by whose decisions I am bound. Unfortunately, and surprisingly, neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has expressly ruled on the question of the scope of section 1981 with regard to any purported distinction between national origin and racial discrimination claims. While the Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue presented by this motion, nonetheless, its decisions contain repeated dicta characterizing the scope of section 1981 protection in terms of “racial” equality. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-60, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 1719, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975) (“§ 1981 affords a federal remedy against discrimination in private employment on the basis of race”); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. at 287, 96 S.Ct. at 2582 (<HOLDING>); see also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
holding that conduct occurring after the formation of an employment contract could not be racial discrimination under  1981 holding that white persons may state a claim under section 1981 and noting  the racial character of the rights being protected  holding with little discussion that section 1981 applies to private racial discrimination holding that title vii precludes a claim under section 1981 for racial discrimination against a federal employee holding unequivocally that  1981 protects against racial discrimination in private employment