of the assignor. Therefore, an assignee who could not be held liable under § 1641(a) of the TILA could at the same time be liable for certain disclosure violations of an assignor under the New Jersey Holder Rule. But this observation does not necessarily answer the question of whether the New Jersey Holder Rule is “inconsistent” with § 1641(a) as required by § 1610(a)(1) for preemption. In determining whether federal law expressly preempts a state statute, the Court must look to whether Congress intended to preempt related state laws when it promulgated the federal statute. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 56, 111 S.Ct. 403, 112 L.Ed.2d 356 (1990); see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) (<HOLDING>). In ascertaining congressional intent, a court
holding that intent of parties to choice of law must be given effect holding that courts must generally give effect to the plain meaning of a statute because that is the best evidence of the legislatures intent holding that where congressional intent is clear a court must give effect to such intent holding parties to an exculpatory clause where the parties intent is clear holding that the district court must give parties notice of intent to depart