reason to believe will be seen by others; not to distinguish between an intentional exposure intended to offend the sensibilities of others and an intentional exposure that is not intended to offend the sensibilities of others. All that Peery holds is that intent to be indecent or lewd is an element of indecent exposure, and one does not have this intent where the exposure is accidental. Peery does not hold that exposure intended to be seen by others is not indecent exposure if it is not intended to offend the sensibilities of others. Furthermore, the indecent exposure statute includes only one term referring t penal statute must be strictly construed, that does not justify a court in supplying restrictive language that is not there. See State v. Zacher, 504 N.W.2d 468, 473 (Minn.1993) (<HOLDING>); State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625, 627-28
recognizing that when an interpretation upholding the constitutionality of a statute is available to this court it must adopt that construction holding an administrative interpretation cannot change the meaning of a statute or control the courts interpretation of it holding that the rule of strict construction does not require the court to assign the narrowest possible interpretation to the statute holding that the courts in the absence of ambiguity should as a general rule confine themselves to a construction of a statute as written and not attempt under the guise of construction to supply omissions or remedy possible defects in the statute or to insert exceptions not made by the legislature holding that if an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems and where an alternative interpretation of the statute is fairly possible we are obligated to construe the statute to avoid such problems