found it “difficult to maintain on a priori grounds that sex is physically dangerous” to every potential victim under the statute. Id. at 299. The First Circuit examined a similar statute-punishing a person over the age of 18 who engages in sexual intercourse with a person between 14 and 16-in United States v. Sacko, 178 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.1999). The court determined that statutory rape crimes fall within the exception to the categorical approach because they “cover[ ] conduct both inside and outside the ‘violent felony’ sphere.” Id. at 4-5. We agree with the First and the Seventh Circuits that statutory rape statutes that include more mature victims and do not contain aggravating factors are not subject to the strict categorical approach articulated in Taylor. See Seaton, 45 F.3d at 111 (<HOLDING>). Thus, this case should be remanded for the
holding the crime of conspiracy is committed or not before the substantive crime begins holding that a court must only look to the statutory definition not the underlying circumstances of the crime to determine whether a given offense is by its nature a crime of violence for purposes of 18 usc  16 holding that if a crime is broadly defined the court can look beyond the elements of the crime holding that once the statute is found to be divisible the court must look to the charging papers and judgment of conviction to determine if the actual crime of which defendant was convicted was a crime of violence but emphasizing that the court is not to examine the particular facts underlying the conviction holding that conviction of a crime requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime