does not create a right to be free from state actions that perpetuate lawful arrests. Gauger v. Hendle, 349 F.3d 354, 359 (7th Cir.2003) (citing McCullah v. Gadert, 344 F.3d 655, 660-61 (7th Cir.2003) (interpreting Reed v. City of Chicago, 77 F.3d 1049, 1052 n. 3 (7th Cir.1996)), and Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 463 n. 3 (7th Cir.2003)). As a seizure does not continue past the Gerstein hearing, in which a court determines whether probable cause existed for a warrantless arrest, see Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 126, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975), Commander Carroll’s actions, even if they prolonged Bergstrom’s seizure, did not deprive Berg-strom of any Fourth Amendment right. The Gauger court noted that in light of Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 750-51 (7th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>), the Fourth Amendment may apply after a
holding that a  1983 due process claim that essentially contests the fairness of the plaintiffs prosecution  is  similar to his malicious prosecution claim and claims resembling malicious prosecution do not accrue until the prosecution has terminated in the plaintiffs favor  holding the same for malicious prosecution holding that section 1983 claims alleging due process violations stemming from malicious prosecution are unavailable when a state malicious prosecution action exists holding that the statute applies also to malicious prosecution actions holding that malicious prosecution claim accrues when underlying prosecution is terminated