See Am. Compl. Ex., at 80a. It is equally clear, therefore, that Plaintiff had no property interest in his role as HOCALJ. “Once a determination has been reached ... that an employee ‘held [his] position at the will and pleasure’: of his employer, “that finding ‘necessarily establishes that [the employee] had no property interest.’ ” Thomas, 351 F.3d at 113 (quoting Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. at 346 n. 8, 96 S.Ct. 2074)). While Plaintiff would be entitled to certain procedural guarantees if he was removed from his position as ALJ, his loss of the title and duties of HOCALJ and restoration to the role of ALJ “was not an action against an employee for which cause was required” and does not entitle Plaintiff to the protections of the Due Process Clause. See Pinar, 747 F.2d at 913-14 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff had no property interest in his
holding that a disclaimer setting forth policies for general guidance only which stated that it did not create a binding contract and that the employee could be terminated without notice and at will at any time for any reason unambiguously provided that employment was atwill holding that a public employee who may only be terminated for cause has a property interest in his position that is protected by the 14th amendment holding that entitlement to benefits is a property interest protected by the due process clause of the fifth amendment to the united states constitution holding that the elevation of a federal employee who could not be removed without cause to a temporary promotion that could be terminated at any time at the discretion of the agency did not confer a property interest protected by the due process clause in the elevated position holding that a public employee who can be discharged only for cause is entitled to at least some informal due process before he can be terminated