violation of a prisoner’s constitutional rights. This Court reached that conclusion in Ruffins and that analysis applies fully to this case. See Ruffins, 701 F.Supp.2d at 404-08. This Court’s determination that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for conduct that occurred post-Earley and before the Sparber and Gamer cases in April 2008 is consistent with numerous other courts in this Circuit who have reached the same conclusion. See Locantore v. Hunt, 775 F.Supp.2d 680, 687 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (“the overwhelming consensus within the Second Circuit is that the protection of qualified immunity applied until April 2008, when the New York Court of Appeals resolved a split among the lower state courts and invalidated the administrative , 2010 WL 5376204, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2010) (<HOLDING>); Smith v. Paterson, No. 08 Civ. 3313(SHS),
holding that private defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity but remanding for a determination of whether they were liable as government actors holding officials are entitled to qualified immunity for reasonable mistakes of law holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity holding that an officer applying for a warrant without probable cause may be entitled to qualified immunity but is not entitled to absolute immunity holding that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for any actions they may have taken to enforce plaintiffs prs following earley but prior to the new york court of appeals decisions in garner and sparber