and also allowed the defendant to offer explanations. Seays, 789 So.2d at 1210. We reversed Mr. Sea sider pending charges if they are relevant for sentencing purposes. 21 So.3d at 160 (citing Dowling, 829 So.2d at 371 and Jansson, 399 So.2d at 1064). Dowling explained that “[t]he United States Supreme Court has held that it is not a violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights to consider other relevant factors when determining an appropriate sentence.” 829 So.2d at 371 (citing Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 100 S.Ct. 1358, 63 L.Ed.2d 622 (1980) and Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed the trial court properly considered defendant’s pending indictment for later offenses at sentencing); People v. Thomas, 59 Mich.App. 21, 228 N.W.2d 531, 532 (1975) (<HOLDING>); but cf. State v. Westall, 116 N.C.App. 534,
holding that evidence of a defendants prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt holding that trial courts jury charge did not amount to reversible error given that plaintiff failed to show she was prejudiced by inapplicable portion of trial courts charge recognizing district courts discretion to consider pending state charge in determining sentence holding that a trial courts consideration of a new pending charge at a sentencing hearing for the purpose of determining a pattern of conduct and defendants character was not improper absent a showing that the trial judge used the pending charge in determining defendants sentence holding that consideration of pending or dismissed charges during sentencing results in a denial of the defendants due process rights