re-sentence Starkweather accordingly. 1 . AS 11.41.100(a)(1)(A). 2 . AS 11.41.200(a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3). 3 . Id. at 584. 4 . Ibid. 5 . Ibid. 6 . SLA 1978, ch. 166, § 2. 7 . AS 12.55.125(c). 8 . Minutes of the House Health, Education, and Social Services Committee for March 15, 1988, Tape 1, Side 2, log no. 124. 9 . Id., log no. 341. 10 . Id., log no. 155. 11 . Ibid. 12 . Ibid. 13 . See Brown v. State, 12 P.3d 201, 210 (Alaska App.2000); Comegys v. State, 747 P.2d 554, 558-59 (Alaska App.1987). 14 . Compare Hamilton v. State, 59 P.3d 760, 772 (Alaska App.2002) ("'we have repeatedly upheld sentences in the upper end of the penalty range for defendants who committed gratuitous or otherwise inexplicable acts of extreme violence"); Harmon v. State, 908 P.2d 434, 444 (Alaska App.1995) (<HOLDING>). 15 . See McClain v. State, 519 P.2d 811,
holding that a firstdegree murder is aggravated when the defendant tortures or inflicts gratuitous pain on the victim holding that for purposes of double jeopardy analysis firstdegree felony murder and aggravated manslaughter are degree variants or aggravated forms of the core offense of homicide holding that a photograph of the hands of the murder victim tied behind her back was properly admitted because it showed the considerable pain inflicted upon the victim by the defendant holding that conspiracy to commit murder is not lesserincluded offense of firstdegree murder holding that that the trial court erred when it determined that firstdegree sexual offense was an aggravated offense