the Government argues, first, the district court’s ruling is consistent with Alford because the court concluded not that Rashad could not have pleaded guilty but rather that, under the circumstances of this case, it would not have accepted such a plea. And that determination, according to the Government, should be reviewed only for abuse of discretion. The district court is certainly not required to accept every guilty plea it is tendered, let alone the guilty plea of every defendant who maintains his innocence; indeed, the district court has considerable discretion to decide whether a guilty plea is appropriate in the circumstances of the particular case. Alford, 400 U.S. at 38 n. 11, 91 S.Ct. at 168 n. 11; see, e.g., United States v. Shepherd, 102 F.3d 558, 562-64 (D.C.Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Preciado, 336 F.3d 739, 743
recognizing timing of guilty plea and prejudice to codefendants rele vant when deciding whether to accept guilty plea holding entry of guilty plea waives challenges to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea  emphasis added holding that the defendants guilty plea was valid where the district court carefully questioned the defendant about whether he understood the consequences of his guilty plea holding that a district court may accept a defendants guilty plea despite an absence of admission to criminal wrongdoing holding that a defendants guilty plea was unconditional where the guilty plea was not in writing and the government did not consent to it being conditional