marks omitted). The test of federal jurisdiction is not whether the cause of action is one on which the claimant can recover, but rather whether the cause of action alleged is so patently without merit as to justify the court’s dismissal for want of jurisdiction. McGinnis v. Ingram Equip. Co., Inc., 918 F.2d 1491, 1494 (11th Cir.1990) (en banc). We liberally construe the Kinseys’ reliance on pendant party jurisdiction as an invocation of the district court’s supplemental jurisdiction. See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir.1998) (“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.”); see also Palmer v. Hosp. Auth. of Randolph County, 22 F.3d 1559, 1566-67 (11th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 468
recognizing that finley had been superseded by 28 usc  1367a holding no pendent party jurisdiction over nondiverse defendants when underlying suit brought under 42 usc  1983 recognizing that the supplemental jurisdiction statute 28 usc  1367a provides congressional authorization for what was formerly known as pendent party jurisdiction holding a district courts power to remand pendent state claims to state court is inherent in statutory authorization to decline supplemental jurisdiction under  1367c holding that even where primary claim is a federal question pendent party jurisdiction is not a recognized basis of jurisdiction in the seventh circuit