enhanced sentence under § 3559(c)(1)); United States v. Bradshaw, 281 F.3d 278, 294 (1st Cir.2002) (same); United States v. Weaver, 267 F.3d 231, 251 (3d Cir.2001) (same); United States v. Davis, 260 F.3d 965, 969 (8th Cir.2001) (same). To the extent Snype contends that, nevertheless, a jury had to find that his present and past robbery convictions qualified as serious violent felonies, his argument is similarly unconvincing for the simple reason that, in this case, the district court did not need to look beyond the judicial record and the statutory definitions of the crimes of conviction to find that Snype’s convictions fit the definition of serious violent felony stated in § 3559(c)(2)(F)(i). See Shepard v. United States, 544 S.Ct. at 24, 125 S.Ct. at 1262 (plurality opinion) (<HOLDING>). As we have already discussed, in the case of
holding that there is no sixth amendment right to jury sentencing holding that a sentencing court may determine the nature of a prior conviction without violating the sixth amendment holding that no sixth amendment concern arises when fact relating to prior conviction can be ascertained from judicial record and statutory definition holding that the fact of a prior conviction for sentencing purposes need not be proved to a jury or admitted by defendant to satisfy the sixth amendment holding that in determining whether a prior conviction is a violent felony a court generally must look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense