predecessor to § 183 as including only the “actively responsible vessel” and not other ships or barges attached thereto. As Quinn recognizes, however, this literal reading of vessel has not been uniformly applied through the years. In Sacramento Navigation Co. v. Salz, 273 U.S. 326, 332, 47 S.Ct. 368, 370-71, 71 L.Ed. 663 (1927), the Court read Liverpool narrowly as applying only in “pure tort” situations where “no contractual obligations [are] involved.” Where the cause of action is for loss of cargo being transported pursuant to a shipping contract, the entire flotilla—in that case a tug and the barge, it was towing—engaged in the act of shipping can be regarded as the “vessel.” Id/, see also Patton-Tully Transportation Co. v. Ratliff, 715 F.2d 219, 222 (5th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). This is what is commonly referred to as the
holding that a shareholder lacks standing to bring a suit based on loss in value to his or her shares as this injury derives from and thus is not distinct from the injury to the corporation holding the limitation fund liability of a defendant shipowner may be increased to include his interest in the value of all vessels engaged in a common enterprise or venture with the vessel aboard which the loss or injury was sustained holding that a party who lends money to be used in the repairs of a vessel or to furnish the vessel with supplies does not have a privilege against the vessel holding that where the real value of an anchoring system design is in the idea not in the physical plans that memorialize it any loss in value of the design represents a loss in the value of the idea which is not a loss of use of tangible property holding a contract clause stating that the yard shall in no case be held responsible for the damages resulting from any loss of use or profit of the vessel to be unambiguous