VII claim, was premised on the identical allegation that Defendants retaliated against him for filing a complaint of race discrimination with the EEOC. Similar to the Title VII retaliation claim, Harper’s abuse of process claim and his claim of retaliation for filing a worker’s compensation claim related to facts precipitating or arising out of his termination; the complaint alleged that the “animus and malice” that led to his retaliatory termination also motivated Defendant Kelly and Childress’s decision to seek personal protection orders against Harper. Because these claims shared the same nucleus of operative facts, the district court did not abuse its discretion in exercising supplemental jurisdiction over them. After the district court denied Ha , 1334 (6th Cir.1989) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); Jones, 931 F.2d at 1090 (“Roadway may have
holding that the statelaw protecting employees from retaliatory discharge was independent from the cba because the statelaw claim could be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself holding that plaintiffs retaliatory discharge claim was not completely preempted and noting that state court on remand would have to apply federal law to remaining issues requiring interpretation of collective bargaining agreement recognizing the tort of retaliatory discharge recognizing that a texas common law claim for retaliatory discharge is a claim sounding in tort holding that plaintiffs retaliatory discharge claim under michigan law was not preempted because the statelaw tort of retaliatory discharge creates rights independent of those established by the collective bargaining agreement further holding that discrimination claim was not preempted even though the employer was likely to rely on provisions of the cba in its defense