to have denied Grajales an entrapment instruction, at least in part, because an entrapment defense conflicted with his claims that he knew he was participating in a gov ernment sting operation. This Court has held that the defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on his theory of defense even if the evidence supporting the theory is "weak, insufficient, inconsistent, or of doubtful credibility.” United States v. Opdahl, 930 F.2d 1530, 1535 (11th Cir.1991) (citation omitted). Thus, to the extent that the district court refused to instruct the jury on entrapment merely because such a theory of defense was inconsistent with his claims that he lacked the specific intent to commit the charged crimes, the district court’s refusal was erroneous. Mathews, 485 U.S. at 65, 108 S.Ct. 883 (<HOLDING>). 5 . The district court relied on Anderson
holding that extrinsic offense evidence was admissible to prove intent where the prosecutor stated that she anticipated the defendant would deny his intent to be involved in the charged offense and defense counsel did not even mention that he would refrain from contesting the intent issue holding a defendant may testify that he lacked intent while also arguing that if the jury concludes otherwise then it should consider whether his intent was the product of government inducement holding that the rule 404b evidence admitted to prove intent was clearly relevant because intent was at issue in the trial holding that the relevant intent is not the intent to return ultimately but the intent to return to the united states within a relatively short period holding that the defendant forfeited his confrontation rights where he kept the police from finding his wife so she could not testify but not addressing the intent requirement