in the district court, we may in our discretion afford him some latitude because he was then incarcerated and proceeding pro se. See, e.g., Raineri v. United States, 233 F.3d 96, 97 (1st Cir.2000); Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 42 (1st Cir.1999). Because the outcome is clear, we elect to address the merits of this argument. Our analysis begins and ends with the language of the AEDPA’s tolling provision. By its terms, that provision applies to state post-conviction filings directed to “the pertinent judgment or claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In a typical habeas case, then, the tolling provision applies only to those state post-conviction filings that seek reexamination of the relevant state-court conviction or sentence. See Rodríguez v. Spencer, 412 F.3d 29, 37 (1st Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); Voravongsa v. Wall, 349 F.3d 1, 6-7 (1st
holding that federal habeas relief is not available to correct errors of state law holding that errors in state law cannot support federal habeas relief holding that the filing of a motion for reconsideration does not toll the period for seeking judicial review of the underlying order holding for the same reason that motion for appointment of counsel does not toll the period for filing a federal habeas petition holding that motion addressed to state appellate courts supervisory powers did not toll the period for seeking federal habeas relief because under state law that motion could not affect the judgment of conviction