not raised in the district court), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1221, 123 S.Ct. 1327, 154 L.Ed.2d 1078 and — U.S. —, 123 S.Ct. 1919, 155 L.Ed.2d 840 (2003); United States v. Gill, 280 F.3d 923, 931 (9th Cir.2002). These cases run somewhat contrary to the Supreme Court’s holding in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), that criminal defendants "are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment.” Id. at 589, 122 S.Ct. 2428 (emphasis added); see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 474, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (noting that the finding in Apprendi’s case was "legally significant because it increased ... the maximum range within which the judge could exercise his discretion ...."); id. at 476, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (<HOLDING>) (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227,
holding under the due process clause of the fifth amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the sixth amendment any fact other than prior conviction that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt holding facts that increase the maximum penalty for a crime must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt holding that other than the fact of a prior conviction any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt holding that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt holding that any fact  that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment submitted to a jury and proven beyond reasonable doubt