of Defendant’s total annual income is inherently subject to potential dispute if paid periodically, unless all restitution payments are postponed to the end of a designated “year.” I must disagree, therefore, that the percentage approach is “better” than an order requiring specific monthly payments. Specific monthly payments establish certainty for both victim and defendant, can be conveniently accounted for and verified, and thus, I believe, provide more incentive for compliance, especially when enforced by the court. It is because monthly income may be “too much or too little” that the percentage approach is cumbersome and, I submit, unworkable; any material change in financial circumstances may be dealt with in the future by new court orders. Id at 154 n. 50, 890 P.2d at 1194 n. 50
holding that the courts have the statutory authority to alter amend or revoke restitution orders on the basis of unforseen or changed circumstances and to impose consequences upon defendants who fail unjustifiably to discharge their obligations thereunder holding that the circuit court did not have the statutory or inherent authority to order restitution in part because the statutes did not envision such an obligation holding that the court erred in failing to inform the defendant that it could impose restitution but that the error did not affect the defendants substantial rights because the court informed the defendant that it could impose a maximum fine of an amount higher than the restitution amount imposed recognizing plenary power of district court to alter interlocutory orders holding that an alien failed to qualify for the changed circumstances exception by asserting only that his personal circumstances had changed by the birth of a child