to an unlawful assertion of police authority. The officer erroneously advised the defendant that blood could be drawn without a warrant. See lead op., ¶ 6. Accordingly, I conclude that the results of the warrantless blood draw should be suppressed. ¶ 147. For the reasons set forth, I dissent. ¶ 148. I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this opinion. 2 Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2173 (2016); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17 (1989); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966). 3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. The 2015-16 version of § 343.305 is the same as the 2013-14 version. 4 See, e.g., State v. Butler, 302 P.3d 609, 613 (Ariz. 2013) (<HOLDING>); People v. Mason, 214 Cal. Rptr. 3d 685, 702
holding that independent of the implied consent law the fourth amendment requires an arrestees consent to be voluntary to justify a warrantless blood draw holding that implied consent that has been withdrawn or revoked by a suspect cannot serve as a substitute for the free and voluntary consent that the fourth amendment requires holding that the implied consent law allows law enforcement officers to obtain blood in circumstances in which a warrant or actual consent may otherwise be required holding that the dissipation of alcohol from a persons blood stream constitutes a sufficient exigency to justify a warrantless blood draw holding that the implied consent statutes are irrelevant when the defendant gives actual consent to a blood or breath test