544 U.S. at 101, 125 S.Ct. 1465 (finding that because questioning of the defendant did not prolong the stop, no independent Fourth Amendment justification was needed for the questioning based upon the legitimacy of the initial stop). “[T]he permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654, 99 S.Ct. 1391. Mimms and its progeny permit the intrusion if the officer merely removes a defendant from his vehicle absent undue delay. The question, however, of where a de min-imis intrusion ends and an undue delay begins is necessarily a fact-specific inquiry. See United States v. Everett, 601 F.3d 484, 493-94 (6th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). It is impossible to select “an arbitrary
holding that new york common law must be applied to determine whether the parties formed an oral settlement agreement and state statutory law must be applied to determine whether the agreement if any is enforceable holding that strip search incident to arrest was not per se unreasonable but holding that search was performed in an unreasonable manner when conducted in view of the public holding search unreasonable when conducted on the highway in broad day light recognizing that the inquiry into whether the facts adequately supported a terry stop is informed by the nature and quality of the intrusion recognizing that a factbound contextdependent inquiry must be conducted in each case to determine whether the duration of the stop was unreasonable