sexual abuse of a ward is a crime of violence under the federal Sentencing Guidelines. Second, we are compelled to make a categorical determination, but Andrews’s arguments rely upon the underlying facts supporting the conviction. See Mathis, 963 F.2d at 408 (citing Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143). Finally, Andrews cites to no authority supporting his view that first-degree sexual abuse of a ward is not a crime of violence. We have yet to consider the issue, and other circuits that have considered the analogous situation of statutory rape (for which consent is also not a defense) have generally found that to be a crime of violence. See, e.g., United States v. Asberry, 394 F.3d 712, 717-18 (9th Cir.2005); see also United States v. Searcy, 418 F.3d 1193, 1196-98 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). But see United States v. Houston, 364 F.3d
recognizing that  the interstate nexus requirement is satisfied by proof of a probable or potential impact on interstate commerce holding a crime committed under a nebraska statute criminalizing sexual contact between an adult and a minor a felony crime of violence for sentencing purposes holding that the commerce clause does not provide congress with authority to enact a federal civil remedy for victims of gendermotivat ed violence because the crime was noneconomic contained no jurisdictional element and the aggregate impact of such crime was based on an attenuated effect upon interstate commerce holding that use of interstate commerce channel to entice minor into sexual contact is a crime of violence holding that commerce clause authorizes congress to punish any particular criminal action even without proof of a relation to interstate commerce when the activity is part of a class of activities determined by congress to affect interstate commerce