he did not want to go to trial, but that he wanted a new attorney “to see what deal the new attorney can get me.” Rivera-Sanchez has failed to demonstrate that he did not understand the plea agreement. Instead, the record shows that he declined to accept the plea agreement because of his view that his conduct did not warrant the sentence recommended by the Government. We are persuaded that Rivera-Sanchez did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. Ill Rivera-Sanchez also contends that the district court erred in entering judgment against him pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b)(2). Rivera-Sanchez correctly asserts that § 1326(b)(2) does not define a separate punishable offense. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998) (<HOLDING>). He argues that we should, therefore, reverse
recognizing that an indemnity provision and an agreement to provide insurance are separate and distinct obligations holding that  1326b is a penalty provision and does not constitute a separate crime holding that probation does not constitute a sentence recognizing that 8 usc  1326b contains sentencing facts not elements of the offense holding that suspension of driving privileges is not punishment and does not violate an individuals right not to be subject to double jeopardy or constitute a disproportionate penalty