and manufacturing agreement with BDT.” BDT acknowledges that “Lexmark did not sign such a written agreement.’-’ BDT nevertheless claims that Lexmark breached a contract implied-in-fact to compensate BDT for its purported trade secrets with the understanding that BDT would be compensated if its technology were incorporated into Lexmark’s products. BDT contends that it suffered a “loss of profits from the anticipated agreements with Lex-mark.” Plaintiffs’ claim must fail, however. A contract implied-in-fact is not an “anticipated” contract but rather a true contract that “requires an actual agreement or meeting of the minds although not expressed.” Kellum v. Browning’s Adm’r, 231 Ky. 308, 21 S.W.2d 459, 466 (1929); see also Oliver v. Gardner, 192 Ky. 89, 232 S.W. 418, 420 (1921) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). A contract implied-in-fact
holding that an insurance contract should be construed as a reasonable person in the position of the insured would have understood it and that if the language used in the policy is reasonably susceptible to different constructions it must be given the construction most favorable to the insured holding that a sale must be both fair and reasonable in price and made in good faith holding that proof must show that both the party rendering the service and the one receiving it expected and understood that compensation would be made holding that the opposing party must show substantial harm holding to warrant reversal the appellant must show both the error of the ruling and resulting prejudice