apparently arguing that increased costs demonstrate competitive harm. However, Dr. McCluer does not reference any concrete instances of increases in costs to patients on which a jury could rely to find that such harm occurred, nor does he opine that costs necessarily, or even probably, increased in this case. (See id. at 22-25, 35-37.) Without more, it would be unreasonable for a jury to take the large inferential step from Dr. McCluer’s generalized opinions to find that patient costs increased as a result of anti-competitive activity in the instant case. The Court has no obligation to sift through Dr. McCluer’s report, or the record as a whole, to determine whether there is any other evidence of an antitrust injury. Mitchell v. City of Moore, 218 F.3d 1190, 1199 (10th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). “[0]n a motion for summary judgment, ‘it is
holding that arguments not raised in district court are waived holding that the court is not obligated to comb the record in order to make the plaintiffs arguments for it holding that a motion to reconsider is not a second opportunity for the losing party to make its strongest case to rehash arguments or to dress up arguments that previously failed holding that a district court need not comb the record to find some reason to deny a motion for summary judgment particularly where the evidence is not set forth in the opposing papers with adequate references so that it could conveniently be found holding that the court should make factual findings from the record evidence as if it were conducting a trial on the record