to participating in cockfighting, HRS § 711-1109(1)(d) (1965 Repl.), pertaining to cruelty to animals, encompassed gamecocks and cockfighting but this court would not decide hypothetical cases “as applied to other persons in situations not before the court”). The relief that Plaintiffs request is essentially one of injunctive relief and would prohibit the State and County from enforcing HRS § 711-1109(1) and MCC § 9.08.010 against them. Such an injunction would greatly interfere with the enforcement of the law, especially in the determination of who should or should not be prosecuted. A declarative judgement in favor of Plaintiffs in this context would likely hinder enforcement of what are presumptively valid laws. See State v. Adler, 108 Hawai'i 169, 177, 118 P.3d 652, 660 (2005) (<HOLDING>); State v. Kam, 69 Haw. 483, 495, 748 P.2d 372,
holding the state failed to meet its burden of showing the erroneous jury instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where it did not address the issue on appeal recognizing that this court has consistently held that every enactment of the legislature is presumptively constitutional and a party challenging the statute has the burden of showing unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt holding that when a constitutional right is vested in a party and there is a doubt as to whether that right has been waived the doubt should be resolved in the defendants favor holding that we have consistently held that a private cause of action will not be found where the legislature has expressly provided for enforcement of a statute holding that even when a jury instruction is defective such a defect is cured when the court provides the jury with the indictment and instructs jurors that the burden of proof rests upon the state to prove every material allegation of the indictment and every essential element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt