2008). The use of the word “and” indicates that a taxpayer must comply with both subsections (1) and (2) for its mailed payment to be timely. See In re Brookshire Grocery Co., 250 S.W.3d 66, 69-70 (Tex.2008) (orig.proceeding); City of Lubbock v. Adams, 149 S.W.3d 820, 827 (Tex.App.Amarillo 2004, pet. denied). We must determine, then, whether either of Tenaska’s payments complied with section 1.08. The February 7 payment was sent by UPS, not first-class mail, and did not bear a post office cancellation mark dated on or before February 1, the due date for Tenaska’s tax payment. The February 7 payment, then, was not timely under section 1.08. See id.; see also Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 S.W.2d 949, 952-53 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1997, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). The real focus of the parties’ disagreement
holding that a defendants actual knowledge that an action is pending or that service has been attempted is not the equivalent of service of summons and will not relieve the plaintiff of its burden or vest the court with jurisdiction holding that service is not avoided by service on a partys attorney as service on an attorney is ineffective unless he has been authorized to accept such service holding the rule 4 requirement of delivery to the appropriate united states attorney required personal service not service by certified mail holding that service by private courier is not equivalent to firstclass mail recognizing presumption of effective service by regular mail