nor has she ever entered an agreement to arbitrate independent state-law discrimination claims in accordance with CBA procedures. Jiineno is much more closely on point. 39 . See Pulcino, 9 P.3d at 793(comparing disparate treatment and accommodation claims). 40 . Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle, 7 F.3d 139, 144 (9th Cir.1992). 41 . Commodore, 839 P.2d at 32 1(citations and internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). 42 . See Saridakis v. United Airlines, 166 F.3d 1272, 1278 (9th Cir.1999) (noting, in the similar context of an RLA preemption case, the frequency with which we find intentional infliction claims to be preempted); Galvez v. Kuhn, 933 F.2d 773, 776 (9th Cir.1991) (noting inconsistency in the case law). 43 . Cook v. Lindsay Olive Growers, 911 F.2d 233, 239-40 (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). 44 . 935 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir.1991). 45 . See
holding that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was preempted where it arose out of the same conduct as a preempted contract claim holding that plaintiffs state law claim against a nonsignatory to the cba was preempted by  301 holding that an employees retaliation claim was not preempted by section 301 because he was exercising his rights under the states antidiscrimination laws and the terms of the cba were at most relevant background for the employees termination holding that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was preempted where it was based on the same conduct as a preempted claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing holding that the cba preempted an intentional infliction claim that was based on a failure to change an employees work schedule so he could attend friday religious services