298, 322, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995) (“[T]ying the miscarriage of justice exception to innocence ... accommodates both the systemic interests in finality ... and conservation of judicial resources, and the overriding individual interest in doing justice in the ‘extraordinary case.’ ”). The Supreme Court has extended the actual innocence exception to capital sentencing, Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992), but has declined to answer whether the doctrine applies to noncapital sentencing errors, Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393, 124 S.Ct. 1847, 158 L.Ed.2d 659 (2004). The First Circuit has not spoken on this issue, and other circuits are split. Compare Spence v. Superintendent, Great Meadow Corr. Facility, 219 F.3d 162, 171 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Maybeck, 23 F.3d 888, 893-94
holding that the actual innocence exception applies to a sentencing enhancement in a noncapital sentence holding that the defendants substantial rights were not affected by a sentencing guidelines enhancement even in the absence of a specific finding by the district court because the evidence amply supported the enhancement holding that no complete innocence exception to the doench doctrine exists holding that a sentencing court may warn a defendant of the possibility of a sentence enhancement holding under acca that the actual innocence of sentence exception applies in the context of habitual offender provisions only where the challenge to eligibility stems from factual innocence of the predicate crimes and not from the legal classification of the predicate crimes