the offense was finally consummated or committed.” Id. at 903 n. 4. Therefore, the court held that the application of the 1997 gain time statute was proper because the true continuing offense was “committed” in 1996 and that different versions of the sentencing guidelines and gain time statutes can apply to a defendant’s sentence. Id. at 902, 904. Similarly, the 1997-gain time statute applies to Cornett’s sentences on the first three counts because they were continuing offenses with the last acts committed in 1997. Therefore, they were “committed on or after October 1, 1995.” § 944.275(4)(b)(3), Fla. Stat. (1997); Young, 820 So.2d at 902-03. Even though counsel’s advice to Cornett was based on counsel’s honest misunderstanding of the gain time statutes, Cornett is entitled to wit 004) (<HOLDING>). Conclusion Accordingly, we reverse the trial
holding that a defendant who has successfully challenged his plea in one ease should be allowed to withdraw his plea in a second case when both cases were part of one negotiated settlement of his charges holding jeopardy did not attach where defendant pled to one charge but refused to voluntarily withdraw his plea to the second charge in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement holding that a defendant who is allowed to withdraw his plea must either withdraw his plea to all charges or to none when his plea to all charges was part of an agreement with the state holding that where a defendant is misled and induced to plead by his counsels mistaken advice then he may be allowed to withdraw his plea holding that defendant should have been allowed to withdraw guilty plea postsentence in part on basis that the same district judge ruled that similar facts in codefendants case did not constitute crime