sentence pursuant to United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir.2005) (en banc). As to Count Three, § 1513(b)(2) punishes anyone who “knowingly engages in any conduct and thereby causes bodily injury to another person ... or threatens to do so, with intent to retaliate against any person for ... any information relating to the ... violation of conditions of ... release pending judicial proceedings given by a person to a law enforcement officer.” 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b). Under the statute, the retaliation must have been motivated by a belief that the person provided such information to a law enforcement officer. The government must prove this element of the offense, like all others, beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (<HOLDING>). When she told Johnson that she would note in
holding that no person shall suffer the onus of a criminal conviction except upon sufficient proof  defined as evidence necessary to convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the offense holding that conviction of a crime requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime holding that due process clause of fourteenth amendment protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime for which he is charged holding that the due process clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged holding that the due process clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged