trustee in bankruptcy, etc., as entities that may be aggrieved parties with standing to file an FCRA claim provides support for conferring standing on a “personal representative” (to the extent that “personal representative” is not subsumed into the term “legal representative”). Moreover, it cannot be said that Mrs. Cimino was not an “individual” capable of being “aggrieved” by discrimination purportedly directed at her husband prior to his death. It is not a leap in logic to find that a statute that permits an aggrieved “trustee in bankruptcy” to file an FCRA charge would similarly permit a widow acting in her capacity as personal and legal representative of the deceased’s estate to do so. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 178, 131 S.Ct. 863, 178 L.Ed.2d 694 (2011) (<HOLDING>). The FCRA “shall be construed according to the
holding that the term aggrieved in title vii incorporates this zone of interests test enabling suit by any plaintiff with an interest arguably sought to be protected by the statute  citation omitted holding that an attorneys letters constitute protected conduct under title vii holding that title vii incorporates statutory epa defenses recognizing that a plaintiff may be able to establish that the statute is unconstitutional by showing that the statute lacks any plainly legitimate sweep  citation omitted holding that six employees bringing suit under title vii were not in privity with the united states which had brought a previous suit against the same employer because the employees sought a type of relief which the united states had not sought