The trial court erred as a matter of law in finding, on these facts, that defendants were not entitled to a qualified immunity and, accordingly, in denying defendants’ motion for a summary judgment. A Pratt Already Received Full Procedural Due Process. [¶ 18] The Superior Court found that “[b]y 1996, it was well established ‘that a constructive discharge of a public employee without procedural due process constitutes an unconstitutional deprivation of property.’ ... .Supp.2d 893, 906 (N.D.Cal.1997), aff'd on other grounds, 203 F.3d 659 (9th Cir.2000) (stating that “Wasson, by acknowledging that she was placed on administrative leave, cannot claim that she was deprived of a property interest in her employment, as a matter of law”); Hunt v. Prior, 236 Conn. 421, 673 A.2d 514, 524 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Koelsch v. Town of Amesbury, 851 F.Supp. 497,
holding that an employers statement that he did not feel that he could afford the unions proposals did not trigger a duty to disclose because the overall context of bargaining did not suggest an inability to pay holding that the plaintiff was entitled to back pay for the differential between unemployment compensation received and the salary he would have earned if not terminated holding that a suspension with pay did not carry consto tutional ramifications because plaintiff did not prove that he was entitled to anything but his salary holding that even though the plaintiff failed to prove that he suffered a meaningful injury he was nevertheless entitled to nominal damages for the defendants violation of his first amendment rights holding that a defendant was not entitled to the affirmative defense where the evidence did not support his contention that he did not aid in the homicidal act