for partial summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s antitrust claims under the Sherman Act and the Virgin Islands Antimonopoly Law. By order dated October 28, 1991, the Court granted CAI’s motion for partial summary judgment. We write now to explain our reasons. II. DISCUSSION A. Standard For Summary Judgement. Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment shall be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). As discussed below, CAI has demonstrated that as a matter of law VIPA and CAI are L.Ed. 315 (1942) (<HOLDING>); Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, 15
holding that private health care providers proceeding under con licenses are immune from antitrust liability under the state action doctrine holding state immune from suit brought in state court holding that a state of california agriculture program to market certain crops was immune from antitrust challenge under state immunity doctrine holding that a railroad owned and operated by the federal government was immune from antitrust action under the governmental immunity doctrine which protects the federal government its agencies and instrumentalities from the reaches of antitrust law holding that the state is immune from punitive awards