been amended effective July 1, 2006. 4 . As is explained herein, t 8 L.Ed.2d 961 (2001); Mullen v. Princess Anne Vol. Fire Co., 853 F.2d 1130, 1137 (4th Cir.1988) (noting that the "shifting burdens of production of Burdine ... are beyond the function and expertise of the jury” and are "overly complex”); Walther v. Lone Star Gas Co., 952 F.2d 119, 127 (5th Cir.1992) ("Instructing the jury on the elements of a prima facie case, presumptions, and the shifting burden of proof is unnecessary and confusing. Instead, the court should instruct the jury to consider the ultimate question of whether defendant terminated plaintiff because of his age”); Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 849-50 (8th Cir.1997) (en banc) (Loken, J., in Part II.A. of the dissent, which a majority of the court joined) (<HOLDING>); Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d
holding that a trial court cannot decide the issue of attorneys fees without findings as to one spouses ability to pay and the others need holding that the jury need only decide the ultimate issue of intentional discrimination and usually need not make findings on the prima facie case or whether the defendants explanation is pretextual holding that although a jury instruction that included the phrase prima facie case and referred to defendants burden of production created a distinct risk of confusing the jury in certain instances it would be appropriate to instruct the jury on the elements of a prima facie case holding that because the plaintiff was not disabled for the purposes of the ada this court need not to address the other elements of the prima facie case holding that once prosecutor makes raceneutral explanation for peremptory challenge and trial court rules on question of intentional discrimination issue of prima facie case becomes moot