to consider this evidence in the aggregate, and instead improperly concluded that Shkreli had presented sufficient evidence of only a single instance of persecution — the December 1998 attack — which the IJ deemed insufficient to give rise to a finding of past persecution. We find no error in the IJ’s interpretation of the evidence. As an initial matter, the IJ acknowledged that Shkreli’s description about the persecution his family suffered under Albania’s communist regime is “consistent with the known country conditions and the Court would have no reason to doubt this.” However, Shkreli “cannot rely solely on the persecution of his family members to qualify for asylum.” Akhtar v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir.2005) (quoting Ciorba v. Ashcroft, 323 F.3d 539, 545 (7th Cir.2003)) (<HOLDING>). In the absence of evidence showing “a pattern
holding that petitioner who was not politically active could not establish a wellfounded fear of persecution on the basis of the politically motivated murder of his father holding that absent a pattern of persecution linked to the applicant persecution of family members is insufficient to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution holding that such a report provided substantial evidence to support the conclusion that petitioner failed to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of future persecution holding that even a ten percent chance of persecution may establish a wellfounded fear holding that a wellfounded fear requires petitioner to show more than a generalized or random possibility of persecution