and do, reaffirm that in this jurisdiction, negligence concepts have no place in strict liability law.” Phillips, 576 Pa. at 656, 841 A.2d at 1007. In concurrence, three Justices noted the incongruity in abiding the numerous accretions of negligence theory into strict-liability doctrine, while at the same time pronouncing they have no place there. Phillips, 576 Pa. at 664, 841 A.2d at 1012 (Saylor, J., joined by Castille, J., and Ea-kin, J.). Furthermore, it was noted, strict-liability theory at its core, as it has been applied in Pennsylvania, incorporates the principle of risk-utility (or cost-benefit) balancing, derived from negligence theory. See id. at 667-68 & n. 5, 841 A.2d at 1013-14 & n. 5 (citing, inter alia, Surace v. Caterpillar, Inc., 111 F.3d 1039, 1044-45 (3d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>)). The concurrence also developed that, in
holding that we are required to predict the position which the pennsylvania supreme court would take in resolving this dispute  and in the absence of a clear statement by the pennsylvania supreme court to the contrary or other persuasive evidence of a change in pennsylvania law we are bound by the holdings of previous panels of this court recognizing the long hegemony of costbenefit analysis under pennsylvania law holding act 111 valid under pennsylvania constitution holding that osha is not required to conduct a costbenefit analysis in promulgating a standard under section 6b5 of the occupational safety and health act because congress uses specific language when intending that an agency engage in costbenefit analysis holding that pennsylvania law applied as the parties did not argue choice of law issue and implied that pennsylvania law applied by focusing their arguments on same