respect to the funds they invested with [CEG],” id. at *3, *5, the court lacked the authority to transfer property— including causes of action — from the investors to the receiver, id. at *5. The court emphasized that to hold otherwise would extend a district court’s jurisdiction beyond the confines of Article III. See id. at *5-6. A number of other cases stand for Scholes’ proposition that fraud on investors that damages those investors is for the investors, and not the receiver, to pursue, whereas fraud on the receivership entity that operates to its damage is for the receiver to pursue, 744 F.Supp. at 1422, notwithstanding a district court’s language granting a receiver authority beyond Article III restrictions. See Fleming v. Lind-Waldock & Co., 922 F.2d 20, 24-25 (1st Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); B.E.L.T., Inc. v. Lacrad Intern. Corp., No.
holding that although the district court empowered the receiver to prevent irreparable loss damage and injury to commodity customers and clients the receiver lacked standing to sue for claims belonging to investors such as violations of the commodity exchange act holding that loss of customers and resulting injury to goodwill can constitute irreparable harm that is not compensable by an award of money damages holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue holding that a receiver may lack standing to sue if the party he is representing cannot allege an injury or assert a claim holding irreparable harm established where defendant faced loss of customers when employee resigned and attempted to take former clients