contamination in th atory judgment that allocates future liability, that party must prove that both the plaintiff and defendant are liable for the response costs and the percentage of that total liability that should be allocated to each party, and a likelihood that the plaintiff will be required to pay more than its share of liability. United States v. Davis, 31 F.Supp.2d 45, 63 (D.R.I.1998), aff'd, 261 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.2001). 35. Section 113(f)(1) does not limit the courts to a particular list of factors to consider in allocating costs between responsible parties. “The statute’s expansive language instead affords a district court broad discretion to balance the equities in the interests of justice.” Bedford Affiliates, 156 F.3d at 429; see also Goodrich Corp., 311 F.3d at 170 (<HOLDING>); Franklin County Convention Facilities Auth.
holding that the apportionment of cercla liability under  113f among various responsible parties is an equitable undertaking within the broad discretion of the district court holding that we lacked jurisdiction to review the veterans courts determination that equitable tolling did not apply in the case before it holding that investigatory costs are considered costs of response under cercla recognizing that the determination is an equitable one holding that the allocation of response costs under  113f is an equitable determination based on the district courts discretionary selection of the appropriate equitable factors in a given case