a requirement, Plaintiffs claim under Section 101(a)(1) must fail as a matter of law. In any event, there is no indication that Plaintiff was discriminated against in his ability to participate in the meeting. As the Supreme Court has stated, Section 101(a)(1) is “a command that members and classes of members shall not be discriminated against in their right to nominate and vote.” Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 139, 85 S.Ct. 292, 13 L.Ed.2d 190 (1964). Therefore, “[a] cause of action by a union member cannot be sustained under 101(a)(1) without some claim of discrimination .... ” Conery v. Niccollai, Jr., 2002 U.S.App. LEXIS 6426, at *4 (3d Cir. Apr. 4, 1992) (citing Calhoon, 379 U.S. at 138-39, 85 S.Ct. 292). See Keck v. Employees Indep. Ass’n, 387 F.Supp. 241, 247 (E.D.Pa.1974) (<HOLDING>). ■ Here, all union members were advised of,
holding union members state law claims for defamation against union preempted holding that a direct action could not be maintained because the declaration does not allege the violation of any right personal to plaintiff but only violation of rights common to all the stockholders holding that the plaintiffs acted on behalf of all union members and reimbursing the attorneys fees from the union treasury such that all union members in effect equally contributed to the costs of litigation holding that defendant is entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff failed to allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right holding no violation of section 101 in spite of violation of union bylaws because plaintiffs do not allege that members or classes have been discriminated against in their right to vote