because it does not take account of the technical defense exception we envision. We need not hold that a government argument that an EAJA application contained an excessive number of hours would constitute a technical defense. Even assuming that an objection to excessive hours is a technical defense, however, the Academy wrongly foresees an endless cycle of litigation over such a defense. As we conceive it, any technical defense can only be raised once. For the government to argue that it was substantially justified in arguing that it was substantially justified in raising any technical defense will still violate the per se rule, thus ending the litigation. The remainder of our task is an easy one. We hold that the Secretary was substantially justified in raising the untimely f .) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 583, 88
holding that plaintiff failed to offer sufficient evidence to support a finding that a similar position existed after his termination holding that standing existed holding no defamation existed holding postaccident citation not sufficient to support finding that coemployee was substantially certain that injury or death would occur holding governments position substantially justified where sufficient support existed in precedent