344 U.S. 590, 596, 73 S.Ct. 472, 97 L.Ed. 576 (1953). For instance, an LPR who left the United States briefly to undertake illegal activity abroad, such as alien smuggling, would clearly be included in the 1225(b) subclass; under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(iii), he would be treated as an alien seeking admission on account of having “engaged in illegal activity after having departed the United States.” See United States v. Tsai, 282 F.3d 690, 696 & n. 5 (9th Cir.2002). But in Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 103 S.Ct. 321, 74 L.Ed.2d 21 (1982), the Supreme Court specifically held that an LPR arrested for alien smuggling upon return from a brief trip abroad is entitled to due process protection, specifically because Mezei is inapplicable in such a scenario. See id. at 34, 103 S.Ct. 321 (<HOLDING>). As such, it is clear that the 1225(b)
holding that plaintiff state employees contract right to be discharged only for cause was not protected by due process clause because it did not rise to level of fundamental right holding that the defendant failed to preserve a due process objection to a sentencing policy because sjimply saying that something is unfair does not suggest that it violates due process holding that there is no due process right to appellate review holding that adjustment of status was permitted even if deportable alien had entered the country as a lawful permanent resident holding that mezei did not suggest that no returning resident alien has a right to due process and that it does not govern this case for plasencia was absent from the country only a few days