afforded under FSIA to require Navoi to submit to burdensome and unnecessary discovery. Cf. Whitehead v. Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, 1998 WL 957463 * 5 (4th Cir.1998). C. Immunity from Attachment Navoi contends that Raccoon’s Application for Charging Order must be denied as contrary to the express terms of the FSIA. Raccoon’s Application seeks to charge Navoi’s purported interest in the Zarafshan-Newmont joint venture. Colorado law provides that upon application by any judgment creditor of a partner, the court which entered the judgment or any other court may charge the interest of the debtor partner with payment of the unsatisfied amount of the judgment with interest thereon. See Colo.Rev.Stat. § 7-60-128. See also First National Bank v. District Court, 652 P.2d 613, 618 (Colo.1982) (<HOLDING>). Raccoon “seeks payment of the judgment form
holding that the information contained in the certificate of limited partnership binds the partnership and the partners with respect to third parties holding that to be timely the notice of a charging lien must be filed before the lawsuit has been reduced to judgment holding that a charging order is the exclusive mechanism to be used to execute upon a judgment debtors interest in a partnership holding that a debtors  522d1 exemption was invalid when the debtor exempted proceeds from the prepetition sale of the debtors marital home which were paid to a judgment creditor with an attachment on the debtors interest in the home recognizing partnership by estoppel only with respect to claims by persons who have reasonably relied upon outward representations of partnership