claim. Likewise, the adversarial relationship between the codefendants was evident from Bacon’s cross-claim against Sandoz, thereby advising the jury of the bias of all Bacon’s and Plaintiff’s witnesses against San-doz. In addition, the likelihood of misleading the jury as to the nature of the agreement and unduly prejudicing Plaintiffs case outweighed any probative value. See ER 403. As a result, we conclude the trial court fairly exercised its discretion in excluding the testimony regarding insurance. II FIFRA Preemption This court has not previously had the opportunity to address the preemptive scope of FIFRA’s labeling provisions directly, nor has the United States Supreme Court. See Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 615, 115 L. Ed. 2d 532, 111 S. Ct. 2476 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Rice v. Dow Chem. Co., 124 Wn.2d 205, 207,
holding that fehba does not completely preempt state law holding that statute allowing states to regulate the sale or use of any federally registered pesticide or device  if and to the extent the regulation does not permit any sale or use prohibited by the federal statute did not preempt local regulation since mere silence  cannot suffice to establish a clear and manifest purpose to preempt local authority holding that erisa does not preempt section 22213b7 holding fifra does not preempt local use regulations holding that erisa does not preempt professional malpractice claims