and there is no indication that Washington would have been particularly inconvenienced by the mistrial. See Therve, 764 F.3d at 1298 (explaining that “district courts are permitted to declare a mistrial and discharge a jury only where, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated”) (quotation marks omitted). Finally, Washington’s two procedural arguments are without merit. First, the district court did not err by failing to specifically address Washington’s right to have his case decided by a single jury panel, or by failing to expressly find a mistrial to be a manifest necessity until the mistrial already had been declared. See Washington, 434 U.S. at 516-17, 98 S.Ct. at 836 (<HOLDING>). Second, the district court’s failure to
holding that the court should make factual findings from the record evidence as if it were conducting a trial on the record holding that the district court must make findings on the record as to the basis for its conclusion about the amount of actual loss holding that the appeals court may affirm the ruling of the district court on any basis which the record supports holding the trial court is not required to make specific findings of fact on the record for each wham factor if the record contains sufficient evidentiary support for the finding of lack of good cause holding that a district court is not required to make a specific finding of manifest necessity or articulate on the record all the factors which informed the deliberate exercise of its discretion as long as the record as a whole provides sufficient justification for the ruling