analyzed in Bryan; and, there, the Court held that defendants were adequately protected by reserving criminal punishment only for those who know that their actions are illegal, id. at 195-96, 118 S.Ct. 1939. Similarly, defendants charged with a violation of IEEPA and the ITR are adequately protected by requiring the government to prove that the defendants knew their actions violated the United States’ embargo on transactions with Iran. See id. Indeed, there is even less reason than in Bryan to require the government to prove the defendant knew of the availability of a license, because the ITR licensing requirement is not, as it was in Bryan, an intrinsic part of the criminal offense at issue. The ITR under which Mousavi was convicted does not even ex plicitl 739, 744 (5th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Quinn, 403
holding that the defendant was placed in official detention when two police officers approached him and told him that he was under arrest as the defendant could not reasonably have believed that he was free to leave holding that defendant was seized where the officer told defendant that she knew that he was on probation defendant admitted to the officer that he had given her a false name and defendant was asked for consent to search a backpack because a reasonable inference was that defendant was the subject of a continuing investigation and his or her freedom of movement had been significantly restricted by the officers show of authority holding that the defendant lacked sufficient contacts with the forum state because there was no evidence the defendant knew where the product would be sold holding that sufficient evidence supported conviction for willful violation of the vietnamese trade embargo where defendant knew that there was an embargo in place against vietnam and a witness testified that the defendant told him he was shipping goods to vietnam by way of singapore because of the embargo holding that evidence of the same name the fact that the previous conviction occurred in precinct of defendants residence and that although the defendant testified he did not deny that he was the person described in the record of the previous conviction was sufficient to establish identity