acts that injured Pujol, however, were not caused by the “predicate acts” alleged in the complaint within the meaning of Sedi-ma’s causation requirement. Id. at 1205. Although Bennett fails to expressly state the reasons for his removal as chairman of the board, he appears to infer in the complaint that one reason was because of his contact with the OCC to prevent the transfer of CNB escrow funds to Centerpoint Bank. In any event, this act that allegedly injured Bennett was not caused by the predicate acts of securities fraud. See Nodine v. Textron, Inc., 819 F.2d 347 (1st Cir.1987) (“[A]n employee discharged for reporting a criminal violation of his employer lacked standing to sue that employer under the RICO Act.”); Cullom v. Hibernia Nat’l Bank, 859 F.2d 1211, 1218 (5th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Bennett’s claimed injury that he has lost the
holding that a person who refuses to participate in an activity which is violative of rico and is constructively discharged for such a refusal may not sue  under  rico holding that an insurer is not liable for punitive damages by its refusal to pay a claim unless such refusal is accompanied by a malicious intent to injure or defraud holding that an atwill employee may not be discharged for refusal to violate the law holding employee resigned and was not constructively discharged because there was no evidence that employer deliberately created working conditions that led to her resignation holding that public policy was violated where the employee was discharged for refusal to participate in a lobbying effort