should be drawn from the defendant's failure to call his accomplices to testify. The prosecutor remarked only that Mitchell had the power to subpoena witnesses, and that the defense could do so "if they thought it would contradict something [the State! presented.” In light of defense counsel’s earlier statements that "clearly you have a situation where a misidentification could take place,” and that the jury should be able to see Corprew, Cochran, and Henderson in the courtroom, the prosecutor's remarks did not relate to the substance of those witnesses’ potential testimonies. Had the prosecutor inferred that Corprew, Cochran, and Henderson would have testified unfavorably to the defense, that inference might well have conflicted with Christensen, 274 Md. at 140-41, 333 A.2d at 49 (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, we conclude that the
holding that trial court has discretion to permit defendant to call accused witness to stand and permit witness to invoke fifth amendment privilege in front of jury where entire defense was centered on witness commission of crime holding that sixth amendment only requires that witness be brought to court not that he be required to take witness stand after refusing to testify and observing that it is irrelevant whether the witnesss refusal is grounded in a valid fifth amendment privilege an invalid privilege or something else entirely holding that an adverse inference cannot be drawn from a defendants failure to call a witness if the states evidence establishes that the witness is an accomplice who would be entitled to assert a fifth amendment privilege holding that witness was not an accomplice in distributing marijuana to himself holding that the prosecutors comment regarding the defendants failure to call a potential witness did not shift the burden of proof because it did not implicate the defendants fifth amendment right not to testify