All that Louisiana had to do was draft one sentence that specifically, challenged EPA’s decision. It did not, and that specific challenge is thus not preserved. The same is true of the STAPPA letter. It specifically addresses STAPPA’s concern that EPA’s proposed standard “does not meet the MACT floor requirements of Section 112(d).” In closing the pertinent section, STAPPA requests that the “EPA recalculate the MACT floor using information about other sources.... ” Like the Louisiana letter, this letter fails to mention beyond-the-floor standards, nor does it cite the specific provision of the CAA which deals with them. In Motor & Equipment Manufacturers, we considered petitioners’ claims waived because they failed to cite the specific provision to the agency below. 142 F.3d at 462 (<HOLDING>). Like the Louisiana letter, the only way the
holding that a mere writ does not serve as notice to a health care provider that a claim might qualify for section 715 coverage for purposes of section 715s requirement of notice to the department see supra note 2 recognizing that the epa can consider the section 404b1 guidelines when acting under section 404c holding that a petitioners claim that epa should comply with caa section 202 does not put the agency on sufficient notice for a specific claim regarding caa section 202b1c holding that if claim is not an allowed secured claim pursuant to section 506a by its terms section 1325a5b is inapplicable holding that plaintiff had failed to state a claim for relief under section 1983