with Hall’s second workers’ compensation claim cannot, in and of itself, support Hall’s retaliation claim. The Court in Burlington Northern emphasized that “it is important to separate significant from trivial harms” because “[t]he anti-retaliation provision protects an individual not from all retaliation, but from retaliation that produces an injury or harm.” 548 U.S. at 67-68. One could certainly argue that the surreptitious videotaping of an employee, depending on its intrusiveness, could serve as supporting evidence of a retaliation claim. Thus, we do not necessarily disagree with Hall’s contention that video surveillance can be submitted as evidence of a larger pattern of retaliation. But cf. Hoffman-Dombrowski v. Arlington Int’l Racecourse, Inc., 254 F.3d 644, 654 (7th Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>); Pierce v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, Inst.
holding that a change in work schedule and request that an employee perform two additional tasks did not rise to the level of an adverse employment action recognizing retaliation involving promotion as adverse employment actions under the first amendment holding that written warnings that impacted the probability an employee would be terminated are adverse employment actions holding that change of schedule video surveillance and disciplinary warnings were not material adverse actions sufficient to sustain retaliation claim holding that defendants decision to change the office schedule without allowing plaintiff leave to alter his personal schedule did not constitute an adverse action although plaintiff alleged that because of the schedule revisions he was forced to come in two hours early for his shift a mere inconvenience is not sufficiently adverse to sustain a prima facie case