all, constitutes discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause....” R. at 92. 3 . Even if Mr. Tennyson had not alleged a suspect class or interference with a fundamental right, dismissal of his equal protection claim with prejudice was not appropriate because amendment of his complaint would not necessarily be futile. He may be able to plead facts sufficient to show that his classification "lacked a reasonable basis or a reasonable relation to a legitimate penological interest.” Milligan, 659 F.3d at 1296. 4 . The district court therefore erred by dismissing all of Mr. Tennyson’s claims against Officer Carpenter on the ground that they related solely to Officer Carpenter’s denial of Mr. Tennyson's grievances. See Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1069 (10th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). But as our previous discussion shows, Mr.
holding that the fact that the members of the grievance committee and the disciplinary counsel are appointed by the supreme court is not enough by itself to establish a per se violation of due process holding that section 1983 action requires a showing of defendants personal participation in alleged constitutional violation holding that denial of a grievance by itself without any connection to the violation of constitutional rights alleged by plaintiff does not establish personal participation under  1983 holding that a city may not be held liable under  1983 where there was no underlying constitutional violation by any of its officers holding that individual liability under  1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation