core responsibilities. Section 348(e) provides that “[c]onversion of a case under section ... 1307 ... terminates the ser vices of any trustee ... that is serving m the case before such conversion.” 11 U.S.C. § 348(e). In the face of such explicit language terminating the authority of the chapter 13 trustee to administer the estate, I cannot find that the trustee retains such broad administrative powers as suggested by the Pegues, Hardin, and Galloway decisions. Having determined that creditors have no vested interest in the funds when they are paid to the trustee, I find that § 348(e) “precludes the Trustee from taking any action with respect to these funds after the conversion.” In re Luna, 73 B.R. at 1002 (emphasis added) (citing In re Perkins, 36 B.R. 618, 620 (Bank.M.D.Tenn.1983)) (<HOLDING>). Conclusion For reasons discussed above, I
holding that a chapter 7 trustee was the only person with authority to bring  a cause of action after the appointment of a trustee holding that the conversion of a chapter 7 petition to a chapter 13 petition was not final until the plan itself was approved recognizing authority of chapter 13 trustee to recover overpayment but not finding refund appropriate where error was attributable to trustee holding that funds held by chapter 13 trustee become property of the chapter 7 estate upon conversion not subject to exemption holding that chapter 13 trustee loses all authority to act when the conversion becomes effective