in her own home. Even in the detention context, moreover, neither factor is dispositive. Id.; accord United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 882 (10th Cir.1994). Nor it is necessary that officers obtain a signed consent form in order to insulate an otherwise knowing and voluntary oral consent against attack. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 231, 93 S.Ct. 2041. The record indicates that Ms. Sugura chose to come to the door wrapped in a blanket. II R. at 70. Although a person’s “vulnerable subjective state” is one factor to consider in determining whether consent was voluntary, Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229, 93 S.Ct. 2041, we are persuaded that Ms. Sugura’s consent was voluntary despite her chosen attire — or lack thereof. Cf. United States v. Dickerson, 975 F.2d 1245, 1249 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). The brief duration of the encounter is also
holding that naked man voluntarily consented to warrantless entry by four police officers who appeared weapons drawn at his front door and physically prevented him from shutting it holding that the defendant had consented where he allowed the police officers into his apartment building and allowed the officers to follow him into his apartment without impediment or objection to the entry of the police holding in an impliedconsent case that a warrantless police entry was unlawful in part because the police did not request entry holding based on steelman and johnson that evidence of the smell of marijuana emanating from a home a car with an open door and the keys in the ignition in front of the home and pry marks on the homes front door was not sufficient to justify a warrantless entry holding that the police officers had probable cause to make a warrantless entry