did not advise Anderson that the answers he gave at the hearing could be used against him in a prosecution for perjury or false statement as required by Rule 11(b)(1)(A), we conclude such omission did not affect his substantial rights. We also conclude the district court properly classified Anderson as an armed career criminal and its imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2000) was reasonable. See United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 126 S.Ct. 2309, 164 L.Ed.2d 828 (2006). Anderson’s assertion that his prior conviction for failure to stop for a blue light cannot serve as a predicate offense for his armed career criminal classification is mer-itless. See United States v. James, 337 F.3d 387, 391 (4th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). We therefore find Anderson’s sentence was
holding that misdemeanor drunk driving by its very nature involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injuiy to another holding that attempted burglary under florida law qualified as a crime of violence under the armed career criminal act 18 usc  924e2biihereinafter acca because it involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another holding that vehicular manslaughter qualifies as a violent felony under section 924e2bii in that it involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another  holding south carolina conviction for failure to stop for a blue light to be violent felony under acca because prohibited conduct creates potential for confrontation and violence holding that failure to stop for a blue light is a violent felony under armed career criminal statute because it involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another