court.” Dilts, 103 P.3d at 96, 101. In Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d at 148 n. 17, the Minnesota Supreme Court observed that "the legislature ha[d] recently enacted significant new requirements for aggravated sentencing departures, including sentencing juries and bifurcated trials, and that th[o]se changes appl[ied] both prospectively and to resentencing hearings” and, as such, it ”express[ed] no opinion about these recent changes, and d[id] not foreclose the district court from considering any constitutionally applicable and/or available laws on remand.” Further, subsequent to that decision, the Minnesota courts have found error where the trial court failed to exercise its inherent power to empanel a jury to avoid any Apprendi problem. See State v. Boehl, 726 N.W.2d 831, 842 (Minn.Ct.App.2007) (<HOLDING>). In State v. Provost, 179 Vt. 337, 896 A.2d
holding that the district court possessed the inherent judicial authority to empanel a resentencing jury on remand from  reversal of the respondents enhanced sentence and because the district court erred by failing to recognize that it possessed this inherent judicial authority boehl reversed and remanded for the district courts discretionary determination of whether to exercise that authority recognizing district courts inherent authority to dismiss with prejudice for abuse of judicial process holding that outside of rule 35 there exists no inherent authority for a district court to modify a sentence holding that the district court was not required to state affirmatively on the record that it knew it possessed the authority to depart downward holding that district courts have inherent judicial authority to impanel sentencing jury for purposes of departing from presumptive sentence