to cases in which the courts of appeals have reached divergent results. 6 We also reject Tyler’s attempt to find support in our disposition in Adams v. Evatt, 511 U. S. 1001 (1994). In Adams, we vacated an opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which had held that Cage was not retroactive, and remanded for further consideration in light of Sullivan. Our order, however, was not a “final determination on the merits.” Henry v. Rock Hill, 376 U. S. 776, 777 (1964) (per curiam). It simply indicated that, in light of “intervening developments,” there was a “reasonable probability” that the Court of Appeals would reject a legal premise on which it relied and which may affect the outcome of the litigation. Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U. S. 163, 167 (1996) (per curiam). (<HOLDING>). On the contrary, the second Teague exception
holding apprendi does not satisfy second exception in teague recognizing south carolina as the governing law and finding no south carolina cases directly on point the court referred to applicable law from other jurisdictions holding that the rule in caldwell v mississippi 472 u s 320 1985 did not fit within the second teague exception even though it added to an existing guarantee of due process protection against fundamental unfairness holding that the rule in simmons v south carolina 512 u s 154 1994 which has been described as serving one of the hallmarks of due process id at 175 oconnor j concurring in judgment did not fit within the second teague exception recognizing south carolina as a jurisdiction where service on statutory agent is exclusive