intend to abolish recklessness as a state of mind sufficient to satisfy 10b-5's scienter requirement.”). Indeed, it would have been anomalous for Congress to have imposed a higher substantive burden on plaintiffs at the pleading stage before discovery than they would bear on summary judgment or at trial after discovery. 23 . Cf. In re Baesa, 969 F.Supp. at 240 (“Since the Reform Act nowhere defines what the 'required state of mind' is for any of the kinds of actions that might be brought under this title, the definition must necessarily be found either elsewhere in the Exchange Act itself or (if the action is judicially implied) in the existing case law.”). 24 . See, e.g., SEC v. Gotchey, No. 91-1855, 1992 WL 385284, at *8 n. 23 (4th Cir. Dec. 28, 1992) (unpublished per curiam opinion) (<HOLDING>); SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 641
holding that the pslra particularity requirement compels plaintiffs to allege severe recklessness holding that handcuffing satisfies this requirement holding that a mere statement that the appellant is a prevailing party satisfies eligibility requirement for jurisdictional purposes holding that severe recklessness satisfies scienter requirement citation omitted holding that the state has a compelling interest in protecting the citizens of minnesota from those who pose a severe threat to their health and safety citation omitted internal quotation marks omitted