judgment rule might well have come to the aid of the proponents of the plan.”); Blish v. Thompson Automatic Arms Corp., 64 A.2d 581, 603 (Del.1948) (finding that disinterested directors had the power to approve a grant of stock to other directors, and that, "in the absence of fraud, ... their unanimous action [was] final”); Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693, 696 (Del.Ch.1971) ("[S]ince the transaction complained of was accomplished as a result of the exercise of independent business judgment of the outside, independent directors whose sole interest was the furtherance of the corporate enterprise, the court is precluded from substituting its uninformed opinion for that of the experienced, independent board members_”). 150 . Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del.1985) (<HOLDING>); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Hldgs.,
holding that as part of a new standard of review requiring directors taking defensive actions to show that those actions were reasonable in relation to threat posed such proof is materially enhanced  by the approval of a board comprised of a majority of outside independent directors citations omitted holding that where approval of the board of directors was not formally requested a demand would have been futile for it could hardly be expected that if approval of the board of directors were sought defendant who controlled 50 of the board would have authorized the action against himself holding that independent directors can be entrusted with the decision to sue other directors on behalf of the corporation holding that the standard of proof for dischargeability actions is the preponderance of the evidence standard holding that causes of actions against directors of corporations for breach of fiduciary duty are contract actions