93 precludes Stovall’s application for probate of an earlier will. In Guinn, there was an order specifically setting aside an order admitting the will to probate. Such circumstances do not exist in this case. Without citing to specific authority, caselaw or otherwise, Stovall asks this court to hold that the admission of a will into probate is negated by a subsequent finding that such will is a forgery. We find no authority supporting such a proposition. We do find, however, that such a conclusion would run against general principles of what it means to admit a will to probate. A judgment admitting an instrument to probate as a will fixes and confirms the rights of those who are named as devisees and legatees and for those who take under them. See Steele v. Renn, 50 Tex. 467 (1878) (<HOLDING>). A judgment admitting a propounded instrument
holding that an action under the illinois declaratory judgment act to void a will must be construed as a will contest that is governed by the laws controlling such contests in probate proceedings holding that the trial courts determination that the invalidity of an unprobated will under texass declaratory judgment act was not error where the action was joined with a probate action and multiple wills were before the court holding that an issue not presented to the trial court will not be considered on appeal holding the action of a trial court annulling a will and probate could not prejudice a defendant who was an innocent purchaser without notice of land devised under a will holding residence means legal residence for will probate