to the destruction of evidence constituted misconduct. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bolzer’s motion for a mistrial. See United States v. Warfield, 97 F.3d 1014, 1028 (8th Cir.1996) (applying abuse of discretion review). The reference to destruction of evidence in the government’s opening statement was a permissible inference that could be drawn from the evidence the government ultimately produced in the case. See United States v. Wilkinson, 754 F.2d 1427, 1435 (2d Cir.1985) (affirming district court’s denial of new trial motion based on prosecutorial misconduct where the statements objected to “did not go beyond inferences that might normally be drawn from the evidence”); see also United States v. Perry, 925 F.2d 1077, 1081 (8th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). It is undisputed, for example, that after the
holding prosecutors argument that defense counsels goal was to keep evidence from the jury was improper holding that prosecutors opening statement was not improper where it referred to a witness who ultimately did not testify and thereby forced the jury to draw an inference from circumstantial evidence holding that the prosecutors comment regarding the defendants failure to call a potential witness did not shift the burden of proof because it did not implicate the defendants fifth amendment right not to testify recognizing that where witness has no constitutional or statutory right to refuse to testify jurors are entitled to draw negative inference from witness refusal to testify holding the prosecutors argument if it was there they can bring it to you was not an improper jury argument