before us, and therefore we need not decide this issue. Id. at 530 n. 9. Here, we have the facts that M.L. addressed and the issue that it did not decide. P.J. entered into a plea agreement where he agreed to pay a specific amount of restitution instead of leaving the amount to the discretion of the juvenile court. We conclude that it can fairly be said that P.J. has waived his right to have the juvenile court inquire into his ability to pay, as he has acknowledged such ability in his plea agreement. Waiver notwithstanding, we observe that the juvenile court accepted the plea, and it was therefore strictly bound by the plea’s sentencing provisions and precluded from exercising discretion to determine the amount of restitution. See Allen v. State, 865 N.E.2d 686, 689 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) (<HOLDING>). We further observe that, unlike in M.L., the
holding that the government was bound by an agreement it treated as binding although it preceded the formal plea agreement holding that when a court accepts a fixed plea agreement it is bound by the agreements terms holding federal court is not bound by terms of plea agreement between defendant and state authorities holding that the state is bound to carry out its side of the bargain once the court accepts a plea agreement holding that both the state and the defendant are bound to the terms of a plea agreement under santobello