“To allow the state an additional fifteen days in which to bring the defendant to trial, in view of the State’s inaction, would impermissibly prejudice the defendant’s speedy trial rights.” Id. The First and the Fourth Districts have similarly held that the State is precluded from exercising its recapture rights if it nol prosses charges and then refiles new charges based on the same incident without informing the defendant. See, e.g., Puzio v. State, 969 So.2d 1197, 1201 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); State v. Morris, 662 So.2d 378, 379 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). This court has not expressly ruled on the issue but has indicated agreement with this line of cases. See State v. McCullers, 932 So.2d 373, 376 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). But see State v. Jimenez, 44 So.3d 1230, 1236-37 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (<HOLDING>); Brown v. State, — So.3d —, — n. 2, 2010 WL
holding the defendant did not demonstrate a denial of his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial where even though the delay was substantial and the defendant was detained pretrial for three years the fault for the delay was shared and the defendant continued to request continuances following his assertion for the right to a speedy trial holding that a defendant is not entitled to automatic discharge upon the expiration of speedy trial even though he was not provided actual notice that the charges were refiled holding that the plaintiff had standing even though automatic stay had terminated and his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot because he also sought actual damages for violation of the automatic stay holding that the speedy trial clock for state charges did not begin to run when the defendant was taken into custody by federal authorities on federal charges but rather when he was indicted for the state charges holding that a defendant is not entitled to relief from default judgment because notice to an attorney of filing of motions and orders is constructive notice to the client even when the client did not have actual notice