is brought or maintained primarily to harass, or whether the defense is brought primarily to frustrate or stall. In any ease where the court finds that an action is frivolous or spurious or was brought primarily to harass the adverse party, the trial court has the discretion to deny a request for attorney’s fees. Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So.2d 697 (Fla.1997). Furthermore, it is not necessary that one party be completely unable to pay attorney’s fees for the court to require the other party to pay those fees. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197, 1205 (Fla.1980). An award of attorney’s fees in domestic support cases is not dependent on one party’s success in the litigation but rather upon the parties’ relative financial resources. Bullock v. Jones, 666 So.2d 224, 225 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (<HOLDING>); Diaco v. Diaco, 363 So.2d 183 (Fla. 2d DCA
holding that a wife was able to pay her own attorneys fees because she had an investment account of 16000 which could be liquidated to pay the fees holding that the fact that the former wife lost on an issue which is not spurious does not mean that she could not be a candidate to receive attorneys fees from the former husband holding that the former husbands property from a noninterspousal gift may not be distributed under section 610751 although use of the former husbands separate property may be awarded to the former wife to satisfy the former husbands child support obligation holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny an award of attorneys fees to the wife holding that the former wife did not waive her attorneyclient privilege simply because the credibility of her claim that she relied on her husbands representations could be impeached by deposing her former attorney