on untried indictments, informations, or complaints. Section 217.490. The IAD contains an “anti-shuttling” provision found in Paragraph 5 of Article IV, which provides: If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner’s being returned to the original place of imprisonment pursuant to paragraph 5 of article V of this agreement, such indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. Section 217.490. The rights and protections created by the IAD are statutory rights, not fundamental or constitutional in nature. Kenneth-Smith v. State, 838 S.W.2d 113, 117 (Mo.App. E.D.1992); United States v. Black, 609 F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th Cir.1979)(<HOLDING>) As such, a defendant’s protections under the
recognizing that prison regulations designed to provide security are not only legitimate but are central to all other correctional goals holding that the protections of the iad are not founded on constitutional rights or the preservation of a fair trial but are designed to facilitate a defendants rehabilitation in prison and to avoid disruptions caused when charges are outstanding against the prisoner in another jurisdiction holding that the iad as construed by fex requires that a prisoner must be tried within 180 days of the date when his request for disposition is actu ally received by the state in which the charges are pending not when the prisoner provides that request to his custodial authorities holding that since the constitutional and statutory extradition provisions are not designed to protect fugitives but rather  are designed to facilitate the administration of justice between states the failure to comply with established procedures does not deprive the fugitive of any protected right and therefore provides no basis for a  1983 claim holding a prisoner has no constitutional right to a job in prison