concerned statements made during settlement negotiations, not the settlement itself. Vardon, like Steele, helps Pfizer, but not entirely. In that case, the plaintiff issued an interrogatory that sought “information relating to settlement negotiations.” Id. at 651. In denying the plaintiffs motion to compel an answer to this interrogatory, the court noted that “[t]he policy favoring freely-negotiated settlements is one of the strongest in the federal courts, and is enshrined in Fed. R. Evid. 4-08’s [ (“Rule 408”) ] exclusionary rule.” 156 F.R.D. at 652 (emphasis added). Like the Steele court’s discussion of the “settlement privilege,” the Vardon court was addressing statements made in the c ivilege as to communications, it did not wholly cordon off all things settlement. Id. at 981-83 (<HOLDING>). Nor could it. As the Court explains below,
holding that evidence of settlement may be considered under rule 408 when reviewing a motion for sanctions recognizing exceptions in rule 408 as applying to settlement agreements and the occurrence of settlement talks holding a settlement privilege exists as to thirdparty discovery of settlement negotiations recognizing the confidentiality ordinarily afforded to settlement agreements holding that property settlement agreements may be specifically enforced