he alleged. Given the plain language of the statute and the Secretary’s regulation, our task should have been: where a claimant’s allegations of pain were not corroborated by medical evidence, we would conclude from the record as a whole that there was substantial evidence justifying the Secretary’s finding that the claimant was not disabled. Despite this clear statutory and regulatory language, however, this circuit’s pre-Re-form Act decisions regarding subjective pain testimony were at best unclear and possibly inconsistent. Compare Gonzalez v. Harris, 631 F.2d 143, 145-46 (9th Cir.1980) (Gonzalez) (despite claimant’s testimony regarding her pain she failed to prove disability because of a lack of supporting medical evidence), with Mark v. Celebrezze, 348 F.2d 289, 292 (9th Cir.1965) (<HOLDING>), and Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th
holding that disability benefits are not retirementtype benefits holding that a medical impairment is deemed  severe  when alone or in combination with other medically determinable physical or mental impairments it significantly limits an individuals physical or mental ability to do basic work activities holding parent entitled to credit for any social security disability benefits paid to child as a result of parents disability recognizing the basic statutory mandate that disability benefits  are to be awarded only in cases of disability by reason of any some medically determinable physical or mental impairment  but then concluding that the ad must determine the truthfulness of allegations of subjective pain holding that a claimants failure to list an impairment either in her application for disability benefits or through her testimony disposes of the claim because the alj was under no obligation to investigate a claim not presented at the time of the application for benefits and not offered at the hearing as a basis for disability