was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent is not clearly erroneous. II. Next we consider whether Camacho’s low intelligence, combined with police tactics, rendered his statements involuntary in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1; see also Minn. Const, art. I, § 7. A defendant is deprived of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment when the defendant’s conviction is founded upon an involuntary confession. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 385-86, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1785-86, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964). Coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to a finding that a confession is involuntary. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167,107 S.Ct. at 521-22; Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 1342-43, 10 L.Ed.2d 513 (1963) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). A court must look at the
holding that question of whether a confession was coerced was not to be resolved by considering the truth or falsity of the confession holding that under elstad the first question that must be answered when determining whether a subsequent confession is tainted by an earlier confession is whether the initial confession was obtained in violation of the defendants fifth amendment rights  ie whether it was involuntary  or whether the confession was voluntary but obtained in technical violation of miranda  holding that question is whether defendants will was overborne by police at the time of the confession holding that to determine whether a statement was voluntary the court must consider the totality of all the surrounding circumstances  both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation and decide  whether a defendants will was overborne by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession holding that trial judges determination of the admissibility of a confession is based on whether the confession was voluntarily given