explanation of its failure to call the witness. In such instances, the State cannot meet its burden as a matter of law, unless there is sufficient other evidence to overcome the inference. But the cases do not hold that before police interrogate a suspect at least two officers must be present so that one can corroborate the other in the event of a suppression hearing. Neither do the cases require police to obtain a written acknowledgment and written waiver of rights. As indicated by the Supreme Court in State v. Myers, where circumstances demonstrate that the evidence was sufficient to support the conclusion that a defendant knowingly waived his Miranda rights, the fact that a corroborating witness was not produced is not critical. See Myers, 86 Wn.2d 419, 428-29, 545 P.2d 538 (1976) (<HOLDING>). Here, the detective failed to ask Haack to
holding that signed waivers and police testimony describing the procedure used to obtain the waivers were sufficient to find a voluntary waiver of rights holding that even though the state court did engage in a colloquy with the petitioner that colloquy was insufficient to establish that the waiver was knowing and voluntary because the state court had refused to permit petitioners counsel to ask him questions that would probe the waivers validity holding that a defendants statements were voluntary after defendant initially refused to sign waiver but later initiated the contact with police and signed the waiver recognizing that courts will enforce waiver of appeal rights when waiver is knowing and voluntary holding that an ijs failure to obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel from a pro se petitioner is a due process violation