falls within section 40102(a)(25)’s definition of “interstate air transportation” and, thus, within section 40116(b)’s preemptive reach. As we did in United Parcel Service, we reject such an unbridled reading of the statute. Further, Lynden’s position is not bolstered by Lynden’s reliance on many of the same cases considered and distinguished in United Parcel Service. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 289 F.2d 770 (D.C.Cir.1961) (allowing freight forwarder to provide trucking service, as opposed to air service, based primarily on language specific to the Certificate issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board); Federal Express Corp. v. California Public Utilities Comm’n, 936 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 979, 112 S.Ct. 2956, 119 L.Ed.2d 578 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Airborne Freight Corp. v. Department of
recognizing that erisas preemption regime is driven by the overpowering federal policy in favor of federal regulation holding that the preemption provision of the act does not apply to a fraud prosecution because there is no conflict with state insurance regulation holding that a party did not waive its preemption defense where its answer did not specifically mention preemption but contained a broader defense that was capable of encompassing preemption holding that 49 usc  1305  a broader preemption statute with very different language  preempted state regulation of federal express including its trucking services holding provisions in ariz rev stat  133010 were not preempted because they were sufficiently compatible with the federal statute or  the statute as a whole would ensure sufficient compliance with the federal standards and further holding any divergent provisions were ministerial or reporting requirements which would not lead to preemption even if different than the federal law