v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In preparing Easley’s defense, his attorney, John Grisez, consulted two different mental health se was not so deficient that it constituted clear error and thus an unreasonable application of Strickland under AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of his habeas corpus petition. AFFIRMED. ** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. 1 . Were we faced with a failure to investigate and present psychiatric evidence in mitigation during a penalty phase, our result would probably be different. See, e.g., Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 851-52 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Wallace, 184 F.3d 1112 (holding that the
holding that trial counsels failure to call defendants family members as witnesses during penalty phase was reasonable trial strategy and not ineffective assistance of counsel holding that where much of evidence davis alleged should have been presented was in fact presented during penalty phase davis had not shown that counsels ineffectiveness deprived him of reliable penalty phase holding that counsels failure to investigate the defendants personal and psychiatric history constituted ineffective assistance during the penalty phase but not during the guilt phase holding that claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel during penalty phase of capital case is cognizable under the pcra holding trial counsels failure to investigate and present substantial mitigation evidence during the sentencing phase can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel