We conclude as well that any alleged defect in Dr. Schmidtgoessling’s assistance cannot be attributed to counsel. Fautenberry argues that Dr. Schmidt-goessling misdiagnosed his mental condition when she concluded that he did not suffer from organic brain damage. Even if we assume that Dr. Schmidtgoessling did misdiagnose Fautenberry, “[a] licensed practitioner is generally held to be competent, unless counsel has good reason to believe to the contrary.” Lundgren v. Mitchell, 440 F.3d 754, 772 (6th Cir.2006). Fautenberry has not shown that counsel had “good reason” to believe that Dr. Schmidtgoessling was incompetent, and we conclude that it was objectively reasonable for counsel to rely upon the doctor’s opinions and conclusions. See Campbell v. Coyle, 260 F.3d 531, 555 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Under these circumstances, any inadequacies
holding in a case where there was no evidence that the expert was incompetent or that the petitioners lawyers had any reason to question the experts professional qualifications that it was objectively reasonable for  trial counsel to rely upon the experts diagnosis holding the experts opinion testimony lacked a proper foundation when there was no physical evidence of sexual abuse and the experts admitted that their conclusions were based solely on the childrens statements that they had been abused holding that the trial court committed no abuse of discretion in denying the appointment of the defendants requested expert as there was no undue prejudice to the defendant because the defendants claim on the predicted effect of the experts testimony was purely speculative holding there was no doubt that the trial judge erred in failing to appoint at least two experts holding that if an experts opinion is dependent upon information that is inaccurate or lacks support in the record it is deemed incompetent