the language of the Act itself and the intent behind the words, we find that the documents sought by Appellant Williams were “records” within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4). B. Whether these records were within the DVA’s “system of records” and thus sub-jeet to the Act’s access provision is a much more difficult problem. Courts have construed § 552a(a)(5) narrowly. See, e.g., Henke v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 88 F.3d 1453, 1459-61 (D.C.Cir.1996) (finding that retrieval capability is not the test since Congress’s use of the words ‘is retrieved’ “suggest[s] strongly that a group of records should generally (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1078, 101 S.Ct. 858, 66 L.Ed.2d 801 (1981); Smiertka v. United States Dep’t of Treasury, 447 F.Supp. 221, 228-29 (D.D.C.1978) (<HOLDING>), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 604
holding that records relating to a student court were not education records holding that a database of email messages is not a system of records under the privacy act because it is not indexed by personal identifier holding that warrants of deportation were properly characterized as nontestimonial official records that were prepared independent of this litigation and were not prepared to prove facts for use in future criminal prosecutions holding that daily reports prepared by agency investigator were not records within a system of records since they were retrievable by the investigators identifier and not accessed by plaintiffs name holding that gradecrossing accident reports prepared by a railroad were not business records because they were not prepared for the systematic conduct of the enterprise as a railroad business rather the reports are calculated for use essentially in the court not in the business their primary utility is in litigating not in railroading