at 1560 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Wise relies on Marttila v. City of Lynchburg, 33 Va.App. 592, 535 S.E.2d 693 (2000), in support of his assertion. In Marttila, the appellant challenged his conviction under Code § 18.2-16, Virginia’s breach of peace statute, which criminalizes “fighting words.” 33 Va.App. at 598, 535 S.E.2d at 698. We recognized that when confronted with an individual’s use of “fighting words,” police officers were required to exercise “greater restraint in their responses than the average citizen.” Id. at 600, 535 S.E.2d at 697. Code § 18.2-460(C) aims, however, to protect the integrity of the legal process, not any individual personally. Whether a speaker’s words would provoke a law enfo , 92 S.Ct. 1103, 1104, 31 L.Ed.2d 408 (1972) (<HOLDING>); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 3, 69
holding a georgia statute that criminalized using opprobrious words or abusive language tending to cause a breach of peace unconstitutional because first amendment protections forbid the states to punish the use of words or language not within narrowly limited classes of speech  holding that under chaplinsky any statute punishing or regulating the use of abusive language must be limited to fighting words holding unconstitutional a statute barring the use of opprobrious words or abusive language tending to cause a breach of the peace holding that instructions are sufficient which substantially follow the language of the statute or use equivalent language holding unconstitutionally broad a statute prohibiting the use of opprobrious language toward or with reference to any member of the city police while in the actual performance of his duty