the Robertses could have adopted DCF’s termination petition was by filing their notice of intent to adopt within the 72 hours after DCF voluntarily dismissed its termination of parental rights petition. We hold that the Robertses’ filing of their notice to adopt was sufficient to notify all parties that they were adopting DCF’s petition, and the adoption of the petition became effective upon DCF’s filing of its notice of voluntary dismissal. Similar to a prematurely filed notice of appeal, which is held in limbo until an appealable order is rendered, the Robertses’ prematurely filed notice of intent adequately afforded all interested parties notice that the termination proceedings were going to be carried forward by the Robertses. See State v. Blaney, 722 So.2d 220 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)(<HOLDING>). C.M. next contends that she was denied equal
holding that a notice of appeal which is prematurely filed shall not be subject to dismissal but rather the notice shall exist in a state of limbo until judgment is rendered at which time the notice of appeal shall mature and shall vest jurisdiction in the appellate court holding that a notice of appeal is timely when filed before final judgment is entered by the district court holding the court lacked jurisdiction where the defendant failed to file a notice of appeal on the attorneys fee issue because a supplemental notice of appeal is required for us to have jurisdiction over an attorneys fees issue that becomes final subsequent to the initial notice of appeal holding that identification of appellant in notice of appeal is a jurisdictional requirement and that the failure to name a party in a notice to appeal constitutes a failure of that party to appeal holding amending of shall file or prosecute to shall not have jurisdiction was not substantive