courts have found that it is inappropriate to dismiss a claim as time— barred because an analysis of inquiry notice is so fact-intensive, in this matter, it is readily apparent from the face of the Complaint that Plaintiffs were on inquiry notice of the alleged fraud no later than April 9, 1999. See NAHC, 306 F.3d at 1326-27 (finding securities fraud claim time-barred on motion to dismiss because plaintiffs had notice of defendant’s overstatement of value of its business, through various SEC filings and general condition of defendant’s kind of business in financial markets, approximately three months pri- or to date plaintiffs alleged they were placed on notice of alleged fraud); see also In re Dreyfus Aggressive Growth Mut. Fund Litig., 2000 WL 10211, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2000) (<HOLDING>). Because the allegations in the Complaint,
recognizing that in certain circumstances inquiry notice may be determined as a matter of law recognizing that postconfirmation related to jurisdiction should be determined with a certain flexibility recognizing that while the lack of an express statute granting sovereign immunity precludes such immunity as a matter of law the entity in question could still be determined to be acting as an agency of the state under the facts and circumstances of a particular relationship holding that in certain circumstances fraud can be prosecuted under the statute holding that it may be decided as a matter of law