finality requirement, the order “must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively unre-viewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 2458, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978). I conclude that this three-part test is satisfied for much the same reasons proffered by the Supreme Court in Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 11-13, 103 S.Ct. at 934-36. Here, the “conclusiveness” prong of the test is satisfied inasmuch as the district court will never again have an opportunity to revisit its Colorado River determination, and its stay order. Cf. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 278, 108 S.Ct. 1133, 1137-38, 99 L.Ed.2d 296 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, not only will the district court, in
holding that bankruptcy court order that a stay applied to a particular party was a final order and noting that bankruptcy court orders lifting or denying relief from an automatic stay are final for purposes of appeal holding that the denial of a motion to find a violation of the automatic stay was a final order holding that an order denying a  522f motion is final because it ends the litigation on the merits recognizing that an order denying a motion to modify a family court order where the motion is based on changed factual or legal circumstances is appealable as a special order after final judgment holding denial of colorado river motion is not final because a district court usually will expect to revisit and reassess an order denying a stay whereas granting a colorado river motion necessarily implies an expectation that the state court will resolve the dispute