the prosecution’s case meets with the jury’s “moral[ ] disap-prov[al].” Since the emergence of the general verdict in criminal eases and the famous opinion in Bushell’s Case, 124 Eng.Rep. 1006 (C.P.1670), freeing a member of the jury arrested for voting to acquit William Penn against the weight of the evidence, nullifying jurors have been protected from being called to account for their verdicts. Moreover, and in addition to the courts’ duty to safeguard the secrecy of the jury deliberation room (discussed in greater detail below), the several rules protecting the unassailability of jury verdicts of acquittal — even where these verdicts are inconsistent with other verdicts rendered by the same jury in the same case, United States v. Carbone, 378 F.2d 420, 423 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 914, 88 S.Ct. 242, 19
holding that the rule of lenity applies to sentencing guidelines holding that in order to preserve the issue a party must object to inconsistent verdicts prior to judgment being entered recognizing a distinction between the power of a federal court to hear statelaw claims and the discretionary exercise of that power recognizing that the rule of lenity applies only after courts exhaust all other evidence of congressional meaning recognizing link between upholding inconsistent verdicts and protecting juries power of lenity