are not per se unenforceable, the Texas Supreme Court in In re Prudential expressly “echo[ed] the United States Supreme Court’s admonition [in Brady v. United States ] that “waivers of constitutional rights must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.’ ” Id. Thus, the Texas Supreme Court equated the Texas standard for a “knowing and voluntary” prelitigation contractual jury waiver with the “knowing and voluntary” standard utilized in criminal cases like Brady to assess the validity of a defendant’s pretrial waiver of a jury trial via a guilty plea. In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 132; see Brady, 397 U.S. at 748, 90 S.Ct. at 1469. But see L & R Realty v. Conn. Nat’l Bank, 246 Conn. 1, 715 A.2d 748, 755 (1998) (<HOLDING>)- This was a logical step by the supreme court
holding that state courts must apply the federal pleading standard in fela cases holding the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment extends the right to jury trial to defendants in serious criminal cases in state courts holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion holding in contractual action that ms bremen controls the enforceability of forum selection clauses in diversity cases holding in commercial loan transaction that it is appropriate to apply a lower standard in determining the enforceability of prelitigation contractual jury trial waivers than for waivers in criminal cases