would have subject matter jurisdiction over the Plaint 1993 WL 1156110, at *3 (D.S.C. Jan. 7, 1993) (citing numerous state and federal decisions to support its holding that “because hospitals are primarily engaged in the business of providing medical services, rather than selling products, strict liability should not be imposed if the medical services involve the use of a product.”). A few state courts have, however, held that a hospital or physician can be deemed a seller or distributor of medical devices for the purposes of a breach of warranty claim. See, e.g., Mauran v. Mary Fletcher Hosp., 318 F.Supp. 297, 300 (D.Vt.1970) (predicting that a hospital could be liable for breach of warranty for selling a defective drug); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 684 P.2d 187, 207 (Colo.1984) (<HOLDING>); Skelton v. Druid City Hosp. Bd., 459 So.2d
holding that the uniform commercial code specifically encompassed a software licensing agreement holding that the physician who included the cost of an intrauterine contraceptive device in the fee for his insertion of the device was a seller under the uniform commercial code holding that the hospital was fraudulently joined because it did not meet the definition of seller as defined by mississippis product liability statute or under the uniform commercial code holding unconscionable a disclaimer of warranties under the uniform commercial code where there was allocation of commercial risks in a socially or economically unreasonable manner holding that no proximate causation existed where a treating physician is well aware of the risks of a medical device independent of any warning by the manufacturer