“[w]e must distinguish between the culpable mental state required for the commission of the offense ... and the language ‘committed against a minor’ ” that instead concerns sentencing enhancement. State v. Williams, 175 Ariz. 98, 102, 854 P.2d 131, 135 (1993). The words “committed against” describe an actus reus and would therefore be an illogical word choice for a legislature seeking to reach a broader class of defendants based exclusively on their mens rea. See State v. Sarullo, 219 Ariz. 431, n.2, 199 P.3d 686, 691 n.2 (App. 2008) (rejecting argument “that the only victim of a burglary is the person against whom the theft or felony was intended to be committed”) (emphasis added); State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court, 184 Ariz. 409, 410-11, 909 P.2d 476, 477-78 (App. 1995) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 31 The legislature’s other uses of the same
holding that police officers are entitled to conduct an investigatory stop of a motorist if they have reasonable suspicion that the motorist has committed a traffic violation holding that a joint tortfeasor may assert a claim for contribution against the plaintiffs uninsured motorist carrier for the torts of an unknown driver holding the crime of conspiracy is committed or not before the substantive crime begins holding that where police officers had stopped a vehicle because they suspected that the motorist was intoxicated irrespective of whether the deputies were justified in detaining the motorist after he showed no signs of intoxication and even if they had not after approaching the motorist observed conditions raising a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot they were entitled to ask the motorist for permission to search his vehicle holding motorist struck by drunk driver had the crime of dui  committed against him regardless of defendants intent