and “the failure to provide a child with food, clothing, or shelter necessary to sustain the life or health of the child, excluding failure caused primarily by financial inability unless relief services had been offered and refused.” Id. § 261.001(4)(A), (B)(iii). These definitions are not exhaustive. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.005(13) (Vernon 2005) (stating that term “includes” is term of enlargement and not of exclusive enumeration); C.B., 376 S.W.3d at 249 & n. 10 (citing Government Code section 311.005(13) and concluding enumerated acts and omissions are not exhaustive). In addition, Texas Supreme Court case law, through its definition of child endangerment, is instructive on what constitutes abuse or neglect under Chapters 262 and 161 of the Code. See Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533 (<HOLDING>) (internal citations omitted); see also In re
holding that use of tangible property must be proximate cause of injury and that property does not cause injury if it does no more than furnish the condition that makes the injury possible holding that prejudice or injury is a necessary element of standing holding due process does not require jury unanimity on particular act or omission submitted as alternate means of committing the conduct element of the offense of injury to a child holding that injury to broker through loss of commission was not antitrust injury holding that endanger means more than a threat of metaphysical injury or the possible ill effects of a lessthanideal family environment but it is not necessary that the conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually suffers injury rather endanger means to expose to loss or injury to jeopardize