insists' that such an interpretation violated the plain language of both 18 U.S.C. § 2256(1), which defines minor as “any person under the age of eighteen years,” and U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(2)(C). This court has never addressed the question of whether a § 2G2.2(b)(2)(C) enhancement is appropriate for situations where the recipient of the child pornography is over eighteen, but believed by the defendant to be under eighteen. Other circuits have addressed that issue in the context of undercover police officers posing as minors. Compare United States v. Morton, 364 F.3d 1300, 1304 (11th Cir.2004), vacated and remanded, 543 U.S. 1136, 125 S.Ct. 1338, 161 L.Ed.2d 95, opinion reinstated by 144 Fed.Appx. 804 (11th Cir.), and cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1053, 126 S.Ct. 785, 163 L.Ed.2d 608 (2005) (<HOLDING>), with United States v. Stevens, 462 F.3d 1169,
holding that it is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy spacious as well as clean wellbalanced as well as carefully patrolled holding that victim of a minor or partial breach must continue own performance but victim of a material or total breach is excused from further performance holding that an undercover law enforcement officer qualified as a minor under ussg  2g22b4 based on the interchangeable use of minor and victim in the commentary to that guideline as well as the definition of victim in the commentary holding the harmed victim need not be the victim of the offense of conviction holding that the victim impact and victim vulnerability aggravators were not overbroad and explaining that though the concepts of victim impact and victim vulnerability may well be relevant in every case evidence of victim vulnerability and victim impact in a particular case is inherently individualized