the States through the Due Process Clause.” Id. It is not self-evident why the McDonald Court did not mention Cooper. Perhaps the omission was an oversight, though we will not conclude lightly that the Supreme Court whiffed on the existence or meaning of its precedent. The more likely explanation is that McDonald was treating Cooper’s statement as superfluous to Cooper’s holding and therefore dictum. Just as Cooper’s statement that the Excessive Fines Clause is enforceable against the States is dictum, so too is McDonald’s statement that the Clause is not. So where does that leave us? Given the lack of clear direction from the Supreme Court, we have a couple of options. One option is to ignore McDonald and follow the le tencourt, 474 Mass. 60, 47 N.E.3d 667, 672 n.7, 681 (Mass. 2016) (<HOLDING>). A second option is to await guidance from the
holding that rluipa violates establishment clause holding that  16913a violates the commerce clause holding that the statute as applied violates the commerce clause holding forfeiture violates federal excessivefines clause based on cooper without mentioning mcdonald holding that lack of notice of charges in disciplinary proceedings violates the due process clause