appointed attorneys unreasonably delayed occurrence of his PCRA hearing and disposition of his PCRA petition, thus violating his right to due process. In so doing, we applied the test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). Pursuant to Barker, the court first considers whether the delay itself is sufficient to trigger further inquiry. Second, the court must evaluate the reason for the delay. Thirdly, the court must ascertain the timeliness of the defendant’s assertion of his right; and lastly, the court must decide if there exists any resulting prejudice to the defendant. Burkett, 5 A.3d at 1276. The 21-month delay herein is clearly sufficient to trigger further inquiry; thus, the first prong of the test is satisfied. Id., 5 A.3d at 1279 (<HOLDING>). With respect to the second prong of Barker,
recognizing that although there were no limits placed on the defense counsels preparation it was surely reasonable for the defense to assume that there was no reason to present argument or evidence directed at whether the death penalty was either appropriate or permissible where the prosecution never argued for the application of the death penalty holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants holding that the penalty is applicable holding that although there is no procedural rule requiring a court to determine a petition within a certain time frame after conducting a hearing in a nondeath penalty case presumptively it should not require more than the 120 days allotted to death penalty cases under parcrimp 909 to render a decision holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty