access to legal materials, health endangerment, and the possibility that his refusal to admit his guilt during sex offender programming would lead to a longer period of incarceration. Some of these challenges might properly be raised in a habeas petition, while others must be raised in a § 1983 civil rights complaint. To further complicate matters, Sherratt sought not only immediate release from confinement (a habeas remedy), but also declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and monetary damages (civil rights remedies). In resolving Sherratt’s petition, the district court first noted that to the extent Sherratt was attacking as unconstitutional his conditions of confinement, he was required to proceed in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. See Rael v. Williams, 223 F.3d 1153, 1154 (10th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). To the extent, however, that Sherratt was
holding that the district court erred in summarily dismissing a  1983 complaint that should have been brought as a habeas petition holding that conditionsofconfinement claims must be brought in 42 usc  1983 civil rights complaint rather than in habeas petition holding that claims under 42 usc  1983 are not personal injury tort claims holding that the state law of collateral estoppel applies in civil rights actions brought under 42 usc  1983 holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983