on the part of the jurors to impose the death sentence are similarly problematic. Unquestionably, “appeals to the pecuniary interests of jurors are patently improper.” United States v. Blecker, 657 F.2d 629, 636 (4th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1150, 102 S.Ct. 1016, 71 L.Ed.2d 304 (1982). Nonetheless, after further review of the DA’s closing argument, it becomes apparent that these isolated statements did not constitute an overarching theme or even serve as a significant part of the DA’s case. In addition, the jury instructions explained in detail how the jury should base their decision. In the context of the whole closing argument and the entirety of the trial, these remarks did not amount to a constitutional violation. See United States v. Pupo, 841 F.2d 1235, 1240 (4th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 842, 109 S.Ct. 113,
holding any improper delegation did not rise to level of plain error holding that inadmissible testimony did not rise to level of plain error because the overwhelming evidence against defendant leads us to conclude that the error committed did not cause the jury to reach a different verdict than it otherwise would have reached holding that the prosecutors request that the jury send a message to the community was improper in the guilt phase of the trial but was not so flagrantly improper as to constitute plain error holding that an infringement on the defendants fundamental due process right in the form of a comment on the defendants silence by the prosecution did not rise to level of plain error holding that improper argument about purging jurors community of drug conspiracies did not rise to level of plain error