opinion as to whether the condition of the asbestos rendered it capable of causing injury. Although Mr. Rhodes indicated that he had seen “friable” asbestos, his testimony was based upon his training in the field of asbestos removal. See Gibson v. W.C.A.B. (Armco Stainless & Alloy Prods.), 580 Pa. 470, 861 A.2d 938, 948 (2004) (noting that a lay witness may provide a technical opinion regarding asbestos in the workplace based upon “either formal education or practical experience”). Under these circumstances, Judge Wimberly did not err by admitting the lay testimony regarding the presence of asbestos in the witnesses’ workplaces, and the admission of that testimony did not warrant a new trial. See Clark v. ITT Grinnell Indus. Piping, Inc., 141 N.C.App. 417, 539 S.E.2d 369, 374 (2000) (<HOLDING>), remanded for reconsideration on other
holding that lay testimony as to the presence of asbestos in the workplace was competent evidence to support the  finding that plaintiff was exposed to asbestos holding that the testimony of an obligor as to amount of payments was sufficient evidence to support findings of actual support paid holding that scientific evidence was not required regarding the extent of exposure to asbestos when deciding where the plaintiff was last injuriously exposed under nc gen stat  9757 holding that security guards testimony that her job was to monitor students behavior did not amount to competent substantial evidence to support a finding that the guard was a designee of the schools principal for purposes of section 8100972 holding that where there is competent evidence to support the courts findings the admission of incompetent evidence is not prejudicial