simple references to the plaintiff-employees — as “good old boys” and “old-fashioned” are insufficient evidence of age-based animus under ADEA). Thus more likely, these types of isolated comments would be considered stray remarks. However, Ceinos’ comments do not seem to be motivated by Acevedo’s age, even if he admittedly “took it personally.” Even more, “it is far from clear that the alleged remarks bespeak any age-based animus at all.” El Dia, Inc., 304 F.3d at 69. Courts have held that “a statement that plausibly can be interpreted two different ways-one discriminatory and the other benign — does not directly reflect illegal animus.” Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, Inc., 199 F.3d 572, 583 (1st Cir.1999); see also Speen v. Crown Clothing Corp., 102 F.3d 625, 636 (1st Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>) In analyzing Ceinos’ comments, this Court
holding that  ambiguous remarks tending to suggest animus based on age are insufficient standing alone to prove an employers discriminatory intent  holding that isolated remarks are insufficient to prove discriminatory intent holding that circumstantial evidence alone may establish discriminatory intent holding that remarks made by decisionmakers could be viewed as reflecting discriminatory animus recognizing that the seventh circuit consistently has held that isolated comments that are no more than stray remarks in the work place are insufficient to establish that a particular decision was motivated by discriminatory animus