that an officer may have removed the ear piece cover from Mr. Pitt’s cell phone in order to link him to the scene of the robbery. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we agree with the district court that a reasonable jury could have found the District’s actions sufficiently “outrageous” to support a verdict for Mr. Pitt on his IIED claim. The District argues that the verdict should be set aside as fatally inconsistent because the jury found the District liable.for IIED while finding the individual officers not liable. We reject the District’s arguments. In both the civil and criminal contexts, courts have held that inconsistency alone is not a sufficient basis for setting aside a jury verdict. See United States v. Dykes, 406 F.3d 717, 722-23 (D.C.Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 1286, 1295
holding that a criminal defendant convicted by a jury on one count cannot attack that conviction because it was inconsistent with the jurys verdict of acquittal on another count citations omitted recognizing this court will uphold a general verdict if evidence on any one count issue or theory sustains the verdict citations omitted holding that under aspinwall when the trial court submits to the jury a good count  one that is supported by the evidence  and a bad count  one that is not supported by the evidence  and the jury returns a general verdict this court cannot presume that the verdict was returned on the good count in such a case a judgment entered upon the verdict must be reversed holding that a defendant cannot challenge his conviction merely because it is inconsistent with jurys verdict of acquittal on another count holding that in some circumstances a sentence on one count may be increased after the sentence on a similar or related count has been vacated on appeal