be called to the stand for the purpose of invoking his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the trial court should consider whether the defendant will be unfairly prejudiced by not allowing the potentially exculpatory witness to invoke this privilege in the jury’s presence. E. Denial of Defense Because Appellant was permitted to fully relate his version of the events that transpired on the night of Ms. Mitchell’s death and to introduce testimony in support of his theory of the case, the State argues that he was not prejudiced by Ms. Day not being called to the witness stand. We are concerned, however, that by denying Appellant the opportunity to call Ms. Day to the stand, he was effectively denied the right to fully present his defense. See Gray, 796 A.2d at 716 (<HOLDING>). Given the factual circumstances of this case,
holding in habeas corpus case that the defendant waived his right to invoke the fifth amendment during his direct testimony and that any prejudice deriving from the invocation of the privilege is  attributed to his decision to testify  recognizing that exercise of trial courts decision regarding witness invocation of fifth amendment in jurys presence requires consideration of defendant being entitled to have his defense fully presented to the jury holding that juveniles request for parent is invocation of fifth amendment rights holding that an unequivocal invocation of the fifth amendment right to counsel must be presented in a manner that a reasonable police officer under similar circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for the presence of an attorney recognizing concerns that invocation of fifth anendment in jurys presence will have a disproportionate impact on their deliberations and identifying principle that guilt may not be inferred from exercise of privilege as underpinning of rule that jury should not draw inferences from witness decision to exercise constitutional privilege against selfin crimination