see Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 115 S.Ct. 1031, 130 L.Ed.2d 1004 (1995) (upholding statutory scheme that permitted a judge to impose a death sentence after "considering" advisory jury verdict without specification of weight to be accorded to the jury's recommendation). 23 The defense notes other instances when, if the issue is raised, the State is required to negate the existence of a claimed mental condition. See, e.g., duress, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-9; consent, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-10; the defense of self, property and others, N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4 to -8; and passion/provocation, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4. 24 We are particularly concerned by the imposition of a clear and convincing burden of proof on a defendant in a capital cause. See Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996) (<HOLDING>). FISHER, J.A.D., concurring. I Georgia’s 1986
holding that in a proceeding to terminate parental rights the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof violates the due process clause and that due process requires at least a clear and convincing evidence standard holding that despite the lack of a statutory requirement that severe child abuse be shown by clear and convincing evidence due to the consequences of such a finding the clear and convincing standard must be applied holding that oklahomas requirement that a defendant prove his incompetency by clear and convincing evidence violated due process holding that the clear and convincing standard provides appropriate due process in cases involving parental rights holding that the due process clause prohibits states from requiring defendants to prove their incompetency by clear and convincing evidence