and the newspaper articles were false, trial counsel’s main concern was that Petitioner would be extensively cross-examined about how the articles made him feel and how they may have given him reason to dislike the Moo Youngs. This conclusion is amply supported by trial counsel’s testimony at the post-conviction hearing, and is left wholly unrefuted. In undertaking this analysis, the Florida Supreme Court did not apply a rule that contradicts Supreme Court ease law, nor did it arrive at a result contrary to one reached by the Supreme Court in a case with materially indistinguishable facts. Additionally, the state court’s application of that correctly-stated law was altogether reasonable. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 185-86, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 2474, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986) (<HOLDING>). The tactical decision to advise petitioner
holding that the ambiguity in the testimony of the cited jurors who were challenged for cause was insufficient to overcome the presumption of correctness owed to the trial courts findings holding that a defendant claiming ineffective assistance  must overcome the presumption that under the circumstances the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy holding that counsels conduct is entitled to the strong presumption that it falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and the petitioner must overcome the presumption that the conduct might be considered sound trial strategy quoting michel v louisiana 350 us 91 101 76 sct 158 100 led 83 1955 holding that because there were several reasons why counsel might have made a particular deci sion petitioner had failed to overcome the presumption that under the circumstances the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy recognizing presumption and finding that it was overcome