the product and geographic sales they may readily compete for, using easily convertible plants and marketing organizations. 2A Phillip E. Areeda et al., Antitrust Law ¶ 570bl at 278 (1995); see also Tampa Elec., 365 U.S. at 330-33, 81 S.Ct. at 629-31. The foreclosed market, in purely quantitative terms, is more accurately described as the percentage of Gilbarco’s total market share sold through its authorized distributors. Seventy percent of Gilbarco’s total dispenser sales are through distributors, and it captured 55% of the total market in 1995. Construing this evidence in the plaintiffs’ favor, the jury could reasonably have concluded that Gilbarco’s policy foreclosed roughly 38% of the relevant market for sales. Although 38% appears significant, see e.g. Twin City, 676 F.2d at 1304 (<HOLDING>), we conclude that it “considerably overstates
holding that placement in awaiting action in an administrative segregation area is an acceptable status pending an investigation or a disciplinary hearing but it is a temporary status and may not be used for an unreasonable or indefinite time and keeping an inmate in it for two years without a hearing or any review was unreasonable holding that 24 foreclosure for an unreasonable length of time is substantial holding that the relevant time is the time of the employment decision holding that taxi cab did not park for an appreciable length of time when it merely stopped to let out passengers holding that alleged choice not to present a conceivable defense when following an unreasonable investigation that failed to discover basis for that defense is itself unreasonable