Poindexter interpreted Title VII’s appointment provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l), a provision “generally viewed as imposing a lesser burden on plaintiffs seeking appointment of counsel, both because of the specificity of Congress’ action ... and because this provision does not require that the plaintiff be a pauper.” Poindexter, 737 F.2d at 1182 n. 18. That provision obviously does not apply to FOIA cases, nor do the reasons behind it. Local Civil Rule 83.11, which implements 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), thus controls. The local rule differs only slightly from the Poindexter factors and, to the extent there are differences, it embraces many of the considerations adopted in other circuits for applying 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). See, e.g., Long v. Shillinger, 927 F.2d 525, 527 (10th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Cookish, 787 F.2d at 3 (holding that factors
holding that individual factual differences among the individual litigants or groups of litigants will not preclude a finding of commonality holding that a prior administrative decision actually decided ultimate factual issues that are essential to plaintiffs present claims and that issue preclusion therefore bars the relitigation of those issues recognizing that a court must balance the policy in favor of hearing a litigants claims on the merits with the policy in favor of finality holding that the function of the trial court on a motion for summary judgment is to determine whether issues of fact exist and not to decide the merits of the issues themselves holding that courts should consider the merits of the litigants claims the nature of the factual issues the litigants ability to present his claims and the complexity of the legal issues