indicate that the named owner of the certificate of deposit may have transferred it to a third party.” Id. Clearly, the principal reason the bank required Brier’s possession of the CD as a precondition to payment was to protect itself from claims asserted by potential third-party transferees of the CD. But “[n]o such protection would be necessary if the certificate were not * * * transferable.” Id. For this reason, we hold, the bank, by expressly incorporating the holder’s possession and endorsement as a precondition to payment, implicitly recognized that Brier’s CD was indeed “of a type” that was transferable in the ordinary course of business, notwithstanding the “nontransferable” legend. See General Electric Co. v. M & C Manufacturing, Inc., 283 Ark. 110, 671 S.W.2d 189, 190 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Citizens National Bank of Orlando v.
holding as matter of law that cds containing restrictions on transfers were nonetheless article 9 instruments holding that it may be decided as a matter of law holding that the defendant did not establish good faith as a matter of law holding no justifiable reliance as a matter of law holding as matter of law that nontransferable cds were article 9 instruments