him during his interrogation and failed to come forward with a truthful version of events during his detention. He alleges that defendants Waller and Pavletic participated in this coercion by advising defendant officers how to proceed, and that defendant prosecutors initiated and maintained criminal proceedings against him using evidence they knew to be false. Hobbs’s IIED claim incorporates the same allegations as his malicious prosecution claim, see 3d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 248, 243, and the two are sufficiently intertwined to demonstrate that defendants’ wrongful conduct continued through the termination of his criminal proceedings. This is the date upon which Hobbs’s IIED claim accrued. See, e.g., Wallace v. City of Zion, No; 11 C 2859, 2011 WL 3205495, at *5 (N.D.Ill. July 28, 2011) (<HOLDING>); Gvozden v. Mill Run Tours, Inc., No.
holding similar allegations supported that the plaintiffs negligence claim did not accrue until plaintiffs loan payments exceeded his ability to pay holding that same limitation provision violated krs  30414370 as to the plaintiffs claim because it did not accrue until denial of the plaintiffs claim for coverage holding that a  1983 due process claim that essentially contests the fairness of the plaintiffs prosecution  is  similar to his malicious prosecution claim and claims resembling malicious prosecution do not accrue until the prosecution has terminated in the plaintiffs favor  holding that because plaintiffs iied claim is based on the facts that support plaintiffs malicious prosecution claim plaintiffs iied claim did not accrue until the charges against them were dismissed holding that arrest made with probable cause and without excessive force does not give rise to iied claim