rail passenger service. Yet, in the case before us, it is evident that the conveyance to Amtrak was one in form only, a necessary formality in consummating a scheme whose purpose was to effect a transfer of B & M's property not to Amtrak, but to Central Vermont. In sanctioning that scheme, the Commission ignores the principle that the condemnation power is to be strictly construed to encompass only what is conferred by statute. See United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 243 n. 13, 67 S.Ct. 252, 258 n. 13, 91 L.Ed. 209 (1946) (utility’s condemnation power limited to those powers “expressed or necessarily implied”); Final Decision, 4 I.C.C.2d at 811 (Gradison, Ch., dissenting); see also National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Two Parcels of Land, 822 F.2d 1261, 1264-65 & n. 3 (2d Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 954, 108 S.Ct. 347, 98
holding that under leedom v kyne jurisdiction exists over challenges addressed to the very existence of board power as opposed to its exercise of that power holding amtraks condemnation power to be of the more limited statutory variety as opposed to the broader sovereign power of eminent domain holding that unless that power is restricted by the principal an agent under a california statutory healthcare power of attorney has the power to execute applicable admission forms including arbitration agreements holding that a statutory remedy does not preempt common law remedies against a nonsovereign entity vested with the power of eminent domain unless the statute expressly or by necessary implication so provides holding that the recognition power is not limited to a determination of the government to be recognized but rather includes the power to take actions without which the power of recognition might be thwarted