limitation on employee actions. 29 U.S.C. § 216(e). Mion’s interpretation of the limitation provision would render the immediately preceding waiver provision superfluous. It would also render meaningless the Secretary’s attempts “to resolve complaints of violations” as specifically provided in § 2617(b)(1). Like the scheme in the FLSA, § 2617(b)(1) encourages the Secretary to resolve FMLA disputes in the first instance. Therefore, the Court concludes that the DOL has the same authority to supervise a binding settlement and waiver under the FMLA that it has under the FLSA. Courts have found the requisite DOL supervision where the employer and the DOL exchanged a letter, call, memo, and visit, see Torreblanca v. Naas Foods, Inc., No. F 78-163,1980 WL 2100, at *2-3 (N.D.Ind. Feb.25, 1980) (<HOLDING>), and where the DOL met with the employer,
holding under flsa holding that the flsa does not preempt a state law contractual claim that seeks to recover wages for time that is compensable under the contract but not under the flsa holding that punitive damages are not allowed under the flsa holding that the flsa preempted plaintiffs fraud claim holding that the flsa does not preempt state law contract provisions that are more generous than the flsa demands