22, 2011, prior to the Legislature’s revision of section 1700(a)(1), we address the elements of the crime in effect at that time of the act. See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 45-46, 110 S. Ct. 2715, 111 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1990) (the United States Constitution prohibits imposing punishment for an act that was not punishable at the time it was committed). 6 Although Melendez testified that J.J. was not married at the time of the first trial, there was no direct evidence that J.J. was not married at the time of the offense. 7 Although this Court has previously held the first charging phrase of section 505 — “[a]ny person who abuses a child” — to be unconstitutionally vague as applied, section 505 is not vague as applied to Rawlins. LeBlanc v. People, 56 V.I. 536, 544-45 (V.I. 2012) (<HOLDING>). In this case, there can be no doubt that oral
holding that attorney disciplinary rule was unconstitutionally vague as applied holding that the illinois statutory definitions of sexual penetration and sexual conduct cover clearly distinct conduct and that therefore the statute was not unconstitutionally vague holding that the first charging phrase of section 505 is unconstitutionally vague as applied where it was not clear whether touching a minors genitals through her pants constituted sexual conduct as defined by the statute holding factor b is not unconstitutionally vague holding that statute which defined sexual contact as any touching of the anus breast or any part of the genitals of another person with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person was not vague