into the advisory agreement with Intermarket and the payment of fees to Intermarket for the Oak Tree transaction) and the PCA lawsuit. 7 . Appellees assert that Crimson has failed to preserve this issue because Crimson did not make a specific challenge in either its response to the motion for summary judgment or its motion for reconsideration to the lack of evidence of the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees sought as damages. However, Crimson was not required to object in the trial court to the insufficiency of appellees' summary judgment proof supporting the award of attorney’s fees as damages in order to preserve this challenge for appellate review; such a complaint may be raised for the first time on appeal. See Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel, 997 S.W.2d 217, 223 (Tex. 1999) (<HOLDING>); City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin
holding that on appeal a nonmovant need not have answered or responded to the motion for summary judgment to contend that the movants summaiy judgment proof is insufficient as a matter of law to support summary judgment holding that nonmovants failure to except or respond cannot supply by default the grounds for summary judgment or the summary judgment proof necessary to establish the movants right holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that a motion for summary judgment was not opposed holding that trial court may not grant summary judgment by default  when the movants summary judgment proof is legally insufficient holding that the parly opposing summary judgment must do more than merely suggest possible error in the movants summary judgment evidence he must submit facts which demonstrate that the movants summary judgment evidence is questionable or that the movants allegations are not properly supported