frame presented by electoral disputes rarely allows for resolution through litigation. Johnson v. FCC, 829 F.2d 157, 159 n. 7 (D.C.Cir.1987); Shays, 414 F.3d at 111. Electoral disputes are thus “paradigmatic” examples of cases that cannot be fully litigated before the particular controversy expires. Moore v. Hosemann, 591 F.3d 741, 744 (5th Cir.2009). The FEC suggests that La Botz has not shown that “the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.” Pharmachemie B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 276 F.3d 627, 633 (D.C.Cir.2002). In the electoral context, many courts have concluded that a plaintiff need only show that others similarly situated might suffer a comparable harm in the future. E.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 737 n. 8, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974) (<HOLDING>); N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep.
holding that plaintiffs claims were not moot although the election was over because the same issues would affect minorparty candidacies in the future but failing to address whether fulani herself would be affected holding that although the 1972 election had long since passed the case was not moot because the statute under review would apply to other candidates in the future holding that election case was not moot after election because there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining parties would be subject to that same action in the future holding that upon commencement of the election process mandamus will not lie to prevent the inclusion of a candidate on the official ballot because by that time the case has become moot holding that appeal was not moot despite the fact that the election had passed because there would be every reason to expect the same parties to generate a similar future controversy emphasis added