142 . Id. at 345-46 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1203 (7th ed.2000)). 143 . That is not to say that the Penal Code’s "coercion” definition requires that the actor actually have intended to carry out the threatened harm. Cf. Velasquez, 772 F.2d at 1357 (regarding federal retaliation statute barring threats of violence or property damage against witnesses, observing that "[i]t ... can make no difference whether the threatener intends to carry out the threat.... When making a threat one hopes not to have to carry it out; one hopes that the threat itself will be efficacious. Most threats, indeed, are bluffs.”). 144 . Accord Board v. State, No. 03-96-00024-CR, 1998 WL 271043, 6-7,-1998 Tex.App. LEXIS 3206, *16-17 (Tex.App.-Austin May 29, 1998, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>); see Tex. Penal Code § 36.05 ("a person
holding that the defendant was not prejudiced by the jurys exposure to the dictionary definition of burglary because the definition referenced theft which was not an element the prosecution was required to prove holding that threat as used in the coercion definition as that definition is incorporated into section 3605s witnesstampering prohibition was not unconstitutionally vague because nature of threat was informed by the harms enumerated in the definition in that case hatred contempt and ridicule holding that the definition of supplier under the ocspa is substantially broader than the definition of debt collector under the fdcpa holding that the definition of operating deficits is not ambiguous despite the absence of a definition of the phrase in the contract holding that a broad statutory definition of a term that was inconsistent with the terms plain meaning did not affect the terms definition in other contexts