1, 1987, it replaced 18 U.S.C. § 3568. See United States v. Lucas, 898 F.2d 1554, 1554-55 & n. 1 (11th Cir.1990) (per curiam). Section 3568 had provided in pertinent part: The sentence of imprisonment of any person convicted of an offense shall commence to run from the date on which such person is received at the penitentiary, reformatory, or jail for service of such sentence. The Attorney General shall give any such person credit toward service of his sentence for any days spent in custody in connection with the offense or acts for which sentence was imposed. 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (repealed) (emphasis added). We had previously interpreted the “in custody” language of § 3568 as requiring actual incarceration. See Spinola v. United States, 941 F.2d 1528, 1529 (11th Cir.1991) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). 2 . The judiciary retains the last word on
holding that time spent on a highly restricted appellate bond did not entitle a federal prisoner to sentencing credit holding time spent on electronic monitoring while on bail release does not constitute custody within meaning of sentencing credit statute holding that substantial attempts by surety may entitle it to remission of bond forfeiture holding that a defendant does not receive credit against the maximum revocation prison term for time previously spent on home detention holding that due process clause does not require a federal prisoner to receive credit for time spent on supervised release if release is revoked