exactly what the black material was before it became black, and that he had not chemically analyzed the material. The defense pathology expert disputed Dr. Cunha’s opinions. At the second trial, Dr. Cunha admitted that the material in Meadows’s stomach was not soot, but did not retreat from his opinion about the esophagus, and was not asked whether he retreated from his opinion about whether Meadows was alive when set on fire. Because Dr. Cunha did not substantially retract his earlier opinion, and because the defense was able to rigorously cross-examine and present its own expert at the first trial, we cannot agree that Tholmer’s trial was infected with constitutional error because of this testimony. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis in original). Tholmer alleges
holding that to show actual prejudice petitioner must show that the errors at trial worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions holding that to show prejudice in a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors the result of the proceeding would have been different holding that to establish prejudice the defendant must show a reasonable likelihood that the sentencing courts obvious errors affected his sentence holding that a defendant must show actual prejudice to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim holding that a defendant must not only show actual prejudice as opposed to mere speculative prejudice  but also  any actual prejudice was substantial  that he was meaningfully impaired in his ability to defend against the states charges to such an extent that the disposition of the criminal proceeding was likely affected