readily ascertainable.” (internal citation omitted)). Because Minnesota’s waiver rule was neither firmly established nor regularly applied in the courtroom closure context when it was applied to Crawford, I respectfully dissent. 6 . It should be noted unpublished appellate decisions in Minnesota are not precedential. See Minn.Stat. § 480A.08. 7 . Since Crawford, the Minnesota’ Court of Appeals has continued to apply the waiver rule as it was articulated in Bashire. See State v. Delacruz, No. A03-129, 2004 WL 193058, at *4 (Minn.Ct.App. Feb. 3, 2004) (unpublished) (finding no waiver where the defendant failed to object to a courtroom closure but did not explicitly agree to the closure); State v. Campbell, No. A06-539, 2007 WL 1121284, at *1 (Minn.Ct.App. April 17, 2007) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>). These cases are irrelevant to our inquiry,
holding appellant waived his challenge to statute as vague as applied because he did not specifically object at trial holding that the defendant waived the issue on appeal when he failed to contemporaneously object to the admission of such evidence at trial holding the defendant waived any claim of error by both failing to object at trial and affirmatively agreeing to a limited closure holding the defendant waived his courtroom closure challenge because he both failed to object to the limited closure and agreed to the closure through his attorney holding that a defendant who is seeking to excuse a procedurally defaulted claim of structural error need not establish actual prejudice and so the court need not require petitioner to prove that his counsels failure to object to the trial closure was actually prejudicial