civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case, when specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court” and “[ujpon the consent of the parties.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). Consent — whether express or implied through conduct — is “the touchstone of magistrate judge jurisdiction.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1119, 1121 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 582, 123 S.Ct. 1696, 155 L.Ed.2d 775 (2003). It is undisputed that the officers furnished neither express nor implied consent to jurisdiction before a magistrate judge. Consequently, the magistrate judge had no jurisdiction to enter final judgment on behalf of the district court, and “any purported judgment is a nullity.” Kofoed, 237 F.3d at 1004; cf. Reynaga, 971 F.2d at 417 (<HOLDING>). Because the judgment entered by the
holding that annexation was a nullity because it was not obtained with consent of requisite number of voters in area to be annexed and consequently jurisdiction was lacking holding that a remand order entered by a magistrate judge was beyond his statutory authority and concluding that review was proper because the court of appeals was not reviewing the merits of the remand order itself holding that a district courts order of dismissal with prejudice was a nullity because the court lacked jurisdiction holding that the judgment was entered without jurisdiction and was therefore a nullity holding that absent consent of all parties magistrate judges stay order was beyond his jurisdiction and was in essence a legal nullity