the thirty-day time limit.” (quotation omitted)); In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194 n. 3 (4th Cir.1997) (en banc) (noting that “the importance of the issue presented justified” exceeding "the 30-day time limitation established by 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(b)(3)(D)”); In re Siggers, 132 F.3d 333, 334-35 (6th Cir.1997) ("[Fjailure to comply with the thirty-day provision does not deprive this Court of the power to grant or deny a motion under § 2244(b)(3)(A),” “[b]e-cause the provision is hortatory or advisory rather than mandatory.”); Gray-Bey v. United States, 201 F.3d 866, 867 (7th Cir.2000) ("We agree with our sister circuits ... that the 30-day period may be- extended for those few cases which require reasoned adjudication and cannot be resolved within the Ct. 2519, 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004) (<HOLDING>); Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 408, 124 S.Ct.
holding that the rule announced in ring does not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review holding that the rule announced in mills v maryland 486 us 367 108 sct 1860 100 led2d 384 1988 doesnt apply retroactively on collateral review holding that ring v arizona 536 us 584 122 sct 2428 153 led2d 556 2002 which applied apprendi to arizonas capital sentencing scheme was not a watershed rule and did not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review holding that the rule announced in ring v arizona 536 us 584 122 sct 2428 153 led2d 556 2002 doesnt apply retroactively on collateral review holding that harris v united states 536 us 545 122 sct 2406 153 led2d 524 2002 does not overrule mendozapaz