of our predecessor court. Id. As stated in Lellmann, “where a person is unjustly suspended in the exercise of official duty ... the party is entitled to whatever emoluments there might be due him during the time of such suspension.” Lellmann v. United States, 37 Ct.Cl. 128, 135 (1902). Thereafter, again before the Back Pay Act, the Court of Claims repeatedly held that the Civil Service Commission (the Board’s predecessor) had the authority to award back pay. E.g., Goodwin v. United States, 127 Ct.Cl. 417, 118 F.Supp. 369 (1954) (finding authority to mandate the payment of back pay, and stating that “the most important element of relief for wrongful demotion, next to restoration to his former status, was back pay”); Lamb v. United States, 116 Ct.Cl. 325, 90 F.Supp. 369, 375 (1950) (<HOLDING>). Congress, in enacting the Back Pay Act in
holding that back pay may be awarded to the date of judgment holding that the plaintiff was entitled to back pay for the differential between unemployment compensation received and the salary he would have earned if not terminated holding that reinstatement was insufficient to remedy a wrongful suspension and that back pay must be awarded as the amount he would have received had he been retained in his job during that period less any amount he might have earned elsewhere holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment holding that plaintiffs allegations  that he was improperly paid for appearances at arbitration proceedings that he received highly negative performance evaluations that he was harassed by being required to perform tasks outside his job description that he received shorter notice of his termination than other employees and that he was terminated in retaliation for his eeoc complaint  each state a claim upon which relief can be granted under  1981