Supreme Court on issues of federal law are bound to be followed.”). Jurisdictions that apply the same analysis as the Jenkins and Taylor courts regard sentenced prisoners awaiting transfer to a permanent institution as having the same status as pretrial detainees to whom the IAD does not apply. The rationale for this view is that, because it is designed to guard against interruption of prison rehabilitative programs, the IAD should not apply to prisoners in temporary facilities where rehabilitation programs are not available. See, e.g., Crooker v. United States, 814 F.2d 75, 77 (1st Cir.1987) (declining to apply the IAD to a prisoner who had been sentenced but not transferred to the correctional facility to commence service); United States v. Paige, 332 F.Supp.2d 467, 472 (D.R.I.2004) (<HOLDING>); State v. Fay, 763 So.2d 473, 475-76
holding that the 180day statutory limit in the iad is tolled starting from the time that a defendant is not represented by counsel until new counsel is either appointed or retained when the defendant has not waived his right to counsel because during this period a defendant is unable to stand trial in accordance with the iad citation omitted holding that because the stated purpose of the iad is to prevent interference with a prisoners rehabilitative environment there is no reason for the iad to apply to a prisoner until he or she is assigned to the institution where the sentence will be served holding that the language of the statute and the courts duty to apply the statute as written requires the court to interpret the statute to apply when the prisoner is sentenced without regard to the institution where the prisoner is incarcerated after the sentencing holding that iad is not applicable until a state lodges a detainer in the jurisdiction where the prisoner is incarcerated holding the iad was not applicable to a prisoner who had been sentenced but was incarcerated in a local jail or holding facility while awaiting transfer to the assigned penal institution