in criminal activity involving contraband. Disposition of those claims did not require the Court to consider whether ove-rinvolvement of Government agents in contraband offenses could ever reach such proportions as to bar conviction of a predisposed defendant as a matter of due process. Nor have we had occasion yet to confront Government overinvolvement in areas outside the realm of contraband offenses. In these circumstances, I am unwilling to conclude that an analysis other than one limited to predisposition would never be appropriate under due process principles. Id. at 492-493, 96 S.Ct. at 1651-1652 (Powell, J., concurring, joined by Blackmun, J.) (footnotes and citations omitted) (citing Unite L.Ed.2d 614 (1985); United States v. Perl, 584 F.2d 1316, 1320 (4th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). In United States v. Hunt, 749 F.2d 1078, the
holding that because statutory variants of an underlying crime are not elements of an attempt to commit the underlying crime jurors are not required to unanimously find which specific statutory variant the defendant intended to commit it is sufficient that they unanimously conclude that the defendant intended to commit any of the applicable statutory variants holding no derivative entrapment where middleman was induced by a government agent to commit crime responding to pressure takes it upon himself to induce another to participate in crime holding an inducement to commit a crime by a private party who has no government involvement does not establish an entrapment defense recognizing that entrapment is a statutory defense rooted in the notion that congress could not have intended to criminally punish those who commit elements of crime but are induced by the government to commit the acts and that outrageous conduct defense is rooted in constitutional law recognizing that a defendant may commit involuntary manslaughter if he acts in selfdefense but is criminally negligent in doing so