an “essentially local safety hazard” to avoid pre-emption under the savings clause of 45 U.S.C. § 434, the plaintiff would still have to show that the state regulation does not create an undue burden on interstate commerce. Although the plaintiff did not address this issue, the common-law theory on which his excessive speed claim rests is an example of the “hodgepodge of state safety regulations” that Congress sought to avoid when it enacted the FRSA to provide uniform railroad regulation. See Easterwood, 933 F.2d at 1552. Therefore, the court rejects plaintiffs argument that federal law does not pre-empt state law generally regarding a railroad’s duty to slow a train for an extra-hazardous crossing. See Walker v. St. Louis-Southwestern Ry. Co., 835 S.W.2d 469, 474 (Mo.Ct.App.1992) (<HOLDING>). II. Adequacy of Grade Crossing Warning
holding that the old common law duty to moderate train speed  at an extra or ultrahazardous crossing is preempted holding that excessive speed claims are preempted but refusing to hold that easterwood extends to any state regulation affecting speed of trains in any manner holding inter alia that common law claims were preempted holding that automobile racing is not an ultrahazardous activity holding claims that a railroad crossing was extrahazardous that warning devices were inadequate and that the train was not operating at a speed commensurate with the hazardous nature of the crossing were all preempted by federal law