court then stated that “[e]ach of these purely factual questions pertains to the conduct of the employee and the conduct and motivation of the employer.” Thus, although the employer, in offering a defense, might argue that some clause of the contract provides a basis for discharge, the court need only determine whether the proffered noninvidious reason was in fact the basis for the discharge, not whether the proffered reason for the discharge was a reason declared by some provision of the contract to be a basis for discharge under the CBA. See Baldracchi v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Div., 814 F.2d 102, 105 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2819, 100 L.Ed.2d 920 (1988). See also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51-52, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 1021, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, in deciding Karetniko-va’s MCRA
holding that collective bargaining agreements cannot compel the arbitration of statutory rights holding that petitioners remedy under title vii of the civil rights act was in addition to remedies available under the collective bargaining agreement in force between his employer and his union holding that employees claim alleging discharge in violation of collective bargaining agreement precluded subsequent action under title vii for the same discharge holding that antidiscrimination rights under title vii cannot be waived by a collective bargaining agreement holding that an employee does not forfeit his title vii right of action if he first seeks relief under an arbitration clause in his collective bargaining agreement