which the bank was located. Such a result could never have been contemplated by Congress.” Id. 67-68. See also Mason v. United States, 260 U.S. 545, 558, 43 S.Ct. 200, 67 L.Ed. 396 (1923) (“Here, while the suit is one in equity, the statute and decisions relied upon have nothing to do with the general principles of equity or with federal equity jurisdiction, but simply establish a measure of damages applicable alike to actions at law and suits in equity. The case presented by the bills is primarily one involving title to land and seeking an injunction against continuing trespasses. The conversion of the oil, for which damages are sought, is incidental and dependent. The entire cause of action is therefore local”); Collett v. Adams, 249 U.S. 545, 550, 39 S.Ct. 372, 63 L.Ed. 764 (1919) (<HOLDING>); Ellenwood v. Marietta Chair Co., 158 U.S.
holding that under the second circuits longstanding doctrine a defendants failure to specifically object to venue at the close of evidence constitutes a waiver of objection to venue holding that the venue provisions of the bankruptcy act were superseded by the local action doctrine holding that former federal venue statute applied to transitory actions only and did not displace local action rule recognizing that special venue statutes are supplemented by the 28 usc  1391 venue provisions applicable to all civil cases holding that the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over counterclaims asserted by the bankruptcy estate against a creditor where the claim is a state law action independent of the federal bankruptcy law and not necessarily resolvable by a ruling on the creditors proof of claim in the bankruptcy emphasis added