should have been 1-7 months based on the facts of conviction and her criminal history, which is well-below the 57-months sentence she received. The sentencing range was increased as a result of the district court’s findings, which she argues had a “disproportionate effect on [her] sentence.” But those findings were all based on the conspiracies for which Garth was tried and convicted. Due process does not require a heightened standard of proof of facts that enhance a sentence when they relate to a conspiracy for which the defendant was charged. United States v. Behler, 14 F.3d 1264, 1272 (8th Cir.1994); United States v. Thompson, 51 F.3d 122, 125 (8th Cir.1995); United States v. Pugh, 25 F.3d 669, 676 (8th Cir.1994); accord United States v. Garro, 517 F.3d 1163, 1169 (9th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). The district court’s findings in this case —
holding circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction to accept a guilty plea where defendant was not indicted for the charge to which he pled guilty but signed a sentencing sheet which established defendant was notified of the charge to which he pled guilty holding that in conjunction an information with a narrow charge and an abstract of judgment indicating that a defendant pled guilty to that charge prove the precise elements of the offense to which the defendant pled guilty holding that a district court may not impose a sentencing enhancement based on conduct of which the jury acquitted the defendant holding that heightened evidentiary standard of proof is not required where the sentencing enhancement is based entirely on the extent of the conspiracy to which the defendant pled guilty holding that a defendant must demonstrate that he would not have pled guilty but for the error