of counsel where he moved to reopen approximately 12 years after he reasonably should have suspected his attorney’s fraud. See Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 680. Zheng’s purported prima facie eligibility for adjustment of status did not require the IJ to reopen his removal proceedings in the absence of a timely motion to reopen. See Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir.2002) (“[A] motion to reopen to consider an application for an adjustment of status must be presented to the [agency] no later than ninety days after the issuance of a final decision by the [agency].”). Because Matter of MS-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 349 (BIA 1998) (en banc), does not alter this conclusion, the IJ did not err by failing to consider its applicability to Zheng’s case. See Matter of M-S-22 I. & N. Dec. at 357 (<HOLDING>). PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. ** This
holding that the bia may deny a motion to reopen on the ground that the movant has not established prima facie eligibility for the underlying relief sought holding that the criminal jurisdiction bar applies to the denials of motions to reopen holding that a motion to reopen may be denied for failure to introduce previously unavailable evidence holding petition seeking review of motion to reopen deportation hearing in the absence of new evidence as without merit under  1927 since petitioner was not entitled to reopen except on showing of significant new evidence holding that a motion to reopen seeking only to apply for a form of relief which was unavailable to the movant at the time of the hearing  is subject to the regulatory requirements governing motions to reopen