does not bar suit against a co-employee for intentional torts, and stated that “injury to another resulting from willful, wanton and reckless negligence should also be treated as an intentional injury for purposes of our Workers’ Compensation Act.” Pleasant, 312 N.C. 710, 715, 325 S.E.2d 244, 248. The Court then held that “the Workers’ Compensation Act does not shield a co-employee from common law liability for willful, wanton and reckless negligence.” Id. at 716, 325 S.E.2d at 249. The willful, wanton and reckless negligence standard is less demanding than Woodson's substantial certainty, and a “constructive intent to injure may be inferred when the conduct of the defendant is manifestly indifferent to the consequences of the act.” Pendergrass, 333 N.C. 233, 238, 424 S.E.2d 391, 394 (<HOLDING>). The individual defendants in this case
holding that prisoner must show prison officials were deliberately indifferent to prison conditions to establish an eighth amendment violation holding that coemployees who instructed employee to work at unguarded machine were not manifestly indifferent to the consequences of his doing so holding that employer was not liable when employee got into a fight with a third party who challenged the way the employee was doing his job holding that employee who resigned left voluntarily where employer accepted resignation told employee not to come to work anymore and paid employee through end of notice period holding that a plaintiffs ability to work is substantially limited when his impairment foreclosed him generally from obtaining jobs doing the type of work plaintiff has chosen as his field