distance from the checkpoint at the time an order could have been made, and that any order would likely have to have been made after Johnson turned the approaching car away from officers), this factual dispute is precisely the kind of issue that must be assumed in Johnson’s favor at this point. McGowin, no doubt realizing this, has not attempted to base any arguments on such an order before this court. Cf 1975 Ala.Code § 32-5A-4 (directing that no person “willfully” refuse to comply with a “lawful” order of someone with the authority to regulate traffic). As a result, any reasonable officer in McGowin’s position would have known that he could not have placed Johnson under arrest. Not even “arguable” probable cause existed. See Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 762-763 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Both Johnson’s alleged forceful seizure and
holding that an officer applying for a warrant without probable cause may be entitled to qualified immunity but is not entitled to absolute immunity holding that arguable probable cause provides an objectively reasonable justification for issuing process and thus gives rise to qualified immunity against an abuse of process claim no less than against a false arrest claim holding that qualified immunity applies only if an officer had arguable probable cause to arrest holding that arrest was unsupported by probable cause but granting qualified immunity to defendants who made the arrest in reliance on communications with other officers holding that the existence of probable cause for an arrest is a complete defense to a first amendment retaliation claim under the doctrine of qualified immunity