information, from the person being interviewed. This line of questioning on redirect was in response to cross-examination by the defendant’s attorney, who elicited the fact that the phone number on the defendant’s FBI 302 interview form was incorrect. The defendant proposes that prosecutors knew that the error on the form was Special Agent Hultz’s because the same phone number (and thus the same error) was written on 302 interview forms from interviews with other defendants. The Defendant’s claim requires this Court to presume that prosecutors knew that the error occurred on two other FBI 302 forms, among the numerous exhibits used in this trial. See United States v. Barham, 595 F.2d 231, 240 (5th Cir.1979), citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, any prejudice was minimal as Hultz
holding that a conviction obtained through the knowing reckless or negligent use of false testimony must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury holding that a prosecutor accused of knowingly presenting false testimony at trial is protected by absolute immunity holding that the prosecutor is prohibited from knowingly presenting or failing to correct false and material evidence against the defendant holding that the knowing use of false testimony to obtain a conviction violates due process holding that prosecutor cannot obtain conviction with the aid of false testimony where the prosecutor knows such testimony is false