orders that the decision of the Secretary be REVERSED and REMANDED to the Secretary with an order to enter an open-ended award for disability benefits to Mr. Jones. Such order does not, of course, impair the right of the Secretary to assess Mr. Jones’ benefits once again should he come to believe that Mr. Jones’ condition is such that there ought be some change in his benefits. 1 . Admittedly, Miranda, and indeed most cases involving the termination of benefits are ones in which the benefits were originally granted in an earlier, separate proceeding, unlike the instant case where the disability benefits were in effect awarded and terminated in the same proceeding. However, nothing of importance turns on this distinction. Cf. Richardson v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 506, 509-10 (6th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); Rivas v. Weinberger, 475 F.2d 255, 258 (5th
holding that even if no previous proceeding had established that the plaintiff was disabled once it is shown at the present proceeding that the plaintiff was disabled at some earlier point in time a presumption still arises that in the absence of proof to the contrary the disability continues holding that because the plaintiff was not disabled for the purposes of the ada this court need not to address the other elements of the prima facie case holding that no ada violation was shown because the disabled were not denied benefits that were otherwise available holding that an employer did not regard the plaintiff as disabled holding that despite the housing authorities challenge to the plaintiffs proof that she is disabled under the federal disability statutes for the purposes of preliminary injunction motion the plaintiff was likely to prevail on showing she was disabled based on 1 the plaintiffs personal declaration concerning the nature of her disabilities 2 the declaration of her social worker and 3 evidence that plaintiff is receiving ssi disability benefits