as: “bodily injury which ... involves a substantial risk of death, a substantial risk of serious permanent disfigurement, a substantial risk of protracted loss or impairment of the function of any part or organ of the body, or breaks, fractures, or burns of the second or third degree”. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-l-901(3)(p). Thus, Gonzalez contends the Colorado statute includes a different class of injuries (e.g., fractures) than the MPC. Although Gonzalez cites similar cases supporting his assertions, other case-law cuts against his position. Compare United States v. Calzada-Ortega, 551 Fed.Appx. 790, 792-93 (5th Cir. 2014) (concluding a similar Wisconsin statute was broader than the enumerated aggravated-assault offense), with United States v. Aluya, 590 Fed.Appx. 433, 434 (5th Cir. 2015) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, pursuant to our limited
holding on plainerror review an oklahoma statute for assault and battery was equivalent to the enumerated offense holding that under maryland common law an assault is an attempted battery an actual battery or a combination of the two holding that virginia domestic assault and battery statute did not qualify holding that the oklahoma statute like the california statute did not qualify as an enumerated offense because it lacked the elements of substantial interference with the victims liberty and risk of bodily injury holding that battery is an inherently included offense of aggravated battery