Under these circumstances, we elect not to reach Hartford’s proffered alternative basis. As Capianco’s claim is to be reviewed de novo, there is no need at this juncture to return it to Hartford to develop facts or for an exercise of discretion; therefore we simply remand this case back to the district court. See Mongeluzo v. Baxter Travenol Long Term Disability Benefit Plan, 46 F.3d 938, 942, 944 (9th Cir.1995); cf. Canseco v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal, 93 F.3d 600, 609 (9th Cir.1996); Nelson v. EG & G Energy Measurements Group, Inc., 37 F.3d 1384, 1388-91 (9th Cir.1994). Although we refuse Capianco’s request to issue specific discovery orders, we note that on remand, Capianco’s two remaining theories may justify further discovery. See Mongeluzo, 46 F.3d at 943-44, 944 (<HOLDING>). Finally, because we remand, “neither party
holding that a court of appeals should review de novo a district courts determination of state law holding that district courts have discretion to admit additional evidence  necessary to conduct an adequate de novo review holding that we review a district courts interpretation of a statute de novo holding that appellant was entitled to a de novo review however he was not entitled to a de novo review of an argument never raised recognizing de novo standard of review