an action has not been brought by the real party in interest, the trial court should, before ruling on the merits of an action, “either grant[] a continuance to permit [the real party in interest’s] joinder or correct[] the defect ex mero motu." As in Daniel, where the trial court erred in ruling on the merits before permitting joinder, the trial court, in this case, erred in addressing the merits without first joining Dolven as aparty. We cannot find this failure to join Dolven harmless because, since High Rock will not benefit if the driveway permit is allowed, there is no guarantee that High Rock will pursue the permit on remand or that the DOT would allow High Rock, a non-owner, to proceed with the application. See Booker v. Everhart, 294 N.C. 146, 158, 240 S.E.2d 360, 367 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we reverse and remand so that
holding that a third party holding legal title to property is a necessary party in an action for equitable distribution holding the family court has jurisdiction to join third parties when property is alleged to be marital but is owned by a third party holding that the failure to interview and present alibi witnesses and to admit a third party outofcourt confession to the crime was prejudicial holding that failure to join necessary party was prejudicial holding father waived claim that alleged de facto custodian should have been named as party in child support proceeding by failing to move to join party or to dismiss for lack of an indispensable party