Here, the Commonwealth contends such authority would be the statutory maximum provisions of 18 Pa.C.S. § 1103(1) (twenty-year maximum sentence for first-degree felonies), ignoring, however, that the distinction between Walton and Shaw, the aforementioned Superior Court cases, and, of course, this appeal, is the absence of a mandatory minimum sentence in Walton. To that end, while the Walton sentencing court retained authority to impose any minimum sentence it wished under 19 P.S. § 1051, the Shaw sentencing court, and, indeed, the sentencing court in this case, possessed no such authority. Rather, mandatory floors on the available sentences existed, abrogating the trial court’s traditional authority to impose minimum sentences it believes appropriate. Accord In re M.W., 725 A.2d at 731 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, because the trial court
holding that the sentence entered by the circuit court was illegal because the court had no authority to impose a sentence that exceeded the punishment fixed by the jury holding that when a sentencing issue centers upon a courts statutory authority to impose a sentence rather than the courts exercise of discretion in fashioning the sentence the issue raised implicates the legality of the sentence imposed holding that when no statutory exception applies  the district court lacks the authority to impose a sentence less than the statutory mandatory minimum holding that a sentence imposed for a violation of supervised release will be upheld where 1 the district court considered the applicable policy statements 2 the sentence is within the statutory maximum and 3 the sentence is reasonable recognizing that if a guidelines error did not affect the district courts selection of the sentence imposed the sentence should be affirmed