father again sought a credit for payments made on behalf of the children. The father’s contention that the trial court should have given him credit for payments he may have made directly to his daughter before that date (i.e., during the four years following her high-school graduation in the spring of 1985) amounts to an impermissible collateral attack upon the trial court’s April 1989 judgment. See Moorer v. Moorer, 487 So.2d 947, 947-48 (Ala.Civ.App.1986) (affirming the denial of a petition for modification of a divorce judgment where the petitioner alleged that periodic alimony awards in the original divorce judgment were actually child support and where the petitioner did not appeal from the original divorce judgment); Patterson v. Patterson, 518 So.2d 739, 742 (Ala.Civ.App.1987) (<HOLDING>). Even with respect to payments the father may
holding that reviewing court may not reverse trial courts judgment on property division unless trial court has clearly abused its discretion or has made inequitable division holding that reconsideration of the correctness of property division was barred on appeal from the judgment enforcing that division holding res judicata applied to improper property division before holding parties were bound by their division agreement holding that a transfer was a demotion where there was testimony that few people transferred voluntarily from jobs in the plaintiffs prior division to jobs in the plaintiffs new division  everybody viewed a transfer from the plaintiffs new division to the prior division as a promotion and the two departments had different seniority systems recognizing division of separate property to be contrary to statute and constitution