recognize any further liability, it could have relied upon the limitation of action clause within the policy. Hounshell v. American States Insurance Co., 67 Ohio St.2d 427, 433, 424 N.E.2d 311, 314 (1981). Thus, we hold that the “negotiation type” of estoppel raised in Shea North, supra, is not applicable here. This, however, does not necessarily end our inquiry. The facts of this case lead us to question the wisdom of applying this clause in the circumstances presented here. At the outset, we note that the limitation for suit set by the clause establishes a significantly shorter time than the six-year period which ordinarily applies to actions on written contracts. See A.R.S. § 12-548; Eureka-Security Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Simon, 1 Ariz.App. 274, 277, 401 P.2d 759, 762 (1965) (<HOLDING>). Ordinarily, we would question the inherent
holding that the contracts clause article i section 10 clause 1 to the united states constitution does not apply to the actions of the federal government holding that a violation of ars section 131402 was not subject to a misdemeanor compromise remedy by civil action pursuant to ars section 133981 holding that a policy with an excess other insurance clause provides no coverage until a policy with a pro rata other insurance clause is exhausted holding that limitation of liability clause was unambiguous holding that absent a policy limitation clause ars  12548 applies to actions on insurance contracts