Id. 44 . Id. 45 . Id. at *11-13. 46 . Id. at * 11 (explaining that under the established protocol, where Genger would have saved the relevant files on the Trans-Resources server); id. at *12 (identifying eight relevant emails, some with attachments, that were not found on the computer image of Genger’s hard drive, and noting that Genger "was not a routine 'deleter' " and had accumulated thousands of e-mails in his inbox). 47 . Id. at *12. 48 . Id. 49 . For example, the outcome perhaps might be different if Trans-Resources had a data retention policy whereby SecureClean was run on employees' computers and the company's servers every three months, and coincidentally, that scheduled run was to occur on September 8, 2008. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Midcap, 893 A.2d 542, 548 (Del.2006) (<HOLDING>). We also note that other state and federal
holding that where the destruction was negligent rather than willful special caution must be exercised to ensure that the sanction is commensurate with the information that was reasonably likely to have been contained in the destroyed evidence holding that an adverse inference for spoliation of evidence requires proof that evidence was destroyed with a culpable state of mind and that it was relevant to the partys claim or defense recognizing that the rationale for giving an adverse inference instruction would not necessarily apply where evidence was destroyed accidentally or where records are purged under a routine document destruction policy holding that the trial court erred by giving a misleading instruction holding that adverse inference rule is permissive