Amendment seizure sufficient to ground a section 1983 malicious prosecution claim? In the classic formulation, a Fourth Amendment seizure occurs “[o]nly when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). In this case, there was no physical force during the post-arraignment period. The appellants’ position, by default, is that their liberty was restrained by a show of authority, manifested most clearly by a series of orders to appear before the court. By obeying these orders, the appellants assert, they yielded to a show of authority, completing the seizure. Cf. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) (<HOLDING>). This proposition is counterintuitive. The
holding that a show of authority by a government actor does not constitute a seizure unless the subject yields or submits to it holding that amtrak was a state actor holding fda seizure action did not constitute final agency action holding that texas democratic party was subject to the fourteenth amendment as a state actor and rejecting as a slight  change in form defendants argument that because the democratic party was a private entity it was not a state actor holding that such a physician was a state actor under  1983