suggestion. Errata to Mot., Exh A; Alejandro Depo., Vol. I Part 2 at 201:7-21. In fact, contrary to Plaintiffs argument in opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment that Plaintiff requested a leave of absence, see Opp. at 17, Plaintiff conceded at his deposition that Plaintiff never sought a leave of absence in connection with Plaintiffs medical condition in March or April of 2014. Alejandro Depo., Vol. I Part 2 at 201:7-21. Thus, because Plaintiff never requested or sought a leave of absence, even after Defendant — through McCale — suggested that Plaintiff consider taking a leave of absence, Plaintiff never provided notice to Defendant that Plaintiff needed to take a leave of absence under the CFRA or the FMLA. See McDaneld, 109 Cal.App.4th at 706, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 267 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the Court GRANTS summary judgment
holding that the employees reference to his mental condition did not constitute the requisite notice of an intent to invoke fmla leave holding that both the cfra and the fmla require the employee to provide notice to the employer of the employees intent to take leave holding that an employee who did not present evidence that she could have returned to work prior to the expiration of her fmla leave allowance was not entitled to additional leave merely because her employer had not properly provided her with notice that the leave was designated as fmla leave holding that employee who exceeded fmla leave was subject to immediate discharge on the very first workday that he was both absent from work and no longer protected by the fmla holding that the employee must at least provide his employer with enough information for the employer to be put on notice that the fmla is a consideration