was not enforceable. For his enforceability argument, Pa-lavan argued that the agreed judgment had been obtained by fraud and that he had not consented to the agreed judgment. On appeal, Palavan frames the issue as a jurisdictional .question. He.argues that the agreed judgment did not deprive the county court of jurisdiction for his appeal and application. We agree that “an agreed judgment in the justice court does not deprive the county court of jurisdiction to hear the ease in a trial de novo.” Mullins v. Coussons, 745 S.W.2d 50, 50 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ). This does not mean, however, that the grounds for dismissal presented in the defendants’ motions—Palavan’s claims being barred by waiver and estoppel due to the agreed judgment—were wrong. See id. at 51 (<HOLDING>). A party may appeal a judgment from a justice
holding agreed judgment presents question of waiver or estoppel rather than question of jurisdiction holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact holding that the question whether a party has agreed to submit an issue to arbitration is a question of law requiring de novo review holding that estoppel was a question of fact recognizing that patent exhaustion presents a factual question