because the incidents are too different in kind, and too remote in time, from the offense to which he pled guilty. The Sentencing Guidelines do not place an explicit time limit on the previous activities that a court may consider in finding a “pattern of activity,” and there appears to be no case support for the proposition that previous events can be too remote in time to amount to a pattern. While this court has not addressed the “remote in time” question in a prece-dential opinion, other courts have addressed this issue. See United States v. Gawthrop, 310 F.3d 405, 414 (6th Cir.2002) (“Nothing in § 2G2.2(b)(4) or its current commentary requires a temporal nexus between any instances of sexual abuse or exploitation.”); United States v. Woodward, 277 F.3d 87, 90-92 (1st Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Lovaas, 241 F.3d 900, 903-04
holding that incidents of sexual abuse that occurred from 19741978 could establish a pattern of activity for purposes of sentencing in 2001 holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse holding that  2g22b5 does not place a time limit on past instances of sexual abuse or exploitation a court may consider in finding a pattern of activity holding that the fouching for the purposes of abuse language in section 1834014 means touching for the purposes of sexual abuse not abuse in general holding trial court was proper in admitting a doctors testimony that a delay between the occurrence of an incident of child sexual abuse and the childs revelation of the incident was the usual pattern of conduct for victims of child sexual abuse