prejudice the defendant. “Darden ignores all this. He contends' that under Nixon defense counsel’s failure to consult with defendant before strategically conceding guilt automatically triggers Cronic’s presumption-of-prejudice standard, even if defense counsel’s strategy to concede guilt was a reasonable, even excellent one. If we accept Darden’s contention we must also accept that Cronic can apply even in cases where defense counsel subjected the! government’s case to meaningful adversarial testing. Without further direction from the Su arding concession of guilt at trial, courts have found a constructive denial of counsel only in those instances where a defendant’s attorney concedes the only factual issues in dispute. See United States v. Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). In contrast, those courts that have
holding that a factual dispute is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit and genuine only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party holding that an evidentiary hearing is not required if there are no factual issues in dispute recognizing that in those cases where the jurisdictional facts are intertwined with the facts central to the merits of the dispute it is the better view that  the entire factual dispute is appropriately resolved only by a proceeding on the merits citations omitted holding that a lawyer who informs the jury that it is his view of the evidence that there is no reasonable doubt regarding the only factual issues that are in dispute has utterly failed to subject the prosecutions case to meaningful adversarial testing holding issues of fact in dispute are solely for the jury