testimony, Wise threatened to have him “dusted.” Wise said “the first thing I’m going to d 2, 375, 512 S.E.2d 169, 170 (1999) (“credibility of a witness, the weight accorded the testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from proven facts are matters solely for the fact finder’s determination”). Wise’s threats of bodily harm were precisely prohibited by Code § 18.2-460(0; they were “true threats”; and they were not protected speech. Therefore, his “as applied” challenge also fails. IV. In summary, we hold Code § 18.2-460(0 is not constitutionally overbroad and is not unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case. For these reasons, we affirm the conviction. Affirmed. 1 . Wise relies upon City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 2510, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130,
holding unconstitutional a statute that prohibits speech that in any manner  interrupts an officer holding that first amendment protections apply to compelled speech as well as restrictions on speech recognizing the need to balance the states interest in fulfilling its responsibilities to the public the extent to which the speech in question involves a matter of public concern and the manner time place and context of the speech recognizing that code is speech holding unconstitutional a rule excluding all religious speech as viewpoint discrimination