equipment necessary to rescue an infant from a locked car was not entitled to sovereign immunity because he was driving in routine traffic and was ordered to obey all traffic laws. Collier, 268 Va. at 391 (Justice Kinser and Justice Koontz dissenting, arguing a child locked in a car presents the possibility of loss of life that should be analyzed under the framework of whether effectuating the governmental purpose embraces “special risks”). Although the Courts recognize a certain degree of judgment and discretion is required for a government employee to transport an individual as part of his or her job, when the actionable conduct occurs during routine driving situations, the driver is not entitled to sovereign immunity. See Fitzgerald v. Perry, 84 Va. Cir. 96, 98 (Roanoke County 2012) (<HOLDING>); see also Ferro v. Shifflett, 72 Va. Cir. 298,
holding no immunity to an officer who was transporting an inmate in need of prenatal care because the special security risks inherent in transporting a prisoner did not impact the deputys operation of the vehicle at the time of the accident holding that suspect was not in custody when officer handcuffed him for officer safety while transporting him to police station holding that in pennsylvania there is a rule that proof of the ownership of a business vehicle involved in an accident raises a presumption that the operation of the automobile was for the owners business purposes holding that business use exclusion did not apply to preclude coverage of an insured after a car accident when the insured had been transporting a refrigerator in his personal vehicle as a favor to a friend had no expectation of compensation except being reimbursed for the cost of gas and it was an isolated incident holding that probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances known to the police officer and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the accused had committed or was committing an offense in situations where the arresting officer has not observed the operation of the vehicle such facts and circumstances would necessarily have to include a relationship between the time there was evidence to show the influence of intoxicants and the time of operation of the vehicle internal citations omitted