and that the district court, therefore, should have put off its ultimate decision once the district court had determined that preliminary relief was not warranted, and granted Cromwell’s request for an opportunity to pursue its discovery request. The argument, however, is hard to square with Cromwell’s contention, prior to the preliminary injunction hearing, that the question was urgent and could not be deferred. Thus, when Cromwell was seeking a prompt hearing, it argued that Regulation’s Rule 8210 demands would cause irreparable harm — there and then — by forcing individual appellants to choose between foregoing their Fifth Amendment privilege (and risking criminal prosecution) or exposing themselves to NASD sanctions. See Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 693 (2d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). The irreparable harm was said to arise from
recognizing that irreparable harm is the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction holding that a movant for a preliminary injunction must first demonstrate that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the requested relief holding that a plaintiff must demonstrate that in the absence of an injunction irreparable injury is likely and not merely a possibility holding that movant must demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction holding that the movant had to establish both of the first two factors ie likelihood of success and irreparable harm to receive a preliminary injunction