also delineates the circuit court’s power to divide or transfer jointly owned marital property. See Code § 20-107.3(0, (E), (G)-(H). Thus, in Code § 20-107.3, the legislature addressed the division of property in an equitable distribution award without any provision for a resulting trust. Because “the jurisdiction of a court in equity is ‘entirely statutory and limited’ in divorce matters,” we conclude that in the context of the equitable distribution proceeding, the circuit court was limited to application of equitable distribution principles and did not have the authority to declare a resulting trust or, along with it, that the husband was a beneficial owner of one half of the property. See Reid, 245 Va. at 414-15, 429 S.E.2d at 211 (quoting McCotter, 149 Va. at 592, 140 S.E. at 673) (<HOLDING>); see also Watkins, 220 Va. at 1054-55, 265
holding that the circuit court did not have the statutory or inherent authority to order restitution in part because the statutes did not envision such an obligation holding that where the government has not presented evidence at the hearing concerning the appropriate amount of restitution    the imposition of the restitution order constitutes plain error holding the court has the inherent authority to enter an order of confidentiality holding that claim that the circuit courts order was deficient because it did not include specific findings of fact regarding each is sue was not preserved for review where it was not raised in the circuit court holding no restitution hearing is mandated when defendant did not object to order of restitution or request a hearing