S.Ct. 53, 34 L.Ed.2d 88 (1972). A presumption exists against waiving the right to a jury trial. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 57 S.Ct. 809, 81 L.Ed. 1177 (1937); Hendrix, 565 F.2d at 258. The burden of proving that a waiver was knowing and intentional rests with the party attempting to enforce the purported waiver. Hendrix, 565 F.2d at 258; Feldman & Son, Ltd. v. Checker Motors Corp., 572 F.Supp. 310, 313 (S.D.N.Y.1983). Defendant has not met this burden. In addressing jury waiver clauses, courts have consistently examined the following factors: negotiability of the contract terms, disparity in bargaining power between the parties, the business acumen of the party opposing the waiver, and the conspicuousness of the jury waiver provision. See, e.g., Hendrix, 565 F.2d at 258 (<HOLDING>); Orix Credit Alliance, Inc. v. Better Built
holding jury waiver valid where contract negotiations took place over a period of years waiver was not inconspicuous and it was not a contract of adhesion holding the jury waiver invalid where waiver was inconspicuous appeared to be nonnegotiable and there was unequal bargaining power holding class action waiver to be enforceable under section 2 of the faa notwithstanding claim that waiver was unconscionable under state law holding that the waiver in two previous contracts was insufficient to support waiver of the contract at issue in that appeal holding that there was only minimal procedural unconscionability despite defendants overwhelming bargaining power its concession that the contract was nonnegotiable and its drafting of the contract