time to comply in light of the availability of alternative water sources. From the command that a court must consider the time necessary to comply when it does order a “judgment as public health may require,” however, it does not necessarily follow that the court must always exact the type of compliance sought by the agency whenever a violation of the Act has been identified. This construction is supported by the fact that, in spite of the ubiquitousness of the term “compliance” in § 300g-3(b), courts are not expressly limited by the statute to entering judgments that “require compliance,” but instead have been granted the leeway to issue “judgment[s] as protection of public health may require.” Cf. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Southwest Marine, Inc., 236 F.3d 985, 1000 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 2242, 150
holding that with respect to judicialenforcement provision in clean water act limiting courts to enforcementj of existing standards and orders the authority to enforce an existing requirement is more than the authority to declare that the requirement exists and repeat that it must be followed holding that the limitation act does not apply to claims brought under the clean water act holding that it is the legislative authority of the union that must  make an act a crime holding that district courts are without jurisdiction to review preenforcement orders issued under the clean water act holding that clean water acts notice provision is a condition precedent to all claims