by convincing evidence that a state court’s factual determinations were erroneous. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (pre-AEDPA); see also Sumner, 449 U.S. at 550, 101 S.Ct. at 770-71. We now address each of Howard’s claims in turn. A. First, Howard, who is black, argues that the. prosecutor’s use of peremptory strikes to exclude black venirepersons from the jury violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). We conclude, however, that Howard has failed to rebut by clear and convincing evidence the trial court’s finding, affirmed by the South Carolina Supreme Court, that the challenges were not exercised for racially discriminatory reasons. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1868-69, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (plurality opinion) (<HOLDING>); see also id. at 369, 111 S.Ct. at 1871-72
recognizing the rock solid basis for such a deferential standard of review holding that the standard of review for an award of statutory damages is even more deferential than an abuse of discretion standard holding that the intent to discriminate under batson is a pure issue of fact subject to review under a deferential standard holding that regardless of the parties agreement to the contrary district courts must review an arbitrators findings of fact and conclusions of law under the highly deferential standard set forth in 9 usc  10a holding that the finding of intent to discriminate is a factual determination subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review