search his car was voluntary even though the police did not tell him he was free to leave holding that it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search the respondents car included consent to search a bag within that car holding that defendants consent to search his person while on board an interstate bus was voluntary even though the police did not tell the defendant of his right to refuse consent holding that warrantless search of defendants vehicle was legal because defendants consent was voluntary even through he was in police custody at the time of giving consent