allowed agents to question beyond the routine inquiry if “suspicious circumstances” exist. Chavira, 9 F.3d at 889. Federal case law has held that suspicious circumstances do not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion, and, in determining what constitutes suspicious circumstances, a court examines “the totality of the circumstances.” Massie, 65 F.3d at 848-49. {13} As for moving a vehicle to a secondary area, the court has given Border Patrol agents “ ‘virtually unlimited discretion to refer ears to the secondary inspection area.’ ” Id. at 847 (quoting United States v. Sanders, 937 F.2d 1495, 1499 (10th Cir.1991)). Where a routine stop is conducted is “ ‘irrelevant to Fourth Amendment concerns.’ ” Id. (quoting Rascon-Ortiz, 994 F.2d at 753); see also Sanders, 937 F.2d at 1499-1500 (<HOLDING>). The court, however, still requires detentions
holding that a dog sniff of an apartment door from a common area is a permissible nonsearch under the fourth amendment holding the correct fourth amendment inquiry assuming the detention is legitimate is whether the questions extended the time that a driver was detained regardless of the questions content holding failure to object to conditioning instructions waived error arising from the jurys failure to answer question when answer could not be implied and that lack of objection waived right to new trial to have jury answer questions holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment holding that directing defendant to the secondary inspection area to answer additional questions is permissible under the fourth amendment