them, sua sponte, on various grounds, including improper venue, untimeliness, and failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Logan appeals. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts, the procedural history, and the scope of issues on appeal. We affirm on the opinion of the district court. We note that Logan stated at oral argument that the charges from her allegedly false 1996 arrest were dropped within twenty-four hours, removing any doubt that the corresponding § 1983 claim is time-barred, as the district court had concluded. See Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 225 (2d Cir.2004) (“The statute of limitations applicable to claims brought under ...[§] 1983 in New York is three years.”); Covington v. City of New York, 171 F.3d 117, 121-23 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). We have considered all of Logan’s arguments,
holding that unlike malicious prosecution claim false arrest claim accrues on the date of the arrest holding that claims for false arrest and imprisonment under  1983 accrue at the time of the arrest holding that a false arrest claim accrues at the latest when the criminal prosecution is dismissed holding that malicious prosecution claim accrues when underlying prosecution is terminated holding that false arrest and false imprisonment claim were not duplicative