in the course of interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"), which required the application of strict scrutiny to government policies that imposed a "substantial burden” on religious beliefs. See Pub.L. No. 103-141, 107 STAT. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seg.), invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997). In Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 477 (2d Cir.1996), we defined a substantial burden as a situation where "the state 'puts substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.' " 5 . For other applications of the substantial burden requirement in the prison religious free exercise context, see, for example, Cane.ll v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>), and Weir v. Nix, 114 F.3d 817 (8th Cir.1997)
holding that docs may place reasonable limitations on an inmates right to the free exercise of religion including a requirement that the inmate register his religious affiliation holding that  relatively shortterm and sporadic  intrusions on an inmates prayer activities did not constitute a substantial burden on inmates free exercise of his religion holding that corrections officers mockpreaching and espousal of religious views did not constitute a substantial burden on inmates free exercise of religion holding that religious exercise is any exercise of religion whether or not compelled by or central to a system of religious belief and that the use building or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered  religious exercise recognizing a religious institutions right to free exercise of religion