502, 504, 505 P.2d 845, 847 (1973). In this case, all that is at issue is a stipulated order of dismissal. Petitioner’s appeal from the development decision of the City Council does not in any way seek to “avoid, defeat, or evade” the stipulated order of dismissal. Instead, it seeks review of the substantive acts undertaken by the City making a zoning decision to secure the dismissal. {11} The City and Wal-Mart urge that Petitioner’s appeal represents a collateral attack on the settlement between them, insofar as Petitioner seeks a reversal of the development agreement contained therein. The jurisprudence pertaining to collateral attacks pertains to judgments and other adjudications. See, e.g., Hanratty v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., 82 N.M. 275, 276, 480 P.2d 165,166 (1970) (<HOLDING>); City of Socorro v. Cook, 24 N.M. 202, 212,
holding that a party could not collaterally attack a default judgment obtained against him in a foreclosure action holding that after a judgment entry grants a decree of foreclosure and order of sale the foreclosure action cannot be dismissed as the judgment is final holding that an injured party in an underlying tort action was not a necessary party in an action by an insurer for declaratory judgment of nonliability where the injured person had not obtained judgment against the insured holding that trial court must make entry of default prior to entry of default judgment and court may not make entry of default when there is no default in law or in fact holding that appellant hjaving failed to exercise administrative appeal  cannot now collaterally attack the tax deficiency determination in an independent action