in turn. 1. Per se violation A per se analysis is appropriate only after courts have had considerable experience with the type of restraint at issue, and only if courts can predict with confidence that it would be invalidated in all or almost all instances under the rule of reason. Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 127 S.Ct. 2705, 2713, 168 L.Ed.2d 623 (2007). Thus, courts have been “slow to condemn rules adopted by professional associations as unreasonable per se and, in general, to extend per se analysis to restraints imposed in the context of business relationships where the economic impact of certain practices is not immediately obvious.” F.T.C. v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 106 S.Ct. 2009, 2018, 90 L.Ed.2d 445 (1986) (citations omitted) (<HOLDING>). In their consolidated summary judgment
holding that category of restraints classed as group boycotts is not to be expanded indiscriminately holding that plaintiffs statistics did not shed any light on the legally relevant issue because they did not indicate the group of applicants who were interviewed or even the group of applicants found qualified or the group of all applicants recognizing women as a distinct group holding that a plaintiff in a reverse discrimination case need show only that he is a member of a protected group and whites are a protected group under title vii holding that the district courts cursory approval of the use of a stun belt fell far below the individualized determination required by sixth circuit precedent but that the error did not prejudice defendant and noting generally that a decision to use a stun belt must be subjected to at least the same close judicial scrutiny required for the imposition of other physical restraints and cautioning that such physical restraints should be used as rarely as possible citations and internal quotation marks omitted