where a plaintiff had discovered the defendant’s alleged negligence before the statute of limitations had expired, but then waited two years before filing the complaint. See New Castle County, 111 F.3d at 1126. In contrast to these cases, Scary filed his motion for ifp and motion for counsel along with his complaint well within the initial 90-day period. He resubmitted copies of his complaint and right to sue letter with his January 10, 2000 letter and his “Motion for Reopening.” No inference of dilatory or inequitable conduct can be drawn from the plaintiffs failure to pay the filing fee immediately after the motion for ifp was denied, given that the motion for counsel was still pending and given what was told to him. See Brown v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 48, 51 (7th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). The Court finds that Scary acted with
holding that a rule 12b6 motion to dismiss should be treated as a motion for summary judgment when plaintiffs counsel relied upon facts outside the four corners of the complaint during oral argument of the motion holding that the statute of limitations should be tolled until both the motion for ifp and the motion for counsel are ruled upon holding statute of limitations should not be equitably tolled for taxpayer who filed a refund claim after the applicable statute of limitations holding that the limitations period should be tolled until the plaintiff became aware of the facts necessary to support a charge of discrimination holding that because the finality of judgment is effectively postponed by the timely filing of a motion under rule 59 the deadline for filing a motion for attorneys fees is tolled until the postjudgment motion is resolved