at 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, and Barbarin does not argue to the contrary. With respect to the other necessary element of Roberts’s two-part test (Garrott’s unavailability at trial), Supreme Court case law requires that “prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain [the witness’s] presence at trial.” Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968). Ultimately, “[t]he lengths to which the prosecution must go to produce a witness is a question of reasonableness.” Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74, 100 S.Ct. 2531 (internal quotation marks omitted). The California Court of Appeal analyzed this issue under an analogous state- law “due diligence” standard. See Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1084 (9th Cir.2008) (noting similarity between California stan .1998) (<HOLDING>). This is true even though, as Barbarin argued
holding that trial counsels inability to locate witness did not constitute ineffective assistance when defendant only knew witnesss first name and the apartment complex where he believed the witness lived holding that defendant is under an obligation to give the government notice of an alibi witness even if defendant is unable to locate the witness holding that search was reasonable where the prosecutor contacted witnesss parents on multiple occasions and issued subpoenas for the witness at the parents home holding that a tip from an unnamed relative of a nonanonymous witness relayed by the witness was unreliable because inter alia even if the witness was honest in his interactions with the police his unnamed relative may have had her own motive for fabricating incriminating evidence holding that effort to locate witness was reasonable where inter alia the prosecutions investigator checked police records and attempted to locate witness at his home and his parents home