Ga. 822, 824 (653 SE2d 729) (2007) (punctuation omitted); see also OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (3). 6 Cummings, 282 Ga. at 824; see also Kim v. Dep’t of Transp., 235 Ga. App. 480, 481 (2) (510 SE2d 50) (1998) (“By its own terms, the State Tort Claims Act must be strictly construed.”). 7 Ga. Dep’t of Transp. v. Baldwin, 292 624, 625 (532 SE2d 401) (2000); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan Gamer, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 69 (1st ed. 2012) (“The ordinary-meaning rule is the most fundamental semantic rule of interpretation.”). 12 Cummings, 282 Ga. at 824. 13 See id. at 825-26 (plaintiff complied with statute when she named the agency she believed to be responsible at the time she served her initial notice); Ga. Ports Auth. v. Harris, 274 Ga. 146, 150 (2) (549 SE2d 95) (2001) (<HOLDING>); Norris v. Dep’t of Transp., 268 Ga. 192, 193
holding that presentation of an untimely petition to the states highest court satisfied the exhaustion requirement holding that challenge to oneyear residency requirement for divorce action was not moot even though plaintiff had since satisfied requirement holding that issuance of an order to show cause satisfied this requirement holding that delivery by federal express satisfied the personal delivery requirement of ocga  502126 and that receipt requirement was satisfied when plaintiff obtained a copy of the fedexed letter that was stamped as received by doas holding that because the requirement of strict compliance with the statute obviates some of the practical difficulties of proving delivery notice to quit served by slipping under door was insufficient despite actual receipt of notice