determinations continue to fall outside the jurisdiction of the court of appeals entertaining a petition for review.” Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir.2006). Thus, the amendment to section 242(a)(2) does not affect our holding in Urenar-Tavarez. While Lindo attempts to frame his argument as one of law, at bottom he is merely arguing that “the evidence he submitted [shows] that his marriage was entered in good faith.’ ” As we have explained, “arguments such as that an Immigration Judge or the BIA incorrectly weighed evidence, failed to consider evidence or improperly weighed equitable factors are not questions of law under § [242](a)(2)(D).” Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir.2007); see also Contreras-Salinas v. Holder, 585 F.3d 710, 715 (2d Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Here, the BIA balanced the relevant evidence
holding that substantial evidence did not support agencys finding fear speculative when petitioner had offered evidence that she had already had two children that she planned to have more that she had gone to great lengths to avoid being sterilized in china and that she had removed her iud after escaping to the united states holding that a plaintiff could not show that she engaged in protected activity because she did not present evidence that she informed her employer that her complaints were based on race or age discrimination holding the petitioner abandoned her cat claim when she failed to raise it in her initial appellate brief holding that regardless of how petitioner characterizes her claim the bia wrongly ruled that she had not entered into her marriage in good faith the court lacked jurisdiction because she is essentially challenging the agencys credibility determinations and the relative weight it accorded to evidence holding appellant produced no evidence that when she made her complaints to management she ever mentioned that she felt she was being treated unfairly due to her race or sex