of statutes of limitations and thus subject to waiver or forfeiture, rather than being jurisdictional."); Million v. Frank, 47 F.3d 385, 389 (10th Cir.1995) ("Compliance with filing requirements of Title VII is not a jurisdictional prerequisite, rather it is a condition precedent to suit that functions like a statute of limitations and is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.”). 2 . The district court erroneously assumed that the time limit for filing suit in this case was thirty days from the agency’s final action. This assumption apparently was based on the district court's belief that Mr. Belhomme's suit was controlled by the version of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) that existed prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Cf. Million v. Frank, 47 F.3d 385, 390 (10th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). In 1991, Congress amended subsection 16(c) to
holding that the thirtyday deadline applies to a claim that arose prior to the 1991 act holding that the damages and jury trial provisions of the 1991 act apply to conduct occurring prior to the date of enactment holding that prior adjudication barred a claim that arose out of the same transactions and that could have been raised in prior suit holding that conduct prior to passage of the civil rights act of 1991 is admissible to provide context and background holding that  1658 applies to claims arising out of the 1991 act