2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979). To the extent that he argues that state officials withdrew from him a state-created liberty interest in conditional release, Evans forgets that the Delaware Supreme Court explained, in Evans II, that Delaware law does not vest in offend ers sentenced to life any interest in conditional release. 872 A.2d at 557-58. We have no warrant to question the holding of Evans II, a decision that rests squarely on state law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Swarthout, 131 S.Ct. at 861; Wilson v. Corcoran, - U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 13, 16, 178 L.Ed.2d 276 (2010) (per curiam). Nor did Evans I I's construction of § 4348 deprive Evans of earned merit or good behavior credits. Cf. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. at Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985) (<HOLDING>). He has already benefitted from those credits,
holding that due process requires some evidence to support official revocation of good time credits holding that statutory good time credits must be calculated under the law in effect at the time of resentencing after an appeal of the sentence is determined holding that due process requires that the findings and actions of a disciplinary prison board be supported by some evidence in the record holding that due process requires a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case holding that depriving inmates of statecreated right to goodtime credits in prison disciplinary proceedings requires due process