we decide the case on this jurisdictional basis, we will not address whether Verde properly exhausted his administrative remedies. 3 . Likewise, our statement that "an order reinstating a prior removal order is the functional equivalent of a final order of removal,” Dinnall v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 247, 251 n. 6 (3d Cir.2005) (quotation marks omitted), was made in a different context and does not control our decision today. 4 . The District Court correctly explained that in order to file a petition for habeas relief, the petitioner must be in custody. App. 9; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1). Yet it pointed to no such requirement in 8 U.S.C. § 1252, nor did Verde identify any other obstacle to filing a petition for review. See Jordon v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 424 F.3d 320, 328 (3d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Verde also contends that the Government
holding that  1252a4 of the real id act precluded the district court from exercising jurisdiction over the petitioners habeas petition holding that because the real id act created a remedy as broad in scope as a habeas petition the act is an adequate substitute for habeas corpus recognizing our ability to construe a pretrial habeas petition filed under  2254 as being brought under  2241 holding that a habeas petition filed more than 30 days after the effective date of the real id act cannot be transferred to the court of appeals as a petition for review for lack of jurisdiction holding that because petitioners habeas petition was converted to a petition for review under the real id act whether jordon was in custody under  2241  is a jurisdictional inquiry no longer relevant to our analysis here