correctly their prior understanding.”); Hopkins v. The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 107 R.I. 679, 685, 270 A.2d 915, 918 (1970) (“To warrant reformation it must appear that by reason of mistake, common to both parties, their agreement fails in some material respect correctly to reflect their prior completed understanding.”). The Family Court, which did not find mutual mistake in this case, is subject to that same limitation. Absent the consent of the parties or one of the recognized bases for reformation, the Family Court does not have the authority to reform or modify a contractual property settlement agreement that is incorporated by reference in (but not merged into) the final divorce judgment. See Riffenburg v. Riffenburg, 585 A.2d 627, 680 (R.I.1991) (<HOLDING>). We have found the Property Settlement
recognizing court has authority to modify agreement to cure any unreasonable provision as to duration or scope holding that trial court is without authority to modify a settlement agreement but may enforce and interpret it holding that former husband was not entitled to evidentiary hearing on petition to modify alimony where he failed to demonstrate substantial change in circumstances since entry of a prior order denying modification of alimony from which he did not appeal holding that the judiciary is without authority to modify alimony in a nonmerged separation agreement recognizing that in cases involving separation agreements unlike commercial contracts the state itself has an interest in the terms and enforceability of the agreement  because if either spouse is left in necessitous circumstances by a separation agreement that spouse  might become a public charge 