resulted in such discrimination taking place. Putting aside the unscientific way the statistics were compiled and their flaws, Reap’s statistics do not tend to show that CNA’s delegation policy was intended to achieve a company-wide policy of discrimination against women, or older women. At most, these statistics might show that the policy resulted in unintentional discrimination at the local level. If we were to certify Reap’s disparate treatment claims, we would be grouping together many unrelated employment decisions made by many individual supervisors against many individual plaintiffs. An analysis of these unrelated decisions would raise numerous individualized questions that are not amenable to generalized proof. See In re LifeUSA Holding Inc., 242 F.3d 136, 145-48 (3d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Alexander v. Gino’s, 621 F.2d 71 (3d
holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class but suggesting that prior to trial the district court ensure that appropriate subclasses are identified holding that district court abused its discretion in certifying class in light of the individ ual calculation of damages that is required holding that a class could not be certified because the definition made class members impossible to identify prior to individualized factfinding and litigation and thereby failed to satisfy one of the basic requirements for a class action under rule 23 holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to certify class action when claims were so individualized that certification was improper holding that district court abused its discretion in certifying class action when claims were too individualized to satisfy rule 23as commonality and rule 23b3s predominance requirements