which for less drastic punishments is available to the administrative board.” {Ibid.) We suggested that “[t]he character and scope of evidence pertinent to punishment which should be received in a case wherein the jury is required to fix the penalty, is a subject which could well receive legislative attention.” (ibid.) 19 Compare People v. Griffin (1963) 60 Cal.2d 182, 191 [32 Cal.Rptr. 24, 383 P.2d 432], holding admissible evidence of a prior crime for which defendant obtained an acquittal. This ruling was explicitly overruled by the language of former section 190.3, providing that “in no event shall evidence of prior criminal activity be admitted for an offense for which the defendant was prosecuted and was acquitted.” Accord, People v. Terry, supra, 61 Cal.2d at pp. 147-148 (<HOLDING>). 20 See People v. Jones, supra, 52 Cal.2d at
holding that where defendant stipulates to prior felony conviction evidence of the nature of the prior crime is irrelevant and should be excluded holding that in determining whether a prior conviction is a violent felony a court generally must look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense holding that for sentencing purposes the government does not need to allege a defendants prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact is not an element of the present crime holding that pardon relieves the recipient upon subsequent conviction of another crime of the additional punishment provided by statute for a second offense holding inadmissible evidence of a prior conviction for which defendant received a pardon