as the center of the private lives of our people.” Id. at 115, 126 S.Ct. 1515 (quotation marks omitted). In the Court’s estimation, the right that a nonconsenting co-occupant has to privacy outweighs any interest the con senting co-oceupant has in allowing the premises to be searched. Id. As Justice Souter, writing for the Court, stated, We therefore hold that a warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence over the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident cannot be justified as reasonable as to him on the basis of consent given to the police by another resident. Id. at 120,126 S.Ct. 1515. [¶ 20] Randolph, however, does not require law enforcement to affirmatively seek the consent of physically present co-tenants who may object. Id. at 121-22, 126 S.Ct. 1515 (<HOLDING>). Here, a uniformed officer entered the camp.
holding that the implied consent law allows law enforcement officers to obtain blood in circumstances in which a warrant or actual consent may otherwise be required holding there is no consent as a matter of law where the consent was given under coercion holding that the state has no affirmative duty to seek out and gain possession of potentially exculpatory evidence holding that there is no need to affirmatively seek the consent of a potentially objecting cotenant when consent has been given by another cotenant unless law enforcement has removed the potentially objecting cotenant holding that because consent is not a statement and a request for consent is not an interrogation giving consent to search is a neutral fact which has no tendency to show that the suspect is guilty of any crime