but only pursuant to a separate agreement, we conclude that Plaintiffs have sufficiently raised a question of fact as to whether the demand letters were truly intended as a condition precedent to filing suit as required by § 772.11(1), i.e., whether they were necessarily preliminary to judicial proceedings, or, as Plaintiffs argue, whether they were sent merely as a “scare tactic.” We find, as did the court in Pledger, that there is conflicting evidence in this record as to whether the Palmer Law Firm acted in good faith in sending the demand letters. But for our rulings infra on other defenses, the issue of the firm’s good faith in sending demand letters should be resolved by a jury. D. FDUTPA Claims 1. Attorney Conduct Under FDUTPA The Palmer Law Firm also c 88, 703 N.E.2d 100 (1998) (<HOLDING>); Shalabi v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, No. 01 C
holding that the punitive provisions of the delaware consumer fraud act were not applicable to attorney conduct occurring within the practice of law given the state supreme courts inherent constitutional and statutory authority to discipline members of the state bar noting the lack of consensus in different jurisdictions as to the applicability of state consumer fraud acts to attorney conduct holding that nothing in the legislative history of the pennsylvania consumer fraud act suggests that the legislature ever intended statutory language directed against consumer fraud to do away with the traditional elements of reliance and causation and accordingly in order to maintain a class action suit under the pennsylvania consumer fraud act a plaintiff must allege reliance holding that illinoiss consumer fraud act did not apply to the claim that attorneys charged excessive fees for legal services because the attorneyclient relationship was the subject of regulation by the state supreme court and the legislature did not specify that it intended the consumer fraud act to apply to the role of attorneys in relation to their clients holding commercial franchises are not covered by new jersey consumer fraud act because they are businesses and not consumer goods holding that the court of appeals erred in modifying the judgment to include attorneys fees when the trial courts refusal to grant attorneys fees was not the subject of a point of error