to the contrary.” However, Sanchez’s conclusion that OCGA § 15-11-26 (a) establishes a mandatory juvenile court procedure is based upon the premise that that statute is the functional equivalent of a criminal speedy trial statute. As the cases cited with approval in Sanchez implicitly hold, when OCGA § 15-11-26 (a) is construed as the juvenile court equivalent of a criminal speedy trial statute, it is both jurisdictional and mandatory and a non-compliance therewith mandates a dismissal with prejudice. J. B. H. v. State of Ga., supra at 203 (1) (citing Strunk v. United States, 412 U. S. 434 (93 SC 2260, 37 LE2d 56) (1973)); E. S. v. State of Ga., 134 Ga. App. 724 (1) (215 SE2d 732) (1975) (citing OCGA § 17-7-170). Compare Sanchez v. Walker County Dept. of Family &c. Svcs., supra at 411 (<HOLDING>). Unlike the majority, I believe that the
holding that a review committee of the kansas board for discipline of attorneys had the authority to dismiss a complaint against an attorney with or without prejudice and when dismissal was ordered without specifying the nature of the dismissal the dismissal was without prejudice to the filing of later proceedings on the same matter holding that dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim should generally be without prejudice but if the plaintiff has been given an opportunity amend his complaint and fails to do so the dismissal may be with prejudice holding borough could not appeal dismissal of complaint without prejudice because  dismissal without prejudice is comparable to a nonsuit under the former practice of lavf  holding that proper remedy for failure to exhaust is dismissal of the claim without prejudice holding that a noncompliance with the provisions of ocga  151119 a and 151121 c will result in a dismissal without prejudice