Clark v. Ferling, 220 Md. 109, 113, 151 A.2d 137, 139 (1959). An action has been defined as ministerial if “it is a duty that has been positively imposed by law, and its performance [is] required at a time and in a manner, or upon conditions which are specifically designated[.]” First Nat’l Bank of Key West v. Filer, 107 Fla. 526, 145 So. 204, 207 (1933). A function has also been described as ministerial if it is “absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely the execution of a set task[.]” James, 288 Md. at 326, 418 A.2d at 1179 (quoting Doeg v. Cook, 126 Cal. 213, 58 P. 707, 708 (1899)). Similarly, a task is considered ministeiial if it is “inflexibly mandatory.” McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 4 (4th Cir.1972), overruled in part by Pink v. Lester, 52 F.3d 73, 77 (4th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides
holding that the analysis by the court in mccray regarding liability for negligent conduct in an action brought pursuant to 42 usc  1983 was inconsistent with united states supreme court case law holding that the state law of collateral estoppel applies in civil rights actions brought under 42 usc  1983 holding that in actions brought under 42 usc  1983 federal courts apply the states statute of limitation for personal injury holding that person in 42 usc  1983 does not include states holding that punitive damages are not recoverable against municipalities in actions brought pursuant to 42 usc  1983