at 1261, 946 P.2d at 1031; Witter v. State, 112 Nev. 908, 922, 921 P.2d 886, 896 (1996), receded from on other grounds by Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215, 994 P.2d 700 (2000). 87 See NRAP 28A; SCR 170. 88 U.S. Const. amend. VIII. 89 See Payne, 501 U.S. at 818-19 (recognizing that Booth rule prevents prosecution from introducing certain victim impact evidence). See generally Smith, 68 P.3d at 330. 90 Smith, 68 P.3d at 330. 91 See, e.g., Robison v. Maynard, 943 F.2d 1216, 1217-18 (10th Cir. 1991); Barbour v. State, 673 So. 2d 461, 468-69 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994), judgment aff’d, 673 So. 2d 473 (Ala. 1995); Greene, 37 S.W.3d at 585-86; Smith, 68 P.3d at 329-30; Ware, 759 A.2d at 783-86; Gardner, 789 P.2d at 286; Pirtle, 904 P.2d at 269. 92 Cf. McNelton, 111 Nev. at 906-07, 900 P.2d at 937-38 (<HOLDING>). 93 Lisle v. State, 113 Nev. 540, 558, 937
holding that erroneous admission of improper and prejudicial evidence did not require reversal because the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty against the defendant even without the prejudicial testimony holding that admission of evidence showing murder victim was pregnant though prejudicial did not render sentencing fundamentally unfair holding that where there is competent evidence to support the courts findings the admission of incompetent evidence is not prejudicial holding that use of a coerced confession in criminal trial would be fundamentally unfair holding that admission of evidence must be fundamentally unfair to constitute a due process violation