such alteration changed the nature of plaintiffs property and the nature of plaintiffs legal rights and obligations without plaintiffs consent. The only “easement” case cited in support of this proposition is Lorenc v. Swiderski, 109 N.J.Eq. 147, 156 A. 465 (1931). This decision by a court of first instance is at variance with the uniform course of Missouri decisions, and, apparently, with the great weight of modern authority. See 28 C.J.S. Easements Sec. 87, and cases cited in Kelly v. Schmelz, 439 S.W.2d 211, 213-214 (Mo.App.1969). Our cases uniformly hold that, absent qualifying language, the owners of a dominant estate are not confined to the uses existing at the time an easement is created, but may use the easement to further any lawful use of their land. Kelly, 439 S.W.2d at 213 (<HOLDING>); Burgess v. Sweet, 662 S.W.2d 916, 919
holding that owners of a dominant estate had a duty to keep the easement in a proper state of repair to avoid damaging the servient estate through erosion holding that the owner of the dominant tenement may extinguish an easement appurtenant by specifically excluding it from a conveyance of the dominant estate holding that an express easement ran with the dominant estate holding that the burden on the servient estate cannot be increased without the consent of the owners of the servient estate and that the owner of the dominant estate to which the appurtenant easement is attached has no power to convey or expand use of that easement in connection with a tract of land owned by another holding that the owners of the dominant estate had the right to build utility poles along side of a road easement