perjury. Id. We have held that, to succeed on a Giglio claim, a defendant must show that the government “knowingly used perjured testimony, or failed to correct what he subsequently learned was false testimony, and that the falsehood was material.” United States v. Dickerson, 248 F.3d 1036, 1041 (11th Cir.2001) (internal quotations omitted). In Wilcox v. Ford, 813 F.2d 1140, 1148 (11th Cir.1987), we held that a defendant’s due process rights were not violated by the introduction of allegedly coerced witness testimony, because the defendant was aware of the nature of the interrogation, had access to the tapes and transcripts of the interrogation prior to trial, and was able to cross-examine both witnesses. Id. at 1148-49; see also Brown v. Jones, 255 F.3d 1273, 1281-82 (11th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Here, there is no evidence that Rudinsky
holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation holding that the sixth amendment generally permits interrogation of a represented person only 1 if it was the defendant and not the government who initiated the interrogation and 2 if the defendant voluntarily waived his right to counsel holding that a consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of miranda  holding that where a second interrogation postmiranda attempted to recreate a first interrogation premiranda statement from the latter was inadmissible holding that the district court did not err in admitting evidence of an allegedly coerced interrogation where the taped interrogation was played for jurors and the defendant crossexamined the witness at length about the interrogation