asserted or argued that he did not know the marshal was a federal employee attempting to arrest him or that he acted out of a reasonable belief that he was being attacked by a private citizen. Thus, the district court did not plainly err in failing to issue such an instruction. See Sellers, 926 F.2d at 417. Our conclusion is further supported by the fact that the district court used the pattern jury instruction in the instant case. See Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal) § 2.09. By giving an instruction that tracked the pattern instruction and that was a correct statement of the law, the district court did not plainly err. See United States v. Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325, 354 (5th Cir.2009); United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 686, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 43 L.Ed.2d 541 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Leach finally contends that the district
holding that convictions under  111 require at least some form of assault holding that under  111 the defendants knowledge of the official status of the victim is generally irrelevant holding that the color of law element may be satisfied by the fact that an official gains access to the victim in the course of official duty holding that the race of the prosecutor is irrelevant holding that a defendant who alleges selfdefense can show through the testimony of another witness that the alleged victim had a propensity for violence thereby inferring that the alleged victim was the aggressor a defendants prior knowledge of the victims reputation for violence is irrelevant because the evidence is offered to show the conduct of the victim rather than the defendants state of mind