39, 635 A.2d 412. The federal case law of preemption of state law by federal law under the Supremacy Clause recognizes not only the “prohibit-permit” type of conflict preemption but also the “frustration of purpose” type of conflict preemption. “Frustration of purpose” conflict preemption happens when “ ‘under the circumstances of [a] particular case, [the challenged state law] stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress’ ” in enacting the federal law. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373, 120 S.Ct. 2288, 147 L.Ed.2d 352 (2000) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 n. 20, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941)). See also Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 120 S.Ct. 1913, 146 L.Ed.2d 914 (2000) (<HOLDING>); Int'l Paper v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 497,
holding the federal motor vehicle safety standards do not preempt jury findings that a bus manufacturers buses were defectively designed holding that a state common law claim seeking to require automobile manufacturers to install airbags would frustrate the purposes of the federal safety standard regulations adopted under the federal motor vehicle safety act which did not require manufacturers to do so and therefore was preempted by conflict holding that even if such claims are cognizable under state law they are preempted in the case of generic drug manufacturers holding that where department of transportation regulations did not require department officials to enforce vehicle regulations the departments decision not to do so was discretionary holding that the safety act and fmvss 208 did not expressly or impliedly preempt a tort claim based on the manufacturers failure to install lap belts