reflection.” Id. (quoting Fowler v. State, 379 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex.Crim.App.1964)). Here, the evidence established that when Officer Mullinax responded to Latar-sha’s 9-1-1 call he found Latarsha “clearly upset,” her hands were shaking badly, and she was crying. The record does not indicate what period of time elapsed between the altercation and Latarsha’s statement, but a reasonable inference exists that 9-1-1 response time is fairly quick. Based on these facts, we cannot say that the trial court acted outside the zone of reasonable disagreement by overruling Davis’s hearsay objection to Officer Mullinax’s recitation of Latarsha’s hearsay statement that Davis had gotten angry and pushed her into a wall and by admitting it as an excited utterance. See, e.g., Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 596 (<HOLDING>); Jackson v. State, 110 S.W.3d 626, 634
holding statements qualified as excited utterances where declarant was scared and tired and her statements were in response to questions twenty hours after the event holding that the statements of a scared to death declarant whispering help me to police officers twenty hours after being assaulted were excited utterances holding that the statements of a recently assaulted very upset and crying assault victim were excited utterances holding that the determination of whether statements are excited utterances is within the trial courts discretion and its ruling will be reversed only for an abuse of that discretion holding that statements made while the declarant was in pain crying bleeding and having trouble breathing were properly admissible as excited utterances