if Underwood were persuasive, this case is distinguishable because Bruner is “faced with the prospect of either punishment if he worked without a license or enduring much expense and effort to obtain the license.” Underwood, 2013 WL 3270564, at *7 (quoting Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir.2008)). The Defendants filed a complaint against Bruner in state court while the current case was pending, seeking to enforce the challenged statutes against him and to block him from operating as a moving company. [See Record No. 48-1, p. 2.] If anything, the Plaintiffs’ injury is more concrete and particularized now than when the Defendants first asserted that the Plaintiffs lack standing. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Despite the Defendants’ assertions to the
holding that to have standing a plaintiff must establish an injury in fact a casual connection between the injury and that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision holding that there must be a causal connection between an insureds advertising and an alleged injury to trigger coverage for an advertising injury holding that to show a causal connection the plaintiff must demonstrate a relationship between the misconduct and the plaintiffs injury holding that because fact of injury was a distinct question from quantum of injury common proof could establish classwide injury even though amount of damage to each plaintiff was uncertain holding that in order to establish standing a plaintiff must show 1 it has suffered an injury in fact  2 the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and 3 it is likely as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision