court may not impose multiple gun minimum sentences on convictions arising from the same criminal episode. To the extent that the state’s assignment of error implicitly raised that issue, I would hold that defendant is correct. See State v. Hardesty, 298 Or 616, 618-19, 695 P2d 569 (1985); see also State v. Wells, 82 Or App 283, 285-86, 728 P2d 533 (1986). I conclude, therefore, that the sentencing court did not err when it imposed a gun minimum sentence on only one count in this case. 2 The inclusion of the language “with a firearm” in the title of the offense for which defendant was sentenced in 1991 is and was sufficient under ORS 161.610(2) to allege use or threatened use of a firearm as an element in aggravation. But see State v. Pies, 104 Or App 646, 650-51, 802 P2d 702 (1990) (<HOLDING>). 3 The judgment in that case simply sentenced
holding it was not a surprise or unfair to the defendant for the state to pursue a theory of aiding and abetting at trial when the charging document did not refer to aiding and abetting holding that to be guilty of aiding and abetting under  924c the defendant must have directly facilitated or encouraged use of the firearm mere presence at the scene of the crime and knowledge that the crime is being committed is not enough holding that a defendant convicted of committing a felony with a firearm on an aiding and abetting theory might not personally have used or threatened to use the firearm and thus that the conviction might not count for purposes of imposing a gun minimum sentence under ors 161610 holding that no active facilitation of the principals use of the firearm is necessary for an aiding and abetting conviction under  924c holding that to enhance a sentence because of the defendants use of a firearm the jury must find the defendant guilty of a crime involving a firearm or otherwise specifically find that a firearm was used