to better their working conditions,’ we do not think that Congress could have intended the protection of § 7 to be as narrow as [to exclude protection outside the employer-employee context]. Id. at 566-67, 98 S.Ct. 2505 (quoting NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14, 82 S.Ct. 1099, 8 L.Ed.2d 298 (1962)). Our circuit has explicitly held that “[e]mployees have the right to engage in concerted communications with third parties regarding legitimate employee concerns, such as terms and conditions of employment and grievances.” Compuware Corp. v. NLRB, 134 F.3d 1285, 1291 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1123, 118 S.Ct. 1805, 140 L.Ed.2d 945 (1998). Third parties can include the employer’s clients or customers. Ibid.; see also Handicabs, Inc. v. NLRB, 95 F.3d 681 (8th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). B. Loss of protection due to actual malice
holding that where the employment of the injured employees was the occasion of the injury the injuries arose out of employment holding that a school board policy prohibiting employees from sending their children to private schools interfered with employees constitutional right to control the education of their children holding that a company policy violated the act by prohibiting employees from discussing employment conditions with the companys clients holding that a company exercising substantial control of the terms and conditions of the work of the employees is an employer under the flsa holding employees identified no clear public policy which their termination violated