traditionally employed by the Second Circuit in its application of Rule 9(b) to scienter pleadings. E.g., Shields, 25 F.3d at 1128; Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1176 (2d Cir.1993). Second, it does not appear that the test as applied is susceptible to the results that defendants fear. Courts applying the “motive and opportunity” test have noted that “Allegations of motive that are generally held by similarly positioned executives and companies [e.g., to improve the company’s financial health or reputation] are insufficient to sustain a claim under the securities laws.” Glickman, 1996 WL 88570, *6 (quoting Grossman v. Texas Commerce Bancshares, Inc., 1995 WL 552744 (S.D.N.Y.1995)); see also In re Crystal Brands Securities Litigation, 862 F.Supp. 745, 749 (D.Conn.1994) (<HOLDING>). The “generic motive” of increasing capital is
recognizing drug traffickers will commonly possess firearms to protect their product to protect their drugs to protect their cash to protect their life and even to protect their turf alteration in original internal quotation marks omit ted holding that allegations of a motive to maintain good relations with suppliers retailers and lenders  pertain to virtually any company that manufactures and distributes goods and are therefore inadequate holding that alleged motives of directors and officers to maintain good relations with suppliers retailers and lenders and to protect their positions are insufficient because they pertain to virtually any company that manufactures goods holding that during an investigatory detention officers are authorized to take such steps as are reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo holding that directors and officers are fiduciaries