father of that child. Given that holding, Longoria’s summary judgment motion in this case was in substance merely a motion to abate, see Carter v. Brady, 423 S.W.2d 946, 951 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the granting of which would merely give Valadez a reasonable opportunity to amend her suit to remove the obstacle to its prosecution. See Texas Highway Dept. v. Jarrell, 418 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex.1967). See also, M & M Const. Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 747 S.W.2d 552, 554 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1988, no writ). A summary judgment should not be based on a pleading deficiency that could be cured by amendment. See Dowler v. Delta Inv. Housing, Inc., 834 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1992, no writ). Cf. Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex.1983) (<HOLDING>), citing, Texas Department of Corrections v.
holding that issue of whether death was proximately caused by intervenihg and superseding cause was not appropriately resolved by summary judgment holding that protective features of special exception procedure should not be circumvented by a motion for summary judgment on the pleadings where plaintiffs pleadings fail to state a cause of action holding that whether pleadings fail to state a cause of action may not be resolved by summary judgment holding that credibility determinations should not be resolved at the summary judgment stage holding that pleadings cannot be regarded as summary judgment evidence