victim’s] use [of drugs distributed by the defendant] is a but-for cause of the death or injury.” Burrage, 571 U.S. at -, 134 S.Ct. at 892. To the extent Ragland argues his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to challenge then-controlling circuit precedent regarding the enhanced penalty provision of § 841(b)(1)(C), we deny the motion. See Burrage, 571 U.S. at-,-, 134 S.Ct. at 886, 892 (abrogating United States v. Monnier, 412 F.3d 859, 862 (8th Cir.2005), and United States v. McIntosh, 236 F.3d 968, 972-73 (8th Cir.2001)). Our cases make clear that counsel’s failure “to anticipate a change in the law” “does not constitute ineffective assistance.” Parker v. Bowersox, 188 F.3d 923, 929 (8th Cir.1999); accord Brown v. United States, 311 F.3d 875, 878 (8th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Ragland has not “made a substantial
holding that the failure to raise a futile issue does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record holding that counsels decision not to argue the absurd or burden the jury with the obvious did not amount to ineffective assistance holding counsels decision not to raise an issue unsupported by thenexisting precedent did not constitute ineffective assistance holding that counsels failure to impeach a witness by showing bias was ineffective assistance