(ie., only when sending a text or making a call). Whether the statute should be construed as defendants urge, however, is an issue of first impression that is immaterial to the suppression issue before us. As the district court recognized, the exclusionary rule is not an available remedy for a statutory violation unless the Constitution requires it or the statute expressly provides for it. See Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 890 (citing United States v. Abdi, 463 F.3d 547, 556 (6th Cir. 2006)); United States v. Page, 232 F.3d 536, 541 (6th Cir. 2000). Defendants clarified in reply that they do not claim that the cell-phone identification information was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 886-90 (holding
holding in contrast to smith v maryland 442 us 735 99 sct 2577 61 led2d 220 1979 construing the federal constitution that warrantless installation of a pen register to record numbers dialed from defendants home telephone constituted an unreasonable search under the colorado constitution holding that telephone company records of calls made from a defendants home did not require the government to seek a search warrant holding use of pen register to record dialed calls was not a search holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises holding that visual strip search of arrestee for failure to register a dog based solely on the arrestees prior drug offense conviction was unconstitutional