a sentence consecutive to a defendant’s undischarged term of imprisonment when the instant offense was committed either: (1) while the defendant was serving a term of imprisonment (including work release, furlough, or escape status), or (2) after sentencing for, but before commencing service of, such term of imprisonment. The second listed circumstance is the one that applies here. On August 20, 1999, the District of Columbia Superior Court revoked Hall’s Youth Act probation and sentenced him, as an adult, to 20 months to five years on the assault charge and to a mandatory minimum of five years to a maximum of fifteen years on the weapons charge. The mandatory minimum five year sentence was a new sentence, not previously imposed. See Mulky v. United States, 451 A.2d 855, 858 (D.C.1982) (<HOLDING>) (interpreting then-D.C. Code § 24-104).
holding that no court has the authority to substitute a different sentence for that which is required by law holding that a sentence imposed for a violation of supervised release will be upheld where 1 the district court considered the applicable policy statements 2 the sentence is within the statutory maximum and 3 the sentence is reasonable holding that a sentence imposed within statutory limits will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court holding that in a new sentencing proceeding after the original sentence has been vacated by the appellate court the trial court is not precluded from applying a drugtrafficking multiplier that it did not use in formulating the original sentence holding that a trial court is not required to reimpose the original sentence but has discretion to impose a new sentence within the statutory limits governing the offense for which she was convicted