(Kennedy, J„ concurring). In this case, appellant was charged and convicted under the Texas statute prohibiting possession of child pornography. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 43.25, 43.26(a). In Texas, it is an offense to knowingly or intentionally possess “visual material that visually depicts a child younger than 18 years of age at the time the image of the child was made who is engaging in sexual conduct” if the person “knows that the material depicts the child” engaging in sexual conduct. Id. § 43.26(a). Unlike the CPPA, however, the plain language of the statute indicates that it prohibits only possession of material that depicts an actual child, not material that merely “appears” to depict a child. Id.; see also State v. Anderson, 151 Ohio App.3d 422, 784 N.E.2d 196, 200 (2003) (<HOLDING>). The legislative history of the statute also
holding that statute which prohibited polygamy did not violate first amendment holding that pornography depicting actual children can be prescribed whether or not the images are obscene because of the states interest in protecting the children exploited by the production process holding that the first amendment does not protect obscenity or pornography produced with actual children holding that the language of the ohio statute prohibits only images depicting actual children and thus does not violate the first amendment holding that virtual child pornography which did not use images of actual minors was protected expressive speech under the first amendment because it did not harm any real children through its production and continued existence