Furthermore, just as the retired firefighters in Williams had no standing to seek a statutory interpretation for prospective relief because their alleged injury had already occurred and was not capable of repetition, Russell does not and cannot argue she will suffer from Metro repeating its course of action, as Metro’s subrogation lien can be satisfied only once. Finally, just as in Williams there was no plausible remedy the declaratory judgment could recommend other than money damages against an immunized governmental entity, here there is no relief a declaratory judgment can offer Russell that does not simply lay the predicate for a damages claim against Metro. See Williams, 216 S.W.3d at 828-29; see also Castro v. McNabb, 319 S.W.3d 721, 733 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2009, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Russell goes to great effort in her briefing
holding that declaratory relief is not appropriate for determination of rights in anticipation of enforcement action that may never occur holding that to establish jurisdiction in action for declaratory judgment controversy must be actual and present a case for the consideration of the court wherein plaintiff is asserting some legal or property right adverse to defendant holding the burden of proof in a bankruptcy court action for declaratory relief as to the ownership of disputed property was on the party making an affirmative claim for relief holding that the declaratory judgment act is remedial only and the party seeking declaratory relief must have an underlying cause of action holding plaintiff may not reshape pleadings to support jurisdiction in an effort to use a petition for declaratory relief to establish a critical element in threatened tort causes of action