theory of the case — generally falls within the broad range of reasonable professional conduct.” And counsel’s reasoned explanation for his strategy here was “not so unsound that no reasonable lawyer would have pursued it.” Thus, the trial court did not err in denying Issa’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Decided January 31, 2017 Reconsideration denied February 23, 2017 Gerard J. Lupa, for appellant. Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Paige Reese Whitaker, Michael V. Snow, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee. For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm Issa’s convictions and the denial of his motion for new trial. Judgment affirmed. Reese and Bethel, JJ., concur. 1 See, e.g., Powell v. State, 310 Ga. Ap ite v. State, 315 Ga. App. 54, 62 (7) (726 SE2d 548) (2012) (<HOLDING>). 32 White v. State, 281 Ga. 276, 280 (3) (637
holding that a properly instructed jury may not consider the redacted confession of a codefendant which obviously referred directly to someone often obviously the defendant holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to continue due to pretrial publicity in part because court instructed jury on three separate occasions to consider only evidence presented in the courtroom holding that similartransaction evidence against codefendant did not require severance given that trial court instructed jury that such evidence only pertained to codefendant holding that the trial court correctly instructed the jury that the defendant had to establish by evidence that outweighed the evidence against him that he lacked the capacity to form specific intent holding that the enhancement requires that the defendant either threaten the codefendant witness or juror in his or her presence or issue the threat in circumstances in which there is some likelihood that the codefendant witness or juror will learn of the threat