that Congress had any intention to exclude the court from those able to change committee membership for appropriate reasons.” Plabell Rubber Products, 140 B.R. at 180. There are various lines of reasoning applied by these courts and they are split on whether the appropriate standard of review is a de novo review or an abuse of discretion by the U.S. Trustee. Compare In re Sharon Steel Corp., 100 B.R. 767, 785-86 (Bankr.W.D.Pa. 1989), and In re Texaco, 79 B.R. 560 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.1987) with Barney’s, 197 B.R. at 439, and Plabell Rubber Products, 140 B.R. at 181-182. There is also a contrary line of authority which holds that the court has no authority to affect the composition of a committee appointed by the U.S. Trustee. See In re Dow Corning Corp., 212 B.R. 258, 264 (E.D.Mich. 1997) (<HOLDING>); In re Wheeler Technology, Inc., 139 B.R. 235,
holding that the language of sec 1102a1 unlike the prior statute does not give the court a role in the appointment or modification of committees and sec 1102a2 does not empower the court to appoint or remove committee members holding that appointment of a conservator does not remove a mentally disabled persons legal disability so as to start the statute of limitations running holding that statute does not remove plaintiffs burden of proving causation and reasonableness holding that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous no need exists for the court to examine the legislative histo ry and the court must give effect to the plain meaning of the statute holding that the fact that the members of the grievance committee and the disciplinary counsel are appointed by the supreme court is not enough by itself to establish a per se violation of due process