sometimes committed acts of violence against persons viewed as acting against the interests of the white race. However, the fact that defendant knew that white supremacists sometimes viewed his website and sometimes harmed people they perceived as enemies is insufficient to transform his lawful statements about Juror A into criminal advocacy, i.e., advocacy directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action, as required by the First Amendment and § 373. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447, 89 S.Ct. 1827. Knowledge or belief that one’s speech, even speech advocating law breaking, may cause others to act does not remove the speech from the protection of the First Amendment, unless the speech is directed to inciting imminent lawless action and is likely to produce such action. See id. (<HOLDING>); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,
recognizing criticisms of public officials is at core of speech protected by first amendment recognizing first amendment protection for news gathering holding that first amendment protections apply to compelled speech as well as restrictions on speech holding that first amendment principles preclude recovery under state law for damages caused by speech or other protected conduct holding that the first amendment protected an incendiary speech by a ku klux klan leader to a klan gathering