a sentence that was not individualized, that violated the separation of powers doctrine, and that was based on an unconstitutional disparity between crack and powder cocaine. We conclude that Wilson’s claims are meritless and that the district court properly considered itself constrained by the applicable statutory minimum sentence. See Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467, 111 S.Ct. 1919, 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991) (nothing that determinate sentences are not unconstitutional); United States v. Gonzalez-Ramirez, 561 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir.2009) (deciding that prosecutor’s discretion to seek enhanced minimum sentence does not vio late separation of powers doctrine), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Sept. 29, 2009) (No. 09-6745); United States v. Perkins, 108 F.3d 512, 518 (4th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). In accordance with Anders, we examined the
holding that no unconstitutional infirmity exists in the sentencing guidelines treatment of crack visavis powder cocaine holding that sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine is constitutional holding distinction between penalties for crimes involving crack cocaine and powder cocaine lacked rational basis and thus violated equal protection clause of state constitution holding that crackpowder disparity was constitutional stating that ujntil the en banc court of this circuit the us supreme court or congress itself accepts this assertion of disparity and finds it untenable challenges to the sentencing guidelines based on the disparity between sentences for crack cocaine and powder cocaine will continue to fail holding that a judge may consider the disparity between the guidelines treat ment of crack and powder cocaine offenses in deciding upon a sentence