of the franchise agreement. See Mass.Gen.L. ch. 93B, § 4(3)(e)(4). In addition, Massachusetts courts, grappling with the somewhat analogous concepts of “due cause” and “just cause,” have taken into account both the business judgment of the decisionmaker and the economic realities confronting the business. See Amoco Oil Co. v. Dickson, 378 Mass. 44, 50, 389 N.E.2d 406 (1979) (finding Amoco’s “good faith business judgment” to terminate an agreement because of the dealer’s unprofitability sufficient to satisfy “due cause” standard); Zussman v. Rent Control Bd., 367 Mass. 561, 566-67, 326 N.E.2d 876 (1975) (upholding unit-by-unit conversion of rent-controlled apartments to condominiums to be just cause for eviction); Dooling v. Fire Com’r of Malden, 309 Mass. 156, 162, 34 N.E.2d 635 (1941) (<HOLDING>). Amoco is particularly instructive. In that
holding outofcourt statements relating to reasons for investigation are not admissible where the reasons for the investigation are not at issue holding that posthoc reasons for an adverse employment decision constitute evidence of pretext recognizing reduction in force if done for reasons of economy is entirely within the authority of the board holding that the inherent differences between banks and other financial institutions constituted just reasons for differing tax treatment holding that reasons of economy constitute just cause for abolishing a position