claim, concluding that the government’s position defending the ALJ’s “overall” decision (that Jager was not disabled) was “grounded in law and fact.” Jager, however, can be a prevailing party entitled to apply for fees under the EAJA regardless of whether she ultimately succeeds in obtaining disability benefits. See Shalala, 509 U.S. at 300-01, 113 S.Ct. 2625. The district court therefore applied an erroneous view of the law. Further, in Jager’s case, the government was not substantially justified in defending the ALJ’s procedural errors. The defense of “basic and fundamental errors” are “difficult to justify.” Corbin, 149 F.3d at 1053. The ALJ in Jager’s case committed some of the same procedural errors this court held in Shafer to be “fundamental.” See Shafer, 518 F.3d at 1072 (<HOLDING>). We therefore conclude that Jager is entitled
holding that the alj erred by rejecting a treating physicians opinion in favor of opinions issued by nontreating doctors without providing a sufficient rationale holding that clear and convincing reasons are not required to reject contradicted conclusions of a treating physician holding that errors such as failing to provide clear and convincing reasons for discrediting a claimants subjective complaints rejecting a treating physicians opinion in favor of a nontreating physicians opinion without providing clear and convincing reasons and erring in assessing the claimants residual functioning capacity are fundamental recognizing that failure to provide good reasons for discrediting a treating physicians opinion is grounds for remand holding that failure to provide good reasons to discredit a treating physicians opinion requires remand