communicated effectively, and walked unassisted. In addition, Meier told Flewell-ing that he was not under the care of a doctor. Moreover, Flewelling’s decision to defer to the judgment of the booking clerk, who regularly confronts inebriated detainees, as to whether Meier needed medical attention was not unreasonable. The Plaintiff points out that Fle-welling did not comply with the departmental policy requiring that a subject with a BAC of .30 or above be transported to a medical facility. As an initial matter, it is not clear that Flewelling was aware of this policy. (See R. 47, Ex. E, C. Flewelling Dep. at 35.) But even if he was aware of the policy and failed to comply, his failure is not a per se constitutional violation. Cf. Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Instead, the focus remains on whether
holding that violation of state law was not a per se constitutional violation holding negligence per se not applicable to violation of railroad commission regulation holding hearing in chambers was not per se a violation of due process holding that violation of city ordinance does not constitute negligence per se holding that citys policy need not be unconstitutional per se but need only cause a constitutional violation