332, 336 (1st Cir.1995); Robinson v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 940 F.2d 1369, 1373 n. 4 (10th Cir.1991). 12 . See Kerr v. Lyford, 171 F.3d 330, 337 (5th Cir.1999) (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978)). 13 . See Henzel, 608 F.2d at 657; see also Reid, 56 F.3d at 336; Robinson, 940 F.2d at 1373 n. 4. 14 . See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274, 113 S.Ct. 2606 (considering stage of criminal justice process in determining functional characterization of the conduct); see also Carter v. Burch, 34 F.3d 257, 263 (4th Cir.1994) (considering pendency of judicial proceedings in making immunity determination). 15 . See Hill, 45 F.3d at 662 (immunity applicable because conduct occurred “after the pros-ecutorial phase of the case had begun”); Carter, 34 F.3d at 263 (<HOLDING>); see also Milstein, 257 F.3d at 1011 (holding
holding that the pendency of postconviction motion does not negate the finality of convictions for immigration removal purposes holding pendency of postconviction judicial proceedings relevant to immunity determination holding that a defendant does not have the right to be represented by counsel in postconviction proceedings which are civil proceedings recognizing judicial immunity for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction holding that personal injury action arising during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings was property of the estate