to submit to testing or his license would be suspended. The implied consent law, however, nowhere “requires” a DUI arrestee to submit to testing, and the DPS officer’s admonition therefore did not mirror the statute. See A.R.S. § 28-1321(A), (B) (stating that although a DUI arrestee “gives consent” to testing of blood, breath, or other bodily substance, he “shall be requested to submit to and successfully complete” any such test) (emphasis added). But even assuming that the officer accurately paraphrased the law, this distinction is immaterial. The Bumper Court’s ruling turned on the grandmother’s acquiescence to the officer’s assertion of lawful authority to search regardless of the truthfulness of the officer’s claim to possess a warrant. See Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548-49, 88 S.Ct. 1788 (<HOLDING>). The officer’s claim of authority to search
recognizing that custody while not determinative in itself places a heavy burden in showing consent was voluntarily given and noting that custody when coupled with other coercive factors will normally necessitate the conclusion that the consent is not effective holding that consent was freely and voluntarily given despite officers advisement that the police could get a search warrant if consent was not given holding that the prosecutors burden to prove that consent was voluntarily given cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority holding there is no consent as a matter of law where the consent was given under coercion holding that the state must prove consent was voluntary not simply a submission to authority