of petitioner’s exchange with Sprague, he should not have imposed a sentence of incarceration in the absence of counsel, without record proof of a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. Because Sprague had a right to counsel, there should have been no suggestion that he could suffer a disability for exercising that right. This constitutes legal error and an abuse of discretion. The United States Supreme Court held that “absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense * * * unless he was represented by counsel * * Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662, 122 S.Ct. 1764, 152 L.Ed.2d 888 (2002) (quoting Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972)); see also State v. Bluitt, 850 A.2d 83, 88-89 (R.I.2004) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,
holding that in order for a waiver of counsel to be valid the trial court must ensure that the defendants waiver of his right to counsel is done knowingly and intelligently so that the record establishes that the defendants choice is made with eyes open holding that under the sixth amendment a criminal defendant may waive his right to counsel if that waiver is knowing intelligent and voluntary holding that trial judges must be satisfied that an accused is making a knowing voluntary and intelligent waiver of counsel having been advised of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation such that there is a record demonstration that an accused elected to proceed without counsel with eyes open holding that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person who has been advised by competent counsel may not be collaterally attacked holding a waiver of a substantial constitutional right must be a voluntary knowing and intelligent act