by the EEOC report and • the EEOC applied a different standard of proof than the standard to be applied by the jury. Appellant’s App’x, vol. 2 at 58-59. This evidentiary ruling did not constitute an abuse of discretion. A. The letter could have engendered undue deference to the EEOC’s findings and confused the jury. The district court concluded that the letter posed too great a risk of unfair prejudice and juror confusion. In our view, the district court did not abuse its discretion in coming to this conclusion. First, if the district court allowed introduction of the EEOC letter, the jury may have felt the need to defer to the EEOC because of its perceived expertise. To avoid this risk, the court may have reasonably thought it needed to exclude the letter. See Hall, 988 F.2d at 1058 (<HOLDING>). Second, introduction of the EEOC letter might
holding it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude testimony holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to exclude an agency finding of no discrimination on the ground that the report would suggest to the jury that it should reach the same conclusion as the agency holding that an order by the trial court remanding the cause to the agency to impose a sanction other than the one imposed by the agency was not a final and appealable order because it did not terminate the litigation between the parties on the merits holding that a finding of fact is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole if it would have been possible for a reasonable jury to reach the boards conclusion holding that when an agency has not reached an issue the proper course is to remand to the agency to address it in the first instance