rule of evidence” that, if the defendant is entitled to introduce into evidence part of a writing, the state is entitled to introduce the remainder of that writing. 295 Or at 490-91 & n 4. The reasoning of Middleton II disposes of the state’s argument in that regard. In summary, we conclude that the trial court erred when it permitted the state to introduce the above-emphasized parts of Smith’s plea agreement. In Snider, this court held that the improper bolstering that occurred in that case was prejudicial error: “In this case, the testimony of [the witness] provided critical evidence about the alleged conspiracy to kidnap and kill the victim. The error in allowing improper bolstering of this witness’s credibility was prejudicial.” 296 Or at 173. See also Keller, 315 Or at 286 (<HOLDING>). In this case, Smith was the only witness who
holding that a trial witnesss testimony as to the credibility of another witness was prejudicial error holding that under hubbard a trial courts error in excluding bias evidence would be harmless if either 1 despite the exclusion the jury nonetheless had an adequate opportunity to assess the witnesss credibility or 2 the witnesss credibility was not important to the outcome of the trial emphasis added holding that fact that one witnesss testimony is at odds with testimony of another witness does not supply a sufficient basis for allegations of perjury holding that it is improper to ask a witness to comment on the credibility of another witness holding that a witnesss testimony or an exhibit may not explicitly and directly contain an opinion as to a trial witnesss credibility