requires that a temporary justice court judge be appointed by the Chairperson, Judge Marx was appointed by "an usurper of the appointing power," Ohms, 881 P.2d at 853 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, Judge Marx was properly appointed by the Chairperson on December 8, 2008. Until this appointment, Judge Marx did not have full right to the office because Judge Christensen lacked the power to appoint him. Nevertheless, Judge Marx's authority was void only "because there was a want of power in the ... appointing body," see id. at 854 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, he may qualify as a de facto judge, thereby ratifying his acts prior to his official appointment, if there was "public acquiescence in the authority." State v. Menzies, 845 P.2d 220, 226 (Utah 1992) (<HOLDING>); see also Vance, 671 P.2d at 131 & n. 5
holding that a court reporter was a de facto official where she assumed authority  under col or of a valid appointment and the public acquiesced in her authority holding that the county attorney had de facto authority and noting that the objection to the county attorneys authority was first made on appeal holding that where a public official takes discretionary action that the official knows will directly benefit a financial interest that the official has concealed in violation of a state criminal law that official has deprived the public of his honest services under  1346 holding that a de facto parents rights do not infringe on the fundamental liberty interests of the other legal parent in a family unit because de facto status can be achieved only through the active encouragement of the biological or adoptive parent by affirmatively establishing a family unit with the de facto parent and child or children that accompany the family holding that a court reporter had de facto authority and noting that the objection to the reporters qualifications was first made after the jury rendered its verdict