punitive damages award that would serve the punitive and deterrent goals of punitive damages, merely because of the good fortune that Aguilar suffered little harm. Abner, 513 F.3d at 163-64 (quoting Cush-Crawford, 271 F.3d at 359). Because I find that the jury’s punitive damages award withstands due process “excessiveness” scrutiny, I must reduce the award to the statutory cap of $300,000. To the extent that Title VII’s statutory cap replaces a comparable civil penalty and other factors as a yardstick of constitutionality of a punitive damages award in discrimination cases, cf. Zhang, 339 F.3d at 1045 (using Title VII’s statutory cap as a comparator in a § 1981 discrimination case, because there was no civil penalty for discrimination claims); see also Abner, 513 F.3d at 164 (<HOLDING>), an award at the statutory cap here is
holding that the combination of the statutory cap and a high threshold for culpability for punitive damages in a title vii case confined a punitive damages award within the cap to a level tolerated by due process holding tcpa is remedial statute and that statutory damages are not punitive damages holding a court may not award punitive damages holding without discussion of the punitive damages issue that judgment for embezzlement which included actual and punitive damages was nondischargeable holding that the termination of the fee cap did not affect litigation in progress when the fee cap was in effect