not the arbitrator, to decide.”); Local 285, Serv. Employees Int’l Union, 64 F.3d at 739 (explaining that a determination about whether a grievance included a particular claim was a matter of “substantive arbitrability”). Conversely, Plaintiff describes the issue as one of procedural arbitrability. See Local 285, Serv. Employees Int’l Union, 64 F.3d at 739 (“Procedural arbitrability ... concerns such issues as ... ‘whether grievance procedures or some part of them apply to a particular dispute [or] whether such procedures have been followed or excused.’ ”) (quoting John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557, 84 S.Ct. 909, 11 L.Ed.2d 898 (1964)). See also Schooltime Transp., Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1459, Civil Action No. 96-10261-FHF (D.Mass.1996) (<HOLDING>). Given that the underlying issue is inherently
holding that the determination regarding whether bus drivers should be subject to a probationary period is properly left to the arbitrator holding that while the determination of the scope of an arbitration agreement is for the court the enforcement of pleading requirements before the arbitrator is a procedural matter for the arbitrator holding that the issue of whether contract which contained arbitration agreement was illegal should be properly decided by arbitrator not court holding that because the parties agreed to arbitrate and both placed the issue before the arbitrator the issue of consolidation was for the arbitrator holding that upon vacating an arbitration award the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator