plea agreement. More to the point, the concerns expressed regarding the impact specific performance would or may have on future criminal defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights have, in the court’s view, been rendered meritless in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Monsanto, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 2657, 2665-2667, 105 L.Ed.2d 512 (1989); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United, States, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 2646, 2651-2657, 105 L.Ed.2d 528 (1989). Moreover, in view of these two cases it is difficult, if not impossible, for the court to see how ordering surrender of the withheld assets would be unfair to Alexander or to his attorneys. See United States v. Monsanto, 109 S.Ct. at 2665-2667; Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S.Ct. at 2656-2657 and 2656 n. 10 (<HOLDING>). In sum, the court concludes, in the exercise
holding that in determining whether the defendant has a prior conviction for burglary under the armed career criminal act the federal court may look only to the terms of the charging document the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant or to some comparable judicial record of this information recognizing ambiguous terms of plea agreement are construed against government recognizing that criminal defense lawyers may very well be unable to collect their fees upon conviction or because of the terms of a plea agreement holding that a courts inquiry as to disputed facts in connection with a prior conviction is limited to the terms of the charging document a plea agreement a transcript of the plea colloquy or a comparable judicial record holding that a federal habeas court may grant specific performance of a plea agreement in the face of evidence that the state has breached the terms of such an agreement