to conduct a hearing). Although an eviden-tiary hearing would have been preferable, we cannot conclude that the court’s weighing of the factors was an abuse of discretion. 2. The district court correctly held that Defendant’s 2004 conviction for mailing threatening communications, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876(c), categorically qualifies as a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(l). Section 876(c) criminalizes the sending of “any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of the addressee or of another.” By its plain terms, a “threat to injure the person” of another categorically constitutes the “threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(l); see United States v. De La Fuente, 353 F.3d 766, 770-71 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). We reach the same conclusion with respect to
holding that the threat to injure prong of  876c categorically constitutes a threatened use of physical force for purposes of 18 usc  16a holding that a conviction under colorevstat  186401 for criminally negligent child abuse was not a crime of violence under 18 usc  16a because physical force was not an element of that crime holding iowa common law touching assault met use of physical force required for enhancement under 18 usc  922g9 be cause any physical contact by necessity requires physical force to complete holding that kidnapping is a crime of violence which necessarily involves the threatened use of physical force under 18 usc  924 holding that  2241a1 requires actual use of force meaning use of such physical force as is sufficient to overcome restrain or injure a person