Livengood tackled plaintiff to the ground as plaintiff was attempting to leave the scene. It is also undisputed that Livengood had repeatedly told plaintiff that she was not free to leave. The “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurred at the timé when Livengood actually applied physical force to restrain the plaintiff. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991). Thus, plaintiff was not seized until she was tackled. At the time plaintiff was tackled, she was fleeing by foot from an investigation wherein she was, at that point, suspected of the crime of disorderly conduct. Whether Mr. Serrano had actually agreed to sign a complaint is irrelevant in these circumstances. See United States v. Bell, 892 F.2d 959, 967 (10th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). The court finds that there existed sufficient
holding that a suspects actions in fleeing from a law enforcement officer who had reasonable suspicion of illegal activity supplied additional grounds supporting probable cause for seizure recognizing that an officer must have a reasonable articulable suspicion that the person has been is or is about to be engaged in criminal activity to frisk an individual for weapons and must have probable cause to conduct a further seizure recognizing that a suspects prior unlawful activity or related convictions can corroborate information supplied by informants holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same holding that traffic stops based on probable cause are valid even if the officer stopping the vehicle suspects that the occupant is engaged in other illegal activity