at best. II. Because judgment as a matter of law deprives the non-moving party of a determination of the facts by a jury, it should be granted sparingly. 9A Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2524, at 252 (1995). Indeed, the Fourth Circuit has held that a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, made pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is now entitled “Renewal of Motion for Judgment After Trial,” “should not be granted unless the evidence is so clear that reasonable men could reach no other conclusion than the one suggested by the moving party.” Persinger v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 920 F.2d 1185, 1189 (4th Cir.1990); see also Cline v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 294, 301 (4th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil
holding that a motion for directed verdict should be granted if there is no evidence on which a jury could legally base a verdict for damages against the moving party holding that denial of motion for judgment after trial will be affirmed if  giving the nonmovant the benefit of every legitimate inference in his favor there was evidence upon which a jury could reasonably return a verdict for him  internal quotations omitted holding that summary judgment is unwarranted if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party holding that the nonmoving party must present specific evidence from which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in its favor recognizing that a motion for directed verdict should be granted when there is no reasonable evidence upon which a jury could legally predicate a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party