or other harm perpetrated by civilians against the petitioner’s group does not constitute persecution unless such acts are “committed by the government or forces the government is either ‘unable or unwilling’ to control.”). Second, only the attempted rape appears to rise to the seriousness required for persecution, and there is no allegation that it was anything other than a one-time incident. See Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 535 (3d Cir.2005) (“[T]wo isolated criminal acts, perpetrated by unknown assailants, which resulted only in the theft of some personal property and a minor injury, is not sufficiently severe to be considered persecution.”). Third, there is no evidence that these incidents were committed “on account of’ her Chinese ethnicity or Christian religion. Id. at 535 (<HOLDING>). We also note that Oroh presented no evidence
holding that a wifes minimal involvement in her husbands business coupled with the lack of evidence that she knew of or intended to further her husbands fraudulent schemes was insufficient evidence of conspiracy holding that  a single ethnic slur was insufficient to establish that the thieves were motivated by lies or her husbands ethnicity in robbing their store holding that where husbands grandfather had devised real estatefirst to his wife for life then to their daughter husbands mother for life and then to her child or children in fee husbands remainder interest in the realestate was tooremote to be considered marital property as it was subject to a complete defeasance if he predeceased his mother holding that persecution of a woman because of her government job or her husbands position as a police officer was not on account of a particular social group holding that the deceased defendant trustees wife was a representative of her husbands estate and a proper party for substitution purposes where the wife was the primary distributee of her deceased husbands estate