who violates this section shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony____ Thus, the pertinent conduct proscribed by Code § 18.2-308.2 is merely that of “being a felon” and “knowingly and intentionally” being in possession of a firearm. Id.; see also Armstrong v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 573, 582, 562 S.E.2d 139, 144 (2002). Neither Code § 18.2-308.2, nor its related statutes, contain a scienter or mens rea element for a conviction under that statute. Indeed, to prove a violation under the plain language of the statute, the Commonwealth must establish nothing more than that the defendant “has been convicted of a felony” and that he or she “knowingly and intentionally possessed] ... any firearm.” Code § 18.2-308.2. But see Reed v. Commonwealth, 15 Va.App. 467, 471, 424 S.E.2d 718, 720-21 (1992) (<HOLDING>). This interpretation comports squarely with
holding that defendants habitual traffic violator conviction could also serve as a predicate felony conviction under the general habitual offender statute holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in not allowing defendant to present evidence of his subjective belief regarding his status as habitual offender because his belief was irrelevant to offense of driving as habitual offender holding based upon language in related statutes now repealed that actual knowledge of declaration of habitual offender status and direction not to drive was required for conviction for driving after having been so declared holding that to constitute a prior conviction for purposes of the habitual felony offender act the defendant must have been adjudicated guilty before the present crime was committed holding that under the 1991 version of the habitual offender statute defendant could not receive habitual offender sentence for life felony