that the firearm will not be used to enhance the defendant’s sentence. Pofahl, 990 F.2d at 1486. Here, however, Diana Buchanan’s only objection to the findings in the presentence report was based on her acquittal of the charge of using or carrying a firearm during a drug-trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The fact that the jury acquitted Diana Buchanan on this charge does not, without more, amount to a factual dispute with the presentence report that Diana Buchanan possessed a firearm within the meaning of § 2D1.1(b)(1). The district court adopted the findings in the presentence report. Without a specific factual controversy, further factual findings under Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(D) are not required. Compare United States v. Mir, 919 F.2d 940, 943 (5th Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>) with Pofahl, 990 F.2d at 1486 (remanding for
holding that where defendant did not offer any rebuttal evidence to refute presentence report district court  was free to adopt facts in psi without further inquiry holding that the district court may adopt facts contained in the psr without further inquiry if the facts have an adequate evidentiary basis and the defendant does not present rebuttal evidence holding that sentencing court may not adopt facts from codefendants presentence report that was not disclosed to defendant holding that because the defendant did not object to the factual recitations in the psi he effectively admitted the facts in the psi holding that bald unsupported assertions by the defendant cannot refute presentence investigation report