the telephone call from his neighbor, alerting him to his family’s situation, and wh „n he had returned home subsequent to receiving the telephone call. This Court has held that testimony is “too vague” only if it does not identify facts corresponding to each of the elements on which the applicant has the burden of proof. See Jin Shui Qiu v. Ashcroft, 829 F.3d 140, 151 (2d Cir.2003). Furthermore, where an applicant gives “spare” testimony, the fact-finder “may wish to probe for incidental details, seeking to draw out inconsistencies that would support a finding of lack of credibility.” Id. at 152. Without so probing, the fact-finder may risk failing to create a record that can support an adverse credibility finding. See Jin Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 104, 114 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Although Chen was unable to recall the exact
holding that the record did not support the agencys adverse credibility finding in the absence of additional probing holding that in the absence of an adverse credibility determination the court must accept petitioners testimony as true holding that inconsistencies  adequately support the administrative law judges alj  adverse credibility finding holding that history of dishonesty can support an adverse credibility finding holding that speculation and conjecture cannot support an adverse credibility finding