143.129 hearing officer and of the commission under 143.131, but not that of a grievance examiner under 143.130. A fortiori, we cannot fathom that the legislature intended the scenario proposed by the City in which an aggrieved party who is granted relief, and who has exhausted his administrative remedies, must begin anew at the bottom by starting again with a step I grievance, possibly in perpetuity. Nor do we believe the legislature intended the seemingly “less drastic” remedy that Jackson would be required to seek a writ of mandamus against his department head in order to have a final order enforced. These constructions would not effectuate the legislature’s intent, only frustrate it, and impose a patently absurd result. Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex.1991) (<HOLDING>). We have thoroughly examined the relevant
holding that courts should avoid interpretations of statutes which would produce absurd results holding that virginia courts must avoid absurd results recognizing that courts should not construe statutes in a way that leads to absurd results holding that contracts should be interpreted to avoid absurd results holding that interpretations of a statute which produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available