at the fringes, section 22-1115 applies clearly and directly to the activities in which the parties who brought this action wish to engage. The complaint they filed made precisely that admission: “[Pjlaintiffs wish peacefully to carry banners, placards, signs and devices which depict messages critical of foreign governments, and their acts and policies. They wish to do so on the public streets and sidewalks in the District of Columbia, within 500 feet of the official buildings of the foreign governments whose acts and policies they intend to criticize.” Complaint at 3-4, R.E. at 6-7. There is no ambiguity, therefore, in the statute’s application to the conduct primarily at issue. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 58-59, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 2446-47, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976) (<HOLDING>). Nor in any event is section 22-1115
holding that a formal summons and complaint were unnecessary because the motion before the court is not an independent action holding that a plaintiff had standing to attack an entire ordinance including portions of the ordinance not applied to the plaintiff holding that the challenge to the constitutionality of a 1996 fort lauderdale ordinance was moot where the ordinance had been amended in 1998 holding it unnecessary to consider vagueness challenge to an ordinance unquestionably applicable to the parties before the court holding that the plaintiffs due process challenge to a city ordinance was barred because it was inextricably intertwined with a statecourt ruling that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the ordinance