the IJ’s determination that he was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal because he failed to demonstrate the requisite hardship. Because this case involves the granting of relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b), the jurisdictional bar of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)© is implicated. See Garcia-Melendez v. Ashcroft, 351 F.3d 657, 661 (5th Cir.2003). This provision strips us of jurisdiction over those decisions that involve the exercise of discretion. Mi-reles-Valdez v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 213, 216 (5th Cir.2003). The IJ’s determination under § 1229b(b)(l)(D) that Rueda’s children would not suffer an “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” if Rueda were deported to Mexico involved the exercise of discretion. See, e.g., Mendez-Moran-chel v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 176, 179 (3d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); cf. Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994, 1012 (5th
holding that a determination regarding whether an alien met the continual physical presence requirement of  1229b was nondiscretionary and thus reviewable holding that the decision whether an alien meets the hardship requirement in 8 usc  1229b is  a discretionary judgment holding that 8 usc  1252a2bi bars this court from reviewing the denial of a motion to reopen where the only question presented is whether the new evidence altered the prior underlying discretionary determination that the petitioner had not met the hardship standard recognizing that at a bond hearing there is no limit to the discretionary factors that may be considered  in determining whether to detain an alien pending a decision on  removal holding that whether an alien satisfies the continuous presence requirement of 8 usc  1229b is a nondiscretionary determination because it involves straightforward statutory interpretation and application of law to fact and is therefore reviewable