determination that plaintiff’s motion to vacate the judgment order was not timely is in error. We agree with the plaintiff’s contention that a motion to vacate is timely if filed with the clerk of the court within 30 days of the judgment order although motioned for hearing after the 30-day period has expired. Under section 68.3 of the Civil Practice Act a motion to vacate is timely if filed within 30 days after the entry of the judgment. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110, par. 68.3.) This provision does not require that the motion be called for hearing within the 30 day period. See City of Chicago v. Exchange National Bank (1971), 133 Ill. App. 2d 370, 273 N.E.2d 484, aff’d, 51 Ill. 2d 543, 283 N.E.2d 878; cf. Kollath v. Chicago Title & Trust Co. (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 8, 338 N.E.2d 188 (<HOLDING>). For the reasons stated we reverse the
holding that a motion for a preliminary injunction and a hearing on that motion were insufficient to prevent the plaintiff from dismissing by notice holding that because the finality of judgment is effectively postponed by the timely filing of a motion under rule 59 the deadline for filing a motion for attorneys fees is tolled until the postjudgment motion is resolved holding that notice of judgment was insufficient holding that the filing of notice without motion is insufficient holding that the filing of an opening brief within the time period for filing a notice of appeal could constitute notice of appeal