unsuccessful claims in a case, “fees for fee litigation should be excluded to the extent that the applicant ultimately fails to prevail in such litigation.” Id. at 163, 110 S.Ct. 2316 n.10. Jean’s reliance on Hensley’s reasonableness formulation at the fees for fees stage in AJA litigation preordains the conclusion that the reasonableness formulation applies to the fees on fees stage of § 1988 too. To put it another way, if EAJA, which is just “like other fee-shifting statutes,” id. at 161, 110 S.Ct. 2316, looks to Hensley, then this court can decide that the Hensley reasonableness formulation likewise applies to the fees stage of § 1988 litigation. As Jean highlights, a presumptive cap lacks textual support and is not needed to ward off exorbitant fees and prot 643 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>). Section 1988 does not contain a similar
holding that buckhannon applies to the attorneys fees provision of the idea holding that applications for attorneys fees must state in detail time spent and the nature of each discrete task before the court can assess the reasonableness of the fees holding defendant waived request for fees pursuant to contract provision by only generally referring to fees in the answer and not citing the contract holding that feecap provision in the individuals with disabilities education act applies to both merits time before administrative agency and fees for fees time in court holding that plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys fees for time spent litigating the fees issue on appeal under title viis attorneys fee provision