CERCLA preempts state law in this situation. See Barton Solvents, Inc. v. Southwest Petro-Chem, Inc., 836 F.Supp. 757, 761 (D.Kan.1993); BASF Corp. v. Central Transport, Inc., 830 F.Supp. 1011, 1013 (E.D.Mich.1993); Bancamerica Commercial Corporation v. Mosher Steel of Kansas, Inc., 1993 WL 370817, *1 (D.Kan.1993); City and County of Denver v. Adolph Coors Co., 813 F.Supp. 1471, 1474-75 (D.Colo.1992); Stychno v. Ohio Edison Co., 806 F.Supp. 663, 669 (N.D.Ohio 1992); Traverse Bay Area Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. Hitco, Inc., 762 F.Supp. 1298, 1301 (W.D.Mich.1991); United States v. Distler, 741 F.Supp. 643, 646 (W.D.Ky.1990); United States v. Sharon Steel Corp., 681 F.Supp. 1492, 1496-98 (D.Utah 1987); but see Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co., 817 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Having found CERCLA preempts South Carolina’s
holding cercla does not preempt californias corporate capacity statute holding that erisa does not preempt professional malpractice claims recognizing cercla successor liability holding that notice not required because cercla is a strict liability statute holding that californias antislapp statute is applicable in federal court