401; Coll, supra, 29 N.J. at 174-75, 148 A.2d 481. The trial court should have allowed Dr. Glover to testify before the jury regarding her estimate of the costs that would occur if Mrs. Campo were to suffer a recurrence of cancer. -III- The error, however, was harmless. Under Rule 2:10-2, a reviewing court should reverse only if a trial error is clearly capable of producing an unjust result. The trial court permitted Dr. Glover to testify regarding Mrs. Campo’s increased risk of harm. Dr. Glover testified that because of Dr. Tama’s alleged failure to diagnose Mrs. Campo’s cancer in 1985, Mrs. Campo was more likely than not to suffer a recurrence. Not allowed was Dr. Glover’s offer to testify regarding the monetary damages that Mrs. Campo would incur if she shoul d 66 (App.Div.1955) (<HOLDING>). The trial court, however, squarely instructed
holding that the cause and prejudice standard applies on collateral review when an element of an offense has been decided by a court rather than a jury and rejecting the contention that the failure to submit an element to the jury is necessarily prejudicial merely because it requires speculation about what a hypothetical jury could have decided had it been allowed to do so holding that erroneous admission of improper and prejudicial evidence did not require reversal because the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty against the defendant even without the prejudicial testimony holding that a trial witnesss testimony as to the credibility of another witness was prejudicial error holding that it may not holding that it is prejudicial to indicate to the jury that the plaintiff has or may have another remedy  