limitations will not commence to run until the contract has been finished.” In the instant case, Freberg was never allowed to deliver a finished product or service to Dr. Robert Thomason. Consequently, up to the date of July 25,1973, the day after Dr. Elizabeth died, Freberg’s cause of action against the Thomasons had not accrued, or in other words, limitations had not begun to run. Indeed, Freberg’s limitations did not begin to run until after he was first prevented from continuing his tasks. See Scott v. Walker, supra. To hold that Freberg’s cause of action accrued after each day’s work would unduly fragment the time of accrual for each of these indivisible tasks. Compare Jones v. Lewis, 11 Tex. 359 (1854); Caldwell v. Jones, 63 S.W.2d 761 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1933, writ ref’d) (<HOLDING>); Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 251, 253 (1965).
recognizing that generally services that benefit debtor are services that facilitate completion of a case holding some evidence existed that physician incurred fees because services had been performed on the physicians behalf holding that defendant must prove when the services were rendered to establish that the new value exception applies holding that an attorneys cause for services rendered over a period of time accrued when his services had been completely performed holding that an attorneys services were personal services rendered or labor done under the predecessor statute to section 38001