Cir.2000); Weberg v. Franks, 229 F.3d 514, 522 (6th Cir.2000); Notari v. Denver Water Dep’t, 971 F.2d 585, 587 (10th Cir. 1992); Johnston v. Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1575-76 (5th Cir.1989); Ratliff v. City of Milwaukee, 795 F.2d 612, 624 (7th Cir.1986). Moreover, because the availability of section 1983 as a remedy for employment discrimination turns on the independence of the right’s source, rather than on the distinct factual basis of the Title VII and section 1983 claims, we further conclude an em ployment discrimination plaintiff asserting a violation of a constitutional right may bring suit under section 1988 alone, without having to plead concurrently a violation of Title VII and comply with the Act’s procedural requirements. See Back, 365 F.3d at 117 (<HOLDING>); Notari, 971 F.2d at 587 (holding “a Title YII
holding a plaintiff alleging a constitutional claim of gender discrimination may bring suit under  1983 alone and is not required to plead concurrently a violation of title vii holding that an employer alone is liable for a violation of title vii by supervisory employees holding that a plaintiff could not assert a  1981 claim based on gender discrimination holding race and gender discrimination claim barred holding that direct evidence of discrimination is not required to prove discrimination in mixed motive cases under title vii