liable as an aider and abettor with a minimal showing of knowledge."); Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir.1975) ("[I]f the method or transaction is atypical ., it may be possible to infer the knowledge necessary for aiding and abetting liability."). Donnelly and KeyBank also assert that "there was no evidence that Donnelly or anyone else at Key{Bank] knew about Leahey's subordination agreement," and that neither Travelers nor Elmore ever "inform[ed] Key[Bank] that Travelers was relying on the $275,000 as a long-term capital contribution" to LGC & M. An alleged aider and abettor, however, need not know all of the details of the primary party's scheme for liability to attach. See, e.g., Woods v. Barnett Bank of Fort Lauderdale, 765 F.2d 1004, 1012 (11th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). Our conclusion with respect to Donnelly's and
recognizing both aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duties and aiding and abetting conversion recognizing aiding and abetting conversion recognizing aiding and abetting trespass holding it was not a surprise or unfair to the defendant for the state to pursue a theory of aiding and abetting at trial when the charging document did not refer to aiding and abetting holding that the knowledge requirement of aiding and abetting element was met even though the bank may not have known of all the details of the primary fraudthe misrepresentations omissions and other fraudulent practices