a liquor vendor. Rather, contribution and indemnity are only discussed in section 340A.802. But the statute of limitations provision at issue here, which is in section 340A.802, subdivision 2, states “[n]o action may be maintained under section 31f.0A.801 unless commenced within two years after the injury.” (Emphasis added.) Because the legislature could have but did not make the statute of limitations applicable to “any action brought under this act,” we read the two-year limitation as only applying to direct actions against the liquor vendor brought under section 340A.801. And we note that this interpretation is consistent with a prior Minnesota Supreme Court decision dealing with statute of limitation bars to contribution and indemnity claims. See City of Willmar, 512 N.W.2d at 877 (<HOLDING>). In conclusion, to avoid the absurd result of
holding defendants counterclaims barred by statute of limitations and did not relate back to date plaintiff filed action holding that the uccs fouryear statute of limitations provision which barred an action by the plaintiff did not bar a thirdparty contribution and indemnity claim holding that plaintiffs entering into a consent agreement with the epa did not trigger the running of the statute of limitations under  113g3 for purposes of a  113f1 contribution action and further distinguishing a  113f1 contribution action from a cost recovery action to which the limitations periods of  113g2 would apply holding that the eleventh amendment does not bar the united states from asserting an indemnity claim against a state holding that any action that was made possible by a post1990 enactment carries a fouryear statute of limitations even if not a wholly new cause of action