RApp. P. 4(a)(1)(B). Accordingly, the scope of Stephann’s appeal is limited to the order denying the motion to reopen. Stephann’s motion to reopen, purportedly based on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6), is properly construed as a motion for relief from judgment based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Cf. Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441, 1463 n. 35 (9th Cir.1992) (“An untimely motion for reconsideration is construed as a motion based on Fed. R.Civ.P. 60(b).”). The district court abused its discretion when it denied Stephann’s motion to reopen for failure to properly file his case within the 60-day period, because this denied Stephann an opportunity to have his case reviewed on the merits. See Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 459 (9th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). REVERSED AND REMANDED. ** This disposition is
holding that coas should be construed liberally holding that because adjudication of cases on their merits is favored rule 60b should be given a liberal construction holding that federal rule of civil procedure 60b should be liberally construed so that cases are heard on the merits and not hampered by technical problems holding that pleadings under the rico act are to be liberally construed holding that under edenfield the act should be liberally construed