are simply not inconsistent, and the civil rule barring contempt as a sanction applies. This should resolve the issue. ¶27 The majority implicitly recognizes the lack of inconsistency between the SVP statute and the civil rules when it states, “CR 37(b)(2)(D) conflicts with the statutory contempt authority granted under [the contempt statute,] chapter 7.21 RCW. Therefore, chapter 7.21 RCW controls.” Majority at 693. The majority therefore looks beyond the statutes specific to SVP proceedings to see if there is a conflict between the civil rules and any statute of general applicabili rom civil (not criminal) rules, this court has moved rapidly to ensure those rules do not apply to those accused of being an SVP either. See In re Det. of Turay, 150 Wn.2d 71, 74 P.3d 1194 (2003) (<HOLDING>). Unfortunately the trend continues today and
recognizing collateral attack on void order holding that 60day time limit for notice of appeal in civil cases not 10day limit in criminal cases applies to  2255 proceedings recognizing bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over such a collateral attack holding that a judgment as to the title in a prior litigation was not subject to collateral attack holding the one year timelimit on collateral attack in criminal cases applies to svp proceedings