these cases is misplaced. The Court in Ewing and Horowitz merely “assumed, without deciding, that federal courts can review an academic decision of a pubbe educational institution under a substantive due process standard.” Ewing, 474 U.S. at 222, 106 S.Ct. 507; see also Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 91-92, 98 S.Ct. 948. In neither case did the Court affirmatively recognize a substantive due process right in a student’s continued enrollment in a public institution. Indeed, in both Ewing and Horowitz, the Court expressly stated that it would not reach the issue of whether the plaintiffs assumed property interest gave rise to a substantive right under the Due Process Clause because the plaintiffs claim failed even if the Court were to assume such a right. See Ewing, 474 U.S. at 223, 106 S.Ct. 507 (<HOLDING>); Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 91-92, 98 S.Ct. 948
holding that even if a students assumed property interest in a sixyear program of study culminating in an undergraduate degree and a medical degree gave rise to a substantive right under the due process clause to continued enrohment free from arbitrary state action the facts of record disclose no such action holding that there is no fourteenth amendment substantive due process right to be free from malicious prosecution and suggesting that such a cause of action might lie under the fourth amendment holding that there is no substantive due process right under the fourteenth amendment to be free from malicious prosecution recognizing that plaintiff can bring action under due process clause of state constitution recognizing right to cause of action as property right under navajo due process