15 & n. 9. Here, the District offers only speculation and senescent stories. Lastly, the statute was premised on the notion that “good government requires greater transparency” — a “value judgment” that was not “susceptible to empirical evidence.” Id. at 16. Here, the District’s core premise is that tour guides who have not passed a multiple-choice exam will harm the tourism economy. See Appellee’s Br. at 19. But this is exactly the sort of “economic” harm we distinguished in Taylor as being “susceptible to empirical evidence.” See Taylor, 582 F.3d at 16. Indeed, the Supreme Court has demanded evidence for the existence of harms in other contexts, too. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 169, 122 S.Ct. 2080, 153 L.Ed.2d 205 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 771, 113 S.Ct. 1792
holding special master did not err in rejecting a theory of causation where there was no evidence in the record suggesting that the proposed mechanism was at work in the petitioners case holding protestor waived its right to challenge a solicitation amendment by not objecting to its terms during the bidding process holding that in the postaward context a disappointed bidder lacked standing to bring a protest action when its submission was nonresponsive to the solicitation holding that defense of fraud was waived where no special issue was submitted and there was disputed evidence holding an ordinance regulating doortodoor solicitation unconstitutional in part because there was no evidence of a special crime problem related to doortodoor solicitation in the record