multiple qualifying drug offenses as the result of a single criminal episode would still be eligible for treatment under this amendment upon reof-fending a second time. However, the summary, when considered alone, gives voters the impression that a first-time offender who committed two qualifying offenses as the result of a single criminal episode (e.g., a defendant charged with possession of cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia resulting from a single lawful search of her pocket), would only qualify once for treatment under this amendment. Thus, the summary’s use of “first two offenses” does not accurately describe the wide scope of the amendment’s text. See Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen. re Casino Authorization, Taxation and Regulation, 656 So.2d 466, 469 (Fla.1995) (<HOLDING>). Second, the term “legislative implementation”
holding that it may not holding that the courts grant of summary judgment did not violate the plaintiffs seventh amendment right to a jury trial and describing the plaintiffs argument that it did as very misleading holding that no jury could reasonably fail to find  that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to take the actions they did when the only invasion of privacy that occurred  was entry and an emergency sweep a search of the premises was not conducted until the magistrate informed of what the officers had learned on the scene prior to entry explicitly authorized a search of the third house holding that the amendments summary was misleading because it could lead voters to believe that only operational floating vessels may house casinos when the amendment authorized casinos on stationary and nonstationary riverboats and us registered commercial vessels holding that defendant staying in abandoned house had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the house despite having a key to the house and the ability to let people in and out of it