are not banned, nor is the use of signs with manually changeable type. Even if EMCs are considered to be a particular “medium,” the fact that a regulation bans a particular medium does not mean that the ordinance is not narrowly tailored. Globe Newspaper, 100 F.3d at 191-92. When the medium itself is the “evil the city [seeks] to address,” then a ban of that entire medium is narrowly tailored. Id. at 192 (citing Vi 1097 (8th Cir.2006) (concluding that an ordinance prohibiting flashing or blinking electronic signs left open sufficient alternative channels of communication, including using non-electronic signs); Globe Newspaper, 100 F.3d at 193 (concluding that street vendors were an adequate alternative to on-street newspaper boxes); Chapin Furniture Outlet, 2006 WL 2711851, at *4 (<HOLDING>). NJI argues that it is losing potential
holding that prohibiting external illumination of political signs while allowing it for other signs was an unconstitutional contentbased restriction since the message on the sign determines whether or not it may be externally illuminated holding that an ordinance exempting certain signs from a general sign ban was an unconstitutional contentbased restriction on speech holding that an ordinance banning emcs does not prevent pjlaintiff from displaying any message  on a sign not prohibited and noting that plaintiff could use banners flags sandwich boards and inflatable signs as alternatives to emcs holding city ordinance preempted by state law because ordinance prohibited act specifically allowed under state law holding that a plaintiff had standing to attack an entire ordinance including portions of the ordinance not applied to the plaintiff