is necessary to provide the defendant with the opportunity to prove actual bias.” United States v. Herndon, 156 F.3d 629, 635 (6th Cir.1998) (emphasis added) (inter nal quotation marks omitted); id. at 637 (reiterating that “the district court has a duty to investigate [a claim of alleged juror influence], and if the allegation is of an extraneous influence, then the district court should have conducted a Remmer hearing”); United States v. Davis, 177 F.3d 552, 557 (6th Cir.1999); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982) (observing that “the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias” and discussing Remmer); United States v. Zelinka, 862 F.2d 92, 95-96 (6th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Rigsby, 45 F.3d at 123 (stating that “we
holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when the trial judge questioned the juror extensively enough to satisfy itself that the juror was not biased emphasis added holding that when a defendant alleges that an unauthorized contact with a juror has tainted a trial a hearing must be held holding that a court must allow the defendant to ask in voir dire whether a potential juror would automatically impose the death penalty and suggesting that such a juror should be disqualified for cause holding that trial courts denial of motion for new trial based on juror misconduct was justified where there was no evidence presented at hearing on motion that juror had knowingly concealed relevant litigation experience during voir dire and identity of juror as county court litigant was not demonstrated holding that there could be no conscious or subconscious influence from shadow jurors contact with juror when juror was unaware of shadow jurors affiliation with a party