See Nason, Koziol, and Wall, Workers’ Compensation § 27.12, at 100 & n.9.50 (Supp. 2014) (“The Massachusetts Appeals Court has clearly settled this debate, holding [in Curry] that the double recovery [prohibition] is limited to compensation payments; therefore, the insurer cannot receive reimbursement from that portion of the third party recovery attributable to payment for the employee’s conscious pain and suffering.”) The settled interpretation of a statute “ought not to be lightly disturbed. Stability of interpretation is signally desirable in [such] matters.” Commissioner of Rev. v. Oliver, 436 Mass. 467,475 (2002), quoting from Welch v. Boston, 211 Mass. 178, 185 (1912). As further addressed herein, Curry is in accord with Eisner v. Hertz Corp., 381 Mass. 127, 133 (1980) (<HOLDING>); Huitin v. Francis Harvey & Sons, 40 Mass.
holding that only deliberate conduct by a municipality which actually causes an injury is compensable under section 1983 holding that because the debtors obligations were not discharged section 524 did not apply holding state courts authority under iowa code section 59821 not the lien created there under prevented debtor from claiming the iowa homestead exemption and therefore the debtor could not avoid the lien because the lien did not impair an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled but for the lien holding that time was not compensable where the employer provided but did not require use of a shuttle holding that a  15 lien did not apply because that section does not require reimbursement for an injury not compensable under c 152