proscribed conduct to include an additional element not expressly required by the plain language of the statute and would impose on the government an often insurmountable burden. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal on Count Two is properly denied. An appropriate Order has entered. 1 . The facts recited here are derived from the testimony and ev 1, 1320 (9th Cir.1999) (stating that “[e]very other circuit that has considered whether § 1326 contemplates three distinct substantive offenses has concluded that it does”). 7 . United States v. Quinn, 359 F.3d 666, 672-73 (4th Cir.2004) (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974)); see also United States v. Daniels, 973 F.2d 272, 274 (4th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). 8 . Bolden, 325 F.3d at 493 (citations
holding an indictment legally insufficient when it failed to inform the defendant of the gravamen of the alleged offense holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a charge on the lesserincluded offense when the evidence showed either the commission of the completed offense as charged or the commission of no offense such that the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser offense holding that the greater offense is  by definition the same for purposes of double jeopardy as any lesser offense included in it holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense recognizing that an indictment must contain the elements of the offense charged fairly inform a defendant of the charge and enable the defendant to plead double jeopardy as a defense in a future prosecution for the same offense