market rate. See, e.g., Glover v. Johnson, 934 F.2d 703, 716-17 (6th Cir.1991) (affirming award where “third-party affidavits submitted by plaintiffs established the prevailing market rate”). However, in the absence of sufficient documentation, the court may rely on its own knowledge of the market. See Norman v. Housing Auth., 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir.1988) (“ ‘The court ... is itself an expert on the question [of reasonableness] and may consider its own knowledge and experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and may form an independent judgment either with or without the aid of witnesses as to value.’ ” (quoting Campbell v. Green, 112 F.2d 143, 144 (5th Cir.1940))); Miele v. New York State Teamsters Conference Pension & Retirement Fund, 831 F.2d 407, 409 (2d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384,
holding that a district judge may rely on his own knowledge of private firm hourly rates in the community in determining the prevailing market rate holding that the fee applicant must produce specific evidence of the prevailing market rates in the relevant community for the type of work for which he seeks an award holding that the magistrate judge did not abuse her discretion in considering the prevailing hourly rates in the southern district of new york when awarding attorneys fees holding that absent other evidence of prevailing market rates the district judge may establish a reasonable rate based on his familiarity with the prevailing rates in the area holding that reasonable fees must be calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community regardless of whether plaintiff is represented by private or nonprofit counsel