court jurisdiction and its silence on the matter of federal jurisdiction”); Erienet, Inc. v. Velocity Net, Inc., 156 F.3d 513 (3d Cir.1998) (accepting the holding oí International Science, supra, that the federal statute "intended to authorize private causes of action only in state court”); Foxhall Realty Law Offices, Inc. v. Telecommunications Premium Services, Ltd., 156 F.3d 432, 438 (2d Cir.1998) ("Congress intended to confer exclusive state court jurisdiction over private rights of action” under the Act); Nicholson v. Hooters of Augusta, Inc., 136 F.3d 1287, 1289, modified 140 F.3d 898 (11th Cir.1998) ("Congress intended to assign the private right of action [under the Act] to state courts exclusively”); Chair King, Inc. v. Houston Cellular Corp., 131 F.3d 507, 510 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). 6 . An earlier Texas intermediate appellate
holding that there was no federal subject matter jurisdiction under the private cause of action provision of the act holding there is no federal private right of action for borrowers under the nfia holding veilpiercing claim does not state cause of action under erisa and cannot independently support federal subject matter jurisdiction holding subject matter jurisdiction divested because federal cause of action had been dismissed without prejudice holding that the elements of a cause of action were not subject matter jurisdictional simply because the statute that created the cause of action provided that district courts shall have jurisdiction of such actions