125, 87 L.Ed. 83 (1942). The test to determine whether an employee is engaged in commerce “is not whether the employee’s activities affect or indirectly relate to interstate commerce but whether they are actually in or so closely related to the movement of the commerce as to be a part of it.” McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491, 497, 63 S.Ct. 1248, 87 L.Ed. 1538 (1943). In the Eleventh Circuit, to be covered under the FLSA, Plaintiff must be “directly participating in the actual movement of persons or things in interstate commerce.” Thorne, 448 F.3d at 1266. That participation must be “a substantial part of [Plaintiffs] work” in order for an FLSA plaintiff to successfully invoke individual coverage. Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 572, 63 S.Ct. 332, 87 L.Ed. 460 (1943) (<HOLDING>). The following facts related to Plaintiffs
holding that commerce clause authorizes congress to punish any particular criminal action even without proof of a relation to interstate commerce when the activity is part of a class of activities determined by congress to affect interstate commerce recognizing that interpreting the flsa to apply to a handler of any good which has moved interstate would negate the significance of the clause and ignore the intent of congress to create a distinction between certain workers whose activities were covered by the flsa and others whose activities were not holding that individual coverage is established if a substantial part of an employees activities related to goods whose movement in the channels of interstate commerce was established by the test we have described he is covered by the flsa holding that maintenance workers in a building that did produce goods for interstate commerce were covered under the flsa holding that congress may regulate purely local intrastate activities if they are part of an economic class of activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce