v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985) ("Though Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made."); State v. Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d 331, 588 N.W.2d 606 (1999) (finding oral statements made before a Miranda warning inadmissible, but written statements made after Miranda warning admissible); Briggs v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 313, 251 N.W.2d 12 (1977) (finding that even where an initial statement made without Miranda warnings was inadmissible, subsequent statements given at a police station after Miranda warnings were admissible as they were the result of routine investigative procedures); State v. Loeffler, 60 Wis. 2d 556, 211 N.W.2d 1 (1973) (<HOLDING>). 15 The dissent is concerned that the
holding that selfinitiated statements volunteered after miranda warnings had been given are admissible holding incustody statements which stem from an illegal arrest are not rendered admissible merely because defendant had been given miranda warnings holding that although defendants voluntarily given initial statement was inadmissible because of miranda violation subsequent statement made after careful miranda warnings were given and waiver was obtained was admissible holding that false statements are constitutionally protected holding that statements given after miranda warnings are admissible even when the arrest that preceded the statements was constitutionally deficient