the above factors. First, the officers’ alleged “threats” do not rise to the level of coercion or duress necessary to negate consent. During their brief encounter with Ms. Sugura, one officer truthfully informed her that she could be arrested for harboring a fugitive or aiding a felon if she was lying about Mr. Miles’ presence in the apartment. II R. at 31, 71. Even generously construed as a “threat,” this statement was not the type of threat that negates an otherwise voluntary consent. See, e.g., United States v. Morrow, 731 F.2d 233, 236 (4th Cir.1984) (“Although [the officer] did tell [the defendant] ... that she could be charged as an accessory ... that statement alone hardly amounts to duress or coercion .... ”); see also United States v. Donaldson, 793 F.2d 498, 502 (2d Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the officer’s statement did not
holding that the searehincidenttoalawfularrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest holding on similar facts that when an investigation on the scene develops probable cause to arrest the third party resident of those premises for harboring the fugitive a warrantless search incident to the arrest may then be made holding that in a situation where the police have probable cause to arrest one party and reasonably mistake a second party for that first party the arrest of the second party is still a valid arrest holding that a warrantless arrest does not violate the fourth amendment if at the time of the defendants arrest police had probable cause to believe that an offense has been is being or will be committed holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment