consideration is whether the citizen was under a reasonable impression that he was not free to leave the officer’s presence.” Crabtree v. State, 762 N.E.2d 241, 245 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (citing United States v. Wylie, 569 F.2d 62, 68 (D.C.Cir.1977)). The test for whether such a reasonable impression existed is what a reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would have thought had he been in the citizen’s shoes. Id. Although nothing in the record suggests that Calmes was a motorist and needed his license to leave the location, nonetheless, upon being asked if he was armed, a reasonable person in Calmes’s position would not feel free simply to terminate the encounter, leave his license with the police, and walk away. See, e.g., United States v. Crump, 62 F.Supp.2d 560, 564 (D.Conn.1999) (<HOLDING>); see also Dowdell v. State, 747 N.E.2d 564,
holding that the encounter between an officer and the defendant did not rise to the level of a terry stop until the defendant gave the officer his license and the officer informed the defendant that he was going to be given a patdown holding that by the time the officer asked the defendant if he could frisk him the encounter had evolved into a stop holding that the initial stop by officer was based on reasonable suspicion that defendant was impersonating a police officer although another officer arrested defendant for privacy act violation holding that once the officer asked the defendant to exit his vehicle the encounter became a stop because the defendant was no longer free to leave holding that defendant was seized where the officer told defendant that she knew that he was on probation defendant admitted to the officer that he had given her a false name and defendant was asked for consent to search a backpack because a reasonable inference was that defendant was the subject of a continuing investigation and his or her freedom of movement had been significantly restricted by the officers show of authority