set forth [for summary judgment] in [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 56 does not apply because of the limited role of a court in reviewing the administrative record.... Summary judgment is [ ] the mechanism for deciding whether as a matter of law the agency action is supported by the administrative record and is otherwise consistent with the APA standard of review.” Southeast Conference v. Vilsack, 684 F.Supp.2d 135, 142 (D.D.C.2010). To prevail on its D.C. EPA claim, the plaintiff must show that the agency’s determination that preparing an EIS for' the challenged project was not necessary was “[arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” D.C. Code § 2-510(a)(3)(A); see also Kegley v. District of Columbia, 440 A.2d 1013, 1019 (D.C. 1982) (<HOLDING>); accord Dep’t of Transp. v. Public Citizen,
holding that a reviewing court has an obligation to satisfy itself of the jurisdiction of the court below holding that the superior court in reviewing agency action uses the precise scope of review the court of appeals employs in reviewing contested cases holding that a reviewing court is not to substitute its decision for that of the board holding that reviewing court may consider trial evidence in reviewing denial of motion to suppress holding that when a court of appeals has jurisdiction on interlocutory appeal the scope of appellate review is not limited to the precise question certified by the district court because the district courts order not the certified question is brought before the court