Perkins did not involve a situation, as here, in which the Board terminated an interference that was mistakenly declared because it initially overlooked the applicability of § 135(b). Because the Board should terminate an interference once it determines that there is a § 135(b) bar, the Board acts in accordance with § 135 when it refuses to address other issues of priority or patentability raised in that interference. Furthermore, the issues presented in the remaining cases cited by Berman, Quinn, Wu, Schulze, and Gartside, did not concern whether the Board is compelled to decide certain issues of patentability, and did not involve a § 135(b) bar. Rather, those cases merely applied the holding of Perkins to facts not presented here. See Guinn, 96 F.3d at 1421-22, 40 USPQ2d at 1159 (<HOLDING>); Wu, 129 F.3d at 1242, 44 USPQ2d at 1645
holding that a partys filing of a statutory disclaimer of all interfering claims does not divest the board of jurisdiction to enter judgment against that party holding that section 1429 does not divest district court of jurisdiction when deportation proceedings are pending holding that summary judgment on one claim that reduced amount in controversy below statutory minimum did not divest court of jurisdiction holding that notice of appeal did not divest the district court of jurisdiction at the time it was filed because a motion for reconsideration was pending holding that bankruptcy court possessed jurisdiction to enter money judgment in noncore proceeding against third party