rights. But “not every burden on the exercise of a constitutional right and not every encouragement to waive such a right is invalid.” Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 219, 99 S.Ct. 492, 493-497, 58 L.Ed.2d 466 (1978). Persons involved in the criminal law process are faced with a variety of choices. Some of the alternatives may lead to unpleasant consequences. For example, to choose to go to trial may result in greater punishment.... Section 3E1.1 may add to the dilemmas facing criminal defendants, but no good reason exists to believe that 3E1.1 was intended to punish anyone for exercising rights. We are unprepared to equate the possibility of leniency with impermissible punishment. Id. (footnotes omitted). But see United States v. Frierson, 945 F.2d 650, 659-60 (3d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1515, 117
holding that denial of reduction for acceptance of responsibility was a penalty which could not be imposed for defendants assertion of fifth amendment privilege holding that the district courts denial of a reduction for acceptance of responsibility is a factual question and should be accorded great deference and should not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous holding that a valid assertion of the fifth amendment privilege in a civil case may not be treated as an admission that allegations are true holding that the statement ill take the fifth was an assertion of the fifth amendment privilege holding that it was clearly permissible for the district court to condition the reduction for acceptance of responsibility on the defendants willingness to provide information identifying the drug source