“are required not where a suspect is simply taken into custody, but rather where a suspect in custody is subjected to interrogation.”). Because the accused’s purpose in requesting an attorney must be determined in order to sort the interplay of these rights, the McNeil Court concluded that an effective invocation of tire Fifth Amendment right to counsel “applies only when the suspect ‘ha[s] expressed’ bis wish for the particular sort of lawyerly assistance that is the subject of Miranda. [Citation omitted.] It requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by the police.” McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178. See State v. Walker, 276 Kan. 939, 945, 80 P.3d 1132 (2003) (<HOLDING>). The Montejo Court reiterated this analysis
recognizing two aspects to assertion of fifth amendment rights 1 a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand request was made for an attorney and 2 the request was for assistance with a custodial interrogation not for subsequent hearings or proceedings holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation holding that juveniles request for parent is invocation of fifth amendment rights holding that a suspects request for counsel to advise him on whether he should consent to a police search pursuant to the indiana constitution did not invoke his miranda right to counsel during a subsequent custodial interrogation holding that an unequivocal invocation of the fifth amendment right to counsel must be presented in a manner that a reasonable police officer under similar circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for the presence of an attorney