disagree. The possible effect on the jury of Holmes’s . fleeting comment regarding Trinidad’s pre-trial incarceration status is markedly different from that of a defendant wearing prison clothing throughout his entire trial. The Supreme Court held in Estelle that the clothing would be a “constant reminder” of the defendant’s condition as a pretrial detainee. 425 U.S. at 504, 96 S.Ct. 1691 (emphasis added). Here, on the contrary, we are dealing with a single, isolated statement that was made and put to rest, and that did not provide any details about Trinidad’s incarceration. A number of cases — both from this and other circuits — -support this crucial distinction and counsel that we reject Trinidad’s argument. See, e.g., United States v. De Jesús Mateo, 373 F.3d 70, 73 (1st Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Deandrade, 600 F.3d
holding that there was no abuse of discretion in denying mistrial based on a comment that the defendant was in prison where the comment provided the jury with little detail holding that comment by prosecutor in closing argument that defense counsel did not produce evidence of the defendants innocence was not a comment on the defendants failure to testify holding that if comment is fairly susceptible of being construed by the jury as a comment on the defendants exercise of his or her right to remain silent it violates the defendants state constitutional right to silence whether comment was introduced in states caseinchief or for impeachment purposes holding that the state may not impeach a defendant with his postarrest or postmiranda silence holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial and instead giving a curative instruction when an improper comment on a defendants silence was not directed to any particular statement or defense offered by the defendant was made during the witnesss explanation of the course of events and did not have the effect of being probative on the issue of guilt or innocence holding that district court acted within its discretion in denying motion for mistrial when prosecutor commented on matter not in evidence in closing argument because comment was not sufficiently prejudicial when taken together with the courts later jury instruction that the jurys recollection of the evidence controlled and that the attorneys arguments were not evidence 