to regulate the affairs of Indians on a reservation”). Thus, barring a specific act of Congress or federal treaty, or a tribe’s express consent to jurisdiction, a state may not assert jurisdiction over a civil action by a non-Indian against an Indian arising out of events occurring in Indian country. “The [Indian nations] . . . [are] distinct communitfies], occupying [their] own territory ... in which the laws of [the states] can have no force, and which the citizens of [the states] have no right to enter, but with the assent of the [Indian nations] themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of Congress.” Williams, 358 U.S. at 219 (quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 560 (1832); see also Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U.S. 423, 429 (1971) (<HOLDING>). As noted by real parties in interest, where
holding that the wisconsin supreme court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law in determining that public law 280 conferred civil jurisdiction to the state of wisconsin to commit burgess an enrolled member of an indian tribe as a sexually violent person holding that pursuant to amended public law 280 a tribe must consent to state court civil jurisdiction over actions arising against member indians in indian country holding that state of south dakota does not have criminal jurisdiction over indians in indian country holding the existence of jurisdiction in state courts to hear a dispute by a materials supplier against a contractor in an indian housing agency under the authority of public law 280 holding that oklahoma police officer was without jurisdiction to arrest indian inside indian reservation when the state has neither received by express grant nor acted pursuant to congressional authorization to assume criminal jurisdiction over indian country