was able to formulate his research and submit his issues of disputed fact, then he would not need a motion for continuance at all. 8 . Interestingly, after the referee denied both of Rapoport’s requests for a continuance, the referee requested an extension from this Court based on Rapoport’s illness. This Court granted the request and extended the time to file the referee’s report until November 28, 2001. 9 . Florida Bar v. Lipman, 497 So.2d 1165, 1167-68 (Fla.1986) ("It is within the sound discretion of the referee, assigned by this Court to preside over a disciplinary proceeding such as this, to grant or deny a motion for continuance. Such a ruling will not be disturbed by this Court absent a clear abuse of discretion.”). 10 . See Greene v. Seigle, 745 So.2d 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>); Mondestin v. Duval Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n,
holding that a party against whom a motion for summary judgment is filed is entitled to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard holding that plaintiffs due process rights were violated when the trial court granted a summary judgment motion eight days after it was filed without providing the plaintiff with a sufficient opportunity to be heard holding that a predeprivation opportunity to be heard satisfies the due process clause holding that a motion to intervene filed after final judgment should have been granted holding that an appellate court should not undertake to review whether a plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted when the only motion filed and the only motion on appeal was the trial courts grant of summary judgment