pronounced his sentence from the bench on July 30, 1999, not when it entered his sentence on October 13, 1999. McGuire argues that because the district court failed to resentence him within seven days of the July 30, 1999, pronouncement, it was without jurisdiction to enter a different sentence on October 13,1999. We disagree. McGuire is correct insofar as there exists a circuit split over the timing of the “imposition” of the judgment and sentence under Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(c). See United States v. Gonzalez, 163 F.3d 255, 263 (5th Cir.1998) (outlining the circuit split and explaining how the Second, Fourth, Tenth, and Fifth Circuits recognize imposition upon oral announcement, and the First and Seventh upon journal entry) (citing United States v. Layman, 116 F.3d 105, 108 (4th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Abreu-Cabrera, 64 F.3d 67,
holding that imposition occurs at time of entry of judgment holding that written judgment controlled over oral pronouncement holding that in cases of direct conflict between a courts oral pronouncement of sentence and the written judgment the oral pronouncement controls holding that imposition occurs at time of oral pronouncement holding that when there is a variation between the oral pronouncement of sentence and the written memorialization of the sentence the oral pronouncement controls