of law. Had the trial judge indicated a refusal to consider the defendant’s mental illness as a diminishing factor in his decision of whether defendant possessed the requisite malice aforethought, we would find it necessary to address the question of the extent to which mental illness could dimmish the intent requirement for second-degree murder. But he did not. Id. at 304 (quoting Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 42, at 326 (1972)). The Court thus acknowledged the substantive components of the diminished-capacity defense (albeit under a different name), but left open the questions of whether, and to what degree, the defense would apply to a general-intent crime like second-degree murder. See also People v. Langworthy, 416 Mich. 630, 331 N.W.2d 171, 180 (1982) (<HOLDING>). A year after Ramsey, the Michigan Supreme
holding that unlike the specificintent crime of firstdegree murder seconddegree murder is a generalintent crime for which the defense of voluntary intoxication is not available holding that conspiracy to commit murder is not lesserincluded offense of firstdegree murder holding that conviction for seconddegree murder operates as implied acquittal on firstdegree murder count holding that first and seconddegree intentional murder verdicts are consistent with a felony murder verdict because lack of intent is not an element of seconddegree felony murder holding that firstdegree murder is one crime although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways