erred by permitting the sexual assault nurse examiner, who examined the victim, to submit expert testimony during trial because the court was on notice that the State had committed a discovery violation by not listing the nurse as an expert witness. The State properly concedes that a discovery violation occurred and that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a Richardson hearing. The State also properly concedes that the trial court erred by permitting the State, over defense counsel’s Richardson objection, to present the nurse as an expert witness and to elicit opinion testimony from her. However, the State argues that such error was harmless. We disagree. The State’s burden to show that a discovery violation was harmless is “extraordinarily high.” Hicks v. State, 45 S ) (<HOLDING>). REVERSED and REMANDED. SAWAYA and ORFINGER,
holding that trial court erred in prohibiting discovery or testimony from a witness it deemed an expert when appellant merely sought to discover facts that were observed by the witness holding that trial courts failure to conduct richardson hearing concerning states discovery violation in not designating a detective as an expert was not harmless even though detectives testimony was brief appellate court could not say beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was not procedurally prejudiced by the discovery violation holding that discovery violation hearing was required to determine whether defendant was procedurally prejudiced by the states nondisclosure of veterinary assistant as expert witness in defendants trial for animal cruelty holding that petitioner was not prejudiced by counsels decision not to call sole witness to petitioners alleged beating at suppression hearing because testimony of arresting officers and assistant attorneys as well as absence of physical evidence of coercion made it unlikely that motion to suppress the confessions would have been granted holding that where the state commits a discovery violation the standard for harmless error is extraordinarily high a defendant is presumed to be procedurally prejudiced if there is a reasonable probability that the defendants trial preparation or strategy would have been materially different had the violation not occurred and a states discovery violation is harmless only if the appellate court can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense was not procedurally prejudiced