deferred [plaintiffs’] ability to discover the facts supporting the cause of action.” Here, plaintiffs knew the facts relevant to amendment, the John Doe officers’ names, from defendants’ initial disclosures received the date the scheduling order was issued. Further, because plaintiffs have not once alleged that they were “unreachable,” this case is not akin to Huber v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 10 Civ. 09348(ALC)(DF), 2012 WL 6082385, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2012) (finding good cause based on, inter alia, counsel’s inability to contact client). Plaintiffs nonetheless urge that because defendants would not be prejudiced by the untimely amendment, the district court erred in its good cause determination. See Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 244 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). We are not persuaded. That defendants
holding that the relevant inquiry is not whether the court has discretion to facilitate notice but whether this is an appropriate case in which to exercise discretion holding that the application of the fair use doctrine at the pleading stage is appropriate recognizing that district court in exercise of its rule 16b discretion may consider other relevant factors including in particular whether allowing the amendment of the pleading at this stage of the litigation will prejudice defendants holding that in exercise of its discretion district court may consider factors such as number of requests made and number of documents withheld holding that under the arbitrary and capricious standard this court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment